UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

__________________________________________

)

BRONWYN FORD, KATRINA MACK, et al., )

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

Civil Action No. 98-11346-NG

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al.,

)

Defendants

)

_________________________________________ )

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The parties to this action, Katrina Mack and the additional class

representatives (“Plaintiffs”), and Suffolk County and the City of Boston (“Defendants”),

by counsel, have entered into this Settlement Agreement.

II. BACKGROUND

2. The plaintiff Katrina Mack filed this action on December 10, 1998,

challenging the constitutionality of strip-searches at the Suffolk County Jail.

3. On February 16, 2000, this Court certified this case as a class action

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 (b)(2) and (b)(3) for all women who, between December 10,

1995 and September 20, 1999, were:

a. taken into custody by the Boston Police Department and transferred to the Suffolk County Jail pursuant to Boston Police Department rules regarding the custody of female prisoners to be held pending a first court appearance, or after an arrest on a default warrant; and

b. subjected to a routine strip-search and visual body cavity search at the Suffolk County Jail pursuant to the policy, practice or custom of the Suffolk County Sheriff.

4. An approved class action notice was sent to all potential class members at their last known addresses in September 2000.
5. All class members are bound by this Settlement Agreement except for ten women who sent a timely Notice of Exclusion.
6. On July 31, 2001, this Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment establishing the defendants’ liability. III. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT
7. The defendants will pay the sum of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) into a settlement fund to settle all claims brought by the plaintiffs in this action, including attorney’s fees and costs (“Settlement Amount”).
8. Class counsel recommends Blackman Kallick Bartelstein LLP, 300 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 660, Chicago IL, to be approved by the Court as claims administrator for this settlement. Class counsel will oversee the settlement administration process and distribution phases and will provide direction to the claims administrator as needed.
9. The claims administrator will arrange for an escrow agent to maintain an interest bearing settlement fund account.
10. The County agrees that it will make its best effort to pay $5 million into the settlement fund account no later than 12:00 noon on September 6, 2002. If the County, despite its best efforts to obtain funding, is unable to make its payment by 12:00 noon on
2

September 6, 2002, the County will make its payment as soon as possible thereafter. In any event, the County agrees that it will make its payment of $5 million into the settlement fund account no later than 12:00 noon on November 29, 2002. If the County fails to make its full payment by 12:00 noon on November 29, 2002, then the County shall pay in addition interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded daily, on all unpaid amounts until all of such unpaid amount and accrued interest have been paid.
11. The City agrees to pay $5 million into the settlement fund account no later than 12:00 noon on September 6, 2002, provided that the County also pays $5 million by that time. If the County, despite its best efforts to obtain funding, is unable to make its payment by 12:00 noon on September 6, 2002, the City will be permitted to hold its payment until the day the County makes its payment. In any event, the City agrees that it will make its payment of $5 million into the settlement fund account no later than 12:00 noon on November 29, 2002. If the City fails to make its full payment on the same day as the County or by 12:00 noon on November 29, 2002, whichever is applicable, then the City shall pay in addition interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded daily, on all unpaid amounts until all of such unpaid amount and accrued interest have been paid.
12. The settlement amount and any interest earned in the settlement fund account until the date of distribution shall belong to the plaintiffs. If there is any balance in the settlement fund account from additional interest earned after all of the settlement
3

checks have been distributed and all expenses, bonuses and attorney’s fees have been paid, the plaintiff will petition the Court for instructions on the distribution of the remaining funds.
13. A hearing by the Court to approve the settlement will take place on Thursday, September 26, 2002 at 2:30 p.m. Any objections to the proposed settlement will be heard by the Court at that time as provided below. IV. CLAIMS PROCEDURES AND SETTLEMENT FUND DISTRIBUTION
14. A Notice of Class Action Settlement and of the Hearing to Approve the Settlement will be sent by first class mail postage prepaid to all potential class members with good addresses within 15 days of the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval of settlement. The notice will include the following:
a. Terms of the settlement; b. The class member’s right to contest the settlement by first filing a
written objection within the time period for filing a claim form and then by appearing in person or through counsel at the fairness hearing on September 26, 2002 at 2:30 p.m.; and c. A Settlement Claim Form, which must be submitted by class members in order to share in the settlement fund. A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit A. Notice will also be made by publication for two days in the Boston Herald, copy attached as Exhibit B. 15. The claims administrator will establish a Claims Hotline with a toll free number staffed live two days a week, from the day after the mailing the Notice of Class
4

Action Settlement through the deadline by which class members must submit a Settlement Claim Form, to answer questions from class members about the notice, the Settlement Claim Form or the fairness hearing. On days when the Claims Hotline is not staffed live, the claims administrator will run a tape recording that will provide the class members with information about the class action and times to call the Claims Hotline to speak to a person. Under the supervision and direction of class counsel, the claims administrator will also answer any questions posed in letters from class members.
16. Class members must submit a valid and complete Settlement Claim Form postmarked no later than September 20, 2002 (at least 45 days from the date of mailing of the Notice of Class Action Settlement) in order to share in the settlement fund. A copy of the claim form is attached as Exhibit C.
17. If a class member objects to the proposed settlement, she must submit a letter of objection, in addition to the Settlement Claim Form, postmarked no later than September 20, 2002 (at least 45 days from the date of mailing of the Notice of Class Action Settlement). She must also appear in person or through counsel at the September 26, 2002 fairness hearing to have her objection considered by the Court. The claims administrator will forward all letters of objection to the Court and to counsel for all parties.
18. The claims administrator will verify that a person who submits a valid Settlement Claim Form postmarked on or before September 20, 2002 (“Claimant”) is a
5

class member by reviewing the information provided by the claimant in the Settlement Claim Form and checking it against the electronic booking data used by Suffolk County which has been provided to plaintiffs’ counsel (“Data”). This information will include the claimant’s name, social security number, date of birth and any alias information.
19. If a claimant cannot be verified as a class member, the claims administrator will send a Notice of Claim Denial to the claimant within 14 days of the deadline for submitting Settlement Claim Forms. A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit D. Any claimant who disagrees with the determination that she is not a class member may appeal to a special master to be appointed by the Court within 14 days from the date the claims administrator sends the claimant the Notice of Claim Denial. The claimant must submit a written statement with supporting documentary evidence which shows that the data is incorrect or incomplete. The evidence may include a notarized letter from the County, criminal offender’s record information (CORI), or certified court documents from the criminal case. The special master will make a determination of class membership within 30 days of the claimant’s appeal of claim denial and will report his findings to the claims administrator and class counsel. Rulings by the special master shall be final and binding.
20. Rose King, attorney for Suffolk County, has also agreed to accept telephone calls from claimants to verify the data. If attorney King is able to verify that a claimant is a class member, she will forward the verified class member’s booking information to the
6

claims administrator and class counsel. The verified class member will need not appeal to the special master.
21. If claimant is verified as a class member, the claims administrator will identify all of the class member’s booking admissions into the Jail during the class period by reviewing the name, Suffolk County unique identification number, social security number and date of birth of the class member.
22. To determine each participating class member’s share in the settlement, the claims administrator will place the class member into one of four settlement categories in accordance with the Distribution Formula attached to and made part of this Settlement Agreement. Each of the four settlement categories has received a point rating to determine the pro rata settlement amount for each participating class member.
23. A Notice of Claim Approval and Membership in a Settlement Category will be sent by first class mail postage-prepaid to all participating class members at the address provided by the class member on the Settlement Claim Form within 30 days of the Court’s final approval of the settlement. The notice will include the following:
a. Membership in a settlement category. b. An estimate of the disbursement amount for the settlement category. c. The participating class member’s right to contest her membership in
the settlement category by appealing to a special master. A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit E.
7

24. A participating class member may contest the determination of her membership in a settlement category by filing an appeal with the special master postmarked within 45 days from the date of mailing of the Notice of Claim Approval and Membership in a Settlement Category. The special master will notify the claims administrator and class counsel of those class members who have appealed.
25. To successfully contest the determination of her membership in a settlement category, a class member must move up at least one category (i.e, from category IV to category III, etc.). If the error sought to be corrected would not change the claimant’s category, the appeal will be denied without a hearing. If a participating class member unsuccessfully contests the determination of her membership in a settlement category, she will be penalized by deducting 20% of the point rating she would otherwise have been entitled to.
26. The special master will decide all appeals regarding membership in a settlement category. Within 15 days of the deadline for class members to file appeals, the special master will notify those who appeal to appear at a hearing at a time and place and in a format determined by the special master. All appeals will be resolved within 60 days of the deadline for class members to file appeals. The special master’s decision will be final and binding on all parties.
8

27. The special master will report his decisions to the claims administrator and class counsel. The claims administrator will send notice to the class member of the special master’s final decision.
28. The claims administrator will make a final calculation of distribution amounts in accordance with the Distribution Formula after all Settlement Claim Forms have been submitted, the deadline for class members to appeal their membership in a settlement category has passed and all appeals have been resolved.
29. The settlement fund will be distributed among participating class members (after approval and payment of attorney’s fees, expenses and class member bonuses) within 30 days after the claims administrator begins to make final calculation of distribution amounts.
30. Bonuses will be paid to compensate class representatives and class members who spent time working with class counsel to achieve the settlement. These checks will be paid at the same time as payments to class members. Class members will receive a bonus for each of the following activities as follows:
a. Serving as a class representatives - $15,000. b. Being the subject of a deposition - $5,000. c. Being selected for a damages trial and preparing to testify - $4,000. d. Providing an affidavit in support of the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment - $500.
9

e. Speaking with newspaper, radio or television reporters about the case before the case was settled - $1,500.
Class counsel will provide the class administrator with a list of class members who are entitled to bonuses.
31. Class counsel will request that the Court approve an attorney’s fee of 30% of the settlement amount with a partial payment of attorney’s fees to be paid within 30 days of the Court granting final approval of the settlement and with the remainder to be paid on the day the settlement fund is distributed to class members.
32. Expenses, including the cost of the claims administrator, the special master and other costs of administration of this settlement, will be paid from the settlement fund subject to approval by the Court. Class counsel will provide an itemization of all expenses for approval by the Court on the day the special master resolves all appeals.
33. The claims administrator will make distributions from the settlement fund to all participating class members within 30 days after the claims administrator begins to make the final determination of settlement fund distribution amounts. The settlement checks will be made payable only in the name of the participating class member and will be sent to the address provided by the participating class member on the Settlement Claim Form.
34. If a participating class member does not provide a mailing address or if the settlement check is returned as undeliverable, the class member will be required to appear
10

in person before the special master at a time and place determined by the special master to present verification of her identity in order to receive her settlement check.
35. Participating class members who make a personal appearance must present one of the following forms of identification to establish their identity: (a) a driver’s license or a state identification card, (b) a passport or a green card, or (c) some other photographic identification card not readily subject to forgery such as a military or student identification card. Other forms of reliable identification may be considered by the special master.
36. If a participating class member is deceased at the time of the distribution of settlement funds, the settlement check will be sent to the class member’s estate if an executor or administrator has been appointed in accordance with law. Payments will not be made to agents of participating class members other than court appointed legal representatives. The representative must provide the necessary documentation to the claims administrator.
37. A participating class member who is confined in a prison, hospital or other institution and who has provided an address for such an institution for payment, will be sent payment to that address.
38. If any settlement check to a participating class member is not cashed or is not claimed, it will be sent to the State Treasury in accordance with the Massachusetts Abandoned Property Act so that the participating class member may claim it in the future.
11

39. The claims administrator will prepare all necessary tax forms relating to the settlement fund account and 1099's for class members who received a settlement check within 6 months of making distributions from the settlement fund.
40. The claims administrator will provide a report to the Court and counsel for all parties accounting for the distribution of the settlement fund including attorney’s fees and expenses.
41. Class counsel shall make final payment to the claims administrator within 30 days after the claims administrator completes the administration of the settlement for fees and expenses not already paid in administrating the settlement.
42. Any deadlines or other dates in this Settlement Agreement may be changed by the Court on a showing of good cause. V. RELEASE
43. In exchange for payment of the settlement amount, the defendants will be released from liability for the strip-searches of class members at the Nashua Street Jail that were part of this law suit unless the class member exercised her right to be excluded from this class action. VI. SUPERVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT
44. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the settlement of this case and may enter orders as appropriate to enforce the settlement, to adjudicate the rights and
12

responsibilities of the parties and to effectuate the fair and orderly administration of the
settlement.
For the plaintiffs, By their attorneys,
______________________________ Howard Friedman BBO #180080 Myong J. Joun BBO #645099 Law Offices of Howard Friedman 90 Canal Street, Fifth floor Boston, MA 02114-2022 (617) 742-4100

For defendant City of Boston By its attorneys,

For defendant Suffolk County: By its attorneys,

______________________________ Eve Piemonte-Stacey BBO #628883 Susan M. Weise BBO #545455 City of Boston Law Department Room 615, City Hall Boston, MA 02201 (617) 635-4029

______________________________ Rose E. King BBO #630973 Kathleen Cawley BBO #551202 Suffolk County Sheriff's Department 200 Nashua Street Boston MA 02114 (617) 989-6680

Dated:

13

 
 Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 1 of 8
EXHIBITB

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 2 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

BRONWYN FORD, KATRINA MACK, et al., )

Plaintiffs

)

)

V.

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al.,

)
)

_________D_ef_en_d_a_nt_s ____________

)
)

Civil Action No. 98-11346-NG

DISTRIBUTION FORMULA
I. DEFINITIONS
l. A "Claimant" is a person who submits a valid complete Settlement Claim Form postmarked on or before September 20, 2002 to the claims administrator.
2. A "Participating Class Member")s a claimant who has been verified as a class member by the claims administrator after review of the information supplied by the claimant in the Settlement Claim Form.
3. The "Data" is the electronic booking data used by Suffolk County which has been provided to plaintiffs' counsel.
II. PARTICIPATING CLASS MEMBER VERIFICATION 4. The claims administrator will verify that a claimant is a class member by
reviewing the information provided by the claimant in the Settlement Claim Form and checking it against the data. This information includes the claimant's name, social security number, date of birth and any alias information.

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 3 of 8

5. If a claimant cannot be verified as a class member, the claims administrator

will

send

a

Notice

of

Claim

Denial

to

the

claimant

within-

14

davs /

of

the

deadline

for

submitting Settlement Claim Forms. A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit D. Any

claimant who disagrees 'ivith the determination that she is not a class member may appeal

to a special master to be appointed by the Court ">vithin I 4 days from the date the claims

administrator sends the claimant the Notice of Claim Denial. The claimant must submit

a written statement 'ivith supporting documentary evidence whjch shows that the data is

incorrect or incomplete. The evidence may include a notarized letter from t~e County,

criminal offender's record information (CORI), or certified court documents from the

criminal case. The special master will make a determination of class membership vvithin

30 days of the claimant's appeal of claim denial and will report his findings to the claims

administrator and class counsel. Rulings by the special master shall be final and binding.

6. Rose King, attorney for Suffolk County, has als·o agreed to accept telephone

calls from claimants to verify the data. If attorney King is able to verify that a claimant

is a class member, she 'ivill forward the verified class member's booking information to the

claims administrator and class counsel. The verified class member 'ivill need not appeal

to the special master.

7. If claimant is verified as a class member, the claims administrator will identify all of the class member's booking admissions into the Jail during the class period by reviewing the name, Suffolk County unique identification number, social security number and date of birth of the class member.

2

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 4 of 8

III. SETTLEMENT CATEGORIES
8. To determine each participating class member's-share in the settlement, the claims administrator will place the class member into one of four settlement categories based on the data.

9. Membership in a settlement category vv:ill be determined based on the crime charged at time of the participating class member's admission into the Nashua Street Jail. If the participating class member was charged vv:ith more than one crime during t:C:e class period, the most severe crime determines her membership in a settlement cat~gory.
l 0. The four settlement categories are as follows:

a.

vSveitthtlaenmyeonnteCoaftethgeorfyolIlocwoninsgistcsriomfecsladssurminegmtbheersclwashsopwereiroedc: harged

CODE1 ABD Drs LAR LAU MDP LMV WOL UWA MVL NSP
our
OTM SMV RSP SHO THR

DESCRIPTION
A&B DOMESTIC/FAMILY ABUSE DISORDERLY.
LARCENY OVER
LARCENY UNDER
:tvlALICIOUS DEST PROPERTY
lvf/V- LARCENY OF M/V lvf/V- OPER. W/0 LICENSE lvf/V- USE W/0 AUTHORITY lvf/V ·VIOL. OF M/V LAW
NON-SUPPORT
OPERATING UNDER INFLUENCE OTHER MISDEMEANOR RECEIVING STOLEN M/V RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY SHOPLIFTING
THREATEN TO COMMIT CRIME

Nashua

1 The three-letter Street Jail.

crime

code

assigned

by

Suffolk

County

during

the

admissions

process

at

the

3

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 5 of 8

TRE VRO WIT

TRESPASSING VIOL. OF RESTRAIN. ORDER WITNESS

b. Settlement Category II consists of all class members who were charged with any one of the following crimes during the class period:

rrYI\'C
'--''-../...L,..I.J....,
ABC APO
AAF
ACC AFF ASS ADW A&B AGA RES ATC CRY SPR ESC
uT l.,..,I'"T"
l l
FUG OTH PVL PBT

DESCRIPTION A&B ON CORR. OFFICER A&B ON A POLICE OFFICER ACCESSORY AFTER FACT ACCESSORY BEFORE FACT AFFRAY- COMMON LAW ASSAULT- OTHER ASSAULT D!W
ASSAULT & BATTERY ASSAULT &BATTERY D/W ATT. RESCUE PRISONER ATTEMPT TO COMMIT A CRIME CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION CONSPIRACY
ESCAPE
FORGERY I COUNTERFEITING FUGITIVE
OTHER FELONY PAROLE VIOLATION POSSESSION BURGLARY TOOLS

c. Settlement Category III consists of all class members who were charged with any one of the following crimes during the class period:

CODE NR ARS AID ARU AWI ARA
B&E
BEN BUR CAR CFA EXT HOM lAB

DESCRIPTION
ARMED ROBBERY
ARSON OR BURNING PROPERTY ASSAULT IN DWELLING ARMED ASSAULT W/I ROB UNARMED ASSAULT W/I TO MURDER ASSAULT W/I TO ROB ARMED BREAKING & ENTERING DAY BREAKING & ENTERING NIGHT BURGLARY ARMED OR ASLTNG CARJACIGNG
CARRYING FIREARM W/0 LIC EXTORTION
HOMICIDE/MURDER
INDECENT A&B

4

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 6 of 8

lAC INW KID LFP MAY PF A ROC STA BUU ROB WEA

INDECENT A&B ON A CHILD INTIMIDATING A WITNESS KIDNAPING LARCENY FROM PERSON MAYHEM POSS. FIREARM W/0 ID RAPE OF CHILD STALKING lJl'-JARlvfED BURGLARY UNARMED ROBBERY WEAPONS POSSESSION

d. Settlement Category IV consists· of all class members who were charged with any one of the following crimes during the class period:

COD F. CNW
ccs
PCA PCB PCC PCD PCE DTR MDA MSA MDB MSB MDD MSD MDE DAB PIS PSA PSB PSC PSD PIA PIB PIC PID PIE PRO SFF SEX UFP

DESCRIPTION COMMON NIGHTWALKER CONSPIRACY VIO DRUG LAWS DRUG POSSESSION - CLASS A DRUG POSSESSION - CLASS B DRUG POSSESSION - CLASS C DRUG POSSESSION - CLASS D DRUG POSSESSION- CLASS E DRUG TRAFFICIGNG MFG/DIST CL. A MFG/DIST CL. A SCH. ZONE MFG/DIST CL; B MFG/DIST CL B SCH. ZONE MFG/DIST CL. D MFG/DIST CL. D SCH. ZONE MFG/DIST CL. E OTHER DRUG CHARGE POSS INST ADMIN CONTR SUB POSS. W/I CL. A SCH. ZONE POSS. W/I CL. B SCH. ZONE POSS. W/I CL. C SCH. ZONE POSS. W/I CL. D SCH. ZONE POSS. W/I TO DIST. CL. A POSS. W/I TO DIST. CL. B POSS. W/I TO DIST. CL. C POSS. W/I TO DIST. CL. D POSS. W/I TO DIST. CL. E PROSTITUTION SEX FOR FEE SEX OFFENSE- OTHER UTTERING FALSE PRESCRIPTION

5

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 7 of 8

11. If a participating class member was booked into the Jail more than once during the class period, the class member will be dropped down one category (i.e., from category I to category II, etc., except category IV, the lowest category). IV. POINT DISTRIBUTION

12. The Settlement Fund will be distributed among participating class members, after approval and payment of attorney's fees and expenses and bonuses for class representatives, based on the following formula:

a. Class members in Settlement Category I shall receive 20 points.

\

b.

Class

members

in

Settlement

Category

II

shall

receive

10

\
points.

c. Class members in Settlement Category III shall receive 5 points.

d. Class members in Settlement Category IV shall receive l point.

13. If a participating class member unsuccessfully contests the determination of

her membership in a settlement category, she vvill be penalii;ed by deducting 20% of the

point rating she would otherwise have been entitled to.

V. SETTLEMENT FUND DISTRIBUTION

14. The Settlement Fund is the $10 million settlement amount paid to the plaintiffs by the defendants plus any interest accrued up to the date of distribution after payment of attorney's fees and expenses and bonuses.
l 5. The monetary value of each point shall be determined by dividing the Settlement Fund by the total number of points in the class. The total number of points is determined by multiplying the number of participating class members in each

6

Case 0:99-cv-03126-DRH Document 56-3 Filed 03/01/2007 Page 8 of 8
Settlement Category by its respective number of points and then adding the sub-total points of each Settlement Category.
16. Bonuses will be paid to compensate class representatives and class members who spent time working with class counsel to achieve the settlement. These checks will be paid at the same time as payments to class members. Class members will receive a bonus for each of the follovving activities as follows:
a. Serving as a class representatives - $15,000. b. Being the subject of a deposition- $5,000.
(
c. Being selected for a damages trial and preparing to testify - $4,000. d. Providing an affidavit in support of the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment- $500. e. Spealdngwith newspaper, radio or television reporters about the case
before the case was settled- $1,500. Class counsel will provide the class administrator with a list of class members entitled to bonuses.
17. Attorney's fees will be 30% of the total settlement, minus the amount of interim attorneys fees already paid to class counsel, subject to approval by the Court.
18. Expenses, including the cost of the claims administrator, the special master and other costs of administration of this settlement, will be paid from the settlement fund subject to approval by the Court. Class counsel shall provide itemization of all such expenses.
7

 
 r" f t ~~~- ,1:-"; UNITED STATES DISTRICm :.ill<DUR'l"

U DISTRICT OF MASSACJlPS-;ETn,S 1',,' ' "

Lui L

,i C. v,;

t'",t -I

"' .". ~., )

U=iVil Action Number: . 9s:":cv"':11'3'4':S:':'NG

... ---~ -"~------------
BRONWYN FORD, Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF BOSTON; SUFFOLK COUNTY; RICHARD ROUSE,SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY,
Defendants

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH JURY
DEMAND [Addition of Count VI and punitive damages]

-.-,-~----,------------~
INTRODUCTION

This is an action for damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§1983 and 1988, and the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution, and under the common-law of

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, against the above-named

defendants. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. §§133l and 1343,

and on the pendent jurisdiction of this court to entertain claims

arising under state law.

Plaintiff alleges that she was negligently arrested on a

defecti ve warrant. Plaintiff also alleges that as a resul t, she

was subjected to two strip searches, and refused medical

attention in violation of Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. It is further alleged that

these violations and torts were committed as

and customs of the above-named defendants.

1

PARTIES
3. The Plaintiff, Bronwyn Ford (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Ms. Ford"), lS an individual residing at 15 Kennedy Drive, Pelham, New Hampshire. ~, Defendant, City of Boston, is a municipal corporation. S, Defendant, Suffolk County, is a duly designated county in the (:ornmonweal th of Massachusetts, under the laws of the Commonwea 1 th of Massachusetts. 6. Defendant, Sheriff, Suffolk County, oversees the Nashua Street
FACTS
'! Un or about May 13, 1996, a complaint was filed a9ainst Ms. ~'ord For malicious destruction of property in violation of G.L. c. 266, §127. 8. On or about August 30, 1996, a hearing was held in Lynn District Court at which time the Court continued the case without ::1 fin(Lin~~ until November 29, 199(,. 9. At the AU9ust 30, 1996, hearing, the Court also assessed restitution in the amount of $290.00 and imposed a $50.00 victim/witness fee. 10. Ms. Ford was to pay said restitution and victim/witness fee on or before November 29, 1996. 11, Ms. Ford paid said resti tution and victim/wi tness fee on November 26, 1996.
2

1). On November 29, 1996, Ms. Ford was defaulted for failure to pay said restitution and victim/witness fee. 13. On or about December 4, 1996, the clerk's office of the Lynn District Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Ms. Ford due to the default. 14. Ms. Ford was arrested at her residence on or about February 19, 1997. 1~. Durjng the arrest, Ms. Ford's arm was unnecessarily twisted violently behind her for no reason and only after she asked the officers for photo identification. 16. Ms. Ford was transported to Boston Police station at Berkeley Street for booking. 17. Ms. Ford, while at Berkeley Street facility, was stripsearched. 18. Thereafter, Ms. Ford was transported to Nashua Street County Jdll, where, once again, she was strip-searched. 19. Ms. Ford was detained at Nashua street county Jail =:Jvernight. 20. While detained, Ms. Ford's personal belongings were confiscated by the officers. 21. During her detention, Ms Ford repeatedly asked for her medication (in her pocketbook) which was prescribed by her doctor for a serlOUS health condition.
Despite Ms. Ford's pleas for her medication, she was re tw-:;ed.
3

23. On or about February 20, 1997, Ms. Ford was transported to Lynn District Court. 24. While detained in a holding cell, Ms. Ford pleaded for her medication. 25. Despite her pleas, Ms. Ford was refused her medication. 26. When finally presented to the court, the judge, after careful review of the docket, dismissed the case against Ms. Ford stating that the "warrant was issued in error." 27. At no time during the events described above, was Plaintiff intoxicated, incapacitated, a threat to the safety of herself or others, or disorderly. 28. The City of Boston has a policy of treating women differently than men. 29. Pursuant to the City of Boston Police Department Rules and Procedures (attached hereto and marked Exhibit "1"), Rule 318, Sec. 9, entitled "FEMALES", states "All female prisoners, after being booked in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Department, shall be sent as soon as possible to the Suffolk County Jail in a Department vehicle." The rule goes on to state "Female prisoners shall be searched by a female Boston Police Officer. I f no female police officer is available, the prisoner shall be transported to the Suffolk County Jail to be searched." 30. There is no similar rule regarding men.
4

31. On or about June 9, 1997, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, City of Lynn, City of Boston and Lynn District Court were all served presentment letters pursuant to G.L. c. 258.
COUNT I
Ford v. City of Boston (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)
32. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference as if set forth hereto in their entirety Paragraphs 1 through 31 above. 33. By the conduct and actions towards Plaintiff by the strip searches, as described above, the Defendant named hereunder Count II, negligently inflicted or knew or should have known that its conduct would result in severe emotional distress. 34. The Defendant's (named hereunder Count I) conduct as described herein, was extreme and outrageous. 35. As a direct result of the conduct and actions towards Plaintiff, as described above, the Defendant named hereunder Count I, caused Plaintiff's severe emotional distress. 36. Plaintiff's severe emotional distress caused her to experience physical pain and distress. 37. As a direct result of the conduct and actions towards Plaintiff, as described above, Ms. Ford suffered and continues to suffer severe injuries of body and mind, incurred expenses for medical care and attendance, and other losses, to which no reasonable person could be expected to endure.
5

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants named hereunder Count I, on Count I of her complaint, plus interest, attorneys fees' and costs of this action.
COUNT II Ford v. City of Boston (Vio~ation of Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United states)
38. Count II has previously been dismissed. COUNT III
Ford v. Suffolk County Ford v. Richard Rouse, Sheriff, Suffolk County
(Violation of Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States)
39. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference as if set forth hereto in their entirety Paragraphs 1 through 38
above. 40. While imprisoned at the Nashua street Jail, Plaintiff was
strip searched. 41. The strip search was required by Suffolk County Sheriff's Department's Departmental Policy Number s507. This policy states that ~strip searches shall be conducted of all inmates committed to the custody of the Department..." The policy requires a strip search of the nude body of every person \\ at the time of each admission to the facility..." The policy also requires a visual body cavity search of a prisoner's anus and vagina. 42. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department does not require any cause for conducting a strip search and visual body cavi ty search of a person arrested on a misdemeanor, on a
6

minor vehicle offense, or for protective custody, who is admitted to the Nashua street Jail for any length of time. 43. These routine searches are conducted without any reason to believe the person has anything concealed on her person. 44. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department regarding strip searches directs county employees to conduct searches that violate the Fourth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution. 45. In addition, as described above, Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs, as they refused her medication. 46. Defendants followed policies and/or customs which enabled deliberate indifference, as described above, and caused the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 47. As a result of certain policies and/or customs, as described above, Plaintiff was subjected to two strip-searches and experienced physical injury due to Defendants' refusal to provide Plaintiff her medication for a serious health condition. 48. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants' conduct, as described above, Ms. Ford suffered and continues to suffer injuries of body and mind, incurred expenses for medical care and attendance, and other losses.
7

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants (named hereunder Count III), on Count III of her complaint, plus interest, attorneys fees' and costs of this action and punitive damages as to Richard Rouse.
COUNT IV
Ford v. Richard Rouse, Sheriff, Suffolk County Ford v. City of Boston Ford v. Suffolk County
(Violation of Article XIV of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)
49. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference as if set forth hereto in their entirety Paragraphs 1 through 48 above. 50. As described above, Plaintiff was negligently arrested on a negligently issued arrest warrant. 51. Excessive force was used by the Boston Police during Plaintiff's arrest. 52. As a resul t of being negligently arrested on a defective warrant, Plaintiff was imprisoned, during which time she was subjected to two strip-searches and experienced physical injury due to Defendants' refusal to provide Plaintiff her medication for a serious health condition. 53. As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants' (named hereunder Count IV) conduct, as described above, Ms. Ford suffered and continues to suffer injuries of body and mind, incurred expenses for medical care and attendance, and other losses.
8

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants (named hereunder Count IV), on Count IV of her complaint, plus interest, attorneys fees' and costs of this action and punitive damages as to Richard Rouse.

Ford v.

COUNT V
Richard Rouse, Sheriff, Suffolk Ford v. City of Boston Ford v. Suffolk County

County

(Violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983)

54. Plaintiff repeats, real leges and incorporates by reference as if set forth hereto in their entirety Paragraphs 1 through 53 above.

55. Defendants (named hereunder Count V), maintained policies and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and by its actions as' described above, violated the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

56. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' (named hereunder Count V) conduct, as described above, Ms. Ford suffered and continues to suffer injuries of body and mind, incurred expenses for medical care and attendance, and other losses.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants (named hereunder Count V), on Count V of her complaint, plus interest, attorneys fees' and costs of this action and punitive damages as to Richard Rouse.

9

COUNT VI Ford v. City of Boston (Violation of Equal Protection of the Constitution of the United states - 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
57. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference as if set forth hereto in their entirety Paragraphs 1 through 56 above. 58. By requiring female prisoners be held at the Suffolk County Jail, it is the policy or procedure of the City of Boston Police Department to automatically transport female prisoners to Suffolk county Jail while men in the same situation are not required to be transported to Suffolk County Jail. 59. The transportation of female prisoners as described above, violates the right of a woman to the equal protection of law.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant (named hereunder Count VI), on Count VI of her complaint, plus interest, attorneys fees' and costs of this action.
THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL COUNTS. Respectfully submitted, BRONWY RD, by h
185 Devonsh" Suite 200 Boston, MA 02110 (617) 482-7600
10

Dated:

~I (J )"'1

Of Counsel:

Audrey J. Samit E

BBO# 559271

,sq.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE

I herebY certify that a true CXJPI of 1he above document was S9M3d ~ the

attomeyof recordJor
bv moll.hand orCA J

each 4'1)

oI1·h! e(f p?wf:-t.y1

11

Exhibit A

.-:

(

Boston Police Department

..
PRISONERS

Rules and Procedures
RULE 318 Hay 26, 1995

This rule is issued to establish guidelines for the care and treatment ofprisoners, including persons held in protective custody (Rule 318-A) and juveniles held in custody (Rule 318B). It replaces Rule 318, dated February 28, 1990, and supersedes all previously issued Rules, Orders, Memorandums, Bulletins and directives concerning the processing, safekeeping and treatment ofprisoners in the custody of members ofthis Department, at the House ofDetention and the Juvenile Pre-Arraignment Facility.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: Officers shall be held strictly responsIble for the safe custody ofthe prisoners under their care and this responsibility is theirs at all times. PrisOners and susped$ shall be treated in a fair and hwnane manner and the rights to which they are entitled shall be respected.
Sec.. 1 ARREST PROCEDURE: Except when otherwise ordered or allowed, every person arrested shall be taken at once to the station house ofthe District wherein such person was arrested where a computerized Department Booking Sheet (hereinafter referred to as a "Booking Sheet") shall be completed promptly by a Booking Officer who shall then photograph and fingerprint the arrested person using the Integrated Identification Imaging System. In addition to being processed using the Integrated Identification Imaging System, all suspects attested for homicide, rape and other
serious offenses, as determined by the Duty Supervisor, shall have a fun set ofinked
prints taken by a trained fingerprint technician.
Sec. 2 EXAMlNATION FOR VISffiLE INJURlES: When a person under arrest or in protective custody is brought to a station for an original booking, or one who has been previously booked at another facility is being surrendered to a receiving facility, the Duty Supervisor shall inunediately examine the prisoner and ifhe finds cuts, bruises or other injuries shall forthwith make a written report thereofto the Commanding Officer (M.G.L. c. 276 § 33). For the purposes ofM.G.L. c. 276 § 33, a Booking Sheet shall be considered sufficient documentation ofinjuries and shall be forwarded to the Chiet: Office ofmternal Investigations. Ifa Booking Officer has been designated, it is the responsibility ofthat officer to notify the Duty Supervisor ofany injuries to the prisoner.
Ifa prisoner is suffering from wounds or injuries which appear to have been inflicted during the arrest process, the Duty Supervisor shall record the fact on the Booking Sheet and notify the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer shall forthwith inquire into the circumstances ofthe case and ifit appears that any injuries on a prisoner are incidental to the arrest process he shall initiate an investigation and shall submit a full and complete report to the Police Commissioner.
When a person in custody is found to be suffering from wounds or injuries requiring medical attention, the Duty Supervisor shall summon medical assistance. Ifso advised, the prisoner shall be sent to a hospital. Such person, ifunder arres4,...sha11 be in the legal custody ofthe police.

.' Boston Police Department

Roles and :Procedures RULE 318

Sec. 3 SICKNESS OR INJURY: Seriously injured prisoners will receive medical attention at a hospital prior to the booking process.
When officers transport a prisoner to a hospital or medical f.aci1ity prior to the booking .process, the prisoner's property shall be inventoried and held by the hospital. Contraband or evidence shall be handled in accordance with Rule 309, Evidence and Found Property.
In the event that a prisoner is transported to a hospital or medical f.aci1ity after the boolcing
process, bislher property v..ill remain in the custody ofthe District.
When a prisoner is unconscious, the Duty Supervisor shall be notified, every effort shall be made to restore consciousness and medical assistance shall be sununoned.
.AIrj unusual appearance or behavior displayed by a prisoner shall receive immediate attention.
Properly prescn"Oed medicines found to be in the prisoner's possession shall be taken into custody. Ifthe person in custody so requests, the Duty Supervisor shall allow a proper dosage, as prescn'bed on the medicine label, to'be given to the prisoner. Dosages and their frequency ofingestion, shall not exceed the limitations set forth on the medicine container. Each dose ofmedication issued shall be recorded on the appropriate form for that prisoner, using the Integrated.Identification Imaging System, by the Duty Supervisor or a Booking Officer.
Sec. 4 BOOIONG PROCEDURES: All persoIU taken to a station house under arrest shall be placed before a Booking Officer where they shall be booked under the direction of the Duty Supervisor or his designee. The Duty Supervisor's authority to designate officers to process prisoners does not relieve the Duty Supervisor ofms responsibility for the booking process.
No person may be designated as a Booking Officer unless they have been trained iu the use and operation of the Integrated Identification Imaging System. AITeSting officers, regardless of whether or not they have been so trained, shall not serve as the Booking Officer for their own prisoner(s).
In addition, no person may operate an Integrated Identification Imaging System terminal unless they have been trained in their use and are properly logged onto the system. Duty Supervisors and designated Booking Officers shall ensure that they properly log on and offthe system to prevent unauthorized per~ons from gaining access to it.
The Duty Supervisor will also designate a Boston Police Officer to conduct a search ofthe person and be responsible for the removal of all personal.property from the prisoner. The searchlng officer will ensure that all items, such as belts, neckties, boots, shoes and laces. or any article which might be used for suicidal purposes are taken frpm the prisoner,
Page 2

Boston Police Department

Rules and Proce4ures RULE 318

whether during an original booking or a prisoner being received from another police facility, whether or not previously booked.
The Booking Officer shall book, photograph and fingerprint all arrested persons using the Integrated Identification Imaging System. In so doing, the Booking. Officer shall:
A Properly'complete the computerized Booking Sheet. (All appropriate spaces on
the Booking Sheet sh2ll be completed.)
B. Ensure that they properly photograph any visible scars, marks, tattoos, injuries or amputations ofall prisoners being booked.
C. Ensure that the prisoner's personal property is properly inventoried.
Ensure that all money and other property taken from a prisoner shall be placed in a Prisoners Property Envelope and that the property is safeguarded in accordance with Department policy and procedures. (Refer to Section 7 ofthis rule,)
The legitimate purposes ofan inventory (custodial) search are: (1) the safeguarding ofthe prisoner's property, (2) the protection ofpolice officers from charges oftheft, (3) the ascertainment ofor the verification ofthe identity ofa prisoner and (4) the keeping out ofthe cells anything dangerous to the prisoner, other prisoners; visitors, and police officers. While conducting an inventory (custodial) search, a police officer may open a closed container and examine its contents solely to meet the legitimate purposes ofthe inventory (custodial) search stated above. Documents or other records may be read or otherwise examined only to the extent necessary for such inventory purposes, including identity checking, and ensuring the arrestee's physical well-being.
In the case oflarge sums of money or property of unusually high value coming into the custody of the Department, the District Commander shall take whatever precautions necessary to safeguard that money or property.
D; Ensure the removal from the prisoner(s) ofbelts, neckties, boots. shoes, and any other property which may be used for suicidal purposes.
E. Check the state's on-line suicide list prior to transmitting an arrested person's booking information to the Identification Unit for verification.
F. Upon completion ofthe booking process, transmit the booking information to the Identification Unit for acceptance. verification and confinnation. Prisoners shall then be eligible for bail in accordance with the restrictions stated below in Section 7, Booking Verification, "Bail Considerations".
G. When a prisoner is being surrendered to another facility. the Juvenile PreArraigrunent Facility or another law enforcement agency, the"prisoner's property shall be handed over to the officer responsible for transportirlg the prisoner
Page 3

. " Boston Police Department

,
Rules and Procedures
RULE"318

accompanied by a Prisoner Transportation Sheet and a Booking Sheet for each prisoner so transfered. The transporting officer shall acknowledge receipt ofthe prisoners property by signing the arrest sheet above the signature ofthe prisoner.
the The transporting officer shall deliver prisoners property ;md the above fonns
to the person in charge at the receiving DiS¢ct or agency who shall care for the
prisollers property in accordance with the provisions ofthis rule. In the case of the Juvenile Detention Facility, the Transporting Officer should deliver the property to the Duty Supervisor or the person in charge oftha.t :tacility. Sec. 5 USE OF TELEPHONE: The Duty Supervisor ofa station house wherein a
person is held in custody shall permit the use ofthe telephone withiIi one hour for the
purpose of allowing the person in custody to conununicate with ,his family or :friends, or to arrange for release on bail, or to engage the services ofan attorney. If.the prisoner has no funds the Department phone may be used (M.GL. c. 276 § 33A).
Sec. 6 FINGERPRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING: State law mandates that whoever is arrested by virtue ofprocess or is taken into custody by an officer and charged with the commission ofa felony shall be fingerprinted according to the system ofthe Identification Section and the Department ofPublic Safety and may be photographed (M.:.Gl.. c. 263 § lA).
In addition, under this Rule, aD persons arrested and booked at a Boston Police District station house shall be futgerprinted and photographed by the Duty Supervisor, or a designated Booking Officer, usiiIg the Integrated Identification Imaging System and in accordance with the operating procedures governing such use.
Booking Officers shall ensure that they properly log on and offthe system and to the extent possible, restrict unauthorized personnel from accessing the terminal.
Upon completing the booldng process for an arrested person, the Booking Officer shall
~ the information to the Identffication Unit for verification and confirmation. Booklng information that is determined by the Identification Unit to be incomplete or unacceptable shaD be re-transmitted once appropriate corrections have been made.
Sec.. 7 BOOIaNG VERnilCATION: The Identification Unit shall be responsible for ensuring the quality of all prisoner photographs (mugshots) and fingerprint images entered into the Integrated Identification Imaging System by. the District Booking Officers and received at the Identification Unit on one ofthe several computer workstations dedicated to boolcing verification.
Identification Unit personnel shall ensure such quality control by making sure that District Booking Officers enter clear photographs and readable fingerprint images into the Integrated Identification hnaging System. Identification Unit personnel shall also be responsible for classifying fingerprints and sending a confiImationmessage to the District
Page 4

-' ' Boston Police Department

Rules and Procedures RULE 318

Booking Officer once such classification and verification has been completed. However,

Identification Unit personnel shall not classify or verify a boolcing until the entire :file has

been accepted.

