Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 467 Filed 03/22/13 Page 1 of 56

1 Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. James E. Gore
2 Williamson Law Firm, LLC 3 218 Delaware St. Suite 207
Kansas City, MO 64105 4 Phone: (816) 256-4150
Fax: (913) 535-0736
5

6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
7

8 PERRY APSLEY, BOB BAILEY, JACOB ) Case No.: 05-1368

9

BAKK, GARY BALL, CHARLES L. BEAN ) JR., PEGGY S. BELL, THOMAS BELTON, ) FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

10 VERNON L. BENTLEY, MELONDA BIRCHER, JERRY L. BRANSTETTER,
11 MICHAEL E. BURGARDT, ROCKY R.

) ) ) )

BURRIS, FRANK CASH, BETTY

)

12 CHILDERS, REDELL COLEMAN, LARRY )

13

E. COMBS, HARVEY J. CONYAC, LOREN ) W. COX, PHYLLIS A. COX, LINDA L. )

14 DEZARN, WILLIAM D. DOSHIER, CHARLES D. ELDER, ALAN S.

) )

15

EPPERSON, LLOYD C. FANSLER, JERALD J. GILBERT, CHIP GILCHRIST

II,

) ) )

16 RICHARD GOTTHARD, BRIAN GROOM, )

JAMES HAMMON, JANET S. HANSEN, 17 DENISE A. HARRIS, ALLEN C.

) )

18

HATCHER, RON W. HENDERSHOT,

)

VERNA J. HOUSTON, LARRY W. JAMES, )

19

DALE C. JAYNE JR., GARY L. JOHNSON, MELVYN J. JOHNSON, DONALD R.

) ) )

20 JONES, RALPH O. KEENER, DANNY R. )

21

KENNEDY, MELVIN E. KERNS, GORDON ) B. KINKEAD, JIMMY LE, CARLTON D. )

22 LEE, STEPHEN L. LINCK, JERRY L. MCKINNEY, FREDDY J. MCCOLPIN,

) )

23

MARK MCCURDY, CATHY J. MUNSELL, ) JAN W. MURRAY, STEVEN NGO, HUYEN )

24 T. NGUYEN, LUYEN D. NGUYEN,

) )

BARBARA A. ODOM, KENT W. OWEN, 25 LOWANDA J. PATTON, PAUL D. PETE,

) )

26

BA PHAM, BRENT L. POPP, JAMES E. PORTER, JAY E. POWELL, WILLARD J.

) )

RATCHFORD, VERONICA RIOS,

)

-1FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 467 Filed 03/22/13 Page 2 of 56

1 RICHARD D. ROEDER, ALBERT

)

SCHLOETZER, JOSEPH E. SCHROEDER, )

2 STEVEN M. SCHWIND, WILLIAM H.

)

3 SETCHELL, JAMES C. SHEPPARD, TEDDY E. SILL, SAMMY J. SMITH,
4 SHARON A. SOUTHERN, LINDA C.

) ) ) )

SPARRER, CHARLES STARK, DONALD )

5 E. TITUS, ABEL L. VASQUEZ, HENRY F. )

VICTOR, JAMES R. WALLACE, JIMMY )

6 WALLACE, RICHARD A. WALLIN,

)

MICHAEL B. WELSH, CAROLYN Y.

)

7 WHEATON, SYLVESTER WILLIAMS II, )

8 JANET M. WILSON, WALTER WOODS, AND BETTY R. YOUNG,

) ) )

9

)

Plaintiffs,

)

10

)

vs.

)

11

)

THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT

)

12 AEROSYSTEMS,

)

)

13

Defendants.

)

)

14

)

)

15

)

16

17

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

18

COMES NOW Plaintiffs individually by and through their counsel, Lawrence W.

19 Williamson, Jr. and James E Gore of Williamson Law Firm, LLC, and for their cause of action

20 against Defendants, allege and state as follows:

21

22

23

24

25

26

-2FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1

I. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2

1.

Each Plaintiff was a member of a properly certified class. As such, the plaintiffs

3 seek injunctive relief and equitable relief in this matter.

4

2.

Boeing and Spirit kept decisions a secret. The defendants kept the names of the

5 subsidiaries secret until after the decisions were made against the plaintiffs. In furtherance of

6 these secrets, Boeing provided a code name “Project Lloyd.” Only certain personnel were

7 provided access to the folders under this database. This database was at least 7.59 MB in size.

8 The defendants have also kept the true relationship between Boeing, Onex, Midwestern, and

9 Spirit AeroSystems a secret.

10

3.

One act that was no secret was the termination of the plaintiffs. Instead of

11 informing the employees when decisions were made, it tortured employees and put families and

12 individuals through unexplainable feelings while they waited to see if they would receive a

13 “pink slip.” In announcing these terminations, the employees of Boeing were entitled to more

14 respect than the insult of throwing “insult slips” into the driveways of the individuals who

15 helped Boeing prosper throughout the years. The humiliation for workers did not end here.

16 Nigel Wright, of Onex, acting on behalf of Spirit, publicly stated that the workers who were not

17 offered positions were individuals with bad attitudes, troublemakers, and/or deadbeats. Some

18 employees were even escorted off of the premises as if they were common criminals.

19

4.

How much less dignity can someone have, than for a delivery truck to throw an

20 envelope out onto the driveway? Each plaintiff deserved much more than that and at the very

21
least deserved to know “why” they were terminated. In failing to adequately protect the rights

22
of the older workers, the defendants have injured not only these employees, but their families

23
and loved ones as well. As Plaintiff Pete has noted, “Life isn't always fair but, why is Boeing

24
playing with the people and their family's lives!?”

25

26

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1

5.

Instead of accepting responsibility for the treatment the defendants have

2 perpetrated, defendants have begun playing “pin the tail on the other.” At the EEOC stage,

3 Defendant Boeing stated that it did not have anything to do with the decisions made against the

4 employees. However, there were notes sent from Onex representatives that stated that Boeing’s

5 managers were to help pick and choose who was staying for the new company (Spirit).

6 Additionally, plaintiffs have indisputable proof that Boeing’s managers indeed had significant

7 input into the wrongful terminations of the plaintiffs.

8

6.

Employees who had believed the myth of job security that Boeing professed over

9 the years were, after 20 years, forced to enter the job market, tainted as worker’s not good

10 enough to make the grade. Plaintiffs, such as Plaintiff James’ dreams of retiring at a certain age

11 were taken away from them.

12

7.

Additionally, the laid off workers were denied the right to vote when time came

13 to protest the actions of Defendants.

14

8.

As another sign of defendants’ bad faith, Nigel Wright stated that as a gesture of

15 good will to the machinists union, when the company needs to hire again that they would first

16 hire back the laid off workers. However, Spirit has not honored that promise. Indeed, many of

17 the plaintiffs have applied for numerous positions that they are qualified for and have held for

18 years, and have not been offered a position. In some cases plaintiffs have been rejected as

19 “unqualified.” Additionally, Spirit AeroSystems has set arbitrary standards regarding being

20 hired into the company so that former workers could almost never receive a job offer.

21
9.

The alleged system was subjective, arbitrary, non-substantive, dishonest, and

22
inaccurate. Additionally, the system was:

23
a. Biased against older (over age 40) workers; and

24
b. Inequitable and inappropriate because of pool size and composition.

25

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

26

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1

10.

This is a civil action over which original jurisdiction is vested in this Court by 28

2 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3). This Court also is vested with exclusive

3 subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims under ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

4 1132(e)(1) and (f)12. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367

5 over all other claims that are so related to claims within its original or exclusive jurisdiction that

6 they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

7 Constitution. Venue is appropriate in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 29 U.S.C. §

8 1132(e) (2) as it is brought in a judicial district in which the defendants reside or may be found

9 at the time the action is commenced. Further, many of the plaintiffs reside in the State of

10 Kansas.

11

11.

Plaintiffs have exhausted and satisfied all conditions precedent to filing this

12 action. Additionally, plaintiffs invoke the single file rule as defendants were placed on

13 sufficient notice of the multiple plaintiff nature of the action. Moreover each Plaintiff was a

14 Class member in case 05-1368, thereby tolling their claims. Multiple plaintiffs filed a class-wide

15 charge of age discrimination with the US. Equal Employment Commission (“EEOC”), which

16 was cross-filed with the Kansas Human Rights Commission (“KHRC”). Each Plaintiff has

17 consented to join this action. The Consent to Sue forms for the named have been filed in 05-

18 1368 and are incorporated herein by reference.

19

III. PARTIES

20

A. General Allegations as to all Plaintiffs

21
12.

At all pertinent times, each of the plaintiffs in this action was an employee of the

22
defendants within the meaning of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630 and a participant in and/or

23
beneficiary of the Plans within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(7) and (8).

24
13.

The plaintiffs, and each of them, suffered from an adverse action by Defendants.

25
B. Specific Allegations as to Individual Plaintiffs

26

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1

14. Plaintiff Perry Apsley (“Plaintiff Apsley”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

2 born on May 5, 1955, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

3 Kansas facility. Plaintiff Apsley was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff

4 Apsley was qualified to hold his position as a Strechpress operator. Thus, Plaintiff Apsley filed a

5 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

6 remedies.

7

15. Plaintiff was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment decision.

8 Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better. Moreover,

9 Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never received

10 any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also tasked to

11 fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment decision.

12 Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger comparators

13 kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This combination of

14 facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

16.

Plaintiff Bob Bailey (“Plaintiff Bailey”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

16 was born on January 1, 1953, and who, as of June 10, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bailey was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

18 Plaintiff Bailey was qualified to hold his position as an equipment maintenance electrician.

19 Thus, Plaintiff Bailey filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

20 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

21
17.

Plaintiff was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

22
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

23
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

24
received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

25
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

26
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

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1 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

2 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

3

18.

Plaintiff Jacob A. Bakk (“Plaintiff Bakk”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

4 was born on March 6, 1954, and who, as of May 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

5 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bakk was employed by Boeing for twenty-five (25) years.

6 Plaintiff Bakk was qualified to hold his position as a chief metal machine operator. Thus,

7 Plaintiff Bakk filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

8 exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

19. Plaintiff was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment decision.

10 Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better. Moreover,

11 Plaintiff consistently received positive performance reviews. Plaintiff also never received any

12 complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker was also tasked to

13 fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment decision.

14 Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger comparators

15 kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This combination of

16 facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

17

20.

Plaintiff Gary Ball (“Plaintiff Ball”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

18 born on September 26, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

19 Wichita, Kansas facility. Boeing employed plaintiff Ball for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Ball

20 was qualified to hold his position as a plumber/boiler employee. Thus, Plaintiff Ball filed a

21
timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

22
remedies.

23
21. Plaintiff Ball was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment decision.

24
Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better. Moreover,

25
Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never received

26
any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also tasked to

-7FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

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1 fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment decision.

2 Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger comparators

3 kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This combination of

4 facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

5

22.

Plaintiff Charles L. Bean Jr. (“Plaintiff Bean”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

6 who was born on January 24, 1952, and who, as of May 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

7 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bean was employed by Boeing for seventeen (17) years.

8 Plaintiff Bean was qualified to hold his position as on the move crew.

9

23. Plaintiff Bean was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

10 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

11 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

12 received any complaints about their work performance in 17 years. A younger worker was also

13 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

14 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

15 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

16 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

17

24.

Plaintiff Peggy S. Bell (“Plaintiff Bell”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

18 was born on April 2, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

19 Wichita, Kansas facility. Boeing employed plaintiff Bell for more than twenty (20) years.

20 Plaintiff Bell was qualified to hold her position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff Bell filed

21
a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

22
administrative remedies.

23
25.

Plaintiff Bell was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

24
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

25
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

26
received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also

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1 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

2 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

3 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

4 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

5

26.

Plaintiff Thomas Belton (“Plaintiff Belton”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

6 who was born on March 23, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

7 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Belton was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18)

8 years. Plaintiff Belton was qualified to hold his position as a plumber/boiler employee. Plaintiff

9 Belton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

10 administrative remedies.

11

27.

Plaintiff Belton was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

12 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

13 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

14 received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

15 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

16 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

17 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

18 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

19

28.

Plaintiff Vernon L. Bentley (“Plaintiff Bentley”) is a resident of the State of

20 Kansas who was born on November 12, 1952, and who, as of August 8, 2005, was employed by

21
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bentley was employed by Boeing for more than

22
nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Bentley was qualified to hold his position as an aluminum heat

23
treater employee.

24
29.

Plaintiff Bentley was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

25
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

26
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

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1 received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker was also

2 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

3 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

4 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

5 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

6

30.

Plaintiff MeLonda Bircher (“Plaintiff Bircher”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

7 who was born on December 20, 1960, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

8 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bircher was employed by Boeing for twenty-two (22)

9 years. Plaintiff Bircher was qualified to hold her position as an asset manager. Plaintiff Bircher

10 filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

11 administrative remedies.

12

31.

Plaintiff Bircher was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

13 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

14 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

15 received any complaints about their work performance in 22 years. A younger worker was also

16 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

17 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

18 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

19 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

20

32.

Plaintiff Jerry L. Branstetter (“Plaintiff Branstetter”) is a resident of the State of

21
Kansas who was born on July 11, 1945, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

22
its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Branstetter was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-

23
seven (27) years. Plaintiff Branstetter was qualified to hold the power district electrician

24
position. Thus, Plaintiff Branstetter filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the

25
right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

26

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1

33.

Plaintiff Branstetter was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

2 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

3 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

4 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 27 years. A younger worker

5 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

6 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

7 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

8 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

9 case law.

10

34.

Plaintiff Michael E. Burgardt (“Plaintiff Burgardt”) is a resident of the State of

11 Kansas who was born on January 26, 1952, and who, as of May 24, 2005, was employed by

12 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Burgardt was employed by Boeing for thirty (31)

13 years. Plaintiff Burgardt was qualified to hold his position as a power feed drill technician.

14 Thus, Plaintiff Burgardt filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

15 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

16

35.

Plaintiff Burgardt was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

17 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

18 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received well to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

19 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 31 years. A younger worker

20 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

21
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

22
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

23
affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

24
case law.

25
36.

Plaintiff Rocky R. Burris (“Plaintiff Burris”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

26
who was born on January 8, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Burris was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years.

2 Plaintiff Burris was qualified to hold his position as a plumber. Thus, Plaintiff Burris filed a

3 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

4 remedies.

5

37.

Plaintiff Burris was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

6 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff Burris was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or

7 better. Moreover, Plaintiff Burris consistently received good to great performance reviews.

8 Plaintiff also never received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A

9 younger worker was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to

10 the adverse employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff

11 performed and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not

12 adversely affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all

13 relevant case law.

14

38.

Plaintiff Frank Cash (“Plaintiff Cash”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

15 was born on October 11, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

16 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Cash was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18)

17 years. Plaintiff Cash was qualified to hold his position as a driveomatic.

18

39.

Plaintiff Cash was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

19 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

20 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

21
received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

22
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

23
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

24
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

25
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

26

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1

40.

Plaintiff Betty Childers (“Plaintiff Childers”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

2 who was born on July 19, 1953, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

3 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Childers was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years.

4 Plaintiff Childers was qualified to hold her position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff

5 Childers filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

6 all administrative remedies.

7

41.

Plaintiff Childers was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

8 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

9 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

10 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 26 years. A younger worker

11 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

12 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

13 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

14 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

15 case law.

16

42.

Plaintiff Redell Coleman (“Plaintiff Coleman”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

17 who was born on April 9, 1946, and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

18 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Coleman was employed by Boeing for more than thirty one

19 (31) years. Plaintiff Coleman was qualified to hold his position as a bench mechanic.

20

43.

Plaintiff Coleman was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

21
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

22
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

23
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 31 years. A younger worker

24
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

25
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

26
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

2 case law.

3

44.

Plaintiff Larry E. Combs (“Plaintiff Combs”) was a resident of the State of Kansas

4 during the stated allegations. Plaintiff Combs was born on September 9, 1948, and as of June 3,

5 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Combs was employed

6 by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Combs was qualified to hold his position as a business

7 process analyst. Thus, Plaintiff Combs filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the

8 right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

45.

Plaintiff Combs was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

10 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

11 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

12 received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also

13 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

14 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

15 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

16 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

17

46.

Plaintiff Harvey J. Conyac (“Plaintiff Conyac”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

18 who was born on January 15, 1945, and who, as of May 27, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

19 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Conyac was employed by Boeing for twenty-seven (27) years.

20 Plaintiff Conyac was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Conyac filed a timely EEOC

21
compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

22
47.

Plaintiff was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

23
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

24
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

25
received any complaints about their work performance in 27 years. A younger worker was also

26
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

2 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

3 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

4

48.

Plaintiff Loren W. Cox (“Plaintiff Cox”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

5 was born on July 21, 1955, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

6 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Cox was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four (24)

7 years. Plaintiff Cox was qualified to hold her position as a bench mechanic.

8

49.

Plaintiff Cox was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

9 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

10 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

11 received any complaints about their work performance in 24 years. A younger worker was also

12 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

13 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

14 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

15 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

16

50.

Plaintiff Phyllis A. Cox (“Plaintiff P. Cox”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

17 who was born on January 1, 1949, and who, as of June 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

18 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff P. Cox was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

19 Plaintiff P. Cox was qualified to hold her position as a sheet metal machinist. Thus, Plaintiff P.

20 Cox filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

21
administrative remedies.

22
51.

Plaintiff P. Cox was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

23
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

24
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

25
received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

26
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

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1 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

2 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

3 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

4

52.

Plaintiff Linda L. DeZarn (“Plaintiff DeZarn”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

5 who was born on June 16, 1956, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

6 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff DeZarn was employed by Boeing for ten (10) years. Plaintiff

7 DeZarn was qualified to hold her position as a certified solder. Thus Plaintiff DeZarn filed a

8 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

9 remedies.

10

53.

Plaintiff DeZarn was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

11 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

12 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received great performance reviews. Plaintiff had not received

13 any complaints about her work performance in 10 years. A younger worker was also tasked to

14 fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment decision.

15 Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger comparators

16 kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This combination of

17 facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

18

54.

Plaintiff William D. Doshier (“Plaintiff Doshier”) is a resident of the State of

19 Kansas who was born on December 6, 1953, and who, as of June 17, 2005, was employed by

20 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Doshier was employed by Boeing for more than

21
twenty-nine (29) years. Plaintiff Doshier was qualified to hold his position as a equipment

22
operator.

23
55.

Plaintiff Doshier was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

24
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

25
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

26
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 29 years. A younger worker

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1 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

2 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

3 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

4 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

5 case law.

6

56.

Plaintiff Charles D. Elder (“Plaintiff Elder”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

7 who was born on February 28, 1952, and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

8 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Elder was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-six (26)

9 years. Plaintiff Elder was qualified to hold his position as a materials processor employee.

10

57.

Plaintiff Elder was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

11 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

12 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

13 received any complaints about their work performance in 26 years. A younger worker was also

14 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

15 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

16 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

17 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

18

58.

Plaintiff Alan S. Epperson (“Plaintiff Epperson”) is a resident of the State of

19 Kansas who was born on August 22, 1964, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

20 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Epperson was employed by Boeing for sixteen

21
(16) years. Plaintiff Epperson was qualified to hold his position as an inspector. Thus, Plaintiff

22
Epperson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

23
all administrative remedies.

24
59.

Plaintiff Epperson was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

25
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

26
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

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1 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 16 years. A younger worker

2 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

3 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

4 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

5 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

6 case law.

7

60.

Plaintiff Lloyd C. Fansler (“Plaintiff Fansler”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

8 who was born on August 5, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

9 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Fansler was employed by Boeing for thirty-one (31) years.

10 Plaintiff Fansler was qualified to hold his position as a skin and spar area person.

11

61.

Plaintiff Fansler was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

12 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

13 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

14 received any complaints about their work performance in 31 years. A younger worker was also

15 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

16 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

17 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

18 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

19

62.

Plaintiff Jerald J. Gilbert (“Plaintiff Gilbert”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

20 who was born on April 20, 1950, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

21
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Gilbert was employed by Boeing for seventeen (17) years.

22
Plaintiff Gilbert was qualified to hold his position as sheet metal mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff

23
Gilbert filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

24
administrative remedies.

25
63.

Plaintiff Gilbert was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

26
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

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1 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

2 received any complaints about their work performance in 17 years. A younger worker was also

3 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

4 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

5 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

6 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

7

64.

Plaintiff Chip Gilchrist II (“Plaintiff Gilchrist”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

8 who was born on August 30, 1956, and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

9 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Gilchrist was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20)

10 years. Plaintiff Gilchrist was qualified to hold his position as a sheet metal mechanic employee.

11

65.

Plaintiff Gilchrist was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

12 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

13 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

14 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker

15 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

16 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

17 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

18 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

19 case law.

20

66.

Plaintiff Richard Gotthard (“Plaintiff Gotthard”) is a resident of the State of

21
Kansas who was born on December 23, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

22
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Boeing employed plaintiff Gotthard for twenty-five (25)

23
years. Plaintiff Gotthard was qualified to hold his position as a machinist. Thus, Plaintiff

24
Gotthard filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

25
all administrative remedies.

26

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1

67.

Plaintiff Gotthard was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

2 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

3 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

4 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker

5 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

6 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

7 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

8 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

9 case law.

10

68.

Plaintiff Brian Groom (“Plaintiff Groom”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

11 was born on October 2, 1958, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

12 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Groom was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four

13 (24) years. Plaintiff Groom was qualified to hold his position as a plastics bench mechanic.

14 Thus, Plaintiff Groom filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

15 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

16

69.

Plaintiff Groom was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

17 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better. 18 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never 19 received any complaints about their work performance in 24 years. A younger worker was also 20 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment
21
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger
22
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This
23
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.
24
70. Plaintiff James Hammon (“Plaintiff Hammon”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who
25
was born on April 25, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its
26
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Hammon was employed by Boeing for thirty-one (31) years.

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 Plaintiff Hammon was qualified to hold his position in transportation. Thus, Plaintiff Hammon

2 filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

3 administrative remedies.

4

71. Plaintiff was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment decision.

5 Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better. Moreover,

6 Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never received

7 any complaints about their work performance in 31 years. A younger worker was also tasked to

8 fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment decision.

9 Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger comparators

10 kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This combination of

11 facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

12

72.

Plaintiff Janet S. Hansen (“Plaintiff Hansen”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

13 who was born on July 4, 1960, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

14 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Hansen was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-one

15 (21) years. Plaintiff Hansen was qualified to hold her position as a transportation employee.

16

73.

Plaintiff Hansen was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

17 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

18 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

19 received any complaints about their work performance in 21 years. A younger worker was also

20 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

21
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

22
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

23
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

24
74.

Plaintiff Denise A. Harris (“Plaintiff Harris”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

25
who was born on August 10, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

26

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Harris was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-nine

2 (29) years. Plaintiff Harris was qualified to hold her position as a factory clerk.

3

75.

Plaintiff Harris was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

4 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

5 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

6 received any complaints about their work performance in 29 years. A younger worker was also

7 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

8 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

9 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

10 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

11

76.

Plaintiff Allen C. Hatcher (“Plaintiff Hatcher”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

12 who was born on April 13, 1949, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

13 Wichita, Kansas facility. Boeing employed plaintiff Hatcher for more than nineteen (19) years.

14 Plaintiff Hatcher was qualified to hold his position as an inspector.

15

77.

Plaintiff Hatcher was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

16 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

17 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

18 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

19 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

20 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

21
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

22
affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

23
case law.

24
78.

Plaintiff Ron W. Hendershot (“Plaintiff Hendershot”) is a resident of the State of

25
Kansas who was born on March 10, 1957, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

26
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Hendershot was employed by Boeing for twenty-

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 467 Filed 03/22/13 Page 23 of 56

1 seven (27) years. Plaintiff Hendershot was qualified to hold his position as a carpenter

2 millwright specialist.

3

79.

Plaintiff Hendershot was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

4 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

5 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

6 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 27 years. A younger worker

7 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

8 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

9 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

10 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

11 case law.

12

80.

Plaintiff Verna J. Houston (“Plaintiff Houston”) is a resident of the State of

13 Kansas who was born on March 26, 1949, and who, as of May 18, 2005, was employed by

14 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Houston was employed by Boeing for ten years.

15 Plaintiff Houston was qualified to hold her position as a sealer. Thus, Plaintiff Houston filed a

16 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

17 remedies.

18

81.

Plaintiff Houston was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

19 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

20 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

21
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 10 years. A younger worker

22
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

23
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

24
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

25
affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

26
case law.

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 467 Filed 03/22/13 Page 24 of 56

1

82.

Plaintiff Larry W. James (“Plaintiff L. James”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

2 who was born on June 26, 1958, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

3 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff James was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four

4 (24) years. Plaintiff James was qualified to hold his position as a material processor. Thus,

5 Plaintiff James filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

6 exhausted all administrative remedies.

7

83.

Plaintiff James was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

8 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

9 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

10 received any complaints about their work performance in 24 years. A younger worker was also

11 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

12 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

13 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

14 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

84.

Plaintiff Dale C. Jayne Jr. (“Plaintiff Jayne”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on May 28, 1950, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Jayne was employed by Boeing for more than nineteen (19)

18 years. Plaintiff Jayne was qualified to hold his position as a tool maker.

19

85.

Plaintiff Jayne was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

20 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

21
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

22
received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker was also

23
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

24
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

25
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

26
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1

86.

Plaintiff Gary L. Johnson (“Plaintiff Johnson”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

2 who was born on August 6, 1952, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

3 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Johnson was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five

4 (25) years. Plaintiff Johnson was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Johnson filed a

5 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

6 remedies.

7

87.

Plaintiff Johnson was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

8 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

9 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

10 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker

11 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

12 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

13 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

14 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

15 case law.

16

88.

Plaintiff Melvyn J. Johnson (“Plaintiff M. Johnson”) is a resident of the State of

17 Kansas who was born on April 28, 1953, and who, as of June 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing

18 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff M. Johnson was employed by Boeing for more than

19 twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff M. Johnson was qualified to hold his position as a laminator.

20 Thus, Plaintiff M. Johnson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue

21
and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

22
89.

Plaintiff Johnson was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

23
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

24
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

25
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 27 years. A younger worker

26
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

2 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

3 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

4 case law.

5

90. Plaintiff Donald R. Jones (“Plaintiff Jones”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

6 born on August 9, 1953, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

7 Kansas facility. Plaintiff Jones was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Jones

8 was qualified to hold his position as an environmental operator. Thus, Plaintiff Jones filed a

9 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

10 remedies.

11

91. Plaintiff Jones was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

12 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

13 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

14 received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker was also

15 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

16 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

17 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

18 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

19

92.

Plaintiff Ralph O. Keener (“Plaintiff Keener”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

20 who was born on August 22, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

21
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Keener was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

22
Plaintiff Keener was qualified to hold his position as an assembly installer. Thus, Plaintiff

23
Keener filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

24
administrative remedies.

25
93. Plaintiff Keener was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

26
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

2 received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

3 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

4 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

5 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

6 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

7

94.

Plaintiff Danny R. Kennedy (“Plaintiff Kennedy”) is a resident of the State of

8 Kansas who was born on September 12, 1952, and who, as June 16, 2005, was employed by

9 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kennedy was employed by Boeing for more than

10 twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff Kennedy was qualified to hold his position as a

11 carpenter/millwright specialist.

12

95. Plaintiff Kennedy was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

13 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

14 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

15 received any complaints about their work performance in 26 years. A younger worker was also

16 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

17 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

18 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

19 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

20

96. Plaintiff Melvin E. Kerns (“Plaintiff Kerns”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

21
born on January 15, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

22
Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kerns was employed by Boeing for more than fifteen (15) years.

23
Plaintiff Kerns was qualified to hold his position as a plumber/power plant specialist. Thus,

24
Plaintiff Kerns filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

25
exhausted all administrative remedies.

26

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1

97.

Plaintiff Kerns was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

2 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

3 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

4 received any complaints about their work performance in 15 years. A younger worker was also

5 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

6 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

7 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

8 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

9

98.

Plaintiff Gordon B. Kinkead (“Plaintiff Kinkead”) is a resident of the State of

10 Kansas who was born on October 7, 1953, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

11 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kinkead was employed by Boeing for more than

12 twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Kinkead was qualified to hold his position as a corrective action

13 coordinator. Thus, Plaintiff Kinkead filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the

14 right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

15

99.

Plaintiff Kinkead was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

16 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

17 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

18 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker

19 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

20 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

21
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

22
affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

23
case law.

24
100.

Plaintiff Jimmy Le (“Plaintiff Le”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

25
born on April 4, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

26
Kansas facility. Plaintiff Le was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Le was

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 qualified to hold his position as a mill operator. Plaintiff Le filed a timely EEOC compliant,

2 received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies. Plaintiff Le

3 filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

4 administrative remedies.

5

101.

Plaintiff Le was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

6 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

7 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

8 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

9 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

10 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

11 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

12 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

13 case law.

14

102.

Plaintiff Carlton D. Lee (“Plaintiff Lee”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

15 was born on January 15, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

16 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Lee was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20) years.

17 Plaintiff Lee was qualified to hold his position as a sheet metal assembler. Thus, Plaintiff Lee

18 filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

19 administrative remedies.

20

103.

Plaintiff Lee was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

21
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

22
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

23
received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also

24
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

25
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

26

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1 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

2 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

3

104.

Plaintiff Stephen L. Linck (“Plaintiff Linck”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

4 who was born on June 11, 1951, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

5 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Linck was employed by Boeing for more than thirty (30)

6 years. Plaintiff Linck was qualified to hold his position as an engineer.

7

105.

Plaintiff Linck was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

8 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

9 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

10 received any complaints about their work performance in 30 years. A younger worker was also

11 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

12 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

13 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

14 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

106.

Plaintiff Jerry L. McKinney (“Plaintiff McKinney”) is a resident of the State of

16 Kansas who was born on March 4, 1953, and who, as of May 20 2005, was employed by Boeing

17 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff McKinney was employed by Boeing for more than

18 nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff McKinney was qualified to hold his position as an operator tape

19 machinist employee.

20

107.

Plaintiff McKinney was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

21
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

22
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

23
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

24
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

25
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

26
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

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1 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

2 case law.

3

108.

Plaintiff Freddy J. McColpin (“Plaintiff McColpin”) is a resident of the State of

4 Kansas who was born on December 9, 1947, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

5 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff McColpin was employed by Boeing for more

6 than twenty-three (23) years. Plaintiff McColpin was qualified to hold his position as a

7 plumber/boiler house power plant employee. Thus, Plaintiff McColpin filed a timely EEOC

8 compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

109.

Plaintiff McColpin was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

10 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

11 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

12 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 23 years. A younger worker

13 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

14 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

15 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

16 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

17 case law.

18

110.

Plaintiff Mark McCurdy (“Plaintiff McCurdy”) is a resident of the State of

19 Oklahoma who was born on February 17, 1960, and who, as of May 23, 2005, was employed by

20 Boeing at its Tulsa, Oklahoma facility. Plaintiff McCurdy was employed by Boeing for more

21
than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff McCurdy was qualified to hold his position as a processor.

22
Thus, Plaintiff McCurdy filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

23
has exhausted all administrative remedies.

24
111. Plaintiff McCurdy was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

25
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

26
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

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1 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker

2 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

3 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

4 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

5 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

6 case law.

7

112.

Plaintiff Cathy J. Munsell (“Plaintiff Munsell”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

8 who was born on December 30, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

9 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Munsell was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years.

10 Plaintiff Munsell was qualified to hold her position as an assembler installer. Thus, Plaintiff

11 Munsell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

12 all administrative remedies.

13

113.

Plaintiff Munsell was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

14 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

15 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

16 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker

17 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

18 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

19 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

20 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

21
case law.

22

114.

Plaintiff Jan W. Murray (“Plaintiff Murray”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

23
who was born on February 28, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

24
its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Murray was employed by Boeing for more than seventeen

25
(17) years. Plaintiff Murray was qualified to hold his position as plastic bench composite

26

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1 mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff Murray filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right

2 to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

3

115.

Plaintiff Murray was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

4 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

5 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

6 received any complaints about their work performance in 17 years. A younger worker was also

7 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

8 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

9 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

10 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

11

116.

Plaintiff Steven Ngo (“Plaintiff Ngo”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

12 was born on November 2, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

13 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Ngo was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18)

14 years. Plaintiff Ngo was qualified to hold his position in the machine shop. Thus, Plaintiff Ngo

15 filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

16 administrative remedies.

17

117.

Plaintiff Ngo was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

18 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

19 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

20 received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

21
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

22
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

23
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

24
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

25

118.

Plaintiff Huyen T. Nguyen (“Plaintiff Nguyen”) is a resident of the State of

26
Kansas who was born on November 10, 1952, and who, as of May 18, 2005, was employed by

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1 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Nguyen was employed by Boeing for more than

2 eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Nguyen was qualified to hold the sealer position. Thus, Plaintiff

3 Nguyen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

4 all administrative remedies.

5

119.

Plaintiff Nguyen was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

6 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

7 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

8 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker

9 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

10 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

11 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

12 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

13 case law.

14

120.

Plaintiff Luyen D. Nguyen (“Plaintiff L. Nguyen”) is a resident of the State of

15 Kansas who was born on November 20, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

16 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff L. Nguyen was employed by Boeing for sixteen

17 (16) years. Plaintiff Nguyen was qualified to hold the tape machine operator position. Thus,

18 Plaintiff Nguyen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

19 exhausted all administrative remedies.

20

121.

Plaintiff L. Nguyen was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

21
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

22
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

23
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 16 years. A younger worker

24
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

25
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

26
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

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1 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

2 case law.

3

122.

Plaintiff Barbara A. Odom (“Plaintiff Odom”) is a resident of the State of

4 Oklahoma who was born on September 5, 1938, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by

5 Boeing at its Tulsa, Oklahoma facility. Plaintiff Odom was employed by Boeing for twenty (20)

6 years. Plaintiff Odom was qualified to hold her position as a supply chain management analyst.

7

123.

Plaintiff Odom was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

8 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

9 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

10 received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also

11 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

12 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

13 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

14 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

124.

Plaintiff Kent W. Owen (“Plaintiff Owen”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on December 17, 1958, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

17 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Owen was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-one 18 (21) years. Plaintiff Owen was qualified to hold his position as a MR&D technical analyst. 19 Thus, Plaintiff Owen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has 20 exhausted all administrative remedies.
21
125. Plaintiff Owen was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment
22
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.
23
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never
24
received any complaints about their work performance in 21 years. A younger worker was also
25
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment
26
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

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1 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

2 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

3

126.

Plaintiff Lowanda J. Patton (“Plaintiff Patton”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

4 who was born on November 26, 1948, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

5 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Patton was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years.

6 Plaintiff Patton was qualified to hold her position as a steel metal employee. Thus, Plaintiff

7 Patton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

8 administrative remedies.

9

127.

Plaintiff Patton was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

10 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

11 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

12 received any complaints about their work performance in 26 years. A younger worker was also

13 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

14 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

15 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

16 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

17

128.

Plaintiff Paul D. Pete (“Plaintiff Pete”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

18 was born on December 13, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

19 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Pete was employed at Boeing for more than twenty-five (25)

20 years. Plaintiff Pete was qualified to hold his position as a sheet metal employee.

21

129.

Plaintiff Pete was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

22
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

23
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

24
received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker was also

25
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

26
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

2 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

3

130.

Plaintiff Ba Pham (“Plaintiff Pham”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

4 born on October 27, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

5 Kansas facility. Plaintiff Pham was employed at Boeing for more than twenty-two (22) years.

6 Plaintiff Pham was qualified to hold the CNC Machinist position.

7

131.

Plaintiff Pham was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

8 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

9 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

10 received any complaints about their work performance in 22 years. A younger worker was also

11 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

12 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

13 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

14 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

132.

Plaintiff Brent L. Popp (“Plaintiff Popp”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

16 was born on August 6, 1959, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Popp was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five (25) 18 years. Plaintiff Popp was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Popp filed a timely 19 EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative 20 remedies.
21
133. Plaintiff Popp was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment
22
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.
23
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never
24
received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker was also
25
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment
26
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

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1 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

2 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

3

134.

Plaintiff James E. Porter (“Plaintiff Porter”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

4 who was born on January 2, 1947, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

5 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Porter was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18)

6 years. Plaintiff Porter was qualified to hold his position as a project planner.

7

135.

Plaintiff Porter was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

8 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

9 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

10 received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

11 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

12 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

13 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

14 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

136.

Plaintiff Jay E. Powell (“Plaintiff Powell”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on October 6, 1954, and who, as of June 16 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Powell was employed by Boeing for more than thirty-one (31) 18 years. Plaintiff Powell was qualified to hold the production machinist position. Thus, Plaintiff 19 Powell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all 20 administrative remedies.
21
137. Plaintiff Powell was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment
22
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.
23
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never
24
received any complaints about their work performance in 31 years. A younger worker was also
25
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment
26
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

2 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

3

138.

Plaintiff Willard J. Ratchford (“Plaintiff Ratchford”) is a resident of the State of

4 Kansas who was born on October 16, 1957, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by

5 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Ratchford was employed by Boeing for nineteen

6 (19) years. Plaintiff Ratchford was qualified to hold his position as a hand router operator.

7 Thus, Plaintiff Ratchford filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

8 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

139.

Plaintiff Ratchford was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

10 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

11 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

12 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

13 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

14 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

15 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

16 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

17 case law.

18

140.

Plaintiff Veronica Rios (“Plaintiff Rios”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

19 was born on November 20, 1961, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

20 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Rios was employed by Boeing for more than five years.

21
Plaintiff Rios was qualified to hold her position as a bench mechanic.

22
141. Plaintiff Rios was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

23
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

24
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

25
received any complaints about their work performance in 5 years. A younger worker was also

26
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

2 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

3 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

4

142.

Plaintiff Richard D. Roeder (“Plaintiff Roeder”) is a resident of the State of

5 Kansas who was born on May 8, 1953, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing

6 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Roeder was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-

7 five (25) years. Plaintiff Roeder was qualified to hold his position as a machinist. Thus, Plaintiff

8 Roeder filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

9 administrative remedies.

10

143.

Plaintiff Roeder was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

11 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

12 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

13 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker

14 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

15 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

16 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

17 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

18 case law.

19

144.

Plaintiff Albert Schloetzer (“Plaintiff Schloetzer”) is a resident of the State of

20 Kansas who was born on August 21, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

21
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Schloetzer was employed by Boeing for fifteen

22
(15) years. Plaintiff Schloetzer was qualified to hold his position as a housekeeper.

23

145.

Plaintiff Schloetzer was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

24
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

25
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

26
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 15 years. A younger worker

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1 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

2 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

3 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

4 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

5 case law.

6

146.

Plaintiff Joseph E. Schroeder (“Plaintiff Schroeder”) is a resident of the State of

7 Kansas who was born on July 23, 1949, and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at

8 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Schroeder was employed by Boeing for more than nineteen

9 (19) years. Plaintiff Schroeder was qualified to hold his position as a materials processor

10 employee.

11

147.

Plaintiff Schroeder was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

12 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

13 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

14 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

15 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

16 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

17 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

18 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

19 case law.

20

148.

Plaintiff Steven M. Schwind (“Plaintiff Schwind”) is a resident of the State of

21
Kansas who was born on July 26, 1951 and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

22
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Schwind was employed by Boeing for more than nineteen

23
(19) years. Plaintiff Schwind was qualified to hold his position as a manufacturing planner

24
employee.

25
149. Plaintiff Schwind was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

26
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

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1 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

2 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

3 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

4 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

5 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

6 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

7 case law.

8

150.

Plaintiff William H. Setchell (“Plaintiff Setchell”) is a resident of the State of

9 Kansas who was born on March 30, 1954, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by

10 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Setchell was employed by Boeing for twenty-

11 seven (27) years. Plaintiff Setchell was qualified to hold his position as a storekeeper/clerk.

12 Thus, Plaintiff Setchell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

13 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

14

151.

Plaintiff Setchell was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

15 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

16 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

17 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 27 years. A younger worker

18 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

19 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

20 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

21
affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

22
case law.

23

152.

Plaintiff James C. Sheppard (“Plaintiff Sheppard”) is a resident of the State of

24
Kansas who was born on January 24, 1953, and who, was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18)

25
years. Plaintiff Sheppard was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Sheppard filed a

26

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1 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

2 remedies.

3

153.

Plaintiff Sheppard was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

4 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

5 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

6 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker

7 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

8 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

9 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

10 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

11 case law.

12

154.

Plaintiff Teddy E. Sill (“Plaintiff Sill”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

13 was born on July 13, 1952, and who, as of May 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

14 Kansas facility. Plaintiff Sill was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20) years.

15 Plaintiff Sill was qualified to hold his position as a polisher-lead employee.

16

155.

Plaintiff Sill was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

17 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

18 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

19 received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also

20 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

21
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

22
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

23
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

24

156.

Plaintiff Sammy J. Smith (“Plaintiff S. Smith”) is a resident of the State of

25
Kansas who was born on January 31, 1959, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

26
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff S. Smith was employed by Boeing for more than

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1 nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff S. Smith was qualified to hold his position as an machinist. Thus,

2 Plaintiff S. Smith filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

3 exhausted all administrative remedies.

4

157.

Plaintiff Smith was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

5 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

6 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

7 received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker was also

8 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

9 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

10 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

11 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

12

158.

Plaintiff Sharon A. Southern (“Plaintiff Southern”) is a resident of the State of

13 Kansas who was born on September 23, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

14 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Southern was employed by Boeing for twenty

15 (20) years. Plaintiff Southern was qualified to hold her position as a sheet metal assembler.

16 Thus, Plaintiff Southern filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

17 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

18

159.

Plaintiff Southern was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

19 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

20 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

21
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker

22
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

23
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

24
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

25
affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

26
case law.

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1

160.

Plaintiff Linda C. Sparrer (“Plaintiff Sparrer”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

2 who was born on February 26, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

3 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Sparrer was employed by Boeing for sixteen years.

4 Plaintiff Sparrer was qualified to hold her position as IWTP operator. Thus, Plaintiff Sparrer

5 filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

6 administrative remedies.

7

161.

Plaintiff Sparrer was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

8 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

9 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

10 received any complaints about their work performance in 16 years. A younger worker was also

11 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

12 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

13 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

14 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

15

162.

Plaintiff Charles Stark (“Plaintiff Stark”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

16 was born on July 26, 1961, and who, as of May 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita,

17 Kansas facility. Boeing employed plaintiff Stark for more than sixteen (16) years. Plaintiff

18 Stark was qualified to hold his position as a materials processor employee.

19

163.

Plaintiff Stark was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

20 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

21
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

22
received any complaints about their work performance in 16 years. A younger worker was also

23
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

24
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

25
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

26
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

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1

164.

Plaintiff Donald E. Titus (“Plaintiff Titus”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

2 who was born on June 13, 1952, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

3 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Titus was employed by Boeing for twenty-five (25) years.

4 Plaintiff Titus was qualified to hold his position as a schedule compliance specialist.

5

165.

Plaintiff Titus was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

6 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

7 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

8 received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker was also

9 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

10 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

11 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

12 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

13

166.

Plaintiff Abel L. Vasquez (“Plaintiff Vasquez”) is a resident of the State of

14 Kansas who was born on May 17, 1942, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing

15 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Vasquez was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-

16 eight (28) years. Plaintiff Vasquez was qualified to hold the manufacturing engineer position.

17 Thus, Plaintiff Vasquez filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

18 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

19

167.

Plaintiff Vasquez was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

20 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

21
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

22
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 28 years. A younger worker

23
was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

24
employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

25
and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

26

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1 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

2 case law.

3

168.

Plaintiff Henry F. Victor (“Plaintiff Victor”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

4 who was born on March 6, 1937, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

5 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Victor was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five

6 (25) years. Plaintiff Victor was qualified to hold his position as a material processor. Thus,

7 Plaintiff Victor filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

8 exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

169.

Plaintiff Victor was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

10 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

11 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

12 received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker was also

13 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

14 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

15 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

16 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

17

170.

Plaintiff James R. Wallace (“Plaintiff Wallace”) is a resident of the State of

18 Kansas who was born on August 11, 1948, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by

19 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wallace was employed by Boeing for more than

20 twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff Wallace was qualified to hold his position as a power distribution

21
electrician. Thus, Plaintiff Wallace filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right

22
to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

23

171.

Plaintiff Wallace was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

24
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

25
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

26
also never received any complaints about their work performance in 26 years. A younger worker

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1 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

2 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

3 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

4 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

5 case law.

6

172.

Plaintiff Jimmy Wallace (“Plaintiff J. Wallace”) is a resident of the State of

7 Kansas who was born on September 28, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

8 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff J. Wallace was employed by Boeing for nineteen

9 (19) years. Plaintiff J. Wallace was qualified to hold his position as a toolmaker.

10

173.

Plaintiff J. Wallace was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

11 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

12 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

13 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 19 years. A younger worker

14 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

15 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

16 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

17 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

18 case law.

19

174.

Plaintiff Richard A. Wallin (“Plaintiff Wallin”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

20 who was born on September 18, 1950, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

21
its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wallin was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-nine

22
(29) years. Plaintiff Wallin was qualified to hold his position as a tool and die/ deep draw

23
employee.

24

175.

Plaintiff Wallin was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

25
decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

26
Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

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1 received any complaints about their work performance in 29 years. A younger worker was also

2 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

3 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

4 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

5 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

6

176.

Plaintiff Michael B. Welsh (“Plaintiff Welsh”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

7 who was born on March 1, 1950, and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

8 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Welsh was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20)

9 years. Plaintiff Welsh was qualified to hold his position as a factory service attendant employee.

10

177.

Plaintiff Welsh was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

11 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

12 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

13 received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker was also

14 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

15 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

16 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

17 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

18

178.

Plaintiff Carolyn Y. Wheaton (“Plaintiff Wheaton”) is a resident of the State of

19 Kansas who was born June 15, 1962, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

20 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wheaton was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

21
Plaintiff Wheaton was qualified to hold her position a factory attendant. Thus, Plaintiff Wheaton

22
filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

23
administrative remedies.

24
179.

Plaintiff Wheaton was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

25
employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

26
or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

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1 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker

2 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse

3 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed

4 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely

5 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant

6 case law.

7

180.

Plaintiff Sylvester Williams II (“Plaintiff Williams II”) is a resident of the State of

8 Kansas who was born on February 7, 1954, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by

9 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Williams II was employed by Boeing for more

10 than twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Williams II was qualified to hold his position as a skin quality

11 employee. Thus, Plaintiff Williams II filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the

12 right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

13

181.

Plaintiff Williams II was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse

14 employment decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily

15 or better. Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff

16 also never received any complaints about their work performance in 20 years. A younger worker

17 was also tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse 18 employment decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed 19 and younger comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely 20 affected. This combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant
21
case law.
22
182. Plaintiff Janet M. Wilson (“Plaintiff Wilson”) is a resident the State of Kansas
23
who was born on January 6, 1960, and who, as May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its
24
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wilson was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.
25
Plaintiff Wilson was qualified to hold his position as an assembler. Thus, Plaintiff Wilson filed a
26

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1 timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative

2 remedies.

3

183.

Plaintiff Wilson was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

4 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

5 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

6 received any complaints about their work performance in 18 years. A younger worker was also

7 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

8 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

9 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

10 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

11

184.

Plaintiff Walter Woods (“Plaintiff Woods”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

12 who was born on March 27, 1947, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

13 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Woods was employed by Boeing for sixteen (16) years.

14 Plaintiff Woods was qualified to hold his positions as a structure mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff

15 Woods filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

16 administrative remedies.

17

185.

Plaintiff Woods was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

18 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

19 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

20 received any complaints about their work performance in 16 years. A younger worker was also

21
tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

22
decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

23
comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

24
combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

25
186. Plaintiff Betty R. Young (“Plaintiff Young”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

26
who was born on July 11, 1957, and who, as of May 27, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

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1 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Young was employed by Boeing for twenty-five (25) years.

2 Plaintiff Young was qualified to hold her position.

3

187.

Plaintiff Young was at least forty years old at the time of the adverse employment

4 decision. Additionally, Plaintiff was performing all job requirements satisfactorily or better.

5 Moreover, Plaintiff consistently received good to great performance reviews. Plaintiff also never

6 received any complaints about their work performance in 25 years. A younger worker was also

7 tasked to fulfill the job requirements that Plaintiff performed prior to the adverse employment

8 decision. Also, there was a continued need for the duties that Plaintiff performed and younger

9 comparators kept their jobs, were recommended, and/or were not adversely affected. This

10 combination of facts supports an inference of discrimination under all relevant case law.

11

188.

Each Plaintiff was laid-off/terminated/not hired in during “Project Lloyd.”

12

C. Defendants

13

1. Boeing

14

189.

Boeing’s Wichita Division supported the commercial, military, and space

15 products and services of the Boeing Corporation. Operations in Wichita date back to the old

16 Stearman Aircraft Company, which became part of Boeing in 1934 when the federal

17 government required United Airlines, Pratt and Whitney, and Boeing to split into three separate 18 companies. It is the largest employer in the State of Kansas. The division produces 75 percent 19 of the parts for Boeing’s 737 commercial airliners as well nacelles, nose sections and other parts 20 for Boeing’s 747, 757, 767, and 777 as well as a range of maintenance services and parts for the
21
company’s military and commercial products. Boeing can be served as set forth in the summons.
22
2. Spirit
23
190. On behalf of Spirit, Onex employees, Nigel Wright, Seth Mersky, and David
24
Mansell negotiated the terms of the sale of the Boeing plants and, along with Boeing, made the
25
decisions against the plaintiffs. It is stipulated that these individuals were working on behalf of
26
the Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. Midwestern Aircraft Systems was formed solely to be the entity to

FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
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1 run the Wichita plant and was not publicized until after the sale of the Boeing plant. Onex

2 boasts on its website that Nigel Wright (managing director of Onex) and Seth Mersky

3 (managing director of Onex “co-led Onex’ acquisition of Boeing’s commercial airplane

4 manufacturing operations in Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma, now

5 operating as Spirit AeroSystems, Inc.”1

6

191.

Each company has been properly served.

7

COUNT I: Age Discrimination

(Disparate Treatment)
8

9

192.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

10

193.

Defendants have engaged in a practice of discrimination against plaintiffs on the

11 basis of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623.

12

194.

Each plaintiff is within the protected age group and their work was beyond

13 satisfactory. Additionally, the plaintiffs were discharged despite the adequacy of their work and

14 not hired despite being the most qualified for the positions. As incorporated in this section,

15 there is evidence the defendants intended to discriminate against the plaintiffs in reaching its

16 decisions.

17

195.

Additionally, the defendants have implemented standards and utilized

18 considerations that have had a disparate impact against protected older workers and Defendants

19 have ignored this impact.

20

196. Moreover, defendants, as part of a scheme to save funds and profit managers and

21 executives professionally and individually, created a scheme to reduce the costs associated with

22 older workers including their benefits.

23

197. Finally, many managers and upper level executives made age bias and direct age

24 related statements directly to Plaintiffs or in the presence of Plaintiffs and other witnesses.

25

26
1
http://www.onex.com/index.taf?pid=40&_UserReference=50E019F7A8D553C143A6EB88.

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1

198. As a result of defendants’ conduct, plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer

2 loss and damage.

3

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

4 WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:

5

A. That court provide the maximum equitable remedies allowable including a

6 permanent injunction be issued compelling Spirit to offer all plaintiffs the opportunity to be

7 reinstated as employees under the same terms and conditions which existed prior to the

8 termination of their employment status and restoration to participant status under the Plans, or in

9 the alternative, equitable restitution to plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), 502(a)(3),

10 and 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) respectfully;

11

B. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants restoring to

12 them all benefits and other forms of compensation lost between the dates of the termination of

13 their employment and the date of judgment, together with interest or an appropriate inflation

14 factor, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3);

15

C. That judgment, individually, be entered in favor of plaintiffs against the defendants

16 for lost benefits, future benefits, back pay (including interest or an appropriate inflation factor),

17 front pay, lost investment capital, and liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b);

18

D. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs against the defendants for all direct,

19 incidental, and consequential damages arising out of the defendants’ breaches of contract;

20

E. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants for

21
liquidated damages in amounts to be determined at trial;

22
F. That judgment be entered for plaintiffs’, individual, consequential damages, including

23
non-financial injuries, arising out of defendants’ actions to the extent allowable by law.

24
G. That plaintiffs be granted their attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees, and the costs and

25
expenses of this litigation;

26

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1

H. That the Court retain jurisdiction over all defendants until such time as it is satisfied

2 that they have remedied the practices complained of and are determined to be in full compliance

3 with the law.

4

DATED: March 22, 2013

5

Respectfully submitted,

6

7

s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr.

Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. #21282

8

James E. Gore

#78080

Williamson Law Firm, LLC

9

218 Delaware St. Suite 207

Kansas City, Missouri 64105

10

Telephone: (816) 256-4150

11

Facsimile: (913) 535-0736

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

12

DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

13

COMES NOW plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, and respectfully request that this

14 matter be set for a jury trial. Wichita, Kansas is designated as place of trial.

15

16

By: s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr.

Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. #21282

17

Attorney for plaintiffs

18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
19

20

I hereby certify I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the court by using the

21 CM/ECF system:

22
James Armstrong 23 Carolyn Matthews
Trish Thelen 24 Todd Tedesco

25 Foulston and Siefken 26 Attorneys for Defendants

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

By: s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. #21282 Attorney for plaintiffs
56-

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs, ) CIVIL ACTION

)

v.

) No. 05-1368-MLB

)

THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX,

)

CORPORATION, AND SPIRIT

)

AEROSYSTEMS

)

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for conditional class certification and notice. (Doc. 79.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. (Docs. 80, 81, 90, 95.) Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED, for reasons set forth herein. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs, all former employees of The Boeing Company (Boeing), allege that defendants terminated their employment or refused to hire them based on plaintiffs’ age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. (Doc. 80 at 1.) Proceeding under provisions of the ADEA that allow for claims to be pursued for a class of similarly situated individuals, plaintiffs seek conditional certification as a class so that notice of the action may be sent to all former Boeing employees who meet the following criteria:
(a) previously worked for Boeing’s Wichita/Tulsa Division; (b) were terminated, laid off by Boeing or not hired by Onex in connection with the sale of the Boeing Wichita/Tulsa Division between January 1, 2002 and July 1, 2005; and (c) were

age 40 or older on the date of termination, layoff or non[-]hire. (Doc. 80 attach. 2 at 1.) Defendants concede that conditional certification is appropriate at this stage of the case, but object to the scope of the putative class, as well as other deficiencies in the proposed notice. (Doc. 90 at 2, 4-5.) Specifically, defendants contend that the class may include only those former Boeing employees terminated as part of the divestiture of its commercial division to Spirit Aerosystems (Spirit) that occurred in May and June of 2005. Id. at 4. Defendants argue that individuals terminated prior to that time are not similarly situated with those who were fired in mid-2005, at which time Boeing terminated all of its employees within its commercial division. Id. at 5-7. Furthermore, defendants argue that plaintiffs who were terminated prior to the mass-layoffs in 2005 failed to exhaust their administrative remedies inasmuch as plaintiffs have provided no evidence that any such plaintiff filed an ADEA charge with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC). Id. at 7-9. Finally, defendants argue that only those individuals who completed re-hire paperwork with Spirit can properly be considered as potential class members. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs agree with a number of defendants’ objections, (Doc. 95 at 2), but insist that the scope of the class must extend back to January 2002 because it was around this time that Boeing concocted a plan to begin reducing the age of its workforce.1 Id. at 6. In
1 Plaintiffs failed to address one of defendants’ objections to the proposed form of notice. Defendants objected to the date that the lawsuit was filed and a reference to the assertion that over 400
-2-

response to the charge of failure to exhaust remedies with the EEOC, plaintiffs rely on the “single filing rule,” which allows plaintiffs who did not file a charge in an ADEA collective action to join the lawsuit so long as they are similarly situated with plaintiffs who did timely exhaust their administrative remedies. (Docs. 40 at 9; 95 at 4;) see also Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1111 (10th Cir. 2001). Finally, plaintiffs object to defendants’ contention that the class should be limited to only those persons who completed the required paperwork necessary to be considered for a job with Spirit, arguing instead that the form was illegal because it “purported to waive the right to challenge the legality of Boeing’s conduct.” (Doc. 95 at 3.)
In sum, there are only two disputed issues before the court. First, whether the class should extend back to January, 2002. And second, whether completion of the re-hire paperwork should be a necessary condition for class participation. II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs claim that defendants discriminated against them on the basis of age in violation of section 4 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623. (Doc. 40, 2d Am. Compl., at 43-44.) The ADEA authorizes plaintiffs to proceed as a class under the opt-in class action provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Pursuant to section 216(b), one or more named plaintiffs may bring a collective action on behalf of themselves and “other employees similarly situated.” In order to identify similarly situated
additional plaintiffs had consented to join the suit. Since plaintiffs did not respond to this objection, it is sustained.
-3-

employees, the court has authority to permit issuance of notice to
potential class members. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S.
165, 169, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486, 107 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1989).
Although noting the existence of at least three different
approaches to determining whether potential class members are
similarly situated with named plaintiffs, the Tenth Circuit has
expressly approved the use of the so-called “ad hoc” approach.
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102, 1104.
In utilizing this approach, a court typically makes an initial “notice stage” determination of whether plaintiffs are “similarly situated.” Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672, 678 (D. Colo. 1997). In doing so, a court “‘require[s] nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.’” Id. (quoting Bayles, 950 F. Supp. at 1066). At the conclusion of discovery (often prompted by a motion to decertify), the court then makes a second determination, utilizing a stricter standard of “similarly situated.” Id. at 678. During this “second stage” analysis, a court reviews several factors, including “(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; (3) fairness and procedural considerations; and (4) whether plaintiffs made the filings required by the ADEA before instituting suit.” Id.
Id. at 1102-03.
This case is currently at the notice stage. Accordingly, the
question is whether plaintiffs have put forth substantial allegations
that potential class members were terminated because of a single
policy or plan. The court finds that they have.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Boeing began considering the
sale of its commercial division at least as early as January of 2002.
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(Doc. 40 at 35.) Presumably in order to make this asset more attractive to potential buyers, plaintiffs allege that Boeing conceived a plan to reduce the average age of its workforce. Id. at 34-38. This plan involved encouraging older workers to retire or quit, and terminating many who would not leave voluntarily. Id. Plaintiffs allege that it was pursuant to this plan that plaintiffs Montgomery and Wells were fired in 2002 and plaintiff Burrows was terminated in 2003. (Doc. 40 at 13, 22, 30.) Assuming the truth of these allegations, the court concludes that plaintiffs have alleged a single policy or plan that resulted in the termination of older workers as far back as January of 2002. Thus, according to Thiessen, plaintiffs have met their burden to show that putative class members are similarly situated at the notice stage.
Against this conclusion, defendants argue that plaintiffs who were terminated prior to the mass-layoffs in 2005 could not possibly be similarly situated with those who were let go just prior to the sale to Spirit. (Doc. 90 at 6-7.) However, defendants’ argument ignores the plain statements in Thiessen that plaintiffs need merely make substantial allegations that the terminations resulted from a single plan or policy. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. Under that standard, it is irrelevant that some plaintiffs were terminated under different circumstances than others. If all the terminations were the result of a policy to rid the company of older workers, that is sufficient at this stage of the proceedings.
Continuing, defendants argue that plaintiffs discharged more than 300 days prior to the 2005 layoffs may not participate because they have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. (Doc. 90 at 7-
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9.) Defendants base this argument, at least in part, on the fact that
the only EEOC charges included in the record listed January 1, 2005
as the earliest date of discriminatory conduct, without indicating
that the plaintiffs were charging a continuing violation. (Doc. 81.)
Ultimately, this argument may have merit. While not every
plaintiff in an ADEA collective action needs to file an EEOC charge,
Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1110-11, there is a requirement that each
plaintiff must have been able to file a charge at the time one or more
of the other plaintiffs actually filed their charges. Id. Since the
allegations of unlawful discharge by Montgomery, Wells, and Burrows
occurred more than 300 days before January 1, 2005, it could be that
their claims will be barred by their failure to file a timely charge
with the EEOC.2 However, under Thiessen, the question of “whether
2 Plaintiffs argue that Thiessen allows for a class period extending back beyond the 300-day limit based on mere allegations of a continuing violation. (Doc. 80 at 7.) Thus, plaintiffs appear to suggest that, since they alleged in their complaint a continuing violation beginning in January of 2002, they are entitled to include all terminations occurring after that date without regard to the contents and timeliness of the EEOC charges that were actually filed. However, a review of Thiessen counsels against that conclusion. The Thiessen opinion did not include the entirety of the actual language of the EEOC charge filed in that case. Since Thiessen was filed in the District of Kansas, this court reviewed the complaint filed in that case. Included as an attachment to the complaint was an EEOC charge that contained an extensive narrative chronicling the allegedly discriminatory policies of the defendant in that case. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., No. 96-2410-KHV, Doc. 4, 1st Am. Compl. attach. 1 exh. B. The EEOC charge specifically referred to the implementation of the discriminatory policy and its application to plaintiff in September of 1993, id., from which the Court of Appeals concluded that “the class should, at this stage of the proceedings, include all those plaintiffs whose related claims (i.e., adverse employment actions resulting from application of the blocker policy) arose between September 1993 and 1995.” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1111. The EEOC charges provided by plaintiffs in support of this motion do not appear to contain any allegations that would place defendants or the EEOC on notice that the challenged employment activities dated back as far as January of 2002. (Doc. 81.) Nevertheless, ultimate
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plaintiffs made the filings required by the ADEA before instituting suit” is not properly raised until the completion of discovery. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103. Thiessen cited Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1066 (D. Colo. 1996), for this proposition, and Bayles in turn relied on Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 376-77 (D.N.J. 1987), wherein the court specifically used this phrase to refer to the filing of a timely EEOC charge. Thus, resolution of this question has no bearing on the propriety of issuing notice to prospective class members. Indeed, discovery may reveal that potential plaintiffs seeking to join the class have satisfied the EEOC filing requirement such that others who did not file an EEOC charge may nevertheless proceed with this suit. See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1110-11.
Finally, with respect to the argument that completing re-hire paperwork is a prerequisite to class membership, the court finds that such a requirement is not appropriate under the facts of this case at this particular stage of the litigation. As previously noted, substantial allegations that all putative class members lost their jobs because of a single policy or plan is sufficient to warrant conditional certification at this point. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102. The crux of plaintiffs’ case is that Boeing’s efforts to reduce the average age of their workforce began in January of 2002. (Doc. 40 at 35.) That constitutes allegations of a single policy driving all the subsequent terminations. Requiring completion of the re-hire paperwork would necessarily exclude those potential class members who
resolution of this issue must await completion of discovery.
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were terminated before any re-hire paperwork ever came into existence. Such a result would be inconsistent with the “single policy” rule under which this motion must be decided. Furthermore, since plaintiffs’ complaint contains allegations that the re-hire paperwork was unlawful, (Doc. 40 at 40-41), and plaintiffs argue that some potential plaintiffs may have refused to complete the forms on that basis, the mere failure to complete the forms cannot be construed as an absolute indication that certain individuals did not desire to continue their employment with Spirit. (Doc. 95 at 3.) For all these reasons, the court finds that completion of the re-hire paperwork shall not be part of the criteria for determining who receives notice of this action.
In sum the court finds that notice of the collective action may be sent to all former Boeing employees who were terminated by Boeing on or after January 1, 2002; who were 40 years of age or older at the time of termination; and who were not hired by Spirit. The notice plaintiffs attached to their brief will be sufficient if modified to conform to these requirements and to the changes proposed by defendants and conceded to by plaintiffs or otherwise waived.3 (Doc. 95 at 2.) Defendants shall provide plaintiffs with the names and last known addresses of all former employees who meet the specified criteria. This matter is hereby referred to the magistrate judge to establish a timetable for completion of all tasks necessary for the opt-in process.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under Local Rule 7.3
3 See supra, note 1. -8-

is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law, or where the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider and advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 15th

day of November 2006, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/ Monti Belot Monti L. Belot UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 139 Filed 12/18/06 Page 1 of 19

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs, ) CIVIL ACTION

)

v.

