Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

SCHOTT NORTH AMERICA, INC.

)

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, female, and to provide appropriate relief to Charging Parties Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, and a class of females who were adversely affected by such practices. As articulated with greater particularity in paragraph 7 below, the Commission alleges that, due to a discriminatory layoff process, Defendant Employer unlawfully selected the Charging Parties and class members for layoffbased on their gender. As a result of the termination oftheir employment with Defendant, the Charging Parties

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 2 of 7
and class members lost substantial wages and benefits and suffered significant emotional harm. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to§ 706(£) (1) and (3) ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. "§ 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3)" ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981A.
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency ofthe United States ofAmerica charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement ofTitle VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(£)(1) and (3) ofTitle VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f) (1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Schott North America, Inc. ("Schott") has continuously been and is now a Maryland corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania and the City of Duryea, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 70 l (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Charging Parties Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis and
Page -2-

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 3 of 7
Yvonne Prywara filed charges of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution ofthis lawsuit have been fulfilled.
7. Since at least October 2004, Defendant Employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Duryea, Pennsylvania facility in violation of Sections 703(a) (I) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) and 2000 (e)-3 (a) (1), by subjecting Charging Parties and a class offemale employees to a discriminatory layoffprocess which resulted in the loss of their jobs due to their gender. The unlawful employment practices included the following:
(a) Prior to the fall of2004, in Defendant's Quality Assurance workforce in its glass production facility, hot end functions were predominately performed by male workers and the cold end functions, by females. Accordingly, the Quality Assurance workforce was generally segregated by gender.Female Quality Assurance workers were denied adequate training in the hot end functions, discouraged from applying for hot end positions, and were subjected to sex-based differential treatment when they were permitted to perform hot end jobs.
(b) In or around September 2004, Defendant decided to combine its hot and cold end positions into one job, entitled Melting Line Operator. Defendant announced that it would create forty such positions, thirty-six full time and four part-time. To that end, Defendant developed a matrix system, which it indicated that it would use to evaluate the skills of the applicants to determine who should be selected for the new position.
(c) Defendant's matrix system, which gave credit to the employees for their ability to perform hot and cold end functions, assessed the cold end duties as requiring
Page -3-

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 4 of 7
a lower level ofskill than the male-dominated hot end functions, even though cold end jobs were in fact highly skilled and required continuous labor. In fact, cold end trainees were required to pass more than 26 tests and three different rotations prior to receiving authorization to work in the cold end section. (d) As part of the rating process, male applicants who had never worked in the cold end were given ratings indicating that they could "fully perform" certain cold end functions. (e) Male applicants who had never worked in either the hot end or the cold end areas were rated well on both hot and cold end functions. At least three male employees with no experience in hot or cold end functions were awarded Melting Line Operator positions. (f) Even though a training "Waiting List" demonstrated that male employees were scheduled to receive needed training on cold end functions, these male employees were rated as fully capable of performing cold end tasks, or in need of only minimal assistance to perform them, on the matrix system. (g) Defendant's Human Resources Representative approached foremen in the Quality Assurance Department and directly asked them to provide male employees with higher scores on the matrix system. (h) Although 25 female employees were rated by the matrix system for the Melting Line Operator positions, only two were hired for full-time positions, while 34 males were hired for these full-time jobs. (i) The Charging Parties and other female class members who applied for the Melting Line Operator positions were not selected for these positions in or about October
Page -4-

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 5 of 7
2004, despite their qualifications for the job. (j) After one female employee was awarded a Melting Line Operator position, she
trained male operators in cold end functions, and was then told that her position was eliminated; she was laid off in late 2004. 8. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 7, above, has been to deprive Charging Parties and a class of female employees of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their sex. 9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 were intentional. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained ofin paragraph 7 were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Charging Parties and a class of female employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in sex discrimination, differential treatment based on sex, and any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of gender, female. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for employees regardless ofsex, which prohibit sex discrimination in the workplace, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Charging Parties and a class offemale
Page -5-

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 6 of 7 employees by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative reliefnecessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement or front pay.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Charging Parties and a class offemale employees by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful employment practices described in paragraph 7, including but not limited to out-ofpocket losses in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Charging Parties and a class offemale employees by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 7, including pain and suffering, humiliation, anxiety, depression, trauma, and loss of life's pleasures, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Charging Parties and a class of female employees punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 7, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
Page -6-

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 1-1 Filed 06/22/2006 Page 7 of 7
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
JAMESL.LEE
Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
Associate General Counsel
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20507

fJL-t~ c; ,a ;_ ~ r;<::f r/

JJDITH A. O'BOYLE

..:> L (

Supervisory Trial Attorney

.Y~

21 S. 5th Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 440-2683 Pennsylvania ID No. 37637

Page -7-

 
 Case 3:06-cv-O1246-JMM Document 27 Filed 01/12/2007 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,
go

CIVIL ACTION NO.

SCHOTT NORTH AMERICA, INC. Defendant.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, female, and to provide appropriate relief to Charging Parties Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne th-ywara, and a class of females who were adversely affected by such practices. As articulated with greater particularity in paragraphs 7 and 8 below, the Commission alleges that, due to a discriminatory layoff process, Defendant Employer unlawfully selected the Charging Parties and class members for layoffbased on their gender. As a result of the termination of their employment with Defendant, the Charging Parties

Case 3:06-cv-O1246-JMM Document 27 Filed 01/12/2007 Page 2 of 7 and class members lost substantial wages and benefits and suffered significant emotional harm.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction oft,his Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to 8 706(t") (1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. "8 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3)" ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 8 1981A. 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(t")(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 8 2000(e)-5(f) (1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Sehott North America, Inc. ("Schott") has continuously been and is now a Maryland corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania and the City of Duryea, and has continuously had at least fifteen (15) employees. 5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 70 l(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 88 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF, CLAIMS 6. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Charging Parties Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis and
Page.2.

Case 3:06-cv-O1246-JMM Document 27 Filed 01/12/2007 Page 3 of 7 Yvonnc Prywara filed charges of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
7. Since at least October 2004, Defendant Employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Duryea, Pennsylvania facility in violation of Sections 703(a) (1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) and 2000 (e)-3 (a) (1), by subjecting Charging Parties and a class of female employees to a discriminatory layoffprocess which resulted in the loss of their jobs due to their gender. The unlawful employment practices included the following:
(a) Prior to the fall of 2004, in Defendant’s Quality Assurance workforce in its glass production facility, hot end functions were predominately performed by male workers and the cold endfunctions, by females. Accordingly, the Quality Assurance workforce was generally segregated by gender. Female Quality Assurance workers were denied adequate training in the hot end functions, discouraged from applying for hot end positions, and were subjected to sex-based differential treatment when they were permitted to perform hot end jobs.
(b) In or around September 2004, Defendant decided to combine its hot and cold end positions into one job, entitled Melting Line Operator. Defendant announced that it would create forty such positions, thirty-six full time and four part-time. To that end, Defendant developed a matrix system, which it indicated that it would use to evaluate the skills of the applicants to determine who should be selected for the new position. Defendant’s matrix system, which gave credit to the employees for their ability to perform hot and cold end functions, assessed the cold end duties as requiring
Page -3-

Case 3:06-cv-O1246-JMM Document 27 Filed 01/12/2007 Page 4 of 7 a lower level of skill than the male-dominated hot end functions, even though cold end jobs were in fact highly skilled and required continuous labor. In fact, cold end trainees were required to pass more than 26 tests and three different rotations prior to receiving authorization to work in the cold end section.
(d) As part of the rating process, male applicants who had never worked in the cold end were given ratings indicating that they could "fully perform" certain cold end functions.
(e) Male applicants who had never worked in either the hot end or the cold end areas were rated well on both hot and eold end functions. At least three male employees with no experience in hot or cold end functions were awarded Melting Line Operator positions.
(13 Even though a training "Waiting List" demonstrated that male employees were
scheduled to receive needed training on cold end functions, these male employees were rated as fully capable of performing cold end tasks, or in need of only minimal assistance to perform them, on the matrix system.
(g) Defendant’s Human Resources Representative approached foremen in the Quality
Assurance Department and directly asked them to provide male employees with higher scores on the matrix system.
(h) Although 25 female employees were rated by the maU’ix system for the Melting
Line Operator positions, only two were hired for full-time positions, while 34 males were hired for these full-time jobs. (i) The Charging Parties and other female class members who applied for the Melting Line Operator positions were not selected for these positions in or about October
Page -4-

Case 3:06-cv-O1246-JMM Document 27 Filed 01/12/2007 Page 5 of 7 2004, despite their qualifications for the j ob.
(J) After one female employee was awarded a Melting Line Operator position, she
trained male operators in cold end functions, and was then told that her position was eliminated; she was laid off in late 2004. 8. Since at 2004, Defendant Employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Duryea, Pennsylvania facility in violation of Section 703(k)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, by subjecting Charging Parties and a class of female employees to a discriminatory layoffprocess caused a disparate impact based on gender. The unlawful employment practices included the following: (a) Defendant utilized a matrix system to evaluate and select employees for Melting Line Operator positions, and this selection procedure had an adverse impact on female applicants who were selected for layoff at a significantly higher rate than male employees. 9. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, has been to deprive Charging Parties and a class of female employees of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their sex. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7 were intentional. 11. The unlawful employment practices complained of~ paragraph 7 were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Charging Parties and a class of female employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court:
Page -5-

Case 3:06-cv-O1246-JMM Document 27 A. Grant a pc~ent inj~c~on enjoining

Filed 01/12/2007 Page 6 of 7 Defendant Employer, its officers,

successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in

sex discrimination, differential treatment based on sex, and any other employment practice which

discriminates on the basis of gender, female.

B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and

programs which provide equal employment opportunities for employees regardless of sex, which

prohibit sex discrimination in the workplace, and which eradicate the effects of its past and

present unlawful employment practices.

C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Charging Parties and a class of female

employees by providing appropriate backpay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be

determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful

employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement or front pay.

D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Charging Parties and a class of female

employees by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the

unlawful employment practices described in paragraphs 7 and 8, including but not limited to

out-of-pocket losses in amounts to be determined at trial.

E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Charging Parties and a class of female

employees by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the

unlawful practices complained of in paragraph 7, including pain and suffering, humiliation,

anxiety, depression, trauma, and loss of life’s pleasures, in amounts to be determined at trial.

F. Order Defendant: Employer to pay Charging Parties and a class of female

employees punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct described in paragraph 7,

in amounts to be determined at trial.

Page -6-

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 27 Filed 01/12/2007 Page 7 of 7 G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public
interest. H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
RONALD S. COOPER General Counsel JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTb~NITY COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20~07
~.ACQL~INE H. MCNAIR Regional Attorney
JUDITH A. O’BOYLE Supervisory Trial Attorney
Cfi~al AHtLto~rAn.eLyOCKE EEOC 21 S. 5th Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 440-2683 Pennsylvania ID No. 37637
Page -7-

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Plaintiff:
and
ARLENE ANDERSON, CAROLYN BLOCKUS, LAURA FIGUEROA, DEBORAH GDOVIN, PATRICIA PAVALONIS, and YVONNE PRYWARA,
Intervenor Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHOTT NORTH AMERICA, INC.
Defendant.

NO. 3:06-cv-01246-JMM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
FILED SCRANTO)\1
AUG 3 0 200

INTERVENOR COMPLAINT Intervenor Plaintiffs Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Debora Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, and Yvonne Prywara ("Intervenor Plaintiffs") file this complaint as statutory intervenors seeking to recover against Defendant Schott North America, Inc. ("Defendant") for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. As alleged herein, Defendant implemented corporate lay-off procedures that were undertaken with the

discriminatbry intent and purpose of disadvantaging female employees, including

Plaintiffs, aihd, these lay~tfprocedures had an ad.ers~:~te impact on female

p.. employees, including Intert$lor Plaintiffs. Intetv~or~itiffs seek all injunctive

, "

and monetwry relief aVailaWeunder Title VII and tfto

The allegations

,

' :' 1;

herein are based on Int~ Plaintiffs' personalilmo• • as to there own acts

and upon information and ~Ofas to the acts ofOthers.

',',:t
• •DICTION ANQ~!

" '.

';, -;' ','!

r

• _ ,;':

1. This Court has jurisdiction over Intervenojj'hdntiffs' federal claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. II 1331, 1332, 1343, 1345, anl*'" Intervenor Plaintiffs'
~f : 'I

because, inter alia, a Sllbstamial part of the eveRts or fIJI••'ons giving rise to the

claim occuI1!ed in this judicial district.

3.

.y PARTIES
Plaintiff Ark. Anderson is an individual

residing in West

~,l .

Avoca, PA.

".atly 4. PlaintiffCarol,.:Bloekus is an individual

residing in West

Pittston, PA.
5. Plaintiff Laurafiguor<)a is an individtt~11 c~tly residing in West

Wyoming, PA...

2

6. ; Plaintiff Debora Gdovin is an individual currently residing in West

Pittston, PA.
7. Plaintiff Patricia Pavalonis is an indfriduat~lently residing in

Avoca PA 18641.

