Create an Alert for This Case on RECAP

MAG,DCD,MEDIATION

U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:20-cv-00965-CB-LPL

RULLI et al v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH et al Assigned to: Judge Cathy Bissoon Referred to: Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan related Case: 2:21-cv-00038-LPL Cause: 28:1983 Civil Rights

Date Filed: 06/29/2020 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
NICOLE RULLI individually and on behalf of her minor son, A.F.

represented by Jamelia N. Morgan Abolitionist Law Center P.O. Box 8654 Pittsburgh, PA 15221 650-387-8582 Email: jamelia@alcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Schuetz Coleman Law Offices of Timothy P. O'Brien 535 Smithfield Street Suite 1025 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 (412) 232-4400 Email: msc@obrienlawpgh.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alexander B Wright Law Offices of Timothy P. O'Brien 535 Smithfield Street Suite 1025 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 412-232-4400 Fax: 412-232-3730 Email: abw@obrienlawpgh.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bret Grote

Plaintiff CHARLES BRYANT, JR.

Abolitionist Law Center PO Box 8654 Pittsburgh, PA 15221 412-654-9070 Email: bretgrote@abolitionistlawcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christine T. Elzer Elzer Law Firm, LLC 100 First Avenue Suite 1010 Pittsburgh , PA 15222 (412) 230-8436 Fax: (412) 206-0855 Email: celzer@elzerlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Quinn Cozzens Abolitionist Law Center PO Box 8654 Pittsburgh, PA 15221 717-419-6583 Email: qcozzens@alcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamelia N. Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Schuetz Coleman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander B Wright (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bret Grote (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff SIMON PHILLIPS
Plaintiff DONOVAN HAYDEN

Christine T. Elzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Quinn Cozzens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamelia N. Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Schuetz Coleman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander B Wright (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bret Grote (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christine T. Elzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Quinn Cozzens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamelia N. Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Schuetz Coleman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff JENNIFER "JAY" YODER
Plaintiff

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander B Wright (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bret Grote (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christine T. Elzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Quinn Cozzens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jamelia N. Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Schuetz Coleman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander B Wright (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bret Grote (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christine T. Elzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Quinn Cozzens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CHRISTOPHER WILSON individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated
V. Defendant CITY OF PITTSBURGH

represented by Jamelia N. Morgan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Schuetz Coleman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander B Wright (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bret Grote (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christine T. Elzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Quinn Cozzens (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael E. Kennedy City of Pittsburgh, Department of Law Federal Practice Group 313 City-County Building 414 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412-255-2025 Fax: 412-255-2285 Email: michael.kennedy@pittsburghpa.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily McNally City of Pittsburgh

Defendant
WILLIAM PEDUTO individually and in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh TERMINATED: 04/05/2021

Department of Law 313 City-County Building 414 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412-2552613 Fax: 4122552285 Email: emily.mcnally@pittsburghpa.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie E. Koren City of Pittsburgh Law Department 414 Grant Street # 313 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412-255-2032 Fax: 412-255-2285 Email: julie.koren@pittsburghpa.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yvonne Schlosberg Hilton City of Pittsburgh Department of Law 414 Grant Street 313 City-County Building Pittsburgh, PA 15219 (412) 255-2001 Fax: (412) 255-2285 Email: yvonne.hilton@pittsburghpa.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lourdes Sanchez Ridge Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP 38th Floor, One Oxford Centre 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412-263-1841 Fax: 412-263-2001 Email: lsr1@pietragallo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John R. Brumberg

Defendant WENDELL HISSRICH individually and in his official capacity as Director of Public Safety for the City of Pittsburgh
Defendant SCOTT SCHUBERT individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
Defendant

Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP One Oxford Centre, 38th Floor 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 412-263-2000 Fax: 412-263-2001 Email: JRB@Pietragallo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael E. Kennedy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily McNally (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie E. Koren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yvonne Schlosberg Hilton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael E. Kennedy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily McNally (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie E. Koren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yvonne Schlosberg Hilton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

STEPHEN VINANSKY Commander of Zone 5 of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, in his individual capacity
Defendant JASON LANDO Commander of Narcotics and Vice for the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, in his individual capacity
Defendant JOHN DOE Tactical Commander, in his individual capacity,

represented by Michael E. Kennedy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily McNally (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie E. Koren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yvonne Schlosberg Hilton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael E. Kennedy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily McNally (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie E. Koren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yvonne Schlosberg Hilton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/29/2020

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against CITY OF PITTSBURGH, JOHN DOE, WENDELL HISSRICH, JASON LANDO, WILLIAM PEDUTO, SCOTT SCHUBERT, STEPHEN VINANSKY (Filing fee, including Administrative fee, $400, receipt number APAWDC-5720795), filed

06/29/2020 06/29/2020 06/29/2020 06/29/2020 07/09/2020 07/10/2020 07/10/2020 09/04/2020 09/04/2020

by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (jd) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Bret Grote on behalf of CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Grote, Bret) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Quinn Cozzens on behalf of CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Cozzens, Quinn) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Christine T. Elzer on behalf of CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Elzer, Christine) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
5 ORDER re Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) Motions to Dismiss, as more fully stated in said order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 06/29/2020. (jmb) (Entered: 06/29/2020)
6 MOTION for attorney Jamelia Morgan to Appear Pro Hac Vice, (Filing fee $70, Receipt # APAWDC-5750144) by NICOLE RULLI. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A) (Morgan, Jamelia) (Entered: 07/09/2020)
7 ORDER GRANTING the 6 Motion for Jamelia Morgan to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 07/10/2020. Text-only entry; no PDF document will issue. This textonly entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Alexander B Wright on behalf of CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Wright, Alexander) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
9 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. CITY OF PITTSBURGH waiver sent on 7/31/2020, answer due 9/29/2020. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 09/04/2020)
10 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY"

09/04/2020 09/04/2020 09/04/2020 09/10/2020 09/16/2020 09/25/2020 09/29/2020 10/01/2020
10/07/2020

YODER. WENDELL HISSRICH waiver sent on 7/31/2020, answer due 9/29/2020. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 09/04/2020)

11 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. JASON LANDO waiver sent on 7/31/2020, answer due 9/29/2020. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 09/04/2020)

12 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. SCOTT SCHUBERT waiver sent on 7/31/2020, answer due 9/29/2020. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 09/04/2020)

13 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. STEPHEN VINANSKY waiver sent on 7/31/2020, answer due 9/29/2020. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 09/04/2020)

14 PRAECIPE to Issue Summons by CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER (Attachments: # 1 Summons) (Elzer, Christine) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

15 Summons Issued as to WILLIAM PEDUTO. (ept) (Entered: 09/16/2020)

16 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. WILLIAM PEDUTO waiver sent on 8/28/2020, answer due 10/27/2020. (Elzer, Christine) (Entered: 09/25/2020)

ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by CITY OF PITTSBURGH, WENDELL

17

HISSRICH, JASON LANDO, SCOTT SCHUBERT, STEPHEN

VINANSKY. (Koren, Julie) (Entered: 09/29/2020)

18 ORDER that a Preliminary Telephone Conference is set for October 8, 2020 at 4:30 PM before Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan. All participants shall call into the conference by dialing 888-363-4749 and entering the access code 6019141. If asked for a security code, use * to bypass. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 10/01/2020. Textonly entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb) (Entered: 10/01/2020)

19 ORDER CANCELLING the Preliminary Telephone Conference set for 10/8/2020 at 4:30 PM. This conference will be rescheduled once all parties are represented by counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge

10/07/2020 10/08/2020 10/08/2020 10/09/2020 10/09/2020
10/09/2020
10/15/2020

Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 10/07/2020. Text-only entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb) (Entered: 10/07/2020)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Lourdes Sanchez Ridge on behalf of WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Ridge, Lourdes) (Entered: 10/07/2020)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael E. Kennedy on behalf of CITY OF PITTSBURGH, WENDELL HISSRICH, JASON LANDO, SCOTT SCHUBERT, STEPHEN VINANSKY. (Kennedy, Michael) (Entered: 10/08/2020)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by Emily McNally on behalf of CITY OF PITTSBURGH, WENDELL HISSRICH, JASON LANDO, SCOTT SCHUBERT, STEPHEN VINANSKY. (McNally, Emily) (Entered: 10/08/2020)
23 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, filed by CHRISTOPHER WILSON, SIMON PHILLIPS, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER, DONOVAN HAYDEN, NICOLE RULLI, CHARLES BRYANT, JR. by WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ridge, Lourdes) (Entered: 10/09/2020)
24 ORDER that a Preliminary Telephone Conference is set for October 14, 2020 at 1:30 PM before Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan. All participants shall call into the conference by dialing 888-363-4749 and entering the access code 6019141. If asked for a security code, use * to bypass. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 10/09/2020. Textonly entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb) (Entered: 10/09/2020)
25 ORDER GRANTING the 23 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to file a Response to the Complaint. Defendant William Peduto's response to the Complaint is due on or before November 6, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 10/09/2020. Textonly entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb) (Entered: 10/09/2020)
26 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan: A Preliminary Telephonic Status Conference was held on 10/14/2020. Judge Lenihan disclosed that she is acquainted with Attorney Ridge and Chief Schubert. She believes that she can be impartial but if any party requests recusal, they are to contact her courtroom deputy, Mr. Banas, at 412-208-7370 by 5 PM October 19, 2020. The Court further inquired if the parties wanted to engage in either an early judicial settlement conference or early mediation rather than proceed through the normal discovery and motions process. If

10/16/2020 10/20/2020
10/22/2020 10/23/2020
11/06/2020 11/06/2020 11/06/2020 11/06/2020

there are no requests for recusal, a second telephone conference will be scheduled next week to further discuss an early mediation option. (jmb) (Entered: 10/15/2020)
27 NOTICE of Appearance by Yvonne Schlosberg Hilton on behalf of CITY OF PITTSBURGH, WENDELL HISSRICH, JASON LANDO, SCOTT SCHUBERT, STEPHEN VINANSKY. (Hilton, Yvonne) (Entered: 10/16/2020)
28 ORDER that a Telephone Conference is scheduled for October 23, 2020 at 10:00 AM to discuss early mediation options. All participants shall call into the conference by dialing 888-363-4749 and entering the access code 6019141. If asked for a security code, use * to bypass. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 10/20/2020. Textonly entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb) (Entered: 10/20/2020)
29 NOTICE of Appearance by John R. Brumberg on behalf of WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Brumberg, John) (Entered: 10/22/2020)
30 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan: A Telephonic Status Conference was held on 10/23/2020. The Court inquired if the parties would like to engage in early mediation. The City Defendants advised that, while they would enter into discussions involving policy issues, they want to conduct discovery to address the monetary damages claims. Therefore, they propose the case proceed under the usual parameters. (jmb) (Entered: 10/23/2020)
31 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Exhibit Certificate of Compliance) (Brumberg, John) Link added to 32 Errata. Modified on 11/6/2020 (ept). Attachments #1, #2 and #3 removed from view and refiled as erratas at 32 and 33 . Modified on 11/6/2020 (ept). (Entered: 11/06/2020)
32 Errata re 31 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by WILLIAM PEDUTO. Reason for Correction: Filed under wrong attorney's login. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Compliance) (Ridge, Lourdes) (Entered: 11/06/2020)
33 Errata re 31 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, 32 Errata, Brief by WILLIAM PEDUTO. Reason for Correction: Brief was filed as an exhibit. (Ridge, Lourdes) Document removed from view and redocketed at 34 . Modified on 11/6/2020 (ept). (Entered: 11/06/2020)
34 BRIEF in Support re 31 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed by WILLIAM PEDUTO. (ept) (Entered: 11/06/2020)

11/12/2020 11/13/2020 12/23/2020 12/23/2020 12/24/2020 01/14/2021 02/26/2021
03/09/2021 03/09/2021

35 MOTION to Extend Time to Respond to Motion to Dismiss by CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 11/12/2020)
36 ORDER GRANTING the 35 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs are granted an additional 25 days to respond to Defendant Peduto's Motion to Dismiss, with same being due on or before December 23, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 11/13/2020. (jmb) (Entered: 11/13/2020)
37 MOTION for Extension of Time to File by WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ridge, Lourdes) (Entered: 12/23/2020)
38 BRIEF in Opposition re 31 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed by CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Elzer, Christine) (Entered: 12/23/2020)
39 ORDER granting 37 Peduto Motion for Extension of Time to File a Reply to the Response to the Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Peduto Reply due by 1/14/2021. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 12/24/20. Text-only entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (Lenihan, Lisa) (Entered: 12/24/2020)
40 REPLY re 38 Brief in Opposition to Motion filed by WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Ridge, Lourdes) Modified on 1/14/2021 (ept). (Entered: 01/14/2021)
41 ORDER that the Initial Case Management Conference in this matter will be held via telephone on March 12, 2021, at 11:00 AM. All participants shall call into the conference by dialing 888-363-4749 and entering the access code 6019141. If asked for a security code, use * to bypass. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file a Rule 26(f) Report no later than two days before the scheduled conference. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file the Stipulation Selecting ADR Process no later than two days before the scheduled conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 02/26/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ADR Form) (jmb) (Entered: 02/26/2021)
42 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 03/09/2021)
43 STIPULATION selecting ADR process by CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI,

03/12/2021 03/12/2021

CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 03/09/2021)
44 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan: A Telephonic Initial Case Management Conference was held on 3/12/2021. The parties request until May 28, 2021 to mediate the case. Only written discovery will be needed. The Plaintiffs will make a demand, including monetary and non-monetary terms, 10 days prior to the mediation. Depending on the demand, Defendants will ensure that someone is present who can speak to any policy making issues as well as someone with complete settlement authority. The Mayor is excused from participating in the initial mediation but he or someone from his office may be required to participate at a later session. Counsel request additional time for class and fact discovery due to the complexity and to allow time for settlement discussions. The Court will allow this, given that both class and fact discovery will proceed in tandem. An Initial Scheduling Order will be entered. Following the conference, the Court realized that there is a John Doe Defendant and therefore, it cannot ask if the parties will consent to magistrate jurisdiction. This will impact whether the ruling on the Mayor's Motion to Dismiss will be via opinion or Report and Recommendation. A telephone conference will be scheduled for March 16, 2021 at 9:30 AM to discuss this. The same dial in numbers are to be used. Counsel are requested to confer to see if the identity of the Doe Defendant, described in the Complaint as the Tactical Commander of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police SWAT Unit during the events described, can be identified. (jmb) (Entered: 03/12/2021)
45 CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER: Compliance with provisions of Rule 16 shall be completed as follows: Initial disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) shall be made by April 2, 2021. Amendments to the pleadings and joinder of additional parties will be completed by April 15, 2021. The ADR process will be completed no later than May 28, 2021. A telephone status conference is scheduled for June 4, 2021 at 10:00 AM. Counsel are to call into the conference by dialing 888-363-4749 and entering the access code 6019141. If asked for a security code, use * to bypass. The parties shall complete class and fact discovery by November 29, 2021. A status/settlement conference will be held on December 6, 2021 at 10:00 am. Trial counsel shall attend and the parties shall be available by telephone. No later than 5 business days prior to the conference any party intending to file a motion for summary judgment shall file a statement, no longer than 3 pages, setting forth the grounds on which the motion will be filed. All parties are to be prepared to discuss this at the conference. All parties are also to be prepared to discuss the filing of the class certification motion. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 03/12/2021. (jmb) (Entered: 03/12/2021)

03/16/2021 03/17/2021 03/17/2021 03/23/2021
04/05/2021 04/05/2021
04/06/2021 04/12/2021

46 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan: A Telephonic Status Conference was held on 3/16/2021. The City of Pittsburgh advised that it would not be able to identify the John Doe Defendant at this time, so the Court will structure the opinion on the Motion to Dismiss as a Report & Recommendation and have a district judge assigned. (jmb) (Entered: 03/16/2021)
Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan no longer assigned to case. (cww) (Entered: 03/17/2021)
Judge Cathy Bissoon presiding. Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan referred. (cww) (Entered: 03/17/2021)
47 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 31 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by WILLIAM PEDUTO recommending that the Motion be granted in part and denied in part. The Motion should be granted with prejudice as it relates to the official capacity claims against Defendant Peduto and as to any claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345. The Motion should be granted without prejudice to filing an Amended Complaint as it relates to Plaintiffs' claims against Mayor Peduto for supervisory liability. It is further recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the class action allegations be denied as moot. Objections to R&R due by 4/6/2021 Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 3/23/2021. (vad) (Entered: 03/23/2021)
48 STIPULATION of Dismissal Without Prejudice as to William Peduto by NICOLE RULLI. (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 04/05/2021)
WILLIAM PEDUTO (individually and in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh) has been terminated. See Stip. of Dismissal (Doc. 48 ). The dismissal under Fed. Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) was effective on filing, and no Court order is/was required. The Magistrate Judge's R&R is not limited to the claims against Mr. Peduto, and the deadlines for objections and responses are unaffected. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on 4/5/21. Text-only entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (dcd) (Entered: 04/05/2021)
49 OBJECTIONS to 47 Report and Recommendation filed by CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. (Elzer, Christine) (Entered: 04/06/2021)
50 MOTION to Intervene by WILLIAM PEDUTO. Motion(s) referred to Lisa Pupo Lenihan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ridge, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/12/2021)

04/12/2021 04/13/2021 04/15/2021 05/19/2021 05/19/2021

51 BRIEF in Support re 50 Motion to Intervene filed by WILLIAM PEDUTO. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1) (Ridge, Lourdes) (Entered: 04/12/2021)

MEMORANDUM ORDER. The R&R (Doc. 47 ) is adopted as the

52

Opinion of the District Court, as relates to 28 U.S.C. § 1345, and

otherwise is moot. Also, Defendant Peduto's Motion to Intervene

(Doc. 50 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Cathy Bissoon on

4/13/21. (dcd) (Entered: 04/13/2021)

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Mediation. David B. White is

53

appointed as mediator. Party DAVID B. WHITE added. Signed by

Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 04/15/2021. (jmb) (Entered:

04/15/2021)

54 Joint MOTION to Extend Time to Complete ADR by CHARLES BRYANT, JR, DONOVAN HAYDEN, SIMON PHILLIPS, NICOLE RULLI, CHRISTOPHER WILSON, JENNIFER "JAY" YODER. Motion(s) referred to Lisa Pupo Lenihan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Coleman, Margaret) (Entered: 05/19/2021)

55 ORDER GRANTING the 54 Joint Motion to Extend ADR Process. The parties are granted an extension of 120 days to conduct an ADR conference with the same to be concluded on or before September 27, 2021. The June 4th Telephone Conference is continued to September 29, 2021 at 3:00 PM. Signed by Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan on 05/19/2021. (jmb) (Entered: 05/19/2021)

PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt

PACER Login:
Description:
Billable Pages:

05/26/2021 12:01:33

CRClearinghouse Client Code:

Docket Report

Search Criteria:

13

Cost:

Hill
2:20-cv-00965-CBLPL
1.30

 
 Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 1 of 42

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICOLE RULLI, individually and on behalf of her )

minor son, A.F.; CHARLES BRYANT JR.; )

SIMON PHILLIPS; DONOVAN HAYDEN; )

JENNIFER “JAY” YODER; DONOVAN )

HAYDEN; and CHRISTOPHER WILSON )

JURING, individually and on behalf of all )

persons similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF PITTSBURGH; WILLIAM PEDUTO, )

individually and in his official capacity as Mayor )

of the City of Pittsburgh; WENDELL HISSRICH, )

individually and in his official capacity as )

Director of Public Safety for the City of )

Pittsburgh; SCOTT SCHUBERT, individually )

and in his official capacity as Chief of the )

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; STEPHEN )

VINANSKY, Commander of Zone 5 of the )

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, in his individual )

capacity, JASON LANDO, Commander of )

Narcotics and Vice for the Pittsburgh Bureau of )

Police, in his individual capacity, JOHN DOE, )

Tactical Commander, in his individual capacity, )

)

Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:20-cv-965 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT IN CIVIL ACTION

I) INTRODUCTION

1. Following the murder of George Floyd, a Black man, by Minneapolis, MN police officers on May 25, 2020, a wave of sustained, large-scale demonstrations against racism and racialized police violence swept across the United States and spread throughout many parts of the world. Protesters expressed their outrage and called for
1

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 2 of 42
justice not only for George Floyd’s murder, but also for Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade, and numerous other Black people, indigenous people, and people of color killed by police in the United States. Protesters have also called for changes to address systemic racism and reshape the way matters of public safety are addressed in this country and in their communities.
2. On June 1, 2020, people from Pittsburgh and surrounding communities assembled in the East Liberty neighborhood of the City of Pittsburgh to add their voices to these nationwide protests and seek change locally. The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police (“PBP”) responded by escalating a peaceful protest into a scene of pandemonium, panic, violence and bloodshed. The PBP deployed hundreds of officers to counter approximately 150 protesters. As the assembled protesters held their hands in the air and chanted, “This is not a riot,” and “Hands up – Don’t shoot,” PBP ordered its officers to attack them with explosives, chemical agents and ammunition which is known to seriously wound and sometimes kill its targets. PBP officers drove ambulances past injured protesters without stopping. After ordering peaceful protesters to leave the area, PBP officers blocked their escape with chemical gas, riot police and mounted patrols. PBP then arrested several protestors for failing to disperse, subjecting them to confinement in the midst of a global COVID-19 pandemic. The PBP ordered tactical officers dressed in paramilitary garb to patrol a residential neighborhood in armored vehicles and arbitrarily throw canisters of chemical gas at and/or arrest anyone they encountered.
3. Plaintiffs assembled in East Liberty to protest the routine covering up of police misconduct and abuse. In response, City of Pittsburgh officials, including the Mayor, Public Safety Director and Chief of Police, disseminated flagrant lies to conceal
2

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 3 of 42
and/or justify the PBP’s shameless use of force against peaceful protesters. These
officials accused protesters of hurling rocks and “volleys of bricks” at PBP officers, and
vehemently denied using chemical agents. Numerous videos demonstrate that these
statements were patently false.
4. Plaintiffs are peaceful protesters who were subjected to police violence
while protesting police violence.
• Nicole Rulli and Charles Bryant brought Ms. Rulli’s thirteen-year-old son, A.F., to the protest to teach him about his First Amendment rights. The police gassed his family and taught him to fear political protests.
• Simon Phillips is a dance instructor who attended the protest for “the chance to congregate with others” and express his “feelings of grief, frustration, and desperation for the Black community.” He was arrested near his East Liberty apartment after he complied with the PBP’s order to leave.
• Donovan Hayden does public service work for a local non-profit. He attended the protest to oppose the “degrading, reckless and racist policing” which he and other Black people experience on a daily basis. PBP officers gassed him chased him a gunpoint as he left the protest.
• Jennifer “Jay” Yoder has a background in social justice and is a trained peacemaker. Yoder attended the protest to support the movement and aid other protesters. Police gassed and pushed Yoder and arrested them1 as they attempted to return to their car after the protest.
• Christopher Wilson Juring is a food service worker. He attended to protest violence and racism and to show support for the African American community. PBP shot him in the back as he fled a cloud of tear gas and smoke.
5. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ conduct violated their First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and assembly, their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from
1 Yoder uses the pronouns “they” and “them.”
3

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 4 of 42
excessive force and false arrest and their Fourteenth Amendment right not to be subject to official governmental policies which violate their constitutional rights.
II) PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Nicole Rulli is an adult resident of the City of Pittsburgh, County of
Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. She files this lawsuit on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son A.F..
7. Plaintiff Charles Bryant, Jr. is an adult resident of the City of Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
8. Plaintiff Simon Phillips is an adult resident of the City of Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
9. Plaintiff Jennifer “Jay” Yoder is an adult resident of the City of Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
10. Plaintiff Donovan Hayden is an adult resident of the City of Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
11. Plaintiff Christopher Wilson Juring is an adult resident of the City of Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
12. Defendant City of Pittsburgh is a municipality within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a principal place of business located at 414 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219. At all times relevant hereto, this Defendant was authorized to and did operate and maintain the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police (“PBP”). At all relevant times this Defendant acted by and through its duly authorized agents, employees and/or assigns, who were then and there acting within the course and scope of their employment,
4

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 5 of 42
under the color of state law and in accordance with the customs, policies and practices of the City of Pittsburgh.
13. Defendant William Peduto is the Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh. At all times relevant, Peduto was the chief policymaker of Defendant City of Pittsburgh. At all times relevant, Peduto ordered, authorized and/or acquiesced in the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged herein. At all times relevant, Peduto was acting under color of state law, within the course and scope of his official duties and in accordance with the customs and/or policies of the City of Pittsburgh. Peduto is sued in his official and individual capacities.
14. Defendant Wendell Hissrich is the Director of the City of Pittsburgh Department of Public Safety. Hissrich is the chief policymaker for the City of Pittsburgh Department of Public Safety. At all times relevant, Hissrich ordered, authorized, participated in and/or acquiesced in the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged herein. At all times relevant, Hissrich was acting under color of state law, within the course and scope of his official duties and in accordance with the customs and/or policies of the City of Pittsburgh. Hissrich is sued in his official and individual capacities.
15. Defendant Scott Schubert is the Chief of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. At all times relevant, Schubert was a policymaker of Defendant City of Pittsburgh. At all times relevant, Schubert ordered, authorized, participated in and/or acquiesced in the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged herein. At all times relevant, Schubert was acting under color of state law, within the course and scope of his official duties and in accordance with the customs and/or policies of the City of Pittsburgh. Schubert is sued in his official and individual capacities.
5

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 6 of 42
16. Defendant Stephen Vinansky is the Commander of Zone 5 of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. At all times relevant, Vinansky ordered, authorized, participated in, and/or acquiesced in the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged herein. At all times relevant, Vinansky was acting under color of state law, within the course and scope of his official duties and in accordance with the customs and/or policies of the City of Pittsburgh. Vinaski is sued in his individual capacity.
17. Defendant Jason Lando is the Commander of Narcotics and Vice for the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. At all times relevant, Lando ordered, authorized, participated in, and/or acquiesced in the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged herein. At all times relevant, Lando was acting under color of state law, within the course and scope of his official duties and in accordance with the customs and/or policies of the City of Pittsburgh. Lando is sued in his individual capacity.
18. Defendant John Doe was the Tactical Commander of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit during the events described herein. At all times relevant, Doe ordered, authorized, participated in, and/or acquiesced in the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged herein. At all times relevant, Doe was acting under color of state law, within the course and scope of his official duties and in accordance with the customs and/or policies of the City of Pittsburgh. Defendant Doe is sued in his individual capacity.
III) JURISDICTION 19. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 USC §§ 451, 1331,
1343 and 1345, and upon the doctrine of pendant and/or supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims.
6

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 7 of 42
20. Venue is proper in this Court because the events described herein occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
IV) FACTS
a. City Officials were on notice that the PBP could and would indiscriminately use excessive force against peaceful protesters.
21. On May 25, 2020 Minneapolis police officers murdered George Floyd, an African-American man, by kneeling on his neck and back until he suffocated. Video of the murder sparked public outrage and weeks of protests against racism and police violence throughout the United States that continue as of the filing of this Complaint.
22. Numerous protests took place in and around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 23. On Saturday, May 30, 2020 thousands of concerned residents of the City of Pittsburgh and surrounding areas gathered in Pittsburgh’s Downtown area to protest police racism and violence. The vast majority of the attendees did not engage in any property damage or violence. However, following some reports of property damage, PBP officers used chemical gas, rubber bullets and other projectiles, pepper spray, flashbang grenades and other riot control agents indiscriminately against everyone present, including peaceful protesters and nonviolent bystanders. Numerous protesters were seriously injured. The PBP arrested 46 people at the protests for “failure to disperse.” The Allegheny County District Attorney refused to pursue charges against at least 39 of these arrestees because the PBP’s evidence was insufficient to support the charges. 24. As a result of the PBP’s actions on May 30, 2020, Defendants Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert were on notice that PBP officers would use overwhelming and excessive force against peaceful protesters with little or no provocation.
7