) No. 05-1368-MLB

)

THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX,

)

CORPORATION, AND SPIRIT

)

AEROSYSTEMS

)

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 99.) The motion has been fully
briefed and is ripe for decision. (Docs. 100, 106, 117.) Defendants’
motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part, for reasons set forth
herein.
I. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS STANDARD: FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c)
In evaluating a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), the court applies the same standard as it would in
deciding a motion for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Nelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 419 F.3d 1117, 1119 (10th
Cir. 2005). Under that standard, the court must
accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. A dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6) will be [granted] only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Id. (quotation omitted). Conclusory allegations, however, have no
bearing upon the court’s consideration. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 139 Filed 12/18/06 Page 2 of 19
1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989). In the end, the issue is not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims. See Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (D. Kan. 2000). II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs, all former employees of The Boeing Company (Boeing), allege that defendants terminated their employment or refused to hire them for various unlawful reasons including age and race, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17; and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. (Doc. 40.)
The parties agree that Boeing sold its commercial division assets to Spirit Aerosystems (Spirit) in mid-2005. These assets were located in the following cities: Wichita, Kansas; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and McAlester, Oklahoma. Id. at 32; (Doc. 100 at 1.) Spirit is a whollyowned subsidiary of the Onex Corporation (Onex) created specifically for the purpose of purchasing the Boeing assets. (Doc. 40 at 32.)
As part of the sale Boeing alleges that it laid off all of its commercial division employees. (Doc. 100 at 4.) These Boeing employees were given the opportunity to apply for jobs with Spirit; however, a precondition to being considered for employment was that the employee complete a “Consent to Release Personnel Information Form” (Consent Form). (Doc. 40 at 40-41.) Plaintiffs are a number of former Boeing employees who were not offered jobs with Spirit. Id. at 31.
Plaintiffs allege that Boeing began considering the sale of its -2-

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commercial division at least by early 2002. (Doc. 40 at 35.) Presumably in order to make this asset more attractive to potential buyers, plaintiffs allege that Boeing conceived a plan to reduce the average age of its workforce. Id. at 34-38. This plan involved encouraging older workers to retire or quit, and terminating many who would not leave voluntarily. Id. Plaintiffs claim that Boeing undertook studies of the costs associated with healthcare and pension benefits for older workers, and that those studies showed Boeing that it could significantly reduce its labor costs by eliminating older workers. Id. at 42-43. Acting on this information, plaintiffs assert that Boeing began terminating older workers as early as January of 2002.
Plaintiffs further allege that, at some point, Onex and Spirit (as potential purchasers) became involved in this scheme and conspired with Boeing in furtherance of this plan, basically making the efforts to reduce the age of the workforce an integral part of the deal under which Boeing would sell its commercial division to Spirit. Id. Ultimately, the plan resulted in Boeing’s decision to terminate its entire commercial division workforce in two mass layoffs that occurred in May and June of 2005.
Plaintiffs’ theory is that once Boeing eliminated its workforce in a blanket termination of all employees, Onex and Spirit completed the scheme by selectively hiring back younger employees. Id. at 9, 31, 35. Accordingly, the theory appears to go, Boeing would appear not to have discriminated because it eliminated all employees, while Onex and Spirit would avoid the liability for discrimination because the case law generally holds that ERISA does not prohibit age
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discrimination in hiring decisions. (Doc. 106 at 13-14.) In the present motion, defendants move for judgment on the claims
in Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 99.) In Count Two, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that defendants failed to keep proper employee records in violation of Title VII. In Count Three, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Consent Form is invalid and that it violates both the ADEA and ERISA. Finally, in Count Four, plaintiffs allege that defendants discharged them and discriminated against them for the purposes of interfering with their attainment of pension and healthcare benefits, in violation of ERISA. (Doc. 40 at 44-45.) III. ANALYSIS
A. Count Two - Records-Keeping Violation Ostensibly proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c), plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Onex and/or Spirit failed to retain certain personnel records required to be maintained by that statute. Section 2000e-8(c) requires employers to “make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed,” and to retain those records for time periods determined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).1 The statute also authorizes the EEOC to seek injunctive relief in the federal courts against employers who refuse to comply with these record-keeping requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c). Defendants maintain that plaintiffs’ claim in Count II fails as
1 The actual retention times prescribed by the EEOC are delineated at 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.
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a matter of law because section 2000e-8(c) does not create a private right of action. (Doc. 100 at 6-7.) Plaintiffs counter that, while the statute does not authorize a private action for enforcement, the court may nevertheless rule on the matter under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. (Doc. 106 at 14-16.) Defendants respond that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not form an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, and that plaintiffs must satisfy the basic requirements for standing in order to obtain any relief, including a declaratory judgment. (Doc. 117 at 6-7.)
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, they present no authority whatsoever for the notion that the court can use the Declaratory Judgment Act as a basis for relief under Count II. Indeed, plaintiffs appear to rely on an Eighth Circuit case from 1937 for generalizations about the utility of a declaratory judgment. (Doc. 106 at 16.) However, a review of that case shows that the parenthetical quote upon which plaintiffs rely was taken from a footnote in a dissenting opinion, which footnote was nothing more than an extremely lengthy quote from a Senate Judiciary Committee Report issued by the 73d Congress. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 89 F.2d 261, 265 n.1 (8th Cir. 1937) (Stone, J., dissenting). This authority is irrelevant, unpersuasive, and is, in fact, no authority at all.2
The few courts that have dealt with this question have made short shrift of the matter. There is no private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c). See Catoire v. Caprock Telecomms. Corp., 2003
2 Plaintiffs’ counsel is strongly advised against continuing this practice in cases before this judge. A lack of accuracy or candor diminishes the persuasiveness of the party’s position and the credibility of his counsel.
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WL 21223258, *2 (E.D. La. May 22, 2003); Branch v. County of Chesterfield, 2001 WL 1943878, *8 n.11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2001). When a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for injunctive relief or monetary damages against a defendant, he cannot bring a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 of N. M. v. Albertson's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2000). In fact, the situation in United Food was strikingly similar (though not identical) to the issue raised in Count II. In United Food, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment under section 217 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 217. Id. at 1197. However, the Tenth Circuit noted that the federal government was the only entity authorized to seek relief under section 217. Id. at 119798. Since that section did not authorize a private entity to seek relief, the plaintiff could not overcome this limitation by pursuing a declaratory judgment. Id. at 1198.
The claim in Count Two is in a similar posture. Section 2000e8(c) only authorizes the EEOC to seek injunctive relief in the district courts. Since plaintiffs clearly cannot seek the only relief authorized under that section, they cannot overcome this limitation by asking for a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs could prove no facts entitling them to relief under Count Two. Therefore, defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on that claim.
B. Count Three - Validity of the Consent Form In this count, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Consent Forms were invalid under ERISA, the ADEA, and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). Under
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the OWBPA, an employee cannot waive ADEA rights “unless the waiver is
knowing and voluntary.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1). In order to be
considered knowing and voluntary, a waiver must be in writing, and it
must comply with a number of additional requirements delineated in
section 626(f)(1). However, before any of the waiver requirements
become binding, there must be an effort to enforce a waiver of the
rights at issue under the ADEA. Id.
Defendants argue that the Consent Form does not purport to waive
any rights under the ADEA. (Doc. 100 at 8.) In fact, defendants
conceded in their answer that the Consent Form did not waive those
rights. (Doc. 54 at 35.) Hence, they argue, the OWBPA requirements
simply do not apply. (Doc. 100 at 8-9.)
The relevant language of the Consent Form provides as follows:
As a result of the proposed transaction whereby Mid-Western Aircraft Systems, Inc. (“Buyer”) has agreed, subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions, to acquire the Wichita Division of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Buyer desires to review personnel information and files of Boeing employees for the purpose of deciding whether to make job offers to them. I understand that a potential consequence of my not authorizing Boeing to furnish information to Buyer is that I will not receive an offer from Buyer.
. . . .
I authorize The Boeing Company to provide Buyer any and all information concerning my employment with Boeing, my education, or any other information that Boeing might have, personal or otherwise, with regard to my employment. I hereby release Boeing, including its officers, directors, agents, and employees from any and all liability, claims and damages which may result from Boeing’s furnishing such information to Buyer.
I understand that this Consent to Release Personnel Information and Records does not apply
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to, and will not authorize the release of, medical records, workers compensation records, Employee Assistance Program records, and Drug Free Workplace Act records.
I further authorize Buyer to request, receive, and verify any and all information furnished to it by Boeing pursuant to this Consent to Release Personnel Information and Records. (Doc. 100 exh. 1-A (emphasis added).) Defendants argue that this language means precisely what it says - that by signing the waiver, plaintiffs were only waiving their rights to assert any claims “which may result from Boeing’s furnishing such information to” Spirit. (Doc. 100 exh. 1-A.) Thus, the waiver only operates to preclude plaintiffs from asserting claims related to a violation of their privacy rights for having released their employee information to Spirit. (Doc. 100 at 9.) Plaintiffs counter that the Consent Form purports to waive “any and all” claims against Boeing. (Doc. 106 at 16 (quoting the Consent Form).) However, plaintiffs deliberately and disingenuously fail to acknowledge that the “any and all” language is further qualified by the text of the Consent Form as limiting the waiver to claims resulting “from Boeing’s furnishing such information to Buyer.” (Doc. 100 exh. 1-A.) The court agrees with defendants’ interpretation. Despite plaintiffs’ bombastic and irrelevant arguments to the contrary, the Consent Form simply cannot be construed as an attempt by defendants to secure a waiver of rights under the ADEA by plaintiffs or anyone
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else.3 By its own terms, the Consent Form waives only those claims related to Boeing’s having released an individual’s personnel information to Spirit. The only possible types of claims that would seem capable of arising from the release of such information are those related to the unauthorized dissemination of personal information claims including and similar to those based on an invasion of privacy. Such claims are not cognizable under the ADEA; therefore, the OWBPA requirements do not apply to the Consent Form.
As an alternative argument for invalidating the Consent Form, plaintiffs argue that defendants procured plaintiffs’ signature on the forms by way of threats and coercion, including threats that plaintiffs would not receive jobs with Spirit unless they signed the form. (Doc. 40 at 44-45.) Plaintiffs further argue that such conduct amounts to retaliation under both the ADEA and ERISA, thereby rendering the Consent Forms unenforceable. (Id.; Doc. 106 at 17-18); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(d), 1140.
The problem here is that, once again, the Consent Form cannot be read as an attempt to secure a waiver of any rights under the ADEA or ERISA. As already noted, the Consent Form is simply an attempt to ensure that Boeing would not be subject to claims that it provided personnel information to Spirit without the authorization of the individuals whose information was being passed. Such claims are not the concern of the ADEA or ERISA.
Plaintiffs appear to suggest that since they would not be
3 One of plaintiffs’ arguments is that they are entitled to represent “. . . any and all persons that the defendant [sic] may utilize the release against.” (Doc. 106 at 17.)
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considered for jobs with Spirit unless they signed the form, and since (pursuant to their theory) the entire exercise of laying off all workers and then re-hiring most of them was a veiled effort to discriminate against them on the basis of age, that any condition precedent to their being considered for employment by Spirit must amount to age discrimination. The court firmly rejects that argument. By its own terms, the Consent Form was a limited waiver of liability related only to the disclosure of personnel records to Spirit. It was universally applicable to all Boeing commercial division employees, all of whom were laid off.4 The form cannot be construed as either an explicit or implicit effort to discriminate on the basis of age. The simple fact is that Spirit needed the employee records in order to make an informed decision about which employees it wanted to hire.
Since the Consent Form cannot be construed as, and is not asserted to be, a waiver of rights under the ADEA or ERISA, plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief under Count Three. Therefore, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to this count of the Second Amended Complaint.
C. Count Four - Interference with ERISA Rights In this count, plaintiffs allege the substance of their ERISA theory - that defendants conspired to terminate them in an effort to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining and receiving pension and/or
4 Compare, e.g., Kruchowski v. Weyerhauser Co., 446 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2006), wherein a waiver form signed by employees involved in a RIF (i.e. not all the company’s employees) was held to be noncompliant with 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) and thus unenforceable against RIF’d employees’ ADEA claims. In this case, defendants are expressly disclaiming any attempt to enforce the waiver as a bar to plaintiffs’ claims.
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healthcare benefits. (Doc. 40 at 45.) In responding to this charge, defendants stand on their argument that when a company terminates all its employees as part of a divestiture, section 510 of ERISA does not apply. Likewise, they contend the law is clear that a company is not liable under section 510 for failing to hire someone. (Doc. 100 at 11-16.)
Section 510 of ERISA provides, in relevant part, that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under [an employee benefit plan] . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1140. Although the statute also proscribes retaliation for exercising ERISA-protected rights, Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990)), plaintiffs rely on the interference prong for their theory in the present case. (Doc. 40 at 45.)
In applying section 510, the Supreme Court has adhered closely to the text of the statute. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 514-16, 117 S. Ct. 1513, 1515-16, 137 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1997). Consistent with that requirement, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants discharged or otherwise discriminated against them in order to interfere with their attainment of benefits. (Doc. 40 at 45.) Thus, the question presented on this aspect of the motion is whether Boeing’s termination of all it commercial division employees, coupled with Spirit’s selective re-hiring, amounts to discharging or discriminating against
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plaintiffs in contravention of section 510. While it seems elementary that these plaintiffs were
“discharged,” given that they were terminated and never re-hired by Boeing, the courts have not employed dictionary jurisprudence in interpreting this ERISA provision. In Andes v. Ford Motor Company, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confronted the question of whether the divestiture of a subsidiary company amounted to a discharge under section 510. 70 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Relying on the text of the statute, legislative history, and a little bit of common sense, the court of appeals concluded that Congress never intended the term “discharge” in section 510 to encompass company- or division-wide layoffs related to the sale of assets. Id. at 1337-38. To do so would have been to impose ERISA liability almost every time a company is sold or a unit is divested. See id. at 1337-38, 1339. In so holding, the D.C. Circuit noted that its holding was in accord with a number of decisions by other courts of appeals. Id. at 1336-37 (citing Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488 (11th Cir. 1993); Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1993); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1987); West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1987); Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017, 105 S. Ct. 431, 83 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1984).
While Andes represents the proper view for divestitures where the termination of the workforce is a mere consequence of the transaction, courts have not been afraid to allow a case to proceed when the challenged actions were allegedly for the purpose of interfering with ERISA rights. For example, in Gavalik v. Cont’l Can Co., the Third
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Circuit found the possibility of ERISA liability where an employer had concocted a “liability avoidance plan” to avoid having ERISA protected benefits vest in certain employees. 812 F.2d 834, 854-57 (3d Cir. 1987). The plan involved shifting work volume from plants with high unfunded pension liability to those with lower liability, as well as laying off younger workers whose pension rights had not vested. Id. at 840-42. It also involved closing at least one facility based on its high unfunded pension liability. Id. at 841. Although the latter action involved termination of all employees at the facility, the court found that the decision was specifically motivated by a desire to prevent vesting of pension benefits. Id. at 863-64.5
Similarly, in Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., a district court in this circuit concluded that the defendant violated section 510 of ERISA when it closed a plant for the purpose of avoiding millions of dollars in pension costs. 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1307 (N.D. Okla. 2001). ERISA liability was imposed despite the fact that this was a plant-wide closure. Id. at 1264, 1268. Thus, contrary to defendants’ assertions, the mere fact of a plant-wide or division-wide divestiture does not foreclose the possibility of liability under section 510.
5 Although the Tenth Circuit has apparently not answered the precise question presented in this case, the court notes that the circuit has relied on Gavalik for its proposition that specific intent to interfere with ERISA-protected rights is a necessary element of a claim under section 510. Garratt, 164 F.3d at 1256; Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 649 (10th Cir. 1993); Card v. Hercules, Inc., 1993 WL 351337, *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1993); Dodson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1991 WL 180090, *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 1991); see also Cunningham v. Adams, 106 Fed. Appx. 693, 698 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2004). The Second Amended Complaint clearly alleged specific intent to interfere with rights protected by ERISA. (Doc. 40 at 45.)
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Moreover, the views expressed in Gavalik and Millsap are not inconsistent with the general view expressed in Andes. In the latter case, the D.C. Circuit held out the possibility that some divestitures could result in ERISA liability if they specifically targeted workers for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of benefits. Andes, 70 F.3d at 1338. The situation alleged here simply adds a new twist to the scenario contemplated in Andes.
While the schemes in Gavalik and Millsap were specifically orchestrated to interfere with protected benefits, plaintiffs do not allege that the same is true here. Indeed, it seems that no one questions the legitimate business purpose behind Boeing’s decision to divest its commercial division assets. Nevertheless, plaintiffs maintain that the elimination of older workers became a central part of the transaction. It was, in effect, part of the consideration for which Onex would purchase the Boeing assets through its newly created entity, Spirit.
In Lessard v. Applied Risk Management, the Ninth Circuit faced a situation quite similar to that presented here. 307 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff was employed by Applied Risk Management, Inc. (ARM). Under the terms of her employment, the plaintiff was provided medical benefits that were protected by ERISA. ARM entered into an agreement with Professional Risk Management and its parent company, MMI Companies, Inc. (PRM/MMI) for the sale of all of ARM’s assets. Under the terms of that agreement, most ARM employees would automatically transfer to PRM/MMI at the time of the sale and would continue to receive benefits under a similar plan. However, individuals, including the plaintiff, who were on medical leave at the
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time of the sale would not be transferred and their benefits would be terminated. Id. at 1022-23.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that in a normal divestiture situation, where the seller terminates all its employees and the buyer refuses to hire some of them, no ERISA violation occurs. Id. at 1026. However, the court of appeals concluded that, where discriminatory intent had been shown, two or more companies would not be allowed to conspire to do what one of them could not do alone. Id. (“Following the Supreme Court's admonition in Inter-Modal Rail, 520 U.S. at 515, 117 S. Ct. 1513, we do not read [West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1987)] to permit two or more companies incident to an asset sale to take joint action that violates the express terms of the statute.”)
Here, the net effect of the scheme, as alleged by plaintiffs, is that the bulk of Boeing’s workforce was transferred to Spirit, but older workers were specifically targeted for elimination. Where defendants have allegedly used complicated schemes and formalities to hide otherwise unlawful conduct, courts have been cautioned not to accept form over substance. See, e.g., Keeler v. C.I.R., 243 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (looking past form and to substance of transactions for tax purposes); Crude Co. v. F.E.R.C., 135 F.3d 1445, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (agency, like courts, “may look beyond form to the economic substance [of a transaction], in order to further the regulatory purpose of Congress”); In re Eufaula Enters., Inc., 565 F.2d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 1977) (“When one legal entity is but an instrumentality or alter ego of another, by which it is dominated, a court may look beyond form to substance and may disregard the theory
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of distinct legal entities in determining ownership of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding”). Lessard applied this guidance to ERISA, and the court finds that approach appropriate to the facts as alleged here. Boeing could not legally terminate its older employees in order to make itself more attractive to a potential purchaser, nor could it agree to get rid of its older workers as part of the consideration for a divestiture. The question here is whether Boeing could conspire with Onex and Spirit to do what it could not do alone.
In synthesizing ERISA section 510 cases discussed herein, the court concludes that Congress never intended for a normal, unbiased divestiture of business assets carried out for a business purpose to trigger ERISA liability based merely on the fact that ERISA benefits were incidentally affected. Under those circumstances, the loss of employment does not amount to a “discharge” under section 510. By contrast, when an employer specifically intends to interfere with the attainment of ERISA-protected benefits, ERISA liability may be possible, even in a divestiture. More specifically, when a seller and a buyer arrange an asset sale so that the net effect of the actions taken by both is to intentionally terminate the employment of older workers during the course of the asset transfer, they may be held liable under section 510 of ERISA for discharging or discriminating against employees for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of rights or benefits protected by ERISA. Under that view, Boeing’s conduct here, if proven, could render it liable under section 510.
Defendants make much of the fact that hiring decisions are generally immune from liability under section 510. (Docs. 100 at 15; 117 at 5.) Thus, they argue, Onex and Spirit cannot possibly be held
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liable, even if Boeing could be. However, the cases upon which defendants rely do not present the question whether a purchaser can conspire with the seller of a business to get rid of the older workers while retaining substantially the rest of the workforce.6 (Doc. 100 at 15-16; 117 at 4-6.) That appears to be the case alleged by plaintiffs, here. According to plaintiffs’ theory, Spirit and/or Onex did not want the economic burden caused by pension and healthcare benefits for Boeing’s older workers, but they were otherwise willing to hire most of the existing younger employees. Spirit could not have accepted the entire Boeing workforce and then selectively fired the older employees. Instead, plaintiffs allege that Onex and Spirit made the elimination of the older workers a prerequisite for purchasing Boeing’s commercial division, and that all defendants conspired to achieve that result in a way that would, technically speaking, appear to avoid liability for discharging or discriminating under section 510 of ERISA. (Doc. 40 at 42-43, 45.)
The court finds that under those unique circumstances, where the net result of the agreed upon conduct was the termination of older
6 The one exception to this statement involves West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1987.) In that case, the seller terminated all employees and the buyer refused to hire them because they would not agree to a benefits package that was less attractive than what they previously held while employed by the seller. Id. at 952-53. The Ninth Circuit found no ERISA liability related to the hiring decision because the purchaser owed no duty to its potential employees. Id. at 955. However, in West, there was no suggestion that the parties had studied the pension and healthcare costs related to older workers and then devised a scheme to get rid of them while effectively continuing the employment of the younger workers. It is the agreement to violate ERISA that exposes the purchaser to liability. See Lassard, 307 F.3d at 1026 (distinguishing West and holding that a purchaser and seller could not conspire to do what neither of them could do alone).
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workers for the purpose of interfering with attainment of rights protected by ERISA, both the seller and the buyers bear culpability for what amounts to discharging those individuals for reasons of age. Accordingly, Onex and/or Spirit may be held liable under ERISA section 510 if plaintiffs successfully prove they participated in the alleged scheme to get rid of the older workers. See Lessard, 307 F.3d at 1027.
The parties should note that this is only the pleading stage. The court offers no opinion regarding the truth or the provability of the allegations supporting Count Four. Rather, the court simply accepts as true the facts in the complaint, as it is required to do at this point in the proceedings. Under that standard, plaintiffs have pleaded a cause of action for interference with attainment of ERISA-protected benefits under section 510. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to Count Four.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under Local Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law, or where the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider and advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in
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Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 18th

day of December 2006, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/ Monti Belot Monti L. Belot UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 1 of 44

1 Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. Shores, Williamson & Ohaebosim, LLC
2 Attorneys and Counselors at Law 3 1400 Epic Center
301 N. Main Street 4 Wichita, Kansas 67202
Phone: (316) 261-5400 5 Fax: (316) 261-5404

6

7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

9
10 PERRY APSLEY, BOB BAILEY,
11 JACOB A. BAKK, GARY BALL,
12 PEGGY S. BELL, THOMAS BELTON,
13 MELONDA BIRCHER, 14 JAMES BOWMAKER,
JERRY L. BRANSTETER, 15 MICHAEL E. BURGARDT,
ROCKY R. BURRIS, 16 DANIEL D. BURROWS,
HENRY F. BUTLER, 17 BETTY CHILDERS,
DAVID L. CLAY, 18 LARRY E. COMBS, 19 HARVEY J. CONYAC,
LOREN W. COX, 20 PHYLLIS A. COX,
LINDA L. DEZARN, 21 WILLIAM D. DOSHIER,
THROMA A. DYAS, 22 ALAN S. EPPERSON, 23 LLOYD C. FANSLER,
JERALD J. GILBERT, 24 RICHARD GOTTHARD,
BRIAN GROOM, 25 DENISE A. HARRIS,
RON W. HENDERSHOT, 26 OLIVIA J. HOUSLEY,
VERNA J. HOUSTON,

) Case No.: 05-1368-MLB ) ) COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

-1CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 2 of 44

1 LARRY W. JAMES,

)

SHARRON N. JAMES,

)

2 GARY L. JOHNSON,

)

3 MELVYN J. JOHNSON, DONALD R. JONES,
4 RALPH O. KEENER,

) ) ) )

DANNY R. KENNEDY,

)

5 MELVIN E. KERNS,

)

GORDON B. KINKEAD,

)

6 JIMMY LE,

)

7

CARLTON E. LEE, STEPHEN L. LINCK,

8 FREDDY J. MCCOLPIN, GLENNYS M. MONTGOMERY,

) ) ) ) )

9 CATHY J. MUNSELL,

)

JAN W. MURRARY,

)

10 HUYEN T. NGUYEN,

)

LUYEN D. NGUYEN,

)

11 KENT W. OWEN,

)

12 LOWANDA J. PATTON, PAUL D. PETE,
13 BRENT L. POPP,

) ) ) )

JAMES E. PORTER,

)

14 JAY E. POWELL,

)

WARREN PYLES,

)

15 WILLARD J. RATCHFORD,

)

16 VERONICA RIOS, RICHARD D. ROEDER,
17 DARLENE E. ROZAR, ALBERT SCHLOETZER,

) ) ) ) )

18 WILLIAM H. SETCHELL,

)

JAMES C. SHEPPARD,

)

19 DEBRA L. SMITH,

)

SAMMY J. SMITH,

)

20 SHARON A. SOUTHERN,

)

21 LINDA C. SPARRER, ABEL L. VASQUEZ,
22 HENRY F. VICTOR,

) ) ) )

JAMES WALKER,

)

23 JAMES R. WALLACE,

)

CAROLYN Y. WHEATON,

)

24 SYLVESTER WILLIAMS II,

)

25 JANET M. WILSON, WALTER WOODS,
26 BETTY R. YOUNG, individually and on

) ) ) )

behalf of those similarly situated,

)

-2CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 3 of 44

1

)

)

2

Plaintiffs,

)

)

3

vs.

)

)

4 THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX )

CORPORATION, SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, )

5 and MIDWESTERN AIRCRAFT,

)

)

6
Defendants.

) )

7

8

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

9
COMES NOW plaintiffs individually and on be half of those sim ilarly situated, by and
10
through their counsel, Lawrence W. W illiamson, Jr. and Uzo L. Ohaebosim of Shores,
11
Williamson, & Ohaebosim, LLC, and for his cause of action against defendants, allege and state
12
as follows:
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

-3CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 4 of 44

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2

3 I. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................. 6 4 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................... 9 5 III. PARTIES .......................................................................................................................... 10 6 A. General Allegations as to all Plaintiffs ............................................................................... 10
7
B. Specific Allegations as to Individual Plaintiffs .................................................................. 10
8

9 C. Defendants ........................................................................................................................... 27
10
11 IV. CLASS ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................................................... 28 12 A. 23 (a) Requirements.......................................................................................................... 28 13 B. 23(b) Requirements........................................................................................................... 29

14
V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS .................................................................................................. 30
15
A. Pattern and Practice of Discrimination ............................................................................. 30
16
1. Boeing and Onex Made Decisions against Employees................................................ 30
17
18 B. Disparate Treatment.......................................................................................................... 31

19

1. Similarly Situated Individuals..................................................................................... 31

20

2. Direct Evidence of Intentional Discrimination ........................................................... 31

21 C. Disparate Impact ............................................................................................................... 34

22

1. Alleged Criteria............................................................................................................. 34

23
2. Alleged Criteria Was Not Utilized................................................................................ 34
24
3. Even If Criteria Was Used, It Allowed for Too much Subjectivity.............................. 35
25
D. Statistics Provide Evidence for Pattern and Practice, Disparate Treatment, and Disparate 26 Impact ........................................................................................................................................ 35

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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 5 of 44
1 E. Release Violated the ADEA and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act................... 36 2 F. IAM Breached its Duty of Fair Representation ................................................................ 37
3
4 COUNT I: AGE DISCRIMINATION.......................................................................................... 37 5 COUNT II: DECLARATORY RELIEF....................................................................................... 38 6 COUNT III: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ............................................................................. 38 7 COUNT IV: INTERFERENCE WITH ERISA RIGHTS ............................................................ 39 8 COUNT V: BREACH OF CONTRACT...................................................................................... 39 9 COUNT VI.................................................................................................................................... 40 10 COUNT VII: RETALIATION ..................................................................................................... 41 11 VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................... 41
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 6 of 44

1

I. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2

1.

This case is about the betrayal by The Boeing Company and its partner in crim e,

3 Onex (Spirit Aerospace, Midwestern Aircraft ) against m ore that 1,000 employees who have

4 dedicated decades in assisting Boeing collecting more that Ten Billion dollars in revenue.

5

2.

Boeing and Onex kept decisions a secret . The defendants kept the nam es of the

6 subsidiaries secret until after the d ecisions were made against the plaint iffs and Class. In

7 furtherance of these secrets, Boeing provided a code name “Project Lloyd.” Only certain

8 personnel were provided access to the folders under th is database. Th is database was at least

9 7.59 MB in size and should be produced in its entir ety in defendants’ init ial disclosures. The

10 defendants have also kept the true relationship between Boeing, Onex, Midwestern, and Spirit

11 Aerospace a secret.

12

3.

One act th at was no s ecret was the term ination of the p laintiffs and Class.

13 Instead of infor ming the employees when decisions were made, it tortured em ployees and put

14 families and individuals through unexplainable feelings while they waited to see if they would

15 receive a “pink slip.” In announcing these te rminations, the employees of Boeing were entitled

16 to more respect than the insult of throwing “insult slips” into the driveways of the individuals

17 who helped Boeing prosper throughout the years. The humiliation for workers did not end here.

18
Nigel Wright, of Onex, publicly s tated that the workers who were not of fered positions were

19
individuals with bad attitudes, troublemakers, and/or dead beats. Some em ployees were even

20
escorted off of the premises as if they were common criminals.

21
4.

How much less dignity can som eone have, than for a delivery truck to throw an

22
envelope out onto the driveway? E ach plaintiff and Class m ember deserved m uch more than

23
that and at the very least deserved to know “why” they were terminated. In failing to adequately

24
protect the rights of the older workers, the de fendants have injured not only these em ployees,

25
but their families and loved ones as well. As Plaintiff Pete has noted, “Life isn't always fair but,

26
why is Boeing playing with the people and their family's lives!?”

-6CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 7 of 44

1

5.

Instead of accepting responsibility for the treatm ent the defendants have

2 perpetrated, defendants have begun playing “pin the tail on the other.” At the EEOC stage,

3 Defendant Boeing stated that it did not have anything to do with the decisions made against the

4 employees. However, there were n otes sent from Onex that stated that Boeing’s mangers were

5 to help pick and choose who wa s staying for the new com pany. Additionally, plaintiffs have

6 undisputable proof that Boeing’s m anagers indeed had significant i nput into the wrongful

7 terminations of the plaintiffs and Class.

8

6.

While Boeing has instituted its “play dumb” defense, Onex has instituted its “see

9 no evil” defense. Despite federal m andates to maintain proper reco rds regarding why the

10 decisions were made against plaintiffs and Class, Onex failed to do so. As a result, Onex was

11 penalized by the EEOC for these actions.

12

7.

Employees who had believed the myth of job security that Boeing professed over

13 the years were, after 20 years, forced to ente r the job m arket, tainted as worker’s not good

14 enough to make the grade. Plaintiffs, such as Pl aintiff James’ dreams of retiring at a certain age

15 were taken away from them.

16

8.

Additionally, the laid off workers were denied the right to vote when time came

17 to protest the actions of Boeing and Onex. The IAM d id not represent the interests of these

18
workers. One exam ple of the Union’s failures can be seen with the f ailure to file a grievance.
19
IAM Union drafted a grievance and called for all to sign. However, mysteriously, the grievance
20
disappeared.
21

22

23

24

25

26

-7CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 8 of 44

1

9.

As another sign of defendants’ bad f aith, Nigel Wright stated that as a gesture of

2 good will to the machinists union, when the company needs to hire again that they would first

3 hire back the laid off workers. However, Onex (Spirit) has not honored that prom ise. Indeed,

4 many of the plaintiffs and Class m embers have applied for positions that they are qualified for

5 and have held for years, and have not been offe red a position. In some cases plaintiffs have

6 been rejected as “unqu alified.” Addition ally, Spirit Aero space has s et arbitrary standards

7 regarding being hired into the company so that former workers could almost never receive a job

8 offer.

9

10.

In connection with the RIF, the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age

10 discrimination, in treating younger em ployees more favorably than older em ployees, including

11 (but not limited to) some of the following specific actions:

12

a. Consciously deciding not to com ply with the Older W orkers Benefit

13

Protection Act (“OW BPA”) for certa in job grades, in order to avoid

14

having to disclose dem ographic data and its “se lection criteria” to those

15

affected by the RIF;

16

b. Terminating more qualified older workers while employing less qualified

17

younger workers;

18
c. Failing to p rovide the term inated workers with the ration ale why they
19
were terminated;
20
d. Filling “open” positions within departments with younger employees (i.e.,
21
under the age of 40) just before the RIF, then te rminating older workers
22
(i.e., those 40 years of age and older ) in the sam e or similar positions as
23
part of the RIF;
24
e. Allowing managers to access improper criteria, such as age, date of birth,
25
and other age related data, for use in making RIF decisions;
26

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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 9 of 44

1

f. Setting up a “sham” process for displaced workers to “re-apply” for open

2

positions with Spirit, r esulting in s ituations where old er applicants (i.e.,

3

those 40 years of age and older) were not given the same consideration as

4

younger employees and were denied even the opportunity to interview for

5

such open positions; and

6

g. Continuing to hire new and younger employees after the RIF.

7

11.

The alleged system was subjective, arbitrary, non-substantive, dishonest, and

8 inaccurate. Additionally, the system was:

9

a. Biased against older (over age 40) workers; and

10

b. Inequitable and inappropriate because of pool size and composition.

11

12.

In addition to the foregoing facts, Plaintiffs are “similarly situated” in that: all are

12 over 40; all were term inated by Boeing and/or not hired by Onex as part of a Reduction in

13 Force.

14

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15

13.

This is a civil action over which original jurisdiction is vested in this Court by 28

16 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3). This Court also is vested with exclusive

17 subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims under ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §

18
1132(e)(1) and (f)12. T his Court has supplem ental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367

19
over all other claims that are so related to claims within its original or exclusive jurisdiction that

20
they form part of the sam e case or contro versy under Article III of the United States

21
Constitution. Venue is appropriate in this Court under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1391 and 29 U.S.C. §

22
1132(e) (2) as it is brought in a ju dicial district in which the de fendants reside or may be found

23
at the time the action is commenced. Further, many of the plaintiffs and class members reside in

24
the State of Kansas.

25
14.

Plaintiffs have exhausted and satisfie d all conditions precedent to f iling this

26
action. Addition ally, plaintiffs invoke the s ingle file ru le as d efendants were placed on

-9CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 10 of 44

1 sufficient notice of the class wide nature of th e action. Multip le plaintiffs filed a class -wide

2 charge of age discrim ination with the US. Equal Employment Commission (“EEOC”), which

3 was cross f iled with the Kansas Hum an Rights Commission (“KHRC”). Each plaintiff has

4 consented to join this action. The Consent to Sue forms for the nam ed plaintiffs will be filed

5 separately due to the size of the files but are incorporated herein by reference.

6

III. PARTIES

7

A. General Allegations as to all Plaintiffs

8

15.

At all pertinent times, each of the pl aintiffs and Class member in this action was

9 an employee of the defendants within the m eaning of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630, and ERISA,

10 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and a participant in and/or be neficiary of the Plans within the meaning of

11 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(7) and (8).

12

16.

The plaintiffs, and each of them , were affected by the defendants’ general pattern

13 and practice of discriminating against older workers.

14

B. Specific Allegations as to Individual Plaintiffs

15

17.

Plaintiff Perry Apsl ey (“Plaintiff Apsley”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born May 5, 1955, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility . Plaintiff Apsley wa s employed by Boeing for tw enty (20) years.

18
Plaintiff Apsley was qu alified to h old his po sition as a Strechpress o perator. Th us, Plaintiff

19
Apsley filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

20
all administrative remedies.

21
18.

Plaintiff Bob Bailey (“P laintiff Bailey”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

22
was born on January 1, 1953, and who, as of June 10, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

23
Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plain tiff Bailey was employed by Boeing f or eighteen (18) years.

24
Plaintiff Bailey was qualified to hold his positi on as an eq uipment maintenance electrician.

25
Thus, Plaintiff Bailey filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

26
has exhausted all administrative remedies.

-10CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 11 of 44

1

19.

Plaintiff Jacob A. Bakk (“Plaintiff Bakk”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

2 was born on March 6, 1954, and who, as of May 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

3 Wichita, Kansas facility . Plai ntiff Bakk was employed by Boeing fo r twenty-five (25) y ears.

4 Plaintiff Bakk was qualified to hold his position as a ch ief metal machine operator. Thus,

5 Plaintiff Bakk f iled a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of th e right to s ue and has

6 exhausted all administrative remedies.

7

20.

Plaintiff Gary Ball (“Plaintiff Ball”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

8 born on Se ptember 26, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

9 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintif f Ball was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

10 Plaintiff Ball was qu alified to hold his position as a plum ber/boiler employee. Thus, Plaintiff

11 Ball filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

12 administrative remedies.

13

21.

Plaintiff Peggy S. Bell (“Pl aintiff Bell”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

14 was born on April 2, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

15 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintif f Bell was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20)

16 years. Plaintiff Bell was qualif ied to hold her position as a m aterial processor. Thus, Plaintiff

17 Bell filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

18
administrative remedies.

19
22.

Plaintiff Thomas Belton (“Plaintiff Belton”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

20
who was born on March 23, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

21
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Belton was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18)

22
years. Plaintiff Belton was qualified to hold his position as a plumber/boiler employee. Plaintiff

23
Belton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

24
administrative remedies.

25
23.

Plaintiff MeLonda Bircher (“Plaintiff Bircher”) is a resident of the State of

26
Kansas who was born on Dece mber 20, 1960, a nd who, as of June 3, 2005, was e mployed by

-11CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Bircher was em ployed by Boeing for twenty-

2 two (22) years. Plaintiff Bi rcher was qualified to hold her pos ition as an asset m anager.

3 Plaintiff Bircher filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

4 exhausted all administrative remedies.

5

24.

Plaintiff James A. Bowmaker (“Plaintiff Bowmaker”) is a resident of the State of

6 Kansas who was born December 24, 1954, and w ho, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing

7 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plain tiff Bowmaker was employed by Boeing for several years.

8 Plaintiff Bowmaker was qualified to hold his position at Boeing. Thus, Plain tiff Bowmaker

9 filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

10 administrative remedies.

11

25.

Plaintiff Jerry L. Branste tter (“Plaintiff Branstetter”) is a res ident of the State of

12 Kansas who was born on July 11, 1945, and w ho, as of June 3, 2005, w as employed by Boeing

13 at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Pla intiff Branstetter was employed by Boeing for more than

14 twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff Branstetter was qualified to hold the power district electrician

15 position. T hus, Plaintiff Branstetter filed a timely EEOC c ompliant, received a notice of the

16 right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

17

26.

Plaintiff Michael E. Burgar dt (“Plaintiff Burgardt”) is a resident of the State of

18
Kansas who was born on January 26, 1952, and who, as of May 24, 2005, was employed by

19
Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plain tiff Burgardt was em ployed by Boeing for thirty

20
(31) years. Plaintiff Burgardt was qualified to hold his position as a power feed drill technician.

21
Thus, Plaintiff Burgardt filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

22
has exhausted all administrative remedies.

23
27.

Plaintiff Rocky R. Burris (“Plaintiff Burri s”) is a resid ent of the State of Kansas

24
who was born on January 8, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

25
Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plain tiff Burris was employed by Boeing f or twenty (20) years.

26
Plaintiff Burris was qualified to hold his position as a plum ber. Thus, Plainti ff Burris filed a

-12CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

2 administrative remedies.

3

28.

Plaintiff Daniel D. Burrows (“Plaintiff Burrows”) is a resident of the State of

4 Kansas who was born on Septem ber 20, 1932, and who, as of August 22, 2003, was em ployed

5 by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Burrows was employed by Boeing for thirty-

6 three (33) years. Plaintiff Bu rrows was qualified to hold his t ooling position. Thus, Plaintiff

7 Burrows filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

8 all administrative remedies.

9

29.

Plaintiff Henry F. Butler (“Plain tiff Butler”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

10 who was born on August 13, 1953, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

11 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Pla intiff Butler was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years.

12 Plaintiff Butler was qualified to ho ld his position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff Butler

13 filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

14 administrative remedies.

15

30.

Plaintiff Betty Childers (“Plaintiff Childers”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on July 19, 1953, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Childers was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years.

18
Plaintiff Childers was qualif ied to hold her position as a m aterial processor. Thus, Plaintiff

19
Childers filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

20
all administrative remedies.

21
31.

Plaintiff David L. Clay (“Plaintiff Clay”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

22
was born on May 18, 1946, and w ho, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

23
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Clay was employed by Boeing for m ore than thirty-five (35)

24
years. Plaintiff Clay was qualif ied to hold his position at B oeing. Thus, Plaintiff Clay filed a

25
timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

26
administrative remedies.

-13CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

32.

Plaintiff Larry E. Combs (“Pla intiff Combs”) was a resident of the State of

2 Kansas during the stated allegations. Plaintiff Combs was born on September 9, 1948, and as of

3 June 3, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintiff Com bs was

4 employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Combs was qualified to hold his position as

5 a business process analyst. Thus, P laintiff Combs filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a

6 notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

7

33.

Plaintiff Harvey J. Conyac (“Plaintiff Conyac”) is a res ident of the State of

8 Kansas who was born on January 15, 1945, and who, as of May 27, 2005, was employed by

9 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Conyac was employed by Boeing for twenty-

10 seven (27) years. Plaintiff Conyac was qualified to hold his pos ition. Thus, Plaintiff Conyac

11 filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

12 administrative remedies.

13

34.

Plaintiff Loren W. Cox (“Plaintiff Cox”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

14 was born on July 21, 1955, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

15 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Cox was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four (24)

16 years. Plaintiff Cox was qualified to hold her position as a bench mechanic.

17

35.

Plaintiff Phyllis A. Cox (“Plaintiff P. Cox”) is a re sident of the State of Kansas

18
who was born on January 1, 1949, and who, as of June 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

19
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff P. Cox wa s employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

20
Plaintiff P. Cox was qualified to hold her position as a sheet metal machinist. Thus, Plaintiff P.

21
Cox filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

22
administrative remedies.

23
36.

Plaintiff Linda L. DeZarn (“Plaintiff DeZarn”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

24
who was born on June 16, 1956, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

25
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff DeZarn was employed by Boeing for ten (10) years. Plaintiff

26
DeZarn was qualified to hold her position as a cert ified solder. Thus Plaintiff DeZa rn filed a

-14CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1 timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

2 administrative remedies.

3

37.

Plaintiff William D. Doshier (“P laintiff Doshier”) is a resident of the State of

4 Kansas who was born on Dece mber 6, 1953, and who, as of June 17, 2005, was e mployed by

5 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Doshier was employed by Boeing for more than

6 twenty-nine (29) yea rs. Plaintif f Doshier was qualified to hold his position as a equipm ent

7 operator.

8

38.

Plaintiff Throma A. Dya s (“Plaintiff Dyas”) is a residen t of the State of Kansas

9 who was born on December 2, 1951, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at

10 its Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plain tiff Dyas wa s employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years.

11 Plaintiff Dyas was qualified to hold her position as an inspector.

12

39.

Plaintiff Alan S. Eppers on (“Plaintiff Epperson”) is a resident of the State of

13 Kansas who was born on August 22, 1964, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

14 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Epperson was e mployed by Boeing for sixteen

15 (16) years. Plaintiff Epperson was qualified to hold his position as an inspector. Thus, Plaintiff

16 Epperson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

17 all administrative remedies.

18
40.

Plaintiff Lloyd C. Fansler (“Plaintiff Fansle r”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

19
who was born August 5, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by B oeing at its

20
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Fansler was em ployed by Boeing for thirty-one (31) years.

21
Plaintiff Fansler was qualified to hold his position as a skin and spar area person.

22
41.

Plaintiff Jerald J. Gilbert (“Plaintiff Gilbert”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

23
who was born on April 20, 1950, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at its

24
Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plain tiff Gilbert was employed by Boeing f or seventeen (17) yea rs.

25
Plaintiff Gilbert was qu alified to h old his po sition as sheet metal mechanic. Thu s, Plaintiff

26

-15CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 16 of 44

1 Gilbert filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

2 all administrative remedies.

3

42.

Plaintiff Richard Gotthard (“Plaintiff Gotthard”) is a resident of the State of

4 Kansas who was born on December 23, 1956, a nd who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

5 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Gotthard was e mployed by Boeing for twenty-

6 five (25) years. P laintiff Gotthard was qualifie d to hold his position as a m achinist. Thus,

7 Plaintiff Gotthard filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

8 exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

43.

Plaintiff Brian Groom (“Pl aintiff Groom”) is a residen t of the State of Kansas

10 who was born October 2, 1958, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

11 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Groom was employed by Boeing for m ore than twenty-four

12 (24) years. Plain tiff Groom was qualified to hold his posi tion as a p lastics bench mechanic.

13 Thus, Plaintiff Groom filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

14 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

15

44.

Plaintiff Denise A. Harris (“Plaintiff Harris”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on August 10, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Harris was employed by Boeing for m ore than twenty-nine

18
(29) years. Plaintiff Harris was qualified to hold her position as a factory clerk.

19
45.

Plaintiff Ron W. Hendershot (“Plaintiff Hendershot”) is a resident of the State of

20
Kansas who was born on March 10, 1957, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

21
Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. P laintiff Hendershot was employed by Boeing for

22
twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff Hendershot was qualified to ho ld his position as a carpenter

23
millwright specialist.

24
46.

Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley (“Plaintiff Housley”) is a resident of the State of

25
Kansas who was born on Dece mber 1, 1948, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was e mployed by

26
Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Housley was employed by Boeing for twenty-

-16CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 17 of 44

1 six (26) years. Plaintiff Housley was qualified to hold her position as a m aster scheduler. Thus,

2 Plaintiff Housley filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

3 exhausted all administrative remedies.

4

47.

Plaintiff Verna J. Houst on (“Plaintiff Houston”) is a resident of the State of

5 Kansas who was born March 26, 1949, and w ho, as of May 18, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing

6 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintif f Houston was employed by Bo eing for ten years.

7 Plaintiff Houston was qua lified to hold her position as a sealer. Thus, Plaintiff Hous ton filed a

8 timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

9 administrative remedies.

10

48.

Plaintiff Larry W. James (“Plaintiff L. James”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

11 who was born June 26, 1958, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

12 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Pla intiff James was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four

13 (24) years. Plain tiff James was qualified to ho ld his position as a m aterial processor. Thus,

14 Plaintiff James filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the righ t to sue and has

15 exhausted all administrative remedies.

16

49.

Plaintiff Sharron N. James (“Plaintiff James”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

17 who was born March 21, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

18
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Jam es was employed by Boeing for twen ty-five (25) years.

19
Plaintiff James was qualified to hold her position as a m aterial processor. Thus, Plaintiff Ja mes

20
filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

21
administrative remedies.

22
50.

Plaintiff Gary L. Johnson (“Plaintiff Johnson”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

23
who was born on August 6, 1952, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

24
Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Johnson wa s employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five

25
(25) years. Plaintiff Johnson was qualified to hold his posit ion. Thus, Plaintiff Johnson filed a

26

-17CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 18 of 44

1 timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

2 administrative remedies.

3

51.

Plaintiff Melvyn J. Johns on (“Plaintiff M. Johnson”) is a resident of the State of

4 Kansas who was born on April 28, 1953, and who, as of June 20, 2005, was employed by

5 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff M. Johnson was e mployed by Boeing for m ore

6 than twenty-seven (27) years. Pla intiff M. Johnson was qualif ied to hold h is position as a

7 laminator. Thus, Plaintiff M. Johnson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the

8 right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

9

52.

Plaintiff Donald R. Jones (“Plaintif f Jones”) is a residen t of the State of Kansas

10 who was born on August 9, 1953, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

11 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plain tiff Jones was employed by Boeing f or nineteen (19) y ears.

12 Plaintiff Jones was qualified to hold his position as an environm ental operator. Thus, Plaintiff

13 Jones filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

14 administrative remedies.

15

53.

Plaintiff Ralph O. Keener (“Plaintiff Keener”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on August 22, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas facility . Plaintiff Keener wa s employed by Boeing f or eighteen (18) years.

18
Plaintiff Keener was qualif ied to hold his position as an assem bly installer. T hus, Plaintiff

19
Keener filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

20
all administrative remedies.

21
54.

Plaintiff Danny R. Kennedy (“Plaintiff Ke nnedy”) is a resident of the State of

22
Kansas who was born on Septem ber 12, 1952, a nd who, as June 16, 2005, was employed by

23
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintiff Kennedy was employed by Boeing for m ore

24
than twenty-six (26) years. Plaintif f Kennedy was qualified to hold his position as a

25
carpenter/millwright specialist.

26

-18CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

55.

Plaintiff Melvin E. Kern s (“Plaintiff Kerns”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

2 who was born on January 15, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at

3 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kerns was employed by Boeing for more than fifteen (15)

4 years. Plaintiff Kerns was qualified to hold his position as a plum ber/power plant specialist.

5 Thus, Plaintiff Kerns filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

6 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

7

56.

Plaintiff Gordon B. Kinkead (“P laintiff Kinkead”) is a reside nt of the State of

8 Kansas who was born on October 7, 1953, a nd who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

9 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kinkead was employed by Boeing for more than

10 twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Kinkead was qualified to hold his position as a corrective

11 action coordinator. Thus, Plaintiff Kinkead filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of

12 the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

13

57.

Plaintiff Jimmy Le (“Plaintiff Le”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

14 born on April 4, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita,

15 Kansas facility. Plaintiff Le was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Le was

16 qualified to hold his pos ition as a mill op erator. Plaintiff Le f iled a tim ely EEOC com pliant,

17 received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all adm inistrative remedies. Plaintiff Le

18
filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

19
administrative remedies.

20
58.

Plaintiff Carlton D. Lee (“ Plaintiff Lee”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

21
was born on January 15, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by B oeing at its

22
Wichita, Kansas facility . Plain tiff Lee was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20)

23
years. P laintiff Lee was qualified to hold h is position a s a shee t metal assem bler. Thus,

24
Plaintiff Lee filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

25
exhausted all administrative remedies.

26

-19CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

59.

Plaintiff Stephen L. Linck (“Plaintiff Linck”) is a res ident of the S tate of Kansas

2 who was born on June 11, 1951, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by B oeing at its

3 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Linck was employed by Boeing for m ore than thirty (30)

4 years. Plaintiff Linck was qualified to hold his position as an engineer.

5

60.

Plaintiff Freddy J. McC olpin (“Plaintiff McColpin”) is a resident of the State of

6 Kansas who was born on Dece mber 9, 1947, an d who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by

7 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff McColpin was employed by Boeing for m ore

8 than twenty-three (23) years. Pla intiff McColpin was qualif ied to h old his pos ition as a

9 plumber/boiler house power plant em ployee. Thus , Plaintiff McColpin filed a tim ely EEOC

10 compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

11

61.

Plaintiff Glennys M. Montgom ery (“Plaintiff Montgomery”) is a resident of the

12 State of Kansas who was born on October 14, 1940, and who, as of March 22, 2002, was

13 employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintiff Mont gomery was e mployed by

14 Boeing for nine years. Plaintiff Montgomery was qualified to be employed at Boeing.

15

62.

Plaintiff Cathy J. Munse ll (“Plaintiff Munsell”) is a resident of the State of

16 Kansas who was born on December 30, 1956, a nd who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

17 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Munsell was em ployed by Boeing for twenty

18
(20) years. Plaintiff Munsell was qualified to ho ld her position as an assem bler installer. Thus,

19
Plaintiff Munsell filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to s ue and has

20
exhausted all administrative remedies.

21
63.

Plaintiff Jan W. Murray (“Plaintiff Murray” ) is a resident of the State of Kansas

22
who was born on February 28, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at

23
its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Murray was employed by Boeing for more than seventeen

24
(17) years. Plaintiff M urray was qualified to hold his positi on as plastic bench com posite

25
mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff Murray filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right

26
to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

-20CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1

64.

Plaintiff Huyen T. Nguyen (“Plaintiff Nguyen”) is a resident of the State of

2 Kansas who was born on Nove mber 10, 1952, a nd who, as of May 18, 2005, was employed by

3 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Nguyen was employed by Boeing for more than

4 eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Nguyen was qualif ied to hold the sealer position. Thus , Plaintiff

5 Nguyen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

6 all administrative remedies.

7

65.

Plaintiff Luyen D. Nguyen (“Plaintiff L. Nguyen”) is a reside nt of the State of

8 Kansas who was born on Nove mber 20, 1950, a nd who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

9 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff L. Nguyen was employed by Boeing for sixteen

10 (16) years. Plaintiff Nguyen was qualified to hold the tape m achine operator position. Thus ,

11 Plaintiff Nguyen filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

12 exhausted all administrative remedies.

13

66.

Plaintiff Kent W. Owen (“ Plaintiff Owen”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

14 who was born on December 17, 1958, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at

15 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Owen was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-one

16 (21) years. Plaintiff Owen was qualified to hold his position as a M R&D technical an alyst.

17 Thus, Plaintiff Owen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

18
has exhausted all administrative remedies.

19
67.

Plaintiff Lowanda J. Patton (“Plaintiff Patton”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

20
who was born on November 26, 1948, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing

21
at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Pa tton was e mployed by Boeing for twenty-six (26)

22
years. Plaintiff Patton was qualif ied to hold her position as a steel metal employee. Thus,

23
Plaintiff Patton f iled a timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has

24
exhausted all administrative remedies.

25
68.

Plaintiff Paul D. Pete (“ Plaintiff Pete”) is a res ident of the State of Kansas who

26
was born on December 13, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 20 05, was employed by Boeing at its

-21CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 22 of 44

1 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Pete was employed at Boeing for more than twenty-five (25)

2 years. Plaintiff Pete was qualified to hold his position as a sheet metal employee.

3

69.

Plaintiff Brent L. Popp (“Plaintiff Popp”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

4 was born on August 6, 1959, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

5 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Popp was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five

6 (25) years. Plaintiff Popp was qualif ied to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Popp filed a tim ely

7 EEOC compliant, received a no tice of the rig ht to sue and has exh austed all ad ministrative

8 remedies.

9

70.

Plaintiff James E. Porter (“Plaintiff Porter”) is a resi dent of the State of Kansas

10 who was born on January 2, 1947, a nd who, as of June 3, 2005, wa s employed by Boeing at its

11 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Porter was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18)

12 years. Plaintiff Porter was qualified to hold his position as a project planner.

13

71.

Plaintiff Jay E. Powell (“Pla intiff Powell”) is a resident of the State o f Kansas

14 who was born on October 6, 1954, and who, as of June 16 2005, was employed by B oeing at its

15 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintif f Powell was employed by Boeing for m ore than thirty-one

16 (31) years. Plaintiff Powell was qualified to hold the production machinist pos ition. Thus,

17 Plaintiff Powell f iled a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the righ t to sue and has

18
exhausted all administrative remedies.

19
72.

Plaintiff Warren Pyles (“Plaintiff Pyles”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

20
was born on Septem ber 8, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

21
Wichita, Kansas f acility. Pla intiff Pyles was employed by Boeing for ei ghteen (18) years.

22
Plaintiff Pyles was qualified to hold his position as a millwright employee. Thus, Plaintiff Pyles

23
filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

24
administrative remedies.

25
73.

Plaintiff Willard J. Ratchford (“Plaintiff Ratchford”) is a re sident of the State of

26
Kansas who was born on October 16, 1957, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by

-22CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 23 of 44

1 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Ratchford was employed by Boeing for nineteen

2 (19) years. Plain tiff Ratchford was qualified to hold his position as a hand rou ter operator.

3 Thus, Plaintiff Ratchford filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to su e

4 and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

5

74.

Plaintiff Veronica Rios (“Plaintiff Rios”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who

6 was born on November 20, 1961, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

7 Wichita, Kansas facility . Plain tiff Rios was employed by Boeing for m ore than five years.

8 Plaintiff Rios was qualified to hold her position as a bench mechanic.

9

75.

Plaintiff Richard D. R oeder (“Plaintiff Roeder”) is a resident of the State of

10 Kansas who was born on May 8, 1953, and w ho, as of June 16, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing

11 at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Roeder was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-

12 five (25) years. Plai ntiff Roeder was qualified to hold hi s position as a m achinist. Thus,

13 Plaintiff Roeder filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to s ue and has

14 exhausted all administrative remedies.

15

76.

Plaintiff Darlene E. Rozar (“P laintiff Rozar”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on October 19, 1947, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at

17 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Rozar wa s employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years.

18
Plaintiff Rozar was qualified to hold her position as a machinist. Thus, Plaintif f Rozar filed a

19
timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

20
administrative remedies.

21
77.

Plaintiff Albert Schloetzer (“Plaintiff Schloetz er”) is a res ident of the State of

22
Kansas who was born on August 21, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

23
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plain tiff Schloetzer was employed by Boeing for fiftee n

24
(15) years. Plaintiff Schloetzer was qualified to hold his position as a housekeeper.

25
78.

Plaintiff William H. Setchell (“Pla intiff Setchell”) is a resident of the State of

26
Kansas who was born on March 30, 1954, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by

-23CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 24 of 44

1 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Setchell was em ployed by Boeing for twenty-

2 seven (27) years. Plaintiff Se tchell was qualified to hold his pos ition as a storek eeper/clerk.

3 Thus, Plaintiff Setchell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

4 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

5

79.

Plaintiff James C. She ppard (“Plaintiff Sheppard”) is a res ident of the State of

6 Kansas who was born on January 24, 1953, and who, was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18)

7 years. Plaintiff Sheppard was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Sheppard filed a

8 timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

9 administrative remedies.

10

80.

Plaintiff Debra L. Smith (“Plaintiff Smith”) was a resident of the State of Kansas

11 during all applicable dates. Pl aintiff Smith was born on January 27, 1962, and who, as of May

12 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Sm ith was

13 employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Pl aintiff Smith was qualified to hold her position

14 as a m anufacturer helper. Thus, Plaintiff Sm ith filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a

15 notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

16

81.

Plaintiff Sammy J. Smith ( “Plaintiff S. Smith”) is a re sident of the State of

17 Kansas who was born on January 31, 1959, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

18
Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff S. Smith was employed by Boeing for more than

19
nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff S. Smith was qualified to hold his position as an machinist. Thus,

20
Plaintiff S. Smith filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to s ue and has

21
exhausted all administrative remedies.

22
82.

Plaintiff Sharon A. Southern (“Plaintiff Southern”) is a resident of the State of

23
Kansas who was born on Septem ber 23, 1951, a nd who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by

24
Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaint iff Southern was e mployed by Boeing for twenty

25
(20) years. Plaintiff Southern was qualified to hold her position as a sheet m etal assembler.

26

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1 Thus, Plaintiff Southern filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and

2 has exhausted all administrative remedies.

3

83.

Plaintiff Linda C. Sparrer (“Plaintiff Sparrer”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

4 who was born on February 26, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at

5 its Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plain tiff Sparrer was e mployed by Boeing for sixteen years.

6 Plaintiff Sparrer was q ualified to h old her pos ition as IWTP operator. Thus, Plaintiff Sparrer

7 filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all

8 administrative remedies.

9

84.

Plaintiff Abel L. Vasqu ez (“Plaintiff Vasquez ”) is a resident of the State of

10 Kansas who was born on May 17, 1942, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing

11 at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Vasquez was employed by Boeing for more than

12 twenty-eight (28) years. Pl aintiff Vasquez was qualified to hold the m anufacturing engineer

13 position. Thus, Plaintiff Vasquez filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right

14 to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

15

85.

Plaintiff Henry F. Victor (“Plaintiff Victor”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

16 who was born on March 6, 1937, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing at its

17 Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintiff Victor wa s employed by Boeing for m ore than twenty-five

18
(25) years. Plaintiff Victor wa s qualified to hold his position as a m aterial processor. Thus,

19
Plaintiff Victor filed a timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to su e and h as

20
exhausted all administrative remedies.

21
86.

Plaintiff James W alker (“Plaintiff Walker”) is a res ident of the State of Kansas

22
who was born on November 15, 1955, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was em ployed by Boeing

23
at its W ichita, Kansas f acility. P laintiff Walker was em ployed by Boeing for eighteen (18)

24
years. Plaintiff W alker was qua lified to hold his position as an assembler. Thus, Plaintiff

25
Walker filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

26
all administrative remedies.