8. PlaintiffYvonne Prywara is an individual_tly residing in West f"
Wyoming, PA. 9. Plaintiffs A.nder$oI1, Blockus, Figueroa.'· ~1%ovin, Pavaloms, and
Prywara are referred to collectively as "IntervenorPl~~" 1O. Defendant ScbottNorth America, ~. (~~ ,',ant" or "Schott") is a
Maryland corporation dohllrbusiness in the Co.on~ of Pennsylvania and

1_ operating a :manufacturing_i1ity in Duryea, Pe8MyI_

11. Defendant has continuously emplo~ at

15 employees and has

.s;'~:J ;
continuously acted as an dlployer engaged in llQ ~ affecting commerce

within the meaning of 42U;S.C. §§ 2000(e), (g),~ (li).~~

12. On February 21.. 2005, Intervenor Pla:b1ti•• ,.tI-filed

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( " . " ) and the

"

, .' .:: "1, .~

Pennsylvania. Human R.~Commission ("PsrtC'·).~inistrative

, ,

t_ complaint c~)flceming the $ttbjeet matter ofthis la~t.:.*~QPY of Intervenor

Plaintiffs' administrative chuges are attached as

, ;!
,),
1.", i'

3

13. The EEOC conducted an investigation and, on September 16,2005,

issued a de.lermination tbatDefendant violated IDtorv~'laintiffs' rights under

1 ,

, ",,'

, ; t,

Title VII. A copy ofthe$C's determinationis;_~as Item 2.

14. On June 22, 2806, the EEOC commeaceda..¥above-caption action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 201lJe..5(f)(1) and (3) and 42 U;.~~. § 1981A. Thus,
.,,,).,
, :ii
Intervenor Plaintiffs havea,l!btUtory right to intenvene• •is action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I).

15. Based on the above, Intervenor Plaintiffs ".cxhausted all
,

administradve remedies ani Satisfied all prerequisitesto:,.tunder Title VII and

,

,.;

thePHRA.

FACTS
16. Intervenor Plaintiffs adopt the factualalle~ described in the
EEOC's originating complaint. These allegations are

(a)

,~oyer has engaged

"'_l~:< 1: ,1 ;
in unllawful empto~tpraetices at its D-rea,...,.lvania facility in

violation ofTitl~ ~ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2f,)(ll~2000(e)-3(a)(1) by

subjecting [Intervonst'Plaintiffs] and a clas~of_'e employees to a , '".,." :v:
discriminatory layoflPmcess which resulted in tlli1~ of their jobs due to

their gender.

4

(b) Prior to the fall of 2004, in Defendant's Quality Assurance

workforce in its glass production facility, hot en<l.ions were

tl~,~1d predominately pmOfilled by male workers Od

end functions, by

femalies. According[lYl,the Quality AssUJallCe ~rce was generally

segregated by genOer.Female Quality Assurance'WOtkers were denied adeq~~ate training in,-hot end functions,dDco~ from applying for hot

end positions, andwlt't subjected to sex-b~ ~al treatment when

they were permitte<iiOperfonn hot endjobs~

(c) In or around September 2004, Wea4"'tdeeided to combine its
hot al!ld cold end tx*tions into one job, entitled . .ling Line Operator.
Defej~dant anno~ that it would create tfJttyMlpositions, thirty-six ! ~'
full-dme and four pan..time. To that end, OOen....i4eveloped a matrix

system, which it indidted that it would use to e _ . the skills of the
{{
'. ('t
applicants to determine who should be sele~ • fie new position.

(d)

for their ability to petformhot and cold endfun,OW., assessed the cold end

duties as requiring a lower level of skill tha:a the, ~dominated hot end

tho" func1:ions, even

cold end jobs were in faothihly skilled and required

continuous labor. Iit.ct, cold end traine$!Wer,' 'red to pass more than

5

- --. - ---- - "- _..

. ..... --.~ --,..-"".,..

26 tests and three different rotations prior to receiving authorization to work

in thte cold end seefi011.

(e) As pan ofthe rating process.J.1itale '
worked in the cold" were given ratings ihdi~.tbat they could "fully
. .';::':;'
perfmm" certain cOlCJ!:cmd functions.
(f) Mate applicants who had never wo~ in either the hot end or

the c!old end areas • • rated well on botlilot a:lUt;i>ldend functions. At I, "
least three male employees with no experl.e \1:;'" hot or cold end , " , 1("

functions were awarded Melting Line Op_tor_ons.

,j:
(g) Even though a training "waiting Lilfi\~onstrated that male

'. " j ;

employees

were

sckeduled

to

receive

n

e

.

~'on
. ,

cold

end

functions,

these male employees were rated as fully'Qlpable!iperforming cold end

"

;.

·;t:

t,)

tasks, or in need of_Iy minimal assistance to •

them, on the matrix

r'· r ( , ~~

system.
. ,

(h) Defendant's Human Resour" R.tative approached , ·;1
Foremen in the'Quatity Assurance Dep~t_kurectly asked them to
0: _r;
pro'tide male empklyees with higher sc~ on .~atrix system. '! .

(i) Altho. . 25 female employ. w. .f,.ted by the matrix system

for lhe Melting L a Operator positions, oijly PMI:were hired for full-time

positions, while 34..:Ies were hired for·tbese

jobs.

6

vc:l;:)t::0.UV"VV-UIL."'TU-\JIYIIYI

L,.,IVVUIII ....... II\...., v - -

.11 __ ...,., __ • ____ _

- - . --;;}-

U) The [Intervenor Plaintiffs] and other female class members who
applied for the Melting Line Operator positions were not selected for these positions in or about October 2004, despite their qualifications for the job.
(k) After one female employee was awarded a Melting Line Operator position, she trained male operators in cold end functions, and was then told that her position was eliminated; she was laid off in late 2004.
(1) The effect of the practices complained of [herein] has been to deprive [Intervenor Plaintiffs] and a class of female employees of equal employment opportunities and othelwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their sex. 17. A substantial number of the job applicants were women, and many of these female applicants - including all of the Intervenor Plaintiffs - had significant work experience. Yet, as a result of the discriminatory "matrix" ranking system described above, of the 36 full-time positions awarded, only 2 positions were obtained by women. 18. Defendant's lay-off practices were intentionally discriminatory and were carried out with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Intervenor Plaintiffs and other female job candidates. As a direct result of Defendant's discriminatory practices, none of the Intervenor Plaintiffs were hired and their employment was terminated in November 2004.

7

Ud3e O.(1U-GV-Q 14"'f0-1J191191

L.lU\.r"Urllvlu. v-o,J- 111'-''''' V. , ...... __ _

19. The above-described lay-off/rehiring process violates Title VII and

the PHRA (i) under a disparate treatment theory of liability because, inter alia, it

was carried out by Schott with the discriminatory intent and purpose of

disadvantaging female employees and (ii) under a disparate impact theory of

liability because, inter alia, such practices have caused an adverse disparate impact

on the basis of gender and are not job related for the positions in question or

consistent with business necessity. The discriminatory nature of the lay-

off/rehiring process is consistent with an ongoing pattern and practice of

mistreatment and discrimination against female employees at SCHOTT over a

number of v.' ears .

COUNT I (Disparate Treatment Under Title VII)

20. Intervenor Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs

as though fully set forth herein.

21. Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or

to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respec:t to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or

applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any

individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as

8

I V",.." ..."''''''' ~~--" case;). Olcr"CV-ul Z'fO-Jlvllvl UU\.IDH It:=lll v-v - IIQ...

1_:;'_ • __ . . .

an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2).
22. Based on the facts alleged herein, Defendant engaged in intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII.
23. In violating Title VII, Defendant acted with reckless indifference to the Title VI[ rights of Intervenor Plaintiffs, ignored a perceived risk that its actions violated Title VII, and failed to make any good faith effort to comply with Title VII.
24. As a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, Intervenor
Plaintiffs have suffered serious damages, including, inter alia, lost back
pay/benefits, lost front payibenefits, mental anguish and other emotional pain and suffering, and general and special damages for lost compensation and job benefits that Interv~mor Plaintiffs would have received but for Defendant's discriminatory conduct.
COUNT II (Disparate Impact Under Title VII) 25. Intervenor Plaintiffs repeat and reassert the allegations set forth in all preceding paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 26. Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair and form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Under the disparate impact theory of Title VII
9

case 3.VlY"CV-U r ~.J"T11rv'"'lIurv(--D~OmC"'T1UITT,,=(errTl1'-l"~-~rll~u v IILII£.VVV
liability, a employment practice is unlawful if it "causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~2(k)(1)(A)(i).
27. Based on the facts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Intervenor Plaintiffs for violating Title VII under the disparate impact theory of liability.
28. As a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, Intervenor Plaintiffs have suffered serious damages, including, inter alia, lost back paylbenefits, lost front paylbenefits, mental anguish and other emotional pain and suffering, and general and special damages for lost compensation and job benefits that Intervenor Plaintiffs would have received but for Defendant's discriminatory conduct.
COUNT III (Disparate Treatment Under PHRA) 29. Intervenor Plaintiffs repeat and reassert the allegations set forth in all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 30. The PHRA prohibits employers from subjecting employees to adverse employment actions based the employee's gender. 43 P.S. § 953. 31. Defendant is an employer covered by the PHRA. 32. By terminating Intervenor Plaintiffs' employment based on Intervenor Plaintiffs' gender, Defendant violated the PHRA.
10

case 0.Ut:J-CV-UIZZRJ-JIVIIVI DOCUltlem ;j-;j !""lIeu UflLflLVVV ~ a~.., , .... '"" n - - _ __
33. As a direct result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, Intervenor Plaintiffs have suffered damages, including lost earnings and emotional distress.
COUNT IV
(Disparate Impact Under PHRA) 34. Plaintiff repeats and reasserts the allegations set forth in all preceding paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 35. An employer violates the PHRA "when its practices, though fair in form and applied without wrongful intent" discriminate against women. See Luhls v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 276 Pa. Super. 232, 267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Under the disparate impact theory ofPHRA liability, a employment practice is unlawful if it causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. 36. Based on the facts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Intervenor Plaintiffs fix violating the PHRA under the disparate impact theory of liability. 37. As a result of Defendant's discriminatory conduct, Intervenor Plaintiffs have suffered serious damages, including, inter alia, lost back pay/benefits, lost front paylbenefits, mental anguish and other emotional pain and suffering, and general and special damages for lost compensation and job benefits that Intervenor Plaintiffs would have received but for Defendant's discriminatory conduct.
11

GeIse 0.Ut;:J-lN-U 1£qu--\JIVlivl DocUment ;:s-;:s 1"'1160 UfI,c,lI,c,vvv ra~v 'v v, .-,- ~~-_
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHE:,REFORE, Intervenor Plaintiffs seeks the following relief: a. All damages which Intervenor Plaintiffs sustained as a result of Defendant's: illegal conduct, including, inter alia, lost back paylbenefits, lost front pay/benefits, mental anguish and other emotional pain and suffering, general and special damages for lost compensation and job benefits that Intervenor Plaintiffs would have received but for Defendant's discriminatory conduct, all available punitive daltnages, and all available liquidated damages; b. Exemplary and punitive damages in an amount commensurate with Defendant':s ability to pay and to deter future conduct; c. A permanent injunction against Defendant and its directors, officers, owners, agents, successors, employees and representatives, and any and all persons acting in concert with them, from engaging in each of the unlawful practices, policies, customs and usages set forth herein; d. A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of in this complaint are unlawful and violate Title VII and the PHRA; e. An adjustment of the wage rates and benefits for Intervenor Plaintiffs to that level which Intervenor Plaintiffs and the class would be enjoying but for Defendant's discriminatory practices;
12

'v-Clse-;:>.UU-L;V-U IL'+O-.JIVIIVI

UOGUmeTlL-;y.;;;y--- rlleu UIILIILUUU

'CI~v , ... VI 1-,

f. Costs incurred, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to the extent allowable by law;
g. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law; and h. Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Intervenor Plaintiffs demand a jury trial as to all claims so triable.

Dated: July 27, 2006

Sean McDonough DOUGHERTY LEVENTHAL & PRICE, LLP 75 Glenmaura National Blvd Moosic, PA 18507 (570) 347-l011 (570) 347-7028 (fax)

Peter Winebrake Kathryn C. Harr TRUJILLO RODRIGUEZ & RICHARDS, LLC 1717 Arch Street, Suite 3838 Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 731-9004 (215) 731-9044 (fax)

13

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

: No. 06cv1246

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

:

ARLENE ANDERSON,

: (Judge Munley)

CAROLYN BLOCKUS,

:

LAURA FIGUEROA,

:

DEBORAH GDOVIN,

:

PATRICIA PAVALONIS, and

:

YVONNE PRYWARA,

:

Plaintiffs

:

:

:

v.

:

:

SCHOTT NORTH AMERICA, INC. :

Defendant

:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 42) in this employment discrimination case. Having been fully briefed and argued, the matter is

ripe for disposition.

