Case: 4:15-cv-00253-SPM Doc. #: 1 Filed: 02/08/15 Page: 1 of 55 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

)

KEILEE FANT, ROELIF CARTER,

)

ALLISON NELSON, HERBERT

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NELSON JR., ALFRED MORRIS,

)

ANTHONY KIMBLE, DONYALE

)

THOMAS, SHAMEIKA MORRIS,

)

DANIEL JENKINS, RONNIE TUCKER, )

TONYA DEBERRY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE CITY OF FERGUSON

)

)

Defendant.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. ___4_:1_5_-_cv_-_2_5_3_____ (Jury Trial Demanded)

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

1. The Plaintiffs in this case are each impoverished people who were jailed by the City

of Ferguson because they were unable to pay a debt owed to the City from traffic tickets or other

minor offenses. In each case, the City imprisoned a human being solely because the person could

not afford to make a monetary payment. Although the Plaintiffs pleaded that they were unable to

pay due to their poverty, each was held in jail indefinitely and none was afforded a lawyer or the

inquiry into their ability to pay that the United States Constitution requires. Instead, they were

threatened, abused, and left to languish in confinement at the mercy of local officials until their

frightened family members could produce enough cash to buy their freedom or until City jail

officials decided, days or weeks later, to let them out for free.

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2. Once locked in the Ferguson jail, impoverished people owing debts to the City endure grotesque treatment. They are kept in overcrowded cells; they are denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap; they are subjected to the constant stench of excrement and refuse in their congested cells; they are surrounded by walls smeared with mucus and blood; they are kept in the same clothes for days and weeks without access to laundry or clean underwear; they step on top of other inmates, whose bodies cover nearly the entire uncleaned cell floor, in order to access a single shared toilet that the City does not clean; they develop untreated illnesses and infections in open wounds that spread to other inmates; they endure days and weeks without being allowed to use the moldy shower; their filthy bodies huddle in cold temperatures with a single thin blanket even as they beg guards for warm blankets; they are not given adequate hygiene products for menstruation; they are routinely denied vital medical care and prescription medication, even when their families beg to be allowed to bring medication to the jail; they are provided food so insufficient and lacking in nutrition that inmates lose significant amounts of weight; they suffer from dehydration out of fear of drinking foul smelling water that comes from an apparatus on top of the toilet; and they must listen to the screams of other inmates languishing from unattended medical issues as they sit in their cells without access to books, legal materials, television, or natural light. Perhaps worst of all, they do not know when they will be allowed to leave.
3. These physical abuses and deprivations are accompanied by other pervasive humiliations. Jail guards routinely taunt impoverished people when they are unable to pay for their release, telling them that they will be released whenever jail staff “feels” like letting them go. As described in detail below, jail guards routinely and pervasively laugh at the inmates and humiliate them with discriminatory and degrading epithets. For example, when filthy and
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shivering women were forced to share blankets to stay warm, officers shouted at the women that they were “stanky ass dykes” and “dirty whores.”
4. City officials and employees—through their conduct, decisions, training and lack of training, rules, policies, and practices—have built a municipal scheme designed to brutalize, to punish, and to profit. The architecture of this illegal scheme has been in place for many years.1
5. In 2014, the City of Ferguson issued an average of more than 3.6 arrest warrants per household and almost 2.2 arrest warrants for every adult, mostly in cases involving unpaid debt for tickets.2 The City of Ferguson issues more arrest warrants per capita than any other city in Missouri larger than 10,000 residents. If the rest of the Saint Louis metropolitan area generated revenue from its courts at the rate done by relatively low-income Ferguson, it would have made nearly $1.3 billion in the past five years.
6. The City’s modern debtors’ prison scheme has been increasingly profitable to the City of Ferguson, earning it millions of dollars over the past several years. It has also devastated the City’s poor, trapping them for years in a cycle of increased fees, debts, extortion, and cruel jailings. The families of indigent people borrow money to buy their loved ones out of jail at rates set arbitrarily by jail officials, only for them later to owe more money to the City of Ferguson from increased fees and surcharges. Thousands of people like the Plaintiffs take money from their disability checks or sacrifice money that is desperately needed by their families for food, diapers, clothing, rent, and utilities to pay ever increasing court fines, fees, costs, and surcharges. They are
1 See, e.g., T.E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 Mo. L. Rev. 69, 93 (1966) (“Our municipal jails are, in almost every case, nothing but calabooses suited at best for temporary detention. The worst of them are comparable with medieval dungeons of the average class; they are the shame of our cities.”); id. at 88 (“[I]t seems that many citizens of the state are being confined needlessly in our city jails…..”); id. at 85 (“[I]t is disgraceful that we do not appoint counsel in our municipal courts to represent indigent persons accused of ordinance violations.”); id. at 90 (“It is clear that many municipalities have at times conceived of their municipal courts in terms of their revenue-raising ability….”). 2 In 2013, the City again issued more than 3.6 arrest warrants per household and 2.2 arrest warrants for every adult.
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told by City officials that, if they do not pay, they will be thrown in jail. The cycle repeats itself, month after month, for years.
7. The treatment of Keilee Fant, Roelif Carter, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Alfred Morris, Anthony Kimble, Donyale Thomas, Shameika Morris, Daniel Jenkins, Ronnie Tucker, and Tonya Deberry reveals systemic illegality perpetrated by the City of Ferguson against some of its poorest people. The City has engaged in the same conduct, as a matter of policy and practice, against many other impoverished human beings on a daily basis for years, unlawfully jailing people if they are too poor to pay debts from traffic tickets and other minor offenses. The result is a Dickensian system that flagrantly violates the basic constitutional and human rights of our community’s most vulnerable people.
8. By and through their attorneys and on behalf of a class of similarly situated impoverished people, the Plaintiffs seek in this civil action the vindication of their fundamental rights, compensation for the violations that they suffered, injunctive relief assuring that their rights will not be violated again, and a declaration that the City’s conduct is unlawful. In the year 2015, these practices have no place in our society.3
Nature of the Action 9. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to jail people when they cannot afford to pay money owed to the City resulting from prior traffic tickets and other minor offenses without conducting any inquiry into the person’s ability to pay and without considering alternatives to imprisonment as required by federal and Missouri law.
3 The Plaintiffs make the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters. The Plaintiffs have attempted to obtain basic jail and court records from the City, but have so far been unable to do so.
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10. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to jail indigent people for these debts without informing them of their right to counsel and without providing adequate counsel.
11. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to hold prisoners in the City jail indefinitely unless and until the person’s family or friends can make a monetary payment sufficient to satisfy the City. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to bargain with inmates and their families on an amount of money that the City will accept for release.
12. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to arbitrarily and incrementally reduce the amount of money required for release throughout a person’s indefinite detention, eventually releasing the person for free if the City determines that it is unlikely to profit from further detention.
13. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to issue and enforce invalid arrest warrants, to threaten debtors that they will be jailed if they do not show up with money, to hold debtors in jail for a week or more without any judicial appearance, and to set and subsequently modify monetary payments necessary for release arbitrarily and without any formal process.
14. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to confine impoverished people who cannot afford their release in grotesque, dangerous, and inhumane conditions.
15. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief. Jurisdiction and Venue
16. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
17. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Parties
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18. Plaintiff Keilee Fant is a 37-year-old woman. Plaintiff Roelif Carter is a 62-year-

old man. Plaintiff Allison Nelson is a 23-year-old woman. Plaintiff Herbert Nelson Jr. is a 26-

year-old man. Plaintiff Alfred Morris is a 62-year-old man. Plaintiff Anthony Kimble is a 53-

year-old man. Plaintiff Donyale Thomas is a 36-year-old woman. Plaintiff Shameika Morris is a

30-year-old woman. Plaintiff Daniel Jenkins is a 27-year-old man. Plaintiff Ronnie Tucker is a

50-year-old man. Plaintiff Tonya DeBerry is a 52-year-old woman. All of the named Plaintiffs

are residents of Saint Louis County.

19. Defendant City of Ferguson is a municipal corporation, organized under the laws

of the State of Missouri. The Defendant operates the Ferguson City Jail and the Ferguson

Municipal Court.

Factual Background

A.

The Plaintiffs’ Imprisonment

i. Keilee Fant

20. Keilee Fant is a 37-year-old woman and single mother. She works as a certified

nurse’s assistant and has been trying to support her family by doing similar work on and off for

nearly 20 years. In the past two decades, the City of Ferguson has jailed Ms. Fant more than a

dozen times for her inability to make monetary payments on old traffic tickets.

21. Ms. Fant was arrested while taking her children to school in October 2013.4 She

was taken to jail in the City of Jennings because of old traffic tickets in that city, and she was told

by Jennings jail staff that she would not be released unless she paid $300. She informed jail staff

