In tlJe
Duitell ~tates Clrnurt nf Appeals
Jtor tlJe §JeuentlJ ((tircuit
No. 11-3261 JOHN SMENTEK, et al., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 C 529--Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.
SUBMITTED APRIL 23, 2012-DECIDED JUNE 19, 2012
Before POSNER, WOOD, and TINDER, Circuit Judges. POSNER, Circuit Judge. John Smentek and others, former inmates of Cook County Jail, are plaintiffs in this class action suit under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 against the County and its sheriff. The suit, filed in the federal district court in Chicago, charges that the defendants' failure to make more than a single dentist available to

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No. 11-3261

the jail's 10,000 inmates constitutes the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and thus violates both the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Most people held in jails as distinct from prisons, including most members of the plaintiff class, are pretrial detainees, and the cruel and unusual punishments clause does not apply to persons who though incarcerated have not been convicted and so are not being subjected to "punishment." But the due process clause has been interpreted to provide equivalent protection. E.g., Zentmyer v. Kendall County, 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000). It is because some of the members of the class are convicts housed in Cook County Jail that the suit advances claims under both amendments.
Vincent Smith, another former inmate of Cook County Jail, had brought a nearly identical suit prior to Smentek's bringing this one. Smith had asked the district court to certify a class consisting of "all persons who, while confined at Cook County Jail on and after June 29, 2005, requested but were not given timely treatment for dental pain." The district judge denied class certification in May 2008. Nine months later a different district judge in the same court denied class certification in a materially identical class action suit by still another former inmate of Cook County Jail, Lance Wrightsell. Then came Smentek, the third materially identical suit, filed in the same court in January 2009 and assigned to still another district judge. We don't understand why all three cases were not assigned to the same judge.

No. 11-3261

3

Besides the usual advantages of consolidation, it would have avoided the problem that has precipitated the appeal in this case, because a single judge would not be of different minds about three identical lawsuits.
Initially the district judge assigned to this case denied class certification on the ground that the denial in the two preceding class action suits (Smith and Wrightsell) barred, by operation of collateral estoppel, the grant of certification in the third. But the judge reversed her ruling and granted certification after the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011), that "neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties. What does have this effect is a class action approved under Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]." ld. at 2380. "The definition of the term 'party' can on no account be stretched so far as to cover a person ... whom the plaintiff in a lawsuit was denied leave to represent." ld. at 2379. We applied the Court's holding in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 10-2407, 2012 WL 1508226 (7th Cir. May 1, 2012), a case like the present one in which, after denial of class certification (one denial, not two as in this case), an unnamed class member filed an identical class action suit, though in a different court.
The Court in Smith v. Bayer Corp. suggested other means for limiting copycat class action litigation besides preclusion, and the defendants in the present case, who have petitioned us for leave to appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) from the grant of class certification, have fastened on one of them: "we would expect federal

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No. 11-3261

courts to apply principles of comity to each other's class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute. See, e.g., Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198 (2000) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936»." 131 S. Ct. at 2382.
We have granted the Rule 23(f) petition, limited to the question of when a district court, in deciding whether to certify a class, should "defer, based on the principles of comity, to a sister court's ruling on a motion for certification of a similar class."
The Court's reference to "comity" in Smith v. Bayer Corp. was cryptic. Neither of the two cases that the Court cited-Cortez and Landis-discusses comity; Cortez doesn't even mention the word. Both are cases about whether to stay one of two pending parallel suits, a question not presented by either this case or Smith v. Bayer Corp. No more than the two cases that the Court cited does Smith v. Bayer Corp. itself discuss the concept. And the similar suits at issue in that case were in different court systems-state and federal.
A standard definition of "comity" is "the respect that sovereign nations (or quasi-sovereigns such as the states of the United States) owe each other." Philips Medical Systems Int'l B. V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839); United States v. Kashamu, 656 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2011); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Homos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 423-24 (2d Cir. 2005). That was a consideration in Smith v. Bayer Corp., because the first class action had been

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5

filed in a state court and the copycat class action in a federal court; it is not a factor here, where all three suits were filed in federal court and based on federal law. But as in such cases as Landis, the word "comity" is used in a looser sense to caution judges against stepping on each other's toes when parallel suits are pending in different courts. See Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 980 (7th Cir. 2005); Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.c. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2007); Ulmet v. United States, 888 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1989). This is not such a case either, however, not only because only one court (though more than one judge) is hosting the parallel suits but also because the Smith and Wrightsel/ cases were over when Judge Lefkow granted the motion for class certification in the present case.
The version of comity announced in dictum in Smith v. Bayer Corp. is novel. It does not involve the mutual respect of sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns and it does not appear to be limited to cases in which parallel suits are pending in different courts (or before different judges) of the same sovereign. If it were so limited, it would have no application if the other parallel suits had been resolved, which may be true here, since class certification in the other Cook County Jail dental cases was denied-or at least very little application, since those cases may continue as individual suits by the former class representatives. The Supreme Court's opinion cites no authority for the extension of the doctrine of comity to mere disagreement between federal judges, and despite the reference to expecting "federal courts to

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apply principles of comity to each other's class certification decisions" (emphasis added), the Court seems really to have been thinking about cases involving federalstate comity, of which Smith v. Bayer Corp. was one.
Whatever the scope of the Supreme Court's current concept of comity, the defendants' argument that Smith v. Bayer Corp. adopted a rule of comity in class action suits that precludes granting class certification in a copycat class action must be rejected; for if the Court had adopted such a rule it would have affirmed the injunction granted in the district court in that case (and affirmed by the court of appeals) against the copycat class action suit, instead of reversing, as it did. It would have been adopting a rule of preclusion rather than rejecting such a rule. True, the effect of the doctrine of comity, when it is successfully invoked, is preclusive. But unlike res judicata, it is a doctrine that does not require but merely permits preclusion, except (as we're about to see) when it governs choice of forum. The mandatory comity for which the defendants in our case contend is just another name for collateral estoppel. The defendants are wrong to think comity a synonym for collateral estoppel, which if true would as we said have required affirmance in Smith v. Bayer Corp.
One can imagine the Supreme Court's ruling that comity between district judges in class certification cases is a doctrine of preclusion, but there's no suggestion of that in Smith v. Bayer Corp. and it would be a surprising rule. It would give comity greater force between two judges of the same court than between two nations each

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jealous of its sovereign authority and demanding respect from other nations. Not that there isn't a serious problem of judge shopping in the disordered realm of class action litigation, a problem well illustrated by this case and its two predecessors taken all together. Without a rule of preclusion, class action lawyers can do what the lawyer here (and the lawyer in Thorogood) did: keep bringing identical class actions with new class representatives until they draw a judge who is willing to certify the class. We are troubled to learn that when the district judge in this case certified the class there were twelve Cook County Jail dental suits pending in the Northern District of Illinois in addition to the two (Wrightsell and Smith) in which certification had been rejected, though we don't know in how many of these cases class certification was sought.
But what is the solution to the judge-shopping problem? How are courts or legislatures to prevent class action litigation from metastasizing? The rule urged by the defendants in this case that the denial of class certification bars the certification of the same or a similar class in a suit by a member of the same class as the previous suit might do the trick, but it would contradict the holding of Smith v. Bayer Corp., which is that a class member who did not become a party to the previous parallel class action is not precluded from seeking class certification in his class action. Cases such as Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103-05 (1981); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Younger v. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 43-44, and Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 1995),

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No. 11-3261

which in the name of comity bar a plaintiff from one forum because another is deemed more appropriate, are not in point; if Smentek and the other named plaintiffs are barred from seeking class certification by virtue of the previous denials, they cannot bring a class action anywhere else. They could file a class action claim in an Illinois state court, but the defendants' concept of comity would require the state court to dismiss it. Yet theirs is the kind of case that as a practical matter probably cannot be litigated other than as a class action because most cases of delayed treatment of dental pain do not hold out a prospect of significant damages.
We are left with the weak notion of "comity" as requiring a court to pay respectful attention to the decision of another judge in a materially identical case, but no more than that even if it is a judge of the same court or a judge of a different court within the same judiciary. We emphasize, however, the qualification in "materially identical." Even two class actions involving the same class may differ materially, for example in the suitability of the class representative or the adequacy of class counsel, and where they do the judge in the second, or third, or nth class action is on his own. This is not such a case; nevertheless the district judge gave plausible reasons for her disagreement with the judges in the two previous Cook County dental cases. Can more be required? The defendants' claim that she was bound by the decisions of the other judges just because those decisions preceded and were contrary to her decision has no basis in law and flouts the principle that a district court decision does not have precedential effect. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct.

No. 11-3261

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2020,2033 n. 7 (2011); Wirtz v. City of South Bend, 669 F.3d 860, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2012). The defendants would have such decisions treated not as mere precedents but as super-precedents that no court lacking appellate authority could question.
The district judge's grant of class certification is therefore affirmed. But this is not to say that the judge's ruling was correct; maybe the other two judges were correct. The appeal asks us to decide only whether comity between federal district judges' rulings on class certification is preclusive. We have decided: it is not.

6-19-12

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 35 Filed: 09/08/09 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:473

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, MALCOLM PATTON, )

AND MELVIN PHILLIPS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

) No. 09 CV 00529

-vs-

)

) (Judge Lefkow)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY,

)

and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

)

)

Defendants.

)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pursuant to leave of Court, plaintiffs ﬁle this second amended complaint and, by counsel, allege as follows:

1. This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1343.

2. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, The Sheriff is sued in his ofﬁcial capacity only.

Illinois.

3. Defendants are responsible for providing medical and dental care to prisoners at the Cook County Jail.

4. Defendants have at all times known that broken, infected, or otherwise diseased teeth and gums can be excruciatingly painful and, if untreated, can result in serious permanent injury.

5. Defendants have also at all times known that dental care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates.

6. At all times relevant, defendants have declined to screening of persons being processed into the jail and

require a dental have required

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 35 Filed: 09/08/09 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:474 - 2 -
prisoners who were in need of dental treatment to endure a lengthy wait before receiving treatment.
7. In 2007, defendants effectively discontinued dental services by eliminating the positions of all but one dentist, who was to be responsible for the care of the ten thousand persons.
8. Defendants’ above described actions were taken in deliberate indifference to the dental needs of prisoners at the Cook County Jail.
9. Plaintiff John Smentek was conﬁned at the Cook County Jail from September 22, 2007 to March 14, 2008.
a. Within two weeks of entering the jail, Smentek began to experience severe tooth pain and submitted a request for dental services.
b. Plaintiff Smentek did not receive a response to his ﬁrst request for dental services. Thereafter, Smentek submitted numerous additional requests for dental services.
c. Plaintiff Smentek did not receive any dental services while he was conﬁned at the Jail.
d. On or about March 14, 2008, Smentek was transferred to the Illinois Department of Corrections.
e. While in the Illinois Department of Corrections, Smentek received dental services and was required to undergo fourteen or ﬁfteen tooth extractions.
f. As the result of defendant’s policies, plaintiff Smentek experienced great pain and suffering and incurred permanent damage to his mouth.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 35 Filed: 09/08/09 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:475 - 3 -
10. Numerous other prisoners at the Cook County Jail have experienced similar injuries as a result of defendants’ policy of requiring prisoners who are in need of dental treatment to endure a lengthy wait before receiving treatment. Accordingly, plaintiff Smentek brings this action individually and pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) for All persons who, while conﬁned at the Cook County Jail on and after June 29, 2005, made a request for treatment of dental pain and were not treated by a dentist within 7 days of that request.
11. Plaintiff Malcolm Patton entered the Cook County Jail on November 17, 2008 and is presently conﬁned in Division 1 at the Jail.
a. In January of 2009, Patton began to experience severe tooth pain, accompanied by bleeding gums.
b. Between January and April of 2009, Patton submitted more than ten requests to see a dentist.
c. Patton began to ﬁle grievances after his requests for dental services were ignored.
d. Patton ﬁled his ﬁrst grievance in April of 2009 and was "referred to dental services."
e. Patton ﬁled another grievance in June of 2009 and was advised on June 17, 2009 that he would be scheduled for "dental sick call."
f. Patton had not seen a dentist as of July 10, 2009, and is presently experiencing severe tooth pain, bleeding gums, and headaches.
12. Plaintiff Melvin Phillips entered the Cook County Jail on February 12, 2008 and is presently conﬁned in Division 9 at the Jail.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 35 Filed: 09/08/09 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:476 - 4 -
a. In March of 2009, Phillips began to experience severe tooth pain when a ﬁlling came loose.
b. Between March and May of 2009, Phillips submitted more than ten requests to see a dentist.
c. Phillips has to date ﬁled three grievances complaining about his unfulﬁlled need to see a dentist. None of these grievances resulted in treatment by a dentist before Phillips sought joined in this lawsuit.
d. On July 27, 2009, while the motion to add Phillips as a plaintiff was pending, a dentist at the jail examined Phillips. The dentist concluded that two extractions were required to alleviate Phillips’ suffering and that this surgery could not be performed until X-rays were taken of Phillips’ jaw.
e. As of September 3, 2009, X-rays have not been taken of Phillips’ jaw and he had not been treated for his increasingly painful condition. Phillips is in constant pain and, because of the pain, is unable to sleep through the night.
13. Plaintiffs Patton and Phillips are experiencing pain and are incurring physical injury as the direct and proximate result of defendants’ deliberate indifference to the dental needs of prisoners at the Cook County Jail.
14. Many prisoners at the Jail in addition to Patton and Phillips are incurring physical injury from defendants’ refusal to provide adequate dental services. There is no adequate remedy at law for defendants’ refusal to provide adequate dental services. Accordingly, plaintiffs Patton and Phillips bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 35 Filed: 09/08/09 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:477 - 5 -

Procedure to obtain prospective injunctive relief for

All persons presently conﬁned at the Cook County Jail who are

experiencing dental pain and who have waited for more than seven

days after having complained about that pain

without having

received treatment by a dentist.

15. Plaintiffs hereby demand trial by jury on their claims for damages.

Wherefore plaintiffs request that appropriate injunctive relief be granted for the class of persons presently conﬁned at the Jail who are in need of dental services, that appropriate damages be awarded to each member of the class proposed by plaintiff Smentek, and that the Court grant whatsoever other relief as may be appropriate.

/__s_/_K__e_n_n_e_t_h__N_.__F_l_a_x_man
KENNETH N. FLAXMAN ARDC No. 830399 200 S Michigan Ave Ste 1240 Chicago, IL 60604-2430
(312) 427-3200 (phone) (312) 427-3930 (fax) knf@kenlaw.com (email)
THOMAS G. MORRISSEY 10249 South Western Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60643 (773) 233-7900
attorneys for plaintiffs

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 35 Filed: 09/08/09 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:478
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of September, 2009, I electronically ﬁled the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notiﬁcation of such ﬁling to the following: Michael L. Gallagher, ASA, 500 Daley Center, Chicago, IL 60602, and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non CM/ECF participants: none.
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman ______________________ Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC Number 08830399 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 1240 Chicago, IL 60604-2430 (312) 427-3200 (phone) (312) 427-3930 (fax) knf@kenlaw.com (email)

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, MALCOLM

)

PATTON, MELVIN PHILLIPS,

)

RODELL SANDERS, and FRANK

)

POWICKI, individually and for all

)

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and )

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 09 C 529 Judge Joan H. Lefkow

OPINION AND ORDER

John Smentek, Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki

(collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action against the Sheriff of Cook County and

Cook County (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that defendants, in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, maintain a policy of deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’ right to receive timely and

appropriate dental care while confined at the Cook County Jail (“the jail”). Before the court is

plaintiffs’ motion to certify two classes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and

(3). For the following reasons, the motion [#50] is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

In 2006, four dentists and eight dental assistants served the approximately 10,000

detainees held at the jail. In 2007, this number was reduced, leaving only one dentist to serve the

inmate population. Dental services were also limited to extractions. Over 200 inmates filed

grievances regarding dental care in 2007. Since this time, the number of dentists has gradually

increased, with two dentists serving the jail population in 2008. In July 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that the jail was not adequately providing dental services to its population. In March 2010, defendants entered into an agreed order with the United States to “ensure that inmates receive adequate dental care, and follow up, in accordance with generally accepted correctional standards of care.” Ex. 8 to Defs.’ Resp. at 37. Under the order, dental care is not to be limited to extractions, and defendants are to ensure that dental staffing is adequate to avoid treatment delays.
While confined at the jail, plaintiffs all experienced dental pain and significant delays in treatment, if treated at all. Smentek was housed at the jail between September 22, 2007 and March 14, 2008. He began to experience severe tooth pain about two weeks after entering the jail. He requested dental services several times but never received attention before he was transferred to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). While in IDOC custody, he had fourteen or fifteen teeth extracted. Patton has been housed at the jail since November 17, 2008. He experienced severe tooth pain and bleeding gums, for which he submitted over ten requests to see a dentist between January and April 2009. He then submitted grievances requesting dental services and only saw a dentist after he joined this suit. Phillips has been confined at the jail since February 12, 2008. Beginning in March 2009, upon experiencing severe tooth pain due to a loose filling, he submitted over ten requests and three grievances to see a dentist. He was only examined by a dentist in July 2009, after he sought to join this suit. Although the dentist concluded that two extractions were necessary, it took two additional months before this was done. Sanders was admitted to the jail on May 18, 2007 and remains confined there. He began experiencing tooth pain in fall 2008 and subsequently filed various
2

requests and grievances requesting to see a dentist. In early 2009, with a swollen jaw and infected gums, he met with a doctor, who concluded that Sanders needed to see a dentist. On May 4, 2009, a dentist told Sanders that he needed a root canal and filling, but that he could only perform extractions. Powicki has been housed at the jail since February 24, 2010.1 Shortly thereafter, he requested to see a dentist for a cracked tooth causing him pain on the right side of his head. He filed grievances on March 28, 2010 and May 8, 2010, complaining that his tooth was causing him earaches, headaches, and extreme pain. As of May 17, 2010, Powicki had not seen a dentist for this pain.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ decision to decrease the number of dentists from four to one in 2007 caused them to experience unnecessary pain and unreasonable treatment delays. Plaintiffs seek to certify two classes. The first class, under Rule 23(b)(2), is defined as “[a]ll persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited for more than seven days after having complained about that pain without having been examined by a dentist.” Pls.’ Mot. for Class Certification at 1. The second class, under Rule 23(b)(3), is defined as “[a]ll persons who, while confined at the Cook County Jail on and after January 1, 2007, made a request for treatment of dental pain and were not examined by a dentist within 7 days of that request.” Id.
LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking to certify a class action must meet two conditions. First, the movant must show the putative class satisfies the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a);
1 An inmate query indicates that Powicki has since been transferred to IDOC custody.
3

Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1992). Second, the action must qualify under at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1017; Hardin v. Harshbarger, 814 F. Supp. 703, 706 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Here, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and (3). Rule 23(b)(2) requires a finding that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Courts retain broad discretion in determining whether a proposed class meets the Rule 23 certification requirements. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the requirements for class certification have been met. Hardin, 814 F. Supp. at 706. The requirements of Rule 23 should be liberally construed to support the policy favoring the maintenance of class actions. King v. Kansas City S. Indus., 519 F.2d 20, 25–26 (7th Cir. 1975), .
ANALYSIS I. Collateral Estoppel
Two courts in this district have already denied certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class in the same or very similar circumstances as presented here. Defendants argue that these adverse decisions bar certification of plaintiffs’ proposed classes. For collateral estoppel to apply, the
4

following four conditions must be met: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked was represented in the prior action.” Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir.2000).
A. Prior Cases In Smith v. Sheriff of Cook County, the court declined to certify a class of “all persons who, while confined at the Cook County Jail on and after June 29, 2005, made a request for treatment of dental pain and did not receive timely treatment of a dentist.” No. 07 C 3659, 2008 WL 1995059, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2008), and reconsideration denied, 2008 WL 4866071 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2008). In its initial opinion on the issue, the court concluded that the class did not satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements, as proving deliberate indifference is fact specific and requires each individual plaintiff to show that he required dental care, did not receive adequate dental care, and suffered significant injury due to the inadequate care. 2008 WL 1995059, at *2. Plaintiffs then sought reconsideration, arguing that they were challenging the “systemic inadequacy of dental services at the Cook County Jail,” an issue common to all members of the proposed class. 2008 WL 4866071, at *1. While acknowledging that systemwide indifference could potentially be established in one proceeding, the court declined to reconsider its order, finding that causation and the impact of the systematic indifference would still vary from one plaintiff to another, raising concerns of predominance and superiority. Id. at *1–2. After the Seventh Circuit declined to review the district court’s decision, the individual plaintiffs’ claims were settled and dismissed with prejudice. No. 07 C 3659, Docket No. 53.
5

Subsequently, in Wrightsell v. Sheriff of Cook County, the court denied certification of a class of “[a]ll persons who, while confined at the Cook County Jail on and after September 23, 2006, made a request for treatment of dental pain and were not examined by a dentist within 7 days of that request.” No. 08 CV 5451, 2009 WL 482370, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009). Relying on the reasoning in Smith, the court found that “[i]ndividual – not common – issues predominate in the case, and a class action would not be a superior means of resolving the alleged Eighth Amendment claim regarding dental care at the Cook County Jail.” Id. at *3. Although the class definition had been modified from that proposed in Smith by specifying that untimely treatment meant an inmate not being examined by a dentist within seven days of requesting treatment of dental pain, the court concluded that this limitation could be unreasonable for certain dental emergencies but reasonable for minor problems. Id. The court also concluded that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Arreola v. Godinez, “that the need for individual damages determinations does not, in and of itself, require denial of [a] motion for certification,” 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008), did not require certification. 2009 WL 482370, at *4. As in Smith, the Seventh Circuit declined Wrightsell’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f). Wrightsell subsequently accepted defendants’ offer of judgment and relinquished any right to appeal the class certification denial. Nonetheless, he filed a notice of appeal, which defendants moved to dismiss. Smentek sought to intervene in the Seventh Circuit, acknowledging that “Wrightsell may not have standing to seek review of the district court’s adverse class determination for the unnamed members of the class.” Wrightsell v. Sheriff of Cook County, 599 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit determined that Wrightsell could not pursue the appeal and that, in order to
6

intervene and pursue the appeal, Smentek would have had to have moved to intervene in the district court within the time allowed for filing a notice of appeal. Id. As Smentek had not done this and could not offer an excuse for failing to do so, the Seventh Circuit denied his motion to intervene. Id.
B. Application to This Action 1. Representation in the Prior Action
Although plaintiffs were not named parties in Smith or Wrightsell, they are bound by the court’s decisions denying class certification if they were adequately represented by the named litigants and class counsel. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 533 U.S. 880, 884, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008) (“In a class action, for example, a person not named as a party may be bound by a judgment on the merits of the action, if she was adequately represented by a party who actively participated in the litigation.”). “Just as [unnamed class members] receive the fruits of victory, so an adverse decision is conclusive against them.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768. Plaintiffs do not challenge the adequacy of representation in the previous actions. In fact, it would be anomalous for them to do so, as counsel for plaintiffs in this case also represented the plaintiffs in Smith and Wrightsell.
2. Same Issue In this case, plaintiffs seek certification of two classes, one for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and one for monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3). The Rule 23(b)(3) class that plaintiffs seek to certify is nearly identical to that in Wrightsell, the only difference being that the beginning date for plaintiffs’ proposed class is approximately three months later than that
7

proposed in Wrightsell. Wrightsell, 599 F.3d at 782. Plaintiffs have not attempted to correct the flaws identified in Wrightsell by amending the class definition. Cf. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 579 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (collateral estoppel was not appropriate where the plaintiff proposed a class that “on its face” sought to correct the flaws that a previous district court found warranted denial of class certification). Their arguments for certification of this class are basically recycled from previous attempts at certification. This leaves no doubt that the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in Wrightsell, namely, certification of a class of inmates at the jail who have requested treatment of dental pain but have not been examined within seven days of that request.2
This is, however, the first attempt at certifying a class for injunctive relief. Thus, Wrightsell does not preclude certification of the proposed 23(b)(2) class, although its reasoning, and that of Smith, as to satisfaction of the Rule 23(a) requirements may be considered persuasive authority.
3. Final Judgment A final judgment, for purposes of collateral estoppel, “includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1980)). In determining whether a judgment is final, the court may consider “the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and
2 The class definition in Smith was slightly different, as plaintiffs there did not place a time limit on how long an inmate would have had to wait after making a request for treatment before being considered a class member, instead leaving open the interpretation of “timely treatment.” The change in class definition from Smith to Wrightsell to specify that a seven day delay in receiving treatment would be considered untimely presumably made collateral estoppel not applicable in Wrightsell and makes Wrightsell, and not Smith, the opinion on which this court would base a finding of collateral estoppel.
8

the opportunity for review,” along with whether the court’s decision was supported by a reasoned opinion. Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964)).
The Seventh Circuit initially denied Wrightsell’s petition for leave to appeal and dismissed his subsequent appeal after Wrightsell settled the case and waived his right to appeal. The fact that the Seventh Circuit did not review the merits of the denial of class certification does not render collateral estoppel inapplicable, as plaintiffs argue, for a judgment need not have been appealed or reviewed by the appellate court for it to be given preclusive effect. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. 84 F.3d 998, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . requires only a judgment that is final in the court rendering it, and not a judgment that is final after exhaustion of appellate remedies . . . .” (citing Prymer v. Ogden, 29 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994), and Williams v. Comm’r, 1 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 1993)). The district court’s decision is “immune, as a practical matter, to reversal or amendment.” Miller Brewing Co., 605 F.2d at 996. Both sides had more than an adequate opportunity to present their positions on whether certification of a class was appropriate. The court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, incorporating Smith’s reasoning and explaining its rejection of Wrightsell’s arguments for why Smith should not apply to his case.
4. Issue Actually Litigated and Essential to the Final Judgment There is no question that the appropriateness of class certification was actually litigated in the Wrightsell case. As in Wrightsell, plaintiffs argue that defendants’ actions in 2007 in reducing the number of dentists at the jail to one caused them to suffer unnecessarily and amounts to deliberate indifference. The Wrightsell court found that certification was
9

inappropriate because individual issues predominated over the common issue of whether the dental staff size was inadequate and a class action would not be “a superior means of resolving the alleged Eighth Amendment claim regarding dental care at the Cook County Jail.” Wrightsell, 2009 WL 482370, at *3. The issue was litigated as vigorously in that case as in the present, and the court’s conclusion with respect to predominance and superiority was essential to the denial of class certification. In such a situation, where the requirements of collateral estoppel are met, counsel is not entitled “to treat the resolution as irrelevant and start anew” in front of a different judge in the hopes of obtaining a different resolution. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767. Although not precluded from proceeding individually, plaintiffs have lost the right to proceed on their claims as representatives of the Rule 23(b)(3) class. “[T]hat’s the upshot of a fully contested litigation in which every potential class member was adequately represented on this issue.” Id. at 769. II. Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Defendants initially argue that plaintiffs’ proposed class for injunctive relief is barred by a recent consent order in United States of America v. Cook County, No. 10 C 2946, Docket No. 13 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2010). The order is intended to “protect the constitutional rights of the inmates detained at the [Jail].” Id. at 3. With respect to dental care, the order provides:
a. Cermak [the health services provider at the Jail] shall ensure that inmates receive adequate dental care, and follow up, in accordance with generally accepted correctional standards of care. Such care should be provided in a timely manner, taking into consideration the acuity of the problem and the inmate’s anticipated length of stay. Dental care shall not be limited to extractions.
10

b. Cermak shall ensure that adequate dentist staffing and hours shall be provided to avoid unreasonable delays in dental care. Id. at 37. Although the United States may seek enforcement of the order if it determines defendants are not in substantial compliance, the order makes clear that no other party, such as plaintiffs here, may enforce its terms. Id. at 53–54. Further, the order provides that “no person or entity may assert any claim or right as a beneficiary or protected class under this Agreed Order” and that it “is not intended to impair or expand the right of any person or organization to seek relief against Defendants or their officials, employees, or agents for their conduct.” Id. at 2. Because the order makes clear that it is not barring an individual housed at the jail from bringing a class action for injunctive relief, defendants’ argument to that effect fails. Defendants then argue that the court should not certify the Rule 23(b)(2) class because there is no longer a need for injunctive relief, as the jail “currently provides both adequate and timely care to the detainees.” Defs.’ Resp. at 11. While the affidavit submitted by Dr. Townsend suggests that improvements have been made in dental services at the jail, it is not the court’s role at this stage to determine the merits of the claim. “If the prerequisites and conditions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are met, a court may not deny class status because there is no ‘need’ for it.” Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972). The court will therefore turn to whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. A. Sufficiently Defined Class Defendants contend that the proposed class definition does not set forth an identifiable class because “dental pain” is too vague a concept to allow the court to determine who is included in the class. The court need not consider the various diagnoses that the term “dental pain” encompasses or the various treatments that could result, however, for plaintiffs are
11

generally challenging the alleged substandard level of dental services available at the jail. Regardless of the various causes of dental pain, putative class members included those who complained about any type of dental pain and have waited more than seven days for necessary treatment. Plaintiffs make clear that their reference to complaints about dental pain means formal complaints memorialized in written documents, such as a detainee health service request form or a grievance form. See Pls.’ Reply at 8. This makes the class readily ascertainable. To make it explicitly clear who is a class member, however, the court will modify the class definition so that it reads: “All persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited for more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.”
Defendants also argue that certifying this class would make failure to render dental treatment within seven days actionable by detainees. Including such a time period in a class definition does not equate to a finding that a delay of seven days in providing treatment is automatically unreasonable and actionable. Plaintiffs will still have to establish the underlying elements of a constitutional violation to prevail on their claim. While the “proposed time period could be inconsistent in some cases with the constitutional requirement,” Wrightsell, 2009 WL 482370, at *3, this is an issue that influences whether the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of predominance is met or whether plaintiffs can prevail on their claim but does not affect whether the class is ascertainable.
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B. Rule 23(a) Requirements Defendants challenge plaintiffs’ ability to meet the requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Those plaintiffs who remain in the jail’s custody, specifically Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, and Rodell Sanders, are adequate representatives for the Rule 23(b)(2) class. Plaintiffs have also met the low hurdles of establishing commonality and typicality. See Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 57 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“[T]he typicality requirement is liberally construed.”); Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 143 F.R.D. 181, 185 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“[T]he commonality requirement has been characterized as a ‘low hurdle’ easily surmounted.”). They claim that inmates with dental pain are suffering unnecessary and prolonged pain due to defendants’ decision to reduce dental services at the jail, particularly in reducing the number of dentists employed there to one. Whether this decision has caused unnecessary pain and delay is a question common to the class and based on the same conduct of defendants. See Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., 178 F.R.D. 493, 496 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that if at least one question of law or fact is common to the class, commonality is satisfied). Plaintiffs, along with the unnamed class members, are all subject to the same alleged practice. Although differences in plaintiffs’ and the class members’ injuries and treatment times are undeniable, this is not fatal to a finding of typicality as “[t]ypical does not mean identical.” Gaspar, 167 F.R.D. at 57. Where injunctive relief alone is at issue, individualized issue should be minimal. Defendants, relying on Smith, argue that the need to consider individual issues defeats commonality and typicality. The denial of class certification in Smith, although initially framed as a failure to meet the commonality and typicality requirements, is better read as finding that
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predominance and superiority, requirements for a Rule 23(b)(3) class, were not met. See Smith, 2008 WL 4866071, at *2. Such an interpretation is supported by the Seventh Circuit’s recent cases decertifying Rule 23(b)(3) classes regarding the amount of time that is reasonable for a detainee to be held after posting bond. See Portis v. City of Chicago, 613 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2010); Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009). In these cases, the court held that common questions do not predominate “[b]ecause reasonableness is a standard rather than a rule, and because one detainee’s circumstances differ from another’s.” Portis, 613 F.3d at 705; Harper, 581 F.3d at 515; see also McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Delay is not a factor that is either always, or never, significant. Instead, the length of delay that is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.”). The court does not read these decisions, which did not address Rule 23(a), as importing the analysis of whether common issues predominate over individual ones into the inquiry into commonality and typicality. Indeed, while the Rule 23(b)(3) class in Portis was decertified, the Seventh Circuit left open the possibility that a class for injunctive relief could be certified based on a claim that defendant had a policy of deliberate delay. Portis, 613 F.3d at 705–06. As plaintiffs here argue that delay in treatment occurred because of a deliberate choice to decrease the availability of dental services, certification of a class for injunctive relief to counter that alleged policy is appropriate.3 Whether plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate a policy of
3 Defendants do not argue that plaintiffs cannot meet Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirement that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). An injunction ordering defendants to increase the number of dentists employed to treat the jail’s inmate population would generally address plaintiffs’ complaints.
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deliberate delay and prevail on their claim for injunctive relief are issues the court need not address today.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification [#50] is granted in part and denied in part. The court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(2) defined as: All persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist. This case will be called for status on December 16, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiffs’ counsel will be expected to report on what relief he believes would be availale that has not been achieved in United States v. Cook County, Case No.10 C 2946.

Dated: November 18, 2010

Enter:___________________________________ JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW United States District Judge

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 Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:1602

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNSMENTEK,MALCOLM

)

PATTON, MELVIN PHILLIPS,

)

RODELL SANDERS, and FRANK

)

POWICKI, individually and for all

)

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and )

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 09 C 529 Judge Joan H. Lefkow

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the portion of this court's November 18,2010 opinion

and order denying certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. The court's denial was based on a

finding that collateral estoppel precluded certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. That finding

relied on In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th

Cir. 2003), in which the Seventh Circuit held that an unnamed putative class member is bound by

a decision denying class certification in a prior action if he or she was adequately represented by

the named litigant and class counsel. The Supreme Court recently abrogated this holding in

Smith v. Bayer Corp.,--- U.S.----, 131 S. Ct. 2368,2380-81, 180 L. Ed. 2d 341 (2011). This

change in the law warrants reconsideration of the appropriateness of certifYing a Rule 23(b)(3)

class.

Defendants concede that, under Smith, class certification is not barred by collateral

estoppel. They argue that the court should nonetheless follow the court's decisions in Smith v.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:1603
Sherif!ofCook County, No. 07 C 3659,2008 WL 1995059 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2008), reconsideration denied, 2008 WL 4866071 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2008), and Wrightsell v. Sherif!of Cook County, No. 08 CV 5451, 2009 WL 4823 70 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009), and deny plaintiffs' latest attempt at certification. While not bound by this court's conclusions in Smith or Wrightsell, see Midlock v. Apple Vacations West, Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 457-58 (7th Cir. 2005), the court will take those decisions into account as persuasive authority. See Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2382 ("[W]e would expect federal courts to apply principles of comity to each other's class certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.").
In their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs have again altered their proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class definition. Whereas plaintiffs previously sought to certify a class of individuals who requested treatment of dental pain and were not examined by a dentist within seven days of the request, they now propose the following class:
Any person who, while confined at the Cook County Jail on and after January 1, 2007, made a request for treatment of dental pain, was not examined by a health care professional authorized to dispense pain medication within 24 hours after making that request, and thereby endured pain. This change does not affect the court's prior conclusion that Rule 23(a)'s requirements are met. 1 Thus, the court need only address Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements. A. Predominance of common issues Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class can be maintained if "questions of law or fact common
1 Defendants note that they do not concede that the commonality requirement is met, particularly in light of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,--- U.S.----, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011). That case involved a putative class of 1.5 million employed at 3,400 stores and had many difficult issues not present here.
2

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to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and ... a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). To determine whether predominance and superiority are satisfied, courts examine "the substantive elements of plaintiffs' claims, the proof necessary for those elements, and the manageability of trial on those issues." Reedv. Advocate Health Care, No. 06-c-3337, 2009 WL 3146999, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009) (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1981)).
"Although related to Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement, 'the predominance inquiry is far more demanding.' To satisfY this aspect of Rule 23(b)(3), 'the plaintiff must show that common issues not only exist but outweigh the individual questions. The common questions must be central to all claims."' Pavone v. Aegis Lending Corp., No. 05-c-1529, 2006 WL 2536632, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2006) (quoting, inter alia, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,623-24,117 S. Ct. 2231,2250,138 L. Ed. 2d689 (1997)). Plaintiffs need only show that common proof will predominate with respect to their claims. Driver v. Applelllinois, LLC, 265 F.R.D. 293,311 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
The central issue will be whether defendants' reduction (or, as plaintiffs characterize it, "obliterat[ation]") of dental services at the Cook County Jail resulted in a constitutional violation, or deliberate indifference, causing class members to suffer prolonged and unnecessary pain. Deliberate indifference may be established by "proving that there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care." Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269,272 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559,575 (lOth Cir. 1980)). The information
3

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submitted on the motion, including a report of the United States Department of Justice into the Jail's failure to provide dental care2 leaves little dispute that the reduction in dental staff at the Jail caused treatment delays. Such delays in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference. See McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010); Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 201 0).
Courts routinely certifY classes under Rule 23(b)(3) challenging uniform policies related to conditions of confinement. See Floodv. Dominguez, No. 2:08 CV 153 PPS PRC, 2011 WL 238265, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2011) (collecting cases from district courts in the Seventh Circuit); Streeter v. SheriffofCook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 614 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ("When a proposed class challenges a uniform policy, the validity ofthat policy tends to be the predominant issue in the litigation."); Calvin v. Sheriffof Will County, No. 03 C 3086, 2004 WL 1125922, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004). On the other hand, Smith and Wrightsell concluded that individual issues would predominate over the policy issue, on the basis that proof of liability would require each plaintiff, as well as each class member, to show "[first,] that he had a condition that required dental care; second, that he did not receive adequate dental care; third, that he suffered significant injury or harm; and fourth, that the injury or harm was causally related to the inadequate care." Smith, 2008 WL 1995059, *2; see Wrightsell, 2009 WL 482370, at *3 ("The reasonableness of the time of treatment measured from seven days of a detainee's request could be umeasonable for a very obvious and serious painful dental emergency requiring
2 The Department of Justice issued a report in July 2008 finding broad deficiencies in dental services after a June 2007 on-site visit to the Jail, including "that the [sole] dentist [for 10,000 inmates] typically was unable to treat inmates with serious or urgent dental needs." Ex. 2 to Dkt. No. 13 at 57-58. It continued, "Despite having Cermak [Hospital] physicians treat these serious dental emergencies, inmates continue to suffer needlessly because they do not receive appropriate follow-up care." Id.
4

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:1606
immediate treatment. Conversely, treatment for a minor dental problem could be adequate even if provided two weeks or more from the date ofthe request."). But individualized issues of causation do not necessarily preclude class certification. See Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
Although reluctant to give plaintiffs' counsel yet another bite at the class issue when he failed to persuade Judge Leinenweber in Smith and Judge Darrah in Wrightsell, this court is convinced that the common issue does predominate. This case is better understood as requiring the plaintiff to prove that a condition of confinement-near elimination of dental care-is one of deliberate indifference to serious medical need, as illustrated by the representative plaintiffs and other witnesses who were not promptly treated after seeking medical treatment for dental pain. Yes, each named plaintiff would have to give evidence supporting the claim. But if liability is established based on the evidence presented by representative plaintiffs, the outcome for members of the class is a different question. See, e.g., Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 1878332, at* I (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2003) (trial of class action against Illinois for injunctive relief brought on behalf of minor children for failing to provide early diagnostic services required under federal Medicaid Act). In other words, the principal issue of causation is the systemic one-adequacy of medical staffing-not the variations in the need claimed by individual inmates.
Defendants cite Harper v. SheriffofCook Co., 581 F.3d 511, in which the court held that class certification was not proper where the plaintiff challenged unreasonable delays in processing detainees who had been admitted to bail in court but had to return to jail to have bond posted. The court decided that common issues did not predominate over individual issues
5

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:1607
because determining a reasonable time would entail many variables, such as "what justifications there might be for the delay on that particular day or for that particular detainee-the time of day, whether the jail was processing an unusually large number of detainees at that time, whether other events occurring at the jail legitimately slowed processing times, whether the detainee's lack of cooperation delayed processing, etc." !d. at 515. Moreover, the court was unconvinced that plaintiffs had even identified a common issue that was central to the litigation. Id Similarly in Portis v. City ofChicago, 613 F.3d 702 (7th'" Cir. 2010), the court rejected the district court's certification of a class of arrestees who were detained more than two hours after being admitted to bail; first because the class definition imposed a rule that could not apply to all members of the class since a reasonable time in one instance might be unreasonable in another. The court left open the possibility that class treatment might be appropriate if the class sought to establish a policy of deliberate delay, as such a policy could be ended by an injunction. !d. at 705; see County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59, Ill S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991) ("Needless delay, or delay for delay's sake--or, worse, delay deliberately created so that the process becomes the punishment-violates the fourth amendment.").
Although this court has already certified a (b)(2) class in light of this statement, as Harper and Portis clearly do not exclude a class action for injunctive relief, the cases are more fundamentally distinguishable because plaintiffs here are attacking a policy of deliberate indifference by reducing staff to a level making it a virtual certainly that adequate care will not be provided, as opposed to a situation where an adequately staffed facility allegedly fails to treat some individuals as promptly as it should.
It should go without saying that determination of class appropriateness is not a question
6

