Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 1 Filed 11/18/11 Page 1 of 37

C'

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

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CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR HOUSING CENTER;

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C;U: ;L\

FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF NORTHERN ALABAMA;

CENTER FOR FAIR HOUSING, INC.; and
JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Civil Action File No.
a. Il-cu °2 V)iJ-CZ

Plaintffs, V.
JULIE MAGEE, in her official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner, and

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND FOR DAMAGES
CLASS ACTION

WILLIAM HARPER, in his official capacity as Elmore County Revenue Commissioner,

Defendants.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1

This is a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by

Plaintiffs Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama,

Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #1, and John Doe #2 for violations of the federal Fair

Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Supremacy Clause and Due Process Clause of the

U.S. Constitution.

2. Plaintiff John Doe #1 is an undocumented immigrant from Mexico. He owns and

resides in a manufactured home in Elmore County, Alabama, along with his partner, five-year-

old U.S.-citizen son, and sixteen-year-old nephew.

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Plaintiff John Doe #2 is an undocumented immigrant from Mexico. Like Plaintiff Doe #1, Plaintiff Doe #2 owns and resides in a manufactured home in Elmore County, along with his partner, his five-year-old U.S.-citizen son, and his partner's parents and three brothers.
4. This action is brought against Defendant Julie Magee in her official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner and Defendant William Harper in his official capacity as the Revenue Commissioner of Elmore County, Alabama.
5. Section 30 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535 (commonly referred to as "HB 56"), forbids "[a]n alien not lawfully present in the United States" from entering into or attempting to enter into "any transaction. [with] the state or a political subdivision of the state," with the sole exception of obtaining a marriage license.' It further forbids any person from entering into or attempting to enter into such a transaction on behalf of an "alien not lawfully present in the United States." An individual found in violation of Section 30 can be convicted of a Class C felony and subjected to up to ten years' imprisonment.
6. Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code requires that all individuals who own, maintain, or keep a manufactured home in Alabama engage in a "transaction" with the State, within the meaning of Section 30 of HB 56. Specifically, by no later than November30 of each calendar year, any such person must pay an annual registration fee and display a current identification decal in a conspicuous location on the outside of her manufactured home. Section 40-12-255 imposes progressive fines and penalties for non-compliance, including imprisonment.
A copy of the enrolled Bill is attached as Attachment 1. HB 56 has not been codified yet but is unofficially reported in electronic databases at Ala. Code § 31-13-1 et seq. (West 2011) and Ala. Code § 31-9C-1 etseq. (Michie/LexisNexis 2011).
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7. Defendants Magee and Harper have adopted and implemented a policy, pursuant to the requirements of Section 30 of HB 56, to reject annual manufactured home registration payments from, and thus deny identification decals to, individuals who are unable to demonstrate U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. In other words, Defendants' policy treats the act of complying with Alabama Code § 40-12-255 as a "business transaction" under HB 56 Section 30.
Until the passage and implementation of Section 30 of HB 56, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 were allowed to register their manufactured homes pursuant to Alabama Code Section 40-12-255.
9. Defendants' policy for enforcing HB 56 Section 30 makes it impossible for Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to make the annual registration payment and obtain current identification decals for their manufactured homes, as they are required to do under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 by no later than November 30, 2011. If Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 attempt to pay their annual registration fees in order to obtain current identification decals, they could face Class C felony charges for attempting to enter into a transaction with the State, in violation of HB 56 Section 30. But if Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 do not pay the annual registration fee and do not display a current identification decal by November 30, 2011, they will face fines, penalties, and Class C misdemeanor charges for violating the Manufactured Homes statute, Alabama Code Sec. 40-12-255.
10. Defendants' policy of enforcing HB 56 Section 30 further makes it impossible for Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to move their manufactured homes on public roads in Alabama. Under subsection (j) of the Manufactured Homes Statute, a permit is required to make such a move, yet any effort to obtain a moving permit would also constitute a "business transaction"
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within the meaning of Section 30 of HB 56. Failure to obtain a moving permit before moving a manufactured home on public roads is punishable as a Class C misdemeanor under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(j)(4).
11. Section 27 of HB 56 makes unenforceable in Alabama courts virtually any contract that takes more than 24 hours to complete and is entered into where the parties know or should have known that one of them is a non-U.S. citizen who lacks proof of lawful immigration status.
12. In the event of eviction from the manufactured home parks where they currently reside, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 may therefore be forced to abandon their homes because under HB 56 they cannot lawfully move them, and any sale contract may be unenforceable.
13. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 bring this case on behalf of themselves and a Class of similarly situated residents of Alabama who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes and lack proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
14. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 also bring this case on behalf of themselves and a Subclass of similarly situated Latino residents of Alabama who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes and lack proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
15. Defendants' policy of enforcing Section 30 so as to refuse annual registration payments from and to deny manufactured home identification decals to individuals who cannot demonstrate U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status will cause immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 and their families, as well as to similarly situated individuals who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes in Alabama.
16. Defendants' policy of enforcing Section 30 50 as to refuse to accept annual registration payments from, and to deny manufactured home identification decals to, members of

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the Class and Subclass has injured and will continue to injure organizational Plaintiffs Central Alabama Fair Housing Action Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, and Center for Fair Housing, Inc. These Plaintiffs have already diverted and will be forced to continue to divert scarce resources away from their core activities in order to conduct education, outreach, and advocacy on behalf of communities throughout Alabama concerning the impact of HB 56 Section 30 on immigrants who live in manufactured homes and who face fines, penalties, and the threat of criminal prosecution if they cannot pay their annual registration fees and receive the required identification decals.
17. Defendants' policy pursuant to HB 56 of refusing annual registration payments from and denying current identification decals to individuals who live in manufactured homes and who cannot show proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status violates the Fair Housing Act, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1 343(a)(4), 2201, 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). 19. Venue is proper in this District and Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 81 and 139 1(b). Defendant Magee and Defendant Harper reside in this State; Defendant Harper is employed in this District and Division as a County official; and Defendant Magee is employed in this District and Division as a State official. A substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims have occurred and/or will occur in this District and Division.
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PARTIES Organizational Plaintiffs 20. The three organizational Plaintiffs collectively provide fair housing services in nearly every county within Alabama. Their core activities include advocating for equal housing opportunities, assisting victims of housing discrimination, and enforcing compliance with the federal Fair Housing Act and related fair housing laws. 21. Plaintiff Central Alabama Fair Housing Center ("CAFHC") is an Alabama non-profit corporation, with its principal place of business in Montgomery, Alabama. Founded in 1995, CAFHC's mission is to promote understanding of the Fair Housing Act and to enforce the Fair Housing Act. It advances that mission through educational activities including speaking to community groups and individuals most likely to experience housing discrimination, training housing providers in fair housing issues, and conducting intake and investigations. 22. Plaintiff CAFHC provides fair housing services in the following Alabama Counties: Autauga, Barbour, Bullock, Butler, Chambers, Chilton, Coffee, Coosa, Covington, Crenshaw, Dale, Dallas, Elmore, Geneva, Greene, Hale, Henry, Houston, Lee, Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Montgomery, Perry, Pike, Russell, Sumter, Tallapoosa, and Wilcox. 23. Plaintiff Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama ("FHCNA") is an Alabama non-profit corporation, with its principal place of business in Birmingham, Alabama. Plaintiff FHCNA was founded in 1993. Its mission is the elimination and eradication of housing discrimination through education and enforcement activities. FHCNA seeks to ensure that all individuals who seek housing are given fair and equal access to housing of their choice. In furtherance of this mission, Plaintiff FHCNA hosts public seminars for housing providers and

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community members, engages in outreach activities, undertakes investigations, and files administrative complaints. Plaintiff FHCNA provides fair housing services in the following Alabama Counties: Blount, Calhoun, Cherokee, Colbert, Cullrnan, DeKalb, Etowah, Fayette, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Lauderdale, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison, Marion, Marshall, Morgan, Pickens, Shelby, St. Clair, Talladega, Tuscaloosa, Walker, and Winston.
24. Plaintiff Center for Fair Housing, Inc. ("CFH") is an Alabama non-profit corporation, founded in 1998, with its principal place of business in Mobile, Alabama. CFH's mission is to advocate, enforce, and educate the communities it serves in the areas of fair and adequate housing, public accommodations, tenants' rights, and fair lending practices, in order to promote healthier and more inclusive communities. Plaintiff CFH provides these fair housing services in the following Alabama Counties: Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Conecuh, Escambila, Mobile, Monroe, and Washington.
Individual Plaintiffs 25. Plaintiff John Doe #1 resides in Elmore County in a manufactured home that he owns. He lives with his partner and five-year-old son, who is a U.S. citizen. Plaintiff Doe #1 is originally from Mexico and came to the United States approximately eight years ago. He rents a lot for his manufactured home in Elmore, Alabama. 26. Plaintiff John Doe #2 resides in Elmore County in a manufactured home that he owns. Plaintiff Doe #2 came to the United States from Mexico in 2002. He rents a lot for his manufactured home in Milibrook, Alabama, where he lives with his partner, their five-year-old son, and his partner's parents and three brothers. Plaintiff Doe #2's son is a U.S. citizen.
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Defendants 27. Defendant Julie Magee is the Revenue Commissioner for the State of Alabama. As the head of the Alabama Department of Revenue, she is charged with carrying out the duties of the Department, which by Alabama law include "general and complete supervision and control of," inter alia, "the collection of all property, privilege, license, excise, intangible, franchise, or other taxes for the state and counties." Ala. Code § 40-2-11(1). Defendant Magee is responsible for supervising and directing the work of all state and county officials who are charged with the assessment and collection of taxes, including the manufactured home registration fee at issue in this case. She is sued in her official capacity. 28. Defendant William Harper is the Revenue Commissioner for Elmore County, Alabama. He is responsible for collecting payments and issuing manufactured home registration decals to manufactured home owners who reside in Elmore County. He is sued in his official capacity.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Alabama's Manufactured Homes Statute
29. In Alabama, a "manufactured home" is subject to the requirements of Section 4012-25 5 of the Alabama Code. Section 40-12-255(a) requires that any "person, firm, or corporation who owns, maintains, or keeps. . . a manufactured home" pay an annual registration fee and an issuance fee in order to obtain a current identification decal. The identification decal, which is designed and issued by the Alabama Department of Revenue, is color-coded to indicate the year in which it was issued and must be displayed on the outside of the manufactured home at eye level, so as to be "clearly visible from the street." Id.
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30. Under Alabama law, the County official with responsibility for collecting taxes and other assessments has the duty to collect the annual manufactured home registration fees, to issue identification decals, and to impose fines and penalties for late payments. In Elmore County, Defendant Harper is the County official who is assigned these responsibilities.
31. The registration fee and issuance fee are due on October 1 of each year and are considered delinquent if not paid by November 30 of each year. An individual who fails to pay the registration fee and issuance fee by November 30 will be fined a $10 delinquent fee and a $15 citation fee. An additional penalty is imposed if the delinquent fee and citation fee are not paid within 15 days of the first citation. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(b). An individual cannot obtain a current identification decal for his or her manufactured home until all outstanding fees and penalties have been satisfied.
32. In addition to the fines and penalties identified above in Paragraph 31, an individual who violates any provision of Section 40-12-255 is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(1). Under Alabama law, a Class C misdemeanor is punishable with a three-month jail term, in addition to a fine of at least $50 and up to $500. Id.; § 13A-5-7 and 13A-5-12.
33. Tn order to obtain a permit to move a manufactured home on public roads in Alabama, a manufactured home owner must obtain a permit from the County official who administers the manufactured home registration laws in the County where the manufactured home is currently being kept. Proof of payment of the current registration fee, as well as any outstanding fines and penalties, is required to obtain a moving permit. Ala. Code § 40-12255(j)(1). Failure to obtain a moving permit before moving a manufactured home on public roads is punishable as a Class C misdemeanor. § 40-12-255(j)(4).

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34. Any state, county or municipal law-enforcement officer, or license inspector is authorized to issue citations for violations of Alabama Code Section 40-12-255, pursuant to Section 40-12-257.
B. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Act 2011-535 35. On June 2, 2011, the Alabama legislature adopted the Beason-Hammon Alabama
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Act 2011-535, a comprehensive state immigration scheme that extensively regulates immigration, immigrants, and those who associate or interact with immigrants. This law is commonly referred to as HB 56.
1. Text of Section 30 of HB 56 36. Section 30 of HB 56 became effective on September 28, 2011. 37. Section 30 of HB 56 defines and utilizes a new legal tenn, a "business transaction." HB 56 § 30(a). The term "business transaction" is defined as "any transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision of the state," with the only exception being for marriage licenses. Id. (emphasis added). 38. The term "business transaction" is vaguely defined in exceptionally broad and misleading terms. As defined by statute, it is not limited to transactions involving "business." 39. The term "business transaction" is broad enough to include numerous transactions with state and local officials that relate to housing, the ability to rent or buy housing, and the provision of services and facilities in connection with housing, therefore implicating compliance with the federal Fair Housing Act and other civil rights laws. 40. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a Class C felony—punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment, see Ala. Code § 13A-5-6-----for an "unlawfully present alien" to enter or attempt to
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enter into virtually any transaction with the state or local government agency. HB 56 § 3 0(b), (d).
41. Section 30 of HB 56 also prohibits a third party from entering or attempting to enter into virtually any transaction with the State or a political subdivision on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States, again at penalty of a Class C felony conviction. Id.
42. Section 30 of HB 56 provides that any person entering or attempting to enter into a transaction with the State or a political subdivision of the state shall be required to demonstrate to the person conducting the transaction on behalf of the state/political subdivision that the applicant is a U.S. citizen, or, if he or she is an alien, that he or she has lawful presence in the United States. HB 56 § 30(c).
43. Section 30 of HB 56 further provides that U.S. citizenship must be proven by producing one of an enumerated list of documents. Id.; see also HB 56 § 29(k). If a person does not possess one of the enumerated documents but is in fact a U.S. Citizen, that person cannot satisfy the proof requirements of Section 30.
44. Section 30 of HB 56 further provides that an alien's lawful presence shall be demonstrated solely by the state or political subdivision's verification of the alien's lawful presence through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE") program operated by the federal Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), or by other verification with DHS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). Id.
45. SAVE is an inter-governmental initiative designed to aid public benefit-granting agencies in determining an applicant's immigration status, and thereby ensure that only entitled applicants receive federal, state, or local public benefits and licenses.
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46. Section 1373(c) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code requires the federal immigration agency to respond to certain immigration status inquiries by state and local agencies. After passage of Section 1373(c), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Department of Homeland Security) created the Law Enforcement Support Center to respond to requests for state and local law enforcement officers. There is, however, no system under § 1373(c) to verify citizenship or immigration status for individuals attempting to renew registration of manufactured homes or relating to any housing issues.
47. Neither the federal SAVE system, nor any federal system for status inquiries under § 13 73(c), has been authorized by the federal government to verify immigration status in order to disqualify individuals from paying registration fees for manufactured homes or for any related purpose.
48. Moreover, federal determinations made under the SAVE system or any other system set up by § 13 73(c), are merely snapshots of an individuals' status at some point prior to the status check and do not provide reliable or accurate immigration status determinations.
49. Upon information and belief, Defendant Harper and the Elmore County Office of the Revenue Commissioner is not enrolled in, and cannot currently utilize, the SAVE program to determine whether manufactured home owners or renters are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
50. Upon information and belief, Defendant Harper and the Elmore County Office of the Revenue Commissioner are not authorized to use, and cannot currently utilize 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) to verify whether residents of manufactured homes are US. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
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51. Upon information and belief, no county or state official in Alabama charged with collecting manufactured home registration fees has received approval to use SAVE to verify whether residents of manufactured homes are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
52. Upon information and belief, no county or state official in Alabama charged with collecting manufactured home registration fees can currently utilize 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) to verify whether residents of manufactured homes are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
53. As a result, state and local officials are making their own determinations about the applicants' U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status before allowing them to renew manufactured home registration and are implementing Section 30 in a manner expressly at odds with HB 56.
54. HB 56 does not establish any process by which an individual can challenge a determination by a state or local official that he or she is not "authorized" to be in the United States.
2. Histoiy and Intent of Section 30 of HB 56 55. The legislative history of Section 30 of HB 56 reveals a plain legislative intent to drive those suspected of being undocumented immigrants, and in particular minority immigrants of Latino heritage, out of Alabama by making living conditions miserable for them or by funneling them into deportation proceedings. 56. Representative Hammon, who introduced the bill in the House, explained: "This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal immigrant's life. They will not stay in Alabama. . [T]his bill is designed to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport themselves." He also noted, "[W]e do want to affect every aspect of someone's life and make it a little more difficull for them to live here." In no uncertain terms, Representative Hammon stated: "[T]he
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intent of this bill is to slow illegal immigration in Alabama through attrition." He emphasized: "We are going to deter illegal immigrants from the State of Alabama."
57. Senator Beason, who introduced a similar omnibus immigration bill in the Senate, and who ultimately consolidated his bill with Hammon's to form HB 56, also expressed his views that the intent of HB 56 was to drive immigrants from the state. In a speech he delivered in February 2011, just before the legislative session commenced, he noted, "The reality is that if you allow illegal immigration to continue in your area you will destroy yourself eventually. If you don't believe illegal immigration will destroy a community go and check out parts of Alabama around Arab and Albertville."
58. Section 30 of HB 56 is designed to achieve these goals by making it impossible for undocumented immigrants who reside in manufactured homes to continue living in this State.
59. The entirety of HB 56, including Section 30, is specifically targeted at making Latinos leave Alabama. The State officials who enacted and are implementing Section 30 of HB 56 knew that Section 30, and HB 56 in its entirety, would have the greatest impact on Latino immigrants. Latinos make up a majority of the State's foreign-born population. And although only a small percentage of Latino immigrants in Alabama are undocumented, a majority of Alabama's undocumented population is Latino.
60. Representative Rich, who voted for the bill, remarked that although he "like[s] Hispanic people," "95 percent of the children that are in the elementary school at Crosswell Elementary School are Hispanic, 95 percent of them. 52 percent of the children that attend Albertville Elementary and Primary School are Hispanic, and the biggest part of them are illegal." Representative Rich did not identify a source of information or any other factual basis for his allegation that "the biggest part of' the school children discussed were undocumented.
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61. Contrary to Representative Rich's assertion, in Alabama approximately 85% of all children whose parents are not lawfully present in the United States are U.S. citizens.
62. Representative Hammon has also conflated Latinos with undocumented immigrants. For example, on June 2, 2011, the date that the House of Representatives passed the final version of HB 56, Representative Hammon explained the need for the bill by claiming that "the illegal immigration population in Alabama is the second fastest growing in the country and the people in our state need jobs back." When asked for evidence to substantiate this claim, he pointed to a news article that observed that the State's Latino population had grown by 145% from 2000 to 2010, the second highest percentage of growth in the country for that ten-year period. The article did not, however, discuss any data or studies of undocumented immigrant populations. It was limited to a discussion of Alabama's Latino population.
63. Similarly, Senator Beason singled out Arab and Albertville, both of which are in Marshall County, as examples of communities that have allegedly been destroyed by the presence of undocumented persons. Senator Beasons 's comments were in no uncertain terms directed at Latino immigrants. Compared to the rest of the State, Marshall County has a large Latino population: 12% of Marshall County residents are Latino, compared to less than 4% of the State population. Moreover, Marshall County has no other significant immigrant population.
64. Those who opposed the legislation likewise understood that it took aim at Mexicans and other Latinos. Senator Singleton observed: "[T]he fact of the matter is that we know that when we talk about illegal immigration that it is basically targeted at one ethnic group and that seems to be the Latino Hispanic Americans. . ." Senator Holmes stated: "The purpose of this bill is. . . these Mexicans . . . . [Y]ou all are trying to get as many in here out and trying to stop as many coming in [as you can] . ." Representative Jackson warned that the effects of HB
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56 would reach even further than targeting Latinos: "It just doesn't stop at the people coming from Mexico. This is not here just for them. This thing is going to have great repercussion for all minorities."
65. At times supporters of HB 56 have spoken in violent terms about their desire to eradicate immigrants in Alabama. For example, at a town hall meeting this summer after HB 56 passed, Alabama Congressman Mo Brooks stated, in reference to his desire to force undocumented immigrants out of Alabama, that "[a]s your congressman on the house floor, I will do anything short of shooting them."
66. In enacting HB 56 generally, and Section 30 specifically, Alabama legislated in an area committed exclusively to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, by passing HB 56, Alabama has intruded into an area of exclusive federal control and has sought to supplant the federal government in key respects.
67. Contrary to long-settled law that establishes the federal government's exclusive role in regulating immigration, Section 30 of HB 56 reflects the view that the State of Alabama should regulate immigration on its own. Alabama has sought to use its self-granted power to attempt to drive people who are perceived to be undocumented out of the State through the denial of housing and housing-related local services. As Representative Hammon stated during legislative debates, "[I]t is the State's responsibility to handle this issue and not the federal government." He explained, "[T]his issue is now the responsibility of the State of Alabama and not the federal government." He explained, in reference to federal immigration law and policy, that "[w]e are not going to depend on a broken system. . . . Here in Alabama we are not going to ignore the problem."
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68. HB 56 allows the State of Alabama to take control of immigration enforcement which Alabama has sought to justify by arguing that the federal government has failed to act to the State's satisfaction. Representative Hammon remarked when he introduced the bill, "[lit appears that the federal government has defaulted on their responsibility of enforcing federal immigration law. And they have forfeited that right to the States." Senator Beason concurred with this sentiment, noting in the Senate debates that "[ijf the federal government would enforce their laws that they have on the books, the states would not be required to begin to do things to help enforce those laws."
69. Representative Hammon, one of the two sponsors of HB 56, has publicly applauded efforts by local officials to deny essential housing-related services to individuals like Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2, precisely because these acts will have the effect of driving Plaintiffs and other similarly situated people out of Alabama. As Representative Hammon explained this October when he was asked his views on new policies by certain public utilities to deny services to undocumented individuals under Section 30:
Our goal [through Section 30] was to prevent any business transactions with any governments. It's just an extension of the goal of the entire bill—to prevent illegal immigrants from coming to Alabama and to discourage those that are here from putting down roots. . . It seems to be working. . . We're seeing a lot of illegal immigrants self-deport. C. Complying with Alabama's Manufactured Homes Statute Constitutes a "Business
Transaction" with the State, Which Is Forbidden to Undocumented Immigrants Under HB 56 Section 30. 70. The process of submitting a payment for the annual manufactured home registration fee and obtaining a current identification decal, as required by Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a), is a "business transaction with the State" subject to HB 56 Section 30(a).
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71. Applying for a moving permit pursuant to Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(j) is also a "business transaction with the State" subject to RB 56 Section 30(a).
72. Thus, the enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 will harm individuals who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes and lack proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. Such individuals will be denied the rights to make an annual manufactured home registration payment, obtain a current identification decal, and apply for a moving permit.
73. Without a current registration payment and identification decal, any individual who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home in Alabama will be subject to serious repercussions, including fines and penalties, conviction of a Class C misdemeanor, and up to three months' imprisonment. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(a), (1); § S 13A-5-7 and 13A-5-12.
74. Without a moving permit, an individual who attempts to transport a manufactured home on public roads in Alabama is subject to fines and penalties, conviction of a Class C misdemeanor, and up to three months' imprisonment. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(j)(1) and (4); § 13A-5-7 and 13A-5-12.
75. In addition, an individual without documentation of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status who attempts to submit an annual manufactured home registration payment, obtain a current identification decal, or apply for a moving permit may be charged with a Class C felony and imprisoned for up to ten years under HB 56. HB 56 § 30(b), (d); Ala. Code § 1 3A-5[ii
76. An individual who attempts to submit a registration payment, obtain a current identification decal, or apply for a moving permit on behalf of an undocumented immigrant will likewise be charged with a Class C felony and can be sentenced to a ten-year prison term. Id.
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77. Defendant Harper, in his capacity as the Revenue Commissioner of Elmore County, has announced a policy pursuant to HB 56 Section 30 of requiring proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status in order for an individual to make an annual manufactured home registration payment and obtain a current identification decal. Defendant Harper's policy makes it impossible for Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to comply with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 because they are not allowed to submit their annual registration payments or obtain a current identification decal.
78. Section 30 of HB 56 applies statewide. Thus the same policy described in the preceding paragraph will be and is already being faced by every member of the Class and Subclass, regardless of which county they live in. In each of these counties, Defendant Magee is responsible for supervising and directing the work of the county revenue commissioners from whom Class and Subclass members must obtain identification decals for their manufactured homes.
D. Section 30 of HB 56 Is Federally Preempted. 79. The federal government has exclusive power over immigration matters. The U.S.
Constitution grants the federal government the power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 4, and to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," U.S. Const. art. I § 8, ci. 3. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government's power to control immigration is inherent in the nation's sovereignty.
80. Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal laws, agencies, and procedures regulating immigration. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act ("TNA"), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 etseq.
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81. The extensive statutory scheme created by the INA leaves no room for supplemental state immigration laws. A state law that regulates the terms and conditions under which non-citizens may remain in the State are preempted as an impermissible regulation of immigration.
82. State laws, like Section 30, that encroach on areas where Congress has indicated an intent to occupy the field—such as the regulation of the residence of non-citizens--are preempted. As are state laws that conflict with federal immigration law.
83. Section 30 of HB 56 dramatically alters the conditions under which non-citizens may remain in Alabama. By specifically requiring all non-citizens to prove that they have lawful status in order to obtain a manufactured home decal, this Section fundamentally affects the terms and conditions under which non-citizens may remain in a dwelling in the State.
84. Furthermore, certain categories of non-citizens, like Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 and the members of the Class and Subclass, are unable to continue to live in their homes under this regime without threat of fines, penalties, or criminal prosecution. As such, Section 30 fundamentally alters the rights of residence of the members of the Class and Subclass and the individual Plaintiffs.
85. As Section 30 is currently being implemented to deny decals to manufactured home owners in the State, local officials are being required to make independent determinations of immigration status—a complex task for which they are not equipped, trained, or authorized to undertake. This is because in determining whether an individual attempting to renew their manufactured home registration is a U.S. citizen or lawful immigrant, state and local officials do not have access to federal databases on immigration and citizenship status. Instead, these state
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and local officials are scrutinizing documents and making their own conclusions about individuals' citizenship and immigration status—determinations they are not trained to make.
86. Under the NA, a non-citizen's immigration status may be fluid and subject to change over time. A non-citizen who enters the United States with authorization, with a student visa for example, may remain in the country past his period of authorized stay and thus no longer be in status. Alternatively, he may overstay his original visa yet remain in status; for example, if he is eligible to and does change into a different visa classification. Conversely, a non-citizen who enters the United States without authorization, for example by crossing into the country by foot while evading border authorities, may subsequently gain lawful status, such as through a successful asylum application or grant of Temporary Protected Status.
87. The fluidity of immigration status is a fundamental feature of federal immigration law. It is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed. This feature, moreover, accommodates many important national interests including, for example, the nation's humanitarian and international law obligations regarding asylum seekers and people fleeing torture.
88. Section 30 of HB 56 presumes that immigration status is definite, not subject to nuance, and readily and quickly ascertained. But those presumptions are not accurate.
89. Moreover, whether a person is a citizen of the United States is not always easily ascertained in the contexts demanded by Section 30 of HB 56. U.S. citizens are not required to carry documentary proof of their citizenship. Section 30 requires utilization of a list of documents, see HB 56 § 30(c), 29(k), but there is no guarantee that every U.S. citizen will possess one of these documents.
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90. Furthermore, there is no national database that contains information about every U.S. citizen. Some people are actually unaware of their U.S. citizenship because they may have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth by operation of law due to their parents' citizenship, despite not having been born in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Others automatically obtain citizenship when their parents become naturalized U.S. citizens. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1433.
91. The federal government has a core, constitutionally protected interest in setting a uniform federal immigration scheme, and in conducting foreign relations with other nations. State immigration laws interfere with these core interests.
92. Because the United States' immigration policy is inextricably intertwined with foreign relations, Alabama's attempt to regulate immigration through Section 30 of HB 56 will adversely impact the United States' ability to conduct foreign relations with other countries. HB 56 will undermine the ability of the U.S. government to speak with a single voice about immigration, including communicating to foreign nations as to what their nationals can expect when they come to visit or reside in the United States. State attempts to interfere with these inherently federal issues can have severe impacts on foreign relations.
E. Defendants' Enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 Has a Disproportionate Adverse Impact on Alabama Latinos.
93. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 as alleged above in Paragraphs 70-78 has a disproportionate adverse impact on Latinos in the State.
94. In Alabama, Latinos are significantly more likely than any other group to live in manufactured homes. Nearly a third (27.6%) of all Latinos living in Alabama reside in the U.S. census housing category "Mobile home, boat, RV, van, etc.," compared to 14.3% of non-Latino
22

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Caucasians, 10.2% of non-Latino African Americans, and 3.2% of Asians. Considering the population of Alabama as a whole, only 13.5% of the population lives in mobile homes.2
95. Latinos are overrepresented among Alabama's foreign-born, non-U.S. citizen population. Latinos make up almost 45% of Alabama's foreign-born, non-naturalized population, whereas the total population of Alabama is less than 4% Latino. Approximately 65% of Alabama's non-U.S. citizen population is Latino.
96. Of Alabama's undocumented immigrant population, a large majority are Latino. Nationwide, approximately 77% of all undocumented immigrants are Latino.
INJURIES TO THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS A. Harm to Individual Named Plaintiffs 97. Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 own and live in manufactured homes located in Elmore County, Alabama. 98. Because of Defendant Harper's policy, Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 face an impossible quandary. If they attempt to submit the annual registration payment and to obtain a current identification decal as required by Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a), and/or to obtain a moving permit in order to move their manufactured homes out of Alabama by traveling on public roads, they will be subject to the harsh penalties established in HB 56 Section 3 0(d), and they will be denied the decal or permit for which they would be applying. If Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 fail to obtain a current identification decal and/or attempt to move their manufactured homes out of Alabama by traveling on public roads without a moving permit, they will be subject to similarly draconian penalties established in Alabama Code Section 40-1225 5(a), (j), and (1).
2 Under Alabama law a mobile home is a "manufactured home" subject to Alabama Code Section 40-12-255.
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99. If subjected to the enforcement of HB 56 Section 30, Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 could be forced to abandon their housing and pernanent1y forfeit their manufactured homes, because there will be no way for them to come into compliance with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a). Under Section 27 of HB 56, these Plaintiffs will not be able to sell their homes if they are forced to leave the manufactured home parks where they now live with their families.
100. Plaintiff Doe #1 wants to comply with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 but knows he cannot do so if Defendants continue their policy of enforcing HB 56 Section 30.
101. Plaintiff Doe #1 fears that if he is unable to obtain a current identification decal, he and his partner and their U.S.-citizen son will have to abandon their home in order to avoid the fines, penalties, and criminal charges that are authorized under Alabama Code Section 40-12255 for failure to display a valid identification decal.
102. Plaintiff Doe #1 does not know where else he could find housing if he had to give up his current home. He and his partner would have to leave behind their jobs and their church community and would have to pull their U.S.-citizen son out of school. Plaintiff Doe #1 is afraid that his son's education would be jeopardized if his family had to leave their home in Elmore.
103. Since the adoption of HB 56, Plaintiff Doe 1, his partner, and his son have suffered continuing anxiety and fear.
104. Plaintiff Doe #2 wants to do what is required under Alabama Code Section 40-12255, but he is unable to make the annual registration payment and obtain a current decal because of Defendants' policy of enforcing Section 30 of HB 56.
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105. Plaintiff Doe #2 is afraid that he will be fined, imprisoned, or deported if he cannot make the annual registration payment and obtain a current identification decal for his manufactured home, where he lives with his partner, son, and five extended family members.
106. Plaintiff Doe #2 fears that because of Defendants' challenged acts, he and his family may have to abandon their home, without being able to sell it. Plaintiff Doe #2 does not know where he and his family could move if they can no longer live in their home in Millbrook. He is worried that he would not be able to find work to support his family, and he does not want to make his young U.S.-citizen son leave his school and his friends.
107. Plaintiff Doe #2 fears that his partner and son's well-being will suffer if Plaintiff Doe #2 is detained or deported, pursuant to Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56.
108. Because they will not have current decals on the outside of their homes, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 will be involuntarily yet conspicuously in violation of their lawful obligations under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255. Being forced to be visibly out of compliance with the law will significantly heighten the exposure of Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 and their families to law enforcement, who pursuant to the new authority conferred by Section 12 of HB 56 are obligated "where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States," to make inquiries into that person's citizenship and immigration status. HB 56 § 12(a). Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 thus face an increased risk of arrest and detention because of Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30.
B. Harm to Organizational Plaintiffs 109. Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has harmed and will continue to harm Plaintiffs CAFHC, FHCNA, and CFH.
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110. Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Plaintiff CAFHC's mission of promoting understanding of and enforcing fair housing laws. In order to counteract the effects of Defendants' acts by educating people about their rights, Plaintiff CAFHC staff members have had to spend time researching the enforcement policies adopted by different counties in Alabama, the criminal and fair housing implications of the law, and related state-law requirements applicable to manufactured homes. Plaintiff CAFHC personnel have also prepared for and presented at know-your-rights training sessions to speak about HB 56 Section 30 to people who live in manufactured home residents and drafted an educational flyer with information about HB 56 Section 30 and manufactured home decals.
111. The need for these counteraction activities that are in specific response to Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 have prevented or delayed Plaintiff CAFHC from working on other projects that it would have completed, including finalizing an Analysis of Impediments, pursuant to a contract awarded by the City of Montgomery; pursuing a planned program to conduct testing for race and disability based housing discrimination in the middle region of Alabama; and participating in a mortgage lending training session.
112. Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Plaintiff FHCNA's mission of eliminating housing discrimination. In order to counteract the discriminatory and unlawful impact of Defendants' acts on the communities it serves, Plaintiff FHCNA will have to divert scarce resources away from regularly planned activities by, inter alia, realigning its testing program to target discrimination based on national origin against residents of manufactured home parks, readjusting its client intake counseling to provide information and assess the impacts of HB 56 Section 30 on manufactured home residents, and meeting with community and civil rights groups regarding the impacts that HB 56
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Section 30 is having on residents of manufactured homes. In response to HB 56 Section 30 Plaintiff FHCNA has engaged and is engaging in communications with HUD to seek guidance on the fair housing implications if the law and is preparing know-your-rights materials.
113. Because Plaintiff FHCNA is devoting and will continue to devote its limited resources to the activities described in the preceding paragraph, it has been unable to engage in regularly planned programs including testing in fields that it had planned to investigate, such as sales and insurance, and engaging in normal outreach and client intake.
114. Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Plaintiff CFH's mission, which is to advocate, enforce, and educate the communities it serves in the areas of fair and adequate housing, public accommodations, tenants' rights, and lending practices. In order to counteract the discriminatory and harmful impact of HB 56 on the communities it serves, Plaintiff CFH has had to reach out to organizations that work with immigrant communities, and it has participated in meetings to discuss the applicability of HB 56 Section 30 to manufactured homes. Plaintiff CFH has spent time researching HB 56 Section 30 and its impact on manufactured home residents, and it has been in communication with HUD regarding problems associated with HB 56's housing restrictions. Plaintiff CFH has also applied to realign its funding from a focus on predatory lending to a focus on outreach and enforcement regarding national origin discrimination in order to respond to HB 56's discriminatory housing restrictions, including Section 30.
115. These counteraction activities have prevented and delayed Plaintiff CFH from working on other planned projects, such as conducting general rental testing and routine outreach activities and conducting education and outreach on other issues.
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CLASS ALLEGATIONS 116. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 have filed this Complaint as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 117. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 request that this Court certify a Class of all similarly situated individuals. The proposed Class definition is: All individuals who (1) reside in Alabama; (2) will be unable to prove U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status under HB 56 Section 3 0(c); and (3) own, maintain, or keep a manufactured home in Alabama. 118. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 further request that the Court certify a Latino Subclass with the following definition: All Latinos who (1) reside in Alabama; (2) will be unable to prove U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status under HB 56 Section 30(c); and (3) own, maintain, or keep a manufactured home. 119. This action is properly maintained as a class action because:
(a) Joinder of all members of the Class and Latino Subclass is impracticable because of the size of the Class and Subclass. (i) The Class comprises more than 40 households. (ii) The Latino Subclass comprises more than 40 households.
(b) The claims alleged on behalf of the Class and Latino Subclass raise questions of law and fact that are common to the Class and Subclass. (i) All Class members will be unable to apply for a renewal tag and will be subject to the same fines, penalties, and threat of criminal prosecution.
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(ii) The members of the Latino Subclass are of the same race and national

origin. The enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 is intentionally

targeted at members of the Subclass because of their Latino race and

national origin, and it will have a disproportionate adverse impact on

members of the Subclass.

(c) The claims of the Class representatives are typical of the Class and Subclass.

(i)

Like the members of the Class, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 will

be unable to apply for a renewal tag and will be subject to the same

fines, penalties, and threat of criminal prosecution.

(ii)

Like the members of the Latino Subclass, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe

#2 are Latinos who will be unable to apply for a renewal tag and

will be subject to the same fines, penalties, and threat of criminal

prosecution, due to the discriminatory intent and effect of

Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56, on grounds of

Subclass members' Latino race and national origin.

