IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Quentin Bullock, and Jack Reid, individually )

and on behalfofa class,

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

VS.

)

)

MICHAEL SHEAHAN,

)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY,

)

in his official capacity

)

and Cook County

)

Defendant

)

No. 04 C 1051

~-,

JUDGE Elaine Bucklo MAGISTRATE Judge Schenkier

FE~ 2 ~ 2~4

NOTICE OF FTLING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 20,2004, I caused to be filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northem District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Dated this 20t~ day of February, 2004.

Thomas G. Morrissey Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, II 60643 (773) 233-7900

~ctf~ly submitted, One of Piain~

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Quentin Bullock, and Jack Reid, individually and on behalf of a class, ,
Plaintiffs
VS.
MICHAEL SHEAHAN, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, in his official capacity and Cook County
Defendant

No. 04 C 1051
JUDGE Elaine Bucklo MAGISTRATE Judge Schenkier

AMENDED COMPLAINT Now comes the Plaintiffs, by and through their attomey, Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd., and Robert H. Farley, Jr. Ltd. and complain of the Defendant as follows: This is a Civil Action for monetary damages to redress deprivations under color of law rights, privileges, and immunities secured under the Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Title 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS (a) Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (b) The Class consist of all male inmates who have been subjected to a strip search at the Cook County Department of Corrections (Jail) following their return to the Jail from court after there is a judicial determination that there is no longer a basis for their.detention, other than

to be processed for release.

©) The class is so numerous that joinder of all persons is impracticable. Inmates are

required by the Sheriff’s Office to return to the Jail after receiving judicial determinations

ordering their release. There is a written directive at the Jail which requires that strip searches are

conducted of all male inmates upon their return to the Jail from Court. The Sheriff’s Office, on

the other hand, does not strip searched similarly situated female inmate returning to the Jail after

receiving judicial determinations ordering their release. Plaintiffs believe that the class probably

numbers well over 20,000 persons.

(d) Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interest of all class members as they

are members of the class and their claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Each of

the plaintiffs is incensed at the treatment accorded the class members and will aggressively

pursue the interests of the entire class. Plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining monetary damages for the

violations of constitutional rights and privileges arc consistent with and not antagonistic to those

of any person within the class.

. ~

(e) The common questions of law and fact include:

(i) Whether the defendant has a policy and practice to strip search all males

with judicial discharge upon their return to the Jail;

(iii) Whether similarly situated female inmates with judicial discharges are

¯ strip searched upon their return to the Jail;

(iv) Whether the visual search of male inmates is reasonable;

(v)

Whether the defendant has knowledge of the conduct alleged herein;

(vi) Whether the conduct alleged herein is in violation of the Fourth, or

2

.___/

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title 42 U.S.C. 1983; (vii) whether plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class are entitled to an award of compensatory damages. (f) The wrongful conduct alleged herein has been conducted generally upon all members of the plaintiff class in that the strip searches were conducted pursuant to a long-established pla~., policy or procedure of the Cook County Department of Corrections. (g) Common questions of fact and law predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. (h) A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy in that: (i) A multiplicity of suits with consequent burden on the courts and defendants should be avoided. (ii) It would be virtually impossible for all putative class members to intervene as parties in this action. (iii) Upon adjudication of defendants’ liability, claims.of the class members can be determined by this Court.
Facts and Parties 1. Plaintiff, Quentin Bullock, also known a.s Robert Bullock, is a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois. 2. Plaintiff Jack Reid is a resident and citizen of the State of Illinois. 3. Defendant MICHAEL SH~AHAN is the Sheriff o~" Cook County. He is sued herein

in his official capacity. At all times relevant hereto, the defendant was acting under color of law of the state of Illinois.

4. Defendant Cook County, under Illinois law, funds the Office of the defendant Sheriff,

and is therefore required to pay a judgment entered against the sheriff’s office in it’s official

capacity.

_

5. On July 17,2002, plaintiff Quentin Bullock was arrested for armed robbery and

subsequently incarcerated in Division One at the Cook County Department of Corrections

6. On May I, 2003, plaintiff Jack Reid entered the Jail on a felony charge and was assigned to Division Nine.
7. On the morning of September 23, 2003, PlaintiffReid’s case was tried at the Criminal Courts Building located at 2600 S. California, in Chicago, Illinois. After a bench trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty of the pending charge and the Court entered an order (mittimus) requiring the Sheriff to release Mr. Reid from custody on the charges before the Court. Mr. Reid was under the constant supervision of C.C.D.O.C. employees and not allowed to have contact with non-employees from the moment he w~s taken from his division for transport to his hearing up to and including the moment he was returned to the Jail for out-processing.
8. On the morning of December 17, 2003, PlaintiffBullock’s case was tried at the Criminal Courts Building located at 2600 S. California, in Chicago, Illinois. After a bench trial, Circuit Court Judge Clay found the plaintiff not guilty of the pending charge and the Court

4

entered an order (mittimus) requiting the Sheriff to release the plaintiff from custody on the charges before the Court. Mr. Bullock was under the constant supervision of C.C.D.O.C. employees and not allowed to have contact with non-employees from the moment he was taken from his division for transport to his hearing up to and including the moment he was returned to the Jail for out-processing.
9. Pursuant to the Sheriff’s procedures, the plaintiffs were returned to Jail after being found not guilty, each with the above referred to mittimus for the limited purpose of administratively releasing the plaintiffs from the Jail. In order to administrative release a person from the Jail pursuant to a court order, the Sheriff’s Office simply checks their records to make sure that there were no additional holds on for that person, returns the civilian clothing to the individual, and verifies the identity of the person prior to the release.
10. Pursuant to the Sheriff’s practice and/or policy, after returning to the Jail at approximately 1:45 p.m., on December 17, 2003, Mr. Bullock was taken into a h~llway with thirty other inmates, and required to remove all his clothing. While naked, Mr. Bullock was ordered by employees of the Sheriff to extend his arms and legs apart, to squat three or four times, and then to cough while squaring. Mr. Bullock was then allowed to put his clothes back on. He.was then placed back into the same loekup facility in Division One which he had been incarcerated in prior to going to court that morning. He was not released from the Sheriff’s custody until approximately 10:15 p.m. that night.
11. Pursuant to the SherifFs practice and/or policy, after returning to the Jail at approximately 1:00 p,m., on September 23,2003, Mr. Reid was also taken into an open hallway
5

with approximately thirty other inmates, and required to remove all his clothing. While naked, Mr. Reid was ordered by employees of the Sheriff to extend his arms and legs apart, to squat three or four times, and then to cough while squating. Mr. Bullock was then allowed to put his clothes back on. He was then placed back into the same lookup facility in Division Nine which he had been incarcerated in prior to going to court that morning. He was not released from the Sheriff’s custody until approximately 8:00 p.m. that night.
12. On information and belief, the Sheriff has issued a General Order in regards to the release of female inmates with court ordered releases. The General Orders specifies that the women are not to be strip search and requires that they be promptly released from custody.
13. On information and belief, the Sheriff’s Office has established procedures to temporarily place a female inmate with court ordered releases in a holding cell while the Sheriff’s Office checks their records to confirm that there are no additional cases or holds on her. As soon as a female inmates eligibility for release is eordirmed, the female inmate is given her civilian, her identity is confirmed by the guards and she is then released from custody. On information and belief, the practice of the Sheriffis to release these women in less than three hours from the time they return to the Jail from court.
COUNT ONE 14. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-13 above as paragraphs 1-13 of Count I. 15. At all times relevant to this complaint, the defendant, as Sheriff of Cook County has the duty to establish procedures and policies and to train deputy sheriffs and C.C.D.O.C. employees to prevent unreasonable body searches of individuals who are in his custody and to ensure that inmates are not improperly discriminated against on the basis of gender.
6

16. Defendant SHEAHAN knew or should have known that male inmates are subjected to an unreasonable strip search, and only males uniformly are subjected to.sueh a search, after a Court has determined that the prisoner is not required to be held in custody any longer.
17. Defendant SHEAHAN instituted, sanctioned, and approved the following policies, practices, customs, and procedures regarding the ship searching of only male individuals who are in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections after there has been a judicial determination that there is no longer a basis for their detention other than to be processed for release by the C.C.D.O.C.
A. After the inmate has appeared in court and is returned to the holding cell adjacent to the Courtroom, he is la~nsported by Sheriff’s employees back to the Cook County Department of Corrections at 26t~ and California.
B. From the time he is picked up from the Courtroom holding cell by Sheriff’s employees to the time he arrives back at Cook County Jail, the inmate is under the constant supervision of Sheriff’s employees and is not allowed to have any contact with anyone other than Sheriff’s employees.
C. Upon his return to the Cook County Department of Corrections at 26~ and California, the detainee is placed in a bullpen in the Receiving Room of Division Five.
D. Subsequently, a group of male inmates from the same housing unit are escorted down a corridor in the Jail and are then ordered to spread out against a wall.
E. Pursuant to the existing policy and practice of the Sheriff, the male inmates are then required to submit to the following strip search:

(i) Each male inmate is ordered to remove all of her clothing. (ii) While naked, the male inmates are ordered to extend their arms and legs apart and
to squat three or four times, coughing during each squat. The inmates are then allowed to put their clothes back on. 18. On information and belief, all male inmates with judicial determinations requiring their release from custody are subjected to the strip search procedure as described above, despi~ the fact that similarly situated female inmates are not strip searched. 19. On information and belief, the strip searches of the male inmates are conducted without regard to whether it was reasonable to believe that any contraband or weapons may have been concealed on the male inmates, and thereby constituted unreasonable searches and seizures. 20. The Sheriff failed to establish appropriate procedures and practices to ensure that male inmates are not subjected to unreasonable body searches and not improperly discriminated against on the basis of gender. 21. The Sheri.fffailed to properly train and supervise the deputy sheriffs and C.C.D.O.C. employees responsible for Conducting body searches of inmates to prevent unreasonable body searches and to not improperly conduct body searches on the basis of gender. 22. The strip search of plaintiffs after they have appeared in Court and the Court has determined they should be released constitutes deliberate indifference to the fight of the plaintiffs in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 23. The acts and practices described above including but not limited to the fact that males returning to the Jail alter receiving judicial discharges are being forced to undergo strip searches whereas females in identical si,Bations are not, were made with the approval,
8

authorization, knowledge, and consent of the defendant. 24. Since instituting the practice of not strip searching similarly situated female
inmates, the defendant has taken no steps to set up a procedure to temporarily hold male inmates returning from court with judicial determinations requiting their release from custody, while the Sheriff’s administrative release procedures are performed.
25. The policies, procedures, practices and acts of defendant alleged above, violate the rights of plaintiffs and members of the class under the Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as follows:
(a) The strip searches were conducted without probable cause or reason to believe that any contraband, or dangerous materials would be fourtd and thereby constituted unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the rights, privileges and immunities of plaintiffs and members of the class under the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendments.
(b) The strip searches constituted gross invasions of the fights of plaintiffs and members of the class to privacy and due process under Fourteenth Amendment.
(c) The policies, procedures and practices of defendant relating to strip searches under these circumstances are only applied to males and not to female inmates, in gross violation of the rights, privileges and immunities of plaintiff class under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
26. As a direct and proximate result of the Sheriff’s policies, practices and procedures, in his official capacity, the defendant subjected the Plaintiffs and members of the class unreasonable body searches which were demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, rel~ulsive, signifying degradation and submission.
9

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court enter an order: 1. Finding that this action should proceed as a class action under Rule 23, Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure;

2. Awarding damages to each plaintiff and member of the class against the defendant in

the amount of fifty thousand dollars in compensatory damages for emotional and psychological

distress, anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and degradation.

_

3. Awarding plaintiffs and the class their costs and attorneys fees under Title 42 U.S.C.

Sect. 1988.

COUNT TWO

27. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-26 above as paragraphs 1-26 of Count II.

,

28. On information and belief, the Sheriffhas issued General Orders in regards to the

release of female inmates with court ordered releases. Within these General Orders, the Sheriff has promulgated procedures for the prompt release of female inmates.

29. On information and belief, the vastmajority of similarly situated female inmates with court ordered discharges are released in less than two hours area" arriving back at the Jail

from court.

30. Defendant SHEAHAN at all times relevant to this complaint is a policy maker for

the C.C.D.O.C.

31, At all times relevant to this complaint, the defendant, as SheriffofCook County, has the duty to establish procedures and policies and to Irain deputy sheriffs and C.C.D.O.C.

employees to prevent unreasonable delays in releasing both male and female inmates fi:om

custody after pending criminal charges are disposed of by a court of law.

10

32. In 1994, Michael Sheahan was named as a defendant in a class action lawsuit entitled Denise Watson, et aL, vs. MichaelSheahan, et al., No. 94 C 6891. In that litigation, the plaintiff class alleged that the defendant violated their constitutional fights by subjected them to prolonged and excessive periods of detention after there had been judicial determinations that there was no longer a basis for their detention, other than that they should be processed for release. The Watson class alleged that there was a widespread and systematic practice at the J~il of delaying the release of individuals after judicial orders were entered requiring the release of individuals.
33. In the fall of 1996, defendant Sheahan entered into a settlement with the plaintiff class in Watson. The class included approximately 51,000 male and female inmates who were held for excessive periods of time at the Jail after receiving a judicial order requiring their release.
34. James Ryan is the Sheriff’s Chief of Operations. He has testified in a deposition that although he was aware that the Sheriff entered into a settlement of the Watson class action, he does not recall any procedures which were put in place for inmates after the settlement to correct the systematic problems in regards to releasing individuals aRer they receive court ordered discharges.
35. Dennis Andrews, is currently the Superintendent of Division One where the plaintiff was housed. Previously he was in charge of the unit which was responsible for processing court ordered discharges after the Watson settlement. Mr. Andrews has testified that after the settlement, he failed to properly supervise the employees assigned the task of processing individuals with court ordered releases and he also admitted that after the Watson settlement,
11

individuals were still being held up to nine hours at the Cook County Jail after they received orders from the courts requiring their release from custody.
36. On information and belief, after the Sheriff entered into the settlement in Watson, male inmates with court ordered releases continued to be detained at the Jail for excessive periods after the courts had ordered their releases.
37. At all times relevant to this complaint, Defendant SHEAHAN had actual knowledge of the widespread and systemic delays in releasing male individuals with court ordered releases at the Cook County Jail. He is also aware of the Jail’s General Orders which set forth the procedures for the prompt release of female inmates.
38. Although the Sheriffwas on notice of his defective procedures for releasing male inmates with court ordered releases, the Sheriff continued the following policies, practices, customs, and procedures regarding the processing for the release of male individuals in the Jail, where a determination has been made that an inmate:is to be re/eased:
A. After the order of release or other appropriate order regarding a detainee’s status is entered by the court, the policy, practice, and custom of the deputy sheriff assigned to the relevant eourt room is to put that individual in a holding cell adjacent to the court room for an indeterminable period.
B. . The detainee then must wait for Sheriff’s employees to pick them up from the courthouse wherein they are being held to transport them baek to the Cook County Department of Corrections.
C. Upon his return to the Cook County Department of Corrections at 26th and California, the detainee is placed in a bullpen in the Receiving Room of Division 12

Five prior to being returned back to his division cell. D. While the individual is in his division cell waiting for his release, his paperwork is
reviewed by the Records Department. E. There is inadequate supervision of the employees within the Records Department
to insure that priority is given to the processing of the paperwork of male inmates who have been to court that day and have received an order to be released. The. vast majority of individuals returning from court each day are to be further detained and do not receive a release order or an I-Bond. F. After the Records Department completes its review for a group of individuals, a call is placed to each individual’s division with instructions that the individual should be brought back to the Receiving Room. This procedure, in itself can take up to two hours until the individuals arrive back in the Receiving Room. G. Once in the Receiving Room, a fingerprint is made to ensure that the individual is the proper person being released. It can take one hour or more before the individual is released from the Receiving Room to the outside world. 39. The Sheriff failed to establish appropriate procedures and practices to insure the prompt release of male detainees from custody after there has been a court determination that there are no longer criminal charges pending against the person. 40. The Sheriff failed to properly train and supervise the deputy sheriffs and C.C.D.O.C. employees responsible for processing such male detainees to prevent unreasonable delays in releasing such persons from custody. 41. The detention ofplaintiffBullock for approximately eight and one-half hours
1.3

and p!aintiffReid for eight hours after judges determined they should be released from custody constitutes deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs, in violation of the Fourth Amendment fights not to be detained for an unreasonable time and the Fourteenth Amendrnent’s Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution due to the fact that similarly situated female inmates are release from custody promptly.
42. Despite the fact that defendant SHEAHAN has personal knowledge of the administrative delays in releasing male inmates, and the unequal treatment of male inmates after they receive a judicial release, SHEAHAN has failed to implement changes in the Jail’s release practices for male inmates.
As a direct and proximate result of the Sheriffs policies, practices and procedures of failing to promptly and expeditiously process detainees for release, plaintiff Bullock was detained for approximately eight and one-half hours after receiving judicial orders of release and plaintiff Reid was similarly held for approximately eight hours. Additionally, plaintiffs lost time from their normal endeavors, and suffered great emotional pain and embarrassment.
Wherefore plaintiffs prays for an award of Fifty thousand dollars and his attorneys fees and cost.
.. Plaintiffs~kttom eys’~eys~
Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. ¯ 10249 S. Western Avenue Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233-7900
14

Robert H. Farley, Jr., Ltd. 1155 S. Wastiington Naperville, I1. 60540 (630)-369-0103
15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Thomas G. Morrissey., an attorney, deposes and states that he served a copy the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT on parties listed above by either mailing or faxing a copy on or before 5:00 p.m. on February 20, 2004.