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 7 of 11 PageID #:1608
of available relief. Each of the individuals in the putative class could file his own law suit and if
he proved that the policy resulted in deliberate indifference to his need, he could recover
damages. If a class is proper, and the class representatives prove a policy of deliberate
indifference, members of the class are not limited to injunctive relief. They may prove up their
damages by showing injury resulting from the policy. This is what occurs in class actions
alleging defective medical devices or drugs. Causation may be clear but damages are different
for individual class members.
The court in Flood v. Dominguez, No. 08 CV 153, 2011 WL 238265 (N. D. Ind. Jan. 21,
2011), rejected the argument defendants make here in a challenge to a variety of conditions of
confinement, including lack of bedding, cold temperatures, lack of hygiene items, lack of
exercise, and small meal portions "as a result of uniform policies or practices by the Jail." Id. at
*2:
[The Jail contends that] the Plaintiffs can't prove liability without individual determinations as to whether the conditions of confinement caused the different physical injuries asserted by the Plaintiffs. And, so the argument goes, if these individual determinations are permitted, common issues will not predominate.
I disagree. First, if a detainee suffered an injury because of a condition of confinement common to all class members, he may recover for that injury. Id at *3.3 Although that court in its original opinion distinguished Smith and Wrightsell on the
3 He reiterated, [T]he conditions of confinement that were common to all detainees held in the Jail's holding cells were the result of the Jail's uniform policies and practices. Liability will not be determined by analyzing the individual physical injuries suffered by each plaintiff, but rather by assessing the constitutionality ofthe policies or practices uniformly applied to all class members. So these common conditions predominate. And while the Plaintiffs will eventually have to tie their injuries to the common conditions of confinement, this does not prevent a jury from finding on a class-wide basis that these same conditions are unconstitutional.
7

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:1609
basis that claims involving denial of medical care are particularly fact specific and generally unsuitable for class certification, 270 F.R.D. at 413, its reasoning applies as well to policies of deliberate indifference to medical care:
[M]any of the variations in the detainees' conditions of confinement differ by a matter of degree, rather than kind. These factual variations ... speak only to damages, not liability. And differences in damages alone will not defeat class certification. Rule 23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems created by the presence in a class action litigation of individual damages issues. I may, for example, divide the class into subclasses to determine damages. In any event, because common issues predominate, the need for individual damages determinations will not defeat class certification.
!d. at 422; see Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 800 (7th Cir. 2008) (remanding denial of class certification for prisoners challenging rule denying crutches where prison argued that each prisoner's case would be different and noting, "even if each damages calculation will be factbound to some degree, many of the issues involved in this case, as we have noted already, would be common among all potential class members"); Mejdrech .v Met-Coil Systems Corp, 319 F.3d 910, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming certification of a 1,000 plaintiff"mass tort" case in which the district court reserved for individual hearings whether a particular class member suffered any legally compensable harm and if so in what amount). Because the common issue of liability is whether reduction of dental services was deliberate indifference to dental patients needing urgent care, the plaintiffs have satisfied the predominance factor. B. Superiority of class action.
Neither party devotes attention to the question of superiority of the class action device. In
2011 WL 238265, at *5.
8

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:1610
considering the satisfaction of the superiority requirement, the court will look at "(A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). As Judge Posner stated in Mejdrich,
If there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.
319 F.3d at 911. The court's staff attorneys report that from January 2010 to date, nineteen pro
se cases were filed in this court against the Sheriff or the Cook County Department of
Corrections alleging deliberate indifference to need for acute dental care. Twelve are still pending.4 Three of the cases, in which all three were represented by counsel, settled. The
litigation of separate law suits arising from the same policy is wasteful of pro bono counsel's
time and the resources of this court.
According to Smith, more than 200 grievances were produced concerning denial of dental
care during 2007, suggesting a substantial but not overwhelming number of class members. The
4 See Smith v. Dart, No. I 0 C 99 (settled in conjunction with Smith v. Dart, No. 10 C 312); McRoyv. Dart, No. 10 C 421; Hernandez v. Ronald, No. 10 C 1529 (settled); Martin v. Cook County Dep 'tofCorr. (CCDOC), No. 10 C 2162; Jackwn v. Dart, No. 10 C 2263; Guiderv. Dart, No. 10 C 2336; Velazquez v. CCCDOC, No. 10 C 2497 (settled); Patten v. Dart, No. 10 C 4964 (dismissed for failure to cure filing deficiencies); Williams v. CCDOC, No. 10 C 5482 (dismissed for failure to pay filing fee); Peterson v. Dart, No. 10 C 5681; Brown v. Dart, No. 10 C 7711; Martinez v. Prozoxsky, No. 10 C 7792; Curtis v. Dart, No. 11 C 933; Morris v. Dart, No. 11 C 934 (dismissed); Woffordv. Dart, No. II C 1397; Pitts v. Dart, No. 11 C 1661 (settled); Townes v. Prozoxski, No. 11 C 1876; Rounds v. Dart, No. II C 4247; Rodriguez v. CCDOC, No. 11 C 4593.
9

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parties have reported that, as a result of the Department of Justice investigation, services have improved since this law suit was filed. This means that the number of claimants will not be overwhelming so as to make the case unmanageable.
Another factor to consider is whether the individual class members would prefer to control their individual claims. The reality is that most of the detainees are indigent. Unlike non-prisoners, they must exhaust their administrative remedies and pay a $350 filing fee, albeit in installments, in order to file a case in this court. Once released from custody, the requirement is not lifted. Few are fortunate to be represented by retained or pro bono counsel so must proceed prose if at all, with neither the skill nor resources to litigate. Obviously, the obstacles deter all but the determined.
A class action, on the other hand, would provide class members an opportunity to present their claims with representation by knowledgeable counsel who can marshal the resources to effectively present the case while those who have and prefer other counsel may opt out. As the court stated in Flood,
[T]his dispute contains a set of legal and factual issues that are shared by the members of the class, and class certification is more efficient than multiple individual suits at dealing with these common questions. Indeed, requiring each class member to bring individual actions would waste time and money. Also, because many ofthe potential class members would likely recover very little in damages, they are unlikely to prosecute individual claims without the cost-sharing efficiencies offered by a class action. Accordingly, a class action is a superior method oflitigating this case. 270 F.R.D. at 422. Likewise, a class action in this situation is superior to proceeding with individual claims. C. Class Definition As indicated at the outset, plaintiffs have redefined the class as "any person who, while
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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 93 Filed: 08/17/11 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:1612

confined at the Cook County Jail on and after January I, 2007, made a request for treatment of dental pain, was not examined by a health care professional authorized to dispense pain medication within 24 hours after making that request, and thereby endured pain." Harper and Portis teach that the court should not define a class by setting a "reasonable" time within which

treatment must be given, although a time period might be used as a rebuttable presumption. Portis, 613 F.3d at 705 (citing McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 59). To address this issue, the court certifies a class of "all inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January I, 2007, who have made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because oflack of treatment." In identifying the class the court will establish a 36-hour threshold. This will be a vehicle for identifying the class and will shift the burden to the defendants to demonstrate existence of a bona fide reason for delay in treatment. See Portis, 613 F. 3d at 705. Damages issues can be addressed on an individualized basis if the case is resolved in favor of the plaintiff class and if damages carrnot be resolved for the class as a whole, as is typical in cases of this sort.

ORDER The motion for certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) is granted. This case will be called for a status hearing and scheduling conference on September 8, 2011 at 8:30. The parties should have a proposed class notice prepared and a schedule that is focused on bringing this aging case to as expeditious a conclusion as practicable.

Dated: August 17, 2011

Enter:~ t<L-pf~
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW United States District Judge

11

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

) Case No. 09 C 529

v.

)

) District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and ) Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. [Dkt 142.] For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice. .
Background Plaintiffs are two certified classes of current and former inmates who have sued defendants Sheriff of Cook County (“Sheriff”) and Cook County (“County”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Cook County Jail (“Jail”) denied adequate dental services to inmates who suffered acute dental pain, and thus defendants violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) class consists of “[a]ll persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.” (Mem. Op. and Order, Nov. 18, 2010 at 15.) [Dkt 68.] The Rule 23(b)(3) class is defined as “[a]ll inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who made a written request for dental
1

care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.” (Mem. Op. and Order, Aug. 17, 2011 at 11.) [Dkt 93.]
Plaintiffs move to compel defendants to produce two requested sets of documents: identifying information about persons processed into the Cook County Jail after July 21, 2011, and “documents prepared in connection with budget requests for dental services at the Cook County Jail and/or Cermak Health Services for each year from 2006 to the present.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 1.) Defendants object to both requests.
Discussion Under the federal rules, subject to certain limitations, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed . . . if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). A party may file a motion to compel disclosure or discovery. Fed. R . Civ. P. 37(a). “The burden rests upon the objecting party to show why a particular discovery request is improper.” Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protec. Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 450 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
I. Identifying Information First, plaintiffs request that the Sheriff produce “in computer readable form” fourteen items
of identifying information for “all persons processed into Cook County Jail from July 21, 2011 to December 31, 2012,” specifically, the name, address, date of birth, home phone number, social security number, date of booking, booking number, inmate ID, release date, and the reason for
2

release of the processed person. (Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 3.) Plaintiffs refer to this information as “the ESI,” and state that defendants produced the ESI for prisoners processed into the Jail through July 20, 2011 in another inmate class action regarding property slips at the Jail, Elizarri v. Sheriff of Cook County, N.D. Ill. No. 07-cv-2427. (Pls.’ Mot. at 2 n.1.) Plaintiffs also state that similar ESI has been produced in other cases involving treatment of detainees at the Jail. (Pls.’ Suppl. at 3.) [Dkt 146.]
The Sheriff objects to the request as overly broad. (Sheriff Resp.) [Dkt 149.] The Sheriff states that the request includes “documentation for approximately 150,000 detainees during the relevant time period” while the estimated size of the classes over the class period is about 1,900 people. (Sheriff’s Resp. at 2.) It is not clear from the Sheriff’s response (which is not supported by any affidavit or other evidence) whether the 150,000 number refers to detainees during the entire class period (from 2007 to present) or the period covered by the subject request (July 21, 2011 to December 2012). It seems more likely to be the former than the latter.
As a compromise, the Sheriff offers to produce identifying information for those persons processed into the Cook County Jail after July 2011 who have filed dental grievances. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs counter that the Sheriff’s offer is insufficient because the classes are defined as including those inmates who “made a written request,” and, according to plaintiffs, “a detainee will only submit a grievance after the Jail has failed to respond to his (or her) written requests for dental care.” (Pls.’ Reply at 4.) [Dkt 152.] Furthermore, the Sheriff’s offer seems at odds with the Sheriff’s objection to producing dental grievances for the class because it would require an individual search of detainee files. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4.) Sheriff’s counsel’s stated in correspondence that “there is no Electronically Stored Data (ESI) in the Sheriff’s possession that contains detainee grievances delineated by the grievance subject matter.” (Id.)
3

In sum, plaintiffs’ request is overinclusive because not all people processed into the Jail will be members of the two classes, and the Sheriff’s proposal is potentially underinclusive because there could be inmates who submitted a written request but never filed a grievance.
An unfortunate by-product of the same attorneys having been involved in a number of cases involving the Jail is the fact that they apparently forget that this court has had limited – or no – involvement in those other cases and does not have the background in this case that the attorneys do. The parties’ briefs assume too much about this court’s knowledge of what has happened in discovery in this and other cases. Furthermore, the mere fact that documents were produced in another case with a different claim and a different class does not, of itself, provide a basis for requiring production in this case. Notwithstanding the court’s direction that the plaintiffs state “what, precisely, they are asking the court to compel defendants to do or produce” (Order, April 12, 2013 [dkt 145] ), the parties’ briefs do not include important facts such as whether the information that plaintiff seeks currently exists in the format plaintiffs request (“computer readable form”) or whether plaintiffs are seeking an order that would require the Sheriff to create a database of that information.
Other than the fact that similar production was ordered in other cases, plaintiffs’ argument for the requested production is a conclusory statement that they need the updated information in order to evaluate the viability of prospective injunctive relief for the Rule 23(b)(2) class and to assess the “extent of defendants’ liability for inadequate dental services” for the Rule 23(b)(3) class. (Pls.’ Mot. at 5-6.) It is not clear what plaintiffs’ counsel intends to do with the information or how it will be used in this case. Since neither party has informed the court whether the data currently exists in a “computer readable form,” the court is reluctant to issue an order compelling the Sheriff to create a database that may not exist. Finally, the parties should engage in further discussions to see if there
4

is a way to provide information about actual class members short of a production that is plainly overinclusive. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is, therefore, denied without prejudice.
II. Pre-Budget Documents Cook County objects to the request for the pre-budget documents on two grounds. First, the
County argues that the pre-budget documents are irrelevant. (County Resp. at 1.) [Dkt 149.] Second, the County has identified in a privilege log 287 pages of documents that the County states are responsive to plaintiffs’ request but are subject to the deliberative process privilege. (Id. at 3 & Ex. B.) The court has reviewed in camera the documents in question.
The County’s argument that the documents are not relevant is unpersuasive. In order to succeed on their constitutional claim against the County, plaintiffs must show that the County acted with deliberate indifference. As already noted by the District Judge, “‘[d]eliberate indifference may be established by ‘proving that there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care.’” (Mem. Op. and Order, Aug. 17, 2011 at 3 (quoting Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983)). To show deliberate indifference on the part of the County, plaintiffs must demonstrate that despite knowledge of the punitive conditions at the Jail, the County failed to provide the Sheriff with sufficient funds to alleviate the condition. See Wilson v. Bd. of Commrs., 878 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Pre-budget documents prepared in connection to dental services are relevant to show whether the board was aware of the conditions at the Jail and are thus relevant to plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim against the County.
As for the County’s second argument, the deliberative process privilege “protects
5

communications that are part of the decision-making process of a governmental agency.” United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993). “Since frank discussion of legal and policy matters is essential to the decisionmaking process of a governmental agency, communications made prior to and as a part of an agency determination are protected from disclosure.” Id. “The deliberative process privilege may be overcome where there is a sufficient showing of a particularized need to outweigh the reasons for confidentiality.” Id. Relevant factors in this analysis include
(1) the relevance of the documents to the litigation; (2) the availability of other evidence that would serve the same purpose as the documents sought; (3) the government’s role in the litigation; (4) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues involved in it; and (5) the degree to which disclosure of the documents sought would tend to chill future deliberations within government agencies, that is, would hinder frank and independent discussion about governmental policies and decisions. K.L. v. Edgar, 964 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Plaintiffs correctly argue that the County has failed to invoke the deliberative process privilege adequately in that the County has failed to demonstrate the “the department head with control over the matter” has personally considered whether the documents should remain confidential. (Pls.’ Reply at 2-3 (citing Ferrell v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 177 F.R.D. 425, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1988.)).) The County has not submitted an affidavit or any other proof showing that the responsible official, rather than the litigating attorney, has considered whether the documents should remain confidential. Even if the County had properly invoked the deliberative process privilege, the plaintiffs’ particularized need for the documents outweighs the County’s reasons for confidentiality. The County argues that the documents must remain confidential because the “Bureau of Health Services
6

should [not] have to fear disclosure of facts or candid opinions regarding which area may be considered for reduction or increases in funding.” (County Resp. at 5.) The County states “parties do not dispute the final numbers passed in the budget” and that “[p]laintiffs are looking for some analysis as to why or what was behind the County Board’s final discretionary decision in reaching a budget each year.” (Id. at 5-6.) That “analysis,” however, is relevant to the plaintiffs’ case against the County. As discussed above, the plaintiffs’ theory is that the County allegedly approved the dental services budget despite knowing that it might create unconstitutional conditions at the Jail. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ particularized need for the pre-budget documents that discuss dental services outweighs the County’s need for secrecy because the County’s deliberative process is directly at issue in this case.
However, in light of the sensitive nature of the documents and the fact that they deal with more than just dental services, the court will allow the County to defer producing the documents until June 26, 2013, in order to permit the County time to move, if it chooses, for leave to produce the documents in a redacted format or otherwise to seek a protective order.1 If the County chooses to produce them in a redacted format, the County must provide the court with copies of the documents showing the proposed redactions no later than June 24, 2013.
Conclusion Plaintiffs’ motion to compel [dkt 142] is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice: plaintiffs’ motion to compel documents pursuant to its “Request for Supplemental Production of
1 The documents include, for example, personal information about individual employees who were considered for layoff.
7

Electronical [sic] Stored Information” is denied without prejudice; plaintiff’s motion to compel prebudget documents that discuss dental services is granted, and defendants shall produce those documents by June 26, 2013.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________ Geraldine Soat Brown United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: June 11, 2013

8

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

) ) Case No. 09 C 529 ) ) District Judge Joan H. Lefkow ) ) Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Geraldine Soat Brown, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Extend the Discovery Cutoff Date (Pls.’ Mot.) [dkt 210], and Defendant Cook County’s Motion to Stay Compliance with Requests for Medical Records (Def.’s. Mot.) [dkt 226] are before the court.1 Defendant Cook County opposes plaintiffs’ motion and requests that plaintiffs be barred from seeking additional dental records except as provided in the court’s October 30, 2013 order regarding the production of dental and medical records. Cook County’s motion asks that the County not be required to comply with requests for inmates’ medical records that plaintiffs’ counsel has sent directly to Cermak Health Services (“Cermak”). For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motion is granted in part and denied in part as detailed below. Cook
1 The plaintiffs’ motion is styled as “renewed” because the original motion was denied without prejudice due to the failure of plaintiffs’ counsel to comply with Local Rule 37.2, which requires counsel to provide a statement about attempts to resolve discovery disputes before seeking court intervention. [Dkt. 209.]
1

County’s motion is granted on an interim basis and otherwise taken under advisement pending further briefing. In addition, in a footnote in Cook County’s response, its counsel states that she believes that Mr. Smentek has passed away. If Mr. Smentek is deceased, his counsel must file a suggestion of death. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a).
Background The certified classes
In this class action case, plaintiffs allege that defendants reduced dental staff at the Cook County Jail to a level that made it a virtual certainty that inmates would not receive adequate dental care. (Mem. Op. and Order, Aug. 17, 2011 at 6.) [Dkt 93.] The District Judge held that, to prevail on this claim, plaintiffs must “prove that a condition of confinement–near elimination of dental care–is one of deliberate indifference to serious medical need, as illustrated by the representative plaintiffs and [others] who were not promptly treated after seeking medical treatment for dental pain.” (Id. at 5.)
The Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) class consists of “[a]ll persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.” (Mem. Op. and Order, Nov. 18, 2010 at 15.) [Dkt 68.] The Rule 23(b)(3) class is defined as “all inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.” (Mem. Op. and Order, Aug. 17, 2011 at 11.) [Dkt 93.] When certifying the plaintiff classes, the District Judge stated that “[d]amages issues can be addressed on
2

an individualized basis if the case is resolved in favor of the plaintiff class and if damages cannot be resolved for the class as a whole, as is typical in cases of this sort.” (Id.)
Discovery deadlines Because plaintiffs are requesting a further extension of fact discovery, it is necessary to
review the number of times fact discovery has been extended in this case. On July 30, 2012, the District Judge ordered fact discovery to close on April 12, 2013. [Dkt 119.] The District Judge later referred the case to this court for discovery supervision and discovery motions [dkt 127], and on March 28, 2013, granted the plaintiffs’ oral motion to extend fact discovery to June 28, 2013. [Dkt 141.] After the District Judge expanded the referral to allow this court to determine discovery cutoff dates [dkt 160], on June 13, 2013, this court struck the June 28, 2013 fact discovery cutoff and ordered the parties to propose a plan to complete discovery. [Dkt 164.] On July 17, 2013, this court ordered that “[a]ll fact discovery shall be noticed in time to be completed by 12/20/13. FIRM DATE.” [Dkt 170.]
The additional dental and medical records When the current discovery cutoff was set, the Sheriff was in the process of producing
additional inmate grievances relating to dental care. Counsel for the Sheriff advised the court that 2000 grievances had been produced and that the Sheriff expected to produce an additional 500 grievances by July 31, 2013. (Id.) Plaintiffs were ordered to request any additional medical records relating to the dental grievances by August 30, 2013. (Id.) Plaintiffs requested dental treatment records for an additional 195 inmates. (Mem. Opinion and Order, October 30, 2013 at 3.) [Dkt
3

202.] After discussions with defendants, plaintiffs reduced this request to dental records for 167 of those inmates, but this court ordered the defendants to produce both medical and dental records for an additional 34 inmates. (Id. at 3, 6-7.)2 Plaintiffs have appealed that ruling to the District Judge whose decision on that is currently pending.
During a status hearing the following day, defendants’ counsel discussed the upcoming “end of the year cutoff for the fact discovery.” (Oct. 31, 2013, Tr. at 3.) Defendants’ counsel reported that plaintiffs had noticed seven depositions and that dates had been set for five of them but there would not be a problem with completing the last two before the cutoff. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ counsel voiced a concern that he needed the medical records the court had ordered defendants to produce in order to complete those depositions. (Id. at 4-5.) Notably, plaintiffs’ counsel did not suggest that any further discovery was going to be served. The court said that it would entertain requests to adjust the schedule into January if necessary but rejected an open-ended discovery extension, explaining:
If for reasons outside anybody’s control that some discovery previously noticed can’t be completed by [the end of the year] deadline, then a motion to extend the time for specific discovery is certainly appropriate, but what I will not do is I will not allow people to start renoticing things and serving new discovery after the cutoff date. This is to conclude previously noticed discovery that for good reasons could not be completed during the discovery cutoff. That’s what it’s for. And then that puts a fence around it. (Id. at 5-6, 8.) According to the plaintiffs, 33 of the 34 medical and dental records were produced on December 3, 2013. (Pls.’ Reply at 3.) [Dkt. 223.] The fate of the 34th record is unclear.
2 Defendants had previously produced dental and medical records for the named plaintiffs and 91 other inmates. (Order, Oct. 30, 2013 at 2.)
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Plaintiffs’ motion to extend the discovery cutoff Despite the “FIRM” discovery cutoff date [dkt 170] and the discussion at the October 31
status hearing about completing final fact discovery by the cutoff date, the plaintiffs served a new round of discovery the following week, including notices of depositions for 25 potential witnesses who had been identified in defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures in December 2012, and a request for the dental and appointment records related to each of 276 grievances that were filed from March 14, 2013, to October 24, 2013. (Pls.’ Mot. ¶¶ 5-7.)3 Plaintiffs now request an extension until March 20, 2014, in order to complete that discovery, and also argue that an extension is required because they do not want to take the depositions until the District Judge rules on the objections to the October 30, 2013 order. In response, Cook County stresses that plaintiffs received the names of the 25 dental employees almost a year ago, in December 2012, and argue that it is unreasonable for plaintiffs to request depositions of these individuals on the eve of the discovery close. (Def.’s Resp. at 2.) It also argues that plaintiffs do not need additional dental or medical records to support their class claims because “policies, procedures, number of patients seen daily in the clinics, and all of that general information should be unaffected by receipt of detainee medical records.” (Id. at 3-4.) Next, Cook County objects that plaintiffs continue to ask for more records even though they have received extensive numbers of inmate medical records and the court recently limited their request for production of records. (Id. at 4-5.)
Cook County’s Motion to Stay Compliance with Requests for Medical Records
3 Cook County states that the deposition notice for the 25 dental employees results in the addition of 19 more depositions (Def.’s Resp. at 1) [dkt 216], presumably because some of these individuals were among the deponents previously scheduled.
5

Plaintiffs’ counsel has recently served requests for inmates’ medical records directly on the Cermak’s Medical Records Department without notifying counsel for the defendants. (See Def.’s Resp., Ex. E (letters to Cermak Medical Records Department requesting medical record for approximately 75 detainees).) Cook County objects strongly to that practice in its response to plaintiffs’ motion. (Def.’s Resp. at 5.) Plaintiffs respond to that objection in their reply, observing that Cook County should make that objection in a separate motion. (Pls.’ Reply at 4 n. 3.) Cook County has now filed its own motion for a protective order to stay any obligation to produce the medical records. (Def.’s Mot.)
Discussion I. Plaintiff’s motion
Plaintiffs’ request for time to obtain additional medical records Plaintiffs’ motion is premised on their belief that their request for injunctive relief entitles them to pursue discovery regarding the dental treatment of any Cook County Jail inmate who has experienced dental pain and waited more than seven days to see a dentist or made a written request for dental care due to acute pain and suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain due to the lack of treatment. According to plaintiffs, as long as inmates continue to file dental grievances, they are entitled to discovery relating to those grievances because plaintiffs have requested injunctive relief on behalf of all inmates who have received unconstitutionally subpar dental treatment at the Cook County Jail. Plaintiffs also assert that they are entitled to receive dental records relating to all known dental grievances before deposing individuals who provided dental care at the Jail, because they wish to question the deponents about the records. (Pls.’ Mot. at ¶¶ 5-7.)
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Greek mythology teaches that Sisyphus was condemned to roll a heavy boulder up a hill, only to have it roll down every time it neared the top. Plaintiffs’ view of discovery is Sisyphean: they seek dental records for finite groups of inmates based on those inmates’ dental grievances but as the top of the hill nears (because defendants produce the records or the court resolves motions about the scope of discovery), they start over again with additional requests for records based on newly submitted dental grievances. The loop is never ending because as time passes, more dental grievances are filed so plaintiffs seek more dental records. Plaintiffs want records for every inmate who has submitted a dental grievance, and posit that they cannot complete oral fact discovery until they first receive all of the requested records.
The solution to this problem is to recognize that liability in this case does not turn on an analysis of the specific dental care provided to each and every class member. As the District Judge explained:
This case is better understood as requiring the plaintiff to prove that a condition of confinement–near elimination of dental care–is one of deliberate indifference to serious medical need, as illustrated by the representative plaintiffs and other witnesses who were not promptly treated after seeking medical treatment for dental pain. Yes, each named plaintiffs would have to give evidence supporting the claim. But if liability is established based on the evidence presented by the representative plaintiffs, the outcome for members of the class is a different question . . . . In other words, the principal issue of causation is the systemic one–adequacy of medical staffing–not the variations in the need claimed by the individual inmates. (Mem. Op. and Order, Aug. 17, 2011 at 5.)
7

Plaintiffs have already received extensive dental and medical records.4 Plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to grievances and records for each inmate is incorrect because to establish liability, plaintiffs must present representational evidence, not evidence for each class member. They do not explain why they need hundreds more records on the eve of the discovery cutoff for purposes of the liability determination. Nor do they explain how, under their view of discovery, the cycle of requesting and producing grievances and records would ever end.
This court has previously determined that the more than 100 inmate dental and medical records plaintiffs have now obtained are sufficient for the purposes of liability discovery. In this court’s view, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are entitled to extend discovery to obtain additional dental and medical records for this phase of the litigation.
The depositions of additional dental employees Cook County states that plaintiffs have deposed nine of defendants’ employees, and defendants previously agreed to produce five more employees. (Def.’s Resp. at 3.) The dispute concerns the 19 dental employees whose depositions plaintiffs first sought in November 2013. Plaintiffs do not explain why they seek to depose these additional 19 dental employees on the eve of the discovery cutoff, except to say that they are entitled to depose treaters about the dental care that they provided to class members, and they need a complete set of medical records before they can do so. (Pls.’ Reply at 5.) Again, as explained above, this is incorrect for the same reason that the
4 Plaintiffs continue to assert that their requests are narrowly tailored because they have merely requested dental, not medical, records. The court, however, has previously held that the medical records are necessary because they “may also contain information about dental care that will be necessary for a complete picture of inmates’ dental care.” (Order, Oct. 30, 2013 at 5.)
8

plaintiffs are not entitled to medical and dental records for every inmate who has submitted a dental grievance: the class claims for deliberate indifference turn on representational evidence, not evidence for each class member.
Moreover, plaintiffs have not presented any reason why they waited until November 2013 to seek to depose dental employees who were disclosed as potential witnesses in December 2012. The July 2013 order setting the current cutoff stated that “discovery shall be noticed in time to be completed by December 20, 2013. FIRM DATE.” (Order, July 17, 2013, emphasis added.) It is particularly disturbing that when the topic of depositions was discussed at the October 31 status hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel made no mention of serving any additional deposition notices, yet less than a week later served a notice for 25 depositions.
At that October 31 status hearing, the parties informed the court that they were trying to get dates before the cutoff for the two remaining deponents. Plaintiffs’ counsel could not in good faith have believed that depositions for an additional 19 deponents noticed on November 6 would be “completed” by December 20. See Finwall v. City of Chicago, 239 F.R.D. 494, 498-99 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (explaining that under Local Rule 16.1 discovery must be completed before the discovery closing date). Plaintiffs’ Notice of Depositions included nominal dates for the depositions to conclude by December 20, but that schedule (which shows three depositions being taken on some days) was clearly impossible when plaintiffs’ counsel served it. (Def.’s Resp., Ex. A.)
These are not newly discovered witnesses. Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue (as is often argued with eleventh-hour discovery requests) that recent developments revealed the role of a dental employee whose importance as a witness could not have been realized earlier. Instead, plaintiffs simply waited until the last minute to notice the depositions of defendants’ witnesses. Plaintiffs had
9

ample opportunity to notice their depositions in time to comply with the order but instead waited until compliance with the order was a functional impossibility. They did so at their own peril. See Davis Cos., Inc. v. Emerald Casino, Inc., No. 99 C 6822, 2000 WL 33956686 at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2000) (rejecting “eleventh hour attempt” to depose a witness and finding “no reason why this facet of discovery could not have been initiated long ago rather than on the eve of discovery cutoff when it will likely entail an extension of discovery”). Accordingly, the court declines to extend the discovery deadline to allow the plaintiffs to depose all 25 of the dental employees.
Plaintiffs did, however, notice five of these depositions in a timely manner and the parties have been attempting to schedule these depositions. Plaintiffs’ objections to this court’s October 30, 2013 order limiting discovery are currently under advisement before the District Judge. [Dkt 221.] As stated at the October 31 status hearing, an extension to complete specific, previously noticed discovery would be entertained. The court “has substantial discretion in managing discovery, including whether or not to modify the discovery schedule.” Rizza v. Underwriters, No. 09 CV 687, 2011 WL 867492 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar.11, 2011). Accordingly, plaintiffs may proceed to take those five depositions. In light of the pending objections to the previous order limiting production of requested medical records, to conserve the parties’ resources in the event that the District Judge sustains the objections, the parties may schedule the depositions after the District Judge rules, even if that occurs after the discovery cutoff. They are directed to do so promptly following the District Judge’s ruling.
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II. Cook County’s motion to stay compliance with requests for medical records In its response to the motion for an extension of the discovery cutoff and its motion, Cook
County asserts that plaintiffs’ counsel is improperly serving document requests directly on the Cermak Medical Records Department without notifying counsel for defendants. (Def.’s Resp., Ex. E.) It appears that plaintiffs’ counsel has tendered to Cermak what are represented to be waivers to release medical records for approximately 75 persons, and demanded that Cermak release “all medical records for the dates provided on the waivers.” (Id.) Plaintiffs contend that the requests are proper under 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/8-2001 and 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a). (Pls.’ Reply at 4.)
Plaintiffs’ actions raises serious questions, including the following: Cook County suggests that plaintiffs’ actions are an intentional effort to circumvent this court’s ruling limiting the medical and dental records defendants are required to produce. The statute and regulation plaintiffs cite do not appear to contemplate this sort of mass production of records as a substitute for ordinary discovery in litigation. Do plaintiffs have authority to support the use of the statute and regulation for that purpose? One of the factors this court considered in ordering sampling of inmate records was weighing the burden of production against the benefit for the litigation. The 75 requests plaintiffs have already sent could impose a significant burden on the Cermak. The regulations require that the person requesting the records pay the reasonable expenses of producing and copying the requested records. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat § 5/8-2001(d); 45 C.F. R. § 164.524(c)(4). Have plaintiffs tendered payment of the expenses to Cermak?
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What provisions have plaintiffs’ counsel made for maintaining the privacy of those records? Are plaintiffs’ counsel planning to disclose any of them to defendants’ counsel? If so, do they intend to disclose all of them or only selected records?
In light of these considerations, Cook County’s motion will be granted on an interim basis pending the filing of a response by plaintiffs that includes addressing the questions raised above and includes a sample of a waiver submitted to Cermak. Cook County may file a reply in support of its motion. The motion is taken under advisement.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Extend the Discovery Cutoff is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically: (1) Plaintiffs’ request to extend discovery so plaintiffs can obtain dental (and medical)
records relating to the 276 grievances filed from March 14, 2013, through October 24, 2013, is denied; (2) Plaintiffs’ request to extend the discovery deadline to allow plaintiffs to depose all 25 of the dental employees is denied, but the court will allow plaintiffs to proceed with the five timely noticed defendants’ employee depositions. They are directed to schedule the depositions promptly after the District Judge rules on plaintiffs’ objections to this court’s October 30, 2013 order, even if this occurs after the discovery cutoff; and (3) If Mr. Smentek is deceased, his counsel must file a suggestion of death. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a). If appropriate, plaintiffs’ counsel shall file, by January 10, 2014, a suggestion of death and a brief memorandum advising the court whether a representative intends to file a motion to substitute. Cook County’s Motion to Stay Compliance with Requests for Medical Records is granted on an interim basis. Cermak Medical Services is not required to produce any medical records pursuant to the waivers submitted with the request of plaintiffs’ counsel until further order of the
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court. Plaintiffs’ response to that motion must be filed by January 10, 2014. Defendant Cook County may file a reply in support by January 17, 2014. The motion is taken under advisement and ruling will be by mail.

Dated: December 19, 2013

______________________________ Geraldine Soat Brown United States Magistrate Judge

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 09 C 529

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Judge Joan H. Lefkow

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OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County and its sheriff charging that inadequate dental care at Cook County Jail (“CCJ”) constitutes cruel and usual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court certified two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). (See dkts. 68, 93.) Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary and permanent injunction on January 6, 2014. (Dkt. 236.) In April 2014, defendants moved to decertify the classes. (Dkt. 306.) The court stayed briefing on the motion to decertify and conducted a bench trial on injunctive relief in June 2014. On August 21, 2014, the court denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and ordered briefing on defendants’ motion to decertify. (Dkt. 372.) For the reasons stated below, the court decertifies the (b)(2) class, making the motion for a permanent injunction moot, and orders modification of the (b)(3) class definition.

BACKGROUND FACTS I. Class Definitions
The court certified a (b)(2) class consisting of “[a]ll persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.” (Dkt. 68 at 15.) The court also certified a (b)(3) class consisting of “[a]ll inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who have made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.” (Dkt. 93 at 11.) II. CCJ Population and Health Care
CCJ has a population of approximately 9,500 detainees. (Tr.1 1193.) The average length of stay at CCJ is fifty-seven days and the median length of stay is twelve days. (Tr. 1195–96.)
Cermak Health Services (“Cermak”), a division of Cook County Bureau of Health Services, provides medical and dental care to detainees at CCJ. Each of the approximately ten divisions at the jail has a medical dispensary that is open on weekday afternoons, and there is a sick call staffed by a registered nurse twice a day. (Tr. 1233–34.) Cermak also operates an onsite emergency room that is open twenty-four hours a day. (Tr. 1234.) III. CCJ Dental Care
Dental care at CCJ has changed significantly in the past seven years. In 2007, Cermak employed one dentist and care was limited to extractions. (See dkt. 68 at 1.) Today, there are six dental clinics at the jail, each located in a different division.2 (Tr. 864, 959, 1117.) The clinics
1 “Tr.” citations refer to the transcript of the bench trial on injunctive relief held in early June 2014.
2 The Sheriff moves detainees without a clinic in their division to a designated clinic. (Tr. 960– 61, 1197, 1235.)
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are staffed by seven dentists,3 two dental hygienists, and seven dental assistants.4 (Tr. 864–65.) The staffing ratio is approximately one dental provider for every 1000 detainees, which is within optimal range for dental care in a correctional setting. (Tr. 145–46, 589.) The dental clinics are open five days a week and each conducts a morning and afternoon session, seeing approximately fifteen patients per day.5 (Tr. 498, 608–09.)
There are several avenues through which a detainee may seek care at a dental clinic. If a detainee complains of dental pain to a nurse or officer, the nurse or officer may call the clinic and ask whether the detainee can be seen immediately. (Tr. 894, 1135, 1235.) A detainee may also submit a Health Service Request form (“HSR”) to a designated spot in his housing unit. (Tr. 1236.) The HSRs are supposed to be retrieved daily and reviewed by a nurse.6 (Tr. 615, 992.) If the HSR includes a symptomatic complaint, such as pain, policy dictates that a nurse should examine the detainee within twenty-four hours. (Tr. 1238, 1271.)
After a nurse reviews the HSRs, the dental assistants retrieve those that contain dental complaints.7 (Tr. 453.) The dental assistants (and sometimes the dentists) review the HSRs and the dental assistants enter them into the electronic records system and categorize the request as urgent, priority, or routine. (Tr. 452–53, 455–56, 652, 895, 993.) If a detainee complains of
3 In their motion for an injunction filed in January 2014, plaintiffs stated that only five dentists worked at CCJ and included a request that defendants hire more dentists. (Dkt. 236 at 5 & n.5.) Plaintiffs did not repeat their request for additional staffing at trial or in their post-trial briefs.
4 The dental assistants perform administrative work in the clinics and take patient histories. (Tr. 491.) They do not provide patient care. (Tr. 449.)
5 When the clinics are not open, detainees with urgent dental complaints may be sent to the emergency room at Cermak. (Tr. 894.)
6 Neither plaintiffs nor defendants called a nurse who performs the initial review of the HSRs to explain the practices and procedures for the review.
7 The dental assistant for Division 6 testified that she picks up between five and ten HSRs a day. (Tr. 461.)
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pain, the request is marked urgent. (Tr. 452–53.) If a request is marked urgent, the detainee is scheduled to visit the dental clinic within a week. (Tr. 474.) The dental assistant may request a specific appointment date after taking into account dates that the detainee is not available. (Tr. 466.) After receiving an urgent HSR, a dental assistant also may ask officers to bring the detainee to the clinic immediately for an evaluation by the dentist. (Tr. 458, 468–470.)
Before 2013, the dental clinics had no control over patient scheduling and relied on a separate patient scheduling department. (Tr. 467.) The dental staff complained about their inability to control scheduling in the summer of 2013 and, in late 2013, the policy was changed to allow the dental clinics to schedule five emergency patients each afternoon. (Tr. 476–77, 483–84, 863–64.) The five emergency slots typically are filled by detainees who have filed grievances and detainees who have submitted HSRs indicating emergencies or urgent issues. (Tr. 485, 1006–07.) The chief operating officer of Cermak testified that he has noticed a decrease in grievances since the new emergency slots were instituted, and the director of oral health testified that the number of grievances has been reduced by almost 58% as a result of the schedule change. (Tr. 1284; see also Tr. 500.)
The dental clinics are not equipped to handle every case. Oral surgeons at Stroger Hospital (“Stroger”) perform more complex oral surgeries and diagnose difficult cases.8 (Tr. 834.) An electronic referral system is used to schedule surgeries at Stroger. (Tr. 1241, 1295.) The dentist enters a request for a patient service into the system, and then Stroger schedules the appointment. (Tr. 666, 1241.) Each weekday Stroger allocates two or three oral surgery slots to
8 Since 2012, the Cermak budget has included funding for a part-time oral surgeon at CCJ, but one dentist testified that the proposed salary is inadequate to attract a candidate. (Tr. 1012–14, 1256.)
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CCJ detainees.9 (Tr. 1017, 1296.) Historically detainees have had to wait months (and even years) for oral surgery at Stroger10 (Tr. 836, 845), but Dr. Townsend, one of the dentists at CCJ,
testified that the wait was approximately two weeks at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 1022.)
If a detainee believes his care is inadequate he may file a grievance. (Tr. 653–54, 1202–
03.) Grievances are picked up by a counselor, sorted, and distributed to the appropriate area.
(Tr. 660–61.) If the grievance touches on a medical issue, the Sheriff forwards it to Cermak.
(Tr. 1203.) Linda Murakami, Cermak’s former director of quality improvement, oversaw the
grievance process for medical issues before she left the position in March 2014. (Tr. 653.)
Murakami testified that in early 2013 she could request an appointment for detainees who
complained that they had not received adequate dental care but could not actually schedule the
appointment. (Tr. 654.) At the end of 2013, the procedures for addressing dental grievances
were modified and the grievances are now faxed directly to a member of the dental staff for
scheduling. (Tr. 659, 689.)
IV. Dental Care Policies Cermak has two official policies that govern treatment of dental pain.11 The first policy
covers general non-emergency health care requests and services. (P. Ex. 110.) The policy
provides that Cermak will collect HSRs on a daily basis and review them within twenty-four
hours. (Id. at 1.) For requests that describe a clinical symptom, such as pain, “Cermak will 9 The assistant director of oral health testified that as of July 1, 2014 there would be four oral
surgery slots for detainees each weekday. (Tr. 1296.) The number of detainees that are treated at Stroger each day is limited to the number of seats on the bus that goes to Stroger. (Tr. 1307.) Sometimes patients with non-dental ailments will take precedence over dental patients on the bus. (Tr. 1082–83.) One dentist testified that he refers approximately ten detainees for oral surgery each month. (Tr. 836.)
10 Dr. Rabin, one of the CCJ dentists, testified that he advises detainees scheduled for oral surgery at Stroger to submit an HSR if they have pain while waiting for their appointment so that he can prescribe additional medication to reduce pain during the wait. (Tr. 892.)
11 The parties focused on the two policies described here, but there may be additional policies touching on dental care at CCJ. (Tr. 993.)
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provide a face-to-face evaluation by a qualified health professional on the next business day in

the health service dispensary or other clinical setting.” (Id.) The policy also provides, “dental

symptoms with pain are to be brought to [Health Service Dispensary] clinic for immediate

evaluation & treatment; if treated at clinic, must be entered into [electronic record].” (P. Ex. 110

at 3.) Dental issues with no “nursing follow-up” are to be forwarded to the dental department,

where the dental assistants will enter the HSR into the electronic records system. (Id.)

