MEDIATION
U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida (Tallahassee) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:19−cv−00431−MW−MJF

GH et al v. MARSTILLER et al Assigned to: CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER Referred to: MAGISTRATE JUDGE MICHAEL J FRANK Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 09/04/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

GH

represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI

FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE INC−

MIAMI FL

100 SE 2ND ST

3750 BANK OF AMERICA TWR

MIAMI, FL 33131

305−358−2081

Fax: 305−358−0910

Email: dtrevisani@floridajusticeinstitute.org

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LEONARD J LAURENCEAU SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − MIAMI FL 2 S BISCAYNE BOULEVARD 32ND FLOOR MIAMI, FL 33131 305−546−5517 Email: leo.laurenceau@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

AIMEE CRISTEN LIM FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES INC − ORLANDO FL PO BOX 533986 ORLANDO, FL 32853 407−553−2550 Email: aimee.lim@floridalegal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JONES FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES INC − NEWBERRY FL 14260 W NEWBERRY RD SUITE 412 NEWBERRY, FL 32669 352−375−2494 Fax: 352−271−4366 Email: cjones@filsinc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

JENNIFER MORRISSEY PAINTER FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES PO BOX 533986 ORLANDO, FL 32853 904−415−6798 Email: jennifer.painter@floridalegal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KELLY JEAN KNAPP

SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − MIAMI FL PO BOX 12463 MIAMI, FL 33101 786−347−2056 Fax: 786−237−2949 Email: kelly.knapp@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURA ANNE FERRO FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE − MIAMI FL 100 SE 2ND STREET SUITE 3750 MIAMI, FL 33131 786−342−6922 Email: lferro@floridajusticeinstitute.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LISA S GRAYBILL SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − NEW ORLEANS LA 201 ST CHARLES AVENUE SUITE 2000 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70170 504−486−8982 Email: lisa.graybill@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARCEL ANDREW LILAVOIS , JR FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE − MIAMI FL 100 SE SECOND STREET SUITE 3750 MIAMI, FL 33131 305−302−8616 Email: mlilavois@floridajusticeinstitute.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SAM N THYPIN−BERMEO FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE INC − MIAMI FL 3750 BANK OF AMERICA TOWER 100 SE SECOND ST MIAMI, FL 33131 305−358−2081 Email: sthypin−bermeo@floridajusticeinstitute.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − TALLAHASSEE FL PO BOX 10788 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32302 850−521−3024 Fax: 350−521−3001 Email: shalini.agarwal@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ANDREA COSTELLO FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES 14260 W NEWBERRY ROAD #412 NEWBERRY, FL 32669 407−801−0332

Plaintiff RL
Plaintiff BW

Fax: 407−505−7327 Email: andrea@floridalegal.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
LEONARD J LAURENCEAU (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
AIMEE CRISTEN LIM (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JONES (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JENNIFER MORRISSEY PAINTER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KELLY JEAN KNAPP (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURA ANNE FERRO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LISA S GRAYBILL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARCEL ANDREW LILAVOIS , JR (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SAM N THYPIN−BERMEO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ANDREA COSTELLO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
LEONARD J LAURENCEAU (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
SIMONE MARSTILLER SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

AIMEE CRISTEN LIM (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JONES (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JENNIFER MORRISSEY PAINTER (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KELLY JEAN KNAPP (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURA ANNE FERRO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LISA S GRAYBILL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MARCEL ANDREW LILAVOIS , JR (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SAM N THYPIN−BERMEO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ANDREA COSTELLO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by BARBARA WILLMAN DAVIS CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Fax: 863−616−1445 Email: b.davis@cttalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ELLIOTT VAN MITCHELL CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Email: e.mitchell@cttalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

HENRY B CAMPBELL CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Fax: 863−616−1445 Email: h.campbell@cttalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JOHN MARC TAMAYO CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Fax: 863−616−1445 Email: j.tamayo@cttalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN BARNET TROHN CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Fax: 863−616−1445 Email: j.trohn@cttalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ROBERT JOSEPH ARANDA CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Fax: 863−616−1445 Email: r.aranda@cttalaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JENNIFER MEGAN VASQUEZ CAMPBELL TROHN TAMAYO & ARANDA − LAKELAND FL 1701 S FLORIDA AVENUE LAKELAND, FL 33880 863−686−0043 Fax: 863−616−1445 Email: j.vasquez@cttalaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by BARBARA WILLMAN DAVIS (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ELLIOTT VAN MITCHELL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

HENRY B CAMPBELL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JOHN MARC TAMAYO (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ROBERT JOSEPH ARANDA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JENNIFER MEGAN VASQUEZ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JONATHAN BARNET TROHN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/04/2019 09/05/2019
09/05/2019 09/05/2019 09/05/2019
09/05/2019
09/05/2019 09/13/2019
09/17/2019 09/17/2019
09/17/2019
09/18/2019

# Docket Text
1 CIVIL COVER SHEET. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 09/04/2019)
2 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number AFLNDC−4610560.), filed by GH, BW, RL. (Attachments: # 1 SUMMONS FOR SIMONE MARSTILLER, # 2 SUMMONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE) (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
3 NOTICE Regarding Electronic Filing and Attorney Admissions Requirements mailed to LEONARD J LAURENCEAU. (blb) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
Set Deadlines: Attorney LAURENCEAU Admissions due by 9/19/2019. (blb) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
4 First MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Lisa Graybill.( Filing fee $ 201 receipt number AFLNDC−4611170.) by BW, GH, RL. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing) (GRAYBILL, LISA) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
5 ORDER ADMITTING LISA GRAYBILL PRO HAC VICE. This Court has considered, without hearing, the Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Lisa Graybill. ECF No. 4 . The motion is GRANTED. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 9/5/19. (blb) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
Set Deadlines/Hearings Status Report due by 10/5/2019. (blb) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
6 Summons Issued as to DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, SIMONE MARSTILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Fl Dept of Juv. Justice Summons) (toy) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI on behalf of BW, GH, RL (TREVISANI, DANTE) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
8 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Complaint and Summons served on Florida Department of Juvenile Justice on 9/13/19, filed by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
9 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Complaint served on Defendant Simone Marstiller on 9/16/19, filed by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
Set Deadlines/Hearings DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE answer due 10/7/2019; SIMONE MARSTILLER answer due 10/7/2019. (blb) (Entered:

10/02/2019 10/03/2019
10/10/2019 10/23/2019 10/28/2019
10/30/2019 10/31/2019
11/04/2019 11/05/2019
11/18/2019 11/20/2019 11/21/2019 11/22/2019 12/02/2019 12/06/2019
12/17/2019

09/18/2019)
10 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 2 Complaint by DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE. (TROHN, JONATHAN) (Entered: 10/02/2019)
11 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT. This Court has considered, without hearing, Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 10 . The motion is GRANTED. Defendants shall file their responsive pleading to the complaint on or before 10/28/2019). Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 10/3/19. (blb) (Entered: 10/03/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 11/12/2019. (blb) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
12 INITIAL SCHEDULING ORDER : Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 12/6/2019. Discovery due by 2/20/2020. Status Report due by 11/25/2019. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 10/23/19. (blb) (Entered: 10/23/2019)
13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , MOTION for More Definite Statement ( (Internal deadline for referral to judge if response not filed earlier: 11/12/2019).) by DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, SIMONE MARSTILLER. (TROHN, JONATHAN) (Entered: 10/28/2019)
14 MOTION to Extend Timeto File Motion for Class Certification by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
15 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT. This Court has considered, without hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend the Deadline for Filing a Motion for Class Certification. ECF No. 14 . The unopposed motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may file their motion for class certification on or before 6/5/2020. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 10/31/19. (blb) (Entered: 10/31/2019)
16 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM MOTION for More Definite Statement by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 11/04/2019)
17 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO DISMISS. This Court has considered, without hearing, Plaintiffs Unopposed Motion for One Week Extension to Respond to Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Class Action Complaint. ECF No. 16 . The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may respond to Defendants motion to dismiss on or before 11/18/2019). Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 11/5/19. (blb) (Entered: 11/05/2019)
18 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 13 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 11/18/2019)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by SAM N THYPIN−BERMEO on behalf of All Plaintiffs (THYPIN−BERMEO, SAM) (Entered: 11/20/2019)
20 STATUS REPORT by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 11/21/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 12/22/2019. (blb) (Entered: 11/22/2019)
21 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Proposed Schedule of Pretrial and Trial Dates) (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 12/02/2019)
22 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS, AND ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT. Defendants have not convinced this Court that dismissal or a more definite statement is warranted. Therefore, Defendants motion, ECF No. 13 , is DENIED. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 12/6/19. (blb) (Entered: 12/06/2019)
23 SCHEDULING AND MEDIATION ORDER : Discovery due by 2/15/2021, Dispositive Motions to be filed by 3/30/2021, Mediation Report due by 4/1/2021, Case referred to mediation. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 12/17/19. (blb) (Entered: 12/18/2019)

12/20/2019 12/20/2019 12/23/2019 01/03/2020
01/03/2020
01/08/2020 01/09/2020 01/15/2020 01/23/2020 01/24/2020 02/21/2020 02/24/2020 02/25/2020 02/28/2020 03/02/2020 03/03/2020
03/05/2020

24 Defendants' ANSWER to 2 Complaint by DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, SIMONE MARSTILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (TROHN, JONATHAN) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
25 STATUS REPORT on Discovery by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 1/23/2020. (blb) (Entered: 12/23/2019)
26 MOTION for Protective Order (Opposed) for Entry of Proposed Qualified HIPAA Protective Order by BW, GH, RL. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed HIPAA Qualified Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit Harvard v. Inch − HIPAA Qualified Protective Order, # 3 Exhibit H.C. v. Bradshaw − HIPAA Qualified Protective Order) (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 01/03/2020)
27 ORDER DIRECTING EXPEDITED RESPONSE. Plaintiffs have filed their Opposed Motion for Entry of Qualified HIPAA Protective Order. ECF No. 26 . Defendants must file a response to the motion not later than Friday, 1/10/2020. See N. D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(E). Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 1/3/20. (blb) (Entered: 01/03/2020)
28 RESPONSE to Motion re 26 MOTION for Protective Order (Opposed) for Entry of Proposed Qualified HIPAA Protective Order filed by DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, SIMONE MARSTILLER. (TROHN, JONATHAN) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
29 HIPAA QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Plaintiffs' motion for entry of HIPAA Qualified Protective Order, ECF No. 26 , is GRANTED. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 1/9/20. (blb) (Entered: 01/09/2020)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by AIMEE CRISTEN LIM on behalf of All Plaintiffs (LIM, AIMEE) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
31 STATUS REPORT on Discovery (Joint) by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 2/24/2020. (blb) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
32 NOTICE of Appearance by MARCEL ANDREW LILAVOIS, JR on behalf of All Plaintiffs (LILAVOIS, MARCEL) (Entered: 02/21/2020)
33 STATUS REPORT on Discovery (Joint) by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 02/24/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 3/25/2020. (blb) (Entered: 02/25/2020)
34 NOTICE of Appearance by JENNIFER MEGAN VASQUEZ on behalf of All Defendants (VASQUEZ, JENNIFER) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
35 Joint MOTION Entry of Proposed Confidentiality Order by BW, GH, RL. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Confidentiality Order) (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 03/02/2020)
36 CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER. This Court has considered, without hearing, the parties' Joint Motion for Entry of Confidentiality Order. ECF No. 35 . For the reasons provided in the motion, this Court finds good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The motion is, therefore, GRANTED.Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 3/3/20. (blb) (Entered: 03/04/2020)
37 MOTION to Quash Non−Party Subpoenas and for a Protective order with Incorporated Memorandum of Law by BW, GH, RL. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Subpoena re G.H., # 2 Exhibit Subpoena re G.H., # 3 Exhibit Subpoena re G.H., # 4 Exhibit Subpoena re G.H., # 5 Exhibit Subpoena re G.H., # 6 Exhibit Subpoena re G.H., # 7 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 8 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 9 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 10 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 11 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 12 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 13 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 14 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 15 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 16 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 17 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 18 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 19 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 20 Exhibit Subpoena re R.L., # 21 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W., # 22 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W., # 23 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W., # 24 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W., # 25 Exhibit