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 8 of 42
25. As a result of the PBP’s actions on May 30, 2020, Defendants Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert were on notice that PBP officers would arrest and jail peaceful protesters with little or no evidence to support criminal charges.
26. Defendants Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert supported the PBP actions. 27. Defendants Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert made no effort to ensure that such indiscriminate use of force did not occur at future protests.
b. PBP used excessive force against peaceful protesters on June 1, 2020 28. On June 1, 2020 thousands of concerned Pittsburgh residents again gathered to protest police racism and violence, this time in the East Liberty neighborhood of the City of Pittsburgh. 29. Plaintiffs were among those protesters who gathered in East Liberty on June 1, 2020. 30. Plaintiff Nicole Rulli attended the protest with her fiancé Plaintiff Charles Bryant, Jr. and her thirteen-year-old son, A.F. (collectively “Rulli family”). Rulli is Caucasian, Bryant is African-American and A.F. is biracial. Bryant wrote of his decision to attend the protest: “Attending the protest on June 1st was the most patriotic act of my life. I was exercising my 1st amendment rights.” Rulli and Bryant brought A.F. to the protest because they wanted to expose him to a peaceful political protest and teach him about his constitutional rights. 31. Plaintiff Simon Phillips is a dance instructor. He is African American. Phillips wrote that he attended the protest for “the chance to congregate with others” and express his “feelings of grief, frustration, and desperation for the Black community.”
8

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 9 of 42
32. Plaintiff Donovan Hayden works for a local arts non-profit. Hayden wrote of his reasons for joining the protest: “The recent killings of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd, reignited the anger that I share with many black people. The anger that comes from being victims to degrading, reckless, and racist policing. I channeled and expressed that anger through protesting on June 1st. I marched, sang, and listened with others to mourn the lives lost and challenge the systems killing us.”
33. Plaintiff Christoper Wilson Juring works in the food service industry. He participated in the protest in order to exercise his First Amendment rights. Juring wrote the following regarding his reasons for protesting: “On Monday, June 1st, 2020 I attended the Black Lives Matter protest in East Liberty to give my support to the fight against police brutality and systemic racism. I feel that participating in such protests is a necessary step in demanding change. As a white person, I wanted to use my privilege and my voice when so many people can’t even walk down the street without fearing for their lives.”
34. Plaintiff Jennifer “Jay” Yoder works for a non-profit that supports survivors of sexual violence. Yoder is a trained international human rights observer and peacemaker and has observed and participated in protests involving international conflict. Jay was at the protest to support racial justice and oppose police brutality, as well to observe police conduct and assist protestors.
35. The protesters marched peacefully in the streets in the vicinity of Penn Avenue and Centre Avenue from approximately 3:30 pm until approximately 6:30 pm.
36. Historically, Defendants Peduto, Hissrich, Schubert and City of Pittsburgh have permitted, approved and/or encouraged similar protests in Pittsburgh streets.
9

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 10 of 42
37. Uniformed Pittsburgh Bureau of Police (PBP) officers approved and/or encouraged the protesters’ activities by, inter alia, marching with them, communicating with organizers, blocking off streets and redirecting traffic.
38. By attending, approving, encouraging, and assisting the protesters activities, Defendants communicated to them that they were exercising their First Amendment rights in a time, place and manner that Defendants considered reasonable.
39. At approximately 6:30 pm, the protesters congregated at the Target store located at the Corner of Penn Avenue and Centre Avenue. Many either remained at that location or left the area.
40. Between 6:30 pm and 7:00 pm, a much smaller group of 100 to 150 protesters continued to march down Centre Avenue toward Negley Avenue (hereinafter “Protesters”).
41. The Protesters marched peacefully down Centre Avenue for over half a mile.
42. Although Defendant Peduto had implemented a curfew for the City of Pittsburgh, this curfew would not go into effect until 8:30 pm, nearly two hours later.
43. As the Protesters marched, approximately 50 to 100 PBP officers formed a line across Centre Avenue at Negley Avenue, blocking the Protesters’ path.
44. The officers wore helmets, face shields and gas masks. Every officer held either a baton or a firearm.
45. Additional officers were dressed in military gear including camouflage, helmets and gas masks. These officers carried firearms and other tactical gear. Some
10

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 11 of 42
had police dogs. On information and belief, these officers were members of the PBP Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) Team.
46. At about the same time as the above described PBP officers blocked the Protesters’ path on Centre Avenue, other PBP officers and/or law enforcement officers acting under the direction of PBP, formed similar lines across other East Liberty streets.
47. The Protesters stopped on Centre Avenue approximately 30 feet from the line of police officers.
48. The Protesters were peaceful. 49. The Protesters’ behavior was not materially different from the behavior of the larger group of protesters earlier in the day, which the PBP openly approved and supported. 50. Groups of Protesters chanted, “Hands up - Don’t Shoot,” “This is not a riot,” “Join us,” and similar phrases. Some Protesters knelt on the ground with their hands in the air. Link to Video 1; Link to Video 2 2 51. The Protesters did not damage public or private property. 52. The Protesters did not throw bricks or rocks at the PBP officers. 53. The Protesters did not engage in any activity that could have given rise to a reasonable belief that they were likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. 54. The Protesters did not present an imminent threat to public safety, peace or order;
2 All attachments can be viewed at the following link https://www.dropbox.com/sh/hlnksjtotwpxs0a/AAC7A6p0dbTaMvxTwA8NArzYa?dl=0
11

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 12 of 42
55. Nevertheless, on information and belief, Defendant Doe and/or other individually named Defendants made the decision to declare the Protesters’ assembly unlawful and order the Protesters to disperse.
56. Defendants’ Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert were either present during the above-described events or were otherwise aware of them as they occurred. These three defendants either made the decision to declare the assembly unlawful, or approved of that decision and the basis for that decision.
57. At approximately 7:17 pm, a PBP officer (possibly Defendant Doe) made the following announcement (hereinafter “unlawful assembly announcement”):
I am Officer [unintelligible] of the Pittsburgh Police. I hereby declare this to be an unlawful assembly. I order all those assembled at this location to immediately disperse. You must leave this immediate vicinity. If you remain in this vicinity you are in violation of the Pennsylvania crimes code. No matter what your purpose is you must leave. If you do not disperse you will be arrested and/or subject to other police action. Other police action may include actual physical removal, the use of riot control agents and/or less lethal munitions which could cause the risk of injury for those who remain. You must immediately leave outbound on Centre Avenue. [Unintelligible]
58. At that time, Centre Avenue outbound was blocked by numerous police vehicles and/or riot control officers;
59. Shortly after the first “unlawful assembly announcement” was made, PBP deployed a Long Range Acoustic Device (“LRAD”) against the Protesters. A LRAD is military-grade weapon that emits a “deterrent tone” so loud it can cause permanent hearing loss.
12

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 13 of 42
60. Police warned the Protesters not to “advance” on their line. However, nearly all of the Protesters were at least 30 feet away from the officers. At no time did any Protester “advance” on the officers.
61. The PBP officer made more “unlawful assembly announcements” over the next several minutes and continued to deploy the LRAD.
62. An unknown PBP officer discharged a firearm into the crowd hitting a Protester in the knee. Other Protesters dragged the injured Protester to the sidewalk and offered him assistance. Link to Video.
63. Despite this aggressive action by the PBP, the Protesters remained peaceful. They continued chanting but did not disperse. The Protesters did not throw rocks, bricks or bottles. The Protesters did not destroy property or commit acts of violence or vandalism. The Protesters did not advance on the police. Link to Video 1. Link to Video 2.
64. Despite the lack of any destruction, property damage or violent behavior by the Protesters, on information and belief, Defendant Doe ordered the PBP officers to use force against the Protesters.
65. The PBP and Defendants made no attempt to communicate to the Protesters why the assembly was declared unlawful.
66. The PBP and Defendants made no attempt to communicate to the Protesters why they were being ordered to disperse.
67. In the middle of an unlawful assembly announcement, a PBP police officer suddenly threw a “flashbang” grenade at the crowd. Link to Video 1; Link to Video 2; Link to Video 3.
13

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 14 of 42
68. A “flashbang” grenade is an explosive device designed to frighten and disorient an enemy through a blinding flash of light and extremely loud explosive noise.
69. Immediately following the detonation of the flashbang grenade, PBP officers began firing “rubber bullets,” “beanbags rounds” and/or “sponge grenades” at the Protesters. Link to Video.
70. “Rubber bullets” are large rubber coated metal cylinders which can be fired from standard firearms or dedicated “riot guns.” “Beanbag rounds” are cloth bags filled with lead shot which are fired from a 12-gauge shotgun. “Sponge grenades” are large plastic or metal bullets with dense foam rubber tips. They are typically fired from a 40mm grenade launcher.
71. Although these items are often referred to as “less lethal” munitions, they are fired with the force of a gun or grenade launcher and have the capability to cause serious injury and/or death, particularly when fired at close range or when fired at vulnerable areas of the body.
72. PBP officers also threw and/or shot canisters into the crowd, some of which emitted smoke (“smoke bombs”) and some of which emitted chemical gas commonly referred to as “tear gas” (“chemical grenades.”)
73. “Tear gas” generally refers to chemical agents that cause tearing, coughing, difficulty breathing, skin irritation and/or vomiting. Tear gas grenades can be thrown or fired from a grenade launcher.
74. Tear gas can cause serious complications for people with respiratory problems. Exposure to tear gas increases susceptibility to COVID-19 infection and/or complications.
14

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 15 of 42
75. Numerous Protesters were injured by tear gas thrown into the crowd. Link to Video. Many Protesters were coughing, had tears streaming down their faces, and had difficulty breathing and seeing. The tear gas caused some Protesters to vomit.
76. The explosions, gunfire, smoke and gas caused many of the Protesters to panic and run outbound on Centre Avenue and into nearby side streets. Link to Video.
77. The PBP officers immediately began to march outbound on Centre Avenue, continuing to indiscriminately shoot rubber bullets, beanbag rounds and/or sponge grenades at the fleeing Protesters as they ran away. Link to Video.
78. The smoke created from the PBP’s smoke bombs and chemical gas grenades was so thick that the officers could not see what or who they were shooting.
79. Videos show PBP officers shooting blindly into smoke-filled Centre Avenue as Protesters run away. Link to Video 1; Link to Video 2.
80. Numerous Protesters were hit with rubber bullets, bean bag rounds and sponge grenades. Some were seriously injured and required hospitalization.
81. One Protester was hit in the face with an unknown munition and knocked unconscious. He suffered serious injuries and began bleeding profusely. Other Protesters dragged him out of the street and attempted to render medical aid. Link to Video ; Link to Photograph. As they did so a SWAT officer threw a chemical grenade at them.
82. No ambulance arrived to treat or transport the protester, so other Protesters eventually drove him to the hospital where, on information and belief, he was treated for multiple facial fractures.
15

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 16 of 42
83. The marching PBP officers were flanked on the sidewalks by PBP SWAT officers who pointed their firearms at Protesters, shoved them and yelled at them. Link to Video.
84. As the PBP officers advanced, they continued to deploy chemical gas grenades, sometimes throwing them at Protesters as they fled.
85. PBP officers deployed oleoresin capsicum (“OC” or “pepper”) spray on fleeing and/or peaceful Protesters.
86. Multiple video recordings from the scene show two Protesters in an alley as the line of PBP officers approaches. The Protesters are on their knees with their hands in the air. An officer sprays an unknown substance, believed to be OC spray, into the Protesters’ faces multiple times from a distance of approximately five feet, causing them to run. A SWAT officer then throws a cannister, believed to be a chemical gas grenade, at the fleeing Protesters as another officer shoots an unknown munition at them. Link to Video 1; Link to Video 2.
87. As the PBP officers advanced, they knowingly shot at peaceful Protesters from dangerously close range.
88. Multiple video recordings from the scene depict a line of officers advancing on three Protesters (two men and a woman). The Protesters slowly walk backwards with their hands raised. A SWAT officer shoots the female protester in the chest with an unknown munition from a distance of approximately 10 feet. Link to Video 1 ; Link to Video 2.
16

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 17 of 42
89. The PBP used advancing lines of officers and chemical gas to cut off avenues of escape for fleeing Protesters. As a result, Protesters were forced to choose between approaching a line of officers or retreating into clouds of chemical gas.
90. PBP officers arrested trapped Protesters and falsely charged them with failure to disperse and disorderly conduct.
91. PBP officers shot and threw chemical gas canisters at trapped Protesters. 92. PBP officers continued to deploy chemical gas and other munitions on Protesters, bystanders and passers-by throughout East Liberty long after the Protesters had dispersed and over a half mile away from where the Protesters had initially assembled. Link to Video 1 ; Link to video 2 Link to Video 3; Link to Video 4. 93. PBP arrested and criminally charged 22 people on June 1 in relation to the protest. 94. Despite a lack of probable cause for these arrests, the PBP transported the 22 arrestees to the Allegheny County Jail where they were confined for hours in close quarters, in an area known to cause an increased risk of contracting COVID-19. 95. On June 18, the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office withdrew charges against all 22 people arrested and charged by PBP due to a lack of evidence.3
c. PBP prevented injured Protesters from receiving medical treatment 96. At all times relevant, at least one ambulance was at the scene and was escorted by an armored SWAT vehicle. This ambulance was not used to provide medical treatment or transportation to injured Protesters. On information and belief, this ambulance was requested by the PBP and was reserved to treat PBP personnel.
3 https://triblive.com/local/pittsburgh-allegheny/charged-dropped-for-22-protesters-arrested-in-east-libertymelee/
17

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 18 of 42
97. On information and belief, the PBP made no effort to ensure that EMTs or other trained medical professionals were available to treat injured Protesters, despite knowing that the level of force they planned to use against Protesters was likely to cause serious injury or death.
98. On information and belief, PBP officers prevented EMTs from entering the area and treating injured Protesters.
99. Because the PBP did not ensure that EMTs were available to treat Protesters and/or prevented EMTs from treating Protesters, injured Protesters received medical assistance by untrained and unqualified individuals and were transported to the hospital in cars and pickup trucks.
d. Plaintiffs Nicole Rulli, Charles Bryant, Jr. and A.F. (the “Rulli family”) 100. The Rulli family left for the protest when Rulli got home from work. They arrived at the corner of Centre Avenue and Penn Avenue at approximately 6:15. 101. The Rulli family joined the Protesters as they marched down Centre Avenue; 102. The Rulli family did not participate in any vandalism, violence or destruction, nor did they witness any vandalism, violence or destruction before the PBP used force against the Protesters. 103. The Rulli family did not throw any objects at PBP officers, nor did they witness anyone else throwing objects at PBP officers before the PBP used force against the Protesters.
18

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 19 of 42
104. The Rulli family did not disperse when ordered to do so because the Protesters were peaceful and they believed they had a First Amendment right to protest police misconduct in that place, at that time and in that manner.
105. After the PBP officers began shooting at them and gassing them, the Rulli family ran outbound on Centre Avenue as directed by the unlawful assembly announcement.
106. The Rulli family found that Centre Avenue outbound was blocked by PBP police in riot gear. Link to Photograph.
107. All of the side streets leading off of Centre Avenue were similarly blocked. 108. Unable to escape, the Rulli family ran to the top of a parking structure/shopping center along Centre Avenue at Beatty Street. 109. From the top of the parking garage they witnessed a Protester on a side street below who was bleeding profusely from the head. Several Protesters were surrounding the injured individual and attempting to render medical aid. No PBP officers or City of Pittsburgh EMTs assisted. Link to Video. As the Rulli family watched, a PBP officer threw a chemical grenade at the injured Protester and those trying to assist him. 110. Eventually the PBP officers advanced far enough down Centre Avenue that the Rulli family was able to exit the parking structure behind them and walk down the sidewalk on Centre Avenue toward their car, which was parked near the Target store. 111. As the Rulli family walked down Centre Avenue toward its intersection with Penn Avenue, an armored vehicle full of SWAT officers stopped in the middle of the street. The armored vehicle was followed by a City of Pittsburgh ambulance and several other PBP vehicles.
19

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 20 of 42
112. The corner of Penn and Centre is well over a half mile from the location where the Protesters had gathered.
113. Several SWAT Officers exited the armored vehicle. Without warning, one of these SWAT officers threw a chemical gas grenade at the Rulli family. Link to Video.
114. The grenade hit Rulli’s foot and immediately began spewing gas in her face; SWAT officers threw two more chemical gas grenades at the family.
115. Rulli yelled to thirteen-year-old A.F., telling him to run as she collapsed, unable to breathe and in excruciating pain.
116. Bryant, who suffers from asthma, was similarly disabled by the chemical gas the PBP officer had thrown at them.
117. The ambulance which followed the armored tactical vehicle did not assist Rulli or Bryant.
118. A group of Protesters attempted to render aide to Rulli and Bryant. 119. A legal observer called 9-1-1 and requested an ambulance. She informed the operator that Mr. Bryant suffered from asthma and had been tear gassed. 120. Rulli and Bryant waited for approximately a half hour. No ambulance arrived to treat them. 121. Bryant began searching for A.F. He asked a PBP officer if he had seen a thirteen-year-old boy without his parents. The PBP officer dismissively told him, “That’s on you.” 122. Upon being told by his mother to run, thirteen-year-old A.F. had run to the parking lot of the Giant Eagle grocery store located near Penn Avenue and Shady
20

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 21 of 42
Avenue. He was disoriented from the effects of the chemical gas and his phone battery was dead, so he was unable to call Rulli or Bryant.
123. A group of strangers found A.F. and attempted to clean the chemicals out of his eyes. One of them lent him a phone to call Rulli and Bryant. These strangers stayed with A.F. until Rulli and Bryant were able to get him.
124. As a direct and proximate result of PBP’s actions, A.F. has become fearful of police officers.
125. As a direct and proximate result of PBP’s actions, A.F. has become fearful of being separated from his parents.
126. As a direct and proximate result of the PBP’s actions, A.F. has become fearful of protests.
127. A.F.’s fears, particularly his fear of protests, has caused the Rulli family to avoid attending protest events which they would otherwise have attended.
128. As a direct and proximate result of PBP’s actions, Rulli, Bryant and A.F. have suffered physical and emotional injuries.
e. Plaintiff Simon Phillips 129. Plaintiff Simon Phillips participated in the protest and march which began at 3:30 at the Target store at the corner of Centre Avenue and Penn Avenue. Phillips left the protest at 5:00 pm to teach a dance class. 130. Phillips returned to the protest at approximately 6:30 pm and marched down Centre Avenue with the Protesters.
21

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 22 of 42
131. Phillips did not participate in any vandalism, violence or destruction, nor did he witness any vandalism, violence or destruction before the PBP used force against the Protesters.
132. Phillips did not throw any objects at PBP officers, nor did he witness anyone else throwing objects at PBP officers before the PBP used force against the Protesters.
133. After the PBP made the first unlawful assembly announcement and before PBP officers began using force against the Protesters, Phillips left the area and tried to return to his apartment.
134. Phillips’ apartment is over a half mile from the Corner of Centre Avenue and Negley Avenue.
135. When Phillips was approximately 200 yards from his apartment, an armored vehicle drove up behind him and several SWAT officers jumped out brandishing firearms.
136. Another line of SWAT officers approached him from the other direction, trapping him.
137. Two women were also trapped by the encroaching SWAT officers. 138. The SWAT team ordered Phillips and the women to put their hands up and drop to the ground, which they did. 139. The SWAT officers bound their hands with zip ties and dragged them to the curb. 140. The SWAT officers would not tell them why they were being arrested. 141. As Phillips was being detained, PBP officers approached, tackled and forcibly arrested a woman as she complained about the arrests. The PBP officers then threw a grenade that contained either smoke or chemical gas at onlookers who questioned the officers’ actions and/or attempted to videotape them. Link to Video.
22

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 23 of 42
142. An hour and a half after he was taken into custody, the officers lifted Phillips to put in him a police vehicle. There was a pool of blood on the ground where he had been sitting. The zip ties had lacerated Phillips’ left wrist.
143. PBP officers transported Phillips to the hospital where he received multiple stitches in his left wrist. Link to Photograph. Phillips did not believe he needed stitches and requested not to get them. PBP officers told him he could not be jailed at the Allegheny County Jail without them. Phillips later received a bill from the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center for $868.
144. PBP officers remained with Phillips while he was in the hospital and transported Phillips from the hospital to the Allegheny County Jail, where he was detained overnight.
145. Phillips was charged with disorderly conduct and failure to disperse. 146. The officers who arrested Phillips had no probable cause to believe that he had committed the crimes of disorderly conduct or failure to disperse. 147. All of the charges against Phillips were withdrawn prior to his preliminary hearing due to a lack of evidence. 148. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the PBP, Phillips suffered physical and emotional injury.
f. Plaintiff Jay Yoder 149. Plaintiff Jay Yoder attended the June 1, 2020 protest to participate in the protest, document the event and assist injured Protesters as needed.
23

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 24 of 42
150. Yoder did not participate in any vandalism, violence or destruction, nor did they witness any vandalism, violence or destruction before the PBP used force against the Protesters.
151. Yoder did not throw any objects at PBP officers, nor did they witness anyone else throwing objects at PBP officers before the PBP used force against the Protesters.
152. Yoder did not leave when ordered to do so by the PBP because they believed they had a constitutionally protected right to continue to protest, as well as to document the PBP’s actions and assist Protesters.
153. Soon after PBP officers began shooting and gassing the Protesters, Yoder, who was on the sidewalk, began to retreat;
154. Because of a disability, Yoder was unable to move fast enough to satisfy the officers. PBP SWAT officers yelled at and pushed Yoder. Link to Video.
155. Chemical gas burned Yoder’s eyes, nose, throat and skin. 156. The PBP fired munitions including rubber bullets, bean bag rounds and sponge grenades at Yoder. 157. Yoder witnessed a SWAT officer shoot a female protester in the chest with an unknown munition which Yoder believed to be a tear gas grenade from a distance of approximately 10 feet. Link to Video. 158. After the Protesters dispersed, Yoder attempted to leave the scene but was blocked by PBP officers. 159. Yoder stated repeatedly to the officers, “My car is over there,” and “I’m just trying to get to my car.”
24

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 25 of 42
160. Nevertheless, PBP officers ordered Yoder to the ground, arrested and falsely charged them with failure to disperse and disorderly conduct. Link to Video.
161. PBP officers transported Yoder to Allegheny County Jail where they were detained overnight.
162. PBP officers did not have probable cause to believe that Yoder had committed the crimes of failure to disperse or disorderly conduct.
163. All of the charges against Yoder were withdrawn prior to their preliminary hearing.
164. As a direct and proximate result of PBP’s use of chemical gas against Yoder, Yoder is at increased risk of contracting and/or suffering complications from COVID-19.
165. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Yoder suffered physical injuries and emotional distress.
g. Plaintiff Donovan Hayden 166. Plaintiff Donovan Hayden participated in the march which took place from approximately 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm and joined the smaller group of Protesters who continued marching down Centre Avenue. 167. Hayden did not participate in any vandalism, violence or destruction, nor did he witness any vandalism, violence or destruction before the PBP used force against the Protesters. 168. Hayden did not throw any objects at PBP officers, nor did he witness anyone else throwing objects at PBP officers before the PBP used force against the Protesters.
25

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 26 of 42
169. Hayden did not leave when ordered to do so by the PBP because he believed he had a First Amendment right to peacefully protest and the order to disperse violated the Constitution.
170. Chemical gas burned Hayden’s eyes, nose, throat and skin and Hayden nearly vomited from the effects of the gas.
171. As a result of PBP’s use of chemical gas against Hayden, Hayden is at increased risk of contracting and/or suffering complications from COVID-19.
172. As a result of PBP’s actions, Hayden suffered physical injuries and emotional distress.
h. Plaintiff Christopher Wilson Juring 173. Plaintiff Christopher Wilson Juring participated in the march which took place from 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm and then joined the smaller group of Protesters who marched down Centre Avenue at approximately 6:30. 174. Juring did not did not participate in any vandalism, violence or destruction, nor did he witness any vandalism, violence or destruction before the PBP used force against the Protesters. 175. Juring did not throw any objects at PBP officers, nor did he witness anyone else throwing objects at PBP officers before the PBP used force against the Protesters. 176. Juring did not leave when ordered to do so by the PBP because he believed he had a First Amendment right to peacefully protest and the order to disperse violated the Constitution. 177. When police began to fire munitions and tear gas into the crowd, Juring ran outbound on Centre Avenue in an attempt to leave the area.
26

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 27 of 42
178. The PBP struck Juring with four rubber bullets in his lower back and the backs of his legs as he ran away. Link to Photograph 1; Link to Photograph 2; Link to Photograph 3. Link to Photograph 4.
179. Chemical gas burned Juring’s eyes, nose, throat and skin. 180. As a result of PBP’s use of chemical gas against Juring, Juring is at increased risk of contracting and/or suffering complications from COVID-19. 181. As a result of PBP’s actions, Juring suffered physical injuries and emotional distress.
i. City of Pittsburgh Officials falsely accused the Protesters of misconduct and minimized the PBP’s use of force
182. At 11:00 on the evening of June 1, 2020 Individual Defendants Peduto, Hissrich, Schubert, Vinansky, Lando and Doe (hereinafter “Individual Defendants”) held a press conference. Link to Transcript.
183. At the press conference defendants Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert praised the actions of the PBP toward the Protesters in East Liberty that evening.
184. Defendant Hissrich Stated:
And I just want to mention that the work that was done by the officers . . . tonight should be commended . . . I think we prevented businesses from being looted and possibly set afire. So I just want to commend all the public safety, the different law enforcement agencies that were out there tonight, and I think the public, they should be thanking the police officers for the work that they have done. 185. Defendant Schubert stated:
I give a lot of credit to the officers who were there because I watched them. They did an incredible job. They did an incredible job trying to keep the public safe while they were out there.
27

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 28 of 42
186. Defendant Peduto Stated:
. . . it was then that the officers escalated to the point of being able to break the crowd up, and that finally succeeded. What we did not see is East Liberty is not on fire tonight. People from East Liberty are not harmed. Two protestors were taken for evaluation, and they should be absolutely fine. Nine officers were hurt by protestors. 187. In order to justify the PBP’s unwarranted violence against peaceful Protesters, Individual Defendants falsely accused the Protesters of misconduct and wrongdoing. These false accusations included:
i. that Protesters vandalized buildings and broke glass windows; ii. that Protesters engaged in acts of violence and destruction; iii. that Protesters attacked a KDKA television news crew; iv. that Protesters attacked Defendant Vinansky in his police vehicle. v. that Protesters were trying to or intended to “burn East Liberty down;” vi. that Protesters were “only there to cause damage and to try to hurt
police officers.” vii. that the PBP’s use of force was precipitated by Protesters throwing
rocks, bricks and water bottles at police officers; viii. that Protesters injured nine PBP officers by throwing rocks and bricks
at their heads, chests, pelvis areas, knees and shoulders; ix. that PBP used force against the Protesters only after the Protesters
threw multiple “volleys of bricks” at officers; 188. Following the protests, Individual Defendants also attempted to minimize the level of force PBP used by falsely claiming that:
i. the only force PBP used against the Protesters was “smoke;” ii. PBP did not use chemical gas against Protesters;
28

