Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 1 of 16
21,23,MOTION/DISMISS,PRISONER,REFER,RULE 16 CONFERENCE HELD,TRANSF
U.S. District Court CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS (Peoria) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19−cv−01133−HAB−EIL

Gay v. Baldwin et al Assigned to: Judge Harold A. Baker Referred to: Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long Case in other court: Illinois Northern, 1:18−cv−07196 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/18/2019 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner Petitions − Prison Conditions Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Anthony Gay

represented by Antonio M Romanucci ROMANUCCI & BLANDIN LLC Suite 900 321 N Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 312−458−1000 Fax: 312−458−1004 Email: aromanucci@rblaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maggie E Filler RODERICK AND SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER 6th Floor 160 East Grand Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 312−503−0899 Fax: 312−503−0891 Email: maggie.filler@macarthurjustice.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen H Weil LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−995−7102 Email: weil@loevy.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexis G Chardon WEIL & CHARDON LLC Suite 2700 333 S Wabash Ave Chicago, IL 60604 312−585−7404 Fax: 312−995−7102 Email: ali@weilchardon.com TERMINATED: 01/24/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Arthur Loevy LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900

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Fax: 312−243−5900 Email: arthur@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel M Greenfield MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER Northwestern Pritzker School of Law 375 E Chicago Ave Chicago, IL 60611 312−503−1271 TERMINATED: 04/22/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan I Loevy LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: jon@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicolette Anne Ward ROMANUCCI & BLANDIN LLC Suite 900 321 N Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 312−458−1000 Fax: 312−458−1004 Email: nward@rblaw.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah C Grady LOEVY & LOEVY 3rd Floor 311 North Aberdeen St Chicago, IL 60607 312−243−5900 Fax: 312−243−5902 Email: sarah@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
State of Illinois TERMINATED: 09/16/2019

represented by Nicholas S Staley OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 13th Floor 100 W Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 312−814−3953 Email: nstaley@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thor Yukinobu Inouye OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 13th Floor 100 W Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 312 814−1670

Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 3 of 16

TERMINATED: 02/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Baldwin

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phillip Waleed Rehani OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 13th Floor 100 W Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 312−814−3700 Fax: 312−814−4425 Email: prehani@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Remy Taborga OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL 1776 E Washington Street Urbana, IL 61802 217−278−3332 Email: ataborga@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thor Yukinobu Inouye (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Jeff Sims

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Remy Taborga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Shane Reister

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Remy Taborga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Melvin Hinton

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Remy Taborga

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(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thor Yukinobu Inouye (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sylvia Butler

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Remy Taborga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thor Yukinobu Inouye (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/27/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Kelly Ann Renzi

represented by Joseph N Rupcich CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP Suite 200 111 North 6th Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−572−1714 Fax: 217−572−1613 Email: jrupcich@cassiday.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jessica Nicole Klaus CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP Suite 200 111 North 6th Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−572−1714 Fax: 217−572−1613 Email: jklaus@cassiday.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J Lombardo CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP Suite 2900 222 W Adams Street Chicago, IL 60606 312−641−3100 Fax: 312−444−1669 Email: jlombardo@cassiday.com TERMINATED: 12/02/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew H Weller CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP Suite 2900 222 West Adams Street Chicago, IL 60606 312−641−3100 Fax: 312−444−1669 Email: mweller@cassiday.com

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TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachael N Hayes Cassiday Schade LLP 111 N. 6th Street Suite 200 Springfield, IL 62701 217−572−1714 Fax: 217−572−1613 Email: rhayes@cassiday.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant William Puga

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jessica Nicole Klaus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J Lombardo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew H Weller (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachael N Hayes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dr. Chess

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Remy Taborga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dr. Nunez

represented by Stetson F Atwood DONOHUE BROWN MATHEWSON & SMYTH LLC Suite 800 140 S Dearborn St Chicago, IL 60603 312−422−9939 Fax: 312−422−0909 Email: atwood@dbmslaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Coffey Ieremia DONOHUE BROWN MATHEWSON & SMYTH LLC

Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 6 of 16

Suite 800 140 S Dearborn St Chicago, IL 60603 312−422−0900 Fax: 312−422−0909 Email: ieremia@dbmslaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Wexford Health Sources Inc

represented by Joseph N Rupcich (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jessica Nicole Klaus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph J Lombardo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/02/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Matthew H Weller (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/03/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachael N Hayes (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Does 2−5

Defendant Dr Doe 1

Defendant Michael Melvin

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Terri Kennedy

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Emily Ruskin

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Varga

represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Justin Wilks
Defendant Sonja Nicklaus
Defendant Rob Jeffreys

Remy Taborga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Nicholas S Staley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Remy Taborga (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/28/2018 10/29/2018 10/29/2018 10/29/2018
10/29/2018 10/30/2018 10/30/2018 10/31/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Anthony Gay; JURY DEMAND. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−15113131. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 10/28/2018)
2 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Anthony Gay by Alexis Garmey Chardon (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Sara L. Ellis. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier. Case assignment: Random assignment. (rc, ) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
3 NOTICE TO THE PARTIES − The Court is participating in the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot (MIDP). The key features and deadlines are set forth in this Notice which includes a link to the (MIDP) Standing Order and a Checklist for use by the parties. In cases subject to the pilot, all parties must respond to the mandatory initial discovery requests set forth in the Standing Order before initiating any further discovery in this case. Please note: The discovery obligations in the Standing Order supersede the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1). Any party seeking affirmative relief must serve a copy of the following documents (Notice of Mandatory Initial Discovery and the Standing Order) on each new party when the Complaint, Counterclaim, Crossclaim, or Third−Party Complaint is served. (ek, ) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Anthony Gay by Stephen H. Weil (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 150, receipt number 0752−15118616. (Filler, Maggie) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Anthony Gay by Daniel M Greenfield (Greenfield, Daniel) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Anthony Gay by Nicolette A. Ward (Ward, Nicolette) (Entered: 10/31/2018)

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10/31/2018 11/05/2018
11/30/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/19/2018 12/21/2018 12/27/2018
12/27/2018
01/03/2019 01/03/2019 01/08/2019
01/09/2019 01/09/2019 01/10/2019 01/15/2019
01/15/2019 01/17/2019

8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Anthony Gay by Antonio Maurizio Romanucci (Romanucci, Antonio) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
9 ORDER: Motion by Maggie E. Filler for leave to appear pro hac vice 5 is granted. The initial status conference in this matter is set for 1/17/2019 at 1:30 PM. The parties are directed to review the procedures and requirements for this conference on Judge Ellis' web site and to submit the required Initial Status Report by 1/10/2019. Motion to appear pro hac vice 5 is granted. Status Report due by 1/10/2019. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 11/5/2018.Mailed notice (smm) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant John Baldwin by Phillip Waleed Rehani (Rehani, Phillip) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc by Matthew H Weller (Weller, Matthew) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc by Joseph Jack Lombardo (Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Dr. Nunez by Stetson F. Atwood (Atwood, Stetson) (Entered: 12/19/2018)
14 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Dr. Nunez by Laura Coffey Ieremia (Ieremia, Laura) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
15 MOTION by Defendants William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc for protective order Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Kelly Renzi, Psy.D, and William Puga, M.D.'s Unopposed Motion for Entry of Qualified Protective Orde Pursuant to HIP[AA (Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
16 Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Kelly Renzi, Psy.D., and William Puga, M.D.'s Notice of Unopposed Motion for Entry of Qualified Protective Order Pursuant to HIPAA NOTICE of Motion by Joseph Jack Lombardo for presentment of motion for protective order, 15 before Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 1/11/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Sylvia Butler, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, State Of Illinois (jjr, ) (Entered: 01/03/2019)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendant Dr. Chess (jjr, ) (Entered: 01/03/2019)
17 Re−Notice of Unopposed Motion for Entry of Qualified Protective Order Pursuant to HIPAA NOTICE of Motion by Joseph Jack Lombardo for presentment of motion for protective order, 15 before Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 1/15/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 01/08/2019)
18 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Melvin Hinton by Nicholas Scott Staley (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
19 WITHDRAWING Phillip Rehani as counsel for Defendant John Baldwin and substituting Nicholas Scott Staley as counsel of record (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 01/09/2019)
20 STATUS Report Joint Initial Status Report by Anthony Gay (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
21 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sara L. Ellis: The parties' unopposed for entry of qualified protective order pursuant to HIPAA 15 is granted. The parties should submit a clean and red−lined copy of their proposed confidentiality order to the Court's proposed order email. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
22 QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE Order Pursuant to HIPAA. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 1/15/2019. Mailed notice (smm, ) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
23 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sara L. Ellis: Status hearing held on 1/17/2019. Briefing schedule on motions to dismiss: Defendants' motions are due by 2/15/19; Plaintiff's responses are due by 3/15/19; Defendants' replies are due by 3/29/19. Briefing schedule on motion to transfer venue: Defendants' motion to transfer to venue is due by 1/25/19; Plaintiff's response is due by 2/15/19; Defendants' reply is due by

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01/18/2019 01/25/2019 01/25/2019
02/13/2019 02/14/2019 02/14/2019 02/14/2019 02/15/2019
02/15/2019 02/15/2019 02/20/2019
02/20/2019
02/22/2019 02/22/2019 03/01/2019
03/08/2019

3/1/19. Next status date set for 4/2/19 at 9:30 a.m. for ruling to transfer venue. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
24 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant State Of Illinois by Nicholas Scott Staley (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 01/18/2019)
25 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sylvia Butler by Nicholas Scott Staley (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
26 MOTION by Defendants Dr. Nunez, William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, State Of Illinois, Wexford Health Sources Inc to transfer case Venue Pursuant to 28 USCS Sec. 1404 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Plf's IDOC Living Assignment History, # 2 Exhibit 2−The Article, # 3 Exhibit Pltf's IDOC Criminal History)(Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
27 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Melvin Hinton, State Of Illinois by Thor Yukinobu Inouye (Inouye, Thor) (Entered: 02/13/2019)
28 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Melvin Hinton, State Of Illinois by Thor Yukinobu Inouye (Inouye, Thor) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
29 MOTION by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Melvin Hinton, State Of Illinois for extension of time UNOPPOSED (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
30 NOTICE of Motion by Nicholas Scott Staley for presentment of extension of time 29 before Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 2/20/2019 at 09:45 AM. (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
31 RESPONSE by Anthony Gayin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Dr. Nunez, William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, State Of Illinois, Wexford Health Sources Inc to transfer case Venue Pursuant to 28 USCS Sec. 1404 26 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
32 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Dr. Nunez(Atwood, Stetson) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
33 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc(Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
34 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sara L. Ellis: Defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time to file their motion to dismiss 29 is granted. Defendants' responsive pleadings are due by 2/22/19; Plaintiff's response is due by 3/22/19; and Defendants' reply is due by 5/5/19. The Court sets a ruling date of 8/7/19 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (rj, ) Modified on 2/20/2019 (rj, ). (Entered: 02/20/2019)
35 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sara L. Ellis: Minute entry 34 is modified to remove the striking of the 4/2/2019 ruling date. Status hearing set for 4/2/2019 at 9:30 a.m. to stand as ruling date on motion to transfer venue. Entry 34 is further modified to correct briefing on motion to dismiss. Defendants' reply is due by 4/5/2019. Ruling date of 8/7/2019 is stricken and reset for 7/16/2019 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/20/2019)
36 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Dr. Chess, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims by Nicholas Scott Staley (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/22/2019)
37 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims, State Of Illinois (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/22/2019)
38 REPLY by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Dr. Nunez, William Puga, Shane Reister, Kelly Ann Renzi, Jeff Sims, State Of Illinois, Wexford Health Sources Inc to response in opposition to motion, 31 , motion to transfer case, 26 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
39 Defendants' Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc(Lombardo, Joseph) (Entered: 03/08/2019)

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03/22/2019
03/27/2019
04/17/2019 04/18/2019 09/16/2019 09/16/2019
09/16/2019 09/16/2019 09/17/2019
09/18/2019
09/30/2019 10/09/2019 10/15/2019 10/16/2019
10/18/2019 10/22/2019 10/22/2019