03/06/2020
03/13/2020
03/24/2020
03/25/2020 03/25/2020 04/22/2020 04/24/2020 04/24/2020
04/27/2020 05/27/2020 05/28/2020

Subpoena re B.W., # 26 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W., # 27 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W., # 28 Exhibit Subpoena re B.W.) (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 03/05/2020)
38 ORDER REQUIRING EXPEDITED RESPONSE. On March 5, 2020, Plaintiffs moved to Quash Non−Party Subpoenas and for a Protective Order. ECF No. 37 . Defendants are ordered to respond to Plaintiffs' motion on or before 3/13/2020. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 3/6/20. (blb) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
39 RESPONSE in Opposition re 37 MOTION to Quash Non−Party Subpoenas and for a Protective order with Incorporated Memorandum of Law filed by DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, SIMONE MARSTILLER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (TROHN, JONATHAN) (Entered: 03/13/2020)
40 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AND MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This Court has considered, without hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Non−Party Subpoenas and Motion for a Protective Order. ECF No. 37 . For the reasons stated in this order, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 3/24/20. (blb) (Entered: 03/24/2020)
41 STATUS REPORT on Discovery (Joint) by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 4/25/2020. (blb) (Entered: 03/25/2020)
42 Joint MOTION to Extend Time/Modify the Scheduling Order (ECF 23) by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 04/22/2020)
43 STATUS REPORT on Discovery (Joint) by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 04/24/2020)
44 ORDER AMENDING SCHEDULING AND MEDIATION ORDER. This Court has considered, without hearing, the Joint Motion to Modify Scheduling Order. ECF No. 42 . The motion is GRANTED and this Court amends the Scheduling and Mediation Order of December 17, 2019, ECF No. 23 , by accepting the proposed deadlines as set forth in this order. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/24/20. (blb) Discovery due by 7/2/2021, Dispositive Motions to be filed by 8/30/2021. (Entered: 04/24/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 5/27/2020. (blb) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
45 STATUS REPORT on Discovery (Joint) by BW, GH, RL. (COSTELLO, ANDREA) (Entered: 05/27/2020)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Status Report due by 6/28/2020. (blb) (Entered: 05/28/2020)

 
 Case 4:19-cv-00431-MW-MJF Document 2 Filed 09/05/19 Page 1 of 60

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

_________________________________

G.H., a minor, by and through his parent and legal guardian, GREGORY HENRY; R.L., a minor, by and through her parent and legal guardian, ANGEL CARTER; B.W., a minor, by and through her parent and legal guardian, LEROI LUZUNARIS; on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated,

Case No.:

Plaintiffs,

v.

SIMONE MARSTILLER, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice; and the FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, an agency of the State of Florida,

Defendant. ______________________________________

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Subjecting children to solitary confinement and depriving them of

even minimal meaningful social interaction can cause trauma, depression, and

anxiety, increase the risk of suicide and self-harm, and permanently interfere with

children’s development. Despite these well-known risks of serious harm, the

Case 4:19-cv-00431-MW-MJF Document 2 Filed 09/05/19 Page 2 of 60
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) isolates thousands of children in solitary confinement every year. The risk of harm for children begins immediately when they are isolated in solitary confinement.
2. Solitary confinement is unnecessary, unproductive, and can be permanently damaging to the individuals subjected to it. A national consensus is emerging that solitary confinement poses a risk of harm for anyone, but is especially harmful for children, who are still developing physically, psychologically, and socially. For children with mental illness, developmental disabilities, or histories of trauma, the risk of harm from isolation is even greater. Among other authorities, the U.S. Department of Justice, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care have recognized that solitary confinement is harmful and should be eliminated for children.
3. The named Plaintiffs, and the class they seek to represent, are, or will be, subject to solitary confinement, in one of the 21 DJJ-operated secure detention centers (Secure Detention) throughout the state. They bring this action to address the violations of their rights.
4. DJJ, through policy and practice, subjects children to solitary confinement, often the same child repeatedly, without any time limit, to manage their behavior as a first response to any situation. In solitary, children spend hours
2

Case 4:19-cv-00431-MW-MJF Document 2 Filed 09/05/19 Page 3 of 60
or days behind locked steel doors in tiny cells. DJJ denies them access to outdoor recreation and schooling, and deprives them of normal human interactions. Children have nothing to do while in solitary confinement but cry, sit idly, bang on the door, yell to try to get the staff’s attention, or sleep. DJJ requires them to eat in their tiny cells next to toilets smelling of, and contaminated by, human waste. The cumulative effect of these deprivations in isolation presents a substantial risk of serious harm to these children, all of whom are vulnerable due to their continuing development.
5. DJJ subjects children with mental illness, who have engaged in selfharming behaviors, or are at risk for suicide, to solitary confinement despite their heightened risk for harm. DJJ fails to provide a mental health examination prior to confinement or meaningful mental health treatment during confinement to prevent the onset or exacerbation of mental illness and reduce the risk of suicide. DJJ’s failure to provide even these basic mental health services is especially troubling considering the strong correlation between isolation and the risk of suicide in juvenile detention: fifty percent (50%) of youth who committed suicide in juvenile facilities were in isolation for behavioral sanctions at the time of their death. DJJ is not only aware of this risk of serious harm to children, it has actually studied it, yet still refuses to take appropriate and necessary actions to prevent it.
3

Case 4:19-cv-00431-MW-MJF Document 2 Filed 09/05/19 Page 4 of 60
6. Depriving a child of meaningful social interaction, programming, or mental stimulation is harmful and counterproductive to the goals of ensuring the safety and security of juvenile facilities. For these reasons, there is a national trend among juvenile and correctional entities to eliminate or dramatically reduce disciplinary or punitive isolation for juveniles and, instead, use more appropriate techniques for managing behavior. These entities use very brief, short-term separation of a youth from others, if at all, and only as a last resort when other options fail to de-escalate situations which pose an acute immediate risk of physical harm to the youth or others. During these brief separations, youth receive mental health services, access to basic necessities, programming, and procedural safeguards such as individualized assessments, supervisory approvals, and reviews. Despite the national shift away from using solitary confinement based on a consensus among scientific, medical, and mental health professionals about the psychological and physiological risks of serious harm, DJJ has ignored these risks and continues to subject children in secure detention centers to frequent and repeated solitary confinement.
7. Defendant Simone Marstiller is aware of and has deliberately disregarded the substantial risk of harm to the rights of Plaintiffs, and other similarly situated children, by authorizing and subjecting them to illegal conditions of confinement, including a policy and practice of using harmful solitary
4

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confinement in violation of the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Simone Marstiller and DJJ have also acted, and are acting, under color of state law to discriminate against Plaintiffs and Class Members with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
8. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class they seek to represent (hereafter collectively “Plaintiffs”), bring this action to redress the violations of their civil, statutory, and constitutional rights by Defendants while acting under color of state law. Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ statewide policy and practice of using solitary confinement in Secure Detention where children are isolated from others in a locked cell with no meaningful social interaction, environmental stimulation, outdoor recreation, schooling, or property. Without judicial intervention, these children will continue to suffer from the physical and psychological harm from solitary confinement. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendants to cease the challenged unlawful policies and practices.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 9. Plaintiffs’ claims for relief are predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which authorizes actions to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of
5

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rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
10. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) & (4).
11. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201, 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injury to their rights under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
VENUE 12. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims brought by Plaintiffs and the class have occurred in this District and Defendants are located in this District.
PARTIES PLAINTIFFS:
Plaintiff G.H. 13. Plaintiff G.H. is a 13-year old African-American child who lives in Orange City, Florida with his parents. He is in Secure Detention at the Volusia
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Regional Juvenile Detention Center (Volusia JDC). He appears in this action through his parent and legal guardian, Gregory Henry.
14. G.H. has been diagnosed with an emotional behavioral disorder. Prior to his placement in Secure Detention, G.H. received intensive therapy at the Florida Palms Academy in Miami, a community-based Statewide In-Patient Psychiatric Program (SIPP) that provides services to children with emotional and behavioral needs. He has also received Exceptional Student Education (ESE) services for students with disabilities. His disability interferes with his ability to learn and think. As a result of his disabilities, he experiences depression, anxiety which makes it difficult to breathe, and thoughts about self-harm.
15. DJJ has repeatedly isolated G.H. in solitary confinement at the Volusia JDC. While in current custody in Secure Detention, DJJ has locked G.H. in solitary confinement once for approximately three days for horseplay with a friend and a second time for over two days for fighting with other children. In isolation, G.H. became increasingly anxious and depressed, causing him to bang on the cell door and flood the cell. In response to these disability-related behaviors, DJJ kept G.H. in solitary confinement.
16. During a previous time in Secure Detention, DJJ isolated G.H. in solitary confinement for one day for fighting with another child.
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17. Each time that DJJ locked G.H. in solitary confinement, it was horrible. DJJ took all of his personal property and left him in an empty room. He had no one to talk to and nothing to do. DJJ prohibited him from going to school and did not provide him with education services in his cell. DJJ also prohibited him from going outside or to recreation. DJJ even forced him to eat in his drab, dirty cell. Typically, the only interactions that he had with staff were when they asked him through the cell door whether he had eaten his food. As a result of these deprivations and conditions, G.H. began to feel depressed and angry almost immediately after DJJ isolated him.
18. During one of the recent confinement periods, the trauma that G.H. experienced caused him to wrap his pants around his neck to choke himself. Instead of providing a meaningful mental health intervention, DJJ’s sole response was to send a detention staff person to open his door, take the pants from around G.H.’s neck, briefly talk to him, and then leave. After the detention staff person left, G.H. wrapped his pants around his neck again to choke himself. He got a funny feeling in his heart, chest, neck, and face and got scared, so he stopped. DJJ never provided any mental health treatment in response to this self-harming behavior.
19. Defendants’ solitary confinement policies and practices caused G.H. to display symptoms and harm that are consistent with those experts identify
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among people in solitary confinement. He engaged in acts of self-harm while in solitary confinement by wrapping his pants around his neck and choking himself. G.H. felt like he was going to die. He became paranoid. G.H. had difficulty sleeping and thought he was having a seizure while he was sleeping even though he does not get seizures. His back and neck also hurt because DJJ would not give him a mat to lie down on during the day; instead, he lay on a hard concrete slab in the cell.
20. Defendants subject G.H. to a substantial risk of serious harm by isolating him in confinement, including by causing him to engage in serious selfinjury, placing him at risk for suicide, exacerbating his psychiatric disability, and causing him to experience further trauma. By isolating him in solitary confinement, Defendants also subject G.H. to disability discrimination by failing to modify their policies and procedures to accommodate his disability; by denying him equal access to programs, services, and activities, including recreation, education, and healthcare because of his disability; and by failing to house him in the most integrated setting to meet his needs.
21. G.H. reasonably fears that he will be subject to solitary confinement again at the Volusia JDC if he is not granted injunctive relief because Defendants have repeatedly subjected G.H. and other children to solitary confinement.
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Plaintiff R.L. 22. Plaintiff R.L. is a 13-year old African-American child who lives in Jacksonville, Florida. She is in Secure Detention at the Duval Regional Juvenile Detention Center (Duval JDC). She appears in this action through her parent and legal guardian, Angel Carter. 23. Prior to her placement in Secure Detention, R.L. received Exceptional Student Education services through the P.R.I.D.E. Academy program in the Duval County Public Schools which provides emotional and behavioral support for students with disabilities. Recently, R.L. spent several months at a SIPP for children at Daniel Kids in Jacksonville which provides intensive residential treatment for children exhibiting severe symptoms of mental and emotional distress. R.L. has been involuntarily hospitalized in a Baker Act facility1 several times. She has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, conduct disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder, and takes psychiatric medications. Her disabilities interfere with her ability to concentrate, learn, interact with others, and think. As a result of her disabilities, she has frequent mood changes and it is difficult for her to regulate impulsive behaviors, maintain self-control, and respond appropriately to conflict with others.
1 See § 394.467, Fla. Stat. (2019). 10