(d) The Class and Latino Subclass representatives and Class counsel will fairly

and adequately represent the interests of the Class and Subclass. The Class

and Latino Subclass representatives have no interests that are antagonistic to

the interests of other Plaintiffs, and Class counsel have substantial experience

in civil rights and class action litigation.

120. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate for the Class because

Defendants have acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole.

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Defendants have applied and will apply the same policy, custom, and/or practice to all Class members.
121. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate for the Latino Subclass because Defendants have acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the Subclass as a whole. Defendants have applied and will apply the same policy, custom, and/or practice to all Latino Subclass members.
122. There are questions of law or fact common to all of the members of the Class and Latino Subclass that predominate over any questions affecting only individuals and a class action is superior to other methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Common questions of law or fact predominate and the controversy is most fairly and efficiently adjudicated via class action because all Class and Latino Subclass members will be subject to the same fines, penalties, and threat of criminal prosecution for the same conduct.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
Against All Defendants On Beha if ofAil Named Piaintffs and the Latino Subclass 123. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs29-34, 55-78, 93-115, 118-119, and 121-122 above. 124. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home to obtain an identification decal by or before November30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply.
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125. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Latino Subclass, to make registration payments and apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit.
126. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 by rejecting registration payments from and denying decals and moving permits to Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2 and the Latino Subclass will make housing unavailable on the bases of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)
Against All Defendants On Behalf ofAll Named Plaintiffs and the Latino Subclass 127. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-115, 118-119, and 121-122 above. 128. Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code requires anyone who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home to obtain a decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 129. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Latino Subclass, to make an annual registration fee payment or apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 130. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 against Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Latino Subclass by refusing to accept their annual registration payments or issue current identification decals or moving permits applies different terms and conditions in the provision of services related to housing occupied by Latino Subclass members, because of their race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Under U.S. Const., Art. VI, ci. 2
Against All Defendants On Behalf of All Named Plaintiffs and the Class 131. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 35-69, 79-92, 97-115, 117, 119-120, and 122 above. 132. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 133. The Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law preempts state law in any area over which Congress expressly or impliedly has reserved exclusive authority or which is constitutionally reserved to the federal government, or where state law conflicts or interferes with federal law. 134. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain non-citizens, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Class, to make an annual registration payment or apply for a manufactured home decal or moving permit. 135. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns or maintains a manufactured home to obtain a decal by or before November 30 of each year. 136. The inability to obtain a decal will make housing unavailable to Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Class. 137. Section 30 of HB 56 regulates the terms and conditions under which non-U.S. citizens may remain in Alabama.
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138. Section 30 is an impermissible state regulation of immigration, and therefore usurps powers constitutionally vested in the federal government exclusively.
139. Section 30 also conflicts with federal laws, regulations, and policies; attempts to legislate in a field occupied by the federal government; imposes burdens and penalties on legal residents not authorized by and contrary to federal law, and unilaterally imposes burdens on the federal government's resources and processes, each in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
140. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV § 1, ci. 3 Against All Defendants
On Behalf of Plaintiff Doe #1, Plaintiff Doe #2, and the Class 141. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-54, 70-78, and 97-108, 117, 119-120, and 122 above. 142. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 prohibits Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class from complying with the requirements under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 to pay an annual registration fee and to obtain and prominently display a current manufactured home identification decal. Without a current identification decal, Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class will be subject to the penalties established in Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a) and (k). 143. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 will force Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class to abandon their housing and permanently forfeit their manufactured homes, because they cannot come into compliance with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a) or (j).
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144. Under Section 27 of HB 56, the individual Plaintiffs and the Class will be unable to sell their homes before abandoning and forfeiting them.
145. Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 against Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class has deprived and/or will deprive them of their property without substantive due process, in violation the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
146. Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 is pursuant to their official capacities as state actors under color of law and is therefore actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment through42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION For Damages Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
Against All Defendants On Behalf ofAll Named Plaintiffs 147. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-96, and 97-115 above. 148. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns, keeps, or otherwise maintains a manufactured home to obtain an identification decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 149. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2 to make registration payments and apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 150. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 by rejecting registration payments from and denying decals and moving permits will make housing unavailable on the bases of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3 604(a).
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151. Defendants' violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) have caused and will continue to cause the named Plaintiffs to suffer compensable injuries, entitling the named Plaintiffs to compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS For Damages Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)
Against All Defendants On Behalf of the Named Plaintiffs 152. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-96, and 97-115 above. 153. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns, keeps, or otherwise maintains a manufactured home to obtain an identification decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 154. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to make registration payments and apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 155. Defendants' enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 by refusing to accept annual registration payments or issue current identification decals or moving permits applies different terms and conditions in the provision of services related to housing on the basis of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 156. Defendants' violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) have caused and will cause the named Plaintiffs to suffer compensable injuries, entitling the named Plaintiffs to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the following relief:
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(1) Issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction immediately enjoining the enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 statewide against Plaintiffs and the Class and Latino Subclass;
(2) Order Defendant Magee to immediately notify all county officials who are responsible for enforcing the manufactured home registration requirements of Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code if said temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is entered;
(3) Certify the Class and Subclass; (4) Enter a declaratory judgment finding that Defendants' enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 violates the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b); the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution; the Due Process Clause of Amendment XIV of the U.S. Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (5) Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing Section 30 of HB 56; (6) Award compensatory damages to Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, CAFHC, FHCNA, and CFH for their claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b); (7) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 3613(c)(2); and (8) Order such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
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Dated: November 18, 2011

Mary auer On Beha if of Counsel for Plaintiffs

Kristi L. Graunke* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 521-6700
kristi.graunke@splcenter.org

Mary Bauer (ASB-1 181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1 172-L6OB) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 4100 Washington Ave. Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer(splcenter.org samuel .brooke(splcenter.org

Linton Joaquin*

Stephen M. Dane*

Karen C. Tumlin*

Jamie L. Crook*

NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER RELMAN, DANE & COLFAX PLLC

3435 Wilshire Blvd.

1225 19 Street NW, Suite 600

Suite 2850

Washington, DC 20036

Los Angeles, CA 90010

(202) 728-1888

(213) 674-2909

sdane(relmanJaw. corn

joaguin(nilc.org

j crook@relmanlawcom

tumlin(Zinilc.org

Justin B. Cox* ACLU IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT 230 Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303-2721 (404) 523-2721 jcox@aclu.org

Lee Gelernt* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 (212) 549-2660 Igelernt@aclu.org

Foster S. Maer* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-3360 fmaer(latinojustice.org dsen(latinojustice.org

Counsel for Plaint iffs

* Pro hac vice admission to be sought

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Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 1-1 Filed 11/18/11 Page 1 of 72

1

HB56

2

132433-8

3

By Representatives Hamrnon, Collins, Patterson, Rich, Norcigren,

4

Merrill, Treadaway, Johnson (R), Roberts, Henry, Bridges,

5

Gaston, Johnson (K), Chesteen, Sanderford, Williams (D),

6

McClendon, Wren, Williams (J), Hubbard (M), Williams (P),

7

Baughn, Moore (B), Long and Canfield

8

RFD: Public Safety and Homeland Security

9

First Read: 01-MAR-li

10

PFD: 02/25/2011

Page 0

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 1-1 Filed 11/18/11 Page 2 of 72

HB5 6

1

2

ENROLLED, An Act,

3

Relating to illegal immigration; to define terms; to

4

require the Attorney General to attempt to negotiate a

5

Memorandum of Agreement under certain conditions; to require a

6

person to present proof of citizenship and residency before

7

voting; to preclude any state or local government or official

8

from refusing to assist the federal government in the

9

enforcement of federal immigration laws; to prohibit an alien

10

unlawfully present in the United States from receiving any

11

state or local public benefits; to prohibit a person not

12

lawfully present from being eligible on the basis of residence

13

for education benefits; to requfre business entities or

14

employers seeking economic incentives to verify the employment

15

eligibility of their employees and to provide penalties; to

16

require an illegal alien to possess certain documents already

17

required by federal law and to provide penalties; to prohibit

18

an unauthorized alien from seeking employment in this state

19

and to provide penalties; to require the verification of the

20

legal status of persons by law enforcement officers under

21

certain circumstances; to criminalize certain behavior

22

relating to concealing, harboring, shielding, or attempting to

23

conceal, harbor, or shield unauthorized aliens and to provide

24

penalties; to create the crime of dealing in false

25

identification documents and the crime of vital records

Page 1

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 1-1 Filed 11/18/11 Page 3 of 72

HB5 6

1

identity fraud and to provide penalties; to prohibit a

2

business entity, employer, or public employer from knowingly

3

employing an unauthorized alien and to provide penalties; to

4

prohibit certain deductible business expenses; to make it a

5

discriminatory practice for a business entity or employer to

6

fail to hire a legally present job applicant or discharge an

7

employee while retaining an employee who is an unauthorized

8

alien under certain conditions; to require the verification of

9

legal status of every alien charged with a crime for which

10

bail is required; to amend Section 32-6--9 of the Code of

11

Alabama 1975, relating to driver's licenses; to require law

12

enforcement to detain any alien whose lawful immigration

13

status cannot be verified under certain conditions; to require

14

notification of the United States Bureau of Immigration and

15

Customs Enforcement and the Alabama Department of Homeland

16

Security when an unlawfully present alien is convicted of

17

state law; to provide for a stay of the provisions of this act

18

when an alien unlawfully present is a victim or critical

19

witness of a crime under certain conditions; to authorize the

20

Alabama Department of Homeland Security to hire state police

21

officers and give the department enforcement power under

22

certain conditions; to provide penalties for solicitation,

23

attempt, or conspiracy to violate this act; to require the

24

Alabama Department of [-lomelarid Security to file a quarterly

25

report with the Legislature under certain conditions; to

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1

require the Alabama Department of Homeland Security to

2

establish and maintain an E-Verify employer agent service

3

under certain conditions; to prohibit the enforcement of

4

certain contracts under certain conditions; to require public

5

schools to determine the citizenship and immigration status of

6

students enrolling; to require school districts to compile

7

certain data and submit reports to the State Board of

8

Education; to require the State Board of Education to submit

9

an annual report to the Legislature; to further provide for

10

eligibility and requirements for voter registration; to

11

establish a state election board; to provide duties of the

12

board; to provide that a person may obtain a certified copy of

13

a birth certificate from the Department of Public Health free

14

of charge under certain conditions; to prohibit an alien not

15

lawfully present from entering into a business transaction

16

under certain conditions and provide penalties; to prohibit a

17

landlord from knowingly entering into a rental agreement to

18

harbor an illegal alien and provide penalties; and in

19

connection therewith would have as its purpose or effect the

20

requirement of a new or increased expenditure of local funds

21

within the meaning of Amendment 621 of the Constitution of

22

Alabama of 1901, now appearing as Section 111.05 of the

23

Official Recompilation of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901,

24

as amended.

25

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF ALABAMA:

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Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.
Section 2. The State of Alabama finds that illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness in this state and that illegal immigration is encouraged when public agencies within this state provide public benefits without verifying immigration status. Because the costs incurred by school districts for the public elementary and secondary education of children who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States can adversely affect the availability of public education resources to students who are United States citizens or are aliens lawfully present in the United States, the State of Alabama determines that there is a compelling need for the State Board of Education to accurately measure and assess the population of students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States, in order to forecast and plan for any impact that the presence such population may have on publicly funded education in this state. The State of Alabama further finds that certain practices currently allowed in this state impede and obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law, undermine the security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the privileges and immunities of the citizens of Alabama. Therefore, the people of the State of Alabama declare that it

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1

is a compelling public interest to discourage illegal

2

immigration by requiring all agencies within this state to

3

fully cooperate with federa] immigration authorities in the

4

enforcement of federal immigration laws. The State of Alabama

5

also finds that other measures are necessary to ensure the

6

integrity of various governmental programs and services.

7

Section 3. For the purposes of this act, the

8

following words shall have the following meanings:

9

(1) ALIEN. Any person who is not a citizen or

10

national of the United States, as described in 8 U.S.C. §

11

1101, et seq., and any amendments thereto.

12

(2) BUSINESS ENTITY. Any person or group of persons

13

performing or engaging in any activity, enterprise,

14

profession, or occupation for gain, benefit, advantage, or

15

livelihood, whether for profit or not for profit. 'Business

16

entity! shall include, but not be limited to the following:

17

a. Self-employed individuals, business entities

18

filing articles of incorporation, partnerships, limited

19

partnerships, limited liability companies, foreign

20

corporations, foreign limited partnerships, foreign limited

21

liabilitycompanies authorized to transact business in this

22

state, business trusts, and any business entity that registers

23

with the Secretary of State.

24

b. Any business entity that possesses a business

25

license, permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter,

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or similar form of authorization issued by the state, any business entity that is exempt by law from obtaining such a business license, and any business entity that is operating unlawfully without a business license.
(3) CONTRACTOR. A person, employer, or business entity that enters into an agreement to perform any service or work or to provide a certain product in exchange for valuable consideration. This definition shall include, but not be limited to, a general contractor, subcontractor, independent contractor, contract employee, project manager, or a recruiting or staffing entity.
(4) EMPLOYEE. Any person directed, allowed, or permitted to perform ]abor or service of any kind by an employer. The employees of an independent contractor working for a business entity shall not be regarded as the employees of the business entity, for the purposes of this act.
(5) EMPLOYER. Any person, firm, corporation, partnership, joint stock association, agent, manager, representative, foreman, or other person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment, or of any employee, including any person or entity employing any person for hire within the State of Alabama, including a public employer. This term shall not include the occupant of a household contracting with another person to perform casual domestic labor within the household.

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(6) EMPLOYMENT. The act of employing or state of

2

being employed, engaged, or hired to perform work or service

3

of any kind or character within the State of Alabama,

4

including any job, task, work, labor, personal services, or

5

any other activity for which compensation is provided,

6

expected, or due, including, but not limited to, all

7

activities conducted by a business entity or employer. This

8

term shall not include casual domestic labor performed in a

9

household on behalf of the occupant of the household or the

10

re]ationship between a contractor arid the emp]oyees of a

11

subcontractor performing work for the contractor.

12

(7) E-VERIFY. The electronic verification of federal

13

employment authorization program of the Illegal Immigration

14

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208,

15

Division C, Section 403(a); 8 U.S.C. §1324(a), and operated by

16

the United States Department of Homeland Security, or its

17

successor program.

18

(8) FEDERAL WORK AUTHORIZATION PROGPAM. Any of the

19

electronic verification of work authorization programs

20

operated by the United States Department of Home]and Security

21

or an equivalent federal work authorization program operated

22

by the United States Department of Homeland Security to verify

23

information of newly hired employees, under the Immigration

24

Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), P.L. 99-603 or the

25

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

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1996, P.L. 104-208, Division C, Section 403(a); 8 U.s.c. §1324 (a)
(9) KNOWS or KNOWINGLY. A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to either of the following:
a. The person's conduct or to attendant circumstances when the person is aware of the nature of the person's conduct or that those circumstances exist.
b. A result of the person's conduct when the person is reasonably aware that the persons conduct is likely to cause that result.
(10) LAWFUL PRESENCE or LAWFULLY PRESENT. A person shall be regarded as an alien unlawfully present in the United States on]y if the person's un]awfu] immigration status has been verified by the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (c) . No officer of this state or any political subdivision of this state shall attempt to independently make a final determination of an aliens immigration status. An alien possessing self-identification in any of the following forms is entitled to the presumption that he or she is an alien lawfully present in the United States:
a. A valid, unexpired Alabama driver's license. b. A valid, unexpired A]abama nondrver identification card.

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c. A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal identification bearing a photograph or other biometric identifier.
d. Any valid United States federal or state government issued identification document bearing a photograph or other biometric identifier, if issued by an enLity that requires proof of lawful presence in the United States before issuance.
e. A foreign passport with an unexpired United States Visa and a corresponding stamp or notation by the United States Department of Homeland Security indicating the bearer v s admission to the United States.
f. A foreign passport issued by a visa waiver country with the corresponding entry stamp and unexpired duration of stay annotation or an 1-94W form by the United States Department of Homeland Security indicating the bearers admission to the United States.
(11) POLICY OR PRACTICE. A guiding principle or rule that may be written or adopted through repeated actions or customs, which must be sanctioned by an agency or the head of an agency.
(12) PROTECTIVE SERVICES PROVIDER. A child protective services worker; adult protective services worker; protective services provider; or provider of services to victims of domestic violence, stalking, sexual assault, or

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human trafficking that receives federal grants under the Victim of Crimes Act, the Vio]ence Against Women Abt, or the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act.
(13) PUBLIC EMPLOYER. Every department, agency, or instrumentality of the state or a political subdivision of the state including counties and municipalities.
(14) STATE-FUNDED ENTITY. Any governmental entity of the state or a political subdivision thereof or any other entity that receives any state monies.
(15) SUBCONTRACTOR. A subcontractor, contract employee, staffing agency, or any contractor, regardless of its tier.
(16) UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN. An alien who is not authorized to work in the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (3)
Section 4. (a) The Attorney General shall attempt to negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Agreement between the State of Alabama and the United States Department of Homeland Security, as provided in 8 U.S.C. Section 1357(g), concerning the enforcement of federal immigration laws, detentions and removals, and relLated investigations in the State of A]abama by certain state law enforcement officers designated by the Attorney General.
(b) The Memorandum of Agreement negotiated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be signed on behalf of this state by

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1

the Attorney General and the Governor or as otherwise required

2

by the appropriate federal agency.

3

(c) A report of the results of the attempt of the

4

Attorney General to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement shall

5

be submitted to the Legislature within six months of the

6

effective date of this act.

7

Section 5. (a) No official or agency of this state

8

or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not

9

limited to, an officer of a court of this state, may adopt a

10

policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement of

11

federal immigration laws by limiting communication between its

12

officers and federal immigration officials in violation of 8

13

U.S.C. § 1373 or 8 U.S.C. § 1644, or that restricts its

14

officers in the enforcement of this act. If, in the judgment

15

of the Attorney General of Alabama, an official or agency of

16

this state or any political subdivision thereof, including,

17

but not limited to, an officer of a court in this state, is in

18

violation of this subsection, the Attorney General shall

19

report any violation of this subsection to the Governor and

20

the state Comptroller and that agency or political subdivision

21

shall not be eligible to receive any funds, grants, or

22

appropriations from the State of Alabama until such violation

23

has ceased and the Attorney General has so certified. Any

24

appeal of the determination of the Attorney General as

25

considered in this section shall be first appealed to the

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1

circuit court of the respective jurisdiction in which the

2

alleged offending agency resides.

3

(b) All state officials, agencies, and personnel,

4

including, but not limited to, an officer of a court of this

5

state, shall fully comply with and, to the full extent

6

permitted by law, support the enforcement of federal law

7

prohibiting the entry into, presence, or residence in the

8

United States of aliens in violation of federal immigration

9

law.

10

(c) Except as provided by federal law, officials or

11

agencies of this state or any political subdivision thereof,

12

including, but not limited to, an officer of a court of this

13

state, may not be prohibited or in any way be restricted from

14

sending, receiving, or maintaining information relating to the

15

immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or

16

exchanging that information with any other federal, state, or

17

local governmental entity for any of the following official

18

purposes:

19

(1) Determining the eligibility for any public

20

benefit, service, or license provided by any state, local, or

21

other political subdivision of this state.

22

(2) Verifying any claim of residence or domicile if

23

determination of residence or domicile is required under the

24

laws of this state or a judicial order issued pursuant to a

25

civil or criminal proceeding of this state.

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(3) Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and 8 U.S.c. § 1644.

2

Cd) A person who is a United States citizen or an

3

alien who is lawfully present in the United States and is a

4

resident of this state may bring an action in circuit court to

5

challenge any official or head of an agency of this state or

6

political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to,

7

an officer of a court in this state, that adopts or implements

8

a policy or practice that is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373

9

or 8 U.S.C. § 1644. If there is a judicial finding that an

10

official or head of an agency, including, but riot limited to,

11

an officer of a court in this state, has violated this

12

section, the court shall order that the officer, official, or

13

head of an agency pay a civil penalty of not less than one

14

thousand dollars ($1,000) and not more than five thousand

15

dollars ($5,000) for each day that the policy or practice has

16

remained in effect after the filing of an action pursuant to

17

this section.

18

Ce) A court shall collect the civil penalty

19

prescribed in subsection (d) and remit one half of the civil

20

penalty to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security and the

21

second half shall be remitted to the Department of Public

22

Safety.

23

(f) Every person working for the State of Alabama or

24

a political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited

25

to, a law enforcement agency in the State of Alabama or a

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political subdivision thereof, shall have a duty to report violations of this act. Any person who willfully fails to report any violation of this act when the person knows that this act is being violated shall be guilty of obstructing governmental operations as defined in Section 13A-10-2 of the Code of Alabama 1975.
(g) For the purposes of this section, the term "official or head of an agency of this state" shall not include a law enforcement officer or other personnel employed in a jail who is acting within the line and scope of his or her duty.
(h) For the purposes of this act, any proceedings against an official shall be only in his or her official capacity. Each side on any litigation considered within this act shall bear their own costs and fees associated with the litigation unless otherwise ordered by the court. For the purposes of this act, the relevant statute of repose for assessing penalties shall be no more than 30 days prior to the initial allegation of the violations of this act.
Section 6. (a) No official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court of this state, may adopt a policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement of this act to less than the full extent permitted by this act or that in any way limits communication between its officers or

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officials in furtherance of the enforcement of this act. If, in the judgment of the Attorney General of Alabama, an official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court of this state, is in violation of this subsection, the Attorney General shall report any violation of this subsection to the Governor and the state Comptroller and that agency or political subdivision shall not be eligible to receive any funds, grants, or appropriations from the State of Alabama until such violation has ceased and the Attorney General has so certified.
(b) All state officials, agencies, and personnel, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court of this state, shall fully comply with and, to the full extent permitted by law, support the enforcement of this act.
(c) Except as provided by this act, officials or agencies of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court of this state, may not be prohibited or in any way be restricted from sending, receiving, or maintaining information relating to the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual or exchanging that information with any other federal, state, or local governmental entity for any of the following official purposes:

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(1) Determining the eligibility for any public

2

benefit, service, or license provided by any state, local, or

3

other political subdivision of this state.

4

(2) Verifying any claim of residence or domicile if

5

determination of residence or domicile is required under the

6

laws of this state or a judicial order issued pursuant to a

7

civil or criminal proceeding of this state.

8

(3) Pursuant to 8 U.s.c. § 1373 and 8 U.S.C. § 1644.

9

(d) A person who is a United States citizen or an

10

alien who is lawfully present in the United States and is a

11

resident of this state may bring an action in circuit court to

12

challenge any official or head of an agency of this state or

13

political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to,

14

an officer of a court in this state, that adopts or implements

15

a policy or practice that limits or restricts the enforcement

16

of this act to less than the full extent permitted by this

17

act. Such person shall have actual knowledge that any official

18

or head of an agency of this state or political subdivision

19

thereof, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court

20

in this state, has adopted or implemented a policy or practice

21

that limits or restricts the enforcement of this act to less

22

than the full extent permitted by this act. If there is a

23

judicial finding that an official or head of an agency,

24

including, but not limited to, an officer of a court in this

25

state, has violated this section, the court shall order that

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the officer, official, or head of an agency pay a civil penalty of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each day that the policy or practice has remained in effect after the filing of an action pursuant to this section.
(e) A court shall collect the civil penalty prescribed in subsection (d) and remit one half of the civil penalty to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security and the second half shall be remitted to the Department of Public Safety.
(f) Every person working for the State of Alabama or a political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, a law enforcement agency in the State of Alabama or a political subdivision thereof, shall have a duty to report violations of this act. Failure to report any violation of this act when there is reasonable cause to believe that this act is being violated is guilty of obstructing governmental operations as defined in Section 13A-10-2, Code of Alabama 1975, and shall be punishable pursuant to state law.
(g) For the purposes of this section, the term "official or head of an agency of this stateH shall not include a law enforcement officer or other personnel employed in a jail who is acting within the line and scope of his or her duty.

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Section 7. (a) As used in this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION. The same meaning as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (3)
(2) FEDERAL PUBLIC BENEFITS. The same meaning as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1611.
(3) STATE OR LOCAL PUBLIC BENEFITS. The same meaning as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.
(b) An alien who is not lawfully present in the United States and who is not defined as an alien eligible for public benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) or 8 U.S.C. § 1641 shall not receive any state or local public benefits.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) or where exempted by federal law, commencing on the effective date of this act, each agency or political subdivision of the state shall verify with the federal government the lawful presence in the United States of each alien who applies for state or local public benefits, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), 1621, and 1625.
(d) An agency of this state or a county, city, town, or other political subdivision of this state may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section.
(e) Verification of lawful presence in the United States shall not be required for any of the following:

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(1) For primary or secondary school education, and state or local public benefits that are listed in 8 U.s.c. § 1621(b)
(2) For obtaining health care items and services that are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition of the person involved and are not related to an organ transplant procedure.
(3) For short term, noncash, in kind emergency disaster relief.
(4) For public health assistance for immunizations with respect to immunizable diseases, for the special supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and children, and for testing and treatment of symptoms of communicable diseases, whether or not such symptoms are caused by a communicable disease.
(5) For programs, services, or assistance, such as soup kitchens, crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter specified by federal law or regulation that satisfy all of the following:
a. Deliver in-kind services at the community level, including services through public or private nonprofit agencies.
b. Do not condition the provision of assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance

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provided on the income or resources of the individual recipient.
c. Are necessary for the protection of life or safety.
(6) For prenatal care. (7) For child protective services and adult protective services and domestic violence services workers. (f) No official of this state or political subdivision of this state shall attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States. An alien's lawful presence in the United States shall be verified by the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). (g) Any United States citizen applying for state or local public benefits, except those benefits described in subsection (e), shall sign a declaration that he or she is a United States citizen. (h) Any person who knowingly makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in a declaration executed pursuant to subsection (g) shall be guilty of perjury in the second degree pursuant to Section 13A-10-102, Code of Alabama 1975. Each time that a person receives a public benefit based upon such a statement or representation shall constitute a separate violation of Section 13A-10-102, Code of Alabama 1975.

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(i) The verification that an alien seeking state or

2

local public benefits is an alien lawfully present in the

3

United States shall be made through the Systematic Alien

4

Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program, operated by the

5

United States Department of Homeland Security. If for any

6

reason the verification of an alien's lawful presence through

7

the SAVE program is delayed or inconclusive, the alien shall

8

be eligible for state or local public benefits in the interim

9

period if the alien signs a declaration that he or she is an

10

alien lawfully present in the United States. The penalties

11

under subsection (h) shall apply to any false, fictitious, or

12

fraudulent statement or representation made in a declaration.

13

(j) Each state agency or department that administers

14

a program that provides state or local public benefits shall

15

provide an annual report with respect to its compliance with

16

this section to the Government Affairs Committee of the Senate

17

and the Government Operations Committee of the House of

18

Representatives, or any successor committees.

19

(k) Errors arid significant delays resulting from use

20

of the SAVE program shall be reported to the United States

21

Department of Homeland Security and to the Alabama Department

22

of Homeland Security to assist the federal government in

23

ensuring that the application of the SAVE program is not

24

wrongfully denying benefits to aliens lawfully present in the

25

United States.

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(1) For the purposes of administering the Alabama

2

Child Health Insurance Program, verification and documentation

3

of lawful presence through any alternative means expressly

4

authorized by federal law shall satisfy the requirements of

5

this section.

6

Section 8. An alien who is not lawfully present in

7

the United States shall not be permitted to enroll in or

8

attend any public postsecondary education institution in this

9

state. An alien attending any public postsecondary institution

10

in this state must eitherpossess lawful permanent residence

11

or an appropriate nonimmigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et

12

seq. For the purposes of this section, a public postsecondary

13

education institution officer may seek federal verification of

14

an alien's immigration status with the federal government

15

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) . A public postsecondary

16

education institution officer or official shall not attempt to

17

independently make a final determination of whether an alien

18

is lawfully present in the United States. Except as otherwise

19

provided by law, an alien who is not lawfully present in the

20

United States shall not be eligible for any postsecondary

21

education benefit, including, but not limited to,

22

scholarships, grants, or financial aid.

23

Section 9. (a) As a condition for the award of any

24

contract, grant, or incentive by the state, any political

25

subdivision thereof, or any state-funded entity to a business

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entity or employer that employs one or more employees, the

2

business entity or employer shall not knowingly employ, hire

3

for employment, or continue to employ an unauthorized alien

4

and shall attest to such, by sworn affidavit signed before a

5

notary.

6

(b) As a condition for the award of any contract,

7

grant, or incentive by the state, any political subdivision

8

thereof, or any state-funded entity to a business entity or

9

employer that employs one or more employees, the business

10

entity or employer shall provide documentation establishing

11

that the business entity or employer is enrolled in the

12

E-Verify program. During the performance of the contract, the

13

business entity or employer shall participate in the E-Verify

14

program and shall verify every employee that is required to be

15

verified according to the applicable federal rules and

16

regulations.

17

(c) No subcontractor on a project paid for by

18

contract, grant, or incentive by the state, any political

19

subdivision thereof, or any state-funded entity shall

20

knowingly employ, hire for employment, or continue to employ

21

an unauthorized alien and shall attest to such by sworn

22

affidavit signed before a notary. The subcontractor shall also

23

enroll in the E-Verify program prior to performing any work on

24

the project and shall attach to the sworn affidavit

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documentation establishing that the subcontractor is enrolled

2

in the E-Verify program.

3

(d) A contractor of any tier shall not be liable

4

under this section when such contractor contracts with its

5

direct subcontractor who violates subsection (c), if the

6

contractor receives a sworn affidavit from the subcontractor

7

signed before a notary attesting to the fact that the direct

8

subcontractor, in good faith, has complied with subsection (c)

9

with respect to verifying each of its employee's eligibility

10

for employment, unless the contractor knows the direct

11

subcontractor is violating subsection (c)

12

(e) (1) Upon the first violation of subsection (a) by

13

any business entity or employer awarded a contract by the

14

state, any political subdivision thereof, or any state-funded

15

entity the business entity or employer shall be deemed in

16

breach of contract and the state, political subdivision

17

thereof, or state-funded entity may terminate the contract

18

after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. Upon

19

application by the state entity, political subdivision

20

thereof, or state-funded entity, the Attorney General may

21

bring an action to suspend the business licenses and permits

22

of the business entity or employer for a period not to exceed

23

60 days, according to the procedures described in Section 15.

24

The court shall order the business entity or employer to file

25

a signed, sworn affidavit with the local district attorney

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within three days after the order is issued by the court

2

stating that the business entity or employer has terminated

3

the employment of every unauthorized alien and the business

4

entity or employer will not knowingly or intentionally employ

5

an unauthorized alien in this state. Before a business license

6

or permit that has been suspended under this subsection is

7

reinstated, a legal representative of the business entity or

8

employer shall submit to the court a signed, sworn affidavit

9

stating that the business entity or employer is in compliance

10

with the provisions of this act and a copy of the Memorandum

11

of Understanding issued to the business entity or employer at

12

the time of enrollment in E-Verify.

13

(2) Upon a second or subsequent violation of

14

subsection (a) by any business entity or employer awarded a

15

contract by the state, any political subdivision thereof, or

16

any state-funded entity the business entity or employer shall

17

be deemed in breach of contract and the state, any political

18

subdivision thereof, or any state-funded entity shall

19

terminate the contract after providing notice and an

20

opportunity to be heard. Upon application by the state entity,

21

political subdivision thereof, or state-funded entity, the

22

Attorney General may bring an action to permanently revoke the

23

business licenses and permits of the business entity or

24

employer according to the procedures described in Section 15.

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(f) (1) Upon the first violation of subsection (c) by

2

a subcontractor, the state or political subdivision thereof

3

may bar the subcontractor from doing business with the state,

4

any political subdivision thereof, any state-funded entity, or

5

with any contractor who contracts with the state, any

6

political subdivision thereof, or any state-funded entity

7

after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. Upon

8

application by the state entity or political subdivision

9

thereof, or state-funded entity, the Attorney General may

10

bring an action to suspend the business licenses and permits

11

of the subcontractor for a period not to exceed 60 days,

12

according to the procedures described in Section 15. The court

13

shall order the subcontractor to file a signed, sworn

14

affidavit with the local district attorney within three days

15

after the order is issued by the court stating that the

16

subcontractor has terminated the employment of every

17

unauthorized alien and the subcontractor will not knowingly or

18

intentionally employ an unauthorized alien in this state.

19

Before a business license or permit that has been suspended

20

under this subsection is reinstated, a legal representative of

21

the subcontractor shall submit to the court a signed, sworn

22

affidavit stating that the subcontractor is in compliance with

23

the provisions of this act and a copy of the Memorandum of

24

Understanding issued to the subcontractor at the time of

25

enrollment in E-Verify.

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(2) Upon a second or subsequent violation of subsection (c) by a subcontractor and upon application by the state entity or political subdivision thereof, or state-funded entity, the Attorney General may bring an action to permanently suspend the business licenses of the business entity or employer according to the procedures described in Section 15. The determination of a violation shall be according to the procedures described in Section 15.
(g) A business entity or employer that complies with subsection (b) shall not be found to be in violation of subsection (a) . A subcontractor that is enrolled in the E-Verify program during the full period of performance of the subcontract shall not be found to be in violation of subsection (c)
(h) The Secretary of State shall adopt rules to administer this section and shall report any rules adopted to the Legislature.
(i) Compliance with this section may be verified by the state authorities or law enforcement at any time to ensure a contractual agreement as provided for in this section is being met.
(j) The suspension of a business license or permit under subsection (e) (1) and (f) (1) shall terminate one business day after a legal representative of the business entity, employer, or subcontractor submits a signed, sworn

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affidavit stating that the business entity, employer, or subcontractor is in compliance with the provisions of this act to the court.
Section 10. (a) In addition to any violation of federal law, a person is guilty of willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.s.c. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.a. § 1306(a), and the person is an alien unlawfully present in the United 5tates.
(b) In the enforcement of this section, an alien's immigration status shall be determined by verification of the alien's immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.5.. § 1373(c). A law enforcement officer shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.
(c) A law enforcement official or agency of this state or a county, city, or other political subdivision of this state may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section except to the extent permitted by the United 5tates constitution and the constitution of Alabama of 1901.
(d) This section does not app]y to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to be present in the United States.
(e) Any record that relates to the immigration status of a person is admissible in any court of this state

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without further foundation or testimony from a custodian of records if the record is certified as authentic by the federal government agency that is responsible for maintaining the record. A verification of an alien's immigration status received from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.s.c. § 1373(c) shall constitute proof of that aliens status. A court of this state shall consider only the federal government's verification in determining whether an alien is lawfully present in the United 5tates.
(f) An alien unlawfully present in the United 5tates who is in violation of this section shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than 30 days in jail.
(g) A court shall collect the assessments prescribed in subsection (f) and remit 50 percent of the assessments to the general fund of the local government where the person was apprehended to be earmarked for law enforcement purposes, 25 percent of the assessments to the Alabama Department of Homeland security, and 25 percent of the assessments to the Department of Public safety.
Section 11. (a) It is unlawful for a person who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public or private place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.

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(b) In the enforcement of this section, an alien's immigration status shall be determined by verification of the alien v s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). A law enforcement officer shall not attempt to independently make a final determination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the United States.
(c) A law enforcement official or agency of this state or a county, city, or other political subdivision of this state may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section except to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
(d) This section does not apply to a person who maintains authorization from the federal government to be employed in the United States.
(e) Any record that relates to the employment authorization of a person is admissible in any court of this state without further foundation or testimony from a custodian of records if the record is certified as authentic by the federal government agency that is responsible for maintaining the record. A verification of an alien's immigration status received from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) shall constitute proof of that alien T s status. A court of this state shall consider only the federal government's

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verification in determining whether a person is an unauthorized alien.
(f) It is unlawful for an occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street, roadway, or highway to attempt to hire or hire and pick up passengers for work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement o± traffic.
(g) It is unlawful for a person to enter a motor vehicle that is stopped on a street, roadway or highway in order to be hired by an occupant of the motor vehicle and to be transported to work at a different location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes the normal movement of traffic.
(h) A person who is in violation of this section shall be guilty o± a Class C misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500)
(i) A court shall collect the assessments prescribed in subsection (h) and remit 50 percent of the assessments to the general fund of the local government where the person was apprehended to be earmarked for law enforcement purposes, 25 percent of the assessments to the Alabama Department of Homeland Security, and 25 percent of the assessments to the Department of Public Safety.
(j) The terms of this section shall be interpreted consistently with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a and any applicable federal rules and regulations.