~ -.

Identification Unit personnel assigned to b001cing verification shall ~e that:

1. Photographic images are clear;

2. Fmgerprints are both clear and readable;

3. Information received is full and complete (i.e., race and sex match photo image, reported tattoos or scars are photographed, et al);

4. Unacceptable or incomplete records are rejected and the appropriate District station notified electronically in order that corrections may be made;

5. Booking records, once accepted, are promptly classified and checked against the central computer database in an attempt to identify the arrested person;

6. Upon completion ofthe classification and verification process, the appropriate fonns are entered in the booking record and a computer confirmation message is Sent to the District station for disposition.

In addition, Identification Unit personnel shall notify the District Booking Officer (by both telephone and computer confirmation) ofany "Master Name" on file for the offender.

Upon receiving such notification, District Booking Officers shall print an updated copy of the Booking Sheet and destroy all copies ofthe Booking Sheet that do not have the "Master Name" on it. District Booking Officers shall ensure that arresting officers are given an updated copy ofthe Booking Sheet.

Delayed Prisoner Processing Procedures: In the event the Integrated Identification Imaging System central database is down for service or communication links with the District booking stations are not functioning and the system cannot be brought back on line.within a reasonable period oftime, Duty Supervisors shall ensure that the following procedures are followed:

1. All booking information will be temporarily stored locally on the booking District's hard drive until such time as communication with the central database has been restored and .the information can be transferred (uploaded).

2. Hard copies ofthe booking infonnation (photographs and fuigerprints) shall be printed out at the District and hand--carried to the Identification Unit where they shall be verified by Identification Unit personnel.

Bail Considerations: No prisoner arrested for a felony or for a violation orM.G.L c. 209A shall be considered eligible for bail until their booking information has been accepted and verified by the Identification Unit. All other priscffiers shall be

PageS

Boston Police Department

Rules and Procedures RULE 318

considered eligtole for bail once Identification Unit personnel'have determined that their fingerprints are readable, their photographic images are clear and their booking information is full and complete.

Sec. 8 PERSONAL PROPERTY HELD AS EVIDENCE: Wh~ any property taken
from a prisoner ~s to be held for evidence, the fonowing procedures shall be fonowed:

A. Property held as evidence shall be placed in a Property Envelope, andlor appropriately tagged, and a notation shall be made on the Incident Report and the Booking Sheet.

B. The size and type of evidence shaIl be the determinants ofthe methods used to prevent contamlnation thereot: and to protect the continuity of possession ofthe evidence.

C. Cash property shall always be designated as "bills" and/or "coin" and the total amount held shall be entered on the Booking Sheet.
D. The property section ofthe Booking Sheet shall be utilized to designate an
property being held as evidence.

E. IffaT any reason a prisoner is unable or unwilling to sign for the receipt ofhis property, the Booking Officer shall sign in the space prQvided for the prisoners signature and shall record the reason that the prisoner did not sign for himself.

F. Ifa partial retwn of property is to be made, the District hard copy ofthe Booking Sheet shall have a notation made on it so that only that property which is not returned to an individual is listed. The prisoner shall sign for his property, in the space provided, on the Booking Sheet in the presence ofthe Booking Officer.

G. Upon completion ofthe prisoners receipt, ,the property held,as evidence which is taken from the prisoner. shall be transferred to the proper unit for the tests and use 'to be made ofit (as detennined by the type ofevidence); ensuririg the continuity of
--__ possession by obtaining the signature ofthe unit member who receives it. A receipt for all evidence shall be stapled into the unit's Receipt Book.

Any officer who accepts a receipt for property, under any circumstances,
m shall enter his initials and number immediately above the signature on a
receipt for property.

Sec. 9 FEMALES: All female prisoners, after being booked in accordance with the rules and procedures ofthe Department, shall be sent as soon as possible-to the Suffolk County Jail in a Department vehicle.

Female prisoners shall be searched by a female Boston Police Officer. Ifno female police

officer is available, the prisoner shall be transported to the Suffolk County Jail to be

searched_

' '::

Page 6

Boston Police Department

Rules and Procedures RULE 318

It shall be the responsi'bility ofthe operator ofthe police vehiCle to notify the Operations Division Dispatcher via radio transmission ofthe point ofdeparture, the exact time and the odometer reading. Upon their arrival at their destination they will again notify the :Opera:tions Division and again give the time, vehicle mileage and odometer reading.

THE ONLY TIME WHEN MALE AND FEMALE PRISoNERs MAY BE
TRANSPORTED TOGETHER IS IF TREY ARE ARRESTED TOGE mER FOR COMPIJCITY IN THE SAME OFFENSE. THEN, THEY MAY ONLY BE TRANSPORTED FROM THE SCENE OF THE CRIME TO THE STATION FOR THE BOOKING PROCESS.
Any article taken from a female prisoner when she is booked at a station house which may be regarded as evidence shall be handled as provided under the section concerning evidence and retained for presentation in court (Rule 309, EvideneeIFound Property).

Female prisoners in police custody shall not be confined in a cell within a cell·block at any station house. Whenever the temporary detention ofa female prisoner is necessary, she shall be placed in a detention room, when one is available, or in a secured room to be held under guard.

Sec. 10 JUVENlLES: 'When an individwl who appears to be intoxicated is taken into police custody and is found to be under the legal age at which alcoholic beverages may be bought, the Duty Supervisor shall endeavor by all proper means to ascertain the place or places at which the minor obtained the liquor. A report ofthe results ofthe inquiry shall be noted on the Incident Report, BPD Fonn1.1.

Prisoners .under seventeen years of age shall not be carried in a vehicle which is occupied

at the same time by a prisoner above that age, except when the prisoner under seventeen

has been arrested in the company ofthat older person or for complicity in the same

off~.

.

For further information on dealing with juvenile prisoners, refer to Rule 3IS-B.

Sec>U DISABLED PERSONS: Department personnel will make every effort to accommodate any disabled person taken into custody and provide reasonably speedy baiL

Pursuant to M GL. c. 221 § 92A, whenever a deaf or hearing impaired person is arrested for an alleged violation ofa criminal law or ordinance, arrangements shall be made through the Operations Division to provide a qualified interpreter to assist such person regarding any interrogation, warning, notification of rights or taking of a statement. Any admission or statement made by a hearing-impaired person made in the absence of a qualified interpreter or a voluntary waiver will not be admissible in court. _

Sec. 12 CELL lNSPECI10N: Prisoners who are not bailed shall be placed in cells with no more force being used than is necessary to overcome resistance. __

Page 7

.. ,' ,; Boston Police Department
'.

•
Rules and Procedures RULE 318

the Prior to placing a prisoner in a cell, an officer will examine cell for any unauthorized
articles and remove them. This officer will also check the locking mechanism to ensure it is not defective. Defective cells are not to be used. Ifthe cell is defective the Duty Supervisor will be notified, who will contact the building superintendent A note.ofthe problem will be entered on the District Administrative Log. Ifcontact cannot be made with the building superintendent, a report will be left for the District Commander, who will
make the notification.
Sec. 13 PRISONER INSPECI'ION: The Duty Supervisor or the Director ofthe Juvenile Pre-Arraigmnent Facility shall visit, or cause to be visited, all persons in their custody at least once every flfteen minutes, and shall ensure that each visit is recorded in the Prisoner Inspection Record (M.GL. c. 40 § 36B).
Sec. 14 SUICIDES AND ATIEMP'I'ED SUICIDES: Whenever, in the opinion ofthe Duty Supervisor or the person in charge ofany police facility, a prisoner shows indications that he may attempt to commit suicide (e.g. extreme depression, anxiety), the Duty , Supervisor or person in charge oftbat facility shall be responsible for taking all reasonable precautions to prevent such an attempt.
The Duty Supervisor shall immediately ensure that the prisoner is closely monitored. The Duty Supervisor shall then notify the Duty Supervisor at the Operations Division who shall dispatch appropriate medical personnel to the scene to make an evaluation as to whether medical treatment is required or whether the prisoner should be hospitalized. If such medical assistance is unavailable, the Duty Supervisor shall have the prisoner transported to a hospi~ accompanied by police officers, where a detennination can be made as to whether he is suicidal.
Department persoMel receiving prisoners should familiarize themselves with any information provided by the Department concerning the past history ofindividuals who may come into their custody.
WheI'!ever a person in police custody attempts or threatens sWcide at a lockup facility. the Booklng Officer or in the case ofthe Juvenile Pre-Arraignment Facility, the Duty Supervisor ofDistrict A-I, shall immediately telephone the Teletype Unit ofthe Operations Division, providing the name ofthe subject, current address, date ofbirth, the charge(s) for which the subject is being detained, and the date, time and nature ofthe attempt or threat. The Teletype Unit shall then send an administrative message to the Criminal History Systems Board. A copy ofthe report pertaining to the attempted or threatened Suicide shall be forwarded to the Office ofPlanning and Research.
If a person attempts or threatens suicide in a lockup facility and is transferred to another lockup facility, the Duty Supervisor shall deliver, or caused to be delivered, to the receiving facility at the time ofdelivery of the prisoner. a copy of the Incident Report,
BPD Fonn 1.1, relating to the attempted or threatened suicide. "=
Page 8

Boston Police Department
.'

Rules and Procedures RULE 318

Whenever a person in the custody ofthe police Department has committed suicide, the Duty Supervisor shall immediately notify the Operations Division Duty Supervisor who shall n~ the Internal Affuirs Division, the Homicide Unit and the Medical Examiners office. The cell in which a suicide has occurred shall be secured and not used until viewed
by the Medi~ Examiner.

The District Commander ofa lockup ~. or in the ease ofthe Juvenile Pre-

Arraignment Facility, the Commander ofDistrict A·l, shall file an Incident Report, BPD

Fonn 1.1 and a Special Report, BPD Fonn 26, through appropriate channels to the Office

ofthe Police Commissioner, whenever a person in police custody commits suicide, dies, or

inflicts self·injury at a lockup tacility which subsequently results in hislher death. The

report shall identify the deceased and describe, in complete detail, the circumstances ofthe

death. A copy ofthe report shall also be forwarded to the Office ofthe Medical

Eamm~.

'

Sec.. 15 FOODISERVICES: No member ofthe force or employee ofthe Department

shall accept a fee for rendering any services to persons in custody; nor shall any member

or employee receive any money or any item ofvalue from a prison~ for any purpose

whatsoever without the knowledge and consent ofthe Duty SuperVisor. (See Rule 102,

Sec. 22, Gifts/Gratuities.)

,

any . Police officers shall not recommend to prisoners or others the employment of

specified person as attorney or counse~ nor shall they furnish the names ofpersons as '

bondsmen or be concerned in matters ofbail, other than as prescnoed in Rule 321, Ball

and Bail Commissioners.

Prisoners shall be made as comfortable as possible. They shall be supplied with clean water to drink.

Prisoners shall not be allowed to receive food or drink other than that which is supplied to the Department by authorized vendors.

Sec.. 16 AUTHORlZED VISITORS: No person shall visit with a prisoner unless authorized by the Duty Supervisor, and then only in the presence and hearing of a police officer assigned for that purpose. However. when a prisoner has retained counsel he shall be allowed to consult with his couns~l in a secured area, within the sight of: but not 'Within hearing ot: the Duty Supervisor or an officer assigned for that purpose.

The Duty Supervisor may restrict visits by friends and relatives subjeCt to the availability ofpersonne~ presentation ofidentification and the needs of the Dep?rtment.

Sec. 17 TRANSPORTAnON: Persons arrested while the Municipal Court or District Courts are in session, who are in a fit condition, shall be taken before said Courts; but if not in a fit condition, such persons shall be detained until they are in a fit condition, unless otherwise lawfully d i s p o s e d . -

Page 9

~ t/ .'
" .' j. Boston Police Department

•
·Rules and Procedures RULE 318

Prisoners shall not be transported in vehicles in excess ofthe seating capacity. When necessary, extra trips shall be made and prisoners awaiting transportation to court shall be returned to cells.

Duty Supervisors shall ensure that no prisoner is transferred from astation to acowt, or

elsewhere, who is not decently clothed.

'

Prisoners transported from station houses to other places for any purpose whatsoever, shall be guarded by a sufficient number ofpatrol personnel and shall be restrained individually or to other prisoners in accordance with Department Rule No. 315,
Handcuffs.

HANDCUFFS SHALL NOT BE REMOVED EXCEPT TO FACllJTATE FINGERPRINTING, WRITING ON FORMS OR WHEN OTHERWISE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

Sec.. 18 ESCAPES: Whenever a prisoner escapes, the Duty Supervisor will be notified immediately. Ifthe escape is from a cell, all exits from ceU·blocks, as well as the building. will be secured by a sufficient number ofofficers and an orderly, methodical search will be conducted.

Ifan escaped prisoner cannot be immediately lo~ the Duty Supervisor will immediately notify the Operations Division, furnishing a complete description, name and address and the nature ofthe arrest. This infonnation will be broadcast to all units.

A report ofany escape shall be made as a supplement to the original 1.1 report and forwarded through the chain of command.

The Internal Affuirs Division will be immediately notified ofany escape.

. -.

Page 10

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

BRONWYN FORD,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

) Civ. No. 98-11346-NG

)

CITY OF BOSTON, SUFFOLK COUNTY, )

and RICHARD J. ROUSE, SHERIFF OF )

SUFFOLK COUNTY,

)

Defendants.

)

GERTNER, D.J.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS' FEES

November 20, 2003

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Bronwyn Ford ("Ford"), moves for attorneys'

fees after having settled her claim against the City of Boston

and the County of Suffolk, for their illegal strip search of her.

The litigation in this case was lead by counsel for the class in

Mack v. Suffolk County, et al. (98-12511), Howard Friedman. The

results obtained in Ford depended almost entirely on the results

of the class action litigation and the leverage it generated.

Plaintiff's counsel in Mack, Mr. Friedman, shaped the arguments,

which the Court accepted in substantial measure on summary

judgment. The outlines for the settlement were worked out by all

of the parties in Mack with substantial and commendable effort.

And once the outlines had been set, the settlement of the Ford

case should have followed. It did not for the reasons described

below.

While the plaintiff's counsel plainly deserves a fee award of some amount, it is also plain that the amount requested is entirely excessive.
A. Ford Litigation On July 13, 1998, the plaintiff, Bronwyn Ford, filed a complaint against the Defendant City of Boston (hereinafter "City") for damages allegedly resulting from two strip-searches that she claims she was subjected to after her arrest on a default warrant. She brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under the common law of Massachusetts. She further claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs while she was in custody, thereby violating the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding Suffolk County (hereinafter "County") and the Sheriff as defendants. The City moved to dismiss Count II of the complaint, as duplicative of plaintiff's section 1983 claim. This motion was granted on April 29, 1999. B. Mack Litigation On March 27, 2000, both the plaintiff and the County filed motions for summary judgment. Rather than acting on the motions,
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however, this Court consolidated the Ford case with a putative class action raising identical issues, Mack v. Suffolk County, et al., U.S. Dist. Ct. 98-12511, on April 4, 2000. The Mack litigation had been filed on December 10, 1998.1
From the outset, it was clear that counsel for Ford was working with counsel for Mack. Furthermore, the consolidation order consolidated both cases essentially under the leadership of Attorney Friedman, class counsel and an acknowledged expert in civil rights litigation.
On November 15, 2000, the Mack plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.2 At the same time, Friedman filed a brief supporting Ford's earlier filed motion for summary judgment.
On July 31, 2001, the Court granted summary judgment to the Mack class, in a broad-ranging decision, declaring the County's search policies during the class period to be facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F. Supp.2d 131 (D. Mass. 2001). Both the City and the County were found also liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the strip searches of women charged with felonies and misdemeanors not involving drugs or guns, and for women arrested on default warrants for such offenses. Defendant Sheriff Rouse was found to
1 The Mack class had been certified on February 16, 2000. See Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (D. Mass. 2000). Ford had specifically opted out of the class.
2 The plaintiffs in Mack were consolidated into Ford. Any reference to the Mack plaintiffs, class, or litigation refers to the class action plaintiffs in the Ford case.
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have qualified immunity for his actions during part of the relevant period, and not to be immune for the remainder.
The outcome of the decision in Ford, the action by the individual Bronwyn Ford, was shaped directly by the decision for the Mack plaintiffs. See Ford v. City of Boston, 154 F. Supp.2d 123, 125 (D. Mass. 2001).3 All damages questions in both cases were to be resolved at a future proceeding.
Immediately thereafter, settlement discussions began as between the Mack plaintiffs and the City. Not surprisingly, the City would not even address the settlement with Ford, until the class action was resolved. Ford presented substantially the same set of circumstances as many individuals in the then certified class action.
The City, in fact, proposed that action in Ford's case be suspended entirely, to allow a final determination regarding the Mack plaintiffs. Again, the suggestion made perfect sense, but counsel for Ford refused, serving a request for admissions, and then a second. The Court stepped in, allowing the City's motion for a protective order, relieving it of the obligation to answer discovery requests.
3 In addition, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the County defendants as to their alleged deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's medical needs and dismissed the claims against defendant Rouse.
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In June of 2002, the parties in Ford attempted mediation,
which failed.4 But the mediation of the Mack case proceeded
apace, and by June 17, 2002, those efforts produced an omnibus
settlement for all class members. By October 1, 2002, Ford
settled as well, leaving attorneys' fees for future litigation.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Appropriateness of Fee Award
The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of l976
authorizes the district court to allow the prevailing party in
4 Defendants claim that mediation failed solely due to the amount of attorneys' fees that counsel in Ford was requesting. Plaintiff does not deny the characterization. Rather, counsel for plaintiff claims that I should strike any reference to the content of settlement discussions under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which precludes evidence of a settlement offer "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." However, Rule 408 specifically states that it "does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose . . . ." As one court has specifically held:
While determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's fees is not specifically mentioned as a purpose for which evidence of a settlement offer may be considered, strong public policy considerations support its admissibility for that purpose. See generally Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 473 (2d Cir.1985) (finding no abuse of discretion where infringer's 'diligent' settlement efforts were factored into district court's refusal to award attorney's fees against infringer). Settlements are to be encouraged and a party to an action in which attorney's fees may be awarded should not be allowed to believe that it can reject a reasonable settlement offer and still recover the full amount of its attorney's fees if ultimately it recovers little more than the original offer. Moreover, litigation is not a weapon to punish an adversary and one who makes a totally unreasonable settlement demand should not be rewarded at the end of the litigation with a generous award of counsel fees.
Greenwich Film Prod., S.A. v. DRG Records, Inc., 1996 WL 502336, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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any Civil Rights Act suit “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A plaintiff prevails if he has succeeded on “'any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’” Texas State Teachers Ass'n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (1st Cir. 1978)).
Although the case has settled, and this Court found the City and County liable to Ford, the settlement occurred as a result of Friedman's efforts in the Mack litigation, on which Ford piggybacked. For example, the plaintiff never made a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause in her complaint. The first time she did so was in a her motion for summary judgment -one paragraph, no citations to case law. She did so only after the Mack plaintiffs claimed Fourteenth Amendment violations. And as to the claims that she alone litigated, the majority were denied.
While some fee award may be appropriate, it is surely not appropriate in the amounts that plaintiff's counsel seeks.
B. Framework for Analysis Essentially, the amount for attorneys' fees is determined by a two-pronged test. First, the calculation of the “lodestar figure” which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the applicable hourly market rate for legal services. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The
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second is an upward or downward adjustment “to account for
exceptional circumstances.” Rogers v. Motta, 655 F. Supp. 39, 43
(D. Mass. 1986). One factor in determining exceptional
circumstances is plaintiff's success or lack of success in the
litigation. Id.
1. The Lodestar Amount
a. Reasonable Rate
A reasonable rate is measured by comparing counsel’s regular
rates with those of the marketplace.5
Plaintiff requests hourly rates ranging from $175 in 1997 to
$250 in 2002. Attorney Klein graduated from law school in 1995,
5 As the Supreme Court noted,
We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate "market rate" for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and most services are determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a particular community. The type of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience, skill and reputation, varies extensively -- even within a law firm. Accordingly, the hourly rates of lawyers in private practice also vary widely. The fees charged often are based on the product of hours devoted to the representation multiplied by the lawyer's customary rate. But the fee usually is discussed with the client, may be negotiated, and it is the client who pays whether he wins or loses. The § 1988 fee determination is made by the court in an entirely different setting: there is no negotiation or even discussion with the prevailing client, as the fee -found to be reasonable by the court -- is paid by the losing party. Nevertheless, as shown in the text above, the critical inquiry in determining reasonableness is now generally recognized as the appropriate hourly rate. And the rates charged in private representations may afford relevant comparisons.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.886, 895 n.11 (1984).
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only three years before the litigation commenced; Attorney Samit in 199l. Neither practiced in the police litigation area or, more broadly, civil rights law (as contrasted with Attorney Friedman who is an expert). (Indeed, for part of the period of time requested, they have sought fees at a rate even higher than that of Attorney Friedman.) They have not remotely justified the rates they have sought, either through the decisions of other courts awarding them fees, or through the expert opinions of other counsel with respect to their work.
Accordingly, I have reduced the hourly rate for Mr. Klein and Mr. Samit for core hours to a range of $125 to $200, and $60 per hour for non-core hours.
2. Number of Hours A lawyer is supposed to exercise billing judgment in applying for fees. The Court is to exclude from the fee calculation hours that were not reasonably expended, including hours that were "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary." Hensley, 46l U.S. at 434. A lawyer is to provide detailed and contemporaneous time records. Critical to this petition is whether the hours upon hours expended by counsel for Ford were remotely reasonable given the fact that Friedman was the lead attorney, doing the lion's share of work for the class. At the very minimum, time expended after August 30, 2001, should be struck. On that date, the City appropriately offered to stay the Ford case until the Mack case
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had been resolved. Counsel had assured Ford's counsel that the Ford case would be negotiated after Mack.
With respect to time before August 30, 2001, it is reasonable to distinguish between "core" and "non-core" work. Ciulla v. Rigny, 89 F.Supp.2d 97, 104-105 (D. Mass. 2000). Core work involves legal research, etc.; non-core work is less demanding tasks, like letter-writing and telephone calls. This is particularly significant in the instant case, where so much of the "core" time was spent replicating the work of Mack counsel.
3. Degree of Success There is no question that plaintiff Ford succeeded on some counts. She succeeded on a Fourth Amendment strip search claim and on a claim she did not raise -- a violation of equal protection. Yet it is also abundantly clear that this success was mainly due to the efforts of counsel in Mack. The scope of the Mack case was such that many, if not all, of the issues in Ford were folded within its litigation. While it was important for counsel for Ford to protect their client's interests, and they should be compensated for that, it is not at all clear that work required anywhere near the time that was expended. Under the circumstances, the petition is plainly unreasonable in relation to the results obtained.
III. CONCLUSION
-9-

Accordingly, I AWARD Eighteen Thousand, Eight Hundred Sixteen And 50/100 ($18,816.50) Dollars, in toto, for Attorneys' Fees to Plaintiff. This is the lodestar amount computed from 1997 to 2001.
See attached appendix.

Dated: November 20, 2003

s/NANCY GERTNER U.S.D.J.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

BRONWYN FORD, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BOSTON, SUFFOLK COUNTY, and RICHARD J. ROUSE, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Civ. No. 98-11346-NG ) ) ) ) )

APPENDIX TO MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS FEES November 20, 2003

I. CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

The following is a spreadsheet of attorney's fees computed

for services rendered by Ms. Samit and Mr. Klein between March 5,

1997, and August 30, 2001.

In terms of "Core" hours, the following rates were used in

the computation for both Ms. Samit and Mr. Klein:

1997 = $125/hour

1998 = $125/hour

1999 = $150/hour

2000 = $175/hour

2001 = $200/hour

The rate of $60/hour was used in computing "Non-Core" activity

fees for both Ms. Samit and Mr. Klein during the entire period.

Original and Adjusted Hours and Billed Amounts -i-

for Ms. Samit and Mr. Klein from March 5, 1997 to August 30, 2001

Total Amount Originally Billed by Ms. Samit
Total Amount Originally Billed by Mr. Klein
Total Amount Originally Billed by both Ms. Samit & Mr. Klein

Hours 96.8 Hours 44.6 Hours 141.4 Hours

Dollars $18,250.00 $10,142.50 $28,392.50

Total Adjusted CORE Hours Billed by Ms. Samit
Total Adjusted CORE Hours Billed by Mr. Klein
Total Adjusted CORE Hours Billed by Ms. Samit & Mr. Klein

70 Hours

$9,617.50

41.5 Hours $7,405.00

111.5 Hours $17,022.50

Total Adjusted NON-CORE Hours Billed by Ms. Samit ($60/hr.)
Total Adjusted NON-CORE Hours Billed by Mr. Klein ($60/hr.)
Total Adjusted NON-CORE Hours Billed by Ms. Samit & Mr. Klein

26.8 Hours $1,608.00 3.1 Hours $186.00 29.9 Hours $1,794.00

Total Adjusted CORE and NON-CORE Hours Billed by Ms. Samit
Total Adjusted CORE and NON-CORE Hours Billed by Mr. Klein
Total Adjusted CORE and NON-CORE Hours Billed by Ms. Samit & Mr. Klein

96.8 Hours 44.6 Hours 141.4 Hours

$11,225.50
$7,591.00
$18,816.50 (AMOUNT AWARDED)

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-iii-

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-x-

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-xii-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, on behalf of herself

)

and on behalf of others similarly situated, )

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, RICHARD J.

)

ROUSE in his individual capacity,

)

JANE DOE, in her individual capacity,

)

and the CITY OF BOSTON,

)

Defendants

)

----------------------------)

Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

SECOND AMENDED COMPlAINT

INTRODUCTION 1. This is a civil rights action for money damages against Suffolk County,
Suffolk County Sheriff Richard Rouse, correctional officer Jane Doe, and the City of Boston, for injuries caused by the unconstitutional strip search of the plaintiffs.
2. The named plaintiff, Katrina Mack, seeks to represent a class of all women who were admitted to the Suffolk County Jail while waiting for bail to be set or for an initial court appearance, women who are arrested on default warrants, and women who are held in protective custody. Included in this class are women who have been taken into custody by the Boston Police Department, the MBTA Police Departme

2 Massachusetts State Police and the police departments of Chelsea, Revere and Winthrop. These women have all been unlawfully subjected to routine strip searches and routine visual body cavity searches due to a formal written policy implemented by the Suffolk County Sheriffs Department that states that "strip searches shall be conducted of all inmates committed to the custody of the Department.... " The policy requires a strip search of the nude body of every person "at the time of each admission to the facility...." The policy also requires a visual body cavity inspection of a prisoner's anus and vagina. These searches are conducted routinely, without any reason to suspect a strip search or a visual body cavity search is necessary.
3. The City of Boston is sued for violating the constitutional rights of women because, under its policy, all women who are held in custody overnight are to be routinely subjected to a strip search and visual body cavity search while men who are held in custody overnight are not subject to such searches as a matter of routine.
4. Plaintiff seeks to have this Court declare that these routine searches are unconstitutional and to enjoin the defendants from conducting strip searches and visual body cavity searches of women who are held awaiting their first court appearance for the setting of bail, and women who are arrested on default warrants, and women who are held in protective custody on the grounds that it violates their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches under both the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions.

3 JURISDICTION
5. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343. PARTIES
6. The named plaintiff, Katrina Mack, was at all times relevant to this complaint a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
7. The defendant Suffolk County is a duly designated county in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
8. The defendant Richard Rouse was at all times relevant to this complaint the Sheriff of Suffolk County. He is sued in his individual capacity. The actions of defendant Rouse alleged in this complaint were taken under color of law.
9. The defendant Jane Doe is a correctional officer employed by Suffolk County. She is sued in her individual capacity.
10. The actions of defendant Doe alleged in this complaint were taken under color of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the County of Suffolk.
11. The defendant City of Boston is a duly organized municipal corporation in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

4 FACTS
12. On March 5, 1998 at 1:30 a.m. plaintiff Katrina Mack was arrested by a Boston police officer in the Charlestown section of Boston for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and leaving the scene after causing property damage.
13. Ms. Mack was taken to the Area A Boston police station on New Chardon Street in Boston.
14. Ms. Mack was booked, fingerprinted, frisked and placed in a cell with another female prisoner.
15. At approximately 3:00 a.m., the plaintiff was told that it was too late for her to be released on bail.
16. Plaintiff was then put in leg shackles, handcuffed and taken in a Boston Police wagon to the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street.
17. When plaintiff arrived at the Suffolk County Jail, defendant Doe brought plaintiff to a room and ordered her to take off all of her clothing.
18. Ms. Mack protested but defendant Doe replied, "You have to do this." 19. Ms. Mack began to cry. She complied with the order and took off all her clothing. Then defendant Doe searched plaintiffs clothing. 20. Defendant Doe next ordered plaintiff to face her, lift her arms up, turn around, bend over and spread her cheeks while defendant Doe conducted a visual body cavity search.

5 21. Defendant Doe had no reason to suspect that plaintiff had any weapons or contraband hidden on her person. 22. After the search, plaintiff was placed into a cell alone. 23. Later in the morning, plaintiff was placed in a holding room with other women. She was taken to the Charlestown District Court for arraignment. The court ordered the plaintiff released on personal recognizance. 24. Plaintiff suffered extreme emotional distress as a result of the strip search and visual body cavity search conducted at the Suffolk County Jail. She was shocked by the incident. She felt humiliated, degraded and violated. 25. The search of plaintiff by defendant Doe conformed to the written policy of the defendant Suffolk County, specifically, Sheriffs Department Policy Number S507. This policy states that "strip searches shall be conducted of all inmates committed to the custody of the Department.... " The policy requires a strip search of the nude body of every person "at the time of each admission to the facility.... " The policy also requires that every female prisoner undergo a visual body cavity search of the prisoner's anus and vagina. 26. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department requires this search as a matter of routine, without any reason to suspect a strip search and visual body cavity search is necessary. 27. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriffs Department applies regardless of the length of time the person is to be held or of the charges lodged against the person.

6 28. The Suffolk County Sheriffs Department conducts a strip search and body cavity search of all women who are admitted to the jail inc1udingwomen who are waiting for an initial court appearance, women who are arrested on default warrants, and women who are held in protective custody. 29. Rule 318C of the Rules and Procedures of the Boston Police Department, requires that all female prisoners "be transported to the Suffolk County Jail for detainment." Female prisoners are not held overnight at Boston Police stations. 30. When female prisoners arrive at the Suffolk County Jail, they are subjected to a routine strip search and visual body cavity search as described above. 31. It is the policy of the Boston Police Department to hold male prisoners in cells at Boston Police stations until their first appearance in court. 32. Male prisoners who are held awaiting an initial court appearance, after arrest on a default warrant or who are held in protective custody in a Boston police station are not subjected to a routine strip search or body cavity search. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 33. This action is brought pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b) (1), (2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by plaintiff as a class action on behalf of all women who were or will in the future be:
a. taken into custody at the Suffolk County Jail before arraignment, or after an arrest on a default warrant or after being taken into protective custody; and

7 b. subjected to a routine strip search and visual body cavity search at
the Suffolk County Jail pursuant to the policy, practice or custom of conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of every person who is admitted to the jail. 34. The named plaintiff, Katrina Mack, is a member of the class. The class represented by the plaintiff is so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical. On information and belief, the number of class members is more than three thousand women. 35. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the class of plaintiffs. Central to all the claims is the constitutionality of the policy or practice of the Suffolk County Sheriff to routinely conduct strip and visual body cavity searches. 36. Plaintiff's claims or defenses are typical of the claims or defenses of the class of plaintiffs. 37. Plaintiffwill fairly and accurately represent and protect the interests of the members of the class. The attorney for plaintiff is experienced and capable in civil rights litigation and has successfully represented plaintiffs in other civil rights litigation including cases alleging unlawful strip searches. Counsel has the resources and expertise to prosecute this action. 38. This action is properly maintained as a class action because the prosecutions of separate actions by the individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants.

8 39. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the prosecutions of separate actions would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members who are not parties or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 40. The defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or declaratory reliefwith respect to the class as a whole. 41. As a direct result of policy class members have been subject to unlawful strip searches and visual body cavity searches which has caused each member of the class to endure pain and suffering and mental anguish. FIRST COUNT: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DEFENDANT SUFFOLK COUNTY 42. The above paragraphs are incorporated herein. 43. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriffs Department regarding strip searches directs County employees to conduct searches that violate the United States Constitution. 44. By the actions described above, the defendant deprived the plaintiff and members of the plaintiff class of their clearly established right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. 45. As a direct and proximate result of this conduct, plaintiff suffered the injuries described above.

9 SECOND COUNT: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DEFENDANT RICHARD ROUSE
46. The above paragraphs are incorporated herein. 47. Defendant Richard Rouse is the Sheriff and is the policymaker for the Suffolk County Jail. 48. Defendant Rouse implemented and maintained a policy of conducting strip searches and visual body cavity searches of all persons who are admitted to the Suffolk County Jail, regardless of the nature of charges or the circumstances of the individual. 49. Defendant Rouse knew or should have known that the strip search policy at the Suffolk County Jail would result in correctional officers conducting unconstitutional searches of women who were being held for arraignment, in protective custody or pursuant to a default warrant. 50. Defendant Rouse established and enforced the policy of conducting routine strip searches without any reason to believe the woman has anything concealed on her person by implementing and maintaining the strip search policy. 51. As a result of defendant Rouse's conduct, plaintiff was subjected to the search described above. 52. Even after defendant Rouse had actual knowledge that the policy of strip searching women who were held for arraignment, in protective custody, or pursuant to a default warrant was unconstitutional, he continued to enforce the policy.

..
10 53. Defendant Rouse acted with reckless indifference to the constitutional rights of women who are detained at the Suffolk County Jail as described above. 54. As a direct and proximate result of this conduct, plaintiff suffered the injuries described above. THIRD COUNT: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DEFENDANT CITY OF BOSTON 55. The above paragraphs are incorporated herein. 56. By requiring female prisoners awaiting an initial court appearance to be held at the Suffolk County Jail, it is the policy or custom of the Boston Police Department to require women who are arrested and held in custody before their first court appearance to undergo a strip search and visual body cavity search while men in the same circumstances are not required to undergo similar searches. 57. The strip search and visual body cavity search of all females awaiting an initial court appearance is an affirmative policy of the Boston Police Department which violates the right of women to the equal protection of law and violates the right of women under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 58. As a direct and proximate result of the policies or customs of the City of Boston, the plaintiff suffered the injuries described above. FOURTH COUNT: 42 U.S.C. §1983: DEFENDANT DOE 59. The above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

II 60. At all times relevant to this complaint, defendant Doe was acting under color of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the County of Suffolk. 61. Defendant Doe had no legal justification for conducting a strip search or a visual body cavity search of the plaintiff's person. 62. By the actions described in the preceding paragraphs, the defendant deprived the plaintiff of clearly established rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and by the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights including freedom from an unreasonable search and seizure and the right to be treated equally under the law. 63. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of the defendant, the plaintiff suffered the injuries described above.
WHEREFORE the plaintiff requests that this Court: 1. declare that the policy or practice of conducting routine strip searches and routine visual body cavity searches ofwomen is illegal and unconstitutional and enjoin enforcement of the policy; 2. award compensatory damages to the individual plaintiff and to members of the plaintiff class; 3. award punitive damages against the defendant Rouse; 4. award the plaintiffs the costs of this action including reasonable attorney's fees; and 5. award whatever additional relief this Court deems necessary and appropriate.

12 IURYDEMAND
A jury trial is hereby demanded.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
BBO #180080 Law Offices of Howard Friedman 90 Canal Street Boston, MA 02114-2022 (617) 742-4100

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, on behalf of herself

)

and on behalf of others similarly situated, )

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, RICHARD J.

)

ROUSE in his individual capacity,

)

JANE DOE, in her individual capacity,

)

and the CITY OF BOSTON,

)

Defendants

)

-----------------------------)

Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

INTERVENORS' COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION 1. This complaint is brought on behalf of members of the class alleged in the
complaint in Mack v. Suffolk County et. al. The intervenors seek to intervene as plaintiffs and class representatives in this case. This intervenors complaint presents the same legal theories as the complaint brought by the named plaintiff. JURISDICTION
2. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.c. §§1983 and 1988 and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.c. §§1331 and 1343.

2 PARTIES
3. Joanne Maniscalco is a resident of the City of Boston. She was arrested without a warrant on the evening of December 5, 1996 in Boston for violation of a Boston ordinance against peddling without a license.
4. Christine Daley is a resident of the City of Boston. She was arrested without a warrant in Boston on September 22, 1997 and charged with assault and battery.
5. Denise Gasparini is a resident of Boston. She was arrested by a Boston police officer on Dec. 7, 1998 on a default warrant from the Somerville district court charging her with larceny under $250.00. This charge was the result of her children's failure to return a rented Sega video game.
6. Alice Buckley was arrested without a warrant on the evening of June 16, 1998 and charged with assault and battery.
7. The defendant Suffolk County is a county in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, duly organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
8. The defendant Richard Rouse was at all times relevant to this complaint the Sheriff of Suffolk County. He is sued in his individual capacity. The actions of defendant Rouse alleged in this complaint were taken under color of law.
9. Jane Doe 2-5 is the term used to describe the female correctional officers employed by Suffolk County who actually conducted the strip searches of the plaintiff~ intervenors. They are sued in their individual capacities.