I. Background

This case grows out of an October 2004 reorganization and subsequent layoff of employees at Defendant Schott North America’s specialty glass plant in Duryea,

Pennsylvania. (Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Summary Judgment (hereinafter “Defendant’s Statement”) (Doc. 43) at ¶ 1).1 Employees at

1The court will cite to defendant’s statement of material facts for those statements which are undisputed. Where the facts are disputed, the court will note that.

the plant were represented by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, and a collective bargaining agreement covered production employees at the time of the layoffs. (Id. at ¶ 4). The six intervenor plaintiffs all worked in the plant prior to October 2004 and filed discrimination charges against the company with the EEOC. (Id. at ¶ 6). The EEOC represents five other plaintiffs who did not file discrimination charges with the agency: Lori Zielinski, Linda Stoss, Margaret Moran, Sally Guzik and Jean Donovan. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Before October 2004, the Duryea plant produced two types of glass: optical and opthalmic. (Id. at ¶ 10). Optical glass is produced in large strips or blocks and is used in a variety of products, which are often part of military, industrial, medical and aerospace systems. (Id. at ¶ 11). Opthalmic glass is most commonly used for eyeglass lenses. (Id. at ¶ 12). Producing each of these types of glass requires much different production processes and different levels and types of staffing. (Id. at ¶ 13).
Glass production on a continuous production line was generally divided into two parts before the plant’s reorganization in October 2004. (Id. at ¶ 14). First, the product went through the “hot end,” where raw chemicals that produce gas were loaded into continuous melting tanks (furnaces) of several hundred liters, melted at extremely high temperatures, “hot formed” into the required product geometry and thermally treated to remove stress. (Id.). This process took place in an annealing oven (lehr), which also provided for the cooling of the glass to room temperature.
2

(Id.). After passing through this hot end, the glass proceeded to the “cold end,” where it was inspected and packaged. (Id. at ¶ 15).
The parties disagree about the amount of attention required by workers in the “hot end” of the opthalmic glass-making process. (Id. ¶ 16; Plaintiff EEOC’s Response and Objections to Defendant’s Statement of Facts (hereinafter “EEOC’s Response”) at ¶ 16). Defendant contends that “the ‘hot end’ forming equipment requires close and continuous monitoring to assure that the glass consistently remains in dimensional tolerance by controlling appropriate temperatures, pressures, speed, timing, etc. of the forming press.” (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 16). Plaintiff EEOC points to the testimony of Thomas Luder, who was a hot-end foreman for 27 years and worked at Schott for 30 years. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 16). According to Luder, once the hot end work was properly set up by the group leader “the work of the operator was minimal.” (Id.). The EEOC points to evidence that hot end workers could take longer breaks than cold end workers, that the workers on the hot end would often sit on chairs reading magazines, and that they sometimes fell asleep while sitting in chairs, requiring foremen to wake them up. (Id.). Workers testified that they saw hot end workers reading newspapers and books, eating, working puzzles and playing poker machines while at work. (Id.).
“Cold end” work was of a different sort, requiring more constant, continuous attention to detail. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 17). Plaintiffs point to evidence that this work was “fast” and “non-stop, and argues that the work was extremely “critical,”
3

since workers at the “cold end” inspected glass that went directly to customers. (EEOC’s Response at ¶¶ 17-18).
Production of optical glass used a different process that arguably required different sets of skills. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 20). Not as much attention to process was required on either end of the line. (Id.). An operator making the “strip glass” associated with optical glass, defendant argues, had several minutes between processes, which allowed for monitoring of both the hot and cold end. (Id. at ¶ 21). The parties disagree about the complexity of the cold end inspection process for optical glass. (Id. at ¶ 21-22; EEOC’s Response at ¶¶ 21-22). Defendant contends that the process is simpler than for opthalmic glass and requires fewer individual tasks or skills. (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiffs insist that cold-end inspectors are “still required to find extremely tiny inclusions and to use several devices to measure the glass.” (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 22). They also have to lift and move glass, as well as cut strips. (Id.).
Before reorganization of production of the plant, jobs in glass production were largely divided by gender. (See Lance Saberhagen, Evaluation of Employee Selection Procedures for Melting Line Operator (Doc. 57-3) (hereinafter “Saberhagen Report”). 95.3% of the hot-end workers were male and 76.6% of the cold-end workers were female. (Id. at 21). Of men in the factory, 83.7% worked in the hot-end section. (Id.). Of women, 92% worked in the cold end. (Id.).
a. The Plant reorganization
4

In October 2004, Schott decided to consolidate all of the Schott Opthalmic production in Grünenplan, Germany. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 42). This decision was one based on the economics of the glass-making business and had been under consideration for several years. (Id. at ¶ 43). Officials at the Duryea plant attempted to limit costs and make production more efficient to prevent the loss of opthalmic production, but failed. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-49).
Once the company decided to shut down a portion of production in the Duryea plant, officials had to reorganize production to meet the new priorities. (Id. at ¶ 50).2 Essentially, the company had to determine how to reorganize production to meet the needs of a facility that no longer produced opthalmic glass. (Id. at ¶ 51). The defendant contends that its goal was to “(i) retain those existing employees who were the most qualified to run optical glass production; and (ii) create a ‘flexible’ workforce, wherein employees could perform numerous production jobs as opposed to a single job in the production process.” (Id. at ¶ 53). The EEOC denies that the defendant proceeded in this fashion. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 53). At first, defendant proposed simply to terminate the opthalmic unit and keep the optical one. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 55). That would have led to layoffs for the entire opthalmic unit workforce. (Id. at ¶ 56). Another option considered by the company was to eliminate some positions and then put up for bid the “crucible operator”
2The EEOC contends that the defendant was aware of the need to shut down much earlier, and had longer to prepare to consolidate the lines than it admits. (See EEOC’s Response at ¶¶ 45-50).
5

position, a “hot end” job. (Id. at ¶ 58). The parties disagree over whether the company abandoned this plan on its own or at the union’s insistence. (Id.; EEOC’s Response at ¶ 58).
As a solution to how to staff the reorganized factory, the company decided to create a new position: “melting line operator” (MLO). (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 65). The defendant asserts it had authority under the collective bargaining agreement to create this new position. (Id. at ¶ 66). The MLO combined the jobs performed on the “hot” and “cold” ends of the line. (Id. at ¶ 67). Putting one employee in charge of work at both ends of the line is a return to production methods in place at the plant before 1985. (Id. at ¶ 69).
In order to award jobs for the new MLO position, the company had develop some sort of rating system to determine who was most qualified to occupy the new positions. Creating these new jobs meant a reduction in the size of the workforce. To determine who should receive the MLO jobs, the company developed a rating system for workers that purported to assign the jobs based on the skills the applicant possessed. (Id. at ¶¶ 70-71). This rating system became known as “the skills matrix” (“matrix”). (Id. at ¶ 72). The process of creating this matrix and rating workers on it is the central element of the instant lawsuit.
Schott had previously used a similar system of rating job performance, though not to this particular scale or for this particular job. (Id.). Earl Hall, human resources director, and Hardy Pankrantz, production manager for hot ends operations, oversaw
6

creation of the matrix. (Id. at ¶¶ 70-71). Hall and Pankrantz requested that the shift foremen provide a list of all job tasks and skills that would be required of melting line operators after the reorganization. (Id. at ¶ 74). According to plaintiffs, one of those who helped with this information, Mary Ellen Pajor, had worked primarily as a bookkeeper for the previous ten years and did not have special knowledge of the MLO processes. (EEOC’s Statement at ¶ 74). George Vamos, Cold End Quality Assurance Manager, also created a list of cold end job functions. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 75).
After the managers compiled this list of job functions, Pajor compiled a list of the skills they named. (Id. at ¶ 77). Pankratz and Steven Krenitsky, Director of Operations at the plant, reviewed the list. (Id. at ¶ 78). They determined that it was “accurate and complete.” (Id.). They thus established the final list of job skills. (Id.). Pankratz and Krenitsky then distributed the list to shift foremen, who were asked to assign a weighting point value to each task. (Id. at ¶ 79). The foremen assigned a numerical point value to each skill between 1 and 10, which defendant claims was based on “the particular skill’s level of difficulty and overall importance to the optical glass production process.” (Id. at ¶ 82). Once a foreman completed his weighting task, Pajor calculated an average numerical value for each task by adding up the number of points that the foremen had assigned the task and dividing it by three (the number of foremen who had rated the tasks). (Id. at ¶¶ 83-84). This was the “weighted average” for the task. (Id. at ¶ 85). Pankratz performed his own weighting
7

and compared it to the numbers the foremen had devised. (Id. at ¶ 86). He did not change their numbers, deciding that they were fair. (Id. at ¶ 87).
Once the numerical values were assigned each task, the company then created a scoring system for grading each worker on those tasks. (Id. at ¶ 88). This system was letter-based. (Id.). Under that system, the evaluator assigned the worker a letter grade for the task, and the letter grade had a corresponding numerical value. (Id. at ¶ 89). There were four letter grades. (Id.). “N” meant that the worker needs training and could not perform the task at all; a worker received 0 points for that grade. (Id. at ¶ 90a). “M” meant that the worker could perform the task with minimal assistance. (Id. at ¶ 90b). A worker with this grade received the weighted average as a score for that task. (Id.). “P” meant a worker could “fully perform” the task. (Id. at ¶ 90c). A worker with that grade was entitled to a score of the weighted average + 1. (Id.). If the weighted average was 6, a worker with a P would receive a 7 for the task. (Id.). “T” meant the worker was skilled enough in the task that she could train others. (Id. at ¶ 90d). With this grade, the worker was entitled to the weighted average plus 2 as their score. (Id.).
After managers established this system, Pajor created an Excel spreadsheet on her computer that used a formula to assign workers points based on their ratings for each task and the weight assigned that task. (Id. at ¶ 91). Once the worker was rated on each task, the scores were added together to create a raw numerical score (the “matrix score”). (Id. at ¶ 94). The company then ranked the workers based on
8

their cumulative matrix scores. (Id. at ¶ 95). The plaintiffs contend that several male employees had their matrix scores changed to add more points. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 95). Those with the highest scores received the highest rankings. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 95). Employees who wanted one of the newly created MLO positions had to bid on a job, and had to provide a matrix rating to be considered. (Id. at ¶¶ 96-97). Around 57 persons submitted such bids, including 9 of the 11 individual plaintiffs in the case. (Id. at ¶ 105).
The dispute in this case is largely about the propriety of this system, both in terms of the way it was designed and in the way it was executed. The defendant argues that tasks that were “more difficult, skilled and ‘critical’ to the glass-making process” received greater weight in the matrix. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 80). Plaintiffs agree only that some tasks received greater weight than others, and argue that the matrix weighed more than “skill,” including categories that were more obviously subjective, like “supports company activities” and “applies feedback to improve product performance.” (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 80). Plaintiffs also contend that the foreman did not receive any guidance on how to establish these point values other than the phrase “assign point value to above tasks 1 to 10, 10 being the most difficult.” (Id.). Defendant contends that the hot end tasks were more difficult, and therefore received a greater weight than the cold end ones. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 81). Plaintiffs insist that cold end tasks were critical, since the final product went out after the cold end tasks. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 81). Plaintiffs thus imply that
9

defendant undervalued those tasks. (Id.). In addition, plaintiffs contend that the rating system measured tasks which
were not typically performed by workers on the hot or cold end, but more often performed by group leaders. (Id. at ¶ 82). Current MLOs related that they were rated on tasks that they have never had to perform as an MLO. (Id.). Plaintiff also argues that the foremen who did the weighting all had experience mostly on the hot end of the line. (Id.). John Nicks, for instance, was a foreman in the hot end from 1987 to 1993, left then company for three years, and returned again in 1996 to supervise the hot end. (Id.). He had only begun to supervise cold end employees in 2003. (Id.). Donald Krafchak, another rater, had worked at Schott since 1974, and had been a hot end supervisor since 1989. (Id.). He began supervising the cold end in 2002 or 2003. (Id.). Neither Vamos, the cold end quality manager, nor any of the four cold end forepersons were invited to participate in the rating process. (Id.). Plaintiffs also point out that union leaders recognized that the matrix appeared designed to favor hot end (male) workers and complained about it.
The parties also dispute the fairness of the evaluation of workers under this system. The parties agree that the foremen were responsible for providing the ratings. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 109a). The foremen then met with the worker to review the matrix rating, and an employee could dispute the score and request a change. (Id. at ¶ 109f). Plaintiffs contend that not all employees were fully informed by their foremen of their scores and the ability to challenge them. (EEOC’s
10

Response at ¶ 109f). Defendant points out that foreman changed the scores of workers who demonstrated that they could perform a task, and that the plaintiffs in this case all agreed that they underwent this process and affirmed the accuracy of the ratings. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶¶ 109g, 111). Plaintiffs contend that the process was hardly as objective or fair as the defendant contends. Some ratings were done by one supervisor and signed by another foreman, who never saw the worker perform the task. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 109a). Other workers were given credit for skill at a task simply on their testimony, rather than on actual observation. (Id. at ¶ 109b). Plaintiffs also complain that they were given their ratings but not informed by their supervisors that they could dispute scores and change them. (Id. at ¶ 109g). One female worker (Donovan) received “N” ratings for tasks she could perform. (Id.). She did not dispute those ratings because she did not understand what “N” meant. (Id.). Plaintiffs also have evidence that male workers were allowed to claim skills they hadn’t performed in years, but women were not able to do so. (Id. at ¶ 109h). Some foremen accepted verbal assurances that workers could perform a task and other foremen required that they demonstrate the ability. (Id.).
b. The reorganized factory After the company completed all of the ratings, the reorganization of the factory occurred. Workers received jobs based on their ratings. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 119). On October 13, 2004, the company posted the bid awards. (Id. at ¶ 121). The workers who received the 40 highest matrix ratings were awarded
11