4 As is the case for thousands of people, many of Ms. Fant’s traffic tickets have resulted from her inability to afford to pay her other tickets, which has prevented her from getting her driver’s license back because of a state and municipal government policy and practice of invalidating licenses for those who cannot afford to pay old tickets.
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that she could not afford to pay $300 to the City of Jennings. After three days in jail, Jennings let her out for free.
22. Ms. Fant’s supposed “release” from Jennings’s custody was just the beginning of a Kafkaesque journey through the debtors’ prison network of Saint Louis County—a lawless and labyrinthine scheme of dungeon-like municipal facilities and perpetual debt. Every year, thousands of Saint Louis County residents, including the Plaintiffs in this case, undergo a similar journey, buying or waiting their way out of jail after jail.
23. After Ms. Fant was “released” from the Jennings jail, the City of Jennings kept Ms. Fant in its jail until her family could pay the several hundred dollars required for release by City of Bellefontaine Neighbors. Bellefontaine Neighbors is so small that it does not have its own jail. Instead, it paid the City of Jennings to confine its inmate debtors in the Jennings jail. After paying the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, Ms. Fant was “released” but kept in the Jennings jail for three more days, supposedly, she was then told, in the “custody” of Velda City, until Velda City responded to Jennings officials that it declined to pick her up. Ms. Fant was then sent to the custody of Saint Louis County for unpaid tickets, where she was kept for three days before being “released” from County custody. Although Ms. Fant was “released,” she was not set free. Ms. Fant languished eight more days in the County jail because she could not afford the release amounts for unpaid tickets in two other cities too small to have their own jail: the City of Normandy and the City of Beverly Hills.
24. While confined in the Saint Louis County facility, jail officials coerced inmates who could not afford to pay for phone calls or to buy food by offering free phone calls to family members and candy in exchange for doing the jail laundry without monetary compensation.
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25. After eight days, Ms. Fant was taken to court in the City of Maryland Heights, where the judge “released” her for free. Nonetheless, Ms. Fant was still not free. Instead, she was transported to Ferguson.
26. When she arrived in Ferguson, City jail staff told her that her release amount was $1,400. They told her that she would be held indefinitely until she paid it. After three days, Ferguson jail staff came and informed her that they had decided to let her out for free.
27. Ms. Fant was again arrested and brought to the Jennings jail in January 2014. After she could not afford to pay several hundred dollars initially demanded for her release, she was told by jail staff that they would let her out if she paid $100. The guard told her that, because Jennings had released her for free last time, he did not want to do that again. After six days, her family paid $100, and she was again “released.” After her “release,” she was kept in the Jennings jail, but shifted to the custody of Bellefontaine Neighbors and thenVelda City. She was then transferred to the Saint Louis County jail. After her “release” from Saint Louis County, she was transported to Maryland Heights for several days, and then to Ferguson.
28. When she arrived at the Ferguson jail, City jail staff told her that she would be held indefinitely unless she paid approximately $1,400. Again, pursuant to City policy, she was not provided a court date or an attorney.
29. Demoralized and weary of being transferred from jail to jail, Ms. Fant asked jail staff if they would accept $1,000, which she thought her family could raise from friends and relatives. The jail officer told her that he wanted to call the Chief of Police to ask if that amount was sufficient. The Chief of Police approved her release if her family could bring $1,000 to the Ferguson pay window, but jail staff told her that she had to get the cash that night or the deal would
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be off. Her family came to Ferguson and bought her release from the Ferguson jail. She was released from the Ferguson jail immediately after her family paid $1,000.
30. When she was released from the Ferguson jail, she was told by jail staff that she should not go to court and that she did not have any future court dates. Instead, she was told to make cash payments at the Ferguson Police Department. She was told that she would be jailed again if she did not make payments.
31. During her repeated and indefinite jailings because of her inability to pay, Ms. Fant was fired from several jobs because of absences. She was indigent and depending on food stamps to supplement her income to feed her children.
32. Similar experiences happened to Ms. Fant more than a dozen times in the past two decades, including one occasion in which she was held in jail by the City of Ferguson for nearly 50 days without a toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, shower, or change of clothes for unpaid traffic tickets because she could not afford to buy her release. During that time, Ms. Fant missed her father’s funeral. On that occasion, the City of Ferguson attempted to bargain with Ms. Fant’s family to get them to pay several thousand dollars to secure her release.
33. Ms. Fant was never provided an attorney by the City or brought to court while in custody in 2013 or 2014. During court appearances on her initial tickets that she attended while not in custody several years before, the City of Ferguson was represented by an experienced prosecutor. On several occasions, the City judge told her that she needed a lawyer because of the complicated circumstances of her tickets and continued the case several times for her to hire a lawyer. Each time, she told the judge that she could not afford to hire a lawyer. Eventually, the City proceeded without providing her an attorney. At no point did the City conduct any meaningful inquiry into her ability to pay or alternatives to incarceration.
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34. On many occasions, Ms. Fant contacted the City in an effort to figure out how to remove her warrants so that she would not be arrested and taken away from her children. Consistent with City policy, she was told that the warrants could not be removed unless she paid cash to the City.
35. Ms. Fant has endured materially the same inhumane and unsanitary Ferguson jail conditions described in this Complaint. In addition to enduring overcrowding with other inmate debtors, Ms. Fant was confined in a cell that lacked basic hygiene (for example, she was told that she would not be given feminine products for menstruation), medical care, exercise, and adequate food.
36. On one occasion, an elderly woman being held because she could not afford a few hundred dollars was shivering because the jail was very cold and because the jail staff refused to give women more than one blanket. After Ms. Fant allowed the woman to share her blanket with her, the guards began shouting at the women that they were “stanky ass dykes” and “dirty whores.”
37. Ferguson jail guards routinely insulted and verbally abused female inmate debtors. On numerous occasions, referring to the grotesque conditions and lack of any feminine products, showers, toothbrushes, or soap, guards mocked the impoverished women for the way that they smelled. Male guards would shout things like: “you hoes stink” and “you need to wash out your coochies.”
38. Ms. Fant still owes significant debts to the City. She is frightened that the City will again jail her indefinitely until she and her family can pay enough to secure her release.
ii. Roelif Carter 39. Roelif Carter is a 62-year-old disabled military veteran. For more than a decade, he has suffered daily from the debilitating and painful effects of a brain aneurism.
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40. Mr. Carter was given tickets by the City of Ferguson more than ten years ago. 41. After receiving the assistance of a lawyer from the Veterans Administration, Mr. Carter pled guilty and was assessed monetary fines for the traffic violations. He informed the court that he was unable to afford the fines, and he was told to pay $100 per month.5 42. Mr. Carter was indigent and unable to afford the payments without serious hardship in meeting the basic necessities of life. Nonetheless, having observed that the City kept people in jail when they could not pay their tickets, Mr. Carter made the payments to the City clerk as often as he could until he was unable to come up with enough money. 43. Mr. Carter asked the City clerk what to do if he was too poor to make a payment by the first day of the month. Mr. Carter was told that, if he did not pay by that day, then a warrant would issue for his arrest. On one occasion, Mr. Carter had not been able to get enough money by the first day of the month and, frightened, he brought the money to the City on the second day of the month. The clerk refused to accept the money. The clerk informed him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest and that, in order to remove the warrant, he would now have to pay several hundred more dollars. Mr. Carter could not afford to pay several hundred dollars. 44. Mr. Carter was arrested on that warrant in August 2010. He was informed by the City jail guards that he would not be released from the jail unless he paid $600. Mr. Carter informed City employees that he was too poor to afford that amount of money. 45. Mr. Carter and his wife depended on his disability payments and food stamps to meet the basic necessities of life.
5 After receiving these initial tickets, Mr. Carter was routinely stopped and arrested by Ferguson police and charged with minor offenses for years, including vehicle citations, not having his dog on a leash, and failure to obey the orders of a police officer. Each time Mr. Carter was arrested, he was held in jail because he was unable to afford to pay for his release, and each time he was eventually released for free after three days.
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46. After three days in jail, the City released Mr. Carter without requiring any payment and without bringing Mr. Carter to court.
47. After Mr. Carter’s release, a City official informed Mr. Carter’s wife that Mr. Carter’s total fines had increased and were now in excess of $1,000. The City official did not explain why the total amount had increased without any formal process. Upon his release from jail, the City again required Mr. Carter to pay $100 per month without any process or inquiry into whether he could afford that amount.
48. On a later occasion, Mr. Carter’s wife was informed that a warrant had been issued for her husband’s arrest, even though Ms. Carter had made the required monthly payment herself. After Ms. Carter showed proof of payment, the City recalled the warrant.
49. With the help of friends and family, Mr. Carter and his wife were able to raise $100 to make payments to the City for a number of months.
50. Mr. Carter was again unable to make a monthly $100 payment on several occasions in 2012 and 2013. The City issued warrants for his arrest each time, and Mr. Carter was arrested in August 2012, November 2012, and July 2013. On each occasion, City officials told Mr. Carter that he would be held in jail unless he paid several hundred dollars. Mr. Carter told City officials that he could not afford that amount of money. Because he was too poor to pay the City what it demanded, Mr. Carter remained in jail each time. On each occasion, Mr. Carter was released for free after three days without being brought to court. On each occasion, the amount of money that he owed in total was increased by the City of Ferguson.
51. After his release from jail on each occasion, Mr. Carter and his wife made $100 payments every time that they could for several years until 2014 because they were told by City officials that Mr. Carter would be kept in jail if they did not pay. The Carters lived in constant
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fear of not being able to both pay the City and have enough money for utilities, groceries, clothing, and other necessities of life.
52. The amount Mr. and Ms. Carter paid to the City is a total of several thousand dollars.6
53. The City never conducted any meaningful inquiry into Mr. Carter’s indigence and ability to pay, and it never appointed him an attorney.
54. Mr. Carter and his wife observed numerous people come to court who could not afford their payments. They observed City employees at the payment window tell numerous people on many occasions that they needed to bring money by a specific date or time or a warrant would be issued for their arrest.
55. Each time Mr. Carter was held in the Ferguson jail was a humiliating and dangerous experience. He was not permitted a toothbrush or toothpaste and was not permitted to shower or wash his clothes. He and other inmates were denied hand soap and forced to live and sleep near an uncleaned toilet with visible excrement and a vile stench. The floors and walls were also uncleaned and contained what appeared to be mucus and blood.
56. The water available to inmates, released from an apparatus connected to the top of the toilet, caused Mr. Carter to develop a sore throat whenever he drank it.
57. Jail staff also refused to allow Mr. Carter to be given the medication that he takes for high blood pressure and the head pain medication that he has needed since his brain aneurism.
6 In June 2014, Mr. and Mrs. Carter were both arrested by the City for new minor municipal offenses. Each was told that they would not be released from jail unless they paid $300 in cash. Both informed the City that they could not afford to pay that amount of money. After three days, Mr. Carter was again released for free. Mrs. Carter, however, who complained to jail staff repeatedly about inadequate medical attention, was forced to remain in jail because she could not come up with the money. The next day, Mr. Carter negotiated a lower release amount and paid $200 to free his wife from jail. Ms. Carter had to be taken to the hospital a couple of days after her release because the jail refused to give her the blood pressure medication that she needs even though her family had brought her medicine to the jail.
Mr. Carter was arrested again in August 2014. He was again told that he would not be released unless he paid cash to the City. Again, after three days, Mr. Carter was released for free.
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Jail staff would not even let Mr. Carter’s wife bring him the prescribed medication. As a result, each jail stay for Mr. Carter resulted in enormous physical pain and discomfort.
58. Each time Mr. Carter was kept in the Ferguson jail, he met many other men who were being held there solely because they were too poor to pay the release amount required by the City. Many of the men told him that they had also been trapped in a cycle of debt and jailing by the City and that they could not see a way out.
59. The jail conditions experienced and witnessed by Mr. Carter are materially the same as the conditions described throughout this Complaint and to those described by numerous other witnesses and victims of the City’s policies and practices over a consistent period of many years.
60. Mr. Carter still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of his inability to make monetary payments.
61. Mr. Carter has also been kept in custody for old unpaid fines and costs because he could not afford to pay for his release by the City of Berkeley and the City of Cool Valley. Paying for his release from one would sometimes result in transport to another, where he would be held until he could pay once more.7
iii. Allison Nelson 62. Allison Nelson is a 23-year-old woman. She works now at a clothing store making near minimum wage. 63. Ms. Nelson has been jailed on two occasions by the City because she has not been able to pay fines and costs from traffic tickets. On each occasion, Ms. Nelson has been held, even though she was indigent, because she could not afford a sum of money set by the City.
7 Other jails, however, permitted his wife to give him the medication that he needs.
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64. In July 2012, Ms. Nelson was arrested and taken to the Jennings jail. After her family borrowed money to have her released from Jennings, she was transported to Ferguson. Jail officials in Ferguson told her that she would be held indefinitely until she paid approximately $700. For several days, she was held while her mother attempted to borrow money to buy her out. Eventually, her mother called the City and told the City that she could raise only $300. The clerk told her mother to call back so that the clerk could check with a supervisor. The supervisor agreed to accept $300, and Ms. Nelson was released.
65. In November 2013, Ms. Nelson was again arrested for non-payment and brought to the Jennings jail. Ms. Nelson was told by jail staff that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $1,000. She informed the jail staff that she could not afford to pay. After four days, the jail staff informed her that her release amount would be lowered to $100. Her parents came to the jail and paid $100, and she was released immediately in the early morning hours of Thanksgiving Day.
66. Ms. Nelson was then brought to the Ferguson jail. Ferguson jail staff told her that she would be held indefinitely and miss Thanksgiving with her family unless she paid several hundred dollars. In the morning, after shift change, a new guard came and said that, since it was Thanksgiving, they would agree to let her out if she could find someone to pay $100. Ms. Nelson’s family borrowed money and came as fast as they could to Ferguson and brought her home for Thanksgiving.
67. While in the Ferguson jail, Ms. Nelson was surrounded by other women who were there because they could not afford to pay the amount that Ferguson required for their release.
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68. Ms. Nelson endured materially the same deplorable jail conditions as the other Plaintiffs. She was kept in a cell and denied access to a toothbrush, toothpaste, and soap. The walls were moldy and covered in gum, paint chips, blood, mucus, and feces.
69. The jail did not provide clean floor mats, and also passed dirty blankets from previous inmates to new inmates without cleaning them.
70. If the inmates wanted water, she and the other women were forced to drink warm water from a mechanism above the toilet, which smelled like a sewer.
71. Inmates were given a honey bun in the morning and a pot pie for lunch and dinner. 72. Although Ms. Nelson did not own any significant assets and was indigent, no meaningful inquiry into her indigence was ever made by the City of Ferguson, and the City never appointed an attorney to represent her. 73. The threat of jail and constant cycle of increasing debts to the City of Ferguson has been a constant fact of daily life for Ms. Nelson for several years. She has been afraid to leave her own home or even get into a car as a passenger. Ms. Nelson’s dream for years has been to join the Navy. After passing the relevant tests as a teenager, she was told by her recruiter that she could not join until she fixed all of her unpaid traffic warrants and tickets, which she has not been able to afford to do.8 74. Ms. Nelson has also been kept in custody for old traffic ticket debts because she could not afford to pay her way out by the City of Chesterfield, the City of Pagedale, the City of Florissant, the City of Country Club Hills, and the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors. iv. Herbert Nelson Jr.
8 Military recruiters routinely refuse to accept applicants with traffic warrants for their arrest. ArchCity Defenders currently represent five clients who desire to enlist in the military but cannot do so as a result of warrants being issued for their arrest as a result of unpaid fines.
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75. Herbert Nelson Jr. is 26 years old. Over the past four years, he has been jailed at least four times in the City of Ferguson when he could not afford to pay old fines and court costs.
76. Mr. Nelson was arrested for non-payment in April 2011 and taken into custody by the City of Jennings. When he was brought to the Jennings jail, he was told that his release amount was $2,000 based on his unpaid debts. He informed jail staff that he could not afford to pay. Each day that he was in jail, his release amount was lowered by jail staff. On the third day, his release amount was lowered to $300, and he was released after his mother borrowed money to buy him out. He was then transported to the Ferguson jail because Ferguson had issued a warrant when Mr. Nelson had not made a payment on an old ticket.
77. Ferguson jail staff informed him that he would be held in jail indefinitely until he paid $400. Mr. Nelson was scared and panicked. He felt trapped and did not know how he would be able to get out of jail. After a day, his mother went to the Ferguson jail with $200 that she had collected from family and friends and said that it was all the family could afford. City employees decided to accept that amount and let Mr. Nelson out of jail.
78. Mr. Nelson was arrested again in October 2013. Again, he was told by Jennings jail staff that his release amount was approximately $2,000. Again the release amount was incrementally lowered without any formal legal process. This time, on the fourth day, his release amount was reduced to $200, and his mother again borrowed the money to buy his release. When he was released from Jennings, he was taken to Ferguson, supposedly because he had outstanding warrants from the same old tickets.
79. Mr. Nelson was told by Ferguson jail staff that he would be held indefinitely until he paid $400. After a day, Mr. Nelson was told that his release amount was reduced to $300. His
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mother then raised $300 from his co-workers, family, and friends, and came to the Ferguson jail and bought his release.
80. Mr. Nelson was arrested again in February 2014. After negotiating his release from the Jennings jail after his release amount was incrementally lowered, Mr. Nelson learned that he would be taken again to the Ferguson jail.
81. Mr. Nelson was told by Ferguson jail staff that he would be held indefinitely until he paid $400. After a day, Mr. Nelson was told that his release amount was reduced to $300. His mother then again raised $300 from his co-workers, family, and friends, and came to the Ferguson jail and bought his release.
82. Mr. Nelson was arrested again in September 2014 and taken to the Jennings jail. After his family bought his release from the Jennings jail, he was taken to the Ferguson jail. Again, he was told by jail staff that his release amount was approximately $400. The next day, the release amount was reduced to $300, and his mother again borrowed the money to buy him out of jail.
83. Mr. Nelson endured and witnessed the deplorable jail conditions described in this Complaint. For example, he was forced to remain with other inmate debtors in a filthy, overcrowded cell that reeked of excrement. He and the other inmates were not given any toothbrush, toothpaste, handsoap, showers, or a change of underwear. The cells were so overcrowded during his multiple periods of incarceration that men were forced to sleep on the floor next to the open, uncleaned toilet. The walls in the Ferguson jail were caked with old food, dust, blood, and mucus. Blankets and mats were transferred to new inmates without being washed.
84. The food rations given to Mr. Nelson and other inmates lacked basic nutrition. Inmates were served a honey bun or donut in the morning, a small pot pie for lunch, and another pot pie for dinner. Mr. Nelson and other inmates were not given drinks and were forced to drink
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smelly water out of a shared faucet connected to the same apparatus as the toilet. Inmates were dehydrated because they were afraid to drink out of the faucet.
85. During one of his periods in the Jennings jail, Mr. Nelson developed two irritated areas on his leg that became infected and turned into boils the size of eggs. This leg injury has subsequently persisted in various iterations for approximately two years. On a later period of incarceration in the Jennings jail, his boils flared and popped, and he was in excruciating pain. On his arrival to the Ferguson jail, the jail staff refused to treat him. They refused to give him antibiotics, painkillers, or a doctor, even though the pants that he was wearing filled with blood and puss. He found it difficult to sit because of the position of the infection on his legs. Finally, after his transfer from the Ferguson jail, a nurse in the Saint Louis City Justice Center examined Mr. Nelson and told him that the infection was related to the jail conditions because his skin had been extremely dirty. The nurse told him that she was amazed at the large size of the boils. She said that she believed that it was turning into staph infection, although he had not been separated from the inmates in the Ferguson jail.
86. Mr. Nelson was indigent for the entire duration of his jailings by the City of Ferguson. Mr. Nelson now works as a painter and is dedicated to supporting his five-year-old son. Because of his recent jailings—including one while he was in uniform on his way to an important painting job—he has lost a number of jobs and finds it difficult to be re-hired because painting contractors know that he could be jailed on the way to any painting job. On one occasion, a coworker had to fill in for Mr. Nelson and then use the money earned from the job to pay for his release from jail. Because of his unpaid ticket debts, Mr. Nelson is not able to grow his own painting business because he cannot obtain his driver’s license, which he needs to drive his tools to job sites.
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87. During Mr. Nelson’s most recent 2014 incarceration, he finally broke down and cried after he missed an important painting job. The cycle of jail and debt has prevented him from getting on his feet and living any kind of meaningful life with his son. Because of his repeated jailings, it has been difficult for him to maintain steady employment and to meet the basic necessities of life for his family.
88. Mr. Nelson has been also held in jail because of his inability to make payments in the City of Jennings, the City of Florissant, Saint Louis County, and the City of Maryland Heights.
v. Alfred Morris 89. Alfred Morris is a 62-year-old man. He is a disabled veteran who relies on a pension from the Department of Veterans Affairs to meet the basic necessities of life. Although Mr. Morris cannot perform physical work because of serious medical problems, he volunteers at the Department of Veterans Affairs hospital to sit with and assist other ill veterans. 90. Mr. Morris has been jailed on at least four occasions in the past five years by the City of Ferguson when he has been unable to make monetary payments. 91. The City of Ferguson locked Mr. Morris in a cage because he failed to pay fines and costs associated with violations of a municipal ordinance that purports to prohibit people from having friends, relatives, or romantic partners stay overnight in their homes without naming the person on a written document in advance. Ferguson police accused Mr. Morris of violating this ordinance because they searched his home and found women’s articles. 92. In 2011, Mr. Morris was arrested and taken to the Ferguson jail. He was told that he would not be released from the jail unless he paid $500. Mr. Morris was eventually released for free.
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93. When Mr. Morris appeared in court, he announced that he wished to plead “not guilty.” The judge told him to sit in a corner while other cases were handled. Mr. Morris watched as the City prosecutor and City judge jailed and threatened with jail unrepresented people when they could not pay the money that they had been told to pay without any inquiry into their indigence or representation of counsel. Finally, the judge told Mr. Morris that when he came back for his next court date, he needed to have an attorney with him. Mr. Morris was not able to afford an attorney, and he was afraid to go back to court because he had been told that he was required to hire an attorney. A warrant was issued for his arrest.
94. Mr. Morris was arrested on the warrant in early 2012. When he arrived at the jail, he was again told that he would be held indefinitely until he paid approximately $500. Mr. Morris became extremely ill in the Ferguson jail because jail staff, pursuant to their policy, refused to give him his blood pressure or HIV medication. The jail was so crowded that Mr. Morris, even though seriously ill, was forced to spend the first night sitting on the edge of a bed in which another man was sleeping. The next night, he was given a space on the floor of the cell to sleep. When Mr. Morris complained for the entire day about his blood pressure, jail staff threatened to charge him with another offense if he were faking an illness and that they would make sure that he got another case. After Mr. Morris became dizzy with unbearable head pain, jail staff were forced to call paramedics. Two days after his arrest, he was taken to the hospital and let out of the jail for free.9
95. Mr. Morris otherwise endured materially the same unsanitary jail conditions as described in this Complaint. For example, during each of his stays in the Ferguson jail, Mr. Morris was forced to stay on mats that had bed bugs and lice. He observed that jail staff would not wash or otherwise sanitize the sleeping mats when they were given from one inmate to another. On
9 Mr. Morris suffered similar blood pressure problems on other occasions in the Ferguson jail.
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none of his stays in the Ferguson jail was Mr. Morris ever allowed to take a shower, given any handsoap, or allowed to brush his teeth.
96. Mr. Morris still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of his inability to make monetary payments.
97. Mr. Morris has been also held in jail because of his inability to make payments in the City of Cool Valley and the City of Maplewood.
vi. Anthony Kimble 98. Anthony Kimble is a 53-year-old man. 99. In the past three years, he has been jailed multiple times by the City of Ferguson for unpaid debt from old traffic tickets. 100. In February 2012, Mr. Kimble was arrested and brought to the Ferguson jail as a result of his non-payment of costs and fines from traffic tickets. He was told by jail staff that he would not be released unless he paid $500 dollars to the City. Mr. Kimble informed jail staff that he could not afford to pay the City. 101. After several days, Mr. Kimble’s family got money from a federal tax refund. Mr. Kimble’s family came to Ferguson and paid $500 for his release. 102. Mr. Kimble was next arrested and brought to the Ferguson jail in February 2013. When Mr. Kimble arrived at the jail, the booking officer told him that he would be held in the jail until he paid $600 to the City. After two days, Mr. Kimble was informed that the City would accept $500 for his release. After two more days, he was informed that the City would accept $400 for his release. After two more days, Mr. Kimble was informed that the City would accept $300. Each time, Mr. Kimble informed jail staff that he could not afford to pay the City.
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103. Mr. Kimble was not brought to court and not provided an attorney. No inquiry was made into his ability to pay.
104. Finally, after it was clear that Mr. Kimble could not pay, he was released by jail staff for free. He had spent nearly two weeks in jail and had lost approximately 12-15 pounds.
105. When Mr. Kimble was released, he was told by jail staff that he should not return to court, but that he needed instead to go to the Ferguson police department by March 1 to pay what he owed.
106. Mr. Kimble was not able to come up with the money that he owed by March 1 and therefore did not go to the police department to bring the money. At the time, he was working as a machine operator and struggling to survive and to make payments for rent, utilities, food, and court ordered child support. Despite being told that he should not go to court, Mr. Kimble was later informed that a warrant had been issued for his arrest for failure to appear.
107. When Mr. Kimble learned of his warrant, he was also informed of a City policy that he could avoid arrest and have the warrant removed if he paid several hundred dollars. Mr. Kimble was not able to have the warrant removed because he was indigent. Although the City does not inform unrepresented people of the option, it also has a policy of allowing warrants to be removed for free if an attorney is retained and enters a notice of appearance on a case.
108. During his time in the Ferguson jail, Mr. Kimble and other inmates would ask when they would be released. Mr. Kimble and other inmates were told repeatedly by Ferguson jail staff to “shut up” and that they would be released “whenever we’re ready to release you.”
109. Mr. Kimble endured materially the same grotesque and inadequate jail conditions as described in this Complaint. During his visits to the jail, he was offered a shower on only one occasion. He was never provided with soap or a toothbrush and toothpaste. The cells were
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overcrowded with men who could not afford to pay for their release, and the ratio of men to beds was often 3 or 4 people for every available bed. He was forced to sleep next to a dirty toilet without sufficient blankets to keep him warm and surrounded by walls covered with urine, blood, and mucus. He was denied access to laundry to clean his clothes.
110. Mr. Kimble and other inmate debtors devised a system of rotation so that the person stuck in jail the longest would rotate to the bed, and the next inmate would take his place when he paid for his release or when he was let out for free.
111. The City only provided a honey bun for breakfast and pot pie for lunch and dinner. Mr. Kimble was often unable to eat breakfast because guards would offer breakfast at 1:00 a.m. by waking up inmates and telling them that they had to eat breakfast then or not at all.
112. Mr. Kimble still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of his inability to make monetary payments.
113. Mr. Kimble has also been jailed for nonpayment of old traffic tickets in City of Pine Lawn and the City of Berkeley.
vii. Donyale Thomas 114. Donyale Thomas is a 36-year-old woman. 115. Ms. Thomas was arrested and brought to the Ferguson jail in 2011 because she had an unpaid balance of old court costs and fines. Ms. Thomas had been a passenger in a car, and officers had asked for her ID and arrested her when a check on her ID revealed the old case. 116. Ms. Thomas was given a thin blanket and a mat and taken to a cell with one bed and three women. Ms. Thomas was told to sleep on the floor. Ms. Thomas was told by jail staff that she would be held indefinitely.
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117. When Ms. Thomas’s mother called the jail, her mother was told that she could get her daughter out of jail by paying several hundred dollars. Ms. Thomas and her mother were indigent and unable to pay. Ms. Thomas was unemployed and relying on food stamps and SSI disability payments to meet the basic necessities of life for herself and her three children.
118. Ms. Thomas was kept in the Ferguson jail for over a week. She was not taken before a judge and was not provided a lawyer.
119. Ms. Thomas was suffering at the time from a severe anxiety attack, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. Ms. Thomas has difficulty being in small, confined spaces. Ms. Thomas would begin to hyperventilate and ask jail guards for treatment because she could not breathe. Her mother, frightened for her daughter’s life, attempted to bring her prescription medication for these illnesses, but jail staff refused, and Ms. Thomas was denied medical treatment in the Ferguson jail.
120. Finally, after more than a week, the City informed Ms. Thomas that it would accept $200 for her release. Her mother raised $200, and Ms. Thomas was released.
121. Ms. Thomas has been jailed by the City of Ferguson on many occasions since she was a teenager. Each time, she has been unable to buy her release because of her indigence.
122. On a subsequent occasion, Ms. Thomas was struggling with her mental health problems and overcome with depression from being trapped in a cycle of debt and jailing for traffic tickets in several municipalities that took her away from her children repeatedly. While languishing in jail in the City of Berkeley because she could not afford to pay for her release, Ms. Thomas attempted to commit suicide by strangling herself with her brassiere. She was taken to the hospital after the other women in her cell started screaming.
123. Ms. Thomas still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of her inability to make monetary payments.
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124. Over the years, when Ms. Thomas has appeared in the Ferguson court, she has seen people jailed because they were unable to make monetary payments and without being provided any attorney or any meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay.
125. Ms. Thomas has also languished in jail for non-payment in the City of Jennings, the City of Berkeley, the City of Pine Lawn, and the City of Dellwood.
viii. Shameika Morris 126. Shameika Morris is a 30-year-old woman. 127. When she was 17 years old, Ms. Morris was charged with a minor municipal offense in Ferguson. When she was brought to the jail, the jail staff refused to let her use the bathroom, and Ms. Morris urinated on herself in the booking area. Jail staff were upset and retaliated against her by keeping her in jail for more than two weeks without bringing her to court and by telling her that she would not be released unless she paid $900. After more than two weeks, Ms. Morris was finally released for free. 128. Since then, Ms. Morris has been arrested and jailed by Ferguson on more than five occasions resulting from that initial offense. 129. In 2011, Ms. Morris was arrested and jailed by Ferguson. When she arrived at the jail, she was told that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $800. Ms. Morris told jail staff that she was too poor to afford that amount. Each day, jail staff informed her that her release amount was reduced by $100. When the release amount was reduced to several hundred dollars, jail staff refused to reduce it for several more days. Because Ms. Morris had not been able to contact her family or her job, her mother and father and her employer were all very worried and thought she had disappeared.
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130. Finally, after more than a week, her mother called around to various cities and learned that she was being held by Ferguson. The Ferguson clerk negotiated with Ms. Morris’s mother, and the clerk agreed after to reduce the amount the City would accept so that the family could use Ms. Morris’s tax refund check of $200. A family friend came to the jail and paid $200 for her release. Ms. Morris was not brought to court and not given an attorney.
131. Later in 2011, Ms. Morris was again arrested and jailed by Ferguson. She was told that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $800. Jail staff informed her each day that her release amount was reduced. After two days, jail staff told her that her release amount was reduced to $500. The following day, jail staff then let Ms. Morris out for free. Ms. Morris was not brought to court and was not given an attorney.
132. In 2012, Ms. Morris was again arrested and jailed by Ferguson. She was told that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $800. Jail staff informed her each day that her release amount had been reduced. After two days, jail staff walked around to all of the inmates and told them their new release amounts and let Ms. Morris out for free. Ms. Morris was not brought to court and was not given an attorney.
133. At all times that she was jailed, Ms. Morris was indigent and struggling to meet the basic necessities of life for her and her children. She depends on food stamps to survive.
134. On many occasions, Ms. Morris has attempted to clear her outstanding warrants in Ferguson, including occasions in which she has attempted to clear the warrants so that she could get a job. On numerous occasions over the past several years, she has called the City clerk and asked how to remove her warrants. The City clerk routinely informed Ms. Morris that it is City policy not to remove warrants unless she paid hundreds of dollars, and the clerk told her that she
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needed to have the money with her if she came to court to turn herself in. Ms. Morris was not able to come up with enough money to remove her warrants.
135. As is true for the other Plaintiffs, Ms. Morris’s experiences in the Ferguson jail have been among the most humiliating and dangerous experiences of her life. Every morning, inmates waited in anticipation for jail staff to tell them if their release amounts would be lowered. They often begged jail staff to lower the amounts and pleaded with them to consider their poverty and their need to be with their children.
136. In all of her time in the Ferguson jail, she has only been offered a shower on one occasion—during her first stay over ten years ago. She has never been offered a toothbrush, toothpaste, or handsoap. During her stays, she and other inmates have routinely noticed blood and mucus smeared on the walls of their cells, and the women were forced to share used blankets and mats because the City jail staff does not launder materials when inmates leave the jail before passing them to other inmates.
137. Many of the women in the jail became chronically dehydrated because they were afraid to drink the water, which has often been yellow in color.
138. During her time in the Ferguson jail, Ms. Morris and other women spent many nights crying and hungry.
139. The guards routinely taunted the female inmates. Guards told women that they were “nasty” and “fat” and mocked them that they would not get out until guards let them out.
140. Ms. Morris is so terrified of languishing again in the Ferguson jail on her warrants that she is afraid even to visit her mother, who lives in Ferguson.
ix. Daniel Jenkins 141. Daniel Jenkins is a 28-year-old man.
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142. Mr. Jenkins has been kept in jail by the City of Ferguson on at least five occasions over the past several years because of his inability to make a monetary payment on old debts from tickets. On each occasion, he was brought to the Ferguson jail and told that he would be held indefinitely unless he paid several hundred dollars. He was not appointed an attorney and no meaningful inquiry was made into his indigence. He was kept in jail until his family could come up with the money to buy his release or until the City decided to release him for free.
143. Mr. Jenkins is indigent and struggles to meet the basic necessities of life for himself and his two young children.
144. Like the other Plaintiffs in this case, each arrest and jailing by Ferguson was part of a longer and indefinite journey through the Saint Louis County debtors’ prison network for Mr. Jenkins. On some of his arrests, Mr. Jenkins has been taken to seven different jails. He is typically held in jail until he either gets family to come up with money or until jail staff decide to release him for free.
145. Mr. Jenkins has been jailed for non-payment by the City of Bel-Ridge, the City of Bel-Nor, the City of Moline Acres, Saint Louis County, the City of Florissant, the City of Welston, the City of Dellwood, the City of Maryland Heights, the City of Beverly Hills, the City of Pine Lawn, and the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors.
x. Ronnie Tucker 146. Ronnie Tucker is a 50-year-old man. 147. Mr. Tucker was arrested and taken to the Ferguson jail in May 2013. Ferguson jail staff informed him that he was being kept in the Ferguson jail pursuant to a warrant in traffic cases from the City of Cool Valley, which paid Ferguson to house its inmate debtors. Ferguson jail staff told him that he would not be released from custody unless he paid $1,000. After several days,
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Mr. Tucker was taken to court in Cool Valley, and his sister was able to raise enough money to pay for his release.
148. When Mr. Tucker was “released” from the custody of Cool Valley, he was returned to the Ferguson jail.10 Ferguson jail staff informed him that he was now being held by the City of Ferguson and that he would not be released unless he paid $600.
149. Mr. Tucker was indigent. At the time of his jailing by Ferguson, Mr. Tucker was working part time as a roofer and surviving on food stamps to meet the basic necessities of life. At no point was any meaningful judicial inquiry made into his ability to pay, and he was not provided an attorney. Having just bought Mr. Tucker’s release from Cool Valley custody, his sister could no longer afford to pay any more money to buy his release.
150. Mr. Tucker spent more than ten additional days in the Ferguson jail because he could not afford to pay the $600 release amount. Eventually, the City let him out for free and told him to return to court. He had not been brought to court or given an attorney the entire time. No inquiry had been made into his indigence.
151. Prior to his next court date, Mr. Tucker was taken to the hospital, where he was admitted to have surgery. He called the Ferguson clerk from the hospital and said that he would not be able to make his court appearance. Pursuant to City policy, he was told by the clerk that he would get a warrant for not showing up in court even if he were in the hospital. He would have to pay several hundred dollars to remove the warrant.
152. Mr. Tucker experienced materially the same jail conditions as alleged in this Complaint and described by the other Plaintiffs and numerous witnesses.
10 He also spent some time during this period in a holding cell in Cool Valley prior to being transported to Ferguson.
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153. Mr. Tucker was never allowed to shower and spent the entire period of weeks in the same clothes without washing them. In addition to languishing in the stench of his own sweat and filth, he was not given any handsoap or allowed to brush his teeth. He and other inmates begged to be allowed to wash themselves, but staff refused. Instead, multiple inmates were forced to sleep on the dirty floor because there were not enough beds to accommodate all of the debtors. He was forced to sleep next to a dirty toilet and surrounded by walls covered with urine, blood, and mucus. He was not given sufficient covering to cope with the cold temperatures in the cell.
154. Ferguson jail guards also routinely taunted their prisoners for not being able to afford to get out. Guards told the men that they would stay in the Ferguson jail until the guards were ready to let them out.
155. Mr. Tucker was not permitted any recreation or exercise, and he spent the entire period without leaving the cell except to go to the court in Cool Valley.
156. Mr. Tucker and the other men in his cell could hear female prisoners screaming from other cells about not being provided products for hygiene.
157. Mr. Tucker has also been jailed for debts from unpaid tickets in Saint Louis County, the City of Jennings, the City of Dellwood, and City of Moline Acres.
xi. Tonya DeBerry 158. Ms. DeBerry is a 52-year-old woman. She has been jailed on numerous occasions for nonpayment of tickets by the City of Ferguson. 159. In January 2014, Ms. DeBerry was pulled over for a traffic violation. She was jailed in Saint Louis County for a day until her family paid $300 to have her released. When she was released from the custody of the County, she was transported to Ferguson.
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160. When she arrived at the Ferguson jail, staff told her that she would be kept in jail unless she paid several hundred dollars. After two nights in jail, a guard came around to her cell and asked her how much she could “come up with.” She told the guard that she could probably raise $300, and Ferguson jail staff let her out after her daughter arrived with $300 borrowed from a neighbor.11 Ms. DeBerry was then transported to the Jennings jail because of unpaid tickets.
161. Ms. DeBerry experienced the same unlawful and deplorable conditions in the Ferguson jail as described in this Complaint. She was denied a toothbrush, toothpaste, and soap, and she was forced to stay in a cell with a vile stench and visible mold.
162. The City also arrested and kept in its jail for indefinite periods both of her teenage children because they could not afford to pay old debts. Ms. DeBerry has, on numerous occasions, called the City and negotiated a release amount for her children. When she offers an amount, the City clerk seeks permission from a supervisor to accept that amount or to reject it. In this manner, she has bought her children out of the Ferguson jail on several occasions in the past several years.
163. Ms. DeBerry was repeatedly forced to choose between raising money to get her children released from the Ferguson jail or raising money to make her own debt payments to the City and to other neighboring municipalities.
B. The City’s Policies and Practices 164. The treatment of the Plaintiffs was caused by and is representative of the City’s policies and practices concerning collecting unpaid fines, fees, costs, and surcharges relating to traffic tickets and other minor offenses for at least the past five years.12
11 Ms. DeBerry was taken to the Jennings jail in April 2011 and told that she would not be released unless she paid $300 to the City of Ferguson. When her family borrowed money and took it to Ferguson, Jennings released her. 12 Unless otherwise mentioned in this Complaint, the policies, practices, and procedures of the City of Ferguson described have been in existence for at least the past five years.
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165. It is the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to use its municipal court and its jail as significant sources of revenue generation for the City. The money to be brought into the City through the municipal court is budgeted by the City in advance.13 As a result, the entire municipal government apparatus, including municipal court officials and City jailors, has a significant and corrupting incentive to operate the court and the jail in a way that maximizes revenues, not justice.
166. Decisions regarding the operation of the court and the jail—including but not limited to the assessment of fines, fees, costs,14 and surcharges; the availability and conditions of payment plans; the setting and re-setting of amounts required for release from jail; the issuance and withdrawal of arrest warrants; and the non-appointment of an attorney—are significantly influenced by and based on maximizing revenues collected rather than on legitimate penological considerations.
167. In 2014, the City of Ferguson issued an average of more than 3.6 arrest warrants per household and almost 2.2 arrest warrants for every adult, mostly in cases involving unpaid debt for tickets. Between 2009 and 2013, the number of traffic cases filed by the City of Ferguson increased by nearly 50%.
168. In Ferguson, blacks were significantly more likely to be stopped, searched, and arrested than whites, even though whites were more likely to possess illegal contraband when searched. Although whites make up more than 29% of the population in Ferguson, they constitute only 12.7% of traffic stops and 6.9% of arrests. The same financial pressures and corrupting
13 The City uses the money collected through these procedures to help fund the City jail, to pay Municipal Court judicial salaries, to pay City Attorney’s Office salaries, and to fund other portions of the City budget. 14 Missouri Law requires costs to be waived for the indigent, see Mo. Code § 479.260, but the City ignores that law.
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influences thus infect City police decisions, including decisions about conducting traffic stops, issuing tickets, and making arrests.
169. Over the past five years, the small City of Ferguson has, according to its public records, earned approximately $10 million from its municipal court fines, fees, costs, and surcharges. A proportional per capita budgetary revenue stream from municipal court fees for the entire Saint Louis metropolitan region would be more than $1,300,000,000.
i. Arbitrary and Indefinite Detention of the Indigent 170. As each of the Plaintiffs’ cases illustrates, the City of Ferguson has adopted a policy and practice of arresting people when they owe unpaid debt from old traffic tickets and other minor offenses. When those arrestees are booked at the Ferguson jail, they are told by jail staff that they can be released immediately, but only if they pay cash to the City of Ferguson. If they cannot pay the City, they are told that they will be held indefinitely. 171. The amount of cash that Ferguson requires for release is based on the total debt owed by the person from their old traffic or other misdemeanor cases. 172. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to hold people in jail unless and until they or their families pay the City. 173. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to gradually and incrementally reduce the amount of money required to buy a person’s release. The reason for this policy is to generate as much money as possible. Some people’s families are able to borrow and raise significant money up front to buy the release of their loved one within hours or days. The longer a person stays in the Ferguson jail, however, the more it costs the City and the more clear it is that the person’s family cannot raise enough money. Thus, the City’s policy and practice is
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to lower the amount periodically on the assumption that the person can raise at least some money to buy his or her release.
174. As a matter of policy and practice, City jail staff and supervisors attempt to negotiate or bargain with the person or the person’s family concerning the amount of money that they are able to pay. This bargaining takes place both inside the jail with the inmate and over the phone or in person at the clerk’s office with the inmate’s family.
175. In many cases, after significant jail time, the City will release the person for free if it is clear that the City cannot extract any money from the person during that jail stay.
176. Inmates find out about these incremental reductions by asking jail staff every morning what their new required payment is. Some days they are told that it has remained the same, and other days they are told that it has been reduced. Inmates are then usually given an opportunity to use the telephone to call family or friends who might be able to come up with enough money to pay for their release. The reductions do not happen as the result of any formal adversarial process.
177. The City’s incremental reductions of the amount required for release are designed also to punish debtors for non-payment on the theory that time in jail will encourage impoverished people to pay in the future if they know that they will be jailed for non-payment. These threats result in people and families borrowing money at high rates of interest to release a loved one or taking money otherwise needed for food, diapers, rent, clothing, and utilities and giving it to the City of Ferguson instead. The result has been widespread hardship for the impoverished people of Ferguson, whose local government has decided to make families choose between feeding hungry children and letting a loved one languish in jail.
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178. These policies and practices have created a culture of fear among the City’s poorest residents, who are afraid even to go to the City police department or the City court to explain their indigence because they know they will be jailed by the City without any meaningful process. The same fear motivates many very poor City residents to sacrifice food, clothing, utilities, sanitary home repairs, and other basic necessities of life in order to scrape together money to pay traffic debts to the City.
179. From the perspective of City officials, these coercive threats are successful. They are successful because the threats and jailings have been crucial to pressuring family members— who have no legal obligation to pay any money to the City on behalf of indigent relatives or friends who owe money from old civil judgments—to come up with money in order to get their loved ones released from jail. They have also been crucial in getting low-income people to forgo basic necessities of life in order to pay the City in an attempt to avoid jail. It is only through this illegal confinement and threat of confinement that the City is able to collect that additional money that any normal creditor could not.
180. The basic scheme of the City of Ferguson is to extort—through the threat of physical confinement—money from debtors who are otherwise unable to afford to pay both the basic necessities of life and their debts to the City. The City’s policies and practices have resulted in the community knowing that impoverished debtors will be arrested and held by the City for days or weeks unless and until they pay enough cash to the City.
181. When providing information to inmates, the City refers to the amount of cash required for release as the inmate’s “bond,” even though the amount it set by reference to the amount of outstanding debt. Moreover, the money is applied automatically toward old unpaid debts and is set, reset, and modified without any process and without consideration of any of the
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lawful considerations related to Missouri’s statutory bail system or consistent with the United States Constitution. Nor is the amount set in relation to any particular pending charge for which legal proceedings are imminent. Indeed, inmates routinely do not even have future court dates set and are held indefinitely without being brought to court. If a person subsequently misses any future payment, the City, without any legal process, confiscates any previous amounts paid by the person to secure their release from jail and resets the person’s debts. The City also adds a “warrant” fee for the person’s missed payment without any legal process.15 In this way, many impoverished people end up paying thousands of dollars over a period of many years to the City based on a small number of relatively inexpensive initial tickets.
182. At any moment, any person can end this cycle by paying the balance of her debt. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to allow any inmate at any time to pay the full amount of the debt owed and to be released immediately, terminating for good all existing previously closed “cases” for which debt is still being collected.16
183. Similarly, at any time, either before an arrest or after an arrest, the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson is to allow all arrest warrants to be removed and inmates to be released immediately if they pay the entire amount of their outstanding balance with the City. It is also the policy and practice of the City to allow individual warrants to be removed without eliminating the entire debt if the person pays an amount arbitrarily set by City employees, usually several hundred dollars in cash based on the total unpaid balance.
15 For example, the person is not arraigned on any new charge for failure to appear prior to the “warrant” fee being added, and the person is not given a meaningful opportunity to present a defense to the elements of such a potential charge. The money is simply added to the person’s debts. 16 The “cases” for which the City is collecting debts have, for the most part, been closed for years, with civil judgments entered requiring the payment of fines and costs.
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184. The City employs a materially different set of procedures for those people who retain private counsel. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to remove existing arrest warrants and schedule new court dates for those debtors who retain a private lawyer. Unrepresented people are told that there is no way to clear their warrants unless they pay the City.
185. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to keep some debtors in jail for indefinite periods without bringing them to court. The City has often kept inmates unable to make monetary payments in its jail without bringing them to court for days or weeks.17
ii. Debt-Collection Proceedings in the Ferguson Municipal Court 186. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to conduct court sessions approximately three times per month.18 Inmates brought to the court from the jail are told that they will remain in jail unless they make monetary payments even though it is the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson not to provide them with an attorney and not to conduct any meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay as required by the United States Constitution.19 187. Inmates are not advised of their relevant rights under federal or Missouri law, including applicable constitutional rights and state-law defenses and procedures.
17 The City also follows a policy and practice of holding inmates in jail for days on behalf of other municipalities until the other municipality decides whether it will pick them up or not. 18 Because the City holds court so infrequently, those arrested on new offenses or warrants who cannot afford the amount of money set by the City have often languished in jail for more than a week before seeing a judicial officer. Inmates arrested on new charges (as opposed to previously unpaid debts) are told that they will not be released from custody prior to trial unless and until they make generically determined monetary payments. As attention on Ferguson has grown in recent months, the City has begun negotiating with arrestees and often releasing inmates with new charges for free after shorter periods of incarceration if they cannot come up with the money to be released immediately. As always, arrestees who are not indigent and who can afford the scheduled monetary payment are released immediately after booking. 19 Because no inquiry is made into ability to pay, no inquiry is likewise made into the reasons for non-payment or alternatives to incarceration.
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188. Those appearing in court from jail are told that they must pay a certain amount of money or be kept in jail. They are, as a matter of policy and practice, told to make phone calls to family members in an attempt to get family members to pay their debts.
189. Non-incarcerated people are told either to appear in court at future dates or told not to appear in court but to make monetary payments on old debts at the police department. Both groups are told, as a matter of City policy and practice, that failure to bring money to pay old debts will result in their arrest. As with confined inmates, a person can end this debt collection process at any time—whether a person has been told to appear in court or told to make payments at the police department—by paying what she owes to the City in full. If a person is too poor to end this process, her closed “case” can go on for years and years in perpetuity after a civil judgment assessing financial penalties, with the City imposing additional fees and surcharges for missed debt-collection payments.20
190. The City prosecutor and City judge do not conduct indigence or ability-to-pay hearings. Regular observers of the City court have never once seen an indigence or ability to pay hearing conducted in the past five years.
191. The City prosecutor and City judge conduct no meaningful individualized process prior to ordering people to make particular monthly payments. Payment plans are set entirely without any adversarial process and without any individualized inquiry into the circumstances of a debtor. City jail officials ordering payments upon release from jail similarly follow no formal adversarial process in determining the amount of required payments. Those jailed for unpaid debts
20 It is the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to inform debtors that, if they or their families pay their debt in full, they can be released from jail and have all proceedings terminated at any moment. At any time, the entire process can be ended by a monetary payment. If a person can afford to pay, the person will never have another court date set by the City of Ferguson. The termination of these cases is determined solely by the wealth of individuals.
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from tickets and other offenses (e.g. for not making their ordered payments) are not appointed an attorney, even though the City is represented by an experienced prosecutor.
192. In addition to the difficulty of mounting constitutional and statutory arguments and defenses in the face of an experienced prosecutor, navigating the origin of the numerous fees and surcharges imposed by Ferguson and determining whether they are even validly assessed by the City in any particular case is a complicated inquiry. This inquiry involves the application of state law and procedure; local law and practice; multiple court files, accounting documents, and receipts over a period of years; and constitutional law to a person’s lengthy case history.
193. The vast majority of those jailed for violating the payment plan condition imposed by the City court were not represented by an attorney on the underlying traffic or minor charge because of the City’s policy and practice of not appointing counsel for the indigent.
194. The Plaintiffs and many other witnesses have observed numerous other impoverished people jailed by the City for non-payment of debts without a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay, without the representation of counsel, and without the consideration of whether imprisonment serves legitimate state interests in light of available alternatives as required by federal and Missouri law. The Plaintiffs and other witnesses have observed numerous other people and families who were told that they or their family member would be held in jail by the City unless and until they brought forward large sums of money to pay off debts supposedly owed for tickets and subsequent surcharges.
iii. The Deplorable Conditions in the Ferguson Jail 195. As described above, inmates jailed for non-payment have, as a matter of City policy and practice, been kept in overcrowded cells with inmates strewn about the floors. The City has
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deliberately and callously ignored basic principles of hygiene, sanitation, medical and mental health care, and inmate safety.
196. Inmates are denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap; they are kept in cells that reek of visible excrement and surrounded by walls smeared with blood and mucus; they are kept in the same clothes for days and weeks without access to laundry or clean undergarments; they huddle in cold temperatures with a single thin blanket even as they beg guards for warm blankets; they develop illnesses and infections in open wounds that spread to other inmates; they sleep next to an open uncleansed toilet; they endure weeks without being allowed to use the moldy shower; women are not given adequate hygiene products for menstruation; they have on occasion been forced to sleep amidst refuse because of the lack of adequate trash removal; they are routinely denied vital medical care and prescription medication, even when their families beg to be allowed to bring medication to the jail; inmates with serious mental health issues are not provided mental health treatment or prescription medication that they need; they are provided food so insufficient and uniform that inmates lose significant amounts of weight and lack essential nutrients; they suffer from dehydration because their only source of water is a foul apparatus connected to the top of the toilet that produces warm water with an unpalatable stench; and they are deprived of books, legal materials, exercise, television, internet, or natural light.
197. Inmates have been sexually abused and physically beaten by jail staff in the past several years as a result of a culture of unaccountability and abuse resulting from a lack of adequate training and supervision.
198. These abuses and deprivations are accompanied by other pervasive humiliations. Jail guards routinely taunt impoverished people when they are unable to pay for their release, telling them that all they have to do in order to be released is to pay money that they do not have.
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Jail guards routinely laugh at the inmates and humiliate them with degrading epithets, many of which focus on how bad the inmates look and smell after languishing in the Ferguson jail.
199. The totality of these conditions described by the Plaintiffs and by numerous witnesses amounts to unlawful punishment. The conditions at the Ferguson jail are deliberately designed to be as degrading and humiliating as possible in order to punish debtors for not paying their debts and to discourage them from missing payments to the City. The purpose and effect is to coerce debtors to borrow money or use money otherwise needed for the basic necessities of life in order to pay the City to avoid being subjected to the dangerous and humiliating Ferguson jail.
200. The jail conditions created and perpetuated by the City of Ferguson would be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment even were convicted prisoners treated with such callous disregard to basic health and safety. The City forces these conditions on pretrial detainees and post-judgment debtors jailed long after monetary judgments and solely because of their inability to make monetary payments and not pursuant to any criminal sentence.
201. The use of the Ferguson jail and its deplorable conditions in discrete spurts of indefinite confinement dependent on incrementally and arbitrarily reduced release amounts or eventual release for free after several days has the purpose and effect of punishing people rather than achieving any other lawful goal.
iv. The City’s Flawed and Unlawful Warrant Process 202. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to issue invalid arrest warrants and to apply arbitrary and illegal policies for the issuance and recalling of warrants. 203. Among the policies and practices of the City of Ferguson are the following:
a. The City informs people that they can remove outstanding warrants simply by paying a sum of money but does not offer a way for the indigent to remove arrest warrants.
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b. The City allows for the removal of existing warrants without paying the City only if the person retains a lawyer.
c. The City issues arrest warrants for the failure to make a payment without probable cause to believe that the person had the ability to make a payment.
d. When impoverished people appear in the courtroom and City payment window, they are told by the judge, courtroom officers, City prosecutor, and City clerk that they will be jailed if they do not bring specific sums of money to the City on designated dates in the future.
e. The City issues arrest warrants for “failure to appear” when people do not pay by certain designated dates even though the person did not fail to appear at any court appearance. The City routinely gives inmates paperwork crossing out a court date and telling them instead to make payments at the police department or to drop money off at the night deposit slot.
f. The City issues arrest warrants for “failure to appear” at court dates for which the person had not been given adequate notice. For example, for a hearing to which the person had not been validly summoned or to a hearing whose date the City has moved without ensuring actual notice has been given to the person. The City does not adequately ensure actual notice of changes in court dates and routinely issues arrest warrants even when it has no probable cause to believe that the elements of a “failure to appear” charge have been met, such as that the person did not intentionally fail to appear because the person was in the custody of another jurisdiction or was in the hospital.
g. After arrest pursuant to a warrant, the City either does not bring the person to court at all or delays presentment unnecessarily and for no legitimate purpose for days or weeks.
C. The Cycle of Debt and Jailing in Other Municipalities
204. Like the other impoverished people stuck in this broken system, the Plaintiffs have
been overwhelmed by the combination of multiplying fines, fees, costs, and surcharges from many
different municipalities at once, as well as the cycle of repeated jailings and subsequent transfers
to several different jails during each jailing, lost jobs, increased fees, and the inability to renew
driver’s licenses because of unpaid tickets. After scraping together cash from family and friends
and borrowing money to pay Ferguson, the Plaintiffs and other Class members would simply be
jailed by another city.
205. The hopelessness of trying to navigate this system for years without financial
resources and without the assistance of a lawyer who understands the process—never knowing
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when they left the house if they would be arrested and always confronted with the powerlessness of being kept in jail indefinitely because of their poverty—fundamentally altered the lives of the Plaintiffs and continues to tear at the core of the community.
206. The fear of having basic rights violated with no recourse is a daily fact of life for the Plaintiffs and thousands of others. It is this despair that the Saint Louis County debtors’ prison network cultivates that leads many impoverished people to avoid the system and some, sadly, to take their own lives while languishing in a jail cell.21
Class Action Allegations 207. The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. 208. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the City’s unlawful debt-collection scheme. 209. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)-(4), Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 210. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions. 211. Plaintiffs propose two Classes: a Declaratory and Injunctive Class and a Damages Class. The Declaratory and Injunctive Class is defined as: All persons who currently owe or who will incur debts to the City of Ferguson from fines, fees, costs, or surcharges arising from cases prosecuted by the City of Ferguson. 212. The Damages Class is defined as: All persons who, from February 8, 2010, until the present, were held in jail by the City because of their non-payment of a monetary sum required
21 At least four suicides and suicide attempts by people held because they were too poor to pay for their release have occurred in local municipal jails just in the past five months.
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by the City. A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 213. Over the past five years, thousands of people have owed and currently owe the City
of Ferguson money from old traffic tickets and other minor municipal offenses. Pursuant to City policy and practice, thousands of people who have indicated that they are too poor to pay their debts in full have been placed on payment plans by the City. All of these people are currently being threatened with arrest and jailing if they do not make the payments in the amount or frequency purportedly required by the City.
214. The City has kept hundreds of people in its jail for non-payment in each of the past five years. The City retains, and is required by law to retain, records of these instances.
215. The City followed and follows materially the same debt-collection policies, practices, and procedures to accomplish the jailing of the Class members. For example, pursuant to the City’s policy and practice, those kept in jail by the City for non-payment did not receive meaningful inquiries into their ability to pay as required by federal and Missouri law. Pursuant to City policy, no determinations of indigence or evaluations of alternatives to incarceration were made, and the City provided none of the relevant state and federal protections for debtors. Nor were those jailed by the City provided adequate counsel to represent them.
216. Those who still owe the City debt payments or who will incur such debts will be subjected to the same ongoing policies and practices absent the relief sought in this Complaint.
B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 217. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. The Plaintiffs seek relief concerning whether the City’s policies, practices, and procedures violated their rights and relief mandating the City to
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change its policies, practices, and procedures so that the Plaintiffs’ rights will be protected in the
future.
218. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are:
 Whether the City has a policy and practice of keeping people in its jail who owe money on old judgments unless and until they can pay a monetary sum;
 Whether the City has a policy and practice of incrementally lowering the amount required to buy a debtor’s release from custody as the person sits in jail;
 Whether the City has a policy and practice of failing to conduct meaningful inquiries into the ability of a person to pay before keeping the person in jail for non-payment;
 Whether the City provides notice to debtors that their ability to pay will be a relevant issue at the proceedings at which they are jailed or kept in jail and whether the City makes findings concerning ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration;
 Whether the City provides adequate legal representation to those jailed for non-payment in proceedings that result in their incarceration;
 Whether the City jail conditions are and have been unsanitary, unsafe, and inhumane in the ways described in this Complaint;
 Whether City employees and agents have a policy and practice of threatening debtors and families of debtors with incarceration for unpaid debts without informing them of their rights;
 Whether the City has a policy of issuing and executing warrants for the arrest of debtors despite lacking probable cause that they have committed any offense and without any notice or opportunity to be heard concerning their ability to pay or the validity of the debt.
219. Among the most important common question of law are:
 Whether keeping people in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment is lawful;
 Whether people are entitled to a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay before being jailed by the City for non-payment;
 Whether people who cannot afford to pay the City are entitled to the consideration of alternatives to incarceration before being jailed for non-payment;
 Whether people are entitled to the appointment of and representation by a lawyer in proceedings initiated and litigated by City prosecutors that result in their incarceration if they cannot afford an attorney;
 Whether the City can employ jail, threats of jail, onerous generic “payment dockets,” and other harsh debt-collection measures (such as ordering payment of significant portions of a person’s public assistance benefits) against debtors who cannot afford immediately to pay the monetary judgment to the City in full;
 Whether the City can arrest people based solely on their non-payment without any probable cause that they have committed any willful conduct or other offense and without notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning legal predicates for a valid detention, such as their ability to pay and the validity of the debt;
 Whether the jail conditions described in this Complaint violate federal law.
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220. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set of policies and practices: the City’s enormously profitable traffic and ordinance debt collection system. The City operates this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day, and all of the ancillary factual questions about how that scheme operates are common to all members of the Class, as well as the resulting legal questions about whether that scheme is unlawful. The material components of the scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 221. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes, and they have the same interests as all other members of the Classes that they represent. Each of them suffered injuries from the failure of the City to comply with the basic constitutional provisions detailed below. The answer to whether the City’s scheme of policies and practices is unconstitutional will determine the claims of the named Plaintiffs and every other Class member. 222. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in their claims that the City’s policies and practices concerning debt collection for fines, fees, costs, and surcharges violate the law in the ways alleged in each claim of the Complaint, then that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Injunctive and Damages Classes, as well as the Damages Subclasses.22 D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 223. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Classes because they are
22 The named Plaintiffs representing the Declaratory and Injunctive Class are Keilee Fant, Roelif Carter, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Alfred Morris, Anthony Kimble, Donyale Thomas, Shameika Morris, Daniel Jenkins, Ronnie Tucker, and Tonya Deberry. The named Plaintiffs representing the Damages Class are: Keilee Fant, Roelif Carter, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Alfred Morris, Anthony Kimble, Donyale Thomas, Shameika Morris, Daniel Jenkins, Ronnie Tucker, and Tonya Deberry.
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members of the Classes and because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those
of the Classes. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class members, all of whom have
a similar interest in vindicating the constitutional rights to which they are entitled.
224. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law,23 who have
experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of
both the details of the City’s scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Plaintiffs
are also represented by attorneys from ArchCity Defenders, who have extensive experience with
the functioning of the entire municipal court system in the City of Ferguson through their
representation of numerous impoverished people in the City of Ferguson.24 Plaintiffs are also
represented by the Saint Louis University School of Law,25 whose distinguished clinical professors
and dedicated students have devoted enormous time and resources to studying the functioning of
the municipal court system and the applicable federal and state law, as well as to representing
impoverished people affected by the illegalities permeating the City’s municipal scheme.
225. The efforts of Plaintiffs’ counsel have so far included extensive investigation over
a period of months, including numerous interviews with witnesses, City employees, City jail
23 Equal Justice Under Law is a non-profit civil rights organization based in Washington, D.C. The organization is funded in part by the Harvard Law School Public Service Venture Fund.
Counsel from Equal Justice Under Law was recently lead counsel in a landmark federal civil rights class action lawsuit against the City of Montgomery for engaging in similar debtors’ prison practices. In that case, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a preliminary injunction condemning and forbidding the City’s similar jailing of impoverished people with unpaid debts, and the case was successfully settled after the City agreed to compensate the Plaintiffs and to the entry of an injunction reforming its entire municipal debtcollection regime. 24 ArchCity Defenders is a non-profit public interest law firm based in Saint Louis. It has represented the poor and homeless in municipal court cases for the past five years and is an expert on the ways in which Ferguson’s illegal practices and policies make and keep people poor. ArchCity Defenders also published an extensive report detailing similar practices and policies in the cities of Bel-Ridge and Florissant. The report is available at www.archcitydefenders.org. 25 Saint Louis University School of Law Clinics have been involved in representing the poor and homeless in municipal courts for many years and have extensive knowledge of and experience with the systemic constitutional violations pervading the City’s scheme. Further, the Clinic and its professors have extensive experience in class action lawsuits.
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inmates, families, attorneys practicing in the Ferguson Municipal Court, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of Missouri municipal courts, and national experts in constitutional law, debt collection, bankruptcy law, criminal law, and jails.
226. Counsel have also observed numerous courtroom hearings in the City of Ferguson and in municipalities across the region in order to compile a detailed understanding of state law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements. Counsel have studied the way that these systems function in other cities in order to investigate the wide array of options in practice for municipalities.
227. As a result, counsel have devoted enormous time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with the City’s scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel has also developed relationships with many of the individuals and families most victimized by the City’s practices.
228. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 229. Class action status is appropriate because the City, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its traffic and ordinance debt-collection scheme, has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Declaratory and Injunctive Class. Thus, a declaration that people in the City cannot be held in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment will apply to each Class member. Similarly, a determination that Class members are entitled, as a matter of federal law, to a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay and an evaluation of alternatives to incarceration before they are jailed by the City for non-payment will apply to each Class member. The same applies to rulings on the other claims, including: that Class
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members are entitled to representation by counsel at proceedings initiated and litigated by City prosecutors in connection with which they are jailed; that the City cannot collect debts from Class members in an onerous manner that violates and evades all of the relevant protections for other judgment debtors; that the jail conditions to which members of the class are exposed are inhumane and unconstitutional; and that the City cannot issue and execute arrest warrants for traffic debtors without probable cause that they have committed an offense and without notice or a hearing prior to the deprivation of their liberty.
230. Injunctive relief compelling the City to comply with these constitutional rights will similarly protect each member of the Class from being again subjected to the City’s unlawful policies and practices with respect to the debts that they still owe and protect those who will incur such debts in the future from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
F: Rule 23(b)(3) 231. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate because the common questions of law and fact overwhelmingly predominate. This case turns, for every Class member, on what the City’s policies and practices were and on whether those policies were lawful. 232. The common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. Class-wide treatment of liability is a far superior method of determining the content and legality of the City’s policies and practices than individual suits by hundreds or thousands of City residents. The question of damages will also be driven by class-wide determinations, such as the policies, practices, and conditions at the City jail. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a
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person was unlawfully jailed. Determining damages for individual Class members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on easily verifiable records of the length of unlawful incarceration. If need be, individual hearings on Class-member specific damages based on special circumstances can be held after Class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
233. The Plaintiffs seek the following relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
Claims for Relief Count One: Defendant City of Ferguson Violated the Plaintiffs’ Rights By Jailing Them For Their Inability To Pay the City. 234. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-233. 235. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses have long prohibited imprisoning a person for the failure to pay money owed to the government if that person is indigent and unable to pay. Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights by jailing Plaintiffs when they could not afford to pay the debts allegedly owed from traffic and other minor offenses. Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights by imprisoning them, and by threatening to imprison them, without conducting any inquiry into their ability to pay and without considering alternatives to imprisonment as required by the United States Constitution. At any moment, a wealthier person in the Plaintiffs’ position could have paid a sum of cash and been released from jail. Defendant’s policy and practice of keeping Plaintiffs in its jail unless and until they are able to pay arbitrarily determined and constantly-shifting sums of money violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Two: Defendant City of Ferguson Violated Plaintiffs’ Rights By Imprisoning Them Without Appointing Adequate Counsel. 236. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-235.
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237. Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by jailing Plaintiffs during proceedings initiated by City prosecutors at which Plaintiffs did not have the benefit of counsel and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive counsel. The City’s policy of not providing adequate counsel in proceedings in which indigent people are ordered to be imprisoned in the City jail for non-payment, which are, in turn, based on payment plans arising from traffic and other violations at which the person was also unrepresented, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Count Three: Defendant City of Ferguson’ Use of Indefinite and Arbitrary Detention Violates Due Process
238. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-237 above. 239. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Defendant from jailing the Plaintiffs indefinitely and without any meaningful legal process through which they can challenge their detention by keeping them confined in the Defendant’s jail unless or until they could make arbitrarily determined cash payments. Count Four: The Deplorable Conditions in the Ferguson Jail Violate Due Process and Constitute Impermissible Punishment 240. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-239 above. 241. The unsafe, unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous conditions of confinement in the Ferguson jail constitute impermissible punishment unrelated to serving any criminal judgment. Even if imposed after valid conviction, the conditions would constitute cruel and unusual treatment. The deplorable and excessively harsh conditions in the Defendant’s jail are unnecessary to accomplish any legitimate government objective and shock the conscience of any reasonable person concerned with human dignity and liberty.
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Count Five: Defendant City of Ferguson’ Use of Jail and Threats of Jail To Collect Debts Owed to the City Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions On Debtors Whose Creditor Is the Government Compared To Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors.
242. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-241 above. 243. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup costs of prosecution from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position to impose unduly harsh methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. Not only does the City place indigent people on generic and overly onerous payment plans lasting years or decades when the cases of wealthier people would be terminated, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, indeterminate “payment dockets” for many years, extra and invalid fees and surcharges, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs, the City takes advantage of its control over the machinery of the City jail and police systems to deny debtors the procedural and substantive statutory protections that every other Missouri debtor may invoke against a private creditor. Many people like the Plaintiffs owing money to the City of Ferguson on old judgments have to borrow money and go further in debt in order to pay off the City of Ferguson because other non-government creditors are not permitted to jail them for non-payment of debt. This coercive policy and practice constitutes invidious discrimination and violates the fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws. Count Six: Defendant City of Ferguson’s Policy and Practice of Issuing and Serving Invalid Warrants, Including Those Solely Based on Nonpayment of Monetary Debt, Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 244. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-243 above. 245. The City’s policy and practice is to issue and serve arrest warrants against those who have not paid their traffic debt. These warrants are sought, issued, and served without any inquiry into the person’s ability to pay even when the City has prior knowledge that the person is
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Case: 4:15-cv-00253-SPM Doc. #: 1 Filed: 02/08/15 Page: 54 of 55 PageID #: 54
impoverished and unable to pay the debts and possesses other valid defenses. These warrants are
regularly sought, issued, and served without any finding of probable cause that the person has
committed the elements of any offense. The City chooses to pursue warrants instead of issuing
summons even when it has spoken to people on the phone or in person and has the opportunity to
notify them to appear in court. The City’s policy of allowing wealthy residents or residents who
can afford to hire an attorney to remove their warrants but refusing to clear warrants for indigent
people who cannot afford those options is unlawful. Moreover, the City’s policy and practice of
not presenting arrestees in court or unreasonably delaying presentment for days or weeks for no
legitimate reason is unlawful. These practices violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and
result in a deprivation of fundamental liberty without adequate due process.
Request for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights by imprisoning them because they cannot afford to pay the City and by imprisoning them without conducting any meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay or into alternatives to incarceration;
b. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by imprisoning them without appointing adequate counsel at the proceedings that led to their incarceration;
c. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ rights by holding them indefinitely in jail independent of any formal legal process;
d. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ rights by subjecting them to unconstitutional jail conditions;
e. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights by imposing harsh debt collection measures not imposed on debtors whose creditors are private entities;
f. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing and serving arrest warrants without probable cause to believe that the elements of an offense had been committed, with unreasonable delay prior to presentment, and without providing pre-deprivation of liberty process where such process is easily available to the City;
g. An order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendant from enforcing the abovedescribed unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs;
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Case: 4:15-cv-00253-SPM Doc. #: 1 Filed: 02/08/15 Page: 55 of 55 PageID #: 55
h. A judgment compensating the Plaintiffs for the damages that they suffered as a result of the City’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
i. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
_/s/ Alec Karakatsanis_______________ Alec Karakatsanis (E.D.Mo. Bar No. 999294DC)
Equal Justice Under Law 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 (202)-681-2409 alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
_/s/ Thomas B. Harvey__________________ Thomas B. Harvey (MBE #61734)
_/s/ Michael-John Voss________________ Michael-John Voss (MBE #61742)
ArchCity Defenders 812 N. Collins Alley Saint Louis, MO 63102 855-724-2489
_/s/ John J. Ammann___________________ John J. Ammann (MBE #34308)
_/s/ Stephen Hanlon________________ Stephen Hanlon (MBE #19340)
_/s/ Brendan Roediger________________ Brendan Roediger (E.D.Mo. Bar No. IL6287213)
Saint Louis University School of Law 100 N. Tucker Blvd. Saint Louis, MO 63101-1930 314-977-2778
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

