Case: 2:16-cv-00009-J As of: 01/22/2019 08:42 PM CST 1 of 6

U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas (Amarillo) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:16−cv−00009−J

CLOSED,MREF

McKee et al v. City of Amarillo, Texas Assigned to: Judge Mary Lou Robinson Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Rachel McKee
Plaintiff Loneta Jackson
Plaintiff Janet Cato
Plaintiff Larissa Coil

Date Filed: 01/14/2016 Date Terminated: 08/08/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Chris G Hoffman Hoffman Sheffield Sauseda & Hoffman 1008 S Madison Amarillo, TX 79101 806/376−8903 Fax: 806/376−5345 Email: choffman@hsshlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeff Blackburn Law Office of Jeff Blackburn 718 W 16th Amarillo, TX 79101 806/371−8333 Fax: 806/350−7716 Email: blackburn@blackburnbrownlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris G Hoffman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeff Blackburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris G Hoffman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeff Blackburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris G Hoffman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeff Blackburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:16-cv-00009-J As of: 01/22/2019 08:42 PM CST 2 of 6

Plaintiff Joshua Moore
Plaintiff Hilario Nayola

represented by Chris G Hoffman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeff Blackburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris G Hoffman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeff Blackburn (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Amarillo, Texas

represented by Bryan Scott McWilliams City of Amarillo 200 SE Third Amarillo, TX 79105 806/378−6067 Fax: 806/378−9487 Email: bryan.mcwilliams@amarillo.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William M McKamie Taylor, Olson, Adkins, Sralla & Elam L.L.P. 13750 San Pedro Avenue, Suite 555 San Antonio, TX 78232 United Sta 2105462122 Fax: 2105462130 Email: mmckamie@toase.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 01/14/2016
01/14/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against City of Amarillo, TX filed by Rachel McKee, Loneta Jackson. (Filing fee $400; Receipt number 0539−7312958) Summons(es) not requested at this time. In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Sheet with continuation sheet) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
2 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 01/14/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-00009-J As of: 01/22/2019 08:42 PM CST 3 of 6

01/14/2016 01/20/2016 01/20/2016 01/26/2016 02/11/2016 02/11/2016 02/16/2016
03/02/2016
03/03/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/22/2016 03/22/2016 03/23/2016 03/24/2016
04/01/2016

3 New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. File to Judge Robinson. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge. Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. (daa) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
4 Request for Clerk to issue Summons in a Civil Action filed by Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
5 Summons Issued as to City of Amarillo, Texas. (daa) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed as to City of Amarillo, Texas ; served on 1/21/2016. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 01/26/2016)
7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by City of Amarillo, Texas (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
8 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
9 ORIGINAL RULE 16 SCHEDULING ORDER: Parties shall be ready for trial by 10/24/2016. Counsel shall file a joint report setting forth the status of settlement negotiations by 5/31/2016. Discovery due by 8/22/2016. Pretrial Materials (designation of expert witnesses) due by 4/25/2016 by parties seeking affirmative relief and due by 5/16/2016 by parties opposing affirmative relief. Joinder of Parties due by 4/4/2016. Amended Pleadings due by 8/15/2016. Motions for summary judgment due by 8/22/2016. All other motions except motions in limine due by 9/19/2016. Rule 26(a)(3) disclosures due by 10/11/2016. (Ordered by Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 2/16/2016) (djs) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
10 AMENDED COMPLAINT − Class Action against City of Amarillo, Texas filed by Rachel McKee, Loneta Jackson. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
11 RESPONSE filed by Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee re: 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 03/03/2016)
12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by City of Amarillo, Texas (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
13 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
14 NOTICE of Service of Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(1) Disclosures filed by Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
15 Joint Submission on Discovery Matters − Scheduling/Discovery Plan by City of Amarillo, Texas, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 03/22/2016)
16 ORDER: On March 22, 2016, the parties submitted a Joint Scheduling/Discovery Plan, requesting a modification to the Court's Original Rule 16 Scheduling Order. The request is granted. See Order for details. (Ordered by Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 3/23/2016) (daa) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
17 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Amend 10 Amended Complaint, filed by Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amendment Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Amendment Exhibit B) (Hoffman, Chris) Modified text on 3/24/2016 (daa). (Entered: 03/24/2016)
18 ORDER re granting 17 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Amend 10 Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs are to promptly electronically file the amended complaint as proposed. (Ordered by Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 4/1/2016) (awc) (Entered: 04/01/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-00009-J As of: 01/22/2019 08:42 PM CST 4 of 6

04/04/2016
04/06/2016 04/13/2016 04/13/2016 04/20/2016 05/23/2016 05/23/2016 05/24/2016 05/25/2016 05/31/2016 06/01/2016 06/02/2016 06/03/2016
06/08/2016 06/09/2016

19 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Second) − Class Action against City of Amarillo, Texas filed by Rachel McKee, Loneta Jackson, Hilario Nayola, Larissa Coil, Joshua Moore, Janet Cato. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
20 RESPONSE filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re: 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
21 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
22 Appendix in Support filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re 21 MOTION to Certify Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s)) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
23 REPLY filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re: 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
24 Designation of Experts by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola. (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
25 MOTION to Quash filed by City of Amarillo, Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
26 Amended MOTION to Quash filed by City of Amarillo, Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 05/24/2016)
27 Order Referring Motion re: 26 Amended MOTION to Quash Motion(s) referred to Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 5/25/2016) (daa) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
28 Joint STATUS REPORT on Settlement Discussions filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
29 ORDER: Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Brief in Support, filed April l3, 2016. Defendant shall file a Response and Brief in Support within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 6/1/2016) (awc) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
30 Unopposed MOTION for Protective Order filed by City of Amarillo, Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
31 ORDER TO CONFER AND ORDER TO RESPOND: Lead counsel for the parties are ordered to meaningfully confer to attempt to resolve this matter. If the parties are unable to resolve the matter by agreement, plaintiffs shall file their response to the motion on or before June 10, 2016. If the parties resolve this matter, then a joint report shall be filed. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte on 6/3/2016) (epm) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
32 RESPONSE filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re: 26 Amended MOTION to Quash (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
33 Joint MOTION to Extend Time to Provide Rule 26(A)(2) Disclosures and to Complete Discovery filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order on Joint Motion to Extend Time) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 06/09/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-00009-J As of: 01/22/2019 08:42 PM CST 5 of 6

06/13/2016
06/13/2016 06/14/2016 06/15/2016 06/15/2016
06/15/2016 06/15/2016 06/17/2016 06/20/2016 06/20/2016
06/21/2016 06/23/2016

34 ORDER granting 33 Joint MOTION to Extend Time to Provide Rule 26(A)(2) Disclosures and to Complete Discovery. The deadlines in the Court's Original Rule 16 Scheduling Order are amended as follows: Parties seeking affirmative relief must provide Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures by August 5, 2016. Parties opposing affirmative relief must provide Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures by August 22, 2016. Finally, all discovery procedures shall be initiated in time to complete discovery by October 3, 2016. No further extensions will be granted without a showing of good cause. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 6/13/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
35 REPLY filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re: 26 Amended MOTION to Quash (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
36 ORDER SETTING HEARING: Motion Hearing set for 6/16/2016 01:30 PM in US Courthouse, Courtroom 1st Floor, 205 E. 5th St. Amarillo, TX 79101−1559 before Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte. re: 30 Unopposed MOTION for Protective Order , 26 Amended MOTION to Quash , 32 Response (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte on 6/14/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/14/2016)
37 MOTION for Hearing to Reschedule Hearing on Pending Motions filed by City of Amarillo, Texas (McKamie, William) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
38 ORDER CORRECTING ORDER SETTING HEARING: On June 15, 2016, the Court entered an Order Setting Hearing. The order stated that the Unopposed Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 30) would be considered, in addition to the Motion to Quash (Doc. No. 26) and Response (Doc. No. 32). The Unopposed Motion for Protective Order has not been referred to the undersigned and will not be considered at the hearing. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte on 6/15/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
39 ORDER RESETTING HEARING: Motion Hearing reset for 6/20/2016 01:30 PM in US Courthouse, Courtroom 1st Floor, 205 E. 5th St. Amarillo, TX 79101−1559 before Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte. re: 26 Amended MOTION to Quash , 32 Response. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte on 6/15/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
40 RESPONSE filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re: 21 MOTION to Certify Class (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
41 ORDER granting 30 Unopposed MOTION for Protective Order filed by City of Amarillo, Texas. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 6/17/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/17/2016)
42 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte: Motion Hearing held on 6/20/2016 re 26 Amended Motion to Quash filed by City of Amarillo, Texas. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Chris G. Hoffman, Jeff Blackburn; Defense − William M. McKamie. (Court Reporter: Digital File) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :38. (egb) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
43 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PROTECTION, re: 26 Amended Motion to Quash the Oral Depositions. After considering the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Protection to the extent that the June 22, 2016 oral depositions of Mayor Harpole and Councilmember Burkett are vacated and shall not be taken without leave of the Court. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte on 6/20/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
44 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 40 Response/Objection filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Extending Time to Reply) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
45 ORDER granting 44 Unopposed Motion to Extend Time to Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class. Plaintiffs shall file a Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class on or before July 8, 2016. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 6/23/2016) (daa) (Entered: 06/23/2016)

Case: 2:16-cv-00009-J As of: 01/22/2019 08:42 PM CST 6 of 6

06/27/2016 07/07/2016
07/08/2016 07/08/2016 08/08/2016 08/08/2016 08/08/2016
08/18/2016 08/30/2016 08/30/2016 09/23/2016
10/07/2016 10/12/2016