MLO bids. (Id. at ¶ 119). 36 of those 40 workers received immediate jobs, and the bottom four were placed on a call-in list and were told they would receive calls to come into work as needed. (Id. at ¶ 120). An employee who was not retained could either accept a layoff and retain seniority rights for eighteen months or voluntarily resign, waive senior and recall rights and receive a severance package. (Id. at ¶ 122). The plaintiffs who did not receive positions accepted the severance benefits. (Id. at ¶ 123). Some of the plaintiffs claim that they were told not to dispute the matrix ratings or seek recall, but instead to accept the severance. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 123).
Many more men than women obtained the MLO jobs. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶¶ 125-30). Defendant contends that the major factor in determining who obtained MLO jobs was whether an employee worked on the cold end or the hot end. (Id. at ¶ 126). Defendant argues that the male employees who worked primarily on the cold end did not obtain jobs in the reorganization. (Id. at ¶¶ 125-27). Plaintiffs point to Richard Evans, whose job was primarily as a general helper making boxes on the cold end, nevertheless obtained a position. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 124). Of the 14 men who applied for MLO jobs from the cold end, 9 had experience on the hot end. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 126). They all received MLO positions. (Id. at ¶ 127). Of the 15 women who applied for MLO positions from the cold end, two had previous experience on the hot end. (Id. at ¶ 128-29). Both received jobs, being ranked 6 and 14 on the matrix. (Id. at ¶¶ 129-30). Defendant
12

contends that 2 women with minimal cold-end experience also received MLO positions, though they ranked low on the list. (Id. at ¶ 131). Plaintiffs deny that the women were inexperienced. (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 131).
As part of establishing the new production processes, defendant found that all of the workers needed to be trained to achieve qualification on those tasks where they were lacking. (Defendant’s Statement at ¶ 136). None of the retained employees were competent in every task. (Id.). The company and the union agreed that eligibility for training would be determined by seniority. (Id. at ¶ 137). Plaintiffs allege that at times men with less seniority received training before more senior women who requested it. (EEOC’s Response at ¶¶ 137-38). Employees who received training were re-rated on the matrix and achieved higher scores. (Id. at ¶ 141). The defendant insists that none of this training occurred between the time that the matrix process was announced and the bids posted on October 13, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 143). Plaintiff EEOC contends that at least two men received training on cold-end processes shortly before the matrix was announced. (EEOC’s Statement at ¶ 143). After December 27, 2004, defendant abandoned the matrix system for determining employment eligibility, and now focused on seniority in layoffs. (Id. at ¶ 144-45).
c. allegations of past improper conduct in the workplace Both the EEOC and the intervenor plaintiffs point to conduct in the workplace which they contend created a discriminatory atmosphere. The plaintiffs point out that male workers asked to fill in on the cold end were disdainful and reluctant to
13

participate, insisting that such tasks were “women’s work.” (EEOC’s Response at ¶ 25). When female cold-end workers returned glass to the hot end after finding flaws in inspection, male cold workers sometimes became annoyed enough to curse and throw glass or the paperwork defining the rejects. (Id.). One male inspector threw hot glass on a table in front of Patricia Pavalonis, and the glass blew up in her face. (Id.). Workers also sometimes threw tools at women bringing back rejected glass to the hot end. (Id.).
The company had a practice of providing training for workers who transferred from the cold end to the hot end. As one male employee testified, “All through the many years I spent at Schott, if you took a job, no matter what it was, you were trained in it. They wouldn’t just throw you to the wolves. You were shown how to do it. And any questions, you could ask. I was never refused help.” (Id. at ¶ 38). Women working on the hot end had a different experience. Plaintiff Carolyn Blockus testified that when she worked on the hot end for a brief time in 1996 male employees Sid Pesotine and Fritz Shoback refused to provide her with training as required. (Id. at ¶ 39). She reported this misbehavior to foreman Tom Luder. (Id.). He went to foreman Donald Krafchak to express Blockus’s complaint. (Id.). Krafchak responded that “I really don’t give a shit. I don’t want women on my shift.” (Id.). Krafchak allegedly made a similar comment at the time the MLO positions were considered. Production supervisor Lenny Cushner also allegedly claimed at a similar time that “the plant would go to hell if women had to do these jobs.” (Id.).
14

Laura Figueroa bid on a hot end job in the 1980s and lasted only one evening. (Id. at ¶ 38). She heard the foreman say, “show her how to hit the tanks once and let her on her own the rest of the night.” (Id.).
Female workers also complained of harassing behavior. Lori Zielinski worked in the hot end in the late 1990s. (Id. at ¶ 39). She reported several instances of sexual harassment from male co-workers. (Id.). Workers wrote obscene words (“c–nt”) on her locker, as well as sexually suggestive phrases. (Id.). Zeilinski also had her mask destroyed, underwear stolen from her locker, and pornography strewn about her work space. (Id.). Workers verbally harassed her and stole her time card. (Id.). She complained to a supervisor that she was not receiving the breaks she was due. (Id.). Her foreman heard this complaint, but did nothing. (Id.). These incidents occurred in 1999. (Id.). Patricia Pavalonis complained to a foreman Zielinski in 2003 or 2004 that foreman Berkoski had grabbed her breast, but she did not pursue charges because she had to work with Berkoski. (Id.). One employee reported to foreman Luder that a worker had exposed his private parts to her while walking along a catwalk. (Id.).
The intervenor plaintiffs also offer a catalog of sexually offensive behavior from male coworkers that supervisors seemed to tolerate. (See Intervenor Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Material Facts (Doc. 59) (hereinafter “Intervenor Plaintiff’s Statement”) at ¶ 37). Male workers verbally abused, harassed and threatened female coworkers who rejected glass on cold-end inspection. (Id. at ¶ 37a).
15

Sexually inappropriate behavior allegedly abounded, including a male worker who regularly exposed himself to female workers and a manager who touched female workers inappropriately. (Id.). Graffiti on the walls targeted women, offering statements such as “Cindy is a slut” or “if anyone wants a blowjob, see Lori or Cindi.” (Id. at ¶ 37b). Male workers decorated their work areas with nude pictures of women from pornographic magazines. (Id. at ¶ 37d). Managers did not act to remove this material. (Id.). Both workers and supervisors read pornographic magazines at work, and supervisors maintained a “library” of such materials in their offices. (Id. at ¶ 37e). Supervisors were also often dismissive of women in the workplace, derisively referring to certain tasks as “women’s work” and voicing opposition to supervising women on their shifts. (Id. at ¶¶ 37i-j).
d. EEOC actions After the six intervenor plaintiffs lost their jobs in late 2004 they filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination. The EEOC investigated the situation and on September 16, 2005 issued a letter that concluded that discrimination had occurred. The report summarized the facts and concluded that “the Commission finds that Respondent subjected Charging Party and a class of females to sex discrimination in layoff as well as persistent, pervasive and patterned sex-based differential treatment and sexual harassment (hostile work environment). There is no indication that cold-end positions are any less skillful and Respondent’s rationale is regarded as a subterfuge to hide its true sexist and discriminatory
16

motives. The implementation of the matrix system was used to target and eliminate a class of jobs held by predominately female employees. Females were blocked from receiving training and therefore were not being given the opportunity to compete for advancement.”
The EEOC also had an expert investigator, Lance Saberhagen, prepare a report on the “evaluation of employee selection procedures for melting line operator.” (See Saberhagen Report). Saberhagen, who holds a PhD in industrial and organizational psychology, examined the matrix developed by Schott to determine whether it caused discrimination against female workers. After exploring the matrix system, Saberhagen concluded that the selection process had an adverse impact on women. The rating factors in the matrix favored men, since many more of the rating factors harmed women than men. The company did not analyze the matrix scores to see if a sex bias existed, the people who created the matrix did not have training in establishing such a system, and the company made no effort to establish an equally effective and less discriminatory alternative. Saberhagen also proposed three alternatives to the matrix system which he said would produce equally skilled workers and not have as discriminatory an impact on women workers. The purpose of this report was to provide evidence of the disparate impact of the Schott program and to demonstrate viable alternatives, as required by the caselaw on disparate impact.
e. the lawsuit
17

Plaintiff EEOC brought a sex discrimination lawsuit on June 22, 2006 (Doc. 1). The intervenor plaintiffs filed their motion for inclusion in the case on July 27, 2006 (Doc. 3). After the court approved this motion (Doc. 10), the intervenor plaintiffs filed a complaint (Doc. 11) that repeated the EEOC’s allegations of discrimination by disparate treatment and disparate impact. The intervenor plaintiffs also made identical claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
With the court’s leave, plaintiff EEOC filed an amended complaint on January 12, 2007 (Doc. 27). The amended complaint alleges that defendant violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act “by subjecting Charging Parties and a class of female employees to a discriminatory layoff process which resulted in the loss of their jobs due to their gender.” This might be called the “disparate treatment” portion of the complaint. Among the unlawful employment practices alleged by the plaintiffs were: a segregation of the work force by gender and an unwillingness to train women in the positions primarily occupied by men; an undervaluing of the skill required to do the jobs primarily occupied by women in the creation of the matrix that assigned the new MLO position, resulting in less change for female workers to obtain those jobs; an unfair rating process that gave men credit for the ability to perform jobs which they had never done; attempts by the Human Resources department to manipulate scores to give men higher ratings; of the 36 MLO positions provided, 34 went to men and 2 to women. The complaint also raises a charge of “disparate impact” under Title VII, alleging that defendant subjected “Charging parties and a class of female
18

employees to a discriminatory layoff process” that “caused a disparate impact based on gender.” That portion of the complaint alleges that plaintiff matrix system for evaluating employees “had an adverse impact on female applicants who were selected for layoff at a significantly higher rate than male employees. As relief, plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant and its agents and employees from engaging in any sexually discriminatory action; an order from the court directing defendant to institute a program to eliminate discrimination and rectify the effects of past discrimination; back pay and other financial remedies for those harmed by the unlawful employment practices; other compensatory damages for plaintiffs; and punitive damages.
After the close of discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The parties then briefed the issue and the court entertained argument, bringing the case to its present posture. II. Jurisdiction
As this case is brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). III. Legal Standard
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
19

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond its pleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
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IV. Discussion Defendant offers several reasons why the court should grant it summary
judgment on plaintiff’s claims. A. Title VII Employment Discrimination Claim Courts have established a burden-shifting scheme for claims of sex
discrimination under Title VII when no direct evidence of such discrimination exists: “the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s rejection.” Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973)). If the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for the discrimination.” Id.
i. Prima Facie Case Defendant argues that it should receive summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims because they have not made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Defendant contends that because all employees lost the positions they held because of the reorganization plaintiff cannot simply rely on the fact that women lost their jobs while men retained them. Instead, they must show that workers similarly situated with plaintiffs who were outside the protected class (that is, women) were hired while
21

plaintiffs were not. Because plaintiffs were not as qualified as those who obtained the jobs, they cannot make out the prima facie case. The proper “similarly situated” comparison, defendant argues, would be with the men who worked on the cold end. Since those men did not obtain jobs either, no prima facie case has been established.
A plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case under Title VII “must show (1) that she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she was discharged [or not promoted], and (4) the position was ultimately filled by a person not of the protected class.” Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir. 1996).
The court finds that plaintiffs can make out a prima facie case here. The evidence shows that the Schott factory had a history of gender segregation in the workplace, and that this segregation meant that skills were divided largely along gender lines. Plaintiffs’ argument is that they were not chosen for their positions because the defendant constructed the matrix system in a way that devalued the skills that women had in the workplace and overvalued those that men had developed. In addition, all workers needed training for the newly designed workplace, and therefore the matrix did not really measure the skills necessary for the new jobs. A reasonable juror could find that the matrix was not an accurate measure of the skill required for the job, and that women were excluded from jobs for which they were equally qualified. Since far more men received the new positions
22

than women, the court concludes that plaintiffs have made out their prima facie case. ii. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reasons
If the plaintiff meets its prima facie burden, the defendant must then show that it denied plaintiff’s promotion for a “‘legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.’” Jones, 198 F.3d at 408. In order to meet its burden in a sex discrimination case, an employer need only introduce “evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.” Fuentes v. Pierske, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). “The employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Here, the defendant for business reasons decided that a shift in production arrangements in the corporation was necessary. In deciding to eliminate an entire class of production, defendant needed to eliminate jobs. As part of eliminating jobs, defendant decided to combine operations on the hot and cold end of the production line. Defendant needed a means of deciding which workers to retain, and the matrix was this means. Defendant contends that this constitutes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the business decision.
Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the defendant has met its burden in this area, though they do appear to say that the system was much less objective than the defendant’s contend. The court agrees that the need to reorganize the factory
23