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24. DJJ isolated R.L. in solitary confinement at the Duval JDC at least two times. On August 27, 2019, DJJ put R.L. into confinement for approximately six hours after another child punched her in the face. DJJ kept R.L. in confinement even after she filed a grievance asking not to be put in confinement and told DJJ that isolating her made her anxiety worse and would put her at risk of harm because of her psychiatric disability. R.L. cried in confinement – she was emotional, upset, and asked to be let out. She was not released from confinement until hours later. In November 2017, DJJ isolated R.L. in confinement for approximately eight hours for peeling the paint off the wall in her cell.
25. While isolated in solitary confinement, R.L. had nothing to do and no one to talk to. She just sat there or cried. The confinement cell was nasty, smelly, soiled with old human feces, and defaced by writing on the wall. While she was in confinement, DJJ did not allow her to attend school or receive education services. DJJ did not allow her to go to recreation. She had to eat in the confinement cell after all the other children ate. DJJ did not let her have any personal property. She was only allowed a mat at night to sleep on. Each time she was put in isolation, she had no idea what time it was or when she would get out. DJJ failed to evaluate her mental status before placing her in confinement to determine what accommodations and services she may have needed to prevent harm. DJJ has knowledge of her extensive mental health needs.
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26. Defendants’ solitary confinement policies and practices caused R.L. to display symptoms and harm that are consistent with those experts identify among people in solitary confinement. She was depressed because she could not talk to her mother. She felt more anxious and found it difficult to sleep. She felt upset and trapped. She felt alone and angry. The trauma of solitary confinement made her disability related psychiatric symptoms worse.
27. Defendants subject R.L. to a substantial risk of serious harm by isolating her in confinement, including by exacerbating the symptoms of her mental illness and causing her to experience further trauma. By isolating her in solitary confinement, Defendants also subject her to disability discrimination by failing to modify their policies and procedures to accommodate R.L.’s disability; by denying her equal access to programs, services, and activities, including recreation, education, and healthcare because of her disability; and by failing to house her in the most integrated setting to meet her needs.
28. R.L. reasonably fears that she will be subject to solitary confinement again at the Duval JDC if she is not granted injunctive relief because Defendants have repeatedly subjected R.L. and other children to solitary confinement.
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Plaintiff B.W. 29. Plaintiff B.W. is an African-American girl who lives in Jacksonville, Florida. She turned 16 years old while in Secure Detention at the Duval JDC. She appears in this action through her parent and legal guardian, Leroi Luzunaris. 30. B.W. has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and prescribed Adderall. DJJ diagnosed B.W. as needing to see an eye doctor for an exam and glasses to correct impaired vision in both eyes with significantly impaired vision in her left eye. Her disabilities interfere with her ability to concentrate, think, and see. 31. DJJ determined that B.W. was pregnant while she was in Secure Detention at the Duval JDC in June 2019 based on a pregnancy test. She is currently approximately 13-14 weeks into her pregnancy. 32. In July 2019, while DJJ was aware that she was pregnant, DJJ isolated B.W. in solitary confinement. She was initially told that she would be put into isolation because she was pregnant, but then put in confinement because she did not go to school. No mental health professionals or medical staff evaluated B.W. during her time in solitary confinement or after. She remained isolated in confinement for several hours. Defendants subjected B.W. to a substantial risk of serious harm by isolating her in confinement, including while she was pregnant and more vulnerable to physical and mental harm such as miscarriage, birth
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complications, or aggravated pregnancy-related symptoms caused by the trauma of solitary confinement.
33. DJJ has repeatedly isolated B.W. in confinement at least 11 times while she has been in Secure Detention for periods ranging from several hours to three days. In 2018, while B.W. was in Secure Detention at the Duval JDC, DJJ isolated B.W. in solitary confinement two times for fighting with other children – once for three days and a second time for one day. In 2018, DJJ also repeatedly isolated her four other times in confinement for periods including one day, over seven hours, five hours, and almost eight hours. She was put in isolation for reasons such as arguments with other children, cursing at staff, and running. In 2017, DJJ isolated B.W. in confinement four times for periods ranging from one day to eight hours for fighting with another child, arguing with other children, and after another child punched her and spit on her.
34. Each time that DJJ isolated B.W. in solitary confinement, the cells were disgusting and dirty. There was human feces smeared on the wall. There were bugs and flies in the room. DJJ did not allow her to have a mat or blanket during the day. She was only allowed out of solitary confinement for a few minutes a day to shower after everyone else. She had to eat in her cell. The only time DJJ staff opened the door was to give her food or take her to shower. While in confinement,
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B.W. felt vulnerable, powerless, and miserable. No staff told her how long she would be in solitary confinement or when she would get out.
35. Defendants’ solitary confinement policies and practices caused B.W. to display symptoms and harm that are consistent with those experts identify among people in solitary confinement. She felt alone, missed her family, and cried. She felt distressed, uneasy, and worried because she was locked in a cell for days and did not know when she would get out. She could not socialize with other people. While she was pregnant, the smell and filthy conditions of the room made her feel sick and nauseated.
36. Defendants subject B.W. to a substantial risk of serious harm by isolating her in confinement and depriving her of social interaction, environmental stimulation, and exercise. By isolating B.W. in solitary confinement, Defendants also subject her to disability discrimination by failing to modify their policies and procedures to accommodate her disability and by denying her equal access to programs, services, and activities, including recreation, education, and healthcare because of her disability; and by failing to house her in the most integrated setting to meet her needs.
37. B.W. reasonably fears that she will be subject to solitary confinement again at the Duval JDC if she is not granted injunctive relief because Defendants have repeatedly subjected B.W. and other children to solitary confinement.
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38. Plaintiffs sue through their parents and legal guardians who are adult citizens of the State of Florida. DEFENDANTS:
39. Defendant Simone Marstiller (Marstiller) is the Secretary of the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. She was appointed DJJ Secretary in January 2019 and is sued in her official capacity. As DJJ Secretary, she is responsible for “planning, coordinating, and managing the delivery of all programs and services within the juvenile justice continuum,” which includes all detention centers and related programs and facilities, community-based residential programs, non-residential programs, and all delinquency institutions funded by the department. § 20.316(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019). Secretary Marstiller is required to “[e]nsure that juvenile justice continuum programs and services are implemented according to legislative intent; state and federal laws, rules and regulations; statewide program standards; and performance objectives,” “establish program policies and rules,” and “coordinate staff development and training.” §§ 20.316(c)(1), (4) & (6), Fla. Stat. Secretary Marstiller has the final authority to take any necessary corrective action concerning a DJJ program or provider. See § 985.632(5)(f)(2), Fla. Stat.
40. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Marstiller was acting under color of state law.
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41. Defendant Florida Department of Juvenile Justice is the principal administrative unit within the executive branch of the State of Florida responsible for planning, developing, coordinating, and administering the juvenile justice continuum of comprehensive services and programs statewide for the prevention, early intervention, control, and rehabilitative treatment of delinquent behavior. §§ 20.03(2); 985.601. Defendant DJJ is an instrumentality of the State of Florida.
42. Defendant DJJ receives federal financial assistance. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Secure Detention in the Department of Juvenile Justice 43. The Florida juvenile justice system is operationally and
philosophically distinct from the adult criminal justice system. The juvenile system manages youth under a strategy of redirection and rehabilitation, rather than punishment. See § 985.02(3), Fla. Stat. Florida’s juvenile system focuses on a rehabilitative model of treatment designed to effect positive behavioral change.
44. There are 21 juvenile secure detention centers (Secure Detention) operated by DJJ in Florida. Secure Detention is a physically restrictive facility that houses children pending adjudication, disposition, or placement, or pursuant to court order. Fla. Admin. Code. R. 63G-2.014(58). Children taken into custody by law enforcement are screened by DJJ using a standardized Detention Risk Assessment Instrument (DRAI) to determine if they should be placed into Secure
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Detention. Secure Detention is used for youth who are held pursuant to a court order or charge of violating the law following an assessment that less restrictive alternatives are not appropriate. § 985.255, Fla. Stat. While a child’s time in Secure Detention can vary from days to weeks, Florida law requires that a child adjudicated delinquent and awaiting placement in a DJJ program must remain in Secure Detention until that placement occurs. § 985.27, Fla. Stat.
45. According to DJJ, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017-18, there were 14,010 youth placed into DJJ Secure Detention statewide.2 Approximately 5,314 of these children were 15 years old or younger. The majority, 54%, were Black, 15% were Hispanic, and 30% were White. Id.
46. During FY 2017-18, the average daily population in DJJ Secure Detention was 1,057 youth. Id. The statewide average length of stay for a child in Secure Detention was 14 days. Id. Solitary Confinement in DJJ Detention Centers
47. Solitary confinement is defined by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care as “the housing of an adult or juvenile with minimal to rare meaningful contact with other individuals.”3 Defendants call this practice
2 See Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Comprehensive Accountability Report, at 3, (2018), http://www.djj.state.fl.us/docs/car-reports/(2017-18-car)-detention-(mg).pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited September 4, 2019).
3 Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Solitary Confinement (Isolation), (Apr. 2016), https://www.ncchc.org/filebin/Positions/Solitary-Confinement-Isolation.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
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“behavioral confinement” or “confinement,” but DJJ’s policy and practice is solitary confinement: children are isolated from others in a locked room for an indefinite period of time with no meaningful social interaction or environmental stimulation. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 63G-2.022(1) & (4).
48. Under DJJ’s policy and practice, children in Secure Detention are subjected to solitary confinement for hours or days at a time. Although DJJ’s Secure Detention Facility Operating Procedures impose a limit on confinement of 72 hours (for non-medical reasons), in practice, DJJ regularly exceeds this time limit. When children go into solitary confinement, they have no idea if, or when, they are getting out.
49. DJJ, through policy and practice, also subjects many children to repeated periods of solitary confinement, increasing the length of time that they cumulatively spend in isolation. Although research shows that isolating children in solitary confinement can exacerbate the agitation and behavior that led to solitary confinement in the first place, DJJ responds to these behaviors with additional repeated stays in confinement, creating a vicious cycle. The same children may also have been put in solitary confinement one or more times during previous stays in Secure Detention. For example, Plaintiff G.H. has been isolated in solitary confinement three times for a total of six days. Plaintiff B.W. has spent eight days (cumulatively) in solitary confinement during multiple separate incidents. This
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repeated exposure to solitary confinement only compounds the risk of harm for children.
50. DJJ’s policy and practice is to isolate children in solitary confinement for any reason, including for minor misbehavior such as talking back to staff, using a computer, not following directions, or cursing. Horseplay and cursing were the bases for Plaintiff G.H. and B.W.’s confinement. DJJ also put Plaintiff B.W. in solitary confinement for failing to attend school. DJJ put Plaintiff R.L. in solitary confinement for peeling paint off her cell wall. This low threshold results in a shocking number of children subjected to solitary confinement in Secure Detention.
51. DJJ’s own data demonstrates that it isolates thousands of children in Secure Detention in solitary confinement each year for many hours or days at a time. For example, over a recent 11-month period, DJJ isolated 4,310 children in confinement for a total of 11,738 times. Children in some jurisdictions are spending up to 107 hours (i.e., over 4 days) at a time in isolation. The statewide average length of time in solitary confinement is 45 hours, with many detention centers isolating hundreds of children for at least 24 hours. Based on the average number of youth in Secure Detention in a year, approximately 30% of children are isolated in solitary confinement at some point during their time in custody. The result of DJJ’s policies and practices is that thousands of children in DJJ’s care are
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subject to a substantial risk of serious harm from cumulatively spending extensive periods of time isolated in confinement.
52. Defendants isolated each of the named Plaintiffs in solitary confinement in Secure Detention, some of them repeatedly, for periods ranging from several hours to days at a time, pursuant to the policies and practices as described herein. Deprivations and Conditions in Solitary Confinement in DJJ Detention Centers
53. DJJ subjects children to solitary confinement by either locking them in the cells they typically live in or by placing them in separate confinement cells for the duration of the confinement period. No matter where solitary confinement takes place, the deprivations and conditions are similar.
54. Once isolated, children cannot come out of their tiny cells except to shower for a few minutes each day. DJJ also ensures that there is nothing for the children to do for the duration of their confinement. DJJ does not permit them to go to school or receive education services. There is no recreation or programming and no access to phones, radios, or televisions. Children cannot have any personal property or writing materials.
55. While in confinement, DJJ prohibits normal human contact. The only way children can speak to someone is by banging on their cell door to try to attract the attention of staff, or by yelling loudly so staff or another child may hear them.
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Staff will often just attempt to communicate with a child through the solid metal door rather than opening the door to talk to a child face-to-face and hear the child clearly.
56. These deprivations of normal social interactions and environmental stimulation are exacerbated by the austere and decrepit conditions inside the cells. Many of the DJJ-operated detention centers are old, dirty, decaying buildings suffering from age and disrepair that is magnified when locked around-the-clock in a tiny cell. The paint on the walls is peeling off. There is graffiti on the cell walls. DJJ has failed to maintain the plumbing which causes toilets to back up and flood the cells. Even when not backed up, the toilets reek of human waste. Some cells have gnats, ants, or bugs that bite children. DJJ requires children to eat alone in their cells in these conditions.
57. The cells where DJJ isolates children are small and cramped spaces. The only fixtures are a toilet, sink, and concrete slab to sit or lay on. DJJ regularly refuses to provide children with a mat for the concrete slab until nighttime. DJJ refuses to turn off the lights in the cells, leaving children under fluorescent lights 24 hours a day. The cells have a large solid metal door with a window that is difficult to see through unless staff is standing directly in front of the cell. In many cells, there is no window to the outside allowing children to see the sun or sky.
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Devastating Effects of Isolation in DJJ Detention Facilities 58. Children subjected to confinement in Secure Detention experience
insomnia, depression, hallucinations, agitation, anger, fear, distress, anxiety, sadness, mistrust, and feelings of hopelessness and abandonment. Children begin to experience these effects almost immediately and they only worsen with time in solitary confinement. Children are at risk of permanent damage from the harms of solitary confinement.
59. Within minutes of isolation in Secure Detention, harms will often begin to manifest in obvious symptoms of pain and suffering. Some children will cry out, loudly bang on and repeatedly kick the metal door and scream to be let out. Some children withdraw from their surroundings and try to cope, alone, with negative or depressive thoughts while they sit and listen to other children scream. For example, Plaintiff R.L. felt more anxious because she was trapped in isolation, cried, and could not sleep. Plaintiff G.H. flooded the solitary confinement cell and banged on the door because he felt anxious and depressed. Other children smear their feces on the walls of the confinement cells.
60. Defendants know there is a serious risk of harm for children in solitary confinement, including new and worsening mental illness symptoms, selfharming behaviors, and suicide, but do not, in practice, implement any policies to eliminate this risk of harm. For example, DJJ does not have a policy to exclude
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children with mental illness or who are at a heightened risk of suicide or self-harm from solitary confinement. DJJ placed Plaintiff G.H. in solitary confinement even though he was a suicide risk and actually tried to choke himself by tying his pants around his neck while in solitary. After a detention staff person observed this behavior, DJJ kept G.H. in solitary confinement, where he tied his pants around his neck and tried to choke himself again.
61. DJJ, through policy and practice, does not provide an assessment by a mental health professional before it subjects a child with mental illness to solitary confinement. DJJ also fails to regularly provide a mental health status examination by a qualified professional within one hour after confinement begins and at regular intervals as long as a child is in solitary confinement despite a scant Facility Operating Procedure requiring a licensed mental health professional to “review the status” of children in solitary confinement every 24 hours. DJJ also fails to provide mental health treatment for children in solitary confinement; effective monitoring for signs and symptoms of suicide in solitary confinement; examination or treatment after release from solitary confinement to address any lasting effects; or meaningful mental health interventions and de-escalation services in response to obvious signs of suffering and pain. So, DJJ conducted no mental health evaluation of R.L. before placing her in solitary confinement even though it was aware of her bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. Likewise, mental health staff failed
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to effectively intervene with respect to G.H.’s attempts to choke himself in confinement. As a result of DJJ’s failure to develop and implement adequate policies and procedures recognized by experts as necessary to eliminate the known risk of harm, the named Plaintiffs and members of the class are suffering from the damaging effects that mirror those reported in the research about children subjected to solitary confinement. Well Known Risks of Harm of Solitary Confinement for Juveniles
62. Medical, psychiatric, and scientific professionals agree that solitary confinement is harmful to both adults and children. These experts agree that children isolated in solitary confinement are more susceptible to harm because they are still developing socially, psychologically, and neurologically.
63. The risk of harm from solitary confinement has been well-recognized by the Supreme Court, including over a century ago:
[People subject to isolation] fell, after even a short confinement into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). More recently, the Supreme Court noted in 2015 that prolonged isolation “exacts a terrible price,” including “common sideeffects … [of] anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-mutilation, and suicidal thoughts and behaviors.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2210 (Kennedy,
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J., concurring) (citing Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 325 (2006)).
64. The psychological harms of solitary for adults have been widely documented by experts. Solitary confinement can exacerbate mental illness or bring about symptoms in people with no prior diagnosis. These psychological harms include: anxiety, depression, insomnia, confusion, withdrawal, emotional flatness, cognitive disturbances, hallucinations, paranoia, psychosis, and suicidality.4 These effects start to manifest within hours or days of isolation, worsening with time and causing permanent damage to individuals, especially those who linger in isolation for extended periods. For some, solitary confinement “can be as clinically distressing as physical torture.”5
65. Experts also recognize a substantial risk of harm for pregnant women in solitary confinement. They cannot receive the exercise and movement that they need to maintain a healthy pregnancy. Common pre-existing feelings of stress and depression are exacerbated which increase the risk of miscarriage and birth complications.
4 Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ., at 124, 130-131 (2003), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0011128702239239 (last visited September 4, 2019).
5 Jeffrey Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104 (2010), http://jaapl.org/content/jaapl/38/1/104.full.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
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66. Children suffer from a heightened risk of psychological and physical harm from solitary confinement. Based on knowledge of the brain development and the impact of adverse childhood experiences on the physical, mental, and behavioral health of children and adolescents, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry has asserted that children subjected to solitary confinement in the criminal justice system are at particular risk for these adverse reactions.
67. The substantial risk of serious harm to children is also established through a well-recognized national study by the Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention concerning the correlation between juvenile suicide and confinement in a locked room in Secure Detention. The study found that half of youth who committed suicide in juvenile facilities were in isolation at the time of their death and more than 60% percent of young people who committed suicide in detention while in confinement had a history of being held in isolation.6 Of the children placed in solitary confinement in secure detention centers, 40% of suicides occurred within the first 72 hours.7
68. Researchers have also found that when juvenile correctional officials promote policies that isolate youth from their peers, alienate them, and deny them
6 Lindsay Hayes, Juvenile Suicide in Confinement, A National Survey, Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention, (2009), at vii., https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/213691.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
7 Id. 27

