BROWN,CASE−CLOSED,CASE−REFERRED,PROTECTIVE−ORDER
U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:16−cv−00799

Doe et al v. Hommrich et al Assigned to: District Judge Eli J. Richardson Referred to: Magistrate Judge Joe Brown related Case: 3:19−cv−00319 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff John Doe a minor, by and through his Mother and next friend,
Plaintiff Sharieka Frazier

Date Filed: 04/25/2016 Date Terminated: 07/19/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Mark J. Downton Brazil Clark, PLLC 2901 Dobbs Avenue Nashville, TN 37204 (615) 984−4681 Email: mark@downtonclark.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas H. Castelli ACLU (Nashville Office) P O Box 120160 Nashville, TN 37212 (615) 320−7142 Ext. 303 Fax: (615) 691−7219 Email: tcastelli@aclu−tn.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wesley B. Clark Brazil Clark, PLLC 2901 Dobbs Avenue Nashville, TN 37204 (615) 730−8619 Fax: (615) 514−9674 Email: wesley@brazilclark.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mark J. Downton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas H. Castelli (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wesley B. Clark (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant

Bonnie Hommrich in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the TN Dept of Children's Services

represented by Alexander Stuart Rieger Tennessee Attorney General's Office P O Box 20207 Nashville, TN 37202−0207 (615) 741−2408 Fax: (615) 532−5683 Email: alex.rieger@ag.tn.gov

Case: 3:16-cv-799 As of: 05/27/2020 07:22 PM CDT 1 of 14

Defendant Children's Services, Tennessee Department of
Defendant Lynn Duke in her individual and official capacity as Director of the Rutherford County Detention Facility TERMINATED: 03/28/2019
Defendant Angela Istvanditsch Lt., in her individual and official capacity as an officer of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility TERMINATED: 03/28/2019
Defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee
Date Filed # Docket Text

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan P. Lakey Walk Cook & Lakey, PLC 431 S. Main St. Suite 300 Memphis, TN 38103 (901) 685−2662 Fax: (901) 685−6122 Email: jlakey@walkcook.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander Stuart Rieger (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan P. Lakey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Josh A. McCreary Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square, N P O Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 (615) 893−5522 Email: jmccreary@mborolaw.com TERMINATED: 03/20/2019
Nicholas Clinton Christiansen Hudson, Reed & Christiansen, PLLC 16 Public Square, N Murfreesboro, TN 37130 (615) 893−5522 Fax: (615) 849−2135 Email: nchristiansen@mborolaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Josh A. McCreary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2019
Nicholas Clinton Christiansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Josh A. McCreary (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/20/2019
Nicholas Clinton Christiansen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016 04/25/2016
04/25/2016
04/25/2016
04/27/2016 04/28/2016 04/28/2016 04/29/2016 05/04/2016 05/04/2016 05/04/2016 05/04/2016

1 COMPLAINT John Doe, a minor, by and through his Mother and next friend, Sharieka Frazier. (Filing fee $ 400 paid) (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Civil Cover Sheet)(af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (af) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/25/2016: # 1 Attachment Proposed TRO) (af). (Entered: 04/25/2016)
3 MEMORANDUM in Support of 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
4 DECLARATION of Sharieka Frazier filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier re: 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
5 DECLARATION of Counsel filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier re: 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
6 RECEIPT #34675040812 in the amount of $400 posted by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier re 1 Complaint. (af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
7 Summons issued as to Tennessee Department of Children's Services, Lynn Duke, Bonnie Hommrich, Rutherford County, & Angela Istvanditsch. (af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Todd J. Campbell: Motion Hearing held on 4/25/2016 re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. TRO granted. Order to enter.(Court Reporter Cathy Leigh.)(db) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
8 *TERMED PER ORDER 30 * TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 4/25/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af) Modified Text on 5/5/2016 (dt). (Entered: 04/25/2016)
9 ORDER: A hearing to consider the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is set for Thursday, May 5, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the hearing will conclude on that day. Counsel for the Plaintiff shall serve a copy of the Temporary Restraining Order and this Order upon the Defendants. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 4/25/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Josh A. McCreary on behalf of Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Nicholas Clinton Christiansen on behalf of Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Thomas H. Castelli on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 04/28/2016)
Bar status for attorneys Thomas H. Castelli, Josh McCreary and Nicholas Christiansen of TN verified as active this date. (dt) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Alexander Stuart Rieger on behalf of Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
14 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
15 MOTION in Limine by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
16 MEMORANDUM in Support of 15 MOTION in Limine filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

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05/04/2016 17 Witness List and Exhibit List by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016 18 Exhibit List for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction by John Doe.. (Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016 19 Witness List for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction by John Doe. (Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016 20 NOTICE of Filing by John Doe Deposition of Lynn Duke (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Deposition of Lynn Duke)(Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

21 NOTICE of Filing by John Doe Deposition of Angela Istvanditsch (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Deposition of Angela Istvanditsch)(Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016 22 DECLARATION of John Doe filed by John Doe. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Declaration of John Doe)(Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

23 RESPONSE in Opposition re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Juvenile Court Order April 20, 2016, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B Juvenile Court Order April 22, 2016, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C Deposition of Lynn Duke, # 4 Exhibit Ex. D Deposition of Angela Istvanditsch)(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016 24 Exhibit List and Witness List by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich.. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016 25 MOTION to Dismiss by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

26 MEMORANDUM in Support of 25 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. Juvenile Court Order April 20, 2016, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B Juvenile Court Order April 22, 2016, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C Juvenile Court Order April 25, 2016)(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/04/2016

27 MOTION for Leave to to File Reply to Defendants' Response by John Doe. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Reply Brief)(Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 05/04/2016)

05/05/2016 28 ORDER granting 27 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 05/05/2016. (vh) Modified on 5/5/2016 (af). (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/05/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Todd J. Campbell: Motion Hearing held on 5/5/2016 re 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. Order to enter.(Court Reporter Cathy Leigh.)(db) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/05/2016 29 REPLY to Response to 2 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by John Doe. (dt) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/05/2016

30 ORDER: The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order in this matter on April 25, 2016 8 . Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 2 . The Court held a hearing on the pending Motion on May 5, 2016, which was attended by counsel for all parties. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order previously entered in this case 8 is terminated. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness 15 is moot. The case is referred back to the Magistrate Judge for customized case management. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 5/5/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

05/05/2016

31 ORDER: This case is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for customized case management in accordance with Local Rule 16.01. This case shall be set for trial upon completion of the initial case management conference by order of the District Judge in accordance with the procedures of Local Rule 16.01(d)(5). Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 5/5/16. (dt) (Entered: 05/05/2016)

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05/09/2016 05/11/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/19/2016
05/23/2016
05/27/2016 05/27/2016 05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/01/2016 06/02/2016 06/07/2016 06/09/2016 06/09/2016 06/22/2016 06/22/2016
06/23/2016

32 NOTICE of Initial Case Management Conference set for 6/29/2016 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. (dt) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
33 MOTION to Continue Case Management Conference by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
34 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Sharieka Frazier, John Doe.(Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
35 RESPONSE to Motion re 25 MOTION to Dismiss filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
36 ORDER granting 33 Motion to Continue Case Management Conference. Initial Case Management Conference is reset for 10:00 a.m. on July 6, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 5/19/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 05/19/2016)
37 ORDER: Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 25 . Since the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs have filed a First Amended Complaint 34 . Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 25 is denied without prejudice as moot. The Complaint to which Defendants' Motion is addressed is no longer the operative complaint in this matter. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 5/23/16. (dt) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
Bar status for attorney Alexander Stuart Rieger of TN verified as active this date. (dt) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
38 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or responsive pleading by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
39 NOTICE of Appearance by Jonathan P. Lakey on behalf of Children's Services, Tennessee Department of (Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
40 ORDER granting 38 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer All Defendants. (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
41 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Responsive Pleading by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
42 ORDER granting 41 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer State of TN and Bonnie Hommrich answer due 6/22/2016. (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
Bar status for attorney Jonathan Lakey and Alexander Rieger of TN verified as active this date. (dt) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
43 MOTION to Dismiss by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
44 MEMORANDUM in Support of 43 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
45 MOTION to Dismiss , MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim , MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
46 MEMORANDUM in Support of 45 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex A Juvenile Court Order Apr. 20, # 2 Exhibit Ex B Juvenile Court Order Apr. 22, # 3 Exhibit Ex C Juvenile Court Order Apr. 25, # 4 Exhibit Ex D Directive to 25.5−DOE, # 5 Exhibit Ex E Policy 11.3, # 6 Exhibit Ex F Policy 19.11)(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 06/22/2016)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 43 MOTION to Dismiss by Rutherford County, Duke, Istvanditsch filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Unreported case − Gawry, # 2 Attachment Juvenile court order March 18 2016)(Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 06/23/2016)

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07/01/2016

48 MOTION to Continue State Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Reset Case Management Conference by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of. (Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/01/2016)

07/01/2016

49 NOTICE of Filing by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich re 45 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , 46 Memorandum in Support,, (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Ex. A Seclusion Procedure)(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 07/01/2016)

07/01/2016

50 ORDER: Pending in this matter is the State Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Reset Case Management Conference 48 presently set for 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, July 6, 2016. The motion is GRANTED, and the Initial Case Management Conference is reset for 1:00 p.m. on Thursday, July 28, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 7/1/16. (dt) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/05/2016 51 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Motion to Dismiss (Unopposed) by John Doe. (Downton, Mark) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/05/2016

52 ORDER granting 51 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 43 MOTION to Dismiss , 45 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction . In filing a motion for additional time it would be helpful if the specific date the response will be due is stated in the motion. Responses will be Due July 25, 2016. (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/05/2016

53 ORDER: Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to State's Motion to Dismiss 51 . There are two Motions to Dismiss pending 43 and 45 . Plaintiff has filed a Response 47 to the Motion to Dismiss of the County Defendants 43 . Plaintiff shall file his Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss by July 25, 2016. All Defendants shall file their Replies by August 8, 2016. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 7/5/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 07/05/2016)

07/07/2016 54 MOTION to Certify Class by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 07/07/2016)

07/07/2016 55 MEMORANDUM in Support of 54 MOTION to Certify Class filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier . (Castelli, Thomas) (Entered: 07/07/2016)

07/21/2016

56 MOTION to Stay re 54 MOTION to Certify Class , 55 Memorandum in Support by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 07/21/2016)

07/21/2016

57 MEMORANDUM in Support of 56 MOTION to Stay re 54 MOTION to Certify Class , 55 Memorandum in Support filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich . (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 07/21/2016)

07/22/2016

58 ORDER granting 56 Motion to Stay Motion for Class Certification and All Discovery. Briefing on the pending Motion for Class Certification is STAYED, pending resolution of the pending Motions to Dismiss. In addition, all discovery is STAYED, pending resolution of the pending Motions to Dismiss. Once the Court rules on the pending Motions to Dismiss, the Magistrate Judge, if appropriate, shall set a briefing schedule for the Motion for Class Certification and determine what, if any, limited discovery is needed with regard to that Motion. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 7/22/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 07/22/2016)

07/25/2016

59 RESPONSE in Opposition re 45 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 07/25/2016)

07/25/2016

60 ORDER: Pursuant to Judge Campbell's Order staying all discovery in this matter (Docket Entry 58), the case management conference presently set for 1:00 p.m. on Thursday, July 28, 2016, is hereby CANCELED. The parties should contact the Magistrate Judge's courtroom deputy within five days of the Court's ruling on the pending Motion to Dismiss, if appropriate, to schedule a conference call with the Magistrate Judge. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on

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7/25/16. (af) (Entered: 07/26/2016)

08/08/2016

61 REPLY to Response to Motion re 45 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Attachment A−DCS Policy 19.12)(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 08/08/2016)

08/26/2016

62 MEMORANDUM Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 8/26/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/26/2016

63 ORDER: Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss 43 filed by Defendants Rutherford County, Duke and Istvanditsch ("County Defendants"). For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, the County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 43 is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 8/26/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/26/2016

64 MEMORANDUM Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 8/26/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/26/2016

65 ORDER: Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss 45 filed by Defendants Tennessee Department of Childrens Services and Commissioner Bonnie Hommrich ("State Defendants"). For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 45 is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 8/26/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/26/2016)

08/30/2016

66 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 9/21/2016 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 8/30/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 08/31/2016)

08/31/2016

67 ORDER: In light of the Court's August 26, 2016 rulings 63 and 65 , the stay previously imposed 58 is now LIFTED, and the Magistrate Judge shall set deadlines for Responses to the Motion for Class Certification at the parties' September 21, 2016 telephone conference. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 8/31/16. (dt) (Entered: 08/31/2016)

09/09/2016 68 ANSWER to 34 Amended Complaint by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich.(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/12/2016 69 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 09/12/2016)

09/12/2016 70 ORDER granting 69 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer All Defendants. (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 09/12/2016)

09/16/2016 71 ANSWER to 34 Amended Complaint by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee.(Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/16/2016)

09/21/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Telephone Conference held on 9/21/2016. Order to enter. (rd) (Entered: 09/21/2016)

09/21/2016

72 ORDER: A telephone scheduling conference was held with the parties in this matter on September 21, 2016. The parties had submitted competing plans for consideration of the initial case management order. The parties may serve written discovery limited to the class certification issue on or before October 7, 2016. Responses to this discovery will be due on or before October 25, 2016. Any depositions needed on this issue will be taken by December 9, 2016. Responses to the pending motion for class certification will be due on or before January 17, 2017, and replies, limited to five pages, will be due by January 31, 2017. Following a ruling by Judge Campbell on the class certification issue, all stays on discovery will be LIFTED and the parties will, within 14 days of a decision, submit to brownchambers@tnmd.uscourts.gov in Word or Word Perfect form a draft scheduling order for the completion of discovery in the case and a recommended trial date for this bench trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe

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Brown on 9/21/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 09/21/2016)

09/22/2016

73 MOTION to Amend/Correct 71 Answer to Amended Complaint by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/22/2016)

09/23/2016

74 ORDER granting 73 Motion to Amend/Correct answer as requested and to withdraw jury demand. Clerk will change docket sheet to remove jury demand in this case (Brown, Joe) (Entered: 09/23/2016)

10/27/2016

75 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Agreed Protective Order)(McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 10/27/2016)

10/28/2016

76 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 10/28/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 10/28/2016)

11/30/2016

On 12/1/16, U.S. District Judge Todd Campbell will retire. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 138 entered 11/18/2016 and effective 11/30/16, this case has been randomly reassigned to Judge Trauger. (eh) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

12/09/2016

77 ORDER: Upon the reassignment of this case to Judge Trauger, the reference to the magistrate judge is WITHDRAWN. The parties shall adhere to the briefing schedule on the Motion to Certify Class (Docket No. 54), which is set out in Judge Brown's Order of September 21, 2016 (Docket No. 72). After a decision on the pending motion, Judge Trauger will set a case management conference before her. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 12/9/2016. (jw) (Entered: 12/09/2016)

01/16/2017

78 RESPONSE in Opposition re 54 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Depo Thomas Schacht)(McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/16/2017 79 MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/16/2017 80 Sealed Document Deposition of John Doe's mother filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/16/2017 81 Sealed Document Deposition of John Doe filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 01/16/2017)

01/17/2017

82 ORDER granting 79 Motion for Leave to File Depositions Under Seal. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 1/17/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017 83 MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017

84 RESPONSE in Opposition re 54 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. D−State Defendants Responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, # 2 Exhibit Ex. E−Deposition of Thomas Schacht, # 3 Exhibit Ex. F−AACAP Policy Statement, # 4 Exhibit Ex. G−(Rescinded) Chapters 1400−2 and 1400−3, # 5 Exhibit Ex. H−Affidavit of Mark Anderson, # 6 Exhibit Ex. I−Proposed Rules 0250−04−08, # 7 Exhibit Ex. J−Provider Policy Manual 2011, # 8 Exhibit Ex. K−DCS Policy 19.12, # 9 Exhibit Ex. L−RC−JDC Contract, # 10 Exhibit Ex. M−MT−JDC Contract, # 11 Exhibit Ex. N−G4S Academy Contract, # 12 Exhibit Ex. O−DCS DOE Policy Directive 25.5, # 13 Exhibit Ex. P−DCS Policy 19.11)(Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017

85 Sealed Document Ex. A−Deposition of Ms. Sharieka Frazier filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)

01/17/2017 86 Sealed Document Ex. B−Detention Hearing Order filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
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01/17/2017 01/17/2017 01/17/2017 01/18/2017 01/31/2017 01/31/2017 01/31/2017 01/31/2017
01/31/2017 01/31/2017 02/01/2017 02/09/2017 02/09/2017
02/17/2017

87 Sealed Document Ex. C−Deposition of John Doe filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
88 Sealed Document Ex. Q−Plaintiff's Response to State Interrogatories filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
89 Sealed Document Ex. R−Delinquency Order filed by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of, Bonnie Hommrich. (Rieger, Alexander) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
90 ORDER granting 83 Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 1/18/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
91 MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
92 REPLY to Response to Motion re 54 MOTION to Certify Class (Reply to State Defendants Response) filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
93 REPLY to Response to Motion re 54 MOTION to Certify Class (Reply to County Defendants Response) filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
94 NOTICE of Filing by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier (Exhibits to Plaintiffs Class Replies) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Rutherford County Yearly Activity Report 2015, # 2 Exhibit B: Rutherford County Class Discovery Responses, # 3 Exhibit E: Rutherford County JDC Standard Operating Procedures (Updated Sept. 2015), # 4 Exhibit F: Rutherford County JDC Standard Operating Procedures (Updated Sept. 2016), # 5 Exhibit G: Case Settlements Involving Solitary Confinement, # 6 Exhibit H: Proposed Rule 0250−04−08−.11, # 7 Exhibit I: DOE Policy Directive −25.5, # 8 Exhibit J: State Class Discovery Responses)(Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
95 Sealed Document (Exhibit C: List of Juveniles Isolated Under Behavioral Management) filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
96 Sealed Document (Exhibit D: Loss of Privilege Details and Incident Reports) filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 01/31/2017)
97 ORDER granting 91 Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/1/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 02/01/2017)
98 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against only Defendants Rutherford County, Lynn Duke by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
99 MEMORANDUM in Support of 98 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against only Defendants Rutherford County, Lynn Duke filed by John Doe, Sharieka Frazier . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − RCJDC procedures updated 2008, # 2 Exhibit B − AACAP Policy Statement, # 3 Exhibit C − US v Ohio settlement, # 4 Exhibit D − Deposition Excerpt − Dr. Thomas Schacht, # 5 Exhibit E − US v. Hinds County, # 6 Exhibit F − US v. Leflore County, # 7 Exhibit G − US v City of New York)(Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
100 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification (Docket No. 54) is granted in part and denied in part. The court will certify a class of "all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present." Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/17/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw) (Entered: 02/17/2017)

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02/21/2017 02/21/2017 02/22/2017
02/28/2017
02/28/2017 02/28/2017 02/28/2017 03/07/2017 03/08/2017 03/08/2017 03/13/2017 03/13/2017 03/14/2017
03/22/2017 03/22/2017 09/07/2017 09/08/2017

101 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Unopposed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
102 MEMORANDUM in Support of 101 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Unopposed filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
103 ORDER granting 101 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to 98 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/22/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
104 RESPONSE in Opposition re 98 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against only Defendants Rutherford County, Lynn Duke filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit RCJDC SOP (relevant portions))(McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
105 MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal Unopposed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
106 Sealed Document deposition of Lynn Duke filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
107 ORDER granting re 105 MOTION for Leave to File Document Under Seal Unopposed filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee, Angela Istvanditsch, Lynn Duke. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/28/2017. (jw) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
108 MOTION for Leave to Leave to File Reply re 104 Response in Opposition to Motion, by John Doe. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Reply)(Downton, Mark) (Entered: 03/07/2017)
109 ORDER granting re 108 MOTION for Leave to Leave to File Reply re 104 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by John Doe. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 3/8/2017. (jw) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
110 REPLY to Response to Motion re 98 Second MOTION for Preliminary Injunction against only Defendants Rutherford County, Lynn Duke filed by John Doe and Sharieka Frazier. (jw) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
111 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Unopposed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
112 MEMORANDUM in Support of 111 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Unopposed filed by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee . (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
113 ORDER granting 111 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Extension to 3/16/2017. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 3/14/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
114 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 3/22/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
115 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 3/22/2017. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw) (Entered: 03/23/2017)
116 First MOTION Set Case Management Conference by John Doe. (Downton, Mark) (Entered: 09/07/2017)
117 ORDER granting 116 Motion for Case Management Conference. Case management conference set for 9/18/17 at 1:00 p.m. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 9/8/2017. (ab) (Entered: 09/08/2017)