represents a legitimate business reason for the defendant’s actions. iii. Pretext
Once defendant meets its burden of providing legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the employment decision, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that a jury “could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating factor or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. at 764. Plaintiff must therefore “[produce] sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the challenged employment action.” Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996). A plaintiff must do more, however, than simply demonstrate that the employer did not make the correct hiring decision: “to discredit the employer’s proffered reason, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is ‘wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.’” Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiffs, defendant contends, insist that defendant should have used seniority as the selection method, and that plaintiffs cannot establish pretext merely by quarreling with the methods defendant used to assign the jobs. Plaintiffs make this same argument about the failure to provide them with further training, defendant
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insist, and it fails for similar reasons. The court finds that plaintiffs have advanced evidence by which a reasonable
jury could conclude that defendant’s stated reasons for the hiring decision were mere pretext for its real motive of preventing women from obtaining jobs in the reorganized workplace. Plaintiffs have produced a large degree of evidence–including expert testimony in the form of Dr. Saberhagen’s report–that shows that the matrix system did not really measure the skills required for the job, but instead valued the skills that men were more likely to have than women. They also have presented evidence that the matrix system was not applied fairly, and that gender bias occurred in the way that managers evaluated workers. Combined with evidence that sexual animosity and harassment abounded in the workplace, and that managers frequently expressed a belief that women should not be employed at Schott, a reasonable jury could find that defendant’s matrix system was merely an attempt to provide a statistical and “objective” veneer for plaintiff’s underlying discriminatory goal. The court will therefore deny defendant’s motion on this point.
B. Disparate Impact Plaintiffs contend that even if they cannot make out a prima facie case for disparate treatment employment discrimination, they can make out a claim for disparate impact discrimination. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s disparate impact claim cannot survive summary judgment.
i. Prima Facie Case
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A plaintiff seeking recovery on a disparate impact theory invokes a claim that “‘involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.’” Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977)). In the disparate impact context, “‘a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed [illegally discriminatory] without evidence of the employer’s subjective intent to discriminate that is required in a ‘disparate-treatment’ case.” Id. at 52-53 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989)).
A plaintiff seeking to prevail on a disparate impact claim must first establish a prima facie case. To do so, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that application of a facially neutral standard has caused a ‘significantly discriminatory hiring pattern.’” Newark Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1991)). Such evidence “usually focuses on statistical disparities.” Id. Defendant does not dispute that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case. Nor could it, since the jobs in the reorganized factory clearly went in disproportionate numbers to men.
ii. Selection criteria job-related and consistent with business necessity If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the defendant then has the burden
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to demonstrate “a business justification for continued use of the challenged practice.” Newark Branch, 940 F.2d at 798. The employer must show that “the employment practice is ‘job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.’” Lanning v. Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 181 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2k).
Defendant argues that the matrix plan was certainly job related and consistent with business necessity, since the company needed to reduce staff and set up new production techniques. The company sought to identify and retain competent employees, and set up the matrix system to do so. Plaintiffs respond that the matrix system benefitted men, and it did not really measure the skills required to perform the MLO job. The matrix was also designed not by an expert in vocational training, but by company employees with no formal education in the area. The matrix made use of job standards that were not required of MLOs, but of group leaders and asked workers to perform tasks that they would never have to as MLOs. Accordingly, the matrix did not consistently measure the needs of the employer in the job, but instead served as a means of weeding out the women who had not traditionally occupied positions where they could be trained in the work valued by the matrix. In addition, defendant has not presented any empirical proof in the form of a “validation study” that would show that the selection process was both job-related and consistent with business necessity. Despite a warning from the union shop steward, the company did not perform this study.
27

The court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that the matrix plan did not represent a system which was job related and consistent with business necessity. Plaintiffs have offered expert evaluations and anecdotal evidence that indicates that matrix system did not adequately measure either the skills workers had obtained or the skills required for the new positions. They have also demonstrated that the matrix built in a bias towards the skills men had obtained in a workplace that was largely sex-segregated, even though those skills were not always necessary for the new positions. W hile a jury could find that defendant designed the best system it could to pass out jobs fairly under difficult systems, a jury could also find that the matrix was designed to perpetuate the long-term biases in the factory and did not adequately measure who could actually perform the new jobs. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate on these grounds.
iii. Equally effective alternative Though the plaintiffs could prevail if a jury concludes that the matrix system was not consistent with business necessity, the court will address whether evidence exists to support plaintiffs’ claims that equally effective alternatives exist. If defendant meets its burden of demonstrating business necessity, “the plaintiffs may still prevail if they can show that an alternative employment practice has a less disparate impact and would also serve the employer’s legitimate business interest.” Lanning, 181 F.3d at 485. Defendant argues that Schott could not have established a system that would have met it goals that would have been less discriminatory.
28

Seniority, for example, would not have allowed an appreciably larger number of women to take the position. Neither would have expanding the crucible operator position instead of creating the MLO. Doing so would not have created any more opportunities for women under the existing union contract. Plaintiffs argue that they have provided equally effective alternatives. They point to Dr. Saberhagen’s report, which suggests three examples of equally effective alternatives that change the weighting of the matrix factors and allow the hiring of (marginally more) women.
The court also finds that the plaintiffs can survive summary judgment on these grounds. While a jury may not be convinced that plaintiff’s alternatives are feasible or significant, that same reasonable jury could also find that plaintiffs have offered an alternative that overcomes the biases inherent to the matrix plan and the history of the Schott workplace. The court will therefore deny summary judgment on plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim as well.
C. Individual Plaintiffs Defendant also challenges the claims of the individual plaintiffs in the case. The court will address each challenged plaintiff seperately.
i. Deborah Gdovin Defendant contends that Gdovin has been receiving disability benefits from Social Security and is thus not able to work and unqualified for the position. She began receiving benefits November 1, 2004. Plaintiffs respond that Gdovin is eligible to recover for any time period in which she could work, and therefore should
29

not have summary judgment granted against her. They also point out that this argument is more about the amount of damages than whether plaintiff can recover at all.
The court agrees with the plaintiffs. While Plaintiff Gdovin may not be eligible for a great deal of compensation, a jury could nevertheless find that she had been the victim of discrimination as a result of defendant’s plant reorganization. Gdovin could prove that she suffered some damages, and a jury could reasonably determine the amount she is owed. The court will deny summary judgment against this plaintiff.
ii. Laura Figeuroa Defendant argues that Plaintiff Laura Figeuroa has been totally disabled and unable to work since October 2006. She therefore is not qualified for the position and cannot prevail. Plaintiffs respond in the same way that they do for Gdovin. For the same reasons as with Plaintiff Gdovin, the court denies summary judgment on these grounds.
iii. Lori Zielinski Defendant argues that Zielinski’s interests are adverse to those of the other plaintiffs and she therefore cannot recover. She received an MLO position based on her skills, and therefore any other alternative proposed by plaintiffs would harm her, and she therefore cannot be part of the litigation. Plaintiff points out that Zielinski was subject to gender-based harassment and discrimination both before and after
30

receiving the MLO position. After she received the MLO job, she was asked to train other employees she feared would eventually take her job. She was criticized for seeking more training in order to prevent this job loss and felt discriminated against. Zeilinski was placed on layoff status with no recall date and took severance pay rather than risk having nothing. She has therefore, plaintiff asserts, presented facts to survive summary judgment.
The court finds that plaintiff Zielinski’s interests are not adverse to those of the other plaintiffs, despite the fact that she received one of the MLO positions. She has presented evidence which indicates she was evaluated on the matrix system, one of the sources of discrimination in the case. She also has presented evidence that indicates that her rating on that system at least in part led to her decision to accept a severance package, which changed the nature of her compensation and limited any future benefits. Accordingly, a jury could conclude that she suffered damages from defendant’s discriminatory practices. The court will deny summary judgment against this defendant as well.
iv. Named plaintiffs cannot establish constitutional standing In its reply brief, defendant argues that none of the named individual plaintiffs can establish constitutional standing to bring their claims, a requirement even under the disparate impact theory. Defendant contends that these plaintiffs would not have been qualified to receive the position under the alternative standards proposed by Dr. Saberhagen, and they therefore cannot prevail on this claim.
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The court disagrees. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federalcourt jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). Standing provides “justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The Supreme Court has held that “the standing question in its Art. III aspect is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.’” Id. at 38 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (1975)). The Court has described three elements that comprise the “irreducable constitutional minimum of standing.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A plaintiff must first “have suffered an ‘injury in fact’–an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized [citations omitted] and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Next, the injury suffered by the plaintiff must by causally connected to the conduct of which the plaintiff complains: “the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’” Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42). Finally, “it must be ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
32

decision.’” Id. (quoting Id. at 38, 43). Here, defendant argues that a number of the individual plaintiffs would not
have been qualified for their positions under any of the alternatives proposed by the plaintiffs. As such, they can show neither that they were injured by the allegedly discriminatory practices nor that their injury would be redressed by the solutions the plaintiffs seek. The court finds standing exists on the disparate impact claim even for those plaintiffs who would not be qualified for positions on the EEOC’s proposed alternatives. First, the injury claimed by all of the plaintiffs is gender-based employment discrimination. The court has concluded that these plaintiffs could prevail under a disparate treatment claim. The disparate impact theory is another way of proving that the matrix enshrined discrimination. These plaintiffs could prove that the matrix system cost them their jobs. If a jury believed that the matrix system was not a legitimate business measure, they would certainly be able to show an injury and plaintiffs would not need to demonstrate a less discriminatory alternative to prevail. Since the court has found that plaintiffs could prevail on that theory, summary judgment is inappropriate on the disparate impact claim. A jury could, of course, conclude that some of the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages if that jury found that plaintiffs could only prevail on an “equally effective alternative” theory. Since the court has found that the plaintiffs could prevail on either of two grounds on their disparate impact claim, however, summary judgment is inappropriate on the claim at this time.
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V. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
will be denied. An appropriate order follows.
34

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

: No. 06cv1246

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

:

ARLENE ANDERSON,

: (Judge Munley)

CAROLYN BLOCKUS,

:

LAURA FIGUEROA,

:

DEBORAH GDOVIN,

:

PATRICIA PAVALONIS, and

:

YVONNE PRYWARA,

:

Plaintiffs

:

:

:

v.

:

:

SCHOTT NORTH AMERICA, INC. :

Defendant

:

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

ORDER

AND NOW, to wit, this 29th day of September 2008, the defendant’s motion

for summary judgment (Doc. 42) is hereby DENIED.

BY THE COURT
s/ James M. Munley Judge James M. Munley UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

35

 
 Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION, ET. AL.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SCHOTT NORTH AMERICA,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Civil Action No. 06-1246

CONSENT DECREE

INTRODUCTION

A. This action was instituted by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (the "EEOC" or the "Commission") on or about June 22, 2006, against SCHOTT

North America, Inc. ("Defendant" or "SCHOTT"), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Title VII"). The Commission alleged that due

to a discriminatory layoff process, Defendant unfairly selected Charging Parties Arlene

Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavolonis, Yvonne

Prywara and a class of female employees for layoff based on their gender. SCHOTT has denied

the allegations of the Complaint, and maintains that Charging Parties were laid for legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons unrelated to their gender.

B. This Consent Decree is entered into by the EEOC and Defendant. This Consent

Decree shall be final and binding between the EEOC and Defendant, its directors, officers,

agents, and successors or assigns. The non-monetary relief injunctive provisions of this Consent

Decree apply only to Defendant's Duryea, Pennsylvania facility.

C. The Commission and Defendant do hereby agree to the entry of this Consent
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Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 2 of 14

Decree, which shall fully and finally resolve all claims which were raised by the EEOC in its

Complaint in Civil Action No. 06-CV-1246. · This Consent Decree shall not constitute an

adjudication of or finding on the merits of the case and shall not be construed as a violation of

Title VII by Defendant.

CONSENT DECREE

Upon consent of the parties to this action, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and

DECREED that:

NON-DISCRIMINATION AND NON-RETALIATION

I. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action.

2. Defendant shall not engage in any employment practice which constitutes

unlawful discrimination under Title VII.

3. Defendant shall not engage in any employment practices which retaliate in any

manner against any person, including but not limited to, Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus,

Deborah Gdovin, Laura Figueroa, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, and the remaining class

of five (5) individuals identified in Exhibit I, because of that person's opposition to any practice

believed to be unlawful under Title VII, or because of the filing of a charge, the giving of

testimony or assistance, or the participation in any manner in any investigation, hearing or

proceeding under Title VII.

4.

Defendant shall not divulge, except as required by law, to any employer or

potential employer of Charging Parties Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa,

Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavolonis, Yvonne Prywara, and the remaining class of five (5)

individuals as identified in Exhibit I, any of the facts or circumstances related to the charges of

2

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 3 of 14
discrimination against Defendant, or any of the events relating to their participation m the litigation of this matter.
5. Defendant represents that the personnel files of Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Deborah Gdovin, Laura Figueroa, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara and the remaining class of five (5) individuals as identified in Exhibit I, do not contain any documents, pleadings, correspondence and related papers referencing the charges of discrimination filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Deborah Gdovin, Laura Figueroa, Patricia Pavalonis, and Yvonne Prywara.
6. Defendant shall comply fully with all provisions of Title VII. Nothing in this Consent Decree, either by inclusion or exclusion, shall be construed to limit the obligations of Defendant under Title VII or the EEOC's authority to process or litigate any charge of discrimination which may be filed against Defendant in the future.
MONETARY RELIEF 7. Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief in the total amount of $1,450,000 (one million fonr hundred fifty thousand dollars) to the class of eleven (II) individuals identified at Exhibit I. The individual monetary amounts to be paid to each individual will be distributed among the claimants in accordance with the agreement between the EEOC and Defendant. Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Arlene Anderson ("Anderson") in full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's complaint. SCHOTT will issue checks to Ms. Anderson and her counsel within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to Arlene Anderson, through her attorney Peter Winebrake, Esq., The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Twining Office Center, Suite 114, 715 Twining Road, Dresher, PA 19025, by certified mail, return receipt requested.
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Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 4 of 14
Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC, Philadelphia District Office, 80 I Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to Anderson.
Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Carolyn Blockus ("Blockus") in full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's complaint. SCHOTT will issue checks to Ms. Blockus and her counsel within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to Carolyn Blockus, through her attorney Peter Winebrake, Esq., The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Twining Office Center, Suite 114, 715 Twining Road, Dresher, PA 19025, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC, Philadelphia District Office, 801 Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to Blockus.
Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Deborah Gdovin ("Gdovin") in full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's complaint. SCHOTT will issue checks to Ms. Gdovin and her counsel within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to Deborah Gdovin, through her attorney Peter Winebrake, Esq., The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Twining Office Center, Suite 114, 715 Twining Road, Dresher, PA 19025, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC, Philadelphia District Office, 801 Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to Gdovin.
Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Laura Figueroa ("Figueroa") in full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's complaint.
4