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Section 12. (a) Upon any lawful stop, detention, or arrest made by a state, county, or municipal law enforcement officer of this state in the enforcement of any state law or ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the citizenship and immigration status of the person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Such determination shall be made by contacting the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) and relying upon any verification provided by the federal government.
(b) Any alien who is arrested and booked into custody shall have his or her immigration status determined pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). The alien's immigration status shall be verified by contacting the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) within 24 hours of the time of the alien's arrest. If for any reason federal verification pursuant to 8 U.s.c. § 1373(c) is delLayed beyond the time that the alien would otherwise be released from custody, the alien shall be released from custody.
(c) A law enforcement officer shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States. A law enforcement officer may not consider race, color, or national origin in

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implementing the requirements of this section except to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
(d) A person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States if the person provides to the law enforcement officer any of the following:
(1) A valid, unexpired Alabama driver's license. (2) A valid, unexpired Alabama nondriver identification card. (3) A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of tribal identification bearing a photograph or other biometric identifier. (4) Any valid United States federal or state government issued identification document bearing a photograph or other biometric identifier, if issued by an entity that requires proof of lawful presence in the United States before issuance. (5) A foreign passport with an unexpired United States Visa and a corresponding stamp or notation by the United States Department of Homeland Security indicating the bearer ! s admission to the United States. (6) A foreign passport issued by a visa waiver country with the corresponding entry stamp and unexpired duration of stay annotation or an 1-94W form by the United

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States Department of Homeland Security indicating the bearer!s admission to the United States.
(e) If an alien is determined by the federal government to be an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), the law enforcement agency shall cooperate in the transfer of the alien to the custody of the federal government, if the federal government so requests.
Section 13. (a) It shall be unlawful for a person to do any of the following:
(1) Conceal, harbor, or shield or attempt to conceal, harbor, or shield or conspire to conceal, harbor, or shield an alien from detection in any place in this state, including any building or any means of transportation, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien has come to, has entered, or remains in the United States in violation of federal law.
(2) Encourage or induce an alien to come to or reside in this state if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that such coming to, entering, or residing in the United States is or will be in violation of federal law.
(3) Transport, or attempt to transport, or conspire to transport in this state an alien in furtherance of the unlawful presence of the alien in the United States,

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knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that the

2

alien has come to, entered, or remained in the United States

3

in violation of federal law. Conspiracy to be so transported

4

shall be a vio]atiori of this subdivision.

5

(4) Harbor an alien unlawfully present in the United

6

States by entering into a rental agreement, as defined by

7

Section 35-9A-141 of the Code of Alabama 1975, with an alien

8

to provide accommodations, if the person knows or recklessly

9

disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in

10

the United States.

11

(b) Any person violating the provisions of this

12

section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for each unlawfully

13

present alien, the illegal presence of which in the United

14

States and the State of AlLabama, he or she is facilitating or

15

is attempting to facilitate.

16

(c) A person violating the provisions of this

17

section is guilty of a Class C felony when the violation

18

involves 10 or more aliens, the illegal presence of which in

19

the United States and the State of Alabama, he or she is

20

facilitating or is attempting to facilitate.

21

(d) Notwithstanding any other law, a law enforcement

22

agency may securely transport an alien whom the agency has

23

received verification from the federal government pursuant to

24

8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) is unlawfully present in the United States

25

and who is in the agencys custody to a state approved

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facility, to a federal facility in this state, or to any other

2

point of transfer into federal custody that is outside the

3

jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency. A law enforcement

4

agency shall obtain judicial or executive authorization from

5

the Governor before securely transporting an alien who is

6

unlawfully present in the United States to a point of transfer

7

that is outside this state.

8

(e) Notwithstanding any other law, any person acting

9

in his or her official capacity as a first responder or

10

protective services provider may harbor, shelter, move, or

11

transport an alien unlawfully present in the United States

12

pursuant to state law.

13

(f) Any conveyance, including any vessel, vehicle,

14

or aircraft, that has been or is being used in the commission

15

of a violation of this section, and the gross proceeds of such

16

a violation, shall be subject to civil forfeiture under the

17

procedures of Section 20-2-93 of the Code of Alabama 1975.

18

(g) In the enforcement of this section, an alien's

19

immigration status shall be determined by verification of the

20

alien's immigration status with the federal government

21

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). A law enforcement officer

22

shall not attempt to independently make a final determination

23

of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.

24

(h) Any record that relates to the immigration

25

status of a person is admissible in any court of this state

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without further foundation or testimony from a custodian of records if the record is certified as authentic by the federal government agency that is responsible for maintaining the record. A verification of an alien's immigration status received from the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) shall constitute proof of that aliens status. A court of this state shall consider only the federal govexnment's verification in determining whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.
Section 14. (a) A person commits the crime of dealing in false identification documents if he or she knowingly reproduces, manufactures, sells, or offers for sale any identification document which does both of the following:
(1) Simulates, purports to be, or is designed so as to cause others reasonably to believe it to be an identification document.
(2) Bears a fictitious name or other false information.
(b) A person commits the crime of vital records identity fraud related to birth, death, marriage, and divorce certificates if he or she does any of the following:
(1) Supplies false information intending that the information be used to obtain a certified copy of a vital record.

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(2) Makes, counterfeits, alters, amends, or mutilates any certified copy of a vital record without lawful authority arid with the intent to deceive.
(3) Obtains, possesses, uses, sells, or furnishes, or attempts to obtain, possess, or furnish to another a certified copy of a vital record, with the intent to deceive.
(c) (1) Dealing in false identification documents is a Class C felony.
(2) Vital records identity fraud is a Class C felony.
(ci) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) A person less than 21 years of age who uses the identification document of another person to acquire an alcoholic beverage.
(2) A person less than 19 years of age who uses the identification documents of another person to acquire any of the following:
a. Cigarettes or tobacco products. b. A periodical, videotape, or other communication medium that contains or depicts nudity. c. Admittance to a performance, live or film, that prohibits the attendance of the person based on age. d. An item that is prohibited by law for use or consumption by such person.

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(e) As used in this section, "identification

2

document" means any card, certificate, or document or banking

3

instrument, including, but not limited to, a credit or debit

4

card, which identifies or purports to identify the bearer of

5

such document, whether or not intended for use as

6

identification, and includes, but is not limited to, documents

7

purporting to be drivers' licenses, nondriver identification

8

cards, certified copies of birth, death, marriage, and divorce

9

certificates, Social Security cards, and employee

10

identification cards.

11

(f) Any person convicted of dealing in false

12

identification documents as defined in this section shall be

13

fined up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for every card or

14

document he or she creates or possesses and be subject to any

15

and all other state laws that may apply. A court shall collect

16

the fines prescribed by this subsection and shall remit 50

17

percent of the fines to the general fund of the local

18

government that apprehended the person to be earmarked for law

19

enforcement purposes, 25 percent of the fines to the Alabama

20

Department of Homeland Security, and 25 percent of the fines

21

to the Department of Public Safety.

22

Section 15. (a) No business entity, employer, or

23

public employer shall knowingly employ, hire for employment,

24

or continue to employ an unauthorized alien to perform work

25

within the State of Alabama. Knowingly employ, hire for

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employment, or continue to employ an unauthorized alien means

2

the actions described in 8 U.s.c. § 1324a.

3

(b) Effective April 1, 2012, every business entity

4

or employer in this state shall enroll in E-Verify and

5

thereafter, according to the federal statutes and regulations

6

governing F-Verify, shall verify the employment eligibility of

7

the employee through E-Verify. A business entity or employer

8

that uses E-Verify to verify the work authorization of an

9

employee shall not be deemed to have violated this section

10

with respect to the employment of that employee.

11

(c) On a finding of a first violation by a court of

12

competent jurisdiction that a business entity or employer

13

knowingly violated subsection (a), the court shall do all of

14

the following:

15

(1) Order the business entity or employer to

16

terminate the employment of every unauthorized alien.

17

(2) 5ubject the business entity or employer to a

18

three-year probationary period throughout the state. During

19

the probationary period, the business entity or employer shall

20

file quarterly reports with the local district attorney of

21

each new employee who is hired by the business entity or

22

employer in the state.

23

(3) Order the business entity or employer to file a

24

signed, sworn affidavit with the local district attorney

25

within three days after the order is issued by the court

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stating that the business entity or employer has terminated the employment of every unauthorized alien and the business entity or employer will not knowingly or intentionally employ an unauthorized alien in this state.
(4) Direct the applicable state, county, or municipal governing bodies to suspend the business licenses and permits, if such exist, of the business entity or employer for a period not to exceed 10 business days specific to the business location where the unauthorized alien performed work.
(d) (1) Before a business license or permit that has been suspended under subsection (c) is reinstated, a ]ega] representative of the business entity or employer shall submit to the court a signed, sworn affidavit stating that the business entity or employer is in compliance with the provisions of this act and a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding issued to the business entity or emp]oyer at the time of enrollment in E-Verify.
(2) The suspension of a business license or permit under subsection (c) shall terminate one business day after a legal representative of the business entity or employer submits a signed, sworn affidavit stating that the business entity or employer is in compliance with the provisions of this act to the court.
(e) For a second violation of subsection (a) by a business entity or employer, the court shall direct the

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1

applicable state, county, or municipal governing body to

2

permanently revoke all business licenses and permits, if such

3

exist, held by the business entity or employer specific to the

4

business location where the unauthorized alien performed work.

5

On receipt of the order, and notwithstanding any other law,

6

the appropriate agencies shall immediately revoke the licenses

7

and permits held by the business entity or employer.

8

(f) For a subsequent violation of subsection (a),

9

the court shall direct the applicable governing bodies to

10

forever suspend the business licenses and permits, if such

11

exist, of the business entity or employer throughout the

12

state.

13

(g) This section shall not be construed to deny any

14

procedural mechanisms or legal defenses included in the

15

E-Verify program or any other federal work authorization

16

program. A person or entity that establishes that it has

17

complied in good faith with the requirements of 8 U.s.c. §

18

1324a(b) establishes an affirmative defense that the business

19

entity or employer did not knowingly hire or employ an

20

unauthorized alien.

21

(h) In proceedings of the court, the determination

22

of whether an employee is an unauthorized alien shall be made

23

by the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.s.c. § 1373 (c) The

24

court shall consider only the federal government's

25

determination when deciding whether an employee is an

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unauthorized alien. The court may take judicial notice of any verification of an individual's immigration status previously provided by the federal government and may request the federal government to provide further automated or testimonial verification.
(i) Any business entity or employer that terminates an employee to comply with this section shall not be liable for any claims made against the business entity or employer by the terminated employee, provided that such termination is made without regard to the race, ethnicity, or nationaJ origin of the employee and that such termination is consistent with the anti-discrimination laws of this state and of the United States.
(j) If any agency of the state or any political subdivision thereof fails to suspend the business licenses or permits, if such exist, as a result of a violation of this section, the agency shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of Section 5 and shall be subject to the penalties thereunder.
(k) In addition to the district attorneys of this state, the Attorney General shall also have authority to bring a civil complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of this section.
(1) Any resident of this state may petition the Attorney General to bring an enforcement action against a

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specific business entity or employer by means of a written,

2

signed petition. A valid petition shall include an allegation

3

that describes the alleged violator or violators, as well as

4

the action constituting the violation, and the date and

5

location where the action occurred.

6

(2) A petition that alleges a violation on the basis

7

of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid

8

and shall not be acted upon.

9

(3) The Attorney General shall respond to any

10

petition under this subdivision within 60 days of receiving

11

the petition, either by filing a civil complaint in a court of

12

competent jurisdiction or by informing the petitioner in

13

writing that the Attorney General has determined that filing a

14

civil complaint is not warranted.

15

(1) This section does not apply to the relationship

16

between a party and the employees of an independent contractor

17

performing work for the party and does not apply to casual

18

domestic labor performed within a household.

19

(m) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of

20

subsection (a) of this section that a business entity or

21

employer was entrapped.

22

(1) To claim entrapment, the business entity or

23

employer must admit by testimony or other evidence the

24

substantial elements of the violation.

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(2) A business entity or employer who asserts an entrapment defense has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the following:
a. The idea of committing the violation started with law enforcement officers or their agents rather than with the business entity or employer.
b. The law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the business entity or employer to commit the violation.
c. The business entity or employer was not already predisposed to commit the violation before the law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the employer to commit the violation.
(n) In addition to actions taken by the state or political subdivisions thereof, the Attorney General or the district attorney of the relevant county may bring an action to enforce the requirements of this section in any county district court of this state wherein the business entity or employer does business.
(0) The terms of this section shall be interpreted consistently with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a and any applicable federal rules and regulations.
Section 16. (a) No wage, compensation, whether in money or in kind or in services, or remuneration of any kind for the performance of services paid to an unauthorized alien

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shall be allowed as a deductible business expense for any state income or business tax purposes in this state. This subsection shall apply whether or not an Internal Revenue Service Form 1099 is issued in conjunction with the wages or remuneration.
(b) Any business entity or employer who knowingly fails to comply with the requirements of this section shall be liable for a penalty equal to 10 times the business expense deduction claimed in violation of subsection (a) . The penalty provided in this subsection shall be payable to the Alabama Department of Revenue.
Section 17. (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice for a business entity or employer to fail to hire a job applicant who is a United States citizen or an alien who is authorized to work in the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (3) or discharge an employee working in Alabama who is a United States citizen or an alien who is authorized to work in the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h) (3) while retaining or hiring an emp]oyee who the business entity or employer knows, or reasonably should have known, is an unauthorized alien.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) may be the basis of a civil action in the state courts of this state. Any recovery under this subsection shall be limited to

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1

compensatory relief and shall not include any civil or

2

criminal sanctions against the employer.

3

(c) The losing party in any civil action shall pay

4

the court costs and reasonable attorneys fees for the

5

prevailing party; however, the losing party shall only pay the

6

attorneys fees of the prevailing party up to the amount paid

7

by the losing party for his or her own attorneys fees.

8

(d) The amount of the attorneys fees spent by each

9

party shall be reported to the court before the verdict is

10

rendered.

11

(e) In proceedings of the court, the determination

12

of whether an employee is an unauthorized alien shall be made

13

by the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.s.c. § 1373(c). The

14

court shall consider only the federal government!s

15

determination when deciding whether an employee is an

16

unauthorized alien. The court may take judicial notice of any

17

verification of an individual's immigration status previously

18

provided by the federal government and may request the federal

19

government to provide further automated or testimonial

20

verification.

21

5ection 18. Section 32-6-9, code of Alabama 1975, is

22

amended to read as follows:

23

!I3269

24

"(a) Every licensee shall have his or her license in

25

his or her immediate possession at all times when driving a

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motor vehicle and shall display the same, upon demand of a

2

judge of any court, a peace officer or a state trooper.

3

However, no person charged with violating this section shall

4

be convicted if he or she produces in court or the office of

5

the arresting officer a driver's license theretofore issued to

6

him or her and valid at the time of his or her arrest.

7

'(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section

8

32-1-4, if a law officer arrests a person for a violation of

9

this section and the officer is unable to determine by any

10

other means that the person has a valid driver's iLicense, the

11

officer shall trans p ort the p erson to the nearest or most

12

accessible maistrate.

13

9(c) A reasonable effort shall be made to determine

14

the citizenship of the person and if an alien, whether the

15

alien is lawfull y p resent in the United States b y verification

16

with the federal overnment iursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). An

17

officer shall not attempt to independent]y make a fina]

18

determination of whether an alien is lawfull y iresent in the

19

United States.

20

(d) A verification inquiry, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

21

1373(c), shall be made within 48 hours to the Law Enforcement

22

Support Center of the United States Department of Homeland

23

Security or other office or agency designated for that purpose

24

by the federa] government. If the person is determined to be

25

an alien unlawfully present in the United States, the person

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1

shall be considered a flight risk and shall be detained until

2

prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration

3

authorities."

4

Section 19. (a) When a person is charged with a

5

crime for which bail is required, or is confined for any

6

period in a state, county, or municipal jail, a reasonable

7

effort shall be made to determine if the person is an alien

8

unlawfully present in the United States by verification with

9

the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c)

10

(b) A verification inquiry, pursuant to 8 U.s.c. §

11

1373(c), shall be made within 48 hours to the Law Enforcement

12

Support Center of the United States Department of Homeland

13

Security or other office or agency designated for that purpose

14

by the federal government. If the person is determined to be

15

an alien unlawfully present in the United States, the person

16

shall be considered a flight risk and shall be detained until

17

prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration

18

authorities.

19

Section 20. If an alien who is unlawfully present in

20

the United States is convicted of a violation of state or

21

local law and is within 30 days of release or has paid any

22

fine as required by operation of law, the agency responsible

23

for his or her incarceration shall notify the United States

24

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Alabama

25

Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373.

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The Alabama Department of Fiomeland Security shall assist in the coordination of the transfer of the prisoner to the appropriate federal immigration authorities; however, the Alabama Department of Corrections shall maintain custody during any transfer of the individual.
Section 21. If a person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States and is a victim of a criminal act, is the child of a victim of a criminal act, is a critical witness in any prosecution, or is the child of a critical witness in any prosecution of a state or federal crime, all provisions of this act shall be stayed until all of the related legal proceedings are concluded. However, the relevant state, county, or local law enforcement agency shall comply with any request by federal immigration officers to take custody of the person.
Section 22. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 31-9A--9 of the Code of Alabama 1975, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security may hire, appoint, and maintain APOST certified state law enforcement officers. Such officers shall receive the same rights and benefits as those prescribed to officers of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, except for the purposes of retirement. The officers shall have the same retirement benefits as a law enforcement officer as defined under Section 36-27-59 of the Code of Alabama 1975.

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(b) Unless a violation of state law occurs in their presence, officers authorized under this section shall not engage in routine law enforcement activity, except for those investigative and analytical duties necessary to carry out the enforcement of this act and to fulfill the mission of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security or those duties necessary to provide assistance to other law enforcement agencies.
(c) The Director of the Alabama Department of Homeland Security shall have the authority to promulgate rules for the enforcement of this act.
Section 23. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security shall have the authority to coordinate with state and local law enforcement the practice and methods required to enforce this act in cooperation with federal immigration authorities and consistent with federal immigration laws.
Section 24. The Alabama Department of Homeland Security shall file a quarterly report to the Legislature on the progress being made regarding the enforcement of this act and the status of the progress being made in the effort to reduce the number of illegal aliens in the State of Alabama. The report shall include, but is not limited to, the statistics and results from the enforcement of the sections of this act, and suggestions on what can be done including additional legislation to further assist the federal

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government in its efforts to apprehend illegal aliens in the State of Alabama. At the start of the 2013 fiscal year, the report shall be filed twice a year. At the start of the 2015 fiscal year, the report is required annually. This report shall also be made available to the public arid shall be announced through a press release from the Attorney General's office.
Section 25. (a) A solicitation to violate any criminal provision of this act, an attempt to violate any criminal provision of this act, or a conspiracy to violate any criminal provision of this act shall have the same penalty as a violation of this act.
(b) For the purposes of this section, solicitation shall have the same principles of liability and defenses as criminal solicitation under subsections (b) through (e) of Section 13A-4-1, Code of Alabama 1975, and Section 13A-4-5, Code of Alabama 1975.
(c) For the purposes of this section, attempt shall have the same principles of liability and defenses as attempt under subsections (b) and (c) of Section 13A-4-2, Code of Alabama 1975, and Section 13A-4-5, Code of Alabama 1975.
(d) For the purposes of this section, conspiracy shall have the same principles of liability and defenses as criminal conspiracy under subsections (b) through (f) of

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Section 13A-4-3, Code of Alabama 1975, and Sections 13A-4-4

2

and 13A-4-5, Code of Alabama 1975.

3

Section 26. (a) (1) The Alabama Department of

4

Homeland Security shall establish and maintain an E-Verify

5

employer agent service for any business entity or employer in

6

this state with 25 or fewer employees to use the E-Verify

7

program to verify an employees employment eligibility on

8

behalf of the business entity or employer. The Alabama

9

Department of Homeland Security shall establish an E-Verify

10

employer agent account with the United States Department of

11

Homeland Security, shall enroll a participating business

12

entity or employer in the E-Verify program on its behalf, and

13

shall conform to all federal statutes and regulations

14

governing E-Verify employer agents. The Alabama Department of

15

Homeland Security shall not charge a fee to a participating

16

business entity or employer for this service.

17

(2) The Alabama Department of Homeland Security

18

E-Verify employer agent service shall be in place within 90

19

days after the effective date of this act. The service shall

20

accommodate a business entity or employer who wishes to

21

communicate with the Alabama Department of Homeland Security

22

by internet, by electronic mail, by facsimile machine, by

23

telephone, or in person, provided that such communication is

24

consistent with federal statutes and regulations governing

25

E-Verify employer agents.

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(b) On or after January 1, 2012, before receiving

2

any contract, grant, or incentive by the state, any political

3

subdivision thereof, or any state-funded entity, a business

4

entity or employer shall provide proof to the state, political

5

subdivision thereof, or state-funded entity that the business

6

entity or employer is enrolled and is participating in the

7

E-Verify program, either independently or through the Alabama

8

Department of Homeland Security E-Verify employer agent

9

service.

10

(c) Every three months, the Alabama Department of

11

Homeland Security shall request from the United States

12

Department of Homeland Security a list of every business

13

entity or employer in this state that is enrolled in the

14

E-Verify program. On receipt of the list, the Alabama

15

Department of Homeland Security shall make the list available

16

on its website.

17

(d) A business entity or employer that is enrolled

18

in the E-Verify program and that verifies the employment

19

eligibility of an employee in good faith pursuant to this

20

section, and acts in conformity with all applicable federal

21

statutes and regulations is immune from liability under

22

Alabama law for any action by an employee for wrongful

23

discharge or retaliation based on a notification from the

24

E-Verify program that the employee is an unauthorized alien.

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Section 27. (a) No court of this state shall enforce the terms of, or otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and an alien unlawfully present in the United States, if the party had direct or constructive knowledge that the alien was unlawfully present in the United States at the time the contract was entered into, and the performance of the contract required the alien to remain unlawfully present in the United States for more than 24 hours after the time the contract was entered into or performance could not reasonably be expected to occur without such remaining.
(b) This section shall not apply to a contract for lodging for one night, a contract for the purchase of food to be consumed by the alien, a contract for medical services, or a contract for transportation of the alien that is intended to facilitate the alien's return to his or her country of origin.
(c) This section shall not apply to a contract authorized by federal law.
(d) In proceedings of the court, the determination of whether an alien is unlawfully present in the United States shall be made by the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (c) . The court shall consider only the federal government ! s determination when deciding whether an alien is unlawfully present in the United States. The court may take judicial notice of any verification of an individualEs immigration status previously provided by the federal

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government and may request the federal government to provide further automated or testimonial verification.
Section 28. (a) (1) Every public elementary and secondary school in this state, at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school, shall determine whether the student enrolling in public school was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the Unkted States and qualifies for assignment to an English as Second Language class or other remedial program.
(2) The public school, when making the determination required by subdivision (1), shall rely upon presentation of the student's original birth certificate, or a certified copy thereof.
(3) If, upon review of the students birth certificate, it is determined that the student was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States, or where such certificate is not available for any reason, the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the student shall notify the school within 30 days of the date of the student's enrollment of the actual citizenship or immigration status of the student under federal law.
(4) Notification shall consist of both of the following:

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a. The presentation for inspection, to a school official designated for such purpose by the school district in which the child is enrolled, of official documentation establishing the citizenship and, in the case of an alien, the immigration status of the student, or alternatively by submission of a notarized copy of such documentation to such official.
b. Attestation by the parent, guardian, or legal custodian, under penalty of perjury, that the document states the true identity of the child. If the student or his or her parent, guardian, or legal representative possesses no such documentation but nevertheless maintains that the student is either a United States citizen or an alien lawfully present in the United States, the parent, guardian, or legal representative of the student may sign a declaration so stating, under penalty of perjury.
(5) If no such documentation or declaration is presented, the school official shall presume for the purposes of reporting under this section that the student is an alien unlawfully present in the United States.
(b) Each school district in this state shall collect and compile data as required by this section.
(c) Each school district shall submit to the State Board of Education an annual report listing all data obtained pursuant to this section.

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(d) (1) The State Board of Education shall compile and submit an annual public report to the Legislature.
(2) The report shall provide data, aggregated by public school, regarding the numbers of United States citizens, of lawfully present aliens by immigration classification, and of aliens believed to be unlawfully present in the United States enrolled at all primary and secondary public schools in this state. The report shall also provide the number of students in each category participating in English as a Second Language Programs enrolled at such schools.
(3) The report shall analyze and identify the effects upon the standard or quality of education provided to students who are citizens of the United States residing in Alabama that may have occurred, or are expected to occur in the future, as a consequence of the enrollment of students who are aliens not lawfully present n the United States.
(4) The report shall analyze and itemize the fiscal costs to the state and political subdivisions thereof of providing educational instruction, computers, textbooks and other supplies, free or discounted school meals, and extracurricular activities to students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States.
(5) The State Board of Education shall prepare and issue objective baseline criteria for identifying and

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assessing the other educational impacts on the quality of education provided to students who are citizens of the United States, due to the enrollment of aliens who are not lawfully present in the United states, in addition to the statistical data on citizenship and immigration status and English as a Second Language enrollment required by this act. The State Board of Education may contract with reputable scholars and research institutions to identify and validate such criteria. The State Board of Education shall assess such educational impacts and include such assessments in its reports to the Legislature.
(e) Public disclosure by any person of information obtained pursuant to this section which personally identifies any student shall be unlawful, except for purposes permitted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and 1644. Any person intending to make a public disclosure of information that is classified as confidential under this section, on the ground that such disclosure constitutes a use permitted by federal law, shall first apply to the Attorney General and receive a waiver of confidentiality from the requirements of this subsection.
(f) A student whose personal identity has been negligently or intentionally disclosed in violation of this section shall be deemed to have suffered an invasion of the students right to privacy. The student shall have a civil

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remedy for such violation against the agency or person that

2

has made the unauthorized disclosure.

3

(g) The State Board of Education shall construe all

4

provisions of this section in conformity with federal law.

5

(h) This section shall be enforced without regard to

6

race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or national origin.

7

Section 29. (a) Applications for voter registration

8

shall give voter eligibility requirements and such information

9

as is necessary to prevent duplicative voter registrations and

10

enable the relevant election officer to assess the eligibility

11

of the applicant and to administer voter registration,

12

identify the applicant and to determine the qualifications of

13

the applicant as an elector and the facts authorizing such

14

person to be registered. Applications shall contain a

15

statement that the applicant shall be required to provide

16

qualifying identification when voting.

17

(b) The Secretary of State shall create a process

18

for the county election officer to check to indicate whether

19

an applicant has provided with the application the information

20

necessary to assess the eligibility of the applicant,

21

including the applLicant 1 s United States citizenship. This

22

section shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with

23

federal law. No eligible applicant whose qualifications have

24

been assessed shall be denied registration.

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(c) The county election officer or Secretary of State's office shall accept any completed application for registration, but an applicant shall not be registered until the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship. Satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship shall be provided in person at the time of filing the application for registration or by including, with a mailed registration application, a photocopy of one of the documents listed as evidence of United States citizenship in subsection (k) . After a person has submitted satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the county election officer shall indicate this information in the persons permanent voter file.
(d) Any person who is registered in this state on the effective date of this act is deemed to have provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and shall not be required to submit evidence of citizenship.
(e) For purposes of this section, proof of voter registration from another state is not satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.
(f) A registered voter who moves from one residence to another within the state or who modifies his or her voter registration records for any other reason shall not be required to submit evidence of United States citizenship.

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(g) If evidence of United States citizenship is deemed to be unsatisfactory due to an inconsistency between the document submitted as evidence and the name or sex provided on the application for registration, such applicant may sign an affidavit containing both of the following:
(1) Stating the inconsistency or inconsistencies related to the name or sex, and the reason therefor.
(2) Swearing under oath that, despite the inconsistency, the applicant is the individual reflected in the document provided as evidence of citizenship.
(h) There shall be no inconsistency between the date of birth on the document provided as evidence of citizenship and the date of birth provided on the application for registration. If such an affidavit is submitted by the applicant, the county election officer or Secretary of State shall assess the eligibility of the applicant without regard to any inconsistency stated in the affidavit.
(i) All documents submitted as evidence of United States citizenship shall be kept confidential by the county election officer or the Secretary of State and maintained as provided by record retention laws.
(j) Nothing in this section shall prohibit an applicant from providing, or the Secretary of State or county election officer from obtaining, satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, as described in this section, at a

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1

different time or in a different manner than an application

2

for registration is provided, as long as the applicant's

3

eligibility can be adequately assessed by the Secretary of

4

State or county election officer as required by this section.

5

(k) Evidence of United States citizenship shall be

6

demonstrated by one of the following documents, or a legible

7

photocopy of one of the following documents:

8

(1) The applicant's driver's license or nondrivers

9

identification card issued by the division of motor vehicles

10

or the equivalent governmental agency of another state within

11

the United States if the agency indicates on the applicant's

12

driver!s license or nondriver's identification card that the

13

person has provided satisfactory proof of United States

14

citizenship.

15

(2) The applicant's birth certificate that verifies

16

United States citizenship to the satisfaction of the county

17

election officer or Secretary of State.

18

(3) Pertinent pages of the applicant's United States

19

valid or expired passport identifying the applicant and the

20

applicant's passport number, or presentation to the county

21

election officer of the applicants United States passport.

22

(4) The applicant's United States naturalization

23

documents or the number of the certificate of naturalization.

24

If only the number of the certificate of naturalization is

25

provided, the applicant shall not be included in the

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registration rolls until the number of the certificate of naturalization is verified with the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services by the county election officer or the Secretary of State, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (c)
(5) Other documents or methods of proof of TJnited States citizenship issued by the federal government pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and amendments thereto.
(6) The applicants Bureau of Indian Affairs card number, tribal treaty card number, or tribal enrollment number.
(7) The applicant T s consular report of birth abroad of a citizen of the United States of America.
(8) The applicant's certificate of citizenship issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.
(9) The applicant's certification of report of birth issued by the United States Department of State.
(10) The app1icants American Indian card, with KIC classification, issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security.
(11) The applicant's final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace.

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(12) The applicant's officialUnited States military record of service showThg the applicant's place of birth in the United States.
(13) An extract from a United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the applicant's birth indicating the applicant's place of birth in the United States.
(1) There is hereby established the State Election Board, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Lieutenant Governor. The State Election Board shall meet on the call of the Secretary of State. The State Election Board shall do both of the following:
(1) Assess information provided by any applicant for voter registration as evidence of citizenship pursuant to subsection (m)
(2) Adopt rules to implement subsection (m) (m) (1) If an applicant is a United States citizen but does not have any of the documentation listed in this section as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, the applicant may submit any evidence that the applicant believes demonstrates the applicant's United States citizenship. (2) Any applicant seeking an assessment of evidence under this section may directly contact the office of the Secretary of State by submitting a voter registration

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application or the national voter registration form and any

2

supporting evidence • of United States citizenship. Upon receipt

3

of this information, the Secretary of State shall notify the

4

State Election Board that such application is pending.

5

(3) The State Election Board shall give the

6

applicant an opportunity for a hearing, upon the applicant!s

7

request in writing, and an opportunity to present any

8

additional evidence to the State Election Board. Notice of

9

such hearThg shall be given to the applicant at least five

10

days prior to the hearing date. An applicant shall have the

11

opportunity to be represented by counsel at such hearing.

12

(4) The State Election Board shall assess the

13

evidence provided by the applicant to determine whether the

14

applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States

15

citizenship. A decision of the State Election Board shall be

16

determined by a majority vote of the board.

17

(5) If an applicant submits an application and any

18

supporting evidence prior to the close of registration for an

19

election cycle, a determination by the State Election Board

20

shall be issued at least five days before such election date.

21

(6) If the State Election Board finds that the

22

evidence presented by the applicant constitutes satisfactory

23

evidence of United States citizenship, the applicant shall

24

meet the requirements under this section to provide

25

satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

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(7) If the State Election Board finds that the evidence presented by an applicant does not constitute satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, the applicant shall have the right to appeal such determination by the State Election Board by instituting an action under 8 U.S.C. § 1503. Any negative assessment of an applicant's eligibility by the State Election Board shall be reversed if the applicant obtains a declaratory judgment pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503, demonstrating that the applicant is a national of the United States.
(n) (1) The Department of Public Health shall not charge or accept any fee for a certified copy of a birth certificate if the certificate is requested by any person who is 17 years of age or older for purposes of meeting the voter registration requirements of this act. The person requesting a certified copy of a birth certificate shall swear under oath to both of the following:
a. That the person plans to register to vote in this state.
b. That the person does not possess any of the documents that constitute evidence of United States citizenship as defined in this act.
(2) The affidavit shall specifically list the documents that constitute evidence of United States citizenship as defined in this act.

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Section 30. (a) For the purposes of this section, "business transaction" includes any transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision of the state, including, but not limited to, applying for or renewing a motor vehicle license plate, applying for or renewing a driver's license or nondriver identification card, or applying for or renewing a business license. "Business transaction" does not include applying for a marriage license.
(b) An alien not lawfully present in the United States shall not enter into or attempt to enter into a business transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state and no person shall enter into a business transaction or attempt to enter into a business transaction on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.
(c) Any person entering into a business transaction or attempting to enter into a business transaction with this state or a political subdivision of this state shall be required to demonstrate his or her United States citizenship, or if he or she is an alien, his or her lawful presence in the United States to the person conducting the business transaction on behalf of this state or a political subdivision of this state. United States citizenship shall be demonstrated by presentation of one of the documents listed in Section 29(k) An alien's lawful presence in the United States shall be demonstrated by this state's or a political subdivision of

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this state's verification of the alien's lawful presence through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program operated by the Department of Homeland Security, or by other verification with the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c)
(d) A violation of this section is a Class C felony. (e) An agency of this state or a county, city, town, or other political subdivision of this state may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section except to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. (f) In the enforcement of this section, an alien's immigration status shall be determined by verification of the aliens immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). An official of this state or political subdivision of this state shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States. Section 31. Nothing in this act is in any way meant to implement, authorize, or establish the Real ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Division D; 119 Stat. 302) Section 32. Although this bill would have as its purpose or effect the requirement of a new or increased expenditure of local funds, the bill is excluded from further requirements and application under Amendment 621, now

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appearing as Section 111.05 of the Official Recompilation of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, as amended, because the bill defines a new crime or amends the definition of an existing crime.
Section 33. The provisions of this act are severable. If any part of this act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, that declaration shall not affect the part which remains.
Section 34. Sections 22 and 23 of this act shall become effective immediately following the passage and approval of this act by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law. Section 9 shall become effective on January 1, 2012, following the passage and approval of this act by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law. Section 15 shall become effective on April 1, 2012, following the passage and approval of this act by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law. The remainder of this act shall become effective on the first day of the third month following the passage and approval of this act by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law.

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HB5 6

1 2

3

4

Speaker of the House of Representatives

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President and Presiding Officer of the Senate

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House of Representatives

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I hereby certify that the within Act originated in

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and was passed by the House 05-APR-11, as amended.

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11

Greg Pappas

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Clerk

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Senate

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House

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Senate

05-MAY-11 0 2-JUN-11 0 2-JUN-11

Amended and Passed
Passed, as amended by Conference Com-
mittee Report
Passed, as amerded by Conference Com-
mittee Report

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR HOUSING CENTER;

FAIR HOUSING CENTER OF NORTHERN ALABAMA;

CENTER FOR FAIR HOUSING, INC.; and
JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v.
JULIE MAGEE, in her official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner, and

Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND FOR DAMAGES
CLASS ACTION

JIMMY STUBBS, in his official capacity as Elmore County Probate Judge,

Defendants.

NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This is a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by Plaintiffs Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #1, and John Doe #2 for violations of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Supremacy Clause and Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 2. Plaintiff John Doe #1 is an undocumented immigrant from Mexico. He owns and resides in a manufactured home in Elmore County, Alabama, along with his partner, five-yearold U.S.-citizen son, and sixteen-year-old nephew.