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social integration, children are exposed to higher rates of suicidal behavior.8 This
evidence demonstrates a substantial risk of serious harm that can be fatal for
children exposed to solitary confinement for even short periods of time. Despite
this known risk of serious harm, DJJ subjects children who have attempted suicide
or engaged in self-injury to solitary confinement in Secure Detention. In Plaintiff
G.H.’s case, DJJ continued to keep him in solitary confinement after observing him
trying to choke himself.
69. Medical research on the adolescent brain explains why children are
more vulnerable to risk of harm, including long-term effects.9 Psychologically,
children are different from adults, making their time spent in isolation even more
difficult and the developmental, psychological, and physical damage more
comprehensive and lasting.10 They experience time differently – a day to a child
feels longer than a day to an adult – and have a greater need for social stimulation.
Id. In adolescents, the connections between the frontal lobe and the mid-brain have
8 Id. at 27. 9 The broad consensus among the scientific and professional community about the psychological vulnerability of children, which places them at an increased risk of harm, has been emphasized and recognized in decisions of the Supreme Court See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68-69 (2010) (juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses relying on “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juveniles and adult minds[,]”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573-74 (2005) (finding that the vulnerabilities and differences between juveniles and adults means that the death penalty cannot be imposed against juveniles); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (youth “is more than a chronological fact . . . it is a moment and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”). 10 Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Solitary Confinement (Isolation), supra note 3.
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not fully developed. As a result, trauma to children can cause permanent changes in brain development and create a higher risk of developing psychiatric conditions like paranoia and anxiety.11
70. The risk of harm to children from solitary confinement, including for suicide, is also increased by the disproportionately high incidence of preexisting mental illness among children involved in the juvenile justice system. Many children who come into contact with the juvenile justice system have diagnosed, or undiagnosed, mental illness or have been receiving special education services prior to placement in Secure Detention. National data indicates that up to 75% of children in the juvenile justice system meet the criteria for a mental health disorder.12 DJJ estimates that over 65% of youth under the agency’s care have a mental illness or substance abuse issue.13
71. For children with pre-existing mental illness, the serious psychological harm caused by solitary confinement is even more devastating. The combination of the lack of any meaningful activity or normal social contact and the stressors of living in a dilapidated, filthy, and loud housing area for extended periods results in a heightened risk of worsening mental health symptoms for
11 National Child Traumatic Stress Network, Justice Consortium Attorney Workgroup Subcommittee, Trauma-Informed Legal Advocacy: A Resource for Juvenile Defense Attorneys, (2018), at 3-4, https://www.nctsn.org/resources/trauma-informed-legal-advocacy-a-resource-forjuvenile-defense-attorneys (last visited September 4, 2019).
12 Lee A. Underwood & Aryssa Washington, Mental Illness and Juvenile Offenders, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH, at 1, 3, (2016).
13 See http://www.djj.state.fl.us/services/health (last visited September 4, 2019). 29

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children. When children engage in behaviors that are a manifestation of their
disabilities, such as yelling or striking their cell doors with their hands, heads, or
bodies, DJJ penalizes these children by adding more time in solitary confinement.
Plaintiff G.H. continued to be held in solitary confinement after he banged on his
cell door and flooded his cell – behaviors that were related to his disabilities. These
actions by DJJ only add to the danger for youth with mental illness, such as G.H.
and R.L., who have an increased risk for suicide.
72. A substantial number of children exposed to solitary confinement are
at further risk of harm because they also suffer from trauma. This trauma can
include physical or sexual abuse; being a victim of or witnessing violence; loss of
family members to death, imprisonment, or abandonment; or a child’s removal from the home through the dependency system or due to arrest.14 Children in the
juvenile justice system have much higher rates of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) such as witnessing or being a victim of violence.15 A recent study shows that 50% of youth in Florida’s juvenile justice system report four or more ACEs.16
The use of solitary confinement places these children at risk for magnifying
14 Burrell, S., Trauma and the Environment of Care in Juvenile Justice Institutions, at 1 (2013), https://ylc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/jj_trauma_brief_environofcare_burrell_final.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
15 Finkel, E., Florida Study Confirms Link Between Juvenile Offenders, ACEs; Rates Much Higher Than CDC’s ACE Study, (2014), https://acestoohigh.com/2014/08/20/floridastudy-confirms-link-between-juvenile-offenders-aces-rates-much-higher-than-cdcs-ace-study/ (last visited September 4, 2019).
16 Id. 30