Magistrate Judge Clinton E Averitte no longer assigned to case. (daa) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
46 RESPONSE filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re: 21 MOTION to Certify Class (Attachments: # 1 Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3 Exhibit(s), # 4 Cover Sheet, # 5 Exhibit(s), # 6 Exhibit(s), # 7 Exhibit(s), # 8 Exhibit(s), # 9 Cover Sheet, # 10 Exhibit(s), # 11 Cover Sheet, # 12 Exhibit(s), # 13 Cover Sheet, # 14 Exhibit(s), # 15 Cover Sheet, # 16 Exhibit(s), # 17 Exhibit(s)) (McKamie, William) (Entered: 07/07/2016)
47 REPLY filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re: 21 MOTION to Certify Class (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
48 Appendix in Support filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re 47 Reply to Response to 21 Motion to Certify Class (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
49 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Granting Defendant's 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim as to all of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 8/8/2016) (chmb) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
50 ORDER DENYING Plaintiffs' 21 Motion for Class Certification as MOOT. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 8/8/2016) (chmb) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
51 FINAL JUDGMENT −− The Court having granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs take nothing on any and all claims and causes of action asserted in this lawsuit against Defendant, andit is FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant is entitled to their reasonable and necessary costs in this action. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 8/8/2016) (awc) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
52 BILL OF COSTS by City of Amarillo, Texas. (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 08/18/2016)
53 OBJECTION filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re: 52 Bill of Costs (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit(s) of Verification) (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
54 Appendix in Support filed by Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Loneta Jackson, Rachel McKee, Joshua Moore, Hilario Nayola re 53 Response/Objection to Defendant's Bill of Costs (Hoffman, Chris) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
55 ORDER: Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Bill of Costs, filed August 30, 2016. Defendant shall file a Response and Brief in Support within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. If Defendant fails to timely respond, the Court will sustain Plaintiffs' Objection and costs will be adjusted accordingly. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 9/23/2016) (vls) Modified typos on 9/26/2016 (awc). (Entered: 09/23/2016)
56 RESPONSE filed by City of Amarillo, Texas re: 53 Response/Objection (McWilliams, Bryan) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
57 ORDER, re: 53 Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant's Bill of Costs. Costs taxed at $3,660. (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 10/12/2016) (daa) Modified text on 12/14/2016 (daa). (Entered: 10/12/2016)

 
 Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 1 of 21 PageID 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION

RACHEL McKEE and LONETA JACKSON Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF AMARILLO, TEXAS
Defendant.

Civil Action No. ___________________

COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs Rachel McKee and Loneta Jackson by and through undersigned counsel, bring this Class Action Complaint against Defendant City of Amarillo, Texas (“the City”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated and, as grounds therefore, state and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION1 1. This case involves a deliberate choice by the City to prioritize the collection of
fines, fees and costs revenue over the Constitutional rights of its residents by instituting a modern day debtor’s prison.