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09/08/2017

Set/Reset Hearings: Case Management Conference set for 9/18/2017 at 01:00 PM in Chambers 825 before District Judge Aleta A. Trauger. (ab) (Entered: 09/08/2017)

09/12/2017 118 First MOTION Reset Case Management Conference by John Doe. (Downton, Mark) (Entered: 09/12/2017)

09/13/2017

119 ORDER granting 118 First MOTION Reset Case Management Conference. Case Management Conference RESET for 10/27/2017 at 03:30 PM in Chambers 825 before District Judge Aleta A. Trauger. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 9/13/17. (gb) (Entered: 09/13/2017)

10/26/2017 120 PROPOSED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER (Agreed) filed by All Plaintiffs. (Clark, Wesley) (Entered: 10/26/2017)

10/27/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Aleta A. Trauger: Case Management Conference held on 10/27/2017. Case will be referred to MJ for settlement conference. (kb) (Entered: 10/27/2017)

10/27/2017

121 INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 4/8/2018. Discovery due by 5/10/2018. Dispositive Motions due by 9/30/2018. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 10/27/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

10/30/2017

122 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Joe Brown to determine which magistrate judge shall conduct the mediation/settlement conference in this case. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 10/27/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 10/30/2017)

11/02/2017

123 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 11/9/2017 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 11/2/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/09/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Telephone Conference held on 11/9/2017. Order to enter. (Time in Court: 30 minutes.) (rd) (Entered: 11/13/2017)

11/13/2017

124 ORDER: A lengthy telephone conference was held with the parties on November 9, 2017, concerning the setting of a settlement conference. As discussed at the conference, the settlement conference will be held before me on December 14, 2017, 9:30 a.m., Courtroom 783. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 11/13/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af) (Entered: 11/14/2017)

12/07/2017 125 MOTION Unopposed Motion Re: Settlement Conference by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 12/07/2017)

12/08/2017 126 ORDER granting 125 Motion concerning attendance at settlement conference. (JBB) (Entered: 12/08/2017)

12/14/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Settlement Conference held on 12/14/2017; Settlement discussions are ongoing. (rd) (Entered: 12/18/2017)

01/05/2018

127 ORDER: At the request of counsel, a further settlement conference is set in this matter for 9:30 a.m., on Thursday, January 25, 2018, in Courtroom 783, 801 Broadway, Nashville, Tennessee. By 12:00 p.m. (Noon) on Tuesday, January 23, 2018, the parties should submit a brief statement of the status of the settlement discussions to brownchambers@tnmd.uscourts.gov. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 1/5/18. (af) (Entered: 01/05/2018)

01/25/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Settlement Conference held on 1/25/2018. Order to enter. (rd) (Entered: 01/25/2018)

01/29/2018 128 ORDER: After consulting with Judge Trauger the deadlines in the current scheduling order ( 121 ) are extended approximately 90 days as follows: Amended Pleadings due by 7/9/2018, Discovery due by 8/16/2018, Dispositive Motions due by 12/31/2018 and
Case: 3:16-cv-799 As of: 05/27/2020 07:22 PM CDT 11 of 14

11/14/2018 11/14/2018 11/26/2018 11/28/2018 11/29/2018
12/21/2018 12/27/2018
01/24/2019 02/01/2019 02/05/2019
02/05/2019

Status Report due by 2/16/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 1/29/18. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
129 ORDER: Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 138, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED to Judge Eli Richardson for all purposes. All present deadlines and court dates shall remain in place, subject to modification by Judge Richardson or the magistrate judge. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 11/13/18. (gb) (Entered: 11/14/2018)
130 ORDER: This case is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for customized case management in accordance with Local Rule 16.01. All existing case management dates, deadlines, and trial settings remain in effect, pending further order of the Court. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 11/14/18. (gb) (Entered: 11/14/2018)
131 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 11/28/2018 01:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 11/26/18. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Joe Brown: Telephone Conference held on 11/28/2018. Order to enter. (Time in Court: 30 minutes) (rd) (Entered: 11/28/2018)
132 ORDER a telephone conference was held on Nov. 26, 2018. The parties advised they had reached a resolution in principal in the case. They will file a notion for preliminary approval of the resolution as required by the Class Action Fairness Act by December 21, 2018. The approval process including notice to the required parties will take at least 100 days. The parties had some discussion with Judge Trauger's staff about the procedure she preferred for the motion. I have contacted Judge Richardson about his preference and we will get back to the parties on any procedural changes they should use before Dec 21. (JBB) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
133 Joint MOTION to Set Aside 132 Order by Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
134 ORDER: Joint Motion to Set Aside Order and Request for Telephonic Status Conference 133 is well taken and is granted. The parties are relieved, nunc pro tunc, from their obligation to file by December 21, 2018 the joint motion contemplated by Doc No. 132 , and a telephonic status conference is hereby scheduled for January 14, 2019 at 9:00 a.m. The parties shall email chambers at richardson_chambers@tnmd.uscourts.gov to receive dialing instructions. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 12/27/18. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
135 Joint MOTION for Settlement Parties' Agreed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement and Supporting Memorandum by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−−Settlement Agreement)(Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
136 ORDER: Telephone Conference set for 2/5/2019 11:00 AM before District Judge Eli J. Richardson. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 2/1/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
137 ORDER: As discussed with counsel for the parties on February 5, 2019, the Court will hold a telephonic status conference on Monday, February 11, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. regarding several specified issues relevant to preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement, including certain concerns that are especially pertinent given that this class action was brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). For the status conference, counsel shall use the same dialing instructions they used on February 5. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 2/5/19. (gb) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Eli J. Richardson: Telephone Conference held on 2/5/2019. Telephonic conference is scheduled for February 11,

Case: 3:16-cv-799 As of: 05/27/2020 07:22 PM CDT 12 of 14

02/11/2019 02/11/2019
02/28/2019 03/20/2019 03/20/2019 03/27/2019 03/28/2019
07/05/2019 07/05/2019 07/05/2019 07/05/2019 07/05/2019 07/05/2019

2019 at 11:00 a.m. (Court Reporter Debbie Watson.) (Jackson, Julie) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
138 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Eli J. Richardson: Telephone Conference held on 2/11/2019. (Court Reporter Debbie Watson.) (Jackson, Julie) (Entered: 02/11/2019)
139 ORDER: Pending before the Court is the Parties' Agreed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement ( 135 ). The Motion is DENIED without prejudice to being re−filed with respect to a revised Class Action Settlement Agreement that accounts for the Court's concerns described herein and previously discussed with counsel for all parties. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 2/11/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 02/11/2019)
140 Second MOTION Parties' Second Agreed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement and Supporting Memorandum by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Class Settlement Agreement)(Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
141 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch, Rutherford County, Tennessee. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Notice to client of withdrawal)(McCreary, Josh) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
142 ORDER granting 141 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Josh A. McCreary terminated (JBB) (Entered: 03/20/2019)
143 Second MOTION Parties' Corrected Second Agreed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement and Supporting Memorandum by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Class Action Settlement Agreement)(Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/27/2019)
144 ORDER granting 143 Second MOTION Parties' Corrected Second Agreed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement. The Class Settlement Agreement is preliminarily approved subject to the Court conducting a fairness or final approval hearing; The Fairness Hearing to consider whether the Class Settlement Agreement will be finally approved is hereby set for July 19, 2019 at 1:00 p.m.; The parties proposed notice of the Fairness Hearing, attached to this Order as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference, is approved; The parties are directed to publish and distribute the Fairness Hearing Notice and/or copies of the Class Settlement Agreement; Defendants Lynn Duke and Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch, in both their individual and official capacities, are hereby dismissed from this litigation with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 3/28/19. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Fairness Hearing Notice) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.) (gb) (Entered: 03/28/2019)
145 NOTICE of Filing by Rutherford County, Tennessee Declarations (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 07/05/2019)
146 DECLARATION of Brian Robertson filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee re: 145 Notice of Filing. (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 07/05/2019)
147 DECLARATION of Lynn Duke filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee re: 145 Notice of Filing. (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 07/05/2019)
148 DECLARATION of Nicholas C. Christiansen, Esq. filed by Rutherford County, Tennessee re: 145 Notice of Filing. (Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 07/05/2019)
149 NOTICE of Filing by Rutherford County, Tennessee Declaration of Jennifer Keough (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Jennifer Keough)(Christiansen, Nicholas) (Entered: 07/05/2019)
150 NOTICE of Filing by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of Declaration Pursuant to Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Stuart Clements)(Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/05/2019)

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07/15/2019 07/19/2019 07/19/2019 07/19/2019

151 NOTICE by Children's Services, Tennessee Department of Parties' Joint Notice of No Objections to Their Motion to Approve Class Settlement Agreement (Lakey, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/15/2019)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Eli J. Richardson: Fairness Hearing held on 7/19/2019. (Court Reporter Debbie Watson.) (Hearing lasted 1:09)(Jackson, Julie) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
152 FINAL ORDER Approving Class Settlement, Ordering Permanent Injunctive Relief, and Dismissing Case with Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Eli J. Richardson on 7/19/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY−ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(gb) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
153 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT re: 152 Order Approving Class Settlement, Ordering Permanent Injunctive Relief, and Dismissing Case with Prejudice. (gb) (Entered: 07/19/2019)

Case: 3:16-cv-799 As of: 05/27/2020 07:22 PM CDT 14 of 14

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through his )

Mother and next friend, SHARIEKA

)

FRAZIER,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, in her official )

capacity as the Commissioner of the

)

Tennessee Department of Children’s

)

Services, THE TENNESSEE

)

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S

)

SERVICES, RUTHERFORD COUNTY, )

TENNESSEE, LYNN DUKE, in her

)

individual and official capacity as Director )

of the Rutherford County Detention Facility )

and LIEUTENANT ANGELA

)

ISTVANDITSCH, in her individual and )

official capacity as an officer of the

)

Rutherford County Juvenile Detention

)

Facility,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

No.__________

VERIFIED COMPLAINT Plaintiff John Doe1, by and through his mother and next friend Sharieka Frazier and his

undersigned counsel, sues Defendants, The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services

(“DCS”), Rutherford County, Tennessee (“the County”), Lynn Duke (“Duke”), and Lieutenant

Angela Istvanditsch, in their individual and official capacities as director and officer of the Facility,

showing as follows:

1 John Doe is a minor, so his name has been redacted pursuant to Local Rules. Similarly, counsel has redacted his name and other identifying information from exhibits and other documents submitted herewith.

Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 1 of 28 PageID #: 1

NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This case involves the constitutional rights of John Doe, a child charged with offenses that would render him delinquent under the laws of Tennessee if the Juvenile Court performed an adjudication and found that he had committed the offenses. Currently, he has not received an adjudication, and is housed at the Rutherford County Detention Facility as a pretrial detainee.2 2. At issue in this case is whether the government may lawfully place a child who is a pretrial detainee and likely suffers from mental illness in solitary confinement for long periods of time. At further issue, is whether the government may lawfully place any child in extended solitary confinement. 3. John Doe has been held in solitary confinement at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility since April 19, 2016 (a period of five (5) days as of the filing of this Complaint) because he allegedly disrupted the Facility’s classroom. 4. Defendants have acknowledged that placing juveniles like John Doe in solitary confinement for long periods of time is a violation of applicable regulations, but in at least this one case, they sought and obtained permission from the Juvenile Court to impose such draconian measures in excess of what is allowable even by the regulations promulgated by the Department of Children’s Services. 5. Almost no standards exist for imposition of solitary confinement of pretrial detainees in Tennessee’s juvenile justice system, and no meaningful opportunity for review exists. John Doe has been subjected to routine periods of solitary confinement during his time in the
2 Tennessee, like most other states, allows pretrial detention of juveniles when certain conditions are met. These conditions include a finding of probable cause, that the child is a threat to himself or the community, and that no less restrictive alternatives to detention exist to protect the child or the community.
2 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 2 of 28 PageID #: 2

Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center, but on April 19th, the Defendants requested (and were granted) permission to hold him alone in a cell with nothing but a toilet and bed for twentythree (23) hours per day. This practice is subject to repetition, and has been visited upon the named Plaintiff in this cause.
6. Imposition of solitary confinement on pretrial detainee juveniles violates John Doe’s and other juvenile pretrial detainees’ rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and their rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 7. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § l983 for Defendants’ violations of his civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 8. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights). 9. Defendant Bonnie Hommrich is the Commissioner of the Defendant Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), which serves as Tennessee’s child welfare agency. The agency is statutorily required to provide services, treatment and protection for vulnerable children throughout the State of Tennessee, including children falling under its protection in this judicial District. DCS is specifically mandated to protect children adjudicated delinquent, and supervises all facilities housing juveniles under charges of delinquency. DCS participates in decisions affecting children housed at the Facility and specifically failed to take any action in order to prevent placement of John Doe into solitary confinement as described more fully herein. DCS’s
3 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 3 of 28 PageID #: 3

unlawful practices complained of and that give rise to the claims herein occurred within this district and division.
10. The Defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee (“the County”) owns and operates the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility. As an operator of a Juvenile Detention Facility, it is mandated to provide for rehabilitation, education, treatment and protection for juveniles placed into its care, under the laws governing DCS and juvenile justice. The County employs Duke and other representatives of the Facility, and through them requested approval to place John Doe into solitary confinement as described more fully herein, and is responsible for continuing the solitary confinement of this child. Upon information and belief, the practice of placing juveniles in solitary confinement is an unofficial policy and routine practice of the County.
11. Defendant Lynn Duke is the director of the Facility employed by the County, and is responsible for the day to day operations of the Facility, including provision and enforcement of solitary confinement. She is further individually responsible for provision of services, education, treatment and protection of the children placed in her facility. Defendant Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch is an officer at the Facility, who, under the supervision and direction of Duke, specifically requested that the Court allow them to place John Doe into solitary confinement as described more fully herein. Duke’s and Istvanditsch’s unlawful practices complained of and that give rise to the claims herein occurred within this district and division.
12. Venue is proper in this judicial district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). PARTIES
13. Plaintiff John Doe is a child currently held in Rutherford County, Tennessee as a juvenile pretrial detainee at the Facility in solitary confinement. Sharieka Frazier is his mother. They are citizens and residents of Rutherford County, Tennessee in this judicial district.
4 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 4 of 28 PageID #: 4

14. Plaintiff is subject to the authority and directives of Defendants DCS, the Facility, Duke and Istvanditsch.
15. John Doe has standing to pursue this lawsuit. 16. Defendant Hommrich is the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) is an agency of the State of Tennessee statutorily required to provide services, treatment and protection for vulnerable children throughout the State of Tennessee. DCS is specifically mandated to protect children deemed delinquent, and to license and supervise facilities that hold juveniles under charges of delinquency. DCS can be served with process through the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee. 17. The Defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee operates the only detention facility for juveniles in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and specifically oversees the confinement of John Doe and other juveniles like him in that county. The County can be served with process through Director Lynn Duke, at 1710 S Church St #4, Murfreesboro, TN 37130. 18. The Defendant Lynn Duke is the director of the Facility, and is responsible for the day to day operations thereof, including provision and enforcement of solitary confinement. She can be served with process at 1710 S Church St #4, Murfreesboro, TN 37130. 19. The Defendant Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch is an officer employed at the Facility, and is responsible for the supervision and protection of children housed there, including Q.F. She can be served with process at 1710 S Church St #4, Murfreesboro, TN 37130. 20. At all times material to this lawsuit Defendants Duke and Istvanditsch were employed by the County. They are sued in their individual and official capacities.
5 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 5 of 28 PageID #: 5

21. Defendants DCS, Rutherford County, Tennessee, Duke and Istvanditsch, at all times relevant hereto, were acting under color of law.
ALLEGATIONS SPECIFIC TO JOHN DOE 22. The Juvenile Court for Rutherford County, Tennessee (“the Juvenile Court”) ordered John Doe detained while awaiting adjudication in the Facility on March 18, 2016. The Court set no review of the matter until the child’s plea date on May 5, 2016. (Redacted Detention Order attached hereto as Exhibit 1). 23. The Juvenile Court further ordered that DCS provide the child with a mental evaluation by April 18, 2016, because “there is reason to believe the child has a mental illness and/or mental retardation”. (Redacted Order Attached hereto as Exhibit 2). 24. A mental health provider attempted to conduct the evaluation on April 6, 2016, but was turned away from the facility because the Facility refused to allow face to face contact between the evaluator and the child due to an “incident” at the facility. Accordingly, the evaluation has not been conducted. The Provider informed the Juvenile Court that it had not conducted the evaluation by letter dated April 6, 2016. (Redacted Letter Attached hereto as Exhibit 3). 25. On April 19, 2016, County employees at the Facility, including Duke and Istvanditsch, requested the Rutherford County District Attorney’s Office file a Motion to Review Detention, seeking to place John Doe in seclusion/isolation for 23 hours a day with no books or other materials, and with the window to his cell covered with a board. Lieutenant Istvanditsch expressly acknowledged that she sought permission to use measures in excess of the regulations governing the Facility. Peculiarly, Lieutenant Istvanditsch and the Court refused to acknowledge that this level of isolation amounted to “solitary confinement.”
6 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 6 of 28 PageID #: 6

26. On April 19, 2016, County employees from the Facility, including Istvanditsch under the direction of Duke, prosecuted the motion to place John Doe in solitary confinement. Agents of the Department of Children’s Services were present at the hearing, but made no objections to Defendant Istvanditsch’s request that the court grant permission to punish John Doe in excess of what is permitted by governing regulations.
27. Defendants urged placement of John Doe into indeterminate solitary confinement because he was disobedient and he had allegedly disrupted the Facility’s classroom, “hollered,” “rapped,” and had “flashed gang symbols.” Defendants did not allege that John Doe was a physical danger to himself or others, that an emergency existed or that he had made threats to other inmates or officers at the Facility. Defendants sought solitary confinement for the purposes of punishment and/or discipline.
28. At the solitary confinement hearing, Lieutenant Istvanditsch acknowledged that placement of a juvenile in solitary confinement under such conditions likely violated DCS and other state policy and regulations. Lieutenant Istvanditsch even acknowledged that John Doe likely suffered from some sort of mental illness and that he had been “acting crazy.”
29. Upon Court approval, Defendants proceeded to place John Doe in solitary confinement on April 19, 2016, and he has remained there ever since.
30. John Doe’s solitary confinement initially included isolation in a concrete cell for 23 out of 24 hours a day, with no access to books, magazines, music or other educational or recreational materials.
31. On April 21, 2016, John Doe returned to Court for a review of his solitary confinement. Defendants acknowledged John Doe’s good behavior, and modified his confinement to include access to books and some extra time outside his cell. Otherwise, he continued to be
7 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 7 of 28 PageID #: 7

kept in confinement for most of his days, and for at least an additional 72 hours. Another review of John Doe’s confinement is set for April 25th, 2016, at 1:00 p.m.
32. Throughout his solitary confinement, John Doe has been excluded from the Facility’s educational program, and no alternative has been provided. John Doe has further been excluded from all recreational activities and has not been allowed meaningful opportunities to exercise his body.
33. John Doe has not been allowed access to a counselor or other mental health professional throughout his detention, and certainly not before or during his period of solitary confinement.
34. John Doe is currently suffering adverse consequences form his continued solitary confinement, including further withdrawal, depression, listlessness and lethargy. He is currently deprived of protected educational opportunities. He is not allowed meaningful opportunities to exercise his body. The total extent of harm visited upon him is unknown.
35. Defendants’ actions make it clear that they may continue John Doe’s solitary confinement, contingent on whether his behavior is “good,” with only slight modification, ad infinitum.
36. Defendants have placed John Doe into solitary confinement in the past. 37. Defendants’ actions to place John Doe in solitary confinement are not motivated by safety and are, instead, motivated by a desire to punish/discipline John Doe. 38. Upon information and belief, and based upon statements made by Defendants in Court, Defendants routinely place juveniles into solitary confinement for some periods of time based upon a determination to punish or discipline youth.
8 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 8 of 28 PageID #: 8

