Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 1

United States District Court 
 for the 

District of Delaware 


PHILIP A. WHARTON, JOSEPH ROUNDTREE, JAMES MADDOX and LAMAR CORREA
Plaintiffs,
v.
CARL C. DANBERG, CATHY ESCHERICH, and REBECCA MCBRIDE
Defendants.

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Y-o C.A. No.: ':( _ \ ~

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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COMPLAINT

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CLASS ACTION

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INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action brought by Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox

and Lamar Correa as plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below

(injured or presently subject to injury) from the practice of the Delaware Department of

Corrections (DDOC) of over-detaining inmates and by the defendants' deliberate indifference to

the effect of the DDOC practice of over-detention on the rights of inmates. To over-detain means

holding a detainee or prisoner in a DDOC facility more than 12 hours beyond when a Court

order releasing the detainee or prisoner has been forwarded to Central Offender Records (COR)

or when a detainee or prisoner is held past the day that his or her sentence has ended.

2. Plaintiffs bring this action against the defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.c. §1983 to enforce the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments for

injuries suffered by them when the defendants caused them to be over-detained and other

members of the class.

3. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). 4. At all times pertinent Carl C. Danberg was Commissioner of the DDOC, Attorney
General of the State of Delaware, or Deputy Principal Assistant to the Commissioner of the Department of Correction.
5. Cathy Escherich was Director of COR during some of the time pertinent to this case.
6. Rebecca McBride was Director of COR during some of the time pertinent to this case.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.c. §1983. This Court also has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§220Iand 2202, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.c. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs claims and those ofproposed class members occurred in this judicial district.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATION 9. The Over-detained Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2) and 23(b)(3), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalfofa class consisting of: (a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any DDOC facility from October 1, 2008 forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released within 12
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hours of the time that a Court order has been forwarded to COR releasing the person or is not released by midnight of the day his or her sentence has ended.
10. Certification of this class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate, because the defendants have a pattern and practice that has uniformly affected all members of both classes, and injunctive relief against the defendants will benefit each and every plaintiff and class member. These patterns and practices have been known to defendants since at least 2008 and continue unabated, thus it is clear that a court order is necessary to insure the rights of the class members.
11. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Plaintiff and the Class satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
12. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of Class members and the fact that Class members may be dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Delaware and the geographic area served by this Judicial District.
13. The classes are entitled to injunctive relief, for example, setting up an independent
monitor to supervise DDOC's inmate records management system to ensure that all inmates are timely released after the legal justification for their incarceration has ceased.
14. Certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also appropriate, in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions, and a class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below.
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15. Among the questions oflaw and fact common to the classes are:

a)

the maximum length of time a person may be held while defendants

perform administrative tasks incident to their release from custody beyond

which it is a violation of their constitutional rights;

b)

whether the defendants, through their actions have caused or allowed to

occur over-detentions exceeding that maximum for each class member;

c)

whether defendants have a pattern and practice of holding detainees and

inmates more than 12 hours past the time that a Court order has been

forwarded to COR ordering their release;

d)

whether defendants have a pattern and practice of holding inmates past the

day their sentence has expired;

e)

whether the defendants are aware of and have failed to address a pattern

and practice of being deliberately indifferent to the rights of detainees and

inmates by ignoring DDOC's practice of over-detaining them;

f) whether defendant's acts as alleged herein violate the Constitution of the

United States;

g) whether such patterns and practices, if found to exist, violate the Fourth

and/or Fifth Amendments;

h) whether plaintiffs, the other members of the Over-detention Class and

future members of the Over-detention Class are entitled to equitable relief,

and, if so, the nature of that relief;

i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative

sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class

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members' damages except those who opt out. 16. Regarding the Over-detained Named Plaintiffs, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been over-detained as defined above, and the answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the DDOC's records. 17. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the Class is impracticable given the large number of Class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating hundreds of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnifY the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the maintenance of this action as a class action in this Court presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Class. 18. Computer records are available for inspection concerning the over-detentions. 19. The over-detention problem is even worse for inmates who:
a) cannot speak English; b) have limited English skills; c) have mental health or other problems that make it difficult for them to
communicate; and d) inmates who have no one on the outside to advocate for them. 20. For these inmates who are over-detained, days and weeks of over-detention are
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not at all uncommon. It is these individuals for whom a class action is particularly appropriate, as without a class action, these individuals most likely would not have the ability or opportunity to bring a lawsuit for their over-detention.
21. The Over-detained Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, as plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by the over-detentions.
22. The Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the class.
23. Plaintiffs are aware of two other pending cases in this court, which address, in part, defendants' flagrant violation of the civil rights of the members of the Over-detention Class. The first case is Nancy Dinote v. Carl C. Danberg, et al., c.A. No.: 12-377-GMS, which in addition to a claim that Ms. Dinote was over-detained for nearly a day, also contains a claim involving equal protection and allegations of serious physical injury. The second case, Errol Springer v. Carl C. Danberg, et ai, C.A. No.: 12-392-GMS includes a claim that false testimony by a probation officer was initially responsible for plaintiffs illegal incarceration in addition to claims that dysfunction in COR contributed to his over-detention of two years and eleven months. The fact patterns of these cases are different from the common fact pattern of the over­ detention class.
DYSFUNCTIONAL PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 24. The DDOC holds prisoners and detainees committed by the Delaware State Courts and other agencies in a variety of correctional facilities. 25. Once an inmate or detainee is placed in the custody of a DDOC facility, he or she
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cannot be released from custody until a judicial order releases him or her or the reason for the

incarceration expires.

26. According to the OOOC website, COR "is primarily responsible for calculating

offender's sentences and release dates. This unit houses and controls all active and inactive

institutional and probation/parole offender records." Also according to the OOOC website, the

general activities at COR include calculating offender sentences and preparing releases as

ordered by the Court.

27. An inmate or detainee who has had his bail posted, had a judge order unsecured

bail, or had a judge order that they be released without bail, still cannot be released until the

judicial order has been processed by COR. Release orders from the Courts are transmitted to

COR by fax machine. Subsequently, it is expected that a COR employee will fill out a check list

on a computer screen to determine whether any reason remains to continue to hold the offender

in custody. The checklist includes reminders to:

a)

check the "offender blue sheet" to determine if there are any open charges

against the offender;

b)

check to make sure the offender is not being monitored by probation and

parole;

c)

check to make sure that there are no outstanding warrants of any type from

any jurisdiction holding the offender; and

d)

check all paperwork in "Records" for any legal documents on the inmate.

28. If all of the checklist information is satisfactory, the COR employee checks off the

appropriate preprinted instructions to the receiving room staff to do such things as verify the

identity of the inmate by photograph, return the inmates property, and have the inmate sign any

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bailor bond papers that need to be signed prior to releasing the inmate. 29. A similar checklist exists for an inmate or detainee for whom the reason for the
incarceration has expired. However, that checklist also requires the COR employee to review the current active legal section to ensure the accuracy of sentence calculation and release date.
30. COR is only open from 6:00 am to midnight Monday through Friday, 6:00 am to 3:00 pm on Saturday, 12:00 noon to 6:00 pm on Sundays, and is closed on holidays. Obviously, no processing of release papers takes place during the time that COR is closed.
31. Clerks from the various courts in Delaware report that COR frequently denies receiving the release orders which have been faxed to COR. The clerks sometimes have to fax the release papers several times before receipt is acknowledged by COR.
32. Bail bondsmen in Delaware who have put up bond for incarcerated individuals find that they frequently have to explain to the family or friends of the inmate for whom bail has been posted, why it is taking so long for the inmate to be released after bail has been posted. Especially since this delay can last days or weeks.
33. DDOC has recently begun to acknowledge its failures to promptly process release orders from the Court. Bail bondsmen and others posting bail are now being told that it might take as much as 24 to 48 hours before the release order is processed by COR and the inmate for whom bail has been posted will be released. Despite the knowledge that DDOC's practices regarding processing release orders from the courts is indefensibly dysfunctional, defendants have done nothing about the problem.
34. COR employees frequently cannot be reached by phone by a bail bondsman or the family or friends of those for whom bail has been posted. Even when reached, COR employees complain of inadequate staff and provide little information to the caller. Because of the
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frustration with COR, friends and family of inmates have resorted to subterfuge, such as telling the COR employees that they are correctional officers when calling for information concerning their loved ones. Otherwise, they get no help from COR.
35. The standard practice of COR employees and of all other DDOC employees who work with prisoner release records is to refuse to respond to any inquiries from inmates. C/Os or counselors in DDOC facilities sometimes assist inmates with obtaining documentation from COR. Frequently there is still a significant delay in the information being received by the C/Os and the C/Os or counselors only help when they feel like it, which is infrequent. As a result inmates cannot obtain the very documentation that is necessary to prove that they are being overdetained and are denied access to the courts.
36. The significant problem with over-detention has been going on at least since August of 2008 and is well known to other government agencies, such as the Public Defender's office. At least one Public Defender's office has programed its computers to flag release dates so that they can try to keep track of whether or not their clients have actually been released as ordered. That same public defender's office has a clerical person who spends a considerable portion of her time working solely on over-detention issues.
37. Defendants plus the wardens at DDOC facilities, COR and Governor Markel have received numerous complaints about the over-detention problem since August of 2008. Complaints have come by mail, email and by phone. Apparently there is or was a website to which individual government employees were posting complaints about COR and the overdetention problem. 38. Individuals who have been charged with serious crimes can be taken to the Justice of the Peace Court for their initial court appearance 24 hours per day, seven days a week.
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However, if these individuals are to be released on unsecured bailor have posted their bail upon arrival at the Justice of the Peace Court, they are frequently subject to remaining detained in a prison for 24 hours or more. Because COR is only open until 3:00 pm on Saturdays and closed on holidays, when a Sunday falls on a holiday, COR is closed for at least 39 consecutive hours during which no release papers are being processed. Even when Sundays are not holidays, COR is closed at least 22 consecutive hours over the weekend.
39. Even if COR is open when the Justice of the Peace Court has faxed a release order to it, the delay in COR responding, frequently exceeds at least 12 hours, and often exceeds 24 hours or more. Delays of days or weeks is not uncommon. As a result JP Court staff frequently have to spend a lot of time trying to explain to irate family members, of incarcerated individuals, why their loved one has not been released despite the fact that bail was posted many hours or even days before.
40. Reportedly, there has been conflict between the office of the Chief Magistrate of the Justice of the Peace Courts and the office of the Commissioner of Correction concerning the continuing over-detention problem. The Chief Magistrate's office has been particularly frustrated that this over-detention problem has been going on for so many years without resolution and what appears to be no adequate steps being taken by the Commissioner's office to solve this problem.
41. The experience in the Superior Courts, Family Courts and Courts of Common Pleas is that inmates for whom bail has been posted or inmates who have been ordered released frequently are detained more than 12 hours past the time that the release order has been forwarded to COR. The same is true for inmates for whom the reason for incarceration has expired, as those inmates often spend considerably more than a day over-detained while COR,
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for whatever reason, fails to provide the appropriate documentation to the correctional facility. 42. Inmates who request help from CIOs, counselors or other DDOC employees at the
various DDOC facilities concerning why they have not been released when bail has been posted or their sentence is expired, invariably get told that the problem lies with the "Records Department", "Central Records", or the "Records Department in Dover". Also, almost invariably they get no assistance from DDOC employees in correcting the over-detention.
EXAMPLES OF OVER-DETENTION 43. "Over-detain" means:
a) holding a detainee or prisoner in the custody of the DDOC without just cause more than 12 hours after an order from a court has been forwarded to COR ordering the detainee or prisoner's release; or
b) holding a detainee or prisoner past the day that their sentence has expired and there is longer just cause for their incarceration.
44. "Release Date" for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which their sentence has expired.
45. "Exit Date" for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is actually released from the custody of the DDOC.
46. Plaintiff Philip A. Wharton was admitted to Sussex Correctional Institution (SCI) on or about 6/27112. His release date was supposed to be 7/9/12, however his exit date was 7/18112, resulting in a nine day over-detention.
47. Plaintiff Joseph Roundtree was admitted to Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (HRYCI) on or about 4/4112. His release date was supposed to be 4117112, however, his exit date was 4124112, resulting in a seven day over-detention.
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48. Plaintiff James Maddox was admitted to SCIon or about 3/11112. His release date was supposed to be 3114112, however, his exit date was 3/19112, resulting in a five day over­ detention.
49. Plaintiff Lamar Correa was admitted to JTVCC on or about 8/12/12. His release date was supposed to be 8/15/12, however, his exit date was 9/11/12, resulting in a 27 day over­ detention.
50. Asia Trimball was admitted to Baylor'S Women's Correctional Institution (BWCI) on or about 6/8111. Her release date was supposed to be 12122/12, however, her exit date was 116112, resulting in almost 15 days of over-detention.
51. Richard Haley, Jr. was arrested on October 18,2011 for allegedly violating a nocontact order, which had in fact been lifted some time in September, 2011. Despite the fact that he repeatedly asked correctional officers and counselors to inquire for him concerning the fact that his no contact order had been lifted, they refused to do so.
52. It was not until the first week of November, 2011, when Mr. Haley met with the public defender, that the Court learned that the no-contact order had been lifted, at which time, Plaintiff Haley was released from prison, ending his approximately 14 day over-detention.
53. On 1117111, Quinton D. Lowman appeared in Kent County Court of Common Pleas in front of Judge Anne Hartnett Reigle at which time he was sentenced to 12 months of Level V incarceration suspended for 30 days at Level IV SVOP, thereafter, by Level III probation for 12 months. However, instead of being held for 30 days at SVOP, Mr. Lowman was held for 64 days at Level V due to the failure of COR and DDOC to correctly apply his sentence before being sent to probation Level III, resulting in 34 days of over-detention.
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54. Ray Wood was admitted to SVOP on or about 6/6/11. His release date was supposed to be 7/21111, however, his exit date was 9/29/11, resulting in 68 days of over­ detention.
55. Sean Snyder was admitted to HRYCI on or about 112111 L His release date was supposed to be 1/25/11, however, his exit date was 2/18/11, resulting in 24 days of over­ detention.
56. Chris Rosendale was admitted to a DOC prison, on or about 12/6/10. His release date was supposed to be 12/6/10 at 1:00 pm, however, his exit date was 12/7/11 at 3:00 pm, resulting in 26 hours of over-detention.
57. Nairobi Wannamaker was admitted to JTVCC on or about 9/8/10. His release date was supposed to be 9/9/10, however, his exit date was 9/16110, resulting in 8 days of over­ detention.
58. Tobias Adams was admitted to SCIon or about 7/20/10. His release date was supposed to be 8/5/10, however, his exit date was 8/22110, resulting in 14 days of over-detention.
59. Thomas Talbert was admitted to HRYCI on or about 2/3/10. His release date was supposed to be 2/411 0, however, his exit date was 2/23/10, resulting in 19 days of over-detention.
60. Roger Scarborough was admitted to JTVCC on or about 9/16/09. His release date was supposed to be 31111 0, however, his exit date was 3/6110, resulting in five days of over­ detention.
61. Counsel for Plaintiffs has been contacted by or informed of many other individuals who have suffered over-detention, but who have not responded to an invitation to join in a class action. Plaintiffs' counsel has a good faith belief that there are a large number of individuals who have suffered over-detention in the last four years, including many whose over­
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detention has lasted days, weeks, or even months. Many have other issues that keep them from

volunteering as plaintiffs in a civil action, such as other legal entanglements, financial problems,

family problems, or citizenship issues and a class action is the only way to protect their rights.