1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters alleged.
Page 1 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 2 of 21 PageID 2
2. Until 1971 the practice in most municipal courts throughout the country and Texas was to impose a jail sentence on persons who did not pay fines assessed for non-jailable offenses such as traffic tickets. Under this practice, known as “pay or lay,” no consideration was given to individual defendants’ financial circumstances and no alternative methods of punishment were considered before sending people to jail for not paying their fines.
3. “Pay or lay” was abolished by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). There, the Court held that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to jail indigent persons solely for failing to pay a fine.
4. The City of Amarillo chose to ignore Tate and has maintained its policy of “pay or lay” from 1960 until the present. The City’s Municipal Code of Ordinances states: Sec. 2-8-111. - Judgments; forms. In the event of a conviction in a case pending before the Municipal Court, the judgment shall be in the name of the State and shall recover of the defendant the fine and other penalties for the use and benefit of the City. Except as otherwise provided the Court shall require the defendant to remain in the custody of the Chief of Police of the City until the fine, Stateimposed fees and other penalties are paid, and order that execution issue to collect the fine and penalties. (Code 1960, § 7-27; Ord. No. 5619, § 1, 8-26-86) The Municipal Code of Ordinances contains no exceptions to § 2-8-111 for defendants who are indigent. It does not include any procedure allowing for the determination of indigence or the appropriateness of alternative punishments, such as community service, for those who are indigent. Despite 44 years of
Page 2 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 3 of 21 PageID 3
jurisprudence recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment rights spelled out in Tate and its progeny, the City of Amarillo has stubbornly persisted in routinely jailing indigent people on the basis of its Code. 5. The City’s policy and practice of “pay or lay” results in the illegal jailing of hundreds, if not thousands, of Amarillo residents each year, threatening those residents’ jobs, housing, families and already tenuous financial circumstances. Two such people are the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit. 6. This lawsuit seeks to hold the City accountable to Plaintiffs Rachel McKee and Loneta Jackson and the class members they seek to represent for these violations of their constitutional rights.
I. PARTIES 7. Plaintiff Rachel McKee is a 47 year-old resident of Amarillo, Texas. 8. Plaintiff Loneta Jackson is a 36 year-old resident of Amarillo, Texas. 9. Defendant City of Amarillo is a municipality organized under the laws of the State
of Texas. The City of Amarillo has established the Amarillo Municipal Court as a department of the City. The City of Amarillo may be served with process by serving the City Clerk, Mayor, Treasurer, or Secretary at 509 S.E. Seventh Avenue, Amarillo, Texas 79105.
Page 3 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 4 of 21 PageID 4
II. JURISDICTION 10. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction).
III. VENUE 11. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all or a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District and the City resides in this district.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The City’s Policies, Practices and Customs 12. The City of Amarillo is located in Potter and Randall Counties in the panhandle of
Texas. The City has a population of approximately 197,000 people. According to census data, approximately 17.1 percent of the population in Amarillo lives at or below the poverty level. 13. The City’s government is constituted by, among other officials, a mayor and a four-person city council. 14. The City has established the City of Amarillo Municipal Court (“Municipal Court”) as a Court of Record under TEX. GOVT. CODE § 30.00003 and conferred upon it jurisdiction as set forth in TEX. GOVT. CODE § 30.00005. AMARILLO, TX., CODE § 2-
Page 4 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 5 of 21 PageID 5
8-2, 2-8-3 (1988). This includes jurisdiction over Class C misdemeanors which are punishable only by fines. Class C misdemeanors are the least serious crimes punishable by the State of Texas and include crimes such as traffic violations, failing to register one’s vehicle and failing to show proof of insurance. 15. The Municipal Court is a subdivision of the City’s Finance division. 16. The City contracts with the Randall County Jail to house those who are ordered by municipal court judges to serve jail time. 17. When someone is charged with a Class C Misdemeanor in Amarillo Municipal Court and is convicted either by plea or trial, they are ordered to pay a fine and court costs by a Municipal Court Judge. 18. These fines and costs are frequently paid in full, which is the objective of the City of Amarillo. For indigent people who cannot afford to pay the full amount at once a different approach is taken. 19. For such people, a court administrator creates a schedule of payments due. The administrator does not take into consideration the person’s ability to pay such installments. Instead, the City has instituted an arbitrary payment schedule that is mechanically applied:
Amarillo’s Minimum Payment Schedule $1.00-$200.00—Balance is due within 30 days; $200.01-$550.00—$55-$65 every two weeks based upon disposable income; $551.01-$750.00—$65-$75 every two weeks based upon disposable income;
Page 5 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 6 of 21 PageID 6
$750.01 & Up—$75 or higher every two weeks based upon disposable income. Note: If unable to pay biweekly, a full monthly payment may be offered to the defendant. If the defendant bonds out of jail, one-third to one-half of the balance is due at judgment or sentencing. If a defendant is remanded to jail for failing to comply with orders of the court, once released, any balance of court costs, fees and fines remaining is due to the court in full. An additional payment plan is not an option. Source: Municipal Court Recorder, vol. 14, no. 4, April/May 2005
20. When an indigent person fails to make a payment under this arbitrary installment
plan, a warrant is issued pursuant to article 45.045 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. This causes the person to be arrested and brought before the court.
21. Although there is some variance from one defendant to another as to the Court’s
specific findings, there is a consistent failure by Amarillo Municipal Court judges
to follow the law in two respects: 1. A meaningful hearing is not held to determine
whether a person is indigent; 2. Alternative methods of enforcing the judgment,
such as community service, are not considered. The end result is that all but a
statistically insignificant number of defendants are sent to jail if they cannot pay
the fine. The statistical evidence of this procedure is irrefutable.
22. According to the Texas Office of Court Administration the City reached final
dispositions in 56,852 cases2 in calendar year 2014. Of those 56,582 cases,
2 OCA statistics are not available on a per defendant basis and there is not a one to one ratio of cases to defendants.
Page 6 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 7 of 21 PageID 7
there were only 9 cases in which the fines and court costs were waived for indigence and only 227 cases in which fines and courts costs were fully or partially satisfied by allowing the defendant to perform community service. In stark contrast, the fines and court costs in 11,089 cases were satisfied by jail time. 23. The City reached final dispositions in 47,627 cases in calendar year 2015. Of those 47,627 cases, there were only 5 cases in which the fines and court costs were waived for indigence and only 318 cases in which fines and courts costs were fully or partially satisfied by allowing the defendant to perform community service. The fines and court costs in 9,123 cases were satisfied by jail time. B. Rachel McKee 24. Ms. McKee is a 47 year-old woman with an eighth grade education. She is the mother of three grown children she raised alone. When she can find work, Ms. McKee cleans houses, hotel rooms and offices for a meager wage. When she is not working, she helps care for her grandchildren. At all times relevant to this complaint, Ms. McKee was legally indigent. 25. In early 2015, Ms. McKee was cited for no driver’s license, no insurance, and speeding. Because she was indigent and afraid of being jailed, she did not enter an appearance for these citations. In October 2015, Ms. McKee was arrested on those charges after a traffic stop. After spending two days in jail, Ms. McKee went before an Amarillo Municipal judge on October 21, 2015. There, she pled
Page 7 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 8 of 21 PageID 8
guilty to both the older charges and the new citations she had been just been issued. 26. After accepting her pleas, the judge ordered her to see the court administrator to establish a payment plan. To get on such a plan, Ms. McKee completed an application that indicated she was “homeless” and that her only income was $40.00 per month in back child support. Despite her obvious indigence, the court ordered her to pay $232.00 in biweekly payments until a balance of $1727.00 was paid. Ms. McKee was charged $25.00 to be put on such a payment plan and was ordered to pay $200.00 down. 27. On November 2, 2015, Ms. McKee voluntarily returned to court to inform the judge that she could not meet the payment plan as scheduled and to ask to modify it to one she could afford. Ms. McKee had clearly indicated to the Court in her previous application for a payment plan and during her appearance before the Court that she was indigent. Her only purpose of reporting to the Court was to avoid going to jail. When she appeared before the Court, Ms. McKee made it clear that she did not want to go to jail and again made it clear to the judge that she was indigent. 28. Rather than modify the plan, the judge put Ms. McKee in jail. No hearing was conducted to determine her indigence and no alternative method of discharging her debt was offered. 29. Ms. McKee was given credit for $100.00 per day towards payment of her debt by serving jail time. She spent 18 days in jail.
Page 8 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 9 of 21 PageID 9
30. In an effort to make this process appear legal, a motion was filed purporting to bear Ms. McKee’s electronic signature. The motion, titled “Defendant’s Motion to Lay Out Fine in Jail,” was created by the court. Not only does the motion contain factual assertions that contradict what Ms. McKee told the court, it also violated the process due her under the Fourteenth Amendment and articulated in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.046.
31. While Ms. McKee does recall signing an electronic signature pad at some point during the proceedings, Ms. McKee maintains she has never seen the document and that the contents of the document were never discussed with her or explained to her. The Court made no effort to explain to Ms. McKee her right to request community service as an alternative method of discharging her debt.
32. Even had Ms. McKee knowingly signed the motion, which she does not concede, the Court was aware that the motion contained statements that were not only false, but also, not in Ms. McKee’s best interest. Allowing persons like Ms. McKee to sign such a document subverts the judicial process and violates their rights to due process and equal protection.
33. Had Ms. McKee, at any time, been offered the option of discharging her fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, she would have agreed to do so.
34. As a result of being jailed in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, Ms. McKee suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish.
Page 9 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 10 of 21 PageID 10
C. Loneta Jackson 35. Ms. Jackson is a 36 year-old mother of five children. Her youngest child is five
years old and has special needs. Ms. Jackson did not graduate from high school and does not have a GED. Ms. Jackson has had sporadic employment primarily as a fast-food worker and currently works part-time at a Wienerschnitzel restaurant. Ms. Jackson receives $5.00 per month in court-ordered child support. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Ms. Jackson was legally indigent. 36. In 2013, Ms. Jackson was cited for no driver’s license, no insurance, expired registration and invalid inspection. Because she was indigent and afraid of being jailed, she did not enter an appearance for these citations. 37. In November 2015, Ms. Jackson lost her purse while riding the bus, losing her only form of identification and her son’s Medicaid card. This left her unable to obtain employment or get medical care for her son. She knew there were warrants for her arrest and if she attempted to get a new driver’s license she would be arrested. She had no alternative but to appear before the Municipal Court and attempt to resolve her debts. 38. When Ms. Jackson made the decision to voluntarily appear, it was her understanding that she would not be able to make the arbitrary payments that would be set by the court administrator. Ms. Jackson’s previous experience with City policy and practice and the Municipal Court’s reputation in the community led her to believe that the only options were “pay or lay.”
Page 10 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 11 of 21 PageID 11
39. On November 2, 2015, Ms. Jackson appeared before the judge. No hearing was conducted to determine her indigence, nor did the judge explain to Ms. Jackson that she had the right to assert that she was indigent. No alternative methods to discharge her fines were offered or discussed. The only alternative presented by the judge to Ms. Jackson was to “pay or lay.” Ms. Jackson could not pay, so the judge gave her credit for $100.00 per day and sentenced her to jail. Ms. Jackson served 18 days in jail in order to discharge her debts.