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 5 of 14
SCHOTT will issue checks to Ms. Figueroa and her counsel within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to Laura Figueroa, through her attorney Peter Winebrake, Esq., The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Twining Office Center, Suite 114, 715 Twining Road, Dresher, PA 19025, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC, Philadelphia District Office, 801 Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to Figueroa.
Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Patricia Pavalonis ("Pavalonis") m full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's complaint. SCHOTT will issue checks to Ms. Pavalonis and her counsel within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to Patricia Pavalonis, through her attorney Peter Winebrake, Esq., The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Twining Office Center, Suite 114, 715 Twining Road, Dresher, PA 19025, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC, Philadelphia District Office, 80 I Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to Pavalonis.
Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Yvonne Prywara ("Prywara") m full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's complaint. SCHOTT will issue checks to Ms. Prywara and her counsel within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to Yvonne Prywara, through her attorney Peter Winebrake, Esq., The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Twining Office Center, Suite 114, 715 Twining Road, Dresher, PA 19025, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade,
5

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 6 of 14
Trial Attorney, EEOC, Philadelphia District Office, 801 Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to Prywara.
THE CLASS 8. Defendant agrees to pay monetary reliefto the remaining class of five (5) individuals as
identified in Exhibit I, in full settlement of the claims against Defendant which were raised in the Commission's Complaint. SCHOTT will issue checks to the remaining class of five (5) individuals as identified in Exhibit I within twenty-one (21) days, following filing of the Consent Decree. The checks will be mailed to each class member to addresses provided by the EEOC. Defendant will mail a photocopy of each check to the EEOC, to the attention of Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC Philadelphia District Office, 801 Market St., Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19107, within five (5) days of the date of mailing of the checks to each class member.
POSTING OF NOTICE 9. Within ten (10) business days after entry of this Decree, or as soon as practicable, Defendant shall post same-sized copies of the Notice attached as Exhibit 2 to this Decree on all bulletin boards located at its Duryea, PA facility, usually used by Defendant for communicating with employees. The notice shall remain posted for three (3) years from the date of entry of this Decree. Counsel for Defendant shall provide a copy of the Notice, and an indication of the date and location of its posting, to the EEOC's Philadelphia District Office, attention, Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, within ten (10) days of the posting. Defendant shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the posting is not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Should the posted copies become defaced, removed, marred, or otherwise illegible, Defendant agrees to as soon as practicable post a readable copy in the same manner as hereto specified.
6

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 7 of 14
NON-DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES AND COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
I0. Defendant's policy or policies against sex discrimination, and complaint procedures shall be drafted in plain and simple language. Defendant shall ensure that its policy or policies against sex discrimination, and related complaint procedures meet the following minimum criteria:
(a) State that Defendant: (i) prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of sex; and (ii) prohibits any act, policy or practice that has the effect of treating employees differently on the basis of their sex in violation of Title VII;
(b) Include a complaint procedure designed to encourage employees to come forward with complaints regarding violations of its policy or policies against sex discrimination, which shall meet the following minimum criteria: (i) provide effective mechanism(s) for reporting incidents of sex discrimination; (ii) provide that the complaints of sex discrimination can be made either in writing or verbally; (iii) identify employees to whom an employee can make a complaint; (iv) encourage prompt reporting by employees; and (v) provide assurances that complainants shall not be subjected to retaliation;
(c) Provide for prompt investigation of complaints of sex discrimination; (d) Provide for prompt communication to the complaining party of the results of the investigation and any remedial actions taken or proposed; and (e) Provide for discipline up to and including discharge of any employee or supervisor who violates Defendant's policy or policies against discrimination, and for increasingly severe discipline of repeat offenders.
7

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 8 of 14
11. Defendant shall distribute to all of its employees and newly-hired employees at its Duryea, PA facility, its policy or policies against sex discrimination within 90 days after entry of this Consent Decree.
12. Within 90 days after entry of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall advise Woody Anglade, Trial Attorney, EEOC's Philadelphia District Office, that its policy or policies against sex discrimination have been distributed to current employees and that new employees will receive these policies and an opportunity to acknowledge receipt. Defendant will retain copies of any acknowledgment ofreceipt form for an employee in the employee's personnel file.
13. Defendant shall once annually for the duration of the Consent Decree provide a copy of its policy or policies against sex discrimination to each employee.
SUPERVISOR ACCOUNTABILITY 14. Defendant shall promote supervisor accountability by the following conduct: (a) Providing anti-discrimination training to all of its supervisory and managerial personnel as set forth in Paragraph 15; (b) Disciplining, up to and including discharge, any supervisor or manager who violates Defendant's policy or policies against sex discrimination; (c) Imposing on all managers and supervisory personnel a duty to administer their work areas to ensure compliance with Defendant's policy or policies against sex discrimination; and (d) Requiring all managers and supervisors to report any incidents and/or complaints of sex discrimination of which they become aware to the Defendant's Human Resources Department located at the Duryea, Pennsylvania facility.
8

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 9 of 14
TRAINING 15. Defendant shall provide training on the requirements of Title VII on the following terms: (a) Defendant agrees to provide annual training sessions to all of its managers and supervisors who work at its Duryea, PA facility. The training will cover employee rights and employer obligations under Title VII. (b) Defendant shall provide training in accordance with Paragraph 15 (a) by December 31, 2009. Defendant shall then also provide such training on at least one occasion in calendar years 20 I0 and 20 11. 16. In addition to the training described in Paragraph 15, Defendant will provide training to all employees and supervisors in its Human Resources Department at its Duryea, PA facility, regarding conducting a prompt and effective investigation into allegations, complaints, or charges of sex discrimination. 17. Defendant agrees to provide the EEOC with any and all copies of pamphlets, brochures, outlines or other written materials provided to the participants of the training sessions. 18. Defendant shall certify to the EEOC in writing within five (5) business days after the training sessions have occurred that the training has taken place and that the required personnel have attended. Such certification shall include: (i) the dates, location and duration of the training session; and (ii) a copy of the registry of attendance, which shall include the name and position of each person in attendance.
RECORD KEEPING 19. For a period of three (3) years following entry of this Decree, Defendant shall
9

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 10 of 14
maintain records of each complaint of any incident of sex discrimination occurring at its Duryea, PA facility. Each such report shall indicate the date the complaint was made, who made it, what was alleged, and what actions the Defendant took to resolve the matter. The Defendant shall also make records of all actions it takes to prevent sex discrimination at its Duryea, PA facility during the duration of this Decree.
20. Nothing contained in this Decree shall be construed to limit any obligation Defendant may otherwise have under Title VII or any other law or regulation.
REPORTING 21. Defendant shall furnish to the EEOC the following written reports annually for a period of three (3) years following entry of this Decree. The first report shall be due twelve (12) months after entry of the Decree. The final report shall be due thirty-six (36) months after entry of the Decree. Each such report shall contain: A certification by Defendant that the Notice required to be posted in Paragraph 9, above, remained posted during the entire twelve (12) month period preceding the report.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 22. ln the event that either party to this Decree believes that the other party has failed to comply with any provision(s) of the Decree, the complaining party shall notify the other party of the alleged non-compliance within ten (10) days of the alleged non-compliance and shall afford the alleged non-complying party ten (10) business days to remedy the non-compliance or to satisfy the complaining party that the alleged non-complying party has complied. If the alleged non-complying party has not remedied the alleged non-compliance within ten (I 0) business days, the complaining party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief.
10

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 11 of 14
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 23. Each party to this Decree shall bear its own expenses, costs and attorneys' fees. 24. The terms of this Decree are and shall be binding upon the present and future agents, directors, ot1icers, assigns, and successors of Defendant in their capacities as agents, directors and officers of Defendant, and not in their individual capacities. This Paragraph shall not be construed as placing any limit on remedies available to the Court in the event that any individual is found to be in contempt for a violation of this Decree. 25. This Consent Decree shall fully and finally resolve all claims which were raised by the EEOC in its Complaint in Civil Action No. 06-CV-1246. 26. This Consent Decree shall be filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and shall continue to be in effect for a period of three (3) years. Any application by any party to modify or vacate this Consent Decree during such period shall be made by motion to the Court on no less than thirty (30) days notice to the other party. 27. The Court retains jurisdiction over this case in order to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree. 28. The Clerk of the District Court is hereby directed to send a file-stamped copy of this Consent Decree to counsel of record.
II

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 12 of 14

For Plaintiff EEOC:
James L. Lee Deputy General Counsel
Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel
Washington, D.C.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
)fiblh.~{~
Debra Lawrence Acting Regional Attorney
~f1' ·V/~,( udith A. O'Boyle Supervisory Trial Attorney

Schott North America:
ers, Esquire Ecke Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC 600 Grant Street, 44th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Allison L. F stein, Esquire Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC 600 Grant Street, 44th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219

IT IS ORDERED:
I
BY THE COURT: ./_J~~~~~~~r=~~
DGE

DATE:~f

I2

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 13 of 14

CLAIMANT 1) Arlene Anderson 2) Carolyn Blockus 3) Deborah Gdovin 4) Laura Figueroa 5) Patricia Pavalonis 6) Yvonne Prywara 7) Jean Donovan 8) Sally Guzik 9) Margaret Moran 10) Linda Stoss 11) Lori Zielinski

EXHIBIT 1

13

Case 3:06-cv-01246-JMM Document 140 Filed 06/12/09 Page 14 of 14

EXHIBIT2

NOTICE TO ALL SCHOTT EMPLOYEES

This Notice is being posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered by the Federal Court in EEOC, et al., v. SCHOTT North America, Civil Action Number 06-1246 (M.D. PA.), resolving a lawsuit filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") against SCHOTT North America ("Defendant" or "SCHOTT").

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, ~ ~, as amended, ("Title VII"), prohibits discrimination against employees and applicants for employment based upon race, color, sex, religion or national origin. Title VII further prohibits retaliation against employees or applicants who avail themselves of their rights under Title VII by engaging in protected activities, such as opposing employment practices believed to be discriminatory, filing a charge of discrimination and/or testifying or participating in a Commission investigation. The EEOC is a federal agency which investigates charges of employment discrimination. The EEOC has authority to bring lawsuits in Federal Court to enforce Title VII.

In its lawsuit, the Commission alleged that SCHOTT violated Title VII. Schott has consistently denied these allegations.

To resolve the case, EEOC and the Defendant have entered into a Consent Decree which provided, among other things, that: (I) SCHOTT will not discriminate on the basis of sex; and (2) SCHOTT will train all employees at its Duryea, PA facility, regarding sex discrimination and Defendant's policy prohibiting sex discrimination.

If you have questions, or if you would like to report discrimination in the workplace, contact SCHOTT's Duryea, Pennsylvania Human Resources Department.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE

This Notice must remain posted for three (3) years from the date below and must

not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions about this

Notice or compliance with its terms may be directed to the: Regional Attorney,

EEOC Philadelphia District Office, 801 Market Street, Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA

19107,

By: 1J1i2_r0.-~ ~~) By:

For: Equal Employment Opportunity

For: SCHOTT North America

Commission

14

 
 Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 1 of 14
CLOSED,MEDSNR,MM,SCR
United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania (Scranton) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:06−cv−01246−JMM

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Schott North America, Inc. Assigned to: Honorable James M. Munley Cause: 42:1981 Sex Discrimination
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/22/2006 Date Terminated: 05/06/2009 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Cynthia A. Locke Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Philadelphia District Office The Bourse, 21 South 5th Street Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106 215−440−2683 Fax: 215−440−2848 Email: cynthia.locke@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Judith A. O'Boyle Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 21 South 5th Street Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19106−2515 215−440−2669 Fax: 215−440−2674 Email: Judith.oboyle@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter D. Winebrake Winebrake & Santillo, LLC Twining Office Center Suite 211 715 Twining Rd Dresher, PA 19025 215−884−2491 Fax: 215−884−2492 Email: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Marino U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 801 Market Street Penthouse Suite 1300 Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−440−2841 Email: stephanie.marino@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Woody Anglade US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 801 Market Street Suite 1300

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 2 of 14
Philadelphia, PA 19107 215−440−2814 Email: woody.anglade@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Intervenor Plaintiff Arlene Anderson
Intervenor Plaintiff Carolyn Blockus

represented by Kathryn C. Harr Trujillo Rodriguez & Richards, LLC 1717 Arch Street Suite 3838 Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−731−9004 Email: kharr@trrlaw.com TERMINATED: 01/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick E. Dougherty Dougherty, Levanthal & Price 459 Wyoming Avenue Kingston, PA 18704 570−288−1427 Fax: 2880799 Email: ped625@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D. Winebrake (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R. Andrew Santillo The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC Twining Office Center Suite 211 715 Twining Road Dresher, PA 19025 215−884−2491 Email: asantillo@winebrakelaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean P. McDonough Dougherty, Leventhal & Price, L.L.P. 75 Glenmaura National Boulevard Moosic, PA 18507 570−347−1011 Fax: 570−347−7028 Email: smcdonough@dlplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kathryn C. Harr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick E. Dougherty

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 3 of 14

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter D. Winebrake (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Santillo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean P. McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Laura Figueroa

represented by Kathryn C. Harr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick E. Dougherty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter D. Winebrake (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Santillo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean P. McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Deborah Gdovin

represented by Kathryn C. Harr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick E. Dougherty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter D. Winebrake (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Santillo