THE WELL KNOWN OVER-DETENTION PROBLEM

62. The Defendants have known since at least 2008 that the DDOC has a practice of

over-detaining detainees and inmates past their release dates.

63.

A

Wilmington

News

Journal

written

by

Sean

O'Sullivan

on

8/29/08

1 ,

reported

outrage by all four Delaware gubernatorial candidates over the fact that 29 inmates had

mistakenly been released in the past year and a half because of DOC errors. Then candidate, and

now Governor, Jack Markell claimed that he would "fix the problem and hold people

accountable". Candidate Bill Lee "credited DOC Commissioner Carl Danberg with being the

first member of the Minner administration to ever step back and accept responsibility for a

problem, acknowledging it exists and telling us what he is trying to do to fix it." According to

the article, "Danberg acknowledged the ongoing issues with mistakes in both erroneous releases

and inmates over-serving their sentence due to errors by DOC personnel two weeks ago."

64. Furthermore, it was reported that:

This week, the DOC released a follow up list of those who were kept longer than their sentences required. While the early release list covered the past 18 months, DOC officials said they only had data on overstays for the past nine months. According to the latest DOC list, 19 people served at least one extra day or up to 20 days longer than was necessary since December 2007. Twelve of the 19 served one or two extra days. Four inmates overstayed between five and seven days, and two were held for almost two weeks longer than a court had ordered.
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1 Archived at: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.comldelawareonline/access/1742752791.html?FMT=FT&FMTS=ABS :FT&type=current&d ate=Aug+29%2C+2008&author=SEAN+O%27SULLIVAN&pub=The+News+loumal&edition=&startpage=B.l &d esc=Politicians+blast+DOC+over+prison+releases
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National experts said early and late releases happen routinely across the country, but they were surprised by the high number in Delaware, a comparatively small prison system, over such a short period of time.
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In Massachusetts, which has about twice as many inmates as Delaware, there was a major restructuring, including the ousting of the department's commissioner, after it was revealed last year that 14 inmates, over a four­ year period, had been held in error past their release dates. One was held in error for four years.
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Danberg said the situation is "unacceptable" and said he launched a major management reorganization at DOC to centralize the processing of inmate sentences and calculation of release dates in Dover to reduce errors. However, he said the transition has created more confusion in the interim.
***
The DOC this week also released the amount the State paid to an inmate who claimed in a Federal civil lawsuit that he was improperly held for 5 years past his release date. Jerome K. Hamilton received $125,000.00 in September, 2007 to settle his case.
65. Defendants Danberg, Escherich, and McBride have long known that DDOC
employees working with release records in COR and elsewhere at DDOC are instructed not to
respond to any inquiries by inmates. As a result, an inmate who believes he has been illegally
over-detained because of a misinterpretation of his sentence, or a delay in processing his release,
has no ability to obtain information concerning the problem from COR. Thus such inmates are
denied access to the Courts. The Defendants are aware that the Court will not grant an over-
detained or illegally incarcerated inmate relief unless they provide the Court the information,
which DDOC refuses to provide directly to inmates.
DDOC OBLIGATIONS AND POLICIES
66. A person arrested and charged with a crime in Delaware may be released on the
person's on recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured personal appearance bond, and
that upon such occurrence, the accused shall be released. (11 Del. C. §2104 and §2105)
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67. DOC Policy 1.4 V, states in part:
It is the policy of the Department of Correction to provide sufficient staff to ensure efficient operations consistent with its mission
68. DOC Policy 4.1 V, states in part:
It is the policy of the Department of Correction to require all decision-making affecting the rehabilitation, housing, discipline, and/or supervision level of offenders or detentioners under the jurisdiction of the Department be fair and equitable.
69. DOC Policy 5.1 V, states:
The Department recognizes that all offenders are entitled to certain basic rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States, as well as Federal and State statutes. Therefore, it is the policy of the Department of Correction to acknowledge and protect basic rights of offenders in its custody.
The Executive Committee, in cooperation with the Attorney General's Office, shall identify all offender's rights including, but not limited to: a safe and healthful living environment, due process for alleged rule violations, freedom of speech and religion, access to the courts and a grievance process allowing for administrative and judicial review.
It will be the responsibility of each bureau chief7section manager to develop procedures, for review and approval by the Commissioner, to insure offender's rights are safeguarded. The procedures should require all staff involved with offenders receive instruction and training specific to this policy and its corresponding procedures.
BREACHES OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS BY DEFENDANTS
70. As Commissioner of DDOC, Defendant Danberg has powers, duties and functions
appointed to him by 11 Del. C. §6516, as follows:
The Commissioner shall assume full and active charge of the Department, its facilities and services, and is the chief executive and administrative officer of the Department
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71. As Commissioner ofDDOC, Defendant Danberg has powers, duties and functions appointed to him by 29 Del. C. §8903, including, but not limited to, the following:
The Commissioner shall: (I) Supervise, direct and account for the administration and operation of the Department, its bureaus, subbureaus, offices, functions and employees;
***
(3) Appoint such additional personnel as may be necessary for the administration and operation of the Department within such limitations as may be imposed by law; 72. Defendant Danberg knew that under DDOC policies, correctional officers were to "go through whatever they can to find out the answer for the inmate", if the inmate was seeking to obtain information regarding their release status. See Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D. Del. 2009). See also DOC Policy 3.13V. Defendant Danberg knew that in practice, CIOs and counselors rarely assisted inmates with such requests. Defendant Danberg knew that the failure of CIOs and counselors to assist inmates with obtaining release information and the refusal of COR to respond to inmate inquiries, meant that inmates who were illegally over-detained, or illegally kept past the expiration of their sentence, frequently had no way to contest their illegal incarceration, and were thus denied access to the Courts. 73. Defendant Danberg has had actual knowledge since at least 2008 that COR and the other records keeping employees for DDOC, were operating so poorly and inefficiently that: a) inmates were frequently over-detained for hours, days, weeks, months and
even years past the time that their release order was forwarded to COR. b) inmate records were lost, misplaced, or intentionally ignored by COR and
other DDOC records keeping staff so frequently that inmates who should
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have been released were held in custody for hours, days, weeks or even years beyond the time that their sentences had expired; c) COR employees and other DDOC record keeping employees routinely refused to respond to any inquiry made by an inmate, and d) COR is closed overnight every weeknight, closed for substantial amounts of time on Saturday and Sunday, and closed totally on holidays. This inevitably leads to inmates spending hours and even days over-detained simply because COR is not open. 74. Defendant Danberg, as the commissioner ofDDOC, had a duty to correct such known problems, but essentially took no steps to address them, despite knowing that the failure to address them would lead to many inmates being over-detained for substantial amounts of time. Defendant Danberg has demonstrated deliberate indifference to the well known over-detention problem since at least 2008. 75. Defendant Danberg acted knowingly, intentionally, unreasonably and with deliberate indifference to the longstanding, widespread dysfunction in DOC including the systemic failures of COR, and the systemic problems with CIOs and counselors. As a result of Defendant Danberg's actions, which violated plaintiffs rights under 14 U.S.c. § 1983, 11 Del. C. §2104 and §2105, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, plaintiffs sustained the following injuries: a) a period of over-detention; 
 b) complete loss of their privacy during their over-detention; 
 c) extreme mental and emotional stress, anxiety, and pain, past, present and 
 future
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76. Defendant Escherich as director of COR, had the duty to implement COR's overall responsibility for all legal aspects of offenders from date of incarceration to release in a way which protected their various civil rights. Defendant Escherich breached her legal obligations when she knowingly failed in her duty to make sure that COR was operating in a manner that did not violate inmates' civil rights.
77. Defendant Escherich had actual knowledge that the record keeping procedures used at COR and by other DDOe employees frequently resulted in inmates being over-detained from a matter of hours to as much as years past the time they were ordered released by a judge, or past the date their sentence expired. She also knew that the DDOe employees working at COR and elsewhere in records keeping always refused to respond to inmates when they inquired about documentation of their release status, thereby making it impossible for inmates who were over-detained to obtain copies of the documents they needed to prove their over-detention. Defendant Escherich knew that the reduced hours of COR meant that some inmates were destined to spend hours if not days over-detained. Despite this knowledge, Defendant Escherich took no steps to address these problems such as:
a) providing proper training to the DOC employees who worked at COR and were responsible for processing release papers for inmates;
b) requiring DOC employees at COR to respond to appropriate requests from inmates who were seeking copies of their release status papers to use in proving they were being over-detained;
c) hiring enough sufficiently trained staff to accurately and rapidly process release papers;
19 


Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 20 of 27 PageID #: 20
d) disciplining those DOC employees who worked at COR and whose failures led to the repeated over-detention of inmates; and
e) arranging for COR to be open more hours, especially on weekends and holidays.
78. Defendant Escherich acted knowingly, intentionally, unreasonably, and with deliberate indifference to the record keeping problems at COR and elsewhere in DDOC. Her failure to do anything about the record keeping problems contributed to a serious over-detention problem and prevented inmates from obtaining release status information to prove they were being over-detained. As a result of her knowing, intentional, unreasonable and deliberate actions which violated Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 14 U.S.c. §1983, 11 Del.C. §2104 and §2105, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, plaintiffs have sustained the following injuries:
a) a period of over-detention; b) complete loss of their privacy during their over-detention; c) extreme mental and emotional stress, anxiety, and pain, past, present and
future 79. Defendant McBride as director of COR, had the duty to implement COR's overall responsibility for all legal aspects of offenders from date of incarceration to release in a way which protected their various civil rights. Defendant McBride breached her legal obligations when she knowingly failed in her duty to make sure that COR was operating in a manner that did not violate inmates' civil rights. 80. Defendant McBride had actual knowledge that the record keeping procedures
20 


Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 21 of 27 PageID #: 21
used at COR and by other DDOe employees frequently resulted in inmates being over-detained from a matter of hours to as much as years past the time they were ordered released by a judge or past the date their sentence expired. She also knew that the DDOe employees working at COR and elsewhere in records keeping always refused to respond to inmates when they inquired about documentation of their release status, thereby making it impossible for inmates who were over­ detained to obtain copies of the documents they needed to prove their over-detention. Defendant McBride knew that the reduced hours of COR meant that some inmates were destined to spend hours if not days over-detained. Despite this knowledge, Defendant McBride took no steps to address these problems such as:
a) providing proper training to the DOC employees who worked at COR and were responsible for processing release papers for inmates;
b) requiring DOC employees at COR to respond to appropriate requests from inmates who were seeking copies of their release status papers to use in proving they were being over-detained;
c) hiring enough sufficiently trained staff to accurately and rapidly process release papers;
d) disciplining those DOC employees who worked at COR and whose failures led to the repeated over-detention of inmates; and
e) arranging for COR to be open more hours, especially on weekends and holidays.
81. Defendant McBride acted knowingly, intentionally, unreasonably, and with 
 deliberate indifference to the record keeping problems at COR and elsewhere in DDOe. Her 
 failure to do anything about the record keeping problems contributed to a serious over-detention 

21 


Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 22 of 27 PageID #: 22
problem and prevented inmates from obtaining release status information to prove they were being over-detained. As a result of her knowing, intentional, unreasonable and deliberate actions which violated Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 14 U.S.C. §1983, 11 De1.C. §2104 and §2105, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, plaintiffs have sustained the following injuries:
a) a period of over-detention; b) complete loss of their privacy during their over-detention; c) extreme mental and emotional stress, anxiety, and pain, past, present and
future 82. All Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. At all relevant times, all Defendants were acting under color of state law; pursuant to their authority as officials, agents, contractors or employees of the State of Delaware; and within the scope of their employment as representatives of public entities, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). 83. Defendants Danberg, Escherich and McBride know that they are exposing prisoners to unreasonable risks of over-detention by their failure to correct the dysfunction of DDOC records keeping, especially in the COR and that such exposure will continue until the problems with record keeping and with COR are rectified. 84. Even though defendants Danberg, Escherich and McBride know that COR and the other record keeping departments at DDOC were dysfunctional, they have failed to take reasonable and effective steps to correct the dysfunction resulting in the needless over-detention of many inmates. 85. Defendants' failure to fix the problems in the dysfunctional COR results in needless pain and suffering, to inmates who have been, are or will be over-detained.
22

Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 23 of 27 PageID #: 23
86. Defendants' policies, practices, acts, and omissions evidence and constitute deliberate indifference to the serious over-detention problem and violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause ofthe Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
87. Defendants' policies, practices, acts, and omissions place Plaintiffs and the members of plaintiff's class at unreasonable, continuing and foreseeable risk of over-detention.
88. As a proximate result of Defendants' unconstitutional policies, practices, acts and omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury, as a result of their over-detention. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law to address the wrongs described herein. The injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury.
89. Defendants caused the intentional, unjustified over-detention of the Overdetained Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury of over-detention because of dysfunction in DDOC's record keeping departments relating to inmates' detention and release,
90. Defendants, by consciously failing to correct the dysfunction in record keeping by DDOC, especially in COR, have acted and continue to act with deliberate indifference to the ongoing over-detention of members of the over-detention class and have violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
91. By continuing to allow DDOC employees, including COR employees to refuse to respond to inmate requests for paperwork concerning their over-detention, Defendants have denied, and continue to deny Plaintiffs' access to the courts and to deny Plaintiff's due process, in violation oftheir rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
23 


Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 24 of 27 PageID #: 24
92. Defendants have continuously been deliberately indifferent to the serious problem of over-detention since at least August of 2008.
93. Defendants are liable by virtue of their deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 for constitutional injuries to the Over-detained Named Plaintiffs caused by their conduct.
94. Accordingly, all Named Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to damages to be detennined at trial, and the Over-detention class is entitled to injunctive relief.
95. Since at least 2008, defendants have known that DDOC has a custom of detaining people past their release dates, thereby causing the intentional, unjustified over-detention of the Over-detained plaintiffs and all other class members.
96. Defendants' actions, and failure to act, as described above, directly and proximately and affinnatively were the moving force behind the continuing violations of the plaintiffs and all other over-detention class members' Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights.
97. Accordingly, all plaintiffs and Over-detention Class members are entitled to damages to be detennined at trial, and the Over-detention Class is entitled to injunctive relief.
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 98. DDOC is over-detaining members of the Over-detention Class which irreparably hanns them, even if they are later able to recover compensatory damages. 99. DDOC's over-detaining members of the Over-detention Class has irreparably hanned, and will continue to irreparably hann, members of the proposed plaintiff Over-detention Class, thus making declaratory and injunctive relief necessary.
100. The policy, custom and practice of the defendants is unconstitutional, in that defendants' have knowingly failed to correct the ongoing, unconstitutional DDOC practice of
24 


Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 25 of 27 PageID #: 25
over-detaining inmates. 101. Upon information and belief, COR and the other records keeping departments of
DDOC continue to be dysfunctional, causing a significant number of inmates to be over­ detained.
102. The continuing pattern of over-detention of inmates will cause irreparable harm to the new and/or prospective members of the Class, an adequate remedy for which does not exist at law.
103. Alternatively, Plaintiffs and members of the Class lack an adequate remedy at law. 104. Plaintiffs and members of the Class would be irreparably injured absent an order from this Court declaring these practices unlawful and unconstitutional.
DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 105. The actions of the Defendants detailed herein are outrageous, in that for at least 4 years, Defendants have knowingly allowed COR to be dysfunctional and allowed employees at COR and other DDOC records keeping departments to refuse to provide inmates with the documentation they need to contest their illegal over-detentions, all of which results in numerous inmates being over-detained unnecessarily. 106. It is clear that the Defendants have no respect for the civil rights of individual citizens or for the rule of law. Consequently, an award of punitive damages is necessary to punish the Defendants, and to send a message to them that the requirements of the United States Constitution indeed apply to their practices which have led to the ongoing over-detention problem in Delaware prisons.
25 


Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 26 of 27 PageID #: 26
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief: 1. Grant a jury trial on all claims so triable; 2. Declare that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) and certifying the Over-detained Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the class consisting of:
(a) Each person who has been, is, or will be incarcerated in any DDOC facility from 8/29/08 up to and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, or the date on which all basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. 3. Declare that Defendants' acts alleged above violate the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution by over-detaining plaintiffs as alleged herein; 4. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Defendants from pursuing the course of conduct complained of herein; 5. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Defendants from pursuing settlement directly with any member of the putative Over-detention Class described herein unless that person is represented by counsel; 6. Award all named plaintiffs compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 7. Appoint an independent monitor to supervise COR, and report to the court, to
26

Case 1:12-cv-01240-LPS Document 1 Filed 10/01/12 Page 27 of 27 PageID #: 27

ensure that all inmates are released on or before their Release Dates, at the expense of

Defendants;

8.

Award plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1988; and grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Date: 1011112

GRADY & HAMPTON, P.A.
IslStephen A. Hampton
Stephen A. Hampton, Esquire (BarID# 2451) John S. Grady (Bar ID # 9) 6 North Bradford Street Dover, Delaware 19904 (302) 678-1265 Attorney for Plaintiffs.

27 


 
 United States District Court for the
District of Delaware

PHILIP A. WHARTON, JOSEPH ROUNDTREE, JAMES MADDOX and LAMAR CORREA
Plaintiffs,
v.
CARL C. DANBERG, CATHY ESCHERICH, and REBECCA MCBRIDE
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

C.A. No.: 12-1240-LPS

)

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

)

)

AMENDED COMPLAINT

)

)

CLASS ACTION

)

)

)

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an action brought by Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox.

and Lamar Correa as plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of the class defined below

(injured or presently subject to injury) from the practice of the Delaware Department of

Corrections (DDOC) of over-detaining inmates and by the defendants' deliberate indifference to

the effect of the DDOC practice of over-detention on the rights of inmates. To over-detain means

holding a detainee or prisoner in a DDOC facility more than 12 hours beyond when a Court

order releasing the detainee or prisoner has been forwarded to Central Offender Records (COR)

or when a detainee or prisoner is held past the day that his orher sentence has ended.

2. Plaintiffs bring this action against the defendants under Section 1983 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments for

injuries suffered by them when the defendants caused them to be over-detained and other

members of the class.

3. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

1

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). 4. At all times pertinent Carl C. Danberg was Commissioner of the DDOC, Attorney
General of the State of Delaware, or Deputy Principal Assistant to the Commissioner of the Department of Correction.
5. Cathy Escherich was Director of COR during some of the time pertinent to this case.
6. Rebecca McBride was Directoc of COR during some of the time pertinent to this case.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. This Court also has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201and 2202, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs claims and those of proposed class members occurred in this judicial district.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATION 9. The Over-detained Named Plaintiffs bring this action under Rules 23(a), 23(b) (2) and 23(b)(3), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any DDOC facility from October 1, 2008 forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released within 12
2

hours of the time that a Court order has been forwarded to COR releasing the person or is not released by midnight of the day his or her sentence has ended.
10. Certification of this class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) is appropriate, because the defendants have a pattern and practice that has uniformly affected all members of both classes, and injunctive relief against the defendants will benefit each and every plaintiff and class member. These patterns and practices have been known to defendants since at least 2008 and continue unabated, thus it is clear that a court order is necessary to insure the rights of the class members.
11. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Plaintiff and the Class satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
12. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of Class members and the fact that Class members may be dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Delaware and the geographic area served by this Judicial District.
13. The classes are entitled to injunctive relief, for example, setting up an independent
monitor to supervise DDOC's inmate records management system to ensure that all llmiates are
timely released after the legal justification for their incarceration has ceased. 14. Certification of a class under Federal Ru1e of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is also
appropriate, in that common questions of law and fact predominate over any individual questions, and a class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as detailed below.
3

15. Among the questions oflaw and fact common to the classes are:

a)

the maximum length of time a person may be held while defendants

perform administrative tasks incident to their release from custody beyond

which it is a violation of their constitutional rights;

b)

whether the defendants, through their actions have caused or allowed to

occur over-detentions exceeding that maximum for each class member;

c)

whether defendants have a pattern and practice of holding detainees and

inmates more than 12 hours past the time that a Court order has been

forwarded to COR ordering their release;

d)

whether defendants have a pattern and practice of holding inmates past the

day their sentence has expired;

e). whether the defendants are aware of and have failed to address a pattern

and practice of being deliberately indifferent to the rights of detainees and

inmates by ignoring DDOC's practice of over-detaining them;

f) whether defendant's acts as alleged herein violate the Constitution of the

United States;

g) whether such patterns and practices, if found to exist, violate the Fourth

and/or Fifth Amendments;

h) whether plaintiffs, the other members of the Over-detention Class and

future members of the Over-detention Class are entitled to equitable relief,

and, if so, the nature of that relief;

i) whether determination of damages suffered by a statistically representative

sample of the class provides the basis for determination of all class

4

members' damages except those who opt out. 16. Regarding the Over-detained Named Plaintiffs, there are no individual questions on the issue of liability other than whether an individual has been over-detained as defined above, and the answer to that question can be determined by ministerial inspection of the DDOC's records. 17. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the Class is impracticable given the large number of Class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating hundreds of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the maintenance of this action as a class action in this Court presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Class. 18. Computer records are available for inspection concerning the over-detentions. 19. The over-detention problem is even worse for inmates who:
a) cannot speak English; b) have limited English skills; c) have mental health or other problems that make it difficult for them to
communicate; and d) inmates who have no one on the outside to advocate for them. 20. For these inmates who are over-detained, days and weeks of over-detention are
5

not at all uncommon. It is these individuals for whom a class action is particularly appropriate, as without a class action, these individuals most likely would not have the ability or opportunity to bring a lawsuit for their over-detention.
21. The Over-detained Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class, as plaintiffs and all other members of the class were injured by exactly the same means, that is, by the over-detentions.
22. The Named Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the class.
23. Plaintiffs are aware of two other pending cases in this court, which address, in part, defendants' flagrant violation of the civil rights of the members of the Over-detention Class. The first case is Nancy Dinote v. Carl C. Danberg, eta!., C.A. No.: 12-377-GMS, which in addition to a claim that Ms. Dinote was over-detained for nearly a day, also contains a claim involving equal protection and allegations of serious physical injury. The second case, Errol Springer v. Carl C. Danberg, eta!, C.A. No.: 12-392-GMS includes a claim that false testimony by a probation officer was initially responsible for plaintiffs illegal incarceration in addition to claims that dysfunction in COR contributed to his over-detention of two years and eleven months. The fact patterns of these cases are different from the common fact pattern of the overdetention class.
DYSFUNCTIONAL PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 24. The DDOC holds prisoners and detainees committed by the Delaware State Courts and other agencies in a variety of correctional facilities. 25. Once an inmate or detainee is placed in the custody of a DDOC facility, he or she
6

cannot be released from custody until a judicial order releases him or her or the reason for the

incarceration expires.

26. According to the DDOC website, COR "is primarily responsible for calculating

offender's sentences and release dates. This unit houses and controls all active and inactive

institutional and probation/parole offender records." Also according to the DDOC website, the

general activities at COR include calculating offender sentences and preparing releases as

ordered by the Court.

27. An inmate or detainee who has had his bail posted, had a judge order unsecured

bail, or had a judge order that they be released without bail, still cannot be released until the

judicial order has been processed by COR. Release orders from the Courts are transmitted to

COR by fax machine. Subsequently, it is expected that a COR employee will fill out a check list

on a computer screen to determine whether any reason remains to continue to hold the offender

in custody. The checklist includes reminders to:

a)

check the "offender blue sheet" to determine if there are any open charges

against the offender;

b) check to make sure the offender is not being monitored by probation and

parole;

c)

check to make sure that there are no outstanding wartants of any type-from

any jurisdiction holding the offender; and

d)

check all paperwork in "Records" for any legal documents on the inmate.

28. If all of the checklist information is satisfactory, the COR employee checks off the

appropriate preprinted instructions to the receiving room staff to do such things as verify the

identity of the inmate by photograph, return the inmates property, and have the inmate sign any

7

bail or bond papers that need to be signed prior to releasing the inmate. 29. A similar checklist exists for an inmate or detainee for whom the reason for the
incarceration has expired. However, that checklist also requires the COR employee to review the current active legal section to ensure the accuracy of sentence calculation and release date.
30. COR is only open from 6:00 am to midnight Monday through Friday, 6:00 am to 3:00pm on Saturday, 12:00 noon to 6:00pm on Sundays, and is closed on holidays. Obviously, no processing of release papers takes place during the time that COR is closed.
31. Clerks from the various courts in Delaware report that COR frequently denies receiving the release orders which have been faxed to COR. The clerks sometimes have to fax the release papers several times before receipt is acknowledged by COR.
32. Bail bondsmen in Delaware who have put up bond for incarcerated individuals fmd that they frequently have to explain to the family or friends of the inmate for whom bail has been posted, why it is taking so long for the inmate to be released after bail has been posted. Especially since this delay can last days or weeks.
33. DDOC has recently begun to acknowledge its failures to promptly process release orders from the Court. Bail bondsmen and others posting bail are now being told that it might take as much as 24 to 48 hours before the release order is processed by COR and the inmate for whom bail has been posted will be released. Despite the knowledge that DDOC's practices regarding processing release orders from the courts is indefensibly dysfunctional, defendants have done nothing about the problem.
34. COR employees frequently cannot be reached by phone by a bail bondsman or the family or friends of those for whom bail has been posted. Even when reached, COR employees complain of inadequate staff and provide little information to the caller. Because of the
8

frustration with COR, friends and family of inmates have resorted to subterfuge, such as telling the COR employees that they are correctional officers when calling for information concerning their loved ones. Otherwise, they get no help from COR.
35. The standard practice of COR employees and of all other DDOC employees who work with prisoner release records is to refuse to respond to any inquiries from inmates. C/Os or counselors in DDOC facilities sometimes assist inmates with obtaining documentation from COR. Frequently there is still a significant delay in the information being received by the C/Os and the C/Os or counselors only help when they feel like it, which is infrequent. As a result inmates cannot obtain the very documentation that is necessary to prove that they are being overdetained and are denied access to the courts.
36. The significant problem with over-detention has been gomg on at least since August of 2008 and is well known to other government agencies, such as the Public Defender's office. At least one Public Defender's office has programed its computers to flag release dates so that they can try to keep track of whether or not their clients have actually been released as ordered. That same public defender's office has a clerical person who spends a considerable portion of her time working solely on over-detention issues.
37. Defendants plus the wardens at DDOC facilities, COR and Governor Markel have received numerous complaints about the over-detention· proDiefn sirice August of-20m5. Complaints have come by mail, email and by phone. Apparently there is or was a website to which individual government employees were posting complaints about COR and the overdetention problem.
38. Individuals who have been charged with serious crimes can be taken to the Justice of the Peace Court for their initial court appearance 24 hours per day, seven days a week.
9