39. There are no standards that exist at the Facility or under DCS policy to allow for solitary confinement such as that visited upon John Doe, or for pretrial detainees in general.
ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO JUVENILE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TENNESSEE IN GENERAL
40. In Tennessee, juveniles in all forms of custody fall under the purview of DCS. DCS provides care and oversight for juveniles upon adjudication as dependent and neglected minors, or upon adjudication as delinquency for commission of offenses that would be criminal if committed by adults. DCS licenses and supervises facilities that house juveniles awaiting adjudication. The overall goals of DCS are set forth by statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-5-102 (2016) as follows:
(1) Protect children from abuse, mistreatment or neglect; (2) Provide prevention, early intervention, rehabilitative and educational services; (3) Pursue appropriate and effective behavioral and mental health treatment; (4) Ensure that health care needs, both preventive and practical, are met; and (5) Keep children safe. 41. DCS is responsible for the licensing and supervision of detention centers for juveniles, and is specifically responsible for licensing and supervision of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-5-109(1) (2016). 42. Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure, juveniles who are detained prior to adjudication for delinquent offenses are entitled to an adjudication of their charges within 30 days of their detention. 43. In practice, pretrial juvenile detainees rarely receive their adjudicatory hearing within the proscribed thirty days. Rather, they are either release before the expiration of thirty days or, like John Doe, they simply remain detained for longer than thirty days in violation of the rule.
9 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 9 of 28 PageID #: 9

44. The Department of Children’s Services operates three “Youth Development Centers” (“YDCs”) for juvenile offenders in Tennessee, but only the most serious repeat offenders are housed in those facilities. DCS maintains detailed policies and procedures for its YDCs.
45. Pretrial detainees are not housed at DCS’s YDCs. Rather, these youths are typically housed at county facilities that have been licensed and that are subject to supervision by DCS.
46. DCS has very limited policies and procedures for the treatment of pretrial detainees who are not housed at YDCs, relying largely on individual providers/facilities to create and maintain their own policies consistent with DCS, state and federal rules, regulations and statutes.
47. Accordingly, although DCS policy appears to prohibit punitive or disciplinary use of solitary confinement for pretrial juvenile detainees, no clear, unified standards exist for the practice.
48. Upon information and belief, pretrial juvenile detainees throughout Tennessee are held by state and county officials in solitary confinement for purposes of punishment and/or discipline, and without regard for their age or mental health status.
49. Upon information and belief, juveniles who are pretrial detainees and who are in custody at DCS’s YDCs are subjected to solitary confinement on a routine basis.
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES IS EXCEPTIONALLY HARMFUL 50. While isolated in solitary confinement, children are deprived of the services and
programming they need for healthy growth and development. 51. Solitary confinement can cause serious psychological, physical, and developmental
harm – or, worse, can lead to persistent mental health problems and suicide. These risks are magnified for young people with disabilities or histories of trauma and abuse.
10 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 10 of 28 PageID #: 10

52. Normal human contact and a range of age-appropriate services and programming are essential for the development and rehabilitation of young offenders.
53. There can be no doubt that the solitary confinement of juveniles is objectively harmful, as authorities from state, federal, international and scientific communities agree that such confinement is extremely damaging to youth.
54. An overwhelming number of youth in juvenile detention are victims of psychological, physical or sexual abuse.
55. An overwhelming number of youth in juvenile detention suffer from diagnosed and undiagnosed mental illness.
56. The mind and psyche of juveniles remains in a developmental stage, and is particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of solitary confinement.
State Acknowledgement of Harm 57. At the state level, DCS has already declared solitary confinement harmful, and has largely prohibited its use except for short-term, emergency, medically approved situations. 58. In DCS’s Administrative Policies and Procedures, at 27.2, DCS, referring to solitary confinement as “seclusion”, declares that “[t]he use of seclusion is seen as a restrictive intervention and one that poses a risk to the psychological well-being of a child/youth.” 59. The policy authorizes seclusion of youth only in emergency situation where the child is a risk of harm to himself or others. 60. Seclusion can only be used upon the order of a doctor, psychologist or other professional.
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61. Orders for seclusion are limited to one (1) hour, and no more than two (2) hours in
a twenty-four (24) hour period. Seclusion must end when the danger of the child to himself or
others has ended.
62. For children in YDCs, which house hardened, repeat felons, DCS policy 19.12
absolutely prohibits the use of seclusion “as a punishment or consequence”. It further limits the
use of seclusion on the most hardened juvenile offenders, requiring constant monitoring and daily
checks by medical professionals.
63. It is clear that the State of Tennessee, acting through DCS, has acknowledged the
objective harm of seclusion, and is subjectively aware of the harm.
Federal Authorities Further Acknowledge the Harm of Solitary Confinement of Juveniles
64. President Obama recently took executive action prohibiting the solitary
confinement of juveniles in the federal system, acknowledging the severe harmful effects on
children.
65. The US Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence
said, “nowhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than
when it involves solitary confinement.”
66. Nearly every court to consider the solitary confinement of adults with serious mental disabilities has found the practice to be unconstitutional.3
3 For example, Ruiz v. Johnson, Southern Federal District Court of Texas, 1999 (37 F. Supp. 2d. 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999)), rev’d on other grounds, Ruiz v. Johnson, Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, 2001 (243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001)), adhered to on remand, Ruiz v. Johnson, Southern Federal District Court of Texas, 2001 (154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001)) (“Conditions in TDCJ-ID’s administrative segregation units clearly violate constitutional standards when imposed on the subgroup of the plaintiff’s class made up of mentally-ill prisoners); Coleman v. Wilson, Eastern Federal District Court of California, 1995 (912 F.Supp. 1282, 1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995)); Madrid v. Gomez, Northern Federal District Court of California, 1995 (889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); Casey v. Lewis, Federal District Court of Arizona, 1993 (834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz. 1993)); Langley v. Coughlin, Southern Federal District Court of New York, 1988 (715 F. Supp. 522, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (holding that evidence of prison officials’ failure to screen out from SHU ‘those individuals who, by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to be severely and adversely affected by placement there’ states an Eighth amendment claim).
12
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 12 of 28 PageID #: 12

67. The US Department of Justice, when it has investigated the isolation and segregation of adolescents in adult facilities, has suggested that there are constitutional limits related to the physical and social isolation of youth with regard to conditions, duration, and process.
68. In 2003, the United States Congress enacted the Prison Rape Elimination Act, and Tennessee has agreed to be bound by its terms. Although in a different context, the law makes clear that solitary confinement of youth is inappropriate. The law bans isolation except as a last resort to keep the juvenile or others safe, and then only until an alternative can be arranged. It bans the practice for both rape victims and perpetrators of rape.
International Law Recognizes the Harm and Cruelty of Juvenile Solitary Confinement
69. With regard to solitary confinement, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) describe punitive solitary confinement of young people under age 18 as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
70. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, which interprets the CRC, has also suggested that the punitive solitary confinement of young people under age 18 is cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
71. The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty reiterates this conclusion.
72. A number of treaty and regional bodies have suggested that the prolonged solitary confinement of both adults and children can constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
73. The special rapporteur on torture, in his report to the General Assembly, called for an absolute ban on solitary confinement for young people under age 18: “The Special Rapporteur holds the view that the imposition of solitary confinement, of any duration, on juveniles is cruel,
13 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 13 of 28 PageID #: 13

inhuman or degrading treatment and violates article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 16 of the Convention against Torture.”
74. The special rapporteur also called for an absolute ban on solitary confinement of those with mental disabilities because the adverse effects are especially significant for persons with serious mental health problems.
75. Although most research on solitary confinement has focused on adults, the findings of this research reasonably can be applied to youth.
76. Research shows that adults who are subject to solitary confinement generally exhibit a variety of negative physiological and psychological reactions, including: hypersensitivity to external stimuli; perceptual distortions and hallucinations; increased anxiety and nervousness; revenge fantasies, rage, and irrational anger; fears of persecution; lack of impulse control; severe and chronic depression; appetite loss and weight loss; heart palpitations; withdrawal; blunting of affect and apathy; talking to oneself; headaches; problems sleeping; confusing thought processes; nightmares; dizziness; self-mutilation; and lower levels of brain function, including a decline in EEG activity after only a few days in solitary confinement.
77. Young people are even less psychologically able than adults to handle solitary confinement. Youth are also psychologically different than adults. They experience time differently (a day for a child feels longer than a day to an adult) and have a greater need for social stimulation.
78. Experts, such as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, believe that, due to their “developmental vulnerability,” adolescents are particularly at risk of adverse reactions.
14 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 14 of 28 PageID #: 14

79. Research published by the Department of Justice found that more than 50% of the suicides of children detained in juvenile facilities occurred while youth were confined alone in their room (a form of solitary confinement) – and that more than 60% of young people who committed suicide had a history of being held in isolation.
80. Additionally, the literature recognizes that children held in isolation are far less likely to receive appropriate education or access to physical development.
81. Defendants, who have received training and reviewed literature related to the special needs of children, were either aware or recklessly unaware of the extremely adverse consequences of solitary confinement on children, and especially on children with mental health needs.
Count One: Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. §1983) 82. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding paragraphs in this Complaint. 83. Defendants, individually and in concert, deprived, and are continuing to deprive, John Doe of the rights secured to him by the United States Constitution. 84. By subjecting John Doe to lengthy solitary confinement as a means of punishment and without regard to his possible mental illness, Defendants have violated, and are continuing to violate, Plaintiff’s right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, his right to due process, and to be kept in humane conditions while awaiting his adjudication, as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 85. Subjecting John Doe to solitary confinement is objectively harmful and inhumane.
15 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 15 of 28 PageID #: 15

86. All Defendants were subjectively aware, or should have been aware but for their reckless disregard of the facts and information available to them, that solitary confinement of juveniles in general and John Doe in particular was unreasonably harmful and inhumane.
87. The solitary confinement of John Doe was unnecessary, served no legitimate interest and violated public policy and law in other regards.
88. Defendants all acted with deliberate indifference and/or intent when they deprived John Doe of his constitutionally protected rights.
89. In depriving John Doe of these rights, Defendants acted under color of state law. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Count Two: Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
(Declaratory Judgment) 90. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding paragraphs in this Complaint. 91. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that Defendants’ actions, whether authorized by policy, statute, rule, custom or practice, violate his rights and would violate his rights in the future, as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Count Three TRO, Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief
42 U.S.C. § 1983 92. Based on the allegations contained in previous paragraphs, which are re-alleged here by reference, Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent injunction. 93. John Doe’s Eighth Amendment rights have been violated under color of state law.
16 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 16 of 28 PageID #: 16

94. To end an ongoing violation of John Doe’s rights, Defendants must be immediately restrained from placing John Doe in solitary confinement as a punishment or discipline, and from placing him in solitary confinement for any reason until they provide a mental health assessment and obtain appropriate medical advice/consent
95. To make John Doe whole and restore his rights, Defendants must also be enjoined from taking further action to deprive John Doe of his right to humane treatment while awaiting adjudication in the form of placing him in solitary confinement.
96. Defendants have indicated that they use solitary confinement routinely to administer punishment and discipline, and have used the practice routinely on John Doe.
97. Defendants’ violation has been ratified by a Court, and no meaningful review is available to him. Accordingly, John Doe has no adequate remedy at law and only injunctive relief can restore John Doe’s constitutionally protected rights and ensure the protection of his rights in the future.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following relief: A. An order declaring that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff’s rights protected under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; B. An immediate temporary restraining order prohibiting the continued solitary confinement of John Doe; C. An order preliminarily and then permanently enjoining Defendants and their officers, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, servants, employees and all other persons or entities in active conceit or privity or participation with them, from placing John Doe or other juveniles in pretrial detention in solitary confinement for punitive or disciplinary reasons;
17 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 17 of 28 PageID #: 17

D. An order enjoining the enforcement of any of Defendant’s’ policies or procedures that authorize the solitary confinement of pretrial detainees or of juveniles who suffer from mental illness;
E. An order directing Defendants to take such affirmative steps necessary to remediate the past use of solitary confinement on juveniles in pretrial detention;
F. An order enjoining Defendants and their officers, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, servants, employees and all other persons or entities in active concert or privity or participation with them, from taking retaliatory action against Plaintiff for bringing this lawsuit, or against any pretrial detainees for their past or future expressions of support Plaintiff or opposition to Defendants’ use of solitary confinement on juvenile pretrial detainees;
F. An entry of judgment for Plaintiff against Defendants for nominal or compensatory damages;
G. An award of Attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988, et seq. or under any other relevant authority;
H. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter to enforce the terms of the Court's orders', and
I. Such further and different relief as this Court may deem just and proper or that is necessary to make the Plaintiff whole.
18 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 18 of 28 PageID #: 18

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Wesley B. Clark__________ Wesley B. Clark, #032611 DOWNTON CLARK, PLLC 2706 Larmon Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 (615) 984-4681 wesley@downtonclark.com

/s/ Mark J. Downton_______ Mark J. Downton, #020053 DOWNTON CLARK, PLLC 2706 Larmon Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 (615) 984-4681 mark@downtonclark.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

19 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 19 of 28 PageID #: 19

EXHIBIT 1
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 20 of 28 PageID #: 20

IN THE JUVENILE COURT OF RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, AT MURFREESBORO

STATE OF TENNESSEE, IN THE MATTER OF:

NO.

75;;>,50 3

A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE

Next Court Date:_ _ _ _ _ __

-,£ Delinquent
D Status

,4
~~-

;) , 1 ·
~OJ:,Otr~

o Officer's Appearance!Waived
Plea Date: {) 3/0 rLI ~

· DETENTION HEARING ORDER .

~ . . · I' fl"r-

r Upon the proof introduced at the hearing with all necessary parties properly before the Court ang.J:~\eB,tjrAfecord,

the Court finds, pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-114(c), that:

SIL II: U

A. DETENTION CRITERIA:

~MARl 8 2016 ,: :;u:.1<= ~ i : : -

"'

\..
~

h1

e

r

e

is

probable

cause

to

believe

that

the

child

has

committed

a

DELINQUENT

O

F

,
FE

N

S

~

: -

---=~~,,,1 MELISSA HARRELL

DEP CLE

o

Constituting a crime against a person resulting ir:i or involving the likelihood of serious bodily injury or

death of the vi~tim (including aggravated rape, rape, and sexual battery).

o

Constituting the unlawful possessi_on of a handgun .or carrying a weapqn pur$uant to Title 39, Chapter

17, Part 13 of the Tennessee Code Annotated.

Constituting other delinquent offense involving the likelihood of serious physical injury or death, an offens constituting a e o violation of probation , or violation of aftercare, and the child is:

~

currently on probation ~

o

currently awaiting Court action on a previous alleged delinquent offense

o

alleged to be an escapee/absconder from a juvenile facility, institution, or other Court-ordered

placement, or

o

has, within the past 12 months, willfully failed to appear at any Court hearing, engaged in

violent conduct resulting in or involving the likelihood of serious bodily injury or death, or

o

has, within the past 12 · months, been adjudicated delinquent .by virtue of an offense

constituting a felony if committed by an adult

..

o

And the following special circumstances pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-114(a) indicate that the child

should be detained: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

o

The child is alleged to be an escapee from a secure juvenile facility or institution.

o

The child is want~d in another jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would

constitute a felony in that jurisdiction.

o There is probable cause to believe that the child has committed a VIOLATION OF A VALID COURT ORDER:

o

The child has been brought into a Court of competent jurisdiction and made subject to a lawful Order.

o

The Court has entered a judgment and/or remedy in accord with ~stablished legal principles based on

the facts after a hearing which observed proper legal principles.

o

The j uvenile received adequate and fair warning of the consequences of violating the Order at the

time it was issued, and such warning has been provided to the juvenile and his/her attorney and/or

legal guardian in writing and is reflected in the Court record and_proceedings.

o

All judicial proceedings related to the alleged violation of a valid Court Order were held before a Court

of competent jurisdiction.

~ THERE IS NO LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE THAT WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF FLIGHT OR SERIOUS

PHYSICAL HARCMasTeO3:T1H6E-cCv-H0I0LD79O9R DOoTcHuEmReSn. t 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 21 of 28 PageID #: 21

B. CONTRARY TO WELFARE:

C.

E EFFORTS TO PREVENT OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT:

·Prior to placement in detention, reasonable efforts were made and services rendered to prevent the removal of the child from his/her home, including:

~ Counselin_g/Outpatient

~ House Arrest

o Pretrial/Informal Diversion

o Family Support Services

o FCIP

o Prior Court Orders

~etter Choices" Program

o Public Service Work

~ Legal Representation:

~'.'"'ourt Probation

~ State Probation

Attorney

o Intensive

o Restitution

o Residential Services/Treatment ¢ Curfew

_C·_- ' A - t : - & - - ~ - - - - - -
o No-Contact Order(s)

?j( Other: Jt V c.tsmru,.t ;. Ile,, j, J L.o.w: f c)P u 11 Cc, • , rly_

o

It was reasonable not to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal from the home, in that:

o

Reasonable efforts have not been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:

· ){. The child shall remain in secure detention pending further Orders of this Court.

D

The child shall be conditionally released from detention to - - - - - - - - - - - on the

day of ·

, 20

, after ______

The child shall abide by the following rules if released: good & lawful behavior; required daily

attend

school; obey household rules; obey school rules; other:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

D

House Arrest ~ - - - - (ParenVGuardian's initials indicating receipt of Rules of House Arrest attached hereto)

Defendant/Parent/Guardian shall inform Court of any change of residence within 10 days of any such change

D

Other: No

NOTICE OF VIOLATION OF VALID COURT ORDER (VCO): Failure to comply with any Court Order is punishable, for which the penalties may include further disposition and/or detainment at the
Rutherford Co. Juvenile Detention Center. VCO remains in effect until - - - - - - - - - - -
f p j ;1 if Parties present included: Defendant Parent/Guardian Petitioner Attorney o Victim o.Interpreter DA

Magistrate
~\f\Y\v-.~
Judge

Date

Defendant
X
Attorney for Defendant

This Order pertains to a preliminary matter, and, if signed by a

Magistrate, is not reviewable by the Judge except on the Court's

Parent/Guardian

own motion. Exception: The setting of bond ~ reviewable by the

Judge upon the filing of a Request for Rehearing by any party

within 5 judicial dCayassoeft3hi:s1O6r-dcevr.-0Se0e7T9R9JP 4D. ocument 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 22 of 28 PageID #: 22

EXHIBIT 2
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 23 of 28 PageID #: 23

O~c:bo IN THE JUVENILE COURT

COUNTY, TENNESSEE

IN THE MATTER OF:

•

• • !.

-

)

J DocketNumber: :]'5d.5()

) )

Ch,;,ge(s) ~~o.W:"Jl.& ('u)

)

)

Felony/Misdemeanor Charge (s) and Tennessee Code(j

)

Citation (s):

) )

- -- - --f-ltENJ

)

- -------------11~r11,fA11-tRr-r.1 8 ~· ni.:;

ORDER FOR OUTPATIENT EVALUATION OF A CHILD UNDER T.C.A. §37-1-128(e)(l)
AND NON-CUSTODIAL ASSESSMENT BY

/:::J '£)\.0 v>• •v ..

,

~ L1SSA HAFiRE' - - · .

OE

THE TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES

This cause was heard on the /S"it,day of ~(C..h.

, 201.k. It appeared to the court

that: (1) there is reason to believe that the childas a mental illness and/or mental retardation; (2)

that it would be in the best interests of the child to undergo an evaluation to determine his or her

mental status to assist the court in disposition of this case; and (3) to have a thorough and

complete assessment, it is necessary to involve both a mental health care provider and the

Department of Children's Services (DCS).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The child submit to an outpatient mental evaluation a ~ (s:u,~ d,a ntL

f <-1 rd:<L

Mental alt Center on the date and time specified

by tlit'Center, but no later than ---r-+-+b''f-+-------

2. The Youth Services Officer (YSO) shall contact the mental health agency and arrange for an appointment for evaluation and, if necessary, ensure that the child is transported to the agency for the examination. The YSO shall deliver a certified copy of this order with the petition to the appropriate individual at the agency. The YSO may also send facsimile copies of the same documents.

3. The representative ofthe Department of Children's Services shall facilitate the gathering of information needed to accomplish a thorough assessment.