3 10. The actions of defendants Doe 2-5 alleged in this complaint were taken under color of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the County of Suffolk. 11. The defendant City of Boston is a duly organized municipal corporation in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
FACTS Ioanne Maniscalco
12. On December 5, 1996 Joanne Maniscalco was arrested outside the Fleet Center in Boston for violation of a Boston ordinance against peddling without a license. She had been selling sausages from a cart. She was taken to the Area A police station in Government Center. She was booked at the police station. After she was held at the police station for two to three hours Ms. Maniscalco was transported to the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street.
13. When Ms. Maniscalco was told she was to be searched she explained that she was only arrested for selling sausages. The correctional officer referred to here as Jane Doe 2 told the plaintiff that they search everyone. Jane Doe 2 ordered Ms. Maniscalco to take off all of her clothing. She did so. The officer visually searched her body. Next Jane Doe 2 stood behind Ms. Maniscalco and ordered her to bend over and spread her cheeks. Ms. Maniscalco did what she was required to do.
14. After the search Ms. Maniscalco was placed in a cell type room near the booking area until she was released from custody. The plaintiff felt that this search was humiliating and degrading. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip

4 search, Ms. Maniscalco suffered and continues to suffer pain, suffering and mental anguish. Christine Daley
15. On September 22,1997 plaintiff Christine Daley was arrested in Boston and charged with assault and battery. She had been in an argument with a roommate. Her roommate was arrested and charged with two counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon on Ms. Daley.
16. Ms. Daley was taken to the D-4 police station. She was booked at the police station. Mter being held at the police station for about an hour she was taken to the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street. At the jail Jane Doe 3 ordered Ms. Daley to take off all of her clothing. She complied. Jane Doe 3 visually searched plaintiff's body. Then Jane Doe 3 stood behind Ms. Daley and ordered plaintiff to bend over and spread her cheeks. She did as she was told.
17. Ms. Daley felt the strip search was humiliating and degrading. As a result of the search she was upset and scared. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search, Ms. Daley suffered and continues to suffer pain, suffering and mental anguish.
18. Ms. Daley was placed in a cell type room near the booking area. She remained in this cell until she was released from the jail. The charges against Ms. Daley were ultimately dismissed.

5 Denise Gasparini
19. Denise Gasparini was arrested by a Boston police officer on Dec. 7, 1998 on a default warrant from the Somerville district court. She was charged with larceny under $250.00 based on the failure to return a rented video game.
20. Ms. Gasparini was taken to the East Boston police station where she was booked. She was held at the police station for a couple of hours. Then she was taken to the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street.
21. Jane Doe 4 brought Ms. Gasparini into a room with a younger female prisoner. Jane Doe 4 ordered the other prisoner to take off all of her clothing. First the correctional officer conducted a strip and visual body cavity search of the other prisoner. Then Jane Doe 4 ordered Ms. Gasparini to remove her clothing. The officer searched plaintiff's body. Next the officer ordered plaintiff to bend over and spread her cheeks while Jane Doe 4 stood behind her.
22. Ms. Gasparini was shocked and scared as a result of the search. She felt humiliated and degraded. The search was emotionally traumatic. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search, Ms. Gasparini suffered and continues to suffer pain, suffering and mental anguish. Alice Buckley
23. Alice Buckley was arrested without a warrant on the evening of June 16, 1998 and charged with assault and battery. She was held in a cell at the Area A police station for five to six hours. Finally she was taken to the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street. Jane Doe 5, a female correctional officer, took her into a room and ordered

6 plaintiff to take off her clothing. Plaintiff removed her clothing. Jane Doe 5 required Ms. Buckley to lift her breasts, bend over and spread her cheeks and lift her feet. Ms. Buckley was scared during the search. She had no idea what she might be ordered to do next. Ms. Buckley felt humiliated and violated. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search, Ms. Buckley suffered and continues to suffer pain, suffering and mental anguish.
24. The charges against Ms. Buckley were ultimately dismissed. Facts Applicable to All Intervenors
25. There was no reason to suspect that any of the intervening plaintiffs had a weapon or contraband hidden on her person.
26. Jane Does 2-5 did not have a reasonable suspicion that any of the intervening plaintiffs had a weapon or contraband hidden on her person.
27. The searches of each plaintiff by defendants Jane Doe 2-5 took place because of the written policy of the defendant Suffolk County, specifically, Sheriff's Department Policy Number S507. This policy states that "strip searches shall be conducted of all inmates committed to the custody of the Department.... " The policy requires a strip search of the nude body of every person "at the time of each admission to the facility.... " The policy also requires that every female prisoner undergo a visual body cavity search of the prisoner's anus and vagina.
28. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department requires this search as a matter of routine, without any reason to suspect a strip search and visual body cavity search is necessary.

7 29. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department applies regardless of the length of time the person is to be held or of the charges lodged against the person. 30. At the time of the incidents alleged in this complaint the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department conducted a strip search and body cavity search of all women who were admitted to the jail including women who were waiting for an initial court appearance and women who were arrested on default warrants. 31. Each of the intervening plaintiffs was searched in the manner described above because of the policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department. 32. Rule 31BC of the Rules and Procedures of the Boston Police Department, requires that all female prisoners "be transported to the Suffolk County Jail for detainment." Female prisoners are not held overnight at Boston Police stations. 33. When female prisoners arrive at the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street, they are subjected to a routine strip search and visual body cavity search as described above. 34. It is the policy of the Boston Police Department to hold male prisoners in cells at Boston Police stations until their first appearance in court. 35. Male prisoners who are held awaiting an initial court appearance or after arrest on a default warrant in a Boston police station are not subjected to a routine strip search or body cavity search. Male prisoners arrested in Boston are only strip searched if there is a reason to suspect the male prisoner has a weapon or contraband hidden on his person.

8
36. If the intervening plaintiffs has been male, they would have remained in custody in a Boston police station and they would not have been required to submit a routine strip and visual body cavity search. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
37. This action is brought pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b) (1), (2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by plaintiff as a class action on behalf of all women who, from December 10, 1995 forward, were or who will in the future be:
a. taken into custody by the Boston Police Department and transferred to the Suffolk County Jail pursuant to Boston Police Department rules regarding the custody of female prisoners to be held pending a first court appearance, or after an arrest on a default warrant; and
b. subjected to a routine strip search and visual body cavity search at the Suffolk County Jail pursuant to the policy, practice or custom of the Suffolk County Sheriff.
38. The intervening plaintiffs are members of the class. The class represented
by the plaintiff is so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical. On
information and belief, the number of class members is more than three thousand
women. 39. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the class of
plaintiffs. Central to all the claims is the constitutionality of the policy or practice of the
Suffolk County Sheriff to routinely conduct strip and visual body cavity searches and
the policy of the City of Boston of conducting routine strip and visual body cavity
searches of woman but not of men who are otherwise in a similar position.

9 40. Plaintiff-intervenors' claims or defenses are typical of the claims or defenses of the class of plaintiffs. 41. Plaintiff-intervenors will fairly and accurately represent and protect the interests of the members of the class. The attorney for the plaintiffs is experienced and capable in civil rights litigation and has successfully represented plaintiffs in other civil rights litigation including cases alleging unlawful strip searches. Counsel has the resources and expertise to prosecute this action. 42. This action is properly maintained as a class action because the prosecutions of separate actions by the individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants. 43. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the prosecutions of separate actions would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members who are not parties or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 44. The defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.

10 45. As a direct result of policy class members have been subject to unlawful strip searches and visual body cavity searches which has caused each member of the class to endure pain and suffering and mental anguish. FIRST COUNT: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DEFENDANT SUFFOLK COUNTY 46. The above paragraphs are incorporated herein. 47. The policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department regarding strip searches directs County employees to conduct searches that violate the United States Constitution. 48. By the actions described above, the defendant deprived the plaintiffintervenors of their clearly established right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. 49. As a direct and proximate result of this conduct, plaintiff-intervenors suffered the injuries described above. SECOND COUNT: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DEFENDANT RICHARD ROUSE 50. The above paragraphs are incorporated herein. 51. Defendant Richard Rouse is the Sheriff and is the policymaker for the Suffolk County Jail. 52. Defendant Rouse implemented and maintained a policy of conducting strip searches and visual body cavity searches of all persons who are admitted to the Suffolk County Jail, regardless of the nature of charges or the circumstances of the individual.

11 53. Defendant Rouse knew or should have known that the strip search policy at the Suffolk County Jail would result in correctional officers conducting unconstitutional searches of women who were being held for arraignment or pursuant to a default warrant. 54. Defendant Rouse established and enforced the policy of conducting routine strip searches without any reason to believe the woman has anything concealed on her person by implementing and maintaining the strip search policy. 55. As a result of defendant Rouse's conduct, plaintiff-intervenors were subjected to the search described above. 56. Even after defendant Rouse had actual knowledge that the policy of strip searching women who were held for arraignment or pursuant to a default warrant was unconstitutional, he continued to enforce the policy. 57. Defendant Rouse acted with reckless indifference to the constitutional rights of women who are detained at the Suffolk County Jail as described above. 58. As a direct and proximate result of this conduct, the plaintiff-intervenors suffered the injuries described above. THIRD COUNT: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DEFENDANT CITY OF BOSTON 59. The above paragraphs are incorporated herein. 60. By requiring female prisoners awaiting an initial court appearance to be held at the Suffolk County Jail, it is the policy or custom of the Boston Police Department to require women who are arrested and held in custody before their first

12 court appearance to undergo a strip search and visual body cavity search while men in the same circumstances are not required to undergo similar searches.
61. The strip search and visual body cavity search of all females awaiting an initial court appearance is an affirmative policy of the Boston Police Department which violates the right of women to the equal protection of law and violates the right of women under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
62. As a direct and proximate result of the policies or customs of the City of Boston, the plaintiff-intervenors suffered the injuries described above. FOURTH COUNT: 42 U.S.C. §1983: DEFENDANTS DOE 2-5
63. The above paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 64. At all times relevant to this complaint, defendants Doe 2-5 were acting under color of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the County of Suffolk. 65. By the actions described in the preceding paragraphs, the correction officers referred to as Jane Doe 2-5 deprived the plaintiff-intervenors of clearly established rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and by the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights including freedom from an unreasonable search and seizure and the right to be treated equally under the law. 66. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of the defendants, the plaintiffintervenors suffered the injuries described above.

13
WHEREFORE the plaintiff-intervenors requests that this Court:
1. declare that the policy or practice of conducting routine strip searches and routine visual body cavity searches ofwomen is illegal and unconstitutional and enjoin enforcement of the policy;
2. award compensatory damages to the individual plaintiffs and to members of the plaintiff class;
3. award punitive damages against the defendant Rouse;
4. award the plaintiffs the costs of this action including reasonable attorney's fees; and
5. award whatever additional relief this Court deems necessary and appropriate.
IURYDEMAND
A jury trial is hereby demanded.
frlcr:l;ITrnD,

Howard Friedman

~_

BBO #180080

Law Offices of Howard Friedman

90 Canal Street

Boston, MA 02114-2022

(617) 742-4100

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

BRONWYN FORD,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF BOSTON, SUFFOLK

)

COUNTY, RICHARD ROUSE,

)

Sheriff of Suffolk County,

)

____~D~e~f~e~n~d~a~n~t~s~.________________ )

KATRINA MACK, on behalf of

)

herself and on behalf of

)

others similarly situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, RICHARD ROUSE,)

JANE DOE, and the CITY OF

)

BOSTON,

)

Defendants.

)

GERTNER, D. J. :

98-11346-N~ Civil Action No.

ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION April 4, 2000

The two cases listed above are ORDERED consolidated for pre-trial

purposes pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) under the lead case, docket number 98-11346. Both cases involve constitutional challenges under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to defendants' strip search policy. Consolidation of these cases will result both in more efficient use of the Court's resources and in more consistent treatment of the serious legal issues raised by these plaintiffs.
All pleadings should be filed under the lead case, the caption of which should be amended to include Jane Doe amongst the Defendants. The dates established in Ford v. City of Boston, 98-11346: the summary judgment hearing on April 10, 2000, at 2:30 p.m.; the pre-trial

.,. . '.
conference on May 16, 2000, at 2:30 p.m.; and the jury trial scheduled to begin May 22, 2000, will be reset.
Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment are now due on November 15, 2000. Defendants' cross motions for summary judgment are to be filed by December 15, 2000. Both parties in Ford v. City of Boston, 9811346, may file supplemental pleadings on these dates should they wish to do so. A hearing on both sets of summary judgment motions will be held on January 10, 2001, at 2:30 p.m. A pre-trial conference and a trial date will be set at a later date.
SO ORDERED. Dated: April 4, 2000

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et al., on behalf of

)

themselves and others similarly situated, )

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et aI.,

)

Defendants

)

-----------------------------)

Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

"PROPO~ED
ORDER

Mter consideration of the plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs' motion and ORDERS that defendant Suffolk County pay $5 million into the settlement fund FORTHWITH.
The Court FURTHER ORDERS that the County pay all interest accrued on the unpaid $5 million from November 29,2002, through the date of payment at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded daily, FORTHWITH.
If the County fails to comply with this Order, the plaintiffs may file any appropriate motions, including a motion to attach County assets.

So ORDERED.

r, United States District Judge
13

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et aI.,

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al.,

)

Defendants

)

-----------------------------)

Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

J?ROPQSED ORDER GRANTING APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT OF THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR AND SPECIAL MASTER

Upon motion of the plaintiffs, this Court does hereby APPROVE the following

payments from the Mack Settlement Escrow Fund:

1. $12,956.21 to Blackman KallickBartelstein LLP, the claims administrator; and

2. $7,125.00 to ADRAssociates for Phyllis N. Seg~l, the special master.

So ORDERED.

./

/

. i

G/ L-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et aL, on behalf of

)

themselves and others similarly situated, )

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al.,

)

Defendants

)

-------------------------------)

. ., ,
Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

PROfJOS:£b
ORDER

After consideration of the Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order to Permit Partial Settlement Distributions, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion and PERMITS the Claims Administrator to make a partial distribution now to class members using the available funds. The Court FURTHER AUTHORIZES a second distribution to class members once the County pays.
1. The Court directs that the first distribution pay class member awards, court-approved bonuses, attorney's fees, and administrative expenses as follows:
a. The Claims Administrator will pay each class member one-half of what the Claims Administrator estimates she would have received, under the Settlement Agreement and Distribution Formula, if the settlement had been consummated on schedule and on the budget developed with class counsel; i.e., without yet accounting for
q\

interest, which will be paid in the second distribution. b. The Claims Administrator will pay each bonus recipient one~half of
the amount of her court~approvcd bonus. c. The Claims Administrator will pay class counsel one~half of the
attorney's fee that would have been paid if the settlement had been consummated on schedule but will subtract the amount of the already-paid interim attorney's fee. d. The Claims Administrator and Special Master will be paid, subject to the court's approval, for fees and expenses. 2. The Court directs that the second distribution be made after Suffolk County pays its $5 million and interest. On the day of the distribution's calculation, the Claims Administrator will allocate the Mack Settlement Escrow Fund account's balance as follows: a. The Claims Administrator and Special Master will be paid, subject to the court's approval, for incurred fees and expenses. b. The Claims Administrator will set aside, subject to the court's approval, a portion of the settlement account's funds sufficient to pay for anticipated fees and expenses. c. The Claims Administrator will reimburse class counsel for litigation expenses, subject to the court's approval.
2

d. The Claims Administrator will pay class counsel an attorney's fee of 30% of the entire amount paid by Suffolk County.
e. The Claims Administrator will pay each bonus recipient the remaining one~half of her court~approved bonus, along with a proportionate share of the interest paid by Suffolk County.
f. The Claims Administrator will pay each participating class member her share of the account's remaining funds on the pro-rata basis set by the Distribution Formula incorporated into the Settlement Agreement.
3. If Suffolk County makes its paymenl before the first checks to class members are mailed, the Claims Administrator may calculate all of the above distributions at once and may combine each class member's p yment into a single check. So ORDERED.
N~
\
3

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRleT COURT DISTRlCT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et aI.,

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v,

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et a!.,

)

Defendants

)

---------------------------)

Civil Action No";:',jg.12Sf.,i-NG· . :..: .. ".,

,. .--'..

...''i:~

PRepOS~D ORDER GRANTING APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT TO THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR AND SPECIAL MASTER

Upon motion of the plaintiffs, this Court does hereby GRANT approval for:
(a) Payment to Blackman Kallick Bartelstein LLP of $15,495.81, effective immediately, for fees and expenses from February 1,2003, through June 30,2003;

(b) Payment to Blackman Kallick Bartdstein LLP of up to $13 ,291.23, to be paid on completion of the second distribution, for those fees and expenses that arise from the remaining administration of the settlemen\.;

(c) Payment to Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services of up to $17,000, to be paid on completion of the second distribution, for those fees and expenses Ihal. arise from the remaining administration of the settlement; and

(d) Reserve of $20,000 in the settlement. fund as a cushion for any unexpected fees and expenses.

So ORDERED.
Dated: _+--'-'---"'-_ _

L
Ntll Y Gertner. , U~n~ ite~ d~ St- ate- s ~ Di~ str~ ic~ t J~ ud­ ge

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et a!.,

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

y,

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et aI.,

)

Defendants

)

--------------------------)

P~OPOSt:D ORDER GRANTING APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPENSES

Upon motion of the plaintiffs, this Court does hereby APPROVE a payment in the amount of $6 I,r, I R.5H from the Mack Settlement Fund (0 plaintiffs' counsel for expenses associated with the litigation of this case.

So ORDERED.

,
1!c~d1-- Naney, ertner, UlU' ted States D"lstnct Judge

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

KATRINA MACK, et al., on behalf )

of themselves and others similarly )

situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

GERTNER, D.J.

Civ. No. 98-11346-NG

ORDER September 10, 2003

The Court hereby Finds that defendant Suffolk County is

obligated to pay the entire amount of the contempt fines totaling

SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND, NINE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT AND 79/100

($74,948.79) DOLLARS for its failure to comply with this Court's

February 26, 2003, Order to pay the $5 million settlement plus

accrued interest forthwith. The Court now ORDERS defendant

Suffolk County, thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, to:

1. Pay $22,658.77 to "Blackman Kallick Barrelstein LLP" for fees and costs that the claims administrator incurred to administer the partial distribution of the settlement.

2. Pay $17,020.85 to "Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services" for fees and costs incurred as the special master to distribute settlement checks for the partial distribution to class members.

3. Pay $3,464.64 to the "Mack Settlement Fund" for unpaid interest.

4. Pay $31,804.53 to "Law Offices of Howard Friedman" for attorneys fees and costs that class counsel incurred in their work to enforce the settlement agreement and to

oversee the first partial distribution of the settlement.

SO ORDERED. Dated: September 10, 2003

/s/ NANCY GERTNER, U.S.D.J.

-2-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et a!.,

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et a!.,

)

Defendants

)

----------------------------)

Civil Action No. 98-12s11-NG

FINAL ORDERS

GERTNER, U.S.D.J. After considering the Plaintiffs' Assented to Motionfor Final Orders, the Court grants
the motion. The Court orders the following: 1. The Court APPROVES the payment of $663 to Blackman Kallick
Bartelstein, LLP ("BK") for the preparation and filing of the 2005 tax return, and the Court ORDERS that BK be paid within 30 days from the date of this Order.
2. The Court APPROVES the award of the remaining balance in the Settlement Fund to Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services, Inc. (MCLS) under the ry pres doctrine, and the Court ORDERS that the award be made within 30 days from the date of this Order. The Court further ORDERS that any additional amount remaining after unclaimed funds are transferred to the Massachusetts Treasury pursuant to the State's Abandoned Property Act will also be awarded to MCLS within 30 days from the transfer to the Massachusetts Treasury.

3. The Court ORDERS that BK maintain all claim forms and other claims related documents for one year from the date of this Order. After that date, BK may destroy the documents. Exempt from this Order will be any items related to taxes including copies of the tax returns filed and 1099s returned which will be saved for the time period required by law.
4. The Court ORDERS that this case be closed as an active case on the court's docket, subject only to monitoring of the use of the funds given to MCLS.

So ORDERED.
Dated: _?'-'-&_)-'---!D----_ '-~ _

Nar y Gert er Umted Sta es District Judge

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

KATRINA MACK, et al., on behalf of

)

themselves and others similarly situated, )

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et aI.,

)

Defendants

)

----------------------------)

Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO HOLD SUFFOLK COUNTY IN CONTEMPT

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs ask this court to hold Suffolk County in contempt of the court's order
of February 26,2003. Plaintiffs ask the court to fine the County for each day that it fails to comply with the order. Plaintiffs suggest a fine beginning at $3,000 per calendar day with the amount of the daily fine increasing by $1 ,000 each subsequent Monday until the County complies with this court's order. The plaintiffs propose that the fines collected be used to establish a fund for the benefit of Suffolk County's women prisoners.
Plaintiffs request the fine to motivate the County to pay without disrupting the County's operations. But this order would put the County and its officials on notice that if the County remains in contempt, further sanctions may be imposed, such as the seizure of county property or an order directing the county treasurer to make payment

from the county's operating accounts. Measures beyond a fine would be a last resort because they could impair the County's ability to run the jail and prison. The requested fine is consistent with the equity court's obligation to use the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990). Likewise, plaintiffs do not seek a finding of contempt against county officials at this time, but if the County's obstreperous behavior persists, such a motion might become necessary. See Spallone. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This civil rights class action suit settled after mediation by Senior District Judge A. David Mazzone on May 30,2002. Over the next month, class counsel negotiated the terms of the Settlement Agreement with counsel for the City and County. The parties agreed that the defendants would each pay $5 million by September 6, 2002. Because counsel for the County were concerned they might need more time, the County agreed to make its "best effort" to pay by the September 6 deadline, but the agreement gave the County a grace period of seven weeks before it would "in any event" make its payment by November 29,2002. The parties agreed that if either defendant failed to pay its share by November 29, it would pay interest from that date forward. l
On July 1,2002, General Counsel Melissa Garand reported to class counsel that the Commonwealth's Executive Office of Administration and Finance was committed
I See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at ~~2-3.
2

to paying the $5 million and that the money would be put in the supplemental budget for 2002. Attorney Garand hoped that this would be accomplished by the end of July 2002 but could not give class counsel a firm date. The Settlement Agreement was signed on July 8, 2002.2
The court granted preliminary approval of the settlement on July 10,2002. Based on the agreed dates class counsel and the claims administrator developed a timewline for administrating the settlement and mailed notice of the settlement to class members on July 22, 2002. The court held a fairness hearing on September 26, 2002, on the assented-to motion to give final approval to the settlement. The County did not raise any objections to approval of the settlement. This court granted final approval on October I, 2002.3
Class counsel and the defendant City of Boston took the steps necessary to consummate the settlement and to ensure that the settlement funds would be distributed on time. Only the County failed to fulfill its settlement obligations. On November 18, 2002, class counsel wrote to remind the County that its payment was due on November 29,2002, and that after that date interest would accrue at a rate of about $50,000 a month. On January 14, 2003, class counsel wrote to the County seeking payment by February 28,2003. Class counsel informed the County that if the County
2 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 11114~5. 3 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 11116~8.
3

did not guarantee payment by February 28,2003, the plaintiffs would file a motion to enforce the settlement at the beginning of February. On January 24,2003, counsel for the County told class counsel that the plaintiffs would need to file the motion to secure payment.4
On February 3, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement. In response to the motion, on February 24, 2003, the County acknowledged its obligation but claimed that the County does not have the money to pay the amount it agreed to pay. The County did not explain what steps it took to comply with the Settlement Agreement. On February 26,2003, the court ordered the County to pay the $5 million and accrued interest "forthwith." On March 4, 2003, class counsel reported the court's order to Assistant General Counsel James Davin by telephone and faxed a copy of the docket sheet.5
On March 5, 2003, the Sheriff's General Counsel Anne Powers forwarded the court's order to the County commissioners with copies to other County officials "for resolution." On March 6, 2003, the County commissioners responded by reminding the General Counsel that the County's budget is set by the County Government Finance Review Board suggesting that the order be referred there.6
4 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 11119-12. 5 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 111113-14. 6 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 111115-16.
4

The County's failure to pay on time prevents complete distribution of the settlement funds as planned. A timetable was established and class members were notified based on the County's promise to pay by November 29, 2002. The claims administrator expects, by the end of March 2003, to have finished processing all claims and appeals (including those claims that were permitted to be filed late by the court) and to be ready to distribute settlement funds. The County's failure to make its payment is the only cause for delay in distributing the settlement funds. 7
Class members are expecting to receive the promised settlement funds soon. Many of these women need the money.8 To minimize their harm, class counsel will shortly make a separate motion for permission to make partial distributions from the City's payment. III. ARGUMENT
A. This Court Has the Power to Enforce the Agreement This court has the power to secure the County's compliance with this class action settlement for several reasons. First, the settlement agreement explicitly provides that the court will have the power to "enter orders as appropriate to enforce the settlement." Second, when parties voluntarily enter into a settlement agreement, the agreement cannot be repudiated by either party, and the court will summarily enforce the
7 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 'U 17. 8 See Affidavit of Howard Friedman at 'UIB.
5

agreement. In re Mal De Mer Fisheries, 884 F.Supp. 635 (D.Mass. 1995); Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus.! Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 852-53 (l st Cir. 1987); Malave v. Carney Hospital, 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1 st Cir. 1999); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). Federal courts have enforcement jurisdiction so that each court may "function successfully, that is ... manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." U.S.I. Properties Corp. v. M.D. Construction Company, 230 F.3d 489,496 (lst Cir. 2000) quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
Finally, given its supervisory role over the settlement of class actions, this court has an even stronger obligation to ensure the settlement is completed. "In a class action, the district court has a duty to class members to see that any settlement it approves is completed, and not merely to approve a promise ... to pay the relief to which it has decided class members are entitled." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 752 F.2d 137,141 (5th Cir.1985).
B. The County Has Violated a Court Order Just as Suffolk County flouted its obligations under the settlement agreement, it has disregarded the court's order. The County agreed to make its "best efforts" to pay the settlement amount by September 6,2002, and "in any event" to pay by November 29,2002. But, the County has not made a payment. Instead it seems the County waited for a motion to enforce the settlement before trying to secure the needed money. On February 26,2003, this court ordered Suffolk County pay the $5 million plus accrued interest "forthwith." This was the least intrusive mechanism to secure
6

compliance with the Settlement Agreement. The Sheriff's Department, which throughout this long litigation has been representing the County, responded by sending the court order to the County's commissioners. The commissioners referred the matter back to the Sheriff's Department, claiming that it had not followed proper procedure. Only now is the County planning a meeting for officials to discuss this matter-which they should have done before the County signed the agreement on July 8,2002.
Twenty days after the court commanded payment "forthwith," the County has still not paid. Because the County did not comply with the court order, this court should hold the County in contempt and order the County to pay a fine until it complies.
C. Contempt Is the Proper Remedy Courts have broad discretion in holding a party to be in civil contempt and in imposing a sanction for the contempt. AccuSoft Corporation v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31 (1 st Cir. 2001). "Courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt." Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990), quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). The contempt sanction should recognize the interest of local authorities in managing their own affairs. Id. "Intent is not an issue in civil contempt proceedings. The sole question is whether a party complied with the district court's order." Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1240 (9th Cir. 1983). Even good faith is not a defense to civil contempt. Fortin v. Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, 692 F.2d at 796. Civil contempt can be justified by showing clear and convincing evidence that the party had
7

notice of the court's order and that the order was violated. AccuSoft Corporation v. Palo. In this case, it is undisputed that the County had notice of the court's order to pay "forthwith" but has not paid.
A finding of civil contempt and an increasing fine would help prevent further harm to class members' interests. Already, class members' settlement checks will be delayed. A contempt ruling and fines should provide the necessary motivation to the County to make payment without further delay. Giving the County more time, in exchange for yet another promise, would not likely result in compliance.
D. The County's Obligation Is Not Excused by its Failure to Take the Necessary Steps to Obtain Payment
The County may not be excused from its obligation by its failure to take the steps needed to secure funds. Fortin v. Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, 692 F.2d 790 798, n.9 (1 st Cir. 1982). The County might argue that it cannot pay because it has not complied with state law requirements. For example, it might claim that it does not have the approval of the County Government Finance Review Board or that the funds have not been included in the County's budget. But the County has had nine months since it agreed to the settlement to take the steps needed for payment. The Settlement Agreement was not conditioned on securing funding from the Commonwealth, nor did it specify that the payment would be made only from a specific account. Before signing the Settlement Agreement and asking this court to approve the class settlement, the County should have secured funding. The County's failure to take
8

the necessary steps months ago does not excuse its failure to comply with the court order. Were such an excuse a valid excuse, "defendants could evade court orders simply by refusing to take preliminary steps toward compliance and claiming impossibility." Id.
Neither maya government entity escape its responsibilities in a civil rights case by arguing that compliance violates state law. Hook v. Arizona, 907 F.Supp. 1326 (D. Ariz. 1995) (failing to pay a court-appointed special master is not excused by an Arizona statute that prohibits the payment of special masters appointed by a federal court). Nor may the County be excused by protesting that compliance would result in a financial crisis. Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 1992).
E. A Fine of $3.000 per Day. Increasing Each Week. Is Proper A sanction to induce compliance with a court's order should take into account the probable effectiveness of the sanction. Morales-Feliciano v. Parole Board of Puerto Rico, 887 F.2d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 1989). Factors the court should consider in determining the amount of the fine are: the magnitude of the harm threatened by future violations, the fine's probable effectiveness as a coercive sanction, and the financial burden it would impose. Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilting Company, 673 F.2d 53, 56-58 (2nd Cir.1982); Princess House v. Iewels by Park Lane, 1991 WL 35495 (D. Mass. 1991). The most important factor in this case is the sanction's probable effectiveness. The County did not make its payment on time despite an interest provision requiring that the County pay interest on its $5 million obligation at the rate of 12% per year
9

compounded daily, which equals approximately $50,000 per month.9 Since $50,000 a month was not large enough to move the County, the fine should start at an amount that is larger. And to impress ever-increasing urgency, the amount of the fine should increase regularly. Plaintiffs suggest that the fine begin at $3,000 per calendar day and that each subsequent Monday the daily fine increase by $1,000. 10 Such fines would be incurred in addition to the accruing interest.
A daily fine against the City of Yonkers beginning at $100 a day and doubling each day of noncompliance though not to exceed $1 million a day was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Spallone, a case in which the defendant city had agreed to a judgment requiring legislation but had then failed to pass the legislation. 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
F. The Fine Should Establish a Fund to Assist Women Prisoners Fines for civil contempt may serve a coercive purpose, a compensatory purpose, or both. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalA<;sociation v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,443 (1986). Because the participating class members will receive interest, the fine need not be compensatory. Thus the requested fine would be primarily for coercing compliance. Plaintiffs ask the court to use its equitable power to create a fund to benefit women incarcerated in the County's facilities. The many class members who did not
9 See Attachment A: Calculation of Interest. 10 Thus each day of the second calendar week would cost $4,000, each day the third calendar week would cost $5,000, and so on. If the court issued this order on, say, Monday, March 31, with the first fine's being incurred on Tuesday, April I, then the fines would total $151,000 by May 1. See Attachment B: Sample Calculation of Fines.
10

submit claim forms will not share in the class distribution. The proposed fund would benefit some of these woman and many others in similar situations. The fund should be administered by a non-profit group named by the court at a later date.
Precedent supports this proposal. In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, the Supreme Court affirmed a court's order that $150,000 in fines be used to finance a fund to increase minority membership in a union apprenticeship program and in the union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the use of contempt fines in a fund used for women inmates in a similar class action. Glover v. Iohnson, 199 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 1999). The First Circuit has also affirmed establishing a fund from coercive sanctions to benefit plaintiffs. Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 622 F.2d 4 (1 st Cir. 1980). Other district courts have created funds used to benefit class members generally. Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 710 F. Supp. 875 (D. R.I. 1989) aff'd, 887 F.2d 258 (lst Cir. 1989); Mobile County Inmates v. Purvis, 581 F.Supp. 222 (S.D. Ala. 1984). Contempt fines have also been used to fund a special master and hearing master. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 526 F.Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Using the fines to aid women prisoners would, like this lawsuit, promote their humane treatment. IV. CONCLUSION
This court should hold Suffolk County in contempt of this court's order of February 26,2003, and should order the County to pay a non-refundable fine beginning
11

at $3,000 per calendar day, with the daily fine increasing by $1,000 each subsequent Monday, until the County pays the plaintiffs the settlement amount and interest. The fines collected should be used to establish a fund for the benefit of Suffolk County's women prisoners.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, For the plaintiffs,
By1Tyl_-----.,
Koward Friedman BBO #180080
Myong J. Joun
BBO #645099 Law Offices of Howard Friedman 90 Canal Street, 5th Floor Boston, MA 02114-2022 (617) 742-4100
12

- _ . .- r-------_ -

-

---

M~ck, et al.,_y. Suffolk County, et al.

._--

---

A:- I

I

Attachment

- -C_a.lc_u---Iation

of

Interest
--

._--

----

--

Acco~ding

I to

the_

S.ettlement

I A?reement's

Fgrmula

_.

..- - -
-.--

s'l· _ - --_.

-_.

Date Day's In....

_.

.-

Total Due

--

---

11/2S/02
--

$5.000,000.00

11/30102

-----

---

$1";643.84· $5,001,643.84

---

-

12/01/02 - $1,644.38 $5,003,288.21

12/02/02

$1,644.92 $5.004,933.13 . _ -

--_ .. --

12/03/02 12/04/02 12/05/02 12/06/02 12/07/02 12/08/02 12/09/02

$1,645.46 $5,006,578.59-
t K~~~~ :~:~~::~~~~~~ ---

---

$1,647.08 $5,011,518.20

---

$1,647.62 $5:013.165.83

-_. --

$1,648-.16 $5,014,813.99

--

--

$1.648.71

$5.016,462.70 _.- .-_._.-

-

_

..

12/10102 12/11/02

$1,649.25 --$5,018,111.95 $1,64S.79 $5,019,76f.74

--

12/12/02

$1,650.33._.- $5,021,4 ~_2.07

_.-

12/13/02 ._-- $1,650.88

---

-- 12/14/02

$1,651.42

_.

12/15/02

$1,651.96

_$5,023,062.94 $5,024,714.36 $5,026.366.32

----

-_.

12/16/02

$1,652.50 $5:028,018.83

-_. -

12/17/02

$1,65~.05

$5,029,671.87

. ---

12118/02 -- .._-- $1,653.59

$5,031,325.46

12/19/02

--

$1,654.13

.-

...

_-----

$5,032,979.60

-

---

--

.. _-----

--

12/20102

$1,654.68 $5;034,634.28

-_.

---
_ .... ---

-

_.

- - - _.

12/21/02 12/22/02 12/23/02
....
12/24/02 12/25/02

$1,655.22 $5,636;-28S.50 -

-

$1,655.77 $5,037,945.27_

$1,65f?31 _.- $5,039,601._58 _._--

$1,656.86 $5,041,258.43 $1,657.40 . $5,042,915.83

._.-----

12/26/02

$1.657.94 $5.044.573.78

-_.__ .--
- - - ._-

12/27/02

$1,658.49 $5:046,232.27

12/28/02 ---- ---_ .. - $1,659.04 _. - $5,047,891.30 _.-

12/29/02

$1,659.58 $5-,049,550.88

......

-12/30102

$1,660.13 $5,051,211.01

-_ .._ - -

12/31/02 01/01/03 01/02/03 01/03/03

_.-

$1,660.67

$1,661.22

._- $1,661.76 $1.662.31

$5,052,871..68
-_~5,054,532.99
$5,056,194.66 $5.057.856.97

---------

--

-_.

,-------

---

~--.

_._.

01/04/03 01/05/03 -01/06/03
01/07/03 _. 01/08/03
M/OS/03 01/10103
----
01/11/03

$1,662.86 --
...- $1.,663.40 ! $1,663.95 .
$ {664.5-0
-_.$1,665.04 $1,665.59 $1,666.14
_ ....
$1,666:69

$5,059,519:83 $5,061,183.23 $5,062,847.19 $5,064,51 {68 $5,066,176.73 $5:067!_842.32 $5,069,508.46 $5,071,17?15

._._.-

r---- _..

01/12/03 01/13/03 01/14/03

$1,667.24 $5,072.842.38 ---
$1,667.78 $5,074,510.17 $1,668.33 $5,076,17_8.50.