However, if these individuals are to be released on unsecured bail or have posted their bail upon arrival at the Justice of the Peace Court, they are frequently subject to remaining detained in a prison for 24 hours or more. Because COR is only open until 3:00pm on Saturdays and closed on holidays, when a Sunday falls on a holiday, COR is closed for at least 39 consecutive hours during which no release papers are being processed. Even when Sundays are not holidays, COR is closed at least 22 consecutive hours over the weekend.
39. Even if COR is open when the Justice of the Peace Court has faxed a release order to it, the delay in COR responding, frequently exceeds at least 12 hours, and often exceeds 24 hours or more. Delays of days or weeks is not uncommon. As a result JP Court staff frequently have to spend a lot of time trying to explain to irate family members, of incarcerated individuals, why their loved one has not been released despite the fact that bail was posted many hours or even days before.
40. Reportedly, there has been conflict between the office of the Chief Magistrate of the Justice of the Peace Courts and the office of the Commissioner of Correction concerning the continuing over-detention problem. The Chief Magistrate's office has been particularly frustrated that this over-detention problem has been going on for so many years without resolution and what appears to be no adequate steps being taken by the Commissioner's office to solve this problem.
41. The experience in the Superior Courts, Family Courts and Courts of Common Pleas is that inmates for whom bail has been posted or inmates who have been ordered released frequently are detained more than 12 hours past the time that the release order has been forwarded to COR. The same is true for inmates for whom the reason for incarceration has expired, as those inmates often spend considerably more than a day over-detained while COR,
10

for whatever reason, fails to provide the appropriate documentation to the correctional facility. 42. Inmates who request help from C/Os, counselors or other DDOC employees at the
various DDOC facilities concerning why they have not been released when bail has been posted or their sentence is expired, invariably get told that the problem lies with the "Records Department", "Central Records", or the "Records Department in Dover". Also, almost invariably they get no assistance from DDOC employees in correcting the over-detention.
EXAMPLES OF OVER-DETENTION 43. "Over-detain" means:
a) holding a detainee or prisoner in the custody of the DDOC without just cause more than 12 hours after an order from a court has been forwarded to COR ordering the detainee or prisoner's release; or
b) holding a detainee or prisoner past the day that their sentence has expired and there is longer just cause for their incarceration.
44. "Release Date" for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which their sentence has expired.
45. "Exit Date" for each detainee or inmate is the day on which the person is actually released from the custody of the DDOC.
46. Plaintiff Philip A. Wharton was admitted to Sussex Correctional Institution -(SCIJ on or about 6/27/12. His release date was supposed to be 7/9/12, however his exit date was 7/18/12, resulting in a nine day over-detention.
47. Plaintiff Joseph Roundtree was admitted to Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (HRYCI) on or about 4/4/12. His release date was supposed to be 4117112, however, his exit date was 4/24/12, resulting in a seven day over-detention.
II

48. Plaintiff James Maddox was admitted to SCI on or about 3111/12. His release date was supposed to be 3/14/12, however, his exit date was 3/19/12, resulting in a five day overdetention.
49. Plaintiff Lamar Correa was admitted to JTVCC on or about 8112/12. His release date was supposed to be 8/15112, however, his exit date was 9111/12, resulting in a 27 day overdetention.
50. Asia Trimball was admitted to Baylor's Women's Correctional Institution (BWCI) on or about 6/8/11. Her release date was supposed to be 12/22/12, however, her exit date was 1/6112, resulting in almost 15 days of over-detention.
51. Richard Haley, Jr. was arrested on October 18, 2011 for allegedly violating a nocontact order, which had in fact been lifted some time in September, 20 II. Despite the fact that he repeatedly asked correctional officers and counselors to inquire for him concerning the fact that his no contact order had been lifted, they refused to do so.
52. It was not until the first week of November, 2011, when Mr. Haley met with the public defender, that the Court learned that the no-contact order had been lifted, at which time, Plaintiff Haley was released from prison, ending his approximately 14 day over-detention.
53. On 11/7/11, Quinton D. Lowman appeared in Kent County Court of Common Pleas in front of Judge Anne Hartnett Reigle at which time he was sentenced to 12 months of Level V incarceration suspended for 30 days at Level IV SVOP, thereafter, by Level III probation for 12 months. However, instead of being held for 30 days at SVOP, Mr. Lowman was held for 64 days at Level V due to the failure of COR and DDOC to correctly apply his sentence before being sent to probation Level III, resulting in 34 days of over-detention.
12

54. Ray Wood was admitted to SVOP on or about 6/6/11. His release date was supposed to be 7/21/11, however, his exit date was 9/29/11, resulting in 68 days of overdetention.
55. Sean Snyder was admitted to HRYCI on or about 1/21111. His release date was supposed to be 1/25/11, however, his exit date was 2/18/11, resulting in 24 days of overdetention.
56. Chris Rosendale was admitted to a DOC prison, on or about 12/6/10. His release date was supposed to be 12/6/10 at 1:00pm, however, his exit date was 12/7/11 at 3:00pm, resulting in 26 hours of over-detention.
57. Nairobi Wannamaker was admitted to JTVCC on or about 9/8/10. His release date was supposed to be 9/9/10, however, his exit date was 9116/10, resulting in 8 days of overdetention.
58. Tobias Adams was admitted to SCI on or about 7/20/10. His release date was supposed to be 8/5/10, however, his exit date was 8/22/10, resulting in 14 days of over-detention.
59. Thomas Talbert was admitted to HRYCI on or about 2/3/10. His release date was supposed to be 2/4/10, however, his exit date was 2/23/10, resulting in 19 days of over-detention.
60. Roger Scarborough was admitted to JTVCC on or about 9/16/09. His release date was supposed to be 3/1110, however, his exit date was-3/o/lil, -resulting in five days of over- ~ detention.
61. Darryl Brooks was admitted to SCI on or about 10/4/13. His release date was supposed to be 10/14/13, however, his exit date was 10/24/13, resulting is nine days of overdetention.
62. Devon Cannon was admitted to JTVCC on or about 10117/12. His release date
13

was supposed to be 10/18/12, however, his exit date was 10/24/12, resulting in six days of overdetention.
63. Andre Daisey was admitted to SCI on or about 3/24/12. His release date was supposed to be 3/26/12, however, his exit date was 4/5/, resulting in ten days of over-detention.
64. Vincent Denney was admitted to JTVCC on or about 8/9/12. His release date was supposed to be 10/5/12, however, his exit date was 10/17/12, resulting in two days of overdetention.
65. Kenneth Guinn was admitted to JTVCC on or about 1113112. His release date was supposed to be 4/12/12, however, his exit date was 4/14112, resulting in two days of overdetention.
66. Henrv Home was admitted to HRYCI on or about 12/7112. His release date was supposed to be 12/7112, however, his exit date was 12/11/12, resulting in three days of overdetention.
67. Michael Jackson was admitted to SCI on or about 5/12/13. His release date was supposed to be 9/28/13, however. his exit date was 10/10/13, resulting in thirteen days of overdetention.
68. Barry King was admitted to Gander Hill on or about 9/12/12. His release date was supposed to be 9/28/12, however, his exit date was 10/9/12, resulting in eleven days of overdetention.
69. Scott Mitchell was admitted to JTVCC on or about 9/8/11. His release date was supposed to be 1/8112, however, his exit date was !113/12, resulting in at least three days of overdetention.
70. Charleen Stannn was admitted to SVOP on or about 8/3112. Her release date was
14

supposed to be 8/22112112, however, her exit date was 8/27/12, resulting in three days of over-

detention.

71. Harold Stevenson was admitted to JTVCC on or about 6/1/10. His release date

was supposed to be 6/2/10, however, his exit date was 6/17/10, resulting in fifteen days of over-

detention.

72. Damon Wilson was admitted to HRYCI on or about 9/26/11. His release date was

supposed to be 6/8/12, however, his exit date was 6/20/12, resulting in twelve days of over-

detention.

73. Counsel for Plaintiffs has been contacted by or informed of many other

individuals who have suffered over-detention, but who have not responded to an invitation to

join in a class action. Plaintiffs' counsel has a good faith belief that there are a large number of

individuals who have suffered over-detention in the last four years, including many whose over-

detention has lasted days, weeks, or even months. Many have other issues that keep them from

volunteering as plaintiffs in a civil action, such as other legal entanglements, frnancial problems,

family problems, or citizenship issues and a class action is the only way to protect their rights.

THE WELL KNOWN OVER-DETENTION PROBLEM

74. The Defendants have known since at least 2008 that the DDOC has a practice of

over-detaining detainees and inmates past their release dates.

75.

A

Wilmington

News

Journal

written

by

Sean

O'Sullivan

on

8/29/08

1 ,

reported

outrage by all four Delaware gubernatorial candidates over the fact that 29 inmates had

mistakenly been released in the past year and a half because of DOC errors. Then candidate, and

1 Archived at: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/delawareonline/access/17 4275279l.html?FMT~FT &FMTS~ABS:FT &type~cnrrent&d ate~Aug+29%2C+2008&authoFSEAN+0%27SULLIVAN&pub~The+News+Joumal&edition~&startpage~B.l &d
esc=Politicians+blast+DOC+over+prison+releases
15

now Governor, Jack Markell claimed that he would "fix the problem and hold people
accountable". Candidate Bill Lee "credited DOC Commissioner Carl Danberg with being the
fust member of the Minner administration to ever step back and accept responsibility for a
problem, acknowledging it exists and telling us what he is trying to do to fix it." According to
the article, "Danberg acknowledged the ongoing issues with mistakes in both erroneous releases
and inmates over-serving their sentence due to errors by DOC personnel two weeks ago."
76. Furthermore, it was reported that:
This week, the DOC released a follow up list of those who were kept longer than their sentences required. While the early release list covered the past 18 months, DOC officials said they only had data on overstays for the past nine months. According to the latest DOC list, 19 people served at least one extra day or up to 20 days longer than was necessary since December 2007. Twelve of the 19 served one or two extra days. Four inmates overstayed between five and seven days, and two were held for almost two weeks longer than a court had ordered.
***
National experts said early and late releases happen routinely across the country, but they were surprised by the high number in Delaware, a comparatively small prison system, over such a short period of time.
***
In Massachusetts, which has about twice as many inmates as Delaware, there was a major restructuring, including the ousting of the department's commissioner, after it was revealed last year that 14 inmates, over a fouryear period, had been held in error past their release dates. One was held in error for four years.
***
Danberg said the situation is "unacceptable" and said he launched a major management reorganization at DOC to centralize the processing of inmate sentences and calculation of release dates in Dover to reduce errors. However, he said the transition has created more confusion in the interim.
•••
The DOC this week also released the amount the State paid to an inmate who claimed in a Federal civil lawsuit that he was improperly held for 5 years past his release date. Jerome K. Hamilton received $125,000.00 in September, 2007 to settle his case.
16

77. Defendants Danberg, Escherich, and McBride have long known that DDOC employees working with release records in COR and elsewhere at DDOC are instructed not to respond to any inquiries by inmates. As a result, an inmate who believes he has been illegally over-detained because of a misinterpretation of his sentence, or a delay in processing his release, has no ability to obtain information concerning the problem from COR. Thus such inmates are denied access to the Courts. The Defendants are aware that the Court will not grant an overdetained or illegally incarcerated inmate relief unless they provide the Court the information, which DDOC refuses to provide directly to inmates.
DDOC OBLIGATIONS AND POLICIES 78. A person arrested and charged with a crime in Delaware may be released on the person's on recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured personal appearance bond, and that upon such occurrence, the accused shall be released. (II Del. C. §2104 and §2105) 79. DOC Policy 1.4 V, states in part: It is the policy of the Department of Correction to provide sufficient staff to ensure efficient operations consistent with its mission
80. DOC Policy 4.1 V, states in part: It is the policy of the Department of Correction to require all decision-making affecting the rehabilitation; housing, -discipline, and/or supervision level of offenders or detentioners under the jurisdiction of the Department be fair and equitable.
81. DOC Policy 5.1 V, states: The Department recognizes that all offenders are entitled to certain basic rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States, as well as Federal and State statutes. Therefore, it is the policy of the Department of Correction to acknowledge and protect basic rights of offenders in its custody.
17

The Executive Committee, in cooperation with the Attorney General's Office, shall identity all offender's rights including, but not limited to: a safe and healthful living environment, due process for alleged rule violations, freedom of speech and religion, access to the courts and a grievance process allowing for administrative and judicial review.
It will be the responsibility of each bureau chie£'section manager to develop procedures, for review and approval by the Commissioner, to insure offender's rights are safeguarded. The procedures should require all staff involved with offenders receive instruction and training specific to this policy and its corresponding procedures.
BREACHES OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS BY DEFENDANTS
82. As Commissioner ofDDOC, Defendant Danberg has powers, duties and functions
appointed to him by II Del. C. §6516, as follows:
The Commissioner shall assume full and active charge of the Department, its facilities and services, and is the chief executive and administrative officer of the Department
83. As Commissioner ofDDOC, Defendant Danberg has
powers, duties and functions appointed to him by 29 Del. C. §8903, including, but not limited to,
the following:
The Commissioner shall:
(I) Supervise, direct and account for the administration and operation of the Department, its bureaus, subbureaus, offices, functions and employees;
***
(3) Appoint such additional personnel as may be necessary for the administration and operation of the Department within such limitations as may be imposed by law;
84. Defendant Danberg knew that under DDOC policies, correctional officers were to
"go through whatever they can to find out the answer for the inmate", if the inmate was seeking
to obtain information regarding their release statns. See Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.
18

Del. 2009). See also DOC Policy 3.13V. Defendant Danberg knew that in practice, C/Os and counselors rarely assisted inmates with such requests. Defendant Danberg knew that the failure of C/Os and counselors to assist inmates with obtaining release information and the refusal of COR to respond to inmate inquiries, meant that inmates who were illegally over-detained, or illegally kept past the expiration of their sentence, frequently had no way to contest their illegal incarceration, and were thus denied access to the Courts.
85. Defendant Danberg has had actual knowledge since at least 2008 that COR and the other records keeping employees for DDOC, were operating so poorly and inefficiently that:
a) inmates were frequently over-detained for hours, days, weeks, months and even years past the time that their release order was forwarded to COR.
b) inmate records were lost, misplaced, or intentionally ignored by COR and other DDOC records keeping staff so frequently that inmates who should have been released were held in custody for hours, days, weeks or even years beyond the time that their sentences had expired;
c) COR employees and other DDOC record keeping employees routinely refused to respond to any inquiry made by an inmate, and
d) COR is closed overnight every weeknight, closed for substantial amounts of time on Saturday and Sunday; and closed totally on holidays. Tills inevitably leads to inmates spending hours and even days over-detained simply because COR is not open.
86. Defendant Danberg, as the commissioner ofDDOC, had a duty to correct such known problems, but essentially took uo steps to address them, despite knowing that the failure to address them would lead to many inmates being over-detained for substantial amounts of time.
19