4. The examining professional shall conduct an evaluation and report to the court: a. Whether the child has a mental illness or mental retardation; b. Whether the child · is subject to voluntary admission or involuntary commitment; c. The type of care, training and treatment required to address any mental illness or mental retardation found;

Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 24 of 28 PageID #: 24

d. Any resources available to provide such services including but not limited

to those provided by DCS.
d e. Specificfor~issues~ ~
:::::r:~~~ _..l-G.,

C
_t):rif¥_nc~

f. Other

5. The staff of the mental health center shall prepare and forward to the court a report which shall address all of the information set out above.
6. If the professional attempting to perform the evaluation for mental illness or developmental disability determines that the evaluation can not be performed on an outpatient basis, the court may order the child placed in a hospital or treatment resource as defined by T.C.A. §33-1-101, for the purposes of evaluation and for treatment necessary to the evaluation, for not more than thirty (30) days.
7. The mental health provider and DCS shall share any information or data on the child without a consent for release of information, including any information or data obtained from sources other than those referenced in this order. The mental health center and DCS are authorized to provide such information to any other provider recommended to the court as necessary for additional services to the child.
8. The Department of Children's Services shall immediately proceed with a noncustodial assessment to determine the need for TennCare benefits and services provided by or accessed through the Department and shall report its findings to the Court and the mental health center within 15 days from date of this order. DCS or the provider shall urge the parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian to apply for TennCare benefits on behalf of the child. The representative of the Department of Children's Services shall meet with the family of the child as soon as possible to assist in the application for TennCare benefits. In the event the parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian refuses or is in any way unavailable to apply for TennCare benefits, DCS is authorized by this court order to apply for TennCare benefits on behalf of the child.
9. The mental health center shall request services from TennCare, private insurance carrier or other potential payer as soon as possible after determination of any further treatment, care, training or other services recommended by the Court.
I0. Ifan evaluation is requested for a misdemeanor charge then the cost of the evaluation is the responsibility ofthe county in which the charges originated.

Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 25 of 28 PageID #: 25

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Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 26 of 28 PageID #: 26

EXHIBIT 3
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 1 Filed 04/25/16 Page 27 of 28 PageID #: 27

April 6, 2016
The Honorable Donna Scott-Davenport Juvenile Court of Rutherford County 1710 South Church Street Murfreesboro, TN 37130
RE: Docket#: 75250J

Dear Judge Scott;

I am writing this letter to let you know that despite scheduling this evaluation at the Rutherford County

Juvenile Detention Center in advance, Dr. Moore was unable to evaluate

today due

to an unplanned facil ity incident and lack of accommodation for space. Dr. Moore was instructed to

reschedule by detention center staff and a new evaluation date has been set for 4/25/16.

lfyou have any questions, please feel free to contact me at 615-459-9251.

Sincerely,
Sh!llir·
Forensic Secre tary

cc: Leslie Collum, Assistant District Attorney Wesley Clark, Attorney for theDefendant

The Guidance Center
131 Mayfield Drive • Smyrna, TN 37167 • (615) 459-9251 • Fox: (615) 459-0791
Case 3:16-cv-00799 DocuHmelpeTnotd1ay...FFioler do B0e4tt/e2r5T/o1m6orroPwage 28 of 28 PageID #: 28

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through his )

Mother and next friend, SHARIEKA

)

FRAZIER,

)

)

On behalf of himself and all others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, in her official )

capacity as the Commissioner of the

)

Tennessee Department of Children’s

)

Services, THE TENNESSEE

)

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN’S

)

SERVICES, RUTHERFORD COUNTY, )

TENNESSEE, LYNN DUKE, in her

)

individual and official capacity as Director )

of the Rutherford County Detention Facility )

and LIEUTENANT ANGELA

)

ISTVANDITSCH, in her individual and )

official capacity as an officer of the

)

Rutherford County Juvenile Detention

)

Facility,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

No. 3-16-cv-00799

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), as a matter of course, Plaintiff John Doe1, by and

through his mother and next friend Sharieka Frazier and his undersigned counsel, sues Defendants,

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), Rutherford County, Tennessee (“the

1 John Doe is a minor, so his name has been redacted pursuant to Local Rules. Similarly, counsel has redacted his name and other identifying information from exhibits and other documents submitted herewith.
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 689

County”), Lynn Duke (“Duke”), and Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch, in their individual and official capacities as director and officer of the Facility, showing as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This class action lawsuit challenges the unconstitutional and inhumane treatment of juveniles placed into lengthy periods of solitary confinement under Tennessee’s juvenile justice system. 2. Named Plaintiff John Doe is a child who was charged with and later adjudicated of offenses that render him delinquent under the laws of Tennessee. John Doe was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility. He is currently in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and is placed at the Middle Tennessee Juvenile Detention Facility in Maury County, Tennessee. DCS plans to transfer John Doe to one of its Youth Development Centers (“YDCs”) as soon as a bed becomes available. At each of the facilities, John Doe has been, is or will be subject to lengthy periods of solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive reasons, specifically for breaking even minor rules of behavior such as touching the television. John Doe is uniquely situated to represent the interests of other juveniles housed in detention throughout Tennessee, because he has been, is or will be subject to the inhumane rules of every level of secure detention in Tennessee, and has already personally suffered from solitary confinement under this system. 3. At issue in this case is whether the government may lawfully place any child in solitary confinement for long periods of time for punitive or disciplinary reasons. 4. Although the statutory scheme for juvenile justice in Tennessee requires licensure and supervision of all detention facilities by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, DCS has almost no standards, rules, policies or regulations for pretrial detainees. Instead, DCS
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allows local detention facilities, like the facility in Rutherford County, to promulgate their own policies and procedures for juvenile detention. Enabled by DCS’s neglect, local facilities, and Rutherford County in particular, have promulgated and currently follow policies that explicitly allow or require lengthy periods of solitary confinement of juveniles for punitive or disciplinary reasons.
5. The statutory scheme for juvenile justice in Tennessee further requires that DCS provide for the care and welfare of children adjudicated delinquent and placed into DCS custody under the state’s juvenile justice tract. To that end, DCS maintains three Youth Development Centers (“YDCs”) to house children in its custody who have been adjudicated delinquent of certain serious crimes and who meet certain conditions. DCS maintains administrative policies for the YDCs that explicitly allow lengthy solitary confinement, up to five (5) days, for punitive reasons when children violate the rules of those facilities.
6. Although mentioned nowhere in the statutory scheme or the administrative policies of DCS, DCS also places children in facilities referred to as “interim” detention facilities after a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent based on certain serious charges, but before a bed/cell opens up at a YDC. There are no published policies or procedures for these facilities.
7. Prior to his adjudication as delinquent, Rutherford County subjected John Doe to lengthy periods of solitary confinement on multiple occasions for punitive or disciplinary reasons.
8. The policies and procedures of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center require solitary confinement of juveniles who violate facility rules, beginning at isolation for periods of twelve (12) hours and continuing up to indefinite solitary confinement. John Doe spent several days in solitary confinement at the Rutherford County Detention Center between March and May, 2016 based on these policies.
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9. Other juveniles housed at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility are subject to the same “Standard Operating Procedures” that require lengthy periods of solitary confinement for any rules violations. Rutherford County routinely places children into solitary confinement under these “Standard Operating Procedures”.
10. Upon information and belief, the “Standard Operating Procedures” of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility are representative of the inhumane policies related to the solitary confinement of juveniles that are currently in place and that are currently followed by juvenile detention personnel throughout the State of Tennessee.
11. DCS has now placed John Doe at the Middle Tennessee Juvenile Detention Center in Columbia, Tennessee. Upon information and belief, that facility, operating under the supervision of DCS, also allows lengthy solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons.
12. DCS has stated that it will place John Doe at a YDC as soon as bed becomes available. Once he is placed at a YDC, John Doe will again be subject to lengthy periods of solitary confinement for punitive/disciplinary reasons if he violates certain rules.
13. The practice of placing juveniles in solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons is subject to repetition, and likely happens every day in Tennessee. John Doe has personally experienced the harmful effects of solitary confinement on multiple occasions.
14. Imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles for punitive or disciplinary reasons violates John Doe’s and other juveniles’ rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and their rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 15. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § l983 for Defendants’ violations of his civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief for himself and similarly situated juveniles that the policies and procedures allowing lengthy solitary confinement of juveniles for disciplinary or punitive reasons are unconstitutional and cannot be enforced against him or others. 16. This court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights). 17. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and (2) because the defendants reside in this district and the events and omissions giving rise to the claims occurred and/or will occur in this district.
PARTIES 18. Plaintiff John Doe is a child currently in DCS custody and residing at the Middle Tennessee Juvenile Detention Center in Columbia, Tennessee. He was previously detained as a juvenile pretrial detainee at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility in solitary confinement. Sharieka Frazier is his mother. They are citizens and residents of Rutherford County, Tennessee in this judicial district. 19. Plaintiff is subject to the authority and directives of Defendants DCS, the Facility, Duke and Istvanditsch. 20. John Doe has standing to pursue this lawsuit. 21. Defendant Hommrich is the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) is an agency of the State of Tennessee statutorily required to provide services, treatment and protection for vulnerable
5 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 5 of 27 PageID #: 693

children throughout the State of Tennessee. DCS is specifically mandated to protect children deemed delinquent, and to license and supervise facilities that hold juveniles under charges of delinquency. DCS has placed children at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility and subjected those children to the rules of that facility, including rules that mandate lengthy solitary confinement as punishment for minor rules violations. DCS can be served with process through the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee.
22. The Defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee operates the only detention facility for juveniles in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and specifically oversaw the confinement of John Doe. It continues to supervise the detention of other juveniles like John Doe, some of whom are from Rutherford County, and others of whom are placed at the Rutherford County Facility by contract with other counties or DCS. The County can be served with process through Director Lynn Duke, at 1710 S Church St #4, Murfreesboro, TN 37130.
23. The Defendant Lynn Duke is the director of the Facility, and is responsible for the day to day operations thereof, including provision and enforcement of solitary confinement. She can be served with process at 1710 S Church St #4, Murfreesboro, TN 37130.
24. The Defendant Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch is an officer employed at the Facility, and is responsible for the supervision and protection of children housed there, including Q.F. She can be served with process at 1710 S Church St #4, Murfreesboro, TN 37130.
25. At all times material to this lawsuit Defendants Duke and Istvanditsch were employed by the County. They are sued in their individual and official capacities.
26. Defendants DCS, Hommrich, Rutherford County, Tennessee, Duke and Istvanditsch, at all times relevant hereto, were acting under color of law.
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ALLEGATIONS SPECIFIC TO JOHN DOE 27. The Juvenile Court for Rutherford County, Tennessee (“the Juvenile Court”) ordered John Doe detained while awaiting adjudication in the Facility on March 18, 2016. John That Court adjudicated John Doe delinquent and placed him into Defendant DCS’s custody on May 10, 2016. In the interim, John Doe was housed at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility. 28. The Juvenile Court further ordered that DCS provide the child with a mental evaluation by April 18, 2016, because “there is reason to believe the child has a mental illness and/or mental retardation”. 29. Immediately upon his admission into the Facility, and for a period of several days, John Doe was placed into solitary confinement by Rutherford County for punitive and/or disciplinary reasons. 30. A mental health provider attempted to conduct the evaluation Ordered by the Court on April 6, 2016, but was turned away from the facility because the Facility refused to allow face to face contact between the evaluator and the child due to an “incident” at the facility. Accordingly, the evaluation was not conducted until April 25, 2016. 31. On April 19, 2016, before any mental evaluation, County employees at the Facility, including Duke and Istvanditsch, requested the Rutherford County District Attorney’s Office file a Motion to Review Detention, seeking again to place John Doe in seclusion/isolation for 23 hours a day with no books or other materials, and with the window to his cell covered with a board, for an indefinite amount of time. 32. On April 19, 2016, County employees from the Facility, including Istvanditsch under the direction of Duke, prosecuted the motion to place John Doe in solitary confinement.
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Agents of the Department of Children’s Services were present at the hearing, but made no objections to Defendant Istvanditsch’s request that the court grant permission to punish John Doe by placing him in isolation for an indefinite period of time.
33. The Court recorded the hearing wherein County officials requested approval of their plan to isolate John Doe indefinitely. County officials admitted at the hearing that John Doe had not harmed or threatened to harm anyone, and that no emergency condition existed.
34. Defendants urged placement of John Doe into indeterminate solitary confinement because he was disobedient and he had allegedly disrupted the Facility’s classroom, “hollered,” “rapped,” and had “flashed gang symbols.” Defendants did not allege that John Doe was a physical danger to himself or others, that an emergency existed or that he had made threats to other inmates or officers at the Facility. Defendants sought solitary confinement for the purposes of punishment and/or discipline.
35. At the solitary confinement hearing, Lieutenant Istvanditsch acknowledged that John Doe likely suffered from some sort of mental illness and that he had been “acting crazy.”
36. Defendants proceeded to place John Doe in solitary confinement again on April 19, 2016, and he remained there until a Temporary Restraining Order compelled his release.
37. John Doe’s solitary confinement typically included isolation in a concrete cell for 23 out of 24 hours a day, with no access to books, magazines, music or other educational or recreational materials. On occasion, the only window to his cell has been covered with a board.
38. Throughout his solitary confinement, John Doe was excluded from the Facility’s educational program, and no alternative was provided. John Doe was further excluded from all recreational activities and was not been allowed meaningful opportunities to exercise his body.
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39. John Doe was not allowed access to a counselor or other mental health professional throughout most of his detention, and certainly not before or during his periods of solitary confinement.
40. John Doe suffered and is currently suffering adverse consequences form his continued solitary confinement, including further withdrawal, depression, listlessness and lethargy. The total extent of harm visited upon him is unknown.
41. Defendants’ actions to place John Doe in solitary confinement were not motivated by safety and were, instead, motivated by a desire to punish/discipline John Doe.
42. Defendants routinely place juveniles into solitary confinement for lengthy periods of time based upon a determination to punish or discipline youth.
43. Upon his adjudication as a delinquent, John Doe was placed into DCS custody for an indeterminate amount of time.
44. The Juvenile Court of Rutherford County Tennessee retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction over John Doe, up to his nineteenth birthday. As such, John Doe will be subject to periodic review of his DCS custody by the Rutherford County Juvenile Court, and will return to Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility for each of several required reviews.
45. DCS has currently placed John Doe at the Middle Tennessee Juvenile Detention Facility in Columbia, Tennessee. That facility is also licensed and supervised by DCS by statute. Upon information and belief, that facility also follows policies that allow placement of juveniles into solitary confinement for lengthy periods of time.
46. DCS plans to place John Doe into one of its three Youth Development Centers. DCS policy explicitly allows for the solitary confinement of juveniles at YDCs for punitive or disciplinary reasons for up to five (5) days at a time.
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POLICIES OF RUTHERFORD COUNTY 47. Officials at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center follow Standard Operating Procedures. 48. The Standard Operating Procedures for Rutherford County’s Juvenile Detention Facility not only allow for solitary confinement: they require solitary confinement of juveniles for punitive or disciplinary reasons. 49. Under the “Behavior Management” section of the Procedures, the County describes its “confinement” procedure as follows: “Confinement consists of placing a detainee in a designated room by him or herself for a period of time. Confinement may be used to gain immediate control of a situation, to ensure safety and security, and/or discipline a detainee for violations of facility rules” 50. The policy further prescribes the following additional restrictions or mandates for “confinement” of juveniles:
a. “detainees are not allowed contact with the general population”; b. “a window board shall be placed over the detainee’s window when they are on
confinement”; c. “Detainees on confinement will not be eligible to receive recreation time or leisure
time”; d. “Educational services may be taken from the detainee”; e. “While in confinement detainees will not be allowed to have any reading material”
(except the Bible). 51. The SOP further sets forth a list of rules for detainees. These rules prohibit a large range of conduct from “must make your bed” to “no cursing” to no fighting.
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52. The SOP then sets forth a “behavioral continuum” that mandates consequences for rules violations. The only consequence available is “confinement”. For some rules violations, mandatory confinement begins at twelve hours, but it may begin at or jump to “indefinite”.
53. Rutherford County uses several terms to describe its policy that mandates isolation and deprivation of sensory stimuli for juveniles, such as “loss of privileges”, “confinement”, “lock down”, “seclusion” and others. Each of these words are interchangeable and mean the same thing—the child is separated from all meaningful human contact and is allowed no stimuli for brain or body for up to indefinite amounts of time, except for one hour per day.
54. Upon information and belief, Rutherford County’s SOPs are representative of the policies followed by other local detention facilities throughout the state.
DCS AND JUVENILE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TENNESSEE 54. In Tennessee, juveniles in all forms of custody fall under the purview of DCS. DCS provides care and oversight for juveniles upon adjudication as dependent and neglected minors, or upon adjudication as delinquency for commission of offenses that would be criminal if committed by adults. 55. DCS licenses and supervises facilities that house juveniles awaiting adjudication. 56. The overall goals of DCS are set forth by statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-5-102 (2016) as follows: (1) Protect children from abuse, mistreatment or neglect; (2) Provide prevention, early intervention, rehabilitative and educational services; (3) Pursue appropriate and effective behavioral and mental health treatment; (4) Ensure that health care needs, both preventive and practical, are met; and (5) Keep children safe.
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57. DCS is responsible for the licensing and supervision of detention centers for juveniles, and is specifically responsible for licensing and supervision of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility, Middle Tennessee Juvenile Detention Center and the Youth Development Centers, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-5-109(1) (2016).
58. Despite its obligations related to all juvenile detention centers in Tennessee, DCS maintains detailed policies and procedures only for its YDCs.
59. DCS has very limited policies and procedures for the treatment of pretrial detainees who are not housed at YDCs, relying largely on individual providers/facilities to create and maintain their own policies.
60. DCS is required by state and federal law to place children in the least restrictive environment possible.
60. DCS Policy explicitly allows solitary confinement for disciplinary purposes at YDCs.
61. DCS Administrative Policies and Procedures: 25.5 DOE governs confinement at YDCs. Under that policy, children may be isolated for up to five days, if approved by an administrator, as a sanction for rules violations. The child must be released from confinement after five days, but if the YDC waits two days, the YDC may return the child to isolation for another five days in a potentially never-ending cycle.
62. DCS’s disciplinary confinement policy requires that the youth be observed by staff at least every fifteen minutes, and that a child in confinement for three days receive consultation from a medical consultant. These controls are an implicit admission that such confinement is damaging to the mental well-being of juveniles.
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SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES IS EXCEPTIONALLY HARMFUL 63. While isolated in solitary confinement, children are deprived of the services and
programming they need for healthy growth and development. 64. Solitary confinement can cause serious psychological, physical, and developmental
harm – or, worse, can lead to persistent mental health problems and suicide. These risks are magnified for young people with disabilities or histories of trauma and abuse.
65. Normal human contact and a range of age-appropriate services and programming are essential for the development and rehabilitation of young offenders.
66. There can be no doubt that the solitary confinement of juveniles is objectively harmful, as authorities from state, federal, international and scientific communities agree that such confinement is extremely damaging to youth.
67. An overwhelming number of youth in juvenile detention are victims of psychological, physical or sexual abuse.
68. An overwhelming number of youth in juvenile detention suffer from diagnosed and undiagnosed mental illness.
69. The mind and psyche of juveniles remains in a developmental stage, and is particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of solitary confinement.
State Acknowledgement of Harm 70. At the state level, DCS has conflicting policies regarding solitary confinement. These conflicting policies allow the practice of solitary confinement as punishment to continue throughout the system.
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71. In DCS’s Administrative Policies and Procedures: 27.2 DOE, DCS, refers to solitary confinement as “seclusion”, and declares that “[t]he use of seclusion is seen as a restrictive intervention and one that poses a risk to the psychological well-being of a child/youth.”
72. The policy authorizes seclusion of youth only in emergency situation where the child is a risk of harm to himself or others. Seclusion can only be used upon the order of a doctor, psychologist or other professional.
73. Orders for seclusion are limited to one (1) hour, and no more than two (2) hours in a twenty-four (24) hour period. Seclusion must end when the danger of the child to himself or others has ended.
74. For children in YDCs, 19.12 DCS absolutely prohibits the use of seclusion “as a punishment or consequence”.
75. It is clear that the State of Tennessee, acting through DCS, has acknowledged the objective harm of seclusion, and is subjectively aware of the harm.
76. Despite its awareness of the brutal harm caused by solitary confinement, DCS continues to allow its use at the local level, at detention centers like the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center, and at its YDCs. DCS allows this inhumane practice to continue because it is deliberately indifferent to the harm the practice causes the youth DCS claims to serve.
Federal Authorities Further Acknowledge the Harm of Solitary Confinement of Juveniles 77. President Obama recently took executive action prohibiting the solitary
confinement of juveniles in the federal system, acknowledging the severe harmful effects on children.
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78. The US Attorney General’s National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence
said, “nowhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than
when it involves solitary confinement.”
79. Nearly every court to consider the solitary confinement of adults with serious mental disabilities has found the practice to be unconstitutional.2
80. The US Department of Justice, when it has investigated the isolation and
segregation of adolescents in adult facilities, has suggested that there are constitutional limits
related to the physical and social isolation of youth with regard to conditions, duration, and process.
81. In 2003, the United States Congress enacted the Prison Rape Elimination Act, and
Tennessee has agreed to be bound by its terms. Although in a different context, the law makes
clear that solitary confinement of youth is inappropriate. The law bans isolation except as a last
resort to keep the juvenile or others safe, and then only until an alternative can be arranged. It bans
the practice for both rape victims and perpetrators of rape.
International Law Recognizes the Harm and Cruelty of Juvenile Solitary Confinement 82. With regard to solitary confinement, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of
Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) describe punitive solitary confinement of young people
under age 18 as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
2 For example, Ruiz v. Johnson, Southern Federal District Court of Texas, 1999 (37 F. Supp. 2d. 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999)), rev’d on other grounds, Ruiz v. Johnson, Fifth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, 2001 (243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001)), adhered to on remand, Ruiz v. Johnson, Southern Federal District Court of Texas, 2001 (154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001)) (“Conditions in TDCJ-ID’s administrative segregation units clearly violate constitutional standards when imposed on the subgroup of the plaintiff’s class made up of mentally-ill prisoners); Coleman v. Wilson, Eastern Federal District Court of California, 1995 (912 F.Supp. 1282, 1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995)); Madrid v. Gomez, Northern Federal District Court of California, 1995 (889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); Casey v. Lewis, Federal District Court of Arizona, 1993 (834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz. 1993)); Langley v. Coughlin, Southern Federal District Court of New York, 1988 (715 F. Supp. 522, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (holding that evidence of prison officials’ failure to screen out from SHU ‘those individuals who, by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to be severely and adversely affected by placement there’ states an Eighth amendment claim).
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83. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, which interprets the CRC, has also suggested that the punitive solitary confinement of young people under age 18 is cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
84. The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty reiterates this conclusion.
85. A number of treaty and regional bodies have suggested that the prolonged solitary confinement of both adults and children can constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
86. The special rapporteur on torture, in his report to the General Assembly, called for an absolute ban on solitary confinement for young people under age 18: “The Special Rapporteur holds the view that the imposition of solitary confinement, of any duration, on juveniles is cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and violates article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 16 of the Convention against Torture.”
87. The special rapporteur also called for an absolute ban on solitary confinement of those with mental disabilities because the adverse effects are especially significant for persons with serious mental health problems.
88. Although most research on solitary confinement has focused on adults, the findings of this research reasonably can be applied to youth.
89. Research shows that adults who are subject to solitary confinement generally exhibit a variety of negative physiological and psychological reactions, including: hypersensitivity to external stimuli; perceptual distortions and hallucinations; increased anxiety and nervousness; revenge fantasies, rage, and irrational anger; fears of persecution; lack of impulse control; severe and chronic depression; appetite loss and weight loss; heart palpitations; withdrawal; blunting of
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affect and apathy; talking to oneself; headaches; problems sleeping; confusing thought processes; nightmares; dizziness; self-mutilation; and lower levels of brain function, including a decline in EEG activity after only a few days in solitary confinement.
90. Young people are even less psychologically able than adults to handle solitary confinement. Youth are also psychologically different than adults. They experience time differently (a day for a child feels longer than a day to an adult) and have a greater need for social stimulation.
91. Experts, such as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, believe that, due to their “developmental vulnerability,” adolescents are particularly at risk of adverse reactions.
92. Research published by the Department of Justice found that more than 50% of the suicides of children detained in juvenile facilities occurred while youth were confined alone in their room (a form of solitary confinement) – and that more than 60% of young people who committed suicide had a history of being held in isolation.
93. Additionally, the literature recognizes that children held in isolation are far less likely to receive appropriate education or access to physical development.
94. All Defendants, who have received training and reviewed literature related to the special needs of children, were either aware or recklessly unaware of the extremely adverse consequences of solitary confinement on children, and especially on children with mental health needs.
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Count One: Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
(42 U.S.C. §1983) 95. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding paragraphs in this Complaint. 96. Defendants, individually and in concert, deprived, and are continuing to deprive, John Doe and similarly situated juveniles of rights secured by the United States Constitution.
97. By subjecting John Doe and similarly situated juveniles to lengthy solitary confinement as a means of punishment, Defendants have violated, are continuing to violate, and likely will violate John Doe’s and other juveniles’ right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, the right to due process, and the right to be kept in humane conditions, as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
98. Subjecting John Doe and other juveniles to solitary confinement for punitive or disciplinary reasons is objectively harmful and inhumane.
99. All Defendants were subjectively aware, or should have been aware but for their reckless disregard of the facts and information available to them, that solitary confinement of juveniles in general and John Doe in particular was unreasonably harmful and inhumane.
100. The solitary confinement of John Doe and other juveniles for punitive or disciplinary reasons is unnecessary, serves no legitimate interest and violates public policy and law in other regards.
101. Defendants all acted with deliberate indifference and/or intent when they deprived John Doe of his constitutionally protected rights.
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102. Defendants all acted with deliberate indifference when they enacted, or allowed to be enacted, policies that allow or require the solitary confinement of juveniles for punitive or disciplinary reasons.
103. In depriving John Doe and other juveniles of these rights, Defendants acted under color of state law. This deprivation under color of state law is actionable under and may be redressed by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Count Two: Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
(Declaratory Judgment) 104. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding paragraphs in this Complaint.
105. Plaintiff, individually or as representative of a class, is entitled to a declaration that Defendants’ actions, whether authorized by policy, statute, rule, custom or practice, have and will violate his rights and the rights of other juveniles, now and in the future, as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Count Three Permanent Injunctive Relief
42 U.S.C. § 1983 106. Based on the allegations contained in previous paragraphs, which are re-alleged here by reference, Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to a Permanent injunction.
107. The rights of John Doe and other juveniles under the Eighth Amendment have been violated under color of state law.
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108. The policies of Rutherford County and DCS make it a near certainty that the rights of John Doe and other juveniles will continue to be violated in the future, as these policies explicitly allow or require lengthy solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes.
109. To end an ongoing violation of John Doe’s and other juveniles’ rights, Defendants must be restrained from placing John Doe or other juveniles in solitary confinement as a punishment or discipline.
110. Under both DCS and Rutherford County policy, no meaningful review is available to John Doe or similarly situated juveniles to protect themselves from the harms of solitary confinement. Defendants’ paper grievance procedures only allow review after the solitary confinement has continued for a lengthy period of time, and the damage of the confinement has already been caused. Accordingly, John Doe has no adequate remedy at law and only injunctive relief can restore John Doe’s constitutionally protected rights and ensure the protection of his rights in the future.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 111. Plaintiff Doe brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief on his own behalf, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), on behalf of all others similarly situated. 112. Plaintiff Doe seeks to represent a class consisting of all current and future juveniles held in detention at secure facilities in the State of Tennessee. 113. All members of the Class are being harmed, or absent injunctive relief will be harmed, by Defendants’ policies, custom and practice of placing juveniles in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive reasons.
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114. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, namely whether Defendants engage in the challenged policies/customs/practices, and whether those policies/customs/practices violate class members’ rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
115. The proposed class representative’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because all inmates are subjected to the same unconstitutional conditions throughout Tennessee’s juvenile justice system, all as challenged in this Complaint.
116. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Plaintiff and unknown Class members can challenge the Defendants’ unlawful actions and policies regarding solitary confinement of juveniles. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions.
A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 117. Over the past several years, the Defendants have maintained a policy explicitly enforcing solitary confinement of juvenile detainees for disciplinary purposes. Pursuant to all Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs, each prospective Class member either has, is, or will be in jeopardy of solitary confinement at the hands of the Defendants. 118. The names, case numbers, dates of confinement, and all other relevant records are in possession of the Defendants and are easily ascertainable. 119. The Defendants have followed and continue to follow materially the same policies, practices, and procedures with respect to all of the Class members. 120. Those who are still detained or who will in the future be detained by the Defendants will be subjected to the same ongoing policies and practices absent the relief sought in this Complaint.
21 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 21 of 27 PageID #: 709