The second policy specifically covers oral care. (P. Ex. 105.) The policy lists five acuity

levels and timeframes for care:

Acuity Level Emergency Urgent
Priority
Routine

Timeframe Immediately
Within 1 week and, whenever possible, within 3 business days Within 2 weeks

Description Patient may suffer irreparable harm if not treated within hours Serious conditions not considered oral emergencies
Require treatment but not urgently

Next available Routine care routine appointment

Examples • Acute fracture • Acute, severe oral infections
• Broken teeth with exposed nerve • Oral infections • Dental caries with pain that cannot
be controlled by analgesics
• Acutely chipped teeth without exposed nerve
• Dental caries without swelling or uncontrollable pain
• Gingivitis • Preventive care

(See id. at 3.) Although the court heard testimony about the policies, plaintiffs do not appear to argue that they fall below the standard of care. Plaintiffs’ argument focuses on whether the policies are implemented consistently. (See Tr. 593.) V. Detainee Testimony and Records
Eight current and former detainees at CCJ testified at trial. The detainees’ testimony and medical records demonstrate that the current treatment of dental issues and dental pain at CCJ

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does not always adhere to the policies and practices detailed above, and detainees may face obstacles to care at several stages of the treatment process.
For example, Jonathan Williams testified that he waited years to be sent to Stroger for removal of a tooth that was causing him pain. (See generally Tr. 194–236; P. Exhs. 98–99.) During the time he waited for surgery he filed numerous HSRs requesting pain medication and antibiotics to treat the tooth, but there were consistent delays in treatment. (Id.)
Quentin Scott saw a physician’s assistant on the same day he submitted an HSR complaining of tooth pain, and he was given aspirin and ibuprofen. (P. Exh. 81 at 127.) Two days later he visited the dental clinic and the dentist referred him to Stroger for surgery and prescribed antibiotics and pain medication. (Tr. 310–11.) He did not receive the medication in a timely manner. (P. Exh. 82 at 13.) More than six months later the teeth causing him pain were pulled at Stroger. (Tr. 322.)
John Saiger12 broke his wisdom tooth in April 2013 while he was at CCJ. Saiger notified an officer that he was in intense pain; the officer responded that he should fill out an HSR. (Tr. 386.) Saiger submitted two HSRs but did not see a medical provider. (Tr. 387.) Saiger filed a grievance two months later in June 2013, complaining about the lack of treatment. (Tr. 388–89; P. Exh. 79 at 6.) He subsequently moved divisions and a scheduled dental appointment had to be rescheduled. (Id. at 8.) He saw the dentist in September 2013, five months after he broke his wisdom tooth. (Tr. 390–91.) The dentist examined his teeth, took an x-ray, stated that an extraction was necessary, prescribed one week of antibiotics and ibuprofen to prepare the tooth for extraction, and scheduled Saiger for a return visit in a week. (Tr. at 391.) Saiger was not
12 Saiger has opted out of the class and has an individual lawsuit pending. See Saiger v. Dart, No. 13 C 5495 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 1, 2013).
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returned to the dentist in a timely manner and, after another grievance and appeal, he saw a dentist at CCJ on January 19, 2014 and his dental issues were resolved. (Tr. 396.)
Stanford Thompson13 chipped his tooth at CCJ and asked an officer to send him to the medical unit for care. The officer refused. (Tr. 764.) The next morning Thompson submitted an HSR complaining about tooth pain, but he did not see a medical provider. (P. Ex. 86 at 1.) A couple of weeks later, Thompson visited the dispensary for an unrelated issue and informed the doctor about his tooth pain. (Tr. 767–68.) The doctor prescribed ibuprofen. (Id.) Thompson filed a grievance requesting to see a dentist. (P. Ex. 87 at 1.) A week later, a dentist saw him and prescribed ibuprofen and antibiotics. (Tr. 770.) Thompson returned to the dentist after a week and the tooth was extracted. (Id.)
Jason Knickrehm submitted an HSR on October 8, 2013, complaining of a toothache and a hole in his tooth. (P. Ex. 66 at 3.) He was not brought to see a medical provider. (Tr. 415; P. Ex. 66 at 1–2.) After he submitted another HSR and a grievance, Knickrehm was seen in urgent care and prescribed medication, which he did not receive. (Tr. 419–20.) Knickrehm visited the dental clinic about six weeks after his initial complaint and was given antibiotics and ibuprofen. (Tr. 420.) The dentist requested a follow-up appointment for the next week to pull the teeth after the infection subsided, but Knickrehm did not return. (Tr. 421–22.) Knickrehm filed another grievance and he was brought to the dental clinic three days later. The dentist pulled one tooth and prescribed additional antibiotics and ibuprofen. (Tr. 423–24, 815–17; P. Ex. 67 at 6–7.) He did not receive the medication and the remaining teeth were not removed for over a month. (Tr. 425.)
13 Thompson has opted out of the class and has an individual lawsuit pending. See Thompson v. Dart, No. 13 C 6946 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 26, 2013).
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Orlando Allen submitted two or three HSRs and a grievance complaining of dental pain
before he was seen. (Tr. 694–96l; P. Ex. 13 at 1, 2, 5; P. Ex. 14 at 1.) Allen visited the dental
clinic about two months after his original request. (Tr. 700.) The dentist prescribed antibiotics
and pain medication, but Allen’s tooth was too swollen to be removed. (Id.) Allen returned to
the clinic a few days later and the dentist operated on the tooth and relieved the pain.14 (Tr. 701.)
VI. Expert Testimony
A. Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Jay Shulman
At the bench trial, the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jay Shulman, did not offer any opinion about
the adequacy of the dental care policies at CCJ, the staffing levels, or the quality of care. (Tr.
40.) He did not visit CCJ. (Tr. 589.) Based on his review of medical files,15 Dr. Shulman
concluded that “face-to-face examinations by nursing staff are not consistent” and “pain relief is
not a systematic part of the treatment system.” (Tr. 86.) On cross-examination, Dr. Shulman
conceded that that dental care staffing at CCJ was within optimal range and that there is an
allowable error rate (10–25% depending on the care being measured) for dental treatment in a
correctional setting. (See Tr. at 133–38, 146.)
14 Allen also had a dental issue in October 2013 for which the care was significantly better. He submitted an HSR on October 28 complaining about pain on the right side of his face. (Tr. 712; P. Ex. 12 at 20.) The next day he saw a registered nurse who gave him Tylenol and he visited the dental clinic on October 31. (Tr. 712–13.)
15 These fourteen files were not culled randomly. Their genesis is as follows: Plaintiffs attached fifty-three inmate affidavits to their motion for preliminary injunction filed in January 2013, after the close of discovery. (See dkt. 236, ex. 11.) Defendants moved to strike the affidavits but also produced medical records for the first fourteen of the fifty-three affiants and used information in those records to rebut the substance of plaintiffs’ motion. (See dkt. 251 at 9 & n.4.) Dr. Shulman reviewed these medical records and found that pain relief was substandard for the majority of the fourteen inmates. (Tr. 170–71, 284.) Plaintiffs argue that the court unfairly restricted the discovery to preclude them from obtaining adequate records to support their case, and thus the lack of randomness of the sample must not be held against them. The court must note that there was, in fact, a somewhat random sampling done in this case in spring of 2011 when the court ordered defendants to provide the names and medical records of all detainees treated in Division 11 dental clinic on February 9, 2011. The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew the motion for a preliminary injunction pending at the time of the sampling. (See dkt. 81.)
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Plaintiffs attached a supplemental report from Dr. Shulman to their response to the
decertification motion. (See dkt. 373, ex. 1.) Defendants have moved to strike the supplemental
report as untimely. (Dkt. 381). In the report, Dr. Shulman asserts the following opinions that
relate to certification issues:
1. A reliable determination of whether a detainee experienced dental pain can be made from the following:
A. Whether the detainee submitted a health service request form or a grievance complaining of a toothache or dental pain,
B. Whether a health services provider, such as a registered nurse, a physician’s assistant, a physician, or a dentist, recorded pain in a clinical note, or prescribed an analgesic in response to the health service request form complaining of a toothache, and
C. Whether the detainee, if seen by a dentist, was prescribed an analgesic or underwent a dental procedure that would have alleviated pain.
2. Any failure to provide return dental appointments within ten days after a detainee has been furnished an antibiotic for a dental infection is likely, with a reasonable degree of dental certainty, to result in a recurrence of preventable and gratuitous pain because of a recurrence of infection that will not be eliminated until the tooth (that is the underlying source of the infection) is treated.
(Dkt. 373, ex. 1 at 1.) Although defendants argue that this report is untimely, it is submitted in
response to defendants’ motion for decertification rather than in support of the requested
injunctive relief. Thus the court will not strike the report and will include it in the materials
considered with respect to its decertification decision.
B. Defendants’ Expert Dr. Karl Meyer
Defendants’ expert, Dr. Karl Meyer, visited CCJ in January 2014 and toured the dental
clinics. (Tr. 1111–12.) He observed the flow of patients and reviewed the daily appointment
logs and HSR forms on the desk. (Tr. 1117.) He also reviewed Cermak’s policies on oral and
non-emergency care. (Tr. 1115–16.)
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Dr. Meyer opined that the facilities, staffing levels, and equipment he observed are sufficient to meet the dental health needs of the detainee population.16 (Tr. 1117, 1120.) He testified that the HSRs he found on the desks in the dental clinic were timely addressed. (Tr. 1118–19, 1126.) He further testified that there was “quite a bit” of routine dental care provided at CCJ, which was uncommon for jail facilities with a high turnover rate. (Tr. 1136–37.)
Dr. Meyer also testified that the policies governing dental care at CCJ are consistent with guidelines promulgated by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. (Tr. 1130– 32.) He noted that outside correctional facilities, when there are limited oral surgery resources, patients may be required to wait extended time periods (up to nine months) for oral surgery. (Tr. 1141–42.) In the interim, the patient is seen episodically to control pain or infection. (Tr. 1142.)
Finally, Dr. Meyer testified that CCJ is addressing the issues raised in Dr. Shulman’s report and testimony. Dr. Meyer also noted that the fourteen records reviewed by Dr. Shulman were not randomly selected but were pulled from detainees who had filed grievances about their dental care. (Tr. 1147–49.) VII. Monitor’s Report
The federal government currently monitors medical care (including dental care) at CCJ pursuant to a 2010 consent order entered in United States v. Cook County, Ill., No. 10 C 2946 (N.D. Ill. filed May 13, 2010). The court granted plaintiffs’ motion to take judicial notice of the monitor’s most recent report, filed in May 2014. (See dkt. 384, ex. 1 (“Monitor’s Rpt.”); dkt. 389.) The executive summary of the report notes, “Inmates currently do not have timely access to care which increases their risk of harm. On any given day, staff vacancies result in redeployment of nurses to medication administration and inmate health requests are not
16 Dr. Meyer testified that acceptable staffing ratios were in the range of one dentist for every 1000 to 1500 detainees. (Tr. 1121.)
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processed.” (Monitor’s Rpt. at 2.) In addition, the monitor found that when nurses do see detainees with urgent dental problems as a result of an HSR, the care may be insufficient: “[F]or patients with dental pain the nurse may only give ibuprofen 200 mg three times daily for two days which for many patients is insufficient dosing and not long enough to last until the dentist can see the patient.” (Id. at 45.)
The monitor reported that dental care was in “partial compliance” with the consent order because of the “difficulty with accurate measuring and reporting of dental wait times.” (Id. at 2.) Specifically, the monitor observed,
The current dental wait time for immediate and urgent HSRs is one to three days. Routine dental HSR wait time is reported to be about 30 days. It unfortunately remains true, however, that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to verify the dental wait time due to inherent [electronic record] rigidity with regard to the ability to locate the HSR form that resulted in the dental clinic visit. (Id. at 67.)
LEGAL STANDARD Rule 23(c)(1) provides that “[a]n order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Thus, until the court enters final judgment, a certification order is “inherently tentative.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978). The standard for decertification is identical to the standard for certifying the class in the first instance, but the court may consider new evidence. As the Fifth Circuit observed, “Under Rule 23, the district court is charged with the duty of monitoring its class decisions in light of the evidentiary development of the case. The district judge must define, redefine, subclass, and decertify as appropriate in response to the progression of the case from assertion to facts.” Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 246 F.R.D.
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326, 334 & n.6 (D.D.C. 2007); cf. Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming decertification of class).
ANALYSIS A party seeking to certify a class action must demonstrate that the class is “ascertainable,” satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and qualifies under at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b).17 See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012). Rule 23(a) requires (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The court certified two classes in this case. First, the court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires a finding that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Second, the court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a finding that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “Class certification is appropriate only if, ‘after a rigorous analysis,’ the trial court is satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.” Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 493 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011)). This may require inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. Id. Courts have
17 It is not settled whether plaintiffs or defendants bear the burden of proof on motions for decertification. Compare Harper v. Yale Int’l Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 03 C 3789, 2004 WL 1080193, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2004) (plaintiffs’ burden); Ellis v. Elgin Riverboat Resort, 217 F.R.D. 415, 419 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (same), and Clarke ex rel. Pickard v. Ford Motor Co., 228 F.R.D. 631, 633 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (defendants’ burden). The court will not resolve this issue here because, even if it is defendants’ burden, they have adequately shown that subsequent developments warrant decertification of the (b)(2) class and modification of the (b)(3) class.
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broad discretion in their decision whether to certify a class. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998).
The evidence at the trial demonstrates that some of the facts on which the court based its initial certification are no longer true. After reviewing the Rule 23 requirements for each class in light of the situation today, the court finds it necessary to revisit its certification decision with respect to commonality as well as the specific requirements of (b)(2) and (b)(3).18
I. Rule 23(a)(2)—Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court rejected superficial common questions, such as whether each class member “suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. The Court held that the common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. Applying this standard, the Court reversed the district court’s certification of a class of female Wal-Mart employees because the alleged discriminatory employment decisions were not made pursuant to uniform policy or practice. Id. at 2556–57. The fact that Wal-Mart’s local managers used their discretion to make employment decisions vitiated the common question of whether the decisions were discriminatory. Id. at 2554–55. In its opinions following Wal-Mart, the Seventh Circuit has looked at whether class members’ claims “share some question of law or fact that can be answered all at once and that the single answer to that question will resolve a central issue in all class members’ claims.”
18 Defendants also argue that the (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes are not ascertainable, do not satisfy typicality, are not adequately represented, and improperly prevent defendants from asserting affirmative defenses. (See generally dkt. 309.) Many of the points made by defendants in support of these arguments overlap with arguments addressed in this opinion or were rejected in the court’s original certification opinions and the court will not revisit them here.
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Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497; see also Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (“What matters to class certification is the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551) (internal quotation marks omitted); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277, 188 L. Ed. 2d 298 (2014) (class treatment may be justified if there is one issue central to the validity of each of the claims in a class action that can be decided in one proceeding).
In order to assess whether there is a common question of law or fact, a court must look to the law governing the plaintiffs’ claims. Deliberate indifference claims generally require an individualized inquiry into whether a plaintiff demonstrates “(1) an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition.”19 Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A claim also may succeed if a plaintiff shows “there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care.” Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In its opinion certifying the (b)(2) class, the court found that the question common to all plaintiffs was whether the alleged inadequacy of dental staff deprived class members of timely relief from dental pain:
[Plaintiffs] claim that inmates with dental pain are suffering unnecessary and prolonged pain due to defendants’ decision to reduce dental services at the jail, particularly in reducing the number of dentists there to one. Whether this decision has
19 Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence, it requires that a defendant “acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind” akin to “criminal recklessness.” Holloway v. Del. Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 2012).
15

caused unnecessary pain and delay is a question common to the class and based on the same conduct of defendants. (Dkt 68 at 13.) The court reiterated the common question in its opinion certifying the (b)(3) class: “Plaintiffs here are attacking a policy of deliberate indifference by reducing staff to a level making it a virtual certainty that adequate care will not be provided, as opposed to a situation where an adequately staffed facility fails to treat some individuals as promptly as it should.” (Dkt. 93 at 6.) After the trial on injunctive relief, it is evident that this common question of causation no longer exists. Defendants have significantly increased dental staffing at the jail to within optimal range. (Tr. 145–46, 589.) Defendants’ policies generally fall within the nationally recognized standard of care and are similar to policies used in other correctional settings. (Tr. 40, 557, 1130–32.) Thus the question that was common to all plaintiffs—whether the alleged inadequacy of dental staff deprived class members of timely relief of dental pain—is no longer present. Although plaintiffs presented evidence that class members suffer unnecessary pain, witness testimony demonstrated that treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at many stages in the treatment process. There is no longer one cause common to all plaintiffs. In some instances, officers did not call medical staff to provide immediate pain relief to a detainee. In other instances, detainees remained in unnecessary pain because nurses did not timely review their HSRs and did not call them down for a face-to-face examination or prescribe painkillers within the appropriate time period. When medication was prescribed, some detainees did not receive it. Sometimes detainees waited too long for an initial appointment with a dentist, at other times, detainees did not receive follow-up appointments when necessary. Some detainees experienced significant delays before seeing an oral surgeon who could ultimately resolve the cause of the pain. Failure to remediate dental pain
16

at any of these points may constitute deliberate indifference depending on the facts of the individual case but, unlike the circumstances present at the time the classes were certified, there is no longer a single question the answer to which would resolve a significant issue in the case.
Plaintiffs disagree and suggest three common questions. First, “[c]ould the Jail provide adequate dental care to detainees at the Cook County Jail with less than the seven dentists now employed at the jail?” (Dkt. 373 at 10.) This question is not common to all class members, however, since some of those members’ claims arose after there were seven dentists at the jail. As discussed below, this is the basis for the court’s modification of the (b)(3) class to a closed time period.
The other common questions proposed by plaintiffs raise two separate causes for detainees’ prolonged dental pain, and thus actually support the finding that there is no longer a single question of causation appropriate for class treatment. The questions are (1) “Does the Jail’s continuing failure to require a face-to-face evaluation from a registered nurse within 24 hours of a written complaint of dental pain result in gratuitous pain?” and (2) “Does the failure of the Jail to provide timely ‘return to clinic’ appointments result in preventable and gratuitous pain?” (Id.) Although there continue to be access to care issues at CCJ, these questions do not point to the type of “systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures” that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment of dental pain. See Wellman, 715 F.2d at 272.
The court finds that Rule 23(a)(2) is not satisfied for either the (b)(2) class or the (b)(3) class (as currently defined) because there is no longer a common question that can be answered in the same proceeding and for which the answer will resolve a central issue in all class
17

members’ claims. See Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497. Although the court could end its inquiry here, for completeness it will also address the Rule 23(b) requirements for each class.
II. Rule 23(b)(2)—General Application and Appropriateness of Injunction Rule 23(b)(2) has two related requirements. First, defendants must base their actions on grounds applicable generally to the class and, second, final injunctive relief must be appropriate for the class as a whole. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). A (b)(2) class is appropriate when “a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (emphasis in original); see also Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 893 n.8 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Where a class is not cohesive such that a uniform remedy will not redress the injuries of all plaintiffs, class certification is typically not appropriate.”) (emphasis in original). In its order certifying the (b)(2) class, the court observed that an injunction satisfying Rule 23(b)(2) could easily be fashioned: “An injunction ordering defendants to increase the number of dentists employed to treat the jail’s inmate population would generally address plaintiffs’ complaints.” (Dkt. 68 at 14 n.3.) As discussed above, this is no longer the case because the jail has increased its dental staff to acceptable, even optimal, levels. Because there is no longer a single identifiable remedy any injunction either would be so abstract that it would give no guidance about what is required or would delve into the minutiae of the administration of dental and health care at CCJ. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) forbids vague injunctions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008), and if the injunction is too finely fashioned, the court runs the risk of aiding some class members to the detriment of others. For example, plaintiffs suggest that the dental
18

clinics should schedule appointments, but one of the dentists alluded to the fact that such a policy could mean less time spent on actual dental procedures. (See Tr. 1008–09.) See also Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such that the case will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.”). It is not within the court’s power or expertise to fashion an appropriate injunction in this case.20
The court’s inability to order injunctive relief applicable to each class member is supported by the fact that plaintiffs have had difficulty articulating the outlines of their request for injunctive relief. (Compare dkt. 236 at 1; dkt. 370 at 1–2; Tr. 1319.) See also Haynes v. Dart, No. 08 C 4834, 2009 WL 2355393, at **9–10 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009) (refusing to certify a (b)(2) class for injunctive relief to remediate jail conditions where plaintiffs failed to identify the scope of equitable relief sought). The plaintiffs ask the court to order Dr. Meyer and Dr. Shulman to conduct a focus review at CCJ and make recommendations to the court. (Tr. 1319.) Plaintiffs do not cite any cases in which other courts have adopted such a remedy and do not address the myriad of issues with this request—most strikingly, who would pay the experts for their time.
Although the court grants defendants’ motion to decertify the (b)(2) class, it bears mention that plaintiffs’ counsel has worked tirelessly for their clients, some of whom have
20 Further, the (b)(2) class definition is focused on access to a dentist rather than access to pain relief. (See dkt. 68 at 15 (defining class as detainees who wait over seven days without seeing a dentist).) This was an appropriate definition when the expected injunctive relief consisted of ordering defendants to hire more dentists. But this is not an appropriate definition when plaintiffs seek a wide range of injunctive relief that includes access to pain relief from nursing staff and access to oral surgery. (See dkt. 370 at 1–2 (requesting injunction to require face-to-face assessment by registered nurse within 24 hours of submission of an HSR form and unspecified “additional relief” to remedy issues with “scheduling follow-up appointments and access to an oral surgeon”).)
19

meritorious claims. Indeed, the court cannot help but surmise that this suit helped bring about the changes at Cermak and CCJ which, in turn, brought about the court’s decision today. If the Supreme Court had not rejected the “catalyst theory” as a basis for an award of fees, see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001), the court would suggest this case as a candidate for such an award.
III. Rule 23(b)(3)—Predominance and Superiority Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class requires a court find that common questions predominate over questions affecting individual members and that the class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The inquiry is similar to commonality but is more demanding. See, e.g., Thomas v. Matrix Corp. Servs, Inc., No. 10 C 5093, 2012 WL 3581298, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2012). To determine whether predominance and superiority are satisfied, courts examine “the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ claims, the proof necessary for those elements, and the manageability of trial on those issues.” Reed v. Advocate Health Care, No. 06 C 3337, 2009 WL 3146999, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009) (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1981)); see also Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184, 180 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2011) (predominance inquiry begins with elements of underlying cause of action).
A. Predominance In discussing predominance in its opinion certifying the (b)(3) class, the court observed that “[c]ourts routinely certify classes under Rule 23(b)(3) challenging uniform policies related to conditions of confinement.” (Dkt. 93 at 4.) Although this holds true for cases that allege a uniform policy or practice constituting deliberate indifference, courts often refuse to certify
20

classes under Rule 23(b)(3) in cases alleging improper implementation of uniform policies. In those cases, courts find that individual issues predominate over common issues.
For example, the Eastern District of Michigan recently declined to certify a class of prisoners who alleged deficient medical care facilities and hygiene policies, determining that the plaintiffs’ claims encompassed too many individual questions. Rouse v. Caruso, No. 06-CV10961, 2013 WL 5775354, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2013). These included “[i]ndividualized and highly fact-specific questions of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs’ specific medical needs and whether treatment was delayed or denied, [and] whether indigent-status was properly revoked . . . .” Id.; see also Roadhouse v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 290 F.R.D. 535, 545– 46 (D. Nev. 2013) (denying certification for arrestees subjected to group strip searches because group strip searches were not part of a policy, and contrasting cases where group strip searches were part of policy); Schilling v. Kenton Cnty., Ky., No. 10-143, 2011 WL 293759, at **9–10 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2011) (denying certification of claims of unconstitutional deprivation of medical care at jail and observing that the commonality requirement is satisfied when class members are “affected by a general policy of the defendant and the general policy is the focus of the litigation”) (emphasis in original); Turner v. Grant Cnty. Detention Ctr., No. 05-148, 2008 WL 821895, at *20 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2008) (holding individual issues predominate over common issues for class of detainees alleging physical assault and subsequent lack of medical care and finding the common questions proposed by plaintiff “are so generic virtually every inmate has an interest in the question’s answer”).
As discussed above with respect to commonality, this case has morphed from one in which a common issue (the inadequacy of dental staffing at CCJ) predominated to one that is focused on individual issues. In addition to the issues discussed above, there are other issues
21

unique to each detainee’s claim that demonstrate that the case is not suited for class treatment for the period after the single overriding question of causation ended. For example, detainees have different reactions to medication. A course of antibiotics may relieve dental pain in some detainees for a long period, while in others it does not relieve the pain at all. Detainees may also refuse care at one point in treatment (e.g., one detainee refused extraction at a clinic in favor of having the extraction at Stroger at a later date), which may give rise to an affirmative defense. Some detainees can no longer receive certain pain medication because the excess amounts they received in correctional facilities in the past have damaged their internal organs. For these detainees it is possible that expedited remediation of dental pain is necessary. And some detainees are held in more restrictive areas, which may result in longer delays in receiving treatment. All of these issues go to liability and require individual assessment.
In other words, once the dental clinics became staffed to the point they met the standard of care, the court’s original finding of predominance, as with commonality, is no longer correct.
B. Superiority A party seeking certification of a (b)(3) class must also show that the class action vehicle is superior. This is closely tied to predominance because a class action is only a superior vehicle if it reduces litigation costs and promotes efficiency. Rule 23(b)(3) lists the following factors for a court to consider in determining whether a class action is superior:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
22

For the reasons discussed above, for the time period after defendants adequately staffed the dental clinics at CCJ, a class action is not a superior vehicle and the question of whether remediation of dental pain for a detainee fell below the deliberate indifference standard is better suited for individual actions. For the time period prior to adequate staffing, however, a class action remains superior.
Defendants disagree, arguing that “the ongoing discovery disputes, moving target of allegations and massive amount of opt-outs has created management problems which far outweigh the potential efficiencies of proceeding as a class action.” (Dkt. 380 at 14; see also dkt. 309, ex. H (listing over 300 opt outs).) But much of the work has already been completed, and the court is prepared to expedite the resolution of the remaining issues.
Thus, rather than decertifying the (b)(3) class, the court will modify the definition to include an end date for inclusion in the class. See Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 392 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (modifying class definition) (citing In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 644 F.3d 511, 519 (7th Cir. 2011)). Once an end date for the class period is determined, the question of liability is common to the class and individual hearings regarding damages for the class members can be held. Preferably, of course, the parties will agree to resolve those claims through negotiations.
CONCLUSION Defendants’ motion to decertify (dkt. 306) is granted in part and denied in part. The court decertifies the (b)(2) class and will modify the (b)(3) class definition in a manner to be determined. Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction (dkt. 236) is denied as moot, as is defendants’ motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact (dkt. 343). The parties are directed to confer in an effort to reach agreement on a closing date for the class period
23

and to discuss parameters for possible settlement of the entire case. A status hearing is set for January 20, 2015 at 10:30 a.m.

Date: December 22, 2014

_______________________________________ U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

24

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 391 Filed: 12/22/14 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:5599

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and

)

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 09 C 529 Judge Joan H. Lefkow

ORDER

Plaintiffs object to two of the magistrate judge’s orders. First, they object to the magistrate judge’s March 25, 2014 order (dkt. 282) denying discovery of identifying information from the Cook County Jail (“CCJ”) database. Second, they object to the magistrate judge’s April 8, 2014 order (dkt. 291) quashing their requests for health records under § 8-2001 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-2001. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs’ objections to the magistrate judge’s March 25, 2014 order (dkt. 292) are overruled and plaintiffs’ objections to the magistrate judge’s April 8, 2014 order (dkt. 299) are sustained.

STATEMENT

I. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) governs a district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s discovery-related decisions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Banks v. Enova Fin., No. 10 C 4060, 2012 WL 5995729, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2012). The district court may modify or set aside a magistrate judge’s order on a nondispositive matter if it is “clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). To sustain an objection to such an order, the district court must be “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997).

II. Procedural Posture

In an opinion filed concurrently herewith, the court decertifies the (b)(2) class and orders modification of the (b)(3) class definition. The court will assume familiarity with the posture of the case and the facts discussed in the concurrent opinion.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 391 Filed: 12/22/14 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:5600
III. Objections to March 25, 2014 Order (Dkt. 292)
Three days before the close of discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel defendants to produce identifying information about detainees at CCJ between 2011 and 2013 (approximately 250,000 individuals). Plaintiffs had filed a similar request limited to 2011 and 2012 detainees earlier in 2013, and the magistrate judge had denied the request without prejudice, finding it overbroad and directing the parties to “engage in further discussions to see if there is a way to provide information about actual class members short of a production that is plainly overinclusive.” (Dkt. 157 at 4–5.)
Defendants objected to the renewed request,1 arguing that it was overbroad and unnecessary to plaintiffs’ case. (See generally dkt. 240.) Plaintiffs disagreed, contending that the identifying information for the 250,000 detainees is relevant because they intended to “survey a sample of the persons who entered the Jail between July 21, 2011 and December 31, 2013 about responses by the Jail to any health service request complaining about dental pain.” (Dkt. 245 at 2.)
The magistrate judge denied plaintiffs’ renewed motion to compel, focusing on the fact that the request came three days before the close of discovery. The magistrate judge observed that the “production of more than two years of detainee information in order to initiate and conduct a survey” was “incompatible with the schedule in this case in which fact discovery is closed and the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and bench trial on the merits are set for June 2, 2014.” (Dkt. 282 at 5.) The magistrate judge also observed that plaintiffs’ counsel never updated the discovery request that formed the basis of their motion to compel to include 2013, which further underlines the disorganized and belated nature of plaintiffs’ request. (See id. at 4.)
The court finds that the magistrate judge’s denial of plaintiffs’ renewed motion to compel as untimely was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law and thus overrules plaintiffs’ objections to the magistrate judge’s March 25, 2014 ruling.
IV. Objections to April 8, 2014 Order (Dkt. 299)
The magistrate judge (in rulings sustained by this court) limited the number of detainee medical records plaintiffs could obtain through discovery because production of a large number of records imposed a substantial burden on Cook County. In response, plaintiffs’ counsel tried to obtain the records from Cermak Health Services of Cook County (“Cermak”) by requesting the medical records in bulk under § 8-2001 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.2 Cook County moved for a protective order to bar plaintiffs’ batch requests. The magistrate judge granted Cook County’s request on an interim basis and granted it in part and denied it in part on a final basis.
1 Defendants actually produced some limited evidence in response to plaintiffs’ motion, including the population of CCJ in 2011, 2012, and 2013, and the average and median length of stay for detainees in 2011 and 2012. (See dkt. 240 at 4.) This did not satisfy plaintiffs. (See dkt. 245 at 2.)
2 Using this method, plaintiffs’ counsel requested medical records for 78 detainees in one week.
2

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 391 Filed: 12/22/14 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:5601
The final order stated:
[T]he requests for medical records served by plaintiffs’ counsel on Cermak Health Services of Cook County in November and December 2013 are quashed and Cermak is not required to honor those requests or any future batch requests (that is, requests for more than one detainee’s records) that include a request for records of any persons listed in plaintiffs’ November 7, 2013 request for production of documents. The interim order is lifted in that Cermak is not prohibited from providing records pursuant to [§ 82001] with respect to any requests for documents presented by plaintiffs’ counsel that comply with the requirements of that Act including a valid authorization and appropriate fees and costs.
(Dkt. 299 at 9.)
Section 8-2001 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure requires private and public health care facilities to allow a patient (or an authorized representative of a patient) to examine and copy the patient’s records. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-2001(b). If a patient or his representative requests copies of the records, the request must be made in writing to the administrator of the health care facility, and the requester must reimburse the facility for all reasonable expenses, “including the costs of independent copy service companies, incurred in connection with such copying not to exceed a $20 handling charge for processing the request and the actual postage or shipping charge, if any, plus [a fee based on page length].” Id. § 5/8-2001(d). The facility must provide the copies within thirty days of the receipt of the written request or provide a written statement of the reasons for delay and the date by which the requested information will be provided. Id. § 8/5-2001(f). In any event, the records must be produced within sixty days after the request. Id.
The magistrate judge quashed plaintiffs’ batch requests under § 8-2001 for two reasons: (1) she believed plaintiffs were attempting to circumvent the discovery rulings in this case; and (2) she did not believe the requests were in keeping with the provisions of § 8-2001.
Her first rationale is foreclosed by American Bank v. City of Menasha, 627 F.3d 261 (7th Cir. 2010), in which the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a federal court can enjoin a plaintiff “from gaining access to records that a state’s public-records law entitles members of the public to see and copy at their own expense.” Id. at 263. The court concluded that the district court could not enjoin the production of the material pursuant to state law and observed that “[t]he case law uniformly refuses to define requests for access to federal or state public records laws . . . as discovery demands, even when as in this case the request is made for the purpose of obtaining information to aid in a litigation and is worded much like a discovery demand.” Id. at 265. Under American Bank, district courts cannot use their authority over discovery in a federal matter to interfere with a plaintiff’s right to gather documents under state law, regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks the documents to further its federal case.3
3 Defendants’ attempt to distinguish American Bank because it dealt with a statute regarding disclosure of public records rather than a statute providing for disclosure of private and confidential
3

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 391 Filed: 12/22/14 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:5602
The magistrate judge’s second rationale, although somewhat convincing,4 is not properly considered in this forum. If Cermak believed that plaintiffs’ requests did not adhere to the requirements of § 8-2001, Cermak could either refuse to respond and wait for plaintiffs to attempt to enforce the request in state court as contemplated by the statute, see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-2001(g), or seek a declaratory judgment in state court that the requests do not comply with the statute.
To the extent the magistrate judge’s April 8, 2014 ruling indicated that it was within her power to restrict the right of a detainee (or a detainee’s authorized representative) to obtain his or her medical records under § 8-2001 by quashing plaintiffs’ requests, the court sustains plaintiffs’ objections. It bears mention, however, that the magistrate judge did not restrict plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability make future requests for individual records under § 8-2001 as long as they made individual requests in compliance with the statute.

Date: December 22, 2014

_______________________________________ U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

medical records is unavailing. Both statutes provide for payment of the costs associated with responding to the requests and thus relieve the producing party of the burden of paying for the production. And in either case, if a federal court is allowed to bar information gathering once discovery is initiated in a federal suit, it could lead to the absurd results detailed in American Bank. See American Bank, 627 F.3d at 261 (considering when an attorney could be forbidden from seeking records otherwise available to him and noting that barring requests for records during a case could simply result in greater pre-suit requests for records).
4 As the magistrate judge observed, in order to receive records under § 8-2001, the requester must pay the reasonable fees of duplication and must provide authorization from the individual detainee. (Dkt. 291 at 5–6.) Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that the magistrate judge was incorrect in assuming that they were required to prepay for the records, citing to a website maintained by the Cook County Health & Hospital System, which states that “detainees shall receive one free copy of medical records for personal use after release from [Cook County Department of Corrections] and shall be charged a reduced rate for any subsequent record requests.” (Dkt. 299 (citing CCHHS, Cermak Health Services, Request and Authorization to Copy Health Information, available at http://www.cookcountyhhs.org/patientservices/medical-records/cermak-health-services/).) The website also states “Cermak Health Services does not accept payments, you will be billed for these services.” (Id.) There is no discussion of whether this policy, which explicitly relates to “personal use” of the medical records, would apply to the requests by plaintiffs’ counsel.
4

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

)

Case No. 09 C 529

)

)

Judge Joan H. Lefkow

)

)

)

)

OPINION AND ORDER

In this class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of Cook County in his official capacity and Cook County, Illinois,1 plaintiffs claim that inadequate dental care at Cook

County Jail (CCJ) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs have moved to divide the class which the court certified

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) into five subclasses. They also move to allow

limited discovery to address claims of detainees arising after the evidentiary hearing was held in

this case. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ amended motion to divide the (b)(3) class (dkt.