40. As in Ms. McKee’s case (see ¶ 30-32), a motion titled “Defendant’s Motion to Lay Out Fine in Jail,” appears in Ms. Jackson’s file. Again, like Ms. McKee, Ms. Jackson was indigent and should have been offered alternative means of discharging her debt. While Ms. Jackson does recall signing an electronic signature pad at some point during the proceedings, Ms. Jackson maintains that she has never seen the document and did not ask the Court to send her to jail or deny her community service as an option to discharge her debts.
41. Even had Ms. Jackson knowingly signed the motion, which she does not concede, the Court was aware that the motion contained statements that were not only false, but also not in Ms. Jackson’s best interest. Allowing persons like Ms. Jackson to sign such a document subverts the judicial process and violates their rights to due process and equal protection.
42. Had Ms. Jackson, at any time, been offered the option of discharging her fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, she would have agreed to do so.
Page 11 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 12 of 21 PageID 12
43. As a result of being jailed in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, Ms. Jackson suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS Defined Class 44. Plaintiffs McKee and Jackson seek class certification pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class defined as: “All indigent3 persons adjudicated by the City of Amarillo Municipal Court to owe fines and/or court costs who on or after January 14, 2014 were jailed for their failure to pay the adjudicated fines and/or court costs” (“the Class”). 45. Certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiffs can prove the elements of their claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claim. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)) 46. On information and belief the proposed Class is expected to consist of at least 1000 members or more and is so numerous that joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number of class members is unknown to named
3 An “indigent” person is consistently defined by Texas law as someone who earns not more than 125 percent of the income level established by the applicable federal poverty guidelines. See e.g. TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE § 133.002; TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 708.158; and the Armstrong, Potter, and Randall District Court and County Court Indigent Defense Plan submitted in accordance with the Texas Fair Defense Act (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 26.04).
Page 12 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 13 of 21 PageID 13
Plaintiffs at the present time, Plaintiffs believe the members of the class to be so numerous as to render joinder of all class members in this action impractical. 47. The City disposes of cases through jail time versus alternative punishment or waiver at a ratio of approximately 47:1. This ratio is irreconcilable with a 17.1 percent poverty rate. Even if impoverished people are marginally over or underrepresented in Municipal Court cases, and even if one assumes defendants typically have multiple cases, the statistical evidence is that there are hundreds, if not thousands of indigent people who have been jailed in violation of their Constitutional rights in the last two years. 48. Class members may be identified by court records readily available from Defendant and notice of the pendency of this action may be provided to class members by mail at the addresses identified in the court records. Supplemental notice may be provided (if deemed necessary by this Court) by means of published notice in one or more newspapers of general circulation within the City of Amarillo or by other Court-approved dissemination methods. Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2)) 49. This action involves questions of law and fact common to the class: a. Whether Defendant engaged in the conduct alleged herein; b. Whether Defendant has a policy, practice, and/or custom of arresting indigent persons who cannot pay fines and costs and converting those unpaid monetary sentences to jail time;
Page 13 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 14 of 21 PageID 14
c. Whether Defendant has a policy and practice of failing to ask about the reasons for a person’s failure to pay before jailing that person for failure to pay;
d. Whether the Defendant has a policy and practice of not considering alternative punishments before imprisoning a person for failure to pay;
e. Whether the City provides notice to debtors that their ability to pay will be a relevant issue at the hearings at which they are jailed and whether the City makes findings concerning ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration;
f. What procedural mechanisms, if any, the City uses as matter of policy and practice to determine indigence and ability to pay;
g. Whether the City applies state procedural and state and federal substantive law designed to determine indigence and to protect indigent debtors;
h. Whether the City has a policy and practice of threatening debtors with incarceration for unpaid debts without informing them of their constitutional rights;
i. Whether the City can employ incarceration, threats of incarceration, and other harsh debt-collection measures (such as applying arbitrary and unreasonable payment schedules) against debtors who cannot afford immediately to pay their debts in full;
j. Whether the foregoing policies and practices are officially promulgated policies, final decisions by municipal policymakers, practices or customs so widespread and well-settled that knowledge is attributable to municipal policymakers, or the byproduct of Defendant’s deliberate indifference to putative class members’
Page 14 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 15 of 21 PageID 15
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; k. Whether the foregoing policies and practices violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and l. Whether the Class is entitled to the damages and other monetary relief and if so, what the terms of relief should be. Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)) 50. The claims of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of each member of the putative Class. Plaintiffs, like all other members of the putative Class, have sustained damages in the form of illegal imprisonment arising from Defendants’ unconstitutional policies, practices and/or customs. 51. Specifically, the Plaintiffs were indigent at the time they were jailed and could have satisfied their fines through alternative means of punishment without undue hardship. None of the named Plaintiffs has received unusual treatment by the Defendant. Adequacy (Rule 23(a)(4)) 52. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the members of the putative Class. Plaintiffs have no known interests which are adverse to or in conflict with other members of the putative classes that would make class certification inappropriate.
Page 15 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 16 of 21 PageID 16
53. Plaintiffs have retained attorneys who are competent and experienced in complex litigation including civil rights litigation. Counsel have both handled numerous cases on behalf of individuals who suffered Constitutional deprivations which resulted in personal injury, wrongful death, unlawful convictions, unlawful imprisonment, and other damages.
54. Counsel has experience with class actions as well. Mr. Hoffman is currently representing a putative class of Colorado citizens in the ongoing litigation against Volkswagen and another putative class in a recently filed wage and hour claim.
55. Counsel also has extensive experience with substantive and procedural criminal defense law which bears heavily on the issues in this case. Mr. Blackburn is a board certified criminal defense lawyer who has represented in excess of 1000 defendants in criminal actions.
56. Counsel has the added advantage of being local. Mr. Hoffman has practiced in Amarillo for approximately 18 years and maintains an office there. Mr. Blackburn has resided and practiced in Amarillo for approximately 32 years and maintains his office there.
57. Counsel has invested substantial time and resources into becoming intimately familiar with the City’s scheme and with all of the relevant municipal, state and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel has also developed relationships with many of the individuals and families most victimized by the City’s practices.
58. Counsel for the putative Class will zealously assert all class members’ claims.
Page 16 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 17 of 21 PageID 17
Predominance and Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)) 59. The common questions of law and fact (see ¶ 49) arising in this action
predominate over any questions solely affecting individual class members. Specifically, the core facts of the Constitutional violations at issue are common to Plaintiffs and all class members will be pursuing the same legal theories based upon these core facts. More generally, the factual and legal issues concerning the scope and effect of Defendant’s policies, practices and customs alleged herein are: a. Central to the claims of Plaintiffs and all Class members; b. Substantially identical with respect to the burden of demonstrating liability; and c. Consist of the most important and fundamental issues to be determined at trial. 60. The class action mechanism is superior to any alternatives that might exist for the fair and effective adjudication of this cause of action. 61. Proceeding as a class action would permit the large number of injured parties to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and judicial resources. 62. A class action is the only practical way to avoid the potentially inconsistent results that numerous individual trials are likely to generate. 63. Class treatment is the only realistic means by which indigent Plaintiffs and other members of the Damages Class, with relatively small individual claims, can effectively litigate against a large, well-represented municipality such as the City. If the Class is not certified, it is unlikely that the putative class members will be
Page 17 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 18 of 21 PageID 18
able to secure counsel and pursue their claims because they are by definition poor and unable to afford a lawyer. 64. Should the putative class members be denied class certification, numerous, repetitive individual actions would place an enormous burden on federal courts as they are forced to review duplicative evidence and repeatedly decide over the same issues relating to the conduct of the City. 65. There are no unusual difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this case as a class action and Plaintiffs and their counsel are not aware of any reason why this case should not proceed as a class action. 66. The question of damages will also be driven by Class-wide determinations, such as the policies, practices and customs of the City of Amarillo. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a person was unlawfully jailed. Determining damages for individual Class members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on easily verifiable records of the length of unlawful incarceration. If need be, individual hearings on Class-member specific damages based on special circumstances can be held after Class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
Page 18 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 19 of 21 PageID 19
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF Count One: Failure to Inquire Into Ability to Pay and Alternatives to Incarceration
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Due Process Clause) 67. The City through its Municipal Code of Ordinances and through the actions of its
Municipal Court has a policy and practice of jailing indigent people without first inquiring into the reasons the person has failed to pay the debt, without determining whether they are indigent, and without considering adequate alternatives to incarceration. 68. Jailing a person who is too poor to pay her debt without first inquiring into the reasons she has failed to pay her debt, without determining if she is indigent, and without consideration of adequate alternatives to incarceration violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983).
Count Two: Commitment to Jail Solely Due to Inability to Pay (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Equal Protection Clause)
69. The City through its Municipal Code of Ordinances and through the actions of its Municipal Court has a policy and practice of jailing indigent people solely because they are unable to pay their debts arising from fines and costs for fineonly offenses.
70. Jailing a person solely because they lack the resources to pay a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Page 19 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 20 of 21 PageID 20
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the members of the Class, respectfully pray for judgment as follows: A. Certification of the proposed Class, including appointment of Plaintiffs as representatives of the Class and the appointment of Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class counsel; B. Damages, including compensatory damages, for the Class members in an amount to be determined at trial; C. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded as allowed by law; D. Compensatory damages for Plaintiffs for efforts taken on behalf of the Class; E. Costs and attorney’s fees; and F. For such other and further relief that the Court deems proper.
Respectfully submitted, ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
/s/ Chris Hoffman Chris Hoffman HOFFMAN, SHEFFIELD, SAUSEDA & HOFFMAN, PLLC 1008 S. Madison Amarillo, TX 79101 Phone: (806) 376-8903 Fax: (806) 376-5345 choffman@hsshlaw.com
Page 20 of 21