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1

87.

Plaintiff James R. W allace (“Plaintiff Wallace”) is a r esident of the State of

2 Kansas who was born on August 11, 1948, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by

3 Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wallace was employed by Boeing for more than

4 twenty-six (26) yea rs. Plaintiff W allace was qualified to hold his position as a power

5 distribution electrician. Thus , Plaintiff W allace filed a tim ely EEOC com pliant, received a

6 notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

7

88.

Plaintiff Carolyn Y. W heaton (“Plaintiff Wheaton”) is a resident of the State of

8 Kansas who was born June 15, 1962, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at

9 its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wheaton was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

10 Plaintiff Wheaton was qualified to hold her pos ition a factory attendant. Thus, Plaintiff

11 Wheaton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted

12 all administrative remedies.

13

89.

Plaintiff Sylvester Williams II (“Plaintiff Williams II”) is a resident of the State of

14 Kansas who was born on February 7, 1954, a nd who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by

15 Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Williams II was em ployed by Boeing f or more

16 than twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Williams II was qualified to hold his position as a skin quality

17 employee. Thus, Plaintif f Williams II filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the

18
right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

19
90.

Plaintiff Janet M. W ilson (“Plaintiff W ilson”) is a resident the State of Kansas

20
who was born on January 6, 1960, a nd who, as May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its

21
Wichita, Kansas f acility. Plaintif f Wilson was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years.

22
Plaintiff Wilson was qualified to hol d his position as an assembler. Thus, Plaintiff Wilson filed

23

a timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted a

ll

24
administrative remedies.

25
91.

Plaintiff Walter Woods (“Plaintiff Woods”) is a resident of the State of Kansas

26
who was born on March 27, 1947, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

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1 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Woods wa s employed by Boeing for si xteen (16) years.

2 Plaintiff Woods was qualified to hold his po sitions as a structure m echanic. T hus, Plaintiff

3 Woods filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a no tice of the right to sue and has exhausted

4 all administrative remedies.

5

92. Plaintiff Betty R. Young (“Plaintiff Young”) is a resident of the State of Kansas who was

6 born on July 11, 1957, and who, as of May 27, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita,

7 Kansas facility. Plaintif f Young was em ployed by Boeing for twenty-five ( 25) years. Plaintiff

8 Young was qualified to hold her position.

9

C. Defendants

10

1. Boeing

11

93.

Boeing’s Wichita Division supp orted the c ommercial, military, and space

12 products and services of the Boeing Corporation. Operations in W ichita date back to the ol d

13 Stearman Aircraft Company, which becam e part of Boeing in 1934 when the federal

14 government required United Airlines, Pratt and Whitn ey, and Boeing to split into three separate

15 companies. It is the lar gest employer in the State of Kansas. The division produces 75 percent

16 of the parts for Boeing’s 737 commercial airliners as well nacelles, nose sections and other parts

17 for Boeing’s 747, 757, 767, and 777 as well as a range of maintenance services and parts for the

18
company’s military and commercial products. Boeing can be served as set forth in the summons

19
2. Onex/Spirit/Midwestern (referred to collectively as Onex)

20
94.

Onex is a Canadian corporation that is the parent company of Spirit A erospace.

21
Midwestern Aircraft Systems is the f ormer name of Spirit Aerospace . Onex negotia ted the

22
terms of the sale of the Boeing plants and, al ong with Boeing, m ade the decisions against the

23
plaintiffs. Midwestern Aircraft Systems was formed solely to be the entity to run the Wichita

24
plant and was not publicized until after the sale of the Boeing plant. Midwestern and Spirit were

25
not properly capitalized and shared the same directors, officers and employees. Onex boasts on

26
its website that Nigel Wright (m anaging director of Onex) and Seth Mersky (m anaging director

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1 of Onex “co-led Onex’ acquisition of Boeing’s commercial airplane manufacturing operations in

2 Wichita, Kansas, and T ulsa and McAlester, Oklahom a, now operating as Spirit A eroSystems,

3 Inc.”1

4

95.

Each company can be served as set forth in the summons.

5

IV. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

6

96.

Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a Class of persons pursuant to

7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).

8

97.

The named plaintiffs bring this Clas s Action Complaint on behalf of a Class of

9 all individuals who were employed with Boeing Wichita and Tulsa and/or Onex at any tim e and

10 laid off, terminated by, or not hired by Onex w ithin two years prior to the sale of the Boeing

11 Wichita and Tulsa plants.

12

98.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify this Class definition and Class period based

13 on the results of his class certification discovery.

14 A. 23 (a) Requirements

15

99.

There are at least one thousand Class members. The Class is so large that joinder

16 of all members is impracticable.

17

100.

Questions of law and facts common to the class include:

18
a. whether the selection procedures utili zed by the defendant has a disparate

19
impact on older workers;

20
b. whether the defendants have violated provisions of the OWBPA;

21
c. whether the defendants failed to take reasonably, or the legally, required

22
action to correct the disparate impact upon older workers;

23
d. whether the defendants have retaliated against its em ployees for previously

24
engaging in protected conduct;

25

26
1 http://www.onex.com/index.taf?pid=40&_UserReference=50E019F7A8D553C143A6EB88.

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1

e. whether the defendants intentionally interfered with the retirement rights of

2

plaintiffs;

3

f. whether defendants have violated th e Labor Managem ent Relations Ac t

4

(“LMRA”);

5

g. whether defendants violated Title VII by failing to keep records of the

6

decisions made against plaintiffs; and

7

h. whether further in junctive relief is appropriate as a rem edy for the past,

8

present, and future discrimination.

9

101.

Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class.

10

102.

Plaintiffs and Class counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

11 Class.

12 B. 23(b) Requirements

13

103.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) : The defendants have acted /refused to act and are

14 acting/refusing to act on grounds generally appli cable to the Class, thereby m aking appropriate

15 final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief to the Class as a whole.

16

104.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3): Common questions of fact and law predom inate over

17 questions affecting only individual members.

18

105.

A class action is superior to other avai lable methods for the fair and efficient

19
adjudication of this controversy.

20

106.

There are no unusual difficulties lik ely to be encountered in the management of

21
this litigation as a class action.

22

107.

Notice to the Class may be acco mplished inexpensively, efficiently and in a

23
manner best designed to protect the due process rights of all Class members by means of written

24
notices supplied throug h defendant’s system of communication. Add itionally, notice can be

25
posted on plaintiffs’ counsels’ website, www.swolawfirm.com.

26

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1

108.

With respect to their c laims for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, all

2 named plaintiffs seek certification of Count I pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) of the following

3 presently ascertainable subclass: All persons employed by Boeing who was terminated or laid

4 off or whose employment was terminated by Boeing or not hired by Onex who wer e age forty

5 and over as of the date of their term ination and who file a consent to join th is action with the

6 Court (collectively, the ADEA subclass).

7

109.

Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADEA warra nt the creation of the ADEA s ubclass

8 because the named plaintiffs who were age forty and over at the time of the termination of their

9 employment are similarly situated to the class of persons they seek to represent in this collective

10 action. All were term inated as a result of a single discrim inatory program designed and

11 implemented at the highest levels of Boeing a nd Onex’s m anagement, and all are seeking the

12 same relief.

13

V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

14

A. Pattern and Practice of Discrimination

15
1. Boeing and Onex Made Decisions against Employees

16

110.

Both Boeing and Onex engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrim ination in

17

connection with the RIF by treating younger employees more favorably than older employees in

18

implementing the RIF. Em ployees were told that Boeing’s m anagers would have “great input”

19

on the decisions that were made against them. Employees were also told that there would be an

20

objective system in place to ev aluate and retain the most qualified individuals. However, this
21

never happened as the d efendants have discarded the most qualified employees because of their
22

age.
23

111.

The defendants have already begun in the “I blam e you and you blam e me”

24

game. For instance, Onex claim s that it did not keep documents that support the reasons that
25

decisions were m ade against the employees desp ite a cle ar federal mandate to reta in this
26

information. As a result of their actions, Onex received a records keep ing violation from the

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1 EEOC. On the other hand, Boeing claim s that it did not play any part in m aking the decisions

2 against the employees. If this is tr ue, the defendants will not be able to rebut the statistical

3 analysis presented by the plainti ffs or the p rima facie ev idence established by th e plaintiffs.

4 Because of this adverse inference, plain tiffs believe that somehow the defendants’ stories will

5 change from that originally told to the EEOC.

6

112.

The defendants together, and in conspir acy and concert, specifically targeted

7 individuals who were over the age of forty in its adverse business decisions. There is no legal

8 justification for these decisions.

9

113.

The decisions made against plaintiffs and Class were part of a common plan and

10 scheme. The scheme was implemented in at least two parts, maybe more. One wave of lay offs

11 occurred in May 2005. The second wave of layoffs occurred in June 2005. All layoffs were

12 part of “Project Lloyd.”

13

B. Disparate Treatment

14
1. Similarly Situated Younger Individuals Treated More Favorably

15

114.

In some divisions, all of the senior grade employees were term inated while

16

similarly situated younger workers were not. Fo r instance, in Departm ent 3271, the top senior

17

employees of their grade level were terminated.

18

115.

Boeing and Onex were targeting indivi duals over the age of forty. In one

19

department, each of the individual’s who were laid off were in the age 51 to 52 bracket and were

20

the top five senior people of that grade level in the shop.
21

116.

Onex through Spirit continues its pattern of releasing older seniority employees

22

while retaining and hiring younger workers at a lo wer pay rate. The jobs of these individuals
23

were not eliminated and some plaintiffs have even applied f or the exact same position that they
24

were terminated from.
25

2. Direct Evidence of Intentional Discrimination
26

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1

117.

Many managers have specifically told employees that they were simply too old to

2 work at Boeing. At meetings, managers would show a pyramid shop. This pyramid chart would

3 show the ages of workers in the division, with the oldest person at the top. Other mangers would

4 simply tell employees that they sho uld retire because the employee was too old. Consider for

5 example the following statements made by managers:

6

(1) Plaintiff Houston was told “If I were you and your age I would

7

retire.”

8

(2) Plaintiff Schloetzer was asked, “W hat will you do Albert if you

9

don’t get a job offer, you’re getti ng old and you’re handicapped?”

10

In fact, a week before Plaint iff Schloetzer was laid off,

11

management stated, “That’s wh at happens when you get old …

12

you can’t move as fast!”

13

(3) Plaintiff Kerns was asked: “are you getting to old to do your job?”

14

and told “Maybe, we should put yo u on another shift if you’re too

15

old! Getting to old to get it done on time?”

16

(4) Plaintiff Housley was told that “these younger folks are much

17

better on the computer than the o lder folks”. S he was also asked

18
how old she was. When she infor med him of her a ge, the
19
manager stated she should just c onsider retirement and not worry
20
about anything because “we do not know what the future holds.”
21
(5) Plaintiff Bonesteel, heard the m anagers mention the “Aging
22
Workforce” comment several times. Plaintiff Bonesteel, knew that
23
the age of the workers was a concern of Boeing.
24
(6) Plaintiff Montgomery was also consistently questioned as to when
25
she was going to retire.
26

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1

(7) Plaintiff Williams II was referred to as the “old guy” b y his

2

managers. W hen Plaintiffs W illiams II receiv ed his twenty year

3

award, his m anagers to him that it was tim e for him to r etire.

4

Additionally, Plaintiff Williams II was always harassed about his

5

age and was called the old guy in a crew m eeting and even told

6

“man your getting gray.”

7

(8) Plaintiff Bronnenberg recalls m eetings where m anagers would

8

consistently comment on the age of the work force.

9

(9) Plaintiff Callaway’s manager continuously pushed him to retire.

10

(10) Plaintiff Apsley heard management say, “if you are fifty-five or

11

older than you should go on and retire.”

12

(11) Managers told Plaintiff Jam es that “Boeing is changing. Young

13

people will come and the older people will go!”

14

(12) Plaintiff Bakk heard comments m ade by m anagement regarding

15

the age of individuals which lead him to believe he was laid off

16

because of his age.

17

(13) Plaintiff Childers was strong ly encouraged to re tire by

18
management.
19
(14) Plaintiff Cox was told by m anagement “If you are too old to keep
20
up the pace … get out! If you are retirement age … get out! This
21
is for the younger people to do the work now.”
22
(15) A week before Plaintiff P. Cox wa s laid off, m anagement asked
23
her how old she was.
24
(16) Management informed Plaintiff DeZarn, on several occasions, that
25
her age and handicap would hinder her future employment.
26

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1

(17) Plaintiff Jones often heard m anagement repeatedly state in

2

meetings that the average age of the workforce was forty-eigh t

3

(48) to forty-nine (49).

4

(18) However, Plaintiff Powell heard management say, “Boeing needs

5

to be competitive with an aging older workforce. Younger people

6

are stronger and faster.”

7

(19) Plaintiff Smith that if she was close to retirement than it would be

8

best for her to retire.

9

C. Disparate Impact

10
1. Alleged Criteria

11

118.

Boeing and Onex have not inform ed any of the e mployees as to why they were

12
not chosen. Boeing or Onex have not informed any em ployee what criteria were actually

13

utilized. To the best of plaintiffs’ knowledge there was a document generated by either Onex or

14

Boeing titled “RE-Hire Recomm endation Criteria.” The criteria contained in this docum ent

15

allowed for excessive subjectivity in the decisions made. More importantly, the criteria violated

16

the collective bargaining agreement. However the criteria were in realit y questions that had no

17

real method to measure and instead allowed managers to exercise prejudices and biases in the

18

employment decisions.

19

2. Alleged Criteria Was Not Utilized

20

119.

Employees never received a notice as to how they did not m eet the criteria

21

offered and in most cases, the employees met every criteria except for being older than forty.
22

120.

In a cursory review of the history of the em ployees leaves no doubt that any

23

24 alleged criteria were never us ed. Many of the em ployees, if not the m ajority, received no

25 discipline and received great pe rformance reviews. Additionall y, many, if not all, em ployees

26 were qualified to com plete their jobs and even received num erous awards and accolades for

their great work.

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1

3. Even If Criteria Was Used, It Allowed for Too much Subjectivity

2

121.

The alleged criteria placed excessiv e subjectivity in the hands of managers who

3 hold inherent biases against em ployees. For instance, one of the alleged criterions was

4 “favorable attitude to ward the com pany.” This “criteri on” is inherently biased against

5 individuals who have reported m isconduct on beha lf of Boeing and have reported that their

6 managers and Boeing had discriminated against employees because of the employee’s age, race,

7 or disability.

8

122.

Along the same lines, the alleged criteria state “does the employee take an active

9
role in developing and solutions to problem s that pose a r isk for injury?” Th is subjective

10
question seems to specifically target individu als who have exercis ed worker’s co mpensation

11
right’s in the past and w ho held work restrictions in the future. By its v ery nature this criterion

12
also places target signs on employees who are over the age of forty.

13

123.

There were no objectiv e measures in place that would curtail the use of this

14
excessive subjectivity. The excessive subjectivity allowed managers to exercise their age biases

15
in recommending individuals for employment.

16
D. Statistics Provide Evidence for Pattern and Practice, Disparate Treatment, and

17

Disparate Impact

18

124.

A review of statistics will raise the irrefutable presumption that the defendant has

19 intentionally discriminated against older work ers. Additio nally, the statistics will raise the

20 irrefutable presumption that the alleged criteria utilized by the defendants had a disparate impact

21 against older workers.

22

125.

The statistics of the samples available yield a statistical significance greater than

23 0.05, that necessary to legally establish discrimination.

24

126.

Additionally, of 930 workers over the age of fifty, 130 were not provided offers

25 (13.9%). In contrast to individuals under th e age of forty, where onl y 10 of 215 were not

26

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1 provided offers from the defendants (4%). This glaring disparity is unexplainable: especially in

2 light of the fact that the bargaining agreement called for lay-offs to take place by seniority.

3

E. Release Violated the ADEA and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act

4

127.

The defendants required Boeing employees to sign a “Consent to Release

5 Personnel Information” form. Thi s form threatened employees that if they did not sign the

6 release, they would not receive a job offer from Onex. In esse nce, employees were told that

7 they would be terminated if they did not sign the form.

8

128.

In order to evade accountability for conduct that it well unders tood to be

9
unlawful, Boeing and Onex prese nted its em ployees with an ultim atum: sign a “Consent to

10
Release Personnel Information” which purported to waive the employees’ right to challenge the

11
legality of Boeing’s conduct.

12

129.

In successfully strong-arming well over 99 percent of its employees into signing

13
the Release, Boeing exp loited the v ulnerability of its em ployees and be trayed the confidence

14
they had reposed in the company during relationships that spanned a decade or more.

15

130.

Indeed, when employees attempted to state that they were signing the form under

16
duress, Boeing return ed the form to the em ployee. For in stance, Sharron Jam es signed the

17
release and placed “signed under duress” on the form. W ithin a week, the d ocument was

18
returned to Plaintiff James and was told to sign the document without the “under duress” or she

19
would be reprimanded by first line manager.

20

131.

This release violates the OWBPA. The OWBPA is designed to protect the rights

21
and benefits of older workers and imposes spec ific requirements for releases covering ADEA

22

claims. The requirements are as follows:

23

(1) the release m ust be written in a m anner calculated to be understood by the

24

employee signing the release, o r by the aver age individual eligible to participate;

25

26

(2) the release must specifically refer to claims arising under the ADEA;

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1

(3) the release must not purport to encompass claims that may arise after the date

2

of execution;

3
(4) the employer must provide consideration for the waiver or release of ADEA

4

claims above and beyond that to which the em ployee would otherwise already be

entitled;

5

(5) the employee must be advised in writing to consult w ith an attorney prior to

6

executing the agreement;

7

(6) the employee m ust be given at leas t 45 days to consider signing if the

8

incentive is offered to a group;

9

(7) the release m ust allow the em ployee to revoke the agreem ent up to 7 days

after signing; and

10

(8) if the release is offe red in connection with an exit incentive or group

11

termination program, the em ployer must pr ovide information relating to the job

12

titles and ages of thos e eligible for the progr am, and the corresponding

information relating to employees in the same job titles who were not eligible or

13

not selected for the program.

14

132.

The defendants did not provide plaintiffs with any of these safeguards and in

15 failing to do so have violated the OWBPA.

16

F. IAM Breached its Duty of Fair Representation

17

133.

Boeing terminated employees prior to their pension vesting, som etimes just

18 months or days away. Additionally, the workers who did not receive an offer from Onex were

19 not allowed to vote. Moreover, the IAM did not file grievances against the defendants and

20 allowed them to make decisions against the Collective Bargaining Agreement

21

134.

Boeing/Onex illegally took the above m easures and others to classify its

22 employees on the basis of age, and to otherwise adversely affect the employm ent of older is

23
employees and other sim ilarly situated em ployees. However, the Uni on failed to protect its

24
members.

25
COUNT I: Age Discrimination

26

(Pattern and Practice, Disparate Treatment and Impact)

135.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

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1

136.

Defendants have engaged in a patter n and practice of dis crimination against

2 plaintiffs on the basis of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

3 U.S.C. § 623.

4

137.

Each of the plaintif fs is within th e protected age group and their work was

5 beyond satisfactory. Additionally, the plaintiffs and Class were discharged despite the adequacy

6 of their work and not hired despite being the most qualified for the positions. As incorporated in

7 this section, there is ev idence the defendants intended to discriminate against the plaintiffs and

8 Class in reaching its decisions.

9

138.

Additionally, the defendant has im plemented standards that have had a disparate

10 impact against older workers.

11

139. As a result of defendants’ conduct, plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered

12 and continue to suffer loss and damage.

13

COUNT II: Declaratory Relief

14

(Violation of Title VII Regulations)

15

140.

Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set

16 forth herein.

17

141.

Title VII r equires employers to m ake and keep re cords "relevant to the

18 determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed."

19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 8(c). EEOC regulations specif y that employers must preserve personnel

20 records, including application forms, for one year. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.

21

142.

The defendants have not kept this required information and Onex received a

22 records keeping violation from the EEOC.

23

COUNT III: Declaratory Judgment

(Invalidity of the Release under ERISA, OWBPA, the ADEA and Common Law)
24

25

143.

Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set

26 forth herein.

-38CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 39 of 44

1

144.

In threatening to term inate the relati onships of its em ployees agents Boeing

2 threatened to terminate employees and Onex refused to cons ider the employees for employment

3 unless they first signed the Release waiving their rights to pursue their claim s, including those

4 under ERISA and the ADEA. Boeing and Onex have engaged in retaliatory conduct in violation

5 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), and Section 5 10 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Inasm uch as

6 they were procured by means of such unlawful re taliatory conduct, the Releases are invalid and

7 unenforceable under ERISA and the ADEA

8

145. The Release also is invalid and unenf orceable because it does not satisfy the

9 requirements set forth in the OWBPA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)).

10

Count IV: Interference with ERISA Rights

11

(In Violation of Section 510 (29 U.S.C. § 1140))

12

146. Plaintiffs and Class h ereby incorporate the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth

13 herein.

14

147. Defendants are prohibited from discharging or otherwis e discriminating against a

15 plan participant "for the purpose of interfering with the a ttainment of any right to which such

16 participant may become entitled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140.

17

148. Here the defendants have specifically intended to interfere with the plaintiffs ERISA

18 rights. Boeing and Onex designed and im plemented its sale with the intention o f interfering

19 with the attainment and receipt of benefits under the Plans.

20

149.

As a result of defendants’ conduct, pl aintiffs and m embers of the Class have

21 suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage.

22

Count V: Breach of Contract

(Violation of LMRA)

23

24

150.

Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set

25 forth herein.

26

151.

Defendants have entered in to contracts, and m ade oral an d written

representations to pla intiffs and members of the Class, regarding the term s and conditions of

-39CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 40 of 44

1 their employment, including but not lim ited to assurances that older workers would and will

2 have the same employment opportunities as others.

3

152.

Defendants’ representations constitute binding contractual comm itments with

4 plaintiffs and members of the Class, and defendant s have contractual obligat ions with others as

5 to these m atters, which were desig ned to prot ect plaintiffs and the Class from the alleged

6 conduct at issue.

7

153.

Moreover, defendants have breached thei r employment contracts with plaintiffs

8 and members of the Class and their contractual commitments to oth ers to tr eat their old er

9 employees fairly and not discriminate against them because of their age.

10

154.

The Collective Bargaining Agreem ent that Boeing entered into required that lay

11 offs were to occur based on an individual’s seni ority. However, Boeing failed to abide by these

12 contractual terms in recomm ending the lay offs of the plaintiffs, thus vi olating the collective

13 bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs have standing to bring a breach of contract action.

14

155.

Furthermore, the IAM, failed to properly file grievances for the egregious acts of

15 Boeing. M oreover, IAM breached its duty of fair representation. The union’s breach of this

16 duty actually affected the integrity of the entire union process. The IAM has simply ignored the

17 meritorious claims of the plaintiffs and Class.

18

156.

Defendants’ contractual breaches have di rectly and proximately caused plaintiffs

19
and the Class to suffer dam ages including, but not lim ited to, lost past and future earnings, lost

20
benefits and consequential damages, in amounts to be proven at trial.

21
Count VI

22

(Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

23

157.

Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set

24

forth herein.

25

158.

Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to injunctive and equitable relief restraining

26

defendants from illegally discriminating against plaintiffs and the Class, and providing plaintiffs

-40CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 41 of 44

1 and the Class the benef its that they would ha ve received but for the discrimination and other

2 illegal conduct of defendants.

3

159. An award of attorney’s fees is appropriate in this case pursuant to applicable law.

4

COUNT VII: Retaliation

5

(Exercising Rights under Protected Activities)

6

160.

Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set

7
forth herein.

8

161.

Many of the class members are females who have complained of discrimination,

9
minorities who have com plained of discrimina tion, individuals who have filed worker’s

10
compensation, exercised FMLA, exercised disabili ty rights, or have blown the whistle on

11
managers, all of which are protected activitie s. Besides being over the age of forty, upon

12
information and belief, defendants’ alleged criteria targeted individuals who have exercised their

13
rights. Thus, the defendants have taken an adverse decision against these individuals.

14

162.

As a result of defendants’ conduct, pl aintiffs and m embers of the Class have

15
suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage.

16
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
17
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:
18
A. That th is case b e certified as a cla ss action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and/or a
19
collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. ' § 216(b) on behalf of the proposed plaintif f class and
20

subclasses, and that plaintiffs’ counsel of record be designated as Class Counsel for the class
21

and subclass;
22

B. That a declaratory judgm ent be issued declaring that the Release is invalid and
23

unenforceable under th e ADEA, ERISA and the common law, pu rsuant to 2 9 U.S.C. §
24

626(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202;
25

C. That a permanent injunction be issued compelling Onex to offer all p laintiffs and the
26

class and subclass members the opportunity to be reinstated as employees under the same terms

-41CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 42 of 44

1 and conditions which existed prior to the term ination of their employment status and restoration

2 to participant status under the Plans, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(b);

3

D. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and the class and subclass m embers

4 and against the defendants restoring to them all benefits and other form s of compensation lost

5 between the dates of the term ination of their em ployment and the date of judgm ent, together

6 with interest or an appropriate inflation factor, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3);

7

E. That judgm ent be entere d in favor of plaintiffs and the class and su bclass members

8 and against the defendants for lost benefits, future benefits, back pay (including interest or an

9 appropriate inflation factor), front pay, lost investment capital, and liquidated damages, pursuant

10 to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b);

11

F. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and class and subclass m embers and

12 against the defendants for all di rect, incidental, and consequen tial damages arising out of the

13 defendants’ breaches of contract;

14

G. That judgm ent be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants for all

15 direct, incidental, and conseque ntial damages, including non-fina ncial injuries, arising out of

16 defendants’ actions, and for punitive da mages in amounts to be determ ined at trial n o less than

17 one billion five hundred m illion dollars ($1,500,000,000) to be divided equally am ong the class

18
members;
19
H. That a constructive trust be im posed over defendants’ assets sufficient to cover all
20
losses suffered by the class members as a result of the violations of ERISA;
21
I. That plaintiffs and class and subclass members be awarded such other and further legal
22
and equitable relief as may be found appropriate and as the Court may deem just or equitable;
23
J. That plaintiffs and class and subcla ss members be gra nted their a ttorneys’ fees,
24
experts’ fees, and the costs and expenses of this litigation;
25
K. That a d eclaratory judgment be issued declaring that the defe ndants have violated
26
Title VII by failing to retain proper documentation; and

-42CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 43 of 44

1

L. That the Court retain jurisdiction over all defendants until such time as it is satis fied

2 that they have remedied the practices complained of and are determined to be in full compliance

3 with the law.

4

5

DATED: December 19, 2005

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Respectfully submitted,

13

14

s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr.

15

Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. #21282

16

Uzo L. Ohaebosim

#20983

Shores, Williamson and Ohaebosim, LLC

17

1400 Epic Center

301 N. Main Street

18

Wichita, Kansas 67202-4814

Telephone: (316) 261-5400

19

Facsimile: (316) 261-5404

Attorneys for plaintiffs
20

21

22

23
DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL
24
COMES NOW plaintiffs, by and through their c ounsel, and respectfully request that this
25
matter be set for a jury trial. Wichita, Kansas is designated as place of trial.
26

-43CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 1 Filed 12/19/05 Page 44 of 44

1

By:

Lawrence
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. W. Williamson, Jr. #21282
Attorney for plaintiffs
-44-

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX )

CORPORATION, and SPIRIT

)

AEROSYSTEMS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 05-1368-MLB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is be fore the court on plaintiffs’ m otion to com pel (Doc. 219) and Boeing’s motion to quash (Doc. 228). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s m otion shall be DENIED and Boeing’s motion shall be GRANTED.1

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Plaintiffs move for an order compelling the production of documents designated as protected by the attorney-client privilege or, in the alternative, for an in camera review. Plaintiffs contend that Boeing has failed to carry its burden of showing that the privilege is

1
The nature of this lawsuit has been described in prior opinions and will not be repeated. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, Doc. 218, filed October 24, 2007.

applicable to the documents listed in Boeing’s privilege log and that the court should review the documents in camera. The parties’ specific argum ents are discussed in greater detail below.
Nature of the Communication Plaintiffs argue that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to business advice
by an attorney but is limited to communications seeking or providing legal advice. Because plaintiffs cannot determine from the privilege log whether the withheld information contains legal or business advice, plaintiffs argue that the court should conduct an in camera review of the documents to determine whether the privilege applies. Boeing agrees that the privilege is limited to legal advice and does not apply to business advice; therefore, Boeing has already produced e-mail messages from attorneys containing business advice. However, Boeing asserts that communications concerning legal advice have been properly withheld and listed in the privilege log.
There is no dispute between the parties that business advice by an attorney is not protected by the privilege and, as noted above, Boeing contends that such information has already been produced.2 However, plaintiffs persist in their request for an in camera review. The court declines plaintiffs’ request. When stripped of prolixity, plaintiffs’ requests for an
2
Plaintiffs do not dispute Boeing’s assertion that numerous e-mails from attorneys concerning business advice have been produced.
-2-

in camera review is a direct attack on defense counsels’ ve racity.3 However, plaintiffs present no evidence or argum ent raising any inference that defense counsels’ veracity is suspect or that there is a reason to que stion the accuracy of the privilege log. 4 Defense counsel are officers of the court and, absent som e justification or credible argument, their representations concerning production should not be lightly dism issed. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument for an in camera review tosearch for “business advice” is not persuasive.
Multiple Documents Boeing’s privilege log contains some “entries” with references to numerous Bates-
stamped documents. P laintiffs argue that Bo eing’s privilege log fails to show that the attorney-client privilege is applicable to each of the listed Bates-stam ped documents. However, Boeing explains that the structure of its privilege log is the result of (1) the same e-mail messages (containing legal advice) being stored in more than one e-mail file and/or (2) legal advice being repeated in string e-mail messages. Because the same e-mail message existed in more than one electronic “document,” Boeing listed all of the documents by Bates number where the legal communication was located. Although Boeing listed entire e-mail
3
Plaintiffs’ argue: “this motion does not attack the veracity of defendant’s counsel.” Doc. 226, p. 2. However, plaintiffs immediately follow with the assertion that they “are not bound by defendant’s good faith designations” and insist that the court conduct an in camera review. Id. These arguments are not consistent. In essence, plaintiffs ask the court to confirm the veracity of counsel’s representations in the privilege log.
4
At best, plaintiffs argue that the court should review the documents in camera simply because plaintiffs have challenged defendant’s designations. Doc. 226, p. 2.
-3-

strings, it redacted only the portion of the string that contained legal communications. At first glance Boeing’s listing of m ultiple Bates-stamped documents for a single
privilege log entry is confusing. However, with Boeing’s clarification, the court is satisfied that the log adequately supports Boeing’s claimof privilege for multiple copies of the same communication.5 Ac cordingly, plaintiffs’ objection to Boeing’s listing of “m ultiple documents” is rejected.
Authors and Recipients of Communications Plaintiffs assert that a document that is not authored by an attorney is not protected
by the attorney-client privilege. This interpretation is too narrow because the attorney-client privilege covers communications to or fromthe client so long as the communication is in the context of securing legal advice. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kraft Foods, 2007 WL 221927 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007) (privilege protects not only professional advice by a lawyer but also the giving of information to the lawyer to e nable the lawyer to provide sound and inform ed advice). Plaintiffs also argue that some of the email messages reflect multiple authors and/or recipients. However, these examples occur in the context of string email messages and, as explained above, Boeing has produced the string emails, redacting only the specific portion
5
The organization of a privilege log for electronic documents existing in multiple locations presents a challenge. Perhaps a better method would be to list the original legal communication by date, author and recipient and thereafter indicate that the other Batesstamped documents are copies or a repeat of the original legal communication. However, electronic discovery is an evolving practice and Boeing will not be faulted for its efforts to organize the privilege log.
-4-

that contains attorney-client communications. Plaintiffs also assert that Boeing has waived the attorney-client privilege by sharing
the legal advice with a third party. However, the “third pa rty” was Goldm an Sachs, a consultant hired by Boeing to assist in the sale of Boeing’s Wichita facilities. Boeing asserts that the withheld information is (1) legal advice from Boeing’s counsel for the purposes of obtaining information or services from Goldman Sachs or (2) Goldm an Sachs’ advice to Boeing of the need for legal advice in order to act on Boeing’s behalf. Under the circumstances, legal communications with a retained consultant does not waive the attorneyclient privilege. See Steele v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita, 1992 WL 123818 (D. Kan., May 26, 1992).
Spirit Communications Plaintiffs also seek to compel communications from Spirit’s counsel that are listed on
Boeing’s privilege log. Plaintiffs contend that since the em ail messages are from counsel representing another party (Spirit), the com munication is not between Boeing and its attorney. However, Boeing explains that the non-privileged portions of the email messages have been produced and the withheld portions areBoeing counsel’s advice to Boeingabout the communication and handwritten notes by Boeing’s counsel. The court agrees that the redacted information is subject to the attorney-client privilege.
-5-

Summary The court has reviewed the privilege log and the arguments of counsel and is satisfied that the materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, an in cam era review is not warranted. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion shall be DENIED. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ m otion to com pel or, in the alternative, for an in camera review (Doc. 219) is DENIED.
Boeing’s Motion to Quash Plaintiffs served notice to take depositionspursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5) & (6) of Boeing’s designated represe ntative in Wichita, Kansas. Boeing m oves to quash the deposition notice, arguing that plaintiffs should take the deposition in Seattle, Washington where the deponent, John Borst, resides, rather than in Wichita. Plaintiffs oppose theomtion, arguing that the deposition should take place in Wichita. The general rule in this district is that “an initial presumption exists that a defendant should be examined at his residence or principal place of business.” Ice Corp. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 2007 WL 1500311, *4 (D. Kan., May 21, 2007); See also Payne v. McKune, 2007 WL 3036190 (D. Kan., Oct. 16, 2007)(in general, deposition of corporate executives and officers are to be taken at the principal place of business of the corporation). Boeing asserts that Seattle, Washington is its principal place of business and location of the witness; thus, the deposition should take place in Seattle. Plaintiffs counter that the general rule does not apply when a plaintiff is constrained
-6-

in selecting a forum . The Topps Co. v. Productos Stani Sociedad Anom ia Industrial Y Commercial, 2001 WL 406193 (S.D.N.Y., April 20, 2001). Thus, the deposition should occur in Wichita because plaintiffs were “constrained” to file this lawsuit in Wichita. Plaintiffs also argue that cost, convenience, and efficiency weigh in favor of conducting the deposition in Wichita. As explained below, neither argument is persuasive.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Topps Co.is not persuasive because the “constraint” or reason for filing the case in the Southern District of New York was a forumselection clause in the parties’ contract. Here, there was no such clause which “constrained” plaintiffs to file the case in Wichita, Kansas. More importantly, the court in Topps Co.still required plaintiff to depose defendant’s corporate representatives in Argentina where the deponents resided and worked. See also Six West Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Managem ent Corp., 203 F.R.D. 98, (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(plaintiff’s deposition of defendant’s corporate representatives ordered to take place in Japan where the deponents resided and worked).
Plaintiffs’ argument concerning cost, convenience, and effic iency is similarly not persuasive. Although it is undoubtedly true, as plaintiffs argue, that it is omre convenient for counsel to take the deposition in Kansas, it isnot more convenient for Mr. Borst to travel to Kansas for a deposition. Moreover, there is no evidence that Boeing selected Mr. Borst in an attempt to increase the expenses of this lawsuit. Mr. Borst was selected because there are no Boeing witnesses in Wichita knowledgeable about the topics listed in the deposition notice. Finally, the need to conduct depositions in various locations is not an extraordinary event, given the nature of this class action lawsuit. The court is not persuaded that the
-7-

circumstances surrounding this deposition should alter the general rule; therefore, plaintiffs shall take Mr. Borst’s deposition in Seattle, Washington and Boeing’s motion to quash the deposition scheduled in Wichita, Kansas shall be GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Boeing’s m otion to qua sh (Doc. 228) is GRANTED.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under D. Kan. Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law, or whe re the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a m otion to reconsider and advancing new argum ents or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by the court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.
-8-

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated at Wichita, Kansas this 22nd day of January 2008.
S/ Karen M. Humphreys _______________________ KAREN M. HUMPHREYS United States Magistrate Judge
-9-

 
 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 239 Filed 05/21/08 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX )

CORPORATION, and SPIRIT

)

AEROSYSTEMS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 05-1368-MLB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint (Doc. 235). Defendants oppose the m otion. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs’ m otion shall be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Background 1 This lawsuit arises from Boeing’s sale of its com mercial airplane m anufacturing facilities in (1) Wichita, Kansa s; (2) Tulsa, Oklahom a; and (3) McAlester, Oklahom a. Highly summarized, plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in a scheme to lower costs by

1
The nature of this lawsuit has been described in greater detail in prior opinions and will not be repeated except for context.

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 239 Filed 05/21/08 Page 2 of 9
reducing the age of Boeing’s workforce at these plants. In 2004 Boeing publicly announced its intention to sell its c ommercial facilities in Wichita and Oklahom a and eventually negotiated an Asset Purchase Agreement with defendant Onex, a Canadian corporation. As part of the transaction, Onex created a new business entity, Spirit AeroSystems Inc., to own and operate the Wichita and Oklahoma facilities.2
Spirit announced plans to continue operatnig the commercial manufacturing facilities. However, Boeing employees who wanted to continue their em ployment with Spirit were required to submit an application. After reviewing work records and interviewing Boeing managers, Spirit hired some, but not all, of the Boeing em ployees who sought to continue employment with Spirit.3
Spirit did not hire the plaintiffs, a group of former Boeing employees. Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class action and contend that Boeing and Onex engaged in unlawful age discrimination in the layoff and rehire process. They allege thre e federal claims: (1) age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, (2) interference with ERISA rights in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140, and (3) breach of the collective bargaining agreement in violation of the
2
The original name of the new company was Mid-Western Aircraft System Inc. However, in July 2005 Mid-Western changed its name to Spirit AeroSystems Inc.
3
Plaintiffs allege that the “common scheme” of discrimination climaxed with major layoffs in May and June of 2005. Doc. 40, p. 35. Boeing denies plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination and argues that all employees in the affected facilities were terminated by June 16, 2005, the effective date of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Spirit assumed operations on June 17 and the former Boeing employees who were rehired began working for Spirit that same day.
-2-

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 239 Filed 05/21/08 Page 3 of 9
LMRA.4
Motion to Amend Plaintiffs move for leave to make the following changes to their complaint:
1. the addition of certain factual allegations and other m inor changes;
2. the dismissal of defendant Onex; 3. the correction of typographical errors; and 4. the addition of a cause of action for civil conspiracy. Defendants oppose only two aspects of the proposed amended complaint.5 First, defendants object to plaintiffs’ citation to num erous documents designated as confidential under the Protective Order (Doc. 70). Second, defendants argue that the addition of a conspiracy claim is futile. With respect to the first issue, the parties are continuing to confer; therefore, the court will defer ruling on that issue pending areport by the parties on whether an agreement has been reached. The second issue, futility, is discussed in greater detail below. The standards for perm itting a party to am end his or her com plaint are well established. Without an opposing party's consent, a party may amend the pleading only by
4
A number of claims asserted in earlier versions of the complaint have been dismissed. The proposed amended complaint removes those claims which have been dismissed.
5
Because defendants do not object to the other changes, plaintiffs shall be granted leave to amend their complaint to incorporate those modifications without further discussion.
-3-

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 239 Filed 05/21/08 Page 4 of 9
leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).6 Although leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” whether to grant leave is within the court' s discretion. Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, 60 F.3d 1486, 1494 (10th Cir. 1995)(citing Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F. 2d 1452, 1462 (10th Cir. 1991)). In exercising its discretion, the court must be “mindful of the spirit of the federal rules of civil procedure to encourage decisions on the merits rather than on mere technicalities.” Koch v. Koch Industrie,s127 F.R.D. 206, 209 (D. Kan. 1989). The court considers a num ber of factors in deciding whether to allow an amendment, including untimeliness, prejudice to the other party, bad faith, and futility of amendment. Hom v. Squire, 81 F.3d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1996).
With respect to futility, “a court may deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss or if it fails to state a claimupon which relief may be granted.” Collins v. Wal-Mart, Inc,.245 F.R.D. 503, 507 (D. Kan. 2007)(citing Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992)). In conducting its review, the court assumes the truth of plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Beedle v. Wilson , 422 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10 th Cir. 2005). Although viewed in a light favorable to plaintiff, the complaint must “contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007). “The m ere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claim s is insufficient; the
6
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is filed. The time for amending “as a matter of course” is long past.
-4-

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 239 Filed 05/21/08 Page 5 of 9
complaint must give the court reason to believe that his plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood
of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk v. Schneider, 493 F.3d
1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).7
Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ proposed conspiracy claim is futile because it is
preempted by federal law. Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim
for age discrimination is preempted by the ADEA. Plaintiffs contend that their state law
conspiracy claim is not “inextricably intertwined” with their ADEA claim ; therefore,
preemption does not apply.8 As explained in greater detail below, the court agrees that the
7
Until recently, dismissal for failure to state a claim was considered appropriate where “it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Bell Atlantic “retired” this often quoted phrase for a new standard. Ridge at Red Hawk, 493 F.3d at 1177.
8
Plaintiffs’ arguments raise some ambiguity concerning which “underlying wrong” forms the basis for the civil conspiracy claim. Plaintiffs assert in their brief:
Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is limited to the fact that the defendants and third parties conspired to reduce the age of the workforce which is age discrimination. Thus, the question is whether the plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claims are inextricably intertwined with plaintiffs’ age discrimination claims.
Doc. 236, p. 6 (emphasis added). However, the “inextricably intertwined” test is used to determine whether a state tort claim is preempted by the LMRA. The ADEA and ERISA are separate and distinct statutory schemes. “A true federal preemption argument would require an examination of whether Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to exercise its powers under the Supremacy Clause to abrogate the rights and duties that the state law would otherwise recognize.” Conyers v. Safelite Glass Corp., 825 F. Supp. 974, 975, fn. 1 (D. Kan. 1993).
During the May 15, 2008 status conference plaintiffs also asserted that their civil
-5-

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 239 Filed 05/21/08 Page 6 of 9
addition of a conspiracy cause of action is futile; thus, plaintiffs’ motion to amend to add the new claim shall be denied.
Kansas recognizes civil conspiracy as an actionable tort. Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 234 Kan. 957, 967 (1984).9 The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished;(3) a meeting of the minds in the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof. Id. However, civil conspiracy is not an indepe ndent cause of action; there must be the “commission of some wrong giving rise to a cause of action independent of the conspiracy.” Id.
The problem with plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is that the “underlying wrongs” on which plaintiffs rely to support their conspiracy claims are ADEA, ERISA, and LMRA violations. Violations of ADEA and ERISA are governed by a com plex statutory scheme that includes detailed adm inistrative remedies and judicial processes. For exam ple, administrative claims must be exhausted before bringing a private claimunder the ADEA or ERISA. In addition, liability in an ADE A case is limite d to “em ployers” and punitive damages are capped. Allowing a state-law conspiracy claim based on an ADEA or ERISA violation would perm it plaintiffs to m ake an “end run” around those federal statutory
conspiracy claim was based, in part, on violations of ADEA, ERISA, and the LMRA. Although the primary thrust of plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is age discrimination, the court also analyzes preemption by ERISA and the LMRA.
9
Plaintiffs filed no reply brief but clarified during the May status conference that their civil conspiracy claim is based on Kansas common law.
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schemes. See Nance v. Maxwell F ederal Credit Union, 186 F. 3d 1338, 1342. (11 th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs essentially attempt to use a state common law claim to preempt the federal statutory scheme for ADEA and ERISA violations, an approach which this court rejects.10 The enforcement of rights created under the ADEA and ERISA must be pursued under the provisions of the ADEA and ERISA, not through alternative state-law mechanisms. Nance, 186 F.3d at 1342-1342; Cf. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny , 442 U.S. 366 (1979)(a federal conspiracy statute m ay not be used to rem edy a violation of Title VII). Accordingly plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is preempted by the ADEA and ERISA.
The issue of whether plaintiffs’ state law civil conspiracy claim is also preempted by the LMRA involves a slightly different analysis.11 Section 301 of the LMRA “expresses a federal policy that the substantive law to applyin § 301 cases is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985). Accordingly, “questions relating to what the partie s to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow frombreaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions
10
In response to the court’s inquiry during the May conference, plaintiffs explained that the purpose in adding the state law conspiracy claim is to (1) reduce their burden of proof related to the ADEA claim and (2) allow for damages otherwise unavailable under the ADEA.
11
As noted above, it is less than clear that plaintiffs are pursuing a civil conspiracy claim based on a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. However, out of an abundance of caution, the court addresses whether such a conspiracy claim is preempted by the LMRA.
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arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.” Id. However, “the Supreme Court has also m ade it clear that ‘not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of thefederal labor law.’” Garley v. Sandia Corp., 236 F. 3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001)(quoting Allis-Chalmers). The test articulated in AllisChalmers for determining whether a state law claim is preempted by § 301 is “whether evaluation of the tort claimis inextricably intertwined with considerations of the terms of the labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).
To the extent plaintiffs contend that theircivil conspiracy claimis based on a violation of the LMRA, the claim is ine xtricably intertwined with the LMRA claim because the collective bargaining agreement must be evaluated to determine whether a breach of contract occurred. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claimbased on a violation of the LMRA is also preempted by federal law.
Because plaintiffs’ state law civil cons piracy claim is preem pted by the ADEA, ERISA, and the LMRA, the claim is futile and leave to amend to add such a claim shall be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to amend (Doc. 235) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with the rulings set forth above. The parties shall confer concerning plaintiffs’ citation to confidential docum ents. If the parties reach an agreement, the revised amended complaint shall be filed on or before June
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10, 2008. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the matter will be taken up at a status conference scheduled by the court.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under D. Kan. Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law, or whe re the party pr oduces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of r easonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a m otion to reconsider and advancing new argum ents or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by the court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated at Wichita, Kansas this 21st day of May 2008.
S/ Karen M. Humphreys __________________________ KAREN M. HUMPHREYS United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 291 Filed 07/02/09 Page 1 of 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX CORPORATION, and SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS,
Defendants.

Case No. 05-1368-EFM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides: “Any. . . judge . . . of the United States shall disqualify hismelf in any proceeding in which his im partiality might reasonably be questioned.” Asserting that m y impartiality as a judge in this matter might reasonably be questioned, plaintiffs move to recuse me. Plaintiffs’ motion emphasizes the word “might” in their motion, but case development indicates that the more appropriate emphasis should be on “reasonably.”1 Because knowledge of all the relevant facts would not cause a reasonable person to have cause to question m y impartiality, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Plaintiffs’ motion sets forth three grounds for ercusal. First, recusal is sought on the grounds that I previously represented the defendant in this case, Boeing. Second, recusal is sought on the

1United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993).
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grounds that I previousl y was a partner in the la w firm which represents Boeing in this instant matter, and was a partner there at the sam e time that each of defendants’ current counsel were employed by the firm.2 Third, recusal is sought on the grounds that during the time I was United States Attorney in this District, I was adverse to Plaintiffs’ current counsel in unrel ated criminal litigation and was “more than a passive participant” in that criminal litigation, as I “approved the prosecution of” defendants and “ made public statem ents regarding the litigation.” 3 Pl aintiffs expound on this third point by arguing that the litigation in question was “hotly contested” and by asserting that, in his representation of the criminal defendants in that unrelated litigation, counsel for the Plaintiffs here made several critical assertions regarding that case which I (as United States Attorney) had authorized.4
Plaintiffs correctly note that the standard is not whether a judge is in fact biased against a party, or otherwise prejudiced regarding the litigation. Rather, the issue of bias or prejudice are to be evaluated on an objective basis, “so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.”5 Recusal should be determined based upon “whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.”6 However, the standard also is not speculative nor fanciful. The test is a reasonable analysis, made upon knowledge of all
2Currently, the Court’s docket sheet lists 8 attorneys from the law firm as having entered their appearance in this case. Of those 8, 2 were not at the firm when I was, and 4 were partners at the firm with me.
3Plaintiffs’ Motion to Recuse, Doc. 272, at p. 3. 4In Plaintiffs’ Reply (Doc. 277), Plaintiff notes that if the Court has any financial interest in Boeing or Spirit, that would create an additional reason to recuse. I do not. 5Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). 6Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987)).
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the facts. Recusal under Section 455a() “must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon themerest unsubstantiated suggestion ofpersonal bias or suggestion.”7 Further, the law of recusal does not recognize the concept of recusing to be on the safe side, for “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.”8
Because the analysis presupposes that the reasonable person has knowledge of all the relevant facts, a supplem ent of Plaintiffs’ factual statement is the first order of business. W ith respect to Plaintiffs first ground for recusal, I joined defendants’ law firm, Foulston Siefkin, LLP9 in August of 1987, and became a partner in June of 1992. I left the firmin March of 2002 to accept an appointment as United States Attorney, which position I held until becom ing a federal district judge in October of 2008. Therefore, I was with the firm 14 years and 8 months, was a partner at that firm for 9 years and 9 months, and have been gone from the firm for 7 years and 4 months.10 In other words, I have been gone from the law firm for half as long a period of time as I was there, and for a period of time only slightly shorter than Iwas a partner there. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ vague allegations, my tenure with the firm does not appear to have overlapped any of the pertinent facts relevant to this case, and in any event I was notinvolved with or knowledgeable of them. This case arises from actions involving the sale of Boeing’s W ichita assets to the newly form ed company
7Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993). 8Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995). 9At the time I joined the firm, it was known as Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt. 10Plaintiffs’ Motion notes that I had only been gone from the firm 3 years at the time this action was filed. While the action was filed in December of 2005 (3 years and 8 months after my departure from the firm), that date is irrelevant as I had nothing to do with the case on that date. It was not reassigned to me until I took the federal bench in October of 2008 (6 years and 7 months after my departure from the firm).
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Spirit Aerosystems, which occurred 3 years after my departure. Moreover, during my 6 years and 7 months as United States Attorney, my United States
Attorney’s Office had several cases adverse t o clients represented by Foulston Siefkin. I was actively involved with some of those cases, and as United States Attorney was knowledgeable of and supervised all of them. As a federal judge over the past 9 months, I have had over two dozen cases assigned to me in which Foulston Siefkin represents one of the parties; over half of those are still open. In other words, since the time that I was a lawyer withFoulston Siefkin, I have been both involved as a lawyer opposing parties represented by Foulston Siefkin, and have been assigned to preside over court disputes involving parties represented by Foulston Siefkin.
It should also be noted that I have no continuinfginancial interest in, or financial expectation from, the Foulston Siefkin firm , and have not so had since m y departure in March of 2002. Plaintiffs’ rationale for their first ground for recusal is nothing more than the fact that I used to be, years ago, associated with Defendants’ law firm. It is not reasonable to question my impartiality as a judge on those grounds alone.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ second ground for recusal, I did, whi le associated with the Foulston Siefkin law firm, represent Boeing from time to time. Those representations all involved tax matters – gene rally property tax m atters. As Boeing’s tax m atters were handled from its corporate offices, then in Seattle, my client contacts in the course of such representation were not Wichita-based Boeing employees (although documents and information would be obtained from Wichita based employees, they were only acting at the direction of the managers in Seattle). This instant matter involves employment matters specific to the Wichita location. My representation of Boeing did not involve any em ployment matters, nor did it inc lude interaction with anyone in a
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managerial position (then or now) at Boeing regarding employment matters. Boeing, as should be apparent, is a l arge corporation, with many different departments and divisions, involving m any different people.
Further, during my more recent tenure as UnitedStates Attorney, I supervised several cases adverse to Boeing, and was personally involved in some of those matters. In other words, since the time that I represented Boeing, I have been adverse in litigation to Boeing.
The law does not require recusal based on prior,unrelated representation of the same party. Awareness of the facts related to my representation of Boeing in the past, and the facts relevant to the claims in this case, would not lead to reasonably questioning my impartiality as a judge in this case.
Finally, Plaintiffs suggest th at my impartiality may be reasonably questioned because of harsh statements Plaintiffs’ counsel allegedly11 made regarding unrelated litigation involving him and the United States Attorney’s Office during a time period when I was the United States Attorney. This is the weakest of Plaintiffs’ three grounds for recusal. First, the law is clear that a defendant cannot force judicial recusal by making “heated” comments about the judge:
“The mere fact that a defendant has m ade derogatory rem arks about a judge is insufficient to convince a sane and reasonabel mind that the attacked judge is biased or prejudiced.” The sam e is true regarding an objective person, knowing all the facts, assessing whether the judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned. Any other conclusion would allow defendants to cause the recusal of judges sim ply by making scurrilous and disparaging rem arks or charges about them . Perm itting parties to manipulate the system with falsehoods or insults in such a manner would be a bizarre application of § 455(a) . . . .12
11I say “allegedly” only because, prior to the filing of this motion, I was totally unaware of these statements counsel claims to have made, which he asserts as grounds for my bias or prejudice against his current clients.
12Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994, fn. 5 (quoting United States v. Bray 546 F.2d 851, 858 (10th Cir. 1976)) (emphasis original).
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Certainly, if a party’s remarks cannot be a reasonable basis for recusal, then the remarks of the party’s counsel clearly cannot form such a reasonable basis. The only claim of bias which is pertinent to the considerations in a recusal motion is a claim of bias against a party, not against an attorney.13
Under the relevant legal standards, a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the relevant facts, would not harbor doubts about m y impartiality in this m atter upon the basis of comments Plaintiffs’ lawyer claims he made previously.
Accordingly, the law requires that I not recuse myself from this case.14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDEREDthat Plaintiffs’ Motion toRecuse (Doc. 272) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 2nd day of July, 2009 in Wichita, Kansas.
/s Eric F. Melgren ERIC F. MELGREN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13Hinman 831 F.2d at 939; Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398-99 (8th Cir. 1983). 14Although Plaintiffs’ motion only seeks recusal in this case, it is inescapable that if an analysis compelled recusal from this case on either Plaintiffs’ first or second basis, or both, then it would also require my recusal from all other cases in which Foulston Siefkin represents a party, and/or in which Boeing is a party.
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al. Plaintiffs,
vs. THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC.,

Case No. 05-1368-EFM

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This case arises out of Boeing’s sale of the assets of its commercial facilities in Wichita, Kansas and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma (the “BCA Wichita Division”), to Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. (“Spirit”), in June 2005. Plaintiffs are former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit when it purchased Boeing’s BCA Wichita Division assets. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit alleging that Defendants violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1140; § 301 of the Labor Managem ent Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29U.S.C. § 623. On November 11, 2006, this Court conditionally certified a collective action under theADEA. Now before the Court are the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ m otion to certify a cl ass under the LMRA and ERISA (Doc. 287); (2) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ERISA and LMRA claims (Doc. 298); and (3) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to decertify Plaintiffs’ ADEA
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claims (Doc. 307). For the reasons stated belowt,he Court grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In light of this holding, Plaintiffs’motion to certify a classunder the LMRA and ERISA and Defendants’ motion to decertify Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims are rendered moot and are therefore denied.
I. Facts1 Years Leading up to the Divestiture of the BCA Wichita Division
In hopes of remaining competitive in the aerospace industry, Boeing Commercial Airplanes (“BCA”), headquartered in Seattle, Washington, began changing its business strategy in the late 1990s. BCA decided to increasingly focus on the initial engineering and design of its aircrafts, sales and marketing to the end user, and final assembly of the finished product. This shift in focus meant moving toward purchasing more piece parts and component assemblies from non-Boeing outside suppliers.
Pursuant to this change in strategy, BCA began exploring opportunities to divest itself of several of its manufacturing operations that had been internal suppliers of piece parts and component assemblies, but were not involved in final assembly of the aircraft. When it reviewed each of its facilities, BCA compared the performance of that Boeing facility as an internal supplier against acquiring the parts and assemblies from an external supplier. The comparisons were based upon a wide variety of factors. Over a number of years, several Boeing facilities were divested.
Boeing’s commercial facilities in Wichita, Kansas and Tulsa and McAlestor, Oklahoma (the “BCA Wichita Division”) were a BCA supplier. In light of the fact that Boeing was
1Additional facts will be set forth in the Analysis section that warrant further discussion.
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increasingly outsourcing work to non-Boeing external suppliers, management at the BCA Wichita Division grew increasingly concerned that the BCA Wichita Division would win fewer contracts on new Boeing programs unless a different cost structure could be established. Due to this concern, management at the BCA Wichita Division began to analyze how they could structure the BCA Wichita Division to be more competitive with external suppliers.
In early 2002, Jeff Turner, the leader of the management team in Wichita, spoke with Jim Morris, BCA V.P., Engineering & Manufacturing in Seattle, and suggested that BCA consider bundling the facilities in Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester and either sell the facilities, create a wholly-owned subsidiary, or spin-off the facilities. Mr. Turner learned that a team of individuals in Seattle was already evaluating whether a different structure for the BCA Wichita Division would allow BCA to purchase the assemblies manufactured at the BCA Wichita Division at a more of a market-based price. BCA management was also evaluating whether restructuring the BCA Wichita Division created less risk than purchasing the assemblies from an external supplier. At the time of these discussions, there were many other suppliers with the ability to meet Boeing’s needs.
In the fall of 2003, the decision to offer the assets of the BCA Wichita Division for sale was made. At that point in time, the potential sale was referred to as “Project Lloyd.” A team of people in Seattle prepared for the potential sale, working closely with the management team for the BCA Wichita Division. Between September 2003 and March 2004, an Offering Memorandum was prepared for and given to potential buyers. This memorandum provided business, product, operational, and financial data, highlighted market outlook, presented current and projected revenue, as well as new growth opportunities, and included internally developed
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cost saving opportunities for the stand alone entity. One of the key assumptions was that Boeing would enter into a long-term supply agreement with the buyer.
BCA believed that the Wichita Division would be attractive due to the potential cost saving opportunities. Unlike Boeing, the purchaser of the Wichita Division would not be constrained by labor contracts that were tied to those in Seattle. These contracts had resulted in the Wichita Division paying higher wages than those in the rest of the Wichita market and had created a number of job codes that were too rigid, as they defined each employee’s job responsibilities too narrowly. In addition to the savings that would occur from offering base pay and benefits that were more in-line with the local market and combining job codes, BCA believed that the purchaser could also reduce costs by reducing the number of people working at the Wichita Division. Management for the Wichita Division believed that the purchaser could still meet the Division’s statement of work by hiring only 80 to 90% of the current workforce.
Onex Partners LP (“Onex”) was one the companies interested in purchasing the BCA Wichita Division. Onex believed that the opportunity to acquire the Wichita Division was attractive because: (1) the commercial aircraft market was at a low point in its production cycle; (2) the Wichita Division would be able to reduce its costs and increase its competitive position by virtue of being separated from Boeing; and (3) the distinct competencies of the Wichita Division, when combined with the long-term supply agreement to be entered into between it and Boeing, would give it a sustainable revenue outlook.
In October 2004, Boeing and Onex entered into exclusive negotiations for the divestiture of the BCA Wichita Division. Boeing agreed that Onex could have access to a select group of leaders in Wichita to allow it to evaluate the supply contracts being offered by Boeing and
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potential cost savings identified by the Wichita management and other consultants.2 From the outset of negotiations, Boeing made it clear that a requirement of any sale was that Boeing’s existing pension obligations would be transferred to Onex for those employees hired by them. Initially, Onex did not want to assume these obligations and preferred to pay a higher purchase price rather than assume the pension obligations. Onex’s position was based on its desire to offer a defined contribution 401(k) retirement plan instead of a defined benefit pension plan. However, in the end, Onex agreed to assume Boeing’s pension liabilities as of the close of the sale, so long as Boeing transferred sufficient funds for the pension obligations being transferred.
Sometime during the negotiations, Onex formed Mid-Western Aircraft Systems, Inc. (“Mid-Western”). Mid-Western served as the vehicle to purchase the assets of the BCA Wichita Division from Boeing.3 On February 22, 2005, Boeing and Mid-Western signed the Asset Purchase Agreement. The closing of the transaction took place on June 16, 2005. At the time of the closing, Boeing terminated all employees at the BCA Wichita Division. All employees stopped accruing benefits under the Boeing pension plan on that day.4 Spirit’s Day One workforce began work on June 17, 2005. Selection Process Used to Pick Spirit’s Day One Workforce
The process used by Spirit to select its Day One workforce was developed by the BCA Wichita Division Human Resources personnel. This process involved Boeing managers evaluating employees on seven defined criteria: skills, productivity, quality, teamwork/attitude,
2At the time, Onex was an equity manager that had no previous experience in the aerospace industry. 3Mid-Western changed its name to Spirit after the divestiture was complete. Throughout this Order, MidWestern and Spirit will be referred to collectively as Spirit. 4This was true regardless of whether any particular employee was offered a job by Spirit.
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safe work practices, lean, and corrective action. Each of the criterion included details and examples of what the criterion meant. Although managers were not told how to weigh the criteria, they were told that they were only to consider these criteria. Managers were further told that age was not to be considered. According to Defendants, these hiring criteria were designed to identify a workforce that would be flexible and possess the skills and attitude necessary to give Spirit the best chance of success.
Selection Process for the Wichita Site In Wichita, the selection process was conducted by organization, with the director of each organization ultimately being responsible for signing off on the hiring recommendations. Within those director groups, the make-up of the selection meetings varied, depending on the make-up or organization of the group. For example, in large organizations, the selection groups may have been organized by second-level manager, that is, a review of all employees reporting to all first-level managers who reported to a particular second-level manager. In other organizations, the selection groups may have been organized by multiple second-level managers. The selection process began in February 2005, and continued through May-June 2005. During this time, there were hundreds of meetings (at least between 300 and 400) in which the managers, accompanied by their HR team, went through their employees and made recommend/not recommend decisions. These meetings included anywhere between one and upwards of fifteen managers. At the first set of these meetings, managers were directed to recommend only 85% of the current workforce. In every meeting where managers made recommendation decisions, Human Resources representatives were present to facilitate the meeting. Typically, the meeting would start off
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with the first-level manager of record for each employee giving his recommendation on the employee. This initial recommendation, though, was not necessarily the resulting recommendation. Other managers also gave recommendations for employees who they had previously managed or observed. After each manager had had an opportunity to share their opinion, the group of managers would then reach an agreement as to whether to recommend a particular employee for hire.
As noted previously, the directors were ultimately responsible for reviewing the decisions that were made within their organizations and signing off on them. The director met with the Human Resources person who had facilitated the meetings and approved or disapproved the recommendation decisions that had been made by the lower-level managers. After the directors signed off on the selection decisions, the decisions were then reviewed by a panel.
During the selection process, Spirit performed several statistical analyses that compared the selection rate for various protected categories of employees (gender, race, and age) to the overall selection rate for employees in various broad job groups. Spirit conducted these analyses at several stages of the selection process between March and June 2005. The analyses were not conducted by segregating employees who were considered in one selection meeting or even all employees under one director. Instead, the employees were grouped together by facility or by a broad Affirmative Action Plan (“AAP”) job group which included many job codes. As a consequence, the results were not reflective of the decision-making groups or the way in which the selection process was conducted.
These analyses revealed that women, workers over the age of 40, and minorities were being adversely affected by the selective rehiring process. Following review of these analyses,
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changes were made to the recommendation statuses for minorities and women. According to Defendants, these changes were not based solely on the impact analyses. Additional factors such as increased work statements and an opportunity to improve the utilization of their workforce also affected their decision to make the changes. No changes were made to the recommendation statuses for workers over the age of 40, though, because Spirit did not believe that the results were indicative of discrimination, particularly where multiple decision makers had been involved in the process and the selection process was properly conducted, with several levels of oversight.
Selection Process for the Oklahoma Sites The same seven criteria that were used at the Wichita site were also used in Oklahoma. Pat Winn, an employee of the Hutchison Group, a Human Resources consultant hired by Spirit, conducted the training on the process to be used to determine which Boeing employees Spirit would hire. All of the Boeing Oklahoma Human Resources personnel and managers involved in the selection process were required to attend the training. At the training session, a copy of the selection criteria to be used was distributed. Mr. Winn also instructed the managers not to consider such factors as an employee’s race, sex, age, disability, or retirement eligibility in making their decisions. Mr. Winn and at least one Human Resources employee attended each of the selection meetings to evaluate the employees in the Tulsa Business Unit. Because of the smaller size of the facilities in Oklahoma, second level managers and directors, who had worked with the employees being considered for years and were knowledgeable about whether the employees met the seven criteria, made the selection decisions.
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Spirit’s Negotiations with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”)
While the selection process was going on, Spirit was negotiating with the IAM over what type of benefits Spirit would offer the union’s members. During these negotiations, the union suggested that Spirit make a contribution to the IAM National Pension Fund (“IAM NPF”), a multi-employer plan that the IAM NPF manages and numerous employers contribute to, in lieu of contributing to a 401(k) plan, which is what Spirit planned to offer to some of its employees who were not represented by the IAM. Spirit agreed to do so.
The IAM NPF uses a schedule for determining how much an employer must contribute to the plan. According to this schedule, an employer that entered the plan around the time that Spirit did should have to contribute $1.35 per hour. However, because the IAM NPF’s actuaries determined that the Wichita Division’s employee population was older and closer to retirement, the IAM NPF demanded that Spirit contribute $1.65 per hour. Believing that the demographics at the Wichita Division were going to change over time, Spirit did not think that it should be locked in at this higher rate. To resolve this dispute, Spirit agreed to deposit a conditional contribution of $.30 per hour into an escrow account for each hour worked by covered employees until June 30, 2010.5 Management for the Wichita Division, i.e., those participating in the selective hiring process, were not involved with these negotiations.
5In January 2006, the Board of Trustees of the IAM NPF determined that Spirit was no longer required to make the additional $.30 per hour payments into escrow, and returned the escrow monies that had been paid on behalf of the IAM workers.
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Results During the selective hiring process, Boeing managers reviewed 10,671 Boeing
employees. Of these employees, 9,203 (86%) were recommended for hire. Of the 10,671 Boeing employees who were considered for hire, 9,332 (87%) were 40 or older. Boeing recommended 7,968 (85%) of these older employees for hire. Spirit actually hired 8,354 Boeing employees for its Day One workforce. Of these, 7,237 (86%) were age 40 or older. The average age of all BCA Wichita Division employees on its last day of operations, June 16, 2005, was 48.6 years. The average age of all Spirit employees on its first day of operations, June 17, 2005, the next day, was 48.2 years.
On or about May 21, 2005, Spirit notified Wichita Division IAM-represented employees as to whether or not they had received a job offer from Spirit. This was prior to the membership vote on the proposed collective bargaining agreement between Spirit and the IAM. Employees who did not receive offers from Spirit were not allowed to vote on the proposed agreement. All of the executive directors up to the CEO at the BCA Wichita Division were offered positions with Spirit.
In the five and a half months following the divestiture, Spirit hired 1,125 more workers. II. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court is familiar with the standards governing the consideration of summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
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of law.”6 An issue is “genuine” if “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.”7 A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”8 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.9
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to summary judgment.10 The moving party is not required to disprove the nonmoving party’s claim or defense, but must only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance.11 If this initial burden is met, the nonmovant must then set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.12 In doing so, the opposing party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in its pleadings, but must present significant admissible probative evidence supporting its allegations.13 The Court is also cognizant that it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence when examining the underlying facts of the case.14
6Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 7Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). 8Id. 9Harrison v. Wahatoyas, LLC, 253 F.3d 552, 557 (10th Cir. 2001). 10Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 11Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987). 12Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 13Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 14Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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Finally, the Court notes that summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut;” rather, it is an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”
In their response, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are premature because they have not yet had the opportunity to conduct merit discovery. In an affidavit attached to their response, Plaintiffs claim that additional time for discovery would enable them to depose the union representatives who were responsible for processing grievances, the managers who made certain recommendations about Plaintiffs, and expert witnesses who would discuss technical aspects of pensions and the amount of money that Defendants have saved from Boeing’s sale of the Wichita division. Plaintiffs make their request pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), which provides:
[i]f a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order. The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request. As recently stated by the Tenth Circuit, a party must do more than simply claim that discovery is incomplete; rather, they must “state with specificity how the additional material will rebut the summary judgment motion.”15 Here, Plaintiffs have merely stated what they intend to do with additional discovery time; they have not stated how any additional facts discovered during that time would create a genuine issue of material fact. As a result, the Court will review the merits of Defendants’ motions.
15Libertarian Party v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2007).
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IV. Discussion Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit alleging that Defendants violated § 510 of ERISA, § 301 of LMRA, and the ADEA. Defendants have asked the Court to grant summary judgment on each of these claims. The Court will address the claims in turn. ERISA § 510 Interference Claim Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated § 510 of ERISA by “design[ing] and implement[ing] [the] sale [of the BCA Wichita Division] with the intention of interfering with [their] attainment and receipt of benefits under the Plans.”16 According to Plaintiffs’ theory, both Defendants wanted to avoid the economic burden caused by pension and healthcare benefits for Boeing’s older workers so they developed a complex scheme to eliminate these workers, and, thus, prevent them from accruing any more costly benefits. Before turning to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim, the Court deems it necessary to properly frame Plaintiffs’ claim. Based on Plaintiffs’ submissions, it appears that Plaintiffs believe that Defendants may be held liable under § 510 if they intended to prevent Plaintiffs from accruing benefits under either the Boeing or Spirit benefit plan. This belief is erroneous. As stated in 29 U.S.C. § 1132, a party may only bring a § 510 claim under a plan that they were a participant of. Therefore, because Plaintiffs, being former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit, were only participants of the Boeing pension plan, their § 510 claim must be construed as relating only to the accrual of benefits under that plan.

