United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Jeffrey HARGETT, Kim A. Overlin, Jimmie Smith, and Loren K. Walker, individually, and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Linda R. BAKER, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Mary Bass, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, Facility Director of
the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, Raymond Woods, Clinical Director, and Travis Hinze, Associate Clinical
Director, Defendants. No. 02 C 1456.
July 1, 2002.
Prisoners detained in sexually violent persons unit brought action against Illinois, alleging that punitive conditions and inadequacies of treatment program deprived them of realistic opportunity to progress through treatment program and gain their release. Prisoners moved for certification of class consisting of all persons who had been, were, or would be committed under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The District Court, Leinenweber, J., held that: (1) prisoners were members of a definite class, and thus had standing to bring class action, and (2) proposed class satisfied numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements for certification.
Motion granted.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LEINENWEBER, J. *1 Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A. Overlin, Jimmie Smith, and Loren K. Walker brought this action individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated against Defendants Linda R. Baker, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Mary Bass, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, Raymond Woods, Clinical Director, and Travis Hinze, Associate Clinical Director. Plaintiffs assert a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Before the

Court is Plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 23.
BACKGROUND
Concerned with alarmingly high recidivism rates among sex offenders, states began in the 1990's to enact civil commitment regimes for the detention and treatment of those found to be “sexual predators” or “sexually dangerous.” Illinois enacted its version, the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, in 1997. See725 ILCS 207/1et seq. Under Illinois' civil commitment program, a “sexually violent person” (“SVP”) is defined as a “person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.”725 ILCS 207/5(f). Once found to qualify as an SVP under the Act, the person is committed to the custody of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services (“DHS”) at its Joliet Correctional Center. See725 ILCS 207/40. SVP's confined under the Act remain in DHS custody until such time as “the person is no longer sexually violent.”725 ILCS 207/40(a). Plaintiffs bring this class action to challenge what they characterize as the impermissibly punitive conditions of their confinement and the constitutionally inadequate treatment they receive as detainees in the Sexually Violent Persons Unit in Joliet. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the punitive conditions and inadequacies of the treatment program work together to deprive SVP's at the Joliet facility of a realistic opportunity to progress through the treatment program and gain their release. Plaintiffs' class action complaint seeks, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the conditions of confinement and mental health treatment of the SVP's violates the Fourteenth Amendment and a permanent injunction against the Defendants compelling them to implement a plan correcting the alleged constitutional deficiencies in the current program.
DISCUSSION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth a number of prerequisites that must be present before a

court may approve a class. First, the Plaintiffs must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a), which include numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation. Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir.1993). Furthermore, at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b) must also be satisfied. In making this determination, the Court does not consider the merits of the case but instead, as with a motion to dismiss, takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). The Plaintiffs shoulder the burden of demonstrating that a class exists, and district courts have broad discretion in ruling on a plaintiff's request. Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Corp., 107 F.3d 466, 474 (7th Cir.1997).
*2 In addition to the four express requirements of Rule 23, there are two implied requirements: first, an identifiable class must exist (the “definiteness” requirement) and second, the named representatives must be members of the class. Gomez v. Illinois St. Bd. of Educ., 117 F.R.D. 394, 397 (N.D.Ill.1987). An identifiable and definite class exists if “its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.” National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351 (N.D.Ill.1997), citing Gomez, 117 F.R.D. at 397. The parties should not have to delve into the merits of the case to determine membership in the class. Toney v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc., No. 98 C 0693, 1999 WL 199249, *5 (N.D.Ill. Mar.31, 1999). If a class is amorphous or indefinite, however, the court has broad discretion to limit or redefine the class to bring it within Rule 23. See Gomez, 117 F.R.D. at 397 n. 2;7B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1760, at 128-29 (2d Ed.1986).
Plaintiffs seek certification of a class consisting of “all persons who have been, are or will be committed under the [Illinois] Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1et seq. and placed in the facility in Joliet, Illinois operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services.”This class definition relies on sufficiently objective and readily identifiable criteria to meet the definiteness requirement. See, e.g., Robert E. v. Lane, 530 F.Supp. 930, 944 (N.D.Ill.1980) (noting that a civil rights action challenging the constitutional adequacy of mental health treatment offered to inmates is a

“prototypical candidate” for class certification).
[1] While not commenting on the definiteness of the proposed class, Defendants do contend that named Plaintiffs Overlin, Hargett and Smith are not members of the class and lack standing to challenge the SVP treatment program because they were not enrolled in “Core treatment” at the time the class action complaint was filed. Core treatment is an intensive individualized therapy program consisting of cognitive restructuring, relapse prevention and journal-keeping that is intended to move the SVP closer to a determination that they are no longer “sexually dangerous.” The fact that Overlin, Hargett and Smith are not or were not in the Core treatment phase of the SVP program when the complaint was filed does not deprive them of standing. To have standing to sue as a class representative, one must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he represents.” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir.1998), citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974). Here, the essential allegation of the complaint is that all SVP's housed in the DHS Joliet facility are subjected to a constitutionally inadequate treatment program that deprives them of any realistic chance to improve and secure their release. The complaint attacks the program in its entirety, not just the Core treatment component. As SVP's detained at the Joliet facility, Hargett, Overlin, Smith and Walker all possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class and are properly before the court as members of the proposed class with standing to sue. The named Plaintiffs are members of a definite class and the Court will proceed to the express requirements for maintaining a class action.
Numerosity
*3 [2] The first Rule 23(a) requirement is numerosity, i.e., that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The proposed class in this case consists of more than 150 individuals. Based on this Court's experience with the management of numerous other cases related to the one at bar, there can be no doubt as to the impracticability of joinder in this case.
Commonality

Second, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the class representatives' claims possess “questions of law or fact common to the class.”The common questions, however, need not be identical, and a “common nucleus of operative fact is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement.” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir.1992). A common nucleus of operative fact is typically found where “defendants have engaged in standardized conduct towards members of the proposed class.” Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.1998). Factual variations among class members' grievances do not defeat a class action. Id.
[3] Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to meet the commonality requirement because the propriety of injunctive or declaratory relief turns on the individual circumstances of each class member's course of treatment, requiring individualized determinations of liability. Whatever the factual variations among the individual SVP's mental health needs may be, the Plaintiffs' attack on the SVP treatment program is premised on a broad allegation that the Defendants engaged in standardized conduct toward the members of the proposed class that deprives all its members of a meaningful opportunity to secure their release. See John v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480, 483 (N.D.Ill.1992) (stating that where the defendant engages in a single course of conduct that results in injury to the class as a whole, a common core of operative facts is usually present).See alsoFED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(2), Advisory Comm. Notes (stating that action or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning of subdivision (b)(2) even if it has taken actual effect as to only one or a few members of the class, provided it is based on grounds which have general application to the class as a whole). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established commonality.
Typicality
The third Rule 23(a) requirement, typicality, is met “[w]hen it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented.” Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 381 (N.D.Ill.1980). Whether the Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the class members they represent is closely related to the commonality inquiry. Keele, 149 F.3d at 595. A

“plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.”Id., citing De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir.1983) (citations and internal quotation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that the typicality requirement directs the “district court to focus on whether the named representatives' claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232.
*4 [4] Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' alleged mistreatment, as it relates to each class member, is unique and that the claims of each individual class member require the application of separate defenses and determinations of liability. The Court disagrees. The named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class, while all subjected individually to varying treatment, are united in their allegation that they all receive constitutionally inadequate treatment flowing from the same systematic deficiencies in Defendants' program. Furthermore, even though some of the facts underlying each person's claims may vary, they do not create any conflicts between the members of the proposed class. See Cook, 151 F.R.D. at 378. The named representatives' claims share the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large and Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality requirement.
Adequacy
[5] To satisfy the adequacy requirement, the class representatives must demonstrate that: (1) they do not have any antagonistic or conflicting claims with other members of the class; (2) they have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure vigorous advocacy; and (3) their counsel is competent, qualified, experienced, and able to vigorously conduct the litigation. Sebo v.. Rubenstein, M.D., 188 F.R.D. 310, 316 (N.D.Ill.1999). Here, Defendants do not challenge certification of the class on adequacy grounds. It appears to the Court that the class representatives possess sufficient interest in the outcome of the case and that they do not have any antagonistic or conflicting claims with other members of the class. The Court notes that Plaintiffs' counsel has extensive experience in this type of institutional litigation and finds Plaintiffs' counsel to

be well-qualified to litigate this action on behalf of the class.
Rule 23(b)
Having met the requirements of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must also meet at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs' § 1983 action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy what they perceive as systematic constitutional deficiencies in the treatment program offered to SVP's at the Joliet facility. Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class actions when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”Defendants make no arguments in response, and as already noted above, an inmate civil rights action challenging the constitutionality of their treatment is a “prototypical candidate” for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
N.D.Ill.,2002. Hargett v. Baker Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2002 WL 1433729 (N.D.Ill.)
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Jeffrey HARGETT, Kim A. Overlin, Jimmie Smith, and Loren K. Walker, Individually, and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Linda R. BAKER, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Mary Bass, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, Facility Director of
the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, Raymond Woods, Clinical Director, and Travis Hinze, Associate Clinical
Director, Defendants. No. 02 C 1456.
July 26, 2002.
Detainees held pursuant to Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act brought a class action under § 1983 against the Illinois Department of Human Services' Secretary and Head Facility Administrator, and the Facility Director, Clinical Director, and Associate Clinical Director of the sexually violent persons unit at a correctional center, challenging what they claimed to be impermissibly punitive conditions of their confinement and constitutionally inadequate treatment. On a defense motion to dismiss, the District Court, Harry D. Leinenweber, J., held that: (1) detainees properly brought suit against officials, rather than against the Department itself; (2) detainees stated a claim under section 1983 for inadequate mental health treatment; and (3) detainees stated a claim under § 1983 for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Motion denied.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LEINENWEBER, J. *1 Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A. Overlin, Jimmie Smith, and Loren K. Walker brought this action individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated against Defendants Linda R. Baker, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Mary Bass, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, Raymond Woods, Clinical Director, and Travis

Hinze, Associate Clinical Director. Plaintiffs assert a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
Concerned with alarmingly high recidivism rates among sex offenders, states began in the 1990's to enact civil commitment regimes for the detention and treatment of those found to be “sexual predators” or “sexually dangerous.” Illinois revisited its existing regime for civil commitment of the “sexually dangerous” by enacting the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act in 1997. See725 ILCS 207/1et seq. Under Illinois' civil commitment program, a “sexually violent person” (“SVP”) is defined as a “person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.”725 ILCS 207/5(f). Once found to qualify as an SVP under the Act, the person is committed to the custody of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services (the “DHS”) at its Joliet Correctional Center. See725 ILCS 207/40. SVPs confined under the Act remain in DHS custody until such time as “the person is no longer sexually violent.”725 ILCS 207/40(a).
Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint challenging what they characterize as the impermissibly punitive conditions of their confinement and the constitutionally inadequate treatment they receive as detainees in the Sexually Violent Persons Unit in Joliet. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the punitive conditions and inadequacies of the treatment program work together to deprive SVPs at the Joliet facility of a realistic opportunity to progress through the treatment program and gain their release. Plaintiffs' class action complaint seeks, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the conditions of confinement and mental health treatment of the SVPs violate rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also request a permanent injunction against Defendants compelling

them to implement a plan correcting the alleged constitutional deficiencies in the current program. Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
DISCUSSION
Standard
*2 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must construe all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A motion to dismiss will not be granted unless it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Motions to dismiss test whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236.
Illinois Department of Human Services as Defendant
[1] Citing to the large body of cases dealing with municipal liability in § 1983 claims, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' real action lies against the Department of Human Services and that the official capacity claims against them should be dismissed as redundant. Defendants ask the Court to disregard the well-established principle that states and state agencies enjoy immunity from suit in federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment. See Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 525 U.S. ---- (2002) (reexamining the boundaries of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). In addition to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, neither a state nor a state agency is viewed as a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and are therefore not amenable to suit. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Despite the broad immunity from suit enjoyed by states and state agencies, plaintiffs may file actions for prospective relief against state officials in federal court when they allege that enforcement of state law violates rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Plaintiffs were correct in naming the officials

in question, rather than the Department of Human Services, as the proper defendants in this case. See Lett v. Magnant, 965 F.2d 251, 256 (7th Cir.1992).
§ 1983 Inadequate Mental Health Treatment
[2] Defendants assert that there is no set of facts Plaintiffs could produce to substantiate their claim that the treatment program provided to SVPs is constitutionally inadequate. As an initial matter, Defendants contend that substantive due process does not require states to provide mental health treatment to civilly detained, sexually violent persons. Contrary to Defendants' suggestion, the issue of whether or not involuntarily civilly committed SVPs possess a substantive due process right to meaningful mental health treatment was not definitively resolved by Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). Indeed, the language used in Hendricks suggests divergent resolutions of this question. Compare Id. at 366 (stating that, even if the primary objective of the Kansas Act is to continue incarceration and not to provide treatment, “this does not rule out that an ancillary purpose of the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require us to conclude that the Act is punitive”), with Id. at 368 n. 4 (citing Allen v. Illinois, for the proposition that “the State serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric care and treatment.” 478 U.S. 364, 373, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986)). The Illinois SVP Act is, however, distinguishable from the Kansas Act in one important aspect. As noted in Hendricks, the Kansas Supreme Court found that, in enacting the Kansas SVP Act, “the clear and overriding concern of the legislature [was] to continue the segregation of sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment with a goal of reintegrating them into society [was] incidental, at best.” 521 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In contrast, the primary purpose of the Illinois SVP Act is to give the individual an opportunity to receive treatment for his propensity to commit sexual offenses. See People v. Trainor, 196 Ill.2d 318, 256 Ill.Dec. 813, 752 N.E.2d 1055, 105859 (Ill.2001) (stating that, in creating and amending the Act, the primary objective of the Illinois legislature was to provide for individual treatment of SVPs “designed to effect recovery”). When, as in Illinois, treatment is used as a primary justification

for civil confinement, fundamental fairness requires that the involuntarily civilly committed person receive such individual treatment as will provide him a meaningful chance to improve and win his eventual release. See, e.g., Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir.2002); D.W. v. Rogers, 113 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (11th Cir.1997); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 92-95 (3d Cir.1986).
*3 The Court recognizes that, under the professional judgment standard set forth in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), states enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens and that the decisions of the professional decision maker overseeing a state institution are presumptively valid. Liability may be imposed only when treatment decisions represent a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.”Id. While Youngberg certainly sets a high bar for Plaintiffs, the question of whether professional judgment has in fact been exercised by the administrators of the Joliet facility cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Recent cases such as McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. ---(2002) may have made it extremely difficult for Plaintiffs to advance arguments regarding certain aspects of their treatment, but it is still possible that Plaintiffs could establish that Defendants failed to exercise professional judgment in other aspects of the SVP treatment program.
§ 1983 Conditions of Confinement
[3] Defendants repeatedly and vigorously remind the Court that cases such as Youngberg and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) require federal courts to afford “appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (citations omitted). Fair enough. Appropriate deference is not, however, unbounded deference, which is precisely what Defendants seem to be seeking when they contend that Plaintiffs' challenge to the conditions of their confinement fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. While Youngberg and Sandin require substantial deference to the judgment of officials managing state institutions, these and other cases also recognize that this deference is not absolute.
For civil commitment of SVPs to operate within the

bounds of the Constitution, a purpose of that confinement, even if it is only an ancillary purpose, must be treatment as opposed to continuing punishment for past crimes. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366-68, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). Moreover, “[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. Reviewing a challenge to an earlier version of Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff in that case had not demonstrated that sexually dangerous persons in Illinois were confined under impermissibly punitive conditions. The Court also found that the conditions imposed on Illinois' SVPs at that time bore a reasonable relationship to the State's interest in treatment. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). However, the Court noted that “had petitioner shown, for example, that the confinement of such persons imposes on them a regimen which is essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need for psychiatric care, this might well be a different case.”Id. This may or may not be such a case. The bar which Plaintiffs must eventually clear to survive summary judgment on the conditions of confinement aspect of their claim is admittedly high, but it is not so insurmountable as to require the Court to hold that no set of facts, if proven, would entitle them to relief. Regardless of whether they will ultimately prevail on the merits, Plaintiffs' complaint challenging their treatment and the conditions of their confinement properly states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
*4 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
N.D.Ill.,2002. Hargett v. Baker Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2002 WL 1732911 (N.D.Ill.)
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Jeffery HARGETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Carol ADAMS, et al., Defendants. No. 02 C 1456.
Jan. 14, 2005.
Everett Joseph Cygal, Michael Patrick Mullins, Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Benjamin S. Wolf, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs. Steven M. Puiszis, James Constantine Vlahakis, Andrew Michael Ramage, J. William Roberts, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LEINENWEBER, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 The Plaintiffs, individuals who have been civilly committed under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1et seq. (the “SVP Act”), brought this suit on behalf of themselves and a class of all other similarly situated individuals challenging the conditions of confinement and quality of treatment at the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the “TDF”). The Defendants are the Director of the Illinois Department of Human Services and various officials at the TDF.
Under the SVP Act, an individual who has been convicted (or found not guilty by reason of insanity) of a sexually violent offense may be detained indefinitely at the TDF if he is found to suffer from a “mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that [he] will engage in acts of sexual violence.”725 ILCS 207/40(a). The SVP Act defines a mental disorder as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.”725 ILCS 207/5(b). The civil commitment lasts until the individual “is no longer sexually violent.” 725 ILCS 207/40(a).
Plaintiffs raise a series of substantive due process constitutional claims that fall under two broad

categories: (1) the conditions of confinement are impermissibly restrictive, and (2) the sex offender treatment provided is inadequate. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that the physical structure and layout of the TDF creates a prison-like environment that is counter-therapeutic and inappropriate for the treatment-based nature of Plaintiffs' civil confinement. In addition, Plaintiffs claim that the TDF staff imposes excessive restrictions on personal movement, conducts inappropriate room and personal searches, and improperly uses seclusion as a vehicle for punishment, in violation of accepted professional standards.
Plaintiffs also contend that the treatment provided at the TDF is constitutionally inadequate. They claim that the TDF violates accepted professional standards pertaining to informed consent and access to treatment. Specifically, Plaintiffs are required to sign a consent form that purportedly contains false and misleading statements, as well as a waiver of confidentiality that is excessively broad. Plaintiffs also complain of the TDF's practice of disclosing patient records to the Illinois Attorney General. In addition, Plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of the treatment provided at the TDF, claiming that it relies on ineffective techniques, such as arousal reconditioning and polygraph use, deprives patients of proven efficacious medications, and lacks sufficiently clear goals and requirements for successful completion of treatment. Indeed, Plaintiffs note that in the five-year history of the program, only a handful of patients have been released. Although Plaintiffs challenge the conditions and treatment at the TDF, they do not mount a facial challenge of the SVP Act itself.
*2 Defendants initially respond that many of Plaintiffs' claims are moot in light of recent changes in policies and practices. They also contend that housing Plaintiffs in a facility that has similarities to a correctional setting does not transform the TDF's program into an essentially punitive program. In addition, Defendants argue that the security measures are reasonable and necessary precautions related to legitimate security needs for both patients and staff. Defendants also contend that the seclusion standards established by psychiatric organizations are not applicable because the patient population at the TDF is different in kind from the type found at psychiatric

hospitals, and, moreover, the SVP Act specifically exempts the TDF from complying with the seclusion provisions in the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.
With regard to Plaintiffs' treatment-related claims, Defendants argue, among other things, that Plaintiffs merely point to areas of professional disagreement, which cannot amount to constitutional violations. Specifically, Defendants contend that arousal reconditioning and polygraph use are wellestablished techniques utilized in the treatment of sex offenders. Defendants also note that the treatment program has established goals for progress, and that several patients have been released, even without completing all phases of the treatment.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Claims Pertaining to Conditions of Confinement
The TDF's Physical Structure and Layout
1. The physical structure of the TDF is more-akin to a high-security, prison-like facility, rather than a lowsecurity facility or traditional mental health treatment facility. Plaintiffs' correctional facilities expert, Steve Martin, presented credible testimony showing certain functional similarities between the TDF and highsecurity facilities, including numerous guard and observation posts, a central security system, continually-locked doors, small prison-like rooms, invasive searches and significant restrictions on movement.
2. Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Metzner presented credible testimony showing that the TDF's physical layout was not conducive to a positive therapeutic milieu. Dr. Metzner, however, also conceded that effective psychotherapy can-and often does occur-in correctional environments that are significantly more restrictive and prison-like than the one at the TDF. Similarly, Dr. Berlin, Plaintiffs' expert, conceded that effective psychotherapy can occur within a prison setting.
3. Thus, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that although the physical structure of the TDF does not facilitate a positive therapeutic environment, it is not, by itself, a significant

impediment to the delivery of effective treatment. As indicated below, other elements of the treatment program overcome the counter-therapeutic features of the TDF's physical structure.
Restrictions on Movement
4. The restrictions on movement at the TDF are more consistent with a high-security correctional facility than a minimum or medium-security prison. Many of the practices pertaining to restrictions on movement and other restrictive practices were imported wholesale from practices established through the Department of Corrections, without full consideration of the appropriateness of all such practices in light of the patient population at the TDF. With the exception of those patients on advanced (AGE) status, patients' room doors are routinely locked throughout the day and night, and patient must request entry and exit to their room. When outside of their rooms, most patients are routinely escorted by security personnel, and must pass through numerous locked doors before reaching the secure yard.
*3 5. A Minnesota sex offender program operating under a comparable statutory scheme for civilly detaining and treating violent sex offenders provided a significantly less-restrictive environment than the TDF, but did not have significantly greater assaultive behavior from its patients. For instance, patients in the Minnesota program had keys to their rooms and could move around the facility with greater freedom than those at the TDF. However, as Dr. Schlank testified, the Minnesota program found that its level of freedoms and privileges created an unintended counter-therapeutic effect and treatment disincentives because patients began to prefer a continued stay at the facility, as opposed to working diligently in treatment to secure release.
6. Although the large majority of TDF patients are not assaultive toward staff or other patients, Defendants presented unrebutted evidence of numerous assaults on staff and between patients that warrant certain heightened restrictions on movement. In addition, Defendants showed that there are also legitimate concerns pertaining to the security of personal property within rooms that relate to rooms being locked, at least with respect to the locking of rooms after a patient has exited the room. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence shows that although

the overall restrictions on movement at the TDF may be greater than those absolutely necessary in light of the patient population at the TDF, there are nonetheless legitimate operational and security concerns behind many of these restrictions.
Room and Personal Searches
7. Patients' rooms are routinely searched for contraband. Although this feature is more akin to a prison environment, as opposed to a forensic mental hospital or other treatment facility, Defendants presented evidence that numerous items, including a makeshift knife (“shank”) and devices to conceal contraband, have been uncovered as a result of these searches. Thus, there are legitimate institutional security concerns underlying the room searches.
8. The TDF's prior policy was to strip search every patient before and after every visit, including visits with attorneys. Under current policy, strip searches have been replaced with a scanning device (the “Rapiscan”) that does not require the patient to unclothe. There was credible testimony that the TDF intended to use the Rapiscan (or a similar device) as a permanent replacement for automatic strip searches. The device cost more than $115,000 and is under a one-year maintenance program. Defendants testified that they will extend the maintenance contract for four years. In addition, there was credible testimony that the TDF staff disliked performing the strip searches. If the Rapiscan device fails mechanically, however, Defendants will revert to routine strip searches until the device is fixed.
9. Taken together, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the TDF intends to use the Rapiscan as a permanent replacement for automatic strip searches on all patients.
Use of the “Black Box”
*4 10. The Black Box is a security instrument that covers the linking chain and keyhole on handcuffs, and is intended to make it more difficult for a person to remove handcuffs. The TDF began using the Black Box after a successful escape by two patients during transport to court. Under prior policy, the TDF used the Black Box on all patients that were being transported off-site. Under current policy, the TDF will now use individualized risk assessments to

determine the necessity of the black box.
11. The Court finds that there are legitimate security concerns underlying the past and present use of the Black Box.
Use of Special Management Status (“SMS”)
12. Special or Secure Management Status (“SMS”) refers to the status and set of conditions that a patient may be placed under when he is determined to be a danger to himself or others. The most common reason a patient is placed on SMS is assaultive or threatening words or behaviors aimed toward another patient or staff.
13. On or about September 2004, the TDF amended its long-standing policy pertaining to the SMS. The following findings of fact, unless otherwise noted, pertain to the terms stated in the new policy.
14. The initial determination of whether a patient is to be placed provisionally on SMS is made by a Security Therapy Aide (the “STA”), who is considered security, not treatment, personnel. STAs typically are not trained in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorders. After a STA makes the initial SMS decision, the patient is directed to his room, and confined within (i.e., the door to his personal room is locked). The patient is not restrained within his room (i.e., five-point restraints or other devices are not used to restrain the patient). If the patient is not showing suicidal ideation or self-injurious behavior, he typically retains the right to use all personal items in his room, including, if available, the television, music players, and books.
15. The vast majority of patients placed on SMS comply with orders to go to their room and no staff physical intervention is typically required to place the patient in his room.
16. The administrator on duty reviews the STA's decision and has the authority to override the STA's decision. Once the patient is on SMS, the Clinician on Call is notified to perform an initial face-to-face medical and psychiatric assessment, or, if after hours, direct a registered nurse to conduct the assessment.
17. Under the terms of the new policy, a nurse (or, if

available, the Clinician on Call) performs a psychiatric screen for suicidal or psychotic symptoms within one hour of placement on SMS. Under current policy, individuals with suicidal ideation or engaging in self-injurious behavior may be placed on Emergency Mental Health Status (“EMHS”). A patient on EMHS will be continually observed by staff. When necessary, a behavioral assessment by a licensed mental health professional or registered nurse will occur within one hour of placement on EMHS. Reassessments shall occur during every shift thereafter. In all cases, the patient must have a faceto-face evaluation by a licensed clinician within 24 hours.
*5 18. Instances of suicidal ideation or behavior are rare at the TDF, and have occurred at a historical rate of twice a year. No successful suicide attempts have occurred. Dr. Jumper testified that in the past fiveand-a-half years, a nurse performing an initial SMS evaluation has never identified an acute psychiatric need. Plaintiffs did not demonstrate otherwise.
19. If the nurse does not initially identify suicidal or psychotic symptoms, the patient is assessed by a nurse every 12 hours thereafter. The new policy specifies that the mental health assessments must be documented in the clinical charge and administratoron-duty log during the shift time period.
20. Within two working days after initial placement on SMS, the Behavior Review Committee (“BRC”) reviews the SMS determination. During this review process, the patient is afforded an opportunity to present his argument against the SMS decision. Following the BRC meeting, approximately one-third of the patients are released from SMS.
21. The experts in the present litigation agreed that the patients at the TDF differ in terms of typical diagnostic criteria and symptom profile from those patients typically residing at psychiatric hospitals. Specifically, under the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (“DSM IV”) classification system, the predominant Axis I diagnoses for TDF patients falls under the category of paraphilias and sexual disorders. The most common diagnosis is pedophilia; greater than 50% of the patients at the TDF have this diagnosis. Pedophilia is a mental disorder characterized by, among other things, intense sexual

urges and behaviors toward prepubescent children. In contrast, the primary diagnoses for patients in forensic psychiatric hospitals fall under the mood or psychotic disorders categories, with schizophrenia, schizoaffective, bipolar I, and severe major depression being among the most common diagnoses.
22. Thus, in a psychiatric hospital population, a significant percentage of patients suffer from severe mental disorders that can interfere with everyday perceptions of reality, including delusions and hallucinations (e.g.,schizophrenia), or cause serious suicidal ideation and behaviors (e.g.,major depression and bipolar disorder). Many of the patients in psychiatric hospitals have difficulty with daily living tasks and self-care skills, and have serious interpersonal, behavioral, and cognitive deficits.
23. In contrast, the vast majority of patients at the TDF do not suffer from psychotic or severe mood disorder symptoms. Suicidal ideation or behavior is a very rare occurrence. The patients at the TDF canand do-perform living and self-care tasks. Although paraphilias and sexual disorders are associated with significant cognitive distortions regarding purported sexual cues from victims, rationalizations of violent behavior, and compulsive and obsessive tendencies, these distortions do not result in the type of widespread impairments in reality testing, as well as other behavioral and cognitive deficits, typically seen in psychotic and serious mood disorders.
*6 24. There is significant disagreement in the psychiatric and psychological community on whether, given the diagnostic and symptomatic profile differences noted above, the seclusion and restraint standards promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association in Task Force Report No. 22 (the “APA Standards”) should apply to patients at the TDF. The APA Standards provide specific recommendations on the proper use of seclusion and restraint with individuals suffering from mental disorders. Specifically, the APA Standards require, among other things, an initial written seclusion order, which is time-limited and subject to ongoing review, and a face-to-face clinical evaluation within the first three hours of seclusion. Thereafter, a patient in seclusion must be monitored every twelve hours. Once the patient is determined to be no longer a threat to himself or others, he should be released from seclusion and/or restraint.

25. The APA standards were based, in part, on concerns over the widespread improper and inconsistent use of seclusion and restraints with patients with serious mental disorders. Historically, treatment staff at psychiatric hospitals tended to use seclusion and/or restraint as a method of punishment or for convenience of the staff to avoid managing difficult patients. Because in psychiatric hospitals violent or disruptive behavior is often the product of a serious mental disorder, the APA Standards provide that seclusion and restraint must be used only for therapeutic purposes, and not punishment. In addition, particularly for individuals with serious cognitive distortions or delusions, the experience of being locked and isolated in a foreign room and/or pinned down in five-point restraints can be extremely traumatic and counter-therapeutic. Thus, in the mental health treatment community, seclusion and/or restraint are considered last-resort alternatives.
26. Although the experts agreed on the diagnostic differences between the TDF patients and traditional psychiatric patients, they did not agree on the implications of these differences to the application of the APA Standards. Drs. Berlin and Metzner, experts for the Plaintiffs, testified that the APA Standards apply to the TDF's operations. In their view, the APA Standards apply equally to patients in psychiatric hospitals and facilities like the TDF, where decisions are primarily based on dangerousness to self or others. Under Dr. Berlin's view, the central inquiryand one that requires a trained mental health professional-is whether the assaultive or threatening behavior is a product of a mental illness. Thus, diagnostic differences between patient populations are irrelevant to the inquiry of whether a patient's dangerousness to self or others is caused by a mental disorder, and indeed the APA Standards do not differentiate procedures based on diagnosis.
27. In contrast, Drs. Dvoskin and Tardiff, experts for the Defendants, testified that the APA Standards do not apply to the TDF because of the significant differences in the types of patients there, as compared to psychiatric hospitals. Under their views, the potential that assaultive or self-injurious behavior is a product of an underlying mental disorder is significantly attenuated in a treatment setting like the TDF, where essentially none of the patients meet criteria for psychotic disorders or severe mood

disorders. Under this view, the violent behavior that occurs at the TDF is primarily targeted antisocial behavior aimed at disrupting the rules and order of the TDF, as opposed to uncontrollable behavior caused by a mental disorder. Thus, the concerns and policies underlying the APA Standards pertaining to the mistreatment and neglect of the chronically mentally ill simply do not apply in a treatment setting like the TDF.
*7 28. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the patients detained at the TDF are substantially different in diagnosis and symptom profile from those typically found at forensic psychiatric hospitals (and other similar settings). Patients at the TDF do not routinely suffer from psychotic or severe mood disorders. Although comorbid major depression is common at the TDF, the absolute rarity of suicidal ideation or behavior, or significant impairment in self-care skills, indicates that the depression (or dysthymia) present is of a lesser severity than that routinely found in psychiatric hospitals. Although patients at the TDF have impaired volitional control regarding sexual urges, they do not have disorders that typically manifest in uncontrollable violent outbursts toward staff or fellow patients, or present serious suicidal risk. Indeed, the evidence showed that the vast majority of TDF patients placed on SMS complied with orders to return to their room without security personnel intervention, and restraints are rarely, if ever, used.
29. Thus, the vast majority of assaultive behavior that precipitates placement on SMS is unlikely to be the product of an Axis I major mental illness. Accordingly, the concerns that future assaultive behavior may be the product of a mental disorder are severely attenuated at the TDF, in comparison to a traditional psychiatric hospital or other inpatient mental health treatment facility.
30. The Court finds that the TDF has made good faith efforts, albeit under the specter of litigation and impending trial, to improve the policy and practices relating to SMS. Following the advice of Dr. Tardiff and others, the TDF has created a written policy that requires immediate administrative review of an STA's preliminary decision to implement SMS. The current policy also properly requires a psychiatric and medical screen by a trained nurse or clinician within one hour of placement in SMS. In addition, on-call

psychiatric consultation is available if acute mental health needs are present. Because the new SMS policy was recently drafted and is in the process of implementation, there is limited evidence of the effectiveness of the policy in practice at the TDF.
31. The TDF's prior SMS procedures and practices lacked clear guidelines and requirements for prompt assessment of psychiatric needs by a nurse or any mental health professional. Nurses often did not properly document when (or if) they conducted the psychiatric screen, and it is likely that patients in SMS often did not receive an appropriate evaluation within a one-hour time frame (or perhaps at all).
32. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that there are legitimate safety and security purposes underlying the use of SMS, as it is presently formulated and implemented at the TDF. There are documented instances of assaults by patients on other patients and staff. SMS allows a patient to be removed from potentially harmful situations where he may injure himself, staff or other patients.
Use of Close Management Status (“CMS”)
*8 33. Following Secure Management Status, some patients may be placed on Close Management Status (“CMS”). CMS requires patients to wear yellow jumpsuits, and also has certain restrictions on movement and times for exercise or recreation.
34. Under the prior policy, patients were uniformly placed on CMS for thirty days and were required to wear yellow jumpsuits. Under current policy, TDF officials will make individualized decisions pertaining to which patients wear a yellow jumpsuit.
35. The Court finds that there are legitimate institutional security concerns underlying the use of the yellow jumpsuit and other features of CMS. For instance, the yellow jumpsuit allows staff and security personnel at the TDF to identify quickly those patients at greatest risk for assaultive behavior, and facilitates the imposition of appropriate restrictions on movement. The Court also finds that the use of yellow jumpsuit does not carry such a stigmatizing effect that it impedes the effective delivery of treatment or creates a significant countertherapeutic environment.