SERVICE LIST
Mr. Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr. Civil Bureau Chief Office of the State’s Attorneys 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602

~~~om~ G Morri~

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Quentin Bullock, and Jack Reid, individually )

and on behalf of a class,

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

VS.

)

)

MICHAEL SHEAHAN,

)

SHE~ OF COOK COUNTY,

)

in his official capacity

)

and Cook County

)

)

Defendant

)

JUDGE Elaine Bucklo MAGISTRATE Judge Schenkier

NOTICE OF FILING

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 19, 2004, I caused to be filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION.
Dated this 19th day of May, 2004.

One~f Plaintiffs’ Ntto~e’
Thomas O. Morrissey Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, I1 60643 (773) 233-7900
Mr. Steven Puiszis Robert Shannon Hinshaw & Culbertson 222 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300 Chicago, I1. 60601-1081

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, individually )

and on behalf of a class

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

VS.

Michael F. Sheahan, as the Sheriff of Cook County in his Official Capacity and Cook County

Defendants

No. 04 C 1051
JUDGE Elaine Bucklo MAGISTRATE Judge Schenkier

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
The Plaimiffs, Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, individually and on behalf of a class, by
their attorneys, Thomas O. Morrissey and Robert H. Farley, Jr., submit this Memorandum in
Support of their Motion for Class Certification.

INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Action Complaint asserts a putative class action against

Defendants on behalf of individuals who have been strip searched without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing contraband or weapons at the Cook County Departmem of Corrections ("Jail") upon their return from court appearances that entitled them to release. The defendants admit that the Sheriff has a policy, and practice of strip searching only male inmates after there has been a judicial determination that

there is no longer a basis for their detention other than to be processed for release from the Jail.

(Def. Answer Amend. Compl. par. 17). The defendants also admit that the named plaintiffs, Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, were strip searched pursuant to this policy and practice upon
¯
returning to the Jail after court appearances where they were found not guilty. (Def. Answer Amend. Compl. pars. 7, 8, 10, &l 1). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ strip search policy is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Shedffwas previously a defendant in a similar class action lawsuit which alleged that the female inmates were strip searched after their return from court appearance that made them eligible for release from the Jail. Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294 (Coar, J.). Although at the time of the filing oftha~ lawsuit, the Jail had a written policy which required all inmates to be strip searched upon their return form court, the Court found that while all females were strip searched, there was no uniform practice in regards to strip searching male court returns. Gary v. Sheahan, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13378 at. "16-17. Following the entry era preliminary injunction barring the strip searching of female inmates returning to the Jail from court appearances which made them eligible for release, and prior to the Court’s entry of summary judgment for the class, the Jail changed its practice in regards to male court returns and issued orders requiring the strip searching of all male inmates returning from court. ARer the Gary Court heard testimony of blatant violations of the preliminary injunction order, a permanent injunction was issued enjoining the Jail" from strip searching female inmate court returnees who have been judicially discharged from the Cook County DeparUnent of Corrections." Gary, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17305.

CLASS DEFINITION The proposed Plaintiff class is defined as follows:
All male inmates who have been subjected to defendants’ policy, practice and custom of strip searching ,without reasonable suspicion that the inmate is concealing a weapon or other contraband, at the Cook. County Department of Corrections ("Jail") following their return from court after there is a judicial determination that there is no longer a basis for their detention, other that to be processed for release.
ARGUMENT Parties seeking class action certification must first satisfy the provisions of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Then, in addition, the ease must fit within at least one of the three subcategofies under Rule 23(b). Rosario v. Lividitis~ 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7~ Cir.
1992), cert.denied, 506 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct.972 (1993). All four 23 (a) prerequisites are quite undoubtedly satisfied here, and this ease falls squarely under the 23 (b)(3) category.
On a motion for class certification, the Court must accept as true all facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-178, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152 (1974) ("We fred nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether
it may be maintained as a class action."); Gammon v. GC Services Limited Partnership, 162 F.D.R. 313, 315, n. 2 (N.D. I11. 1995) (When evaluating a motion for class certification, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true."); Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353-54 (7~
Cir. 1975); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd OfEduc., 117 F.R.D. 394, 396 (N.D. I11. 1987): Newburg
on Class Actions, See. 3.20, p. 3-124 ("It is settled law that any preliminary inquiry into or consideration of the merits of litigation is improper in cormeetion with a determination of the

propriety of a class action.") Moreover, "the interests of justice require that in a doubtful case...any error, if there is to be one, should be committed in favor of allowing a class action." Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3~ Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10~ Cir.), cert. Denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Tapken v. Brown, 1992 WL 17894, *26 (S.D. Fla.); Horton v. Goose Creeklndependent School District, 690 F.2d 470, 487, n. 32 (5t~ Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D. 32, 50 (E.D. Va. 1981).
1. Plaintiff has established the prerequisites for a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) A. Numerosity
Numerosity is easily met in this case. Courts in this judicial circuits have certified classed with less than 50 members. Patrykus v. Goraills, 121 F.R.D. 357, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (court certified a class of approximately 50 class members, stating that "the complaint need not allege the exact number or identity of class members"); Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 660 (N.D. I11. 1989) (court held that numerosity was met when the plaintiffs demonstrated that at least 35 individuals were members of the proposed class); Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, 415 F.2d 1326, 1333, n.4 (72 Cir. 1996) (finding that a class of 151 was sufficient to certify a class, but 40 would have been acceptable). Case law has also recognized that courts should make "common assumptions" to support a finding of numerosity. Grossman v. Waste Management, lnc., 162 F.R.D. 322, 329 (N.D. I11. 1995). The numerosity requirement should be constnaed liberally in civil rights actions. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 (52 Cir. 1975).
4

In this case, numerosity is satisfied because the joinder of all individuals affected by the Sheriff’s policy is impracticable. In Gary, there were approximately 12,000 putative class members and due to the fact that there are substantially more male inmates at the Jail than females, the size of the class will exceed 20,000 individuals..
B. Commonality Commonality requires that there be one or more questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23 (a) (2). This rule does not require that all questions of law or fact raised in the litigation be common. PortAuth. Police Benevolent~4ssn. V. Port~4uth., 698 F.2d 150, 153-4 (24 Cir. 1983). There need only be a single issue common to all members of the class. Harris, 127 F.R.D. at 661. In fact, "[w]hen the party opposing the class has engaged in some course of conduct that effects a group of persons and gives rise to a cause of action, one or more of the elements of that cause of action will be common to all of the persons affected." Newberg on Class Actions, Sec. 3.10, p. 3-51. So long as one issue of law or fact is common to the class, "the presence of individual questions will not prevent satisfaction of the Rule 23 (a) (2) prerequisite." ld. at p. 360. See also Ivy v. Meridian Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 108 F.R.D. 1 I8, 123 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that commonality and typicality were satisfied in an employment discrimination case despite the defendant’s argument that individual questions would predominate concerning each hiring decision); Patrykus, 121 F.R.D. at 361 (holding that "[d]ifferences in individual cases concerning treatment or damages does not defeat commonality"); Krislov v. Rednour, 946 F.Supp. 563,568 (N.D. Ill 1996). In this case, commonality is easily met because Defendants "engaged in some course of

conduct that affects a group of persons and gives rise to a cause of action." Newberg on Class
Actions, Sec. 3.10, p. 3-51. As previously stated, the Sheriff admits to having a policy of strip
searching all male inmates returning to the Jail after receiving court orders making them eligible
for release. In addition, all female inmates returning to the Jail with court ordered releases are
not strip searched. (Def. Answer Amend. Compl, par. 17). In Bynum v. District of Columbia,
217 F.R.D. 43; 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13884, (2003), the plaintiffs challenged the District of Columbia, Department of Correction’s policy of strip searching inmates upon reku’ning from
court to jail with court orders entitling them to be released. In determining that the plaintiffs’ had satisfied the commonality requirement of Rtde 23(a), the court stated that :
Regardless of the potential variation of individual circumstances of each inmate’s return, the challenged activity-strip searching- is common to all putative class member. The question of whether defendant’s policy of strip searching violates the Constitution raises questions of law and fact that are common to the class. When the cause of action arises out of a course of conduct that affects a group of persons, one or more elements of the cause of action will be common to the entire group. Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 34 (quoting Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg On Class Actions Sect. 3.10 (42 ed., 2002). In this case, as with the other detention class, the question of causation will be the same for all plaintiffs, because it is the same course of conduct that allegedly injured each plaintiff.
The common questions of law and fact in the present case are as follows:
A. Whether the defendants admitted policy and practice of strip searching all
male inmates without reasonable suspicion that the inmate is concealing a weapon or other
contraband, with judicial discharges upon their return to the Jail violates the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments.
B. Whether female inmates returning to the Jail with judicial discharges are
similarly situated to male inmates returning to the jail with judicial discharges.
6

C. Typicality Typicality determines whether a sufficient relationship exists between the injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting the class, so that the court may properly attribute a collective nature to the challenged conduct. General Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 152 (1982). When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requiremem is met irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims. Id; see also Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2s 931,936-937 (2~d Cir. 1998); Baby Neal ex tel Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3~ Cir. 1994). Courts should look to the elements of the cause of action that the class representative must prove in order to establish the defendant’s liability. If they are substantially the same as those needed to be proved by the class members’ claims, the representative’s claim is typical. Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1992). For example, inPatrylcus v. Gomilla, 121 F.ILD. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1988), the plaintiffs brought a class action complaint alleging that government officers violated their civil rights. The complaint alleged that police and state officials busted into a bar frequented by homosexual and bisexual men, without warrants for any class members nor probable cause, and forced class members to lie face down on the floor for several hours, subjected them to unnecessary searches and photographs, compelled the class members to reveal detailed personal information and subjected the class members to homosexual slurs. The court certified a class because the claims asserted on behalf of all potential class members arose from the same course of conduct and were based upon the same legal theories, Id. at 362. According to the court, the fact that defendants hypothetically may assert individualized defenses, or that some class might not be homosexual or
7

bisexual, has no bearing on the issue of typicality. Id. The court needed only to determine if the named representatives’ claims had the same essential characteristics as the claims of the other members of the class. Id.
Here, the Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the class. The defendants admit that the named plaintiffs, Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, were strip searched pursuant to the challenged policy and practice after court appearances where they wcrc found not guilty. (Def. Answer Amend. Compl. pars. 7, 8, 10, &l 1). The Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that typicality is satisfied in this case.
D. Adequacy of representation The two factors that are universally recognized as the guidelines for adequate representation are: 1) the representative must not have interests antagonistic to or conflicting with the interests of the class, and 2) the representative must appear able to prosecute the action vigorously tlu’ough qualified counsel. Newberg on Class ~4ctions, Sec. 3,22, p. 3-126. See also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 312; ,4mchen Products, Inc. V. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,626, n. 20, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997). In re United Energy Corp. Solar Power Modules Tax Shelter Invs. Sees. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251,257 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that the plaintiffs were adequate representatives for the class where they expressed an interest in and understanding of the case and participated in depositions) .. The party opposing a class has the burden to establish that representation is inadequate. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 (3’d Cir, 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 176 (1982). Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the putative class. The plaintiffs have no interest

which are adverse to the class. The named plaintiffs each were strip searched pursuant to the defendants’ policy and practice, without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion after becoming eligible for release upon a judicial finding of not guilty. Counsels for the plaintiffs are experienced civil fights attorneys with experience in complex class action litigation. Thomas Morrissey has been class counsel in Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139 (Judge Gettleman); Thompson, et al. v. Oty of Chicago, No. 01 C 6916, 2002 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 10627 (Magistrate Judge Nolan); Gary et aL, v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294 (Judge Coar); Watson et at, v. Sheahan, No. 94 C 6891 (Judge Bucklo); Hvorcik et at v. Sheahan, 92 C 7324 (Judge Shadur). Robert H. Farley, Jr., has been class counsel in Portis and Gary.
2. Plaintif~ have establi.~hed that the las~ action is maintainable pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).
Rule 23 (b) (3) permits a class action where "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3). "The predominance requirement is generally satisfied where a ’common nucleus of operative facts’ exists among all class members for which the law provides a remedy." Chandler v. Southwest Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 302, 310 (N.D. I11. 1995). "Once this basic determination has been made, the fact that there may be individual questions, as proposed by defendant, will not defeat the predominating common question." Miner v. Gillette Company, 428 N.E.2d 478, 485 (I11. 1981). See also Zinberg v. Washington Bancorp, lnc., 138 F.R.D. 397, 410 (D.N.J. 1990) ("Where all class members are united in their desire to establish the defendants’ complicity and liability,
9

individual issues, if they exist, are secondary."). The requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3) are easily met in this case. As set forth above for
commonality, at a minimum, the issue as to whether members of the class were unlawfuIly strip searched aRer court appearances making them eligible for release (and thereby deprived of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) is common to all putative class members, and this question is the overriding and predominant issue applicable to all putative class members. Even if there are, arguendo, other questions affecting only individual members, no such questions would predominate over the common class questions. A class action is also superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Denying a class and requiring hundreds of individual actions would waste judicial resources, may lead to duplicative and inconsistent rulings, and would cause a financial hardship for the class members if they were all required to prosecute individual actions.
CONCLIJSION Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs requests that this Court enter an Order certifying this action as a class action, certifying the plaintiffs as representatives of the class defined herein, and designating their attorneys, Thomas O. Morrissey and Robert H. Farley, Jr., as class counsel.
Respectfully~ ~/~ ’~submitted’\.,~ On~ 0fthe Attorneys for~ aintiffs
10

Thomas G. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10249 S. Western Ave. Chicago, I1. 60643 773-233-7900 Robert H. Farley, Jr. Robert H. Farley, Jr. Ltd. 1155 S. Washington Naperville, IL 60540 630-369-0103
11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Robert H. Farley, Jr., one of the attorneys for the Plaintiffs, deposes and states that he service a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Class Certification, by mailing and faxing a copy on or before 5:00 p.m. on May 19, 2004 to the attorney(s) listed below.

Mr. Steven Puiszis Robert Shannon Hinshaw & Culbertson
222 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300 Chicago, I1, 60601-1081

Robert H. Farley,Jr.

12

 
 Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 1 of 23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

QUENTIN BULLOCK, and JACK REID, individually and on behalf of a class,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL SHEAHAN, SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, in his official capacity, and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No. 04 C 1051 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, individually and on

behalf of a class (collectively “plaintiffs”) have brought this

suit challenging the constitutionality of defendants Michael

Sheahan and Cook County’s (collectively “defendants”) policy and/or

practice under which male inmates, in the custody of the Cook

County Department of Corrections (“CCDC”), were subjected to strip

searches upon returning to the CCDC for out-processing after being

ordered released. The parties have filed cross motions for summary

judgment. For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motion is granted

in part and defendants’ motion is denied.

I.

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges violations of the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution based on the

defendants’ policy and/or practice under which male inmates were

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 2 of 23
subjected to strip searches upon returning to the CCDC for outprocessing after being ordered released. Specifically, at the time they were strip searched, plaintiffs Bullock and Reid had been ordered released after being found not guilty of the charges against them.
The following facts are not in dispute. All CCDC inmates, including those ordered discharged in court, are required to return to the jail before being released. All inmates returning to the jail after their court appearances (hereinafter “returns”) are placed in holding cells located within the Receiving, Classification and Diagnosis Center (“RCDC”) of the jail prior to being brought back to their respective housing divisions within the jail. The CCDC has several housing divisions which house different groups or classifications of inmates (i.e. maximum, medium, minimum security). Each of these divisions has its own separate building on the jail grounds. There are two housing divisions for women. The RCDC is located in the basement of Division Five and is the nerve center of the jail for inmate transport, as all inmates who enter or exit the jail are processed at some point in the RCDC, as well as inmates who are transferred between housing divisions. The inmates are placed in bullpens within the RCDC. Aside from the smaller bullpens A, B, C, and D, the male intake area of the RCDC has six additional larger bullpens, numbered 1-6. Some of the larger numbered bullpens can house 150 to 200 inmates.
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 3 of 23
After their court appearance, every inmate is given a court order called a mittimus. A mittimus indicates the disposition of an inmate’s criminal case to the Department of Corrections. This document indicates if the inmate is a “possible discharge.” Among the returns, the jail identifies any mittimus which indicates a possible discharge and that document is taken to the Records Department. Any inmate ordered discharged remains in custody until the Sheriff determines that there are no other cases or holds which would prevent the inmate from being released. The jail staff checks CIMIS, the jail’s computerized record keeping system, in order to determine whether a court discharge has other cases which would require continued detention. In the meantime, the returns are placed in the bullpens within the RCDC.
As of March 2008, the jail housed 9,165 inmates. Of these, 8,436 were male and 729 were female. Approximately 800 to 1,200 inmates go to court on any given weekday. The inmates are transported by bus to different courts. The ratio of male to female inmates is greater than 9 to 1. The same 9 to 1 male to female ratio applies to inmates going to court on a given day. There can be as many as 5 to 6 times more men than women discharged from the jail on any particular day and on average during the year. Approximately 120 female inmates go to court on a daily basis and approximately 30 to 40 female inmates are court discharges. The male returns arrive at the jail throughout the day, commencing
3

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 4 of 23
approximately at 10:30 or 11 a.m. until as late as 7 or 8 p.m. The return of male discharges is staggered over the period of 8 or 9 hours.
As a matter of practice and policy, male and female returns are strip searched only upon their return to their respective housing divisions within the jail, not the RCDC. Inmates are returned to the housing divisions when the transportation officers from the inmates’ respective housing divisions come to pick them up from the RCDC. This can occur approximately every 30 to 90 minutes or up to two hours depending on the division. The procedure by which male returns are strip searched consist of the following: (1) the inmates are lined up at arm’s length from each other; (2) the inmates are instructed to remove all their clothing; (3) the inmates are then instructed to extend their arms and legs apart; (4) the inmates are then ordered to squat three or four times and cough while squatting. The number of inmates being searched at once varies; there is testimony that as many as 50 to 80 male inmates have been searched together.
The policy and practice of strip searching male returns differs from that for female returns. It is the policy and practice of the Sheriff not to give male returns who are to be discharged an option to avoid being strip searched. In contrast, the jail has a specific procedure in place for female returns who are to be discharged which affords them the option of not being
4

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 5 of 23
strip searched. Under this procedure, once it is determined that a female return is a possible discharge by the RCDC staff, she is segregated from the general return population by being placed in a separate bullpen within the RCDC. The female return remains in the separate bullpen until a computer and records check is completed to determine whether the inmate is in fact a discharge. Any detainees who are determined not to be discharges are removed from the discharge bullpen and placed in the general population return bullpen. If a female detainee is determined to be a discharge and elects not to return to her housing division, then the Records Department notifies the appropriate housing division that their clothes be brought to the RCDC. Within the month of October 2003, the average time for female inmates to be discharged was within two hours after returning from court. The average longest discharge time was 2:42 and the average shortest time was 1:10 for that time period.
When female discharges are strip searched they are placed in a location with privacy dividers among the inmates. These dividers or privacy screens do not allow inmates to see each other during the strip search. During the time that the class members were strip searched, the CCDC did not use dividers to afford any privacy to the male discharges. In February 2007, the Sheriff installed privacy screens similar to those used to search female inmates for searching new inmates (or “arrestees”) arriving to the jail. Up to
5

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 6 of 23
37 new male inmates can be strip searched at a time with the privacy screens, and approximately 200 to 350 new male inmates are processed into the jail on a daily basis. Also since 2007, defendants have been using privacy screens when the putative class members were returned to their housing divisions and strip searched. Defendants contend this is a “pilot program,” but it is implemented for all court returns and inmates housed in all divisions.
II. Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). I must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
III. The class certified in this case on June 17, 2005 is defined as follows: All male inmates who, on or after February 12, 2002, have been subjected to defendants’ policy and practice of strip searching a male inmate upon his return to the jail following a court appearance at which court appearance a specific case or charge against the inmate was dismissed when no other cases, charges, warrants or holds were pending against that inmate which warranted that inmate’s continued detention at the jail.
6

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 7 of 23
(Order dated 6/17/05, Doc. Entry # 72.) Plaintiffs’ motion seeks
summary judgment on the following claims:
1. The strip searching of all male court discharges and not all female court discharges violates the Equal Protection Clause. 2. The strip searching of all male court discharges in large non-private group settings with up to fifty inmates while the female court discharges, who opt to return to the housing divisions, are afforded privacy violates the Equal Protection Clause. 3. The strip searching of all male court discharges not based upon reasonable suspicion that they are concealing contraband violates the Fourth Amendment. 4. Assuming arguendo, the Defendants are entitled to strip search all male court discharges, the manner in which the strip search is conducted, in large non-private group settings violates the Fourth Amendment. 5. There was an unreasonable delay in releasing plaintiffs.
Defendants oppose the motion for summary judgment and have filed
their own motion for summary judgment on these claims.
A. Equal Protection Claim
In order to make out a prima facie case under the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show
that (1) they are “similarly situated” to female inmates with
judicial discharges, (2) they were treated differently than such
female inmates, and (3) defendants acted with discriminatory
intent. See Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 370 (7th Cir. 2000).
Defendants argue plaintiffs cannot establish the first and third
requirements. I disagree and find plaintiffs have made a prima
facie case under the Equal Protection clause.
7

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 8 of 23
With respect to the first requirement, defendants argue class members are not similarly situated to female discharges due to their disparity in numbers (roughly five to six times more male potential discharges); propensity for violence; and, on average, lengthier criminal histories, which increase the amount of time needed to make a final determination before final discharge. Defendants also note that men do not have menstrual cycles. According to defendants this is significant because this bodily function is the reason given for providing privacy screens to female discharges. Defendants also rely on Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), in support of their argument. There, the Eighth Circuit found that inmates at two separate and distinct prisons were not similarly situated due to differences in security concerns “reflecting differences in the number and age of the inmates, the kinds of crimes committed by them, the length of sentences, and the frequency of incidents involving violence, escapes, or contraband.” Id. at 1103.
Male discharges are similarly situated to female discharges for purposes of the Equal Protection clause if they are “comparable . . . in all material respects.” Crawford v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). This requirement is intended to “eliminate confounding variables” and help “isolate the critical independent variable.” Id. At the outset, the case relied on primarily by defendants is
8

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 9 of 23
distinguishable. Timm involved two groups of inmates in two distinct facilities, the Nebraska State Penitentiary - an all-male maximum security prison designed to house prisoners classified as requiring medium or maximum security - and the Nebraska Center for Women. The present case involves two groups of inmates within the same facility. The additional reasons set forth by defendants for distinguishing between male and female discharges at the CCDC also fail to establish that these groups are not similarly situated. Although defendants are correct that the male inmates outnumber the female inmates, there are varying security classifications within each group which correspond to each other (i.e. there are both female and male inmates who are classified as “maximum security”).1 The statistics concerning inmate violence clearly indicate this takes place among female inmates as well as male inmates. Moreover, defendants specifically argue that “low security detainees could be enlisted to help obtain contraband or weapons by fellow inmates,” and provide no reason why this does not apply equally to female discharges. Indeed, female discharges are subject to strip searches for security reasons upon returning to the housing facilities. Finally, underscoring the weakness of this argument is the fact that defendants’ primary justification for distinguishing between male and female discharges is their alleged
1There is also overlap in staff. Division 3 (for women) and Division 8 (for men) share the same superintendent and supervisory staff.
9

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 10 of 23
inability to hold them in the RCDC while their records are reviewed - a logistical rather than a security concern. Accordingly, I find the plaintiffs are similarly situated to the female potential discharges.
Next, defendants argue plaintiffs cannot establish discriminatory intent. Discriminatory purpose “implies that the decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on an identifiable group.” David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original). “[I]ntentional disregard of plaintiffs’ rights in adopting certain policies [can be] tantamount to intentional discriminatory behavior.” Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 881 (7th Cir. 1988).
Defendants argue they have no animus toward male discharges, that their motivation is simply to preclude weapons and contraband from being smuggled into the jail. As already set forth and admitted by defendants, however, female discharges are also capable of smuggling contraband into the jail. This salient fact fatally undermines defendants’ argument. Accordingly, I find plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of discriminatory intent.
Since plaintiffs have made a prima facie case under the Equal Protection clause, the issue becomes what level of scrutiny is applicable. Defendants argue that I should apply a rational basis
10

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 11 of 23
test under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Turner held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89.
Turner does not foreclose all heightened judicial review, however. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (“reasonable-relationship test [applies] only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’”)) (emphasis in original); Hammer v. Ashcroft, 512 F.3d 961, 968 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Post-Turner, the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny [] to prison regulations involving suspect classifications such as race.”) (citation omitted); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying heightened scrutiny to Equal Protection claim based on gender discrimination); Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116, at *7, 9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1998) (Coar, J.) (same). Indeed, gender is a “quasi-suspect” class and subject to heightened scrutiny. Pitts, 866 F.2d at 1454-55; Ashann-Ra v. Com. of Virginia, 112 F.Supp.2d 559, 570-71 (W.D. Va. 2000); Thompson v. Sheahan, No. 00 C 3772, 2001 WL 204774, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2001); Gary, 1998 WL 547116, at *7, 9. Thus, when analyzing gender-based discrimination in the prison context, courts ask whether such policies are substantially related to
11

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 12 of 23
important governmental objectives. Id.; see also Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273-74 (7th Cir. 1983).
“[A] party seeking to uphold a policy that expressly discriminates on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the differing treatment.” Id. at 1273 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). The classification must (1) serve important governmental objectives and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Id. at 1273-74 (quotation omitted).
Defendants set forth prison safety and security as their important governmental objectives. This does not appear to be disputed. The issue is whether defendants’ policy and practice discriminating between male and female inmates is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
The blanket strip search policy of all male potential discharges is not substantially related to the achievement of prison safety and security as articulated by defendants. As exemplified by the policy concerning female discharges, if the jail took appropriate steps to identify and segregate potential discharges upon their return to the jail, the security concerns would be addressed. There can be no dispute that female returns are just as capable of importing contraband into the jail as their male counterparts. For defendants to argue otherwise would suggest
12

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 13 of 23
the need to strip search female inmates is obliterated because, according to defendants, the chance they will engage in violence is statistically insignificant.2 The fact that there is a greater number of male inmates does not legitimize the constitutional violation. See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725-26 (“The purpose of requiring [a substantial relationship between the objective and the means] is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”); see also Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (inquiry used to determine if two employees are similarly situated does not include the ratio of protected class members to particular workforce). Defendants’ logistical explanations for their discriminatory policy have been previously rejected in similar circumstances when assessing their constitutionality under the Equal Protection clause. See, e.g.,
2Defendants’ reliance on the statistical data concerning specific incidents in jail among the male and female inmate populations is faulty. According to defendants, there is a greater number of male inmates and a greater number of incidents within the male inmate population, therefore male inmates are more dangerous. This reasoning is faulty precisely because it fails to control for population size. For example, defendants set forth that 76% of all reported fights involve male inmates. This means female inmates are responsible for almost a quarter of fights and yet make up less than 10% of the inmate population (specifically 729 in 2008). Therefore, based on defendants’ statistics, individual female inmates are more likely to be involved in fights than male inmates.
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Gary, 1998 WL 547116, at *2, 9. Accordingly, I find no issue of material fact remains on the question of whether defendants’ blanket strip search policy of male discharges deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional right to Equal Protection. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs also argue defendants’ policy exempting male inmates from obtaining privacy screens violates the Equal Protection clause. With regard to this claim, defendants have first failed to establish there is an important government objective served by failing to afford male inmates privacy screens during strip searches prior to 2007. Indeed, jail staff admits there is no deterrence reason for conducting the searches this particular way, nor do defendants contend that the searches are any less effective in detecting contraband when conducted in a location with privacy screens (as is presently done). For the same reasons, defendants have also failed to establish that searching the discharges in this manner is substantially related to achieving an important government objective. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
B. Fourth Amendment The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) governs Fourth Amendment unreasonable search analysis in the prison context. The plaintiffs in Bell challenged
14

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 15 of 23
the defendants’ practice of strip searching all inmates following
contact visits. The Supreme Court held:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559. “The more intrusive the search, the closer
governmental authorities must come to demonstrating probable cause
for believing that the search will uncover the objects for which
the search is being conducted.” Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,
723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 18 n.15 (1968)).3
The scope of the intrusion here is severe. A strip search is
“inherently invasive.” Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 405
F.Supp.2d 933, 938-39 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The Seventh Circuit has
reaffirmed that “strip searching involving the visual inspection of
3Defendants argue plaintiffs do not have an expectation of privacy in light of their status as inmates. This argument is overinclusive as it overlooks plaintiffs’ status as discharges and is inconsistent with the law of this Circuit. See Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[D]oes a prison inmate enjoy any protection at all under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures? . . . the answer is ‘yes’”); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1268-73 (finding searches violated inmates Fourth Amendment rights); see also Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]t a minimum, reasonable suspicion must exist to justify strip searches of persons entitled to release from the Jail who are to placed in the general jail population while their records are checked for other detention orders, warrants, or holds.”).
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 16 of 23