Defendant Danberg has demonstrated deliberate indifference to the well known over-detention problem since at least 2008.
87. Defendant Danberg acted knowingly, intentionally, unreasonably and with deliberate indifference to the longstanding, widespread dysfunction in DOC including the systemic failures of COR, and the systemic problems with C/Os and counselors. As a result of Defendant Danberg's actions, which violated plaintiffs rights under 14 U.S.C. §1983, II Del. C. §2104 and §2105, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, plaintiffs sustained the following injuries:
a) a period of over-detention; b) complete loss of their privacy during their over-detention; c) extreme mental and emotional stress, anxiety, and pain, past, present and
future 88. Defendant Escherich as director of COR, had the duty to implement COR's overall responsibility for all legal aspects of offenders from date of incarceration to release in a way which protected their various civil rights. Defendant Escherich breached her legal obligations when she knowingly failed in her duty to make sure that COR was operating in a manner that did not violate inmates' civil rights. 89. Defendant Escherich had actual knowledge that the record keeping procedures used at COR and by other DDOC employees frequently resulted in inmates being over-detained from a matter of hours to as much as years past the time they were ordered released by a judge, or past the date their sentence expired. She also knew that the DDOC employees working at COR and elsewhere in records keeping always refused to respond to inmates when they inquired about documentation of their release status, thereby making it impossible for inmates who were
20

over-detained to obtain copies of the documents they needed to prove their over-detention. Defendant Escherich knew that the reduced hours of COR meant that some inmates were destined to spend hours if not days over-detained. Despite this knowledge, Defendant Escherich took no steps to address these problems such as:
a) providing proper training to the DOC employees who worked at COR and were responsible for processing release papers for inmates;
b) requiring DOC employees at COR to respond to appropriate requests from inmates who were seeking copies of their release status papers to use in proving they were being over-detained;
c) hiring enough sufficiently trained staff to accurately and rapidly process release papers;
d) disciplining those DOC employees who worked at COR and whose failures led to the repeated over-detention of inmates; and
e) arrangmg for COR to be open more hours, especially on weekends and holidays.
90. Defendant Escherich acted knowingly, intentionally, unreasonably, and with deliberate indifference to the record keeping problems at COR and elsewhere in DDOC. Her failure to do anything about the record keeping problems contributed-to-a serious over-detention problem and prevented inmates from obtaining release status information to prove they were being over-detained. As a result of her knowing, intentional, unreasonable and deliberate actions which violated Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 14 U.S.C. §1983, 11 Del.C. §2104 and §2105, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, plaintiffs have sustained the following injuries:
21

a) a period of over-detention; b) complete loss of their privacy during their over-detention; c) extreme mental and emotional stress, anxiety, and pain, past, present and
future 91. Defendant McBride as director of COR, had the duty to implement COR's overall responsibility for all legal aspects of offenders from date of incarceration to release in a way which protected their various civil rights. Defendant McBride breached her legal obligations when she knowingly failed in her duty to make sure that COR was operating in a manner that did not violate inmates' civil rights. 92. Defendant McBride had actual knowledge that the record keeping procedures used at COR and by other DDOC employees frequently resulted in inmates being over-detained from a matter of hours to as much as years past the time they were ordered released by a judge or past the date their sentence expired. She also knew that the DDOC employees working at COR and elsewhere in records keeping always refused to respond to inmates when they inquired about documentation of their release status, thereby making it impossible for inmates who were overdetained to obtain copies of the documents they needed to prove their over-detention. Defendant McBride knew that the reduced hours of COR meant that some inmates were destined to spend hours if not days over-detained. Despite this knowledge, Defendant McBride took no steps to address these problems such as:
a) providing proper training to the DOC employees who worked at COR and were responsible for processing release papers for inmates;
22

b) requiring DOC employees at COR to respond to appropriate requests from inmates who were seeking copies of their release status papers to use in proving they were being over-detained;
c) hiring enough sufficiently trained staff to accurately and rapidly process release papers;
d) disciplining those DOC employees who worked at COR and whose failures led to the repeated over-detention of inmates; and
e) arranging for COR to be open more hours, especially on weekends and holidays.
93. Defendant McBride acted knowingly, intentionally, unreasonably, and with deliberate indifference to the record keeping problems at COR and elsewhere in DDOC. Her failure to do anything about the record keeping problems contributed to a serious over-detention problem and prevented inmates from obtaining release status information to prove they were being over-detained. As a result of her knowing, intentional, unreasonable and deliberate actions which violated Plaintiffs' rights pursuant to 14 U.S.C. §1983, 11 Del.C. §2104 and §2105, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, plaintiffs have sustained the following injuries:
a) a period of over-detention; b) complete loss of their privacy during their over-detention; c) extreme mental and emotional stress, anxiety, and pain, past, present and
future 94. All Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. At all relevant times, all Defendants were acting under color of state law; pursuant to their authority as officials,
23

agents, contractors or employees of the State of Delaware; and within the scope of their employment as representatives ofpublic entities, as defmed in 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
95. Defendants Danberg, Escherich and McBride know that they are exposing prisoners to unreasonable risks of over-detention by their failure to correct the dysfunction of DDOC records keeping, especially in the COR and that such exposure will continue until the problems with record keeping and with COR are rectified.
96. Even though defendants Danberg, Escherich and McBride know that COR and the other record keeping departments at DDOC were dysfunctional, they have failed to take reasonable and effective steps to correct the dysfunction resulting in the needless over-detention of many inmates.
97. Defendants' failure to fix the problems in the dysfunctional COR results in needless pain and suffering, to inmates who have been, are or will be over-detained.
98. Defendants' policies, practices, acts, and omissions evidence and constitute deliberate indifference to the serious over-detention problem and violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause ofthe Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
99. Defendants' policies, practices, acts, and omissions place Plaintiffs and the members of plaintiff's class at unreasonable, continuing and foreseeable risk of over-detention.
100. As a proximate result of Defendants' unconstitutional policies, practices, acts and omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury, as a result of their over-detention. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law to address the wrongs described herein. The injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is necessary to prevent continued and further injury.
24

101. Defendants caused the intentional, unjustified over-detention of the Overdetained Named Plaintiffs and all other class members by deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injury of over-detention because of dysfunction in DDOC's record keeping departments relating to inmates' detention and release,
102. Defendants, by consciously failing to correct the dysfunction in record keeping by DDOC, especially in COR, have acted and continue to act with deliberate indifference to the ongoing over-detention of members of the over-detention class and have violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
103. By continuing to allow DDOC employees, including COR employees to refuse to respond to inmate requests for paperwork concerning their over-detention, Defendants have denied, and continue to deny Plaintiffs' access to the courts and to deny Plaintiff's due process, in violation oftheir rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
104. Defendants have continuously been deliberately indifferent to the serious problem of over-detention since at least August of2008.
105. Defendants are liable by virtue of their deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional injuries to the Over-detained Named Plaintiffs caused by their conduct.
106. Accordingly, all Named Plaintiffs and class members are entitled to damages to be determined at trial, and the Over-detention class is entitled to injrinctive relief.
107. Since at least 2008, defendants have known that DDOC has a custom of detaining people past their release dates, thereby causing the intentional, unjustified over-detention of the Over-detained plaintiffs and all other class members.
I 08. Defendants' actions, and failure to act, as described above, directly and proximately and affirmatively were the moving force behind the continuing violations of the
25

plaintiffs and all other over-detention class members' Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights.
109. Accordingly, all plaintiffs and Over-detention Class members are entitled to damages to be determined at trial, and the Over-detention Class is entitled to injunctive relief.
IRREPARABLE INJURY AND INJUNCTNE RELIEF llO. DDOC is over-detaining members of the Over-detention Class which irreparably harms them, even if they are later able to recover compensatory damages. lll. DDOC's over-detaining members of the Over-detention Class has irreparably harmed, and will continue to irreparably harm, members of the proposed plaintiff Over-detention Class, thus making declaratory and injunctive relief necessary.
112. The policy, custom and practice of the defendants is unconstitutional, in that defendants' have knowingly failed to correct the ongoing, unconstitutional DDOC practice of over-detaining inmates.
113. Upon information and belief, COR and the other records keeping departments of DDOC continue to be dysfunctional, causing a significant number of inmates to be overdetained.
114. The continuing pattern of over-detention of inmates will cause irreparable harm to the new and/or prospective members of the Class, an adequate remedy for which does not exist at law.
115. Alternatively, Plaintiffs and members of the Class lack an adequate remedy at law. 116. Plaintiffs and members of the Class would be irreparably injured absent an order from this Court declaring these practices unlawful and unconstitutional.
26

DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 117. The actions of the Defendants detailed herein are outrageous, in that for at least 4 years, Defendants have knowingly allowed COR to be dysfunctional and allowed employees at COR and other DDOC records keeping departments to refuse to provide inmates with the documentation they need to contest their illegal over-detentions, all of which results in numerous inmates being over-detained unnecessarily. 118. It is clear that the Defendants have no respect for the civil rights of individual citizens or for the rule of law. Consequently, an award of punitive damages is necessary to punish the Defendants, and to send a message to them that the requirements of the United States Constitution indeed apply to their practices which have led to the ongoing over-detention problem in Delaware prisons.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief: 1. Grant a jury trial on all claims so triable; 2. Declare that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) and certifying the Over-detained Named Plaintiffs as the proper representative of the class consisting of:
(a) Each person who has been, is, or will be incarcerated in any DDOC facility from 8/29/08 up to and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order, or the date on which all basis for his or her
27

detention has otherwise expired.

3.

Declare that Defendants• acts alleged above violate the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth

Amendments to the Constitution by over-detaining plaintiffs as alleged herein;

4. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Defendants from pursuing the course of

conduct complained of herein;

5. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Defendants from pursuing settlement

directly with any member of the putative Over-detention Class described herein unless that

person is represented by counsel;

6. Award all named plaintiffs compensatory and consequential damages in an amount

to be detennined at trial;

7. Appoint an independent monitor to supervise COR, and report to the court, to

ensure that all inmates are released on or before their Release Dates, at the expense of

Defendants;

8.

Award plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1988; and grant such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

GRADY &HAMPTON,P.A.
Is/Stephen A. Hampton
Stephen A. Hampton, Esquire (Bar ID# 2451) John S. Grady (BariD # 9) 6 North Bradford Street Dover, Delaware 19904 (302) 678-1265

28

Date: 6/2/14

Attorney for Plaintiffs.

29

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

PHILIP A. WHARTON, JOSEPH ROUNDTREE, JAMES MADDOX and LAMAR CORREA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CARL C. DANBERG, CATHY ESCHERICH and REBECCA MCBRIDE,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 12-1240-LPS

MEMORANDUM ORDER Pending before the Court are Joseph M. Walls's motion to intervene and motion for partial summary judgment. (D.I. 8, 36) For the reasons below, the motions are DENIED. 1. On October 1, 2012, Plaintiffs Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox, and Lamar Correa (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") filed suit against Defendants Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, and Rebecca McBride (collectively, the "Defendants") alleging violations of Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See D.I. 1at~1) Defendants filed an answer to the Complaint on November 20, 2012. (D.I. 6) On December 4, 2012, Joseph M. Walls, an inmate currently housed at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, filed a motion to intervene. 1 (D.I. 8) On August 15, 2013, Mr. Walls filed a motion for partial summary judgment

'Mr. Walls's motion is made pursuant to "Civil Rule 24(a)(2)(b)(2)." (D.I. 8 at 1) The Court assumes Mr. Walls seeks to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) and 24(b)(l)(B).
1

on issues relating to the start date of his sentence and calculation of good time credits. (D.I. 36) 2. Under Rule 24(a)(2), a person is entitled to intervene if: (1) the application for
intervention is timely, (2) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation, (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by the disposition of the action, and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation. See Kleissler v. US. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1998). Rule 24(b)(1 )(B) also provides for permissive intervention where the movant "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." Permissive intervention is "highly discretionary." Brody By & Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992). "In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3); see also United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2014).
3. In response to Mr. Walls's motion, Defendants suggest Mr. Walls is not a member of the potential class being represented by Plaintiffs' counsel and, thus, fails to satisfy the second and third prongs of Rule 24(a)(2).2 Plaintiffs contend the class has not yet been defined and the Court need not reach that issue to resolve the pending motion to intervene, given that Mr. Walls has no right to intervene if his interests are being adequately represented by the parties. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. Mr. Walls fails to demonstrate how his interests will not be adequately represented by counsel ifhe is eventually found to be a class member. Therefore,
2In Defendants' view, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims concern: (i) Defendants' alleged practice of "over-detaining" inmates, and (ii) Defendants' allegedly deliberate indifference to the effect of overdetention on the rights of inmates. (D.1. 19 at 1) By contrast, Mr. Walls's complaints with the Department of Corrections involve merit time or good time credits and conditional release.

having failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the relevant test, Mr. Walls is not entitled to intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
4. The Court declines to allow permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(l)(B) as well. There appears to be substantial disagreement among the parties in this suit as to whether Mr. Walls's motion, which is concerned with merit time, good time credit, parole date, and conditional release, involves some of the same issues as those underlying this § 1983 action or whether his issues are entirely distinct and properly characterized as a habeas petition. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). Given this dispute, the Court finds permissive intervention risks unduly delaying or prejudicing the adjudication of the original parties' rights. Further, because Mr. Walls has made no showing that his interests will not be adequately represented by the parties, the Court finds the need to permit Mr. Walls to intervene under Rule 24(b)(l)(B) is weakened. See United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion where existing prejudice was "further compounded by the fact that Gillette's intervention is unnecessary due to the United States' adequate representation in the ongoing litigation").
5. Because Mr. Walls is not a party to this suit and the Court denies his motion to intervene, the Court will deny his motion for partial summary judgment.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: A. Mr. Walls's Motion to Intervene (D.1. 8) is DENIED. B. Mr. Walls's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.I. 36) is DENIED. C. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend (D.I. 49), on which Defendants take no
position (D.1. 49-1), is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file its Amended Complaint no
3
1
I

later than October 6, 2014. D. The parties shall file a joint status report no later than October 6, 2014.