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existing trauma; evidence shows that this can have serious long-term harmful impacts on health and well-being.17
73. Recognizing children’s greater vulnerability to harm, numerous psychiatric, medical, scientific, correctional, and legal authorities support the elimination of solitary confinement for juveniles. The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Medical Association, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, the American Public Health Association, and the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators have called for juvenile and adult correctional facilities to stop the use of solitary confinement of children. These authorities articulate how juveniles’ particular vulnerabilities expose them to a risk of adverse reactions from isolation.
74. The Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, for example, opposes the use of solitary confinement for juveniles based on research that shows that placing detained youth in isolation has “negative public safety consequences, does not reduce violence and likely increases recidivism. Subjecting developing adolescents to isolation can cause permanent psychological damage and multiple studies suggest it is highly correlated with suicide. [] Solitary confinement is the most harmful and extreme form of isolation and has damaging impacts.”18
17 Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Solitary Confinement (Isolation), supra note 3. 18 Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, Toolkit: Reducing the Use of Isolation, at 7, (March 2015),
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75. In concluding that solitary confinement should be banned for
juveniles, in 2012, the United States Attorney General’s National Task Force on
Children Exposed to Violence concluded, “Nowhere is the damaging impact of
incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than when it involves solitary
confinement,” including increased vulnerability to suicide.19 In 2016, the United
States Department of Justice ended the practice of using solitary confinement for
juveniles in all federal prisons because of the growing consensus of the risk of
harm for children.20
76. Human rights organizations and authorities also recognize the harms
of solitary confinement for juveniles and advocate for an end to the practice. The
World Health Organization21 and the United Nations have recognized that solitary
confinement is particularly harmful to a child’s psychological well-being and
cognitive development.22 In a 2015 report, the United Nations Special Rapporteur
http://dcfs.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dcfsnvgov/content/Programs/JJS/CJCA%20Toolkit%20Reducin g%20the%20use%20of%20Isolation.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
19 Report of the Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence, at 178 (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
20 See Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Review of Solitary Confinement, (Jan. 25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/25/fact-sheet-departmentjustice-review-solitary-confinement (last visited September 4, 2019).
21 Prisons and Health, The World Health Organization Ch. 6 (S. Enggist, L. Moller, G. Galea, C. Udesen, eds., 2014), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/249188/Prisons-and-Health.pdf?ua=1 (last visited September 4, 2019).
22 See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (“CRC”); U.N. Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, G.A. Res. 45/112, Annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), U.N. Doc.
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on Torture condemned the solitary confinement of children for any duration as
torture and acknowledged the high risk of mental illness and higher rates of suicide
and self-harm for juveniles in solitary confinement.23
77. Many state correctional systems also recognize the substantial risk of
harm to juveniles caused by solitary confinement and have voluntarily
implemented measures to eliminate its use. At least 29 states have prohibited
juvenile detention facilities from using disciplinary isolation, or any isolation for
juveniles.24 Five states – New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Nebraska, and
New Mexico – have also banned solitary confinement for juveniles in their state
prison systems.25
A/45/49, at 201 (Dec. 14, 1990) (“The Riyadh Guidelines”); U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), U.N. Doc. A/45/49, ¶ 67 (Dec. 14, 1990) (“The Beijing Rules”) (“[a]ll disciplinary measures constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment shall be strictly prohibited, including corporal punishment, placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement or any other punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health of the juvenile concerned.”).
23 Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/66/268, at ¶ 77 (Aug. 5, 2011), http://solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
24 See Lowenstein Sandler LLP & Lowenstein Center for the Public Interest, 51 Jurisdiction Survey of Juvenile Solitary Confinement Rules in Juvenile Justice Systems, (July 2016), https://www.lowenstein.com/media/2825/51-jurisdiction-survey-of-juvenile-solitaryconfinement-rules-72616.pdf, (last visited September 4, 2019).
25 See Peoples, et al. v. Fischer, Docket No. 11-cv-2694 (S.D.N.Y.), at ECF No. 137-1, https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0062-0011.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019); see also Act 314, 218th Leg., Assembly No. 314 (N.J. 2019), at 2-3, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/A0500/314_R1.PDF, (last visited July 24, 2019); Blythe, Anne, N.C. Prisons Halt Solitary Confinement for Inmates 17 and Younger, The News & Observer, June 15, 2016, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/crime/article84025297.html (last visited July 24, 2019); L.B. 686, 2019 Leg., 106th Session, (Neb. 2019), at 7, https://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/106/PDF/Slip/LB686.pdf, (last visited September 4,
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78. Despite this national trend to eliminate the solitary confinement of children, Defendants continue to use this dangerous and inhumane method on children entrusted to the care of DJJ for redirection and rehabilitation.
79. It is clear that putting children in solitary confinement poses a risk of serious and long-term psychological and physiological harm. The prevailing medical, scientific, professional, and correctional authorities demonstrate that it violates contemporary standards of decency in a civilized society to expose children in Secure Detention to such a risk. No Legitimate Penological Purpose Supports the Use of Solitary Confinement
80. There is no legitimate penological purpose that supports DJJ’s policy and practice of subjecting children to solitary confinement in Secure Detention given the established substantial risk of serious harm and the other available options to address the behavioral needs of children. Solitary confinement is not only harmful to children, it does not reduce future misbehavior.
81. DJJ does not use solitary confinement in Secure Detention sparingly as a last resort to respond to immediate serious threats of physical harm by children to themselves or others. Rather, DJJ uses solitary confinement for any or no reason. In practice, DJJ subjects children to solitary confinement in Secure
2019); and H.B. 364, 54th Leg., 1st Session, (N.M. 2019), at 2, https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/final/HB0364.pdf, (last visited September 4, 2019).
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Detention for minor issues, including talking back to staff, using a computer without authorization during school testing, not following staff directions, horseplay, or cursing. Indeed, Defendants have routinely subjected the named Plaintiffs and members of the class to solitary confinement in circumstances that do not present a “volatile situation” in which a “youth’s sudden or unforeseen onset of behavior imminent and substantially threatens the physical safety of others or himself.” Fla. Admin. Code. R. 63G-2.014(7).
82. DJJ, through unwritten policy and practice, subjects children to solitary confinement for periods of time (i.e., hours or days) that exceed any legitimate penological goal or need to address behaviors that “imminently” threaten their safety or the safety of others as described in written DJJ policies. For example, DJJ subjects children to solitary confinement for hours or days after a physical altercation and after they are calm and demonstrating positive behavior. Defendants know that children are isolated in solitary confinement in circumstances that lack any legitimate penological justification based on, inter alia, their review of confinement data and the required notifications to the Assistant Secretary to isolate a child in confinement beyond 24 or 72 hours.
83. The statewide average length of solitary confinement for Secure Detention centers is 45 hours, with many detention centers confining children much longer. This exceeds the amount of time that would be arguably permissible
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even for behaviors that could pose an imminent physical threat to self or others. Instead, DJJ’s solitary confinement times for children extend well past the purported threat have subsided, including for the named Plaintiffs.
84. DJJ’s policy and practice for solitary confinement in detention is contrary to well established juvenile detention and correctional standards. Instead of isolating children for prolonged periods as Defendants do, many other correctional systems that have addressed the harms posed by the solitary confinement of juveniles have reformed their practices. These states use confinement, if at all, only as a last resort after de-escalation techniques and behavior interventions have been exhausted by trained individuals; and only for the shortest duration possible, with strict time limits, to remedy a specific, immediate and serious threat to an individual or other’s physical safety. Confinement is never used as punishment. They provide programming and services to avoid the use of confinement; ensure that staff are appropriately trained in the use of verbal deescalation, restorative justice, and behavior intervention techniques and that these are used and exhausted to defuse situations; require approvals for initial and continued confinement placement; consistently provide mental health and medical assessments, services, and oversight by qualified professionals before and during confinement; and require confinement use to be recorded, reviewed, and analyzed.
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85. DJJ recognizes that standards such as behavior interventions, prohibiting isolation for children at risk for suicide, and using conflict resolution strategies, should be used; DJJ, in fact, uses some of these in its post-adjudication residential program policy concerning room restriction. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 63E-7.009. This policy, however, does not apply to Plaintiffs in Secure Detention.
86. There is also no legitimate penological justification for DJJ’s policy and practice of denying children access to basic human needs while in solitary confinement. DJJ deprives children in solitary confinement of: required daily educational instruction; outdoor recreation; reading and writing materials; a clean cell free from the smell or presence of human waste; and normal human interactions. Defendant Marstiller is Deliberately Indifferent to the Serious Risk of Harm
87. Defendant Marstiller has known of and disregarded a substantial risk to Plaintiffs’ health and safety posed by the use of solitary confinement in DJJ Secure Detention. Defendant Marstiller has failed to stop subjecting children to solitary confinement in detention despite the knowledge of the risk of physical and psychological harm to children.
88. Defendant Marstiller has been repeatedly warned about, but failed to eliminate, the risks of harm to children from solitary confinement. For example, in February 2011, a lawsuit was brought against the DJJ Secretary by a class of
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children with mental illness and developmental disabilities who were adjudicated delinquent and in DJJ custody at the North Florida Youth Development Center26 in J.B. v. Walters, Case No. 11-83-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla.).
89. The allegations in J.B. v. Walters included, inter alia, that the DJJ Secretary subjected youth to an unconstitutional policy, pattern, and practice of the punitive use of isolation and restraints. Id. The Complaint alleged that DJJ was subjecting children diagnosed with serious mental illness, trauma, learning disabilities, intellectual disabilities, and who had engaged in acts of self-injury or attempted suicide to a risk of harm by placing them in punitive isolation in dangerous conditions. Id. Through that litigation, the DJJ Secretary was specifically informed that, “Isolation is contraindicated for adolescents with developmental disabilities, mental illness and self-harming behaviors.” Id., Doc. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 66-70. In response to this litigation, the DJJ Secretary and the agency made a decision to close the institution, and amend its rules to eliminate the use of solitary confinement in residential programs (i.e., post-adjudication). They deliberately chose not to eliminate the use of solitary confinement in Secure Detention.
26 This program was referred to as the North Florida Youth Development Center by DJJ. It was comprised of two DJJ residential facilities adjacent to each other on the same campus: the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys and the Jackson Juvenile Offender Correctional Center.
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90. On December 1, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) also sent the DJJ Secretary (and DJJ) a findings letter following its investigation of the North Florida Youth Development Center, concluding that “youth were subject to lengthy and unnecessary isolation,” youth with mental health needs or at risk for suicide were in danger and improperly subjected to solitary confinement, and youth confined in the isolation units did not consistently receive required services, such as education materials, regular mental health evaluations, or daily large muscle exercise. Findings Letter, at 4, 17-18.27
91. Defendant Marstiller’s knowledge of the risk of harm to children is apparent in the differences in DJJ’s written policies concerning what forms of isolation are permissible in DJJ residential post-adjudication programs compared to Secure Detention. Defendants amended DJJ’s administrative rules several years ago to explicitly prohibit the use of punitive isolation in residential programs. Defendants only authorize the limited use of controlled observation as an immediate short-term crisis intervention when non-physical interventions are not effective, and in response to “sudden or unforeseen onset of behavior that substantially threatens the physical safety of others and compromises security.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 63E-7.002(20). Defendant Marstiller authorizes, approves,
27 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys and the Jackson Juvenile Offender Center, Marianna, Fla., (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/02/dozier_findltr_12-1-11.pdf (last visited September 4, 2019).
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ratifies, and oversees these DJJ policies, practices, and procedures. See § 20.316(1)(c), Fla. Stat. see also §§ 120.54 (2) & (3), Fla. Stat.
92. Similarly, in DJJ residential programs, Defendants explicitly prohibit isolation or solitary confinement behind a closed door. They only authorize “room restriction” as part of a behavior management system. Even then, room restriction cannot be used for children at risk for suicide, cannot exceed four hours, requires supervisor approval, requires conflict and behavior intervention by staff, happens in a child’s room with the door open, and requires children to get all services and programming during this brief time separation. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 63E7.009(4).
93. Despite the elimination of solitary confinement in DJJ’s residential programs, Defendants have refused to eliminate solitary confinement in Secure Detention for the same children. As a result, under DJJ’s policies and practices, children who purportedly must be isolated and deprived of education, outdoor recreation, writing or reading materials, social stimulation, and normal human interactions suddenly and arbitrarily no longer require such measures days or weeks later after they are placed in a DJJ residential program.
94. Defendants review the data maintained by DJJ concerning the use of solitary confinement in DJJ-operated secure detention centers. This includes, at a minimum, all records kept of any confinement, and notifications to the Assistant
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Secretary for Detention Services of any confinement placements permitted beyond 24 hours or the need for any confinement hearing if a child is held in solitary beyond 72 hours. Fla. Admin. Code. 63G-2.022(e) & (h).
95. Defendants were also warned of the risk of harm to children subject to solitary confinement in detention through the following: several letters or emails from counsel with Florida Legal Services since September 2018 behalf of youth subject to solitary confinement who had engaged in self-harm and were at risk for suicide; grievances filed by children, including Plaintiffs, asking to be removed from solitary confinement or not placed in confinement again because they posed no imminent physical risk of harm to themselves or others but were instead at risk of harm in confinement; their own knowledge of children with mental health conditions or physical injuries like broken or sprained arms, children who have attempted suicide by wrapping sheets around their neck, and children who have cut themselves with pencils or other objects, all of whom were still placed in solitary confinement; and the DJJ Secretary’s trip to the Missouri Youth Services Authority to learn about the “Missouri Model” of juvenile justice which eliminated the practice of juvenile solitary confinement. Defendants’ Policies and Practices Discriminate Against Children with Disabilities
96. DJJ, through its policies and practices, discriminates against children with disabilities in its use of solitary confinement in Secure Detention. It fails to
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reasonably modify its solitary confinement policies and procedures when needed to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. It fails to ensure that children with disabilities in solitary confinement have access to, are permitted to participate in, and are not denied the benefits of programs, services, and activities because of their disabilities. It fails to ensure that children with disabilities in isolation are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
97. DJJ fails to reasonably modify its solitary confinement policies and procedures to ensure that children with disabilities are not placed in solitary confinement, or have their time extended, because of their disabilities. For example, children with psychiatric or developmental disabilities have difficulty regulating their behaviors or respond erratically or inappropriately to conflict, stress, trauma, staff, and other youth. For example, Plaintiffs R.L. and G.H., because of their disabilities, do not have effective coping skills to manage the conditions and conflicts inherent in Secure Detention and often react to stressful situations with emotional outbursts and impulsive behaviors. Some children also have a hard time understanding facility rules or directions. DJJ fails to identify or recognize behavior as disability related and provide the accommodations, supports and services that these children need. Instead, DJJ responds by labeling this as misbehavior and sends them, including Plaintiffs, to, or extends their time in, solitary confinement.