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No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiffs in this putative class action claim that they were repeatedly jailed by the City of Ferguson (the “City”) for being unable to pay fines owed to the City from traffic tickets and other minor offenses, without being afforded an attorney and without any inquiry into their ability to pay. The City has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and has also moved for a more definite statement and to strike redundant or immaterial matter. (Doc. No. 8.) For the reasons set forth below, the City’s motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND The named Plaintiffs are 11 individuals who allege that they have been jailed by the City on numerous occasions because they were unable to pay fines owed from traffic and other minor offenses, were not afforded counsel or any inquiry into their ability to pay, and were held in jail indefinitely, in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, and denied access to basic hygiene products and medical care. They filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 8, 2015, asserting claims under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.1 They seek to represent a declaratory and injunctive class of “[a]ll persons
who currently owe or who will incur debts to the City . . . from fines, fees, costs, or
surcharges arising from cases prosecuted by the City,” and a damages class of “[a]ll
persons who, from February 8, 2010, until the present, were held in jail by the City because
of their non-payment of a monetary sum required by the City.” (Doc. No. 1 at 44-45.)
Count One of the complaint alleges that the City violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing and threatening to jail
Plaintiffs indefinitely for their inability to pay debts owed from traffic and other minor
offenses, without conducting any inquiry into Plaintiffs’ ability to pay and without
considering alternatives to imprisonment. Plaintiffs allege that, as a matter of policy and
practice, when arrestees are booked at the City’s jail, they are told by jail staff that they can
be released immediately but only if they pay cash to the City. Thus, Plaintiffs allege that
“[a]t any moment, a wealthier person in the Plaintiffs’ position could have paid a sum of
cash and been released from jail.” (Doc. No. 1 at 51.)
Count Two alleges that the City violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments by jailing Plaintiffs without affording them the benefit of counsel
or obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel. Plaintiffs allege that
the City has a policy and practice of not informing people of their right to counsel and not
1 Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs’ complaint also references the First and Eighth Amendments in the list of constitutional provisions this case “aris[es] under.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) However, in their response to the City’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs explicitly disclaim any reliance on these Amendments and describe the First Amendment reference as an “oversight.” See Doc. No. 13 at 15, 25 n.12. Therefore, the Court will grant the City’s motion to strike as it relates to paragraph 16’s references to the First and Eighth Amendments.
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appointing counsel “in proceedings in which indigent people are ordered to be imprisoned in the City jail for non-payment, which are, in turn, based on payment plans arising from traffic and other violations at which the person was also unrepresented.” (Doc. No. 1 at 52.) Plaintiffs contend that they were not provided any hearing prior to their incarceration for non-payment of fines, and at the hearings on their traffic and other offenses at which the fines were first imposed, they were also unrepresented while the City was represented by experienced prosecutors.
Count Three alleges that the City’s use of indefinite and arbitrary detention violates the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs allege that the City has a policy and practice of jailing indigent persons owing debts to the City “indefinitely and without any meaningful legal process through which they can challenge their detention by keeping them confined . . . unless or until they could make arbitrarily determined cash payments.” (Doc. No. 1 at 52.) Plaintiffs further allege that “inmates routinely do not even have future court dates set and are held indefinitely without being brought to court”; that “[i]f a person . . . misses any future payment, the City, without any legal process confiscates any previous amounts paid by the person to secure their release from jail and resets the person’s debts”; and that the City also adds “warrant fee[s]” for any missed payments, which increases the total debt owed by Plaintiffs. Id. at 37. The complaint alleges specific instances of City jail staff and supervisors holding Plaintiffs in jail for days or weeks, without setting future court dates or bringing Plaintiffs to court, and then gradually and incrementally reducing the amount of money required to buy a Plaintiff’s release, not through any formal court process, but by negotiating or bargaining with Plaintiffs or their families regarding the
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amount of money they are able to pay. For example, the complaint alleges that named Plaintiff Keilee Fant was on one occasion “held in jail by the City of Ferguson for nearly 50 days . . . for unpaid traffic tickets because she could not afford to buy her release.” (Doc. No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiffs further allege that “[i]n many cases, after significant jail time, the City will release the person for free if it is clear that the City cannot extract any money from the person during that jail stay.” Id. at 23, 35.
Count Four alleges that the totality of the conditions of the City’s jail amount to punishment of the pre-trial detainee and post-judgment debtor Plaintiffs, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs allege that while in jail, they were kept in “materially the same . . . conditions,” though for different amounts of time. See, e.g., Doc. No. 1 at 10, 14, 16, 18, 21, 23, 30, 32. Plaintiffs allege they were forced to sleep on the floor in overcrowded cells smeared with feces, blood, and mucus; denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, soap, and feminine hygiene products; kept in the same clothes for days without access to a shower, laundry, or clean undergarments; kept in cold temperatures and forced to share thin blankets; routinely denied medical care and prescription medication; provided only honeybuns and potpies to eat; provided only a single source of water connected to the top of the toilet, which produced warm water with an “unpalatable stench”; and deprived of books, legal materials, exercise, television, internet, and natural light. Id. at 41.
Count Five alleges that the City’s use of jail and threats of jail to collect debts owed to the City violates the Equal Protection Clause because it imposes “unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the government compared to those who owe money to private creditors.” (Doc. No. 1 at 53.) Plaintiffs allege that the “City takes
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advantage of its control over the machinery of the City jail and police systems to deny debtors the procedural and substantive statutory protections that every other Missouri debtor may invoke against a private creditor.” Id.
Count Six alleges that the City has a policy and practice of issuing and serving invalid warrants, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs allege that the City regularly issues and serves arrest warrants for “failure to appear,” even when there was no court appearance scheduled2 or when the City has not provided adequate notice of a court date, for example, because the City has moved a person’s hearing date without informing that person. Plaintiffs further allege that the City informs people that they can immediately remove outstanding warrants by paying a sum of money or by retaining a lawyer, but the City does not offer a way for unrepresented, indigent persons to remove arrest warrants.
As relief, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the City’s policies and practices, as outlined above, violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; a permanent injunction preventing the City from enforcing these policies and practices; and an award of compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
On March 2, 2015, the City moved to dismiss, or alternatively to strike and for a more definite statement of, Plaintiffs’ complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(e), and 12(f). (Doc. No. 8.)
2 Plaintiffs allege, for example, that the City “routinely gives inmates paperwork crossing out a court date and telling them instead to make payments at the police department or to drop money off at the night deposit slot.” (Doc. No. 1 at 43.)
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ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES The City’s Arguments
The City first argues that Plaintiffs’ 55-page complaint violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, which require a “short and plain” statement of the claims, set forth in “numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10. The City argues that if the Court does not dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for the reasons stated below, it should order Plaintiffs to replead their complaint with more definiteness, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), and should strike from Plaintiffs’ pleading any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, pursuant to Rule 12(f).
Next, the City argues that all six counts of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 action are barred by two federal court doctrines. The first, derived from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 447 (1994), bars § 1983 plaintiffs from recovering damages “for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” unless they prove that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . , or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The City argues that because Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Heck’s so-called “favorable-termination” requirement by pleading that their convictions or sentences have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus, their claims must be dismissed under Heck.
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The second doctrine the City invokes is Rooker-Feldman, which bars unsuccessful state court parties from seeking what amounts to appellate review of the state judgment in a federal district court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The City argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred under this doctrine because Plaintiffs “ultimately state that their damages sustained pursuant to each and every count resulted in unconstitutional judgments,” and “state proceedings allow for their own administrative review and appellate processes for such constitutional assertions.” (Doc. No. 9 at 10.)
Turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, the City contends that Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts in support of any constitutional violation. With respect to their claim in Count One, regarding jailing those who are unable to pay fines, the City argues that Plaintiffs fail to state an equal protection violation because Plaintiffs have not pleaded that similarly situated persons were treated differently.
Regarding Count Two’s right-to-counsel claim, the City argues that “at least one Plaintiff, Alfred Morris, alleges that he was informed of the ‘need[]’ of obtaining an attorney,” and it is “unclear” if this claim is asserted on behalf of all Plaintiffs, including Morris. (Doc. No. 9 at 12.) The City also notes that Plaintiffs have a right to self-representation in state court proceedings.
The City argues that Plaintiffs’ due process claims in Counts Three and Four, regarding indefinite and arbitrary detentions and conditions of confinement, should be dismissed or repleaded with more specificity because “Plaintiffs do not delineate which of many alleged detentions are constitutionally significant (and upon which detentions
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Plaintiffs seek recovery of damages),” and because “Plaintiffs do not . . . specify which alleged deprivation listed in their Complaint [was] experienced by which Plaintiff and which[] of these serves as their basis for this cause of action.” (Doc. No. 9 at 12-13, 15.)
With respect to Count Five’s equal protection claim comparing the treatment of Plaintiffs to the treatment of debtors owing money to private creditors, the City argues that Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to private debtors as a matter of law.
Regarding Count Six’s claim that the City’s warrant procedures are unconstitutional, the City argues that this claim should be stricken as duplicative of Count One, and that, in any event, Plaintiffs offer no authority for the proposition that the City’s warrant procedures violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Finally, the City argues that Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief should be denied for lack of an actual controversy and lack of ripeness. The City argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not justiciable because Plaintiffs allege only past harm and have not pleaded a reasonable likelihood that they will again be arrested and subject to any of the City’s allegedly unlawful policies and practices. Plaintiffs’ Response
Plaintiffs respond, first, that the City misunderstands the federal pleading rules. Plaintiffs argue that their complaint satisfies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10 and that, although lengthy, it provides background information necessary to give context to the City’s policies and practices.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that neither the Heck nor Rooker-Feldman doctrines apply in this case. Plaintiffs argue that they do not challenge their underlying convictions and
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sentences imposed for those convictions—i.e., the underlying traffic and other minor offenses and resulting fines. Instead, Plaintiffs describe their claims as “freestanding civil rights violations” arising out of post-judgment municipal procedures to collect money. (Doc. No. 13 at 7.) Plaintiffs note that the constitutionality of this post-judgment scheme has “no bearing on the validity of guilt in a traffic case or the propriety of the amount of fine originally assessed.” Id. at 6. Indeed, Plaintiffs argue, “one of the central claims of this case is that the Plaintiffs were detained and ransomed entirely apart from any judicial process, let alone pursuant to a valid conviction and sentence.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that because their complaint does not challenge any state court judgment, Heck and Rooker-Feldman are inapplicable.
Regarding the merits of their claims, Plaintiffs argue that it is well established that the City’s practice of jailing those who are unable to pay fines, as alleged in Count One, violates both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses. Plaintiffs contend that they plead all elements of an equal protection claim because they allege facts to establish that the City jails the poor “when wealthier people avoid jail solely by virtue of their financial resources.” (Doc. No. 13 at 11.)
Likewise, Plaintiffs argue that their right-to-counsel claim in Count Two adequately alleges that Plaintiffs are entitled to counsel in any proceedings at which they are jailed for failure to pay a fine, because these proceedings are complicated and because they stem from proceedings at which the government is represented by an experienced lawyer. Plaintiffs note that the City does not raise any substantive challenges to Count Two except
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to briefly mention the right to self-representation, which Plaintiffs argue is irrelevant in this case because Plaintiffs allege the City did not obtain valid waivers of counsel.
Regarding Counts Four and Five, relating to arbitrary and indefinite detentions and other conditions of confinement, Plaintiffs note that the City does not dispute that these claims are viable, but argues only that they are not pleaded with sufficient specificity. Plaintiffs argue that “[e]ach of the named Plaintiffs allege that, after they were arrested and taken to the Ferguson jail, they were told that they would be held there indefinitely, unless or until they paid enough money to get out or until their jailors decided to let them go for free,” and that the City has “openly practiced this policy for years.” (Doc. No. 13 at 14.) Thus, Plaintiffs argue that they have pleaded, in detail, a due process violation resulting from arbitrary and indefinite detentions. Likewise, Plaintiffs argue that they have pleaded with specificity “a constellation of [jail] conditions,” which “feed into and reinforce each other,” and which, in totality, amount to a violation of due process. Id. at 16.
Plaintiffs also argue that their allegations in Count Five are sufficient to state an equal protection claim based on the differences in treatment of Plaintiffs as compared to civil judgment debtors. Plaintiffs argue that the U.S. Supreme Court in James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) held that although a “State’s claim to reimbursement may take precedence, under appropriate circumstances, over the claims of private creditors, and that enforcement procedures . . . need not be identical,” this “does not mean . . . that a State may impose unduly harsh or discriminatory terms merely because the obligation is to the public treasury rather than to a private creditor.” See Doc. No. 13 at 18 (quoting James, 407 U.S. at 138). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that by alleging that the City does not afford them the
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protections Missouri law affords civil judgment debtors, they have sufficiently pleaded an equal protection violation.
With respect to Count Six, Plaintiffs argue that their allegations state a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which requires all warrants to be based on probable cause. Plaintiffs also argue that Count Six states an equal protection violation arising out of the City’s policy of allowing wealthier and/or represented people to automatically remove warrants but not allowing indigent, unrepresented people to do the same. Plaintiffs contend that because “freedom from physical confinement is a fundamental right, the City’s disparate treatment must meet heightened scrutiny,” and “[i]n any event, there is not even a rational basis for allowing represented debtors or debtors who can afford to make monetary payments to remove warrants freedom while arresting and detaining unrepresented and impoverished debtors.” (Doc. No. 13 at 23.)
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pleaded a basis for declaratory and injunctive relief because they have pleaded that they “still owe debts to the City that the City is currently attempting to collect . . . using its unlawful policies and procedures.” (Doc. No. 13 at 24.)
DISCUSSION Motion for More Definite Statement and to Strike
The federal pleading rules provide that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “A party may move
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for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “Together these rules permit the court and the litigants to know, at the pleading stage, who is being sued and the grounds for same, thereby facilitating the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action.” Bay Indus., Inc. v. Tru–Arx Mfg., LLC, No. 06–C–1010, 2006 WL 3469599, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 29, 2006); Superior Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 44 F. Supp. 3d 890, 898 (D. Minn. 2014) (“The remedy of repleader based on violation of Rules 8 and 10 has generally been reserved for egregious cases where a defendant does not know the basic facts that constitute the claim for relief against it.”).
A party may also move to strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Although courts enjoy “broad discretion” in determining whether to strike a party’s pleadings, such an action is “an extreme measure.” Stanbury Law Firm v. IRS, 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, motions to strike are “viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.” Id.
Upon review of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court finds that it satisfies Rules 8 and 10. The complaint is stated with sufficient, but not superfluous, detail, and its paragraphs are limited, as far as practicable, to discrete sets of circumstances, such that the City should be able to frame a responsive pleading. And except for Plaintiffs’ admittedly mistaken references to the First and Eighth Amendments in paragraph 16, the Court does not find any language in the complaint so redundant, impertinent, or scandalous as to warrant the extreme measure of striking. Therefore, the Court will grant the City’s Rule 12(f) motion
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to strike solely with respect to Plaintiffs’ references to the First and Eighth Amendments in paragraph 16, and will otherwise deny the City’s motions under Rules 12(e) and 12(f). Motion to Dismiss
I. Legal Standard To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s allegations
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in plaintiff’s favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). A court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” and consider the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Group, 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010).
II. Heck’s Favorable-Termination Requirement “Heck specifies that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success
would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). Although the City broadly states that Heck bars each of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly” held that, notwithstanding Heck, plaintiffs may “bring § 1983 actions challenging the conditions
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of their confinement.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 84. Thus, Heck clearly does not bar Count Four.
As for the remaining claims, in order to decide whether Heck’s favorable-termination requirement applies, the Court must consider “whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 83 (“In context, Heck uses the word ‘sentence’ to refer not to prison procedures, but to substantive determinations as to the length of confinement.”). “But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id.; see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82 (clarifying that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is only barred “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”).
In this case, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the only state court convictions at issue are the Plaintiffs’ underlying traffic and other minor offenses, which are alleged to have resulted only in fines, not sentences. Plaintiffs allege that their incarceration resulted from post-judgment procedures to enforce non-payment of those fines, but not from any separate conviction or sentence.3 A judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor would not necessarily
3 The City does contend that the challenged incarcerations were ordered pursuant to any state court judgment. Indeed, the City itself argues that the Eighth Amendment is not
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demonstrate the invalidity of Plaintiffs’ underlying traffic convictions or fines, but only the City’s procedures for enforcing those fines. Nor would Plaintiffs’ success in this case “necessarily” invalidate the fact or duration of their incarceration. Success would mean only a change in the City’s procedures prior to incarceration. Even if these procedures were changed, Plaintiffs may still have been found to have willfully refused to pay a fine they were capable of paying and thereafter lawfully incarcerated pursuant to constitutional procedures and conditions. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82 (“Success for [the plaintiff] does not mean immediate release from confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new parole application.”).
The Court notes that the City’s discussion of the Sixth Circuit case, Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007), is misplaced and, more importantly, incomplete. Like this case, Powers involved a putative class action brought by a plaintiff who was incarcerated for non-payment of a fine incurred as a result of a reckless-driving charge. Powers, 501 F.3d at 597. The municipal court in Powers appointed a public defender for the plaintiff at both his initial reckless driving hearing and sentencing, as well as a subsequent court hearing after his arrest for failing to pay the court-ordered fine. Id. at 597. The plaintiff pleaded no contest to both the initial reckless driving charge and the subsequent failure to pay his fine, the public defender did not seek an indigency hearing, and plaintiff served at least one day in jail for failing to pay the fine.
applicable to Plaintiffs precisely because they have not “alleged formal adjudications of guilt regarding their incarcerations.” (Doc. No. 9 at 13.)
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Id. He then brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the public defender’s office had a policy of failing to request indigency hearings for clients facing jail time for nonpayment of court-ordered fines. Id.
The Sixth Circuit found that the § 1983 action was cognizable, notwithstanding Heck, for two reasons. The first was that the plaintiff’s term of incarceration—one day—was too short to enable him to seek habeas relief, and the Sixth Circuit held that Heck’s favorable-termination requirement was excused for habeas-ineligible § 1983 plaintiffs. Id. at 601. As the City correctly notes, this issue is the subject of a circuit split, in which the Eighth Circuit has explicitly disagreed with the Sixth Circuit. See Newmy v. Johnson, 758 F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit—like the First, Third, and Fifth—has interpreted Heck to impose a universal favorable termination requirement on all § 1983 plaintiffs attacking the validity of their conviction or sentence . . . [even] for an inmate who is detained for only a short time with limited access to legal resources[.]”). Therefore, as the City correctly notes, Plaintiffs in this case could not avoid Heck merely by arguing their jail terms were too short to enable them to seek habeas relief.
But Plaintiffs do not make this argument. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Heck is inapplicable for the second reason discussed in Powers—namely, because they do not challenge the fact or duration of their underlying convictions or sentences but only the improper procedures that culminated in their post-judgment incarceration. Powers, 501 F.3d at 603 (“[The] second reason . . . that Powers need not comply with the favorable-termination requirement [is] because he alleges that his constitutional rights
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were violated as a result of improper procedures, not that his underlying conviction or jail sentence was improper.”). As the Sixth Circuit noted in Powers, “[a] conclusion that the procedures, or rather the lack of procedures, that culminated in Powers’s incarceration violated his constitutional rights has nothing to do with the propriety of his underlying conviction,” and would only mean that “the failure to grant Powers an indigency hearing, not that the order committing him to jail was wrongful.” Id. at 604. In other words, “Powers’s incarceration is not ‘necessarily invalid’ because Powers may have willfully refused to pay a fine he was capable of paying, rather than having been actually impecunious,” but “we cannot guess at [this] precisely because Powers did not get an indigency hearing.” Id. at 605; see also Ray v. Judicial Corrs. Servs., No. 2:12–CV– 02819–RDP, 2013 WL 5428360, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013) (holding that Heck did not apply because “Plaintiffs essentially advance procedural challenges to the Town’s conduct—e.g., the lack of an indigency hearing after failure to pay fines and/or the lack of providing counsel prior to incarceration—rather than attacking the propriety of their confinement or probation.”). The same is true in this case. Accordingly, the Court rejects the City’s argument that Heck bars Plaintiffs’ claims.
III. Rooker-Feldman “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the
doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Because Plaintiffs do not complain
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of injuries caused by the state court judgment, but rather by the post-judgment procedures employed to incarcerate persons who are unable to pay fines, Rooker-Feldman is also inapplicable. See Powers, 501 F.3d at 606 (“The Rooker– Feldman doctrine has no bearing on Powers’s claims because he does not allege that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the state-court judgment, but rather by the Public Defender’s conduct in failing to ask for an indigency hearing as a prerequisite to his incarceration.”); Ray, 2013 WL 5428360, at *9 (holding that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable to the plaintiffs’§ 1983 claims against the municipality for jailing indigent persons unable to pay traffic fines because “Plaintiffs’ suit does not challenge the merits of the municipal court’s decisions,” or “call into question any of the bases on which those judgments were reached,” but only “challenge[s] the post-judgment probationary program”).
IV. Sufficiency of Claims Turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, a municipality such as the City may be
liable under § 1983 “if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). But municipalities are only liable for their own illegal acts; they may not be held vicariously liable for their employees’ actions. Id.; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) (“As we recognized in Monell and have repeatedly reaffirmed, Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights.”).
Thus, plaintiffs seeking to impose § 1983 liability on local governments must prove 18

that “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Id. Local governments may also be liable for failure to train employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights, where the failure to train amounts to “deliberate indifference,” meaning that “a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Id. at 1360. “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to show deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id.
i. Jailing for Inability to Pay (Count One) Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that the City’s policy and practice of jailing Plaintiffs for their inability to pay fines violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” Tate, 401 U.S. at 398 (1971); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1983) (“[I]f the State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely because he lacked the resources to pay it.”). Following these rulings, federal courts have repeatedly held that jailing persons who are unable to pay a court-ordered fine, without first inquiring into their ability to pay and
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considering alternatives to imprisonment, violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665, 674 (“Due process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis in these cases,” and both principles require that before imprisoning a probationer for failure to pay a court-ordered fine, “a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay,” and “[i]f the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay, the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment” and may imprison “[o]nly if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests”); Tate, 401 U.S. at 399 (holding that a state “cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine”); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that, in order to comply with due process and equal protection, a court must “inquire into an individual’s reasons for failing to pay a fine or courts costs,” and “if the individual was simply unable to pay, that is, he was indigent, the court is required to consider alternative measures of punishment”); Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a municipal court could not constitutionally impose a sentence requiring an indigent to pay a fine forthwith or serve a specified number of days in jail because the “alternative fine” system unlawfully “creates two disparately treated classes: those who can satisfy a fine immediately upon its levy, and those who can pay only over a period of time, if then”).
The Supreme Court has clarified that the Constitution does not preclude imprisoning a person “with the means to pay a fine who refuses or neglects to do so,” or
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imprisoning a person “when alternative means are unsuccessful despite the [person’s] reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means.” Tate, 401 U.S. at 400-401. But “[b]y sentencing [a person] to imprisonment simply because he could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically turn[s] a fine into a prison sentence,” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674.
The 11 named Plaintiffs have specifically alleged that, pursuant to a City policy and practice, they were each jailed for failure to pay a fine without any inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment. Therefore, Plaintiffs have stated due process and equal protection claims in Count One. See Alkire, 330 F.3d at 818 (finding that plaintiff’s evidence of ten cases, including his own, in which persons were detained by municipal court for failure to pay debt without inquiry into ability to pay was sufficient “for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that his constitutional rights were violated by the [municipal court]”); Doe v. Angelina County, 733 F. Supp. 245, 257 (E.D. Tex. 1990 ) (granting plaintiff summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against a municipality because there was uncontroverted evidence that “it was the practice of jail officials immediately to incarcerate persons arrested . . . without a hearing, if they failed to raise the funds to pay [court-imposed] fines by means of telephone calls from the county jail,” and “this practice of automatically converting fine-only sentences into terms of incarceration was unconstitutional”); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that the incarceration of an indigent person in a civil contempt proceeding
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violated the Due Process Clause where the person “did not receive clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his civil contempt proceeding[,] [n]o one provided him with a form (or the equivalent) designed to elicit information about his financial circumstances[,] [and] [t]he court did not find that [he] was able to pay” before ordering incarceration).
ii. Right to Counsel (Count Two) The parties have not addressed whether the legal proceedings in which Plaintiffs were jailed for failure to pay fines—if any proceedings were held at all—were civil or criminal in nature. In either case, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim that the City’s failure to appoint counsel for the indigent Plaintiffs, or to obtain waivers thereof, in connection with their incarceration violated their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). In Argersinger, the Court noted that its holding was applicable to “prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances,” and that “[t]he denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail sentence.” Id. Then in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Supreme Court clarified that the right to counsel applies only when a person is actually sentenced to imprisonment and not merely when imprisonment is an authorized penalty. Scott, 440 U.S. at 370-74. The Court reasoned that “actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
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imprisonment,” and “actual imprisonment [is] the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.” Id. at 373. Moreover, “a suspended sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution for the crime charged.” Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
But the right to counsel does not automatically attach to all proceedings involving the possibility of imprisonment. For example, the Supreme Court has held that there is not an automatic right to counsel in probation revocation hearings or in civil contempt proceedings; instead, the right to counsel in these proceedings is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, according to due process principles. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (“Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.”); Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517-20 (2011) (holding that “the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual . . . fac[ing] incarceration,” and instead the right to counsel must be determined by balancing traditional due process factors, such as the indigent defendant’s liberty interest, the state’s opposing interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards). In Turner, the Court found that due process would “not require the provision of counsel where the opposing [party] (to whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State
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provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have mentioned
(adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to
dispute, relevant information, and court findings),” but because the petitioner in that case
received “neither counsel nor the benefit of alternative procedures,” his incarceration
violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2520.
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 31.02 also provides some considerations for
determining when counsel is required:
If any person charged with an offense, the conviction of which would probably result in confinement, shall be without counsel upon his first appearance before a judge, it shall be the duty of the court to advise him of his right to counsel, and of the willingness of the court to appoint counsel to represent him if he is unable to employ counsel. Upon a showing of indigency, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint counsel to represent him. If after being informed as to his rights, the defendant requests to proceed without the benefit of counsel, and the court finds that he has intelligently waived his right to have counsel, the court shall have no duty to appoint counsel. If at any stage of the proceedings it appears to the court in which the matter is then pending that because of the gravity of the offense charged and other circumstances affecting the defendant, the failure to appoint counsel may result in injustice to the defendant, the court shall then appoint counsel.
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 31.02(a).
Plaintiffs allege that they were not afforded counsel at the initial hearings on their
underlying traffic and other offenses, nor prior to their incarceration for failing to pay the
court-ordered fines for these offenses. The Court notes that because Plaintiffs allege they
were only fined, not sentenced to imprisonment, at their initial hearings for their traffic and
other offenses, a right to counsel may not have attached at that time. But a more difficult
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question arises regarding Plaintiffs’ claimed right to counsel at the time they were incarcerated for failing to pay the court-ordered fines.
A similar claim was addressed by the District of Maine in Colson v. Joyce, 646 F. Supp. 102 (D. Me. 1986). In that case, too, the petitioner was arrested for failing to pay a court-ordered fine arising out of a conviction for driving with a suspended license, and the petitioner was not represented by counsel or advised of a right to counsel prior to incarceration. Colson, 646 F. Supp. at 104. However, in Colson, the petitioner was at least afforded a court hearing prior to his incarceration, at which he was asked to show cause why he should not be committed for failing to pay the fine.4 Id. Nevertheless, the court found, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, that the petitioner had a due process right to counsel at this show cause hearing prior to incarceration, because the petitioner’s liberty interest clearly outweighed the state’s interest in enforcing its penalties without incurring the costs of court-appointed counsel. Id. at 108, aff’d, 816 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1987).
Although the Court believes further development of the record will shed light on the nature of the proceedings, if any, by which Plaintiffs allege they were incarcerated, the Court finds at this stage, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim that the City’s failure to appoint counsel or obtain waivers thereof violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights, particularly in light of their allegations that they were also not afforded any hearing, inquiry into ability to pay, or alternative procedural safeguards in connection with their incarceration.
4 The petitioner in Colson also waived the issue of whether the court adequately inquired into his ability to pay before incarcerating him. Colson, 646 F. Supp. at 104.
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Indeed, the City does not dispute that appointment of counsel, or waivers thereof, were required in this case; the City merely argues that it is unclear if Count Two is asserted on behalf of all Plaintiffs. The City points to Plaintiffs’ allegations that at least one Plaintiff, Alfred Morris, was informed of the “need” for counsel. Upon review of the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged that they were neither informed of a right to counsel nor appointed counsel in connection with their incarcerations.5 Moreover the Plaintiffs allege that the failure to appoint counsel or obtain waivers for indigent debtors was a policy and practice of the City. The Court finds that these allegations are sufficiently specific to put the City on notice that Count Two is asserted on behalf of all Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs sufficiently state a claim on behalf of all Plaintiffs, including Morris. Plaintiffs’ allegation that Morris was informed of a “need” for counsel does not demonstrate that Morris knowingly and intelligently waived a right to counsel, and therefore does not defeat Count Two.
iii. Indefinite and Arbitrary Detentions (Count Three) The City acknowledges that its only argument for dismissal of Count Three is the “Plaintiffs’ failure to specify which detention it claims is constitutionally significant (or which detention each Plaintiff intends to raise a claim upon which relief may be granted).” (Doc. No. 15 at 6.) A review of Plaintiffs’ complaint reveals that they have specifically alleged that they were each detained for days or weeks without a court appearance through
5 Plaintiff Roelif Carter alleges that he had the assistance of a lawyer from the Veterans Administration prior to pleading guilty and being assessed a fine in connection with one of his traffic violations, but he alleges that the City never appointed him an attorney in connection with his incarceration for failure to pay fines. Compare Doc. No. 1 at 11, with id. at 13.
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which to challenge their detention, and that the City has a policy and practice of holding people in jail indefinitely until they or their families pay arbitrarily determined cash payments. See Doc. No. 1 at 6-32, 34-38, 52. Although Count Three overlaps with the other counts to some extent, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state a due process claim.
In determining whether an extended detention following an arrest violates due process, courts must consider “the totality of the circumstances,” including “(1) whether the Due Process Clause prohibits an extended detention, without an initial appearance, following arrest by a valid warrant; (2) whether the defendants’ conduct offended the standards of substantive due process; and (3) whether the totality of circumstances shocks the conscience.” Hayes v. Faulkner County, 388 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit has held that “the Due Process Clause forbids an extended detention, without a first appearance, following arrest by warrant,” and has recognized that “[t]he consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest [because] [p]retrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit has not delineated with precision “the duration and circumstances of detention that might result in a substantive due process violation.” Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005). However, it has found that a county’s 38-day pre-appearance detention of a person arrested by warrant for failure to appear at a municipal court hearing in connection with a ticket for not having automobile tags and vehicle insurance violated due process. Hayes, 388 F.3d at 675. It has also cited
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with approval the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that an 18-day pre-appearance detention violated due process. Id. at 673 (citing and discussing with approval Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, (7th Cir. 1985)); but see Luckes, 415 F.3d at 940 (finding, on summary judgment, that a 24-hour detention of a person arrested by warrant for failing to pay traffic fine did not violate due process).
At this early stage in the case, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ allegations of pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one case, nearly two months, in the conditions described below, which are alleged to have been connected only to a municipal code violation that did not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which are alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily determined payment was made, plausibly state a pattern and practice of due process violations for which the City may be held liable.
iv. Conditions of Confinement (Count Four) As discussed above in connection with Count Three, courts must examine the “totality of the circumstances” of a pretrial detainee’s confinement to determine whether the conditions rise to the level of a due process violation. Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010). Pretrial detainees are “entitled to at least as great protection” as convicted prisoners are entitled under the Eighth Amendment. Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 2013). “Hence, pretrial detainees are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time.” Id. “Conditions of confinement, however, constitute cruel and unusual punishment only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Whitnack v. Douglas
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County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit has also held that
“deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard of culpability for all claims that prison
officials failed to provide pretrial detainees with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety.” Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 2006); see
also Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s applied to a
municipality in the Fourteenth Amendment context, deliberate indifference is purely
objective: liability may be premised on obviousness or constructive notice.”).
While reviewing the totality of circumstances of Plaintiffs’ confinement, the Court
focuses on the nature of the conditions and the length of Plaintiffs’ exposure to these
conditions. See Owens v. Scott County Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
Whitnack, 16 F.3d at 958 (“Conditions, such as a filthy cell, may be tolerable for a few days
and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”) (citation omitted).
Although Plaintiffs have alleged they were exposed to materially the same conditions,6 the length of exposure differed among Plaintiffs and among different
instances of incarceration, and these differences may impact the merits of each Plaintiff’s
claim. Compare Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268–69 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no
constitutional violation where pretrial detainee was subjected to overflowed toilet for four
days), Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 444–47 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding inmate’s deprivation
6 The Court disagrees with the City that by alleging they were exposed to “materially the same conditions,” Plaintiffs’ allegations are too vague for the City to respond. Upon review of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the duration of their different instances of incarceration and the conditions to which they were exposed during those incarcerations. As discussed below, whether these conditions amount to a due process violation is a fact-intensive question that will benefit from further development of the record.
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of clothes, running water, hygiene supplies, blanket, and mattress for four days did not violate Eighth Amendment), Whitnack, 16 F.3d at 958 (finding no constitutional violation arising from dirty cell with excrement and vomit because conditions lasted only for 24 hours before cleaning supplies were distributed), and Stickley, 703 F.3d at 423-24 (finding denial of pretrial detainee’s requests for additional toilet paper did not violate constitution because of the limited amount of time he went without toilet paper and because “[w]hen he did run out of toilet paper, he was able to clean himself by taking a shower”), with Owens, 328 F.3d at 1027 (finding question of fact raised regarding due process violation where pretrial detainee spent five weeks sleeping on mattress on floor approximately a foot and a half away from toilet, where urine splashed on blankets and blankets were cleaned less than once a month), and Morris, 601 F.3d at 811 (holding that transporting pretrial detainee “in a small, unsanitary dog cage for [a] ninety-minute drive” to the courthouse, “with no compelling urgency and other options available, was excessive in relation to the goal of preventing escape, and thus, an inference may be reasonably made that [this] conduct amounted to [unconstitutional] punishment”).
Nevertheless, at this early stage, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations of repeated detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one case, nearly two months, during which Plaintiffs allege they were forced to sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces; were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene products; were denied access to shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time; were denied medications; and were provided little or inadequate food and water, are sufficient to state a plausible claim for a due process violation attributable to the City.
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v. Treatment of Plaintiffs as Compared to Civil Judgment Debtors (Count Five) In James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a Kansas recoupment statute that permitted the state to recoup court-appointed attorney fees for indigent criminal defendants without permitting the criminal defendant to raise any of the defenses permitted to other civil judgment debtors, including certain protections from wage garnishment, violated equal protection. James, 407 U.S. at 142. The Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause “imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out” and that such rationality “is lacking where, as in the instant case, the State has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory conditions of repayment” not imposed on other judgment debtors. Id. at 140. As the City correctly notes, however, the debtors afforded disparate treatment in James were similarly situated because all of their debts were civil in nature. See U.S. v. Cunningham, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (“Although the statute in James dealt with indigent criminal defendants, the debts involved—and afforded disparate treatment—were all civil in nature.”). And at least one district court evaluating James has held that “discriminating against criminal judgment debtors by denying them state law exemptions does not violate . . . equal protection” because criminal judgment debtors are not similarly situated to civil judgment debtors. Id. (holding that prohibiting a criminal defendant owing restitution from invoking exemptions afforded civil judgment debtors did not violate equal protection). The City asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that Plaintiffs’ fines are not merely court costs but fines imposed pursuant to criminal judgments. Accordingly, the Court
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finds that Plaintiffs cannot state an equal protection claim for being treated differently with respect to their fines than civil judgment debtors because they have not adequately alleged that they are similarly situated to civil judgment debtors. See Schmidt v. Des Moines Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 811, 820 (8th Cir. 2011) (“To establish a violation of [the Equal Protection Clause], a plaintiff must show that she was treated differently than other persons who were in all relevant respects similarly situated.”) (citation omitted). The Court will grant the City’s motion to dismiss Count Five.
vi. Warrant Procedures (Count Six) “By virtue of its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). But if a person is arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, even if the circumstances of his detention may have been wrongful or constitute false imprisonment under a tort-law analysis, the person fails to state a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 142-43; see also Luckes, 415 F.3d at 939 (“Because Luckes was named in a valid bench warrant, however, probable cause for his arrest pursuant to that warrant was established, and his Fourth Amendment argument is thus without merit.”). In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to allege that their arrest warrants were facially invalid, and therefore fail to state a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were arrested for “failure to appear” without being provided adequate notice of a court appearance may give rise to a tort claim but do not establish that their arrest warrants were facially invalid. See Heard v. City of
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Blytheville, No. 3:10CV00272 SWW, 2011 WL 1639231, at *2 (E.D. Ark. May 2, 2011) (holding that a plaintiff arrested pursuant to warrant for failure to appear, who alleged that the city “had at its disposal officers and actual data which would have and should have established that Plaintiff had not been given notice of a requirement to appear as a witness in the aforementioned court proceeding,” failed to “allege facts sufficient to support a claim that the warrant for her arrest was facially invalid”). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in Count Six.
However, Plaintiffs state an additional claim in Count Six that the City has an allegedly unconstitutional policy and practice of affording wealthier individuals who are able to pay a fine and individuals represented by counsel an opportunity to immediately clear warrants, while not allowing unrepresented, indigent individuals to do the same. Like Count One, this claim appears to allege, effectively, that the City automatically turns fines into prison sentences for indigents lacking the funds to pay, in violation of Tate. Although this claim appears to be duplicative of Count One, at this point in the proceeding, the Court declines to dismiss it for failure to state a claim. However, duplicative damages will not be recoverable.
vii. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Finally, the Court finds the City’s objection to Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief to be without merit. Contrary to the City’s assertions, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a reasonable likelihood of future harm because they have pleaded they still owe debts to the City, which the City may enforce by using the allegedly unlawful methods and procedures described above. See, e.g., Doc. No. 1 at 10, 14, 16, 19, 22, 24,
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25, 28, 30; see also Ray, 2013 WL 5428360, at *14 (holding that plaintiffs’ allegations that they “still owe[d] various fines and fees,” demonstrated they were “under the present and constant threat of being subject to the allegedly illegal methods and procedures utilized . . . to collect municipal fines,” and their claims for “prospective injunctive relief” were therefore appropriate). Whether Plaintiffs can demonstrate that the factors governing injunctive relief weigh in their favor may be determined at a later stage.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of Ferguson’s motion to dismiss, or alternatively to strike or for a more definite statement, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. No. 8.) The motion is GRANTED as follows: the words “First” and Eighth” in Paragraph 16 of the complaint are STRICKEN; Count Five is DISMISSED; and Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in Count Six is DISMISSED. Except as set forth above, the motion is DENIED.

Dated this 26th day of May, 2015.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

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No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. No. 20) to reconsider the Court’s Order (Doc. No. 19) dismissing Count Five and dismissing in part Count Six of Plaintiffs’ complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action asserted six claims against the City of Ferguson, arising out of the City’s policies and practices of jailing them for failure to pay fines owed from traffic and other minor offenses. In its May 26, 2015 Memorandum and Order (the “Order”), the Court largely denied the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. However, the Court granted the City’s motion with respect to two of Plaintiffs’ six claims. Count Five of Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the City’s imposition of “unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the government compared to those who owe money to private creditors” violates the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. No. 1 at 53.) Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that “the City takes advantage of its control

over the machinery of the City jail and police systems to deny debtors the procedural and substantive statutory protections that every other Missouri debtor may invoke against a private creditor.” Id. The City argued that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to private debtors as a matter of law. Plaintiffs responded that, according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), states may not “impose unduly harsh or discriminatory terms” on debtors whose “obligation is to the public treasury rather than to a private creditor.” See Doc. No. 13 at 18 (quoting James, 407 U.S. at 138).
In its prior Order, this Court held that, unlike the plaintiffs in James, 407 U.S. at 138, who were found to be similarly situated to private judgment debtors where they owed the state reimbursement for legal defense fees, Plaintiffs’ fines in this case were not alleged to be merely court fees or costs. Rather, Plaintiffs’ fines were alleged to be imposed in connection with traffic and other municipal offenses. Although Plaintiffs argued in opposition to dismissal that unpaid court fines may be considered civil judgments because Missouri Revised Statute § 560.031 provides that unpaid fines may be collected by means used to enforce money judgments,1 Plaintiffs did not allege or argue that the underlying traffic and other offenses for which the fines were first imposed were civil judgments. And upon review of the complaint, the Court found that Plaintiffs had not adequately
1 However, this statute also authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of fines “unless the offender shows that his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the sentence of the court, or not attributable to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to obtain the necessary funds for payment.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560.031(2).
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alleged that they are similarly situated to private judgment debtors. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to state an equal protection claim in Count Five.
Count Six of Plaintiffs’ complaint challenged the City’s warrant procedures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs alleged that the City regularly issues and serves arrest warrants for “failure to appear,” even when the City has not provided adequate notice of a court date, for example, because City officials moved a person’s hearing date without informing that person. Plaintiffs further alleged that the City informs people that they can immediately remove outstanding warrants by paying a sum of money or by retaining a lawyer, but the City does not offer a way for indigent, unrepresented persons to remove arrest warrants. The City argued that this claim should be dismissed as duplicative of Count One, and because Plaintiffs offered no authority for the proposition that the City’s warrant procedures violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs responded that their allegations sufficiently stated a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which requires all warrants to be based on probable cause. Plaintiffs also argued that Count Six stated an equal protection violation arising out of the City’s policy of allowing wealthier and/or represented people to automatically remove warrants but not allowing indigent, unrepresented people to do the same.
The Court agreed with Plaintiffs’ latter argument and held that Plaintiffs’ allegations in Count Six regarding the City’s different treatment of them based on their inability to pay were sufficient to state an equal protection claim. However, the Court held that Plaintiffs did not state a Fourth Amendment claim in Count Six. The Court found that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were arrested for “failure to appear” without
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being provided adequate notice of a court appearance may have given rise to a tort claim but did not rise to the level of a constitutional claim.
Plaintiffs have moved for reconsideration of both of these rulings. With respect to Count Five, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs did not adequately plead that they are similarly situated to private judgment debtors. Plaintiffs cite Missouri caselaw suggesting that violations of municipal ordinances are, at most, only quasi-criminal in nature. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that the fines imposed for these violations are similar enough to civil money judgments to give rise to an equal protection violation for failure to treat the debts similarly. Plaintiffs also note that their debts include not only their offense-related fines but also separately assessed court surcharges and fees that are more akin to the court costs at issue in James.
With respect to Count Six, Plaintiffs argue that they have stated a valid Fourth Amendment claim, notwithstanding their facially valid arrest warrants, based on the City’s alleged policy of issuing arrest warrants without probable cause.
The City responds that the Court correctly dismissed both claims. The City argues that Count Five was correctly dismissed because, even if the underlying offenses for which Plaintiffs’ fines were imposed are only quasi-criminal in nature, Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded that, as quasi-criminal judgment debtors, they are similarly situated to private judgment debtors. The City also argues that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in Count Six was correctly dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations were based on signed and issued warrants, and any argument about the underlying probable cause for those warrants was not adequately pleaded in the complaint.
4

DISCUSSION A “district court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify an interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of judgment.” K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims[.]”). Thus, district courts have substantial discretion in ruling on motions for reconsideration. However, in general, “[m]otions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Regarding Count Five, the Court notes that in order to state an equal protection claim based on being treated differently than private judgment debtors, Plaintiffs bear the burden to demonstrate that are similarly situated to private judgment debtors. See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 731(8th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a threshold showing that she is similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal protection claim”). There is some question whether Plaintiffs can meet that burden in this case because, as the Court previously found, their complaint does not describe in any detail their underlying offenses and does not allege whether the nature of the fines imposed for these offenses was such as to render Plaintiffs similarly situated to private judgment debtors. See United States v. Cunningham, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (distinguishing James v. Strange and holding that prohibiting a criminal judgment debtor from invoking exemptions afforded private judgment debtors did not
5

violate equal protection). However, rather than dismissing the claim at this early stage, the Court feels that the better practice is to allow the parties to develop the record with respect to these issues. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration with respect to Count Five.
Regarding Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in Count Six, as the Court previously held, “[b]y virtue of its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). “Probable cause exists if the totality of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person in believing the individual arrested had committed an offense.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772 F.3d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
But as Plaintiffs correctly note, “[d]eference to the magistrate . . . is not boundless.” Id. In their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs argue that just as an individual government official may violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining a warrant based on knowingly or recklessly false information, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978), so may the City, under the principles of municipal liability discussed in Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), violate the Fourth Amendment by
6

having a policy that leads to the issuance of warrants based on knowingly or recklessly false information, or by having a policy that causes systemic invalidity in issuing and executing warrants.
Although the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that their warrants were based on knowingly or recklessly false information, upon reconsideration and focusing on Plaintiffs’ allegations in Paragraph 203 of the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded that the City has a policy of issuing warrants for “failure to appear” without probable cause. See Myers v. Becker Cnty., 833 F. Supp. 1424, 1434 (D. Minn. 1993) (“It is axiomatic that Myers cannot be charged with a misdemeanor for not appearing at a hearing of which she did not have prior notice. Accordingly, there was absolutely no basis to objectively believe that probable cause existed to arrest Myers for failure to appear.”).
Municipalities may be liable under § 1983 if an action “pursuant to official municipal policy,” including “practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law,” cause the plaintiffs’ injuries. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). In Paragraph 203 of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, as a matter of routine, the City issues arrest warrants for a person’s “failure to appear” after City officials have given the person paperwork crossing out their court date or have moved the court date without informing the person. Whether Plaintiffs can prove that such practices are “so persistent and widespread” as to have the force of law may be determined at a later stage. At this stage, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim against the City. See, e.g., Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,
7

277 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that municipality may be liable for Fourth Amendment violation where it “fail[ed] to provide protective measures and fail safes” against issuance of erroneous or invalid warrants); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 13-CV-02963, 2013 WL 4014565, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2013) (finding valid Fourth Amendment claim was stated against the municipality, based on its practice of issuing “warrants for a probationer’s failure to appear in court when the courts were closed.”); but cf. Myers, 833 F. Supp. at 1435 (granting municipality summary judgment where “[t]here [was] no evidence whatsoever that the County had a policy, official or otherwise . . . for issuing arrest warrants without probable cause”). Therefore, the Court will also grant Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration with respect to Count Six.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 20.) The Memorandum and Order dated May 26, 2015 (Doc. No. 19) is hereby amended as set forth above. Counts Five and Six of Plaintiffs’ complaint are hereby reinstated, and the parties shall move forward on all claims in the complaint.

Dated this 13th day of July, 2015.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8

 
 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 53 Filed: 04/13/16 Page: 1 of 59 PageID #: 439

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

)

KEILEE FANT, ROELIF CARTER,

)

ALLISON NELSON, HERBERT

)

NELSON JR., ALFRED MORRIS,

)

ANTHONY KIMBLE, DONYALE

)

THOMAS, SHAMEIKA MORRIS,

)

DANIEL JENKINS, RONNIE TUCKER, )

TONYA DEBERRY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE CITY OF FERGUSON

)

)

Defendant.

)

___________________________________ )

No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF (Jury Trial Demanded)

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Introduction

1. The Plaintiffs in this case are each impoverished people who were jailed by the

City of Ferguson because they were unable to make a monetary payment to the City arising from

traffic tickets or other minor offenses. In each case, the City kept a human being in its jail solely

because the person could not afford to make a monetary payment. Although the Plaintiffs

pleaded that they were unable to pay due to their poverty, each was held in jail indefinitely and

none was afforded a lawyer or the inquiry into their ability to pay that the United States

Constitution requires. Instead, they were threatened, abused, and left to languish in confinement

at the mercy of local officials until their frightened family members could produce enough cash

to buy their freedom or until City jail officials decided, days or weeks later, to let them out for

free.