the anal area are ‘demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and] signify [] degradation and submission.” Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272) (alterations in original) (although police had probable cause to conduct a strip and body cavity search of the plaintiff, the manner in which it was conducted was unreasonable); see also Calvin, 405 F.Supp.2d at 938-39. When these searches are conducted in public, the intrusion is considered even more severe. See, e.g., Campbell, 499 F.3d at 718-19 (collecting cases). Moreover, plaintiffs - as individuals for whom there is no longer any basis for detention - clearly have a privacy interest which is arguably greater than that of pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Gary, 1998 WL 547116, at *13.
The evidence of the manner and location of these searches consists of affidavits by certain class members, attesting they were searched in a large group setting in a “public hallway.” In turn, defendants provide incomplete transcripts of depositions of jail staff which provide the staff’s impressions that the searches are conducted professionally while attempting to safeguard plaintiffs’ privacy. The “hallway” is an “underground tunnel,” according to defendants, which connects different housing divisions. Defendants do concede that the searches are conducted in this hallway or tunnel that is used by general staff, but that
16

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 17 of 23
at the time of the searches the general staff is not allowed to pass until the searches are completed. There is no dispute that these searches are conducted in large group settings and that inmates are placed at approximately arm’s length apart when searched.
Defendants’ proposed justifications for conducting these searches boil down to security and administrative concerns. As already set forth, defendants have failed to establish that individual male inmates pose a greater security threat than individual female inmates. Nor have they established that they had individualized reasonable suspicion. See Calvin, 405 F.Supp.2d at 943-45; Gary, 1998 WL 547116, at *13-14. Indeed, the record reflects that none of the searches of the class members resulted in detection of any weapons or drugs. Only one class member was ever found to have contraband, which consisted of two dollars. See Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272-73 (the fact that only a few items were recovered in strip searches belied defendants’ claim that policy was necessary for security).
With respect to the administrative costs associated with modifying the current policy and practice with respect to class members, defendants fail to effectively distinguish female discharges in making their arguments. Although the number of daily male discharges exceeds that of female discharges, it is not
17

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 18 of 23
disproportionate when viewed in light of the jail population breakdown based on gender.
Plaintiffs argue there are several less intrusive and equally effective alternatives to the current policy and practice. They argue specifically that: there is sufficient space in the RCDC to hold male potential discharges until the Records Department determines whether the person is an actual discharge; the jail has the ability to utilize other space besides the RCDC to segregate potential discharges (such as the Criminal Court Building); the jail has the ability to identify before the court appearance whether any male inmates who receive possible discharges have other pending cases by printing out on the inmate’s court pass all future court dates which would indicate whether the inmate was a possible discharge; the jail has the ability to identify after court whether any male inmates who receive possible discharges have pending cases; the jail has the ability to use Court Services to identify male inmates who receive possible discharges prior to returning to the RCDC; the jail has the ability to provide additional holding facilities by creating new bullpens to handle court discharges such as in the commissary and commissary storage areas which are adjacent to the RCDC and underutilized and have enough space to house four bullpens capable of holding in excess of 120 inmates (each of these areas would cost approximately $50,000 to $200,000 to construct). Defendants present additional arguments as to why
18

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 19 of 23
none of these proposed alternatives are tenable, which are unpersuasive and in some cases unsupported by the record.
Although in Bell the Court noted that the existence of a “less intrusive and equally effective alternative” is not dispositive, 441 U.S. at 559 n. 40, courts in this Circuit have found the balance under Bell tipped in plaintiff’s favor in the presence of reasonable alternatives which undermine defendants’ proposed justification. See Campbell, 499 F.3d at 719 (finding that the lack of evidence to suggest “any conceivable exigency that could be met only by strip-searching Campbell in public” helped tip Bell balance in plaintiff’s favor); Canedy, 16 F.3d at 188 (“where it is reasonable . . . to respect an inmate’s constitutional privacy interests, doing so . . . is a constitutional mandate”); Calvin, 405 F.Supp.2d at 943 (noting that strip searches “have repeatedly [been] invalidated . . . based on the reasoning that less invasive searches or other detention practices could obviate the need for a strip search” and that “a prison system cannot rely on the realities of its own detention structure alone to justify an invasion of privacy as significant as a strip search”); Simenc v. Sheriff of DuPage County, Ill., No. 82 C 4778, 1985 WL 4896, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1985) (“At a minimum, jail officials should ensure that [] embarrassment is minimized by conducting the search in an area where it cannot be observed by anyone other than the person conducting the search.”).
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I find the blanket strip search policy of male discharges violates the Fourth Amendment. The Bell factors weigh in plaintiffs’ favor. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
C. Unreasonable Delay Plaintiffs argue they were subjected to unreasonable delays in being released from the CCDC after receiving court-ordered discharges. Bullock and Reid were delayed 8.5 and 8 hours, respectively. Defendants argue the complexity of the discharge process justifies such a delay. The Supreme Court has set forth a 48 hour time limit for probable cause determination after arrest. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). “This is not to say that the probable cause determination in a particular case passes constitutional muster simply because it is provided within 48 hours.” Id. In Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2004) the Seventh Circuit required the government to justify a four hour detention - half the time that is at issue here. The issue, then, becomes whether the delay was reasonable. County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. “[T]he reasonableness of a length of detention typically ‘is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts presented in each case.’” Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747 (quoting Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 360 Filed 07/30/2008 Page 21 of 23
eleven-hour detention of individual waiting to be discharged presented a jury question). “Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake. In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility.” County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56.
Defendants seek summary judgment on the ground that they have provided a sufficient explanation for the delay and there is no evidence demonstrating an improper purpose for the delay as set forth in Chortek, 356 F.3d 747-48. However, both parties have presented conflicting evidence concerning the reasonableness of the delay - mostly in the form of expert testimony. Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the jail computer system is quick, was not malfunctioning, and that the jail staff is able to complete the discharge process for females in a fraction of the time. Accordingly, I find plaintiffs have established there is a triable issue concerning the reasonableness of the delay and defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.
D. Qualified Immunity County and local government entities are not covered by the Eleventh Amendment. Richmand v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Defendants argue they are entitled
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to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ damage claim because the Sheriff, although acting in his official capacity, “could be considered an agent of Illinois government insofar as requiring the strip searching of all male and female inmates who return to their housing division.” (Def. Br. At 33-34.)4 If the Sheriff were acting as an arm of the state, then the claims for damages may not be brought in federal court. Id.
Defendants cite to the Illinois Administrative Code (“IAC”) in support of the proposition that all male and female inmates must be strip searched. The IAC does not support this. Instead, it provides
Detainees permitted to leave the confines of the jail temporarily, for any reason, shall be thoroughly searched prior to leaving and before re-entering the jail. 20 Ill. ADC 701.140(a). The provision does not mandate strip searches, just that the inmates be “thoroughly searched.” See Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 803 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting same argument under the New York Administrative Code).5 Defendants have not established the Sheriff was acting as an arm of the state and,
4It must be noted that this suit concerns the Equal Protection and Fourth Amendment rights of male discharges (not all inmates).
5Defendants argue that Illinois state appellate court decisions have interpreted “thoroughly searched” under the Illinois Administrative Code to mean strip searched. Although strip searches were upheld in the cases referred to by defendants, none held that a sheriff was required by state law to conduct a strip search.
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therefore, are not entitled to qualified immunity. Their motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.
IV. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to all claims except the unreasonable delay claim. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendants also filed a motion to strike, which is denied as moot for I did not rely on the affidavits of Sean Driscoll or Jeffrey Dorsey.

Dated: July 30, 2008

ENTER ORDER:
______________________________ Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 1 of 40

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

QUENTIN BULLOCK, and JACK REID,

)

individually and on behalf of a

)

cla•• ,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THOMAS DART, SHERIi'F OF COOK COUNTY, )

in his official capacity, and COOK )

COUNTY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 04 C 1051 I~·.:
t. .', , ~'
' ""~I

M!IlM9lW\J!?UM OPINION AND ORDER

On July 30, 2008, I entered an order resolving cross-motions

for summary judgment in this action (the "July 30 Order"). At

issue was whether defendants Michael Sheahan (then the Cook County

Sheriff) and Cook County violated the Fourth and/or Fourteenth

Amendment rights of plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid, and a

class of male individuals in the custody of the Cook County

Department of Corrections ("CCDOC" or the "Jail"). I granted

plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on claims that defendants'

policy of performing blanket strip searches on male inmates

returning to CCDOC from court hearings, where those hearings

resul ted in the dismissal of certain charges and there was no

additional basis for the inmates' detention, violated the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, I held that defendants'

policy and practice of allowing female court returns; but not male

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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 2 of 40

court returns, to avoid being subj ected to a strip search by electing to remain in the Jail's receiving area while their release was processed, rather than return to their housing divisions, violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection. I also held that defendants' policy and practice of affording certain privacy accommodations to female court returns who are strip searched but not to male court returns, all of whom are strip searched, violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection. I further held that the blanket strip search policy of all male court returns violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. I also denied defendants' motion, which sought summary judgment of non-liability on all of plaintiffs~ claims, in its entirety. In particular, I held that defendants are not immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment as a matter of law, and that a material factual dispute existed as to whether the length of plaintiffs' detention was reasonable. 1
Now before me is defendants' motion for reconsideration of my July 30 Order. For the reasons discussed below, that motion is granted in part. To the extent the motion is granted, on reconsideration, I resolve the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment as set forth below.

lThe July 30 Order stated that both sought parties summary judgment on the issue of unreasonable delay. In fact, only defendants sought summary judgment on this issue.
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I.
At the outset, I feel compelled to note that ascertaining which facts are genuinely in dispute in this matter has been complicated by the manner in which the parties handled their Local Rule 56.1 submissions. Instead of setting forth, and responding to, short factual statements as the Rule requires, the parties approached · their filings as a platform for advancing competing characterizations of the evidence and for highlighting their respective experts' opinions. Defendants, in particular, packed multiple, often conclusory assertions and opinions into each factual "statement," followed by a string cite to various portions of the record. Plaintiffs (and I) were then faced with the burden of trying to match up the various propositions in each numbered statement with the corresponding citations and determining whether the statements were, in fact, supported by the evidence. This approach flies in the face of both the letter and the spirit of L.R. 56.1.
In addition, defendants typically responded to plaintiffs' statements with their own "undisputed" version of the same or related facts, which recharacterized, amended, or added to the facts plaintiffs set forth. This type of response is obviously unacceptable, as it fails to respond to plaintiffs' facts and also introduces new facts that plaintiffs have no means of controverting. If defendants cannot dispute plaintiffs' properly
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supported facts, they must admit them. To the extent defendants wish to convey that plaintiffs' facts, although undisputed, fail to tell the whole story, defendants may add, in a separate numbered statement, whatever factual material they believe is necessary to complete the picture. That is the purpose of L.R. 56.1(b) (3)©. I remind both parties (for plaintiffs, while generally more restrained in their factual statements, were not immune from narrative, non-responsive, argumentative responses) that I am entitled to demand strict adherence to L.R. 56.1, and that I may refuse to consider facts presented in a fashion inconsistent with the rule. Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7 th Cir. 2008).
With this introduction, r turn to the facts. A short glossary
of terms is useful to begin. Throughout this opinion, I refer to inmates who return to the Jail after an appearance in court as "court returns." r refer to court returns whose appearance culminates in the issuance of a mittimus dismissing particular charges against them as "possible discharges." I refer to the mittimus itself as a "dismissal mittimus."' A possible discharge becomes an "actual discharge" if the Sheriff determines, based upon
2r note that the parties use various terms to refer to such a
mittimus, including, for example, "court ordered release," and "court ordered discharge." I am mindful that a mittimus does not order or effect an inmate's release but rather dismisses certain charges against the inmate, and I have chosen the term "dismissal mittimus" to reflect this distinction.
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a review of the inmate's records by CCDOC staff, that the inmate is not subject to any additional charges, warrants, or holds and may therefore be released.
The parties agree that as of March 2008, the Jail housed 9,165 inmates. Of these, 8,436 were male and 729 were female--a ratio of approximately nine to one. CCDOC inmates live in one of the Jail's ten housing divisions, each of which operates semi-autonomously and has its own separate building on the Jail grounds. Eight of the divisions are for men, and two are for women. Inmates are housed according to their security classifications, which are established based on a number of factors, including criminal history, prior convictions, prior disciplinary problems, known gang affiliation, any history of drug or alcohol abuse, etc. Roughly 32% of all CCDOC inmates (male and female) have a maximum security classification.
The Receiving, Classification and Diagnosis Center ("RCDC") is the Jail's hub of inmate movement. All inmates who transfer between housing divisions, or who enter or exit the Jail for any reason, including court appearances, medical or psychiatric treatment, participation in alternative programs, etc., must be processed through RCDC. In addition, the RCDC is used by CCDOC and outside agencies for various other purposes. For example, the Illinois State Department of Corrections conducts parole hearings twice a month in the male intake area of the RCDC. Inmates
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 6 of 40

attending these hearings are "staged" in one of the several

bullpens that are also used for staging inmates before and after

they attend court.

The parties do not dispute the physical characteristics of the

ReDe, only the extent to which the premises are, or could be,

amenable to certain' activities. The parties agree on the

following: An area referred to as the "male intake area" contains

four small bullpens identified by letters A, B, e, and D, and six

larger bullpens identified by numbers 1 through 6. The numbered

bullpens are referred to as the "interior bullpens." In addition

to the bullpens just described, there are five "exterior bullpens,"

which are located outside the male intake area. 3 Both male and

female inmates who enter or leave the Jail, including for court

appearances, may be staged for transit at different times in these

bullpens.

Defendants assert that due to security concerns, •

however, inmates of different security classifications and/or

different discharge statuses generally are not commingled in the

various bullpens.· Some of the bullpens described above have

'I assume that these five "exterior bullpens" are the same as those that are alternately referred to as "court return bullpens." Defendants also refer to something called the "bonding cage," also outside the intake area, and it is unclear whether this is something other than the exterior bullpens.
'Plaintiffs point out, and there is evidence to suggest, that certain classes of inmates are, on occasion, commingled. CCDOC's position is that although this is sometimes inevitable due to logistical constraints, it is highly undesirable from a security perspective.
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toilet facilities while others do not. The parties disagree about how many inmates can be held in the various bullpens.
Each weekday, approximately 800 to 1,200 inmates attend court, and again the ratio of men to women is approximately nine to one. Inmates are first transported from their housing divisions to the RCDC, where they are staged in the various bullpens while CCDOC transportation officers verify and prepare the inmates' court paperwork. Roughly half of the inmates attending court on any given day attend hearings at the Criminal Courts Building ("CCB") in Chicago, which is adjacent to the CCDOC facilities and is accessed by a system of underground tunnels. Inmates whose court hearings are at one of the "outlying" courts are transported from the RCDC to the courts and back by bus. Inmates going to court at the CCB are taken through tunnels from the RCDC into the basement of the CCB; which area is known as the "Bridge." The Bridge is separated by walls into two sides known as the "male bridge," which contains holding cells numbered 4-8, and the "female bridge," which contains holding cells numbered 1-3. Confusingly, inmates of either sex may be held in the cells located on either side (but male and female inmates presumably are not commingled). The Bridge is staffed by CCDOC officers during the hours of inmate movement from the Jail to the court. Transportation officers bring inmates from the Bridge to the inmates' next waystation--the courtroom lockups--using dedicated elevators within the CCB. The lockups are
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 8 of 40
generally adjacent to the various courtrooms (though some or all courtrooms share lockup facilities with one other c ourtroom) and are staffed by courtroom deputies, who take custody of the inmates upon their arrival. At the conclusion of the morning court calls, Court Services' transportation team takes the inmates from the lockups baGk down to the Bridge. From there, they are returned to the Jail via the RCDC, and ultimately, in most cases, to their respective housing divisions, following a procedure that is at least as complex as the one required for their arrival at the court.
It should be apparent from the above that CCDOC has a complex system requiring interagency coordination for transporting inmates from their living quarters within the Jail to the courts and back. It is also clear from the record that the logistics of moving hundreds of inmates presenting a range of security risks to several different locations requires significant time. Indeed, inmates with court "appearances are awakened between 4:00 and 4:20 a.m. to ensure their prompt arrival at court calls beginning at 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. And at the end of each day, inmates returning from outlying courts or from late court calls at the CCB may return to the RCDC as late as 9:00 p.m.
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Every court return, regardless of the court's disposition of
his or her case,s is required to return to the Jail before being
released. Both male and female court returns are transported from the courts back to the RCDC. At this point, the procedure for processing court returns back into (or, in the case of actual discharges, out of) the Jail diverges based on two factors: the inmate's sex, and whether the inmate obtained a dismissal mittimus.
As explained below, the combination of these factors is what
determines whether and how a court return is subject to a strip search. The lack of uniformity between the procedures applied to male actual discharges and female actual discharges is the basis for plaintiffs' claims.
Before delving into these procedures, a few additional statistics provide helpful context. A representative study using
data from 2002-2005 shows that on average, 209 male inmates per day
receive dismissal mittimuses (i.e., they become "possible discharges 8 ), although CCDOC physically transports only 170 of
these inmates to and from court.6 The same study showed a peak of
5For ease of reference, I sometimes refer to the disposition of a court return's "case." What I mean in each instance is the disposition of the particular charges or matter before the court on the day of the hearing.
6The remainder are "electronic monitoring" or "papers only" inmates, who are not physically transported from the Jail to the court and back, but who are nevertheless subject to CCDOC monitoring or are in CCDOC custody. Both numbers are relevant, since although only the inmates who are transported to and from court are subject to the challenged strip search, CCDOC must
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291 possib~e discharges on a single day (of whom CCDOC transported 243). The corresponding numbers for female inmates show an average of 38 possible discharges per day (of whom 31 are transported), with a peak of 55 (45 transported). on average, 57% of male possible discharges became actual discharges. 7 Stated differently, an average of 43% of male court returns who receive dismissal mittimuses are not eligible for release (i.e., do not become actual discharges) due to other holds. The parties do not dispute these figures.
At all times relevant to this case, the policy and practice of CCDOC has been to strip search all male and female court returns who return'to their housing divisions after a court appearance, regardless of the disposition of their cases. It has not been CCDOC's policy or practice during the relevant time period to strip search court returns, male or female, in the RCDC.
All male court returns, including those returning from court with dismissal mittimuses, are required to proceed from the RCDC to their respective housing divisions while the Records Department of the CCDOC processes their paperwork. If a male court return's mittimus indicates that he is a possible discharge, an administrative assistant in the Discharge Unit of the Records
process the rni ttimus papers of all of the inmates with court proceedings to determine whether they may be discharged.
7The study does not provide a corresponding percentage for female inmates.
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Department checks CIMIS (a computerized record system containing case information on each inmate), as well as the inmate's paper "record pack" to determine whether the inmate is an actual discharge. If so, the inmate is brought back from his division to RCDC, where his identity is verified and he is released. In the case of pla~ntiffs Bullock and Reid, this process took eight-and-ahalf and eight hours respectively. '
The procedure by which male court returns are searched is as follows: (1) the inmates are lined up at arm's length from each other; (2) the inmates are instructed to remove all of their clothing; (3) the inmates are then instructed to extend their arms and legs apart; and (4) the inmates are ordered to squat three or four times, and to cough while squatting. The number of inmates being searched at once varies; there is testimony that as many as 50 male inmates have been searched together, but that generally the number is lower.

"The amended complaint states, "The detention of plaintiff Bullock for approximately eight and one-half hours and plaintiff Reid for eight hours after judges determined they should be released from custody constitutes deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs." It is not clear from this language, and the parties' summary judgment papers do not clarify, whether plaintiffs began counting at the time the judge signed the dismissal mittimus, at the time plaintiffs were returned to CCDOC custody after their hearings (recall that inmates are in the custody of the courtroom deputy at least until they leave the courtroom lockups, and apparently remain in the custody of Court Services for some time thereafter en route to the Jail), at the time they actually arrived at the Jail, or some other time.
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Female court returns are processed differently upon their return from court. Upon or shortly after their arrival at RCDC, female court returns are broken down into two groups, according to the disposition noted on their mittimuses. All female court returns other than those who received dismissal mittimuses are required, like their male counterparts, to return to their housing divisions, where they are strip searched. But female court returns whose mittimuses show they are possible discharges are segregated into a separate bullpen within the RCDC while the CCDOC staff consults CIMIS and reviews their records to determine if they are eligible for release. If these reviews show that there are no additional holds on the possible discharges, their street clothing is brought to them, and they .may elect whether to return to their divisions to retrieve their personal property, in which case they are subj ect to a strip search, or instead to be discharged immediately and return within thirty days for their personal property. • The parties dispute the average time it takes. for female actual discharges to be released, but there appears to be no dispute that female court returns--regardless of whether they elect to remain in the RCDC or return to the hOUSing divisions--are

'Defendants state that roughly 90% of women entitled to immediate discharge elect to return to their divisions.
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generally discharged in appreciably less time than the eight and eight-and-a-half hours alleged by plaintiffs Bullock and Reid. 'o
The option for female possible discharges to remain in the
RCDC while their records are reviewed and their release is
processed is, the parties agree, the result of an injunction issued in Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116 (N.D. Ill., Aug.
20, 1998) (Coar, J.). During that litigation, in March of 1997,
Judge Coar preliminarily enjoined the Cook County Sheriff from
strip searching female possible discharges, ~unless after their
return a computer check of their record indicates there are other
reasons for holding the inmate or unless the female court return
[w] ants to return to her living quarters to recover personal
items." Id., Docket No. 37 (minute order). Pursuant to this
injunction, which later became final, the Executive Director of the
Jail issued a memorandum in 1997 setting forth the procedure
described above. Around the same time, the CCDOC executive staff
lOPlaintiffs allege that the process averages two hours for female actual discharges·. Defendants raise several colorable objections to plaintiffs' evidence, including that it purports to be based on data produced by defendants but does not accurately reflect that data. Both parties reference the underlying data by document control number (1. e., "Bates" number), not by exhibit number, and I have been unable to locate the data in the record. Nevertheless, . in their response to plaintiffs' statement of fact, defendants cite several discharge times they believe are reflected in that data, ranging from two hours and forty-five minutes to four
hours and forty-five minutes. Thus, although this evidence is
obviously insufficient to compare averages, even the longest female discharge time cited by defendants is considerably shorter than eight hours.
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held at least one or two meetings to c onsider whether a similar policy could be instituted for male court returns but concluded it would not be feasible due to the number of male court returns and the lack of available space t o segregate male possible discharges within the RCDC or elsewhere in the Jail facility.
Plaintiffs also complain that, in addition to the fact that female possible discharges may elect not to return to their divisions (and thus avoid the strip search), female court returns who do return to their divisions are strip searched in more favorable conditions than their male counterparts. In particular, while female inmates are also searched in groups, privacy screens prevent them from seeing one another. The parties agree that privacy screens were:i,nstituted for women as a result of claims brought in Wilkes v. Sheahan, 01 C 1592 (N.D. Ill. 2001) Y In that case, a ·group of female inmates alleged that the group strip searches to which they were subjected were unsanitary and humiliating because women who were menstruating were forced to remove their. sanitary napkins, causing blood to run down their legs and onto the floor, in view of other inmates.
"Plaintiffs assert that it was this lawsuit that prompted the use of privacy dividers for women. Defendants do not properly admit or deny plaintiffs' statement, but they acknowledge the lawsuit and also admit that privacy dividers are used in order to protect women from "embarrassment related to menstruation" during searches. Accordingly, I consider plaintiffs' statement undisputed.
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Since the present lawsuit was filed, defendants have begun using privacy screens during male strip searches as well. In February 2007, the Sheriff installed privacy screens for searching male and female new inmates (or ftarrestees") arriving to the Jail. Up to 37 new male inmates can be strip searched at a time with the privacy screens, and approximately 200 to 350 new male inmates are processed into the Jail on a daily basis. Also since 2007, defendants have been using privacy screens when male court returns are returned to their housing divisions and strip searched.
II. Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 2007); FED. R. Crv. P. 56©. I must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986) .
A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, (1986). The nonmoving party, however, "must do more than simply shOW that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
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Corp., 475 U. S . 574, 586 (1986). "The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmovant 1." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the following claims:
1. The strip searching of all male court discharges and not all female court discharges violates the Equal Protection Clause,
2. The strip searching of all male court discharges in large 'non-private group settings with up to fifty inmates while the female 'court discharges, who opt to return to the housing divisions, are afforded privacy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
3. The strip searching of all male court discharges not based upon reasonable suspicion that they are concealing contraband violates the Fourth Amendment.
4. Assuming, arguendo, the Defendants are entitled to strip search all male court discharges, the manner in which the strip search is conducted, in large non-private group settings violates the Fourth Amendment.
Defendants oppose plaintiffs' motion and seek summary judgment
in their favor on the grounds that 1) the strip search policy and
practice applied to plaintiffs was not unreasonable; 2) plaintiffs
cannot prevail on their equal protection claims; 3) plaintiffs'
"unreasonable delay" in discharge claims are not actionable; and 4)
defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
A. Equal Protection
The essential mandate of the Equal Protection Clause is that
"all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
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(citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 u.s. 202, 216 (1982). Although the
Fourteenth Amendment "does not take from the States all power of classification," Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979), "a policy that expressly discriminates on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the differing treatment." Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In my July 30 Order, I ·heldthat plaintiffs had satisfied the threshold requirement of proving that male and female actual discharges are similarly situated, that there was no material dispute about defendants' intent, and that defendants had failed to show an exceedingly persuasive justification for their disparate treatment.
On reconsideration, I again conclude that male and female actual discharges are similarly situated. I am mindful that the sheer number of men versus women means that it may require more of defendants to develop a system in which male possible discharges are segregated and processed separately from other male court returns than it did for them to develop a system for segregating and processing female possible discharges separately from other female returns. I am also mindful of the physiological differences between men and women. These distinctions, however, go to whether any or all of the differences in treatment plaintiffs allege are justified, not to whether male and female actual discharges are
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similarly situated. "The similarly situated inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated to another group for purposes of the challenged government action." Klinger v. Department 'of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8 th Cir. 1994).
The challenged action in plaintiffs' first equal protection claim is the systematic strip searching of male actual discharges, whom defendants have no authority to detain, other than for a reasonable time incident to outprocessing. Plaintiffs do not challenge defendants' policies or practices for strip searching CCDOC inmates generally, or even for strip searching court returns other than those who are to be processed out. Thus, the most salient feature of ,both the plaintiff class and the comparison group of female actual discharges is their discharge status, and they are similarly situated in that respect. As to plaintiffs' second claim, the challenged action is CCDOC's gender-specific use
of privacy dividers. There is no question that strip searches are invasive by nature, or that regardless of one's gender, the level
of invasiveness is heightened when searches are conducted in the view of others. That women menstruate may justify some level of differential treatment, but it does not alter the similarly situated inquiry. Accordingly, I again hold that plaintiffs are similarly situated to female actual discharges.
On the issue of intent, both parties appear to believe that
for plaintiffs to prevail on their equal protection claim, they
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must demonstrate discriminatory intent beyond simply pointing to a policy and practice that facially distinguishes between male and female court returns. This is understandable, since many cases invoking the Equal Protection Clause are concerned with statutes, ordinances, or other state action that is facially neutral but that disproportionately affects one group of individuals. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 u.s. 256 (1979) (upholding facially gender-neutral veterans' preference statute that disproportionately benefitted men); Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976) (upholding facially race-neutral employment eligibility test that adversely impacted black applicants); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.S. 356 (1886) (discharging from custody Chinese citizens imprisoned pursuant to facially neutral ordinance arbitrarily applied against Chinese). In such cases, because "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Constitution.'" Id. at 274 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed., 402 u.s. 1, 16 (1971», to prevail on an equal protection claim a plaintiff must prove not only adverse impact but also invidious intent.
This, however, is not such a case. The CCDOC policy and practice of segregating female possible discharges from the remainder of the female court returns, such that female actual returns may elect to avoid strip searches, is not gender-neutral on its face. Defendants claim that their strip search policy and practice is, in fact, gender neutral because all court returns-
19

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-male and female alike--are subj ect to strip searches if they return to their divisions. This simply ignores the part of the policy that excepts female actual discharges from the requirement of returning to their living quarters. There is no question that the policy adopted pursuant to the Gary injunction facially applies only to female court returns. In this respect, this case is not analogous to those cited above, but is more similar to Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 u.s. 718 (1982) (public
university's policy of admitting only women to school of nursing held unconstitutional); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Assisted Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (zoning ordinance that required special use permit for group home for mentally retarded held unconstitutional); and Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago 723 F.2d 1263 (7Ch Cir. 1983) (city's practice of strip searching female misdemeanor offenders while male misdemeanor offenders were subject only to himd searches held unconstitutional). There was no discussion, in these cases, of intent, presumably because the challenged state action discriminates on its face, and its purpose for doing so does not affect the level of scrutiny to which it is subject. See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 (statutes intended to "protect" women subject to same heightened scrutiny as any policy that expressly discriminates based on gender). Likewise, plaintiffs here need not make any further showing of defendants' intent.
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For the reasons discussed above, I again conclude that defendants·must show an -exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification," that the classification serves "important government objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 u.s. at 724 (internal quotations
omitted). On reconsideration, I find that this is a question that must be answered by a jury.
The challenged policies cannot be analyzed in a vacuum but must be viewed in context, taking into account how they came into existence and have evolved over time. That a portion of the CCDOe inmate population must attend court each weekday is not a new phenomenon. But a significant increase in the prison population and evolving security issues have made the logistics of transporting inmates from their housing divisions to and from the various courts in Chicago and outlying districts increasingly complex.