Other Restrictions
36. Patients at the TDF generally have a wide range of available commissary items, although the availability of certain items may depend upon the patients' behavioral management status. There was no evidence demonstrating that the restrictions on commissary items are excessive.
37. The use of intercoms within a patient's room facilitates institutional security. There was no evidence demonstrating that the use of such intercoms is a significant imposition on the patients' privacy.
38. The use of a variety of statuses within the TDF that correspond with privileges, including room location, increased freedom of movement, and access to certain commissary items, is not atypical of institutional and quasi-correctional settings. There are rational security concerns underlying the decision to have all patients initially begin at a lower end of the privilege continuum: in many instances, the staff do not initially know the potential risks of a new patient. In addition, making privileges contingent on good behavior and participation in treatment, creates positive contingencies and reinforcements for productive therapeutic behavior.
B. Claims Pertaining to Treatment, Informed Consent, Access to Treatment and Confidentiality
39. The Consent-to-Treatment form used by the TDF prior September 2004 had an apparent typographical error in the following sentence that omitted the word “each”: “I understand that, when necessary, the treatment team and program-related staff may share information with [each] other about me without my consent.”The current consent form does not have this typographical error. Although the TDF apparently used a consent form with a blatant and significant typographical error for several years, there was no evidence showing that the treatment staff had relied on this error to share confidential information with others outside of treatment staff.
*9 40. The Consent-to-Treatment form contains a provision notifying patients that treatment records may be provided to the Illinois Attorney General “in

order to prepare for court.”Under prior policy, TDF staff automatically sent copies of any records requested by a patient to the office of the Illinois Attorney General, without requiring a request from the Attorney General's office or making an individualized assessment of whether the patient was requesting the records in preparation of a court filing. The TDF has since discontinued this policy. Plaintiffs did not show, however, that the Attorney General used any patient information supplied by the TDF for purposes other than preparing for court proceedings.
41. Until recently, the Consent-to-Treatment form included a statement pertaining to Illinois' mandatory reporting law that stated: “any uncharged offense(s) against minors will be reported to DCFS.” Although the TDF apparently used this form, which contained an inaccurate statement of the Illinois mandatory reporting law, for several years, the current consent form does not have this particular statement.
42. Until recently, the Consent-to-Treatment form did not contain specific information pertaining to arousal-reducing medications. The current form contains information pertaining to such medications.
43. Patients must sign the Consent-to-Treatment form to receive treatment at the TDF, as the TDF must respect a patient's right to refuse treatment. There are no provisions in the consent form that allow the patient to sign the form, accept treatment, but yet specifically preserve (or claim to not waive) the right to object in a court of law to certain disclosures or other matters presented in the Consent-to-Treatment form.
44. The TDF's treatment program requires patients to disclose in great detail past offenses, including uncharged offenses. There are no immunity provisions insulating the patients from future prosecution based on the disclosure of uncharged offense. The clinical practice at the TDF, however, is to advise patients not to disclose identifying information that would trigger mandatory reporting requirements. There have been three instances where the Illinois DCFS was notified under the mandatory reporting statute. Yet, to-date, no TDF patient has been prosecuted for disclosures within the treatment program.
45. The TDF uses a Psychosexual Testing Consent

Form for the administration of the Multiphasic Sex Inventory that contains a hold-harmless and indemnity clause. The test may not be administered nor scored without a properly signed consent form. The consent form was drafted by the test developers, not the TDF staff. No patient has been denied treatment because of refusal to sign the consent form, nor is the test a prerequisite for participation in the treatment program.
46. Occasionally, some of the meetings between mental health staff and patients occur in the patients' rooms or in the common area directly outside of the patients' rooms. These common areas do not have adequate sound privacy to ensure patient confidentiality.
Arousal Reconditioning and Medications
*10 47. The successful treatment of sex offenders like those treated at the TDF is complicated and may require multi-modal treatment techniques, including cognitive, behavioral, and medical interventions. The Practice Standards and Guidelines for the Members of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (the “ATSA”) consider arousal reconditioning, relapse prevention (cognitivebehavioral techniques), and medication techniques to be viable treatment interventions for sexual abusers.
48. There is professional disagreement in the psychiatric and psychological treatment fields as to the long-term effectiveness of sexual arousal reconditioning, as practiced at the TDF, in the treatment of sexual abusers. Although clinicians treating sexual offenders continue to use arousal reconditioning as a treatment tool, there is significant research literature indicating that the effects of arousal reconditioning are short-term and may not significantly reduce recidivism rates. The arousal reconditioning technique, however, may have shortterm utility in providing an immediate assessment of a patient's current deviant arousal.
49. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Berlin, a recognized expert in the field of treatment for sexual abusers, provided credible testimony showing that arousal reconditioning is typically not sufficient treatment on its own, and may indeed provide very limited value, even when used in conjunction with medications and other cognitive therapy techniques. Dr. Berlin,

however, conceded that there are significant numbers of clinicians who continue to believe that arousal reconditioning is an effective cognitive therapy technique for treating sexual offenders. Indeed, the ATSA, a respected professional organization that provides recommended guidelines and standards for sex offender treatment providers, specifically encourages the use of arousal reconditioning techniques.
50. Dr. Schlank, Defendants' expert, credibly testified that techniques such as arousal reconditioning are routinely used in sexual offender treatment programs. She also testified that it is not unusual for such programs to emphasize cognitive techniques at the outset of treatment, and thereafter direct attention toward medications.
51. Dr. Berlin provided credible testimony showing that anti-androgen medications can be an important treatment tool for sexual offenders. Selective Serontinergic Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”) may also have some utility in the treatment of sexual offenders, although their effectiveness on reducing deviant sexual arousal is likely to be less than antiandrogen medication. There is, however, a danger that patients may over-rely on medications as a purported “cure” and will underutilize cognitive therapy and relapse prevention techniques. Thus, over-reliance on medications may place put patients at heightened risk of a relapse under certain circumstances.
52. Under the prior policy, the TDF treatment staff may have overestimated the utility of arousal reconditioning, and underestimated the utility of antiandrogen medications.
*11 53. The TDF has psychiatric coverage on two days per week, for a total of 16 hours per week. Although the TDF staff concedes that this level of coverage is sub-optimal, particularly as the new treatment policies may substantially increase the use of arousal-reducing medications, it is nonetheless sufficient to cover the core psychiatric needs of the TDF patients.
Use of the Polygraph
54. The TDF administers the polygraph test as part of its treatment program. The TDF uses a polygraph

technique called the Control Question Technique (the “CQT”). The polygraph is used to assess, among other things, the truthfulness of patients' disclosures about past offenses.
55. There is significant professional disagreement about the reliability and validity of the CQT administration, as well as the proper role of the polygraph in the treatment of sex offenders in general. There is substantial research literature indicating that the CQT is unreliable and overestimates untruthful responses. Dr. Iacono, Plaintiffs' expert on the polygraph, however, conceded that there are recognized experts in the scientific community, although they tend to train at one particular research institution, who believe the CQT is a scientifically valid procedure for the polygraph. In addition, many departments of the federal government, including the FBI, routinely use the CQT.
56. Independent of the reliability or validity of the polygraph instrument as a purported “lie detector,” it can be an effective treatment tool because it can facilitate patient disclosures regarding past offenses. That is, simply administering a polygraph test may encourage certain patients to make truthful disclosures before or after the test.
57. Patients who fail the polygraph examination generally cannot advance beyond Phase II in the treatment program. There was evidence, however, that patients who failed the polygraph (or have inconclusive results) can complete other work in advanced phases of the program, and even can obtain release. Thus, a failed polygraph examination is not an insurmountable obstacle to release from the TDF.
58. Under prior policy, the TDF Polygraph Review Committee reviewed only a subset of polygraph results and may have overestimated the utility of the polygraph in detecting untruthful responses. Under current policy, the Polygraph Review Committee will review all polygraph test results.
Progress of Treatment and Prospects of Release
59. The TDF core treatment program comprises five phases, each with different treatment tasks and goals. Phase 1 (Assessment) involves initial treatment evaluation and baseline measurements. Phase 2

(Accepting Responsibility) includes use of the polygraph, extensive written descriptions (“journaling”) of past offenses, and cognitive restructuring techniques aimed at correcting distortions that relate to sex offending. Phase 3 (SelfApplication) includes relapse prevention techniques, which involve detailed assessments of the situational, behavioral and cognitive variables associated with offending, as well as continued cognitive restructuring and journaling work. Phase 4 (Incorporation) incorporates the prior three phases and helps the patient formulate a “wellness” plan. Finally, Phase 5 (Transition) plans the patient's reintroduction into the community.
*12 60. The TDF core treatment program provides approximately 15 hours of direct sex offender treatment per week. According to Dr. Schlank's unrebutted testimony, this amount of treatment is somewhat higher than other similar treatment programs. In addition to the 15 hours of treatment, there are other ancillary treatment programs provided.
61. In general, the treatment program provides coherent treatment goals and provides an overall roadmap for progress.
62. Participation in treatment at the TDF, however, is quite low. Less than 50% of patients participate in core treatment. There are a variety of reasons why patients do not participate in treatment. Some patients do not participate because they disagree with the treatment methods, consent forms, and/or disclosures to the Attorney General. Others do not participate because they may have been advised by their attorneys not to participate in treatment pending resolution of this case and/or other court appeals.
63. Certain members of the TDF staff recognize that participation in treatment is excessively low and have engaged in efforts to increase outreach to patients. The recent policy changes, including review of polygraphs, more-carefully delineated SMS procedures, clarification of the confidentiality provisions, increased use of anti-androgen medications, more individualized assessments of threat risks, elimination of strip searches, as well as resolution of this litigation, should provide incentives for increased participation in treatment.

64. Given the chronic and severe nature of the paraphilias and sexual disorders suffered by patients at the TDF, the course of treatment to date is not inappropriately long. The treatment program appropriately focuses on behavioral changes as the sign post for release, rather than fixed time periods. Moreover, completion of all phases of treatment is not an absolute prerequisite for release from the TDF: some patients have been released without completing all phases of treatment.
65. There is significant treatment value in having patients provide some form of written description of past offenses (the so-called “journaling” technique). Under prior policy, however, the journaling process in Phase II was overemphasized and excessively time-consuming in relation to other aspects of the treatment program. Under current policy, the process of journaling is more streamlined, having moved to a “categorical offense” description model. This should facilitate greater patient success in Phase II of the treatment program.
66. Since the program's inception more than five years ago, approximately 10 patients have been released. The large majority of these patients, however, had not completed all phases of the treatment program. In addition, several of the patients were released by court order, against the recommendation of the independent consultant hired by TDF to make release recommendations. The rate of release, although notably low, is not unusual, given the complexity of psychological issues facing TDF patients, coupled with the low participation rates in treatment.
Accreditation
*13 67. The TDF is not accredited by the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (the “JCAHO”) or the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities (the “CARF”). In June 2003, the TDF performed a “mock” CARF review and determined that it had not formalized its policies sufficiently in writing to pass CARF accreditation. CARF accreditation is generally considered to have less stringent requirements than JCAHO.
Other Issues Raised in the Complaint

68. Staff training.The TDF treatment staff is sufficiently trained and informed in the treatment of sexual deviance. The TDF treatment staff has the proper credentials for the tasks performed.
69. Individualized treatment plans.The treatment plan for the patients is sufficiently individualized to meet patient needs, and, as noted above, the treatment program provides a coherent road map and goals for treatment progress.
70. Family participation in treatment.There was no evidence demonstrating that family members are unreasonably excluded from participating in treatment or visiting.
71. Grievance procedures.The TDF has established sufficient grievance procedures. For instance, the evidence showed that the Behavioral Review Committee conducts hearings to address patients' grievances regarding SMS. In addition, there was evidence showing that patient committees are involved in providing feedback to treatment and administrative staff, and reasonable accommodations have been made.
72. Education, Religious, Vocational, and Recreational Activities.There was no evidence demonstrating that the TDF fails to afford reasonable educational, religious, vocational or recreational activities.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review for Constitutional Claims
1. Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the conditions of confinement and treatment fall broadly under the “professional judgment standard.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Under this standard, decisions made by trained professionals are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See id. at 324.Constitutional violations will be found only when administrative or clinical decisions pertaining to confinement and treatment are a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards.” Id. at 323.In addition, courts may not “specify which of several professionally accepted choices should be made,” but rather only

“make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised.” Id. at 321.Thus, this Court's review of the TDF's practices is very limited: it can intervene only if Plaintiffs have established that TDF's practices are “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
2. Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to “more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. The Constitution, however, does not require that the patients at the TDF receive “optimal treatment,” but rather minimum levels of care are sufficient. West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir.2003); see also Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir.1998).“[A]ll the Constitution requires is that punishment be avoided and medical judgment exercised.” West, 333 F.3d at 749.
*14 3. The SVP Act contains a provision that specifically exempts the TDF from complying with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the “MHDDC” and the “MHDDC exemption”).725 ILCS 207/50(b) (West 2004). The MHDDC provides a series of rights and procedural requirements for mentally ill individuals, including significant limitations on the use of seclusion and restraint. See405 ILCS 5/2-108 and 405 ILCS 5/2109. Defendants argued repeatedly at trial (and in their post-trial brief) that the MHDDC exemption is an affirmative defense that precludes Plaintiffs from challenging any practices that are required under the MHDDC. In particular, Defendants argue that the MHDDC exemption precludes the TDF from being required to comply with the APA Standards on seclusion and restraint. See, e.g., Def. Post Trial Br. at 20-21.
4. Defendants' line of reasoning here is not particularly well-developed, but they appear to argue that because the APA Standards are functionally equivalent to the MHDDC provisions on seclusion and restraint, Plaintiffs' argument runs headlong into the MHDDC exemption. See id. 20-21.In addition, Defendants seem to argue that because Plaintiffs have not mounted a facial challenge to the MHDDC

exemption, they must be precluded from allowing a de facto invalidation of this statutory provision via application of the APA Standards. See id. at 6-7, n. 9.
5. Defendants' argument on the MHDDC exemption is unconvincing. First, Defendants provide no authority for the proposition that a party challenging practices at a state-operated facility must also raise a facial challenge to any underlying statutory authority related to such practices. Nothing in Youngberg or its progeny suggests that such a facial challenge is a procedural prerequisite. Second, and relatedly, Defendants misunderstand the legal implications of a Plaintiff victory on this issue. Specifically, a finding that the APA Standards apply under Youngberg is not tantamount to the distinct finding that the MHDDC exemption is constitutionally invalid. Procedurally, the issue of the constitutionality of the MHDDC exemption is not before this Court. It may be that Youngberg requires the TDF to follow certain seclusion and restraint practices that happen to overlap with provisions in the MHDDC, but it is incorrect to consider that equivalent to a legal finding that the MHDDC provision is unconstitutional. Indeed, there are numerous provisions in the MHDDC that would remain untouched by a finding that the APA Standards apply, and, moreover, nothing in the MHDDC exemption forbids the TDF from complying with the APA Standards. Rather, properly read, the plain language of the MHDDC exemption merely suggests that the MHDDC itself cannot provide a toehold for legal liability-and Plaintiffs indeed are not relying on the MHDDC provisions. Finally, Defendants ignore (or misunderstand) the fundamental concept that states cannot create statutory schemes that evade the requirements of the United States Constitution. That is, nothing in the SVP Act itself can serve as an affirmative defense that protects the TDF from comporting with the constitutional requirements specified in Youngberg.
Standard on Review Regarding Mootness of Claims
*15 6. As noted above, Defendants altered many of the challenged policies, including several at the last minute, on the eve of trial. As a result of these changes, Defendants now claim that many of the Plaintiffs' claims are effectively mooted. Plaintiffs respond that many-if not all-of the policy changes are merely “adjustments of convenience” for the

purposes of prevailing in the litigation, rather than bona fide and long-term shifts in policy and practice.
7. To prevail on their claim of mootness, Defendants face a heavy burden: they must show that subsequent events have “made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrong behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”See, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Defendants must show that “there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.”Id. (citation omitted).
8. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims pertaining to the strip searches and the Consent-to-Treat form are mooted by Defendants' policy changes because Defendants have shown that there is no reasonable expectation that they will systematically return to former procedures. For instance, the TDF expended considerable funds on the Rapiscan device and has in place a reasonable maintenance plan to ensure its continued operation. Although it is possible that the device may break down and require a temporary return to strip searches, this outcome is too speculative (and infrequent) to amount to a cognizable claim. The Consent-to-Treat form omitted or changed the objectionable language, and added language pertaining to medications-these are essentially the changes requested by Plaintiffs-and there was no indication at trial that the Defendants intended to return to the old consent forms.
9. Plaintiffs' other claims are not mooted by the recent policy changes. The vast majority of these changes occurred on the eve (or even during) trial and thus have yet to become established practice. For instance, Defendants themselves acknowledged that the intended changes to the polygraph, SMS, and CMS procedures were not yet fully implemented. As noted above, the Court finds that Defendants have made good faith efforts to improve the program in various ways and intend to convert these new policies into established practice. This good faith finding alone, however, is insufficient to meet the heavy burden of showing that there is no reasonable expectation that past policies will be repeated, particularly as Defendants have maintained throughout this litigation that their past policies were entirely adequate. In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that even the new procedures are, for the most part, constitutionally inadequate. Thus, the Court will

reach conclusions of law based on both the old and the new procedures in these areas.
The Conditions of Confinement
10. Facility administrators are afforded wide latitude to maintain institutional security, internal order, and ensure the protection of patients and staff. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23; West, 333 F.3d at 748. Professional decisions made by appropriately trained personnel are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. Measures employed by institutions to ensure security and order are permissible non-punitive interventions. See id at 322-24.
*16 11. Here, there is an established history of patients acting in threatening and assaultive ways toward the staff and other patients at the TDF. Contraband items that could be used as weapons have been found. In addition, the criteria for being detained at the TDF include the commission of at least one sexually violent act, and previous violent acts are important predictors of future violence. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (citations omitted). Indeed, the large majority of patients at the TDF have repeatedly engaged in acts of sexual violence, some with adults. Most TDF patients, however, do not appear to be generally violent, but rather target specific victims, most often children. Thus, it cannot be said that this is a population particularly prone to assaulting staff, and indeed the large majority of violent episodes involving patients and staff appear to be limited to a smaller cluster of patients.
12. Although the configuration of the facility and the level of restrictions may be excessive in light of this patient population, this Court has only limited discretion to review the TDF's administrative and security decisions. Defendants' decisions (with the exception of its prior policy on SMS, as discussed below) fall under the purview of reasonable professional judgment in the administration of a hybrid detention and treatment facility. Thus, whether under old or new policies, the restrictions of movement, the room and personal searches, use of the black box, use of close management status, and use of intercoms, are not substantial departures from accepted professional judgment and standards, and therefore are constitutionally permissible.

Specifically, as noted above under the Findings of Fact, there are legitimate security and institutional concerns underlying these policies that indicate that professional judgment is being properly exercised.
13. The new policies pertaining to conditions of confinement, however, are clearly superior to old practices, and will likely facilitate increased patient participation in successful treatment, which is, after all, one of the main purposes of the SVP Act.
14. With regard to Defendants' procedures pertaining to the use of secured or special management status (“SMS”), the Court finds that the APA Standards (and other similar professional standards cited by the Plaintiffs) do not apply wholesale to the use of SMS. First, the concerns underlying the APA Standards, namely that the behavior in question is the product of a mental disorder, are significantly attenuated under the present circumstances because the patient population is significantly different from that found in psychiatric hospitals. See In re Samuelson, 189 Ill.2d 548, 244 Ill.Dec. 929, 727 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ill.2000)(noting the differences between persons committed under the SVP Act versus te Illinois Mental Health Code); see also In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 568 S.E.2d 338, 346 (S.C.2002) (citations omitted) (noting how violent sex offenders are a different class of committable individuals). Second, the SMS procedures are significantly different from the typical use of seclusion and restraint in psychiatric hospitals. Patients at the TDF are not secluded in designated seclusion rooms, devoid of personal artifacts or other comforts, but rather are confined in their own rooms, with access to all their personal belongings. Cf. West, 333 F.3d at 747 (describing the different type of “therapeutic seclusion” used in the Wisconsin SVP program, where patients were placed in a room that contained only a concrete platform for a bed, and were often deprived of clothing and other personal items and amenities). In addition, patients are not physically restrained once inside their rooms.
*17 15. Thus, the nature of the precipitating behavior and the actual implementation of SMS is substantially different from the types of behaviors and procedures addressed by the APA Standards. Accordingly, rigid adherence to the entire protocol specified by the APA standards is not constitutionally required. See West, 333 F.3d at 749 (noting that “the

Constitution does not immediately fall into line behind the majority view of a committee appointed by the American Psychiatric Association” and “[i]n a world of uncertainty about how best to deal with sexually dangerous persons, there is room for both disagreement and trial-and-error.”). Moreover, even if the APA Standards applied here, this is not a negligence case where any deviation from the standard of care could impose liability. See Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir.1998)(contrasting the professional judgment standard with negligence and intentional misconduct standards). Instead, the controlling standard in a constitutional challenge requires a substantial departure from accepted practices or standards. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. As shown directly below, the TDF's procedures are not such a substantial departure from the protocol under the APA Standards.
16. Although the APA Standards do not control the determination of what constitutes professional judgment in the context of the TDF's use of SMS, they nevertheless inform this determination. For instance, the APA Standards recommend that there be a timely and documented initial psychiatric and medical screen shortly after placement in seclusion. This recommendation appears to be universally endorsed by the psychiatric community. Indeed, there was a consensus among the testifying experts that professional judgment in this area requires, at a minium, a timely assessment of potential mental health needs. In fact, the TDF's own expert, Dr. Tardiff, specifically recommended and guided the change in policy that now clearly requires a documented psychiatric screen within one hour of placement in SMS.
17. Given the differences in patient populations and the procedures at the TDF, staff may exercise its professional judgment in applying and modifying pertinent portions of the APA Standards (and other professional standards). For instance, the TDF's decisions to allow security personnel make the preliminary determination of SMS, to have a nurse make the initial psychiatric screen, and to amend the time period for subsequent observations all reflect the exercise of professional judgment in light of the patient population at the TDF. In fact, the competing testimony provided by recognized experts in this case pertaining to the TDF's SMS procedures show that

there is, at most, bona fide professional disagreement about whether, and in what fashion, the APA Standards map onto the SMS procedures at the TDF. Indeed, Defendants' key expert, Dr. Tardiff, was the chairperson on the APA Standards task force, and yet testified that they did not apply in this treatment setting. (Plaintiffs note that Dr. Tardiff's testimony may not have been the model of consistency, considering his prior testimony in a Wisconsin case, but the Court notes that the seclusion practices at the Wisconsin facility were indeed different, see West, 333 F.3d at 747, and that Dr. Tardiff's observation regarding patient differences was effectively supported by Plaintiffs' own experts.)
*18 18. The TDF's prior policy did not clearly require a timely psychiatric and medical assessment. Even though the concerns regarding suicidality and other products of mental disorder are attenuated in this population, they are certainly not entirely absent. Professional judgment dictates that patients placed in seclusion (or, under the circumstances here, quasiseclusion is a more-appropriate term) must receive, at a minium, an initial psychiatric screen, which must be well documented for other treatment staff. Thus, the TDF's prior policy did not meet constitutional requirements on these grounds.
19. Although the Court finds that the new SMS policies are not sufficiently established to meet the high burden of mooting Plaintiffs' claims, it finds that Defendants have made a sufficient showing that the new policy is in fact being implemented at the TDF. Thus, there is no need for the imposition of the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, in light of Defendants' current policies and practices. Although Plaintiffs argue that the last-minute policy changes are merely temporary litigation strategy, and, moreover, the staff at the TDF lacks the ability to implement the new SMS policies effectively, the Court finds that this litigation has caused a good faith reexamination and change in the insufficient past SMS policy. Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants presented credible testimony of their intention to adhere to the recent policies presented at trial.
The Claims of Inadequate Treatment
20. As noted above, the Constitution does not require optimal treatment. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at

319; West, 333 F.3d at 749. All that is required is minimally adequate treatment to protect a patient's liberty interests. See Youngberg, at 319.The TDF's treatment practices can be found unconstitutional only if the practices are such “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
21. In a previous opinion in this case, this Court relied on the Youngberg standard, but also cited Third and Eleventh Circuit authority for the proposition that an involuntarily civilly committed person is entitled to treatment that provides “a meaningful chance to improve and win his eventual release.” Hargett v. Baker, 2002 WL 1732911, *2-3. At that early stage in the litigation, it was possible that the treatment claims articulated by Plaintiffs fell within the gap that the Supreme Court in Youngberg declined to address: specifically, whether an involuntarily committed person has “some general constitutional right to treatment per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318;see also D.W. v. Rogers, 113 F.3d 1214, 1218, n. 5 (11th Cir.1997). At this stage, however, it is clear that the “minimal treatment” standard articulated in Youngberg is the proper controlling standard. In addition, the Supreme Court has noted that the Constitution does not “prevent[ ] a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). Moreover, even if a “meaningful chance to improve” were part of the standard here, it is clear that the TDF treatment program does provide such “meaningful chance.”
*19 22. The types of chronic sex offenders who reside at the TDF are notoriously difficult to treat. They suffer from extreme and difficult-to-control sexual urges, which may have complicated biological, behavioral and cognitive causal factors. Many suffer from a variety of co-morbid problems that complicate the treatment picture, such as substance abuse, mood, and personality disorders. In addition, many patients at the TDF are reluctant to seek treatment and have an extensive history of reoffending. In short, this is a chronic, severely disturbed patient population with a multiplicity of serious and complex psychiatric difficulties. This is

certainly not the typical outpatient “worried well” or depressed patient, who can be successfully treated with short-term cognitive-behavioral therapy and/or antidepressant medication.
23. Thus, the clinical staff at the TDF is faced with the unenviable competing tasks of providing adequate treatment at a pace to allow sufficient progress for potential release, while simultaneously ensuring that patients are not released prematurely into the community to reoffend. The latter task is not to be taken lightly, as the recidivism rates of sex offenders are tragically high. This, of course, is the principal rationale behind the SVP Act.
24. In light of these challenging tasks, the Court finds that the treatment program and delivery of services at the TDF adequately meet constitutional requirements. Specifically, the TDF's use of arousal reconditioning and polygraph techniques are well within the bounds of professional judgment. While arguably the TDF may have over emphasized these techniques in its treatment regimen, there is certainly widespread acceptance and use of these techniques in the sex offender treatment community. Thus, it cannot be said that the TDF's use of such techniques is a substantial departure from accepted practices and standards. See Youngberg 457 U.S. at 323.
25. Similarly, the TDF's use of arousal-reducing medications, while perhaps not optimal, is clearly within constitutional bounds. As noted above, there is reasonable professional disagreement as to the timing, dosage, and type of medications that are most effective in reducing deviant sexual arousal. Dr. Berlin, an undisputed expert in this area, represents one end of the professional continuum on the use of anti-androgen medications, but his testimony, coupled with that of Defendants' experts, fairly shows nothing more than bona fide professional disagreements, and these seldom, if ever, amount to constitutional violations, provided there are sufficient numbers of respected professionals on each side. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23.
26. The low rates of treatment participation, progress, and release at the TDF are disappointing, but do not amount to constitutional violations. As noted under the factual findings, there are a multiplicity of reasons why patients do not participate in treatment, and only some of these can be laid on the doorstep of

TDF policies and practices. The treatment program has a coherent overall plan and sequence, with identifiable goals and standards. This is not to say that the treatment program is ideal: particularly under past practices, certain treatment tasks were excessively time-consuming or ill-defined, such as the former “journaling” approach under Phase II.
*20 27. The primary impediment, however, to achieving greater success in the program is the severity and chronicity of the patient population. Taken together, there was insufficient testimony demonstrating that the structure or administration of the treatment program was such a substantial departure from professional judgment that it amounts to constitutionally deficient treatment. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23.
28. The confidentiality practices of the TDF, although, again, perhaps not optimal, do not amount to a constitutional violation. In particular, there was evidence that certain patient-therapist interactions occurred in the common areas near other patients' rooms. This lacks adequate sound privacy to maintain confidentiality, but such activities, although not desirable practice, are not such a substantial departure to trigger constitutional relief. The disclosures to the Illinois Attorney General under prior policy, although apparently excessive in light of the provisions for disclosure under the SVP Act, do not amount to a constitutional violation. For instance, there was credible testimony by Dr. Wood that he believed the disclosures were to be used by the Attorney General for preparing for court, and Plaintiffs did not present evidence to show otherwise. Moreover, this former practice has been discontinued.
29. The absence of accreditation by JCAHO or CARF does not amount to a constitutional violation. The facility clearly could benefit from further development and refinement of written policies, and accreditation by an appropriate organization may provide additional and valuable oversight. Accreditation by itself, however, is not a litmus test for the constitutionality of the practices at the TDF. Instead, the Court must look to the actual practices, and, as noted above, they pass constitutional muster for a variety of reasons.
30. Finally, the remaining claims raised by Plaintiffs

in their complaint or at trial pertaining to staff training, family participation, grievance procedures, individual treatment plans, discharge planning, and educational and vocational training had thin-if anyevidentiary support at trial. Plaintiffs certainly did not establish that the TDF's practices in these areas amounted to constitutional violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' demand for Declaratory Relief is GRANTED insofar as the TDF's prior SMS was unconstitutional and Defendants failed to establish that Plaintiffs' claim on this issue was moot, but any remaining claims for declaratory relief are DENIED.
Because the TDF has made the requisite showing that the new SMS policy cures the defects in the prior policy, Plaintiffs' demand for injunctive relief is DENIED with respect to this and all other claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
N.D.Ill.,2005. Hargett v. Adams Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 399300 (N.D.Ill.)
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 1 of 12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

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FEB 2 8 2002

JEFFERY HARGETT; KIM A. OVERLIN; JIMMIE SMITH; LOREN K. WALKER; on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LINDA R. BAKER, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, MARY BASS, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services, TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, RAYMOND WOODS, Clinical Director, and TRAVIS HINZE, Associate Clinical Director,

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Defendants.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, JEFFERY HARGEIT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH and LOREN K. WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by their undersigned counsel, state as follows for their Class Action Complaint:
INTRODUCTION 1. This complaint asserts a civil rights action pursuant to Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress violations of the United States Constitution in connection with the complete and utter failure of the Defendants or those acting under their control or direction to provide adequate and meaningful mental health treatment to the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated that have been involuntarily detained by the Illinois