40 RESPONSE by Anthony Gayin Opposition to MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims, State Of Illinois 37 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
41 ORDER: The Court grants Defendants' motion to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 26 . The Court transfers this case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. See Statement. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 3/27/2019. Mailed notice (smm, ) (Entered: 03/28/2019)
42 TRANSFERRED to the Central District of Illinois the electronic record.(smm, ) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
43 Case transferred in from District of Illinois Northern; Case Number 1:18−cv−07196. . (Entered: 04/18/2019)
Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long added. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 09/16/2019)
44 ORDER entered by Judge Colin Stirling Bruce on 9/16/2019. The Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint 37 . The Court sua sponte dismisses the State of Illinois as a party in these proceedings. The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to terminate the State of Illinois as a party in this case. The Court refers this case to Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long for further proceedings. See written order. (KE, ilcd) (Entered: 09/16/2019)
TEXT ORDER entered by Judge Colin Stirling Bruce on 9/16/2019. Motion to Dismiss 37 is DENIED pursuant to order 44 entered 9/16/2019. (KE, ilcd) (Entered: 09/16/2019)
45 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Joseph N Rupcich on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 09/16/2019)
46 ORDER setting Rule 16 Scheduling Conference entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 9/17/2019. Rule 16 Scheduling Conference is set for 10/22/2019 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom B in Urbana before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long. See written Order. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
ORDER REASSIGNING CASE entered by Judge Colin Stirling Bruce on 9/18/2019. Judge Colin S. Bruce disqualifies and recuses himself from participation in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455. Pursuant to instructions from Chief Judge Sara Darrow, this matter is reassigned to Judge Harold A. Baker for further proceedings. (KE, ilcd) (Entered: 09/18/2019)
47 ANSWER to 1 Complaint AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES by John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims.(Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 09/30/2019)
48 NOTICE of Change of Address by Stephen H Weil (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/09/2019)
49 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting by Anthony Gay. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 10/15/2019)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 10/16/2019. This Court has reviewed the parties' Report of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting 49 and the matter is hereby converted from personal appearance to telephone conference on 10/22/19 at 10:00 AM. The Court will initiate the call.(DS, ilcd) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
50 NOTICE of Change of Address by Maggie E Filler (Filler, Maggie) (Entered: 10/18/2019)
51 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Rachael N Hayes on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Hayes, Rachael) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
52 Minute Entry for proceedings held 10/22/2019 before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long. Appearance for Petitioner by Stephen Weil and Nicolette Ward. Appearance for Respondents by Nick Staley, Rachael Hayes and Laura Ieremia. Rule 16 conference

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10/30/2019
11/05/2019 11/05/2019 11/06/2019 11/15/2019 11/18/2019 11/18/2019 11/18/2019 11/27/2019 12/02/2019

held by telephone. Plan approved; dates set. The other limitations referenced in the Report of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting 49 are adopted by reference. Consent to magistrate judge discussed (form attached). ADR options offered, including court−hosted settlement conference. The following discovery deadlines are set: Initial disclosure due by 11/5/19; ESI discovery submitted by 11/15/19; Fact discovery due 11/20/20; Amended pleadings and joinder of parties by plaintiff due by 8/26/20; Amended pleadings and Joinder of parties by defendant due by 9/28/20; Plaintiff`s expert disclosure and expert reports due by 1/22/21; Defendant's expert disclosure and expert reports due by 3/5/21; Rule 26(e) supplements due 4/16/21; Expert discovery due 6/22/21; Discovery, including deposition of experts, due by 6/22/21; Case dispositive motions due by 6/22/21. A Final Pretrial Conference is set for 10/21/2021 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom C in Urbana before Judge Harold A. Baker. Jury Selection/Jury Trial is set for 11/8/2021 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom C in Urbana before Judge Harold A. Baker. (10 days) A Status Conference is set for 5/11/2020 at 10:00 AM by telephone from Urbana (court will place call) before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long to discuss possible court hosted mediation or summary trial. (Tape #UR−B 10:03 AM.) (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
TEXT ORDER entered by Judge Harold A. Baker on 10/30/2019. The minutes 22 from the Rule 16 scheduling conference indicated that discovery is due by June 22, 2021, and that case dispositive motions are due by June 22, 2021. The Court corrects the deadlines as follows: All discovery, including deposition of experts, is to be completed by June 22, 2021. Case dispositive motions are due by July 22, 2021. All other dates and deadlines remain in full force and effect. (KE, ilcd) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
53 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Dr. Pierre Nunez's Initial Disclosures Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) by Laura Coffey Ieremia on behalf of Dr. Nunez (Ieremia, Laura) (Entered: 11/05/2019)
54 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel DEFENDANTS INITIAL RULE 26(a)(1) DISCLOSURES by Nicholas S Staley on behalf of John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 11/05/2019)
55 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Amended Certificate of Service − Dr. Pierre Nunez's Initial Disclosures Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) by Laura Coffey Ieremia on behalf of Dr. Nunez (Ieremia, Laura) (Entered: 11/06/2019)
56 STATUS REPORT THE PARTIES REPORT REGARDING SUBMISSION OF AN ESI DISCOVERY PLAN by Anthony Gay. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Weil, Stephen) Modified on 11/18/2019 to correct mislabeling of (1)(RK, ilcd). (Entered: 11/15/2019)
57 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Jessica Nicole Klaus on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 11/18/2019)
58 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Defendants' Initial Disclosures by Jessica Nicole Klaus on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 11/18/2019)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 11/18/2019. A telephone status conference is set for 12/6/19 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long. The Court will initiate the call. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 11/18/2019)
59 MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Joseph J. Lombardo and Matthew H. Weller to be replaced by Jessica N. Klaus, by Respondents William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc. Responses due by 12/11/2019 (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 11/27/2019)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 12/2/2019. The Motion to Substitute Counsel 59 is GRANTED. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate attorneys Joseph J. Lombardo and Matthew H. Weller from this case. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 12/02/2019)

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12/06/2019
12/20/2019 12/31/2019 01/01/2020 01/08/2020 01/22/2020 01/23/2020 01/24/2020 01/24/2020
01/27/2020 02/03/2020 02/03/2020 02/03/2020 02/04/2020 02/04/2020 02/07/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings held 12/6/2019 before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long. Appearance for the petitioner by Stephen Weil. Appearance for the respondents by Nicholas Staley, Jessica Klaus and Scott Kater. Status Conference held by telephone. Status re ESI protocol 56 discussed. ESI Protocol to be modified as discussed on the record. Petitioner's brief regarding the ESI Protocol is due 12/20/2019. (Other Deadline set for 12/20/2019) Attorney Staley's response is due by 1/1/2020. (Secondary Other Deadline set for 1/1/2020) Petitioner's reply is then due 1/8/2020. (Miscellaneous Deadline 1/8/2020). A Status Conference is set for 5/11/2020 at 10:00 AM by telephone from Urbana (court will place call) before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long. (Tape #UR−B 10:03 AM.) (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 12/06/2019)
60 MEMORANDUM Regarding ESI Protocol by Anthony Gay. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
61 Response by William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc re 60 Memorandum re ESI Protocol. (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 12/31/2019)
62 Response by John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims re 60 Memorandum . (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 01/01/2020)
63 Reply by Anthony Gay re 60 Memorandum, 61 Response, 62 Response Relating to ESI Protocol.. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
64 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Remy Taborga on behalf of John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims (Taborga, Remy) (Entered: 01/22/2020)
65 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. Responses due by 2/6/2020 (Chardon, Alexis) (Entered: 01/23/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 1/24/2020. The Motion to Withdraw Alexis Chardon as Counsel 65 is GRANTED. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate attorney Alexis Chardon from this case. (Attorney Alexis G Chardon terminated) (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
66 ORDER re 56 Status Report entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 1/24/20. The Court finds that Plaintiff's proposed search terms, custodians, and repositories are overbroad, unlikely to produce information relevant to any party's claim or defense, and are disproportionate to the needs of this single plaintiff case. The Court directs the parties to submit a proposed ESI Protocol consistent with this order within fourteen days. See written Order. ( Miscellaneous Deadline 2/7/2020.) (KM, ilcd) (Entered: 01/24/2020)
67 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by Defendants William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc. Responses due by 2/10/2020 (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
68 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Sarah C Grady on behalf of Anthony Gay (Grady, Sarah) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
69 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Jonathan I Loevy on behalf of Anthony Gay (Loevy, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
70 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Arthur Loevy on behalf of Anthony Gay (Loevy, Arthur) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
71 RESPONSE to Motion re 67 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 2/4/20. Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time 67 is GRANTED. Defendant's deadline to submit responses to written discovery is extended to 2/10/20. (KM, ilcd) (Entered: 02/04/2020)
72 DISCOVERY PLAN − PROPOSED/Report of Rule 26(f)Planning Meeting by John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims. (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/07/2020)

Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 13 of 16

02/07/2020 02/07/2020 02/10/2020 02/11/2020 02/12/2020 02/21/2020 02/24/2020 02/25/2020 02/26/2020 02/27/2020 03/06/2020
03/06/2020 03/07/2020
03/16/2020 03/20/2020

73 MOTION for Order (Amended ESI Protocol) by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. Responses due by 2/21/2020 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Grady, Sarah) (Entered: 02/07/2020)
74 OBJECTION to 66 Order,,, Set/Reset Deadlines:,, by Anthony Gay. (Grady, Sarah) (Entered: 02/07/2020)
75 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Answers to Interrogatories and Response to Request for Production by Jessica Nicole Klaus on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 02/10/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Judge Harold A. Baker on 2/11/2020. The Court requests that Defendants respond to Plaintiff's Objection 74 within fourteen (14) days of this order. (KE, ilcd) (Entered: 02/11/2020)
76 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Wexford Answers to Interrogatories by Jessica Nicole Klaus on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 02/12/2020)
77 RESPONSE to Motion re 73 MOTION for Order (Amended ESI Protocol) filed by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims. (Staley, Nicholas) Modified on 2/24/2020 to correct title of document (SAG, ilcd). (Entered: 02/21/2020)
78 RESPONSE to Motion re 73 MOTION for Order (Amended ESI Protocol) filed by Defendants William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 02/24/2020)
79 Response by John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims re 74 Objection . (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/25/2020)
80 MOTION to Substitute Attorney, Thor Inouye to be replaced by Nicholas Staley, by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims. Responses due by 3/11/2020 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 02/26/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 2/27/2020. The Motion to Substitute Attorney 80 is GRANTED. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate attorney Thor Inouye from this case. (Attorney Thor Yukinobu Inouye terminated) (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 3/6/2020. This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Entry of Amended ESI Protocol 73 filed by Plaintiff. On January 24, 2020, the court entered an Order ruling on the same arguments raised in the instant Motion. Because Plaintiff's Motion raises identical arguments as made in his prior Memorandum 60 , the Court presumes that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a party may seek to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days. The Court grants a Rule 59(e) motion only if there exists "a manifest error of law or fact." Divane v. Krull Electric Co., 194 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's Motion does not show a manifest error of law or fact, but instead regurgitates the same arguments previously made and considered by the court. For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Amended ESI Protocol 73 is DENIED. The court adopts the parties' agreed Discovery Plan for Electronically Stored Information 72 . (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
81 DISCOVERY PLAN FOR ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
82 AMENDED COMPLAINT against John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Dr Doe 1, Does 2−5, Melvin Hinton, Dr. Nunez, William Puga, Shane Reister, Kelly Ann Renzi, Jeff Sims, Wexford Health Sources Inc, Michael Melvin, Terri Kennedy, Emily Ruskin, John Varga, Justin Wilks, Sonja Nicklaus, Rob Jeffreys, filed by Anthony Gay.(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 03/07/2020)
83 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Dr. Nunez (Ieremia, Laura) (Entered: 03/16/2020)
84 OBJECTION to Order on Motion,,,, by Anthony Gay. (Grady, Sarah) (Entered: 03/20/2020)

Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 14 of 16

03/23/2020 03/23/2020
03/23/2020 03/23/2020 03/23/2020
03/24/2020
03/26/2020 04/06/2020 04/13/2020 04/13/2020
04/14/2020
04/14/2020 04/20/2020 04/20/2020 04/23/2020 04/23/2020 04/27/2020

85 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer UNOPPOSED by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims. Responses due by 4/6/2020 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/23/2020)
86 Amended MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer UNOPPOSED by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims. Responses due by 4/6/2020 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 03/23/2020)
87 ANSWER to 82 Amended Complaint, by William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc.(Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 03/23/2020)
88 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants William Puga, Wexford Health Sources Inc. Responses due by 4/6/2020 (Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 03/23/2020)
89 MEMORANDUM in Support re 88 MOTION to Dismiss (Partial) filed by Defendants William Puga, Wexford Health Sources Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J)(Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 03/23/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 3/24/2020. IDOC Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 86 is GRANTED. Defendants Rob Jeffreys, John Baldwin, Jeff Sims, Shane Reister, Melvin Hinton, Sylvia Butler, and Jamie Chess's deadline to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint is extended to 4/13/20. Motion 85 is denied as MOOT. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 03/24/2020)
90 ANSWER to 82 Amended Complaint, by Dr. Nunez.(Atwood, Stetson) (Entered: 03/26/2020)
91 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Unopposed) by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. Responses due by 4/20/2020 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/06/2020)
92 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Nicholas S Staley on behalf of John Varga (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
93 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer UNOPPOSED by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims, John Varga. Responses due by 4/27/2020 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 4/14/2020. The IDOC Defendants' Second Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time 93 is GRANTED. Defendants Rob Jeffreys, John Baldwin, Jeff Sims, Shane Reister, Melvin Hinton, Sylvia Butler, Jamie Chess, and John Varga Defendants' deadline to respond to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is extended to 4/27/20. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
94 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Remy Taborga on behalf of Rob Jeffreys, John Varga (Taborga, Remy) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
95 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Anthony Gay. John Varga waiver sent on 4/1/2020, answer due 6/1/2020. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
96 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 88 MOTION to Dismiss (UNOPPOSED) by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. Responses due by 5/4/2020 (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
97 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Nicholas S Staley on behalf of Sonja Nicklaus, Emily Ruskin, Justin Wilks (Staley, Nicholas) (Main Document 97 replaced at request of counsel on 4/28/2020) (KM, ilcd). (Entered: 04/23/2020)
98 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Nicholas S Staley on behalf of Michael Melvin (Staley, Nicholas) (Main Document 98 replaced at request of counsel on 4/28/2020) (KM, ilcd). (Entered: 04/23/2020)
99 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Anthony Gay. Justin Wilks waiver sent on 4/1/2020, answer due 6/1/2020. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/27/2020)

Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 15 of 16

04/27/2020 04/27/2020
04/29/2020 04/29/2020 05/01/2020 05/01/2020
05/01/2020
05/01/2020 05/01/2020 05/04/2020
05/11/2020
05/12/2020 05/14/2020 05/15/2020 05/19/2020
06/01/2020 06/04/2020

100 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Anthony Gay. Sonja Nicklaus waiver sent on 4/1/2020, answer due 6/1/2020. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Judge Harold A. Baker on 4/27/2020. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's First and Second Motions for Extensions of Time 91 , 96 to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has until May 1, 2020 to file their response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (KE, ilcd) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
101 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Anthony Gay. Michael Melvin waiver sent on 4/16/2020, answer due 6/15/2020. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
102 NOTICE of Appearance of Attorney by Nicholas S Staley on behalf of Terri Kennedy (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 04/29/2020)
103 ANSWER to 82 Amended Complaint, by Terri Kennedy, Michael Melvin, Sonja Nicklaus, Emily Ruskin, John Varga, Justin Wilks.(Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/01/2020)
104 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , MOTION to Stay re 82 Amended Complaint, by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Terri Kennedy, Michael Melvin, Sonja Nicklaus, Shane Reister, Emily Ruskin, Jeff Sims, John Varga, Justin Wilks. Responses due by 5/15/2020 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/01/2020)
105 MEMORANDUM in Support re 104 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM MOTION to Stay re 82 Amended Complaint, filed by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Terri Kennedy, Michael Melvin, Sonja Nicklaus, Shane Reister, Emily Ruskin, Jeff Sims, John Varga, Justin Wilks. (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/01/2020)
106 MOTION for Leave to File Responsive Pleading Instanter by Defendants John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Dr. Chess, Melvin Hinton, Rob Jeffreys, Shane Reister, Jeff Sims. Responses due by 5/15/2020 (Staley, Nicholas) (Entered: 05/01/2020)
107 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 88 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/01/2020)
TEXT ORDER entered by Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long on 5/4/2020. Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Responsive Pleading 106 is GRANTED. The Court will consider Defendants' responsive pleading filed on 5/1/20. (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 05/04/2020)
Minute entry for proceedings held 5/11/20 before Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long. Appearance on behalf of Plaintiff by Stephen Weil, Nicolette Ward and Sarah Grady. Appearance on behalf of defendants by Nicholas Staley, Jessica Klaus and Laura Ieremia. Status hearing held by telephone. Status of the case and discovery discussed. Further status hearing set by telephone for 7/10/20 at 10:00 am. Call in information will be provided to the parties at a later date. (Court Reporter LC.) (DS, ilcd) (Entered: 05/11/2020)
108 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Anthony Gay. Terri Kennedy waiver sent on 4/1/2020, answer due 6/1/2020. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/12/2020)
109 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Anthony Gay. Emily Ruskin waiver sent on 4/1/2020, answer due 6/1/2020. (Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/14/2020)
110 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 104 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM MOTION to Stay re 82 Amended Complaint, filed by Plaintiff Anthony Gay. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Weil, Stephen) (Entered: 05/15/2020)
111 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Wexford's Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories and Response to Request to Produce by Joseph N Rupcich on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford Health Sources Inc (Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 05/19/2020)
112 NOTICE of Subpoenas (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
113 CERTIFICATE of Service/Counsel Second Supplemental Response to Request to Produce by Joseph N Rupcich on behalf of William Puga, Kelly Ann Renzi, Wexford

Case: 1:19-cv-1133 As of: 07/08/2020 06:32 PM CDT 16 of 16
Health Sources Inc (Rupcich, Joseph) (Entered: 06/04/2020) 06/19/2020 114 NOTICE of Subpoenas (Klaus, Jessica) (Entered: 06/19/2020)

 
 Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

)

ANTHONY GAY,

)

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

)

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, JOHN

)

BALDWIN, JEFF SIMS, SHANE REISTER, )

DR. DOE 1, MELVIN HINTON, SYLVIA

)

BUTLER, KELLY ANN RENZI, WILLIAM )

PUGA, DR. CHESS, DR. NUNEZ,

)

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. and )

DOES 2-5

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT Plaintiff, ANTHONY GAY by his undersigned attorneys, complains against the abovenamed Defendants as follows:
INTRODUCTION When Anthony Gay was a teenager, he got into a fight with another teen who had insulted his sister. The teen claimed that Anthony had stolen his hat and a $1 bill in the process, so Anthony was charged with robbery. Anthony pleaded guilty, received a suspended prison sentence, and was placed on probation. Then, in another youthful error, Anthony violated his probation by driving a car without a license. As a result of these two events, in 1994 Anthony – then only 20 years old – was imprisoned by the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). With good behavior, he should have been released in 3½ years. But Anthony suffers from borderline personality disorder. After he was imprisoned the symptoms of this mental illness manifested, and he began to act out. Instead of providing
1

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:2
treatment for his mental illness, the IDOC cited him for a variety of violations. Eventually, in 1998, the IDOC placed Anthony in solitary confinement—and it kept him there for the next twenty years. For twenty years, Anthony lived alone in a small, bare, stifling cell, where he was deprived of all human contact for close to 24 hours per day.
The impact of solitary confinement on Anthony was catastrophic. Deprived of any sustained human interaction, Anthony’s mental condition deteriorated, and he began to engage in horrific acts of self-mutilation. He cut his forearm and his neck. He cut into his left inner thigh and wove the wound together with strips of a blanket. He cut into his scrotum and embedded a zipper there. He cut off a testicle and hung it on his cell door. He cut open his scrotum again and pierced it with paperclips. He mutilated his penis on multiple occasions, embedding a pen, plastics, and a zipper into the cuts. He stuck a pen into his eyelid and stabbed his thigh with a spoon, so deep that it had to be removed surgically. His documented acts of self-mutilation number in the dozens and continued for nearly the entirety of his solitary confinement.
It was plain for anyone to see that solitary confinement was ravaging Anthony’s mind, and that he was in desperate need of appropriate mental healthcare. But instead of placing Anthony in a setting that would alleviate the impact on his mind, or providing him treatment to get better, the Defendants responded by prolonging Anthony’s extreme isolation, depriving him of access to human contact, programming, mental health care, and activities—for decades.
As a result, Anthony’s torture was both compounded and extended. Solitary confinement had triggered Anthony’s mental illness, causing him to act erratically and irrationally. One manifestation was Anthony’s self-mutilation. Another was irrational “assaults” on prison staff, in which Anthony would do things like throw his body fluids at prison guards through cracks in his cell door. Instead of recognizing these acts for the manifestations of mental illness that they were, the Defendants doubled down. Anthony was given “tickets” that punished him with
2

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:3
consecutive sentences of solitary confinement until the year 2152 – or two lifetimes of solitude. Anthony was also charged criminally for his “attacks” on prison staff, which ultimately extended his actual prison sentence by about fifteen years, with all but a few weeks of it to be served in solitary.
This extreme isolation continued even though in Rasho v. Baldwin, No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill.), an ongoing class action concerning the IDOC’s treatment of mentally ill prisoners, the Defendants acknowledged that Anthony was among a handful of IDOC prisoners who were so mentally ill that they needed acute, inpatient psychiatric care. Defendants refused to provide this care. Instead, they continued to hold Anthony in extreme isolation, with the devastating impact that Anthony continued to mutilate himself.
All told, Anthony spent nearly two decades in solitary confinement in a state of acute mental decompensation. By the time he was finally released from prison in 2018, he had mutilated himself hundreds of times. Throughout his solitary confinement, it was obvious to the Defendants that Anthony was in desperate need help. And at any point during his confinement, they could have rescued him, either by providing adequate services within prison or by transferring him to inpatient psychiatric hospital. For the Defendants, however, it was simply more convenient to deal with a difficult inmate by keeping him locked away in an isolation cell. That “solution” inflicted decades of unthinkable pain on Anthony, and continues to harm him after his release.
Through their actions and inaction in the face of Anthony’s obvious mental decompensation, the Defendants tortured Anthony. This lawsuit seeks to hold the Defendants accountable for the injuries that they inflicted on Anthony by holding him in solitary confinement for two decades.
3

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:4

I.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Anthony Gay asserts the following claims to redress the egregious abuse that the

Defendants inflicted upon him:

2. Count One—Eighth Amendment. By placing Anthony in extended solitary

confinement notwithstanding its obvious, devastating impact on his mental health, the

Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Anthony, exhibited deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs, and inflicted punishment on him for no legitimate penological

purpose. This caused extreme mental anguish, suffering, and multiple physical injuries, in

violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

3. Counts Two and Three—Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act.

The Defendants also discriminated against Anthony because of his mental illness, in violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Anthony’s

severe mental illness was a disability covered by the ADA and the RA. While the Defendants

have policies to ensure that that IDOC prisoners with conventional medical needs (such as

physical injuries or illnesses) receive the medical treatment they need, the Defendants did not

provide equivalent treatment for Anthony’s mental condition. Instead, they followed a

continuing discriminatory policy of forcing him to undergo extended torture in solitary

confinement, without appropriate treatment, until his sentence was completed.

4. In further violation of the ADA and the RA, the Defendants failed to provide

reasonable accommodations for Anthony’s disability. The Defendants provide IDOC prisoners

with a variety of programs and services, and they are obligated not to segregate disabled and

non-disabled persons. Among these is furnishing the basic human need of interaction with other

persons. With reasonable accommodations to his disability, the Defendants could have provided

4

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 5 of 23 PageID #:5

Anthony with these programs and services, but they chose not to. Instead they placed him in

extended solitary confinement. Anthony served years in disciplinary solitary confinement

because he exhibited behaviors that were a result of the fact that the Defendants had put a

disabled person in solitary confinement. Defendants’ continuing policy of failing to provide

these accommodations to mentally ill prisoners like Anthony resulted in his entrapment in a

cruel, endless cycle, and the devastating consequences described in this Complaint.

5. Count Four—Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Due Process Clause, Anthony

had a right to meaningfully challenge his placement in solitary confinement and show that he

should not have been there. Had the Defendants provided this right, Anthony could have shown

that his placement in solitary was improper, since it flowed from irrational acts arising from his

mental illness, which was triggered by his confinement in solitary. The Defendants never

afforded Anthony this opportunity, however, causing him to suffer the injuries described in this

Complaint.

* * *

6. Anthony had the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and he had

the right not to be mistreated or discriminated against because of his disability. By this action,

Anthony seeks to vindicate those rights and to have the Defendants answer for the way they

treated a vulnerable man with a severe mental illness, first by inflicting horrific damage on him

by throwing him in solitary, and then by failing to treat the devastating illness that they

themselves had both caused and exacerbated.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a), as

Plaintiff’s causes of action are brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

5

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 6 of 23 PageID #:6

United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act,

and the Rehabilitation Act.

8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as one or more of

the Defendants resides in this judicial district and a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claims asserted in this lawsuit occurred in this judicial district.

III.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Anthony Gay is a resident of Illinois. Between 1994 and 2018, he was

imprisoned by the IDOC at multiple prisons, including the Tamms, Dixon, Pontiac, Stateville,

and Menard prisons. He now lives with his family in Rock Island, Illinois.

10. Defendant State of Illinois operates the IDOC, which imprisoned Anthony and

subjected him to solitary confinement, pursuant to a continuous policy, described herein, under

which difficult, mentally ill prisoners were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of

being provided with appropriate mental health treatment. The State of Illinois, and the IDOC,

receive federal funding.

11. Defendant John R. Baldwin is the acting director of the IDOC. Defendant

Baldwin is sued in his official and individual capacities. Defendant Baldwin had actual

knowledge that solitary confinement both causes and exacerbates mental illness. He also knew

that multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them Anthony Gay, were in critical need of

inpatient psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that the IDOC was failing to provide. At all

relevant times Defendant Baldwin had the power to ensure this treatment was provided by the

IDOC, or to secure the transfer of these prisoners to mental health facilities operated by the

Illinois Department of Human Services (“IDHS”). Defendant Baldwin took neither course of

action.