Prior to 1992, inmates attended court in their civilian clothes, rather than in prison garb. In the event an inmate's court appearance resulted in the dismissal of the charges then before the court, eourt Services would call the Records unit at eeDoe to find out whether any additional charges, warrants, or holds prev~nted that inmate's release from custody. If not, the inmate was released by Court Services and was not required to
21

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 22 of 40
return to CCDOC at all, other than to pick up his or her personal belongings at a later time. That process changed in approximately 1992, when the inmate population of CCDOC experienced a dramatic increase. Prisoners were no longer permitted to attend court hearings in their street clothes, and for at least this reason, they were required to return to the Jail after court appearances, regardless of the court's disposition of the pending charges.
By 1996, when -the Gary plaintiffs brought their lawsuit, CCDOC had a written policy, set forth in General Order 13.1, that required all court returns, including male and female possible discharges, to be strip searched. All court returns were also required to return to their housing divisions within the Jail, regardless of the disposition of their cases. The Gary plaintiffs (a class of female actual discharges) alleged that the policy was
not enforced as written, and that in practice, all female court
returns were subjected to systematic strip searches in the recei ving area of the Jail, 12 while male court returns were not regularly strip searched at all. See Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116 (N.D. - Ill., Aug. 20, 1998) (Coar, J.).
The p~rties in Gary agreed that pursuant to General Order 13.1, female - court returns were systematically strip searched in the RCDC before returning to their housing divisions. The
12r presume that the "Receiving Area" referred to in Judge Coar's opinions refers to the RCDC.
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defendant conceded that male court returns were not strip searched
in the RCDC pursuant to General Order 13.1, explaining that the
number of male court returns and the limited space available had
for years made strip searching male returns in the RCDC "just about
impossible." Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116 at *2
(N.D. 111., Aug. 20, 1998). Moreover, the defendant in Gary
presented no evidence that the Sheriff's standard practice was to
strip all male inmates returning from court. The Gary court thus
concluded that there was no dispute that female court returns were
systematically strip searched, while male court returns were not.
The court further found that for the purpose of the plaintiffs'
claims, the male and female inmate populations were similarly
situated. Accordingly, the court held, pursuant to Mary Beth G.
and Mississippi University for Women, that the defendant bore the
burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the
differing treatment.
The Gary court went on to state:
Remarkably, the defendant does not even attempt to argue that such a policy is related to any important government objectives. Instead, the defendant tries to convince this court that there is no disparity in the treatment of the male[s] and females. The women are strip searched, the defendant contends, pursuant to the defendant's standard operating procedure that all detainees returning from court, both male and female, are to be strip searched. Although such a written policy does exist, the evidence has clearly shown that the actual practice in the Jail has not reflected this policy for nearly a decade.

23

- - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _. .... ._.......
Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 24 of 40
Gary v. Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116 at *9 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 20, 1998) (citations to record omitted). The court therefore concluded that the defendant had not met its burden of justifying the differential treatment, and that there was no issue of material fact on the issue of liability under the Equal Protection Clause_
The Gary court also found that the defendant's practice violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that even assuming female court returns posed a security risk if they returned to their housing divisions without being strip searched, "a simple change in the processing of individuals in the plaintiff class would eliminate" the need to strip search the plaintiffs, all of whom were possible discharges upon their return to the Jail and became actual' discharges after a records check revealed no outstanding warrants or holds. Gary v_ Sheahan, No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116 at *14 (N.D_ Ill., Aug. 20, 1998)_ The court explained:
Executive Director Velasco testified that the Sheriff has the ability to 'review, in a very short period of time, the six or eight females that are going to be discharged on a daily basis to make a determination whether there are other charges or holds pending. Furthermore, Assistant Director Maul testified that it is feasible to discharge females from the Receiving Room if they agreed to waive picking up their property in their cells, and instead have their property brought to them_
rd. (citations to record omitted) .
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Several considerations emerge from my reexamination of the Gary case and its relevance to plaintiffs' claims. As noted above, the parties agree that CCDOC's current policy and practice was instituted pursuant to the Gary court's order enjoining the Cook County Sheriff from strip searching female possible discharges, "unless after their return a computer check of their record indicates there are other reasons for holding the inmate or unless the female court return [wlants to return to her living quarters to recover personal items." That order plainly directs the Sheriff to adopt procedures facially specific to female possible discharges, as was indeed appropriate in view of the factual record in that case.
It is clear from this history that the gender-specific policy adopted pursuant to Gary was instituted as a means of righting particular constitutional wrongs visited on female inmates in a particular context. It is reasonable to assume, as the Gary court apparently concluded, that a gender-based classification was appropriate based on the record in that case. See Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. 718 at 728 ("In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened"). Nevertheless, even assuming the policy adopted pursuant to the Gary injunction was warranted under the
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circumstances of that case, defendants still bear the burden of proving in this case, on this record, that the security concerns they assert justify maintaining a facially discriminatory policy_ Their burden is high, but it is not insurmountable _ Defendants may convince a jury that the differences between the male and female inmate populations (for example, the substantial size difference as well as asserted differences in the nature and frequency of dangerous incidents in each population), justify continuing to process male actual discharges together with the other male court returns, despite the fact that female actual discharges are entitIed, pursuant to Gary, to a less intrusive practice. Indeed, CCDOC administrators have testified that the "simple" solution available in Gary is not feasible here due to logistical constraints that are inseparable · from security concerns.
I conclude that the ultimate question is best framed as whether defendants have demonstrated an exceedingly persuasive justification for CCDOC's policy and practice of processing male actual discharges together with the male general court return population, while female actual discharges are segregated. and processed separately from the female court return population. This formulation both identifies the challenged policy in terms that affirmatively apply to the
26

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,.

Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 27 of 40

plaintiff class (rather than by negative reference to the policy applied to female inmates) and makes clear that defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that the genderbased distinction is warranted under the circumstances of this case. The record contains sharply conflicting expert opinions on this question, and summary judgment is not the place to resolve this battle of the experts.
For the foregoing reasons, the parties' cross~motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that defendants' policy of strip searching of all male court discharges and not all female court discharges violates the Equal Protection Clause are denied.
Similarly, the analytical framework plaintiffs propose for their claim that plaintiffs are not offered the same level of privacy as similarly situated female court returns must be turned on its head. Plaintiffs state that -[t)he reason the Sheriff does not provide dividers for men during a strip search is because there was previously a class action lawsuit about the strip searching of women at the Jail and because there are more men than women at the Jail. ,,13 The first portion of this statement is a reference to Wilkes v. Sheahan, 01 C 1592 (N.D. Ill. 2001), in which the plaintiffs alleged

13Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 280-2) No. 21.
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that the group strip searches to which they were subjected were conducted in abusive, humiliating, and unsanitary conditions that violated their Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Among other particulars, the Wilkes
plaintiffs alleged that although they or other women being searched were menstruating, they were required to remove their sanitary napkins and perform the search in a manner that allowed blood to run down their legs onto the floor, in view of other inmates. Based on the complaint, it appears that the
gravamen of the Wilkes plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims
was that the manner in which the searches were conducted was particularly humiliating and abusive to them as women because of their particular physiological functions.
The Wilkes case was dismissed pursuant to a settlement
agreement prior to the issuance of any opinion, so the merits of these claims was not decided. The point, however, is that the gender-based classification underlying the policy on privacy dividers, like the gender-based classification that determines who can remain in the RCDC during outprocessing, was instituted to rectify specific practices that violated (or
allegedly violated, in Wilkes) the rights of female inmates. While neither Wilkes nor Gary is disposi tive of whether
defendants are justified in maintaining the gender-based distinctions challenged in this case, the factual
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circumstances and claims in those cases are certainly relevant

to the justifications defendants now assert. Defendants

continue to bear the burden of demonstrating an exceedingly

persuasive justification for the gender-based classification

underlying the differential use of privacy dividers.

Nevertheless, the question is properly framed not as whether

not providing dividers to men furthers an important government

interest, but rather whether providing them to women in the

first instance did so."

Defendants assert "the objective of protecting women from

embarrassment related to menstruation" in support of their

gender-based classification. Plaintiffs do not claim that

this objective is unimportant, nor that the use of privacy

dividers for women is insufficiently related to its

achievement.

Instead, plaintiffs attack defendants ·'

justification by claiming that it "fails to appreciate that

strip searches can be equally embarrassing, repulsive and

degrading to males." This may be true (as noted above, this

is why men and women are similarly situated), but defendant is

entitled to have a jury weigh the evidence and decide whether

the added factor of menstruation justifies differential

treatment. As noted above, "a gender-based classification '

"I assume, for the present discussion, that defendants were not independently obligated under the Fourth Amendment to use privacy dividers for either men or women.
29

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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 30 of 40

favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened." Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 728. A jury could conclude, based on the evidence, that while group searches without privacy dividers are invasive and uncomfortable to both sexes, they are unreasonably so for women who may be viewed while menstruating, and that this distinction justifies CCDOC's gender-based classification.
For the foregOing reasons, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that defendants' policy of strip searching of all male court discharges in large nonprivate group settings with up to fifty inmates, while the female court discharges, who opt to return to the housing divisions, are afforded privacy, violates the Equal Protection Clause are denied.
B. Fourth Amendment On reconsideration, I have also revised my views about the appropriateness of summary judgment on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims. In defendants' favor is Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), which upheld visual body cavity searches of inmates--including both sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees--after contact visits, and which emphasized what the Seventh Circuit has called "the animating theme" of the Supreme Court's recent prison jurisprudence, Johnson v.
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Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7 th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original): that prison administrators have broad discretion to adopt and execute the policies they deem necessary to maintain institutional security, and that judges should not interfere with the "professional expertise of corrections Officials." 441 U.S. at 548. The Bell court further held that body cavity searches can be conducted on less than probable cause, id. at 560, and that the existence of less restrictive means of detecting contraband does not necessarily render the searches unreasonable. Id. at 559 n. 40.
Bell .did not, however, approve the use of blanket strip searches in any and all circumstances, but instead reaffirmed the need to conduct a fact-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of the particular search. Prison "[o]fficials do not have carte blanche to institute any policy they please under the justification of institutional security," Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 405 F.Supp.2d 933, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citation omitted). Bell requires courts to consider "the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." 441 U.S. at 559.
In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit held that the City's policy of routinely strip searching female misdemeanor offenders,
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without reasonable suspicion that they were concealing drugs or weapons, violated the Fourth Amendment. The court acknowledged that Bell upheld the strip searches in that case on less than probable cause, but distinguished Bellon factual grounds, including that the Bell plaintiffs, unlike Mary Beth G., "were awaiting trial on serious federal charges ... and were being searched after contact visits." 723 F.2d at 1272. The court concluded that these factual differences were "sufficiently significant to compel our own inquiry as to whether the strip searches conducted by the City were 'reasonable' under the fourth amendment." Id.
The court then proceeded to analyze the Bell factors, balanCing the severe intrusion on the plaintiffs' privacy and dignity against the City's purported justification for the search. Although the City asserted "the need to maintain the security of the City lockups by preventing misdemeanor offenders from bringing in weapons or contraband," 723 F. 2d at 1272, the court concluded that the City's evidence "belies its purported concerns." Id. at 1273. In particular, the court noted that because the plaintiffs--a11 of whom were detained on traffic or other minor offenses--were not charged with "the kinds of crimes ... that might give rise to a reasonable belief that the woman arrestee was concealil1g an item in a body cavity," and that, in fact, there was no evidence that the
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strip searches of female misdemeanor offenders had ever turned up contraband, the challenged searches were not justified. Id.
Indeed, although courts of appeals are not unanimous on the question, several circuits have agreed that minor offenders charged with non-violent crimes not ordinarily associated with drugs or weapons cannot be subject to strip searches absent a reasonable suspicion that they are harboring contraband. See, e.g., Swain v. Spinney, 117 F. 3d 1, 7 (l.t Cir. 1997); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395 (loth eir. 1993); but see Powell v. Barrett, No. 05-16734, 2008 WL 4072800 (lph Cir., Sept. 4, 2008) (no reasonable suspicion required). The hitch in this case, of course, is that at the time the searches are carried out on male court returns, eeDoe does not know with what crimes, if any, the inmate is charged, and, in case of the plaintiff class, the answer is--by definition--none. Here, it becomes clear that the reasonableness of plaintiffs' searches cannot be resolved as a matter of law, but depends on the jury's resolution of the same factual dispute discussed in relation to plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment violations. If the jury credits the testimony of plaintiffs' experts, several of whom have opined that segregating male possible discharges from the general male court return population in the RCDC would not compromise
33

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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 34 of 40

institutional safety, it may conclude that CCDOC's current procedure is unreasonable. If, however, the jury credits defendants' witnesses, and determines that the Jail officials are within their discretion to execute the current procedure as necessary to institutional security, it could conclude that the searches are reasonable, notwithstanding that some of the inmates searched will ultimately be determined to have had no charges pending at the time of the search.
Mary Beth G. does not preclude the latter of these potential outcomes. Although the court determined in that case that the City of Chicago lacked reasonable suspicion as to female misdemeanor offenders as a class, it did not go so far as to hold that individualized reasonable suspicion as to each detainee was required, and implicitly acknowledged that reasonable suspicion may exist as to other classes of offenders (such as those charged with prostitution, assault, or narcotics violations, 723 F.2d at 1273). Accordingly, if a jury finds that security considerations prevent the segregation of actual discharges before they return to their divisions, it could also conclude that the blanket searches were reasonable, based on reasonable suspicion as to some or all of the remaining court returns.
For the foregoing reasons, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that defendants' policy
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 35 of 40

of strip searching of all male court discharges not based upon reasonable suspicion that they are concealing contraband violates the Fourth Amendment is denied.
Plaintiffs' claim that the manner in which the strip search is conducted, in large non-private group settings, violates the Fourth Amendment, is also inappropriate for summary judgment. As plaintiffs' formulation of the claim indicates, lack of privacy is their primary complaint. Plaintiffs rely on two cases for the proposition that strip
searches must respect individual privacy: Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2007), and Hills v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391
(lOth Cir. 1984). While it is true that in each of these cases, the appeals court held that manner in which the search was conducted unreasonably invaded the arrestee's. privacy, neither case supports judgment of plaintiffs' claim as a matter of law. Setting aside the fact that the plaintiff in
Campbell was searched incident to his arrest, and not while he
was in j ail (the court noted that this distinction was
relevant), Campbell addressed a visual body cavity search
conducted in the arrestee's friend's backyard, in plain view of onlookers. In Hills, an arrestee was taken to a "lobby area" of the jail, in which ten or twelve people, none of whom was involved in the search, were milling about, then forced to face the w~ll and drop his pants and undershorts for a visual
35

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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 36 of 40

inspection of his buttocks . One element that immediately
.--
distinguishes both Campbell and Hill is that the viewing public in those cases was not limited, as it is in this case, to other inmates also being searched, but included passers-by (Campbell) or anyone who happened to be in the jail's "lobby area" (Hills).
Defendants, for their part, cite to Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997), and Elliot v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that strip searches conducted in front of other inmates are permissible under the Fourth Amendment, and Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254 (lOth Cir. 2002), for the proposition that whether legitimate penological objectives justify a strip search in an open area in view of other inmates is a fact-sensi tive issue. In response to the Farmer defendants' argument that the lower court's denial of summary judgment erroneously placed the burden on the defendants to justify their policy (the same argument defendants raise here), the court upheld the denial, stating, "Defendants proffered evidence of their justification, the plaintiff disputed that evidence, and the district judge found that the matter could not be resolved at the summary judgment stage. That is all." 288 F.3d at 1261.
The situation in this case is similar. As defendants' cases demonstrate, the Constitution clearly does not require
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 37 of 40

strip searches to be conducted in a manner that allows only the prison officials conducting the search to view the inmate.
Plaintiffs do not claim that a strip search conducted in a
manner that allows the inmates being searched to view each
other is per se unreasonable. Plaintiffs make much of the fact that in 2007, during the pendency of this lawsuit,
defendants instituted the use of privacy screens for male
group strip searches, and argue that this demonstrates
defendants had no justification for not using them earlier.
But this argument misses the point. As discussed above,
prison officialS are not required to choose the least restrictive means of achieving their objective of maintaining
order and safety within the institution. Moreover, granting
summary judgment based on CCDOC's later use of privacy screens raises a significant public policy concern. AS the Eighth Circuit noted in Klinger v. Department of Corrections,
(P]rison officials would be far less willing to experiment and innovate at an individual institution knowing that a federal court could impose liability on the basis of a program comparison. Indeed, inmates would suffer because officials would likely provide each institution with the bare constitutional minimum of programs and services to avoid the threat of equal protection liability.
31 F.3d 727, 733 (8<h Cir. 1994). Similarly here, if each time
eCDOC improved upon the conditions for conducting inmate
searches, a court could impose liability based on CCDOC's pre-
improvement procedures, ceDoe would have a perverse incentive
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 38 of 40

not to seek improvements, and to conduct searches in a manner that minimally meets constitutional standards, even where improvements are feasible. Of course, the jury may consider evidence of these improvements in weighing the parties ' respective positions; but it does not entitle plaintiffs to prevail as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that the manner in which the strip search is conducted, in large non-private group settings, violates the Fourth Amendment are denied.
As to plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim based on unreasonable delay, although defendants' Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration seeks to vacate the entirety of the July 30 Order, defendants do not argue any basis for revisiting my disposi tion of this claim. Motions for reconsideration-regardless of whether brought under Rule 54(b) or Rule 59(e)-serve a limited function, and are appropriate only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Rothwell Cotton Co. V. Rosenthal ~ Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7, h Cir. 1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D.Ill. 1982), aff'd, 736 F.2d 388 (7 th Cir.1984) (citation and footnote omitted», amended by, 835 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1987). As defendants have not asserted that any of these grounds applies to my denial of
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Case 1:04-cv-01051 Document 429 Filed 02/27/2009 Page 39 of 40

summary judgment in their favor on plaintiffs' unreasonable delay claim, I decline to reconsider that denial. In any event, I am convinced that pursuant to Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he reasonableness of a length of detention typically 'is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts presented in each case' "), summary judgment of this claim is i~appropriate in this case.
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Defendants' motion for reconsideration also asserts that I erred in declining to grant summary judgment for defendants on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. They have not persuaded me, however, that my denial of summary judgment on this ground rested on a manifest error of law or fact. Defendants concede that Sheriffs generally act as county, rather than state officials. That an Illinois Sheriff may act as an arm of the State does not compel the conclusion that this exception--rather than the general rule--applies here. Accordingly, defendants' motion to reconsider the portion of the July 30 Order denying summary judgment on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity is denied. ls

ISAs the substance of my analysis and the authorities I cited
made clear, at issue was whether defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. References in the July 30 Order to "qualified" immunity should be amended accordingly.
39

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration is granted as to the portions of the July 30 Order that granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their Fourteenth Amendment claims and on certain of their Fourth Amendment claims. Those portions of the July 30 Order are vacated, and I now deny both parties' motions for summary judgment on those claims.
Defendants' Rule 54(b) motion is denied as to the portions of the July 30 Order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable delay and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment bqsed on Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Dated: February 27, 2009

EN'rlilR ORDER:
Elaine E. Bueklo United States District Judge

40

 
 Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge
CASE NUMBER
CASE TITLE

Elaine E. Bucklo 04 C 1051

Sitting Judge if Other than Assigned Judge
DATE
Bullock vs. Dart

5/23/2011

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT
Defendants’ Motion to Bar Plaintiff Reid from Taking Award [471] is granted.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices. *Mail AO 450 form.

STATEMENT

In March 2011, the parties in this suit entered into a settlement

agreement. One term of the agreement stipulated that Reid was to receive

an “incentive award” of $25,000 for serving as one of the representatives

for the plaintiff class. Defendants

later discovered that, during

bankruptcy proceedings in 2010, Reid certified that he had no legal claims

of any value. Defendants claim that Reid’s debts were ultimately discharged

on the basis of the latter representation, and that, as a result, he is now

judicially estopped from recovering the incentive award. I agree.

“Judicial estoppel provides that a party who prevails on one ground in a prior proceeding cannot turn around and deny that ground in a subsequent one.” Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co. v. Avent America, Inc., 612 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2010). “It is an equitable concept designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process and “to prevent litigants from playing fast and loose with the courts.” Butler v. Village of Round Lake Police Dept., 585 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Its purpose is to prevent a litigant from prevailing twice on opposite theories.” Id.

Reid maintains that the omission of the claim during the bankruptcy proceedings was inadvertent. Except for his say-so, however, he offers no evidence in support of this contention. Reid additionally relies on the fact that he has recently been given permission by the bankruptcy court to reopen his case and to report the $25,000 payment. Thus, he argues that his bankruptcy action will be modified and his previous omission of the payment will not benefit him. Once again, however, Reid’s assertions are based

04C1051 Bullock vs. Dart

Page 1 of 2

STATEMENT
largely on his own speculations. Indeed, even if Reid’s contention is true and he ultimately does not benefit from the omission, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that judicial estoppel still applies. As the court has explained:
a debtor who receives even preliminary benefits from concealing a chose in action from his creditors can still be estopped from pursuing the suit in the future. To hold otherwise would give debtors an incentive to game the bankruptcy system. Debtors could take a wait-and-see approach to disclosure by prosecuting an undisclosed claim while waiting to see how favorably the bankruptcy proceeding unfolds before discharge. That approach would undermine both the primary aim of judicial estoppel, which is to protect the integrity of the judicial process, and the bankruptcy law’s goal of unearthing all assets for the benefit of creditors.
Williams v. Hainje , 375 Fed. App’x. 625, 628 (7th Cir 2010) (citations omitted).
For these reasons, defendants’ motion to bar is granted.

04C1051 Bullock vs. Dart

Page 2 of 2

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 468 Filed: 03/18/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:9496

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, individually

)

and on behalf of a class

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

Michael F. Sheahan, as the Sheriff of Cook

)

County in his Official Capacity and Cook County )

)

Defendants.

)

No. 04 C 1051 JUDGE Elaine Bucklo

ORDER

The Court has reviewed the proposed settlement of this class action and, having held a hearing on the fairness of the settlement, finds that notice of the proposed settlement has been provided to all class members by first class mail to his last known address and that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the proposed settlement, be and the same hereby is, approved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the time for class members to submit claims is extended to April 15, 2011. Defendant Cook County shall, within 45 days, pay incentive awards in the amount of $25,000 to Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid. Defendant Cook County shall, within 45 days, pay to attorneys Thomas G. Morrissey and Robert H. Farley, Jr., the sum of $159,303.88 as reimbursement for expenses. Defendant Cook County shall, within 45 days, pay to attorneys Thomas G. Morrissey and Robert H. Farley, Jr., the sum of $1,600,000 as partial compensation in attorney fees and the final balance of the attorney fees, $500,000 shall be paid on January 7, 2012. This cause is dismissed with prejudice as to all Class Members and this Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the provisions as set forth in the settlement agreement.

ENTER:

03/18/2011 Elaine E. Bucklo United States District Judge

 
 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (2007)
Quentin BULLOCK, and Jack Reid, individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiffs, v.
Michael SHEAHAN, Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity, and Cook County, Defendants.
No. 04 C 1051.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
August 28, 2007.
761 *761 Thomas Gerard Morrissey, ThomasG. Morrissey, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Bernard E.J. Quinn, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ELAINE E. BUCKLO, District Judge.
Defendants Michael Sheahan and Cook County (collectively "defendants") have moved to strike and bar the expert testimony and opinions of plaintiffs Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid's, individually and on behalf of a class (collectively "plaintiffs"), retained architectural expert Donald Henry. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
I.
Plaintiffs' two-count amended complaint alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution based on the defendants' alleged policy and/or practice under which male inmates, in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDC"), are subjected to strip searches upon returning to the CCDC for out-processing after being ordered released. Specifically, the named plaintiffs had been ordered released after being found not guilty of the charges against them. Plaintiffs also complain that female inmates are not subjected to such searches and, therefore, this policy and/or practice violates the Equal Protection clause.
Mr. Henry is a registered architect specializing in the design of prisons and jails. He was retained by plaintiffs to inspect various areas within the CCDC, including the Receiving, Classification, Diagnostic Center ("RCDC") where the plaintiffs are held prior to entering the housing units and being subjected to strip searches, and to offer an opinion on whether there is adequate space for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees who have been discharged pursuant to court order prior to their release from custody. Female detainees who have been discharged are allegedly placed in a holding cell in the RCDC and directly processed out of CCDC without being strip searched or re-entering the housing units. Defendants contend there is no space in the RCDC to construct additional bullpens to house the discharged male detainees so that they would not be required to enter the housing units and undergo strip searches.
II.
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Fed.R.Evid. 702, which reads
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
For expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, the movant must establish that the expert testimony is both 762 reliable and would assist the trier of fact in understanding *762 the evidence or determining a fact at issue in the
case. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-91, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The primary purpose of Rule 702 is to avoid confusing and unreliable expert testimony. See id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786; Loeffel Steel Prod., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 372 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1110 (N.D.Ill. 2005). Nevertheless, "[t]he rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule, and the trial court's role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system." Spearman Indus. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 128 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1150 (N.D.Ill.2001) (quotation omitted). Cross examination and the presentation of contrary evidence are the "traditional and appropriate means" of attacking expert testimony. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)).
III.
Defendants do not take issue with Mr. Henry's qualifications as an expert, but the rigor of his methodology. As set forth in his report, Mr. Henry reached his opinions and the conclusions contained in his expert report "[a]fter a tour of the Cook County Department of Corrections including the RCDC" and reviewing other expert reports, RCDC and basement floor plans, the Sheriffs 2006 Status Report and charts summarizing certain computer records on male detainees. Defendants argue that Mr. Henry has not employed the same methodology as is standard in his professional practice because he has not: (1) reviewed all of the written discovery in this case; (2) considered all explanatory variables for the CCDC's current design, including interviewing CCDC personnel and has relied on incomplete costs estimates; (3) created finalized architectural drawings, instead of the sketches attached to his report, to illustrate his proposals; and (4) formally entered the sanitation area, which he has suggested be redesigned, but looked into it through an open doorway instead.
None of defendants' objections render Mr. Henry's opinions or testimony unreliable or irrelevant under Daubert. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) ("no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience"). Mr. Henry is not required to review all of the written discovery in this case in order to render his opinions and defendants' remaining objections are best addressed through cross-examination. Accordingly, defendants' motion to strike on these grounds is denied.
Defendants also take issue with Mr. Henry's cost estimates. They argue that his cost estimates are contrary to existing law because they are either incomplete or too high and the Constitution does not require that defendants pay excessive costs in accommodating plaintiffs. Defendants cite Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), in support. In Block, the Supreme Court applied its ruling in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), to determine that a jail's ban on contact visits was reasonably related to a legitimate government objective 0907 internal security of the detention facility 0907 and did not violate the detainees' substantive due process rights. 468 U.S. at 586, 104 S.Ct. 3227.
In this case, the complaint alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection clause 0907 neither of which are addressed in the holding in Block. Accordingly, defendants' argument is misplaced. In order to 763 establish unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, courts must balance the constitutional *763 rights of the detainee with the interests of the detention facility. In doing so, courts consider four factors; (1) the scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which it is conducted; (3) the place in which it is conducted; and (4) the justification for initiating it. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Under the Equal Protection clause, disparity in treatment among similarly situated individuals based on gender survives judicial scrutiny "only by showing at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273-74 (7th Cir.1983) (quotations omitted). Mr. Henry's testimony is not contrary to Fourth Amendment or Equal Protection jurisprudence and, therefore, is admissible.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to strike is denied. ENTER ORDER.
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 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (2007)
Quentin BULLOCK, and Jack Reid, individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiffs, v.
Michael SHEAHAN, Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity, and Cook County, Defendants.
No. 04 C 1051.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
November 5, 2007.
764 Thomas Gerard Morrissey, Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Robert *764 Hugh Farley, Jr., Robert H. Farley, Jr., Ltd., Naperville, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Bernard E.J. Quinn, E. Michael Kelly, Frank Joseph Marsico, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Cook County State's Attorney, Patrick Malone Blanchard, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ELAINE E. BUCKLO, District Judge.
Defendants Michael Sheahan and Cook County (collectively "defendants") have moved to strike certain portions of plaintiffs Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid's (collectively "plaintiffs") motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution based on the defendants' alleged policy and/or practice under which male inmates, in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDC"), are subjected to strip searches upon returning to the CCDC for out-processing after being ordered released. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that
[p]ursuant to the Sheriff's practice and/or policy, after returning to the Jail . . . Mr. Bullock was taken into a hallway with thirty other inmates, and required to remove all his clothing. While naked, Mr. Bullock was ordered by employees of the Sheriff to extend his arms and legs apart, to squat three or four times, and then to cough while squat[t]ing.
(Compl. at ¶ 10.) The complaint makes substantially similar allegations with respect to Reid. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Bullock and Reid had been ordered released after being found not guilty of the charges against them. The complaint also alleges that female inmates are not subjected to such searches and, therefore, this policy and/or practice violates the Equal Protection clause.