430) is denied. Plaintiffs’ motion for additional discovery (dkt. 465) is denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 18, 2010, the court denied certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class based on

collateral estoppel but certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief. The class was

defined as “[a]ll persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental

1 This opinion refers to the Sheriff of Cook County as the defendant, as the County of Cook is only responsible, if at all, as the Sheriff’s indemnitor. See Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 686 & n.5 (1998) (“[T]he lack of identity between the county sheriff's department and the general county government indicates that § 1983 suits against sheriffs in their official capacities are in reality suits against the county sheriff's department rather than the county board.”).

pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.” (Dkt. 68 at 15.) Because of a change in the law, see Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 314–316, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 180 L. Ed. 2d 341 (2011) (holding that an adverse class determination was not binding on putative class members), the court reconsidered its denial of the (b)(3) class and certified a class consisting of “all inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who have made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment” (dkt. 93 at 11).2
On December 22, 2014, following an evidentiary hearing, the court decertified the (b)(2) class and modified the (b)(3) class to include an end date coinciding with the time period for which the CCJ became adequately staffed. (Dkt. 390 at 23.) Plaintiffs appealed the order decertifying the (b)(2) class. (See dkt. 392). The court of appeals affirmed. Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 3615761 (7th Cir. July 6, 2016), and its mandate issued on August 11, 2016 (dkt. 461). This leaves the (b)(3) class comprising “all inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007 until [date to be determined], who have made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.” The parties have been unable to agree on the end date.
The issues before the court are whether the proposed subclasses are consistent with the court’s previous directions in the case and, if so, whether the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met for each proposed subclass.
2 The opinion is not clear as to why the (b)(3) class definition is different from the (b)(2) class definition, but plaintiffs’ motion to certify their proposed (b)(3) class characterized it as “limited” to inmates who requested dental care and suffered “prolonged and unnecessary pain.” (Dkt. 82 ¶ 4). In fact, this definition is likely broader than the (b)(2) class.
2

ANALYSIS I. Whether the Proposed Subclasses Are Consistent With “the Law of the Case”
Plaintiffs argue that their proposed subclasses can all be certified under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common questions predominate over individual ones and that a class action is the superior method for adjudicating the controversy.3 Whether the proposed subclasses can be certified, however, must be addressed in the context of the history of this litigation. Previously, with respect to the (b)(3) class, the court found that Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements were not met absent an end date coinciding with when the CCJ staffing rose to a constitutionally adequate level. (Dkt. 390 at 17– 23.) To avoid having to make inferences from the evidence elicited at the preliminary injunction hearing, it urged the parties to agree on an end date such that individual class members could be notified and their claims for damages addressed. Defendant has proposed July 14, 2009, which is the date CCJ exceeded the “pre-cut” staffing and budgetary levels of 2006 (specifically, employing four dentists, which defendant contends, met minimal standards of adequacy under the Constitution).
Rather than proposing a single end date marked by a staffing level, plaintiffs propose to divide the (b)(3) class into five subclasses representing succeeding segments of time up to the present, each describing a type of needed-but-delayed/denied care within specific time frames of residency at CCJ. The five subclasses plaintiffs propose fall into two categories. Subclasses one and two include inmates whose claims arose before the CCJ became staffed at current levels.
3 A class may be divided into subclasses, but each subclass is treated as a class under Rule 23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5); Johnson v. Meriter Health Srvs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 2012). (“[A]s long as each subclass is homogeneous, in the sense that every member of the subclass wants the same relief, and each subclass otherwise satisfies the requirements for certifying a class, so that each could be the plaintiff in a separate class action, there is no objection to combining them in a single class action.”).
3

Subclasses three, four, and five define subclasses beginning after that point, continuing to entry
of judgment, and address what plaintiffs contend is persistent lack of constitutionally adequate
dental care even after the adequate staffing level was achieved.
A. Post-March 12, 2013 Subclasses—Subclasses Three, Four, and Five4
Defendant vociferously objects to inclusion of plaintiffs whose claims arose after March
12, 2013, as inconsistent with the court’s decision to modify the (b)(3) class by setting an end
date for inclusion in the class. Plaintiffs’ effort to circumvent that ruling is not accepted.
Certainly, a class might be able to proceed on the allegation that, optimal staffing
notwithstanding, defendant’s practices expose all inmates at CCJ to substantial risk of serious
harm even if the harm might be different for different inmates, but such is a case for injunctive
relief.5 The court has already decided that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that injunctive relief
could be granted on the basis that failure to implement procedures was so serious as to support a
4 Plaintiffs’ propose the following definitions of these three subclasses:
• Subclass three: “All inmates housed at the Cook County Department of Corrections from March 12, 2013 to the date of entry of judgment who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who did not receive a face to face assessment from a registered nurse or higher level practitioner within 24 hours of the complaint.” (Dkt. 430 at 1.)
• Subclass four: “All inmates housed at the Cook County Department of Corrections from March 12, 2013 to the date of entry of judgment who, having been prescribed an antibiotic for a dental infection, were not treated by a dentist within 10 days thereafter.” (Id. at 1–2.)
• Subclass five: “All inmates housed at the Cook County Department of Corrections from March 12, 2013 to the date of entry of judgment who suffered acute pain because the inmate was not treated by an oral surgeon within fourteen days after having been referred to an oral surgeon after a diagnosis of pain or infection.” (Id. at 2.)
5 Cf. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming (b)(2) class certification where all inmates claimed to suffer the same constitutional injury when exposed to severe understaffing that created a substantial risk of serious future harm, even though the state’s maladministration may result in different harm for different inmates).
4

finding that all detainees are at serious risk of harm. (See dkt. 390 at 6 (“Plaintiffs’ argument

focuses on whether the policies are implemented consistently.”); id. at 17 (“Although there

continue to be access to care issues at CCJ, these questions do not point to the type of ‘systemic

and gross deficiencies in staff, facilities, equipment, or procedures’ that would lead to a finding

that all detainees are effectively denied treatment of dental pain.”).)

To expand the scope of the class as requested would entail reopening discovery (plaintiffs

have moved for additional discovery) and would prolong the litigation, denying already delayed

relief to members of this transient class. Inmates who believe they have been denied

constitutionally-required dental care after the end date will not be bound by the judgment in this

case, but theirs is a different case, based on conditions that are significantly different from those

existing when this case was filed years ago or even as of the date of the evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs’ proposal to create subclasses three, four, and

five. B.

Pre-March 12, 2013 Subclasses—Subclasses One and Two6

Subclass one includes inmates housed at CCJ from January 1, 2007 until July 14, 2009

(defendant’s proposed end date), who made written requests for dental care because of acute pain

but were not examined by a dentist within seven days of that request. The second subclass is the

same, but for the period from July 15, 2009 to March 11, 2013. The proposed start and end dates

6 Plaintiffs’ propose the following definitions of these two subclasses:
• Subclass one: “All inmates housed at the Cook County Department of Corrections from January 1, 2007 to July 14, 2009 who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who were not examined by a dentist within 7 days of that request.” (Dkt. 430 at 1.)
• Subclass two: “All inmates housed at the Cook County Department of Corrections from July 15, 2009 to March 11, 2013 who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who were not examined by a dentist within 7 days of that request.” (Id.)

5

correspond with the following events:
• January 1, 2007: Cermak Health Services (Cermak)7 reduced the number of dentists it employs to one following the implementation of 2007 budget cuts.8
• July 14, 2009: Cermak hired its fourth dentist, thereby restoring dental staffing to its pre-budget cut level.
• March 11, 2013: Cermak hired its seventh dentist, which equals the number of dentists employed when the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction because staffing had reached constitutionally adequate levels.
(See dkt. 421 at 7.)9 Plaintiffs do not explain why their proposed subclasses are defined more
narrowly than the (b)(3) class definition, and the court declines to narrow its earlier definition,
making the following subclasses:
Subclass one: All inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections from January 1, 2007 to July 14, 2009, who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.
Subclass two: All inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections from July 15, 2009 to March 14, 2013, who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.10
The court previously found that a (b)(3) class of the above definition could be certified so
long as accompanied by an end date coinciding with when adequate staffing levels were
7 Cermak is a division of the Cook County Bureau of Health Services and provides medical and dental care to CCJ detainees.
8 Defendant argues that the appropriate start date for this class should be April 1, 2007, the date the 2007 budget cuts took effect. (See dkt. 421 at 7; dkt. 442 at 3 n.4.)
9 As with subclasses three, four, and five, plaintiffs do not explain the basis for the particular time limit they would impose on defendant for addressing dental pain.
10 Plaintiffs’ class period suggests that the seventh dentist was hired on March 12, 2013. Defendant’s briefing actually appears to put this date two days later, on March 14, 2013. (See dkt. 421 at 7.) This is an insignificant difference but the court will presume that defendant’s information is correct.
6

instituted. Therefore, only two issues remain: (1) the appropriate end date for the class definition and (2) whether plaintiffs new proposed class representatives meet Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement.11
1. End Date Initially, plaintiffs argued that the cutoff date should coincide with the hiring of the seventh dentist and defendant argued that staffing levels became constitutionally adequate when a fourth dentist was hired. Plaintiffs advocated for their cutoff date because the court’s decertification order was based on a finding that, at the point the seventh dentist was hired, CCJ was adequately staffed. (Dkt. 422 at 1.) True enough, but the court did not explicitly find that staffing was inadequate before that date. Likewise, defendant’s position is based on the fact that when a fourth dentist was hired, staffing levels were returned to levels that existed prior to the 2006 budget cuts (dkt. 421 at 2), but defendant has not demonstrated that staffing was constitutionally adequate before the budget cuts. As such, the court is not persuaded that subclasses one and two advance the resolution of the case. The parties are unable to agree on an end date, so the court will rely on the hearing record to make a finding of when after January 2007 the level of care met Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment standards. Plaintiffs’ expert did not offer an opinion about the adequacy of staffing levels (dkt. 390
11 Plaintiffs also request that the court revisit its previous finding that at least by the time of the preliminary injunction hearing that the CCJ was staffed at a constitutionally adequate level. (Dkt. 411 at 2.) Plaintiffs’ argument is principally based on the CRIPA Monitor’s February 2, 2015 report, which reported on monitoring conducted during the week of November 3, 2014. (See dkt. 411 at Ex. 1 at 1–3.) Despite plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary, the CRIPA Monitor’s observations in that report are not materially different from those made in the CRIPA Monitor’s May 2014 report, of which this court took judicial notice prior to its decision to decertify the (b)(2) class. (Dkt. 389.) To the extent that there are differences between the two reports, those differences are generally unrelated to the issue of staffing, which is the common question that unites those within the (b)(3) class.
7

at 9), although he conceded that the current staffing was “within optimal range.” (Id.) Defendant’s expert testified that acceptable staffing ratios were in the range of one dentist for every 1000 to 1500 detainees. Id. at 11, n.16. At the time of the hearing, there were 9,500 detainees in custody at CCJ. Id. at 2. If the defense expert is credited, seven to ten dentists would have been required to service that population. As such, the court finds that the date that the seventh dentist was employed (and working) would be the earliest end date. At least one inmate witness, however, testified about delay and denial of dental care after submitting an HSR in October 2013. Id. at 8. The record also reflects that until “late 2013,” the dental clinics were not able to schedule emergency appointments, which made it difficult to address acute pain cases. Id. at 4. After policy was changed to allow the clinics to schedule five emergency appointments per day, the number of grievances fell by fifty-eight percent Id. In light of the evidence, then, the court will define the class as follows:
All inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections from January 1, 2007 to October 31, 201312 who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment. Accordingly, the motion to create subclasses one and two is denied.
2. Adequacy of Class Representatives Because the court declines to create subclasses, there is no need to add, or address the qualifications of, additional class representatives unless the already-approved representatives can no longer serve. (See dkt. 68 at 13 (approving Melvin Phillips, Malcolm Patton, and Rodell
12 The date the emergency appointment policy was implemented is not in the record available to the court, but the class should comprise inmates who were resident until the emergency policy was instituted. This can be amended if there is a significant variance from October 31.
8

Sanders as class representatives)).13 Therefore, the motion insofar as it seeks to add class representatives is denied without prejudice.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ amended motion to divide the class into subclasses (dkt. 430) is denied. Plaintiffs’ motion to divide the class into subclasses (dkt. 398) is moot. Plaintiffs’ motion to allow limited discovery (dkt. 465) is denied. Plaintiffs’ counsel, in cooperation with defendant’s counsel, shall prepare a proposed class notice consistent with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) which shall be filed not later than November 3, 2016. The case will be called for status hearing on October 18, 2016 at 10:30 a.m., at which lead counsel for each party shall appear and be prepared to discuss the resolution of this case.

Date: October 13, 2016

_______________________________ U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

13 The record indicates that John Smentek is deceased, although plaintiffs’ counsel did not file a suggestion of death on the record as directed on October 7, 2014. (Dkt. 232.) Neither was Smentek’s name included in those approved as class representatives in the opinion and order certifying the class. Again, plaintiffs’ counsel should update the record as to which representative plaintiffs are still able to serve.
9

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 1 of 38 PageID #:9673

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Dennis Smentek, et al., Plaintiffs,
-vsSheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No. 09-cv-529 ) ) (Judge Lefkow) ) ) )

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Plaintiffs, with the agreement of Defendants, move the Court to

grant preliminary approval to the class action settlement agreement at-

tached to this motion as Exhibit 1.

Grounds for this motion are as follows:

1. Following the decision of the Court of Appeals in the appeal

from this Court’s order decertifying the Rule 23(b)(2) class, Phillips v.

Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2016), this Court redefined

the Rule 23(b)(3) class to be: “All inmates housed at Cook County Depart-

ment of Corrections from January 1, 2007 to October 31, 2013 who made a

written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered pro-

longed and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.”

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 2 of 38 PageID #:9674
2. Thereafter, the parties enlisted the assistance and guidance of Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman to explore the possibility of compromising all matters at issue. The parties, with the approval of Magistrate Judge Weisman, exchanged additional data relevant to settlement and on August 23, 2017, Magistrate Judge Weisman provided the parties with a proposed valuation for settlement purposes. Defendants rejected this proposal on October 23, 2017.
3. On November 8, 2017, the Court set the case for trial on April 30, 2018. Defendants expressed a renewed interest in pursuing settlement after plaintiffs served their supplemental expert report, and, with the continued assistance of Magistrate Judge Weisman, the parties succeeded in negotiating a settlement of this action. A copy of the settlement agreement is attached as Exhibit 1.
4. The settlement establishes a “settlement fund” in the amount of $5,563,000 (five million five hundred and sixty three thousand dollars) to cover damages for class members associated with their dental care, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, resolution of three separate lawsuits, and administration of this settlement.
5. Class members will receive varying awards based on length of stay at the jail and the number of grievances, if any, filed. The algorithm
-2-

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 3 of 38 PageID #:9675
for awards is described in the settlement agreement. No class member shall receive in excess of $3,000 (three thousand dollars) Class counsel estimates that the average award will be about $200 (two hundred dollars).
6. Class counsel believes that some class members will not receive mailed notice of this settlement because they have changed addresses and will learn about the settlement only after payment of the first installment. Accordingly, the parties have agreed that payments will be made in two waves, with payments to the “second wave” claimants being made at the same amount as paid in the first installment to the extent possible: if the total amount of these second wave payments exceed the amount remaining after payment of the first installment, the amount to be paid to each “second wave claimant” shall be proportionately reduced. Class counsel does not believe that any funds will remain after the second wave payment and the parties have agreed that the Court shall reserve jurisdiction to rule on the practicability and amount of any supplemental payment to the “first wave” claimants if the second wave payments is less than $ the amount remaining after payment of the first installment.
7. Dennis Smentek, as the special administrator of the estate of original named plaintiff John Smentek, shall, subject to the approval of the Court, receive an incentive award of $25,000 (twenty five thousand dollars)
-3-

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 4 of 38 PageID #:9676
to be paid to the next of kin of John Smentek. Subject to the approval of the Court: The additional plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki, shall each receive $15,000 (fifteen thousand dollars). Class member Tom Tuduj, who appeared for a deposition, shall receive an incentive award of $3,000 (three thousand dollars). James Curtin, the plaintiff in 11-cv-933, Kenneth Morris, the plaintiff in 11-cv-934, and Percy Rounds, the plaintiff in 11-cv-4247, shall each receive $15,000 (fifteen thousand dollars). The sums in this paragraph will be paid by Cook County without any deduction for fees or costs.
8. After full agreement had been reached on the monetary relief for the classes, the parties, with the assistance of Magistrate Judge Weisman, negotiated attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties agreed that subject to the approval of the Court, class counsel will, without objection from Defendants, be reimbursed for costs, to be paid from the “settlement fund,” in the amount actually expended not to exceed $250,000 (two hundred and fifty thousand dollars), and, again subject to approval of the Court and without objection from Defendants, receive payment from the “settlement fund” in the amount of $2,000,000 (two million dollars), or about 36% of the “settlement fund.” The parties also agreed that defendants will pay up to $300,000 (three hundred thousand dollars) for the costs of administration of
-4-

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 5 of 38 PageID #:9677
the settlement and that any unused portion of this amount shall revert to Defendants.
9. Counsel for the parties believe it will be feasible to mail class notice by June 1, 2018. Counsel suggest that the Court allow 60 days, or until July 30, 2018, for class members to respond to class notice, which would allow the fairness hearing to be held on August 16, 2018, or such other date as may be set by the Court.
10. Attached as Exhibit 2 is the proposed form of class notice. The parties propose that notice be sent by first class to the last known address of each class member and that an opt-out form be provided to all class members. Proposed claim forms and opt-out forms are attached as Exhibits 3 and 4, respectively.
It is therefore respectfully requested: A. That the Court grant preliminary approval to the settlement and find that the terms of the settlement, as embodied in the Settlement Agreement, are sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to allow dissemination of the notice of the Settlement Agreement to the Class; B. That the Court set dates for mailing and responding to class notice. The parties suggest June 1, 2018 for mailing class notice and July 30, 2018 as the deadline for responding to notice;
-5-

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 6 of 38 PageID #:9678
C. That the Court authorize the parties to provide notice, claim forms, and opt-out forms by first class mail in the form attached as Exhibits 2, 3, and 4; and
D. That the Court hold a fairness hearing on August 16, 2018, or such other date as may be convenient to the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 830399 Joel A. Flaxman 200 S. Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 427-3200
Lead Counsel for the Plaintiff Class
Patrick W. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 S. Western Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60643 Additional Counsel for the Class
-6-

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 7 of 38 PageID #:9679
Exhibit 1

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 8 of 38 PageID #:9680

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Dennis Smentek, et al., Plaintiffs,
-vsSheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) No. 09-cv-529 ) ) (Judge Lefkow) ) ) )

CLASS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This settlement agreement is entered into by all parties to this ac-

tion through their respective undersigned counsel to resolve all matters at

issue in this action.

I. RECITALS
1. Nature of the Litigation. On January 27, 2009, the plaintiff

John Smentek filed this case, for himself and all others similarly situated,

in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois al-

leging violations of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution regarding dental care provided by Cook County. Mal-

colm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders and Frank Powicki subse-

quently joined the case as additional plaintiffs. Dennis Smentek, as special

representative for the estate of John Smentek, substituted as plaintiff fol-

lowing the death of John Smentek. At all times relevant to the Complaint,

Exhibit 1

Page 1

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 9 of 38 PageID #:9681
Cook County designated Cermak Health Services, a division of the Cook County Health and Hospital System, as the evaluator and provider of dental care to detainees at the Cook County Jail
2. Class Certification. The district court initially declined to permit the case to proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. (Mem.Op., November 18, 2010.) Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Bayer, 131 S.Ct. 2368 (2011), the district court reconsidered and ordered that the case proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3). The Court of Appeals declined to overturn that order. Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2012).
3. The Hearing on Injunctive Relief. Shortly after the close of fact discovery on December 20, 2013, plaintiffs filed an application for injunctive relief. Following a six day bench trial, the district court decertified the (b)(2) class and denied the requested injunctive relief as moot. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought review of this order in the Court of Appeals. Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (7th Cir.2016).
4. Redefinition of the Class. Following the decision of the Seventh Circuit, the district court in its order of October 13, 2016 redefined the plaintiff class to be: “All inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections from January 1, 2007 to October 31, 2013 who made a writ-

-2Exhibit 1

Page 2

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 10 of 38 PageID #:9682
ten request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.”
5. Settlement Process. Recognizing the risk, uncertainty, and delay of contested litigation, the parties enlisted the assistance and guidance of Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman to explore the possibility of compromising all matters at issue. The parties, with the approval of Magistrate Judge Weisman, exchanged additional data relevant to settlement and on August 23, 2017, Magistrate Judge Weisman provided the parties with a proposed valuation for settlement purposes. Defendants rejected this proposal on October 23, 2017.
6. Preparation for Trial. On November 8, 2017, the district court set the case for trial on April 30, 2018. Defendants expressed a renewed interest in pursuing settlement after plaintiffs served their supplemental expert report, and, with the continued assistance of Magistrate Judge Weisman, the parties agreed to this proposed resolution of all claims at issue in this litigation.
7. Certification by Class Counsel. Class counsel are skilled and experienced in class actions, have investigated the facts and the applicable law, and believe that it is in the best interest of the class to enter into this Settlement Agreement.

-3Exhibit 1

Page 3

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 11 of 38 PageID #:9683
8. Denial of Liability. Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County vigorously contest and deny each and every claim and all material allegations by the plaintiffs.
Cook County nonetheless has concluded that it is in its best interests, and in the best interests of the citizens of Cook County, that the action be settled on the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement. Cook County reached this conclusion after considering the factual and legal issues in the action, the substantial benefits of a final resolution of the action, the expense that would be necessary to defend the action through trial and any appeals that might be taken, the benefits of disposing of protracted and complex litigation, and the desire of Cook County to conduct its business unhampered by the distractions of continued litigation.
Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County enter into this Agreement without acknowledging any fault, liability, or wrongdoing of any kind. Neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be construed as an admission or concession by Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County of the truth of any of the allegations made in the action, or of any liability, fault, or wrongdoing of any kind whatsoever on the part of Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County.

-4Exhibit 1

Page 4

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 12 of 38 PageID #:9684
9. Non-Precedential Settlement. To the extent permitted by law, neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be offered as evidence or received in evidence in any pending or future civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding, to establish any liability or admission by Cook County and/or the Sheriff of Cook County, except in any proceedings brought to enforce the Agreement.
Neither this Agreement, nor any pleading or other paper related in any way to this Agreement, nor any act or communication in the course of negotiating or implementing this Agreement, shall be deemed an admission by Cook County and/or the Sheriff of Cook County that certification of a class is appropriate in any other litigation, or otherwise shall preclude Cook County and/or the Sheriff of Cook County from opposing or asserting any argument it may have with respect to certification of any class in any proceeding. Moreover, the parties agree that this settlement shall not be used as precedent in any way as to any subsequent conduct of Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County except as set forth herein.
II. DEFINITIONS
10. In addition to the foregoing, the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below:

-5Exhibit 1

Page 5

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 13 of 38 PageID #:9685

a. “Cook County” means Cook County, the Cook County Health and Hospital System, Cermak Health Services or and/or any other successors, assigns or legal representatives thereof.
b. “Sheriff” means the Sheriff of Cook County and/or any other successors, assigns or legal representatives thereof.
c. ‘‘Class Period’’ means the time between January 1, 2007 and October 31, 2013.
d. “Potential Class Members” means all persons who would qualify as part of the Class, prior to the date by which exclusion from the Class must be requested.
. e. “Agreement” means this Class Settlement Agreement
f. “Released Persons” means Cook County, , the Cook County Health and Hospital System, Cermak Health Services, Cook County’s counsel, the Sheriff of Cook County, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of their past, present or future boards, commissions, members, directors, officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof.
g. ‘‘Preliminary Approval Date’’ means the date the Court grants preliminary approval to this settlement agreement.
h. “Final Approval Date” means the date that the Court gives its final approval to this settlement agreement.
i. ‘‘Final Settlement Date’’ means the date on which either of the following events has occurred: (a) if no objection is interposed to this proposed settlement, the ‘‘final approval date.’’ (b) If an objection is interposed to this proposed settlement and there is no appeal from the Final Approval Order, thirty-one (31) days after the Court enters the Final Approval Order and any objector has been provided with notice that the Court entered the Final Approval Order. (C) If an appeal is taken from the Final Approval Order, seven (7) days after a reviewing court either affirms the Final Approval Order or denies review and either all avenues of appeal have been exhausted or the time for seeking further appeals has expired.

-6Exhibit 1

Page 6

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 14 of 38 PageID #:9686
III. RELIEF
11. Monetary Relief to the Class. To resolve all claims at issue in this case, the parties have agreed that, as part of the consideration for this Agreement, Cook County will establish a “settlement fund” in the amount of $5,563,000 (five million five hundred and sixty three thousand dollars) to cover damages for class members associated with their dental care, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, resolution of three separate lawsuits, and administration of this settlement.
12. Incentive Payments. Dennis Smentek, as the special administrator of the estate of original named plaintiff John Smentek, shall, subject to the approval of the Court, receive an incentive award of $25,000 (twenty five thousand dollars) to be paid to the next of kin of John Smentek. The additional plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki, shall each receive $15,000 (fifteen thousand dollars). Class member Tom Tuduj, who appeared for a deposition, shall receive an incentive award of $3,000 (three thousand dollars). James Curtin, the plaintiff in 11-cv-933, Kenneth Morris, the plaintiff in 11-cv-934, and Percy Rounds, the plaintiff in 11-cv-4247, shall each receive $15,000 (fifteen thousand dollars). These sums will be paid by Cook County without any deduction for fees or costs.

-7Exhibit 1

Page 7

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 15 of 38 PageID #:9687
13. Payments to Class Members. The parties, while recognizing that each Class Member may have a distinct claim for damages, agree that the expense, uncertainly, and delay of providing each class member with an individual determination of damages outweighs the benefits of a distribution based on date of occurrence. The parties also agree that greater awards are appropriate for claimants who submitted one or more grievances, as set out below, provided, however, that no class member shall receive in excess of $3,000 (three thousand dollars.
Each Class Member shall receive one award (which may be paid in two installments) even though he (or she) claims to have suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment on more than one occasion. A first installment shall be paid on the “Final Settlement Date.” The total amount of the first installment shall be half of the settlement fund available for distribution to class members, or $1,440,000 (one million four hundred and forty thousand dollars), provided that no class members receives more than $3,000 (three thousand dollars)
The amount to be paid to each claimant shall be computed by assigning points as explained below. A person who would qualify as a class member in more than stay at the Jail shall receive a single award for the highest available time period.

-8Exhibit 1

Page 8

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 16 of 38 PageID #:9688
The number of points to be assigned to each claimant is as follows:
• 1 point to any claimant who was in custody at the Jail for less than thirty days and who did not submit a grievance complaining of untreated dental pain;
• 2 points to any claimant who was in custody at the Jail for 30 or more days and who did not submit a grievance complaining of untreated dental pain;
• 5 points to who submitted one grievance complaining of untreated dental pain;
• 7 points to any claimant who submitted two grievances complaining of untreated dental pain;
• 10 points to any claimant who submitted three grievances complaining of untreated dental pain;
• 15 points to any claimant who submitted four or more grievances complaining of untreated dental pain.
The dollar value of each point for the first installment shall be de-
termined by dividing $1,440,000 (one million four hundred and forty thou-
sand dollars), the total sum available for the first installment, by the total
number of points assigned to all claimants. No class member shall receive
more than $3,000 (three thousand dollars).
Class counsel believes that some class members will not receive
mailed notice of this settlement and will first learn about the settlement
after payment of the first installment. Accordingly, class members may
submit claim forms in the 60 day period following payment of the first in-

-9Exhibit 1

Page 9

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 17 of 38 PageID #:9689

stallment. These claimants are referred to below as “second wave” claimants.
Payment shall be made to “second wave” claimants at the same amount as paid in the first installment to the extent possible: if the total amount of these second wave payments exceeds the amount remaining after payment of the first installment, the amount to be paid to each “second wave claimant” shall be proportionately reduced. The Court reserves jurisdiction to rule on the practicability and amount of any supplemental payment to the “first wave” claimants if the second wave payments is less than $1,440,000, however under no circumstances will total payments to any individual exceed $3,000.
If any funds are not distributed to claimants after the “second wave,” such funds shall be paid to class members who submit claims in the nine month period following the “final approval date.”
14. Reversion to Defendants. Any portion of the “settlement fund” that is not expended in payment of damages for Class Members, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, and administration expenses shall revert to Defendants.
15. Payment to Class Counsel. Attorneys’ fees and costs were not finally negotiated until after full agreement had been reached on the

-10Exhibit 1

Page 10

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 18 of 38 PageID #:9690
monetary relief for the class. The parties agreed that subject to the approval of the Court, class counsel will, without objection from Defendants, be reimbursed for costs, including expert expenses, to be paid from the “settlement fund,” in an amount not to exceed $250,000, Subject to the approval of the Court and without objection from Defendants, class counsel will receive payment from the “settlement fund” in the amount of $2,000,000, or about 36% of the “settlement fund.”
16. Administration of the Settlement. The settlement will be administered by an independent entity, to be selected by Class Counsel, with the consent of Defendants, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Defendants have agreed to pay up to $300,000 for the actual costs of administration of the settlement. Any unused portion of this amount shall revert to Defendants.
IV. NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCEDURE
17. Within thirty days after the Court has given its preliminary approval to this settlement, notice of the settlement, and information about the date and time of the fairness hearing will be sent by first class mail to the last ascertainable address of each Class Member. “Ascertainable” means the last known address appearing in the records of the Sheriff

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 19 of 38 PageID #:9691

of Cook County as enhanced by the United States Postal Service change of address database.

18. To participate in this settlement, each Class Member must submit a sworn Claim Form (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) postmarked no later than the date certain established on the final Class Notice (attached hereto as Exhibit 2). The Class Notice will include a forwarding and return address, which will be a Post Office Box controlled by the Class Administrator.

V. DECEASED, DISSOLVED, BANKRUPT, OR INCAPACITATED CLASS MEMBERS
19. Where a Class Member is deceased and a payment is due to
that Class Member, upon receipt of a proper notification and documenta-
tion, settlement payment shall be made in accordance with Illinois law.

20. Where a Class Member has been declared bankrupt, or is the subject of an open and ongoing bankruptcy proceeding, and a payment is due to the Class Member, upon receipt of proper notification and documentation, the settlement payment shall be made to such Class Member in accordance with applicable United States Bankruptcy Code laws.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CLASS
21. The Class Notice shall list Class Counsels’ addresses. Other than as provided for in this Agreement, communications relating to the ac-

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Page 12

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 20 of 38 PageID #:9692
tion or this Settlement with persons receiving Class Notices and Potential Class Members shall be through Class Counsel. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent Cook County, the Sheriff, their employees, agents, or representatives from communicating with Potential Class Members or Class Members in the normal course of their operations.
VII. CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT AND EFFECT OF DISAPPROVAL, CANCELLATION OR TERMINATION OF STIPULATION
22. If the Court disapproves this Agreement or fails to rule, or if the Court enters the Final Judgment but it is reversed or vacated on appeal, this Agreement shall be null and void and of no force and effect. If the Court materially modifies any provision of the Agreement or proposed Final Judgment, or if either is materially modified on appeal or remanded to the Court for modification, any party shall have the option of terminating this Agreement and withdrawing this consent to the entry of the Final Judgment, in which case this Agreement shall be null and void and of no force and effect.
23. If any financial obligation is imposed upon Cook County and the Sheriff in addition to or greater than those specifically set out in this Agreement, Cook County and the Sheriff may withdraw its consent to the

-13Exhibit 1

Page 13

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 21 of 38 PageID #:9693
entry of the Final Judgment, in which case this Agreement shall be null and void and of no force and effect.
VIII. OBJECTIONS
24. A Class Member may file a notice of intent to object to the proposed settlement. The written notice of intent to object must be filed with the Clerk of the Court not later than 7 days before the date set for the Final Settlement Hearing.
IX. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
25. Plaintiff and Class Counsel warrant and represent that no promise or inducement has been offered or made for this Agreement except as set forth herein, that this Agreement is executed without any reliance whatsoever on any statements or representations not contained herein, including but not limited to any statements, conduct, disclosure or non-disclosure or representations regarding discovery in the action, and that this Agreement reflects the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the terms of the Release. The warranties and representations made herein shall survive the execution and delivering of this Agreement and shall be binding upon the parties’’ heirs, representatives, successors and assigns.

-14Exhibit 1

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 22 of 38 PageID #:9694
X. RELEASES
26. Upon the Effective Date, Plaintiff, all Class Members, and their heirs, trustees, executors, administrators, principals, beneficiaries, assigns and successors will be bound by the Final Judgment and conclusively deemed to have fully released, acquitted and forever discharged, as defined in paragraph 9(d). All people and entities who meet the Class Definition and who have not timely filed “opt out” forms shall be forever barred from prosecuting their own lawsuit asserting any of the claims at issue in this litigation and they and their heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, agents, partners, successors and assigns shall be deemed to have fully released and forever discharged the Released Persons (defined below) from all Released Claims (defined below).
27. “Released Persons” means Cook County, Cook County’s counsel, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff’s counsel, Governmental Interinsurance Exchange, Bliss McKnight Insurance Company and any of their past, present or future boards, commissions, members, directors, officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof.
28. “Released Claims” means and includes any and all Unknown Claims, known claims, and rights, demands, actions, causes of action, suits,

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 23 of 38 PageID #:9695

debts, liens, contracts, liabilities, agreements, interest, costs, expenses or losses, for the acts alleged or which are or could have been alleged by the named plaintiffs or the potential class members in this action, or relate in any way whatsoever to this action regarding dental care at the Cook County Jail between January 1, 2007 and October 31, 2013.
XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
29. The parties hereto and their undersigned counsel agree to undertake their best efforts and mutually cooperate to effectuate this Agreement and the terms of the settlement set forth herein, including taking all steps and efforts contemplated by this Agreement, and any other steps and efforts which may become necessary by order of the Court or otherwise. The parties hereto further agree to defend this Agreement against objections made to final approval of the Settlement or in any appeal of the Final Judgment or collateral attack on the Agreement or Final Judgment. Class Counsel will not seek from Cook County, Cook County’s counsel, the Sheriff of Cook County, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of the Sheriff’s and/or Cook County’s past, present or future officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof any additional compensation, including attorney fees, cost, expenses or reimbursements for any work that may be involved in defending this Agreement.

-16Exhibit 1

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 24 of 38 PageID #:9696

30. The undersigned counsel represent that they are fully authorized to execute and enter into the terms and conditions of this Agreement on behalf of their respective clients.
31. Except as otherwise provided between the parties, this Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and supersedes any prior agreements or understandings between them. All terms of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals, and shall be construed as if drafted by all parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are and shall be binding upon each of the parties hereto, their agents, attorneys, employees, successors and assigns, and upon all other persons claiming any interest in the subject matter hereof through any of the parties hereto, including any Class Member.
32. Any claim form or opt-out form must be signed individually by a Class Member, not as or on behalf of a group, class, or subclass, except that such claim form or opt-out form may be submitted on behalf of an individual Class Member by the executor or administrator of a deceased Class Member’s estate, or the legal guardian of a Class Member who has been declared incompetent.
33. To the extent permitted by law, this Agreement may be pleaded as a full and complete defense to, and may be used as the basis for

-17Exhibit 1

Page 17

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 25 of 38 PageID #:9697

an injunction against, any action, suit or other proceeding which may be instituted, prosecuted or attempted in breach of this Agreement.
34. Funding of Administration of the Settlement: Within fourteen (14) days after the Court has given its preliminary approval to this proposed settlement, Cook County shall pay to the Client Fund Account of Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. (“the Flaxman firm”), the sum of $300,000 (fifty thousand dollars) so that Flaxman may hire a Claim Administrator to administer the settlement and receive interim fees associated with providing notice to class members. The Flaxman Firm shall pay to the Claim Administrator the amounts due for payments to class members who submitted timely claims. The Flaxman Firm shall provide undersigned Defense counsel with all invoices from the Claim Administrator when such invoices are paid.
35. Funding of the Settlement: Within fourteen (14) after the Court has entered final approval of the terms of the proposed class settlement (“Final Settlement Date”), Cook County shall pay to the Client Fund Account of Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. the sum of $5,263,000 (five million, two hundred and sixty three thousand dollars). Upon funding of the settlement, class counsel shall be entitled to receive the total amount of fees and costs approved by the Court. Payments to counsel shall be made not-

-18Exhibit 1

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 26 of 38 PageID #:9698
withstanding the existence of any timely filed objections thereto, or potential for appeal therefrom, or collateral attack on this Agreement or any part thereof, subject to Class Counsel’s obligation to make appropriate refunds or repayments to Defendants if and when, as a result of any appeal and/or further proceedings on remand, or successful collateral attack, the award of attorneys’ fees or cost award is reduced or reversed.
36. Payment of Claims. If the Court enters the Final Approval Order, the Claims Administrator shall within twenty-one (21) days after the Final Approval Date mail the Class Member Payments to those Class Members who submitted a valid and timely claim.
Within 60 days of the Final Settlement Date, Class Counsel shall provide Defendants with copies of all releases and opt out forms signed by class members and potential class members.
37. Change of Time Periods. All time periods and dates described in this Agreement are subject to the Court’s approval. These time periods and dates may be changed by the Court or by the Parties’ written agreement without notice to the Class.
38. Binding on Successors. This Agreement binds and benefits the Parties’ respective successors, assigns, legatees, heirs, and personal representatives.

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 27 of 38 PageID #:9699
39. Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the attached exhibits contain the entire agreement between the Parties and constitute the complete, final and exclusive embodiment of their agreement with respect to the settlement of the Lawsuit. This Agreement and the attached exhibits supersede any and all prior agreements, arrangements or understandings, whether written or oral, express or implied, between them relating to the subject matter hereof. The Parties agree that there are no understandings, written, oral, express, implied or otherwise, except as set forth in this Agreement and the attached exhibits, and that in entering into this Agreement, no Party has relied, or is entitled to rely, upon any promise, inducement, representation, statement, assurance or expectation unless it is contained herein in writing.
40. Exhibits. The exhibits to this Agreement are integral parts of the Agreement and are incorporated into this Agreement as though fully set forth herein.
41. Modifications and Amendments. No amendment, change or modification to this Agreement will be valid unless in writing signed by the Parties or their counsel.
42. Construction and Interpretation. Neither the Parties nor any of the Parties’ respective attorneys will be deemed the drafter of this

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 28 of 38 PageID #:9700
Agreement for purposes of interpreting any provision in this Agreement in any judicial or other proceeding that may arise between them. This Agreement has been, and must be construed to have been, drafted by all the Parties to it, so that any rule that construes ambiguities against the drafter will have no force or affect.
43. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which constitutes an original, but all of which together constitutes one and the same instrument. Several signature pages may be collected and annexed to one or more documents to form a complete counterpart. Photocopies or PDF copies of executed copies of this Agreement shall be treated as originals.
44. Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is declared by the Court to be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement will continue in full force and effect.
45. Waiver. No delay on the part of either Party in the exercise of any right, power or remedy shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or partial exercise of any right, power or remedy preclude the further exercise thereof, or the exercise of any other right, power or remedy.

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 29 of 38 PageID #:9701
46. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois and without regard to conflict of laws principles.
47. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. Other than the payments set out above, each Party shall bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs relating in any way to the Lawsuit or this Agreement, or the subject matter of any of them.
48. Cooperation to Obtain Court Approval. The Parties agree to cooperate fully to execute any documents and take all additional actions which are consistent with and which may be necessary or appropriate to secure the Court’s preliminary and final approval of this Agreement.
49. Enforcement and Reservation of Jurisdiction. The parties agree that the Court will reserve jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this Agreement. If the Court approves the settlement, it will enter an order of dismissal that will dismiss the litigation with prejudice as to all Class Members, except those persons who have timely filed “opt out” forms.
Agreed to, this 1st day of May, 2018 (signatures on following page)

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 30 of 38 PageID #:9702
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 830399 200 S. Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Lead Counsel for the Class
Patrick W. Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 S. Western Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60643 Additional Counsel for the Class
/s/ Francis J. Catania (with consent) Francis J. Catania, ASA 500 Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 An Attorney for Defendant Cook County
/s/ Gerald M. Dombrowski (with consent) Gerald M. Dombrowski Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman LLP 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606-1225 An Attorney for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County

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Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 31 of 38 PageID #:9703
Exhibit 2

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 32 of 38 PageID #:9704

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Dennis Smentek, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs

) 09-cv-529

-vs-

)

Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois, ) (Judge Lefkow)

Defendants

)

NOTICE OF HEARING ON SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION

TO: All inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections from January 1, 2007 to October 31, 2013 who made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment

A proposed settlement of this case, Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook County, et al, 09-cv-529 has been submitted to the Court for approval. This document describes the proposed settlement and tells you what to do if you are a class member and (a) wish to participate in the settlement, or (b) wish to exclude yourself from this case, or (c) if you believe that the proposed settlement should not be approved.

THIS IS NOT A NOTICE OF A LAWSUIT AGAINST YOU YOU MAY BENEFIT FROM READING THIS NOTICE
PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY

WHAT THIS CASE IS ABOUT The plaintiffs in this case were detainees at the Cook County Jail from January 1, 2007 through October 31, 2013. The defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County, and Cook County, Illinois. The action is pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and alleges violations of rights secured by the United States Constitution. The Court ordered that the case may proceed as a class action on August 17, 2011 and modified the class definition on October 13, 2016. Each plaintiff made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and claims to have suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment. The Sheriff and the County deny that anyone suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.

THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT With the assistance of the Court, the lawyers for the parties have agreed to a settlement of all claims in this case. Defendants have agreed to establish a settlement fund in the amount of $5,563,000 (five million five hundred and sixty three thousand dollars) to cover damages for class members, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, resolution of three separate lawsuits, and administration of this settlement. A total of $2,880,000 (two million eight hundred and eighty thousand available to pay class members.