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 1 Filed 01/14/16 Page 21 of 21 PageID 21 /s/ Jeff Blackburn Jeff Blackburn BLACKBURN & BROWN, LLP 718 SW 16th Ave. Amarillo, TX 79101 Phone: (806) 371-8333 Fax: (806) 350-7116 blackburn@blackburnbrownlaw.com
Page 21 of 21

 
 Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 1 of 9 PageID 1770

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION

RACHEL MCKEE, LONETA

§

JACKSON, JANET CATO, LARISSA

§

COIL, JOSHUA MOORE, and HILARIO §

NAYOLA,

§

§

Plaintiffs,

§

v.

§

§

CITY OF AMARILLO, TEXAS,

§

§

Defendant.

§

NO. 2:16-CV-00009-J

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for

Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(B)(6), filed on March 16, 2016. In that Motion, Defendant, the City of Amarillo, requests that

the Court dismiss all of Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) claims for municipal liability.

Plaintiffs filed a Response on April 6, 2016, arguing that Plaintiffs' Complaint plausibly alleged

§ 1983 claims. Defendant filed a Reply on April20, 2016. Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Rachel McKee, Lonetta Jackson, Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Joshua Moore, and

Hilario Nayola (Plaintiffs) filed suit under § 1983 against Defendant, the City of Amarillo (the

City), alleging that the City's fine collection system is unconstitutional as applied to indigent

individuals. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges the City instituted a "modern day debtor's prison" by

imposing "a jail sentence on persons who did not pay fines assessed for non-jailable offenses."

Under this "pay or lay" practice, the municipal court and its officers allegedly failed to consider: (1)

individuals' financial circumstances and (2) alternative methods of punishment.

1

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 2 of 9 PageID 1771
Between 2013 and 2015, Plaintiffs received a plethora of citations including, but not limited to, expired vehicle registration, invalid vehicle inspection, speeding violations, dog related offenses, failure to maintain financial responsibility, driving with an invalid license, and driving without insurance. Plaintiffs allege that each citation was issued for a fine only offense. In other words, the harshest punishment for each citation was merely a monetary fine payable to the City.
The Complaint is unclear, but it appears that court administrators put at least some Plaintiffs on a payment schedule to discharge the fines in installments. The Complaint alleges the court administrators did "not take into consideration the person's ability to pay such installments." Further, when an individual missed an installment payment, "a warrant [was] issued . . . This [caused] the person to be arrested and held by Amarillo City Police officers before being brought before the court ...." The Complaint states "the Amarillo Police Department [made] no inquiry into whether the person was capable of paying the fine before taking them into custody."
Plaintiffs eventually appeared before the Amarillo Municipal Court to address the unpaid fines. According to the Complaint, the municipal judge provided Plaintiffs with two options: pay the fines or go to jail. Plaintiffs, allegedly unable to pay, were incarcerated for failure to pay fines assessed for non-jailable offenses. Each Plaintiff maintains that he or she was legally indigent at all relevant times.
Plaintiffs argue that municipal officers (municipal judges, municipal court administrators, and police department) acted pursuant to a "pay or lay" statute, Amarillo Code of Ordinances § 2-8Ill (Section 2-8-111 ). Section 2-8-111 states as follows:
In the event of a conviction in a case pending before the Municipal Court, the judgment shall be in the name of the State and shall recover of the defendant the fine and other penalties for the use and benefit of the City. Except as otherwise provided the Court shall require the defendant to remain in the custody of the Chief of Police of the City until the fine, Stateimposed fees and other penalties are paid, and order that execution issue to collect the fine and penalties.
2

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 3 of 9 PageID 1772
AMARILLO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-8-111. Plaintiffs allege that municipal officers, by enforcing Section 2-8-111, violated constitutional rights afforded to indigent individuals unable to pay fines. 1 Plaintiffs' Complaint argues that the City is liable for such constitutional violations under § 1983. The City seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims arguing, in relevant part, that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for municipal liability.
STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is to be evaluated on the pleadings alone. See Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1986). To defeat the motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plaintiffs "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted). Legal conclusions need not be accepted as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiffs claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the pleading standard of Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 662. Dismissal for failure to state a claim does not require a determination that, beyond a doubt, the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. Instead, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
1 Plaintiffs allege municipal officers violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by converting a fine only offense to jail time solely because an individual was unable to pay a fine. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971). Plaintiffs also allege municipal officers violated the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment by failing to make an affirmative determination of indigency status and consider adequate alternatives to incarceration. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
3

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 4 of 9 PageID 1773
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 662.
DISCUSSION I. Section 1983 Municipal Liability Municipalities can be liable under § 1983 when an official policy serves as the moving force behind constitutional violations. Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit held that a city ordinance constitutes an official policy. Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1990). The only official policy at issue in this case is Section 2-8-111. Portions of the Complaint, Motion, and Response address a persistent and widespread practice carried out by municipal officers. However, Plaintiffs affirmatively waived this theory of liability: "To make it clear, Plaintiffs claims are based on the existence of a written policy which has served as the moving force behind a constitutional violation, not on the policymaking authority of judges, administrators, or police." Plaintiffs' Response, p. 17. Here, Plaintiffs argue that a city ordinance, Section 2-8-111, is the official policy that served as the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. The City does not dispute that Plaintiffs' Complaint plausibly alleges Equal Protection and Due Process violations. Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court's decision turns on whether the Complaint plausibly states Section 2-8-111 served as the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. The Court holds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to meet this burden. An official policy serves as the moving force when a municipal officer's action is taken in accordance with an official policy. See Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 533 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, no municipal liability exists when the municipal officer's actions are taken in contravention of an official policy. See id. At the motion to dismiss stage the question is not whether Amarillo municipal officers violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
4