1-/

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 2 of 12
Department of Human Services ("DHS") pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1 et al. (the "SVP Act"). The avowed purposed of the SVP Act is to provide mental health treatment and care to individuals in the custody of DHS in the least restrictive manner consistent with the person's needs and in accordance with the court's commitment order. The treatment and care provided by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated is punitive and Constitutionally inadequate.
JURISDICTION
2. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1331 and § 1343.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Jeffery Hargett was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about March, 2000 by the Circuit Court of Iroquois County, Illinois. Mr. Hargett has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Hargett has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Hargett has never received adequate treatment or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release. 4. Plaintiff Kim A. Overlin ("Overlin") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about June, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Macon County, Illinois. Mr. Overlin has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Overlin has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Overlin has never
-2-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 3 of 12
received adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic chance for his release.
5. Plaintiff Jimmie Smith ("Smith") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about October, 2000 by the Circuit Court of Macoupin County, Illinois. Mr. Smith has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Smith has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systematic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Smith has been denied adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic chance for his release.
6. Plaintiff Loren K. Walker ("Walker") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about September, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois. Mr. Walker has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Walker has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nonetheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Walker has been denied adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic chance for his release.
7. Defendant Linda R. Baker ("Baker"), is the Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") and the chief administrative officer of the DHS. Defendant Baker is sued herein in her official capacity. At all relevant times, she was acting under the color of state law.
8. Defendant Mary Bass ("Bass") is the Head Facility Administrator of DHS. She is sued herein in her official capacity. At all relevant times, she was acting under the color of state law.
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 4 of 12
9. Defendant Timothy Budz ("Budz") is the Facility Director of the DHS Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he was acting under the color of state law.
10. Defendant Raymond Woods ("Woods") is the Clinical Director of the DHS Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he was acting under the color of state law.
11. Defendant Travis Hinze ("Hinze") is the Associate Clinical Director of the DHS Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he was acting under the color of state law.
12. Baker, Bass, Budz, Woods and Hinze (the "Defendants"), pursuant to authority vested in them by the State of Illinois (the "State"), are the individuals primarily responsible for the care, custody, treatment and control of the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. The Defendants knowingly and with deliberate indifference established and maintained the treatment policies, procedures and regime that are challenged in this action.
BACKGROUND 13. The SVP Act provides for the civil commitment into the custody of DHS of persons that: (a) have been convicted, or acquitted by reason of insanity, of certain sexual offenses; and (b) have been found to have a mental disorder that creates a substantial possibility that they will engage in future acts of sexual violence. Persons may be detained by DHS pursuant to the SVP Act prior to a civil commitment proceeding if there is probable cause to believe that conditions (a) and (b) above are met. 14. Although the SVP Act's stated purpose is not to punish, but instead is to provide for the segregation and treatment of persons with a dangerous
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 5 of 12
mental disorder, Plaintiffs in fact have not received adequate treatment and have been confined in punitive conditions that are not rationally related to the purposes of the SVPAct.
15. This action challenges under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the punitive conditions and the inadequate treatment received by the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. Specifically, this action challenges the decision of the Defendants to warehouse and put out of sight the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated in an attempt to hold them indefinitely and to punish, rather than treat their perceived mental disabilities.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 16. This case is brought on behalf of a class that consists of all persons who have been, are or will be committed under the SVP Act and placed in the custody of DHS. 17. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The population in the custody of DHS exceeds 150 individuals and is constantly growing larger as new persons are detained and civilly committed under the SVP Act. 18. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, and these questions predominate over those affecting only individual class members. The predominate common question is whether the mental health treatment and care provided by the Defendants or those acting under their control or direction comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 6 of 12
19. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories in that they have all suffered as a result of the unconstitutional practices alleged in this Complaint.
20. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the members of the class. They have no interests antagonistic to the class, and they are represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in civil rights litigation.
21. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that the Defendants, by creating and maintaining the practices alleged in this complaint, have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, and, as a result, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the entire class is appropriate.
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS 22. Defendants, in their official capacities, are collectively responsible for the policies and procedures controlling the manner and method of Plaintiffs' confinement and manner and method of their mental health treatment. 23. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to provide civilly committed persons with access to mental health treatment that is at least minimally adequate and gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions to improve so that they can be released. Further, because the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are not prisoners, they are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. 24. The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being denied meaningful mental health care treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions materially to improve because, among other things, the Defendants have failed:
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 7 of 12
(a) To properly train staff regarding the treatment of sexual deviance;
(b) To provide a coherent and meaningful individualized treatment program for each detainee with understandable goals and a road map showing steps necessary for improvement and release;
(c) To make adequate provisions for the participation of detainees' family members in rehabilitation efforts, including permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and allowing prompt telephone access to detainees in cases of family emergency;
(d) To draft and implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans;
(e) To afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for educational, religious, vocational and recreational activities;
(f) To cease requiring, as a precondition to participation in all but the most basic treatment offered by DHS, and therefore, as a predicate to release, that the Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated detainees to admit to a laundry list of real and imagined crimes for which they were not convicted, and thereby place themselves in jeopardy of future criminal prosecution for other crimes in violation of the Plaintiffs' Fifth right against self-incrimination applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(g) To institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality.
25. The aforesaid failure to provide constitutionally adequate
treatment is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or
standards and demonstrates that the Defendants did not base their decisions on such
professional judgment.
26. Instead of providing treatment and conditions that are rationally
related to the purposes of Plaintiffs' confinement, Defendants are using the SVP
program as a means of warehousing and punishing those in the SVP program. Since
this program was initiated over four years ago, no more than a handful of detainees
have been permitted to successfully complete the Defendants' treatment program to
-7-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 8 of 12
the point where the Defendants recommended their discharge to the courts. Defendants erect one arbitrary barrier after another to prevent Plaintiffs from progressing to the point where the SVP program will recommend their release, including requiring participants in the program to confess to crimes which they did not commit.
27. The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being held in conditions that are more restrictive than the conditions under which the Plaintiffs were confined when they were incarcerated as criminals prior to their civil commitment under the Act. These conditions are unrelated to the security or treatment needs of the SVP population and are purely punitive in nature. Further, the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are arbitrarily confined in conditions that are more restrictive than the conditions under which most convicted felons are confined by the Illinois Department of Corrections in that, among other things, the Plaintiffs:
(a) Are routinely stripped searched before and after every visit, including visits with attorneys;
(b) Are routinely shackled with restraints normally used for the transportation of prisoners housed in "super-max" facilities;
(c) Are subjected to intrusive cell searches, often with little or no justification, with greater frequency than those of prisoners;
(d) Have their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways; for example, they are not allowed to go to the commissary by themselves;
(e) Are not allowed to purchase their own razor, stapler, nail clippers, aspInns or other similar over-the-counter medication, vitamins or eye drops; and
(f) Are constantly surveilled by DHS as a result of the installation of intercom systems in the Plaintiffs' cells.
-8-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 9 of 12
CLAIM FOR RELIEF 28. The aforesaid conditions are not rationally connected to furthering the constitutionally legitimate purpose of the Act, which is to provide for the segregation and treatment of the Plaintiffs because of their alleged mental disorder, and are excessive in relation to that purpose, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer distress, humiliation, pain and a loss of liberty. The Defendants' practices and policies described above violate Plaintiffs' rights to reasonable mental health care and constitute punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs have been and continue to be irreparably harmed by these injuries and they have no adequate remedy at law for the Defendants' unlawful conduct. WHEREFORE, JEFFERY HARGETT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH and LOREN K. WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court: (1) Issue a Declaratory Judgment that the conduct, conditions and
mental health treatment described in this complaint violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Issue a Permanent Injunction against the Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and upon all those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the Injunction by personal service or otherwise requiring them to submit and implement a plan correcting the constitutional deficiencies alleged in this complaint; (3) Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 10 of 12

(4) Expressly reserve the right of all class members to bring subsequent lawsuits for damages; and
(5) Enter such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

DATED: February 27, 2002

JEFFERY HARGETT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH and LOREN K. WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

By:

Everett J. Cygal Schiff Hardin & Waite 6600 Sears Tower Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 258-5783

Benjamin S. Wolf Roger Baldwin Foundation
of the ACLU, Inc. 180 North Michigan Avenue Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 201-9740

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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 11 of 12
DOCIO:UD

JS 44 (Rev.3J99)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

FEB 28 Z002

The JS-44 civil co

e informaUon contained heJein neither replace nor supplement the flling and se~ce of p~8dings or other papers as required

by law, except as provided by /ocalNlas of court. This fonn. approved by the Judicial Conference of the Uniled Stat~5 in September 1974, is. required for the use

of Ihe Clerk of Court 10r the purpose of Inltlatlng the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

I. Ca) PLAINTIFFS
Jeffery Hargett; Kim A. Overlin; Jimmie

Smith; Loren K. Walker; on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly

situated

Will

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DEFENDANTS
Linda R. Baker, S~cretary of the I l l i

Department of HUman Services, Mary Ba

Head Facility Administrator for the

Illinois Department of Human Services

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IV: NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN 'X" IN ONE BOX ONLy)

CONTRACT

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o Under EQual Ace9n tQ~ 119) Con¢itu\:iollltlity of State 5t1tM03 o Il1O Other Sto.UQry Adi ons
Appeal to DlStnct

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JUdQ8 from

~ :1:0riginal

[J 2 Removed from o 3 Remanded from I:J 4 Reinstated or

o 5 another district

o e Multidistrict

o 7 MagIStrate

f( Proceeding

State Court

Appellate Court

Reopened

(specify)

Litigation

Judgment

Vi. CAUSE OF ACTlON (CITe THE u.s. CMl STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE: FlUNG AND WRITE eRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE.
DO NOTCI1E JURISDIC1lQNA1..ST"TUTES UNLESS DlVERSlT't)
Title 42 of the United States Code, Sec~ion 1983, Class Action on behalf
of civil detainees for due process violations.

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

V CHECK IF THI$ IS A CLASS ACTION
)"\UNDER F.R.C.R 23

DEMAND $

VIII.RELATED CASE(S) (Seeinstrucllons):

IF ANY

JUDGe

Harry D. Leinenweber

DATE
2/27/02

"TIORNEY OF RI;CORD

CHECK YES only if demanded In complaInt

JURY DEMAND: t:J YES

t:J NO

DOCKET NUMBER

99 C 2861

FOR OFFICE use ONLY

RECEIPT II _ _ _ _ _ _ AMOONT _ _ _ _ _ _ APPLYlNGIFP _ _ _ _ _ _ JUOOE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ MAG. JUDGE

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 1 Filed 02/27/2002 Page 12 of 12

In the Matter of

U..----TED STATES DISTRICT C~T NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLIN,2LSGE KENI'IEUY
Eastern Division

Jeffery Hargett; Kim A. Overlin; Jimmie Smith; Loren K.

BraCKetED Walker; on be~alfofthemselves and all others similarly
sItuated, Plamtlffs,

v. Linda R. Baker, et a!., Defendants.

u
FEB 2 B 2002

clj 2C 1 4 GERrvi',lI[!)\!G.'!.!S:'.T:Es/\OT~;:.,r}-buHncG:;;r,:'V\j

N~ber:

. .

&

f;:'~;', l::?

APPEARANCES ARE HEREBY FILED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AS ATTORNEY(S) FOR:

U 0

Plaintiffs

(A)
fAA. A SIGNATURE /.fA
7' . / /TV..J ria NEAvMEereVtt J. Cy al
FIRM
Schiff Hardi & Waite
STREET ADDRESS
6600 Sears Tower
CITY/~T ATEIZIP
ChIcago, IL 60606
(312)N25~~5E783

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)

6215930 MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR?

RJ YES

TRIAL ATIORNEY?

0 YES __-1

NO [J
C NO

SIGNATURE

(C)

NAME

FIRM

STREET ADDRESS

CITY/ST ATEIZII'

TELEPHONE NUMBER

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)

MEMBER OFTR1AL BAR? TRIAL ATIORNEY? DESIGNATED AS LOCAL COUNSEL?

0 YES
0 YES
0 YES

D NO
D NO
0 NO

SIGNATURE
NAME FIRM

=

c::;, j -.5

(B)

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, ,,-
0)
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STREET ADDRESS

CITY1STATE/ZIP

TELEPHONE NUMBER

IDENTIFICATiON NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)

MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR? TRIAL ATIQRNEY? DESIGNATED AS LOCAL COUNSEL?
SIGNATURE

0 YES 0 YES 0 YES
(D)

0 NO 0 NO
0 NO

NAME

FIRM

STREET ADDRESS

CITY/STATE/ZIP

TELEPHONE NUMBER

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (SEE ITEM 4 ON REVERSE)

MEMBER OF TRIAL BAR? TRIAL ATTORNEY? DESIGNATED AS LOCAL COUNSEL?

L YES D YES
L YES

0 NO
D NO
n NO

 
 Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 1 of 41

?d:;. ---

y 0~.(' '0'~~?:J'/

L-I/,\

",.,

.~/.-, ('I

<> :.. ;(" (.v."'.

',(.,J
V

"</, FOR

THE

IN THE UNITED STATES NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

DISTRICT COURT ILLINOIS EASTERN

DIVISIO"~"'_",

""

<v')·.s~

-;. "'/

iJ "'/' f}t n .' uwdEld•r',.',,..~' '/~1 I~J"!"'fl'A~I··

~/'·",2·o
,,'v/,''V/ -

j JEFFERY HARGETT, et al.,

MAY 2 2 ZDD;

.

Plaintiffs

j NO. 02 C 1456

J:: '/..

v. LINDA BAKER, et al.,

D )
)

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber

,..~r ~12{)'J'::'o.

)
Defendants.)

C(~Ii4,1/.CIf4~1. W ~l

MEMORANDUM

OF

LAW

IN

SUPPORT

OF

MOTION

TO

' iJ.s• D/8
DISMIS

f.Ivi"I.C071"1~"'8

OUIi-,.

Defendants, LINDA BAKER, MARY BASS, TIMOTHY BUDZ, RAYMOND WOOD

and TRAVIS HINZE, through their undersigned attorneys, submit the following as their

Memorandum of Law in Support oftheir Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, JEFFERY HARGETT, KIM OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH and LOREN

WALKER, have been civilly committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human

Services ("DHS") pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS

207/1 et seq., ("the SVP Commitment Act"). See Plaintiffs' Compl., ~~ 3-6 (attached as Exhibit

A). Plaintiffs claim that they have "never received adequate treatment or treatment that might

yield a realistic chance for [their] release." Id. Plaintiffs have sued Defendants LINDA

BAKER, MARY BASS, TIMOTHY BUDZ, RAYMOND WOOD and TRAVIS HINZE in their

official capacities. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' adoption and administration of the treatment

program "is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards

and demonstrates that the Defendants did not base their decisions on such professional

judgment." Id. at ~ 25. Plaintiffs claim that the treatment program fails to comport with their

rights afforded by the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.

5504511vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 2 of 41
Defendants move to dismiss this action in its entirety on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of any constitutional violation andlor how the Defendants violated the "professional judgment" standard under the circumstances.
II. THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS COMMITMENT ACT The SVP Commitment Act sets forth a process through which a person who is "sexualIy violent" may be civilly committed. A "sexually violent person" ("SVP") is defined as an individual who has either been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity of an underlying "sexualIy violent offense" and is found to be dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that he will engage in future acts of sexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/5 (f); 207/15(b). If a person is civilly committed under the Act, § 40(a) provides that "[t]he court shall order the person to be committed to the custody of the Department [of Ruman Services] for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexualIy violent person." The Act requires the Department of Corrections to provide DRS with a "secure facility" to house those individuals who are not appropriate for treatment through conditional release. § 207/50 (b); 59 ILADC 299.200. Section 299.300 of the Illinois Administrative Code sets forth the standards for a "secure residential facility." Currently, DRS operates that facility in Joliet, Illinois which is commonly referred to as the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the "Joliet TDF"). The security measures and "resident behavior management system" which are applied to the SVP residents at that facility are outlined at §§ 299.350 and 299.600-830 of Code. Sections 299.310 and 299.330(d) of the Illinois Administrative Code outlines the "treatment" that is to be afforded to SVPs who have consented to treatment. The Joliet TDF is not subject to the provisions of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. See 725 ILCS § 207(50)(b).
2
SS04S11vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 3 of 41
The Illinois SVP Act is similar to the statute that was upheld against a constitutional attack in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Hendricks rejected an ex post facto and double jeopardy challenge to the State of Kansas' SVP statute. The Illinois Supreme Court has also rejected ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges to the constitutionality of the Illinois Act. In Re Detention o/Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228 (2000). Moreover, in Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) the Supreme Court rejected an "as applied" habeas challenge in which the petitioner sought release from the State of Washington's SVP program.
III. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONSi Plaintiffs divide their claims into two broad categories of allegations - inadequate treatment and overly restrictive conditions of confinement. As for the treatment claims, Plaintiffs claim that they "are being denied meaningful mental health care treatment that gives
them a realistic opportunity for their conditions to improve." CompI., "if 24. Specifically,
Plaintiffs assert the following treatment related deficiencies: (I) inadequate staff training; (2) failing to provide "a coherent and meaningful individualized treatment program for each detainee with understandable goals and a road map showing steps necessary for improvement and release"; (3) failing "[t]o make adequate provisions for the participation of detainees' family members in rehabilitation efforts"; (4) failing "[t]o draft and implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans"; (5) failing "[t]o afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for education, religious, vocational and recreational activities;" (6) failing "[t]o cease requiring, as a precondition to participation in all but the most basic treatment offered by DHS ... that the Plaintiffs ... to admit to a laundry list of real and imagined crimes
1 The allegations in this case are similar to those raised in the Consolidated Third Amended Complaint filed in Harrold TineyBey, et aI., v. Howard Peters, III, et aI., Case No. 99 C 2861 (hereafter referred to as the "Consolidated Case"), which was filed on September 20, 2000.
3
SS04S11vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 4 of 41
for which they were not convicted, and thereby place themselves in jeopardy of future criminal prosecution" in violation of the Constitution. Compl, ~ 24(a)-(g). Plaintiffs assert that these failures, collectively, constitute "a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice and standards." !d. at '\[25.
Plaintiffs attack the following conditions of their confinement: (1) routine strip searches following visits; (2) maximum security shackling; (3) intrusive cell searches; (4) restricted freedom of movement; (5) inability to purchase types of over-the-counter grooming and pharmacy items; and (6) excessive surveillance through the use of an in-room intercom system. Id. at, '\[27. As discussed below, neither category of claims, individually or collectively, violate the constitutional standards that apply to civilly detained individuals.
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES A. The "Professional Judgment" Standard As civil detainees, Plaintiffs' claims are reviewed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through the application of the "professional jUdgment" standard.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.s. 307, 323 (1982). This standard provides officials with a
"presumption of correctness" in the decisions that they make in the fields of mental health and security, Id. at 321, 324, and is virtually identical to the Eighth Amendment's "deliberate indifference" standard. Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982,987-89 (7th Cir. 1998).
In Youngberg, the mother of a mentally ill man, brought suit against several officials, claiming that the officials had failed to provide her son "with appropriate 'treatment or programs for his mental retardation.'" Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310-11. The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that "a State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities." Id. at 317. It then observed that involuntarily committed persons enjoy a right to "adequate" conditions of confinement ("food, shelter, clothing and
4
SS04511vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 5 of 41
medical treatment" Id. at 324) as well as "minimally adequate" care, treatment and training which is reasonably necessary to protect their interests. Id. at 319. Youngberg held that a constitutional violation would only exist if a defendant violated his "professional jUdgment." In the Court's words, "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.2 In setting this threshold, the Court highlighted the substantial discretion afforded state officials in this context:
we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operation of these institutions should be minimized. Id. at 322. Significantly, under the professional judgment standard civil detainees are not provided with a "deep well" of constitutional protections. Rather, states are only required to provide detainees with "minimally adequate" treatment and care. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319,322; also, Collignon, 163 F3d at 987 (when the state involuntary commits a person, "it assumes an obligation to provide some minimum level of well-being and safety.") (emphasis added). To determine whether professional judgment has been exercised, Youngberg explained: decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Such presumption is necessary to enable institutions ofthis type .....to continue to function. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; see also, Parham v. J.R., 422 U.S. 584, 608, N.16 (1979); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,352 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
2 The Supreme Court defined a professional decision maker as "a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. There is no dispute that the individual Defendants are "professionals" who meet that standard. Rather, Plaintiffs accuse the individual Defendants of violating their professional judgment. Compl., ~ 25.
5
5504511vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 6 of 41
Finding that institutional decisions should be reviewed with deference, Youngberg instructed courts to refrain from second-guess these decisions:
the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made. Id. at 321; see also, Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 N.4 ("States enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens . . . [b]y this measure, Kansas has doubtless satisfied its obligation to provide available treatment."). The Seventh Circuit has explained that a violation of the professional judgment standard can exist only where the professional's subjective response to a situation "was so inadequate that it demonstrated an absence of professional judgment, that is that no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances." Collignon, 163 F.3d at 989 (emphasis supplied). Put another way, a mere disagreement over how to structure or what to include in a professionally acceptable treatment plan will not constitute a violation of the professional judgment standard. Id.; Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1996). As noted above, Collignon observed that "there is minimal difference between the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard and substantive due process' "professional judgment standard." Id. at 988.3 Under the "deliberate indifference standard," an official can be held liable only when he or she knows that the inmate faces a "substantial risk of serious harm" and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The following sections explain that Defendants have exercised their professional judgment and that they have not acted with deliberate indifference to their rights.
3 See a/so, Mayoral v. Shehan, 245 F. 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000» (holding that there is "little practical difference between" a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and a Eighth Amendment "deliberate indifference" analysis. ).
6
SS04S11vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 7 of 41
B. The Rational Basis Test Applies to "Sexually Violent Persons" Plaintiffs' claims should be reviewed under the "rational basis" standard because Plaintiffs are not members of a suspect class. Thielman v. Leen, 282 F.3d 478, 485 (7th Cir. 2002); see also, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, "[a] court will not disturb the law as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Thielman, 282 F.3d at 485 (affirming use of security measures against SVPs in Wisconsin); Stanley, 213 F.3d at 342 ("A state rationally could conclude that psychopaths do not benefit from intra-prison programs, that they spoil the programs for less aggressive inmates, or both."). C. This Court Should Defer to the Legislative Intent of the SVP Act To the extent that Plaintiffs assert that the SVP Act is punitive in its intent or operation, that contention is rebuffed by the Act itself which provides that any commitment obtained thereunder is civil in nature. In concluding that the Kansas statute was civil on its face, the Hendricks held that its analysis was "a question of statutory construction" in which it would "defer" to the legislature's stated intent absent a showing of the '" clearest proof that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil. ", Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. Hendricks called the later approach a "heavy burden." Id. In holding that the Kansas statute was non-punitive in nature, the Court reviewed both the statute on its face and the conditions which Mr. Hendricks claimed rendered his confinement punitive in nature. Id. at 362-63. This approach was reiterated in Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. at 262 and in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997). Seling held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 did not provide the means for the detainee's release even if the particular nature of the his
7
5504S11vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 8 of 41
confinement amounted to punishment. Rather, the Court suggested that the proper method of
attack might be through a state court lawsuit or a § 1983 action. Id. at 263.4
Because Plaintiffs appear to be bringing a "facial" and "as applied" attack to the SVP Act and its statutory based procedures (see Compl, ~~ 14-15, 26-29), this Court has the power to
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims in their entirety on a motion to dismiss. Thielman, 282 F.3d at 486
(affirming motion to dismiss that attacked provisions of the State of Wisconsin's SVP Act); see
also, Hendricks, 521 at 361-63, Seling, 531 U.S. at 261; Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100.
D. Plaintiffs Are Not Comparable to DOC Prisoners
Plaintiffs argue that their constitutional rights have been violated because they have been
denied certain privileges that were allegedly available to them when they were in DOC custody.
See Comp\., ~ 27. This argument is without merit. It is well settled that "prisoners" and "non-
prisoners" are not similarly situated for purposes of a constitutional analysis. Barichello v.
McDonald, 98 F.3d 948,952-53 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We have found no case, however, holding that
the state is powerless to distinguish between criminal and civil patients in matters of
4 Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Seling went one step further in suggesting that Mr. Young's first stop should be in state court rather than a § 1983 action:
[w]hen, as here, a state statute is at issue, the remedy for implementation that does not comport with the civil nature of the statute is resort to the traditional state proceedings that challenge unlawful executive actions; if those proceedings fail, and the state courts authoritatively interpret the statute as permitting impositions that are indeed punitive, then and only then can federal courts pronounce a statute that on its face is civil to be criminal. Such an approach protects federal courts from becoming enmeshed in the sort of intrusive inquiry into local conditions at state institutions that are best left to the State's own judiciary, at least in the first instance. And it avoids federal invalidation of state statutes on the basis of executive implementations that the state courts themselves, given the opportunity, would find to be ultra vires. Only this approach, it seems to me, is in accord with our sound and traditional reluctance to be the initial interpreter of state law. ld. at 269 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia's well reasoned concurrence comports with prior precedent which requires courts to defer to the decisions of state actors and resist substituting their own judgment. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321, 324; Parham, 422 U.S. at 608 N.16; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352; Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 (1979); see also, Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 NA.
8
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 9 of 41
treatment."); People v. McDougle, 303 Ill.App.3d 509 (2d Dist. 1999) (holding that individuals civilly committed to DOC under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were not similarly situated and could not be constitutionally compared to individuals who had been committed under the SVP Act); People v. McVeay, 302 Ill.App.3d 960, 967 (2d Dist. 1999) (same).5
Plaintiffs' argument also misses the mark in that when they were housed in DOC custody, they were living at different facilities with differing levels of security. Plaintiffs were housed with individuals who committed various types of crimes ranging from theft and burglary to drug dealing. Now, however, they are committed only with other "sexually violent" individuals, which provides a significantly different dynamic for those officials who are operating the "secure facility" at which the Plaintiffs reside. To accept Plaintiffs' argument would ignore the fact that the DHS, in exercising its professional judgment, can set forth restrictive security measures which take into account the "sexually violent nature" of the individuals it houses. Thielman v. Leen, 282 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2002). As explained below, considering the wide ranging security threats posed by detainees (some are clearly more violent than others) DHS's security decisions should be afforded substantial deference. Id. at 482-84.
Plaintiffs' argument also ignores the fact that the Seventh Circuit has essentially negated any difference between the constitutional standards it applies to convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees. Mayoral, 245 F.3d at 938; Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988. Consequently, it is beyond question that DHS, in the exercise of its professional judgment, is not required to build a separate facility that replicates the level of security which each resident was accustomed to while in DOC.
5 See also, Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 1999) (pre-trial detainees are not similarly situated to convicted prisoners); Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that prisoners and non-prisoners are not similarly situated groups for comparison purposes); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1995).
9
5504SIlvl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 10 of 41
v. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Been Subjected to Unconstitutional Conditions Paragraph twenty-seven of the Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the conditions at the Joliet TDF violate the Fourteenth Amendment because "[t]hese conditions are unrelated to the security or treatment needs of the SVP population and are purely punitive in nature." Compl, ~ 27. Their complaints can be summarized as follows:
(1) strip searches following visits; (2) maximum security shackling; (3) intrusive cell searches; (4) restricted freedom of movement; (5) inability to buy particular over-the-counter grooming/pharmacy items; and (6) surveillance through the use of an in-room intercom system. As discussed below, none of these complaints rise to the level of a constitutional. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' complaints regarding security measures employed by the Joliet TDF ignore the security risks posed by "sexually violent persons". Plaintiffs would have this court second-guess the security measures that exist at the Joliet TDF despite the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the approach now urged by the Plaintiffs. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (1979) ("the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."); Seibert v. Alt, 2002 WL 370019, *2 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding State of Wisconsin's decision to confiscate an SVP's word processor and disks in response to institution wide security search for gang-related material). Consequently, in light of the deference afforded to facility officials under Youngberg and Bell on the issue of institutional security, the Plaintiffs'
10
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 11 of 41
claims in paragraph 27 should be summarily rejected because they neither individually nor collectively render their confinement punitive and all reflect legitimate security measures which the defendants may lawfully employ.
Second guessing aside, in order to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs must establish that they have a "liberty interest" in the purported constitutional rights that have been allegedly violated and that the deprivation allegedly suffered "imposes an atypical and significant hardship" in a constitutional sense. Thielman v. Leen, 282 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). In Thielman, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's determination that several provisions of the State of Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Persons Act did not violate a detainee's rights to due process where the plaintiff had alleged that the defendants had subjected him to overly restrictive security measures characterized by the court as '''full and double-locked restraints, chain-type-belt waist restraints with attached handcuffs, security Blackbox, and leg restraints'" - during transport without an individualized determination that the security measures were necessary.
In affirming the district court's dismissal of this claim, the Seventh Circuit in Thielman analyzed the "predicate question" - "whether Thielman has a liberty interest in not being subjected to WRC's restraint policy." Accepting for the sake of argument that Wisconsin law provided the plaintiff with "a state-created right to the least restrictive conditions of confinement during transport," the Seventh Circuit held that the Wisconsin statutes did "not provide [him with] a liberty interest cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment." Thielman, 282 F.3d. at 482. Applying the rationale of Sandin v. Conner, the Seventh Circuit found that civil detainees could only have a protectabJe liberty interest under state law where the method of restraint ''' ...
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imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. ", Id. at 484 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
Acknowledging that Sandin disavowed the practice of involving courts in the "day-today" management of prisons in favor of allowing officials to operate them with "appropriate deference and flexibility," the Seventh Circuit concluded that the same deference should be provided to those officials running Wisconsin's SVP program. Thielman, 282 F.3d. at 483. In recognizing that "Sandin teaches that any person already confined may not nickel and dime his way into a federal claim by citing small, incremental deprivations of physical freedom," Thielman held that "Sandin's reasoning applies with equal to force to persons confined under" the Wisconsin SVP Act. Id. at 484. According to Thielman, "facilities dealing with those who have been involuntarily committed for sexual disorders are 'volatile' environments whose dayto-day operations cannot be managed from on high." Id. at 483. Applying Sandin, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the methods of restraint ("a waist belt and leg chains") did not impose an
"atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of [plaintiff s1
confinement." Id. at 484. 1. Security Restraints and Strip Searches are Constitutional
Thielman rejected a nearly identical challenge that the use of the physical restraints failed to afford the plaintiff what he termed "the least restrictive conditions of confinement." Id. at 484-85. Applying the "rational basis test," Thielman agreed with Wisconsin's argument that the "dangerousness" of sexually violent persons warranted the use of those restraints. Id. at 485. Finding that detainees under the Wisconsin SVP Act "have a previous conviction ... to evidence their dangerousness" and a chance of "indefinite commitment, heightening their desire to escape," Thielman held that the methods of restraint were rationally related to a legitimate
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goverrnnental interest. Id. In so finding, the Seventh Circuit accepted the affidavit of the security director of the Wisconsin SVP program which described that at least six cases of battery had been referred out for prosecution and that one patient had escaped and abducted a trial. Id. 6
Against these standards, Title 59, § 299.350 of the Illinois Administrative Code sets forth the security measures employed by the SVP Program:
d) Movement of Residents Handcuffs, security belts and/or leg irons may be used to restrain any resident when: I) A person confined pending a review of an incident under Section 299.660 or in secure management status (Sections 299.650 and 299.690) is moved within the facility, 2) A resident is transported outside the facility, or 3) Determined by the Program Director to be necessary for security. Since the Administrative Code provides for the use of the complained of security measures, under Thielman's analyses, in order to comport with the Constitution, the State of Illinois is simply required to establish that there exists a "rational basis" to support the use of these measures. Clearly, there is no reason to suggest that persons detained under the Illinois SVP Act are less violent than those detained under the Wisconsin SVP Act in Thielman. In fact, since the inception of the Illinois SVP Act on January I, 1998, there have been not less than fifteen reported incidents of assaults by residents on DHS staff. See Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Security Director Robert Glotz, ~~ 1-3, 8. Fourteen of these assaults were reported to the Illinois State Police for prosecution and seven were prosecuted. Id. at ~~ 9-10. In addition, in October of 2000, two SVPs escaped from a DHS transportation vehicle en route to Cook County Circuit Court after they overpowered DHS staff. See Exhibit A, Affidavit of Glotz, ~ 4-7. Here, the complained of security measures are no different that what was alleged in
6 Significantly, the Seventh Circuit accepted the affidavit in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion. 13
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Thielman. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claim in paragraph 27(b) which challenges the methods of security under the SVP Program.
To the extent that Thielman was not called upon to discuss whether strip searches of sexually violent persons before and after visits would violate the Constitution, this court need only turn to the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) to find that this argument has no merit. In Bell, the Court sustained against a similar constitutional challenge, the practice of conducting routine body cavity searches following contact visits. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60. In reaching that conclusion, the Bell court held that governmental officials should be provided "wide-ranging deference" and that the constitutional rights of the detainees held in their custody may be limited or restricted in order to maintain the "essential goals" of institutional security and the preservation of internal order and discipline. Id at 547. Underlying the Court's opinion was its finding that "[t]here is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser risk than convicted inmates. Indeed, it may be that in certain circumstances they present a greater risk to security and order." Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.
As recognized in Thielman, sexually violent persons by their very nature pose severe security risks. In light of this fact, the application of strip searches before and after visits is rationally related to legitimate security concerns. In fact, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587-89 (1984) went so far as to uphold a blanket prohibition of contact visits for pretrial detainees as well as irregularly scheduled shakedown searches of individual cells for security reasons. In Block, the Supreme Court recognized that the "purpose of the cavity searches in Wolfish was to discover and deter smuggling of weapons and contraband" which is a recognized risk associated with contact visits. Block, 468 U.s. at 587-88. As these cases teach, this Court should afford Defendants the benefit of the doubt with regard to their efforts to provide for
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institutional security, internal order and discipline at the Joliet TDF and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims in paragraphs 27(a) and (b).
2. Room Searches are Constitutional Plaintiffs' claim in paragraph 27(c) that they "[a]re subjected to intrusive cell searches, often with little or no justification," should also be dismissed that they do not have a constitutional right of privacy. Bell, 441 U.S. at 557 ("even the most zealous advocate of prisoners' rights would not suggest that a warrant is required ... Detainees' drawers, beds and personal items may be searched."); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-30 (1984) (holding that prisoners lack expectation of privacy in their belongings). Again, Title 59 of the Illinois Administrative Code sets forth that "[a]1I residents and their clothing, property, housing and work assignments are subject to search at any time." See 59 ILADC 299.350(£)(2). In both Bell and Block, the Supreme Court upheld the practice of conducting unannounced searches of living areas as a legitimate security measure. Here, DHS has a legitimate right to search for sexually explicit material which is off limits to SVPs. Plaintiffs do not suggest that those searches are being conducted to punish the residents, rather they object to their frequency. As noted above, Plaintiffs' comparisons to their prior DOC custody is of no moment. Accordingly, paragraph 27(c) should be dismissed.
3. Plaintiffs Do Not Have Unrestricted Freedom of Movement To the extent that Plaintiffs argue in paragraph 27(d) that they "[h]ave their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways; for example, they are not allowed to go to the commissary by themselves," this claim should be dismissed because persons in custody do not have a constitutional right to unfettered movement within a facility. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430) (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no constitutionality based liberty interest
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in movement outside of a cell guaranteed by the Due Process Clause); see also, Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2nd 644,647-48 (7th Cir. 1992) (criminal defendant found unfit to stand trial did not have a protected liberty interest in being confined under the "least restrictive environment"). In fact, Title 59 of the Administrative Code provides that the Program Director of the TDF "may confine residents temporarily in all or part of the facility when determined necessary in order to maintain security of the facility or the safety of residents, employees or other persons." See 59 ILADC 299.350(e)(I). Bearing this point in mind, institutional lockdowns are not per se violations of the Constitution. Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1986) (regardless of severity or duration of the lockdowns, due process rights are not violated because the difference in pre and post lock down conditions is one of degree and not of kind).
4. DHS Commissary Policies Do Not Violate the Constitution Plaintiffs' claim in paragraph 27(e) that they are unable to purchase certain personal items from the Joliet TDF commissary should also be dismissed. It is well settled that persons do not have a constitutional right to unrestricted "commissary privileges." Robinson v. Illinois State Correctional Center, 890 F. Supp. 715, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (rejecting similar claim brought by prisoner on due process, equal protection and Eighth Amendment grounds). Rather, "the fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conclusions or restrictions of detention into" unlawful "punishment" Bell, 441 U.S. at 437. Plaintiffs' alleged inability to purchase razors, staplers, nail clippers (or other similar items that can be used as weapons) from outside vendors is readily justified on the basis of maintaining institutional security and safety. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs are required to purchase the enumerated personal items from the Joliet TDF commissary does not
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violate the constitution. contrary to Plaintiffs' allegations in paragraph 27(f), they do not have a constitutional right against having an intercom system installed in their cells. As discussed in Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57, detainees do not have a right of privacy. Even if they did, Plaintiffs have failed to identify a single instance in which their were monitored or that they have suffered damages from such monitoring (such as overhearing any privileged conversations). The intercom system is a legitimate security tool which has no punitive purpose.
5. Room Monitoring is Constitutional Contrary to Plaintiffs' allegations in paragraph 27(f), they do not have a constitutional right against having an intercom system installed in their rooms. As discussed in Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57, detainees do not have a right of privacy. Even if they did, Plaintiffs have failed to identify a single instance in which their were monitored or that they have suffered damages from such monitoring (such as overhearing any privileged conversations). The intercom is a legitimate tool which has no punitive purpose. Here, DHS has a legitimate basis for installing the intercom system. Rather than relying on SVPs to yell out requests through the door of the rooms, the intercom allows SVPs to contact staff to open their door or to summon help in an emergency. B. The SVP Treatment Program Does Not Violate "Professional Judgment" As noted above, the Supreme Court has declared that "decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Such presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type...to continue to function." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. Ignoring this principle, Plaintiffs have drafted a proverbial laundry list of alleged deficiencies which they claim support their contention that DHS officials have neglected to exercise any professional judgment in the adoption and administration of the SVP Program. CompI., ~~ 24-25. Claiming that "no more than a handful of detainees have been permitted to successfully complete the Defendants' treatment program to the point where the Defendants recommended their discharge
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to the courts," Plaintiffs allege that the program violates the Constitution because they have not yet been released. Id. at ~ 26.
By pointing to the successful completion of the treatment program by other SVPs (which was pointed out to this Court earlier this year in the State's objection to the discovery extension that was sought in the case of Tiney-Bey v. Peters, Case No. 99 C 2861), Plaintiffs have pled themselves out-of-court. Even if Plaintiffs had ignored this fact, as discussed below, their requested relief goes beyond what is required by the Constitution. Specifically, the relief they request ignores the limited role that courts have in overseeing the day-to-day operations of a state facility. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321,324; Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; Thielman, 282 F.3d. at 483; see also, Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 NA
Plaintiffs' allegations also ignore In re Detention of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, (2nd Dist. 200 I) which specifically overturned a trial court's attempt to dictate that manner in which the petitioner was to obtain of treatment. Contrary to Plaintiffs' attempts to second guess their treatment, the Second District in Hayes held that "nothing in the Act suggest that the trial court may appoint an expert on a continuing basis to oversee the implementation of a treatment plan." 747 N.E.2d at 459. Deferring to the State's treatment program, the reviewing court in Hayes held that "the Act specifically authorizes the Department to operate a secure facility and provide by rule for the nature of the facility and the level of care to be provided to the facility. 725 ILCS 207/50(b) (West 1998)." Pointing out this fact, the Hayes court held that "[a] trial court order appointing a special individual to oversee treatment at the facility directly conflicts with the authority granted the Department by this section. Therefore, the trial court's order ... exceeds the trial court's statutory authority." Id. (citations omitted). In so holding, the Hayes court pointed out that a trial court's appointment of an expert to "oversee" the implementation of
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treatment would cause the resources of DHS to "be consumed by the administrative burden of multifarious reporting requirements.'"
As noted in Hayes, the Act sets forth a detailed treatment program, which by its very nature, establishes that professional judgment was applied in creating the program. Title 59, Section 299.310 ofthe Illinois Administrative Code sets forth the following treatment:
a) A resident shall be provided with adequate and humane care and treatment services pursuant to an individual services plan, which shall be formulated and periodically reviewed by the treatment team with the participation of the resident to the extent feasible and, where appropriate, such resident's guardian. A qualified professional shall be responsible for overseeing the implementation ofsuch plan. b) Residents shall attend scheduled individual and group therapy sessions, objective sexual assessment appointments, and other programming as set forth in the individualized services plans. A resident may be excused from attendance requirements by the Program Director for illness, pursuant to the Resident Behavior Management System or for other good cause. (emphasis supplied). While SVPs must consent to be treated and are free to refuse to be treated, "[i]f the resident refuses to consent to or enter recommended treatment, demonstrates disinterest or a lack of progress attributable to poor motivation within treatment, the team may reassign the resident to another management status." See 59 ILAC 299.310. Section 299.330 of the Code also provides for a highly detailed regimen for the administration of psychotropic medicine which includes Treatment Review Committee Hearing procedures, clinical review procedures, emergency procedures as well as procedures related to minors. One disappointing aspect of this case is that class counsel abandoned discovery into propriety of the treatment program in the case of Harrold Tiney-Bey, et al., v. Howard Peters,
7 Hayes is also noteworthy to the extent that it recognized that Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, a psychiatrist, testified at the trial court level and "opined that that the treatment respondent would receive at the then Sheridan treatment facility would be adequate to treat his mental condition." Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 449.
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IlL et ai., Case No. 99 C 2861 (the "Consolidated Case") when it chose to file this action after Defendants raised Article III standing arguments and objected to numerous discovery extensions sought by the Plaintiffs. Declining to amend the Consolidated Case to add the present Plaintiffs, counsel filed an entirely new action. In doing so, however, counsel left in his wake detailed written discovery answers which set forth the treatment program provided to the SVP residents. Pleadings and discovery materials in other cases on this court's docket are matters that this Court may accept through judicial notice on a 12(b)6 motion. Opoka v. INS, 94 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. I 996)(collecting cases); Doherty v. City a/Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 324 (7th Cir. 1996); Henson v. CSC Credit Srvs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994).
In response to Plaintiffs' interrogatory number 17 which asked "What are the policies and procedures relating to the treatment program," defendants provided a detailed answer which identified the individualized nature of the five step treatment program which is set up to treat SVPs through the core therapies of cognitive restructuring, relapse prevention and journaling which can range from 15 to 33 hours per week of individualized therapy. That interrogatory answer was provided to this court in opposition to the Consolidated Plaintiffs' request for an extension of discovery and is attached to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as Group Exhibit B.
In response to this interrogatory answer and the production of hundreds of documents, including Defendant Budz's detailed "Focus Report" which detailed the methodology of the treatment program (see Group Exhibit B), Plaintiffs neglected to depose any treatment providers. Defendants in the Consolidated Case also provided the resumes of the treatment professionals involved in the SVP program which detail the fact that they have collectively devoted over four dozen years to providing treatment to sexually violent persons. 8 In response to Plaintiffs' request
8 For example, Defendant Dr. Raymond Wood is the Clinical Director of the SVP Treatment Program. Dr. Wood received his doctorate in psychology in 1991 and has worked in the treatment of sexually
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to extend discovery, Defendants tendered the evaluation report of its consulting expert, Dr. William L. Marshall.9 See Group Exhibit B (attached to Def.s' Motion to Dismiss). Rather than respond to this Court's December 13, 2001 order which had instructed Plaintiffs to submit a non-binding response to Dr. Marshall's report by January 31, 2002 (see transcript of 12/12/01 hearing, p. 23 (lines 17-25) & p. 26 (lines 14-17 attached as Exhibit C to Def.s' Motion to Dismiss», Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the December 13, 2001, ruling and obtained leave of Court to conduct expert discovery without restriction before March 6, 2002. Ignoring this deadline, Plaintiffs' counsel proceeded to file this present action.
Defendants, by attaching these materials, are attempting to demonstrate that given the broad deference and presumption of correctness provided to professionals in these circumstances, that DHS has in fact exercised its professional judgment in developing the SVP
treatment program. In light of this fact, disposal of Plaintiffs' claims on a motion to dismiss is supported by Thielman.
Moreover, because a professional'S judgment in this context is presumptively valid, and because the State has a treatment program in place, Plaintiffs must do more than broadly allege that "[tJhe aforesaid failure to provide constitutionally adequate treatment is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards and demonstrates that the
violent sex offenders since 1994. See Group Exhibit B, p. I. From 1994 to 1998 he rose through the ranks of the State of Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Persons Program to eventually head the program. Id. Prior to working in Wisconsin's program, Dr. Wood began treatmg incarcerated persons in 1985. Id. at p. 2. Dr. Wood was the lead coordinator of the 2001 National Sexually Violent Persons Conference and Summit held in Chicago in May of 200 1, has co-authored five publications related to the treatment of sex offenders and has partIcipated in over a dozen presentations related to this topic. Id. at pp. 2-4. Dr. Wood has also participated in nearly four dozen conferences related to the treatment of sex offenders. Id. at pp. 4-7. 9 Dr. Marshall is a nationally acclaimed expert on sexually violent persons. According to his resume, he "has been instrumental in establishing several prison and community treatment programs for sexual offenders in Canada and in six other countries. Bill is an active clinician and researclier who has over 190 publications, including 40 book chapters and 5 books, with most of this work dealing with sexual offenders. He is on, or has been on, the editorial board of 14 international scientific journals, and he is the recipient of the Lifetime Achievement Award of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders." See Group Exhibit B.
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Defendants did not base their decisions on such professional judgment." Compl., ~ 25. To hold otherwise would run afoul of the Court's holding in O'Lone v. Estate oJShabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1987) (explaining that state officials do not "have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.").
Finally, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' treatment related claims because, none of the complained of "failures" of the program independently or collectively violate the constitution.
1. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Constitutional Right to Education or Vocational Services
Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, they do not have a constitutional right to educational or vocational services. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000); Garza v. Miller,
688 F.2d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 1982); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1996); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing cases). For this reason alone,
Plaintiffs' claim that they are entitled to education and vocational services should be dismissed. Plaintiffs' claim should also me dismissed to the extent that they lack Article III standing.
To establish standing, a plaintiff must "show that he 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as a result of the challenged official conduct, and the injury or threat of injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural or hypotheticaL'" City ojLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983) (citations omitted); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." (emphasis supplied». Here, Plaintiffs have alleged no facts which establish that they have been or will be injured by the alleged lack of education and vocational training currently available at the Joliet TDF nor have they suggested how these services will aid in their rehabilitation.
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Plaintiffs' claims are also premature. Vocational training under the SVP Act is triggered at the point in time where an SVP reaches the point of conditional release. See 59 ILADC 299.400 Section 299.400 specifically provides for vocational training at the point of conditional release. Here, DHS has recently contracted with Liberty Healthcare to provide these services to SVPs who graduate to conditional release. (See Def.s' Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit D, p. 13). In addition, this contract requires Liberty's employees to have at least five years of therapy experience in sex offender treatment. Id. at p. 16. The fact that DHS has chosen to focus its program on sex offender treatment and does not provide vocational training until that treatment has been successful is an imminently reasonable approach. Otherwise, residents may be distracted from the foremost goal of the program - their successful treatment as sex offenders and ultimately the release from their civil commitment. Adding vocational training will take time away from the core therapies of the treatment program and could result in a longer stay the Joliet TDF. The alleged failure to offer vocational training at an earlier stage in the program does not suggest that professional judgment was not exercised; rather it reflects the exercise of considered judgment on the issue.
In view of the fact that Plaintiffs lack any constitutional right to education or vocational training, they cannot establish that the treatment program's alleged failure to provide these services violates the professional judgment standard.
2. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Allege an Abridgement of Their First Amendment Right to Practice Religion
Individuals who are in custody have a right to practice their religion, Cruz v. Beta, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). However, the right to exercise one's religious beliefs "does not depend upon his ability to pursue each and every aspect of the practice of his religion." Canedy v. Boardman, 91 F.3d 30, 33 (7th Cir. 1996). Rather, a detention
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facility is simply required to provide "reasonable opportunities" for religious practice, and nothing more. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322; Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1994). Restrictions on a detainee's right to practice his or her religious beliefs will be upheld as long as they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" such as institutional security and economic concerns. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; Alston, 13 F.3d at 1039. DHS has recognized this constitutional right by establishing that "Residents shall be provided reasonable opportunities to pursue their religious beliefs and practices subject to the Program's concerns regarding security, safety, rehabilitation, institutional order, space, and resources." See 59 ILADC 299.300(d)
Plaintiffs lack standing because they have totally failed to allege that they themselves have been deprived the right to practice their religion of choice. Moreover, they have failed to plead any facts or conclusions which suggest how the treatment program is rendered deficient by virtue of the alleged lack of a religious component.lO In light of these pleading deficiencies and legal principles, Plaintiffs cannot establish that the treatment program's provisions for religious needs violate the professional judgment standard.
3. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Constitutional Right to Have Their Families Participate in Treatment
Plaintiffs suggest the that the treatment program violates the professional judgment standard because the program allegedly does not "make adequate provisions for the participation of detainees' family members in rehabilitation efforts." Compl., ~ 24(c). Plaintiffs also fault the program for failing to permit family visits "with reasonable frequency" and from failing to
10 In fuct, adding a religious component to their sex offender treatment program would put the State at risk of a claim that they were violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472,480 (7th Cir. 1996) (religious component to a prison's narcotics rehabilitation program violated the First Amendment); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (striking down nondenominational religious invocation and benediction as part of a public school graduation ceremony). The fact that prayers or religious services are "technically voluntary" has not prevented courts from finding violations of the Establishment Clause. Wallace v. JafJree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down Alabama statute prescribing a moment of silence followed by voluntary prayer in schools).
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provide "prompt telephone access to detainees in cases of family emergency." ld. None of these omissions violate the Constitution much less the professional judgment standard.
Addressing the last complaint first, none of the Plaintiffs have alleged that they have been harmed in any manner, much less allege that their treatment has been compromised because they were unable to have telephone contact with their family during a so-called "family emergency." It should go without saying that they lack standing to assert such a claim for anyone else. As for the allegedly deficient visitor policy, again, it is unclear how the treatment program is to blame for this deficiency or how the visitor policy renders the treatment program substandard. In any event, none of the Plaintiffs have standing to assert because they have failed to allege that they have been deprived of any visits or that any denial of visitation has harmed their treatment.
Plaintiffs' remaining claim regarding the alleged lack of family participation also fails to establish a constitutional violation or a violation of the professional judgment standard. First, there is no clear right to have family members participate in treatment. In any event, none of the Plaintiffs assert that they have made and/or been denied a request to have their family participate in their treatment. Even if they made such a request, Plaintiffs have not alleged how family participation would positively impact their treatment. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. Clearly, DHS has a rational basis for exercising its judgment to not include family members in treatment sessions.
4. The SVP Act Contains Comprehensive Grievance and Behavior Management Procedures
Contrary to Plaintiffs' allegations in paragraph 24(d) of their Compliant, the SVP Program contains a comprehensive set of behavioral management procedures as set forth in Title 59 of the Illinois Administrative Code. Specifically, § 299.650 details the temporary assignment of SVPs on secure management status, § 299.660 details the Behavioral Review Committee's review of incident reports and § 299.670 details the consequences of rule violations. See also, §
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299.690 (placement in Secure Management Status); § 299.700 (conditions of confinement in Secure Management Status); §§ 299.800 through 299.850 (detailing grievance procedures); § 299.630 and Appendix A to Title 59 sub-section 299 (describing and defining rule violations).
Plaintiffs have failed to set forth how they have been injured as a result of the established grievance procedures and behavioral management plans, let alone specify, what, if any provision(s) violate the Constitution or the professional judgment standard. While notice pleading is allowed under the federal rules, defendants should not be forced to guess at what is the plaintiffs' liability theory. Plaintiffs fail to allege how the behavioral management program renders the treatment program inadequate and therefore this claim should be dismissed.
5. The Treatment Program Does Not Violate the 5th Amendment Plaintiffs contend that the treatment program violates the Fifth Amendment's protection against self incrimination because it requires SVP's to admit to real and imagined crimes. Compl, ~ 24(f). There is no merit to this claim. Similar claims have been rejected in In re Detention ofAnders, 710 N.E.2d 475, 478-79 (2nd Dist. 1999) and In re Detention ofTiney-Bey, 707 N.D.2d 751, 755-56 (4th Dist. 1999). Both courts held that SVPs did not have a right to maintain silence during psychological evaluations. Rather, the right to silence was statutorily limited to SVP trial proceedings. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986), rejected a similar challenge to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01, et seq.), holding that the civil nature of the statute did not trigger the Fifth Amendment.
6. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Allege a Breach of Confidentiality There is no merit to Plaintiffs' suggestion in paragraph 24(g) that the treatment program violates the professional judgment standard on the basis that the program fails "[tlo institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality." See Pl.s' Compl, ~ 24(g). As discussed in In re Detention ofAnders, 710 N.E.2d 475, 480 (2nd Dist. 1999), the physician-
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patient privilege does not apply to the SVP Act due to the fact that a commitment proceeding places a detainee's "mental condition" "at issue." This claim should also be dismissed because there are not facts alleged to suggest that any of the named Plaintiffs have suffered from any purported right to confidentiality. Again, none of the Plaintiffs have standing to raise this claim.
7. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Treatment "Roadmap" Provide them with an Individualized Treatment Program
Turning to Plaintiffs' more esoteric contentions, they do not have a constitutional right which entitles them to "a road map showing steps necessary for improvement and release." Compi., ~ 24(b). Aside from the fact that this claim is totally inappropriate for class-wide relief (for example, Plaintiff Kim Overlin's detailed Master Treatment Plan (which has been provided in discovery to Plaintiffs) is markedly different from that of Plaintiff Loren Walker (see Motion to Dismiss, Group Exhibit E)), Plaintiffs' request runs smack against the professional judgment standard. Plaintiffs are provided with an individualized service plan under 59 ILAC 299.310. Those plans form the basis of the treatment which will ultimately lead to an individual's release from his commitment. To the extent Plaintiffs desire something more - a roadmap to release their claim is simply not actionable in light of the inherent difficulties in treating mental illness. All that is required is an individualized plan which meets the professional judgment standard which is precisely what the Plaintiffs are provided under 59 ILAC 299.310.
Treating a mental illness is not like administering to custodial conditions. Rather, each individual's sexual history, his personality traits, background experiences, substance abusive, anti-social tendencies, etc. require an individualized plan, not some roadmap for all residents of the program. As recognized by Hendricks, "not only do 'psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness' .. . but the Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those properly subject to civil confinement."
27
SS04S11vl