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98. DJJ also fails to modify its policies and procedures while children with disabilities are in solitary confinement. This includes failing to offer adequate out-of-cell time, social interaction, environmental stimulation, mental health treatment, recreation, and school services to prevent mental health symptoms from becoming worse. As a result, many children with psychiatric and developmental disabilities in isolation experience further harm and engage in self-harm such as banging or punching the doors or concrete walls or, in the case of G.H., tying his pants around his neck.
99. DJJ has failed to adopt policies and procedures to ensure that children with disabilities are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to meet their needs, which cannot be met in solitary confinement. DJJ subjects children with psychiatric and developmental disabilities, including Plaintiffs, to solitary confinement when they engage in nonconforming behaviors due to their disabilities, instead of housing them in settings where they can receive treatment and services that they need to live safely and with others. For example, children diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, including Plaintiff B.W., may exhibit impulsive behavior such as fighting with peers or being unable to focus on or be attentive to staff directions. Rather than developing a system with reasonable accommodations that positively reinforces preferred behaviors or uses
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mental health services to intervene, re-direct, and de-escalate situations, DJJ punishes these children, including Plaintiff B.W., with solitary confinement.
100. The unnecessary placement of children with disabilities in solitary confinement perpetuates unwarranted assumptions and stereotypes that they are incapable of participating in and benefiting from services, activities, and programs. Such placement also causes harm by severely limiting their independence and daily activities, including social contacts, educational advancement, and healthcare.
101. Other juvenile justice systems have safely integrated children with disabilities into their general population by providing adequate therapeutic and programmatic services. DJJ fails to develop and implement such policies and practices.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff Class Definition
102. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(1) and (b)(2).
103. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of children who are, or will be, in custody in a DJJ-operated secure detention center and subject to solitary confinement.
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Plaintiff Class Meets Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Requirements Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
104. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Fed. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The class is fluid, as children regularly enter and leave the class as a result of DJJ’s policies and practices, but it includes, at a minimum, hundreds of class members who are subject to confinement by DJJ on any given day. Due to DJJ’s policies and practices, all class members are at substantial risk of harm.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 105. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, including but not limited to: • whether Defendants’ policies and practices regarding solitary confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; • whether Defendant Marstiller has been deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of mental and physical harm of class members; and • whether there is no legitimate penological purpose for Defendants’ policies and practices regarding solitary confinement.
Defendants are expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that their actions violated the law.
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Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 106. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of those of the Plaintiff Class, as their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct; and their claims are based on the same theory of law as the class’ claims.
Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 107. Plaintiffs are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Plaintiff Class because Plaintiffs do not have any interests antagonistic to the class. Plaintiffs, as well as the Plaintiff Class members, seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of Defendants. Plaintiffs are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoners’ rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 108. This action is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because the number of class members is several thousand children and the prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn, would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DJJ. In addition, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual
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members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)
109. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DJJ’s policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this Complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the class, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the class. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. All state-wide confinement policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of DJJ. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the Plaintiff class. Disability Subclass Definition
110. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and, pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of a subclass of all qualified children with disabilities as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), who are, or will be, in custody in a DJJ-operated secure detention center and subject to solitary confinement (disability subclass).
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Disability Subclass Meets Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Requirements Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)
111. The subclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The class is fluid, as children with disabilities regularly enter and leave the class as a result of DJJ’s confinement policies and practices. The exact number of subclass members is unknown, but members are identifiable using records maintained by DJJ in the ordinary course of business. On information and belief, there are at least several hundred subclass members. Due to DJJ’s solitary confinement policies and practices, all members of the subclass are at risk of suffering from discrimination.
Commonality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 112. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the subclass, including whether DJJ violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. DJJ is expected to raise common defenses to these claims, including denying that its actions violate the law.
Typicality: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 113. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of those of the disability subclass, as their claims arise from the same policies, practices, or courses of conduct; and their claims are based on the same theory of law as the class’ claims.
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Adequacy: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) 114. Plaintiffs are capable of fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the disability subclass because they do not have any interests antagonistic to the subclass. Plaintiffs and the disability subclass members seek to enjoin the unlawful acts and omissions of DJJ. Plaintiffs are represented by counsel experienced in civil rights litigation, prisoner’s rights litigation, and complex class action litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) 115. Since the number of the disability subclass is approximately several thousand children, prosecution of separate actions by individuals would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, which in turn would establish incompatible standards of conduct for DJJ. In addition, the prosecution of separate actions by individual members could result in adjudications with respect to individual members that, as a practical matter, would substantially impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 116. This action is also maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because DJJ’s policies, practices, actions, and omissions that form the basis of this Complaint are common to and apply generally to all members of the subclass, and the injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will
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apply to all members of the subclass. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. All state-wide confinement policies are centrally promulgated, disseminated, and enforced from the central headquarters of DJJ. The injunctive and declaratory relief sought is appropriate and will apply to all members of the disability subclass.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
(All Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class v. Defendant Marstiller) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Fourteenth Amendment
117. Paragraphs 1 through 116 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 118. Through the policies and practices described herein, Defendant Marstiller subjects all Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class to a substantial risk of serious harm and deprives Plaintiffs and the Class of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities and human dignity through the excessive and inappropriate use of solitary confinement. These policies and practices are inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a civilized society. Defendant Marstiller has caused the wanton infliction of pain upon Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. 119. There is no legitimate penological purpose for Defendant Marstiller’s solitary confinement policies, practices, and procedures as authorized,
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implemented, and enforced, and they amount to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
120. These policies have been and continue to be implemented by Defendant Marstiller and her agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert under the color of state law, in their official capacity, and are the direct and proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ and the Plaintiff Class’s ongoing deprivation of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
121. Defendant Marstiller has been and is aware of all deprivations complained of herein and has condoned, or been deliberately indifferent, to such conduct. Defendant also has been and is aware of the substantial risk of harm caused by these deprivations and has done nothing to alleviate this risk of harm. It should be obvious to Defendant Marstiller, and to any reasonable person, that the conditions imposed on Plaintiffs and the Class cause tremendous mental anguish, physical harm, suffering, and pain to such individuals.
122. Plaintiffs have suffered harm and will continue to suffer harm, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
123. These harms will continue unless enjoined by this Court.
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COUNT II (All Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class v. Defendant Marstiller)
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth Amendment 124. Paragraphs 1 through 116 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 125. Through the policies and practices described herein, Defendant Marstiller subjects all Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class to a substantial risk of serious harm and deprives Plaintiffs and the Class of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities and human dignity through the excessive and inappropriate use of solitary confinement. These policies and procedures are inconsistent with evolving standards of decency in a civilized society. Defendant Marstiller has caused the wanton infliction of pain upon Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. 126. There is no legitimate penological purpose for Defendant Marstiller’s solitary confinement policies, practices, and procedures as authorized, implemented and enforced, and they amount to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 127. These policies have been and continue to be implemented by Defendant Marstiller and her agents, officials, employees, and all persons acting in concert under the color of state law, in their official capacity, and are the direct and proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ and the Plaintiff Class’s ongoing deprivation of rights secured under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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128. Defendant Marstiller has been and is aware of all deprivations complained of herein, and has condoned or been deliberately indifferent to such conduct. Defendant also has been and is aware of the substantial risk of harm caused by these deprivations and has done nothing to alleviate or reduce this risk of harm. It should be obvious to Defendant Marstiller, and to any reasonable person, that the conditions imposed on Plaintiffs and the Class cause tremendous mental anguish, physical harm, suffering, and pain to such individuals.
129. Plaintiffs have suffered harm and will continue to suffer harm, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s violation of their rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
130. These harms will continue unless enjoined by this Court. COUNT III
(All Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass v. Defendant DJJ) Americans with Disabilities Act
131. Paragraphs 1 through 116 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 132. Plaintiffs and other Disability Subclass members are qualified individuals with disabilities as defined in the Americans with Disabilities (ADA). They have impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities, they have records of such impairments, or they are regarded as having such impairments. All children in the Disability Subclass meet the essential eligibility
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requirements for the receipt of services of the participation in programs and activities provided by Defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
133. Plaintiffs and other Disability Subclass members are qualified to participate in the services, programs, activities, and benefits provided to children in DJJ custody within the meaning of Title II of the ADA.
134. Defendant DJJ is a public entity as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) and it has an affirmative duty to create policies and procedures to prevent discrimination based on disability.
135. Defendant DJJ violates the ADA by failing to ensure that children with disabilities have access to, are permitted to participate in, and are not denied the benefits of programs, services, and activities provided by Defendant DJJ. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(1).
136. Defendant DJJ violates the ADA by failing to make “reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability…” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
137. Defendant DJJ discriminates against “qualified individual[s] with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA by administering programs and services for children with disabilities in a manner that denies them the opportunities to
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receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(2).
138. As a result of Defendant DJJ’s policies and practices regarding individuals with disabilities, Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass are unnecessarily placed and retained in solitary confinement due to their disabilities; are denied equal access to activities, programs, and services for which they are otherwise qualified; and are denied the opportunity to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.
139. As a direct and proximate cause of these actions and omissions, Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass have suffered and continued to suffer from harm and violation of their ADA rights. These harms will continue unless enjoined by this Court.
COUNT IV (All Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass v. Defendant DJJ)
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 140. Paragraphs 1 through 116 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth. 141. Plaintiffs and other Disability Subclass members are qualified individuals with disabilities as defined in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(20) & 794.
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142. Plaintiffs and other Disability Subclass members are qualified to participate in the services, programs, activities, and benefits provided to children in DJJ custody within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
143. Defendant DJJ excludes Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass from participation in and denies them the benefits of programs or activities, by reason of their disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(a).
144. Defendant DJJ discriminates against “qualified individual[s] with a disability” within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act by administering programs and services for children with disabilities in a manner that denies them the opportunities to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2).
145. Defendant DJJ denies Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass the opportunity afforded others to participate in programs or activities. 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(b)(1).
146. Defendant DJJ utilizes criteria or methods of administration that either purposely, or in effect, discriminate on the basis of handicap and defeat or substantially impair accomplishment of the objectives of Defendant DJJ’s programs or activities with respect to handicapped persons. 28 U.S.C. § 42.503(b)(3).
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147. Defendant DJJ violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to reasonably accommodate children with disabilities in its facilities, programs, activities, and services.
148. As a result of Defendant DJJ’s discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodations, Plaintiffs and members of the Disability Subclass do not have equal access to DJJ’s activities, programs, and services for which they are otherwise qualified.
149. As a direct and proximate cause of these policies and practices, Plaintiffs and the Disability Subclass have suffered and continue to suffer harm and violation of their rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. These harms will continue unless enjoined by this Court.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the class and disability subclass they seek to represent, respectfully request that this Court: A. Assume jurisdiction; B. Permit the Plaintiffs to proceed using pseudonyms; C. Declare this suit is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure; D. Adjudge and declare that the conditions, acts, omission, policies, and practices of Defendants and their agents, officials, and employees are in violation
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of the rights of Plaintiffs and the class and subclass they represent under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;