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 29 of 42
iii. PBP did not use, “crowd munitions” against Protesters iv. PBP did not use “rubber bullets” against Protesters; v. Only two protesters were injured by PBP use of force; vi. no Protesters were seriously injured by PBP use of force; vii. City of Pittsburgh personnel treated all injured Protesters at the
scene and transported them to hospitals. j. Defendants’ prior tolerance of more threatening protestors demonstrates
that Defendants did not reasonably believe Protestors posed a threat to public safety, peace or order 189. On April 20, 2020 protesters congregated on Grant Street in Downtown Pittsburgh to protest Governor Tom Wolf’s decision to close businesses due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 190. Many of the April 20 protesters openly carried tactical rifles and wore paramilitary outfits. A group of these protesters referred to themselves as “The Iron City Response Guard.” When asked by a reporter why they had armed themselves in this manner for a peaceful protest, one belligerently responded, “Why not?” 191. The June 1, 2020 Protesters were not carrying tactical rifles, or any other firearms. The June 1, protesters were not dressed in paramilitary outfits. 192. The unarmed and peaceful June 1, 2020 Protesters posed less of a threat of “substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm” to the residents of the City of Pittsburgh than the heavily armed April 20 protesters. 193. On information and belief, the PBP did not deploy SWAT units, armored vehicles, riot police and/or snipers to the April 20 protests. 194. The PBP did not declare the April 20 protests to be unlawful, order the protesters to disperse and/or use force to disperse them.
29

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 30 of 42
k. City of Pittsburgh Officials were aware of, acquiesced in and/or failed to intervene to prevent the violation of the Protesters’ rights.
195. Individual Defendants witnessed or were otherwise aware of the events described herein as they unfolded.
196. Individual Defendants were aware that the Protesters were peaceful and were engaged in constitutionally protected speech.
197. Individual Defendants did not have a reasonable expectation that the Protesters would cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm;
198. Individual defendants did not have reason to believe that the Protesters presented an imminent threat to public safety, peace or order;
199. Individual Defendants ordered, authorized and/or acquiesced in the order to declare the assembly unlawful;
200. Individual Defendants ordered, authorized and/or acquiesced in the use of excessive force against Protesters;
201. Individual Defendants had the opportunity to intervene to prevent the violation of the Protesters’ constitutionally protected rights and failed or refused to do so;
l. The decision to use force constituted the official policy of the City of Pittsburgh
202. Defendants Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert, jointly and/or individually, possessed final policymaking authority to make the decision to 1) declare Protesters’ assembly unlawful, 2) use force to disperse Protesters and 3) use noxious chemical gas and extremely dangerous and painful rubber bullets, beanbag rounds and/or sponge grenades against Protesters.
30

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 31 of 42
203. Peduto, Hissrich and Schubert jointly and/or individually made, approved and/or acquiesced in these decisions to violate Protesters’ constitutional rights.
204. The violation of Protesters’ rights was the direct result of the official policy of the City of Pittsburgh.
m. PBP violated its policy regarding discharge of less lethal munitions
205. PBP’s policy regarding discharge of less lethal munitions does not provide for the use of rubber bullets or sponge grenades. Nevertheless, PBP officers shot Protesters with rubber bullets and sponge grenades.
206. PBP’s Policy regarding discharge of less lethal munitions does not permit discharge from less than 20 feet. Nevertheless, officers discharged rubber bullets, beanbags and/or sponge grenades at Protesters from a distance of far less than 20 feet.
207. PBP policy recognizes that, “The use of kinetic energy impact projectiles are considered deadly force, if intentionally deployed to areas of the subjects [sic] body that are recognized as likely to cause serious bodily injury or death (head, neck, throat, chest or solar plexus).” PBP policy prohibits officers from targeting these areas of a person’s body unless deadly force is justified. Nevertheless, PBP officers fired hundreds of rubber bullets, beanbags and/or sponge grenades indiscriminately into clouds of smoke, through which they could not see the Protesters’ bodies. As a result, Protesters were hit with projectiles in areas of their bodies likely to cause serious bodily injury and were, in fact, seriously injured.
208. PBP policy requires officers to transport persons subject to kinetic energy impact projectiles to a medical facility for evaluation and treatment. PBP did not transport Protesters injured by rubber bullets and bean bags to medical facilities, or render any
31

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 32 of 42
medical aid whatsoever, even though an ambulance accompanied police vehicles. PBP did not pre-arrange for medical care or transportation for injured Protesters, even though it intended to use levels of force which were likely to cause serious injury or death to Protesters.
209. PBP’s failure to follow its own policy regarding discharge of less lethal munitions constituted deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs.
n. PBP failed to adopt necessary policies and procedures regarding crowd control
210. The PBP does not have a policy governing the declaration of assemblies as “unlawful” and the forced dispersal of protests, even though the need for such a policy is obvious.
211. The PBP does not have a policy governing the use of chemical gas, flashbang grenades and/or smoke bombs even though the need for such a policy is obvious.
212. PBP’s failure to adopt these policies constituted deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and other peaceful Protesters with whom PBP officers come into contact.
o. PBP’s failed to properly train officers regarding crowd control 213. PBP’s use of force training curriculum does not address, or does not properly address, crowd/riot control techniques, use of impact munitions, chemical gas, flashbang grenades and/or smoke bombs. 214. PBP does not train, or does not properly train, officers in crowd/riot control techniques;
32

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 33 of 42
215. PBP does not train, or does not properly train, officers in the use of munitions such as rubber bullets, bean bag rounds and/or sponge grenades.
216. PBP does not train, or does not properly train, officers in the use of chemicals, such as “tear gas” and/or OC spray for crowd control purposes.
217. PBP does not train, or does not properly train, officers in the use of flashbang devices and/or smoke bombs for crowd control purposes.
218. PBP’s failure to train its officers, as hereinbefore described, constituted deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs and other peaceful protesters with whom PBP officers come into contact.
V) CLASS ALLEGATIONS
219. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
220. Plaintiffs seek to represent a primary class and two subclasses. 221. The proposed primary class consists of the following:
Every individual who was present at or near the intersection of Centre Avenue and Negley Avenue in the City of Pittsburgh on June 1, 2020 for the purpose of engaging in lawful protest and who was ordered to disperse by the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. 222. The first proposed subclass (Subclass A) consists of the following: Every member of the primary class who was subjected to force by City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Officers, or law enforcement officers acting under the direction of the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. 223. The second proposed subclass (Subclass B) consists of the following: Every member of the primary class who was arrested and/or who was criminally charged with disorderly conduct and/or
33

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 34 of 42
failure to disperse by City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police officers or other officers acting under the direction of the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. 224. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a)(1) are satisfied with regard to
classes and subclasses in that Plaintiff estimates that there are at least 100 class
members in the primary class and subclass A, and at least 22 class members of subclass
B, whose interests would be affected by any order of declaratory or injunctive relief. The
number of class members is so large that joinder of all its members is impracticable.
225. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a)(2) are satisfied in that there
are questions of law and fact common to the classes, including but not limited to:
i. Whether the Defendants violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution when they declared the Protesters peaceful assembly “unlawful” and ordered Protesters to disperse?
ii. Whether the Defendants violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution when they used force to disperse Protesters who were peaceably assembled?
iii. Whether the Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they used force to disperse Protesters who were peaceably assembled?
iv. Whether the Defendants violated the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by using unnecessary and excessive force to disperse Protesters who were peaceably assembled?
v. Whether the Defendants violated the Fourth and/or 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to adequately train, supervise, regulate PBP officers, including failure to promulgate necessary policies, in responding to individuals exercising constitutionally protected rights to protest and/or assemble.
34

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 35 of 42
226. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a)(3) are satisfied in that Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class. Plaintiff and all class members are seeking injunctive relief and damages under federal law. Any finding that that Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiffs’ rights will be applicable to all class members.
227. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a)(4) are satisfied in that Plaintiffs’ attorneys, Margaret S. Coleman, Esq., and the Law Offices of Timothy P. O’Brien, and Quinn Cozzens and the Abolitionist Law Center will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class in that: (i) they have done significant work in identifying and investigating potential claims prior to filing this action; (ii) they and their respective firms have extensive experience litigating class actions, other complex litigation and the types of claims asserted in the Class Action Complaint; (iii) they have extensive knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) they are advancing the costs of the litigation.
228. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(1) are satisfied in that prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; and/or adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
229. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(2) are satisfied in that the parties opposing the class have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
35

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 36 of 42
VI) CLAIMS COUNT I
Named Plaintiffs and Primary Class Members v. Individual Defendants Violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
230. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above, violated Plaintiffs’ and Primary Class Members First Amendment Rights to freedom of speech, freedom to peaceably assemble and freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances.
231. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above, were not reasonable regulations of the time, place or manner of Plaintiffs’ speech.
232. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above had the purpose and effect of suppressing Plaintiffs’ speech and dissuading Plaintiffs and others from engaging in future activities protected by the First Amendment;
233. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above, would reasonably be expected to deter a reasonable person from exercising their First Amendment rights.
234. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, as outlined above, Plaintiffs and Primary Class Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering.
COUNT II Named Plaintiffs and Subclass A Members v. Individual Defendants Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Excessive Force 235. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above, violated Plaintiffs’ and Subclass A Members’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force.
36

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 37 of 42
236. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, as outlined above, Plaintiffs and Primary Class Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering.
COUNT III Phillips, Yoder and Subclass B Members v. Individual Defendants Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Unlawful Arrest 237. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above subjected Phillips, Yoder and Subclass B Members to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 238. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, as outlined above, Phillips, Yoder and Subclass B Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering.
COUNT IV Phillips, Yoder and Subclass B Members v. Individual Defendants Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Retaliatory Prosecution 239. Defendants’ actions, as outlined above subjected Phillips and Yoder and Subclass B members to malicious prosecution in retaliation for engaging in Constitutionally protected speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
37

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 38 of 42
240. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, as outlined above, Phillips, Yoder and Subclass B Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering.
COUNT V Named Plaintiffs and Primary Class Members v. City of Pittsburgh Violation of the First and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 241. Defendant City of Pittsburgh's conduct, as hereinbefore described, was the direct and proximate cause of violations of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights to freedom of speech and freedom to peaceably assemble. 242. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, as outlined above, Plaintiffs and Primary Class Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering.
COUNT VI Named Plaintiffs and Subclass A Members v. City of Pittsburgh Violation of the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Excessive Force 243. Defendant City of Pittsburgh's conduct, as hereinbefore described, was the direct and proximate cause of violations Plaintiffs’ and Subclass A Members’ Fourth Amendment Rights to freedom from excessive force. 244. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, as outlined above, Plaintiffs and Subclass A Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering. 245.
38

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 39 of 42
COUNT VII Named Plaintiffs and Subclass A Members v. City of Pittsburgh Violation of the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Unlawful Arrest 246. Defendant City of Pittsburgh's conduct, as hereinbefore described, was the direct and proximate cause of violations Plaintiffs’ and Subclass B Members’ Fourth Amendment Rights to freedom from false arrest and malicious prosecution. 247. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, as outlined above, Plaintiffs and Subclass B Members suffered physical injury and/or emotional and psychological pain and suffering.
VII) REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: (a) Certify pursuant to Fed R. Civ. Pro. 23 a class of every individual who was present at or near the intersection of Centre Avenue and Negley Avenue in the City of Pittsburgh on June 1, 2020 for the purpose of engaging in peaceful protest and who was ordered to disperse by the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. (b) Certify pursuant to Fed R. Civ. Pro. 23 a subclass of every member of the primary class who was subjected to force by City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Officers, or law enforcement officers acting under the direction of the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police. (c) Certify pursuant to Fed R. Civ. Pro. 23 a subclass of every member of the primary class who was arrested and/or who was criminally charged with
39

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 40 of 42
failure to disperse by City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police officers, or law
enforcement officers acting under the direction of the City of Pittsburgh
Bureau of Police.
(d) Award declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Plaintiffs and the Class and
against Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter an
order specifying that:
i. City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police officers shall not discharge rubber bullets, beanbag rounds, sponge grenades or similar munitions against protesters not engaged in acts of violence toward other people or deploy such munitions indiscriminately such that protesters not engaged in acts of violence toward other people are likely to be injured thereby;
ii. City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police officers shall not deploy rubber bullets, beanbag rounds, sponge grenades or similar “less lethal munitions” under circumstances where the officers cannot see the individuals at whom they are shooting;
iii. City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police officers shall not order protesters to disperse unless the attendees present an imminent threat to public safety, peace or order.
iv. The City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police shall not order protesters to disperse without providing a safe means of egress;
v. City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police officers shall not use chemical agents to disperse any protest unless the attendees present an imminent threat to public safety, peace or order.
(e) Award to Plaintiffs and the Class punitive damages against the Individual
Defendants.
(f) Award to Plaintiffs and the Class compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees
and costs against All Defendants, and
(g) Award such other relief as this Court deems necessary and proper.
40

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 41 of 42
Respectfully submitted,
THE LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY P. O’BRIEN
/s/ Margaret S. Coleman Margaret S. Coleman Pa. ID No. 200975 msc@obrienlawpgh.com
535 Smithfield Street, Suite 1025 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 (412) 232-4400
and
ABOLITIONIST LAW CENTER
/s/ Quinn Cozzens Quinn Cozzens Staff Attorney PA I.D. No. 323353 qcozzens@alcenter.org
/s/ Bret Grote Bret Grote Legal Director PA I.D. No. 317273 bretgrote@abolitionistlawcenter.org
/s/ Jamelia N. Morgan Jamelia N. Morgan, of counsel4 NY I.D. No. 5351176
Abolitionist Law Center PO Box 8654 Pittsburgh, PA 15221 717-419-6583
ELZER LAW FIRM, LLC
/s/ Christine T. Elzer Christine T. Elzer Pa. I.D. No. 208157
100 First Avenue, Suite 1010
4 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice forthcoming
41

Case 2:20-cv-00965-LPL Document 1 Filed 06/29/20 Page 42 of 42 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 (412) 230-8436
42

ClassAction.org
This complaint is part of ClassAction.org's searchable class action lawsuit database and can be found in this post: Pittsburgh, Public Officials Face Class Action Over Police Use of Force During June 1 East Liberty Protest

 
 357 F.Supp. 1289 (1973)
COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS ON PHILADELPHIA POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Frank L. RIZZO et al., Defendants. Gerald G. GOODE et al., Plaintiffs,
v. James H. J. TATE, Mayor, City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.,
Defendants.
Civ. A. Nos. 70-2430, 70-491.
United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.
March 14, 1973.
1290*1290 Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz by Peter Hearn, and F. John Hagele, III, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs Goode, and others.
George J. Ivins, Deputy City Sol., John Mattioni, Asst. City Sol., for defendants Tate, and others.
William Lee Akers, Harry Lore, and Richard Axelrod, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility, and others.
George J. Ivins, and John B. Day, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants Tate, and others (except Arlen Specter).
David Richman, Philadelphia, Pa., for Arlen Specter.
OPINION AND ORDER
FULLAM, District Judge.
In two separate but related civil rights actions, certain individuals and groups, acting on behalf of minority citizens and residents of Philadelphia, seek various forms of relief against the Mayor and police officials of the City, on the basis of alleged widespread violations of the constitutional rights of minority citizens by the police of the City of Philadelphia.
From a procedural standpoint, the record in these cases is somewhat anomalous: plaintiffs and their respective counsel are different in the two cases, and have proceeded independently. However, both groups of plaintiffs purport to act on behalf of essentially the same class of plaintiffs. Although the specific relief sought in each case is different, both sets of plaintiffs urge that a pattern of unconstitutional behavior on the part of the police is shown by their evidence of numerous specific instances of such alleged misconduct; each

group relies upon a different set of specific instances as examples alleged to establish the pattern. Since I have heard all of the evidence in both cases, it would be difficult, and in my opinion improper, in view of the nature of the claims, to dispose of each case separately, based upon its own limited record. The defendants in both cases are essentially the same, and are represented by the same counsel in both cases.
1291*1291 This Court's disposition of these cases has already been delayed too long. Much of this delay is squarely the responsibility of the Court, and is attributable to other pressing demands of its case load. In partial justification for this unfortunate delay, it may be noted that the records of the two cases are extremely complex, the issues involved are subtle and somewhat novel, and the required decisions touch upon sensitive and emotion-filled aspects of community life.
Another factor requires mention. During the pendency of these two actions before the undersigned, a third case filed by different plaintiffs on behalf of the same class of plaintiffs, seeking similar relief, was pending before another member of this Court. That case, which was instituted after the Goode case but before the COPPAR case, eventuated in a consent decree granting injunctive relief, dated December 18, 1972. The defendants in all three cases are essentially the same, and all have been represented throughout by the City Solicitor's office. Nevertheless, at no time have defense counsel meaningfully addressed themselves to the class action issues involved, nor to questions of res judicata or collateral estoppel which may be involved.
A brief summary of the issues in all three cases will provide a starting point for analysis: In the Goode case, Civil Action No. 70-491, plaintiffs contend that certain police officers of the City of Philadelphia are biased against Negroes and other minority groups, and habitually violate their legal and constitutional rights in the course of carrying out their police duties; that the proclivities of these officers are well known to their superiors in the Department; that the persons in control of the supervision of the Police Department, by failing to take appropriate disciplinary action, have condoned these illegal and unconstitutional activities, as a matter of policy. Plaintiffs further contend that there is no adequate machinery for dealing with civilian complaints against the police, and that departmental resistance to the creation or implementation of adequate complaint procedures justifies the conclusion that it is the policy of the Department to condone racially discriminatory actions by the police. Plaintiffs seek two kinds of relief in this action: removal or other appropriate disciplinary action in the cases of certain named policemen; and establishment of appropriate machinery to deal with civilian complaints against police.
The COPPAR plaintiffs (Civil Action No. 70-2430) allege widespread and systematic violations of the constitutional rights of Negroes and other citizens by the police in the routine performance of their duties, with the express or tacit approval of their superiors. Plaintiffs ask the Court to appoint a "receiver" or similar official to supervise the Police Department (presumably, sweeping injunctive relief, and the appointment of a master to supervise enforcement of the decree), to prevent further violations. This case was originally precipitated by certain incidents involving police raids on buildings thought to be occupied by members of the "Black Panther" Party, threatened interference with a proposed convention of that group of the City, and the alleged holding of certain black militants without probable cause and in excessive bail. At an earlier stage, this Court entered a

temporary restraining order which alleviated some of the immediate problems; eventually, this order expired by its own terms, and has not been renewed.
The plaintiffs in Goode presented evidence of ten specific instances of alleged violations, together with a mass of evidence, including expert testimony, dealing with the alleged inadequacies of existing complaint procedures; the defendants produced some countervailing evidence on both subjects. The COPPAR plaintiffs produced evidence relating to some 30 additional specific instances of alleged misconduct, and a limited amount of evidence challenging the complaint procedures; the defendants presented evidence to the contrary in most, if not all, of the instances alleged.
1292*1292 In the third action, Alexander et al. v. Rizzo et al., Civil Action No. 70-992, the principal charge of discrimination against blacks alleged in the complaint was the practice of widespread arrests "for investigation," and incidental indignities related thereto, apparently triggered by a particular incident involving the murder of a Philadelphia police officer. The injunctive decree in that case, which was entered "without hearing or trial and upon the stipulation of the parties", embodies detailed provisions governing police contacts with civilians based upon less than probable cause for arrest.
The Court's findings of fact are set forth below. They reflect evaluations of credibility which give appropriate weight, on the one hand, to the anti-police bias of many of the complaining witnesses, and their emotional involvement in the incidents, and, on the other hand, to the natural reluctance of the accused officers to concede any misconduct on their part. Whenever the merits were substantially in doubt, the defendants were accorded the full benefit of the presumption that the police officers acted properly.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. General
During the period covered by the evidence produced at the hearings in these cases, James H. J. Tate was Mayor of Philadelphia, and Frank L. Rizzo was Police Commissioner. Mr. Rizzo is now the Mayor.
During the same period, Fred T. Corleto, was Managing Director of the City of Philadelphia; Hillel S. Levinson is now the Managing Director. Under § 5-100 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the Managing Director is charged with responsibility for supervising all activities of those departments the heads of which are appointed by him. Under § 3-206 of the Charter, the Managing Director, with the approval of the Mayor, appoints the Police Commissioner.
The Police Commissioner, under Charter § 3-404, serves at the pleasure of the Managing Director. He has responsibility for supervision and control over activities of the Police Department. Charter § 5-200(b) provides that the Police Department "shall discipline the Philadelphia police."

Defendant Robert G. Selfridge is Deputy Police Commissioner in charge of the uniformed forces of the Police Department. Defendant William Murphy is Chief of the Highway Patrol and exercises supervision and control over its members. The chain of command within the Highway Patrol is: captain, lieutenant, sergeant, and patrolman.
During the period covered by the evidence, Anthony DeFazio was a police officer of the City of Philadelphia, having been appointed on December 28, 1965. He served as a member of the Highway Patrol. Shortly before the conclusion of the hearings in these cases, he was retired on disability, and is no longer an active policeman.
John D'Amico is a Philadelphia police officer, a member of the Highway Patrol, having been appointed to the Department on June 26, 1967.
B. Existing Complaint Procedures
As a general practice, no record is made by the Police Department of any civilian complaints, unless submitted in writing. There are no forms available to citizens for filing such complaints. When a written complaint is filed, it is supposed to be recorded by the police on a "complaint and incident report" form (No. 75-48); but the general practice at the district level is not to record such complaints.
When a complaint has been recorded, an investigation is made by Police Department inspectors assigned to Staff Inspection Headquarters. The investigation includes obtaining a statement of the complainant and the officers involved. The Police Department controls the investigation and does not assist the complainant in obtaining witnesses. 1293*1293 The tendency is to minimize, and seek avoidance or withdrawal of complaints.
Police officers accused of misconduct do not submit to interviews or give statements relating to the charges to anyone other than the police investigators.
Police officers accused of misconduct never submit to polygraph tests. While there is no departmental regulation on the subject, the Fraternal Order of Police has a fixed policy of refusing to lend its support or provide counsel for any police officer who submits to a polygraph test, and this policy is well-known to the Police Department. In consequence, as above stated, police do not submit to such examination. Nevertheless, complainants against police officers are frequently requested to, and do, submit to polygraph examinations, unaware that the accused officer will not be so examined. No records are kept of the manner in which the polygraph test is administered; only a result is noted.
When an officer is under investigation, his personnel file is usually examined. Commendations from the Commissioner and commendatory letters from citizens are always placed in an officer's personnel file. Letters of complaint are not. If an officer has been brought before a police board of inquiry, that fact is noted in his personnel file. If there are several such instances, some further investigation as to the basis for the previous board of inquiry contacts is usually made.

The investigators prepare a report for the Police Commissioner. Previous incidents of alleged misconduct are not mentioned in the report, unless there are several of them and they have been investigated.
The Commissioner decides, in his sole discretion, whether an officer should face trial before the Police Board of Inquiry for a violation of the Police Department Disciplinary Code. It is generally believed within the Department that the Commissioner refers cases to a board of inquiry for trial only if he is already convinced that the accused officer is guilty and should be disciplined.
A board of inquiry consists of three police officers. The complaint is presented by a police "advocate" at a trial-type hearing. Upon a finding of guilty, penalties (reprimand, suspension or dismissal) are recommended to the Commissioner. The final decision with respect to imposition of penalties rests with the Commissioner. Dismissals are reviewable by the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission.
Counsel for the complainant (other than the "police advocate") is not permitted to participate in the hearing before the Board of Inquiry. Accused police officers are represented by counsel.
The entire departmental disciplinary procedure is directed primarily to violation of departmental rules and regulations, rather than to alleged violations of legal or constitutional rights of civilians.
For the most part, a civilian complainant against a police officer is not informed of the final disposition of his complaint.
C. Commission on Human Relations
The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations is an independent commission established by § 3-100(e) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. Its powers and duties are to ". . . enforce all statutes and ordinances prohibiting discrimination against persons because of race, color, religion or national origin . . ." and to ". . . conduct educational programs to promote the equal rights and opportunities of all persons regardless of their race, color, religion or national origin" (Charter § 4-700).
The Commission receives complaints from citizens alleging misconduct by the Philadelphia Police, but the Commission has no investigatory or enforcement powers with respect to such complaints.
Until mid-1969, the Commission would forward such complaints to the Police Department, the Department would investigate 1294*1294 and report the results of its investigation to the Commission; and the Commission would advise the complainant of these results. Beginning in mid-1969, the Police Department terminated its practice of providing the Commission with a report of the investigation; instead, a summary was provided. The Commission thereupon terminated its practice of handling citizen complaints against police. Instead, it directs

complainants to other agencies, such as Philadelphians for Equal Justice, Community Legal Services, the American Civil Liberties Union, or the District Attorney's office.
D. Police Advisory Board of Philadelphia
The Police Advisory Board of Philadelphia was an agency established in 1958 by the then Mayor of Philadelphia, to hear complaints by citizens against Philadelphia police involving alleged violations of constitutional rights or other mistreatment. The Board then made recommendation to the Mayor in each case.
In March of 1967, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia enjoined the Board from further functioning, and the Board became inactive. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court decision in June of 1969. On December 22, 1969, the Board was dissolved by Mayor Tate. During the period of its operations, the Board had no investigative resources, and relied primarily on the investigations made by the Police Department. Because of uncertainty as to whether the Board had subpoena power, it never attempted to exercise such power.
E. Criminal Prosecution of Police Through District Attorney's Office
The District Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of all persons charged with crimes, as defined by local and state law, within the City of Philadelphia. The Community Rights Division of the District Attorney's office is responsible for prosecuting police officers charged with having committed crimes against citizens.
Complaints received by the District Attorney's office are sent to the Police Department for investigation. A report is returned to the District Attorney, who then decides whether or not to prosecute.
In many cases where a complaint is made against a police officer, criminal charges arising out of the same incident are pending against the complainant. The District Attorney also has responsibility for prosecuting the complainant. In many cases, the same Assistant District Attorney may be responsible for some aspects of both prosecutions.
Prosecutions of police officers do not occur unless serious physical injury has been sustained by a citizen as a result of police action. Often, complaints against police are dropped in exchange for a dismissal of criminal charges against the complainant.
The District Attorney's office does not ordinarily communicate to the claimants its decision not to prosecute the police officer.
F. Goode Case
The plaintiffs in this case are black citizens of Philadelphia who claim that their constitutional rights have been infringed by the conduct of Philadelphia police; they bring

their action on behalf of themselves and all other citizens of Philadelphia whose constitutional rights have been or are likely to be thus infringed.
I make the following findings of fact concerning the specific instances alleged:
1. Roy Lee Shaw. On March 10, 1969, Roy Lee Shaw, a 16-year old black male, was arrested and charged with assault and battery on a police officer, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct.
On that date, at about 2 p. m., Shaw walked out of a store located at the corner of 11th and Somerset Streets. Officer DeFazio of the Highway Patrol, who was patroling the area in an unmarked 1295*1295 car, observed Shaw. He drove around the block, proceeded south on 11th Street (a one-way streeet for northbound traffic), parked his car adjacent to where Shaw was walking, got out of his car and told Shaw to stop. Shaw turned and asked why he was being stopped, whereupon DeFazio struck him on the head with a blackjack. Shaw then struck DeFazio on the chin, and ran north on 11th Street. DeFazio drew his service revolver and fired a shot in the general direction in which Shaw was running. Shaw then stopped, DeFazio placed one handcuff on him, and pulled him, struggling, back to the police car. DeFazio shoved Shaw into the car and called for additional police help. Shaw was lying face down on the back seat of the police car, still struggling, and DeFazio then struck him with his nightstick. Two other officers arrived on the scene, and additional blows were struck, until they succeeded in placing both handcuffs on Shaw and placing him in a police wagon.
A crowd, mostly blacks, was attracted to the scene by the commotion. As the officers left, DeFazio made various racially derogatory remarks to the crowd.
Shaw was transported to the headquarters of the 25th Police District, where he was again struck by police nightsticks. His mother attempted to visit him, but was not permitted to see him while he was at the district office.
Eventually, Shaw was transported to Episcopal Hospital and received medical treatment. A cut on his head required four stitches. After receiving medical treatment, Shaw was taken back to the 25th Police District and held for approximately two more hours, whereupon he was released in the custody of his mother.
On June 11, 1969, Shaw was initially adjudicated delinquent in Juvenile Court proceedings, but was released without probation. The next day, the disposition of the case was changed to "discharge as to offense."
There was no basis for stopping Shaw in the first place, there was no probable cause to arrest him, and his arrest was illegal. He did not assault DeFazio, nor was he guilty of disorderly conduct; he merely made minimal efforts to defend himself and to protest the violation of his rights.
Neither Shaw nor any member of his family made any complaint to the Police Department or any other City official concerning this matter. Shaw did bring the matter to the attention of Community Legal Services; a staff attorney of that organization wrote to the Community

Relations Service of the United States Department of Justice describing the incident, but received no reply.
2. Gerald G. Goode. On December 1, 1969, at about 11 o'clock p. m. or midnight, Gerald G. Goode, a 25-year old black graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania, six feet one inch tall and weighing approximately 200 pounds, was a passenger in an automobile driven by Mrs. Ruth Rotko, a white woman, the wife of an Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia. They were proceeding north on Broad Street. Mr. Goode was sitting in the right rear seat and was the only passenger.
Near the intersection of Broad Street and Erie Avenue, while their car was stopped for a traffic light, Mr. Goode noticed police officers DeFazio and D'Amico frisking a black man nearby. Mr. Goode rolled down the car window and called to the officers that they had no right to do what they were doing, and that they should leave the man alone. At that time, the officers were approximately 25 feet away from the car, and within hearing range of Mr. Goode's remarks. Mr. Goode did not use profanity or make any personally derogatory remarks.
The traffic light then turned green, and the Rotko car proceeded north for several blocks, until overtaken and stopped by D'Amico and DeFazio, who gave chase in an unmarked police car. Both officers proceeded to the passenger side of the Rotko car, and one of them 1296*1296 called to Mrs. Rotko to produce her identification cards. DeFazio ordered Goode to get out of the car. When Goode did not promptly comply, DeFazio opened the unlocked front door of the car, reached through and unlocked the rear door, and opened it. He struck Goode on the knee with a blackjack and yanked him out of the car by his coat. The officers then turned Goode around against the car and patted him down.
Goode demanded to know why he was being subjected to this treatment, but received no reply. The officers attempted to place handcuffs on him, and he swung his arms in an attempt to avoid the handcuffs.
As Goode was being pulled from the car and turned around, he stepped on the foot or bumped the leg of Officer D'Amico.
After being frisked, Goode turned and again asked for an explanation for the police action, whereupon Officer DeFazio struck him across the cheek and mouth with a blackjack, cutting his lip. Angered by this treatment, Goode told the officers to "get your fucking hands off me".
After handcuffing Mr. Goode and placing him in the police car, the officers returned to the Rotko car and asked Mrs. Rotko for her driver's license and registration card. Officer D'Amico searched the back seat and rear interior portion of the car. Both officers inquired of Mrs. Rotko as to the basis of her acquaintanceship with Mr. Goode. Mrs. Rotko was given a ticket for failing to have her driver's license in her possession, and there was some suggestion that they might arrest her too.
In explanation of their arrest of Mr. Goode, Officer D'Amico stated "you can't use profanity with an officer."