6

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 7 of 23 PageID #:7
12. Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) is a private company that was under contract to provide medical care and mental healthcare to the prisoners of the IDOC, including Anthony, during a number of years of Anthony’s imprisonment. This care included the obligation to provide comprehensive and specialized mental health services, including any specialty and emergency care that was not provided at IDOC facilities. Despite its contractual obligations, however, by policy and practice Wexford did not provide on-site mental health services necessary to meet the needs of persons with severe mental illnesses like Anthony, nor did it transfer prisoners who needed such care to appropriate outside mental health facilities.
13. Defendant Jeff Sims is the IDOC’s Central Region Psychology Supervisor. He is sued in his individual capacity. While Anthony was confined in the prisons under Defendant Sims’ supervision, Sims was personally aware of the harm Anthony was incurring from solitary confinement, and had actual knowledge that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Sims had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
14. Defendant Shane Reister is the IDOC’s Southern Region Psychology Supervisor. He is sued in his individual capacity. While Anthony was confined in the prisons under Defendant Reister’s supervision, Reister was personally aware of the harm Anthony was incurring from solitary confinement, and had actual knowledge that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Reister had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
15. Defendant Dr. Doe 1 is IDOC’s Northern Region Psychology Supervisor. Dr. Doe 1 is sued in his or her individual capacity. While Anthony was confined in the prisons under Defendant Dr. Doe 1’s supervision, he or she was personally aware of the harm Anthony was incurring from solitary confinement, and had actual knowledge that Anthony needed
7

Case: 1:18-cv-07196 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/28/18 Page 8 of 23 PageID #:8
psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Doe 1 had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
16. Defendant Dr. Melvin Hinton is the Acting Statewide Mental Health Supervisor for the IDOC. He is sued in his individual capacity. Dr. Hinton was personally aware of Anthony’s confinement and its impact on his mental health condition. Dr. Hinton also knew that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Hinton had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
17. Defendant Dr. Sylvia Butler is the Mental Health Director of Menard Correctional Center. She is sued in her individual capacity. At all relevant times she was employed by Defendant Wexford. Dr. Butler was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care at Menard when he was incarcerated there in 2015-2016, and she was aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Butler had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
18. Defendant Dr. Kelly Ann Renzi is the Mental Health Director of Pontiac Correctional Center. She is sued in her individual capacity. Dr. Renzi was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care at Pontiac when he was incarcerated there in 2017-2018, and she was aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Renzi had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
19. Defendant Dr. William Puga was a physician at Pontiac Correctional Center. At all relevant times, he was employed by Defendant Wexford. He is sued in his individual capacity. Dr. Puga personally provided psychiatric care to Anthony at Pontiac from 2016-2018. Along with Dr. Renzi, Dr. Puga was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care and was aware
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that he needed to be removed from solitary confinement, and needed psychiatric care and

appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Puga had the power to

seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.

20. Defendant Dr. Chess is the Mental Health Director of Dixon Correctional Center.

He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times he was employed by Defendant

Wexford. Dr. Chess was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care at Dixon in 2018 and was

aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all

relevant times Dr. Chess had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do

so.

21. Defendant Dr. Nunez is a physician at Dixon Correctional Center. At all relevant

times, Dr. Nunez was employed by Defendant Wexford. He is sued in his individual capacity.

Dr. Nunez personally provided psychological care to Anthony at Dixon in 2018. Along with Dr.

Chess, Dr. Nunez was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care and was aware that he needed

psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr.

Nunez had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.

22. Defendant Does 2-5 are sued herein by fictitious names for the reason that their

true names are unknown to Plaintiff. These Doe defendants are administrators overseeing

facilities where Anthony was held in solitary confinement, and who had a duty to provide

inmates with a meaningful opportunity to challenge their solitary confinement placement.

Despite their obligation to do so, the Doe defendants failed to provide such an opportunity to

Anthony, prolonging his solitary confinement.

IV.

FACTS

23. In 1994, while he was still a teenager, Anthony Gay was charged with robbery—

the result of an incident in which he got in a fight with another teen who had insulted his sister,

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and the teen claimed Anthony had stolen the teen’s hat and a $1 bill. He pleaded guilty, was given a suspended prison sentence, and was placed on probation.
24. Later that year, while still on probation, Anthony was pulled over and found to be driving without a license. He was adjudicated as having violated his probation, and a few days before Christmas 1994, at the age of 20, Anthony checked himself into the IDOC to begin serving a seven-year sentence. With credit for good behavior, he was eligible for release in 3½ years.
25. Anthony could not maintain good behavior, however. He suffers from mental illnesses, including borderline personality disorder. The illness manifested in prison, causing Anthony to act erratically and to break prison rules. As a result of these infractions he lost his time credit for good behavior.
By holding Anthony in prolonged solitary confinement, the Defendants tortured him. 26. In March 1998, as a result of his infractions, Anthony was placed in solitary confinement. He was confined to a cell roughly half the size of a parking space. He typically was not allowed outside the cell, even for meals, and his cell doors were constructed in a manner that made it virtually impossible to see outside. Anthony was sometimes let out of his cell for short periods of “exercise” in a small, confined space. Otherwise, he was confined to his cell and could not see, talk with, or interact with any other human being, even a guard. Between 1998 and 2018 Anthony was transferred among a series of similar small, stifling solitary confinement cells in the IDOC’s Tamms, Dixon, Pontiac, Stateville, and Menard prisons. During this time period, Defendants conspired to ensure that Anthony was transferred from one solitary confinement cell to another, even when he was moved among prisons. He did not have sustained contact with another human being for twenty years.
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27. It has long been recognized that the conditions of solitary confinement can both cause mental illness and be especially devastating to persons suffering from mental illness. Indeed several years before Anthony was placed in solitary confinement, one federal court observed that “placing [mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement] is the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe,” Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995), because such prisoners “are at a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental health, including overt paranoia, psychotic breaks with reality, or massive exacerbations of existing mental illness as a result of the conditions” in solitary confinement. Id. Federal courts around the country have recognized the same thing; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed that the conditions of solitary confinement “aggravate[] the symptoms of [a prisoner’s] mental illness and by doing so inflict[] severe physical and especially mental suffering,” Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2006), and there is a “scientific consensus . . . that prisoners held in solitary confinement experience serious, often debilitating—even irreparable—mental and physical harm[] . . . .” Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted)). That was abundantly true for Anthony: in layman’s terms, placing him in solitary confinement caused him to lose his mind.
28. The primary manifestation of Anthony’s mental decompensation in solitary confinement was repeated, severe self-mutilation. He began to cut and re-cut wounds on his testicles, penis, neck, arms, legs, and groin. He cut open his scrotum, pierced it with paperclips, embedded it with cloth strips, a zipper, and staples. He castrated portions of his testicles. He cut his left inner thigh and tied it up with strips of blanket. He cut his penis repeatedly.
29. This self-mutilation began shortly after Anthony was placed in solitary confinement in 1998. It lasted throughout Anthony’s imprisonment in solitary confinement, and
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was sustained, continuous, and severe. This is a partial sampling of self-mutilation events
between August 2016 and May 2018:
• August 2016: Anthony cuts his scrotum and bleeds severely on his cell floor, requiring evacuation to an outside hospital.
• October 28, 2016: Anthony cuts his arm, thigh, and scrotum and inserts five staples, two ink pen reservoirs, and a spoon into the wounds.
• November 4, 2016: Anthony cuts his arm, thigh, and scrotum. He puts a plastic fork, ink pen, piece of fingernail clippers, and three pieces of metal in his scrotum.
• November 10, 2016: Anthony cuts his arm and scrotum. He puts nails and mop thread in his scrotum.
• November 12, 2016: Anthony re-cuts his scrotum. • November 15, 2016: Anthony cuts his scrotum and inserts foreign objects. • March 1, 2017: Anthony cuts himself with two sharpened ink pens, and
receives a disciplinary ticket for possessing contraband. • June 8, 2017: Anthony cuts his leg and scrotum with pieces from a broken fan.
He sews wire through his leg. He puts a fan motor through his leg. He puts foreign objects in his scrotum and stabs the fan guard through his scrotum. • June 16, 2017: Anthony cuts his arm and inserts a spoon in the wound far enough to require surgical removal. • February 3, 2018: Anthony cuts open his right thigh. Later, he reopens the cut and embeds the following inside: three spork handles, an ink pen, an ink pen tube, the top of a spork, metal, and staples. He also stabs an ink pen through his eyelids. • February 20, 2018: Anthony cuts himself. • March 2, 2018: Anthony cuts his thigh and stabs an ink pen through his eyelid. • April 7, 2018: Anthony cuts himself again. • April 15, 2018: Anthony cuts his scrotum and puts apple seeds in it. • April 16, 2018: Anthony again cuts his scrotum and puts foreign objects inside. • April 17, 2018: Anthony refuses medical treatment on his scrotum, and is put in restraints. • April 19, 2018: Anthony cuts his scrotum again, and loses so much blood that he becomes unconscious • May 27, 2018: Anthony puts a razor in his eye and cuts his scrotum.
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The Defendants were well aware of the devastating impact solitary confinement has on persons suffering from mental illness, and they were well aware of its catastrophic impact on Anthony in particular. Indeed, the Defendants meticulously recorded Anthony’s self-mutilation in his medical records.
30. Nonetheless, the Defendants did little to help Anthony. Anthony was given psychotropic drugs off and on during his incarceration, but they did not stop his self-harm. And at different prisons, a counselor would sometimes shout questions at Anthony through his cell door. This “treatment” was essentially performative. The Defendants were well aware that it was solitary confinement that was driving Anthony insane, but throughout nearly his entire incarceration they did almost nothing to ameliorate it. Instead, the Defendants conspired to simply move him from one solitary confinement cell to another, among the IDOC’s sprawling system of prisons.
31. Indeed, far from conceding what they knew—i.e., that Anthony’s solitary confinement had driven him insane—Anthony was prosecuted vigorously for manifestations of his mental illness. In addition to self-harming, Anthony’s mental illness caused him to lash out at others by throwing his own body fluids through the heavy steel door of his isolation cell. This was a well-recognized symptom of mental illness, which was being compounded and worsened by Anthony’s inability to withstand the conditions of isolated confinement. Instead of treating his mental illness, prison officials began referring each such act to the local prosecutor so that Anthony would be charged criminally for the outbursts. The resulting prosecutions were entirely unnecessary and had little purpose beyond ensuring that Anthony would continue to suffer in solitary confinement well beyond his original release date. As a judge who presided over one of these prosecutions remarked, “I would think a $2.00 piece of plastic draping [in front of Anthony’s cell] would have prevented all of” the incidents.
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32. The criminal convictions Anthony received for actions caused by his mental illness added another 92 years to Anthony’s original seven-year sentence. In addition, Anthony had racked up more than 150 years of “solitary time” meted out by IDOC as a result of his disciplinary infractions – meaning he could serve time until the year 2152 without ever leaving solitary. In short, Anthony was destined to serve the rest of his natural life in solitary confinement.
33. Eventually, criminal attorneys who took up Anthony’s cause were able to file a habeas petition and ultimately succeed in shortening Anthony’s sentence. Even so, Anthony was not released from the IDOC until August 27, 2018. By that point, he had spent 24 years in prison, enduring the last 20 consecutive years in the isolating torture of solitary confinement.
The Defendants could have stopped Anthony’s torture at any time 34. It is universally recognized that isolation and solitary confinement for any significant period of time is likely to make a person suffering from mental illness even worse, creating a substantial and increased risk of harm to the patient. It is also well known that the impact of solitary confinement is cumulative, in that it causes more damage to a person’s mind over time—and that these cumulative impacts can themselves cause mental illness. For this reason, leading correctional standard-setting bodies provide specifically that such confinement should not occur. For example, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care Standards for Mental Health Services in Correctional Facilities states that “[i]nmates who are seriously mentally ill should not be confined under conditions of extreme isolation.” The American Correctional Association has concluded that seriously mentally ill prisoners such as Anthony should not be placed in solitary confinement for more than 30 days. The Association of State Correctional Administrators “believe[s] that lengthy stays [in solitary confinement] manufacture or increase mental illness.” And the American Bar Association Treatment of Prisoner Standards
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similarly advises that “[p]risoners diagnosed with serious mental illness should not be housed in settings that exacerbate their mental illness or suicide risk, particularly in settings involving sensory deprivation or isolation.”
35. Early on in Anthony’s confinement, prison medical staff examined him and confirmed that he suffered from an acute mental health crisis and was at severe risk of self-harm. And years before his eventual release, Anthony was identified by the State of Illinois in court papers as one of only a few dozen prisoners within the entire IDOC whose mental illnesses were so acute and dangerous that they required full inpatient mental healthcare.
36. There are no facilities or services within the IDOC for providing such care. But that should not have prevented Anthony from receiving the care he needed. The Defendants were capable of ensuring that Anthony received appropriate mental healthcare outside the IDOC. Nevertheless, they failed to do so:
(a) State law empowers the director of the IDOC to have a prisoner needing intensive psychiatric care to be transferred to the custody of the IDHS during the prisoner’s sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/3-8-5. And the IDHS operates multiple mental health centers for treating such people. Defendants Baldwin, Sims, Reister, Dr. Doe 1, Hinton, Butler, Renzi, Puga, Nunez, and Chess were personally aware that there were a handful of IDOC prisoners, which included Anthony, who could not receive appropriate psychiatric care within the IDOC and therefore should have been transferred to the custody of the IDHS. Attorneys representing Defendant Baldwin and the IDOC admitted as much during a court hearing in Rasho v. Baldwin, 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill. (Mihm, J.)), an ongoing injunctive class action against Defendant Baldwin concerning the care of mentally ill prisoners within the IDOC. Despite this knowledge, however, no Defendant tried to have Anthony transferred to an IDHS facility before the completion of his
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sentence. As a result, Anthony unnecessarily endured years of solitary confinement without adequate mental health treatment, and continued to mutilate himself.
(b) Defendants Butler, Renzi, Puga, Nunez, and Chess, who provided care for Anthony, knew about his acute mental health condition, and knew that he needed inpatient psychiatric care that was not offered by the IDOC. They could have sought Anthony’s referral to an inpatient psychiatric facility through the “collegial review” process operated by Wexford, their employer. They did not do so, however.
(c) Defendant Wexford was capable of providing Anthony with the treatment he needed, or having him transferred out of IDOC facilities for inpatient mental health treatment. Wexford was and is under contract with the State of Illinois to provide both medical and mental health care to all prisoners within the IDOC. This included the provision of “[c]omprehensive and specialized mental health services” for IDOC prisoners, including off-site and hospitalization services as necessary to treat the medical and mental health needs of the IDOC’s prisoners. (Indeed, pursuant to this contract Wexford arranges every day for IDOC prisoners suffering from injuries and “physical” illnesses, like cancer, to be transported outside of IDOC prisons to medical facilities where they can receive the medical care they need.) Wexford also employed doctors and mental health professionals to assess the mental condition of IDOC prisoners. Its employees and agents examined Anthony and concluded that he was suffering from acute mental distress that required intensive care. By policy and practice, however, Wexford had never developed such a hospitalization capacity within the IDOC’s facilities, so this meant that Anthony required off-site hospitalization. On information and belief, Wexford also had a policy and practice of ignoring its obligation to provide such off-site hospitalization for seriously mentally ill prisoners, and did not seek to transfer any
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prisoners—including Anthony—for the off-site mental healthcare that they needed. As a result of this policy and practice, Anthony remained in solitary confinement in a crisis cell, suffering the injuries described herein. 37. Even short of providing Anthony with the care he needed, the Defendants could simply have let Anthony out of his solitary confinement cell to interact with other people. This they finally did, but only in the last few weeks of Anthony’s incarceration, in 2018 at Dixon Correctional Center. Not surprisingly, during even that short time, Anthony’s mental health improved dramatically. 38. For two decades, the Defendants knew that solitary confinement both causes and exacerbates mental illness. They knew that allowing Anthony to be placed in solitary confinement for any meaningful length of time was toxic to his mental health and would cause him to suffer both mental anguish and—when he harmed himself as a result of that anguish— intense physical pain. They also had the ability to prevent him from further harm by removing him from solitary and to secure appropriate treatment for his acute and devastating mental condition. But even though they knew Anthony would be devastated by solitary confinement, and even though they could have treated him appropriately, the Defendants allowed him to remain in solitary confinement anyway. 39. In effect, confronted with a prisoner whose mental illness made him hard to deal with, the Defendants chose to address the problem by keeping Anthony in a penal tomb—even though they knew that to do so was to inflict torture on him, for years on end.
COUNT I: Eighth Amendment Against: Baldwin (individual capacity), Sims (individual capacity), Reister (individual capacity); Dr. Doe 1 (individual capacity); Hinton (individual capacity), Butler (individual capacity), Renzi (individual capacity), Puga (individual capacity), Nunez (individual
capacity), Chess (individual capacity), and Wexford 40. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here.
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41. Anthony suffered from severe mental illnesses that were serious medical conditions and placed him at serious risk of harm and in need of intense medical treatment.
42. By holding Anthony in solitary confinement for years on end, Defendants caused or aggravated his mental illness.
43. The Defendants knew that Anthony’s serious medical needs were not being treated within IDOC’s facilities, and that the isolation of solitary confinement would exacerbate his condition and cause him further damage over time.
44. Despite what they knew, the Defendants failed to transfer Anthony out of IDOC to a facility where he could receive care for his serious mental health condition. Nor did they ameliorate the conditions of his confinement in prison, or provide him with effective treatment. Instead, they allowed him to remain isolated in solitary confinement.
45. Defendants conspired to keep Anthony in solitary confinement in institutions throughout the IDOC.
46. In so doing, the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Anthony’s serious medical needs.
47. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to secure proper treatment for Anthony and their decision that he instead be consigned to solitary confinement, Anthony suffered physical and psychological injuries, severe pain, and acute mental anguish.
48. Defendants’ consignment of Anthony in solitary confinement constituted the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
49. Defendants’ deliberate indifference to Anthony’s medical needs violated his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
50. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Anthony suffered the mental and physical injuries described herein.
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COUNT II: Americans with Disabilities Act Against: the State of Illinois, Baldwin (official capacity) 51. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 52. Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 53. Title II of the ADA (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12132) states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 54. To prevent discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) requires a public entity to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the services, program, or activity.” 55. The State of Illinois and the IDOC are public entities as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 56. At all times relevant to this Complaint, in light of his severe mental illness, Anthony was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 57. Due to his mental illnesses, Anthony had a mental impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, including but not limited to thinking, interacting with others, and controlling his behavior. As a result of his mental disabilities, he required intensive inpatient psychiatric therapy.
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58. Anthony was wholly dependent upon Defendants for basic daily needs and appropriate accommodations. As a state prisoner, he met the essential eligibility requirement for receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by the IDOC and the State of Illinois.
59. Under Title II of the ADA and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a), Defendants are responsible for ensuring that individuals in custody with known disabilities are provided with reasonable accommodations to prevent discrimination on the basis of disability.
60. Despite Anthony’s known and obvious disability—his severe mental illness, his repeated attempts to self-harm, and his classification among a handful of prisoners so mentally ill that they could not receive proper care within the IDOC—Defendants abided by a continuous policy of discrimination against mentally ill prisoners and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability and failing to provide him with access to human contact, rehabilitation opportunities, group therapy, adequate mental health treatment, and the numerous other programs and services that the IDOC offers to prisoners outside of their cells.
61. Based on their ongoing discriminatory policies, Defendants further failed to accommodate Anthony’s disabilities in the IDOC’s disciplinary processes, and they discriminated against him by deliberately isolating him on account of his mental illness.
62. The Defendants have and do make arrangements for other prisoners, who require hospitalization outside of the IDOC because of physical injuries or illnesses, to receive such outside hospitalization, or to receive effective care within the IDOC.
63. The foregoing accommodations were reasonable and, if provided to mentally ill patients like Anthony, would have enhanced Anthony’s quality of life, ameliorated his mental illness, and alleviated his suffering. Instead, and precisely because of his mental illness,
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Defendants placed Anthony in solitary confinement and removed his access to these necessary accommodations.
64. Due to the failure of Defendants to provide Anthony with the reasonable accommodation of inpatient intensive psychiatric treatment, Anthony was deprived of access to services, programs, and activities, including education, programming, recreation, exercise, human interaction, and mental health treatment and services.
65. The effects of social isolation and dehumanization of his conditions of solitary confinement were worsened by the Defendants’ deprivation of Anthony’s access to mental health programs and services to counteract the effects of the solitary confinement.
66. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to provide reasonable accommodation for his mental illness, and their continuous policies of discrimination against mentally ill prisoners, Anthony suffered extreme mental pain and anguish and physical harm, as described in this complaint.
COUNT III: Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Against: the State of Illinois and Baldwin (official capacity) 67. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 68. At all times relevant to this Complaint, in light of his severe mental illness, Anthony was a qualified individual with a disability as defined in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 69. The State of Illinois and the IDOC receive federal financial assistance. 70. Defendants discriminated against Anthony by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his mental disabilities. 71. By placing Anthony in solitary confinement and depriving him access to appropriate services, programs, and activities, including education, programming, recreation,
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exercise and mental health services, the Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
72. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to provide reasonable accommodation for his mental illness, and their continuous policies of discrimination against mentally ill prisoners, Anthony suffered extreme mental pain and anguish and physical harm, as described in this complaint.
COUNT IV: Fourteenth Amendment (Defendant Does 2-5)
73. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 74. Defendants have violated Anthony’s rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by, among other things: failing to provide Anthony a meaningful opportunity to challenge or be heard about his solitary confinement; failing to provide information about the basis for any decision to continue his solitary confinement; denying Anthony any opportunity to provide information to and/or to influence the ultimate decision-maker regarding his continuing solitary confinement; and failing to inform Anthony of the requirements to be released from solitary confinement. 75. As a result of these failures Anthony’s solitary confinement was prolonged and he suffered the physical and psychological injuries described in this complaint.