E. Permanently enjoin Defendants, their agents, officials, employees, and

all persons acting in concert with them under color of state law or otherwise, from

continuing the unlawful acts, conditions, and practices described in this Complaint;

F. Order Defendants, their agents, officials, employees, and all persons

acting in concert with them under color of state law or otherwise, to develop and

implement, as soon as practical, a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of serious

harm described herein;

G. Retain jurisdiction over Defendants until such time as the Court is

satisfied that the unlawful policies, practices, acts, and omissions complained of

herein no longer exist and will not recur;

H. Award Plaintiffs, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988,

12205, and 12133, the costs of this suit and reasonable attorneys’ fees and

litigation expenses; and

I. Grant such other and further relief and this Court deems just and

proper.

Dated: September 4, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

By: s/ Andrea Costello Andrea Costello Fla. Bar No. 0532991 Christopher M. Jones
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Fla. Bar No. 994642 Jennifer Painter Fla. Bar No. 110966 Florida Legal Services 122 E. Colonial Drive, Suite 100 Orlando, FL 32801 Telephone: (407) 801-0332 (direct) andrea@floridalegal.org christopher@floridalegal.org jennifer.painter@floridalegal.org
Kelly Knapp Fla. Bar No. 1011018 Leonard J. Laurenceau Fla. Bar No. 106987 Southern Poverty Law Center 4770 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 760 Miami, FL 33137 Telephone: (786) 347-2056 kelly.knapp@splcenter.org leo.laurenceau@splcenter.org
Shalini Goel Agarwal Fla. Bar No. 90843 Southern Poverty Law Center 106 East College Ave., #1010 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Telephone: (850) 521-3024 shalini.agarwal@splcenter.org
Lisa Graybill* Texas Bar No. 24054454 Southern Poverty Law Center 201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (334) 549-0498 lisa.graybill@splcenter.org
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Dante P. Trevisani Fla. Bar No. 72912 Laura A. Ferro Fla. Bar No. 1015841 Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 100 S.E. 2nd St., Ste 3750 Miami, FL 33131 Telephone: (305) 358-2081 dtrevisani@floridajusticeinstitute.org lferro@floridajusticeinstitute.org *Pro hac vice application forthcoming Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 Case 4:19-cv-00431-MW-MJF Document 22 Filed 12/06/19 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

G.H., a minor, by and through his parent and legal guardian, Gregory Henry, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CASE NO.: 4:19cv431-MW/CAS

SIMONE MARSTILLER, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, ET AL.,

Defendants. ___________________________________/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, AND ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR A
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

This Court has considered, without hearing, Defendant Florida Department of

Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) and Defendant Simone Marstiller’s (collectively,

“Defendants”) motion to dismiss. ECF No. 13. Defendants move to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint in toto, and alternatively, requests this Court to require

Plaintiffs to make a more definite statement of their claims. ECF No. 13, at 35.

Additionally, Defendants’ move to dismiss the complaint as to Defendant Marstiller.

ECF No. 13, at 7.