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2. Once locked in the Ferguson jail, impoverished people who cannot afford to pay the City endure grotesque treatment. They are kept in overcrowded cells; they are denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap; they are subjected to the constant stench of excrement and refuse in their congested cells; they are surrounded by walls smeared with mucus and blood; they are kept in the same clothes for days and weeks without access to laundry or clean underwear; they step on top of other inmates, whose bodies cover nearly the entire uncleaned cell floor, in order to access a single shared toilet that the City does not clean; they develop untreated illnesses and infections in open wounds that spread to other inmates; they endure days and weeks without being allowed to use the moldy shower; their filthy bodies huddle in cold temperatures with a single thin blanket even as they beg guards for warm blankets; they are not given adequate hygiene products for menstruation; they are routinely denied vital medical care and prescription medication, even when their families beg to be allowed to bring medication to the jail; they are provided food so insufficient and lacking in nutrition that inmates lose significant amounts of weight; they suffer from dehydration out of fear of drinking foul smelling water that comes from an apparatus on top of the toilet; and they must listen to the screams of other inmates languishing from unattended medical issues as they sit in their cells without access to books, legal materials, television, or natural light. Perhaps worst of all, they do not know when they will be allowed to leave.
3. These physical abuses and deprivations are accompanied by other pervasive humiliations. Jail guards routinely taunt impoverished people when they are unable to pay for their release, telling them that they will be released whenever jail staff “feels” like letting them go. As described in detail below, jail guards routinely and pervasively laugh at the inmates and humiliate them with discriminatory and degrading epithets. For example, when filthy and
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shivering women were forced to share blankets to stay warm, officers shouted at the women that they were “stanky ass dykes” and “dirty whores.”
4. City officials and employees—through their conduct, decisions, training and lack of training, rules, policies, and practices—have built a municipal scheme designed to brutalize, to punish, and to profit. The architecture of this illegal scheme has been in place for many years.1
5. In 2014, the City of Ferguson issued an average of more than 3.6 arrest warrants per household and almost 2.2 arrest warrants for every adult, mostly in cases involving unpaid debt for tickets.2 The City of Ferguson issues more arrest warrants per capita than any other city in Missouri larger than 10,000 residents. If the rest of the Saint Louis metropolitan area generated revenue from its courts at the rate done by relatively low-income Ferguson, it would have made nearly $1.3 billion in the past five years.
6. The City’s modern debtors’ prison scheme has been increasingly profitable to the City of Ferguson, earning it millions of dollars over the past several years. It has also devastated the City’s poor, trapping them for years in a cycle of increased fees, debts, extortion, and cruel jailings. The families of indigent people borrow money to buy their loved ones out of jail at rates set arbitrarily by jail officials, only for them later to owe more money to the City of Ferguson from increased fees and surcharges. Thousands of people like the Plaintiffs take money from their disability checks or sacrifice money that is desperately needed by their families
1 See, e.g., T.E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 Mo. L. Rev. 69, 93 (1966) (“Our municipal jails are, in almost every case, nothing but calabooses suited at best for temporary detention. The worst of them are comparable with medieval dungeons of the average class; they are the shame of our cities.”); id. at 88 (“[I]t seems that many citizens of the state are being confined needlessly in our city jails…..”); id. at 85 (“[I]t is disgraceful that we do not appoint counsel in our municipal courts to represent indigent persons accused of ordinance violations.”); id. at 90 (“It is clear that many municipalities have at times conceived of their municipal courts in terms of their revenue-raising ability….”). 2 In 2013, the City again issued more than 3.6 arrest warrants per household and 2.2 arrest warrants for every adult.
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for food, diapers, clothing, rent, and utilities to pay ever increasing court fines, fees, costs, and surcharges. They are told by City officials that, if they do not pay, they will be thrown in jail. The cycle repeats itself, month after month, for years.
7. The treatment of Keilee Fant, Roelif Carter, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Alfred Morris, Anthony Kimble, Donyale Thomas, Shameika Morris, Daniel Jenkins, Ronnie Tucker, and Tonya Deberry reveals systemic illegality perpetrated by the City of Ferguson against some of its poorest people. The City has engaged in the same conduct, as a matter of policy and practice, against many other impoverished human beings on a daily basis for years, unlawfully jailing people if they are too poor to pay money bonds and debts from traffic tickets and other minor offenses. The result is a Dickensian system that flagrantly violates the basic constitutional and human rights of our community’s most vulnerable people.
8. By and through their attorneys and on behalf of a class of similarly situated impoverished people, the Plaintiffs seek in this civil action the vindication of their fundamental rights, compensation for the violations that they suffered, injunctive relief assuring that their rights will not be violated again, and a declaration that the City’s conduct is unlawful. In the year 2015, these practices have no place in our society.3
Nature of the Action 9. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to jail people when they cannot afford to pay cash bonds and/or debts owed to the City resulting from traffic tickets and other minor offenses without conducting any inquiry into the person’s ability to pay and without considering alternatives to imprisonment as required by federal and Missouri law.
3 The Plaintiffs make the allegations in this Complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters. The Plaintiffs have attempted to obtain basic jail and court records from the City, but have so far been unable to do so.
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10. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to jail indigent people for debts without informing them of their right to counsel and without providing adequate counsel or a neutral finding of probable cause in a prompt manner.
11. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to hold prisoners in the City jail indefinitely unless and until the person’s family or friends can make a monetary payment sufficient to satisfy the City. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to bargain with inmates and their families on an amount of money that the City will accept for release.
12. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to arbitrarily and incrementally reduce the amount of money required for release throughout a person’s indefinite detention, eventually releasing the person for free if the City determines that it is unlikely to profit from further detention.
13. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to issue and enforce invalid arrest warrants, to threaten debtors that they will be jailed if they do not show up with money, to hold arrestees in jail for days or more than a week without any judicial appearance, and to set and subsequently modify monetary payments necessary for release arbitrarily and without any formal process.
14. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to confine impoverished people who cannot afford their release in grotesque, dangerous, and inhumane conditions.
15. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief. Jurisdiction and Venue
16. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., and the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
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17. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Parties

18. Plaintiff Keilee Fant is a 37-year-old woman. Plaintiff Roelif Carter is a 62-year-

old man. Plaintiff Allison Nelson is a 23-year-old woman. Plaintiff Herbert Nelson Jr. is a 26-

year-old man. Plaintiff Alfred Morris is a 62-year-old man. Plaintiff Anthony Kimble is a 53-

year-old man. Plaintiff Donyale Thomas is a 36-year-old woman. Plaintiff Shameika Morris is a

30-year-old woman. Plaintiff Daniel Jenkins is a 27-year-old man. Plaintiff Ronnie Tucker is a

50-year-old man. Plaintiff Tonya DeBerry is a 52-year-old woman. All of the named Plaintiffs

are residents of Saint Louis County.

19. Defendant City of Ferguson is a municipal corporation, organized under the laws

of the State of Missouri. The Defendant operates the Ferguson City Jail and the Ferguson

Municipal Court.

Factual Background

A.

The Plaintiffs’ Imprisonment

i. Keilee Fant

20. Keilee Fant is a 37-year-old woman and single mother. She works as a certified

nurse’s assistant and has been trying to support her family by doing similar work on and off for

nearly 20 years. In the past two decades, the City of Ferguson has jailed Ms. Fant more than a

dozen times for her inability to make monetary payments on old traffic tickets. 21. Ms. Fant was arrested while taking her children to school in October 2013.4 She

was taken to jail in the City of Jennings because of old traffic tickets in that city, and she was

told by Jennings jail staff that she would not be released unless she paid $300. She informed jail

4 As is the case for thousands of people, many of Ms. Fant’s traffic tickets have resulted from her inability to afford to pay her other tickets, which has prevented her from getting her driver’s license back because of a state and municipal government policy and practice of invalidating licenses for those who cannot afford to pay old tickets.
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staff that she could not afford to pay $300 to the City of Jennings. After three days in jail, Jennings let her out for free.
22. Ms. Fant’s supposed “release” from Jennings’s custody was just the beginning of a Kafkaesque journey through the debtors’ prison network of Saint Louis County—a lawless and labyrinthine scheme of dungeon-like municipal facilities and perpetual debt. Every year, thousands of Saint Louis County residents, including the Plaintiffs in this case, undergo a similar journey, buying or waiting their way out of jail after jail.
23. After Ms. Fant was “released” from the Jennings jail, the City of Jennings kept Ms. Fant in its jail until her family could pay the several hundred dollars required for release by City of Bellefontaine Neighbors. Bellefontaine Neighbors is so small that it does not have its own jail. Instead, it paid the City of Jennings to confine its inmate debtors in the Jennings jail. After paying the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, Ms. Fant was “released” but kept in the Jennings jail for three more days, supposedly, she was then told, in the “custody” of Velda City, until Velda City responded to Jennings officials that it declined to pick her up. Ms. Fant was then sent to the custody of Saint Louis County for unpaid tickets, where she was kept for three days before being “released” from County custody. Although Ms. Fant was “released,” she was not set free. Ms. Fant languished eight more days in the County jail because she could not afford the release amounts for unpaid tickets in two other cities too small to have their own jail: the City of Normandy and the City of Beverly Hills.
24. While confined in the Saint Louis County facility, jail officials coerced inmates who could not afford to pay for phone calls or to buy food by offering free phone calls to family members and candy in exchange for doing the jail laundry without monetary compensation.
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Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 53 Filed: 04/13/16 Page: 8 of 59 PageID #: 446
25. After eight days, Ms. Fant was taken to court in the City of Maryland Heights, where the judge “released” her for free. Nonetheless, Ms. Fant was still not free. Instead, she was transported to Ferguson.
26. When she arrived in Ferguson, City jail staff told her that her release amount was $1,400. They told her that she would be held indefinitely until she paid it. After three days, Ferguson jail staff came and informed her that they had decided to let her out for free.
27. Ms. Fant was again arrested and brought to the Jennings jail in January 2014. After she could not afford to pay several hundred dollars initially demanded for her release, she was told by jail staff that they would let her out if she paid $100. The guard told her that, because Jennings had released her for free last time, he did not want to do that again. After six days, her family paid $100, and she was again “released.” After her “release,” she was kept in the Jennings jail, but shifted to the custody of Bellefontaine Neighbors and thenVelda City. She was then transferred to the Saint Louis County jail. After her “release” from Saint Louis County, she was transported to Maryland Heights for several days, and then to Ferguson.
28. When she arrived at the Ferguson jail, City jail staff told her that she would be held indefinitely unless she paid approximately $1,400. Again, pursuant to City policy, she was not provided a court date or an attorney.
29. Demoralized and weary of being transferred from jail to jail, Ms. Fant asked jail staff if they would accept $1,000, which she thought her family could raise from friends and relatives. The jail officer told her that he wanted to call the Chief of Police to ask if that amount was sufficient. The Chief of Police approved her release if her family could bring $1,000 to the Ferguson pay window, but jail staff told her that she had to get the cash that night or the deal
8

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would be off. Her family came to Ferguson and bought her release from the Ferguson jail. She was released from the Ferguson jail immediately after her family paid $1,000.
30. When she was released from the Ferguson jail, she was told by jail staff that she should not go to court and that she did not have any future court dates. Instead, she was told to make cash payments at the Ferguson Police Department. She was told that she would be jailed again if she did not make payments.
31. During her repeated and indefinite jailings because of her inability to pay, Ms. Fant was fired from several jobs because of absences. She was indigent and depending on food stamps to supplement her income to feed her children.
32. Similar experiences happened to Ms. Fant more than a dozen times in the past two decades, including one occasion in which she was held in jail by the City of Ferguson for nearly 50 days without a toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, shower, or change of clothes for unpaid traffic tickets because she could not afford to buy her release. During that time, Ms. Fant missed her father’s funeral. On that occasion, the City of Ferguson attempted to bargain with Ms. Fant’s family to get them to pay several thousand dollars to secure her release.
33. Ms. Fant was never provided an attorney by the City or brought to court while in custody in 2013 or 2014. During court appearances on her initial tickets that she attended while not in custody several years before, the City of Ferguson was represented by an experienced prosecutor. On several occasions, the City judge told her that she needed a lawyer because of the complicated circumstances of her tickets and continued the case several times for her to hire a lawyer. Each time, she told the judge that she could not afford to hire a lawyer. Eventually, the City proceeded without providing her an attorney. At no point did the City conduct any meaningful inquiry into her ability to pay or alternatives to incarceration.
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34. On many occasions, Ms. Fant contacted the City in an effort to figure out how to remove her warrants so that she would not be arrested and taken away from her children. Consistent with City policy, she was told that the warrants could not be removed unless she paid cash to the City.
35. Ms. Fant has endured materially the same inhumane and unsanitary Ferguson jail conditions described in this Complaint. In addition to enduring overcrowding with other inmate debtors, Ms. Fant was confined in a cell that lacked basic hygiene (for example, she was told that she would not be given feminine products for menstruation), medical care, exercise, and adequate food.
36. On one occasion, an elderly woman being held because she could not afford a few hundred dollars was shivering because the jail was very cold and because the jail staff refused to give women more than one blanket. After Ms. Fant allowed the woman to share her blanket with her, the guards began shouting at the women that they were “stanky ass dykes” and “dirty whores.”
37. Ferguson jail guards routinely insulted and verbally abused female inmate debtors. On numerous occasions, referring to the grotesque conditions and lack of any feminine products, showers, toothbrushes, or soap, guards mocked the impoverished women for the way that they smelled. Male guards would shout things like: “you hoes stink” and “you need to wash out your coochies.”
38. Ms. Fant still owes significant debts to the City. She is frightened that the City will again jail her indefinitely until she and her family can pay enough to secure her release.
ii. Roelif Carter
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39. Roelif Carter is a 62-year-old disabled military veteran. For more than a decade, he has suffered daily from the debilitating and painful effects of a brain aneurism.
40. Mr. Carter was given tickets by the City of Ferguson more than ten years ago. 41. After receiving the assistance of a lawyer from the Veterans Administration, Mr. Carter pled guilty and was assessed monetary fines for the traffic violations. He informed the court that he was unable to afford the fines, and he was told to pay $100 per month.5 42. Mr. Carter was indigent and unable to afford the payments without serious hardship in meeting the basic necessities of life. Nonetheless, having observed that the City kept people in jail when they could not pay their tickets, Mr. Carter made the payments to the City clerk as often as he could until he was unable to come up with enough money. 43. Mr. Carter asked the City clerk what to do if he was too poor to make a payment by the first day of the month. Mr. Carter was told that, if he did not pay by that day, then a warrant would issue for his arrest. On one occasion, Mr. Carter had not been able to get enough money by the first day of the month and, frightened, he brought the money to the City on the second day of the month. The clerk refused to accept the money. The clerk informed him that a warrant had been issued for his arrest and that, in order to remove the warrant, he would now have to pay several hundred more dollars. Mr. Carter could not afford to pay several hundred dollars. 44. Mr. Carter was arrested on that warrant in August 2010. He was informed by the City jail guards that he would not be released from the jail unless he paid $600. Mr. Carter informed City employees that he was too poor to afford that amount of money.
5 After receiving these initial tickets, Mr. Carter was routinely stopped and arrested by Ferguson police and charged with minor offenses for years, including vehicle citations, not having his dog on a leash, and failure to obey the orders of a police officer. Each time Mr. Carter was arrested, he was held in jail because he was unable to afford to pay for his release, and each time he was eventually released for free after three days. Pursuant to policy and practice, at no time was Mr. Carter provided with a prompt neutral determination of probable cause.
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45. Mr. Carter and his wife depended on his disability payments and food stamps to meet the basic necessities of life.
46. After three days in jail, the City released Mr. Carter without requiring any payment and without bringing Mr. Carter to court.
47. After Mr. Carter’s release, a City official informed Mr. Carter’s wife that Mr. Carter’s total fines had increased and were now in excess of $1,000. The City official did not explain why the total amount had increased without any formal process. Upon his release from jail, the City again required Mr. Carter to pay $100 per month without any process or inquiry into whether he could afford that amount.
48. On a later occasion, Mr. Carter’s wife was informed that a warrant had been issued for her husband’s arrest, even though Ms. Carter had made the required monthly payment herself. After Ms. Carter showed proof of payment, the City recalled the warrant.
49. With the help of friends and family, Mr. Carter and his wife were able to raise $100 to make payments to the City for a number of months.
50. Mr. Carter was again unable to make a monthly $100 payment on several occasions in 2012 and 2013. The City issued warrants for his arrest each time, and Mr. Carter was arrested in August 2012, November 2012, and July 2013. On each occasion, City officials told Mr. Carter that he would be held in jail unless he paid several hundred dollars. Mr. Carter told City officials that he could not afford that amount of money. Because he was too poor to pay the City what it demanded, Mr. Carter remained in jail each time. On each occasion, Mr. Carter was released for free after three days without being brought to court. On each occasion, the amount of money that he owed in total was increased by the City of Ferguson.
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51. After his release from jail on each occasion, Mr. Carter and his wife made $100

payments every time that they could for several years until 2014 because they were told by City

officials that Mr. Carter would be kept in jail if they did not pay. The Carters lived in constant

fear of not being able to both pay the City and have enough money for utilities, groceries,

clothing, and other necessities of life.

52. dollars.6

The amount Mr. and Ms. Carter paid to the City is a total of several thousand

53. The City never conducted any meaningful inquiry into Mr. Carter’s indigence and

ability to pay, and it never appointed him an attorney.

54. Mr. Carter and his wife observed numerous people come to court who could not

afford their payments. They observed City employees at the payment window tell numerous

people on many occasions that they needed to bring money by a specific date or time or a

warrant would be issued for their arrest.

55. Each time Mr. Carter was held in the Ferguson jail was a humiliating and

dangerous experience. He was not permitted a toothbrush or toothpaste and was not permitted to

shower or wash his clothes. He and other inmates were denied hand soap and forced to live and

sleep near an uncleaned toilet with visible excrement and a vile stench. The floors and walls

were also uncleaned and contained what appeared to be mucus and blood.