Mr. Goode was taken to a police station and detained in a cell for approximately two hours. He was then taken to Episcopal Hospital, where he received several stitches in his lip and a tetanus shot. He was then returned to the police station and, at approximately 5 a. m., was taken to the Police Administration Building at 8th and Race Streets, where he was fingerprinted and photographed. At approximately 9 a. m. the next day he was brought before a magistrate on charges of assault and battery on an officer, resisting arrest, and breach of the peace, and was released on nominal bail. On February 11, 1970, all charges against Mr. Goode were dismissed, upon the joint motion of the Commonwealth and Mr. Goode's attorney.
The Police Department conducted an investigation into the conduct of D'Amico and DeFazio in this matter; the investigation was under the supervision of staff inspectors Ditmer and Fragassi.
Statements were taken from the persons directly involved and from five witnesses, and a report summarizing the statements was compiled. The personnel records of the officers were checked. DeFazio's personnel record at that time showed one previous suspension and two appearances before the Police Board of Inquiry. No further check into the backgrounds of the officers was made, nor was DeFazio's prior record referred to in the report.
The statements obtained by the investigating inspectors were essentially in accord with the facts set forth above. The statements of Officers D'Amico and DeFazio (neither of whom testified in the present case) asserted that Goode had used profanity in his initial comments to them and that he was unruly and boisterous after they stopped his car.
The inspectors expressed the conclusion that Mr. Goode's initial comments to the officers constituted probable cause for his arrest; that only reasonable force was used; that the officers were not unduly rude to Mrs. Rotko; and that, in summary, there was no basis for disciplinary action against either officer.
In finding that there was probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Goode, the inspectors adopted the interesting reasoning 1297*1297 that Mr. Goode's initial comments must have created probable cause for his arrest, otherwise the officers would not have pursued the Rotko car so vigorously.
On the basis of the undisputed and admitted facts, it is entirely clear that there was no probable cause for arresting Mr. Goode, and that the conduct of the police was in flagrant violation of the law and the Constitution.
3. The Ballow Incident. On June 20, 1970, at approximately 7:45 p. m., Officers Frederick Moorse and John D'Amico observed a black male operating a motorcycle which did not have registration plates. The man refused to stop at their request, whereupon they gave chase in their police car. Eventually, the man fell off the motorcycle, and escaped on foot, the officers in pursuit.

The officers concluded that the person sought had entered a house at 2337 N Howard Street. As the officers arrived at that address, a crowd of approximately 20 people, mostly black, gathered in the street.
Juanita Ballow and one Carlos Edney resided at that address. Plaintiffs' testimony was to the effect that Officer D'Amico ran into the house, passed Miss Ballow, went up to the second floor, came back downstairs and then told Miss Ballow that he was chasing someone. The defense version was that the two officers stopped at the door of the house, where they were confronted by Miss Ballow and Mr. Edney. For present purposes, this discrepancy need not be resolved.
It appears to be undisputed that, when Miss Ballow and Mr. Edney demanded to know what the police wanted, Officer D'Amico drew his service revolver and threatened to shoot Miss Ballow. Officer Moorse summoned assistance, and an additional police officer arrived. D'Amico broke the glass in the front door of the house with his nightstick, and the three officers entered the house. Mr. Edney was standing inside in the hallway, with a wrench in his hand. After a brief discussion with Officer D'Amico as to the officers' purpose, a scuffle ensued. When D'Amico again threatened to use his revolver, Edney escaped out the back door.
The officers searched the upper floors of the house, but did not find the man they were originally looking for. The officers emerged from the front of the house, and Carlos Edney, who had come around from the back of the house, again asked what they were doing, and made a derogatory remark to D'Amico. D'Amico pushed Edney against a parked car and handcuffed him.
As Carlos Edney was being handcuffed, his brother, Frederick Edney, arrived on the scene, ran up to D'Amico and asked him what Carlos was being arrested for. Allegedly because Frederick seemed to be reaching into his pocket as if to draw something from it, the officers physically restrained him and handcuffed him as well. Frederick Edney had no weapon or anything else in his pocket. Both of the Edneys were taken into custody. On July 31, 1970, Frederick Edney was convicted in Municipal Court on a charge of interfering with a police officer.
4. Herbert Brown Incident. On December 1, 1969, at about 12:30 a. m., Herbert Brown and Wesley Joiner, two black men, were walking along Atlantic Street near its intersection with Old York Road. There were automobiles parked along Atlantic Street near where they were walking, and they were carrying a flashlight.
Officers DeFazio and D'Amico, who were patrolling the area in an unmarked car, stopped the two men and pushed them up against a wall. Brown and Joiner were discovered to be carrying a pair of pliers and a screwdriver, as well as a flashlight. DeFazio stated to Brown, "Got you now, nigger," and accused him of attempting to steal a car battery. When Brown attempted to explain that his own disabled vehicle was parked about a block away, with two girlfriends in it; and that he was looking 1298*1298 for a piece of wire with which to attempt to start his car, DeFazio struck him in the face with his hand.

The two men were handcuffed, placed in the police car, and taken to the police station. Their request for permission to inform their waiting female companions, and to give them carfare so that they could get home, was denied. When Brown complained that his handcuffs were too tight, DeFazio again used racially derogatory terms and did not loosen the handcuffs until they arrived at the police station. Charges of attempted larceny against Brown and Joiner were ultimately dismissed, for lack of a prosecuting witness.
Giving the police the benefit of the doubt, I shall assume for present purposes that the two men were, or reasonably appeared to be, attempting to steal a battery. But this would not, of course, justify the racial slurs, the rough treatment, or the disregard of the plight of their stranded female companions.
5. Bernard Sisco Incident. On October 31, 1969, at about 9:30 p. m., police patroling in the 16th District were notified by radio that a rape had occurred in the area of 37th and Wallace Streets. Shortly thereafter, approximately six officers arrived at the scene. The complaining witness stated that she had been raped by several males, and that she knew that one of them was blind and lived at 3620 Wallace Street, a short distance away.
Bernard Sisco, a blind 20-year old black male, resided at the address stated. Officers DeFazio, Carroll and Brown proceeded to that address, and, without standing on ceremony, opened the door and entered the house, announcing simultaneously that they were police officers. Bernard Sisco opened the vestibule door from the inside and stood there, with an open knife in his hand. The police officers heard the victim of the rape, who had accompanied them, say something to the effect that Sisco was one of the rapists.
The police ordered Sisco to drop his knife, and he did so, whereupon the police wrestled him to the floor. Lieutenant Taylor and Lieutenant McGaughrin came up onto the porch to help subdue Sisco. After a struggle, the officers succeeded in handcuffing Sisco, and pulled him out of his house and into the street. While they were awaiting the arrival of a patrol wagon, Sisco spit on Officer Carroll, whereupon Officer Carroll lost control of his temper, grabbed him by the collar, pushed him to the ground, and began beating him. A superior officer ordered Carroll to go back to his police car, and he did so.
When the officers were placing Sisco in the patrol wagon, he stumbled, whereupon Officer DeFazio pushed him violently into the wagon.
Sisco was taken to the West Detective Division Headquarters at 44th and Park-side, where he remained for approximately four hours. He had been at the Detective Division Headquarters for about two hours before his mother was permitted to see him for the first time. She brought him a clean set of clothing, and observed that he was bleeding from his nose and mouth.
Thereafter, Sisco was taken to the Police Administration Building for processing. Photographs, taken some time between 2:25 a. m. and 4:45 a. m., on November 1, 1969, reveal no visible signs of physical injury to his head, nor do they conclusively rule out the presence of injury. The medical records of the Philadelphia Detention Center, where Sisco was held without bail pending preliminary hearing, do not reveal that he received any

treatment. He was kept in the prison hospital solely because of his blindness, and not for any other reason.
At a preliminary hearing on November 7, 1969, the rape charges were dismissed when the victim was unable to identify Sisco positively as one of her assailants. He was, however, held for court on charges of resisting arrest, assault and battery on an officer, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon.
1299*1299 After the preliminary hearing, a physician to whom Sisco was referred by his rehabilitation counsellor, examined him on November 11, 1969. The doctor found swelling on the top of the head, and concluded that Sisco had suffered a cerebral concussion.
The evidence upon which the foregoing findings are based is sharply conflicting. According to Sisco, his sister, and his mother, Sisco never offered any resistance to the police, but was nevertheless severely and monstrously abused, both at the scene of the arrest, and while in police custody thereafter. If their testimony were accepted at face value, the police acted with utter barbarity. If the testimony of the police and the victim of the alleged rape were accepted as literally correct, Sisco was never struck at all by any of the police. Under this version, any physical mistreatment of Sisco was self-inflicted, by reason of his rolling around on the ground and otherwise struggling against the handcuffs.
Given the fact that the police believed they were in "hot pursuit," and the admitted circumstances of their entry into the Sisco house and their initial observation of Sisco; and given the admitted fact that at least one officer became so angry that he had to be restrained by his superior officer, I have no doubt that Sisco was struck, and that the officers did not limit their use of force to the precise amount required to "subdue" a prisoner who was, after all, both blind and handcuffed, and who had earlier relinquished his weapon when ordered to do so.
While I have concluded that the testimony of the complaining witnesses is undoubtedly exaggerated, I do not believe it is totally fictional. The exaggerations and embroidery sprang from a sincere and deeply held conviction that the conduct of the officers was totally unjustified.
The evidence was sharply in conflict as to whether the victim of the crime identified Sisco as one of her assailants, before his arrest. I have accepted the defense testimony that she did. It must be conceded, however, that the extent of her opportunity to make such an identification before the initial scuffle is not altogether clear; and 10 days later she was unable to identify him at the preliminary hearing.
6. Joseph Reas Incident. On the evening of May 2, 1969, Joseph Reas, a 16-year old white male, was attending a carnival at Father Judge High School. At approximately 10 p. m., he and three other boys entered the school playground near the carnival area, and saw a girl who was weeping and who had blood on her face. Police arrived at the scene and some of the boys started to run away. Reas did not run. However, he was struck twice on the head with a blackjack, fell to the ground, and was struck again on the back of the head. His head was cut open, and he lost consciousness as he was being placed in a police wagon.

Officer DeFazio was one of several officers who arrested Reas and other teenagers on that occasion.
Reas was taken to Nazareth Hospital, where he regained consciousness and received several stitches to close his head wound. He remained in the hospital for two days. He was initially charged with inciting to riot, but the charges were dropped while he was still in the hospital.
The boy's mother could obtain no information from the hospital as to what had occurred. The next day she went to the 7th Police District Headquarters but no one there could give her any information as to the identity of the police officers involved, except that they were members of the Highway Patrol.
In some undisclosed fashion, Mrs. Reas was caused to believe that Officer DeFazio was probably the one who had struck her son. She spoke to Captain Murphy, Commanding Officer of the Highway Patrol, several times by telephone. She was discouraged from attempting to speak directly to Officer 1300*1300 DeFazio, but was advised that she had the right to press charges against him.
Mrs. Reas did not press charges against Officer DeFazio. Several months after the incident, DeFazio visited Mrs. Reas at her place of employment, and, among other things, told her: "Highway patrolmen are known to be rough and tough, and I am a highway patrolman, and I am proud of it."
7. Disciplinary Action. In none of the foregoing incidents was any disciplinary action taken against Officer DeFazio, D'Amico, or, so far as the record discloses, any of the other police officers involved. In the following two instances, disciplinary action was taken against DeFazio:
(a) Louise J. Reed. On October 3, 1967, Louise J. Reed, a black woman and the wife of a Common Pleas judge, and Coleman Clark, a white man, were employed as teachers at the George Washington Carver Elementary School, which is located in a predominately black area.
Officer DeFazio was patrolling the area in a police car. At about 4 p. m., Mr. Clark, who had just left a faculty meeting at the school, was driving his car nearby. Officer DeFazio stopped him in front of the school; Mr. Clark did not know why he was being stopped, and DeFazio did not tell him. A heated discussion followed.
At about that time, other faculty members were emerging from the school. Among other things, DeFazio told Clark to shut up, and accused him of acting like "the black pigs that live around here." Mrs. Reed remonstrated with DeFazio because of this remark, but was told to shut up. Mr. Clark rejoined the argument, and others became involved. At one point, DeFazio placed Clark under arrest, but the school principal intervened and restored calm.
The next day, 57 members of the faculty of the school complained in writing to DeFazio's commanding officer, with copies to the Mayor and Police Commissioner. Ultimately, on November 8, 1967, DeFazio was tried by the Police Board of Inquiry on charges of using

rude and insulting language, and conduct offensive to the public. Mr. Clark and DeFazio exchanged apologies. The Board found DeFazio guilty and recommended a two-day suspension, with which the Police Commissioner concurred. Mr. Clark was informed of the Board's decision.
(b) Anti-Semitic Remarks. On the same date as the hearing referred to in the preceding paragraph, DeFazio was also tried by the Police Board of Inquiry on charges of insubordination, neglect of duty and disobedience of orders. He was found guilty of having referred to a member of the public as a "Jew bastard" in the presence of a Jewish police officer; appearing at a court hearing in improper uniform, and refusing to submit a memorandum to a superior officer. The Board of Inquiry recommended a 10-day suspension; Police Commissioner Rizzo reduced this to three days' suspension.
As a result of the two incidents discussed above, DeFazio received a total suspension of five days. However, this was "served" by deducting five days from his accrued vacation time, and thus did not result in any actual pecuniary loss.
8. Miscellaneous. There was a great deal of evidence concerning Officer DeFazio's off-duty conduct in his home neighborhood. This evidence, which is substantially uncontradicted, raises further serious questions about DeFazio's fitness for police work. However, since DeFazio is no longer on the force, no useful purpose would be served by detailing the circumstances here.
It is clear that numerous oral complaints were received by DeFazio's superiors, relating to his conduct both on and off duty, and that no written record of these complaints was made, and no action taken. These complaints had no appreciable effect upon DeFazio's official fitness ratings.
1301*1301 G. COPPAR Case
The Coalition of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility (COPPAR) is an organization of some 32 constituent organizations with a common concern about police conduct and police-citizen relations. The Co-Chairmen of the organization are Mrs. Mary Rouse and Mr. Floyd Platton. The principal function of the organization is to receive citizen complaints of police misconduct through its constituent organizations, and, with the help of attorneys retained through these organizations, to bring the complaint to the attention of the Police Commissioner or other authorities in a position to remedy the conduct in question. Mrs. Rouse maintains an office at 124 W. Cumberland Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
COPPAR, and the individual plaintiffs (all of who claim to have been the victims of unconstitutional police conduct), purport to bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others in Philadelphia who are, or are likely to be, similarly mistreated. Additional plaintiffs include the Black Panther Party, a militant black organization; and the Young Lords Party, a militant organization of persons with Latin American ancestry.

The specific instances of alleged police misconduct are set forth in chronological order, in the following findings:
1. Charles Blackman. This incident evolved from an altercation between Charles Blackman, a black male who resides at 1412 S. Fallon Street, and Officer Crawford McGerald, a black police officer who was off duty at the time.
Mr. Blackman's house is apparently quite close to the street. In parking his car in front of the Blackman residence, McGerald apparently permitted the vehicle to come in contact with the house; at least, Mr. Blackman was convinced that he had done so. Blackman called the police to report the incident, but the investigating officer, finding that McGerald's car was then parked legally, and observing no damage, left the area.
Shortly thereafter, Blackman encountered McGerald and cursed at him because of the incident. McGerald pushed Blackman down in the street. Blackman struck McGerald a glancing blow on the side of his body with an ice pick which Blackman was carrying. Thereupon McGerald pursued Blackman onto the porch of his house, drew his revolver and struck Blackman on the side of the face with it.
A patrol wagon, and the investigating officer referred to above, arrived at the scene. They accepted McGerald's version of the incident, took Blackman to a hospital and, after he refused treatment, to the West Detective Division, where he was placed under arrest and charged with aggravated assault and battery on a police officer.
This incident is of no significance in the present case. At most, it arguably demonstrates that, in a case of a personal altercation between a civilian and an off-duty policeman, the police are likely to side with their colleague.
2. Robert Nicholas. Two Community Legal Services lawyers, engaged by a local community organization to represent two young men who had been arrested, were initially refused permission to see or talk to their clients. A high-ranking police officer, Inspector Shields, was called to the station. He reiterated the view that it was the policy of the Police Department not to permit attorneys to talk to defendants unless they knew the names of their clients and had been retained by the clients' families, as distinguished from community organizations. The police made no attempt to verify the parents' wishes in the matter, although one or more of them was present in the vicinity. The police appeared to be suspicious of the attorneys and antagonistic to the community organization which had engaged their services.
The defendants contend that the alleged police policy explained by Inspector 1302*1302 Shields has since been discarded. I accept that representation.
3. Raymond Ragland. On May 18, 1970, at about 11 p. m., Raymond Ragland, a black male pharmacologist, was walking slowly on the sidewalk along Gowen Avenue near his home. This is a racially mixed area. Ragland was neatly dressed. An unmarked police car, which had been proceeding in the opposite direction, turned around a short distance up the street and came back towards Mr. Ragland. He looked at the car after it had completed this maneuver.

Officers Rowe and Taylor, who were in the police car, stopped and asked Ragland if he was all right. They received no audible response. They then got out of the police car and asked for identification. Ragland told them that he had none, although he did have a wallet on his person. Ragland complained to the police about being stopped and asked for identification.
Thereafter, over the space of about 10 minutes, a spirited discussion ensued, during which the officers continued to demand identification, and asked Ragland to take his right hand out of his pocket. Ragland continued to question their reason for stopping him, and told them that if he was wanted for anything they should take him to a police station, otherwise they should let him go.
Finally, Officer Taylor reached for Ragland's right hand, and Ragland quickly pulled his hand out of his pocket. The officers then told Ragland he was under arrest, but did not say what for.
Ragland was then frisked. The officers pulled his arms behind his back for the purpose of handcuffing him. Ragland pulled his left arm away. One officer thereupon told him that he would "twist your black arm off." Officer Taylor struck Ragland on the arms, spine and knuckles with his nightstick, and also jabbed him in the stomach with the stick. Ragland was handcuffed, and taken in a patrol wagon to the 14th District Station, where he produced his identification. He was told that he was being held "for investigation."
Thereafter, Ragland was taken to Northwest Detective Headquarters, about three miles away. He was asked his name, address and occupation, and asked what organizations he belonged to. He was also requested to make a statement. Ragland identified himself, but refused to make any further statement. He was then told by a detective that he was being charged with assault and battery on an officer, resisting arrest, and disturbing the peace. About an hour later, Ragland was transported to the Police Administration Building. He was given a preliminary hearing, and was released on his own recognizance at about 5 a. m. Several weeks later the charges were dismissed at a further hearing.
Ragland wrote a letter of complaint to the Police Commissioner. The latter responded, advising that the complaint was being referred to the Highway Patrol. Several weeks later, a representative of the Highway Patrol informed some of Ragland's fellow employees that nothing would be done with respect to the complaint. Ragland also gave a statement to the FBI concerning the incident, but never heard further from that agency.
Several months later, a staff inspector of the Police Department requested Ragland to provide a written statement of the incident, and Ragland complied. Three months later, having heard nothing further about the matter, Ragland's attorney telephoned Inspector Kopsitz, and was then advised that no action would be taken. Except for this conversation, Ragland has never received any information from the Police Department concerning the disposition of his complaint.
4. Howard Schwartz. On May 23, 1970, shortly after midnight, a black male teenager snatched a set of car keys from a woman who had just parked her car near Rodney Street and Mt. Airy Avenue. The boy and three companions 1303*1303 then fled the scene. Two police officers observed this incident and gave chase, but the boys escaped. Thereupon,

the two officers, together with other officers who had been called to the scene, proceeded through the area and picked up approximately eight teenage boys and brought them back to the scene for possible identification by the victim. She did not identify any of the boys, and only one of the boys was believed by the police to resemble the youth they had earlier seen fleeing.
When one of the boys resisted the officers' efforts to have him confront the victim, Officer Duross pulled him from the police car and struck him in the face with his fist. All of the eight boys were taken away from the scene in police cars. Notwithstanding the victim's inability to identify her assailants, the two boys who had been apprehended by Officer Duross were taken to 14th District Headquarters. They were held until 8:30 a.m., when they were interviewed by a juvenile aid officer. They were charged with robbery, and subsequently released in the custody of their parents.
One Howard Schwartz, a disinterested witness who resided nearby, observed the police conducting the on-the-spot confrontations. He was disturbed by what he regarded as improper police conduct, and reported the incident to Mrs. Rouse of COPPAR. However, he made no complaint to police officials, because he felt it would be pointless.
5. Kenneth Lassiter. On June 6, 1970, at about 7 a.m., Kenneth Lassiter, a 16-year old black male, at the request of his mother, was loading some packages into a car in front of his home at 6th and Green Streets. He was dressed in a T-shirt, dungarees, and sneakers with no socks.
Detective McCaron was patrolling the area in an unmarked police car. Among other things, he was investigating a rape which had taken place at a nearby school the previous week. He had been furnished a description and a composite sketch of the alleged rapist. He concluded that Kenneth Lassiter resembled the suspect.
The officer approached Lassiter and ascertained his name, age and address, and told Lassiter that he was being taken into police custody for investigation in connection with some streetcar robberies.
Lassiter did not object to accompanying the officer. The officer made no attempt to inform the boy's family of the situation, until Lassiter's mother, who had observed the incident from inside the house, came out to protest.
The officer told her that Kenneth was being taken to the Central Detective Division, and he was in fact transported there in a patrol wagon.
Although the police apparently did not consider that Kenneth was under arrest, the fact is that he was photographed, shown the composite sketch of the rapist and told the reason for the investigation, warned of his right to remain silent and to have a lawyer, and questioned about his school and social activities. At some point, he was requested to take a lie detector test, and agreed to submit to this examination.