16Doc. 241, p. 49.

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Section 510 provides in relevant part:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan.17
To prevail on a § 510 interference claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had the
specific intent to interfere with their protected ERISA rights.18 The plaintiff can satisfy this
burden by relying on either direct or circumstantial proof.19 Here, Plaintiffs have not presented
direct evidence that Defendants had the specific intent to interfere with their protected ERISA
rights. Therefore, Plaintiffs must prove their case through circumstantial evidence.
In cases where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, courts have applied the
familiar McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green20 burden shifting framework, regardless of whether
the plaintiff is asserting a § 510 claim individually or on behalf of a class.21 Under this
framework, the plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff succeeds in making this showing, a presumption of discrimination is created and the
burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
1729 U.S.C. § 1140. 18See Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 649 (10th Cir. 1993). 19See Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 20411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 21See, e.g., Pendleton v. QuickTrip Corp., 567 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2009); Crawford v. TRW Auto. U.S. LLC, 560 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 2009); Giordano v. Thomson, 564 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009); Kouvchinov v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 537 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2008); Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 2007); Godwin v. Sw. Research Inst., 237 Fed. Appx. 306, 308 (10th Cir. 2007); Tisdale v. Woman’s Hosp., 191 Fed. Appx. 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2006); Lessard v. Applied Risk Mgmt., 307 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002); Salus v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 135 (7th Cir. 1997); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 1993); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 239 (4th Cir. 1991).
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for its conduct. If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption is destroyed and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual.22
In their response, Plaintiffs argue that the application of the McDonnell Douglas test in this case would constitute reversible error. More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that because they allege that Defendants have engaged in a pattern or practice of pension-based discrimination, the Court must apply the pattern-or-practice framework adopted by the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States23, a Title VII case where the United States brought a pattern-or-practice claim against an employer.24 In support of their contention, Plaintiffs cite to a number of courts that have applied the Teamsters’ pattern-orpractice method of proof to discrimination claims arising under statutory provisions other than Title VII, namely the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.25 Plaintiffs also cite to Vaszlavik v. Storage Technology Corp.26, a District Court of Colorado case where the court appears to have implicitly approved the application of
22See Goodwin, 237 Fed. Appx. at 308. 23431 U.S. 324 (1977). “Pattern and practice cases are typically tried in two or more stages.” Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001). 24Unlike other anti-discrimination statutes, Title VII explicitly provides the Attorney General with the authority to bring a civil action when they have reasonable cause to believe that an employer is engaging in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a). 25See Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1996) (ADEA); White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (ADA). 26183 F.R.D. 264 (D. Colo. 1998).
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the pattern-or-practice method of proof to § 510 claims.27 In their briefing, Defendants claim
that Plaintiffs’ contention is erroneous.28
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument. First, Plaintiffs have not cited to one
case where the presiding court applied the pattern-or-practice framework to a § 510 claim, which
is particularly telling in light of the fact that the pattern-or-practice methodology was developed
by the Supreme Court more than thirty years ago and that courts have applied the framework in
other contexts. Second, the lone case that Plaintiffs cited to where the pattern-or-practice
framework was even discussed in the § 510 context, Vazlavik, is of little persuasive value
because the court in that case merely stated that the plaintiffs were proceeding under a pattern-
or-practice theory; it did not provide a reasoned explanation for why the framework was
appropriate in the § 510 context.29 Third, Plaintiffs have failed to advance any argument for why
this Court should expand the pattern-or-practice framework into the § 510 context. Accordingly,
the Court is unwilling to find that the pattern-or-practice framework applies to § 510 claims.
27See id. at 266 (“Plaintiffs seek to represent the proposed class only to the extent their [ERISA claim] is based on a pattern and practice of discrimination, which is subject to the bifurcated approach of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States . . . . If the representative plaintiffs show a pattern and practice of discrimination in phase one of the trial, the class members are entitled to a presumption that they were individually discriminated against.”).
28In their response, Plaintiffs state that the Court cannot grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 510 claim because Defendants did not address Plaintiffs’ pattern-or-practice argument in their initial motion. Plaintiffs’ contention is erroneous for two reasons. First, Defendants did argue in their initial motion, albeit in a footnote, that the pattern-or-practice method of proof does not apply in this case, and, even if it does, Plaintiffs’ claim would fail because their evidence does not show that it is Defendants’ regular practice to discriminate against plan participants based on their pension status. Second, and irrespective of the first, Defendants could argue in their reply that the pattern-or-practice method of proof does not apply here because Plaintiffs made the argument in their response that it did. See, e.g., Beaudry v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 1164, 1166 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 401 (6th Cir. 2002); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Edelson (In re Wildman), 859 F.2d 553, 555-56 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988).
29See Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009) (admonishing courts not to blindly import proof frameworks that were developed under Title VII).
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Even if the framework did apply to § 510 claims, though, Plaintiffs’ § 510 claim would fail. In order to survive a summary judgment motion made at the first stage of a pattern-orpractice case, the plaintiff must produce evidence that shows two things: first, that the defendant has engaged in unlawful conduct; second, that it is the defendant’s standard operating procedure – the regular rather than the unusual practice – to engage in such conduct.30 To determine whether the alleged conduct is indeed unlawful, courts must necessarily look to the statutory basis of the plaintiff’s claim. Here, because Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated § 510, the Court must look to § 510.
Section 510 makes it unlawful for “any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a [plan’s] participant for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled to under the plan.” As is evident from the preceding quote, § 510, by its terms, does not cover all forms of pension-based discrimination. Recently, in Becker v. Mack Trucks31, the Third Circuit addressed the question of whether, despite its failure to include the word hire in the string of denominated employment practices, Congress intended to cover discrimination that occurs during an employer’s hiring decisions.32 There, to ascertain Congress’ intent, the court first compared § 510's language to the language found in other employment discrimination statutes. It then reviewed § 510's legislative history and the judicial opinions interpreting it. After performing these exercises, the court concluded that Congress did not intend for § 510 to regulate such decisions.33 This Court is

30 Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1109. 31281 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2002). 32Id. at 379-83. 33Id. at 383.

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persuaded by the Third Circuit’s reasoning, and thus agrees that § 510 does not usually apply to an employer’s hiring decisions.
In addition to not usually applying to an employer’s hiring decisions, § 510 also typically does not apply to an employer’s basic operational decisions (such as the decision to sell one of its divisions), even when such decisions are based, at least in part, on labor costs.34 The reason for this is that § 510 was primarily designed to cover only actions aimed directly at individuals, and basic operational decisions are usually based on impersonal factors.35 As pointed out by the D.C. Circuit, if Congress had intended to cover such decisions, it would have included the terms layoff and termination in the statute.36
Although hiring decisions and basic operational decisions do not generally, by themself, violate § 510, they may if they are made pursuant to a scheme that is specifically designed to interfere with an employee’s protected ERISA rights. As noted by the Court previously, in such cases, the parties’ decisions will be viewed as one, and thus taken together amount to a discharge or discriminatory act.37
Here, Plaintiffs allege that a scheme existed between Defendants and that Defendants based their respective decisions on that scheme. In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs rely principally upon the following factual allegations: (1) Boeing believed that the wages at the Wichita Division were higher than the local market; (2) Jeff Turner, Spirit’s Chief Executive
34See Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 35Id. at 1337-38. 36Id. at 1338. 37Doc. 139, p. 17-18. The Court’s holding was premised on the principle that two actors cannot do what one could not do on their own. See Lessard, 307 F.3d at 1026.
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Officer, stated that older workers tend to be more expensive in regards to pay and benefits; (3) Boeing saved millions of dollars in future pension benefits by divesting the Wichita Division; (4) Boeing was tracking during the rehiring process the number of people who were retirement eligible; (5) Boeing workers over the age of 40 were not hired by Spirit at the level expected by Plaintiffs’ expert and that the difference between the expected and actual number is statistically significant; (6) Spirit realized an immediate cost savings by not rehiring all of the Boeing employees; and (7) Spirit considered employees in the age range of 45-54 the most expensive in terms of pension expenses. In their reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish the necessary connection between Defendants’ actions to meld them into one.
There is little case authority on the issue of what type of evidence a plaintiff must produce at the summary judgment stage in order to substantiate their contention that actions taken by two separate actors should be treated as one.38 Recently, however, in Nauman v. Abbott Laboratories39, the Northern District of Illinois addressed the related question of whether it should analyze an employer’s decision to spin off a subdivision separately from its decision to adopt a policy not to hire back the spun off workers for a period of time into the future when determining whether the former employer had the requisite unlawful intent. The court concluded that it should not. The court stated that because the adoption of the no-hiring policy affected the
38It appears that there has been only one case where both the seller and buyer in a divestiture were held liable under § 510, Lessard, 307 F.3d 1020. That case is of little help here, though, because the plaintiff there did not have to rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove their claim, as the sales agreement between the parties facially discriminated against employees exercising rights to which they were to entitled to under the plan. See id. at 1025-26.
392008 WL 4773135 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2008).
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plaintiffs’ ability to accrue future pension benefits under the former employer’s plan, the actions should be considered together.40
The Court finds the Nauman opinion instructive on the issue now before it, and concludes that, at a minimum, the party seeking to have two or more actions treated as one must show that each action affected their ability to accrue additional benefits under the plan that they participated in. The reason such a showing is necessary is that without it there is simply no reasonable basis to believe that the parties’ actions were taken pursuant to an unlawful agreement designed to keep employees from accruing benefits that are protected by ERISA.
Here, it is an uncontroverted fact that all Boeing employees stopped accruing Boeing pension plan benefits on the day that they were terminated. This was true without regard to whether or not Spirit later hired an employee. Spirit’s hiring decisions had absolutely no impact on Plaintiffs’ ability to accrue additional benefits under the Boeing pension plan. As a consequence, the Court sees no reason to treat Boeing’s decision to terminate all of its employees in conjunction with the asset sale and Spirit’s decision not to hire them all back as one.
Because Defendants’ actions must be viewed separately, Plaintiffs’ § 510 claim can survive summary judgment only if Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that either of these actions, by themself, constitute unlawful conduct under § 510. Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to make this showing. To begin with, an employer’s decision to sell one of its divisions can only violate § 510 if the division sold had some special ERISA characteristic, such as having a clearly aboveaverage proportion of employees with pension rights about to vest or being the most expensive

40Id. at *9.

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division in terms of pension costs.41 Here, Plaintiffs have not argued, much less put forward any evidence, that the Wichita Division had any special ERISA characteristics. Rather, they have merely alleged that Boeing sold the Wichita Division in order to avoid incurring another year of pension costs. Selling an ongoing business in order to avoid such costs, though, is not prohibited by ERISA.42 As a consequence, Boeing’s decision to sell the Wichita Division does not violate § 510. Furthermore, Spirit’s hiring decisions do not violate § 510 because hiring decisions, at least those not part of a scheme to violate ERISA, are not covered by this provision. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claim could not succeed under the pattern-or-practice framework even if it applied.
Plaintiffs’ claim also fails under the McDonnell Douglas test because, for the reasons just stated, Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case of unlawful pension discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must first show that the defendant has engaged in prohibited conduct.43 Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this requirement. As established above, neither Spirit’s hiring decisions nor Boeing’s decision to sell violate § 510. Therefore, in light of the fact that Plaintiffs’ § 510 claim cannot succeed under either the McDonnell Douglas test or the pattern-or-practice framework, summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff’s § 510 claim.
41See, e.g., Deich-Keibler v. Bank One, 243 Fed. Appx. 164, 170 (7th Cir. 2007); Andes, 70 F.3d at 1338. The cases relied upon by Plaintiffs are consistent with this rule. See Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (closing a plant that had a disproportionate number of employees about to qualify for an early or normal retirement); Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1549 (D. Utah 1992) (deciding to accelerate the closure of a plant in order to prevent a large number of employees from obtaining vested pension rights).
42See Andes, 70 F.3d at 1338 (stating, that despite the fact that a business owner’s decision to sell is “virtually always based, at least in part, on labor costs,” ERISA does not routinely cover such decisions”).
43See Maez v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel., 54 F.3d 1488, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995).
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ADEA Claims
The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age;” as well as
“(2) to limit segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”44 Plaintiffs have raised two claims under the
ADEA: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The Court will review these claims in turn.
Disparate Treatment
Plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claim alleges that during the Wichita Division divestiture
Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment of employees over the age of 40.45 To establish a prima facie case of pattern-or-practice discrimination, Plaintiffs must
show that Defendants’ regularly and purposefully treated members of the protected group less favorably and that unlawful discrimination was Defendants’ regular procedure or policy.46 Plaintiffs can make this showing solely by producing evidence of gross statistical disparities.47 If
4429 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2). 45The Court questions the appropriateness of applying the pattern-or-practice method in a case where the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of one employment action, see Oinonen v. TRX, Inc., 2010 WL 396112, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2010) (citing Sperling v. Hoffman-La Roche,Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1364 (D.N.J. 1996); see also 110 Cong. Rec. 14270 (1964) (statement by Sen. Humphrey) (“[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature.”), which is what Plaintiffs claim the Wichita Division divestiture was, see, e.g., Doc. 341, p. 77 (“The class includes individuals who were subject to one combined employment action: involuntarily terminated by Boeing and not hired by Spirit.” (emphasis added)); however, because Defendants do not raise the issue, the Court will not decide it. 46E.E.O.C. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1999). 47Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
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such statistics do not exist, Plaintiffs may still establish a pattern or practice by “combining statistics with historical, individual, or circumstantial evidence.”48 If Plaintiffs make their showing, the burden of production shifts to Defendants to show that the challenged decisions were made for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, or that Plaintiffs’ proof is inaccurate or insignificant.49 In the present case, Plaintiffs have put forth statistical, circumstantial, and anecdotal evidence. Plaintiffs’ Statistical Evidence
Plaintiffs have submitted one expert report relating to statistics. This report was prepared by Dr. Charles Mann. For his report, Dr. Mann reviewed two sets of data: (1) Recommendation data for three groups of Boeing employees (all employees, Shared Services Group (SSG) employees, and non-SSG employees) who were recommended or not recommended for hire and (2) Outcome data for three groups of Boeing employees (all employees, SSG employees, and non-SSG employees) who were hired or not hired by Spirit.50 Dr. Mann chose to analyze this data both in the aggregate and broken down by each individual director group.
Dr. Mann’s recommendation analysis considered the recommendation decisions of twenty-nine director groups that had at least one hire or non-hire. The recommendation decisions of eight of these director groups were uninformative and, thus, were not studied. Of the remaining twenty-one director groups, Dr. Mann found that only four had statistically
48Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). 49Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360. 50Dr. Mann’s statistical analysis of the data sets for each of the three groups of Boeing employees is not materially different. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, the Court will discuss only Dr. Mann’s analysis of the data for the all employees group.
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significant differences adverse to older employees.51 Dr. Mann’s report showed, though, that in all but five of the director groups, workers over the age of 40 were not recommended at a rate higher than workers under the age of 40.
Viewing the recommendation decisions of the director groups as a whole, Dr. Mann found that workers over the age of 40 were adversely affected at a statistically significant level. According to Dr. Mann, the difference between the number of people over the age of 40 that his model predicted would be recommended (8,028) and the number that was actually recommended (7,968) was greater than five standard deviations. This number of standard deviation correlates with a 1 in 50,000 chance that the results observed were the product of random occurrence. Dr. Mann did not offer an opinion as to what caused this difference.
With respect to his outcome analysis, Dr. Mann considered the outcome decisions of twenty-eight director groups that had at least one hire or non-hire. The outcome decisions of nine of these directors were uninformative and, thus, were not studied. Of the remaining nineteen director groups, Dr. Mann found that only three had statistically significant differences adverse to older employees.52 Dr. Mann’s report showed, though, that in all but one of the director groups, workers over the age of 40 were not recommended at a rate higher than workers under the age of 40.
Viewing the outcome decisions of the director groups as a whole, Dr. Mann found that workers over the age of 40 were adversely affected at a statistically significant level. According to Dr. Mann, the difference between the number of people over the age of 40 that his model
51These four director groups contained only 35% of the older employees who were not recommended for hire.
52These three director groups contained only 20% of the older workers that were not hired by Spirit.
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predicted would be hired (7,285) and the number that was actually hired (7,237) was over four and a half standard deviations. This number of standard deviations also correlates with a 1 in 50,000 chance that the results observed were the product of random occurrence. Dr. Mann did not offer an opinion as to what caused this difference.
In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is insufficient to establish a pattern or practice of age discrimination.53 Specifically, Defendants point out that in neither analysis did Dr. Mann report statistically significant disparities adverse to workers over the age of 40 in more than four of the twenty-plus director groups he studied. They also direct the Court’s attention to the fact that, out of the thousands of employees recommended for hire or actually hired, if Defendants would have recommended sixty more workers over the age of 40 or hired forty-eight more workers over the age of 40, workers over the age of 40, in the aggregate, would not have been adversely affected at a statistically significant level.
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of pattern-or-practice age discrimination. First of all, Dr. Mann’s analyses relating to the individual director groups do not prove a pattern or practice, despite the fact that in a number of director groups workers over the age of 40 were not hired or not recommended at a rate higher than workers under the age of 40. The reason for this is that a majority of the director groups analyzed did not have statistically significant disparities. As a general rule, statistics must be statistically significant in order to give rise to an inference of
53Defendants have also submitted a report prepared by their statistical expert. However, because Defendants did not rely on this report for their motion, the Court did not rely on the opinions expressed in it when deciding Defendants’ motion.
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discrimination.54 This rule does not necessarily apply, though, when the sample size is small.55 Here, a majority of the director groups studied did have meaningful populations.56 Therefore, in
order for Dr. Mann’s director group statistics to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination,
they would, at a minimum, have to show that in a significant number of director groups older
workers were adversely affected at a statistically significant level. Because Dr. Mann’s
statistics, do not do this, they fail to prove a pattern or practice of discrimination.
In addition, Dr. Mann’s aggregate results do not make out a prima facie case. To be sure,
some courts have held that when the plaintiff’s statistics show a disparity between the expected
value and the actual value greater than four or five standard deviations, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment.57 However, these cases must be read in
light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts must consider the statistical evidence in the context of the surrounding facts and circumstances.58 In certain instances, a large number of
standard deviations simply will not be enough. This case presents one of those instances. It is
important to recognize that here the Court is looking at thousands of hiring decisions, not
54See, e.g., Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir. 1998); Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1989).
55See Pitre, 843 F.2d at 1269. 56See U.S. v. San Diego County, 1979 WL 269, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 1979) (stating that a sample size of eighty-one is large enough to be probative of discrimination). Here, fifteen out of the nineteen director groups studied in the outcome analysis had over a hundred workers. Similarly, fifteen out of the twenty-one director groups studied in the recommendation analysis had over a hundred workers. 57See, e.g., Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 496 n.17 (4th Cir. 1981); N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of East Haven, 892 F. Supp. 46, 50 (D. Conn. 1995). 58Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340. In the disparate impact context, the Supreme Court has stated that “we have not suggested that any particular number of ‘standard deviations’ can determine whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in the complex area of employment discrimination.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988).
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hundreds. Due to this large sample, de minimus disparities may become statistically
significant.59 Here, Dr. Mann’s model predicted that out of over 9,000 recommendations
decisions, sixty more Boeing workers over the age of forty should have been recommended.
Similarly, Dr. Mann’s model predicted that out of over 8,000 hires, forty-eight more workers
over the age of 40 should have been hired. Stated another way, Boeing recommended and Spirit
hired over 99% of the workers that Dr. Mann’s model predicted. The Court finds this disparity
to be practically insignificant, and, as a consequence, that Plaintiffs’ aggregate results also do not
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.60
The Court’s finding that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is insufficient to establish that age
discrimination occurred on a company-wide level is further buttressed by the fact that the
percentage of Spirit’s Day One workforce that was over the age of 40 (86.6%) is nearly identical
to the percentage of workers who were considered for hire that were over the age of 40 (87.4%).
As noted by other courts in the reduction-in-force context, an insignificant drop like this does not
support a finding of age discrimination.61
59See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Williborn, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION 12.03 (2002) (“Statistical significance is affected by the number of observations, so that for large samples, spurious significance can result.”); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 191-92 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2000) (stating that the reason that small disparities can be statistically significant is that “statistical significance is determined, in part, by the number of observations in the data set”).
60See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 124 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2000) (“When practical significance is lacking – when the size of the disparity or correlation is negligible – there is no reason to worry about statistical significance.”); see generally Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical Disparities” as Evidence of a Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical versus Legal Significance, 22 LAB. LAW 271 (2007) (highlighting some of the problems of using statistical significance as the measuring rod for determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case).
61See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d at 952. Plaintiffs’ argument that the Court must look beyond the demographics of the Day One workforce in ascertaining whether discrimination occurred is unpersuasive. While the Tenth Circuit has recognized actions taken by an employer after an employee’s termination may be probative of discrimination, see Bingman v. Natkin & Co., 937 F.2d 553, 556-57 (10th Cir. 1991), it has done so only when there is a logical connection between the action taken against the plaintiff and the one that occurs later.
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Plaintiffs’ Circumstantial and Anecdotal Evidence Plaintiffs also present what they contend to be a wealth of circumstantial and anecdotal
evidence. Plaintiffs first cite to statements made by managers and executives and internal documents that they believe demonstrate that Defendants had an age biased corporate culture and that this culture permeated the divestiture. The first statement that they cite to is one made by Jeff Turner, CEO of Spirit. According to a declaration submitted by Plaintiffs, some time within one year of the divestiture, Mr. Turner told a manager that “Boeing’s workforce was getting older and that the managers needed to find ways to do something about it.” Next, Plaintiffs cite to comments made by other upper-level management noting the fact that Boeing had an older workforce. Plaintiffs then cite to multiple derogatory statements made by low-level managers to older workers. Lastly, Plaintiffs cite to emails sent between Spirit and its consultants during the negotiations with the IAM NPF discussing how much the average age of the workforce would have to drop in order for Spirit to avoid having to pay a higher rate into the pension fund.
In further support of their claim that Defendants had an age bias culture and that this culture affected the hiring process, Plaintiffs put forth an expert report prepared by Dr. Caren Goldberg. In her report, Dr. Goldberg states that the statistical disparities identified by Dr. Mann occurred in a climate of age-based animus and were the result of an intentional plan to reduce the age of the workforce. She also states that the subjectivity of the selective rehiring process
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to establish this connection between their after-the-fact evidence and the divestiture. Without such a connection, the fact that workers over 40 make up a smaller percentage of workers at the Wichita Division now than they did in 2005 is not probative on the issue of whether intentional discrimination occurred during the divestiture.
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provided fertile ground for bias, that the process was incapable of yielding accurate results, and
that negative decisions regarding older workers is more likely in an age bias climate.62
After reviewing this evidence, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could not conclude
that there was a pervasive age bias that affected hiring decisions during the Wichita Division
divestiture. Although some of Plaintiffs’ culture evidence indicates that some managers may
have been biased against older workers, this evidence, viewed as a whole, is insufficient to create
an inference that such a bias was held companywide. Unlike the cases cited by Plaintiffs,63 there
is no evidence that upper-level management viewed older workers less capable or younger
workers more favorably or believed that older workers needed to be replaced by younger ones,64
which is significant because without such evidence it is hard to believe that there was an age bias
emanating from the upper-echelons of corporate management that infected the managers and
supervisors below. The only evidence that Plaintiffs have offered that could even conceivably
be construed as showing that upper-level management viewed older workers disfavorably is Jeff
62The essence of Dr. Goldberg’s expert report is simply that, in her opinion, there was a better way to make the hiring decisions and the fact that Defendants did not use her preferred method indicates animus. The Court gives no credence to these opinions regarding the motivation of Defendants’ actions, as they are lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help. See, e.g., Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, 66 F.3d 1119, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995); Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989).
63See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2001); Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec., 128 F.3d 128, 130-32 (3d Cir. 1997); Grayson v. Kmart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097-98; (11th Cir. 1996); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 333-34 (3d Cir. 1995); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 55 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs’ cases are further distinguishable on the ground that none of them involved a patter-or-practice claim being decided at the summary judgment stage.
64Plaintiffs no doubt believe that the emails sent between Spirit and its consultants during Spirit’s negotiations with the IAM show that Defendants believed that older workers needed to be replaced by younger ones and this belief tainted the selective rehiring process. They do not. As noted above, the management at the Wichita Division was not involved with these negotiations. As a result, the staffing scenarios discussed by Spirit and its consultants during these negotiations are not probative on the issue of whether age discrimination occurred while the hiring decisions were being made. See Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that there must be a nexus between the alleged comments and the adverse employment actions in order for them to be probative of discrimination).
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Turner’s comment to a manager that “Boeing’s workforce was getting older and that the managers needed to find ways to do something about it.” However, when this comment is viewed in the correct context, it is clear that it is benign. The submitted evidence unambiguously demonstrates that Jeff Turner and other upper-level management officials were concerned about their workforce’s age because they were afraid that a large percentage of their workforce would retire within a few years of each other, and, thus, leave Boeing with an inexperienced workforce. Such a concern belies the claim that Defendants disfavored older workers and that this sentiment created an environment that led to these workers not being recommended for hire. As a consequence, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to create a triable issue as to whether Defendants had a corporate culture of age bias and that this culture resulted in a widespread pattern of older workers not being recommended for hire because of their age.
Next, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were tracking the age of employees during the selective rehiring process and that this fact supports their claim that Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age discrimination. In support of this charge, Plaintiffs cite to a 2004 Investment Memorandum prepared by Onex that listed the average age of employees belonging to the eight unions that operated at Boeing, a list prepared by Boeing stating how many people over the age of 55 had been recommended for hire, and notes taken by someone during the Tulsa selection process that listed the age of certain employees.
The Court finds that this evidence is insufficient to raise an inference that it was Defendants’ standard operating procedure to engage in unlawful discrimination during the Wichita Division divestiture. To begin with, Plaintiffs’ first two pieces of evidence are not probative on the issue of discrimination. These documents, unlike the ones in the cases cited by
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Plaintiffs,65 do not list individual ages.66 Furthermore, there is no evidence that the decision makers had this information when they were making their hiring decisions.67 As for the last piece of evidence, it too is insufficient to show a pattern or practice because it only relates to the selection process at the Tulsa site. Thus, at best, it supports an inference that isolated discriminatory acts occurred.
Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants’ desire to reduce labor costs supports their pattern or practice claim. According to Plaintiffs’ theory, Defendants believed older workers were more expensive, and, because of this belief, decided not to hire them. Plaintiffs’ argument is deficient for two reasons. First, there is no evidence to support a finding that those making the hiring decisions based their decisions on how much a particular worker would cost Spirit in terms of either wages or benefits. As established by Defendants, the meaningful cost savings highlighted by Boeing were tied to Spirit hiring fewer workers, changing various work rules, and offering lower wages. Second, even if some workers were not selected because they were perceived by those making the hiring decisions as being more expensive, this would not violate the ADEA. As noted by several circuit courts following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazen
65See Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 781 (3d Cir. 1994); Sheerin v. N.Y. State Div. of Substance Abuse Servs., 844 F. Supp. 909, 915-17 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
66See Edwards v. Baptist Health, 2005 WL 1331262, at *7 (M.D. Ala. June 3, 2005) (“[T]he fact that [the defendant] requested and received merely the average age of the workforce in general, months in advance of the RIF at issue here, is so attenuated and weak that no fact finder could reasonably conclude from this evidence that [the defendant] intended to discriminate against [the plaintiff] on the basis of her age.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67See Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that the maintenance of age information, “absent direct evidence that it was used in making adverse employment decisions, cannot create even a circumstantial inference of discrimination”).
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Paper Co. v. Biggins68, “employment decisions motivated by factors other than age (such as
retirement eligibility, salary, or seniority), even when such factors correlate with age, do not
constitute age discrimination.”69
Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ decision to utilize a subjective selection
process supports their pattern or practice claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’
adopted this process to “conceal [a] systematic and discriminatory policy.” While the use of
subjective considerations by an employer may create an inference of discrimination in certain
cases, the use is “not unlawful per se.”70 To determine if in fact the use does give rise to an
inference unlawful intent, the Court must look at the evidence presented.71 Here, while the
evidence may support an inference of discrimination, it fails to create an inference of company-
wide discrimination. First, as discussed above, the statistics do not show a practically significant
disparity in the aggregate nor do they show statistically significant disparities across the
divisions. Second, outside of Dr. Goldberg’s improper expert testimony that Defendants’
decision to utilize a subjective process was deliberate, to which, as noted earlier, the Court gives
68507 U.S. 604 (1993). In Hazen, the Court stated that an employer’s decision that is wholly motivated by factors other than age does not violate the ADEA. It went on to say that “[t]his is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with age.” Id. at 611.
69McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d at 951; accord James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2000); Broaddus v. Fla. Power Corp., 145 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998); Denio v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 1996 WL 423125, at *3 (4th Cir. July 30, 1996); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994). The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not suggest a contrary result. To begin with, the majority of cases cited by Plaintiffs were decided before Hazen and are contrary to the Court’s holding therein. As for the lone case that Plaintiffs cite to that is post-Hazen and involved an ADEA claim at the summary judgment stage, Babich v. Unisys Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Kan. 1994), it is readily distinguishable. There, the plaintiff did more than merely allege that the defendant terminated him because they viewed him as being more expensive; rather, he presented evidence that the cost the defendants were seeking to avoid was directly tied to his age. See id. at 1351-52 (terminating the plaintiff shortly before he turned 54 prevented the plaintiff from attaining the right to receive early retirement and medical benefits).
70See Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1981). 71Id. at 1046.
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no credence,72 there is no evidence that Defendants chose this process for the purpose of
covering up a discriminatory policy. As a result, Defendants’ use of subjective criteria does not
raise an inference that discrimination was Defendants’ ordinary practice during the divestiture.
Plaintiffs further claim that Spirits’ failure to act after an internal report showed that
workers over the age of 40 were adversely impacted by the selective rehiring process is evidence
of discrimination. The Court disagrees. First, it is an uncontroverted fact that Spirit did not
believe the results were indicative of discrimination because there were multiple decision makers
that were involved in the process and the selection process was conducted with several levels of oversight. Furthermore, unlike the cases cited by Plaintiffs,73 Spirit did not have a policy in
place that mandated that it alter its hiring decisions if a report showed a disparity. Without such a policy, Spirit’s failure to act simply is not probative of discrimination.74 As for the fact that
Spirit chose to alter its hiring decisions with regard to women and minorities, it too does not
raise an inference of discrimination. This decision simply tells us nothing about whether
Defendants did not choose to hire a class of workers because of their age.
Lastly, Plaintiffs point the Court to the forty-plus declarations that they have submitted in
support of their claim. The overwhelming majority of these declarations merely state each
declarant’s own opinion that the he or she was qualified for the job that they previously held;
72See, e.g., In re Fosemax Prod. Liab. Litig., 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Andrews, 882 F.2d at 708.
73See Russell v. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 746 (8th Cir. 2003); Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1108 (11th Cir. 2001); Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991); Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1301 (3d Cir. 1996); Milburn v. West, 854 F. Supp. 1, 8, 13 (D.D.C. 1994).
74Cf. McFadden v. State Univ. of N.Y., College of Brockport, 195 F. Supp. 2d 436, 456 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the defendant’s failure to write the plaintiff a letter of recommendation after she complained of sex discrimination was not evidence of retaliation because, among other things, there was no policy in place of providing such letters).
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only one states that the declarant was not chosen for hire because of their age. Thus, while these declarations may be relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim,75 they are insufficient, in themself, to establish a pattern of age discrimination during the Wichita Division divestiture.76
Although none of Plaintiffs’ evidence viewed individually is sufficient to establish a
pattern or practice of age discrimination, it may, when viewed in the aggregate, raise a triable
issue as to whether Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age discrimination during the Wichita Division divestiture.77 Plaintiffs argue that the Tenth Circuit has found that the
combination of their allegations is sufficient to establish a pattern or practice of age
discrimination. According to Plaintiffs, this case is directly analogous to E.E.O.C. v. Sandia Corp78. Plaintiffs contend that like Sandia, there is evidence that the procedure for determining
who was to be terminated during the reduction in force (“RIF”) relied on highly subjective
factors, that management was concerned about the increasing age of the corporation’s
employees, that qualification for benefits under the retirement plan was a factor considered by
the decision makers while making employment decisions, and that older workers were adversely
impacted by Defendants’ actions.
75See Chisholm, 665 F.2d at 494-95. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ implication, the plaintiffs in Chisholm did more than simply state that they were qualified for the position that they sought. Rather, they provided numerous examples of instances when they were treated differently than their white counterparts. See Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Serv., 516 F. Supp. 810, 852-67 (D.N.C. 1980).
76See Chiang v. Schafer, 2008 WL 3925260, at *35 (D.V.I. Aug. 20, 2008) (stating that witnesses must testify to specific instances of when they were adversely affected because of their membership in a protected class in order for their testimony to show that the defendant had the intent to discriminate); E.E.O.C. v. Consol. Servs., 777 F. Supp. 599, 609 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (same).
77See Pitre, 843 F.2d at 1268 (“[A]ll of the evidence, statistical and nonstatistical, tending to establish a prima facie case should [be] assessed on a cumulative basis.” (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1189 (4th Cir. 1981))).
78639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
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While there are certainly similarities between this case and Sandia, there are significant differences that the Court finds distinguishes Sandia from the matter now before it. First, in Sandia, the disparities highlighted by Plaintiffs’ statistics were stark and were uniform across the board. Although older workers made up a small percentage of the workforce, they consistently made up a sizeable portion of the number of people terminated.79 Furthermore, and more importantly, there was evidence in Sandia that the defendant had adopted policies to remedy the problems it associated with having an older workforce. For example, in that case, the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant had implemented a hiring scheme that discriminated against older workers.80 In light of these differences, the Court concludes that Sandia does not control here.
A case that appears to be more similar to the one at hand is E.E.O.C. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.81. There, due to adverse business circumstances, the defendant had to undertake major RIFs of its nonunion employees. First-line supervisors were responsible for preparing the RIF lists. In deciding who to keep, supervisors were to consider the following subjective factors: experience, versatility of skills, and work quality. Supervisors were not told how much weight to give to each factor; however, they were told that age was not to be considered. Once the supervisor had completed their list, they submitted it to their division head for review.82
79Id. at 605-08. 80Id. at 610-11. 8117 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (E.D. Mo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 948. 82Id. at 1051.
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The RIFs resulted in 13.7% of the workers over the age of 55 being terminated, as opposed to only 5.4% of the workers under the age of 55.83 Believing that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of age discrimination during the RIF process, the E.E.O.C. filed an ADEA claim. In support of its claim, the E.E.O.C. presented statistically significant statistics showing an adverse impact against workers older than 55, an expert report prepared by a human resource expert, which stated, among other things, that there was a cultural focus of youth which permeated the RIF decisions, anecdotal evidence that some managers had selected employees over the age of 55 for layoff because of their age, higher salaries, and retirement eligibility,84 documents that expressed concern over the company’s aging workforce and aging management team, and a discriminatory statement made by the CEO sometime a year and a half before the RIFs.85 After reviewing this record, the district court concluded that the E.E.O.C.’s evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case that age discrimination was the defendant’s standard operating procedure during the RIFs.86
Similarly, after reviewing the entire record in this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ proof is insufficient to establish a pattern or practice of age discrimination. Although Plaintiffs have produced evidence that may indicate that discrimination did occur during the divestiture, they have failed to put forth the “substantial proof” necessary to show that intentional age discrimination was Defendants’ standard operating procedure.87
83Id. at 1052. 84Id. at 1052-53. 85McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d at 953. 86McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d. at 1053. 87King v. Gen. Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Typically, a plaintiff will meet their burden by buttressing statistical evidence demonstrating substantial disparities with evidence of general discriminatory policies or specific instances of discrimination.88 Here, as noted above, Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence does not show significant disparities. As a consequence, Plaintiffs’ other proof must be correspondingly stronger in order for their claim to survive summary judgment.89 Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, their circumstantial and anecdotal proof cannot shoulder this burden. Noticeably lacking from Plaintiffs’ proof is evidence showing that Defendants had an age bias corporate culture or that a corporate policy of discrimination had been adopted. The absence of such evidence in this case proves to be fatal. It is important to recognize that Plaintiffs are not claiming that discrimination was the regular practice for a particular manager or even a particular director group, but rather that it was the standard operating procedure throughout the Wichita Division to discriminate based on age. Thus, in order for Plaintiffs to succeed on their claim, they must show companywide discrimination. Without either of the aforementioned pieces of evidence or statistical evidence demonstrating significant disparities company-wide, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find that age discrimination was the regular practice at the large employment site of the Wichita Division, as opposed to a couple director groups. Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment is merited on Plaintiffs’ pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim.
88See E.E.O.C. v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 299 (7th Cir. 1991). 89See In re W. Dist. Xerox Litig., 850 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that when either statistical or anecdotal evidence is lacking, “the other must be correspondingly stronger for plaintiffs to meet their burden.”).
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Disparate Impact In addition to authorizing recovery on a disparate treatment theory, the ADEA also allows recovery on a disparate impact theory.90 Disparate impact claims involve “employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified.”91 “To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact age discrimination, plaintiffs must show that a specific identifiable employment practice or policy caused a significant disparate impact on a protected group.”92 If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie showing, the burden of production and persuasion of showing that the action taken was based on reasonable factors other than age shifts to the defendant.93 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case for two reasons. First, Defendants argue that the practice or policy identified by Plaintiffs – excessive subjectivity in the selective rehire process and the use of ill-defined criteria in an age biased culture – is insufficient to support a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. Second, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ statistics do not show that a practice or policy had a significant adverse impact on older workers. Because the Court finds that even if Plaintiffs had sufficiently identified a practice or policy their claim would still fail because they have not shown that the alleged practice or policy has created a significant disparity, it will not address Defendants’ first argument and instead go
90Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). 91Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15). 92Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 943 F.2d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 1991)). 93Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (2008).
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directly to the second one. Whether a disparity is sufficiently significant to give rise to liability under the ADEA is a question that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.94 While there is no “rigid mathematical formula” for determining whether a disparity is significant,95 courts have
adopted various tests to aid them in making this determination. For example, some courts have looked to whether the disparity is statistically significant.96 Others have looked to the 80% rule enunciated in the E.E.O.C.’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,97 which
states that an employer’s selection criterion has an adverse impact, for purposes of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, where members of a protected group are selected at a rate less than four-fifths that of the allegedly preferred counterpart.98 While still others have looked at whether the disparity is both statistically and practically significant.99
Here, Plaintiffs point the Court to the fact that, in the aggregate, each one of their
expert’s analyses showed that older workers were adversely affected at a statistically significant
level by the divestiture. It is Plaintiffs’ position that because there was a disparity and this
disparity was statistically significant, they have shown that the policy or practice in question has
94Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Moore v. Sw. Bell Tele. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curium) (“The United States Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on just what threshold mathematical showing of variance along racial lines suffices as a ‘substantial disproportionate impact.’”).
95Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95. 96See, e.g., Clark v. Pennsylvania, 885 F. Supp. 694, 707-08 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 97See, e.g., Gaskey v. Fulton Bellows, LLC, 2007 WL 869621, at *8-9 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2007); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D. Conn. 1979); Jackson v. Nassau County Civil. Serv. Comm’n, 424 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 98See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1, 1607.4(D) (2008). 99See Barbera Lindemann & Paul Grossman, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 131 (4th ed. 2007); see also Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1511 n.4 (10th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that courts may require, in addition to statistical significance, that the observed disparity be substantial).
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caused a significant disparate impact. The Court disagrees. It is important to recognize that the term “statistical significance’ is a term of art within the science of statistics which means simply that the disparity observed was unlikely to have been produced by chance.”100 Statistical significance does not tell us whether the disparity we are observing is meaningful in a practical sense nor what may have caused the disparity. In cases where there is a great deal of data, even small differences may be highly statistically significant.101 Even though the differences between Dr. Mann’s expected and actual values were highly statistically significant, they lack practical significance. If forty-eight more people over the age of 40 would have been hired, Plaintiffs’ hiring statistics would not have been statistically significant under Dr. Mann’s analysis. Likewise, if sixty more people would have been recommended for hire, Plaintiffs’ recommendation statistics would not have been statistically significant under Dr. Mann’s analysis. In light of these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show that workers over the age of 40 have suffered an adverse effect sufficient to give rise to a disparate impact claim.102
Further support for the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have failed to show that workers over the age of 40, as a class, were adversely impacted by Defendants’ policy can be found in the fact that Dr. Mann’s statistics do not show a statistically significant impact consistently across
100Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2009 WL 2461892, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2009). 101Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). 102See Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991); see also McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 280 (5th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that statistically significant statistics may not be sufficient to support an inference of adverse impact under certain circumstances); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 124 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed. 2000) (“When practical significance is lacking – when the size of the disparity or correlation is negligible – there is no reason to worry about statistical significance.”).
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the individual director groups.103 In fact, Dr. Mann’s analyses show that only a small number of
the twenty-plus director groups had statistically significant disparities. As a matter of law, this
proof is insufficient to show a disparate impact across the class of older employees.104
Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiffs’ ADEA disparate impact individual
and collective action claims.
LMRA § 301 Claim
Based on Plaintiffs’ complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs are asserting multiple theories of
recovery under § 301. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on only one, though105:
the allegation that Boeing violated its CBA with the IAM when IAM members who did not
receive job offers from Spirit were not allowed to vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and
the IAM.106 In their motion, Defendants contend that summary judgment is warranted on this
theory for the following four reasons: (1) it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2)
Plaintiffs have not identified the provision of the CBA that Boeing allegedly breached nor have
they offered evidence in support of a finding that Boeing indeed did breach the CBA; (3)
Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to support a finding that the IAM breached its duty of fair
103See Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that the plaintiff’s statistics were insufficient to establish a disparate impact claim because they were not statistically significant).
104Cf. Carpenter v. The Boeing Co., 2004 WL 2661691, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2004) (stating, in the class certification context, that the plaintiffs’ statistics were insufficient to show a class-wide disparate impact because there were significant segments of the defendant’s population in which no statistically significant disparities existed).
105Defendants also asked for summary judgment on any § 301 claim raised by any named plaintiff who was not represented by the IAM in their motion. In their response, Plaintiffs stated that they are not bringing any individual § 301 claims for named plaintiffs who were not represented by the IAM. As a consequence, Defendants’ request is moot.
106This is the only theory for which Plaintiffs have sought class certification. See Doc. 294, p. 40 (“[T]he LMRA class’ claims are based on the same legal theory: the defendants prohibited IAM members that it perceived not to support the proposed contract changes that would potentially affect the divestiture of the Wichita Division from voting on a contract, although it was their contractual right to do so and encouraged the Union no [sic] to pursue grievances.”).
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representation; and (4) Plaintiffs cannot prove any casual connection between any alleged breach
and their purported damages, as the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM was not
approved initially.107
Because Plaintiffs’§ 301 claim based on their inability to vote on the proposed CBA
between Spirit and the IAM is a hybrid claim, Plaintiffs must prove both that Boeing violated the
CBA and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.108 In their response, Plaintiffs
claim that Boeing breached § 21.3 of the CBA by not allowing them to vote. Section 21.3
provides that
[a]ll terms and conditions of employment included in this Agreement shall be administered and applied without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, status as a disabled or Vietnam era veteran, age, gender, or the presence of a disability, except in those instances where age, gender, or the absence of a disability may constitute a bone fide occupational qualification. If administration and application of the contract is not in contravention of federal or state law such administration or application shall not be considered discrimination under this Section 21.3.
Plaintiffs’ decision to rely on § 21.3 as the basis of their claim that Boeing violated the
CBA by not allowing them to vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM is a
curious one. As is clear from the above quote, § 21.3 says absolutely nothing about voting; it is
only a general anti-discrimination provision. Thus, in order for this provision to have been
violated, there must be an underlying provision dealing with voting that was administered or
applied in a discriminatory fashion. In their briefing, Plaintiffs failed to identify any CBA
107Plaintiffs contend in their response that Defendants’ decision to move for summary judgment is a clear attempt to prevent Plaintiffs from having a fair chance to prove their claim. The Court disagrees. The parties have engaged in extensive discovery for over three years. The fact that this discovery has focused on class certification issues does not detract from the afore stated fact. Plaintiffs’ have sought class certification on the theory that Boeing violated § 301 by not allowing due-paying members to vote on the proposed CBA. Thus, Plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to obtain whatever proof they need to prosecute this claim.
108See Hinkley v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 249 Fed. Appx 13, 16 (10th Cir. 2007).
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provision dealing with an IAM member’s right to vote on a proposed CBA. For this reason alone, summary judgment is warranted on this claim.109 Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Boeing had any say whatsoever in determining which IAM members would be allowed to vote. Assuming for the moment, though, that such a provision existed and Boeing did participate in the decision making process for deciding who would be able to vote on the proposed CBA, Plaintiffs’ claim would still fail because there is absolutely no evidence to support a finding that the determination of who was eligible to vote was based on age. It is uncontroverted that all Boeing IAM members who did not receive a job offer from Spirit, regardless of age, were not eligible to vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM. Therefore, in light of Plaintiffs’ failure to show that Boeing violated its CBA with the IAM, the Court finds that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiffs’ § 301 claim alleging that Boeing violated the CBA when IAM members who did not receive job offers from Spirit were not allowed to vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM.110
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ERISA § 510 claim, and Plaintiffs’ § 301 claim alleging that Boeing violated its CBA with the IAM when IAM members who did not receive job offers from Spirit were not allowed to vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM, (Doc. 298), is hereby GRANTED.
109See Lampkin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2004 WL 2211605, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2004); see also Abdelmesih v. Waldorf-Astaria, 1998 WL 740940, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1998) (stating that an employer does not violate the CBA for taking actions that are not prohibited by the CBA); Greenslade v. Chi. Sun-Times, 930 F. Supp. 323, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same).
110In cases where the Court finds that the CBA has not been violated, the Court does not need to first determine whether the union breached its duty before granting summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Bliesner v. Comm. Workers of Am., 464 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2006); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 6162 (1st Cir. 1998); Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 1994 WL 20090, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1994); Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class under the LMRA and ERISA (Doc. 287) is hereby DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADEA pattern or practice of intentional age discrimination collective action claim and Plaintiffs’ ADEA disparate impact individual and collective action claims (Doc. 307) is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to decertify Plaintiffs’ ADEA collective action (Doc. 307) is hereby DENIED as moot. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of June, 2010, in Wichita, Kansas. /s Eric F. Melgren ERIC F. MELGREN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al. Plaintiffs,
vs. THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC.,

Case No. 05-1368-EFM

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This case arises out of The Boeing Com pany’s (“Boeing’s”) sale of the assets of its commercial facilities in Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma (the “BCA Wichita Division”), to Spirit AeroSys tems, Inc. (“Spirit”), in June 2005. Plaintiffs are form er Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit when itpurchased Boeing’s BCA Wichita Division assets. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit alleging that Defendants, Boeing andSpirit, violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1140; § 301 of the Labor Managem ent Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185; and the Age Discrim ination in Em ployment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623. The Court issuedan Order (Doc. 356) granting Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim, Plaintiffs’ § 301 claimalleging that Boeing violated its CBA with the IAM when IAM members who did not receive job offers from Spirit were not allowed to vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM, Plaintiffs’ ADEA pattern or practice of intentional age discrim ination collective action claim , and Plaintiffs’ ADEA disparate im pact

individual and collective action claims. This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion asking the Court to reconsider that Order (Doc. 359.) For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion.
The Court has discretion whether togrant a motion to reconsider.1 The Court may recognize any one of three grounds justifying r econsideration: an intervening change in controlling law, availability of new evidence, or the need to co rrect clear error or prevent m anifest injustice.2 A motion to reconsider is not a second opportunity for the losing party to make its strongest case, to rehash arguments, or to dress up arguments that previously failed.3 Such motions are not appropriate if the movant only wants the Court to revisit issues already addressed or to hear new arguments or supporting facts that could have been presented originally.4
Here, Plaintiffs do not point to an intervening change in controlling law nor do they point to the availability ofnew evidence. Rather, Plaintifs’ motion is based entirely on the claimthat the Court committed manifest error. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in the following four ways: (1) not affording themmore time to complete additional discovery; (2) failing to follow a decision it had m ade in an earlier order in this case; (3) not applying the pattern-or-pra ctice framework to their ERISA and ADEA claims; and (4) misapplying the summary judgment standard. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1See Hancock v. City Okla. City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988). 2See Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981);Burnett v. W. Res. Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (D. Kan. 1996). 3See Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1482, 1483 (D. Kan. 1994). 4See Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Time for Additional Discovery Citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d),5 Plaintiffs contend that theCourt should have afforded them
more time to perform additional discovery before gra nting Defendants’ motions for sum mary judgment. In order to receive relief under Rule56(d), the requesting party must “show[] by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot presen t facts essential to just ify its opposition.”6 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this rule to m ean that the requesting party cannot “ simply stat[e] that discovery is incomplete but must ‘state with specificity how the additional material will rebut the summary judgment motion.’ ”7 In its initial Order, the Court denied Plaintif fs’ request because Plaintiffs “merely stated what they intend[ed] todo with additional discovery; they [did] not state[] how any additional facts discovered during that time would create a genuine issue of material fact.”8 In their motion, Plaintiffs have again failed to specifically state how any additional material would have rebutted Defendants’ m otion. Therefore, the Court concludes that its earlier denial of Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) request was not error. Conflict with an Earlier Order Issued by the Court
Plaintiffs’ next contention is that the Court failed to follow a decision it made in an earlier Order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 139). In particular, Plaint iffs claim that the
5In their motion, Plaintiffs actually cite to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Under the new version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2010, Rule 56(f) has been moved to Rule 56(d). Because this change was not substantive, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs’ request as being a Rule 56(d) request.
6Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 7Libertarian Party v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotingBen Ezra, Weinstein &Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000)). 8Doc. 356, p. 12.
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Court’s ruling in its Order granting Defendants’ smu mary judgment motions is inconsistent with the
following statement made in the earlier Order:
[w]here the net result of the agreed upon conduct was the term ination of older workers for the purpose of interfering withattainment of rights protected by ERISA, both the seller and the buyers bear culpability for what amounts to discharging those individuals for reasons of age. Accordingly, Onex and/or Spirit may be held liable under ERISA section 510 if plaintiffs successfully prove they participated in the alleged scheme to get rid of the older workers.9
The Court disagrees. As is clear from the quote above, to succe ed on their joint-action theory,
Plaintiffs needed to show that the buyer and seller acted pursuant to an illegal scheme designed to
prevent them from attaining additional rights protected by ERISA. Because ERISA protects only
those rights that Plaintiffs were entitled to under the plan in which they actually participated, 10
Plaintiffs needed to present evidence that both Boeing’s and Spirit’s actions deprived them from
accruing additional rights under the Boeing pension plan, the only plan in which they participated,
in order for their theory to s urvive summary judgment. At the sum mary judgment stage, the
uncontroverted evidence showed that Spirit’s hiring decisions had no affect on Plaintiffs’, or any
other workers’, ability to accrue additional rightsunder the Boeing plan. As explained by the Court
in its summary judgment Order, it wa s this failure of proof that doom ed Plaintiffs’ joint-action
9Doc. 139, p. 17-18. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ asserti on, the Court did mention this statement in its summary judgment Order. See Doc. 356, p. 18 (“Although hiring decisions and basic operational decisions do not generally, by themself, violate § 510, they may if they are made pursuant to a scheme that is specifically designed to interfere with an employee’s protected ERISA rights. As noted by the Court previously, in such cases, the parties’ decisions will be viewed as one, and thus taken together amount to a discharge or discriminatory act.” (citation omitted)).
10Plaintiffs appear to believe that the Court’s interp retation of § 510 as protecting only those rights that an employee is entitled to under the plan they participated in conflicts with its earlier Order. It does not. It is important to recognize that, at the time the Court decided Defendants’ motion to dismiss, all that it hadin front of it was Plaintiffs’ complaint. This complaint only alleged that Defendants sc hemed together to deprive Plaintiffs of the opportunity of accruing additional ERISA protected rights; it did not furthe r allege that the buyer’s hiring decisio ns affected only Plaintiffs’ ability to acquire rights under the buyer’s plan, notheir ability to obtainadditional benefits under the seller’s plan. Thus, the issue of whether ERISA protectsrights offered under a plan that a plaintiff was nota participant of was not before the Court and was not decided.
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theory. This result, the granting of sum mary judgment on Plaintiffs’ joint-action theory be cause Plaintiffs had not shown that an illegal scheme ex isted, is completely consistent with the Court’s earlier ruling. As a consequence, the Court findsno merit to Plaintiffs’ second argument, and, thus, denies Plaintiffs’ motion to the extent it is based on it. Pattern-or-Practice Framework
The Court makes short shrift of Plaintiffs’ thidr argument. In its motion, Plaintiffs argue that the Court’s questioning of the appropriateness of applying the pattern-or-practice frame work to ERISA claims and ADEA claims arising out of a single employment action, which is what Plaintiffs claim the divesture of the Wichita Division was, waserror. While it is true that the Court questioned the application of this framework in the context ofthis case, it is also true that this afct had no affect on the Court’s resolution ofthe matters before it, as it analyzed Plaintiffs’ ERISA and ADEA claims under Plaintiffs’ proposed framework. Accordingly, this argument does not provide a basis for the Court to vacate its summary judgment Order. Application of the Summary Judgment Standard
Plaintiffs’ last argument is that the Court violated the Seventh Am endment by granting Defendants’ summary judgment motion on their ADEA claims. The Seventh Amendment does not preclude the entry of all summary judgments, rather, just those that are improper.11 Therefore, the key question here is whethe r the Court misapplied the law governing sum mary judgment when deciding Defendants’ motion.
11See, e.g., Stanko v. Maher, 419 F.3d 1107, 1112 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”12 “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence allows areasonable jury to resolve the issue either way.”13 A fact is “material” when “it is essentialto the proper disposition of the claim.”14 The court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.15
Before delving into Plaintiffs’ arguments, it isnecessary to properly frame Plaintiffs’ claims. As noted by the Court in its sum mary judgment Order, “Plaintiffs are not claiming that discrimination was the regular practice for a particual r manager or even a particular director group, but rather that it was the standard ope rating procedure throughout the W ichita Division to discriminate based on age.”16 With that in mind, the Court now turns to the question of whether it erred in concluding that Plaintiffshad failed to produce evidence suffciient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to its ADEA claims.
Plaintiffs first contend that the Court’s conclusion was error because the Court failed to take into account all of their evidence. Implicit within Plaintiffs’ argument is that the evidence that the Court did not explicitly discuss in its Order wasprobative of discrimination, otherwise there would be no basis for claiming that the Court erred in not considering it. The first piece of evidence that Plaintiffs allege the Court ignored is the em ail exchange between Onyx and its consultant s while Onyx was in negotiations with theIAM over the contribution that Spirit would have to make to the
12Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 13Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006). 14Id. 15LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2004). 16Doc. 356, p. 37.
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IAM’s pension fund. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ asse rtion, the Court did address this evidence in its Order. In footnote sixty four, the Court stated that the exchange was not probative on the issue of whether age discrimination occurred during the divestiture because the parties to the emails did not select which workers to hire and the content of the emails were not shared with those inside of the corporate hierarchy at the Wichita Division.17 In their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence that calls into ques tion the Court’s earlier conclusion relating to this evidence. Therefore, the Court concludes that it did not error in finding it not to be probative of discrimination.
The second piece of evidence is the portion of Jeff Turner’s deposition testimony where he stated that older workers generally tend to be more expensive because of experience. This type of statement, which merely reflects a fact of life and is devoid ofany disparaging undertones, does not give rise to inference of age bias. 18 Thus, the Court did not error in not finding this evidence probative of discrimination. Similarly, the Court did not err in finding Jim Urso’s statement, that at the time of the sale potential buyers would look at the age of the workforce and it would affect their decision to purchase the company, to not be probative. This statement merely reflects a truism of business life and there is no evidence sugges ting that the statem ent was made with any disparaging undertones.
The fourth piece of evidence that Plaintiffs c ite to is a document that directs a corporate spokesperson how to respond to the following hypothetical question:
17See Doc. 356, p. 29 n.64 (citing Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1994)). 18See, e.g., Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 1994).
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What benefits/issues do you see in light otfhe age demographics of your work force? How many employees are of retiree age? How does your labor cost competitiveness compare to som e of the other industry players given the relative age of the employees. Our age demographics provide us a highly tenured, experienced workforce with the knowledge, skills, and abilities that keep ushighly competitive. Our average age is 48 and 17% of our population is 55 or older. Average seniority is 19 years so much of the workforce is at or near the top oftheir wage scale. This has created an hourly situation that says we are 20% above the local market and 30% above the national. There is absolutely nothing about this hypothetical exchange that suggests that age discrimination played any role in the W ichita divestiture, much less that such discrim ination was Defendants’ standard operating procedure. The same is true for the rest of the evidence thaPt laintiffs cite to in their motion and that was not explicitly discussed by the Court in its summary judgment Order. Therefore, for these reasons, the Court concludes that it did not error in not explicitly discussing all of the evidence cited by Plaintiffs in their motion in its Order. Plaintiffs’ second basis for claim ing error is that the Court failed to draw all reasonable inferences in their favor from the evidence it did di scuss in its Order. Plaintiffs contend t hat the multiple derogatory comments m ade by low-level m anagers and Jef f Turner’s statem ent made sometime within a year of the divestiture that Boeing’s workforce was getting older and that the managers needed to find ways to do som ething about it raise a factual dispute as to whe ther Defendants had a corporate culture of age discrim ination that led to older workers being discriminated against on a com pany-wide level. The Court disagrees. Beginning with the derogatory comments, Plaintiffs have failed once again to put forward authority establishing that the comments of a handful of low-level m anagers in a company employing thousands of wor kers is
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sufficient to show a corporate policy against older workers.19 In the absence of such authority, the
Court is unwilling to say that these com ments create a question for the jury on the issue. As f or
Turner’s statement, Plaintiffs have failed to pr ovide any context for this statement whatsoever.
Without any context, the Court cannot say that this am biguous statement gives rise to a fact ual
dispute as to whether upper m anagement at the W ichita Division held an age bias and this bias
infected all those below. 20 Therefore, the Cour t again concludes that the cited evidence is
insufficient to create an issue for the jury.
Plaintiffs next claim that the Court improperly interpreted Dr. Mann’s statistical evidence.
Plaintiffs first take issue with the Court’s ruling that their director group statistics needed to show
that a significant number of director groups selected younger workers at a statistically significant
19In their m otion to reconsider, Plaintiffs state that in their response to Defendants’ motion for sum mary judgment they provided cases that clearly showed that theseytpe of comments are sufficient to establish that a corporate policy of age discrim ination existed. The Court disagrees. First, all of the cases in Plaintiffs’ response dealt wit h discriminatory comments made by people in high-level positionswithin the corporate hierarchy, not low-level managers. Second, none of these cases were from this Circuit. Therefore, the cases in Plaintiffs’ response do not clearly establish that comments made by multiple low-level managers show a corporate policy of discrimination. In their currentmotion, however, Plaintiffs do cite to a new case that is fromthe Tenth Circuit and does discuss comments made by managers, Furr v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987). Furr is inapposite, though, to the issue of whether comments by a handful of managers, in a company employing thousands of workers, can show discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure, as that issue was not before the court. In Furr, the issue before the court was m erely whether the plaintiffs had sufficientlyshowed that the defendant’s unlawful discrimination was willful, which the court found that it was because the defendant was made aware, through an earlier court opinion, of the fact that discriminating against workers because of their age violated theADEA and there was evidence, namely the plaintiffs’ managers’ ageist comments, that the defendant was still making employment decisions based onage. See id. at 1537. Accordingly,Furr does not mandate a different result in this case.
20See, .e.g., O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp. , 56 F.3d 542, 549 (4th Cir.) (“The secon d statement, made two weeks prior to O’Connor’s discharge, consisted of the following: ‘O’Connor, you are too damn old for this kind of work.’ O’Connor testified, however, that hedid not remember what he and Williams were discussing when this comment was made or whether this comment was in relation to a business matter. Thus, there is no evidence that this statement was made in the context of replacing O’Connor. Without this requisite nexus, this statem ent evinces no discriminatory intent.” (internal c itations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds by 516 U.S. 973 (1995); Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1459 (10th Cir. 1994) (same (citing Cone, 14 F.3d at 531)). As stated by theCourt in its summary judgment Order, the only context thatis provided for this statement comes from Defendants’ evidence, which unambiguously demonstrates that management for the Wichita Division wasconcerned about their workers’ age because it was afraid that a significant number of its workers would retire and leave the company with an inexperienced work force. Such a concern is benign, and does not suggest discrimination.
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level in order to establish a prima facie case of company-wide discrimination. There are really two parts to this argument: first, that it was error to require the results to be statistically significant, and second, that it was e rror to require Plaintiffs’ statistics to show that a significant num ber of the director groups reported statistically significant results adverse to older workers. Beginning with the first part, as explained by the Court in its summary judgment Order, it is well established that, at a minimum, results must be statistically significant before they are probative of discrimination.21 Accordingly, the first part of Plaintiffs’ argument is without legal traction and is rejected. As for the second part, it too lacks m erit. It is intuitive that in order for a person to establish, through statistics focusing on individual director groups, that discrimination occurred on a company-wide level, their statistics must show that discrimination occurred across the individual director groups. In their motion, Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with a persuasive reason to deviate fromthis logic. Therefore, the Court rejects the second part of Plaintiffs’ first argument as well.
Plaintiffs’ other argument relating to the Court’s treatment of Dr. Mann’s statistics is that the Court improperly ignored Dr. Mann’s aggregate results. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ charge, the Court did not ignore these results; rather, it reviewed them and concluded that they were insufficient to establish a prima facie case of com pany-wide discrimination because they were not practically significant. No doubt Plaintiffs disagree with the Court’s conclusion that practical significance is necessary before statistically significant statistics establish discrim ination, but they have not put forth binding precedent that mandates a contrary result. As a result, the Court will go with what it continues to believe is the proper approach for accessing statistics dealing with a large number of data points, and, thus, reject Plaintiffs’ second argument regarding Dr. Mann’s statistics.
21See Doc. 356, p. 26 (citingBennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir. 1998);Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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Plaintiffs’ third basis for claiming error is that the Court wrongly disregarded Dr. Goldberg’s opinions. According to Plaintiffs, the Court was free to disregardGoldberg’s opinions only if they were conclusory, which Plaintiffs contend the Court improperly concluded they were.22 Plaintiffs’ argument is meritless for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs misstate the law. It is well established that the Court has broad discretion in deciding the ad missibility of expert testim ony, and that it can disregard it when it relates solely to issues that are “readily within the comprehension and ability of the jury.” 23 Second, Pl aintiffs misstate the Court’s reasoning for disregarding Goldberg’s opinions. The Court disregarded these opinions because it concluded they were “lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help,”24 not because they were conclusory. As a consequence, Plaintiffs’ motion presents no valid reason for the Court to reverse its earlier decision on this issue. Therefore, t he Court concludes that it did not error in not considering Goldberg’s opinions when deciding Defendants’ motions.
In sum, the Court has again reviewed Plain tiffs’ evidence, and again concludes that it is insufficient to raise a factual di spute sufficient for any of the afore m entioned claims to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ m otion to reconsider its sum mary judgment Order.
22Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion in their motion, Defendants raised the argument that Goldberg’s opinions were improper in their reply to their motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADEA claim. See Doc. 345, p. 8.
23Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998). 24Doc. 356, p. 29 n.62. Plaintiffscite a number of cases fromjurisdictions outside of the Tenth Circuit that they believe establish that such opinions are admissible. The Court finds, though, the line of cases to the contrary to be more persuasive, and follows the rule established therein. See Kotla v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 115 Cal. App. 4th 283, 292 (2004) (collecting cases that have rejected opinions like those offered by Goldberg).
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDEREDthat Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider (Doc. 359) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 28th day of March, 2011.
ERIC F. MELGREN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 385 Filed 07/12/11 Page 1 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC.,

Case No. 05-1368-EFM

Defendants.

NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER The Court enters this nunc pro tunc order to crorect a clerical error in its July 11, 2011, Order denying the parties’ motion to strike and granting their motion to certify (Doc. 384). References to April 8 in the July Order should read “March 28.” The July 11 Order denying the parties’ motion to strike and granting their motion to certify is hereby amended to reflect the foregoing correction.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This case arises out of The Boei ng Company’s (“Boeing’s”) sale of the assets of its commercial facilities in W ichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahom a (the “W ichita Division”), to Spirit AeroSystem s, Inc. (“Spirit” ), in June 2005. Plain tiffs are former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit when it purchased Boeing’s Wichita Division assets. On December 19, 2005, Plaintif fs filed this action, asserting the f ollowing claims: Count I – age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 385 Filed 07/12/11 Page 2 of 7
623;1 Count II – violation of the records-keepingrequirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); Count III – violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1); Count IV – interference with rights under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1140; Count V – breach of the collection bargaining agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants in violation of the Labor Ma nagement Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185; and Count VII – retaliation.2
On December 18, 2006, the Court issuedan Order dismissing Counts II and III3. On October 30, 2007, the Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims stemming from conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 2005, and Plaintiffs’retaliation claims brought under Title VII and the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”).4 On June 30, 2010, the Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim arising out of the Wichita Division divestiture, Plaintiffs’ LMRA claim alleging that Boeing violated its col lective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace W orkers (“IAM”) when IAM m embers who did not receive job offers fromSpirit were not allowedto vote on the proposed CBA between Spirit and the IAM, Plaintiffs’ ADEA pattern or practice ofintentional age discrimination collective action claim, and Plaintiffs’ ADEA disparate im pact claim. On March 28, 2011, the Court denied Plaintiffs’
1Plaintiffs allege pattern and practice, disparate treatment, and disparate impact age discrimination. 2Count VI merely states that Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive and equitable relief restraining defendants from illegally discriminating against Plaintiffs and the Class. 3See Doc. 139. 4See Doc. 222.
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motion to reconsider the Court’ June 30 Order. 5 Following the issuance of the afore described orders, Plaintiffs have at least one outstanding claim – disparate treatment based on age.
This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion requesting Rule 54(b) certification of the June 30 Order, or, in the alternative, permission to seek an interlocutory appeal of that order (Doc. 366), and Defendants’ motion seeking Rule 54(b) certification of the June 30, October 30, and March 28 Orders (Doc. 370). Plaintiffs’ Rule 54b() request is unopposed. Defendants’ requests are unopposed. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the parties’ motions.
Pursuant to Rule 54(b), when multiple claims or parties are involved in an action, “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly de termines that there is no just reason for delay.” 6 In deciding a Rule 54(b) motion, the Court must consider “whether the claims under review [are] separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the natureof the claims already determined [are] such that no appellate court would have to decide the sam e issues m ore than once even if the re were subsequent appeals.”7 If the Court concludes that certif ication is appropriate, it m ust make two express findings: (1) that the judgment is final, and (2) that there is no just reason to delay review of the final order until it has conclusively ruled on all claims presented by the parties to the case.8
5See Doc. 365. 6Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 7Stockman’s Water Co. v. Vaca Partners, L.P,. 425 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotationmarks omitted) (alterations in original). 8See id.
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Finality of the June 30 and October 30 Orders To be final, an order “m ust be final in the sense that it is an ultim ate disposition of an
individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.”9 Claims are considered disposed of if they are “distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.”10 Although there is no hardand-fast rule for determining whether claims are separable, “courts should consider whe ther the allegedly separate claims turn on the same factual questions, whether they involve common legal issues, and whether separate recovery is possible.”11
With the aforem entioned principles in m ind, the Court finds that both the June 30 a nd October 30 Orders are final orders for purposes of Rule 54(b). Beginning with the June 30 Order, each of the claims disposed of are separate and distinct from any remaining claims, as they turn on different factual questions, involve different legal issues, and allow for separate recovery. W ith regard to the October 30 Order, the same is true. As a result, the Court concludes that the June 30 and October 30 Orders satisfy the finality requirement. Whether a just reason for delaying review of the June 30 and October 30 Orders exists
In deciding whether the second erquirement for Rule 54(b) certification is satisfied, the Court “must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved.”12 Here, the June 30 Order easily meets the requisite standard. Based on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representations, it appears that there is a significant num ber of named and consent plaintiffs, possibly 700, who
9Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10Id. at 1243. 11Inola Drug, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 390 F. App’x 774, 774 (10th Cir. 2010). 12Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
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intend to pursue individual ADEA claims. Due to the sheer number of plaintiffs, this case will likely not only take many years to resolve, but also devour a staggering amount of resources. Because of these facts, the Court believes that the m ost prudent course of action is to have the Tenth Circuit review the rulings contained in the June 30 Orderosoner than later. By reviewing the June 30 Order now, the Court can avert the costly possibility of having to retry the plaintiff’s ADEA claims,13 or having to try a second round of cases that involvemany of the same parties and underlying facts that the first did, which would be the case if the Ci rcuit was to disagree with the Court’s rulings regarding Plaintiffs’ ERISA and LMRA claims. Therefore, in light of the potential problems just highlighted, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delaying review of the June 30 Order.
As for the October 30 Order, the Court also concludes that there is no just reason to delay review of it. As Tenth Circuit precedent reveals,there is no just reason to deny a request for review of a district court’s ruling that disposes of clai ms that are separate and distinct from those that remain when another ruling made in the same case is already being reviewed by the circuit court.14 Accordingly, because the Court has already found that the June 30 Order should be certified, it finds that there is no just reason to delay review of the October 30 Order.
In sum, the Court concludes that the June 30 and October 30 Orders satisfy both of the requirements for Rule 54(b) certification. Additi onally, due to the fact that the March 28 Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the June 30Order is inextricably intertwined with the June 30 Order, an appealable order, the Court concludes that the March 28 Order should also be certified
13Cf. Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp,.267 F.3d 1096, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that pattern-orr-apctice ADEA claims differ dramatically from individual ADEA claims, and stating that if the plaintiffs were to succeed ontheir pattenor-practice theory that they would beentitled to a presumption that their employer had discriminated against them when they sought individual relief).
14See Gross v. Pirtle, 116 F. App’x 189, 194-95 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 385 Filed 07/12/11 Page 6 of 7
to the Circuit f or its review.15 As a result the Court grants De fendants’ and Plaintiffs’ m otions seeking certification.16
With regard to the other outstanding m otions in this case – Plaintiffs’ m otion to strike Defendants’ expert report (Doc. 349) and Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Doc. 351) – in light of its rulings regarding certification, the Court denies them without prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDEREDthat Plaintiffs’ motion requesting Rule 54(b) ceritfication of the June 30 Order, or, in the alternative, permission to seek an interlocutory appeal of that Order (Doc. 366) is hereby GRANTED. The Court certifies its June 30 Order for appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion seeking Rule 54(b) certification of the June 30, October 30, and March 28 Orders (Do.c370) is hereby GRANTED.The Court certifies its October 30 and March 28 Orders for appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Defendants’ expert report (Doc. 349) is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDEREDthat Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Doc. 351) is hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
15See, e.g., Carpenter v. The Boeing Co., 223 F.R.D. 552, 558 (D. Kan. 2004). 16Because the Orders should be certified for appeal underRule 54(b), it is unnecessary for the Court to consider the propriety of an appeal under§ 1292. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Johnson, 2009 WL 211939 (D. Kan. Jan. 23, 2009).
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 385 Filed 07/12/11 Page 7 of 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 12th day of July, 2011. ERIC F. MELGREN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 406 Filed 02/09/12 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT )

AEROSYSTEMS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 05-1368-EFM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the court on two different (but related) motions to stay. First, five pro se plaintiffs move the court for (1) an order “staying proceedings” and (2) an order compelling their former attorneys to provide themwith “all relevant discovery documents.” (Doc. 387).1 The remaining plaintiffs, represented by Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. and Uzo L. Ohaebosim, also move for a stay of discovery related to the remaining individual claims pending rulings on their interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit. (Doc. 400). Defendants oppose the pro se plaintiffs’ request to compel all discovery documents, arguing that many of the discovery docum ents have no relevance to the pro se plaintiffs’ individual claim s. Defendants also object to a stay of “all” proceedings but agree that a stay of discovery is

1
The five pro se plaintiffs are Henry F. Butler, Warren K. Pyles, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, and David Clay. Their former attorneys are Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr., and Uzo L. Ohaebosim. Mr. Williamson and Mr. Ohaebosim represent the remaining named plaintiffs individually and are seeking class certification.

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 406 Filed 02/09/12 Page 2 of 3
appropriate. For the reasons set forth below, the motions shall beGRANTED IN PARTand DENIED IN PART.
With respect to the pro se plaintiffs’ request to “stay proceedings,” this court has no authority to issue orders concerning matters that are the subject of the interlocutory appeal2. However, there are a number of individual claims that have not been appealed. The court is persuaded that discovery should not proceed on the rem aining individual claims pending rulings by the Tenth Circuit because a piecem eal approach to the individual claims at this time would be inefficient and counterproductive.
The pro se plaintiffs’ request to com pel their form er attorneys to produce “all discovery” shall be denied because portions of defendants’ discovery responses were the subject of a protective order that placed restrictions on the disclosure of the inform ation. Equally important, the pro se plaintiffs have not demonstrated that all discovery documents are relevant to their remaining individual claims. Because the court is imposing a stay on discovery, the resolution of these discovery issues is unnecessary at this time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the pro se plaintiffs’ m otion to “ stay proceedings” (Doc. 387) is GRANTED IN PART and discovery in this case is stayed, consistent with the rulings herein. The pro se plaintiffs’ m otion to compel their former attorneys to produce all discovery m aterials is DENIED. The m otion of the represe nted
2
The interlocutory appeal divests this court of jurisdiction over the matters appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
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Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 406 Filed 02/09/12 Page 3 of 3 plaintiffs to stay discovery pending rulings by the Tenth Circuit(Doc. 400) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated at Wichita, Kansas this 9th day of February 2012.
S/ Karen M. Humphreys _________________________ KAREN M. HUMPHREYS United States Magistrate Judge
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 Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 416 Filed 09/19/12 Page 1 of 3

Appellate Case: 11-3238 Document: 01018903214 Date Filed: 08/27/2012 Page: 1

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________
PERRY APSLEY; BOB BAILEY; JACOB A. BAKK; GARY BALL; PEGGY S. BELL; THOMAS BELTON; MELONDA BIRCHER; JERRY L. BRANSTETER; MICHAEL E. BURGARDT; ROCKY R. BURRIS; DANIEL D. BURROWS; BETTY CHILDERS; LARRY E. COMBS; HARVEY J. CONYAC; LOREN W. COX; PHYLLIS A. COX; LINDA L. DEZARN; WILLIAM D. DOSHIER; ALAN S. EPPERSON; LLOYD C. FANSLER; JERALD J. GILBERT; RICHARD GOTTHARD; BRIAN GROOM; DENISE A. HARRIS; RON W. HENDERSHO; VERNA J. HOUSTON; LARRY W. JAMES; GARY L. JOHNSON; MELVYN J. JOHNSON; DONALD R. JONES; RALPH O. KEENER; DANNY R. KENNEDY; MELVIN E. KERNS; GORDON B. KINKEAD; JIMMY LE; CARLTON D. LEE; STEPHEN L. LINCK; FREDDY J. MCCOLPIN; GLENNYS M. MONTGOMERY; CATHY J. MUNSELL; JAN W. MURRAY; HUYEN T. NGUYEN; LUYEN D. NGUYEN; KENT W. OWEN; LOWANDA J. PATTON; PAUL D. PETE; BRENT L. POPP; JAMES E. PORTER; JAY E. POWELL; WILLARD J. RATCHFORD; VERONICA RIOS; RICHARD D. ROEDER; ALBERT SCHLOETZER; WILLIAM H. SETCHELL; JAMES C. SHEPPARD; DEBRA L. SMITH; SAMMY J. SMITH; SHARON A. SOUTHERN; LINDA C. SPARRAR; ABEL L. VASQUEZ; HENRY F. VICTOR; JAMES R. WALLACE, Unit Manager; CAROLYN

August 27, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 416 Filed 09/19/12 Page 2 of 3 Appellate Case: 11-3238 Document: 01018903214 Date Filed: 08/27/2012 Page: 2

Y. WHEATON; SYLVESTER WILLIAMS, II; JANET M. WILSON; WALTER WOODS; BETTY R. YOUNG; VERNON L. BENTLEY; REDELL COLEMAN; CHARLES D. ELDER; CHIP GILCHRIST, II; JANET S. HANSEN; JERRY L. MCKINNEY; JOSEPH E. SCHROEDER; STEVEN M. SCHWIND; TEDDY F. SILL; CHARLES STARK; MICHAEL B. WELSH; CHARLES L. BEAN, JR.; JAMES HAMMON; ALLEN C. HATCHER; MARK MCCURDY; STEVEN NGO; BA PHAM; DONALD E. TITUS; JIMMY WALLACE; BARBRA ODOM; FRANK CASH; RICHARD WALLIN; DALE C. JAYNE, JR.; STEVEN BASIC; ROBERT W. BOYD; and REGINA SUE WALKER, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

JAMES BOWMAKER; DAVID L. CLAY; HENRY F. BUTLER; THROMA A. DYAS; OLIVIA J. HOUSLEY; SHARRON N. JAMES; WARREN K. PYLES; DARLENE E. ROZAR; JAMES WALKER; ROY T. WELLS, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.
THE BOEING COMPANY; SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS,

No. 11-3238 (D.C. No. 6:05-CV-01368-EFM-KMH)

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

JUDGMENT _________________________________

2

Case 6:05-cv-01368-EFM-KMH Document 416 Filed 09/19/12 Page 3 of 3 Appellate Case: 11-3238 Document: 01018903214 Date Filed: 08/27/2012 Page: 3
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
This case originated in the District of Kansas and was argued by counsel. The judgment of that court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
3

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT )

AEROSYSTEMS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Case No. 05-1368-MLB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion “to compel or for an in camera review of documents.” (Doc. 255). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs’ motion shall be DENIED.1
Plaintiffs seek an order com pelling the production of certain docum ents that defendants designated as protected by the attorney-client privilege. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants (1) failed to carry their burden of showing that the privilege is applicable to the docum ents listed in the privilege log and/or ( 2) “impliedly waived” the privilege. The parties’ arguments are discussed in greater detail below.

1
The nature of this lawsuit has been described in prior opinions and will not be repeated. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, Doc. 218, filed October 24, 2007.

1. Sufficient Showing Plaintiffs challenge two categories of documents listed on defendants’ privilege logs:
(1) a collection of emails regarding an “adverse impact analysis” conducted by defendants and (2) certain docum ents related to an agreem ent between Spirit and the IAM National Pension Fund. (Doc. 256-2, p. 3). First, plaintiffs argue that “it is not clear based on the description of many documents that each document listed in the Bates Range would fall under the sam e privilege.” Doc. 256,-2, p. 3 (em phasis in original). This argum ent is rejected. Review of the privilege log reveals that only one docum ent or email message is listed for each privilege log entry.
Plaintiffs also argue, in a conclusory fashion and without specifying any privilege log entries, that the attorney-client privilege has not been established because documents were either (1) not authored by an attorney or (2) attorneys were not involved in the communication. Defendants counter that the emails drafted by non-attorneys were prepared in the context of requesting or receiving legal advice.
A communication is privileged if it is between an attorney and client in the context of providing legal advice, even if the communication comes from the client. Johnson v. Kraft Foods, 2007 WL 221927 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that an attorney did not create the em ail message does not de feat the privilege. Similarly, “communications among non-attorneys in a corporation may be privileged if made at the direction of counsel, to gather information to aid counsel in providing legal services.” Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 238 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Kan. 2006). Moreover, the
-2-

attorney-client privilege is not lost m erely because an em ployee conveys the legal
communication to another employee for action. The court is satisfied, based on a review of
the privilege logs and defendants’ response brief, tha t defendants have made a sufficient showing that the disputed entries are protected by the attorney-client privilege.2
2. Waiver
Plaintiffs also assert that defendants have im pliedly waived the attorney-client
privilege under the three-prong test first announced in Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D.
Wash. 1975). Under Hearn, the court must find each of the following conditions to establish
an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege: (1) the party asserting the privilege
affirmatively acted in a manner that resulted in the assertion of the privilege; (2) through the
affirmative act, that party placed the protected information at issue by making it relevant to
the case; and (3) application of the pr ivilege would deny the opposing party access to information vital to its claims of defense.3
2
Privilege Log Entry No. 10026 is listed in plaintiffs’ motion. However, Boeing’s revised privilege log indicates that the document is protected by only the work product doctrine. The court declines to address the issue of whether entry No. 10026 should be produced because plaintiffs’ motion does not challenge defendants’ contention that the document is work product.
3
Noting that Hearn has been criticized and its tests applied unevenly, the Second Circuit recently added a requirement that a party rely on privileged advice from counsel to make a claim or defense. In Re Erie County, 546 F. 3d 222 (2nd Cir. 2008). This court finds it unnecessary to consider the more recent limitations discussed in Erie because plaintiffs fail to satisfy the traditional Hearn standards.
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The Tenth Circuit has not enunciated a test for when an implied waiver occurs. See IMC Chems., Inc. v. Niro, Inc., 2000 WL 1466495 at *8 (D. Kan. July 19, 2000)(J. Waxse describes the various approaches, noting that Hearn utilizes a liberal test). However, even if this court were to apply the liberal Hearntest, defendants have not “impliedly waived” the attorney-client privilege because defendants have not placed the protected communications at issue in this lawsuit.4 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument that defendants impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege is rejected.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ m otion to com pel or, in the alternative, for an in camera review (Doc. 255) is DENIED.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under D. Kan. Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts
4
The court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that defendants affirmatively placed the communications at issue because Boeing managers (who later became Spirit managers) “failed to take any steps to address the adverse impact” against older workers. This argument reflects plaintiffs’ factual claims rather than affirmative defenses asserted by defendants.
Plaintiffs also cite differences between a draft and the final version of an agreement between Spirit and the IAM National Pension Fund. However, plaintiffs fail to show how defendants affirmatively placed the change in wording at issue in this case.
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or applicable law, or whe re the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a m otion to reconsider and a dvancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by the court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated at Wichita, Kansas this 9th day of December 2008.
S/ Karen M. Humphreys _______________________ KAREN M. HUMPHREYS United States Magistrate Judge
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 Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
2007 WL 163201 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
Perry APSLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The BOEING COMPANY, The Onex Corporation, and Spirit Aerosystems, Defendants.
No. 05–1368–MLB. | Jan. 18, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr., Monique K. Centeno, Uzo L. Ohaebosim, Shores, Williamson & Ohaebosim, LLC, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiffs.
Carolyn L. Matthews, Douglas L. Stanley, James M. Armstrong, Todd N. Tedesco, Trisha A. Thelen, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Wichita, KS, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KAREN M. HUMPHREYS, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to compel defendants to answer discovery requests. (Doc. 97). For the reasons set forth below, the motion shall be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Background
This lawsuit arises from Boeing’s sale of its commercial airplane manufacturing facilities in (1) Wichita, Kansas; (2) Tulsa, Oklahoma; and (3) McAlester, Oklahoma.1 Highly summarized, plaintiffs allege that, “as early as January 2002,” Boeing engaged in a “common scheme” of discrimination against older workers when the company began efforts to sell its Wichita Division. Doc. 40, p. 35. Plaintiffs contend that Boeing “made several ‘low-key’ layoffs” of older workers in 2002 and 2003 to make a prospective purchase of its Wichita operations more attractive to buyers by reducing pension and health care costs. Doc. 40, p. 35.
Boeing admits that in September 2003 a team of Boeing employees was formed to sell the Wichita Division.2 Doc. 115, p. 4. In 2004 Boeing publicly announced its intention to sell its commercial facilities in Wichita and Oklahoma and eventually negotiated an Asset Purchase Agreement with defendant Onex, a Canadian corporation. As part of the transaction, Onex created a new business entity, Spirit AeroSystems Inc., to own and operate the Wichita and Oklahoma facilities.3
Spirit announced plans to continue operating the commercial manufacturing facilities. However, Boeing employees who wanted to continue their employment with Spirit were required to submit an application. After reviewing work records and interviewing Boeing managers, Spirit hired some, but not all, of the Boeing employees who sought to continue employment with Spirit.4
Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class action and allege that Boeing and Onex engaged in unlawful age discrimination in the layoff and rehire process. Doc. 40, pp. 43–44.5 Plaintiffs also contend that Boeing and Onex (1) intentionally interfered with their ERISA pension rights, (2) breached collective bargaining agreements, and (3) unlawfully retaliated against employees who had previously exercised protected employment rights.6 Doc. 40, pp. 44–47. Additional facts and contentions are
1

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
included in the analysis of the parties’ discovery disputes.
Motion to Compel
Plaintiffs move to compel (1) Boeing to answer five interrogatories and produce documents responsive to eleven production requests and (2) Spirit to produce documents responsive to twelve production requests. Doc. 97. Plaintiffs also ask the court to approve a temporal scope of discovery commencing January 1, 2000 and to rule on plaintiffs’ email search protocol. Doc. 104. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the discovery requests (1) seek irrelevant information, (2) are overly broad and/or (3) unduly burdensome. Plaintiffs counter that the information requested is relevant and that defendants have failed to show that producing the information is unduly burdensome.
*2 The standards concerning the scope of discovery are well established. Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(I), (ii), and (iii). (Emphasis added).
The limitations in Rule 26(b)(2)(I), (ii), and (iii) are: (I) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.7
Relevance, at the discovery stage, is broadly construed. Generally, “a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689–90 (D.Kan.2001) (citations omitted).8 When the discovery sought appears relevant on its face, the party resisting discovery has the burden of demonstrating that the requested information does not fall within the scope of discovery defined under Rule 26(b)(1). Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 216 F.R.D. 666, 670 (D.Kan.2003). Conversely, “when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request.” Id.
Once the threshold question of relevance has been satisfied, the analysis proceeds to whether the requested information is privileged or otherwise limited by the considerations set out in Rule 26(b)(2)(I), (ii), or (iii). Generally, the party opposing discovery has the burden of demonstrating through detailed explanation, exhibit, and/or affidavit that the request is unduly burdensome or overly broad. See, e.g., Horizon Holdings Inc. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 213 (D.Kan.2002). However, the court may deny a motion to compel where the discovery request is overly board or unduly burdensome on its face. See, e.g., Aikens v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 538 (D.Kan.2003). With these standards in mind, the court turns to the parties’ discovery disputes.
Temporal Scope of Discovery
*3 Plaintiffs ask that the court “establish the scope of discovery dates from January 1, 2000 through August 30, 2006.” Doc. 98, p. 19. Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ request and, for the reasons set forth below, the court rejects plaintiffs’ motion for a blanket order extending discovery back to January 1, 2000.
In the first place, plaintiffs do not identify any specific discovery request at issue in their attempt to extend the discovery period back to January 2000. Rather, plaintiffs argue that they have alleged a continuing violation and that “at least two plaintiffs were employed and effected in 2002 and 2003.” Doc. 98, p. 17. Plaintiffs also argue that courts typically permit
2

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
discovery in employment termination cases for a reasonable number of years before and after the alleged discrimination.
The court agrees that it is not unusual to allow discovery in employment discrimination cases to span a reasonable number of years. However, the determination of an appropriate time span requires sufficient information and argument upon which the court can make an informed decision. Here, plaintiffs point to no specific discovery requests and the court is left to speculate regarding why January 2000 is an appropriate date.9 At best, it appears that plaintiffs pick January 2000 because it is approximately 5 years before Boeing’s sale of its facilities to Spirit (June 16, 2005). However, if the effective date of the sale is a determinative benchmark, it is not clear why discovery dating back to January 2000 is necessary.10
More importantly, plaintiffs specifically allege that “defendant’s common scheme began as early as January 2002.” Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Doc. 40, p. 35. Given plaintiffs’ contention of when Boeing’s “scheme” commenced, plaintiffs’ rationale for extending all discovery back to January 2000 is not apparent. Finally, plaintiffs’ brief contains confusing language concerning the relevant time period.11
In light of the allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint and the parties’ arguments, the court concludes that a reasonable period of time for discovery extends back to January 1, 2002, the earliest date of Boeing’s alleged scheme.12
E–Mail Search Protocol Plaintiffs move to compel Boeing and Spirit to produce e-mails under the following criteria:
Covered Individuals: (1) all individuals involved in the decision making process of Project Lloyd; (2) all individuals involved in the decision to select the Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester facilities for sale.
Time Period: (1) January 1, 2000.
Scope: (1) e-mail transmitting spreadsheets regarding the lay-off/no hire decisions; (2) e-mail transmitting reports/studies/surveys regarding the costs of pensions and the age of the workforce at Boeing; (3) e-mail about lay-off/no hire decisions; (4) e-mail transmitting lay-off instructions or guidelines and comments regarding such instructions or guidelines; *4 (5) e-mail containing the following search terms: a. Project b. Lloyd c. Retirement d. ERISA e. Discrimination f. Age g. Lay-off h. Lay off
3

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
i. Layoff
j. Benefit
k. Onex
l. Spirit
m. Geezer
n. Retire
o. Pension
p. Old
q. Midwestern Aircraft
r. Healthcare
s. Health care
Defendants oppose the motion to compel the e-mail materials, arguing that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. In support of its objection, Boeing explains (1) the process necessary to determine the location of e-mails and (2) the process for organizing and actually searching the files after the location of the e-mail data is identified.13 Boeing estimates that it will take a knowledgeable team of computer staff at least five hours per employee to locate and retrieve e-mails stored on centralized servers. For users who stored e-mail in separate files on their respective hard drive or portable storage devices, Boeing estimates that the search time per employee will exceed one day.14 Boeing also argues that the number of individuals “involved in the decision making process” is large and an unknown number of persons had multiple e-mail addresses and encrypted their e-mail messages.15 Boeing also complains that the use of relatively common terms will produce a large volume of e-mail messages having nothing to do with the issues in this case.16
Spirit’s objections are similar to the arguments asserted by Boeing. However, because Spirit utilized a variety of computer resources during the early stages of its operations, the search is more complex and estimated to take at least two days per employee.17 In addition, Spirit currently has no software to decrypt e-mails that were previously on Boeing’s system; therefore, Spirit would be forced to (1) contract with Boeing for services to decrypt the e-mails or (2) require each computer user to decrypt his or her own e-mail.
In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue that defendants’ burden “is not undue and that the benefits that plaintiffs will garner from electronic mail search vastly outweigh the defendants’ burdens.” Doc. 126, p. 25. Plaintiffs also argue that defendants have failed to show an undue burden because: (1) the number of individuals with e-mail on their individual hard drive is unknown, (2) the number of files is unknown; and (3) the number and size of the e-mail for targeted individuals is unknown. With respect to this latter argument concerning “unknowns,” plaintiffs’ position is misguided. It is precisely because there are “unknowns” that plaintiffs’ request imposes a greater burden on defendants. For example, because there are variations in the storage locations for e-mail, defendants are tasked with individually questioning each e-mail user concerning their respective practices so that all e-mail sources are identified for searching.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the benefits of discovery outweigh defendants’ burden raises a more difficult question because of the expansive nature of their e-mail requests and the number of e-mail users involved. In order to better evaluate this discovery request, the court will set this matter for a hearing. At a minimum, the parties should address the following questions:
*5 1. How many persons are covered by plaintiffs’ e-mail search protocol?18
2. Although Boeing has estimated the amount of hours to locate and search for e-mail, what is the estimated cost?
3. Exactly what are the “benefits of discovery” that plaintiffs reference?
4. Does the number of search terms materially increase the cost?
4

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
5. Should the costs of electronic discovery be borne by plaintiffs?
6. Is there a more efficient method for discovery than electronic searches?
7. What computer resources or expertise did plaintiffs rely on in formulating a search protocol? If the information is produced, how will plaintiffs’ process the data?
Individual Discovery Requests to Boeing
Interrogatory No. 2 Plaintiffs move to compel Boeing to answer the following interrogatory:
If you contend that current or future costs related to pension or health care costs for employees was not a factor in the decision to sell the Boeing plants at issue, please provide a factual basis for such contention and identify all documents that support this contention.
Boeing did not answer the interrogatory and asserted that the request was “overly broad, unduly burdensome, vague, and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” Boeing also asserted in a conclusory statement that its reasons for selling the Wichita Division are irrelevant to the issue of who received a job offer from Spirit.
The court is satisfied that the requested information is relevant. The theory of plaintiffs’ age discrimination and ERISA claims is that defendants engaged in a scheme to reduce expenses by eliminating older employers who presumably have higher health care and pension costs and plaintiffs are entitled to know whether pension and health care costs were a factor in the decision to sell the facilities.19 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Boeing to answer Interrogatory No. 2 shall be GRANTED.
Interrogatory No. 8 Interrogatory No. 8 requests that Boeing:
Identify each and every meeting that took place involving management or executive level employees regarding the sale of Boeing plants that ultimately ended with the sale of the plants at issue in this matter being sure to identify any documents that support this answer.
Boeing objected to answering this interrogatory, arguing that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. The court agrees. Answering the interrogatory would require Boeing to identify hundreds, if not thousands, of meetings that occurred concerning the sale of the Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester facilities. The meetings involved a wide variety of topics such as real estate, environmental issues, supply contracts, and intellectual property that are irrelevant to the issue raised by plaintiffs’ claims. Because the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face, the Motion to compel Boeing to answer Interrogatory No. 8 shall be DENIED.
Interrogatory No. 9 *6 Interrogatory No. 9 asks:
If you contend that no employee was retaliated against because exercising protected rights, please provide a factual support for such contention being sure to identify all documents that support your answer.20
In response to the interrogatory, Boeing cited earlier interrogatory answers explaining that it terminated all employees in its commercial divisions at its Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester facilities at the time of the June 16, 2005 sale to Sprint and that Boeing was not involved in the recommendations or determinations of who would be hired by Spirit.21 Because Boeing has explained why it contends no employee was subjected to retaliation, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Interrogatory No. 9 shall be DENIED.
5

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Interrogatory No. 10 Plaintiffs ask Boeing to:
Please describe the process that was utilized to determine which employees would not be recommended for hire by Spirit or laid off by Boeing.
With respect to layoffs, Boeing states that it terminated all employees in the commercial divisions in Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester. Because all employees were terminated as part of the sales transaction, Boeing did not engage in a process “to determine which employees” would be laid off.22 Accordingly, Boeing has sufficiently answered the portion of the interrogatory concerning “layoffs.”
However, Boeing’s response concerning the process of determining “which employees would not be recommended for hire by Spirit” is inadequate and incomplete. At best, Boeing argues that it “was not involved in the recommendations or determinations of who would be hired by Spirit.” However, the discovery issue before the court is not whether Boeing was “involved” but rather whether Boeing is able to shed light on the facts concerning the “process.”23 Boeing shall answer the interrogatory and, at a minimum, describe its understanding of the process for “determining which employees would not be recommended for hire by Spirit.” Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Interrogatory No. 10 is GRANTED IN PART, consistent with the court’s ruling.
Interrogatory No. 11 Interrogatory No. 11 asks Boeing:
If you contend that the process used to select individuals for lay-off or not to hire with Spirit was not excessively subjective, please provide a factual support for such contention being sure to identify all documents that support your answer.
Again, with respect to the issue of layoffs, Boeing’s answer that all employees were laid off is sufficient. However, Boeing has not provided an appropriate answer to the question of whether or not the process for selecting individuals for hiring by Spirit was excessively subjective. The motion to compel Interrogatory No. 11 is GRANTED IN PART and Boeing shall answer the portion of the interrogatory concerning the hiring process.
Production Request No. 9 Plaintiffs seek to compel Boeing to produce:
All documents, manuals, handbooks, policies, procedures, notices or directives issued by the defendant pertaining to: *7 a. Recruitment; b. Selection and hiring; c. Objective testing; d. Subjective evaluations; e. Position requirements; f. Job posting; g. Job assignment; h. Seniority system;
6

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
i. Discipline;
j. Demotion;
k. Transfer;
l. Layoff;
m. Discharge;
n. Training programs or skill acquisition opportunities;
o. Investigations of employees; and
p. Promotions.
Boeing agreed to produce (1) written policies relating to discipline and layoff benefits, (2) the Collective Bargaining Agreements in effect as of June 15, 2005, and (3) job descriptions in effect just before the divestiture. However, Boeing objects to the remaining requests as irrelevant, overly broad, and unduly burdensome.
Plaintiffs concede that their request “may not be relevant on its face” but argue that the requested materials provide “important background information on how Boeing worked.” Doc. 98, p. 14, footnote 4. Plaintiffs also argue that they “are entitled to determine if defendants have any other policies that are discriminatory against older workers.” Id.
Neither argument by plaintiff is persuasive. As noted above, the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) has been amended and narrowed and, absent a showing of good cause, the scope of discovery is limited to the claims and defenses asserted in the case.24 Plaintiffs’ far-reaching request for discovery materials based on the need for “background information” is not sufficiently tailored to the claims or defenses asserted in this case. Similarly, plaintiffs’ assertion that they are entitled to determine whether defendants have any other discriminatory policies against older workers is not persuasive. “The [2000 Amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) ] signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings.” Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments to Rule 26.25
In addition to exceeding the scope of relevant discovery, Production Request No. 9 is overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face because the request specifically asks for “all documents, manuals, handbooks, policies, procedures or directives issued by defendant” pertaining to the 16 areas of employment. (Emphasis added). The all-inclusive request for documents is excessive for purposes of securing “background” information. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Production Request No. 9 is DENIED.
Production Request No. 13 Plaintiffs seeks to compel:
All documents that show the identity of any person, company, or other entity contacted, consulted, or retained to analyze, review, or otherwise evaluate all financial aspects of the sale of any Boeing plants that ultimately ended with the sale at issue in this matter. (Emphasis added).
*8 Boeing opposes the motion, arguing that it has identified the retained consultants that it used during the transaction and that plaintiffs have not shown why they are entitled to all documents showing the individuals’ or companies’ identities. In addition, Boeing argues that over 4,000 persons were contacted, consulted or retained concerning this transaction and that producing all documents that identify such individuals is unduly burdensome and overly broad. Plaintiffs counter that Boeing’s representation that it has disclosed the retained consultants’ names is not a proper response to a Rule 34 request for production of documents. Plaintiffs also argue that it requested the names of people who “were contacted and not simply retained.”
The motion to compel Production Request No. 13, as currently drafted, shall be DENIED. To the extent plaintiffs seek the identity of retained consultants, Boeing’s representation that it utilized an investment banker (Goldman Sachs & Co.) and an
7

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
accounting firm (KPMG) is sufficient.26 With respect to consultants that were contacted but not retained, the relevance of such information is not obvious and plaintiffs have failed to present a persuasive argument that such information is relevant.27 Accordingly, the motion to compel shall be DENIED.28
Production Request No. 15 Plaintiffs seek to compel:
All documents that reflect any aspect of a financial analysis for Project Lloyd or the sale of all Boeing plants that ultimately led to the sale of the Wichita, Tulsa and McAlester plants.
Boeing opposes the motion to compel, arguing that the request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and requests information lacking relevance to the claims in this case. The court agrees that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome; therefore, the motion to compel Production Request No. 15 shall be DENIED.29 A request for “all documents that reflect any aspect of a financial analysis” is overly broad on its face since it requires Boeing to gather and produce documents concerning subjects such as state and local sales tax issues which have no relevance to the claims in this case. Equally important, Boeing represents that electronic information stored in two of its servers related to Project Lloyd equals approximately 22 gigabytes of information and that documents made available to prospective purchasers with Boeing’s Offering Memorandum filled 54 boxes.30 Given the volume of documents and records involved, a request for “all documents that reflect any aspect” is overly broad and unduly burdensome.31
Production Request No. 21 Production Request No. 21 requests:
All studies, reports, or analysis done by internal staff, consultants, government agencies, or others related to the pensions and/or retirement benefits of employees of each Boeing plant that Boeing considered selling during the relevant time period.
Boeing opposes production of the requested documents, arguing that the pension and retirement studies lack relevance for the reasons contained in its motion for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. 99. However, Boeing’s motion for judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of interference with ERISA rights was denied; therefore, its arguments concerning a lack of relevance are moot.
*9 Boeing also argues that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. The court does not agree. Contrary to other production requests for “all documents,” plaintiffs only requested “studies, reports, or analysis” of pension and retirement benefits at plants that Boeing considered selling during the relevant time period. Because the request is sufficiently narrow, Boeing’s objections that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome are rejected. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel the “studies, reports, or analysis” requested in Production Request No. 21 shall be GRANTED.
Production Request No. 24 Production Request No. 24 asks Boeing to:
Please produce any and all documents involving negotiations (including but not limited to, all offers, counter offers, memos, letters, and rejections) between Boeing and any other entity regarding the sale of any Boeing plant, including the Wichita, Tulsa and McAlester locations within the relevant time period.
Boeing opposes the motion to compel, arguing that in the course of negotiating the sale, Boeing and Onex addressed many business issues, such as the real estate involved in the sale, and that the majority of time spent in negotiations related to intellectual property issues and supplier contracts pursuant to which Spirit would sell component parts and subassemblies to Boeing. The court agrees that negotiations related to intellectual property issues and supplier contracts have no apparent relevance to this case and such materials need not be produced. However, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ lawsuit is that Boeing
8

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
and Onex schemed to get rid of older employees to reduce health care and pension costs. Because the negotiations go to the heart of plaintiffs’ theory of a scheme, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Production Request No. 24 shall be GRANTED, with the exception of negotiations concerning supplier contracts and intellectual property issues.32
Production Request No. 28 Production Request No. 28 asks Boeing to:
Produce all documents submitted to any government entity regarding the sale of the Boeing plants at issue in this litigation.
Although plaintiffs list this production request as one of the matters to be compelled in their motion, neither party presents any argument concerning Production Request No. 28. In the absence of any argument, the motion to compel Production Request No. 28 shall be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Production Request Nos. 29 and 34 The parties have resolved these two requests and the motion to compel Production Request Nos. 29 and 34 is MOOT. Doc. 115, p. 1, footnote 1; Doc. 126, p. 19, footnote 6.
Production Request No. 36 Plaintiffs move to compel:
All minutes or notes from any meeting of the corporation, its officers or directors from January 1, 2000 until the present where the age of Boeing’s workforce, healthcare costs, pension costs, and/or the sale of Boeing plants was discussed.
*10 Boeing opposes the motion to compel, arguing that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. As previously noted, the court is not persuaded that discovery extending back to January 1, 2000 is warranted and the temporal scope shall be limited to January 1, 2002. With respect to officers or directors, the court is of the opinion that the request for minutes or notes is sufficiently narrow and appropriate and that portion of Production Request No. 36 shall be GRANTED. However, plaintiffs’ request for notes “from any meeting of the corporation” is too broad because it encompasses all employee “meetings” where the sale of the plant was discussed.33 The motion to compel notes from any meeting of the corporation shall be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and plaintiffs may clarify and narrow their request.
Production Request No. 42 Production Request No. 42 requests:
All worksheets and spreadsheets regarding or relating to the decision to sell the Boeing plants in issue.
Although Boeing objects to Production Request No. 42, the motion to compel shall be GRANTED. Boeing has failed to make a showing that the request is overly broad or unduly burdensome. Moreover, the request appears relevant because the documents will show whether pension and healthcare benefits factored into Boeing’s decision-making process.
Production Request No. 51 Plaintiffs seek to compel:
All documents received by defendant from any financial consultant, investment banker, or investment service commenting on, recommending, or cautioning a layoff relating in any way with the sale of the
9

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Boeing plants that were considered for sale since January 1, 2000.
Although Boeing objects to this request based on a lack of relevance, the court is satisfied that the request is relevant because it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.34 Boeing’s argument that the request is overly broad is not persuasive and there is no evidence that gathering the materials would be unduly burdensome. The motion to compel Production Request No. 51 shall be GRANTED with the caveat that the temporal scope is modified to January 1, 2002.
Individual Discovery Requests to Spirit
Production Request No. 11 Plaintiffs move to compel Spirit to produce:
All documents that show the identity of any person, company, or other entity contacted, consulted, or retained to analyze, review, or otherwise evaluate all financial aspects of the purchase of the Boeing plants at issue in this matter.
Spirit opposes the production request and provides the names and addresses of the 11 consulting firms it utilized during the transaction. Both Spirit and plaintiffs assert arguments identical to those raised by Boeing and plaintiffs concerning plaintiff’s Request No. 13 to Boeing. For the reasons set forth above concerning Request No. 13, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Spirit to produce materials responsive to Production Request No. 11 shall be DENIED.
Production Request No. 13 *11 Similar to Request No. 15 to Boeing, plaintiffs seek to compel Spirit to produce:
All documents that reflect any aspect of a financial analysis regarding the purchase of the Boeing plants at issue in this matter.
Sprint opposes the motion, arguing that its records concerning the transaction are voluminous and that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome.35 For the same reasons plaintiffs’ motion to compel Request No. 15 was denied, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Spirit to produce all documents responsive to Production Request No. 13 shall be DENIED.
Production Request No. 17 Plaintiffs move to compel Spirit to produce:
All studies, reports, or analysis done by internal staff, consultants, government agencies or others related to the pensions, and/or retirement benefits of employees of each Boeing plant that Spirit considered purchasing from Boeing during the relevant time period.
This request is similar to Production Request No. 21 to Boeing. For the reasons discussed above concerning Request No. 21, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Spirit to provide materials responsive to Production Request No. 17 shall be GRANTED.
Production Request No. 18 Production No. 18 requests that Spirit produce:
All documents, including but not limited to studies, reports, memoranda, and notices, relating to the analysis of health care benefits of employees at all plants that you considered purchasing from Boeing and the potential cost to health care benefits of employees of Spirit.36
10

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Similar to Production Request No. 17, plaintiffs’ motion to compel studies and reports related to the analysis of health care benefits and costs shall be GRANTED.
Production Request No. 20 and Production Request No. 29 Request No. 20 asks Spirit to:
Please produce any and all documents that reflect any and all stages of negotiations between Spirit and Boeing for the purchase of any Boeing plant within the relevant time period.
Request No. 29 asks Spirit to:
Please produce any and all documents involving negotiations (including, but not limited to, all offers, counter offers, memos, letters, and rejections) between Spirit and Boeing regarding the purchase of any Boeing plant, including the Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester locations within the relevant time period.
These production requests are similar to Production Request No. 24 to Boeing which asked for materials concerning negotiations. For the reasons set forth in the order granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel Request No. 24, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Request Nos. 20 and 29 shall be GRANTED with the exception of negotiations concerning supplier contracts and intellectual property issues.
Production Request No. 21 Production Request No. 21 asks Spirit to:
Please produce all documents that comment on the costs and other financial information that Spirit considered during the purchase of the Boeing plants at issue in this case.
*12 Spirit opposes the motion, arguing that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. The court agrees. The request for “all documents” commenting on “costs” and “financial information” would include documents on such irrelevant issues as real estate leases, supplier contracts, and tax issues, matters which have no relevance to this lawsuit. Accordingly, the motion to compel Production Request No. 21 shall be DENIED.
Production Request No. 28 Similar to plaintiffs’ Production Request No. 36 to Boeing, plaintiffs move to compel Spirit to produce:
All minutes or notes from any meeting of the corporation, its officers, or directors regarding health care costs, pensions, age discrimination, and/or layoffs.
Spirit opposes the motion to compel, arguing that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. With respect to officers or directors, the court is of the opinion that the request for minutes or notes is sufficiently narrow and appropriate and that portion of Production Request No. 28 shall be GRANTED. However, plaintiffs’ request for notes “from any meeting of the corporation” is too broad because it encompasses all employee “meetings” where health care, pensions, age discrimination and/or layoffs may have been discussed.37 The motion to compel notes from any meeting of the corporation shall be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and plaintiffs may clarify and narrow their request.
Production Request No. 30 Plaintiffs request that Spirit:
Please produce any and all documents that reflect the expenses related to the acquisition of Boeing 11

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
plants, restructuring, and other expenses related to the initial setup of Spirit Aerospace following your purchase of the Boeing plants.
The motion to compel this information shall be DENIED. Spirit’s acquisition and setup expenses have no apparent relevance to the claims in this case and plaintiffs have failed to present any valid rationale for the discovery of this information.
Production Request No. 39 Plaintiffs move to compel Spirit to produce:
All documents, including e-mails, about how the costs of pensions and health care benefits would affect your decision to purchase the Boeing plants at issue.
This information is relevant to the claims in this case and Spirit’s arguments that the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome are not persuasive. Therefore, the motion to compel Production Request No. 39 shall be GRANTED.
Production Request No. 42 Production Request No. 42 asks Spirit to produce:
All documents received by defendant from any financial consultant, investment banker, or investment service commenting on, recommending, or cautioning a lay-off or of employees not hired or retained relating in any way with the purchase of the Boeing plants that were considered for purchase since January 1, 2000.
Contrary to Spirit’s objection, this request seeks relevant information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In addition, the request is narrowly tailored to secure information concerning layoff or hiring issues. Accordingly, the motion to compel Production Request No. 42 shall be GRANTED but the temporal scope is limited to a period of time commencing January 1, 2002.
Production Request No. 46 *13 Request No. 46 asks Spirit for:
All documents that were generated during all meetings where decisions were made to extend or not extend offers of employment to Boeing employees.
Plaintiffs have withdrawn this request. Doc. 126, p. 23, footnote 7. Accordingly, the motion to compel Production Request No. 46 is MOOT.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to compel (Doc.97) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with the rulings set forth above. A deadline for defendants to answer the interrogatories and produce documents will be established after the hearing concerning e-mail production. The hearing will be held on January 26, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. in United States Courthouse, Courtroom 326, 401 North Market, Wichita, Kansas.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under D. Kan. Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law, or where the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider and advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F.Supp. 1172 (D.Kan.1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by the court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007) IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

The Wichita, Tulsa and McAlester facilities comprised Boeing’s “Wichita Division.” Boeing also has facilities for

“military-related” operations in Wichita which were not sold and are not a part of this litigation. In the context of this opinion and

the lawsuit, the terms “facilities” or “operations” refer to Boeing’s commercial airplane manufacturing business.

2

The project to offer these facilities for sale was known as “Project Lloyd.”

3

The original name of the new company was Mid–Western Aircraft System Inc. However, in July 2005 Mid–Western changed its

name to Spirit AeroSystems Inc.

4

Plaintiffs allege that the “common scheme” of discrimination climaxed with major layoffs in May and June of 2005. Doc. 40, p.

35. Boeing denies plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination and argues that all employees in the affected facilities were terminated by

June 16, 2005, the effective date of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Spirit assumed operations on June 17 and the former Boeing

employees who were rehired began working for Spirit that same day.

5

Plaintiffs allege that (1) Onex is the parent company of Spirit Aerospace [sic], (2) Spirit was “not properly capitalized and (3)

Spirit and Onex share the same directors, officers and employees. Doc. 40, p. 32. Although not expressly alleged in the complaint,

plaintiffs apparently seek to pierce the corporate veil between Onex and Spirit.

6

Plaintiffs’ claims that defendants violated (1) Title VII record keeping requirements by failing to maintain records and (2) other

federal statutes by requiring employees to sign releases have been dismissed. Memorandum and Order, Doc. 139, filed December

18, 2006. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining ERISA claim has been denied. Id.

7

Rule 26(b)(2) was amended effective December 1, 2006 to address electronic discovery. The limitations described in parts (I), (ii),

and (iii) remain unchanged.

8

Citing a 1991 case, plaintiffs assert that a request for discovery should be allowed “unless it is clear that the information sought can

have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the action.” Snowden v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 137 F .R.D. 336, 341

(D.Kan.1991)(emphasis added). However, the holding in Snowden was based on the 1991 version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) which

has since been amended. As noted above, the current version of Rule 26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to “any matter, not

privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” (Emphasis added). There has been no showing of “good cause” for

more expansive discovery; therefore, the scope of discovery in this case is limited to the claims and defenses asserted by the

parties.

Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 1993 “to enable the court to keep tighter rein on the extent of discovery” because the

“information explosion of recent decades” greatly increased the potential cost, delay, or oppression caused by wide-ranging

discovery. Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments to Rule 26. Rule 26(b)(1) was again amended in 2000 to further

narrow the scope of discovery and “involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious

discovery.” Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments to Rule 26. Cases predating these amendments must be carefully

scrutinized given the current version of Rule 26(b)(1) and the increased emphasis on judicial management of the discovery

process.

9

The conclusory allegation of a “continuing violation” is not sufficient justification for the time span requested by defendant. The

events complained of occurred after January 1, 2002.

10

As previously noted, Boeing commenced “Project Lloyd” in September 2003 and publicly announced its intent to sell the Wichita

facilities in 2004.

11

Plaintiffs request in the text of their brief that discovery extend back to January 2000. However, in a footnote plaintiffs propose

that discovery extend back to January 1, 2002. Doc. 98, p. 17, footnote. 5.

12

This ruling should not be construed as a determination that there is no set of circumstances where discovery before January 1, 2002

might be relevant. Rather, plaintiffs’ conclusory arguments for a blanket order extending all discovery back to January 2000 are

simply not persuasive.

13

Computer servers storing e-mail are located in (1) St. Louis, Missouri, (2) Huntsville, Alabama, and (3) Seattle, Washington. In

addition to the servers, e-mail users also retain e-mail materials on their individual computer hard drives and portable storage

devices. Because not all e-mail materials are stored on servers, Boeing would need to contact each individual user to determine

where e-mail materials are located.

13

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

14

Boeing’s response contains a relatively technical explanation of the processes necessary to locate and search for the requested

e-mail materials. However, because the court will schedule oral argument on the issue of e-mail production, a detailed recitation of

the technical requirements is unnecessary at this time.

15

Assuming that plaintiffs intend to include those individuals who made the decision as to which employees would be offered jobs

with Spirit, the request involves approximately 550 individuals. With respect to “Project Lloyd” and Boeing’s decision to sell its

facilities, approximately 100 persons were either (1) decision makers or (2) played a significant role in providing information and

advice.

16

For example, plaintiffs’ request for every e-mail containing the term “benefit” includes all e-mail in which the sender’s signature

included his or her title of “Benefits Administrator.”

17

For example, Spirit contracted with an outside vendor (Cox Communications) to provide interim e-mail accounts for a limited

number of Spirit employees during its first year of operations. Spirit also utilized “legacy” e-mail files for e-mail stored on Boeing

computer servers prior to June 3, 2006. E-mails created after June 2006 are stored on a Spirit server.

18

As noted, it is unclear whether the search involves 550, 100, or a smaller number of people. If, as argued by Boeing, the e-mail is

not located in a centralized data base, the number of persons involved is a major issue. Search of a few centralized data bases is

materially different from searching 550 individual computers and/or storage systems.

19

Boeing’s boilerplate objections that the interrogatory is overly broad, unduly burdensome and vague are not supported and

therefore rejected.

20

A number of plaintiffs’ discovery requests contain questionable grammatical choices. For purposes of accuracy and consistency,

the court quotes plaintiffs’ discovery requests verbatim without modification or correction.

21

In addition to citing its answers to Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5, Boeing provided documents for individuals who (1) filed for

disability, (2) filed for workers compensation, filed a lawsuit against Boeing, or (4) lodged a complaint against a manager.

Production Request No. 11.

22

Boeing answered Interrogatory No. 10 by citing its response to Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5.

23

Boeing asserts in its answer to Interrogatory No. 4 that it “was not involved in the recommendations or determinations of who

would be hired by Spirit” and also incorporates its answer to Interrogatory No. 3. In answering Interrogatory No. 3, Boeing again

asserts that it was not involved in the recommendations or determinations of who would be hired by Spirit but also states: “Boeing

managers were acting as representatives of the new company in making recommendations.” Boeing’s Response Brief, Doc. 115,

Exhibit 1A (emphasis added).

Apparently, Boeing managers did make recommendations concerning the employees Spirit should hire. The assertion by Boeing

that recommendations were made in a “representative” capacity is unresponsive to the question asked by Interrogatory No. 10.

Equally important, Boeing, Onex, and Spirit are all represented in this lawsuit by the same attorneys. Factual information known

to a party and its counsel must be disclosed in an interrogatory answer.

24

Plaintiffs proffer no showing of “good cause” to expand the scope of discovery to “any matter relevant to the subject matter

involved in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).

25

Plaintiffs’ suggestion that they are entitled to discover the listed employment practices because they alleged a “pattern and

practice” is also not persuasive. Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are based on wrongful terminations for purposes of saving healthcare

and pension costs. Under the circumstances, their broad discovery request for topics such as training, promotions, or discipline are

an unwarranted fishing expedition.

26

Under Rule 26(b)(2), the court may limit the use of a discovery method if the information is “obtainable from some source that is

more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”

27

Because financial consultants do not work for free, one would not expect a consultant who had been contacted but not retained

would possess relevant information not otherwise available from Boeing or its retained consultants.

28

The wording of the production request causes some uncertainty as to what is requested. It is not clear whether plaintiffs seek the

identity of persons who analyzed the entire transaction (persons retained to “evaluate all financial aspects”) or individuals who

analyzed only a portion of the financial issues, such as lease or rental agreements. The number of consultants analyzing the entire

financial transaction would be relatively small. However, the number of individuals providing input on the various components

would be significant. To the extent plaintiffs seek the identity of persons who consulted on any financial aspect of the sale, the

request is overly broad because it would include material on irrelevant topics such as environmental issues and supply contracts.

29

Plaintiffs argue that even if their request for “all documents” is overly broad, defendants must still produce documents to the extent

14

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

such documents are not objectionable. Citing Johnson v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535, 542 (D .Kan.2006). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Johnson is troubling. While recognizing that a party has a duty under the federal rules of discovery to respond to the extent that discovery requests are not objectionable, Judge Waxse specifically held that no response is required “when inadequate guidance exists to determine the proper scope of a request.” Id. Here, as in Johnson, an objection was properly lodged to the production request. The remaining portion of the production request fails to provide adequate guidance for Boeing to determine the proper scope of production.