Exhibit 2

Page 1

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 33 of 38 PageID #:9705

If the Court approves the proposed settlement, each member of the “released class” will receive an award based on the total number of claimants, length of time at the Jail, and the number of grievances, if any, filed by the claimant. Class counsel expect that the average award will be about $200; regardless of the number of claimants, the maximum award available is $3,000. The estate of original plaintiff John Smentek will receive an incentive award of $25,000; the additional plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki, will each receive $15,000. Class member Tom Tuduj, who appeared for a deposition, will receive an incentive award of $3,000. Each plaintiff in the three consolidated cases will receive $15,000. Attorneys’ fees, which were negotiated after an agreement had been reached on the monetary relief for the class, will be paid from the settlement fund in an amount not to exceed 36% of the fund, or $2,000,000 as approved by the Court. Class counsel will also receive reimbursement for actual litigation costs up to $250,000.
RELEASE If you want to participate in this settlement, you must complete the enclosed Claim Form and “release”, which means that you cannot sue about anything that arises out of your incarceration related to dental care at the Cook County Jail. The release does not extend to any claim that has not yet accrued or that is already pending in court.
CLASS COUNSEL’S OPINIONS The class is represented by attorneys Joel A. Flaxman and lead counsel Kenneth N. Flaxman, 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 201, Chicago, Illinois 60604, (312) 427-3200. The class is also represented by Thomas G. Morrissey and Patrick W. Morrissey. Class Counsel have investigated the facts and the applicable law and consider this settlement to be in the best interest of the class.
NO ADMISSION OF LIABILITY By settling this lawsuit, Defendants do not admit that they have done anything wrong. Defendants expressly deny any wrongdoing and/or violation of any individual’s constitutional rights. Defendants, by agreeing to resolve this case, do not agree to resolve claims of detainees held at the Cook County Jail outside the time period of this class and will vigorously defend any such claims.
FINAL APPROVAL HEARING A hearing will be held on August 16, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. in Courtroom 2201, United States Courthouse, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60602. The hearing will decide whether the proposed class settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and whether the proposed settlement should be approved by the Court. The date and time of the hearing may be changed without further written notice to the class.
Any class member who wishes to be heard either in support of or in opposition to the proposed settlement must file a written objection or comment with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60602 on or before July 31, 2018. Written objections or comments will be considered whether or not the class member attends the hearing.

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YOUR OPTIONS If you are an eligible class member and wish to receive a portion of the settlement proceeds, you must return the enclosed claim form to the Claims Administrator. A pre-paid pre-addressed return envelope is provided. The claim form must be received by [date to file claim]. If the settlement is finally approved by the Court, and if you are an eligible class member, you will receive a check. YOU WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY MONEY IF YOU DO NOT SUBMIT A CLAIM FORM.
If you do not wish to participate in this settlement, you can opt-out, which means to exclude yourself from both the class action and the settlement. To opt-out, you must return the opt-out form to lead counsel for the class, Kenneth N. Flaxman, 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 201, Chicago, Illinois 60604. The opt-out form must be post marked by [date of opt out]. If you do not timely opt out of the class, you will be a class member and bound by the terms of the settlement and the Court’s orders. You will be bound by any judgment approving or disapproving the settlement, and you will receive the benefits of the settlement, if approved by the Court.
MORE INFORMATION The settlement agreement and all other papers filed in this action may be examined and copied in the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 219 South Dearborn Street, 20th floor, Chicago, Illinois 60602 between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Monday through Friday. Do not call either the Court or Office of the Clerk for information about the case.

-3Exhibit 2

Page 3

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 35 of 38 PageID #:9707
Exhibit 3

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 36 of 38 PageID #:9708
RETURN THIS FORM TO:
[name and address of administrator CLAIM FORM
PREPRINTED NAME AND ADDRESS

YOU MUST FILL OUT THIS FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF SMENTEK V. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY
THIS FORM MUST BE RECEIVED BY JULY 31, 2018
I certify under penalties of perjury as provided by law that I was detained at the Cook County Jail between January 1, 2007 and October 31, 2013, that I made a written request for dental care because of acute pain, and suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment. .
By signing below, I hereby promise not to sue and to release and forever discharge Cook County, Cook County’s counsel, the Sheriff of Cook County, the Sheriff’s counsel, and any of their past, present or future boards, commissions, members, directors, officers, agents, employees and/or independent contractors, and/or any other successors, assigns, or legal representatives thereof for any and all Unknown Claims, known claims, and rights, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, debts, liens, contracts, liabilities, agreements, interest, costs, expenses or losses, for the acts alleged or which are or could have been alleged by the Named Plaintiff or the Potential Class Members in this action, or relate in any way whatsoever to this dental care at the Cook County Jail between January 1, 2007 and October 31, 2013.

My social security number is:

Claim Verification and Substitute W9:

Under penalties of perjury, I certify that:

1. The Social Security number shown on this form is my correct taxpayer identification number (or I am waiting for a number to be issued to me); and

2. I am not subject to backup withholding because: (a) I am exempt from backup withholding, or (b) I have not been notified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that I am subject to backup withholding as a result of a failure to report all interest or dividends, or (c) the IRS has notified me that I am no longer subject to backup withholding; and

3. I am a U.S. Person (including a U.S. resident alien).

Claim Verification and W-9 Signature

Date Signed

M M

D D

Y YY Y

Note: if you have been notified by the IRS that you are subject to backup withholding, you must cross out item 2 above. The IRS does not require your consent to any provision of this document other than this Form W-9 certification to avoid backup withholding.
IF YOU HAVE AN ADDRESS CHANGE, PLEASE FILL OUT THE FORM BELOW:
Mailing Address

City

State

Zip Code

Exhibit 3

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 37 of 38 PageID #:9709
Exhibit 4

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 568 Filed: 05/01/18 Page 38 of 38 PageID #:9710

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Dennis Smentek, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs

) 09-cv-529

-vs-

)

Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois, ) (Judge Lefkow)

)

Defendants

)

OPT-OUT FORM

I have read the NOTICE OF HEARING ON SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION in this case.
I do not want to participate as a member of the class in this lawsuit.
I understand that by signing this form, I will not be represented by class counsel, I will not share in the settlement in this case, but must proceed on my own.

DO NOT FILL OUT THIS FORM IF YOU WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS LAWSUIT
If you choose not to participate in this case, please date and sign your name below.

Date: _____________________

______________________________ Signature [preprinted name and address]

If you do not wish to participate in this case, you must return this form to the law offices of Kenneth N. Flaxman, 200 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 201, Chicago, Illinois 60604 by July 31, 2018. This means that the form must be received at the office of class counsel by thast date and not simply put in the mail by then

Exhibit 4

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 580 Filed: 08/22/18 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:9800

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Dennis Smentek, et al., Plaintiffs,
-vsSheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois
Defendants.

) ) ) ) No. 09-cv-529 ) ) (Judge Lefkow) ) ) (Magistrate Judge Weisman) ) )

ORDER APPROVING CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

This matter is before the Court for final approval of the Settlement

Agreement in this class action. The Court is familiar with the history of this case,

the issues raised, and the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court has re-

viewed and considered the Settlement Agreement and Plaintiffs’ Memorandum

in Support of Approval of Class Action Settlement, and provided the parties and

any class member with an opportunity to be heard at a hearing on August 21,

2018. No one has objected to the proposed settlement. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Court has considered the strength of plaintiffs’ case compared

to the amount of defendants’ settlement offer, and assessed the complexity,

length, risk, uncertainty, and expense of the litigation, and finds that the settle-

ment is fair, reasonable, and adequate in accordance with Rule 23(e)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 580 Filed: 08/22/18 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:9801
2. The Court has considered the affidavit from Christopher Longley, the Chief Executive Officer of the administrator (Atticus Administration LLC) submitted with Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Approval of Class Action Settlement, ECF No. 577, and has reviewed the actual forms used to provide class notice and an opportunity to opt-out and finds that the class has received appropriate notice in accordance with Rule 23(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Class counsel has informed the Court that 18,388 claims were filed by August 15, 2018. Counsel for the parties have agreed to a rolling payment of claims, i.e., all claims will be paid on a “first in-first out” basis until the sooner of May 21, 2019 (the nine month period following the final approval date agreed to in the settlement agreement) or the date funds are exhausted. Because of the higher than expected number of claims filed, Counsel for the parties have also agreed that the settlement will be paid at the rate of $50 “per point,” as defined in paragraph 13 of the settlement agreement. This means that the average award will be $100 per class member (most class members will be paid for two “points”), rather than the $200 previously estimated by class counsel. The Court hereby approves this agreement.
4. The Court approves the payment of an incentive award of $25,000 (twenty five thousand dollars) to Dennis Smentek to be paid to the next of kin of John Smentek. The Court also approves the payment to each of the additional plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki, in
-2-

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 580 Filed: 08/22/18 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:9802
the amount of $15,000 (fifteen thousand dollars). In addition, the Court approves the payment of an incentive award in the amount of $3,000 (three thousand dollars) to class member Tom Tuduj. Finally, the Court approves the payment of $15,000 (fifteen thousand dollars) to each of the following: James Curtin, the plaintiff in 11-cv-933, Kenneth Morris, the plaintiff in 11-cv-934, and Percy Rounds, the plaintiff in 11-cv-4247. These sums will be paid by without any deduction for fees or costs.
5. The payment of fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $2,000,000 and expenses in the amount of $220,000 (with any surplus not expended after the final disbursement of checks to be returned to Cook County) is hereby approved as fair and reasonable.
6. The Court grants final approval of the Settlement. This matter is dismissed with prejudice; the Court retains jurisdiction to May 21, 2019 to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Dated: August 22, 2018
Enter:
________________________________ Joan H. Lefkow United States District Judge
-3-

 
 Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016) 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204
828 F.3d 541 United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Melvin PHILLIPS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
Nos. 14–3753 & 15–1616 |
Argued February 11, 2016 |
Decided July 6, 2016 |
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied August 3, 2016*
Synopsis Background: Current and former pretrial jail detainees brought § 1983 action against county and county sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to their need for dental care. Two classes were certified. After bench trial, detainees’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief was denied, injunctive relief class was decertified, detainees’ motion for permanent injunctive relief was dismissed as moot, and certified class based on predominance of common questions was modified. Detainees filed motion for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence, which motion was filed during pendency of appeal from class decertification decision. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Joan Humphrey Lefkow, J., 2014 WL 7330792, denied the motion. Detainees appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Ripple, Circuit Judge, held that:
claims of isolated indifference to a particular detainee’s dental care needs did not satisfy commonality requirement for class certification;
detainees did not point to systematic and gross deficiencies that would support commonality;
motion for relief from judgment was procedurally improper; and
the procedurally improper motion would not be

recharacterized, as basis for interlocutory appeal.
Affirmed as to decertification; appeal from denial of motion for relief from judgment dismissed.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
*543 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:09–cv–00529—Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Kenneth N. Flaxman, Law Office of Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Michael Lambert Gallagher, Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee Sheriff of Cook County.
Michael Lambert Gallagher, Maureen O’Donoghue Hannon, Thomas Cargie, Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee Cook County, Illinois.
Before Ripple, Kanne, and Williams, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Ripple, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Melvin Phillips, Malcolm Patton, Rodell Sanders, and Frank Powicki are current and former detainees of Cook County Jail (the “Jail”). They brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County, Illinois, and the Sheriff of Cook County (collectively, “Cook County”), claiming that the level of dental care they received at the Jail demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court originally certified two classes of plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. However, the district court subsequently decertified one class, modified the other class, and determined that the detainees’ motion for injunctive relief was moot. The detainees timely appealed the district court’s decision to decertify. While that appeal was pending, the detainees moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) based on newly discovered evidence, but the district court denied the motion. The detainees timely

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appealed this denial as well, and we consolidated the two appeals. We now hold that the district court acted well within its discretion in decertifying the two classes because of the lack of a *544 common issue of fact or law. Further, the filing of a Rule 60(b) motion during this interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because there was no final judgment in the case. Moreover, because the district court took no action that substantially altered its decision on the decertification issue, we cannot treat its disposition of the Rule 60(b) filing as the appeal from a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to decertify the class and dismiss the appeal from the court’s disposition of the Rule 60(b) motion.
I
The plaintiffs ask us to review two aspects of the proceedings in the district court. First, they ask that we review the decision to decertify a class of litigants. Second, they ask that we review the district court’s disposition of the Rule 60(b) motion.
We first address the district court’s decision to decertify the classes that it had previously certified. This issue requires, as our colleague in the district court correctly recognized, that we apply the decision of the Supreme Court in Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), a task we have undertaken several times before.1
A.
This case got underway when a former detainee at the Jail brought a civil action in the Northern District of Illinois on January 27, 2009, alleging that Cook County showed deliberate indifference in its administration of dental care. Five detainees subsequently joined the lawsuit.2
On November 10, 2010, the district court ordered that the case proceed as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for “[a]ll persons presently confined at the ... Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist.”3 At that time, the court was of the view that the class members shared a common question based on the “defendants’ decision to reduce dental

services at the jail, particularly in reducing the number of dentists employed there to one.”4 The district court concluded in a subsequent order that the case could also proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3).5
*545 After discovery, the detainees moved for preliminary and permanent injunctions on January 6, 2014. They asked the district court to require the defendants:
1. To screen health service requests complaining about dental pain on a daily basis,
2. To provide a procedure for detainees complaining about dental pain to obtain prompt access to pain reduction medicine (e.g., ibuprofen), and
3. To maintain records of requests for dental treatment, including dates inmates are scheduled to be examined by dental personnel, dates inmates are actually examined by dental personnel, and documentation of cancellation or failure to appear for dental treatment or examination.[6]
In response, the defendants moved to decertify the classes. The district court stayed briefing on the motion to decertify and then held a six-day bench trial on injunctive relief in June 2014.
The pleadings and the record of the bench trial establish the following facts. The Jail has a population of approximately 9,500 detainees. The average length of stay at the Jail is fifty-seven days, and the median length of stay is twelve days. Cermak Health Services (“Cermak”), a division of the Cook County Bureau of Health, provides dental care to the detainees at the Jail.
In 2008, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed an action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., which charged, among other allegations, that the Jail provided “inadequate medical care.” United States v. Cook Cty., Ill., 761 F.Supp.2d 794, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2011).7 Cook County entered into a consent order with the DOJ in May 2010, agreeing to improve conditions at the Jail and to allow regular monitoring from the federal government. The consent order mandates that:
a. Cermak shall ensure that inmates receive adequate dental care, and follow up, in accordance with generally accepted correctional standards of care. Such care should be provided in a timely manner, taking into consideration the acuity of the problem and the inmate’s anticipated length of stay. Dental

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care shall not be limited to extractions.
b. Cermak shall ensure that adequate dentist staffing and hours shall be provided to avoid unreasonable delays in dental care.[8]
Prior to the DOJ action, in 2007, Cermak employed only one dentist, and his sole contribution to the inmates’ dental health was extractions. As of 2014, however, Cermak employed seven dentists, two dental hygienists, and seven dental assistants. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Jay Shulman, described this level of staffing as “optimum.”9
Upon experiencing dental pain, a detainee can either complain directly to a nurse or officer, or submit a Health Service Request form (“HSR”). Under Cermak’s policy, HSRs must be retrieved daily and reviewed by a registered nurse. When the HSR includes a complaint about dental pain, the policy requires that a qualified health professional examine the detainee *546 within twenty-four hours. Despite the policy, Dr. Shulman opined that “face-to-face examinations by nursing staff are not consistent[ly]” performed.10
HSRs are then provided to the dental clinics. The clinics categorize the requests as emergency, urgent, priority, or routine. Appointments are then scheduled based on the type of request. A 2014 monitor’s report found that “[t]he current dental wait time for immediate and urgent HSRs is one to three days. Routine dental HSR wait time is reported to be about 30 days. It unfortunately remains true, however, that it is extremely difficult [if] not impossible to verify the dental wait time.”11
After an initial appointment, Cermak may schedule either a return appointment or an oral surgery at Stroger Hospital. Detainees who believe their care was inadequate at any stage in this process can file a grievance with a counselor at the Jail. Any grievances which concern medical issues are forwarded to Cermak and then faxed directly to a member of the dental staff if they involve dental needs.
Eight detainees testified about their dental treatment on behalf of the plaintiffs. Because their testimony is necessary for an understanding of the issues on appeal, we set it forth in some detail. Jonathan Williams testified that he complained of tooth pain in April 2010 and had a tooth extracted in June 2010. However, he “believe[d] they took out the wrong tooth. And [he] notified them.”12 According to Mr. Williams, he was seen by the dental clinics about a dozen more times over the next three years, where he received fillings and tooth cleanings. Several times, the

dentists referred Mr. Williams to Stroger for oral surgery related to the tooth that should have been extracted and provided him with pain medication. However, Mr. Williams did not undergo surgery. He then submitted several HSRs related to pain in early 2013, which did not receive a response. Mr. Williams again was referred to Stroger in March 2014, and finally had his tooth extracted in May 2014. At the bench trial in early June 2014, Mr. Williams noted that he had “stitches in [his] mouth right now that just hang[ ] down,” and that, despite requests for assistance, “they haven’t been addressed.”13
Terrance Olden testified that he submitted a series of HSRs beginning in January 18, 2013, in which he complained of a toothache and asked that his tooth be extracted. He said that, at least by January 28, 2013, he “was supposed to be scheduled to get a tooth pulled.”14 Mr. Olden did not get evaluated at Stroger until June 10 and did not get his tooth extracted until October 11. Mr. Olden acknowledged that he saw a dentist ten different times throughout 2013 for different treatments. Mr. Olden also acknowledged that he was prescribed and then received pain medication eleven times during that same period. However, he testified that there were times, prior to the extraction, in which he did not have pain medication—and that he submitted HSRs to that effect.
Mr. Olden further testified that he submitted an HSR on January 10, 2014, and on “that same night[,] a nurse came on the deck to issue medication” and “s[aw] [his] face.”15 He also submitted an HSR on *547 January 13 and two more on January 15, but did not receive face-to-face evaluations. Mr. Olden had a dental appointment “sometime at the end of the month of January” 2014.16 The dentist extracted a tooth, and Mr. Olden testified that the pain subsided.17
John Saiger testified that a piece of his wisdom tooth broke off on March 23, 2013. He submitted two successive HSRs, but did not receive a face-to-face evaluation. Mr. Saiger then submitted a grievance on June 5, noting that he had not received an evaluation. In response, the Jail scheduled a dental appointment for the end of June. Mr. Saiger then moved divisions, and the appointment was rescheduled. He did not receive a dental appointment until September 2013. At that time, the dentist determined that an extraction would be necessary and told Mr. Saiger that a return appointment would be scheduled in a week. However, Mr. Saiger did not return to the clinic and have his tooth extracted until January 19, 2014.18
Kenneth Weatherspoon had a tooth extracted by Cermak

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in 2012. He testified that he submitted an HSR on April 4, 2013, complaining of an abscess in his upper right jaw, where the tooth had been extracted. He did not receive a face-to-face evaluation, but he was seen by a dentist on April 23. The dentist examined Mr. Weatherspoon and referred him to Stroger “[b]ecause there was nothing that she could do.”19 Mr. Weatherspoon submitted several grievances, but, at the time of the bench trial in May 2014, he had not had an appointment at Stroger. He did testify that he had two appointments in the dental clinic in 2014, one for an examination and one for a filling.
Orlando Allen testified that he had submitted two or three HSRs complaining of dental pain before he received an appointment sometime around May 17, 2013. At that appointment, the dentist determined that Mr. Allen’s tooth was too swollen to be removed at that time. Mr. Allen was prescribed—and subsequently received—ibuprofen and penicillin. His tooth was then operated upon a few days later, on May 23, 2013. Mr. Allen also testified that he experienced a separate dental issue in October 2013. He submitted an HSR on October 28, received a face-to-face evaluation on October 29, and then visited the dental clinic on October 31.
Quentin Scott testified that he submitted an HSR complaining of tooth pain on August 6, 2013. That same day, he had a face-to-face evaluation with a physician’s assistant who prescribed aspirin and ibuprofen. Mr. Scott then saw a dentist two days later, on August 8. The dentist referred him to Stroger and prescribed antibiotics and pain medication. Mr. Scott did not receive the medication for at least one *548 month. On November 5, 2013, Mr. Scott visited Stroger and had x-rays taken. Mr. Scott did not visit Stroger again until March 28, 2014, when his teeth were extracted.
Stanford Thompson testified that he chipped his tooth during lunch sometime in August 2013 and asked a corrections officer if he could be sent to a medical unit. The officer refused and instead told Mr. Thompson to fill out an HSR. Mr. Thompson submitted an HSR, but he did not receive an evaluation. A few weeks later, Mr. Thompson visited the dispensary for an unrelated issue and informed the doctor of his tooth pain. The doctor prescribed ibuprofen, but Mr. Thompson never received the medication. Mr. Thompson then filed a grievance on August 27, 2013. He subsequently saw a dentist in early September, who prescribed medication (which Mr. Thompson received) and informed him that he had been “scheduled to get the tooth pulled ... September 19th. But when she s[aw] the state of it, ... she was going to speed up the process.”20 Mr. Thompson’s tooth was extracted on

or around September 10, 2013.21
Jason Knickrehm testified that he submitted an HSR on October 8, 2013, complaining of a broken tooth and a toothache, but did not receive any response. He submitted a second HSR and a grievance on October 20. Mr. Knickrehm was then seen in urgent care the next day and was prescribed medication. However, he testified that he never received that medication. Mr. Knickrehm was then seen in the dental clinic on November 21. The dentist determined that a few of Mr. Knickrehm’s teeth would need to be extracted, and expressed an intention to schedule that appointment within the next week. However, Mr. Knickrehm did not receive a return appointment until December 19. Three days earlier, on December 16, Mr. Knickrehm submitted a grievance that complained about his wait. The dentist only extracted one tooth at this appointment and then prescribed additional medication. Mr. Knickrehm did not receive that prescription, and the remaining teeth were not extracted until January 31, 2014.
After considering this evidence, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court later decertified the Rule 23(b)(2) class, modified the Rule 23(b)(3) class, and denied the motion for a permanent injunction as moot.
First, the court looked at the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). The court explained that the class members’ claims needed to “share some question of law or fact that can be answered all at once and that the single answer to that question will resolve a central issue in all class members’ claims.”22 In its original certification, the court found a common question concerning the inadequately low number of dental staff. However, the increase in the number of dentists eliminated this common question. Further, Cermak had implemented policies that aligned with national standards.
The court could not find another common factor among all of the detainees’ claims, noting that “treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at *549 many stages.”23 The court therefore found that the merits of each plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference would necessarily “depend[ ] on the facts of the individual case.”24 The detainees proposed some new common questions, particularly ones about the Jail’s failure to provide face-to-face evaluations within twenty-four hours of an HSR and its failure to provide timely return to clinic appointments. However, the court found that these questions “raise[d] two separate causes” for a detainee’s

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pain, which proved that there was no common issue that could be assessed classwide.25 Further, neither of these allegations pointed to a systematically deficient practice. The court concluded that the commonality requirement was not met.
The court noted that it “could end its inquiry here” because its Rule 23(a)(2) analysis required that both classes be decertified.26 It nevertheless went on to address, for the sake of completeness, the Rule 23(b) requirements for each class. After observing that there was no longer a single identifiable remedy that could help all class members, the court granted the defendant’s motion to decertify the Rule 23(b)(2) class. The court then discussed whether a class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the Rule 23(b)(3) class could be modified to encompass only those detainees whose claims arose when the Jail had only one dentist, because their claims presented a common question of deliberate indifference. This class’s claims are still pending in the district court.
Finally, the court explained that, because it decertified the Rule 23(b)(2) class, the motion for a permanent injunction was moot. In other words, without a certifiable class, the court saw no need to consider the underlying merits of the petitioners’ claims. The detainees timely appealed the court’s order.
B.
The district court’s foundational reason for decertifying both classes was that the bench trial had established that the detainees had not presented “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). We review a district court’s decision regarding class certification for abuse of discretion. Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2014). Of course, “legal determinations made in support of the decision are reviewed de novo.” Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 490 (7th Cir. 2012).
1.
When determining whether to certify a class, a district court first must find that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are met:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity);
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality);
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy of representation).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (parentheticals added). Here, the district court’s focus, and *550 therefore our concern, is the commonality requirement: whether “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Id.
The Supreme Court recently clarified the contours of this commonality requirement. In Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, current and former employees alleged, on behalf of 1.5 million members of a class, that the company had denied them equal pay or promotions on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1 et seq. 564 U.S. at 344–45, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The employees did not contend that Wal–Mart had an express corporate policy of sex discrimination. Instead, they contended that Wal–Mart provided local managers with undue discretion over pay and promotion, which resulted in an unlawful disparate impact on female employees. Id. In their view, Wal–Mart was liable for these decisions because of “its refusal to cabin its managers’ authority” and its “strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ ” that “permit[ted] bias.” Id. at 345, 131 S.Ct. 2541.
The Court determined that the employees’ claims lacked commonality and therefore decertified the class. The Court began by observing that “[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common ‘questions.’ ” Id. at 349, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate commonality for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), however, a prospective class must show that its claims “depend upon a common contention ... of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The Court noted that this analysis may “entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Id. at 351, 131 S.Ct. 2541. Further, courts are not simply applying a pleading standard;

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instead a prospective class “must be prepared to prove that there are in fact ... common questions of law or fact.” Id. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (emphasis in original). However, the Court made clear that “even a single common question will do.” Id. at 359, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying this standard to the employees’ claims, the Court held that the employees had failed to identify a classwide policy or practice which applied to all of the class members. The employees objected to the company’s grant of discretion to employers, but they had “not identified a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.” Id. at 356, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The employees also alleged that a corporate culture existed, but they had failed to present evidence that demonstrated that such a culture would be provable at trial or that this culture caused the alleged disparity. Id. at 353–55, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The Court concluded that the employees “wish[ed] to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer.” Id. at 352, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (emphasis omitted).
In the wake of Wal–Mart, we have made clear that a prospective class must articulate at least one common question that will actually advance all of the class members’ claims. For instance, when students brought a class action against a public school district, alleging that the district delayed or denied entry into individualized education programs (“IEPs”) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1440 et. seq., we held that the students had not identified a common question:
*551 To illustrate the commonality problem in the certified class, consider two hypothetical students within the class: one has a disability and would be eligible for special education but has never been identified as being disabled nor gone through the IEP process; another was identified as disabled and received a timely IEP meeting, but the child’s parents did not attend the IEP meeting and were not notified of their right to do so.

Both scenarios involve violations of the IDEA, but what common question can be answered that would assist the court in determining [the district’s] liability for each? On the plaintiffs’ theory, that question is something like this: Did [the district] fulfill its IDEA obligations to each child? But while that generic question is surely a part of both children’s claims, it must be answered separately for each child based on individualized questions of fact and law, and the answers are unique to each child’s particular situation.
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498; see also Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 (“Where the defendant’s alleged injurious conduct differs from plaintiff to plaintiff, ... no common answers are likely to be found.”). We noted that “an illegal policy might provide the ‘glue’ necessary to litigate otherwise highly individualized claims as a class,” but that the plaintiffs had not presented any proof of such a policy. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 352, 131 S.Ct. 2541); see also Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming the decertification of a class where the plaintiffs challenged a series of individual employers’ decisions but failed to identify a company-wide policy).
By contrast, we have held that consumers who brought claims of fraudulent representation against a seller of pharmaceuticals presented a common question concerning whether the seller had made fraudulent statements that a drug had been “ ‘clinically tested’ and ‘scientifically formulated.’ ” Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 673 (7th Cir. 2015). The seller contended that the consumers were arguing that the drug was “ineffective” and that this argument would “depend[ ] on individual factors such as the severity of the consumer’s pre-use medical condition, the consumer’s pattern of use, and other potentially confounding variables.” Id. We rejected the seller’s characterization of the plaintiffs’ claims, explaining that their “claims do not rise or fall on whether individual consumers received health benefits” but rather “whether [the seller’s] representations were deceptive.” Id. That latter question, we held, could be answered in one stroke. Id.; see also Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 374–75 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding a common question where a group of employees alleged that their

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employer had an “unofficial policy” of requiring unpaid overtime hours and submitted affidavits from a branch manager and regional manager alluding to such a policy); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that one class of consumers presented a common question whether a washer design caused mold to accumulate and that another class presented a common question whether a washer control unit caused the machine to shut down).
We also have emphasized that the common question presented by a prospective class of plaintiffs need not resolve every issue in the case. See Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 (“Neither Rule 23 nor any gloss that decided cases have added to it requires that every question be common. It is routine in class actions to have a final phase in which individualized proof be submitted.” (emphasis in original)). In *552 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012), for example, we found a common question where employers had brought a classwide challenge to two employment policies that potentially had a discriminatory impact. Id. at 488–89. We observed that “should the claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be necessary to determine which class members were actually adversely affected.... But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those trials to determine whether the challenged practices were unlawful.” Id. at 491.
Similarly, in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of Chicago, 797 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2015), we considered whether educators could bring a classwide challenge, on the basis of race-based discrimination, to a three-step review process that identified “deficient” schools and then replaced the faculty and staff from those schools. Id. at 429–31. The first two steps in this process were objective and general, but the third step arguably was individualized to each school. Id. at 435. We held that “if the plaintiffs allege that the objective criteria in the first two steps narrowed the pool in such a way as to have a disparate impact on African-American teachers (and indeed they do), then this is the glue that binds the claims together without regard to the later, subjective step.” Id. at 436. In other words, a court could determine whether the first two steps in the process were discriminatory on a classwide basis, even if a challenge to the last step in the process could not be adjudicated classwide.27 In all of these cases, however, the answer to a common question of law or fact resolved a key element of all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Our sister circuits have similarly required plaintiffs to

articulate at least one common question that is central to the resolution of all of their claims. See, e.g., Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Consideration of [the commonality] requirement obligates a district court to determine whether plaintiffs have suffered the same injury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); DL v. Dist. of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 126–27 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (collecting cases and noting that, “[i]n the absence of identification of a policy or practice that affects all members of the class in the manner Wal–Mart requires, [a] district court’s analysis is not faithful to the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(a) commonality”); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 843 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Wal–Mart requires district courts to specifically delineate how a class proceeding would allow the court to resolve a discrete question of law whose determination ‘will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each of the [individual plaintiff’s] claims in one stroke.’ ” (quoting 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541)).
A determination of commonality often requires a precise understanding of the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims. In Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014), a case arising in a context not too different from the one here, our colleagues on the Ninth Circuit considered whether prison inmates could bring a series of Eighth Amendment challenges on a classwide basis. The court noted that “commonality *553 cannot be determined without a precise understanding of the nature of the underlying claims” presented by the plaintiffs. Id. at 676. Upon analyzing the claims, the court concluded that “class members are as one in their exposure to a particular and sufficiently well-defined set of allegedly illegal policies and practices, rather than only in their advancement of a general Eighth Amendment legal theory.” Id. at 679. The court noted, for example, the plaintiffs’ allegations that the prison severely understaffed medical facilities and had a practice of placing inmates in isolation with insufficient nutrition. Id. at 679–80. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had provided actual proof of these illegal policies and practices, as opposed to “utterly threadbare allegations.” Id. at 683. For these reasons, the court found common questions.
The governing principle at the heart of our inquiry is therefore well-established and regularly applied: a common question “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution” in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541. “The critical point is ‘the need for conduct common to members of the class.’ ” Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016) 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204
(7th Cir. 2014)). The common question (or common questions) need not address every aspect of the plaintiffs’ claims, but it must “drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chi. Teachers Union, 797 F.3d at 434. It must “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541.
2.
Here, the detainees contend that the district court misread Wal–Mart and its progeny. In their view, the district court demanded that the detainees present a single common question rather than allowing for multiple common questions. In other words, the detainees argue that the district court imposed a “ceiling” of a single common question when it should have imposed a “floor.”28
Had the district court imposed a cap on the number of common questions, as the detainees suggest, its decision could not be justified by the teaching of Wal–Mart. Cf. In re IKO, 757 F.3d at 603 (finding commonality where plaintiffs presented four common questions); Parsons, 754 F.3d at 664, 679 (identifying ten practices or policies that each represented a common question). We think it clear, however, that the detainees’ characterization of the district court’s ruling is without any foundation. Rather, after noting the Rule’s requirement that the district court consider whether the detainees had presented “questions of law or fact common to the class,”29 the court concluded that “there is no longer a single question the answer to which would resolve a significant issue in the case.”30 This statement hardly means that the district court decertified the class because the detainees presented too many common questions; the court decertified the class because the detainees had not presented even one question that could “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” *554 Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The district court correctly understood the holding of Wal–Mart.
3.
The detainees further maintain that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the detainees had not presented any common questions of fact or law for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(2). As the Supreme Court noted,

analysis of this question will “entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim” of deliberate indifference. Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 351, 131 S.Ct. 2541; see also Parsons, 754 F.3d at 676. We therefore pause to set forth the standards for deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.31
“Deliberate indifference occurs when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner exists, but” intentionally or recklessly “disregards that risk.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). We have identified “two distinct categories of deliberate indifference claims” pertaining to medical treatment. Cleveland–Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1989). First, there are “claims of isolated instances of indifference to a particular inmate’s medical needs.” Id.; see also Berry, 604 F.3d at 440. For these claims, a plaintiff must show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition32 and that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2011). Second, there are “claims that systemic deficiencies at the prison’s health care facility rendered the medical treatment constitutionally inadequate for all inmates.” Cleveland–Perdue, 881 F.2d at 430–31. For these claims, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “there are such systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate population is effectively denied access to adequate medical care.” Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)).
After hearing the evidence at trial, the district court took the view that the detainees’ claims were best characterized as “claims of isolated instances of indifference to a particular inmate’s medical needs.” Cleveland–Perdue, 881 F.2d at 430. There certainly is a substantial basis for such a determination. Some of the detainees contend that they did not receive a prompt response to their HSR but otherwise received timely and responsive treatment. Others contend that they received an evaluation within a day of submitting *555 their HSR but they then experienced a significant delay before a return appointment. Still others allege that they saw a dentist and were prescribed medicine but did not receive the prescribed medicine. Just like the students in Jamie S., each of whom encountered unique difficulties caused by different actors as they underwent the IEP process in their schools, there is no common question here that addresses

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016)
95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204
all of these detainees’ claims at once. See 668 F.3d at 498. The detainees each present a different situation that involved a different type of dental pain, took place at a different time, involved different medical professionals and prison staff, and concerned a different alleged deficiency in the treatment process. Cf. Chi. Teachers Union, 797 F.3d at 439–40 (finding commonality where a single decision-making body enforced a general, albeit discretionary, policy).
The detainees nevertheless ask us to focus especially on two questions of fact that they believe to be “common” among all their claims of deliberate indifference:
(1) Does the Jail’s continuing failure to require a face-to-face evaluation from a registered nurse within 24 hours of a written complaint of dental pain result in gratuitous pain?
(2) Does the failure of the Jail to provide timely “return to clinic” appointments result in preventable and gratuitous pain? [33]
Both of these questions concern delays, albeit different sorts of delays, in medical treatment. We previously have held that when assessing deliberate indifference claims, a delay in medical treatment “is not a factor that is either always, or never, significant. Instead, the length of delay that is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.” McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Kress v. CCA of Tenn., LLC, 694 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving a district court’s observation that “the level of medical care required ... will vary depending on each inmate’s circumstances”). The more significant the dental pain, the more immediate is the need for treatment. In determining whether such complaints can be characterized appropriately as presenting a common question susceptible to class resolution, careful examination of the context is crucial.
One of our earlier cases illustrates this point. In Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009), we had to consider whether a class bringing Fourth Amendment claims presented common questions about the length of detention. Id. at 515. We explained that the “constitutionality of [any] detention depends on whether the length of the delay ... was reasonable in any given case.” Id. As a result, “[l]iability, to say nothing of damages, would need to be determined on an individual basis.” Id.; see also Portis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 613 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Because reasonableness is a standard rather than a rule, and because one detainee’s

circumstances differ from another’s, ... class certification is inappropriate.”).34 In the same way, the constitutionality *556 of a wait for medical treatment will depend on a variety of individual circumstances. See McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640. These questions can only be answered by looking at the unique facts of each detainee’s case. In light of their contextual nature, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the questions the detainees present about the length of delay in medical treatment are incapable of being solved on a classwide basis. See Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541.
A consideration of each of the detainees’ proposed questions makes clear the hurdle that cannot be overcome. First, the detainees claim that the Jail fails to provide a face-to-face evaluation from a registered nurse within twenty-four hours of a complaint. However, simply establishing that detainees at the Jail consistently wait more than twenty-four hours does not advance materially any individual’s claim of deliberate indifference.35 See Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (asking whether the question “drive[s] the resolution of the litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Again, an earlier Fourth Amendment case illustrates the point well. When plaintiffs brought a class action challenging any detention following a custodial arrest that lasted more than two hours, we held that the class should be decertified. Portis, 613 F.3d at 703–04. We explained that, “[g]iven the contextual nature of analysis under the fourth amendment,” imposing “an inflexible two-hour rule” would be “impossible.” Id. at 704. Just as a rigid two-hour rule could not be imposed under the Fourth Amendment, a rigid twenty-four-hour rule for dental care cannot be imposed under the Eighth Amendment. In both areas of law, the analysis is similarly contextual.
The detainees also claim that the question whether the Jail provides timely “return to clinic” appointments is common to the class. However, to determine whether a return visit is “timely,” a court must look at evidence that will be unique to each individual class member. See McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640. As the district court correctly perceived, the differing testimonies at the bench trial show that this inquiry would be particularly individualized in this case. John Saiger did not receive a return appointment to extract his broken wisdom tooth until five months after his first appointment. Alternatively, Orlando Allen received a return appointment within a few days of his first appointment. Stanford Thompson similarly testified that his return appointment occurred a week after initially seeing a dentist for tooth pain. Any or all of these individuals may have experienced deliberate indifference. See Smith v.

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016)
95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204
Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even a few days’ delay in addressing a severely painful but readily treatable condition suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference.”). However, the detainees do not explain how the court can define a “timely” return visit without looking at the circumstances of each individual case. The district court reasonably concluded that it could not resolve a question about “timely visits” in a classwide manner.
As noted earlier, we also recognize a second category of deliberate indifference claims alleging “that systemic deficiencies at the prison’s health care facility rendered *557 the medical treatment constitutionally inadequate for all inmates.” Cleveland–Perdue, 881 F.2d at 430–31. In Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1983), for example, we found systemic deficiencies at a prison where two out of three physicians could not communicate effectively with patients because of a language barrier, a staff psychiatrist position had been unfilled for two years, prisoners had been denied vital surgeries for two to five years, and medical supplies were being reused because they had not been restocked. Id. at 272–74. Similarly, in Cleveland–Perdue v. Brutsche, we held that a plaintiff stated a claim of systemic deliberate indifference where a prison allegedly had failed to make any changes to its procedures following the death of an inmate who had been prescribed medicine over the phone. 881 F.2d at 428–31. In contrast, the plaintiff in Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1991), who only presented evidence about the medical care he himself received, did not provide evidence of a widespread practice, and therefore failed to present a claim of systemic deliberate indifference. Id. at 1202 n. 4; see also Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1375 n. 10 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that, “in light of [a plaintiff’s] overall treatment, the few incidents in which [the plaintiff] suffered delays in his treatment simply fail to reveal a ‘pattern of conduct’ evidencing deliberate indifference” as articulated in Wellman).
If plaintiffs can present classwide evidence that a prison is engaging in a policy or practice which rises to the level of a systemic indifference, then we can identify “conduct common to members of the class” which advances the litigation. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498 (“[A]n illegal policy might provide the ‘glue’ necessary to litigate otherwise highly individualized claims as a class.” (emphasis omitted)). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Parsons identified as a common question whether there was a systemic “failure to provide timely access to medically necessary specialty care.” 754 F.3d at

664, 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained that where “variations undoubtedly exist” between each inmate’s treatment, the claim must be that a prison “regularly provides a level of [care] that is so inadequate that it exposes any inmate ... to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 680 (emphasis in original). Further, the court did “not hold that utterly threadbare allegations that a group is exposed to illegal policies and practices are enough to confer commonality.” Id. at 683.
As Parsons suggests, a class action probably could be brought where plaintiffs presented some evidence that a prison had a policy that regularly and systemically impeded timely examinations. See Portis, 613 F.3d at 705 (discussing the potential for common issues where “the class sought to establish that a jurisdiction had adopted a policy of deliberate delay”). Similarly, a class action probably could be brought where evidence suggested that a prison had such a consistent pattern of egregious delays in medical treatment that a trier of fact might infer a systemic unconstitutional practice. See Holmes, 930 F.2d at 1202 n. 4 (discussing how a pattern of unconstitutional conduct can indicate “an entrenched practice that has the effective force of a formal policy”).
Here, however, the district court correctly observed that the detainees’ “questions do not point to the type of ‘systematic and gross deficienc[y]’ ... that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment.”36 A *558 twenty-four hour delay in responding to treatment does not automatically constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the detainees do not allege that the Jail has a specific policy that directly causes a wait following an HSR. Some of the alleged delays in return to clinic appointments “may constitute deliberate indifference depending on the facts of the individual case,”37 but the detainees do not present a pattern of egregious delays across the entire class. See Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1375 n. 10.38 Just as in Wal–Mart, proof of a systemic practice which could tie all the claims together is “absent here.” 564 U.S. at 353, 131 S.Ct. 2541; see also Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498 (vacating a class-certification order because there was no evidence of a common illegal policy); Bell, 800 F.3d at 375 (holding that a prospective class had presented a common issue of fact when it “offered evidence” of “a broader company policy”). For these reasons, the detainees’ proposed questions do not address a gross and systemic deficiency that applies to the entire class. Instead, the detainees bring a series of individual claims of deliberate indifference. See Cleveland–Perdue, 881 F.2d at 430.