Wilmington, Delaware September 29, 2014

UNITED TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

PHILIP A. WHARTON, JOSEPH ROUNDTREE, JAMES MADDOX, and LAMAR CORREA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT COUPE, CARL C. DANBERG, and REBECCA MCBRIDE,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 12-1240-LPS.

Stephen A. Hampton, GRADY & HAMPTON, L.L.C., Dover, DE. Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Michael F. McTaggart, Scott W. Perkins, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE Attorneys for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 30, 2015 Wilmington, Delaware

f ~t S~ U.S. Distri
Pending before the Court.are (1) a Motion for Class Certification, filed by Plaintiffs Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox, and Lamar Correa ("Plaintiffs") (D.I. 58); (2) a Motion to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class ("Motion to Strike"), filed by · Defendants Robert Coupe,1 Carl C. Danberg, and Rebecca McBride ("Defendants")2 (D.I. 59); and (3) a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants (D.I. 74). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will deny as moot Defendants' Motion to Strike.
. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are· individuals who have spent time in the custody of the Delaware Department of Correction ("DDOC"). (See D.I. 64 at 1) Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and "all others similarly situated," alleging injury resulting from "the practice of the [DDOC] of over-detaining inmates and by the Defendants' deliberate indifference to the effect of the DDOC practice of over-detention on the rights of inmates." (D.I. 1 at 1; D.I. 64 at 1) Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and damages on behalf of themselves and their proposed class of"past, current, or future Delaware inmates" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fed. R. Civ. P.
1 Pursuant to an agreement by the parties, the Court ordered that "[c]urrent Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction ('DDOC') Robert Coupe is substituted only as a defendant for former Commissioner Carl Danberg for the purpose of Plaintiffs' claims seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the DDOC. Defendant Danberg remains a defendant .with respect to the legal claims raised against him by Plaintiffs." (D.I. 88 at 2)
2 All claims against foimer Defendant Cathy Escberich were dismissed; she is no longer a party to this action. (See D.I. 88 at 1)
1

23, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 (D.I. 77 at 1) Plaintiffs also allege violations
of 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105. (See D.l. 64 at 20-21, 23; D.I. 83 at 2) Plaintiffs define the
proposed class as follows:
(a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any Delaware prison from October 1, 2008, forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released within 12 hours of the time that a court order has been forwarded to [Central Offender Records ("COR")] releasing the person, or is not released by midnight of the day his or her sentence has ended.
(D.I. 77 at 1) COR is a division of the DDOC that is "primarily responsible for calculating
offenders' sentences and release dates. This unit houses and controls all active and inactive
institutional and probation/parole offender records." (See D.I. 64 at 7) "[T]he general activities
at COR include calculating offender sentences and preparing releases as ordered by the Court."
(Id.)
Defendants are current or former officials at the DDOC or COR. Defendant Robert
Coupe is the current Commissioner of the DDOC. (D.I. 88 at 2) Defendant Carl C. Danberg was
Commissioner of the DDOC from the beginning of the alleged class period (October 1, 2008)
through "early 2013." (See D.l. 64 at 2; D.I. 75 at 4) Defendant Rebecca McBride is the current
Director of COR. (D.I. 75 at 4-5)
According to Plaintiffs, "[a]n inmate or detainee who has had his bail posted, had a judge
order unsecured bail, or had a judge order that they be released without bail, still cannot be
released until the judicial order has been processed by COR. Release orders from the Courts are
3 Plaintiffs seek class certification pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). (D.I. 84 at 57) Plaintiffs previously asserted claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments but subsequently dropped these claims. (See D.l. 83 at 2; 88 at 1)
2

transmitted to COR by fax machine." Subsequently, "a COR employee will fill out a check list
on a computer screen to determine whether any reason remains to continue to hold the offender
in custody." (Id.) If all of the checklist information is satisfactory, the COR
employee checks off the appropriate preprinted instructions to the receiving room staff to do such things as verify the identity of the inmate by photograph, return the inmate's property, and have the inmate sign any bail or bond papers that need to be signed prior to releasing the inmate. A similar checklist exists for an inmate or detainee for whom the reason for the incarceration has expired. However, that checklist also requires the COR employee to review the current active legal section to ensure the accuracy of sentence calculation and release date.
(Id. at 7-8)
Plaintiffs allege various deficiencies at COR, including (1) COR is only open during
certain hours (limiting the responsiveness of COR to releases received after-hours), (2) COR is
inadequately staffed, (3}COR employees "frequently den[y] receiving ... release orders,"
(4) COR employees are frequently unresponsive to phone calls by bail bondsmen, family and
friends of inmates, or even the inmates themselves, who are detained past their release dates or
past the dates when their sentences expire, and (5) COR frequently delays processing release
orders for more than 12 hours. (D.I. 64 at 8-11) Defendants dispute the aforementioned
allegations. (See generally D.l. 75, 81)
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Class Certification "Class certification is proper only 'if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,
that the prerequisites' of [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 23 are met." In re Hydrogen
3

Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. ofthe S. W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). Pursuant to Rule 23(a), the Court may certify a class only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), a party seeking class certification must satisfy one of Rule 23(b)'s additional requirements. See Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[P]arties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(l), (2), or (3) ...."). Plaintiffs here seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). (D.I. 84 at 4) Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is permissible where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the · class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is permissible where "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and ef:fi.Ciently adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). II. Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden of
4

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be - or, alternatively, is - genuinely disputed must be supported either by citing to "particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A) & (B). Ifthe moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; see also Podobnik v. US. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;" a factual dispute is genuine only where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the
5

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"). Thus, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find" for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION I. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
"Rule 23(a) ensures that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate. The Rule's four requirements - numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation- effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiffs claims." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule - that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are infact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions oflaw or fact, etc." Id. at 2551 (emphasis in original).
"The crux of this case is commonality - the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that 'there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class."' Id. at 2550-51 (quoting Rule 23(a)(2)). Plaintiffs' claims "must depend upon a common contention" which "must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination of its truth or falsity
6

will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Id. at 2551.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove sufficient commonality among the claims of their proposed class members. Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that at least some of the alleged over-detentions were caused by court errors or delays. (See D.I. 75 at 7-10; D.I. 77 at 17) For example, release papers for Plaintiff Joseph Roundtree were, according to Defendants (and without dispute from Plaintiffs), processed "promptly" upon receiving them, although "Family Court in New Castle may have delayed in sending" the release papers. (See D.I. 75 at 7)
Because Plaintiffs appear to concede that some of the alleged over-detentions were caused by court errors (see D.l. 71 at 7) (arguing court errors could be minimized, but not necessarily eliminated), rather than errors that could have been controlled or prevented by personnel at the DDOC, it would be improper to certify a class of every inmate who has been or will be over-detained for more than 12 hours past a release date or past midnight of their sentence terminations. Plaintiffs are suing only DDOC officials in this case. ·If the Court were to certify Plaintiffs' proposed class, and if the proposed class were to prevail on the merits, it would impute liability to Defendants for actions of non-parties - actions that Defendants had no control over. Thus, there is no "common contention" for Plaintiffs' proposed class, the truth or falsity of which would "resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one . stroke." Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (D.I. 58). In light of this ruling, the Court will deny as moot Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class
7

(D.I. 59). II. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Sovereign Immunity Defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants in their official capacities. (D.I. 75 at 14-15) The Eleventh Amendment forbids suits in federal courts against a state absent "unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.l (1985). Consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects state officials from liability if the suit is such that "the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); see also Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) ("[R]elief sought nominally against an [official] is in fact against the sovereign ifthe decree would operate against the latter."). Plaintiffs specified in their Amended Complaint that "[a]ll Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities." (See D.I. 64 at 23) (emphasis added) To the extent Plaintiffs are suing Defendants in their official capacities, the Court determines that such claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. B. Qualified Immunity Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs are barred from recovering damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (See D.I. 75 at 2)
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
8

understood that what he is doing violates that right. When properly applied, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants contend that there is no clearly established right to be released within a
specific period of time, let alone the 12-hour period proposed by Plaintiffs. (D.I. 75 at 16)
Plaintiffs respond by citing analysis from a District Court's opinion, Banks v. York, 515 F. Supp.
2d 89, 115 (D.D.C. 2007), for the proposition that "the law regarding over-detention and Section
1983 liability based on supervisory inaction was clearly established by early 2006" and that
"there is ... a substantial body of law recognizing that over-detention violates the Constitution." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; collecting cases involving over-detention).4
Because the Court will resolve Defendants' summary judgment motion on other grounds,
discussed infra, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiffs have proven that there is a
clearly established right for prisoners to be released within 12 hours of court orders or by
midnight on the date their sentences terminate.
C. Plaintiffs' Claims Under 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105
Plaintiffs allege violations of 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105. (See D.I. 64 at 20-21, 23; D.I. 83
at 2) These code sections address the duties of Delaware State Courts, not DDOC officials. See
4Banks resolved a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment, and did not address potential violations in light of a complete factual record. Moreover, the Court in Banks gave weight to the fact that the District of Columbia - the Defendant in the Banks case had a history of over-detention violations, including a series of "injunctions and settlement agreements." Id. at 115. Plaintiffs have pointed to no similar history in Delaware.
9

generally 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105; see also 11 Del. C. § 2101 ("Purposes of this chapter") ("It is the purpose of this chapter to reform the system of bail in the various courts ofthis State and to empower and equip the courts to utilize a system of personal recognizance or an unsecured personal appearance bond ... pending a final determination ofthe court . ...")(emphasis added). These Sections do not set out any duties ofDDOC officials. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs' claims under§§ 2104 or 2105, since Defendants are being sued in their capacities as DDOC officials.5
D. Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Claims Plaintiffs assert claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, Plaintiffs do not cite any case law for the proposition that they may bring claims under both Amendments challenging the same conduct. Plaintiffs' claims concern their conditions of confinement and alleged failures by Defendants to ensure timely release. As such, the claims fit squarely within the Third Circuit's over-detention and Eighth Amendment analysis. See generally Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs' proposed class, quoted above, includes prisoners who have been or will be over-detained in prison; it is not directed at individuals who have only suffered more generalized deprivations of liberty that might be addressed under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. In similar circumstances, the Third Circuit has applied the "more-specific-provision rule" to hold that Fourteenth Amendment claims need not be addressed separately from Eighth Amendment claims. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621F.3d249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Because these allegations fit squarely within the Eighth
5 Danberg is currently a judge on the Delaware Court of Common Pleas, a position he has held since early 2013. (See D.l. 75 at 4)
10

Amendment's prohibition on cruel and Uill;lSual punishment, we hold that the
more-specific-provision rule forecloses [Plaintiff]'s substantive due process claims."). For the
foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect
to Plaintiffs' Fo{irteenth Amendment claims.6
E. Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment Claims
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against every person who, under color of state
law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected," another person to a deprivation of a federally protected
right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well-recognized that. government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory ofrespondeat superior. Rather, state actors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct. With this principle in mind, we have previously identified two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates. First, liability may attach if they, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm. Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under§ 1983 ifhe or she participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate' s unconstitutional conduct. "Failure to" claims - failure to train, failure to discipline, or, as is the case here, failure to supervise are generally considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability.
6 Plaintiffs contend that "[b]y continuing to allow DDOC employees, including COR employees[,] to refuse to respond to inmate requests for paperwork concerning their over-detention, Defendants have denied, and continue to deny[,] Plaintiffs' access to the courts and to deny [sic] Plaintiffs' due process, in violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." (D.I. 64 at 25) The Court finds that, while this may appear to be a standalone claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs' allegations clearly focus on prisoners who have been over-detained, regardless of why such prisoners were over-detained (for example, because of insufficient responsiveness to inmate requests). Again, then, by application of the more-specific-provision rule, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims.
11

Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2014) rev 'don other grounds sub nom..Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' conduct falls under the first of the abovementioned categories ofliability (policy or practice liability). (See generally D.l. 64) Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants are liable under the second category.
Under the applicable Eighth Amendment analysis, Plaintiffs' burden is to demonstrate that "(l) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight; and (3) a causal connection. between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention." Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 25, 2010).
. With respect to the first requirement from Montanez, the Court cannot say at this time that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants had knowledge of the over-detention problem and the risk that unwarranted punishment was being inflicted. There are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Defendants were aware of what might be found to be general disorganization and incompetence of DDOC personnel and whether Defendants were aware of a significant risk that unwarranted punishment might be inflicted on prisoners. Thus, even though Plaintiffs have failed to tie Defendants' awareness of these problems to any specific policies or actions of Defendants, Plaintiffs have adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs have met the first requirement.
Regarding the second requirement from Montanez - deliberate indifference - the Court
12

determines that no reasonable factfinder could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of Plaintiffs' over-detention. Plaintiffs make a series of vague allegations against Danberg7 and McBride, arguing that each of them knew about the general problem of overdetention but did nothing about it. (See generally D.I. 64 at 18-20, 22-26) Even assuming that existing policies at the DDOC created an unreasonable risk of Eighth Amendment injury,· there is insufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants were indifferent.to that risk. To the contrary, the record shows that each of the Defendants worked to improve the DDOC and COR to address over-detention issues.
As noted in Plaintiffs' own submissions, former Commissioner Danberg was praised as being "the first member of [former Governor] Minner[' s] administration to ever step up and accept responsibility for a problem [related to erroneous prisoner releases], acknowledging it exists and telling us what he is trying to do to fix it." (D.I. 61-3 at PA184) The undisputed record shows that Danberg created COR with an eye toward improving prisoner release processes:
[Danberg] coordinated efforts with the bureau chief and Cathy Escherich and the union relating to_ the business change, because it was a huge business change for the department in the centralization ofrecords. We met with legislators in discussion with the centralization of records, chiefjustices from the different courts. So he played a pretty active role in forming discussions and communications and coordinating those through the union, which central offender records staff are a part of.
7For purposes of Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, the Court will interpret the general allegations against Danberg discussed hereinafter as being directed to Coupe, who is the current Commissioner of the DDOC. (See D.I. 88 at 2)
13