It is the policy of the Police Department, concurred in by the District Attorney's office, that any person 16 years of age or older may be submitted to a lie detector test, without notification to or consent of his parents, if he consents.
Kenneth was taken to the Police Administration Building, and a polygraph test was administered. As a result, the police concluded that Kenneth was innocent. One of the initial questions asked of Kenneth during the test was, "during the first 13 years of your life, do you remember jerking off?"
Kenneth was released at about noon on the day of his arrest. He had not been provided with any food during his time in custody, and he was not provided with transportation home.
Immediately after Kenneth was taken from his home by the police, his mother telephoned a relative who worked for the Human Relations Commission. The latter 1304*1304 arrived at Central Detective Division while Kenneth was still there, but was not permitted to see him. She asked why he was being held, and was told that he was not under arrest, but was just "under investigation." She asked that, in that case, he be released immediately; and she was assured that Kenneth would be released in a few minutes. Instead, Kenneth was removed to the Police Administration Building for the polygraph test, but the relative was not informed of this until about 15 minutes later. She protested that he was too young for such a test, but her protests were ignored.
A written complaint in connection with this incident was made to the Police Commissioner. Staff inspectors interviewed Lieutenant McCaron, but no action was taken.
5. Helen Peurifoy. On June 10, 1970, the police were required to deal with what was apparently a potentially tense racial situation in Southwest Philadelphia (whether the tension was racial in origin, or stemmed from teenage gang disputes, is not altogether clear). Officers patrolling the area encountered a large group of persons, mostly blacks, in the vicinity of 57th Street and Chester Avenue. Some children in the group were holding bottles. The officers proceeded to arrest some of these persons.
Mrs. Helen Peurifoy, a black woman, had been visiting friends nearby and came out to see what was happening. She questioned the police as to why the particular people were being arrested, and urged the police to arrest some other persons who had escaped. She was immediately placed under arrest for "inciting to riot." She protested her arrest, and attempted to resist police efforts to handcuff her, by swinging her arms.
One Sergeant Simmons, Patrolman DiSalvatore, and two other police officers, subdued Mrs. Peurifoy and succeeded in placing handcuffs upon her. She was pulled across the street and pushed into a patrol wagon, and transported to the district police station.
Upon arrival at the police station, Mrs. Peurifoy did not willingly leave the patrol wagon, so she was yanked out of the vehicle by Officer DiSalvatore, who also threatened her with his nightstick and called her a "black bitch."
Inside the station, Mrs. Peurifoy requested a glass of water and some medication which she needed, but this request was ignored. She was not permitted to make a telephone call. After

approximately 45 minutes, she was again handcuffed and taken in a patrol wagon to West Detective Division Headquarters.
During both of her trips in the patrol wagon, Mrs. Peurifoy was jostled extensively by the motion of the vehicle; she is convinced to this day that the vehicles were intentionally operated in an erratic manner, swerving from side to side, stopping and starting suddenly, in order to increase her discomfort.
At West Detective Division Headquarters, Mr. Peurifoy was kept in a cell for about an hour, and again was denied water and medication. She was questioned by a detective as to what had happened, and was not warned of her rights until after she has responded to his questions. She complained to him of her illness and need for medication, and also about the treatment which had been accorded her by the police. The detective then left the interview room, and returned in about 15 minutes, informed Mrs. Peurifoy that she was being discharged, and offered her a glass of water and the requested medication. She was then visited by a staff inspector who offered to drop all charges against her if she would promise not to file a complaint against the police officers. She was returned to the district police station, where the officer in charge told her that he would write a note to the officer who had mistreated her. About three hours after her original arrest, Mrs. Peurifoy was released, and no charges were ever filed against her.
1305*1305 6. Mary Blackwell. On July 23, 1970, at about 10 p.m., police were summoned to the scene of a disturbance in the area of 24th and Moore Streets, where bottles and stones were being thrown. There had been large-scale racial disturbances in that area in the past.
Among the other events of that evening, two police officers arriving at the 1700 block of 24th Street observed two teenage boys, one white and one black, confronting each other in the street, each with a belt wrapped around his hand. A crowd had gathered, and the officers had difficulty reaching the boys. One of the officers, Sergeant Mangini, took the belt away from the white boy, and approached the black youth, one Vincent Blackwell, 17 years of age. As Blackwell backed away from the officer, Sergeant Mangini struck him on the arm with his nightstick. Blackwell's 20-year-old sister attempted to intervene, and was jabbed in the abdomen with the nightstick.
Blackwell's mother, who had come down from her porch to try to get her boy back into the house, was nearby when this occurred. When the sergeant swung at her son, she grasped the officer's shirt and tried to push him away. The officer struck her in the abdomen and pushed her away from him.
Other people gathered around, and the sergeant cleared the area by swinging his nightstick. All three Blackwells were placed under arrest and taken to a patrol wagon. No one else was arrested on that occasion.
Mrs. Blackwell was dressed in a slip and blouse, and her daughter, who had been preparing for bed, was wearing blue jeans and a pajama top. All three Blackwells were taken to South Detective Division Headquarters. The police did not inform Mrs. Blackwell of the nature of the charges against her or her children. She was told that she did not have to make any statement, however she did make a voluntary statement, and so did the children.

While the Blackwells were being held in custody, the police were proceeding to investigate the incident, by taking statements from residents in the area. All of the witnesses agreed that Sergeant Mangini had not been attacked, and Sergeant Mangini had advised the detectives that he had struck the Blackwells. All of these interviews were completed by 1:30 a.m.
After 1:30 a.m., the Blackwells were given food for the first time, and Mr. Blackwell, the husband and father, was permitted to visit them and give them clothing.
At about 3 o'clock a.m., the three Blackwells were transported to the Police Administration Building, where they were fingerprinted and photographed. At about 4:30 p.m. on July 24, they were arraigned, and were told for the first time that they were charged with assault and battery on a police officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and inciting to riot.
On July 31, 1970, the Blackwells appeared at a preliminary hearing. The presiding magistrate dismissed all charges, but emphatically told Mrs. Blackwell that if any charges arising out of the arrests were brought against police officers, she would be rearrested and prosecuted.
7. Jean Thomas. On August 11, 1970, at about 6:45 p.m., Officer Tullio Ioannucci was shutting off an open fire hydrant at 39th and Mt. Vernon Streets. Mrs. Jean Thomas, a black woman, suggested to him that it would do no good to close the hydrant, because people would simply open it again. The officer told her, in effect, not to bother him. The conversation became heated. The officer called Mrs. Thomas a nigger bitch, and she called him a pig. Residents in the area began to gather about.
The officer advised Mrs. Thomas that he was going to arrest her for disorderly conduct, and proceeded to his nearby police car to call for a patrol wagon. Mrs. Thomas went into her house.
1306*1306 Additional police officers and park guards arrived, in response to Officer Ioannucci's call. He then attempted to enter Mrs. Thomas' house, but the doorway was blocked by her 17-year old daughter Cheryl. Two other children, James Thomas, 14, and Brenda Thomas, 18, also were at the door and told the police to stay away. Cheryl Thomas refused to move out of the officer's way, and was arrested and placed in the patrol wagon. The other two children tried to prevent this, and were also arrested and placed in the patrol wagon. Two officers then entered the house and conducted a thorough search, from basement to attic, but did not find Mrs. Thomas. They then left and took the three children to 16th District Headquarters. They were interviewed by a juvenile aid officer, but refused to give information. Brenda was sent to West Detective Division headquarters to be treated as an adult offender; James and Cheryl were charged with disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assault and battery, and were taken to the Youth Study center and held overnight. The next morning they were released, and all charges were dropped.
A few days later, Brenda Thomas was released, having been found guilty of one of the offenses charged against her. Mrs. Thomas was never arrested or charged with any offense arising out of this incident.

8. Dennis Holland. On August 14, 1970, at about 2 p.m., a police officer observed Dennis Holland, a 25-year old black male, lying unconscious in a parking lot at 13th and Commerce Streets. He called for an emergency wagon, which transported Holland to Jefferson Hospital.
In the emergency room, Holland regained consciousness, but did not respond sensibly to questions asked of him, and proceeded to behave in a very erratic manner. He was thereupon placed under arrest and charged with disorderly conduct. Although police obtained his identification from his wallet, no member of his family was notified. He was promptly sentenced to 30 days in jail, in default of a $30 fine, and was taken to the House of Correction. He continued to behave erratically, and was taken to the prison hospital.
Throughout this entire series of events, Holland, who was a diabetic, had been suffering from a diabetic reaction, and was clearly not responsible for his actions. It was not until the following day that his true condition became known, after which his relatives were contacted, and he was released from prison that night.
No charge of actual police misconduct could properly be based upon this incident. The police, the hospital staff, and the committing magistrate exhibited merely a regrettable lack of concern, and a willingness to jump to conclusions.
9. Fernando WHITE. On August 15, 1970, at about 11:30 p.m., two highway patrolman got out of their police car in Germantown in order to investigate a person they believed to resemble a rape suspect. A group of persons were standing nearby. Upon completion of their investigation, the officers got back into their vehicle. A black youth, Fernando White, age 16 or 17, approached the vehicle on the passenger side, asked the officer for his name and badge number, and then spit upon him. The officers then emerged from the police car, subdued and handcuffed White, after a brief struggle.
White was taken to 14th District Headquarters, and a group of citizens followed him to that office in order to protest his arrest. A police lieutenant spoke to this group, interviewed White, and decided to release him because he had no prior record, the incident was not serious, and White apologized to the officer. No charges were filed, and White was released at about 12:30 a.m.
10. Adalberto Molinas. (This incident did not involve anything approaching misconduct by the police, nor does it shed any light upon the issues in this litigation.)
1307*1307 11. Raid on Black Panther Headquarters. On Saturday, August 29, 1970, two police officers were shot, one of them fatally, while on duty at a police station. On August 30, 1970, two more policemen were shot and wounded when they stopped a stolen car.
The Police Department apparently suspected that members of the Black Panther Party may have been involved in these shootings. A convention, the Citizens Constitutional Convention, was scheduled to be held in Philadelphia on September 4, 1970; members of the Black Panther Party were expected to attend that meeting.

The police planned massive raids on premises believed to be occupied by the Black Panther organization; the raids were carried out at about 6 a.m. on August 31, 1970. Raids on premises at 3625 Wallace Street, 2935 Columbia Avenue, and 428 Queen Lane, were conducted simultaneously.
The raid on 3625 Wallace Street was conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Members of the press were alerted in advance, and press photographers were present at the scene.
Interpreting the evidence in the light most favorable to the police, it appears that approximately 20 police officers arrived at 3625 Wallace Street; that an inspector knocked on the door and announced that he had a warrant to serve; and that thereafter some gun shots were fired from inside the building. The police fired about five rounds into the building, then fired tear gas projectiles into the building. The occupants emerged, with their hands on their heads. Police spotlights illuminated the area. All of the occupants were lined up at gunpoint against a wall, and all except the one female present were required to disrobe completely. They were photographed in that condition, and the photographs received widespread newspaper publicity.
The searches of the other premises were very vigorous and thorough. It does not appear whether there were search warrants for the other properties (apparently, there was no search warrant for the Queen Lane property). The three buildings were totally ransacked by the police.
As a result of the three raids, approximately 16 persons were arrested and charged with assault with intent to kill, violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and conspiracy. All were held without bail until 8 p.m., at which time bail was set in the amount of $100,000 each, by a Common Pleas judge who, at the intervention of Police Commissioner Rizzo (now Mayor Rizzo) went to the Police Administration Building for that purpose, superseding the regularly assigned magistrate. At the bail hearing, the judge refused to consider or apply the prescribed standards for fixing bail. On September 3, 1970, in the course of a hearing in this Court on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction directed, inter alia, to the bail issue, the bail in each case was, with the consent of the District Attorney's office, reduced to $2,500.
In conjunction with these raids, Mr. Rizzo made various inflammatory outbursts, arguably racial in overtone, in the presence of newspaper reporters; these remarks were widely published in the local press.
12. 23rd and South Streets Incident. On August 30, 1970, at 5:45 p.m., a bus containing approximately 45 teenage males and 12 adults, all of whom were black, stopped near 27th and South Streets to pick up several black youths who were being pursued by a large group of white youths. Several passengers got off the bus, and fights erupted between whites and blacks; some of the participants were armed with sticks and bottles. A crowd, about evenly divided between whites and blacks, congregated in the area.
There had been several racial confrontations in that area over a period of several weeks. Three police officers appeared on the scene and immediately attempted to disperse the

crowd and to 1308*1308 separate the blacks from the whites. The bus departed, with some of its occupants still on board; the remaining youths ran in all directions.
A large group, containing approximately 50 persons, most of whom were black, proceeded east on South Street. One of the police officers was injured when he tripped over an exposed water pipe. Other police learned of this injury, and apparently were under the impression that the police officer had been assaulted (it is agreed that he was not).
At 23rd and South Streets, two police officers halted the group mentioned above, and stood them against a wall. Several patrol wagons and a bus load of policemen arrived at the scene, and some of the officers drew their guns. The persons halted were frisked, handcuffed and placed in patrol wagons. A few youths who failed to halt were apprehended and brought back to the scene.
Altogether, 29 persons were taken into custody. Two who had suffered injuries were taken to a hospital; the remaining 27 (10 juveniles and 17 adults) were taken to the 17th District Headquarters. One youth was returned to the scene in an attempt to identify white persons involved in the incident, but no such identification occurred.
After about an hour at the 17th District Headquarters, the arrestees were taken to the Police Administration Building, where all were photographed and fingerprinted, and held in a cell room.
Detectives proceeded to interview the arrestees, in groups of five. The first five interviews were completed at about 8 p.m., by which time the police had learned from other sources that the injured officer had not been assaulted, but had sustained his injury by tripping and falling. At about 8 p.m., a representative of the Human Relations Commission telephoned the Police Administration Building to inquire about the situation.
Nevertheless, the interviews continued. A record check was run on each of the arrestees, and statements were taken from each.
By 9 p. m., the police had determined that no charges would be brought against any of the persons arrested. But the interviews continued. Ultimately, at about 11:30 p. m., the arrestees were taken back to the 17th District, where a representative of the Human Relations Commission had arranged to have them picked up by relatives.
The police did not consider that any of these individuals was arrested on this occasion. The only information given to the arrestees was that they were being held in custody to get them off the street.
No whites were arrested or detained in connection with this incident. The procedures actually followed by the police were totally inconsistent with the explanation ultimately offered, namely, that the police were attempting to protect the blacks arrested.
While the evidence does not justify the conclusion that the police were unwilling to prosecute the whites involved in these skirmishes, (some attempt was made to identify

possible white culprits), the fact remains that blacks were taken into custody "for investigation", whereas the whites were not.
13. Wilfredo Rojas. On August 31, 1970, at about 11:30 a. m., police Officers Oliver and Brooks received word that two men had been stripping automobiles, and had been seen running west on American Street; and that one of the men was wearing a blue shirt. The officers observed Wilfredo Rojas, an 18-year old Puerto Rican male, and a companion, walking along Dauphin Street near American. The two youths stopped to converse with two individuals seated in a parked Volkswagen automobile.
Because Rojas and his friend had blue shirts on, the officers stopped to question them. Thereafter, one of the officers concluded that a female seated in the Volkswagen bore some physical resemblance 1309*1309 to a person whose photograph he had seen on an FBI wanted poster.
The officers radioed for instructions, and a supervisor appeared on the scene. He told them that the alleged car strippers had already been arrested, and that Rojas and his friend were not involved in that offense. Nevertheless, all four persons were taken into custody and transported to East Detective Headquarters. Police records were checked, and the police satisfied themselves that the girl was not the person wanted by the FBI.
One of the males was wearing the insignia of the Young Lords Party. The police questioned all of the males about their involvement with that organization, and about a homicide with which the police suspected that the Young Lords Party had some connection. No charges were filed against any of these persons; all were released that day.
14. Stop and Frisk Incidents of September 1, 1970. On September 1, 1970, at about 9:30 p. m., a group of 16 police officers stopped a group of approximately 30 black teenage boys in the area of 48th Street and Fairmount Avenue. Some of the officers drew their guns, and the boys were ordered to line up against a wall, where they were searched. Finding no weapons, the police released the boys. At no time did the police give any indication as to the reason for their actions.
After proceeding approximately one-half block farther along the street, the same boys were stopped again by a different group of policemen, and the same search procedure was repeated. This time, the boys were ordered to leave the scene in different directions.
On the same evening, two police officers stopped another group of 10 or 15 black boys walking along Waylusing Avenue near Lancaster Avenue. The boys were searched, and were allowed to leave the area in groups of four or five.
The area in which these incidents occurred is known to the police as one in which juvenile gang activity flourishes. However, the boys who were stopped were not in fact involved in gang activities at the time.
15. Ronald Crampton. On September 3, 1970, two police officers at the scene of a fire saw a car go through a red light, at what they considered to be a high speed. They gave chase in their police car. The operator of the pursued vehicle, Ronald Crampton, was not aware of

the police presence, and did not immediately respond. Ultimately, he became aware of the police officers and stopped his car. The police shined a spotlight on him, drew their weapons and ordered him out of the car. After frisking him, and being satisfied that he was unarmed, they gave him a ticket for going through the traffic light and for a defective muffler.
Mr. Crampton is convinced that he was not guilty of any infraction. He demanded a hearing in Traffic Court, but was fined even though neither officer appeared at the hearing.
16. Johnson and Simon. On September 8, 1970, at about 10 p. m., two black high school students, John Stanley Johnson and Herbert Simon, were walking along Chew Avenue in Germantown, immediately in front of Johnson's residence. Johnson was swinging a closed umbrella.
Officers Winchester and Kochik drove past the boys in an unmarked police car, and heard Johnson make some comment which they could not decipher. The police turned around and returned to the scene. They demanded to know what Johnson had said, frisked both boys and asked for identification. The boys denied making any comment, and told the police that Johnson lived at the house in front of which they were standing. The boys did not give the police their names, but Johnson handed the police his wallet, which contained his identification.
The boys were placed in the police car and transported to 14th District Headquarters. However, before they left the scene, Johnson's grandmother came out of the house and inquired as to where 1310*1310 they were being taken. The police gave her no reply.
While the boys were at the district headquarters, Simon complained that the police were being too rough with another individual whom they had apprehended. A black police officer pushed Simon away, and, when Johnson attempted to see what was happening, he pushed Johnson away and struck him on the chin with his fist, stating that he did not like the boys' attitudes.
The boys were then locked in a cell. Johnson's mother arrived at the station, but was not permitted to talk to him. After about an hour, the boys, handcuffed together, were taken in a patrol wagon to another police station at 22nd Street and Hunting Park Avenue. The police did not inform Johnson's mother of his whereabouts until about an hour after the boys had left.
At the 22nd Street and Hunting Park Station, the boys were interrogated as to their previous police contacts, and their organizational affiliation. At about 1:30 a. m., Johnson's mother was permitted to see them for the first time. After warning the boys of their constitutional rights, the police formally charged Johnson with disorderly conduct and interfering with a police officer. No charges were lodged against Simon.
Mrs. Johnson was permitted to talk to the officer who had struck her son; the officer maintained that he had acted properly.
Both boys were released in the custody of Mrs. Johnson at about 4 a. m. on September 9, 1970. Later in the day, Johnson and his mother were interviewed by a juvenile court officer.

Because they disputed the charge that Johnson had struck the policeman, the case was referred to juvenile court.
17. Alaberti and Whelan Incident. On the evening of September 17, 1970, a white male was severely beaten by several black males, in the vicinity of 22nd and Pierce Streets, a racially tense area. Several police cars arrived at the scene, and the victim was taken to a hospital.
Many residents of the area, all of whom were white, were congregating in the street, aroused by the incident. The police told them to disperse, but some of the residents refused to leave the scene and were vocal in their criticisms of the police handling the matter.
One of the residents, Mrs. Alaberti, was pushed against a police car and struck with a nightstick. A 17-year old white youth, James Whelan, protested the treatment she was receiving. Several other persons loudly criticized the police. All were arrested, and held in custody at the 17th District Station for about an hour and a half. All were then released without charges.
None of the persons arrested made any complaints about the conduct of the police, because they were told by a ward committeeman who was present that any such complaints might result in criminal charges being placed against them.
18. Fred Brooks Incident. Two police officers stopped a 22-year old black male who was walking near his home at about 2 o'clock a. m. He could not produce any verification of his identity, but one of the officers recognized him as a resident of the neighborhood. They made a note of his name and age, and, apparently, detained him briefly while they checked some nearby parked cars for possible signs of criminal activity.
Under the circumstances, I am satisfied that the police acted reasonably in all respects on this occasion.
19. Locke and Perry. On September 20, 1970, at about 8:30 a. m., Officer Dennis Kirby was visually inspecting the interior of an automobile parked in the 2500 block of Mascher Street (his explanation is that he believed the car might be stolen). However, (a) he had no information to that effect and made no attempt to learn whether it had been reported stolen; and (b) the age and physical condition of the vehicle would seem to have made it an unlikely candidate for theft.
As the officer was withdrawing from the automobile, he was struck by some 1311*1311 water thrown from a third floor window of the adjacent house. The officer testified that he saw Oliver Locke throw the water. Oliver Locke, who resided at the house, denies having thrown the water. For present purposes, I shall assume that Locke did in fact throw water on the police officer.
A heated verbal exchange followed, in the course of which Locke told the officer to stay away from the car (which was Locke's car) unless he had a warrant.
Officer Kirby radioed for assistance, and Lieutenant Smith and several other patrolmen and a patrol wagon arrived a few minutes later. Locke remained at the open third-floor window

of his house, and made several derogatory remarks to the police, including calling them "pigs." The police told him to come down to the door, that he was under arrest, and that if he did not come to the door they would come in and get him. Locke again stated "fuck you, pigs." What followed can only be described as a rather complete loss of control on the part of the police.
The police broke open the door to the house, and three of them ran up the stairs. Locke's wife, five months pregnant and dressed only in a nightgown, was standing on the secondfloor landing. Lieutenant Smith pushed her out of the way and ran up to the third floor, where he seized Oliver Locke and pulled him down the stairs. Officer Kirby struck Locke on the head with a blackjack, causing an open wound.
As Locke was being dragged down the stairs, Lieutenant Smith again pushed Mrs. Locke aside. She followed them down the stairs, screaming, and the officers pushed her away and struck her body with their nightsticks. She was dragged by the hair, and fell down several steps.
Mr. Locke, still struggling, was pushed into a patrol wagon. His wife followed, protesting; she called the officers "pigs" and attempted to strike one of them on the back with her fists. The officers called her a pig as well, and pushed her into a patrol wagon.
Mr. and Mrs. Locke were taken to East Detective Division Headquarters, and locked in cells. In the course of this proceeding, Mrs. Locke, by reason of her condition and scanty attire, was the target of rude and offensive remarks from some of the policemen present. Mr. and Mrs. Locke remained at East Detective Division Headquarters until that evening, when additional clothing was obtained for Mrs. Locke, and both were taken to a hospital. Mr. Locke received five stitches for his head wound, Mrs. Locke was found to have a bruised foot, but no other medical problems developed.
After receiving hospital treatment, Mr. and Mrs. Locke were taken to the Police Administration Building and charged with assault and battery on a police officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, threats to do bodily harm, and breach of the peace. They were released on bail.
The house in which the Lockes resided was shared with another couple, Mr. and Mrs. William Perry. On September 23 and 24, police, armed with a search warrant, appeared at the house to search for drugs. The search was very thorough. The officers removed clothing from bureau drawers, and emptied sugar bowls and soap cartons in the course of the search. No drugs were found. The officers made no attempt to straighten up the disorder their search had caused.
On November 24, 1970, at 2 a. m., Mr. Perry was arrested in South Philadelphia and held in police custody until 11 p. m. The police informed him that he was being arrested for "conspiracy to commit terroristic vandalism," but no formal charges were ever filed against him.
20. Thomas Lodico. On September 24, 1970, shortly before 9 a. m., Thomas Lodico parked his car near Bartlett Junior High School at 11th and Christian Streets, and proceeded to

distribute to students several copies of the "Plain Dealer," an underground newspaper. 1312*1312 Mr. Lodico was 23 years of age, white, and had long hair, a mustache and beard. Bartlett Junior High School is located in a predominately black neighborhood.
The newspaper which Lodico was distributing contained an article entitled "Fuck the Schools," and included a rather illegible cartoon which, arguably, depicts someone stabbing or otherwise assaulting a police officer. The text of the newspaper article included many words generally regarded as obscene.
Two police officers stopped Lodico and asked for a copy of the paper. Lodico gave them one. The officers expressed the view that the newspaper was "trash." The officers then summoned their supervisor, a sergeant, to the scene. The officers searched the back part of Lodico's car, where there was a pile of these newspapers.
A group of about 20 adults and children gathered at the scene. The adults complained about the paper which Lodico was distributing.
The officers thereupon handcuffed Lodico, placed him in the patrol wagon, and transported him to a district station. About 15 minutes later, he was taken to South Detective Division Headquarters, where he was photographed. Lodico requested a lawyer and stated that he did not wish to make any statement; nevertheless, he was questioned by various detectives about his associations with another underground newspaper. He was held in custody until about 12:30 p. m., when he was released. No charges were filed. He was not fed during his time in custody. During this same period, Lodico's automobile was taken by the police to the South Detective Division Headquarters, and was searched further.
21. Joseph Sterling. On September 24, 1970, at about 9:15 a. m., Joseph Sterling, who also worked for the Plain Dealer newspaper, drove his automobile slowly through the intersection of 11th and Christian Streets, and parked at an angle, whereupon he got out of his car and looked about in a confused manner. Mr. Sterling was white, 20 years old, and had long hair, a mustache and a beard.
A police officer (Rouse), who had observed Sterling's activities, stopped him and asked if anything was wrong. He noticed that Sterling's eyes seemed bloodshot, and that copies of the Plain Dealer were in Sterling's automobile. Officer Rouse then took Sterling into custody, and transported him to the district station, where Sterling was told that he was under arrest for driving while under the influence of narcotics. He was taken to the Police Administration Building in a patrol wagon, was fingerprinted and photographed, and voluntarily took a balloon test.
Sterling was permitted to make a phone call. He told the officers that he did not wish to make any statement until he had consulted a lawyer. Nevertheless, several detectives engaged him in a discussion involving his views on police activities and on the Vietnam war. He was interrogated about his use of drugs. He was not fed during his time in custody. At about 1 p. m., he was brought before a magistrate and was discharged.

22. Mark Soto and Jerry Serrano. On September 25, 1970, at approximately 10 p. m., police officer Charles Smith was called to the scene of a fist fight at Howard and York Streets. Approaching the area, he radioed for assistance. As the officer approached the scene, two males who appeared to have been engaged in a fight with each other stopped fighting, walked down York Street toward Hope Street, and again confronted each other as if to renew the fight. Officer Smith followed, and restrained one of the men against a parked car.
At this point, two other males grabbed Smith's arms and struck him with their fists, and one attempted to grab his gun. All three civilians then ran away.
A 15-year old black male, Mark Soto, was standing behind the officer; Smith apparently believed that he had been involved in the assault. Using the butt of his gun, Officer Smith struck Soto. 1313*1313 Soto tried to run away, but Smith caught him and wrestled with him, striking Soto again with his weapon.
At this point, two other police officers arrived on the scene. One of them struck Soto on the head with his night stick, and Soto fell to the ground. Two officers then held Soto down. Soto continued to struggle and was kicked in the head by a police officer.
A crowd gathered. Some were shouting derogatory remarks, others merely pleaded with the officers to stop treating Soto so roughly. Bottles and bricks were thrown in the general vicinity.
Soto was taken in a patrol wagon to 26th District Headquarters, and was then taken to Episcopal Hospital where he received stitches for a head wound. He was then taken to 25th District Headquarters and held over night. During this period, various police called him a Panther and a "black nigger."
In the course of the foregoing incident, two other officers saw a Puerto Rican male throw a bottle in the direction of their police vehicle. The culprit disappeared down Waterloo Street. Shortly thereafter, the officers apprehended Jerry Serrano, a Puerto Rican male age 16, believing him to be the person who threw the bottle at them. Two other officers appeared to assist in the arrest. Serrano struggled to escape. The officers struck him approximately six times on his back and arms with nightsticks, and called him a "Spic."
Serrano was taken first to one police station then to another. Ultimately, he was charged with assault and battery and disorderly conduct. He was released to his father at 5 a. m. the following day. Serrano has consistently denied that he was guilty of any offense on the occasion in question.
A delegation headed by Mrs. Mary Rouse, of the COPPAR organization, went to the 26th District Headquarters to protest the treatment of Mark Soto. She asked to speak to the captain, but he was not present and the officer in charge refused to communicate with him. Mrs. Rouse then telephoned Lieutenant George Fencl, head of the Civil Disobedience Squad, and he and the district captain soon arrived. After speaking briefly with the protesting group, these officers then sent for a staff inspector. Arriving a short time later, the staff inspector met with representatives of the protesting group and recorded their

complaints and promised a thorough investigation. However, neither the complainants nor the district captain ever heard anything further about the investigation.
23. Ellis Steward. On October 1, 1970, at about 3:30 p. m., Ellis Steward, a 52-year black man, was driving in his car and picked up three young individuals. Sergeant Komada, patroling in a police car, saw these persons get into Steward's car. One of them resembled a person known to Sergeant Komada as a narcotics user, and Sergeant Komada had been informed that a Negro male was selling narcotics in the area. Accordingly, Komada followed the Steward vehicle.
At Germantown Avenue, the three passengers got out of the car. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Steward stopped his car in response to Sergeant Komada's signals. Komada asked Mr. Steward for his vehicle registration, and advised him that the persons who had just been in his car were narcotics users. The first card Steward showed to Sergeant Komada was not his vehicle registration. Steward was ordered out of his car, and complied, and was frisked. This occurred in front of a factory from which workers were emerging at the change of shifts. Steward loudly objected to the police procedure, especially in front of a large number of people in an area where he was known. He informed the officer that he was physically disabled. Sergeant Komada then arrested Steward for disorderly conduct.
At that point a second officer (Flint) arrived on the scene, and the two policemen proceeded to handcuff Mr. Steward. Steward objected to being handcuffed and swung his arms about to evade the 1314*1314 handcuffs, whereupon Officer Flint struck Steward on the shoulder and head with his blackjack. Steward and both officers fell to the ground in the scuffle. Steward was handcuffed and placed in a patrol wagon. Upon arrival at the 35th District Headquarters, Steward seemed to be unable to walk. He lay on the floor for about a half hour, and then was taken to a hospital, where a physician examined him and concluded that he was all right. He was then returned to the police station and formally charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. He was eventually released from custody at 3:30 a. m. the following morning. During his 12 hours in police custody, he was not fed. On October 21, 1970, he was convicted of the above charges in Philadelphia Municipal Court.
24. Albert Boccuto and Anthony Dignetti. On October 6, 1970, at about 6 p. m., a group of about 20 boys, ranging in age from 15 to 21, were playing football in a school yard at 3600 North Randolph Street. During the preceding two-year period, the police had received many complaints from residents of the area and from the Board of Education to the effect that the school building was being vandalized and that young persons were drinking and breaking bottles in the school yard at night.
Officer Wells, patrolling nearby, knew of these earlier complaints. He went to the school yard and told the boys to leave.
One of the youths, Albert Boccuto, age 17, Caucasian, did not immediately leave, and protested the validity of the officer's order. The officer radioed for assistance. Boccuto used obscene language to the officer, and the officer then told him that he was under arrest. The officer pushed Boccuto against a chain fence and held him by the hair to prevent his escape. Nearby residents gathered to witness the encounter.