V.

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Anthony Gay respectfully requests judgment against

Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following:

A. An award of compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages;

B. An award of full costs and attorneys’ fees arising out of this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the ADA, and the RA; and

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C. Any and other further relief this Court may deem just and appropriate.

VI.

DEMAND FOR JURY

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby demands

a trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.

Dated: October 28, 2018

/s/ Alexis G. Chardon

.

Alexis G. Chardon – ali@weilchardon.com Stephen H. Weil – steve@weilchardon.com Weil & Chardon LLC 333 S. Wabash Ave., Suite 2700 Chicago, IL 60604 312-585-7404

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Antonio Romanucci

.

Antonio Romanucci - aromanucci@rblaw.net Nicolette Ward - nward@rblaw.net Romanucci & Blandin, LLC 321 North Clark St., Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 458-1000

/s/ Maggie E. Filler

.

Maggie E. Filler* Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center 745 Atlantic Avenue, 8th Floor Boston, MA 02111 (857) 284-1455 maggie.filler@macarthurjustice.org

*Pro hac vice petition forthcoming

/s/ Daniel M. Greenfield

.

Daniel M. Greenfield Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503-8538 daniel-greenfield@law.northwestern.edu

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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 1:19-cv-01133-HAB-EIL # 44 Page 1 of 13

E-FILED
Monday, 16 September, 2019 10:45:50 AM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

ANTHONY GAY, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No. 1:19-cv-01133-CSB ) ) )

ORDER

Plaintiff, Anthony Gay, filed a complaint [1] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Defendants State of Illinois, John Baldwin, Sylvia Butler, Jamie

Chess, Melvin Hinton, Pierre Nunez, William Puga, Shane Reister, Kelly

Ann Renzi, Jeff Sims, Wexford Health Sources, Incorporated (“Wexford”),

and five individuals Plaintiff identified as John Doe 1 to 5 violated his

constitutional rights during his incarceration in the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”).1