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 4 of 14

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean P. McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Patricia Pavalonis

represented by Kathryn C. Harr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick E. Dougherty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter D. Winebrake (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Santillo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean P. McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor Plaintiff Yvonne Prywara

represented by Kathryn C. Harr (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick E. Dougherty (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter D. Winebrake (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Andrew Santillo (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean P. McDonough (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 5 of 14

V. Defendant Schott North America, Inc.
Mediator Mediator TERMINATED: 12/13/2006

represented by Allison L. Feldstein Saul Ewing LLP One PPG Place Suite 3010 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 412−209−2533 Fax: 412−209−2595 Email: afeldstein@saul.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Myers Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott 600 Grant Street 44th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412−566−5900 Fax: 14125666099 Email: jmyers@eckertseamans.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Judith E. Harris Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP 1701 Market St. Philadelphia, PA 19103 215−963−5028 Email: jeharris@morganlewis.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth A. Maguschak McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC 100 Pine St PO Box 1166 Harrisburg, PA 17108 717.237.5406 Email: emagusch@mwn.com TERMINATED: 12/14/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/22/2006
06/22/2006 06/29/2006 07/27/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Schott North America, Inc. , filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(kn, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
Summons Issued as to Schott North America, Inc. and provided to Attorney Locke for service on Defendant(s). (kn, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
2 LETTER ORDER Re: Case Assignment and Procedures Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 6/29/06. (sm, ) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
3 MOTION to Intervene by Arlene Anderson, Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Item 1 − Part 1# 4 Item 1 − Part 2# 5 Item 2# 6 Certificate of Service# 7 Proposed Order)(Harr, Kathryn) (Entered: 07/27/2006)

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 6 of 14

07/28/2006
08/01/2006 08/21/2006
08/28/2006 08/29/2006 08/29/2006 08/29/2006 08/30/2006 08/30/2006 08/30/2006
08/30/2006
08/30/2006 09/12/2006 09/19/2006 09/28/2006
09/29/2006
10/06/2006
10/06/2006 10/11/2006 11/21/2006 11/24/2006

4 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara re 3 MOTION to Intervene. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Item 1 (Part 1) to Exhibit A# 3 Item 1 (Part 2) to Exhibit A# 4 Item 2 to Exhibit A)(Harr, Kathryn) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
SPECIAL ADMISSION FORM SENT to Kathryn Harr, Esquire. (jc) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Schott North America, Inc. served on 7/7/2006, answer due 7/27/2006. (Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by John J. Myers on behalf of Schott North America, Inc. (Myers, John) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
7 ANSWER to Complaint by Schott North America, Inc..(Myers, John) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
8 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRCP 7.1. (Myers, John) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
9 RESPONSE by Schott North America, Inc. to Motion to Intervene. (Myers, John) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
Document 10 deleted; To be refiled (sm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
10 ORDER granting 3 Motion to Intervene Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 8/30/06 (sm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
11 Intervenor COMPLAINT , filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara against Intervenor Dft Schott North America, Inc..(sm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
12 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephonic Case Management Conference set for 10/5/2006 11:30 AM in Scranton before Honorable James M. Munley.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 8/30/06. (sm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
13 STANDING ORDER #1 Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 8/30/06. (sm, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Judith E. Harris on behalf of Schott North America, Inc. (Harris, Judith) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
15 ANSWER to Intervenor Complaint by Schott North America, Inc..(Myers, John) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
16 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Allison L. Feldstein on behalf of Schott North America, Inc. Attorney Allison L. Feldstein is seeking special admission. Filing Fee: 25.00 Receipt Number: 333 107984. (ga, ) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
17 CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN JOINT by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Harr, Kathryn) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
18 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: Discovery due by 3/31/2007. Motions due by 5/20/2007. Pltf expert reports due 4/30/07; Dft expert reports due 5/31/07Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 10/6/06. (sm, ) (Entered: 10/06/2006)
19 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Allison L. FeldsteinSigned by Judge James M. Munley on 10/6/06. (sm, ) (Entered: 10/06/2006)
20 ORDER REFERRING CASE to MAndatory Mediation. Elizabeth A. Maguschak added.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 10/11/06. (sm, ) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
21 Letter from Mediator Elizabeth Maguschak seeking additional time in which to conduct court−ordered mediation. (joeb) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
22 ORDER GRANTING 21 Letter request for extension of time until 12/15/06 to complete mediation.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 11/24/06. (sm, ) (Entered:

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 7 of 14

12/13/2006 01/11/2007 01/12/2007 01/12/2007 01/12/2007 01/12/2007 01/18/2007 01/29/2007 01/30/2007 03/01/2007 03/12/2007 03/13/2007
05/21/2007 05/22/2007
07/16/2007 07/17/2007
09/21/2007 09/25/2007 11/01/2007

11/24/2006)
23 REPORT OF MEDIATOR (Settlement Not Reached) (Maguschak, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/13/2006)
24 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
Left message with Atty. Cynthia Locke, to re−file "Brief in Support" to Motion to Amend as a seperate document. (ga, ) (Entered: 01/12/2007)
25 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 24 First MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/12/2007)
26 ORDER granting 24 Pltf's Motion to Amend/Correct the Complaint.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 1/12/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
27 AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(sm, ) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
28 NOTICE of Change of Address by Peter D. Winebrake (Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/18/2007)
29 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Schott North America, Inc..(Myers, John) (Entered: 01/29/2007)
30 WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE − Attorney Kathryn C. Harr terminated on behalf of Intervenor Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Harr, Kathryn) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
31 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Judith A. O'Boyle on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Attorney Judith O'Boyle is seeking special admission.. (ga, ) (Entered: 03/01/2007)
32 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by all parties and by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Myers, John) (Entered: 03/12/2007)
33 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Discovery due by 5/31/2007. Dispositive motions due 7/20/07; Pltf expert reports due 6/30/07 ; DFt expert reports due 7/31/07.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 3/13/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
34 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
35 ORDER granting 34 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Discovery due by 7/31/2007. Dispositive motions due 8/20/07; Pltf expert reports due 8/30/07; Dft expert reports due 9/30/07Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 5/22/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
36 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
37 ORDER granting 36 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Discovery due by 9/15/2007. Dispositive motions due 10/5/07; Pltf expert reports due 10/15/07; DFt expert reports due 11/14/07Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 7/17/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 07/17/2007)
38 MOTION for Extension of Time to of Pretrial Scheduling Deadlines of All Parties by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 09/21/2007)
39 ORDER granting 38 Motion to Extend Deadlines. Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 9/25/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 09/25/2007)
40 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Summary Judgment Briefing by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered:

Case: 3:06-cv-1246 As of: 06/19/2018 03:22 PM EDT 8 of 14

11/02/2007 11/05/2007 11/05/2007 11/05/2007
11/05/2007 11/13/2007 11/14/2007 11/16/2007 11/19/2007 11/28/2007
12/12/2007
12/12/2007 12/13/2007 12/14/2007
01/02/2008 01/03/2008 01/03/2008

11/01/2007)
41 ORDER granting 40 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 11/2/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 11/02/2007)
42 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
43 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
44 APPENDIX by Schott North America, Inc.. to 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1# 2 Exhibit(s) 2# 3 Exhibit(s) 3# 4 Exhibit(s) 4# 5 Exhibit(s) 5# 6 Exhibit(s) 6# 7 Exhibit(s) 7# 8 Exhibit(s) 8# 9 Exhibit(s) 9# 10 Exhibit(s) 10# 11 Exhibit(s) 11# 12 Exhibit(s) 12# 13 Exhibit(s) 13# 14 Exhibit(s) 14# 15 Exhibit(s) 15# 16 Exhibit(s) 16# 17 Exhibit(s) 17# 18 Exhibit(s) 18# 19 Exhibit(s) 19# 20 Exhibit(s) 20# 21 Exhibit(s) 21# 22 Exhibit(s) 22# 23 Exhibit(s) 23# 24 Exhibit(s) 24# 25 Exhibit(s) 25# 26 Exhibit(s) 26)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
45 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
46 MOTION for Extension of Time to For Deadlines for Expert Reports by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence# 2 Proposed Order)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
47 ORDER granting 46 Motion to Extend Time −pltf expert reports due 11/16/07; Dft expert reports due 12/18/07 Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 11/14/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 11/14/2007)
48 MOTION for Extension of Time to for Expert Reports by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 11/16/2007)
49 ORDER granting 48 Motion to Extend Time to file expert reports − pltf due 11/19/07; dft due 12/19/07. Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 11/19/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
50 MOTION for Extension of Time to for the Submission of a Supplemental Expert Report by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 11/28/2007)
51 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
52 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
53 Proposed Order. (McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
54 ORDER granting 51 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment ;and granting 52 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Brief in Opposition due by 1/10/2008 Reply Brief due by 1/31/2008.Signed by Judge James M. Munley on 12/14/07 (sm, ) (Entered: 12/14/2007)
55 Second MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Summary Judgment Response Brief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Concurrence, # 2 Proposed Order)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/02/2008)
56 ORDER granting 55 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/3/08 (sm, ) (Entered: 01/03/2008)
57 ANSWER TO STATEMENT OF FACTS or, Statement of Material Facts in Dispute filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, #

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01/03/2008 01/10/2008
01/11/2008

2 Part 1 of Expert Report, # 3 Expert Report Part 2, # 4 Exhibit(s) Ex. 2, Part 1 of Hall Deposition, # 5 Exhibit(s) Ex. 2, Part 2 of Hall Deposition, # 6 Exhibit(s) Ex. 3, Deposition of Michael Kepich, # 7 Exhibit(s) Ex. 4, Part 1, McLean Deposition, # 8 Exhibit(s) Ex. 4, Part 2 of McLean Deposition, # 9 Exhibit(s) Ex. 5, Arlene Anderson's Charge of Discrimination, # 10 Exhibit(s) Ex. 5, Part 1 of Luder Deposition, # 11 Exhibit(s) Ex. 5, Part 2 of Luder Deposition, # 12 Exhibit(s) Ex. 6, Deposition of Patricia Pavalonis, # 13 Exhibit(s) Ex. 7, Deposition of Laura Figeuroa, # 14 Exhibit(s) Ex. 8, Part 1 of Donovan Deposition, # 15 Exhibit(s) Ex. 8, Part 2 of Donovan Deposition, # 16 Exhibit(s) Ex. 9, Deposition of Yvonne Prywara, # 17 Exhibit(s) Ex. 10, Part 1 of Evans Deposition, # 18 Exhibit(s) Ex. 10, Part 2 of Evans Deposition, # 19 Exhibit(s) Ex. 11, Part 1 of Stoss Deposition, # 20 Exhibit(s) Ex. 11, Part 2 of Stoss Deposition, # 21 Exhibit(s) Ex. 12, Deposition of Bebe Yuhas, # 22 Exhibit(s) Ex. 13, Deposition of Michelle Korpusik, # 23 Exhibit(s) Ex. 14, Deposition of Ernhart Pankratz, # 24 Exhibit(s) Ex. 14, Part 2 of Pankratz Deposition, # 25 Exhibit(s) Ex. 15, Deposition of Nicholas Pace, # 26 Exhibit(s) Ex. 16, Part 1 of Krenitsky Deposition, # 27 Exhibit(s) Ex. 16, Part 2 of Krenitsky Deposition, # 28 Exhibit(s) Ex. 17, Deposition of James Mazonis, # 29 Exhibit(s) Ex. 18, Part 1 of Krafchak Deposition, # 30 Exhibit(s) Ex. 18, Part 2 of Krafchak Deposition, # 31 Exhibit(s) Ex. 19, Deposition of Robert Brody, # 32 Exhibit(s) Ex. 20, Part 1 of Berkoski Deposition, # 33 Exhibit(s) Ex. 20, Part 2 of Berkoski Deposition, # 34 Exhibit(s) Ex. 21, Part 1 of Nicks Deposition, # 35 Exhibit(s) Ex. 21, Part 2 of Nicks Deposition, # 36 Exhibit(s) Ex. 22, Deposition of Thomas Surdouski, # 37 Exhibit(s) Ex. 23, Deposition of Arlene Anderson, # 38 Exhibit(s) Ex. 24, Deposition of Carolyn Blockus, # 39 Exhibit(s) Ex. 25, Deposition of Sally Guzik, # 40 Exhibit(s) Ex. 25, Part 2 of Guzik Deposition, # 41 Exhibit(s) Ex. 26, Deposition of Margaret Moran, # 42 Exhibit(s) Ex. 27, Melting Line Operator Bid Awards, # 43 Exhibit(s) Ex. 28, Deposition of Phillip Burkel, # 44 Exhibit(s) Ex. 29, Deposition of Sandy Herman, # 45 Exhibit(s) Ex. 30, Deposition of Mary Ellen Pajor, # 46 Exhibit(s) Ex. 31, Employee Profile Sheet for Jean Donovan, # 47 Exhibit(s) Ex. 32, Deposition of Lori Zeilinski, # 48 Exhibit(s) Ex. 33, Deposition of Robert Zeilinski, # 49 Exhibit(s) Ex. 34, Deposition of Deborah Gdovin, # 50 Exhibit(s) Ex. 35, Melting Line Operator Bid of Jean Donovan, # 51 Exhibit(s) Ex. 36, Reponse to EEOC's Interrogatory No. 12, # 52 Exhibit(s) Ex. 37, Skills Matrix Used for Selection of MLOs, # 53 Exhibit(s) Ex. 38, Skills Matrix with Divisions, # 54 Exhibit(s) Ex. 39, Individual Skills Matrix for Phillip Burkel, # 55 Exhibit(s) Ex. 40, Errata Sheet for Stoss Deposition, # 56 Exhibit(s) Ex. 41, Melting Line Operator Bid Application for Donovan, # 57 Errata Ex. 42, Memo from Pajor on Training, # 58 Exhibit(s) Ex. 43, Agreement Between Schott and Union, # 59 Exhibit(s) Ex. 43A, Announcement signed by Earl Hall, # 60 Exhibit(s) Ex. 44, Jean Donovan Layoff Notice, # 61 Exhibit(s) Ex. 45, Pajor Memo to Shift Foreman, # 62 Exhibit(s) Ex. 46, Documents from Lori Zeilinski Personnel File, # 63 Exhibit(s) Ex. 47, Memo from Lori Zeilinski, # 64 Exhibit(s) Ex. 48, Employee Profile Sheet for Lori Zeilinski, # 65 Exhibit(s) Ex. 49, Employee Profile Sheet for James Burt, # 66 Exhibit(s) Ex. 50, Employee Profile Sheet for Richard Evans, # 67 Exhibit(s) Ex. 51, Deposition Transcript of James Hunt, # 68 Exhibit(s) Ex. 52, Affidavit of McDonough Boylan, # 69 Exhibit(s) Exhibit S−Fn. 2 to Seberhagen Report, Ex. 1, # 70 Exhibit(s) Ex. S−Fn.3 to Seberhagen Report, Ex. 1)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/03/2008)
58 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Table of Authorities, # 2 Table of Contents, # 3 Certificate of Service, # 4 Certificate of Word Count, # 5 Proposed Order)(Locke, Cynthia) (Entered: 01/03/2008)
59 STATEMENT OF FACTS re 43 Statement of Facts −− INTERVENOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNTERSTATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Service, # 2 Exhibit(s) IP−1, # 3 Exhibit(s) IP−2, # 4 Exhibit(s) IP−3, # 5 Exhibit(s) IP−4, # 6 Exhibit(s) IP−5, # 7 Exhibit(s) IP−6, # 8 Exhibit(s) IP−7, # 9 Exhibit(s) IP−8, # 10 Exhibit(s) IP−9, # 11 Exhibit(s) IP−10, # 12 Exhibit(s) IP−11)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/10/2008)
60 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Service)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/11/2008)