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016)
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The detainees still have, of course, legal avenues in which to bring their claims of deliberate indifference. First, the district court did identify one common policy that might constitute systemic deliberate indifference: Cook County’s decision to staff the Jail with only one dentist.39 That policy ended at some time before the district court issued its order, so the court certified a narrower class of detainees who received inadequate dental care before the Jail hired more dentists. That action is ongoing. Further, detainees may bring individual claims of deliberate indifference based on their own unique circumstances. We express no opinion on the potential merits of the pending class action or on any individual detainee’s claims. Rather, we simply hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded, on the record before it, that the detainees’ claims do not present common issues of law or fact. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to decertify the class.
II
While the appeal from the decertification of the classes and the consequent denial of request for injunctive relief was *559 pending in this court, the detainees filed a motion in the district court requesting relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). They maintained that new evidence established that there were common questions of law and fact and that class certification was possible. Invoking our Seventh Circuit Rule 57, the detainees asked that the district court indicate whether, on the basis of this information, it would be inclined to grant relief if we were to vacate the extant orders and remand the case for further proceedings. The district court denied the motion, stating that it was not inclined to revise its order decertifying the class. The detainees now appeal the denial of their Rule 60(b) motion.
The detainees brought this matter to the district court’s attention through a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). That rule is, “by its terms[,] limited to ‘final’ judgments or orders” and is “inapplicable to interlocutory orders.” Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 571 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2015); Adams v. City of Chicago, 135 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1998). Here, because the district court had not entered a final judgment, the detainees’ filing was simply a request for relief from an interlocutory order decertifying a class. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657 (describing an order granting or denying certification as interlocutory). The detainees

therefore were not permitted to file a Rule 60(b) motion.
That said, the detainees, although unable to employ Rule 60(b) as a vehicle, were not altogether barred from presenting new evidence to the district court on the certification question in what amounted to a motion to reconsider the decertification of the class, see Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1999), or an amended motion to certify the class, see McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 486; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”). For a period of time, there appeared to be significant tension in our case law as to when the disposition of such a motion is appealable to this court. Gary placed severe restrictions on such an appeal, permitting one only if the district court “materially alters the [original] decision.” 188 F.3d at 893. McReynolds viewed the matter quite differently and saw this court as having far more flexibility in determining whether an appeal ought to be taken. 672 F.3d at 486–87. It suggested that an appeal ought to be permitted whenever, “as a result of new law or newly learned facts, the [initial] denial of certification was erroneous.” Id. at 486. This standard, the court said, is necessary to permit the parties to avoid endless years of unnecessary litigation and to put the case on a path to speedy resolution. Id. It appears that this tension has been assuaged substantially and in all likelihood eliminated by our most recent decisions in Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC, 739 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 2014) and Matz v. Household International Tax Reduction Investment Plan, 687 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2012). It is clear now that, in concert with our sister circuits, we will allow an appeal only when the district court has issued an order “materially altering a previous order granting or denying class certification ... even if it doesn’t alter the previous order to the extent of changing a grant into a denial or a denial into a grant.” Matz, 687 F.3d at 826.
In this case, allowing appellate consideration of the matters raised in the detainees’ motion filed under Rule 60(b) would not foster, but would work to the detriment of, the policy concerns that we *560 have articulated in our cases.40 Here, the district court made no ruling that altered, in any meaningful sense, its earlier decision. Indeed, the court pointedly said that, until we ruled on its earlier decision, any definitive decision on the matters raised in the subsequent motion would be premature. Moreover, the court noted that the detainees’ own approach to discovery might supply a basis for its decision whether to reconsider the decertification.41

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016) 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204

Conclusion

Number 15–1616 is DISMISSED. The defendants may

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it

recover their costs in this court.

determined that the evidence produced at trial required, in

accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in

All Citations

Wal–Mart, the decertification of the classes that it had certified previously. Accordingly, the district court’s

828 F.3d 541, 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204

judgment in Case Number 14–3753 is AFFIRMED.

Further, for the reasons stated above, the appeal in Case

Footnotes

*

Circuit Judges Flaum and Rovner took no part in the consideration or the decision of this case.

1

See, e.g, Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 374–75 (7th Cir. 2015); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of

Educ. of Chi., 797 F.3d 426, 433 (7th Cir. 2015); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2014);

Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 493

(7th Cir. 2012).

2

The originally named plaintiff, John Smentek, is no longer a part of the case for reasons not disclosed by the record.

3

R.68 at 15. When certifying a class, a district court must first find that the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(a) have been met:

(1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Once the district court

determines that these four requirements have been met, the court must then determine whether the class meets

the requirements of one of the categories listed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). Rule 23(b)(2) concerns

classes that seek classwide injunctive relief. Rule 23(b)(3) concerns classes that present claims where common

questions predominate.

4

R.68 at 13.

5

The defendants took an interlocutory appeal from this order on grounds unrelated to this current appeal. We

affirmed the district court’s grant of certification. Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2012).

6

R.236 at 1.

7

The DOJ’s lawsuit is not directly related to this class action, which began in January 2009. However, this lawsuit

provides some important background, and many of the reports created pursuant to that lawsuit are relevant in this

dispute.

8

R.71–2 at 37.

9

R.449 at 146.

10

Id. at 86.

11 R.384 at 78. The district court took judicial notice of this monitor’s report after trial. See R.389.

12 R.449 at 197.

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016) 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204

13

Id. at 212.

14 R.451 at 215.

15

Id. at 211.

16

Id. at 213.

17 Mr. Olden opted out of the class and filed an individual lawsuit. The parties in Mr. Olden’s case submitted a stipulation of dismissal. Stipulation, Olden v. Cook Cty., No. 1:13–cv–05283 (N.D. Ill.) (R.66).

18 Mr. Saiger also opted out of this class and has an individual lawsuit pending. Saiger v. Dart, No. 13 C 5495, 2015 WL 1433076, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2015); see also Saiger v. Dart, No. 13 C 5495, 2016 WL 98573, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2016).

19 R.450 at 116. The parties appear to dispute the reason that the dentist referred Mr. Weatherspoon to Stroger. Mr. Weatherspoon testified that he was referred for “oral surgery.” Id. at 118. However, Cook County contends that he “was referred to Stroger for a pathology consult not an extraction.” Appellees’ Br. 11. The dentist testified that she could not find anything wrong with Mr. Weatherspoon’s gums and referred him to Stroger to see if they could identify something that she had missed. R.452 at 141.

20

R.452 at 31.

21 Like Mr. Olden and Mr. Saiger, Mr. Thompson opted out of the class and filed an individual lawsuit. A district court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants in that case. Thompson v. Taylor, No. 13 C 6946, 2016 WL 164340, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2016).

22 R.390 at 14–15 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

23

Id. at 16.

24

Id. at 17.

25

Id. at 17.

26

Id. at 18.

27 We went on to hold, however, that the third step in the process did present a common question of fact or law. Even though that step was individualized to each school, determinations were still being made by “one decision-making body, exercising discretion as one unit.” Chi. Teachers Union, 797 F.3d at 440. We contrasted the educators’ challenge to the challenges against the decisions of the board with the challenges against the decisions of “thousands of individual managers” in Wal–Mart and the decisions of “countless school district employees” in Jamie S. Id. at 439.

28 Appellants’ Br. 17.

29 R.390 at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)).

30

Id. at 17.

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016) 95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204

31 “The Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, including the provision of adequate medical care.” Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir. 2010). We note that some members of the class are pretrial detainees and that “the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted persons.” Id. at 831. However, in this context, the present case law holds that “pretrial detainees ... are entitled to the same basic protections under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly, we apply the same legal standards to deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.; see also Smentek, 683 F.3d at 374. But see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (holding that there are different standards for sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees in the case of excessive force claims).

32 We have held that tooth decay and similarly severe dental pain “can constitute an objectively serious medical condition.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010).

33 Appellants’ Br. 23; see also R.390 at 17 (district court identifying these two proposed common questions).

34 Both Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 581 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2009), and Portis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 613 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2010) concerned whether common issues predominated under Rule 23(b)(3), and not whether the class had failed to present a single common issue under Rule 23(a)(2). However, both cases made clear that a question about the length of detention could not be common to the class.

35 Indeed, the evidence suggests that the wait time before a face-to-face evaluation varied. Quentin Scott testified that he saw a physician’s assistant, who was able to provide aspirin and ibuprofen, on the same day he submitted an HSR. Orlando Allen similarly testified that he received an evaluation from a registered nurse within twenty-four hours of submitting an HSR in October 2013. However, he also testified that he submitted two or three other HSRs earlier that year without receiving any evaluation.

36 R.390 at 17 (quoting Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983)).

37

Id.

38 The detainees suggest that any delays in return appointments are the result of one policy: Cermak’s decision to vest a scheduling department with the primary authority to schedule appointments rather than the dentists themselves. However, that policy is not central to the claims of detainees who did not experience a delay in return appointments and allege that their treatment was deficient for other reasons. More importantly, the detainees do not explain why a clerk in the scheduling department would cause longer waits between appointments than a dentist, much less how the decision to vest authority in a clerk was so misguided that it constitutes deliberate indifference in violation of the Constitution. In fact, a dentist who disliked the policy testified at the bench trial that “it runs more efficient if scheduling does the appointments. It has us more—doing more—having more time to do procedures than scheduling patients.” R.453 at 83. The detainees have not invited our attention to any evidence which could prove that this policy is the cause of a delay in treatment. See Wal–Mart, 564 U.S. at 353–55, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (refusing to grant class certification on the basis of a “strong corporate culture” because the plaintiffs failed to present any proof that adverse employment actions resulted from this corporate culture).

39 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “a policy and practice of severe under-staffing” presents a common question that can be addressed on a classwide basis. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).

40 We previously have construed Rule 60(b) orders as reconsiderations of interlocutory orders and allowed for appellate consideration. For example, we construed a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion after a grant of summary judgment as a reconsideration of the prior summary judgment ruling. Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2015). Similarly, we construed a district court’s order stating, pursuant to Circuit Rule 57, that it

Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County, 828 F.3d 541 (2016)
95 Fed.R.Serv.3d 204
was disinclined to change its ruling denying injunctive relief, as “the equivalent of the initiation of a new motion for preliminary injunction.” Adams v. City of Chicago, 135 F.3d 1150, 1154 (7th Cir. 1998). In those cases, however, unique circumstances compelled us to construe the orders in this manner. In Adams, the plaintiffs filed a Rule 60(b) motion after we directed them to follow the procedure laid out in Circuit Rule 57. 135 F.3d at 1153–54. We noted that “we share[d] the responsibility for any confusion resulting from this patchwork process” and declared that “[h]enceforth, the Circuit Rule 57 procedure should be used exclusively for final judgments.” Id. at 1154. In Mintz, we made an exception where “despite denying what it erroneously treated as a Rule 60(b) motion,” the district court “did review the belated submission and decided that it would not affect the grant of summary judgment.” 788 F.3d at 679. In other words, the district court’s analysis of the Rule 60(b) motion was indistinguishable from an analysis of a summary judgment motion. The order could fairly be construed as one concerning summary judgment without any change in the analysis. In this case, however, the district court engaged in a different review than the one we will consider.
41 See R.427 at 10 (“Now, a lot of the discovery problems were of your own making.... So my view is let’s have the Court of Appeals take a look at this case and see what they say.... I’m not—certainly not inclined to tell the Court of Appeals that I’m inclined to vacate what I’ve done before.”). In their brief in this court, the detainees also argue that there was an impermissible “asymmetry” to the discovery allowed each party. This argument is presented to give context to the detainees’ arguments on the substantive merits of its Rule 60(b) motion. For the reasons we have explained, any consideration of these matters on appeal would be, at best, premature.

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 1 Filed: 01/27/09 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN SMENTEK, Plaintiff, -vs-
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
Defendants.

) ) ) ) No. 09 CV ____ ) ) (jury demand) ) FILED: JANUARY 27, 2009 ) 09CV529 ) ) JUDGE LEFKOW
MAGISTRATE JUDGE BROWN

COMPLAINT
PH

Plaintiff, by counsel, alleges as follows:

1. This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1343.

2. Defendants are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois. The Sheriff is sued in his ofﬁcial capacity only.

3. Defendants are responsible for providing medical and dental care to prisoners at the Cook County Jail.

4. Defendants have at all times known that broken, infected, or otherwise diseased teeth and gums can be excruciatingly painful and, if untreated, can result in serious permanent injury.

5. Defendants have also at all times known that dental care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates.

6. At all times relevant, defendants have declined to require a dental screening of persons being processed into the jail and have required prisoners who were in need of dental treatment to endure a lengthy wait before receiving treatment.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 1 Filed: 01/27/09 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:2 - 2 -
7. In 2007, defendants effectively discontinued dental services by eliminating the positions of all but one dentist, who was to be responsible for the care of the ten thousand persons.
8. Plaintiff John Smentek was conﬁned at the Cook County Jail from September 22, 2007 to March 14, 2008.
9. Within two weeks of entering the jail, plaintiff began to experience severe tooth pain and submitted a request for dental services.
10. Plaintiff did not receive a response to his ﬁrst request for dental services. Thereafter, plaintiff submitted numerous additional requests for dental services.
11. Plaintiff did not receive any dental services while he was conﬁned at the Jail.
12. On or about March 14, 2008, plaintiff was transferred to the Illinois Department of Corrections.
13. While in the Illinois Department of Corrections, received dental services and was required to undergo fourteen or ﬁfteen tooth extractions.
14. As the result of defendant’s policies, plaintiff experienced great pain and suffering and incurred permanent damage to his mouth.
15. Defendants’ above described actions were taken in deliberate indifference to the dental needs of prisoners at the Cook County Jail.
16. Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury.

Case: 1:09-cv-00529 Document #: 1 Filed: 01/27/09 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:3 - 3 -
Wherefore plaintiffs request that judgment be entered in his favor in an amount in excess of ﬁfty thousand dollars and that the Court grant such relief as may be appropriate. to each member of the proposed class as may be appropriate.
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman ________________________ KENNETH N. FLAXMAN ARDC No. 830399 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 1240 Chicago, Illinois 60604-2430 (312) 427-3200 (phone) (312) 427-3930 (fax) knf@kenlaw.com
THOMAS G. MORRISSEY 10249 South Western Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60643 (773) 233-7900 (phone) (773) 239-0387 (fax) tgmlaw@ameritech.net
attorneys for plaintiff

 
 Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 1 of 47
APPEAL,PC Scan,PROTO,TERMED,WEISMAN
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:09−cv−00529

Smentek et al v. Sheriff of Cook County et al Assigned to: Honorable Joan H. Lefkow Demand: $50,000 Case in other court: 14−01690
14−03753 and 15−01616 15−01616 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Dennis Smentek as Special Administrator for the estate of John Smentek
Plaintiff Malcolm Patton
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/27/2009 Date Terminated: 12/27/2018 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C. 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 201 Chicago, IL 60604−6107 (312) 427−3200 Email: knf@kenlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. 200 S Michigan Ave Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427−3200 Email: jaf@kenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Gerard Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey 10150 South Western Ave. Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233−7900 Email: tgmorrisseylaw@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick William Morrissey Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. 10150 South Western Ave. Suite Rear Chicago, IL 60643 (773) 233−7900 Email: patrickmorrissey1920@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Melvin Phillips
Plaintiff Rodell Sanders
Plaintiff Frank Powicki

represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick William Morrissey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick William Morrissey (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel A. Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Sheriff of Cook County

represented by Anthony E. Zecchin Hale Law LLC 53 West Jackson Blvd. Suite 330 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 870−6933 Email: azecchin@ahalelaw.com TERMINATED: 09/22/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
Elaine Cindy Davenport Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman LLP 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 641−1555 Email: edavenport@sanchezdh.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gerald Michael Dombrowski Sanchez & Daniels

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Defendant Cook County, Illinois

333 West Wacker Drive Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 641−1555 Email: gdombrowski@sanchezdh.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael L. Gallagher Wise Morrissey Kaveny, LLC 161 N. Clark Street Suite 3200 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 580−2040 Email: mlg@wmklawfirm.com TERMINATED: 08/14/2017
Michael D. Warner Cook County State's Attorney 50 W. Washington St. Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−3368 Email: michael.warner@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 09/20/2016
Nicholas E Cummings , IL Email: nicholas.cummings@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 09/22/2017
Shawnte Miaundra Raines Sanchez, Daniels & Hoffman 333 W. Wacker Drive Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 641−1555 Email: sraines@SanchezDH.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Yifan Xu Sanchez Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman 333 W. Wacker Dr. Ste. 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 641−1555 Email: ysanchez@sanchezdh.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cathy McNeil Stein Cook County State's Attorney's Office Civil Actions Bureau 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5365 Email: cathymcneil.stein@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 10/27/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
Chaka M. Patterson Cook County States Attorney's Office Daley Ctr. 500 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602

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312 −603−5365 Email: chaka.patterson@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Francis J. Catania Cook County State's Attorney Richard J Daley Center 50 W Washington St Room 530 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−5440 Email: francis.catania@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Lynn Huff Sears Holdings Management Corporation 3333 Beverly Road #B6−370B Hoffman Estates Hoffman Estates, IL 60179 United Sta (847) 286−0624 Email: andrea.huff@searshc.com TERMINATED: 04/02/2018
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Richard Condron O'Rourke, Hogan, Fowler & Dwyer 10 South LaSalle Street Suite 3700 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)739−3500 Email: dcondron@ohfdlaw.com TERMINATED: 08/14/2017
Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon Cook County State's Attorney's Office (69W) 69 W. Washington Suite 3110 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603−1424 Email: maureen.hannon@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 08/14/2017
Michael L. Gallagher (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/14/2017
Sandra A. Navarro Cook County Health and Hospitals System 1900 W. Polk Street Room 155 Chicago, IL 60612 312 864 0841 Email: snavarro@cookcountyhhs.org TERMINATED: 08/14/2017
Thomas E. Cargie Cook County State's Attorney's Office (69W) 69 W. Washington

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Movant Percy Rounds
Movant Darnell Cooper Movant Jimmie Dale Miller

Suite 3110 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603 1426 Email: thomas.cargie@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 08/14/2017
represented by Albert Lee Hogan , III Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP CH 155 North Wacker Drive Suite 2700 Chicago, IL 60606−1720 (312) 407−0700 Email: ahogan@skadden.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexander James Kasparie Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom Llp And Affiliates 155 N Upper Wacker Dr #2700 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 407−0815 Email: alexander.kasparie@skadden.com TERMINATED: 08/20/2018
Nathan Andrew Shev Sperling & Slater, P.C. 55 West Monroe Street Suite 3200 Chicago, IL, IL 60603 (312) 676−5846 Email: nshev@sperling−law.com TERMINATED: 08/01/2013
represented by Darnell Cooper N−71947 Hill Correctional Center P. O. Box 1700 Galesburg, IL 61401 PRO SE

Date Filed 01/27/2009 01/27/2009 01/27/2009
01/27/2009
01/27/2009

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by John Smentek; Jury Demand. (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet. (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff John Smentek by Kenneth N Flaxman. (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff John Smentek by Thomas Gerard Morrissey. (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
SUMMONS issued, 2 originals, as to Defendants Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois. (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2009)

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02/04/2009 02/06/2009 03/09/2009 03/09/2009 03/09/2009 04/07/2009 04/21/2009 05/25/2009 05/26/2009
06/25/2009 06/25/2009
06/25/2009 07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/13/2009 07/16/2009
07/23/2009

6 ALIAS SUMMONS issued, 1 original, as to Defendant Sheriff of Cook County. (tlm) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
7 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing set for 4/7/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois by Michael L. Gallagher (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
9 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
10 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois re answer to complaint 9 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
11 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing reset for 4/21/2009 at 09:30 AM by agreement.Telephoned notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
12 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 4/21/2009 and continued to 5/26/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/22/2009)
13 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to certify class (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Exhibits 1−11, # 2 Appendix Exhibits 12−15, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/25/2009)
14 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 5/26/2009. Response to plaintiff's motion to certify class 13 due by 6/23/2009; reply due by 7/14/2009; ruling will issue by mail.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
15 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to certify class 13 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
16 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to certify class 13 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiff's motion for class certification, # 2 Exhibit Smith's Rule 23(f) petition to appeal, # 3 Exhibit Wrightsell's Rule 23(f) petition to appeal, # 4 Exhibit 7th Cir. order denying Smith's petition, # 5 Exhibit 7th Cir. order denying Wrightsell's petition, # 6 Exhibit Defendants' response to Smith's Rule 23(f) petition, # 7 Exhibit Defendants' response to Wrightsell's Rule 23(f) petition)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
17 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois re response in opposition to motion,, 16 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
18 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to add plaintiffs and for leave to file amended complaint and amended motion for class certification (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
19 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to add plaintiffs and for leave to file amended complaint and amended motion for class certification [CORRECTED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
20 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 19 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 7/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
21 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion hearing held on 7/16/2009 and continued to 7/30/2009 at 9:30 A.M. for ruling on motion to add plaintiffs and for leave to file amended complaint and amended motion for class certificaton 19 . Plaintiff's motion to add plaintiffs... 19 is entered. Defendants' response to motion to add plaintiffs... 19 to be filed by 7/23/2009. Mailed notice (ldg, ) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
22 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to add plaintiffs and for leave to file amended

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07/23/2009 07/30/2009 07/30/2009 07/30/2009
08/19/2009 08/19/2009 08/27/2009 09/04/2009 09/04/2009 09/04/2009 09/04/2009 09/08/2009
09/08/2009 09/17/2009
09/22/2009 09/22/2009 09/28/2009

complaint and amended motion for class certification [CORRECTED] 19 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
23 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois re response in opposition to motion 22 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
24 AMENDED complaint by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, John Smentek against all defendants (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
25 MOTION by Plaintiffs John Smentek, Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips to certify class [amended] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/30/2009)
26 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Court ruled on plaintiffs motion.... 19 . Plaintiffs motion to add plaintiffs and for leave to file amended complaint and amended motion for class certification 19 is granted. (Duplicate motion 18 is moot.) Defendants to answer or otherwise plead to amended complaint 19 on or before 8/20/2009. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
27 ANSWER to amended complaint by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
28 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois re answer to amended complaint 27 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
29 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing set for 9/8/2009 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/27/2009)
30 MOTION by Plaintiff Melvin Phillips for leave to file supplement to complaint and to amend proposed class definition (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
31 MOTION by Plaintiff Melvin Phillips for temporary restraining order and to set hearing on application for preliminary injunction (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
32 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file 30 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 9/10/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
33 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for temporary restraining order 31 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 9/10/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
34 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 9/8/2009 and continued to 9/17/2009 at 10:00 AM. Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order 31 is continued to 9/17/2009 at 10:00 AM. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file supplement to complaint and to amend proposed class definition 30 is granted. Plaintiff shall file amended complaint by 9/9/2009; defendant to answer or otherwise plead by 9/23/2009. Defendant's oral motion to extend time to 10/6/2009 to respond to plaintiff's amended motion for class certification 27 is granted. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
35 SECOND AMENDED complaint by John Smentek, Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips against all defendants (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
36 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 9/17/2009 regarding plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order 31 held and continued to 9/29/2009 at 09:30 AM. Status hearing held on 9/17/2009. Scheduling Conference set for 10/22/2009 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
37 ANSWER to amended complaint Second amended by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
38 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois re answer to amended complaint 37 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 09/22/2009)
39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiff's motion hearing for temporary restraining order and to set hearing on application for preliminary injunction 31 reset for 10/22/2009 at 09:30 AM by agreement.Telephoned notice (mad, )

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10/07/2009
10/08/2009
10/08/2009 10/22/2009
11/17/2009 01/14/2010 01/27/2010 03/30/2010 04/01/2010 05/20/2010 05/20/2010 05/21/2010 06/11/2010 06/11/2010

(Entered: 09/28/2009)
40 RESPONSE by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois to motion to certify class 25 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I, Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, # 2 Exhibit II, Permission to Appeal, # 3 Exhibit III, Permission to Appeal, # 4 Exhibit IV, Smith Order, # 5 Exhibit V, Wrightsell Order, # 6 Exhibit VI, Defendants Response (Smith), # 7 Exhibit VII, Defendants Response (Wrightsell), # 8 Exhibit VIII, Duran Consent Decree, # 9 Exhibit IX, John Howard Association Monitor Report, # 10 Exhibit X, Townsend Affidavit)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 10/07/2009)
41 RESPONSE by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois CORRECTED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit I, Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, # 2 Exhibit II, Permission to Appeal, # 3 Exhibit III, Permission to Appeal, # 4 Exhibit IV, Smith Order, # 5 Exhibit V, Wrightsell Order, # 6 Exhibit VI, Defendants' Response (Smith), # 7 Exhibit VII, Defendants' Response (Wrightsell), # 8 Exhibit VIII, Duran Consent Decree, # 9 Exhibit IX, John Howard Association Monitor Report, # 10 Exhibit X, Townsend Affidavit)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
42 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County, Illinois (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 10/08/2009)
43 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 10/22/2009. Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order and to set hearing on application for preliminary injunction 31 is withdrawn. Reply in support of plaintiff's motion to certify class 25 is due by 11/17/2009. Status hearing held on 10/22/2009 and continued to 11/17/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/22/2009)
44 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 11/17/2009 and continued to 1/14/2010 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
45 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 1/14/2010 and continued to 4/1/2010 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/14/2010)
46 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' motion for class certification 25 is denied without prejudice subject to refiling after the Court of Appeals rules in Wrightsell v. Cook County, No. 09−2634.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/27/2010)
47 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:The time of the status hearing on 4/1/2010 is reset to 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/30/2010)
48 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 4/1/2010. Plaintiff given leave to add additional plaintiffs and file motion for leave to file amended complaint and motion for class certification with agreed briefing schedule by 5/20/2010.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/01/2010)
49 MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, John Smentek, Rodell Sanders, Frank Powicki to amend/correct amended complaint 35 [third amended complaint] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
50 MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to certify class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit all exhibits)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
51 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Enter agreed briefing schedule as to plaintiffs' motion to certify class 50 , and plaintiffs' motion for leave to file third amended complaint 49 ; responses due by 6/17/2010; replies due by 7/1/2010; ruling will issue by mail.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/21/2010)
52 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class 50 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/11/2010)
53 NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 52 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow

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06/17/2010 07/01/2010
07/01/2010 07/15/2010 07/21/2010 07/21/2010 07/29/2010 08/02/2010 08/02/2010 11/05/2010 11/10/2010 11/10/2010 11/16/2010 11/18/2010

on 6/17/2010 at 08:30 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/11/2010)
54 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendants' motion 52 for extension of time to 7/1/2010 to file response to motion to certify class 50 is granted. Reply due by 7/15/2010.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/17/2010)
55 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to certify class 50 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Third Amended Motion for class certification, # 2 Exhibit Smith's 23(f) Petition to appeal, # 3 Exhibit Wrightsell's 23(f) Petition to appeal, # 4 Exhibit 7th Circuit's order on Smith's Petition, # 5 Exhibit 7th Circuit's order on Wrightsell's Petition, # 6 Exhibit Defendants' Response to Smith's Petition, # 7 Exhibit Defendants' Response to Wrightsell's Petition, # 8 Exhibit CRIPA Agreed Order, # 9 Exhibit CRIPA Complaint, # 10 Exhibit Dr. Townsend's Affidavit)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2010)
56 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re response in opposition to motion,,, 55 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2010)
57 REPLY by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to response in opposition to motion,,, 55 for class certification (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/15/2010)
58 MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to supplement memorandum in support of motion for class certification (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
59 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to supplement 58 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 7/29/2010 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
60 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiff's motion for leave to file supplemental memorandum in support of motion for class certification 58 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/30/2010)
61 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to certify class 50 Supplemental (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Portis v. City of Chicago Opinion)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 08/02/2010)
62 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re response in opposition to motion, 61 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 08/02/2010)
63 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiff's motion for leave to file third amended complaint 49 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
64 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to supplement their response to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 7th Circuit Opinion in Thorogood v. Sears Roebuck)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
65 NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion to supplement, 64 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/16/2010 at 08:30 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 11/10/2010)
66 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendants' motion 64 for leave to file a supplemental response to plaintiffs' third amended motion for class certification is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
67 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Enter Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated in the Opinion and Order, plaintiffs' motion for class certification 50 is granted in part and denied in part. The court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(2) defined as: All persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist. Status is set for December 16, 2010 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiffs' counsel will be expected to report on what relief he believes would be available that has not been achieved in

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11/18/2010 12/02/2010 12/02/2010 12/06/2010
12/16/2010 01/07/2011 01/07/2011 01/13/2011
02/18/2011 04/11/2011 04/11/2011 04/15/2011 04/20/2011 04/21/2011 06/16/2011 06/16/2011 06/23/2011

United States v. Cook County, Case No.10 C 2946.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/18/2010)
68 OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/18/2010:Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 11/18/2010)
69 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 68 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
70 NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief 69 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/16/2010 at 08:30 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
71 EXHIBIT by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County regarding MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 68 69 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit District Court's Opinion, # 2 Exhibit CRIPA Agreed Order, # 3 Exhibit CRIPA Complaint)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 12/06/2010)
72 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendants' motion for reconsideration 69 and status hearing reset for 1/13/2011 at 08:30 AM by agreement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/17/2010)
73 MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to certify class [RENEWED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
74 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to certify class 73 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/13/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
75 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion to reconsider 69 denied. Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification 73 is denied. Status hearing held on 1/13/2011 and continued to 2/18/2011 at 01:30 PM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/14/2011)
76 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status conference and settlement conference held in chambers on 2/18/2011. Status hearing set for 4/19/2011 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/22/2011)
77 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for preliminary injunction schedule (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
78 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for preliminary injunction 77 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/21/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
79 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 4/19/2011 reset for 4/21/2011 at 08:30 AM by agreement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/15/2011)
80 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for preliminary injunction schedule 77 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 04/20/2011)
81 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 77 is withdrawn. Status hearing held on 4/21/2011 and continued to 7/14/2011 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/22/2011)
82 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for reconsideration regarding order on motion to certify class, set/reset hearings,,,,,, 67 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
83 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief, 82 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/23/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/16/2011)
84 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Response to plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of order denying Rule 23(b)(3) certification 82 due by 7/8/2011; reply due by 7/15/2011; ruling will issue by mail.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered:

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07/05/2011 07/05/2011 07/06/2011 07/12/2011 07/29/2011
07/29/2011 08/05/2011 08/17/2011
08/17/2011 09/08/2011 09/16/2011
09/16/2011 10/05/2011 10/05/2011

06/23/2011)
85 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for reconsideration, motion for relief, 82 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/05/2011)
86 NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 85 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 7/7/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/05/2011)
87 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendants' motion for extension of time to 7/29/2011 to file response to motion to reconsider 85 is granted. Reply will be due by 8/5/2011.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/06/2011)
88 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 7/14/2011 stricken and reset for 9/8/2011 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
89 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for reconsideration regarding order on motion to certify class, set/reset hearings,,,,,, 67 82 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Court's order denying class certification, # 2 Exhibit Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
90 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re response in opposition to motion, 89 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
91 REPLY by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek to response in opposition to motion, 89 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
92 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Pursuant to Opinion and Order, dated 8/17/2011, The motion for certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) is granted. This case will be called for a status hearing and scheduling conference on September 8, 2011 at 8:30. The parties should have a proposed class notice prepared and a schedule that is focused on bringing this aging case to as expeditious a conclusion as practicable. Mailed notice. [For further detail see separate order(s).] (ea, ) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
93 OPINION AND ORDER, Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/17/2011.(ea, ) (Entered: 08/19/2011)
94 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 9/8/2011. Class to be identified by 11/10/2011. Scheduling conference and status hearing set for 11/17/2011 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
95 CERTIFIED Copy of Order from the Seventh Circuit 11−8022: It Is Ordered that the petition is Granted to the extent that the court will permit an appeal on the sole issue that follows: when should a district court on deciding a motion for class certification defer, based on the principles of comity, to a sister court's ruling on a motion for certification of a similar class. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011). Petitioners shall pay the required appellate fees to the clerk of the district within 14 days from the entry of this order pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(d)(1). Once the district court notifies this court that the fees have been paid, the appeal will be entered on this court's general docket and briefing will be set. (Entered: 09/19/2011)
97 PURSUANT USCA order dated 10/4/11 this document is being filed as a NOTICE of appeal by Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook Co. regarding orders 92 , 93 Filing fee $ 455.00. Receipt # 4624067658. (dj, ) Modified on 10/5/2011 (dj, ). (Entered: 10/05/2011)
98 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
99 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 97 . Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 10/05/2011)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 12 of 47

10/05/2011 10/19/2011
10/24/2011 10/24/2011 11/06/2011 11/06/2011
11/17/2011
01/05/2012 01/05/2012
01/10/2012
03/06/2012 03/14/2012 03/14/2012 04/26/2012 07/11/2012 07/11/2012
07/11/2012
07/13/2012 07/30/2012 07/30/2012

100 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 97 ; USCA Case No. 11−3261. (tlm) (Entered: 10/05/2011)
101 COPY of order dated 10/19/2011 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 97 ; Appellate case no. : 11−3261. It Is Ordered that the appellant file this overdue Docketing Statement with the clerk of this court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. Failure to do so will result in a one hundred dollar ($100.00) fine and/or dismissal of this notice of appeal. (tlm) (Entered: 10/20/2011)
102 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 97 (USCA no. 11−3261) (dj, ) (Entered: 10/24/2011)
103 USCA RECEIVED on 10/24/11 the long record regarding notice of appeal 97 (dj, ) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
104 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to reassign case (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/06/2011)
105 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to reassign case 104 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/22/2011 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/06/2011)
106 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held on 11/17/2011 and continued to 1/12/2012 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiffs' motion to reassign cases 11 C 933 and 11 C 934 to this Court 104 is granted without objection.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/17/2011)
107 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to authorize piggyback mailing of class notice (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/05/2012)
108 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 107 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/10/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/05/2012)
109 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 1/10/2012. Plaintiffs' motion to authorize piggyback mailing of class notice 107 is granted. Status hearing of 1/12/2012 stricken. Parties are to notify the Court after the decision by the Court of Appeals of the pending matter. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
110 OPT Out form by Stephanie Barnes (Exhibits). (tlm) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
111 OPT−OUT Form filed by Castaneda Ramiro. (ea, ) (Entered: 03/15/2012)
112 OPT−OUT Form filed by Todd Hadley. (ea, ) (Entered: 03/15/2012)
113 OPT−OUT Form by Ricky R. Battles dated 4/10/12 (Exhibits). (tlm) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
114 NOTICE of Issuance of Mandate from the Seventh Circuit. No record to be returned. (tlm) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
115 CERTIFIED Copy of MANDATE of USCA dated 06/19/12 regarding notice of appeal 97 ; USCA No. 11−3261: The district judge's grant of class certification is Affirmed, with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (tlm) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
116 CERTIFIED Copy of OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Submitted 4/23/2012; Decided 6/19/2012 in USCA case no. 11−3261. (tlm) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
117 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing set for 7/31/2012 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
118 STATUS Report by John Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
119 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:The scheduling dates within the parties' Written Status Report 118 are adopted, including the following: Non−expert discovery will close on 4/12/2013; Plaintiffs shall make expert disclosures, including service of expert reports, by June 3, 2013. Defendants shall make their expert disclosures, including service of expert reports, by July 12, 2013. Depositions of the

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 13 of 47

08/20/2012 08/20/2012 08/20/2012 08/20/2012 08/23/2012 09/20/2012 10/29/2012 10/30/2012
10/30/2012
11/01/2012
11/13/2012 11/16/2012 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 01/02/2013
01/03/2013

experts shall be taken within 28 days of designation. Status hearing of 7/31/2012 is stricken and reset for 10/30/2012 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/30/2012)
120 ATTORNEY Appearance for Movant Percy Rounds by Albert Lee Hogan, III (Hogan, Albert) (Entered: 08/20/2012)
121 ATTORNEY Appearance for Movant Percy Rounds by Nathan Andrew Shev (Shev, Nathan) (Entered: 08/20/2012)
122 MOTION by Movant Percy Rounds to reassign case as Related Under Local Rule 40.4 (Hogan, Albert) (Entered: 08/20/2012)
123 NOTICE of Motion by Albert Lee Hogan, III for presentment of motion to reassign case 122 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/23/2012 at 08:30 AM. (Hogan, Albert) (Entered: 08/20/2012)
124 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Unopposed motion of Percy Rounds for reassignment of his case (11 C 4247) to this Court 122 is granted. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 08/29/2012)
125 MOTION of joinder by Movant Darnell Cooper, pro se (Exhibits). (tlm) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
126 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 10/29/2012)
127 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held on 10/30/2012 and continued to 2/12/2013 at 8:30 A.M. By agreement of the parties, this case is referred to Magistrate Judge Brown for discovery supervision, all discovery motions and a settlement conference. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 10/30/2012)
128 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case referred to the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on all discovery motions, discovery supervision and settlement conference, pursuant to Local Rule 72.1. Signed by Executive Committee on 10/30/12. (tlm) (Entered: 10/30/2012)
129 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: The referral of this matter having been assigned to Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown, an initial status hearing is hereby set before Magistrate Judge Brown on 11/16/12 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1812. The parties shall deliver a copy of an initial status report providing the information required by Judge Brown's Order Setting Initial Status Report to the Courtroom Deputy (Room 1808) three business days before the initial status hearing. See www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JUDGE BROWN. Notices mailed by Judicial staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 11/01/2012)
130 STATUS Report [Initial on referral case] by John Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/13/2012)
131 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 1/8/13 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 11/16/2012)
132 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to take deposition of Incarcerated Persons (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
133 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion to take deposition 132 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/8/2012 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Docket Text modified by Clerks Office.) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
134 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion to take deposition 132 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 1/9/2012 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Docket text Modified by Clerk's Office.) (Entered: 01/02/2013)
135 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion to take deposition 132 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 1/9/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/03/2013)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 14 of 47

01/07/2013 01/08/2013
01/31/2013 02/06/2013 03/20/2013 03/28/2013 04/02/2013 04/02/2013 04/04/2013 04/12/2013
04/16/2013 04/23/2013 04/23/2013 04/24/2013 04/24/2013 04/26/2013

136 LETTER from Abayomi Adedeji.(Exhibits) (ea, ) (Entered: 01/08/2013)
137 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 1/31/13 at 9:45 a.m. Motion hearing held. Defendant's Motion to Depose Incarcerated Persons 132 is granted. Cook County Department of Corrections is ordered to make Rodell Sanders available for deposition at a mutually agreed time and date. Danville Correctional Center is ordered to make Malcolm Patton available for deposition at a mutually agreed time and date. Dixon Correctional Center is ordered to make Frank Powicki available for deposition at a mutually agreed time and date. Permission is further granted for each of the depositions of the persons listed above to be conducted by video−conferencing, if available, when preferable for all of the parties. Motion hearing date previously set for 1/9/13 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and no appearance is necessary. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/08/2013)
138 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 3/20/13 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
139 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 2/12/2013 reset for 3/28/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed and telephoned notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
140 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 4/18/13 at 9:00 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
141 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 3/28/2013 and continued to 6/11/2013 at 08:30 AM. Plaintiff's oral motion to extend discovery cut−off is granted to 6/28/2013. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/28/2013)
142 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to compel (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
143 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 142 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 4/10/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
144 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: At the parties' request, the motion hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 142 set for 4/10/12 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and reset to 4/12/13 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
145 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 4/12/2013: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 142 is taken under advisement. The parties shall file supplemental materials with respect to the motion according to the schedule set out below, which was suggested by the parties' counsel at the motion hearing. Status hearing previously set for 4/18/13 is stricken and reset to 6/13/13 at 9:45 a.m. [For further details see attached order.] (psm, ) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
146 SUPPLEMENT to motion to compel 142 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
147 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to compel 142 Disclosure of PreBudget Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/23/2013)
148 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re response in opposition to motion 147 For Dsiclosure of PreBudget Documents (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/23/2013)
149 RESPONSE by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to motion to compel 142 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
150 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County re Response 149 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2013)
151 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Defendant Cook County's Response 149 to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 142 indicates that the Defendant is asserting the deliberative process privilege over 287 pages of pre−budget documents. Defendant is ordered to submit a copy of those pre−budget documents to the court for