1 Plaintiff has since been released from IDOC custody.
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Defendants State of Illinois, Baldwin, Butler, Chess, Hinton, Reister, and Sims move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must assert “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and interpreting all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2013)
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(interpreting the plausibility standard to mean that the plaintiff “must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II. ANALYSIS The Court limits its consideration to the following two claims: (1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Baldwin, Butler, Chess, Hinton, Reister, and Sims and (2) Plaintiff’s discrimination claim against Defendants State of Illinois and Baldwin that Plaintiff alleges under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act.
A. Plaintiff’s Overarching Claim The crux of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants concerns the lack of mental health care within IDOC and placement in solitary confinement, which he contends accelerated the deterioration of his mental wellbeing. Plaintiff elaborates that he suffers from a borderline personality disorder. After his imprisonment in 1994, he engaged in horrific acts of selfmutilation and acted out by throwing feces and urine at prison staff. Plaintiff claims that instead of recognizing Plaintiff’s behavior as
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manifestations of mental illness and providing him appropriate treatment, Defendants issued disciplinary tickets that resulted in his continued solitary confinement for approximately two decades. These circumstances deprived Plaintiff of human contact, programming, mental health care, and activities. Plaintiff was also criminally charged and convicted of assaulting prison staff, which extended his initial seven-year prison sentence an additional fifteen years. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages as well as costs and attorneys’ fees.
B. Eighth Amendment As mentioned, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim proceeds against the following Defendants, who are either current or former IDOC employees: Baldwin, former IDOC director; Butler, mental health director of Menard Correctional Center; Chess, mental health director at Dixon Correctional Center; Hinton, acting statewide mental health supervisor; Reister, southern region psychology supervisor; and Sims, central region psychology supervisor.
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Plaintiff claims that collectively, “Defendants knew that [Plaintiff’s] serious medical needs were not being treated … and that the isolation of solitary confinement would exacerbate his conditions and cause him further damage over time.” (ECF 1: p. 18:43.) Plaintiff claims further that despite what they knew, Defendants neither transferred Plaintiff to a facility where he could receive effective treatment nor improved the conditions of his confinement. Plaintiff adds that attorneys representing Baldwin in the pending case of Rasho v. Baldwin, 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2007) (Mihm, J.), have essentially admitted that “a handful of IDOC prisoners, which included [Plaintiff], … could not receive appropriate psychiatric care within IDOC ….” (Id. p. 15:36.)
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not provide facts to establish their knowledge of Plaintiff’s specific circumstances and Rasho offers no support because Defendants Butler, Chess, Hinton, Reister, and Sims were not parties in that case, and the plaintiff in Rasho sued Baldwin in his official capacity.
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Despite Defendants’ focus on Plaintiff’s specific circumstances, the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a constitutional claim regarding a fundamental deficiency within IDOC—namely, the lack of appropriate mental health care, which Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew was deficient. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Prison officials thus have a constitutional duty to provide inmates with the care they require for their serious medical needs.”). According to Plaintiff, DOC’s refusal to provide appropriate care or to make reasonable accommodations worsened his physical and psychological health, which in turn caused his erratic behavior toward prison staff.
Based on Plaintiff’s alleged facts, a jury could reasonably find that Defendants Baldwin, Butler, Chess, Hinton, Reister, and Sims knew of this alleged systemic deficiency given their respective senior positions within IDOC. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F. 3d 1422, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a sheriff and county director of corrections can be expected to know of or participate in creating a systemic situation); see also Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he personal
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involvement of senior jail officials … can be inferred at the motion to dismiss stage, where, as here, the plaintiff alleges ‘potentially systemic,’ as opposed to ‘clearly localized,’ constitutional violations.”). Therefore, the Court concludes that at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Baldwin, Butler, Chess, Hinton, Reister, and Sims.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants State of Illinois and Baldwin, in
his official capacity, discriminated against Plaintiff based on his disability in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
“Title II of the [ADA], 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, both . . . create federal remedies for disability discrimination by state and local government agencies ….” Reed v. Illinois, 808 F.3d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 2015). However, the “relief available” to a plaintiff under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act “is coextensive.” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012).
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The Court confines its analysis to Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim. Other than some minor differences that are not relevant in this case, “the analysis governing each statute is the same except that the Rehabilitation Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept for their prisons.” Id. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 n.5. (“Illinois has waived its immunity from suits for damages under the Rehabilitation Act as a condition of its receipt of federal funds.”).
“As a practical matter, then, [courts] may dispense with the ADA and the thorny question of sovereign immunity, since [a plaintiff] can have but one recovery.” Id. at 672 (citing Duran v. Town of Cicero, 653 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs may have but one recovery); Wilson v. Sood, 727 F. App’x 220, 221-22 (7th Cir. 2018) (dismissal of ADA claim had no effect on scope of remedy because Rehabilitation Act claim remained).
“To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, [a plaintiff] need only allege that (1) he is a qualified person (2) with a disability[,] and (3) the Department of Corrections denied him access to a program or activity because of his disability.” Id. at 672. To be a qualified person under the
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Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff “must meet ‘the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.’” Johnson v. Randle, 451 F. App’x 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege enough facts to satisfy the first and third prongs of his burden. The Court disagrees.
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that despite his known and visible mental health illness, Defendants discriminated against him by denying access to mental health services outside of the prison yet Defendants provided outside medical services to other inmates with physical injuries and illnesses. (1: p. 20:62.) Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate his disability by providing inpatient psychiatric therapy, opting instead, to keep him isolated long term, which deprived him access to services, programs, activities, exercise, recreation, and human interaction. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. See Andrews v. Rauner, 2018 WL
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3748401, at *5 (C.D. Ill. August 6, 2018) (concluding that the plaintiff stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act by alleging that State Defendants denied her access to outside hospitalization but allowed inmates with physical injuries or illnesses to receive private care and instead, placed her in solitary confinement due to her mental disability).
As mentioned, Plaintiff names Defendants State of Illinois and also Baldwin, in his official capacity. However, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” (citations omitted). Id. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses the State of Illinois as a party in this case.
D. Statute of Limitations Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 28, 2016 [1]. Defendants contend that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims bars all of Plaintiff’s claims arising before October 28, 2016. See Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2013) (“To sum
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up, we reiterate our holding that the limitations period applicable to all § 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years ….” (emphasis in original)). Plaintiff responds that the continuing violation doctrine tolls the two-year statute of limitations period typically imposed on § 1983 claims.
“The continuing violation doctrine is … applicable when the state actor has a policy or practice that brings with it a fresh violation each day.” Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006)). The critical inquiry to determine whether the continuing violation doctrine applies is whether the constitutional deprivation “was a fresh act each day, or whether it was a discrete act that took place upon the first [instance] that merely had lingering consequences.” Savory, 469 F.3d at 673.
In this regard, the Court finds the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Heard v. Sheahan instructive. 253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001). In Heard, a prisoner discovered a prominent bulge in his groin. Id. at 317. A doctor diagnosed him with a ruptured hernia and recommended surgery, but the jail refused to act on the recommendation. Id. The prisoner filed suit more than two
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years after he discovered he needed medical attention. Id. In discussing
whether the continuing violation doctrine applied to the prisoner’s claim,
the Seventh Circuit stated:
[The jail’s refusal to treat the prisoner’s condition] continued for as long as the defendants had the power to do something about his condition, which is to say until he left the jail. Every day that they prolonged his agony by not treating his painful condition marked a fresh infliction of punishment that caused the statute of limitations to start running anew. A series of wrongful acts creates a series of claims.
Id. at 318.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that for about twenty years, Defendants denied
him mental-health care that caused him physical and psychological harm.
Although further discovery may prove otherwise, at this stage of the
proceedings, the Court is satisfied that the continuing violation doctrine
tolls Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint [37].
2) The Court sua sponte dismisses the State of Illinois as a party in 12

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these proceedings. The Court directs the Clerk of the Court to terminate the State of Illinois as a party in this case. 3) The Court refers this case to Magistrate Judge Eric I. Long for further proceedings. Entered September 16, 2019.
s/ Colin S. Bruce _________________________________________
COLIN S. BRUCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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E-FILED
Saturday, 07 March, 2020 12:22:45 PM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS URBANA DIVISION

)

ANTHONY GAY,

)

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN, ROB JEFFREYS, JEFF

)

SIMS, SHANE REISTER, DR. DOE 1,

)

MELVIN HINTON, SYLVIA BUTLER,

)

KELLY ANN RENZI, WILLIAM PUGA, DR. )

CHESS, DR. NUNEZ, WEXFORD HEALTH )

SOURCES, INC. and MICHAEL MELVIN,

)

TERRI KENNEDY, EMILY RUSKIN, JOHN )

VARGA, JUSTIN WILKS, SONJA

)

NICKLAUS, and DOES 2-5

)

Defendants.

Case No. 1: 19-cv-1133 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Hon. Harold A. Baker, Judge Hon. Eric I. Long, Mag. Judge

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT1 Plaintiff, ANTHONY GAY by his undersigned attorneys, complains against the abovenamed Defendants as follows:
INTRODUCTION When Anthony Gay was a teenager, he got into a fight with another teen who had insulted his sister. The teen claimed that Anthony had stolen his hat and a $1 bill in the process, so Anthony was charged with robbery. Anthony pleaded guilty, received a suspended prison sentence, and was placed on probation. Then, in another youthful error, Anthony violated his probation by driving a car without a license. As a result of these two events, in 1994 Anthony –

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), Plaintiff is filing this amended pleading with the written consent of the opposing parties.
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then only 20 years old – was imprisoned by the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). With good behavior, he should have been released in 3½ years.
But Anthony suffers from borderline personality disorder. After he was imprisoned the symptoms of this mental illness manifested, and he began to act out. Instead of providing treatment for his mental illness, the IDOC cited him for a variety of violations. Eventually, in 1996, the IDOC placed Anthony in solitary confinement—and it kept him there for over twenty years. For more than twenty years, Anthony lived alone in a small, bare, stifling cell, where he was deprived of all human contact for close to 24 hours per day.
The impact of solitary confinement on Anthony was catastrophic. Deprived of any sustained human interaction, Anthony’s mental condition deteriorated, and he began to engage in horrific acts of self-mutilation. He cut his forearm and his neck. He cut into his left inner thigh and wove the wound together with strips of a blanket. He cut into his scrotum and embedded a zipper there. He cut off a testicle and hung it on his cell door. He cut open his scrotum again and pierced it with paperclips. He mutilated his penis on multiple occasions, embedding a pen, plastics, and a zipper into the cuts. He stuck a pen into his eyelid and stabbed his thigh with a spoon, so deep that it had to be removed surgically. His documented acts of self-mutilation number in the dozens and continued for nearly the entirety of his solitary confinement.
It was plain for anyone to see that solitary confinement was ravaging Anthony’s mind, and that he was in desperate need of appropriate mental healthcare. But instead of placing Anthony in a setting that would alleviate the impact on his mind, or providing him treatment to get better, the Defendants responded by prolonging Anthony’s extreme isolation, depriving him of access to human contact, programming, mental health care, and activities—for decades.
As a result, Anthony’s torture was both compounded and extended. Solitary confinement had triggered Anthony’s mental illness, causing him to act erratically and irrationally. One
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manifestation was Anthony’s self-mutilation. Another was irrational “assaults” on prison staff, in which Anthony would do things like throw his body fluids at prison guards through cracks in his cell door. Instead of recognizing these acts for the manifestations of mental illness that they were, the Defendants doubled down. Anthony was given “tickets” that punished him with consecutive sentences of solitary confinement until the year 2152 – or two lifetimes of solitude. Anthony was also charged criminally for his “attacks” on prison staff, which ultimately extended his actual prison sentence by about fifteen years, with all but a few weeks of it to be served in solitary.
This extreme isolation continued even though in Rasho v. Baldwin, No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill.), an ongoing class action concerning the IDOC’s treatment of mentally ill prisoners, the Defendants acknowledged that Anthony was among a handful of IDOC prisoners who were so mentally ill that they needed acute, inpatient psychiatric care. Defendants refused to provide this care. Instead, they continued to hold Anthony in extreme isolation, with the devastating impact that Anthony continued to mutilate himself.
All told, Anthony spent nearly two decades in solitary confinement in a state of acute mental decompensation. By the time he was finally released from prison in 2018, he had mutilated himself hundreds of times. Throughout his solitary confinement, it was obvious to the Defendants that Anthony was in desperate need help. And at any point during his confinement, they could have rescued him, either by providing adequate services within prison or by transferring him to an inpatient psychiatric hospital. For the Defendants, however, it was simply more convenient to deal with a difficult inmate by keeping him locked away in an isolation cell. That “solution” inflicted decades of unthinkable pain on Anthony, and continues to harm him after his release.
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Through their actions and inaction in the face of Anthony’s obvious mental

decompensation, the Defendants tortured Anthony. This lawsuit seeks to hold the Defendants

accountable for the injuries that they inflicted on Anthony by holding him in solitary

confinement for two decades.

I.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Anthony Gay asserts the following claims to redress the egregious abuse that the

Defendants inflicted upon him:

2. Count One—Eighth Amendment. By placing Anthony in extended solitary

confinement notwithstanding its obvious, devastating impact on his mental health, the

Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Anthony, exhibited deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs, and inflicted punishment on him for no legitimate penological

purpose. This caused extreme mental anguish, suffering, and multiple physical injuries, in

violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

3. Counts Two and Three—Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act.

The Defendants also discriminated against Anthony because of his mental illness, in violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Anthony’s

severe mental illness was a disability covered by the ADA and the RA. While the Defendants

have policies to ensure that that IDOC prisoners with conventional medical needs (such as

physical injuries or illnesses) receive the medical treatment they need, the Defendants did not

provide equivalent treatment for Anthony’s mental condition. Instead, they followed a

continuing discriminatory policy of forcing him to undergo extended torture in solitary

confinement, without appropriate treatment, until his sentence was completed.

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4. In further violation of the ADA and the RA, the Defendants failed to provide

reasonable accommodations for Anthony’s disability. The Defendants provide IDOC prisoners

with a variety of programs and services, and they are obligated not to segregate disabled and

non-disabled persons. Among these is furnishing the basic human need of interaction with other

persons. With reasonable accommodations to his disability, the Defendants could have provided

Anthony with these programs and services, but they chose not to. Instead they placed him in

extended solitary confinement. Anthony served years in disciplinary solitary confinement

because he exhibited behaviors that were a result of the fact that the Defendants had put a

disabled person in solitary confinement. Defendants’ continuing policy of failing to provide

these accommodations to mentally ill prisoners like Anthony resulted in his entrapment in a

cruel, endless cycle, and the devastating consequences described in this Complaint.

5. Count Four—Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Due Process Clause, Anthony

had a right to meaningfully challenge his placement in solitary confinement and show that he

should not have been there. Had the Defendants provided this right, Anthony could have shown

that his placement in solitary was improper, since it flowed from irrational acts arising from his

mental illness, which was triggered by his confinement in solitary. The Defendants never

afforded Anthony this opportunity, however, causing him to suffer the injuries described in this

Complaint.

*

*

*

6. Anthony had the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and he had

the right not to be mistreated or discriminated against because of his disability. By this action,

Anthony seeks to vindicate those rights and to have the Defendants answer for the way they

treated a vulnerable man with a severe mental illness, first by inflicting horrific damage on him

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by throwing him in solitary, and then by failing to treat the devastating illness that they

themselves had both caused and exacerbated.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a), as

Plaintiff’s causes of action are brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act,

and the Rehabilitation Act.

8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as one or more of

the Defendants resides in this judicial district and a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claims asserted in this lawsuit occurred in this judicial district.

III.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Anthony Gay is a resident of Illinois. Between 1994 and 2018, he was

imprisoned by the IDOC at multiple prisons, including the Tamms, Dixon, Pontiac, Stateville,

and Menard prisons. He now lives with his family in Rock Island, Illinois.

10. Defendant Rob Jeffreys is the director of the IDOC, which imprisoned Anthony

and subjected him to solitary confinement, pursuant to a continuous policy, described herein,

under which difficult, mentally ill prisoners were placed in prolonged solitary confinement

instead of being provided with appropriate mental health treatment. Defendant Jeffreys is sued

in his official capacity. The IDOC receives federal funding.