6 In June 2014, Mr. and Mrs. Carter were both arrested without a warrant by the City for new minor municipal offenses. Each was told that they would not be released from jail unless they paid $300 in cash. Both informed the City that they could not afford to pay that amount of money. After three days, Mr. Carter was again released for free. Mrs. Carter, however, who complained to jail staff repeatedly about inadequate medical attention, was forced to remain in jail because she could not come up with the money. The next day, Mr. Carter negotiated a lower release amount and paid $200 to free his wife from jail. Ms. Carter had to be taken to the hospital a couple of days after her release because the jail refused to give her the blood pressure medication that she needs even though her family had brought her medicine to the jail.
Mr. Carter was arrested again in August 2014 without a warrant. He was again told that he would not be released unless he paid cash to the City. Again, after three days, Mr. Carter was released for free. Pursuant to policy and practice, at no point was Mr. Carter provided with a neutral determination of probable cause.
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56. The water available to inmates, released from an apparatus connected to the top of the toilet, caused Mr. Carter to develop a sore throat whenever he drank it.
57. Jail staff also refused to allow Mr. Carter to be given the medication that he takes for high blood pressure and the head pain medication that he has needed since his brain aneurism. Jail staff would not even let Mr. Carter’s wife bring him the prescribed medication. As a result, each jail stay for Mr. Carter resulted in enormous physical pain and discomfort.
58. Each time Mr. Carter was kept in the Ferguson jail, he met many other men who were being held there solely because they were too poor to pay the release amount required by the City. Many of the men told him that they had also been trapped in a cycle of debt and jailing by the City and that they could not see a way out.
59. The jail conditions experienced and witnessed by Mr. Carter are materially the same as the conditions described throughout this Complaint and to those described by numerous other witnesses and victims of the City’s policies and practices over a consistent period of many years.
60. Mr. Carter still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of his inability to make monetary payments.
61. Mr. Carter has also been kept in custody for old unpaid fines and costs because he could not afford to pay for his release by the City of Berkeley and the City of Cool Valley. Paying for his release from one would sometimes result in transport to another, where he would be held until he could pay once more.7
iii. Allison Nelson 62. Allison Nelson is a 23-year-old woman. She works now at a clothing store making near minimum wage.
7 Other jails, however, permitted his wife to give him the medication that he needs.
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63. Ms. Nelson has been jailed on two occasions by the City because she has not been able to pay fines and costs from traffic tickets. On each occasion, Ms. Nelson has been held, even though she was indigent, because she could not afford a sum of money set by the City.
64. In July 2012, Ms. Nelson was arrested and taken to the Jennings jail. After her family borrowed money to have her released from Jennings, she was transported to Ferguson. Jail officials in Ferguson told her that she would be held indefinitely until she paid approximately $700. For several days, she was held while her mother attempted to borrow money to buy her out. Eventually, her mother called the City and told the City that she could raise only $300. The clerk told her mother to call back so that the clerk could check with a supervisor. The supervisor agreed to accept $300, and Ms. Nelson was released.
65. In November 2013, Ms. Nelson was again arrested for non-payment and brought to the Jennings jail. Ms. Nelson was told by jail staff that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $1,000. She informed the jail staff that she could not afford to pay. After four days, the jail staff informed her that her release amount would be lowered to $100. Her parents came to the jail and paid $100, and she was released immediately in the early morning hours of Thanksgiving Day.
66. Ms. Nelson was then brought to the Ferguson jail. Ferguson jail staff told her that she would be held indefinitely and miss Thanksgiving with her family unless she paid several hundred dollars. In the morning, after shift change, a new guard came and said that, since it was Thanksgiving, they would agree to let her out if she could find someone to pay $100. Ms. Nelson’s family borrowed money and came as fast as they could to Ferguson and brought her home for Thanksgiving.
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67. While in the Ferguson jail, Ms. Nelson was surrounded by other women who were there because they could not afford to pay the amount that Ferguson required for their release.
68. Ms. Nelson endured materially the same deplorable jail conditions as the other Plaintiffs. She was kept in a cell and denied access to a toothbrush, toothpaste, and soap. The walls were moldy and covered in gum, paint chips, blood, mucus, and feces.
69. The jail did not provide clean floor mats, and also passed dirty blankets from previous inmates to new inmates without cleaning them.
70. If the inmates wanted water, she and the other women were forced to drink warm water from a mechanism above the toilet, which smelled like a sewer.
71. Inmates were given a honey bun in the morning and a pot pie for lunch and dinner.
72. Although Ms. Nelson did not own any significant assets and was indigent, no meaningful inquiry into her indigence was ever made by the City of Ferguson, and the City never appointed an attorney to represent her.
73. The threat of jail and constant cycle of increasing debts to the City of Ferguson has been a constant fact of daily life for Ms. Nelson for several years. She has been afraid to leave her own home or even get into a car as a passenger. Ms. Nelson’s dream for years has been to join the Navy. After passing the relevant tests as a teenager, she was told by her recruiter that she could not join until she fixed all of her unpaid traffic warrants and tickets, which she has not been able to afford to do.8
8 Military recruiters routinely refuse to accept applicants with traffic warrants for their arrest. ArchCity Defenders currently represent five clients who desire to enlist in the military but cannot do so as a result of warrants being issued for their arrest as a result of unpaid fines.
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74. Ms. Nelson has also been kept in custody for old traffic ticket debts because she could not afford to pay her way out by the City of Chesterfield, the City of Pagedale, the City of Florissant, the City of Country Club Hills, and the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors.
iv. Herbert Nelson Jr. 75. Herbert Nelson Jr. is 26 years old. Over the past four years, he has been jailed at least four times in the City of Ferguson when he could not afford to pay old fines and court costs. 76. Mr. Nelson was arrested for non-payment in April 2011 and taken into custody by the City of Jennings. When he was brought to the Jennings jail, he was told that his release amount was $2,000 based on his unpaid debts. He informed jail staff that he could not afford to pay. Each day that he was in jail, his release amount was lowered by jail staff. On the third day, his release amount was lowered to $300, and he was released after his mother borrowed money to buy him out. He was then transported to the Ferguson jail because Ferguson had issued a warrant when Mr. Nelson had not made a payment on an old ticket. 77. Ferguson jail staff informed him that he would be held in jail indefinitely until he paid $400. Mr. Nelson was scared and panicked. He felt trapped and did not know how he would be able to get out of jail. After a day, his mother went to the Ferguson jail with $200 that she had collected from family and friends and said that it was all the family could afford. City employees decided to accept that amount and let Mr. Nelson out of jail. 78. Mr. Nelson was arrested again in October 2013. Again, he was told by Jennings jail staff that his release amount was approximately $2,000. Again the release amount was incrementally lowered without any formal legal process. This time, on the fourth day, his release amount was reduced to $200, and his mother again borrowed the money to buy his release.
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When he was released from Jennings, he was taken to Ferguson, supposedly because he had outstanding warrants from the same old tickets.
79. Mr. Nelson was told by Ferguson jail staff that he would be held indefinitely until he paid $400. After a day, Mr. Nelson was told that his release amount was reduced to $300. His mother then raised $300 from his co-workers, family, and friends, and came to the Ferguson jail and bought his release.
80. Mr. Nelson was arrested again in February 2014. After negotiating his release from the Jennings jail after his release amount was incrementally lowered, Mr. Nelson learned that he would be taken again to the Ferguson jail.
81. Mr. Nelson was told by Ferguson jail staff that he would be held indefinitely until he paid $400. After a day, Mr. Nelson was told that his release amount was reduced to $300. His mother then again raised $300 from his co-workers, family, and friends, and came to the Ferguson jail and bought his release.
82. Mr. Nelson was arrested again in September 2014 and taken to the Jennings jail. After his family bought his release from the Jennings jail, he was taken to the Ferguson jail. Again, he was told by jail staff that his release amount was approximately $400. The next day, the release amount was reduced to $300, and his mother again borrowed the money to buy him out of jail.
83. Mr. Nelson endured and witnessed the deplorable jail conditions described in this Complaint. For example, he was forced to remain with other inmate debtors in a filthy, overcrowded cell that reeked of excrement. He and the other inmates were not given any toothbrush, toothpaste, handsoap, showers, or a change of underwear. The cells were so overcrowded during his multiple periods of incarceration that men were forced to sleep on the
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floor next to the open, uncleaned toilet. The walls in the Ferguson jail were caked with old food, dust, blood, and mucus. Blankets and mats were transferred to new inmates without being washed.
84. The food rations given to Mr. Nelson and other inmates lacked basic nutrition. Inmates were served a honey bun or donut in the morning, a small pot pie for lunch, and another pot pie for dinner. Mr. Nelson and other inmates were not given drinks and were forced to drink smelly water out of a shared faucet connected to the same apparatus as the toilet. Inmates were dehydrated because they were afraid to drink out of the faucet.
85. During one of his periods in the Jennings jail, Mr. Nelson developed two irritated areas on his leg that became infected and turned into boils the size of eggs. This leg injury has subsequently persisted in various iterations for approximately two years. On a later period of incarceration in the Jennings jail, his boils flared and popped, and he was in excruciating pain. On his arrival to the Ferguson jail, the jail staff refused to treat him. They refused to give him antibiotics, painkillers, or a doctor, even though the pants that he was wearing filled with blood and puss. He found it difficult to sit because of the position of the infection on his legs. Finally, after his transfer from the Ferguson jail, a nurse in the Saint Louis City Justice Center examined Mr. Nelson and told him that the infection was related to the jail conditions because his skin had been extremely dirty. The nurse told him that she was amazed at the large size of the boils. She said that she believed that it was turning into staph infection, although he had not been separated from the inmates in the Ferguson jail.
86. Mr. Nelson was indigent for the entire duration of his jailings by the City of Ferguson. Mr. Nelson now works as a painter and is dedicated to supporting his five-year-old son. Because of his recent jailings—including one while he was in uniform on his way to an
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important painting job—he has lost a number of jobs and finds it difficult to be re-hired because painting contractors know that he could be jailed on the way to any painting job. On one occasion, a co-worker had to fill in for Mr. Nelson and then use the money earned from the job to pay for his release from jail. Because of his unpaid ticket debts, Mr. Nelson is not able to grow his own painting business because he cannot obtain his driver’s license, which he needs to drive his tools to job sites.
87. During Mr. Nelson’s most recent 2014 incarceration, he finally broke down and cried after he missed an important painting job. The cycle of jail and debt has prevented him from getting on his feet and living any kind of meaningful life with his son. Because of his repeated jailings, it has been difficult for him to maintain steady employment and to meet the basic necessities of life for his family.
88. Mr. Nelson has been also held in jail because of his inability to make payments in the City of Jennings, the City of Florissant, Saint Louis County, and the City of Maryland Heights.
v. Alfred Morris 89. Alfred Morris is a 62-year-old man. He is a disabled veteran who relies on a pension from the Department of Veterans Affairs to meet the basic necessities of life. Although Mr. Morris cannot perform physical work because of serious medical problems, he volunteers at the Department of Veterans Affairs hospital to sit with and assist other ill veterans. 90. Mr. Morris has been jailed on at least four occasions in the past five years by the City of Ferguson when he has been unable to make monetary payments. 91. The City of Ferguson locked Mr. Morris in a cage because he failed to pay fines and costs associated with violations of a municipal ordinance that purports to prohibit people
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from having friends, relatives, or romantic partners stay overnight in their homes without naming the person on a written document in advance. Ferguson police accused Mr. Morris of violating this ordinance because they searched his home and found women’s articles.
92. In 2011, Mr. Morris was arrested and taken to the Ferguson jail. He was told that he would not be released from the jail unless he paid $500. Mr. Morris was eventually released for free.
93. When Mr. Morris appeared in court, he announced that he wished to plead “not guilty.” The judge told him to sit in a corner while other cases were handled. Mr. Morris watched as the City prosecutor and City judge jailed and threatened with jail unrepresented people when they could not pay the money that they had been told to pay without any inquiry into their indigence or representation of counsel. Finally, the judge told Mr. Morris that when he came back for his next court date, he needed to have an attorney with him. Mr. Morris was not able to afford an attorney, and he was afraid to go back to court because he had been told that he was required to hire an attorney. A warrant was issued for his arrest.
94. Mr. Morris was arrested on the warrant in early 2012. When he arrived at the jail, he was again told that he would be held indefinitely until he paid approximately $500. Mr. Morris became extremely ill in the Ferguson jail because jail staff, pursuant to their policy, refused to give him his blood pressure or HIV medication. The jail was so crowded that Mr. Morris, even though seriously ill, was forced to spend the first night sitting on the edge of a bed in which another man was sleeping. The next night, he was given a space on the floor of the cell to sleep. When Mr. Morris complained for the entire day about his blood pressure, jail staff threatened to charge him with another offense if he were faking an illness and that they would make sure that he got another case. After Mr. Morris became dizzy with unbearable head pain,
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jail staff were forced to call paramedics. Two days after his arrest, he was taken to the hospital and let out of the jail for free.9
95. Mr. Morris otherwise endured materially the same unsanitary jail conditions as described in this Complaint. For example, during each of his stays in the Ferguson jail, Mr. Morris was forced to stay on mats that had bed bugs and lice. He observed that jail staff would not wash or otherwise sanitize the sleeping mats when they were given from one inmate to another. On none of his stays in the Ferguson jail was Mr. Morris ever allowed to take a shower, given any handsoap, or allowed to brush his teeth.
96. Mr. Morris still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of his inability to make monetary payments.
97. Mr. Morris has been also held in jail because of his inability to make payments in the City of Cool Valley and the City of Maplewood.
vi. Anthony Kimble 98. Anthony Kimble is a 53-year-old man. 99. In the past three years, he has been jailed multiple times by the City of Ferguson for unpaid debt from old traffic tickets. 100. In February 2012, Mr. Kimble was arrested and brought to the Ferguson jail as a result of his non-payment of costs and fines from traffic tickets. He was told by jail staff that he would not be released unless he paid $500 dollars to the City. Mr. Kimble informed jail staff that he could not afford to pay the City. 101. After several days, Mr. Kimble’s family got money from a federal tax refund. Mr. Kimble’s family came to Ferguson and paid $500 for his release.
9 Mr. Morris suffered similar blood pressure problems on other occasions in the Ferguson jail.
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102. Mr. Kimble was next arrested and brought to the Ferguson jail in February 2013. When Mr. Kimble arrived at the jail, the booking officer told him that he would be held in the jail until he paid $600 to the City. After two days, Mr. Kimble was informed that the City would accept $500 for his release. After two more days, he was informed that the City would accept $400 for his release. After two more days, Mr. Kimble was informed that the City would accept $300. Each time, Mr. Kimble informed jail staff that he could not afford to pay the City.
103. Mr. Kimble was not brought to court and not provided an attorney. No inquiry was made into his ability to pay.
104. Finally, after it was clear that Mr. Kimble could not pay, he was released by jail staff for free. He had spent nearly two weeks in jail and had lost approximately 12-15 pounds.
105. When Mr. Kimble was released, he was told by jail staff that he should not return to court, but that he needed instead to go to the Ferguson police department by March 1 to pay what he owed.
106. Mr. Kimble was not able to come up with the money that he owed by March 1 and therefore did not go to the police department to bring the money. At the time, he was working as a machine operator and struggling to survive and to make payments for rent, utilities, food, and court ordered child support. Despite being told that he should not go to court, Mr. Kimble was later informed that a warrant had been issued for his arrest for failure to appear.
107. When Mr. Kimble learned of his warrant, he was also informed of a City policy that he could avoid arrest and have the warrant removed if he paid several hundred dollars. Mr. Kimble was not able to have the warrant removed because he was indigent. Although the City does not inform unrepresented people of the option, it also has a policy of allowing warrants to be removed for free if an attorney is retained and enters a notice of appearance on a case.
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108. During his time in the Ferguson jail, Mr. Kimble and other inmates would ask when they would be released. Mr. Kimble and other inmates were told repeatedly by Ferguson jail staff to “shut up” and that they would be released “whenever we’re ready to release you.”
109. Mr. Kimble endured materially the same grotesque and inadequate jail conditions as described in this Complaint. During his visits to the jail, he was offered a shower on only one occasion. He was never provided with soap or a toothbrush and toothpaste. The cells were overcrowded with men who could not afford to pay for their release, and the ratio of men to beds was often 3 or 4 people for every available bed. He was forced to sleep next to a dirty toilet without sufficient blankets to keep him warm and surrounded by walls covered with urine, blood, and mucus. He was denied access to laundry to clean his clothes.
110. Mr. Kimble and other inmate debtors devised a system of rotation so that the person stuck in jail the longest would rotate to the bed, and the next inmate would take his place when he paid for his release or when he was let out for free.
111. The City only provided a honey bun for breakfast and pot pie for lunch and dinner. Mr. Kimble was often unable to eat breakfast because guards would offer breakfast at 1:00 a.m. by waking up inmates and telling them that they had to eat breakfast then or not at all.
112. Mr. Kimble still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of his inability to make monetary payments.
113. Mr. Kimble has also been jailed for nonpayment of old traffic tickets in City of Pine Lawn and the City of Berkeley.
vii. Donyale Thomas 114. Donyale Thomas is a 36-year-old woman.
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115. Ms. Thomas was arrested and brought to the Ferguson jail in 2011 because she had an unpaid balance of old court costs and fines. Ms. Thomas had been a passenger in a car, and officers had asked for her ID and arrested her when a check on her ID revealed the old case.
116. Ms. Thomas was given a thin blanket and a mat and taken to a cell with one bed and three women. Ms. Thomas was told to sleep on the floor. Ms. Thomas was told by jail staff that she would be held indefinitely.
117. When Ms. Thomas’s mother called the jail, her mother was told that she could get her daughter out of jail by paying several hundred dollars. Ms. Thomas and her mother were indigent and unable to pay. Ms. Thomas was unemployed and relying on food stamps and SSI disability payments to meet the basic necessities of life for herself and her three children.
118. Ms. Thomas was kept in the Ferguson jail for over a week. She was not taken before a judge and was not provided a lawyer.
119. Ms. Thomas was suffering at the time from a severe anxiety attack, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. Ms. Thomas has difficulty being in small, confined spaces. Ms. Thomas would begin to hyperventilate and ask jail guards for treatment because she could not breathe. Her mother, frightened for her daughter’s life, attempted to bring her prescription medication for these illnesses, but jail staff refused, and Ms. Thomas was denied medical treatment in the Ferguson jail.
120. Finally, after more than a week, the City informed Ms. Thomas that it would accept $200 for her release. Her mother raised $200, and Ms. Thomas was released.
121. Ms. Thomas has been jailed by the City of Ferguson on many occasions since she was a teenager. Each time, she has been unable to buy her release because of her indigence.
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122. On a subsequent occasion, Ms. Thomas was struggling with her mental health problems and overcome with depression from being trapped in a cycle of debt and jailing for traffic tickets in several municipalities that took her away from her children repeatedly. While languishing in jail in the City of Berkeley because she could not afford to pay for her release, Ms. Thomas attempted to commit suicide by strangling herself with her brassiere. She was taken to the hospital after the other women in her cell started screaming.
123. Ms. Thomas still lives in constant fear of being jailed again because of her inability to make monetary payments.
124. Over the years, when Ms. Thomas has appeared in the Ferguson court, she has seen people jailed because they were unable to make monetary payments and without being provided any attorney or any meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay.
125. Ms. Thomas has also languished in jail for non-payment in the City of Jennings, the City of Berkeley, the City of Pine Lawn, and the City of Dellwood.
viii. Shameika Morris 126. Shameika Morris is a 30-year-old woman. 127. When she was 17 years old, Ms. Morris was charged with a minor municipal offense in Ferguson. When she was brought to the jail, the jail staff refused to let her use the bathroom, and Ms. Morris urinated on herself in the booking area. Jail staff were upset and retaliated against her by keeping her in jail for more than two weeks without bringing her to court and by telling her that she would not be released unless she paid $900. After more than two weeks, Ms. Morris was finally released for free. 128. Since then, Ms. Morris has been arrested and jailed by Ferguson on more than five occasions resulting from that initial offense.
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129. In 2011, Ms. Morris was arrested and jailed by Ferguson. When she arrived at the jail, she was told that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $800. Ms. Morris told jail staff that she was too poor to afford that amount. Each day, jail staff informed her that her release amount was reduced by $100. When the release amount was reduced to several hundred dollars, jail staff refused to reduce it for several more days. Because Ms. Morris had not been able to contact her family or her job, her mother and father and her employer were all very worried and thought she had disappeared.
130. Finally, after more than a week, her mother called around to various cities and learned that she was being held by Ferguson. The Ferguson clerk negotiated with Ms. Morris’s mother, and the clerk agreed after to reduce the amount the City would accept so that the family could use Ms. Morris’s tax refund check of $200. A family friend came to the jail and paid $200 for her release. Ms. Morris was not brought to court and not given an attorney.
131. Later in 2011, Ms. Morris was again arrested and jailed by Ferguson. She was told that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $800. Jail staff informed her each day that her release amount was reduced. After two days, jail staff told her that her release amount was reduced to $500. The following day, jail staff then let Ms. Morris out for free. Ms. Morris was not brought to court and was not given an attorney.
132. In 2012, Ms. Morris was again arrested and jailed by Ferguson. She was told that she would not be released unless she paid approximately $800. Jail staff informed her each day that her release amount had been reduced. After two days, jail staff walked around to all of the inmates and told them their new release amounts and let Ms. Morris out for free. Ms. Morris was not brought to court and was not given an attorney.
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133. At all times that she was jailed, Ms. Morris was indigent and struggling to meet the basic necessities of life for her and her children. She depends on food stamps to survive.
134. On many occasions, Ms. Morris has attempted to clear her outstanding warrants in Ferguson, including occasions in which she has attempted to clear the warrants so that she could get a job. On numerous occasions over the past several years, she has called the City clerk and asked how to remove her warrants. The City clerk routinely informed Ms. Morris that it is City policy not to remove warrants unless she paid hundreds of dollars, and the clerk told her that she needed to have the money with her if she came to court to turn herself in. Ms. Morris was not able to come up with enough money to remove her warrants.
135. As is true for the other Plaintiffs, Ms. Morris’s experiences in the Ferguson jail have been among the most humiliating and dangerous experiences of her life. Every morning, inmates waited in anticipation for jail staff to tell them if their release amounts would be lowered. They often begged jail staff to lower the amounts and pleaded with them to consider their poverty and their need to be with their children.
136. In all of her time in the Ferguson jail, she has only been offered a shower on one occasion—during her first stay over ten years ago. She has never been offered a toothbrush, toothpaste, or handsoap. During her stays, she and other inmates have routinely noticed blood and mucus smeared on the walls of their cells, and the women were forced to share used blankets and mats because the City jail staff does not launder materials when inmates leave the jail before passing them to other inmates.
137. Many of the women in the jail became chronically dehydrated because they were afraid to drink the water, which has often been yellow in color.
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138. During her time in the Ferguson jail, Ms. Morris and other women spent many nights crying and hungry.
139. The guards routinely taunted the female inmates. Guards told women that they were “nasty” and “fat” and mocked them that they would not get out until guards let them out.
140. Ms. Morris is so terrified of languishing again in the Ferguson jail on her warrants that she is afraid even to visit her mother, who lives in Ferguson.
ix. Daniel Jenkins 141. Daniel Jenkins is a 28-year-old man. 142. Mr. Jenkins has been kept in jail by the City of Ferguson on at least five occasions over the past several years because of his inability to make a monetary payment on old debts from tickets. On each occasion, he was brought to the Ferguson jail and told that he would be held indefinitely unless he paid several hundred dollars. He was not appointed an attorney and no meaningful inquiry was made into his indigence. He was kept in jail until his family could come up with the money to buy his release or until the City decided to release him for free. 143. Mr. Jenkins is indigent and struggles to meet the basic necessities of life for himself and his two young children. 144. Like the other Plaintiffs in this case, each arrest and jailing by Ferguson was part of a longer and indefinite journey through the Saint Louis County debtors’ prison network for Mr. Jenkins. On some of his arrests, Mr. Jenkins has been taken to seven different jails. He is typically held in jail until he either gets family to come up with money or until jail staff decide to release him for free. 145. Mr. Jenkins has been jailed for non-payment by the City of Bel-Ridge, the City of Bel-Nor, the City of Moline Acres, Saint Louis County, the City of Florissant, the City of
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Welston, the City of Dellwood, the City of Maryland Heights, the City of Beverly Hills, the City of Pine Lawn, and the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors.
x. Ronnie Tucker 146. Ronnie Tucker is a 50-year-old man. 147. Mr. Tucker was arrested and taken to the Ferguson jail in May 2013. Ferguson jail staff informed him that he was being kept in the Ferguson jail pursuant to a warrant in traffic cases from the City of Cool Valley, which paid Ferguson to house its inmate debtors. Ferguson jail staff told him that he would not be released from custody unless he paid $1,000. After several days, Mr. Tucker was taken to court in Cool Valley, and his sister was able to raise enough money to pay for his release. 148. When Mr. Tucker was “released” from the custody of Cool Valley, he was returned to the Ferguson jail.10 Ferguson jail staff informed him that he was now being held by the City of Ferguson and that he would not be released unless he paid $600. 149. Mr. Tucker was indigent. At the time of his jailing by Ferguson, Mr. Tucker was working part time as a roofer and surviving on food stamps to meet the basic necessities of life. At no point was any meaningful judicial inquiry made into his ability to pay, and he was not provided an attorney. Having just bought Mr. Tucker’s release from Cool Valley custody, his sister could no longer afford to pay any more money to buy his release. 150. Mr. Tucker spent more than ten additional days in the Ferguson jail because he could not afford to pay the $600 release amount. Eventually, the City let him out for free and told him to return to court. He had not been brought to court or given an attorney the entire time. No inquiry had been made into his indigence.
10 He also spent some time during this period in a holding cell in Cool Valley prior to being transported to Ferguson.
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151. Prior to his next court date, Mr. Tucker was taken to the hospital, where he was admitted to have surgery. He called the Ferguson clerk from the hospital and said that he would not be able to make his court appearance. Pursuant to City policy, he was told by the clerk that he would get a warrant for not showing up in court even if he were in the hospital. He would have to pay several hundred dollars to remove the warrant.
152. Mr. Tucker experienced materially the same jail conditions as alleged in this Complaint and described by the other Plaintiffs and numerous witnesses.
153. Mr. Tucker was never allowed to shower and spent the entire period of weeks in the same clothes without washing them. In addition to languishing in the stench of his own sweat and filth, he was not given any handsoap or allowed to brush his teeth. He and other inmates begged to be allowed to wash themselves, but staff refused. Instead, multiple inmates were forced to sleep on the dirty floor because there were not enough beds to accommodate all of the debtors. He was forced to sleep next to a dirty toilet and surrounded by walls covered with urine, blood, and mucus. He was not given sufficient covering to cope with the cold temperatures in the cell.
154. Ferguson jail guards also routinely taunted their prisoners for not being able to afford to get out. Guards told the men that they would stay in the Ferguson jail until the guards were ready to let them out.
155. Mr. Tucker was not permitted any recreation or exercise, and he spent the entire period without leaving the cell except to go to the court in Cool Valley.
156. Mr. Tucker and the other men in his cell could hear female prisoners screaming from other cells about not being provided products for hygiene.
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157. Mr. Tucker has also been jailed for debts from unpaid tickets in Saint Louis County, the City of Jennings, the City of Dellwood, and City of Moline Acres.
xi. Tonya DeBerry 158. Ms. DeBerry is a 52-year-old woman. She has been jailed on numerous occasions for nonpayment of tickets by the City of Ferguson. 159. In January 2014, Ms. DeBerry was pulled over for a traffic violation. She was jailed in Saint Louis County for a day until her family paid $300 to have her released. When she was released from the custody of the County, she was transported to Ferguson. 160. When she arrived at the Ferguson jail, staff told her that she would be kept in jail unless she paid several hundred dollars. After two nights in jail, a guard came around to her cell and asked her how much she could “come up with.” She told the guard that she could probably raise $300, and Ferguson jail staff let her out after her daughter arrived with $300 borrowed from a neighbor.11 Ms. DeBerry was then transported to the Jennings jail because of unpaid tickets. 161. Ms. DeBerry experienced the same unlawful and deplorable conditions in the Ferguson jail as described in this Complaint. She was denied a toothbrush, toothpaste, and soap, and she was forced to stay in a cell with a vile stench and visible mold. 162. The City also arrested and kept in its jail for indefinite periods both of her teenage children because they could not afford to pay old debts. Ms. DeBerry has, on numerous occasions, called the City and negotiated a release amount for her children. When she offers an amount, the City clerk seeks permission from a supervisor to accept that amount or to reject it. In this manner, she has bought her children out of the Ferguson jail on several occasions in the past several years.
11 Ms. DeBerry was taken to the Jennings jail in April 2011 and told that she would not be released unless she paid $300 to the City of Ferguson. When her family borrowed money and took it to Ferguson, Jennings released her.
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163. Ms. DeBerry was repeatedly forced to choose between raising money to get her children released from the Ferguson jail or raising money to make her own debt payments to the City and to other neighboring municipalities.
B. The City’s Policies and Practices 164. The treatment of the Plaintiffs was caused by and is representative of the City’s policies and practices concerning collecting unpaid fines, fees, costs, and surcharges relating to traffic tickets and other minor offenses for at least the past five years.12 165. It is the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to use its municipal court and its jail as significant sources of revenue generation for the City. The money to be brought into the City through the municipal court is budgeted by the City in advance.13 As a result, the entire municipal government apparatus, including municipal court officials and City jailors, has a significant and corrupting incentive to operate the court and the jail in a way that maximizes revenues, not justice. 166. Decisions regarding the operation of the court and the jail—including but not limited to the assessment of fines, fees, costs,14 and surcharges; the availability and conditions of payment plans; the setting and re-setting of amounts required for release from jail; the issuance and withdrawal of arrest warrants; and the non-appointment of an attorney—are significantly influenced by and based on maximizing revenues collected rather than on legitimate penological considerations. In fact, on only one occasion in the five years preceding the filing of this lawsuit was a person kept in the Ferguson jail pursuant to a sentence. Every other person held in the jail
12 Unless otherwise mentioned in this Complaint, the policies, practices, and procedures of the City of Ferguson described have been in existence for at least the past five years. 13 The City uses the money collected through these procedures to help fund the City jail, to pay Municipal Court judicial salaries, to pay City Attorney’s Office salaries, and to fund other portions of the City budget. 14 Missouri Law requires costs to be waived for the indigent, see Mo. Code § 479.260, but the City ignores that law.
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because of a municipal court case in Ferguson was kept in jail because the person could not afford a monetary payment required by the City for release. The single person jailed served a sentence of two weekends in jail.
167. In 2014, the City of Ferguson issued an average of more than 3.6 arrest warrants per household and almost 2.2 arrest warrants for every adult, mostly in cases involving unpaid debt for tickets. Between 2009 and 2013, the number of traffic cases filed by the City of Ferguson increased by nearly 50%.
168. In Ferguson, blacks were significantly more likely to be stopped, searched, and arrested than whites, even though whites were more likely to possess illegal contraband when searched. Although whites make up more than 29% of the population in Ferguson, they constitute only 12.7% of traffic stops and 6.9% of arrests. The same financial pressures and corrupting influences thus infect City police decisions, including decisions about conducting traffic stops, issuing tickets, and making arrests.
169. Over the past five years, the small City of Ferguson has, according to its public records, earned approximately $10 million from its municipal court fines, fees, costs, and surcharges. A proportional per capita budgetary revenue stream from municipal court fees for the entire Saint Louis metropolitan region would be more than $1,300,000,000.
i. Arbitrary and Indefinite Detention of the Indigent 170. As each of the Plaintiffs’ cases illustrates, the City of Ferguson has adopted a policy and practice of arresting people when they owe unpaid debt from old traffic tickets and other minor offenses. When those arrestees are booked at the Ferguson jail, they are told by jail
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staff that they can be released immediately, but only if they pay cash to the City of Ferguson. If they cannot pay the City, they are told that they will be held indefinitely.15
171. The amount of cash that Ferguson requires for release is based on the total debt
owed by the person from their old traffic or other misdemeanor cases.
172. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to hold people in
jail unless and until they or their families pay the City.
173. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to gradually and
incrementally reduce the amount of money required to buy a person’s release. The reason for
this policy is to generate as much money as possible. Some people’s families are able to borrow
and raise significant money up front to buy the release of their loved one within hours or days.
The longer a person stays in the Ferguson jail, however, the more it costs the City and the more
clear it is that the person’s family cannot raise enough money. Thus, the City’s policy and
practice is to lower the amount periodically on the assumption that the person can raise at least
some money to buy his or her release.
174. As a matter of policy and practice, City jail staff and supervisors attempt to
negotiate or bargain with the person or the person’s family concerning the amount of money that
they are able to pay. This bargaining takes place both inside the jail with the inmate and over the
phone or in person at the clerk’s office with the inmate’s family.
15 The City’s policies and practices—and the terminology that it uses—are at times difficult to navigate. For example, many of the monetary debts that the City claims are owed are actually additional fees and surcharges automatically assessed for the issuance of warrants or the recalling of warrants. These are “assessed” and declared owed entirely independent of any conviction and without any finding of guilt. Moreover, many of the release amounts (which City employees call “bond” amounts) are purportedly classified as pretrial money bail for new charges, typically the charge of “failure to appear.” Each of the named Plaintiffs was, according to the City, kept in its jail pursuant to cash “bond” relating to new “failure to appear” charges. In any event, the City applies materially the same money-based post-arrest detention policies to arrestees charged with new offenses as it does to arrestees who owe old debts. All are kept in jail indefinitely unless and until they make arbitrary monetary payments or unless and until City employees negotiate lower release amounts or ultimately decide to release them for free. None are held pending any court appearance. Thus, those arrested for new ordinance violations, such as Roelif Carter, and those arrested for non-payment (which is typically accomplished through a new charge) are all treated the same and are all subjected to the same post-arrest money-based policies and practices.
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175. In many cases, after significant jail time, the City will release the person for free if it is clear that the City cannot extract any money from the person during that jail stay.
176. Inmates find out about these incremental reductions by asking jail staff every morning what their new required payment is. Some days they are told that it has remained the same, and other days they are told that it has been reduced. Inmates are then usually given an opportunity to use the telephone to call family or friends who might be able to come up with enough money to pay for their release. The reductions do not happen as the result of any formal adversarial process.
177. The City’s incremental reductions of the amount required for release are designed also to punish debtors for non-payment on the theory that time in jail will encourage impoverished people to pay in the future if they know that they will be jailed for non-payment. These threats result in people and families borrowing money at high rates of interest to release a loved one or taking money otherwise needed for food, diapers, rent, clothing, and utilities and giving it to the City of Ferguson instead. The result has been widespread hardship for the impoverished people of Ferguson, whose local government has decided to make families choose between feeding hungry children and letting a loved one languish in jail.
178. These policies and practices have created a culture of fear among the City’s poorest residents, who are afraid even to go to the City police department or the City court to explain their indigence because they know they will be jailed by the City without any meaningful process. The same fear motivates many very poor City residents to sacrifice food, clothing, utilities, sanitary home repairs, and other basic necessities of life in order to scrape together money to pay traffic debts to the City.
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179. From the perspective of City officials, these coercive threats are successful. They are successful because the threats and jailings have been crucial to pressuring family members— who have no legal obligation to pay any money to the City on behalf of indigent relatives or friends who owe money from old civil judgments—to come up with money in order to get their loved ones released from jail. They have also been crucial in getting low-income people to forgo basic necessities of life in order to pay the City in an attempt to avoid jail. It is only through this illegal confinement and threat of confinement that the City is able to collect that additional money that any normal creditor could not.
180. The basic scheme of the City of Ferguson is to extort—through the threat of physical confinement—money from debtors who are otherwise unable to afford to pay both the basic necessities of life and their debts to the City. The City’s policies and practices have resulted in the community knowing that impoverished debtors will be arrested and held by the City for days or weeks unless and until they pay enough cash to the City.
181. When providing information to inmates, the City refers to the amount of cash required for release as the inmate’s “bond,” even though the amount is set by reference to the amount of outstanding debt. Moreover, the money is applied automatically toward old unpaid debts and is set, reset, and modified without any process and without consideration of any of the lawful considerations related to Missouri’s statutory bail system or consistent with the United States Constitution.16 Nor is the amount set in relation to any particular pending charge for
16 In the case of new warrantless arrestees who owe no debts from prior cases, the City uses these release amounts to ensure collection of future not-yet-imposed money judgments from people who will likely be too poor to pay those judgments after conviction absent the threat of jail. Because it releases people for free after indeterminate periods of time but routinely prior to any court date, the City uses these “cash bond” amounts to ensure that it collects money for ultimate violations in advance rather than for any legitimate pretrial government objective. The City uses a cash “bail schedule” based on the charge of arrest as determined by City police as the starting point for police and jail officials to negotiate and lower release amounts with arrestees and their families the longer a person remains in jail after an arrest.
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which legal proceedings are imminent. Indeed, inmates routinely do not even have future court dates set and are held indefinitely without being brought to court. If a person subsequently misses any future payment, the City, without any legal process, confiscates any previous amounts paid by the person to secure their release from jail and resets the person’s debts. The City also adds a “warrant” fee for the person’s missed payment without any legal process.17 In this way, many impoverished people end up paying thousands of dollars over a period of many years to the City based on a small number of relatively inexpensive initial tickets.
182. At any moment, any person can end this cycle by paying the balance of her debt. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to allow any inmate at any time to pay the full amount of the debt owed and to be released immediately, terminating for good all existing previously closed “cases” for which debt is still being collected.18
183. Similarly, at any time, either before an arrest or after an arrest, the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson is to allow all arrest warrants to be removed and inmates to be released immediately if they pay the entire amount of their outstanding balance with the City. It is also the policy and practice of the City to allow individual warrants to be removed without eliminating the entire debt if the person pays an amount arbitrarily set by City employees, usually several hundred dollars in cash based on the total unpaid balance.
184. The City employs a materially different set of procedures for those people who retain private counsel. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to remove existing arrest warrants and schedule new court dates for those debtors who retain a
17 For example, the person is not arraigned on any new charge for failure to appear prior to the “warrant” fee being added, and the person is not given a meaningful opportunity to present a defense to the elements of such a potential charge. The money is simply added to the person’s debts. 18 The “cases” for which the City is collecting debts have, for the most part, been closed for years, with civil judgments entered requiring the payment of fines and costs.
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private lawyer. Unrepresented people are told that there is no way to clear their warrants unless they pay the City.
185. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to keep some debtors in jail for indefinite periods without bringing them to court. The City has often kept inmates unable to make monetary payments in its jail without bringing them to court for days or weeks.19
ii. Debt-Collection Proceedings in the Ferguson Municipal Court 186. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to conduct court sessions approximately three times per month.20 Inmates brought to the court from the jail (which is rare) are told that they will remain in jail unless they make monetary payments even though it is the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson not to provide them with an attorney and not to conduct any meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay as required by the United States Constitution.21 187. Inmates are not advised of their relevant rights under federal or Missouri law, including applicable constitutional rights and state-law defenses and procedures.
19 The City also follows a policy and practice of holding inmates in jail for days on behalf of other municipalities until the other municipality decides whether it will pick them up or not. 20 Because the City holds court so infrequently, those arrested on new offenses or warrants who cannot afford the amount of money set by the City have often languished in jail for more than a week before seeing a judicial officer. Inmates arrested on new charges (as opposed to previously unpaid debts) are told that they will not be released from custody prior to trial unless and until they make generically determined monetary payments. As attention on Ferguson has grown in recent months, the City has begun negotiating with arrestees and often releasing inmates with new charges for free after shorter periods of incarceration if they cannot come up with the money to be released immediately. As always, arrestees who are not indigent and who can afford the scheduled monetary payment are released immediately after booking. 21 Because no inquiry is made into ability to pay, no inquiry is likewise made into the reasons for non-payment or alternatives to incarceration.
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188. Those appearing in court from jail are told that they must pay a certain amount of money or be kept in jail. They are, as a matter of policy and practice, told to make phone calls to family members in an attempt to get family members to pay their debts.
189. Non-incarcerated people are told either to appear in court at future dates or told not to appear in court but to make monetary payments on old debts at the police department. Both groups are told, as a matter of City policy and practice, that failure to bring money to pay old debts will result in their arrest. As with confined inmates, a person can end this debt collection process at any time—whether a person has been told to appear in court or told to make payments at the police department—by paying what she owes to the City in full. If a person is too poor to end this process, her closed “case” can go on for years and years in perpetuity after a civil judgment assessing financial penalties, with the City imposing additional fees and surcharges for missed debt-collection payments.22
190. The City prosecutor and City judge do not conduct indigence or ability-to-pay hearings. Regular observers of the City court have never once seen an indigence or ability to pay hearing conducted in the past five years.
191. The City prosecutor and City judge conduct no meaningful individualized process prior to ordering people to make particular monthly payments. Payment plans are set entirely without any adversarial process and without any individualized inquiry into the circumstances of a debtor. City jail officials ordering payments upon release from jail similarly follow no formal adversarial process in determining the amount of required payments. Those jailed for unpaid
22 It is the policy and practice of the City of Ferguson to inform debtors that, if they or their families pay their debt in full, they can be released from jail and have all proceedings terminated at any moment. At any time, the entire process can be ended by a monetary payment. If a person can afford to pay, the person will never have another court date set by the City of Ferguson. The termination of these cases is determined solely by the wealth of individuals.
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debts from tickets and other offenses (e.g. for not making their ordered payments) are not appointed an attorney, even though the City is represented by an experienced prosecutor.
192. In addition to the difficulty of mounting constitutional and statutory arguments and defenses in the face of an experienced prosecutor, navigating the origin of the numerous fees and surcharges imposed by Ferguson and determining whether they are even validly assessed by the City in any particular case is a complicated inquiry. This inquiry involves the application of state law and procedure; local law and practice; multiple court files, accounting documents, and receipts over a period of years; and constitutional law to a person’s lengthy case history.
193. The vast majority of those jailed for violating the payment plan condition imposed by the City court were not represented by an attorney on the underlying traffic or minor charge because of the City’s policy and practice of not appointing counsel for the indigent.
194. The Plaintiffs and many other witnesses have observed numerous other impoverished people jailed by the City for non-payment of debts without a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay, without the representation of counsel, and without the consideration of whether imprisonment serves legitimate state interests in light of available alternatives as required by federal and Missouri law. The Plaintiffs and other witnesses have observed numerous other people and families who were told that they or their family member would be held in jail by the City unless and until they brought forward large sums of money to pay off debts supposedly owed for tickets and subsequent surcharges.
iii. The Deplorable Conditions in the Ferguson Jail 195. As described above, inmates jailed for non-payment have, as a matter of City policy and practice, been kept in overcrowded cells with inmates strewn about the floors. The
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City has deliberately and callously ignored basic principles of hygiene, sanitation, medical and mental health care, and inmate safety.
196. Inmates are denied toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap; they are kept in cells that reek of visible excrement and surrounded by walls smeared with blood and mucus; they are kept in the same clothes for days and weeks without access to laundry or clean undergarments; they huddle in cold temperatures with a single thin blanket even as they beg guards for warm blankets; they develop illnesses and infections in open wounds that spread to other inmates; they sleep next to an open uncleansed toilet; they endure weeks without being allowed to use the moldy shower; women are not given adequate hygiene products for menstruation; they have on occasion been forced to sleep amidst refuse because of the lack of adequate trash removal; they are routinely denied vital medical care and prescription medication, even when their families beg to be allowed to bring medication to the jail; inmates with serious mental health issues are not provided mental health treatment or prescription medication that they need; they are provided food so insufficient and uniform that inmates lose significant amounts of weight and lack essential nutrients; they suffer from dehydration because their only source of water is a foul apparatus connected to the top of the toilet that produces warm water with an unpalatable stench; and they are deprived of books, legal materials, exercise, television, internet, or natural light.
197. Inmates have been sexually abused and physically beaten by jail staff in the past several years as a result of a culture of unaccountability and abuse resulting from a lack of adequate training and supervision.
198. These abuses and deprivations are accompanied by other pervasive humiliations. Jail guards routinely taunt impoverished people when they are unable to pay for their release, telling them that all they have to do in order to be released is to pay money that they do not have.
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Jail guards routinely laugh at the inmates and humiliate them with degrading epithets, many of which focus on how bad the inmates look and smell after languishing in the Ferguson jail.
199. The totality of these conditions described by the Plaintiffs and by numerous witnesses amounts to unlawful punishment. The conditions at the Ferguson jail are deliberately designed to be as degrading and humiliating as possible in order to punish debtors for not paying their debts and to discourage them from missing payments to the City. The purpose and effect is to coerce debtors to borrow money or use money otherwise needed for the basic necessities of life in order to pay the City to avoid being subjected to the dangerous and humiliating Ferguson jail.
200. The jail conditions created and perpetuated by the City of Ferguson would be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment even were convicted prisoners treated with such callous disregard to basic health and safety. The City forces these conditions on pretrial detainees and post-judgment debtors jailed long after monetary judgments and solely because of their inability to make monetary payments and not pursuant to any criminal sentence.
201. The use of the Ferguson jail and its deplorable conditions in discrete spurts of indefinite confinement dependent on incrementally and arbitrarily reduced release amounts or eventual release for free after several days has the purpose and effect of punishing people rather than achieving any other lawful goal.
iv. The City’s Flawed and Unlawful Warrant Process 202. It is and has been the policy and practice of the City to issue invalid arrest warrants and to apply arbitrary and illegal policies for the issuance and recalling of warrants. 203. Among the policies and practices of the City of Ferguson are the following:
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a. The City informs people that they can remove outstanding warrants simply by paying a sum of money but does not offer a way for the indigent to remove arrest warrants.
b. The City allows for the removal of existing warrants without paying the City only if the person retains a lawyer.
c. The City issues arrest warrants for the failure to make a payment without probable cause to believe that the person had the ability to make a payment.
d. When impoverished people appear in the courtroom and City payment window, they are told by the judge, courtroom officers, City prosecutor, and City clerk that they will be jailed if they do not bring specific sums of money to the City on designated dates in the future.
e. The City issues arrest warrants for “failure to appear” when people do not pay by certain designated dates even though the person did not fail to appear at any court appearance. The City routinely gives inmates paperwork crossing out a court date and telling them instead to make payments at the police department or to drop money off at the night deposit slot.
f. The City issues arrest warrants for “failure to appear” at court dates for which the person had not been given adequate notice. For example, for a hearing to which the person had not been validly summoned or to a hearing whose date the City has moved without ensuring actual notice has been given to the person. The City does not adequately ensure actual notice of changes in court dates and routinely issues arrest warrants even when it has no probable cause to believe that the elements of a “failure to appear” charge have been met, such as that the person did not intentionally fail to appear because the person was in the custody of another jurisdiction or was in the hospital.
g. After arrest pursuant to a warrant, the City either does not bring the person to court at all or delays presentment unnecessarily and for no legitimate purpose for days or weeks.
h. In cases of warrantless arrest, the City fails as a matter of policy and practice to make a neutral finding of probable cause and thus holds people in jail for longer than 48 hours without a neutral finding of probable cause based on sworn evidence. Moreover, because the City policy is to negotiate cash bond and then to release people for free eventually, it does not detain new arrestees for the purpose of any kind of court proceeding. Thus, the City’s initial detention period based on warrantless arrest is unrelated to any legitimate government interest and entirely unconnected from any need to prepare for any probable cause or preliminary hearing because the City does not hold probable cause hearings or preliminary hearings or make any formal probable cause findings.
C. The Cycle of Debt and Jailing in Other Municipalities
204. Like the other impoverished people stuck in this broken system, the Plaintiffs
have been overwhelmed by the combination of multiplying fines, fees, costs, and surcharges
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from many different municipalities at once, as well as the cycle of repeated jailings and subsequent transfers to several different jails during each jailing, lost jobs, increased fees, and the inability to renew driver’s licenses because of unpaid tickets. After scraping together cash from family and friends and borrowing money to pay Ferguson, the Plaintiffs and other Class members would simply be jailed by another city.
205. The hopelessness of trying to navigate this system for years without financial resources and without the assistance of a lawyer who understands the process—never knowing when they left the house if they would be arrested and always confronted with the powerlessness of being kept in jail indefinitely because of their poverty—fundamentally altered the lives of the Plaintiffs and continues to tear at the core of the community.
206. The fear of having basic rights violated with no recourse is a daily fact of life for the Plaintiffs and thousands of others. It is this despair that the Saint Louis County debtors’ prison network cultivates that leads many impoverished people to avoid the system and some, sadly, to take their own lives while languishing in a jail cell.23
Class Action Allegations 207. The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. 208. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which Plaintiffs and unknown Class members can challenge the City’s unlawful debt-collection scheme. 209. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a Class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1)-(4), Rule 23(b)(2), and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
23 At least four suicides and suicide attempts by people held because they were too poor to pay for their release have occurred in local municipal jails just in the past five months.
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210. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of those provisions.
211. Plaintiffs propose three Classes: two Declaratory and Injunctive Classes and a Damages Class. The first Declaratory and Injunctive Class is defined as: All persons who currently owe or who will incur debts to the City of Ferguson from fines, fees, costs, or surcharges arising from cases prosecuted by the City of Ferguson. The second Declaratory and Injunctive Class is all persons who, either because they owe debts to the City of Ferguson, through warrantless arrest, or for any other reason, will become in the custody of the City of Ferguson and thereby subjected to its post-arrest wealth-based detention procedures.
212. The Damages Class is defined as: All persons who, from February 8, 2010, until the present, were held in jail by the City because of their non-payment of a monetary sum required by the City.
A. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 213. Over the past five years, thousands of people have owed and currently owe the City of Ferguson money from old traffic tickets and other minor municipal offenses. Pursuant to City policy and practice, thousands of people who have indicated that they are too poor to pay their debts in full have been placed on payment plans by the City. All of these people are currently being threatened with arrest and jailing pursuant to the City’s illegal post-arrest money based detention policies if they do not make the payments in the amount or frequency purportedly required by the City. Pursuant to City policy, thousands of additional arrestees have been and will be charged by the City with new ordinance violations and kept in jail pursuant to the City’s illegal post-arrest money-based detention policies. 214. The City has kept thousands of people in its jail for non-payment of fines, fees,
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and cash “bond” in each of the past five years. The City retains, and is required by law to retain, records of these instances.
215. The City followed and follows materially the same post-arrest procedures and debt-collection policies, practices, and procedures to accomplish the jailing of the Class members. For example, pursuant to the City’s policy and practice, those kept in jail by the City when they could not pay did not receive meaningful inquiries into their ability to pay as required by federal and Missouri law. Pursuant to City policy, no determinations of indigence or evaluations of alternatives to incarceration were made, and the City provided none of the relevant state and federal protections for debtors. Nor were those jailed by the City provided adequate counsel to represent them.
216. Those who still owe the City debt payments or who will incur such debts or be arrested for new charges will be subjected to the same ongoing policies and practices absent the relief sought in this Complaint.
B. Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 217. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class. The Plaintiffs seek relief concerning whether the City’s policies, practices, and procedures violated their rights and relief mandating the City to change its policies, practices, and procedures so that the Plaintiffs’ rights will be protected in the future. 218. Among the most important, but not the only, common questions of fact are: • Whether the City has a policy and practice of placing and keeping people in its jail who owe money on old judgments unless and until they can pay a monetary sum; • Whether the City has a policy and practice of keeping people in its jail after arrest unless and until they can pay a monetary sum; • Whether the City has a policy and practice of incrementally lowering the amount required to buy a person’s release from custody as the person sits in jail;
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• Whether the initial amount of money required by the City for release is predetermined and/or set without reference to a person’s ability to pay;
• Whether the City has a policy and practice of failing to conduct meaningful inquiries into the ability of a person to pay before keeping the person in jail for non-payment;
• Whether the City provides notice to debtors that their ability to pay will be a relevant issue at the proceedings at which they are jailed or kept in jail and whether the City makes findings concerning ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration;
• Whether the City provides adequate legal representation to those jailed for non-payment in proceedings that result in their incarceration;
• Whether the City jail conditions are and have been unsanitary, unsafe, and inhumane in the ways described in this Complaint;
• Whether City employees and agents have a policy and practice of threatening debtors and families of debtors with incarceration for unpaid debts without informing them of their rights;
• Whether the City has a policy of issuing and executing warrants for the arrest of debtors despite lacking probable cause that they have committed any offense and without any notice or opportunity to be heard concerning their ability to pay or the validity of the debt;
• Whether the City has a policy and practice of failing to make prompt neutral probable cause findings based on sworn evidence for warrantless arrests.
219. Among the most important common question of law are:
• Whether keeping people in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment is lawful;
• Whether people are entitled to a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay before being jailed by the City for non-payment;
• Whether people who cannot afford to pay the City are entitled to the consideration of alternatives to incarceration before being jailed for non-payment;
• Whether it is lawful for the City to keep arrestees in jail after arrest pursuant to predetermined cash bail that does not take into account ability to pay before releasing arrestees for free after indeterminate periods;
• Whether people are entitled to the appointment of and representation by a lawyer in proceedings initiated and litigated by City prosecutors that result in their incarceration if they cannot afford an attorney;
• Whether the City can employ jail, threats of jail, onerous generic “payment dockets,” and other harsh debt-collection measures (such as ordering payment of significant portions of a person’s public assistance benefits) against debtors who cannot afford immediately to pay the monetary judgment to the City in full;
• Whether the City can arrest people based solely on their non-payment without any probable cause that they have committed any willful conduct or other offense and without notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning legal predicates for a valid detention, such as their ability to pay and the validity of the debt;
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• Whether and how long the City can lawfully hold people in custody on warrantless arrests without any neutral finding of probable cause and without any intention of bringing the arrested person before a neutral judicial officer for such a finding;
• Whether the jail conditions described in this Complaint violate federal law. 220. These common legal and factual questions arise from one central scheme and set
of policies and practices: the City’s enormously profitable traffic and ordinance post-arrest detention and debt-collection system. The City operates this scheme openly and in materially the same manner every day, and all of the ancillary factual questions about how that scheme operates are common to all members of the Class, as well as the resulting legal questions about whether that scheme is unlawful. The material components of the scheme do not vary from Class member to Class member, and the resolution of these legal and factual issues will determine whether all of the members of the class are entitled to the constitutional relief that they seek.
C. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 221. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes, and they have the same interests as all other members of the Classes that they represent. Each of them suffered injuries from the failure of the City to comply with the basic constitutional provisions detailed below. The answer to whether the City’s scheme of policies and practices is unconstitutional will determine the claims of the named Plaintiffs and every other Class member. 222. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in their claims that the City’s policies and practices concerning post-arrest wealth-based detention and debt collection for fines, fees, costs, and surcharges violate the law in the ways alleged in each claim of the Complaint, then that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the Injunctive and Damages Classes.24
24 The named Plaintiffs representing the Declaratory and Injunctive Class are Keilee Fant, Roelif Carter, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Alfred Morris, Anthony Kimble, Donyale Thomas, Shameika Morris, Daniel Jenkins, Ronnie Tucker, and Tonya Deberry. The named Plaintiffs representing the Damages Class are: Keilee Fant, Roelif Carter, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Alfred Morris, Anthony Kimble, Donyale Thomas, Shameika Morris, Daniel Jenkins, Ronnie Tucker, and Tonya Deberry.
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D. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
223. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Classes because they are
members of the Classes and because their interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to,
those of the Classes. There are no known conflicts of interest among Class members, all of
whom have a similar interest in vindicating the constitutional rights to which they are entitled. 224. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law,25 who have
experience in litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of
both the details of the City’s scheme and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Plaintiffs
are also represented by attorneys from ArchCity Defenders, who have extensive experience with
the functioning of the entire municipal court system in the City of Ferguson through their representation of numerous impoverished people in the City of Ferguson.26 Plaintiffs are also represented by the Saint Louis University School of Law,27 whose distinguished clinical
professors and dedicated students have devoted enormous time and resources to studying the
functioning of the municipal court system and the applicable federal and state law, as well as to
representing impoverished people affected by the illegalities permeating the City’s municipal
25 Equal Justice Under Law is a non-profit civil rights organization based in Washington, D.C. The organization is funded in part by the Harvard Law School Public Service Venture Fund.
Counsel from Equal Justice Under Law was recently lead counsel in a landmark federal civil rights class action lawsuit against the City of Montgomery for engaging in similar debtors’ prison practices. In that case, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a preliminary injunction condemning and forbidding the City’s similar jailing of impoverished people with unpaid debts, and the case was successfully settled after the City agreed to compensate the Plaintiffs and to the entry of an injunction reforming its entire municipal debt-collection regime. 26 ArchCity Defenders is a non-profit public interest law firm based in Saint Louis. It has represented the poor and homeless in municipal court cases for the past five years and is an expert on the ways in which Ferguson’s illegal practices and policies make and keep people poor. ArchCity Defenders also published an extensive report detailing similar practices and policies in the cities of Bel-Ridge and Florissant. The report is available at www.archcitydefenders.org. 27 Saint Louis University School of Law Clinics have been involved in representing the poor and homeless in municipal courts for many years and have extensive knowledge of and experience with the systemic constitutional violations pervading the City’s scheme. Further, the Clinic and its professors have extensive experience in class action lawsuits.
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scheme. 225. The efforts of Plaintiffs’ counsel have so far included extensive investigation over
a period of months, including numerous interviews with witnesses, City employees, City jail inmates, families, attorneys practicing in the Ferguson Municipal Court, community members, statewide experts in the functioning of Missouri municipal courts, and national experts in constitutional law, debt collection, bankruptcy law, criminal law, and jails.
226. Counsel have also observed numerous courtroom hearings in the City of Ferguson and in municipalities across the region in order to compile a detailed understanding of state law and practices as they relate to federal constitutional requirements. Counsel have studied the way that these systems function in other cities in order to investigate the wide array of options in practice for municipalities.
227. As a result, counsel have devoted enormous time and resources to becoming intimately familiar with the City’s scheme and with all of the relevant state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel has also developed relationships with many of the individuals and families most victimized by the City’s practices.
228. The interests of the members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Rule 23(b)(2) 229. Class action status is appropriate because the City, through the policies, practices, and procedures that make up its post-arrest wealth-based detention and traffic and ordinance debt-collection scheme, has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Declaratory and Injunctive Class. Thus, a declaration that people in the City cannot be held in jail solely because they cannot afford to make a monetary payment will apply to each Class
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member. Similarly, a determination that Class members are entitled, as a matter of federal law, to a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay and an evaluation of alternatives to incarceration before they are jailed by the City for non-payment will apply to each Class member. The same applies to rulings on the other claims, including: that Class members are entitled to representation by counsel at proceedings initiated and litigated by City prosecutors in connection with which they are jailed; that the City cannot collect debts from Class members in an onerous manner that violates and evades all of the relevant protections for other judgment debtors; that the jail conditions to which members of the class are exposed are inhumane and unconstitutional; and that the City cannot issue and execute arrest warrants for traffic debtors without probable cause that they have committed an offense and without notice or a hearing prior to the deprivation of their liberty.
230. Injunctive relief compelling the City to comply with these constitutional rights will similarly protect each member of the Class from being again subjected to the City’s unlawful policies and practices with respect to the debts that they still owe and protect those who will incur such debts or be subject to arrest by the City in the future from the same unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole is appropriate.
F: Rule 23(b)(3) 231. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate because the common questions of law and fact overwhelmingly predominate. This case turns, for every Class member, on what the City’s policies and practices were and on whether those policies were lawful.
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232. The common questions of law and fact listed above are dispositive questions in the case of every member of the Class. The question of liability can therefore be determined on a class-wide basis. Class-wide treatment of liability is a far superior method of determining the content and legality of the City’s policies and practices than individual suits by hundreds or thousands of City residents. The question of damages will also be driven by class-wide determinations, such as the policies, practices, and conditions at the City jail. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a person was unlawfully jailed. Determining damages for individual Class members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on easily verifiable records of the length of unlawful incarceration. If need be, individual hearings on Class-member specific damages based on special circumstances can be held after Class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
233. The Plaintiffs seek the following relief and hereby demand a jury trial in this cause for all matters so appropriate.
Claims for Relief Count One: Defendant City of Ferguson Violated the Plaintiffs’ Rights By Jailing Them For Their Inability To Pay the City. 234. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-233. 235. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses have long prohibited imprisoning a person for the failure to make a payment to the government if that person is indigent and unable to pay. Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights by jailing Plaintiffs when they could not afford to pay the debts allegedly owed from traffic and other minor offenses. Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights by imprisoning them, and by threatening to imprison them, without conducting any inquiry into their ability to pay and without considering
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alternatives to imprisonment as required by the United States Constitution. At any moment, a wealthier person in the Plaintiffs’ position could have paid a sum of cash and avoided arrest and jailing. Defendant’s policy and practice of placing and keeping Plaintiffs in its jail unless and until they are able to pay arbitrarily determined and constantly-shifting sums of money violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit the City’s post-arrest wealth-based detention as a result of the City’s use of a cash bond whereby initial cash release amounts are set (and routinely modified by City employees) without any inquiry into a person’s ability to pay. As a result, those arrested for unpaid debts and/or for new offenses who are able to pay the cash bond are released immediately while those who cannot pay the cash bond are detained solely because of their inability to pay without any meaningful legal process to inquire into their ability to pay the amounts demanded by the City.
Count Two: Defendant City of Ferguson Violated Plaintiffs’ Rights By Imprisoning Them Without Appointing Adequate Counsel.
236. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-235. 237. Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by jailing Plaintiffs during proceedings initiated by City prosecutors at which Plaintiffs did not have the benefit of counsel and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive counsel. The City’s policy of not providing adequate counsel in proceedings in which indigent people are ordered to be imprisoned in the City jail for non-payment, which are, in turn, based on payment plans arising from traffic and other violations at which the person was also unrepresented, violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Count Three: Defendant City of Ferguson’s Use of Indefinite and Arbitrary Detention Violates Due Process.
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238. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-237 above. 239. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Defendant from jailing the Plaintiffs indefinitely and without any meaningful legal process through which they can challenge their detention by keeping them confined in the Defendant’s jail unless or until they could make arbitrarily determined and frequently shifting cash payments, or until City employees decided to release them for free. Count Four: The Deplorable Conditions in the Ferguson Jail Violate Due Process and Constitute Impermissible Punishment 240. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-239 above. 241. The unsafe, unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous conditions of confinement in the Ferguson jail constitute impermissible punishment unrelated to serving any criminal judgment. Even if imposed after valid conviction, the conditions would constitute cruel and unusual treatment. The deplorable and excessively harsh conditions in the Defendant’s jail are unnecessary to accomplish any legitimate government objective and shock the conscience of any reasonable person concerned with human dignity and liberty. Count Five: Defendant City of Ferguson’ Use of Jail and Threats of Jail To Collect Debts Owed to the City Violates Equal Protection Because It Imposes Unduly Harsh and Punitive Restrictions On Debtors Whose Creditor Is the Government Compared To Those Who Owe Money to Private Creditors. 242. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-241 above. 243. The United States Supreme Court has held that, when governments seek to recoup costs of prosecution from indigent defendants, they may not take advantage of their position to impose unduly harsh methods of collection solely because the debt is owed to the government and not to a private creditor. Not only does the City place indigent people on generic and overly onerous payment plans lasting years or decades when the cases of wealthier people would be
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terminated, but by imposing imprisonment, repeated threats of imprisonment, indeterminate “payment dockets” for many years, extra and invalid fees and surcharges, and other restrictions on Plaintiffs, the City takes advantage of its control over the machinery of the City jail and police systems to deny debtors the procedural and substantive statutory protections that every other Missouri debtor may invoke against a private creditor. Many people like the Plaintiffs owing money to the City of Ferguson on old judgments have to borrow money and go further in debt in order to pay off the City of Ferguson because other non-government creditors are not permitted to jail them for non-payment of debt. This coercive policy and practice constitutes invidious discrimination and violates the fundamental principles of equal protection of the laws.
Count Six: Defendant City of Ferguson’s Policy and Practice of Issuing and Serving Invalid Warrants, Including Those Solely Based on Nonpayment of Monetary Debt, Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
244. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-243 above. 245. The City’s policy and practice is to issue and serve arrest warrants against those who have not paid their traffic debt. These warrants are sought, issued, and served without any inquiry into the person’s ability to pay even when the City has prior knowledge that the person is impoverished and unable to pay the debts and possesses other valid defenses. These warrants are regularly sought, issued, and served without any finding of probable cause that the person has committed the elements of any offense. The City chooses to pursue warrants instead of issuing summons even when it has spoken to people on the phone or in person and has the opportunity to notify them to appear in court. The City’s policy of allowing wealthy residents or residents who can afford to hire an attorney to remove their warrants but refusing to clear warrants for indigent people who cannot afford those options is unlawful. Moreover, the City’s policy and practice of not presenting arrestees in court or unreasonably delaying presentment for days or weeks for no
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legitimate reason is unlawful. These practices violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and result in a deprivation of fundamental liberty without adequate due process.
Count Seven: Defendant City of Ferguson’s Extended Detention of Warrantless Arrestees Without A Neutral Judicial Finding of Probable Cause Based On Sworn Evidence Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 246. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-245 above. 247. The Fourth Amendment (as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment) prohibits extended detention after a warrantless arrest without a prompt finding of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer based on sworn evidence. The City routinely fails as a matter of policy and practice to make a neutral finding of probable cause and thus keeps people in jail for longer than 48 hours without a neutral finding of probable cause based on sworn evidence. Because City policy is to negotiate cash bond and then to release people for free eventually if they cannot pay, it does not detain new arrestees for the purpose of any legal proceeding. Thus, the City’s extended initial detention period for those who cannot afford to pay after warrantless arrest is unrelated to any legitimate government interest and entirely unconnected from any need to prepare for any probable cause or preliminary hearing because the City does not hold probable cause hearings or preliminary hearings or make any formal probable cause findings.
Request for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue the following relief: a. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due
process and equal protection rights by imprisoning them because they cannot afford to pay the City and by imprisoning them without conducting any meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay or into alternatives to incarceration; b. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by imprisoning them without appointing adequate counsel at the proceedings that led to their incarceration; c. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ rights by holding them indefinitely in jail independent of any formal legal process;
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d. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ rights by subjecting them to unconstitutional jail conditions;
e. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights by imposing harsh debt collection measures not imposed on debtors whose creditors are private entities;
f. A declaratory judgment that Defendant violates Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing and serving arrest warrants without probable cause to believe that the elements of an offense had been committed, with unreasonable delay prior to presentment, without requiring a prompt neutral probable cause finding for warrantless arrestees, and without providing pre-deprivation of liberty process where such process is easily available to the City for judgment debtors;
g. An order and judgment permanently enjoining Defendant from enforcing the abovedescribed unconstitutional policies and practices against Plaintiffs;
h. A judgment compensating the Plaintiffs for the damages that they suffered as a result of the City’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct;
i. An order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
_/s/ Alec Karakatsanis_______________ Alec Karakatsanis (E.D.Mo. Bar No. 999294DC)
Equal Justice Under Law 916 G Street, NW Suite 701 Washington, DC 20001 (202)-681-2409 alec@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
_/s/ Thomas B. Harvey__________________ Thomas B. Harvey (MBE #61734)
_/s/ Michael-John Voss________________ Michael-John Voss (MBE #61742)
ArchCity Defenders 812 N. Collins Alley Saint Louis, MO 63102 855-724-2489
_/s/ John J. Ammann___________________ John J. Ammann (MBE #34308)
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_/s/ Stephen Hanlon________________ Stephen Hanlon (MBE #19340) _/s/ Brendan Roediger________________ Brendan Roediger (E.D.Mo. Bar No. IL6287213) Saint Louis University School of Law 100 N. Tucker Blvd. Saint Louis, MO 63101-1930 314-977-2778 _/s/ Sonia W. Murphy ________________ Sonia W. Murphy (Pro Hac Vice) White & Case LLP 701 13th Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 637-6161
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

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No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER The named Plaintiffs in this putative civil rights class action are 11 individuals who allege that they have been jailed by the City of Ferguson (the “City”) on numerous occasions because they were unable to pay cash bonds or other debts owed to the City resulting from their traffic and other minor offenses. Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of the United States Constitution and as a matter of the City’s policy and practice, they were not afforded counsel, any inquiry into their ability to pay, or a neutral finding of probable cause in a prompt manner; and they were held in jail indefinitely, in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, until they or their friends or family members could make a monetary payment sufficient to satisfy the City. The City has moved to dismiss all claims in Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint except one, relating to the conditions of confinement, and to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 57.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the City’s motion.