Another white male, Anthony Dignetti, age 22, protested the officer's treatment of Boccuto. The officer told him that he also was under arrest. Both youths were then handcuffed and taken in a patrol wagon to the 25th District Headquarters. Other officers arriving on the scene dispersed the remaining crowd by waving their nightsticks.
Neither Boccuto nor Dignetti was told by the arresting officer why they were supposed to leave the school yard, nor why they were arrested. Boccuto was charged by juvenile officers with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. He was held in a cell for several hours and then released. The charges were dismissed the next day. Dignetti was charged with disorderly conduct. He was held for three hours and then released; the charges were dismissed the next day.
Dignetti testified that, while being held at the police district headquarters, he was punched several times by a guard. The guard flatly denied any such incident. In the absence of any clear basis for assessing the relative credibility of these witnesses, I have concluded that the evidence on this point is evenly balanced, and therefore make no finding that Dignetti was beaten.
About a month before the above incident, on September 4, 1970, at about 9 p. m., Albert Boccuto and a companion, Sammy Fabrizzo, were stopped by two police officers in the vicinity of 5th and Annsbury Streets. The officers held the boys at gunpoint, frisked them, asked them where they were going and what they were doing, and then permitted the boys to leave. It appears that the police had received numerous complaints from residents in the area, concerning groups of teenagers congregating on street corners and causing disturbances. The police response to these complaints was to disperse any crowds they saw on street corners, and to arrest anyone who failed to comply, on charges of "corner lounging" or disorderly conduct.
25. Dwight Redding Byrd. On October 12, 1970, at 1:15 p. m., Officers Winchester and Byrne observed one Dwight Redding Byrd, a Negro male, 1315*1315 holding in his hand a 20-inch sword, partially removed from its wooden sheath. Several other Negro males, one of whom had a large stick in his hand, were walking away from Byrd.
Winchester approached Byrd, took the sword away from him, examined it, and advised Byrd that he was under arrest. He then attempted to place handcuffs on Byrd. Byrd pulled away, and the sword fell to the ground. In the meantime, Officer Byrne had stopped the other Negro males, and, with gun drawn, required them to lean against a wall, frisked them, and asked their identification.
As Byrd continued to struggle with Officer Winchester, flailing his arms and kicking, the unsheathed sword lay on the pavement about four feet away. Officer Byrne came to his fellow officer's assistance; neither officer picked up the sword.
After about a minute, Byrd picked up the sword and began to swing it over his head. The officers were standing in the street about five feet away from Byrd, backing away from him. Both officers drew their guns.

Byrd was speaking in a foreign tongue (possibly Arabic). He faced the officers, swinging the sword in front of his face. He stepped toward the officers, but did not point the sword at them or lunge at them.
The officers told Byrd to drop the sword. They repeated this instruction three or four times. When he failed to comply after about 30 seconds, Officer Byrne fired into Byrd's chest, and Winchester fired into Byrd's leg. Byrd fell to the sidewalk; 20 minutes later he was removed from the scene; he was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
The District Attorney later ruled that the killing of Dwight Byrd was justifiable homicide.
26. Mr. and Mrs. Leon Brown, and Edward Smalley. On October 18, 1970, a Sunday, at about 2:30 p. m., four police officers assigned to the narcotics unit acted unreasonably in conducting a search of the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Leon Brown, 3943 North 10th Street, pursuant to a search warrant.
For present purposes, I shall assume, without deciding, that the search warrant was valid. The four officers, none of whom was in uniform, all of whom were casually dressed, knocked on the door, displayed their badges to Mrs. Brown's sister, who was looking out through the door window, and demanded entry. Without waiting for a response, they broke down the door, breaking it off its hinges. They then thoroughly ransacked the entire house.
Three officers invaded Mrs. Brown's bedroom on the second floor; she had just arisen from a nap, and was clad only in her underwear. She was ordered to remain standing as the officers searched the bedroom. After some delay, she eventually was provided with a housecoat.
The officers emptied out drawers and closets in all of the rooms in the house, and overturned mattresses. They did not inform Mr. and Mrs. Brown the purpose of the search, until it had been in progress for several minutes. They then advised the Browns that they were looking for drugs, and checked the Browns' arms for signs of needle marks.
The police found no drugs, and left the premises after about a half hour. Before leaving, they put back some of the items which they had dumped from bureau drawers, but the premises were in considerable disorder after the police left. The front door was not repaired.
At about the same time that the above search was taking place, a similar search was conducted at 2619 West Lehigh Avenue, in which an Afro boutique shop occupied by a friend of the Browns, one Leonard Smalley, was located. Although the affidavit in support of the alleged search warrant indicated that the warrant was directed at the boutique shop, the officers searched the second and third floors of the building first, before proceeding to search the boutique shop. 1316*1316 No one was present in the building when the police arrived. They broke the lock on the building door, searched upstairs, then broke the door to the boutique shop off its hinges and searched the shop.
No drugs were found, the merchandise was disarranged, and some items were stolen. The entire search took about a half hour.

Mr. Smalley learned of the search of his shop when, on behalf of the Browns, he inquired at the 22nd and Hunting Park Avenue Station as to the purpose of the search of the Brown residence. After observing the damage to his store, he returned to the police station on two or three occasions and asked to see the search warrant. No such warrant has ever been shown to him.
27. Mrs. Irene Thompson. On October 23, 1970, at about 4 p. m., an 11-year old Negro boy was caught shoplifting at a Woolworth Store on Chester Avenue. When he refused to give his name and address, the manager called the police.
Officer Leon Burke responded to the call. Holding the boy by his belt, he escorted him to the sidewalk. The boy then attempted to escape, and bit the officer on the finger. The officer lost his temper. He wrestled the boy to the sidewalk, fell on top of him, and repeatedly banged his head against the pavement. A crowd gathered, and complained of the officer's treatment of the boy.
Mrs. Irene Thompson, a black woman, reasonably well educated and responsible, observed the officer's conduct. She had not known any of the persons involved previously. She was very disturbed at the incident, and made several attempts to complain about Officer Burke's conduct, and to inquire about what had happened to the boy.
The police were reluctant to listen to her; she was not permitted to talk to Officer Burke, even though he was present in the station house.
When Mrs. Thompson insisted that she wished to make a complaint, it was finally arranged that one of the police officers would listen to her. However, as she was explaining the incident to him, he kept defending the conduct of Officer Burke. Mrs. Thompson was told to return to the police station the following Monday. She did so, but was told that no one knew anything about the matter.
Mrs. Thompson has never received any information from any police or city source concerning her complaint, or concerning the boy who had been mistreated.
H. Statistics
At the request of the Court, certain statistical information has been furnished by the defendants. The period covered by these statistics runs from January 1, 1968 to July 1, 1970. During that period, 2,339 persons were arrested and charged with assault and battery on a police officer or resisting arrest. In 1,451 of these cases (62 percent), either no other charges were filed, or the other charges were limited to such crimes as disorderly conduct, breach of the peace, interfering with an officer, intoxication, or incitement to riot.
During the same period, 2,709 cases which included charges of resisting arrest or assault and battery on a police officer were disposed of. Seventy-eight percent of the defendants were exonerated (67 percent before trial). Only 26 percent of these cases resulted in convictions for disorderly conduct, breach of the peace, threats, or intoxication.

By way of comparison, there were a total of 97,688 arrests in 1968, of which 17,960 were for serious offenses; there were 99,932 arrests in 1969, of which 18,103 were for serious offenses; and there were 101,552 arrests in 1970, of which 20,769 were for serious offenses. The term "serious offenses", as used in the foregoing statistics, means murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault and battery, burglary, larceny of automobile, and larceny involving goods valued at more than $50.
1317*1317 The COPPAR organization received approximately 200 complaints of police misconduct during the first eight months of 1970.[1]
II. DISCUSSION
Careful evaluation of all of this mass of evidence leads inescapably, and perhaps not surprisingly, to the conclusion that, while the overall situation is not as bad as the plaintiffs contend, neither is it as acceptable as the defendants contend.
At the outset, it may be appropriate to register a few general observations about the difficult problems of the police in our society, and the practical limitations upon the role of courts in resolving disputes of the kind represented by this litigation. It is a truism that the multitude of social ills afflicting our society bear most heavily upon the poor, and especially upon the black poor. These same social ills spawn much of the activity which society regards as criminal. Society as a whole, in the ghettos as well as in the suburbs, looks to the police for protection against criminal activity. The policeman is not responsible for the deplorable conditions in which the underprivileged exist, but he is charged with responsibility for dealing at firsthand with the more egregious results of these conditions. To the deprived, he can easily become the symbol of society's oppression, and the target for undifferentiated hostility generated by causes having no direct relationship to police conduct.
Police traditionally are trained and function as a quasi-military organization. Generally speaking, they are required to enforce the law as it is written. They are required to obey orders, and to exact obedience from others. The tactics of police enforcement involve a considerable measure of naked power. Dealing so frequently with persons who have no respect for law or for the police function, the policeman cannot always rely upon peaceful and reasonable persuasion as the instrument of choice.
The hazards of police work are very real and pervasive. The conduct of individual officers in stress-filled situations should not be judged by the standards of armchair hindsight.
And finally, departmental routine in a large police department is necessarily somewhat cumbersome and time-consuming. The record is replete with instances of this problem. Typically, an individual is stopped by a patrolling police officer and questioned briefly about some actual or suspected misfeasance. If he does not give a satisfactory account of himself, he is taken to the precinct office. After some delay and processing there, if further questioning is desired, he is transported to the Detective Division for interrogation and further processing. Thereafter, he is transported to the Police Administration Building in center-city ("The Round-house") for further questioning and, perhaps, detention, formal charges, and a preliminary hearing. Where there was probable cause for the original arrest,

the entire process would seem to be unobjectionable. But the record makes clear that this practice is not limited to probable cause situations.
From the record as a whole, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, in the absence of probable cause for arrest, at least two classes of individuals are particularly likely to be subjected to this kind of procedure: poor blacks, and individuals who question or protest the initial police contact. It is apparent from this record that a substantial number of policemen genuinely believe (a) that if an individual is freed without formal charges within 24 to 48 hours after his initial arrest, he should not object to the inconvenience involved; (b) that a person 1318*1318 who questions the propriety of police conduct, or refuses to cooperate with the police, should expect to be inconvenienced, or worse; and (c) that if it is ultimately established that there was probable reason to believe an individual guilty of an offense, his treatment at the hands of the police should be judged by different standards than those applicable to the innocent. And, needless to say, such incidents are viewed by the police and the detainees from entirely different perspectives; a course of events which, to the policeman, are merely routine "police procedure" often appear to the civilian involved to be drastic and outrageous encroachments upon his liberty and privacy.
Problems similar to those presented in this case have been the subject of a great deal of learned commentary. See, for example, Skolnick: Justice without Trial, Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society (1966); Westley: Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality (1970); Chevigny: Police Power, Police Abuses in New York City (1969); Niederhoffer: Behind the Shield, the Police in Urban Society (1967). Two presidential commissions have addressed themselves extensively to these issues: The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (1967), at pp. 178-207 (in which, incidentally, the Philadelphia Highway Patrol is described as a "skull-cracking division"); Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Ch. 11 (1968). A review of this material suggests that the problems disclosed by the record in the present case are not new, and are fairly typical of the problems afflicting police departments in major urban areas.
The totality of the evidence in this case convincingly establishes the following general conclusions:
1. Violations of the legal and constitutional rights of citizens are committed by only a small percentage of the members of the police force.
2. Nevertheless, such violations do occur, entirely too frequently.
3. The evidence does not disclose any conscious departmental policy of racial bias, or of discriminatory enforcement on racial lines.
4. The presence of racial prejudice on the part of an individual police officer, manifested in the performance of his police duties, is unlikely to be reflected adversely in the performance ratings accorded him by his superiors.
5. Existing procedures for handling civilian complaints and for enforcement of police discipline related to civilian complaints is totally inadequate. It is the policy of the

department to discourage the filing of such complaints, to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven police misconduct, and to resist disclosure of the final disposition of such complaints.
The evidence discloses that violations of legal and constitutional rights of citizens by the police are most widespread in the following areas of police activity:
(1) Arrests "for investigation"; (2) Treatment of citizens who question or criticize what the police are doing in a particular instance; (3) Charges of resisting arrest, when the arrest was unlawful in the first place; (4) Extreme overreaction to actual or reported assaults upon policemen.
Before discussing the ultimate issue as to whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to relief in this proceeding, various legal issues must be resolved.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss in both cases, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), apparently on the theory that the Court lacks the power to grant injunctive relief in situations of this kind. However, when a pattern of frequent police violations of rights is shown, the law is clear that injunctive relief may be granted. Lewis et al. v. Kugler et al., 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971).
Defendants in the Goode case also seek dismissal on the ground that indispensable parties (Officers De Fazio 1319*1319 and D'Amico) were not joined. I agree that, in the absence of these individuals as parties to the lawsuit, no relief which directly affects them may properly be granted. However, the evidence concerning these two officers is relevant, and may properly be considered, in connection with the issues involving the remaining defendants.
In the COPPAR case, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was too vague and general to state a cause of action under § 1983. While the complaint is probably insufficient on that ground, see Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967), this defect was remedied by requiring the plaintiffs to provide a list of witnesses and a brief description of each incident charged, in advance of the hearings in this case.
The District Attorney has moved to dismiss the complaint in the COPPAR case. To the extent that some of the plaintiffs originally sought injunctions against pending criminal prosecutions, the motion clearly is meritorious. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 747, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1972). However, this Court, early in the proceedings, declined to grant such relief, and the plaintiffs in question appeared to have abandoned this issue. In view of the District Attorney's relationship to the handling of civilian complaints against police misconduct, he was properly retained as a party to the litigation.
At an earlier stage of the proceedings, I informally granted the defense motion to dismiss the case with respect to the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords Party, because of their refusal to submit to discovery. That ruling will now be formalized. Elimination of these organizations as parties plaintiff does not, of course, preclude consideration of the evidence relating to these organizations or their members in connection with the issues raised by the other plaintiffs.

Defendants in the COPPAR case have also argued that COPPAR has no standing to bring this action, and is not a proper representative of the class of plaintiffs. I believe COPPAR does have the requisite standing. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Smith v. Board of Education of Morrilton School District, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
On September 4, 1970, I entered an injunction in the COPPAR case, restraining the police from violating the constitutional rights of citizens in certain enumerated respects. The Ellis Steward incident and the Johnson and Simon incident occurred while this injunction was in effect, and plaintiffs seek an adjudication of contempt. While it appears that the order of this Court was violated, particularly in the Johnson and Simon case, this may have been due to a lack of precision in the framing of the injunctive order. Although it is a close question, I am not persuaded that the violation was willful. The police apparently were not aware that what they did amounted to an arrest.
In both cases, the captions should be amended to designate Mr. Rizzo as the Mayor, and Mr. Thomas O'Neill as the Police Commissioner, and to reflect such other personnel changes as have occurred in the interim.
As noted earlier, the evidence in this case does not establish the existence of any overall Police Department policy to violate the legal and constitutional rights of citizens, nor to discriminate on the basis of race. The record does establish, however, that such violations do occur, with such frequency that they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances; and that little or nothing is done by the city authorities to punish such infractions, or to prevent their recurrence. I am convinced that, except in cases of severe injuries, existing remedies are inadequate to protect the public interest involved. Private suits for damages are expensive, time-consuming, not readily available, and not notably successful; moreover, they have no preventive effect. Except in extreme cases, 1320*1320 criminal prosecutions are unlikely; and, in any event, given the dual role of the District Attorney's staff, such prosecutions are a most unsatisfactory vehicle for vindication of the rights involved.
Respect and admiration for the performance of the vast majority of police officers cannot justify refusal to confront the reality of the abuses which do exist. But deference to the essential role of the police in our society does mandate that intrusion by the courts into this sensitive area should be limited, and should be directed toward insuring that the police themselves are encouraged to remedy the situation.
In the course of these proceedings, much of the argument has been directed toward the proposition that courts should not attempt to supervise the functioning of the police department. Although, contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Court's legal power to do just that is firmly established, see for example, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1938); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970); Lewis et al. v. Kugler et al., supra. And see The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 Yale L.J. 143 (1968); and cf. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (prison conditions), I am not persuaded that any such drastic remedy is called for, at least initially, in the present cases.

To a large extent, consideration of sweeping injunctive relief in the present cases has been obviated by the consent injunctive decree in the Alexander v. Rizzo case (C.A. No. 70-992). Although the point has not been raised by the parties, it would seem that this decree should be accorded res judicata, or at least collateral estoppel, effect, at least with respect to the abuses inherent in initial police contacts and arrests "for investigation." In any event, the entry of that decree should go far to eliminate many of the abuses complained of in the present cases.
While there are additional areas of police misconduct asserted in the present case, to which a further injunctive decree might by directed, I am satisfied that the establishment of adequate procedures for handling and adjudicating civilian complaints against the police would go far to prevent further abuses, and to reduce the friction which the existing procedures, or lack of procedures, generate.
There are four principal defects in the present arrangement. (1) The departmental procedures are geared to handle infractions of police rules and regulations, yet these rules and regulations are not framed to cover specific violations of the legal and constitutional rights of civilians; (2) Complaints are handled on a "chain of command" basis, and this results in a tendency to minimize and discourage civilian complaints; (3) The existing procedures do not provide adequate opportunity for the civilian complainant to present his case, before a relatively objective tribunal; and (4) The outcome of the proceeding is not disclosed.
In attempting to frame an appropriate remedy in this litigation, the existence of sharp philosophical differences over the issue of civilian review of police activities cannot be overlooked. The defendants, and police generally, strongly oppose the entire concept of civilian review. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, appear to contend that no other solution is feasible. It is not the function of a court to attempt to resolve this doctrinal controversy; such issues are best resolved in the legislative and executive branches of government, and ultimately in the polling places. But it is the obligation of a federal court, under the Civil Rights Act, to take appropriate action to prevent recurring and otherwise predictable violations of the constitutional rights of citizens. If this can be accomplished without imposing some form of civilian review, that course of action seems preferable, since it would represent the least drastic of possible alternatives. But if, after a reasonable opportunity for experimentation, the police themselves prove unable to reduce the abuses complained of to an acceptable 1321*1321 minimum, then some form of civilian intervention, whether by a civilian administrative agency, or by injunctive decree, may become necessary.
In conformity with the views expressed above, the defendants will be required to formulate and submit to this Court for approval, a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints alleging police misconduct. It is suggested that the following guidelines should be carefully considered in such formulation: (1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure spelling out in some detail, in simple language, the "dos and don'ts" of permissible conduct in dealing with civilians (for example, manifestations of racial bias, derogatory remarks, offensive language, etc.; unnecessary damage to property and other unreasonable conduct in executing search warrants; limitations on pursuit of persons charged only with summary offenses; recording and processing civilian complaints, etc.). (2) Revision of procedures for processing complaints against police, including (a)

ready availability of forms for use by civilians in lodging complaints against police officers; (b) a screening procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (c) prompt and adequate investigation of complaints; (d) adjudication of non-frivolous complaints by an impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant to present his complaint, and to the police officer to present his defense; and (3) prompt notification to the concerned parties, informing them of the outcome.
In this connection, I note that the plaintiffs have contended that, so long as the final decision is reviewable by the Police Commissioner, any such procedure is likely to prove inadequate. I am not persuaded that this necessarily follows. Some worthwhile analogies may perhaps be derived from the recent improvements in handling disciplinary matters in the military forces. It has apparently been feasible in the Armed Forces to provide relatively impartial adjudications, essentially unfettered by command pressures, while still retaining control by the military. If, in notifying the complainant as to the disposition of his complaint, a brief statement of the reasons for the disposition were also required, arbitrary or erroneous rejection of legitimate complaints would be unlikely.
It should be mentioned that the foregoing guidelines are consistent with generally recognized minimal standards for improving police-community relations. They impose no substantial burdens on the Police Department, and pose no threat to vigorous law enforcement. They afford protection to the accused policeman, as well as to the complaining civilian.
In conclusion, it should perhaps be emphasized that this Court has not decided that the plaintiffs and the class they represent have a constitutional right to improved departmental procedures for handling civilian complaints against police. What the Court has decided is that, under existing circumstances, violations of constitutional rights by police do occur in an unacceptably high number of instances; that, in the absence of change in procedures, such violations are likely to continue to occur; and that revision of procedures for handling civilian complaints is a necessary first step in attempting to prevent future abuses.
An appropriate order will be entered in each of the two cases.
ORDER IN NO. 72-2430
And now, this 14th day of March, 1973, it is ordered:
1. The Black Panther Party and the Young Lords Party are stricken from the caption of the case as plaintiffs, and as to those plaintiffs the complaint is dismissed.
2. The remaining plaintiffs are directed to make appropriate amendments to the caption of the case, to reflect changes in personnel which have occurred during the pendency of this lawsuit.
1322*1322 3. The defendants, acting jointly or separately, as they may prefer, are directed, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, to submit to this Court for its approval a

comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct, in conformity with the views expressed in the Opinion of this Court filed this date.
ORDER IN NO. 7-491
And now, this 14th day of March, 1973, it is ordered:
1. The plaintiffs are directed to make appropriate amendments to the caption of the case, to reflect changes in personnel which have occurred during the pendency of this lawsuit.
2. The defendants, acting jointly or separately, as they may prefer, are directed, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, to submit to this Court for its approval a comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct, in conformity with the views expressed in the Opinion of this Court filed this date.
[1] At a post-hearing conference in January 1973, both sides were afforded an opportunity to reopen the hearings in order to produce evidence of any pertinent changes in procedures, or, other relevant circumstances, which may have occurred since the briefs were filed. In the absence of any request for reopening, the cases are being disposed of on the existing record.

 
 Council Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability..., 60 F.R.D. 615 (1973)

60 F.R.D. 615 United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.
COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS ON PHILADELPHIA POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY et al., on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. James H. J. TATE et al., Defendants.
Gerald G. GOODE et al. v.
James H. J. TATE et al.
Civ. A. Nos. 70–2430, 70–491. |
Oct. 5, 1973.
Synopsis Plaintiffs sought award of counsel fees plus costs and disbursements with respect to separate cases which were brought for vindication of constitutional rights, in which significant violations were established and which resulted in plaintiffs obtaining relief that would prove beneficial to all citizens of city. The District Court, Fullam, J., held that court’s discretion should be exercised in favor of an award of counsel fees and expenses, and that respective counsels would be awarded specified amount of counsel fees and costs and disbursements.
Payment of fees and costs ordered.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*616 Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz by Peter Hearn, and F. John Hagele, III, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs Goode and others.
William Lee Akers, Harry Lore and Richard Axelrod, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs Council of Organizations of Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility and others.
Sheldon L. Albert, Chief Deputy City Sol., John M. McNally, Jr., First Deputy City Sol., for defendants Tate and others.
Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
FULLAM, District Judge.
On March 14, 1973, I entered Findings of Fact and filed an Opinion, 357 F.Supp. 1289, applicable to both of the above cases, and entered Orders in each case, the effect of which was to require the defendants to formulate and submit to this Court revised procedures for handling civilian complaints against police officers, and to revise police training and instructional manuals, for the purpose of minimizing violations of the constitutional rights of citizens. The required submissions were made, and various conferences have been held, at which the views of all counsel were fully presented. Concurrently with the filing of this Memorandum, I am entering in each case a ‘final judgment,’ the principal features of which appear to be reasonably acceptable to the parties.
The issues to be resolved in this Memorandum relate to counsel fees, expenses and costs. Plaintiffs in the Goode case seek an award of counsel fees in the sum of $45,000, plus costs and disbursements in the sum of $4,167.58. Plaintiffs in the COPPAR case seek an award of $38,250, plus $300 in expenses. I am satisfied that, in both cases, the Court’s discretion should be exercised in favor of an award of counsel fees and expenses. The cases were brought for the vindication of constitutional rights, significant violations were established, and the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining relief which should prove beneficial to all of the citizens of Philadelphia. The difficult question concerns the appropriate amount to be awarded.
Until the entry of this Court’s Opinion and Order of March 14, 1973, the two cases were processed independently. The COPPAR plaintiffs sought sweeping *617 injunctive relief (including the appointment of a ‘receiver’ for the Police Department), as well as damages; the Goode plaintiffs concentrated primarily upon obtaining improvements in the procedures for handling civilian complaints against police officers. Although both sets of plaintiffs were purporting to act on behalf of essentially the same class of plaintiffs, they proceeded independently, with different goals in mind, and with
1