Defendants contend plaintiffs improperly seek summary judgment on unpled theories of liability and move to strike. Plaintiffs' motion seeks summary judgment on the following four claims:
1. The strip searching of all male court discharges and not all female court discharges violates the Equal Protection Clause.
2. The strip searching of all male court discharges in large non private group settings with up to fifty inmates while the female court discharges, who opt to return to the housing divisions, are afforded privacy violates the Equal Protection Clause.

3. The strip searching of all male court discharges not based upon reasonable suspicion that they are concealing contraband violates the Fourth Amendment.
4. Assuming arguendo, the Defendants are entitled to strip search all male court discharges, the manner in which the strip search is conducted, in large non private group settings violates the Fourth Amendment.
(Def. Mot. to Strike Ex. D.) Defendants move to strike the second and fourth claims.
The factual allegations contained in the complaint satisfy notice pleading standards with respect to all of the Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims identified in the motion for summary judgment. See E.E.O.C. v. 765 Concentra Health Serve., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir.2007). *765 Nevertheless, defendants contend that these claims come as a surprise because they were never addressed by plaintiffs during fact or expert discovery. Defendants also move to strike certain exhibits attached to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, including deposition transcripts, affidavits, and other documents submitted by high ranking officials at CCDC, on the ground that they have not been previously disclosed and plaintiffs represented they "had no intention of using testimony from such transcripts in the pending case."
The defendants, as movants, have not provided specific evidence of any misrepresentations or sandbagging other than an affidavit stating that discovery did not focus on the privacy issue. Moreover, plaintiffs explained in court that the purportedly unpled theories did not require any specific expert discovery from their part, and therefore none was conducted.
I find defendants had notice of the claims and the motion to strike the second and fourth claims is denied, but 0907 consistent with the parties' representations in court on October 22, 2007 0907 defendants are granted time to conduct additional discovery on the exhibits at issue. Plaintiffs have indicated they do not have an objection to additional discovery.
II.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants have until December 31, 2007 to complete discovery on the exhibits at issue and plaintiffs must provide complete copies of the deposition transcripts included among the exhibits at issue.
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 Shepard v. International Business Machines Corp., 45 F.R.D. 536 (1968)

45 F.R.D. 536 United States District Court S. D. New York.
Francis H. SHEPARD, Jr., Plaintiff, v.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, Defendant.
No. 65 Civ. 1029. | Dec. 13, 1968.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*537 Robert D. Spille, Curtis, Morris & Safford, New York City, for plaintiff.
Charles H. Walker, Fish, Richardson & Neave, New York City, for defendant.
Albert R. Connelly, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Donald E. Degling, Jules P. Kirsch, Fish, Richardson & Neave, New York City, of counsel.
Opinion
OPINION
MacMAHON, District Judge.
This is a patent infringement action in which defendant moves for a separate trial on the issues of validity and infringement and to defer the issue of damages until validity and infringement are determined. [1] [2] [3] Motions for separate trials are addressed to the

discretion of the court, Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 257 F.Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y.1965), and are granted when they ‘will be conducive to expedition and economy.’ Rule 42(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. There is no doubt that separate trial of the issues of validity and infringement will provide a more rapid trial. The issue of damages is often more complex than the issues of validity and infringement. Trial of all three issues would only clutter the record and tend to confuse the jury. If validity and infringement are determined in favor of plaintiff, defendant might very well pay the damages to avoid another trial. If these issues are decided against plaintiff, no further trial will be necessary.
Accordingly, the issues of validity and infringement will be tried separately. Swofford v. B & W Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962, 85 S.Ct. 653, 13 L.Ed.2d 557 (1965). [4] Separate trial of these issues does not divest plaintiff of his right to a jury trial which has been duly demanded and is expressly preserved by Rule 42(b). Plaintiff has a right to a jury trial on the issues of validity and infringement. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962); Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S. 445, 44 S.Ct. 533, 68 L.Ed. 1098 (1924).
So ordered.
Parallel Citations
12 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1026, 161 U.S.P.Q. 102
	  

1

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 4 of 33 PageID #:9297

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid, )

individually and on behalf of a )

class,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-vs-

) No. 04 CV 1051

)

Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook ) (Judge Bucklo)

County in his official capacity )

and Cook County,

)

)

.

Defendants. )

CLASS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This settlement agreement is entered into by all parties to this action through their respective undersigned counsel to resolve all matters at issue in this action.
RECITALS
1. Nature of litigation. On February 12, 2004, plaintiffs filed the above captioned action, for themselves and all others similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging violations of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Title 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988. The plaintiffs allege that they were strip searched upon being returned to the jail for out-processing following a court ruling which warranted their release from Jail.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 5 of 33 PageID #:9298
2. Class Certification. Pursuant to the Court's order of June 15, 2005, the instant case is proceeding as a class action for:
All male inmates who, on or after February 12, 2002, have been subjected to defendant’s policy and practice of strip searching a male inmate upon his return to the jail following a court appearance at which court appearance a specific case or charge against the inmate was dismissed when no other cases, charges, warrants or holds were pending against that inmate which warranted that inmate’s continued detention at the jail. 3. Important Rulings. On July 30, 2008, the Court initially granted Plaintiffs summary judgment for liability with respect to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment strip search claims and denied Defendants motion for summary judgment. On February 27, 2009, the Court granted Defendants motion for reconsideration and set aside its order granting summary judgment.
4. Settlement Process. During the pendency of defendants’ appeal on Eleventh Amendment issues, counsel for the parties participated in the Settlement Conference Program of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. With the assistance of Joel N. Shapiro, Senior Conference Attorney, counsel for the parties discussed the outline of a proposed resolution of this case. Counsel thereafter renewed the settlement dialogue and agreed to a proposed settlement. This proposal was presented to the Cook County Board and approved by the Board after further negotiations between the parties. The pro-
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 6 of 33 PageID #:9299
posed settlement takes into account the risks, delay and difficulties involved in establishing a right to recovery in excess of that offered by this settlement and the likelihood that the litigation will be further protracted.
5. Certification by Class Counsel: Class Counsel have investigated the facts and the applicable law and believe that it is in the best interest of the class to enter into this Settlement Agreement.
6. Denial of Liability: Cook County and Sheriff vigorously contest each and every claim in the Action. Cook County and Sheriff maintain that they have consistently acted in accordance with governing laws at all times. Cook County and Sheriff vigorously deny all of the material allegations set forth in the Action. Cook County and Sheriff nonetheless have concluded that it is in their best interest that the Action be settled on the terms and conditions set forth in this Stipulation. Cook County reached this conclusion after considering the factual and legal issues in the Action, the substantial benefits of a final resolution of the Action, the expense that would be necessary to defend the Action through trial and any appeals that might be taken, the benefits of disposing of protracted and complex litigation, and the desire of Cook County to conduct its business unhampered by the distractions of continued litigation.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 7 of 33 PageID #:9300
7. As a result of the foregoing, Cook County and Sheriff enter into this Stipulation without in any way acknowledging any fault, liability, or wrongdoing of any kind. Neither this Stipulation, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be construed as an admission or concession by Cook County or the Sheriff of the truth of any of the allegations made in the Action, or of any liability, fault, or wrongdoing of any kind whatsoever on the part of Cook County or the Sheriff, or shall be used as precedent in the future against Cook County and the Sheriff in any way.
8. To the extent permitted by law, neither this Stipulation, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be offered as evidence or received in evidence in any pending or future civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding, to establish any liability or admission by Cook County and/or the Sheriff, except in any proceedings brought to enforce the Stipulation.
9. Neither this Stipulation, nor any pleading or other paper related in any way to this Stipulation, nor any act or communication in the course of negotiating, implementing or seeking approval of this Stipulation, shall be deemed an admission by Cook County or the Sheriff
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 8 of 33 PageID #:9301
that certification of a class or subclass is appropriate in any other liti-
gation, or otherwise shall preclude Cook County or the Sheriff from op-
posing or asserting any argument it may have with respect to certifica-
tion of any class(es) or subclass(es) in any proceeding or this Action, or
shall be used as precedent in any way as to any subsequent conduct of
Cook County or the Sheriff except as set forth herein.
DEFINITIONS
10. In addition to the foregoing, the following terms shall have
the meanings set forth below:
a. “Cook County” means the County of Cook and/or any other successors, assigns or legal representatives thereof.
b. “Sheriff” means the Sheriff of Cook County and/or any other successors, assigns or legal representatives thereof.
c. “Class Counsel” means Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd., 12049 South Western Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, 60643, Robert H. Farley, Jr., Ltd., 1155 South Washington, Naperville, Illinois 60540 and Kenneth N. Flaxman, 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1240, Chicago, Il. 60604.
d. “Class Member” means any person who is included within the definition of the class set out in paragraph 2 above.
e. The “Young litigation” means proceedings in Young v. County of Cook, No. 06-cv-552 (N.D. Ill).
f. “Effective Date” means that date defined in paragraph 25 of this Stipulation.
g. “Final Settlement Hearing” means the hearing at which the Court is asked to grant final approval of this Settlement.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 9 of 33 PageID #:9302
h. “Administrator” means class counsel. i. “Potential Class Members” means all persons who would
qualify as part of the Class, prior to the date by which exclusion from the Class must be requested. j. “Released Claims” means and includes any and all Unknown Claims, known claims, and rights, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, debts, liens, contracts, liabilities, agreements, interest, costs, expenses or losses, for the acts alleged or which are or could have been alleged by the Named Plaintiffs or the Potential Class Members in this Action, or relate in any way whatsoever to this Action regarding strip searches of inmates after returning to the jail following a court appearance at which court appearance a specific case or charge against the inmate was dismissed when no other cases, charges, warrants or holds were pending against that inmate which warranted that inmate’s continued detention at jail and any cause of action or claim not filed to date in a court of law known or unknown on or before the date of this settlement that arose out of his incarceration at the jail. This release does not extend to any claim that may be, or has been, or will be, asserted on behalf of the “releasing person” as an unnamed class member in any other action. k. “Released Persons” means Cook County, Cook County’s counsel, the Sheriff of Cook County, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of the Sheriff’s and Cook County’s past, present or future officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof.
RELIEF
11. Monetary Relief to the Class. To resolve all claims at is-
sue in this case involving monetary relief to class members, other than
attorneys' fees, expert and consulting witness fees and litigation costs,
the parties have agreed that, as part of the consideration for this
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 10 of 33 PageID #:9303
Agreement, Defendants will establish a fund (the "Settlement Fund") in the amount of $1,400,000 (One Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars).
12. Incentive Payments. The named plaintiffs, Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid shall, subject to the approval of the Court and receipt by the County of Cook of properly executed IRS W-9 forms, receive an incentive award of $25,000. Such award shall be in lieu of, and not in addition to, any other awards to which the named plaintiffs may be entitled under this settlement. These incentive awards will be paid by defendants in addition to the funds that are part of the “Settlement Fund”
13. Administration of the Settlement. An Administration Fund in the amount of $285,000 shall be established. The cost of administration of the settlement, including but not limited to notice to the class, establishing class membership, processing of claim forms, and providing a final list of claimants and addresses, shall be paid from this Administration Fund. For purposes of performing ministerial work in the administration of this settlement only, class counsel agrees to a rate of $200 per hour for the time of lawyers with three or more years of experience and $100 per hour for the time of legal assistants. Cook County shall reimburse counsel for administrative costs upon receipt of
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 11 of 33 PageID #:9304
itemized statements, with payments to be made within 30 days of receipt of said statement with a maximum amount not to exceed the Administrative fund of $285,000. Any portion of the $285,000 not expended by November 1, 2011 for administrative and notice costs and expenses from the Administration Fund shall revert to Cook County.
14. Payments to Class Members: The parties, while recognizing that each class member may have a distinct claim for emotional damages, agree that the expense, uncertainly, and delay of providing each class member with an individual determination of damages outweighs the benefits of a distribution based on date of occurrence. Accordingly, the parties agree that each class member shall receive an award from the “Settlement Fund” not to exceed $200 (two hundred dollars).
15. The Potential Young Setoff: Class members who were processed into the Jail on or after January 30, 2004 may be members of the plaintiff lass in the Young litigation, referred to in paragraph 10(e) above. Defendants may be entitled to a setoff of $100 for each class member if Defendants certify that the class member has been sent a legal notice to his last known address stating he is eligible to receive an award of $200 or more from the Young litigation. By way of illustration and not limitation, a class member who receives an award of $200 in Young shall receive an award of $100 in this case.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 12 of 33 PageID #:9305
16. Each class member shall receive one award from the “Settlement Fund” even though he may have been subjected to more than one strip search. The actual amount to be paid to each class member will be determined within 60 days after expiration of the date for submission of claim forms. The total amount to be paid to class members, will not exceed $1,400,000 (One Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars). If more than 7000 claims are submitted, each claimant shall receive an aliquot share of the settlement fund. If less than 7000 claims are submitted, the undistributed portion of the “Settlement Fund” designated by the Cook County Comptroller shall be held until November 1, 2011 to allow payment of any claim submitted late with good cause shown. Good cause is defined as legally adequate and substantial grounds and not simply neglect. Any portion of the “Settlement Fund” remaining on November 2, 2011 shall revert to Cook County.
17. Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses: Attorneys’ fees and costs were not finally negotiated by Class Counsel and counsel for the Released Parties until after full agreement had been reached on the monetary relief for the class. Class counsel represented that the total amount of attorneys’ fees shall not exceed two million one hundred thousand dollars and that counsel have expended $159,303.88 as costs. Cook County has agreed not to contest any request by Class Counsel for
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 13 of 33 PageID #:9306
an award of fees not to exceed two million one hundred thousand dollars and costs in the amount previously stated, and agrees that it will pay 3/4ths of the attorneys’ fees and all of the costs within 45 days following the Court’s final approval of the settlement, and the balance of the attorney fees on January 7, 2012.
NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCEDURE
18. Within twenty-one days after the Court has given its preliminary approval to this proposed settlement, notice of the proposed settlement, and information about the date and time of the fairness hearing will be sent by first class mail to the last ascertainable address of each class member. “Ascertainable” means the last known address as enhanced by the United States Postal Service change of address database. The cost of this notice shall be paid by defendant Cook County. In the event that this settlement obtains final approval from the Court, the cost of notice will be deducted from the Administration Fund.
19. To participate in this settlement, each Class Member must submit a sworn Claim Form postmarked no later than the date certain established on the final Class Notice. The Class Notice will include a forwarding and return address, which will be a Post Office Box controlled by Class Counsel. Class Counsel shall provide Cook County and the Sheriff with copies of all claim forms received.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 14 of 33 PageID #:9307
DECEASED, DISSOLVED, BANKRUPT, OR INCAPACITATED CLASS MEMBERS
20. Where a Class Member is deceased and a payment is due to that Class Member, upon receipt of a proper notification and documentation, settlement payment shall be made in accordance with Illinois law.
21. Where a Class Member has been declared bankrupt, or is the subject of an open and ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, and a payment is due to the Class Member, upon receipt of proper notification and documentation, the settlement payment shall be made to such Class Member in accordance with applicable United States Bankruptcy Code laws.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CLASS
22. The Class Notice shall list Class Counsel's addresses. Other than as provided for in this Stipulation, communications relating to the Action or this Settlement with persons receiving Class Notices and Potential Class Members shall be through Class Counsel. Nothing in this Stipulation shall be construed to prevent Cook County, the Sheriff, their employees, agents, or representatives from communicating with Potential Class Members or Class Members in the normal course of its operations.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 15 of 33 PageID #:9308
CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT AND EFFECT OF DISAPPROVAL, CANCELLATION
OR TERMINATION OF STIPULATION
23. If the Court disapproves this Stipulation or fails to rule, or if the Court enters the Final Judgment but it is reversed or vacated on appeal, this Stipulation shall be null and void and of no force and effect. If the Court materially modifies any provision of the Stipulation or proposed Final Judgment, or if either is materially modified on appeal or remanded to the Court for modification, with Cook County and the Sheriff determining what is “material” in the use of its reasonable discretion, Cook County, the Sheriff or Class Counsel shall have the option of terminating this Stipulation and withdrawing this consent to the entry of the Final Judgment, in which case this Stipulation shall be null and void and of no force and effect.
24. If any financial obligation is imposed upon Cook County in addition to or greater than those specifically set out in this Stipulation, Cook County may withdraw its consent to the entry of the Final Judgment, in which case this Stipulation shall be null and void and of no force and effect.
25. The “Effective Date” of this Stipulation shall be the date on which the Court enters an order approving this proposed settlement.
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 16 of 33 PageID #:9309
OBJECTIONS
26. A class member may file a notice of intent to object to the proposed settlement. The written notice of intent to object must be filed with the Clerk of the Court not later than 7 days before the date set for the Final Settlement Hearing.
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
27. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel warrant and represent that no promise or inducement has been offered or made for the Release in paragraphs 25 except as set forth herein, that the Release is executed without any reliance whatsoever on any statements or representations not contained herein, including but not limited to any statements, conduct, disclosure or non-disclosure or representations regarding discovery in the Action, and that the Release reflects the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the terms of the Release. The warranties and representations made herein shall survive the execution and delivering of the Release and shall be binding upon the parties' heirs, representatives, successors and assigns.
RELEASES
28. Upon the Effective Date, Plaintiffs, all Class Members, and their heirs, trustees, executors, administrators, principals, beneficiaries, assigns and successors will be bound by the Final Judgment and
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Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 17 of 33 PageID #:9310
conclusively deemed to have fully released, acquitted and forever discharged, as defined in paragraph 10(j).
29. All people and entities who meet the Class Definition and who have not timely filed “opt out” forms shall be forever barred from prosecuting their own lawsuit asserting any of the claims at issue in this litigation and they and their heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, agents, partners, successors and assigns shall be deemed to have fully released and forever discharged the Released Persons (defined below) from all Released Claims (defined below).
a. “Released Persons” means County of Cook and the Sheriff of Cook County each of their past or present directors, officers, employees, agents, Board members, attorneys, advisors, consultants, representatives, partners, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, related companies, and divisions, and each of their predecessors, successors, heirs and assigns.
b. “Released Claims” means any and all liabilities, claims, cross-claims, causes of action, rights, actions, suits, debts, liens, contracts, agreements, damages, restitution, disgorgement, costs, attorneys' fees, losses, expenses, obligations or demands, of any kind whatsoever that the Releasing Persons may have or may have had, whether in arbitra-14-

Case: 1:04-cv-01051 Document #: 461 Filed: 11/16/10 Page 18 of 33 PageID #:9311
tion, administrative, or judicial proceedings, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, threatened, asserted or unasserted, actual or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, that were alleged in this lawsuit. This re lease does not extend to any claim that may be, has been, or will be, asserted on behalf of the “releasing person” as an unnamed class member in any other action.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
30. The parties hereto and their undersigned counsel agree to undertake their best efforts and mutually cooperate to effectuate this Stipulation and the terms of the proposed settlement set forth herein, including taking all steps and efforts contemplated by this Stipulation, and any other steps and efforts which may become necessary by order of the Court or otherwise. The parties hereto further agree to defend this Stipulation against objections made to final approval of the Settlement or in any appeal of the Final Judgment or collateral attack on the Stipulation or Final Judgment. Class Counsel will not seek from Cook County any additional compensation, including attorney fees, cost, expenses or reimbursements for any work that may be involved in defending this agreement.
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31. The undersigned counsel represent that they are fully authorized to execute and enter into the terms and conditions of this Stipulation on behalf of their respective clients. This agreement has been presented to and approved by the Cook County Board.
32. Except as otherwise provided between the parties, this Stipulation contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and supersedes any prior agreements or understandings between them. All terms of this Stipulation are contractual and not mere recitals, and shall be construed as if drafted by all parties hereto. The terms of this Stipulation are and shall be binding upon each of the parties hereto, their agents, attorneys, employees, successors and assigns, and upon all other persons claiming any interest in the subject matter hereof through any of the parties hereto, including any Class Member.
33. To the extent permitted by law, this Stipulation may be pleaded as a full and complete defense to, and may be used as the basis for an injunction against, any action, suit or other proceeding which may be instituted, prosecuted or attempted in breach of this Stipulation.
34. Enforcement and Reservation of Jurisdiction. The parties agree that the Court will reserve jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this agreement and that the Court may, for good cause, ad-
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just and reset the dates set out in paragraph 16 above for a reasonable period following final approval of this settlement. Good cause is defined as legally adequate and substantial grounds and not simple neglect. If the Court approves the settlement, it will enter an order of dismissal that will dismiss the litigation with prejudice as to all Class Members, except those persons who have timely filed “opt out” forms.

Agreed to, this 16th day of November, by the party representa-

tives below who have affixed their signatures showing their assent to

the above Class Settlement Agreement.

/s/ Thomas G. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey ARDC #3125372 10249 S. Western Ave Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233-7900
Robert H. Farley, Jr. 1155 S. Washington St. Suite 201 Naperville, Il. (630) 369-0103 attorneys for plaintiffs

/s/ Francis J. Catania (with consent) Francis J. Catania Assistant State’s Attorney 500 Daley Center Chicago IL 60602 (312) 603-6572 an attorney for defendant Cook County

/s/ Steven M. Puiszis (with consent) Steven M. Puiszis Bernard E. Jude Quinn Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 222 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 704-3000 attorneys for defendant Sheriff of Cook County

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 Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 1 of 37
PROTO,SCHENKIER,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−01051

Bullock, et al v. Sheahan, et al Assigned to: Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier Demand: $0 Case in other court: 08−03471
09−01734 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Quentin Bullock
Plaintiff Jack Reid individullay and on behalf of a class

Date Filed: 02/11/2004 Date Terminated: 03/18/2011 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey 10150 South Western Ave. Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233−7900 Email: tgmorrisseylaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Hugh Farley , Jr. Robert H. Farley, Jr., Ltd. 1155 South Washington Naperville, IL 60540 (630) 369−0103 Fax: (630) 369−0195 Email: farleylaw@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Hugh Farley , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Thomas Dart Sheriff of Cook County, in his official capacity

represented by Bernard E.J. Quinn Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000 Email: jquinn@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher G. Markey Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 2 of 37

TERMINATED: 09/12/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Craig Michael Sandberg Muslin &Sandberg 19 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 700 Chicago, IL 60603−1491 (312) 263−7249 Fax: (312) 263−8193 Email: craig@muslin−sandberg.com TERMINATED: 11/07/2005

E. Michael Kelly Hinshaw &Culbertson 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 300 Chicago, IL 60601−1081 (312) 704−3000

Frank Joseph Marsico Watt, Tieder, Hoffar &Fitzgerald LLP 10 S. Wacker Drive Suite 2935 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 219−6900 Fax: (312) 559−2758 Email: fmarsico@watttieder.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Cook County

represented by Christopher G. Markey (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY

Francis J. Catania Cook County State's Attorney Richard J Daley Center 50 W Washington St Room 302 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5440 Fax: (312) 603−3600 Email: francis.catania@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick T. Driscoll , Jr. c/o Neville and Mahoney 221 N. La Salle St. Suite 2100 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 236−2100 Fax: (312) 236−3613 Email: pdrisco@cookcountygov.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Craig Michael Sandberg (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/03/2007

Frank Joseph Marsico (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 3 of 37

proposed Nestor Ruiz
proposed Theron Travis

Patrick Malone Blanchard Office of Independent Inspector General, Cook County, Ill. 1160 69 West Washington Street Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−0364 Fax: (312) 603−9948 Email: patrick.blanchard@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 10/08/2008
Thomas V. Lyons Nolan Law Group 20 North Clark 30th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 630 4000 Email: tvl@nolan−law.com TERMINATED: 11/04/2005
represented by Thomas Gerard Morrissey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/11/2004
02/11/2004 02/23/2004 03/08/2004 03/08/2004 03/10/2004 04/07/2004 04/20/2004
04/27/2004 05/14/2004

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT; jury demand − Civil cover sheet − Appearance(s) of Thomas Gerard Morrissey as attorney(s) for plaintiff (two originals and two copies summons(es) issued.) (Documents: (1−1 through 1−3)). (jmm) (Entered: 02/11/2004)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 2/11/04 in the amount of $ 150.00, receipt # 10322649. (jmm) (Entered: 02/11/2004)
2 AMENDED COMPLAINT [1−1] by plaintiff ; Notice (las) (Entered: 02/24/2004)
3 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Cook Co by Patrick T. Driscoll Jr., Thomas Vincent Lyons, Patrick Malone. (vmj) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
4 MOTION by defendant Cook Co to extend the time to answer, move or otherwise plea to plaintiffs' amended complaint ; Notice (las) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
5 MINUTE ORDER of 3/10/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant, Cook County's motion for extension of time until 4/7/04 to answer or otherwise plead to amended complaint is granted [4−1]. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 03/11/2004)
6 MOTION by defendant for enlargement of time to file responsive pleading ; Notice (las) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
7 MINUTE ORDER of 4/20/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion for a 7 day extension to respond to the amended complaint is granted [6−1]. Discovery is ordered closed on 9/30/04. Pretrial order will be due by 10/29/04; and response to any motions in limine by 11/12/04. Pretrial conference set for 11/18/04 at 4:30 p.m. This case is placed on the court's January pooled trial calendar beginning 1/4/05 at 9:40 a.m. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
8 ANSWER, affirmative defenses by defendants to plaintiffs' amended complaint [2−1]; jury demand; Notice. (air) (Entered: 04/28/2004)
12 MOTION by plaintiffs for referral of discovery matters to the assigned magistrate ; Notice (rmm) Modified on 8/21/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 05/24/2004)

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05/14/2004 05/17/2004 05/19/2004 05/20/2004 05/21/2004 05/21/2004
05/27/2004 06/17/2004 06/18/2004 06/22/2004
06/24/2004 06/25/2004 06/28/2004 07/01/2004 07/01/2004 07/01/2004 07/06/2004 07/06/2004 07/08/2004

13 MOTION by plaintiffs for class certification ; Notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
14 MOTION by defendants for enlargement of time to respond to plaintiff's written discovery requests (Attachments); Notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
10 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of their motion for class certification; Notice. (hp) Modified on 05/21/2004 (Entered: 05/21/2004)
11 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendant's motion for an enlargement of time to respond to plaintff's written discovery; Notice. (gma) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
9 REFERRAL ORDER: Case referred to Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier for discovery supervision Mailed notice. (mpj) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
15 MINUTE ORDER of 5/21/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for referral of discovery matters to the assigned Magistrate is granted [12−1]. Defendant's motion for an additional 30 days to respond to plaintiffs' written discovery request is also granted [14−1]. Response to plaintiffs' motion to certify a class [13−1] is due by 6/24/2004; and any reply by 7/9/2004. Ruling on motion for class certification [13−1]will be mail by 8/6/2004. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 5/27/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing set to 9:00 6/24/04 . Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
17 MOTION by defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to respond to plaintiff's motion for class certification and plaintiff's written discovery requests ; Notice (las) (Entered: 06/23/2004)
16 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendant's motion for enlargement of time to respond to plaintiff's written discovery requests [14−1] and motion to certify class [13−1]; Notice (las) . Modified on 8/21/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 06/21/2004)
18 MINUTE ORDER of 6/22/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant's motion for enlargement of time until 7/6/04 [17−1] to file his response to the motion for class certification [13−1] and to file formal responses to plaintiff's written discovery requests is granted. Accordingly, reply is extended to 7/16/04. Ruling will be made by mail by 8/20/04. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 06/23/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 6/24/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 7/1/04 . Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 06/24/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 6/25/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing reset to 8:30 7/15/04 . The status hearing set for 7/1/04 is stricken. Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
20 MOTION by defendants for a rule 16 pretrial conference ; Notice (las) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
19 REFERRAL ORDER: Case referred to Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier for discovery motion Mailed notice. (mpj) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
21 RESPONSE by plaintiff to defendant's motion for a rule 16 pretrial conference [20−1] (las) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
22 MINUTE ORDER of 7/1/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion for a Rule 16 pretrial conference is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for resolution. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
23 MEMORANDUM of law by defendants in opposition to motion for class certification [13−1]; Notice (las) Modified on 9/4/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 07/07/2004)
24 MOTION by defendant Michael Sheahan for reconsideration ; Notice (las) (Entered: 07/09/2004)
25 MINUTE ORDER of 7/8/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion for reconsideration of the order dated 7/1/04 is denied [24−1]. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 07/09/2004)

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07/08/2004 07/09/2004 07/12/2004 07/15/2004 07/16/2004 07/16/2004 07/23/2004
07/29/2004 07/30/2004 07/30/2004 08/17/2004 08/19/2004
09/20/2004 09/23/2004
09/27/2004

26 MINUTE ORDER of 7/8/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Defendants' motion for a Rule 16 pre−trial conference is set for hearing on 7/16/04 at 2:30 p.m. [20−1]. The status hearing set for 7/15/04 is stricken. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 07/09/2004)
27 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel defendants to respond to plaintiffs' written discovery (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 7/12/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Argument on motion for Rule 16 pretrial conference is reset for 9:00 7/15/04. The hearing set for 7/16/04 is stricken. Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 07/12/2004)
28 MINUTE ORDER of 7/15/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing set for 7/22/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff's motion to compel [27−1] is granted as modified by the Court's ruling on the record in open court. Plaintiff's motion for Rule 16(f) conference is granted [20−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
29 REPLY memorandum by plaintiffs in support of the motion for class certification [13−1]; Notice. (cem) Modified on 9/4/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 07/19/2004)
30 NOTICE by plaintiff of filing regarding plaintiffs exhibits for reply memorandum in support of the motion for class certification (Attachments). (cem) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
31 MINUTE ORDER of 7/23/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier: Status hearing held and continued to 8/17/04 at 9:00 a.m. The parties are to submit a proposed protective order to the court; pending the entry of a written protective order, all documents responsive the plaintiffs' request for records from the Cook County Prison Facility will be attorneys' eyes only. The plaintiffs' counsel is to inspect the requested document's at the Cook County Prison Facility by 7/30/04. Mailed notice (jmm) (Entered: 07/27/2004)
32 AGREED MOTION by defendant Michael Sheahan to extend discovery cut−off and to continue the trial setting ; Notice (las) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
33 MOTION by defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file surreply to plaintiffs' reply memorandum in support of the motion for class certification ; Notice (las) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
34 SURREPLY by defendants to plaintiffs' reply memorandum on the issue of class certification (las) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 8/17/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 9/23/04 . The plaintiff's oral motion to extend its time to respond to defendant's outstanding document request is granted without objection. The plaintiff is to respond by 8/24/04. mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 08/17/2004)