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 28 of 41
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 359. Similarly, Seling, 531.S. at 255-56, noted that the Mr. Young's expert opined that "there is not any mental disorder that makes a person likely to reoffend" while Washington's expert came to the opposite conclusion and when he opined that Mr. Young suffered from a personality disorder which made him likely to reoffend. Lastly, Plaintiffs do not have standing for the relief they request because they have not described how they have been injured by not having a "roadmap" for release, Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-102, and because they have failed to point to any alternative methodology. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
While Plaintiffs fault DHS with failing to provide them with "a coherent and meaningful individualized treatment program," Compl., ~ 24(b), they do not appear to dispute have been provided with an individualized treatment plan as mandated by § 299.310 of the Illinois Administrative Code. As noted above, Plaintiffs Overlin and Walker have different treatment plans. Again, Plaintiffs are improperly seeking to micro-manage the SVP treatment program. Moreover, Plaintiffs' individualized request is contrary to class relief to the extent that each treatment plan will necessarily respond to individualized concerns. Lastly, they lack standing to raise this claim because they have failed to point to an injury caused by DHS much less offer an alternative treatment plan. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-102; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
8. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Allege a Failure-to-Train Claim As a final matter, Plaintiffs have failed to set forth the elements of a failure to train claim against DHS. See Pl.s' Compl., ~ 24(a). First, assuming that a failure to train claim can be brought in the absence of a violation of the professional judgment standard, as a fundamental matter, a failure-to-train claim must be based upon a constitutional injury. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) ("considerably more proof than [aJ single incident will be necessary ... to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the unconstitutional deprivation."); Canton v. Harris, 489
28
SS04S11vi

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 29 of 41
U.S. 378, 390-91 (1988). Accordingly, simply alleging that a defendant was inadequately
trained is not enough. Second, it is not enough to simply "point to something that the [entity1
'could have done' to prevent" the injury from occurring. Canton, 489 U.S. at 392. Put another way, allegations that "more or better training" fail to state a claim. Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332,1345 (7th Cir. 1997); Erwin v. County ofManitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiffs have failed to allege any injury other than the fact that they remain in DHS custody and none of their contentions established a constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot make out a failure to train claim. Estate ofPhillips v. City ofMilwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 597 (7th Cir. 1997); Contreras v. City ofChicago, 119 F.3d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1997). In view of the foregoing, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' failure-to-train claim.
C. The Department of Human Services is the Only Proper Defendant Plaintiffs have sued Defendants in his or her official capacities. As Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) teaches, these official capacity claims are in reality a single claim against the Illilnois Department of Human Services. See also, Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1021 N.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing redundant official capacity claims against individual defendants; Contrerras v. City of Chicago, 920 F.Supp. 1370, 1376 N.l (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same). To the extent that any claims remain in the face of this motion, this Court should order that the Complaint be amended to name DHS as the proper defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION As this Court can imagine, the successful treatment of sexually violent individuals is not any easy task. The Illinois SVP Program is not a life sentence. Rather, SVPs who are not in treatment may petition for release via periodic evaluations and court ordered evaluations "for the purpose of determining whether the person has made sufficient progress to be conditionally released or discharged." See 725 ILCS 207/55; 207/60; 207/65; 207170. Moreover, since the
29
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 30 of 41

inception of the SVP Program only several years ago, six (6) SVPs have been conditionally

released to the community and two (2) release proceedings are currently pending. For privacy

purposes (as mandated by the Illinois Mental Health and Disabilities Confidentiality Act, 740

ILCS 110, et seq.), these individuals will be listed by a DHS identification number.

DHS ID No. 18 23 41 57 91 48 5 II

Committing County Saline Perry Lake Winnebago Marion Cook Winnebago Kane

Admittance Date 04119/98 04/27/98 08/18/98 12/17/98 07/15/99 09/18/98 01/26/98 04/01198

Release Date 07/29/99 02/04/99 03/14/00 03/22/00 08119/01 10117/01 Pending Pending

Ignoring the facts, Plaintiffs' lawsuit improperly seeks to mandate the marmer in which

treatment should be provided to all of the SVP residents on a class-wide basis. As aptly stated

by the Supreme Court, "[ilt is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or

class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of

courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion

as to comply with the laws and the Constitution." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Defendants, respect request that this

Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.

J. William Roberts Steven M. Puiszis James C. Vlahakis HINSHAW & CULBERTSON 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, Illinois 6060 I-I 081 (312) 704-3000
30

5S04SIlvi

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 31 of 41
Exhibit A

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 32 of 41
"

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DlVISION

RECEP ----0
FEB 27 20uZ

JEFFERY HARGETT; KIM A. OVERLIN; )

JIMMIE SMITH; LOREN K. WALKER; 011 )

behalf of themselves and all others

I

Similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs.

I

)

v.

)

)

LINDA R. BAKER, Secl"etary of the

)

Illinois Department of Human Semces, )

MARY BASS, Head Facility

)

Administrator for the Illinois

I

Department of Human Services,

)

TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director of )

the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at

)

the JoUet Correctional Center,

)

RAYMOND WOODS, Clinical Director, )

and TRAVIS HINZE, associate Clinical I

Director,

)

w. r~;.::...:.'~;·\i!.. OOulliNS
cu;.... u.s. DlaTRICT COURT
02C No. :i45·6
JUDGE KENNELLY
MAGISTRt,TE J'-IDGf. GERALDiNE SOAT BROWN

Defendants.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, JEFFERY HARGEIT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH and LOREN K. WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by their undersigned coun~el, ~tatp. as follows for their Class. Action Complaint:
INTRODUCTION 1. This complalnt asserts a civil rights action pursuant to Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress violations of the United States Constitution in connection with the complete and utter failure of the Defendants or those acting under their control or direction to provide adequate and meaningful mental health treatment to the named Plalntiffs and all others similarly situated that have been involuntarily detalned by the Illinois

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 33 of 41
Department of Human Services ("DHS") pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/ I et al. (the "SVP Act"). The avowed purposed of the SV t' Act 1S to prov1de mental health treatment and care to individuals in the custody of DHS in the least restrictive manner consistent with the person's needs and in accordance with the court's commitment order. The treatment and care provided by the Defentlanl~ to lhe Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated is punitive and Constitutionally inadequate.
JURISDICTION 2. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under Title 28 of the United States Code, § 1331 and § 1343.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Jeffery Hargett was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about March, 2000 by the Circuit Court of Iroquois County, Illinois. Mr. Hargett has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Hargett has never refused treatment or to partiCipate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Hargett has never received adequate treatment or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release. 4. PlaintitI Kim A. Overlin ("Overlin") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about June, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Macon County, Illinois. Mr. Overlin has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Overlin has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Overlin has never
-2-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 34 of 41
received adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic chance for his release.
5. Plaintiff Jimmie Smith ("Smith") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about October, 2000 by the Circuit Court of Macoupin County, Illinois. Mr. Smith has consented to partiCipate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Smith has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systematic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Smith has been denied adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic dum,," for his release.
6. Plaintiff Loren K. Walker ("Walker") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about September, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois. Mr. Walker has consented to partiCipate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Walker has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nonetheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Walker has been denied adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic chance for his release.
7. Defendant Linda R. Baker ("Baker"), is the Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") and the chief administrative officer of the DHS. Defendant Baker is sued herein in her official capacity. At all relevant times, she was acting under the color of state law.
8. Defendant Mary Bass ("Bass") is the Head Facility Administrator of DHS. She is sued herein in her official capacity. At all relevant times, she was acting under the color of state law.
-3-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 35 of 41
.'
9. Defendant Timothy Budz ("Budz") is the Facility Director of the DHS Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he was acting under the color of state law.
10. Defendant Raymond Woods ("Woods") is the Clinical Director of the DHS Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he was acting under the color of state law.
11. Defendant Travis Hinze ("Hinze") is the Associate Clinical Director of the DHS Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he was acting under the; colur uf state law.
12. Baker, Bass, Budz, Woods and Hinze (the "Defendants"), pursuant to authority vested in them by the State of Illinois (the "State"), are the individuals primarily responsible for the care, custody, treatment and contwl of the Plaintiffs ani!. all others similarly situated. The Defendants lmowingly and with deliberate indifference established and malntalned the treatment policies, procedures and regime that are challenged in this action.
BACKGROUND
13. The SVP Act provides for the civil commitment into the custody of DHS of persons that: (a) have been convicted. or acquitted by reason of insanity. of certain sexual offenses; and (b) have been found to have a mental disorder that creates a substantial possibility that they will engage in future acts of sexual violence. Persons may be detained by DHS pursuant to the SVP Act prior to a civil commitment proceeding if there is probable cause to believe that conditions (a) and (b) above are met.
14. Although the SVP Act's stated purpose is not to punish, but instead is to provide for the segregation and treatment of persons with a dangerous
-4-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 36 of 41
mental disorder. Plaintiffs in fact have not received adequate treatm~nt ~nrJ h~v~ heen confined in punitive conditions that are not rationally related to the purposes of the SVP Act.
15. This action challenges under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the punitive conditions and the inadequate treatment received by the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. Specifically, this action challenges the decision of the Defendants to warehouse and put out of sight the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated in an attempt to hold them indefmitely and to punish, rather than treat their perceived mental disabilities.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 16. This case is brought on behalf of a class that consists of all
the pet"sons who have been t €l.re 01" will lJe COlnnutb;::d under the SVP Act and placed in
custody of DHS. 17. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. The population in the custody of DHS exceeds 150 individuals und is constantly growing larger as new persons are detained and civilly committed under the SVPAct.
18. There are questions of law Ql1d fact common to the members of the class, and these questions predominate over those affecting only individual class members. The predominate common question is whether the mental health treatment and c:ar~ provided by t.he nefendant.s or those acting under their control or direr:t.ion comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
-5-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 37 of 41 :
19. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class member~. All are based on the same factual and legal theories in that they have all suffered as a result of the unconstitutional practices alleged in this Complaint.
20. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the members of the class. They have no interests antagonistic to the class, and they are represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in civil rights litigation.
21. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that the Defendants, by creating and maintaining the practices alleged in thi>$ complaint, have acted On ground:s generally applicable to the class, C:Ulf.1. a~ a result, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the entire class is appropriate.
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS 22. Defendants, in their official capacities, are collectively responsibl~ for the policies and procedures controlling the manner and method of Plaintiffs' confinement and manner and method of their mental health treatment, 23. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to provide Civilly committed persons with access to mental health treatment that is at least minimally adequate and gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions to improve so that they can be released, Further, because the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are not prisoners, they are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish, 24, The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being denied meaningful mental health care treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions materially to improve because, among other things, the Defendants have failed:
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 38 of 41

I

(a) To properly train staff regarding the treatment of sexual deviance;

(b) To provide a coherent and meaningful individualized treatment program lor each detainee with understandable
goals and a road map showing steps necessary for improvement and release;

(c) To make adequate provisions for the participation of detainees' family members in rehabilitation efforts, including permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and allowing prompt telephone access to detainees in cases of family emergency;

(d) To draft and implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans;

f

(e) To afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for

educational, religious, vocational and recreational activities;

(1) To cease requiring, as a precondition to participation in all
but the most basic treatment offered by DHS, and therefore, as a predicate to release, that the Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated detainees to admit to a laundry list of real and imagined crimes for which they were not convicted, and thereby place themselves in jeopardy of future criminal prosecution for other crimes in violation of the Plaintiffs'
Fifth right against self-incrimination applied to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment; and

(g) To institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality.

25. The aforesaid failure to provide constitutionally adequate

treatment is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or

standards and demonstrates that the Defendants did not base their decisions on such

professional judgment.

26. Instead of providing treatment and conditions that are rationally

related to the purposes of Plaintiffs' confinement, Defendants are using the SVP

program as a means of warehousing and punishing those in the SVP program. Since

this program was initiated over four years ago, no more than a handful of detainees

have been permitted to successfully complete the Defendants' treatment program to

-7-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 39 of 41
, ..
the point where the Defendants recommended their discharge to the courts. Defendants erect one arbitrary barrier after another to prevent Plaintiffs from progressing to the point where the SVP program will recommend their release, including requiring participants in the program to confess to crimes which they did not commit.
27. The PlaImiffs and aU others similarly Situated are being held In conditions that are more restrictive than the conditions under which the Plaintiffs were confmed when they were incarcerated as criminals prior to their civil commitment under the Act. These conditions are unrelated to the security or treatment needs of the SVP population and are purely punitive in nature. Further, the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are arbitrarily confined in conditions that
are more restrictive than the conditione under which most convicted felons ar~
confined by the lllinois Department of Corrections in that, among other things, the Plaintiffs:
(al Are routinely stripped searched before and after every visit, including visits with attorneys;
(b) Are routinely shackled with restraints normally used for the transportation of prisoners housed in "super-max" facilities;
(c) Are subjected to intrusive cell searches, often with little or no justification, with greater frequency than those of prisoners;
(d) Have their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways; for example, they are not allowed to go to the commissary by themselves;
(e) Are not allowed to purchase their own razor, stapler, nail clippers, aspmns or other similar over-the-counter medication, vitamins or eye drops; and
(f) Are constantly surveilled by DHS as a result of the installation of intercom systems in the Plaintiffs' cells.
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 40 of 41
CLAIM FOR RELIEF 28. The aforesaid conditions are not rationally connected to furthering the constitutionally legitimate purpose of the Act, which is to provide for the segregation and treatment of the Plaintiffs because of their alleged mental disorder, and are excessive in relation to that purpose, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer distress, humiliation, pain and a loss of liberty. The Defendants' practices and policies described above violate Plaintiffs' rights to reasonable mental health cru-e and constitute punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs have
been o.n.d continue to be irreparably harmed by these irtjuric:s and they have nQ
adequate remedy at law for the Defendants' unlawful conduct. WHEREFORE, JEFFERY HARGETT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH
and LOREN K. WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court:
(I) Issue a Declaratory Judgment that the conduct, conditions and mental health treatment described in this complaint violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
(2) Issue a Permanent Injunction against the Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, and upon all those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the Injunction by personal service or otherwise requiring them to submit and implement a plan correcting the constitutional deficiencies alleged in this complaint;
(3) Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
·9·

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 11 Filed 05/21/2002 Page 41 of 41

(4) Expressly reserve the right of all class members to bring subsequent lawsuits for damages; and
(5) Enter such other and furlh~r r~1i~f as this Court deems just and equitable.