11. Defendant John R. Baldwin was the acting director of the IDOC. Defendant

Baldwin is sued in his individual capacity. Defendant Baldwin had actual knowledge that

solitary confinement both causes and exacerbates mental illness. He also knew that multiple

severely mentally ill prisoners, among them Anthony Gay, were in critical need of inpatient

psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that the IDOC was failing to provide. At all relevant

times Defendant Baldwin had the power to ensure this treatment was provided by the IDOC, or

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to secure the transfer of these prisoners to mental health facilities operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services (“IDHS”). Defendant Baldwin took neither course of action.
12. Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) is a private company that was under contract to provide medical care and mental healthcare to the prisoners of the IDOC, including Anthony, during a number of years of Anthony’s imprisonment. This care included the obligation to provide comprehensive and specialized mental health services, including any specialty and emergency care that was not provided at IDOC facilities. Despite its contractual obligations, however, by policy and practice Wexford did not provide on-site mental health services necessary to meet the needs of persons with severe mental illnesses like Anthony, nor did it transfer prisoners who needed such care to appropriate outside mental health facilities.
13. Defendant Jeff Sims is the IDOC’s Central Region Psychology Supervisor. He is sued in his individual capacity. While Anthony was confined in the prisons under Defendant Sims’ supervision, Sims was personally aware of the harm Anthony was incurring from solitary confinement, and had actual knowledge that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Sims had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
14. Defendant Shane Reister is the IDOC’s Southern Region Psychology Supervisor. He is sued in his individual capacity. While Anthony was confined in the prisons under Defendant Reister’s supervision, Reister was personally aware of the harm Anthony was incurring from solitary confinement, and had actual knowledge that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Reister had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
15. Defendant Dr. Doe 1 is IDOC’s Northern Region Psychology Supervisor. Dr. Doe 1 is sued in his or her individual capacity. While Anthony was confined in the prisons
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under Defendant Dr. Doe 1’s supervision, he or she was personally aware of the harm Anthony was incurring from solitary confinement, and had actual knowledge that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Doe 1 had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
16. Defendant Dr. Melvin Hinton is the Acting Statewide Mental Health Supervisor for the IDOC. He is sued in his individual capacity. Dr. Hinton was personally aware of Anthony’s confinement and its impact on his mental health condition. Dr. Hinton also knew that Anthony needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Hinton had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
17. Defendant Dr. Sylvia Butler is the Mental Health Director of Menard Correctional Center. She is sued in her individual capacity. At all relevant times she was employed by Defendant Wexford. Dr. Butler was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care at Menard when he was incarcerated there in 2015-2016, and she was aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Butler had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
18. Defendant Dr. Kelly Ann Renzi is the Mental Health Director of Pontiac Correctional Center. She is sued in her individual capacity. Dr. Renzi was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care at Pontiac when he was incarcerated there in 2017-2018, and she was aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Renzi had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
19. Defendant Dr. William Puga was a physician at Pontiac Correctional Center. At all relevant times, he was employed by Defendant Wexford. He is sued in his individual
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capacity. Dr. Puga personally provided psychiatric care to Anthony at Pontiac from 2016-2018. Along with Dr. Renzi, Dr. Puga was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care and was aware that he needed to be removed from solitary confinement, and needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Puga had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
20. Defendant Dr. Chess is the Mental Health Director of Dixon Correctional Center. He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times he was employed by Defendant Wexford. Dr. Chess was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care at Dixon in 2018 and was aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Chess had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
21. Defendant Dr. Nunez is a physician at Dixon Correctional Center. At all relevant times, Dr. Nunez was employed by Defendant Wexford. He is sued in his individual capacity. Dr. Nunez personally provided psychological care to Anthony at Dixon in 2018. Along with Dr. Chess, Dr. Nunez was responsible for Anthony’s psychiatric care and was aware that he needed psychiatric care and appropriate treatment that he was not receiving. At all relevant times Dr. Nunez had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
22. Michael Melvin was the warden at Pontiac Correctional Center during Anthony’s imprisonment there in 2017-2018, and was responsible for the implementation, oversight, and supervision of policies and practices at Pontiac. Melvin also knew that as a result of Defendants’ policies, including at Pontiac, multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them Anthony Gay, were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of being provided with appropriate mental health treatment. At all relevant times Melvin had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
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23. Terri Kennedy was an assistant warden at Pontiac Correctional Center during Anthony’s imprisonment there in 2017-2018, and was responsible for the implementation, oversight, and supervision of policies and practices at Pontiac. Kennedy also knew that as a result of Defendants’ policies, including at Pontiac, multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them Anthony Gay, were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of being provided with appropriate mental health treatment. At all relevant times Kennedy had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
24. Emily Ruskin was an assistant warden at Pontiac Correctional Center during Anthony’s imprisonment there in 2017-2018, and was responsible for the implementation, oversight, and supervision of policies and practices at Pontiac. Ruskin also knew that as a result of Defendants’ policies, including at Pontiac, multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them Anthony Gay, were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of being provided with appropriate mental health treatment. At all relevant times Ruskin had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
25. John Varga was the warden of Dixon Correctional Center during Anthony’s imprisonment there in 2018, and was responsible for the implementation, oversight, and supervision of policies and practices at Dixon. Varga also knew that as a result of Defendants’ policies, including at Dixon, multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them Anthony Gay, were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of being provided with appropriate mental health treatment. At all relevant times Varga had the power to seek appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.
26. Justin Wilks was an assistant warden of Dixon Correctional Center during Anthony’s imprisonment there in 2018, and was responsible for the implementation, oversight, and supervision of policies and practices at Dixon. Wilks also knew that as a result of
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Defendants’ policies, including at Dixon, multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them

Anthony Gay, were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of being provided with

appropriate mental health treatment. At all relevant times Wilks had the power to seek

appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.

27. Sonja Nicklaus was an assistant warden of Dixon Correctional Center during

Anthony’s imprisonment there in 2018, and was responsible for the implementation, oversight,

and supervision of policies and practices at Dixon. Nicklaus also knew that as a result of

Defendants’ policies, including at Dixon, multiple severely mentally ill prisoners, among them

Anthony Gay, were placed in prolonged solitary confinement instead of being provided with

appropriate mental health treatment. At all relevant times Nicklaus had the power to seek

appropriate treatment for Anthony, but did not do so.

28. Defendant Does 2-5 are sued herein by fictitious names for the reason that their

true names are unknown to Plaintiff. These Doe defendants are administrators overseeing

facilities where Anthony was held in solitary confinement, and who had a duty to provide

inmates with a meaningful opportunity to challenge their solitary confinement placement.

Despite their obligation to do so, the Doe defendants failed to provide such an opportunity to

Anthony, prolonging his solitary confinement.

IV.

FACTS

29. In 1994, while he was still a teenager, Anthony Gay was charged with robbery—

the result of an incident in which he got in a fight with another teen who had insulted his sister,

and the teen claimed Anthony had stolen the teen’s hat and a $1 bill. He pleaded guilty, was

given a suspended prison sentence, and was placed on probation.

30. Later that year, while still on probation, Anthony was pulled over and found to be

driving without a license. He was adjudicated as having violated his probation, and a few days