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 5 of 9 PageID 1774
Rather, the question is whether the municipal officers acted in accordance with or contravention of an official policy when the alleged violations occurred.
The parties disagree on whether Section 2-8-111 served as the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiffs interpret Section 2-8-111 as directing municipal officers to automatically jail indigent individuals for fine only offenses without determining indigency status and considering adequate alternatives to incarceration. Thus, under Plaintiffs' interpretation, the alleged violations resulted from actions taken in accordance with an official policy.
The City counters that Plaintiffs misinterpret Section 2-8-111 because Plaintiffs' interpretation renders the "except as otherwise provided" language meaningless. Under the City's interpretation, Section 2-8-111 and applicable municipal statutes require proper procedures prior to jailing an individual for failure to pay a fine. The City argues that municipal officers acted in contravention of the official policy when the alleged constitutional violations occurred. Thus, the Court must conduct a statutory interpretation analysis in order to determine what Section 2-8-111 dictates or allows.
If Plaintiffs' interpretation prevails, Plaintiffs' Complaint states a plausible claim for municipal liability and the Motion must be denied. On the other hand, if the City correctly interprets Section 2-8-111, the Motion must be granted.
II. Statutory Construction Analysis When construing a statute, courts should give words their plain and common meaning and avoid rendering any language meaningless. See White v. Black, 190 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1999); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998). "If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt, with few exceptions, the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words and terms." Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999). When a statute is unambiguous on its face,
5

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 6 of 9 PageID 1775
courts should not apply rules of construction to create an ambiguity. See id. at 865-66. Most importantly to this analysis, federal courts "should not strain to interpret a statute in a manner that renders it unconstitutional and should, instead, attempt to read it as constitutional if its words permit." Hill v. City ofHous., Tex., 789 F.2d 1103, 1112 (5th Cir. 1986).
Section 2-8-111 does not direct municipal officers to violate indigent individuals' constitutional rights. Section 2-8-111 explicitly provides that "except as otherwise provided the Court shall require the defendant to remain in the custody of the Chief of Police of the City until the fine, State-imposed fees and other penalties are paid ...." AMARILLO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-8-111 (emphasis added). The plain and ordinary meaning of the words has one unambiguous meaning. Section 2-8-111, which combines "except as otherwise provided" and "shall," mandates that the municipal court must incarcerate individuals for failure to pay a fine unless provided otherwise. An interpretation that ignores possible exceptions to the incarceration requirement renders "except as otherwise provided" meaningless. This Court must therefore determine if a municipal statute provides an exception to the incarceration requirement. Simply put, does a municipal statute prevent municipal officers from incarcerating indigent individuals without first determining indigency status and considering adequate alternatives to incarceration?
Ordinances are interpreted in concert with applicable city charter provisions. See Polsgrove v. Moss, 157 S.W. 1133 (Ky. 1913); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 381 (2016) ("An ordinance must be construed in connection with, and in subordination to, the charter or statute from which it derives its force ...."). Therefore, the Court will read Section 2-8-111 in concert with Amarillo City Charter provisions relating to municipal courts. See City ofAlexandria v. Cleco Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 465, 478-79 (W.D. La. 2010) (reading a city charter and ordinance in concert); Cherry Creek Aviation, Inc. v. City ofSteamboat Springs, 958 P.2d 515, 519 (Colo. App. 1998) ("Additionally, city charters and ordinances pertaining to the same subject matter must be construed as a whole to ... avoid
6

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 7 of 9 PageID 1776
inconsistencies and absurdities."). Reading Section 2-8-111 and applicable city charter provisions together, the Court holds that municipal statutes provide an exception to the automatic incarceration requirement.
The City Charter specifically requires municipal courts to follow constitutionally proper procedures before incarcerating indigent individuals for failure to pay a fine. The City of Amarillo Charter Section 22(ff) pertains to Amarillo Municipal Courts. See AMARILLO CHARTER Art. II § 22(ff). Section 22(ff) creates the municipal court system, sets the jurisdictional limits, and specifically adopts certain Texas state laws made applicable to municipal courts. See id. §§ 22(ff)(ff-2). Section 22(ff-2) explicitly states: "State Law Controlling. All ... prosecutions, ... commitment of those convicted of offenses [and] the collection and payment offines ... shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas and all other laws, as amended, that are applicable to Municipal Courts. " Id § 22(ff-2) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court must consult the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provisions that both apply to municipal courts and relate to commitment and collection of fines.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires municipal courts to follow procedures that prevent the alleged constitutional violations. Chapter 45 mandates procedural rules for municipal courts. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 45.001-.002 (West 2015) ("Criminal proceedings in the justice and municipal courts shall be conducted in accordance with this chapter."). Article 45.046, entitled Commitment, provides that:
(a) When a judgment and sentence have been entered against a defendant and the defendant defaults in the discharge of the judgment, the judge may order the defendant confined in jail until discharged by law if the judge at a hearing makes a written determination that: (1) the defendant is not indigent and has failed to make a good faith effort to discharge the fine and costs; or (2) the defendant is indigent and: 7

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 8 of 9 PageID 1777
(A) has failed to make a good faith effort to discharge the fines and costs under Article 45.0492; and
(B) could have discharged the fines and costs under Article 45.049 without experiencing any undue hardship.
ld. § 45.046. City Charter § 22(ff-2) specifically adopts and incorporates this provision into the City Charter, and the Texas statute is unmistakably clear. See id.; AMARILLO CHARTER § 22(ff). Municipal courts, before jailing an indigent individual for failure to pay a fine, must first make a written determination of indigency status and consider reasonable alternatives to incarceration (here, community service). TEX. CRIM. PROC. §§ 45.046, .049.
Putting the rules of statutory interpretation together, Section 2-8-111 cannot plausibly serve as the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. One unambiguous interpretation exists based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words; interpreting Section 2-8-111 in concert with applicable charter provisions; and ensuring the Court does not render any portion meaningless.
The City Charter, by adopting Article 45.046 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, provides an exception to Section 2-8-111 's automatic incarceration. This exception prevents municipal judges from confining indigent defendants to jail for failure to pay a fine without first determining indigency status and considering adequate alternatives to incarceration. Only after conducting the proper procedures and concluding the indigent defendant willfully or unjustifiably failed to discharge the fine through payment or community service is the municipal court required to jail individuals for the failure to pay.
CONCLUSION Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Section 2-8111 cannot serve as the moving force behind Plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations. The City's
2 "A justice or judge may require a defendant who . . . is determined by the court to have insufficient resources or income to pay a fine or costs, to discharge all or part of the fine or costs by performing community service." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 45.049 (West 2015).
8

..

\

I'

•

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 49 Filed 08/08/16 Page 9 of 9 PageID 1778

municipal officers (judges, court administrators, and police department) acted in contravention of,

not in accordance with, an official city policy. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be

Granted Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(6) is GRANTED as to all of Plaintiffs' § 1983

claims.

It is SO ORDERED.

~ Signed this the

day of August, 2016.

9

 
 Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 28 PageID 188

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION

RACHEL McKEE, LONETA JACKSON, JANET CATO, LARISSA COIL, JOSHUA MOORE, and HILARIO NAYOLA
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF AMARILLO, TEXAS
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:16-CV-00009-J

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs Rachel McKee, Loneta Jackson, Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Joshua Moore, and Hilario Nayola, by and through undersigned counsel, bring this Class Action Complaint against Defendant City of Amarillo, Texas (“the City”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated and, as grounds therefore, state and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION1 1. This case involves a deliberate choice by the City to prioritize the collection of
fines, fees, and costs revenue over the Constitutional rights of its residents by instituting a modern day debtor’s prison.
1 Plaintiffs make the allegations in this complaint based on personal knowledge as to matters in which they have had personal involvement and on information and belief as to all other matters alleged.
Page 1 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 28 PageID 189
2. Until 1971 the practice in most municipal courts throughout the country and Texas was to impose a jail sentence on persons who did not pay fines assessed for non-jailable offenses such as traffic tickets. Under this practice, known as “pay or lay,” no consideration was given to individual defendants’ financial circumstances and no alternative methods of punishment were considered before sending people to jail for not paying their fines.
3. “Pay or lay” was abolished by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). There, the Court held that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to jail indigent persons solely for failing to pay a fine.
4. The City of Amarillo chose to ignore Tate and has maintained its policy of “pay or lay” from 1960 until the present. The City’s Municipal Code of Ordinances states: Title II, Ch. 2-8, Art. I, Sec. 2-8-111. - Judgments; forms. In the event of a conviction in a case pending before the Municipal Court, the judgment shall be in the name of the State and shall recover of the defendant the fine and other penalties for the use and benefit of the City. Except as otherwise provided the Court shall require the defendant to remain in the custody of the Chief of Police of the City until the fine, Stateimposed fees and other penalties are paid, and order that execution issue to collect the fine and penalties. (Code 1960, § 7-27; Ord. No. 5619, § 1, 8-26-86) The Municipal Code of Ordinances contains no exceptions to § 2-8-111 for defendants who are indigent. It does not include any procedure allowing for the determination of indigence or the appropriateness of alternative punishments, such as community service, for those who are indigent. Despite 44 years of jurisprudence recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment rights spelled out in Tate
Page 2 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 28 PageID 190
and its progeny, the City of Amarillo has stubbornly persisted in routinely jailing indigent people on the basis of its Code. 5. The City’s policy and practice of “pay or lay” results in the illegal jailing of hundreds, if not thousands, of Amarillo residents each year, threatening those residents’ jobs, housing, families, and already tenuous financial circumstances. Two such people are the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit. 6. This lawsuit seeks to hold the City accountable to Plaintiffs Rachel McKee, Loneta Jackson, Janet Cato, Larissa Coil, Joshua Moore, and Hilario Nayola, and the class members they seek to represent for these violations of their constitutional rights.
I. PARTIES 7. Plaintiff Rachel McKee is a 47 year-old resident of Amarillo, Texas. 8. Plaintiff Loneta Jackson is a 36 year-old resident of Amarillo, Texas. 9. Plaintiff Janet Cato is a 49-year-old resident of Amarillo, Texas. 10. Plaintiff Larissa Coil is a 25-year-old resident of White Deer, Texas. 11. Plaintiff Joshua Moore is a 25-year-old resident of Wichita, Kansas. 12. Plaintiff Hilario Nayola is a 19-year-old resident of Amarillo, Texas. 13. Defendant City of Amarillo is a municipality organized under the laws of the State
of Texas. The City of Amarillo has established the Amarillo Municipal Court as a department of the City. The City of Amarillo may be served with process by serving the City Clerk, Mayor, Treasurer, or Secretary at 509 S.E. Seventh Avenue, Amarillo, Texas 79105.
Page 3 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 4 of 28 PageID 191
II. JURISDICTION 14. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction).
III. VENUE 15. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all or a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District and the City resides in this district.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The City’s Policies, Practices, and Customs 16. The City of Amarillo is a home rule municipality located in Potter and Randall Counties in the panhandle of Texas. The City has a population of approximately 197,000 people. According to census data, approximately 17.1 percent of the population in Amarillo lives at or below the poverty level. 17. The City’s government is constituted by, among other officials, a mayor and a four-person city council. 18. The City has established the City of Amarillo Municipal Court (“Municipal Court”) as a Court of Record under Tex. Govt. Code § 30.00003 and conferred upon it jurisdiction as set forth in Tex. Govt. Code § 30.00005. Amarillo, Tx., Code § 2-82, 2-8-3 (1988). In addition, the City conferred jurisdiction under its Charter provisions in article II, Section 22. This includes jurisdiction over Class C misdemeanors, which are punishable only by fines. Class C misdemeanors are
Page 4 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 5 of 28 PageID 192
the least serious crimes punishable by the State of Texas and include crimes such as traffic violations, failing to register one’s vehicle, and failing to show proof of insurance. 19. Municipal Court judges are appointed to a two-year term. However, the City maintains the right to remove those judges under its Charter. City of Amarillo Charter, Article II, Section 22(ff). 20. The Municipal Court is a subdivision of the City’s Finance division. 21. The City has reserved the right to establish, maintain, and regulate the means of punishment for “City convicts.” City of Amarillo Charter, Article II, Section 22(gg). 22. The City contracts with the Randall County Jail to house those who are ordered by municipal court judges to serve jail time. This costs the City approximately $1.9 million per year.2 Upon information and belief, the contract with Randall County provides for a per inmate/bed charge and requires payment for a minimum number of inmates. Therefore the City has a sunk cost which has the potential to create an interest in using the beds it has paid for. 23. When someone is charged with a Class C Misdemeanor in Amarillo Municipal Court and is convicted either by plea or trial, they are ordered to pay a fine and court costs by a municipal court judge. 24. These fines and costs are frequently paid in full, which is the objective of the City of Amarillo. For indigent people who cannot afford to pay the full amount at once a different approach is taken.