30

Boeing represents that one gigabyte is roughly equivalent to a pickup truck load of documents.

31

As a practical matter, even if the documents were ordered produced, plaintiffs would have to develop some type of process to

narrow their search for relevant documents. The criteria should be narrowed now rather than after huge volumes of data have been

produced. The court is particularly reluctant to require defendant to sort through and produce truckloads of data that has no

relevance to the case.

Additionally, Boeing provided plaintiffs with an index of the documents made available to the prospective purchasers. There is

no indication that plaintiffs narrowed their production requests after reviewing the index.

32

The court recognizes that the negotiations likely include topics having little or no relevance to the claims in this case. However,

because supplier contracts and intellectual property issues apparently made up the majority of the negotiations, the materials

ordered produced are greatly reduced.

33

For example, the request would include notes from any meeting by lower level employees discussing real estate issues related to

the sale—matters that have no relevance to this lawsuit. Similarly, a meeting between a supervisor and an engineer concerning an

environmental report would be included in this request. Under the circumstances, a request for all meeting notes where the sale

was discussed is simply overly broad.

34

For example, a memo from a consultant cautioning Boeing to avoid the appearance of age discrimination may lead to evidence of

efforts to conceal discriminatory conduct.

35

Spirit estimates that it has approximately 14 gigabytes of electronic data concerning the sale.

36

During the meet and confer process, plaintiffs offered to “limit this request to all documents that address the costs of pensions and

health care as well as all studies and reports, and memoranda that relate to the analysis of the costs of pension and health care

benefits” but that Spirit still refused to produce the documents. The court sees no material difference between the original request

and plaintiffs’ proposal.

37

For example, the request, as presently drafted, would include notes from meetings between an individual employee and a benefit

coordinator concerning health care or pension questions. Under the circumstances, a request for all meeting notes where the sale

was discussed is simply overly broad.

15

 
 Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
2007 WL 3120712 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
Perry APSLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The BOEING COMPANY, The Onex Corporation, and Spirit Aerosystems, Defendants. No. 05–1368–MLB. | Oct. 24, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr., Monique K. Centeno, Uzo L. Ohaebosim, Shores, Williamson & Ohaebosim, LLC, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiffs. Carolyn L. Matthews, Douglas L. Stanley, James M. Armstrong, Todd N. Tedesco, Trisha A. Thelen, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Wichita, KS, for Defendants. Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KAREN M. HUMPHREYS, United States Magistrate Judge. *1 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion to compel responses to interrogatories and production requests. (Doc. 193). For the reasons set forth below, the motion shall be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Background This lawsuit arises from Boeing’s sale of its commercial airplane manufacturing facilities in (1) Wichita, Kansas; (2) Tulsa, Oklahoma; and (3) McAlester, Oklahoma.1 In 2004 Boeing publicly announced its intention to sell its commercial facilities in Wichita and Oklahoma and eventually negotiated an Asset Purchase Agreement with defendant Onex, a Canadian corporation. As part of the transaction, Onex created a new business entity, Spirit AeroSystems Inc., to own and operate the Wichita and Oklahoma facilities.2
Spirit announced plans to continue operating the commercial manufacturing facilities. However, Boeing employees who elected to continue employment with Spirit were required to submit applications. After reviewing work records and interviewing Boeing managers, Spirit hired some, but not all, of the Boeing employees who applied.3 Plaintiffs (Boeing workers who submitted applications but were not hired by Spirit) contend that defendants engaged in a scheme to reduce wage and ERISA costs by eliminating older workers.
Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class action and allege that Boeing and Spirit engaged in unlawful age discrimination in the layoff and rehire process. Doc. 40, pp. 43–44.4
Plaintiffs also contend that Boeing and Onex (1) intentionally interfered with their ERISA pension rights, (2) breached collective bargaining agreements, and (3) unlawfully retaliated against employees who had previously exercised protected employment rights.5 Doc. 40, pp. 45–47. Additional facts and contentions are included in the following analysis of the parties’ discovery disputes.
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Motion to Compel
Plaintiffs move to compel (1) Boeing to answer three interrogatories and produce documents responsive to nine production requests and (2) Spirit to answer three interrogatories and produce documents responsive to three production requests. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the discovery requests (1) seek irrelevant information, (2) are overly broad and/or (3) are unduly burdensome. Plaintiffs counter that the information requested is relevant and that defendants have failed to show that producing the information is unduly burdensome.6
The standards concerning the scope of discovery are well established. Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). (Emphasis added).
*2 The limitations in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii) are: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.7
Relevance, at the discovery stage, is broadly construed and generally “a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689–90 (D.Kan.2001) (citations omitted). When the discovery sought appears relevant on its face, the party resisting discovery has the burden of demonstrating that the requested information does not fall within the scope of discovery defined under Rule 26(b)(1). Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 216 F.R.D. 666, 670 (D.Kan.2003). Conversely, “when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request.” Id.
Once the threshold question of relevance has been satisfied, the analysis proceeds to whether the requested information is privileged or otherwise limited by the considerations set out in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), or (iii). Generally, the party opposing discovery has the burden of demonstrating through detailed explanation, exhibit, and/or affidavit that the request is unduly burdensome or overly broad. See, e.g., Horizon Holdings Inc. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 213 (D.Kan.2002). However, the court may deny a motion to compel where the discovery request is overly board or unduly burdensome on its face. See, e.g., Aikens v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 538 (D.Kan.2003). With these standards in mind, the court turns to the parties’ specific disputes.
Individual Discovery Requests to Spirit
Interrogatory Nos. 24, 25, and 28 Interrogatory No. 24 asks Spirit to
Identify any variables that you contend are relevant to testing in order to determine whether any statistical analysis that may be conducted to test to determine whether there is a statistical significance sufficient to establish age discrimination, being sure to identify any document you contend supports this contention.
Interrogatory No. 25 asks Spirit to
Identify any variables that you contend are relevant to statistical analyses conducted in order to determine whether individuals who previously filed grievances, lawsuits, and/or complaints were
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
significantly impacted by the selective re-hire process, being sure to identify any document you contend supports this contention.
*3 Interrogatory No. 28 asks Spirit to
Identify any variables that you contend are relevant to testing any statistical disparities in the age of workers selectively re-hired, being sure to identify any document you contend supports this contention.
Opposing the motion to compel, Spirit argues that the interrogatories are premature and that it will disclose the relevant variables pursuant to deadlines established by the court for expert witness disclosures.8 The court agrees. In essence, plaintiffs are asking Spirit to identify the “variables” considered relevant by defendant’s experts without seeing plaintiffs’ statistical methodology and analysis. Such an exercise would require Spirit to engage in speculation, a process this court rejects. Accordingly, the motion to compel Interrogatory Nos. 24, 25, and 28 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Discovery concerning “statistical variables” may be renewed after plaintiffs produce their expert disclosures and reports.
Production Request No. 68 Production Request No. 68 asks for any documents “that compare and/or comment on projected cost savings against actual cost savings that Spirit experienced between June 17, 2005 and September 1, 2006.” (Emphasis added). In response to Spirit’s initial objection that the request was overly broad, plaintiffs agreed to limit the request to labor costs and fringe benefits (including pensions, health care costs and retiree medical expenses). Spirit continues to object to the modified request, arguing that the actual cost savings that occurred after the June 2005 hiring process are irrelevant to Spirit’s hiring decisions. Spirit also argues that the actual savings are the result of “countless factors” such as “a high demand for airplanes in the post-divestiture time period along with an efficient use of its work force.”
The court is satisfied that the requested information is relevant because the modified request seeks documents that discuss Spirit’s pre-divestiture “projected costs savings” concerning labor and fringe benefits.9 Moreover, the production request is narrowly tailored and requests only documents that compare projected costs against actual cost savings for a relatively brief period of time. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Production Request No. 68 is GRANTED.
Production Request No. 76 Production Request No. 76 requests “any documents discussing the costs and benefits in purchasing the Wichita Division .” Again, in response to Spirits’ initial objection that the request was overly broad and unduly burdensome, plaintiffs modified their request to (1) labor and fringe benefit costs and (2) demographics of the workforce. Spirit maintains its objection to the modified production request, arguing that plaintiffs’ modified request continues to ask for “any” document, a request that would require Spirit to examine virtually every e-mail message to determine whether the costs or benefits of labor or fringe benefits were discussed.
*4 The issues of e-mail production and a search protocol are the subject of a separate sampling process which the parties are currently testing and will not be resolved in this ruling. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ request for “any” documents shall be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Production Request No. 80 Production Request No. 80 seeks “to the extent not previously produced, all financial analyses, studies, memos, or reports detailing, referencing, or discussing such financial analyses, that were provided to any member of the team assembled for the purpose of purchasing the Wichita Division referencing the costs, benefits, and/or feasibility of purchasing any Division of the Boeing Company.” This request is merely a revised version of a production request previously rejected by this court. Memorandum and Order, Doc. 145, pp. 27–28 (denying motion to compel Production Request No. 13). For the reason set forth in the court’s prior ruling, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Production Request No. 80 is DENIED.
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Individual Discovery Requests to Boeing
Production Request Nos. 52, 53, 54, 57, 62, 173, and 175 and Interrogatory Nos. 32, 34, and 35 Production Request Nos. 52, 53, 54, 57, 62, 173, and 175 and Interrogatory Nos. 32, 34, and 35 seek documents and information concerning the funding and costs of “Boeing’s pension plans.” Boeing argues that the requests and interrogatories are overly broad and unduly burdensome because the requests seek corporate-wide discovery of irrelevant documents. As explained in greater detail below, the court agrees.
During the relevant time period of 2002 to 2005, Boeing sponsored over thirty different defined benefit pension plans world-wide. Only three of those pension plans had participants from the Kansas and Oklahoma facilities that were sold to Spirit. The three pension plans involved were nationwide plans in which the Wichita and Oklahoma employees participated along with thousands of other employees across the country. More specifically,
(1) The Boeing North American Retirement Plan (the “BNA” plan) offered pension benefits to union-represented employees in Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. As of January 1, 2005, there were 103,685 participants nationwide in the BNA plan, 750 (or .7%) of which were Tulsa and McAlester employees.
(2) The Boeing Company Employee Retirement Plan (the “BCERP” plan) provided pension benefits to union-represented employees in Wichita. On January 1, 2005, there were 160,518 participants nation wide in the BCERP plan, of which 10,300 (or 6.4%) were Wichita employees.
(3) Similarly, the Pension Value Plan for Employees of the Boeing Company (the “PVP” plan) provided pension benefits to non-union employees in Wichita, Tulsa, and McAlester. The PVP also covers other Boeing employees across the country. On January 1, 2005, there were 133,534 participants nationwide in the PVP, 2,800 (or 2%) of which were BCA Wichita Division employees.
*5 Because only three of Boeing pension plans were involved in the divestiture that gives rise to this lawsuit, plaintiffs’ discovery requests for a broad range of documents from the thirty-plus pension plans is overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face.
Equally important, plaintiffs’ requests utilize over-inclusive terms which require the collection and production of large volumes of irrelevant documents. For example, Request No. 175 requests documents “discussing options to reduce current and/or projected pension costs or expenses.” However, there are a variety of fees and expenses in pension plans, such as administrative fees for record-keeping, accounting, and trustee services as well as investment management services. Plaintiffs have not shown the relevance of such fees to the claims in this case. Similarly, plaintiffs’ production requests and interrogatories ask for all documents “regarding” or “relating” or “discussing” broad pension topics. Such requests are overly broad on their face and rejected.10 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Production Request Nos. 52, 53, 54, 57, 62, 173, and 175 and Interrogatory Nos. 32, 34, and 35 is DENIED.
Production Request Nos. 169 and 170 Request No. 169 asks Boeing to produce “your 2004 quarterly presentations.” Request No. 170 asks Boeing to produce “your 2003 financial presentations.” Boeing opposes plaintiffs’ motion to compel, arguing that the requests are overly broad, vague, and ambiguous. The court agrees. Boeing is a multi-national, publicly traded company which provides numerous “presentations” concerning financial matters every year. Vague requests for “financial presentations” are not sufficient. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel Production Request Nos. 169 and 170 shall be DENIED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to compel (Doc.193) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with the rulings set forth above. Defendants shall produce the documents ordered herein on or before November 30, 2007.
A motion for reconsideration of this order under D. Kan. Rule 7.3 is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or applicable law, or where the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider and advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F.Supp. 1172 (D.Kan.1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by the court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed.
*6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

The Wichita, Tulsa and McAlester facilities comprised Boeing’s “Wichita Division.” Boeing also has facilities for

“military-related” operations in Wichita which were not sold and are not part of this litigation. In the context of this opinion and

the lawsuit, the terms “facilities” or “operations” refer to Boeing’s commercial airplane manufacturing business.

2

The original name of the new company was Mid–Western Aircraft System Inc. However, in July 2005 that name changed to Spirit

AeroSystems Inc.

3

Plaintiffs allege that the “common scheme” of discrimination culminated with major layoffs in May and June of 2005. Doc. 40, p.

35. Boeing denies plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination and argues that all employees in the affected facilities were terminated by

June 16, 2005, the effective date of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Spirit assumed operations on June 17 and the former Boeing

employees who were rehired began working for Spirit that same day.

4

Plaintiffs allege that (1) Onex is the parent company of Spirit, (2) Spirit was not properly capitalized and (3) Spirit and Onex share

the same directors, officers and employees. Doc. 40, p. 32. Although not expressly alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs apparently

seek to pierce the corporate veil between Onex and Spirit.

5

Plaintiffs’ claims that defendants violated (1) Title VII record keeping requirements by failing to maintain records and (2) other

federal statutes by requiring employees to sign releases have been dismissed. Memorandum and Order, Doc. 139, filed December

18, 2006. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining ERISA claim has been denied. Id.

6

Plaintiffs’ motion includes a lengthy discussion of the theory of their case and the evidence provided to date with attachments. A

recitation of plaintiffs’ case and the evidence is unnecessary except to note that plaintiffs have received a substantial volume of

discovery concerning Boeing’s decision to sell the “Wichita Division” and Spirit’s hiring decisions.

7

Rule 26(b)(2) was amended effective December 1, 2006 to address electronic discovery. The limitations described in parts (i), (ii),

and (iii) remain unchanged.

8

Spirit asserts that plaintiffs have separately requested and received documents concerning the internal analysis conducted by Spirit

as part of the employee selection process and that Spirit is not withholding discovery into how that analysis was done. Plaintiffs

concede that they have received such information and are aware of the variables listed in that analysis.

9

Spirit concedes that it has or will produce studies, reports, or analyses relating to pensions, retirement benefits, and health care

benefits that were created prior to its June 2005 purchase. Doc. 207, p. 32.

10

By way of contrast, the court previously ordered Boeing to produce the studies, reports, or analyses done by internal staff or

consultants related to the pension benefits of employees of each Boeing plant that Boeing considered selling during the relevant

time period. Memorandum and Order, Doc. 145, pp. 22–23.

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 Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 3231526 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
Perry APSLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The BOEING COMPANY, The Onex Corporation, and Spirit Aerosystems, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 05–1368–MLB. | Oct. 30, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr., Monique K. Centeno, Uzo L. Ohaebosim, Shores, Williamson & Ohaebosim, LLC, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiffs.
Carolyn L. Matthews, Douglas L. Stanley, James M. Armstrong, Todd N. Tedesco, Trisha A. Thelen, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Wichita, KS, for Defendants.

Opinion

NUNC PRO TUNC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MONTI L. BELOT, United States District Judge. *1 This matter comes before the court on defendants’ joint motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 189.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. (Docs.190, 203, 212.) The motion is GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs, former employees of The Boeing Company (“Boeing”), filed suit in December 2005 generally alleging employment-related harms. Defendants are Boeing, Spirit Aerosystems (“Spirit”), and The Onex Corporation (“Onex”). The case has undergone procedural and substantive manipulations and the following claims remain against defendants: 1) Count I—age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623;1 2) Count IV—interference with rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1140; 3) Count V—breach of the collective bargaining agreement between plaintiffs and defendants, assumedly in violation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”); and 4) Count VII—retaliation.
Plaintiffs’ Count VII appears to allege retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), because the plaintiffs allege protected activities stemming from gender and racial discrimination and disability discrimination. In addition, plaintiffs’ Count VII alleges retaliation against “individuals who have filed worker’s compensation” claims, “exercised [Family Medical Leave Act]” rights, or who “have blown the whistle on managers.” (Doc. 40.)
The court has previously outlined the parties’ current dispute.2 (See Docs. 118 at 1–3; 139 at 2–4.) Boeing sold its commercial division assets to Spirit in mid–2005. These assets were located in Wichita, Kansas; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and McAlester, Oklahoma. Spirit is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Onex, created specifically for the purpose of purchasing the Boeing assets. As part of the sale, Boeing laid off all of its commercial division employees. These former employees of
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Boeing were given the opportunity to apply for jobs at Spirit. A precondition to being considered for employment with Spirit was that the employee complete a “Consent to Release Personnel Information Form.” Plaintiffs are a number of former Boeing employees who were not offered jobs with Spirit.
Plaintiffs allege that Boeing began considering the sale of its commercial division at least by early 2002. Presumably in order to make this asset more attractive to potential buyers, plaintiffs contend that Boeing conceived a plan to reduce the average age of its workforce. This alleged plan involved encouraging older workers to retire or quit, and terminating many who would not leave voluntarily. Plaintiffs claim that Boeing undertook studies of the costs associated with healthcare and pension benefits for older workers, and that those studies showed Boeing that it could significantly reduce its labor costs by eliminating older workers. Acting on this information, plaintiffs assert that Boeing began terminating older workers as early as January 2002.
*2 Plaintiffs further allege that, at some point, Onex and Spirit (as potential purchasers) became involved in this scheme and conspired3 with Boeing in furtherance of this plan, basically making the efforts to reduce the age of the workforce an integral part of the deal under which Boeing would sell its commercial division to Spirit. Ultimately, plaintiffs say, the plan resulted in Boeing’s decision to terminate its entire commercial division workforce in two mass layoffs that occurred in May and June of 2005.
Plaintiffs’ theory is that once Boeing eliminated its workforce in a blanket termination of all employees, Onex and Spirit completed the scheme by selectively hiring back younger employees. Accordingly, Boeing would appear not to have discriminated because it eliminated all employees, while Onex and Spirit would avoid the liability for discrimination because case law generally holds that ERISA does not prohibit age discrimination in hiring decisions. At least that is plaintiffs’ theory.
The parties have brought matters before this court on two prior occasions. In an order conditionally certifying a class claim on plaintiffs’ ADEA count, the court found that plaintiffs had satisfied their minimal burden of making “substantial allegations” of “a single decision, policy, or plan.” See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir.2001) (setting forth standards for determining the propriety of class certification at the “notice stage” of a case). The court found that:
notice of the collective action may be sent to all former Boeing employees who were terminated by Boeing on or after January 1, 2002; who were 40 years of age or older at the time of termination; and who were not hired by Spirit.
(Doc. 118 at 7.) The court extended the time period back to January 1, 2002 because plaintiffs had made substantial allegations that terminations beginning in January 2002 were part of a single policy to rid Boeing of older workers. The court did not find, as a matter of uncontested fact, that the alleged scheme began in January 2002.
In a footnote, the court also considered whether plaintiffs had made required ADEA filings prior to filing suit. The court stated:
Plaintiffs argue that Thiessen allows for a class period extending back beyond the 300–day limit based on mere allegations of a continuing violation. (Doc. 80 at 7.) Thus, plaintiffs appear to suggest that, since they alleged in their complaint a continuing violation beginning in January of 2002, they are entitled to include all terminations occurring after that date without regard to the contents and timeliness of the EEOC charges that were actually filed. However, a review of Thiessen counsels against that conclusion. The Thiessen opinion did not include the entirety of the actual language of the EEOC charge filed in that case. Since Thiessen was filed in the District of Kansas, this court reviewed the complaint filed in that case. Included as an attachment to the complaint was an EEOC charge that contained an extensive narrative chronicling the allegedly discriminatory policies of the defendant in that case. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., No. 96–2410–KHV, Doc. 4, 1st Am. Compl. attach. 1 exh. B. The EEOC charge specifically referred to the implementation of the discriminatory policy and its application to plaintiff in September of 1993, id., from which the Court of Appeals concluded that “the class should, at this stage of the proceedings, include all those plaintiffs whose related claims (i.e., adverse employment actions resulting from application of the blocker policy) arose between September 1993 and 1995.” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1111. The EEOC charges provided by plaintiffs in support of this motion do not appear to contain any allegations that would place defendants or the EEOC on notice that the challenged employment activities dated back as far as January of 2002. (Doc. 81.)
*3 (Doc. 118 at 6–7 n. 2.) Ultimately, the court found that Thiessen required that this question regarding exhaustion not be
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
resolved until the completion of discovery.4
The parties have been before this court one additional time. In an order on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court dismissed Counts II and III of plaintiffs’ complaint, which sought declaratory judgments that defendants failed to keep proper records and that the consent forms used by Boeing were invalid. Regarding Count IV, plaintiffs’ claim under ERISA that defendants discharged or otherwise discriminated against them in an effort to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining and receiving pension and/or healthcare benefits, the court refused to grant defendants’ motion. (Doc. 139.) After these rulings, the parties conducted discovery, which has been ongoing since that time.
The motion currently before the court is very narrow. Defendants Boeing, Onex, and Spirit jointly move for summary judgment, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, on plaintiffs’: 1) ADEA claims (Count I) stemming from conduct occurring prior to January 1, 2005; and 2) those portions of Count VII (retaliation) brought under Title VII and the ADA. (Doc. 190 at 1–2.)
II. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS The following facts are uncontroverted. There are one hundred named plaintiffs in this matter. Of those one hundred named plaintiffs, sixty-six filed administrative charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or the Kansas Human Rights Commission (“KHRC”) concerning their termination from Boeing and/or failure to be hired by Spirit.5
Sixty-one of the named plaintiffs were terminated from Boeing’s Wichita facility in May or June 2005 and filed EEOC charges alleging age discrimination.6 The earliest of the charges was filed June 18, 2005. The earliest date specified for the alleged discriminatory conduct was January 1, 2005. Of these sixty-one Wichita named plaintiffs’ EEOC charges, forty-five of the charges: include only the date of January 1, 2005 in listing dates of discrimination; do not mark the box for “continuing action;” and, in the narrative, only discuss the individual’s termination from Boeing and failure to be hired from Spirit in 2005.7 The remaining sixteen, of the sixty-one named plaintiffs terminated from Boeing’s Wichita facility, state: that the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred from January 1, 2005 to June 16, 2005; check the box for “continuing action;”8 and only discuss the individual’s termination from Boeing and failure to be hired from Spirit in 2005. All of the sixty-one named plaintiffs marked the box on their EEOC charge for “retaliation.” The narrative portion of the EEOC charge, however, contains no mention of retaliation for opposing protected conduct or complaining of gender, race, or disability discrimination.9
Two additional named plaintiffs were terminated from Boeing’s Wichita facility in June 2005 and filed KHRC charges in July 2005. These two plaintiffs alleged a January 1, 2005 layoff, age discrimination, and “retaliation for having openly opposed acts and practices forbidden by the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” However, neither of these two named plaintiffs marked the box on their charge for retaliation. Neither KHRC charge mentions retaliation based on complaints of race or gender discrimination or the exercise of disability rights.
*4 Two other named plaintiffs, Barbara Odom and Mark McCurdy, were terminated from Boeing’s Oklahoma facility in June 2005 and filed EEOC charges. Odom alleged race, age, and disability discrimination based on the June 15, 2005 layoff, signing of the consent form, and failure to be hired by Spirit. McCurdy alleged age discrimination based on the June 16, 2005 layoff, signing of the consent form, and failure to be hired by Spirit. Odom listed June 3, 2005 as the date the discrimination took place; McCurdy listed March 15, 2005 to June 16, 2005 as the dates the discrimination took place. Neither EEOC charge includes class allegations, and Odom and McCurdy did not check the box for “continuing action.” Neither EEOC charge is marked for “retaliation” and neither EEOC charge includes any allegations of retaliation. In a separate letter to the EEOC, Odom alleged retaliation for her participation in an unrelated gender-discrimination suit against Boeing and based on age discrimination due to incidents in May 2001.
Finally, named plaintiff Daniel Burrows was terminated from Boeing’s Wichita facility on August 22, 2003.10 Burrows filed an EEOC charge against defendants on June 29, 2005 alleging probable age discrimination based on his 2003 termination. Burrows stated that the date the alleged discrimination took place was June 16, 2005, almost two years after he was terminated, although he checked the box for “continuing action.” Burrows also checked the box for “retaliation” on his EEOC charge, although he does not allege any acts of retaliation in his narrative.
III. ANALYSIS
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standards The rules applicable to the resolution of this motion, now at the summary judgment stage, are well known and are only briefly outlined here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs the entry of summary judgment in favor of a party who “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” if sufficient evidence exists “so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way” and “[a]n issue is ‘material’ if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.1998). When confronted with a fully briefed motion for summary judgment, the court must ultimately determine “whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v.. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If so, the court cannot grant summary judgment. Prenalta Corp. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 944 F.2d 677, 684 (10th Cir.1991).
B. Exhaustion of ADEA Claims Occurring Prior to January 1, 2005. *5 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to discharge an individual because of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623. Defendants move for partial summary judgment on the named plaintiffs’ pre-January 2005 individual and collective action ADEA claims, arguing that no plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies for conduct prior to January 1, 2005, and that, therefore, the ADEA claims should be limited to events occurring on or after that date. (Doc. 190 at 12.) Plaintiffs respond that they have adequately exhausted all ADEA claims back to January 1, 2002. (Doc. 203.)
Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1308 (10th Cir.2005). In general, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies as to each discrete incident of discrimination. Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 191, 1194–95 (10th Cir.2004). For class claims to be exhausted, the class members’ claims must, at least, be similarly situated to the exhausted claims of the named plaintiffs. Id. at 1198 (citing Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1110 (10th Cir.2001), and noting that the Tenth Circuit either requires that a non-filing plaintiff be “similarly situated” or that the filed charges give notice of the “collective or class-wide nature of the charge” in order for the court to consider a non-filing plaintiff’s claim); see also Monreal v. Potter, 367 F .3d 1224, 1233–34 (10th Cir.2004) (citing Belhomme v. Widnall, 127 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir.1997) for the proposition that a class claim cannot be exhausted by an individual charge when the agency would not be notified of the complainant’s intent to raise class allegations through the filing of an individual complaint).
Plaintiffs argue that their EEOC charges were timely filed based on the “continuing violation” doctrine, which plaintiffs say allows the court to consider acts of alleged discrimination which occurred prior to the appropriate limitations period for all of plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. 203 at 6–9.) Although it is not entirely clear what plaintiffs are trying to achieve, it appears that they want to be able to recover for acts of discrimination occurring prior to January 2005, either for themselves or for as-yet-unidentified class members.
The continuing violation doctrine developed in the context of hostile work environment claims. The doctrine permits consideration of unexhausted incidents of alleged discrimination for hostile work environment claims, as long as “an act” contributing to a hostile work environment took place within the limitations period for filing the EEOC charge. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). For the continuing violation doctrine to apply, however, there must be a relationship between acts alleged after the beginning of the filing period and the acts alleged before the filing period. Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, City & County of Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1308–09 (10th Cir.2005). In addition, a court can consider the history of acts comprising the hostile work environment only if the employee did not unreasonably delay the filing of a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 1308. To make this determination, a court should look at the type of the acts, the frequency of the acts, and the perpetrator of the acts. Id. at 1309.
*6 In Morgan, the court emphasized that discrete discriminatory acts, as opposed to claims like hostile work environment where the discrimination does not occur on a particular day and occurs over the course of time, would not be singularly actionable if time barred, even if they are related to timely filed charges. The Morgan court also stated, however:
The existence of past acts, and the employee’s prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113. 4

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Since deciding Morgan in 2002, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed Morgan’s ultimate holding that the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable to “discrete acts” of employment discrimination. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162 (2007), the Supreme Court reiterated Morgan’s holding that the period for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC begins when the act occurs, and that this rule is applicable to all discrete acts of discrimination. Discrimination in termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, refusal to hire, and pay-setting decisions are all discrete acts. Id. at 2165. Therefore, the Supreme Court has been very clear in recent years that the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable to the discrete act of termination and hiring, the alleged discriminatory practices in this litigation.11
Despite this Supreme Court authority, plaintiffs argue that two Tenth Circuit cases, Croy v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 345 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.2003), and Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir.2001), support their contention that the Tenth Circuit has left the door open for application of the continuing violation doctrine to claims other than hostile work environment claims.
In Croy, the Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiff’s allegations of a “glass ceiling”12 in her workplace were “akin to a hostile work environment claim, it is appropriate to look to the entire time period of alleged discrimination in order to determine liability.” 345 F.3d at 1203. The court then quoted language from Morgan that Title VII does not “bar an employee from using prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Id. Ultimately, the court found that none of the alleged acts of discrimination occurred during the limitations period. Therefore, the continuing violation doctrine’s requirement that at least one of the alleged discriminatory acts occur during the limitations period was not met and the court refused to consider the plaintiff’s untimely discrimination claim. Id. The court in Croy did not apply the continuing violation doctrine to a discrete claim of discrimination. This case does not support plaintiffs’ argument, because the claims made here are not “akin to a hostile work environment claim” but are discrete acts with specific dates of alleged harm.
*7 In Thiessen, the Tenth Circuit outlined the trial approach to be taken in class action claims alleging pattern or practice discrimination. 267 F.3d at 1106. A class-based pattern or practice claim asserts that it was the employer’s standard operating procedure to discriminate against employees on the basis of a protected characteristic. Id. at 1105. A pattern or practice claim changes the burdens imposed on the parties and requires, initially, only that a discriminatory policy existed, rather than that each individual plaintiff was the victim of a discriminatory policy. Id. The Thiessen court discussed the continuing violation doctrine, but only based on its reliance on a prior Tenth Circuit case which has subsequently been abrogated by Morgan. As a result, Thiessen is not supportive of plaintiffs’ position that the Tenth Circuit would permit application of the continuing violation doctrine to pattern or practice ADEA claims.13
But even if these cases did not exist, the court still would find that the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable to this case. The thrust of plaintiffs’ claim is the alleged discrimination that occurred in May and June 2005 when plaintiffs were laid off from Boeing and not rehired by Spirit. See generally Doc. 40 at 6–9 (generally alleging harm resulting from Boeing’s reduction in force and Spirit’s failure to rehire Boeing employees). This is the time frame and factual allegations presented to the EEOC. See Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1342 (10th Cir.1997) (“The twofold purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give notice of an alleged violation to the charged party and to give the administrative agency an opportunity to conciliate the claim in furtherance of Title VII’s goal of securing voluntary compliance.”). The named plaintiffs alleged no adverse employment action other than the termination and failure to rehire in 2005.14 The named plaintiffs were apparently employees of Boeing at the time their employment with Boeing was terminated in 2005. Although plaintiffs complaint speaks generally of earlier “test” layoffs by Boeing, plaintiffs have identified no named plaintiff that fits this description and plaintiffs’ EEOC charges do not identify any named plaintiff whose employment was terminated prior to 2005. Obviously, the named plaintiffs could have suffered no adverse employment action by Spirit until they were not hired by Spirit in 2005.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to establish exhaustion of claims arising prior to 2005 has failed—at most they have pointed out one EEOC charge (from named plaintiff Pyles) that is unrelated to the current litigation15 and one letter to the EEOC (from named plaintiff Odom) that does not exhaust ADEA claims as to the class.16 See Foster, 365 F.3d at 1198 (noting that for class claims to be exhausted, the class members claims must, at least, be similarly situated to the exhausted claims of the named plaintiffs); Monreal, 367 F.3d at 1233–34 (noting that a class claim cannot be exhausted by an individual charge because the agency would not be notified of the complainant’s intent to raise class allegations through the filing of an individual complaint).
*8 Regarding their ADEA claims, plaintiffs lastly argue that the charges they exhausted with the administrative agencies with dates beginning in January 2005 were “reasonably related” to the allegations in their complaint stemming to January 2002, and that, therefore, they are entitled to seek judicial relief for incidents not listed in their administrative charge (i.e., for the
5

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
incidents occurring between January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2005). (Doc. 203 at 9–13.) Plaintiffs cite Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir.1994)17 as “governing law” and quote the following statement from that case: “[w]hen an employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original charge to the EEOC, the judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the EEOC.” (Doc. 203 at 8.) As defendants point out, however, this case was abrogated by Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210–11 (10th Cir.2003). The Ingels case and the “reasonably related” standard is no longer valid law.
At most, plaintiffs have convinced the court that it may consider relevant background evidence in support of plaintiffs’ 2005 ADEA allegations.18 This practice is permitted by Morgan. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113 (“Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.”). Pursuit of unexhausted claims, however, is not permitted. As a result, defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ individual and collective ADEA claims for alleged conduct prior to January 1, 2005, is GRANTED.
C. Exhaustion of Title VII and ADA Retaliation Claims. Defendants next move for summary judgment on the named plaintiffs’ individual and class retaliation claims that are based on alleged gender, racial, or disability discrimination. Defendants assert that no named plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies for such claims. (Doc. 190 at 17.) Plaintiffs’ gender, race, and disability retaliation claims are apparently brought pursuant to Title VII and the ADA.
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (a)(1). Title VII also makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee because the employee has opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII, or because the employee has “participated ... in an investigation, proceeding or hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability” with regard to “job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” The ADA also makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee because the employee has opposed an practice made unlawful by the ADA or because the employee has “made a charge, ... or participated in any manner” in an ADA-related proceeding.
*9 Similar to the ADEA claims discussed above, Title VII requires a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to suit. Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir.2005). In addition, before a party can file a claim in federal court under the ADA, that party must first exhaust administrative remedies before the EEOC. MacKenzie v. City and County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir.2005). The charge-filing requirements of the ADEA, Title VII, and the ADA are to be construed consistently. Shikles, 426 F.3d at 1310 (“Because we must construe the charge filing requirements of the ADEA and Title VII consistently, to the extent that those requirements are similar, we must also construe the charge filing requirements of the ADEA and the ADA consistently.”).
Plaintiffs argue that because sixty-one of the named plaintiffs’ EEOC charges checked the box for retaliation, and that two of the named plaintiffs’ KHRC charges stated that defendants retaliated against plaintiffs for having exercised rights under the Kansas Age Discrimination in Employment Act, that they have exhausted their gender, race, and disability retaliation claims.19 Defendants are correct in noting, however, that of the plaintiffs who checked the retaliation box on their EEOC charge, the narratives on the EEOC charge made clear that the alleged retaliation was in regard to the consent forms utilized by Boeing in conjunction with the mass layoffs in 2005. The narratives, and nothing else on the charge, alerted the agency of any gender, racial, or disability discrimination, and certainly did not identify any employment action taken by defendants in retaliation for a protected Title VII or ADA activity.
As a result, defendants did not have notice of a retaliation claim related to gender, race, or disability discrimination and the administrative agencies did not have an opportunity to investigate and conciliate the same. See, e.g., Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir.2004) (stating that Title VII’s filing requirement “is intended to protect employers by giving them notice of the discrimination claims being brought against them, in addition to providing the EEOC with an opportunity to conciliate the claims”); Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 755 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that an employee must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit and holding that when the employee gives notice of only one act of discrimination, she can not bring suit on other, past acts of discrimination); Aramburu v. Boeing Co ., 112 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir.1997) (stating that a suit “may include allegations of discrimination reasonably related to the allegations listed in the administrative charge” (emphasis added)).
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Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
Plaintiffs made no charges whatsoever with regard to a gender, race, or disability retaliation claim and it is clear the retaliation they did allege was related only to the consent forms in conjunction with Boeing’s 2005 layoffs. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in establishing exhaustion, a Title VII and ADA prerequisite to suit. See McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1106 (“[B]ecause failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff as the party seeking federal jurisdiction to show, by competent evidence, that [the plaintiff] did exhaust.”).
*10 Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ retaliation claims related to gender, race, or disability discrimination is GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION Defendants’ joint motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 189) is GRANTED for the reasons stated more fully herein.
A motion for reconsideration of this order is not encouraged. Any such motion shall not exceed five double-spaced pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F.Supp. 1172, 1174 (1992). The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed five double-spaced pages. No reply shall be filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

Plaintiffs allege “pattern and practice, disparate treatment and disparate impact” age discrimination. (Doc. 40 at 43–44.)

2

The court’s brief summary of the parties’ dispute is for background purposes only. The parties have not attempted to establish or

controvert these facts as it is not necessary for resolution of the current motion.

3

Plaintiffs’ complaint uses the term conspiracy in its factual background of the case, but no legal claim of conspiracy is made. (See

Doc. 40 at 40.)

4

The parties have apparently completed discovery related to plaintiffs’ EEOC charges. See Doc. 190 at 11.

5

At times, it appears defendants are making an issue of whether the named plaintiffs are “Wichita Named Plaintiffs” or “Oklahoma

Named Plaintiffs,” apparently distinguishing between former employees of Boeing’s commercial facilities in Wichita, Kansas

versus those in Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. The court can discern no purpose for this distinction, and defendants point the

court to none. Because the parties refer to the plaintiffs in this manner, however, the court will do so as well.

6

Specifically, the EEOC charges alleged “pattern and practice, disparate treatment, and disparate impact” age discrimination.

7

One of the forty-five, Warren Pyles, filed an additional charge with the EEOC. In this additional charge, which appears to only be

against Spirit, Pyles alleged he had been retaliated against because of filing EEOC claims in 1997 that resulted in a “pending class

action lawsuit.” In another section, Pyles stated that the most recent date of the harm was November 17, 2004 to May 30, 2005. In

this additional charge, Pyles also stated he wanted to represent all individuals discriminated against on the basis of race.

Information regarding Pyles was presented to the court in plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs’ counsel is

cautioned regarding his behavior in attempting to establish additional statements of fact. Counsel consistently has made

statements that, upon inspection of the cited exhibits, were half-truths, misleading, incomplete, or blatantly unsupported by the

cited exhibit.

8

One of these sixteen individuals did not check the box for “continuing action.”

9

For many of the named plaintiffs, the narrative portion of the EEOC charge is identical. For example, many of the narratives state:

I. I am an individual over the age of forty and I was employed by Boeing and I was eligible to be hired by Onex.

II. I was laid off by Boeing and not hired by Onex.

III. I was qualified for my position and satisfactorily performed my job duties.

IV. I was forced to sign a waiver under the threat of losing my job and/or not being considered for a position by Onex.

V. I was informed by Boeing that I was laid off and not to report to work prior to the sale of Boeing and was not hired by

Onex.

VI. Both Boeing and Onex were instrumental in the decision to lay me off/not hire me. The decision made by Boeing and

7

Apsley v. Boeing Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

Onex was based on my age. VII. Boeing and Onex have violated the pattern and practice, disparate treatment, and disparate impact theories of discrimination under the ADEA. Similarly situated individuals under the age of forty were not affected by Boeing/Onex’s decision. VIII. I seek to represent a class of similarly situated individuals who have been wronged by the illegal actions of Boeing/Onex. See generally Doc. 190 Exhibits.

10

Burrows’ EEOC form (Doc. 190 Exh. 12) states that he was laid off in 2003. Defendants’ statement of fact 16 states that Burrows

was terminated in 2003. Plaintiffs’ response is “uncontroverted.” Therefore, the court finds that Burrows was terminated.

11

The fact that plaintiffs allege a “pattern and practice” of age discrimination does not change the court’s analysis. A pattern and

practice claim is merely a method of styling a particular claim of discrimination. In this case, plaintiffs allege that it was

defendants’ pattern and practice to discriminate on the basis of age by terminating and failing to rehire employees over the age of

forty. The termination of employment and failure to rehire are still the discriminatory policies, the discrete acts, causing the alleged

harm.

12

The plaintiff in Croy alleged a continuous failure over time to promote a female executive.

13

Plaintiffs cite one additional case in support, Davidson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Utility, 470 F.Supp.2d 934 (S.D.Ind.2007). In

Davidson, a district court case out of the Southern District of Indiana, the court stated that “the Morgan decision permits the

continuing violation doctrine to apply only to remediate hostile work environment or pattern-and-practice claims.” Id. at 949. The

court, however, analyzed each of the eight plaintiff’s failure to promote claims as distinct acts and did not apply or analyze the

continuing violation doctrine in any way.

14

Merely alleging “pattern and practice” age discrimination does not change the fact that the complained of adverse employment

action was a termination in 2005.

15

Pyles’ charge is unrelated because it is an additional charge, against Spirit only, discussing retaliation from 1997 activity and racial

discrimination. These allegations are obviously unrelated to the claims made in the complaint to this court. Even plaintiffs do not

contend that Boeing’s alleged discriminatory acts began prior to January 2002.

16

Odom’s letter to the EEOC is unrelated to the exhausted class claims and discusses singular incidents, against only Odom

individually, of May 2001 age discrimination. This is prior to the now alleged January 2002 conduct and Odom’s letter in no way

indicates or alerts the EEOC or defendants of a class claim.

17

In addition to multiple other errors, plaintiffs’ counsel incorrectly cites this case as a 2004 decision, rather than a 1994 decision.

(Doc. 203 at 8.) Obviously, the ten year difference produced multiple pertinent Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit opinions on this

issue.

18

Such evidence, if any, will have to be made by a written offer of proof prior to trial.

19

Plaintiffs also attempt to argue that plaintiff Pyles exhausted a retaliation claim stemming from gender, racial, or disability

discrimination. Pyles’ additional charge, however, discusses only retaliation based on a 1997 EEOC claim, wholly unrelated to the

current litigation.

8

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PERRY APSLEY, et al., Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE BOEING COMPANY and SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS,
Defendants.

Case No. 05-1368-EFM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Twenty-six plaintiffs assert claims for age discrimination against Defendants The Boeing Company and Spirit Aerosystems for hiring decisions made in 2005. This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 527) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification (Doc. 531). Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with a court order requiring complete responses to discovery requests, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss all remaining claims of all remaining plaintiffs. Because this Order constitutes a final judgment, Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 54(b) certification is denied as moot.
I. Factual and Procedural Background This lawsuit was filed as a class action in 2005, alleging age discrimination for hiring decisions arising from Boeing’s sale of the assets of its commercial facilities to Spirit. Plaintiffs are former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit when it bought Boeing’s Wichita

assets. In 2010, the Court granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiffs’ collective action claims, which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 2012.1 In 2013, an amended complaint was filed on behalf of 87 plaintiffs alleging individual counts of age discrimination. In February 2014, 10 plaintiffs were dismissed as a result of settlement agreements.
In March 2014, Defendants filed a motion to compel and asked for sanctions for Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with their discovery obligations. As a result of an agreement between the parties, Magistrate Judge Karen Humphreys denied the motion a week later and instead issued an agreed-upon order mandating that Plaintiffs provide “a complete, verified answer to Defendants’ interrogatories, a complete response to Defendants’ requests for production and all responsive documents, a photograph of themselves, and a signed consent to release records” to Defendants’ counsel by April 11, 2014.2 The order also warned that “[i]f any Plaintiff fails to respond as required in this Order, their claims will be dismissed with prejudice without further notice as a sanction for failure to comply with their discovery obligations and to prosecute their action.”3 The deadline was extended to May 19, 2014, with the admonition that “this new deadline will be strictly and rigidly enforced.”4 The April 2014 order also directed Plaintiffs’ counsel to identify inactive plaintiffs who had ceased communication with counsel.
Before the first deadline had passed, 14 more plaintiffs were dismissed as a result of settlements. Two other plaintiffs were dismissed as deceased, leaving 61 plaintiffs. After the second deadline passed in May, 35 plaintiffs were identified as inactive and dismissed without
1 Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 1184, 1194-1207 (10th Cir. 2012). 2 Order Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, Doc. 509, p. 2. 3 Order Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, Doc. 509, p. 2. 4 Order, Doc. 521, p. 1-2.
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opposition for failing to comply with the Court’s orders. As a result, 26 plaintiffs remain. In June 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 527). In July 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification (Doc. 531) to appeal an August 2013 order that awarded Defendants court costs related to the Court’s granting of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. After a hearing in October 2014, the motions are fully briefed and ripe.5
II. Legal Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, a district court has authority to dismiss an action if a party fails to obey an order to provide discovery.6 A district court has broad discretion to use sanctions to make sure that lawyers and parties fulfill their duty to promptly and responsibly manage the litigation.7 A dismissal order should be based on willfulness, bad faith, or some fault rather than an inability to comply.8 The Tenth Circuit suggests that a district court consider various factors to decide whether to issue a dismissal sanction: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for non-compliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.”9 These factors are not required but are offered as criteria the district court may wish to consider.10
5 Remarkably, given that the hearing was scheduled to address Plaintiffs’ ongoing failure to adequately participate in this litigation by responding as mandated to discovery requests, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to attend the October 22 motion hearing in Wichita.
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). 7 Lee v. Max International, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 2011). 8 Id. at 1321. 9 Id. at 1323 (quoting Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992)). 10 Id.
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III. Analysis In March 2014, Defendants filed a motion to compel and asked for sanctions for Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with their discovery obligations. A week later, Magistrate Judge Karen Humphreys dismissed the motion and issued the following order, which was the result of an agreement between the parties: The Plaintiffs shall provide to Defendants’ counsel the following by April 11, 2014: a complete, verified answer to Defendants’ interrogatories, a complete response to Defendants’ requests for production and all responsive documents, a photograph of themselves, and a signed consent to release records. If any Plaintiff fails to respond as required in this Order, their claims will be dismissed with prejudice without further notice as a sanction for failure to comply with their discovery obligations and to prosecute their action. No Plaintiff will be provided relief from this Order absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances in a pleading filed on or before April 18, 2014.11
At stake are separate counts of age discrimination alleged by the 26 remaining plaintiffs. Defendants seek dismissal of all 26 plaintiffs with prejudice as a sanction for failure to comply with their discovery obligations as mandated by the order. Specifically, Defendants argue that all 26 plaintiffs should be dismissed for failure to provide complete discovery responses to requests for production and all responsive documents. Defendants have put Plaintiffs into three categories: 12 who produced no documents at all, three who provided no documents regarding income, and 11 who produced some documents regarding income. Each plaintiff provided a photo and a consent form to release information. At issue is whether Plaintiffs complied with the Court’s order to provide “a complete, verified answer to Defendants’ interrogatories” and “a complete response to Defendants’ requests for production and all responsive documents.”
11 Order Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, Doc. 509, p. 2.
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Plaintiffs argue that they have produced all relevant documents in their possession and have complied with the Court’s orders within the existing rules. Further, Plaintiffs argue that they have provided Defendants with authorizations to obtain all employment records and tax records, making them equally accessible to the requesting party.
It appears that all 26 plaintiffs have provided a verified answer to Defendants’ interrogatories. Most of the missing information or documents relate to mitigation of damages. Defendants’ arguments center around Plaintiffs’ failure to produce documentation about income earned after no longer being employed by Boeing. Defendants’ request for production included the following requests:
2. W-2s, 1099s, and other documentation of compensation or renumeration you received since January 1, 2004.
14. Documents supporting each itemized claim for damages you identified in your answers to defendants’ interrogatories to you, such as tax records, financial statements, receipts, medical records, or other documents that support each item of damages you are seeking. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs had a duty to preserve tax documents relating to their income because they sought back wages dating back to 2005, when the complaint was filed. At the motion hearing, Defendants represented that Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that the documents were owed and that Plaintiffs’ counsel planned to request missing tax returns from the IRS. Plaintiffs argue that they have provided signed consent forms to release information, including tax returns. But the Court notes that these forms do not address tax records, only employment and educational records. Defendants represent that none of the 26 plaintiffs have provided the IRS form that would authorize them to obtain copies of their tax information from the IRS.12
12 Defendants note that the IRS requires a signed Form 8821 for a taxpayer to authorize disclosure of tax information to a third party. No such form has been produced in this case.
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A. The Court Must Assess Each of the 26 Plaintiffs Individually All 26 plaintiffs have provided answers to interrogatories and have responded to Defendants’ requests for production. The issue is one of measuring the responses to determine whether those responses are sufficient to avoid the sanction of dismissal. Defendants have addressed each of the 26 plaintiffs’ responses individually, noting varying degrees of noncompliance. Because each of the 26 has separate claims that stand or fall on their own merits, the Court also addresses the responses of each plaintiff individually. Perry Apsley Apsley is one of 12 plaintiffs who produced no documents at all and one of 15 identified by Defendants as providing deficient interrogatory answers. Specifically, Apsley did not list his employers or income since 2005. His interrogatory answers to these questions referenced an “attached response,” but there were no attachments. Apsley produced no tax documentation. Bob Bailey Bailey did not produce tax returns for 2010 to 2013 despite being informed two weeks before the deadline that they were missing. His response indicated that he submitted tax documents from 2005 to 2009. Bailey indicated that he received retirement beginning in 2009 but did not otherwise indicate that he did not file a tax return from 2010 to 2013. Bailey also reported receiving a disability benefit beginning in May 2013 but provided no documentation of either the nature of the claim or the amount of income. Defendants note that Bailey listed nine potential witnesses but did not describe their knowledge or provide contact information. Gary Ball Ball did not provide any documentation at all despite reporting severance, unemployment, and retirement income. He produced no tax returns or tax records, such as a 1099
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that would reflect his income. Defendants note that Ball previously had provided pretermination W-2s from 2002 to 2004 earlier in the litigation but none in response to the current request.
Thomas Belton Belton did not provide any tax returns. He was not employed after leaving Boeing, but he indicated that he earned income from unemployment, retirement, and social security. He produced W-2s and 1099s for each year from 2005 to 2012. But he did not produce any documentation of his social security income and no documentation of income for 2013. Rocky Burris Burris lists eight years of income dating back to 2005, but his interrogatory answer did not list the source of income as requested. The listing of specific dollar amounts suggests that he referenced documentation, but he did not provide any documentation at all. Defendants noted that they informed Plaintiffs’ counsel of this deficiency two weeks before the deadline, and it was not corrected. Burris did not provide any W-2s, 1099s, or tax records. His response to request for production No. 14 referred to an attached document, but no attachment was provided. Lloyd Fansler Fansler provided no documentation related to his income despite stating that he took early retirement from Boeing in 2006. Defendants acknowledge that Fansler provided some documents related to severance pay from Boeing in 2005. But otherwise, Fansler failed to identify the amount of his income as required by interrogatory No. 2 and did not produce any tax returns or tax records documenting his income. Brian Groom Groom provided some income documentation. Specifically, he provided a 2005 tax return and a draft of his 2008 tax return. But he did not provide tax returns for 2006 to 2007 or 2009 to
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2013. Groom’s interrogatory answers indicate that he was employed at least from 2005 to 2009 and from 2011 to 2013. He produced W-2s for 2008 and 2009 but no documents relating to his income in 2006 and 2007 or from 2010 to 2013. His response to interrogatory No. 2 was that his self-employment with a construction company was legally zero, but he deducted $96,000 in income from the company in his calculation of damages in interrogatory No. 7. Defendant conceded the possibility that Groom may not have filed a tax return every year but that was not expressly indicated in his response. Defendants note that they notified Plaintiffs’ counsel two weeks before the deadline that most of Groom’s tax returns were missing.
Ron Hendershot Hendershot provided no documentation at all, including no tax records and no tax returns. He reported severance and unemployment income but attached no documentation as requested. Defendants also note that Hendershot responded four days late but are not seeking dismissal for that reason. Dale Jayne Jayne did not produce any documentation regarding his post-termination income, either in the form of W-2s or tax returns, from 2005 to 2012. The only documentation Jayne provided was his 2013 tax returns, and he was the only plaintiff to do so. Jayne listed five employers since 2010 but did not provide income amounts or documentation of income, except for the 2013 tax return. In response to an interrogatory seeking income amounts since 2005, Jayne responded that documentation was attached but only information from 2013 was attached. Gary Johnson Johnson listed specific income amounts from unemployment and retirement but provided no documentation or no tax returns at all. He also listed more than 30 names in response to
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interrogatory No. 10, which requested him to identify potential witnesses, “including a description of the substance of each such person’s knowledge or information.” Johnson provided no such descriptions or contact information for any of the names listed.
Donald Jones Jones listed two jobs since 2007 in his interrogatory response, and he indicated he received retirement and unemployment income. Jones provided seven years of salary figures, down to the penny, for one employer since 2007. But he did not provide any documentation at all for this income, or any other income, in the form of W-2s, 1099s, or tax returns. The listing of specific amounts suggests that Jones possessed such income documentation, but he failed to provide it to Defendants as required. Danny Kennedy Kennedy produced no tax returns. He provided a self-produced income summary that listed specific dollar amounts for income earned from 2004 to 2012. He produced W-2s and 1099s for 2004 to 2007 but none from 2008 to 2013. He also listed income from substitute teaching and self-employment in 2007 and 2008, but he produced no documentation from either. Kennedy also indicated that he earned an associates degree from Cowley County Community College but provided no documentation as requested. Freddy McColpin McColpin produced no tax returns despite listing employment from 2005 to 2011. He produced income information in the form of W-2s and 1099s from 2005 to 2010, but he provided no income documentation for 2011 to 2013 despite listing wages in 2011 and unemployment and retirement starting in 2012. Defendants also point out that he indicated that he graduated from Friends University in 2006, but he provided no documentation as requested.
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Cathy Munsell Munsell did not produce any tax information, either in the form of W-2s or tax returns, to document her income from 2009 to 2012. In response to interrogatory No. 2, Munsell listed income amounts, down to the penny, for each year from 2005 to 2013. These amounts suggest that Munsell possessed documentation that she used to prepare her answer, but she provided no documentation for 2009 to 2012 as requested. Munsell produced tax returns for 2006 to 2008. She also produced partial income information for 2013 but left blank income amounts from two jobs despite responding in May 2014. She provided no documentation related to her income for 2013. Defendants also note that Munsell listed three potential witnesses but did not indicate what their knowledge was. Kent Owen Owen provided no documentation at all despite listing income from two jobs, severance, unemployment, and pensions. He lists one employer from 2006 to present with a varied annual income of $40,000 to $120,000 but, again, provides no W-2s or tax returns as requested. He also lists five potential witnesses with no contact information or any description of their knowledge. James Porter Porter included no income information, neither amounts beyond hourly rates nor documentation, from three jobs he listed from 2006 to 2008. And no amounts other than severance pay were deducted from his damages estimate in response to interrogatory No. 7. The only documentation of any kind that Porter produced was a job search record, which Defendants characterized as 18 pages and unreadable. Other than that, Porter provided no documentation of income in the form of W-2s or tax records and no estimate of post-termination income earned despite listing three jobs.
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Willard Ratchford Ratchford produced no tax returns. He listed four employers since 2005, including a current job held since 2010. Ratchford listed annual income totals and provided some W-2s and 1099s for 2005 to 2012. But he provided no amounts or documents related to 2013 income. In response to interrogatory No. 14 seeking tax records, Ratchford referenced an attachment, but Defendants represent that he produced no tax returns. Richard Roeder Roeder listed two jobs since 2010 and listed specific dollar amounts for income from severance, unemployment, pension, and wages since 2005. But he did not provide any documentation at all for this income either in the form of W-2s, 1099s, or tax returns. Defendants also note that Roeder answered an interrogatory by stating he was enrolled in college, but he failed to provide documentation as requested in the request for production. Albert Schloetzer Schloetzer did not provide any documentation at all despite reporting income from unemployment, disability, and retirement. He produced no tax records or tax returns. Defendants note that Schloetzer responded four days after the May 19 deadline. Joseph Schroeder Schroeder provided a detailed chart showing his income, down to the penny, from various sources from 2005 to 2012. But he failed to provide any income documentation in response to requests for production No. 2 and No. 14, either in the form of W-2s or 1099s or tax returns. In response to Interrogatory No. 2 seeking income information, Schroeder responded, “See Request for Production of Documents regarding tax returns from 2005 through 2012,” but no such information was provided. The listing of specific income amounts suggests that he
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referenced documentation to produce the chart, but he did not provide any documentation related to his income. Defendants note that Schroeder did not include income information for 2013 despite responding in May 2014. The only documentation Schroeder provided was a list of employers and six emails related to seeking employment in 2006.
Sammy Smith Smith listed five employers since 2005 but provided no documentation such as W-2s or tax returns to verify his income. He also failed to list the amount of income from these five jobs, revealing only that he received severance from Boeing and some unemployment benefits. He provided no income or tax documentation at all despite listing five jobs since 2005. Donald Titus Titus listed six jobs since 2006, including a current job since 2012. But Titus provided no documentation related to his income, either in the form of W-2s or tax returns. Nor did Titus provide amounts from any of these jobs in response to interrogatory No. 2 seeking income information. The only documentation provided was a one-page listing of total income amounts for each of seven years from 2005 to 2011. The list includes specific dollar amounts, which suggests that he referenced documentation to prepare the list but did not produce any of the documentation that he appeared to possess. James R. Wallace Wallace provided no tax returns and no income documentation despite listing two employers from 2006 to 2013. He also listed severance and retirement income but produced no documentation. He listed hourly rates for his two jobs but did not provide annual income totals as requested. In response to interrogatory No. 7, Wallace provided amounts representing new salary, retirement, and severance down to an exact dollar amount, which suggests that he
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possessed documentation to arrive at these amounts. But he produced no such documentation as requested. The only documentation Wallace produced was one page of a social security earnings record.
Jimmy Wallace Wallace did not produce any tax returns except for 2005. He has been employed by the same employer since 2005, and he indicated he earned $409,031.70 in wages from that job. Wallace provided W-2s and 1099s for 2005 to 2011. He produced no documentation for income for 2012 and 2013 despite indicating that he was employed. The listing of a precise income amount since 2005 suggests Wallace possessed documentation used to arrive at a total amount. Some, but not all, documentation was produced. Richard Wallin Wallin did not provide any documentation at all despite reporting unemployment and retirement income. Defendants note that Wallin’s interrogatory answers were sufficient, but his response to Defendants’ request for production was two days late despite not producing any documents. Sylvester Williams Williams lists two jobs since 2007 but did not list any income from these jobs in response to an interrogatory seeking income information. He listed income from severance, unemployment, and retirement but provided no documentation at all for any income. In calculating his damages in response to interrogatory No. 7, Williams deducted $198,071.40, which suggests that he referenced documentation in his possession to arrive at this exact figure. He provided no such documentation to Defendants as required. He also indicated that he received a bachelor’s degree from Friends University but failed to provide documentation.
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B. Noncompliance of Each Plaintiff Warrants Dismissal of All Claims To summarize, the Court finds that none of the 26 plaintiffs have complied with Judge Humphreys’ order. Specifically, none of the 26 complied with the order to provide “a complete response to Defendants’ requests for production of and all responsive documents.” The common denominator among all 26 plaintiffs is that no one provided tax returns for all years from 2005 to 2013 as required. In an employment discrimination case such as this, a terminated employee must mitigate damages, and post-termination income shows an employee’s effort to satisfy this obligation.13 Here, Defendants sought tax returns to verify that all income had been disclosed. Coordinating nine years of tax returns for 26 plaintiffs is a daunting task, but it is a task that Plaintiffs’ counsel signed up for and agreed it could complete by May 19. As part of the agreement, Defendants withdrew their motion to compel and motion for sanctions. In their written response to the motion, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendants are entitled to their tax returns. Plaintiffs only argue that Defendants have equal access to the documents because they provided signed consent forms so that Defendants can obtain their tax returns. But this is not true. The consent forms provided to the Court only address employers and educational institutions. Therefore, the missing tax returns are not equally accessible to Defendants. And the failure of each of the 26 plaintiffs to provide tax returns or access to tax returns for each year is not compliant with the court order and is grounds for dismissal. In addition, many plaintiffs have failed to produce documents aside from tax returns that support dismissal.
13 See Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1066 (8th Cir. 2004).
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The factors suggested by the Tenth Circuit weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ actions as a sanction. First, Defendants have been prejudiced with multiple delays, extensions of deadlines, and incomplete information to assess each plaintiff’s case. Second, Plaintiffs have interfered with the judicial process by failing to completely respond to Defendants’ discovery requests even after the Court issued two orders compelling them to do so. Plaintiffs’ counsel also disregarded the judicial process by failing to appear at the motion hearing. Third, Plaintiffs are culpable for their inaction. As noted, Defendants alerted some Plaintiffs of their discovery deficiencies before the deadline, but no additional information or documents were provided. Plaintiffs were fully aware of the potential consequences of their inaction as evidenced by their agreement to produce documents by May 19 or face dismissal.14
Dismissal is a severe sanction. But most significant to the Court, Plaintiffs were warned that dismissal was the sanction for noncompliance. As noted, the court order at issue was the result of the Plaintiffs’ agreement to completely respond to discovery requests or have their cases dismissed. Specifically, the order warned that the deadline would be “strictly and rigidly enforced” and that no further extensions would be granted. Therefore, Plaintiffs had ample warning that dismissal with prejudice would result.
Finally, the Court finds that there is no sanction short of dismissal that would be effective. After reviewing the record and the nine-year history of this litigation, Plaintiffs have been given multiple opportunities to respond to Defendants’ discovery, which is information Defendants are entitled to have. Despite being warned that their lawsuits would be dismissed for
14 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs made no attempt to provide additional documents during the five months between the deadline and the motion hearing. The Court acknowledges that Defendants would be entitled to argue untimeliness, but the lack of effort adds to Plaintiffs’ apparent lack of interest in pursuing this case.
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failing to comply, Plaintiffs fell significantly short of the obligations outlined in Judge Humphreys’ order. Though the order warned Plaintiffs that their claims would be dismissed “without further notice,” the Court initiated a hearing that Plaintiffs’ counsel chose not to even attend. This inaction exemplifies a pattern of nonparticipation that leads the Court to find that a lesser sanction would not deter further noncompliance. Therefore, the Court concludes that dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate sanction for all 26 plaintiffs.
Because this Order dismisses all remaining claims, this Order constitutes a final judgment. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification (Doc. 531) is moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 527) is hereby GRANTED with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification (Doc. 531) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 6th day of January, 2015.
ERIC F. MELGREN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

PERRY APSLEY, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

THE BOEING COMPANY, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No.: 05-1368-EFM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Defendants moved this Court to dismiss these age discrimination claims due to Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with a last-chance order compelling discovery. Concerned about Plaintiffs’ seemingly ongoing failure to adequately participate in this litigation, the Court scheduled a hearing on the motion. Plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing (more on that later). Defendants made a detailed, plaintiff-by-plaintiff presentation of discovery response failures, and on January 7, 2015, this Court dismissed all remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed; but not timely. This matter is now back before this Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave to File Notice of Appeal Out of Time (Doc. 554). Plaintiffs1 filed their Notice of Appeal on February 9, 2015; which Defendants asserted was a few days out of time2 and asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to dismiss. Plaintiffs responded pleading excusable neglect:

1 In the Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs became Appellants, and Defendants became Appellees, but for
simplicity purposes they shall continue to be referred to by their status in this Court. 2 Defendants contend that 30 days from January 7, 2015, was February 6, 2015. That is uncontroverted (and
incontrovertible). February 6, 2015, was a Friday.