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3. Plaintiff John Doe #2 is an undocumented immigrant from Mexico. Like Plaintiff Doe #1, Plaintiff Doe #2 owns and resides in a manufactured home in Elmore County, along with his partner, his five-year-old U.S.-citizen son, and his partner’s parents and three brothers.
4. This action is brought against Defendant Julie Magee in her official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner and Defendant Jimmy Stubbs in his official capacity as the Probate Judge of Elmore County, Alabama.
5. Section 30 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535 (commonly referred to as “HB 56”), forbids “[a]n alien not lawfully present in the United States” from entering into or attempting to enter into “any transaction . . . [with] the state or a political subdivision of the state,” with the sole exception of obtaining a marriage license.1 It further forbids any person from entering into or attempting to enter into such a transaction on behalf of an “alien not lawfully present in the United States.” An individual found in violation of Section 30 can be convicted of a Class C felony and subjected to up to ten years’ imprisonment.
6. Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code requires that all individuals who own, maintain, or keep a manufactured home in Alabama engage in a “transaction” with the State, within the meaning of Section 30 of HB 56. Specifically, by no later than November 30 of each calendar year, any such person must pay an annual registration fee and display a current identification decal in a conspicuous location on the outside of her manufactured home. Section 40-12-255 imposes progressive fines and penalties for non-compliance, including imprisonment.
1 A copy of the enrolled Bill is attached as Attachment 1. HB 56 has not been codified yet but is unofficially reported in electronic databases at Ala. Code § 31-13-1 et seq. (West 2011) and Ala. Code § 31-9C-1 et seq. (Michie/LexisNexis 2011).
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7. Defendants Magee and Stubbs have adopted and implemented a policy, pursuant to the requirements of Section 30 of HB 56, to reject annual manufactured home registration payments from, and thus deny identification decals to, individuals who are unable to demonstrate U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. In other words, Defendants’ policy treats the act of complying with Alabama Code § 40-12-255 as a “business transaction” under HB 56 Section 30.
8. Until the passage and implementation of Section 30 of HB 56, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 were allowed to register their manufactured homes pursuant to Alabama Code Section 40-12-255.
9. Defendants’ policy for enforcing HB 56 Section 30 makes it impossible for Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to make the annual registration payment and obtain current identification decals for their manufactured homes, as they are required to do under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 by no later than November 30, 2011. If Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 attempt to pay their annual registration fees in order to obtain current identification decals, they could face Class C felony charges for attempting to enter into a transaction with the State, in violation of HB 56 Section 30. But if Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 do not pay the annual registration fee and do not display a current identification decal by November 30, 2011, they will face fines, penalties, and Class C misdemeanor charges for violating the Manufactured Homes statute, Alabama Code Sec. 40-12-255.
10. Defendants’ policy of enforcing HB 56 Section 30 further makes it impossible for Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to move their manufactured homes on public roads in Alabama. Under subsection (j) of the Manufactured Homes Statute, a permit is required to make such a move, yet any effort to obtain a moving permit would also constitute a “business transaction”
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within the meaning of Section 30 of HB 56. Failure to obtain a moving permit before moving a manufactured home on public roads is punishable as a Class C misdemeanor under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(j)(4).
11. Section 27 of HB 56 makes unenforceable in Alabama courts virtually any contract that takes more than 24 hours to complete and is entered into where the parties know or should have known that one of them is a non-U.S. citizen who lacks proof of lawful immigration status.
12. In the event of eviction from the manufactured home parks where they currently reside, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 may therefore be forced to abandon their homes because under HB 56 they cannot lawfully move them, and any sale contract may be unenforceable.
13. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 bring this case on behalf of themselves and a Class of similarly situated residents of Alabama who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes and lack proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
14. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 also bring this case on behalf of themselves and a Subclass of similarly situated Latino residents of Alabama who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes and lack proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
15. Defendants’ policy of enforcing Section 30 so as to refuse annual registration payments from and to deny manufactured home identification decals to individuals who cannot demonstrate U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status will cause immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 and their families, as well as to similarly situated individuals who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes in Alabama.
16. Defendants’ policy of enforcing Section 30 so as to refuse to accept annual registration payments from, and to deny manufactured home identification decals to, members of
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the Class and Subclass has injured and will continue to injure organizational Plaintiffs Central Alabama Fair Housing Action Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, and Center for Fair Housing, Inc. These Plaintiffs have already diverted and will be forced to continue to divert scarce resources away from their core activities in order to conduct education, outreach, and advocacy on behalf of communities throughout Alabama concerning the impact of HB 56 Section 30 on immigrants who live in manufactured homes and who face fines, penalties, and the threat of criminal prosecution if they cannot pay their annual registration fees and receive the required identification decals.
17. Defendants’ policy pursuant to HB 56 of refusing annual registration payments from and denying current identification decals to individuals who live in manufactured homes and who cannot show proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status violates the Fair Housing Act, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), 2201, 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). 19. Venue is proper in this District and Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 81 and 1391(b). Defendant Magee and Defendant Stubbs reside in this State; Defendant Stubbs is employed in this District and Division as a County official; and Defendant Magee is employed in this District and Division as a State official. A substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims have occurred and/or will occur in this District and Division.
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PARTIES Organizational Plaintiffs 20. The three organizational Plaintiffs collectively provide fair housing services in nearly every county within Alabama. Their core activities include advocating for equal housing opportunities, assisting victims of housing discrimination, and enforcing compliance with the federal Fair Housing Act and related fair housing laws. 21. Plaintiff Central Alabama Fair Housing Center (“CAFHC”) is an Alabama non-profit corporation, with its principal place of business in Montgomery, Alabama. Founded in 1995, CAFHC’s mission is to promote understanding of the Fair Housing Act and to enforce the Fair Housing Act. It advances that mission through educational activities including speaking to community groups and individuals most likely to experience housing discrimination, training housing providers in fair housing issues, and conducting intake and investigations. 22. Plaintiff CAFHC provides fair housing services in the following Alabama Counties: Autauga, Barbour, Bullock, Butler, Chambers, Chilton, Coffee, Coosa, Covington, Crenshaw, Dale, Dallas, Elmore, Geneva, Greene, Hale, Henry, Houston, Lee, Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Montgomery, Perry, Pike, Russell, Sumter, Tallapoosa, and Wilcox. 23. Plaintiff Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama (“FHCNA”) is an Alabama non-profit corporation, with its principal place of business in Birmingham, Alabama. Plaintiff FHCNA was founded in 1993. Its mission is the elimination and eradication of housing discrimination through education and enforcement activities. FHCNA seeks to ensure that all individuals who seek housing are given fair and equal access to housing of their choice. In furtherance of this mission, Plaintiff FHCNA hosts public seminars for housing providers and community members, engages in outreach activities, undertakes investigations, and files
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administrative complaints. Plaintiff FHCNA provides fair housing services in the following Alabama Counties: Blount, Calhoun, Cherokee, Colbert, Cullman, DeKalb, Etowah, Fayette, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Lauderdale, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison, Marion, Marshall, Morgan, Pickens, Shelby, St. Clair, Talladega, Tuscaloosa, Walker, and Winston.
24. Plaintiff Center for Fair Housing, Inc. (“CFH”) is an Alabama non-profit corporation, founded in 1998, with its principal place of business in Mobile, Alabama. CFH’s mission is to advocate, enforce, and educate the communities it serves in the areas of fair and adequate housing, public accommodations, tenants’ rights, and fair lending practices, in order to promote healthier and more inclusive communities. Plaintiff CFH provides these fair housing services in the following Alabama Counties: Baldwin, Choctaw, Clarke, Conecuh, Escambia, Mobile, Monroe, and Washington.
Individual Plaintiffs 25. Plaintiff John Doe #1 resides in Elmore County in a manufactured home that he owns. He lives with his partner and five-year-old son, who is a U.S. citizen. Plaintiff Doe #1 is originally from Mexico and came to the United States approximately eight years ago. He rents a lot for his manufactured home in Elmore, Alabama. 26. Plaintiff John Doe #2 resides in Elmore County in a manufactured home that he owns. Plaintiff Doe #2 came to the United States from Mexico in 2002. He rents a lot for his manufactured home in Millbrook, Alabama, where he lives with his partner, their five-year-old son, and his partner’s parents and three brothers. Plaintiff Doe #2’s son is a U.S. citizen.
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Defendants 27. Defendant Julie Magee is the Revenue Commissioner for the State of Alabama. As the head of the Alabama Department of Revenue, she is charged with carrying out the duties of the Department, which by Alabama law include “general and complete supervision and control of,” inter alia, “the collection of all property, privilege, license, excise, intangible, franchise, or other taxes for the state and counties.” Ala. Code § 40-2-11(1). Defendant Magee is responsible for supervising and directing the work of all state and county officials who are charged with the assessment and collection of taxes, including the manufactured home registration fee at issue in this case. She is sued in her official capacity. 28. Defendant Jimmy Stubbs is the Probate Judge for Elmore County, Alabama. He is responsible for collecting payments and issuing manufactured home registration decals to manufactured home owners who reside in Elmore County, pursuant to Alabama Local Law 93702. He is sued in his official capacity.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Alabama’s Manufactured Homes Statute
29. In Alabama, a “manufactured home” is subject to the requirements of Section 4012-255 of the Alabama Code. Section 40-12-255(a) requires that any “person, firm, or corporation who owns, maintains, or keeps . . . a manufactured home” pay an annual registration fee and an issuance fee in order to obtain a current identification decal. The identification decal, which is designed and issued by the Alabama Department of Revenue, is color-coded to indicate the year in which it was issued and must be displayed on the outside of the manufactured home at eye level, so as to be “clearly visible from the street.” Id.
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30. Under Alabama law, the County official with responsibility for collecting taxes and other assessments has the duty to collect the annual manufactured home registration fees, to issue identification decals, and to impose fines and penalties for late payments, unless that duty is assigned to another county official. In Elmore County, Defendant Stubbs is the County official who is assigned these responsibilities.
31. The registration fee and issuance fee are due on October 1 of each year and are considered delinquent if not paid by November 30 of each year. An individual who fails to pay the registration fee and issuance fee by November 30 will be fined a $10 delinquent fee and a $15 citation fee. An additional penalty is imposed if the delinquent fee and citation fee are not paid within 15 days of the first citation. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(b). An individual cannot obtain a current identification decal for his or her manufactured home until all outstanding fees and penalties have been satisfied.
32. In addition to the fines and penalties identified above in Paragraph 31, an individual who violates any provision of Section 40-12-255 is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(l). Under Alabama law, a Class C misdemeanor is punishable with a three-month jail term, in addition to a fine of at least $50 and up to $500. Id.; §§ 13A-5-7 and 13A-5-12.
33. In order to obtain a permit to move a manufactured home on public roads in Alabama, a manufactured home owner must obtain a permit from the County official who administers the manufactured home registration laws in the County where the manufactured home is currently being kept. Proof of payment of the current registration fee, as well as any outstanding fines and penalties, is required to obtain a moving permit. Ala. Code § 40-12-
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255(j)(1). Failure to obtain a moving permit before moving a manufactured home on public roads is punishable as a Class C misdemeanor. § 40-12-255(j)(4).
34. Any state, county or municipal law-enforcement officer, or license inspector is authorized to issue citations for violations of Alabama Code Section 40-12-255, pursuant to Section 40-12-257.
B. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Act 2011-535 35. On June 2, 2011, the Alabama legislature adopted the Beason-Hammon Alabama
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Act 2011-535, a comprehensive state immigration scheme that extensively regulates immigration, immigrants, and those who associate or interact with immigrants. This law is commonly referred to as HB 56.
1. Text of Section 30 of HB 56 36. Section 30 of HB 56 became effective on September 28, 2011. 37. Section 30 of HB 56 defines and utilizes a new legal term, a “business transaction.” HB 56 § 30(a). The term “business transaction” is defined as “any transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision of the state,” with the only exception being for marriage licenses. Id. (emphasis added). 38. The term “business transaction” is vaguely defined in exceptionally broad and misleading terms. As defined by statute, it is not limited to transactions involving “business.” 39. The term “business transaction” is broad enough to include numerous transactions with state and local officials that relate to housing, the ability to rent or buy housing, and the provision of services and facilities in connection with housing, therefore implicating compliance with the federal Fair Housing Act and other civil rights laws.
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40. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a Class C felony—punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment, see Ala. Code § 13A-5-6—for an “unlawfully present alien” to enter or attempt to enter into virtually any transaction with the state or local government agency. HB 56 § 30(b), (d).
41. Section 30 of HB 56 also prohibits a third party from entering or attempting to enter into virtually any transaction with the State or a political subdivision on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States, again at penalty of a Class C felony conviction. Id.
42. Section 30 of HB 56 provides that any person entering or attempting to enter into a transaction with the State or a political subdivision of the state shall be required to demonstrate to the person conducting the transaction on behalf of the state/political subdivision that the applicant is a U.S. citizen, or, if he or she is an alien, that he or she has lawful presence in the United States. HB 56 § 30(c).
43. Section 30 of HB 56 further provides that U.S. citizenship must be proven by producing one of an enumerated list of documents. Id.; see also HB 56 § 29(k). If a person does not possess one of the enumerated documents but is in fact a U.S. Citizen, that person cannot satisfy the proof requirements of Section 30.
44. Section 30 of HB 56 further provides that an alien’s lawful presence shall be demonstrated solely by the state or political subdivision’s verification of the alien’s lawful presence through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”) program operated by the federal Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), or by other verification with DHS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). Id.
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45. SAVE is an inter-governmental initiative designed to aid public benefit-granting agencies in determining an applicant’s immigration status, and thereby ensure that only entitled applicants receive federal, state, or local public benefits and licenses.
46. Section 1373(c) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code requires the federal immigration agency to respond to certain immigration status inquiries by state and local agencies. After passage of Section 1373(c), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Department of Homeland Security) created the Law Enforcement Support Center to respond to requests for state and local law enforcement officers. There is, however, no system under § 1373(c) to verify citizenship or immigration status for individuals attempting to renew registration of manufactured homes or relating to any housing issues.
47. Neither the federal SAVE system, nor any federal system for status inquiries under § 1373(c), has been authorized by the federal government to verify immigration status in order to disqualify individuals from paying registration fees for manufactured homes or for any related purpose.
48. Moreover, federal determinations made under the SAVE system or any other system set up by § 1373(c), are merely snapshots of an individuals’ status at some point prior to the status check and do not provide reliable or accurate immigration status determinations.
49. Upon information and belief, Defendant Stubbs and the Elmore County Probate Office are not enrolled in, and cannot currently utilize, the SAVE program to determine whether manufactured home owners or renters are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
50. Upon information and belief, Defendant Stubbs and the Elmore County Probate Office are not authorized to use, and cannot currently utilize 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) to verify whether residents of manufactured homes are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
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51. Upon information and belief, no county or state official in Alabama charged with collecting manufactured home registration fees has received approval to use SAVE to verify whether residents of manufactured homes are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
52. Upon information and belief, no county or state official in Alabama charged with collecting manufactured home registration fees can currently utilize 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) to verify whether residents of manufactured homes are U.S. citizens or have lawful immigration status.
53. As a result, state and local officials are making their own determinations about the applicants’ U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status before allowing them to renew manufactured home registration and are implementing Section 30 in a manner expressly at odds with HB 56.
54. HB 56 does not establish any process by which an individual can challenge a determination by a state or local official that he or she is not “authorized” to be in the United States.
2. History and Intent of Section 30 of HB 56 55. The legislative history of Section 30 of HB 56 reveals a plain legislative intent to drive those suspected of being undocumented immigrants, and in particular minority immigrants of Latino heritage, out of Alabama by making living conditions miserable for them or by funneling them into deportation proceedings. 56. Representative Hammon, who introduced the bill in the House, explained: “This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life. They will not stay in Alabama . . . . [T]his bill is designed to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport themselves.” He also noted, “[W]e do want to affect every aspect of someone’s life and make it a little more difficult for them to live here.” In no uncertain terms, Representative Hammon stated: “[T]he
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intent of this bill is to slow illegal immigration in Alabama through attrition.” He emphasized: “We are going to deter illegal immigrants from the State of Alabama.”
57. Senator Beason, who introduced a similar omnibus immigration bill in the Senate, and who ultimately consolidated his bill with Hammon’s to form HB 56, also expressed his views that the intent of HB 56 was to drive immigrants from the state. In a speech he delivered in February 2011, just before the legislative session commenced, he noted, “The reality is that if you allow illegal immigration to continue in your area you will destroy yourself eventually . . . . If you don’t believe illegal immigration will destroy a community go and check out parts of Alabama around Arab and Albertville.”
58. Section 30 of HB 56 is designed to achieve these goals by making it impossible for undocumented immigrants who reside in manufactured homes to continue living in this State.
59. The entirety of HB 56, including Section 30, is specifically targeted at making Latinos leave Alabama. The State officials who enacted and are implementing Section 30 of HB 56 knew that Section 30, and HB 56 in its entirety, would have the greatest impact on Latino immigrants. Latinos make up a majority of the State’s foreign-born population. And although only a small percentage of Latino immigrants in Alabama are undocumented, a majority of Alabama’s undocumented population is Latino.
60. Representative Rich, who voted for the bill, remarked that although he “like[s] Hispanic people,” “95 percent of the children that are in the elementary school at Crosswell Elementary School are Hispanic, 95 percent of them. 52 percent of the children that attend Albertville Elementary and Primary School are Hispanic, and the biggest part of them are illegal.” Representative Rich did not identify a source of information or any other factual basis for his allegation that “the biggest part of” the school children discussed were undocumented.
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61. Contrary to Representative Rich’s assertion, in Alabama approximately 85% of all children whose parents are not lawfully present in the United States are U.S. citizens.
62. Representative Hammon has also conflated Latinos with undocumented immigrants. For example, on June 2, 2011, the date that the House of Representatives passed the final version of HB 56, Representative Hammon explained the need for the bill by claiming that “the illegal immigration population in Alabama is the second fastest growing in the country and the people in our state need jobs back.” When asked for evidence to substantiate this claim, he pointed to a news article that observed that the State’s Latino population had grown by 145% from 2000 to 2010, the second highest percentage of growth in the country for that ten-year period. The article did not, however, discuss any data or studies of undocumented immigrant populations. It was limited to a discussion of Alabama’s Latino population.
63. Similarly, Senator Beason singled out Arab and Albertville, both of which are in Marshall County, as examples of communities that have allegedly been destroyed by the presence of undocumented persons. Senator Beason’s comments were in no uncertain terms directed at Latino immigrants. Compared to the rest of the State, Marshall County has a large Latino population: 12% of Marshall County residents are Latino, compared to less than 4% of the State population. Moreover, Marshall County has no other significant immigrant population.
64. Those who opposed the legislation likewise understood that it took aim at Mexicans and other Latinos. Senator Singleton observed: “[T]he fact of the matter is that we know that when we talk about illegal immigration that it is basically targeted at one ethnic group and that seems to be the Latino Hispanic Americans . . . .” Senator Holmes stated: “The purpose of this bill is . . . these Mexicans . . . . [Y]ou all are trying to get as many in here out and trying to stop as many coming in [as you can] . . . .” Representative Jackson warned that the effects of HB
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56 would reach even further than targeting Latinos: “It just doesn’t stop at the people coming from Mexico. This is not here just for them. This thing is going to have great repercussion for all minorities.”
65. At times supporters of HB 56 have spoken in violent terms about their desire to eradicate immigrants in Alabama. For example, at a town hall meeting this summer after HB 56 passed, Alabama Congressman Mo Brooks stated, in reference to his desire to force undocumented immigrants out of Alabama, that “[a]s your congressman on the house floor, I will do anything short of shooting them.”
66. In enacting HB 56 generally, and Section 30 specifically, Alabama legislated in an area committed exclusively to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, by passing HB 56, Alabama has intruded into an area of exclusive federal control and has sought to supplant the federal government in key respects.
67. Contrary to long-settled law that establishes the federal government’s exclusive role in regulating immigration, Section 30 of HB 56 reflects the view that the State of Alabama should regulate immigration on its own. Alabama has sought to use its self-granted power to attempt to drive people who are perceived to be undocumented out of the State through the denial of housing and housing-related local services. As Representative Hammon stated during legislative debates, “[I]t is the State’s responsibility to handle this issue and not the federal government.” He explained, “[T]his issue is now the responsibility of the State of Alabama and not the federal government.” He explained, in reference to federal immigration law and policy, that “[w]e are not going to depend on a broken system . . . . Here in Alabama we are not going to ignore the problem.”
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68. HB 56 allows the State of Alabama to take control of immigration enforcement which Alabama has sought to justify by arguing that the federal government has failed to act to the State’s satisfaction. Representative Hammon remarked when he introduced the bill, “[I]t appears that the federal government has defaulted on their responsibility of enforcing federal immigration law. And they have forfeited that right to the States.” Senator Beason concurred with this sentiment, noting in the Senate debates that “[i]f the federal government would enforce their laws that they have on the books, the states would not be required to begin to do things to help enforce those laws.”
69. Representative Hammon, one of the two sponsors of HB 56, has publicly applauded efforts by local officials to deny essential housing-related services to individuals like Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2, precisely because these acts will have the effect of driving Plaintiffs and other similarly situated people out of Alabama. As Representative Hammon explained this October when he was asked his views on new policies by certain public utilities to deny services to undocumented individuals under Section 30:
Our goal [through Section 30] was to prevent any business transactions with any governments. It’s just an extension of the goal of the entire bill—to prevent illegal immigrants from coming to Alabama and to discourage those that are here from putting down roots. . . . It seems to be working. . . . We’re seeing a lot of illegal immigrants self-deport.
C. Complying with Alabama’s Manufactured Homes Statute Constitutes a “Business Transaction” with the State, Which Is Forbidden to Undocumented Immigrants Under HB 56 Section 30.
70. The process of submitting a payment for the annual manufactured home registration fee and obtaining a current identification decal, as required by Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a), is a “business transaction with the State” subject to HB 56 Section 30(a).
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71. Applying for a moving permit pursuant to Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(j) is also a “business transaction with the State” subject to HB 56 Section 30(a).
72. Thus, the enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 will harm individuals who own, maintain, or keep manufactured homes and lack proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. Such individuals will be denied the rights to make an annual manufactured home registration payment, obtain a current identification decal, and apply for a moving permit.
73. Without a current registration payment and identification decal, any individual who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home in Alabama will be subject to serious repercussions, including fines and penalties, conviction of a Class C misdemeanor, and up to three months’ imprisonment. Ala. Code § 40-12-255(a), (l); §§ 13A-5-7 and 13A-5-12.
74. Without a moving permit, an individual who attempts to transport a manufactured home on public roads in Alabama is subject to fines and penalties, conviction of a Class C misdemeanor, and up to three months’ imprisonment. Ala. Code §§ 40-12-255(j)(1) and (4); §§ 13A-5-7 and 13A-5-12.
75. In addition, an individual without documentation of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status who attempts to submit an annual manufactured home registration payment, obtain a current identification decal, or apply for a moving permit may be charged with a Class C felony and imprisoned for up to ten years under HB 56. HB 56 § 30(b), (d); Ala. Code § 13A-56.
76. An individual who attempts to submit a registration payment, obtain a current identification decal, or apply for a moving permit on behalf of an undocumented immigrant will likewise be charged with a Class C felony and can be sentenced to a ten-year prison term. Id.
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77. Defendant Stubbs, in his capacity as the Probate Judge of Elmore County, has announced a policy pursuant to HB 56 Section 30 of requiring proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status in order for an individual to make an annual manufactured home registration payment and obtain a current identification decal. Defendant Stubbs’ policy makes it impossible for Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to comply with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 because they are not allowed to submit their annual registration payments or obtain a current identification decal.
78. Section 30 of HB 56 applies statewide. Thus the same policy described in the preceding paragraph will be and is already being faced by every member of the Class and Subclass, regardless of which county they live in. In each of these counties, Defendant Magee is responsible for supervising and directing the work of the county officials from whom Class and Subclass members must obtain identification decals for their manufactured homes.
D. Section 30 of HB 56 Is Federally Preempted. 79. The federal government has exclusive power over immigration matters. The U.S.
Constitution grants the federal government the power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 4, and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government’s power to control immigration is inherent in the nation’s sovereignty.
80. Congress has created a comprehensive system of federal laws, agencies, and procedures regulating immigration. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
81. The extensive statutory scheme created by the INA leaves no room for supplemental state immigration laws. A state law that regulates the terms and conditions under
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which non-citizens may remain in the State are preempted as an impermissible regulation of immigration.
82. State laws, like Section 30, that encroach on areas where Congress has indicated an intent to occupy the field—such as the regulation of the residence of non-citizens—are preempted. As are state laws that conflict with federal immigration law.
83. Section 30 of HB 56 dramatically alters the conditions under which non-citizens may remain in Alabama. By specifically requiring all non-citizens to prove that they have lawful status in order to obtain a manufactured home decal, this Section fundamentally affects the terms and conditions under which non-citizens may remain in a dwelling in the State.
84. Furthermore, certain categories of non-citizens, like Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 and the members of the Class and Subclass, are unable to continue to live in their homes under this regime without threat of fines, penalties, or criminal prosecution. As such, Section 30 fundamentally alters the rights of residence of the members of the Class and Subclass and the individual Plaintiffs.
85. As Section 30 is currently being implemented to deny decals to manufactured home owners in the State, local officials are being required to make independent determinations of immigration status—a complex task which they are not equipped, trained, or authorized to undertake. This is because in determining whether an individual attempting to renew their manufactured home registration is a U.S. citizen or lawful immigrant, state and local officials do not have access to federal databases on immigration and citizenship status. Instead, these state and local officials are scrutinizing documents and making their own conclusions about individuals’ citizenship and immigration status—determinations they are not trained to make.
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86. Under the INA, a non-citizen’s immigration status may be fluid and subject to change over time. A non-citizen who enters the United States with authorization, with a student visa for example, may remain in the country past his period of authorized stay and thus no longer be in status. Alternatively, he may overstay his original visa yet remain in status; for example, if he is eligible to and does change into a different visa classification. Conversely, a non-citizen who enters the United States without authorization, for example by crossing into the country by foot while evading border authorities, may subsequently gain lawful status, such as through a successful asylum application or grant of Temporary Protected Status.
87. The fluidity of immigration status is a fundamental feature of federal immigration law. It is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the system of immigration regulation that Congress has prescribed. This feature, moreover, accommodates many important national interests including, for example, the nation’s humanitarian and international law obligations regarding asylum seekers and people fleeing torture.
88. Section 30 of HB 56 presumes that immigration status is definite, not subject to nuance, and readily and quickly ascertained. But those presumptions are not accurate.
89. Moreover, whether a person is a citizen of the United States is not always easily ascertained in the contexts demanded by Section 30 of HB 56. U.S. citizens are not required to carry documentary proof of their citizenship. Section 30 requires utilization of a list of documents, see HB 56 §§ 30(c), 29(k), but there is no guarantee that every U.S. citizen will possess one of these documents.
90. Furthermore, there is no national database that contains information about every U.S. citizen. Some people are actually unaware of their U.S. citizenship because they may have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth by operation of law due to their parents’ citizenship, despite not
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having been born in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Others automatically obtain citizenship when their parents become naturalized U.S. citizens. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1433.
91. The federal government has a core, constitutionally protected interest in setting a uniform federal immigration scheme, and in conducting foreign relations with other nations. State immigration laws interfere with these core interests.
92. Because the United States’ immigration policy is inextricably intertwined with foreign relations, Alabama’s attempt to regulate immigration through Section 30 of HB 56 will adversely impact the United States’ ability to conduct foreign relations with other countries. HB 56 will undermine the ability of the U.S. government to speak with a single voice about immigration, including communicating to foreign nations as to what their nationals can expect when they come to visit or reside in the United States. State attempts to interfere with these inherently federal issues can have severe impacts on foreign relations.
E. Defendants’ Enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 Has a Disproportionate Adverse Impact on Alabama Latinos.
93. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 as alleged above in Paragraphs 70-78 has a disproportionate adverse impact on Latinos in the State.
94. In Alabama, Latinos are significantly more likely than any other group to live in manufactured homes. Nearly a third (27.6%) of all Latinos living in Alabama reside in the U.S. census housing category “Mobile home, boat, RV, van, etc.,” compared to 14.3% of non-Latino Caucasians, 10.2% of non-Latino African Americans, and 3.2% of Asians. Considering the population of Alabama as a whole, only 13.5% of the population lives in mobile homes.2
2 Under Alabama law a mobile home is a “manufactured home” subject to Alabama Code Section 40-12-255.
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95. Latinos are overrepresented among Alabama’s foreign-born, non-U.S. citizen population. Latinos make up almost 45% of Alabama’s foreign-born, non-naturalized population, whereas the total population of Alabama is less than 4% Latino. Approximately 65% of Alabama’s non-U.S. citizen population is Latino.
96. Of Alabama’s undocumented immigrant population, a large majority are Latino. Nationwide, approximately 77% of all undocumented immigrants are Latino.
INJURIES TO THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS A. Harm to Individual Named Plaintiffs 97. Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 own and live in manufactured homes located in Elmore County, Alabama. 98. Because of Defendant Stubbs’ policy, Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 face an impossible quandary. If they attempt to submit the annual registration payment and to obtain a current identification decal as required by Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a), and/or to obtain a moving permit in order to move their manufactured homes out of Alabama by traveling on public roads, they will be subject to the harsh penalties established in HB 56 Section 30(d), and they will be denied the decal or permit for which they would be applying. If Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 fail to obtain a current identification decal and/or attempt to move their manufactured homes out of Alabama by traveling on public roads without a moving permit, they will be subject to similarly draconian penalties established in Alabama Code Section 40-12255(a), (j), and (l). 99. If subjected to the enforcement of HB 56 Section 30, Plaintiff Doe #1 and Plaintiff Doe #2 could be forced to abandon their housing and permanently forfeit their manufactured homes, because there will be no way for them to come into compliance with
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Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a). Under Section 27 of HB 56, these Plaintiffs will not be able to sell their homes if they are forced to leave the manufactured home parks where they now live with their families.
100. Plaintiff Doe #1 wants to comply with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 but knows he cannot do so if Defendants continue their policy of enforcing HB 56 Section 30.
101. Plaintiff Doe #1 fears that if he is unable to obtain a current identification decal, he and his partner and their U.S. citizen son will have to abandon their home in order to avoid the fines, penalties, and criminal charges that are authorized under Alabama Code Section 40-12255 for failure to display a valid identification decal.
102. Plaintiff Doe #1 does not know where else he could find housing if he had to give up his current home. He and his partner would have to leave behind their jobs and their church community and would have to pull their U.S. citizen son out of school. Plaintiff Doe #1 is afraid that his son’s education would be jeopardized if his family had to leave their home in Elmore.
103. Since the adoption of HB 56, Plaintiff Doe #1, his partner, and his son have suffered continuing anxiety and fear.
104. Plaintiff Doe #2 wants to do what is required under Alabama Code Section 40-12255, but he is unable to make the annual registration payment and obtain a current decal because of Defendants’ policy of enforcing Section 30 of HB 56.
105. Plaintiff Doe #2 is afraid that he will be fined, imprisoned, or deported if he cannot make the annual registration payment and obtain a current identification decal for his manufactured home, where he lives with his partner, son, and five extended family members.
106. Plaintiff Doe #2 fears that because of Defendants’ challenged acts, he and his family may have to abandon their home, without being able to sell it. Plaintiff Doe #2 does not
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know where he and his family could move if they can no longer live in their home in Millbrook. He is worried that he would not be able to find work to support his family, and he does not want to make his young U.S.-citizen son leave his school and his friends.
107. Plaintiff Doe #2 fears that his partner and son’s well-being will suffer if Plaintiff Doe #2 is detained or deported, pursuant to Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56.
108. Because they will not have current decals on the outside of their homes, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 will be involuntarily yet conspicuously in violation of their lawful obligations under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255. Being forced to be visibly out of compliance with the law will significantly heighten the exposure of Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 and their families to law enforcement, who pursuant to the new authority conferred by Section 12 of HB 56 are obligated “where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States,” to make inquiries into that person’s citizenship and immigration status. HB 56 § 12(a). Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 thus face an increased risk of arrest and detention because of Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30.
B. Harm to Organizational Plaintiffs 109. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has harmed and will continue to harm Plaintiffs CAFHC, FHCNA, and CFH. 110. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Plaintiff CAFHC’s mission of promoting understanding of and enforcing fair housing laws. In order to counteract the effects of Defendants’ acts by educating people about their rights, Plaintiff CAFHC staff members have had to spend time researching the enforcement policies adopted by different counties in Alabama, the criminal and fair housing implications of the law, and related state-law requirements applicable to manufactured homes. Plaintiff CAFHC
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personnel have also prepared for and presented at know-your-rights training sessions to speak about HB 56 Section 30 to people who live in manufactured home residents and drafted an educational flyer with information about HB 56 Section 30 and manufactured home decals.
111. The need for these counteraction activities that are in specific response to Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 have prevented or delayed Plaintiff CAFHC from working on other projects that it would have completed, including finalizing an Analysis of Impediments, pursuant to a contract awarded by the City of Montgomery; pursuing a planned program to conduct testing for race and disability based housing discrimination in the middle region of Alabama; and participating in a mortgage lending training session.
112. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Plaintiff FHCNA’s mission of eliminating housing discrimination. In order to counteract the discriminatory and unlawful impact of Defendants’ acts on the communities it serves, Plaintiff FHCNA will have to divert scarce resources away from regularly planned activities by, inter alia, realigning its testing program to target discrimination based on national origin against residents of manufactured home parks, readjusting its client intake counseling to provide information and assess the impacts of HB 56 Section 30 on manufactured home residents, and meeting with community and civil rights groups regarding the impacts that HB 56 Section 30 is having on residents of manufactured homes. In response to HB 56 Section 30 Plaintiff FHCNA has engaged and is engaging in communications with HUD to seek guidance on the fair housing implications if the law and is preparing know-your-rights materials.
113. Because Plaintiff FHCNA is devoting and will continue to devote its limited resources to the activities described in the preceding paragraph, it has been unable to engage in
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regularly planned programs including testing in fields that it had planned to investigate, such as sales and insurance, and engaging in normal outreach and client intake.
114. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 has frustrated and will continue to frustrate Plaintiff CFH’s mission, which is to advocate, enforce, and educate the communities it serves in the areas of fair and adequate housing, public accommodations, tenants’ rights, and lending practices. In order to counteract the discriminatory and harmful impact of HB 56 on the communities it serves, Plaintiff CFH has had to reach out to organizations that work with immigrant communities, and it has participated in meetings to discuss the applicability of HB 56 Section 30 to manufactured homes. Plaintiff CFH has spent time researching HB 56 Section 30 and its impact on manufactured home residents, and it has been in communication with HUD regarding problems associated with HB 56’s housing restrictions. Plaintiff CFH has also applied to realign its funding from a focus on predatory lending to a focus on outreach and enforcement regarding national origin discrimination in order to respond to HB 56’s discriminatory housing restrictions, including Section 30.
115. These counteraction activities have prevented and delayed Plaintiff CFH from working on other planned projects, such as conducting general rental testing and routine outreach activities and conducting education and outreach on other issues.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 116. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 have filed this Complaint as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 117. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 request that this Court certify a Class of all similarly situated individuals. The proposed Class definition is: All individuals who (1) reside in
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Alabama; (2) will be unable to prove U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status under HB 56 Section 30(c); and (3) own, maintain, or keep a manufactured home in Alabama.
118. Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 further request that the Court certify a Latino Subclass with the following definition: All Latinos who (1) reside in Alabama; (2) will be unable to prove U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status under HB 56 Section 30(c); and (3) own, maintain, or keep a manufactured home.
119. This action is properly maintained as a class action because: (a) Joinder of all members of the Class and Latino Subclass is impracticable because of the size of the Class and Subclass. (i) The Class comprises more than 40 households. (ii) The Latino Subclass comprises more than 40 households. (b) The claims alleged on behalf of the Class and Latino Subclass raise questions of law and fact that are common to the Class and Subclass. (i) All Class members will be unable to apply for a renewal tag and will be subject to the same fines, penalties, and threat of criminal prosecution. (ii) The members of the Latino Subclass are of the same race and national origin. The enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 is intentionally targeted at members of the Subclass because of their Latino race and national origin, and it will have a disproportionate adverse impact on members of the Subclass. (c) The claims of the Class representatives are typical of the Class and Subclass.
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(i)

Like the members of the Class, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 will

be unable to apply for a renewal tag and will be subject to the same

fines, penalties, and threat of criminal prosecution.

(ii)

Like the members of the Latino Subclass, Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe

#2 are Latinos who will be unable to apply for a renewal tag and

will be subject to the same fines, penalties, and threat of criminal

prosecution, due to the discriminatory intent and effect of

Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56, on grounds of

Subclass members’ Latino race and national origin.

(d) The Class and Latino Subclass representatives and Class counsel will fairly

and adequately represent the interests of the Class and Subclass. The Class

and Latino Subclass representatives have no interests that are antagonistic to

the interests of other Plaintiffs, and Class counsel have substantial experience

in civil rights and class action litigation.

120. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate for the Class because

Defendants have acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole.

Defendants have applied and will apply the same policy, custom, and/or practice to all Class

members.

121. Class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate for the Latino Subclass

because Defendants have acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the Subclass

as a whole. Defendants have applied and will apply the same policy, custom, and/or practice to

all Latino Subclass members.