The centralization of records was initiated in order to centralize our business practices so that we were uniform and consistent in getting the calculations done, releases done, the legal processes done, and that the actual process procedure would be handled in a uniform manner. (See McBride Deposition, D.I. 60-1 at 246-47) These are not the actions of someone who is "deliberately indifferent" to a problem. On the record before the Court, one can only conclude that Danberg worked to address over-detention issues, and that he was not deliberately indifferent to them. Likewise, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence indicating that McBride is or was deliberately indifferent to the over-detention problem. As she stated at her deposition - and without dispute from Plaintiffs - COR processes between 16,000 and 18,000 releases a year. (D.I. 60-1 at 249) "The administration of a system of punishment entails an unavoidable risk of error. In the case of punishment through imprisonment, those errors may result in harms to inmates. Elimination of the risk of error in many instances would be either literally impossible or unfeasible because prohibitively costly." Sample, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989). Given the number ofreleases handled by COR each year, it is unsurprising (though of course unfortunate) that errors occur and that prisoners are sometimes over-detained. Evidence that some incidents of over-detention occurred is not sufficient, by itself, to show that McBride was deliberately indifferent to such incidents. To the contrary, McBride demonstrated throughout her deposition that she was intimately familiar with COR's procedures, including training procedures intended to improve handling of prisoner releases, and she actively worked to improve processes at COR to prevent and address problems of over-detention. (See, e.g., D.I. 60-1 at 239, 248-52) Regarding current Commissioner Coupe, Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence whatsoever
I
14

suggesting that he is or was deliberat~ly indifferent to the over-detention problem. In fact, the only reference to Coupe in Plaintiffs' summary judgment brief shows that Coupe was not deliberately indifferent to the over-detention problem. (See D.I. 77 at 13) ("In 2013, Bureau Chief Kim Wheatley was pushed by Commissioner Coupe to have COR form a 'special unit' to speed up the daily bail releases.") As with the other Defendants, the record supports only a finding that Coupe was trying to improve the DDOC, and COR specifically. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants in light of Plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence of deliberate indifference.
Regarding the third requirement from Montanez, and as an independent basis for granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pointed to no causal connection between any actions or policies attributable to Defendants and the harm suffered by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs point to COR's hours of operation (see D.I. 77 at 2), general unresponsiveness to requests on behalf of inmates (see id. at 4), and alleged understaffing (see id. at 5), but Plaintiffs make no attempt to connect any of these alleged deficiencies to Plaintiffs' specific harm or even Defendants' conduct or policies. As such, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find a causal connection between Defendants' actions or policies and Plaintiffs' harm.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims.
15

CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (D.I. 58), deny as moot Defendants' Motion to Strike (D.I. 59), and grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 74). An appropriate Order follows.
16

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

PHILIP A. WHARTON, JOSEPH ROUNDTREE, JAMES MADDOX, and LAMAR CORREA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT COUPE, CARL C. DANBERG, and REBECCA MCBRIDE,
Defendants.

C.A. No. 12-1240-LPS

MEMORANDUM ORDER At Wilmington this 21st day of March, 2016:

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox, and Lamar Correa's ("Plaintiffs") Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.I. 94) ("Motion") For the reasons below, the Motion is

DENIED . 1. Plaintiffs are individuals who spent time in the custody of the Delaware Department
of Correction ("DDOC"). (See D.I. 90 at 1) Defendants are current or former officials at the DDOC. (Id. at 2) Plaintiffs accused Defendants of violating Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by way of Defendants' "deliberate indifference to the effect of the DDOC practice of over-detention on the rights of inmates." (Id. at 1-2) Plaintiffs moved for certification of a class of current and former inmates alleged to have been over-detained. (Id. at 2) Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims. (See generally D.I. 74, 75 , 81) The Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendants as to all claims' and denied Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. (See generally D.l. 90)
2. " [A] judgment may be altered or amended ifthe party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3 ) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice." Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration should not be used to reargue issues that the Court has already considered and decided. See Brambles USA Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del. 1990).
3. Plaintiffs have wholly failed to address the legal standard of Rule 59 and have pointed to no change in controlling law, new evidence, error oflaw or fact, or manifest injustice that would support their Motion. "The scope of a motion for reconsideration .. . is extremely limited. Such motions are not to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case; rather, they may be used only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Blystone v. Horn , 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). Because Plaintiffs' Motion appears to be an attempt to rehash arguments already made at summary judgment, in light of the same record that existed at
HO~~:l~~ summary judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion is denied. U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
1In a status report, Plaintiffs stated their belief that "requests for injunctive relief were not addressed" by the Court' s summary judgment Order. This is incorrect. As noted by Defendants (see D.I. 96 at 1 n.1 ), the Court rejected all of Plaintiffs' claims, including those for injunctive relief, against Defendants Rebecca McBride and Robert Coupe, the only Defendants still working at the DDOC. (See D.I. 90 at 15-16) (noting lack of evidence of McBride ' s deliberate indifference and lack of evidence against Coupe)
2

 
 Case: 1:12-cv-1240 As of: 10/27/2017 09:34 AM EDT 1 of 11
CLOSED,PaperDocuments,MEDIATION−CJB
U.S. District Court District of Delaware (Wilmington) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:12−cv−01240−LPS

Wharton et al v. Danberg et al Assigned to: Judge Leonard P. Stark Case in other court: Third Circuit, 19−01988 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff Philip A. Wharton
Plaintiff Joseph Roundtree
Plaintiff James Maddox

Date Filed: 10/01/2012 Date Terminated: 04/11/2016 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner: Prison Conditions Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Stephen A. Hampton Grady & Hampton 6 North Bradford Street Dover, DE 19904 (302) 678−1265 Email: sahampton@gradyhampton.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth C. Fillingame Grady & Hampton 6 North Bradford Street Dover, DE 19904 302−678−1265 Email: efillingame@gradyhampton.com TERMINATED: 02/10/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Grady Grady & Hampton 6 North Bradford Street Dover, DE 19904 (302) 678−1265 Fax: 3026783544 Email: jgrady@gradyhampton.com TERMINATED: 01/29/2014
represented by Stephen A. Hampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth C. Fillingame (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John S. Grady (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2014
represented by Stephen A. Hampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth C. Fillingame

Case: 1:12-cv-1240 As of: 10/27/2017 09:34 AM EDT 2 of 11

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Grady (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2014

Plaintiff Lamar Correa

represented by Stephen A. Hampton (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth C. Fillingame (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/10/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John S. Grady (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/29/2014

V. Defendant Carl C. Danberg

represented by Michael F. McTaggart Department of Justice State of Delaware 820 N. French Street, 8th Floor Carvel Office Building Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 577−8993 Fax: (302) 577−6630 Email: Michael.McTaggart@state.de.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dennis Spivack Department of Justice 820 N. French Street, 6th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 577−8449 Fax: 302−577−6630 Email: dennis.spivack@state.de.us TERMINATED: 02/09/2015
Katisha D. Fortune ADDRESS EXPIRED / UNKNOWN UNDELIVERABLE EMAIL (479) 277−6751 TERMINATED: 04/30/2013
Marc P. Niedzielski Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building 820 North French Street Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 577−8400 TERMINATED: 01/02/2014
Scott W. Perkins Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP

Case: 1:12-cv-1240 As of: 10/27/2017 09:34 AM EDT 3 of 11

1201 N. Market Street, Suite 2300 P.O. Box 1266 Wilmington, DE 19899 302−421−3681 Email: sperkins@saul.com TERMINATED: 11/20/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Cathy Escherich TERMINATED: 07/28/2015

represented by Michael F. McTaggart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dennis Spivack (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2015

Katisha D. Fortune (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/30/2013

Marc P. Niedzielski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/2014

Scott W. Perkins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Rebecca McBride

represented by Michael F. McTaggart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dennis Spivack (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/09/2015

Katisha D. Fortune (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/30/2013

Marc P. Niedzielski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/2014

Scott W. Perkins (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/20/2015 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Coupe

represented by Michael F. McTaggart (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Intervenor

Case: 1:12-cv-1240 As of: 10/27/2017 09:34 AM EDT 4 of 11
Joseph M. Walls SBI #107897 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977

Date Filed 10/01/2012
10/01/2012 10/02/2012 10/10/2012 10/23/2012 11/14/2012 11/14/2012 11/14/2012 11/20/2012 11/27/2012 11/28/2012 12/04/2012 12/14/2012
12/20/2012 12/20/2012
12/20/2012
12/21/2012

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed with Jury Demand against Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride − Magistrate Consent Notice to Pltf. ( Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 0311−1148445.) − filed by Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox, Lamar Correa. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(eam) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
2 Notice, Consent and Referral forms re: U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction (eam) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
No Summons Issued (eam) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
Case Assigned to Judge Leonard P. Stark. Please include the initials of the Judge (LPS) after the case number on all documents filed. (rjb) (Entered: 10/10/2012)
Summons Issued with Magistrate Consent Notice attached as to Carl C. Danberg on 10/23/2012; Cathy Escherich on 10/23/2012; Rebecca McBride on 10/23/2012. (rwc) (Entered: 10/23/2012)
3 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Philip A. Wharton. Carl C. Danberg served on 11/1/2012, answer due 11/26/2012. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Philip A. Wharton. Cathy Escherich served on 11/3/2012, answer due 11/26/2012. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Philip A. Wharton. Rebecca McBride served on 11/1/2012, answer due 11/26/2012. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
6 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
7 MOTION for Pro Hac Vice Appearance of Attorney William Claiborne − filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
SO ORDERED, re 7 MOTION for Pro Hac Vice Appearance of Attorney William Claiborne filed by Philip A. Wharton. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 11/28/12. (ntl) (Entered: 11/28/2012)
8 MOTION to Intervene − filed by Joseph M. Walls. (dzb, ) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
9 ORAL ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall confer regarding proposed dates in the scheduling order and shall submit a proposal to the Court no later than January 4, 2013. The parties are to review the Court's form scheduling order, which is posted at http://www.ded.uscourts.gov (see Chambers, Judge Stark, Forms). ORDERED by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 12/14/12.(ntl) (Entered: 12/14/2012)
10 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 8 MOTION to Intervene − filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
11 PROPOSED ORDER Grant Plaintiffs' Motion for an Enlargement of Time to File their Response to the Motion to Intervene re 10 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 8 MOTION to Intervene by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Plaintiffs' Motion for an Enlargement of Time to File their Response to the Motion to Intervene by Philip A. Wharton re 10 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 8 MOTION to Intervene (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 12/20/2012)
13 Letter to The Honorable Leonard P. Stark from Deputy Attorney General Marc P. Niedzielski regarding plaintiff's motion for extension of time. (Niedzielski, Marc)

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12/21/2012
12/27/2012
01/04/2013 01/04/2013 01/04/2013 01/10/2013 01/16/2013 01/18/2013 01/24/2013
01/24/2013 02/07/2013 02/07/2013 02/15/2013 03/05/2013 03/08/2013 03/27/2013 04/09/2013 04/22/2013 04/30/2013

(Entered: 12/21/2012)
SO ORDERED, re 10 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 8 MOTION to Intervene filed by Philip A. Wharton, 11 Proposed Order, filed by Philip A. Wharton. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 12/21/12. (ntl) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
14 ORAL ORDER by Judge Leonard P. Stark: Pursuant to Defendants' letter of December 21, 2012 (D.I. 13 ), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' response to the Motion to Intervene (D.I. 8 ) is due on or before January 23, 2013.(rpg) (Entered: 12/27/2012)
15 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael F. McTaggart on behalf of Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride (McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Katisha D. Fortune on behalf of Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride (Fortune, Katisha) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
17 PROPOSED ORDER Scheduling by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 01/04/2013)
18 NOTICE of Appearance by Dennis Spivack on behalf of Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride (Spivack, Dennis) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
19 RESPONSE to Motion re 8 MOTION to Intervene filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Fortune, Katisha) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
20 RESPONSE to Motion re 8 MOTION to Intervene filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 01/18/2013)
21 SCHEDULING ORDER: Case referred to the Magistrate Judge for the purpose of exploring ADR. Joinder of Parties due by 12/1/2013. Amended Pleadings due by 12/1/2013. Discovery due by 8/1/2014. Status Report due by 5/20/2013. Dispositive Motions due by 2/10/2014. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 1/24/13. (ntl) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke for Mediation. (dlk) (Entered: 01/30/2013)
22 REPLY BRIEF − re 8 MOTION to Intervene filed by Joseph M. Walls. (mdb) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
23 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories Directed to Defendants, and Plaintiff's 1st Request for Production Directed to Defendants by Philip A. Wharton.(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
24 ORDER Setting Teleconference: A Telephone Conference is set for 3/18/2013 at 10:45 AM before Judge Christopher J. Burke to discuss ADR. Signed by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 2/15/2013. (dlk) (Entered: 02/15/2013)
25 NOTICE OF SERVICE of State Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and State Defendants' First Request for Production by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
26 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by Philip A. Wharton (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 03/08/2013)
27 ORDER Setting Teleconference: A Telephone Conference is set for 9/23/2013 at 11:00 AM before Judge Christopher J. Burke. Signed by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 3/27/2013. (dlk) (Entered: 03/27/2013)
28 Addendum to Reply Brief 22 − filed by Joseph M. Walls. Re 8 MOTION to Intervene. (cla, ) (Entered: 04/09/2013)
29 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' 1st Request for Production by Philip A. Wharton.(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
30 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Counsel Katisha D. Fortune by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride (Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 04/30/2013)

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05/08/2013 05/09/2013 05/10/2013
05/20/2013 07/12/2013
07/26/2013
08/15/2013 08/27/2013 08/27/2013 08/28/2013 08/28/2013 09/09/2013 09/20/2013 10/17/2013
12/27/2013