35 MINUTE ORDER of 8/19/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion for leave to file surreply to plaintiffs' reply memorandum in support of the motion for class certification is granted [33−1]. Defendants' agreed motion to extend discovery cut−off [32−1] and continue the trial setting is also granted [32−2]. Accordingly, discovery is extended to 11/30/04. Pretrial order will be due by 12/30/04; and response to any motions in limine by 1/14/05. Pretrial conference set for 11/18/04 is reset for 2/11/05 at 3:30 p.m. and trial set for 1/4/05 is reset for 2/28/05 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
36 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel (Attachments); Notice (las) (Entered: 09/27/2004)
37 MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 10/27/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff's motion to compel is denied as moot in light of the agreement of the parties that the inspection of the facilities outlined in paragraphs 1−3, and any 3 of the facilities outlines in paragraphs 4−5 of the plaintiffs' notice to inspect is to take place on 10/2/03 at a mutually agreebale time [36−1]. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 09/27/2004)
38 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Christopher G. Markey (emd) (Entered: 09/30/2004)

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09/29/2004 10/27/2004 11/18/2004 11/19/2004 11/30/2004 11/30/2004
12/09/2004 12/14/2004
01/04/2005
01/14/2005 01/26/2005 02/01/2005
02/10/2005

39 MINUTE ORDER of 9/29/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : The court enters the agreed protective order as amended by the Court at paragraphs 6, 10, and 12 . (Entered Agreed Protective Order). Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 10/07/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/27/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 11/30/04 . Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 10/27/2004)
41 AGREED MOTION by defendants for enlargement of time to complete discovery and to continue trial setting ; Notice (las) Modified on 9/4/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 12/01/2004)
40 MINUTE ORDER of 11/19/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo: Plainfiff's motion for class certification is granted [13−1] as set forth in the memorandum opinion and order attached hereto Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Notice mailed by judge's staff. (dmkf) (Entered: 11/22/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 11/30/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 9:00 12/14/04 . Mailed notice (mmm) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
42 MINUTE ORDER of 11/30/04 by Hon. Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' agreed motion for enlargement of time to complete discovery [41−1] and continue trial setting is granted [41−2]. Accordingly, fact discovery is extended to 1/31/05. For any expert discovery, parties shall submit a letter to the court before the next status hearing set for 2/4/05 at 10:00 a.m. Pretrial conference set for 2/28/05 are vacated. The date for the filing of the pretrial order is also vacated. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 12/01/2004)
44 MOTION by plaintiff to compel (Attachments); Notice (las) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
43 MINUTE ORDER of 12/14/04 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Plaintiffs' motion to compel is granted in part; plaintiff's request for information concerning inmates release times from custody is held in abeyance until 1/4/05. By close of business today, the defendants are directed to supplement the electronic file with the social security numbers of the inmates, subject to the protective order by agreement of the parties. By 12/28/04, the defendants are to deliver to the plaintiffs an electronic file of inmates released from custody covering a period from 1/1/02 through 12/31/04. A status hearing is set for 1/4/05 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice(eav) (Entered: 12/15/2004)
45 MINUTE ORDER of 1/4/05 by Hon. Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 2/1/05 at 9:00 a.m. The plaintiff's oral motion for supplemental information concerning inmates release times from custody for the time period of 2/1/02 through 12/31/03 is granted. The defendant is to provide said information by 1/14/05. Mailed notice (las) (Entered: 01/05/2005)
46 AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs for extension of time to complete discovery ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 01/14/2005)
47 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Motion for extension of time to file 46 is granted. Accordingly, discovery is extended to 5/27/2005. Status hearing set for 2/4/05 is reset for 6/3/2005 at 10:00 AM. Mailed Notices (mpj, ) (Entered: 01/26/2005)
48 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 02/10/05 at 9:00 a.m. The plaintiffs shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 04/01/05. The defendants shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 04/29/05. Docketing to mail notices. (hp, ) (Entered: 02/02/2005)
49 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held. The court orders the parties to meet and confer on 2/10/05 regarding discovery disputes. By 2/14/05, the plaintiffs are to submit it to defendants a statement setting forth, in no more than one page per dispute, each outstanding discovery dispute and the basis on which plaintiffs seek production; plaintiffs also shall attach a copy of the discovery request served that seeks the requested information. By noon on 2/17/05, the defendants shall respond to each separate discovery issue raised, in no more than one page per issue, setting forth their objection. The plaintiffs shall submit the statement and responses to the court by the close of business on 2/17/05. A motion

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02/17/2005 02/18/2005
03/11/2005 03/11/2005 03/16/2005 03/18/2005
03/22/2005 03/22/2005
04/12/2005 04/12/2005 04/14/2005 04/22/2005 04/22/2005 04/22/2005 04/25/2005 04/28/2005

hearing is set for 2/18/05 at 10:00 a.m. Status hearing held on 2/10/2005, Set deadlines/hearing as to Motion Hearing set for 2/18/2005 at 10:00 AM. (las, ) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
50 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County by Frank Joseph Marsico; Notice. (lcw, Lakisha) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
51 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The court extends the deadline for the parties to disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) report as follows: the plaintiffs shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 4/21/2005. The defendants shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) by 5/12/2005. No expert depositions are to be taken before all expert reports are submitted. Mailed notice (rmm, ) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
52 MOTION by Plaintiffs to approve notices to class (gma, ) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
53 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs to approve notices to class 52 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/18/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/11/2005)
54 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Michael Sheahan by Craig Michael Sandberg; Notice. (ar, ) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
55 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion (52) to approve notices to class entered and continued to 4/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. If the issues are resolved before the next hearing, parties shall submit an order for entry. Discovery is extended to 9/1/05. Status hearing set for 6/3/05 is reset for 9/9/05 at 10:00 a.m. No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
56 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Status hearing set for 9/9/2005 at 10:00 AM. No notice. Modified on 4/27/2006 (smm, ). (Entered: 03/22/2005)
57 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 04/12/05 at 9:00 AM. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer regarding Plaintiff's proposed additional interrogtories in excess of 25 pages. The parties' oral motion to extend the expert discovery deadline is granted. The Plaintiff shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 07/29/05. The Defendant shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 08/12/05. No expert depositions are to be taken before all expert reports are submitted. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
58 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 6/7/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
59 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for approval of notice 52 is entered and continued to 4/29/2005 at 10:00 AM. Telephoned notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/12/2005)
60 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a class, by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr. (ar, ) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
61 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for leave of court to take in excess of ten depositions. (rbf, ) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
62 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for leave of court to take in excess of ten depositions 61 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/27/2005 at 08:30 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 04/22/2005)
64 OBJECTIONS by Defendants to Plaintiffs' proposed posting of notice of class action; Notice 52 (ar, ) (Entered: 04/27/2005)
63 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Pursuant to plaintiffs' request. their motion to approve notices 52 is entered and continued to 5/6/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/25/2005)
65 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion to take in excess of ten depositions 61 is granted in part. By 06/28/05, the plaintiffs' shall take the depositions of Superintendent Brown, Chief Ribola, and

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05/04/2005 06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/07/2005 06/10/2005 06/10/2005 06/15/2005 06/15/2005 06/16/2005 06/17/2005
06/21/2005 06/23/2005 06/23/2005 06/28/2005

the 30(b)(6) depositions of people with knowledge about (a) Divisions 2,5,8,10, and 11, and (b) defendants' denials of the request to admit. At the next status hearing, the Court will determine whether additional depositions will be permitted. A status hearing is set for 06/28/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 04/29/2005)
66 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Pursuant to parties' joint request, plaintiffs' motion for approval; of notice 52 is entered and continued to 6/17/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
67 MOTION by Plaintiffs to compel defendants to respond (gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
68 NOTICE of Motion by Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs to compel defendants to respond 67 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 6/9/2005 at 08:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
69 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The Court resets the hearing on plaintiff's motion to compel defendants to respond 67 to 6/21/2005 at 02:00 PM. Telephone and mail notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 06/07/2005)
70 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Michael Sheahan by Bernard E.J. Quinn (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
71 REPLY by Plaintiffs to defendants' objections to Plaintiffs' proposed posting of notice of class action 64 ; Notice. (ntf, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
73 PROPOSED Notice by Michael Sheahan of class action; Notice. (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
74 PROPOSED LEGAL NOTICE by plaintiffs of class action; Notice.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
75 REPLY by defendants to plaintiffs' reply to defendants' objections to plaintiffs' proposed posting of notice of class action 71 . (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/20/2005)
72 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion to approve notices 52 heard and the motion is granted.Class notice approved as discussed in court and with the following additional change: The disputed sentence shall read: "If the released female inmate has personal belongings in her division cell, she must return to the jail at a later date to pick them up." The paragraph beginning "The defendants contend that as a result, male inmates have to be returned...." can remain in the notice. As agreed, the class definition is amended to be "All male inmates who, on or after February 12, 2002, have been subjected to defendant's policy and practice of strip searching a male inmate upon his return to the jail following a court appearance at which court appearance a specific case or charge against the inmate was dismissed when no other cases, charges, warrants or holds were pending against that inmate which warranted that inmate's continued detention at the jail." Notice will be sent first class mail based on last known addresses. Any posting of notice will await further proceedings in the case. If Judge Schenkier decides that additional time is needed for discovery he may change the schedule. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 06/17/2005)
78 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : By agreement of the parties, hearing on plaintiffs' motion to compel 67 is reset to June 28, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. Notified counsel by telephone. (gcy, ) (Entered: 06/24/2005)
76 MOTION by Plaintiffs to compel deponent to answer questions (gma, ) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
77 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs to compel deponent to answer questions 76 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 6/28/2005 at 09:00 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
79 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Plaintiff's motion to compel defendants to respond 67 is withdrawn based on agreement of the parties. Plaintiff's motion to compel answer to deposition 76 is withdrawn based on agreement of the parties., Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 7/14/2005 at 09:00

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 9 of 37

07/12/2005 07/14/2005
07/21/2005
07/22/2005 08/05/2005 08/22/2005 08/25/2005 08/26/2005 08/26/2005 08/26/2005 09/01/2005 09/01/2005 09/06/2005

AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
80 REQUEST by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to take depositions of policy makers (Exhibits); Notice (rmm, ) (Entered: 07/14/2005)
81 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held. Plaintiffs' request to take depositions of policy makers is taken under advisement. By 7/22/05, the defendants are to provide to the plaintiffs documentation showing which of plainitffs' request defendants contend have already been answered in discovery. By 8/2/05, the parties are to meet and confer regarding plaintiffs' requests. By 8/25/05, the parties are to submit to the Court a letter listing which requests are in dispute, if any, and provide supporting documentation for their positions. The parties' oral motion to extend the expert discovery deadline is granted. The plaintiffs shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 9/30/05. The defendants shall disclose experts and sumbit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 10/31/05. No expert depositions are to be taken before all expert reports are submitted. The depositions of all experts are to be completed by 11/30/05. No other discovery is to be initiated. A status hearing is set for 9/1/05 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed order (gcy, ) (Entered: 07/18/2005)
82 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The minute order of 7/14/05 is corrected to strike the 7/22/05 date for the defendants to provide to the plaintiffs documentation showing which of plainitffs' request defendants contend have already been answered in discovery, and to revise it as follows: by 7/26/05, the defendants are to provide to the plaintiffs documentation showing which of plainitffs' request defendants contend have already been answered in discovery. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 07/21/2005)
83 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The Court strikes the status hearing set for 9/1/05, and resets the status hearing to 9/6/05 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 07/22/2005)
84 LETTER from Micheal A. Bold. (mjc, ) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
85 NOTICE by Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid of class action and of deadline to opt. (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
88 REQUEST for exclusion from class action by David Lozano. (ar, ) (Entered: 08/29/2005)
86 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County for leave to substitute lead attorney (gma, ) (Entered: 08/26/2005)
87 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County for leave to substitute lead attorney 86 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/9/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 08/26/2005)
89 AMENDED ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Michael Sheahan by Bernard E.J. Quinn (ar, ) (Entered: 08/30/2005)
90 MOTION by Plaintiffs to compel defendants to permit inspection by plaintiffs' expert (gma, ) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
91 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs to compel defendants to permit inspection by plaintiffs' expert 90 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 9/8/2005 at 08:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
92 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : For the reasons stated on the record in open court, plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants to permit an inspection by plaintiffs' expert, Sheila Vaughan (doc. # 90) is GRANTED. The inspection shall be conducted during weekday hours, and shall be completed by 09/30/05. For the reasons stated on the record in open court, plaintiffs' motion for production of witness(es) to give Rule 30(b)(6) testimony (doc. # 80) is GRANTED as to Categories D, E, F, G and K(8) of plaintiffs motion; in all other respects, the motion is DENIED. The Rule 30(b)(6) depositions on these subjects shall be completed by 09/30/05. Plaintiffs' unopposed oral motion to adjust the

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 10 of 37

09/09/2005 09/12/2005
09/14/2005
09/15/2005 09/19/2005 09/19/2005 10/07/2005 10/21/2005
10/21/2005 10/21/2005
10/25/2005 10/25/2005 11/02/2005 11/02/2005

expert discovery schedule is GRANTED, as follows: (1) plaintiffs' expert disclosures and Rule 26(a)(2) reports are due by 10/31/05; (2) defendants' expert disclosures and Rule 26(a)(2) reports are due by 11/30/05; and (3) all expert depositions are to be completed by 12/30/05. Documents currently being produced by defendants shall be made reviewed by plaintiffs at a mutually−agreeable date on or before 09/16/05. Other than the discovery required by this order, no new discovery shall be initiated. The matter is set for a status conference on 11/03/05 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice. (tlp, ) (Entered: 09/06/2005)
93 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Status hearing set for 9/9/05 is reset for 12/9/2005 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 09/09/2005)
94 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant, Sheahan's motion for leave to substitute lead attorney 86 is granted. Accordingly, Christopher Markey is allowed to withdraw his appearance and Bernard E. Jude is given leave to file his amended appearance as lead counsel on defendant's behalf. Mailed notice (air, ) (Entered: 09/15/2005)
95 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant Sheahan's motion for leave to substitute lead attorney is granted. Accordingly, Christopher Markey is allowed to withdraw his appearance and Bernard E. Judge Quinn is given leave to file his amended appearance as lead counsel on defendant's behalf. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 09/16/2005)
96 NOTICE by Nestor Ruiz: "I, Nestor Ruiz, request for an exclusion from the class...." (ar, ) Modified on 11/13/2008 (gmr, ). (Entered: 09/20/2005)
97 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Michael Sheahan by Bernard E.J. Quinn; Notice of filing (ar, ) (Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 4/3/2008) (hp, ). (Entered: 09/22/2005)
98 REQUEST by Proposed Plaintiff Theron Travis to be included in the class. (ar, ) Modified on 9/4/2014 (ym, ). (Entered: 09/23/2005)
99 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing set for 10/20/2005 at 09:00 AM. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
100 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 12/1/2005 at 09:00 AM. The status hearing set for 11/3/05 is stricken. The plaintiff's oral motion to take one additional deposition is granted as directed by the Court. The deposition is to be limited to the basis of the author's observation as stated in the 5/13/05 Howard Johnson Association RCDC report. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
101 COMBINED MOTION by Attorney Craig M. Sandberg to withdraw as counsel of record for Michael F. Sheahan and to correct the record to reflect his appearance on behalf of Cook County (gma, ) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
102 NOTICE of Motion by Craig Michael Sandberg for presentment of COMBINED MOTION by Attorney Craig M. Sandberg to withdraw as counsel of record for Michael F. Sheahan and to correct the record to reflect his appearance on behalf of Cook County 101 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/28/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
103 MOTION by Defendant Cook County to withdraw Thomas V. Lyons as counsel of record (gma, ) (Entered: 10/25/2005)
104 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Vincent Lyons for presentment of MOTION by Defendant Cook County to withdraw Thomas V. Lyons as counsel of record 103 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/4/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 10/25/2005)
105 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for discovery Motion to Limit Discovery Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(b)(2) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A to Motion to Limit Discovery)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
106 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for discovery 105 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 11/8/2005 at 08:30 AM.

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 11 of 37

11/02/2005 11/02/2005 11/03/2005
11/04/2005 11/07/2005 11/07/2005 11/07/2005
11/10/2005 11/21/2005 11/21/2005 11/23/2005 12/08/2005

(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
107 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to clarify (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
108 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion by plaintiff to clarify 107 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 11/3/2005 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
111 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record in open court, plaintiff's motion to clarify 107 and defendants' motion to limit discovery 105 are granted in part, as follows: (a) by 11/10/05, defendants shall supplement their responses to Int. Nos. 1−2 to state what categories of information included in the Brown report are collected by CIMIS or any other electronic database; which of those categories of information are accessible electronically without any additional programming; which categories of information are accessible electronically only through additional programming work; and which categories of information are not collected on CIMIS or any other electronic database; (b) by 11/10/05, plaintiffs shall inform defendants in writing of no fewer than five and more than ten 5−day periods, between February, 2002, and October, 2005, for which they seek production by defendants of the categories of information set forth in the Brown report; and (c) by 11/10/05, defendants shall inform plaintiffs in writing of any categories of information stored on CIMIS or any other electronic databases which they say cannot be provided due to the burden or cost of special programming, and if defendants take that position, by 11/17/05, they shall produce any information technology witness for deposition by plaintiffs on that position. The matter is set for a status conference on 11/21/05 at 8:30 AM to discuss the timing of production by the additional information sought by plaintiffs. Except as set forth in this order, plaintiffs' motion to clarify and defendants motion to limit discovery are denied 105 107 . Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
112 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant County of Cook's motion for leave to withdraw appearance of Thomas V. Lyons is granted 103 . Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
109 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for protective order Motion for Entry of Addendum to Agreed Protective Order Regarding CIMIS Information and Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
110 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for protective order 109 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 11/10/2005 at 08:30 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
113 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Attorney Craig M. Sandberg's combined motion to withdraw his appearance as counsel of record for Michael F. Sheahan is granted 101 . His motion to correct the record to reflect his appearance on behalf of defendant Cook County is also granted. Attorney Craig Michael Sandberg terminated as to Defendant Michael F. Seahan. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
114 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Defendants' Motion for Entry of Addendum to Agreed Protective Order Regarding CIMIS Information and Discovery is denied for the reasons stated on the record in open court. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/14/2005)
115 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 12/20/2005 at 08:30 AM.No notice, advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
116 STIPULATION (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
117 STIPULATION REGARDING DESIGNATION OF R.C.D.C. DIAGRAM AS "CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL" (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 11/23/2005)
118 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : On court's own motion status hearing set for 12/9/05 is reset for for 1/13/2006 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (mpj,

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 12 of 37

12/20/2005
12/28/2005 01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/10/2006 01/10/2006 01/12/2006 01/13/2006
01/23/2006 01/27/2006 02/01/2006 02/03/2006 02/03/2006 02/03/2006 02/03/2006
02/09/2006 02/09/2006

) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
119 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 01/13/2006 at 08:30 AM. By 01/10/06, supplemental briefs are to be submitted to the Court regarding what information can be retrieved through CIMIS with regards to the Brown Study. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
120 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 11/03/05 before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier (ar, ) (Entered: 12/28/2005)
121 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for discovery Reopen Discovery (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
122 Reopen Discovery NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for discovery 121 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 1/13/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
123 Joint Brief Regarding January 10, 2006 Teleconference Regarding CIMIS Reconstruction of Brown Report by Michael Sheahan (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
124 NOTICE by all parties (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
125 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : On court's own motion, Status hearing set for 1/13/06 is reset for 2/3/2006 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
126 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 02/14/06 at 9:00 AM. Plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery 121 is granted consistent with the Court's ruling on the limitation of the discovery to be provided. By 01/31/06, the defendants are to make the incident reports from two divisions, for a six month period, available for review by plaintiff. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
127 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 12/20/05 before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier (ar, ) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
128 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date: 10/20/2005; Before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier (mb, ) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
129 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : On court's own motion, status hearing set for 2/3/06 is reset for 3/3/2006 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 02/01/2006)
130 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to amend/correct For Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
131 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for preliminary injunction (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
132 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack ReidMotion for a referral of the preliminary injunction hearing to the assigned magistrate (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
133 Motion for leave to file second amended complaint;motion for preliminary injunction;motion for a referral of the preliminary injunction hearing to the assigned magistrate NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to amend/correct 130 , motion for miscellaneous relief 132 , motion for preliminary injunction 131 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/10/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/03/2006)
134 OBJECTIONS to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
135 RESPONSE by Defendant Michael Sheahan Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A to Response# 2 Exhibit Group Exhibit 1.1 to Exhibit A to Response# 3 Exhibit Group Ex. 1.2 to Ex. A to Response# 4 Exhibit Group Ex. 1.3 to Ex. A to Response# 5 Exhibit

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 13 of 37

02/09/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006
02/14/2006
02/27/2006 03/01/2006 03/01/2006
03/02/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/08/2006

Group Ex. 1.4 to Ex. A to Response# 6 Exhibit Group Ex. 1.5 to Ex. A to Response# 7 Exhibit Group Ex. 1.6 to Ex. A to Response# 8 Exhibit Group Ex. 1.7 to Ex. A to Response)(Puiszis, Steven) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
136 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan Notice of Filing of Defendant Sheahan's Response (Puiszis, Steven) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
137 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavits)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
138 PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for discovery 137 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 2/16/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
139 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction 131 heard on 2/10/06 and the motion is denied. Plaintiffs' motion 132 for a referral of that motion to the Magistrate Judge is denied as moot. Plaintiffs' reply on their motion to amend complaint 130 : will be due by by 2/27/2006. Targert date for ruling by mail set for 3/7/06. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
140 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status/motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to reopen discovery 137 is granted pursuant to the limitations and directions given by the Court. The plaintiffs are given leave to take the deposition of Sergeant Milton and Superintendent Brown, limited to the grievances allegedly filed by Ahmed Morgan or Larry Gibson. The defendants are given leave to take the depositions of Mr. Morgan and Mr. Gibson limited solely to the issue of any grievances filed. No new other−retained expert may be initiated. The plaintiffs shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 04/03/06. The defendants shall disclose experts and submit Rule 26(a)(2) reports by 05/03/06. No expert depositions are to be taken before all expert reports are submitted. The depositions of all experts are to be completed by 06/09/06. By 02/02/06, the defendants are to produce their CIMIS data to the plaintiffs. Status hearing set for 04/11/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
141 REPLY by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To File A Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
142 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to amend/correct 130 Motion for Leave to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Addressing Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
143 Notice of Motion for Leave to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Addressing Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to FIle Second Amended Complaint NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to amend/correct 130 , motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief,, 142 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/6/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
144 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant's motion for leave to file response to plaintiffs' reply regarding their motion for leave to file second amended complaint is granted. Status hearing set for 3/3/06 is reset for 4/21/06 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/02/2006)
145 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to compel Defendant To Provide A Formal Response To Plaintiffs' Production Request (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
146 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion to compel 145 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 3/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
147 RESPONSE by Defendant Michael Sheahan to objections 134 , notice of motion, 133 Defendant's Response in Support of His Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion for

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 14 of 37

03/08/2006 03/09/2006
03/09/2006
03/17/2006 03/20/2006 03/23/2006 03/23/2006 04/03/2006 04/03/2006 04/10/2006
04/10/2006 04/10/2006 04/11/2006 04/11/2006

Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
148 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan re Response, 147 Notice of Filing of Defendant's Response in Support of His Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
149 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendant To Provide A Formal Response To Plaintiffs' Production Request 145 is denied for the reasons stated on the record in open court. The Court gives the plaintiffs leave to file a Request to Admit which is to be limited to a specific timeframe by 3/10/06. The defendants are to answer the Request to Admit by 3/17/06. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
150 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Plaintiffs' motion (130) to file a second amended complaint is denied. Campbell v. Miller, 373 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2004), supports defendants' objection, and indeed, probably compels this result. At the very least, it shows that the second amended complaint is unnecessary. If defendants' practice is found to be unconstitutional it will cease. But the proposed plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the practice and this is not a case in which there is not otherwise a remedy. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
151 CERTIFICATE of Service Objections &Responses to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions Under Rule 36 by Bernard E.J. Quinn on behalf of Michael Sheahan (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
152 CERTIFICATE of Service Reflecting Service of Amended Objections &Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions Under Rule 36 by Bernard E.J. Quinn on behalf of Michael Sheahan (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
153 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 01/13/06 before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier. (ar, ) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
154 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 02/10/06 before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo (ar, ) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
155 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for extension of time for expert's written report (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
156 for expert's written report NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for extension of time 155 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/11/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
157 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Agreed motion for an extension of time to provide written report of expert (doc. # 156) is GRANTED. The expert discovery schedule is revised as follows: plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures and reports are due by 04/07/06; defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures and Rule 26(a)(2) reports are due by 05/08/06; all expert depositions are to be completed by 06/16/06. The status conference set for 04/11/06 is RESET to 05/11/06 at 9:00 a.m. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/10/2006)
158 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for hearing Plaintiffs' Motion for a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference (Morrissey, Thomas) (Incorrect PDF Attached) Modified on 4/11/2006 (gma, ). (Entered: 04/10/2006)
159 Plaintiffs' Motion for a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for hearing 158 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/13/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/10/2006)
160 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for hearing Corrected for a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B# 2 Exhibit A)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
161 Corrected Notice of Motion for a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for hearing 160 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/13/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 15 of 37

04/11/2006 04/13/2006 04/14/2006 04/14/2006 04/17/2006
04/26/2006 05/17/2006 05/17/2006 05/17/2006 05/17/2006 05/22/2006 05/22/2006 05/22/2006 05/23/2006

(Entered: 04/11/2006)
162 NOTICE of Correction regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for hearing Plaintiffs' Motion for a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference 158 (Incomplete PDF Attached) (gma, ) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
163 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for 160 a settlement conference is granted. Accordingly, this case is referred to Magistrate Judge Schenkier for a settlement conference. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
164 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Pursuant to parties' request, status hearing set for 4/21/06 is reset for 4/27/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
166 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: settlement conference. Signed by Executive Committee on 4/14/06. (cdy, ) (Entered: 04/18/2006)
165 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Telephone status conference held. The matter is set for a settlement conference on 06/01/06 at 1:30 p.m. The settlement will be conducted pursuant to the Court's Instructions n Settlement Conferences. Plaintiff's settlement letter is to be delivered to defense counsel by 05/15/06; defendants' letter is to be delivered to plaintiff's counsel by 05/23/06; defense counsel shall deliver a copy of all letters to chambers by noon on 05/24/06. The status conference set for 05/11/06 is stricken. No depositions of experts shall commence prior to the settlement conference. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
167 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : On court's own motion, status hearing set for 4/27/06 is reset for 6/16/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
168 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Rule 26 Report and To Bar Expert from Expressing Opinions at Trial (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
169 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion to strike 168 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/25/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
170 MEMORANDUM by Michael Sheahan in Support of Motion to Strike Rule 26 Report and to Bar Expert From Expressing Opinions at Trial (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
171 CERTIFICATE by Michael Sheahan of Service (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
172 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to continue Motion For Referral of Defendant's Motion to Strike Report and to Bar Plaintiffs' Expert from Expressing Opinions at Trial (Morrissey, Thomas) (Incorrect PDF Linked) . Modified on 5/23/2006 (gma, ). (Entered: 05/22/2006)
173 Motion for Referral of Defendant's Motion to Strike Report and to Bar Plaintiffs' Expert From Expressing Opinions at Trial NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to continue 172 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/25/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
174 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to continue Plaintiffs' Motion For Referral of Defendant's Motion To Strike Report and to Bar Plaintiffs' Expert From Expressing Opinions at Trial (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