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122. There are questions of law or fact common to all of the members of the Class and Latino Subclass that predominate over any questions affecting only individuals and a class action is superior to other methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Common questions of law or fact predominate and the controversy is most fairly and efficiently adjudicated via class action because all Class and Latino Subclass members will be subject to the same fines, penalties, and threat of criminal prosecution for the same conduct.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
Against All Defendants On Behalf of All Named Plaintiffs and the Latino Subclass 123. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-115, 118-119, and 121-122 above. 124. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home to obtain an identification decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 125. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Latino Subclass, to make registration payments and apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 126. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 by rejecting registration payments from and denying decals and moving permits to Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2 and the Latino Subclass will make housing unavailable on the bases of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)
Against All Defendants On Behalf of All Named Plaintiffs and the Latino Subclass 127. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-115, 118-119, and 121-122 above. 128. Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code requires anyone who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home to obtain a decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 129. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Latino Subclass, to make an annual registration fee payment or apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 130. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 against Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Latino Subclass by refusing to accept their annual registration payments or issue current identification decals or moving permits applies different terms and conditions in the provision of services related to housing occupied by Latino Subclass members, because of their race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Under U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2
Against All Defendants On Behalf of All Named Plaintiffs and the Class 131. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 35-69, 79-92, 97-115, 117, 119-120, and 122 above. 132. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
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Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 133. The Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law preempts state law in any area over which Congress expressly or impliedly has reserved exclusive authority or which is constitutionally reserved to the federal government, or where state law conflicts or interferes with federal law. 134. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain non-citizens, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Class, to make an annual registration payment or apply for a manufactured home decal or moving permit. 135. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns or maintains a manufactured home to obtain a decal by or before November 30 of each year. 136. The inability to obtain a decal will make housing unavailable to Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and members of the Class. 137. Section 30 of HB 56 regulates the terms and conditions under which non-U.S. citizens may remain in Alabama. 138. Section 30 is an impermissible state regulation of immigration, and therefore usurps powers constitutionally vested in the federal government exclusively. 139. Section 30 also conflicts with federal laws, regulations, and policies; attempts to legislate in a field occupied by the federal government; imposes burdens and penalties on legal residents not authorized by and contrary to federal law, and unilaterally imposes burdens on the federal government’s resources and processes, each in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
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140. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV § 1, cl. 3 Against All Defendants
On Behalf of Plaintiff Doe #1, Plaintiff Doe #2, and the Class 141. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-54, 70-78, and 97-108, 117, 119-120, and 122 above. 142. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 prohibits Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class from complying with the requirements under Alabama Code Section 40-12-255 to pay an annual registration fee and to obtain and prominently display a current manufactured home identification decal. Without a current identification decal, Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class will be subject to the penalties established in Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a) and (k). 143. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 will force Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class to abandon their housing and permanently forfeit their manufactured homes, because they cannot come into compliance with Alabama Code Section 40-12-255(a) or (j). 144. Under Section 27 of HB 56, the individual Plaintiffs and the Class will be unable to sell their homes before abandoning and forfeiting them. 145. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 against Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, and the Class has deprived and/or will deprive them of their property without substantive due process, in violation the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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146. Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 is pursuant to their official capacities as state actors under color of law and is therefore actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION For Damages Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
Against All Defendants On Behalf of All Named Plaintiffs 147. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-96, and 97-115 above. 148. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns, keeps, or otherwise maintains a manufactured home to obtain an identification decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 149. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2 to make registration payments and apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 150. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 by rejecting registration payments from and denying decals and moving permits will make housing unavailable on the bases of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 151. Defendants’ violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) have caused and will continue to cause the named Plaintiffs to suffer compensable injuries, entitling the named Plaintiffs to compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS For Damages Under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)
Against All Defendants On Behalf of the Named Plaintiffs 152. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 29-34, 55-78, 93-96, and 97-115 above. 153. Alabama law, specifically Section 40-12-255 of the Alabama Code, requires anyone who owns, keeps, or otherwise maintains a manufactured home to obtain an identification decal by or before November 30 of each year, and imposes strict civil and criminal penalties, fines, and the threat of criminal prosecution for failure to comply. 154. Section 30 of HB 56 makes it a crime for certain persons, including Plaintiffs Doe #1 and Doe #2 to make registration payments and apply for a manufactured home decal or a moving permit. 155. Defendants’ enforcement of Section 30 of HB 56 by refusing to accept annual registration payments or issue current identification decals or moving permits applies different terms and conditions in the provision of services related to housing on the basis of race and national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 156. Defendants’ violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) have caused and will cause the named Plaintiffs to suffer compensable injuries, entitling the named Plaintiffs to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that the Court grant the following relief: (1) Issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction immediately enjoining the enforcement of HB 56 Section 30 statewide against Plaintiffs and the Class and Latino Subclass;
35

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 31 Filed 11/21/11 Page 36 of 38

(2) Order Defendant Magee to immediately notify all county officials who are

responsible for enforcing the manufactured home registration requirements of Section 40-12-255

of the Alabama Code if said temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is entered;

(3) Certify the Class and Subclass;

(4) Enter a declaratory judgment finding that Defendants’ enforcement of HB 56 Section

30 violates the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b); the Supremacy Clause of Article

VI of the U.S. Constitution; the Due Process Clause of Amendment XIV of the U.S.

Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(5) Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing Section 30 of HB

56;

(6) Award compensatory damages to Plaintiffs Doe #1, Doe #2, CAFHC, FHCNA, and

CFH for their claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b);

(7) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1988 and 3613(c)(2); and

(8) Order such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

Dated: November 21, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke On Behalf of Counsel for Plaintiffs

Kristi L. Graunke* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 521-6700 kristi.graunke@splcenter.org

Mary Bauer (ASB-1181-R76B) Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 4100 Washington Ave. Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org

36

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 31 Filed 11/21/11 Page 37 of 38

Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 (213) 674-2909 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org

Stephen M. Dane* Jamie L. Crook* RELMAN, DANE & COLFAX PLLC 1225 19th Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 728-1888 sdane@relmanlaw.com jcrook@relmanlaw.com

Justin B. Cox* ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 230 Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303-2721 (404) 523-2721 jcox@aclu.org

Lee Gelernt* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 (212) 549-2660 lgelernt@aclu.org

Foster S. Maer* Diana S. Sen* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org dsen@latinojustice.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs

* Appear pro hac vice

37

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered through the CM/ECF system by electronic mail to the following counsel:
Margaret L. Fleming James W. Davis Misty S. Fairbanks William G. Parker, Jr. Joshua K. Payne Assistant Attorneys General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mfairbanks@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us jpayne@ago.state.al.us I further certify that arrangements have been made to serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing by hand delivery, along with a summons from this court, to: Judge Jimmy Stubbs Probate Office 100 Commerce Street Wetumpka, Alabama 36092 I so certify this 21st day of November, 2011.
s/ Samuel Brooke Samuel Brooke
38

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 Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 50 Filed 11/23/11 Page 1 of 10
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her

)

official capacity as

)

Alabama Revenue

)

Commissioner, and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his

)

official capacity as

)

Elmore County Probate

)

Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv982-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs’

motion for a temporary restraining order against

defendants Julie Magee (in her official capacity as

Alabama Revenue Commissioner) and Jimmy Stubbs (in his

official capacity as Elmore County Probate Judge), filed

November 18, 2011, and now under submission following a

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 50 Filed 11/23/11 Page 2 of 10
hearing held on November 23, 2011. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
To warrant temporary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their underlying case, (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs in the absence of an injunction would exceed the harm suffered by the defendants, and (4) that an injunction would not disserve the public interest. Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011). In balancing these four factors, while the likelihood of success is generally most important, the court may employ a “sliding scale” by “balancing the hardships associated with the issuance or denial” of the injunction against “the degree of likelihood of success on the merits,” Florida Medical Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welf. , 601 F.2d 199, 203 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979); the greater the
2

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 50 Filed 11/23/11 Page 3 of 10
potential harm, the lower the likelihood of success needs to be. Id .1 Accordingly, where the “balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the injunction, the movant[s] need only show a substantial case on the merits.” Gonzalez v. Reno , 2000 WL 381901, at *1 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle , 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. June 26, 1981)).
This lawsuit challenges the defendants’ enforcementof § 30 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535 (“HB 56”), as applied to Alabama’s manufactured homes statute, 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255. Importantly, this as-applied challenge raises a host of issues not considered by the court in United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *58-60 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) (Blackburn, J.), or Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley , 2011 WL 5516953 (N.D.
1. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
3

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Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) (Blackburn, J.). In those cases, which were both facial challenges, the court never ruled on, or even considered, the lawfulness of § 30 of HB 56 as applied to § 40-12-255.
Section 30 of HB 56 makes it unlawful for “[a]n alien not lawfully present in the United States” to enter into, or attempt to enter into, “a business transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state.” HB 56 § 30 (Doc. No. 31-1, at 68). Meanwhile, § 40-12-255 requires that owners of manufactured homes pay an annual registration fee to get an identification decal that must be visibly displayed on the exterior of the manufactured home. 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255(a). The manufacturedhome registration papers and fee are due October 1 of each year and are considered delinquent if not paid by November 30, at which point a non-compliant owner of a manufactured home can be given a civil fine or face criminal charges for a class C misdemeanor, punishable up to three months in jail. 1975 Ala. Code § 13A-5-7(a)(3).
4

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The plaintiffs present a number of theories for relief, but the court need consider only one for the purposes of granting this temporary-restraining-order request: As currently applied to § 40-12-255, § 30 conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted.
The first consideration the court must make is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this claim. The court finds that, quite convincingly, the plaintiffs have met their burden. When a state law conflicts with a federal statute, the state law is necessarily preempted. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). In the immigration context, States “enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens,” Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); that power is committed exclusively “to the political branches of the Federal Government.” Id. As a corollary, the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.” DeCanas v. Bica , 424 U.S. 351, 354
5

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(1976). Through the Immigration and Nationalization Act, Congress created “‘a comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization’ and set ‘the terms and conditions of admission to the country and subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting , 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353, 359).
In conjunction with this scheme and to assist with immigration enforcement, Congress created certain mechanisms, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program (SAVE) and 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), that permit States and localities to obtain an immigrant’s lawful status. But these programs only allow state agents to verify immigration status, which means these agents perform ministerial functions and “no independent determinations are made and no state-created criteria are applied .” League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 770 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (emphasis added). Section
6

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30 of HB 56 purports to rely upon the two above federal enforcement mechanisms: SAVE and § 1373(c). See HB 56 § 30(c) (Doc. No. 31-1, at 68-69). But, as was made dramatically clear by the testimony of both defendants in the hearing held on November 23, 2011, the defendants use neither SAVE nor § 1373(c) when determining whether to allow the owner of a manufactured home to obtain his or her annual registration decal. Instead, the evidence reflects that the Alabama Revenue Department and the Elmore County Probate Office initially proposed to use their own, state-created alternative for determining whether, under § 30, an individual has adequately demonstrated his or her lawful citizenship status, but are now in the process of developing a new system that will comply with HB 56.2 Not only is it unclear what this new process will be but it is also unclear whether that new process will be in operation any time in the near future.
2. It appears that the defendants propose to use a list of documents included in § 12(d) and § 29(k) of HB 56 to determine citizenship and lawful status. They are not verifying lawful status with the federal government.
7

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What is clear is, first, that the defendants do not now have in place a definite process that will be in sync with federal immigration law and, second, that they will not have a process in place any time soon. The conclusion that the defendants’ current process (or, perhaps to be more accurate, lack of a definite process) conflicts with federal law is inescapable. The plaintiffs, therefore, have shown a substantial likelihood on the success of the merits of their claim.
Combining the second and third factors, the court finds that the plaintiffs are likely to face irreparable harm if application of § 30 of HR 56, as applied to § 4012-255, is not enjoined: they face both civil and criminal liability after November 30, 2011, because they are being prohibited from paying their registration fees. The court finds that any harm to the defendants is slight, especially given the short-term nature of this order and given the uncertainty that the defendants will have in
8

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 50 Filed 11/23/11 Page 9 of 10
place any time soon a process for determining citizenship status.
Fourth and finally, the court finds that the public interest will be served by granting a temporary restraining order, which will be used to preserve the status-quo and prevent the plaintiffs from facing potential civil and criminal liability, as the court considers the plaintiffs’ still-pending motion for a preliminary injunction.
*** Accordingly, it is ORDERED: (1) The plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order (Doc. No. 13) is granted. (2) Defendants Julie Magee and Jimmy Stubbs, and all
those acting in concert with them, are hereby ENJOINED from requiring any person who attempts to pay the annual registration fee, required by 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255, to prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
9

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(3) Defendants Magee and Stubbs, and all those acting in concert with them, are ENJOINED from refusing to issue the manufactured home decal required by 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255 to any person because that person cannot prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
(4) Defendant Magee is hereby ORDERED to immediately notify all county officials who are responsible for enforcing the manufactured home registration requirements of 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255 of this temporary restraining order.
(5) This injunction shall expire on December 7, 2011, at 4:30 p.m.
DONE, this the 23rd day of November, 2011, at 4:30 p.m.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 50-1 Filed 11/23/11 Page 1 of 2
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 ( 11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885- 86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L .Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . .” and from “[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). Rev.: 4/04

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 50-1 Filed 11/23/11 Page 2 of 2
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her

)

official capacity as

)

Alabama Revenue

)

Commissioner, and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his

)

official capacity as

)

Elmore County Probate

)

Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv982-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant Julie Magee, Revenue Commissioner for the

State of Alabama, has filed a motion to dissolve the

temporary restraining order this court entered on

November 23, 2011. In that order, Central Alabama Fair

Housing Center v. Magee, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov.

23, 2011), the court found that the plaintiffs were

likely to prevail on their claim that § 30 of the Beason-

Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011

Ala. Laws 535 (HB 56), as applied to Alabama’s manufactured-homes statute, 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255, is preempted by federal law. Magee, 2011 WL 5878363, at *2. Commissioner Magee’s motion to dissolve will be denied.
I. As explained, § 30 of HB 56 makes it unlawful for “[a]n alien not lawfully present in the United States” to enter into, or attempt to enter into, “a business transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state.” HB 56 § 30 (Doc. No. 31-1, at 68). Under § 30(d) of HB 56, an individual who enters into or attempts to enter into such a transaction commits a Class C felony, id., and can be imprisoned up to ten years. 1975 Ala. Code 13A-5-6(a)(3). Meanwhile, in lieu of an ad valorem property tax, § 40-12-255 requires that owners of manufactured homes pay an annual registration fee to obtain an identification decal that must be visibly
2

displayed on the exterior of their manufactured home. 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255(a). The registration and fee are due October 1 of each year and considered delinquent if not paid by November 30, at which point a noncompliant owner of a manufactured home can be given a civil fine or face criminal charges for a Class C misdemeanor, punishable up to three months in jail. 1975 Ala. Code § 13A-5-7(a)(3). In addition, § 40-12-255 requires that the owner of a manufactured home obtain a permit “to move said manufactured home on the highways of Alabama,” and a current registration is required to obtain the moving permit. 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255(j). As above, moving a manufactured home without a permit is subject to civil penalties and criminal prosecution as a Class C misdemeanor. Id.
Taken together, application of § 30 of HB 56 to § 4012-255 puts in an intractable dilemma aliens who wish to keep their mobile homes but are unable to verify their lawful residency: they face civil and criminal liability
3

for not paying their manufactured home tax, while simultaneously facing civil and criminal liability if they attempt to remove their homes from the State. They can neither stay, nor can they go. In addition, even attempting to pay the registration fee without verification of lawful residence amounts to a felony.
Because States “enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens,” Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982), and the power to “regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,” state laws that conflict with federal laws are invalid as preempted. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). In its prior order, the court concluded that defendant Magee’s application of § 30 of HB 56 to § 40-12-255 was likely preempted because she was not, as required by HB 56 itself, using federal standards--through either the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program or by verification with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
4

§ 1373(c)--to verify immigration status. Instead, Magee’s practice involved the use of “state-created criteria” for determining immigration status, which is impermissible. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson , 908 F. Supp. 755, 770 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (Pfaelzer, J.).
In response, as expressed in a memorandum dated November 28, 2011, and sent to various unnamed county officials (probate judges, revenue commissioners, county tax collectors, and county licensing officers), Commissioner Magee has interpreted the court’s ruling as concerning only “the process to be followed in determining an alien’s lawful presence in the United States” and as inapplicable to “the process to be used in determining a person’s United States Citizenship.” Magee Memo (Doc. No. 57-1, at 1). Based on a distinction between determining citizenship and an alien’s lawful presence, the Department of Revenue’s policy now allows state and local officials encountering those who wish to
5

enter into a “business transaction” with that state agency to first ask whether the individual has a valid driver’s license. If a person says “yes,” state and local officials may use “the AL-Verify Program to confirm that ... applicant has a valid, unexpired Alabama driver’s license or non-driver’s identification card.” Id. If a person says “no” but claims to be a United States citizen, then the officials may verify his citizenship through an enumerated list of documents. (The list, apparently, is derived from § 29(k) of HB 56, which § 30 incorporates by reference). The policy does not state what happens to a person who claims to be a citizen but does not have an acceptable document for verification; presumably the officials must refuse the “business transaction.” However, if a person says “no” to having a driver’s license and again says “no” to being a citizen but instead “states that he is a lawful alien (lawfully present in the United States), then the
6

person’s status as a lawful alien should be verified through” SAVE or DHS. Id. at 2.
As the new policy recognizes, registration for SAVE is not automatic. See id. Instead, as indicated by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) website, use of SAVE requires each agency to apply for authorization by providing background information on the agency, which includes both the source of law “authorizing [the] agency to administer the benefit or license or engage in another activity for which [the] agency will be verifying immigration status” and an estimate of the “number of queries [the] agency will submit each year.” USCIS Website (Doc. No. 67-7, at 2). After that, an agency must await “legal review,” which can take several weeks to complete. Id . at 3. The agency must then enter into a memorandum of agreement with USCIS that outlines the agency’s financial obligations and the amount it will pay to use SAVE. Given this process, Commissioner Magee’s policy
7

memorandum acknowledges that state and local officials cannot begin using SAVE immediately. Magee Memo (Doc. No. 57-1, at 2-3). At the same time, this memorandum says nothing about how any state or local subdivision will obtain DHS verification under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
Regardless, where DHS does not verify the lawful presence of an alien, the new policy recognizes that Commissioner Magee’s old standards, listed in § 12(d) of HB 56, are “no longer valid” and that state or county officials “can no longer allow an alien to document his lawful presence in the United States through the use of documents or legible photocopies of documents.” Magee Memo (Doc. No. 57-1, at 2-3). Instead, if state or local officials are unable to verify an alien’s lawful presence through SAVE or verification with DHS, then the officials “should allow the alien to conduct the requested business transaction.” Id.
Commissioner Magee argues these policy changes, as outlined in her memorandum, mean “the basis of the
8

temporary restraining order no longer exists” and that the order should therefore be dissolved. Mo. to Dissolve (Doc. No. 57, at 2).1 The court cannot agree.
II. As an initial matter, Commissioner Magee has failed to point to any legal standard or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under which the court should find her requested relief is warranted. The plaintiffs argue that the court should use the standard for evaluating whether a preliminary injunction should be modified or dissolved, namely, whether the movant has made a showing that changed circumstances warrant discontinuation of the order, which “may be satisfied by showing either a significant change in factual conditions or law.” 11A
1. The court reads Magee’s motion to dissolve as applying to only whether the plaintiffs can demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, not as challenging any of the other factors that are necessary to obtain temporary equitable relief. Accordingly, Magee’s motion in no way questions the determination made in court’s prior order regarding these factors, Magee, 2011 WL 5878363, at * 3.
9

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2961 (2d ed. 1995). This standard echos the test described in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, where the Supreme Court explained that a party seeking modification of a consent decree “bears the burden of establishing a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree” and that this burden may be satisfied “by showing either a significant change in factual conditions or in law.” 502 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1992). If the moving party meets this standard, the court then considers “whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Id. 391.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has applied Rufo to the context of permanent injunctions, seeRiccard v. Prudential Ins. Co. , 307 F.3d 1277, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002), and other courts have relied on the same standard in the preliminary-injunction context as well. E.g. , Concilio de Salud Integral de Loiza, Inc. v. PerezPerdomo, 551 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2008); Sprint
10

Communications Co. v. CAT Communications Int’l, Inc. , 335 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2003).
Given this analogous treatment of requests to modify or dissolve various forms of equitable relief and because Commissioner Magee’s argument is essentially one of changed circumstances, this court employs the Rufo analysis here. Indeed, the rationale behind looking to changed circumstances is especially applicable in this case. “The need for changed circumstances prevents an enjoined party from constantly challenging the imposition of a[n] ... injunction,” Sprint , 335 F.3d at 242, and a court should redraft or vacate its order only when doing so is necessary “to insure that the decree accomplishes its intended result .” Wright, supra , § 2961 (emphasis added).
The intended result of the court’s temporary restraining order was to ensure that, statewide, § 30 of HB 56 would in no way be applied to individuals seeking to renew their manufactured-home decals under § 40-12255. While the memorandum indicates that, under the new
11

policy, the impermissible “state-created criteria” identified in the prior order can no longer be used, nothing about that policy change, by itself and in the abstract, indicates that state and local officials have stopped engaging in conduct preempted by federal law. Put differently, nothing in the memorandum necessarily and conclusively demonstrates that there has been a change in the actual circumstances of how § 30 of HB 56 will be and has been applied.
In fact, and contrary to the new policy as expressed in the memorandum, the plaintiffs have introduced evidence indicating that, in practice, nothing on the ground has changed, and particularly at the county level: On November 28 and 29, 2011, the first two business days following the court’s order, plaintiffs’ counsel say that they received numerous calls from individuals who were not permitted to pay registration fees because they could not provide sufficient proof of their immigration status. See Tumlin Decl. (Doc. No. 67-4, at 2); Brooke Decl. (Doc. No. 67-1, at 2). These reports were from five
12

counties in the state. A woman in Gadsden (Etowah County, Alabama), for example, was “told nothing had changed” in light of the court’s order, “and that she had to produce a driver’s license.” Brooke Decl. (Doc. No. 67-1, at 2). Meanwhile, in Birmingham and Bessemer (both in Jefferson County) two individuals were told, respectively, that they needed a valid driver’s license and that they “needed to provide proof of lawful immigration status” to register their manufactured homes. Tumlin Decl. (Doc. No. 67-4, at 3). In similar fashion, an employee of plaintiff Central Alabama Fair Housing Center called the Houston County Probate office on November 28, and was told that “a driver’s license is still required.” Singh Decl. (Doc. No. 67-3, at 2).2
2. In addition, before the court is the plaintiffs’ motion, filed yesterday, to enforce the temporary restraining order. This motion, as supported by declarations, alleges that more individuals, including at least one in a sixth county, have been denied the ability to register their manufactured homes on the basis that they failed to provide evidence of citizenship or lawful residence. See id. at 5-7; Brooke Decl. (Doc. No. 70-1).
13

Additional record evidence, the plaintiffs argue, suggests that compliance has not been confirmed: When the plaintiffs’ attorneys notified Commissioner Magee’s counsel that several individuals across five counties were still being denied the ability to register their manufactured homes because they could not demonstrate lawful immigration status, defense counsel replied that the new policy memorandum had been sent to these offices. Brooke Decl. (Doc. No. 67-1, at 3). When asked about how the memorandum was sent and to whom it was sent and, most important, about whether there was any way to confirm that these offices were now in compliance, defense counsel failed to confirm. Instead, he replied: “I am representing to you that the referenced offices ... have received Commissioner Magee’s ... Memo. If you would notify me of an office unaware of the Memo, I would appreciate it.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
The problem, of course, is that awareness is not compliance. The fact that Commissioner Magee’s memorandum expressed a new policy for enforcement of HB
14

56 does not necessarily reflect a change in practice. As
the adage goes, a change in theory does not always mean
a change in practice. Confronted with the plaintiffs’
evidence of alleged noncompliance, the court cannot
conclude at this time on the current record, without a
hearing, that circumstances have changed in a manner to
warrant immediate dissolution of the temporary
restraining order.3
3. The court makes no finding, at this time, that the plaintiffs’ noncompliance allegation is true. The denial of Commissioner Magee’s motion for immediate dissolution is therefore without prejudice to her right to challenge the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. To warrant immediate dissolution of a temporary restraining order, without a hearing, based on changes circumstances, a movant would have to come forward with undisputable evidence of full compliance in all material aspects or ask for a hearing on the disputed evidence, although, as indicated later in the instant opinion and order, Magee’s motion is due to be denied on other grounds as well.
Indeed, with their motion to enforce, see supra note 2, the plaintiffs also contend that there is a change in circumstances but the change warrants additional injunctive relief.
15

III.
In any event, even assuming that there has been a
change in practice as contemplated in Commissioner
Magee’s memorandum, the court is not convinced that this
new policy achieves the intended result of the court’s
prior order. To be perfectly clear, the court intends
that the defendants apply § 40-12-255 without any
modification by HB 56 or reference to citizenship status;
the question of citizenship or lawful immigration status
is completely off-the-table. By its text, § 40-12-255
requires only that:
“The owner of the manufactured home shall furnish to the registration official the make, model, year, length, width, number of transportable modules, and serial number of the manufactured homes and the registration official shall furnish a receipt to the manufactured home owner containing the above referenced information.”
1975 Ala. Code. § 40-12-255(a) (emphasis added).
Even under the new policy, however, the State appears
to burden manufactured home registration in ways not
contemplated by § 40-12-255, which could, in practical
16

effect, deter individuals from attempting to register their manufactured homes. As the memorandum concedes, there is no practical way any state agency could have registered for SAVE over the weekend, and the memorandum does nothing to address how verification from DHS works or how it can be obtained. Therefore, if an alien lacks documentation and the agency cannot lawfully verify his citizenship status, then, under the Commissioner’s proposed procedures, that alien will have gone through a three-step process related to immigration status all for naught, for regardless of the outcome of this questioning he must be given the registration papers. The purpose of the court’s prior order was not to empower state and local officials to erect a hurdle of ultimately inconsequential questioning and possible harassment for those attempting to reside in their manufactured homes without violating § 40-12-255.
The fact that the new policy still allows state and local government units to announce that immigration status will be verified by either SAVE or § 1373(c), but
17

acknowledges that this verification will not actually occur is akin to a fraud. On one hand, state and local actors make public--for example, through probate office websites--their intention to condition manufactured home registration upon verification of an alien’s lawful residence, but, on the other hand, simultaneously and quietly recognize that such verification, and the denial of a manufactured home registration, cannot actually occur. Cf. Singh Decl. (Doc. No. 67-3, at 5) (depicting county website indicating that “proof of U.S. Citizenship is required when renewing all manufactured homes”); Crook Decl. (Do. No. 67-2, at 5,9) (same). Importantly, the ultimately hollow requirement of verification is not insubstantial: it comes backed, as per the text of HB 56, with the threat of felony criminal sanction should anyone dare to attempt to register their manufactured home knowing they lack verification. Just as a wooden owl perched atop the bridge of a fishing boat wards off seagulls with its menacing but ultimately harmless glare, the Commissioner’s new policy appears designed to keep
18

undocumented immigrants from even attempting to register their mobile homes, even though their immigration status can have no bearing on that transaction. In short, the court is not convin ced that the new policy outlined in Commissioner Magee’s memorandum would not achieve indirectly what the court’s order directly prohibits.
IV. Even without the foregoing, the court remains convinced that dissolving the temporary restraining order would be inappropriate. As noted in the prior order, the plaintiffs have presented several reasons why § 30 of HB 56 as applied to § 40-12-255 should be enjoined. Indeed, they have presented several independent grounds for finding preemption as well, none of which turn upon whether “state-created criteria” are being used to enforce § 30 of HB 56. The court finds that the plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on their claim that § 30 of HB 56 is preempted as applied to Alabama’s manufactured homes
19

statute. State law is “naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute,” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000), which can occur when a state law frustrates “the accomplishment of a federal objective.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. , 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). Here, that federal “objective” is found in the Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., a “comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization” that sets “the terms and conditions of admission to the country and subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).
The INA establishes a number of classifications for aliens who have entered the United States (for example, visitors and other non-immigrants, immigrants who plan on staying permanently, or those seeking refugee or asylum) and each classification has its own set of statutory requirements for determining the length, conditions, and
20

terms of an alien’s stay. At the heart of this scheme is enforcement, which rests squarely within the discretion of the executive branch of the federal government, and often times the Attorney General. See, e.g. , 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (empowering the Attorney General to withhold removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (providing discretion to withhold removal for victims of domestic abuse). But, even with this discretion, the federal determination about whether aliens must be deported or the conditions under which they may remain is incomplete; the executive must provide a hearing before an immigration law judge to remove a person from the United States or when it seeks to determine whether an individual deserves some other form of relief. See, e.g. , 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (barring deportation of those with “temporary protected status”); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (setting standards for adjustment of status to permanent residency). In fact, the INA permits, and due process may require, judicial review of deportation decisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; Alhuay v. U.S. Atty Gen., ___ F.3d___, 2011 WL 5061386, at *10 (11th
21

Cir. Oct. 26, 2011). Thus, given the INA, the executive has wide latitude to allow aliens to remain in the country as a matter of discretion, and may be prevented from deporting certain individuals all-together.
Applied to § 40-12-255, § 30 of HB 56 stands as an obstacle to the INA’s balance of discretion and process by making it difficult for those who have been permitted to remain in the country to live in their homes. While Congress has created a number of statutes sanctioning various forms of unlawful entry into the United States, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1323-28, and for the “harboring” of an alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1324, Congress never criminalized an alien’s attempt to lawfully reside in his home; nor has Congress permitted States to regulate the residence of aliens. Instead, enforcement is left to the executive. Any state law, like HB56, that “imposes additional criminal laws on top of a comprehensive federal scheme that includes no ... carve out for state regulation” is likely preempted. Ga. Latino Alliance for
22

Human Rights v. Deal, 2011 WL 2520752, at *14 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011) (Thrash, J.).
In fact, every court that has considered a locality’s attempt to regulate immigration by limiting access to housing for individuals who cannot prove citizenship or lawful residence has been enjoined as preempted. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton , 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Boyle, J.); Garrett v. City of Escondido , 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (Houston, J.).
Perhaps most convincingly, the other provisions of HB 56 that, on their face, apply to housing were enjoined as likely preempted in United States v. Alabama , 2011 WL 4469941, at *41-45 (Sept. 28, 2011) (Blackburn, C.J.). There, it was clear that § 13 of HB 56--which prohibits anyone from entering into rental agreements with aliens without verifying their lawful residence--applied to the housing context, but the court did not believe, and
23

expressly declined to find, that § 30 had the broad reach it has been given. Id. at 59-60 & n.25. It is now clear that § 30 of HB 56 reaches § 40-12-255 and thereby conditions lawful residence in a manufactured home upon verification of immigration status. In light of this consistent body of precedent, the court finds that the plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on their preemption claim.
*** Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant Julie Magee’s motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 57) is denied. DONE, this the 1st day of December, 2011.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her

)

official capacity as

)

Alabama Revenue

)

Commissioner, and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his

)

official capacity as

)

Elmore County Probate

)

Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv982-MHT (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

On November 18, 2011, the plaintiffs filed this

lawsuit charging that defendants Julie Magee (in her

official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner) and

Jimmy Stubbs (in his official capacity as Elmore County

Probate Judge) violated the United States Constitution,

as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fair

Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, by applying § 30 of the

Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535, to Alabama’s manufactured homes statute, 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255. The plaintiffs’ complaint was accompanied by both a motion for temporary restraining order and a motion for preliminary injunction. After meeting with counsel for both sides, the court set both motions for a November 23 evidentiary hearing.
On November 23, after conducting an evidentiary hearing and entertaining oral argument from both sides, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, with the order set to expire on December 7, 2011, at 4:30 p.m. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011).
On November 28, defendant Magee filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and, on November 30, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce and amend it. The court set the plaintiffs’ motion for a December 1 evidentiary hearing.
2

On December 1, after receiving and reviewing briefs from the parties, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dissolve. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee , 2011 WL 6010501 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2011). Also just prior to the December 1 hearing, the parties resolved the issues presented by the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce and amend, and the motion was withdrawn on December 2.
At the December 1 hearing, defendant Magee asked for clarification of an issue. The court stated that the issue would be clarified in its order resolving the plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion after further briefing by the parties. Defendant Magee filed her supplemental brief on December 5, and the plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief on December 6.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2) provides that a temporary restraining order will expire no later than 14 days after its issuance “unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension.”
3

The Rule further provides that “The reasons for an extension must be entered in the record.” Because the court has had to spend substantial time addressing issues that arose after entry of its order granting the motion for temporary restraining order; because of the need to review the recently filed briefs (with the last one filed only yesterday) on defendant Magee’s request for clarification; and because of the complex issues presented by this litigation, the court needs more time to resolve the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
*** Accordingly, and “for good cause,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(2), it is ORDERED that the temporary restraining order entered on November 23, 2011, (doc. no. 50), is extended to December 12, 2011, at 4:30 p.m., at which time it will expire. See Maine v. Fri, 483 F.2d 439, 441 (1st Cir. 1973) (“as long as the hearing on the preliminary injunction is held expeditiously within the
4

appropriate time frame, the district court should be able to extend the restraining order while it prepares its decision”); see also Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. v. Mercantile Mortg. Co., 727 F. Supp. 371, 375 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Moran, J.) (granting several month extension because 20 days was “a woefully inadequate time in which to prepare for, hear and decide a motion for preliminary injunction”).
DONE, this the 7th day of December, 2011. /s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her

)

official capacity as

)

Alabama Revenue

)

Commissioner, and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his

)

official capacity as

)

Elmore County Probate

)

Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv982-MHT (WO)

OPINION

This lawsuit is a challenge to the application of

§ 30 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen

Protection Act (commonly referred to as “HB 56”), 2011

Ala. Laws 535, which, when combined with another Alabama

statute, essentially prohibits individuals who cannot

prove their citizenship status from staying in their

manufactured homes. The plaintiffs are the Central

Alabama Fair Housing Center, the Fair Housing Center of

Northern Alabama, the Center for Fair Housing, Inc., and two individuals proceeding under pseudonym as John Doe #1 and John Doe #2. The defendants are Julie Magee, in her official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner, and Jimmy Stubbs, in his official capacity as Elmore County Probate Judge. The plaintiffs claim, among other things, that this application of HB 56 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604. The jurisdiction of the court has been invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
This as-applied challenge to HB 56 is now before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. As explained below, the motion will be granted.
2

I. BACKGROUND A. Passage of HB 56 In June 2011, the Alabama legislature passed a comprehensive and far-reaching state immigration law: HB 56. For example: § 7 prohibits an “alien who is not lawfully present in the United States” from receiving any state or local public benefits; § 8 makes it unlawful for an alien not lawfully present to enroll in or attend any public college; § 10 makes it a crime to fail to “complete or carry an alien registration document”; § 11 makes it “unlawful for an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public or private place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor”; § 12 requires officers who have “reasonable suspicion ... that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present” to make a “reasonable attempt” to determine the citizenship and immigration status of the person; § 13 makes it unlawful to conceal, “harbor,” or shield an “alien from detection,” which includes
3

“entering into a rental agreement ... with an alien to provide accommodations[] if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United States”; § 17 makes it a “discriminatory practice for a business entity or employer to fail to hire a job applicant who is a United States citizen or an alien who is authorized to work in the United States ... while retaining or hiring an employee who the business entity or employer knows, or reasonably should have known, is an unauthorized alien”; § 18 requires police officers to determine the citizenship of drivers pulled over and cited for driving without a valid license; § 27 voids certain contracts between “a party and an alien unlawfully present”; § 28 requires public schools to determine the citizenship and immigration status of their students; § 29 requires evidence of citizenship or lawful residence for voter registration; and § 30 prohibits “business transactions” between an “alien not lawfully present” and the State or
4

a political subdivision. HB 56 (Doc. No. 31-1),
available electronically at Ala. Code § 31-13-29 (West
2011).
In sum, as Representative Micky Ray Hammon put it:
“This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal
immigrant’s life. They will not stay in Alabama. ...
[T]his bill is designed to make it difficult for them to
live here so they will deport themselves.” Leg. Session
(Doc. No. 14-3, at 27).1
1. The Alabama legislature does not preserve or produce official transcripts of their proceedings, committee reports, or other legislative history. See Ex Parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co. , 742 So.2d 182, 187 (Ala. 1999)(“Of course, Alabama has no record of proceedings comparable to the Congressional Record as a source of legislative history.”); Macon v. Huntsville Utils. , 613 So.2d 318, 320 (Ala. 1992). The legislature does, however, record its hearings, which are available online. The plaintiffs have transcribed some of the legislative debate and introduced the transcripts into evidence. The defendants have had the opportunity to view these transcripts to verify authenticity, accuracy, and breadth, and were to submit any objections with their proposed findings of fact, but have not challenged or supplemented any of the transcripts. The court, therefore, finds the transcripts both admissible and reliable.
5

B. Challenge to § 30 of HB 56
On November 18, 2011, after observing how the State
was applying HB 56, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit.
Though the statute has many provisions, this litigation
focuses exclusively on § 30 as applied to Alabama’s
manufactured homes statue, Ala. Code § 40-12-255.
Section 30 of HB 56 makes it unlawful for “[a]n alien
not lawfully present in the United States” to enter into,
or attempt to enter into, “a business transaction with
the state or a political subdivision of the state.” HB
56 § 30 (Doc. No. 31–1) at 68. 2 Under § 30(d) of
2. In its entirety, § 30 provides:
“(a) For the purposes of this section, business transaction includes any transaction between a person and the state or a political subdivision of the state, including, but not limited to, applying for or renewing a motor vehicle license plate, applying for or renewing a driver’s license or nondriver identification card, or applying for or renewing a business license. Business transaction does not include applying for a marriage license.
(continued...) 6

2.(...continued) “(b) An alien not lawfully present in the United States shall not enter into or attempt to enter into a business transaction with the state or a political subdivision of the state and no person shall enter into a business transaction or attempt to enter into a business transaction on behalf of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.
“(c) Any person entering into a business transaction or attempting to enter into a business transaction with this state or a political subdivision of this state shall be required to demonstrate his or her United States citizenship, or if he or she is an alien, his or her lawful presence in the United States to the person conducting the business transaction on behalf of this state or a political subdivision of this state. United States citizenship shall be demonstrated by presentation of one of the documents listed in subsection (k) of Section 31-13-29. An alien’s lawful presence in the United States shall be demonstrated by this state’s or a political subdivision of this state’s verification of the alien’s lawful presence through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program operated by the Department of Homeland Security, or by other verification with the Department of Homeland Security
(continued...)
7