DATED: February 27, 2002

JEFFERY HARGETT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH and LOREN K. WALKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

Everett J. Cygal Schiff Hardin & Waite 6600 Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinoi" 60606
(312) 258-5783

Benjamin S. wolf Roger Baldwin Foundation
of the ACLU, Inc.
180 North MichigWl Avenue
Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 201-9740

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 Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Hargett, et al.,
v. Baker, et al.,

) )
Plaintiff, )
) ) ) )
Defendants. )

No. 02 C 1456 Judge Leinenweber

NOTICE OF FILING

To: ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 6, 2 Answer and Affirmative Defenses and appearances hereto and herewith served upon you.

caused to be filed, Defendants' sel, copies of which are attached

Hinshaw & Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street, Suite 300 Chicago, Illinois 60601-1081 (312) 704-3000

James C. Vlahakis

5513846vl 785743

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 2 of 20

Certificate of Service
I, James C. Vlahakis, an attorney, state that I served the on September 6, 2002, via MESSENGER DELIVERY. .II

Everett Cygal

v

Schiff, Hardin & Waite

6600 Sears Tower

Chicago, IL 60606

(312) 258-5500/Facsimile: (312)258-5600

Benjamin S. Wolf Roger Baldwin Foundation ofthe ACLU 180 North Michigan Ave., Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601

(312)201-9740IFacsimile: (312)201-9760

1counsel of record

5513846v1785743

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 3 of 20

•

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFERY HARGETT; KIM A. OVERLIN; )

TIMMIE SMITH; LOREN A. WALKER; )

on behalf of themselves and all others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs, v.

) ) No. 02 C 1456

LINDA BAKER, Secretary of the Illinois

) )

Judge Leinenweber

Department of Human Services, MARY

)

BASS, Head Facility Administrator for the )

Illinois Department of Human Serves,

)

TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director of the )

Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet )

Correctional Center, RAYMOND WOODS, )

Clinical Director, and TRAVIS HINZE,

)

Associate Clinical Director,

)

)

Defendants.

)

FIl. eD
SCP 082,
CLeI4lf.;•:(Ja.~,.'LOw/,:,.:O0"0/2/f,

..lore

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

OUR.,.

TO CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Defendants, LINDA BAKER, MARY BASS, TIMOTHY BUDZ and RAYMOND

WOOD, by and through their undersigned counsel, submit the following as their Answer and

Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint:

INTRODUCTION 1. This complaint asserts a civil rights action pursuant to Title 42 of the United

States Code, § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress violations of the United States

Constitution in connection with the complete and utter failure of the Defendants or those acting under their control or direction to provide adequate and meaningful mental health treatment to

the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated that have been involuntarily detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services (nDHsn) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons

5547120v1785743

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 4 of 20

-, '
Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1 et al. (the "SVP Act"). The avowed purposed of the SVP Act is to provide mental health treatment and care to individuals in the custody of DHS in the least restrictive manner consistent with the person's needs and in accordance with the court's commitment order. The treatment and care provided by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated is punitive and constitutionally inadequate.

ANSWER:

Defendants object to the compound nature of this paragraph which violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Without waiving this objections, Defendants admit that the "complaint asserts a civil rights action pursuant to Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress violations of the United States Constitution" and that Plaintiffs contend that Defendants, or those acting under their control or direction, have failed to "provide adequate and meaningful mental health treatment to the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated that have been involuntarily detained by" DHS pursuant to the SVP Act. Defendants admit that Plaintiffs allege a Section 1983 cause of action as set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 1 but deny the remaining allegations of sentence 1. Defendants deny that the second sentence of paragraph 1 accurately sets forth the purpose of the SVP Act and further deny that Plaintiffs or any similarly situated individuals have statutory or constitutional right to be treated and housed in "the least restrictive manner" as alleged above. Defendants deny the third sentence of paragraph 3. Defendants further state that the SVP facility provides sex offender and related treatment, and by statute is not under the Mental Health Code nor is it considered a mental health facility.

JURISDICTION

2. The Court has jurisdiction over· this action under Title 28 of the United States

Code, § 1331 and § l343.

ANSWER: Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 2. PARTIES
3. Plaintiff Jeffery Hargett was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about March, 2000 by the Circuit Court of Iroquois County, Illinois. Mr. Hargett has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr.

2
5547120vl785743

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 5 of 20

.,.
Hargett has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Hargett has never received adequate treatment or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit the first sentence of paragraph 3 and admit that Plaintiff Hargett has generally consented to participate in sex offender treatment programs but deny that he has fully participated in all treatment programs offered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program and further deny that he has never refused treatment or to fully participate in any test administered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program. Defendants deny that there are any deficiencies in the sex offender treatment program and deny that Plaintiff Hargett has not been offered adequate treatment and/or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release.

4. Plaintiff Kim A. Overlin ("Overlin") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant

to the Act in or about June, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Macon County, Illinois. Mr. Overlin

has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS.

Mr. Overlin has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the

Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP program described below,

Mr. Overlin has never received adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic

chance for his release.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit the first sentence of paragraph 4 and admit that Plaintiff Overlin has generally consented to participate in sex offender treatment programs but deny that he has fully participated in all treatment programs offered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program and further deny that he has never refused treatment or to fully participate in any test administered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program. Defendants deny that there are any deficiencies in the treatment program and deny that Plaintiff Overlin has not been offered adequate sex offender treatment and/or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release.

3
5547120vl 785743

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 6 of 20

5. Plaintiff Jimmie Smith (" Smith") was involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the Act in or about October, 2000 by the Circuit Court of Macoupin County, Illinois. Mr. Smith has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs provided by DHS. Mr. Smith has never refused treatment or to participate in any test administered by the Defendants. Nevertheless, due to the systematic deficiencies in the SVP program described below, Mr. Smith has been denied adequate treatment or treatment that would lead to a realistic chance for his release.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit the first sentence of paragraph 5 and admit that Plaintiff Smith has generally consented to participate in sex offender treatment programs but deny that he has fully participated in all treatment programs offered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program and further deny that he has never refused treatment or to fully participate in any test administered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program. Defendants deny that there are any deficiencies in the treatment program and deny that Plaintiff Smith has not been offered adequate sex offender treatment and/or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release.

6. Plaintiff Loren K. Walker ("Walker") was involuntarily civilly committed

pursuant to the Act in or about September, 1998 by the Circuit Court of Madison County,

Illinois. Mr. Walker has consented to participate in any and all mental health treatment programs

provided by DHS. Mr. Walker has never refused treatment or to participate in any test

administered by the Defendants. Nonetheless, due to the systemic deficiencies in the SVP

program described below, Mr. Walker has been denied adequate treatment or treatment that

would lead to a realistic chance for his release.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit the first sentence of paragraph 6 and admit that Plaintiff Walker has generally consented to participate in sex offender treatment programs but deny that he has never refused treatment or to fully participate in any test administered by Department of Humans Services' treatment program. Defendants deny that there are any deficiencies in the treatment program and deny that Plaintiff Walker has not been offered

4
5547120vl 785743

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 7 of 20

adequate sex offender treatment and/or treatment that might yield a realistic chance for his release. 7. Defendant Linda R. Baker ("Baker"), is the Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") and the chief administrative officer of the DHS. Defendant Baker is sued herein in her official capacity. At all relevant times, she was acting under the color of state law.

ANSWER:

Defendant Baker admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7 but denies that these allegations establish her personal responsibility for the complained of acts or omissions. The remaining Defendants make no response as this allegation is directed solely at Defendant Baker. To the extent required, the remaining Defendants admit that Defendant Baker has been sued in her official capacity and that at all relevant times she was acting under color of state law.

8. Defendant Mary Bass ("Bass") is the Head Facility Administrator of DHS. She is

sued herein in her official capacity. At all relevant times, she was acting under the color of state

law.

ANSWER:

Defendant Bass denies the first sentence of paragraph 8. Defendant Bass, however, admits that she is the Community Services Director of the SVP program and denies that these allegations or that her position establish her personal responsibility for the complained of acts or omissions. The remaining Defendants make no response as this allegation is directed solely at Defendant Bass. To the extent required, the remaining Defendants admit that Defendant Bass has been sued in her official capacity and that at all relevant times she was acting under color of state law.

9. Defendant Timothy Budz ("Budz") is the Facility Director of the DHS Sexually

Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant times, he

was acting under the color of state law.

ANSWER:

Defendant Budz admits the allegations contained in paragraph 9 but denies that these allegations establish his personal responsibility for the complained of acts or omissions. The remaining Defendants make no response as this allegation is directed solely at Defendant Budz. To the extent required, the remaining Defendants admit that Defendant Budz has

5
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 8 of 20

been sued in his official capacity and that at all relevant times he was acting under color of state law. 10. Defendant Raymond Woods ("Woods") is the Clinical Director of the DHS
Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant
times, he was acting under the color of state law.

ANSWER:

Defendant Wood admits the allegations contained in paragraph 10 but denies that these allegations establish his personal responsibility for the complained of acts or omissions. The remaining Defendants make no response as this allegation is directed solely at Defendant Wood. To the extent required, the remaining Defendants admit that Defendant Wood has been sued in his official capacity and that at all relevant times he was acting under color of state law.

ANSWER:

11. Defendant Travis Hinze ("Hinze") is the Associate Clinical Director of the DHS

Sexually Violent Persons Unit at Joliet. He is sued herein in his official capacity. At all relevant

times, he was acting under the color of state law.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Defendant Hinze was employed as described above but state that he is no longer employed by the treatment program. To the extent required, the remaining Defendants admit that he has been sued in his official capacity and that at all relevant times he was acting under color of state law. Defendants further state these allegations fail to establish Dr. Hinze's personal responsibility for the complained of acts or omissions.

12. Baker, Bass, Budz, Woods and Hinze (the "Defendants"), pursuant to authority

vested in them by the State of Illinois (the "State"), are the individuals primarily responsible for

the care, custody, treatment and control of the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. The

Defendants knowingly and with deliberate indifference established and maintained the treatment

policies, procedures and regime that are challenged in this action.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Defendant Budz is responsible for day-to-day operations of the SVP facility and that Defendant Wood is responsible for oversight of sex offender treatment. Defendants deny the remaining allegations.

6
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 9 of 20

BACKGROUND 13. The SVP Act provides for the civil commitment into the custody of DRS of persons that: (a) have been convicted, or acquitted by reason of insanity. of certain sexual offenses; and (b) have been found to have a mental disorder that creates a substantial possibility that they will engage in future acts of sexual violence. Persons may be detained by DRS pursuant to the SVP Act prior to a civil commitment proceeding if there is probable cause to believe that conditions (a) and (b) above are met.

ANSWER: Defendants deny that Plaintiffs have adequately paraphrased the SVP Act and further state that the Act speaks for itself.
14. Although the SVP Act's stated purpose is not to punish, but instead is to provide for the segregation and treatment of persons with a dangerous mental disorder. Plaintiffs in fact have not received adequate treatment and have been confmed in punitive conditions that are not rationally related to the purposes of the SVP Act.

ANSWER: Defendants deny that Plaintiffs have adequately paraphrased the SVP Act and further state that the Act speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 14.
15. This action challenges under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the punitive conditions and the inadequate treatment received by the Plaintiffs and
all others similarly situated. Specifically, this action challenges the decision of the Defendants to
warehouse and put out of sight the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated in an attempt to
hold them indefmitely and to punish, rather than treat their perceived mental disabilities.

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the conclusory allegations contained paragraph 15 but admit that this action challenges, via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conditions of confmement and sex offender treatment provided to Plaintiffs.

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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 10 of 20

CLASS ALLEGATIONS 16. This case is brought on behalf of a class that consists of all persons who have been, are or will be committed under the SVP Act and placed in the custody of DRS.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this action is brought on behalf of a class that consists of all persons who are or will be committed under the SVP Act and placed in the custody of DRS. The class does not consist of individuals who are detainees not committed to the program and/or committed individuals who are on conditional release to the community.

17. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The

population in the custody of DRS exceeds 150 individuals and is constantly growing larger as

new persons are detained and civilly committed under the SVP Act.

ANSWER: Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 17 but deny that the population is "constantly growing larger" (emphasis supplied).

18. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, and these questions predominate over those affecting only individual class members. The predominate common question is whether the mental health treatment and care provided by the Defendants or those acting under their control or direction comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
ANSWER: Defendants deny the conclusory allegations contained in paragraph 18 but admit that the Court has certified a class.
19. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories in that they have all suffered as a result of the unconstitutional practices alleged in this Complaint.
ANSWER: Defendants deny the conclusory allegations contained in paragraph 19 but admit that the Court has certified a class.

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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 11 of 20

20. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the members of the class. They have no interests antagonistic to the class, and they are represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in civil rights litigation.

ANSWER: Defendants admit that counsel are experience in class action lawsuits but state that they are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations.
21. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in
that the Defendants, by creating and maintaining the practices alleged in this complaint, have
acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, and, as a result, declaratory and injunctive
relief with respect to the entire class is appropriate.

ANSWER: Defendants admit that a class IS certified but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 21. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
22. Defendants, in their official capacities, are collectively responsible for the policies
an procedures controlling the manner and method of Plaintiffs' confinement and manner and method of their mental health treatment.

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Defendant Budz is responsible for day-to-day operations of the SVP facility and that Defendant Wood is responsible for oversight of sex offender treatment. Defendant Baker authorizes program directives. Defendants deny the remaining allegations.

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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 12 of 20

23. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to provide civilly committed persons with access to mental health treatment that is at least minimally adequate and gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions to improve so that they can be released. Further, because the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are not prisoners, they are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.

ANSWER:

Objection, this allegation is in the nature oflegal argument which does not adequately state the applicable law. Without waiving this objection, Defendants admit that Plaintiffs are civil detainees. Defendants deny that the of sex offender treatment and the conditions of confinement are constitutionally inadequate based on their status. Defendants deny the remaining allegations.

24. The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being denied meaningful mental

health care treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity for their conditions materially to

improve because, among other things, the Defendants have failed:

(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
5547120v1785743

To properly train staff regarding the treatment of sexual deviance;
To provide a coherent and meaningful individualized treatment program for each detainee with understandable goals and a road map showing steps necessary for improvement and release;
To make adequate provisions for the participation of detainees' family members in rehabilitation efforts, including permitting family visits with reasonable frequency and allowing prompt telephone access to detainees in cases offamily emergency;
To draft and implement fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans;
To afford reasonable opportunities to all residents for educational, religious, vocational and recreational activities;
To cease requiring, as a precondition to participation in all but the most basic treatment offered by DRS, and therefore, as a predicate to release, that the Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated detainees to admit to a laundry list of real and imagined crimes for which they were not convicted, and thereby place themselves in jeopardy of future criminal
10

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 13 of 20
prosecution for other crimes in violation of the Plaintiffs' Fifth [sic1right
against self-incrimination applied to the states by the Fourteenth i\mendment; and (g) To institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality . i\NSWER: Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 24 and all of its subparts. 25. The aforesaid failure to provide constitutionally adequate treatment is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards and demonstrates that the Defendants did not base their decisions on such professional judgment. i\NSWER: Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25. 26. Instead of providing treatment and conditions that are rationally related to the purposes of Plaintiffs' confinement, Defendants are using the SVP program as a means of warehousing and punishing those in the SVP program. Since this program was initiated over four years ago, no more than a handful of detainees have been permitted to successfully complete the Defendants' treatment program to the point where the Defendants recommended their discharge to the courts. Defendants erect one arbitrary barrier after another to prevent Plaintiffs from progressing to the point where the SVP program will recommend their release, including requiring participants in the program to confess to crimes which they did not commit. i\NSWER: Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 26. 27. The Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are being held in conditions that are more restrictive than the conditions under which the Plaintiffs were confined when they were incarcerated as criminals prior to their civil commitment under the i\ct. These conditions are unrelated to the security or treatment needs of the SVP population and are purely punitive in nature. Further, the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated are arbitrarily confined in
11
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 14 of 20

conditions that are more restrictive than the conditions under which most convicted felons are confined by the Illinois Department of Corrections in that, among other things, the Plaintiffs:

(a) Are routinely stripped searched before and after every visit, including visits with attorneys;

(b) Are routinely shackled with restraints normally used for the transportation of prisoners housed in "super-max" facilities;

(c) Are subjected to intrusive cell searches. often with little or no justification, with greater frequency than those of prisoners;

(d) Have their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways; for example, they are not allowed to go to the commissary by themselves;

(e) Are not allowed to purchase their own razor, stapler, nail clippers, aspirins or other similar over-the-counter medication, vitamins or eye drops; and
Cf) Are constantly surveilled by DHS as a result of the installation of intercom
systems in the Plaintiffs' cells.

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 27 and all of its subparts with the exception that they admit that Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have been routinely strip searched before and after visits for security reasons and that Plaintiffs and others similarly situated may have been required to purchase DHS issued razors, staplers, nail clippers, aspirins, vitamins and/or eye drops.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

28. The aforesaid conditions are not rationally connected to furthering the

constitutionally legitimate purpose of the Act, which is to provide for the segregation and

treatment of the Plaintiffs because of their alleged mental disorder, and are excessive in relation

to that purpose, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 28. 29. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer distress, humiliation, pain and a loss of liberty. The Defendants' practices and policies described above violate Plaintiffs' rights to reasonable mental

12
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 15 of 20 health care and constitute punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs have been and continue to be irreparably harmed by these injuries and they have no adequate remedy at law for the Defendants' unlawful conduct.
ANSWER: Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 29.
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 16 of 20 WHEREFORE, Defendants, LINDA BAKER, MARY BASS, TIMOTHY BUDZ and
RAYMOND WOOD, submit that Plaintiffs and the class are not entitled to any of the relief they demand
Respec V)"......l--Uefendants
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 17 of 20
· .

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 1. Plaintiffs and the class do not have a constitutional entitlement to the level of sex

offender treatment they demand. 2. Defendants and their employees have not violated the professional judgment

standard in providing sex offender treatment to Plaintiffs and the class.

3. Plaintiffs and the class do not have a constitutional right to vocational training

and/or education while being civilly detained.

4. Plaintiffs and the class have never been punished in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 5. By statute, the provisions of the Mental Health Code do not apply nor is the Joliet

facility considered a mental health facility under Illinois law.

6.

Plaintiffs and the class have not suffered any adverse harm as a result of any act

or omission taken by any Defendant or employees.

7. Plaintiffs have failed to allege the requisite level of personal responsibility against the Defendants as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

9. Plaintiffs, with the exception of Loren Walker, lack standing to attack the sex

offender treatment program because they has not fully consented and/or fully participated in sex offender treatment.

10. Plaintiffs have not been deprived of their right to practice the religion of their choice as it relates to the allegations of their complaint.

11. facility.

Plaintiffs and the class do not have a constitutional right of privacy in the Joliet

12. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to have their family members participate in sex offender treatment.

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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 18 of 20
· .
13. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to have "freedom of movement" at the Joliet facility.
14. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be maintained in the least restrictive manner as alleged in their complained.
15. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be free of the security measures complained of in their complaint.
16. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to purchase their own razor, stapler, nail clippers, aspirins or other similar over-the-counter medication, vitamins or eye drops, as opposed to being required to purchase DHS approved and/or offered items.
17. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be free from room searches. 18. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be free from strip searches. 19. Plaintiffs have not been deprived of a coherent and meaningful sex offender treatment. 20. The sex offender treatment staff is not inadequately trained. 21. Plaintiffs and the class are not in jeopardy of future criminal prosecution for other crimes in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 22. Adequate confidentiality protections are used III the sex offender treatment program. 23. Defendants have drafted and employed fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans.
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 19 of 20
, .
13. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to have "freedom of movement" at the Joliet facility.
14. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be maintained in the least restrictive manner as alleged in their complained.
15. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be free of the security measures complained of in their complaint.
16. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to purchase their own razor, stapler, nail clippers, aspirins or other similar over-the-counter medication, vitamins or eye drops, as opposed to being required to purchase DHS approved andlor offered items.
17. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be free from room searches. 18. Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to be free from strip searches. 19. Plaintiffs have not been deprived of a coherent and meaningful sex offender treatment. 20. The sex offender treatment staff is not inadequately trained. 21. Plaintiffs and the class are not in jeopardy of future criminal prosecution for other crimes in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 22. Adequate confidentiality protections are used III the sex offender treatment program. 23. Defendants have drafted and employed fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management plans.
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Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 31 Filed 09/06/2002 Page 20 of 20

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Defendants, LINDA BAKER, MARY BASS, TIMOTHY BUDZ and RAYMOND WOOD, respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against the Plaintiffs and the class.

J. William Roberts Steven M. Puiszis James C. Vlahakis Andrew M. Ramage lllNSHAW & CULBERTSON 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, Illinois 60601-1081 (312) 704-3000

B y:----;:-:-'I':-'~-¥I--'~""=-=-___:_-­ One ofth Attorneys for Defendants

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 Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFERY HARGETT; KIM A. OVERLlN;

I

JIMMIE SMITH; LOREN K. WALKER; on I

behalf of themselves and all others

I

similarly situated,

I

)

Plaintiffs,

)

I

v.

I

I

CAROL ADAMS, Secretary of the Illinois I

Department of Human Services,

I

TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director of the I

Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the

I

Joliet Correctional Center, RAYMOND

I

WOODS, Clinical Director, and SHAN

I

JUMPER, Associate Clinical Director,

)

)

Defendants.

I

I

No. 02 C 1456

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 591el

Plaintiffs submit the following memorandum in support of their motion

pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter and amend

the Memorandum and Order (the "Order") entered in this matter on January 14,

2005.

INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs request this Court to alter or amend the Order by vacating that

Order and, further, entering a new order granting judgment in favor the Plaintiffs

with respect to one narrow issue: whether the Defendants' administration of

arousal-reducing medication violates accepted professional judgment, practices and

standards as set forth by the Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307

(1982). The PlaintifIs respectfully submit that the Court has misapprehended the

evidence at trial. Specifically, both of the Plaintiffs' psychiatric experts testified at

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 2 of 11
trial that the Defendants' practices concerning informed consent for arousalred'-lcing medication substantially violated accepted professional judgment practices, and standards for the treatment of sexual offenders. The Defendants did not call a single expert witness qualified to refute these assertions. Indeed, the Court properly granted the Plaintiffs' Daubert Motions with respect to the opinions of Drs. Dvoskin and Schlank regarding medication, finding the Defendants' experts unqualified to discuss the issue. Tr. 1093-96, 1135, 1490-95. 1 The Defendants also elected not to call either of the two DHS psychiatrists on their witness list.
As discussed morc fully below, the Court's conclusions about the TDF's practices regarding arousal-reducing medication omit crucial, unrebutted evidence about the Defendants' violations of accepted professional judgment, practice and standards regarding informed consent and rely in part on testimony that the Court itself ruled inadmissible. The Plaintiffs, therefore, respectfully request that the Court alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
ARGUMENT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(e) "enables a district court to correct its own errors, spanng the parties illld the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings: Russell v. Delco Rerny Div., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). As the Seventh Circuit has recognized:
A motion for reconsideration performs a valuable function where the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial iSSI1es presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.
1 All cites to "Witness, page" refer to testimony given at the trial in this case. All cites to "PX _" or "DX _" refer respectively to Plaintiffs' and Defendants' trial exhibits.
2

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 3 of 11
1990) (emphasis added). See also Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1999) ("if illl issue arises to which a party does not have the opportunity to respond, granting the motion to amend may be appropriate").
A motion to alter or amend can and should be granted whenever the Court has made a "rncmifest error of law or fact." Russell, 51. F.3d at 749 (emphasis added). See also William E. Hlack lrwestrnents, Inc. v. Eric Erwt'/, Inc., 1998 WL 801837 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1998) (granting motion to reconsider where movant contended the Court had "misapprehended the conclusions which could have been drawn from the undisputed facts"). For the reasons stated below, the Plaintiffs respcctfulIy request the Court to do so here.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD When a state deprives a person of his or her liberty in order to treat a mental
disorderj those patients arc entitled to "reasonable care/' and "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions." Youngberg v. Rorneo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). As to the test for liability, the Supreme Court, in Youngberg, held that "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id., 457 U.S. at 323.
Applying Youngberg, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that it is unacceptable for a defendant to argue that "no decision by a person with an advanced degree is open to question in litigation" or that "holders of [advanced] degrees never need fear liability, even if the whole medical profession and every published scholarly article are against them." West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745, 749 (7th eir. 2003) (affirming denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity issues relating to civilly committed sex offenders in Wisconsin). The Seventh
3

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 4 of 11
Circuit has also stated that professional judgment is not "synonymous with a decision made by a person 'competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue.'" [d. (citation omitted) A
judgment is not 'professional' if it is not based on a view as to how best to operate a
mental health facility. " Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1209, fn. 9 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)
Ill. THE PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE A. Every Patient For Whom Anti-Androgen Medication Is Appropriate Should Receive Accurate Information About That Option. The Plaintiffs' experts testified that accepted standards regarding informed
consent require that every patient should be evaluated by a properly credentialed professional to determine the full range of appropriate treatment options, should receive accurate information about each of those options (including the risks and benefits of each), and, in collaboration with the professional, should have the opportunity to choose which options to pursue. See PX 6, p.9; Metzner, 358-60; Berlin, 617-18, 641-42. The Defendants did not contest this testimony.
In addition, the Court found--rclying on Drs. Metzner and Berlin--that antiandrogen medication is an important treatment option for many sex offenders. See Slip Op., at 22-23; Metzner, 359-60; Berlin, 614, 616, 632-33, 639; Schlank, 1182. This fact was corroborated at trial by an exhibit prepared by Dr. Bednarz, the TDF's own psychiatrist. PX 131. In that document, Dr. Bednarz acknowledged that Depo-Lupron, the most frequently recommended arousal-reducing medication, has been shown substantially to reduce recidivism. PX 131; see also Berlin, 628-31, 637.
Accordingly, accepted professional judgment, practices and standards require that every patient be screened to determine whether such medications are
4

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 5 of 11
an appropriate treatment option. See Berlin, 641-42, 647-48. All patients for whom this medication is appropriate should receive accurate information about the risks and benefits, along with information about other appropriate treatment options, and should have the opportunity to make an informed choice (in consultation with their physician), about which treatments they will pursue. See Berlin, 641-42; PX 8, pp. 12-13; PX 6, p. 9.
B. The TDF Has Violated Accepted Standards Of Informed Consent By Failing Properly To Evaluate Patients And Provide Essential Information About Anti-Androgen Medication.
The Defendants have never provided most of the patients at the TDF with the opportunity to make an informed choice about whether to consent to treatment with anti-androgen medication. See Metzner, 359-60; PX 6, p. 9; Berlin, 612, 61718,638-42,645·50,753-55; PX fl, pp. 12-13; PX 179, pp. 2-3. Not a single patient was receiving anti-androgen medication as of 2002, and none of the handbooks or forms distributed to patients referred to this accepted course of treatment. Berlin, 638; PX 6, p. 9. Although a handful of patients were receiving anti-androgen medications by the trial in this case in 2004, the TDF still had no system in place to screen patients and provide essential information about anti-androgen medication. See Berlin, 645-50.
In fact, Dr. Wood himself acknowledged that the TOWs policies with respect to medication did not fundamentally change in the weeks leading up to trial. Wood Dep. 9/16/04, pp. 8·9. Moreover, Dr. Bednarz, the TDF's part-time psychiatrist, admitted in his deposition that, like his predecessors, he has no intention to meet with every patient to discuss the risks and benefits of anti-androgen medication -instead, he will rely on word of mouth for patients to hear about its virtues. See Bednarz Dep. 9/20/04, pp. 36-37. This approach falls short of meeting accepted
5

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 6 of 11
standards of informed consent. See Berlin, 617-18, 645-46; PX 8, pp. 12-13; PX 178, p. 2; PX 179, pp. 2-3.
C. The Court's Finding That There Was A "Reasonable Professional Disagreement" Is Not Supported By The Record.
The Court found that there is "reasonable professional disagreement as to the timing, dosage and type of medications that are most effective in reducing deviant sexual arousal," and that these "bona fide professional disagreements" cannot amount to constitutional violations. Slip Op_ at 43-44. Yet, the Plaintiffs did not challenge individua.l medical decisions to prescribe (or not prescribe) a particular kind of medication to a particular patient. Instead, the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge focuses on the systemic failure to provide the opportunity for the patients to make an informed choice about medication. The record reveals no real disagreement regarding the need to provide patients with sufficient information about the range of available treatment options, including anti-androgen medication, to enable them to make an informed treatment decision.
Dr. Berlin testified that many patients at the TDF who could benefit from anti-androgen medication had never received adequate information about this highly effective treatment option. Berlin, 640-48. He concluded that this failure to provide informed consent was his "primary objection" to the Defendants' practices concerning this medication. Berlin, 612. Dr. Metzner likened the TDF's failure to discuss these medications with a large number of patients to treating a person with schizophrenia without mentioning anti-psychotic medications as an available treatment option. See Metzner, 359-60.
After the testimony of the Plaintiffs' experts, which established that the Defendants' provision of anti·androgen medication does not meet the Youngberg test, the burden of going forward shifted to the Defendants. The Defendants, however, offered no competent evidence to the contrary to the testimony of the
6

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 7 of 11
Plaintiffs' experts. In fact, the Court specifically ruled that neither Dr. Schlank nor
Dr. Dvoskin - t.he only two retained experts who even attempted to address the
issue of medicat.ion - was competent to provide expert testimony about this issue.
Tr. 1093-96, 1135, 1489-95. Although the TDF's psychiatrist, Dr. Bednarz, and
OilS' head psychiatrist, Dr. Fitchtner, appeared on the Defendants' witness list,
neither psychiatrist was called at trial. Therefore, the expert opinions of Drs.
Metzner and Berlin that the former and current practices at the TDF violate
accepted professional judgment, standard and practice remain uncontradicted and
un rebutted by any competent evidence. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' have reviewed the
record and werc unable to locate any competent testimony that supports the notion
that there is a reasonable professional disagreement in the medical field on this
l.SSUC. 2
D. The Defendants' Adjustments Of Convenience Do Not Satisfy Youngberg
Apparently rccognizing the weakness of their proof on this issue, the
Defendants modified their Consent to Treat.ment form twice during trial, adding,
and then amending, a section generally listing arousal-reducing medication as a
treatment option. 3 PX 181; OX 206. This belated adjustment of convenience falls
2 The Court's opinion stated that Dr. Berlin "represents one end of the professional continuum on the use of anti-androgen medications" and that his testimony "coupled with that of Defendants' experts, fairly shows nothing more than bona fide professional disagreements." Slip Op., at 43-44. The Court's conclusion appears to be based on the testimony of Defendant.s' expert Dr. Anita Schlank, who comment.ed that some psychiatrists "say t.hat treatment is mainly cognitive" while others "rely very heavily on medications." Sehlallk, 1181. The Court found, however, that Dr. Schlank was not qualified to testify regarding the use of medication to treat sex offenders. In any event, as discussed above, the relevant question is not which treatment modality is better. Rather, the relevant question is whether the Defendants have advised patients about the risks and benefits of, and permitted t.hem to make an informed choice regarding, all appropriate options. Tr. 1135. " Included in the Defendants adjustments of convenience distributed just prior to trial was a memorandum dated September 1, 2004, entitled Arousal Reducing Medication Treatment Options. The memorandum outlined the TDF's intended
7

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 8 of 11
far short of rendering Plaintiffs' claims moot regarding this issue, See Slip Op_ at
32-34 ("To prevail on their claim of mootness, Defendants face a heavy burden; they
must show that subsequent events have 'made it absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrong behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."') (citation omitted),
In addition, Plaintiffs' experts made clear that informed consent for an
important treatment option of this kind requires morc than a passing reference in a
consent form, See generally Berlin, 617-18, 641-42, The Defendants' method of
providing information about this important treatment option still depends largely
on the comprehension and initiative of the patients - many of whom are
uneducated or even cognitively impaired - and falls far short meeting accepted
standards concerning informed consent, See Exhibit 5 to PX 6, p_ 2 (describing
high percentages of patients with developmental and other disabilities)
E. The Defendants' Argued Against Propositions That Were Not Asserted By The Plaintiffs
The Defendants have attempted to distract the Court with a number of red
herrings because of their complete failure of proof on this issue, First, the
Defendants argued that anti-androgen medication should never be the sole
treatment option, and that patients should be discouraged from over-relying on
--_.,----,-----------------------
plan for educating patients about medications, including a proposed revision to the resident handbook. DX 156, This revision appears in a draft handbook which apparently was not given to patients by the time of trial. See DX 201 (described in the Defendants' Exhibits as "draft" handbook and dated August 2004). Dr. Bednarz indicated that he had begun to implement at least one of the proposed changes -that he was now discussing medication with new patients admitted to the TDF -but that he had no intention of having such discussions with all of the nearly 200 current patients, See Bednarz Pep_ 9/20/04, pp, 34-36.
Clearly, these last minute, partial changes, which at the time of trial at best only affected a minority of patients, do not moot Plaintiffs' claims concerning the absence of informed consent for anti-androgen medication, Even if these changes had been fully implemented and had addressed the problem, which they did not, the Plaintiffs still would be entitled to a Declaratory Judgment concerning this issue. See Slip, Op. at 40 (discussing declaratory relief with respect to the TDF'~ practices concerning Special Management Status).
8

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 9 of 11
medications as a cure-all for offending behavior. See Defendants' Trial Brief at the Conclusion of the Evidence ("Def. Sr.") at 39; see also Slip Op. at 23. The Defendants have set up a straw man. Plaintiffs' experts never argued that medication should be used in isolation from other appropriate treatment or that it was a cure-all for t.he patients at the TDF. See Metzner, 359-60; Berlin, 633.
Second, the Defendants argued that in addition to anti-androgens, other medications such as selcctive serotonin reuptake inhibitors ("SSRls") may be appropriate to suppress the sexual appetites of some patients. Def. Br. at 39. Dr. Berlin made clear that anti-androgen medications are a mueh more appropriate option for most of the patients at the TDF. Berlin, 639-41. See Slip Op. at 23 (SSRls "may also have some utility in the treatment of sexual offenders, although their effectiveness on reducing deviant sexual arousal is likely to be less than antiandrogen medication."). Whether the TDF also should provide information about SSRls and recommend them in appropriate circumstances is simply irrelevant to Plaintiffs' claims.4 The relevant issue is whether the TDF provides to its patients adequate information about anti-androgen medication, an important treatment option for this grOl..lp of patients, as well as an opportunity for informed consent. As discussed above, the answer clearly is no. See Metzner, 358-60; Berlin, 612, 617-18, 638-42, 645-50.
Third, the Defendants vigorously defend their now-abandoned practice of requiring patients to complete a program of "arousal reconditioning" before they receive anti-androgen medication. Def. Br. at 39-40. Dr. Berlin questioned this practice, pointing to strong scientific evidence that supports the effectiveness of
4 In another attempt at distraction, the Defendants endeavored for Dr. Berlin to overstate the risks of using anti-androgen medication. However, despite the fact that any medication may produce certain side effects, Dr. Berlin testified that on the spectrum of medications that doctors prescribe to produce changes in behavior, the risks presented by anti-androgens are not. particularly high. Berlin, 755-56.
9

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 10 of 11
anti-androgen medication and the lack of scienlifie evidence supporting arousal reconditioning; however, he did note that a few clinicians continue to use the latter approach. See Slip Op. at 22. The Defendants' argument again misses the point: Even if the TDF wished to recommend to patients - contrary to the relevant research - thal thcy consider attempting arousal reconditioning before medication, the TDF cannot withhold from patients vital information about medication and deny them the opportunity to participate in an informed decision about available treatmcnt options. No expert at trial supported the notion that the TDF had the right unilaterally to impose its choices about treatment options on patients without providing any opportunity for informed consent. See PX 6, p. 9; Berlin, 612, 61718, 638-42; 645-50; 753-55; PX 8, pp. 12-13; PX 179, pp. 2-3.
10

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 168 Filed 01/28/2005 Page 11 of 11

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs' presented credible and uncontroverted evidence at trial that anti-androgen medication is an important treatment option for sexual offenders, and that t.he TDF fails to provide most patients with sufficient informati"n about anti-androgen medication for them to participate in an informed decision this on treatment option. This failure violates accepted professional judgment, practices and standards.