31 PROPOSED ORDER to require that certain discovery be treated as confidential by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 05/08/2013)
SO ORDERED, re 31 STIPULATION AND ORDER AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 5/9/13. (ntl) (Entered: 05/09/2013)
32 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' Response to 1st Set of Interrogatories and Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' first Request for Production re 23 Notice of Service by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. Related document: 23 Notice of Service filed by Philip A. Wharton.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 05/10/2013)
33 Interim STATUS REPORT by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 05/20/2013)
34 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' First Supplemental Response to Question 3 of Plaintiffs' First Set of Request for Production of Documents (Bates Numbered Guinn 1 − 1619 and King 1 − 900) re 23 Notice of Service, 32 Notice of Service, by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. Related document: 23 Notice of Service filed by Philip A. Wharton, 32 Notice of Service, filed by Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride, Carl C. Danberg.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
35 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' Second Supplemental Response to Question 3 of Plaintiffs' First Set of Request for Production of Documents re 23 Notice of Service, 34 Notice of Service, 32 Notice of Service, by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. Related document: 23 Notice of Service filed by Philip A. Wharton, 34 Notice of Service, filed by Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride, Carl C. Danberg, 32 Notice of Service, filed by Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride, Carl C. Danberg.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 07/26/2013)
36 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment − filed by Joseph M. Walls. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Letter)(cla, ) (Entered: 08/15/2013)
37 PROPOSED ORDER Amend Scheduling order by Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
38 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' Third Supplemental Response to Question 3 of Plaintiffs' First Set of Request of Production of Documents re 23 Notice of Service by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. Related document: 23 Notice of Service filed by Philip A. Wharton.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 08/27/2013)
SO ORDERED, re 37 STIPULATED AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER −− Discovery due by 2/3/2014, Dispositive Motions due by 8/11/2014. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 8/28/13. (ntl) (Entered: 08/28/2013)
39 RESPONSE to Motion re 36 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 08/28/2013)
40 RESPONSE to Motion re 36 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 09/09/2013)
ORAL ORDER: The Telephone Conference set for 9/23/2013 at 11:00 AM before Judge Christopher J. Burke has been cancelled and will be rescheduled for a date to be determined. Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 9/20/2013. (dlk) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
41 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' Foruth Supplemental Response to Question 3 of Plaintiffs' First Set of Request for Production of Documents (Bates Numbered Hendricks 1−70 and Page 1−31) re 23 Notice of Service, 32 Notice of Service, by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. Related document: 23 Notice of Service filed by Philip A. Wharton, 32 Notice of Service, filed by Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride, Carl C. Danberg.(Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
42 MOTION for Marc P. Niedzielski to Withdraw as Attorney − filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Niedzielski, Marc) (Entered: 12/27/2013)

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01/29/2014 01/29/2014 02/03/2014
03/06/2014 03/06/2014 03/14/2014 03/14/2014 03/19/2014 05/28/2014
06/02/2014 08/18/2014 08/18/2014 08/25/2014 08/25/2014 08/25/2014 09/03/2014 09/29/2014
10/01/2014 10/03/2014 10/03/2014

43 Second MOTION for Scheduling Order − filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
44 NOTICE of Substitution of Counsel by Philip A. Wharton (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 01/29/2014)
SO ORDERED, re 43 Second Stipulated Amended Scheduling Order −− Amended Pleadings due by 1/2/2015. Discovery due by 9/3/2014. Joinder of Parties due by 1/2/2015. Dispositive Motions due by 3/11/2015. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 2/3/14. (ntl) (Entered: 02/03/2014)
45 ORDER Setting Teleconference: A Telephone Conference is set for 3/17/2014 at 10:00 AM before Judge Christopher J. Burke. Signed by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 3/5/214. (dlk) Modified on 3/6/2014 (dlk). (Entered: 03/06/2014)
CORRECTING ENTRY: The entry made at D.I. 45 has been corrected to reflect the time for the T/C is 10:00 a.m. not 10:15 a.m. (dlk) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
46 NOTICE of Appearance by Scott W. Perkins on behalf of Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
CORRECTING ENTRY: D.I. 47 deleted as duplicative of D.I. 46. (ntl) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
47 ORDER Setting Teleconference: A Telephone Conference is set for 6/2/2014 at 10:00 AM before Judge Christopher J. Burke. Signed by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 3/19/2014. (dlk) (Entered: 03/19/2014)
48 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' Fifth Supplemental Response to Question 3 of Plaintiffs' First Set of Request for Production of Documents re 23 Notice of Service filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.(McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
49 MOTION to Amend/Correct Complaint − filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Certificate of Service, # 3 Exhibit Amended complaint)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
50 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Rebecca McBride on 9/3/14 filed by Philip A. Wharton.(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
51 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Kim Wheatley on 9/3/14 filed by Philip A. Wharton.(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
52 NOTICE OF SERVICE of State Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories and State Defendants' Second Request for Production Directed to Plaintiffs filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.(Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
53 OBJECTIONS by Rebecca McBride to 50 Notice to Take Deposition . (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
54 OBJECTIONS by kimberly wheatley to 51 Notice to Take Deposition . (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
55 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Plaintiffs' 2nd Request for Production Directed at Defendant filed by Philip A. Wharton.(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
56 MEMORANDUM ORDER re 36 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Joseph M. Walls is DENIED; 8 MOTION to Intervene filed by Joseph M. Walls is DENIED; 49 MOTION for Leave to Amend filed by Philip A. Wharton is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/29/14. (ntl) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
57 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Second Request for Production filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.(McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
58 MOTION to Certify Class − filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed order, # 2 Notice of Class Action)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
59 MOTION to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class − filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of

Case: 1:12-cv-1240 As of: 10/27/2017 09:34 AM EDT 8 of 11

10/03/2014 10/03/2014
10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/07/2014 10/09/2014 10/09/2014 10/15/2014
10/16/2014 10/27/2014 10/27/2014 10/29/2014 11/07/2014 11/13/2014 02/09/2015 02/10/2015

Service)(Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
60 [SEALED] EXHIBIT re 59 MOTION to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Part 2, # 2 Exhibit A Part 3, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
61 [SEALED] OPENING BRIEF in Support re 58 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Philip A. Wharton.Answering Brief/Response due date per Local Rules is 10/20/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Appendix, # 3 Appendix, # 4 Appendix, # 5 Appendix, # 6 Appendix, # 7 Appendix, # 8 Appendix, # 9 Appendix, # 10 Appendix, # 11 Appendix)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
62 REDACTED VERSION of 60 Exhibit to a Document, Exhibit A to The Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
63 Joint STATUS REPORT by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
64 [SEALED] AMENDED DOCUMENT by Philip A. Wharton. Amended Complaint. (Attachments: # 1 certificate of service)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
65 NOTICE OF SERVICE of Plaintiffs Answers to State Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories and Plaintiffs' Responses to State Defendants' Second Request for Production filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton.(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
66 REDACTED VERSION Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of their Motion for Class Certification by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Appendix)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/09/2014)
67 STIPULATION Regarding Briefing Schedule for Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Defendants' Motion to To Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class re 59 MOTION to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class, 58 MOTION to Certify Class by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 10/15/2014)
SO ORDERED, re 67 Stipulation Regarding Briefing Schedule for motion for class certification and motion to strike certain members of the purported class. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 10/16/14. (ntl) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
68 [SEALED] ANSWERING BRIEF in Opposition re 58 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.Reply Brief due date per Local Rules is 11/6/2014. (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
69 [SEALED] RESPONSE to Motion re 59 MOTION to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Certificate of Service)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
70 REDACTED VERSION of 68 Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 10/29/2014)
CORRECTING ENTRY: D.I. 71 and D.I. 72 were removed from the docket (filed in error). Counsel is advised to re−file the document as a Stipulation. (ntl) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
71 REPLY BRIEF re 58 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
72 NOTICE requesting Clerk to remove Dennis Spivack as co−counsel. Reason for request: Mr. Spivack is no longer associated with the Delaware Department of Justice. (McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
73 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by Philip A. Wharton (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 02/10/2015)

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03/11/2015 03/11/2015 03/27/2015 03/31/2015 04/27/2015 05/04/2015 05/04/2015
05/04/2015 05/04/2015 05/19/2015 06/08/2015
06/18/2015

74 MOTION for Summary Judgment − filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
75 [SEALED] OPENING BRIEF in Support re 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.Answering Brief/Response due date per Local Rules is 3/30/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Part 1, # 2 Exhibit A Part 2, # 3 Exhibit A Part 3, # 4 Certificate of Service)(Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
76 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME Answering Brief and Reply Brief to Motion for Summary Judgment to April 28 and May 19 − filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
SO ORDERED, re 76 STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME Answering Brief and Reply Brief to Motion for Summary Judgment to April 28 and May 19 filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/31/15. (ntl) (Entered: 03/31/2015)
77 ANSWERING BRIEF in Opposition re 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton.Reply Brief due date per Local Rules is 5/7/2015. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 04/27/2015)
CORRECTING ENTRY: D.I. 78 was deleted and will be refiled as a sealed document. (ntl) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
78 [SEALED] APPENDIX re 77 Answering Brief in Opposition, CORRECTING ENTRY: by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Vol 1 pt B, # 2 Appendix Vol 1 pt C, # 3 Appendix Vol 1 pt D, # 4 Appendix Vol 1 pt E, # 5 Appendix Vol 1 pt F, # 6 Appendix Vol 2 pt A, # 7 Appendix Vol 2 pt B, # 8 Appendix Vol 2 pt C, # 9 Appendix Vol 2 pt D, # 10 Appendix Vol 2 pt E, # 11 Appendix Vol 2 pt F)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
79 REDACTED VERSION of 77 Answering Brief in Opposition, 78 Appendix, CORRECTING ENTRY: by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
80 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Appendix to Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton re 78 Appendix, (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 05/04/2015)
81 REPLY BRIEF re 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Perkins, Scott) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
82 ORAL ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall submit, by June 18, 2015, a chart identifying, for each purported class member Plaintiffs wish the Court to consider in ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (D.I. 58), (a) the Defendant(s) against whom each purported class member could assert a claim, (b) the legal theory (or theories) (i.e., Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment(s)) under which each purported class member seeks relief, and (c) citations to specific facts (and specific page numbers in the record) that Plaintiffs intend to rely upon for support of each legal theory (or theories). Plaintiffs shall further submit, by June 25, 2015, a brief, no longer than ten (10) pages, addressing which subsection(s) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (i.e., subsection(s) 1, 2, and/or 3) under which Plaintiffs seek class certification (whether subsections 2 and 3, as in the Amended Complaint, or subsections 1 and 2, as in Plaintiffs' briefing for their motion for class certification) and further addressing the applicability, if any, of the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Barkes, No. 14−939 (June 1, 2015). Defendants may submit a brief, no longer than ten (10) pages, in response to Plaintiffs' brief, due no later than July 2, 2015. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will hold a status teleconference on July 20 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' counsel shall initiate the call to 302−573−4573. ORDERED by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 6/8/15. (ntl) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
83 CLAIM Construction Chart by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 06/18/2015)

Case: 1:12-cv-1240 As of: 10/27/2017 09:34 AM EDT 10 of 11

06/25/2015 07/02/2015
07/02/2015 07/02/2015
07/20/2015 07/24/2015 07/28/2015 09/28/2015 09/30/2015 09/30/2015 10/23/2015
10/26/2015 10/28/2015 10/28/2015
11/10/2015 11/20/2015

84 RESPONSE to Order re 82 Order Setting Teleconference,,,,,, filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 06/25/2015)
85 [SEALED] ANSWERING BRIEF in Opposition re 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendants' Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Their Opposition to Class Certification and in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride.Reply Brief due date per Local Rules is 7/13/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service)(McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
CORRECTING ENTRY: item filed as D.I. 86 deleted per counsel's request on 7/2/2015. Counsel to re−file corrected document. (rpg) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
86 REDACTED VERSION of 85 Answering Brief in Opposition, Defendants' Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Their Opposition to Class Certification and in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment − Redacted in Its Entirety by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Certificate of Service)(McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Leonard P. Stark − Telephone Conference held on 7/20/2015. (Court Reporter Stacy Ingram (Hawkins Rptg.)) (ntl) (Entered: 07/20/2015)
87 PROPOSED ORDER Regarding Legal Issues Raised at Court's July 20, 2015 Teleconference re Telephone Conference by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 07/24/2015)
88 ORDER Regarding Legal Issues Raised at Court's July 20, 2015 Teleconference. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 7/28/15. (ntl) (Entered: 07/28/2015)
89 MOTION to Protect Exhibits and Court Filings − filed by Joseph M. Walls. (cna) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
90 MEMORANDUM OPINION re pending motions. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/30/15. (ntl) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
91 ORDER re 90 Memorandum Opinion −− 58 MOTION to Certify Class is DENIED; 59 MOTION to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class is DENIED as moot; 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/30/15. (ntl) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
92 ORAL ORDER: On September 30, 2015, the Court ordered the parties to "meet and confer and submit a joint status report, including their proposal(s) for further proceedings and/or order(s), if any, no later than October 9, 2015." As it appears that the parties have failed to submit a joint status report, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall submit a joint status report by October 27, 2015. ORDERED by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 10/23/15. (ntl) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
93 Joint STATUS REPORT by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
94 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure − filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
95 OPENING BRIEF in Support re 94 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton.Answering Brief/Response due date per Local Rules is 11/16/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
96 RESPONSE to Motion re 94 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Robert Coupe, Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (McTaggart, Michael) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
97 MOTION for Scott W. Perkins to Withdraw as Attorney − filed by Carl C. Danberg, Cathy Escherich, Rebecca McBride. (Perkins, Scott) (Main Document 97 replaced on

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11/24/2015) (ntl). (Entered: 11/20/2015)
CORRECTING ENTRY: Correct pdf document added to D.I. 97 . (ntl) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
98 MEMORANDUM ORDER Denying 94 MOTION to Alter Judgment or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/21/16. (ntl) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
CASE CLOSED (ntl) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
99 NOTICE OF APPEAL of 98 Memorandum and Order, 91 Order, . Appeal filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Joseph Roundtree, Philip A. Wharton. (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
APPEAL − Credit Card Payment of $505.00 received re 99 Notice of Appeal (Third Circuit) filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree. ( Filing fee $505, receipt number 0311−1916461.) (Hampton, Stephen) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
100 NOTICE of Docketing Record on Appeal from USCA for the Third Circuit re 99 Notice of Appeal (Third Circuit) filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree. USCA Case Number 19−1988. USCA Case Manager: Carmella (DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED AND CAN ONLY BE VIEWED BY COURT STAFF)(cw,) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
101 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Philip A. Wharton −− TRANSCRIPT NOT NEEDED. (ntl) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
102 Letter to Judge Stark from Joseph Walls regarding request for copywork. (jcs) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
Remark : Sent Joseph Walls copies of D.I. 56 , 90 , and 91 as requested per D.I. 102 . (jcs) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
103 MANDATE of USCA as to 99 Notice of Appeal (Third Circuit) filed by Lamar Correa, James Maddox, Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree. USCA Decision: Affirmed.(Attachments:#(1)Opinion)(cw,) (Entered: 05/11/2017)