BACKGROUND As an initial matter, the Court notes that it denied an earlier motion by the City to dismiss Plaintiffs’ original complaint.1 In its current motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the City incorporates by reference the arguments raised in that earlier motion in order to “preserve their arguments, preserve the record, and to allow the Court to reconsider such arguments should this Court deem appropriate.” (Doc. No. 58 at 1 n.1.) After careful consideration, the Court concludes that reconsideration is not warranted and will therefore only address the new arguments asserted by the City. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts seven claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of the City’s policies and practices of jailing individuals for failure to pay money owed from traffic and other minor offenses. Plaintiffs seek to represent three classes: (1) a declaratory and injunctive relief class of “[a]ll persons who currently owe or who will incur debts to the City of Ferguson from fines, fees, costs, or surcharges arising from cases prosecuted by the City”; (2) a declaratory and injunctive relief class of “all persons who, either because they owe debts to the City of Ferguson, through warrantless arrest, or for any other reason, will become in the custody of the City of Ferguson and thereby subjected to its post-arrest wealth-based detention procedures”; and (3) a damages class of “[a]ll persons who, from February 8, 2010 until the present, were held in jail by the City because of their non-payment of a monetary sum required by the City.” (Doc. No. 53 at 46.)
1 The Court thereafter granted Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for leave to amend their complaint in order to add a new proposed class and a new claim (Count Seven).
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In Count One of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs claim that the City violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by jailing and threatening to jail Plaintiffs indefinitely for their inability to pay debts owed from traffic and other minor offenses, without conducting any inquiry into Plaintiffs’ ability to pay and without considering alternatives to imprisonment. Plaintiffs allege that, as a matter of policy and practice, when arrestees are booked at the City’s jail, they are told by jail staff that they can be released immediately but only if they pay an “arbitrarily determined and constantly-shifting” sum of money to the City. Id. at 54.
In Count Two, Plaintiffs claim that the City violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “by jailing Plaintiffs during proceedings initiated by City prosecutors at which Plaintiffs did not have the benefit of counsel and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive counsel.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that the City has a policy and practice “of not providing adequate counsel in proceedings in which indigent people are ordered to be imprisoned in the City jail for non-payment, which are, in turn, based on payment plans arising from traffic and other violations at which the person was also unrepresented.” Id.
In Count Three, Plaintiffs claim that the City’s use of indefinite and arbitrary detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs allege that the City has a policy and practice of jailing indigent persons owing debts to the City “indefinitely and without any meaningful legal process through which they can challenge their detention by keeping them confined . . . unless or until they could make arbitrarily determined cash payments.” Id. at 55. Plaintiffs further allege that “inmates routinely do
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not even have future court dates set and are held indefinitely without being brought to court,” that “[i]f a person . . . misses any future payment, the City, without any legal process confiscates any previous amounts paid by the person to secure their release from jail and resets the person’s debts,” and that the “City also adds a ‘warrant’ fee for the person’s missed payment without any legal process,” which increases the total debt owed by Plaintiffs. Id. at 38. Plaintiffs allege specific instances of City jail staff and supervisors holding Plaintiffs in jail for days or weeks, without setting future court dates or bringing Plaintiffs to court, and then gradually and incrementally reducing the amount of money required to buy a Plaintiff’s release, not through any formal court process, but by negotiating or bargaining with Plaintiffs or their family regarding the amount of money they are able to pay. Plaintiffs further allege that “[i]n many cases, after significant jail time, the City will release the person for free if it is clear that the City cannot extract any money from the person during that jail stay.” Id. at 36.
In Count Four, Plaintiffs claim that the totality of the conditions of the City’s jail amount to punishment of the pre-trial detainee and post-judgment debtor Plaintiffs, in violation of the Due Process Clause.
In Count Five, Plaintiffs claim that the City’s use of jail and threats of jail to collect debts owed to the City violates the Equal Protection Clause because it imposes “unduly harsh and punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the government compared to those who owe money to private creditors.” Id. at 55. Plaintiffs allege that the “City takes advantage of its control over the machinery of the City jail and police systems to deny
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debtors the procedural and substantive statutory protections that every other Missouri debtor may invoke against a private creditor.” Id. at 56.
In Count Six, Plaintiffs claim that the City has a “policy and practice of issuing and serving invalid warrants,” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 56. Plaintiffs allege that, pursuant to the City’s policies and practices, warrants are regularly issued for “failure to appear,” even when there was no court appearance scheduled2 or when the City has not provided adequate notice of a court date, for example, because City officials moved a person’s hearing date without informing that person. Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]he City informs people that they can immediately remove outstanding warrants simply by paying a sum of money” or by retaining a lawyer, but that the City does not offer a way for unrepresented indigent persons to remove arrest warrants. Id. at 44.
In Count Seven, Plaintiffs claim that the City’s “extended detention of warrantless arrestees without a neutral judicial finding of probable cause based on sworn evidence” violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs allege that, as a matter of policy and practice, the City routinely holds people in jail for longer than 48 hours without a neutral determination of probable cause. Plaintiffs allege that, moreover, “[b]ecause City policy is to negotiate cash bond and then to release people for free eventually if they cannot pay, it does not detain new arrestees for the purpose of any legal proceeding.” Id. at 57.
2 Plaintiffs allege, for example, that “[t]he City routinely gives inmates paperwork crossing out a court date and telling them instead to make payments at the police department or to drop money off at the night deposit slot.” (Doc. No. 53 at 44.)
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Notably, Plaintiffs allege that the challenged actions often took place outside of the judicial process completely and were, in all cases, caused by and representative of “the City’s policies and practices concerning collecting unpaid fines, fees, costs, and surcharges relating to traffic tickets and other minor offenses for at least the past five years.” Id. at 33. Plaintiffs further allege that “[i]t is the policy and practice of the City . . . to use its municipal court and its jail as significant sources of revenue generation for the City.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that they still owe significant debts to the City and fear that they will again be jailed because of their inability to make monetary payments, subject to the City’s policies and practices outlined above.
As relief, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the City’s’ policies and practices, as outlined above, violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; a permanent injunction preventing the City from enforcing these policies and practices; and an award of compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
The City has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and all of Plaintiffs’ claims except Count Four, for failure to state a claim.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES The City argues that all claims except Count Four should be dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot show that the alleged injuries were attributable to the City for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983. Specifically, the City argues that each of the claims at issue arises out of a municipal court judge’s allegedly improper action (or inaction) in
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carrying out judicial functions as part of the Ferguson Municipal Court, which, according to the City, is an arm of the state and is outside the control of the City as a matter of state law. The City then cites a line of federal cases following the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), and City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), for the proposition that “the actions of a municipal judge in his or her judicial capacity to enforce state law do not act as a municipal official or lawmaker for purposes of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. No. 58 at 9.)
In a few footnotes, the City briefly mentions alternative arguments for dismissal, based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and abstention. With respect to immunity, the City argues in a single footnote that, although the Court need not address the issue if it finds that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for municipal liability, “[i]n the alternative, Defendant sets forth a good faith request that the Eleventh Amendment be extended to the conduct alleged by Plaintiffs for the reasons described below (municipal court alleged action and inaction).” (Doc. No. 58 at 4 n.2.) The City does not further explain the basis of this argument. In another footnote, the City requests that the Court take judicial notice of a state court case, in which some of same attorneys representing Plaintiffs are purportedly “challenging alleged fees of the City.” Id. at 20 n.11. The City does not provide further information about this lawsuit but argues that, to the extent this Court believes Plaintiffs have stated a claim for municipal liability based on the City’s fees or surcharges, such claim is “barred by the Colorado River doctrine as parallel state court litigation is
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pending.” Id. (citing Colorado Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).
Next, the City argues that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief should be dismissed on standing and ripeness grounds. Specifically, the City contends that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts establishing standing to seek injunctive relief because Plaintiffs allege only past harm and have not pleaded a real and immediate threat of injury resulting from the City’s conduct. The City further contends that Plaintiffs’ claims amount to a “general grievance with the City,” which the Court should decline to hear as a matter of “prudential restraint.”
In support of its ripeness argument, the City points to a Consent Decree entered on April 19, 2016, in a case brought by the United States Department of Justice against the City and pending before a different judge of this Court, United States v. City of Ferguson, Case No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP, Doc. No. 41 (the “Consent Decree”). The City argues that the Consent Decree “addresses the determination of indigence and the imposition of fines (¶¶ 340–42), payment plans and community service (¶¶ 343–46), the issuance of warrants in connection with a hearing to determine payment (¶¶ 347–48), and bond schedules, bond, payment of bond, and pretrial detention (¶¶ 349–50).” 3 (Doc. No. 58 at 35 n.15.) Thus, the City argues that the Consent Decree has fully addressed Plaintiffs’ claims such that no further injunctive relief is necessary.
3 The Court takes judicial notice of the terms of the Consent Decree as a matter of public record appropriately considered at this stage. See Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs do not object to the Court’s consideration of the Consent Decree in ruling on the City’s motion to dismiss.
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In response to the City’s motion, Plaintiffs argue that, contrary to the line of cases cited by the City, their complaint alleges constitutional violations caused by the City’s own policies and practices, not merely by a single municipal judge’s decisions. Plaintiffs argue that the violations here are in fact alleged to have taken place largely outside of the judicial process and without any involvement by a municipal judge. Plaintiffs also note that the Consent Decree—in which the City has agreed to stop certain practices alleged to be unconstitutional in this case (such as imposing fines, fees, and costs without an ability-to-pay determination, and using arrest warrants to collect debts owed to the City) —belies the City’s arguments that it lacks any control over such practices.
Plaintiffs further argue that the Court should reject the City’s “halfhearted[]” Eleventh Amendment immunity and Colorado River abstention arguments as unsupported and wrong on the merits. With respect to the City’s abstention argument, Plaintiffs contend that the state court lawsuit noted by the City “challenges the initial issuance of fines,” whereas the present lawsuit “challenges the City’s collection methods.” (Doc. No. 62 at 17 n.17.)
Plaintiffs also argue that they have stated a viable request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs argue that they have established standing to obtain such relief because they have pleaded that they still owe debts to the City and are still subject to the City’s allegedly unconstitutional debt-collection and post-arrest policies and practices. Plaintiffs also argue that their claims do not assert a generalized grievance but assert violations of Plaintiffs’ own constitutional and statutory rights.
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Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the City’s “lack of ripeness” argument appears to be an argument that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is moot in light of the April 19, 2016 Consent Decree. To that argument, Plaintiffs respond that any mootness argument is “premature,” as the Consent Decree contains future deadlines by which the City must make changes to policies and practices that would address problems raised in the complaint. Plaintiffs argue that, although the City may be able to prove mootness when it completes those future reforms, it has not done so yet. In a sur-reply, Plaintiffs also note that “the Consent Decree articulates somewhat different relief than Plaintiffs seek, according to a set of deadlines that Plaintiffs have not agreed to.” (Doc. No. 65-1 at 11.)
DISCUSSION To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s allegations must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in plaintiff’s favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). A court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” and consider the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010)
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(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Municipal Liability
“Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if
the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3)
a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Corwin v. City of Indep., Mo., 829
F.3d 695, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
The Supreme Court has rejected any heightened pleading requirement for claims
alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1993). To survive a motion to
dismiss such a claim, a complaint need only allege facts sufficient “to draw an inference
that the conduct complained of resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom.”
Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004).
A policy is an official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters. Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability through an unofficial custom of the municipality by demonstrating (1) the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Corwin, 829 F.3d at 700 (citations omitted).
“The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the
municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
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municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible,” meaning action which the “municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-480. Special problems arise when considering whether an unconstitutional municipal policy may be inferred from the isolated acts of a single official. That is the question addressed in Pembaur, Praprotnik, and in the line of federal cases that the City relies on in its motion.
In answering that question, the Supreme Court held that a single official’s isolated actions may constitute a municipal policy where the official has “final policymaking authority,” which is a question of state law, and where the challenged action was “taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official . . . responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city’s business.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (emphasis removed) (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482-83).
The federal circuit courts of appeal (in the line of cases relied upon by the City) have applied this rule to find that a municipal judge does not act as a final policymaker of the municipality for purposes of municipal liability when she makes a judicial decision under the authority of state law and appealable to the state’s higher courts. See, e.g., Granda v. City of St. Louis, 472 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 2007); Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2003); Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 314-16 (9th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992); Woods v. City of Michigan City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1991). In each of these cases, the plaintiffs “by naming [a particular municipal court judge acting in his judicial capacity] as the source of
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the constitutional deprivation, detach[ed] the local governments from the unconstitutional policy.” Woods, 940 F.2d at 279.
But Plaintiffs do not seek to hold the City liable for the judicial decisions made by a municipal court judge in particular cases. Indeed, as noted above, Plaintiffs allege that the constitutional deprivations here took place largely outside of any judicial process. Instead, Plaintiffs’ complaint is replete with allegations that each of the injuries alleged was caused by the City’s own unconstitutional policies and by the continuing and pervasive unconstitutional practices of a wide range of City employees. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have pleaded enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support their claim of municipal liability under § 1983, which is all that is required at this stage. See Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 13–cv–02963, 2013 WL 4014565, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2013) (“[W]hile the extent of the City’s involvement in the warrant process may be disputed, and whether its procedures, or lack thereof, for preventing the issue of erroneous warrants may be challenged, those are fact-sensitive issues that can be addressed in later proceedings.”). Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Colorado River Abstention
The City fails to present a coherent or complete legal argument as to why Eleventh Amendment immunity would apply here, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.54 (finding no “basis for concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability”), or why Colorado River abstention would be appropriate.4 Therefore, the Court will deny the
4 Colorado River abstention is reserved for “exceptional circumstances where the surrender of federal jurisdiction is supported by the clearest of justifications” and is
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City’s motion to dismiss on these alternative grounds. Injunctive Relief
For a plaintiff to demonstrate standing to obtain injunctive relief, he must show that he “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (citation omitted). “It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish standing by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant’s allegedly wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and that the threatened injury is certainly impending.” Park v. Forest Serv. of U.S., 205 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000)
Plaintiffs have established standing to obtain injunctive relief by pleading that they still owe debts to the City and are still subject to the City’s continuing unconstitutional debt-collection and post-arrest policies and procedures. See, e.g., Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (distinguishing Lyons, “in which the constitutionally objectionable practice [of chokeholds] ceased altogether before the plaintiff filed his complaint,” and holding that plaintiffs established standing where they were still detained at the time of the complaint and still subject to the county’s policy of failing to provide prompt probable cause hearings); Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., No. 2:12-CV-02819-RDP, 2013 WL 5428360, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations that they “still owe[d] various fines and fees,” demonstrated they were “under
especially disfavored where federal law controls. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., LLC v. City of Cameron, Mo., 806 F.3d 1113, 1121 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted),
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the present and constant threat of being subject to the allegedly illegal methods and procedures utilized . . . to collect municipal fines,” and their request for “prospective injunctive relief” was therefore appropriate).
Plaintiffs have also satisfied any “prudential” concerns that bear on the question of standing because, as discussed above, they have “asser[ted] their own legal rights and interests,” and not merely a “generalized grievance[]” of the public at large. Cf. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
Plaintiffs’ standing to obtain injunctive relief is not diminished by the City’s entry into the April 19, 2016 Consent Decree with the Department of Justice. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the effect of the Consent Decree on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief presents a question of mootness, which occurs “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013). A request for injunctive relief “becomes moot if it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will recur or if interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 745 (8th Cir. 2004). “The heavy burden of proving mootness falls on the party asserting the case has become moot.” Id.
In Kennedy Building Associates, the Eighth Circuit considered “whether a defendant’s entry into an agreement with a third party to negotiate a resolution to the violation on which injunctive relief is based moots a claim for injunctive relief.” Id. The
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third-party agreement in that case was an administrative consent order that the defendant entered with a state environmental agency “to design and implement a remedial plan [concerning contaminated property] whose terms [were] yet unknown.” Id. at 742. The question was whether the administrative consent order mooted a claim by a private plaintiff in a separate suit for an injunction to clean up the same contaminated property. The Eighth Circuit held that, although a claim for injunctive relief may be moot where “the condition on which the suit was based had been remedied” by a third-party agreement, the same was not necessarily true where the agreement “depend[ed] on future events entirely outside [of the] control” of the plaintiff seeking injunctive relief. Id. at 745-46. The Eighth Circuit noted that if a request for injunctive relief “were to be dismissed upon an agreement between third parties to perform at some time in the future, if some impediment arises or some prolonged delay ensues in the planned performance, the plaintiff would be at square one.” Id. at 745; see also Gropper v. Fine Arts Housing, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 664, 670, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that a defendant’s entry into a voluntary compliance agreement (“VCA”) with the Department of Justice that bound it to address “the majority” of an individual plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims in a separate case did not moot the individual plaintiff’s claims because “the VCA consist[ed] largely of promises that [the defendant] will fulfill in the future”; but deciding to stay case during the term of the VCA to avoid “duplicative litigation while [the defendant] was engaged in an ongoing effort to comply with the law”).
The Eighth Circuit in Kennedy Building Associates further held that “[e]ven assuming for the sake of argument that entering an administrative agreement to do
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something in the future is the same thing as having already done the thing for purposes of mootness analysis, . . . [r]elief granted in another tribunal can moot a claim . . . only where the relief granted is complete.” Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., 375 F.3d at 746.
Here, too, the Court finds that the City has not yet demonstrated that the Consent Decree moots Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. A review of the Consent Decree reveals that the City has agreed to “develop and implement” plans to correct its municipal court practices in the future. See, e.g., Consent Decree, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP, Doc. No. 41 at ¶ 328 (within 90 days, “the City will develop and implement all necessary ordinances and policies to ensure that the practices of the Ferguson Municipal Court are grounded in the fair administration of justice and comport with all constitutional and other legal requirements”); ¶ 340 (within 60 days, “the City will ensure that defendants are provided with appropriate ability-to-pay determinations”); ¶ 348 (within 60 days, “the City will establish and implement protocols, through policy or ordinance, to ensure that arrest warrants related to municipal code violations will be issued, if at all, only after all other mechanisms available for securing a person’s appearance in court have been exhausted” and to “ensure that arrest warrants are not being issued in response to a person’s financial inability to pay a fine or fee”); ¶ 350 (within 60 days, “the City will develop and implement a plan to eliminate e the use of a fixed monetary bond schedule”).
The City also does not suggest (and a review of the Consent Decree’s terms does not reveal) that the Consent Decree addresses Plaintiffs’ claim in Count Two, regarding Plaintiffs’ alleged right to counsel and the City’s policies and practices in this regard. Therefore, the City has not demonstrated that the Consent Decree provides complete relief.
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The City may well establish in the near future, as a result of new policies designed or implemented under the terms of the Consent Decree, “that there is no reasonable expectation that the violation[s] will recur or [that] interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation[s].” See Kennedy Bldg. Assocs., 375 F.3d at 745. Alternatively, the City may establish that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief should be stayed or withheld, in whole or in part, to avoid duplication of or inconsistency with the relief ordered in the Consent Decree (a point that the City has not clearly made to date). But the City has not done so yet. In sum, the Court will deny the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is DENIED. (Doc. No. 57.)

Dated this 15th day of November, 2016.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 84 Filed: 12/02/16 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 935
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

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No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, following oral argument on this day on Plaintiffs’
motion (Doc. No. 73) to compel production of documents, that the motion is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part as follows and as more fully discussed at oral argument:
Within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, the parties shall meet and confer on the
following topics:
(1) Search terms and protocol to address Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, as narrowed; (2) A list of key custodians most likely to have discoverable emails such that
wholesale production of their non-privileged emails is appropriate; (3) The sequence, manner, and format of production; (4) The timeline for production of emails that Defendant has already reviewed for
privilege; (5) The timeline for production of emails that Defendant has not yet reviewed for
privilege; and (6) How the emails on the two flash drives at issue in Plaintiffs’ motion (and
discussed at oral argument) equate to the universe of discoverable emails in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control.

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 84 Filed: 12/02/16 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 936
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 14 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall file a joint status report addressing these topics.

Dated this 2nd day of December, 2016.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 173 Filed: 02/13/18 Page: 1 of 5 PageID #: 2775
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

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No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiffs in this putative class action claim that they have been jailed by Defendant, the City of Ferguson (the “City”), on numerous occasions because they were unable to pay cash bonds or other debts owed to the City resulting from their traffic and other minor offenses. Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of the United States Constitution and as a matter of the City’s policies and practices, they were not afforded counsel, any inquiry into their ability to pay, or a neutral finding of probable cause in a prompt manner; and they were held in jail indefinitely, in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, until they or their friends or family members could make a monetary payment sufficient to satisfy the City. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts seven claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The City moves to dismiss, on sovereign immunity grounds, all claims in Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint except the claim relating to conditions of confinement (Count IV). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the City’s motion. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s allegations

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 173 Filed: 02/13/18 Page: 2 of 5 PageID #: 2776
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard “simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in plaintiff’s favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). A court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” and consider the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
This is the third motion to dismiss filed by the City, and this motion asserts arguments similar to the ones raised in a prior motion (ECF No. 57), but reframes them in terms of sovereign immunity. In short, the City argues that Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges are directed to the conduct of the municipal court only, and that, therefore, their claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity doctrine because the municipal court is an arm of the state under Missouri law. As the undersigned has held in this case, and as other judges in this District have held with respect to nearly identical complaints and motions to dismiss, the complaint here alleges that the challenged conduct was and is driven by policies and practices implemented by the City for the purpose of increasing revenue. In addition to conduct undertaken by the municipal court, the
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Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 173 Filed: 02/13/18 Page: 3 of 5 PageID #: 2777
complaint alleges that the City’s unlawful policies and practices are executed through its clerk, police department, and city attorney, all of whom act under the authority of the city council. Thus, the complaint sufficiently claims that Plaintiffs were subjected to unlawful conduct carried out pursuant to the unconstitutional policies and practices of the City, which is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection. See, e.g., ECF No. 79; Webb v. City of Maplewood, Mo., No. 4:16-CV-1703 CDP, 2017 WL 2418011, at *6 (E.D. Mo. June 5, 2017); Baker v. City of Florissant, No. 4:16-CV-1693 NAB, 2017 WL 6316736, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2017).
The City’s argument that the doctrines of absolute judicial, prosecutorial, and quasi-judicial immunity bar Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims likewise fails. Although the City attempts to limit potential liability to individual actors, such as the municipal judge, court clerk, prosecutor, and police officers to whom these immunity doctrines may apply, the amended complaint alleges that it was the City’s unconstitutional policies, practices, and procedures that drove the unlawful conduct. Unlike government officials, municipalities do not enjoy absolute or qualified immunity from constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980)).
Finally, the City correctly asserts that, where a plaintiff brings his § 1983 claims under a theory of municipal liability based on the decision of an official responsible for establishing final policy, the identification of the final policymaker “is itself a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury.”
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Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 173 Filed: 02/13/18 Page: 4 of 5 PageID #: 2778
Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza Civic Ctr., 847 F.3d 941, 946 (8th Cir. 2017). But even if identification of the policymaker is ultimately required in this case based on the theories of municipal liability asserted, the Court does not believe that it is required at this stage. See, e.g., Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that “not all theories of municipal liability under § 1983 require (or depend on) a single final policymaker,” and identification of a final policymaker is not required at the pleading stage, provided that the complaint sufficiently alleges “a policy, practice, or custom of the City” that caused the constitutional violation).
In light of the extensive briefing submitted on these issues, the Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s corrected motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, and motion for a hearing, are both DENIED. ECF Nos. 150 & 165. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay previously entered is lifted, and, no later than seven days from the date of this Memorandum and Order, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, which addresses the filing deadline and briefing schedule for any motion for class certification; the parties’ positions concerning the referral of this action to mediation and when such a referral would be most productive; and any other appropriate deadlines and dates in the current Case Management Order, including a proposed trial date.
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Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 173 Filed: 02/13/18 Page: 5 of 5 PageID #: 2779
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the current trial setting of April 9, 2018, is VACATED, to be reset as appropriate in accordance with the parties’ joint proposed scheduling plan.

Dated this 13th day of February, 2018.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 2017 WL 3392073 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.
Keilee FANT, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The CITY OF FERGUSON, Defendant.
No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF |
Signed 08/07/2017
Attorneys and Law Firms
Alexander G. Karakatsanis, Civil Rights Corps., Margaret Jane Spicer, Sonia Williams Murphy, Vivake Prasad, White and Case, Washington, DC, Andrew Ernest Tomback, Alice Tsier, Dorian K. Panchyson, Lawrence Crane Moscowitz, White and Case, New York, NY, Brendan D. Roediger, John J. Ammann, St. Louis University School of Law, Michael-John Voss, Thomas B. Harvey, Blake Alexander Strode, Edward James Hall, Nathaniel Richard Carroll, Archcity Defenders, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.
Jessica Lynn Diamond, Peter J. Dunne, Robert T. Plunkert, Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C., Aarnarian (Apollo) D. Carey, Ronald A. Norwood, Lewis Rice, LLC, Maurice B. Graham, Gray and Ritter, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 111) to disqualify defense counsel, Peter J. Dunne, Robert T. Plunkert, Jessica L. Diamond,1 and their law firm of Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C. (collectively, “the Pitzer firm”), based on a conflict of interest. The motion to disqualify arises from the Pitzer firm’s hiring of attorney Ryan McGinty, who previously represented Plaintiffs in municipal matters giving rise to the current litigation.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that the Pitzer firm has a conflict of interest under the applicable rules of professional conduct, and is accordingly prohibited from representing Defendant, the City of Ferguson (the “City”), in this matter. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion. Although the City is also represented by other attorneys, from the law firm of Lewis Rice LLC, the Court will stay these proceedings for another 21 days to allow the City time to obtain new counsel if it so desires.
BACKGROUND
The 11 named Plaintiffs in this putative class action assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising out of the City’s policies and practices of jailing individuals for failure to pay money owed from traffic and other municipal offenses. Plaintiffs filed suit on February 8, 2015, represented by attorneys from, among other organizations, ArchCity Defenders.
McGinty was employed as an attorney with ArchCity Defenders from approximately March 5, 2012, through January 5, 2017, first as a contract attorney and, beginning in January or February 2015, as a full-time staff attorney. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that McGinty represented at least four of the 11 named Plaintiffs during this time in matters in the City’s municipal court, including the particular municipal matters giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case.
McGinty has submitted an affidavit attesting that he did “provide some services to individuals who were clients of ArchCity Defenders, Inc. in connection with citations they received from the City of Ferguson,” but that “those services did not involve, directly working on the filing or pursuit of [this] class action or any other class actions against the City of Ferguson.” ECF No. 128-3. McGinty’s affidavit does not name the individuals he represented while employed at ArchCity Defenders or further describe the services he provided.
On March 2, 2015, the Pitzer firm entered its appearance on behalf of the City, and it has represented the City since that time. In November and December of 2016, additional attorneys from Lewis Rice LLC, also entered appearances on behalf of the City.
McGinty was hired by the Pitzer firm on April 6, 2017, and his first day of employment was April 17, 2017. The

Pitzer firm has presented evidence that, to date, McGinty has been employed exclusively in the firm’s asbestos litigation group, a practice group “totally separate” from the municipal practice group in which Dunne and Plunkert are employed and which has been handling this putative class action.
*2 On April 18, 2017, Plaintiffs learned that the Pitzer firm hired McGinty.2 The next day, during a deposition of two of the named Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked Plunkert whether McGinty had been hired by the Pitzer firm, and Plunkert confirmed McGinty’s hiring. On April 25, 2017, Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Dunne about the potential conflict of interest resulting from McGinty’s hiring. According to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Dunne did not respond. But Plaintiffs’ counsel conferred with Plunkert by telephone on April 25, 2017, and with another representative of the Pitzer firm by email in early May 2017. Plunkert and the other representative informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that they did not believe a conflict existed with respect to the hiring of McGinty.
The Pitzer firm has presented evidence that, on April 25, 2017, when Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Dunne about the potential conflict regarding McGinty, the Pitzer firm implemented an “ethical wall” (sometimes called a “Chinese wall”) by which McGinty was “totally excluded” from accessing the files related to this case and any other suit filed by ArchCity Defenders against the City. ECF No. 128-2. The ethical wall was not implemented until eight days after McGinty’s first day of employment at the Pitzer firm.
The Pitzer firm has also presented evidence that its computer records show that McGinty had “not accessed nor attempted to access any of the [City’s] files” before or after the ethical wall was implemented. Id. And McGinty and Dunne have both attested by affidavit that McGinty has never discussed the instant case with any member of the Pitzer firm and that McGinty has fully maintained the confidentiality of any information learned or obtained by him while working for ArchCity Defenders.
No written consent or waiver has been sought from or provided by Plaintiffs with respect to the Pitzer firm’s representation of the City. Plaintiffs filed this motion to disqualify on June 7, 2017. Plaintiffs argue that the Pitzer firm’s representation of the City violates the Missouri Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by this Court, because McGinty would be prohibited from representing the City, and McGinty’s conflict must be imputed to the entire Pitzer firm.
The City responds3 that the ethical wall the Pitzer firm

created eliminates any possibility of a conflict of interest and that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof of showing that disqualification is warranted. In reply, Plaintiffs argue that Missouri does not recognize ethical walls as a method of avoiding this type of conflict of interest, and that in any event, the ethical wall here was insufficient to protect Plaintiffs’ confidentiality because it was not erected until eight days after McGinty began work at the Pitzer firm.
On June 23, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to stay all proceedings until the Court ruled on this motion to disqualify. ECF No. 129.
DISCUSSION
“The decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify an attorney rests in the discretion of the district court.” Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1154 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). While district courts are generally “encourage[d] ... to strictly enforce the [applicable] Code of Professional Responsibility,” Central Milk Producers Co-op. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 1978), motions to disqualify are “subjected to particular scrutiny” because of the potential for abuse by opposing counsel. Macheca Transp. Co. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 463 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The party moving for disqualification bears the burden of showing that continuing representation would be impermissible. See A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 859 (8th Cir. 1995). “However, because courts also have the duty to maintain public confidence in the legal profession and to ensure the integrity of judicial proceedings, any legitimate doubts must be resolved in favor of disqualification.” Process Controls Int’l, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt., No. 4:10CV645 CDP, 2011 WL 1791714, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 10, 2011) (citations omitted); see also Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1978).
*3 This Court has adopted the Missouri Supreme Court’s Rules of Professional Conduct. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 12.02. Two rules are relevant here. Rule 4-1.9(a) governs the duties an attorney owes to former clients:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in

which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Rule 4-1.10(a) governs the imputation of an attorney’s conflict to his law firm:
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 4-1.7 or 4-1.9[.]4
Applying these rules, the Court will consider, first, whether McGinty “would be” prohibited from representing the City in this case, and second, if so, whether McGinty’s conflict must be imputed to the Pitzer firm.
McGinty’s Conflict: Rule 4-1.9(a) Rule 4-1.9(a) is “prophylactic, aimed at “preventing even the potential that a former client’s confidences and secrets may be used against him.” Zerger & Mauer LLP v. City of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477, 493 (Mo. 2002)). The rule “does not require the former client to show that actual confidences were disclosed.” In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d at 494 (citation omitted). Rather, the “primary concern is the possibility, or appearance of the possibility, that the attorney may have received confidential information during the prior representation.” Zerger & Mauer LLP, 751 F.3d at 932 (citing In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d at 492 n.14).
To establish a conflict of interest under Rule 4-1.9(a), a movant must prove: “(1) the attorney had a former attorney-client relationship with the movant; (2) the interests of the attorney’s current client are materially adverse to the movant’s interests; and (3) the current representation involves the same or a substantially related matter as the attorney’s former representation of the movant.” Id. at 932 (citation omitted).
There is no dispute with respect to the first and second elements. The Court finds, and McGinty has not disputed, that McGinty had an attorney-client relationship with at least four of the named Plaintiffs in the municipal matters giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims in this case against the City, and the City’s interests are materially adverse to Plaintiffs’ interests.

Regarding the third element, neither McGinty nor the City has contested that this case and the municipal matters in which McGinty represented Plaintiffs are “substantially related.” Given that Plaintiffs’ claims in this case arise directly from, and are based on the City’s conduct in, the municipal matters, the Court concludes that a substantial relationship exists. See Rule 4–1.9 cmt. [3] (noting that “[m]atters are ‘substantially related’ ... if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter,” and that, for example, “a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations”); In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d at 494-95 (listing among non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether a substantial relationship exists, whether the case “involved the same client and the matters or transactions in question are relatively interconnected,” and whether “common subject matter, issues, and causes of action existed”). Therefore, McGinty would be prohibited from representing the City here.
Imputation of McGinty’s Conflict to the Pitzer Firm: Rule 4-1.10(a) *4 A literal reading of Rule 4-1.10(a) precludes any of the Pitzer firm’s lawyers from representing the City because McGinty alone “would be prohibited from doing so” by Rule 4-1.9(a). See Rule 4-1.10(a). The “premise” of Rule 4-1.10(a) is “that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client [and] that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated.” Rule 4-1.10 cmt. [2].
Neither the text of the rule nor any comment thereto indicates that an ethical wall or screen would alter the rule’s application. Indeed, the only time a wall or screen is mentioned is in Comment [4] to the rule, which states that the rule does not apply “where the person prohibited from involvement in the matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary,” but that “[s]uch persons ... ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect.” Rule 4-1.10 cmt. [4] (emphasis added). This comment does not suggest that a wall or screen would limit the

imputation of a lawyer’s conflict to his firm.

Likewise, although there is not a wealth of caselaw

addressing this issue in Missouri or the Eighth Circuit, the

caselaw in this district and the informal advisory opinions

of the Missouri Bar Association’s Legal Ethics Counsel

that have addressed the issue have held or stated that an

ethical wall does not eliminate the conflict of interest. See

E. Maine Baptist Church v. Regions Bank, No.

405-CV-962 CAS, 2007 WL 3022220, at *4 (E.D. Mo.

Oct. 12, 2007) (relying in part on the Missouri Bar

Association’s informal advisory ethics opinions and

holding that a lawyer’s conflict under Rule 4-1.9(a), with

respect to his former representation of a group of

defendants, prohibited his new law firm from representing

the plaintiffs in the same case, notwithstanding that the

lawyer was separated by an ethical wall from any

involvement in the case at his new firm); see also Mo.

Informal Advisory Op. Nos. 20060003 (“[S]creening does

not avoid the application of Rule 4-1.10, although it

sometimes facilitates persuading the former client to

waive the conflict”), 20050030 (same), 20030007 (same),

and

20020006

(same),

available

at

http://www.mobar.org/ethics/informalopinions.htm.

Although these authorities are not binding, they persuade

the Court that the ethical wall erected by the Pitzer firm

does not eliminate the firm’s imputed conflict of interest.

The cases cited by the City do not persuade the Court to hold otherwise. Indeed, one of the few Eighth Circuit cases cited by the City actually supports Plaintiffs’ arguments. In Central Milk Producers Co-op., 573 F.2d at 993, the Eighth Circuit, applying similar, but not identical, disciplinary rules under the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility, for lawyers moving from public to private employment, held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify a law firm based on the conflict of interest of one of its attorneys where the attorney had been screened from involvement in the case at issue.

The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that “a literal reading” of the applicable rules prohibited the firm from the representation, but the appellate court relied on certain unique circumstances in that case to uphold the district court’s denial of the motion to disqualify. Id. at 992-93. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit noted that the movants “not only waited more than two years after they knew [the conflicted attorney] had been hired to formally raise the issue, but they specifically approved the arrangement followed by [the firm] with respect to screening [the conflicted attorney] from the case.” Id. at 992 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to disqualify but cautioned as

follows:
*5 Although we have determined that disqualification was not required in this case, our opinion should not be construed as an approval of the practice involved in this case which necessitates a probe of the outer limits of what constitutes permissible professional conduct. If the motion to disqualify had been timely filed when [the conflicted attorney] first joined the [ ] firm, this court may have reached a different result.
Id. at 993. Plaintiffs here have neither delayed moving to disqualify nor approved the screening procedures erected by the Pitzer firm, placing this case firmly outside Central Milk’s “outer limit” of permissible professional conduct.5
The City also argues that a “burden-shifting” framework should apply here, whereby Plaintiffs bear an “initial burden” of raising a presumed conflict by “showing receipt of relevant confidences,” and the Pitzer firm has an opportunity to rebut that presumption by contesting the facts relied upon by Plaintiffs or showing that counsel did not in fact share confidential information. ECF No. 128 at 5-6. However, the only case cited by the City in support of such a framework, Polish Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Parish v. Hettenbach, 303 S.W.3d 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), did not address the question of imputation of an attorney’s conflict of interest to his law firm under Rule 4-1.10(a). In Hettenbach, the Missouri Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether an attorney’s conflict of interest should be imputed to a separate firm with which he entered a “co-counsel relationship” by way of a “Joint Litigation Agreement.” Id. at 599, 604. Unlike Rule 4-1.10(a), the applicable rules of professional conduct did not automatically mandate imputation in such a case. Rather, imputation was only “required when the attorney, through his or her relationship with co-counsel, was in a position to receive relevant confidences regarding the party seeking disqualification,” making a rebuttable presumption test appropriate. Id. at 604. Hettenbach is therefore entirely distinguishable, and from the Court’s review, no binding or factually similar persuasive authority has applied such a test to the question of imputation under Rule 4-1.10(a).
Other Considerations Relevant to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify

Plaintiffs filed this motion to disqualify shortly after learning of the conflict of interest and after attempting to confer with the Pitzer firm regarding the same, convincing the Court that Plaintiffs are not using disqualification merely as a strategy to deprive the City of its choice of counsel. See Hettenbach, 303 S.W.3d at 599 (“[A] motion to disqualify should be made with reasonable promptness after the party becomes aware of the conflict to prevent the party from using disqualification as a strategic tool to deprive his opponent of counsel of his choice after substantial preparation has been completed.”) (citation omitted).
*6 Moreover, the City is represented by other attorneys from another well-respected firm, and to ease potential prejudice to the City, the Court will stay this matter for another 21 days to allow the City time to obtain new counsel if desired. Finally, although the Court does not lightly enter this decision to partially deprive the City of its choice of counsel, the Court has a duty “to maintain public confidence in the legal profession and to ensure the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Process Controls, 2011 WL 1791714, at *6. Given the clear conflict of interest under the applicable rules of professional conduct, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Peter J. Dunne, Robert T. Plunkert, Jessica L. Diamond, and the law firm of Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C., from representing Defendant in this matter is GRANTED. ECF No. 111.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay currently in place shall continue for another 21 days, to allow Defendant time to obtain new counsel, if it so desires.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 28 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, including an appropriate deadline to complete any outstanding depositions of the named Plaintiffs and any necessary amendment to the briefing schedule for Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the current Case Management Order.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2017 WL 3392073

Footnotes

1

Diamond entered her appearance on July 20, 2017, after this motion was fully briefed. But the Court deems Plaintiffs’

motion applicable to all attorneys employed by Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C.

2

Plaintiffs’ counsel learned of McGinty’s hiring through “word of mouth” from individuals who remained in contact with

McGinty. ECF No. 111-1.

3

The City’s response was filed by the law firm of Gray, Ritter & Graham, P.C., which has entered an appearance on

behalf of the Pitzer firm for the sole purpose of responding to the issues raised in Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify.

4

Rule 4-1.10(a) is subject to an exception not applicable here, regarding conflicts based on a “personal interest” of the

prohibited lawyer that do not implicate questions of client loyalty or protection of confidential information. Comment [3]

to the rule suggests that the exception applies where, for example “one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent

a given client because of strong political beliefs, ... but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs

of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm.” Rule 4-1.10 cmt. [3].

5

Moreover, as Plaintiffs correctly note, even in jurisdictions in which courts have suggested an ethical wall could be

effective, motions to disqualify have been granted when the wall was not in place immediately upon the conflicted

attorney’s hiring. See, e.g., Cobb Publ’g, Inc. v. Hearst Corp., 907 F. Supp. 1038, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (granting a

motion to disqualify where the screen between a conflicted attorney and his new law firm was not erected until 11 days

after the attorney began work at the new firm).

 
 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 189 Filed: 03/12/18 Page: 1 of 2 PageID #: 2877

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Ferguson’s motion (ECF No.

175) to stay all proceedings pending interlocutory appeal of this Court’s decision denying

its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity

(ECF No. 150). Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

The Court has carefully considered the arguments and legal authority presented by

the parties. Because Defendant’s motion to dismiss asserted a colorable claim to

immunity, and the Court cannot say that Defendant’s appeal is frivolous, the Court

concludes that a stay is appropriate. See, e.g., Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois,

123 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to stay all proceedings

pending interlocutory appeal is GRANTED. ECF No. 154.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than 14 days after resolution of

Defendant’s interlocutory appeal, the parties shall file a joint proposed scheduling plan for

the remainder of this litigation, which addresses the filing deadline and briefing schedule

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 189 Filed: 03/12/18 Page: 2 of 2 PageID #: 2878
for any motion for class certification; the parties’ positions concerning the referral of this action to mediation and when such a referral would be most productive; and any other appropriate deadlines and dates in the current Case Management Order, including a proposed trial date.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case shall be closed, for administrative purposes only, pending a resolution of the interlocutory appeal.

Dated this 12th day of March, 2018.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

 
 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 223 Filed: 03/05/19 Page: 1 of 4 PageID #: 2940

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON
Defendant

) ) ) Cause No.: 4:15-CV-00253-AGF ) ) ) ) ) )

THE CITY OF FERGUSON’S RULE 12(C) MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I THROUGH III AND V THROUGH VII FOR FAILURE TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY UNDER RULE 19

Defendant The City of Ferguson (hereafter “the City”) moves pursuant to Rule

12(c) that this Court dismiss Counts I through III and V through VII of the first

amended class action complaint (Doc. 53) of Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al. (hereafter

“Motorists”) for failure, under Rule 19, to join the municipal division of the Circuit

Court of St. Louis County (hereafter “the Court Division”) as an indispensable party

under Rule 19. The City further states the following:

1. Motorists have named the City as the sole defendant in this lawsuit.

2. Motorists have (wrongly) defined the City to include the Court Division.

3. In Counts I through III and V through VII, Motorists seek injunctive relief

that the City has no authority to give, as the City has no authority to compel the

Court Division or its officers to take any particular actions with regard to the Court

Division’s inherent powers.