HB 56, an individual who enters into or attempts to enter
into such a transaction commits a Class C felony, id.,
and can be imprisoned up to ten years. 1975 Ala. Code
13A–5–6(a)(3).
2.(...continued) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
“(d) A violation of this section is a Class C felony.
“(e) An agency of this state or a county, city, town, or other political subdivision of this state may not consider race, color, or national origin in the enforcement of this section except to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
“(f) In the enforcement of this section, an alien’s immigration status shall be determined by verification of the alien’s immigration status with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). An official of this state or political subdivision of this state shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.”
HB 56 § 30 (Doc. No. 31–1) at 68-69.
8

Meanwhile, in lieu of an ad valorem property tax,
§ 40–12–255 requires certain owners of manufactured homes
pay an annual registration fee to obtain an
identification decal that must be visibly displayed on
the exterior of their manufactured home. 1975 Ala. Code
§ 40–12–255(a).3
3. Subparts (a) and (b) of § 40–12–255 provide:
“(a) Every person, firm, or corporation who owns, maintains or keeps in this state a manufactured home as defined according to subsection (n) of this section, ... shall pay an annual registration fee . . .; and upon payment thereof such owner shall be furnished an identification decal, designed by the Department of Revenue and color coded to denote the size and year issued, which shall be immediately attached to and at all times thereafter displayed at eye level on the outside finish of the manufactured home for which the registration fee was paid, and one foot from the corner on the right side facing the street, so as to be clearly visible from the street. The fee shall be due and payable on October 1 of each year and delinquent if not paid before December 1 of each year.”
“(b) The owner of any manufactured home (continued...)
9

3.(...continued) who fails to pay the registration fee hereby provided for shall be subject to a delinquent fee of $ 10 if payment is made on or after December 1, or if the manufactured home owner fails to pay the registration fee or if the owner fails to display the identification decal on such manufactured home, as hereinabove required. Furthermore, the owner shall be subject to a citation fee of $ 15 and if the registration fee and citation fee are not paid within 15 calendar days of date cited a penalty of $ 24 will be assessed against the owner of the manufactured home. ... The official responsible for administering the provisions of this section must collect all fees and penalties due before a decal may be issued to the manufactured home owner.”
1975 Ala. Code. § 40-12-255.
The decal and registration requirements do not apply to every owner of a manufactured home. Instead, “the registration fee shall be in lieu of the ad valorem taxes that would have been available” for the manufactured home beginning October 1, 1991. Id . Another section of Alabama law provides that some manufactured home owners still pay the ad valorem taxes directly instead of through the registration and decal process: “All manufactured homes located on land owned by the manufactured home owners, except those manufactured homes rented or leased for business purposes, other than those manufactured homes in the inventory of a manufactured
(continued...)
10

The registration and fee are due October 1 of each year
and considered delinquent if not paid by November 30, at
which point a noncompliant owner of a manufactured home
can be given a civil fine or face criminal charges for a
Class C misdemeanor, id . § ( l), punishable up to three
months in jail. 1975 Ala. Code § 13A–5–7(a)(3). In
addition, § 40–12–255 requires that the owner of a
manufactured home obtain a permit “to move said
manufactured home on the highways of Alabama,” and a
current registration is required to obtain the moving
permit. 1975 Ala. Code § 40–12–255(j). 4 As above,
3.(...continued) home dealer or manufacturer.” 1975 Ala. Code § 40-11-1. In practical terms, this means that individuals who live in manufactured home parks have to go through § 40-12-255 to pay their version of an annual property tax, while those who have a manufactured home on their own property are still assessed a traditional ad valorem tax.
4. Subsection (j) of § 40–12–255 provides in part as follows:
“(j) No manufactured home may be moved on the roads or highways of Alabama
(continued...) 11

4.(...continued) unless one of the following provisions are met:
(1) Every person, firm, or corporation who owns, maintains, or keeps in this state a manufactured home, must obtain a permit to move said manufactured home on the highways of Alabama. The permit shall be obtained from the county official who administers the manufactured home registration laws. Proof of payment of the current registration fee, issuance fee, and any applicable penalties shall be required before the moving permit shall be issued. Manufactured home dealers shall not be required to obtain a moving permit when moving a manufactured home that is part of dealer’s inventory or moving a manufactured home for the first time after a sale of such manufactured home from dealer’s inventory as evidenced by a bill of sale or bill of lading.
. . .
(4) The provisions of this section shall be enforced by any law enforcement officials in the State of Alabama. Any person, firm, or corporation moving a manufactured home on the roads or highways of Alabama without a moving permit shall be issued a traffic
(continued...)
12

moving a manufactured home without a permit is subject to
civil penalties and criminal prosecution as a Class C
misdemeanor. Id.
Defendant Magee is the Revenue Commissioner for the
State and oversees the collection of taxes, including the
registration fees for manufactured homes. See 1975 Ala.
40-2-11. Manufactured homes are registered through
county offices, such as a revenue commissioner’s office
or a probate office. Defendant Stubbs is the Elmore
County Probate Judge and oversees manufactured-home
registration in Elmore County. Since HB 56 went into
4.(...continued) citation for failure to have in possession the required moving permit and shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor; and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to a fine of not less than $ 50.
(5) The issuing official shall charge a $ 10 fee for the above referenced moving permit. One-half of said fee shall accrue to the county general fund to cover the costs of obtaining and issuing said permits, and the remaining one-half shall accrue to the State Road and Bridge Fund.”
13

effect, Commissioner Magee has placed information about it on the Department of Revenue’s website and provided county officials, such as Judge Stubbs, with training and instruction regarding HB 56 generally and § 30 more specifically.
The phrase “business transaction,” as defined by § 30 in HB 56, appears to be unique in Alabama law and has not previously been used in this manner. Accordingly, there has been considerable debate as to whether a “business transaction” includes any undertaking that involves financial resources going to a state or local official, no matter how mundane. Since this litigation began, the Alabama Attorney General has provided some guidance about the outer limits of the scope of “business transactions” under § 30. See Luther Strange, Guidance Letter from Ala. Atty. Gen., No. 2011-02 (Dec. 2, 2011) (Doc. No. 794). Regardless of the outer limits of this term and even with the new guidance letter, it is undisputed that the State’s interpretation of § 30 includes the transactions at issue here: the payment of registration fees and other
14

requirements associated with § 40-12-255. Thus, Commissioner Magee’s office understands § 30 of HB 56 to apply to § 40-12-255, the Alabama manufactured homes statute, which means, among other things, that individuals who cannot verify their citizenship or lawful residency are precluded from registering their manufactured homes.
Taken together, therefore, the court finds that the application of § 30 of HB 56 to § 40-12-255 puts aliens who are unable to verify their lawful residency between a rock and a hard place: they face civil and criminal liability for not paying their manufactured home tax, while simultaneously facing civil and criminal liability if they attempt to remove their homes from the State. They can neither stay, nor can they go. In addition, even attempting to pay the registration fee without verification of lawful residence amounts to a felony. This is not mere speculation. As Magee admits, and the court finds as a matter of fact, when § 30 of HB 56 is applied § 40-12-255, “the individual Plaintiffs cannot
15

continue living in Alabama in manufactured homes they own and maintain on certain property without violating either Section 30 or Ala. Code § 40-12-255 or causing others to violate Section 30.” Def. Magee Proposed Facts (Doc. No. 64, at 8).
C. Temporary Restraint of § 30 Following a hearing on November 23, 2011, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of § 30 as applied to § 40-12-255, with the order to expire on December 7, 2011. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011). Commissioner Magee later filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order, which the court denied on December 1. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL 6010501 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2011). Also, on December 1, Commissioner Magee agreed to extend the December 1 § 40-12-255 registration deadline to December 31. On December 7, the court extended the temporary
16

restraining order to December 12, 2011. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL (M.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2011).
D. Prior Challenges to HB 56 Admittedly, HB 56 was challenged in prior federal litigation by a number of private parties: individual plaintiffs, religious leaders, and several advocacy groups, including the Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, the National Immigration Law Center, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley , 5:11-cv-2484 (N.D. Ala, July, 1, 2011); Parsley v. Bentley , 5:11-cv-2736 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2011). The United States also challenged HB 56. United States v. Alabama, 2:11-cv-2746 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2011). In different ways, the prior litigation claimed that HB 56, in its entirety and in specific provisions, was unlawful on its face, that is, without implementation. In that litigation, which was filed in the Northern
17

District of Alabama, the court temporarily enjoined all of HB 56 until September 28, 2011, at which time it declined to enjoin the entire Act preliminarily, but found a number of individual sections likely unlawful. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley , 2011 WL 5516953 (Sept. 28, 2011) (Blackburn, J.); United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941 (Sept. 28, 2011) (Blackburn, J.). The court held that § 30 of HB 56 should not be enjoined. United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at * 59-60. Both the private parties and the United States sought a stay of enforcement pending the outcome of their appeal for the non-enjoined sections of HB 56. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted in part and denied in part the stay. United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4863957, at *6 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011). Relevant here, the appellate court declined to grant a stay pending appeal for the facial challenge to § 30 of HB 56. Id.
In the prior litigation, the State claimed that the United States was “misinterpreting, or at least
18

exaggerating, Section 30” and that there was no reason “why covered ‘business transactions’ would include the payment of property taxes or the payment of court fees.” Alabama Br. (Doc. No. 33-5, at 37). Accordingly, that court interpreted § 30 narrowly and found that it prohibited only “transactions” involving the issuances of a number of licenses, including licenses to drivers, business, professionals, hospitals, and to day care facilities. United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *60. The court expressly found that “the term ‘business transactions’ does not reach registration requirements,” and therefore that it had “no need to decide whether prohibiting unlawfully-present aliens from ... complying with state and local government registration laws is prohibited.” Id. at *59 n.25.
As the case before this court has revealed, the United States was not exaggerating in the prior litigation. Section 30 has now been applied broadly to prohibit manufactured home registration, which is, essentially, the property tax for certain manufactured
19

homes in Alabama. See 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255(a). In this light, § 30’s application here is well beyond anything contemplated in the facial challenge in the prior litigation.
Therefore, as compared to the prior litigation, this case has a very narrow focus. Whereas the first round of litigation challenged HB 56 on its face , this case involves only a very specific application of HB 56. In the prior litigation, the posture of the case as a facial challenge meant that the court had to rely upon the text of the statute and the representations by the State to determine the breadth of § 30--no specific facts or parties subject to enforcement of the law were before the court. As such, that court looked to the “common understanding” of the word “business” to determine how it might modify the term “transaction.” Unfortunately, as that court found, “the words of Section 30 obfuscate its meaning” because the section “declares a ban on business transactions and then proceeds to define ‘business transactions’ with examples, none of which fit within the
20

commonly understood definition of a business transaction.” United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *59. Section 30 lists as examples of a “business transaction” an application for or renewal of a vehicle license plate, driver’s license, or business license.
Therefore, the challenge to the application of § 30 to § 40-12-255 presented here was not presented in the prior litigation.
II. DISCUSSION A. Preliminary-Injunction Standard A preliminary injunction lasts through the pendency of the litigation to preserve the status quo until a meaningful decision on the merits is rendered. United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539-40 (11th Cir. 1983). To obtain this relief, the plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their underlying case, (2) that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) that the balance of the harms suffered by the plaintiffs
21

without an injunction would exceed the harms suffered by

the defendants, and (4) that an injunction would not

disserve the public interest. Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d

1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011). In balancing these factors,

while the likelihood of success is generally most

important, the court may employ a “sliding scale” by

“balancing the hardships associated with the issuance or

denial” of the injunction against “the degree of

likelihood of success on the merits”; the greater the

potential harm, the lower the likelihood of success needs

to be. Fla. Med. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. &

Welf., 601 F.2d 199, 203 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979).

5

Accordingly, where the “‘balance of equities weighs

heavily in favor of granting the injunction, the

movant[s] need only show a substantial case on the

merits.’” Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno , 2000 WL

5. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
22

381901, at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000) (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. June 26, 1981)).
A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to each of the four prerequisites.” Siegel v. LePore , 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam). That said, whether to issue a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the district court. Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach , 410 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005).
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 1. Preemption
The United States Constitution makes federal law the “supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2. For this reason, a “fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council , 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). In the immigration context, there
23

are three ways in which a state or local law may be preempted by federal law: “(1) where the local law attempts to regulate immigration” (a form of “express” preemption); (2) where implementation of the local law is an obstacle to or conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or treaties (“conflict” preemption); and (3) “where the local law attempts to operate in an area occupied by federal law” (“field” preemption). Garrett v. City of Escondido , 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (Houston, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1253 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Pfaelzer, J.). If preemption is found, the Supremacy Clause invalidates the state or local law. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009).6
6. When Congress legislates in a field the States have traditionally occupied, there is a “presumption against preemption,” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 n.3 (2009); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). As applied to § 40-12-255’s
(continued...) 24

The plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on
their preemption claim. Indeed, every court that has
considered a state or local law that conditioned housing
on the ability to prove lawful immigration status has
held (or, in the context of preliminary-injunctive
relief, found it substantially likely) that those laws
are preempted. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d
170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated , 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); 7
6.(...continued) manufactured home registration requirements, § 30 of HB 56 dictates how aliens must prove their lawful residence and whether aliens that lack documentation may lawfully live in a manufactured home. Because the verification of lawful immigration status and setting residency requirements for aliens are areas where the federal government, not the States, has traditionally held the reins, see, e.g. , Fiallo v. Bell , 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), the court does not apply the presumption against preemption. Cf. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 348 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The states have not traditionally occupied the field of identifying immigration violations so we apply no presumption against preemption.”).
7. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Lozano for reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), which addressed an Arizona immigration statute providing for the suspension or revocation of “licenses of state employers that
(continued...)
25

United States v. Alabama , 2011 WL 4469941 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (Blackburn, J.); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch , 701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Boyle, J.) (“Farmers Branch II”); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (Lindsay, J.) (“Farmers Branch I”); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477(M.D. Pa. 2007) (Munley, J.); Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 105657.

a. Federal Immigration Law

Enacted in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq

., established “‘a

comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of

7.(...continued)

knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens.”

Id. at 1973. The Whiting Court focused on the

“interaction of federal immigration and state laws

dealing with the employment of unauthorized aliens.” Id.

at 1974 (emphasis added). Whiting is silent on housing

issues.

Given that the Third Circuit expressly

distinguished state regulation of employment from state

regulation of housing, Lozano, 620 F.3d at 219-20,

Whiting is not to the contrary. In other words, this

court still finds Lozano persuasive.

26

immigration and naturalization’ and set ‘the terms and conditions of admission to the country and subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting , 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (quoting De Canas v. Bica , 424 U.S. 351, 353, 356 (1976)). In Lozano, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the INA “sets forth the criteria by which ‘aliens,’ defined as ‘any person not a citizen or a national of the United States,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), may enter, visit, and reside in this country.” 620 F.3d at 196. The court observed that, “Under the INA, there are three primary categories of aliens who may lawfully enter and/or spend time within the United States: (1) ‘nonimmigrants,’ who are persons admitted for a limited purpose and for a limited amount of time, such as visitors for pleasure, students, diplomats, and temporary workers, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); (2) ‘immigrants,’ who are persons admitted as (or after admission, become) lawful permanent residents of the United States based on, inter alia, family, employment, or diversity
27

characteristics, see 8 U.S.C. § 1151; and (3) ‘refugees’

and ‘asylees,’ who are persons admitted to and permitted to stay for some time in the United States because of

humanitarian concerns, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157–58.” Id .

(footnote omitted). The court continued that, “Aliens wishing to be legally admitted into the United States

must satisfy specific eligibility criteria in one of

these categories, and also not be barred by other

provisions of federal

law that determine

inadmissibility,” and that “Congress has determined that

non-citizens who, inter alia , have certain health conditions, have been convicted of certain crimes,

present security concerns, or have been recently removed

from the United States, are inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and if detained when attempting to enter or

reenter the country, may be subject to expedited removal,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1225.” Id. Notwithstanding this classification system, there

were approximately 11.2 million unauthorized aliens

living in the United States as of March 2010. Pew

28

Hispanic Center, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010 29 (2011) (Doc. No. 14-2, at 57). These individuals lack lawful authorization for a variety of reasons, including unlawful entry, visa overstay, marriage fraud, and certain felony convictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. This does not mean, however, that the federal government is doing nothing. For fiscal year 2009, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers averaged 816 arrests a day and deported approximately 912 more, half of which had committed crimes. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 2011 WL 252072, at *14 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011) (Thrash, J.). In fiscal year 2011, ICE removed 396,906 individuals, and nearly 55% of those had committed crimes. ICE Website, Removal Statistics, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/, (last visited December 12, 2011).
Congress has created a number of tools for enforcement of its immigration scheme. Congress has criminalized unlawful entry by an alien and reentry by removed aliens, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 & 1326, and made it a
29

crime to “harbor,” knowingly or recklessly, an alien lacking lawful immigration status. 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a)(1)(A)(iii). In fact, for 2010, “immigration offenses were prosecuted in federal court more than any other offense.” Deal , 2011 WL 2520752, at *14 (citing U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2010 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 11-12 (2010)). Congress, however, has declined to establish criminal penalties relating to the mere presence of unauthorized persons in the country.
The INA tasks the federal government, specifically the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (which houses ICE), with removing unauthorized aliens and provides detailed guidance for removal procedures, but “it is completely within the discretion of the federal officials to remove persons from the country who are removable.” Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530. Thus, as a matter of discretion, DHS decides if and when to initiate removal proceedings against unauthorized aliens. As a corollary, federal officials have created priorities for addressing violations of immigration law. As the numbers bear out,
30

the “federal government gives priority to prosecuting and

removing illegal immigrants that are committing crimes in this country and to those who have previously been

deported for serious criminal offenses such as drug

trafficking and crimes of violence.” Deal 2520752, at *14.

, 2011 WL

In the current administration, “ICE has adopted clear

priorities that call for the agency’s enforcement resources to be focused on the identification and removal

of those that have broken criminal laws, recently crossed

our border, repeatedly violated immigration law or are fugitives from immigration court.” ICE Website, supra .

For fiscal year 2011, 90% of the 396,906 individuals

removed “fell into one of ICE’s enforcement priorities.” Id. On the other hand, “the federal government

frequently exercises its discretion not to try to remove

persons from the country even though they may lack lawful immigration status,” Lozano 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530 n.6,

and the government “permits several categories of persons

who may not be technically lawfully present in the United

31

States to work and presumably live here.” Id. at 530-31. Despite DHS’s broad discretion to set priorities
regarding which aliens, if any, the executive branch wants to focus on for deportation, the process of removal is not automatic. Instead, when DHS decides to seek removal, the alien is typically entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge designed to determine whether she may remain in the country. The immigration judge makes the initial determination as to removability, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3), which can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, in some instances, the federal courts of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Even after those appeals, the Attorney General may cancel removal of certain permanent residents if specific statutory criteria are satisfied. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The Attorney General may also grant relief to victims of domestic violence and human rights abuses. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(2) & 1231(b). And, in certain situations where an unauthorized person cannot be deported–-such as a home country’s refusal to accept the individual–-that
32

individual cannot be detained indefinitely. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Thus, in addition to setting and regulating immigration classifications, federal law establishes detailed procedures for removing unauthorized aliens.
Two amendments to the INA have focused on undocumented immigrants’ employment and access to social services: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). These statutes created several mechanisms, such as DHS’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program (SAVE), that assist in the implementation of those reforms by permitting States and localities to verify an immigrant’s lawful status. As its name indicates, SAVE was designed to assist States in determining an alien’s eligibility for certain public benefits programs, not for determining an alien’s lawful status. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b7. Similarly, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) mandates that ICE
33

“respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.” 8 Currently, law enforcement officials are the only officials authorized to verify immigration status under § 1373(c), which is done through the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 374 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996 (D. Ariz. 2010) (Bolton, J.).
b. “Regulation of Immigration” The plaintiffs’ first preemption claim is that applying § 30 of HB 56 to Alabama’s manufactured home registration requirements constitutes an impermissible
8. SAVE and Section 1373(c) are distinct from the government’s E-Verify program, which employers may use to verify an employee’s immigration status.
34

“regulation of immigration.” The plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on this claim. Through Article I, the Constitution provides that it is the power of Congress, and Congress alone, “To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 4. As a result, “the States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.” Plyler v. Doe , 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). The authority “to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.” DeCana,s 424 U.S. at 354; see also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (explaining that “the authority to control immigration is vested solely in the Federal Government”).
In DeCanas, the Supreme Court held that, because the Constitution vests the federal government with authority over immigration and naturalization, a State’s “regulation of immigration” is preempted. 424 U.S. at 355. The Court, however, recognized that not “every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted” by the federal government’s exclusive federal power to
35

regulate immigration. Id . Instead, a State “regulates immigration” when it makes “a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.” Id.
DeCanas applied that concept to a California law that made it unlawful for employers to hire unauthorized aliens and required employers to use federal standards to make determinations about immigration status.9 The Court concluded that California’s law was not a regulation of immigration because the state law regulated only employment and not presence. Id. at 359-61.
The crux of the issue here is whether § 30 of HB 56, as applied to § 40-12-255, is preempted as a “regulation of immigration” because it “alters the conditions” under which an alien “may remain” in Alabama. It appears to do just that. By effectively barring undocumented immigrants from owning an entire class of dwellings, the
9. At the time, Congress had yet to criminalize the employment of unauthorized aliens. It now has. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A).
36

statute goes to the very core of an immigrant’s residency. Unlike laws related to the employment of undocumented or unauthorized aliens, which fall under States’ traditional police powers, see Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973, this case is about an immigrant’s residence, which the State has no power to regulate. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n , 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902).
As mentioned above, every federal court that has considered a locality’s attempt to regulate immigration by limiting access to housing for individuals who cannot prove citizenship or lawful residence has been found preempted. Several of these courts did so on the basis that the laws were “regulations on immigration.” The court finds these decisions persuasive.
First, in Farmers Branch II, the court concluded that a local ordinance prohibiting individuals “not lawfully present” from occupying rental property within the city was a regulation of immigration. Acknowledging that federal law allows cities to condition certain local
37

benefits on lawful presence, see 8 U.S.C. § 1621, the court rejected the city’s argument that denying undocumented aliens the ability to obtain rental property in the jurisdiction was a “public benefit.” Farmers Branch II, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 854. Instead, the ordinance imposed “additional local restrictions based on federal immigration classifications on those who wish to remain in” the jurisdiction. Id . at 855. “Local regulation that conditions the ability to enter private contract for shelter on federal immigration status is of a fundamentally different nature than the sorts of restrictions on employment or public benefits that have been found not to be preempted regulations of immigration.” Id. Importantly, as the court explained, “restrictions on residence directly impact immigration in a way that restrictions on employment or public benefits do not” because restrictions on housing fundamentally
38

impact an immigrant’s ability to remain in a State. Id. As such, the ordinance was preempted.10
Likewise, in Lozano v. City of Hazleton , the Third
Circuit addressed a city ordinance regarding immigration,
much like HB 56. 620 F.3d at 219-24. The ordinance had
two sets of provisions: employment provisions, which
imposed sanctions on hiring undocumented workers, and
housing provisions, which made it unlawful to “let, lease
or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien” and made
“legal immigration status a condition precedent to
entering into a valid lease.” Id. at 179. The housing
provisions, Lozano held, were “attempts to regulate
residence based solely on immigration status,” and were
not within States’ traditional police powers because
“[d]eciding which aliens may live in the United States
10. Commissioner Magee concedes that “the manufactured home decals at issue are not among the ‘public benefits’ listed in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 or 1621.” Magee Supp. Br. 14 n.7 (Doc. No. 80, at 14 n.7). Given this concession, the court has trouble seeing how the registration decals at issue here would not fall within this line of authority as direct regulations of residency based on immigration status.
39

has always been the prerogative of the federal government.” Id . at 220. Because the “housing provisions regulate[d] which aliens may live” within the jurisdiction, the court found them to be preempted. Id.
To be sure, § 30 does not, on its face, condition residence in Alabama upon an immigration classification. As applied to § 40-12-255, however, the section is the equivalent of such a prohibition, at least for those owning manufactured homes on rented land. Commissioner Magee admits as much: “Section 30 as applied in this instance means that the individual Plaintiffs cannot continue living in Alabama in manufactured homes they own and maintain on certain property without violating either Section 30 or Ala. Code § 40-12-255 or causing others to violate Section 30.” Def. Proposed Facts 8 (Doc. No. 64, at 8).11 Congress has never gone so far as to support the
11. Importantly, HB 56, as written, goes further than just manufactured homes. Section 13 of HB 56 makes it a crime to enter into a rental agreement with an alien if the “person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien is unlawfully present in the United
(continued...) 40

idea that aliens residing in this country cannot own a home and, further, must forfeit one if they have paid for it. This prohibition on ownership of a manufactured home on the basis of an immigrant’s classification likely amounts to a “regulation of immigration” under DeCanas.
Commissioner Magee contests this court’s reliance on cases like Lozano and Farmers Branch II , pointing out that § 30 is not a “total ban” on housing and that the plaintiffs can still reside, in some limited ways, within the State of Alabama. Nonetheless, while the defendants’ specific application of § 30 does not prohibit every unlawful immigrant from living within the borders of the State, it serves as an effective bar for many unauthorized persons who already own their manufactured

11.(...continued)

States.” HB 56 § 13(a)(4) (Doc. No. 31-1, at 36). In

effect, this provision requires private landlords,

housing managers, and even those renting rooms to friends

to verify an individual’s immigration status before

renting a unit. See

id. § 13(g) (describing

enforcement); Hammon Tr. (Doc. No. 68, at 40-41). This

section has already been enjoined as likely preempted.

United States v. Alabama, 2011 WL 4469941, at *41-45.

41

home. The relevant fact in Lozano and Farmers Branch II was not that the residency requirements were total bans. They were not: the restrictions applied to rentals, but not home ownership. Exclusion from certain classes of private housing was the crucial problem in each instance. In this way, § 30’s application goes further than either of these “total bans” on rental property, for it actually interferes with the right of home ownership.
Analogous to these cases, the manner in which § 30, as applied to the manufactured homes statute, constitutes a “regulation of immigration” can be seen by looking at the possible cumulative effect of these sorts of laws. In the first case, as it is with § 13 of HB 56 and the ordinances in Lozano and Farmers Branch II, undocumented immigrants cannot live in rental property; in the second case, this one, they can no longer own the manufactured home they have lawfully purchased. The next case is unknown, but this sort of incremental intrusion is precisely how the slippery-slope toward an actual all-out ban for undocumented immigrant residency works. Cf.
42

generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation , 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 569 (2008) (describing the thousands of immigration bills recently enacted); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1026 (2003).
Another cumulative effect has to do with the scope of preemption analysis: if every State adopted the rental ordinances and manufactured home ownership bans seen here, undocumented immigrants’ residency in these classes of housing would be impossible nationwide. The State cannot “impose an auxiliary burden upon the ... residence of aliens that was never contemplated by Congress.” Farmers Branch II, 701 F. Supp. at 855 (quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12 (1982) (internal quotes and further citation omitted)). These “auxiliary burdens,” as seen from the shift between rental in prior cases to actual ownership here, is why the court’s perspective is not only Alabama’s law. If Alabama “can regulate as it has here, then so could every state or locality.” Lozano, 620 F.3d at 221; see also Rowe v. N.H. Motor
43

Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 373 (2008) (rejecting a the argument that a law was not preempted because it would not apply nationally, since allowing the State to set this requirement “would allow other states to do the same”). As the Third Circuit reasoned: “‘[W]e can imagine the slippery slope ... if every local and state government enacted laws purporting to determine that ... [certain persons] could not stay in their bounds. If every city and state enacted and enforced such laws ... the federal government’s control over decisions relating to immigration would be effectively eviscerated.’” Lozano, 620 F.3d at 222 (quoting Farmers Branch I, No. 3:08–cv–1551–B, Hrg. Tr. at 136 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2008) (Lindsay, J.)).
Put differently, through the Constitution the federal government has the exclusive authority to authorize an immigrant’s entry and exit from the country. By necessity, federal law must also control the time in between: an immigrant’s residency. Congress has chosen a uniform policy for regulating immigrant residency
44

within the United States, which has not meant deporting every removable aliens and instead allowing some to stay.
Commissioner Magee seems to acknowledge that a residency requirement should be preempted under DeCanas. See Magee Supp. Br. 8-9 (Doc. No. 80, at 8-9) (attempting to distinguish this case from other residency requirements). Regardless of whether § 30’s application to § 40-12-255 creates a “total ban” on residency, it is undisputed that it does have this effect for many manufactured home owners in Alabama and does so on the basis of immigration status. That fact is dispositive: “The legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name.” Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325 (1866).
c. Implied Preemption Because “the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the
45

national government,” where the government acts any state law must yield. Hines v. Davidowitz , 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941). As such, where the federal government, “in the exercise of its superior authority in th[e] field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation ... states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id. at 66-67. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged that federal immigration policy “has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.” Galvan v. Press , 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
Accordingly, even in the absence of express preemption, a federal law’s “structure and purpose” can trump a state statute in two ways. Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2004). First, “state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute.” Id . A conflict
46

occurs when a state law frustrates the “accomplishment of a federal objection,” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. , 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000), or “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. Second, when “Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’ state law in that area is preempted.” Crosby , 530 U.S. at 372.
The INA reflects Congress’s objective of exerting federal control over an immigrant’s residency in this country. The court finds that the plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on their claim that § 30 of HB 56 is conflict preempted by the INA. Section 30’s application to Alabama’s manufactured home statute creates at least two obstacles to federal immigration policy. First, Alabama’s policy regulates an immigrant’s residency in contradiction to federal policy. Second, HB 56 imposes an impermissible verification scheme in both practice and theory.
47

Like the legislation at issue in Lozano , § 30 “assume[s] that the federal government seeks the removal of all undocumented aliens.” Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 531. This premise is legally and factually wrong. As discussed above, it is the federal government–-not the States–-that gets to determine who are permitted into this country and who get to stay once they are here, and the federal government does not seek to remove all undocumented aliens from the country. The mandatory denial of a mobile-home permit therefore ignores the INA’s careful balancing of executive discretion, administrative process, and judicial review. SeePlyler, 457 U.S. at 225 (“The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.”).
In short, HB 56 seeks removal of unauthorized persons that the Executive Branch has not initiated removal proceedings against. The sponsors of HB 56 declared that their goal was the “self-deportation” of unauthorized persons. See, e.g., Transcript of Nov. 23, 2011 Hearing, Doc. No. 68, at 17 (Statement of Representative Hammon);
48

id. at 118 (Statement of Senator Beason). As Senator Beason explained, HB 56 was “designed to reduce the number of illegal aliens in the state.” Id. The States, however, cannot accomplish this goal through residency restrictions.
In addition, some unauthorized aliens are not removable under federal law. For instance, Congress has established the category of “temporary protective status” (TPS), see 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, whereby the Secretary of Homeland Security can classify foreign countries as too unsafe or impractical to deport foreign nationals to. Typically, this occurs if there is an ongoing armed conflict or environmental disaster in the area. As of December 1, 2011, nationals of El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan are eligible for TPS. Alabama’s policy of encouraging “selfdeportation” of these individuals is an obstacle to federal policy.
Section 30’s application to § 40-12-255 also runs counter to the verification procedures that Congress has
49

established. Under § 30, state and local officials must utilize either SAVE or § 1373(c) to verify an alien’s lawful status before conducting a business transaction. Criminal enforcement of § 30 is limited to § 1373(c) verification, presumably because that system is more accurate. Section 30(f) makes clear that state and local officials “shall not attempt to independently make a final determination of whether an alien is lawfully present in the United States.”
While § 30 attempts to piggyback on DHS’s verification programs, it fails to account for the nuances of federal immigration law. To take just one example: removal and asylum decisions are notoriously unpredictable. See , e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (noting a reversal rate, in whole or in part, of 40% of Board of Immigration Appeals decisions); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007) (demonstrating substantial variability
50

between the circuits in immigration decisions). While this lack of uniformity is certainly troubling, it underscores the point that state and local officials are ill-equipped to make removal decisions. Indeed, in “light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented [person] will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226; see also id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he structure of the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which eventually will be deported.”).
Thus, even assuming that HB 56’s verification procedures were perfectly synchronized with the federal government’s processes, § 30 would still pose an obstacle to congressional purpose. The reason is simple: verification reveals only an immigrant’s status at a particular moment in time, which says nothing about whether the federal government has decided to remove that
51

person from the country. Cf . 68 Fed. Reg. 58301, 58302 (Sept. 28, 2000) (“A Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) response showing no Service record on an individual or an immigration status making the individual ineligible for a benefit is not a finding of fact or conclusion of law that the individual is not lawfully present.”). Magee is making an impermissible leap from undocumented status to removal. Assuming that the former requires the latter runs afoul of federal policy.
Finally, Commissioner Magee contends that § 30’s application to the manufactured home statute is simply an exercise of the State’s licensing authority. She relies principally on Whiting, where a plurality of the Supreme Court held that States may require businesses to use EVerify and may revoke or suspend business licenses as punishment for hiring undocumented workers. 131 S. Ct. at 1968.
Whiting is inapposite for at least two reasons. First, the Whiting Court addressed licensing in a
52

distinct context: the employment of unauthorized aliens. Congress has expressly given States discretion to issue licenses in this area, thereby saving these schemes in this area from being preempted. IRCA provides: “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (emphasis added). The Whiting Court found that Arizona’s license revocation statute fit squarely within this employment-specific savings clause and was not preempted. Whiting , 131 S. Ct. at 1977-78. No similar savings clause exists for state regulation of immigration residency requirements. HB 56, therefore, cannot claim this safe harbor.
Second, assuming the “annual registration free” is an exercise of “licensing” authority, in this case the license intrudes into a quintessentially federal domain:
53

residency requirements.12 As discussed at length above, applying § 30 of HB 56 to § 40-12-255 has erected a residency requirement for mobile home owners living on rented property. Preemption cannot be escaped by recasting this prohibition as a universal “licensing” requirement. The provision is directed at a specific group: aliens who cannot establish their lawful residency. The Supreme Court long ago made clear that States cannot require the registration of aliens. Hine,s 312 U.S. at 56-60 (discussing Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act). Accordingly, because this application of § 30 establishes a de facto residency requirement through its annual decal process, it is preempted.13
12. Consistent with the line drawn by the northern district between business or driver’s “licenses” and “registration fees,” see United States v. Alabama , 2011 WL 4469941, at 60 n.25, the court has doubts as to whether § 40-12-255’s annual registration scheme is even a even “license” within the meaning of Whiting.
13. As applied to § 40-12-255, § 30 of HB 56 is field preempted for essentially the same reasons that it is conflict preempted.
54

Therefore, through the creation of a residency
regulation for unauthorized aliens, Alabama has usurped
federal control over immigration policy. Whether this
incursion is labeled express or conflict preemption, the
plaintiffs have established by a substantial likelihood
that it is void under the Supremacy Clause.14
14. Before closing its discussion of preemption, the court adds that, if HB 56, with its broad and farreaching provisions, is viewed synergistically as a whole rather than myopically provision by provision and is viewed in application rather than facially, an interesting question is presented as to whether the statute, if the evidence shows that its clear effect, and perhaps purpose, is to rid the State of certain aliens completely (rather than to deny them of a state benefit here and there), is, in reality, nothing short of a local immigration statute and thus preempted. Cf. Leg. Session (Doc. No. 14-3, at 27) (as Representative Micky Ray Hammon put it: “This [bill] attacks every aspect of an illegal immigrant’s life. They will not stay in Alabama. ... [T]his bill is designed to make it difficult for them to live here so they will deport themselves.”). This question of synergy, that is, whether HB 56’s provisions function together to produce a result (deportation) not independently obtainable, is not presented here. Nevertheless, when § 30, as applied to § 40-12-255, is viewed in the comprehensive context of all of HB 56’s provisions and the limited evidence so far of the impact, intended or not, of these provisions, including § 30, the conclusion that § 30 is a residency restriction and thus preempted is reinforced.
55

2. Fair Housing Act The FHA prohibits actions that “make unavailable” or “deny” a dwelling “to any person because of” his race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The statute also proscribes actions that “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges ... in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith[] because of” his race or national origin. I.d § 3604(b). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ application of § 30 of HB 56 to Alabama Code § 40-12-255 violates both subparts (a) and (b) of § 3604, that is, the FHA. It is undisputed that, as applied to § 40-12255, § 30 effectively “makes unavailable” a manufactured home and changes the terms or conditions of residing in a manufactured home by conditioning residence on a demonstration of lawful presence in the United States. The plaintiffs argue that HB 56 discriminates against
56

Latinos.15 Commissioner Magee counters that HB 56
complies with the FHA because it has nothing to do with
race or national origin; it has to do with lawful
immigration status, which is beyond the ambit of the FHA.
The FHA recognizes claims of intentional
discrimination, as well as those brought under a
disparate-impact theory. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure
Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2008); Jackson
v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994).16 The
15. As relevant here, the court uses the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” interchangeably. See, e.g. , Valle v. Secretary for Dep’t of Corrs. , 478 F.3d 1326, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 2007). In addition, both Latino and Hispanic backgrounds are often treated as encompassing both race and national origin, Booth v. Pasco County , 2010 WL 2757209, at *10 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (Moody, J.), and the concepts of race and national origin, as they pertain here, are difficult to separate. See Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 560-62 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (Karlton, J.). Accordingly, the court treats the plaintiffs’ argument of discrimination on the basis of being Latino as encompassing both race and national discrimination and does not differentiate between the two concepts.
16. The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a case addressing: (1) whether disparate impact is available under the FHA and, if so, (2) what method of proof governs such a claim. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, ___ U. S. ___, ___ S. Ct.
(continued...)
57

plaintiffs have alleged violations of the FHA under both theories, and the court finds that they are likely to succeed on each claim.
Unlike the preemption claim, which “must be based on the language of the Act alone and not the motivation for its enactment,” Hispanic Interest Coalition , 2011 5516953, at *17, the discrimination claims under the FHA require an inquiry into, among other things, the motivation for passing the statute, and they call for a more searching inquiry into the background of HB 56.
a. Intentional Discrimination The plaintiffs first argue that HB 56 was passed to intentionally discriminate against Latinos in violation of the FHA. To prove intentional discrimination, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that race or national origin had “some role” in the passage of HB 56. Sofarelli v.
16.(...continued) ___, 2011 WL 531692 (Nov. 7, 2011). Until that case is decided, the court looks to existing precedent.
58

Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co. , 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973). In making this determination under the FHA, the Eleventh Circuit has followed the factors outlined in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). See Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County , 466 F.3d 1276, 1283-84 (quoting United States v. Hous. Auth. of City of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 727 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (Hand, J.), which was quoting Arlington Heights).
Though an Equal Protection case, the Arlington Heights standard is used in FHA cases generally, e.g. , Hallmark, 466 F.3d at 1283-84, and is of particular relevance here because the court addressed what it means for a multi-member body, such as the Alabama legislature, to take an action, at least in part, “because of” an impermissible factor. As in the FHA context, “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required” to demonstrate that an action is unlawful. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. That said, intentional
59

discrimination “does not require a plaintiff to prove

that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes,” because “[r]arely can it be

said that a legislature or administrative body operating

under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern or even that a particular purpose was

the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.” Id. Race or national

origin, however, is not just another competing factor for legislators to consider, and, when “there is proof that

a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in

the decision,” judicial deference to the legislative act is no longer justified. Id. at 265-66.