175 NOTICE of Correction regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to continue Motion For Referral of Defendant's Motion to Strike Report and to Bar Plaintiffs' Expert from Expressing Opinions at Trial 172 (Incorrect PDF Linked) (gma, ) (Entered: 05/23/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 16 of 37

05/24/2006
05/25/2006
06/02/2006
06/06/2006
06/21/2006 06/21/2006 06/21/2006 06/27/2006 07/05/2006 07/05/2006 07/06/2006 07/06/2006 07/06/2006 07/06/2006 07/07/2006

176 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for referral of defendant's motion to strike report and to bar plaintiffs' expert from expressing opinions at trial is denied. However, ruling on the motion to strike is deferred pending settlement discussions before Judge Schenkier. Mailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
177 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Rule 26 Report and To Bar Expert from Expressing Opinions at Trial is entered and continued until completion of the settlement conference. In the event that the case fail to settle, response to the motion will be due 21 days after the settlement conference. Status hearing set for 6/6/2006 at 9:00a.m. Mailed Notice. (slb, ) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
179 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held. The matter is set for a status conference on 7/11/2006 at 09:00 AM. By the close of business on 6/8/06, the parties shall produce all materials and information considered by their testifying experts that have not already been produced. Absent further order of the court or agreement of the parties, the depositions of defendant's testifying experts shall be held in abeyance pending the 7/11/06 status conference. Mailed (vmj, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
178 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Status hearing held on 6/6/2006. Set deadlines/hearing as to defendant's motion to strike 168 : Responses due by 7/6/2006. Replies due by 7/17/2006. Target date for ruling by mail set for 8/7/06. Depositions of experts to be completed by 9/7/06 and any dispositive motion to be filed by 10/10/06. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
180 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for protective order regarding The MGT of America, Inc. Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
181 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for protective order 180 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 6/27/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
182 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan re MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for protective order regarding The MGT of America, Inc. Report 180 , notice of motion 181 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
183 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Defendants' motion for protective order regarding The MGT of America, Inc. Report 180 is denied. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
184 PROPOSED Pretrial Order Agreed Protective Order re: MGT of America Report by Quentin Bullock, Michael Sheahan, Cook County, Jack Reid (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
185 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan re proposed pretrial order 184 the Parties Agreed Protective Order (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
186 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs to Defendants Motion To Strike Rule 26 Report And To Bar Expert From Expressing Opinions At Trial (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
187 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for leave to file excess pages (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
188 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 187 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/13/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
191 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER signed by Judge Sidney I. Schenkier on 7/6/2006:Mailed notice(tlm) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
190 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier: The Court grants the parties Joint Agreed Protective Order (doc. #184) as modified by the Court at paragraphs 4(d), 6, and 10. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 07/11/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 17 of 37

07/10/2006 07/11/2006
07/17/2006 07/17/2006 08/04/2006 08/15/2006 08/15/2006 08/16/2006 08/25/2006 08/25/2006 08/29/2006
09/01/2006 09/07/2006 09/21/2006 09/21/2006

189 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file brief in excess pages 187 is granted. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
192 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 9/7/2006 at 09:00 AM. Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's oral motion for Cook County to provide the plaintiff with Mr. Lanes' compensation for his study of the Cook County jail is granted as stated on the record in open court. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
193 RESPONSE in Support of Motion to Strike Rule 26 Report and to Bar Expert From Expressing Opinions at Trial (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit N)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
194 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan re response in support of motion 193 to Strike Rule 26 Report and to Bar Expert from Expressing Opinions at Trial (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
195 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant's motion to strike 168 Rule 26 report and to bar expert from expressing opinions at trial is denied. The report sufficiently complies with the requirements of Rule 26. Status hearing set for 11/17/2006 at 09:45 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/04/2006)
196 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts in Excess of 80 Paragraphs (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
197 Notice of Motion for Leave to File L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for leave to file 196 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/22/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
198 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendant's motion for leave to file 196 is granted in part. Defendant is allowed to file 125 statements. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
199 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time The Parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Expert Depositions and File Dispositive Motions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
200 Notice of Joint Motion for Extension of Time NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for extension of time 199 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/5/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
201 Amended Notice of Motion of the Parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Exerpt Depositions and File Dispositive Motions NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for extension of time 199 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/5/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
202 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Parties' joint motion for extension of time 199 until 9/30/06 to complete expert discovery is granted. Parties also have until 11/2/06 to file dispositive motions. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
203 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 10/11/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
204 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for bill of costs &expenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(C) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/21/2006)
205 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for bill of costs 204 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 9/26/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/21/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 18 of 37

09/21/2006 09/25/2006 09/27/2006
10/02/2006 10/09/2006 10/09/2006 10/10/2006 10/10/2006 10/10/2006 10/11/2006 10/12/2006 10/12/2006
10/19/2006 10/19/2006 10/24/2006

206 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff class, pursuant to Judge Schenkier's 07/05/06 protective order. (RESTRICTED). (ar, ) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
207 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by plaintiffs. (RESTRICTED). (ar, ) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
209 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to compel (doc. #207) is denied as moot. By 10/4/06, The defendant is to submit to plaintiff any other plans or proposals implementing a new information system, or to affirm that there are on other plans or proposals. Defendants' motion for costs &expenses pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) (doc. # 204) is denied. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 10/04/2006)
208 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The parties' oral motion to reset the 10/11/06 status hearing to 10/12/2006 at 09:00 a.m. is granted. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
210 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for extension of time Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/09/2006)
211 Joint Motion for an Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for extension of time 210 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/16/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/09/2006)
212 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to compel discovery (Morrissey, Thomas) (Incorrect PDF Linked) Modified on 10/11/2006 (gma, ). (Entered: 10/10/2006)
213 Motion to Compel NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 212 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 10/17/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
214 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to compel discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
215 NOTICE of Correction regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to compel discovery 212 (Incorrect PDF Linked) (gma, ) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
216 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Parties' joint motion for extension of time 210 until 12/5/06 to file dispositive motions is granted. Status hearing set for 11/17/06 is reset for 12/8/2006 at 09:45 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
217 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status/motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is granted 214 . By 10/20/06, the defendant is to produce all the files identified in the motion regarding the Capital Project Request Form, dated 7/24/06. Defendant's oral motion for Mr. Sol to produce all invoices for cases he worked with Mr. Morrissey is granted. By 10/24/06, Mr. Sol is to produce those invoices to the defendant. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
218 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to compel Discovery (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/19/2006)
219 Discovery NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to compel 218 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 10/24/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/19/2006)
220 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid to compel Discovery 218 is granted. Defendant is directed to produce the documents as outlined in open court by 11/3/2006. No further discovery will be permitted based on those documents. By 11/3/2006, defendants shall deliver to plaintiffs' counsel a declaration by a knowledgeable person attesting that there are no documents showing software specifications for the replacement for the CIMIS system that is currently under

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 19 of 37

10/30/2006 10/30/2006 11/02/2006
11/16/2006 11/16/2006 11/16/2006 11/20/2006
11/21/2006
11/22/2006 11/30/2006 12/19/2006 12/19/2006 12/20/2006 12/20/2006 01/10/2007

consideration. Status hearing date of 10/31/2006 is reset for 11/30/2006 at 09:00 AM. Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 10/24/2006)
221 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to amend/correct the Court's Record (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
222 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion to amend/correct 221 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 11/2/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
223 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held 218 221 . Defendants' motion to amend/correct the Court's record 221 is granted. Plaintiffs' oral motion to withdraw from the Court file document 218 and substitute revised motion is granted. Mailed notice (ar, ) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
224 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for discovery to allow additional expert testimony (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
225 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for extension of time to file dispositive motions (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
226 NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for discovery 224 , motion for extension of time 225 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/21/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
227 RESPONSE by Michael Sheahan in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for discovery to allow additional expert testimony 224 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F Under Seal# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
228 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Plaintiffs' motion 224 to allow additional expert discovery heard and the motion is granted. I am somewhat dubious about the proposed expected testimony but it will be easier for all concerned to allow the additional discovery and testimony now than to find out in the middle of trial (or in response to a motion for summary judgment) that the proposed testimony is important. Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time is also granted. Accordingly, the filing of any dispositive motion is extended to 3/8/07. Status hearing set for 12/8/06 is reset for 3/16/2007 at 09:45 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
229 EXHIBIT by Defendant Michael Sheahan Exhibit B incorrectly filed regarding response in opposition to motion, 227 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
230 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 1/11/2007 at 09:00 AM. By 1/5/07, the plaintiff is to submit his supplemental expert report. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/30/2006)
231 Agreed Protective Order Regarding CIMIS Information and Discovery by Michael Sheahan (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
232 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan re other 231 Agreed Protective Order Regarding CIMIS Information and Discovery (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
233 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier :Enter Agreed Protective Orderd regarding CIMIS information and discovery (attached), as modified by the Court at Paragraph 8. (For further detail see separate order). (ar, ) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
234 AGREED Protective Order Regarding CIMIS Information and Discovery, signed by Judge Sidney I. Schenkier on 12/20/2006 233 .(ar, ) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
235 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Motion to Strike, or alternatively, Leave to Disclose Surrebuttal Experts and for Extension of Time to Complete Surrebuttal Expert Discovery and to File Dispositive Motions Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26 and 56 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 to Motion to Strike# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2 to Motion to Strike# 3 Exhibit 3 to Motion to Strike# 4 Exhibit 4 to Motion to Strike# 5 Exhibit 5 to Motion to Strike# 6 Exhibit 6 to Motion to Strike)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 01/10/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 20 of 37

01/10/2007 01/10/2007
01/10/2007 01/11/2007
01/12/2007 01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/22/2007
01/24/2007 01/24/2007 01/26/2007 01/26/2007 01/30/2007 01/31/2007

236 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to strike,, 235 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 1/16/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
237 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to Motion to Compel# 2 Exhibit B to Motion to Compel# 3 Exhibit C to Motion to Compel# 4 Exhibit D to Motion to Compel# 5 Exhibit E to Motion to Compel# 6 Exhibit F to Motion to Compel# 7 Exhibit G to Motion to Compel# 8 Exhibit H to Motion to Compel# 9 Exhibit I to Motion to Compel)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
238 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to compel, 237 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 1/16/2007 at 08:30 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
239 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 2/28/2007 at 09:00 AM. The plaintiff shall produce to defendant all materials his expert considered for his report by 1/17/07. The defendant shall disclose its responsive expert and submit Rule 26(a)(2) report by 2/2/07.Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
240 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock To Defendants Motion To Strike Or Alternatively Leave To Disclose Surrebuttal Experts, etc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 01/12/2007)
241 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Motion hearing held on 1/16/2007 regarding defendants' motion to strike 235 . Ruling will be made by mail. No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
242 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Defendants' motion to compel 237 is withdrawn.Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
243 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendant's motion to strike 235 is denied. Defendant's motion for leave to disclose surrebuttal experts by 2/23/07 and for extension of time until 4/6/07 to complete surrebuttal experts discovery is granted. Any dispositive motions will be due by 6/8/07. Status hearing set for 3/16/07 is reset for 4/13/2007 at 09:45 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
244 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file to take the deposition of Charles Fasano (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit A−1# 3 Exhibit A−2−# 4 Exhibit A−3# 5 Exhibit A−4# 6 Exhibit A−5# 7 Exhibit B# 8 Exhibit C)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
245 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for leave to file, 244 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 1/31/2007 at 08:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
246 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to supplement / Amend − Plaintiffs' Expert Sheila Vaughan's Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
247 Plaintiffs NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion to supplement 246 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 1/31/2007 at 08:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
249 RESPONSE by Defendant Michael Sheahan to Plaintiffs' motion to allow plaintiffs' expert Sheila vaughan to amend opinion (Exhibits); Notice. (ar, ) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
248 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Defendants' motion for leave to take the deposition of Mr. Charles Fasano 244 is granted without objection. Mr. Fasano's deposition is to be completed by 2/7/07; the date can only be adjusted by order of the Court, or by agreement of the parties in writing. Plaintiffs' motion to allow Ms. Vaughn to amend her opinion 246 is granted without objection. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 01/31/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 21 of 37

02/06/2007 02/06/2007 02/28/2007 04/03/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007
04/19/2007 04/27/2007 04/30/2007
04/30/2007 05/01/2007 05/01/2007 05/03/2007 05/29/2007
06/12/2007 06/12/2007 06/19/2007
06/19/2007

250 (FILED on the incorrect docket. The case title does not match the case number.) (Quinn, Bernard). (Entered: 02/06/2007)
251 NOTICE of Correction regarding joint consent to jurisdiction by US magistrate judge 250 . (FILED on the incorrect docket. The case title does not match the case number.) (jmp, ) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
252 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 4/17/2007 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/01/2007)
253 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :On court's own motion, status hearing set for 4/13/07 is reset for 4/27/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
254 DUPLICATE Entry (ar, ).Modified on 4/19/2007 (ar, ). (Entered: 04/17/2007)
255 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held. All matters relating to this referral have been resolved and the case is returned to theassigned judge for further proceedings. Judge Sidney I. Schenkier no longer referred on this case. (ar, ) (Entered: 04/17/2007)
256 NOTICE of Correction regarding duplicate entry of Judge Schenkier's 04/17/07 minute order 254 .(ar, ). Modified on 4/19/2007 (ar, ). (Entered: 04/19/2007)
257 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Status hearing held on 4/27/2007.Status hearing set for 5/30/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
258 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike and to Bar Expert Testimony and Opinions of Donald Henry (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
259 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to strike, 258 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/30/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
260 MOTION by Defendant Cook County to withdraw as attorney (Sandberg, Craig) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
261 NOTICE of Motion by Craig Michael Sandberg for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 260 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/8/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Sandberg, Craig) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
262 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Craig Sandbers' motion to withdraw as counel of rcord for The County of Cook 260 is granted.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
263 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Set deadlines/hearing as to defendant's motion to strike, and to bar expert 258 : Response due by 6/20/07; and any reply by 7/6/07. Target date for ruling by mail set for 7/27/07. Status hearing set for 5/30/07 is reset for 8/17/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
264 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for order to set a date to file dispositive motions and to set a trial date (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
265 Plaintiffs NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for order 264 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 6/20/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
266 RESPONSE by Quentin Bullock, Jack Reidin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike and to Bar Expert Testimony and Opinions of Donald Henry 258 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
267 NOTICE by all plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike and Bar the Testimony of Plaintiffs's Expert Donald Henry (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 06/19/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 22 of 37

06/20/2007
07/05/2007
08/13/2007 08/13/2007 08/14/2007 08/28/2007 08/28/2007 09/18/2007 09/18/2007 09/20/2007 09/28/2007 09/28/2007 09/28/2007
09/28/2007 10/03/2007

268 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Plaintiffs' motion 264 to set date for dispositive motions heard and the motion is granted. Accordingly, parties have until 9/7/07 to file any dispostive motion. The court will set briefing schedule when the motion is filed. The court will not set a trial date at this time. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
269 REPLY by Michael Sheahan to MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike and to Bar Expert Testimony and Opinions of Donald Henry 258 Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Opinions of Donald Henry (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I# 2 Exhibit J# 3 Exhibit K# 4 Exhibit L)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 07/05/2007)
270 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time for Filing Dispositive Motions (Joint) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
271 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of extension of time 270 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/17/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
272 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendant's joint motion for extension of time 270 until 9/28/07 to file dispositive motions is granted. status hearing set for 8/17/07 is reset for 10/5/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/14/2007)
273 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion to strike (258) is denied. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
274 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/28/2007:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
275 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file dispositive motions (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
276 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of extension of time 275 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/25/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
277 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendants' motion for extension of time 275 until 10/12/07 to file dispositive motion is granted.Status hearing set for 10/5/07 is now reset for 10/19/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
278 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for summary judgment (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
279 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to file instanter their oversized Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment for Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plts. Memorandum of Law In Support of Summary Judgment for Plaintiffs)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
280 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to file instanter their Rule 56.1 Statement and To Exceed Paragraph Limits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plts. Rule 56.1 Statement# 2 Exhibit Index To Exhibits# 3 Exhibit Exhibits 1−4# 4 Exhibit Exhibits 5−7# 5 Exhibit Exhibits 8−19# 6 Exhibit Exhibits 20−25# 7 Exhibit Exhibits 26−28# 8 Exhibit Exhibit 29# 9 Exhibit Exhibits 30−38# 10 Exhibit Exhibits 39−43# 11 Exhibit Exhibits 44−48)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
281 Plaintiffs NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for summary judgment 278 , motion to file instanter, 279 , motion to file instanter, 280 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/4/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
282 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Plaintiffs' motion to file instanter 279 is granted. Their motion to file oversized brief instanter 280 is also granted; Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for summary judgment 278 : Response will be due by 11/2/07; and any reply by 11/23/07. Target date for ruling by mail set for 12/31/07. Status hearing set for 10/19/07 is reset for 1/25/2008 at 10:00

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 23 of 37

10/04/2007 10/04/2007 10/05/2007 10/10/2007
10/10/2007 10/10/2007 10/10/2007 10/10/2007 10/10/2007 10/11/2007 10/11/2007 10/16/2007 10/17/2007 10/17/2007 10/17/2007

AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
283 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file dispositive motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
284 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 283 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/9/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/04/2007)
285 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendant's motion for extension of time until the court addresses issues raised by plaintiffs in their motion fo rsummary judgment to file 283 dispositive motion is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
286 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Unpled Theories of Liability and Evidence Not Previously Contained in the Record From Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
287 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to strike, 286 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/15/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
288 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for settlement conference and refer this matter to the Magistrate to conduct settlement conference (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
289 Plaintiffs NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for settlement 288 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/15/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
290 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Plaintiffs' motion for settlement conference 288 is granted. Accordingly, this case is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/10/2007)
291 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: settlement conference.(mpj, )No notice. (Entered: 10/10/2007)
292 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Set deadlines as to defendant's motion to strike, 286 : Responses due by 10/18/2007. Ruling will be made by mail by 10/26/07.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/11/2007)
293 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The matter has been referred to this Court for the purpose of conducting a settlement conference. The matter is set for a status conference on 10/18/07 at 9:00 a.m. for the purpose of selecting a date for the settlement conference. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/11/2007)
294 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to Defendant Sheriff's Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 10/16/2007)
295 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Strike Unpled Theories of Liability and Evidence not Previously Contained in the Record from Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/17/2007)
296 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for leave to file, 295 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/22/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/17/2007)
297 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement Conference set for 11/20/2007 at 10:00 AM., in chambers 1756. The settlement conference will be conducted in accordance with the Court's Standing Order on Instructions for Settlement Conference, which is enclosed and can also be accessed from the Court's Website at http:/www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge/schenkier/sispage.htm. The

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10/22/2007 10/23/2007
10/26/2007 10/26/2007 10/30/2007 11/05/2007
11/05/2007 11/20/2007 12/17/2007 12/17/2007 12/18/2007 12/19/2007 12/19/2007

schedule for exchange of demand and offer set forth in the standing order is as follows: plaintiff's counsel shall serve on defense counsel a written settlement demand by 11/06/07. Defendant's counsel shall serve on plaintiff's counsel a written settlement offer by 11/13/07. The plaintiff's counsel shall deliver copies of these letters to chambers by noon on 11/15/07. Parties with full and complete settlement authority must attend the conference. The status conference set for 10/18/07 is stricken. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 10/19/2007)
298 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendants' motion for leave to file 295 reply in support of their motion to strike is granted. Ruling on motion to strike will be made by mail. No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
299 RESPONSE by Michael Sheahanin Support of MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Unpled Theories of Liability and Evidence Not Previously Contained in the Record From Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 286 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/23/2007)
300 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to clarify Order of October 5, 2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 10/26/2007)
301 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to clarify 300 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/31/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 10/26/2007)
302 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendant's motion to clarify 300 order of 10/5/07 is granted. Time to respond to motion for summary judgment will be set after the ruling on motion to strike.No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
303 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : I find defendants had notice of the claims and the motion to strike the second and fourth claims is denied, but consistent with the parties' representations in court on October 22, 2007 defendants are granted time to conduct additional discovery on the exhibits at issue. Plaintiffs have indicated they do not have an objection to additional discovery. Defendants' motion to strike 286 is, therefore, granted in part and denied in part. Set deadlines as to motion for summary judgment 278 : Responses due by 1/22/2008. Replies due by 2/5/2008. Target date for ruling by mail set for 3/7/08. Status hearing set for 1/25/08 is reset for 3/28/2008 at 10:00 AM. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
304 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/5/2007:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 11/05/2007)
305 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held. The matter is set for a status conference on 02/12/08 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
306 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to complete discovery referenced in Defendant's Motion to Strike and the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 5, 2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
307 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 306 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 12/20/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
308 RESPONSE by Quentin Bullockin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to complete discovery referenced in Defendant's Motion to Strike and the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 5, 2007 306 (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 12/18/2007)
309 REPLY by Defendant Michael Sheahan in Support of Motion for Enlargement Of Time to Complete Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 12/19/2007)
310 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan Notice of Filing of Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Enlargement of Time (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 12/19/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 25 of 37

12/19/2007
02/07/2008 02/07/2008 02/11/2008 02/11/2008 02/11/2008 02/12/2008 02/14/2008
02/14/2008 02/15/2008 03/18/2008 03/18/2008 03/19/2008
03/28/2008

311 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo : Defendants' motion (306) for enlargement of time to complete discovery to January 30, 2008 is granted. Defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is to be filed by February 21, 2008. Any reply shall be filed by March 6. Target date for ruling by mail set for April 7, 2008.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 12/19/2007)
312 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Affidavits of Sean Driscol and Jeffrey Dorsey in Support Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
313 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion to strike, 312 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/12/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
314 RESPONSE by Quentin Bullock, Jack Reidin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan to strike Affidavits of Sean Driscol and Jeffrey Dorsey in Support Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 312 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
315 NOTICE by Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Sheriff's Motion to Strike Affidavits of Sean Driscoll and Jeffrey Dorsey (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
316 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendants' motion to strike 312 affidavits is taken under consideration. No appearance is needed in court tomorrow.No notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 02/11/2008)
317 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 5/14/2008 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 02/12/2008)
318 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for consolidated briefing schedule and miscellaneous relief regarding parties' cross−motions for summary judgment: (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit A, #(2) Exhibit B, #(3) Exhibit C, #(4) Exhibit D). (Marsico, Frank). (Text modified by Clerk's Office). Modified on 2/15/2008 (ar, ). (Entered: 02/14/2008)
319 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 318 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/19/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 02/14/2008)
320 MINUTE entry before Judge Elaine E. Bucklo :Defendant's motion for entry of order respecting briefing schedule, and additional statements of fact, is granted.Mailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
321 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
322 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for extension of time to file 321 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/24/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/18/2008)
323 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendant's unopposed motion for extension of time 321 is granted. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment and response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 278 will be due by 3/28/2008. Plaintiffs' reply and response to defendant's motion will be due by 4/11/2008. Defendant will have until 4/18/08 to file any reply on his motion for summary judgment. Target date for ruling by mail set for 5/16/08.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/19/2008)
324 RESPONSE by Michael Sheahanin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for summary judgment 278 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Appendix Table of Contents to Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Exhibit 3, # 6 Exhibit 4, # 7 Exhibit 5, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8, # 11 Exhibit 9, # 12 Exhibit 10, # 13 Exhibit 11, # 14 Exhibit 11A, # 15 Exhibit 11B, # 16 Exhibit 11C, # 17 Exhibit 11D, # 18 Exhibit 12, # 19 Exhibit 12A, # 20 Exhibit 12B, # 21

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 26 of 37

03/28/2008 03/28/2008 03/28/2008 03/28/2008 03/28/2008
03/31/2008
04/03/2008

Exhibit 12C, # 22 Exhibit 13, # 23 Exhibit 14, # 24 Exhibit 15, # 25 Exhibit 16, # 26 Exhibit 17, # 27 Exhibit 18, # 28 Exhibit 19, # 29 Exhibit 20, # 30 Exhibit 21, # 31 Exhibit 22, # 32 Exhibit 23, # 33 Exhibit 24, # 34 Exhibit 25, # 35 Exhibit 26, # 36 Exhibit 27, # 37 Exhibit 28, # 38 Exhibit 28A, # 39 Exhibit 28B, # 40 Exhibit 29, # 41 Exhibit 30−1, # 42 Exhibit 30−2, # 43 Exhibit 31, # 44 Exhibit 32, # 45 Exhibit 33, # 46 Exhibit 33A, # 47 Exhibit 33C, # 48 Exhibit 34, # 49 Exhibit 35, # 50 Exhibit 36, # 51 Exhibit 37, # 52 Exhibit 38, # 53 Exhibit 39, # 54 Exhibit 40, # 55 Exhibit 41A, # 56 Exhibit 41B, # 57 Exhibit 42, # 58 Exhibit 43, # 59 Exhibit 44, # 60 Exhibit 45, # 61 Exhibit 45A, # 62 Exhibit 45B, # 63 Exhibit 45C, # 64 Exhibit 45D, # 65 Exhibit 46, # 66 Exhibit 47, # 67 Exhibit 48, # 68 Exhibit 49, # 69 Exhibit 50, # 70 Exhibit 51, # 71 Exhibit 52, # 72 Exhibit 53, # 73 Exhibit 54, # 74 Exhibit 55, # 75 Exhibit 56, # 76 Exhibit 57, # 77 Exhibit 58, # 78 Exhibit 59, # 79 Exhibit 60, # 80 Exhibit 61, # 81 Exhibit B, # 82 Exhibit C)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
325 RULE 56 1(B)(3)(C) Statement by Michael Sheahan regarding motion for summary judgment 278 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
326 RESPONSE by Defendant Michael Sheahan to Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
327 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for summary judgment and Memorandum of Law (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
328 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan re MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for summary judgment and Memorandum of Law 327 (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
329 of Undisputed Facts STATEMENT by Michael Sheahan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5 Exhibit 6A, # 6 Exhibit 6B, # 7 Exhibit 6C, # 8 Exhibit 7A, # 9 Exhibit 7B, # 10 Exhibit 7C, # 11 Exhibit 7D, # 12 Exhibit 8A, # 13 Exhibit 8B, # 14 Exhibit 8C, # 15 Exhibit 9A, # 16 Exhibit 9B, # 17 Exhibit 10A, # 18 Exhibit 10B, # 19 Exhibit 11A, # 20 Exhibit 12, # 21 Exhibit 13, # 22 Exhibit 14, # 23 Exhibit 15, # 24 Exhibit 16, # 25 Exhibit 17, # 26 Exhibit 18, # 27 Exhibit 19, # 28 Exhibit 20, # 29 Exhibit 21, # 30 Exhibit 22, # 31 Errata 23A, # 32 Exhibit 24, # 33 Exhibit 25, # 34 Exhibit 26, # 35 Exhibit 27, # 36 Exhibit 28, # 37 Exhibit 29, # 38 Exhibit 30, # 39 Exhibit 31, # 40 Exhibit 32, # 41 Exhibit 33, # 42 Exhibit 34, # 43 Errata 35, # 44 Exhibit 36, # 45 Exhibit 37, # 46 Exhibit 38, # 47 Exhibit 39, # 48 Exhibit 40, # 49 Exhibit 41, # 50 Exhibit 42, # 51 Exhibit 43, # 52 Exhibit 44, # 53 Exhibit 45, # 54 Exhibit 46, # 55 Exhibit 47, # 56 Exhibit 48, # 57 Exhibit 49, # 58 Exhibit 50, # 59 Exhibit 50A, # 60 Exhibit 50B, # 61 Exhibit 50C, # 62 Exhibit 50D, # 63 Exhibit 51, # 64 Exhibit 52, # 65 Exhibit 53, # 66 Exhibit 54, # 67 Exhibit 55, # 68 Errata 56, # 69 Exhibit 57, # 70 Exhibit 58, # 71 Exhibit 59, # 72 Exhibit 60, # 73 Exhibit 61, # 74 Exhibit 62, # 75 Exhibit 63A, # 76 Errata 63B, # 77 Exhibit 63C, # 78 Exhibit 63D, # 79 Exhibit 63E, # 80 Exhibit 63F, # 81 Exhibit 63G, # 82 Exhibit 63H, # 83 Exhibit 64)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