Dated: January 28, 2005

Respectfully Submitted:
tAdJMC- Everett J. Cy~--'--
Joshua D. Lee Amy M. Rubenstein SCHIFF HARDIN LLP 6600 Sears Tower Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258-5500
Benjamin S. Wolf Sarah Schreiber ROGER BALDWIN FOUNDATION
of the ACLU, Inc. 180 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2300 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 201-9740

II

 
 Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 183 Filed 03/25/2005 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
I L E D FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOI~
r- EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFERY HARGETT, et a~., Plaintiffs,

MAR 2 5 Z005
JUDGE HARRY D. LEINENWEBER U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

v.

Case No. 02 C 1456

CAROL ADAMS, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, et a~.,

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 59(e) seeking a judgment in their favor on the sole issue of whether the Defendants' administration of arousal-reducing medication violates accepted professional judgment, practices and standards as set forth in Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 u.s. 307 (1982) Plaintiffs rely upon the testimony of
their testifying experts, Drs. Berlin and Metzner that accepted standards of informed consent require that residents be provided with essential information about anti-androgen medications.
The court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law discussed and made specific findings concerning the issues raised in the Plaintiffs' Motion. The court found that, while antiandrogen medications can be an important treatment tool, there was a danger that "patients may over-rely on medications as a purported

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 183 Filed 03/25/2005 Page 2 of 4

'cure' and will underutilize cognitive therapy and relapse

prevention techniques." (Finding of Fact No. 51). Based on this

Finding of Fact the court concluded that "the TDF's [Joliet

Treatment and Detention Facility's] use of arousal reconditioning

[is] well within the bounds of professional judgment" and the

"use of arousal-reducing medications

was clearly within

constitutional bounds." (Conclusion of Law Nos. 24 and 25).

The main thrust of Dr. Berlin's testimony was his contention

that the use of arousal-reducing medication, i.e., an anti-androgen

was the most effective known sex offender treatment, and the

defendants put too much emphasis on arousal reconditioning to the

detriment of anti-androgen medications, which violated accepted

standards. However, Berlin was able to cite no literature in

support of this contention, but relied upon what he referred to as

"the common law of informed consent." Dr. Berlin did not review

any of the practices or policies of any of the other SVP facilities

across the country. Dr. Metzner merely testified in passing that

the consent form in use by the TDF "did not talk about the use of

anti-androgens as a treatment option" which he said was "certainly

not the only treatment, but for many people in this population it's

a very important component of treatment."

In contrast the defendants did produce evidence both

documentary and oral that showed quite clearly that Drs. Berlin and

Metzner's views were not uniformly held and that there was

- 2-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 183 Filed 03/25/2005 Page 3 of 4
significant support for the position that arousal reconditioning ought be tried first before resorting to medications. Appendix D of the ATSA (the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers) standards points out that anti-androgens have not been formally approved by the FDA for use with sexual abusers and carry with them some potentially serious side-effects. The Appendix further pointed out that, while their use has found support in clinical trials, placebo-controlled studies were needed to evaluate their effectiveness in reducing recidivism. The Appendix further recommends that non-physician members should consider pharmacological therapy only after control has not been achieved through sexual arousal reconditioning and deviant sexual arousal remains high. The evidence further showed that the TDF's earlier treatment program, which used sexual arousal reconditioning as the preferred mode of treatment to be utilized prior to resorting to pharmaceuticals, was similar to that employed in other Sexual Violent Programs in the United States.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the defendants have recently made changes in their treatment programs and informed consent that have increased the use of anti-androgens and other arousal reducing medications as urged by plaintiffs. The informed consent form recently adopted for use at the TDF informs the patient of the availability of anti-androgen medication. Dr. Bednarz, staff psychiatrist at the TDF, testified that he currently
- 3-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 183 Filed 03/25/2005 Page 4 of 4

visits Core Treatment groups on a regular basis to discuss the availability of arousal reducing medications.
While the number of TDF residents on medication at the time this suit was filed was very low, the number of residents currently on some form of medication has gone up dramatically so that currently 33 or 34 are on some form of medication, even though as many as half of the residents decline to participate in treatment. As stated by the court in its Findings of Fact, prior to the filing of this lawsuit the TDF may have overestimated the utility of arousal recondition, and underestimated the utility of antiandrogen medication (Finding of Fact No. 52) but that the use of such treatment modalities was not a substantial departure from accepted practices and standards.
For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

L
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court

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 Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 1 of 9

IN 'HE UNITED , ...., DI,,",C' COUR.

~

l E D FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOISF "

EASTERN DIVISION

g

JEFFERY HARGETT, et al.., Plaintiffs,
v. CAROL ADAMS, et al..,
Defendants.

JUL 282005
/ JUUD.I:GI.Ea/HsTARi'l/RCYTDc~elNENweBeR
Case No. 02 C 1456 UR.,. JUDGe Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are the Defendants' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' are not entitled to costs and attorney's fees (the "Motion"); Defendants' Bill of Costs; and Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs. The Court grants Defendants' Motion and declines to award attorney's fees or other costs to either party.
I. DISCUSSION Defendants argue that in order for a party to recover any portion of the requested attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the party must be a "prevailing party" in the litigation. Defendants contend that under case law, Plaintiffs cannot be considered a "prevailing party," and therefore are barred from seeking fees. Plaintiffs respond that Defendants' motion is an improper procedural motion that results in judicial inefficiency. Plaintiffs argue that Local Rule 54.3 requires Defendants to engage

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 2 of 9

in a discussion regarding disputed fees or other nontaxable

expenses and then enter into a "pre-motion agreement" and "joint

statement." Also, Plaintiffs have filed only their bill of costs

and not their fee petition, making Defendants' motion premature.

Both Defendants and Plaintiffs agree that Defendants' motion

is a "departure from the requirements of Local Rule 54.3."

Contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments, however, Defendants' motion is

appropriate at this juncture as the Court stated in open court on

June 23, 2005. Even though Plaintiffs have not formally filed for

attorney's fees, on May 6, 2005 they sent a Local Rule 54.3

attorney's fee petition letter to Defendants. (See 5/27/05 Agreed

Mot. )

Although Defendants include a collateral discussion

concerning Plaintiffs' actual fees and costs, this is not the crux

of their motion and Defendants agreed to put aside this section for

purposes of ruling on the threshold "prevailing party" issue.

Defendants correctly contend that if Plaintiffs are barred

from seeking fees because they are not a "prevailing party," then

the line-item dispute process of Local Rule 54.3 is unnecessary.

To recover attorney's fees, the party must be considered a

"prevailing party." See 42 u.s.c. § 1988; FED. R. CIV. PRoe. 54(d).

Therefore, resolution of Plaintiffs' status under the governing law

is in the interests of judicial economy and the Court waives the

local rule for these purposes. Obviously, if resolved in

- 2-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 3 of 9
Plaintiffs' favor, then the parties should proceed according to Local Rule 54.3's requirements.
A. Prevailing Party To recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a party must be a "prevailing party" in the litigation. To be a "prevailing party," a plaintiff must obtain some tangible relief, either in the form of damages or an injunction that "must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 110 (1992); see also Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 4 (1988) (explaining some type of action by defendant is necessary, e.g., "the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or termination of some conduct") A plaintiff must point to "actual relief on the merits of his claim [that] materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12. "The relief requirement emphasizes the practical impact of a lawsuit." Peterson v. Gibson, 372 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 2004). A declaratory judgment does not provide the type of relief necessary for a plaintiff to be considered a "prevailing party." See Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4 (finding no prevailing party status to plaintiff who obtained declaratory judgment that prison officials violated plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights) The most recent Supreme Court case on this issue, Buckhannon Bd. & Care
- 3-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 4 of 9
Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources, stated that "[aJ defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change."
Buckhannon, 532 u.s. 598, 605 (2001); see also Petersen, 372 F.3d
at 866 (adopting Buckhannon's analysis on prevailing party). B. Plaintiffs' Status
Defendants voluntarily modified their practices and procedures at the facilities in question before the bench trial. Thereafter, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims except one, and awarded solely declaratory relief on the remaining claim. The Court's judgment did not require modification of Defendants' behavior, nor did it materially alter the legal relationship between the parties. (See 1/13/05 Mem. Op. and Order); see Cady v. City of Chicago, 43 F.3d 326, 330 (7th Cir. 1994) (denying fees when defendant Chicago removed the objected newsstand and stated that "where a plaintiff obtains a declaratory judgment but is not benefitted by any change of the defendant's behavior toward him, he normally does not qualify as a prevailing party"). Although Plaintiffs may consider Defendants' facility and policy changes to be a favorable outcome, Defendants' actions were not pursuant to Court injunction or other order and therefore do not form the basis for Plaintiffs recovery of fees. See Fed' n of Advertising Indus. Reps., Inc. v. Ci ty of Chicago, 326 F. 3d 924
- 4-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 5 of 9
(7th Cir. 2003) (denying fees where plaintiff was not prevailing party even though city repealed ordinance in question after district court's opinion)
The Court only granted declaratory relief insofar as Defendants prior "Special management Status" ("SMS") was unconstitutional. However, the Court did not grant any injunctive relief on this issue because Defendants "made a sufficient showing that the new policy, [taking effect in September 2004), is in fact being implemented at the [Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility)." (1/13/05 Mem. Op. and Order at 40.) Over Plaintiffs' arguments, the Court found "that this litigation has caused a good faith reexamination and change in the insufficient past SMS policy." Id. This case falls squarely within Buckhannon's reasoning. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs do not qualify as prevailing parties and cannot pursue recovery of attorney's fees.
C. Parties Bear Their Own Costs and Attorney's Fees The Court also will address Defendant's potential recoupment of attorney's fees and both parties' requests for costs. In its discretion, the Court finds that both parties should bear their own costs and fees.
1. Attorney's Fees Attorney's fees are governed by FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (d) (2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988(b) states that "the court, in its
- 5-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 6 of 9

discretion, may allow the prevailing party

a reasonable

attorney's fee..

"(emphasis added). The ACLU represented the

civilly committed and primarily indigent plaintiffs throughout the

course of the litigation. During the pendency of the case,

Defendants voluntarily revamped many procedures and practices at

the facilities where Plaintiffs reside, which mooted most of

Plaintiffs' claims. Besides the SMS issue, the remaining claims

were unsuccessful at trial, but were of colorable merit. "A

prevailing defendant in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may

recover attorney's fees from the plaintiff only upon a finding that

the plaintiff's action was 'frivolous, unreasonable or without

foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.'"

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (citation omitted); see also

Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 930 (7th

Cir. 2000).

To date, Defendants have not filed for attorney's fees. In

the interest of judicial economy, the Court concludes that any such

attorney fee petition by Defendants would be unwarranted because

the action clearly was not frivolous. Likewise, Plaintiffs do not

qualify for attorney's fees. See supra Section I.B.

2. Costs

Costs are governed by FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (d) (1) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920. Courts have "'discretion to determine whether and to what

extent'" a prevailing party may be awarded its requested costs.

- 6-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 7 of 9
Barber v. Ruth, 7 F.3d 636, 644 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Goldsmith v. Murphy, No. 02 C 5777, 2005 WL 442230, at *34 (N. D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2005) (directing each party to bear its own costs in a mixed result case). However, the Court recognizes the strong presumption that a prevailing party will recover costs. See Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing overcoming the presumption where there is misconduct by the party seeking costs or a pragmatic exercise of discretion when the losing party is indigent). Even so, courts in this district have consistently denied costs to both parties where the plaintiffs are prisoners and filed colorable claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e. g., Hammond v. Griley, No. 02 C. 6990, 2004 WL 413293 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2004) (granting summary judgment because plaintiff did not have "triable eighth amendment claims"); Greer v. McCurry, No. 02 C 4326, 2003 WL 21826549 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2003) (granting defendant's summary judgment motion finding no evidence in support of prisoner's § 1983 medical action); Berrum v. United States, No. 02 C 7714, 2003 WL 21078040 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003) (finding no due process violation in prisoner's pro se civil rights action regarding notice during government property seizure) .
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants filed for recovery of costs. This case afforded mixed results for both parties. See Goldsmith, 2005 WL 442230, at *3 (concluding that where defendants prevailed on most claims, but plaintiff received monetary relief on at least
- 7-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 8 of 9
one claim, both parties' limited success compels them to bear their own costs) The Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims (but one) for injunctive and declaratory relief. However, Plaintiffs achieved some measure of change, although not through judicial order, and a favorable declaratory finding on one claim's past practice. For all the above stated reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion for Bill of Costs.
Plaintiffs are not a "prevailing party" for purposes of recovering attorney's fees under § 1988. See supra Section LB. In order to recoup attorney's fees and other costs under the statutes and FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d), a party must be the "prevailing party" in litigation. However, Buckhanon suggested that in certain cases the analysis of prevailing party for costs may differ from that of fees because of the presumption in favor of costs. 532 U.S. at 606 n.8; see also Petersen, 372 F.3d at 867-68. The Seventh Circuit has stated that to recover costs, a party must prevail "as to the substantial part of the litigation." See Testa v. Village of Mundelein, Ill., 89 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying costs to both parties where jury awarded plaintiff $1,500 on malicious prosecution claim, but lost on § 1983 claim). As the Court previously discussed, at best, Plaintiffs achieved mixed results and limited success. Accordingly, in its discretion, the Court also denies Plaintiffs' motion for Bill of Costs.
- 8-

Case 1:02-cv-01456 Document 227 Filed 07/26/2005 Page 9 of 9
II. CONCLUSION On July 18, 2005, the Court granted the parties' Agreed Motion for Extension of Time related to Defendants' Motion. The Court hereby vacates the Order Re-setting Briefing Schedule. The law on "prevailing party" is clear and the relevant facts concerning the Court's judgment and resolution of Plaintiffs' claims are readily apparent. The parties need not incur any additional costs or time briefing this matter. Defendants' Motion is granted insofar as the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not a "prevailing party" for purposes of fees. Defendants' and Plaintiffs' motions for Bill of Costs are denied. The Court directs that both parties bear their own fees and costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court

- 9-

 
 Case: 1:02-cv-01456 Document #: 164 Filed: 01/13/05 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:1341
AO 450(Rev. 5/85)Judgment in a Civil Case
United States District Court
Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division

Jeffery Hargett, et al v.
Carol Adams, et al

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE Case Number: 02 C 1456

D

Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been

tried and the jury rendered its verdict.

•

Decision by Court. This action came to trial before the Court. The issues have been

tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants' on all claims for injunctive relief and all claims of declaratory relief, except as to defendants' prior SMS policy.

Date: 1/13/2005

 
 Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 1 of 21
BROWN,PROTO,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.0.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:02−cv−01456

Hargett, et al v. Baker, et al Assigned to: Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Jeffery Hargett

Date Filed: 02/27/2002 Date Terminated: 01/13/2005 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Everett Joseph Cygal Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: ecygal@schiffhardin.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Michelle Rubenstein Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: arubenstein@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin S. Wolf Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 180 North Michigan Avenue Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601−7401 (312) 201−9740 Email: bwolf@aclu−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Theodore Varas Preston Gates &Ellis 701 Fifth Avenue Suite 5000 Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 623−7580
Joshua Douglas Lee Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: jdlee@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Patrick Mullins Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive 6600 Sears Tower Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 2 of 21

Sarah E Schriber Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 180 North Michigan Avenue Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601−7401 (312) 201−9740 Email: sschriber@aclu−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kim A Overlin

represented by Everett Joseph Cygal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Michelle Rubenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin S. Wolf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Theodore Varas (See above for address)

Joshua Douglas Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Patrick Mullins (See above for address)

Sarah E Schriber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jimmie Smith

represented by Everett Joseph Cygal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Michelle Rubenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin S. Wolf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Theodore Varas (See above for address)

Joshua Douglas Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Patrick Mullins (See above for address)

Sarah E Schriber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 3 of 21

Plaintiff
Loren K Walker on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Everett Joseph Cygal (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Michelle Rubenstein (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin S. Wolf (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Theodore Varas (See above for address)
Joshua Douglas Lee (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Patrick Mullins (See above for address)
Sarah E Schriber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Linda R Baker Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

represented by J William Roberts Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 TERMINATED: 04/03/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Michael Ramage Hinshaw &Culbertson 400 South Ninth Street Suite 200 Springfield, IL 62701 (217) 528−7375 TERMINATED: 04/03/2003
James Constantine Vlahakis Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 Email: jvlahakis@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/03/2003
Steven M. Puiszis Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 4 of 21

(312) 704−3000 Email: spuiszis@hinshawlaw.com TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

Defendant
Mary Bass Head Ficility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human services TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

represented by J William Roberts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/03/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Michael Ramage (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

Steven M. Puiszis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

Defendant
Timothy Budz Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center

represented by J William Roberts Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 Email: broberts@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Michael Ramage Hinshaw &Culbertson 400 South Ninth Street Suite 200 Springfield, IL 62701 (217) 528−7375 Email: aramage@hinshawlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Thomas Shannon Hinshaw &Culbertson LLP 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 704−3901 Email: rshannon@hinshawlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven M. Puiszis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Raymond Woods Clinical Director

represented by J William Roberts (See above for address)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 5 of 21

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Michael Ramage (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven M. Puiszis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Travis Hinze Associate Clinical Director TERMINATED: 04/03/2003

Defendant
Carol Adams Dr.

represented by J William Roberts (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Michael Ramage (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steven M. Puiszis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Shan Jumper

represented by J William Roberts (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Michael Ramage (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert Thomas Shannon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 6 of 21

Steven M. Puiszis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/27/2002 02/27/2002 03/04/2002 03/10/2002
03/12/2002 03/12/2002 03/13/2002
03/19/2002
03/27/2002 03/29/2002
04/16/2002 04/23/2002 05/06/2002 05/14/2002 05/16/2002

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT − Civil cover sheet − Appearance(s) of Everett Joseph Cygal as attorney(s) for plaintiffs' ( no summons(es) issued.) ( Documents: 1−1 through 1−3) (hmb) (Entered: 02/28/2002)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 2/27/02 in the amount of $ 150.00, receipt # 10618630. (hmb) (Entered: 02/28/2002)
2 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Benjamin S. Wolf. (yp) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 3/10/02 by Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly : Status hearing set to 9:00am. on 4/24/02 before Judge Kennelly in Chambers, Room 1778. Parties are to review and comply with the attached standing order. Counsel for plaintiff(s) are ordered to cause a copy of this order to be delivered forthwith to each defendant in the same manner that has been or is being served on each defendant. Mailed notice (or) (Entered: 03/10/2002)
MOTION by defendant Timothy Budz to reassign based on relatedness (Attachments); Notice (Original in case file 99 cv 2861) (yap) (Entered: 03/13/2002)
MOTION by defendant Timothy Budz to reassign based on relatedness (Attachments); Notice (Original in case file 99 cv 2861) (yap) (Entered: 03/19/2002)
3 MINUTE ORDER of 3/13/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendant's motion to reassign based on relatedness is granted [0−1]. Cause to be reassigned to the calendar of Judge Harry D. Leinenweber. Defendants' to answer or othewise plead by 4/29/02. Status hearing set for 4/16/02 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (yp) (Entered: 03/19/2002)
4 REASIGNMENT ORDER of 3/19/02 This case is reassigned to the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber from Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly pursuant to Local Rule 40.4. , Case related 1:99−cv−2861 with member cases 1:02−cv−1456. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 03/20/2002)
5 MOTION by plaintiff to maintain class action ; Memorandum in support; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 04/02/2002)
6 MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Answer brief to plaintiff's motion to maintain class action [5−1] due 5/13/02. Reply to answer brief due 5/23/02. Ruling on plaintiff's motion to maintain class action set for 6/12/02 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 04/02/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 4/16/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing reset to April 29, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wp) (Entered: 04/19/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 4/23/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing reset to April 30, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wp) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
7 AGREED MOTION by parties for an extension of time to file briefs concerning plaintiffs' motion for class certification ; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
9 MOTION by defendants to dismiss class action complaint , and motion to file oversized memorandum of law in support instanter (Attachments); Notice. (yp) (Entered: 05/22/2002)
8 MINUTE ORDER of 5/16/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : The agreed motion for an extension of time to file briefs concerning plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted [7−1]. Defendants to file their brief in response to plaintiffs' motion for class by 5/20/02. Plaintiffs' reply brief to be filed by 5/30/02 [5−1].

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 7 of 21

05/21/2002
05/21/2002 06/03/2002 06/11/2002 06/12/2002 06/14/2002
06/18/2002 06/25/2002 06/28/2002 07/11/2002
07/12/2002 07/25/2002 08/01/2002 08/01/2002 08/01/2002 08/02/2002 08/06/2002

Ruling date for 6/12/02 is reset to 6/28/02 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
10 MINUTE ORDER of 5/21/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion to file oversized memorandum of law in support instanter is granted [9−2]. Plaintiffs' response to defendants' motion to dismiss class action complaint to be filed by 6/18/02 [9−1]. Defendant's reply brief due 7/9/02. Defedants' response to plaintiffs' motion for class is not due by 6/3/02 [5−1]. Plaintiffs' reply brief now due by 6/13/02. The court's oral ruling date of 6/28/02 is reset to 7/10/02 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (yp) (Entered: 05/22/2002)
11 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by defendant in support of motion to dismiss [9−1] (Attachment). (yp) (Entered: 05/22/2002)
12 RESPONSE by defendant to plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
14 MOTION by defendants for leave to cite to additional authority in support of motion to dismiss (Attachment); Notice. (yp) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
13 REPLY memorandum by plaintiff in support of motion to maintain class action [5−1]; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 06/13/2002)
15 MINUTE ORDER of 6/14/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion for leave to cite to additional authority in support of motion to dismiss is granted [14−1]. Palintiffs' response brief now due by 6/21/02. No notice (yp) (Entered: 06/17/2002)
16 MINUTE ORDER of 6/18/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : The oral ruling date of 7/10/02 for Plainitff's motion for certification is stricken [5−1]. The court will rule by mail. Mailed notice (yp) Modified on 06/19/2002 (Entered: 06/19/2002)
17 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in opposition to defendants'motion to dismiss [9−1] (Attachment); Notice. (yp) (Entered: 06/27/2002)
18 MINUTE ORDER of 6/28/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing set for 7/11/02 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 07/01/2002)
19 MINUTE ORDER of 7/11/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing held and continued to 8/21/02 at 9:00 a.m. Reply brief to the motion to dismiss now due by 7/12/02. Ruling date stricken. The court will rule by mail. No notice (cem) (Entered: 07/12/2002)
20 REPLY by defendants in support of motion to dismiss [9−1]; Notice. (gcy) (Entered: 07/16/2002)
21 MINUTE ORDER of 7/25/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendant's motion to dismiss class action complaint is denied. [9−1] Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (eav) (Entered: 07/26/2002)
MOTION by defendants to certify class definition (Original in 99cv2861). (yp) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
22 NOTICE by defendants of motion to certify class definition [0−1]. (yp) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
23 MOTION by defendants to stay discovery ; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
24 NOTICE by defendants of motion to certify class definition [0−1]. (yp) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
26 MINUTE ORDER of 8/6/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion to certify class definition is granted [0−1]. The plaintiffs have agreed to delete the words "have been" from the current definition of the class contained on page four of this courts 6/28/02 memorandum opinion and order. Defendants' motion to stay discovery is withdrawn [23−1]. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 08/09/2002)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 8 of 21

08/07/2002 08/20/2002 08/21/2002
09/03/2002 09/06/2002 09/06/2002 01/06/2003 03/07/2003 03/11/2003
03/18/2003 03/18/2003 04/01/2003 04/01/2003 04/03/2003
04/03/2003 05/05/2003 05/06/2003 05/06/2003 05/06/2003

25 LETTER dated 8/7/02 by Everett J. Cygal to James C. Vlahakis, Esq. (yp) (Entered: 08/09/2002)
27 MOTION by defendants Linda R Baker, Mary Bass, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods for protective order governing plaintiffs' Rule 34 request (Attachments); Notice. (yp) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
28 MINUTE ORDER of 8/21/02 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion for protective order governing plaintiffs' Rule 34 request is granted [27−1] in part and denied in part as stated on the record. Defendants' response to the motion to unconsolidate by 8/23/02. Status hearing held. (Entered Agreed Protective Order.) No notice (yp) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
29 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Michael Patrick Mullins, Everett J. Cygal; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 09/05/2002)
30 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants Linda R Baker, Mary Bass, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods by J William Roberts, Steven M. Puiszis, James Constantine Vlahakis, Andrew Michael Ramage. (yp) (Entered: 09/09/2002)
31 ANSWER by Linda R Baker and affirmative defenses to class action complaint [1−1]; Notice. (yp) (Entered: 09/09/2002)
SCHEDULE set on 1/6/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing set for January 16, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wp) (Entered: 01/06/2003)
32 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery , and to extend time for fact discovery until 6/30/03 (Attachments); Notice. (air) Modified on 05/22/2003 (Entered: 03/12/2003)
44 MINUTE ORDER of 3/11/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is granted [32−1]. Plaintiff's limited to fifteen depositions. Plaintiff's motion to extend time to 06/30/03 for fact discovery is granted [32−2]. Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 06/18/2003)
33 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file additional appearance Christopher T. Varas (rmm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
38 NOTICE by plaintiffs of motion for leave to file additional appearance Christopher T. Varas [33−1] (Attachment) (rmm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
34 MOTION by plaintiff to compel discovery (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
35 MOTION by defendants Timothy Budz and Raymond Woods to substitute parties pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.25(D) ; Notice (rmm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
36 MINUTE ORDER of 4/3/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file additional appearance Christopher T. Varas is granted [33−1i. Defendants' motion to substitute parties pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.25(D) is granted [35−1]. Defendants Linda Renee Baker, Mary Bass and Travis Hinze are dismissed as parties of interest and Dr. Carol Adams and Shan Jumper are substituted as defendants. Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is denied [34−1]. No notice (rmm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
37 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Christopher T. Vargas (rmm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
40 EMERGENCY MOTION by defendants' to compel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.37 (Attachments); Notice. (hmb) (Entered: 05/14/2003)
39 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' emergency motion to compel (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 05/07/2003)
41 CORRECTED EMERGENCY MOTION by defendants' to compel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P37 (Attachments); Notice. (hmb) (Entered: 05/14/2003)
42 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to defendants' emergency motion to compel [41−1] (Attachments); Notice. (hmb) (Entered: 05/14/2003)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 9 of 21

05/07/2003 06/18/2003
06/18/2003 07/14/2003 07/16/2003
07/17/2003
08/22/2003 08/25/2003 08/26/2003 08/26/2003 08/27/2003
08/28/2003 09/04/2003 09/08/2003 09/09/2003
09/15/2003 09/16/2003

43 MINUTE ORDER of 5/7/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' emergency motion to compel is denied, under the conditions stated in open court [41−1], [40−1]. Mailed notice (hmb) (Entered: 05/14/2003)
45 MINUTE ORDER of 6/18/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : The court's minute order dated 3/11/03 is corrected to read as follows: plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery is granted in part and denied in part, as indicated in open court. Plaintiffs' limited to 15 depositions. Plaintiffs' motion to extend time to 6/30/03 for fact discovery is granted. Mailed notice (hmb) (Entered: 06/19/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 6/18/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing set for July 16, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 06/23/2003)
46 MOTION by Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper to dismiss Jeffery Hargett as a class representative (Attachments); Notice (las) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 7/16/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing and continued to December 10, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff to complete expert reports by September 16, 2003. Defendants' response to reports due October 31, 2003. Plaintiff's rebuttal due December 1, 2003. No notice (wp) (Entered: 07/16/2003)
47 MINUTE ORDER of 7/17/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing reset for 9/23/03 at 9:00 a.m. Defendants' motion to dismiss Jeffery Hargett as a class representative is withdrawn without prejudice [46−1]. No notice (las) (Entered: 07/18/2003)
48 MOTION by Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper for protective order (Attachments); Memorandum in support; Notice (ar) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
49 AMENDM MOTION by Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper for protective order [48−1] (Attachments); Notice (ar) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
50 CROSS−MOTION by plaintiffs for a declaration of rights regarding expert witness and for other relief ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
51 MEMORANDUM of law by plaintiffs in support of their cross−motion for a declaration of rights regarding expert witness and for other relief (Attachment) [50−1] [50−2] (1 vol.) (ar) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
52 MINUTE ORDER of 8/27/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' amended motion for protective order is granted [48−1] [49−1]. Plaintiffs' cross−motion for a declaration of rights regarding expert witness and for other relief is denied [50−1] [50−2]. No notice (ar) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
53 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Amy Michelle Rubenstein (ar) (Entered: 08/29/2003)
55 MOTION by plaintiffs to reset schedule Memorandum in support; Notice (hp) (Entered: 09/16/2003)
54 RESPONSE by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Wood, and Shan Jumper to plaintiffs' motion to reset schedule (Attachments); Notice (ar) (Entered: 09/09/2003)
56 MINUTE ORDER of 9/9/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing re−set for 11/13/03 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion to reset schedule is granted [55−1] in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' report due by 10/09/03. All other reports due 11/12/03. No notice (hp) (Entered: 09/16/2003)
58 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel the production of master files (Attachments); Notice (hp) Modified on 09/22/2003 (Entered: 09/19/2003)
57 RESPONSE by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to plaintiffs' "motion to compel the Production of Master Files" (Attachments). (hp) (Entered: 09/19/2003)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 10 of 21

09/16/2003 09/17/2003
09/23/2003 09/23/2003 09/23/2003
10/01/2003 10/02/2003 10/20/2003 10/20/2003 10/21/2003 10/21/2003
10/22/2003 10/29/2003 10/30/2003
11/04/2003 11/20/2003 12/12/2003 12/15/2003 12/16/2003