1

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 223 Filed: 03/05/19 Page: 2 of 4 PageID #: 2941
4. In addition, Counts I through III and V through VII cannot be resolved without this Court necessarily determining whether the alleged wrongdoings were carried out on behalf of the City or on behalf of the Court Division.
5. Consequently, Motorists cannot obtain complete relief in this lawsuit absent the Court Division being joined to this lawsuit as a defendant, making the Court Division a required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(A).
6. For the same reasons, the Court Division necessarily has an interest in this lawsuit’s subject matter and cannot adequately defend that interest without it being joined as a defendant. This constitutes another reason why it is a required party to this lawsuit. Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(1).
7. But the Court Division cannot be joined to this case, as it is a sovereign entity immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
8. This immunity, combined with the other factors of Rule 19(b), renders the Court Division an indispensable party such that equity and good conscience require the dismissal of Counts I through III and V through VII.
9. The United States Supreme Court has been very clear about what must be done in precisely this situation: “A case may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to suit.” Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008) (emphasis added).
10. The Court in Pimentel went on to rule that “dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the interests of the absent sovereign.” See id. (emphasis added).
2

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 223 Filed: 03/05/19 Page: 3 of 4 PageID #: 2942
11. Indeed, a district court’s very consideration of the merits of a lawsuit in the absence of a required sovereign entity “is ‘itself an infringement on…sovereign immunity.’” Florida Wildlife Fed., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng.¸ 859 F.3d 1306, 1318 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 864-865 (2008)).
12. Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to resolve this matter now, prior to the filing of any motions for class certification or motions for summary judgment.
13. The City incorporates fully into this paragraph its memorandum in support of this motion filed contemporaneously with it, along with any and all subsequent supporting memoranda that may be filed.
Accordingly, the City moves for this Court to dismiss Counts I through III and V through VII for failure, under Rule 19, to join an indispensable party, and for any other relief that is just and proper.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ John M. Reeves John M. Reeves, #59634MO William A. Hellmich, #31182MO Blake D. Hill, #58926MO Jason S. Retter, #59638MO KING, KREHBIEL & HELLMICH, LLC, 2000 S. Hanley Road U.S. St. Louis, MO 63144 314-646-1110 – Phone 314-646-1122 – Fax Attorneys for Defendant
3

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 223 Filed: 03/05/19 Page: 4 of 4 PageID #: 2943 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed with the Court’s electronic filing system, with notice of case activity to be generated and sent electronically by the Clerk of said Court on the 5th day of March, 2019, to all counsel of record.
/s/ John M. Reeves
4

 
 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 204 Filed: 01/10/19 Page: 1 of 5 PageID #: 2900
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________
No. 18-1472 ___________________________ Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris; Anthony Kimble; Donyale Thomas; Shameika Morris; Daniel Jenkins; Ronnie Tucker; Tonya DeBerry, lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees,
v. City of Ferguson, Missouri, lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________ Submitted: September 28, 2018
Filed: January 10, 2019 ____________
Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. ____________
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Keilee Fant and ten others brought a putative class action against the City of Ferguson, alleging several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City moved to dismiss six of seven counts based on sovereign immunity. The district
Appellate Case: 18-1472 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2019 Entry ID: 4744276

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 204 Filed: 01/10/19 Page: 2 of 5 PageID #: 2901
court1 denied the motion, and the City seeks interlocutory review of this decision. Because the City disclaims any sovereign immunity for itself, and seeks only to invoke the sovereign immunity of a nonparty, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The six counts at issue stem from the City’s alleged detention of plaintiffs for their inability to pay traffic fines. The City’s motion to dismiss argued that sovereign immunity barred those claims because the alleged injuries are attributable to the Ferguson Municipal Court, which the City says is an arm of the State of Missouri. The district court denied the motion, concluding the City is not entitled to sovereign immunity, and that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that the plaintiffs’ injuries are attributable to the City.
Given that the litigation continues in the district court, the parties dispute whether there is a “final decision” over which this court has appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The City invokes the well-established principle that an order denying a claim of sovereign immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). That principle, however, does not apply where the party appealing disclaims any immunity of its own and instead seeks to invoke the immunity of a nonparty. Sovereign immunity protects certain entities against the indignity of suit and the burdens of litigation, see id. at 143-44, 146, but this justification for an exception to the final order rule is inapplicable where the claimed sovereign is not a party to the action. The City here does not claim an immunity of its own and instead asserts immunity of the Ferguson Municipal Court. The municipal court is not a party to the action, and we lack jurisdiction on this appeal to
1The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
-2-
Appellate Case: 18-1472 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/10/2019 Entry ID: 4744276

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 204 Filed: 01/10/19 Page: 3 of 5 PageID #: 2902
address any potential claim of immunity by the municipal court that might arise in future litigation.
The City points out that this court exercised jurisdiction in Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483 (8th Cir. 2018), where a city claimed sovereign immunity on the ground that a municipal court—allegedly an arm of the State—was the real party in interest. Id. at 485-86. In Webb, however, the city asserted its own alleged sovereign immunity. We exercised jurisdiction to determine whether there was merit to the city’s claim that it was immune from suit. Here, by contrast, the City does not assert sovereign immunity of its own.
For these reasons, the City’s interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The City’s motion for judicial notice and conditional motion to remand are denied.
______________________________
-3-
Appellate Case: 18-1472 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/10/2019 Entry ID: 4744276

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 204 Filed: 01/10/19 Page: 4 of 5 PageID #: 2903

Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court

United States Court of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit
Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse 111 South 10th Street, Room 24.329
St. Louis, Missouri 63102

VOICE (314) 244-2400 FAX (314) 244-2780
www.ca8.uscourts.gov

January 10, 2019

Mr. John M. Reeves KING & KREHBIEL 2000 S. Hanley Road Saint Louis, MO 63144-1524
RE: 18-1472 Keilee Fant, et al v. City of Ferguson, MO
Dear Counsel:
The court has issued an opinion in this case. Judgment has been entered in accordance with the opinion. The opinion will be released to the public at 10:00 a.m. today. Please hold the opinion in confidence until that time.
Please review Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Eighth Circuit Rules on postsubmission procedure to ensure that any contemplated filing is timely and in compliance with the rules. Note particularly that petitions for rehearing and petitions for rehearing en banc must be received in the clerk's office within 14 days of the date of the entry of judgment. Counsel-filed petitions must be filed electronically in CM/ECF. Paper copies are not required. No grace period for mailing is allowed, and the date of the postmark is irrelevant for pro-se-filed petitions. Any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc which is not received within the 14 day period for filing permitted by FRAP 40 may be denied as untimely.
Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court
JMM Enclosure(s) cc: Mr. John J. Ammann
Mr. Nathaniel R Carroll Mr. Peter J. Dunne Mr. Mauricio Alfredo Gonzalez Mr. William A. Hellmich Mr. Alexander G. Karakatsanis Mr. Gregory J. Linhares Mr. Ronald Alan Norwood Mr. Blake A. Strode Mr. Andrew E. Tomback Ms. Alice Tsier
District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 4:15-cv-00253-AGF

Appellate Case: 18-1472 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2019 Entry ID: 4744276

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 204 Filed: 01/10/19 Page: 5 of 5 PageID #: 2904

Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court

United States Court of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit
Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse 111 South 10th Street, Room 24.329
St. Louis, Missouri 63102

VOICE (314) 244-2400 FAX (314) 244-2780
www.ca8.uscourts.gov

January 10, 2019

West Publishing Opinions Clerk 610 Opperman Drive Building D D4-40 Eagan, MN 55123-0000
RE: 18-1472 Keilee Fant, et al v. City of Ferguson, MO
Dear Sirs:
A published opinion was filed today in the above case.
Counsel who appeared on the brief and presented argument on behalf of the appellant was John M. Reeves, of Saint Louis, MO.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Alice Tsier, of New York, NY. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; John J. Ammann, of Saint Louis, MO., Mauricio Alfredo Gonzalez, of San Francisco, CA., Nathaniel R Carroll, of Clayton, MO., Blake A. Strode, of Saint Louis, MO., Alexander G. Karakatsanis, of Washington, DC., Andrew E. Tomback, Alice Tsier, Martin B. Sawyer, Larry C. Moscowitz, James C. Robinson and Dorian Panchyson all of New York, NY.
The judge who heard the case in the district court was Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig. The judgment of the district court was entered on February 13, 2018.
If you have any questions concerning this case, please call this office.
Michael E. Gans Clerk of Court
JMM
Enclosure(s)
cc: MO Lawyers Weekly

District Court/Agency Case Number(s): 4:15-cv-00253-AGF

Appellate Case: 18-1472 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/10/2019 Entry ID: 4744276

 
 Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 1 of 7 PageID #: 3471
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KEILEE FANT, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE CITY OF FERGUSON,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

No. 4:15-CV-00253-AGF

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiffs in this putative class action claim that they have been jailed by Defendant, the City of Ferguson (the “City”), on numerous occasions because they were unable to pay cash bonds or other debts resulting from their traffic and other minor offenses. Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of the United States Constitution and as a matter of the City’s policies and practices, they were not afforded counsel, any inquiry into their ability to pay, or a neutral finding of probable cause in a prompt manner; and they were held in jail indefinitely, in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, until they or their friends or family members could make a monetary payment sufficient to satisfy the City, as part of a broad, revenue-generating scheme. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts seven claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. They seek compensatory damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moves to dismiss, for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, all claims in Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint except the claim relating

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 2 of 7 PageID #: 3472
to conditions of confinement (Count IV). This is the fourth motion to dismiss filed by the City in this now four-year-old case. This motion asserts arguments similar to those raised in prior motions but reframes them in terms of Rule 19. In short, the City argues that Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges are directed solely to the conduct of the Ferguson Municipal Court (the “municipal court”), which the City argues is a separate entity, and that the municipal court is therefore required to be joined as a co-defendant under Rule 19(a). But the City argues that joinder is not feasible because the municipal court is an arm of the state under Missouri law and, as such, entitled to sovereign immunity. The City contends that because there is a potential for injury to the interests of the municipal court and because the municipal court is immune from suit, dismissal of the claims at issue is required under Rule 19(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the City’s motion.
DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) permits dismissal of a claim for failure to join a party under Rule 19. Rule 19, in turn, sets forth a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the absent person’s presence is “required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). Joinder is required when: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or
2

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 3 of 7 PageID #: 3473
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). “[T]he focus of Rule 19(a)(1) is on relief between the parties and not on the speculative possibility of further litigation between a party and an absent person.” Cedar Rapids Bank & Tr. Co. v. Mako One Corp., 919 F.3d 529, 534–35 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). When joinder is not required under Rule 19(a), “the inquiry is at an end, and the motion to dismiss for failure to join the party in question must be denied.” Rochester Methodist Hosp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 1006, 1016 (8th Cir. 1984). If joinder is required but not feasible, the Court must proceed to the second step and “determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed,” considering several enumerated factors. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Factors to consider include (1) the extent to which a judgment in the required person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which such prejudice could be lessened or avoided by protective provisions or otherwise shaping the relief to be granted; (3) the adequacy of a judgment rendered in the person’s absence; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In analyzing these factors in the context of a claim of sovereign immunity, the Court must give sufficient weight to the sovereign status of the absent person, which “in some instances, [will mean] that the plaintiffs will be left without a forum for definitive resolution of their claims.” Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 872 (2008).
3

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 4 of 7 PageID #: 3474
The Rule 19 inquiry is a “highly-practical, fact-based endeavor,” and courts are “generally reluctant to grant motions to dismiss of this type.” Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., 786 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2015). “A decision under Rule 19 not to decide a case otherwise properly before the court is a power to be exercised only in rare instances.” Nanko Shipping, USA v. Alcoa, Inc., 850 F.3d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
The Court concludes that the municipal court (perhaps more properly referenced as the municipal division) is not a required party under Rule 19(a). Rule 19(a)(1)(A)’s condition that a court be able to accord complete relief “does not mean that every type of relief sought must be available, only that meaningful relief be available.” Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). Here, the Court is able to accord meaningful relief to Plaintiffs without joinder of the municipal court. Plaintiffs seek money damages from the City, a declaration that the City violated their constitutional rights, and an injunction enjoining the City from enacting and enforcing its allegedly unlawful policies and customs. The Court may provide such relief to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims prove to be viable and meritorious. The City’s argument that the municipal court, and not the City, caused the alleged constitutional violations may be a reason to deny relief on Plaintiffs’ claims,1 but it does not support a
1 Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of arrests dating back to 2010. Although the City cites to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.04, governing supervision of courts hearing ordinance violations, in support of its argument, the current version of that Rule was not adopted until 2016. The 2016 amendment required, for the first time, that municipal courts operate in substantial compliance with certain minimum operating standards, which were not made effective until July 1, 2017. See Mo. S. Ct. R. 37.04 & 37.04 app. A (amended Sept. 20, 2016, eff. July 1, 2017). Moreover, although the City argues that
4

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 5 of 7 PageID #: 3475
finding under Rule 19(a)(1) that joinder of the municipal court is required. See, e.g., Gwartz v. Jefferson Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 23 F.3d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Whether the asserted facts support claims other than the ones before the court or whether the complaint here adequately states [the plaintiffs’] claims . . . are not the issues under Rule 19(a)(1).”).
Likewise, under Rule 19(a)(1)(B), even assuming that the municipal court has an interest relating to the subject of the action, disposition of the action in the municipal court’s absence will not as a practical matter impair or impede the municipal court’s ability to protect its interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). In support of its argument to the contrary, the City relies primarily on the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Two Shields v. Wilkinson, 790 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2015). In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that the named defendants induced an absent sovereign, the United States, to breach its fiduciary duty by approving leases for interests in land held in trust. Id. at 792-93. In other words, in order to prevail on their claims against the named defendants, the plaintiffs were required to prove that the absent sovereign acted illegally. Id. at 796. A judgment entered in the sovereign’s absence would thus “potentially cloud the validity of many of the land grants approved by the government.” Id. For this reason, the Eighth Circuit found that the United States’ ability to protect its interest would be impaired or impeded by its absence from the litigation. Id. at 797.
Plaintiffs’ allegations concern solely municipal court functions, Plaintiffs also allege, for example, that the City’s chief of police negotiated cash payments from Plaintiffs directly in exchange for their release from jail, without the involvement of the municipal court. E.g., ECF No. 53 ¶¶ 29-30.
5

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 6 of 7 PageID #: 3476
By contrast, here, none of Plaintiffs’ claims requires a showing that the municipal
court acted illegally. Rather, for Plaintiffs to succeed on their claims, they must
demonstrate that the City acted unlawfully.2 See Fochtman v. Darp, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-
5047, 2018 WL 3148113, at *6–7 (W.D. Ark. June 27, 2018) (distinguishing Two Shields
on this ground and holding that an absent sovereign’s more remote interest in the
outcome of a case was insufficient to require joinder).
Nor would the municipal court’s absence subject the City to a substantial risk of
incurring double or otherwise inconsistent obligations. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(1)(B)(ii). The City’s own argument supports such a holding. The City asserts
that, as a matter of law, it cannot be held liable for the municipal court’s conduct. If the
City is correct, and if the actions complained of were caused by the municipal court, then
as explained above, Plaintiffs’ claims may fail on the merits. But resolution of these
issues does not require the municipal court’s joinder. See Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1430.
Because the municipal court is not a required party under Rule 19(a), the Court need not
address whether dismissal is required under Rule 19(b). The City’s motion must be
denied. In light of the extensive briefing submitted on these issues, oral argument is
unnecessary.
2 The other cases relied upon by the City are even more readily distinguishable. Pimentel was an interpleader action in which the parties conceded that the absent sovereign claiming an interest in the assets at issue was a required party under Rule 19(a). 553 U.S. at 864. And Ray v. Judicial Corrections Services, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02819RDP, 2017 WL 660842 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2017) and McMillian v. Johnson, No. CV93-A-699-N, 1994 WL 904652 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 1994), were not Rule 19 cases at all but involved motions for summary judgment and to dismiss for failure to state a claim, respectively, which are more appropriate vehicles for resolving merits arguments like the ones the City raises.
6

Case: 4:15-cv-00253-AGF Doc. #: 261 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 7 of 7 PageID #: 3477
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I through III and V through VII, and motion for a hearing, are both DENIED. ECF Nos. 223 & 226.

Dated this 6th day of August, 2019.

_______________________________ AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7

 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________________ No: 19-2939
___________________ Keilee Fant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Roelif Carter; Allison Nelson; Herbert Nelson, Jr.; Alfred Morris; Anthony Kimble; Donyale Thomas; Shameika
Morris; Daniel Jenkins; Ronnie Tucker Plaintiffs - Appellees
Tonya DeBerry Plaintiff
John R. Narayan, personal representative of the estate of Tony DeBerry, Deceased Plaintiff - Appellee v.
City of Ferguson, Missouri Defendant - Appellant
______________________________________________________________________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis (4:15-cv-00253-AGF)
______________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT
Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction is granted. Appellant's motion to stay proceedings in the district court is denied as moot.
October 10, 2019

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court: Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. ____________________________________
/s/ Michael E. Gans

 
 ADR,ADRC,PROTO,REOPEN,TRCK3
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:15−cv−00253−AGF

Fant et al v. Ferguson, Missouri, City of Assigned to: District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Keilee Fant individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Date Filed: 02/08/2015 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 1601 Connecticut Avenue N.W. Suite 800 Washington, DC 20009 202−681−2409 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Andrew Ernest Tomback WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8200 Fax: 212−354−8113 Email: andrew.tomback@whitecase.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brendan D. Roediger ST LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 100 N. Tucker Blvd. Suite 701 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−977−2778 Fax: 314−977−1180 Email: broedige@slu.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John J. Ammann ST LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 100 N. Tucker Blvd. Suite 701 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−977−2778 Fax: 314−977−3334 Email: ammannjj@slu.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Marco Antonio Lopez Civil Rights Corps 910 17th St NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 202−844−4975 Fax: 202−609−8030 Email: marco@civilrightscorps.org

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855−724−2489 x1002 Fax: 855−925−1307 Email: mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 1601 Connecticut Avenue N.W. Suite 800 Washington, DC 20009 202−844−4975 Fax: 202−609−8030 Email: ryan@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8487 Email: sniwa@whitecase.com TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey ADVANCEMENT PROJECT 1220 L. Street NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20005 314−482−3342 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: tharvey@archcitydefenders.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8200 Fax: 212−354−8113 Email: alice.tsier@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker WHITE AND CASE LLP − Miami 200 S. Biscayne Boulevard 4900 First Union Financial Center Miami, FL 33131 305−995−5297 Email: adaker@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Blake Alexander Strode ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855−724−2489 x1003 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: bstrode@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard WHITE AND CASE LLP − DC 701 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20005−3807 202−626−3666 Email: claire.leonard@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8902 Email: daudette@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8393 Fax: 212−354−8113 Email: dorian.panchyson@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 855−724−2489 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: e.j.hall89@gmail.com TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 786−281−8358 Email: glenda.dieuveille@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−361−8834 x1024 Fax: 314−925−1307

Email: jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−361−8834 x1021 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II WHITE AND CASE LLP − DC 701 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20005−3807 202−626−3618 Email: jonathanc.black@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8272 Fax: 212−354−8113 Email: larry.cranemoscowitz@whitecase.com TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim WHITE AND CASE LLP − Los Angeles 555 S. Flower Street Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−620−7749 Email: leonardo.kim@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang WHITE AND CASE LLP − Tokyo 26th Floor 1−8−3 Marunouchi Chiyoda−ku, Tokyo 100−0005 Tokyo Japan 8−136−384−3172 Email: li.jiang@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer WHITE AND CASE LLP − DC 701 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20005−3807 202−729−2310 Email: margaret.spicer@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8200 Email: martin.sawyer@whitecase.com TERMINATED: 03/11/2020

PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez WHITE AND CASE LLP − Los Angeles 555 S. Flower Street Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−620−7826 Email: mauricio.gonzalez@us.dlapiper.com TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven WHITE AND CASE LLP − Houston 1200 Smith Street Suite 2300 Houston, TX 77002 713−496−9700 Email: meredith.craven@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8325 Email: micaela.heery@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll KEANE LAW LLC 7777 Bonhomme Ave. Suite 1600 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−391−4700 Email: nathaniel@keanelawllc.com TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−8211 Email: sean.sigillito@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane WHITE AND CASE LLP − DC 701 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20005−3807 202−729−2464 Email: shannon.lane@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri ARCHCITY DEFENDERS 440 N. 4th St. Suite 390 St. Louis, MO 63102 314−461−8834 x2006 Fax: 314−925−1307 Email: satri@archcitydefenders.org TERMINATED: 02/03/2020

Plaintiff Roelif Carter

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy WHITE AND CASE LLP − DC 701 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20005−3807 202−637−6161 Fax: 202−639−9355 Email: sonia.murphy@whitecase.com TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Stephen M. Ryals THE RYALS LAW FIRM PC P.O. Box 11065 Ferguson, MO 63135 314−952−5393 Email: ryals@rblawstl.com TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Tara Mikkilineni CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 1601 Connecticut Avenue N.W. Suite 800 Washington, DC 20009 202−922−6470 Email: tara@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad WHITE AND CASE LLP − DC 701 13th St., NW Washington, DC 20005−3807 212−819−7614 Email: vivake.prasad@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev WHITE AND CASE LLP − Los Angeles 555 S. Flower Street Suite 2700 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−620−7841 Fax: 213−452−2329 Email: zaur.gajiev@whitecase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille

(See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Allison Nelson

Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Stephen M. Ryals (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE

Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address)

Plaintiff Herbert Nelson, Jr.

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff Alfred Morris

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy

Plaintiff Anthony Kimble

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address)

Plaintiff Donyale Thomas

PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address)

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Shameika Morris

Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address)

Plaintiff Daniel Jenkins

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020

Plaintiff Ronnie Tucker

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address)

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri

Plaintiff
Tonya DeBerry TERMINATED: 05/29/2019

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marco Antonio Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan Chasce Downer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE

Thomas B. Harvey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alice Tsier (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Alexander Strode (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dorian K. Panchyson (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Edward James Hall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/12/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Glenda Dieuveille (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John McCann Waldron (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence Crane Moscowitz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Jane Spicer (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE
Martin Bingham Sawyer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Mauricio A. Gonzalez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathaniel Richard Carroll (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sima Atri (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/03/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Williams Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 PRO HAC VICE
Stephen M. Ryals (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/04/2016
Tara Mikkilineni (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John R. Narayan personal representative of the estate of Tony DeBerry, Deceased

represented by Alexander G. Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew Ernest Tomback (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brendan D. Roediger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John J. Ammann (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael−John Voss (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Seiji Niwa (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/11/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
Angela Daker (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Claire Leonard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Danielle Marie Audette (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Clayton Black , II (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leonardo Kim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Li Jiang (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Meredith Francine Craven (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt

V. Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Martin Sigillito (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon Lane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Vivake Prasad WHITE AND CASE LLP − New York 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 212−819−7614 Email: vivake.prasad@whitecase.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zaur D. Gajiev (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jessica Lynn Diamond Jessica Diamond, Attorney at Law 3703 Watson Rd. St. Louis, MO 63109 314−610−8712 Email: jessdiamond@att.net TERMINATED: 08/07/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Michael Reeves , Jr. REEVES LAW LLC 3703 Watson Road Saint Louis, MO 63109 314−775−6985 Fax: 314−775−6985 Email: reeves@reeveslawstl.com TERMINATED: 04/20/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John P. Torbitzky BEHR AND MCCARTER PC 7777 Bonhomme Avenue Suite 1400 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−862−3800 Fax: 314−862−3953 Email: jtorbitzky@bmplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter J. Dunne PITZER SNODGRASS PC 100 S. Fourth Street Suite 400 St. Louis, MO 63102−1821

314−421−5545 Fax: 314−421−3144 Email: dunne@pspclaw.com TERMINATED: 08/07/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert T. Plunkert PITZER SNODGRASS PC 100 S. Fourth Street Suite 400 St. Louis, MO 63102−1821 314−335−1306 Fax: 314−421−5545 Email: plunkert@pspclaw.com TERMINATED: 08/07/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy J. Reichardt BEHR AND MCCARTER PC 7777 Bonhomme Avenue Suite 1400 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−862−3800 Fax: 314−862−3953 Email: treichardt@bmplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Timothy William Rudolph BEHR AND MCCARTER PC 7777 Bonhomme Avenue Suite 1400 St. Louis, MO 63105 314−862−3800 Fax: 314−862−3953 Email: trudolph@bmplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William A. Hellmich HELLMICH HILL LLC 1049 N. Clay Ave. Kirkwood, MO 63122 314−646−1110 Fax: 314−646−1122 Email: Bill@hellmichhillretter.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aarnarian (Apollo) D. Carey LEWIS RICE LLC − St Louis 600 Washington Suite 2500 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−444−7788 Fax: 314−612−7788 Email: acarey@lewisrice.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Blake Daniel Hill HELLMICH HILL LLC 1049 N. Clay Ave. Kirkwood, MO 63122

314−646−1110 Fax: 314−646−1122 Email: Blake@hellmichhillretter.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey J. Brinker BRINKER AND DOYEN LLP 34 N. Meramec Ave. Fifth Floor Clayton, MO 63105 314−863−6311 Fax: 314−863−8197 Email: jbrinker@brinkerdoyen.com TERMINATED: 10/29/2018 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maurice B. Graham GRAY AND RITTER PC 701 Market Street Suite 800 St. Louis, MO 63101−1826 314−241−5620 Fax: 314−241−4140 Email: mgraham@grgpc.com TERMINATED: 09/23/2019
Michelle V. Stallings HELLMICH HILL LLC 1049 N. Clay Ave. Kirkwood, MO 63122 314−646−1110 Fax: 314−646−1122 Email: michelle@hellmichhillretter.com TERMINATED: 10/29/2018
Ronald A. Norwood LEWIS RICE LLC − St Louis 600 Washington Suite 2500 St. Louis, MO 63101 314−444−7759 Fax: 314−612−7759 Email: rnorwood@lewisrice.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/08/2015
02/08/2015 02/09/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against defendant All Defendants with receipt number 0865−4717478, in the amount of $400 Jury Demand,, filed by Anthony Kimble, Tonya DeBerry, Allison Nelson, Donyale Thomas, Daniel Jenkins, Roelif Carter, Shameika Morris, Keilee Fant, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Ronnie Tucker, Alfred Morris. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Original Filing Form, # 3 Summons, # 4 Notice of Process Server)(Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 02/08/2015)
2 NOTICE OF PROCESS SERVER by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker Process Server: Elizabeth Washam (JMC) (Main Document 2 replaced on 2/9/2015) (JMC). (Entered: 02/09/2015)
Case Opening Notification: 1 Summons(es) issued. The summons was emailed to ammannjj@slu.edu. All parties must file the Notice Regarding Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction Form (moed−0041.pdf) consenting to or opting out of the Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Judge Assigned: U.S. Magistrate Judge Shirley P. Mensah. (JMC) (Entered: 02/09/2015)

02/09/2015 02/18/2015
02/18/2015
03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/02/2015 03/03/2015 03/09/2015
03/09/2015
03/10/2015 03/16/2015 05/06/2015
05/22/2015
05/22/2015

Pursuant to Local Rule 2.08, the assigned/referred magistrate judge is designated and authorized by the court to exercise full authority in this assigned/referred action or matter under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636 and 18 U.S.C Sec. 3401. (CSAW) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
3 ENTRY of Appearance by John J. Ammann for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Ammann, John) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed filed by Anthony Kimble, Tonya DeBerry, Allison Nelson, Donyale Thomas, Daniel Jenkins, Roelif Carter, Shameika Morris, Keilee Fant, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Ronnie Tucker, Alfred Morris. Ferguson, Missouri, City of served on 2/9/2015, answer due 3/2/2015. (Ammann, John) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
5 CJRA ORDER (GJL). Judge Magistrate Judge Shirley P. Mensah termed. Case reassigned to Judge District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig for all further proceedings (JWD) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
6 ENTRY of Appearance by Peter J. Dunne for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
7 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
8 MOTION to Dismiss Case by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
9 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 8 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
10 ENTRY of Appearance by Robert T. Plunkert for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Plunkert, Robert) (Entered: 03/02/2015)
11 Docket Text ORDER Re: 7 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 3, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
12 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
13 RESPONSE in Opposition re 8 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
14 Docket Text ORDER Re: 12 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 10, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
15 REPLY to motion re 8 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) Modified on 3/17/2015 to change docket text (JWJ). (Entered: 03/16/2015)
16 RULE 16 ORDER This case is assigned to Track: 2 Joint Scheduling Plan due by 6/5/2015. Rule 16 Conference set for 6/12/2015 01:30 PM in Chambers before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. (See Order for Complete Details). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/6/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 05/06/2015)
17 ENTRY of Appearance by Michael−John archVoss for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (archVoss, Michael−John) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
18 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Telephone Conference regarding status of case and potential for settlement held on 5/22/2015. (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

05/26/2015
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07/13/2015
09/22/2015 09/30/2015 10/02/2015 10/19/2015 10/20/2015 12/11/2015

19 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of Fergusons motion to dismiss, or alternatively to strike or for a more definite statement, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. No. 8 .) The motion is GRANTED as follows: the words "First" and "Eighth" in Paragraph 16 of the complaint are STRICKEN; Count Five is DISMISSED; and Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim in Count Six is DISMISSED. Except as set forth above, the motion is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 5/26/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 05/26/2015)
20 MOTION for Reconsideration re 19 Memorandum & Order,, by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 06/01/2015)
21 RESPONSE in Opposition re 20 MOTION for Reconsideration re 19 Memorandum & Order,, filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 06/05/2015)
22 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. . (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 06/05/2015)
23 REPLY to Response to Motion re 20 MOTION for Reconsideration re 19 Memorandum & Order,, filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Karakatsanis, Alexander) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
24 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Ferguson, Missouri, City of.(Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 06/09/2015)
25 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Rule 16 Conference held on 6/12/2015. Conference held in person and via telepone as to attorney Alex Karakatsanis. CMO to issue. (FTR Gold: No.) (NEB) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
26 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER This case is assigned to Track: 3 Motion to Join Parties due by 9/24/2015. Discovery Completion due by 4/15/2016. Non−Dispositive Motions due by 4/26/2016. ADR Future Reference 1/29/2016. Dispositive Motions due by 5/19/2016. Jury Trial set for 10/11/2016 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Pretrial Compliance due by 9/21/2016. Motion in Limine due by 9/27/2016. (See Order for Complete Details). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/15/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
27 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 20 .) The Memorandum and Order dated May 26, 2015 (Doc. No. 19 ) is hereby amended as set forth above. Counts Five and Six of Plaintiffs' complaint are hereby reinstated, and the parties shall move forward on all claims in the complaint. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/13/15. (KXS) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
28 ENTRY of Appearance by Stephen M. Ryals for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant. (Ryals, Stephen) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
29 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Protective Order)(Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
30 CONSENT PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 2, 2015. (BRP) (Entered: 10/02/2015)
31 MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the following: Motion for Class Certification ;Proposed extension date January 18, 2016 by Plaintiff Keilee Fant. (Ryals, Stephen) (Entered: 10/19/2015)
32 Docket Text ORDER Re: 31 Motion for Extension of Time to File; Extension to file the following: Motion for Class Certification; Proposed extension date January 18, 2016 by Plaintiff Keilee Fant; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 20, 2015. (SAA) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
33 ENTRY of Appearance by Blake Alexander Strode for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Strode, Blake)

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(Entered: 12/11/2015)
34 MOTION for Extension of: Time for Expert Witness Certification by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
35 Amended MOTION for Extension of: Time for Expert Witness Certification by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 12/11/2015)
36 ORDER AMENDING CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for extension of time is GRANTED (Doc. No. 35 ), and the Case Management Order is hereby amended as follows: (a) Plaintiffs shall disclose all expert witnesses and shall provide the summaries and reports required by Rule 26(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., no later than January 11, 2016, and shall make expert witnesses available for depositions, and have depositions completed, no later than February 8, 2016. (b) Defendant shall disclose all expert witnesses and shall provide the summaries and reports required by Rule 26(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., no later than March 21, 2016, and shall make expert witnesses available for depositions, and have depositions completed, no later than April 18, 2016. (c) The parties shall complete all discovery in this case no later than April 22, 2016. Except as amended herein, the Case Management Order previously entered by the Court shall remain unchanged. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' previously filed motion for extension of time is DENIED as moot. (Doc. No. 34 .) ( Discovery Completion due by 4/22/2016.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/15/2015. (NEB) (Entered: 12/15/2015)
37 NOTICE Deposition: by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
***REMARK regarding Notice 37 : Pursuant to Rule 26 − 3.02; In civil actions, discovery and disclosure materials pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, and 36, and the certificates of their service, shall not be filed with the Court except as exhibits to a motion or memorandum. (See Local Rule 26−3.02 located on the court website.) (NEB) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
38 Consent MOTION to Amend/Correct Case Management Order by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
39 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sonia W. Murphy. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5209212) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing Murphy Certificate of Good Standing)(Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
40 Docket Text ORDER Re: 39 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sonia W. Murphy by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 12, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
41 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to amend the Case Management Order is GRANTED as follows (Doc. No. 38 ). (SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS) ( Discovery Completion due by 7/22/2016., Dispositive Motions due by 8/19/2016., Jury Trial set for 1/9/2017 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/12/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
42 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Alternative Dispute Resolution. This case is referred to: Mediation Designation of Lead Counsel: Brendan D. Roediger ADR Completion Deadline due by 3/31/2016. ADR Compliance Report Deadline due by 4/14/2016. Designation of Neutral/Conference Report due by 2/18/2016. (SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/29/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 01/29/2016)

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43 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Stephen M. Ryals by Plaintiff Keilee Fant. (Ryals, Stephen) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
44 Docket Text ORDER Re: 43 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Stephen M. Ryals by Plaintiff Keilee Fant; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 4, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 02/04/2016)
45 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation by Plaintiff Keilee Fant. (Roediger, Brendan) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
46 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 45 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Mediation, filed by Plaintiff Keilee Fant; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 20, 2016. (AGF) (Entered: 02/20/2016)
47 Designation of Neutral by parties and ADR Conference Report by Plaintiff Keilee Fant Neutral: Sher, Richard P. Date of Conference: April 21, 2016 time: 9:00 a.m. Location: 190 Carondelet Plaza, Ste. 1100, St. Louis, MO 63105(Roediger, Brendan) (Entered: 03/03/2016)
48 NOTICE of Appointment of Neutral. Neutral name: Sher, Richard P. Neutral selected by parties.(MCB) (Entered: 03/05/2016)
49 First MOTION for Extension of: Case Management Schedule by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
50 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to amend the Case Management Order is GRANTED as follows (Doc. No. 49): Discovery Completion due by 10/24/2016., Jury Trial set for 4/10/2017 08:30 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. (SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER DETAILS) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 12, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
51 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit First Amended Complaint − Redlined, # 2 Exhibit First Amended Complaint − Clean)(Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
52 Docket Text ORDER Re: 51 Consent Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 13, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
53 FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT against defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of Amendment to 1 Complaint, no Summons(es) issued, Waivers issued none, Consents issued none, Jury Demand,, filed by Anthony Kimble, Tonya DeBerry, Allison Nelson, Donyale Thomas, Daniel Jenkins, Roelif Carter, Shameika Morris, Keilee Fant, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Ronnie Tucker, Alfred Morris. Related document: 1 Complaint, filed by Roelif Carter, Ronnie Tucker, Daniel Jenkins, Alfred Morris, Donyale Thomas, Keilee Fant, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Tonya DeBerry, Anthony Kimble.(NEB) (Entered: 04/14/2016)
54 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
55 Docket Text ORDER Re: 54 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 22, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
56 ANSWER to 53 Amended Complaint,, by Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Red−lined Answer)(Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
57 MOTION to Dismiss :Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
58 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 57 MOTION to Dismiss :Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 04/27/2016)

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07/15/2016 10/10/2016

59 MOTION for Extension of Time to File ;Extension to file the following: Opposition to Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ;Proposed extension date May 18, 2016, MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
60 ADR COMPLIANCE REPORT by Neutral: Sher, Richard P.. Date of Conference: April 21, 2016. The parties participated in good faith. The parties did not achieve a settlement.(Sher, Richard) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
61 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 59 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Extension to file the Opposition to Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation, filed by Plaintiffs; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 16, 2016. (AGF) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
62 RESPONSE to Motion re 57 MOTION to Dismiss :Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Hall, Edward) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
63 ENTRY of Appearance by Edward James Hall for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Hall, Edward) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
64 REPLY to Response to Motion re 57 MOTION to Dismiss :Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
65 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY to Motion re 57 MOTION to Dismiss :Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sur−Reply)(Karakatsanis, Alexander) Modified docket text on 6/2/2016 (NEB). (Entered: 06/01/2016)
66 MOTION for Extension of: Time by Plaintiff Keilee Fant. (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
67 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 65 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY regarding 57 MOTION to Dismiss: Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint, filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 30, 2016. (AGF) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
68 SURREPLY to Motion re 57 MOTION to Dismiss :Partial Dismissal of First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (BRP) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
69 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs unopposed motion to amend the Case Management Order is GRANTED as follows (Doc. No. 66 ): (SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS) ( Discovery Completion due by 1/23/2017., Dispositive Motions due by 2/21/2017., Jury Trial set for 7/10/2017 09:00 AM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/5/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 07/05/2016)
70 ENTRY of Appearance by Nathaniel Richard Carroll for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
71 Joint MOTION to Stay by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 10/10/2016)

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11/18/2016 12/02/2016

72 Docket Text ORDER Re: 71 Joint Motion to Stay by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 11, 2016. (SAA) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
73 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)(Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
74 RESPONSE to Motion re 73 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex A, # 2 Exhibit Ex C, # 3 Exhibit Ex D, # 4 Exhibit Ex E, # 5 Exhibit Ex F, # 6 Exhibit Ex G, # 7 Exhibit Ex H, # 8 Exhibit Ex I)(Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
75 MOTION FOR ORDER PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502(d) by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
76 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 75 MOTION for Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Order Pursuant to FRE 502(d) filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
77 REPLY to Response to Motion re 73 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
78 REPLY to Response to Motion re 75 MOTION for Ruling on 502(d) Order filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 10/28/2016)
79 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is DENIED. (Doc. No. 57 .) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 15, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
80 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) is GRANTED in part, to the extent that the Court will separately enter a Rule 502(d) order. (Doc. No. 75.) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court shall hold a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to compel (Doc. No. 73 ) on Friday, December 2, 2016 at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom 12S. (Motion Hearing set for 12/2/2016 01:30 PM in Courtroom 12S before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 18, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
81 ORDER UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502(d): 1. The production of privileged or work−product protected documents, electronically stored information ("ESI"), or information, whether inadvertent or otherwise, is not a waiver of the privilege or protection from discovery in this case or in any other federal or state proceeding. This Order shall be interpreted to provide the maximum protection allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). 2. Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit a party's right to conduct a review of documents, ESI or information (including metadata) for relevance, responsiveness and/or segregation of privileged and/or protected information before production. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 18, 2016. (BRP) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
82 ENTRY of Appearance by Ronald A. Norwood for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Norwood, Ronald) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
83 Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig: Motion Hearing held on 12/2/2016 re 73 MOTION to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Roelif Carter, Ronnie Tucker, Daniel Jenkins, Alfred Morris, Donyale Thomas, Keilee Fant, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Tonya DeBerry, Anthony Kimble. Counsel for parties present their arguments. The

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Court directs counsel to discuss the emails and have Plaintiffs provide additional search terms to Defendant. Order to issue. (Court Reporter:P. Dunn Wecke) (FTR Gold: No) (NEB) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
84 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, following oral argument on this day on Plaintiffs motion (Doc. No. 73 ) to compel production of documents, that the motion is GRANTEDin part and DENIED in part as follows and as more fully discussed at oral argument: Within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, the parties shall meet and confer on the following topics: [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS.]...IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 14 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall file a joint status report addressing these topics. ( Status Report due by 12/16/2016.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 12/2/2016. (NEB) (Entered: 12/02/2016)
86 TRANSCRIPT ORDER REQUEST for 83 (MOTION HEARING) by Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker court reporter P. Dunn Wecke before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. (Forwarded to Court Reporter by email)(BRP) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
85 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Andrew E. Tomback. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5711659) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
87 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 85 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Attorney Andrew E. Tomback, filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 9, 2016. (AGF) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
88 ENTRY of Appearance by Aarnarian (Apollo) D. Carey for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Carey, Aarnarian (Apollo)) (Entered: 12/14/2016)
89 Consent MOTION for Protective Order Modification by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Plunkert, Robert) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
90 STATUS REPORT by Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Search Terms, # 2 Exhibit List of Custodians)(Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
91 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 89 Consent MOTION for Protective Order Modification, filed by Defendant City of Ferguson, Missouri; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 19, 2016. (AGF) (Entered: 12/19/2016)
92 TRANSCRIPT of 83 (MOTION HEARING) held on 12/02/2016 before Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patti Dunn Wecke, Patti_Dunn_Wecke@moed.uscourts.gov, 314−244−7984. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/26/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/6/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/5/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
93 STATUS REPORT Second Joint Status Report by Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
94 ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before March 27, 2017, the parties shall file a status report advising the Court of the parties compliance with the most recent Amended Case Management Order (ECF No. 69 ), and if appropriate, any joint proposed amendment to the schedule. (Status Report due by 3/27/2017.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/20/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
95 STATUS REPORT Third Joint Status Report by Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 03/27/2017)

03/31/2017

96 Consent MOTION to Amend/Correct Case Management Order by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 03/31/2017)

04/03/2017

97 Docket Text ORDER Re: 96 Consent Motion to Amend/Correct Case Management Order by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. This case is rescheduled for trial on April 9, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. This is a three week trial docket. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 3, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 04/03/2017)

04/11/2017

98 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Edward Hall by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Hall, Edward) (Entered: 04/11/2017)

04/12/2017 99 Docket Text ORDER Re: 98 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Edward Hall by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 12, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 04/12/2017)

05/23/2017 100 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Dorian Kelly Panchyson. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5968020) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Panchyson, Dorian) (Entered: 05/23/2017)

05/23/2017 101 Docket Text ORDER Re: 100 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Dorian Kelly Panchyson by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on May 23, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 05/23/2017)

05/31/2017 102 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Alice Tsier. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5980815) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 05/31/2017)

06/01/2017 103 Docket Text ORDER Re: 102 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Alice Tsierby Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 1, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/01/2017 104 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Vivake Prasad. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5982355) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/01/2017 105 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Margaret Spicer. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5982382) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Spicer, Margaret) (Entered: 06/01/2017)

06/07/2017 106 SUPPLEMENTAL re 104 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Vivake Prasad. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5982355) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 06/07/2017)

06/07/2017 107 SUPPLEMENTAL re 105 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Margaret Spicer. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−5982382) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Spicer, Margaret) (Entered: 06/07/2017)

06/07/2017 108 Docket Text ORDER Re: 104 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Vivake Prasad; and 105 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Margaret Spicerby Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 7, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/07/2017 109 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation /Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification which Exceeds Fifteen Pages by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/07/2017 110 MOTION for Leave to File Sealed Document /Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Excerpts of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Certain Exhibits Under Seal by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/07/2017 111 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel for Defendant City of Ferguson Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C. by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − Declaration of Thomas B. Harvey, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B − Harvey Email to Dunne dated Apr 24 2017, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C − Harvey Email to Dunne dated May 2 2017, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D − Thomas Email to Harvey dated May 4 2017)(Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/07/2017 112 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/07/2017 113 SEALED DOCUMENT re 112 MOTION to Certify Class /Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/07/2017 114 SEALED DOCUMENT re 112 MOTION to Certify Class /Declaration in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class Action by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24 Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit AB, # 29 Exhibit AC, # 30 Exhibit AD, # 31 Exhibit AE, # 32 Exhibit AF, # 33 Exhibit AG, # 34 Exhibit AH, # 35 Exhibit AI, # 36 Exhibit AJ, # 37 Exhibit AK, # 38 Exhibit AL, # 39 Exhibit AM, # 40 Exhibit AN, # 41 Exhibit AO, # 42 Exhibit AP, # 43 Exhibit AQ, # 44 Exhibit AR, # 45 Exhibit AS, # 46 Exhibit AT, # 47 Exhibit AU, # 48 Exhibit AV, # 49 Exhibit AW, # 50 Exhibit AX, # 51 Exhibit AY, # 52 Exhibit AZ, # 53 Exhibit BA, # 54 Exhibit BB, # 55 Exhibit BC, # 56 Exhibit BD, # 57 Exhibit BE, # 58 Exhibit BF, # 59 Exhibit BG, # 60 Exhibit BH, # 61 Exhibit BI, # 62 Exhibit BJ, # 63 Exhibit BK, # 64 Exhibit BL, # 65 Exhibit BM, # 66 Exhibit BN, # 67 Exhibit BO, # 68 Exhibit BP, # 69 Exhibit BQ, # 70 Exhibit BR, # 71 Exhibit BS, # 72 Exhibit BT)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
06/08/2017 115 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 112 MOTION to Certify Class Declaration in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class Action [Public Redacted]. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A− Filed Under Seal, # 2 Exhibit B− Filed Under Seal, # 3 Exhibit C− Filed Under Seal, # 4 Exhibit D− Filed Under Seal, # 5 Exhibit E− Filed Under Seal, # 6 Exhibit F− Filed Under Seal, # 7 Exhibit G− Filed Under Seal, # 8 Exhibit H− Filed Under Seal, # 9 Exhibit I− Filed Under Seal, # 10 Exhibit J− Filed Under Seal, # 11 Exhibit K− Filed Under Seal, # 12 Exhibit L− Filed Under Seal, # 13 Exhibit M− Filed Under Seal, # 14 Exhibit N− Filed Under Seal, # 15 Exhibit O− Filed Under Seal, # 16 Exhibit P− Filed Under Seal, # 17 Exhibit Q− Filed Under Seal, # 18 Exhibit R− Filed Under Seal, # 19 Exhibit S− Filed Under Seal, # 20 Exhibit T− Filed Under Seal, # 21