B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 121. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. The Plaintiff seeks relief concerning whether the Defendants’ policies, practices, and procedures violated their rights and relief requiring that those policies, practices and procedures be changed to protect their rights in the future. 122. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
• Factual determinations concerning whether the County and DCS permit and practice solitary confinement; • All of the facts surrounding how the County and DCS promulgate policies regarding disciplinary or punitive solitary confinement, and what DCS policies and practices are in place for the oversight of the County’s use of solitary confinement 123. Among the most important common question of law are: • Whether the use of solitary confinement against juveniles for punitive or
disciplinary reasons violates federal law 124. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set of policies and practices. The Defendants’ written policies and procedures expressly provide for and even require the use of disciplinary or punitive solitary confinement of juveniles. The Defendants operate openly under these policies and procedures openly and in materially the same manner every day.
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 125. The named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, and he has the same interests in this case as all other members of the Class that he represents. Each
22 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 22 of 27 PageID #: 710

of them suffered injuries from the failure of the Defendants to comply with constitutional and statutory duties detailed above. The answer to whether the Defendant’s policies and practices is unlawful in the ways alleged will determine the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other Class member.
126. If the named Plaintiff succeeds in his claims that the Defendants’ policies and practices concerning solitary confinement violate the law in the ways alleged in each claim of the Complaint, then that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Class.
D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 127. The named Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because he is a member of the Class and because his interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the Class. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class members, all of whom have a similar interest in vindicating the constitutional rights to which they are entitled. 128. The Plaintiff is represented by attorneys from Downton Clark, PLLC, and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Tennessee who have experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of the Defendant’s policies and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. 129. Due to the emergent nature of the situation in which the named Plaintiff found himself on April 25, 2016, counsel’s efforts commenced immediately and since that day counsel have interviewed witnesses, community members, and medical experts on the issues surrounding the solitary confinement of juveniles. 130. As a result, counsel have devoted considerable time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with the Defendant’s policies and procedures, as well as the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that should govern them.
23 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 23 of 27 PageID #: 711

131. Counsel for the Plaintiff possesses the resources to prosecute this case zealously. 132. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiff and their attorneys.
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 133. Class action status is appropriate because the Defendants, through the policies, practices, and procedures above described, have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class. Thus, a declaration that people in the Class are entitled, as a matter of federal law, to be free from disciplinary or punitive solitary confinement would benefit every member of the proposed Class. The same applies to legal rulings on other claims. 134. Injunctive relief compelling the Defendants to comply with these constitutional requirements will similarly protect each member of the Class from being subjected to the Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices with respect to the use of punitive or disciplinary solitary confinement. Furthermore, such relief will protect future detainees from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
F. Rule 23(b)(3) 135. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate because the common questions of law and fact overwhelmingly predominate in this case. This case turns, for the named Plaintiff, as well as for the members of the Class, on what the Defendants’ policies and practices are and on whether those policies are lawful. 136. The common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. Class-wide treatment of liability is a far superior method of determining the
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content and legality of the Defendants’ policies and practices than individual suits by hundreds or thousands of Tennessee residents.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the following relief: A. That the Court certify a class as defined and requested hereinabove; B. That the Court enter an order declaring that the Defendants have violated or will violate the Plaintiff’s and the class’s rights protected under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; C. That the Court enter an order permanently enjoining Defendants and their officers, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, servants, employees and all other persons or entities in active conceit or privity or participation with them, from placing John Doe or other juveniles in the class in solitary confinement for punitive or disciplinary reasons; D. That the Court enter an order permanently enjoining the enforcement of Defendants’ policies that allow or require solitary confinement of juveniles for disciplinary or punitive reasons; E. An order directing Defendants to take such affirmative steps necessary to remediate the past use of solitary confinement for punitive or disciplinary reasons on juveniles; F. An order enjoining Defendants and their officers, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, servants, employees and all other persons or entities in active concert or privity or participation with them, from taking retaliatory action against Plaintiff for bringing this lawsuit, or against any juvenile detainees for their past or future expressions of support Plaintiff or opposition to Defendants’ use of solitary confinement on juveniles for punitive or disciplinary reason;
25 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 25 of 27 PageID #: 713

G. An entry of judgment for Plaintiff and the class against only the County Defendants for nominal damages;
H. An award of Attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988, et seq. or under any other relevant authority;
I. That this Court retain jurisdiction of this matter to enforce the terms of the Court's orders' and appoint a neutral monitor to ensure compliance with injunctive relief; and
J. Such further and different relief as this Court may deem just and proper or that is necessary to make the Plaintiff and the class whole.
Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Mark J. Downton_______ Mark J. Downton, #020053 ACLU Cooperating Attorney DOWNTON CLARK, PLLC 2706 Larmon Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 (615) 984-4681 mark@downtonclark.com

/s/ Wesley B. Clark__________ Wesley B. Clark, #032611 ACLU Cooperating Attorney DOWNTON CLARK, PLLC 2706 Larmon Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204 (615) 984-4681 wesley@downtonclark.com

/s/ Thomas H. Castelli_________ Thomas H. Castelli, BPR#024849 Legal Director ACLU Foundation of Tennessee P.O. BOX 120160 Nashville, TN 37212 615.320.7142 tcastelli@aclu-tn.org
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 18, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served via ECF to:

Josh McCreary Attorney for Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch and Rutherford County Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square North P.O. Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 jmccreary@mborolaw.com

Nicholas Clinton Christiansen Attorney for Lynn Duke, Angela Istvanditsch and Rutherford County Cope, Hudson, Reed & McCreary, PLLC 16 Public Square North P.O. Box 884 Murfreesboro, TN 37133 nchristiansen@mborolaw.com

Alexander S. Rieger Attorney for Bonnie Hommrich and Department of Children’s Services Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General and Reporter General Civil Division P.O. Box 20207 Nashville, TN 37202 (615)532-5683 fax alex.rieger@ag.tn.gov

/s/ WESLEY CLARK

27 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 34 Filed 05/18/16 Page 27 of 27 PageID #: 715

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through

)

his Mother and next friend, SHARIEKA )

FRAZIER

)

)

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, et al.

)

NO. 3-16-0799 JUDGE TRAUGER

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Docket No. 54). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Frazier filed this action on behalf of her minor son pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her son’s constitutional rights. The primary issue in this case is whether facilities licensed and/or supervised by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, including the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center (“RCJDC”), may use solitary confinement for juvenile offenders for punitive or disciplinary reasons. Plaintiff John Doe is a minor who was charged with, and later adjudicated guilty of, offenses that rendered him delinquent under the laws of the State of Tennessee. The Amended Complaint (Docket No. 34) alleges that the Juvenile Court for Rutherford County, Tennessee, ordered Plaintiff detained in the RCJDC while he awaited adjudication. Plaintiff avers that, immediately upon his admission into RCJDC and for a period of several days, he was placed into solitary confinement by the Rutherford County Defendants (Rutherford County, Duke and Istvanditsch) for punitive and/or disciplinary reasons. The Amended Complaint alleges that, once Plaintiff was adjudicated

delinquent, he was put into the custody of the Defendant Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed at the Middle Tennessee Juvenile Detention Facility in Columbia, Tennessee, where he alleges he could be subjected to lengthy solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons. Plaintiff alleges that placing him in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive reasons violates his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief only.
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action as a class action on behalf of “all current and future juveniles detained in any facility licensed and/or supervised by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, including Juvenile Detention Centers operated by county governments or private entities” and a sub-class of “all current and future juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center and subject to Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center’s Standard Operating Procedures Behavior Management Policy, Chapter 6, § 19.” Plaintiff alleges that DCS and RCJDC policies and practices permit their licensed facilities to place members of the proposed classes in punitive and/or disciplinary solitary confinement.
CLASS CERTIFICATION A class action will be certified only if, after rigorous analysis, the court is satisfied that the prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) have been met and that the action falls within one of the categories under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Bridging Communities Inc. v. Top Flite Financial Inc., 843 F.3d 1119, 1124 (6th Cir. 2016). The decision whether to certify a class, committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, turns on the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 479 (W.D. Mich. 1994). The parties seeking class
2

certification bear the burden of showing that the requirements for class certification are met. Bridging Communities, 843 F.3d at 1124.
A party seeking to maintain a class action must be prepared to show that Rule 23(a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation requirements have been met. Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1428 (2013). In addition, the party must satisfy, through evidentiary proof, at least one of Rule 23(b)’s provisions. Id. at 1428-29. Class Definition
Before a court may certify a class pursuant to Rule 23, the class definition must be sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class. Young v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2012). If the class members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or “mini-trials”, then a class action is inappropriate. In re Skelaxin Antitrust Litigation, 299 F.R.D. 555, 557 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
As Defendants point out, Plaintiff does not allege that all solitary confinement of juveniles is constitutionally impermissible - only solitary confinement for punitive reasons.1 To show the same alleged injury in this case, the class members must be those who were actually placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes - not all juveniles who could be, but have not been, placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes.
Defendants argue that determining which juveniles were placed in solitary confinement or isolation would involve extensive individualized analysis, and yet, the Rutherford County

1

Plaintiff has admitted that solitary confinement or isolation may be appropriate

for some purposes, see, e.g., Docket No. 99, p. 5; Docket No. 34 (Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 33-

34, 41.

3

Defendants have produced a list of 128 juveniles who experienced “isolation” pursuant to RCJDC’s Behavioral Management policy (requiring “confinement”) from March 17, 2016, through October 7, 2016. Docket No. 94-2, Interrogatory No. 10; Docket Nos. 95 and 96. Thus, there is evidence that RCJDC has this information, and Plaintiff has provided evidence probative of the numbers and identities of juveniles who suffered the alleged unconstitutional harm in RCJDC.
Because it is possible to identify the juveniles in RCJDC who were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, Plaintiff’s class definition shall be revised to be “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 2 to the present.” The Rutherford County Defendants shall produce this information, for the relevant time period, by March 10, 2017.
With regard to the State Defendants, Plaintiff’s supporting documents refer only to the total number of juveniles in DCS secure facilities in Tennessee. Because that number is not limited to those who actually experienced the alleged unconstitutional harm, this proposed class is merely speculative. The proposed class members did not all share the same injury.3 If the DCS class is defined as broadly as Plaintiff asks, Defendants would have individual defenses to each class member’s situation - that is, whether he or she was placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary and/or punitive purposes. Such individualized analysis defeats the purposes of class actions.

2

The court has chosen this beginning point because it is one year before the filing

of this case, and the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is one year.

3

Moreover, Plaintiff does not even allege that he sustained unconstitutional injury

while he was in DCS custody. Docket No. 34 (Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 27-28; Doe Deposition,

p. 21.