2 Amarillo City Budget FY 2014, p. 294

Page 5 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 6 of 28 PageID 193
25. For such people, a court administrator creates a schedule of payments due. The administrator does not take into consideration the person’s ability to pay such installments. Instead, the City has instituted an arbitrary payment schedule that is mechanically applied: Amarillo’s Minimum Payment Schedule $1.00-$200.00—Balance is due within 30 days; $200.01-$550.00—$55-$65 every two weeks based upon disposable income; $551.01-$750.00—$65-$75 every two weeks based upon disposable income; $750.01 & Up—$75 or higher every two weeks based upon disposable income. Note: If unable to pay biweekly, a full monthly payment may be offered to the defendant. If the defendant bonds out of jail, one-third to one-half of the balance is due at judgment or sentencing. If a defendant is remanded to jail for failing to comply with orders of the court, once released, any balance of court costs, fees and fines remaining is due to the court in full. An additional payment plan is not an option. Source: Municipal Court Recorder, vol. 14, no. 4, April/May 2005
26. When an indigent person fails to make a payment under this arbitrary installment plan, the court administrator and her staff confront the person about the consequences of failing to pay and try to force the person to comply without performing any meaningful inquiry into their ability to do so. This payment plan, along with the administrative functions of enforcing it, were put in place in May 2004 as part of a “focus on compliance” by the municipal court. Id. The clear tenor of this scheme is “pay or go to jail.”
27. For those who ultimately cannot pay, a warrant is issued pursuant to article 45.045 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. This causes the person to be
Page 6 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 7 of 28 PageID 194
arrested and held by Amarillo City Police officers before being brought before the court, either in person or by video. The Amarillo Police Department makes no inquiry into whether the person was capable of paying the fine before taking them into custody. If the person is arrested on a warrant for failure to pay, they are held until a judge is available to arraign them. This, in some cases, can involve the individual being held over the weekend without any determination of their indigence. 28. Although there is some variance from one defendant to another as to the Court’s specific findings, there is a consistent pattern of following the City’s pay or lay ordinance and a corresponding failure by Amarillo Municipal Court judges to follow state and federal law in two respects: 1. A meaningful hearing is not held to determine whether a person is indigent; 2. Alternative methods of enforcing the judgment, such as community service, are not considered. The end result is that all but a statistically insignificant number of defendants are sent to jail if they cannot pay the fine. The statistical evidence of this procedure is irrefutable. 29. The moving force behind the City’s collection scheme and the judges, clerks, and police who enforce it is Section 2-8-111 of its Code (see infra, ¶4). This ordinance is an express written policy by the City stating that those who fail to pay debts owed to the City must go to jail, with no consideration given to their ability to pay. 30. According to the Texas Office of Court Administration, the City reached final dispositions in 56,852 cases3 in calendar year 2014. Of those 56,582 cases,
3 OCA statistics are not available on a per-defendant basis and there is not a one-to-one ratio of cases to defendants.
Page 7 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 8 of 28 PageID 195
there were only 9 cases in which the fines and court costs were waived for indigence and only 227 cases in which fines and courts costs were fully or partially satisfied by allowing the defendant to perform community service. In stark contrast, the fines and court costs in 11,089 cases were satisfied by jail time. 31. The City reached final dispositions in 47,627 cases in calendar year 2015. Of those 47,627 cases, there were only 5 cases in which the fines and court costs were waived for indigence and only 318 cases in which fines and courts costs were fully or partially satisfied by allowing the defendant to perform community service. The fines and court costs in 9,123 cases were satisfied by jail time. 32. The City’s collection scheme results in tremendous profit. For example, in 2014 the Amarillo Municipal Court collected $8,233,423 in fines, court costs, and “other amounts.” Of that amount $5,655,143 was kept by the City, with the rest being remitted to the State.
B. Rachel McKee 33. Ms. McKee is a 47-year-old woman with an eighth-grade education. She is the
mother of three grown children she raised alone. When she can find work, Ms. McKee cleans houses, hotel rooms, and offices for a meager wage. When she is not working, she helps care for her grandchildren. At all times relevant to this complaint, Ms. McKee was legally indigent. 34. In early 2015, Ms. McKee was cited for no driver’s license, no insurance, and speeding. Because she was indigent and afraid of being jailed, she did not enter an appearance for these citations. In October 2015, Ms. McKee was arrested on
Page 8 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 9 of 28 PageID 196
those charges after a traffic stop. After spending two days in jail, Ms. McKee went before an Amarillo municipal judge on October 21, 2015. There, she pled guilty to both the older charges and the new citations she had just been issued. 35. After accepting her pleas, the judge ordered her to see the court administrator to establish a payment plan. To get on such a plan, Ms. McKee completed an application that indicated she was “homeless” and that her only income was $40.00 per month in back child support. Despite her obvious indigence, the Court ordered her to pay $232.00 in biweekly payments until a balance of $1,727.00 was paid. Ms. McKee was charged $25.00 to be put on such a payment plan and was ordered to pay $200.00 down. 36. On November 2, 2015, Ms. McKee voluntarily returned to court to inform the judge that she could not meet the payment plan as scheduled and to ask to modify it to one she could afford. Ms. McKee had clearly indicated to the Court in her previous application for a payment plan and during her appearance before the Court that she was indigent. Her only purpose of reporting to the Court was to avoid going to jail. When she appeared before the Court, Ms. McKee made it clear that she did not want to go to jail and again made it clear to the judge that she was indigent. 37. Rather than modify the plan, the judge put Ms. McKee in jail, thus enforcing the City’s written policy set forth in Section 2-8-111. No hearing was conducted to determine her indigence and no alternative method of discharging her debt was offered.
Page 9 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 10 of 28 PageID 197
38. Ms. McKee was given credit for $100.00 per day towards payment of her debt by serving jail time. She spent 18 days in jail.
39. In an effort to make this process appear legal, a motion was filed purporting to bear Ms. McKee’s electronic signature. The motion, titled “Defendant’s Motion to Lay Out Fine in Jail,” was created by the Court. Not only does the motion contain factual assertions that contradict what Ms. McKee told the Court, it also violated her due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and articulated in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 45.046.
40. While Ms. McKee does recall signing an electronic signature pad at some point during the proceedings, Ms. McKee maintains she has never seen the document and that the contents of the document were never discussed with her or explained to her. The Court made no effort to explain to Ms. McKee her right to request community service as an alternative method of discharging her debt.
41. Even had Ms. McKee knowingly signed the motion, which she does not concede, the Court was aware that the motion contained statements that were not only false, but also not in Ms. McKee’s best interest. Allowing persons like Ms. McKee to sign such a document subverts the judicial process and violates their rights to due process and equal protection.
42. Had Ms. McKee, at any time, been offered the option of discharging her fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, she would have agreed to do so.
43. As a result of being jailed in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, Ms. McKee suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish.
Page 10 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 11 of 28 PageID 198
C. Loneta Jackson 44. Ms. Jackson is a 36-year-old mother of five children. Her youngest child is five
years old and has special needs. Ms. Jackson did not graduate from high school and does not have a GED. Ms. Jackson has had sporadic employment primarily as a fast-food worker and currently works part-time at a Wienerschnitzel restaurant. Ms. Jackson receives $5.00 per month in court-ordered child support. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Ms. Jackson was legally indigent. 45. In 2013, Ms. Jackson was cited for no driver’s license, no insurance, expired registration, and invalid inspection. Because she was indigent and afraid of being jailed, she did not enter an appearance for these citations. 46. In November 2015, Ms. Jackson lost her purse while riding the bus, losing her only form of identification and her son’s Medicaid card. This left her unable to obtain employment or get medical care for her son. She knew there were warrants for her arrest and if she attempted to get a new driver’s license she would be arrested. She had no alternative but to appear before the Municipal Court and attempt to resolve her debts. 47. When Ms. Jackson made the decision to voluntarily appear, it was her understanding that she would not be able to make the arbitrary payments that would be set by the court administrator. Ms. Jackson’s previous experience with City policy and practice and the Municipal Court’s reputation in the community led her to believe that the only options were “pay or lay.” 48. On November 2, 2015, Ms. Jackson appeared before the judge. No hearing was conducted to determine her indigence, nor did the judge explain to Ms. Jackson
Page 11 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 12 of 28 PageID 199
that she had the right to assert that she was indigent. No alternative methods to discharge her fines were offered or discussed. The only alternative presented by the judge to Ms. Jackson was to “pay or lay,” thus enforcing the City’s written policy set forth Section 2-8-111. Ms. Jackson could not pay, so the judge gave her credit for $100.00 per day and sentenced her to jail. Ms. Jackson served 18 days in jail in order to discharge her debts. 49. As in Ms. McKee’s case (see ¶ 39-41), a motion titled “Defendant’s Motion to Lay Out Fine in Jail,” appears in Ms. Jackson’s file. Again, like Ms. McKee, Ms. Jackson was indigent and should have been offered alternative means of discharging her debt. While Ms. Jackson does recall signing an electronic signature pad at some point during the proceedings, Ms. Jackson maintains that she has never seen the document and did not ask the Court to send her to jail or deny her community service as an option to discharge her debts. 50. Even had Ms. Jackson knowingly signed the motion, which she does not concede, the Court was aware that the motion contained statements that were not only false, but also not in Ms. Jackson’s best interest. Allowing persons like Ms. Jackson to sign such a document subverts the judicial process and violates their rights to due process and equal protection. 51. Had Ms. Jackson, at any time, been offered the option of discharging her fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, she would have agreed to do so. 52. As a result of being jailed in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, Ms. Jackson suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish.
Page 12 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 13 of 28 PageID 200
53. D. Janet Cato
54. Mrs. Cato is a 49-year-old woman and a U.S. Army veteran. She is a mother of three grown children whom she raised alone. Mrs. Cato has worked various jobs following her honorable discharge from the Army, including correctional officer for TDCJ, payroll clerk for Pantex, and a home healthcare professional. Recently Mrs. Cato filed for disability and is unable to work because she has scoliosis and rheumatoid arthritis. At all times relevant to this complaint, Ms. Cato was legally indigent.
55. In 2013, Mrs. Cato received 19 citations, one for speeding and 18 for dog-related offenses, and defaulted on the payment of the citations, resulting in capias warrants issued for her arrest.
56. On March 6, 2014, Mrs. Cato voluntarily appeared in court to resolve the 19 citations. Mrs. Cato was financially dependent on unemployment at the time she appeared and did not have the money to pay her outstanding fines and costs. She requested the Court grant her the ability to serve jail time on the weekends to satisfy her debt or the ability to satisfy the debt through community service. Without considering Mrs. Cato’s financial situation, the judge responded, “In this court there are two options: you can pay it or lay it.”
57. Mrs. Cato was booked into Randall County Jail on March 6, 2014 to lay out the 19 citations totaling $5,271. She was given credit of $100.00 per day towards payment of her debt by serving jail time. After spending 52 days in jail, Mrs. Cato was released on April 27, 2014.
Page 13 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 14 of 28 PageID 201
58. Had Mrs. Cato, at any time, been offered the option of discharging her fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, she would have agreed to do so.
59. As a result of being jailed in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, Mrs. Cato suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish. E. Larissa Coil
60. Ms. Coil is a 25-year-old woman with a high school education. She moved out on her own when she was 16, finishing her high school education on her own. She attended the Art Institute in Dallas, Texas for a short time, pursuing a degree in photography, but had to drop out because she could not afford tuition even with grants and scholarships. Ms. Coil has primarily worked food service jobs as a waitress or hostess, and is currently a hostess at Harrah’s restaurant in White Deer, Texas. At all times relevant to this complaint, Ms. Coil was indigent.
61. Ms. Coil began receiving citations for Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility as early as 2012. When arrested for defaulting on the payment of these fines and costs, Ms. Coil’s mother paid the outstanding balance to free her daughter. On January 28, 2014, Ms. Coil was booked into Randall County Jail for three traffic citations: Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility, Operation of Vehicle with Expired License, and Failure to Yield Right of Way-Left Turn. Once again her mother was able to pay at least a portion of the outstanding fines and costs to free her daughter.
62. On April 9, 2014, Ms. Coil voluntarily appeared in court to resolve the citations from January 28, 2014 that had become capias warrants, as well as three new
Page 14 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 15 of 28 PageID 202
citations: No Insurance, Driving While License Invalid, and Fail to Comply Striking Unattended Vehicle. The judge questioned Ms. Coil about why she failed to pay her fines and costs, and Ms. Coil replied that she did not have any money. The judge found her indigent, stated that she had “failed to make a good faith effort” to discharge her fines and costs, and ordered her to jail. Ms. Coil was not offered a chance to do community service or any other way of resolving her citations. Her mother was unable to pay any of the fines and costs to keep Ms. Coil out of jail. 63. Ms. Coil was booked into Randall County Jail on April 9, 2014 for six traffic citations totaling $1,907. She spent 14 days in jail. 64. Had Ms. Coil, at any time, been offered the option of discharging her fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, she would have agreed to do so. 65. As a result of being jailed in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, Ms. Coil suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish.
F. Joshua Moore 66. Mr. Moore is a 25-year-old single man, with an 11th grade education, who works
as a laborer. He is currently working on getting a commercial driver’s license. At all relevant times to this complaint, Mr. Moore was legally indigent. 67. Mr. Moore has appeared in court several times to resolve his outstanding fines and costs. Each time the Court failed to consider his finances and sent him to the collections office to make calls to his relatives asking them to bring money to bail
Page 15 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 16 of 28 PageID 203
him out. Each time he was ordered to jail because he could not come up with the money in time. 68. Mr. Moore was booked into the Randall County Jail on six traffic citations that had become capias warrants: Registration-Expired Buyer’s Plate, Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibilty-2nd, No Driver’s License, No Valid Inspection Certificate, Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility, and No Driver’s License. The total for these citations was $2,229 and he spent 32 days in jail. 69. Mr. Moore was booked into the Randall County Jail again on April 14, 2015. This time he was in for six more traffic violations: Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility, No Driver’s License, Operation of Vehicle with Expired License Plate, No Valid Inspection Certificate, Driving While License Invalid, and Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility. The total for these citations was $1,879 and he spent three days in jail before a friend was able to pay enough to have him released. 70. Had Mr. Moore, at any time, been offered the option of discharging his fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, he would have agreed to do so. 71. As a result of being jailed in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, Mr. Moore suffered compensatory damages including mental anguish.