With this in mind, Arlington Heights

explained:

“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such

circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be

available.” Id. at 266; cf. Hallmark, 466 F.3d at 1283 (“‘Because explicit statements of racially discriminatory

motivation are decreasing, circumstantial evidence must

often be used to establish the requisite intent.’”

60

(quoting Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. at 727)). “[W]ithout

purporting to be exhaustive,” Arlington Heights identified five “subjects of proper inquiry in

determining whether racially discriminatory intent

existed” in the decision. 429 U.S. at 268 First, the “impact of the official action ... may

provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear

pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the

governing legislation appears neutral on its face.” Id.

at 266. Effect is an important “starting point” because the “impact of an official action is often probative of

why the action was taken in the first place since people

usually intend the natural consequences of their actions.” Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471,

487 (1997).

Second, the court may consider the

“historical

background of the decision ... , particularly if it

reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious

purposes.” Arlington Heights , 429 U.S. at 266. This

61

also means the court “may take into account any history of discrimination by the decisionmaking body or the jurisdiction it represents.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md. , 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Hallmark, 466 F.3d at 1283-85.
Third, and another form of historical background, the court may consider the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” which “may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
Fourth, both procedural and substantive departures from typical decisionmaking practices can be considered. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68. Substantive departures exist when “factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.” Id. at 267.
Fifth, “the legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or report.” Id . at 268.
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In looking at contemporaneous statements, along with statements made in the sequence of events leading up to the decision, courts are mindful of terms that may appear benign but are in fact “camouflaged racial expressions” or are pretext for animus against a particular group. Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Greater N.O. Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 648 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811-12 (E.D. La. 2009) (Berrigan, J.); Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck , 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) (McMahon, J.).
Further, Arlington Heights recognized that, in “some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 at 268. In such an instance, “a legislator may testify only to his own motivations, his opinion regarding the motivation of the body as a whole, the information on which the body acted, the body’s knowledge of alternatives, and deviations from procedural or substantive rules typically employed.” Cano v. Davis ,
63

193 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (three-judge

court) (Morrow, J.).

The court recognizes that “[p]roving the motivation

behind official action is often a problematic

undertaking,” especially when dealing with a body the

size of the Alabama legislature. Hunter v. Underwood ,

471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). Nonetheless, Underwood

powerfully affirms the approach of looking to legislative

purpose through the statements made in legislative

deliberation.

When considering the Alabama

Constitutional Convention of 1901, the Supreme Court

looked at evidence demonstrating that the law was “part

of a movement” that had a racially discriminatory

purpose. 471 U.S. at 229. As the district court had

done, Underwood then looked to statements of the

Convention’s president as “evidence of legislative

intent” and went on to consider “the proceedings of the

64

convention, several historical studies, and the testimony of two expert historians.” Id.17

17. In a motion in limine, Commissioner Magee argues

that evidence of the legislator’s individual statements

are simply irrelevant to determining whether there has

been intentional discrimination on account of race or

national origin. Mot. In Limine (Doc. No. 40). Magee is

wrong. Cases like Arlington Heights

and Underwood

definitively establish that contemporaneous statements by

individual decisionmakers are relevant to determining

whether race was a motivating factor for the decision.

As the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and other

courts have recognized in a variety of contexts, where

the court’s inquiry centers on finding an improper

purpose, looking into legislators’ motives and comments

happens frequently. Where such information is available,

this inquiry is now the norm, not the exception. See,

e.g., Easley v. Cromartie , 532 U.S. 234, 253-54 (2001);

Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 489; Shaw v. Hunt , 517 U.S.

899, 906 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-18

(1995); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of

Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540-42 (1993); Hallmark, 466 F.3d

at 1284; Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002);

Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514,

1527-28 (11th Cir. 1993); Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hil,l

973 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1992); Goldberg v. Whitman, 743

F. Supp. 943, 947-57 (D. Conn. 1990) (Nevas, J.).

A further problem with Magee’s objection is its presumption that to find intentional discrimination the court must find that every legislator acted with a discriminatory motive. This is not the standard. As explained, it is well established that the plaintiffs must prove that race or national origin played some role in the decision, that is, race or national origin was a
(continued...)
65

In essence, as the Supreme Court has explained, “the inquiry is practical.” Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.24 (1979). “What a legislature or any official entity is ‘up to’ may be plain from the results they achieve, or the results they avoid. Often it is made clear from what has been called ... the give and take of the situation.” Id . (internal quotes and citation omitted). Put differently, “[d]iscriminatory intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 426 (2d Cir. 1995).
To begin, there is substantial evidence that concern for illegal immigration was behind the passage of HB 56. HB 56 itself proclaims that “illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness,” which is “encouraged” when public agencies “provide public benefits without verifying immigration status.” HB 56
17.(...continued) motivating factor for passing the law, not the only one. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; Hallmark, 466 F.3d at 1283; Sofarelli, 931 F.2d at 722.
66

§ 2 (Doc. No. 31-1, at 5). These problems, HB 56 finds, are exacerbated by the “costs incurred by school districts for the public elementary and secondary education of children who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” which has created a “compelling need for the State Board of Education to accurately measure and assess the population of students who are aliens not lawfully present in the United States.” Id . When coupled with other policies that “impede and obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law, undermine the security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the privileges and immunities of the citizens of Alabama,” it is in Alabama’s “compelling public interest to discourage illegal immigration.” Id . Moreover, numerous statements by both Alabama Senators and Representatives confirm these findings.
Nevertheless, after considering the factors listed in Arlington Heights--the effect of the bill, its historical background, the sequence of events leading up to its enactment, its substantive departures, and the
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contemporaneous statements of legislators--the court is convinced that, while the record clearly establishes that concern about illegal immigration was a substantial factor behind the passage of HB 56, there is substantial evidence that race and national origin also played a role in the passage of HB 56.
First, the effect of HB 56 falls disproportionately upon Latinos. Until recently, Alabama had only a minuscule Latino population. Today, however, Latinos comprise approximately 3.7% of the State’s population. And like the broader national trend, the unauthorized immigrant population in Alabama has increased dramatically in recent years: from 5,000 in 1990 to 120,000 in 2010. Though unauthorized immigrants account for roughly 2.5% of the State’s population, id . at 52, the overwhelming majority (between 65% and 77%) of these immigrants in Alabama are Latino. 18 In short, Latinos
18. These numbers are based upon record evidence, and three sources in particular: (1) the 2008-2010 American Community Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census
(continued...) 68

make up a disproportionate share of the State’s foreign-
born population and constitute a large majority of the
State’s non-citizen population, which is why HB 56 has
the greatest impact on this community.
Second, while the plaintiffs do not allege that there
were any deviations of procedure with respect to HR 56,
they do argue that the State departed substantively from
values it would normally prioritize when it passed the
statute.19 The court agrees that, with HB 56, the State
18.(...continued) Bureau; (2) the Pew Hispanic Center’s Report, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010 (2011), which reproduces and analyzes 2010 Census Data; and (3) a DHS report analyzing data from 2009, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009 4 (2010). See generally Crook Decl. (Doc. No. 14-2).
19. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that HB 56 undermines (1) collection of revenues, (2) fostering compliance with state licensing laws, and (3) preventing homelessness and family disruption. Though neither defendant has submitted a response to this argument, the court has carefully considered each alleged departure. The current evidentiary record fails to support this argument except as to disruption of family and, in particular, the burdening of children of undocumented immigrants, which is the only aspect of the argument addressed by the court.
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departed dramatically from the way it has historically treated, indeed, prioritized the treatment of, children. Alabama, through each of its constitutions, has viewed education as a crucial component to a child’s welfare, see Opinion of the Justices , 624 So.2d 107, 158 (Ala. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Ex Parte James, 836 So.2d 813 (Ala. 2002), and treats characteristics of a child’s parents that detract from education (like poverty or an unsafe environment) as obstacles to overcome. In fact, when “a parent is unable or unwilling to meet the basic parental responsibilities to provide the child food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, nurturing, and protection,” a juvenile court has grounds to terminate parental rights. B.B.T. v. Houston County Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 WL 5436314, at *2 (Ala. Civ. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (citing 1975 Ala. Code 12-15-319). In those circumstances, the State steps in to provide for the child, regardless (and despite) of what happens to the parent or what any decisions they have made.
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In stark contrast, for the sake of addressing illegal immigration, HB 56 departs from the State’s general treatment of children. To that end, HB 56 attempts to combat immigration in two ways. First, the statute envisions reporting to the federal government the “unfair” costs of immigration borne by the State due to its lax immigration enforcement. Second, HB 56 provides strong incentives for undocumented aliens to leave the State (or “self-deport”) even if, and despite the fact that, their children are U.S. citizens.
Specifically, § 28 of HB 56 serves the first goal by requiring “[e]very public elementary and secondary school” in the State to “determine whether the student enrolling in the public school was born outside the jurisdiction of the United States” and then requires each school district to send that information to the Alabama Board of Education, which must then compile an annual report regarding the costs of educating unlawfully present children. HB 56 § 28 (Doc. No. 31-1, at 57). The second goal is achieved through an in terrorem
71

mechanism: schools must record whether a student “is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.” Id . This requirement relies on the strong disincentive parents have to reveal to schools that their U.S. citizen children have parents that are “not lawfully present in the United States.”
The plaintiffs have submitted evidence demonstrating that HB 56 is especially tough on the “mixed status” families, “where one or more of the family members are U.S. Citizens or lawful permanent residents” and other members of the family are not. Ctr. For Am. Progress, Top 10 Reasons Alabama’s New Immigration Law is a Disaster for Families (Nov. 15, 2011), in (Doc. No. 42-3, at 110).20 As reported by the Center for American Progress, “85% of the children of Alabama’s undocumented
20. More pejoratively, these children are referred to as “anchor babies,” which, as Representative Hammon explained, is “a term that a lot of people use to say that illegal immigrants come to the country and have babies that are U.S. citizens, and that gives them a reason to be able to stay here.” Hearing Tr. (Doc. No. 68, at 28).
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immigrants live in ‘mixed status’ families,’” and “the Urban Institute estimates that 28,000 U.S. citizen children in Alabama have noncitizen parents.” Id.
Burdening the education of children as a method for tracking their parents’ wrongs is a substantive departure from prior legislative enactments of the state; instead, as the parental-termination statute indicates, the typical goal is just the opposite. A survey of other Alabama statutes demonstrates this point. For instance, the Alabama Department of Youth Services was created to “promote and safeguard the social well-being and general welfare of the youth of the state,” and, to achieve this goal, among other, the State is tasked with providing for the “promotion and improvement of community conditions, programs and resources to aid parents in discharging their responsibilities for the care, development and well-being of their children.” 1975 Ala. Code § 44-1-1. Likewise, when establishing the Alabama Council on Family and Children, the legislature found that “there is at present a need in Alabama to coordinate, at the state and
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local level, the efforts of existing providers of services supporting early childhood development and family involvement in education.” 1975 Ala. Code § 16-116.1. Other parts of Alabama law recognize that parents play an integral role in their child’s education and that there is a close “interrelationship of the family life of a child and the educational achievement of the child.” 1975 Ala. Code. § 16-28-2.2; see also id § 16-40A-1 (contemplating a supportive, collaborative role between schools and families to prevent drug abuse and teen pregnancy). Indeed, Alabama law specifically recognizes the harm caused to children by being uprooted from their schools or losing support based upon their parents’ decisions. See, e.g. , 1975 Ala. Code. § 15-44B-1 (creating a compact “to remove barriers to education success imposed on children of military families because of frequent moves and deployment of their parents”).
HB 56 is in direct conflict with these substantive values. No other statute in the State views the decisions of a parent, even if unlawful, as a
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justification for taking actions that will have an adverse effect on school children. The State usually attempts to protect children from the negative consequences of their parents’ conduct, not punish them for it. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained, “legislation directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.” Plyler , 547 U.S. at 220.
Nor does this burden solely fall upon students who are themselves undocumented immigrants. To the contrary, this substantive departure relies on a child’s citizenship status as part of the problem. Thus, HB 56 targets U.S. citizens that are children--and who often have no choice in the mat ter--solely on the basis of their parents’ immigration status, something previously unseen in Alabama. This feature thus takes HB 56 beyond the problem of immigration: it explicitly reaches U.S. citizens as well. Targeting citizens suggests that “illegal immigrants” do not constitute the entire problem
75

addressed by the HB 56; some other group, not just immigrants, are a component of the perceived problem.
This is not to say that the State may not shift course, or alter its substantive values (for doing so is often a measure of progress). But such callous disregard for children is not located in any other portion of Alabama law; from provisions that ensure military children are not disadvantaged by frequent moves to strong enforcement for child support, Alabama has recognized that the actions of a parent and the conditions of the family have a direct impact on children. HB 56, however, departs from these values, and does so significantly for one narrow class of children: those whose parents are undocumented immigrants.
In sum, the court finds that the evidence in this record indicates that HB 56 is a substantive departure from the State’s typical treatment of families and children in particular; in other words, the court has serious doubts that children--and, in particular, children who are actually citizens of this Nation--who
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are of a different hue, race, and nationality would have been treated so adversely. “[T]he factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
Moreover, that HB 56’s treatment of children in mixed status families, who are overwhelmingly Latino, is so markedly different from the State’s historical treatment of children in general suggests strongly that the difference in treatment was driven by animus against Latinos in general and thus that the statute was discriminatorily based.
Third, with regard to the Arlington Heights factors of background and contemporaneous statements of legislators, two concerns counsel that these two factors should be considered with caution but still critically. The first concern is that, throughout its history, the United States has experienced multiple waves of immigrants. In turn, these influxes often produce backlash. See Mojica v. Reno , 970 F. Supp. 130, 145
77

(E.D. N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (“It is well known that prejudice against the Irish, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Italians, the Jews, the Mexicans and other emerged as these groups emigrated in substantial numbers.”). Cyclical patterns of immigration by definable groups heighten ethnic and religious tensions. In the 1830s to 1850s, anti-Catholic sentiment accompanied the “Know Nothing” party’s opposition to Irish and German immigrants. John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 , at 3-5 (2002 ed.). A dramatic increase in Asian immigrants on the West Coast resulted in the passage of “exclusion” acts that prohibited immigration from China, Japan, and other Asian nations. See Lozano , 496 F. Supp. 2d at 557 & n.86 (discussing exclusion acts passed from the 1880s to the 1920s). The late nineteenth century also witnessed a rise in anti-Semitism in response to Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe. Higham, supra , at 67. The “most marked xenophobic” period in American history was the 1920s, when Congress closed the “immigration door [in]
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favor[] of West Europeans over Italians, Jews, Asians and others through numerical restrictions by country.” Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 145. Latino immigrants have also faced discrimination following substantial migration into the country. In 1954, for example, hundreds of thousands of undocumented Mexican immigrants were deported during “Operation Wetback.” See generally Juan Ramon Garcia, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954 (1980).
While this background teaches that backlashes to influxes of immigrants have been regularly a part of our national history, it does not warrant the conclusion that, in Alabama, HB 56 was product of such backlash. This history does, however, teach that legislation that comes on the heels of a substantial immigrant influx--in particular, where the legislation, as demonstrated above, has a disproportionate impact on these immigrants--should be eyed carefully.
The court’s second concern is the fact that, in their statements about HB 56, Alabama legislators often spoke
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about illegal immigrants and Latinos in the same breath and the fact that Latinos were mentioned often in the debate on HB 56 should not be taken as conclusive, or even necessarily indicative, that Latinos were the discriminatory target of HB 56. The plaintiffs themselves have argued, and the court has agreed, that Latinos make up 64.8% of the non-citizens residing in Alabama. The topic of Latinos is unavoidable in the discussion immigration in Alabama. Indeed, legislative arguments against the passage of HB 56 often centered on the statute’s impact on Latinos.
At the same time, however, the court must be sensitive to the use, in the legislative debates, of illegal immigrant as a code for Latino or Hispanic, with the result that, while addressing illegal immigrants was the target, discriminating against Latinos was the target as well. This use is dramatically reflected in how HB 56’s drafter, Representative Hammon, conflated race and immigration status. After a reporter inquired about Hammon’s oft-repeated comment that “Alabama has the
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second-fastest-growing illegal immigrant population in

the nation” and asked for evidence substantiating Hammon’s claim, Hammon sent the journalist a news article

that indicates Alabama’s Hispanic population had the

second-largest percentage growth between 2000 and 2010, and says nothing about unauthorized immigration

whatsoever. Hammon Doesn’t Know Difference Between

‘Hispanic’ and Illegal Immigrant (June 23, 2011), in

(Doc. No. 14-3, at 117); see

Jeremy Gray, Alabama

Hispanic Population growth 2nd Highest in the U.S. , The

Birmingham News (Mar. 26, 2011) (article that Hammon sent journalist).

Similarly, Representative Kerry Rich’s opening

statement to the legislature demonstrates the numerous ways in which legislators frequently conflated illegal

immigration and Hispanics when discussing the ills to be

remedied by HB 56. Representative Rich began his testimony as follows:

“Representative Hammon, I want to thank you for bringing this bill to address an issue that is a huge issue in the State

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of Alabama. But it is especially a huge issue on Sand Mountain. I want to say to my colleagues here in the House that I realize, and I realize completely, that God loves Hispanics just as much as he loves me, anybody in this chamber, and I understand that. I don’t question that one second.
“But I tell you what I do have a problem with. First of all, if Hispanics come to this country and they come to this country legally, and there is about 20 percent of them that we are told, in our area, that have come here legally, I have no problem with them whatsoever. As a matter of fact, I like the Hispanic people. Most of the Hispanic people are hard workers. Most of them have good family values. Most of them are good Christian, church-going people. The ones that I have a problem with are the ones that come here and create all kinds of social and economic problems. And those problems are rampant in our area.
“The population of Marshall County increased by about 11 thousand in this last census from 2000 to 2010. And according to estimates from the Census Bureau, there is about 11 thousand Hispanics in Marshall County now. And there is even more in other parts of Sand Mountain. I will give you two quick examples. 95 percent of the children that are in the elementary school at Crosswell Elementary School are Hispanic, 95 percent of them. 52 percent of the children that attend
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Albertville Elementary and Primary School are Hispanic, and the biggest part of them are illegal.
“It is costing our area hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars to educate these children. And the taxpayers in my area -- they don't deserve to have to pay that bill.
“They don’t deserve that.
“Let me give you just one example. And I want to make this clear as to what happens in our area. Illegals come to our area, and they have children just as soon as they can. Now, this is real[ly] what I am talking about. They have children just as soon as they can. And then when they start them into school, they go and register them and most of the time they register their children, if they were born here, they register them in their real name. But then--and they--and the parents give the school their real name. But what happens is they tell them that if you call my workplace, wherever that is, poultry plant, whatever, if you call my workplace, then don't ask for me under this name, ask for me under this other name.”
Leg. Session (Doc. No. 14-3, at 33-34) (emphasis added).
Rich memorialized similar comments on the website related
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to his position as a representative. Hearing Tr. (Doc. No. 68, at 57).
As with Hammon, the county population figures Rich relies on are for Hispanics, not non-citizens or illegal immigrants. Moreover, his criticism (that “The ones that I have a problem with are the ones that come here and create all kinds of social and economic problems”) appears to be aimed at Hispanics in general, not illegal immigrants.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the legislative debate on HB 56 was laced with derogatory comments about Hispanics. This evidence reinforces the contention that term illegal immigrants (the purported target of HB 56) was just a racially discriminatory code for Hispanics. For example, Representative Rogers made comments that reflect popular stereotypes about Mexicans and draw explicit distinctions along the lines of race and national origin, not immigration. Rogers argued that HB 56 needed to punish employers that hired undocumented workers more harshly. In so doing, he explained “I am
84

not against deterring illegals,” and then described the
sorts of “illegals” that needed deterring by anecdote:
“Now, they have got some up here in Hoover and
Homewood--that I saw them about 30 of them get out of a
car one day. I see guys--I thought it was a circus.
They kept getting out and kept getting out. ... [B]ut the
kidding part about it now is if we stop the employer from
employing them, they won’t come. Now, that is why I
would like to see a ... law that ... punishes employers.”
Leg. Session (Doc. No. 14-3, at 78). Rogers then
continued:
“I have gotten calls from--from Hispanics. But the killing part about them, I will tell you what happened. I know for a fact you won’t believe this. But when they get a chance to become legal, you know [w]hat they put on his ... driver’s license? White. They put white down there. I--I don’t know about 20 of them right now. The are darker than I am. But it say white on it--on their driver’s license.”
(Id. at 78-79). In this statement there is a stereotype
commonly associated with Mexicans (they ride in crowded
cars), and this stereotype overlaps with assumptions
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frequently made about unlawful immigrants. See, e.g. , United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (5th Cir. 1984) (Tate, J., dissenting) (arguing that ‘“reasonable suspicion’ of illegal alien entry cannot be based upon the mere circumstance that a crowded pickup truck of dirty appearing Hispanic-descended workmen is traveling on an Interstate highway at 11:30 in the evening”); United States v. Mallides , 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973) (describing police officers assumption that a car contained “illegal aliens ... based entirely on the officers fleeting observation that there were six Mexican-appearing men in the car”).
Along these same lines, Representative Thomas E. Jackson commented that getting rid of “illegal” immigrants might be counterproductive because “immigrants do keep this nation functioning,” by he meant: “the people I saw when I went to visit the chicken houses” were “4-foot Mexicans in there catching them chickens.” Leg. Session (Doc. No. 14-3, at 32).
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The contention, based on the above examples from what
is in the record, that the term illegal immigrants was
often a code for Hispanics is reinforced by the fact
that, as shown above, HB 56 treats mixed status children,
the overwhelming number of which are Latino, differently
from the way children have been historically viewed and
treated in Alabama.21
21. To be sure, many other examples in the record provide support for the inference that Latinos were the target of HB 56. For instance, there are many statements that focus on Sand Mountain, Albertville, and Marshall County, Alabama, which, at 12% of the county’s population, has an over-concentration of Latinos relative to the state population of 3.7%. Marshall County U.S. Census Bureau Quick Facts(Doc. No. 14-3, at 124); see, e.g., Hearing Tr. (Doc. No. 68, at 77) (Senator Scofield describing Marshall County as the “epicenter” of illegal immigration in Alabama); Leg. Session (Doc. No. 14-3, at 68, 77) (Representative Hammon explaining that “illegals ... work all over North Alabama,” and describing “situations” in Marshall County that have “crimes that are very much akin to slavery”); Sam Rolley, Beason: Dems Don’t Want to Solve Illegal Immigration Problem , The Cullman Times (Feb. 6, 2011) (Doc. No. 14-3, at 9) (quoting Senator Beason saying that the “reality is that if you allow illegal immigration to continue in your area you will destroy yourself eventually. . . . If you don’t believe illegal immigration will destroy a community go and check out parts of Alabama around Arab and Albertvile”). Likewise, Representative Rich noted
(continued...)
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In conclusion, while the court cannot yet say
conclusively, based on the Arlington Heights factors,
that discriminatory bias against Hispanics was behind HB
56, the current evidence of such in the record is
substantial enough to support putting HB 56 on hold
21.(...continued) “estimates by a large number of people that roughly 80% of these people in the area are illegal,” and, to be sure, Rich was “talking about people that are Hispanic that are in our area that are illegal.” Leg. Session (Id. at 8).
As mentioned, referring to Latinos may in some ways be inevitable when discussing the issue of immigration in Alabama. However, as the discussion of preemption made clear, there is simply no way to “tell” simply by looking at an individual what their immigration status is, and the evidence of how these legislators know, or purport to know, that the Latinos in Marshall county are unlawfully present is little more than speculation and hearsay from people around town. Nonetheless, when confronted with a similar absence of evidence, many of the same legislators presumed that other groups of immigrants were “legal.” See, e.g., Hearing Tr. (Doc. No. 68, 91-92) (Scofield describing presumably legal groups); Rich Tr. (Doc. No. 51-5, at 13-14) (same). Thus, the combination of a lack of evidence and an assumption of unlawfulness applied to Latinos that is not applied to other groups, especially when buttressed against evidence of the conflation of Latino and “illegal immigrant,” supports an inference of discrimination.
88

pending further discovery and final presentation of evidence by the parties on the issue.
b. Disparate Impact As noted, housing practices that have a discriminatory effect on individuals of a certain race or national origin can violate the FHA. To prevail on a disparate-impact claim, the plaintiffs must first make a prima-facie showing of discriminatory effect. That may be accomplished by showing either “that the decision has a segregative effect” or that “‘it makes housing options significantly more restrictive for members of a protected group than for persons outside that group.’” Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x 581, 586 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hous. Investors, Inc. v. City of Clanton, Ala., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (Thompson, J.)). The plaintiffs here have taken the latter course, arguing that the Alabama’s implementation of § 30 significantly restricts housing options for Latinos in Alabama.
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While there is no single test for measuring whether
a protected class bears the brunt of a facially neutral
housing policy, “certain guidelines have developed,”
Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County , 466 F.3d
1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006):
“First, it may be inappropriate to rely on absolute numbers rather than on proportional statistics. Second, statistics based on the general population [should] bear a proven relationship to the actual [population at issue]. Third, the appropriate inquiry is into the impact on the total group to which a policy or decision applies.”
Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). Whatever
the analysis, if plaintiffs’ statistics demonstrate that
Latinos are disproportionately affected by the State’s
actions, then they have established a prima-facie case of
disparate impact.
But, “[o]f course, not every housing practice that
has a disparate impact is illegal.” Graoch Assoc. #33,
L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro. Hum. Relations
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 375 (6th Cir. 2007); cf . Metro.
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Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights , 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Although we agree that a showing of discriminatory intent is not required under section 3604(a), we refuse to conclude that every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal.”). More than a prima-facie case of disparate impact is necessary before the plaintiffs can prevail. However, the next step in the inquiry is unclear. SeeGraoch, 508 F.3d at 372-74 (explaining sources of agreement and disagreement between circuits); Ojo v. Farmers Grp., 600 F.3d 1201, 1204 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting the different approaches taken by courts within the Ninth Circuit). There are two possible paths: courts either apply a burden-shifting approach similar to that used in workplace-discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, or a balancing test designed to uncover the appropriateness of the defendants’ behavior.
The case law in the Eleventh Circuit, which frequently relies upon City of Chickasaw, points towards
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the latter approach. See, e.g., Bonasera, 342 F. App’x at 585; Reese v. Miami-Dade county , 242 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Highsmith, J.).
In City of Chickasaw the court examined a residency requirement that the plaintiffs insisted had a disparate impact on African-Americans. 504 F. Supp. at 730. Since not all actions with a discriminatory effect on housing are illegal, the court considered “four factors which can ... test whether the conduct that produces a discriminatory impact ... violates the [FHA]”: (1) the magnitude of the discriminatory effect, (2) whether there is any evidence of discriminatory intent, (3) the defendant’s interest in taking the complained-of action, and (4) whether the plaintiffs sought to compel the defendant affirmatively to provide housing for members of a protected class or merely “restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.” Id . That approach, originally conceived by the Seventh Circuit, Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights , 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
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1977), has been followed, with some modification, in the Fourth Circuit, Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C,. 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982), the Sixth Circuit, Arthur v. City of Toledo, Ohio, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986) (adopting factors one, three, and four), and the Tenth Circuit, Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the second factor), among others.
As an initial matter, the plaintiffs have clearly established a prima-facie case of disparate impact against Latinos. The “starting point” of this court’s analysis “is always the subset of the population that is affected by the disputed decision,” which, in this case, is owners of manufactured homes (and their children) who, but for this law, would pay their registration fee and renew their identification decal. City of Clanto,n 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
At the most general level, and as Commissioner Magee admits, the subset of the population most directly affected by HB 56 is non-citizens. See Magee. Br. 17
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(Doc. No. 38). In Alabama, that group is overwhelmingly and disproportionately Latino. While Latinos make up only 3.7% of the State’s population, they constitute 64.8% of non-citizens residing in Alabama. Crook Decl. (Doc. No. 14-2, at 7, 11). Moreover, while only 13.5% of Alabamians live in mobile homes, roughly 27.6% of Latinos do so (compared to 14.6% of whites, 10.2% of Blacks, and 3.2% of Asians). Id. at 2, 15. Put another way, while Latinos make up only about 3.7% of the State’s population, they constitute nearly 7% of those living in mobile homes. Since Latinos are more likely to reside in mobile homes than are other racial groups, they will bear a disproportionate burden from any regulation targeting mobile home residents. Section 30’s application to Alabama’s manufactured homes statute therefore targets two groups that are disproportionately Latino: noncitizens residing in Alabama and residents of mobile homes. Doing so creates a severe and disproportionate effect on Alabama’s Latino population.
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The defendants do not challenge that conclusion. Instead, Magee responds with the cursory allegation that those statistics are “misleading” b ecause “100% of illegal immigrants are not U.S. citizens” and that, “Therefore, one could always prove, statistically, that a law [targeting] illegal immigrants has an adverse impact based upon persons of foreign birth.” Magee. Br. 17 (Doc. No. 38).
Assuming this argument applies to Latinos as well as “persons of foreign birth,” id ., extending protection from housing discrimination to Latinos even when they are not specifically targeted by the challenged practice “is a feature of the FHA’s programming, not a bug,” Mt. Holly Gardens, 658 F.3d at 385. The entire purpose of the FHA is to root out discriminatory-housing practices, whether implemented with the intent to deprive certain groups of equal access to housing or not. While that broad scope makes it somewhat easier for a plaintiff to demonstrate a prima-facie case of discrimination, the Third Circuit has explained that: “We need not be concerned that this
95

approach is too expansive because the establishment of a prima facie case, by itself, is not enough to establish liability under the FHA. It simply results in a more searching inquiry into the defendant’s motivations-precisely the sort of inquiry required to ensure that the government does not deprive people of housing ‘because of race.’” Id.
Moreover, the FHA protects “any person,” regardless of his immigration status, and it is therefore no defense to an FHA claim to assert that those harmed by the State’s actions are undocumented residents. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. Put another way, the cursory assertion that the State was primarily discriminating against some other, non-protected group (in this case non-citizens) does not undermine plaintiffs’ showing of a prima-facie case of disparate impact against Latinos. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that company’s policy targeted the non-protected group of workers lacking a high school diploma could not save it from disparate impact claim after policy was shown to
96

have a disproportionate effect on African Americans). The court therefore easily concludes that the plaintiffs have likely made a prima-facie showing of disparate impact.
Since the statistics demonstrate that the State’s actions in enforcing § 30 of HB 56 will have a disproportionate effect on Latinos in Alabama, the court next looks to the four factors laid out in City of Chickasaw to determine whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their disparate-impact claim. Each of those factors favors the plaintiffs.
First, the complained of behavior has a dramatic disparate impact. Not only are the plaintiffs’ statistics overwhelming, but after a full day of hearings and numerous rounds of evidentiary submissions there is no direct evidence that anyone other than Latinos has been or will be effected by § 30’s application to Alabama’s manufactured homes statute.
Second, as described more thoroughly above, the plaintiffs have provided substantial evidence of
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discriminatory intent. “[T]here can be little doubt that if evidence of [discriminatory] intent is presented, that evidence would weigh heavily on the plaintiff’s side of the ultimate balance.” Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936. That plaintiffs have put forth such evidence therefore supports translating their prima-facie showing of disparate impact into an actual finding of illegal conduct.
Third, when assessing a claim for disparate impact, the court considers whether “the defendant is a governmental body acting outside the scope of its authority or abusing its power.” Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293. If so, then the law “is not entitled to the deference which courts must pay to legitimate governmental action.” Id. This is such a case.
Broadly speaking, regulation of immigration is the purview of the federal government, not the States. By seeking to regulate immigration through HB 56, Alabama has exceeded its authority, which is why so many of HB 56’s provisions are preempted. In this case, the
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specific provisions at issue deal with housing. As emphasized above, housing is fundamentally distinct from other benefits, such as the provision of driver’s licenses or access to employment, that States may, under some circumstances, condition on citizenship. By focusing on housing, and thereby on the movement of Latinos into and out of the State, § 30 falls outside the authority vested in state legislatures. Section 30 is therefore not entitled to the same deference as legislation falling within the traditional police powers of the State. Without that deference, the State’s actions are more likely to violate the FHA.
Fourth, and importantly, the plaintiffs are not asking for a hand-out, or the affirmative provision of housing. Quite the opposite, all they want to do is lawfully pay their taxes. Stated another way, the plaintiffs are seeking to remove a barrier to housing, not to force the State, affirmatively, to provide them additional assistance. This weighs heavily in favor of finding illegal disparate impact.
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In sum, a sufficient p reliminary showing that all
four City of Chickasaw factors favor enjoining the
application of § 30 to § 40-12-255 on disparate-impact
grounds. That showing, when backed up by plaintiffs’
evidence of a prima-facie case of disparate impact, is
enough for the court to find a likelihood of success on
the merits of their disparate-impact claim.22
22. The same result would follow in those circuits applying the burden-shifting approach mentioned above. Under that approach, a prima-facie showing of disparate impact shifts the burden to the defendant who must then demonstrate that the law is related to a legitimate nondiscriminatory policy objective. Doing so leads to an inquiry into the existence of an alternative means to accomplish that legitimate goal which would reduce or eliminate the adverse impact. See , e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 38182 (3d Cir. 2011); Gallagher v. Oagner , 619 F.3d 823, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2010); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington Branch , 844 F.2d 926, 935-38 (2d Cir. 1988).
Here, Commissioner Magee argues that HB 56 was meant to target illegal immigration, which she contends has drained the State’s resources and caused a host of other problems. There are two flaws with this reasoning. First of all, as explained above, there is evidence that the law was passed with discriminatory animus against Latinos. Second, even if the law was intended to protect the state fisc by reducing the costs of education,
(continued...)
100