4

There is no evidence before the court that the State Defendants maintain information concerning punitive solitary confinement, although there is also no indication that Plaintiff asked for that information. See Docket Nos. 84-1 and 94-8. Because this proposed class definition is too broad, and there is no information before the court to indicate that determining the members of the class would not involve individualized analysis, Plaintiff’s proposed DCS class cannot be certified at this time. Numerosity
The first requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although there is no strict numerical test, substantial numbers usually satisfy the numerosity requirement. Gilbert v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 2016 WL 4159682 at * 4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2016) (citing Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2006)). “There is no magic minimum number that will breathe life into a class.” Russo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 291, 294 (D. Conn. 2001). Plaintiff must show some evidence of or reasonably estimate the number of class members, and, in assessing numerosity, the court may make common sense assumptions without the need for precise quantification of the class. Id.
With regard to Rutherford County, Plaintiff has presented evidence from discovery that indicates that the number of juveniles held in RCJDC in one year (July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016) numbered more than 1,000. Docket No. 94-1 (indicating 986 juveniles from Rutherford County, 315 juveniles from out of county, and 38 juveniles from DCS). Plaintiff has also presented evidence from discovery that, from March 17, 2016 through October 7, 2016, 128 juveniles experienced “isolation” pursuant to RCJDC’s Behavioral Management policy that requires “confinement.” Docket No. 94-2, Interrogatory No. 10; Docket Nos. 95 and 96. The court interprets
5

this list to represent juveniles who were placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes.
Given the numbers produced by the Rutherford County Defendants in discovery, the court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the numerosity requirement with regard to that proposed class (as revised by the court). Joinder of all potential class members would be impractical and most juveniles, many still in DCS or RCJDC custody, would be unable to bring their own actions for this alleged constitutional violation. Moreover, numerous lawsuits on this same question could easily bring inconsistent rulings. Commonality
Rule 23 also requires that Plaintiff show questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Commonality requires that Plaintiff demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). Their claims must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution, which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation, 722 F.3d 838, 852 (6th Cir. 2013).
As noted above, to show the same alleged injury in this case, the class members must be those who were actually placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes - not all juveniles who could be, but have not been, placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes.
For the RCJDC revised class, the common questions are:
6

(1) Whether Defendants allow the use of solitary confinement of juveniles for punitive and/or disciplinary reasons.
(2) Whether the use of punitive and/or disciplinary solitary confinement of juveniles violates the U.S. Constitution.
The answers to the above questions would apply to all juveniles who have been placed in solitary confinement for punitive and/or disciplinary reasons at RCJDC. For these reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated commonality as to the RCJDC class, as revised above. Typicality
Typicality is met if the class members’ claims are fairly encompassed by the named plaintiffs’ claims. This requirement insures that the class representative’s interests are aligned with the interests of the represented class members so that, by pursing his own interests, the class representative also advocates the interests of the class members. Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 852-53. Thus, a plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and if his claims are based on the same legal theory. In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir. 1996); Young, 693 F.3d at 543.
Commonality and typicality tend to merge because both of them serve as guideposts for determining whether, under the particular circumstances, maintenance of a class action is economical, and whether the plaintiff’s claims and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Young, 693 F.3d at 542. Typicality cannot be established when a named plaintiff who proves his own claim would not necessarily have proved anyone else’s claim. Coleman v. General Motors Acceptance
7

Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64. 79 (M.D. Tenn. 2004). If Plaintiff here proves his constitutional claim, he will prove the constitutional claims of the other class members, so long as the class is defined in the limited way described above. If placing RCJDC juveniles in solitary confinement for disciplinary and/or punitive reasons is unconstitutional as to Plaintiff, it is also unconstitutional for other RCJDC juveniles placed in solitary confinement for those purposes.
Here, the claim of Plaintiff - that it is unconstitutional to place juvenile detainees in punitive and/or disciplinary solitary confinement and that such actions should be enjoined - is typical of a RCJDC class defined as revised above. Plaintiff’s claim and those of the potential class members are based on the same legal theory and arise from the same course of conduct. Plaintiff has met the typicality requirement for class certification as to the RCJDC class defined above. Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that this adequacy of representation requirement encompasses two criteria : (1) the representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the class, and (2) it must appear that the representative will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. Coleman, 220 F.R.D. at 79.
In this case, if the class is defined as limited above, Plaintiff will share common interests with the members of the class. In addition, the court finds no evidence that Plaintiff will not vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. Rule 23(b)
Plaintiff must not only satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a), but he must also meet one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Plaintiff contends that he meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2),
8

which provides: “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class by allowing and using punitive solitary confinement for the juveniles in their secure facilities. The injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks would enjoin any use of punitive solitary confinement for juveniles in the RCJDC facilities, relief that would affect all class members.
CONCLUSION For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification (Docket No. 54) is granted in part and denied in part. The court will certify a class of “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present.” IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________ ALETA A. TRAUGER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and through

)

his Mother and next friend, SHARIEKA )

FRAZIER

)

)

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, et al.

)

NO. 3-16-0799 JUDGE TRAUGER

MEMORANDUM Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 98) against Defendants Lynn Duke and Rutherford County.1 For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED on the terms and conditions set forth in the accompanying Order.
BACKGROUND This action was filed by John Doe, a minor, by and through his mother, to stop the imposition of punitive solitary confinement for juveniles in the Rutherford County Detention Facility and in facilities operated by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Docket No. 1. On April 25, 2016, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (Docket No. 8), enjoining Defendants from continuing the ongoing solitary confinement of Plaintiff. On May 5, 2016, the court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, finding that Plaintiff had not shown irreparable harm, since the challenged conduct was no longer occurring.2 Docket No. 30.

1

Plaintiffs’ Motion is not directed to Defendant Angela Istvanditsch, who is also

an officer of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility.

2

John Doe was no longer at the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility.

Plaintiff then filed an Amended Class Action Complaint (Docket No. 34) and a Motion to Certify Class (Docket No. 54), and Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 43 and 45). The court denied the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, finding that Plaintiff John Doe’s claim was “capable of repetition, evading review,” and therefore was not moot, even though he was no longer in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility. Docket Nos. 63 and 65. On February 17, 2017, the court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class, in part, and certified a class (“the Rutherford County Class”) consisting of “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present.” Docket No. 100.
In the current motion, Plaintiffs again seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants Rutherford County and Duke from placing John Doe or any member of the Rutherford County Class in solitary confinement, seclusion, “loss of privileges” or other status that involves prolonged separation from peers or isolation as punishment or discipline. Docket No. 98. In their Memorandum, Plaintiffs ask the court to enjoin Defendants Duke and Rutherford County from placing juveniles in solitary confinement or otherwise isolating them from meaningful contact with their peers as punishment or discipline. Docket No. 99.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is to consider: (1) whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether irreparable harm will result without an injunction; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction will result in substantial harm to others;
2

and (4) whether the public interest is advanced by the injunction. O’Toole v. O’Connor, 802 F.3d 783, 792 (6th Cir. 2015); Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009).
ANALYSIS Based on the motion, pleadings, briefs, and the entire record, the court finds: (1) The Rutherford County Class Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that these Defendants are violating their constitutional rights to be free from inhumane treatment. Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on their claims that juveniles being detained in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive or disciplinary purposes constitutes such inhumane treatment. Plaintiffs have shown that courts around the country have found increased protections for juveniles and persons with diminished capacities from inhumane treatment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment); Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F.Supp.2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (administrative segregation units for diminished capacity prisoners violate Eighth Amendment standards); Turner v. Palmer, 84 F.Supp.3d 880, 883 (S.D. Iowa 2015) and cases cited therein (isolation cells for juveniles unconstitutional). Plaintiffs have also cited numerous scientific findings and international authorities that have opined that punitive solitary confinement or isolation for juveniles in government custody is cruel, inhuman and degrading. As this court previously stated, solitary confinement of juveniles in government custody for punitive or disciplinary reasons, especially for extended periods of time and especially for youth who may suffer from mental illness, violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions against the inhuman treatment of detainees. See Docket No. 8.
3

(2) The Rutherford County Class Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, harm, loss, or damage if injunctive relief is not granted pending trial. The harm suffered in solitary confinement is not harm easily undone. Indeed, the loss of constitutional rights is presumed to constitute irreparable harm. See, e.g., Young v. Giles County Bd. of Educ., 181 F.Supp.3d 459, 465 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
Defendants argue that the court, having denied Plaintiffs’ first Motion for Preliminary Injunction, is precluded from granting Plaintiffs’ motion because of the “law of the case.” In denying Plaintiffs’ first Motion for Preliminary Injunction, however, the court noted that, because Plaintiff John Doe was no longer in the Rutherford County Detention Facility, his request for injunctive relief against Defendants Duke and Rutherford County was moot. Now that a class has been certified, the same reasoning does not apply. As the court noted in certifying a class, the Rutherford County Defendants have produced a list of 128 juveniles who experienced isolation for punitive or disciplinary reasons from March 17, 2016, through October 7, 2016. See Docket No. 100.
This case is no longer considered moot because the class members are and have been in the Rutherford County Detention Facility, and the challenged conduct is capable of repetition, yet evading review.3 Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided before he is either released or convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and other persons similarly situated could

3

This exception applies when (1) the challenged action was in its duration too

short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable

expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.

Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005).

4

be detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. Gerstein v. Pugh, 95 S.Ct. 854, 861, n. 11 (1975); Wilson v. Gordon, 822 F.3d 934, 944-45 (6th Cir. 2016).
(3) The balance of relative harms among the parties weighs in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants Rutherford County and Duke. Defendants argue that issuance of a preliminary injunction would interfere with the appropriate functioning of juvenile justice in Rutherford County. If Defendants are not placing juveniles in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive or disciplinary reasons, this preliminary injunction will change nothing for these Defendants. If there is a continuing constitutional violation occurring, then the harms to Plaintiffs certainly outweigh any harm to Defendants.
(4) For these same reasons, the public interest will not be harmed by injunctive relief pending trial. Protection of children from violations of constitutional rights is clearly in the public interest.
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is granted, and the court will issue a Preliminary Injunction Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ___________________________________ ALETA A. TRAUGER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5

 
 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT In the matter of Doe, et al. v. Hommrich, et al., United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Case No. 3:16-CV-00799 (the “Litigation”), the parties have reached a class settlement agreement as memorialized herein (the “Class Settlement Agreement”) and subject to the approval to the district court consistent with the requirement of federal law. The parties to the Class Settlement Agreement are as follow: (1) plaintiff John Doe, a minor, by and through his Mother and next friend, Sharieka Frazier (hereinafter “Mr. Doe”); (2) a plaintiff class certified by the district court in the Litigation (Docket No. 100), consisting of “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present” (the “Class”); (3) defendant Bonnie Hommrich, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of the Children’s Services (the “Commissioner”);1 (4) defendant the Tennessee Department of the Children’s Services (the “Department”); and (5) defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee (the “County” or “Rutherford County”). Mr. Doe and the Class shall collectively be referred to as “Plaintiffs”; the Commissioner and the Department shall collectively be referred to as “State Defendants”; and, the County shall be referred to as “Rutherford County” or “County,”; and, Plaintiffs, State Defendants and Rutherford County shall collectively be referred to as the “Parties”. This Class Settlement Agreement is intended by the Parties to fully, finally and forever resolve, discharge and settle the Released Claims (as that term is defined below in
1 Commissioner Hommrich retired in January and the new Commissioner of the Department is Commissioner Jennifer Nichols. The Commissioner refers to both the named defendant, Commissioner Hommrich, and Commissioner Nichols, both in their official capacity.
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Section V), upon and subject to the terms and conditions of this Class Settlement Agreement, and subject to the final approval of the Court.
The purpose of this Class Settlement Agreement is to remedy and prevent potential constitutional violations concerning the use of solitary confinement of juveniles at the Rutherford Juvenile Detention Center (the “Rutherford JDC”), and to fully and finally resolve the Litigation, including the claims of any person subjected to solitary confinement, seclusion, and/or isolation from April 25, 2015 to the present at the Rutherford JDC. The Rutherford JDC is an integral part of the child welfare and public safety system in Rutherford County, Tennessee. Through the provisions of the Class Settlement Agreement, the Parties seek to ensure that County Defendants use of solitary confinement, seclusion and/or isolation2 at the Rutherford JDC meet constitutional standards.
Recitals
The following recitals provide background with regard to the Class Settlement Agreement. The Parties agree, however, that they are not intended to and do not create duties, rights or binding obligations, and, further, the Parties specifically state that the Recitals are not enforceable provisions of this agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, definitions of terms set forth in the Recitals are intended to be binding on the Parties.
A. Rutherford County operates the Rutherford JDC;
B. The Department licenses all Juvenile Detention Centers (“JDCs”) legally operating in the State of Tennessee, including the Rutherford JDC;
2 For purposes of this Class Settlement Agreement, the Parties are using the terms “solitary confinement”, “seclusion”, and “isolation” interchangeably and to mean the same thing.
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C. On April 25, 2016, Mr. Doe filed a Complaint seeking to enjoin the Defendants’ use of disciplinary solitary confinement against him and further seeking a declaration that the use of solitary confinement to punish or discipline juveniles violates the United States Constitution. Docket No. 1.
D. Mr. Doe thereafter amended his Complaint to add class allegations (Docket No. 34) and subsequently moved to certify a class of juvenile plaintiffs (Docket Nos. 54, 55).
E. After considering the submissions in opposition to class certification (Docket Nos. 78, 84), the District Court declined to certify a class consisting of “all current and future juveniles detained in any facility licensed and/or supervised by the [Department], including Juvenile Detention Centers operated by county governments or private entities” but did certify a class consisting of “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present” (Docket No. 100).
F. On March 23, 2017, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction Order enjoining and restraining “Defendants Rutherford County and Lynn Duke, and their officers, agents, employees, servants, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them … from placing juveniles in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Facility in solitary confinement or otherwise isolating them from meaningful contact with their peers as punishment or discipline, pending further orders of the court”. Docket No. 115. Upon entry of the permanent injunction, the Preliminary Injunction shall be dissolved.
G. In June 2017, the Department enacted new rules governing all JDCs, including the Rutherford County JDC: the Rules of the Department of Children’s Services, Chapter 0250-04-
3 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 3 of 39 PageID #: 3762

08, Minimum Standards for Juvenile Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Resources (the “Rules”); the Department began working on the Rules in late 2014; the Rules were finalized after input from both providers and child advocacy groups; and, the Rules include specific and appropriate requirements with regard to JDCs’ use of seclusion. For purposes of the Class Settlement Agreement, the Rules refers to and means the Rules of the Department of Children’s Services, Chapter 0250-04-08, Minimum Standards for Juvenile Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Resources, as interpreted and implemented by the Department.
H. Following adoption of the Rules, the Department began planning for the routine review of JDCs to ensure compliance with the new Rules, including JDCs’ use of seclusion. As part of its regular oversight of JDCs, including Rutherford JDC, the Department intends to conduct targeted on-site reviews of JDCs’ use of restrictive behavioral management, including seclusion, at least twice a year (with at least one being unannounced) to ensure the JDCs are adhering with the requirements of the Rules, and during these reviews they will interview juveniles then living at the JDCs (the “Reviews”). At the conclusion of each Review of JDCs and based on that Review, including the Rutherford JDC, the Department will draft a Restrictive Behavior Management Targeted Review Report or similarly named report that describes the JDCs’ compliance with the seclusion Rules: these reports completed with regard to the Rutherford JDC shall herein be referred to as the “Rutherford JDC Report”.
I. On January 23 and 29, 2018, the Department conducted a preliminary on-site review of the Rutherford JDC for the purpose of identifying any preliminary issues with Rutherford County’s use of seclusion under the requirements of the new Rules at the Rutherford JDC, and thereafter completed a report with regard to that review (“Rutherford JDC Preliminary Report”).
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J. On October 30, 2017, the district court ordered this case referred to Magistrate Judge Brown for the purpose of facilitating the setting of a settlement conference (Docket No. 122) and, thereafter, Magistrate Judge Brown ordered and then conducted mediation conferences between the Parties on December 14, 2017 and January 16, 2018.
K. State Defendants and Rutherford County have denied and continue to deny that they committed, or threatened, or attempted to commit any wrongful action or violation of the law in connection with the subject matter of the Litigation. State Defendants and Rutherford County further maintain that they have meritorious defenses to the causes of actions asserted in the Litigation and were prepared to vigorously defend this matter. Nonetheless, taking into account the uncertainty and risks inherent in any litigation, State Defendants and Rutherford County have determined that defending this Litigation would be burdensome and expensive, and that it is desirable and beneficial to them that the Litigation be fully and finally settled and terminated in the manner and upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Class Settlement Agreement.
L. The Parties agree that this Class Settlement Agreement is a compromise of disputed claims and that the Class Settlement Agreement, along with any related documents, and any negotiations resulting in it shall not be construed as or deemed to be evidence of or an admission or concession of liability or wrongdoing on the part of any defendant or the Released Parties, as defined below.
M. Lynn Duke, in her individual and official capacity as Director of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center (“Duke”), and Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch, in her individual and official capacity as an officer of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center (“Istvanditsch”) were named as Defendants in the Complaint. The Parties agree that Duke and Istavanditsch are not necessary parties for the relief granted herein. As such, pursuant to Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure 41 and 23, the Parties will jointly ask the Court to dismiss Duke and Istvanditsch with prejudice as parties in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and upon entry of a preliminary approval order in this matter.
Section I—Plaintiff Class This Class Settlement Agreement is entered into on behalf of the Class, which as stated above, has been certified by the district court and consists of “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present.” Docket No. 100.
Section II—Compliance with the Department’s Rules As described above, after over two years of consideration and discussion, and after input from several child advocacy groups, in June 2017, the Department enacted the Rules, which include specific requirements with regard to JDCs’ use of seclusion in Tennessee, including provisions that: (1) prohibit the use of seclusion for punitive purposes; (2) govern the approval that must be obtained before or immediately after seclusion is implemented; (3) govern the frequency of observation of juveniles subjected to seclusion by JDCs while in seclusion; (4) govern the JDCs’ documentation requirements when seclusion is used; and, (5) govern the training requirements for JDC staff. Plaintiffs agree that the provisions in the Rules relating to JDCs’ use of seclusion, and associated requirements, are appropriate and meet constitutional standards. Rutherford County agrees that it is bound by the seclusion requirements set forth in the Rules, and will be bound by any revisions subsequently made to the Rules. Rutherford County further agrees to abide by the seclusion requirements set forth in the Rules or any revisions to the Rules.
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Rutherford County further acknowledges and agrees that the Rules prohibit the use of seclusion for punitive purposes at any JDC they operate.
Section III—Department’s Oversight of Rutherford JDC
As part of this Class Settlement, State Defendants provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel a draft of their standard operating procedure (“SOP”) for conducting the Reviews, as that term is defined in Recital H. Plaintiffs’ counsel provided to State Defendants any and all comments they had regarding the SOP, in writing, within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the SOP. State Defendants considered in good faith Plaintiffs’ counsel’s comments, if any, before finalizing the SOP. State Defendants had and have the sole discretion to establish the final SOP contents and modify them as necessary moving forward.
As part of this Class Settlement, State Defendants have provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of the Rutherford JDC Preliminary Report and the Rutherford JDC Report, with the names of juveniles redacted, for the calendar year 2018. State Defendants also agree to provide to Plaintiffs’ counsel with the Rutherford JDC Report, within fifteen (15) days of the conclusion of each Review conducted of Rutherford JDC in the calendar year 2019.
Section IV—Continuing Injunctive Relief Rutherford County agrees that a permanent injunction will be entered in the Litigation. Specifically the Final Order will include a provision providing for the following injunctive relief, which will hereinafter be referred to in this agreement as the “Permanent Injunction”: “Rutherford County is permanently enjoined from using seclusion for punishment as provided in the Rules, as may be amended or revised by the State of Tennessee.”
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Section V—Release
Mr. Doe and the Class, and every member of the class, individually and as a Class, for themselves, their attorneys, parents, spouses, executors, representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns (collectively the “Releasing Parties”), in consideration of the relief set forth in the Class Settlement Agreement, the sufficiency of which is acknowledged, will and hereby do, to the fullest extent permitted by law, fully and finally release State Defendants and Rutherford County, their employees, officers, contractors, agents, representatives, affiliates, successors, and attorneys, Duke and Istvanditsch (the “Released Parties”), from any and all past or present claims, demands, causes of action, liabilities, obligations, costs, fees, interest, attorneys’ fees, and expenses for the relief sought in the Litigation or for any other claims seeking declaratory and/or injunctive relief that arises out of the Litigation (the “Released Claims”) under or pursuant to any theory of law, including, but not limited to, the United States Constitution, the Tennessee Constitution, state or federal statutes, state or federal regulations, and/or state or federal common law.
Section VI--Attorneys’ Fees
A. Attorney Fees for this Action. The Parties agree that Plaintiffs qualify as a “prevailing party” as such term is defined in 42 U.S.C. 1988, and that counsel for Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees and reimbursement. Rather than litigate the separate issue of the amount of fees reasonable for counsel’s services in achieving this Class Settlement Agreement and Final Order, after a review of the time slips maintained by Plaintiffs’ counsel for this Litigation and negotiation conducted under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Brown and a private mediator, Rutherford County and State Defendants have agreed to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel the total sum of attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $250,000.00, apportioned as follows: Rutherford County agrees to pay $166,666.67; State Defendants agree to pay $83,333.33. Said payment shall
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be made within sixty (60) days of the entry of the Final Order dismissing this case with prejudice and after the entry of an order by the district court approving the fees, whichever date is later. Plaintiffs and their counsel hereby agree and acknowledge that the award of $250,000.00 for fees and expenses fully compensates them for all work performed to date and in the future relative to this Litigation, and that Plaintiffs’ counsel are not entitled to, and Plaintiffs hereby waive any claim for, additional attorneys’ fees or expenses for any work performed related to this Litigation.
B. Attorney Fees for Review of Routine Review Documents. As set forth above in Section III, State Defendants provided Plaintiffs’ counsel copies of the Rutherford JDC Preliminary Report and the Rutherford JDC Report (collectively the “Reports”) for on-site reviews conducted at Rutherford JDC during the calendar year 2018 and will provide more in calendar year 2019. Plaintiffs and their counsel agree that they are not entitled to receive payment from State Defendants or Rutherford County for work performed by them in reviewing the Reports, or taking any follow-up action with regard to the Reports, or for any other matter related to this Litigation except for the sum specifically set forth above in Section VI.A.
C. Attorneys’ Fees for New Action. Nothing in this Class Settlement Agreement will be construed to limit or preclude Plaintiffs’ attorneys from seeking the recovery of attorneys’ fees in any new, subsequently filed action.
Section VII—Notice and Approval
A. District Court Approval. This Class Settlement Agreement shall be subject to District Court approval. However, nothing in this Class Settlement Agreement shall be deemed to authorize the District Court to change or vary any of its terms. If the District Court does not approve this Class Settlement Agreement in the executed form or in a revised form with the express written approval of all parties, then this Settlement Agreement is of no legal effect and the Parties are not
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bound by its terms. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event any exhibit to the Agreement is modified by the district court as part of or during the approval process, the Class Settlement Agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless (1) the modification is material and (2) any of the Parties declares in writing, within seven days of the modification, that it considers the modification to be material in nature.
B. Preliminary Approval. The Parties agree that they will cooperate and take all reasonable steps to ensure that this Class Settlement Agreement is approved by the District Court and becomes effective. Within thirty (30) days after the execution of the Class Settlement Agreement by all Parties, counsel for the Parties shall file a joint motion with the Court for a preliminary order approving the Class Settlement Agreement (“Motion for Preliminary Approval”). The Parties agree to attach to the Motion for Preliminary Approval at least the following documents: (1) a copy of the executed Class Settlement Agreement; (2) a proposed Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement; Directing Issuance of Settlement Notice; and Scheduling of Hearing on Final Approval, in the form as attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “Preliminary Order”); (3) proposed notice to the class for the final Fairness Hearing, described below (the “Fairness Hearing Notice”); and, (4) a proposed Permanent Injunction and Order of Dismissal with prejudice, for which the Parties will seek entry following the final approval of the Class Settlement Agreement, in the form as attached hereto as Exhibit B (the “Final Order”). The Parties agree that Duke and Istavanditsch, named as Defendants in the original Complaint, are not necessary parties for the relief granted herein. As such, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41 and 23, the Parties shall jointly ask the Court to dismiss Duke and Istvanditsch with prejudice as parties in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and include their dismissal with prejudice in the Preliminary Order.
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C. Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). Within fifteen (15) days of the filing of the Motion for Preliminary Approval, counsel for Defendants will provide the Notice of this Class Settlement Agreement as required by the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715.
D. Fairness/Final Approval Hearing. The fairness or final approval hearing (the “Fairness Hearing”) will be held on such date as the Court, in its discretion, may order. At the Fairness Hearing, the Parties shall jointly move for and recommend the entry of the Final Order, attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Fairness Hearing shall take place on a date allowing for such period of Notice to the Class as the District Court may direct, and in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1715.
E. Notice. Parties shall jointly request that the Court approve notice of the proposed Class Settlement Agreement to be provided to the Class as follows: within 30 days after Preliminary Approval, the Parties shall distribute notice of the proposed Class Settlement Agreement as required by the District Court's preliminary approval order. Attached as Exhibit C is the notice the Parties propose be approved by the court (the “Fairness Hearing Notice”). The Fairness Hearing Notice includes a brief statement of the claims released by the Class; the date of the hearing on the Final Approval of the Class Settlement Agreement; the deadline for submitting objections to the Class Settlement Agreement; the web page, address, and phone and fax numbers that may be used to obtain a copy of the Fairness Hearing Notice and/or the Class Settlement Agreement in the format and language requested. Moreover, the Parties shall request that the Court order that the Fairness Hearing Notice be published as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' counsel, the Department and the County shall each post in a prominent place on their respective websites a copy of the Fairness Hearing Notice and the proposed Class Settlement Agreement until the deadline for submitting objections has passed. 2. Following Final Approval, Plaintiffs' counsel and the County shall each post a copy of the final Class Settlement Agreement on their respective websites for a period of twelve (12) months.
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3. The County shall also post the Fairness Hearing Notice in the visitor areas and in the entrance lobby of the Rutherford JDC until the deadline for submitting objections has passed. The County shall also mail the Fairness Hearing Notice to the Juvenile Court Judge and Magistrates for the Juvenile Court of Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Public Defender's Office, and the Rutherford County District Attorney's Office. 4. Nothing in this Class Settlement Agreement shall bar the Parties from further distribution of the Fairness Hearing Notice at their own expense. 5. Each party shall bear their own cost of providing the notice set forth in Section VII E.1-4. 6. At least fourteen (14) days before the Fairness Hearing, Counsel for the Department and Rutherford County will provide a declaration to the District Court attesting that they each disseminated notice consistent with this Class Settlement Agreement. 7. The Rutherford County Defendants shall send a copy, by U.S. First-Class Mail, a copy of the Notice to the last known address of the one-hundred and twenty-eight (128) persons identified by Rutherford County in the course of discovery and referenced by the Court in its Order certifying the class (Docket No. 100 at 4), unless excluded from potential class membership by agreement of counsel for Rutherford County and Plaintiffs.
F. Final Approval Order. The Parties shall use their best efforts to secure the Court’s
issuance of Final Approval Order. The Parties will request that the Final Approval Order include,
among other things: find that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff Class and class
members and that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to approve the Class Settlement
Agreement; approve the Class Settlement Agreement as fair, adequate and reasonable, and
consistent and in compliance with all applicable provisions of the law; and, declare that this Class
Settlement Agreement to be binding on the Plaintiff Class.
Section VIII – Miscellaneous Provisions
A. Complete Agreement. This Class Settlement Agreement shall constitute the entire
integrated agreement of the Parties. No prior contemporaneous communications, oral or written,
or prior drafts shall be relevant or admissible for purposes of determining the meaning of any
provisions here in this litigation or in any other proceeding.
12
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B. Cooperation. The Parties agree, subject to their fiduciary and other legal obligations, to cooperate to the extent reasonably necessary to effectuate and implement all terms and conditions of this Class Settlement Agreement and to exercise their reasonable best efforts to accomplish the foregoing terms. Plaintiffs’ counsel, the State Defendants’ counsel and the Rutherford County’s counsel agree to cooperate with one another in seeking Court approval of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Class Settlement Agreement and the Final Order and Judgment.
C. Headings. The headings used in this Class Settlement Agreement are used for the purposes of convenience and are not intended to have any legal effect.
D. Amendment of Agreement. This Class Settlement Agreement may not be amended, modified, altered or otherwise changed in any manner except by a writing signed by a duly authorized agent of Plaintiffs, State Defendants, and Rutherford County, and approved by the Court. In the event any exhibit to the Agreement is modified by the district court as part of or during the approval process, the Class Settlement Agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless (1) the modification is material and (2) any of the Parties declares in writing, within seven days of the modification, that it considers the modification to be material in nature.
E. Costs and Expenses. Except as other specifically provided herein in Section VI.A., each party shall bear their own expenses and costs, including attorneys’ fees.
F. Execution in Counterpart. This Class Settlement Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, exchanged by hand, messenger, facsimile, or PDF as an electronic mail attachment. All executed counterparts and each of them shall be deemed to be one and the same instrument provided that counsel for the Parties to this Class Settlement Agreement all exchange
13 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 13 of 39 PageID #: 3772