G. Hilario Nayola 72. Hilario Nayola is a 20-year-old college student majoring in Biology. A former
foster child, he works part-time jobs while attending class full time. His part-time
Page 16 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 17 of 28 PageID 204
wages help support his four younger siblings. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Mr. Nayola was legally indigent. 73. In 2013 and 2014, Mr. Nayola received citations for traffic violations he could not afford to pay. He was arrested in October of 2014 and appeared before the judge after spending two days in jail. He pled guilty to several petty offenses, including expired registration, speeding, and no proof of insurance. He was released and instructed to report to Collections with $453.00 by 9:00 AM the next business day. Unable to pay that amount and fearing arrest, Mr. Nayola did not appear the next day and another warrant was issued for his arrest. 74. In August of 2015, Mr. Nayola appeared in court to resolve his pending citations. This time his payment plan was set at $95.00 every two weeks. Again, in accordance with the City’s practice, no consideration was made regarding Mr. Nayola’s financial circumstances and ability to meet the payment plan. When he was unable to make payments in accordance with the plan, a warrant was issued for his arrest. 75. Mr. Nayola was arrested on November 10, 2015. He was brought before a Municipal Court judge. The judge did not give him a hearing to determine whether he was indigent. The judge also did not consider whether he could discharge his judgment through community service or some other alternative method. Instead, he was sent to jail where he was given $100.00 per day credit toward payment of his debt. He served six days until a relative paid $940.00 and he was released.
Page 17 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 18 of 28 PageID 205
76. At the time Mr. Nayola was jailed, he had been offered a housekeeping job at BSA. He was scheduled to start that job the week that he was jailed. As a result of being incarcerated, Mr. Nayola lost the job, furthering his inability to pay his debts.
77. Mr. Nayola still owed money to the City of Amarillo. He was ordered to report once again to the Municipal Court collections department the day after being released from jail, this time with $250.00. Without $250.00 and convinced that he would be jailed, causing him to miss classes and exams, Mr. Nayola did not report.
78. On December 10, 2015, his classes now complete, Mr. Nayola voluntarily appeared in court. He explained to the judge why he had missed his appointment and that he was indigent. The judge agreed that he was indigent, but sent him to jail without offering any other means to discharge the judgment.
79. Had Mr. Nayola, at any time, been offered the option of discharging his fines and costs through community service or other alternative means, he would have agreed to do so.
80. As a result of being jailed in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, Mr. Nayola suffered compensatory damages including lost wages and mental anguish. V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS Defined Class
81. Plaintiffs McKee, Jackson, Cato, Coil, Moore, and Nayola seek class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class defined as: “All
Page 18 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 19 of 28 PageID 206
indigent4 persons adjudicated by the City of Amarillo Municipal Court to owe fines and/or court costs who on or after January 14, 2014 were jailed for their failure to pay the adjudicated fines and/or court costs” (“the Class”). 82. Certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiffs can prove the elements of their claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claim.
Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)) 83. On information and belief, the proposed Class is expected to consist of at least
1,000 members or more and is so numerous that joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number of class members is unknown to named Plaintiffs at the present time, Plaintiffs believe the members of the class to be so numerous as to render joinder of all class members in this action impractical. 84. The City disposes of cases through jail time versus alternative punishment or waiver at a ratio of approximately 47:1. This ratio is irreconcilable with a 17.1 percent poverty rate. Even if impoverished people are marginally over or underrepresented in Municipal Court cases, and even if one assumes defendants typically have multiple cases, the statistical evidence is that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of indigent people who have been jailed in violation of their Constitutional rights in the last two years.
4 An “indigent” person is consistently defined by Texas law as someone who earns not more than 125 percent of the income level established by the applicable federal poverty guidelines. See e.g. Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 133.002; TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 708.158; and the Armstrong, Potter, and Randall District Court and County Court Indigent Defense Plan submitted in accordance with the Texas Fair Defense Act (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 26.04).
Page 19 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 20 of 28 PageID 207
85. Class members may be identified by court records readily available from Defendant, and notice of the pendency of this action may be provided to class members by mail at the addresses identified in the court records. Supplemental notice may be provided (if deemed necessary by this Court) by means of published notice in one or more newspapers of general circulation within the City of Amarillo or by other Court-approved dissemination methods. Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2))
86. This action involves questions of law and fact common to the class: a. Whether Defendant engaged in the conduct alleged herein; b. Whether Defendant has a policy, practice, and/or custom of arresting indigent persons who cannot pay fines and costs and converting those unpaid monetary sentences to jail time; c. Whether Defendant has a policy and practice of failing to ask about the reasons for a person’s failure to pay before jailing that person for failure to pay; d. Whether the Defendant has a policy and practice of not considering alternative punishments before imprisoning a person for failure to pay; e. Whether the City provides notice to debtors that their ability to pay will be a relevant issue at the hearings at which they are jailed and whether the City makes findings concerning ability to pay and alternatives to incarceration; f. What procedural mechanisms, if any, the City uses as matter of policy and practice to determine indigence and ability to pay; g. Whether the City applies state procedural and state and federal substantive law designed to determine indigence and to protect indigent debtors;
Page 20 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 21 of 28 PageID 208
h. Whether the City has a policy and practice of threatening debtors with incarceration for unpaid debts without informing them of their constitutional rights;
i. Whether the City can employ incarceration, threats of incarceration, and other harsh debt-collection measures (such as applying arbitrary and unreasonable payment schedules) against debtors who cannot afford immediately to pay their debts in full;
j. Whether the foregoing policies and practices are officially promulgated policies, final decisions by municipal policymakers, practices or customs so widespread and well-settled that knowledge is attributable to municipal policymakers, or the byproduct of Defendant’s deliberate indifference to putative class members’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
k. Whether the foregoing policies and practices violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
l. Whether the Class is entitled to the damages and other monetary relief and if so, what the terms of relief should be. Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3))
87. The claims of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of each member of the putative Class. Plaintiffs, like all other members of the putative Class, have sustained damages in the form of illegal imprisonment arising from Defendants’ unconstitutional policies, practices and/or customs.
Page 21 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 22 of 28 PageID 209
88. Specifically, the Plaintiffs were indigent at the time they were jailed and could have satisfied their fines through alternative means of punishment without undue hardship. None of the named Plaintiffs has received unusual treatment by the Defendant. Adequacy (Rule 23(a)(4))
89. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the members of the putative Class. Plaintiffs have no known interests which are adverse to or in conflict with other members of the putative Class that would make class certification inappropriate.
90. Plaintiffs have retained attorneys who are competent and experienced in complex litigation including civil rights litigation. Counsel has handled numerous cases on behalf of individuals who suffered Constitutional deprivations which resulted in personal injury, wrongful death, unlawful convictions, unlawful imprisonment, and other damages.
91. Counsel has experience with class actions as well. Mr. Hoffman is currently representing a putative class of Colorado citizens in the ongoing litigation against Volkswagen and another putative class in a recently filed wage-and-hour claim.
92. Counsel also has extensive experience with substantive and procedural criminal defense law which bears heavily on the issues in this case. Mr. Blackburn is a board-certified criminal defense lawyer who has represented in excess of 1,000 defendants in criminal actions.
93. Counsel has the added advantage of being local. Mr. Hoffman has practiced in Amarillo for approximately 18 years and maintains an office there. Mr. Blackburn
Page 22 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 23 of 28 PageID 210
has resided and practiced in Amarillo for approximately 32 years and maintains his office there. 94. Counsel has invested substantial time and resources into becoming intimately familiar with the City’s scheme and with all of the relevant municipal, state, and federal laws and procedures that can and should govern it. Counsel has also developed relationships with many of the individuals and families most victimized by the City’s practices. 95. Counsel for the putative Class will zealously assert all class members’ claims.
Predominance and Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)) 96. The common questions of law and fact (see ¶ 54) arising in this action
predominate over any questions solely affecting individual class members. Specifically, the core facts of the Constitutional violations at issue are common to Plaintiffs, and all class members will be pursuing the same legal theories based upon these core facts. More generally, the factual and legal issues concerning the scope and effect of Defendant’s policies, practices, and customs alleged herein are: a. Central to the claims of Plaintiffs and all Class members; b. Substantially identical with respect to the burden of demonstrating liability; and c. Consist of the most important and fundamental issues to be determined at trial. 97. The class action mechanism is superior to any alternatives that might exist for the fair and effective adjudication of this cause of action.
Page 23 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 24 of 28 PageID 211
98. Proceeding as a class action would permit the large number of injured parties to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and judicial resources.
99. A class action is the only practical way to avoid the potentially inconsistent results that numerous individual trials are likely to generate.
100. Class treatment is the only realistic means by which indigent Plaintiffs and other members of the Damages Class, with relatively small individual claims, can effectively litigate against a large, well-represented municipality such as the City. If the Class is not certified, it is unlikely that the putative class members will be able to secure counsel and pursue their claims because they are by definition poor and unable to afford a lawyer.
101. Should the putative class members be denied class certification, numerous repetitive individual actions would place an enormous burden on federal courts as they are forced to review duplicative evidence and repeatedly decide over the same issues relating to the conduct of the City.
102. There are no unusual difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this case as a class action, and Plaintiffs and their counsel are not aware of any reason why this case should not proceed as a class action.
103. The question of damages will also be driven by Class-wide determinations, such as the policies, practices, and customs of the City of Amarillo. To the extent that individual damages will vary, they will vary depending in large part on the amount of time that a person was unlawfully jailed. Determining damages for individual Class members can thus typically be handled in a ministerial fashion based on
Page 24 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 25 of 28 PageID 212
easily verifiable records of the length of unlawful incarceration. If need be, individual hearings on Class-member-specific damages based on special circumstances can be held after Class-wide liability is determined—a method far more efficient than the wholesale litigation of hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF Count One: Failure to Inquire Into Ability to Pay and Alternatives to Incarceration
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Due Process Clause) 104. The City, through its Municipal Code of Ordinances and through the actions of its
Municipal Court, judges, court administrators, and police department, has a policy and practice of jailing indigent people without first inquiring into the reasons the person has failed to pay the debt, without determining whether they are indigent, and without considering adequate alternatives to incarceration. 105. The written policy contained in the City’s ordinances and the practices of its Municipal Court, judges, court administrators, and police department were the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights of due process. All individuals complained of were acting under color of law when they violated Plaintiffs’ rights to due process. 106. Jailing a person who is too poor to pay her debt without first inquiring into the reasons she has failed to pay her debt, without determining if she is indigent, and without consideration of adequate alternatives to incarceration violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983).
Count Two: Commitment to Jail Solely Due to Inability to Pay Page 25 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 26 of 28 PageID 213
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Equal Protection Clause) 107. The City, through its Municipal Code of Ordinances and through the actions of its
Municipal Court, judges, court administrators, and police department, has a policy and practice of jailing indigent people solely because they are unable to pay their debts arising from fines and costs for fine-only offenses. 108. The written policy contained in the City’s ordinances and the practices of its Municipal Court, judges, court administrators, and police department were the moving force behind the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights of equal protection. All individuals complained of were acting under color of law when they violated Plaintiffs’ rights to due process. 109. Jailing a person solely because they lack the resources to pay a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the members of the Class, respectfully pray for judgment as follows: A. Certification of the proposed Class, including appointment of Plaintiffs as representatives of the Class and the appointment of Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class counsel; B. Damages, including compensatory damages, for the Class members in an amount to be determined at trial; C. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded as allowed by law; D. Compensatory damages for Plaintiffs for efforts taken on behalf of the Class;
Page 26 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 27 of 28 PageID 214
E. Costs and attorney’s fees; and F. For such other and further relief that the Court deems proper.
Respectfully submitted, ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
/s/ Chris Hoffman Chris Hoffman HOFFMAN, SHEFFIELD, SAUSEDA & HOFFMAN, PLLC 1008 S. Madison Amarillo, TX 79101 Phone: (806) 376-8903 Fax: (806) 376-5345 choffman@hsshlaw.com
/s/ Jeff Blackburn Jeff Blackburn BLACKBURN & BROWN, LLP 718 SW 16th Ave. Amarillo, TX 79101 Phone: (806) 371-8333 Fax: (806) 350-7116 blackburn@blackburnbrownlaw.com
Page 27 of 28

Case 2:16-cv-00009-J Document 19 Filed 04/04/16 Page 28 of 28 PageID 215 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 4, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following: Bryan McWilliams Assistant City Attorney William M. McKamie City Attorney City of Amarillo Post Office Box 1971 Amarillo, Texas 79105-1971
/s/ Chris Hoffman Chris Hoffman
Page 28 of 28