01115/03

$1,668:88 i-· $5,077.847.38

Page 1 of4

_=:=- _ f----- ----
r--

1--- ___ L

-_--+--___

j Mack et ~1~ffOI~_~,~~- ___ ~__

f------f- Attachment A: Calculation of Interest _

f---f-:-

1_ _

_

__ t

_

_

_

I----f--A-c-cording to th- e-- S- ettle- ment Ag1r'e--e-m---e-n--t-'s-F-o-rm-u-l+a

1-- --------t- ------=----+--

Date _ Day's Interest

Total Due

f-- - -

---

03/05/03

$1,695.98

$5,160,298.20

I-- -----1--------=-03/06/03 --_. $0.1]96.54 -$5*161,994.74'-+----···

f----

03/07/03

$1,69?09$5,163,69_1'---'--.8=----=-3'___+_---

03/08/03 __ _ $1,697:65_ $5,165,3a.9.~~=-----+-____ _

_ -+- 03/09/03

$1,698.21~5,167,087.70 _ _ _ __

03/10/03_ $1,698.77 __ $5,168,786.46

----

03/11/03

$1,699.33~5, 170,485.79

03/12/03

$1,699.89

$5,172,185.68

03/13/03

$1,700.44

- - - - --

03/14/03 ---- $1,701.00

$5,173,886.12 __~5,175,587.13

03/15/03 __- ----_-_-_+------',0---':-3/16/03

$1,701.56 _ $5,177,288.69
-- $(702.1~-_--$5,178,_~_90.8:::-1+--____

03/17/03

---

03/18/03 03/19/03

03/20/03
-------
03/21/03 ----+-----'03/22/03

~-=-==-- -- ~;~~!~~;