signed counterparts. A complete set of original executed counterparts shall be filed with the Court if the Court so requests.
G. Choice of Law. This Class Settlement Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Tennessee. Signatures on Next Page
14 Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 14 of 39 PageID #: 3773

Executed bv.
John Doe
,
Signature:
Date: February Zh-,2019

Sharieka Frazicr,as mother and next friend of
Plaintiff John Doe ^
1
Signature! A
Date: February2-ft^. 20r9

Plaintiff's Class Counsel,signing on behalf of Class
Signature:
Name: Title:
Date: February 3.^. 2019

Jennifer Nichols,in her o^ialcapacity as the Commissioner ofthe TennesseeDepartmentof
the Children's Services
Signature: Date: February ,2019

Tennessee Department of Children's Services

Signature: Name: Title; Dale: February

, 2019

Rutherford County,Tennessee

Signature: Name:
Title:
Date: February

, 2019

15
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Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 17 of 39 PageID #: 3776

EXHIBIT A
to the Class Settlement Agreement
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and

)

through his Mother and next friend

)

SHARIEKA FRAIZER,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Docket No. 3:16-CV-0799

)

JUDGE RICHARDSON/BROWN

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, et al

)

)

Defendants.

)

_____________________________________________________________________________

[proposed] ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE CLASS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, DISMISSING CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE, SETTING FAIRNESS HEARING AND APPROVING FAIRNESS HEARING NOTICE
_____________________________________________________________________________

Pending before the Court is the Parties’ Corrected Second Agreed Motion for Preliminary

Approval of Class Settlement Agreement (the “Motion”). (Docket No. ___.) In the Motion, which

has been jointly filed and agreed to by all of the parties to this litigation, the parties request the

Court to do the following: preliminarily approve the Class Settlement Agreement attached to the

Motion; set a Fairness Hearing date for final consideration of the Class Settlement Agreement;

approve the Notice of the Fairness Hearing presented by them; and, dismiss individual defendants

Lynn Duke (“Duke”) and Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch (“Istvanditsch”).

The Court has reviewed the Motion, as well as the exhibits thereto and makes the following

findings:

1. All parties to the Class Settlement Agreement joined in the Motion and seek for the

relief requested be entered. The parties are as follows: plaintiff John Doe, a minor, by and through

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his Mother and next friend, Sharieka Frazier, and class representative; (2) the plaintiff class certified by the district court in this matter, consisting of “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present” (see Memorandum Order, Docket No. 100, p. 9); (3) defendant Bonnie Hommrich, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of the Children’s Services; (4) defendant the Tennessee Department of the Children’s Services (the “Department”); and (5) defendant Rutherford County, Tennessee (“Rutherford County”) (collectively, these defendants will be referred to as the “Parties”).
2. This Court previously certified a class in this matter (Docket No. 100), and the class is “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive purposes, from April 25, 2015 to the present” (the “Class”). (Docket No. 100 at 9.) In certifying the Class, this Court noted that Plaintiffs were not seeking damages, only injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 2.
3. Following certification of the Class, the Court conducted an in-person case management conference, at which counsel for the Parties agreed that it made sense to schedule a mediation/judicial conference with a magistrate judge to determine whether the Parties could resolve the case. (See Order, Docket No. 122.) The Court thus referred this case to Magistrate Judge Brown. Id.
4. The terms of the Class Settlement Agreement (Docket No. __) resulted from intense negotiations between the Parties under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Brown and then a private mediator. The Court concludes that the Class Settlement Agreement was the result of an arm’s length negotiation between experienced counsel for the Parties and not the product of overreaching or fraud.
2
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5. The Parties submitted the Class Settlement Agreement to the Court in their Motion (the “Class Settlement Agreement”).
6. The Court preliminarily finds that on its face the Class Settlement Agreement provides the certified Class with the primary relief they sought, namely permanent injunctive relief. Specifically, if the Class Settlement Agreement is approved after the Fairness Hearing, a permanent injunction will be entered enjoining Rutherford County from using seclusion for punishment as provided in the Rules, as may be amended or revised by the State of Tennessee. (See Class Settlement Agreement, Section IV (the “Permanent Injunction”).)
7. In addition to the Permanent Injunction, the Class Settlement Agreement also requires the Department to provide, and indeed it is reported by the Parties in the Motion that the Department has begun providing, Plaintiffs’ counsel with copies of reports describing reviews the Department is conducting of Rutherford JDC relative to its implementation of the Rules of the Department of Children’s Services, Chapter 0250-04-08, Minimum Standards for Juvenile Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Services (the “Rules”). Among other thing, the Parties agree that the Rules prohibit the use of seclusion for punitive purposes and Rutherford County agrees in the Class Settlement Agreement that they are bound by the Rules. (See Class Settlement Agreement, Section II.) Moreover, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and experts, reviewed the Rules and agree that the “provisions relating to JDCs’ use of seclusion, and associated requirements, are appropriate and meet constitutional standards.” Id. These reports, which were provided in 2018 and will be provided 2019, allow Plaintiffs’ counsel to conduct appropriate oversight of Rutherford JDC’s ongoing use of seclusion.
8. For all these reasons, the Court preliminarily finds, subject to consideration of any objections timely filed by a Class Member, argument presented at the final approval or fairness
3
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hearing (the “Fairness hearing”), and any other information appropriately provided to this Court, that the Class Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.
9. The Class Settlement Agreement also describes the notice to be provided to the Class of the Fairness Hearing (the “Fairness Hearing Notice”), how the Fairness Hearing Notice will be published, and attaches the proposed notice as an exhibit. (Class Settlement Agreement, Section VII.E.)1 The Parties ask this Court to approve the Fairness Hearing Notice as part of this motion.
10. Following preliminary approval of a class settlement, putative class members must be notified of the settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). “The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Id. “[N]otice must ... fairly apprise ... prospective members of the class of the terms of the proposed settlement so that class members may come to their own conclusions about whether the settlement serves their interests.” Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 630 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To meet this standard, a class notice should “inform the class members of the nature of the pending action, the general terms of the settlement, that complete and detailed information is available from the court files, and that any class member may appear and be heard at the hearing.” Kinder v. Meredith Corp., 2016 WL 454441, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2016) quoting Newburg on Class Actions § 8:17 (5th ed.).
11. The Fairness Hearing Notice is appropriate and reasonable. It includes the following information: a brief statement of the claims released by the Class; the date of the Fairness Hearing; a description of the proposed settlement; the deadline for submitting objections
1 The proposed notice is attached to this Order as Exhibit 1. 4
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to the settlement; information about how to obtain a copy of the Class Settlement Agreement; the information that must be contained in any objection; attendance at the Fairness Hearing, including the date; and, contact information for all counsel to the case, along with an invitation to contact Class counsel if they have any questions. (See proposed Fairness Hearing Notice, attached hereto as Exhibit 1.)
12. The method by which the Fairness Hearing Notice is proposed to be published also is reasonably calculated to reach members of the Class. The Parties seek Court approval to publish the Fairness Hearing Notice by several means. (See Class Settlement Agreement, Section VII.E.) When a case, like this one, is certified under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts often do not require any notice to the class of motion to approve settlement, and even where notice is required often it is accomplished by publication. Hart v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-00623-JST, WL 9288252 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017) (citing Green v. American Exp. Co., 200 F.R.D. 211, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530, 541 (6th Cir. 2016). The Parties request that this Court approve the publication of the Fairness Hearing Notice be published by several means. First, the Department and Rutherford County have agreed to post a copy of the Fairness Hearing Notice and proposed Class Settlement Agreement in a prominent place on their websites. Id., Section VII.E.1. Moreover, Rutherford County shall post the Fairness Hearing Notice in the entrance lobby and the visiting areas of the Rutherford JDC until the deadlines for objecting has passed. Id., Section VII.E.3. Further, Rutherford County also will mail the Fairness Hearing Notice to Juvenile Court Judge and Magistrates for the Juvenile Court of Rutherford County, as well as the Rutherford County Public Defender’s Office and the Rutherford County District Attorney’s Office. Id. Finally, Rutherford County is sending, by U.S. First-Class Mail, a copy of the Notice to the last known address of the one-hundred and twenty-eight (128) persons
5
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identified by Rutherford County in the course of discovery and referenced by the Court in its Order certifying the class (Docket No. 100 at 4), unless excluded from potential class membership by agreement of counsel for Rutherford County and Plaintiffs.
13. Lynn Duke, who was named in the suit in her individual and official capacity as Director of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center (“Duke”), and Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch, who was named in the suit in her individual and official capacity as an officer of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center (“Istvanditsch”) are not necessary parties for the relief contained the Class Settlement Agreement or this Order and may be dismissed with prejudice as jointly requested by the parties.
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED in whole and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Class Settlement Agreement is preliminarily approved subject to the Court conducting a fairness or final approval hearing (the “Fairness Hearing”);
2. The Fairness Hearing to consider whether the Class Settlement Agreement will be finally approved is hereby set for July 19, 2019;
3. The parties proposed notice of the Fairness Hearing (the “Fairness Hearing Notice”), attached to this Order as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference, is approved;
4. The parties are directed to publish and distribute the Fairness Hearing Notice and/or copies of the Class Settlement Agreement as follows:
a. Plaintiffs' counsel, the Department and the County shall each post in a prominent place on their respective websites a copy of the Fairness Hearing Notice and the proposed Class Settlement Agreement until the deadline for submitting objections has passed.
b. Following Final Approval, Plaintiffs' counsel and the County shall each post a copy of the final Class Settlement Agreement on their respective websites for a period of twelve (12) months.
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c. The County shall also post the Fairness Hearing Notice in the visitor areas and in the entrance lobby of the Rutherford JDC until the deadline for submitting objections has passed. The County shall also mail the Fairness Hearing Notice to the Juvenile Court Judge and Magistrates for the Juvenile Court of Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Public Defender's Office, and the Rutherford County District Attorney's Office. Finally, the County shall send, by U.S. FirstClass Mail, a copy of the Notice to the last known address of the one-hundred and twenty-eight (128) persons identified by Rutherford County in the course of discovery and referenced by the Court in its Order certifying the class (Docket No. 100 at 4), unless excluded from potential class membership by agreement of counsel for Rutherford County and Plaintiffs.
d. Nothing in this Class Settlement Agreement shall bar the Parties from further distribution of the Fairness Hearing Notice at their own expense.
e. Each party shall bear their own cost of providing the notice set forth in Section VII E.1-4.
f. At least fourteen (14) days before the Fairness Hearing, Counsel for the Department and Rutherford County will provide a declaration to the District Court attesting that they each disseminated notice consistent with this Class Settlement Agreement.
5. Defendants Lynn Duke and Lieutenant Angela Istvanditsch, in both their individual and official capacities, are hereby dismissed from this litigation with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this _____ day of ___________, 2019.
__________________________________ ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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EXHIBIT B
to the Class Settlement Agreement
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 26 of 39 PageID #: 3785

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and

)

through his Mother and next friend

)

SHARIEKA FRAIZER,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Docket No. 3:16-CV-0799

)

JUDGE RICHARDSON

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, et al

)

)

Defendants.

)

_____________________________________________________________________________

[proposed] FINAL ORDER APPROVING CLASS SETTLEMENT, ORDERING PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE _____________________________________________________________________________

This matter came to be heard in open Court upon a Fairness Hearing, conducted on July

19, 2019, for final consideration of the proposed Class Settlement Agreement. The parties

provided Notice to the Class of the proposed settlement agreement and the Fairness Hearing

consistent with the approved Fairness Hearing Notice approved by this Court.