Council Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability..., 60 F.R.D. 615 (1973)

different theories as to the best way to present their respective cases. The defendants were essentially the same in both cases, and were represented throughout by the same counsel.
The defendants now assert, among other things, that the efforts of counsel were unnecessarily duplicative, and that their fees should be reduced accordingly. However, the defendants never made any attempt to obtain a consolidation of the two cases (notwithstanding occasional suggestions from the Court to that effect). Moreover, except for some duplication in argument, it appears likely that approximately the same amount of lawyer time would have been involved in any event. That is to say, there was little or no duplication in the evidence presented, or in the discovery and marshalling of evidence and pretrial preparation.
The defendants contend that counsel fees should not be awarded, or, if awarded, should be minimal, because the litigation did not achieve results as drastic as originally sought by the plaintiffs; because relief equivalent to what this Court actually granted could have been achieved at an early stage in the litigation by amicable settlement; and because many of the improvements in police routines which the plaintiffs sought were brought about by reason of a consent decree to which the defendants submitted in another lawsuit before a different judge. There is some merit in these arguments, but not much.
When the end result of this litigation is compared with the relief originally sought by the plaintiffs, it is apparent that the Goode plaintiffs achieved a greater degree of success than did the COPPAR plaintiffs. But the efforts of both sets of lawyers contributed substantially to the results which have been achieved. The Goode plaintiffs focused upon a small number of specific instances to establish the need for relief, and presented extensive evidence and argument in order to demonstrate the inadequacies of existing police procedures. The COPPAR plaintiffs, on the other hand, presented much more extensive evidence of specific instances of violations of constitutional rights, but relatively little which was helpful on the issue of the precise form of relief to be granted. This Court’s determination that relief in some form should be granted was based to a significant degree upon the extensiveness of constitutional violations, as revealed by the COPPAR evidence.
Having participated actively, throughout this litigation, in various attempts to achieve an amicable settlement, this Court is in a position to evaluate the defendants’

contention that most of the litigation was unnecessary. The case was vigorously contested throughout. While both sides in the Goode case expressed a willingness to resolve the litigation by the adoption and promulgation of revised police procedures, they never came close to agreeing upon what the changes should be. Even after this Court’s Order of March 14, 1973, setting forth suggested guidelines, the parties were unable to reach agreement; and the terms of the final judgment entered by this Court differ in several important respects from the terms suggested by the defendants. In short, I am satisfied that the results achieved in this litigation would not have occurred through voluntary action on the part of the defendants, without the need for litigation.
It is correct that, as noted in my Opinion of March 14, 1973, the terms of the consent decree in the case of Alexander v. Rizzo (C.A. No. 70–992) entered *618 on December 18, 1972, made it unnecessary for this Court to consider certain aspects of the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the present cases. It may well be that, if the pendency of the Alexander litigation had been brought to the attention of this Court, or plaintiffs’ counsel, some reduction in the labors of counsel in the present cases might have been achieved. But, just as defense counsel made no attempt to achieve consolidation and possible conservation of legal efforts in the present cases, they never saw fit to bring the Alexander case to light, and I was not aware of it until after the consent decree was entered. In short, the most that can be said is that the defendants and their counsel in the present cases may have had an opportunity to reduce the amount of legal work which was necessary on behalf of the plaintiffs in the present cases, but failed to do so. Turning now to the specifics of the requests for counsel fees: Counsel for the Goode plaintiffs have filed a comprehensive affidavit setting forth in detail the services performed and the time consumed in its performance. They claim compensation at the rate of $45 per hour. The defendants have filed a counter-affidavit, agreeing that $45 per hour is a reasonable rate, and neither admitting nor denying the amount of time spent (1,052.5 hours). In the course of a conference in chambers, both sides expressed the view that no hearing would be required, and that the Court could properly dispose of the issue on the basis of the affidavits submitted. It further appeared that, although not in a position to concede the accuracy of plaintiffs’ counsel’s time records, defense counsel had no reason to doubt their accuracy and, if a hearing were held, would not challenge them. Under these circumstances, I have concluded that a hearing would be a useless formality, and that proof of the amount of time spent is
2

Council Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability..., 60 F.R.D. 615 (1973)

adequately supplied on the record by the affidavit of plaintiffs’ counsel.
I am therefore satisfied that, if the defendants should bear the full cost of plaintiffs’ counsel fees, $45,000 would be a reasonable allowance for the services rendered. In the COPPAR case, counsel have itemized the number of days of trial, the estimated amount of time spent in preparation for trial, and various other specified legal services; have computed the minimum charge for such services under the fee bill of the Philadelphia Bar Association; and have concluded that their services in this litigation, in view of its nature, importance, and complexity, should be compensated at a rate equal to double the minimum fee. I have concluded that certain discounts should be applied to the estimates submitted. While it is difficult to quantify these discounts, I have concluded that the following factors should be taken into account: (a) the same amount of work should have been done in somewhat less time than counsel apparently actually spent; (b) a considerable amount of work appears to have been devoted to objectives tangential to the actual issues involved in the litigation; and (c) no justification has been shown for evaluating counsel’s services at double the suggested minimum rate. I have concluded that, if the defendants were to pay the full amount of plaintiffs’ counsel fees to date in the COPPAR case, $20,000 would represent a reasonable amount for such services.
The next question is whether the defendants should be required to pay the full amount of plaintiffs’ counsel fees. As discussed at length in my Opinion of March 14, 1973, the evidence in this case disclosed no conscious policy of permitting or encouraging widespread violations of constitutional rights by police *619 officers, and no basis for concluding that a majority of police officers commit such violations. Nevertheless, the evidence did

disclose that such violations have been occurring with unacceptable frequency, and that existing police procedures are inadequate to prevent such violations. Plaintiffs’ counsel have performed a valuable public service in pursuing this litigation, but punitive measures are not called for. I have concluded that awards of less than the full amount of plaintiffs’ counsel fees is appropriate in these cases. Here again, I believe it necessary to draw distinctions between the two cases. The Goode plaintiffs were more nearly successful, and their efforts were more directly devoted to attempting to obtain a rational solution to the problem. In the COPPAR case, plaintiffs were less successful, and somewhat less sensitive to the true public interest. Moreover, the defendants are less chargeable with failure to settle the COPPAR litigation, since it is apparent that no amicable settlement along the lines ultimately specified by this Court would ever have been acceptable to these plaintiffs.
Giving due weight to all of the factors discussed above, I have concluded that plaintiffs in the Goode case should be awarded counsel fees in the total sum of $25,000, plus costs and disbursements in the sum of $4,167.58; and that plaintiffs in the COPPAR case should be awarded counsel fees in the total sum of $10,000, plus costs and disbursements in the sum of $250 (calculated on the basis of the amount claimed, deducting an item of $50 for briefs, findings of fact and conclusions of law). Jurisdiction will be reserved over the question of counsel fees in connection with the individual damage claims in the COPPAR case. In addition, of course, plaintiffs in both cases are free to seek further awards in the event further proceedings become necessary.
All Citations
60 F.R.D. 615

3

 
 506 F.2d 542 (1974)
Gerald G. GOODE et al., Appellants in No. 73-2023, v.
Frank L. RIZZO, Mayor, City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al., Appellants in Nos. 73-2024 and 73-2025.
COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY et al., Appellants in No. 73-
2079, v.
Honorable James H. J. TATE et al. Appeal of Frank L. RIZZO et al., in Nos. 73-2077 and 73-2078.
Nos. 73-2023 to 73-2025 and 73-2077 to 73-2079.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued June 10, 1974. Decided November 1, 1974. Certiorari Granted March 31, 1975.
543*543 Peter Hearn, F. John Hagele, Nancy J. Gellman, Jack J. Levine, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees in Nos. 73-2024 and 73-2025 and for cross-appellants in 73-2023; Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.
James M. Penny, Jr., Asst. City Sol., John Mattioni, Deputy City Sol., Martin Weinberg, City Sol., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants in Nos. 73-2024, 73-2025, 73-2077 and 73-2078, and cross-appellees in Nos. 73-2023 and 73-2079.
William Lee Akers, Philadelphia, Pa., Harry Lore, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees in Nos. 73-2077 and 73-2078 and cross-appellants in 73-2079.
Barry S. Kohn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Israel Packel, Atty. Gen., Community Advocate Unit, Philadelphia, Pa., for Commonwealth 544*544 of Pennsylvania, amicus curiae, on behalf of appellees in Nos. 73-2023 and 73-2025.
Robert M. Landis, Samuel T. Swansen, Stephen M. Cushmore, Philadelphia, Pa., for Philadelphia Bar Assn., amicus curiae, for appellees in 73-2023 to 73-2025 and crossappellants in 73-2023; Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.
Charles C. Hileman, III, C. Gary Wynkoop, Philadelphia, Pa., for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, amicus curiae; Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.
Frederic L. Ballard, Michael Lehr, Philadelphia, Pa., for Greater Philadelphia Movement, amicus curiae.

Before STALEY, GIBBONS and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
Certiorari Granted March 31, 1975. See 95 S.Ct. 1443.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
A delicate balancing between the functions of the federal district court and the police department of the City of Philadelphia is the essence of the controversy presented in this appeal. A finding by the trial court that a modification of internal procedures for handling citizens' complaints is an adequate remedy for preventing future misconduct by a minority of police officers is sufficiently supported by the record. But, an assessment of counsel fees in this § 1983 case must be remanded for further proceedings.
Two separate cases were filed by different plaintiffs, all purporting, however, to represent essentially the same class of persons.[1] The defendants also were generally the same, being the Mayor and other city and police officials.[2] The two cases were consolidated by the district judge for final disposition, and we therefore, as did he, treat this litigation as unitary.
The plaintiff produced evidence which the district court found adequate to establish a pattern of violations of the legal and constitutional rights of citizens by Philadelphia police, particularly in the areas of "arrest for investigation, charges of resisting arrest when the arrest was initially unlawful, extreme over-reaction to actual or reported assaults upon policemen and in the treatment of people who question or criticize police activity in particular instances."
The testimony was presented by victims of police misconduct or witnesses to it and encompassed more than thirty-five 545*545 incidents, not all of which were found to be examples of improper activity on the part of the officers. The district judge summarized each incident in his voluminous findings of fact and concluded that, while misconduct is attributable to only a small percentage of the members of the police force, the violations take place with such frequency that "they cannot be dismissed as rare isolated instances; and that little or nothing is done by the city authorities to punish such infractions, or to prevent their recurrence."[3]
The existing police procedures for processing and adjudicating citizen complaints and for enforcing police discipline were evaluated, the court finding that the arrangements then existing were totally inadequate because:
1. The procedures were geared to handle infractions of police regulations but these rules were not framed to cover specific violations of citizens' constitutional rights; 2. Complaints were handled on a "chain of command" basis which discouraged civilian complaints; 3. There was no adequate opportunity for the complainant to present his case to an objective tribunal;

4. The outcome of the proceedings were not disclosed; and 5. There was a tendency to minimize consequences of proven police misconduct.
Although the plaintiffs had asked for a sweeping equitable decree, including the appointment of a "receiver" to supervise the police department and the civilian review of police activity, the trial court concluded that a much more limited form of relief was appropriate. It required the defendants to revise the procedures within the police department for processing citizens' complaints against the police, including such matters as:
1. Preparing and distributing appropriate forms for the submission of complaints; 2. Prompt and adequate investigation; 3. Adjudication by an impartial body insulated from command pressures; and 4. Fair opportunity for both complainants and police officers to present their cases, followed by notification to the parties of the outcome.
The court stated that its guidelines pose no threat to vigorous law enforcement, are consistent with generally recognized minimal standards, and impose no substantial burden on the police department. The district court also concluded that an award of counsel fees and expenses to the plaintiffs was justified and assessed sums totalling $39,417.58 against "the defendants."
The defendants appeal from the judgments in all respects. The plaintiffs COPPAR and Goode cross-appeal on the ground that the grant of counsel fees is inadequate, and COPPAR cross-appeals from the denial of its request for the appointment of a receiver.
I.
We first consider the defendants' challenge to the plaintiffs' standing to maintain this suit on the ground that the requirements set out in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), have not been met. In that case the Supreme Court found a lack of standing when the complaint did not allege injury on the part of any of the named plaintiffs and no class determination had been made. But, a few months later, in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2201, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (May 21, 1974), the Court noted, "... Moreover as, to this portion of the decree, directed at police misconduct generally rather than to any particular state statute, named plaintiffs intimidated by misconduct may represent all others in the class of those similarly abused ..."
546*546 In the case sub judice, the named plaintiff, Gerald Goode, alleged in the complaint and established at the trial an incident where he was the victim of an illegal arrest and beating by Philadelphia police.[4] Herbert Brown, another named plaintiff, alleged an illegal beating by the police which presented an arguably constitutional violation.
While the GOODE complaint is loosely drawn, a fair reading shows that the individual plaintiffs allege a series of illegal arrests and unauthorized entry into their homes by police officers. Many of the named plaintiffs did not testify at the hearing. However, at the direction of the trial judge at a pretrial hearing, a list of other names and a description of the incidents in which they were involved were filed with the court. Although somewhat informal, this may

properly be considered an amendment to the complaint and was so treated by the district court. Many of these additional parties testified in the district court.
Although more precision and attention to the appropriate procedural rules by the parties would have been helpful, from a practical standpoint we conclude that the requisites for standing have been met.
There is a distinction too between the underlying situation in the O'Shea case and the instant litigation. In O'Shea v. Littleton, supra, the Court was concerned with the fact that the injunction sought by the plaintiffs would affect events which would take place during state criminal trials, thus violating the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Here, on the other hand, the plaintiffs were concerned with alleged police practices which would not come to the attention of a state court in most instances because prosecutions were not instituted or were dismissed at a very early stage. Furthermore, unlike the O'Shea litigation, the Court did determine the applicable class to be all the citizens of Philadelphia and an included class of all black residents of the City.[5]
II.
The trial court's conclusion that there were widespread violations of constitutional rights through police misconduct is attacked by the defendants as being inconsistent with the finding that only a small percentage of the officers on the force are accountable for these actions. The defendants also assert that the number of separate incidents presented to the court formed an inadequate basis for a finding of a pattern or practice.
There is no mathematical formula which can be of assistance in determining how many witnesses or how many incidents are needed to establish a pattern of conduct by any group in a community. The trial judge must work with the material that is presented to 547*547 him and must decide whether sufficient credible data are available to reach a conclusion. It is his responsibility primarily, and an appellate court must accord great deference to that fact finding process. In a case of this nature, too, we are conscious of the weight which must be given to the findings of a trial judge which are dependent upon and interwoven with intensely local conditions and circumstances. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973).[6]
We have noted also, as did the district judge, that the police officials of Philadelphia entered into a consent decree in Alexander v. Rizzo, supra,[7] agreeing to modify the procedures to be followed when a person is to be interrogated in the course of a criminal investigation. Compliance with that decree will serve to prevent recurrence of some of the types of illegal conduct about which the plaintiffs here complained. We need not consider, nor did the district court, whether this consent decree has any collateral estoppel effect as to the existence of a pattern of misconduct by police officers. Nevertheless, it was a factor to which the trial judge could give some weight in arriving at his findings.
Our review of the lengthy record in this case in addition to the contents of the appendix submitted by the parties does not reveal findings of fact which are clearly erroneous or conclusions which are not supported by reasonable interpretation of those underlying

facts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 2585, 2587.
We conclude that there was an adequate evidentiary record to support the findings of the district court that violations of constitutional rights by the Philadelphia police occurred in an unacceptably high number of instances and that in the absence of change in procedures such violations are likely to recur.
That we do not reverse the district court's conclusions, however, does not mean that we are unaware of the idealism and dedication of the vast majority of police officers. Their duties are difficult and dangerous, and the work which they perform is too often unheralded and unappreciated. Even a casual review of the record of the citations for bravery awarded to some of the offending officers in this case cannot but impress the reader with the fact that often the most routine assignment may suddenly turn into one involving death or serious injury to the policemen. And yet, we place upon these officers the additional burdens of almost superhuman patience and forbearance in the face of hostile and provocative conduct and insist that they accord full legal protection and respect to those who would deny similar treatment to the officers. But such high standards must be maintained because of the tremendous importance of police work to the maintenance of an orderly society without which no rights can survive. We would fail in the respect which we owe the vast majority of policemen should we not fail to correct the derelictions of the few who do not meet the difficult standards which the community requires.
III.
The district court's order granting relief is limited and moderate in tone indicating its faith in the ability and willingness of the police department to investigate and correct the transgressions of its errant members. Despite the assertions of the defendants, the court is 548*548 not thrusting itself into the day to day operations of the police department—a situation which we agree would be inadvisable and inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). Indeed, the procedures which the district court required be implemented by the police department for the receipt, investigation, and disposition of civilian complaints are fully in accord with the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Urban Police Function, which were unanimously approved by the Executive Committee of the International Chiefs of Police in December, 1972.
We agree with the district court in its refusal to appoint a "receiver" for the police department as requested by COPPAR. Whether such action might ever be necessary in the most extreme circumstances, we need not here consider because the factual situation in this case would not warrant such action. See Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971).
We emphasize that the district judge did not find that the plaintiffs were entitled to a change in the disciplinary procedures of the police department as a matter of constitutional right. The decision on the necessity for relief was based upon violations of constitutional rights which had occurred and which he found would be recurring. It was only in the context of the proper remedy to be utilized that the district court reviewed the existing procedures and

found them inadequate. The revisions were one of the forms of relief available and were ordered because they appeared to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct. Lewis v. Kugler, supra. See also The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 Yale L.J. 143 (1968); Injunctive Relief for Violations of Constitutional Rights By the Police, 45 Colo.L.Rev. 91 (1973).
IV.
While we find no error in the injunctive relief decreed in this case, we do not believe that the record adequately explains the award of counsel fees to the plaintiffs.
The district court filed an order as follows:
"1. That the defendants shall pay to the plaintiffs in the Goode case, Civil Action No. 70491, counsel fees in the sum of $25,000, plus disbursements and costs in the sum of $4,167.58. "2. That the defendants shall pay to the plaintiffs in the COPPAR case, Civil Action No. 702430, counsel fees in the sum of $10,000, plus disbursements and costs in the sum of $250."
The accompanying memorandum recited that the court's discretion was exercised in favor of the award of counsel fees because "[t]he cases were brought for the vindication of constitutional rights, significant violations were established, and the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining relief which should prove beneficial to all of the citizens of Philadelphia." The court also noted that the parties had been unable to reach an amicable agreement, even after its order setting out guidelines had been filed, and that the results achieved could not have occurred without the need for litigation. Nevertheless, the memorandum concluded that while plaintiffs' counsel had performed a valuable public service,[8] punitive measures were not called for. The memorandum and orders are ambiguous and leave us in doubt as to the basis on which the court exercised its discretion and by whom the payments were to be made.
549*549 Even if statutory authority is lacking, in the exercise of their equitable powers federal courts may award attorneys' fees when the interest of justice so requires. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973). Although the rule is broadly stated, in application the power is generally exercised in three categories:
1. Where there has been bad faith, vexation, or oppression. In this class of cases, the punitive aspects predominate. See e. g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of City of Jackson, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1972). 2. Where a common fund has been created, or closely analogous to this, where a definable class benefits from the litigation and an award enables the court to spread the expense among all who benefit. E. g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). Cf. Brewer v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 406 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 1778, 32 L.Ed.2d 136, sub nom. 409 U.S. 892, 93 S.Ct. 109, 34 L.Ed.2d 149 (1972).

3. Where the private attorney general theory may have application—that is, where the litigation was instituted to vindicate a policy granted a high priority by a congressional action. See, e. g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).[9]
However, the equitable power may be circumscribed by Congress. Hall v. Cole, supra.
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no language dealing with counsel fees, there have been awards under the general equitable power in some cases brought under the terms of the statute. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 501 F.2d 31 (No. 73-1613, 3d Cir., May 3, 1974, amended June 11, 1974), and see the compilation of cases in Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973).[10]
The district court did not articulate the basis which it felt justified an award, and we think it important that this be done. Why the fees should be paid has significance in determining who is liable, and we do not feel that we should engage in speculation as to the district court's rationale.
We have similar difficulty in divining the district court's intentions as to the source of funds to satisfy the awards. There are two obvious alternatives: the defendants personally or the City of Philadelphia. Each choice, however, poses special problems which require examination by the district court, perhaps with additional fact finding for clarification.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), makes clear that officials in the executive department may be personally liable for damages in § 1983 cases. However, a qualified immunity is available as a defense when there is good faith on the part of the defendant. In Skehan v. 550*550 Board of Trustees, supra, we held that this immunity would apply to assessments for counsel fees as well as to damages.
In the exercise of discretion, too, the district court should consider the fact that the defendants apparently did not personally participate in the incidents which led to the necessity of injunctive relief. Respondeat superior is not applicable in its traditional sense since the defendant officials are not employers. Both subordinates and officials are employees of the governmental unit. Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). In Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974), this court assumed, arguendo, that no damages for the actions of a subordinate could be imposed upon a governmental official in the absence of his actual knowledge of, acquiescence in, or participation in the unlawful activity. See also Vicarious Liability Under § 1983, 6 Ind.L.Rev. 509 (1973).
Furthermore, we note that some of "the defendants" were not in office at the time the incidents arose and were substituted as parties only after the lawsuits were close to conclusion.[11] Similarly, some of the defendants who were officials during the period when the incidents occurred were not included among those liable since they were not parties at the time the order was entered.[12]
To summarize then, if it is the intention of the district court to find the defendants personally liable for an award of counsel fees, it will be necessary to consider the issues of:
1. official immunity;

2. vicarious liability; and 3. identification of the individuals liable.
Additionally, if it is comtemplated that personal liability will be imposed, the equitable basis for making any award will require analysis. For example, the equities involved in a private attorney general or spreading-the-cost theory are less apparent if individuals are being ordered to reimburse the plaintiffs than if a large entity in which all claim membership is to pay the assessment. Correspondingly, the traditional test of obduracy and intransigence may have far more significance if individual liability is involved.[13]
If it is the thought that the City of Philadelphia, although not a party to this litigation, is to be the source of the funds, then other issues must be passed upon by the district court with appropriate assistance from counsel.
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S. Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), clarified some earlier uncertainty by holding that a city is outside the ambit of § 1983 "for purposes of equitable relief as well as damages" and may not be a named defendant in such a case. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), held that while an injunction could be issued against a state officer, damages or "equitable restitution" could not be imposed when in fact they would come from the state. We held in Skehan v. Board of Trustee, supra, that the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment extends to an award of counsel fees from the state treasury, although that would not be so if the payment were to be made by a college which was a subsidiary governmental unit.[14]
551*551 The district court, therefore, should consider whether under the facts and circumstances present in this case the rationale of Edelman as it deals with sovereign immunity should apply to the statutory exclusion granted a city under § 1983.[15]
Another matter which may be of significance is whether any of the individual defendants would have the power under the city charter or Pennsylvania law to authorize disbursement of funds in this situation. In exercising its discretion to award counsel fees, the district court would no doubt be concerned with the efficacy of its pronouncement.
The issues which would be raised by an award of counsel fees in this case are broad and complex. We believe they should be resolved only upon a record which would clearly specify the grounds upon which the district court relied. Of course, we take no position at this time as to whether fees should be awarded or if so, against whom they should be assessed.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed as to the injunctive relief granted but will be vacated and remanded as to the award of counsel fees for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[1] The district court ordered that the Goode case could be maintained as a class action on behalf of all residents of the City of Philadelphia and an included class of all black residents of Philadelphia. The complaint in the COPPAR case alleged the class to be composed of the plaintiff and black and white persons in the City of Philadelphia expressing political views contrary to defendants and advocating police responsibility to the community. COPPAR is an acronym for the Council of Organization on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility.

[2] The original complaint in the Goode case named the following defendants:
James H. J. Tate, Mayor, City of Philadelphia
Fred T. Corleto, Managing Director, City of Philadelphia
Frank L. Rizzo, Commissioner of Police, City of Philadelphia
Robert G. Selfridge, Deputy Commissioner of Police, City of Phila.
William Murphy, Captain, Police Department, City of Philadelphia
By Order of Court, dated September 11, 1973, the following defendants were substituted:
Frank L. Rizzo, Mayor, City of Philadelphia
Hillel S. Levinson, Managing Director, City of Philadelphia
Joseph F. O'Neill, Commissioner of Police, City of Philadelphia
Morton B. Solomon, Deputy Commissioner of Police, City of Phila.
William Murphy, Captain, Police Department, City of Philadelphia
In COPPAR, the original named defendants were:
Honorable James H. J. Tate; Frank L.
Rizzo; Fred T. Corletto; Arlen Spector.
The record does not reveal any substitution of the named defendants, despite the court's order of March 14, 1973, directing the plaintiffs to make appropriate amendments to the caption of the case to reflect changes in personnel.
[3] COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F.Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D.Pa.1973).
[4] In a suit for damage in the state court against the individual police officers and the City of Philadelphia Goode was given a judgment by a board of arbitration against the City of Philadelphia although no finding was entered against the policemen personally. That case was appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
[5] The designation of class was granted by the district court under the provisions of Rule 23(b)(2), which reads:
"An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: ... (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ..."
The defendants have not questioned the class designation on the basis of size or definition and therefore, we do not consider those elements. Cf. Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971).
We also note that the defendants in the case of Alexander v. Rizzo, Civil Action No. 70-992 (E.D.Pa.1972), entered into a consent decree in which they stipulated that the final order was "for the benefit of every member of the class of plaintiffs referred to in the Complaint ..." The Alexander complaint reveals that the action was brought on behalf of all black residents of the City of Philadelphia. (Complaint, para. 5)

[6] It is not inappropriate to note that the same district judge decided the case of Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F.Supp. 881 (E.D.Pa. 1968), where an injunction against alleged police misconduct was denied. That same judge is presently retaining jurisdiction of the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Joseph F. O'Neill et al., 345 F.Supp. 305 (E.D.Pa.1972), involving the hiring practices of the Philadelphia police.
[7] See note 5, supra.
[8] In the Goode case, the court remarked that the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel were more nearly successful and their efforts were more directly devoted to attempting to obtain a rational solution but in the COPPAR litigation the plaintiffs were "somewhat less sensitive to the true public interest" and were less inclined toward an amicable settlement along the lines ultimately set out by the court.
[9] The Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on this theory in Hall v. Cole, supra, although it discussed it in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, where the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) permitted an award of counsel fees in the court's discretion. See also Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (May 15, 1974), where the Court noted the high priority particularly accorded desegregation matters. In North-cross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973), the Court expressly declined to consider whether and under what circumstances an award of attorneys' fees might be permissible in § 1983 litigation.
[10] Many of the cases fail to distinguish between awards made under §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983 even though these sections are derived from separate statutes and the rationale applicable to § 1982. for example, may not apply to § 1983. See, e. g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., supra, where the court cites the absence of criminal sanctions to enforce § 1982 as one reason to encourage private attorney general actions.
[11] See note 2, supra.
[12] The former district attorney of Philadelphia would be liable under this order for a share of the counsel fees awarded the plaintiffs even though no member of the district attorney's staff was in any way involved in the incidents which convinced the court that injunctive relief was required. In Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), this court held that the district attorney is not liable for damages under § 1983 because of judicial immunity.
[13] In discussing fees, the district court did say that "punitive measures are not called for" and that "no conscious policy of permitting or encouraging widespread violations of constitutional rights by police officers" existed.
[14] The court's opinion noted that a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 had been asserted and that therefore it was not significant that the college was not a "person" under § 1983. Since the parties to the litigation sub judice argued only § 1983 jurisdiction, we consider only that theory. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 696 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). Convincing proof of the parties' intent is the COPPAR motion to add the City of Philadelphia as a defendant on the expectation that the Moor v. County of Alameda case, supra, which was then pending in the Supreme Court, would result in a county being declared a "person." The motion was not acted upon, and the city is a named defendant in neither case. Goode asserted only § 1983 and § 1988 claims. We leave open for district court consideration the question of § 1331 jurisdiction which COPPAR alleged. As to whether Goode could amend to allege such a jurisdictional ground, see 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Similarly, whether the City of Philadelphia could or should be joined under § 1331 is not before us, and in view of such problems as the statute of limitations, laches and respondeat superior, we do not pass upon it.
[15] There are numerous cases in which counsel fees have been assessed against school boards without any discussion of whether those entities are "persons" under § 1983. The definition of "person" under this specific statute is far from clear, and there are inconsistencies in the case law. Contrast, for example, U. S. ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969), with Scher v. Board of Education of Town of West Orange, 424 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1970). For a resume of the cases in this circuit demonstrating the problem, see Thornberry, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Monroe v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U.Colo.L.Rev. 105 (1971). The Supreme Court has met the issue only in cases involving cities and counties. Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, Moor v. County of Alameda, supra, and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Curiously, despite the many cases before the Supreme Court in recent years in which school boards were among the named defendants, the issue of whether the board is a "person" has never been decided by the Court. For the view that the "person" exclusion should be narrowly construed in order to carry out the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, see Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S.Cal.L.Rev. 131 (1972).