$1,702.68

$5,180,693.49

$1,703.24 -- $5,182,396.73+____----

$1,703.80

$5,184,100.54

-- $1.764.36-$5,185,804.90

$1,704.92

$5,187,509.82

$1,70-5.48

$5,189,21--5=----=.3---=-0-+-------

~~:~~~:~~ I--~;:~:~::~;:-~-;-----

-----
--- - - - --

03/25/03 ---
~~~;~~
03/28/03

- $1,707.17 :$5,194,335.12 - - - -
. :;:;~~;~f~~::!~:~~~'---+----
$1,708.85 -_ $5,199,459.98

03/29/03

$1,709.41-'-- $5,201,169.39

=-_--+--03/30103 ___------=-$1-:-':,7=-:09.97

$5,202,87_9-----:.3="_,-:-1_- - -

03/31/03

$1,710.54

$5,204,589.90

__

04/01/03- $1,711.10 I $5,206,301.00

04i02/03

$1.?11.~_61 $5,20~,012.66

f- _+---=-04/03/03

~--

04/04/03 04/05/03

$1,712.22 $-{712.79 _

$$55,2,0291,7124A_3cc:.·78-=-.---6=87'_~__++_--------

r-- $1,71 ~.35

$5,213,15_1.02+--_ _

C-------

04/06/03

$1,713.91

$5,214,864._~3 _ __

04/07/03 _ $1,714.48 ,_ $5,216,579.41_

04/08/03

$1,715.04

$5,218,294.45

--t-- 04io9/03

f---

04/10103

'------

------- 04/11/03

r--

04/12/03 04/13/03

$1..?15.60 $5-,220,010:----:.0::-::5c+--_----_

$1,716.17

$5,221,726.22

__ $1,"'-16:7~_~5,22~,442.95

$1,717.30._- $5,225,160.?-=----5+-_ __

$1,717.86 $5,226,878._11

04/14/03 1--1-_~-+-04/15/03

$1,718.43 $1,i18.99

$5,228,596.53 $5,230,315.5~-+-----_-_ _---_---_-

04/16/03

$1,719.56 $5,232,035.08

:-=--=__ f----

04/17/03

$1,720.12$5,233,755.20

- - - - 04/18/03 _ __$1,720.69 __ $5,235,47=----=5=.8:-=----9

04/19/03

$1,721.25

$5,237,197.14

1----

--+-----'04/20/03

$1,i21-:82i$5)38,918.96

f-

04/21/03

$1,722.38 -$5,240,641.34

------

Page 3 of4

==-. -==- _==- -,------- _ ..--- ~ ---t-- .--.--._. ----r=. --I Mack, et al., v. Suffolk County, et al.

_ ._ _.

Attachment A:__ 9alculation of Interest

__

- - ' . - _ _ _ .1.__ _ _ 1 _ _ _ . _-------:- _. .._ _

_ =~rd;ng to the Settlement AremenfS Fo,mu,":=_

Date Day's Interest

Total Due

=----04/22/0~ - $1 '7i2~95)5,242,364.29--

__-----.9~/2o-3--,---10_3f___ $1,723.52

$5,244,087.81

_._ . .- - -04/24/03

$1,724.08

-, ..

.,

$5,245,811.89

_ ____04/25/03_ $1,724..651 $5,247,536.54

-__

_______ 04/26/03 _ _$1,725.22. $5,249,26c..:..1..:....:76=--+-_

_

04/27/03 - -.. ----t------':04/28/03
04/29/03

$1,725.78 i $5,250,987.55
$1,726.35 I . $5,252,713.90--+.-._---. $1 ,7~ $5,254,440.82

04/30103

$1.72'7".491 $5,256,168.31 __ - __

05/01/03

$1,728.06 $5,257,896.36

05/02/03
0
05/03/03• -
=--_---- 05/04/03 05/05/03
=--______ 05/06/03 _-+- 05/07103
--05/08/03

$1,'7il3".62 $5,25-9,624.98

$1,729:19 $5,"261,354.18

. $1,729.76- $5,263,083.94-+---'

-$1 '730''$~5,H2.3©4,814.27

$1 ,730:90

$5,266!~45._1__6=--+-_ _ _.

$1,731.47 $5,268,276.63 - $T,732.0~- . $5-,270,008.67 - - -

05/09/03 ----t-- 05/10/03

$1,732.61 $5,271,741.27 ---${733.1S- $5)73,474.45- ----

- - 05/11/03 --- -----0"5/1"2/03

~--:

05/13/03

$1,733.75 $5,275,208.19

--

--$1 734.32 ····$5:276,942.51 . - - - -

1

$1,734.89' $5,278,677.39-- ---

05/14/03

$1,73!:i.46 $5,280,412.85-+-_ _

...- --- _

05/15/03 05/16/03
05/17103

$1,736.03 $5,282,148.87
$11736.60 $5 283,885.47 1
$1,737: 17 ___ $5)85,622.6~

05/18/03 r------t---=-:05/19/03

$1,737.74 $1,738.31

$5,287,360.38-+---' $5,28-9,098.69 - - - -

05/20/03 ... - __ - - - . OS/21/03

$1,738.88: $5,290,"837.57 $1,739.451 . -$5,292,5~7'-62=-+--'_ _

05/22/03

$1,740.03 __ $5,294,~_1~:05

__

_05/23/03 ___ _ 95/24/03 _ __ _ _ 05/~5/03

$1,740.60.. $5,296,057.65-+-_ _

$1,741.17 $5,297,798.82 ~_ __

$1,741.74

~~,299,540.56 . _ __

Page 4 of4

..- - t - - ~-----l---...

..- - . I--- -

L-==-_- 1 _ - - ._ -
--.

-
-

t--- Mack, et al., v.
r---~~ - - - -

Suffolk

County,

et

al .

f--==t- . ____ 1 _- _ I - - -t- _Attachment B: Sam_~le Calculation ofFines

I-- -

r___

- - - _ ..
....- -

(Using the plaintiffs' proposed formula and with fines

----

beginning to be incurr~~s;day, April 1, 2003.) . ...-

t - - - . - - f-=--- .-

Day

.._ - - _D..ate Day's Fine Cumulative

_..-

f-- . ..- t:T-:-u-

---

W

- - Th

F

I--f---.

Sa . ...

04/01/03 04/02/03
f--
04/03/03 04/04/03 f-04/05103 f - -

3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000

3,000
.- .- 6,000 _. 9,000
12,000
..
15,000

.-
._.. _ - -
.. -

1--1--- ..

Su Monday

04/06/03 -_. 04/07/03

3,000 _.. ..- 18,000

4,000

22,000

._-
.. -

I--

Tu

._-

W

04/08/03 -- 04/09/03

.. ----_....- 4,000 4,000

26,000 30,000

Th

t - - - .-

----

04/10103 _..- I - - ....~.- . 4,000

-_. F

04/11/03
----

4:000

34,000 38,000 - - _... _--

fI--1---.

Sa Su ---
-..- l-:-=- ...
_._-1M=o-n-d-a-y Tu

04/12/03 04/13/03 04i14io3I-0411-5/03 f - -

4,000
.-
4,000
~,OOO
_5,000

._- 42,000 --- .

.-

46,000 -_. .-

51,000

.-

56,000

I---

W

04/16/03

5,000

1----

I--1 - - - ..-

Th

. _..

F .-.. ....

04/17/03 ____5,000 0 4 / 1 8 / 0 3 1 - - - - - - _ . 5,0-00

. _ - _ . _. Sa

_.. ._- 04/19/05 __

5,00q --_.

61,000 66,000 _. 71,000 76,000

-_._---

Su

04/20103

5,000

81,000 _.

.. -

1---

Monday Tu

04/21/03

6,000

04/22/03 '-------6,060

87,000

93,000

-

._.

--

-

-

W

_. ----T=-h_....

-

F

-_.-

Sa

04/23/03

6,000

04/24/03

6,000

I--
04125/03

6}-000

--

04/26/03

6,000

-

99,000

.-

105,000

111,000

_ _ 117,000_ .

... .. -

Su

- 04/27/03

6,000

123,000 --.---

1---- _._-1M=-o. nday

04/28/03

7!000

13~,000

.-

- - - - - Tu

04/29/03
--

7,000

137,000 _._-_ ....._-

----- W

04/30103

7,000

144,000

-....

f----

-

-

Th
f=-

-

-

F

05/01/03 + - - -_ _7,000

151,000

05/02/03

.- 7,000 _.

158,000

-

Sa
1----

05/03/03

7,000

165,000

-

t----
._--

Su
Monda~
.-

05/04/03 t---.-- 7,0..00

05/05/03

8,900

172,000 180,000

_. .- - - Tu

05/06/03

8,000

188,000 --------

I- . - W

_ _ I--.

.-

-

Th IF= - -

t-- -

Sa

Su

t---
_.. - _..

Monday

05/07/03

8,000

05/08/03

8,000

05/09/03 _ _8,00_0

_. 05/10103 05/11/03

_~9 8,000

_0.5_/1-2_/0...3. ....

9!90o.

196,000 204,000 21-2,000

---

_.

-

_ _ 220,000 _.

.

228,000 ._.

-

237,000

.-

W 1--- - - Tu tn1 1---. ---
- - .. ~ --
.----
Sa

05/13/03 .-
05/14/03 _. 05/15/03
05/16/03 05/171(j"3 I - -

9,000
9,00Q 9,000 _. 9,000 9,000

246,boq

I----

255,000

I----

264,000

------

273,000

..

.-

282,000

Page 1 of3

. Mack, et al., v. Suffolk County, et aJ. _ _.
r __ r= __. _=:I.. _
_=-=-=. =-r ___-----=-=_ . _. ~ttachment B: Sam.ple Calculation_of Fines. (Using the plaintiffs' proposed formula and with fines beginning to be incurred Tuesday, A ~20~

Day

Date Day's Fine Cumulative

_ _ S_u___ +------'0--'-'5/18/03~ 9-,00_0 - -- 291,000

Monday__ 05/19/03

10,000 ._ _3i)1-,000

Tu

05/20103

10,000 _~OO

W

-+-------::-c05/21/03 -_-_--- 10,000

321,000 _ __ _.

~

05/22/03

_10,000 _~1,900

-i=----------o5t23J03

10,000

341,000-,---+_ _.

Sa

05/24/03

-·10,000

351,000

_ _S_u_·___ +--_05-'----:/2,5/03-- 10,000

361,000

M~nday _ 05/26/03

11 ,OOO~~.O.---,--0-::--t0_

T u - 05/27103

11,000

W

05/28/03-- -1 i~900

Th

-05/29/03 _~OO

383,090.____ ~94,000
405,000

-F--··

05/30/03

11,000

416,00---,,--0+--_.

Sa

05/31/03

11,000-- 427,000

Su

06/01/03 ___1_1,POD

438,000

Monday

06/02/03_ 12,090_

450,000

Tu-
W--
.~

06/03/03 06/04/03
06/05/03

12,000

462,000

. 12,000 - 474,0'----':0--:0:-1-

-_ 12,000. ._ _486,000

-F--

06/06/03

. 12,000

498,000

Sa

06/07103

Su - - -. 06/08/03

12,000 --510,0C-C:0:-0::--t12,000 - .. 522,0.00 ___

M-onday -06/09/03·- --13,0.00

53_5,000

Tu - . -

06110103_13,000 _ 548,000

W

-------06111/03

13,000- 561,000

Th

06/12/03--- 13,000

574,000 ...___.

F

06/13/03-

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06/22/03

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06/28/0315,000 ___891,000

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06/29/03

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_832,000

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07/01/0316,000

848,000

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864,000

16,000 --------aao,000

Page 2 of 3

f------+-- _

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-

Mack, et al., v. Suffolk County, et al.

+--_: -1

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r---

-------t-::::----
Day F
c:::----i--
Sa

Date 07/04/03 07/05/03

---------,:--
Day's Fine 16,000 16,000

Cumulative 896,000 912,000

----
--

_____~u ----:-_t--_~0::-7-=/0-=6/=0~3\___----1-E?,000

_____ Monday

07/07/03

__ 17,000

928,gOq --------l 945,00Q_____ _

_________ Tu

07/08/03 ____J7,000

962,000 _ _ __

f---

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07/09/03 07/10/03 07/11/03
07/12/03

17,000 17,000 17,000
17,000

979,000

-

996,000

1,013,000

-

1,930.'-0-,0--,--00-+-_ _

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~:_-_-_-_- -""onday

07/14/03

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07/15/03 _ 18,000 07/16/0318,000

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07/28103

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07/29/03_ 20,000

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08/02/03

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1,386,090 +_-_ -____-__-_-_- - l

1,406,OqO 1 ,426,000

-----

1,446,000- - - - - - - - - - l

Page 3 of 3

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

__________________________________________

)

KATRINA MACK, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

v.

) Civil Action No. 98-12511-NG

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al.,

)

Defendants

)

__________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL ORDERS PERMITTING DISTRIBUTION OF THE REMAINDER OF SETTLEMENT FUND

Plaintiffs petition this Court to distribute the amount remaining in the Mack

Settlement Fund to Massachusetts Correctional Legal Services (“MCLS”) to be used for

legal work to assist female prisoners at MCI–Framingham, the only state prison for

women in Massachusetts. The Settlement Agreement in this case provides:

The settlement amount and any interest earned in the settlement fund account until the date of distribution shall belong to the plaintiffs. If there is any balance in the settlement fund account from additional interest earned after all of the settlement checks have been distributed and all expenses, bonuses and attorney’s fees have been paid, the plaintiff will petition the Court for instructions on the distribution of the remaining funds.

Settlement Agreement at ¶12. The agreement also provides this Court with the power

to make any orders necessary to enforce the settlement agreement. ¶ 44. Counsel for the

class recommends that this money go to MCLS, consistent with the cy pres doctrine which is used by courts to direct distribution of funds remaining in a class action.1

1 A Memorandum of Understanding between plaintiffs’ counsel and MCLS is attached to this memorandum.

MCLS is a non-profit corporation that provides legal services to prisoners. Founded in 1972, MCLS was established to provide legal and civil services to people in Massachusetts jails and prisons. MCLS is supported through government contracts, grants and private donations.
The cy pres doctrine allows for excess and unclaimed funds from a class action settlement to be disbursed to a charitable organization at the direction and under the supervision of the court. Under the cy pres doctrine, the funds should be used to benefit the “next best class.” Democratic Central Committee of the District of Columbia v..Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 84 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir.1996) (current bus riders found to be the next best class); In Re Three Mile Island Litigation 557 F. Supp 96 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (payment made to newly formed foundation to study the biological effects of radiation exposures from a nuclear plant accident). The National Association of Consumer Advocates Guideline for plaintiff’s lawyers on cy pres states:
class counsel should propose a disposition of the unclaimed portion of the award that will either (1) protect the interests of the persons injured by the illegal conduct and thus indirectly benefit absent class members or (2) promote the purposes of the statutory prohibitions sought to be enforced in the underlying litigation. “Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Consumer Class Actions,” 176 F.R.D. 375, 393 (1997). Because this was a §1983 case on behalf of women in custody, it is most appropriate that the funds be used to protect the constitutional rights of women in prison in Massachusetts.
2

Under the Memorandum of Understanding, the funds will be used to further MCLS’s current advocacy on behalf of women prisoners. MCLS will also receive cy pres money from another class action which it will use to investigate potential areas of litigation and of advocacy for prisoners at MCI -Framingham. The funds from this case will be used to implement the recommendations by litigation if necessary.
Incarcerated women suffer from a disproportionate rate of physical and mental illness. Initiatives for formulating and implementing sufficient programming, counseling and medical care for the female prison population are underfunded and generally unsupported compared to men’s institutions. See 12 A.L.R. 4th 1219 §3. Due to the lack of funding for medical screening, preventative care and treatment, many incarcerated women have unwillingly and prematurely surrendered their lives to cervical and breast cancer. Kendra D. Arnold, Note, The Right to Live: A Constitutional Argument for Mandatory Preventative Health Care for Female Prisoners, 10 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 343, 343 (2004). Incarcerated women are also more susceptible than the general population to HIV, Hepatitis C, and reproductive diseases. Cynthia Chandler, Articles, Death and Dying in America: The Prison Industrial Complex’s Impact on Women’s Health, 18 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 40, 42 (2003). Furthermore, studies show that a significantly high number of women who have been incarcerated are victims and survivors of male violence such as rape, incest or domestic violence and often times have chemical dependencies for illegal drugs or alcohol. Despite an overwhelming need for women’s correctional facilities to provide health care, programming, child-care or parenting assistance, substance abuse
3

counseling and mental health counseling, prison administrations have neglected the area. Research by MCLS conducted with the aid of these funds may allow the organization to focus attention on these issues and help incarcerated women in this state.
By distributing the remaining settlement funds to MCLS, this Court is both complying with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and assuring that the funds will be used to promote respect for the constitutional rights of women prisoners in Massachusetts. Since many of the class members in this case were held at MCIFramingham, the funds will serve to benefit members of the class.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, The plaintiffs By their attorneys,
/s/ Howard Friedman ________________________________ Howard Friedman BBO #180080 Myong J. Joun BBO #645099 Law Offices of Howard Friedman P. C. 90 Canal Street, Fifth floor Boston, MA 02114-2022 (617) 742-4100

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day a true copy of the above document was served upon the attorney of record for each party by mail if the attorney is not an CM/ECF participant.

/s/ Howard Friedman

Date: 3/18/05

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE PURSUANT TO L.R. 7.1(A)(2)

Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(A)(2), I certify that I have conferred in good faith with counsel for the defendant(s) in an attempt to resolve the issue that is the subject of the accompanying motion.

/s/ Howard Friedman

Date: 3/18/05

4

 
 133 F.Supp.2d 116 (2001)
Bronwyn FORD, Katrina Mack, et al., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SUFFOLK COUNTY, Richard J. Rouse in his individual capacity, Jane Doe, in her individual capacity, and the City of Boston, Defendants.
No. Civ 93-11346-NG.
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
March 13, 2001.
117 *117 Audrey Samit, Eric N. Klein, Klein & Miller LLP, Howard Friedman, Law Offices of Howard Friedman, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Michael A. Goldsmith, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Eve Anne Piemonte-Stacey, Melissa J. Garand, Rose E. King, Assistant General Counsel, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR RECUSAL
GERTNER, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Memorandum addresses an important question in this age of close media coverage of judicial proceedings: whether a district judge's statement to a reporter about a pending case creates an appearance of partiality that requires recusal when the substance of the statement is already a matter of public record, widely reported in the media.
To be sure, the First Circuit has looked at the statement in question in connection with a recusal motion in an unrelated action, Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, Civil Action No. 99-11330-NG [hereinafter "Boston's Children"]. In its decision In re Boston's Children First, 239 F.3d 59 (1st Cir.2001) modified, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir.2001) [hereinafter "In re Boston's Children"], it is clear that the Court has significant concerns about a judge's speaking to the press about a pending case. But it is also clear that the opinion raises important questions concerning how to evaluate the "appearance of impartiality" standard for recusal, after such a comment has been made. This important and ongoing debate, however, does not affect the bottom line here: Whatever the standard, however broadly applied, this case is distinguishable.
This action involves a class of women plaintiffs ("the plaintiffs" or "the plaintiff class") allegedly strip-searched at the Suffolk County Jail between December 10, 1995, and September 20, 1999, in violation of their constitutional rights. The case has been pending for nearly two years. In a published and widely reported decision released February 16, 2000, this Court determined that the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims. Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (D.Mass.2000) [hereinafter "Mack"]. The factual findings on standing were clear: This Court found that the plaintiffs "suffered a personal injury ... fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and ... likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Id. at 19.
On August 3, 2000, I spoke to a newspaper reporter about the Boston's Children case. In a Boston Herald article the following day ("the August 4 article"),[1] I made the following statement contrasting the standing issues in the Boston's Children case and this one:

In [the instant] case, there was no issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were injured. It was absolutely clear every woman had a claim.... [Boston's Children] is a more complex case.
Now, over six months after the article was published, the defendants (including the City of Boston, which took the opposite position in Boston's Children) suddenly argue that I am obliged to recuse myself, because the statement somehow suggests the position the Court will take on the ultimate question 0907 "that the Defendants are liable for the act of strip-searching all of the [plaintiffs] and that every plaintiff was injured."
118 *118 This characterization of the reported statement is untenable. What I said was identical to what I had previously said in my published standing decision 0907 in this case, "there [is] no issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were injured." Indeed, in the very next sentence, I make it clear that I am referring to the plaintiffs' "claims," not to any damages they may ultimately receive. The statement forecasts absolutely nothing about future decisions.
No one familiar with the record of this case, or with the media coverage, could reasonably question my impartiality based on this reiteration of publicly recited facts. If defendants' belated argument justifies recusal in a case pending before me for two years, then the standard is truly overbroad.
Defendants' motion for recusal [docket entry # 82] is therefore DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Boston's Children Action
For purposes of clarity, I begin by summarizing the procedural posture of the unrelated Boston's Children case, to which I referred in my controversial statement in the Boston Herald.
In that high-profile case, filed in mid-1999, the plaintiffs challenge the City of Boston's allegedly raciallydiscriminatory school assignment policies. On July 26, 2000, the Boston Herald published an article ("the July 26 article") detailing an interview with the plaintiffs' counsel, in which the counsel misrepresented the procedural posture of the case and made several provocative and unsubstantiated assertions, including alleging that this Court had refused to hear class certification claims of white children in Boston's Children, while granting class certification to jailed women in the instant action.[2]
To correct the inaccuracies in the July 26 article, I wrote a letter to the Boston Herald, dated July 28, 2000, with copies to counsel. Subsequently, the Herald reporter called to inquire about the standing issues in Boston's Children and in the present action. As reported in the August 4 article and quoted above, I responded:
In [the present] case, there was no issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were injured. It was absolutely clear every woman had a claim.... This is a more complex case.[3]
Based on my letter and this comment, the Boston's Children plaintiffs filed a motion for recusal, claiming that my "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."[4] Essentially, they argued that my comment somehow forecast the position I would take on their class certification motions.
I denied the motion after a hearing on the issue. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, again seeking recusal. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted the writ and denied my subsequent petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. In re Boston's Children, 239 F.3d at 66.
B. This Action
The procedural history of the instant case is very different. This action was filed in July 1998. On February 16, 2000, I determined that the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims, and I certified the plaintiff class. Mack, 191 F.R.D. at 19-21. The decision was well covered in the press.[5]
119

*119 In this standing decision, I found that all of the plaintiffs had demonstrated both (1) that they had suffered personal injury "fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and ... likely to be redressed by the requested relief"; and (2) "that, at the time the complaint was filed, a real and immediate threat of future injury existed." Id. at 19, 21.[6] The defendants apparently sought appellate review of my standing and class certification decision, but the First Circuit denied their petition.
Six months after the article was published, this motion was filed.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Recusal Standard
The defendants seek recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which obliges any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States to disqualify herself "in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." [7] This provision establishes an objective standard, mandating recusal only "when the facts asserted `provide what an objective, knowledgeable member of the public would find to be a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality.'" In re Boston's Children, 239 F.3d at 62 (emphasis added) (citing In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir.1981)).
As indicated by the word "knowledgeable," above, the § 455(a) standard requires that the "facts asserted" be evaluated from the perspective of an "objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts." United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113, 120-21 (2d Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted)); accord El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. M/Y JOHANNY, 36 F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir.1994) (summarizing the § 455(a) test as, "whether a reasonable person, `were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality'" (citing Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 739 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1984))).
Thus, one must determine whether recusal is warranted "`not by considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show[,] but by examining the record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.'" Bayless, 201 F.3d at 127 (quoting SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir.1988) (internal citations omitted)).
B. The Defendants' Recusal Motion
Defendants' recusal motion entirely fails to meet this objective, reasonable- and knowledgeable-person standard. The nub of defendants' claim is that my August 4 comment implies that I have pre-judged their liability for the 120 plaintiffs' injuries. *120 This interpretation is entirely unreasonable. Whatever questions one may have about the recusal inquiry outlined by the First Circuit in In re Boston's Children case, it is clear that defendants' motion falls short.
1. The February 2000 Decision Conveys Precisely the Same Message as My Statement
Anyone familiar with the record in this action knows that in February 2000, I issued a decision that recognizes plaintiffs' standing to pursue their claims for compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Mack, 191 F.R.D. at 19-21. The opinion clearly indicates that a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages can only satisfy the standing requirement "by demonstrating that [she] ... suffered a [past] personal injury." As the defendants chose not to challenge this aspect of plaintiffs' standing, the decision wastes little time in concluding that plaintiffs adequately demonstrated such injury.[8]

So, defendants' belated recusal motion accuses me of repeating to a reporter the two facts that the February 2000 decision had already established: that the plaintiffs "were injured," and that "every woman had a claim."
2. The August 4 Article Only Addresses Plaintiffs' Standing, Not Defendants' Liability
In light of the February 2000 procedural ruling, no one familiar with the record in this case, or with press coverage surrounding it could reasonably misconstrue my comment in the August 4 article as forecasting future decisions or indicating bias. The article focuses on questions of class certification and standing. It quotes the counsel for the plaintiffs in Boston's Children as arguing that this Court should "hear [the plaintiffs'] motion for class certification" before holding a hearing on standing.[9] That approach, plaintiffs' counsel suggests, would comport with the sequence followed in the instant action.
The meaning of my response is unmistakable: In Boston's Children, it would be inappropriate to address class certification before standing, as I did in Mack because questions of standing are "complex," whereas in the present action, there is no "issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were injured.... [E]very woman ha[s] a claim."
This observation does not indicate bias. It is about standing, not substantive liability. It speaks the language of pleadings 0907 what the women's claims were 0907 not the language of proof. Indeed, it reflects the defendants' position, that there was no meaningful contest about plaintiffs' "claims" of past injury.
3. The February 2000 Standing Decision Was Widely Reported in the Media
Even if one were unfamiliar with the judicial record in this case and were entirely reliant on the media, one still could not reasonably question my impartiality based on the comment in the August 4 article. Any reasonable reader of the press would recognize that the comment simply restates the (well-reported[10]) conclusions I reached earlier regarding standing and class certification in this case.
4. The Holding in In re Boston's Children Should Not be Applied Here
121 One need not question the First Circuit's holding in In re Boston's Children to *121 reach a contrary decision regarding recusal in this case. In that case, the panel was apparently concerned that my use of the term "more complex" to describe the "pending" standing and class certification issues in Boston's Children could "arguably" be interpreted to suggest "that the petitioner's claims for certification and temporary injunctive relief were less than meritorious." In re Boston's Children, 239 F.3d at 62-63.
No such misunderstanding could occur here. As of August 4, 2000, I had already published my standing and class certification decision. No substantive motions were pending. My comment could not "arguably" be interpreted to suggest anything except that the plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated injury 0907 a factual finding I had already made on the record.
Further, the panel's decision in In re Boston's Children is expressly limited to the "particular events in, and character of, [that] highly idiosyncratic ... [and] newsworthy ... case," and the decision itself emphasizes that there is a "continuing need for a case-by-case determination of [recusal] issues." Id. at 65, 66.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even if one agrees with the recusal standard announced in In re Boston's Children, and agrees that my statement in the August 4 article warrants recusal in the Boston's Children case,[11] and agrees that a judge

should always avoid comment on pending cases, the In re Boston's Children decision does not dictate the outcome here.
To hold that my recitation of previously-and publicly-established fact casts doubt on a judge's impartiality, thereby necessitating recusal, would establish a judicial code of silence that reason cannot bear. Defendants' motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Dave Wedge, Race-Based Admissions Case to Be Heard, Boston Herald, August 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4331739.
[2] Dave Wedge, Lawyer Fights School Ruling; Claims White Kids Have Class-Action Rights, Boston Herald, July 26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4331012.
[3] Supra note 1.
[4] Plaintiffs base their recusal motion on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides, "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
[5] E.g. Andrea Estes, Judge Oks Class Suit Over Strip Searches, Boston Herald, Feb. 17, 2000, at 003; Shelley Murphy, Judge Clears Way for Class-Action Suit over Strip Searches, Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 2000, at B2; Judge Allows Class-Action Suit over Strip Searches, Associated Press State & Local Wire, Feb. 18, 2000, at State and Regional.
[6] The decision cites County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), in which the Supreme Court observed, "[a]t the core of the standing doctrine is the requirement that a plaintiff `allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'" Id. at 51, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).
[7] The defendants also cite Canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which instructs that a "judge should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action." As the First Circuit has "indicated that the Code ... does not overlap perfectly with § 455(a)," and that "it is possible to violate the Code without creating an appearance of partiality ... [or] to comply with the Code yet still be required to recuse [oneself]," I confine my discussion to the recusal standard set out in § 455(a). In re Boston's Children, 239 F.3d at 63.
[8] The issue of prospective relief is more complex. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must "also demonstrate that she is in real and immediate danger of sustaining future, direct injury as a result of official conduct ongoing at the time of the suit." Id. at 19. On the truncated record presented at the class certification hearing, I determined that here, too, the plaintiffs ultimately prevail. Id. at 20-21.
[9] Supra note 1.
[10] Supra note 6
[11] The active judges on the First Circuit are apparently themselves divided regarding the appropriateness of the panel's decision in In re Boston's Children. 239 F.3d at 66 ("Those active judges who are not members of the panel are currently of the view that, even if the district court's statement to the reporter comprised a comment on the merits, it does not create an appearance of partiality such as to require mandatory recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)").
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 154 F.Supp.2d 123 (2001)
Bronwyn FORD, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF BOSTON, Suffolk County, and Richard J. Rouse, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Defendants.
No. CIV. 98-11346-NG.
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
July 31, 2001.
124 *124 Audrey Samit, Eric N Klein, Klein & Miller, Howard Friedman, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Michael A. Goldsmith, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Boston Law Department, City Hall, Eve Anne Piemonte-Stacey, Rose E. King, Assistant General Counsel, Suffolk County Sheriff's Dept., Melissa J. Garand, Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF FORD
GERTNER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Bronwyn Ford ("Ford") was arrested on a defective default warrant and subjected to two strip-searches and one visual body cavity search while in custody.[1] She challenges the constitutionality of these searches under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and under the Constitution and common-law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In addition, she claims the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs while in custody, in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Ford moves for summary judgment against the City of Boston ("City") on her Fourth Amendment claim relating to the search at the Boston Police Department's ("BPD") Berkeley Street facility ("Berkeley Street lockup"), against Suffolk County ("County"), Richard Rouse ("Rouse"), and the City on her Fourth Amendment claims relating to the search at the Nashua Street Jail ("County Jail"), and against the City on her equal protection claim. The City cross-moves for summary judgment of all counts in which it is named (Counts I, IV, V, and VI), and the County 125 and Sheriff *125 Rouse (together, "County defendants") move for summary judgment of all claims in which they are named (Counts III, IV, V, and VI).[2]
For the reasons discussed below, Ford and the County's motions for summary judgment [docket entries # 41 and 42] are hereby ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The City's motion for summary judgment [docket entry # 90] is DENIED. Specifically, I issue the following rulings:
1. Summary Judgment is DENIED as to the City's liability for the alleged booking search by City police officers at the Berkeley Street lockup.
2. Summary judgment is GRANTED for Ford as to the County and City's liability under the Fourth Amendment, and the City's liability under the Equal Protection Clause, for the strip and visual body cavity search by officials at the County Jail. The amount of damages to which Ford is entitled raises questions of fact that must be resolved in a future proceeding.
3. Rouse is entitled to sovereign immunity for his role in the strip-search at the County Jail.

4. Summary judgment is DENIED as to any defendants' liability under Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
5. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the County defendants as to their alleged deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's medical needs while incarcerated. And finally,
6. Summary judgment is DENIED as to the City's liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the searches at the City and County Jails.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts Relating to the BPD's Policy of Transferring Female Arrestees to the County Jail
The reader is referred to the Background section of the accompanying Memorandum Re: Motions for Summary Judgment by and Against the Class Plaintiffs [hereinafter, "Class Summary Judgment Memorandum"] for a general discussion of the BPD's policy of transporting all female arrestees to the County Jail for detention pending an initial court appearance, and for a detailed description of the comprehensive strip-search policy in place at that Jail at the time Ford was detained there.
B. Facts as Presented by the Plaintiff
Ford tells a very simple story. On February 19, 1997, she was arrested at her home on a default warrant for failure to pay a restitution fee on a charge of malicious destruction of property valued over $250.00.[3] On the way to the police vehicle, Ford was handcuffed. The arresting officers neither searched nor frisked her in any way during or after the arrest.
Upon arrival at the Berkeley Street lockup, Ford was searched by a female officer, Loletha Graham-Smith 126 ("Officer Graham-Smith"). Ford alleges that she was completely naked during the search, *126 but she does not
indicate that Officer Graham-Smith conducted a visual body-cavity inspection.
Following the strip-search, Ford was allowed to dress. She was then placed in a cell to await transport to the County Jail. Ford was held in the cell, alone, for over an hour.
Ford indicates that she was transported to the County Jail in the custody of two Boston police officers. According to the officers in question, although they do not specifically recall transporting Ford, their usual practice at the time was to ensure that arrestees never left their sight, custody, or control from the time they were taken from the holding cage at the City police station until they were turned over to booking officers at the County Jail. Arrestees remained handcuffed during the entire transfer.
As part of the admission process at the County Jail, Ford was required to submit to a full strip and visual body cavity search. As detailed in the Background section of the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum, this second strip-search was thorough, invasive, and humiliating. Ford indicates she was told to strip, to lift her breasts so the Jail officials could inspect underneath them, and to bend over and spread the cheeks of her buttocks apart. She was then allowed to dress and placed in a holding cell, where she remained overnight.
At some point during her ordeal, Ford avers, her personal belongings were confiscated by County officers. Although she repeatedly asked Jail officials to return certain prescription medications, the officials refused either to return the medications or to attend to her medical needs in any other way.[4]
The next morning, Ford was taken to Lynn District Court. The court reviewed the docket in her case and ultimately dismissed the case, as "the warrant was issued in error."

C. Facts as Presented by the Defendants
The defendants do not contest that City police officers arrested Ford, searched her at the Berkeley Street lockup, and then transferred her to the County Jail, where she was subjected to a strip and body cavity search. The defendants do, however, challenge certain other details of Ford's story.
Specifically, Officer Graham-Smith states that she does not remember searching Ford, but that it was not her practice to require female arrestees to be completely naked during a search. Further, the City indicates that Ford was carrying two sharp knives in her handbag at the time of the arrest.[5]
In addition, with respect to Ford's alleged requests for her medication while she was in County custody, the County defendants indicate that Ford never requested 0907and, indeed, explicitly refused 0907 medical attention while at the County Jail. Further, they allege that while Ford was at the Jail, she never informed Jail staff that she suffered from any conditions or symptoms requiring medical attention.
127 *127 II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The summary judgment standard is fully described in the corresponding section of the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum.
B. Federal and State Constitutional Law Governing Strip-searches
The federal law in this Circuit regarding strip and visual body cavity searches is discussed at length in the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum. In this context, the following summary suffices.
Referring to the general issue of "reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment," the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts reviewing searches to "balanc[e] ... the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails" ("the Bell balancing test"). Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). First Circuit case law applying this test provides additional, though somewhat equivocal guidance. In 1993, the court concluded that strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified, at the least, by a reasonable suspicion that the individual being searched is carrying a weapon or harboring contraband. Id., 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1997). The court did not, however, articulate the constitutional prerequisite to a strip-search in the absence of a visual body cavity inspection, stating only that "strip and/or visual body cavity searches are not routine, and must be carefully evaluated." Then, in Roberts v. Rhode Island, the First Circuit suggested that in cases involving "particularly dangerous" prisoners or arrestees charged with violent felonies, institutional security concerns might justify strip and visual body cavity searches in the absence of particularized reasonable suspicion. Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111-12 (1st Cir.2001).
By comparison, state law on the issue is less ambiguous. Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XIV, provides every person the right "to be secure from all unreasonable searches." Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d at 11090712 (1st Cir.1997). Further, the Supreme Judicial Court recently held0907presumably, though not explicitly, under this Article0907"that probable cause is the appropriate standard to apply to strip and visual body cavity searches." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 708 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1999). Thus, Massachusetts courts apply a stricter standard to strip and visual body cavity searches than do federal courts in this circuit. Accord Swain, 117 F.3d at 11 (expressing a similar view, but before Thomas was decided).

C. Discussion of Plaintiff's Claims
In the interests of clarity, I discuss Ford's claims in the order in which the alleged injuries occurred, rather than the order in which the claims are listed in Ford's complaint. I therefore begin with the search at the Berkeley Street lockup, then address, in turn, the search at the County Jail, Sheriff Rouse's claim of qualified immunity, the plaintiff's claims under Article XIV of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and the County defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to Ford's medical needs, and finally I address the City's liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
1. Search at the Berkeley Street Lockup
City liability for the alleged strip-search at the Berkeley Street lockup cannot be determined on summary 128 judgment, as numerous issues of material fact remain unresolved. To begin with, although Ford *128 claims that
she was naked during the search, Officer Graham-Smith denies that the women she searched were completely naked at any point during a search. Without a more accurate factual picture of the extent of the search at the Berkeley Street lockup, I can neither conduct the Bell balancing test nor determine the appropriate state legal standard to assess the constitutionality of that search.
Further, even assuming that the search at the Berkeley Street lockup was unconstitutional under the Commonwealth or Federal Constitution, Ford cannot establish City liability for the search unless she can show that an "official policy [was] the moving force [behind] the constitutional violation." Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Hancock v. Town of Wakefield, 1996 WL 490175, *4 (Mass.Super.1996) (concluding that the Supreme Judicial Court would apply Monell to the MCRA (citing Rodriques v. Furtado, 575 N.E.2d 1124, 1131 (1991))). I cannot make this determination on the record now before me.
In support of her claim that City policy provided the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation, Ford maintains that the City failed either to promulgate a constitutional strip-search policy or to train its officers regarding the legal requirements for a strip-search. While I certainly agree that, in principal, failure to promulgate a policy or provide training "may be fairly said to represent a policy for which [a] city is responsible," such responsibility only attaches if "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." City of Canton Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).
Here, Ford variably alleges (1) that the BPD had a policy (Rule 318) under which all female arrestees were stripsearched, and (2) that the BPD had "no policy ... on strip-searches and that such lack of policy caused the police officers to not know the rules regarding strip-searches." These vague and seemingly contradictory allegations are insufficient to prove, as a matter of law, that the City was "deliberately indifferent" to the constitutional rights of arrestees.
On the other hand, Ford does introduce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine question of fact as to whether the City paid adequate attention to the evolving case law regarding the constitutional requirements for a strip-search. Specifically, Officer Graham-Smith's testimony about the wide range of circumstances in which she routinely strip-searched arrestees strongly suggests a need for a new search policy and/or further training. Further, the City's blithe assertions that "Rule 318 does not mandate a strip-search," and "it is not the policy of the [BPD] to strip-search women being transferred to the Suffolk County Jail," do little to dispel this suggestion, particularly as the City is apparently unable to articulate what its strip-search policy was at the time Ford was arrested.
Thus, I find that Ford has introduced sufficient evidence to raise genuine questions of fact regarding the constitutionality both of the strip-search at the Berkeley Street lockup, and of the City's then-applicable search "policy." These questions of fact preclude summary judgment in favor of either party on any issue arising out of

the contested City strip-search. Ford and the City's motions for summary judgment are therefore DENIED insofar as they relate to the search at the Berkeley Street lockup.
129 *129 2. Search at the County Jail
Ford's claims relating to the search at the County Jail are completely addressed by my discussion in the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum. Had Ford chosen to remain in the class, she would have been a member of Sub-Class I, as her underlying offense0907smashing the headlights of someone's empty car with an empty beer bottle0907involved neither drugs nor violence against another individual.[6] As such, Ford is entitled to damages from the City and the County for violation of her Fourth Amendment rights in connection with the search at the County Jail, and from the City for violation of her equal protection rights. The amount of damages to which Ford is entitled remains to be determined. Ford's motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED, and the defendants' corresponding motions are DENIED, insofar as they relate to the City and County's liability for the unconstitutional search at the County Jail.
3. Sheriff Rouse's Qualified Immunity
For the reasons stated in the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum, I conclude that Rouse has established the defense of sovereign immunity for his role in the County strip-search, as the search occurred before June 25, 1997, when the First Circuit issued its decision in Swain, supra. Accordingly, the County defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Sheriff Rouse's liability for Ford's injuries.
4. Claims under Article XIV of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
The defendants seek summary judgment of the plaintiffs' claims under Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, on the grounds that the "Declaration of Rights does not provide for a direct, private, right of action without a statutory basis or vehicle." This may be true, but it is irrelevant. As the First Circuit observed in Swain, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA") provides a private right of action for vindication of "rights protected by either federal or state law." 117 F.3d at 11-12. Thus, the defendants' motions for summary judgment of Ford's Article XIV claims are DENIED.[7]
5. County Defendants' Deliberate Indifference to Ford's Medical Needs at the County Jail
I next consider the County defendants' request for summary judgment of Ford's Eighth Amendment allegations 130 regarding inadequate provision of medical care at the *130 County Jail. Ford's filings on this issue are quite
sparse. In her complaint, she says only that during her detention, she "repeatedly asked for her medication (in her pocketbook) which was prescribed by her doctor for a serious health condition," and that these requests were denied, apparently by Jail officials. Then, in her opposition to the County defendants' motion for summary judgment, Ford alleges more broadly that she "requested [medical] help" while in the County Jail, but Jail officials "denied [her] her medication and ignored her medical needs." Neither of these pleadings provide any information at all about the nature of Ford's alleged medical condition.
Ford's deposition provides some additional information. For example, Ford indicates that she suffers from migraine headaches and takes beta blockers preventively. In the deposition, however, Ford directly states that she does not recall asking to see a nurse while at the County Jail, nor informing any staff at the Jail that she was "experiencing the symptoms of a migraine headache."
These few facts are simply insufficient to support Ford's Eighth Amendment claim. Most tellingly, Ford does not bring a claim against the individuals directly responsible for the alleged deprivation of medical care. As a result, her claim cannot be premised solely on Jail officials' treatment of her but must rest more broadly on the County

and Sheriff Rouse's deliberate indifference to the medical needs of all Jail inmates. But Ford provides absolutely no evidence to support this broader claim. Without any such evidence, Ford's conclusory allegation that conditions at the Jail violate the Eighth Amendment cannot survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the County defendants' motion for summary judgment of Ford's Eight Amendment claim is GRANTED.
6. City's Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count I)
Finally, I consider Ford's claim against the City for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of the stripsearches at the City and County Jails. This claim requires Ford to prove: "(1) negligence (duty of reasonable care and breach of that duty); (2) emotional distress; (3) causation; (4) physical harm manifested by objective symptomatology; and (5) that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress under like circumstances." Brimage v. City of Boston, 2001 WL 69488, *1 (Mass.Super.2001) (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982)). Ford bases the claim on the City's alleged failure to formulate a constitutional strip-search policy or to train City police officers regarding the constitutional prerequisites to such a search.
The City argues that it is entitled to summary judgment of this claim, because State law provides immunity to municipalities for "any claim arising out of an intentional tort." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c). The City observes that a strip-search "is a prototypical intentional act," and it therefore concludes that it is immune to liability for any emotional distress Ford may have suffered as a result of the contested searches.
The City correctly states Massachusetts law, but I question its reasoning. While I certainly agree that a stripsearch is an intentional "act," it is not an intentional tort unless the officer performing the search acted with "intent to harm (or a state of mind of knowing that the act would result in a violation of a legally protected right)." Foster 131 v. McGrail, 844 F.Supp. 16, 25 (D.Mass.1994) (citing *131 Schenker v. Binns, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 404, 466 N.E.2d 131 (1984)). Thus, the strip-searches of Ford cannot have been intentional torts unless the officers performing the searches knew at the time that the searches were unlawful. But this is precisely what Ford contests: She argues that the City failed to adequately train the officers, as a result of which they did not know, at the time, that the searches were unconstitutional. If Ford is ultimately able to prove her claim of failure to train she will also have conclusively proven that the strip-searches were not intentional torts.
Put differently, the fact that the same set of circumstances could also form the basis for intentional tort claims does not preclude Ford's alternative theory of the case. According to Ford, the City failed adequately to train its officers, so it is the City that should be liable for the officers' resulting (uninformed, and therefore unintentional) violation of her rights. Ford must still establish the factual truth of this story at trial, but assuming she is able to do so, Massachusetts law does not grant the City immunity from her claim. Therefore, the City's request for summary judgment of this claim is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum, all parties' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The details of this decision are provided above and in the attached Order Re: Summary Judgment Motions.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Ford opted out of the certified class of plaintiffs, but she continues to be a party to this action, and to pursue her individual claims against the defendants. This Memorandum only addresses Ford's individual claims. I address the claims of the plaintiff class in another Memorandum, also issued today.
[2] This Court previously dismissed Count II of the plaintiff's complaint.
[3] Apparently, Ford struck someone's car with a bag of beer bottles and broke at least one headlight and one window.

The default warrant was later determined to be defective, as Ford had previously paid the restitution fee in full. Ford does not allege, however, that any of the defendants knew or should have known, at any time relevant here, that the warrant was defective.
[4] Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, Ford apparently takes a prescription medication to prevent migraines. She does not indicate whether she actually had a headache while in the County Jail, or simply wished to take the medication preventively.
[5] Although City officials apparently failed to find these knives, County officials found them upon Ford's admission to the County Jail.
[6] The fact that Ford had two small knives in her handbag when she was admitted to the County Jail does not affect this analysis. Ford indicates, and the County does not dispute, that the knives were "tiny" pen-knives, one wooden, and one with inlaid stones. Ford alleges she carried them to "cut apples and carrots at the barn to give my horse." If the presence of such small penknives in an arrestee's handbag, without more, were sufficient to create "reasonable suspicion" that the arrestee was harboring weapons or contraband, that jurisprudential standard would afford little protection. Almost every woman carries some small sharp objects in her handbag 0907nailfiles, keys, ballpoint pens, safety pins. I do not dispute the Jail officials' right and obligation to confiscate the knives, but I cannot accept that their mere presence in Ford's handbag justified her strip and visual body cavity search.
[7] Ford does not request summary judgment of this claim, so I reach no conclusion as to its underlying merits. I remind Ford, however, that in order to maintain her claim under the MCRA, she must ultimately prove, based on the specific facts of her case, that the injuries resulting from her strip-search were "perpetrated by `threats, intimidation, or coercion' as required under Massachusetts law." Swain, 117 F.3d at 12.
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 154 F.Supp.2d 131 (2001)
Bronwyn FORD, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF BOSTON, Suffolk County, and Richard J. Rouse, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Defendants.
No. CIV. 98-11346-NG.
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
July 31, 2001.
1323 *132 *133 Audrey Samit, Eric N Klein, Klein & Miller, Howard Friedman, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Michael A. Goldsmith, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Boston Law Department, City Hall, Eve Anne Piemonte-Stacey, Rose E. King, Assistant General Counsel, Suffolk County Sheriff's Dept., Melissa J. Garand, Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY AND AGAINST THE CLASS PLAINTIFFS
GERTNER, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Between December 10, 1995, and September 20, 1999 ("class period"), the City of Boston ("City") followed an express policy of transferring all female arrestees who could not post bail to Suffolk County's maximum security Nashua Street Jail ("Jail"). In contrast, the City held male arrestees in City facilities. During the same time period, the Suffolk County ("County") Sheriff's Department followed an express policy of subjecting these Jail admittees0907all women0907to strip and visual body cavity searches.
Until May 24, 1999, the County's search policy was astonishingly broad. Under this pre-May 1999 policy, County officials strip-searched all arrestees admitted to the Jail, regardless of the crimes with which they were charged, or any other individual factors. Women were searched following arrests for crimes as minor as peddling sausages without a license, and larceny under $250 associated with the failure to return a rented video game.
The searches could not have been more degrading. Officers inspected each woman's ears, mouth, and nostrils, humiliating or offensive to the dignity of the woman, asked her to lift each breast and to spread the cheeks of her buttocks so that the officers could inspect her genitals.
From May 24, 1999, until the end of the class period, the search policy was more limited, requiring a determination of probable cause prior to searches of misdemeanants. The amended policy continued to permit suspicionless strip-searches of all arrestees charged with felonies, however, and it made no attempt to distinguish between arrestees charged with offenses involving violence or illicit substances, and other felony arrestees arguably less likely to be carrying weapons or contraband.
134 As a direct result of the City's transfer policy and the County's search policies, *134 more than five thousand women[1] taken into custody by the Boston Police Department ("BPD") during the class period were transferred to the County Jail, where they were subjected to "routine"[2] strip and visual body cavity searches. At issue here are the basic rights of this class of women 0907many of whom were detained solely because they could not afford to post bail. The women a 0907 certified class0907challenge the constitutionality of the Jail strip-searches on Fourth Amendment and equal protection grounds.[3]

This memorandum and order addresses the class' motion for summary judgment [docket entry # 75], as well as the cross motion for partial summary judgment filed by the County, Richard J. Rouse ("Rouse") and Jane Doe ("Doe") (together, "County defendants") [docket entry # 92]. For the reasons discussed below, I find and DECLARE the County's search policies during the class period facially unconstitutional. Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED in favor of the plaintiffs on all questions relating to the facial constitutionality of those policies.
I further find the County and the City liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") for violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of all class members charged with felonies or misdemeanors involving neither violence nor drugs, and class members held on default warrants for similar offenses. Accordingly, summary judgment of liability against the County and City is GRANTED in favor of those plaintiffs.
With respect to Sheriff Rouse, I find that he is entitled to qualified immunity for his role in any unconstitutional strip-searches that occurred prior to June 25, 1997, when the First Circuit decided Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). As detailed below, however, he is liable for all unconstitutional strip-searches that occurred after that date. Accordingly, summary judgment of liability against Sheriff Rouse is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Because of the state of the record, this Memorandum reaches no decision as to the defendants' Fourth Amendment liability for strip-searches of women arrested initially or on default warrants for crimes involving violence or drugs.[4] Accordingly, the plaintiffs' request for summary judgment of liability under the Fourth Amendment, and the County defendants' corresponding cross-motion for partial summary judgment, are DENIED with respect to those searches. As described below, further briefing and factual development is necessary to clarify the claims of these class members.
135 *135 To facilitate resolution of the remaining issues in this case, I hereby create two sub-classes of women: (1) those class members arrested (initially or on default warrants) for crimes involving neither drugs nor violence ("Sub-Class I"); and (2) those class members arrested (initially or on default warrants) for offenses involving either drugs or "violence" ("Sub-Class II"). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4). The plaintiffs are DIRECTED to identify a named representative for Sub-Class II, or to propose further divisions of the sub-class, by August 15, 2001. This filing should also propose a suitable definition for the term "violence" in the context of this case. The defendants' response is due within fifteen days thereafter.
Finally, I turn to the plaintiffs' claims against the City for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On this question, my holding is clear: The record is more than sufficient to establish that the City denied all plaintiffs, in both Sub-Classes I and II, the equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment of liability against the City for violation of the Equal Protection Clause is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts as Presented by the Plaintiff Class
The basic, largely uncontested facts of this case are both straightforward and appalling. During the almost fouryear period at issue here (and for several previous years), the City transported all female arrestees who could not post bail to the Suffolk County Jail, a maximum security pre-trial detention facility,[5] for detention pending their initial court appearance.[6] From the beginning of the class period until late May 1999 (almost a year after this action was filed), most if not all of these women0907regardless of the crime with which they were charged, or any other individual characteristics0907were strip-searched upon their admission to the Jail.[7] Worse still, these routine strip-searches were mandated by Sheriff's Department policy ("Policy I").
On May 24, 1999, the County amended its policy to require a finding of probable cause prior to a strip-search of an arrestee charged with a misdemeanor, but the new policy ("Policy II") continued to require strip-searches of all

arrestees charged with felonies. Not until September 20, 1999 0907 the end of the class period 0907did the County finally eliminate routine strip-searches of all pre-arraignment detainees, including those charged with felonies.[8]
136 *136 The County concedes that it made the first of these policy changes to conform 0907 albeit two years late to 0907 a 1997 First Circuit ruling, which held that "[s]trip and visual body cavity searches must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that [an] arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons."[9]Swain, 117 F.3d at 6. The County apparently made the second change to bring its search policy into conformity with both state law and the BPD's newly adopted search policy.[10]
During the years in which strip-searches of women arrestees were routine, the searches were conducted without any individualized findings of reasonable suspicion. Many of the plaintiffs were searched following arrests for misdemeanors or non-violent felonies, in situations in which there was no apparent reason to suspect them of carrying weapons or contraband. For example, the class representative, Katrina Mack, was strip-searched on March 5, 1998, after she was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene after causing property damage.[11] Another plaintiff was strip-searched after she was arrested for violating a municipal ordinance that prohibits peddling sausages without a license.[12] A third was arrested on a default warrant for larceny under $250.00, issued after her children failed to return a rented Sega video game. [13]

Even more troubling, the plaintiffs represent that many of the women strip-searched at the Jail had already been searched0907and some had undergone visual body cavity inspections0907while in BPD custody. That is, according to the plaintiffs, these class members were first strip-searched by the BPD, then transported in BPD custody to the Jail, and then strip-searched again by the officials at the Jail.

Pursuant to the Sheriff's Department's Policy S507(B), the strip-searches at the Jail were incredibly thorough and invasive. Jail officials were told to:

137

*137 1. Instruct the inmate to empty his/her pockets and set aside property for searching.

2. Instruct the inmate to remove all clothing and set aside clothes for searching.

3. Visually examine the inmate's entire body in a careful and systematic order ... to identify and seize contraband ....

4. Start with the inmate's head and hair. Have the inmate run through his/her hair with his/her fingers.

5. Examine behind the inmate's ear.

6. Check the inmate's mouth by having him/her open wide ....

7. Check the inmate's nostrils for any abnormalities.

8. ... Check his/her entire back and chest down to the waist line. Then have the inmate roll his/her hands 180 degrees forward and then backwards with his/her fingers widespread. You should also check under his/her fingernails. Check his/ her armpits carefully and then examine down the sides of his/her body to the waist line. If the inmate is female, she must lift each breast separately so that you can check for possible contraband ....