59 NOTICE of filing by defendants regarding defendants response to plaintiffs' motion to compel [57−1] (hp) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
60 MINUTE ORDER of 9/17/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Under the conditions set forth in open court, plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of master files is granted [58−1] in part and denied in part. No notice (hp) (Entered: 09/22/2003)
61 MOTION by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to reset date for defendants' expert disclosures ; Notice (hp) (Entered: 09/25/2003)
62 JOINT MOTION by parties to reset schedule of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner and Mr. Steve Martin (hp) (Entered: 09/25/2003)
63 MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : The joint motion to reset schedule is granted. [62−1] Defendants motion to reset date for defendants' expert disclosures is granted. [61−1] Parties to submit order setting forth schedule. No notice (hp) (Entered: 09/25/2003)
64 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiffs regarding their expert's right to interview staff (Attachments) (hp) (Entered: 10/03/2003)
65 MINUTE ORDER of 10/2/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiffs' emergency motion regarding their expert's right to interview staff is granted in part and denied in part. [64−1] No notice (hp) (Entered: 10/03/2003)
66 EMERGENCY MOTION by defendants for protective order related to plaintiffs' proposed dissemination of Dr. Berlin's Rule 26 report (Attachments); Notice (hp) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
75 EMERGENCY MOTION by defendants for protective order related to plaintiffs' proposed dissimination of Dr. Berlin's Rule 26 Report. (RESTRICTED) (hp) (Entered: 01/02/2004)
67 LETTER to Judge Leinenweber from defendants counsel James C. Vlahakis dated 10/21/03. (hp) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
69 MINUTE ORDER of 10/21/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Filed defendant's motion for a protective order. [66−1] Evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion for protective order set for 11/17/03 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (hp) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
68 LETTER to Judge Leineneber from defendants counsel James C. Vlahakis dated 10/22/03. (hp) (Entered: 10/31/2003)
70 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiffs to remove the restraint on their counsels' speech and lift the protective order entered October 21, 2003 ; Memorandum in support; Notice (hp) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
71 MINUTE ORDER of 10/30/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiffs' emergency motion to remove the restraint on their counsels' speech [70−1] and lift the protective order entered October 21, 2003 is granted. [70−2] Evidentiary hearing is stricken. [66−1] No notice (hp) (Entered: 11/03/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 11/4/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing reset to November 20, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wp) (Entered: 11/04/2003)
SCHEDULE set on 11/20/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing held and continued to February 5, 2004 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 11/25/2003)
73 MOTION by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to reset expert discovery schedule ; Notice (hp) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
72 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendants' second motion to reset the expert discovery schedule (Attachment) (hp) (Entered: 12/16/2003)
74 MINUTE ORDER of 12/16/03 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing re−set for 06/01/04 at 9:00 a.m. Daubert briefs to be filed by 06/01/04. Under the

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 11 of 21

01/12/2004 01/14/2004 01/15/2004 01/15/2004 01/21/2004
01/28/2004
02/11/2004 02/12/2004 03/29/2004 04/01/2004 04/08/2004 05/04/2004
05/04/2004
05/11/2004 05/11/2004 05/11/2004 05/27/2004

conditions set forth in open court, defendant's motion to reset expert discovery schedule is granted. [73−1] No notice (hp) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
77 MOTION by plaintiffs for protective order (Attachments) (eav) (Entered: 01/16/2004)
76 RESPONSE by defendants Carol Adams, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to plaintiffs' "motion for protective order" [66−1]; (Attachment); Notice (hp) (Entered: 01/15/2004)
78 MINUTE ORDER of 1/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : (Entered Order Resetting Expert Discovery Disclosures. No notice (eav) (Entered: 01/16/2004)
79 MINUTE ORDER of 1/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiffs' motion for protective order is denied. [77−1] No notice (eav) (Entered: 01/16/2004)
80 MOTION by defendants Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to consolidate and stay case No. 03 C 2009 in relation to Hargett v. Baker, 02 C 1456 and Tiney−Bey v. Peters, 99 C 2861 (Attachments); Notice (hp) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
81 MINUTE ORDER of 1/28/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion to consolidate and stay case No. 03 C 2009 to 02 C 1456 Hargett vs. Baker is denied, but, granted as to 99 C 2861 Tiney−Bey vs. Peters. [80−1] No notice (hp) (Entered: 02/03/2004)
82 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendants Shan Jumper, Carol Adams, Raymond Woods and Timothy Budz to reset expert discovery schedule (Attachments); Notice. (jmm) (Entered: 02/13/2004)
83 MINUTE ORDER of 2/12/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: Defendant's unopposed motion to reset expert discovery schedule is granted [82−1]. No notice (jmm) (Entered: 02/13/2004)
84 MOTION by defendants to extend disclosure of Dr. Janice Marques (Attachment); Notice (hp) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
85 MINUTE ORDER of 4/1/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing set for 04/08/04 at 9:00 a.m. Defendants' motion to extend disclosure of Dr. Janice Marques is granted. [84−1] Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 4/8/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing held. Bench trial set for September 20, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 04/13/2004)
MOTION by William Stevens in opposition to the defendant's motion to reassign, consolidate and stay case no, 04 C 0274 based upon relatedness to Tiney−Be v. Peters, 99 C 2861 and Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 ; Notice (Original in 99 C 2861) (las) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
86 MOTION by plaintiff William Stevens in opposition to the defendant's motion to reassign, consolidate and stay case no. 04 C 0274 based upon relatedness to Tiney−Bey v. Peters, 99 C 2861 and Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 ; Notice. (hp) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
MOTION by William Stevens in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) ; Notice (Original in 99 C 2861) (las) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
MOTION IN OPPOSITION by William Stevens to defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6); Notice of motion, Certificate of Service/Service List, and Correspondence (Original in 99 C 2861) (eav) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
87 MOTION by defendant William Stevens in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) ; Notice. (hp) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
88 MOTION by defendants to extend time to file Daubert motions ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 06/02/2004)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 12 of 21

06/01/2004 06/15/2004 06/15/2004 06/17/2004
06/28/2004
07/09/2004 07/13/2004 07/13/2004 07/13/2004
07/21/2004 07/29/2004 07/30/2004 08/05/2004 08/09/2004

89 MINUTE ORDER of 6/1/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 a.m. on 06/15/04. Defendants' motion to extend time to file Daubert motions is granted [88−1]. No notice (ar) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 6/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing held and continued to July 21, 2004 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wp) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
90 REFERRAL ORDER: Case referred to Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier for Settlement Conference Mailed notice. (wp) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
91 MINUTE ORDER of 6/17/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing is set for 7/1/04 at 9:00 a.m. courtroom 1700, for the purpose of setting a date for a settlement conference. The settlement conference will be conducted in accordance with the Court's Standing Order on Instructions for Settlement conference, which is enclosed and can also be accessed from the Courts Website at Http://10.205.15.104/JUDGE/SCHENKIER/sispage.htm. Prior to the 07/01/04 status hearing the parties shall jointly contact the Court's courtroom deputy at 312/435−7573 with agreed dates for a settlement conference. The status hearing will be stricken if a settlement conference date is set with the Court's courtroom deputy. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
92 MINUTE ORDER of 6/28/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference is set for 07/20/04 at 10:00 a.m., in chambers 1746. The settlement conference will be conducted in accordance with the Court's Standing Order on Instructions for Settlement Conference, which can be accessed from the Courts Website at http://10.205.15.104/Judge/Schenkier/sispage.htm. The schedule for exchange of demand and offer set forth in the standing order is as follows: plaintiff's counsel shall serve on defense counsel a written settlement demand by 07/07/04. Defendant's counsel shall serve on plainitff's counsel a written settlement offer by 07/14/04. The parties shall deliver copies of these letters to chambers by close of business on 07/15/04. Parties wil ultimate settlement authority must attend the conference. The status hearing set for 07/01/04 is stricken. Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 06/30/2004)
94 MOTION by defendants Timothy Budz, Carol Adams, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to extend time to file Daubert motions ; Notice. (hp) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
93 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Sarah E. Schriber. (hp) (Entered: 07/14/2004)
ORAL MOTION by defendants to amend motion . (hp) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
95 MINUTE ORDER of 7/13/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing re−set for 07/29/04 at 9:00 .a.m. Defendants' motion to extend time to file Daubert Motions is granted. [94−1] Defendant's oral motion to amend motion is granted. [0−0] Plaintiff granted leave to file additional appearance. No notice (hp) (Entered: 07/15/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 7/21/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held on 7/20/04 and continued to 10:00 7/27/04 . Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 07/21/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 7/29/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing held. Attorney Michael Mullins granted leave to withdraw as counsel. No notice (wp) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
96 MINUTE ORDER of 7/30/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held and continued to 08/04/04 at 5:30 p.m. Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
97 MINUTE ORDER of 8/5/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Continued settlement conference held on 08/04/04, and continued to 08/09/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
98 MINUTE ORDER of 8/9/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Continued settlement conference held. After four conferences with the parties, the Court concludes that settlement cannot be reached at this time. All matters subject to the referral having

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 13 of 21

09/02/2004 09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/10/2004 09/13/2004
09/13/2004 09/13/2004 09/14/2004
09/14/2004
09/14/2004 09/14/2004 09/14/2004 09/15/2004 09/15/2004
09/15/2004
09/15/2004

been concluded, the referral is hereby terminated. Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
101 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery supplementation ; Memorandum in support; (Attachments); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
99 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs of law in support of plaintiffs' motion for judicial inspection and special session. (hp) (Entered: 09/07/2004)
102 MOTION by plaintiffs for judicial inspection and special session ; Notice. (hp) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
103 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel production of privilege log (Attachments); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
100 MINUTE ORDER of 9/13/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : The Order entered on 01/28/04 in Case No. 02 C 1456 [81−1] is hereby clarified and amended sua sponte as follows: Case No. 03 C 2009 is found to be related to Case No. 99 C 2861, but not Case No. 02 C 1456. All proceedings in Case No. 03 C 2009 are stayed pending resolution of the principal issues in Case No. 99−C 2861. Case No. 03 C 2009 is not consolidated with Case No. 99 C 2861. Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
105 FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER APPENDIX by the parties (5 Vols: 105−1 through 105−5) (hp) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
131 PRE−TRIAL ORDER by the parties (Attachments). (hp) (Entered: 10/04/2004)
104 MINUTE ORDER of 9/14/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery supplementation is granted. [101−1] Plaintiff's motion to compel production of privilege log is denied. [103−1] Plaintiffs' motion for judicial inspection and special session [102−1] is continued generally. No notice (hp) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
106 MOTION by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to bar plaintiffs' proposed experts, Fred Berlin, M.D., Jeffrey Metzner, M.D., Steve Martin from testifying as to certain opinions at trial ; Notice. (air) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
107 MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to the qualifications and methodologies of Dr. Fred Berlin (Attachment). (air) (Entered: 09/15/2004)
108 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Joshua Douglas Lee. (jmp) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
109 EMERGENCY MOTION by plaintiffs for rule to show cause and other relief (Attachments); Notice. (gma) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
110 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: Plaintiff's emergency motion for rule to show cause [109−1] and other relief is granted [109−2]. Depositions ordered to proceed. No notice (gma) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
111 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: The Facility Director of IDHS Detention Facility, Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, is hereby commanded to have the body of Jimmie Smith present for court at 219 S. Dearborn on Monday, 9/27/04 at 8:00 a.m. for trial (Entered Order.) No notice (gma) Modified on 09/16/2004 (Entered: 09/16/2004)
112 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: The Facility Director of IDHS Detention Facility, Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, is hereby commanded to have the body of Jeffrey Hargett present for court at 219 S. Dearborn on Monday, 9/27/04 at 8:00 a.m. for trial. (Entered Order.) No notice (gma) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
113 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: The Facility Director of IDHS Detention Facility, Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, is hereby commanded to have the body of Kim Overlin present for court at 219 S. Dearborn on Monday, 9/27/04 at 8:00 a.m. for trial. (Entered

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 14 of 21

09/15/2004
09/15/2004
09/15/2004 09/16/2004 09/17/2004
09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/20/2004
09/20/2004 09/20/2004 09/21/2004 09/21/2004 09/21/2004 09/21/2004 09/22/2004 09/22/2004

Order.) No notice (gma) Modified on 09/16/2004 (Entered: 09/16/2004)
114 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: The Facility Director of IDHS Detention Facility, Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, is hereby commanded to have the body of Loren Walker present for court at 219 S Dearborn on Monday, 9/27/04 at 8:00 for trial. (Entered Order.) No notice (gma) Modified on 11/24/2004 (Entered: 09/16/2004)
115 MINUTE ORDER of 9/15/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: The Facility Director of IDHS Detention Facility, Illinois Department of Human Services, Timothy Budz, is hereby commanded to have the body of Earl Davis present for court at 219 S. Dearborn on Monday, 9/27/04 at 8:00 a.m. for trial. (Entered Order.) No notice (gma) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
116 MEMORANDUM of law by defendants in support of motion to bar plaintiffs' proposed expert M.D., Jeffrey Metzner, M.D. [106−1] (Attachments); Notice. (ntf) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
FORWARDED two certified copies of each minute order dated 9/15/04 to U.S. Marshal's Office. (gma) Modified on 11/24/2004 (Entered: 09/16/2004)
122 MOTION by defendants Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper to structure hearing on this matter to first determine which of plaintiffs' claims are moot and no longer relevant (Attachments); Notice of motion (eav) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
117 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendants' motion for a hearing on mootness (Attachments). (gcy) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
118 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to defendants' proposed exhibits; Notice of filing (eav) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
119 BENCH BRIEF by plaintiffs (Attachments) (eav) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
120 TRIAL BRIEF by defendants Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper discussing the application of the "Professional Judgment" standard to the security and treatment of civilly confined, violent sex offenders (eav) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
121 MOTIONS by defendants Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper in limine Nos. 1−7 (Attachments); Notice of filing (eav) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
123 MOTION by defendants Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper to strike portions of Dr. Iacono's 9/14/04 "Supplemental Expert Report" (Attachments) (eav) (Entered: 09/22/2004)
125 OBJECTIONS by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, and Shan Jumper to plaintiffs' exhibits [118−1]. (hp) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
126 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendants' motion to strike portions of Dr. Iacono's supplemental report [123−1] (Attachment). (hp) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
127 NOTICE of filing by defendants regarding objections to plaintiffs' proposed exhibits [125−1]. (hp) (Entered: 09/24/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/21/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Trial begins−bench. Bench trial held and continued to September 22, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
124 ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants' Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper by Robert Thomas Shannon. (vmj) (Entered: 09/23/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/22/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to September 23, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 15 of 21

09/23/2004 09/27/2004 09/28/2004 09/28/2004 09/28/2004
09/28/2004 09/29/2004 09/29/2004 09/30/2004 10/01/2004 10/04/2004 10/05/2004 10/06/2004
10/06/2004 10/07/2004 10/21/2004 10/21/2004 10/26/2004
10/26/2004

SCHEDULE set on 9/23/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to September 27, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/27/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to September 28, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
128 MOTION by plaintiff to strike portions of Dr. Schlank's expert report and limit testimony (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 09/29/2004)
129 MOTION by plaintiffs to strike portions of Dr. Dvokins's expert report and limit testimony (Attachments); Notice (cdy) (Entered: 09/29/2004)
130 MINUTE ORDER of 9/28/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : The IDHS Detention Facility is directed to bring the body of Earl Davis to Court on 09/28/2004 at 10:00 a.m. for trial and return him to the custody of IDHS Detention Facility. (Entered Order). No notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/30/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/28/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to September 29, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/29/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to September 30, 2004 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
132 MOTION by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper for directed verdict (Attachment); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 10/04/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 9/30/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to October 1, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/1/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to October 4, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/01/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/4/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to October 5, 2004 at 11:00 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/5/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held and continued to October 6, 2004 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/6/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Bench trial held. Trial ends−Bench. Post trial motions to be filed by October 27, 2004. Parties granted leave to file briefs in excess of 15 pages, but not to exceed 25 pages. The court will rule by mail. No notice (wp) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
133 OFFER OF PROOF by plaintiffs regarding one−hour nurse review of patients on SMS status [119−1] [120−1] (Attachments). (hp) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
134 SUPPLEMENTAL DEPOSITIONS of Michael Bednarz, Timothy Bodz, Darrell Sanders and Raymond Wood taken on September 16 and 20, 2004 (Attachments). (hp) (Entered: 10/12/2004)
136 MOTION by plaintiff to supplement the record ; Notice. (jmm) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
137 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion to supplement the record [136−1] (Attachments). (jmm) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
135 RESPONSE by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record with untimely and irrelevant exhibits (Attachments); Notice. (hp) Modified on 10/28/2004 (Entered: 10/28/2004)
139 MINUTE ORDER of 10/26/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to supplement the record [136−1] is taken under advisement. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (jmm) (Entered: 11/01/2004)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 16 of 21

10/29/2004 11/01/2004 11/01/2004 11/01/2004 11/04/2004 11/04/2004
11/05/2004 11/10/2004 11/24/2004
11/24/2004 11/24/2004 11/24/2004 11/24/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/15/2004

138 POST TRIAL brief by plaintiffs (Attachments). (jmm) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
140 MOTION by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper for leave to file instanter post−trial briefs ; Notice. (hp) Modified on 11/24/2004 (Entered: 11/05/2004)
141 TRIAL brief by defendants Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Carol Adams, Shan Jumper at the conclusion of the evidence (Attachments); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 11/05/2004)
142 NOTICE of filing supplemental trial exhibits by defendants. (hp) (Entered: 11/05/2004)
ORAL MOTION by plaintiff for further briefing . (hp) (Entered: 11/05/2004)
143 MINUTE ORDER of 11/4/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion for leave to file post−trial briefs is granted. [140−1] Plaintiff's oral motion for further briefing is denied. No notice (hp) Modified on 11/24/2004 (Entered: 11/05/2004)
144 MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW by defendants in support of admission of forensic psychophysiology using the polygraph as a learned treatise (Attachments); Notice. (gma) (Entered: 11/09/2004)
145 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' submission to admit the James Allen Matte text as a learned treatise (Attachments) (las) (Entered: 11/16/2004)
146 PARTIES DEPOSITIONS DESIGNATIONS, Counter−Designations &Objections of Illinois Department of Human Services and Liberty Healthcare Corporation by Raymond M. Wood, Ph.D., Timothy J. Budz; and Robert E. Glotz (3 Vols: 146−1 thru 146−3). (hp) (Entered: 11/29/2004)
147 DEPOSITION designations and counter−designations by parties'. (vmj) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
148 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs' to defendants' proposed deposition designations. (vmj) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
149 OBJECTIONS by defendants' to plaintiffs' proposed deposition designations, Volumes I, II and III. (vmj) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
150 NOTICE of filing regarding remark [147−1], objection [148−1], objection [149−1]. (vmj) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
151 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Raymond Woods by James C. Vlahakis; Notice. (hp) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
152 NOTICE of filing by defendants Liberty Healthcare, Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper of appearance by James C. Vlahakis. (hp) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
153 NOTICE of filing by defendants Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper of appearance of counsel James C. Vlahakis. (hp) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
154 MOTION by defendants Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper to reassign , consolidate and stay case no. 04 C 6307 based upon relatedness to Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 (Attachments); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 12/23/2004)
155 MOTION by defendant Raymond Woods to reassign , consolidate and stay case No. 04 C 6814 base upon relatedness to Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 (Attachments); Notice. (hp) Modified on 12/23/2004 (Entered: 12/23/2004)
156 MOTION by Liberty Healthcare to reassign and stay case no. 04 C 0908 based upon relatedness to Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 (Attachments); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 12/23/2004)
157 JOINT MOTION by the parties to designate certain trial exhibits as restricted and place them under seal ; Memorandum in support; Notice. (hp) Modified on 12/23/2004 (Entered: 12/23/2004)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 17 of 21

12/16/2004
12/21/2004 12/23/2004 12/23/2004 12/23/2004 01/13/2005
01/13/2005 01/19/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 02/03/2005 02/09/2005

158 MINUTE ORDER of 12/16/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Filed defendants' motion to reassign and stay case no. 04 C 908 based on relatedness. Based on relatedness, defendants' motions to reassing and stay case no. 04 C 908 now pending before Judge Zagel, Case No. 04 C 6814 now pending before Judge Shadur and Case No. 04 C 6307 now pending before Judge St. Eve are granted. [154−1] [154−2] [154−3] The joint motion to designate certain trial exhibits as restricted and place them under seal is granted. [155−1] [155−2] [155−3][156−1][156−2] 157 No notice (hp) Modified on 12/23/2004 (Entered: 12/23/2004)
161 MOTION by defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods, Shan Jumper for leave to cite additional authority (Attachments); Notice. (hp) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
159 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 05/07/03, 07/17/03, 08/27/03, 09/09/03, 09/17/03, 09/23/03, 10/21/03, 01/15/04, 04/08/04, 06/01/04 Before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber (10 Vols: 159−1 thru 159−10). (hp) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
160 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): Held on 08/21/02, 07/16/03 Before Honorable Harry D Leinenweber (Documents 160−1 through 160−2). (rbf) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
162 MINUTE ORDER of 12/23/04 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' motion for leave to cite additional authority is granted. [161−1] No notice (hp) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
163 MINUTE ORDER of 1/13/05 by Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber: Plaintiffs' demand for declaratory relief is granted insofar as to TDF's prior SMS was unconstitutional and defendants failed to establish that plaintiffs' claim on this issue was moot, but any remaining claims sfor declaratory relief are denied. Plaintiffs' demand for injunctive relief is denied with respect to this and all other claims, case terminated. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (air) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
164 ENTERED JUDGMENT. (air) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
165 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendants' motion to reassign, consolidate and stay case no. 04 C 6307 based upon relatedness to Hargett −v− Adams 02 C 1456 (Attachment).(hp, ) Modified on 5/18/2005 (lxs, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 5/18/2005 (lxs, ). (Entered: 01/25/2005)
166 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A Overlin, Jimmie Smith, Loren K Walker to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (gma, ) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
167 NOTICE of Motion by Everett Joseph Cygal for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A Overlin, Jimmie Smith, Loren K Walker to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 166 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 2/3/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
168 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Jeffery Hargett, Kim A Overlin, Jimmie Smith, Loren K Walker in Support of MOTION by Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A Overlin, Jimmie Smith, Loren K Walker to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 166 (gma, ) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
169 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to alter judgment 166 to be filed by February 17, 2005. Plaintiffs' reply brief due February 24, 2005. The court will rule by mail. Bill of Costs and Rule 59(e) Motions to be filed two weeks after the court's ruling on the motion to alter. No notices (wp, ) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
170 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : The court's minute entry dated February 3, 2005 is amended to read as follows: Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to alter judgment to be filed by February 17, 2005. Plaintiffs' reply brief due February 24, 2005. The court will rule by mail. Bill of Costs and the letter exchange on fees to be filed two weeks after the court's ruling on the motion to alter. No notices (wp, ) (Entered: 02/09/2005)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 18 of 21

02/17/2005 02/17/2005
02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/17/2005 02/23/2005
02/23/2005 03/04/2005
03/04/2005
03/10/2005 03/10/2005 03/25/2005 03/25/2005 04/08/2005 04/08/2005
04/12/2005
04/21/2005

171 MOTION by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods to strike portions of plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider (gma, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
172 NOTICE of Motion by Steven M. Puiszis for presentment of MOTION by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods to strike portions of plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider 171 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 2/22/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
173 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider; Notice. (gma, ) Modified on 3/10/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/18/2005)
174 EXHIBITS by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods filed in response to plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider (gma, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
176 EXHIBITS by Defendants in response to plaintiff's Rule 59(E) motion to reconsider 173 . (hp, ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
175 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiffs' reply to defendants motion to strike 171 to be filed by March 4, 2005. Defendants' oral motion to withdraw and substitute its response in opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider is granted. No notice (wp, ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
177 CORRECTED response in opposition to plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider 173 by Defendants (hp, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
178 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A Overlin, Jimmie Smith, Loren K Walker for leave to file instanter their reply memorandum in support of their motion ot alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (gma, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
179 NOTICE of Motion by Everett Joseph Cygal for presentment of UNOPPOSED MOTION by Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim A Overlin, Jimmie Smith, Loren K Walker for leave to file instanter their reply memorandum in support of their motion ot alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) 178 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/10/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
180 REPLY MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in Support of plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.59(e) 178 . (lcw) (Entered: 03/14/2005)
181 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to file instanter 178 is granted No notice (wp, ) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
182 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend judgment 166 is denied. Judicial staff mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 03/29/2005)
183 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/25/2005. (mjc, ) (Entered: 03/29/2005)
184 JOINT MOTION by Defendants, Plaintiffs for extension of time to (1)comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and Local Rule 43.2 and (2) file Bill of Costs (gma, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
185 NOTICE of Motion by all parties for presentment of JOINT MOTION by Defendants, Plaintiffs for extension of time to (1)comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and Local Rule 43.2 and (2) file Bill of Costs 184 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 4/12/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
186 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : THe Joint Motion for extension of time to April 22, 2005 in which to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3 and to file the Bill of Costs 184 is granted. Mailed notice (wp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
187 JOINT MOTION by Defendants, Plaintiffs for extension of time to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3 and file their bill of costs (gma, ) (Entered: 04/21/2005)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 19 of 21

04/21/2005
04/26/2005
05/06/2005 05/06/2005 05/06/2005 05/06/2005 05/10/2005 05/10/2005
05/10/2005 05/11/2005 05/11/2005 05/12/2005 05/12/2005 05/17/2005 05/17/2005 05/17/2005
05/19/2005
05/27/2005 05/27/2005

188 NOTICE of Motion by Sarah E Schriber for presentment of JOINT MOTION by Defendants, Plaintiffs for extension of time to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3 and file their bill of costs 187 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 4/26/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/21/2005)
189 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : The Joint Motion for extension of time 187 to May 6, 2005 in which to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3 and to file their Bill of Costs is granted. Mailed notice (wp, ) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
190 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of defendants' motion for leave to file bill of costs instanter before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 5/10/2005 at 09:30 AM. (las, ) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
191 MOTION by Defendants Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, and Raymond Woods for leve to file bill of costs instanter (las, ) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
228 BILL of Costs by Plaintiffs; Declaration of Benjamin S. Wolf (Exhibits). (hp, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
229 NOTICE of filing by all plaintiffs re Bill of costs 228 (hp, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
192 MOTION by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods for leave to file bill of costs instanter (gma, ) (Entered: 05/11/2005)
193 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of MOTION by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods for leave to file bill of costs instanter 192 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 5/12/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 05/11/2005)
194 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' Motion for leave to file bill of costs instanter is granted. Mailed notice (wp, ) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
195 BILL of Costs by defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods; Notice of filing. (hp, ) (Entered: 05/17/2005)
202 MEMORANDUM of law by defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods in Support of bill of costs 195 (hp, ) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
200 BILL of Costs by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods (hp, ) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
201 NOTICE of filing by all defendants re bill of costs 200 (hp, ) (Entered: 05/20/2005)
196 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Status hearing set for 6/2/2005 at 09:00 AM. Parties to submit disposition regarding related cases. Mailed notice (wp, ) (Entered: 05/17/2005)
197 AGREED MOTION by all parties to set joint briefing schedule with regard to the parties' competing bill of costs.(rbf, ) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
198 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of agreed motion to set joint briefing schedule with regard to the parties competing bill of costs 197 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 5/19/2005 at 09:30 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 05/18/2005)
199 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : The Agreed Motion to set a briefing schedule 197 is granted. Initial brief to the bill of costs to be filed by June 17, 2005. Response/Reply briefs to be filed by July 8, 2005. The court will rule by mail. Mailed notice (wp, ) (Entered: 05/19/2005)
203 AGREED MOTION by Defendants to extend time to respond to plaintiffs' Local Rule 54.3 fee petition(gma, ) (Entered: 05/31/2005)
204 NOTICE of Motion by defendants for presentment of AGREED MOTION by Defendants to extend time to respond to plaintiffs' Local Rule 54.3 fee petition 203 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/2/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 05/31/2005)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 20 of 21

06/02/2005
06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/07/2005 06/07/2005 06/09/2005 06/17/2005 06/17/2005 06/17/2005
06/20/2005 06/20/2005
06/20/2005 06/22/2005 06/23/2005 06/23/2005 06/24/2005 06/24/2005

205 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' Agreed Motion to extend time to June 13, 2005 in which respond to Plaintiffs' Local 54.3 Fee Petition 203 203 is granted. Defendants' to produce the chart on all related cases by June 3, 2005. No notice (wp, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
208 APPENDIX by Plaintiffs regarding cases that are related to the Hargett class action pursuant to L.R. 40.4. (hp, ) (Entered: 06/10/2005)
209 REPORT by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods regarding reassigned cases that are related to The Hargett Class Action pursuant to L.R. 40.4.; Notice of filing. (hp, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
211 APPENDIX by Defendants to Report regarding reassigned cases that are related to The Hargett Class Action Pursuant to L.R. 40.4 209 (Exhibits). (hp, ) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
206 MOTION by Defendants Carol Adams, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Raymond Woods to file defendants' report regarding reassigned cases instanter. (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
207 NOTICE of Motion by Kourtney A Mulcahy for presentment of motion to file defendants' report regarding reassigned cases instanter 206 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/9/2005 at 09:30 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
210 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber :Defendants' Motion for leave to file 206 is granted. No notice(wp, ) (Entered: 06/15/2005)
215 JOINT MOTION by The Parties for extension of time to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3 regarding attorney's fees (hp, ) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
216 AMENDED JOINT MOTION for extension of time 215 by The Parties (hp, ) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
217 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : The joint motion for extension of time comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3 by 06/17/05; file initial briefs regarding each party's Bill of Costs by Friday, 06/24/05; and file response/reply briefs regarding each party's Bill of Costs by Friday, 07/15/05 is granted. 215 212 : No notice (hp, ) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
212 MOTION by Defendants for ruling that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(gma, ) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
213 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of MOTION by Defendants for ruling that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 212 before Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/23/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
214 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by defendants in opposition to plaintiffs' PETITION for attorney's fees (gma, ) (Entered: 06/21/2005)
218 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motion for a ruling on plaintiffs eligibility for attorney's fees 212 ; Notice of filing. (hp, ) Modified on 6/24/2005 (hp, ). (Entered: 06/24/2005)
219 CORRECTED PAGE SIX by defendants to its memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney's fees 218 ; Notice of filing (hp, ) (Entered: 06/29/2005)
220 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Response to defendant's motion for ruling to be filed by July 7, 2005. The court will rule by mail. No notice (wp, ) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
221 LETTER to Judge Leinenweber dated 06/23/05 from defendant's counsel James C. Vlahakis regading corrected page six 219 (hp, ) (Entered: 07/01/2005)
222 CORRECTED page six by defendants to their memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiffs' petition for attorney's fees 218 ; Notice of filing (hp, ) (Entered: 07/01/2005)

Case: 1:02-cv-1456 As of: 09/19/2012 05:52 PM CDT 21 of 21

07/05/2005 07/18/2005 07/18/2005 07/26/2005
07/26/2005 09/28/2005 10/03/2005 01/14/2010

223 AGREED MOTION by The Parties for extension of time to file response to attorney's fees 212 (hp, ) (Entered: 07/19/2005)
224 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : The Agreed motion extension of time is granted. 223 Plaintiffs' response in support of their prevailing party status eligible for attorneys fees to be filed by 08/05/05. Defendants' reply brief to be filed by 08/19/05. 212 Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
225 ORDER Re−Setting Briefing Schedule 224 Signed by Judge Harry D. Leinenweber on 7/18/2005:Mailed notice(hp, ) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
226 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: Before the Court are defendants' motion for ruling that plaintiffs are not entitled to costs and attorney's fees; defendants bill of costs; and plaintiffs' bill of costs. The Court grants defendants' motion and declines to award attorney's fees or other costs to either party. 212 The Court vacates the Order of 07/18/2005 re−setting briefing schedule. 224 225 Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
227 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Harry D. Leinenweber on 7/26/2005:Mailed notice(hp, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
230 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Defendants' Motion to strike 171 is denied as moot, nunc pro tunc, see 3/25/05 Order (183−1) denying Plaintiffs' motion to alterl or amend judgment. Motions terminated: (wp, ) (Entered: 09/28/2005)
231 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : The plaintiff has four boxes of trial exhibits in the courtroom. Plaintiff is hereby directed to make arrangements to removed said exhibits by Friday October 14, 2005 or they will be destroyed. Mailed notice (wp, ) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
232 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of sealed document #75 by Brian Bochenwer of the law firm of Hinshaw &Culbertson (vmj, ) (Entered: 01/15/2010)

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-00908 As of: 10/21/2014 08:21 AM CDT 1 of 5
BROWN,PC,RELATED,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−00908

Morales, et al v. Adams, et al Assigned to: Honorable James B. Zagel Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff Alex Morales

Date Filed: 02/05/2004 Date Terminated: 02/10/2010 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alex Morales #695627 Rushville − DHS R.R. #1, Box 6A Rushville, IL 62681 PRO SE
Notices to Prisoner Correspondence . Email: Prison1_ILND@ilnd.uscourts.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Carol Adams
Defendant Timothy Budz
Defendant Liberty Behavioral Health Corp.

represented by General Counsel Illinois Department of Human Services 100 West Randolph 6th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 312−814−2752 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Shirley Ruth Calloway Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312)814−5581 Email: scalloway@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 Email: jvlahakis@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-00908 As of: 10/21/2014 08:21 AM CDT 2 of 5