On Saturday, January 31, 2015, [Plaintiffs’] counsel received news of such a personal, sensitive and debilitating nature that demanded immediate action such that [Plaintiffs’] counsel, because of excusable neglect, was unable to file the Notice of Appeal until February 9, 2014, one business/counting day after the expiration of the purported last day to file said Notice.3
The Tenth Circuit directed that request be made to the district court, pursuant to Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(5), which permits the district court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal.
Plaintiffs accordingly filed such motion in this Court. Their memorandum in support of the
motion for leave to file out of time acknowledges that the appeal was untimely filed, and pleads
excusable neglect upon language virtually identical to that quoted above. As they did in the
Circuit Court, Plaintiffs stated a willingness “to provide to this Court an Affidavit and supporting
documentation for in camera review of the cause. . . because of the extreme personal nature of the cause of the excusable neglect.”4 Presumably, the Court was expected to request the affidavit
and documentation, because none was provided to either this Court or to the Court of Appeals. Defendants’ response challenges that this is a “naked assertion” of excusable neglect.5
Interestingly, their challenge is not made primarily on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to carry
their burden of demonstrating excusable neglect by making “naked assertions” without any
demonstration of proof (“references provided upon request” really is not sufficient to carry one’s
burden in litigation). This would have been a compelling argument, if made.
Instead, Defendants proffer a fascinating alternate theory of what actually happened.
Rejecting Plaintiffs’ filed position (before this Court and the Circuit Court) that counsel’s
personal and debilitating news prevented a timely filing, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs filed on
the date they planned to file – February 9 – because Plaintiffs’ counsel misunderstood his filing
3 Appellants’ Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Case No. 15-3026, Doc. 01019389411, at p. 2. 4 Doc. 554-1, p. 2. 5 Doc. 555, p. 1.
2

deadline. Defendants’ attachment to their Response6 demonstrates that, the day after Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal, Defendants’ counsel emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel to inform Plaintiffs that Defendants believed the notice of appeal to be untimely, and that Defendants intended to seek dismissal of the appeal. Defendants contacted Plaintiffs pursuant to Tenth Circuit rules to determine their position on the planned motion. Plaintiffs responded (within five minutes according to the email date and time stamps) that they would oppose the motion as their calculation gave them until the 9th.
Now, if Plaintiffs made a miscalculation of dates, they certainly would not be the first litigants to do so. And this Court, at least, would tend in normal circumstances to be persuadable that a date missed by one day could be due to the excusable neglect of miscalculation.7 But the Court is hampered from granting relief to Plaintiffs’ on those grounds for the simple reason that Plaintiffs have not sought relief on those grounds.
The Court is further hampered from granting relief upon the grounds for which Plaintiffs have sought relief because Plaintiffs have, as Defendants note, proffered nothing more than the naked assertion of an intervening event. If Plaintiffs have support for their claim, surely the time to have offered it would have been upon the filing of the motion seeking leave. Certainly it is not the Court’s obligation to serve discovery requests upon a party seeking such relief, who has suggested that it has relevant documents but has failed to offer them, even in an “under seal” request for an in camera review.
6 Doc. 555. 7 Defendants’ brief speculates that the miscalculation was due to Plaintiffs adding three days to the filing period due to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) and Fed. R. App. P. 26(c). Doc. 555, p. 2, n.2. It appears that the Tenth Circuit made a similar speculation. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Case No. 15-3026, Doc. 01019384927 (attached to Doc. 556). It also seems likely to this Court, from experience it has had in other circumstances, that the mistake could be as simple as confusing 30 days with one month, determining that one month from January 7 was February 7, and since that date fell on a Saturday, giving themselves until the next business day, Monday, February 9. In any event, all of this is speculation. And it is all irrelevant to the inescapable fact that the filing was late.
3

The Court’s concerns about this request go beyond these difficulties, though. First, the
Court notes what the lawyers all know, but what the Plaintiffs themselves (who may be
interested enough to read this Order) may not know; and that is how very simple it is to file a
notice of appeal. That may be best illustrated by reference to the (untimely) notice of appeal
filed in this case. In its entirety, save for the case caption, signature block and certificate of
service, it reads: “PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs in the
above-named case, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
from an Order dismissing the action on the 7th day of January 2015. DATED: February 8, 2015.”8 That’s it. No lengthy legal argument, nor voluminous procedural compilation of
relevant documents, but something that cannot take more than five to ten minutes to prepare.
Given that, the Court is puzzled how an event purported to have happened on Saturday, January
31, could have prevented the preparation and filing (electronic filing, achievable from one’s desk) of such a simple document six days later.9
On a more fundamental level, however, this Court must confess to both skepticism of
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s proffered (but unverified) reasons for “excusable neglect” and to frustration
with Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel’s inattention to this case. To explain why, we must
return to October 22, 2014, when the Court held its hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
8 Doc. 549. 9 A possible explanation might be that Plaintiffs and their counsel took a long time, with careful deliberation including all of the numerous remaining plaintiffs, in deciding whether or not to appeal. That, again, would be speculation. And it is speculation that the Court is inclined to disbelieve. The press coverage of the Court’s dismissal the day after such dismissal quoted this same Plaintiffs’ counsel as saying he planned to appeal the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and ask the judge to reconsider; to do everything he could to get it reversed. Wichita Eagle, January 8, 2015, p. 2C. If that story were accepted as accurate, it would indicate that a decision to appeal had been made more than three weeks before the alleged debilitating event of January 31. However, the Court is reluctant to put too much reliance upon a quote in a newspaper, which has not been independently verified; and further recognizes that a statement to the press that one plans to appeal is not the same thing as an actual, final decision between counsel and client to in fact appeal.
4

As noted, Plaintiffs failed to appear at that hearing. A little background regarding that failure to appear is now in order.10
It should be noted that the hearing had been docketed for this date on October 10, 2014.11 Prior to setting the hearing for October 22, the Court emailed both counsel with proposed dates. Defendants’ counsel indicated that two proposed dates would work for them. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that he was available October 22, late morning due to having to travel from Kansas City (roughly three hours away). The Court then set the hearing for October 22, at 1:30 p.m. This date was only twelve days away and was set to accommodate Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request. Immediately following the setting of that hearing, the Court separately emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel to draw his attention to an earlier notification from the Clerk’s office that he was in default of maintaining his active status with the Court, and to inform him that he would have to take care of that matter if he wished to participate in the hearing on behalf of his clients.
Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the Court an email the day before the hearing, October 21, 2014, but at 10:26 p.m. so that Court staff did not see it until the next morning. The email was sent as a reply to the October 10 email notifying him of his inactive status. His email read, in full: “I have not been advised if I have been reinstated to the case. I am desirous of continuing this hearing to a later date. I have a pre surgery appointment for my son (tonsils). Please advise.”
Immediately upon seeing the email the next morning (the day of the hearing), Court staff phoned counsel. When unable to reach him by phone, at 8:31 a.m. he was emailed, cautioning him that waiting until 10:26 the night before the hearing to request a continuance might not be well received, and inquiring whether he had checked on his termination or reinstatement status
10 The events about to be related are drawn from the Court’s email and phone conversations. It should be noted that the Court discussed many of these matters on the record at the commencement of that hearing. 11 Doc. 543.
5

before the Court. In fact, his status had been returned to “Active” on October 10, the same day the Court’s staff set the hearing and cautioned him about his status. His status on the electronic docket of this case would have reflected “Active” thereafter, which he would have seen if at any time after his renewal he would have logged in.
At 8:50 a.m., the Court again emailed counsel to inform him of the foregoing – that the docket in this case reflected that his status was active – and to advise him that no motion for a continuance had been filed, nor would one be likely granted at this late date absent an extraordinary emergency. Counsel and Court staff spoke on the phone shortly thereafter. The Court was informed that no motion for a continuance had in fact been filed, nor had counsel conferred with opposing counsel regarding a continuance. Accordingly, he was advised by the Court that the hearing would be conducted as scheduled, and that he should plan to appear. This conversation happened within a time frame that would have allowed him to make the three-hour trip from Kansas City. However, counsel indicated that he had learned the day before that his son’s doctor for an upcoming tonsils surgery had a cancelation in his schedule that would permit the doctor to see his son that morning on a pre-surgery appointment, and that he wanted to take advantage of the schedule opening. As noted, he did not appear at the hearing.
This detail is recounted because counsel was quoted in the newspaper story the day after dismissal12 addressing his non-appearance at the hearing by claiming that he had notified the Court “weeks and days before the hearing – even the day of” that he could not attend because he was dealing with the death of his grandmother who had raised him. This assertion, if accurately quoted, is dramatically at odds with what he told this Court, and when he told it.
12 The Court has previously referenced this story, in footnote 9, as well as the Court’s reluctance to place too much reliance on an unverified quote in the newspaper; but for reasons that become obvious the Court considers them worth noting.
6

In the final analysis, the Court retains the impression that Plaintiffs (and, significantly, their counsel), continue to have an “apparent lack of interest in pursuing this case.”13 This is evidenced by the reasons stated in the Court’s original order of dismissal – the demonstrated disinterest in complying with discovery sanctions that were accompanied by the warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal. Of course, it is also evidenced by Plaintiffs’ nonappearance at the hearing, even though the Court scheduled it at a time Plaintiffs’ counsel requested. The thin and varying reasons given for that non-appearance need not be further discussed. It is further evidenced by counsel’s failure to count to “thirty” in calculating his time for docketing a notice of appeal, and by failing to even take the initiative of submitting to the Court, for an in camera review, his documentation of the personal, sensitive and debilitating events that he claimed form the basis for his excusable neglect. Finally, for what it’s worth, it is evidenced by the failure of Plaintiffs to file a reply to Defendants’ response to its motion for leave. The Court waited the appropriate amount of time for such a reply to be filed, but the date for filing a reply has also now passed.
Moreover, the Court has developed serious doubts about the candor and good faith of counsel’s representations. It is skeptical that counsel was really worried about his reinstatement status on October 22, 2014, the day of the hearing, as opposed to looking for an excuse freeing him to take the sudden opening in the doctor’s schedule for his son’s non-emergency (tonsils) surgery. It struggles with the varying and inconsistent reasons given for missing the October hearing, and it struggles with the varying and inconsistent representations made about when and how the Court was informed that counsel would not make the hearing. It is troubled with the incompatible reasons given for missing the filing deadline; first to Defendants’ counsel when contacted for a position on the contemplated motion to dismiss, and then to the Circuit Court and
13 Court’s Order of Dismissal, January 7, 2015, Doc. 545, p. 15 at n.14.
7

this Court. In short, the Court has lost confidence in the reliability of anything Plaintiffs’ counsel tells it.
This loss of confidence, coupled with a complete failure to give the Court anything other than a “naked assertion” of its grounds for excusable neglect, compels the Court to determine that Plaintiffs have not shown excusable neglect for failing to timely file their Notice of Appeal. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal Out of Time (Doc. 554) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 8th day of April, 2015.
ERIC F. MELGREN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8

 
 SA,PROTO
U.S. District Court DISTRICT OF KANSAS (Wichita) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 6:05−cv−01368−EFM−KMH

Apsley et al v. Boeing Company, The et al Assigned to: District Judge Eric F. Melgren Referred to: Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys related Cases: 6:13−cv−01046−EFM−KMH
6:13−cv−01043−EFM−KMH 6:13−cv−01047−EFM−KMH 6:13−cv−01050−EFM−KMH 6:13−cv−01048−EFM−KMH 6:13−cv−01049−EFM−KMH Case in other court: 10CCA, 11−03238
10CCA, 13−03240 10CCA, 14−03005 10CCA, 15−03026 10CCA, 15−03094 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/19/2005 Date Terminated: 01/07/2015 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Perry Apsley Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated

represented by James E. Gore Williamson Law Firm, LLC 218 Delaware Street, Suite 207 Kansas City, MO 64105 816−256−4150 Fax: 913−535−0736 Email: j.gore@thewilliamsonfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. Williamson Law Firm, LLC 218 Delaware Street, Suite 207 Kansas City, MO 64105 816−256−4150 Email: l.williamson@thewilliamsonfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Monique K. Centeno Centeno Law, LLC 8623 E 32nd Street N, Suite 300 Wichita, KS 67226 316−618−4172 Fax: 316−462−5722 Email: mcentenolaw16@gmail.com TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Uzo L. Ohaebosim PSUSBSID−NOMAIL 816−256−4150 Fax: 913−535−0736 TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff

represented by

Bob Bailey Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Jacob A. Bakk Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Gary Ball Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff

James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Peggy S. Bell Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/20/2014
Plaintiff Thomas Belton Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Melonda Bircher Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/17/2014
Plaintiff

represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

James Bowmaker Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013
Plaintiff Jerry L. Bransteter Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Michael E. Burgardt Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/17/2014

represented by James Bowmaker 6545 Ward Parkway Wichita, KS 67217 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address)

Plaintiff Rocky R. Burris Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Daniel D. Burrows Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/31/2013
Plaintiff Henry F. Butler Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013

TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Henry F. Butler 4119 Brooks St Wichita, KS 67220 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address)

Plaintiff Betty Childers Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff David L. Clay Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013
Plaintiff Larry E. Combs Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/07/2014

TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by David L. Clay P.O. Box 641 Andover, KS 67002 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Harvey J. Conyac Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/20/2014
Plaintiff Loren W. Cox Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Phyllis A. Cox Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Linda L. Dezarn Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/14/2014
Plaintiff William D. Doshier Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Throma A. Dyas Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Throma A. Dyas 1906 N. Tallyrand St. Wichita, KS 67206 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address)

Plaintiff Alan S. Epperson Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Lloyd C. Fansler Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Jerald J. Gilbert Individually and on behalf of those

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address)

similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff Richard Gotthard Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Brian Groom Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Denise A. Harris Individually and on behalf of those

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address)

similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Ron W. Hendershot Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley 5904 Rockwood Wichita, KS 67208 Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/10/2013

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Paul S. McCausland Young, Bogle, McCausland, Wells & Blanchard, PA One Main Place 100 North Main Street, Suite 1001 Wichita, KS 67202−1322 316−265−7841 Fax: 316−265−3956 Email: p.mccausland@youngboglelaw.com

Plaintiff Verna J. Houston Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Larry W. James Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Sharron N. James Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Sharron N. James 4919 E. 10th Wichita, KS 67208 316−687−1280 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Gary L. Johnson Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Melvyn J. Johnson Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Donald R. Jones Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Ralph O. Keener Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Danny R. Kennedy Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Melvin E. Kerns Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/23/2014

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Gordon B. Kinkead Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Jimmy Le Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Carlton D. Lee Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Stephen L. Linck Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Freddy J. McColpin Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Glennys M. Montgomery Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/31/2013

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Cathy J. Munsell Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Jan W. Murray Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Huyen T. Nguyen Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Luyen D. Nguyen Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Kent W. Owen Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Lowanda J. Patton Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Paul D. Pete Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Brent L. Popp Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff James E. Porter Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr.

Plaintiff Jay E. Powell Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Warren Pyles Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013
Plaintiff

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Warren Pyles 14058 SW 50th Benton, KS 67017 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by

Willard J. Ratchford Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Veronica Rios Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Richard D. Roeder Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff

James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Darlene E. Rozar Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013
Plaintiff Albert Schloetzer Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff William H. Setchell Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

represented by Darlene E. Rozar 3141 S. Illinois Circle Wichita, KS 67217 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address)

Plaintiff James C. Sheppard Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Debra L. Smith Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/10/2013
Plaintiff Sammy J. Smith Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated

TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Paul S. McCausland (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address)

Plaintiff Sharon A. Southern Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Linda C. Sparrar Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff Abel L. Vasquez Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address)

Plaintiff Henry F. Victor Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff James Walker Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013
Plaintiff James R. Wallace Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated

TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James Walker 426 Archer Drive Andover, KS 67002 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Carolyn Y. Wheaton Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/17/2014
Plaintiff Sylvester Williams, II Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated
Plaintiff Janet M. Wilson Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Walter Woods Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff Betty R. Young Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Vernon L. Bentley Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Redell Coleman Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Charles D. Elder Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Chip Gilchrist, II Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 02/07/2014

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Janet S. Hansen Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Jerry L. McKinney Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/17/2014
Plaintiff Joseph E. Schroeder Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Steven M. Schwind Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Teddy F. Sill Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff Charles Stark Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address)

Plaintiff Roy T. Wells Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/29/2013
Plaintiff Michael B. Welsh Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Roy T. Wells 2412 North Gentry Wichita, KS 67220 316−682−7648 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/23/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by

Charles L. Bean, Jr TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff James Hammon TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff Allen C. Hatcher TERMINATED: 03/11/2014
Plaintiff

James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Mark McCurdy TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Steven Ngo TERMINATED: 04/10/2014
Plaintiff Ba Pham TERMINATED: 05/28/2014
Plaintiff

represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Donald E. Titus
Plaintiff Jimmy Wallace
Plaintiff Barbra Odom TERMINATED: 02/07/2014
Plaintiff

represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Frank Cash TERMINATED: 03/17/2014
Plaintiff Richard Wallin
Plaintiff Dale C. Jayne, Jr
Plaintiff

represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Monique K. Centeno (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Uzo L. Ohaebosim (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Basic TERMINATED: 03/25/2013
Plaintiff Robert W. Boyd 8888 SW 110th St. Augusta, KS 67010 TERMINATED: 03/25/2013
Plaintiff Regina Sue Walker 246 Bryans Drive McDonough, GA 30252 TERMINATED: 03/25/2013
V. Defendant Boeing Company, The

represented by Steven Basic 1844 S. Laurel Street Wichita, KS 67207 PRO SE
James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James E. Gore (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence W. Williamson , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carolyn L. Matthews 12112 E. Killenwood Ct. Wichita, KS 67206 316−691−1282 Email: clmatthews97@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles E. McClellan Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−267−6371 Email: cmcclellan@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles E. Watson , II Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−291−9589 Fax: 866−347−5153 Email: cewatson@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Douglas L. Stanley Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−267−6371 Fax: 866−347−5136 Email: dstanley@foulston.com TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Forrest T. Rhodes , Jr. Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−291−9555 Fax: 866−347−5132 Email: frhodes@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James M. Armstrong Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−291−9576 Fax: 316−267−6345 Email: jarmstrong@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sophie K. Counts 1203 Community Lane Midland, TX 79701 316−209−8949 Fax: Email: sophiecounts@gmail.com TERMINATED: 03/27/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY
Teresa L. Shulda Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−291−9791 Fax: 866−347−5160 Email: tshulda@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Todd N. Tedesco Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−291−9776 Fax: 866−347−5138 Email: ttedesco@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trisha A. Thelen Foulston Siefkin LLP − Wichita 1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100 Wichita, KS 67206−4466 316−291−9586 Fax: 866−347−5139

Defendant Onex Corporation, The TERMINATED: 06/24/2008
Defendant Spirit Aerosystems

Email: tthelen@foulston.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carolyn L. Matthews (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas L. Stanley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
James M. Armstrong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Todd N. Tedesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trisha A. Thelen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carolyn L. Matthews (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles E. McClellan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles E. Watson , II (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas L. Stanley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/24/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY
Forrest T. Rhodes , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James M. Armstrong (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sophie K. Counts (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/27/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant
Midwestern Aircraft TERMINATED: 02/27/2006

Teresa L. Shulda (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Todd N. Tedesco (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Trisha A. Thelen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Trisha A. Thelen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/19/2005
12/19/2005 12/20/2005 02/27/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT No Summons Issued with trial location of Wichita, Kansas, filed by Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton E. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murrary, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F Butler, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James.(rm, ) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
FILING FEE PAID: in the amount of $ 250, receipt number 4631000122 (rm, ) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
Minute Entry : Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys added. Magistrate Judge Donald W. Bostwick no longer assigned to case. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry) (aw ) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
2 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen(Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated), Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy E Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells,

02/27/2006 02/27/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 03/01/2006
03/01/2006
03/03/2006 03/03/2006 03/03/2006
03/03/2006
03/07/2006

Michael Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Janet S Hansen, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F Butler, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James.(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
3 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by all plaintiffs against Midwestern Aircraft pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 41(a)(1)(i) (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
4 MOTION for extension of time to file Motion for Class Certification by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
5 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plantiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
6 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plantiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
7 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
8 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
9 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
10 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
11 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
12 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
13 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all palintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
14 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
Summons Issued as to Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry) (rm, ) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
15 ORDER granting 4 Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Class Certification. The deadline will be established at the scheduling conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 3/1/06. (vs) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
16 NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
17 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
18 Summons Returned Executed −− Certified Mail by Perry Apsley upon Spirit Aerosystems served on 3/2/2006, answer due 3/22/2006 (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
19 Summons Returned Executed −− Certified Mail by Perry Apsley upon Boeing Company, The served on 3/2/2006, answer due 3/22/2006 (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: 6 Notice (Other) filed by Perry Apsley; page 12 of docket entry 6 contains two pages which were overlapped when scanned, obscuring one of

03/08/2006 03/10/2006 03/16/2006 03/16/2006 03/16/2006 03/21/2006 03/21/2006 03/21/2006
03/21/2006
03/21/2006
03/21/2006
03/23/2006
03/24/2006 03/27/2006 03/27/2006
03/28/2006 03/29/2006
03/29/2006 03/31/2006 03/31/2006

them; per the office of plaintiff's counsel, the obsured page is the consent of Harold Dudley, which can be seen in its entirety as page 9 of the same docket entry (DE 6) (cs, ) Modified on 3/7/2006 to correct typo (cs, ). (Entered: 03/07/2006)
20 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
21 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
22 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
23 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
24 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
25 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
26 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Trisha A. Thelen on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
27 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by James M. Armstrong on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
28 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Carolyn L. Matthews on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
29 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Douglas L. Stanley on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Stanley, Douglas) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
30 CLERK'S ORDER extending time until 4/3/06 for Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems to answer or otherwise plead. Signed by deputy clerk on 3/21/06.(cs, ) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
31 CLERK'S ORDER extending time until 4/13/06 for Defendants Onex Corporation, to answer or otherwise plead. Signed by deputy clerk on 3/23/06.(cs, ) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
32 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
33 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
34 Summons Returned Executed −− certified mail by Perry Apsley upon Onex Corporation, The served on 3/10/2006, answer due 4/13/2006 (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/27/2006)
35 NOTICE of conesent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/28/2006)
36 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint re 1 Complaint,,,,,, 2 Amended Complaint,,,,,, by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Amended Complaint) (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
37 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
38 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
39 ORDER granting 36 Plaintiff's unopposed Motion to Amend Complaint and Add Parties. Second Amended Complaint to be filed within 10 days. Signed by Magistrate

04/03/2006 04/04/2006 04/04/2006 04/04/2006 04/04/2006 04/05/2006 04/06/2006 04/06/2006 04/07/2006 04/07/2006 04/11/2006
04/12/2006 04/13/2006 04/14/2006 04/17/2006 04/28/2006 05/04/2006 05/08/2006 05/10/2006 05/11/2006 05/12/2006 05/19/2006

Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 3/31/06. (sj) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
40 AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Perry Apsley.(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/03/2006)
41 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
42 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
43 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
44 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/04/2006)
45 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/05/2006)
46 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
47 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
48 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
49 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
50 INITIAL ORDER REGARDING PLANNING AND SCHEDULING: Telephone Scheduling Conference set for 5/25/2006 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Report of Parties' Planning Meeting deadline 5/18/2006. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/11/06.(sj) (Entered: 04/11/2006)
51 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
52 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
53 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
54 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems.(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
55 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
56 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
57 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/08/2006)
58 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Discovery to The Boeing Company and Spirit Aerospace (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
59 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
60 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
61 MINUTE ORDER. At the request of counsel, the scheduling conference set on 5/25/2006 at 10:00 a.m. shall be conducted in person in the Courtroom of Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Signed by deputy clerk on 5/19/06.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered:

05/19/2006 05/22/2006 05/23/2006 05/24/2006 05/25/2006
05/26/2006
05/26/2006
05/30/2006
05/30/2006
05/31/2006 06/07/2006 06/14/2006 06/26/2006 06/28/2006 06/30/2006 06/30/2006 07/12/2006 07/24/2006 07/27/2006 07/27/2006

05/19/2006)
62 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Discovery (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/19/2006)
63 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
64 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
65 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Scheduling Conference held on 5/25/2006. Tape #(10:11−11:00). (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
66 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 10/4/2006 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/26/06.(sj) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
67 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems of First Discovery Requests to Plaintiffs (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
68 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
69 ORDER granting 68 Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests. Deadline extended to 7/12/2006. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/30/06. (sj) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
70 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/31/06. (sj) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
71 NOTICE of Service of Subpoena Pursuant to Rule 45 by Perry Apsley et al. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
72 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/14/2006)
73 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
74 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
75 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Initial Disclosures (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
76 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Defendants' Initial Disclosures (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
77 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
78 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/24/2006)
79 MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally and Notice by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/27/2006)
80 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 79 MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally and Notice by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr.# 2 Proposed Notice of Action)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/27/2006)

07/28/2006 07/28/2006 08/02/2006 08/08/2006 08/10/2006 08/14/2006 08/15/2006
08/15/2006 08/21/2006 08/24/2006 09/01/2006 09/01/2006 09/05/2006

81 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 79 MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally and Notice by Plaintiff Perry Apsley Exhibit 1 (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
82 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Consent to Join Action of James Woods by Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/28/2006)
83 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Responses to Defendants' First Set of Requests for Production (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/02/2006)
84 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 79 MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally and Notice by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
85 ORDER granting 84 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification. Signed by Judge Monti L Belot on 8/10/06. (jh) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
86 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
87 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Monique K. Centeno on behalf of Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James. (Centeno, Monique) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
88 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Consent by Perry Apsley for Kim B. Nixon (Centeno, Monique) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
89 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery Responses to Plaintiffs' 1st and 2nd Sets of Certification Requests (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/21/2006)
90 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 79 MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally and Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 08/24/2006)
91 Joint MOTION for extension of time to File Motions to Compel by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
92 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The of Boeing's Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs' First Set of Certification Interrogatories (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/01/2006)
93 ORDER granting 91 the parties' joint Motion for Extension of Time to 9/26/06 to file motions to compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/5/06. (vs) (Entered: 09/05/2006)

09/05/2006 09/07/2006 09/07/2006 09/26/2006 09/26/2006
09/29/2006 09/29/2006 10/02/2006
10/06/2006 10/11/2006
10/11/2006 10/20/2006
10/23/2006 10/26/2006 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 10/27/2006

94 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/05/2006)
95 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re: 79 MOTION to Certify Class Conditionally and Notice (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
96 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Todd N. Tedesco on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Tedesco, Todd) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
98 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Supplemental Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories# 2 Exhibit Spirit S−I Filed August 30, 2006)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
99 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 99 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
101 ORDER. Upon its own motion and after consultation with counsel, the court ORDERS that the status conference set for October 4, 2006 shall be CANCELLED pending further briefing on the plaintiffs' motion to compel. Counsel shall consult for the purpose of suggesting a new date for the status conference after the motion to compel has ripened. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/2/06.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
102 Joint MOTION for extension of time for Plaintiffs to File Supp Mot to Compel and for Def to Respond to Mots to Compel by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 10/06/2006)
103 ORDER granting 102 Joint Motion for Extension of Time for Plaintiffs to File Supplemental Motion to Compel and for Defendants to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel. See order for deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/11/06. (sj) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
104 SUPPLEMENT to 97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses, 98 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Plaintiff Perry Apsley. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
105 MINUTE ORDER: A status conference/motion hearing is set for 12/11/2006 at 3:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. The purpose of the conference is to discuss case status and to address the pending motion to compel. COUNSEL SHALL APPEAR IN PERSON. Signed by deputy clerk on 10/20/06.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(vs) (Entered: 10/20/2006)
106 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 99 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
107 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Subpoena to IAM pursuant to Rule 45(b) (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/26/2006)
108 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
109 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all palintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
110 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response and Reply as to 97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses, 104 Supplement, 98 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 10/27/2006)

10/27/2006 10/30/2006 11/03/2006
11/07/2006 11/10/2006
11/13/2006 11/14/2006 11/15/2006 11/16/2006 11/20/2006 11/28/2006 11/29/2006 11/29/2006 11/29/2006 12/01/2006 12/01/2006
12/04/2006

111 RETURN OF SERVICE of subpoena(s) filed by Plaintiff Perry Apsley executed upon 10/26/06 on 10/27/06 by Personal Service (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
112 ORDER granting 110 Joint Motion for Extension of Time. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/30/06. (sj) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
113 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses, 104 Supplement, 98 Memorandum in Support of Motion, by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
114 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/07/2006)
115 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses (Attachments: # 1 Index to Exhibits# 2 Exhibit 01 Thelen Decl# 3 Exhibit 1A Boeing Answers to Interrogatories# 4 Exhibit 1B Boeing Resp to RFPs# 5 Exhibit 1C Spirit Resp to RFPs# 6 Exhibit 1D Sept. 15, 2006, Meet and Confer Ltr# 7 Exhibit 1E Sept. 21, 2006, Meet and Confer Ltr# 8 Exhibit 02 Baird Decl# 9 Exhibit 02A−1 Boeing Offering Memo Pt 1# 10 Exhibit 02A−2 Boeing Offering Memo Pt 2# 11 Exhibit 02A−3 Boeing Offering Memo Pt 3# 12 Exhibit 02A−4 Boeing Offering Memo Pt 4# 13 Exhibit 02B Index of Boeing Data Room# 14 Exhibit 02C Project Lloyd Non−Disc Agr List# 15 Exhibit 03 Newman Decl# 16 Exhibit 04 Wright Decl# 17 Appendix 05 Schmidt Decl# 18 Exhibit 06 Tabor Decl# 19 Exhibit 07 Visor Decl)(Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 11/10/2006)
116 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 115 Response to Motion,,, Signed Declarations of Baird (Ex. 02) and Wright (Ex. 04) by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
117 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 99 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
118 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 79 Motion for conditional class certification and notice. Signed by Judge Monti L Belot on 11/16/06. (cl ) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
119 ORDER granting 113 Joint Motion for Extension of Time. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 11/16/06. (sj) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
120 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
121 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
122 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
123 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
124 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
125 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/01/2006)
126 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re: 97 MOTION to Compel Discovery Responses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2004 Quarterly Presentation# 2 Exhibit First Set of Requests for Production to Boeing)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/01/2006)
127 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/04/2006)

12/04/2006 12/06/2006 12/06/2006 12/08/2006 12/11/2006 12/12/2006
12/12/2006
12/12/2006 12/14/2006 12/14/2006 12/15/2006
12/15/2006 12/18/2006 12/19/2006 01/02/2007 01/09/2007 01/11/2007
01/16/2007 01/18/2007

128 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/04/2006)
129 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
130 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
131 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/08/2006)
132 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/11/2006)
133 STATUS REPORT AND ORDER. Status Conference set for 1/17/2007 at 02:00 PM in person before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. See order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 12/12/06.(sj) (Entered: 12/12/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Status Conference held on 12/11/2006. (Tape #2:58 − 3:38.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 12/12/2006)
134 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/12/2006)
135 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
136 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
137 DISREGARD ENTRY; DOCUMENT IS A DUPLICATE OF A DOCUMENT WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY FILED − NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) Modified on 12/15/2006 (cs, ). (Entered: 12/15/2006)
138 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/15/2006)
139 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 99 defendants' Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. Signed by Judge Monti L Belot on 12/18/06. (cl ) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
140 NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
141 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/02/2007)
142 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
143 MINUTE ORDER: Upon the request of counsel, the status/motion conference set for 1/17/07 is canceled and RESCHEDULED to 1/26/2007 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Counsel shall appear in person. Signed by deputy clerk on 1/11/07.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(vs) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
144 NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
145 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 97 Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. Hearing scheduled for 1/26/2007 at 10:00 a.m. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 1/17/07. (sj) (Entered: 01/18/2007)

01/24/2007 01/25/2007 01/26/2007 01/26/2007 01/30/2007
02/02/2007 02/08/2007 02/15/2007 02/15/2007 02/15/2007 02/16/2007 02/23/2007 02/28/2007

146 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
147 Consent NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/25/2007)
148 ORDER ON STATUS CONFERENCE. Status Conference set for 5/9/2007 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Counsel shall appear in person. See order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 1/26/07.(sj) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Status Conference held on 1/26/2007. (Tape #10:07−11:15.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
149 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems, Midwestern Aircraft, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James of Subpoena Richard Phenneger pursuant to Rule 45(b) (Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
150 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
151 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
152 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Fourth Set of Supplemental Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
153 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of (1) First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Spirit, (2) Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Boeing, and (3) Third Set of Requests for Production to Boeing and Spirit (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
154 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Requests for Admission to Defendant Boeing (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
155 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
156 Consent NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
157 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/28/2007)

03/08/2007 03/16/2007 03/20/2007
03/21/2007
03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/27/2007 03/30/2007 04/02/2007 04/02/2007 04/16/2007
04/16/2007
04/16/2007
04/17/2007 04/20/2007 04/20/2007 05/09/2007

158 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
159 Consent NOTICE of consent to sue by Perry Apsley and all Plaintiff`s (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/16/2007)
160 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/20/2007)
161 ORDER granting 160 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to 5/2/07 to File Discovery Responses. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 3/21/07. (vs) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
162 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
163 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
164 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
165 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
166 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
167 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
168 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
169 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The of Boeing's 1st Supplemental Discovery Responses (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
170 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
171 Consent NOTICE of Consent To Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
172 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Consents to join# 2 Exhibit Consents# 3 Exhibit Consents)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
173 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Consents# 2 Exhibit Consents# 3 Exhibit Consents# 4 Exhibit Consents)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
174 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Consents# 2 Exhibit Consents# 3 Exhibit Consents)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/16/2007)
175 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The of Discovery (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/17/2007)
176 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Consents)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
177 Consent NOTICE of Consent to Sue by Perry Apsley ,et al. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Consent)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Status Conference held on 5/9/2007. (Tape #10:03 − 11:16.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 05/09/2007)

05/11/2007 05/23/2007 05/31/2007 06/04/2007 06/04/2007 06/07/2007 06/12/2007 07/02/2007 07/06/2007 07/20/2007 07/25/2007 08/09/2007 08/09/2007
08/09/2007 08/10/2007 08/10/2007 08/10/2007

178 ORDER. An in person status conference is set for 8/22/2007 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. See order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/11/07.(sj) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
179 ORDER APPROVING SAMPLING PROTOCOL FOR EMAIL REVIEW AND PROTECTIVE ORDER GOVERNING THE SAMPLING. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/23/07.(vs) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
180 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Fifth Set of Supplemental Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
181 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The of Discovery Responses (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/04/2007)
182 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery Responses (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/04/2007)
183 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery Responses (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
184 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The of Discovery Responses (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
185 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to file Motion to Compel by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/02/2007)
186 ORDER granting 185 Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel. Deadline extended to 7/20/2007. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 7/6/07. (sj) (Entered: 07/06/2007)
187 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
188 ORDER granting 187 Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel. Deadline extended to 8/10/2007. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 7/25/07. (sj) (Entered: 07/25/2007)
189 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
190 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 189 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index# 2 Crooks Declaration# 3 Exhibit 1−10 to Decl# 4 Exhibit 11−20 to Decl# 5 Exhibit 21−30 to Decl# 6 Exhibit 31−40 to Decl# 7 Exhibit 41−50 to Decl# 8 Exhibit 51−60 to Decl# 9 Exhibit 61−67 to Decl)(Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
191 MOTION for extension of time to file motion to compel regarding plaintiffs' privilege designations by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 08/09/2007)
192 ORDER granting 191 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to 9/6/07 to file motion to compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 8/10/07. (vs) (Entered: 08/10/2007)
193 MOTION to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/10/2007)
194 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 193 MOTION to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests by Plaintiffs Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter

08/10/2007 08/13/2007
08/22/2007 08/22/2007 08/23/2007 08/24/2007

Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James(Williamson, Lawrence) Additional attachment(s) added on 9/26/2007 (Sealed User Wichita cs, ). (Entered: 08/10/2007)
195 MOTION to be added to the plaintiff class by movant Steven Basic (cs, ) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
196 Unopposed SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Plaintiffs Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James (Attachments: # 1 Memoradum In Support of Motion to Compel# 2 Index of Exhibits# 3 Exhibit # 4 Exhibit # 5 Exhibit # 6 Exhibit # 7 Exhibit # 8 Exhibit # 9 Exhibit # 10 Exhibit # 11 Exhibit # 12 Exhibit # 13 Exhibit # 14 Exhibit # 15 Exhibit # 16 Exhibit # 17 Exhibit # 18 Exhibit # 19 Exhibit # 20 Exhibit # 21 Exhibit # 22 Exhibit # 23 Exhibit # 24 Exhibit # 25 Exhibit # 26 Exhibit # 27 Exhibit # 28 Exhibit # 29 Exhibit # 30 Exhibit # 31 Exhibit # 32 Exhibit # 33 Exhibit # 34 Exhibit # 35 Exhibit # 36 Exhibit # 37 Exhibit # 38 Exhibit # 39 Exhibit # 40 Exhibit # 41 Exhibit # 42 Exhibit # 43 Exhibit # 44 Exhibit # 45 Exhibit # 46 Exhibit # 47 Exhibit # 48 Exhibit # 49 Exhibit # 50 Exhibit) (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
197 ORDER. Plaintiffs' motion to file documents under seal 196 is conditionally granted pending further briefing by the parties. Doc. 194 shall be sealed pending further order of the court. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 8/22/07.(sj) (Entered: 08/22/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Status Conference held on 8/22/2007. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 08/22/2007)
198 Joint MOTION for extension of time for plaintiffs to file motion to compel re privilege designations and for defendants' response to motion to compel by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/23/2007)
199 ORDER granting 198 Joint Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs shall file any motion to compel with respect to defendants' 7/26/07 privilege designations by 9/21/2007. Defendants shall have until 9/12/2007 to file a response to Plaintiffs'

08/24/2007 08/29/2007
08/29/2007 09/04/2007
09/04/2007 09/12/2007 09/18/2007 09/19/2007 09/21/2007 09/21/2007

Motion to Compel 193 . Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 8/24/07. (sj) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
200 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 195 MOTION for Order re Steven Basic (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
201 ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE: At the direction of Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys, a status conference is set for 9/26/2007 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys via telephone conference call to be initiated by the court. The purpose of the conference is to discuss the motion filed by Steven Basic to be added as a plaintiff in this case (Doc. 195). Mr. Basic is directed to provide a telephone number to the court where he can be reached for this conference no later than 9/19/2007. Signed by deputy clerk on 8/29/07. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 08/29/2007)
202 REPLY to Response to Motion (entitled "Response to Motion") by Movant Steven Basic re: 195 MOTION for Order (cs, ) (Entered: 08/29/2007)
203 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James re 189 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit # 3 Exhibit)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
204 NOTICE of telephone number of movant and request for Magistrate Humphreys to review attached document by Steven Basic (cs, ) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
205 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 193 MOTION to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
206 ORDER granting 205 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 193 MOTION to Compel. Response deadline 9/19/2007. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/18/07. (vs) (Entered: 09/18/2007)
207 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 193 MOTION to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 09/19/2007)
208 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 207 Response to Motion Signed Declaration of Curtis (Ex. B) by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 09/21/2007)
209 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to file Motion to Compel Production of Documents identified in Defendants' July 23, 2007 Privilege Log by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/21/2007)

09/26/2007
09/26/2007
09/26/2007 09/27/2007 10/03/2007 10/05/2007 10/09/2007
10/19/2007 10/22/2007
10/24/2007 10/26/2007 10/26/2007 10/29/2007 10/30/2007 11/07/2007

210 ORDER granting 209 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to 10/5/07 to file a motion to compel production of documents identified on defendants' 7/26/07 privilege log. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/26/07.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (vs) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
211 ORDER granting 195 Motion of Steven Basic to be added to plaintiffs' class; granting 196 plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. See Order for details. The clerk shall grant access to sealed document(s) to counsel of record. Attorneys admitted pro hac vice must obtain sealed document(s) from local counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/26/07. (vs) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Status Conference held on 9/26/2007. (Tape #9:58 − 10:21.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (vs) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
212 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 189 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
213 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re: 193 MOTION to Compel Responses to Discovery Requests (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/03/2007)
214 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to file Motion to Compel by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
215 ORDER. Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel 214 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file their motion to compel no later than 10/19/2007. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/9/07. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 10/09/2007)
216 MOTION for extension of time to file motion to compel by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/19/2007)
217 ORDER. Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Compel 216 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file their motion to compel no later than 10/26/2007. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/22/07. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 10/22/2007)
218 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 193 Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. Defendants shall produce the documents ordered herein on or before 11/30/2007. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/24/07. (sj) (Entered: 10/24/2007)
219 MOTION to Compel or for an In Camera Review of documents identified in defendants' July 26, 2007 Privilege Logs by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/26/2007)
220 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 219 MOTION to Compel or for an In Camera Review of documents identified in defendants' July 26, 2007 Privilege Logs by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Defendants' Privilege Log)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/26/2007)
221 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 189 defendants' joint motion for partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Monti L Belot on 10/29/07. (cl ) (Entered: 10/29/2007)
222 NUNC PRO TUNC MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Defendants' joint motion for partial summary judgment is granted. Signed by Judge Monti L Belot on 10/29/07.(cl ) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
223 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 219 MOTION to Compel or for an In Camera Review of documents identified in defendants' July 26, 2007 Privilege Logs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index# 2 Matthews Declaration)(Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 11/07/2007)

11/13/2007
11/13/2007
11/21/2007 11/26/2007 11/27/2007 11/27/2007

224 NOTICE by Plaintiffs Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Steven Basic, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James of taking deposition of Corporate Representative(s) Pursuant to 30(b)(6) on December 4, 2007, December 5, 2007, and December 6, 2007 (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
225 NOTICE by Plaintiffs Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Steven Basic, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James of taking deposition of Corporate Representative(s) Pursuant to 30(b)(6) on December 4, 2007, December 5, 2007, and December 6, 2007 (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
226 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re: 219 MOTION to Compel or for an In Camera Review of documents identified in defendants' July 26, 2007 Privilege Logs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
227 NOTICE of Change of Address by Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
228 MOTION for Protective Order Quashing Deposition Notices by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
229 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 228 MOTION for Protective Order Quashing Deposition Notices by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/27/2007)

12/11/2007 12/20/2007 12/26/2007 01/22/2008 04/04/2008
04/07/2008 04/07/2008 04/21/2008 05/15/2008
05/15/2008 05/21/2008 06/04/2008
06/12/2008 06/24/2008 06/25/2008 07/11/2008

230 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 228 MOTION for Protective Order Quashing Deposition Notices (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/11/2007)
231 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 228 MOTION for Protective Order Quashing Deposition Notices (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 12/20/2007)
232 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery Responses (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 12/26/2007)
233 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 219 Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel; granting 228 Defendant Boeing's Motion for Protective Order Quashing Deposition Notice. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 1/22/08. (sj) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
234 ORDER: A status/scheduling conference is set for 5/15/2008 at 1:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Counsel shall submit to the court by 5/9/08 suggestions for future case management and scheduling. COUNSEL SHALL APPEAR IN PERSON. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/4/08.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(vs) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
235 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint re 40 Amended Complaint by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/07/2008)
236 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 235 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint re 40 Amended Complaint by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/07/2008)
237 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 235 MOTION for Leave to Amend Complaint re 40 Amended Complaint (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/21/2008)
238 SCHEDULING ORDER: Class certification non−expert discovery deadline 10/21/2008; expert discovery deadline 11/14/2008; status conference set for 11/4/2008 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. See order for additional details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/15/08.(sj) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Scheduling Conference held on 5/15/2008. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
239 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 235 Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/21/08. (sj) (Entered: 05/21/2008)
240 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL: Pre−1/1/05, consent plaintiffs' ADEA claims against defendants in this action are hereby dismissed without prejudice, that all claims between these consent plaintiffs and defendants for fees and costs relating to the ADEA claim are waived, and all costs of the ADEA claim between these consent plaintiffs and defendants, including attorney fees, shall be satisfied directly by the party incurring the same. Signed by District Judge Monti L Belot on 6/4/08. (Attachments: # 1 consent plaintiffs terminated by Boeing prior to 1/1/05)(cl) (Entered: 06/04/2008)
241 AMENDED COMPLAINT , Third against all defendants, filed by Perry Apsley.(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/12/2008)
242 STIPULATION AND ORDER DISMISSING PARTY Onex Corporation, The. Signed by District Judge Monti L Belot on 6/24/08.(cl) (Entered: 06/24/2008)
243 CLERKS ORDER extending time until 7/11/08 for Defendants Boeing Company, The and Spirit Aerosystems to answer or otherwise plead. Signed by deputy clerk on 6/25/08.(alm) (Entered: 06/25/2008)
244 ANSWER to 241 Amended Complaint by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems.(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 07/11/2008)

07/30/2008 08/11/2008 08/19/2008 08/19/2008 09/05/2008 09/09/2008 09/18/2008 09/25/2008 09/30/2008
09/30/2008 10/06/2008 10/06/2008
10/08/2008
10/15/2008 10/16/2008 10/20/2008
10/21/2008 10/21/2008

245 APPROVED PROTOCOL FOR REVIEW OF ADDITIONAL EMAIL AND ENTRY OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 7/29/08.(sj) (Entered: 07/30/2008)
246 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of see names in body of Notice on see dates in body of Notice (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/11/2008)
247 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Teresa L. Shulda on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Shulda, Teresa) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
248 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Forrest T. Rhodes, Jr on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Rhodes, Forrest) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
249 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Charles E. Watson, II on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Watson, Charles) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
250 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery Requests to Consent Plaintiffs (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/09/2008)
251 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of see names in body of Notice on see dates in body of Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/18/2008)
252 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of see names in body of Notice on see dates in body of Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 09/25/2008)
253 ORDER. The letter and envelope received from Robert W. Boyd requesting permission to join the plaintiff class shall be filed/docketed as a motion and filed under seal. The clerk shall grant access to the sealed motion to counsel of record. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/30/08.(sj) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
254 SEALED MOTION of Robert Boyd filed per 253 Order of Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys(cs) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
255 MOTION to Compel or for In Camera Review of Documents by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
256 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 255 MOTION to Compel or for In Camera Review of Documents by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/8/2008: # 1 Corrected Main Document) (cs). (Entered: 10/06/2008)
257 DOCKET ANNOTATION: 256 Memorandum in Support of Motion filed by Perry Apsley − the original pdf attached to this entry was incorrect; the correct pdf file is now attached to the original entry and to this entry for service purposes (cs) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
258 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 254 SEALED MOTION Robert Boyd to Join Collective Action (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 10/15/2008)
259 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of names listed in Notice on dates listed in Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
260 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 255 MOTION to Compel or for In Camera Review of Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Boeing 8/15/2008 Priv. Log Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit 2 2008−08−15 Spirit Priv Log excerpts)(Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
261 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Sophie K. Counts on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Counts, Sophie) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
262 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of see names in body of Notice on see dates in body of Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 10/21/2008)

10/21/2008 10/23/2008
11/05/2008 11/05/2008 11/10/2008 12/01/2008 12/09/2008 12/12/2008 01/23/2009 01/27/2009 02/25/2009

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to District Judge Eric F. Melgren for all further proceedings. District Judge Monti L Belot no longer assigned to case. Signed by District Judge Monti L Belot on 10/21/08.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(rm) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
263 NOTICE by Plaintiffs Gary L Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Gary Ball, Jimmy Le, Carlton D Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W Murray, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Kent W. Owen, Peggy S Bell, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Thomas Belton, Albert Schloetzer, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Debra L Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Melonda Bircher, James R. Wallace, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young, James Bowmaker, Vernon L Bentley, Redell Coleman, Charles D Elder, Chip Gilchrist, II, Janet S Hansen, Jerry L McKinney, Joseph E Schroeder, Steven M Schwind, Teddy F Sill, Charles Stark, Roy T Wells, Michael B Welsh, Charles L Bean, Jr, James Hammon, Allen C Hatcher, Mark McCurdy, Steven Ngo, Ba Pham, Donald E Titus, Jimmy Wallace, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Perry Apsley, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Barbra Odom, Henry F Butler, Frank Cash, Richard Wallin, Dale C Jayne, Jr, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, Bob Bailey, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, Denise A. Harris, Ron W. Hendershot, Steven Basic, Olivia J Housley, Jacob A. Bakk, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James of taking deposition of multiple deponents on dates designated in the notice. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: Status Conference held on 11/5/2008. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
264 FIRST REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER: Class certification discovery deadline 5/15/2009. See order for additional deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 11/5/08.(sj) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
265 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of see names in body of Notice on see dates in body of Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
266 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of see names in body of Notice on see dates in body of Notice (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
267 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 255 Plaintiffs' motion to compel or for in camera review of documents. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 12/9/08. (sj) (Entered: 12/09/2008)
268 ORDER granting 254 Robert Boyd's Motion to Join Collective Action. The clerk of the court shall take appropriate steps to reflect in the docket that Robert Boyd has consented to be a member of the conditionally certified ADEA collective action. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 12/12/08. (sj) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
269 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems, Midwestern Aircraft of taking deposition of David Clay on January 30, 2009 (Rhodes, Forrest) (Entered: 01/23/2009)
270 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems, Midwestern Aircraft of taking deposition of Olivia Housley on January 29, 2009 (Tedesco, Todd) (Entered: 01/27/2009)
271 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of Caren B. Goldberg, Ph.D. on March 6, 2009 (Tedesco, Todd) (Entered: 02/25/2009)

02/27/2009 03/04/2009 03/13/2009 03/17/2009 03/17/2009 03/20/2009 03/20/2009 03/26/2009 04/01/2009 04/02/2009
04/09/2009 04/10/2009 04/22/2009 04/30/2009 05/04/2009
06/12/2009 06/12/2009 06/26/2009 06/26/2009

272 MOTION for Recusal by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
273 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Response to Request for Production Directed to Consent Plaintiff's (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/04/2009)
274 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 272 MOTION for Recusal (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
275 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of See Notice for names on See Notice for dates (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
276 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Second Supplemental Disclosure Statement (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
277 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re: 272 MOTION for Recusal (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
278 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of See Notice for names on See Notice for dates (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 03/20/2009)
279 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE by attorney Sophie K. Counts as to Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Counts, Sophie) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
280 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to file motion to compel plaintiffs' discovery response by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
281 ORDER granting 280 Defendant's unopposed Motion for Extension of Time for Defendants' Motion to Compel Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' First Requests for Production of Documents to Consent Plaintiffs. Deadline extended to 5/1/2009. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/1/09. (sj) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
282 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Expert Disclosures of Dr. Gerald Graham and Dr. Mary Baker (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
283 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of See Notice for names on See Notice for dates (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 04/10/2009)
284 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of Betty Young on April 29, 2009 (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 04/22/2009)
285 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of Betty Young on May 6, 2009 (Matthews, Carolyn) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
286 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL. ADEA claims of certain individuals in Section I are reinstated and the individual in Section II has no ADEA claim against defendants. ADEA claims of individuals listed in Section III are hereby dismissed. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 5/4/09.(bs) (Entered: 05/04/2009)
287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
288 SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Sealed Document Memoradum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
289 MOTION for extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' motion to seal by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
290 ORDER granting 289 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Seal. Response deadline is 7/8/2009. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 6/26/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

07/02/2009 07/08/2009 07/09/2009 07/13/2009 07/14/2009 07/20/2009 07/31/2009 07/31/2009 07/31/2009
07/31/2009
07/31/2009
08/03/2009 08/04/2009 08/14/2009

291 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 272 Motion for Recusal. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/2/09. (alm) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
292 MOTION for extension of time to file Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
293 ORDER granting 292 Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Seal. Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Seal 288 is suspended until plaintiffs file an Amended Motion to Seal on 7/15/2009. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/9/2009. (cm) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
294 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class Errata by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
295 MOTION to Modify Briefing Schedule by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
296 ORDER granting 295 Defendants' unopposed Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 7/17/09. (sj) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
297 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on Briefing by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
298 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
299 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 298 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 03, # 3 Exhibit 04, # 4 Exhibit 06, # 5 Exhibit 07, # 6 Exhibit 08, # 7 Exhibit 10, # 8 Exhibit 14, # 9 Exhibit 15, # 10 Exhibit 16, # 11 Exhibit 20, # 12 Exhibit 23, # 13 Exhibit 25, # 14 Exhibit 28, # 15 Exhibit 32, # 16 Exhibit 33, # 17 Exhibit 34, # 18 Exhibit 35, # 19 Exhibit 36, # 20 Exhibit 36A, # 21 Exhibit 36B, # 22 Exhibit 36C, # 23 Exhibit 41, # 24 Exhibit 43, # 25 Exhibit 45, # 26 Exhibit 46, # 27 Exhibit 47, # 28 Exhibit 52, # 29 Exhibit 54, # 30 Exhibit 55)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
300 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 287 MOTION to Certify Class for Plaintiffs' ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 03, # 3 Exhibit 04, # 4 Exhibit 06, # 5 Exhibit 08, # 6 Exhibit 10, # 7 Exhibit 14, # 8 Exhibit 15, # 9 Exhibit 20, # 10 Exhibit 22, # 11 Exhibit 23, # 12 Exhibit 25, # 13 Exhibit 28, # 14 Exhibit 29, # 15 Exhibit 32, # 16 Exhibit 34, # 17 Exhibit 36, # 18 Exhibit 36A, # 19 Exhibit 36B, # 20 Exhibit 36C, # 21 Exhibit 37, # 22 Exhibit 39, # 23 Exhibit 40, # 24 Exhibit 41, # 25 Exhibit 42, # 26 Exhibit 43, # 27 Exhibit 45, # 28 Exhibit 46, # 29 Exhibit 48, # 30 Exhibit 49, # 31 Exhibit 51, # 32 Exhibit 52, # 33 Exhibit 53, # 34 Exhibit 54, # 35 Exhibit 55, # 36 Exhibit 56, # 37 Exhibit 58, # 38 Exhibit 59, # 39 Exhibit 60)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
301 SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 10F, # 3 Exhibit 14, # 4 Exhibit 20, # 5 Exhibit 20A, # 6 Exhibit 20B, # 7 Exhibit 20C, # 8 Exhibit 20D, # 9 Exhibit 20E, # 10 Exhibit 22, # 11 Exhibit 22A, # 12 Exhibit 22B, # 13 Exhibit 25, # 14 Exhibit 28, # 15 Exhibit 29, # 16 Exhibit 34B, # 17 Exhibit 50)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 07/31/2009)
302 SEALED INDEX OF EXHIBITS by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 301 SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal revised index (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 46)(Thelen, Trisha) Modified on 8/4/2009 to add the word "sealed."(aa). (Entered: 08/03/2009)
303 Amended SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/04/2009)
304 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on Briefing by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/14/2009)

08/14/2009 08/14/2009 08/14/2009 08/14/2009
08/14/2009
08/17/2009 08/18/2009 08/18/2009
08/20/2009 08/20/2009 08/20/2009

305 ORDER granting 297 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages on Briefing. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/14/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
306 ORDER granting 304 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages on Briefing. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/14/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
307 MOTION for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Decertify Plaintiffs' ADEA Claims by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
308 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 307 MOTION for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Decertify Plaintiffs' ADEA Claims by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Exhibit 4, # 4 Exhibit 6, # 5 Exhibit 7, # 6 Exhibit 8, # 7 Exhibit 10, # 8 Exhibit 11, # 9 Exhibit 12, # 10 Exhibit 13, # 11 Exhibit 14, # 12 Exhibit 14−1, # 13 Exhibit 15, # 14 Exhibit 17, # 15 Exhibit 18, # 16 Exhibit 19, # 17 Exhibit 20, # 18 Exhibit 21, # 19 Exhibit 22, # 20 Exhibit 23, # 21 Exhibit 25, # 22 Exhibit 26, # 23 Exhibit 27, # 24 Exhibit 28, # 25 Exhibit 29, # 26 Exhibit 30, # 27 Exhibit 31, # 28 Exhibit 34, # 29 Exhibit 34−1, # 30 Exhibit 35, # 31 Exhibit 35−1, # 32 Exhibit 36, # 33 Exhibit 36A, # 34 Exhibit 36B, # 35 Exhibit 36C, # 36 Exhibit 37, # 37 Exhibit 39, # 38 Exhibit 40, # 39 Exhibit 41, # 40 Exhibit 42, # 41 Exhibit 43, # 42 Exhibit 44, # 43 Exhibit 45, # 44 Exhibit 49−1, # 45 Exhibit 52−1, # 46 Exhibit 55−1, # 47 Exhibit 56−1, # 48 Exhibit 57, # 49 Exhibit 61, # 50 Exhibit 62, # 51 Exhibit 63, # 52 Exhibit 64, # 53 Exhibit 65, # 54 Exhibit 66)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
309 SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 11, # 3 Exhibit 12, # 4 Exhibit 13, # 5 Exhibit 13C, # 6 Exhibit 13D, # 7 Exhibit 13E, # 8 Exhibit 14−1, # 9 Exhibit 17, # 10 Exhibit 18, # 11 Exhibit 18B, # 12 Exhibit 18C, # 13 Exhibit 19A, # 14 Exhibit 21, # 15 Exhibit 21A, # 16 Exhibit 21D, # 17 Exhibit 21E, # 18 Exhibit 26, # 19 Exhibit 27, # 20 Exhibit 28, # 21 Exhibit 30, # 22 Exhibit Index 31, # 23 Exhibit 34−1D, # 24 Exhibit 49−1, # 25 Exhibit 52−1, # 26 Exhibit 57, # 27 Exhibit 63, # 28 Exhibit 64, # 29 Exhibit 64A, # 30 Exhibit 65, # 31 Exhibit 65A, # 32 Exhibit 66)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/14/2009)
310 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. Amendment to 299 Memorandum in Support of Motion,,, corrected Exhibit 7. (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
311 Amended SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal Second, by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
312 ORDER granting 301 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, defendant is also granted leave to conventionally file DVD with the memorandum; finding as moot 303 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal; granting 309 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, defendant is also granted leave to conventionally file DVD with the memorandum; granting 311 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Counsel directed to file forthwith requested document(s) with an event from the SEALED DOCUMENTS category. The clerk shall grant access to sealed document(s) to counsel of record. Pro hac vice attorneys must obtain sealed document(s) from local counsel. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/18/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 08/18/2009)
313 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 300 Response to Motion,,, 299 Memorandum in Support of Motion,,, correcting Exhibit 28. (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
314 SEALED EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 298 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 10F, # 2 Exhibit 14, # 3 Exhibit 20, # 4 Exhibit 20A−20E, # 5 Exhibit 25, # 6 Exhibit 28, # 7 Exhibit 34B, # 8 Exhibit 46)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
315 SEALED EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 300 Response to Motion,,, by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 10F, # 2 Exhibit 14, # 3 Exhibit 20, # 4 Exhibit 20A−20E, # 5 Exhibit 22, # 6 Exhibit 22A−22B, # 7 Exhibit 25, # 8 Exhibit 28, # 9 Exhibit 29, # 10 Exhibit 34B, # 11 Exhibit 46, # 12

08/20/2009
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Exhibit 50)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
316 SEALED EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 307 MOTION for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Decertify Plaintiffs' ADEA Claims by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 10F, # 2 Exhibit 11, # 3 Exhibit 12, # 4 Exhibit 13, # 5 Exhibit 13C−13E, # 6 Exhibit 14, # 7 Exhibit 14−1, # 8 Exhibit 17, # 9 Exhibit 18, # 10 Exhibit 18B−18C, # 11 Exhibit 19A, # 12 Exhibit 20, # 13 Exhibit 20A−20E, # 14 Exhibit 21, # 15 Exhibit 21A, 21D−21E, # 16 Exhibit 22, # 17 Exhibit 22A−22B, # 18 Exhibit 25, # 19 Exhibit 26, # 20 Exhibit 27, # 21 Exhibit 28, # 22 Exhibit 29, # 23 Exhibit 30, # 24 Exhibit 31, # 25 Exhibit 34B, # 26 Exhibit 34−1D, # 27 Exhibit 49−1, # 28 Exhibit 50, # 29 Exhibit 52−1, # 30 Exhibit 57, # 31 Exhibit 63, # 32 Exhibit 64, # 33 Exhibit 64A, # 34 Exhibit 65, # 35 Exhibit 65A, # 36 Exhibit 66)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
317 ORDER finding as moot 288 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Plaintiffs have up to and including 8/28/2009 in which to file their memorandum publicly. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/20/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 08/20/2009)
318 MOTION to Amend Scheduling Order by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
323 EXHIBITS RECEIVED CONVENTIONALLY AND FILED UNDER SEAL IN SUPPORT of 312 Order on Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. The following Exhibits were received conventionally, per Order of the Court: Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification (DE 300); Exhibit 1 to the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 308); and Exhibit 1 to the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 299).(alm) Modified on 8/28/2009 to remove availability language as these Exhibits were filed under seal.(alm). (mam). (Entered: 08/28/2009)
319 INDEX OF EXHIBITS by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 287 MOTION to Certify Class (Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
320 SEALED EXHIBIT(S) re 294 Memorandum in Support of Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21, # 2 Exhibit 23, # 3 Exhibit 31, # 4 Exhibit 35, # 5 Exhibit 42)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
321 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley Redacted (Attachments: # 1 Redacted Exhibit 9, # 2 Redacted Exhibit 14, # 3 Redacted Exhibit 18, # 4 Redacted Exhibit 26, # 5 Redacted Exhibit 28, # 6 Redacted Exhibit 45)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
322 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley PUBLICLY FILED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 10, # 10 Exhibit 11, # 11 Exhibit 12, # 12 Exhibit 13, # 13 Exhibit 14, # 14 Exhibit 15, # 15 Exhibit 16, # 16 Exhibit 17, # 17 Exhibit 19, # 18 Exhibit 20, # 19 Exhibit 22, # 20 Exhibit 24, # 21 Exhibit 25, # 22 Exhibit 27, # 23 Exhibit 29, # 24 Exhibit 30, # 25 Exhibit 32, # 26 Exhibit 33, # 27 Exhibit 34, # 28 Exhibit 36, # 29 Exhibit 37, # 30 Exhibit 38, # 31 Exhibit 39, # 32 Exhibit 40, # 33 Exhibit 41, # 34 Exhibit 43, # 35 Exhibit 44, # 36 Exhibit 46, # 37 Exhibit 47, # 38 Exhibit 48, # 39 Exhibit 49)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
DOCKET ANNOTATION: The Exhibits referenced in Docket Entry 323 are FILED UNDER SEAL and are NOT available for viewing in the Clerk's Office as previously stated. The language has been removed from the Docket Entry. (alm) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
324 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages regarding Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
325 ORDER granting 324 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 08/28/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (Melgren, Eric) (Entered: 08/28/2009)