330 EXHIBIT by Defendant Michael Sheahan regarding statement,,,,,, 329 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 3, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 3A, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 11B, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.1, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.2, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.3, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.4, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.5, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.6, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit 11.B.7, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.1, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.2, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.3, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.4, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.5, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.6, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.7, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.8, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.9, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.10, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.11, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.12, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.13, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.14, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.15, # 27 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.16, # 28 Exhibit Exhibit 23.B.17, # 29 Exhibit Exhibit B.23.18, # 30 Exhibit Exhibit 23B.19)(Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 03/31/2008)
331 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County to amend/correct Response 326 Exhibits in Paragraphs 140 and 141 of Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) (Attachments: #

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04/03/2008 04/07/2008 04/10/2008 04/10/2008 04/15/2008
05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/12/2008 05/13/2008 05/14/2008 05/19/2008 05/19/2008
05/21/2008
05/29/2008

1 Exhibit A)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 04/03/2008)
332 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion to amend/correct,, motion for relief, 331 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/9/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 04/03/2008)
333 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendants' motion to amend/correct 331 responses is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/07/2008)
334 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for extension of time to file response/reply to pending Motions for Summary Judgment (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
335 Plaintiffs NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 334 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/16/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
336 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file response/reply 334 is granted. Accordingly, plaintiffs will have until 5/12/08 to respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment and to reply regarding their motion for summary judgment. Defendants will have until 6/2/08 to file reply on their motion for summary judgment. Target date for ruling by mail reset for 7/2/08.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/15/2008)
337 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
338 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to Defendants' Statement of Additional Facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
339 REPLY by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
340 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
341 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to file instanter their oversized Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
342 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion to file instanter 341 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/15/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
343 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file oversized brief instanter 341 is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/13/2008)
344 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Status hearing held and continued to 7/31/2008 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 05/14/2008)
345 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file response/reply Reply Brief in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
346 Notice of Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 345 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/22/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
347 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file response/reply Reply Brief in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Reply due 6/23/2008.Mailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
348 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 10/24/2006, 11/2/2006; Before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier. (Document not scanned) (348−1 through 348−2) (aac, ) (Entered: 05/30/2008)

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06/10/2008 06/10/2008 06/10/2008 06/16/2008
07/02/2008 07/02/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/28/2008 07/30/2008
07/30/2008 08/11/2008 08/11/2008 08/13/2008
08/15/2008

349 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file response/reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
350 Notice of Motion NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 349 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 6/16/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
351 RESPONSE by Quentin Bullockin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for extension of time to file response/reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 349 Plaintiffs' Objections To Defendants' Second Motion For Enlargement Of Time To File Reply Brief (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
352 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Motion hearing held on 6/16/2008. Defendant, Michael Sheahan's Motion for enlargement of time to file reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment 349 is granted. Defendant to file reply by 7/7/2008. There will be no further extensions. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
353 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file Reply Brief in Excess of 15 Pages (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 07/02/2008)
354 NOTICE of Motion by Frank Joseph Marsico for presentment of motion for leave to file 353 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/8/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 07/02/2008)
355 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendant's motion for leave to file 353 reply brief in excess of 15 pages is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
356 REPLY by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County to motion for summary judgment 327 in support of motion for summary judgment (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
357 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan, Cook County re reply 356 filing of reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment (Marsico, Frank) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
358 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Status hearing set for 7/31/08 is stricken and reset to 10/7/2008 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 07/28/2008)
359 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion (278) for summary judgment is granted with respect to all claims except the unreasonable delay claim. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (327)is denied. Defendants also filed a motion (312) to strike, which is denied as moot for I did not rely on the affidavits of Sean Driscoll or Jeffrey Dorsey. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details. Status hearing set for 11/7/2008 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
360 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/30/2008:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
361 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack ReidMotion to set pretrial conference (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/11/2008)
362 Motion to set a pretrial conference NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 361 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 8/14/2008 at 08:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/11/2008)
363 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Telephone hearing held on plaintiffs' motion to set a settlement conference. The motion is withdrawn; the matter is set for a status hearing in chambers on 09/26/08 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss setting a date for a reconvened settlement conference.Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 08/13/2008)
364 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County for leave to file Their Motion for Reconsideration in Excess of Fifteen (15) Pages (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/15/2008)

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08/15/2008 08/18/2008
08/18/2008 08/21/2008 08/21/2008 08/22/2008 08/26/2008 08/26/2008
08/29/2008 09/03/2008 09/10/2008 09/10/2008 09/12/2008
09/12/2008 09/12/2008 09/15/2008 09/24/2008 09/24/2008

365 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for leave to file 364 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/20/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/15/2008)
366 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendants' motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration in excess of 15 pages 364 is granted. Responses to defendants' motion for reconsideration due by 9/2/2008. Target date for ruling by mail set for 9/19/08.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
367 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County for reconsideration − Rule 54(B) − (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/18/2008)
368 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County for extension of time to file notice of appeal − Fed.R.App. 4(a)(5) (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
369 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of extension of time 368 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 8/27/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 08/21/2008)
370 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendants' motion for extension of time 368 until 9/29/08 to file any notice of appeal is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/22/2008)
371 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for extension of time to file a Response To Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/26/2008)
372 to file a Response To Defenants' Motion For Reconsideration NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of extension of time 371 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/2/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 08/26/2008)
373 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time 371 until 9/5/08 to respond to defendants' motion for reconsideration is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/29/2008)
374 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to motion for reconsideration 367 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
375 REPLY by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County In Support of Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
376 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan, Cook County re reply 375 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
377 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook CountyFor Leave to Cite Powell v. Barrett, No. 05−16734, 2008 WL 4072800 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2008) as Additional Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/12/2008)
378 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 377 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/17/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/12/2008)
379 AMENDED motion for miscellaneous relief 377 Amended Exhibit A to Motion for Leave to Cite Additional Authority (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/12/2008)
380 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendants' motion 377 for leave to cite additional authority is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 09/15/2008)
381 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County to expedite Ruling on Defendants' Rule 54(B) Motion for Reconsideration (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/24/2008)
382 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion to expedite 381 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/29/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/24/2008)

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09/26/2008
09/26/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 09/29/2008 09/30/2008 09/30/2008 10/02/2008 10/03/2008 10/03/2008 10/03/2008 10/06/2008 10/07/2008 10/07/2008 10/07/2008

383 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Defendants' motion (381) to expedite motion to reconsider, to the extent they want an immediate decision on the motion, is denied. I do not think the time to appeal, which would be limited at any rate at this stage, runs until I decide the motion. With regard to the motion, both sides have pointed to a factual error. My present intention is to set argument as to that issue, which is important, but I am not going to do so until I have completed my reconsideration of the other issues raised.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 09/26/2008)
384 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Status hearing in chambers held and continued to 11/18/08 at 10 a.m. in chambers. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/26/2008)
385 NOTICE of appeal by Michael Sheahan regarding orders 360 Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 07520000000003145510. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
386 DOCKETING Statement by Michael Sheahan regarding notice of appeal 385 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
387 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
388 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 385 . Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
389 Defendants' Notification to District Court of Protective Appeal by Michael Sheahan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−D)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
390 NOTICE by Michael Sheahan, Cook County re other 389 Amended Notice of Filing of Notice of Appeal (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
392 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 385 ; USCA Case No. 08−3471. (mb, ) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
391 DESIGNATION by Michael Sheahan, Cook County of record on appeal (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
402 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet (Poor Quality Original − Paper Document on File.) (mb, ) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
393 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County by Francis J. Catania (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 10/02/2008)
394 MOTION by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County for a Circuit Rule 57 Finding (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
395 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 394 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/9/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
396 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock to motion for miscellaneous relief 394 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion For A Circuit Rule 57 Finding (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
397 REPLY by Defendants Michael Sheahan, Cook County to motion for miscellaneous relief 394 , Response 396 Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion for a Circuit Rule 57 Finding (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
398 MOTION by counsel for Defendant Cook County to withdraw as attorney (Blanchard, Patrick) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
399 NOTICE of Motion by Patrick Malone Blanchard for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 398 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/14/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Blanchard, Patrick) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
400 NOTICE by Cook County re MOTION by counsel for Defendant Cook County to withdraw as attorney 398 , notice of motion 399 (Blanchard, Patrick) (Entered: 10/07/2008)

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10/07/2008 10/07/2008 10/07/2008 10/08/2008 10/08/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/09/2008 10/14/2008 10/14/2008 11/03/2008 11/03/2008
11/05/2008 11/18/2008
11/20/2008 12/04/2008 12/05/2008

401 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendant's motion (394) for a finding that the court is inclined to grant the motion for reconsideration under Circuit Rule 57 is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
403 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid for leave to file Cite Additional Authority (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
404 Cite Additional Authority NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for leave to file 403 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/14/2008 at 09:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
405 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file additional authority 403 is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Defendant, Cook County's motion to withdraw appearance of Patrick M. Blanchard is granted. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
407 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/16/2008 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
408 MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Cite Additional Authority, Instanter (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 10/09/2008)
409 DUPLICATE of Entry No. 408 (Quinn, Bernard) Modified by clerk's office on 10/14/2008 (mb, ). (Entered: 10/09/2008)
410 NOTICE of Correction regarding MOTION by Defendant Michael Sheahan for leave to file response to plaintiffs' motion to cite additional authority, instanter 409 (mb, ) (Entered: 10/14/2008)
411 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendant's motion for leave to file 408 response to plaintiff's motion to cite additional authority is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 10/14/2008)
412 MANDATE of USCA dated 11/3/08 regarding notice of appeal 385 ; USCA No. 08−3471. (mb, ) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
413 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 10/10/08 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 385 ; Appellate case no. : 08−3471. It is ordered that the motion is granted. In light of the district court's indication of a willingness to grant the parties' requested relief, this appeal is remanded pursuant to Circuit Rule 57 for further proceedings consistent with the district court's October 7, 2008 order. The parties are reminded that "[a]ny party dissatisfied with the judgment as modified must file a fresh notice of appeal." Cir.R.57. (mb, ) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
414 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:On court's own motion, status hearing reset for 12/5/2008 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
415 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 02/17/09 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers. By the close of business on 02/13/09, the parties shall submit a joint statement on the matters discussed at the conference. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
416 Notice of Automatic Substitution of Thomas Dart in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Cook County by Michael Sheahan (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 11/20/2008)
417 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:On court's own motion, status hearing reset for 3/6/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
418 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Pursuant to Notice of Substitution, Thomas Dart is substituted as Sheriff of Cook County in lieu of MichaelSheahan. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 12/08/2008)

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02/03/2009 02/03/2009 02/09/2009 02/09/2009 02/12/2009
02/13/2009 02/13/2009 02/20/2009 02/23/2009
02/27/2009 02/27/2009 03/03/2009
03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/18/2009 03/20/2009

419 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullock for attorney fees Plaintiffs' Request That Interim Fees Be Determined Pursuant To Local Rule 54.3 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Farley, Robert) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
420 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Robert Hugh Farley, Jr for presentment of motion for attorney fees 419 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/24/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 02/03/2009)
421 MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart for leave to file Supplement Rule 54(b) Motion for Reconsideration with Newly Discovered Evidence (Attachments: # 1 Errata A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 02/09/2009)
422 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion for leave to file 421 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/24/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 02/09/2009)
423 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Telephone status conference held. By agreement of the parties, the continued settlement conference set for 02/17/09 is RESET to 04/22/09 at 10:00 a.m. By 04/17/09, the parties shall submit to chambers any supplemental materials the parties wish the Court to consider in advance of the conference. Telephone notice (mmm, ) Modified on 2/12/2009 (mmm, ). (Entered: 02/12/2009)
424 RESPONSE by Quentin Bullockin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Thomas Dart for leave to file Supplement Rule 54(b) Motion for Reconsideration with Newly Discovered Evidence 421 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
425 NOTICE by Quentin Bullock Response to Defendants' Motion to Supplement Rule 54(b) with Newly discovered Evidence (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
426 RESPONSE by Defendants Thomas Dart, Cook County to motion for attorney fees 419 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 02/20/2009)
427 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Plaintiffs' motion for interim fees 419 is denied. Defendants' motion for leave to supplement the record with newly discovered evidence 421 is denied. This Court will issue an opinion on the motion for reconsideration by the end of this week. No appearance is necessary on 2/24/2009. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 02/23/2009)
428 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Defendants' Motion for reconsideration 367 is granted in part. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (mb, ) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
429 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/27/2009:(mb, ) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
430 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Status hearing set for 3/6/09 is now vacated. Pretrial Order due by 5/15/2009. Motions in limine with supporting memoranda due by 5/15/2009. Responses due by 5/29/2009. Pretrial Conference set for 6/26/2009 at 03:00 PM. Jury Trial set for 7/6/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/03/2009)
431 NOTICE of appeal by Thomas Dart, Cook County regarding orders 360 , 429 Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 07520000000003600079. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
432 DOCKETING Statement by Thomas Dart, Cook County regarding notice of appeal 431 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
433 MOTION by Defendants Thomas Dart, Cook County to stay Pending Appeal (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
434 NOTICE of Motion by Bernard E.J. Quinn for presentment of motion to stay 433 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/24/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
435 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 03/20/2009)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 33 of 37

03/20/2009 03/20/2009 03/23/2009
03/25/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009 03/27/2009

436 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 431 . Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
438 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 431 ; USCA Case No. 09−1734. (mb, ) (Entered: 03/24/2009)
437 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Set deadlines as to defendants' motion to stay 433 : Responses due by 3/30/2009. Ruling will be made by mail.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/23/2009)
442 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Thomas Dart and Cook County; Notice. (mb, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
439 DESIGNATION by Thomas Dart, Cook County of record on appeal : USCA Case No. 08−3471 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
440 DESIGNATION by Thomas Dart, Cook County of record on appeal : USCA Case No. 09−1734 (Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
441 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 06−17−05 before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo. Court Reporter Contact Information: michael_snyder@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312) 435−5563.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

03/27/2009 03/29/2009 03/30/2009 03/31/2009
04/08/2009
04/29/2009 04/29/2009

Redaction Request due 4/17/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/27/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/25/2009. (Snyder, Michael) (Entered: 03/27/2009)
445 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 3/27/09 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 385 , notice of appeal 431 ; Appellate case nos. : 08−3471 and 09−1734. (mb, ) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
443 RESPONSE by Quentin Bullockin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Thomas Dart, Cook County to stay Pending Appeal 433 Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion To Stay Pending Appeal (Farley, Robert) (Entered: 03/29/2009)
444 REPLY by Defendants Thomas Dart, Cook County in support of motion to stay and response to request for certification of frivolousness (Attachments: # 1 Order)(Quinn, Bernard) (Entered: 03/30/2009)
446 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Defendants' motion (433) for a stay pending appeal is granted. I do not believe the Seventh Circuit will disagree with my ruling on Eleventh Amendment immunity but the appeal of the issue is not frivolous and it would be a waste of resources to have a trial in the meantime if the Seventh Circuit disagrees with me.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
447 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:The presiding district judge has issued a stay of proceedings pending interlocutory appeal. As a result, the parties have informed the Court that they do not wish to proceed at this time with the settlement conference set for 04/22/09. Accordingly, that settlement conference date is stricken. The parties are directed to contact chambers when they wish to reschedule a settlement conference date.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 04/08/2009)
448 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 431 (USCA no. 09−1734) (dj, ) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
449 USCA RECEIVED on 4/29/09 the long record regarding notice of appeal 431 (dj, ) (Entered: 05/01/2009)

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05/19/2009 06/02/2009 06/02/2009 07/10/2009 12/11/2009 12/15/2009 04/06/2010
05/25/2010 06/23/2010 07/28/2010 09/10/2010 11/16/2010 11/16/2010
11/17/2010
11/18/2010 11/26/2010 03/17/2011

450 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:On court's own motion, pretrial conference set for 6/26/09 and trial set for 7/6/09 are now vacated. Status hearing set for 7/10/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/19/2009)
451 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 5/26/09 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 385 , notice of appeal 431 ; Appellate case no. : 08−3471 and 09−1734. (mb, ) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
452 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the partial record on appeal in USCA no. 09−1734 and 08−3471 consisting of two sealed envelopes. (mb, ) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
453 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Status hearing held on 7/10/2009. Status hearing set for 12/16/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
454 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:At parties' request, Status hearing reset for 12/15/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
455 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Status hearing held on 12/15/2009. Status hearing set for 5/26/2010 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 12/15/2009)
456 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:The matter is currently stayed, and the parties have indicated that they do not wish to continue settlement conference until the disposition of the pending appeal. Accordingly, the referral is hereby terminated. Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
457 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:At plaintiffs' request, Status hearing set for 5/26/10 is reset for 6/24/2010 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
458 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:At plaintiff's request, Status hearing set for 6/24/10 is reset for 8/13/2010 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 06/23/2010)
459 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:At parties' request, Status hearing set for 8/13/10 is reset for 9/10/2010 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 07/28/2010)
460 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Status hearing held on 9/10/2010. Status hearing set for 11/19/2010 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
461 MOTION by Plaintiffs Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid preliminary approval of class action settlement (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
462 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion 461 for preliminary approval of settlement is entered and continued to 11/17/2010 at 09:45 AM. Status hearing set for 11/19/10 is now vacated.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
463 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiffs' motion 461 for preliminary approval of class action settlement heard on 11/17/2010 and the motion is granted. Class notices to be mailed out by 1/5/11. Class claims and opt−out due by 3/1/11; and any objection to be filed by 3/7/11. Fairness hearing set for 3/18/11 at 1:30 p.m. Parties to submit draft order for entry.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 11/17/2010)
464 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/18/2010:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 11/18/2010)
465 CERTIFICATE of Notice of Class Action Settlement 28 USCA Sec 1715(b) to U.S. Attorney and Illinois Atty Gen. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 11/26/2010)
466 MEMORANDUM by Quentin Bullock, Jack Reid in support of approval of proposed settlement (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 03/17/2011)

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 35 of 37

03/18/2011 03/18/2011 03/29/2011
03/29/2011 04/12/2011 04/12/2011 04/18/2011
04/26/2011

467 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Fairness hearing held on 3/18/2011 and the class action settlement approved. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 03/18/2011)
468 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/18/2011:Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
469 MANDATE of USCA dated 3/29/11 regarding notice of appeal 385 , notice of appeal 431 ; USCA No. 08−3471 and 09−1734. It is ordered that these appeals are voluntarily dismissed. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). The parties shall bear their own costs. (mb, ) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
470 LETTER from the USCA retaining the record on appeal in USCA no. 08−3471 and 09−1734. (mb, ) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
471 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Thomas Dart To Bar Reid from Taking Award (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Reid Pet for Bankruptcy, # 2 Exhibit B Discharge Order)(Catania, Francis) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
472 NOTICE of Motion by Francis J. Catania for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 471 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/18/2011 at 09:30 AM. (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
473 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Defendants' motion to bar 471 heard on 4/18/11 and the motion is entered and continued. Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for miscellaneous relief 471 : Responses due by 5/9/2011. Replies due by 5/23/2011. Ruling set for 5/27/2011 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 04/18/2011)
474 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11−17−10 before the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo. Court Reporter Contact Information: michael_snyder@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312) 435−5563.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

05/09/2011 05/09/2011 05/09/2011 05/10/2011 05/17/2011 05/17/2011 05/23/2011

Redaction Request due 5/17/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/27/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/25/2011. (Snyder, Michael) (Entered: 04/26/2011)
475 RESPONSE by Jack Reid to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Thomas Dart To Bar Reid from Taking Award 471 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/09/2011)
476 NOTICE by Jack Reid re response to motion 475 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/09/2011)
477 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 09−1734 and 08−3471 consisting of 1 Pleading and 7 Transcripts. (ber, ) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
478 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 09−1734; 08−3471 consisting of one volume of pleadings and seven transcripts. (mb, ) (Entered: 05/12/2011)
479 REPLY by Cook County, Thomas Dart to response to motion 475 , MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Thomas Dart To Bar Reid from Taking Award 471 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/17/2011)
480 NOTICE by Cook County, Thomas Dart re reply to response to motion 479 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 05/17/2011)
481 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo: Defendants' Motion to Bar Plaintiff Reid from Taking Award 471 is granted.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 05/23/2011)

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05/23/2011 06/17/2011 06/17/2011 06/20/2011 06/23/2011
07/14/2011 07/14/2011 07/25/2011 07/25/2011 08/04/2011 08/09/2011
01/27/2012 01/27/2012 01/31/2012 02/03/2012 04/09/2012 04/09/2012 04/12/2012

482 WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/23/2011: Mailed notice(mpj, ) (Entered: 05/23/2011)
483 MOTION by Plaintiff Jack Reid for reconsideration Order Baring Plaintiff Jack Reid From Receiving Settlement Award (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
484 NOTICE by Jack Reid re MOTION by Plaintiff Jack Reid for reconsideration Order Baring Plaintiff Jack Reid From Receiving Settlement Award 483 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
485 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for reconsideration 483 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 6/23/2011 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 06/20/2011)
486 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 483 heard on 6/23/11 and the motion is entered and continued. Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for reconsideration 483 : Responses due by 7/14/2011. Replies due by 7/25/2011. Ruling set for 8/5/2011 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
487 RESPONSE by Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Jack Reid for reconsideration Order Baring Plaintiff Jack Reid From Receiving Settlement Award 483 (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
488 NOTICE by Cook County Response to Motion to Reconsider (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
489 REPLY by Jack Reid to response in opposition to motion 487 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
490 NOTICE by Jack Reid re reply to response to motion 489 (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 07/25/2011)
491 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Ruling on plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration set for 8/5/11 is vacated. Ruling will be made by mail.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/04/2011)
492 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiff Jack Reid's motion for reconsideration 483 is granted to the extent discussed in the minute order. Accordingly, I vacate my earlier ruling granting defendant's motion to bar, and I leave the matter to be decided in the course of the proceedings currently pending before the bankruptcy court.Mailed notice (mpj, ) (Entered: 08/09/2011)
493 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin BullockReferral of Enforcement of Class Settlement Agreement to Assigned Magistrate (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/27/2012)
494 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 493 before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/1/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 01/27/2012)
495 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Plaintiff's motion for referral of enforcement of the class settlement to the assigned magistrate judge 493 is granted. No appearance is required on 2/1/12.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 01/31/2012)
496 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier. Signed by Executive Committee on 2/3/12.(mb, ) (Entered: 02/07/2012)
497 MOTION by Plaintiff Quentin Bullockto Approve Final Payment of Late Claims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/09/2012)
498 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 497 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/12/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 04/09/2012)
499 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Motion hearing held. The parties consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. Plaintiff's motion to approve final payment of late claims 497 is granted. Enter Agreed Order (attached). Defendants are hereby ordered to pay the claims of the following: Marell Carter,

Case: 1:04-cv-1051 As of: 04/08/2016 03:15 PM CDT 37 of 37

04/12/2012 04/12/2012 04/13/2012
04/13/2012 04/17/2012 04/17/2012 04/20/2012

Salvador Casillas, Lamond Haggard, Carl Highley, Sylvester Land, Linzy Pittman, Tracy Lofton, Leslie Hughes, Issac Potts, Boris Perkins, Fred Davis, David Fuentes, David Williams, Jerome Sack, Mark Thomas, Ozious Thomas, Anthony Washington, Fidel Torres, Tony Ignot, Christopher Rose, Larry Brown, William Gordon, Jimmie Moore, and Alfredo Nieves. The following claimants shall have until June 15, 2012 to submit proof of their eligibility to be included in the class: Robert Sims, Andre Davis, Terry Brown, Anthony Culverson, Cameron Delaney, Raymond Ellison, Marchillo Freeman, Raymond Garvin, Luis Gaston, Demetrius Hemphill, Londell Lancaster, Dwan Payton, Theron Riddle, McClinnon Smith, Fred Tero, Clifton Thurman, Stevie Wallace, Elijah Williams, and Quinten Weaklis. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 04/12/2012)
500 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/12/2012. Mailed notice.(jj, ) (Entered: 04/12/2012)
501 JOINT CONSENT to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge by parties. (jj, ) (Entered: 04/12/2012)
502 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: The Court hereby strikes docket no. 500 , as there was a typographical error referencing a date of 6/15/12 (in paragraph #4 of the order attached to plaintiff's motion # 497 ). The paragraph in that order is corrected to reflect the date of 6/15/11. Enter Order (attached). Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
503 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/13/2012. Mailed notice.(jj, ) (Entered: 04/13/2012)
504 MINUTE entry before Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo:Parties' filed a Joint Consent before the Magistrate Judge. This case will be reassigned.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
505 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier for all further proceedings. Signed by Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/17/12.(mb, ) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
506 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: The case having been reassigned to this Court on consent (doc. # 505 ), the referral is hereby terminated. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 04/20/2012)