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 15 of 47

04/30/2013 06/05/2013 06/05/2013 06/07/2013
06/11/2013
06/11/2013 06/11/2013 06/11/2013 06/11/2013
06/12/2013 06/13/2013 06/13/2013 06/13/2013
07/01/2013

in camera review no later than 5/3/13. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 04/26/2013)
152 REPLY by Plaintiff John Smentek to Response 149 , response in opposition to motion 147 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/30/2013)
153 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to compel production of detainee grievances (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/05/2013)
154 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 153 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 6/12/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/05/2013)
155 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 153 previously set for 6/12/13 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and reset to 6/13/13 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
156 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: For the reasons set out in the following Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel [dkt 142 ] is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice: plaintiffs' motion to compel documents pursuant to its "Request for Supplemental Production of Electronical [sic] Stored Information" is denied without prejudice; plaintiff's motion to compel prebudget documents that discuss dental services is granted. Defendants shall produce those documents by 6/26/13. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
157 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 6/11/2013.(psm, ) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
158 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 6/11/2013 and continued to 9/17/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
159 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 6/11/2013. Motion of Darnell Cooper for joinder 125 is granted. Darnell Cooper will be a class member. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/11/2013)
160 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above captioned case be referred to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown is expanded to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the discovery supervision to include determination of all discovery cut−off dates. Entered by Executive Committee on 6/11/2013. (tlm) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
161 SUPPLEMENT to motion to compel 153 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
162 ENTERED in error. (Main Document 162 replaced on 6/13/2013) (psm, ). (Entered: 06/13/2013)
163 NOTICE of Correction re: 162 . (psm, ) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
164 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 7/17/13 at 9:45 a.m. Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 153 is entered and continued to 7/17/13 at 9:45 a.m. Discovery cutoff of 6/28/13 is stricken and will be reset at the next status date. No later than 7/3/13, parties shall meet and confer to propose a plan to conclude discovery. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
165 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: On June 11, 2013, defendant Cook County was ordered to produce its pre−budget documents that discuss dental services by June 26, 2013. [Dkt 157 .] Because the documents contain potentially sensitive information that does not relate to the dental services budget, the County was permitted to submit to the court proposed redactions to its pre−budget documents for in camera review. The County has submitted its proposed redactions, and the court has reviewed them. None of the proposed redactions pertain to the County's dental services budget. Accordingly, the County's proposed redactions are approved. The County shall produce the documents in their redacted form by 7/8/2013. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (psm, ). (Entered: 07/01/2013)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 16 of 47

07/03/2013 07/03/2013 07/12/2013
07/16/2013 07/17/2013
07/17/2013 07/17/2013 07/25/2013 07/25/2013 08/01/2013 09/12/2013 09/16/2013 09/24/2013 09/24/2013 09/26/2013

166 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
167 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for protective order 166 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 7/12/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
168 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Motion hearing held. Motion for Protective Order 166 is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted in that the pre−budget documents produced by the defendants will be held subject to a confidentiality order. The parties agree that they shall submit to the court an agreed motion to govern confidentiality and a HIPPA request for the medical records of class members who are not named plaintiffs. The motion is denied as to the specific protective order proposed. Counsel for the defendants shall submit a proposed confidentiality order using the Court's model confidentiality order before 7/17/13. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
169 STATUS Report on form of protective orders by John Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
170 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 9/12/13 at 9:45 a.m. Motion hearing held. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order 166 is granted. Enter Agreed HIPAA Qualified Protective Order. Enter Confidentiality Order. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 153 is granted. Counsel for the Cook County Sheriff advises the Court that 2000 grievances have been produced. The Sheriff is reviewing approximately 500 additional grievances, and shall produce those identified as dental grievances by 7/31/13. All depositions relating to the pre−budget documents shall be completed by 9/30/13. No later than 8/30/13, Plaintiff will request any additional medical records to be produced relating to the dental grievances. All fact discovery shall be noticed in time to be completed by 12/20/13. FIRM DATE. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
171 AGREED HIPAA QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE Order. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 7/17/2013.(psm, ) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
172 CONFIDENTIALITY Order. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 7/17/2013.(psm, ) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
173 MOTION by counsel for Movant Percy Rounds to withdraw as attorney by Nathan A. Shev (Shev, Nathan) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
174 NOTICE of Motion by Nathan Andrew Shev for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 173 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/1/2013 at 08:30 AM. (Shev, Nathan) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
175 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion of Nathan A. Shev to withdraw as attorney for Percy Rounds 173 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/01/2013)
176 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 10/31/13 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
177 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 9/17/2013 reset for 11/14/2013 at 08:30 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
178 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
179 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for protective order 178 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 9/27/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
180 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Defendants' Motion for Protective Order 178 is taken under advisement. Plaintiffs' response shall be filed by 10/4/13. Defendants' reply shall be filed by 10/11/13. Courtesy copies shall be provided to Judge Brown at the time of filing. The Court shall rule by mail. Motion hearing previously set for 9/27/13 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken. Notices mailed by

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 17 of 47

09/26/2013 10/04/2013
10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/04/2013 10/10/2013
10/10/2013 10/18/2013
10/30/2013

Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 09/26/2013)
181 STATUS Report by Darnell Cooper (tg, ) (Entered: 09/30/2013)
182 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek in Opposition to motion for protective order 178 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 3, # 3 Certificate of Service)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
183 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 1] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
184 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 2] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
185 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 3] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
186 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 4] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
187 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 5] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
188 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 6] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
189 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 7] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
190 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 8] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
191 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 9] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
192 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 10] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
193 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 11] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
194 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 12] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
195 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 13] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
196 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 14] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
197 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff John Smentek [exhibit 2, part 15] regarding memorandum in opposition to motion 182 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
198 REPLY by Cook County, Illinois to memorandum in opposition to motion 182 for a second protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment F, # 2 Exhibit Attachment G, # 3 Exhibit Attachment H)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
199 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re reply to response to motion 198 for a Second Protective Order (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
200 MOTION by Movant Darnell Cooper for order; Notice. (tg, ) (Pursuant to the March 2011 Judicial Conference Policy requiring that remote access restrictions be implemented when placing scanned versions of previously filed paper documents on the record, this document is restricted to allow public access only at the Clerk's Office public access terminals.) Modified on 9/25/2018 (las, ). (Entered: 10/23/2013)
201 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: For the reasons set forth in the following order, Defendants' Second Motion for Protective Order 178 is granted in part. Defendants' response to plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents for Designated Class Members shall be limited to producing the dental and medical

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 18 of 47

10/30/2013 10/31/2013 11/12/2013 11/12/2013 11/13/2013 11/13/2013 11/14/2013
11/15/2013
11/19/2013 11/19/2013 11/19/2013 11/20/2013
11/27/2013
11/27/2013 11/27/2013
11/27/2013

records of every fifth inmate on plaintiffs' list of 167. Enter Order. [For further detail see separate order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
202 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 10/30/2013.(psm, ) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
203 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held and continued to 12/17/13 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
204 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for extension of time to complete discovery (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
205 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of extension of time 204 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/15/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
206 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of extension of time 204 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 11/15/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
207 OBJECTIONS by John Smentek to order 202 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
208 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 11/14/2013 and continued to 2/27/2014 at 09:00 AM. Sheriff of Cook County is to file a statement concerning residency of Darnell Cooper at Cook County Jail by 11/22/2013. Defendants to file response to plaintiffs' objections to magistrate's order 207 by 11/27/2013. Plaintiffs' reply in support of objections to be filed by 12/4/2013. Ruling will issue by mail.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
209 MINUTE entry before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Motion hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Discovery Cutoff Date 204 is denied without prejudice because of the failure to comply with Local Rule 37.2. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
210 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for extension of time to complete discovery (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
211 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 210 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 11/22/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
212 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Rodell Sanders by Patrick W Morrissey (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
213 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Extend Discovery Cutoff Date 210 is taken under advisement. Defendants' response shall be filed by 11/27/13. Plaintiffs may file a reply no later than 12/3/13. Motion hearing previously set for 11/22/13 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and no appearance is necessary. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 11/20/2013)
214 RESPONSE by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to objections 207 to Magistrate's order of October 30, 2113 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit index, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
215 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re Response, 214 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
216 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for extension of time to complete discovery 210 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
217 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re response to motion, 216 for extension of time (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 19 of 47

12/03/2013 12/04/2013 12/04/2013 12/04/2013 12/04/2013 12/05/2013
12/05/2013 12/13/2013 12/16/2013 12/16/2013 12/17/2013 12/17/2013 12/19/2013
12/19/2013

218 REPLY by Plaintiff John Smentek to response to motion, 216 , motion for extension of time to complete discovery 210 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
219 SUR−REPLY by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to reply 218 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
220 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for leave to file amended reply memorandum (ECF #216) (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
221 REPLY by Plaintiff John Smentek to objections 207 , Response, 214 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/04/2013)
224 MOTION by Nicholas Ungureanu for leave to proceed independently and opt out of class action suit (tg, ) (Entered: 12/09/2013)
222 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Reply Memorandum 220 is granted. Plaintiffs' may file the Amended Reply Memorandum attached to the Motion 220 as Exhibit 1. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. notice (psm, ) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
223 REPLY by John Smentek to response to motion, 216 [AMENDED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/05/2013)
225 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing previously set for 12/17/13 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and reset to 1/7/14 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 12/13/2013)
226 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois for protective order To Stay Compliance With Reqeust for Records (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment E)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
227 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for protective order 226 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 12/20/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
228 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to compel [renewed] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
229 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 228 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 12/20/2013 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
230 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Compel 228 will be taken under advisement. Defendants' response shall be filed by 1/10/14. Plaintiffs' reply shall be filed by 1/17/14. Motion hearing previously set for 12/20/13 at 9:45 is hereby stricken and no appearance is necessary. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
231 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10−31−13 before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown. Court Reporter Contact Information: Lois A. LaCorte, lois_lacorte@ilnd.uscourts.gov, (312) 435−5558.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

12/19/2013

Redaction Request due 1/9/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/20/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/19/2014. (LaCorte, Lois) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
232 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: For the reasons set out in the following Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Extend the Discovery Cutoff 210 is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically: (1) Plaintiffs' request to extend discovery so plaintiffs can obtain dental (and medical) records relating to the 276 grievances filed from March 14, 2013, through October 24, 2013, is denied; (2) Plaintiffs' request to extend the discovery deadline to allow

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 20 of 47

12/19/2013 12/22/2013

plaintiffs to depose all 25 of the dental employees is denied, but the court will allow plaintiffs to proceed with the five timely noticed defendants' employee depositions. They are directed to schedule the depositions promptly after the District Judge rules on plaintiffs' objections to this court's October 30, 2013 order, even if this occurs after the discovery cutoff; and (3) If Mr. Smentek is deceased, his counsel must file a suggestion of death. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a). If appropriate, plaintiffs' counsel shall file, by January 10, 2014, a suggestion of death and a brief memorandum advising the court whether a representative intends to file a motion to substitute. Cook County's Motion to Stay Compliance with Requests for Medical Records 226 is granted on an interim basis. Cermak Medical Services is not required to produce any medical records pursuant to the waivers submitted with the request of plaintiffs' counsel until further order of the court. Plaintiffs' response to that motion must be filed by January 10, 2014. Defendant Cook County may file a reply in support by January 17, 2014. The motion is taken under advisement and ruling will be by mail. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Motion hearing previously set for 12/20/13 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and no appearance is necessary. Status hearing previously set for 1/7/14 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and reset to 2/4/14 at 9:45 a.m. [For further detail see separate order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
233 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 12/19/2013.(psm, ) (Entered: 12/19/2013)
234 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 11/15/13 before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown. Court Reporter Contact Information: TRACEY D. McCULLOUGH, 312−435−5570, Tracey_Mccullough@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

01/02/2014 01/06/2014 01/06/2014 01/09/2014
01/10/2014 01/14/2014 01/14/2014

Redaction Request due 1/13/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/22/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/24/2014. (Mccullough, Tracey) (Entered: 12/22/2013)
235 OBJECTIONS by John Smentek to order on motion for extension of time to complete discovery, order on motion for protective order, terminate hearings, set/reset hearings, set motion and R&R deadlines/hearings,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 232 , memorandum opinion and order 233 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
236 MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek for preliminary injunction and to schedule hearing on permanent injunction (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
237 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for preliminary injunction 236 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/9/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
238 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 1/9/2014 regarding plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and to schedule hearing on permanent injunction 236 . Response due by 1/23/2014; reply due by 1/30/2014. Motion Hearing set for 2/20/2014 at 10:00 AM. Response to plaintiff's objections to Magistrate's Order of December 19, 2013 235 due by 1/30/2014; reply due by 2/13/2014.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
239 RESPONSE by Plaintiff John Smentek to memorandum opinion and order 233 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/10/2014)
240 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to compel [renewed] 228 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
241 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County re response in opposition to motion 240 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 01/14/2014)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 21 of 47

01/15/2014
01/17/2014 01/17/2014 01/21/2014 01/22/2014 01/23/2014 01/23/2014 01/23/2014 01/23/2014 01/23/2014
01/24/2014 01/24/2014 01/24/2014
01/29/2014

242 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: On 12/19/2014, the court ordered defendant Dart to respond to plaintiffs' renewed motion to compel [dkt 228 ] by 1/10/14 and ordered the plaintiffs to file a reply by 1/17/2014. [Dkt 230 .] On 1/14/2014, Dart filed his response. [Dkt 240 .] In the response, Dart's counsel states that his failure to file a timely response was inadvertent and requests leave to file the response instanter. The request to file the response instanter is granted. The court extends the time for plaintiffs to reply until 1/21/2014. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
243 REPLY by Cook County, Illinois to Response 239 To Motion to Stay (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
244 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re reply to response to motion 243 To Stay (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/17/2014)
245 RESPONSE by John Smentekin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to compel [renewed] 228 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/21/2014)
246 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:The time of the status hearing on 2/27/2014 is reset to 11:00 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/22/2014)
247 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to vacate poprtion of order of December 19, 2013 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
248 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to vacate 247 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 1/29/2014 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
249 MOTION by Defendant Cook County, Illinois for leave to file excess pages (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
250 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 249 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 1/29/2014 at 09:45 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
251 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County in Opposition to motion for preliminary injunction 236 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
252 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 249 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/30/2013 at 08:30 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
253 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 249 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/30/2014 at 08:30 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
254 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Plaintiffs' motion to vacate order of December 19, 2013 [dkt 247 ] is, in essence, a sur−response to Cook County's reply in support of its motion to stay compliance with requests for medical records [dkt 243 ]. Cook County's reply was filed as part of the briefing on Cook County's motion to stay [dkt 226 ], which was granted on an interim basis on 12/19/13 [dkt 232 ]. As such, Plaintiffs' motion to vacate is taken under advisement as part of the briefing on Cook County's motion to stay. Cook County may file a sur−reply by 2/10/14. No further briefing on this topic will be permitted without leave of court. The noticed presentment date of 1/29/14 for the plaintiffs' motion to vacate is stricken. In light of the motions pending before this court and the proceedings before the District Judge, the status hearing set for 2/4/14 is stricken and reset to 3/4/14 at 9:45 a.m. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/24/2014)
255 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendant's motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to plaintiff's application for preliminary injunction and a hearing in excess of fifteen pages 249 is granted up to twenty pages.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/29/2014)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 22 of 47

01/30/2014 01/30/2014 01/30/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014 02/07/2014 02/10/2014 02/13/2014
02/18/2014 02/19/2014 02/25/2014 03/04/2014 03/06/2014 03/06/2014
03/10/2014

256 RESPONSE by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to objections, 235 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
257 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re Response 256 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
258 REPLY by John Smentek to memorandum in opposition to motion, 251 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
259 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to strike Expert Report and Leave to File a Surreply (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Surreply, # 2 Exhibit P, # 3 Exhibit Q, # 4 Exhibit R)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
260 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/13/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
261 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to file surreply (Omitted Relief from 259 ) (tg, ) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
262 RESPONSE by Plaintiff John Smentek to motion to strike 259 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
263 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 2/13/2014 regarding defendants' motion to strike the expert report included with plaintiffs' reply and for leave to file a surreply to plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction 259 and taken under advisement. Motion hearing regarding plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and to schedule hearing on permanent injunction 236 is reset from 2/20/2014 to 3/6/2014 at 10:00 AM. Plaintiffs' oral motion to extend date to 2/18/2014 by which to file reply in support of plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate's Order of December 19, 2013 235 is granted.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/13/2014)
264 REPLY by Plaintiff John Smentek to objections, 235 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
265 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 2/27/2014 reset for 3/6/2014 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/19/2014)
266 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing previously set for 3/4/14 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and reset to 3/6/14 at 10:15 a.m., after the hearing with the District Judge. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
267 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/4/2014: Objections 207 and 235 by John Smentek to Magistrate Judge Brown's orders dated 10/30/2013 and 12/19/2013 are overruled. See Statement for detail.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
268 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Status hearing held. Pending motions are taken under advisement, and ruling will issue by mail. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
269 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 3/6/2014. Motion of Darnell Cooper for order to confirm or deny that he is a member of the class 200 is ruled on as follows: It is determined that Darnell Cooper is not a member of the class for the reasons stated on the record. Defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's expert report attached to reply brief 259 is denied. Defendants' motion for leave to file sur−reply in further opposition to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction hearing 259 is granted. Hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 236 held and continued to 6/2/2014 at 10:00 AM. Bench Trial on the merits of the case is also set for 6/2/2014 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/06/2014)
270 OBJECTIONS by John Smentek to magistrate judge status hearing 268 AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/10/2014)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 23 of 47

03/10/2014 03/12/2014 03/12/2014 03/13/2014
03/14/2014 03/14/2014 03/21/2014 03/21/2014 03/24/2014
03/24/2014 03/24/2014 03/25/2014
03/25/2014

271 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to vacate 247 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 3/13/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/10/2014)
272 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to strike the 53 declarations attached to Platinitff motion for Injunctive Relief (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
273 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 03/12/2014)
274 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 3/13/2014. Plaintiff's objections to Magistrate's Order of March 6, 2014 270 are overruled without prejudice to refiling after Magistrate Judge Brown makes her ruling. Response to plaintiff's motion for sanctions 270 due by 4/3/2014; reply due by 4/10/2014. Response to defendants' motion to strike 272 due by 4/3/2014; reply due by 4/10/2014. Defendants' oral motion to strike its response to plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction 251 with leave to refile an appropriately redacted response is granted. Settlement Conference set for 5/2/2014 at 02:00 PM. Each party shall submit their settlement position to chambers via letter no later than 4/25/2014.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
275 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to motion for preliminary injunction 236 EXHIBITS REDACTED (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
276 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re Response, 275 REDACTED EXHIBITS (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
277 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for discovery to be reopened to allow depositions of witnesses disclosed by defendants after the close of fact discovery (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
278 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for discovery 277 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 3/26/2014 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/21/2014)
279 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Discovery to Allow Depositions of Witnesses Disclosed by Defendant After the Close of Fact Discovery 277 is stricken without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule 37.2. Motion hearing previously set for 3/26/14 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and no appearance shall be necessary. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
280 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for discovery [to reopen to allow deposition of witnesses disclosed by defendants after the close of fact discovery] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
281 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for discovery 280 before Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 3/28/2014 at 09:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
282 ORDER entered by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 3/25/2014: Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel 228 is granted in part and denied in part as follows: The Sheriff shall provide to plaintiffs' counsel statistics showing the monthly and yearly detainee population of Cook County Department of Corrections in 2011, 2012 and 2013, and the average and median length of detainment at the Cook County Department of Corrections in 2011 and 2012. In all other respects, the motion is denied. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
283 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Reopen Discovery 280 is taken under advisement. Defendants' response shall be filed by 4/4/14. Plaintiffs' reply shall be filed by 4/11/14. The Court will issue a ruling by mail. Motion hearing previously set for 3/28/14 at 9:45 a.m. is hereby stricken and no appearance shall be necessary. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm,

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 24 of 47

04/01/2014 04/01/2014 04/01/2014 04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/04/2014 04/08/2014
04/08/2014 04/08/2014 04/10/2014 04/10/2014 04/10/2014 04/10/2014 04/11/2014 04/15/2014
04/21/2014 04/22/2014

) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
284 RESPONSE by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to objections 270 to Magistrate's Order of March 6, 2014 and Motion for Sanctions (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
285 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re Response 284 to plaintiff's objections (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
286 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 97 ; USCA Case No. 14−1690 (tg, ) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
287 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek in Opposition to motion to strike 272 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/03/2014)
288 RESPONSE by Defendant Cook County, Illinois to motion for discovery 280 To Reopen Discovery to Allow Depositions of Additional Witnesses (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
289 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re Response 288 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
290 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: For the reasons set out in the following Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendant Cook County's Motion for Protective Order to Stay Compliance with Request for Records 226 and Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Order of December 19, 2013 247 are both granted in part and denied in part as set out further in the following order. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. [For further detail see separate order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
291 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 4/8/2014.(psm, ) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
292 OBJECTIONS by John Smentek to order on motion to compel,,,,,, written opinion,, 282 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
293 REPLY by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to motion to strike 272 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
294 REPLY by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to motion to strike 272 with exhibits a−c (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
295 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re reply 294 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
296 REPLY by Plaintiff John Smentek to Response 284 to motion for sanctions (ECF #284) (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
297 RESPONSE by John Smentekin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for discovery [to reopen to allow deposition of witnesses disclosed by defendants after the close of fact discovery] 280 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/11/2014)
298 CERTIFIED Order by the U.S.C.A., Appeal No. 14−1690. IT IS ORDERED that, in light of the magistrate judge's April 8, 2014 order, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED as premature. Now that the magistrate judge has made her final ruling, petitioner still may be able to obtain the relief he seeks by filing an objection with the district judge, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); he has failed to demonstrate that there are "no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires." Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). This court expresses no opinion about the merits of the mandamus petition. (tg, ) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
300 STATUS Update Requested by Darnell Cooper (tg, ) (Entered: 04/23/2014)
299 OBJECTIONS by John Smentek to order on motion for protective order, order on motion to vacate, text entry,,,,,, 290 , memorandum opinion and order 291 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/22/2014)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 25 of 47

04/24/2014 04/29/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014
05/01/2014 05/02/2014
05/06/2014 05/06/2014

301 STATUS Report [in response to ECF #300] by John Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
302 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 236 is reset from 6/2/2014 to 6/5/2014 at 9:00 a.m. Bench Trial on the merits of the case is also reset from 6/2/2014 to 6/5/2014 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
303 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for leave to file excess pages Instanter (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
304 MOTION by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 303 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Text Modified by Clerk's Office on 4/30/2014, duplicate of 303 ) (tg, ). (Entered: 04/30/2014)
305 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages 303 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
306 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to Decertify Class (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
307 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion to to Decertify Class 306 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
308 ORDER Entered by the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown on 4/30/2014: For the reasons set out in the attached order, Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Reopen Discovery to Allow Depositions of Witnesses Disclosed by Defendants After the Close of Fact Discovery 280 is denied. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff.(psm, ) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
309 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County in support of motion for miscellaneous relief 306 Motion To Decertify (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Table of Contents, # 2 Appendix Index to Exhibits, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit k, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
310 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek in Opposition to motion for leave to file excess pages 303 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
311 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Settlement conference held on 5/2/2014. The case will not settle at this time but parties are encouraged to continue settlement discussions on their own. The Bench Trial on injunctive relief will begin on 6/2/2014 at 9:30 a.m. The court will reserve 30 hours for the hearing to be allocated as follows: 18 hours for plaintiffs and 12 hours for defendants. The parties have agreed that they will identify witnesses for the hearing on injunctive relief by 5/5/2014. Plaintiffs may identify up to 10 detainee witnesses. If medical records for any of the 10 detainees have not been produced by defendants, defendants will produce the medical records to plaintiffs within 72 hours after identification. To the extent defendants wish to depose the 10 detainee witnesses, defendants may request such depositions. The parties will identify exhibits for the hearing on injunctive relief by 5/9/2014. The parties will file proposed finding of facts by 5/19/2014. The minute entry resetting bench trial and hearing to 6/5/2014 is vacated. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
312 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:The portion of the minute entry 269 of 3/6/2014, ruling that "Darnell Cooper is not a member of the class for the reasons stated on the record" is vacated. Plaintiff reports that Darnell Cooper is a potential class member. All other aspects of the minute entry 269 remain in force.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
313 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/6/2014: Plaintiff's motion for sanctions 270 is denied. Defendant Cook County's request for costs for responding to the motion is denied. (See Statement)Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 05/06/2014)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 26 of 47

05/09/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/12/2014 05/14/2014 05/15/2014
05/16/2014 05/16/2014 05/19/2014 05/19/2014

314 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Michael D. Warner (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/09/2014)
315 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
316 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 315 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
317 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum [video] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
318 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 317 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
319 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to vacate memorandum opinion and order 291 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
320 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to vacate, motion for relief 319 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
321 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin limine to Bar Witnesses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavits of Schoonover and Meuller)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
322 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin limine To Limit Plaintiffs Expert Testimony (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
323 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion in limine 322 , motion in limine 321 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/12/2014)
324 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:The motions noticed before the Court for 5/15/2014 will be heard at 10:30 a.m. The 11:00 a.m. time setting for 5/15/2014 for the matters in this case is stricken.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/14/2014)
325 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 5/15/2014. For the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Memorandum Opinion and Order 319 is denied as moot. Defendant Cook County will produce Gustavo Favian's medical records. For the reasons stated on the record, Defendants' Motion In Limine to Bar Witnesses 321 is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is barred from calling more than 10 detainee witnesses at trial and is barred from calling Ms. Schoonover. Plaintiff may call Ms. Meuller. Defendants' Motion In Limine to Limit Plaintiff's Expert Testimony 322 is granted. As agreed by the parties on the record, Defendants' Motion to Strike Declarations 272 is moot. Plaintiff's Motions for Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum 315 and 317 are granted, but Plaintiff is reminded that he is barred from calling more than 10 detainee witnesses. Plaintiff shall submit proposed draft orders for writs to chambers via the proposed order mailbox on Judge Lefkow's web page on the District Court's website by 5/16/2014. The Bench Trial will cover the time period 1/1/2013 to present. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/15/2014)
326 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to objections 292 , objections 299 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
327 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re Response 326 to Objections (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/16/2014)
328 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Sandra A. Navarro 09cv529 (Navarro, Sandra) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
329 Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/19/2014)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 27 of 47

05/19/2014 05/19/2014 05/19/2014 05/20/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/22/2014 05/23/2014 05/28/2014
05/28/2014
05/28/2014 05/28/2014 05/28/2014

330 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County re other 329 Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
331 Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by John Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/19/2014)
332 ORDER Directing Issuance of Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/19/2014. Mailed notice(tg, ) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
334 ORDER Directing Issuance of Video Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/20/2014:Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 05/21/2014)
338 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin limine #3 To Bar non−party witnesses from Courtroom (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
339 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion in limine 338 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/28/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
340 RESPONSE by John Smentekin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin limine #3 To Bar non−party witnesses from Courtroom 338 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
341 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to strike the testimony of Dr. Jay D. Shulman (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
342 NOTICE of Motion by Michael D. Warner for presentment of motion to strike 341 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/28/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
343 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
344 NOTICE of Motion by Michael D. Warner for presentment of motion to strike 343 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/28/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
345 RESPONSE by John Smentekin Opposition to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to strike the testimony of Dr. Jay D. Shulman 341 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/23/2014)
346 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 5/28/2014. Defendant's motion in limine No. 3 to bar non−party witnesses from the courtroom 338 denied as stated on the record. Defendants' joint motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Jay Schulman 341 denied as stated on the record. Defendants' joint motion to strike portions of plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 343 taken under advisement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
347 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:VIDEO WRIT issued on 5/21/2014 as to Jason D. Krickrehm, Jose Bautista, and Meinardo Concepcion 336 is quashed. New video writ will issue as to Jason D. Krickrehm and Meinardo Concepcion only.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
348 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:VIDEO WRIT issued on 5/21/2014 as to Orlando Allen 336 is quashed. A new video writ with a different appearance date will issue.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
349 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:VIDEO WRIT issued on 5/21/2014 as to Blake Conyers 337 is quashed. The appearance of Blake Conyers is no longer needed.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
350 AMENDED ORDER Directing Issuance of Video Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/28/2014: Mailed

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 28 of 47

05/29/2014 06/02/2014 06/03/2014 06/04/2014 06/05/2014 06/09/2014 06/10/2014
07/08/2014 07/11/2014
07/17/2014 07/17/2014 07/18/2014 07/18/2014 07/18/2014 07/21/2014 07/21/2014
07/23/2014
07/23/2014 08/15/2014
08/21/2014

notice(mad, ) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
353 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: The Bench Trial scheduled for 6/2/2014 will start at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
354 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Bench trial held on 6/2/2014 and continued to 6/3/2014 at 08:45 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
355 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Bench trial held on 6/3/2014 and continued to 6/4/2014 at 09:15 AM. (mad, ) (Entered: 06/03/2014)
356 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Bench trial held on 6/4/2014 and continued to 6/5/2014 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/04/2014)
357 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Bench trial held on 6/5/2014 and continued to 6/9/2014 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
358 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Bench trial held on 6/9/2014 and continued to 6/10/2014 at 09:30 AM. (mad, ) (Entered: 06/09/2014)
359 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Bench trial held on 6/10/2014 and concluded. Preliminary injunction hearing held and concluded. Parties may file simultaneous briefs by 7/8/2014. Matter will be taken under advisement. Ruling will issue by mail. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/11/2014)
360 STIPULATION concerning production of specific documents (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
361 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Date by which parties may file simultaneous briefs regarding the preliminary injunction hearing is extended to 7/18/2014.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
362 MEMORANDUM by Sheriff of Cook County in Opposition to motion for preliminary injunction 236 post−hearing brief (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
363 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County re memorandum in opposition to motion 362 post−hearnig brief (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/17/2014)
364 TRIAL Brief by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index to Transcripts)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
365 NOTICE by Cook County, Illinois re trial brief 364 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
366 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek [POST TRIAL] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
367 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to amend/correct memorandum 366 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
368 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to amend/correct, motion for relief 367 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 7/24/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/21/2014)
369 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiff's motion plaintiffs for leave to file a corrected post−trial memorandum 367 is granted. Plaintiff shall file a corrected post−trial memorandum. Motion is removed from the court's call of 7/24/2014.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
370 MEMORANDUM memorandum 366 by John Smentek [CORRECTED} Post−Trial (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
371 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 306 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/21/2014 at 11:30 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
372 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 8/21/2014. Briefing schedule as to defendants' motion to decertify 306 : response due by September 11, 2014; reply due by September 25, 2014. Plaintiff's motion for entry of a preliminary injunction and to schedule hearing on a permanent injunction 236 is

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 29 of 47

09/11/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/19/2014 09/24/2014
10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/02/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/06/2014 10/07/2014

denied in part and granted in part as discussed on the record. The court granted the request for a hearing on injunctive relief and a bench trial was held on 6/2/2014. The request for preliminary injunction is denied as stated on the record. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
373 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek in Opposition to motion for miscellaneous relief 306 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
374 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to memorandum in opposition to motion 373 to Decertify (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
375 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
376 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 374 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 9/25/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
377 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendant's motion for extension of time to 10/2/2014 to file reply in support of defendants' motion to decertify 306 374 is granted. Motion is removed from the court's call of 9/25/2014 and will not be called in court. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
378 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for leave to file excess pages for Reply in Support of Motion to Decertify (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
379 NOTICE of Motion by Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon for presentment of (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
380 REPLY by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to memorandum in opposition to motion 373 to decertify the class action (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
381 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to strike Plaintiffs' supplimental expert report (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
382 NOTICE of Motion by Michael D. Warner for presentment of motion to strike 381 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 10/7/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Warner, Michael) (Entered: 10/02/2014)
383 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek by Joel A. Flaxman (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
384 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to take judicial notice of reliable portions of monitor's CRIPA report (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
385 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for leave to file suggestion of additional authority (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
386 RESPONSE by John Smentek to MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for leave to file excess pages for Reply in Support of Motion to Decertify 378 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
387 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file 385 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 10/9/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
388 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 384 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 10/9/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/06/2014)
389 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 10/7/2014. Defendants' motion for leave to file reply in excess of 15 pages instanter 378 is granted. Defendants' joint motion to strike plaintiffs' supplemental expert report 381 taken under advisement. Ruling will issue by mail. Plaintiffs' motion to take judicial notice of reliable portions of Monitor's CRIPA Report 384 is granted.

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 30 of 47

12/22/2014
12/22/2014
12/22/2014 12/22/2014
12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 12/22/2014 01/05/2015 01/05/2015 01/05/2015 01/05/2015 01/06/2015 01/06/2015 01/06/2015 01/07/2015

Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file suggestion of additional authority 385 is granted. Motions 381 and 384 are removed from the court's call of 10/9/2014. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
390 OPINION and ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/22/2014: Defendants' motion to decertify 306 is granted in part and denied in part. The court decertifies the (b)(2) class and will modify the (b)(3) class definition in a manner to be determined. Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction 236 is denied as moot, as is defendants' motion to strike portions of plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact 343 . The parties are directed to confer in an effort to reach agreement on a closing date for the class period and to discuss parameters for possible settlement on the entire case. Status hearing is set for 1/20/2015 at 10;30 a.m.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
391 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/22/2014: Plaintiffs object to two of the magistrate judge's orders. First, they object to the magistrate judge's March 25, 2014 order 282 denying discovery of identifying information from the Cook County Jail database. Second, they object to the magistrate judge's April 8, 2014 order 291 quashing their requests for health records under § 8−2001 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8−2001. For the reasons discussed in the Statement portion of this Order, plaintiffs' objections to the magistrate judge's March 25, 2014 order 292 are overruled and plaintiffs' objections to the magistrate judge's April 8, 2014 order 299 are sustained. Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
392 NOTICE of appeal by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders regarding orders 390 Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0752−10180223. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
393 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendants' joint motion to strike plaintiffs' supplemental expert report 381 is denied pursuant to the Opinion and Order 390 . (See page 10 of the Opinion and Order)Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
394 DOCKETING Statement by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders regarding notice of appeal 392 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
395 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 392 . (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
396 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 392 . Notified counsel (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/22/2014)
397 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 392 ; USCA Case No. 14−3753 (mmy, ) (Entered: 12/23/2014)
398 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentekto divide class into subclasses (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
399 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 398 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/8/2015 at 11:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
400 NOTICE of appeal by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County regarding orders 390 . Filing fee $ 505. receipt# 4624132842. (gcy, ) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
403 PETITION by Defendants for permission to appeal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 23(f). (Exhibits)(rp, ) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
401 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 400 . (gcy, ) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
402 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 400 . Notified counsel (gcy, ) (Entered: 01/06/2015)
404 ORDER dated 1/5/2015 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 392 ; Appellate case no. : 14−3753. (rp, ) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
405 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: is continued to 1/20/2015 at 10:30 AM. No response is required at this time.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 31 of 47

01/16/2015 01/27/2015 02/09/2015
02/09/2015
02/09/2015
02/10/2015 02/11/2015 02/11/2015 02/19/2015 02/19/2015

406 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing and motion hearing on plaintiffs' motion to divide class into subclasses 398 is reset from 1/20/2015 to 1/27/2015 at 10:30 a.m. by agreement. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
407 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing held on 1/27/2015. Motion hearing held on 1/27/2015 regarding plaintiffs' motion to divide class into subclasses 398 . Defendants' response to motion 398 due by 2/24/2015; plaintiffs' reply due by 3/10/2015; ruling by mail. Plaintiffs' to file a brief regarding the cut−off days for class period by 2/10/2015; defendants' response due by 2/24/2015; plaintiffs' reply due by 3/10/2015; ruling by mail.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
408 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 8−21−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 3/2/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/11/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
409 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 3−6−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 3/2/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/11/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
410 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 3−13−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 3/2/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/11/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
411 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek on date defendants adequately staffed dental clinics at CCJ (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
412 NOTICE by John Smentek re memorandum 411 [exhibit 3 on electronic media] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
413 EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, John Smentek regarding memorandum 411 (mmy, ) (Pursuant to the March 2011 Judicial Conference Policy requiring that remote access restrictions be implemented when placing scanned versions of previously filed paper documents on the record, this document is restricted to allow public access only at the Clerk's Office public access terminals.) (ep, ). Modified on 5/10/2018 (ep, ). (Main Document 413 replaced on 9/25/2018) (las, ). (Entered: 02/13/2015)
414 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek Rule 60(b) Motion (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/19/2015)
415 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 414 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/25/2015 at 10:00 AM.