9. ... [E]xamine the inmate's buttocks and groin area ....

a. The inmate must be told to bend forward and spread the cheeks of his/her buttocks. Be sure to look for possible strings protruding from the anus or vagina ....

b. The front groin (pubic) area and in between the inmate's legs must be checked thoroughly ....

10. ... [S]earch down both of the inmate's legs 0907front, back, inside and out.

11. ... [C]heck the inmate's feet. Don't forget to look between each toe and check the bottom of each foot.
Although the County issued a new strip-search policy every year, the basic procedure did not change.
Despite this exhaustive search procedure, plaintiffs assert, strip-searches of BPD arrestees during the class period only uncovered contraband 0.063% of the time on 0907 five occasions, during a period in which almost 8,000 female arrestees were brought to the Jail by Boston police.
Another disturbing aspect of this story is the City's disparate treatment of male and female arrestees. In accordance with City policy during the class period, only female arrestees who could not post bail were transported to the Jail. As a result, although both male and female arrestees were subjected to searches during booking at City police stations,[14] male arrestees who could not post bail were then held in City police lockups and only rarely subjected to a second search, while female arrestees were brought to the Jail, where they were routinely subjected to humiliating strip and visual body cavity searches.
B. Contested Issues of Fact Identified by the County and Sheriff Rouse
138 The defendants concede many of the facts detailed above, but they insist that a *138 few key issues remain in dispute. For example, the County challenges the plaintiffs' assertion that only 0.063% of searches conducted at the Jail produced contraband. The County argues0907with some testimonial support, but no data 0907that Jail officers in fact uncovered contraband "on a regular basis" as a result of searching BPD detainees. Further, the County maintains that the very fact that some of the Jail searches of BPD detainees uncovered contraband indicates that "proper searches were not conducted by Boston Police before transportation to the Jail."
The County also takes issue with the plaintiffs' statistics regarding the crimes with which class members were charged, and it offers alternative data. Of most relevance here, the County indicates that it believes there were 7,907 admissions of BPD detainees during the relevant time period,[15] of which 5,080 were held on misdemeanors only, 2,048 were held on felonies only, and 774 were held on both misdemeanors and felonies. [16] The County emphasizes that these figures do not indicate that 7,907 women were strip-searched during the class period. It concedes, however, that its policy until May 1999 was to strip-search all arrestees admitted to the Jail except those who specifically objected to the search, and it offers no data regarding the number of women who objected during the period.
Turning to the question of liability, the County argues that its obligation to ensure safety at the Jail raises an issue of material fact that cannot be addressed on summary judgment. Specifically, the County notes that the Jail is primarily a maximum security pretrial detention facility. It suggests that institutional security concerns during the class period required that BPD detainees entering the Jail be strip-searched before they were brought in contact with the general population. In light of these concerns, the County argues that before this Court can evaluate the reasonableness of the contested strip-searches, the fact-finder must determine the appropriate "weight to be given the institutional security needs" at the Jail.
Finally, the County and Sheriff Rouse argue that there is an outstanding issue of fact regarding the role that Rouse played in promulgating Suffolk County Sheriff's Department policies. The County avers that it will demonstrate at trial that "someone other than ... Rouse had final authorization" to issue such policies.
C. Contested Issues of Fact Identified by the City
The City, too, identifies issues of fact that it believes preclude summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Specifically, although the City admits that it transferred all of the plaintiffs to the Jail, it asserts that it had no authority or control over the manner in which they were treated at the Jail, and it further suggests that it was entitled to assume that the County's treatment of the women was constitutional. At "worst" (from its perspective), the City

argues that any question of vicarious City liability for searches conducted pursuant to County strip-search policies 139 raises issues of fact regarding whether the City had *139 actual or constructive knowledge of the County policies.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In this context, "material" means that "a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit ... if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant." McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995). Similarly, "genuine" means that "the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party." Id.
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1999). Overall, therefore, Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Finally, I note that where, as here, there are dueling motions for summary judgment, the Rule 56 standard remains intact. The motions "simply demand that all factual disputes and any competing rational inferences be resolved in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Santana v. Deluxe Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 162, 167 (D.Mass.1998) (citing Den Norske Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.1996)).
B. Constitutionality of the Search Policies
The plaintiffs' overarching request is that I "declare that the policy or practice of conducting routine strip-searches and routine visual body cavity searches of women is illegal and unconstitutional" and "enjoin enforcement" of the challenged County search policies.[17] For the reasons discussed below, these requests are GRANTED with respect to both Policies I and II.[18]
1. Legal Background
As the First Circuit recently held in a similar case, "[b]oth convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees" 0907and therefore, clearly, the pre-arraignment arrestees who largely make up the plaintiff class here 0907 "retain constitutional rights despite their incarceration, including basic Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 140 searches and seizures." Roberts v. Rhode *140 Island, 239 F.3d 107, 109090710 (1st Cir. 2001).[19] Since the detainees are confined, their rights may be somewhat more limited than those of the general public, but they are not the nullity that Suffolk County's expansive strip-search policies would suggest.
Strip and visual body cavity searches are far from "routine." The Supreme Court indicated more than twenty years ago that such searches "instinctively give[ it] ... pause," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and since then courts have used much stronger language. The First Circuit, for example, deems such searches "an `extreme intrusion' on personal privacy and `an offense to the dignity of the individual.'" Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 (citing Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir.1996)). The Seventh Circuit's language is even more strident: "[S]trip searches involving the visual inspection of the anal and genital areas [are] demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive,

signifying degradation and submission." Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.1983) modified (1984) (internal citations omitted).
These strong sentiments, which I share, provide the backdrop for my analysis of the challenged County search policies. In addition, the courts have provided a more explicit if 0907 occasionally inconsistent 0907analytic framework. The foundation for this framework is the Supreme Court's observation in Bell that the "test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment ... requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."[20]Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. To perform this "Bell balancing test," the Court instructed future courts to "consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Id.
Applying this test almost two decades later, the First Circuit concluded that strip and visual body cavity searches "must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the [particular] arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons." Swain, 117 F.3d at 7 (emphasis added). Earlier this year, the First Circuit again applied the "reasonable suspicion" standard to strike down two Rhode Island policies under which arrestees were routinely strip-searched prior to admission to a state prison. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 108. Further, the Court found the Rhode Island blanket strip-search policies unconstitutional even though the plaintiff in the case was held in a maximum security facility where arrestees routinely "mingle[d] with the general population" 0907circumstances arousing precisely the same institutional security concerns invoked by the defendants here.[21]Id. at 112-13.
In their filings, the defendants cite the Roberts decision, for the proposition that the reasonable suspicion standard only applies "in the context of prisoners held in local jails for minor offenses." Further, the County 141 invokes Roberts to support its *141 institutional security arguments, because the Roberts court observes in passing, "institutional security is a legitimate need of law enforcement, and may provide a compelling reason for a warrantless strip-search absent reasonable suspicion of individual wrongdoing." Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110, 111.
The County takes these quotations entirely out of context. Both of these observations appear in dicta preceding the court's discussion of Roberts' specific claims. Further, even in its discussion of "compelling" institutional security concerns, the Roberts court provides only two examples of circumstances in which blanket warrantless and suspicionless searches may be constitutional: (1) searches of inmates after largely private, full-contact visits with outsiders; and (2) searches of "particularly dangerous inmates" returning to a "special security area" of a maximum security prison after a visit to the law library or infirmary.[22]Id. at 111 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 558090759; Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir.1983)). Neither example applies here.
The Roberts court's only other reference to circumstances possibly justifying a blanket search policy that does not require individualized suspicion is its later observation, also in dicta, that the "reasonable suspicion standard may be met simply by the fact that the inmate was charged with a violent felony." Id. at 112 (emphasis added). These dicta, however, give little guidance as to what sort of felony is categorized as "violent," or why someone charged with such an offense should be suspected of concealing weapons or contraband. One might argue, for example, that while the nature of the crime for which someone was arrested should be considered in evaluating the presence or absence of a "reasonable suspicion" to search, does not independently establish "reasonable suspicion" sufficient to justify a blanket search policy.
2. Policy I
The First Circuit's analysis in Roberts may signal a certain ambivalence about the reasonable suspicion standard and the relationship between that standard and institutional security concerns, but that ambivalence does not affect the outcome here. In this case, there is absolutely no question that the County's concern for the security of the Jail does not justify its pre-May 1999 policy of searching all BPD arrestees without any individual or classwide findings of reasonable suspicion.
To begin with, by the defendants' own admission, the majority of the BPD arrestees were charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses, and fewer than a quarter of those arrestees were charged with drug offenses. Further, the record in this case clearly indicates that many or even most members of the plaintiff class

had already been searched[23] during booking by the BPD, and had been transported to the Jail in BPD custody. 142 [24] Under these *142 circumstances, the County cannot reasonably have suspected the women, as a class, of
harboring weapons or contraband at the time of admission.
The County posits that because BPD arrestees joined the general population at the maximum security Jail, they could have served as a conduit for the introduction of drugs or other illicit items. I find this unlikely. It defies belief to suppose that any of the plaintiffs deliberately sought arrest in order to smuggle contraband or weapons into the Jail. Cf. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 (noting the "essentially unplanned nature of an arrest and subsequent incarceration"). Further, Jail officials here had no reason to believe 0907and, indeed, numerous reasons to doubt0907that the BPD arrestees, as a class, were particularly dangerous. It may be reasonable "to safeguard[] institutional security" by engaging in "extra efforts to ensure that the most dangerous inmates do not have access to weapons or contraband," but "the extension of the intrusion to far less dangerous inmates ... is a severe incursion on privacy frowned upon by the Bell balancing test." Id. at 111.
Finally, I note that if the County truly had serious concerns about allowing the BPD arrestees to mingle with the general population, it could simply have held the women in a separate area of the Jail during their short stays. Indeed, the County admits that since May 1999, when it abandoned Policy I, it has housed all BPD arrestees in a booking area separate from the Jail's main housing unit. In light of this policy change, which clearly indicates the ready availability of isolated space to house BPD arrestees, the County's earlier choice to strip-search all BPD arrestees is nothing short of outrageous.
Nothing on the record before me, therefore, justifies the search policy in place at the Jail prior to May 24, 1999. [25] Jail officials made no individualized findings of reasonable suspicion prior to conducting strip-searches of BPD arrestees. Nor were there any class-wide characteristics or factual circumstances that warranted such searches in every case. While I understand the County's concern over institutional security, that concern does not excuse the County's decision to require the women in the plaintiff class 0907many of whom had yet to see a judge to 0907 endure the indignities of a strip and visual body cavity search. "`[A]n indiscriminate strip-search policy routinely applied ... can not be justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security considerations.'" Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113 (quoting Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.1981)).
Thus, Policy I fails to satisfy the Bell balancing test and falls well short of the constitutional standards articulated by the First Circuit in Swain and Roberts. Accordingly, I find the policy facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
143 *143 3. Policy from May 24 to September 20, 1999
As noted above, the County amended its search policy on May 24, 1999, to require a finding of probable cause prior to a strip-search of any pre-arraignment detainee arrested for a misdemeanor. With County approval, though, Jail officials continued to search everyone else0907all BPD arrestees charged with felonies, and apparently, those held on default warrants0907 without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause.
Policy II also fails Fourth Amendment scrutiny. As indicated above, the First Circuit has only identified a few narrow circumstances in which the reasonable suspicion standard is inapplicable, and blanket strip-searches permissible. None of those circumstances is present here. This case does not involve full-contact visits with outsiders, but rather routine admissions of new arrestees. There is no indication that women arrested by the BPD after May 1999 were "particularly dangerous," or that the Jail had a "lengthy [documented] history" of "contraband problems."[26] Finally, the County made no effort to distinguish women charged with violent felonies from those held on default misdemeanor warrants or charged with lesser felony offenses 0907like the plaintiff charged with larceny over $250.00 for failing to return a rented video game.[27] I find no support in the First Circuit case law, or anywhere else, for the County's peculiar conviction that State officials may constitutionally strip-search all felony arrestees, and all arrestees held on default warrants, upon admission to the Jail.

Indeed, quite apart from First Circuit law, there is simply no rational basis for making such a consequential and yet arbitrary distinction between groups of BPD arrestees. While the felony-misdemeanor distinction provides a convenient benchmark by which society can estimate the seriousness of an offense, it offers little information about the likelihood that an individual arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband.[28] Why, for example, should a woman charged with larceny over $250.00 be suspected of concealing contraband and therefore subjected to a routine suspicionless strip-search, when a woman charged with misdemeanor possession of drugs cannot be strip-searched without probable cause? A blanket search policy that distinguished between violent and nonviolent felons might be closer to the mark, offering an arguably reasonable or 0907 at least rational 0907approach to balancing the need for particular searches against the indignities consequent to such invasions of privacy, but drawing the line between misdemeanants and felons is not.
Similarly, the mere fact that women held on default warrants "ha[ve] been arraigned, ha[ve] had bail set and ha [ve] defaulted on ... court appearance[s]" does not, as the County maintains, justify routine suspicionless stripsearches. There is no reason to suppose that a woman who once failed to appear before a court is, as a result, more likely to be carrying a weapon or contraband if and when she is later arrested. Indeed, the plaintiff in 144 Roberts was arrested on such an outstanding warrant, and the First Circuit itself observed *144 that "both highly dangerous and relatively harmless offenders may be incarcerated with judicial approval." Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111. In light of this observation, the County's position that the "need" to search all women arrested on default warrants somehow outweighs the resulting invasion of personal rights is simply incomprehensible.
In short, I find no reason to believe that a woman charged with a felony or held on a default warrant inherently presents a greater risk to prison security (through introduction of weapons or contraband) than a woman charged with a misdemeanor. As a result, I am not persuaded that the County corrected the constitutional deficiencies in Policy I simply by instituting a requirement of probable cause prior to a strip-search of misdemeanor arrestees. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches mandates some effort by Jail officials either to premise searches on individualized reasonable suspicion or to identify classes of arrestees that reasonably pose a heightened risk to institutional security. Policy II does neither and is therefore facially unconstitutional.
C. Defendants' Liability
Although the County's search policies during the class period are facially unconstitutional and warrant declaratory relief for the plaintiffs, the defendants' liability for the promulgation and implementation of those policies 0907and thus, the damages due to the individual plaintiffs0907presents a harder question. I first discuss the County's liability under the Fourth Amendment. I then consider Sheriff Rouse's claim of qualified immunity for unconstitutional searches. Finally, I turn to the City's liability for the searches, first under the Fourth Amendment and then under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The County's Liability for Fourth Amendment Violations
To hold a local government entity liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights violations committed by its employees, a plaintiff must establish that the violations resulted from implementation or execution of a policy or custom of the entity. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690090791, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Here, there can be no question that (1) prior to May 1999, Suffolk County had an explicit policy of strip-searching every BPD arrestee admitted to the Jail, regardless of any individual characteristics, and (2) between May and September 1999, the County had an explicit policy of strip-searching all BPD felony arrestees and arrestees held on default warrants, again regardless of any individual characteristics. Thus, if any of the resulting searches were unconstitutional, the County is liable under Monell.
The next question, therefore, is whether any or all Jail searches of BPD arrestees during the class period violated the arrestees' civil rights. As Policies I and II are facially unconstitutional, it is tempting to conclude that all searches conducted while those policies were in effect were also unconstitutional. At this stage, however, I decline to make such a broad finding as a matter of law. Among other issues, it may well be that women charged with certain violent felonies are not entitled to damages for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights in

connection with the Jail searches. Even though the County policies under which these women were searched were unconstitutional, the particular searches may not have been. Thus, I find it appropriate to subdivide the plaintiff class into two sub-classes, the first made up of women to whom the County is clearly liable in damages 145 as a matter of law, and the second *145 made up of women whose stories present more difficult questions.
In identifying the line that separates these sub-classes, I am guided at this preliminary stage by my conviction that arrestees charged with offenses0907felonies or misdemeanors0907that involve neither drugs nor violence pose no inherent risk to the institutional security of a detention facility. I am also guided by the First Circuit's suggestion in dicta that the "reasonable suspicion standard may be met simply by the fact that [an] inmate was charged with a violent felony." Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112. While I am not persuaded that this statement governs my decisions in this case, it does convince me that on the record now before me, I cannot determine that all plaintiffs charged with violent felonies are entitled to damages from the County as a matter of law.
Based on these principles, I define the following sub-classes: (1) Sub-Class I: class members who were searched following arrests (either originally or on a default warrant) for offenses involving neither violence nor drugs (class representative Katrina Mack); and (2) Sub-Class II: the remaining class members, who were searched after following arrests for offenses (either misdemeanors or felonies) involving drugs or "violence" (class representative to be determined).[29]
a. County Liability to Sub-Class I
There can be no question about the County's liability in damages to the women in Sub-Class I. All of these women were subjected to horribly invasive strip and visual body cavity searches. The County made no pretense of balancing the need for the searches against "the invasion of personal rights that the search[es] entail[ed]." Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
Further, even if I were to allow the County now to propose a retroactive rationale for the searches, nothing the County could suggest would suffice to justify its routine policy of searching women whose alleged conduct0907whether misdemeanor or felony0907involved neither drugs nor violence. Why should a woman charged with uttering a forged check0907or, for that matter, violating a regulation governing sausage peddling 0907therefore be suspected of carrying concealed weapons or drugs?[30] There is no rational reason for the County to have concluded that these women, as a class, posed a threat to the institutional security of the Jail.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment of liability against the County is GRANTED in part. The County is liable in damages for the unconstitutional searches of all women in Sub-Class I. With respect to SubClass I, therefore, this action will now proceed to individual hearings to determine the amount of damages owed to each woman. One further caveat: If the County can produce evidence suggesting that it had individualized 146 reasonable suspicion to search any particular *146 woman in Sub-Class I0907due, for example, to her conduct during arrest it 0907 is invited to introduce that evidence during the individualized damages hearings. The Court or the fact-finder will then make findings of fact, and I will adjust my estimate of liability accordingly.
b. County Liability to Sub-Class II
On the record now before me, the County's liability in damages as a matter of law to the women in Sub-Class II is less clear. While I appreciate these plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to damages because the County did not, at the time of the searches, conduct the Bell balancing test, let alone make individualized findings of reasonable suspicion, I also recognize that generic characteristics may occasionally generate sufficient security concerns to justify "warrantless strip-search[es] absent reasonable suspicion of individual wrongdoing." Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111. In this case, the maximum security Jail sought, reasonably, to prevent the introduction of drugs or weapons. It therefore seems plausible0907albeit barely0907 that Jail officials could constitutionally have followed a policy of searching arrestees charged with certain crimes, namely those involving weapons or drugs, on the theory that perpetrators of such crimes are marginally more likely to be hiding weapons or drugs on their person at the time of the arrest.

I emphasize, however, that this discussion does not constitute a prediction that the County will ultimately be absolved of liability for the routine searches of the women in Sub-Class II. Rather, my point is merely that on the record now before me, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that those women are entitled to damages.
The plaintiffs' current filings paint a very sympathetic picture of the class as a whole, because they tell the stories only of those women arrested for minor and nonviolent offenses. Before I reach any decision regarding the County's liability to the women in Sub-Class II, I must have some better understanding of the types of crimes with which the women were charged. Accordingly, summary judgment of liability is DENIED with respect to Sub-Class II.
To facilitate resolution of the remaining issues relating to Sub-Class II, the plaintiffs are ORDERED to identify a sub-class representative, or to propose further subdivisions of the sub-class,[31] by August 15, 2001. In this same filing, the plaintiffs are instructed to propose a suitable definition for the terms "violence" and "violent offense," as used herein. The defendants may respond within fifteen days thereafter.
2. Sheriff Rouse's Liability for Fourth Amendment Violations
The parties agree that the Sheriff of Suffolk County "has final policymaking authority for establishing policies for conducting searches of prisoners at the Nashua Street Jail." Thus, because Rouse became Sheriff in October 1996 and remained in that position for the rest of the class period, he clearly bears responsibility for the County's unconstitutional strip-search policies during most of the class period.
The County's argument to the contrary 0907that Rouse never directly "exercised []his authority" to establish County search policies, but instead "relied on the expertise of his staff in promulgating Department policies" is 0907 147 unavailing. Sheriff Rouse's hands-off approach to his job does *147 not absolve him of responsibility for unconstitutional policies developed and promulgated by his underlings on his watch.
The only outstanding question relevant to Rouse's liability in damages, therefore, is whether he is entitled to immunity for any of the unconstitutional searches performed during the class period. The Supreme Court established the standard for qualified immunity[32] two decades ago, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald:
[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.... If the law at [the time of the offense] was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.
Id., 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 569 (1st Cir.1985) (discussing a Sheriff's potential qualified immunity in a context similar to that here). This standard requires a court to inquire first whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established at the time of the injury, and second whether "a reasonable, similarly situated official [would have understood] that the challenged conduct violated that established right." Swain, 117 F.3d at 9. Applying this standard here, I find Sheriff Rouse entitled to qualified immunity for all unconstitutional searches conducted prior to the First Circuit's 1997 decision in Swain, but liable in damages for all such searches performed thereafter.
The law governing strip-searches has changed significantly over the last thirty years. As recently as 1975, the First Circuit held that post-arrest searches involving visual body cavity inspections were "plainly authorized" by Supreme Court precedent and required no further scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 300 (1975). Since then, the Court has come full circle, announcing on June 25, 1997 that Klein is no longer good law, and further, that strip and visual body cavity searches cannot be conducted without individualized reason to suspect that the arrestee is harboring weapons or contraband. Swain, 117 F.3d at 7.
This is precisely the sort of situation for which the doctrine of qualified immunity was developed. The rationale for the doctrine is, in part, that it reduces the likelihood that "able citizens" will be deterred "from accept[ing] public

office" by the possibility of personal liability for actions taken in good-faith reliance on uncertain legal standards. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. I therefore find that Sheriff Rouse has established the defense of qualified immunity for those searches. Between 1975 and 1997, the lingering effects of Klein sufficiently muddied the waters of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this Circuit that a reasonable person in the Sheriff's position could, in good faith, have believed the County's routine search policy to be constitutional.[33]
148 *148 In conclusion, therefore, summary judgment of liability against Sheriff Rouse is GRANTED in part, and the County defendants' motion for summary judgment is also GRANTED in part. I find Rouse liable in damages to all members of Sub-Class I who were searched at the Jail after June 25, 1997. As discussed above for the County, the amount of those damages will be determined in future, individualized hearings.[34]
Rouse's liability for searches of the women in Sub-Class II remains to be determined, but should those searches ultimately be found to be unconstitutional, Rouse will only be responsible for searches conducted after June 25, 1997.[35]
3. The City's Liability for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Violations
[12] City liability for the Jail searches of BPD arrestees poses an interesting question of institutional responsibility. Again, the governing standard derives from Monell: § 1983 provides a cause of action against a municipality for violations resulting from implementation or execution of city policies or customs. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690090791. In this case, though, the plaintiffs' claims fit none of the standard analytic models for municipal liability. For example, the City, unlike the County, had no express policy of subjecting all BPD arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches. Indeed, the City claims0907and I assume, for purposes of this ruling 0907that it had no control over the promulgation of the County policies proximately responsible for the challenged searches. Further, the record before me does not suggest that any City employees had a practice or custom of conducting such searches0907let alone a practice sufficiently "well settled and widespread" as to be attributable to the City. Bordanaro v. City of Everett, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir.1989). Finally, none of the challenged searches resulted directly from the City's failure to promulgate a search policy, e.g. Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[I]n situations that call for procedures, rules, or regulations, the failure to make a policy itself may be actionable"), nor from its failure to train its employees regarding the constitutional prerequisites to a search, City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388090790, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1988) ("[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a `failure to train' can be the basis for liability under § 1983").
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs' claims against the City are clearly actionable under § 1983. The plaintiffs point to an express agreement between the City and the County Sheriff, under which the County agreed to "take custody of and house" BPD arrestees at the Jail. This case is thus best analyzed as involving a subcontract between the City and the County, under which Jail employees, acting as agents of the City, supervised and cared for City 149 arrestees.[36] As such, the City had *149 an affirmative obligation0907as is present in the more standard models for municipal liability to 0907 ensure that the policy of the Jail officials did not lead to widespread violation of BPD arrestees' constitutional rights. Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 n. 9 (11th Cir.1984) ("[W]here a governmental entity delegates the final authority to make decisions then those decisions necessarily represent official policy").
A simple example is sufficient to prove this point. Suppose the City had contracted with a private party to run a women's detention facility. If the wardens at that facility followed a deliberate and explicit policy of starving or torturing the women in their care, the City clearly could not argue that it bore no responsibility for those abuses. "In that sense, the [City's] duty [to detainees in its care] is non-delegable." Id. at 705. Similarly, here, "although the [County] ... contracted to perform an obligation owed by the [City], the [City] itself remains liable for any constitutional deprivations caused by the policies or customs of the [County]."[37]Id.[38]
Having established that the City had an affirmative obligation to monitor conditions for BPD arrestees housed at the Jail, I must next assess whether the City failed to meet that obligation. In so doing, I find the "deliberate

indifference" standard of City of Canton readily applicable. 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197. As in that action, the alleged municipal misdeed here is not an affirmative policy but a "failure" 0907the failure adequately to monitor the search policies followed by City agents employed at the Jail, to ensure compliance with minimum constitutional standards. To establish liability, then, the plaintiffs must establish that the City's failure to monitor "amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to the rights" of BPD detainees. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197.
The plaintiffs easily meet this standard. Strip-searches at maximum security detention facilities are an unfortunate 150 fact of life, yet the City chose to house almost *150 ten thousand BPD arrestees in such a facility without once
checking, even after the 1997 Swain decision, that the facility had a constitutional search policy 0907let alone investigating the actual practices of Jail employees. For that matter, no City official apparently remarked on Jail personnel's surprising lack of curiosity about the precise nature of BPD booking searches. This lack of curiosity itself should have alerted City officials to the likelihood that the Jail followed a policy of routinely strip-searching all admittees rather than tailoring each search to the particular circumstances of an individual admittee's arrest. As this case sadly illustrates, the risks posed by the City's "glaring omissions" of oversight are concrete and obvious. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Those risks are more than sufficient to establish "deliberate indifference" as a matter of law. [39]Id.
To excuse its failure to monitor the Jail's search policy and practice, the City cites Deaton v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.1993), for the proposition that it was entitled to assume that conditions at the Jail comported with constitutional standards. This argument might make some sense if the City had merely asked the County to house a few arrestees for a short period. Here, however, the City effectively used the County Jail as its own facility for almost a decade. To permit the City to escape liability in this case would be to sanction willful disregard of municipal obligations. The City presumably could have chosen to build a municipal facility for women, or to hold arrestees in one of the ten existing City police station lockups.[40] That it chose instead to contract with the County to house female arrestees did not entitle it to bury its head in the sand and ignore the manner in which the County treated those arrestees. Governmental entities may not "slough off their responsibilit [ies]" by performing "a `shell game' with the legal ownership of prisons." Deaton v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 890 (6th Cir.1993) (Boggs, J., concurring).
Under these circumstances, there can be no question that the City's liability in damages for Jail violations of BPD arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights is coextensive with that of the County. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' request for summary judgment of City liability is GRANTED in part. The City is liable in damages for the unconstitutional searches of women in Sub-Class I throughout the class period. The City's liability for the searches of women in Sub-Class II remains to be determined.
4. The City's Liability for Equal Protection Violations
Finally, I turn to the plaintiffs' claim that the City denied female arrestees the equal protection of the laws. As (1) there can be no question that explicit City policy mandated that the women be sent to the Jail, and (2) I have 151 already concluded that the City can be held liable under *151 § 1983 for subsequent Fourth Amendment violations at the Jail, the only issue that must be addressed to determine City liability on the plaintiffs' equal protection claim is whether the City policy, and the resulting searches, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The City's policy of sending women to the County Jail resulted in a clear and significant gender disparity in the treatment of BPD arrestees. Both male and female arrestees were searched incident to booking, but only female arrestees were routinely subjected to degrading strip and visual body cavity searches thereafter. To satisfy the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, the City would have to show that it had "an `exceedingly persuasive justification' for [this] differing treatment." Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273 (citing Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982)).
[This] burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the [City].... The [City] must show `at least that the [challenged] classification serves `important governmental objectives and that the

discriminatory means employed' are `substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' The justification ... must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996).
The City fails to carry this burden. It explains its decision to house female arrestees at the County Jail by referring briefly to "the need to ensure the security, safety and health of the female prisoners, which could not adequately be fulfilled at the [BPD] area station houses." It indicates that "[p]olice district cells could not hold women, because they were not configured to separate women from men," and it argues "the department did not have the personnel and resources to administer holding cells for women."
These conclusory statements do little more than recast the City's original decision to discriminate in less offensive terms. To satisfy the strictures of the equal protection jurisprudence outlined above, the City would have to explain why it could find no satisfactory space for women in the BPD station houses, and why it felt its personnel and resources were better used to meet the needs of male rather than female arrestees.[41] Vague and general references to funding and space constraints cannot justify a policy that resulted directly in the strip and visual body cavity searches of thousands of female arrestees, while permitting their male counterparts to rest in the relative comfort and security of BPD lockups. An explicit City policy of searching female but not male BPD arrestees would clearly violate the Equal Protection Clause. E.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273090774. The policy at issue here is an improvement in name only.
Thus, I find the City liable in damages for the violation of the equal protection rights of all women in the plaintiff class, regardless of the crimes with which they were charged, or the sub-class in which they fall for the Fourth Amendment analysis. The amount of damages remains to be determined.
IV. CONCLUSION
152 As detailed above, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED in *152 part and DENIED in part. The County defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
The plaintiffs are ORDERED to name a representative for Sub-Class II or 0907 alternatively, to propose further subdivision of that class by 0907 August 15, 2001. The defendants' response is due within fifteen days thereafter.
SO ORDERED.
[1] As noted below, the defendants indicate that almost 8,000 women meet this class description. This larger number apparently includes many women who chose to opt out of the plaintiff class.
[2] I adopt the plaintiffs' terminology, but I note that I do not believe "`a strip-search can ... be characterized as a routine procedure. ... Indeed, a strip-search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.'" Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir.1996), cited with approval in Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997).
[3] One individual plaintiff, Bronwyn Ford, opted out of the class but continues to pursue her claims as an individual party to this action. I discuss her claims in a separate Memorandum, also issued today.
[4] I note, however, that Sheriff Rouse's qualified immunity for searches conducted prior to June 25, 1997, extends to searches of women arrested initially or on default warrants for crimes involving violence or drugs.
[5] According to Sheriff Rouse, the Jail was never intended to house pre-arraignment detainees.
[6] This practice began in March 1991, when the City closed its House of Detention and established a policy whereby "[f]emale prisoners arrested or detained by members of the Boston Police Department [("BPD")] [were] processed in the usual manner and then transported to the Suffolk County Jail ... for detainment." BPD Rule 318C. And the practice will apparently stop as of September 2001.

In apparent response to this ongoing class action, I note that the BPD recently announced that beginning as early as September 2001, it will no longer place female suspects awaiting arraignment in the custody of the County Sheriff's Department. Francie Latour, Boston to Stop Holding Women Suspects in Suffolk Jail, Boston Globe, June 7, 2001, at A21.
[7] The County indicates that prior to May 24, 1999, the only detainees not searched were those who explicitly refused the search. Those detainees were not housed with the general Jail population but were instead placed alone in a cell in the Booking Room and watched by a Jail officer. The County provides no record of the number of women who avoided a search in this way.
[8] The parties' various filings are strangely silent about the County's search policy for prisoners held pursuant to default felony or misdemeanor warrants. As the County defendants' various filings argue that routine searches of such women are constitutional, I proceed on the assumption that both Policy I and Policy II allowed such searches without a finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
[9] See County's Suppl. Resp. to Pls.' Fourth Set of Interrogs at Resp. 4.
[10] Id. at Resp. 5.
In 1999, the SJC concluded that "probable cause is the appropriate standard to apply to strip and visual body cavity searches." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 403, 708 N.E.2d 669, 673 (Mass.1999). The BPD then adopted a new policy, under which probable cause "to believe an arrestee has either contraband or weapons in his or her possession is necessary before a strip-search may be conducted." BPD Rule 318D.
[11] The plaintiffs' filings do not seem to indicate whether Mack was charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, but under Massachusetts law, "a first offense of operating while under the influence is a misdemeanor." Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 719 N.E.2d 473, 477 (Mass.1999). In the absence of any contrary indication, therefore, I will assume Mack was charged with a misdemeanor.
According to the plaintiffs, 575 other members of the class were also charged with motor vehicle violations, including operating under the influence, and operating without a license.
[12] Plaintiffs indicate that like this woman, 137 women in the class were arrested for miscellaneous minor misdemeanors.
[13] Plaintiffs maintain that 553 class members were charged with larceny, (90 for larceny under $250.00, and 463 for larceny over $250.00), 630 with shoplifting, and 156 with uttering.
Additional statistics provided by the plaintiffs include: 286 class members charged with trespass; 351 with disorderly conduct; 201 with receiving a stolen motor vehicle; 588 with domestic assault and battery; and 188 with violation of a restraining order.
[14] The City's search policy and practice apparently varied during the class period, but the plaintiffs allege that both men and women were frequently strip-searched incident to booking, and a few plaintiffs claim they were also subjected to visual body cavity inspections while in BPD custody.
[15] This number includes all BPD detainees admitted to the Jail during the time period at issue here. It therefore counts all women who fit the class description, including those who opted out of this action. (The parties offer no explanation for the difference between this figure (7,907) and the numbers cited by the plaintiffs (7,878 at one point, and 8,109 elsewhere)).
[16] Five women cannot be placed into one of these three categories due to an obscure problem with the County's charge data.
[17] I recognize that neither Policy I nor II remains in effect, and further, that the SJC's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra note 11, renders it unlikely that the City or County will ever again pursue a policy of strip-searching arrestees without probable cause. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are not moot, as the defendants have not established that it is "`absolutely clear'" their "`wrongful

behavior'" will not recur. Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16, 21 (D.Mass.2000) (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1983)).
[18] I emphasize that this finding does not resolve the issue of the defendants' liability for the strip-searches of class members. That issue is discussed at length below.
[19] As indicated below, the Roberts decision involved a constitutional challenge to two Rhode Island blanket strip-search policies.
[20] This is commonly referred to as the "Bell reasonableness test." E.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 108.
[21] I also note that Roberts was arrested on an outstanding "body attachment" a 0907 Rhode Island writ that "allows officers to take the defendant into custody if the family court is not in session." Id. at 108 n. 2. Thus, Roberts' arrest was sanctioned by a judge, much like the arrests on default warrants at issue here.
[22] In addition to the factors referenced in the text, the prison in question also had a long, well-documented history of contraband problems. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111 (citing Arruda, 710 F.2d at 888). Though the defendants here argue that the County Jail has such a contraband problem, they provide little data to support their contention that BPD arrestees contribute to the problem in any way.
[23] The defendants dispute the plaintiffs' claim that City police officers strip-searched female arrestees as part of a routine booking search. The City provides no evidence, however, to refute the numerous depositions submitted by the plaintiffs, in which female officers indicate that they routinely required women to strip, partially or completely, during a booking search.
[24] The County's observation that Jail officials found some contraband on BPD arrestees in spite of the prior booking searches does little to convince me that the contested searches were necessary. Though there is some factual dispute as to the amount of contraband discovered as a result of the strip-searches of BPD arrestees, the County has produced only five records indicating that Jail officials discovered contraband as a result of an intrusive strip-search. "The lack of specific instances where a body cavity search was necessary to discover contraband supports a finding that the policy of searching all [arrestees] is an unreasonable one." Id. at 112.
[25] I recognize that the challenged searches would have been still worse if, for example, Jail officials had performed them in a public setting, or if male officials had searched the female arrestees. The absence of these aggravating factors does not, however, render harmless the County's misguided search policy. Cf. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 107 (noting that the unconstitutional search at issue in that case was performed "in a relatively private manner").
[26] See supra note 22.
[27] Mass. Gen. L. ch. 266, § 30 (defining larceny over $250.00 as a felony offense).
[28] See generally Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip-search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L.Rev. 239, 284 (2001) (surveying cases and concluding that the "circuits have found, in interpreting the Bell standard, that the mere classification of the crime charged, whether felony or misdemeanor, is irrelevant.")
[29] I reach no decision here as to the definition of the term "violence" in the context of this case. As indicated below, the parties are invited to propose a suitable definition in their next filings to this Court. In so doing, the parties should keep in mind that the object of this endeavor is to separate offenses that inherently generate a suspicion the offender may be concealing weapons or contraband, from offenses that generate no such suspicion.
[30] This conclusion is only strengthened by the particular facts of this case, including the prior BPD booking searches, the women's transferral to the Jail in BPD custody, and the documentary evidence suggesting that full strip and visual body cavity searches only rarely resulted in the discovery of contraband.

[31] Cf. United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (discussing "the burden of constructing subclasses").
[32] There can be no question that, "as a prison administrator, the Sheriff is entitled to invoke [this] immunity defense." Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 569 (1st Cir.1985).
[33] In fact, the district judge in Swain himself concluded that "[a]lthough Klein predate[d] the premiere Supreme Court case on strip-searches, Bell ..., it remain[ed] valid First Circuit law." Swain, 932 F.Supp. 25 (D.Mass.1996), rev'd, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
[34] As the issue of punitive damages involves questions of Rouse's subjective knowledge and intent, that issue, too, is best reserved for resolution in individualized damages hearings.
[35] My findings regarding qualified immunity also extend to defendant Doe. The plaintiffs do not request summary judgment of their claims against Doe, however, so I do not here assess her liability for searches after June 25, 1997.
[36] I recognize that this would not be sufficient to support City liability under a theory of respondeat superior. Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ("We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior." (internal citations omitted)). Here, however, the question is City liability for promulgation and implementation of an express County policy, not City liability for the negligent acts of County employees acting as agents of the City.
[37] That the County is a public entity does not alter this analysis. At least in the prison context, a private party that contracts to perform a public service is considered a "state actor" for purposes of § 1983 liability, so there is no reason to suppose that a municipality's constitutional obligations to its detainees are somehow more acceptably delegated to a public than a private entity. E.g. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (holding that for § 1983 purposes, a private physician under contract to provide medical services to inmates in a state prison system acted "under color of state law" when treating an inmate). Thus, any entity, public or private, that takes on the city's obligations may be held liable as a state actor under § 1983, but the city, too, retains its oversight obligations.
[38] Accord Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8th Cir.2001). The Young case involved a situation similar to that here, in which the City of Little Rock contracted with Pulaski County for the housing of city prisoners. The plaintiff in the case, Willie Mae Young, sought to hold the City accountable for her strip-search at the County jail. The Eighth Circuit upheld the jury verdict for Young, reasoning as follows:
Strip-searching of prisoners is routine procedure, and the jury could reasonably infer that the City knew that a person entering the [County] jail, in jail clothing with a group of other detainees, would be strip-searched. In these circumstances, it is far from unfair to attribute to the City the policies routinely used by the County jail in the housing and processing of City prisoners.
Id. at 736.
[39] As further evidence of the City's deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its arrestees, the plaintiffs note that the City failed to adopt its own policy on the issue of strip-searches until September 1998, midway through the class period. Though regrettable, that omission is not directly relevant here. Even if the City had promulgated an explicit policy regarding strip-searches, the policy would not necessarily have protected female BPD arrestees from strip-searches at the Jail; the absence of such a policy is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove "deliberate indifference" to conditions at the Jail.
[40] In fact, this is what the City now proposes to do. City's Letter to the Court of June 6, 2001 [docket entry # 114].
[41] For example, cells in one of the existing station houses could have been devoted to female arrestees, as the City now proposes to do. Id.

Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 
 Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)
191 F.R.D. 16 United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
Katrina MACK, on behalf of herself and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SUFFOLK COUNTY, Richard Rouse, Jane Doe, and the City of Boston, Defendants.
No. Civ.A. 98–12511–NG. | Feb. 16, 2000.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*17 Howard Friedman, Law Offices of Howard Friedman, Boston, MA, for Katrina Mack, plaintiff, Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley, Movants.
Rose E. King, Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department, Legal Services Division, Boston, MA, for Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, defendants.
Michael A. Goldsmith, Asst. Corp. Counsel, City of Boston Law Dept., Boston, MA, Eve Anne Piemonte– Stacey, Boston, MA, for City of Boston, defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GERTNER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Katrina Mack (“Plaintiff” or “Mack”) and four potential intervenors (“Plaintiffs”) seek to represent a class of women subjected to strip-searches and visual body cavity inspections during pre-arraignment detention at the Suffolk County jail. The searches were not episodic. They were conducted pursuant to an official policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff’s office. They were conducted regardless of the charge; every single female pre-arraignment detainee was required to be stripsearched, whether detained for a misdemeanor or a felony. One Plaintiff was charged with driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident, and another, with peddling without a license. There was no requirement that there was individualized suspicion that the women were carrying weapons or contraband.
Plaintiff brings an Equal Protection Clause claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant City of Boston (“City”) and Fourth Amendment claims against both the City and Defendants Suffolk County, Jane Doe,

and Richard J. Rouse, the Suffolk County Sheriff (“Suffolk County Defendants”).
She also moves for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), and seeks to represent:
All women1 who, from December 10, 1995, forward, were or who will in the future be:

1

Plaintiff has amended her complaint several times since

its initial filing. In her first amended complaint,

Plaintiff excluded women being held on felony charges

from the group she sought to represent and included

women held in protective custody. See, Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint [docket entry # 8]. Subsequently,

Plaintiff obtained permission to remove women held in

protective custody from her complaint and include

women held on felony charges. See, Plaintiff’s Second

Motion to Amend the Complaint [docket entry # 19].

a. taken into custody by the Boston Police Department and transferred pursuant to Boston Police Department rules regarding the custody of female prisoners to the Suffolk County Jail to be held pending a first court appearance, or after an arrest on a default warrant; and,
b. subjected to a routine strip-search and visual body cavity search at the Suffolk County Jail pursuant to the policy of conducting a stripsearch and visual body cavity search of every person who is admitted to the jail. Also before this Court is a motion brought by Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, and Alice Buckley to intervene in this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(2). The motion to intervene is assented to by Plaintiff and essentially mirrors Plaintiff’s complaint.
Because I find that the Defendants acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, that Mack, Plaintiffs, and the proposed class all share common questions of law which predominate over individual issues, and that *18 a class action would be the most efficient and just means of resolving this dispute, Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED.
The motion to intervene of Plaintiffs Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, and Alice Buckley, is GRANTED since (1) they meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(b), (2) Defendants were on notice of their claims as potential class members since the filing of the complaint, and (3) Plaintiff Katrina Mack has assented to their intervention.
1

Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)

I. BACKGROUND Women arrested in the City of Boston are, as a matter of City policy,2 transported to the Suffolk County Jail for detention pending an initial court appearance; regional police station lockups, for the most part, do not have adequate facilities. In contrast, men arrested in Boston are held in police lock-ups until arraignment. Until May 24, 1999, all persons committed to the custody of the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department were subjected to a stripsearch and a visual body cavity search at the time they were admitted.3 Because Suffolk County holds female pre-arraignment detainees for the City, only female detainees had to suffer through the uniform strip-search policy. Male pre arraignment detainees, held in police station lock-ups, were only strip-searched when an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee had contraband or weapons in his possession.

2

Boston Police Department Rule 318–C, Care and

Custody of Female Prisoners: “[f]emale prisoners

arrested or detained by members of the Boston Police

Department will be processed in the usual manner and

transported to the Suffolk County Jail, 200 Nashua

Street, Boston, for detainment.”

3

Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department Policy Number

S507: “It is the policy of the Suffolk County Sheriff’s

Department that strip-searches shall be conducted of all

inmates committed to the Custody of the Department

and at any other time when there exists reasonable

suspicion that contraband may be present.”

On March 5, 1998, Plaintiff Mack was arrested by a Boston police officer. She was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor and leaving the scene of an accident after causing property damage. After being booked in a Boston police station, Plaintiff was transported to the Suffolk County Jail on Nashua Street, where she was subjected to a strip-search and a visual body cavity search by a female officer. She was asked to take off all of her clothing, and to bend over and spread the cheeks of her buttocks in order to allow for a visual inspection of her genital area and anus. She claims that she suffered from extreme emotional distress as a result of this search.
The four intervening Plaintiffs were also arrested in Boston, transported to the Suffolk County Jail, subjected to a strip-search and a visual body cavity search, and allegedly suffered extreme emotional distress as a result. Maniscalco and Gasparini were charged with peddling without a license and larceny under $250 respectively. Daley and Buckley were charged with assault and battery.

A. The Allegations
1. Fourth Amendment Allegations
Plaintiff claims that the strip-search and visual body cavity inspection to which she, and women in the class she seeks to represent, were subjected violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The First Circuit allows strip-searches to be conducted only if the official conducting the search has reason to believe that the individual searched is concealing weapons or contraband. Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1997) (strip-search must be based upon a reasonable suspicion that individual was concealing contraband or weapons); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564–5 (1st Cir.1985) (prison’s blanket strip-search policy unconstitutional due to lack of particularized suspicion justifying searches).

2. Equal Protection Allegations
Plaintiff also alleges that the City violated her right to Equal Protection under the law by sending only female pre-arraignment detainees to the Suffolk County Jail where they *19 would be subject to the Suffolk County Defendant’s blanket strip-search policy. In its opposition to Plaintiff’s Second–Motion for Class Certification, the City concedes that similarly situated women and men are treated differently: “all BPD [Boston Police Department] female prisoners who do not make bail prior to arraignment and when the courts are closed are transported to the Jail [Suffolk County Jail] (and consequently strip-searched), whereas similarly situated men are housed in Area lockups (and consequently, not necessarily strip-searched).”4

4

The Defendant City of Boston’s Opposition To The

Plaintiff’s Second Motion For Class Certification

[docket entry # 32], p. 2. The City argues that “the

defendants’ interlocking policies” did not necessarily

result in a class-wide deprivation of Fourth Amendment

rights. Id. This argument is relevant to City’s liability

rather than to the question of class certification. The

plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at this preliminary

stage to justify a class action.

II. DISCUSSION A. Standing and Mootness
2

Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)
[1] [2] Those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy Article III’s threshold case or controversy requirement by demonstrating that they have standing to bring the case, namely, a personal stake in the outcome. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Moreover, the plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660.5 For compensatory at damages, standing is satisfied by demonstrating that the plaintiff has suffered a personal injury which is fairly traceable to defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 50, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). For injunctive relief, plaintiff must also demonstrate that she is in real and immediate danger of sustaining future, direct injury as a result of official conduct ongoing at the time of the suit. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660.

5

This aspect of Lyons, recently restated by the Supreme

Court in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental

Services, 528U.S. 167, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610

(2000), has been the subject of scholarly criticism. See,

Laura L. Little, “It’s About Time: Unraveling Standing

and Equitable Ripeness,” 41 Buff.L.Rev. 933 (Fall,

1993). Little criticizes the Court for collapsing the

analysis of jurisdiction and remedy into a single

threshold enterprise. Little suggests that standing issues

are satisfied by injury-in-fact to the plaintiff. Whether

injunctive relief should then be given should depend