Exhibit U− Filed Under Seal, # 22 Exhibit V− Filed Under Seal, # 23 Exhibit W− Filed Under Seal, # 24 Exhibit X− Filed Under Seal, # 25 Exhibit Y− Filed Under Seal, # 26 Exhibit Z− Filed Under Seal, # 27 Exhibit AA− Filed Under Seal, # 28 Exhibit AB− Filed Under Seal, # 29 Exhibit AC− Filed Under Seal, # 30 Exhibit AD− Filed Under Seal, # 31 Exhibit AE− Filed Under Seal, # 32 Exhibit AF− Filed Under Seal, # 33 Exhibit AG− Filed Under Seal, # 34 Exhibit AH− Filed Under Seal, # 35 Exhibit AI− Filed Under Seal, # 36 Exhibit AJ− Filed Under Seal, # 37 Exhibit AK− Filed Under Seal, # 38 Exhibit AL− Filed Under Seal, # 39 Exhibit AM− Department of Justice Report on its Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, dated Mar. 4, 2015, # 40 Exhibit AN− Filed Under Seal, # 41 Exhibit AO− Filed Under Seal, # 42 Exhibit AP− Filed Under Seal, # 43 Exhibit AQ− Bates Nos. 0394−96, General Order § 421 of the Ferguson Police Department, # 44 Exhibit AR− Filed Under Seal, # 45 Exhibit AS− Filed Under Seal, # 46 Exhibit AT− Bates Nos. 0483−89, General Order § 454. of the Ferguson Police Department, # 47 Exhibit AU− Filed Under Seal, # 48 Exhibit AV− Filed Under Seal, # 49 Exhibit AW− Filed Under Seal, # 50 Exhibit AX− Filed Under Seal, # 51 Exhibit AY− Filed Under Seal, # 52 Exhibit AZ− Filed Under Seal, # 53 Exhibit BA− Bates Nos. 0358−71, General Order § 416 of the Ferguson Police Department, # 54 Exhibit BB− Filed Under Seal, # 55 Exhibit BC− Filed Under Seal, # 56 Exhibit BD− Filed Under Seal, # 57 Exhibit BE− Filed Under Seal, # 58 Exhibit BF− Filed Under Seal, # 59 Exhibit BG− Filed Under Seal, # 60 Exhibit BH− Filed Under Seal, # 61 Exhibit BI− Filed Under Seal, # 62 Exhibit BJ− Filed Under Seal, # 63 Exhibit BK− Filed Under Seal, # 64 Exhibit BL− Filed Under Seal, # 65 Exhibit BM−Deposition of Brian Kaminski, # 66 Exhibit BN− Deposition of Stephanie Karr, # 67 Exhibit BO−Deposition of Thomas Jackson, # 68 Exhibit BP− Filed Under Seal, # 69 Exhibit BQ−Deposition of Mary Anne Twitty, # 70 Exhibit BR−Deposition of William Catanzaro, # 71 Exhibit BS−Deposition of Ronnie Tucker, # 72 Exhibit BT−Deposition of Alfred Morris)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
06/08/2017 116 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 112 MOTION to Certify Class [Public Redacted] filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
06/08/2017 117 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 112 MOTION to Certify Class /Declaration of Alec Karakatsanis in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class Action and Related Documents. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
06/08/2017 118 MOTION for Hearing re 112 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
06/08/2017 119 NOTICE of Service: by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 116 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 115 Declaration,,,,,,,,,,,,, 113 Sealed Document, 114 Sealed Document,,,,,, (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
06/09/2017 120 Docket Text ORDER Re: 109 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation /Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification which Exceeds Fifteen Pages by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 9, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
06/09/2017 121 Docket Text ORDER Re: 110 Motion for Leave to File Sealed Document Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Excerpts of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Certain Exhibits Under Seal by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 9, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
06/14/2017 122 MOTION for Limited/Special Appearance and Request for Ten Additional Days to Respond by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Graham, Maurice) (Entered: 06/14/2017)

06/15/2017 123 Docket Text ORDER Re: 122 Motion for Limited/Special Appearance and Request for Ten Additional Days to Respond by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 15, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
06/15/2017 124 JOINT MOTION TO ADOPT A BRIEFING SCHEDULE re 112 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Dunne, Peter) Modified docket text on 6/15/2017 (NEB). (Entered: 06/15/2017)
06/15/2017 125 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pending Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
06/16/2017 126 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties Joint Motion to Adopt a Briefing Schedule on Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Class is GRANTED. ECF No. 124 . Defendants response to Plaintiffs motion for class certification shall be due no later than July 10, 2017, and any reply shall be due no later than July 25, 2017. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants response to Plaintiffs motion for a temporary stay (ECF No. 125 ) shall be due no later than Tuesday, June 20, 2017, and any reply shall be due no later than Thursday, June 22, 2017. The Court will address whether to amend the briefing schedule for Plaintiffs motion for class certification, adopted above, following a ruling on the motion to stay. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/16/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
06/20/2017 127 RESPONSE to Motion re 125 MOTION to Stay Proceedings Pending Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D)(Dunne, Peter) (Entered: 06/20/2017)
06/21/2017 128 RESPONSE to Motion re 111 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel for Defendant City of Ferguson Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C. filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exhibit A, # 2 Affidavit Exhibit B, # 3 Affidavit Exhibit C)(Graham, Maurice) (Entered: 06/21/2017)
06/23/2017 129 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary stay of proceedings is GRANTED. ECF No. 125 . These proceedings are STAYED until such time as the Court rules on Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Defendant's counsel. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within seven days after the Court rules on Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Defendants counsel, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, including an appropriate deadline to complete any outstanding depositions of the named Plaintiffs and any necessary amendment to the briefing schedule for Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the current Case Management Order. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 6/23/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
06/28/2017 130 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
06/29/2017 131 Docket Text ORDER Re: 130 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on June 29, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
07/07/2017 132 REPLY to Response to Motion re 111 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel for Defendant City of Ferguson Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C. filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
07/10/2017 133 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Lawrence Crane Moscowitz. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6040066) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Moscowitz, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/10/2017)

07/11/2017 134 Docket Text ORDER Re: 133 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Lawrence Crane Moscowitz by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on July 11, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 07/11/2017)

07/20/2017 135 ENTRY of Appearance by Jessica Lynn Diamond for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Diamond, Jessica) (Entered: 07/20/2017)

08/07/2017 136 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify Peter J. Dunne, Robert T. Plunkert, Jessica L. Diamond, and the law firm of Pitzer Snodgrass, P.C., from representing Defendant in this matter is GRANTED. ECF No. 111 . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay currently in place shall continue for another 21 days, to allow Defendant time to obtain new counsel, if it so desires. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 28 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, including an appropriate deadline to complete any outstanding depositions of the named Plaintiffs and any necessary amendment to the briefing schedule for Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the current Case Management Order. (Attorney Robert T. Plunkert; Jessica Lynn Diamond and Peter J. Dunne terminated.). Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/7/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 08/07/2017)

08/21/2017 137 ENTRY of Appearance by John Michael Reeves, Jr for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 08/21/2017)

08/22/2017 138 ENTRY of Appearance by Jeffrey J. Brinker for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Brinker, Jeffrey) (Entered: 08/22/2017)

09/05/2017 139 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. . (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 09/05/2017)

09/06/2017 140 MEMORANDUM re 139 Joint Scheduling Plan by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/06/2017 141 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay previously entered is LIFTED, and the Court shall hold a status conference on Thursday, September 14, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. in the chambers of the undersigned. Any out−of−town counsel may participate in the conference by telephone, if counsel notifies the office of the undersigned of his or her intent to do so at least twenty−four (24) hours in advance of the scheduled conference. (Status Conference set for 9/14/2017 10:00 AM in Chambers before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 6, 2017. (BRP) (Entered: 09/06/2017)

09/08/2017 142 MEMORANDUM re 139 Joint Scheduling Plan by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Murphy, Sonia) (Entered: 09/08/2017)

09/11/2017

***REMARK regarding Memorandum 142 : The use of an attorney's electronic filing login and password to file a pleading, motion, memorandum or other document constitutes the signature of that attorney on that document for all purposes, including Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. (See Local Rule 11−2.11 located on the court website.) (NEB) (Entered: 09/11/2017)

09/14/2017 143 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation memo in support of mtd Counts I through III and V through VII for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 09/14/2017)

09/14/2017 144 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Counts I through III and V through by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) Modified per DTO 148 on 9/20/2017 (NEB). (Entered: 09/14/2017)

09/14/2017 145 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 144 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Counts I through III and V through filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 09/14/2017)

09/14/2017 146 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all deadlines in this case are STAYED for 60days as follows [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS]. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 09/14/2017. (KCB) (Entered: 09/14/2017)

09/15/2017 147 Docket Text ORDER Re: 143 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation memo in support of mtd Counts I through III and V through VII for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 15, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 09/15/2017)
09/19/2017 148 MOTION for Leave to File Corrected Motion To Dismiss, MOTION to Amend/Correct 144 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Counts I through III and V through by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Corrected Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Exhibit B −− Memo in Support of Corrected Motion to Dismiss)(Reeves, John) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
09/20/2017 149 Docket Text ORDER Re: 148 Motion for Leave to File Corrected Motion To Dismiss, Motion to Amend/Correct 144 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Counts I through III and V through by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 20, 2017. (SAA) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
09/20/2017 150 DEFENDANT CITY OF FERGUSON'S CORRECTED MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I THROUGH III AND V THROUGH VII FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (NEB) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
09/20/2017 151 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 150 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (NEB) (Entered: 09/20/2017)
10/19/2017 152 ENTRY of Appearance by Michelle V. Stallings for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Stallings, Michelle) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
11/06/2017 153 ENTRY of Appearance by Sima Atri for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Atri, Sima) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
11/10/2017 154 MOTION to Stay Pending Ruling on Sovereign Immunity by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 11/10/2017)
11/10/2017 155 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 154 MOTION to Stay Pending Ruling on Sovereign Immunity filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 11/10/2017)
11/17/2017 156 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 154 MOTION to Stay Pending Ruling on Sovereign Immunity filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 11/17/2017)
11/20/2017 157 REPLY to Response to Motion re 154 MOTION to Stay Pending Ruling on Sovereign Immunity filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Guggenberger order, # 2 Exhibit B −− letter to court, # 3 Exhibit C −− Guggenberger new order)(Reeves, John) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
11/20/2017 158 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. . (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
11/22/2017 159 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER... IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants motion for a further stay of proceedings is GRANTED. ECF No. 154 . Except as set forth below, the stay previously entered in this case shall remain in effect until the Court rules on Defendants Corrected Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 150). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs response to Defendants Corrected Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 150) shall be due no later than December 20, 2017, and any reply shall be due no later than January 8, 2018. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within seven days after the Court rules on Defendants Corrected Motion to Dismiss, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, which addresses the briefing schedule for Plaintiffs motion for class certification (ECF No. 112); the parties positions concerning the referral of this action to mediation and when such a referral would be most productive; and any other outstanding deadlines in the current Case Management Order.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 11/22/2017. (NEB) (Entered: 11/22/2017)

12/20/2017 160 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation /Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Response to the City of Ferguson's Corrected Motion to Dismiss which Exceeds Fifteen Pages by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
12/20/2017 161 RESPONSE in Opposition re 150 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
12/21/2017 162 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 160 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Response to the City of Ferguson's Corrected Motion to Dismiss which Exceeds Fifteen Pages, filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on December 21, 2017. (AGF) (Entered: 12/21/2017)
01/08/2018 163 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
01/08/2018 164 REPLY re 150 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A −− Consent Decree)(Reeves, John) Modified docket text on 1/9/2018 (NEP). (Entered: 01/08/2018)
01/08/2018 165 MOTION for Hearing re 150 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
01/09/2018 166 Docket Text ORDER Re: 163 Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 9, 2018. (SAA) (Entered: 01/09/2018)
01/12/2018 167 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Martin Bingham Sawyer. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6330629) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Sawyer, Martin) (Entered: 01/12/2018)
01/16/2018 168 Docket Text ORDER Re: 167 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Martin Bingham Sawyer by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 16, 2018. (SAA) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
01/16/2018 169 MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to the City of Ferguson's Corrected Motion to Dismiss by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant's Third Motion to Dismiss)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 01/16/2018)
01/17/2018 170 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a sur−reply is DENIED, based on the length and content of the proposed surreply. ECF No. 169 . However, no later than 7 days from the date of this Order, Plaintiffs may file a brief surreply of no more than five pages, solely addressing Defendant's argument in its reply brief that a final policymaker must be identified. The parties are further advised that they should avoid the use of extensive footnotes, and any footnotes must be in at least 12 point font. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as set forth above, no further briefing on Defendant's motion to dismiss will be permitted. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 17, 2018. (BRP) (Entered: 01/17/2018)
01/24/2018 171 SURREPLY to Motion re 150 MOTION to Dismiss /Sur−Reply in Opposition to Defendant's Third Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 01/24/2018)
01/29/2018 172 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motions for class certification and for a hearing are DENIED without prejudice to refiling, as appropriate, upon lifting of the stay. ECF Nos. 112 & 118 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 01/29/2018. (KCB) (Entered: 01/29/2018)

02/13/2018 173 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's corrected motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, and motion for a hearing, are both DENIED. ECF Nos. 150 & 165 . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay previously entered is lifted, and, no later than seven days from the date of this Memorandum and Order, the parties shall submit a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, which addresses the filing deadline and briefing schedule for any motion for class certification; the parties' positions concerning the referral of this action to mediation and when such a referral would be most productive; and any other appropriate deadlines and dates in the current Case Management Order, including a proposed trial date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the current trial setting of April 9, 2018, is VACATED, to be reset as appropriate in accordance with the parties joint proposed scheduling plan. (Joint Scheduling Plan due by 2/20/2018.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 13, 2018. (BRP) (Entered: 02/13/2018)
02/15/2018 174 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 173 Memorandum & Order,,,, by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0865−6386037. Appeal Record due by 3/1/2018. (Entered: 02/15/2018)
02/15/2018 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
02/15/2018 176 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
02/16/2018 177 NOTICE of Intent to Oppose Defendant City of Ferguson's Motion for a Further Stay of Proceedings Pending a Ruling on Its Corrected Motion to Dismiss: by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
02/20/2018 178 JOINT SCHEDULING PLAN by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. . (Strode, Blake) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
02/22/2018 179 RESPONSE in Opposition re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/23/2018 180 NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 173 Memorandum & Order,,,,. Notice of Appeal filed on 02/15/2018 by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE.(MFG) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
02/27/2018 181 REPLY to Response to Motion re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Reeves, John) (Entered: 02/27/2018)
02/27/2018 182 EXHIBIT 2 re 181 REPLY to Response to Motion re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) Modified docket text on 2/28/2018 (NEP). (Entered: 02/27/2018)
03/05/2018 183 MOTION for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to the City of Ferguson's Motion to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1− Surreply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/06/2018 184 Docket Text ORDER Re: 183 Motion for Leave to File a Sur−Reply in Further Opposition to the City of Ferguson's Motion to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 6, 2018. (SAA) (Entered: 03/06/2018)

03/06/2018 185 Initial Notification from USCA for 174 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of USCA Appeal Number: 18−1472(NEP) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
03/06/2018 186 Briefing Schedule from USCA for 174 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of USCA Appeal Number: 18−1472 Transcript due: 4/16/2018 (See attached document for all other deadlines.)(NEP) (Entered: 03/06/2018)
03/06/2018 187 SURREPLY to Motion re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (NEP) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
03/08/2018 188 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re 175 MOTION to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 −− appeal docket activity, # 2 Exhibit 2 −− oral argument schedule)(Reeves, John) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
03/12/2018 189 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to stay all proceedings pending interlocutory appeal is GRANTED. ECF No. 154 . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than 14 days after resolution of Defendants interlocutory appeal, the parties shall file a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, which addresses the filing deadline and briefing schedule for any motion for class certification; the parties' positions concerning the referral of this action to mediation and when such a referral would be most productive; and any other appropriate deadlines and dates in the current Case Management Order, including a proposed trial date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case shall be closed, for administrative purposes only, pending a resolution of the interlocutory appeal. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 12, 2018. (BRP) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
04/03/2018 190 ENTRY of Appearance by Mauricio A. Gonzalez for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Gonzalez, Mauricio) (Entered: 04/03/2018)
04/27/2018 191 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Mauricio Gonzalez. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−6508724) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Gonzalez, Mauricio) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
04/27/2018 192 Docket Text ORDER Re: 191 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Mauricio Gonzalez by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 27, 2018. (SAA) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
05/10/2018 193 MEMORANDUM to forward sealed exhibits for appeal by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
05/14/2018 194 Records Transmittal re 174 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal : USCA Appeal #: 18−1472 The following has been forwarded to USCA: Sealed Exhibits (JWD) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
06/21/2018 195 NOTICE of Change of Address filed by Nathaniel Richard Carroll. (Carroll, Nathaniel) Law firm address changed in CM/ECF (CAR). (Entered: 06/21/2018)
10/24/2018 196 ENTRY of Appearance by William A. Hellmich for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Hellmich, William) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
10/26/2018 197 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Brinker & Doyen, LLP by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Brinker, Jeffrey) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
10/29/2018 198 Docket Text ORDER Re: 197 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney/Firm Brinker & Doyen, LLP by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 29, 2018. (SAA) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
10/29/2018 199 ORDER of USCA : The motion to withdraw filed by Mr. Jeffrey J. Brinker and Ms. Michelle V. Stallings is granted. Mr. John Reeves, now with the law firm of King, Krehbiel & Hellmich, LLC will remain on case. USCA Appeal #: 18−1472 (KCB) (Entered: 10/29/2018)

11/05/2018 200 ENTRY of Appearance by John Michael Reeves, Jr for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/05/2018 201 ENTRY of Appearance by John Michael Reeves, Jr for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
11/29/2018 202 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Nathaniel R. Carroll by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Carroll, Nathaniel) (Entered: 11/29/2018)
11/30/2018 203 Docket Text ORDER Re: 202 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney; attorney/firm Nathaniel R. Carroll by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on November 30, 2018. (SAA) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
01/10/2019 204 OPINION from USCA re 174 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. USCA Appeal #: 18−1472. The City's interlocutory appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Citys motion for judicial notice and conditional motion to remand are denied. (BRP) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
01/10/2019 205 USCA JUDGMENT as to 174 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of. Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. This appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on the record of the district court, briefs of the parties and was argued by counsel. After consideration, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with the opinion of this Court. (BRP) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
01/10/2019 206 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay previously entered by the Court is LIFTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than 14 days from the date of this Order, the parties shall file a joint proposed scheduling plan for the remainder of this litigation, which addresses the filing deadline and briefing schedule for any motion for class certification; the parties' positions concerning the referral of this action to mediation and when such a referral would be most productive; and any other appropriate deadlines and dates in the current Case Management Order, including a proposed trial date. (Joint Scheduling Plan due by 1/24/2019.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 10, 2019. (BRP) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
01/14/2019 207 ENTRY of Appearance by John Michael Reeves, Jr for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 01/14/2019)
01/17/2019 208 ENTRY of Appearance by Blake Daniel Hill for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Hill, Blake) (Entered: 01/17/2019)
01/24/2019 209 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 206 Order,, by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
01/24/2019 210 RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER re 206 Order,, /Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Scheduling by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 01/24/2019)
01/25/2019 211 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court shall hold a status conference on Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 9:30 a.m. in the chambers of the undersigned. Any out−of−town counsel may participate in the conference by telephone, if counsel notifies the office of the undersigned of his or her intent to do so at least twenty−four (24) hours in advance of the scheduled conference. (Status Conference set for 1/30/2019 09:30 AM in Chambers before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 1/25/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
01/25/2019 212 ENTRY of Appearance by John McCann Waldron for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Waldron, John) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
01/29/2019 213 Docket Text ORDER: ; ORDERED Due to a conflict on the Court's schedule (related to a hearing on a motion for a temporary restraining order), the Status Conference scheduled for January 30, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. is VACATED, and will be rescheduled at a later date. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on January 29, 2019. (AGF) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

02/01/2019 214 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference previously set for January 30, 2019 is RESET for Wednesday, February 6, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. in the chambers of the undersigned. Any out−of−town counsel may participate in the conference by telephone, if counsel notifies the office of the undersigned of his or her intent to do so at least twenty−four (24) hours in advance of the scheduled conference. (Status Conference set for 2/6/2019 02:00 PM in Chambers before District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/1/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 02/01/2019)
02/04/2019 215 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Marco A. Lopez. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−7018174) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Lopez, Marco) (Entered: 02/04/2019)
02/04/2019 216 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Tara Mikkilineni. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−7018236) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Mikkilineni, Tara) (Entered: 02/04/2019)
02/04/2019 217 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Ryan C. Downer. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number 0865−7018752) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Downer, Ryan) (Entered: 02/04/2019)
02/05/2019 218 Docket Text ORDER Re: 215 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Marco A. Lopez by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; 216 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Tara Mikkilineni by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; and 217 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Ryan C. Downer by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on February 5, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
02/06/2019 219 MANDATE of USCA as to 174 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of USCA #:18−1472. In accordance with the judgment and pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the formal mandate is hereby issued in the above−styled matter. (BRP) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
02/07/2019 220 ENTRY of Appearance by Jacqueline Marie Kutnik−Bauder for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Kutnik−Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
02/07/2019 221 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS.] (Discovery Completion due by 10/31/2019. Dispositive Motions due by 12/2/2019.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/7/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
03/05/2019 222 Consent MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation as to supporting memorandum by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
03/05/2019 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and V −− VII by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) Modified on 3/5/2019 (BRP). (Entered: 03/05/2019)
03/05/2019 224 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and V −− VII filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) Modified on 3/5/2019 (BRP). (Entered: 03/05/2019)
03/05/2019 225 NOTICE of Filing Exhibit by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of re 224 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and V −− VII (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Text of Rule 19), # 2 Exhibit B (Relevant Missouri Law), # 3 Exhibit C (Mo.S.Ct. R. 37))(Reeves, John) Modified on 3/5/2019 (BRP). Modified on 3/6/2019 (AFC). (Entered: 03/05/2019)

03/05/2019 226 NOTICE request for oral argument: by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of re 224 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and V −− VII (Reeves, John) Modified on 3/5/2019 (BRP). (Entered: 03/05/2019)
03/06/2019 227 Docket Text ORDER Re: 222 Consent Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation as to supporting memorandum by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 6, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 03/06/2019)
03/11/2019 228 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply /Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 03/11/2019)
03/12/2019 229 RESPONSE in Opposition re 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
03/13/2019 230 Docket Text ORDER Re: 228 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 13, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
03/13/2019 231 MOTION to Withdraw 229 Response in Opposition to Motion, / Plaintiffs' Motion to withdraw Response to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
03/13/2019 232 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 231 MOTION to Withdraw 229 Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Plaintiffs will have until March 26, 2019, to re−file their Opposition brief. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on March 13, 2019. (AGF) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
03/26/2019 233 RESPONSE in Opposition re 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
04/02/2019 234 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 04/02/2019)
04/03/2019 235 Docket Text ORDER Re: 234 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 Motion to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 3, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/03/2019)
04/09/2019 236 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 04/09/2019)
04/10/2019 237 Docket Text ORDER Re: 236 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 223 Motion to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 10, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/10/2019)
04/12/2019 238 Consent MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation as to its Rule 19 reply memorandum by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
04/12/2019 239 REPLY to Response to Motion re 223 MOTION to Dismiss Case as to Counts I −− III and IV −− VII filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1

Attachment Addendum 1)(Reeves, John) (Entered: 04/12/2019)

04/15/2019 240 Docket Text ORDER Re: 238 Consent Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation as to its Rule 19 reply memorandum by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on April 15, 2019. (SAA) (Entered: 04/15/2019)

05/20/2019

NOTICE: IF YOU HAVE ALREADY UPGRADED YOUR PACER ACCOUNT YOU CAN DISREGARD THIS NOTICE. IF YOU DO NOT UPGRADE YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FILE IN THE SYSTEM AFTER MAY 31, 2019. PLEASE UPGRADE IMMEDIATELY. If you are using a shared account to file cases, you will need to create an individual account; instructions can be found at:https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/Register−for−New−PACER−account.pdf. If you already have an individual account, it will need to be upgraded; instructions can be found https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/moed/files/Upgrade−Current−PACER−Account.pdf. If you need further assistance contact the MOED CM/ECF Help Desk at 314−244−7650 or moedml_cmecf_help@moed.uscourts.gov. (CSAW) (Entered: 05/20/2019)

05/21/2019 241 MOTION for Suggestion of Death UPON THE RECORD UNDER RULE 25(a)(1) and MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 A (Death Certificate), # 2 B (Letters of Admin))(Voss, Michael−John) (Entered: 05/21/2019)

05/29/2019 242 ORDER : IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for substitution of party on behalf of Plaintiff Tonya DeBerry is GRANTED. ECF No. 241 . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall substitute the Plaintiff as requested in the motion. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 05/29/2019. (KCB) (Entered: 05/29/2019)

06/03/2019 243 Consent MOTION for Leave to Utilize Documents Produced Pursuant to Protective Order by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Waldron, John) (Entered: 06/03/2019)

06/04/2019 244 Docket Text ORDER Re: 243 Consent Motion for Leave to Utilize Documents Produced Pursuant to Protective Order by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 06/04/2019. (KCB) (Entered: 06/04/2019)

07/08/2019 245 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct / Joint Motion to Amend Case Management Order by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tsier, Alice) (Entered: 07/08/2019)

07/09/2019 246 ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' Joint Motion to Amend Case Management Order is GRANTED. ECF No. 245 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/9/19. (EAB) (Entered: 07/09/2019)

07/18/2019 247 MOTION to Seal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson and Certain Exhibits Under Seal by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 07/18/2019)

07/18/2019 248 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion (SEALED) re 247 MOTION to Seal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson and Certain Exhibits Under Seal / Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 07/18/2019)

07/18/2019 249 SEALED DOCUMENT re 247 MOTION to Seal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson and Certain Exhibits Under Seal /

Declaration of Andrew Tomback in Connection with Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10−A, # 11 Exhibit 10−B, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12−A, # 14 Exhibit 12−B, # 15 Exhibit 13, # 16 Exhibit 14, # 17 Exhibit 15−A, # 18 Exhibit 15−B, # 19 Exhibit 16, # 20 Exhibit 17, # 21 Exhibit 18−A, # 22 Exhibit 18−B)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
07/18/2019 250 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
07/18/2019 251 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 07/18/2019)
07/19/2019 252 Docket Text ORDER Re: 247 MOTION to Seal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson and Certain Exhibits Under Seal by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/19/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
07/19/2019 253 Docket Text ORDER Re: 250 MOTION for Leave to File in Excess of Page Limitation by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/19/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
07/24/2019 254 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Glenda Dieuveille. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7354154) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Dieuveille, Glenda) (Entered: 07/24/2019)
07/25/2019 255 Docket Text ORDER Re: 254 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Glenda Dieuveille. by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/25/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 07/25/2019)
07/25/2019 256 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Hellmich, William) (Entered: 07/25/2019)
07/26/2019 257 Docket Text ORDER Re: 256 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 7/26/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
07/26/2019 258 MEMORANDUM in Opposition of Sealed Motion re 251 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Hellmich, William) (Entered: 07/26/2019)
07/31/2019 259 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply / Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Compel the Production of Documents by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 07/31/2019)

08/01/2019 260 Docket Text ORDER Re 259 Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time, up to and including August 7, 2019, to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Compel the Production of Documents by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. ; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on August 1, 2019. (MCB) (Entered: 08/01/2019)
08/06/2019 261 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts I through III and V through VII, and motion for a hearing, are both DENIED. ECF Nos. 223 & 226 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/6/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
08/07/2019 262 SEALED DOCUMENT re 251 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson / Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 19, # 2 Exhibit 20, # 3 Exhibit 21, # 4 Exhibit 22, # 5 Exhibit 23, # 6 Exhibit 24, # 7 Exhibit 25, # 8 Exhibit 26)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
08/07/2019 263 MOTION to Unseal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
08/14/2019 264 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 263 MOTION to Unseal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 08/14/2019)
08/21/2019 265 REPLY to Response to Motion re 263 MOTION to Unseal Document / Plaintiffs' Motion to Unseal Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson / Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Unseal Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant City of Ferguson filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 08/21/2019)
08/28/2019 266 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 261 Memorandum & Order, by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number AMOEDC−7426450. Appeal Record due by 9/11/2019.(Reeves, John) (Entered: 08/28/2019)
08/29/2019 267 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon Lane. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7429607) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Lane, Shannon) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
08/29/2019 268 MOTION to Stay all proceedings pending interlocutory appeal by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
08/29/2019 269 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 268 MOTION to Stay all proceedings pending interlocutory appeal filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 08/29/2019)
08/30/2019 270 Docket Text ORDER Re: 267 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon Lane by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 8/30/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 08/30/2019)
08/30/2019 271 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Meredith Craven. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7432454) by Plaintiffs

Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Craven, Meredith) (Entered: 08/30/2019)
08/30/2019 272 MOTION for Extension of: Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 08/30/2019)
09/03/2019 273 Docket Text ORDER Re: 271 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Meredith Craven by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/3/19. (EAB) (Entered: 09/03/2019)
09/03/2019 274 Docket Text ORDER Re: 272 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. (Response to Court due by 9/12/2019.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/3/19. (EAB) (Entered: 09/03/2019)
09/03/2019 275 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Seiji Niwa. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7435703) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Niwa, Seiji) (Entered: 09/03/2019)
09/04/2019 276 Docket Text ORDER Re: 275 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Seiji Niwa by Plaintiffs Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/4/19. (EAB) (Entered: 09/04/2019)
09/04/2019 277 NOTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND NOA SUPPLEMENT by clerk to USCA regarding 261 Memorandum & Order,. Notice of Appeal filed on 08/28/2019 by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. NOTIFICATION TO COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTY: FILE REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT WITH DISTRICT COURT CLERKS OFFICE.(MFG) (Entered: 09/04/2019)
09/05/2019 278 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth above. ECF No. 251 . Within 14 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order, Defendant shall produce documents responsive to Plaintiffs' requests with respect to the search terms ghetto and (St. Ann OR St. Louis) /s (book OR arrest OR transfer OR hold). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to unseal is GRANTED. ECF No. 263 . The Clerk of Court shall unseal ECF Nos. 248, 249, 258 & 262, and all exhibits thereto. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/5/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 09/05/2019)
09/10/2019 279 Initial Notification from USCA for 266 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of USCA Appeal Number: 19−2939(AFC) (Entered: 09/10/2019)
09/10/2019 280 Briefing Schedule from USCA for 266 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of USCA Appeal Number: 19−2939 Transcript due: 10/21/2019 (See attached document for all other deadlines.)(AFC) (Entered: 09/10/2019)
09/12/2019 281 RESPONSE in Opposition re 268 MOTION to Stay all proceedings pending interlocutory appeal / Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 09/12/2019)
09/17/2019 282 REPLY to Response to Motion re 268 MOTION to Stay all proceedings pending interlocutory appeal filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 09/17/2019)
09/19/2019 283 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to stay proceedings pending interlocutory appeal is DENIED. ECF No. 268 . Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 9/19/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 09/19/2019)
09/20/2019 284 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Maurice B. Graham by In Re Maurice B Graham. (Graham, Maurice) (Entered: 09/20/2019)

09/23/2019 285 Docket Text ORDER Re 284 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm Maurice B. Graham. ; ORDERED Motion is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on September 23, 2019. (MCB) (Entered: 09/23/2019)
10/10/2019 286 MOTION for Extension / Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of: time to Complete Fact Discovery by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
10/10/2019 287 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 286 MOTION for Extension / Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of: time to Complete Fact Discovery filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
10/14/2019 288 RESPONSE to Motion re 286 MOTION for Extension / Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of: time to Complete Fact Discovery filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Hellmich, William) (Entered: 10/14/2019)
10/18/2019 289 MOTION for Leave to Utilize Documents Produced Pursuant to Protective Order by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Voss, Michael−John) (Entered: 10/18/2019)
10/21/2019 290 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER [SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE DETAILS.] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery is GRANTED. ECF No. 286. ( Discovery Completion due by 7/31/2020.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 21, 2019. (MCB) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
10/21/2019 291 Docket Text ORDER Re 289 MOTION for Leave to Utilize Documents Produced Pursuant to Protective Order by Plaintiffs'. ; ORDERED Motion is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on October 21, 2019. (MCB) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
10/21/2019 292 Consent MOTION for Protective Order Modification by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Declaration of Acknowledgement and Agreement to be Bound by the Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order)(Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 10/21/2019)
10/22/2019 293 Docket Text ORDER Re: 292 Consent MOTION for Protective Order Modification by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/22/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
10/24/2019 294 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Danielle Marie Audette. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7541474) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(CMC) (Entered: 10/24/2019)
10/25/2019 295 Docket Text ORDER: Re 294 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Danielle Marie Audette by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Keilee Fant, et al.; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 10/25/19. (EAB) (Entered: 10/25/2019)
10/31/2019 296 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Angela Daker. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7555436) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred

Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Daker, Angela) (Entered: 10/31/2019)
11/01/2019 297 Docket Text ORDER Re: 296 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Angela Daker. by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 11/1/2019. (AFC) (Entered: 11/01/2019)
11/22/2019 298 MANDATE of USCA as to 266 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by Ferguson, Missouri, City of USCA #:19−2939. In accordance with the judgment and pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the formal mandate is hereby issued in the above−styled matter. (EAB) (Entered: 11/22/2019)
01/02/2020 299 ENTRY of Appearance by Sean Martin Sigillito for Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Sigillito, Sean) (Entered: 01/02/2020)
01/31/2020 300 MOTION to Withdraw Sima Atri by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Kutnik−Bauder, Jacqueline) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
02/03/2020 301 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 300 MOTION to Withdraw Sima Atri by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Kutnik−Bauder, Jacqueline) filed by Roelif Carter, Ronnie Tucker, Daniel Jenkins, Alfred Morris, John R. Narayan, Donyale Thomas, Keilee Fant, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Tonya DeBerry, Anthony Kimble ; ORDERED GRANTED, Attorney Sima Atri terminated.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/3/20. (KJS) (Entered: 02/03/2020)
02/13/2020 302 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Jonathan C. Black II. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7753394) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Black, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/13/2020)
02/13/2020 303 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Claire Linda Leonard. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7753613) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Leonard, Claire) (Entered: 02/13/2020)
02/13/2020 304 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Issued to Mark Byrne and Michael Salant by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 02/13/2020)
02/13/2020 305 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 304 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Issued to Mark Byrne and Michael Salant filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 02/13/2020)
02/14/2020 306 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 304 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Issued to Mark Byrne and Michael Salant [Public Version]. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F − Filed Under Seal, # 7 Exhibit G − Filed Under Seal, # 8 Exhibit H − Filed Under Seal, # 9 Exhibit I − Filed Under Seal, # 10

Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P)(Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
02/14/2020 307 SEALED DOCUMENT re 304 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Issued to Mark Byrne and Michael Salant by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit F, # 2 Exhibit G, # 3 Exhibit H, # 4 Exhibit I)(Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
02/14/2020 308 ENTRY of Appearance by John P. Torbitzky for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Torbitzky, John) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
02/14/2020 309 ENTRY of Appearance by Timothy William Rudolph for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Rudolph, Timothy) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
02/14/2020 310 ENTRY of Appearance by Timothy J. Reichardt for Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reichardt, Timothy) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
02/14/2020 311 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 303 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Claire Linda Leonard. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7753613) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Leonard, Claire) filed by Roelif Carter, Ronnie Tucker, Daniel Jenkins, Alfred Morris, John R. Narayan, Donyale Thomas, Keilee Fant, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Tonya DeBerry, Anthony Kimble, 302 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Jonathan C. Black II. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7753394) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Black, Jonathan) filed by Roelif Carter, Ronnie Tucker, Daniel Jenkins, Alfred Morris, John R. Narayan, Donyale Thomas, Keilee Fant, Shameika Morris, Allison Nelson, Tonya DeBerry, Herbert Nelson, Jr., Anthony Kimble ; ORDERED GRANTED.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/14/2020. (JMP) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
02/18/2020 312 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Li Jiang. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number MOEDC−7759797) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Jiang, Li) (Entered: 02/18/2020)
02/19/2020 313 Docket Text ORDER Re: 312 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Li Jiang. by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/19/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 02/19/2020)
02/25/2020 314 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 304 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Issued to Mark Byrne and Michael Salant filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit for Mark Byrne, # 2 Affidavit Affidavit for Mike Salant)(Hellmich, William) (Entered: 02/25/2020)
02/25/2020 315 LETTER from USCA with letter/order from U.S. Supreme Court attached. USCA Appeal #: 19−2939 The petition for writ of certiorari has been filed.(JMP) (Entered: 02/25/2020)
02/27/2020 316 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents from Defendant the City of Ferguson by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Audette, Danielle) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
02/27/2020 317 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion re 316 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents from Defendant the City of Ferguson filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble,

Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Audette, Danielle) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
02/27/2020 318 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 316 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents from Defendant the City of Ferguson [Public Version]. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G (Filed Under Seal), # 8 Exhibit H (Filed Under Seal), # 9 Exhibit I (Filled Under Seal), # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K (Filed Under Seal), # 12 Exhibit L (Filed Under Seal), # 13 Exhibit M (Filed Under Seal), # 14 Exhibit N (Filed Under Seal, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P (Filed Under Seal))(Audette, Danielle) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
02/27/2020 319 SEALED DOCUMENT re 316 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents from Defendant the City of Ferguson by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit G, # 2 Exhibit H, # 3 Exhibit I, # 4 Exhibit K, # 5 Exhibit L, # 6 Exhibit M, # 7 Exhibit N, # 8 Exhibit P)(Audette, Danielle) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
02/28/2020 320 ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, on or before March 13, 2020, the parties shall file a joint status report setting forth their agreed procedures and timing for completing discovery necessary for expert disclosures and their proposed amended Case Management Order; or, if the parties cannot agree, separate status reports setting forth each sides proposal for completing such discovery, with citation to supporting legal authority, and proposed amended Case Management Order. (Status Report due by 3/13/2020.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 2/28/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
03/05/2020 321 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Zaur D. Gajiev. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7795273) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing Certificate of Good Standing)(Gajiev, Zaur) (Entered: 03/05/2020)
03/05/2020 322 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Leonardo Sun Muniz Kim. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7795292) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Kim, Leonardo) (Entered: 03/05/2020)
03/06/2020 323 Docket Text ORDER Re: 321 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Zaur D. Gajiev by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker, 322 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Leonardo Sun Muniz Kim by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; BOTH ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/6/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
03/06/2020 324 REPLY to Response to Motion re 304 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Issued to Mark Byrne and Michael Salant filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 03/06/2020)
03/06/2020 325 DECLARATION filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker re 324 Reply to Response to Motion, . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Q, # 2 Exhibit R, # 3 Exhibit S, # 4 Exhibit T, # 5 Exhibit U)(Prasad, Vivake) (Entered: 03/06/2020)

03/10/2020 326 MOTION to Withdraw / Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Certain Counsel by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Tomback, Andrew) (Entered: 03/10/2020)
03/11/2020 327 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 326 MOTION to Withdraw / Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw Certain Counsel by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; GRANTED, Attorney Sonia Williams Murphy; Seiji Niwa; Martin Bingham Sawyer; Mauricio A. Gonzalez and Lawrence Crane Moscowitz terminated.. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/11/2020. (JMP) (Entered: 03/11/2020)
03/12/2020 328 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 316 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents from Defendant the City of Ferguson filed by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I − St. Louis County Presiding Judge Judge Reno Order of December 18, 2019, # 2 Exhibit II − Email Chain ending January 16, 2020)(Hill, Blake) (Entered: 03/12/2020)
03/13/2020 329 STATUS REPORT of Defendant (per Order of 2/28/20) by Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I − St. Louis County Presiding Judge Judge Reno Order of December 18, 2019)(Hill, Blake) (Entered: 03/13/2020)
03/13/2020 330 STATUS REPORT / Plaintiffs' Status Report by Roelif Carter, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Daker, Angela) (Entered: 03/13/2020)
03/17/2020 331 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt. The Certificate of Good Standing was attached.(Filing fee $100 receipt number AMOEDC−7820203) by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing)(Heery−Hyatt, Micaela) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
03/18/2020 332 Docket Text ORDER Re: 331 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Micaela Ann Heery−Hyatt by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker; ORDERED GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/18/2020. (AFC) (Entered: 03/18/2020)
03/23/2020 333 REPLY to Response to Motion re 316 MOTION to Compel / Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Productions of Documents from Defendant the City of Ferguson filed by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Audette, Danielle) (Entered: 03/23/2020)
03/24/2020 334 LETTER from USCA with letter/order from U.S. Supreme Court attached. USCA Appeal #: 19−2939 Supreme Court #: 19−1025. The petition for writ of certiorari has been denied.(KJS) (Entered: 03/24/2020)
03/31/2020 335 STATUS REPORT (Supplement to ECF 329) by Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Hill, Blake) (Entered: 03/31/2020)
04/18/2020 336 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm John M. Reeves and Reeves Law, LLC by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John) (Entered: 04/18/2020)
04/20/2020 337 Docket Text ORDER: Re: 336 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney ;attorney/firm John M. Reeves and Reeves Law, LLC by Defendant Ferguson, Missouri, City of. (Reeves, John); GRANTED, Attorney John Michael Reeves, Jr terminated. Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/20/20. (JMP) (Entered: 04/20/2020)
04/21/2020 338 MOTION to Amend/Correct 290 Case Management Order − Amended, / Modification of Schedule by Plaintiffs Roelif Carter, Tonya DeBerry, Keilee Fant, Daniel Jenkins, Anthony Kimble, Alfred Morris, Shameika Morris, John R. Narayan, Allison Nelson, Herbert Nelson, Jr, Donyale Thomas, Ronnie Tucker. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Daker, Angela) (Entered: 04/21/2020)

04/23/2020 339 AMENDED CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Joint Motion for Modification of Scheduling Order is GRANTED. ECF No. 338 . IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following amended schedule shall apply in this case: [SEE ORDER FOR FULL DETAILS]( Discovery Completion due by 1/4/2021.) Signed by District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 4/23/20. (JMP) (Entered: 04/23/2020)