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Plaintiffs have alleged four counts in their complaint seeking relief for violation of their rights protected by the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, ECF No. 2, at 50–53, and their rights protected by the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), ECF No. 2, at 53–55. For the reasons provided below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss This Court accepts the allegations in the amended complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Hunt v. Amico Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). “To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A ‘claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Plaintiff’s allegations must amount to ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
II. Factual Background This is a civil rights case arising from statewide policies and practices of isolating children in solitary confinement. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
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repeatedly isolate children for days at a time, with no time limit, in locked cells. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 48, 51. The isolation imposes certain conditions such as lack of meaningful social interaction, environmental stimulation, outdoor recreation, education, sanitation, or access to personal property. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 53–57. The isolation, along with the conditions imposed, subject them, and over 4,000 children placed in isolation every year, to a substantial risk of serious harm to their psychological and physical health and safety in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment and that policymakers have exhibited deliberate indifference towards these risks. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 47–51, 53–77, 87–95, 117–30. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants discriminate against children with disabilities through the same policies and practices and, therefore, violate the rights protected by ADA and RA. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 96–101, 131–49
III. Defendant Marstiller Before getting into the meat of Defendants’ motion—failure to state a claim for each cause of action—this Court will tackle Defendants’ request that this Court dismiss the complaint against Defendant Marstiller. Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed as to Defendant Marstiller, sued in her official capacity, because such claims are redundant. ECF No. 13, at 7. This Court disagrees. Plaintiffs sue Defendant Marstiller in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 2, at
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50, 52. On the other hand, Plaintiffs sue Defendant DJJ for violations of their rights protected by the ADA and RA. ECF No. 2, at 53, 55. There is no redundancy here. While it would be redundant for Plaintiffs to sue both the Secretary in her official capacity and the state agency for the same claims, see, e.g., Taylor v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 2:10-cv-641-ftm-38UAM, 2013 WL 12213191, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2013), that is not the case here.
Additionally, if this Court were to dismiss claims against Defendant Marstiller, Plaintiffs would be barred from seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, “[a] state, a state agency, and a state official sued in [her] official capacity are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 . . . .” Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). But, when prospective relief, including injunctive relief, is sought, “a state official sued in [her] official capacity is person for purposes of § 1983.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and have, therefore, properly sued Defendant Marstiller in her official capacity under § 1983.
For these reasons, this Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Marstiller.
IV. First and Second Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment) Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment are evaluated under the same standard. See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir.
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2015), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). “The Eighth Amendment ‘set[s] limits on the treatment and conditions states may impose on prisoners.’ ” Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App’x 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “[U]nder the Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.” Id. (citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits ‘inflictions of pain . . . that are totally without penological justification.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
A two-part analysis governs Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement. Id. “First, the conditions of confinement must be objectively ‘serious’ or ‘extreme,’ ” i.e., “the prisoner ‘must show that a condition of his confinement pose[s] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the prisoner must show that the defendant prison officials subjectively acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ with regard to the conditions at issue.” Id. (citation omitted). And while solitary confinement does not, in and of itself, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, “[c]onfinement . . . in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.” Id. (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy either prong of the test. This Court disagrees. This Court finds that Plaintiffs have “nudged [their] claim across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550
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U.S. at 570. That is to say, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the isolation along with the conditions they have been subjected to deprived them of basic human needs that resulted in a substantial risk of serious harm and that Defendant Marstiller was deliberately indifferent with regards to the conditions at issue. But before this Court goes into the detailed analysis with respect to the two prongs of the test, this Court will tackle certain arguments raised by Defendants.
First, Defendants argue that there is no different constitutional standard for juveniles. ECF No. 13, at 21. That is, Defendants argue, the Constitution does not require detention center to treat adults and juveniles different in order to maintain security and order. ECF No. 13, at 21. Pure malarkey. There can be no doubt that the Constitution requires different treatment between adults and juveniles in the context of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that fundamental differences between adults and children are consequential in the Eighth Amendment context. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 573– 74 (2005) (recognizing the “comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles” and finding that “differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood” such that the death penalty cannot be imposed against juveniles under the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
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471, 476 (2012) (observing that “[youth] is a moment and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage” and recognizing “children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes”).
Why, then, should the case be different in the conditions of confinement context? Defendants’ answer is simple—because none of these cases are about conditions of confinement—but unpersuasive. See ECF No. 13, at 21–22. The standard for conditions of confinement in the Eighth Amendment context most certainly requires juveniles to be treated differently from adults. It is, partly, an objective test from the point of view of the prisoner. When that prisoner is a juvenile, the standard requires this Court to analyze whether the conditions pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to future health or safety of a child. Given the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized that juveniles suffer from certain psychological vulnerabilities when compared to adults, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the same conditions imposed on adults and children would have similar effects on them.
Second, Defendants take issue with the relief sought in this case. ECF No. 13, at 22–25. Specifically, Defendants argue that the injunction sought would impermissibly insert this Court into the business of the legislative and executive branches. ECF No. 13, at 23. Defendants appear to argue that this Court does not
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have the power to grant the prospective relief sought. But courts can, and routinely do, address violations of constitutional rights and issue prospective relief to remedy violations in a civil action challenging prison conditions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010); V.W. v. Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 590 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting a preliminary injunction and enjoining defendants from imposing 23-hour disciplinary isolation on juveniles at the Justice Center); A.T. v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391, 418 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (same). To the extent Defendants are worried about the scope of Plaintiffs’ requested injunction, their arguments are premature. This Court is aware of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and its requirement that prospective relief must be “narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A). At this stage, this Court has found no violation of Plaintiffs’ rights and is not granting any prospective relief.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any policies, practices, or customs of DJJ that resulted in unconstitutional conditions of confinement and have, therefore, failed to state a claim under § 1983. ECF No. 2, at 20–21. This Court disagrees. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a statewide policy, practice, or custom of solitary confinement, including the cumulative effects of deprivation of basic human needs that are a consequence of the isolation. See ECF
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No. 2, ¶¶ 47–57. Rule 8 merely requires “a short and plain statement of the claim” that is “plausible on its face”—one that “calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of an alleged violation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. Plaintiffs satisfy this requirement. Plaintiffs make general allegations about the policies, practices, and customs that reflect when and for how long a juvenile is placed in solitary confinement. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 47–51. Additionally, Plaintiffs provide specific examples of deprivation of basic human needs that accompany isolation. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 52–57. The specific policies, practices, or customs underlying the isolation and the conditions imposed during isolation will likely be revealed during discovery. See Harvard v. Inch, Case No. 4:19-cv-212MW-CAS, 2019 WL 5587314, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2019). For the purpose of this motion, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to bring a suit under § 1983.
A. Objective Prong: Conditions of Confinement Poses an Unreasonable Risk of Serious Harm
“Whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual is judged under a ‘contemporary standard of decency’—that is, ‘the evolving standards of decency mark the progress of maturing society.’ ” Quintanilla, 730 F. App’x at 746; see also Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304. “As such, Plaintiffs, to properly state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment, must show that the conditions of confinement violate contemporary standards of decency.” Harvard, 2019 WL 5587314, at *3.
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Plaintiffs cite multiple authorities to show that isolating children violates contemporary standards of decency because of children’s heightened vulnerability and continued physical, psychological, and social development. See ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 62–79. In addition to providing psychological, medical, and professional authorities, Plaintiffs allege, citing various authorities, that some states and the federal government have recognized the harm of solitary confinement on children and have banned or limited the use of solitary confinement. See ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 75, 77. “Taken together, these authorities help this Court to determine whether Defendants use of isolation and their policies and practices relating isolation violate contemporary standards of decency.” Harvard, 2019 WL 5587314, at *3. At this stage in the litigation, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that isolation of children violates contemporary standards of decency.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the cumulative effects of various forms of deprivation subject juveniles to unreasonable risk of serious psychological and physiological harm. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that deprivation of normal human contact, environmental stimulation, exercise, property, education, and sanitation subject them to an unreasonable risk of serious psychological and physiological harm. See, e.g., ECF No 2, ¶¶ 47 (alleging deprivation of social interaction and environmental stimulation); 54–55 (alleging deprivation of normal human contact, education and environmental stimulation); 56–57 (alleging
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deprivation of sanitation). Courts have recognized exercise, social interaction, environmental stimulation, and sanitation as basic human needs. See Harvard, 2019 WL 5587314, at *8 (collecting cases recognizing exercise, human contact, social interaction, and environmental stimulation as basic human needs); Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing cases that recognize deprivation of basic sanitary conditions can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).
For each of these broad allegations of deprivation of basic human needs, Plaintiffs list specific conditions of confinement. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants deprive them of sanitation because, among other things, 1) Defendants have failed to maintain plumbing which has resulted in toilets to back-up and flood the cells, 2) toilets reek of human waste and children are required to eat in the cells where the toilets are located, and 3) cells contain gnats, ants, or bugs that bite children. ECF No. 2, ¶ 56. “While some of these allegations in isolation may not result in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that conditions of confinement, in combination, have a ‘mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single identifiable human need’ such as human contact, environmental stimulation,” recreation, and sanitation. See Harvard, 2019 WL 5587314, at *8 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).
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For these reasons, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show an objective risk of serious harm for children subject to solitary confinement.
B. Subjective Prong: Defendant Marstiller’s Deliberate Indifference to Substantial Risk of Harm
“In conditions-of-confinement cases . . . to find deliberate indifference on part of a prison official, a plaintiff inmate must show: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; [and] (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312 (citation omitted). “That is, the evidence must demonstrate that “with knowledge of the infirm conditions, [the official] knowingly or recklessly declined to take actions that would have improved the conditions.” Id. (citation omitted). And “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 1313. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant Marstiller was deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of harm caused by isolation and the conditions imposed during isolation.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant Marstiller’s subjective knowledge of the risk of harm and her disregard of that risk in at least four ways. First, Plaintiffs point to a lawsuit filed against the DJJ Secretary where plaintiffs challenged defendants use of isolation in DJJ’s North Florida Youth Development residential facility. ECF No. 2,
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¶¶ 88–89. In that case, DJJ Secretary was informed that “[i]solation is contraindicated for adolescents with developmental disabilities, mental illness, and self-harming behavior.” ECF No. 2, ¶ 89. From this, it can be inferred that Defendants knew the harm isolation caused to adolescents with developmental disabilities, mental illness, and self-harming behavior. Each of the named Plaintiffs suffers from developmental disability or mental illness, and at least one has engaged in self-harm. See infra Section V. In response to the lawsuit, DJJ Secretary and the agency amended DJJ’s rules to eliminate the use of solitary confinement in residential programs. ECF No. 2, ¶ 89. However, they chose not to eliminate the use of solitary confinement in secure detention, where the named Plaintiffs are placed. Based on these allegations, it can be inferred that Defendants knew the risk of isolation and deliberately chose not to eliminate it in secure detention, thereby disregarding the risk associated with isolation.
Second, Defendants’ knowledge can be inferred from the findings letter that DJJ Secretary received from the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ).1 ECF No. 2, ¶ 90. The DOJ found that DJJ’s use of isolation at the Florida Youth Development Center, along with the denial of required services such as
1 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys and the Jackson Juvenile Offender Center, Marianna, Fla., (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/02/dozier_findltr_12-1-11.pdf (last visited December 4, 2019) (hereinafter, “Findings Letter”).
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educational materials, regular mental health evaluation, or daily exercise were unconstitutional conditions of confinement, especially for children with mental health needs or children at risk for suicide. See Findings Letter, at 17–18. This notice by the DOJ demonstrates that Defendants were aware of the substantial risk of harm created by the use of isolation, along with the conditions imposed during isolation, and deliberately disregarded the risk by continuing to impose isolation in secure detention. See Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (finding that plaintiff had satisfied the subjective requirement of Eighth Amendment test because the “exchange between the DOJ and the DOC demonstrate[d] that the DOC was aware of the substantial risk of harm created”).
Third, Plaintiffs allege Defendants deliberately indifferent by comparing the practices and policies of isolation in residential post-adjudication programs and secure detention. ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 91–93. The differences highlighted by Plaintiffs demonstrate that Defendants know the risk of harm to children due to solitary confinement and have implemented policies in residential programs to offset the harm. However, Defendants have deliberately disregarded the risks posed by isolation for children in secure detention.
Finally, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants had actual notice of the substantial risk of serious harm to the children subjected to solitary
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confinement. First, Plaintiffs’ counsel notified Defendants of the risk of harm to children subject to solitary confinement on behalf of youth who had engaged in selfharm behavior and were at a risk for suicide. ECF No. 2, ¶ 95. Second, Defendants received grievances from children, including Plaintiffs, asking to be removed from solitary confinement or not be placed in solitary again because they posed no imminent physical risk of harm to themselves or others, but were at risk of harm from being put in confinement. ECF No. 2, ¶ 95. Third, Defendants were aware of the risks for children with physical injuries like broken or sprained arms, who attempted suicide by wrapping sheets around their neck, and who cut themselves with pencils or other objects. ECF No. 2, ¶ 95. And despite this knowledge, Defendants placed these children, or retained them, in solitary confinement. ECF No., ¶ 95. Even after having actual notice of the substantial risk of harm through letters, grievances, and direct knowledge of harm, Defendants refused to change their solitary confinement policy and practice in secure detention. Plaintiffs have, therefore, adequately alleged Defendants’ deliberate indifference. See V.W., 236 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (finding significant evidence that defendants had been on notice of specific risks of serious risk of harm from solitary confinement through communication with juvenile advocacy group, prior litigation on the issue, complaints from parents, and defendants’ continued observations); A.T., 298 F. Supp. 3d at 414 (finding significant evidence that defendants had been on notice of
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the specific risk of serious risk of harm from solitary confinement through complaints from the juveniles themselves, defendants’ own continued observations, and the fact that the practices had continued unabated despite the pending litigation).
While each one of the instances of knowledge, standing alone, may not be enough to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm, taken together, they nudge Plaintiffs’ claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. For these reasons, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to preserve their first and second causes of action.
V. Second and Third Cause of Action (Americans with Disability Act; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) To state a claim under the ADA and RA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.” Owens v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 475, 477 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (quoting Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007)). “With the exception of its federal funding requirement, the RA uses the same standards as the ADA, and therefore, cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable.” Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 214 (11th
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Cir. 2005) (unpublished). Defendants appear to challenge only the first and the third factor of this test.
The term “disability” under the ADA is a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more” of an individual’s “major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentration, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Major life activities also “includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). Additionally, “the term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1)(i). “[T]he threshold issue of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.” 28 C.F.R. 35.108(d)(1)(ii).
Each Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged impairments that substantially limit major life activities. Plaintiff G.H. has an emotional behavioral disorder, depression, learning disorder, and anxiety which substantially limits his brain function, ability to learn, and ability to think. ECF No. 2, ¶ 14; see 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.108(b)(2), (c)(1) & (d)(2)(iii)(C). Additionally, Plaintiff G.H. wrapped his pants around his neck to
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choke himself. ECF No. 2, at ¶¶ 18-19. This shows that his mental illness substantially limits his ability to take care of himself. See Peters v. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A mental illness that impels one to suicide can be viewed as a paradigmatic instance of inability to care for oneself.”). Plaintiff R.L. has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, conduct disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder which substantially limits her brain function. ECF No. 2, ¶ 23; see 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(2)(iii)(K) (“Major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder . . . substantially limits brain function). Finally, Plaintiff B.W. suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and impaired vision which substantially limits her thinking, concentration, and ability to see. ECF No. 2, ¶ 30; see 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.108(b)(1), (c)(1) & (d)(2)(iii)(B).
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were not discriminated against because of their disability. Specifically, Defendants claim that none of the Plaintiffs were placed in isolation or have remained in isolation because of their disability. ECF No. 13, at 28. This is not the case. At least one of the named Plaintiff alleges that he remained in isolation because of his disability. ECF No. 2, ¶ 15 (Plaintiff G.H. retained in isolation for behaviors related to his disability). Further, “[a]n ADA claim may proceed on the theory that the Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the
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Plaintiffs’ disability.” Lonergan v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 623 F. App’x 990, 992 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they were discriminated against because of their disability due to Defendants’ failure to provide reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 97 (alleging DJJ’s failure to 1) modify disciplinary rules to accommodate for erratic behaviors of psychiatric or developmentally disabled children, and 2) accommodate children that have a hard time understanding facility rules or directions); 98 (alleging failure to modify DJJ’s isolation policies and procedures to provide for adequate out-of-cell time, social interaction, environmental stimulation, mental health treatment, recreation, and school services, which results in self-harm behavior such as banging or punching the doors or concrete walls or attempting suicide); 99 (alleging failure to provide psychiatric or developmentally disabled children with mental health services to intervene, re-direct, and de-escalate situation caused by their disability-related behavior rather than punishing them with solitary confinement). Each of these failures to modify DJJ’s policies and procedures to accommodate children with disabilities affects one or more named Plaintiffs. See, e.g., ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 97 (Plaintiffs R.L. and G.H.); 98 (Plaintiff G.H.); 99 (Plaintiff B.W.). Additionally, the named Plaintiffs asked for accommodation through grievances. Specifically, Plaintiffs asked to be removed from solitary confinement or not placed in
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confinement again because they posed no imminent risk of harm to themselves or others, but were instead at risk of harm in confinement. ECF No. 2, at ¶ 95.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their claims for relief under the ADA and RA.
VI. Motion for a More Definite Statement As an alternative to dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendants move for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). “Rule 12(e) motions are only permitted where the pleading at issue ‘is so vague or ambiguous that the [responding] party cannot reasonably prepare a response.’ ” Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., Case No. 1:16-cv-355-MW/GRJ, 2017 WL 5957773, at *4 (N.D. Fla. July 24, 2017). They are neither a vehicle to obtain greater detail nor are they to be used as a substitute for discovery. Id. (citations omitted). Defendants proffer seven issues that need to be clarified. ECF No. 13, at 31–34. These questions do not necessarily raise ambiguity in the complaint, but rather seek additional information about the nature of the claims and the relief sought. The information sought by Defendants is more properly obtained via discovery than through a motion for a more definite statement. Plaintiffs’ complaint is neither vague nor ambiguous. The complaint has enabled this Court, and Defendants, to understand the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. The complaint describes, in detail, 1) the nature of
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confinement juveniles are subjected to at DJJ facilities, 2) the conditions and deprivations that are imposed during solitary confinement, 3) the effects isolation has on juveniles, 4) the lack of penological justification supporting the use of solitary confinement, 5) the deliberate indifference of Defendant Marstiller to the effects of isolation and the conditions it imposes, and 6) the nature of discrimination children with disabilities face in DJJ’s facilities.
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is denied. VII. Conclusion
Defendants have not convinced this Court that dismissal or a more definite statement is warranted. Therefore, Defendant’s motion, ECF No. 13, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on December 6, 2019. s/Mark E. Walker Chief United States District Judge
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