upon the effectiveness and appropriateness of the

remedy which may well require discovery and a full

scale hearing on the merits. See also, 13 CHARLES A.

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H.

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §

3531.2, at 405–6 (2d ed. 1984) (“The opinion [Lyons ]

entrenches the lesson that standing depends on the

request for relief. Lyons had standing to seek damages,

as no one could deny. The self-same injury and facts

did not support standing to seek a prospective remedy.

It would be easy to argue that this distinction does not

serve any obvious purpose of standing doctrine. The

court must investigate the facts of Lyons’ encounter

with the police; it must find whether the acts of the

offending officer were authorized by official

departmental policy; and it must determine whether the

individual acts or departmental policy were unlawful.

Lyons must be trusted as an advocate on these matters;

why not let him seek a more general and prospective

remedy based on the same facts?”)

In addition, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the Article III requirements continue to be met throughout the case, that the “requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) ... continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397,

100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), in turn quoting Monaghan, “Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When,” 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An Article III court may only adjudicate live, ongoing controversies. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988).
Defendant Suffolk County does not challenge Mack or Plaintiffs’ standing to seek compensatory damages. It does challenge their standing to seek injunctive relief for two reasons. First, it claims that their fear of being stripsearched again is speculative, depending upon the possibility of another arrest, and pretrial detention. Second, it *20 claims that the issue is moot because it voluntarily changed its strip-search policy on May 24, 1999, after this lawsuit had started, to allow strip-searches of women held on misdemeanors only upon a finding of probable cause to believe the arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband. On September 20, 1999, the Defendant went even further, changing its policy to require a probable cause finding for all strip-searches, including those of women held on felonies.
B. Standing to Claim Injunctive Relief Although the plaintiff in Lyons had standing to seek compensatory damages for the injuries he suffered when subjected to a chokehold by the Los Angeles police, the Court held that he had no standing to seek injunctive relief because he failed to establish “a real and immediate threat” that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation and subjected to a chokehold. Id. at 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660.
Likewise, Defendants here contend that Mack’s claims of future injury, and those of Plaintiffs, are speculative; they have not shown that there is any likelihood that they will be arrested again, be detained, and thus, be vulnerable to another strip-search.
Defendants’ reliance on Lyons is misplaced. The decision did not hinge entirely on the likelihood that Lyons would be detained at a traffic stop in the future. Indeed, if that is all Lyons means—that Plaintiff has to prove the likelihood of future arrests—42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be gutted. The only people who could seek injunctive relief would be those that the police were truly “out to get,” those alleging malice who could count on future police encounters.
Apart from such unfortunates, no one can predict future arrests. Indeed, any rational plaintiff would strive to avoid them. Nevertheless, some groups of people are more vulnerable than others. Plaintiffs with a criminal record, for example, are more likely to be arrested and detained than those with no criminal history. See, Lake v. Speziale, 580 F.Supp. 1318 (D.Conn.1984) (plaintiff who had been incarcerated on two occasions for contempt for failure to
3

Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)

meet child support obligation had standing to challenge contempt procedures in light of plaintiff’s poverty and likelihood of future proceedings); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (plaintiff who had been stopped by the police on 15 occasions in two years had standing to seek injunctive relief); Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir.1998) (a class of children arrested on delinquency charges would suffer harm from the NYPD’s mandatory interrogation policy.)
Mack and Plaintiffs in the case at bar are similarly vulnerable. The Suffolk County Defendants concede that “the majority of women who are brought to the Jail have prior criminal records, and have been held at the Jail before.”6 Under the circumstances, it is not unreasonable to conclude that future arrests are likely.7

6

Defendants Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse and Jane

Doe’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Second Motion for

Class Certification [docket entry # 35], p. 13.

7

Obviously, no plaintiff subject to being strip-searched

can sue mid-search. By the time she comes to court, the

offending act is over. Yet, she may pursue a claim if the

injury she alleges is capable of repetition, but evades

review due to the inherently temporary nature of the

injury. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318, 108 S.Ct. 592,

98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). As discussed above, Mack and

Plaintiffs in the case at bar demonstrated that, at the

time Mack filed her complaint, there was a reasonable

likelihood that they would be arrested and strip-

searched again.

In any event, the Court characterized its holding more narrowly, remarking that Lyons would have to demonstrate not only that the triggering event, detention at a traffic stop, was likely, but also that the police would conduct themselves in a highly implausible fashion at the stop, in order to establish his standing to seek injunctive relief:
[i]n order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either, (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning *21 or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such

manner.... We note that five months elapsed between October 6, 1976, and the filing of the complaint, yet there was no allegation of further unfortunate encounters between Lyons and the police.
Id. at 106–08, 103 S.Ct. 1660.

Because the conduct challenged by Lyons was episodic, occurring only when police officers determined that the use of a chokehold was necessary, rather than a routine procedure, authorized for use at every traffic stop, Lyons’ claim that he was likely to be subjected to a chokehold at a traffic stop in the future was speculative. Id. at 108, 103 S.Ct. 1660. [3] In the instant case, more than a “practice” is at issue. This was an iron clad policy. It applied to every woman detained, regardless of offense. It was in place at the time Mack and each of the Plaintiffs was arrested and at the time Mack filed her complaint. Unlike the plaintiff in Lyons, they could predict with utter certainty that any woman arrested by the Boston Police and detained at the Suffolk County Jail, no matter what the charge, would be strip-searched.8 As Mack and the intervening Plaintiffs have demonstrated that, at the time the complaint was filed, a real and immediate threat of future injury existed, they have standing to seek injunctive relief.

8

If the allegedly illegal actions are taken pursuant to an

official policy, the fact that any one member of a class

cannot demonstrate a “real and immediate threat,” id. at

105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, that she will be arrested again

does not mean that there is not a “real and immediate

threat” that the illegal conduct will occur again. As the

Lyons Court did not indicate that it intended to preclude

injunctive relief for such plaintiffs, I read the case as

allowing such relief under other circumstances such as

the ones set forth in the case at bar.

C. Mootness The case law, recently clarified by the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 120 S.Ct. 693, 708, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000), makes it clear that “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.” See also, City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1983). If it did, the courts would be compelled to leave the defendant “free to return to his old ways.” Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 708, Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289, n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1070.
4

Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)

The Defendants bear a particularly heavy burden of establishing mootness if the challenged policy had been in place at the time the suit was filed. Id. A defendant who it is alleged, was doing wrong, then voluntarily complies with the standards sought by plaintiffs, “bears a formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id.9

9

Similarly, in Lyons, had there been initial standing, the

moratorium on the use of chokeholds “would not have

mooted an otherwise valid claim for injunctive relief

because the moratorium was by its terms not

permanent.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660.

In Laidlaw, the court did not find the case moot where the defendants had stopped discharging pollutants after the complaint was filed, and indeed, where the entire facility was closed, dismantled and put up for sale. Laidlaw still had its permit to discharge pollutants, a permit whose terms it had violated. As such it was not “absolutely clear that Laidlaw’s permit violations could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. at 710.
A similar situation presents itself here. While it is true that the Suffolk County Defendants’ change in policy diminishes the chances that Mack, Plaintiffs, or members of the proposed class, will be strip-searched without a reasonable suspicion of concealed weapons or contraband in the future, it does not eliminate that possibility. Absent the imperative imposed by an injunction, these Defendants are free to reinstate the objectionable practice at any time. See, City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982).
*22 [4] Defendant Suffolk County claims that it changed its policy to comport with First Circuit constitutional standards for strip-searches established in Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1997). However, on June 25, 1997, Swain held that all strip-searches, not just those performed on persons held for misdemeanors,10 must be justified by at least a finding of reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, earlier First Circuit authority indicates that all strip-searches must be justified by individualized suspicion that the arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband. Blackburn, 771 F.2d at 564–5. The fact that defendant Suffolk County maintained its blanket stripsearch policy for almost fourteen years after the Blackburn decision was issued and for almost two years after Swain suggests that Defendant changed its policy to avoid liability in the case at bar rather than to comport with constitutional standards. Since the Suffolk County Defendants obviously did not feel bound by First Circuit authority regarding strip-searches before Plaintiff filed her complaint, there surely is a risk that Defendants will feel

free to resume their policies and practices at the close of this litigation. As Defendants have not made it “absolutely clear” that they will not reinstate their blanket strip-search policy, their voluntary changes in policy do not moot Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.

10

As noted above, the first policy change on May 24,

1999, required a finding of reasonable suspicion to

search women charged with misdemeanors only.

D. Class Certification In order to maintain a class action, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she, and the class she wishes to represent, meet all four requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and fit into one of the categories enumerated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). To meet the threshold requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), Plaintiff must establish that the proposed class she has the following qualities:
(1) numerosity (a ‘class [so large] that joinder of all members is impracticable’); (2) commonality (‘questions of law or fact common to the class’); (3) typicality (named parties’ claims or defenses ‘are typical ... of the class’); and, (4) adequacy of representation (representatives ‘will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class’).
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). The initial inquiry required by Rules 23(a) and (b) does not involve an examination of the merits of the underlying case, but rather serves the limited purpose of determining whether a class action is the most appropriate mode of adjudicating plaintiff’s claims. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974).
1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that a member of a class may sue on behalf of all class members only if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Plaintiff Mack cannot currently specify the exact number of women in the class she wishes to represent. However, she estimates that several thousand female prearraignment detainees were subject to the challenged policies between December 10, 1995, and December 10, 1998. Plaintiff has yet to extract the names of women in the relevant groups—pre-arraignment detainees and women arrested on a default warrant—who were stripsearched—from the larger listing of all women admitted into the county’s custody during this period.11
5

Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)

11

Plaintiff’s amended complaint excludes those women

who were being held in protective custody.

[5] The fact that a class is so numerous as to render identification difficult is itself an indication that joinder of proposed class members as plaintiffs would be impracticable and a class action would be more appropriate. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir.1972) (indicating that Rule 23 was drafted to accommodate civil rights actions in which the members of the class are often incapable of specific enumeration). As Defendants have not challenged the proposed class on this ground, and as it seems likely that the class will include several thousand *23 women, I conclude that Plaintiff has satisfied the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).

2. Commonality and Typicality
The second and third prongs of Rule 23(a) require plaintiff to demonstrate that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” and that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class.”
Defendants argue both that Plaintiff’s claims are not typical of those of the class she wishes to represent and that her claims do not share common questions of law or fact with those of other class members. In support of this proposition, Defendants note that each of the class members came into custody under different circumstances and on different charges: some women in the class were frequent offenders, some were not; some women were charged with felony offenses, some with misdemeanors; some women were held pending arraignment, some women were held on a default warrant. Defendants also argue that intervening Plaintiff Joanne Maniscalco’s claims are not the same as those of Plaintiff Katrina Mack and other class members who were arrested and searched after the issuance of Swain v. Spinney in June of 1997. Defendants suggest that before this date, a blanket stripsearch policy was permissible according to First Circuit case law.12

12

This last distinction does not hold water because, as I

noted above, I believe that it was clear as far back as

1985 that individualized suspicion was required for a

strip-search. Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 563 (1st

Cir.1985)

All of these differences between the proposed class members, while arguably relevant as defenses to liability, do not change the fact that this class action raises the

same basic claim and shares common questions of law. While Rule 23(a)(2) requires Plaintiff to show that common questions of law or fact exist and that class members’s claims are not in conflict with one another, it does not require that class members’ claims be identical. Guckenberger v. Boston University, 957 F.Supp. 306, 325 (D.Mass.1997). See also, Wilcox v. Petit, 117 F.R.D. 314, 316 (D.Maine 1987). Furthermore, an assessment of whether class members share common questions of law or fact does not require an assessment of defendant’s liability for plaintiffs’ claims. Lamphere v. Brown University, 553 F.2d 714, 719, n. 11 (1st Cir.1977). Rather, objections to certification which involve the merits of plaintiffs’ claims are best resolved at summary judgment. Id.
[6] Mack, Plaintiffs, and the proposed class members share a common legal theory, that these searches were unconstitutional because, conducted pursuant to a blanket strip-search policy, they were not based on a reasonable suspicion that the individuals searched were concealing weapons or contraband. Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3) despite varying defenses to liability which may be raised regarding particular individuals. See, Guckenberger, 957 F.Supp. at 325–26 (challenge to school’s blanket accommodations policy appropriate for class action despite fact that plaintiffs suffered from various disabilities).
3. Adequacy of Representation
Rule 23(a) states: “One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if .... (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This rule requires that Plaintiff demonstrate that her interests will not conflict with those of class members and that her counsel is qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation. Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir.1985). I have already determined that Plaintiff’s claims do not conflict with those of the proposed class members but rather state common injuries and legal theories. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced and successful civil rights attorney. Defendants do not challenge the adequacy of Plaintiff’s representation. Accordingly, I find that Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
4. Defendants Acted on Grounds Generally Applicable to Class as Whole
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Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)
Rule 23(b)(2) requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that “the party opposing the class has *24 acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” This section of Rule 23 was designed to accommodate civil rights class actions in which the members of the class may be difficult to enumerate. Advisory Committee’s Note To 1966 Amendment to Rule 23.
Defendants do not deny that they acted on grounds generally applicable to the class but rather focus on their assertions that the requested declaratory relief is inappropriate as Plaintiff lacks standing to seek declaratory relief. As I explain at length above, I find that Plaintiff, and the class she seeks to represent, has standing to seek this relief. Therefore, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.

5. Common Questions Predominate
Rule 23 requires that Plaintiff demonstrate not only that she shares common questions of law or fact with the proposed class but also, if she seeks 23(b)(3) certification, that these common questions “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”
Both the City and the Suffolk County Defendants claim that certification is improper under 23(b)(3) because individual, rather than common, questions predominate. Together they argue that the reasonableness of the searches challenged in this action must be evaluated individually, by examining the facts surrounding each search,13 and conclude that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements of 23(b)(3). In addition, the Suffolk County Defendants argue that because Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim only applies to the City’s conduct, common questions of law do not predominate over individual questions and thus certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is inappropriate.14

13

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60

L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Although the question of class

certification was not discussed by the Bell Court, I note

that this case involved, amongst other issues, a class

action challenge to a jail’s strip-search policy.

14

On this point, Defendants seem to be at odds because

the Suffolk County Defendants argue that the Equal

Protection claim creates a separate question of law

whereas the City argues that this claim is “hopelessly

and inextricably intertwined” with the issue of whether

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The

Defendant City Of Boston’s Opposition To The

Plaintiff’s Second Motion For Class Certification [docket entry # 32], p. 3

[7] As I explained earlier in my discussion of the requirements of 23(a)(2), Mack, Plaintiffs, and the proposed class members all share a common legal claim against the Defendants as they all claim to have been subjected to the very same conduct, an unconstitutional strip-search.15 Significantly, they also share a common Equal Protection Clause claim against the City as they are all women who were or will be transported by the City to the Suffolk County Jail. And, as noted above, they share Fourth Amendment challenges to both based on a blanket strip-search policy. They claim to have suffered the same injuries, and are pursuing the same legal theories. To require Plaintiff to prove that each individual search was unsupportable, as well as indiscriminate, would be unnecessary and unfair. Given that these women were routinely strip-searched, the burden rests on Defendants to demonstrate that particular searches were reasonable. See, Doe v. Calumet City, Illinois, 754 F.Supp. 1211, 1220 (N.D.Ill.1990) (plaintiffs not required to show that defendants lacked reasonable belief that individual plaintiffs were concealing weapons or contraband where plaintiffs had shown the strip-search policy to be routine and indiscriminate).

15

The question of whether the City of Boston and Suffolk

County are separate legal entities is hotly contested but

is not relevant to this discussion. For the purposes of

class certification, I need only determine whether the

proposed class has sufficient common legal claims

against both Defendants. Which Defendant is liable for

which constitutional violations is a question best

reserved for a later stage in this litigation.

6. Class Action Superior Method of Adjudication
The final hurdle Plaintiff must clear under Rule 23(b)(3) is the requirement that she demonstrate that a class action is a fair and efficient method of adjudicating the controversy *25 and would be superior to other methods. Defendants allege that this case is not suitable for class certification because the litigation of the class claims will require a multitude of “mini-trials” on liability and damages.
[8] As to liability, it is likely, given the uniform and indiscriminate nature of the strip-search policy at issue, that liability can be determined on a class-wide rather than an individual basis.16 Furthermore, although individualized inquiries into the impact of the searches on particular class members may be necessary, the potential
7

Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16 (2000)

for differing amounts of restitution does not automatically preclude class certification. Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991, 995 (3rd Cir.1976). Should a genuine problem arise due to variability in damage claims, I will consider subclasses or, at worse, decertifying the class.17

16

See, Doe v. Calumet City, Illinois, 754 F.Supp. 1211,

1220 (N.D.Ill.1990) (defendant cannot avoid liability

by manufacturing post-hoc basis for strip-searches

which were conducted pursuant to indiscriminate and

routine policy); Smith v. Montgomery County,

Maryland, 573 F.Supp. 604, 612 (D.Md.1983)

(resolution of liability for and damages resulting from

indiscriminate strip-search policy more efficiently

settled within context of class action).

17

See, Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263,

1267 (7th Cir.1983) (23(b)(2) class action challenging

City’s strip-search policy decertified for purpose of

damage determination).

Finally, Defendants suggest that a class action would be a waste of judicial resources where individual damages are likely to be minimal. This reasoning runs contrary to the very purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) which seeks to vindicate “the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.” Amchem Products v. Windsor 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). The policy

at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. Id. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1997).
III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff Katrina Mack and the intervening Plaintiffs represent scores of women who share a common complaint against Defendants which overshadows any individual questions. These women raise serious allegations concerning the conduct of the Defendants and justice requires that their complaints be addressed promptly and efficiently. I find that Plaintiffs, Mack and the intervenors, meet the requirements Rule 23, both in letter and in spirit. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Class Certification [docket entry # 25] and the Motion to Intervene [docket entry # 29] are GRANTED.
The parties are also ORDERED to submit a new proposed litigation schedule by February 28, 2000.
SO ORDERED.
	  

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United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:98-cv-11346-NG

CLOSED

Ford v. Massachusetts, Commo, et al Assigned to: Judge Nancy Gertner Demand: $0 related Case: 1:00-cv-11485-NG Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Bronwyn Ford
V. Defendant Commonwealth of Massachusetts TERMINATED: 09/28/1998

Date Filed: 07/13/1998 Date Terminated: 01/21/2003 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Audrey Samit Dow & Lewis, P.C. 21 Merchants Row Suite 5 Boston, MA 02109 617-523-0777 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric N Klein Eric N.. Klein & Associates Suite 435 20 Park Plaza Boston, MA 02116 617-482-7600 Fax: 617-948-2597 Email: enk@kleinattorneys.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Salvatore Giorlandino Office of Attorney General Government Bureau/Trial Division Central Massachusetts Regional Office One Exchange Place, 3rd fl. Worcester, MA 01608 508-792-7600 ext.109 Fax: 508-795-1991 TERMINATED: 09/28/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Boston, City of
Defendant The City of Lynn TERMINATED: 09/01/1998 Defendant Lynn District Court TERMINATED: 09/28/1998 Interested Party Marie Hudson

represented by Eve A Piemonte-Stacey ROACH & CARPENTER, P.C. 24 School Street Boston, MA 02108 617-720-1800 Fax: 617-720-0720 Email: eps@rc-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Goldsmith Reynolds Rappaport & Kaplan LLP 106 Cooke Street P.O. Box 2540 Edgartown, MA 02539 508-627-3711 Fax: 508-627-3088 Email: mgoldsmith@rrklaw.net TERMINATED: 10/05/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Weise City of Boston Law Department Boston City Hall Room 615 Boston, MA 02201 617-635-4040 Fax: 617-635-3199 Email: susan.weise@cityofboston.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Salvatore Giorlandino (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/28/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Patricia Garin Stern, Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin 90 Canal Street

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Defendant Suffolk County
Defendant Sheriff, Suffolk County TERMINATED: 07/16/2001

Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-5800 Fax: 617-742-5858 Email: pgarin@sswg.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kathleen M. Cawley Suffolk County Sheriff's Department 200 Nashua Street Boston, MA 02114 617-961-6680 Fax: 617-961-6693 Email: kcawley@scsdma.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa J. Garand Koufman & Frederick, LLP 265 Essex Street Suite 301 Salem, MA 01970 978-745-2212 Fax: 978-745-9157 Email: mgarand@kflawyers.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King Suffolk County Sheriff's Department 200 Nashua Street Boston, MA 02114 617-635-1100 TERMINATED: 02/10/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Melissa J. Garand (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/16/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Date Filed 07/13/1998 07/13/1998 08/05/1998 08/05/1998 08/05/1998 08/21/1998 08/25/1998 09/01/1998 09/28/1998 09/28/1998 10/16/1998
11/06/1998 11/09/1998 11/09/1998 11/17/1998 11/24/1998
11/30/1998

#

Docket Text

1 Complaint filed. Case assigned to Judge: Gertner. Receipt #: 7643 Amount:$ 150. Fee Status: paid (mr) (Entered: 07/14/1998)
Summons issued for Massachusetts, Commo, Boston, City of, Lynn, City of, Lynn District Court (mr) (Entered: 07/14/1998)
2 Notice of appearance of attorney for Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Lynn District Court by Salvatore M. Giorlandino, filed. c/s. (rca) (Entered: 08/05/1998)
3 Motion by City of Lynn to dismiss , filed. c/s. (rca) (Entered: 08/05/1998)
4 Affidavit of Kevin F. Coppinger, Deputy Chief of the City of Lynn Police Department re: [3-1] motion to dismiss , filed. c/s. (rca) (Entered: 08/05/1998)
5 Motion by Bronwyn Ford, Lynn, City of to extend time to 9/1/98 to respond to motion to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 08/25/1998)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [5-1] motion to extend time to 9/1/98 to respond to motion to dismiss . (fmr) (Entered: 08/25/1998)
6 Notice of voluntary dismissal by Bronwyn Ford as to Lynn, City of , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/02/1998)
7 Stipulation of dismissal by Bronwyn Ford, Massachusetts, Commo, Lynn District Court without prejudice, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
Terminated document: terminating [3-1] motion to dismiss Requested by JAM. Filing party has been dismissed from the case. (fmr) (Entered: 09/28/1998)
8 Amended complaint by Bronwyn Ford filed. (Answer due 10/26/98 for Boston, City of ) . Amended complaint amends [1-1] complaint ; adding Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk . (fmr) (Entered: 10/19/1998)
9 Waiver of service returned executed as to Boston, City of . Mailed on 7/16/98 . (fmr) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
10 Motion by Boston, City of to dismiss count II of the amended complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/10/1998)
11 Answer by Boston, City of to complaint; jury demand, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/10/1998)
12 Motion by Suffolk County to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
13 Motion by Bronwyn Ford to extend time to 12/11/98 to file opposition to defendantss motion to dismiss , filed. c/s ASSENTED TO (tmc) (Entered: 11/25/1998)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [13-1] motion to extend time to 12/11/98 to file opposition to defendantss motion to dismiss . (fmr) (Entered: 11/30/1998)

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12/11/1998 12/14/1998 12/30/1998 12/30/1998 01/07/1999 01/07/1999 01/08/1999 01/15/1999 01/19/1999
01/27/1999 01/27/1999 04/29/1999 04/29/1999 05/27/1999 05/28/1999 06/16/1999 06/22/1999 06/22/1999

14 Response by Bronwyn Ford in opposition to [12-1] motion to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/14/1998)
Motion to dismiss #10 and opposition sent to chambers (fmr) (Entered: 12/14/1998)
15 Assented to Motion by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk to withdraw [12-1] motion to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/30/1998)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [15-1] motion to withdraw [12-1] motion to dismiss . (fmr) (Entered: 12/30/1998)
16 Replaces withdrawn motion-Motion by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/07/1999)
17 Memorandum by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk in support of [16-1] motion to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/07/1999)
18 Certificate of Consultation re: narrowing issues of complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/08/1999)
19 Motion by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk to extend time to 2/17/99 to file opposition , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [19-1] motion to extend time to 2/10/99 to file opposition . Counsel may have until 2/10/99 to file a memorandum in opposition (fmr) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
20 Response by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk in opposition to [16-1] motion to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/28/1999)
21 Memorandum by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk in opposition to [16-1] motion to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/28/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [16-1] motion to dismiss . (fmr) (Entered: 05/01/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [10-1] motion to dismiss count II of the amended complaint . (fmr) (Entered: 05/01/1999)
22 Judge Nancy Gertner . Notice of Hearing/conference: set scheduling conference for 3:30 6/22/99 . (fmr) (Entered: 05/27/1999)
23 Notice of change of address filed by Eric N Klein by Bronwyn Ford . (fmr) (Entered: 06/03/1999)
24 Joint statement by Bronwyn Ford, Boston, City of, Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk , re: scheduling conference, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
Scheduling conference held . (fmr) (Entered: 06/22/1999)
25 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: scheduling conference, Joint statement is adopted. Discovery deadline is 10/15/99.. refer to mediation in 11/99 set evidentiary hearing for 2:30 1/25/00 , set pretrial conference for 2:30 3/7/00 , set Jury trial for 9:00 3/13/00 Court Reporter: none (fmr) Modified on 06/22/1999 (Entered: 06/22/1999)

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11/02/1999 11/02/1999 11/16/1999 11/16/1999 11/17/1999 12/06/1999
12/06/1999 12/08/1999 12/08/1999
12/20/1999 12/20/1999 12/20/1999 12/20/1999 12/22/1999 12/27/1999 12/27/1999 01/03/2000 01/03/2000

26 Motion by Bronwyn Ford to amend [1-1] complaint to add a claim , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
27 Certificate of Consultation re: [26-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint to add a claim , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
28 Response by Boston, City of in opposition to [26-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint to add a claim , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/17/1999)
29 Response by Suffolk County in opposition to [26-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint to add a claim , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/17/1999)
Motion to amend #26 sent to chambers with opposition (fmr) (Entered: 11/17/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [26-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint to add a claim to the extent that the allowance of this motion has an impact on other deadlines the parties are to file proposed scheduling orders. [EOD Date 12/8/99] (fmr) (Entered: 12/08/1999)
56 Amended complaint by Bronwyn Ford filed. . Amended complaint amends [8-1] amended complaint ; adding . (fmr) (Entered: 05/19/2000)
30 Joint motion by Bronwyn Ford, Boston, City of, Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk to modify discovery schedule , filed. . (fmr) (Entered: 12/08/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [30-1] joint motion to modify discovery schedule, as the trial date will not be affected. Motions for summary judgment are due on 1/18/00 . [EOD Date 12/8/99] (fmr) (Entered: 12/08/1999)
31 Motion by Sheriff, Suffolk for protective order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/20/1999)
32 Memorandum by Sheriff, Suffolk in support of [31-1] motion for protective order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/20/1999)
33 Certificate of Consultation re: [31-1] motion for protective order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/20/1999)
34 Motion by Sheriff, Suffolk for expidited Hearing on motion for protective order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/20/1999)
35 Answer by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk to second amended complaint, filed.; jury demand (fmr) (Entered: 12/27/1999)
36 Response by Bronwyn Ford in opposition to [31-1] motion for protective order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
37 Memorandum by Bronwyn Ford in opposition to [31-1] motion for protective order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
Motion # 31 sent to chambers (fmr) (Entered: 01/03/2000)
Evidentiary hearing set at 2:30 4/10/00 . (fmr) (Entered: 01/04/2000)

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01/16/2000
02/22/2000 02/23/2000 02/28/2000
03/27/2000 03/27/2000
03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/29/2000 04/04/2000
04/05/2000 04/06/2000 04/12/2000 04/12/2000 04/12/2000

Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [73-1] motion to permit affidavits of class members using psyedonyms . [EOD Date 11/20/00] (fmr) (Entered: 11/20/2000)
38 Joint motion by Bronwyn Ford, Boston, City of, Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk to extend time to 4/10/00 to discovery , filed. . (sad) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
39 Judge Nancy Gertner . Procedural Order entered re: Pretrial/Trial; . [EOD Date 2/28/00] (fmr) (Entered: 02/28/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [38-1] joint motion to extend time to 4/10/00 to discovery, reset pretrial conference for 2:30 5/16/00 , reset Jury trial for 9:00 5/22/00. Motion hearing will go forward on 4/10/00 at 2:30 . [EOD Date 2/28/00] (fmr) (Entered: 02/28/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [31-1] motion for protective order . [EOD Date 3/28/00] (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [34-1] motion for expidited Hearing on motion for protective order . [EOD Date 3/28/00] (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
40 Motion by Bronwyn Ford to compel release of addresses of police officers , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
41 Motion by Bronwyn Ford for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
42 Motion by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
43 Memorandum by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk in support of [42-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
44 Certificate of Consultation re: [42-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
45 Letter by Audrey Samit dated: 3/28/00 to: Judge Gertner re: opinion from District of RI filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/04/2000)
46 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order entered, consolidating cases this case will be the lead case. 98-12511 will be the member case. [EOD Date 4/5/00] (fmr) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
Consolidated Lead Case. (fmr) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
47 Answer by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk, Jane Doe to Seconded amended complaint, filed. c/s. (mlb) (Entered: 04/07/2000)
48 Response by Sheriff, Suffolk in opposition to [40-1] motion to compel release of addresses of police officers , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
49 Motion by Bronwyn Ford, Jane Doe, Katrina Mack for clarification of the class definition , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
50 Motion by Bronwyn Ford, Jane Doe, Katrina Mack for order of notice , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/14/2000)

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04/18/2000 04/25/2000 04/27/2000 05/08/2000 05/19/2000 05/19/2000 05/26/2000 06/02/2000 06/12/2000 06/14/2000
06/14/2000
06/14/2000
06/19/2000 06/19/2000 06/20/2000

Member case is 98-12511 (fmr) (Entered: 04/18/2000)
51 Response by Boston, City of in opposition to [50-1] motion for order of notice , filed. (eaf) (Entered: 04/27/2000)
52 Cross motion by Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk for clarification of , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/28/2000)
53 Answer by Boston, City of to second amended complaint, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
54 Motion by Bronwyn Ford, Katrina Mack, Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley to compel documents from the city of boston , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 05/19/2000)
55 Memorandum by Bronwyn Ford, Katrina Mack, Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley in support of [54-1] motion to compel documents from the city of boston , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 05/19/2000)
57 STIPULATION (Motion) by Bronwyn Ford, Boston, City of , for discovery , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
58 Letter by Howard Friedman dated: 5/31/00 to: Ms Molloy re: order of notice is appropriate due to 1st cir. ruling filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/05/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [54-1] motion to compel documents from the city of boston. As there is no opposition filed [EOD Date 6/15/00] (fmr) (Entered: 06/15/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [49-1] motion for clarification of the class definition . Class definitition will include women held at the Suffolk County Jail from 12/10/95 through 9/20/99 [EOD Date 6/15/00] (fmr) (Entered: 06/15/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [40-1] motion to compel release of addresses of police officers on the condition that the General Counsels office of the Sheriff Department accept service for all defendants in this case without exception. [EOD Date 6/15/00] (fmr) (Entered: 06/15/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [50-1] motion for order of notice, with one exception- Question 3 asks "where you strip searched by the Boston Police? The question should be "Where you strip searched at Suffolk County jail, by jail employees or Botson Police" . [EOD Date 7/5/00] (fmr) (Entered: 07/05/2000)
59 Response by Bronwyn Ford in opposition to [42-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
Opposition to summary judgment (#59) sent to chambers. All pending motions at this time, are in chambers (fmr) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment due 11/15/00; defedant cross motion due 12/15/00 Hearing will be held o motions 1/10/01 at 2:30 (fmr) (Entered: 06/20/2000)

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06/20/2000 06/20/2000 06/23/2000 06/23/2000
06/26/2000 06/29/2000 06/29/2000 06/30/2000 07/17/2000
08/16/2000
08/23/2000 08/25/2000 08/29/2000
09/01/2000
09/06/2000
09/06/2000 09/06/2000

Evidentiary hearing on motions for summary judgment set at 2:30 1/10/01 . (fmr) (Entered: 06/20/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [57-1] stipulation motion for discovery . [EOD Date 6/21/00] (fmr) (Entered: 06/21/2000)
60 Motion by Boston, City of, Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk for reconsideration of [0-0] endorsed order , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
61 STIPULATION (Motion) by Boston, City of, Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk, Jane Doe, Katrina Mack, Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley , for protective order Proposed order attached , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
Motion for protective order sent to chambers (fmr) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [61-1] stipulation motion for protective order . [EOD Date 7/5/00] (fmr) (Entered: 07/05/2000)
62 Judge Nancy Gertner . Protective Order entered . [EOD Date 7/5/00] (fmr) (Entered: 07/05/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [52-1] cross motion for clarification of . [EOD Date 7/5/00] (fmr) (Entered: 07/05/2000)
63 Motion by Bronwyn Ford, Massachusetts, Commo, Boston, City of, Lynn, City of, Lynn District Court, Suffolk County, Sheriff, Suffolk, Jane Doe, Katrina Mack, Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley for Hearing , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 07/18/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [63-1] motion for Hearing, set status conference for reset to 11:00 9/6/00 . [EOD Date 8/22/00] (fmr) (Entered: 08/22/2000)
Status conference set at 11:00 9/6/00 . (fmr) (Entered: 08/23/2000)
64 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 to approve amended notice , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 08/31/2000)
65 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [64-1] motion to approve amended notice , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 08/31/2000)
Clerk notified atty Friedman and atty Klein on 9/1/00 that the status conference has been reset from 11:00 am until 9:30 am on 9/6/00. CTRM #4. Clerk left voice mail for both atty's. (mcm) (Entered: 09/01/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [60-1] motion for reconsideration of [0-0] endorsed order . [EOD Date 9/7/00] (fmr) (Entered: 09/07/2000)
Status conference held . (fmr) (Entered: 09/07/2000)
66 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: status conference Dft request judge go back to oriinal discovery schedule. Exend sum jgm to 2/2001. Judge will address the motion to apporve amended notice today. Dft counsel will file new proposed discovery schedule for judge's approval. march or april 2001 sum jgm hearing

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09/06/2000 09/18/2000
09/20/2000 09/21/2000 09/27/2000 10/04/2000 10/05/2000 10/05/2000 11/06/2000
11/13/2000
11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/15/2000

Court Reporter: None (fmr) (Entered: 09/07/2000)
67 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order entered granting [64-1] motion to approve amended notice . [EOD Date 9/11/00] (fmr) (Entered: 09/11/2000)
68 Joint statement by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346, Massachusetts, Commo in 1:98-cv-11346, Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346, Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-11346, Joanne Maniscalco in 1:98-cv-11346, Christine Daley in 1:98-cv-11346, Denise Gasparini in 1:98-cv-11346, Alice Buckley in 1:98-cv-11346 , re: litigation schedule, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/18/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [68-1] litigation schedule. Depos by 10/30/00. Plft summary judgment 11/15/00 Dft motion for summary judgment by 2/23/01. [EOD Date 9/21/00] (fmr) (Entered: 09/21/2000)
Motion hearing re: [42-1] motion for summary judgment at 3:00 3/13/01 (fmr) (Entered: 09/21/2000)
69 Answer by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 to complaint; jury demand, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/27/2000)
Mail sent to Audry Samit returned by Post Office because: no longer at address. (fmr) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
70 Notice of withdrawal of counsel by attorney Michael A. Goldsmith for Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/05/2000)
71 Notice of appearance of attorney for Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 by Eve Anne Piemonte-Stacey, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/05/2000)
72 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346, Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-11346, Joanne Maniscalco in 1:98-cv-11346, Christine Daley in 1:98-cv-11346, Denise Gasparini in 1:98-cv-11346, Alice Buckley in 1:98-cv-11346 to permit affidavits of class members using pseudonyms , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/06/2000)
73 AMENDED Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346, Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-11346, Joanne Maniscalco in 1:98-cv-11346, Christine Daley in 1:98-cv-11346, Denise Gasparini in 1:98-cv-11346, Alice Buckley in 1:98-cv-11346 to permit affidavits of class members using psyedonyms , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
74 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 for leave to file brief in excess of 20 pgs. , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [74-1] motion for leave to file brief in excess of 20 pgs. . [EOD Date 11/15/00] (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
75 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
76 Memorandum by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)

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11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/15/2000 11/16/2000
12/08/2000 02/06/2001 02/06/2001
02/06/2001 02/06/2001
02/13/2001 02/14/2001 02/14/2001
02/20/2001
02/20/2001 02/23/2001 02/23/2001 02/23/2001

77 Memorandum in support of [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
78 Appendix/exhibits by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
79 Appendix/exhibits by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
80 Appendix/exhibits by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 11/15/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [72-1] motion to permit affidavits of class members using pseudonyms . [EOD Date 11/20/00] (fmr) (Entered: 11/20/2000)
81 Letter by Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-11346 dated: 12/7/00 re: exclusion from law suit notice filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/08/2000)
82 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 to disqualify judge , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
83 Memorandum by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [82-1] motion to disqualify judge , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
84 Certificate of Consultation re: [82-1] motion to disqualify judge , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
85 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 to stay proceedings on summary judgment motions until final judgment on recusal , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
86 Motion by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 for joinder in motion to recuse , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
Motion #86 sent to chambers (fmr) (Entered: 02/14/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [85-1] motion to stay proceedings on summary judgment motions until final judgment on recusal . [EOD Date 2/15/01] (fmr) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
87 Response by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [85-1] motion to stay proceedings on summary judgment motions until final judgment on recusal , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/20/2001)
88 Memorandum by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [82-1] motion to disqualify judge , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/20/2001)
89 Memorandum by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
90 Cross motion by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
91 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 for leave to file brief exceeding the page limit , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/26/2001)

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02/23/2001
02/23/2001
02/28/2001
03/07/2001 03/07/2001
03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/13/2001
03/13/2001 03/14/2001

92 Cross motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346 for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
93 Memorandum by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [75-1] motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/26/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [91-1] motion for leave to file brief exceeding the page limit . [EOD Date 3/14/01] (fmr) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [86-1] motion for joinder in motion to recuse . [EOD Date 3/8/01] (fmr) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [82-1] motion to disqualify judge . Opinion to follow [EOD Date 3/8/01] (fmr) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
94 Memorandum by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [92-1] cross motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
95 Affidavit of Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-11346 , re: [94-1] opposition memorandum , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
96 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 for leave to file reply memo , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
Motion for leave # 96 sent to chambers with proposed filing (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
97 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 for leave to file reply memo , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
Motion for leave # 97 sent to chambers with proposed filing (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
98 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 to strike affidavit of William Sturgeon , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
99 Affidavit of Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-11346 , re: [98-1] motion to strike affidavit of William Sturgeon , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
Copies of petition for writ of mandamus filed with this court (fmr) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
100 Order of the US Court of Appeals re: Petitioner's Emergency Motion to stay proceedings below is allowed, pending further action by the court on the petition for writ of mandamus. (jr) (Entered: 03/13/2001)
101 Judge Nancy Gertner . Memorandum and Order entered. denying [82-1] motion to disqualify judge [EOD Date 3/13/01] (fmr) (Entered: 03/13/2001)
102 Memorandum by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [90-1] cross motion for summary judgment , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/14/2001)

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03/14/2001 03/14/2001 03/21/2001 03/22/2001 03/23/2001 03/26/2001 03/26/2001 03/26/2001 03/28/2001
04/04/2001 04/09/2001 04/12/2001 04/12/2001 05/14/2001 05/21/2001

103 Affidavit of Eric N Klein in 1:98-cv-11346 , re: [102-1] opposition memorandum , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
Certified copy of docket and record on appeal forwarded to U.S. Court of Appeals re: Writ of Mandamus filed directly through the U.S. Court of Appeals . (jr) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
Transmitted supplemental record on appeal: re: Document numbers: 102, 103 (jr) (Entered: 03/21/2001)
US Court of Appeals Case Number assigned to [0-0] recommendations appeal : USCA NUMBER: 01-1312. (jr) (Entered: 03/22/2001)
104 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346 for leave to file reply to opposition , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
Motion for leave #104 sent to chambers with proposed reply (fmr) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
105 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [98-1] motion to strike affidavit of William Sturgeon , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
106 Notice of change of address filed by Eric N Klein in 1:98-cv-11346 . (fmr) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
107 Order of the US Court of Appeals re: [0-0] recommendations appeal; The petition for writ of mandamus is denied, essentially for the reasons stated in the district court's memorandum dated March 13, 2001...We add only that while we agree with the district court's analysis as a whole, it does appear that contrary to that court's statement, summary judgment motions were pending at the time the court made the remark in question. (jr) (Entered: 03/28/2001)
Record on appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals. (jr) (Entered: 04/04/2001)
108 Judge Nancy Gertner . Notice of Hearing/conference: Motion hearing set for 2:45 5/31/01 for [92-1] cross motion for summary judgment . (fmr) (Entered: 04/09/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [104-1] motion for leave to file reply to opposition . [EOD Date 4/12/01] cc: all counsel of record. (eaf) (Entered: 04/12/2001)
109 Reply by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 to response to [92-1] cross motion for summary judgment , filed. (eaf) (Entered: 04/12/2001)
110 Letter by Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-11346 dated: 5/8/01 to: clerk re: supplement s/j filed. (eaf) (Entered: 05/14/2001)
111 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 for order of requiring dft to produce additional addresses of class members , filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/21/2001)

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05/24/2001 05/31/2001 05/31/2001 06/04/2001 06/07/2001 06/07/2001 06/11/2001
07/11/2001 07/20/2001 07/31/2001
07/31/2001

112 Certificate of Consultation re: [111-1] motion for order of requiring dft to produce additional addresses of class members , filed. (eaf) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
Motion hearing re: [90-1] cross motion for summary judgment (jf) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
116 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: Motion hearing [90-1] cross motion for summary judgment taken under advisement Court Reporter: Hagopian Mullane V. Suffolk County, et al - separate action filed (City of Boston not named as a dft) (jf) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
113 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [111-1] motion for order of requiring dft to produce additional addresses of class members , filed. (eaf) (Entered: 06/04/2001)
114 Letter by Eve A. Piemonte Stacey, Assist Corp. Counsel dated: 6/6/01 to: Judge Gertner re: Correspondence as a supplement to the City of Boston's argument filed. (jf) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
115 Letter by Eric N Klein in 1:98-cv-11346 dated: 6/5/01 to: Judge Gertner re: Supplement to Plt's Bronwyn Ford's position in support of summary judgment against the City of Boston, Suffolk County & Richard Rouse filed. (jf) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
117 Letter by Rose E. King in 1:98-cv-11346 dated: 6/6/01 to: Judge Gertner re: invitation at the close of hearing to submit a post-hearing letter to address any additional issues. Attached is US District Judge Mary Lisi's memo and order determining class certification in the Roberts V. Rhode Island case. filed. (jf) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
118 Stipulation of dismissal as to Defendant Suffolk County Sheriff Richard Rouse ONLY by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346, Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Sheriff, Suffolk in 1:98-cv-11346, All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 without costs, filed. (jf) (Entered: 07/16/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [98-1] motion to strike affidavit of William Sturgeon. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 7/23/01] (jf) (Entered: 07/23/2001)
119 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order entered denying [92-1] cross motion for summary judgment, denying [90-1] cross motion for summary judgment, granting in part, denying in part [75-1] motion for summary judgment, granting in part, denying in part [42-1] motion for summary judgment, granting in part, denying in part [41-1] motion for summary judgment. cc:cl [EOD Date 7/31/01] (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2001)
120 Judge Nancy Gertner. Memorandum and Order entered re: Motions for Summary Judgment by and against Plaintiff Ford. .....For the reasons stated above and in the Class Summary Judgment Memorandum, all parties' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The details of this decision are provided above and in the attached Order Re: Summary Judgment Motions. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)

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07/31/2001
07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001 08/13/2001 08/15/2001 08/21/2001 08/30/2001

121 Judge Nancy Gertner. Memorandum and Order entered re: Motions for Summary Judgment by and against the class plaintiffs.....As detailed above, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The County defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The plaintiffs are ORDERED to name a representative for Sub-Class II --or alternatively, to propose further subdivision of that class -- by 8/15/01. The defendants' response is due within fifteen days thereafter. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [92-1] cross motion for summary judgment....See memo dated 7/31/01. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [97-1] motion for leave to file reply memo. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [96-1] motion for leave to file reply memo. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting in part, denying in part [75-1] motion for summary judgment . See memo dated 7/31/01. cc:counsel of record.[EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting in part, denying in part [41-1] motion for summary judgment . See memo dated 7/31/01. cc:counsel of record.[EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting in part, denying in part [42-1] motion for summary judgment . See memo dated 7/31/01. cc:counsel of record.[EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [90-1] cross motion for summary judgment. See memo dated 7/31/01. cc:counsel of record. [EOD Date 8/1/01] (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
122 Reply by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 to [89-1] opposition memorandum , filed. (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
123 Reply by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 to [93-1] opposition memorandum , filed. (jf) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
Mail sent to Audrey Samit, Esq. returned by Post Office because: not deliverable as addressed. Resent, new address. (jf) (Entered: 08/13/2001)
124 Plaintiffs' Proposed definition of "Violent Offenses" and Designation of Sub-Class II Representatives. (sent to chambers) (jf) Modified on 08/16/2001 (Entered: 08/16/2001)
Mail sent to Audrey Samit, Esq. returned by Post Office because: no forward order on file. (jf) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
125 Proposed Definition of "Violence" and "violent Offenses" for designation of Sub-classes by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 received for filing. (jf) (Entered:

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08/30/2001 09/06/2001 10/10/2001 10/29/2001 11/01/2001 11/01/2001
11/28/2001 11/28/2001
12/03/2001 12/14/2001 01/07/2002 01/07/2002 01/29/2002

08/30/2001)
126 Reply/response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 to [125-1] City of Boston's Proposed Definition of "violence" and "violent Offenses" for designation of Sub-classes, filed. (jf) (Entered: 08/30/2001)
Document #125 and #126 sent to chambers 9/6/01. (jf) (Entered: 09/06/2001)
127 Judge Nancy Gertner . Notice of Hearing/conference: Set status conference for 3:15 11/1/01 . cc:counsel of record. (jf) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
128 Status report and Proposal by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 filed. Sent to Chambers. (jf) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
Status conference held . (jf) (Entered: 11/06/2001)
129 Judge Nancy Gertner. Clerk's Notes: re: Status Conference Held., Set Motion hearing for 2:30 3/4/02 , Summary Judgment Motion due 1/7/02, Opposition due 2/4/02; Set pretrial conference for 2:30 5/21/02 , Set Jury trial for 9:00 6/3/02 ; Counsel will provide names of the first 7 plaintiffs to go to trial on the nonviolent and non drug cases forthwith; Summary judgment motion will address the question of class and definition and the remaining 4th amendment issues. Court Reporter: None (jf) (Entered: 11/06/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [111-1] motion for order of requiring dft to produce additional addresses of class members. "See Order dated 11/28/01." cc:cl [EOD Date 11/29/01] (jf) (Entered: 11/29/2001)
130 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Requiring the Defendants to produce additional addresses of Class Members entered granting [111-1] motion for order of requiring dft to produce additional addresses of class members. "....plaintiffs' counsel shall provide the defendants with a list containing these class members' names, the unique Boston Police Deprtment CR identification number assigned to each of these class members by the defendants, their social security numbers, their dates of birth, and any addresses that plaintiffs possess of these class members by 12/19/01. The defendants shall use this information to search their databases in order to locate the addresses given by these class members during the class members' most recent bookings. The defendants shall provide the plaintiffs with a list in electronic form of any addresses that plaintiffs do not currently possess of these class members by 1/25/02. SO ORDERED." cc:cl [EOD Date 11/29/01] (jf) (Entered: 11/29/2001)
131 Letter by Judge Gertner dated: 12/3/01 to: Counsel re: mediator, filed. (jf) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
Mail sent to Audrey Samit returned by Post Office because: no forwarding address. (resent to new address 12/14/01) (jf) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
132 Memorandum by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 re: fourth amendment rights of sub-class II plaintiffs, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
Document #132 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
133 Status report and Proposed Discovery schedule for initial damages trials by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 01/30/2002)

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01/29/2002 01/29/2002
02/08/2002 02/11/2002
02/11/2002
02/27/2002 02/28/2002
03/04/2002 03/04/2002 03/08/2002 04/08/2002 04/08/2002 04/09/2002 04/16/2002
04/18/2002 04/19/2002 04/19/2002

Status conference held . (jf) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
134 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: Status Conference Held; Trials-damages to begin on 6/3/02 for six (6) plaintiffs from sub class I and for Ms. Ford. Plaintiff shall pick 3 plaintiffs and defendants shall pick 3 plaintiffs to start trial. Proposed status report outlining deadlines filed in open court and adopted (see report for deadlines). Court Reporter: None (jf) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
135 Memorandum by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 re: fourth amendment liability to sub-class II, filed. (sent to chambers) (jf) (Entered: 02/08/2002)