08/28/2009
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326 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley PUBLICLY FILED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 52, # 2 Exhibit 54, # 3 Exhibit 55, # 4 Exhibit 56, # 5 Exhibit 57, # 6 Exhibit 58, # 7 Exhibit 59, # 8 Exhibit 60, # 9 Exhibit 61, # 10 Exhibit 62, # 11 Exhibit 63, # 12 Exhibit 64, # 13 Exhibit 65, # 14 Exhibit 66, # 15 Exhibit 67, # 16 Exhibit 68, # 17 Exhibit 70, # 18 Exhibit 71, # 19 Exhibit 72, # 20 Exhibit 73, # 21 Exhibit 74, # 22 Exhibit 75, # 23 Exhibit 76, # 24 Exhibit 77)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
327 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley PUBLICLY FILED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 79, # 2 Exhibit 80, # 3 Exhibit 81, # 4 Exhibit 82, # 5 Exhibit 83, # 6 Exhibit 84, # 7 Exhibit 85, # 8 Exhibit 86, # 9 Exhibit 87, # 10 Exhibit 88, # 11 Exhibit 89, # 12 Exhibit 90, # 13 Exhibit 91, # 14 Exhibit 92, # 15 Exhibit 93, # 16 Exhibit 94, # 17 Exhibit 95, # 18 Exhibit 96, # 19 Exhibit 97, # 20 Exhibit 98, # 21 Exhibit 99, # 22 Exhibit 100)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
328 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley PUBLICLY FILED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 101, # 2 Exhibit 102, # 3 Exhibit 103, # 4 Exhibit 104, # 5 Exhibit 105, # 6 Exhibit 106, # 7 Exhibit 107, # 8 Exhibit 108, # 9 Exhibit 109, # 10 Exhibit 110, # 11 Exhibit 111, # 12 Exhibit 112, # 13 Exhibit 113, # 14 Exhibit 114, # 15 Exhibit 115, # 16 Exhibit 116, # 17 Exhibit 117, # 18 Exhibit 118, # 19 Exhibit 119, # 20 Exhibit 120, # 21 Exhibit 121, # 22 Exhibit 122)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
329 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re: 287 MOTION to Certify Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supplemental Declaration from Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr.)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
330 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley PUBLICLY FILED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 123, # 2 Exhibit 124, # 3 Exhibit 125, # 4 Exhibit 126, # 5 Exhibit 127, # 6 Exhibit 128)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
331 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley PUBLICLY FILED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 50)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
332 SEALED EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley TO BE SEALED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 53 to be sealed)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
333 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 287 MOTION to Certify Class by Plaintiff Perry Apsley Exhibit 78 Parts 1−6 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 78 Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 78 Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 78, # 4 Exhibit 78 Part 4, # 5 Exhibit 78 Part 5, # 6 Exhibit 78 Part 6)(Ohaebosim, Uzo) (Entered: 08/28/2009)
334 ORDER granting 318 Plaintiff unopposed Motion to Modify Briefing Schedule. See order for revised deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/3/09. (sj) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
335 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
336 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 298 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List 9.11.09−Updated Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit 131, # 4 Exhibit 132, # 5 Exhibit 133, # 6 Exhibit 134, # 7 Exhibit 135, # 8 Exhibit 136, # 9 Exhibit 137, # 10 Exhibit 138)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
337 ORDER granting 335 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 9/14/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
338 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages for Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or Decertification (Doc. 308) by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/25/2009)

09/25/2009 09/25/2009
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339 Unopposed SEALED MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Sealed Document Exhibit 141, # 2 Proposed Sealed Document Exhibit 142, # 3 Proposed Amended Complaint Exhibit 144)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
340 ORDER granting 338 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 339 Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Counsel directed to file forthwith requested document(s) with an event from the SEALED DOCUMENTS category. The clerk shall grant access to sealed document(s) to counsel of record. Pro hac vice attorneys must obtain sealed document(s) from local counsel.. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 9/25/2009.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
341 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 307 MOTION for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Decertify Plaintiffs' ADEA Claims (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exhibit 138, Executed LWW Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit 139, # 3 Exhibit 140, # 4 Exhibit 143, # 5 Exhibit 145, # 6 Exhibit 146, # 7 147, # 8 148, # 9 Exhibit 149, # 10 Exhibit 150, # 11 Exhibit 151, # 12 Exhibit List Updated 9.25.09 Exhbit List)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
342 SEALED EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 341 Response to Motion, by Plaintiff Perry Apsley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 142, # 2 144)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/25/2009)
343 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 298 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
344 MOTION TO JOIN LAWSUIT by Movant Regina Sue Walker(alm) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
345 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 307 MOTION for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Decertify Plaintiffs' ADEA Claims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 16−1)(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 10/16/2009)
346 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 344 MOTION for Joinder (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 10/30/2009)
347 REPLY to Response to Motion by Movant Regina Sue Walker re: 344 MOTION for Joinder. (aa) (Entered: 11/04/2009)
348 ORDER granting 344 Motion to join collective action. The Clerk shall take appropriate steps to reflect in the docket that Regina Sue Walker has consented to be a member of the conditionally certified ADEA collective action. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 11/6/09. (sj) (Entered: 11/06/2009)
349 MOTION to Strike Defendant's Expert Report of Dr. Mary Baker and to Disqualify her from testifying in front of a jury by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker,

02/19/2010 02/22/2010 02/22/2010 02/23/2010 03/08/2010
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Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 02/16/2010)
350 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 349 MOTION to Strike Defendant's Expert Report of Dr. Mary Baker and to Disqualify her from testifying in front of a jury by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
351 MOTION to Strike plaintiffs' motion to strike Baker testimony by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
352 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 351 MOTION to Strike plaintiffs' motion to strike Baker testimony by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 02/22/2010)
353 ORDER granting 350 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 349 Motion to Strike. Defendant's will have up to and including 14 days after the entry of the order on 351 Motion to strike, unless such order makes 349 moot. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 2/23/2010.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 02/23/2010)
354 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young re 351 MOTION to Strike plaintiffs' motion to strike Baker testimony (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
355 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 351 MOTION to Strike plaintiffs' motion to strike Baker testimony (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 03/12/2010)
356 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER finding as moot 287 Motion to Certify Class; granting 298 Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the ERISA 510 and LMRA 301 Claims; granting 307 Motion for Summary Judgment. See ORDER for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 6/30/2010. (cm) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
357 MOTION for extension of time to file Motion for Reconsideration by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph

07/12/2010 08/13/2010
08/13/2010

O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
358 ORDER granting 357 Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiffs are given up to and including 8/13/2010 in which to file their motion. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/12/2010.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
359 MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/13/2010)
360 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 359 MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen,

08/26/2010 08/27/2010 09/10/2010 09/23/2010

Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/13/2010)
361 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 359 MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/26/2010)
362 ORDER granting 361 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 359 MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,,. RESPONSE DEADLINE 9/10/2010. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/27/2010.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 08/27/2010)
363 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 359 MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 09/10/2010)
364 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon

03/28/2011 04/08/2011
04/08/2011

L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young re: 359 MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, MOTION for Reconsideration re 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/23/2010)
365 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 359 Motion for Reconsideration. See Order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 3/28/2011. (cm) (Entered: 03/28/2011)
366 MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/08/2011)
367 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 366 MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) by

04/20/2011 04/20/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011
05/18/2011 05/26/2011 06/10/2011

Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Williamson, Lawrence) Modified on 4/12/2011 (aa). (Entered: 04/08/2011)
368 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 366 MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Thelen, Trisha) Modified to take out repetitive text on 4/21/2011 (adw). (Entered: 04/20/2011)
369 ORDER granting 368 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 366 MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b). Response deadline 4/29/2011. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 4/20/2011. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) Modified to take out repetitive text on 4/21/2011 (adw). (Entered: 04/20/2011)
370 MOTION to Certify Order by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Armstrong, James) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
371 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 366 MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) MOTION to Certify Orders in Documents 356 and 365 for Appeal Pursuant to Rule 54(b) or in the Alternative, 1292(b) and Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification (Armstrong, James) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
372 MOTION to Withdraw attorney Lawrence Williamson from case by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith. (aa) (Entered: 05/18/2011)
373 MOTION to Stay Case and MOTION to Appoint Mediator (Response deadline 6/9/2011) by Plaintiff Henry F. Butler.(adw) (Entered: 05/27/2011)
374 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 373 MOTION to Stay Case MOTION for Order (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/10/2011)

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07/12/2011 08/08/2011 08/08/2011

375 AMENDED MOTION to Stay Case, MOTION for Hearing ( Response deadline 7/5/2011) by Plaintiff Henry F. Butler. (aa) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
376 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 375 MOTION to Stay Case MOTION for Hearing (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
377 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney As to Named Individuals by Plaintiffs James Bowmaker, Henry F. Butler, David L. Clay, Throma A. Dyas, Olivia J. Housley, Sharron N. James, Warren Pyles, Darlene E. Rozar, James Walker, Roy T. Wells(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/21/2011)
378 ORDER granting 377 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney as to Named Individuals. The clerk will indicate all named individuals as Pro Se. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 6/23/2011.Mailed to pro se party Henry Butler, Warren Pyles, Olivia Housley, Ann Dyas, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, Roy Wells, James Bowmaker, David Clay, James Walker by regular mail (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
379 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE by attorney Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. as to Debra L. Smith (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
380 ORDER: Per the Court's filing at 378 the Court is finding as moot 373 Motion to Stay Case; finding as moot 373 Motion for Order; finding as moot 375 Motion to Stay Case; finding as moot 375 Motion for Hearing. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 6/23/2011.Mailed to pro se party Henry Butler, Warren Pyles, Olivia Housley, Ann Dyas, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, Roy Wells, James Bowmaker, David Clay, James Walker by regular mail (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
381 ORDER finding as moot 372 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 6/23/2011.Mailed to pro se party Henry Butler, Warren Pyles, Olivia Housley, Ann Dyas, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, Roy Wells, James Bowmaker, David Clay, James Walker by regular mail (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
382 MOTION for Reconsideration re 378 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, 381 Order on Motion to Withdraw, 380 Order on Motion to Stay Case, Order on Motion for Order, Order on Motion for Hearing by Plaintiff Warren Pyles. (aa) (Entered: 07/07/2011)
383 ORDER denying 382 Motion for Reconsideration. See Order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/11/2011.Mailed to pro se party Henry Butler, Warren Pyles, Olivia Housley, Throma Dyas, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, Roy Wells, James Bowmaker, David Clay, James Walker by regular mail (cm) (Entered: 07/11/2011)
384 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 349 Motion to Strike ; denying 351 Motion to Strike ; granting 366 Motion to Certify; granting 370 Motion to Certify. See Order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/11/2011.Mailed to pro se party Warren Pyles, Throma A. Dyas, Sharron N. James, Roy T. Wells, Olivia J. Housley, James Walker, James Bowmaker, Henry Butler, David L. Clay, Darlene E. Rozar by regular mail (cm) (Entered: 07/11/2011)
385 ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC correcting clerical error in the July 11, 2011 Order denying the parties' motion to strike and granting their motion to certify (Doc. 384). See attached Order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/12/2011. (cm) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
386 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Paul S. McCausland on behalf of Olivia J. Housley. (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 08/08/2011)
387 MOTION to Stay Deadlines, MOTION to Compel ( Response deadline 8/22/2011) by Plaintiffs Henry F. Butler, David L. Clay, Sharron N. James, Warren Pyles, Darlene E. Rozar. (Titled, "Plaintiff's Pro Se Motion For A Stay Of The Proceedings And Order To Compel The Parties To Produce All Relevant Discovery Documents.")(aa) (Entered: 08/09/2011)

08/10/2011 08/10/2011 08/11/2011
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09/01/2011 09/02/2011 09/02/2011 09/02/2011 10/11/2011 10/19/2011 10/19/2011 10/20/2011
10/25/2011

388 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 365 Order on Motion for Reconsideration, 222 Memorandum & Opinion, 356 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, by Plaintiff Perry Apsley. Filing fee $ 455, Internet Payment Receipt Number 1083−2115754. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
389 PRELIMINARY RECORD ON APPEAL transmitted to 10CCA re 388 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Packet)(aa) (Entered: 08/10/2011)
390 APPEAL DOCKETED in 10CCA on 08/11/2011 and assigned Appeal No. 11−3238 re 388 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, filed by Perry Apsley. Docketing statement due 08/25/2011 for Appellants Perry Apsley, et al. Transcript order form due 08/25/2011 for Lawrence W. Williamson Jr.. Notice of appearance due on 08/25/2011. (aa) (Entered: 08/12/2011)
391 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response as to 387 MOTION to Stay Deadlines MOTION to Compel by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/22/2011)
392 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley re 387 MOTION to Stay Deadlines MOTION to Compel OBJECTION TO STAY OF PROCEEDINGS (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 08/22/2011)
393 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 387 MOTION to Stay Deadlines MOTION to Compel (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 08/22/2011)
394 ORDER granting 391 Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response re 387 MOTION to Stay Deadlines MOTION to Compel. Response deadline extended to 9/2/2011. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 8/23/2011. Mailed to pro se parties Henry F. Butler, Warren K. Pyles, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, David Clay, Throma Dyas, Roy Wells, James Bowmaker, and James Walker by regular mail. (sj) (Entered: 08/24/2011)
395 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM: No Transcript Required filed by Perry Apsley re 388 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/01/2011)
396 LETTER TO 10CCA stating record is complete re 388 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. ( Appeal No. 11−3238) (aa) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
397 RETURN mail received re 394 Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply, addressed to David L. Clay; not remailed. (aa) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
398 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 387 MOTION to Stay Deadlines MOTION to Compel (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 09/02/2011)
399 MOTION to Withdraw Attorney Monique K. Centeno and reinstate Attorney Lawrence Williamson by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith. (aa) (Entered: 10/11/2011)
400 MOTION to Stay Deadlines of Collective Action Plaintiffs excluding Plaintiffs Butler, Pyles, Housley, Cash, Dyas, Walker, Wells, Rozar, Bowmaker, and James by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/19/2011)
401 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Perry Apsley re 399 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/19/2011)
402 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 399 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Motion is granted as to withdrawing Monique Centeno, but denying as to substituting Lawrence Williamson; Plaintiff Debra Smith will continue to be represented by Uzo Ohaebosim. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 10/20/2011.Mailed to pro se party Darlene Rozar, David Clay, Henry Butler, James Bowmaker, James Walker, Roy Wells, Sharron James, Throma Dyas, Warren Pyles by regular mail (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
403 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 400 MOTION to Stay Deadlines of Collective Action Plaintiffs excluding Plaintiffs Butler, Pyles, Housley, Cash, Dyas, Walker, Wells, Rozar, Bowmaker, and James (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 10/25/2011)

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404 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay, filed on October 19, 2011 by Perry Apsley re 400 MOTION to Stay Deadlines of Collective Action Plaintiffs excluding Plaintiffs Butler, Pyles, Housley, Cash, Dyas, Walker, Wells, Rozar, Bowmaker, and James. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/26/2011)
405 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith(daw) (Entered: 02/08/2012)
406 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 387 Pro Se Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Deadlines; denying 387 Pro Se Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel; granting 400 Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Deadlines. Discovery is stayed pending ruling by the Tenth Circuit. See order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 2/9/2012. Mailed to pro se parties Henry F. Butler, Warren K. Pyles, Sharron James, Darlene Rozar, and David Clay by regular mail. (sj) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
NOTICE Re: Pro Se Mailing. Document 406 Order on Motion to Stay Deadlines, Order on Motion to Compel, mailed to James Bowmaker, James Walker, Roy T. Wells, and Throma A. Dyas on 2/9/2012 by regular mail. (sj) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
407 RESPONSE by Attorney Uzo Ohaebosim re 405 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel and Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance (Ohaebosim, Uzo) Modified on 2/29/2012 to correct filer (aa). (Entered: 02/12/2012)
408 RETURN mail received re 406 Order on Motion to Stay Deadlines, Order on Motion to Compel, addressed to David L. Clay; not remailed. (aa) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
409 REPLY to Response to Motion by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith re: 405 MOTION to Disqualify Counsel. (aa) (Entered: 02/29/2012)
410 ORDER granting 405 Plaintiff Debra Smith's Motion to terminate Uzo Ohaebosim's representation of her in this case. Ms. Smith is responsible for complying with all deadlines and aspects of her individual claims. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/5/2012. (sj) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
NOTICE Re: Pro Se Mailing. Document 410 Order on Motion to terminate Counsel's representation of Debra Smith mailed to Darlene Rozar, David Clay, Henry Butler, James Bowmaker, James Walker, Roy Wells, Sharron James, Throma Dyas, Warren Pyles on 4/5/2012 by regular mail. (sj) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
411 RETURN mail received re 410 Order on Motion to Disqualify Counsel, addressed to David L. Clay. Not remailed. This is a text entry only (aa) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
412 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Paul S. McCausland (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
413 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Paul S. McCausland on behalf of Debra L. Smith (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 07/24/2012)
414 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE by Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley re 70 Protective Order signed Confidentiality Agreement by counsel. (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
415 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith re 70 Protective Order Confidentiality Agreement Signed by Counsel. (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
416 APPEAL MANDATE from 10CCA: affirming decision of the District Court. (Appeal No. 11−3238) (Attachments: # 1 Judgment, # 2 Mandate issued letter)(aa) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
417 BILL OF COSTS by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 10/24/2012)
418 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 417 Bill of Costs by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 A, # 3 B, # 4 C, # 5 D, # 6 E, # 7 F, # 8 G, # 9 H, # 10 I, # 11 J, # 12 K, # 13 L)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 10/24/2012)
419 ORDER SETTING STATUS/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. A Status/Scheduling Conference is set for December 12, 2012 at 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys, Courtroom 326 (KMH), U.S. Courthouse, 401 N. Market, Wichita,

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Kansas. All parties shall be present in person or appear by counsel. The parties shall confer and provide a status report to the court by December 5, 2012 identifying which claims remain and a proposed schedule for completion of discovery. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 10/30/2012. Mailed to pro se parties Darlene E. Rozar, David L. Clay, Henry F. Butler, James Bowmaker, James Walker, Roy T. Wells, Sharron N. James, Throma A. Dyas, and Warren Pyles by regular mail. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 10/30/2012)
420 RETURN mail received re 419 Order, Set Hearings − addressed to David L. Clay; not remailed. (aa) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
421 OBJECTION(S) to 418 Bill of Costs, 417 Bill of Costs by Perry Apsley. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/07/2012)
422 REPLY to 421 Objection(s) Memo in Support of Defendant's Bill of Costs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
423 MOTION for extension of time TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS (417) WITH MOTION by Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − PROPOSED OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS, MOTION FOR JOINDER IN OBJECTIONS BY APSLEY, ET AL. AND FOR PRODUCTION OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR ITEMS SOUGHT TO BE TAXED)(McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
424 MOTION for extension of time TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS (417) WITH MOTION by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − PROPOSED OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS, MOTION FOR JOINDER IN OBJECTIONS BY APSLEY, ET AL. AND FOR PRODUCTION OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR ITEMS SOUGHT TO BE TAXED)(McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 11/14/2012)
425 MOTION for Leave to file OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS (417) AND MOTIONS PERTAINING THERETO OUT OF TIME by Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − PROPOSED OBJECTIONS AND MOTIONS REGARDING BILL OF COSTS (417))(McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
426 MOTION for Leave to file OBJECTIONS TO BILL OF COSTS (417) AND MOTIONS PERTAINING THERETO OUT OF TIME by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − PROPOSED OBJECTIONS AND MOTIONS REGARDING BILL OF COSTS (417))(McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
427 ORDER finding as moot 423 Motion for Extension of Time to File.; granting 425 Motion for Leave to File Out of Time as to Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 11/16/2012. (cm) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
428 ORDER finding as moot 424 Motion for Extension of Time to File.; granting 426 Motion for Leave to File Out of Time as to Plaintiff Debra L. Smith. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 11/16/2012. (cm) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
429 OBJECTION(S) to 417 Bill of Costs , MOTION FOR JOINDER IN OBJECTIONS BY APSLEY, ET AL. AND MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR ITEMS TO BE TAXED by Olivia J. Housley. (McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
430 OBJECTION(S) to 417 Bill of Costs , MOTION FOR JOINDER IN OBJECTIONS BY APSLEY, ET AL., AND MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR ITEMS TO BE TAXED by Debra L. Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − RETAINER AGREEMENT, # 2 Exhibit 2− RECEIPT OF PAYMENT)(McCausland, Paul) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
431 MOTION for Joinder in objections by Apsley, et al.; MOTION to Produce supporting documents for items to be taxed by Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley. (Response deadline 11/30/2012) (THIS ENTRY MADE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MOTION PORTION OF A THREE−PART DOCUMENT. PDF IDENTICAL TO DE 429 .) (alm) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

11/16/2012
11/19/2012
11/19/2012 11/19/2012 11/19/2012 11/20/2012 11/20/2012 11/20/2012 11/20/2012 11/26/2012
11/29/2012 11/29/2012 12/04/2012 12/06/2012
12/06/2012
12/10/2012

432 MOTION for Joinder in objections by Apsley, et al., MOTION to Produce supporting documents for items to be taxed by Plaintiff Debra L. Smith. (Response deadline 11/30/2012) (THIS ENTRY WAS MADE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MOTION PORTION OF A THREE−PART DOCUMENT; THE PDF FILE IS IDENTICAL TO DOCKET ENTRY 430 )(alm) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
433 NOTICE of Hearing: THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE FOR THIS HEARING Upon further review of the case and Bill of Cost filings, the Court is concerned these filings may be premature. Therefore a Status Conference is set for 11/29/2012 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 408 (EFM) before District Judge Eric F. Melgren to discuss this matter. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
NOTICE Re: Pro Se Mailing. Document 433 Notice of Hearing, mailed to James Bowmaker, David Clay, Throma Dyas,Sharron James, James Walker, and Roy Wells on 11/19/2012 by regular mail. (cm) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
NOTICE Re: Pro Se Mailing. Document 433 Notice of Hearing, mailed to Warren Pyles and Darlene Rozar on 11/19/2012 by regular mail. (cm) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
434 Letter from Roy Wells to the court (cs) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
435 REPLY to 429 Objection(s) to Bill of Costs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
436 REPLY to 430 Objection(s), to Bill of Costs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
437 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 431 MOTION for Joinder MOTION to Produce in opposition to production of documents (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
438 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 432 MOTION for Joinder MOTION to Produce in opposition to production of documents (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
439 NOTICE of Hearing: THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE FOR THIS HEARING At the direction of Judge Eric F. Melgren, the Status Conference scheduled for 11/29/2012 is RESCHEDULED for 12/12/2012 at 12:45 PM in Judge's Chambers, Room 414 (EFM) before District Judge Eric F. Melgren. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 11/26/2012)
440 NOTICE of Hearing: THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE FOR THIS HEARING Status Conference scheduled for 12/12/2012 at 12:45 PM has been moved to Courtroom 326 before District Judge Eric F. Melgren. (cm) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
NOTICE Re: Pro Se Mailing. Document 439 Notice of Hearing, 440 Notice of Hearing mailed to Darlene Rozar; David Clay; Henry Butler; James Bowmaker; James Walker; Roy Wells; Sharron James; Throma Dyas; Warren Pyles on 11/29/2012 by regular mail. (cm) (Entered: 11/29/2012)
441 Joint MOTION to Sever Plaintiffs Housley and Smith by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
442 MOTION for Order to (1) Determine whether the single file rule applies based on this Court's decision and subsequent affirmation by the Tenth Circuit, (2) Determine the date that the statute of limitations begin to run again, and (3) To toll that date by 90 days after the Court issues a ruling on the current Motion. by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/06/2012)
443 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 442 MOTION for Order to (1) Determine whether the single file rule applies based on this Court's decision and subsequent affirmation by the Tenth Circuit, (2) Determine the date that the statute of limitations begin to run again, and (3) To toll t by Plaintiff Perry Apsley(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 12/06/2012)
444 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Henry F. Butler re 419 Order. (aa) (Entered: 12/10/2012)

12/10/2012 12/10/2012 12/10/2012 12/10/2012 12/11/2012
12/12/2012 12/12/2012 12/12/2012 12/13/2012
12/19/2012 12/19/2012
12/28/2012 01/10/2013
01/10/2013

445 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Sharron N. James re 419 Order. (aa) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
446 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Warren Pyles re 419 Order.(aa) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
447 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Darlene E. Rozar re 419 Order. (aa) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
448 RESPONSE by Plaintiff David L. Clay re 419 Order. (aa) (Entered: 12/10/2012)
449 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 442 MOTION for Order to (1) Determine whether the single file rule applies based on this Court's decision and subsequent affirmation by the Tenth Circuit, (2) Determine the date that the statute of limitations begin to run again, and (3) To toll t (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 12/11/2012)
450 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by Charles E. McClellan on behalf of Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (McClellan, Charles) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
451 MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before District Judge Eric F. Melgren: STATUS CONFERENCE held on 12/12/2012. (Court Reporter Jo Wilkinson.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: STATUS CONFERENCE held on 12/12/2012. (Tape #1:42−2:52.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
452 ORDER. Amended complaint asserting individual claims due by 3/1/2013; parties shall confer and submit an order concerning the dismissal of those plaintiffs not pursuing individual claims by 3/8/2013; defendants' motion to sever the individual claims of the pro se plaintiffs due by 12/19/2012 and pro se plaintiffs shall have 21 days to respond. See order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 12/13/2012.Mailed to pro se parties Darlene E. Rozar, David L. Clay, Henry F. Butler, James Bowmaker, James Walker, Roy T. Wells, Sharron N. James, Throma A. Dyas, and Warren Pyles by regular mail.(sj) (Entered: 12/13/2012)
453 MOTION to Sever Pro Se Plaintiffs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
454 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 453 MOTION to Sever Pro Se Plaintiffs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A−1, # 3 Exhibit A−2, # 4 Exhibit A−3, # 5 Exhibit A−4, # 6 Exhibit A−5, # 7 Exhibit A−6, # 8 Exhibit A−7, # 9 Exhibit A−8, # 10 Exhibit A−9, # 11 Exhibit A−10, # 12 Exhibit A−11, # 13 Exhibit A−12, # 14 Exhibit A−13, # 15 Exhibit A−14, # 16 Exhibit A−15, # 17 Exhibit A−16, # 18 Exhibit A−17, # 19 Exhibit A−18, # 20 Exhibit B, # 21 Exhibit C, # 22 Exhibit D, # 23 Exhibit E, # 24 Exhibit F)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
455 RETURN mail received re Status Conference, 452 Order, addressed to David Clay; remailed on 12/31/2012 to P.O. Box 641. (aa) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
456 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 441 Plaintiffs' Motion to Sever Housley and Smith's remaining individual ADEA claims. The Clerk shall assign new docket numbers to the individual lawsuits of Housley and Smith and copy the operative complaint and answers into those dockets. Housley and Smith shall file amended complaints using their respective new case numbers by 2/11/2013. No additional filing fee is required. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 1/10/2013. Mailed to pro se parties James Bowmaker, Henry F. Butler, David L. Clay, Throma A. Dyas, Sharron N. James, Warren Pyles, Darlene E. Rozar, James Walker, and Roy T. Wells by regular mail. (sj) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
457 DOCKET ANNOTATION: Pursuant to Chief Magistrate Judge Humphreys' order, DE 456 in 05−1368−EFM, the cases of plaintiffs Housley and Smith vs. Boeing has been severed from the original case. All documents related to plaintiff Housley's case shall now be filed in 13−1021−EFM and all documents related to plaintiff Smith's case shall be filed in 13−1022−EFM. (cs) (Entered: 01/11/2013)

01/14/2013 01/24/2013
01/25/2013 01/29/2013 01/31/2013 03/01/2013
03/05/2013 03/18/2013

458 MINUTE ORDER/NOTICE: An audio recording of the status conference conducted by Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 12/12/12 was provided to pro se plaintiff Henry F. Butler on 1/14/13 pursuant to his request. Signed by deputy clerk on 1/14/2013.Mailed to pro se parties: James Bowmaker, Henry F. Butler, David L. Clay, Throma A. Dyas, Sharron N. James, Warren Pyles, Darlene E. Rozar, James Walker and Roy T. Wells by regular mail (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(vs) (Entered: 01/14/2013)
459 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 453 Defendants' uncontested Motion to Sever Pro Se Plaintiffs. The Clerk shall assign new docket numbers to the individual lawsuits and copy the operative complaint and answers into those dockets. The pro se plaintiffs shall file amended complaints using their respective new case numbers by February 25, 2013. Failure to file an amended complaint by February 25, 2013 may result in dismissal of the pro se plaintiff's individual lawsuit without further notice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 1/24/2013. Mailed to pro se party James Bowmaker, Henry Butler, David Clay, Throma Dyas, Sharon James, Warren Pyles, Darlene Rozar, James Walker and Roy Wells by regular mail. (sj) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
460 Joint MOTION to Dismiss Party Burrows & Montgomery with Prejudice by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
461 DOCKET ANNOTATION: Pursuant to Chief Magistrate Judge Humphreys' order, DE 459 in 05−1368−EFM, the cases of pro se plaintiffs Bowmaker, Butler, Clay, Dyas, James, Pyles, Rozar, Walker & Wells vs. Boeing has been severed from this case. All documents related to these plaintiffs' cases shall now be filed in the individual cases and NOT in 05−1368 (cs) (Entered: 01/29/2013)
462 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE granting 460 Motion to Dismiss Party. It is hereby ordered that any claims in the above−captioned case being asserted on behalf of Daniel Burrows and Glennys Montgomery are dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its or his own costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 1/31/2013. (aa) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
463 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Richard Wallin, Willard J. Ratchford, Rocky R. Burris, Henry F. Victor, Lloyd C. Fansler, Betty R. Young, Brian Groom, Jerry L. Bransteter, Gordon B. Kinkead, Linda C. Sparrar, Carlton D. Lee, Steven Ngo, Jerald J. Gilbert, Redell Coleman, James E. Porter, Albert Schloetzer, Sammy J. Smith, Larry W. James, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Melonda Bircher, Verna J. Houston, Regina Sue Walker, Danny R. Kennedy, Lowanda J. Patton, Gary Ball, Donald E. Titus, Mark McCurdy, Donald R. Jones, Richard Gotthard, Michael E. Burgardt, Sharon A. Southern, Kent W. Owen, Janet M. Wilson, Abel L. Vasquez, Harvey J. Conyac, Betty Childers, Cathy J. Munsell, Veronica Rios, Phyllis A. Cox, Gary L. Johnson, Ron W. Hendershot, James Hammon, William D. Doshier, Charles D. Elder, James C. Sheppard, Alan S. Epperson, Barbra Odom, Perry Apsley, Thomas Belton, Melvin E. Kerns, Ralph O. Keener, Stephen L. Linck, Steven M. Schwind, Denise A. Harris, Jerry L. McKinney, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet S. Hansen, Peggy S. Bell, Linda L. Dezarn, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Charles Stark, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Walter Woods, Jan W. Murray, Melvyn J. Johnson, Freddy J. McColpin, Paul D. Pete, Loren W. Cox, Vernon L. Bentley, Jimmy Wallace, Jimmy Le, Allen C. Hatcher, Huyen T. Nguyen, Steven Basic, Brent L. Popp, James R. Wallace, Joseph E. Schroeder, Robert W. Boyd, William H. Setchell, Teddy F. Sill, Chip Gilchrist, II, Frank Cash, Luyen D. Nguyen, Richard D. Roeder, Larry E. Combs, Jacob A. Bakk, Ba Pham, Michael B. Welsh, Jay E. Powell, Bob Bailey.(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/01/2013)
464 MINUTE ORDER/NOTICE: An audio recording of the status conference conducted by Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 12/12/12 was provided to defense counsel on 3/5/13 pursuant to their request. Signed by deputy clerk on 3/5/2013. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(vs) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
465 Unopposed MOTION to Amend Complaint re 463 Amended Complaint,,,,,, by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky

03/18/2013 03/22/2013 04/05/2013 04/05/2013 04/05/2013 04/08/2013
04/17/2013

R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Amended Complaint)(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/18/2013)
466 ORDER granting 465 Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion to Amend Complaint. Plaintiffs shall file and serve their amended complaint by 3/22/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 3/18/2013. (sj) (Entered: 03/18/2013)
467 AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Perry Apsley.(Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 03/22/2013)
468 MOTION to Sever by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Midwestern Aircraft, Onex Corporation, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
469 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 468 MOTION to Sever by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Status Hearing Transcript Citations, # 2 Exhibit Thelen Declaration)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
470 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer as to 467 Amended Complaint by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) Modified on 4/8/2013 to correct motion type (aa). (Entered: 04/05/2013)
471 ORDER granting 470 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Fifth Amended Complaint. If Defendants' Motion to Sever (Doc. 468) is granted, defendants must respond to the forthcoming individual complaints as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; if the motion is denied, defendants must respond to the Fifth Amended Complaint within 21 days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/5/2013. (sj) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
472 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E.

04/24/2013 04/24/2013 05/13/2013
07/15/2013 08/05/2013 08/06/2013
08/26/2013
09/11/2013
09/11/2013 09/24/2013 09/25/2013 09/25/2013 09/25/2013 09/25/2013

Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young re 468 MOTION to Sever (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
473 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE by attorney Douglas L. Stanley as to Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
474 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 468 MOTION to Sever (Thelen, Trisha) Modified on 4/24/2013 to correct title (alm). (Entered: 04/24/2013)
475 ORDER. With reference to 468 defendants' motion to sever the individual ADEA disparate treatment claims, the parties shall confer and submit a report to the chambers of the undersigned judge by 5/21/2013 addressing: 1) the nature and extent of the remaining discovery and 2) the parties' suggestions for a master schedule. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 5/13/2013. (sj) (Entered: 05/13/2013)
476 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying without prejudice 468 Defendants' Motion to Sever. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 7/15/2013. (sj) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
477 ANSWER to 467 Amended Complaint by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems.(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
478 ORDER REGARDING PLANNING AND SCHEDULING: Scheduling Conference set for 9/10/2013 at 10:00 AM by telephone before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Report of Parties' Planning Meeting deadline 9/3/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 8/6/2013. (sj) (Entered: 08/06/2013)
479 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 431 Motion to Produce; granting in part and denying in part 432 Motion to Produce. Defendants' Bill of Costs 417 is allowed as stated in this order. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/26/2013. (cm) (Entered: 08/26/2013)
480 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 3/4/2014 at 11:00 AM by telephone before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys; discovery deadline 9/10/2014; dispositive motion deadline 10/10/2014; proposed pretrial order due by 9/22/2014; final pretrial conference set for 9/26/2014 at 11:00 AM by telephone before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/11/2013. (sj) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
481 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE by attorney Uzo Ohaebosim and Monique Centenno as to All Plaintiffs (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
482 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 479 Order on Motion to Produce,,, by Plaintiff Perry Apsley. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
APPEAL FEE STATUS: filing fee not paid re: Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment 482 . (THIS IS A TEXT ONLY ENTRY−NO DOCUMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TRANSACTION) (aa) (Entered: 09/25/2013)
483 PRELIMINARY RECORD ON APPEAL transmitted to 10CCA re 482 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Packet)(aa) (Entered: 09/25/2013)
484 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery (McClellan, Charles) (Entered: 09/25/2013)
485 APPEAL DOCKETED in 10CCA on 09/25/2013 and assigned Appeal No. 13−3240 re 482 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment filed by Perry Apsley. The Fee and Docketing statement due 10/09/2013 for Perry Apsley, et al.Transcript order form due 10/09/2013 for Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. Notice of appearance due on 10/09/2013 for Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean Jr., Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William

09/27/2013 10/08/2013 10/15/2013 10/15/2013
11/08/2013 11/15/2013 11/15/2013
11/18/2013 12/09/2013 12/23/2013 01/07/2014 01/09/2014
01/09/2014 01/09/2014

D. Doshier, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Dale C. Jayne Jr., Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., Charles Stark, The Boeing Company, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Unit Manager, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods and Betty R. Young. (aa) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
486 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery (McClellan, Charles) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
487 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Discovery Requests (McClellan, Charles) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
488 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Master Set of Interrogatories and Master Set of Requests for Production (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
APPEAL FEE PAID in the amount of $455 Receipt No. W4631005858. re Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment 482 filed by Perry Apsley (THIS IS A TEXT ONLY ENTRY−NO DOCUMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TRANSACTION) (smg) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
489 TRANSCRIPT ORDER FORM: No Transcript Required filed by Perry Apsley re 482 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
490 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to respond to discovery by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
491 ORDER granting 490 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to 12/16/13 to Respond to Plaintiffs' Master Set of Interrogatories and Plaintiffs' Master Set of Requests for Production. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 11/15/2013. (vs) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
492 LETTER TO 10CCA stating record is complete re 482 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. ( Appeal No. 13−3240) (aa) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
493 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 442 Motion for Order. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 12/9/2013. (cm) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
494 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Defendants Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs Master Set of Interrogatories (McClellan, Charles) (Entered: 12/23/2013)
495 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 493 Order on Motion for Order by Plaintiff Perry Apsley. (Williamson, Lawrence) (Entered: 01/07/2014)
APPEAL FEE STATUS: filing fee NOT PAID re: 495 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment on behalf of Plaintiff Perry Apsley. (THIS IS A TEXT ONLY ENTRY−NO DOCUMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TRANSACTION) (alm) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
496 PRELIMINARY RECORD ON APPEAL transmitted to 10CCA re 495 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Packet)(alm) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
497 APPEAL DOCKETED in 10CCA on 1/9/14 and assigned Appeal No. 14−3005 re 495 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment filed by Perry Apsley. Fee due by 01/23/2014. (alm) (Entered: 01/09/2014)

01/09/2014 01/09/2014 01/31/2014
02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/06/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014 02/14/2014 03/04/2014 03/04/2014
03/11/2014
03/11/2014 03/12/2014
03/12/2014 03/17/2014

498 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Response to Request for Production (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
499 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Answers and Objections to Interrogatories (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
500 ORDER. Upon the court's own motion due to a scheduling conflict, the status conference set 3/4/3014 at 11:00 a.m. is CANCELLED and RESCHEDULED to 3/11/2014 at 11:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys via telephone conference call to be initiated by the court. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 1/31/2014. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
501 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE by James E. Gore on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Gore, James) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
502 STRICKEN PER DOCKET ENTRY 503 −− STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of 9 Plaintiffs by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Thelen, Trisha) Modified on 2/7/2014 (aa). (Entered: 02/06/2014)
505 ORDER of 10CCA DISMISSING APPEAL as to 495 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment filed by Perry Apsley. ( Appeal No. 14−3005) (aa) (Entered: 02/12/2014)
503 ORDER STRIKING re 502 Stipulation of Dismissal as an inappropriate filing. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 2/7/2014. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(cm) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
504 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 2/7/2014. (aa) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
506 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE as to Linda L. Dezarn. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 2/14/2014. (aa) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
507 MOTION to Compel and for Sanctions by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
508 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 507 MOTION to Compel and for Sanctions by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
509 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 507 Defendants' Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. Defendants' request for sanctions is denied as moot. Defendants' request that plaintiffs respond to discovery and comply with agreements they have made relating to discovery is granted. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 3/11/14. (sj) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
510 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE as to Allen C. Hatcher. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 03/11/2014. (aa) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
511 ORDER. A status conference is set for 7/1/2014 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys via telephone conference call to be initiated by the court. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 3/12/14. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: STATUS CONFERENCE held on 3/11/2014. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
512 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that parties Frank Cash,

03/20/2014 04/04/2014 04/04/2014 04/08/2014 04/10/2014 04/10/2014
04/14/2014 04/14/2014
04/18/2014

Jerry L. McKinney, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Melonda Bircher and Michael E. Burgardt are hereby dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. Any and all claims that were asserted or could have been asserted by the above plaintiffs in this matter shall be and are hereby dismissed WITH PREJUDICE, and each party shall bear their own attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 03/14/2014. (aa) Modified on 3/18/2014 to correct text (alm). (Entered: 03/17/2014)
513 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. Peggy S. Bell and Harvey J. Conyac are dismissed. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 03/19/2014. (aa) (Entered: 03/20/2014)
514 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Reqeust for Production (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
515 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of Defendants' Answers and Objections to Plaintiff's Mast Set of Interrogatories (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
516 NOTICE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems of taking deposition of Multiple deponents on Multiple dates (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
517 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. See order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 04/09/2014. (aa) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
518 MOTION for extension of time to Respond to Defendants Discovery Requests by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Gore, James) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
519 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 518 MOTION for extension of time to Respond to Defendants Discovery Requests (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
520 ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE: A status conference is set for 4/17/2014 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys via telephone conference call to be initiated by the court. The conference will address Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Discovery (Doc. 518). If counsel are not available on 4/17/14 at 10:00 a.m. they shall confer and suggest alternate dates for the conference. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/14/14. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys: STATUS CONFERENCE held on 4/17/2014. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (sj) (Entered:

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07/02/2014 07/11/2014

04/18/2014)
521 ORDER granting 518 Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery. Deadline extended to 5/19/2014. No further extensions to this discovery deadline will be granted. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 4/18/14. (Attachments: # 1 Dionne Obituary, # 2 Moore Obituary (sj) (Entered: 04/18/2014)
522 NOTICE OF SERVICE by Perry Apsley of Notice of Service of Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (Gore, James) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
523 ORDER DISMISSING PARTY Melvin E. Kerns with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 05/23/2014. (aa) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
524 Unopposed MOTION to Dismiss Multiple Plaintiffs with Prejudice by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
525 ORDER OF PLAINTIFFS' DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE granting 524 Motion to Dismiss. Please see order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 05/27/2014. (aa) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
526 ORDER. Upon the court's own motion, the status conference set 7/1/2014 at 11:00 a.m. is CANCELLED and RESCHEDULED for 7/8/2014 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys via telephone conference call to be initiated by the court. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 6/10/14. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
528 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index and Exhibits 1−28)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 06/20/2014)
529 ORDER. The status conference set for July 8, 2014 at 11:00 a.m. with Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys is CANCELLED pending a ruling on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Multiple Plaintiffs (Doc. 527). IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 6/25/14. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.)(sj) (Entered: 06/25/2014)
530 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 528 Memorandum in Support of Motion correcting Exhibit 21 and inserting Exhibit 2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex 2)(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
531 MOTION to Certify for Rule 54(b) Certification by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells,

07/11/2014
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Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification)(Gore, James) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
532 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT of 531 MOTION to Certify for Rule 54(b) Certification by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young(Gore, James) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
533 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young re 527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs (Gore, James) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
534 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Reply as to 533 Response to Motion,,,,,,, to Dismiss by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
535 ORDER granting 534 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs Reply deadline 8/1/2014. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 7/24/2014. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
536 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 531 MOTION to Certify for Rule 54(b) Certification (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 07/25/2014)

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537 REPLY to Response to Motion by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re: 527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
538 Unopposed MOTION for extension of time to Serve Rule 26 Supplemental Disclosures by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/01/2014)
539 ORDER granting 538 Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Rule 26 Supplemental Disclosures. Deadline extended to 8/25/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 8/4/14. (sj) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
540 ORDER of 10CCA DISMISSING APPEAL as to 482 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment filed by Perry Apsley. ( Appeal No. 13−3240) (aa) (Entered: 08/22/2014)
541 MOTION to Amend Scheduling Order by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
542 ORDER granting 541 Defendants' uncontested Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. The pretrial conference set 9/26/14 at 11:00 a.m. is CANCELLED. See order for further details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys on 9/11/14. (sj) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
543 NOTICE of Hearing: THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE FOR THIS HEARING 527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs : (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) Motion Hearing set for 10/22/2014 at 01:30 PM in Courtroom 408 (EFM) before District Judge Eric F. Melgren. (cm) (Entered: 10/10/2014)
544 MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held before District Judge Eric F. Melgren: MOTION HEARING held on 10/22/2014 re 527 MOTION to Dismiss Party Multiple Plaintiffs filed by Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems. (Court Reporter Jo Wilkinson.) (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no.pdf document associated with this entry.) (cm) (Entered: 10/22/2014)
545 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 527 Motion to Dismiss Party; denying as moot 531 Motion to Certify. Please see M&O for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 01/06/2015. (aa) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
546 JUDGMENT. Signed by deputy clerk on 01/06/2015. (aa) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
547 CERTIFICATE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT by Court Reporter Jo Wilkinson (jw) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
548 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held October 22, 2014, before Judge Eric F. Melgren, Court Reporter Jo Wilkinson, 316−315−4334, jo_wilkinson@ksd.uscourts.gov. Transcript purchased by: Mr. James M. Armstrong.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: Within 7 calendar days of this filing, each party shall inform the Court, by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact, of the party's intent to redact personal data identifiers from the electronic transcript of the court proceeding. The policy is located on our website at www.ksd.uscourts.gov. Please read this policy carefully. If no Notice of Intent to Redact is filed within the allotted time, this transcript will be made electronically available on the date set forth below.

02/09/2015

Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/20/2015. (jw) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
549 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 546 Judgment, 545 Order on Motion to Dismiss Party, Order on Motion to Certify by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma

02/10/2015 02/10/2015 02/10/2015
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A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young. (Gore, James) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
APPEAL FEE STATUS: filing fee not paid re: Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment 549 on behalf of Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Gary Ball, Thomas Belton, Rocky R. Burris, Lloyd C. Fansler, Brian Groom, Ron W. Hendershot, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Danny R. Kennedy, Freddy J. McColpin, Cathy J. Munsell, Kent W. Owen, James E. Porter, Willard J. Ratchford, Richard D. Roeder, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Sammy J. Smith, Donald E. Titus, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Sylvester Williams, II. (THIS IS A TEXT ONLY ENTRY−NO DOCUMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TRANSACTION) (aa) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
550 PRELIMINARY RECORD ON APPEAL transmitted to 10CCA re 549 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Packet)(aa) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
551 APPEAL DOCKETED in 10CCA on 02/10/2015 and assigned Appeal No. 15−3026 re 549 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment,,,,,,, filed by James R. Wallace, Abel L. Vasquez, Ron W. Hendershot, Roy T. Wells, Freddy J. McColpin, Bob Bailey, Lowanda J. Patton, William D. Doshier, Kent W. Owen, Henry F. Butler, Peggy S. Bell, Linda L. Dezarn, Willard J. Ratchford, Walter Woods, Allen C. Hatcher, Ba Pham, Thomas Belton, James Bowmaker, Barbra Odom, Darlene E. Rozar, Olivia J. Housley, Redell Coleman, Jimmy Le, Joseph E. Schroeder, Linda C. Sparrar, Betty R. Young, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvyn J. Johnson, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Denise A. Harris, Jay E. Powell, Huyen T. Nguyen, Teddy F. Sill, Robert W. Boyd, Perry Apsley, Jerald J. Gilbert, Cathy J. Munsell, Michael B. Welsh, Jerry L. Bransteter, Loren W. Cox, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, David L. Clay, William H. Setchell, Steven Ngo, Rocky R. Burris, James Hammon, Carlton D. Lee, Betty Childers, Richard Gotthard, Larry W. James, Gordon B. Kinkead, James Walker, Melvin E. Kerns, Henry F. Victor, Chip Gilchrist, II, Stephen L. Linck, Janet M. Wilson, Charles Stark, Vernon L. Bentley, Larry E. Combs, Veronica Rios, Paul D. Pete, Jerry L. McKinney, Richard D. Roeder, Jan W. Murray, Brian Groom, Lloyd C. Fansler, Donald R. Jones, Sylvester Williams, II, Gary L. Johnson, Daniel D. Burrows, Richard Wallin, Donald E. Titus, James E. Porter, Warren Pyles, Mark McCurdy, Regina Sue Walker, Harvey J. Conyac, Alan S. Epperson, Frank Cash, Charles D. Elder, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Steven M. Schwind, Phyllis A. Cox, Albert Schloetzer, Sharon A. Southern, Sharron N. James, Brent L. Popp, Steven Basic, Glennys M. Montgomery, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Luyen D. Nguyen, Melonda Bircher, Throma A. Dyas, Jacob A. Bakk, Jimmy Wallace, Ralph O. Keener, Michael E. Burgardt, Gary Ball, Janet S. Hansen, Verna J. Houston, James C. Sheppard. Fee is due by 02/24/2015 in district court. (aa) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
552 (DISREGARD THIS DOCUMENT − DOCUMENT FILED IN THE WRONG COURT) −−− APPELLANT'S BRIEF by Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Gary Ball, Thomas Belton, Rocky R. Burris, Lloyd C. Fansler, Brian Groom, Ron W. Hendershot, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Danny R. Kennedy, Freddy J. McColpin, Cathy J. Munsell, Kent W. Owen, James E. Porter, Willard J. Ratchford, Richard D. Roeder, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Sammy J. Smith, Donald E. Titus, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Sylvester

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Williams, II. (Gore, James) Modified on 2/23/2015 (aa). (Entered: 02/22/2015)
553 ORDER of 10CCA as to 549 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, filed by James R. Wallace, Abel L. Vasquez, Ron W. Hendershot, Roy T. Wells, Freddy J. McColpin, Bob Bailey, Lowanda J. Patton, William D. Doshier, Kent W. Owen, Henry F. Butler, Peggy S. Bell, Linda L. Dezarn, Willard J. Ratchford, Walter Woods, Allen C. Hatcher, Ba Pham, Thomas Belton, James Bowmaker, Barbra Odom, Darlene E. Rozar, Olivia J. Housley, Redell Coleman, Jimmy Le, Joseph E. Schroeder, Linda C. Sparrar, Betty R. Young, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvyn J. Johnson, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Denise A. Harris, Jay E. Powell, Huyen T. Nguyen, Teddy F. Sill, Robert W. Boyd, Perry Apsley, Jerald J. Gilbert, Cathy J. Munsell, Michael B. Welsh, Jerry L. Bransteter, Loren W. Cox, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, David L. Clay, William H. Setchell, Steven Ngo, Rocky R. Burris, James Hammon, Carlton D. Lee, Betty Childers, Richard Gotthard, Larry W. James, Gordon B. Kinkead, James Walker, Melvin E. Kerns, Henry F. Victor, Chip Gilchrist, II, Stephen L. Linck, Janet M. Wilson, Charles Stark, Vernon L. Bentley, Larry E. Combs, Veronica Rios, Paul D. Pete, Jerry L. McKinney, Richard D. Roeder, Jan W. Murray, Brian Groom, Lloyd C. Fansler, Donald R. Jones, Sylvester Williams, II, Gary L. Johnson, Daniel D. Burrows, Richard Wallin, Donald E. Titus, James E. Porter, Warren Pyles, Mark McCurdy, Regina Sue Walker, Harvey J. Conyac, Alan S. Epperson, Frank Cash, Charles D. Elder, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Steven M. Schwind, Phyllis A. Cox, Albert Schloetzer, Sharon A. Southern, Sharron N. James, Brent L. Popp, Steven Basic, Glennys M. Montgomery, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Luyen D. Nguyen, Melonda Bircher, Throma A. Dyas, Jacob A. Bakk, Jimmy Wallace, Ralph O. Keener, Michael E. Burgardt, Gary Ball, Janet S. Hansen, Verna J. Houston, James C. Sheppard. Order filed by Clerk of the Court (CW) abating case until 3/10/2015 to allow the appellants to seek relief in the district court. The Appellants shall file a status report on or before 03/10/2015. See attached order for further information Served on 02/24/2015. ( Appeal No. 15−3026) (aa) (Entered: 02/26/2015)
554 MOTION for Leave to File Notice of Appeal Out of Time by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Out of Time)(Gore, James) Modified on 3/10/2015 (cs). (Entered: 03/08/2015)
555 RESPONSE by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems re 554 MOTION for Leave to File Notice of Appeal Out of Time (Thelen, Trisha) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
556 EXHIBIT(S) IN SUPPORT of 555 Response to Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal Out of Time by Defendants Boeing Company, The, Spirit Aerosystems(McClellan, Charles) (Entered: 03/11/2015)

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557 ORDER of 10CCA as to 549 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. Order filed by Clerk of the Court (CW) continuing abatement pending district court's ruling on the motion to file notice of appeal out of time. Status report due 04/10/2015 − and every 30 days thereafter until the district court rules on the motion − by Perry Apsley, et al. All electronic filings must contain ECF certificate. Fee is now due by 03/23/2015 for Perry Apsley, et al. ( Appeal No. 15−3026) (aa) (Entered: 03/12/2015)
558 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 554 Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal Out of Time. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 4/8/2015. (cm) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
559 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 558 Order on Motion for Leave to File by Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Jacob A. Bakk, Gary Ball, Steven Basic, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Peggy S. Bell, Thomas Belton, Vernon L. Bentley, Melonda Bircher, James Bowmaker, Robert W. Boyd, Jerry L. Bransteter, Michael E. Burgardt, Rocky R. Burris, Daniel D. Burrows, Henry F. Butler, Frank Cash, Betty Childers, David L. Clay, Redell Coleman, Larry E. Combs, Harvey J. Conyac, Loren W. Cox, Phyllis A. Cox, Linda L. Dezarn, William D. Doshier, Throma A. Dyas, Charles D. Elder, Alan S. Epperson, Lloyd C. Fansler, Jerald J. Gilbert, Chip Gilchrist, II, Richard Gotthard, Brian Groom, James Hammon, Janet S. Hansen, Denise A. Harris, Allen C. Hatcher, Ron W. Hendershot, Olivia J. Housley, Verna J. Houston, Larry W. James, Sharron N. James, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Melvyn J. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Ralph O. Keener, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvin E. Kerns, Gordon B. Kinkead, Jimmy Le, Carlton D. Lee, Stephen L. Linck, Freddy J. McColpin, Mark McCurdy, Jerry L. McKinney, Glennys M. Montgomery, Cathy J. Munsell, Jan W. Murray, Steven Ngo, Huyen T. Nguyen, Luyen D. Nguyen, Barbra Odom, Kent W. Owen, Lowanda J. Patton, Paul D. Pete, Ba Pham, Brent L. Popp, James E. Porter, Jay E. Powell, Warren Pyles, Willard J. Ratchford, Veronica Rios, Richard D. Roeder, Darlene E. Rozar, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Steven M. Schwind, William H. Setchell, James C. Sheppard, Teddy F. Sill, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Sharon A. Southern, Linda C. Sparrar, Charles Stark, Donald E. Titus, Abel L. Vasquez, Henry F. Victor, James Walker, Regina Sue Walker, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Roy T. Wells, Michael B. Welsh, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Sylvester Williams, II, Janet M. Wilson, Walter Woods, Betty R. Young. (Gore, James) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
APPEAL FEE STATUS: filing fee not paid re: Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, 559 on behalf of Plaintiffs Perry Apsley, Bob Bailey, Gary Ball, Thomas Belton, Rocky R. Burris, Lloyd C. Fansler, Brian Groom, Ron W. Hendershot, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, Gary L. Johnson, Donald R. Jones, Danny R. Kennedy, Freddy J. McColpin, Cathy J. Munsell, Kent W. Owen, James E. Porter, Willard J. Ratchford, Richard D. Roeder, Albert Schloetzer, Joseph E. Schroeder, Sammy J. Smith, Donald E. Titus, James R. Wallace, Jimmy Wallace, Richard Wallin, Sylvester Williams, II () (THIS IS A TEXT ONLY ENTRY−NO DOCUMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TRANSACTION) (aa) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
560 PRELIMINARY RECORD ON APPEAL transmitted to 10CCA re 559 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Preliminary Packet)(aa) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
561 APPEAL DOCKETED in 10CCA on 04/20/2015 and assigned Appeal No. 15−3094 re 559 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, filed by James R. Wallace, Abel L. Vasquez, Ron W. Hendershot, Roy T. Wells, Freddy J. McColpin, Bob Bailey, Lowanda J. Patton, William D. Doshier, Kent W. Owen, Henry F. Butler, Peggy S. Bell, Linda L. Dezarn, Willard J. Ratchford, Walter Woods, Allen C. Hatcher, Ba Pham, Thomas Belton, James Bowmaker, Barbra Odom, Darlene E. Rozar, Olivia J. Housley, Redell Coleman, Jimmy Le, Joseph E. Schroeder, Linda C. Sparrar, Betty R. Young, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvyn J. Johnson, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Denise A. Harris, Jay E. Powell, Huyen T. Nguyen, Teddy F. Sill, Robert W. Boyd, Perry Apsley, Jerald J. Gilbert, Cathy J. Munsell, Michael B. Welsh, Jerry L. Bransteter, Loren W. Cox, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, David L. Clay, William H. Setchell, Steven Ngo, Rocky R. Burris, James Hammon, Carlton D. Lee, Betty Childers, Richard Gotthard, Larry W. James, Gordon B. Kinkead, James Walker, Melvin E. Kerns, Henry F. Victor, Chip Gilchrist, II, Stephen L. Linck, Janet M. Wilson, Charles Stark, Vernon L. Bentley, Larry E. Combs, Veronica Rios, Paul D. Pete, Jerry L. McKinney, Richard D. Roeder, Jan W. Murray, Brian Groom, Lloyd C. Fansler, Donald R. Jones, Sylvester Williams, II,

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Gary L. Johnson, Daniel D. Burrows, Richard Wallin, Donald E. Titus, James E. Porter, Warren Pyles, Mark McCurdy, Regina Sue Walker, Harvey J. Conyac, Alan S. Epperson, Frank Cash, Charles D. Elder, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Steven M. Schwind, Phyllis A. Cox, Albert Schloetzer, Sharon A. Southern, Sharron N. James, Brent L. Popp, Steven Basic, Glennys M. Montgomery, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Luyen D. Nguyen, Melonda Bircher, Throma A. Dyas, Jacob A. Bakk, Jimmy Wallace, Ralph O. Keener, Michael E. Burgardt, Gary Ball, Janet S. Hansen, Verna J. Houston, James C. Sheppard. Fee is due by 05/04/2015 for Perry Apsley, et al. Transcript order form and docketing statement due 05/04/2015 for Perry Apsley, et al. Notice of appearance due on 05/04/2015 for Perry Apsley, et al. and The Boeing Company, et al. (Attachments: # 1 forms)(aa) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
562 ORDER of 10CCA DISMISSING APPEAL as to 549 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, filed by James R. Wallace, Abel L. Vasquez, Ron W. Hendershot, Roy T. Wells, Freddy J. McColpin, Bob Bailey, Lowanda J. Patton, William D. Doshier, Kent W. Owen, Henry F. Butler, Peggy S. Bell, Linda L. Dezarn, Willard J. Ratchford, Walter Woods, Allen C. Hatcher, Ba Pham, Thomas Belton, James Bowmaker, Barbra Odom, Darlene E. Rozar, Olivia J. Housley, Redell Coleman, Jimmy Le, Joseph E. Schroeder, Linda C. Sparrar, Betty R. Young, Danny R. Kennedy, Melvyn J. Johnson, Debra L. Smith, Sammy J. Smith, Denise A. Harris, Jay E. Powell, Huyen T. Nguyen, Teddy F. Sill, Robert W. Boyd, Perry Apsley, Jerald J. Gilbert, Cathy J. Munsell, Michael B. Welsh, Jerry L. Bransteter, Loren W. Cox, Dale C. Jayne, Jr, David L. Clay, William H. Setchell, Steven Ngo, Rocky R. Burris, James Hammon, Carlton D. Lee, Betty Childers, Richard Gotthard, Larry W. James, Gordon B. Kinkead, James Walker, Melvin E. Kerns, Henry F. Victor, Chip Gilchrist, II, Stephen L. Linck, Janet M. Wilson, Charles Stark, Vernon L. Bentley, Larry E. Combs, Veronica Rios, Paul D. Pete, Jerry L. McKinney, Richard D. Roeder, Jan W. Murray, Brian Groom, Lloyd C. Fansler, Donald R. Jones, Sylvester Williams, II, Gary L. Johnson, Daniel D. Burrows, Richard Wallin, Donald E. Titus, James E. Porter, Warren Pyles, Mark McCurdy, Regina Sue Walker, Harvey J. Conyac, Alan S. Epperson, Frank Cash, Charles D. Elder, Charles L. Bean, Jr, Steven M. Schwind, Phyllis A. Cox, Albert Schloetzer, Sharon A. Southern, Sharron N. James, Brent L. Popp, Steven Basic, Glennys M. Montgomery, Carolyn Y. Wheaton, Luyen D. Nguyen, Melonda Bircher, Throma A. Dyas, Jacob A. Bakk, Jimmy Wallace, Ralph O. Keener, Michael E. Burgardt, Gary Ball, Janet S. Hansen, Verna J. Houston, James C. Sheppard. The captioned appeal is dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 3.3(B) and 10th Cir. R. 42.1. ( Appeal No. 15−3026) (Attachments: # 1 Mandate issued letter)(aa) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
563 ORDER of 10CCA as to 559 Notice of Appeal − Final Judgment, filed by Plaintiffs. Order filed by Clerk of the Court (JKC) − Appellants shall file a response to the motion to dismiss within 10 days from the date of this order, this appeal will be subject to dismissal without further notice for failure to prosecute. 10th Cir. R. 42.1. In addition, the court notes that the fees for this appeal have not been paid. If the fees have not been paid to the district court within 10 days from the date of this order, this appeal may be dismissed without further notice pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 3.3(B). Response/Fee due on 06/15/2015 for Perry Apsley, et al. ( Appeal No. 15−3094) (aa) (Entered: 06/03/2015)
564 APPEAL MANDATE from 10CCA: dismissing appeal. (Appeal No. 15−3094) (Attachments: # 1 Mandate issued letter)(aa) (Entered: 06/17/2015)
565 COSTS TAXED in the amount of $54,326.02 against Plaintiffs re Bill of Costs 417 (jh) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
566 COSTS TAXED (AMENDED) in the amount of $50,425.49 as ordered pursuant to Memorandum and Order filed 8/26/2013 (Document 479) re Bill of Costs 417 (jh) (Entered: 08/14/2015)