Defendant Raymond Wood
Defendant Shan Jumper
Defendant Robert Brucker
Defendant James Haage Defendant Mr Porter Defendant Unknown Others

General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/05/2004
02/05/2004 02/05/2004
02/06/2004
02/10/2004

# Docket Text
1 RECEIVED COMPLAINT with 8 copies. (gcy) . Modified on 8/20/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/06/2004)
2 CIVIL cover sheet. (gcy) . Modified on 8/20/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/06/2004)
3 APPLICATION by Alex Morales to proceed in forma pauperis an affidavit. (gcy). Modified on 8/20/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/06/2004)
FORWARDED entire case file to Prisoner Correspondence. (gcy) (Entered: 02/06/2004)
4 MINUTE ORDER of 2/10/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : The plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied [3−1], without prejudice. The plaintiff is

Case: 1:04-cv-00908 As of: 10/21/2014 08:21 AM CDT 3 of 5

02/10/2004 03/23/2004
04/07/2004 04/07/2004 05/17/2004
06/04/2004 07/08/2004
07/08/2004 07/09/2004 07/09/2004 08/10/2004
09/23/2004 09/23/2004

granted thirty days in which either to file a renewed application to proceed in forma pauperis or to submit the $150 statutory filing fee. Any application to proceed in forma pauperis must certified by a D.H.S. official and must include a trust fund account showing the plaintiff's current balance and transactions for the past six months. Failure to comply with these directives by 03/10/04, will result in denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis and summary dismissal of this case. The Clerk is directed to provide the plaintiff with a blank i.f.p. petition along with a copy of this order. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (gcy) Modified on 02/11/2004 (Entered: 02/11/2004)
MAILED to Alex Morales copy of order dated 2/10/04 with blank i.f.p. petition. (gcy) (Entered: 02/11/2004)
5 MINUTE ORDER of 3/23/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : By order of 02/10/04, the court ordered plaintiff to file a renewed application to proceed in forma pauperis and have the form certified by D.H.S. official and include a trust fund account or to pay the $150.00 filing fee. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the 02/10/04, order. Accordingly, this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.41(b). The case is terminated. terminating case. Mailed notice (gcy) . Modified on 8/20/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 03/24/2004)
6 APPLICATION by plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis (Attachment) (aew) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
7 LETTER from plaintiff regarding IFP application (aew) (Entered: 04/07/2004)
8 MINUTE ORDER of 5/17/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file in forma pauperis [6−1] is denied. Plaintiff is directed to pay a partial filing fee of $14.50 within 30 days of the date of this order if he wants this case to be reopened. If he does not pay the partial filing fee this case will remain closed. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
INMATE installment payment in the amount of $ 14.50 paid on 6/4/04, receipt # 1092858. (gcy) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
9 MINUTE ORDER of 7/8/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : On June 4, 2004, plaintiff paid the partial filing fee as ordered by the court in its 5/17/04, order. The clerk is accordingly ordered to reopen this case. Case reopened. Pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court orders the United States Marshal to effect sevice in this action. Service by the Marshal is necessary in this particular action because plaintiff is a civil detainee and proceeding pro se. The clerk shall issue summonses and send plaintiff a Notice of Availability of a Magistrate Judge, Instructions for Submitting Documents, and a copy of this order. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (gcy) Modified on 07/09/2004 (Entered: 07/09/2004)
COMPLAINT. (gcy) (Entered: 07/09/2004)
SUMMONS issued 8 originals and 8 copies as to Carol Adams, Timothy Budz, Liberty Behavioral, Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper, Robert Brucker, Haage, Mr Porter with certified copies of minute order dated 7/8/04 and complaints, to U.S. Marshal for service. (gcy) Modified on 07/09/2004 (Entered: 07/09/2004)
MAILED Notice of Availability and Instruction for Submitting Documents to Alex Morales. (gcy) (Entered: 07/09/2004)
10 RETURN OF SERVICE of summons and complaint by U.S. Marshal's Office Executed on 8/2/04 as to defendants Raymond Wood, Robert Brucker, Shan Jumper, Timothy Budz, Unexecuted as to defendants Mr Porter and James Haage Jr (Attachments) (10−1 through 10−6) (rmm) . Modified on 8/20/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 08/11/2004)
12 RULE 6(b) MOTION by defendant for leave to file appearance, answer &affirmative defenses instanter ; Notice. (gcy) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
13 MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : Defendants motion to appear and file answer instanter is granted [12−1]. Telephoned notice (gcy) (Entered: 10/07/2004)

Case: 1:04-cv-00908 As of: 10/21/2014 08:21 AM CDT 4 of 5

09/23/2004 09/23/2004 10/05/2004
10/06/2004 10/19/2004 10/19/2004
10/21/2004 10/26/2004 11/17/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/30/2004 03/24/2005 06/06/2005
06/07/2005

18 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Timothy Budz by Shirley R. Calloway (gcy) (Entered: 11/01/2004)
19 ANSWER by Timothy Budz to complaint. (gcy) Modified on 11/02/2004 (Entered: 11/01/2004)
11 MINUTE ORDER of 10/5/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : The Clerk is directed to issue alias summonses to Mr. Porter and James haage, Jr., and the U.S. Marshal is directed to make all reasonable efforts to serve them. The Department of Human Services at Joliet is orderd to furnish the Marshal with Porter and Haage's last known adresses. The information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service and any doucmentation of the addresses shall be retained only by the Marshal. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file nor disclosed by the Marshal. Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
ALIAS SUMMONS issued 2 original and 2 copies as to Mr. Porter and James Haage, Jr., with 2 certified copies of order and copies of complaint to U.S. Marshal for service. (gcy) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
14 RETURN OF SERVICE by U.S. Marshals executed as to defendant Carol Adams on 07/20/04. (ntf) . Modified on 8/21/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 10/21/2004)
16 RETURN OF SERVICE of summons and complaint served on as to defendant Liberty HealthCare Corp., by cerrified mail, Receipt #7002−2410−0002−2953−3185 (Green Return Receipt Attached)., mailed on 07/20/04. Waiver not returned to U.S. Marshal's Service as of 10/19/04. (gl) . Modified on 8/21/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 10/22/2004)
15 MOTION by plaintiff for appointment of counsel ; Notice. (gcy) . Modified on 8/20/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 10/22/2004)
17 MINUTE ORDER of 10/26/04 by Hon. James B. Zagel : Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is denied [15−1]. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
20 RETURN OF SERVICE unexecuted as to defendant James Haage. (gcy) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
21 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants Liberty Behavioral, Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper, Robert Brucker by James Constantine Vlahakis (hp) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
MOTION by defendants Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper to reassign , consolidate and stay case no. 04 C 6307 based upon relatedness to Hargett V. Adams, 02 C 1456 (Attachments); Notice (Original in 02 C 1456). (hp) (Entered: 12/23/2004)
MOTION by defendants Liberty Behavioral, Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper, Robert Brucker to reassign , consolidate and stay case No. 04 C 908 based upon relatedness to Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 (Attachments)(Original in 02 C 1456). Notice. (hp) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
22 REASSIGNMENT ORDER of 12/30/04 Case related 1:02−cv−1456 with member cases 1:04−cv−908 . This case is reassigned to the Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber in accordance with the provisions of Local Rule 40.4 Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
23 U.S. MARSHAL SUMMONS Returned Unexecuted by Alex Morales. (gcy, ) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
25 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Defendants Liberty Behavioral, Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper, Robert Bruckner's motion to reassign case, consolidate and stay case No. 04 C 908 based upon relatedness to Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 nun pro tunc December 30, 2004. Mailed notices. (gcy, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
24 MINUTE entry before Judge Harry D. Leinenweber : Plaintiff has not served defendants James Haage, Jr., and Mr. Porter within 120 days of the filing of the complaint on July 8, 2004. Plaintiff is accordingly given 30 days to show good cause why such service was not made. If plaintiff does not show good cause or

Case: 1:04-cv-00908 As of: 10/21/2014 08:21 AM CDT 5 of 5

06/30/2005 07/07/2005 02/06/2007 03/08/2007 04/12/2007 05/03/2007 06/18/2007
12/23/2009
01/07/2010
02/10/2010

otherwise respond to this order within 30 days, defendants James Haage, Jr., and Mr. Porter will be dismissed from this action, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 06/08/2005)
26 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to Judge James B. Zagel for all further proceedings. . Signed by Judge Charles P. Kocoras on 6/30/05. (gcy, ) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
27 RESPONSE by Plaintiff to order to show cause. (Exhibits). (gcy, ) (Entered: 07/11/2005)
28 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing set for 3/8/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
29 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Status hearing held on 3/8/2007. Status hearing set for 4/12/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
30 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel : Status hearing reset for 5/3/2007 at 10:00 AM. Written status report due by 5/1/2007.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
31 MINUTE entry before Judge James B. Zagel :Status hearing held on 5/3/2007. Plaintiff to respond to written submissions by 5/31/2007. Reply due 6/14/2007. Written status report due 7/12/2007.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
32 STATUS Report of Similarly Situated Claims Pending In This District And The Impact Of The Hargett v. Adams Class Action by Liberty Behavioral Health Corp., Raymond Wood, Shan Jumper, Robert Brucker (Attachments: # 1 Appendix of Exhibits# 2 Exhibit 1 − 4# 3 Exhibit A# 4 Exhibit B# 5 Exhibit C# 6 Exhibit D# 7 Exhibit E# 8 Exhibit F# 9 Exhibit G# 10 Exhibit H − K# 11 Exhibit L − N)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
33 MINUTE entry before Honorable James B. Zagel: Status hearing set for 1/8/2010 at 10:00 AM. There has been no action taken in this case in over 2 years. The Plaintiff is directed to give notice to the court within 14 days of whether he is interested in pursuing this cause of action. Defendants are directed to submit a status report to the court within 14 days.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 12/23/2009)
34 MINUTE entry before Honorable James B. Zagel: There has been no action taken in this case in over 2 years. The Plaintiff is directed to give notice to the court within 14 days of whether he is interested in pursuing this cause of action. Status hearing (1−8−2010) is reset for 2/10/2010 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 01/07/2010)
35 MINUTE entry before Honorable James B. Zagel:Status hearing held on 2/10/2010. Case is dismissed for want of prosecution. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 02/18/2010)

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 1 of 14
BROWN,PROTO,RELATED,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−06814

Taylor v. Adams, et al Assigned to: Honorable Milton I. Shadur Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff Dale Taylor

Date Filed: 10/28/2004 Date Terminated: 04/13/2009 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Ian H. Morrison Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 460−5000 Fax: (312) 460−7000 Email: imorrison@seyfarth.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven H. Fine Law Office of Steven H. Fine 53 West Jackson Boulevard 1515 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)922−0855 Email: sfinelaw@hotmail.com TERMINATED: 07/26/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Ernst Henning Ostrand Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 460−5000 Fax: (312) 460−7000 Email: eostrand@seyfarth.com TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Frank Antonio Bear Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 460−5000 Fax: (312) 460−7000 Email: fbear@seyfarth.com TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory M. Davis Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 460−5000 Fax: (312) 460−7000

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 2 of 14

Email: gmdavis@seyfarth.com TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Plaintiff William G Rambeau, Jr.

represented by Ian H. Morrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ernst Henning Ostrand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Plaintiff Edward L Denton

represented by Ian H. Morrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ernst Henning Ostrand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Plaintiff Raynor E Daniels

represented by Ian H. Morrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Dougherty Foley Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 460−5000 Fax: (312) 460−7000 Email: edfoley@seyfarth.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ernst Henning Ostrand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Plaintiff Anthony A Ashford

represented by Ian H. Morrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 3 of 14

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Dougherty Foley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ernst Henning Ostrand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Plaintiff
Daniel W Baze individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Ian H. Morrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ernst Henning Ostrand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

V.
Defendant
Carol L Adams Secretary, Illinois Department of Human Services

represented by Gary Michael Griffin Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312)814−3650 Fax: (312)814−4425 Email: ggriffin@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
General Counsel Illinois Department of Human Services 100 West Randolph 6th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 312−814−2752 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Elizabeth Keane Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 W. Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−3711 Fax: (312) 814−4425 Email: akeane@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Revels Askew

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 4 of 14

Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−5160 TERMINATED: 12/06/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Frank Antonio Bear (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Meghan Maine Illinois Department of Human Services 100 West Randolph Street 6th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−0927 Email: Meghan.Maine@illinois.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Timothy J Budz Facility Director of the SVP Treatment and Detention Facility TERMINATED: 12/20/2005

represented by General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Revels Askew (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/06/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Frank Antonio Bear (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006

Defendant
Raymond M Woods Dr., Clinical Director of the SVP Treatment and Detention Facility TERMINATED: 12/20/2005

represented by James Constantine Vlahakis Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 Email: jvlahakis@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Frank Antonio Bear (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 5 of 14

Defendant Harry − Reed Illinois State Police Polygraph Examiner, In Their Individual Capacities TERMINATED: 12/20/2005
Defendant Thomas Monahon Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Treatment and Detention Facility ("SVPTDF")
Defendant Shaun Jumper Clinical Director of the SVPTDF TERMINATED: 12/01/2008
Defendant Dr. Leah Chanklin Acting Associate Clinical Director of the SVPTDF TERMINATED: 12/01/2008

Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
General Counsel (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Frank Antonio Bear (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/11/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory M. Davis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/26/2006
represented by Gary Michael Griffin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Elizabeth Keane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meghan Maine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Devereux Vernon InfoLawGroup LLP 225 W. Washington 22nd Floor Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−3467 Fax: (312) 704−3001 Email: svernon@hinshawlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Devereux Vernon (See above for address)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 6 of 14

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jack Graham Executive II

represented by Gary Michael Griffin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alice Elizabeth Keane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Meghan Maine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jeff Clausen Clinical Primary Therapist TERMINATED: 12/01/2008

represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Devereux Vernon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Deitra Dearbone Clinical Primary Therpist TERMINATED: 12/01/2008

represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Devereux Vernon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Thomas Speaker Clinical Primary therapist, in their individual and official capacities TERMINATED: 12/01/2008

represented by James Constantine Vlahakis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Devereux Vernon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Larry Beaumont

Date Filed 10/22/2004
10/22/2004 10/22/2004
10/25/2004

# Docket Text
1 RECEIVED COMPLAINT with four copies. (lw)(Envelope postmarked 10/20/04) Modified on 7/15/2010 (Hill, C., ). (Entered: 10/25/2004)
2 CIVIL cover sheet. (lw) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
3 APPLICATION by plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis ; Notice of Filing. (lw) (Entered: 10/25/2004)
FORWARDED complete case file to Prisoner Correspondence. (lw) (Entered: 10/25/2004)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 7 of 14

10/28/2004
10/28/2004 10/29/2004 11/10/2004 11/10/2004 11/16/2004
11/19/2004 11/29/2004 12/08/2004 12/08/2004 12/13/2004 12/13/2004 12/16/2004 12/16/2004 12/22/2004 12/28/2004

4 MINUTE ORDER of 10/28/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Status hearing set for 12/28/04 at 8:45 a.m. Taylor's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted [3−1] only to the extent that Taylor need not prepay the $150.00 filing fee. That fee must be paid in installments. This action will be permitted to go forward, except that nonlawyer Taylor is not authorized to proceed on behalf of any "Others Similarly Situated". The United States Marshals Service is directed to proceed with the service of process on defendants, and this court is contemporaneously entering its customary initial scheduling order. (Entered Memorandum Order) (See reverse of minute order) Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
COMPLAINT (vmj) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
SUMMONS issued, original and 4 copies, as to defendants Carol L Adams, Timothy J Budz, Raymond M Woods, Harry Reed, to U.S. Marshal, with copies of complaint and certified copy of minute order dated 10/28/04. (vmj) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
5 MOTION by plaintiff Dale Taylor for appointment of counsel (ar) (Entered: 11/16/2004)
7 MOTION by plaintiff to supplement plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis [3−1] ; Notice. (air) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
6 MINUTE ORDER of 11/16/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : In response to this Court's 10/27 minute order, plaintiff Taylor has supplied the information required by 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(2). Based on that information, Taylor's IFP application is granted only to the extent that he need not repay the $150 filing fee. Instead he is required to pay the entire fee in installments with an initial partial payment of $.25 (a copy of this order being sent to the IL. Dept. of Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility so it can make such payment). Taylor's motion for appointment of counsel is granted [5−1]. This Court hereby appoints Steven H. Fine, 53 W. Jackson Blvd., Ste. 1220, Chicago, IL 60604, 312−922−0855. The Clerk shall issue summons and forward to the Marshal for service. The December 28 status date stands. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
SUMMONS issued, five originals and five copies, as to defendants, to U.S. Marshal's with two certified copies of minute order dated 11/16/04 and complaint. (lc) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
8 U.S. MARSHALS RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant Carol L Adams 11/22/04 (Attachment). (lc) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
9 U.S. MARSHALS RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant Timothy J Budz on 12/02/04. (lc) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
10 U.S. MARSHALS RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant Raymond M Woods on 12/02/04. (lc) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
11 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Raymond M. Wood by James Constantine Vlahakis. (hp) Modified on 12/15/2004 (Entered: 12/15/2004)
MOTION by defendant Raymond M. Woods to reassign , consolidate and stay case No. 04 C 6814 based upon relatedness to Hargett v. Adams, 02 C 1456 (Attachments); Notice (Original in 04 C 1456). (hp) (Entered: 12/28/2004)
12 U.S. MARSHALS RETURN OF SERVICE executed as to defendant Harry Reed on 12/10/04. (lc) (Entered: 12/20/2004)
13 WAIVER of service of summons as to defendant Harry − Reed sent on 12/8/04 (lc) (Entered: 12/20/2004)
15 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants Carol L Adams, Timothy J Budz by David Revels Askew (lc) (Entered: 12/29/2004)
14 MINUTE ORDER of 12/28/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held and continued to 2/11/05 at 9:00a.m. Plaintiff's amended complaint is to be filed on or before 01/05/05. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 12/29/2004)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 8 of 14

12/30/2004 01/05/2005 06/30/2005 07/01/2005 07/15/2005 07/26/2005
09/02/2005 09/08/2005 09/28/2005 10/28/2005 12/06/2005
12/06/2005 12/06/2005 12/08/2005 12/08/2005 12/15/2005 12/20/2005 12/20/2005

16 REASSIGNMENT ORDER of 12/30/04 This case is reassigned to the Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber. Case consolidated 1:02−cv−1456 with member cases 1:04−cv−6814. Mailed notice (lc) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
17 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Dale Taylor by Steven H. Fine (ar) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
19 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to Judge Milton Shadur for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 6/30/05. Mailed notice (For further details see order).(cem) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
18 ATTORNEY Appearance for defendant Harry Reed by James Constantine Vlahakis; Notice. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/07/2005)
20 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing set for 7/25/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 07/15/2005)
21 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur: Status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 9/9/05 at 09:00 AM. Attorney Steven Fine is granted leave to withdraw as counsel on behalf of the plaintiff. This Court hereby appoints from this Court's trial bar, Gregory M. Davis Seyfarth Shaw, 55 E. Monroe, Ste. 4200, Chicago, IL 60603, 312−269−8565 to represent the plaintiff. Attorney Gregory M. Davis for Dale Taylor added. Attorney Steven H. Fine terminated. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
22 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants by Frank Antonio Bear, Gregory M. Davis. (lcw, ) (Entered: 09/07/2005)
23 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 9/8/2005 Status hearing set for 10/28/2005 at 09:00 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 09/08/2005)
24 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Dale Taylor by Frank Antonio Bear, Gregory M. Davis (vmj, ) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
25 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 10/28/2005 Status hearing set for 12/6/2005 at 09:00 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/28/2005)
29 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur: Status hearing held and continued to January 26, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. Megan Maine is granted leave to substitute her appearance in place of David Askew for the Defendants. (jmm, ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
32 FIRST AMENDED complaint by Dale Taylor, William G Rambeau, Jr, Edward L Denton, Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford, Daniel W Baze against all defendants (vmj, ) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
33 FIRST AMENDED Complaint by Dale Taylor, William G Rambeau, Jr, Edward L Denton, Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford, Daniel W Baze against all defendants. (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/27/2005)
26 MOTION by Plaintiff Dale Taylor to dismiss Defendant Beaumont Without Prejudice (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
27 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Antonio Bear for presentment of motion to dismiss 26 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 12/15/2005 at 09:15 AM. (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
28 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant Beaumont without prejudice is granted. 26 Defendant Beaumont is hereby dismissed from this action. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
30 First AMENDED complaint by Dale Taylor against all defendants and terminating Raymond M Woods; Timothy J Budz and Harry − Reed (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
31 NOTICE by Dale Taylor re amended complaint 30 (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 12/20/2005)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 9 of 14

01/27/2006 03/31/2006
04/28/2006 04/28/2006 04/28/2006 04/28/2006
04/28/2006
04/28/2006
04/28/2006 05/09/2006
05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/23/2006 05/24/2006 05/26/2006 05/26/2006

34 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 1/27/2006 Status hearing set for 3/31/2006 at 09:00 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
35 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 3/31/2006 Status hearing set for 5/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. Defendants' answer to count 3 and response to count 1 is due on or before April 28, 2006. (srn, ) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
36 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Jack Graham by Gary Michael Griffin (Griffin, Gary) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
37 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Jack Graham by Meghan O'Donnell Maine (Maine, Meghan) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
38 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin to dismiss Dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs? First Amended Class Action Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
39 MEMORANDUM by Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin in Support of motion to dismiss 38 Dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs First Amended Class Action Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
40 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Jack Graham, Jeff Clausen, Deitra Dearbone, Thomas Speaker to dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
41 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Jack Graham, Jeff Clausen, Deitra Dearbone, Thomas Speaker for leave to file to File Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
42 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of motion to dismiss, 40 , motion for leave to file, 41 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 5/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
43 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to dismiss 38 is entered and continued. Plaintiff's response is due on or before May 30, 2006. Motion to dismiss Count V 40 is denied. Defendants' Answer to remaining counts is due on or before May 23, 2006. Motion for leave to file 41 is granted. Defendant has to May 30, 2006 in which to file a motion for summary judgment as to count III. Status hearing set for 6/26/2006 at 09:00 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
44 ANSWER to amended complaint by Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Jack Graham(Maine, Meghan) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
45 ANSWER to amended complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Deitra Dearbone(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
46 ANSWER to amended complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Jeff Clausen, Thomas Speaker(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
47 MOTION by Defendants Jeff Clausen, Thomas Speaker to dismiss Counts II, III and IV of Plainiffs First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− First Amended Complaint)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
48 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of motion to dismiss 47 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/1/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
49 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Dale Taylor, William G Rambeau, Jr, Edward L Denton, Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford, Daniel W Baze by Ernst Henning Ostrand (Ostrand, Ernst) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
54 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Enter Memorandum Order. Accordingly, both anwers must be amended on or before 6/9/06. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/31/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 10 of 14

05/26/2006 05/30/2006 05/30/2006 05/30/2006
05/30/2006 05/31/2006
05/31/2006 06/02/2006 06/09/2006 06/09/2006 06/12/2006
06/12/2006 06/15/2006 06/21/2006
06/21/2006

55 MEMORANDUM Order Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 5/26/2006.(lcw, ) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
50 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Jack Graham, Jeff Clausen, Deitra Dearbone, Thomas Speaker for leave to file To Amend Their Answers to Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint (Maine, Meghan) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
51 NOTICE of Motion by Meghan O'Donnell Maine for presentment of motion for leave to file, 50 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/1/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Maine, Meghan) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
52 RESPONSE by Dale Taylor, William G Rambeau, Jr, Edward L Denton, Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford, Daniel W Baze in Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin to dismiss Dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs? First Amended Class Action Complaint 38 (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
53 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re response in opposition to motion, 52 to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
56 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin for leave to file Reply Brief in Support of Moiton to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss# 2 Exhibit A (reply brief) Hargett Opinion# 3 Exhibit C (reply brief) Defense Trial Exhibit 205(e) identifying residents who failed the polygraph yet were released from the program# 4 Exhibit C (reply brief) Defense Trial Exhibit 205(d) identifying residents who failed the polygraph yet continued to progress through aspects of treatment)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
57 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of motion for leave to file,, 56 (Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
58 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to dismiss 38 is entered and continued generally. Motion to dismiss 47 is entered and continued generally. Motion for leave to file 50 is granted, Motion for leave to file 56 is granted. (srn, ) (Entered: 06/02/2006)
59 Amended ANSWER to amended complaint by Jeff Clausen, Thomas Speaker(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
60 Amended ANSWER to amended complaint by Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Deitra Dearbone(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
61 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Jack Graham for leave to file (Agreed Motion) For Leave To File Their Amended Answer To Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint Instanter (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Amended Answer To Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint)(Griffin, Gary) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
62 NOTICE of Motion by Gary Michael Griffin for presentment of motion for leave to file, 61 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/15/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Griffin, Gary) (Entered: 06/12/2006)
63 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for leave to file 61 Their Amended Answer To Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint Instanter is granted. (srn, ) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
64 MOTION by Plaintiffs Dale Taylor, William G Rambeau, Jr, Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford, Daniel W Baze for leave to file Plaintiffs' Consolidated Motions for Leave to Substitute Counsel and to Effect Substitution (Attachments: # 1 Ian Morrison's Appearance on Behalf of Plaintiffs)(Ostrand, Ernst) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
65 NOTICE of Motion by Ernst Henning Ostrand for presentment of motion for leave to file, 64 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/26/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Ostrand, Ernst) (Entered: 06/21/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 11 of 14

06/26/2006
06/28/2006 06/28/2006 07/19/2006
07/19/2006 07/24/2006
07/28/2006 08/16/2006 08/30/2006 09/07/2006 09/11/2006
09/12/2006 09/15/2006 11/20/2006 01/19/2007 02/21/2007 03/27/2007

66 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to dismiss 47 is granted without objection., Motion for leave to file 64 is granted, Status hearing held on 6/23/2006, Attorney Ian H. Morrison added for plaintiffs. Attorney Gregory M. Davis terminated. Status hearing set for 9/1/2006 at 09:00 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
67 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Movant's motion to dismiss is denied, and they are ordered to answer that count on ot before 7/14/06. 38 (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
68 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 6/28/2006.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
69 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin to file instanter Answers to Count I of First Amended Class Action Complaint, Agreed (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A: Answer to Count I by Defendants Jumper and Chankin# 2 Exhibit Exhibit B: Answer to Count I by Defendants Adams and Monahan)(Maine, Meghan) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
70 NOTICE of Motion by Meghan O'Donnell Maine for presentment of motion to file instanter, 69 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 7/24/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Maine, Meghan) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
71 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin to file instanter Answers to Count I of First Amended Class Action Complaint, Agreed is granted. 69 (srn, ) (Entered: 07/24/2006)
72 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Jeff Clausen, Deitra Dearbone, Thomas Speaker by Stephen Devereux Vernon (Vernon, Stephen) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
73 NOTICE by Ernst Henning Ostrand of Change of Address (Ostrand, Ernst) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
74 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing reset for 9/7/2006 at 09:00 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
75 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 9/7/2006 Status hearing set for 9/15/2006 at 09:15 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
76 MOTION by Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin, Jack Graham, Jeff Clausen, Deitra Dearbone, Thomas Speaker to transfer case to the Central District of Illinois (Attachments: # 1 Appendix # 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Exhibit G)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
77 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of motion to transfer case, 76 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 9/15/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
78 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to transfer case 76 is denied, Status hearing held on 9/15/2006 Status hearing set for 11/20/2006 at 09:00 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
79 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 11/20/2006 Status hearing set for 1/19/2007 at 09:00 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
80 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 1/19/2007.Status hearing set for 2/21/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
81 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 2/21/2007, Status hearing set for 3/27/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/22/2007)
82 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 3/27/2007.Status hearing set for 5/31/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, )

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 12 of 14

04/02/2007 04/02/2007 05/24/2007 06/26/2007 07/20/2007 08/23/2007 09/26/2007 09/26/2007 11/19/2007 11/26/2007 11/26/2007
01/25/2008 02/11/2008
02/13/2008 02/19/2008 04/10/2008

(Entered: 03/27/2007)
83 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Enter Agreed Protective Order.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
84 AGREED PROTECTIVE Order. Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 4/2/2007.(lcw, ) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
85 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :At counsel's request thestatus hearing is reset for 6/28/2007 at 09:00 AM. The May 31 date is stricken.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
86 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :At counsel's request theStatus hearing is reset for 7/20/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
87 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 7/20/2007,Status hearing set for 8/23/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
88 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 8/23/2007, Status hearing set for 11/19/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 08/23/2007)
89 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Dale Taylor, William G Rambeau, Jr, Edward L Denton, Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford, Daniel W Baze to withdraw as attorney (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
90 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Antonio Bear for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 89 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 10/1/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Bear, Frank) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
91 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 11/19/2007.Status hearing set for 1/28/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
92 STIPULATION of Dismissal Of Certain Defendants Without Prejudice (Ostrand, Ernst) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
93 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Pursuant to the Stipulation for partial dismissal without prejudice, Count V of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Dentrall Dearborne, Jeff Clausen and Thomas Speaker.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
94 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :At counsel's request the Status hearing is reset for 2/11/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/25/2008)
95 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 2/11/2008. This Court grants the dismissal of counts 2,3,4 and 5 without costs and without prejudice with leave to reinstate or enforce the settlement agreement on or before April 10, 2008. Absent a timely file motion to reinstate, extend the time in which to reinstate or enforce the settlement agreement, this order will become final on April 11, 2008. Attorney Frank Antonio Bear and Ernst Henning Ostrand are granted leave to withdraw. Alice Keane is granted leave to file an additional appearance.Status hearing set for 4/11/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
96 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Carol L Adams, Thomas Monahon, Jack Graham by Alice Elizabeth Keane (Keane, Alice) (Entered: 02/13/2008)
97 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :This Court's February 11, 2008 minute order is amended to reflect that counts 1,2,3 and 4 are dismissed. Count 5 remains.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
98 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Milton I. Shadur:At counsel's request the Status hearing is reset for 5/2/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 04/10/2008)

Case: 1:04-cv-06814 As of: 10/21/2014 08:11 AM CDT 13 of 14

04/14/2008 05/02/2008 07/17/2008 09/16/2008
09/16/2008 09/17/2008 09/29/2008
10/01/2008 10/07/2008 11/25/2008 12/01/2008
12/15/2008 02/05/2009 03/05/2009 03/17/2009

99 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford by Erin Dougherty Foley (Foley, Erin) (Entered: 04/14/2008)
100 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Status hearing held on 5/2/2008. Status hearing set for 7/17/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
101 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Status hearing held on 7/17/2008. Status hearing set for 9/17/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
102 MOTION by Defendants Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin to compel FIRST MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS TO PROVIDE COMPLETE INTERROGATORY ANSWERS AND TO IDENTIFY RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS WHICH THEY BELIEVE SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Motion, # 2 Exhibit A−C (emails pursuant to LR 37.2), # 3 Exhibit D − Plaintiffs' Discovery Responses, # 4 Exhibit E − Elliot v. Monahan Complaint)(Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 09/16/2008)
103 NOTICE of Motion by James Constantine Vlahakis for presentment of motion to compel, 102 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 9/19/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Vlahakis, James) (Entered: 09/16/2008)
104 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Motion to compel 102 is entered and continued to 10/3/08 at 8:45 a.m. Response is due on or before September 29, 2008. Status hearing held on 9/17/2008. Status hearing set for 10/3/2008 at 08:45 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 09/17/2008)
105 RESPONSE by Raynor E Daniels, Anthony A Ashford to MOTION by Defendants Shaun Jumper, Leah Chanklin to compel FIRST MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS TO PROVIDE COMPLETE INTERROGATORY ANSWERS AND TO IDENTIFY RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS WHICH THEY BELIEVE SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS 102 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Morrison, Ian) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
106 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:At counsel's request the Status hearing is reset for 10/7/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/01/2008)
107 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Motion to compel 102 is denied. Plaintiffs are to be made available for prompt depositions. Status hearing held on 10/7/2008. Status hearing set for 12/15/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
108 STIPULATION of Dismissal Without Prejudice and Only With Respect To Defendants Leah Chanklin, Jeff Clausen, Deitra Dearbone, Shaun Jumper and Thomas Speaker (Morrison, Ian) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur: Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation to Dismiss, defendants Deitra Dearbone; Shaun Jumper; Thomas Speaker; Leah Chanklin and Jeff Clausen are dismiss without prejudice with leave to reinstate on or before January 5, 2009. Each party bears their own costs and attorneys' fees.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
110 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Status hearing held on 12/15/2008. Status hearing set for 2/5/2009 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/15/2008)
111 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:At counsels' request the Status hearing is reset for 3/6/2009 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/05/2009)
112 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:At counsel's request the Status hearing is reset for 3/17/2009 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
113 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Status hearing held on 3/17/2009. Status hearing set for 4/13/2009 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/17/2009)

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04/13/2009 08/19/2009

114 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:Status hearing held on 4/13/2009. On joint oral motion this action is dismissed without prejudice and without costs with leave to move to reinstate, enforce the settlement agreement or extend the time in which to reinstate on or before October 13, 2009. Absent a timely filed motion this order will become final on October 14, 2009. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
115 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur:On counsel's representation, this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 08/19/2009)