For the reasons stated herein, the proposed Class Settlement Agreement is approved, and

the Court makes the following FINDINGS and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS

FOLLOWS:

1. On March 27, 2019, the plaintiffs John Doe, individually and on behalf of the class

as Class Representative (“Mr. Doe”) and counsel for Mr. Doe and the class certified by this Court,

Thomas H. Castelli, Mark J. Downton and Wesley B. Clark (collectively “Class Counsel”), and

the defendants Bonnie Hommrich, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Tennessee

Department of the Children’s Services (“Commissioner Hommrich”), the Tennessee Department

Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 27 of 39 PageID #: 3786

of the Children’s Services (the “Department”), and, Rutherford County, Tennessee (the “County”) filed a Corrected Second Agreed Motion to Approve Class Settlement (Docket No. __ (“Motion to Approve”.) Attached to the Motion to Approve is the executed Class Action Settlement Agreement (the “Class Settlement Agreement”), which all parties request this Court to approve and based on which the parties seek this final order. A copy of the Class Settlement Agreement is attached to this Order as Exhibit A.
2. On _________, this Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Class Settlement, Directing Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Fairness Hearing (Docket No. ___ (the “Preliminary Approval Order”).) Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, a Fairness Hearing was conducted on July 19, 2019.
3. This Final Order Approving Class Settlement, Ordering Permanent Injunctive Relief, and Dismissing Case with Prejudice (the “Final Order”) incorporates the Class Settlement Agreement and its exhibits, and the Preliminary Approval Order.
4. Based on the entire record before this Court, including the Memorandum and Order entered on February 17, 2017 (Docket No. 100), the Class Settlement Agreement (attached as Exhibit A), the Motion to Approve (Docket No. __), the Preliminary Approval Order (Docket No. __), the Fairness Hearing, and all other prior submissions and filings in this proceeding, the Court hereby confirms that the certified and final class in this matter is as follows (hereinafter referred to as the “Class” and/or the “Class Members”):
All juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present. (Docket No. 100, p. 9; and, Class Settlement Agreement, Section I.)
2
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5. The Court confirms that the Class meets all the applicable requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and (b)(2).
6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties in the Litigation, including all Class Members, and has subject matter jurisdiction over this class litigation, including jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement, grant final certification of the Class, to settle and release all claims released in the Settlement Agreement, to enter the permanent injunction, and to dismiss this matter with prejudice. Further, venue is proper in this Court.
7. In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order, the Class Members were given notice of the terms of the Settlement (the “Notice”), as well as the date, time and location of the Fairness Hearing and the deadline for presenting objections to the Class Settlement Agreement. In particular and in conformity with the Preliminary Approval Order, the Notice was provided to Class Members by the following means: a mailing by Rutherford County to the last known address of the one-hundred and twenty-eight (128) potential class members identified by Rutherford County in the course of discovery and referenced by the Court in its Order certifying the class (Docket No. 100 at 4), unless excluded from potential class membership by agreement of counsel for Rutherford County and Plaintiffs; publication on the websites of the County and the Department; posting in the entrance lobby and visitor areas of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center; and, mailing to Juvenile Court Judge and Magistrates for the Juvenile Court of Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Public Defender’s Office, and the Rutherford County District Attorney’s Office. The Notice informed the Class Members of who was in the class, a summary of basis for the litigation, a description of the proposed settlement, that they could object to the proposed settlement, a description of the proposed release, and the procedure and deadline for submitting any such objections. The Notice provided Class Members with adequate time to
3
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submit any objections to the Class Settlement Agreement. This Court finds that the Notice, both its content and the method by which it was published to potential Class Members, afforded Class Members appropriate and adequate protections to make informed decisions regarding the Class Settlement Agreement, and satisfied the requirement of law and due process.
8. The designated class representative is John Doe, and the Court finds that he adequately represents the Class for purposes of entering into and implementing the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, the Court finds that Thomas H. Castelli, Mark J. Downton and Wesley B. Clark are appropriate class counsel.
9. At the July 19, 2019, Fairness Hearing, the Parties presented support for why the Class Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned. Moreover, no Class Member has lodged an objection to the Class Settlement Agreement, either in writing in advance of, or by way of testimony at, the Fairness Hearing.
10. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), the Court hereby approves in all respects the parties settlement as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and finds that the Settlement Agreement is in all respects fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of the Class, and fully complies with the applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), the Class Action Fairness Act, and any other applicable law. The Court hereby declares the Settlement Agreement is binding on all Class Members and is to be preclusive in that regard.
11. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate based on the following factors and findings, among other things: (a) there is no fraud or collusion underlying the Settlement Agreement; (b) the complexity, expense, and uncertainty in this matter favors settlement of behalf of the Class; (c) the Settlement Agreement provides meaningful
4
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injunctive relief on behalf of the Class Members and other juveniles who may come into the custody of the Rutherford JDC; and (d) any and all other applicable factors that favor final approval.
12. Consistent with the terms of the Class Action Settlement, the following permanent injunction, entered with regard to only the defendant Rutherford County, is hereby ordered: “Rutherford County is permanently enjoined from using seclusion for punishment as provided in the Rules of the Department of Children’s Services, Chapter 0250-04-08, Minimum Standards for Juvenile Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Services (the “Rules”), as may be amended or revised by the State of Tennessee.”
13. Consistent with the terms of the Class Action Settlement, the Department provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel a draft of their standard operating procedure (“SOP”) for conducting the Reviews, as that term is defined in the Settlement Agreement, and Plaintiffs’ counsel provided to State Defendants any and all comments they had regarding the SOP, in writing, within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the SOP. State Defendants considered in good faith Plaintiffs’ counsel’s comments, if any, before finalizing the SOP. State Defendants had and have the sole discretion to establish the final SOP contents and modify them as necessary moving forward. Moreover, State Defendants have provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of the Rutherford JDC Preliminary Report, and the Rutherford JDC Report, with the names of juveniles redacted, for the calendar year 2018 and part of 2019, and Defendants shall continue to provide to Plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of the Rutherford JDC Report, as those terms are defined in the Settlement Agreement, with the names of juveniles redacted, within fifteen (15) days of the conclusion of each review conducted by the Department of Rutherford JDC in the remaining part of calendar year 2019.
5
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14. Plaintiffs Mr. Doe and the Class Members provide the defendants a release of claims as part of the Settlement Agreement (the “Release”). (Settlement Agreement, Section V). Based upon the entire record in this cause, including the statements of Class Counsel, this Court finds that Release is appropriate and adopts the Release as binding on the parties.
15. The parties agree, and this Court finds, that Mr. Doe and the Class qualify as prevailing parties as defined in 42 U.S.C. §1988, and that they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fee and reimbursement. Based on the Class Settlement Agreement and the statements of counsel at the Fairness Hearing, a mediated resolution among the parties has been reached with regard to the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses to be awarded: the total amount of fees and expenses payable to Class Counsel is $250,000.00, with County Defendants to pay $166,666.67 and State Defendants to pay $83,333.33. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h), the Court approves this total fee and expense award and finds it to be fair and reasonable, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) and in accordance with the terms of the Class Settlement Agreement. Thereby, Rutherford County is hereby directed to pay its share of the fee/expense award, $166,666.67, to Class Counsel within sixty (60) days of the entry of this order. Further, State Defendants are hereby directed to pay its share of the fee/expense award, $83,333.33, to Class Counsel within sixty (60) days of the entry of this order. Class Counsel shall allocate and distribute this award of fees among themselves. In approving and making this award, the Court understand and orders that the award of $250,000,00 for fees and expenses fully compensates Class Counsel for all work performed to date and in the future relative to this Litigation, and that Class Counsel shall not be entitled to, and Plaintiffs waive any claim for, additional attorneys’ fees or expenses for any additional work performed related to this litigation. Nothing in this Order is intended
6
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to or shall be construed to limit or preclude Class Counsel from seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees in any new, subsequently filed action.
16. In making the foregoing findings, the Court has exercised its discretion in certifying the Class. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement resulted from extensive, arm’s length, good faith negotiations between Class Counsel and counsel for the defendants. Moreover, the negotiations were overseen and supervised by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown and then a private, Rule 31 mediator, Mr. Earle Schwarz.
17. Upon entry of this Final Order, this matter shall be dismissed with prejudice and Final Judgment shall be entered in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this _____ day of ___________, 2019. __________________________________ ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
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EXHIBIT C
to the Class Settlement Agreement
Case 3:16-cv-00799 Document 143-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 34 of 39 PageID #: 3793

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and

)

through his Mother and next friend

)

SHARIEKA FRAIZER,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, et al

)

)

Defendants.

)

Docket No. 3:16-CV-0799 JUDGE RICHARDSON/BROWN

NOTICE OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND FAIRNESS HEARING OF CLASS ACTION
DEFINITION OF THE CERTIFIED CLASS/TO: All juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present.”
THE PURPOSE OF THIS NOTICE: This notice has three purposes:
(1) to tell you about the proposed settlement and the fairness hearing;
(2) to tell you how to obtain more information, including a copy of the full proposed settlement agreement;
(3) to explain how you may object to the proposed settlement if you disagree with it.
THE BASIS FOR THIS CASE: A class action lawsuit alleged that the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center was improperly holding detainees in “solitary confinement” or isolation as a form of punishment or discipline, and that the practice amounted to cruel and unusual punishment that is unconstitutional. The lawsuit also alleged that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (DCS) participated in decisions affecting detainees housed at the center and elsewhere and that DCS failed to take any action in order to prevent placement of detainees into “solitary confinement.” The parties have reached a tentative settlement that the Court has preliminarily approved. The settlement is not an admission of wrongdoing or an indication that any law was violated.
1
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT: The following description is only a summary of the key points in the proposed settlement agreement. Information on how to obtain a copy of the full, proposed agreement is provided after this summary.
This settlement provides injunctive relief to class members and does not provide financial damages to any person. In particular the settlement provides that “Rutherford County is permanently enjoined from using seclusion for punishment as provided in the Rules, as may be amended or revised by the State of Tennessee.” As referenced in the injunction, the settlement agreement requires Rutherford County to comply with certain rules that the State of Tennessee ratified and implemented during the pendency of this case that apply to all juvenile detention centers. Further, the settlement agreement requires that the State provide reports of its 2018 and 2019 reviews of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center, which are being conducted to ensure compliance with the State’s new rules, to Class Counsel.
As part of the settlement, Plaintiff Doe and the plaintiff class are releasing Defendants from certain claims. In particular, Plaintiff Doe and the plaintiff Class are releasing Defendants from any causes of action, and resulting attorneys’ fees, that could have been brought against them for declaratory relief and/or injunctive relief related to the conduct that is the subject matter of the litigation. For a complete description of the terms, releases and "settled claims," you should obtain a full copy of the proposed settlement agreement. Defendants do not admit any wrongdoing, fault, or liability. The settlement agreement cannot be used against defendants as evidence of any presumption, concession, or admission of any liability, negligence, fault, or wrongdoing in future actions, and may not be used against defendants to establish a presumption in any other litigation.
The agreement also resolves all claims by the Class and Class Counsel for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs’ counsel is being paid fees and expenses by Defendants in the total sum of $250,000.00, which will be divided among Mark J. Downton and Wesley B. Clark, and Thomas H. Castelli on behalf of the ACLU Foundation of Tennessee, Inc.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. TO UNDERSTAND IT FULLY, YOU SHOULD READ THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT. Copies of the proposed settlement may be obtained at no cost to you from the attorneys for the plaintiffs/Class Counsel listed at the end of this Notice. In addition, a copy of the proposed Agreement is also available for viewing on the websites listed below, in the section entitled Websites on which the Settlement Agreement is available for review,
2
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PROCEDURES FOR AGREEMENT OR OBJECTION:
IF YOU AGREE with the proposed settlement, you do not need to do anything at this time. If you wish to attend, you may attend the Fairness Hearing, on the date set forth below.
IF YOU DISAGREE with the proposed settlement, you have a right to object to it and to the dismissal of the remaining claims in the lawsuit. Your objections will be considered by the Court as it reviews the settlement ONLY IF you follow these procedures:
1. Objections must be filed in writing by mail with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, United States Courthouse, 801 Broadway #800, Nashville, TN 37203.
ALL OBJECTIONS MUST CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
a. Name, address, and telephone number of the person filing the objection.
b. A statement of the reasons for the objection.
c. A statement that copies of the objections have also been sent to the attorneys listed at the end of this notice.
2. You must send copies of your objections to all attorneys listed at the end of this notice.
3. The deadline for receipt of written objections by the Court and the attorneys listed below is June 28, 2019. Objections filed by mail must be postmarked on or before June 24, 2019, to be considered timely. Objections filed or mailed after the above dates will not be considered. Class members who fail to lodge objections on or before June 28, 2019, will not be permitted to testify at the settlement hearing.
4. No later than July 9, 2019, the attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants shall file and serve responses, if any, to objections they timely receive from persons opposed to the proposed settlement.
THE FAIRNESS HEARING IN THIS CASE IS SET FOR JULY 19, 2019. CONTACT CLASS COUNSEL, NOT THE COURT, REGARDING THE FAIRNESS HEARING.
3
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WEBSITES ON WHICH THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW:
Plaintiffs’ Website www.aclu-tn.org Or https://www.brazilclark.com/notice-of-hearing/
Department of Children’s Services’ Website www.tn.gov/dcs.html
Rutherford County’s Website http://rutherfordcountytn.gov/jdc/notice-of-settlement.html
ATTORNEYS' NAMES AND ADDRESSES FOR PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys/Class Counsel:
Thomas H. Castelli Legal Director, ACLU Foundation of Tennessee 615-320-7142 (phone) 615-691-7219 (fax) tcastelli@aclu-tn.org
Mark J. Downton Wesley B. Clark
615-730-8619 (phone) 615-514-6974 (fax) mark@downtonclark.com wesley@brazilclark.com
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Defendants’ Attorneys: For State Defendants: Alexander S. Rieger 615-741-2408 (phone) 615-532-5683 (fax) alex.rieger@ag.tn.gov Jon P. Lakey 901-260-2575 (phone) 901-339-2588 (fax) jlakey@walkcook.com For County Defendants: Nicholas C. Christiansen (615) 893-5522 (phone) (615) 849-2135 (fax) nchristiansen@mborolaw.com
5
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE, a minor, by and

)

through his Mother and next friend

)

SHARIEKA FRAIZER,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

Docket No. 3:16-CV-0799

)

JUDGE RICHARDSON

v.

)

)

BONNIE HOMMRICH, et al

)

)

Defendants.

)

_____________________________________________________________________________

FINAL ORDER APPROVING CLASS SETTLEMENT, ORDERING PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE _____________________________________________________________________________

This matter came to be heard in open Court upon a Fairness Hearing, conducted on July

19, 2019, for final consideration of the proposed Class Settlement Agreement. The parties

provided Notice to the Class of the proposed settlement agreement and the Fairness Hearing

consistent with the approved Fairness Hearing Notice approved by this Court.

For the reasons stated herein, the proposed Class Settlement Agreement is approved, and

the Court makes the following FINDINGS and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS

FOLLOWS:

1. On March 27, 2019, the plaintiffs John Doe, individually and on behalf of the class

as Class Representative (“Mr. Doe”) and counsel for Mr. Doe and the class certified by this Court,

Thomas H. Castelli, Mark J. Downton and Wesley B. Clark (collectively “Class Counsel”), and

the defendants Bonnie Hommrich, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Tennessee

Department of the Children’s Services (“Commissioner Hommrich”), the Tennessee Department

of the Children’s Services (the “Department”), and, Rutherford County, Tennessee (the “County”) filed a Corrected Second Agreed Motion to Approve Class Settlement (Docket No. __ (“Motion to Approve”.) Attached to the Motion to Approve is the executed Class Action Settlement Agreement (the “Class Settlement Agreement”), which all parties request this Court to approve and based on which the parties seek this final order. A copy of the Class Settlement Agreement is attached to this Order as Exhibit A.
2. On March 28, 2019, this Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Class Settlement, Directing Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Fairness Hearing (Docket No. 144 (the “Preliminary Approval Order”).) Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, a Fairness Hearing was conducted on July 19, 2019.
3. This Final Order Approving Class Settlement, Ordering Permanent Injunctive Relief, and Dismissing Case with Prejudice (the “Final Order”) incorporates the Class Settlement Agreement and its exhibits, and the Preliminary Approval Order.
4. Based on the entire record before this Court, including the Memorandum and Order entered on February 17, 2017 (Docket No. 100), the Class Settlement Agreement (attached as Exhibit A), the Motion to Approve (Docket No. 143), the Preliminary Approval Order (Docket No. 144), the Fairness Hearing, and all other prior submissions and filings in this proceeding, the Court hereby confirms that the certified and final class in this matter is as follows (hereinafter referred to as the “Class” and/or the “Class Members”):
All juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present. (Docket No. 100, p. 9; and, Class Settlement Agreement, Section I.)
2

5. The Court confirms that the Class meets all the applicable requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and (b)(2).
6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties in the Litigation, including all Class Members, and has subject matter jurisdiction over this class litigation, including jurisdiction to approve the Settlement Agreement, grant final certification of the Class, to settle and release all claims released in the Settlement Agreement, to enter the permanent injunction, and to dismiss this matter with prejudice. Further, venue is proper in this Court.
7. In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order, the Class Members were given notice of the terms of the Settlement (the “Notice”), as well as the date, time and location of the Fairness Hearing and the deadline for presenting objections to the Class Settlement Agreement. In particular and in conformity with the Preliminary Approval Order, the Notice was provided to Class Members by the following means: a mailing by Rutherford County to the last known address of the one-hundred and twenty-eight (128) potential class members identified by Rutherford County in the course of discovery and referenced by the Court in its Order certifying the class (Docket No. 100 at 4), unless excluded from potential class membership by agreement of counsel for Rutherford County and Plaintiffs; publication on the websites of the County and the Department; posting in the entrance lobby and visitor areas of the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center; and, mailing to Juvenile Court Judge and Magistrates for the Juvenile Court of Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Public Defender’s Office, and the Rutherford County District Attorney’s Office. The Notice informed the Class Members of who was in the class, a summary of basis for the litigation, a description of the proposed settlement, that they could object to the proposed settlement, a description of the proposed release, and the procedure and deadline for submitting any such objections. The Notice provided Class Members with adequate time to
3

submit any objections to the Class Settlement Agreement. This Court finds that the Notice, both its content and the method by which it was published to potential Class Members, afforded Class Members appropriate and adequate protections to make informed decisions regarding the Class Settlement Agreement, and satisfied the requirement of law and due process.
8. The designated class representative is John Doe, and the Court finds that he adequately represents the Class for purposes of entering into and implementing the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, the Court finds that Thomas H. Castelli, Mark J. Downton and Wesley B. Clark are appropriate class counsel.
9. At the July 19, 2019, Fairness Hearing, the Parties presented support for why the Class Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned. Moreover, no Class Member has lodged an objection to the Class Settlement Agreement, either in writing in advance of, or by way of testimony at, the Fairness Hearing.
10. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), the Court hereby approves in all respects the parties settlement as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and finds that the Settlement Agreement is in all respects fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of the Class, and fully complies with the applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including the Due Process Clause), the Class Action Fairness Act, and any other applicable law. The Court hereby declares the Settlement Agreement is binding on all Class Members and is to be preclusive in that regard.
11. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate based on the following factors and findings, among other things: (a) there is no fraud or collusion underlying the Settlement Agreement; (b) the complexity, expense, and uncertainty in this matter favors settlement of behalf of the Class; (c) the Settlement Agreement provides meaningful
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injunctive relief on behalf of the Class Members and other juveniles who may come into the custody of the Rutherford JDC; and (d) any and all other applicable factors that favor final approval.
12. Consistent with the terms of the Class Action Settlement, the following permanent injunction, entered with regard to only the defendant Rutherford County, is hereby ordered: “Rutherford County is permanently enjoined from using seclusion for punishment as provided in the Rules of the Department of Children’s Services, Chapter 0250-04-08, Minimum Standards for Juvenile Detention Centers and Temporary Holding Services (the “Rules”), as may be amended or revised by the State of Tennessee.”
13. Consistent with the terms of the Class Action Settlement, the Department provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel a draft of their standard operating procedure (“SOP”) for conducting the Reviews, as that term is defined in the Settlement Agreement, and Plaintiffs’ counsel provided to State Defendants any and all comments they had regarding the SOP, in writing, within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the SOP. State Defendants considered in good faith Plaintiffs’ counsel’s comments, if any, before finalizing the SOP. State Defendants had and have the sole discretion to establish the final SOP contents and modify them as necessary moving forward. Moreover, State Defendants have provided to Plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of the Rutherford JDC Preliminary Report, and the Rutherford JDC Report, with the names of juveniles redacted, for the calendar year 2018 and part of 2019, and Defendants shall continue to provide to Plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of the Rutherford JDC Report, as those terms are defined in the Settlement Agreement, with the names of juveniles redacted, within fifteen (15) days of the conclusion of each review conducted by the Department of Rutherford JDC in the remaining part of calendar year 2019.
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14. Plaintiffs Mr. Doe and the Class Members provide the defendants a release of claims as part of the Settlement Agreement (the “Release”). (Settlement Agreement, Section V). Based upon the entire record in this cause, including the statements of Class Counsel, this Court finds that Release is appropriate and adopts the Release as binding on the parties.
15. The parties agree, and this Court finds, that Mr. Doe and the Class qualify as prevailing parties as defined in 42 U.S.C. §1988, and that they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fee and reimbursement. Based on the Class Settlement Agreement and the statements of counsel at the Fairness Hearing, a mediated resolution among the parties has been reached with regard to the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses to be awarded: the total amount of fees and expenses payable to Class Counsel is $250,000.00, with County Defendants to pay $166,666.67 and State Defendants to pay $83,333.33. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h), the Court approves this total fee and expense award and finds it to be fair and reasonable, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) and in accordance with the terms of the Class Settlement Agreement. Thereby, Rutherford County is hereby directed to pay its share of the fee/expense award, $166,666.67, to Class Counsel within sixty (60) days of the entry of this order. Further, State Defendants are hereby directed to pay its share of the fee/expense award, $83,333.33, to Class Counsel within sixty (60) days of the entry of this order. Class Counsel shall allocate and distribute this award of fees among themselves. In approving and making this award, the Court understand and orders that the award of $250,000,00 for fees and expenses fully compensates Class Counsel for all work performed to date and in the future relative to this Litigation, and that Class Counsel shall not be entitled to, and Plaintiffs waive any claim for, additional attorneys’ fees or expenses for any additional work performed related to this litigation. Nothing in this Order is intended
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to or shall be construed to limit or preclude Class Counsel from seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees in any new, subsequently filed action.
16. In making the foregoing findings, the Court has exercised its discretion in certifying the Class. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement resulted from extensive, arm’s length, good faith negotiations between Class Counsel and counsel for the defendants. Moreover, the negotiations were overseen and supervised by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown and then a private, Rule 31 mediator, Mr. Earle Schwarz.
17. Upon entry of this Final Order, this matter shall be dismissed with prejudice and Final Judgment shall be entered in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 19th day of July, 2019. __________________________________ ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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