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 32 of 47

02/23/2015 02/23/2015 02/25/2015
02/25/2015 03/03/2015 03/03/2015
03/17/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/23/2015 04/02/2015

(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/19/2015)
416 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to memorandum 411 , motion for miscellaneous relief 398 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
417 NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief, 416 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/25/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
418 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 2/25/2015. Defendant's motion for enlargement of time 416 is granted. Defendants are granted an enlargement of time, up to and including 3/3/2015 for Defendants Sheriff Thomas Dart and Cook County to file their response to Plaintiffs' Motion to divide into subclasses and define the class. Plaintiffs are granted an enlargement of time, up to and including 3/17/2015 to file their replies. Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion 414 is denied. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/26/2015)
419 OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Argued 1/9/2015; Decided 2/25/2015 in USCA case no. 15−8001 (tg, ) (Entered: 02/26/2015)
420 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentekto divide class into subclasses 398 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
421 MEMORANDUM by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County on closing the Rule 23(b)(3) class when Cermak dental care was constitutionally adequate (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 03/03/2015)
422 REPLY by John Smentek to memorandum 421 , MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentekto divide class into subclasses 398 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/17/2015)
423 NOTICE of appeal by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders regarding orders 418 Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0752−10462188. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
424 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 423 . (ea, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
425 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 423 . Notified counsel. (ea, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
426 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 423 ; USCA Case No. 15−1616. (sxw) (Entered: 03/23/2015)
427 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 2/25/15 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Laura Renke, laura_renke@ilnd.uscourts.gov, 312.435.6053.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

04/24/2015 04/24/2015

Redaction Request due 4/23/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/4/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/1/2015. (Renke, Laura) (Entered: 04/02/2015)
428 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for partial summary judgment (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
429 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for partial summary judgment 428 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/29/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/24/2015)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 33 of 47

04/24/2015 04/24/2015 04/27/2015
04/28/2015 04/29/2015
05/05/2015 05/05/2015 06/26/2015 06/26/2015 06/30/2015
07/01/2015 07/01/2015
07/01/2015 07/22/2015 07/22/2015 07/23/2015

430 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentekto divide class into subclasses [AMENDED] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
431 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 430 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 4/29/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/24/2015)
432 RULE 56.1(a)(3) Statement by John Smentek regarding motion for partial summary judgment 428 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index to Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit One (Cook County Jail FIndings Letter), # 3 Exhibit Two (Deposition of Dr. Townsend), # 4 Exhibit Three (Declaration of Tuduj), # 5 Exhibit Four (Tuduj Grievances), # 6 Exhibit Five (Grievances, part one of four), # 7 Exhibit Five (Grievances, part two of four), # 8 Exhibit Five (Grievances, part three of four), # 9 Exhibit Five (Grievances, part four of four), # 10 Exhibit Six (Index to Exhibit Five))(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/27/2015)
433 MEMORANDUM by John Smentek in support of motion for partial summary judgment 428 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
434 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 4/29/2015. Plaintiffs' amended motion to divide class into subclasses 430 is taken under advisement with the other similar pending motion. Response to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment 428 is due by 6/29/2015. Reply is due by 7/20/2015. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to depose incarcerated person is granted − draft order to be submitted by movant.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
435 NOTICE by Thomas Gerard Morrissey of Change of Address (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
436 NOTICE by Patrick William Morrissey of Change of Address (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
437 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion for partial summary judgment 428 UNOPPOSED (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
438 UNOPPOSED NOTICE of Motion by Michael L. Gallagher for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 437 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 7/1/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 06/26/2015)
439 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Defendants' motion for extension of time to file response 437 is granted. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 7/1/2015. Response to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment 428 is due by 7/1/2015. Reply is due by 7/22/2015.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 06/30/2015)
440 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to Rule 56 statement,, 432 (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
441 RULE 56 (b)(3)(C) additonal facts Statement by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County regarding motion for partial summary judgment 428 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
442 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for partial summary judgment 428 (Gallagher, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2015)
443 RULE 56 1(c) Statement [Response to Defendants' Additional Facts] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/22/2015)
444 RESPONSE by John Smentekin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for partial summary judgment 428 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/22/2015)
445 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for leave to file Oversize Memorandum and to Correct Typographical Errors (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Memorandum)(Flaxman,

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 34 of 47

07/23/2015 08/04/2015 08/04/2015 08/20/2015
08/20/2015
08/20/2015
08/20/2015
08/20/2015

Joel) (Entered: 07/23/2015)
446 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for leave to file 445 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/5/2015 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 07/23/2015)
447 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file oversize memorandum and to correct typographical errors 445 is granted. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 8/5/2015.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 08/04/2015)
448 RESPONSE by John Smentekin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for partial summary judgment 428 [corrected] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/04/2015)
449 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6−2−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 9/10/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/18/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
450 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6−3−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 9/10/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/18/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
451 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6−4−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 9/10/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/18/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
452 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6−5−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 9/10/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/18/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
453 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6−9−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 35 of 47

08/20/2015
12/04/2015 12/08/2015 12/18/2015 12/21/2015 12/21/2015 05/12/2016 08/11/2016 08/11/2016
08/11/2016 08/11/2016 09/16/2016 09/16/2016 09/16/2016

Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 9/10/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/18/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
454 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 6−10−14 before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Pamela S. Warren, https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Transcript−Order−Form.aspx. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 9/10/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/21/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/18/2015. (Warren, Pamela) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
455 STATUS Update Report by Darnell Cooper; Notice. (sr, ) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
456 RESPONSE by Plaintiff John Smentek to status report 455 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
457 NOTICE to Transmit Record on Appeal regarding notice of appeal 392 , notice of appeal 423 ; USCA Case No. 14−3753 and 15−1616 (sr, ) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
458 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 392 , 423 (USCA no. 14−3753 15−1616). (smm) (Entered: 12/21/2015)
459 USCA RECEIVED on 12/21/15 the long record regarding notice of appeal 392 , notice of appeal 423 . (smm) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
460 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown: All matters relating to the referral of this action having been concluded, the referral is closed and the case is returned to the assigned judge. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (et, ) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
461 MANDATE of USCA dated 8/11/2016 regarding notice of appeal 392 , notice of appeal 423 ; USCA No. 14−3753, 15−1616. No record to be returned. (td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
462 CERTIFIED copy of USCA FINAL JUDGMENT dated 7/6/2016 regarding notice of appeal 392 , notice of appeal 423 ; USCA No. 14−3753, 15−1616. The district court's judgment in Case Number 14−3753 is AFFIRMED. The appeal in Case Number 15−1616 is DISMISSED. The defendants may recover their costs in this court. (td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
463 CERTIFIED copy of OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Argued 2/11/2016; Decided 7/6/2016 in USCA case no. 14−3753, 15−1616. (td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
464 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 8/3/2016 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 392 , notice of appeal 423 ; Appellate case no. : 14−3753, 15−1616. IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing with suggestion of rehearing en banc is hereby DENIED. (td, ) (Entered: 08/12/2016)
465 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek for discovery (Motion to Allow Limited Discovery) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
466 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for discovery 465 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 9/21/2016 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/16/2016)
467 RESPONSE by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to motion for discovery 465 to be reopened (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 09/16/2016)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 36 of 47

09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/19/2016 09/20/2016 09/21/2016 10/13/2016
10/17/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016
10/18/2016 10/20/2016 11/08/2016 11/08/2016 11/15/2016 11/15/2016

468 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Anthony E. Zecchin (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
469 MOTION by Attorney Michael L. Gallagher and Michael D. Warner to withdraw as attorney for Sheriff of Cook County. No party information provided (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
470 NOTICE of Motion by Anthony E. Zecchin for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 469 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 9/28/2016 at 09:30 AM. (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
471 ORDER: Motion of Michael L. Gallagher and Michael D. Warner to withdraw as attorneys for Sheriff of Cook County 469 is granted. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 9/28/2016. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 9/20/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
472 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 9/21/2016 regarding plaintiff's motion to allow limited discovery 465 . Motion taken under advisement. Ruling will issue by mail. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/21/2016)
473 Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 10/13/2016: Plaintiffs' amended motion to divide the class into subclasses (dkt. 430) is denied. Plaintiffs' motion to divide the class into subclasses (dkt. 398) is moot. Plaintiffs' motion to allow limited discovery (dkt. 465) is denied. Plaintiffs' counsel, in cooperation with defendant's counsel, shall prepare a proposed class notice consistent with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) which shall be filed not later than November 3, 2016. The case will be called for status hearing on October 18, 2016 at 10:30 a.m., at which lead counsel for each party shall appear and be prepared to discuss the resolution of this case.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
474 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Andrea Lynn Huff (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
475 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable M. David Weisman for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: settlement conference.(mad, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 10/18/2016)
476 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: This case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Weisman to conduct a settlement conference and discuss general issues related to settlement. Status hearing 11/15/16 at 9:15 a.m. Prior to the status hearing, the Court specifically requests that counsel have available dates for all necessary parties in advance of the status hearing, and to the extent possible, consult with opposing counsel in an attempt to identify mutually convenient and feasible dates for the settlement conference. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
477 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing held on 10/18/2016 and continued to 1/10/2017 at 11:00 AM for report on settlement. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 428 is denied without prejudice.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
478 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Nicholas E Cummings (Cummings, Nicholas) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
479 MOTION by Plaintiff John Smentek to file instanter (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
480 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to file instanter 479 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/16/2016 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/08/2016)
481 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Plaintiffs' motion to file instanter 479 is granted. Order will follow. Motion is stricken from the Court's call of 11/16/2016.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
483 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. For the reasons stated on record, any grievances from October 25, 2013 through and including October 31, 2013 related to inadequate dental care shall be produced to plaintiff by November 30, 2016. Any objections by the Sheriff of Cook

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 37 of 47

11/15/2016
11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/16/2016 11/21/2016 12/01/2016 12/02/2016 12/06/2016 12/08/2016 12/13/2016 12/13/2016 12/16/2016
12/22/2016

County to the production of grievances related to dental care shall be filed by 11/23/16. Parties shall meet with the appropriate County officials to review extracting data from Cook County Health System Records for purposes of identifying class members. Status hearing set for 12/16/16 at 10:00 a.m. The parties have confirmed a settlement conference for 1/17/17 at 2:00 p.m. Plaintiff's settlement letter shall be delivered to Defendant, with a copy delivered to the Court, in chambers, on or before 1/3/17. Defendant's settlement letter shall be delivered to Plaintiff, with a copy delivered to the Court, in chambers, on or before 1/10/17. The parties can submit their respective documents by email to Proposed_Order_Weisman@ilnd.uscourts.gov. However, please note that settlement letters are not to be filed on the CM−ECF system. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
484 ORDER: Plaintiff's motion to file instanter 479 is granted. A suggestion of death of a named plaintiff, John Smentek, has been made on the record 479 . Plaintiff's request that the court appoint Dennis Smentek as special administrator for John Smentek for the purpose of prosecuting this action on behalf of the estate of John Smentek is granted. The caption of this case shall be amended to reflect substitution of Dennis Smentek, as special administrator for the estate of John Smentek, as plaintiff for John Smentek. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/15/2016. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
482 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Thomas E. Cargie (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
485 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Dennis Smentek by Kenneth N Flaxman (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
486 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Dennis Smentek by Joel A. Flaxman (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
487 MOTION by Movant Darnell Cooper to seek present and future independent status updates on the above class action (Exhibit).;Notice (mc, ) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
488 WITHDRAWING as counsel for Defendant Cook County, Illinois and substituting Maureen O'Donoghue Hannon as counsel of record (Hannon, Maureen) (Entered: 12/01/2016)
489 LETTER from Jose M. Aguayo dated 11/28/2016.(Envelope) (nsf, ) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
490 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to motion for miscellaneous relief 487 , letter 489 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
491 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by David Richard Condron (Condron, David) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
492 MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek for protective order (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
493 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for protective order 492 before Honorable M. David Weisman on 12/16/2016 at 10:00 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
494 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status/Motion hearing held. For the reason's stated on record, plaintiff's motion for protective order 492 is denied without prejudice. Parties shall send a modified order with the revisions stated in open court. The Court's order dated 11/12/16 docket no. 483 is modified as follows: Parties are not directed to file settlement letters; instead by 1/10/17 parties shall file a joint status report addressing the issues where parties agree and disagree. If plaintiff would like to send a settlement letter for defendants and the Court to view they are granted to do so, but defendants are not required to file a response. Status hearing/Settlement conference set for 1/17/17 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
495 QUALIFIED HIPAA PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 12/22/2016. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 12/22/2016)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 38 of 47

01/03/2017 01/04/2017 01/04/2017 01/09/2017 01/10/2017 01/17/2017
01/24/2017 01/25/2017 02/06/2017 02/14/2017 02/16/2017
03/03/2017

496 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 1/10/2017 is reset for 2/7/2017 at 11:00 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
497 ORDER: Darnell Cooper's motion to seek present and future independent status updates on the above class action 487 is granted insofar as the Clerk is directed to mail a copy of documents 494 and 496 to Darnell Cooper, Inmate No. N−719947, c/o Hill Correctional Center, P.O. Box 1327 Galesburg, IL 61401. Other status inquiries should be made to class counsel. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/4/2017. Mailed notice (nsf, ) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
MAILED Mailed copy of documents 494 and 496 to Darnell Cooper, Inmate No. N−719947, c/o Hill Correctional Center, P.O. Box 1327 Galesburg, IL 61401. (nsf, ) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
499 NOTICE by Darnell Cooper of Change of Address.(Envelope post marked 01/06/2017) (nsf, ) (Entered: 01/11/2017)
498 STATUS Report [JOINT] by Dennis Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
500 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Initial settlement conference held on 1/17/17. Plaintiff's counsel, and defense counsel for Cook County and Sheriff Dart appeared. Progress was made in identifying additional information necessary to reach a potential settlement in this matter. Based on the issues raised during the settlement conference, the parties are to consider additional data that would be necessary and an appropriate sample size to estimate potential settlement values. Status hearing set for 1/25/17 at 11:00 a.m. Parties should be prepared to discuss the above information, and set an additional settlement hearing date. The Court thanks counsel for their efforts to date at resolving this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
501 STATUS Report by Dennis Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
502 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. The Court and parties had a brief status that converted into a settlement conference. Settlement conference held. Status and continued settlement conference set for 2/16/17 at 2:00 p.m. The Court thanks counsel for their continued efforts at attempting to resolve this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
503 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Status hearing of 2/7/2017 stricken and reset for 3/7/2017 at 11:00 AM for report on settlement.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
504 STATUS Report by Dennis Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
505 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Settlement conference held. All parties represented by counsel. Based on progress made during this settlement conference, a subsequent settlement conference is appropriate. To facilitate further settlement discussions, the Court orders as follows: 1) All future submissions related to settlement discussions (including but not limited to "status reports" or similar filings) should be sent to this Court's proposed order box at Proposed_Order_Weisman@ilnd.uscourts.gov, and not filed with the Clerk's Office (see Local Rule 83.5); 2) County defendants, if such production is available, shall produce to plaintiff's counsel a spreadsheet of 2012 individuals requesting dental care that includes nurse's comments, dental records, and medical records in order to provide plaintiff's counsel with electronic data to evaluate dental care provided; 3) by 3/2/17, and after all parties consult with any statistician (or similarly qualified individual) whom parties wish to use for purposes of settlement discussions, parties shall submit agreed possible dates and times for the next settlement conference with the requirement that any statistician the parties wish to consult must be available by phone for the next settlement conference. Status hearing set for 3/15/17 at 9:15 a.m. for docket management purposes, and for the parties to report on the progress of the above−noted issues. The Court thanks counsel for their continued efforts at resolving this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
506 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Status hearing of 3/7/2017 stricken. A new status hearing will be set after a settlement conference date is

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 39 of 47

03/14/2017 03/30/2017
05/12/2017 05/30/2017 06/01/2017 07/06/2017 08/10/2017 08/10/2017 08/14/2017 08/17/2017

scheduled before the Honorable M. David Weisman.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
507 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: At the parties request, the status hearing set for 3/15/17 is stricken and reset to 3/30/17 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
508 ORDER: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. For the reasons stated on record, Defendants shall complete the production of 250 sample potential class members (and requested accompanying data as discussed in open court) from the 2012 population by 4/27/17. The random selection process of potential class members should encompass all impacted jail divisions in a manner that is agreed upon by all parties. If production is not completed by 4/27/17, Defendants shall file a motion for an extension of time, with an explanation as to issues that have created the delay. The Court encourages defendants to make a rolling production, if possible. By 5/25/17, plaintiffs shall complete their review of provided data, identify any randomly identified potential class members who do not meet the class definition, and seek a replacement potential class member for the random sample analysis. If unanticipated problems arise, the Court encourages the parties to work them out without Court intervention. If the parties are unable to resolve a particular issue, the parties must file a motion as soon as practicable to address any disagreement (while still complying with Local Rule 37.2 (meet and confer requirements)). In other words, the Court does not want any disputes to sit dormant and unaddressed until the next status hearing. Status hearing set for 6/1/17 at 1:30 p.m. The Court continues to appreciate all counsel's efforts at working through the issues involved in attempting to resolve this matter. Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 3/30/2017. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
509 STATEMENT by Darnell Cooper, Notice. (Exhibits)(Envelope postmarked 5/8/2017) (pk, ) (Entered: 05/17/2017)
510 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: At the parties' request, the status hearing set for 6/1/17 will begin at 9:45 a.m., rather than at 1:30 p.m. (PLEASE NOTE TIME CHANGE.) Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
511 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Plaintiff's settlement demand letter shall be provided to Defendants by 6/8/17. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's settlement demand letter by 7/7/17. Parties shall provide the Court with an original and redline version of the demand letters prior to the next status. Status hearing set for 7/26/17 at 1:00 p.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
512 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman:At the parties' request and by agreement, Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's settlement demand letter by 8/7/17. Parties shall provide the Court with an original and redline version of the demand letters via email at Proposed_Order_Weisman@ilnd.uscourts.gov prior to the next status. Status hearing set for 7/26/17 is stricken and reset to 8/23/17 at 1:00 p.m.Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
513 MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County to substitute attorney (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
514 NOTICE of Motion by Andrea Lynn Huff for presentment of motion to substitute attorney 513 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/16/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
515 ORDER: Defendants' motion to withdraw counsel 513 is granted. Michael Gallagher, Thomas Cargie, David Condron, Maureen Hannon and Sandra Navarro are withdrawn as counsel for defendants. Andrea Huff is given leave to file her appearance on behalf of defendants. Motion is stricken from the Courts call of 8/16/2017. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/14/2017. Mailed notice (jk, ) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
516 MOTION by Darnell Cooper for a status update and to compel the defendants to respond to plaintiff settlement letter (Envelope postmark 08/14/2017). (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing) (jk, ) (Entered: 08/22/2017)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 40 of 47

08/23/2017
09/08/2017
09/21/2017 09/22/2017 09/22/2017 09/22/2017 09/22/2017 09/22/2017
09/25/2017 10/23/2017
10/24/2017 10/24/2017 10/27/2017 10/27/2017 10/27/2017 10/27/2017

517 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Status hearing held. Settlement conference held. The Court has provided parties with a proposed valuation for settlement purposes. Status hearing set for 9/22/17 at 9:00 a.m. Counsel are encouraged to discuss the proposal provided by the Court, and consider modifications and adjustments proposed by counsel in an attempt to resolve this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
518 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: The motion of Darnell Cooper for a status update and to compel the defendants to respond to plaintiff's settlement letter 516 is denied. Class members should direct their inquiries to class counsel, Kenneth N. Flaxman, 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 201, Chicago, Illinois 60604−6107 or Thomas G. Morrissey, 10150 S. Western Ave., Suite Rear, Chicago, IL 60643.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 09/08/2017)
519 WITHDRAWING Andrea L. Huff, Anthony E. Zecchin, and Nicholas E. Cummings as counsel for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County and substituting Elaine Cindy Davenport as counsel of record (Davenport, Elaine) (Entered: 09/21/2017)
520 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Gerald Michael Dombrowski (Dombrowski, Gerald) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
521 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Yifan Xu Sanchez (Sanchez, Yifan) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
ORAL MOTION for leave to file an appearance on behalf of the remaining defendants. (ao,) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
ORAL MOTION for additional time to seek approval of settlement. (ao,) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
523 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Defense counsel oral motion for leave to file an appearance on behalf of the remaining defendants is granted. Defendants oral motion for additional time to seek approval of settlement is granted. Status hearing set for 10/23/17 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
522 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Shawnte Miaundra Raines (Raines, Shawnte) (Entered: 09/25/2017)
524 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Defense counsel advised the Court that they have not yet received the full record of this case from the State's Attorney's Office. The Court orders all Assistant State's Attorneys who have an appearance on file in this matter to appear at the next status. While the Court is mindful of the State's Attorney's authority to manage litigation affecting Cook County and its components, considering the age of this case, its history, and the substantial progress made towards resolution of this matter, the Court has significant concerns that the progress towards resolution will be adversely affected if some semblance of continuity of counsel is not maintained. Status hearing set for 10/27/17 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
525 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Andrea Lynn Huff Lead attorney (Huff, Andrea) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
526 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Cathy McNeil Stein (Stein, Cathy) (Entered: 10/24/2017)
527 MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to set trial schedule (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
528 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 527 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/8/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
ORAL MOTION by Attorney Cathy McNeil Stein to withdraw as attorney for Cook County, Illinois. No party information provided. (ao,) (Docket Text Modified by Chambers Staff on 10/31/17) (Entered: 10/31/2017)
ORAL MOTION to correct the docket and strike Andrea Huff as counsel for Sheriff of Cook County. (ao,) (Entered: 10/31/2017)

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10/27/2017
11/08/2017
11/09/2017 12/01/2017
12/07/2017
12/08/2017 12/08/2017 12/11/2017 12/13/2017 12/14/2017

529 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Counsel for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois advised the Court that they are not interested in a settlement conference. Defendants' oral motion to withdraw Cathy McNeil Stein as counsel for Cook County, Illinois is granted without objection. Defendants' oral motion to correct the docket and strike Andrea Huff as counsel for Sheriff of Cook County is granted without objection. Status hearing set for 12/7/17 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 10/31/2017)
531 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 11/8/2017. Plaintiffs' motion to set trial schedule 527 is granted. Jury Trial set for 4/30/2018 at 09:00 AM. Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/14/2018 at 02:00 PM. Status hearing set for 12/19/2017 at 11:00 AM. The case is currently under referral to the Honorable M. David Weisman. Referral of the case to the Honorable M. David Weisman is expanded to include the following: preparation of all pretrial materials, including scheduling filings of motions in limine; rulings on all motions in limine; and scheduling filings of all other pretrial materials, including final pretrial order. The parties should consider consenting to the jurisdiction of the Honorable M. David Weisman for trial.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
530 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Chaka M. Patterson (Patterson, Chaka) (Entered: 11/09/2017)
532 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on November 8, 2017 before the Honorable Joan Humphrey − Mag Lefkow. Order Number: 28927. Court Reporter Contact Information: Blanca I. Lara, 219 South Dearborn, Room 2504, Chicago, Illinois 60604, blanca_lara@ilnd.uscourts.gov. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 12/22/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/2/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/1/2018. (Lara, Blanca) (Entered: 12/01/2017)
533 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Defendants' rebuttals to all supplemental expert reports shall be filed by 1/12/18. Status hearing set for 12/14/17 at 9:30 a.m. to address issues Plaintiffs have identified as relevant to pretrial proceedings. Prior to the hearing, parties shall send case citations they believe to be useful regarding the standard of proof issue to the Court's proposed email box (Proposed_Order_Weisman@ilnd.uscourts.gov), with a copy to all counsel. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
534 MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to appoint additional trial counsel (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
535 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 534 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/13/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/08/2017)
536 RESPONSE by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, Dennis Smentek to MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to appoint additional trial counsel 534 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/11/2017)
537 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 12/13/2017. Plaintiff's motion, by Thomas Morrissey, to appoint additional trial counsel 534 is denied.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
538 ORDER: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. The Court sets the following pretrial schedule: Plaintiffs' initial pretrial order shall be provided to defendants by 1/29/18. Defendants shall respond by 2/13/18. Parties are to meet and confer as to any disputed issues by 2/15/18 in an attempt to resolve those disputes. Plaintiffs are responsible for filing the final proposed pretrial order by 2/16/18. Motions in limine shall be filed by 2/13/18. Responses due 2/27/18. Motion hearing set for 3/8/18 at 12:00 p.m. Evidentiary depositions of two class members who plaintiffs wish to present at trial, but who are currently incarcerated, must be completed by 2/2/18. By 2/16/18, Plaintiffs must present to defendants portions of the depositions they intend to offer

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 42 of 47

12/17/2017 12/17/2017 12/18/2017 12/19/2017 12/19/2017 12/19/2017 01/17/2018 01/17/2018
01/17/2018

into evidence. Defendants' objections to proposed deposition evidence as well as requested inclusion of testimony (see e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 106) shall be filed by 2/23/18. Plaintiffs' reply, including responses to defendants' objections, and objections to defendants' requested inclusions, shall be filed by 3/1/18. Ruling on deposition testimony to be included in evidence set for 3/8/18 at 12:00 p.m. By 3/2/18, Plaintiffs shall have secured a vendor to edit the video depositions with the understanding that the edited testimony must be ready for trial on 4/30/18. Defendants shall depose Plaintiffs' expert(s) by 2/2/18. Plaintiffs shall depose Defendants' expert(s) by 2/16/18. Any Daubert motions shall be filed by 2/23/18. Responses shall be filed by 3/5/18. Motion hearing set for 3/8/18 at 12:00 p.m. By 1/12/18, the County shall update its Rule 26 disclosures to include particularly any opinion evidence offered by current County employees as to constitutional standards they consider applicable and the basis for that opinion. The Court notes that during the status hearing there was substantive discussions as to whether a County employee who would testify as to the dental services provided at Cook County Jail during the relevant time period satisfied constitutional standards was an opinion witness, and whether such anticipated testimony was subject to pre−trial disclosure. The Court notes that Fed. R. Evid. 701 defines the scope of opinion testimony to which a non−expert witness may testify. The Court further notes that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) controls disclosure of witnesses who would testify pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703, and 705. This rule does not distinguish between retained and non−retained experts. Thus, to the extent the County is planning on presenting a current employee to provide opinion testimony at trial (that exceeds opinion testimony allowed by Rule 701), such testimony should be disclosed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2). The Court is not making a substantive ruling as no issue was presented to the Court for ruling. Rather, the Court is clarifying its view on the applicable controlling law in this area. Plaintiffs shall update their Rule 26 disclosures by 1/12/18 as well. Plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate shall be filed with the District Court by 12/19/18. Response shall be filed by 1/19/18. Reply shall be filed by 1/29/18. Status hearing set for 1/17/18 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 12/14/2017. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 12/15/2017)
539 MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to reset trial date (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/17/2017)
540 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Gerard Morrissey for presentment of motion to reset 539 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 12/19/2017 at 11:00 AM. (Morrissey, Thomas) (Entered: 12/17/2017)
541 RESPONSE by Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, Dennis Smentekin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to reset trial date 539 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 12/18/2017)
542 REPLY by Dennis Smentek to response in opposition to motion 541 (Morrissey, Patrick) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
543 MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, Dennis Smentek to bifurcate damages and liability (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/19/2017)
544 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Motion hearing held on 12/19/2017. Motion of plaintiff's attorney Thomas G. Morrissey to reset trial date 539 is denied. Status hearing held on 12/19/2017. Kenneth Flaxman is appointed as lead counsel.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
ORAL MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate 543 , ORAL MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook County for leave to depose Greg Basharis and Sheila Ferguson. (ao,) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
ORAL MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, Dennis Smentek for leave to depose Dr. Thomas Prozorovsky, DDS, ORAL MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, Dennis Smentek for leave to depose incarcerated individuals (Larry Williams (M19087) and Thomas Tuduj (M05570)). (ao,) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
545 ORDER: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Defendants' oral motion for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate 543 is granted. Response

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 43 of 47

01/19/2018

shall be filed by 1/26/18. Reply shall be filed by 2/5/18. Defendants' oral motion for leave to depose Greg Basharis and Sheila Ferguson is granted. Plaintiffs' counsel shall provide identifying information to defense counsel as to Mr. Basharis and Ms. Ferguson by 1/19/18 and produce the deponents by 2/16/18 at a mutually agreeable time. If Plaintiffs' counsel does not produce Mr. Basharis or Ms. Ferguson for a deposition, Plaintiffs may not call these individuals as trial witnesses. Plaintiffs' oral motion for leave to depose Dr. Thomas Prozorovsky, DDS, is granted over Defendants' objection. Defendants agree to produce Dr. Thomas Prozorovsky for a deposition by 2/16/18 at a mutually agreeable time and place. Plaintiffs' oral motion for leave to depose incarcerated individuals (Larry Williams (M19087) and Thomas Tuduj (M05570)) is granted without objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B). The Court resets the following dates: By 2/23/18, Plaintiffs must present to Defendants portions of the depositions they intend to offer into evidence. Defendants' objections to proposed deposition evidence as well as requested inclusion of testimony (see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 106) shall be filed by 3/2/18. Plaintiffs' reply, including responses to Defendants' objections, and objections to Defendants' requested inclusions, shall be filed by 3/8/18. Ruling on deposition testimony to be included in evidence set for 3/12/18 at 10:00 a.m. Defendants shall depose Plaintiffs' expert(s) by 2/9/18. Plaintiffs shall depose Defendants' expert(s) by 2/23/18. Any Daubert motions shall be filed by 2/23/18. Responses shall be filed by 3/5/18. Parties should note that if they believe a Daubert motion is appropriate, they need to ensure that necessary depositions are completed sufficiently in advance of the 2/23/18 date to allow for appropriate briefing on the issue. Motion hearing set for 3/12/18 at 10:00 a.m. (ALL OTHER DATES SET IN ORDER NO. 538 REMAIN.) Status hearing set for 2/21/18 at 10:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 1/17/2018. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
546 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on September 22, 2017, before the Honorable M. David Weisman. Order Number: 29126. Court Reporter Contact Information: Laura LaCien, 312−408−5032, laura_lacien@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

01/19/2018

Redaction Request due 2/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/20/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/19/2018. (Lacien, Laura) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
547 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on October 23, 2017, before the Honorable M. David Weisman. Order Number: 29126. Court Reporter Contact Information: Laura LaCien, 312−408−5032, laura_lacien@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

01/19/2018

Redaction Request due 2/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/20/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/19/2018. (Lacien, Laura) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
548 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on October 27, 2017, before the Honorable M. David Weisman. Order Number: 29126. Court Reporter Contact Information: Laura LaCien, 312−408−5032, laura_lacien@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 44 of 47

the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

01/22/2018 01/26/2018 01/29/2018
01/29/2018 01/30/2018 02/02/2018
02/08/2018
02/21/2018

Redaction Request due 2/9/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/20/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/19/2018. (Lacien, Laura) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
549 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: At the parties request, a settlement conference is set for 1/29/18 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
550 RESPONSE by Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Malcolm Patton, Melvin Phillips, Frank Powicki, Rodell Sanders, Dennis Smentek to bifurcate damages and liability 543 (Dombrowski, Gerald) (Entered: 01/26/2018)
551 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Settlement conference held. Plaintiffs have exchanged a final settlement demand. Defendants requested additional time to consider this demand. Status hearing set for 2/9/18 at 9:15 a.m. At plaintiffs' request, the final pretrial order schedule is modified as follows: Plaintiffs' initial pretrial order shall be provided to defendants by 2/5/18. Defendants shall respond by 2/20/18. Parties are to meet and confer as to any disputed issues by 2/22/18 in an attempt to resolve those disputes. Plaintiffs are responsible for filing the final proposed pretrial order by 2/24/18. All other dates to stand. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
552 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Status hearing set for 2/9/18 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
553 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Due to a clerical error, the status hearing set for 2/9/18 is stricken and reset to 2/2/18 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
554 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 2/8/18 at 10:30 a.m. to allow the parties' time to continue settlement discussions. Any pretrial dates in place from 2/2/18 through 2/8/18 are stayed. If the parties cannot reach agreement on the few remaining settlement issues that remain outstanding, the parties are reminded that the trial date in place will not be adjusted. Thus, the pretrial schedule will become increasingly condensed to comport with the trial date. The Court thanks counsel for their reasonableness and professionalism in nearly resolving this matter. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
555 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. At the parties' joint request, status hearing converted to further settlement conference to address lingering issues related to proposed settlement terms. Proposed settlement has been reached between the parties, subject to the district court's approval. After consulting with the district court, the following dates are now controlling: Preliminary approval hearing is set for Tuesday, May 1, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. before Judge Lefkow. Fairness hearing is set for Thursday, August 16, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. before Judge Lefkow. Status hearing before this Court is set for Thursday, February 21, 2018 at 10:00 a.m., at which time the parties should be prepared to discuss the status of current address availability / accessibility through the Sheriff's data management system for potential class members. All pre−trial dates are stricken. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/12/2018)
556 ORDER: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court issues a rule to show cause against the Cook County Sheriff's Department for its failure to present "the status of current address availability/accessibility through the Sheriff's data management system for potential class members." (See Dkt. 555 .) As was made clear on the record, the purpose of today's hearing was to discuss the means and ability to implement the parties' settlement agreement. Counsel for the Sheriff's Department raised concerns about this process at the last hearing. Sheriff's counsel was instructed to be prepared to discuss these concerns at today's status hearing. Id. Instead, the Sheriff's lead counsel sent a junior associate, who, while extremely professional and respectful, was not prepared to address the fundamental issues raised by Sheriff's counsel at the last status hearing. From the Courts perspective, appearing

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 45 of 47

02/22/2018
02/23/2018
02/28/2018 03/08/2018 03/21/2018 03/30/2018 04/02/2018

counsel's inability to address these issues was the result of lead counsel's failure to dutifully follow−up on the issues at hand. This is unacceptable to the Court. This case is approaching a ten−year anniversary mark. The parties and the Court have invested significant resources in litigating, and ultimately reaching a settlement in this case, subject to the district court's required review and approval of its terms. The Sheriff's Department, and more particularly its counsel, cannot claim that there may be insurmountable hurdles in effectuating the settlement terms, and then do little or nothing to determine whether these "insurmountable hurdles" are real or imagined. For these reasons, the Court has issued a Rule to Show Cause. The Court also orders (1) the Director of the IT department at the Sheriff's Department, (2) a representative from the Sheriff's Department's General Counsel's office, and (3) the person most knowledgeable as to the retention since 1/1/07 of electronic records for detainees through the Jail Management System or similar database, be present at the next hearing. Rule to show cause/status hearing set for 2/23/18 at 12:00 p.m. The Court notes that if the Director of the IT department is unable to appear, Sheriff's counsel may email the Courtroom Deputy, Alyssia Owens, at Alyssia_Owens@ilnd.uscourts.gov (copying all counsel) with an explanation as to why he/she is unavailable and the Court will entertain waiving his/her presence. Despite the circumstances outlined in this order, the Court looks forward to working with all counsel in continuing to move this case forward to a full resolution, and thanks counsel for their continued diligence in this matter. Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 2/21/2018. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
557 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: The Court has received a communication from counsel for the Cook County Sheriff's Department indicating that the requested information at issue in the Court's most recent order is obtainable, and will be provided to class counsel forthwith. The Court sincerely appreciates the response from the Cook County Sheriff. In order to ensure that this matter continues to move forward towards implementation of the agreed terms of settlement (subject to the district court's approval), the status hearing set for 2/23/18 will remain. The Court, sua sponte, modifies its order requiring the presence of certain personnel from the Sheriff's Office for this status hearing. Based on the representations made to the Court, the director of the IT department for the Sheriff's Department, a representative from the General Counsel's Office of the Sheriff's Department, and an individual most knowledgeable regarding maintenance of electronic records during the relevant time frame need not appear. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
558 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Rule to Show Cause/Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Plaintiffs acknowledge receipt of the requested information concerning potential class members. The Rule to Show Cause issued against the Cook County Sheriff's Department (Dkt. 556 ) is withdrawn based on compliance with the Court's 2/21/18 order. Status hearing set for 3/21/18 at 10:00 a.m. to provide an update on the finalization of documents memorializing the settlement agreement. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
559 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: At the parties' request, the status hearing set for 3/21/18 will begin at 2:00 p.m., rather than at 10:00 a.m. (PLEASE NOTE TIME CHANGE.) Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 02/28/2018)
560 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Proposed settlement having been reached between the parties, pretrial conference date of 3/14/2018 and trial date of 4/30/2018 are stricken.Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
561 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 4/23/18 at 1:00 p.m. to provide an update on the finalization of documents memorializing the settlement agreement. As of todays hearing, the settlement process remains on track. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
562 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County, Illinois by Francis J. Catania (Catania, Francis) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
563 WITHDRAWING Andrea Lynn Huff as counsel for Defendant Cook County, Illinois and substituting Anthony E. Zecchin as counsel of record (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/02/2018)

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04/06/2018 04/20/2018 04/23/2018 04/30/2018
05/01/2018 05/01/2018 05/02/2018 05/02/2018
05/04/2018
06/12/2018 07/13/2018 08/17/2018 08/17/2018

564 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: On the Court's own motion and by agreement of the parties, the status hearing set for 4/23/18 will begin at 10:15 a.m., rather than at 1:00 p.m. (PLEASE NOTE TIME CHANGE.) Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
565 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow:Preliminary approval hearing is reset from 5/1/2018 to 5/2/2018 at 10:00 AM. before Judge Lefkow. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
566 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Parties are reviewing the proposed written settlement agreement. Status hearing set for 4/30/18 at 9:15 a.m. to confirm the settlement process remains on track. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
567 MINUTE entry before the Honorable M. David Weisman: Magistrate Judge Status hearing held. Parties reported that they have reached agreement on all necessary forms for class notice and related issues. With agreement of the defendants, the Court met with plaintiffs' counsel following the status hearing to discuss issues tangentially connected to settlement, as these issues relate to plaintiffs' counsel's compensation. Plaintiffs' counsel requested a further meeting to discuss these issues, which the Court will entertain on a one−time basis if requested. As reflected on the record, and as the Court finds following the meeting with plaintiffs' counsel, the issues that remain unresolved are tangentially connected to this matter, and these issues do not alter the conclusion that all material terms relating to settlement have been agreed upon, subject to the district court's final approval. All matters relating to the referral of this case having been resolved, this matter is returned to the District Judge. Referral terminated. Mailed notice (ao,) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
568 MOTION by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to approve consent judgment [preliminary approval] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
569 ATTORNEY Appearance for Movant Percy Rounds by Alexander James Kasparie (Kasparie, Alexander) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
570 NOTICE by Dennis Smentek [of filing of corrected agreement and notice] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 05/02/2018)
571 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion hearing held on 5/2/2018. Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement 568 is granted without objection − draft order to follow. Movants are to submit their proposed order to chambers via the proposed order mailbox on Judge Lefkow's web page on the District Court's website. Fairness hearing is reset from 8/16/2018 to 8/21/2018 at 10:30 AM. Mailed notice (mad, ) (Entered: 05/02/2018)
572 ORDER Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/4/2018: This court grants preliminary approval to the settlement and finds that the terms of the settlement, as embodied in the Class Settlement Agreement, are sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to allow dissemination of the Notice of the Hearing on Settlement of Class Action to the Class. This court authorizes the parties to provide notice, claim forms, and opt−out forms by first class mail in the form attached to the Motion as Exhibits 2 (as corrected in ECF No. 570), 3 and 4. The Court sets May 31, 2018, as the date for mailing class notice and July 31, 2018, as the deadline for responding to the notice. The Court sets a fairness hearing in this matter on August 21, 2018 at 10:30 a.m.Mailed notice(mad, ) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
573 LETTER from Raymond Cathey #M48275 (Exhibits) (Document attached has no case number) (Envelope postmark 06/08/2018). (jk, ) (Entered: 06/14/2018)
574 LETTER from Henry West dated 07/06/2018 (Document attached has no case number). (jk, ) (Entered: 07/17/2018)
575 MOTION by Attorney Alexander J. Kasparie to withdraw as attorney for Percy Rounds. No party information provided (Kasparie, Alexander) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
576 NOTICE of Motion by Alexander James Kasparie for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 575 before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/22/2018 at 09:30 AM. (Kasparie, Alexander) (Entered: 08/17/2018)

Case: 1:09-cv-529 As of: 05/05/2020 01:51 PM CDT 47 of 47

08/17/2018 08/20/2018
08/21/2018
08/22/2018 09/11/2018 09/24/2018 10/31/2018 11/06/2018 12/12/2018 12/27/2018
01/22/2019 02/14/2019 10/29/2019 10/29/2019
10/29/2019
10/29/2019 10/31/2019 11/06/2019

577 MEMORANDUM by Dennis Smentek in support of proposed settlement (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
578 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion to withdraw as attorney 575 is granted. Attorney Alexander James Kasparie terminated. Hearing is stricken from the Court's call of 8/22/2018. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 08/20/2018)
579 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Fairness Hearing held. The class action settlement is approved. Draft order to be submitted. The parties shall file a written status report on payments by 10/31/2018. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
580 ORDER Approving Class Action Settlement signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 8/22/2018. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
581 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Motion to bifurcate 543 is terminated as moot. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 09/11/2018)
582 LETTER from Marcus Deloney dated 9/16/18. (Envelope postmarked 9/19/18) (Received for docketing on 10/1/18) (tt, ) (Entered: 10/01/2018)
583 STATUS Report on Payments by Dennis Smentek (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
584 LETTER from Carlos Beltran dated 10/20/2018. (Exhibit) (Envelope postmarked 11/1/18; institution mail room). (mma, ) (Entered: 11/06/2018)
585 CLASS MEMBER Jimmie Dale Miller #K79113 response and objections to settlement payout. (Exhibit) (tt, ) (Entered: 12/14/2018)
586 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow: Pursuant to the Order approving class action settlement 580 , this case is settled and dismissed with prejudice. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
587 LETTER from Richard Robinson. (Envelope dated 1/16/19) (ek, ) (Entered: 01/22/2019)
588 NOTICE by Jimmie Dale Miller of Change of Address. (mma, ) (Entered: 02/14/2019)
589 RECEIVED Complaint and no copies by Daniel Dotson; Notice. (Exhibits) (Attachments: # 1 (Envelope postmarked 10/22/2019)(pj, ) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
590 APPLICATION for leave to proceed in forma pauperis by Daniel Dotson. (Exhibits) (Envelope postmarked 10/22/2019) (pj, ) Modified on 10/30/2019 (pj, ). (Entered: 10/30/2019)
591 AFFIDAVIT Accompanying Motion for Permission to Appeal In Forma Pauperis by Daniel Dotson. (Envelope postmarked 10/22/2019) (pj, ) Modified on 10/30/2019 (pj, ). (Entered: 10/30/2019)
592 MOTION for attorney representation by Daniel Dotson. (Envelope postmarked 10/22/2019) (pj, ) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
594 RESPONSE by Plaintiff Dennis Smentek to received complaint 589 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/31/2019)
595 ORDER: Daniel L. Dotson (K53118) has submitted several documents and "motions" 589 , 590 , 591 . 592 , 593 regarding additional settlement proceeds he was informed he was to receive in this matter because class counsel learned that he had submitted a grievance. Class counsel has filed a response 594 indicating that he "cured that problem" by transferring the additional $150 to Mr. Dotson's commissary account. Accordingly, Mr. Dotson's "motions" 590 , 591 . 592 are denied as moot and the matter remains closed. The Clerk is directed to mail Mr. Dotson a copy of this order at Danville Correctional Center. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 11/6/2019. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 11/06/2019)