136 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346 for summary judgment as to sub-class II , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
137 Memorandum by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [136-1] motion for summary judgment as to sub-class II, filed. c/s (Bound cannot be scanned) (jf) (Entered: 02/12/2002)
Documents #136 and #137 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 02/27/2002)
138 Response by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [136-1] motion for summary judgment as to sub-class II , and reply to the city of Boston's memorandum regarding sub-class II plaintiffs, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/28/2002)
Motion hearing re: [136-1] motion for summary judgment as to sub-class II (jf) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
139 Judge Nancy Gertner. Clerk's Notes: re: Motion Hearing Held; Motions taken under advisement. Court Reporter: Hagopian (jf) (Entered: 03/05/2002)
140 Letter by Rose E. King in 1:98-cv-11346 dated: March 6, 2002 to: Ms. Molloy re: dates when out of the office, filed. (jf) (Entered: 03/11/2002)
141 Motion by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 for protective order , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
142 Certificate of Consultation re: [141-1] motion for protective order , filed. (jf) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
143 Notice of appearance of attorney for Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 by Susan M. Weise, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/09/2002)
144 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order for Pretrial Conference for Judge Gertner's session entered, Set pretrial conference for 2:30 5/21/02 , Set Jury trial for 9:00 6/3/02 . cc:cl [EOD Date 4/16/02] (jf) (Entered: 04/16/2002)
145 Notice of appearance of attorney for Marie Hudson in 1:98-cv-11346 by Patricia Garin, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
146 Response by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [141-1] motion for protective order, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
147 Motion by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 for leave to file request for admissions in excess of twenty-five , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/24/2002)

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04/24/2002 05/02/2002
05/02/2002
05/03/2002 05/03/2002 05/06/2002 05/09/2002 05/09/2002 05/15/2002
05/15/2002
05/20/2002 05/20/2002 05/20/2002 05/22/2002
05/23/2002

Document #141 - Motion for Protective Order and #146 - Response in Opposition sent to chambers on 4/24/02. (jf) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
148 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order of reference entered for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Referred to: Senior Judge Mazzone for: mediation to case(s) 1:98-cv-11346. (jf) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
161 Memorandum by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [160-1] motion regarding jury selection procedures , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/24/2002)
149 Second Motion by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 for protective order and opposition to plaintiff's motion to allow request for admissions in excess of twenty-five , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/03/2002)
150 Certificate of Consultation re: [149-1] motion for protective order and opposition to plaintiff's motion to allow request for admissions in excess of twenty-five , filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/03/2002)
Document #147 and #149 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 05/03/2002)
151 Judge A. D. Mazzone . Notice of Hearing/conference: Set ADR Conference for 2:00 5/10/02 . Notice sent to counsel. (jf) (Entered: 05/06/2002)
152 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 for protective order , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
153 Response by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [152-1] motion for protective order , filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/09/2002)
154 Certificate of Consultation re: [152-1] motion for protective order , filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/09/2002)
155 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 for order granting access to criminal offender record information concerning the plaintiff Mary Ramos , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/15/2002)
156 Affidavit of Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 of Rose E. King in 1:98-cv-11346 , re: [155-1] motion for order granting access to criminal offender record information concerning the plaintiff Mary Ramos , filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/15/2002)
157 Joint Pretrial memorandum by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346, All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346, Marie Hudson in 1:98-cv-11346 filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
158 Proposed exhibits and Proposed Jury instructions by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346, filed in WordPerfect format on a disk. (jf) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
Document #157 and #158 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 05/20/2002)
159 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 to reduce number of sub-class I representative damages trials to two , filed. c/s (sent to chambers) (jf) (Entered: 05/22/2002)
Document #155 and affidavit in support #156 sent to chambers on 5/23/02 w/ no opposition filed to date. (jf) (Entered: 05/23/2002)

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05/29/2002 05/29/2002
05/30/2002 05/30/2002
06/04/2002 06/17/2002 06/19/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 06/24/2002 07/08/2002 07/08/2002

160 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 regarding jury selection procedures , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/24/2002)
162 Report by A. David Mazzone in 1:98-cv-11346 of Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings. The case was: Settled. Your clerk should enter a 60 day order of dismissal. The class action suit has been resolved. The suit brought by plaintiff Bronwyn Ford was not mediated and remains open. (jf) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
Pre-trial conference held . (jf) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
163 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: Pretrial Conference Held, Mack Case 98-12511 (member case), parties report to the court that case has settled; Set Fairness hearing for 2:30 9/26/02 for anyone who objects to the settlement, Ford Case - This case has not settled; Reset pretrial conference for 2:30 10/3/02 , RESET Jury trial for 9:00 10/28/02 ; All parties agree to mediate this case before Judge Mazzone - ASAP. Clerk will refer immediately. (jf) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
164 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order of reference entered for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Referred to: Senior Judge Mazzone for: mediation (Ford v. Suffolk County, et al) (jf) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
165 Response by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-11346, Joanne Maniscalco in 1:98-cv-11346, Marie Hudson in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to [159-1] motion to reduce number of sub-class I representative damages trials to two , filed. c/s (Sent to chambers on 6/4/02) (jf) Modified on 06/04/2002 (Entered: 06/04/2002)
166 Judge A. D. Mazzone. Notice of Hearing/conference: Set ADR Conference for 2:00 6/19/02 . Notice sent to counsel. (jf) (Entered: 06/06/2002)
167 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order of Dismissal entered as to member case only 98-12511. [EOD Date 6/18/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/18/2002)
168 Notice of change of Firm Name filed by Audrey Samit in 1:98-cv-11346 . c/s. (mlb) (Entered: 06/19/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered mooting [136-1] motion for summary judgment as to sub-class II . [EOD Date 6/26/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered mooting [155-1] motion for order granting access to criminal offender record information concerning the plaintiff Mary Ramos . [EOD Date 6/26/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered mooting [159-1] motion to reduce number of sub-class I representative damages trials to two . [EOD Date 6/26/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [160-1] motion regarding jury selection procedures . [EOD Date 6/26/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
169 Assented to Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 for preliminary approval of class settlement and proposed notice , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 07/10/2002)
170 Memorandum by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [169-1] motion for preliminary approval of class settlement and proposed notice , filed. (jf) (Entered:

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07/31/2002 08/23/2002 09/10/2002 09/12/2002 09/20/2002 09/24/2002 09/24/2002 09/24/2002 09/24/2002

07/10/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [169-1] motion for preliminary approval of class settlement and proposed notice. cc:cl [EOD Date 7/11/02] (jf) (Entered: 07/11/2002)
171 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order entered granting [169-1] motion for preliminary approval of class settlement and proposed notice. Notice sent to counsel. [EOD Date 7/11/02] (jf) (Entered: 07/11/2002)
172 Notice of change of address filed by Eric N Klein in 1:98-cv-11346 by Bronwyn Ford in 1:98-cv-11346 . (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
173 Letter by Eric N Klein in 1:98-cv-11346 dated: 7/24/02 to: Clerk re: decision of pending motions filed. (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [141-1] defendant City of Boston's motion for protective order. cc:cl [EOD Date 7/31/02] (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered denying [147-1] motion for leave to file request for admissions in excess of twenty-five. cc:cl [EOD Date 7/31/02] (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [149-1] defendant City of Boston's second motion for protective order and opposition to plaintiff's motion to allow request for admissions in of twenty-five. cc:cl [EOD Date 7/31/02] (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [152-1] Suffolk County defendant's motion for protective order. cc:cl [EOD Date 7/31/02] (jf) (Entered: 07/31/2002)
174 Assented to Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to appoint a special master , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 08/23/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [174-1] plaintiffs' motion to appoint a special master. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/11/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/11/2002)
175 Judge Nancy Gertner . Procedural Order entered re: Pretrial/Trial; Pretrial Conference set for 2:30 10/3/02 Jury Trial set for 9:00 10/28/02. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/17/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/17/2002)
176 Copy of Letter by Cornelius J. Moynihan, Esq. dated: 9/11/02 to: Claims Administrator re: settlement claim form filed. (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
177 Assented to Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to amend the settlement agreement and distribution formula , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
178 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to grant amnesty for claims submitted within one week of deadline , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
179 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to appoint Lynn Metras as a class representative , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
180 Assented to Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 for final approval of class settlement , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)

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09/26/2002 10/01/2002 10/01/2002

181 Memorandum by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 in support of [180-1] assented to motion for final approval of class settlement, filed. (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
182 Exhibits by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 [180-1] motion for final approval of class settlement. (bound cannot be scanned) (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
183 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to extend deadline for mailing denial notices to 10/25/02 , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [177-1] plaintiffs' assented to motion to amend the settlement agreement and distribution formula. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/27/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [178-1] plaintiffs' motion to grant amnesty for claims submitted within one week of deadline. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/27/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [179-1] plaintiffs' motion to appoint Lynn Metras as a class representative. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/27/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [180-1] plaintiffs' assented to motion for final approval of class settlement. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/27/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [183-1] plaintiffs' motion to extend deadline for mailing denial notices to 10/25/02. cc:cl [EOD Date 9/27/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered denying [176-1] objection in letter form by class member Renee M. Laplume. cc:cl [EOD Date 10/1/02] (jf) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
fairness Hearing held . (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
185 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: Fairness Hearing Held; Parties will file a stipulation of dismissal (April 2003); Fairness hearing/settlement hearing held on the Mack case (98-12511NG); Judge addresses procedural motions first; motion to amend settlement agreement(makes procedural changes) ALLOWED; motion to extend deadline for mailing denial claims - ALLOWED; motion to grant amnesty - ALLOWED; motion to appoint class representative ALLOWED; Final Approval - Judge approves settlement; Judge addresses objection to settlement agreement, Attorney Moynahan makes his argument on behalf of Renee Laplume (class member) - Denied objection. Court Reporter: Teri Gibson (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
186 Notice of appearance of attorney by Attorney Moynihan on behalf of class member Renee Laplume, filed. (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
184 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order entered granting [180-1] motion for final approval of class settlement. cc:cl [EOD Date 10/1/02] (jf) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
188 Report by A. David Mazzone in 1:98-cv-11346 of Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings. The case was: settled as to Ms. Ford's claims. A petition for attorney's fees remains to be resolved. Counsel have agreed on an expedited

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10/03/2002 10/10/2002 10/10/2002 10/17/2002 10/17/2002 10/17/2002
10/17/2002 10/21/2002
10/21/2002 10/24/2002 10/28/2002 10/28/2002
10/28/2002
01/16/2003
01/21/2003

schedule for filing papers on the petition. (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
Case no longer referred to ADR. (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
187 Judge Nancy Gertner. Clerk's Notes: re: parties have reached an agreement re: settlement; counsel would like the opportunity to litigate the attorney's fees; motion for fees has already been served, defendant will oppose by 10/9/02, plaintiff will file reply by 10/17/02; Set hearing on attorney's fees for 2:30 10/28/02 ; jury trial is canceled. (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
Pre-trial conference held (parties have reached an agreement re: settlement). (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
189 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees and taxation of costs, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 10/10/2002)
190 Response by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 in opposition to plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees and taxation of costs, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 10/10/2002)
191 Assented to Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to sever Ford and Mack as two separate actions , filed. c/s (sent to chambers) (jf) (Entered: 10/17/2002)
192 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 for attorney fees and taxation of costs , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
193 Surreply by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 to defendant City of Boston's and Suffolk County's opposition response to [192-1] motion for attorney fees and taxation of costs , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
194 Motion by All Plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-11346 for additional attorney fees , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 10/18/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [191-1] motion to sever Ford and Mack as two separate actions. cc:cl [EOD Date 10/22/02] (jf) (Entered: 10/22/2002)
Case no longer consolidated w/ 98-12511. (jf) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
195 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 to [193-1] plaintiff's sur-reply for attorney's fees and taxation of costs, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
motion hearing Hearing held . (jf) (Entered: 10/29/2002)
196 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: motion hearing held; [194-1] motion for additional attorney fees taken under advisement, [192-1] motion for attorney fees and taxation of costs taken under advisement Court Reporter: Harold Hagopian (jf) (Entered: 10/29/2002)
197 Sur reply by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-11346 to reply to [192-1] motion for attorney fees and taxation of costs filed. (sent to chambers) (jf) (Entered: 10/29/2002)
198 Stipulation of dismissal by Bronwyn Ford against City of Boston, Suffolk County, Richard Rouse in 1:98-cv-11346 with prejudice, filed. without costs (ms) (Entered: 01/17/2003)
Case closed. (jf) (Entered: 01/21/2003)

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199 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-11346 for Rose E. King to withdraw as attorney , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/06/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [199-1] motion for Rose E. King to withdraw as attorney cc:cl . [EOD Date 2/14/03] (jf) (Entered: 02/14/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER entered granting in part and denying in part [192] Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Taxation of Costs. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
200 Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER entered MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS' FEES.(Filo, Jennifer) Additional attachment(s) added on 11/24/2003 (Filo, Jennifer). (Entered: 11/24/2003)
201 Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS' FEES entered (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
Notice of correction to docket made by Court staff because Memorandum and Order (document #200) was missing pages. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 11/24/2003)
202 Letter/request (non-motion) to clerk from Eric N. Klein re: taxation of costs, filed. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/08/2004)
203 Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER entered amending order entered on November 20, 2003, and adding to the amount awarded an additional $904.53 in costs. (Gertner, Nancy) (Entered: 01/27/2004)
Judge Nancy Gertner : ELECTRONIC ORDER entered denying [194] Motion for Additional Attorney Fees : The Court has already resolved the motion for attorneys fees for counsel in Ford for work up to the date of their initial petition; the Court has amended the order entered on attorneys fees to include costs that were inadvertently omitted from the original order. This motion, for work done to counter the defendants' entirely legitimate concerns about plaintiff's fee application, is DENIED. (Gertner, Nancy) (Entered: 02/03/2004)

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United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:00-cv-11485-NG

CLOSED

Conrad v. Boston, City of, et al Assigned to: Judge Nancy Gertner Demand: $0 related Case: 1:98-cv-11346-NG Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Barbara Conrad
V. Defendant Boston, City of

Date Filed: 07/26/2000 Date Terminated: 10/31/2002 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Howard Friedman Law Offices of Howard Friedman 90 Canal Street 5th Floor Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-4100 Fax: 617-742-5858 Email: hfriedman@civil-rights-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael A. Goldsmith Reynolds Rappaport & Kaplan LLP 106 Cooke Street P.O. Box 2540 Edgartown, MA 02539 508-627-3711 Fax: 508-627-3088 Email: mgoldsmith@rrklaw.net TERMINATED: 10/13/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen G. Cox City Of Boston Law Department Room 615 City Hall Boston, MA 02201 617-635-4064 Email: scoxlaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant Paul Evans
Defendant Jane Doe Defendant Suffolk County TERMINATED: 02/05/2001 Defendant Jane Roe TERMINATED: 02/05/2001

Susan M. Weise City of Boston Law Department Boston City Hall Room 615 Boston, MA 02201 617-635-4040 Fax: 617-635-3199 Email: susan.weise@cityofboston.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eve A Piemonte-Stacey ROACH & CARPENTER, P.C. 24 School Street Boston, MA 02108 617-720-1800 Fax: 617-720-0720 Email: eps@rc-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Goldsmith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/13/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen G. Cox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan M. Weise (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Rose E King Suffolk County Sheriff's Department

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Defendant
Richard Rouse TERMINATED: 02/05/2001

200 Nashua Street Boston, MA 02114 617-635-1100 TERMINATED: 02/05/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/05/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/26/2000 07/26/2000 08/03/2000 08/30/2000 09/25/2000 09/27/2000 10/04/2000 10/12/2000
10/12/2000 10/13/2000 10/13/2000 10/13/2000

#

Docket Text

1 Complaint filed. Case assigned to Judge: Gertner. Receipt #: 24128 Amount:$ 150.00. Fee Status: pd (fmr) (Entered: 07/31/2000)
Summons issued for Boston, City of, Paul Evans, Jane Doe, Suffolk County, Jane Roe, Richard Rouse (fmr) (Entered: 07/31/2000)
2 Rule 16.1 Certification filed by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485 . (fmr) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
3 Return of service executed as to Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485 with service on 8/17/00 filed. Answer due on 9/6/00 for Paul Evans (fmr) (Entered: 08/31/2000)
4 Motion by Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485 to dismiss , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/25/2000)
5 Answer by Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485 to complaint; jury demand, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/27/2000)
6 Motion by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485 to amend [1-1] complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
7 Letter dated: 10/12/00 to: Ms Mulcahy re: Paul Evans intends to withdraw motion to dismiss complaint because motion to amend the complaint has been filed filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/12/2000)
8 Answer by Jane Roe in 1:00-cv-11485, Richard Rouse in 1:00-cv-11485 to complaint; jury demand, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/12/2000)
9 Notice of appearance of attorney Eve Piemonte Stacey for Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485 by , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/13/2000)
10 Motion by Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485 for Michael Goldsmith to withdraw as attorney , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/13/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [10-1] motion for Michael Goldsmith to withdraw as attorney (Terminated attorney Michael A.

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12/04/2000 12/04/2000 12/05/2000 12/05/2000 12/05/2000
02/01/2001
10/09/2001
10/10/2001 10/11/2001 10/11/2001
11/02/2001
11/09/2001 02/20/2002 02/20/2002 05/29/2002

Goldsmith for Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485, attorney Michael A. Goldsmith for Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485 . [EOD Date 10/13/00] (fmr) (Entered: 10/13/2000)
Motion to amend and motion to dismiss sent to chambers (fmr) (Entered: 12/04/2000)
11 Answer by Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485 to amended complaint, filed.; jury demand (fmr) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [4-1] motion to dismiss . [EOD Date 12/6/00] (fmr) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [6-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint . [EOD Date 12/6/00] (fmr) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
12 Amended complaint by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485 filed. (Answer due 12/15/00 for Richard Rouse, for Jane Roe, for Suffolk County, for Jane Doe, for Paul Evans, for Boston, City of ) . Amended complaint amends [1-1] complaint ; adding . (fmr) (Entered: 12/06/2000)
13 Stipulation of dismissal by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485, Suffolk County in 1:00-cv-11485, Jane Roe in 1:00-cv-11485, Richard Rouse in 1:00-cv-11485 without prejudice, filed. without costs (fmr) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
14 Joint statement and Proposed Discovery Schedule by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485, Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485, Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485, Jane Doe in 1:00-cv-11485 , filed. c/s. (jf) (Entered: 10/09/2001)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsement re: [14-1]Joint Statement, Adopted. (jf) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
Scheduling conference held . (jf) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
15 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: 16.B Held., Joint Statement Adopted, Set status conference for 2:30 6/11/02 Court Reporter: None (jf) (Entered: 10/12/2001)
16 STIPULATION (Motion) by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485, Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485, Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485, Jane Doe in 1:00-cv-11485, for protective order , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 11/05/2001)
17 Judge Nancy Gertner . Protective Order entered granting [16-1] stipulation motion for protective order. cc:cl [EOD Date 11/9/01] (jf) (Entered: 11/09/2001)
18 Notice of appearance of attorney for Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485, Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485 by Stephen G. Cox, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/20/2002)
19 Notice of withdrawal of counsel by William J. Donahue, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/20/2002)
20 Joint motion by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485, Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485, Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485, Jane Doe in 1:00-cv-11485 to extend Discovery Deadline to September 20, 2002 , filed. . (jf) (Entered: 06/07/2002)

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06/10/2002 06/11/2002 06/11/2002
06/12/2002 07/18/2002 09/10/2002 09/23/2002 09/26/2002
10/31/2002 10/31/2002 10/31/2002 11/05/2002

Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [20-1] joint motion to extend Discovery Deadline to September 20, 2002. cc:cl [EOD Date 6/11/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/11/2002)
Status conference held . (jf) (Entered: 06/12/2002)
21 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: status conference held; Parties agree to mediation before Judge Mazzone; clerk will refer both cases to Judge Mazzone for mediation forthwith (01-11485NG & 00-10915NG); All discovery deadlines extended, see docket #20. Court Reporter: None (jf) (Entered: 06/12/2002)
22 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order of reference entered for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Referred to: Senior Judge Mazzone for: Mediation to case(s) 1:00-cv-11485, (jf) (Entered: 06/12/2002)
23 Notice of appearance of attorney for Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485, Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485 by Susan M. Weise, filed. c/s (kf) (Entered: 07/24/2002)
24 Judge A. D. Mazzone. Notice of Hearing/conference: Set ADR Conference for 10:30 10/31/02 . Notice mailed to counsel. (jf) (Entered: 09/12/2002)
25 Joint motion by Barbara Conrad in 1:00-cv-11485, Boston, City of in 1:00-cv-11485, Paul Evans in 1:00-cv-11485 to extend discovery deadline , filed. (jf) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [25-1] joint motion to extend discovery deadline to January 20, 2003; status conference set for 9/30/02 is hereby cancelled; disclosure of expert witnesses by plaintiffs due by 12/3/02, disclosure of expert witness by defendants by 12/30/02; all discovery by 1/20/03; dispositive motions by 2/25/03; reset pretrial conference for 2:30 4/2/03 , reset Jury trial 9:00 4/7/03 . cc:cl [EOD Date 9/27/02] (jf) (Entered: 09/27/2002)
Case no longer referred to ADR. (jf) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
26 Judge Nancy Gertner. 60 Day Settlement Order of Dismissal entered. cc:cl [EOD Date 11/1/02] (jf) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
Case closed. (jf) (Entered: 11/01/2002)
27 Report by A. David Mazzone in 1:00-cv-11485 of Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings. The case was: settled. party A. David Mazzone in 1:00-cv-11485 (jf) (Entered: 11/08/2002)

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United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:98-cv-12511-NG

CLOSED

Mack v. Suffolk County, et al Assigned to: Judge Nancy Gertner Demand: $0 related Case: 1:01-cv-10096-NG Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Katrina Mack
V. Defendant Suffolk County

Date Filed: 12/10/1998 Date Terminated: 05/11/2005 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Howard Friedman Law Offices of Howard Friedman 90 Canal Street 5th Floor Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-4100 Fax: 617-742-5858 Email: hfriedman@civil-rights-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Myong J. Joun Law Offices of Howard Friedman, P.C. 90 Canal Street, 5th Floor Boston, MA 02114-2022 617-742-4100 Fax: 617-742-5858 Email: mjjoun@civil-rights-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrea J. Cabral Suffolk County District Attorney's Office One Bulfinch Place Boston, MA 02114 617-619-4070 TERMINATED: 04/04/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Cawley Suffolk County Sheriff's Department

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Defendant Richard J. Rouse TERMINATED: 04/04/2003
Defendant Jane Doe

200 Nashua Street Boston, MA 02114 617-961-6680 Fax: 617-961-6693 Email: kcawley@scsdma.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa J. Garand Koufman & Frederick, LLP 265 Essex Street Suite 301 Salem, MA 01970 978-745-2212 Fax: 978-745-9157 Email: mgarand@kflawyers.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King Suffolk County Sheriff's Department 200 Nashua Street Boston, MA 02114 617-635-1100 TERMINATED: 02/13/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kathleen M. Cawley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa J. Garand (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/13/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kathleen M. Cawley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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Defendant Boston, City of
Defendant Andrea Andrea Cabral-Sheriff of Suffolk County

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa J. Garand (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/13/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eve A Piemonte-Stacey ROACH & CARPENTER, P.C. 24 School Street Boston, MA 02108 617-720-1800 Fax: 617-720-0720 Email: eps@rc-law.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen M. Cawley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Goldsmith Reynolds Rappaport & Kaplan LLP 106 Cooke Street P.O. Box 2540 Edgartown, MA 02539 508-627-3711 Fax: 508-627-3088 Email: mgoldsmith@rrklaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anne P. Powers Suffolk County Sheriff's Department 200 Nashua Street Boston, MA 02114 617-989-6665 Fax: 617-989-6688 Email: anne_powers@scsdma.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Movant Joanne Maniscalco
Movant Christine Daley
Movant Denise Gasparini
Movant Alice Buckley
Intervenor Plaintiff Joanne Maniscalco
Intervenor Plaintiff Christine Daley
Intervenor Plaintiff Denise Gasparini
Intervenor Plaintiff Alice Buckley

represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Howard Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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V. Intervenor Defendant Suffolk County
Intervenor Defendant Richard J. Rouse
Intervenor Defendant Jane Doe
Intervenor Defendant Boston, City of

represented by Melissa J. Garand (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/13/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Melissa J. Garand (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/13/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Melissa J. Garand (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E King (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/13/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Eve A Piemonte-Stacey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Goldsmith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Date Filed 12/10/1998 12/10/1998 12/21/1998 12/21/1998 12/21/1998 01/05/1999 01/15/1999 01/25/1999 01/25/1999
01/25/1999
02/16/1999 02/17/1999 03/15/1999 03/24/1999 04/05/1999 04/12/1999 04/26/1999

#

Docket Text

1 Complaint filed. Case assigned to Judge: Gertner. Receipt #: 10919 Amount:$ 150.00. Fee Status: pd (fmr) (Entered: 12/14/1998)
Summons issued for Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of (fmr) (Entered: 12/14/1998)
2 Return of service executed as to Richard J. Rouse with service on 12/14/98 filed. Answer due on 1/3/99 for Richard J. Rouse (fmr) (Entered: 12/21/1998)
3 Return of service executed as to Suffolk County with service on 12/14/98 filed. Answer due on 1/3/99 for Suffolk County (fmr) (Entered: 12/21/1998)
4 Return of service executed as to Boston, City of with service on 12/14/98 filed. Answer due on 1/3/99 for Boston, City of (fmr) (Entered: 12/21/1998)
5 Answer by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe to complaint; jury demand, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/05/1999)
6 Answer by Boston, City of to complaint; jury demand, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/19/1999)
7 Motion by Katrina Mack to amend [1-1] complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/25/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [7-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint as the defendant has not filed an answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint . (fmr) (Entered: 01/25/1999)
8 Amended complaint by Katrina Mack filed. (Answer due 2/4/99 for Boston, City of, for Jane Doe, for Richard J. Rouse, for Suffolk County ) . Amended complaint amends [1-1] complaint ; adding . (fmr) (Entered: 01/25/1999)
9 Judge Nancy Gertner . Notice of Hearing/conference: set scheduling conference for 11:00 4/14/99 . (fmr) (Entered: 02/18/1999)
10 Response by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe in opposition to [7-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 02/19/1999)
11 Letter by Howard Friedman dated: 3/11/99 to: Ms. Molloy re: resheduling of 4/14/99 hearing filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/15/1999)
12 Letter by Rose E King dated: 3/22/99 to: Ms. Mulcahy re: endorsement allowing motion to amend filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [11-1] remark, reset scheduling conference for 11:00 4/29/99 . (fmr) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
13 Joint statement by Katrina Mack, Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Boston, City of , re: discovery schedule, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/12/1999)
14 Notice of appearance of attorney for Boston, City of by Eve Anne Piemonte-Stacey, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/26/1999)

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04/27/1999 04/27/1999 04/29/1999
04/29/1999
04/29/1999
04/29/1999 04/29/1999
05/03/1999 05/03/1999 05/24/1999 06/04/1999
06/04/1999
06/08/1999 06/21/1999 06/21/1999
07/01/1999 07/01/1999

15 Motion by Katrina Mack to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/28/1999)
16 Memorandum by Katrina Mack in support of [15-1] motion to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/28/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [7-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint (previous endorsement was vacated) . (fmr) (Entered: 05/01/1999)
17 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order entered, vacating [0-0] endorsed order allowing motion to amend complaint, endorsed by the Deputy clerk . (fmr) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
Discovery schedule: Answers to class cert by 7/1/99; Status conference set cor 7/6/99 at 2:30; Discovery is complete 10/30/99; summary judgment motions by 12/3/99 (fmr) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
Scheduling conference held . (fmr) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
18 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: scheduling conference Court Reporter: none. Joint statment adopted with revisions. Trial set for 2/7/00. Consolidation with case 98-12346 is possible (fmr) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
Status conference set at 2:30 7/6/99 . (fmr) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
Jury trial set at 9:00 2/7/00 . (fmr) (Entered: 05/03/1999)
19 Motion by Katrina Mack to amend [8-1] amended complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 05/25/1999)
20 Response by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of in opposition to [19-1] motion to amend [8-1] amended complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/07/1999)
21 Memorandum by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of in opposition to [19-1] motion to amend [8-1] amended complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 06/07/1999)
Motion to amend the complaint #19 sent to chambers with opposition (fmr) (Entered: 06/08/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [19-1] motion to amend [8-1] amended complaint . [EOD Date 6/21/99] (fmr) (Entered: 06/21/1999)
22 Second Amended complaint by Katrina Mack filed. (Answer due 7/1/99 for Boston, City of, for Jane Doe, for Richard J. Rouse, for Suffolk County ) . Amended complaint amends [8-1] amended complaint ; adding . (fmr) (Entered: 06/21/1999)
23 Response by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe in opposition to [15-1] motion to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 07/02/1999)
24 Response by Boston, City of in opposition to [15-1] motion to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 07/02/1999)

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07/06/1999 08/02/1999 08/02/1999 08/02/1999 08/13/1999 09/13/1999 09/20/1999
09/22/1999 09/22/1999
09/30/1999 09/30/1999 09/30/1999 09/30/1999 09/30/1999 10/01/1999
10/01/1999
10/08/1999

Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [15-1] motion to certify class action . [EOD Date 7/7/99] (fmr) (Entered: 07/07/1999)
25 Second Motion by Katrina Mack to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 08/03/1999)
26 Memorandum by Katrina Mack in support of [25-1] motion to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 08/03/1999)
27 Exhibits by Katrina Mack [25-1] motion to certify class action (fmr) (Entered: 08/03/1999)
28 Motion by Katrina Mack, Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of to continue class certification hearing , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 08/13/1999)
29 Motion by Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley to intervene , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/13/1999)
30 Motion by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of to extend time to 10/8/99 to respond to motion to intervene , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
Terminated document: terminating [28-1] motion to continue class certification hearing Requested by Judge Gertner. (fmr) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [30-1] motion to extend time to 10/8/99 to respond to motion to intervene . [EOD Date 9/22/99] (fmr) (Entered: 09/22/1999)
31 Motion by Boston, City of for leave to file brief in excess of 20 pgs. , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
32 Memorandum by Boston, City of in opposition to [25-1] motion to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
33 Exhibits by Boston, City of [32-1] opposition memorandum (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
34 Motion by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe for leave to file brief in excess of 20 pgs. , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
35 Memorandum by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe in opposition to [25-1] motion to certify class action , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [31-1] motion for leave to file brief in excess of 20 pgs. . [EOD Date 10/1/99] (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [34-1] motion for leave to file brief in excess of 20 pgs. . [EOD Date 10/1/99] (fmr) (Entered: 10/01/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [28-1] motion to continue class certification hearing, Motion hearing set for 2:00 10/27/99 for [25-1] motion to certify class action . [EOD Date 10/8/99] (fmr) (Entered: 10/08/1999)

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10/08/1999 10/08/1999 10/12/1999 10/20/1999 10/20/1999 10/20/1999 10/27/1999 10/28/1999 10/28/1999 10/28/1999 10/28/1999
01/06/2000 02/16/2000
02/16/2000
02/16/2000
03/01/2000 03/02/2000 03/02/2000

36 Response by Suffolk County in opposition to [29-1] motion to intervene , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/12/1999)
37 Response by Boston, City of in opposition to [29-1] motion to intervene , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/12/1999)
Motion to intervene as plaintiffs # 29 sent to chambers with opposition (fmr) (Entered: 10/12/1999)
38 Motion by Katrina Mack for leave to file reply brief , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/20/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [38-1] motion for leave to file reply brief . [EOD Date 10/20/99] (fmr) (Entered: 10/20/1999)
39 Reply/response by Katrina Mack to [35-1] opposition memorandum, [32-1] opposition memorandum , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/20/1999)
40 Motion by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of for leave to file reply , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/28/1999)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [40-1] motion for leave to file reply . [EOD Date 10/28/99] (fmr) (Entered: 10/28/1999)
41 Sur reply by Suffolk County to reply to [25-1] motion to certify class action filed. (fmr) (Entered: 10/28/1999)
Motion hearing re: [25-1] motion to certify class action Motion hearing held (fmr) (Entered: 11/01/1999)
42 Judge Nancy Gertner . Clerk's Notes: re: motion hearing held. Oral arguement held and motions taken under advisement Court Reporter: hagopian (fmr) (Entered: 11/01/1999)
43 Motion by Katrina Mack for discovery , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 01/10/2000)
44 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order entered granting [25-1] motion to certify class action granting [29-1] motion to intervene . [EOD Date 2/17/00] (fmr) (Entered: 02/17/2000)
45 Judge Nancy Gertner . Memorandum and Order entered. granting [25-1] motion to certify class action granting [29-1] motion to intervene [EOD Date 2/17/00] (fmr) (Entered: 02/17/2000)
53 Intervenor's complaint by Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley against Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
46 Joint statement by Katrina Mack, Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of , re: litigation schedule, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/01/2000)
47 Motion by Boston, City of to stay pending interlocutory appeal , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/03/2000)
48 Certificate of Consultation re: [47-1] motion to stay pending interlocutory appeal , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/03/2000)

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03/08/2000 04/04/2000 04/05/2000 04/05/2000
04/05/2000 04/06/2000 12/18/2000 12/18/2000
12/18/2000 04/24/2002
04/29/2002

49 Motion by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe to stay , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/03/2000)
50 Response by Katrina Mack in opposition to [49-1] motion to stay, [47-1] motion to stay pending interlocutory appeal , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/06/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [49-1] motion to stay . [EOD Date 3/6/00] (fmr) (Entered: 03/06/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [43-1] motion for discovery . [EOD Date 3/6/00] (fmr) (Entered: 03/06/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered denying [47-1] motion to stay pending interlocutory appeal . [EOD Date 3/6/00] (fmr) (Entered: 03/06/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [46-1] litigation schedule. Court accepts plaintiffs proposal in para A2, defendants proposals in Para B 1,2 [EOD Date 3/6/00] (fmr) Modified on 03/10/2000 (Entered: 03/06/2000)
51 Response by Katrina Mack in opposition to [47-1] motion to stay pending interlocutory appeal , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 03/10/2000)
52 Judge Nancy Gertner . Order entered, consolidating cases . [EOD Date 4/5/00] (fmr) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
Consolidated Member Case. . Lead Case Number: 1:98 11346 (fmr) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
Case closed. This case has been consolidated with Ford v. Suffolk County. All pleadings should be filed in the lead case. Cases have been consolidated for all purposes including trial (fmr) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
Evidentiary hearing on summary judgment set at 2:30 1/10/01 . (fmr) (Entered: 04/05/2000)
54 Answer by Suffolk County, Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe to [53-1] intervenor complaint , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
55 Motion by Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of for Melissa Garand to withdraw as attorney , filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [55-1] motion for Melissa Garand to withdraw as attorney (Terminated attorney Melissa J. Garand for Jane Doe, attorney Melissa J. Garand for Richard J. Rouse, attorney Melissa J. Garand for Suffolk County . [EOD Date 12/18/00] (fmr) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
56 Notice of appearance of attorney for Richard J. Rouse, Jane Doe, Boston, City of by Kathleen M. Cawley, filed. (fmr) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
57 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order of reference entered for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Referred to: Senior Judge Mazzone for: mediation to case(s) 1:98-cv-12511. (jf) (Entered: 04/25/2002)
58 Notice of appearance of attorney for Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 by Myong J. Joun, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/01/2002)

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06/17/2002 07/01/2002 07/10/2002
10/24/2002 10/24/2002 11/13/2002 12/02/2002
12/05/2002 12/10/2002
01/03/2003 01/03/2003
01/03/2003
01/03/2003
01/10/2003
01/10/2003 01/15/2003
01/15/2003

59 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order of Dismissal entered. Notice sent to counsel [EOD Date 6/18/02] (jf) (Entered: 06/18/2002)
Case reopened. (See Lead Case 98-11346) Fairness Hearing set for 9/26/02. (jf) Modified on 07/01/2002 (Entered: 07/01/2002)
60 Letter by Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-12511 dated: 7/9/02 to: Ms. Molloy (clerk) re: request that 60-day settlement order of dismissal be vacated, filed. (jf) (Entered: 07/19/2002)
Case no longer referred to ADR. (jf) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
Case no longer consolidated with 98-11346. (jf) (Entered: 10/24/2002)
61 Assented to Motion by plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-12511 to set December 13, 2002 as the deadline for reviewing late claims , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 11/13/2002)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting [61-1] motion to set December 13, 2002 as the deadline for reviewing late claims. cc:cl [EOD Date 12/2/02] (jf) (Entered: 12/02/2002)
62 Motion by plaintiffs in 1:98-cv-12511 for an order of approval for payment of the claims administrator , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
63 Notice of assent to plaintiff's motion for an order of approval for payment of the claims administrator by City of Boston, in 1:98-cv-12511, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 12/12/2002)
Letters sent to Attorney Friedman. (jf) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [62-1] motion for an order of approval for payment of the claims administrator. cc:cl [EOD Date 1/3/03] (jf) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
64 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order of the Court Granting Approval for Payment of the Claims Administrator entered. cc:cl [EOD Date 1/3/03] (jf) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsement re: [63-1] Allowing defendant City of Boston's assent to plaintiff's motion for an order of approval for payment of the claims administrator. (jf) (Entered: 01/03/2003)
65 Assented to Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 for an order granting thirty-one claimants permission to file late claims , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 01/10/2003)
Proposed Order granting Thirty-one claimants permission to file late claims by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 received for filing. (jf) (Entered: 01/10/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [65-1] motion for an order granting thirty-one claimants permission to file late claims. PROPOSED ORDER ATTCH, listing all 31 names. [EOD Date 1/15/03] (mcm) (Entered: 01/15/2003)
66 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order Granting Thirty-one claimants permission to file late claims entered. cc:cl [EOD Date 1/23/03] (jf) (Entered: 01/23/2003)

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02/03/2003 02/03/2003 02/03/2003 02/03/2003 02/04/2003 02/04/2003 02/05/2003 02/10/2003 02/24/2003
02/26/2003
02/26/2003
02/27/2003 03/05/2003 03/06/2003

67 Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering Suffolk County to pay $5 million plus interest to the settlement fund , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
Proposed Order by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 received for filing. (jf) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
68 Memorandum by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 in support of [67-1] motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering Suffolk County to pay $5 million plus interest to the settlement fund, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
69 Affidavit of Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-12511 , re: [67-1] motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering Suffolk County to pay $5 million plus interest to the settlement fund , filed. (jf) (Entered: 02/04/2003)
70 Motion by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-12511 for Rose E. King to withdraw as attorney , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/06/2003)
71 Notice of appearance of attorney for Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-12511 by Kathleen M. Cawley, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 02/06/2003)
Documents #67 - #69 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 02/05/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting [70-1] motion for Rose E. King to withdraw as attorney cc:cl [EOD Date 2/13/03] (jf) (Entered: 02/13/2003)
72 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-12511 to [67-1] motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering Suffolk County to pay $5 million plus interest to the settlement fund, filed. c/s (Sent to chambers) (jf) Modified on 02/25/2003 (Entered: 02/25/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting plaintiffs' [67-1] motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering Suffolk County to pay $5 million plus interest to the settlement fund. cc:cl [EOD Date 2/27/03] (jf) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
73 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order entered. ".......GRANTS plaintiffs' motion and ORDERS that defendant Suffolk County pay $5 million iinto the settlement fund FORTHWITH. The FURTHER ORDERS that the County pay all interest accrued on the unpaid $5 million from November 29, 2002, through the date of payment at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded daily, FORTHWITH.........SO ORDERED." cc:cl [EOD Date 2/27/03] (jf) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
74 Response by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 in opposition to defendant Suffolk County's request for additional time to make payment, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 03/04/2003)
79 Copy Letter by Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, by Anne P. Powers in 1:98-cv-12511 dated: 3/5/03 to: Sirs: re: settlement filed. (jf) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
75 Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 for an order granting approval for payment of the claims administrator and special master , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered:

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03/06/2003
03/18/2003 03/18/2003 03/18/2003 03/18/2003 03/20/2003 03/20/2003 03/24/2003 03/24/2003 03/27/2003
04/01/2003
04/03/2003 04/03/2003
04/04/2003
04/04/2003
04/04/2003 04/04/2003

03/07/2003)
Proposed Order granting approval for payment of the claims administrator and special master by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 received for filing. (jf) (Entered: 03/07/2003)
Documents #74 and #75 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
76 Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 for contempt of Suffolk County , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
77 Memorandum by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 in support of [76-1] motion for contempt of Suffolk County , filed. (jf) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
78 Affidavit of Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-12511 , re: [76-1] motion for contempt of Suffolk County , filed. (jf) (Entered: 03/19/2003)
80 Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 for an order to permit partial settlement distributions , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
Proposed Order on motion for an order to permit partial settlement distributions by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 received for filing. (jf) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
Documents #76 and 80 sent to chambers. (jf) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
81 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order to Show Cause entered: Show Cause Hearing set for 9:30 4/4/03. cc:cl [EOD Date 3/24/03] (jf) (Entered: 03/24/2003)
82 Response by Boston, City of in 1:98-cv-12511 to [80-1] motion for an order to permit partial settlement distributions, filed. c/s (Sent to chambers) (jf) Modified on 03/28/2003 (Entered: 03/28/2003)
83 Response by Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-12511 in opposition to [76-1] motion for contempt of Suffolk County, filed. c/s (sent to chambers) (jf) (Entered: 04/02/2003)
84 Reply by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 to response to [76-1] motion for contempt of Suffolk County, filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
85 Affidavit of Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-12511, re: [84-1] plaintiffs' reply to Suffolk County's opposition to the motion to hold the county in contempt, filed. (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
86 Notice of appearance filed by attorney Anne P. Powers for Suffolk County Sheriff 1:98-cv-12511 Andrea J. Cabral-Sheriff, filed. (mcm) Modified on 04/04/2003 (Entered: 04/04/2003)
87 Second Affidavit of Suffolk County in 1:98-cv-12511 of Andrea J. Cabral in 1:98-cv-12511 , re: [83-1] opposition response , filed in open court. (mcm) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
Show cause hearing held . (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
88 Judge Nancy Gertner. Clerk's Notes: re: Show Cause Hearing/Motion hearing held on #76 and #80; motions #76 and #80 - allowed; motion to appoint alternate special master filed in open court and Allowed; hearing continued- Set show cause hearing for 11:00 5/7/03 ; Attorney Powers will file a change of address

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04/04/2003 04/04/2003 04/04/2003
04/04/2003 04/04/2003 04/04/2003
04/04/2003 04/04/2003 04/24/2003 05/06/2003 05/06/2003 05/06/2003

forthwith (old address appears on docket). Court Reporter: Harold Hagopian (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
89 Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 to appoint an alternate special master , filed in open court. c/s (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting plaintiff's [75-1] motion for an order granting approval for payment of the claims administrator and special master . Notice mailed to counsel. [EOD Date 4/4/03] (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
90 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order Granting Approval for Payment of the Claims Administrator and Special Master entered. "Upon motion of the plaintiffs, this Court does hereby APPROVE the following payments from the Mack Settlement Escrow Fund: 1. $12,956.21 to Blackman Kallick Bartelstein LLP, the claims administrator; and 2. $7,125.00 to ADR Associates for Phyllis N. Segal, the special master. So ORDERED." cc:cl [EOD Date 4/4/03] (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting plaintiff's [76-1] motion for contempt of Suffolk County . Notice mailed to counsel.[EOD Date 4/4/03] (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered granting plaintiff's [80-1] motion for an order to permit partial settlement distributions. cc:cl [EOD Date 4/4/03] (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
91 Judge Nancy Gertner. Order entered. "After consideration of the Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order to Permit Partial Settlement Distributions, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion and PERMITS the Claims Administrator to make a partial distribution now to class members using the available funds. The Court FURTHER AUTHORIZES a second distribution to class members once the County pays......." Notice mailed to counsel. [EOD Date 4/4/03] (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner. Endorsed Order entered granting plaintiffs' [89-1] motion to appoint an alternate special master. cc:cl [EOD Date 4/4/03] (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
92 Affidavit of Howard Friedman in 1:98-cv-12511 , re: [89-1] motion to appoint an alternate special master , filed. (jf) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
93 Transcript of proceedings for Show Cause Hearing held on proceeding date: April 4, 2003 before Judge: Gertner. Court Reporter: Harold Hagopian (jf) (Entered: 04/24/2003)
94 Motion by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering the sheriff to effect payment , filed. c/s (jf) (Entered: 05/07/2003)
95 Memorandum by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 in support of [94-1] motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering the sheriff to effect payment , filed. (jf) (Entered: 05/07/2003)
Proposed Order on Plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering the sherif to effect payment by Katrina Mack in 1:98-cv-12511 received

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05/07/2003
05/09/2003 05/21/2003 06/30/2003 06/30/2003 06/30/2003 07/01/2003 07/07/2003 07/11/2003
07/16/2003 07/21/2003 07/21/2003 07/22/2003 08/20/2003

for filing. (jf) (Entered: 05/07/2003)
96 Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Nancy Gertner : Show Cause Hearing held on 5/7/2003/Hearing held on plaintiff's motion to enforce settlement; Attorney Friedman informs the Court that Suffolk County has agreed to pay the amount owed today; defendants ask Judge to waive the contempt fines; ORDERED: Judge takes under advisement; Fine issues: deferred until parties submit a list of costs; parties to file on or before 6/30/03. (Court Reporter Harold Hagopian.) (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 05/22/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner . Endorsed Order entered mooting [94-1] plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement by ordering the sheriff to effect payment. cc:cl [EOD Date 5/13/03] (jf) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Mail sent to Anne P. Powers, Esq. Clerk mailed on 5/21/03 to current address of 1 Ashburton Place, Boston (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 05/21/2003)
97 MEMORANDUM Regarding Contempt Sanctions against Suffolk County by Katrina Mack. c/s (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/09/2003)
98 Proposed Document(s) submitted by Katrina Mack received for filing. Document received: Order. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/09/2003)
99 Defendant Suffolk County's Response Regarding Costs and Request for Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Submission, filed. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
100 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Suffolk County re 99 Response. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
101 Plaintiffs' OPPOSITION to the County's Request for Additional Time, filed. c/s(Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/10/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER entered ENDORSEMENT re 99 Response Regarding costs and request for time to respond to plaintiff's submission. "Allowed. Defendant's shall file response on or before 7/16/03." Notice mailed to counsel.(Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/14/2003)
102 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of its request that the court limit the fines associated with the court's order holding the defndant in contempt by Suffolk County. c/s (sent to chambers)(Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/22/2003)
103 MOTION for Approval of Payment to the Claims Administrator and Special Master by Plaintiffs.c/s (sent to chamber w/ proposed order attached)(Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/23/2003)
104 MOTION for Payment of Expenses by Plaintiffs.c/s (sent to chambers w/ proposed order attached)(Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/23/2003)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. Mail sent to Melissa J. Garand (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/22/2003)
Judge Nancy Gertner : Electronic ORDER entered granting 103 MOTION for Approval of Payment to the Claims Administrator and Special Master by Plaintiffs; granting 104 MOTION for Payment of Expenses by Plaintiffs. (Gertner, Nancy) (Entered: 08/20/2003)

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09/10/2003 09/10/2003 09/10/2003 03/18/2005 03/18/2005
03/18/2005 03/22/2005 05/11/2005

105 Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER GRANTING APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT TO THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR AND SPECIAL MASTER entered. Mailed to counsel. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/10/2003)
106 Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER GRANTING APPROVAL FOR PAYMENT OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPENSES entered. Notice mailed to counsel. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/10/2003)
107 Judge Nancy Gertner : ORDER entered. "......Suffolk County is obligated to pay the entire amount of the contempt fines totaling Seventy-Four Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty-Eight and 79/100 ($74,948.79) Dollars for its failure to comply.....". Notice mailed to counsel. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/10/2003)
108 Assented to MOTION for Order to For Final Orders by Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley, Katrina Mack. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Final Report of the Claims Administrator# 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order re Final Orders)(Friedman, Howard) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
109 MEMORANDUM in Support re 108 Assented to MOTION for Order to For Final Orders Cy Pres Award filed by Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley, Katrina Mack. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memorandum of Understanding with MCLS)(Friedman, Howard) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
110 MOTION to Substitute Revised Final Orders re 108 Assented to MOTION for Order For Final Orders, 109 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Joanne Maniscalco, Christine Daley, Denise Gasparini, Alice Buckley, Katrina Mack.(Friedman, Howard) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
111 Judge Nancy Gertner : FINAL ORDERS entered. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/24/2005)
Civil Case Terminated. (Filo, Jennifer) (Entered: 05/11/2005)

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