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01/25/2008 01/28/2008 01/29/2008 02/01/2008 02/07/2008 02/19/2008 02/20/2008 02/21/2008 04/16/2008
05/05/2008 05/05/2008 05/19/2008
09/29/2008 10/24/2008 11/02/2008 11/04/2008 12/30/2008

61 MOTION for Extension of Time to to Reply to Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/25/2008)
62 Amended MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply to Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/28/2008)
63 ORDER granting 62 Concurred Motion for Extension of Time to File reply − due 2/21/08.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/29/08 (sm, ) (Entered: 01/29/2008)
64 PETITION FOR SPECIAL ADMISSION (PRO HAC VICE) by Stephanie Marino on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Attorney Stephanie Marino is seeking special admission. Filing fee $ 25. (Marino, Stephanie) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
65 SPECIAL ADMISSIONS FORM APPROVED as to Stephanie MarinoSigned by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/7/08. (sm, ) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
66 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Summary Judgment Reply by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
67 ORDER granting 66 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/20/08 (sm, ) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
68 BRIEF IN SUPPORT (Reply Brief in Support) re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Attachments)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 02/21/2008)
69 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment : Motion Hearing set for 5/19/2008 10:00 AM in Scranton before Honorable James M. Munley.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 4/16/08. (sm, ) (Entered: 04/16/2008)
Doc #70 filed incorrectly and deleted per attorney. Entry of appearance will be refiled correctly. (ao, ) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
70 NOTICE of Appearance by Patrick E. Dougherty on behalf of Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Dougherty, Patrick) (Entered: 05/05/2008)
72 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by Suzanne Halko of oral argument before Judge James Munley on 5/19/2008. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge James Munley on 5/19/2008. By s/ Suzanne Halko. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr1, ) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
73 MEMORANDUM and ORDER denying 42 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 9/29/08 (sm, ) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
74 SCHEDULING ORDER: Pretrial Conference set for 1/15/2009 10:00 AM in Scranton before Honorable James M. Munley.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 10/24/08. (sm, ) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
75 NOTICE of Appearance by R. Andrew Santillo on behalf of Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara (Santillo, R.) (Entered: 11/02/2008)
76 NOTICE of Appearance by Woody Anglade on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
77 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motions in Limine by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 12/30/2008)

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12/30/2008
12/30/2008
01/06/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009
01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009

78 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Any and All Reference to Lori Zielinski's Alleged Sexual Encounter with Robert Zielinski at Defendant's Worksite by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Exhibit(s) A)(Anglade, Woody) Modified on 1/5/2009 (sm, ). (Entered: 12/30/2008)
79 ORDER granting 77 Motion to extend time to submit motions in Limine. The parties are to submit all motions in limine, including those challenging an expert witness, on or before January 9, 2009. The pre−trial conference is RE−SCHEDULED for January 23, 2009 at 11 a.m.. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 12/30/08 (ga, ) Modified on 1/5/2009 ( doc 78 termed in error)(sm, ). (Entered: 12/30/2008)
80 RESCHEDULING ORDER: Pretrial Conference set for 2/6/2009 11:00 AM in Scranton before Honorable James M. Munley.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/6/09. (sm, ) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
81 MOTION in Limine Re Effect of SSDI Benefits on Damages by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Proposed Order)(Myers, John) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
82 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 81 MOTION in Limine Re Effect of SSDI Benefits on Damages filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Myers, John) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
83 MOTION in Limine re GDOVIN, MORAN & GUZIK by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Proposed Order)(Myers, John) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
84 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 83 MOTION in Limine re GDOVIN, MORAN & GUZIK filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Myers, John) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
85 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Lay Opinion Testimony Regarding the Relative Import of Cold End Tasks by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
86 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 85 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Lay Opinion Testimony Regarding the Relative Import of Cold End Tasks filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
87 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Stray Remarks That Are Not Timely or Are Purportedly Made By Non−Decision Makers by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
88 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 87 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Stray Remarks That Are Not Timely or Are Purportedly Made By Non−Decision Makers filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
89 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of the Sex Discrimination Case of Judith Luder by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
90 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 89 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of the Sex Discrimination Case of Judith Luder filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
91 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Lance Seberhagen by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Appendix 1, # 3 Appendix 2, # 4 Appendix 3, # 5 Appendix 4)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
92 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 91 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Lance Seberhagen filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
93 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation For Brief In Support of Motion to Exclude Testimony of Lance Seberhagen by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
94 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Anecdotal Evidence of Unrelated Incidents of Harassment by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)

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01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/13/2009 01/13/2009 01/21/2009 01/21/2009 01/21/2009
01/21/2009 01/27/2009
01/27/2009
01/29/2009 01/29/2009

95 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 94 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Anecdotal Evidence of Unrelated Incidents of Harassment filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
96 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Third Party Witness Thomas Luder by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
97 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 96 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Third Party Witness Thomas Luder filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
98 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the EEOC Determination Letter by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
99 BRIEF IN SUPPORT re 98 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the EEOC Determination Letter filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
100 MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation For Briefs In Support Of Motions In Limine by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
101 ORDER granting 93 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/12/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 01/13/2009)
102 ORDER granting 100 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 1/12/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 01/13/2009)
103 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 81 MOTION in Limine Re Effect of SSDI Benefits on Damages filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/21/2009)
104 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 83 MOTION in Limine re GDOVIN, MORAN & GUZIK filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/21/2009)
105 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 89 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of the Sex Discrimination Case of Judith Luder filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B, # 4 Exhibit(s) C, # 5 Exhibit(s) D)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/21/2009)
106 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 98 MOTION in Limine to Exclude the EEOC Determination Letter filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/21/2009)
107 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 94 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Anecdotal Evidence of Unrelated Incidents of Harassment filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/27/2009)
108 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 96 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Third Party Witness Thomas Luder filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/27/2009)
109 NOTICE by Schott North America, Inc. re 78 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Any and All Reference to Lori Zielinski's Alleged Sexual Encounter with Robert Zielinski at Defendant's Worksite −−NON−OPPOSITION (Myers, John) (Entered: 01/29/2009)
110 REPLY BRIEF re 83 MOTION in Limine re GDOVIN, MORAN & GUZIK filed by Schott North America, Inc..(Myers, John) (Entered: 01/29/2009)

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01/30/2009 01/30/2009
01/30/2009 01/30/2009 01/30/2009 01/30/2009 01/30/2009 01/31/2009
02/03/2009 02/03/2009 02/03/2009 02/05/2009
02/05/2009

111 Unopposed MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation for Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Lance Seberhagen by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
112 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 87 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Stray Remarks That Are Not Timely or Are Purportedly Made By Non−Decision Makers filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
113 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Defendant's Witness List, # 2 Exhibit(s) Defendant's Exhibit List, # 3 Exhibit(s) Defendant's Proposed Verdict Slip)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
114 Consent MOTION to Exceed Page Limitation re Briefs Docketed as Docket Nos. 107 and 112 by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certification of Concurrence)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
115 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 91 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Lance Seberhagen filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
116 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 91 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Lance Seberhagen filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
117 PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List, # 2 Special Verdict Questions)(Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
118 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re 85 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Lay Opinion Testimony Regarding the Relative Import of Cold End Tasks filed by Arlene Anderson, Carolyn Blockus, Laura Figueroa, Deborah Gdovin, Patricia Pavalonis, Yvonne Prywara, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit(s) A, # 3 Exhibit(s) B, # 4 Exhibit(s) C, # 5 Exhibit(s) D)(Winebrake, Peter) (Entered: 01/31/2009)
119 Exhibit List Supplement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.. (Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
120 ORDER granting 111 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/3/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
121 ORDER granting 114 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/3/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
122 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part parties' motions in limine− GRANTING as unopposed pltf's 78 Motion in Limine re Alleged sexual encounter; granting as unopposed dft's 81 Motion in Limine re SS Disability ; denying dft's 83 Motion in Limine re pltfs Gdovin Moran & Guzik; denying 85 dft's Motion in Limine re lay opinion ; denying dft's 87 Motion in Limine re stray remarks ; granting in part and denying in part dft's 89 Motion in Limine re sexual discrimination case; denying 91 dft's Motion to Exclude testimony of L. Seberhagen; denying dft's 94 Motion in Limine re exclusion of anecdotal evidence of unrelated incidents; denying dft's 96 Motion in Limine re exclusion of tesimony of Thomas Luder; and granting 98 dft's Motion in Limine as unopposed re EEOC determination letter.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/5/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 02/05/2009)
123 MOTION for Extension of Time to to Confer Regarding Trial Exhibits and, MOTION for Extension of Time to File Certificate Pursuant to Local Rule 30.10 by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 02/05/2009)

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02/06/2009 02/06/2009
02/06/2009 02/17/2009 02/27/2009
03/02/2009 03/06/2009
03/06/2009 03/06/2009 03/25/2009 04/21/2009 05/01/2009 05/06/2009 06/10/2009 06/12/2009

124 ORDER granting 123 Motion to Extend Time to confer re trial exhibits and to file Certifcate.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/6/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
125 COURT REPORTER NOTES OF PROCEEDINGS filed by L. Boyanowski of Pretrial Conference before Judge Munley on 2/6/09. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 753(b), I certify that these original notes are a true and correct record of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of PA before Judge Munley on 2/6/09. By s/ L. Boyanowski. (Court Reporter Notes are viewable by court staff only). (cr5, ) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
127 SCHEDULING ORDER: Jury Selection/Trial set for 6/2/2009 09:00 AM in Scranton before Honorable James M. Munley. Pretrial docs due 5/1/09. Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 2/6/09. (sm, ) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
128 Letter from Atty Feldstein re case to proceed to mediation − session scheduled for 3/18/09 in Phila, PA. (sm, ) (Entered: 02/17/2009)
129 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to to Confer Regarding Trial Exhibits and, Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Certificate Pursuant to Local Rule 30.10 by Schott North America, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
130 ORDER granting 129 Motion to Extend Time to confer re trial exhibits and dep transcripts.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 3/2/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
131 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of Allowing Each Plaintiff to Give Their Own Separate Opening & Closing Statements at Trial. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits in Support of Plaintiff EEOC's Motion, # 2 Proposed Order)(Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
132 Letter from Sean McDonough to Judge Munley. (McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
133 MEMORANDUM OF LAW by Schott North America, Inc. in Support of Limiting Plaintiffs' Cross−Examination and Opening and Closing Statements. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Allison) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
134 Letter from Sean McDonough to Judge Munley. (McDonough, Sean) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
135 Letter from EEOC Regarding Status of Case. (Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 04/21/2009)
136 SCHEDULING ORDER: Telephone Status Conference set for 5/6/2009 03:00 PM in Scranton before Honorable James M. Munley.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 5/1/09. (sm, ) (Entered: 05/01/2009)
138 ORDER DISMISSING CASE as parties have informed the Court that case has SETTLED; Parties will have 30 days to consummate the settlement.Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 5/6/09. (sm, ) (Entered: 05/06/2009)
139 Proposed MOTION for Settlement Consent Decree by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Letter to Court)(Anglade, Woody) (Entered: 06/10/2009)
140 ORDER APPROVING 139 Motion for Settlement (CONSENT DECREE). Signed by Honorable James M. Munley on 6/11/09 (sm, ) (Entered: 06/12/2009)