 
 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
RIZZO, MAYOR OF PHILADELPHIA, ET AL. v.
GOODE ET AL.
No. 74-942.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued November 11, 1975. Decided January 21, 1976. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
364*364 James M. Penny, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Stephen Arinson.
Peter Hearn argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Nancy J. Gellman, Jack J. Levine, William Lee Akers, and Harry Lore.[*]
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after parallel trials of separate actions[1] filed 365*365 in 1970, entered an order in 1973 requiring petitioners "to submit to [the District] Court for its approval a comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct" in accordance with a comprehensive opinion filed together with the order. The proposed program, negotiated between petitioners and respondents for the purpose of complying with the order, was incorporated six months later into a final judgment. Petitioner City Police Commissioner was thereby required, inter alia, to put into force a directive governing the manner by which citizens' complaints against police officers should henceforth be handled by the department.[2] The Court of Appeals for 366*366 the Third Circuit, upholding the District Court's finding that the existing procedures for handling citizen complaints were "inadequate," affirmed the District Court's choice of equitable relief: "The revisions were . . . ordered because they appeared to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct." 506 F. 2d 542, 548 (1974). We granted certiorari to consider petitioners' claims that the judgment of the District Court represents an unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority committed to them by state and local law to perform their official functions. We find ourselves substantially in agreement with these claims, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The central thrust of respondents' efforts in the two trials was to lay a foundation for equitable intervention, in one degree or another, because of an assertedly pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers. This mistreatment was said to

have been directed against minority citizens in particular 367*367 and against all Philadelphia residents in general. The named individual and group respondents were certified to represent these two classes. The principal petitioners here—the Mayor, the City Managing Director, and the Police Commissioner—were charged with conduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement of this mistreatment to failure to act in a manner so as to assure that it would not recur in the future.
Hearing some 250 witnesses during 21 days of hearings, the District Court was faced with a staggering amount of evidence; each of the 40-odd incidents might alone have been the piece de resistance of a short, separate trial. The District Court carefully and conscientiously resolved often sharply conflicting testimony, and made detailed findings of fact,[3] which both sides now accept, with respect to eight of the incidents presented by the Goode respondents and with respect to 28 of those presented by COPPAR.[4]
The principal antagonists in the eight incidents recounted in Goode were Officers DeFazio and D'Amico, members of the city's "Highway Patrol" force. They were not named as parties to the action. The District Court found the conduct of these officers to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen complainants in three[5] of the incidents, and further found that complaints to the police Board of Inquiry had resulted in one case in a relatively mild five-day suspension and in another case a conclusion that there was no basis for disciplinary action.
In only two of the 28 incidents recounted in COPPAR 368*368 (which ranged in time from October 1969 to October 1970) did the District Court draw an explicit conclusion that the police conduct amounted to a deprivation of a federally secured right; it expressly found no police misconduct whatsoever in four of the incidents; and in one other the departmental policy complained of was subsequently changed. As to the remaining 21, the District Court did not proffer a comment on the degree of misconduct that had occurred: whether simply improvident, illegal under police regulations or state law, or actually violative of the individual's constitutional rights. Respondents' brief asserts that of this latter group, the facts as found in 14 of them "reveal [federal] violations."[6] While we think that somewhat of an overstatement, we accept it, arguendo, and thus take it as established that, insofar as the COPPAR record reveals, there were 16 incidents occurring in the city of Philadelphia over a year's time in which numbers of police officers violated citizens' constitutional rights. Additionally, the District Court made reference to citizens' complaints to the police in seven of those 16; in four of which, involving conduct of constitutional dimension, the police department received complaints but ultimately took no action against the offending officers.
The District Court made a number of conclusions of law, not all of which are relevant to our analysis. It found that the evidence did not establish the existence of any policy on the part of the named petitioners to violate the legal and constitutional rights of the plaintiff classes, but it did find that evidence of departmental procedure indicated a tendency to discourage the filing of civilian complaints and to minimize the consequences of police 369*369 misconduct. It found that as to the larger plaintiff class, the residents of Philadelphia, only a small percentage of policemen commit violations of their legal and constitutional rights, but that the frequency with which such violations occur is such that "they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances." COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (1973). In the course of its opinion, the District Court commented:

"In the course of these proceedings, much of the argument has been directed toward the proposition that courts should not attempt to supervise the functioning of the police department. Although, contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Court's legal power to do just that is firmly established, . . . I am not persuaded that any such drastic remedy is called for, at least initially, in the present cases." Id., at 1320.
The District Court concluded by directing petitioners to draft, for the court's approval, "a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints," to be formulated along the following "guidelines" suggested by the court:
"(1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure spelling out in some detail, in simple language, the `dos and don'ts' of permissible conduct in dealing with civilians (for example, manifestations of racial bias, derogatory remarks, offensive language, etc.; unnecessary damage to property and other unreasonable conduct in executing search warrants; limitations on pursuit of persons charged only with summary offenses; recording and processing civilian complaints, etc.). (2) Revision of procedures for processing complaints against police, including (a) ready availability of forms for use by civilians in lodging complaints against police 370*370 officers; (b) a screening procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (c) prompt and adequate investigation of complaints; (d) adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant to present his complaint, and to the police officer to present his defense; and (3) prompt notification to the concerned parties, informing them of the outcome." Id., at 1321.
While noting that the "guidelines" were consistent with "generally recognized minimum standards" and imposed "no substantial burdens" on the police department, the District Court emphasized that respondents had no constitutional right to improved police procedures for handling civilian complaints. But given that violations of constitutional rights of citizens occur in "unacceptably" high numbers, and are likely to continue to occur, the court-mandated revision was a "necessary first step" in attempting to prevent future abuses. Ibid. On petitioners' appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed.
II
These actions were brought, and the affirmative equitable relief fashioned, under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. It provides that "[e]very person who, under color of [law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or] suit in equity . . . ." The plain words of the statute impose liability—whether in the form of payment of redressive damages or being placed under an injunction—only for conduct which "subjects, or causes to be subjected" the 371*371 complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.
The findings of fact made by the District Court at the conclusion of these two parallel trials— in sharp contrast to that which respondents sought to prove with respect to petitioners— disclose a central paradox which permeates that court's legal conclusions. Individual police officers not named as parties to the action were found to have violated the constitutional

rights of particular individuals, only a few of whom were parties plaintiff. As the facts developed, there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners —express or otherwise—showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection found by the District Court between petitioners and the individual respondents was that in the absence of a change in police disciplinary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not with respect to them, but as to the members of the classes they represented. In sum, the genesis of this lawsuit—a heated dispute between individual citizens and certain policemen—has evolved into an attempt by the federal judiciary to resolve a "controversy" between the entire citizenry of Philadelphia and the petitioning elected and appointed officials over what steps might, in the Court of Appeals' words, "[appear] to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct." 506 F. 2d, at 548. The lower courts have, we think, overlooked several significant decisions of this Court in validating this type of litigation and the relief ultimately granted.
A
We first of all entertain serious doubts whether on the facts as found there was made out the requisite Art. III 372*372 case or controversy between the individually named respondents and petitioners. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), the individual respondents, plaintiffs in the District Court, alleged that petitioners, a county magistrate and judge, had embarked on a continuing, intentional practice of racially discriminatory bond setting, sentencing, and assessing of jury fees. No specific instances involving the individual respondents were set forth in the prayer for injunctive relief against the judicial officers. And even though respondents' counsel at oral argument had stated that some of the named respondents had in fact "suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices," the Court concluded that "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id., at 495-496. The Court further recognized that while "past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury," the attempt to anticipate under what circumstances the respondents there would be made to appear in the future before petitioners "takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture." Id., at 496-497. These observations apply here with even more force, for the individual respondents' claim to "real and immediate" injury rests not upon what the named petitioners might do to them in the future—such as set a bond on the basis of race—but upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that unknown policeman's perception of departmental disciplinary procedures. This hypothesis is even more attenuated than those allegations of future injury found insufficient in O'Shea to warrant invocation of federal jurisdiction. Thus, insofar as the individual respondents were concerned, we think they lacked the requisite "personal 373*373 stake in the outcome," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), i. e., the order overhauling police disciplinary procedures.
B
That conclusion alone might appear to end the matter, for O'Shea also noted that "if none of the named plaintiffs. . . establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the

defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class" which they purport to represent. 414 U. S., at 494. But, unlike O'Shea, this case did not arise on the pleadings. The District Court, having certified the plaintiff classes,[7] bridged the gap between the facts shown at trial and the classwide relief sought with an unprecedented theory of § 1983 liability. It held that the classes' § 1983 actions for equitable relief against petitioners were made out on a showing of an "unacceptably high" number of those incidents of constitutional dimension—some 20 in all—occurring at large in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7,500 policemen.
Nothing in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), the only decision of this Court cited by the District Court,[8] 374*374 or any other case from this Court, supports such an open-ended construction of § 1983. In Hague, the pattern of police misconduct upon which liability and injunctive relief were grounded was the adoption and enforcement of deliberate policies by the defendants there (including the Mayor and the Chief of Police) of excluding and removing the plaintiff's labor organizers and forbidding peaceful communication of their views to the citizens of Jersey City. These policies were implemented "by force and violence" on the part of individual policemen. There was no mistaking that the defendants proposed to continue their unconstitutional policies against the members of this discrete group.
Likewise, in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802 (1974), relied upon by the Court of Appeals and respondents here, we noted:
"The complaint charged that the enjoined conduct was but one part of a single plan by the defendants, and the District Court found a pervasive pattern of intimidation in which the law enforcement authorities sought to suppress appellees' constitutional rights. In this blunderbuss effort the police not only relied on statutes . . . found constitutionally deficient, but concurrently exercised their authority 375*375 under valid laws in an unconstitutional manner." Id., at 812 (emphasis added).
The numerous incidents of misconduct on the part of the named Texas Rangers, as found by the District Court and summarized in this Court's opinion, established beyond peradventure not only a "persistent pattern" but one which flowed from an intentional, concerted, and indeed conspiratorial effort to deprive the organizers of their First Amendment rights and place them in fear of coming back. Id., at 814-815.
Respondents stress that the District Court not only found an "unacceptably high" number of incidents but held, as did the Court of Appeals, that "when a pattern of frequent police violations of rights is shown, the law is clear that injunctive relief may be granted." 357 F. Supp., at 1318 (emphasis added). However, there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree from that which exists elsewhere; indeed, the District Court found "that the problems disclosed by the record . . . are fairly typical of [those] afflicting police departments in major urban areas." Ibid. Thus, invocation of the word "pattern" in a case where, unlike Hague and Medrano, the defendants are not causally linked to it, is but a distant echo of the findings in those cases. The focus in Hague and Medrano was not simply on the number of violations which occurred but on the common thread running through them: a "pervasive pattern of intimidation" flowing from a deliberate plan by the named defendants to crush the nascent labor

organizations. Medrano, supra, at 812. The District Court's unadorned finding of a statistical pattern is quite dissimilar to the factual settings of these two cases.
The theory of liability underlying the District Court's opinion, and urged upon us by respondents, is that even 376*376 without a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small percentage of the police force, petitioners' failure to act in the face of a statistical pattern is indistinguishable from the active conduct enjoined in Hague and Medrano. Respondents posit a constitutional "duty" on the part of petitioners (and a corresponding "right" of the citizens of Philadelphia) to "eliminate" future police misconduct; a "default" of that affirmative duty being shown by the statistical pattern, the District Court is empowered to act in petitioners' stead and take whatever preventive measures are necessary, within its discretion, to secure the "right" at issue. Such reasoning, however, blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language in a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress chose in § 1983. We have never subscribed to these amorphous propositions, and we decline to do so now.
Respondents claim that the theory of liability embodied in the District Court's opinion is supported by desegregation cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). But this case, and the long line of precedents cited therein, simply reaffirmed the body of law originally enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954):
"Nearly 17 years ago this Court held, in explicit terms, that state-imposed segregation by race in public schools denies equal protection of the laws. At no time has the Court deviated in the slightest degree from that holding or its constitutional underpinnings. ..... "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility 377*377 are inherent in equitable remedies." Swann, supra, at 11, 15.
Respondents, in their effort to bring themselves within the language of Swann, ignore a critical factual distinction between their case and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In the latter, segregation imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for varying periods of time, whereas in the instant case the District Court found that the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights. Those against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases such as Swann and Brown were not administrators and school board members who had in their employ a small number of individuals, which latter on their own deprived black students of their constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were administrators and school board members who were found by their own conduct in the administration of the school system to have denied those rights. Here, the District Court found that none of the petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution. Under the well-established rule that federal "judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation," Swann, supra, at 16, this case presented no occasion for the District Court to grant equitable relief against petitioners.
C

Going beyond considerations concerning the existence of a live controversy and threshold statutory liability, we must address an additional and novel claim advanced by respondent classes. They assert that given the citizenry's "right" to be protected from unconstitutional exercises of police power, and the "need for protection from 378*378 such abuses," respondents have a right to mandatory equitable relief in some form when those in supervisory positions do not institute steps to reduce the incidence of unconstitutional police misconduct.[9] The scope of federal equity power, it is proposed, should be extended to the fashioning of prophylactic procedures for a state agency designed to minimize this kind of misconduct on the part of a handful of its employees. However, on the facts of this case, not only is this novel claim quite at odds with the settled rule that in federal equity cases "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy," ibid., but important considerations of federalism are additional factors weighing against it. Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 120 (1951), quoted in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S., at 500.
Section 1983 by its terms confers authority to grant equitable relief as well as damages, but its words "allow a suit in equity only when that is the proper proceeding for redress, and they refer to existing standards to determine what is a proper proceeding." Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475, 486 (1903) (Holmes, J.). Even in an action between private individuals, it has long been held that an injunction is "to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case." Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 10, 33 (1850). When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with "the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the `dispatch of its own internal 379*379 affairs,' Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961)," quoted in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 83 (1974). The District Court's injunctive order here, significantly revising the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police department, was indisputably a sharp limitation on the department's "latitude in the `dispatch of its own internal affairs.' "
When the frame of reference moves from a unitary court system, governed by the principles just stated, to a system of federal courts representing the Nation, subsisting side by side with 50 state judicial, legislative, and executive branches, appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 928 (1975).
So strongly has Congress weighted this factor of federalism in the case of a state criminal proceeding that it has enacted 28 U. S. C. § 2283 to actually deny to the district courts the authority to issue injunctions against such proceedings unless the proceedings come within narrowly specified exceptions. Even though an action brought under § 1983, as this was, is within those exceptions, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972), the underlying notions of federalism which Congress has recognized in dealing with the relationships between federal and state courts still have weight. Where an injunction against a criminal proceeding is sought under § 1983, "the principles of equity, comity, and federalism" must nonetheless restrain a federal court. 407 U. S., at 243.

But even where the prayer for injunctive relief does not seek to enjoin the state criminal proceedings themselves, we have held that the principles of equity nonetheless militate heavily against the grant of an injunction except in the most extraordinary circumstances. In O'Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 502, we held that "a major 380*380 continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted." And the same principles of federalism may prevent the injunction by a federal court of a state civil proceeding once begun. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975).
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments, though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government, but against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments such as petitioners here. Indeed, in the recent case of Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U. S. 605 (1974), in which private individuals sought injunctive relief against the Mayor of Philadelphia, we expressly noted the existence of such considerations, saying: "There are also delicate issues of federal-state relationships underlying this case." Id., at 615.
Contrary to the District Court's flat pronouncement that a federal court's legal power to "supervise the functioning of the police department . . . is firmly established," it is the foregoing cases and principles that must govern consideration of the type of injunctive relief granted here. When it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of this state agency, the District Court departed from these precepts.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court 381*381 of Appeals which affirmed the decree of the District Court is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
To be sure, federal-court intervention in the daily operation of a large city's police department, as the Court intimates, is undesirable and to be avoided if at all possible. The Court appropriately observes, however, ante, at 367, that what the Federal District Court did here was to engage in a careful and conscientious resolution of often sharply conflicting testimony and to make detailed findings of fact, now accepted by both sides, that attack the problem that is the subject of the respondents' complaint. The remedy was one evolved with the defendant officials' assent, reluctant though that assent may have been, and it was one that the police department concededly could live with. Indeed, the District Court, in its memorandum of December 18, 1973, stated that "the resolution of all the disputed items was more nearly in accord with the defendants' position than with the plaintiffs' position,"

and that the relief contemplated by the earlier orders of March 14, 1973, see COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (ED Pa.), "did not go beyond what the defendants had always been willing to accept." App. 190a. No one, not even this Court's majority, disputes the apparent efficacy of the relief or the fact that it effectuated a betterment in the system and should serve to lessen the number of instances of deprival of constitutional rights of members of the respondent classes. What is worrisome to the Court is abstract principle, and, of course, the Court has a right 382*382 to be concerned with abstract principle that, when extended to the limits of logic, may produce untoward results in other circumstances on a future day. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
But the District Court here, with detailed, careful, and sympathetic findings, ascertained the existence of violations of citizens' constitutional rights, of a pattern of that type of activity, of its likely continuance and recurrence, and of an official indifference as to doing anything about it. The case, accordingly, plainly fits the mold of Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802 (1974), and Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), despite the observation, 357 F. Supp., at 1319, that the evidence "does not establish the existence of any overall Police Department policy to violate the legal and constitutional rights of citizens, nor to discriminate on the basis of race" (emphasis supplied). I am not persuaded that the Court's attempt to distinguish those cases from this one is at all successful. There must be federal relief available against persistent deprival of federal constitutional rights even by (or, perhaps I should say, particularly by) constituted authority on the state side.
The Court entertains "serious doubts," ante, at 371-372, as to whether there is a case or controversy here, citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974). O'Shea, however, presented quite different facts. There, the plaintiff-respondents had alleged a fear of injury from actions that would be subsequent to some future, valid arrest. The Court said:
"We assume that respondents will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners. . . . Under these circumstances, where 383*383 respondents do not claim any constitutional right to engage in conduct proscribed by therefore presumably permissible state laws, or indicate that it is otherwise their intention to so conduct themselves, the threat of injury from the alleged course of conduct they attack is simply too remote to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and permit adjudication by a federal court." Id., at 497-498.
Here, by contrast, plaintiff-respondents are persons injured by past unconstitutional conduct (an allegation not made in the O'Shea complaint) and fear injury at the hands of the police regardless of whether they have violated a valid law.
To the extent that Part II-A of the Court's opinion today indicates that some constitutional violations might be spread so extremely thin as to prevent any individual from showing the requisite case or controversy, I must agree. I do not agree, however, with the Court's substitution of its judgment for that of the District Court on what the evidence here shows. The Court states that what was shown was minimal, involving only a few incidents out of thousands of arrests in a city of several million population. Small as the ratio of incidents to arrests may be, the District Court nevertheless found a pattern of operation, even if no

policy, and one sufficiently significant that the violations "cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances." 357 F. Supp., at 1319. Nothing the Court has said demonstrates for me that there is no justification for that finding on this record. The Court's criticism about numbers would be just as forceful, or would miss the mark just as much, with 100 incidents or 500 or even 3,000, when compared with the overall number of arrests made in the city of Philadelphia. The pattern line will appear somewhere. The District Court drew it this side of the number of 384*384 proved instances. One properly may wonder how many more instances actually existed but were unproved because of the pressure of time upon the trial court, or because of reluctant. witnesses, or because of inherent fear to question constituted authority in any degree, or because of a despairing belief, unfounded though it may be, that nothing can be done about it anyway and that it is not worth the effort. That it was worth the effort is convincingly demonstrated by the result in the District Court, by the affirmance, on the issues before us, by a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit, and by the support given the result below by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Bar Association, the Greater Philadelphia Movement, and the other entities that have filed briefs as amici curiae here in support of the respondents.
The Court today appears to assert that a state official is not subject to the strictures of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 unless he directs the deprivation of constitutional rights. Ante, at 375-377. In so holding, it seems to me, the Court ignores both the language of § 1983 and the case law interpreting that language. Section 1983 provides a cause of action where a person acting under color of state law "subjects, or causes to be subjected," any other person to a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. By its very words, § 1983 reaches not only the acts of an official, but also the acts of subordinates for whom he is responsible. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), the court said that § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions," id., at 187, and:
"It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, 385*385 neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by state agencies." Id., at 180. (Emphasis added.)
I do not find it necessary to reach the question under what circumstances failure to supervise will justify an award of money damages, or whether an injunction is authorized where the superior has no consciousness of the wrongs being perpetrated by his subordinates.[1] It is clear that an official may be enjoined from consciously permitting his subordinates, in the course of their duties, to violate the constitutional rights of persons with whom they deal. In rejecting the concept that the official may be responsible under § 1983, the Court today casts aside reasoned conclusions to the contrary reached by the Courts of Appeals of 10 Circuits.[2]
386*386 In the instant case, the District Court found that although there was no departmental policy of racial discrimination, "such violations do occur, with such frequency that they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances; and that little or nothing is done by the city authorities to punish such infractions, or to prevent their recurrence," 357 F. Supp., at 1319, and that it "is the policy of the department to discourage the filing of such complaints,

to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven police misconduct, and to resist disclosure of the final disposition of such complaints." Id., at 1318. Needless to say, petitioners were under a statutory duty to supervise their subordinates. See Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, c. 2, § 5-200. I agree with the District Court that its findings are sufficient to bring petitioners within the ambit of § 1983.
Further, the applicability of § 1983 to controlling officers allows the district courts to avoid the necessity of injunctions issued against individual officers and the consequent continuing supervision by the federal courts of the day-to-day activities of the men on the street. The District Court aptly stated:
"Respect and admiration for the performance of the vast majority of police officers cannot justify refusal to confront the reality of the abuses which 387*387 do exist. But deference to the essential role of the police in our society does mandate that intrusion by the courts into this sensitive area should be limited, and should be directed toward insuring that the police themselves are encouraged to remedy the situation." 357 F. Supp., at 1320.
I would regard what was accomplished in this case as one of those rightly rare but nevertheless justified instances—just as Allee and Hague—of federal-court "intervention" in a state or municipal executive area. The facts, the deprival of constitutional rights, and the pattern are all proved in sufficient degree. And the remedy is carefully delineated, worked out within the administrative structure rather than superimposed by edict upon it, and essentially, and concededly, "livable." In the City of Brotherly Love—or in any other American city—no less should be expected. It is a matter of regret that the Court sees fit to nullify what so meticulously and thoughtfully has been evolved to satisfy an existing need relating to constitutional rights that we cherish and hold dear.
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Peter Van N. Lockwood, David Bonderman, J. Harold Flannery, Paul R. Dimond, William E. Caldwell, and Norman J. Chachkin for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law; by Barry S. Kohn, Deputy Attorney General, Vincent X. Yakowicz, Solicitor General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Drew S. Days III for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Robert M. Landis and Samuel T. Swansen for the Philadelphia Bar Association; by Anthony G. Amsterdam, Melvin L. Wulf, Joel M. Gora, and Sanford J. Rosen for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Frederic L. Ballard for the Greater Philadelphia Movement.
[1] The complaint in the first action, filed in February 1970 and styled Goode v. Rizzo, was brought by respondent Goode and two other individuals. The second, filed in September 1970 and styled COPPAR v. Tate, was brought by 21 individuals and four organizations: the Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility (COPPAR), an unincorporated association composed of some 32 constituent community organizations; the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, whose principal office is in Atlanta, Ga.; and the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords Party, unincorporated associations of black citizens and citizens of Spanish origin, respectively. The latter two groups, of which some of the individual complainants in COPPAR were members, were ultimately dismissed as parties by the District Court for failure to submit to discovery. Both complaints named as defendants those officials then occupying the offices of Mayor, City Managing Director (who supervises and, with the Mayor's approval, appoints the Police Commissioner), and the Police Commissioner, who has direct supervisory power over the department. Two other police supervisors subordinate to the Commissioner were also named defendants. Both actions were permitted to proceed as class actions, with the individual respondents representing all residents of Philadelphia and an "included" class of all black residents of that city. For a thorough account of the procedural background of this case, see the District Court's opinion. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (1973).
[2] A judgment of considerable detail was entered against petitioners, appropriate substitution having been made in 1973 of the current officeholders, including petitioner Rizzo, by then Mayor. See n. 1, supra. The existing procedure for handling complaints, embodied in the 2 1/2-page "Directive 127" (March 1967), was expanded to an all-

encompassing 14-page document reflecting the revisions suggested by the District Court's "guidelines." See infra, at 369-370. Directive 127 as revised was ordered by the District Court to be promulgated as such by the Police Commissioner and posted in various public areas, with copies provided anyone who either requested one or inquired generally into the procedure for lodging complaints. A "Citizen's Complaint Report" was ordered drawn up in a format designated by the court, with copies to be printed and available in sufficient quantities to the public in several locations. The department was further ordered to propose a police recruit training manual reflective of the court's "guidelines," with respondents then having the chance to proffer alternative suggestions. Finally, the department was directed to maintain adequate statistical records and annual summaries to provide a basis for the court's "evaluation" of the program as ordered; the court reserved jurisdiction to review petitioners' progress in these areas and to grant further relief as might be appropriate. Pet. for Cert. 20a-37a.
[3] Each of the incidents in Goode and COPPAR is set out in full detail in the District Court's opinion. 357 F. Supp., at 1294-1316. For present purposes we need only highlight those findings.
[4] See n. 1, supra.
[5] Incidents "1" through "3" 357 F. Supp., at 1294-1297.
[6] This textual summary of the District Court's findings with respect to the COPPAR incidents is taken from the Brief for Respondents 14-15, and n. 18
[7] The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners had in their appeal raised no question of the propriety of the class designation under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23. That issue is therefore not before us, and we express no opinion upon it.
[8] Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (CA4 1966), was also cited by the District Court for the proposition that federal courts have the legal power to "supervise the functioning of the police department." 357 F. Supp., at 1320. But the court in Lankford intimated no such power, and the facts which confronted it are obviously distinguishable. There, in executing an "evil practice that has long and notoriously persisted in the Police Department," the police, searching over a 19-day period for two black men who murdered one of their ranks, conducted some 300 warrantless searches of private residences in a predominately Negro area "at all hours of the day and night" on nothing more than "unverified anonymous [telephone] tips." 364 F. 2d, at 198, and 205 n. 9. This "series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever to come under the scrutiny of a federal court" arose out of what several experienced police officers testified was a "routine practice" in "serious cases." Id., at 200-201. Injunctive relief under § 1983 was granted against the defendant Police Commissioner because the wholesale raids were the "effectuation of a plan conceived by high ranking [police] officials," a practice which in the interim the defendant had "renounced only obliquely, if at all," and as to which "the danger of repetition has not been removed." Id., at 202, 204.
[9] Brief for Respondents 34-35.
[1] In this regard, however, this Court recently has approved the imposition of criminal liability without "consciousness of wrong-doing" for failure to supervise subordinates. United States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658 (1975). The concept, thus, is far from novel doctrine.
[2] "Under section 1983, equitable relief is appropriate in a situation where governmental officials have notice of the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates and fail to prevent a recurrence of such misconduct. Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 . . . (1939). From a legal standpoint, it makes no difference whether the plaintiffs' constitutional rights are violated as a result of police behavior which is the product of the active encouragement and direction of their superiors or as a result of the superiors' mere acquiescence in such behavior. In either situation, if the police officials had a duty, as they admittedly had here, to prevent the officers under their direction from committing the acts which are alleged to have occurred during the Convention, they are proper defendants in this action." Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F. 2d 1084, 1086 (CA7 1969). See also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F. 2d 1196, 1199 (CA1), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 977 (1974), and Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F. 2d 6, 8 (CA1 1972); Wright v. McMann, 460 F. 2d 126, 134-135 (CA2), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 885 (1972); Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F. 2d 1343, 1351 (CA3 1971); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (CA4 1966); Jennings v. Patterson, 460 F. 2d 1021, 1022 (CA5 1972); Smith v. Ross, 482 F. 2d 33, 36 (CA6 1973); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F. 2d 6, 10-11 (CA7 1972); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F. 2d 1271, 1275 (CA8 1973); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F. 2d 877, 881 (CA10 1974); Carter v. Carlson, 144 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 395, 447 F. 2d 358, 365 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418 (1973).