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before Christmas 1994, at the age of 20, Anthony checked himself into the IDOC to begin serving a seven-year sentence. With credit for good behavior, he was eligible for release in 3½ years.
31. Anthony could not maintain good behavior, however. He suffers from mental illnesses, including borderline personality disorder. The illness manifested in prison, causing Anthony to act erratically and to break prison rules. As a result of these infractions he lost his time credit for good behavior.
By holding Anthony in prolonged solitary confinement, the Defendants tortured him. 32. In March 1998, as a result of his infractions, Anthony was placed in solitary confinement. He was confined to a cell roughly half the size of a parking space. He typically was not allowed outside the cell, even for meals, and his cell doors were constructed in a manner that made it virtually impossible to see outside. Anthony was sometimes let out of his cell for short periods of “exercise” in a small, confined space. Otherwise, he was confined to his cell and could not see, talk with, or interact with any other human being, even a guard. Between 1998 and 2018 Anthony was transferred among a series of similar small, stifling solitary confinement cells in the IDOC’s Tamms, Dixon, Pontiac, Stateville, and Menard prisons. During this time period, Defendants conspired to ensure that Anthony was transferred from one solitary confinement cell to another, even when he was moved among prisons. He did not have sustained contact with another human being for twenty years. 33. It has long been recognized that the conditions of solitary confinement can both cause mental illness and be especially devastating to persons suffering from mental illness. Indeed several years before Anthony was placed in solitary confinement, one federal court observed that “placing [mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement] is the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe,” Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146,
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1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995), because such prisoners “are at a particularly high risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental health, including overt paranoia, psychotic breaks with reality, or massive exacerbations of existing mental illness as a result of the conditions” in solitary confinement. Id. Federal courts around the country have recognized the same thing; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed that the conditions of solitary confinement “aggravate[] the symptoms of [a prisoner’s] mental illness and by doing so inflict[] severe physical and especially mental suffering,” Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 977 (7th Cir. 2006), and there is a “scientific consensus . . . that prisoners held in solitary confinement experience serious, often debilitating—even irreparable—mental and physical harm[] . . . .” Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted)). That was abundantly true for Anthony: in layman’s terms, placing him in solitary confinement caused him to lose his mind.
34. The primary manifestation of Anthony’s mental decompensation in solitary confinement was repeated, severe self-mutilation. He began to cut and re-cut wounds on his testicles, penis, neck, arms, legs, and groin. He cut open his scrotum, pierced it with paperclips, embedded it with cloth strips, a zipper, and staples. He castrated portions of his testicles. He cut his left inner thigh and tied it up with strips of blanket. He cut his penis repeatedly.
35. This self-mutilation began shortly after Anthony was placed in solitary confinement in 1998. It lasted throughout Anthony’s imprisonment in solitary confinement, and was sustained, continuous, and severe. This is a partial sampling of self-mutilation events between August 2016 and May 2018:
 August 2016: Anthony cuts his scrotum and bleeds severely on his cell floor, requiring evacuation to an outside hospital.
 October 28, 2016: Anthony cuts his arm, thigh, and scrotum and inserts five staples, two ink pen reservoirs, and a spoon into the wounds.
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 November 4, 2016: Anthony cuts his arm, thigh, and scrotum. He puts a plastic fork, ink pen, piece of fingernail clippers, and three pieces of metal in his scrotum.
 November 10, 2016: Anthony cuts his arm and scrotum. He puts nails and mop thread in his scrotum.
 November 12, 2016: Anthony re-cuts his scrotum.  November 15, 2016: Anthony cuts his scrotum and inserts foreign objects.  March 1, 2017: Anthony cuts himself with two sharpened ink pens, and
receives a disciplinary ticket for possessing contraband.  June 8, 2017: Anthony cuts his leg and scrotum with pieces from a broken fan.
He sews wire through his leg. He puts a fan motor through his leg. He puts foreign objects in his scrotum and stabs the fan guard through his scrotum.  June 16, 2017: Anthony cuts his arm and inserts a spoon in the wound far enough to require surgical removal.  February 3, 2018: Anthony cuts open his right thigh. Later, he reopens the cut and embeds the following inside: three spork handles, an ink pen, an ink pen tube, the top of a spork, metal, and staples. He also stabs an ink pen through his eyelids.  February 20, 2018: Anthony cuts himself.  March 2, 2018: Anthony cuts his thigh and stabs an ink pen through his eyelid.  April 7, 2018: Anthony cuts himself again.  April 15, 2018: Anthony cuts his scrotum and puts apple seeds in it.  April 16, 2018: Anthony again cuts his scrotum and puts foreign objects inside.  April 17, 2018: Anthony refuses medical treatment on his scrotum, and is put in restraints.  April 19, 2018: Anthony cuts his scrotum again, and loses so much blood that he becomes unconscious  May 27, 2018: Anthony puts a razor in his eye and cuts his scrotum.
The Defendants were well aware of the devastating impact solitary confinement has on persons
suffering from mental illness, and they were well aware of its catastrophic impact on Anthony in
particular. Indeed, the Defendants meticulously recorded Anthony’s self-mutilation in his
medical records.
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36. Nonetheless, the Defendants did little to help Anthony. Anthony was given psychotropic drugs off and on during his incarceration, but they did not stop his self-harm. And at different prisons, a counselor would sometimes shout questions at Anthony through his cell door. This “treatment” was essentially performative. The Defendants were well aware that it was solitary confinement that was driving Anthony insane, but throughout nearly his entire incarceration they did almost nothing to ameliorate it. Instead, the Defendants conspired to simply move him from one solitary confinement cell to another, among the IDOC’s sprawling system of prisons.
37. Indeed, far from conceding what they knew—i.e., that Anthony’s solitary confinement had driven him insane—Anthony was prosecuted vigorously for manifestations of his mental illness. In addition to self-harming, Anthony’s mental illness caused him to lash out at others by throwing his own body fluids through the heavy steel door of his isolation cell. This was a well-recognized symptom of mental illness, which was being compounded and worsened by Anthony’s inability to withstand the conditions of isolated confinement. Instead of treating his mental illness, prison officials began referring each such act to the local prosecutor so that Anthony would be charged criminally for the outbursts. The resulting prosecutions were entirely unnecessary and had little purpose beyond ensuring that Anthony would continue to suffer in solitary confinement well beyond his original release date. As a judge who presided over one of these prosecutions remarked, “I would think a $2.00 piece of plastic draping [in front of Anthony’s cell] would have prevented all of” the incidents.
38. The criminal convictions Anthony received for actions caused by his mental illness added another 92 years to Anthony’s original seven-year sentence. In addition, Anthony had racked up more than 150 years of “solitary time” meted out by IDOC as a result of his disciplinary infractions – meaning he could serve time until the year 2152 without ever leaving
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solitary. In short, Anthony was destined to serve the rest of his natural life in solitary confinement.
39. Eventually, criminal attorneys who took up Anthony’s cause were able to file a habeas petition and ultimately succeed in shortening Anthony’s sentence. Even so, Anthony was not released from the IDOC until August 27, 2018. By that point, he had spent 24 years in prison, enduring the last 20 consecutive years in the isolating torture of solitary confinement.
The Defendants could have stopped Anthony’s torture at any time 40. It is universally recognized that isolation and solitary confinement for any significant period of time is likely to make a person suffering from mental illness even worse, creating a substantial and increased risk of harm to the patient. It is also well known that the impact of solitary confinement is cumulative, in that it causes more damage to a person’s mind over time—and that these cumulative impacts can themselves cause mental illness. For this reason, leading correctional standard-setting bodies provide specifically that such confinement should not occur. For example, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care Standards for Mental Health Services in Correctional Facilities states that “[i]nmates who are seriously mentally ill should not be confined under conditions of extreme isolation.” The American Correctional Association has concluded that seriously mentally ill prisoners such as Anthony should not be placed in solitary confinement for more than 30 days. The Association of State Correctional Administrators “believe[s] that lengthy stays [in solitary confinement] manufacture or increase mental illness.” And the American Bar Association Treatment of Prisoner Standards similarly advises that “[p]risoners diagnosed with serious mental illness should not be housed in settings that exacerbate their mental illness or suicide risk, particularly in settings involving sensory deprivation or isolation.”
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41. Early on in Anthony’s confinement, prison medical staff examined him and confirmed that he suffered from an acute mental health crisis and was at severe risk of self-harm. And years before his eventual release, Anthony was identified by the State of Illinois in court papers as one of only a few dozen prisoners within the entire IDOC whose mental illnesses were so acute and dangerous that they required full inpatient mental healthcare.
42. There are no facilities or services within the IDOC for providing such care. But that should not have prevented Anthony from receiving the care he needed. The Defendants were capable of ensuring that Anthony received appropriate mental healthcare outside the IDOC. Nevertheless, they failed to do so:
(a) State law empowers the director of the IDOC to have a prisoner needing intensive psychiatric care to be transferred to the custody of the IDHS during the prisoner’s sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/3-8-5. And the IDHS operates multiple mental health centers for treating such people. Defendants Baldwin, Sims, Reister, Dr. Doe 1, Hinton, Butler, Renzi, Puga, Nunez, Chess, Melvin, Kennedy, Ruskin, Varga, Wilks, and Nicklaus, were personally aware that there were a handful of IDOC prisoners, which included Anthony, who could not receive appropriate psychiatric care within the IDOC and therefore should have been transferred to the custody of the IDHS. Attorneys representing Defendant Baldwin and the IDOC admitted as much during a court hearing in Rasho v. Baldwin, 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill. (Mihm, J.)), an ongoing injunctive class action against Defendant Baldwin concerning the care of mentally ill prisoners within the IDOC. Despite this knowledge, however, no Defendant tried to have Anthony transferred to an IDHS facility before the completion of his sentence. As a result, Anthony unnecessarily endured years of solitary confinement without adequate mental health treatment, and continued to mutilate himself.
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(b) Defendants Butler, Renzi, Puga, Nunez, and Chess, who provided care for Anthony, knew about his acute mental health condition, and knew that he needed inpatient psychiatric care that was not offered by the IDOC. They could have sought Anthony’s referral to an inpatient psychiatric facility through the “collegial review” process operated by Wexford, their employer. They did not do so, however.
(c) Defendant Wexford was capable of providing Anthony with the treatment he needed, or having him transferred out of IDOC facilities for inpatient mental health treatment. Wexford was and is under contract with the State of Illinois to provide both medical and mental health care to all prisoners within the IDOC. This included the provision of “[c]omprehensive and specialized mental health services” for IDOC prisoners, including off-site and hospitalization services as necessary to treat the medical and mental health needs of the IDOC’s prisoners. (Indeed, pursuant to this contract Wexford arranges every day for IDOC prisoners suffering from injuries and “physical” illnesses, like cancer, to be transported outside of IDOC prisons to medical facilities where they can receive the medical care they need.) Wexford also employed doctors and mental health professionals to assess the mental condition of IDOC prisoners. Its employees and agents examined Anthony and concluded that he was suffering from acute mental distress that required intensive care. By policy and practice, however, Wexford had never developed such a hospitalization capacity within the IDOC’s facilities, so this meant that Anthony required off-site hospitalization. On information and belief, Wexford also had a policy and practice of ignoring its obligation to provide such off-site hospitalization for seriously mentally ill prisoners, and did not seek to transfer any prisoners—including Anthony—for the off-site mental healthcare that they needed. As a
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result of this policy and practice, Anthony remained in solitary confinement in a crisis cell, suffering the injuries described herein. 43. Even short of providing Anthony with the care he needed, the Defendants, including all the individual defendants, could simply have had Anthony let out of his solitary confinement cell to interact with other people. This they finally did, but only in the last few weeks of Anthony’s incarceration, in 2018 at Dixon Correctional Center. Not surprisingly, during even that short time, Anthony’s mental health improved dramatically. 44. For two decades, the Defendants knew that solitary confinement both causes and exacerbates mental illness. They knew that allowing Anthony to be placed in solitary confinement for any meaningful length of time was toxic to his mental health and would cause him to suffer both mental anguish and—when he harmed himself as a result of that anguish— intense physical pain. They also had the ability to prevent him from further harm by removing him from solitary and to secure appropriate treatment for his acute and devastating mental condition. But even though they knew Anthony would be devastated by solitary confinement, and even though they could have treated him appropriately, the Defendants allowed him to remain in solitary confinement anyway. 45. In effect, confronted with a prisoner whose mental illness made him hard to deal with, the Defendants chose to address the problem by keeping Anthony in a penal tomb—even though they knew that to do so was to inflict torture on him, for years on end.
COUNT I: Eighth Amendment Against: Baldwin (individual capacity), Sims (individual capacity), Reister (individual capacity); Dr. Doe 1 (individual capacity); Hinton (individual capacity), Butler (individual capacity), Renzi (individual capacity), Puga (individual capacity), Nunez (individual capacity), Chess (individual capacity), Melvin (individual capacity), Kennedy (individual capacity), Ruskin (individual capacity), Varga (individual capacity), Wilks (individual
capacity), Nicklaus (individual capacity), and Wexford 46. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here.
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47. Anthony suffered from severe mental illnesses that were serious medical conditions and placed him at serious risk of harm and in need of intense medical treatment.
48. By holding Anthony in solitary confinement for years on end, Defendants caused or aggravated his mental illness.
49. The Defendants knew that Anthony’s serious medical needs were not being treated within IDOC’s facilities, and that the isolation of solitary confinement would exacerbate his condition and cause him further damage over time.
50. Despite what they knew, the Defendants failed to transfer Anthony out of IDOC to a facility where he could receive care for his serious mental health condition. Nor did they ameliorate the conditions of his confinement in prison, or provide him with effective treatment. Instead, they allowed him to remain isolated in solitary confinement.
51. Defendants conspired to keep Anthony in solitary confinement in institutions throughout the IDOC.
52. In so doing, the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Anthony’s serious medical needs.
53. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to secure proper treatment for Anthony and their decision that he instead be consigned to solitary confinement, Anthony suffered physical and psychological injuries, severe pain, and acute mental anguish.
54. Defendants’ consignment of Anthony in solitary confinement constituted the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
55. Defendants’ deliberate indifference to Anthony’s medical needs violated his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
56. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Anthony suffered the mental and physical injuries described herein.
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COUNT II: Americans with Disabilities Act Against: Jeffreys (official capacity)
57. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 58. Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 59. Title II of the ADA (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12132) states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 60. To prevent discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) requires a public entity to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the services, program, or activity.” 61. The State of Illinois and the IDOC are public entities as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 62. At all times relevant to this Complaint, in light of his severe mental illness, Anthony was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 63. Due to his mental illnesses, Anthony had a mental impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, including but not limited to thinking, interacting with others, and controlling his behavior. As a result of his mental disabilities, he required intensive inpatient psychiatric therapy.
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64. Anthony was wholly dependent upon Defendants for basic daily needs and appropriate accommodations. As a state prisoner, he met the essential eligibility requirement for receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by the IDOC and the State of Illinois.
65. Under Title II of the ADA and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a), Defendants are responsible for ensuring that individuals in custody with known disabilities are provided with reasonable accommodations to prevent discrimination on the basis of disability.
66. Despite Anthony’s known and obvious disability—his severe mental illness, his repeated attempts to self-harm, and his classification among a handful of prisoners so mentally ill that they could not receive proper care within the IDOC—Defendants abided by a continuous policy of discrimination against mentally ill prisoners and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability and failing to provide him with access to human contact, rehabilitation opportunities, group therapy, adequate mental health treatment, and the numerous other programs and services that the IDOC offers to prisoners outside of their cells.
67. Based on their ongoing discriminatory policies, Defendants further failed to accommodate Anthony’s disabilities in the IDOC’s disciplinary processes, and they discriminated against him by deliberately isolating him on account of his mental illness.
68. The Defendants have and do make arrangements for other prisoners, who require hospitalization outside of the IDOC because of physical injuries or illnesses, to receive such outside hospitalization, or to receive effective care within the IDOC.
69. The foregoing accommodations were reasonable and, if provided to mentally ill patients like Anthony, would have enhanced Anthony’s quality of life, ameliorated his mental illness, and alleviated his suffering. Instead, and precisely because of his mental illness,
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Defendants placed Anthony in solitary confinement and removed his access to these necessary accommodations.
70. Due to the failure of Defendants to provide Anthony with the reasonable accommodation of inpatient intensive psychiatric treatment, Anthony was deprived of access to services, programs, and activities, including education, programming, recreation, exercise, human interaction, and mental health treatment and services.
71. The effects of social isolation and dehumanization of his conditions of solitary confinement were worsened by the Defendants’ deprivation of Anthony’s access to mental health programs and services to counteract the effects of the solitary confinement.
72. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to provide reasonable accommodation for his mental illness, and their continuous policies of discrimination against mentally ill prisoners, Anthony suffered extreme mental pain and anguish and physical harm, as described in this complaint.
COUNT III: Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Against: Jeffreys (official capacity)
73. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 74. At all times relevant to this Complaint, in light of his severe mental illness, Anthony was a qualified individual with a disability as defined in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 75. The State of Illinois and the IDOC receive federal financial assistance. 76. Defendants discriminated against Anthony by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his mental disabilities. 77. By placing Anthony in solitary confinement and depriving him access to appropriate services, programs, and activities, including education, programming, recreation,
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exercise and mental health services, the Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
78. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to provide reasonable accommodation for his mental illness, and their continuous policies of discrimination against mentally ill prisoners, Anthony suffered extreme mental pain and anguish and physical harm, as described in this complaint.
COUNT IV: Fourteenth Amendment Against: Melvin (individual capacity), Kennedy (individual capacity), Ruskin (individual capacity), Varga (individual capacity), Wilks (individual capacity), Nicklaus (individual
capacity), Defendant Does 2-5 79. Each paragraph of this complaint is incorporated as if fully restated here. 80. Defendants have violated Anthony’s rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by, among other things: failing to provide Anthony a meaningful opportunity to challenge or be heard about his solitary confinement; failing to provide information about the basis for any decision to continue his solitary confinement; denying Anthony any opportunity to provide information to and/or to influence the ultimate decision-maker regarding his continuing solitary confinement; and failing to inform Anthony of the requirements to be released from solitary confinement. 81. As a result of these failures Anthony’s solitary confinement was prolonged and he suffered the physical and psychological injuries described in this complaint.

V.

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Anthony Gay respectfully requests judgment against

Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following:

A. An award of compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages;

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B. An award of full costs and attorneys’ fees arising out of this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), the ADA, and the RA; and

C. Any and other further relief this Court may deem just and appropriate.

VI.

DEMAND FOR JURY

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.

Dated: March 7, 2020
Antonio Romanucci - aromanucci@rblaw.net Nicolette Ward - nward@rblaw.net Romanucci & Blandin, LLC 321 North Clark St., Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 458-1000
Maggie E. Filler Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center 160 East Grand Avenue (6th Floor) Chicago, IL 60611 maggie.filler@macarthurjustice.org

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Stephen H. Weil

.

Arthur Loevy – arthur@loevy.com Jon Loevy – jon@loevy.com Sarah Grady – sarah@loevy.com Stephen Weil – weil@loevy.com Loevy & Loevy 311 N. Aberdeen Street Third Floor Chicago, IL 60607 312-243-5900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Stephen H. Weil, a licensed attorney (ARDC No. 6291026) hereby certify that on March 7, 2020, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system.
/s/ Stephen H. Weil .