C. Other Equitable Factors
That the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits of both their preemption and FHA claims does not,
in and of itself, justify injunctive relief. To obtain
a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must also show
(1) irreparable harm, (2) that the balance of hardships
22.(...continued) preventing the individual plaintiffs from paying what amounts to a tax is a strange way of accomplishing that goal, especially because Alabama schools are funded heavily by property taxes, not income taxes. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d at 114. This disconnect calls into question whether the asserted justification for the manner in which the State is implementing § 30 is a bonafide one. See Town of Huntingtion, 844 F.2d at 936.
Moreover, even assuming a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy objective, there are certainly less discriminatory alternatives. The proposed implementation of § 30 will have a dramatic effect on both Latinos who are United States citizens and those who are not, since all children born in this county are United States citizens and many of them live in manufactured homes with their non-citizen parents. The State has done nothing to protect the interests of those citizens, thereby broadening the discriminatory impact that this legislation has on Latinos. The State has therefore not selected the least discriminatory means of accomplishing its stated goal.
101

favors granting the injunction, and (3) that issuance of the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.
The irreparable-harm factor clearly favors granting the requested injunction. In Gresham v. Windrush Partners, the Eleventh Circuit held that “proof of the existence of discriminatory housing practices is sufficient to permit a court to presume irreparable injury.” 730 F.2d 1417, 1424 (11th Cir. 1984). The court provided several reasons why housing discrimination is sufficiently linked to irreparable injury so as to support such a presumption, many of which clearly apply to this case. “First, a person who is discriminated against in the search for housing cannot remain in limbo while a court resolves the matter. He or she must find housing elsewhere, and once that housing is found ... it becomes difficult to disrupt new friendships and other community ties by uprooting oneself again.” I.d In this case, those affected by Alabama’s implementation of § 30 will be forced not just out of their neighborhoods, but
102

precluded from owning a manufactured home that rests on rented land anywhere in Alabama, and will therefore likely leave the State. That will further exacerbate the disruption to friendships and commun ities. Moreover, attempts to find new housing will be complicated by the near complete ban on residency in manufactured homes.
Second, “monetary relief cannot correct the injury completely.” Id. That is because the loss of housing also causes a number of other harms, including the loss of accessible jobs and “being unable to escape the neverending and seemingly unbreakable cycle of poverty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It is difficult to see how the individual plaintiffs (and those similarly situated) would be able to recover socially or financially from being forced from their homes, and certainly no relief that this court could grant would be able to compensate them fully for that loss. A presumption of irreparable harm may therefore be applicable in this case, especially since the defendants have nothing to rebut that presumption. But, given that
103

the extent of residential intrusion at issue here not only causes social disruption but goes directly to ownership, the court finds that irreparable harm is likely to result, regardless of any presumption, absent the entry of an injunction.
There is a second, independent reason for finding a likelihood of irreparable harm. Those effected by the State’s implementation of § 30 have two choices: abandon their homes or face civil fines and potential jail time. Putting individuals to such a choice causes irreparable injury. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992), the Court explained that forcing an individual to choose between violating a law or suffering the severe economic consequences of obeying it is a “Hobson’s choice” that constitutes irreparable harm. While that case dealt with a potentially costly regulation, the same principle applies here: irreparable harm exists where the plaintiffs will suffer lifealtering and potentially permanent damages that could not be sufficiently remedied at the conclusion of the
104

litigation even if the court ultimately finds in their favor. In this case, the individual plaintiffs will face a dilemma of either abandoning their homes or deciding to commit crimes, and this court lacks the remedial tools to undo the full effect and consequences of either choice.
The balance-of-Hardship factor also favors granting the requested injunction. Absent a preliminary injunction, the individual plaintiffs and those similarly situated must live in fear of being arrested and fined (for attempting to comply with their registration requirements or for remaining out of compliance) on the one hand or abandoning their homes on the other. Latinos, unable to live lawfully in their homes or to take their homes with them, will no doubt choose to uproot their children from school, quit their jobs, abandon their homes, pack up their belongings, and leave the State. Granting a preliminary injunction would prevent those harms and protect the status quo as this court determines the ultimate merits of the dispute.
105

Against that strong showing of hardship, the defendants have failed to even allege, let alone demonstrate, that any harm will befall them if an injunction is issued. In fact, defendant Magee’s decision to extend the time for obtaining or renewing manufactured home registrations suggests that any harm from not enforcing § 30 of HB 56 to Alabama Code § 40-12255, should there be any at all, will be slight. See Magee Order (Doc. No. 79-2). On this basis, the balance of harms strongly favors the plaintiffs.
The public interest also favors granting the injunction. As discussed above, the defendants appear to be implementing § 30 in a manner that violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the FHA. There can be no doubt that the public benefits from uniform implementation of this nation’s immigration laws, see Farmers Branch II , 701 F. Supp. 2d at 859, which can only occur if the defendants are enjoined. Furthermore, as winter approaches, the public interest
106

supports ensuring individuals are secure in their homes pending resolution of this case.
With all four factors weighing heavily in favor of granting a preliminary injunction, the court easily concludes that one is necessary in this case. This injunction applies to all subparts of § 30, which means that the State may not request any information related to citizenship or lawful immigration status from those seeking to register their manufactured home or obtain an identification decal, nor can the State enforce § 30(d), which makes it a felony to enter into such a transaction, against those seeking to register their homes or obtain an identification decal.
III. CONCLUSION The plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on their claim that, applied to § 40-12-255, § 30 of HB 56 is preempted both as a regulation of immigration and because it conflicts with federal law. The plaintiffs are also substantially likely to prevail on their claims
107

under the FHA. With all three equitable considerations pointing squarely towards issuing a preliminary injunction, the court concludes that one is appropriate in this case.
An appropriate order will be entered. DONE, this the 12th day of December, 2011.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 154 Filed 05/17/13 Page 1 of 3 Case: 11-16114 Date Filed: 05/17/2013 Page: 1 of 2

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 154 Filed 05/17/13 Page 2 of 3 Case: 11-16114 Date Filed: 05/17/2013 Page: 2 of 2

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 154 Filed 05/17/13 Page 3 of 3 Case: 11-16114 Date Filed: 05/17/2013 Page: 1 of 1

John Ley Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
May 17, 2013

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

Debra P. Hackett U.S. District Court PO BOX 711 MONTGOMERY, AL 36101-0711
Appeal Number: 11-16114-CC Case Style: Central Alabama Fair Housing C, et al v. Commissioner, Alabama Revenue, et al District Court Docket No: 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC

The enclosed copy of this Court's Order of Dismissal is issued as the mandate of this court. See 11th Cir. R. 41-4. Counsel are advised that pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 27-2, "a motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify an order must be filed within 21 days of the entry of such order. No additional time shall be allowed for mailing."
Sincerely,
JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Joe Caruso Phone #: (404) 335-6177
Enclosure(s)

DIS-4 Multi-purpose dismissal letter

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, ET AL.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her official capacity as )

Alabama Revenue Commissioner,

)

and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his official capacity as )

Elmore County Probate Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACT. NO. 2:11CV982-MHT (WO)

PROTECTIVE ORDER

As explained by the court in its memorandum opinion granting a preliminary

injunction, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center v. Magee, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2011 WL

6182334, (M.D. Ala. December 12, 2011), this case involves the application of § 30 of

the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (commonly referred

to as “HB 56”), 2011Ala. Laws 535, in a manner which essentially prohibits individuals

who cannot prove their citizenship status from remaining in their manufactured homes.

Presently before the court is a motion for protective order filed by the plaintiffs on

January 6, 2012. (doc. # 111). The court heard oral argument on the motion on February

14, 2012. The court has carefully considered the briefs of the parties, and based on the

argument and the briefs, the court concludes that a protective order should issue but not

under the terms requested by the plaintiffs.

In their motion, the plaintiffs request that the court pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . [enter] an appropriate protective order restricting the dissemination of certain information they will produce through the discovery process—specifically, the identity of and contact information for John Doe #11 and John Doe #2 (hereinafter, “Doe Plaintiffs”), and information related to the immigration status of potential parties, class members, and witnesses. (Plts.’ Mot. for Protective Order at 1, doc. # 111) In support of this motion, the plaintiffs, while confirming their willingness to disclose discovery information to the defendants, state they "fear that absent a protective order restricting Defendants and their counsel from further dissemination of this information, the Doe Plaintiffs, class members, and witnesses will be at a substantial risk of harassment, violence, arrest, and deportation." (Id. at 2) Thus, the plaintiffs argue that the in terrorem effect of disclosure justifies the protective order. It appears to the court that this “fear” is more than abstract or speculative. Plaintiffs, for example, note that Sections 5 and 6 of HB 56 require Defendants and their attorneys, upon pain of civil and criminal penalty, to disclose to appropriate officials the identities of the Doe plaintiffs and the immigration-related information of anyone they suspect of being undocumented and anyone they suspect of violating any provision of HB 56. And, at oral argument on February 14, 2012, the defendants indicated to the court that while they agree not to make public disclose of this information, they could not agree that they would not disclose it to federal immigration officials because of two federal statutes, statutes which the court will
1On February 9, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of John Doe #1.
2

discuss later in this order.
In its preliminary injunction opinion, this court recognized the in terrorem impact
disclosure has on aliens not lawfully present in the United States. The court first
described how § 28 of HB 56 achieves a goal of creating “strong incentives for
undocumented aliens to leave the State (or “self-deport”) even if, and despite the fact that,
their children are U.S. citizens,” by requiring schools to record whether a student is the
child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States. “This requirement relies on the
strong disincentive parents have to reveal to schools that their U.S. citizen children have
parents that are ‘not lawfully present in the United States.’ ” Central Alabama Fair
Housing Center v. Magee, ___ F.Supp.2d ____, ____, 2011 WL 6182334, 17 (M.D.Ala. December 12, 2011).2
Understanding what relief the plaintiffs request from the court is best achieved by
looking to the plaintiffs’ proposed protective order. In that document, the term
“confidential information” is defined as any information which discloses
a. the identities, addresses, phone numbers, and any other contact or identifying information pertaining or relating to Parties or individuals granted permission by the Court to proceed under a pseudonym (including but not limited to John Doe #1 and John Doe #2), their family members, and
2The plaintiffs also argue that absent issuance of a protective order, sections 5 and 6 of HB 56 violate their constitutional right of access to the courts. A well establish principle of judicial restraint counsels that a court should "avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). Indeed, the federal courts are duty bound to avoid a constitutional question if answering the question is unnecessary to the adjudication of the claims at hand. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 807-808 (11th Cir. 2010). Because addressing the constitutional question is unnecessary, the court declines to reach this issue.
3

anyone with whom they reside;
b. immigration-related information of any individual party, potential or actual class member, witness, or of their family members or cohabitants, including but not limited to, immigration status, alienage, national origin, dates of entry to the United States, immigration documents, Alien identification numbers (“A-numbers”) or any other number used or assigned by government entities for identification purposes, passport and visa numbers, immigration proceedings, and applications for immigration or work authorization documents.
The proposed protective order would prohibit the defendants and their attorneys
disclosing in any manner “confidential information” to “any person, firm, agency,
corporation, or other entity” not expressly authorized by the order to receive it.
The defendants oppose the motion for protective order. First, the defendants argue
that the motion is overbroad because it asks the court to protect “any kind of information
related to any person’s immigration status that is discovered in this lawsuit. Such a
sweeping prohibition covers persons by default who may not actually need their
information protected for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ motion.” (Defs.’ Resp., doc. #
121 at 2-3) Correctly, the defendants note that the sweep of the plaintiffs’ request
potentially would cover information already in the public domain. Secondly, the
defendants argue that issuance of the protective order prohibiting disclosure of
immigration information by the defendant public officials and their lawyers to any law
enforcement agency would violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or 8 U.S.C. § 1644.
The court will first address the defendants’ contention that § 1373 and § 1644
prohibit the court from issuing a protective order. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1373 deals generally
4

with communication between government agencies and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service as follows:
a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity.
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1644 provides
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.
The plain wording of both statutes broadly prohibits restrictions on the free flow of
information about the immigration status of aliens present in the United States. The only
significant difference between the statutes is that § 1644 applies to entities whereas §
5

1373(a) applies to both entities and officials. The named defendants in this case are state
government officials. Their lawyers are Assistant Attorney Generals for the State of
Alabama. Thus, the defendants argue that §§ 1373 and 1644 prohibit the court from
preventing the defendants or their attorneys from disclosing information learned through
the discovery process.
It is unnecessary for the court to delve into any issues related to the applicability of
these statutes or whether they do indeed cabin the authority of the court with respect to the parties or their counsel.3 While §§ 1373 and 1644 arguably prevent the court from
stopping the defendant officials from making disclosure of immigration information,
these statutes assuredly do not prohibit the court from controlling how the private party
plaintiffs and their counsel respond to discovery requests. See, e.g., Day v. Sebelius, 227
F.R.D. 668, 678 (D. Kan. 2005) (Sections 1373 and 1644 do not prevent court from
precluding private parties from disclosing immigration status information).
The court has inherent authority to control the discovery process under FED R. CIV. P. 26. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011); Phipps v. Blakeney, 8 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir.1993). And, given the nature of this case,
3The plaintiffs suggest that Congress does not have the authority to prohibit the court from issuing orders in this lawsuit. But there are plenty of statutes that prevent courts from issuing certain types of orders. These are just a few examples: Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) prohibits a federal court from "hear[ing]" alien claims. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the anti-injunction statute, prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings. Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) prohibits a district court from ordering a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to run concurrently with "any other term of imprisonment." The Bail Reform Act specifically prohibits a court from "impos[ing] a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the [defendant]." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2).
6

the court concludes it is appropriate that it exercise that authority in a manner which admittedly is more intrusive than the usual process of discovery which is designed to and hopefully does operate without judicial intervention. This conclusion should not be understood as any criticism of the parties or their counsel. Rather, the court finds that greater control by the court in this case which involves sensitive and publically volatile issues will lead to less controversy and a more efficient and less costly discovery process.4 In that regard, even if the initial protection afforded by this order is broad, as the process of discovery proceeds, the court expects that the nature and scope of the protection will narrow. Thus, the court concludes that the defendants’ objections on that basis are premature.
There is one final question the court must address. At oral argument the defendants stated that they need discovery primarily for jurisdictional purposes, arguing correctly that they are entitled to test the jurisdictional premises underlying this lawsuit. But with regard to restrictions on discovery, defense counsel argued that at the TRO hearing before Judge Thompson they did not object to the individual plaintiffs proceeding under a pseudonym so long as the defendants could conduct discovery. At oral argument
4In reaching this conclusion, the court is well aware of the continuing controversy about the ability of a court to adequately control discovery. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), even the Supreme Court expressed dismay about the ability of judges to control discovery. Id. at 559-60. For a contrary view, see Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 187, 201, 206-07 (2011). The instant case, however, does not presently appear to the court to involve complex facts which might adversely affect the ability of the court to effectively control discovery.
7

on February 14, 2012, counsel for the defendants explained, “What happened was, at the
hearing on the TRO . . . we agreed in open court not to oppose the motion with the
stipulation that we would be allowed to do similar to what has been done in the Northern
District immigration cases which is conduct discovery freely in that the court could enter
appropriate protective orders but that we would be allowed to ask questions . . .
[unintelligible] information to take depositions. The order that you are referring to that
granted that motion . . . says the motion is granted subject to the conditions stated in
court.”5 Here is what happened at the TRO hearing.
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we take up a few preliminary matters. The first thing I'd like to take up before we get to the two motions that are the subject of this hearing, those motions being the motion for TRO and the motion for preliminary injunction, is the motion for leave to proceed under a pseudonym. What's the defendants' position on that motion, or have you developed one?
MR. DAVIS: We have, Your Honor. This issue was dealt with in the Northern District in a very similar case. And there, Judge Blackburn found a solution that I think is appropriate. She gave the plaintiffs permission to proceed under pseudonyms; but she noted that if, as the case developed, the defendants would need to conduct discovery, there would be some leeway; that if we needed the identities in order to do it, that could be accommodated so that we could protect our interests, but the identity would be protected from the public. So with that caveat, we have no objection to the motion.
THE COURT: The motion can be granted subject to leave to the defendants, at the appropriate time, to ask for information or to take depositions of the Doe plaintiffs.
5This quote is taken from the tape of the proceedings held on February 14, 2012.
8

(Tr. Mot. Hearing Regarding TRO at 6-7, doc. # 68) To be blunt, nothing in the proceeding held before Judge Thompson on November
23, 2011, suggests that the defendants were given carte blanche to “freely” conduct discovery in whatever manner they desire. In addition, the undersigned does not accept the premise that under any circumstances this court would ever bargain away its authority to manage litigation to avoid having to consider on the merits any issue, much less a question such as allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym.
All discovery in this case must be completed by October 5, 2012. (Uniform Scheduling Order, ¶ 7, doc. # 110, entered January 6, 2012) Thus, there is ample time for the parties to complete the discovery process under the orders of the court. The approach the court will take is to allow discovery on a phased or incremental basis. The plaintiffs, at least initially, will be authorized to respond to discovery without disclosing any personally identifiable or immigration status information about certain persons. However, the plaintiffs will be required to maintain in their possession discovery responses which do contain the personally identifiable or immigration status information and barred from disclosure of these documents except on order of the court. No discovery concerning witnesses shall be allowed at this time.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion for protective order (doc. # 111) be and is hereby GRANTED as follows:
1. No discovery shall be conducted without leave of the court.
9

2. On or before March 19, 2012, the parties may propound interrogatories in accordance with FED R. CIV. P. 33 and the understandings between the parties as memorialized in the Joint Report of the Parties’ Planning Meeting conducted on December 28, 2011. (doc. # 103) No other form of discovery is permitted at this time.
3. No discovery seeking disclosure of the identity of any witness shall be allowed at this time.
4. With respect to responses by the plaintiffs to discovery, counsel for the plaintiffs shall insure that responses to discovery served on the defendants contain no personally identifiable or immigration status information about the individual plaintiff or their family members, persons with whom the plaintiff resides or putative class members. The foregoing notwithstanding, plaintiffs’ counsel shall likewise insure that any redaction goes no further than that necessary to fulfill the purposes of this order.6
5. With respect to responses by the plaintiffs to discovery, counsel for the plaintiffs shall maintain in their possession unredacted versions of all discovery responses and shall not disclose the unredacted versions except by order of the court.
6. Upon receipt of any discovery responses or objections, the opposing party may file appropriate motions pursuant to FED R. CIV. P. 37(a), and the court will promptly consider the motion. In this regard, counsel are reminded of their obligation under the Rules to confer about any discovery dispute before seeking relief from the court. It is
6At the time of the preparation of this order, only one individual plaintiff remained in this lawsuit. If additional individual plaintiffs are joined, this order shall fully apply to them.
10

further ORDERED that a discovery scheduling conference be and is hereby set on April
24, 2012, at 1:30 p.m. This conference shall be conducted by telephone conference which shall be set up by the plaintiffs. The purpose of this conference is to determine what further discovery shall be allowed and to establish a schedule for this discovery. Counsel should be fully prepared to discuss this subject with the court.
Done this 5th day of March, 2012. /s/Charles S. Coody
CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
11

 
 Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 05/04/14 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, Revenue

)

Commissioner for the State of Alabama, )

et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WHEREAS the parties have resolved issues relating to Plaintiffs’ petition for attorney’s fees and costs, and WHEREAS the underlying claims of the Plaintiffs for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties and their respective counsel that the above-captioned action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Respectfully submitted this 4th day of May, 2014.

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 05/04/14 Page 2 of 3

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
/s/ Stephen M. Dane Stephen M. Dane* Jamie L. Crook* RELMAN, DANE & COLFAX PLLC 1225 19th Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 728-1888 sdane@relmanlaw.com jcrook@relmanlaw.com
Samuel Brooke (ASB-1172-L60B) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 4100 Washington Ave. Montgomery, AL 36104 (334) 956-8200 mary.bauer@splcenter.org samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
Linton Joaquin* Karen C. Tumlin* Alvaro M. Huerta* NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 (213) 674-2909 joaquin@nilc.org tumlin@nilc.org huerta@nilc.org

Kristi L. Graunke* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 233 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2150 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 521-6700 kristi.graunke@splcenter.org
Lee Gelernt* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NW 10004
Justin B. Cox* ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 230 Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303-2721 (404) 523-2721 jcox@aclu.org (212) 549-2660 lgelernt@aclu.org
Foster S. Maer* LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF 99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 (212) 219-3360 fmaer@latinojustice.org

* Granted leave to appear pro hac vice

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 166 Filed 05/04/14 Page 3 of 3
Attorneys for Defendant Julie Magee, Revenue Commissioner for the State of Alabama
LUTHER STRANGE (ASB-0036-G42L) Attorney General
BY:
/s/ James W. Davis Margaret L. Fleming (ASB-7942-M34M) James W. Davis (ASB-4063-I58J) Misty S. Fairbanks Messick (ASB-1813-T71F) William G. Parker, Jr. (ASB-5142-I72P) Assistant Attorneys General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Telephone: (334) 242-7300 Facsimile: (334) 353-8440 mfleming@ago.state.al.us jimdavis@ago.state.al.us mmessick@ago.state.al.us wparker@ago.state.al.us
Attorneys for Defendant Jimmy Stubbs, Probate Judge of Elmore County
/s/ Kendrick E. Webb Fred L. Clements, Jr. Kendrick E. Webb Webb & Eley, PC 7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive P.O. Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124-0909 fclements@webbeley.com kwebb@webbeley.com

 
 Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 167 Filed 05/08/14 Page 1 of 2
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her

)

official capacity as

)

Alabama Revenue

)

Commissioner, and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his

)

official capacity as

)

Elmore County Probate

)

Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv982-MHT (WO)

JUDGMENT

Pursuant to the stipulation of dismissal (Doc. No.

166), it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court

that the stay previously entered (Doc. No. 165) is

dissolved and that this cause is dismissed in its

entirety without prejudice.

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 167 Filed 05/08/14 Page 2 of 2
The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case is closed. DONE, this the 8th day of May, 2014.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 167-1 Filed 05/08/14 Page 1 of 2
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CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 ( 11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885- 86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L .Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . .” and from “[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). Rev.: 4/04

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 167-1 Filed 05/08/14 Page 2 of 2
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

 
 Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 88 Filed 12/12/11 Page 1 of 3
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

CENTRAL ALABAMA FAIR

)

HOUSING CENTER, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JULIE MAGEE, in her

)

official capacity as

)

Alabama Revenue

)

Commissioner, and

)

JIMMY STUBBS, in his

)

official capacity as

)

Elmore County Probate

)

Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv982-MHT (WO)

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In accordance with the opinion issued today, it is the

ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows:

(1) The plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction

(doc. no. 13) is granted.

(2) Defendants Julie Magee and Jimmy Stubbs, and all

those acting in concert with them, are preliminarily

ENJOINED from requiring any person who attempts to pay the

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 88 Filed 12/12/11 Page 2 of 3
annual registration fee, required by 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255, to prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
(3) Defendants Magee and Stubbs, and all those acting in concert with them, are preliminarily ENJOINED from refusing to issue the manufactured home decal, required by 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255, to any person because that person cannot prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
(4) Defendant Magee is to notify immediately all county officials, who are responsible for enforcing the manufactured home registration requirements of 1975 Ala. Code § 40-12-255, of this preliminary injunction.
(5) The court preliminarily DECLARES that it is not a criminal violation of § 30 of HB 56 for an individual who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home to make or attempt to make a registration payment and obtain a registration decal without providing proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status.
2

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 88 Filed 12/12/11 Page 3 of 3
The plaintiffs are not required to post any security while this preliminary injunction remains in effect. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(2).
DONE, this the 12th day of December, 2011.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 88-1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 1 of 2
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1 365, 1 368 ( 11th Ci r. 1 983). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885- 86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys’ fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L .Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . .” and from “[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court’s denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). Rev.: 4/04

Case 2:11-cv-00982-MHT-CSC Document 88-1 Filed 12/12/11 Page 2 of 2
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD – no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).

 
 Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 1 of 22
CLOSED,CSC_ClerkB,MHT−ClerkB
U.S. District Court Alabama Middle District (Montgomery) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11−cv−00982−MHT−CSC

Central Alabama Fair Housing Center et al v. Magee et al Assigned to: Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson Referred to: Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody Case in other court: USCA, 11−16114−CC Cause: 42:3601 Fair Housing Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 11/18/2011 Date Terminated: 05/08/2014 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 443 Civil Rights: Accommodations Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Central Alabama Fair Housing Center

represented by Alvaro M. Huerta National Immigration Law Center 3435 Wilshire Boulevard − Ste 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−639−3900 Fax: 213−639−3911 Email: huerta@nilc.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson St. − 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−219−3360 Fax: 212−431−4276 Email: dsen@latinojustice.org TERMINATED: 01/16/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Foster S. Maer LatinoJustice PRLDEF 99 Hudson St. − 14th Floor New York, NY 10013 212−739−7507 Fax: 212−431−4276 Email: fmaer@latinojustice.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lee Gelernt American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St − 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2616 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: lgelernt@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamie L. Crook Relman, Dane &Colfax PLLC 1225 19th St NW − Ste 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Fax: 202−728−0848 Email: jcrook@relmanlaw.com (Inactive)

Plaintiff

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 2 of 22
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin B. Cox American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 1989 College Avenue NE Atlanta, GA 30317 404−221−5854 Email: jcox@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Cassandra Tumlin National Immigration Law Center 3435 Wilshire Blvd. − Ste 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−674−2909 Email: tumlin@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristi L. Graunke Southern Poverty Law Center 1989 College Avenue NE Atlanta, GA 30317 404−521−6700 Email: kristi.graunke@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER 3435 Wilshire Blvd − Ste 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90010 213−674−2909 Email: joaquin@nilc.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary C Bauer Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Ave Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: mary.bauer@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 06/07/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: samuel.brooke@splcenter.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen M. Dane Relman, Dane &Colfax PLLC 1225 19th Street, N.W. − Ste 600 Washington, DC 20036 202−728−1888 Fax: 202−728−0848 Email: sdane@relmanlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 3 of 22

Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama

represented by Alvaro M. Huerta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Foster S. Maer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Justin B. Cox (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristi L. Graunke (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lee Gelernt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamie L. Crook (See above for address)

Karen Cassandra Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary C Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M. Dane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Center for Fair Housing, Inc.

represented by Alvaro M. Huerta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 4 of 22

Diana S Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John Foster S. Maer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lee Gelernt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jamie L. Crook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Justin B. Cox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karen Cassandra Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kristi L. Graunke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary C Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen M. Dane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
John Doe #1 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/15/2012

represented by Alvaro M. Huerta (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Diana S Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 5 of 22

Plaintiff
John Doe #2 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

John Foster S. Maer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin B. Cox (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Cassandra Tumlin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristi L. Graunke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary C Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen M. Dane (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alvaro M. Huerta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diana S Sen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2013

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 6 of 22
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Foster S. Maer (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lee Gelernt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamie L. Crook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin B. Cox (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Cassandra Tumlin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristi L. Graunke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linton Joaquin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary C Bauer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/07/2013 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel J Brooke (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen M. Dane (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Julie Magee in her official capacity as Alabama Revenue Commissioner

represented by James William Davis State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−353−1356 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: jimdavis@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua K. Payne Spotswood Sansom &Sansbury LLC 1819 5th Ave N; Ste 1050 Birmingham, AL 35203

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 7 of 22

205−986−3627 Fax: 205−986−3639 Email: jpayne@spotswoodllc.com TERMINATED: 08/16/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Lindsey Fleming State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130 334−353−3738 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: mfleming@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−353−8674 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: mmessick@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William G. Parker , Jr. Office of the Attorney General P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−242−7997 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: Wparker@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
William Harper in his official capacity as Elmore County Revenue Commissioner TERMINATED: 11/21/2011

Defendant
Jimmy Stubbs in his official capacity as Elmore County Probate Judge

represented by Fred Lee Clements , Jr. Webb &Eley, PC PO Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124 334−262−1850 Fax: 334−262−1772 Email: fclements@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kendrick Emerson Webb Webb &Eley PO Box 240909 Montgomery, AL 36124−0909 334−262−1859 Fax: 334−262−1889 Email: kwebb@webbeley.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed

# Docket Text

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 8 of 22

11/18/2011
11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011
11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011
11/18/2011
11/18/2011
11/18/2011

1 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND FOR DAMAGES against William Harper, Julie Magee, filed by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #1. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(dmn) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
2 Summons Issued as to Julie Magee and returned to counsel for personal service. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
3 Summons Issued; summons and complaint mailed CMRRR as to William Harper. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
4 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Central Alabama Fair Housing Center. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
5 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Center for Fair Housing, Inc. (dmn, ) (Main Document 5 replaced on 11/18/2011) (dmn, ). (Entered: 11/18/2011)
6 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
7 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by John Doe #1. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
8 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by John Doe #2. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
9 MOTION for Leave to Proceed Under a Pseudonym by John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(dmn) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
10 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of 9 MOTION for Leave to File filed by John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
11 MOTION for Class Certification by John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
12 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of 11 MOTION for Class Certification filed by John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Temporary Restraining Order, # 2 Proposed Preliminary Injunction Order)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
14 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 1, Declaration of Jamie L. Crook, # 3 Exhibit 2, Declaration of Samuel Brooke, # 4 Exhibit 3, Declaration of John Doe #1, # 5 Exhibit 4, Declaration of John Doe #2, # 6 Exhibit 5, Declaration of Faith R. Cooper, # 7 Exhibit 6, Declaration of Lila E. Hackett, # 8 Exhibit 7, Declaration of Teresa F. Bettis)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
***Attorney Stephen M. Dane, Karen C. Tumlin, and Linton Joaquin added for Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2 pursuant to Motions for Admission Pro Hac Vice filed 11/18/2011. (dmn) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
15 Motion for STEPHEN M. DANE to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602020614) by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Proposed Order, # 4 Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 9 of 22

11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011 11/18/2011
11/18/2011 11/21/2011 11/21/2011
11/21/2011

16 Motion for LINTON JOAQUIN to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602020613) by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
17 Motion for Karen C. Tumlin to Appear Pro Hac Vice ( Filing fee $ 50.00 receipt number 4602020612) by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order, # 3 Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt)(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
18 Filing fee: $ 350.00, receipt number 4602020611. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
19 NOTICE of Correction re 5 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement. The wrong pdf was attached when originally filed. The corrected pdf is attached to this notice. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected pdf of Doc. 5 )(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
20 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #1. All Plaintiffs. (Bauer, Mary) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
21 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #1. William Harper served on 11/18/2011, answer due 12/9/2011. (Bauer, Mary) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
22 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #1. Julie Magee served on 11/18/2011, answer due 12/9/2011. (Bauer, Mary) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
Set/Reset Hearings: Oral Argument re 13 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction set for 11/18/2011 04:30 PM by telephone before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
23 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Oral Argument held on 11/18/2011 (PDF available for court use only), Motion Hearing held on 11/18/2011 re 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by John Doe #2, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc. (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (ag, ) (Main Document 23 replaced on 11/22/2011) (ag, ). (Entered: 11/18/2011)
Set/Reset Hearings: Evidentiary Hearing re 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction set for 11/23/2011 08:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. (ag, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
24 ORDER granting motions for admission pro hac vice (Doc. Nos. 15 , 16 , &17 ). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2011. (dmn) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
25 ORDER that plaintiffs' 13 MOTION for a Preliminary Injunction is set for an Evidentiary Hearing on 11/23/2011 at 08:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The defendants are to file a written response to the motion by no later than noon on 11/22/2011. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to notify by telephone all defense counsel (those who appeared in person and by telephone at the status conference on 11/18/2011) of this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2011. Copies furnished to Calendar group, AG. Counsel notified by telephone as directed. (dmn) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
26 ORDER that plaintiffs' 13 MOTION for a Temporary Restraining Order is set for an Evidentiary Hearing on 11/23/2011 at 08:00 AM in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. The defendants are to file a written response to the motion by no later than noon on 11/22/2011. The court misspoke during the on−the−record conference on 11/18/2011, when it said that the motion

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 10 of 22

11/21/2011
11/21/2011
11/21/2011 11/21/2011 11/21/2011 11/21/2011 11/21/2011 11/21/2011
11/21/2011 11/21/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011

for a TRO was "folded" into the motion for a preliminary injunction. Instead, the two motions will be considered as separate motions on 11/23/2011. The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to notify by telephone all defense counsel (those who appeared in person and by telephone at the status conference on 11/18/2011) of this order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/21/2011. Copies furnished to Calendar group and AG. Counsel notified by telephone as directed. (dmn) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
27 Motion for Kristi L. Graunke to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) [Modified on 11/22/2011 to add attorney's name requesting appearance.−DMN] (Entered: 11/21/2011)
28 Motion for Justin B. Cox to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) [Modified on 11/22/2011 to add attorney's name requesting appearance.−DMN] (Entered: 11/21/2011)
29 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Julie Magee. (Fairbanks, Misty) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/22/2011: # 1 Corrected Certificate of Service) (dmn, ). (Entered: 11/21/2011)
***Attorney Misty S. Fairbanks,James William Davis,Margaret Lindsey Fleming, William G. Parker, Jr., Joshua K. Payne added for Julie Magee pursuant to Doc. 29 ). (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
30 NOTICE by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2 of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant William Harper (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
31 AMENDED COMPLAINT (FIRST) against Julie Magee, filed by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #1. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Act 2011−535 / HB 56)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
32 Summons Issued as to Jimmy Stubbs and returned to counsel for personal service. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/21/2011)
33 RESPONSE in Opposition re 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction (State Defendant's First Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction) filed by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14)(Fairbanks, Misty) (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/22/2011: # 15 Corrected Certificate of Service) (dmn, ). (Entered: 11/21/2011)
35 PRO HAC VICE filing fee received for Kristi L. Graunke re 27 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice: $ 50.00, receipt number 4602020641.(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
36 PRO HAC VICE Filing fee received for Justin B. Cox re [ 28 Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice: $ 50.00, receipt number 4602020640.(dmn, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
34 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Jamie L. Crook)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
37 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc., John Doe #2, John Doe #1. Jimmy Stubbs served on 11/22/2011, answer due 12/13/2011. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 11/22/2011)

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11/22/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011
11/22/2011 11/22/2011
11/22/2011 11/23/2011 11/23/2011
11/23/2011

38 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 14 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support,, 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Fleming, Margaret) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
39 MOTION to Change Venue by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Fleming, Margaret) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
40 MOTION in Limine Concerning Proposed Testimony of Legislators by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
41 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by the plaintiffs as to why Magee's 39 Motion to Change Venue filed by Julie Magee should not be granted; Show Cause Response due by 7:00 a.m. on 11/23/2011. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/22/11. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
42 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing, by the plaintiffs as to why 40 Motion in Limine filed by Julie Magee should not be granted; Show Cause Response due by 7:00 a.m. on 11/23/2011. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/22/11. (djy, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
43 PRO HAC VICE Filing fee for Jamie L. Crook re 34 Motion: $ 50.00, receipt number 4602020643. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
44 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support Related to Proof of Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Brooke, Samuel) (Main Document 44 replaced on 11/28/2011 to correct the main PDF document to include the electronic signature of counsel) (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 11/22/2011)
45 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support Related to Proof of Intent Under the Fair Housing Act filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
46 NOTICE by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2 re 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction OF SUPPLEMENTAL EVIDENCE (Attachments: # 1 Ex 8 − Gonzalez Decl)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
47 RESPONSE in Opposition re 39 MOTION to Change Venue filed by Central Alabama Fair Housing Center. (Tumlin, Karen) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
48 RESPONSE in Opposition re 40 MOTION in Limine Concerning Proposed Testimony of Legislators filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Dane, Stephen) (Entered: 11/23/2011)
49 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Motion Hearing held on 11/23/2011 re 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by John Doe #2, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Center for Fair Housing, Inc. (PDF available for court use only). (Court Reporter Risa Entrekin.) (Attachments: # 1 Witness List, # 2 Plaintiffs Exhibit List) Exhibits in binder with case file(ag, ) (Entered: 11/23/2011)
50 OPINION AND ORDER that: (1) plaintiffs' 13 MOTION for a Temporary Restraining Order is granted; (2) Defendants Julie Magee and Jimmy Stubbs, and all those acting in concert with them, are hereby ENJOINED from requiring any person who attempts to pay the annual registration fee, required by 1975 Ala. Code § 40−12−255, to prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status; (3) Defendants Magee and Stubbs, and all those acting in concert with them, are ENJOINED from refusing to issue the manufactured home decal required by 1975 Ala. Code § 40−12−255 to any person because that person cannot prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status; (4) Defendant Magee is hereby

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 12 of 22

11/23/2011
11/23/2011
11/23/2011
11/25/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011

ORDERED to immediately notify all county officials who are responsiblefor enforcing the manufactured home registration requirements of 1975 Ala. Code § 40−12−255 of this temporary restraining order; (5) This injunction shall expire on December 7, 2011, at 4:30 p.m. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/23/2011 at 4:30 p.m. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist)(cc, ) (Entered: 11/23/2011)
52 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of MOTION HEARING REGARDING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, Excerpt of Proceedings−Testimony of Kerry Galen Rich (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/23/2011, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/14/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/27/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/21/2012. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
53 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of MOTION HEARING REGARDING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, Excerpt of Proceedings−Testimony of Scott Beason (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/23/2011, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/14/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/27/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/21/2012. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
54 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of MOTION HEARING REGARDING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, Excerpt of Proceedings−Testimony of Micky Ray Hammon (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on 11/23/2011, before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/14/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/27/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/21/2012. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
51 Proposed Findings of Fact by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Ex 1 − Hammon Trans, # 2 Ex 2 − Rich Trans, # 3 Ex 3 − Beason Trans, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) Document has been edited to restrict access to personal information pursuant to the E−Government Act. (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/28/2011: # 5 Redacted Exhibit 1 − Hammon Transcript, # 6 Redacted Exhibit 2 − Rich Transcript, # 7 Redacted Exhibit 3 − Beason Transcript) (cc, ). (Entered: 11/25/2011)
55 NOTICE of Correction re 44 MEMORANDUM related to proof of disparate impact to correct the main PDF document to include the electronic signature of counsel (Attachments: # 1 corrected main document to Docket Entry 44 )(djy, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
56 NOTICE by Julie Magee State Defendant's Notice of Compliance with Opinion and Order Dated November 23, 2011 (Doc. 50 ) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) [Modified on 11/29/2011 to create link to Doc. 50 .−DMN] (Entered: 11/28/2011)
57 NOTICE by Julie Magee State Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Evidence and Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 13 of 22

11/28/2011 11/28/2011
11/28/2011
11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/28/2011 11/29/2011
11/29/2011
11/29/2011

A)(Davis, James) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
58 Motion for attorney Lee Gelernt to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Brooke, Samuel) [Modified on 11/29/2011 to include attorney's name requesting appearance.−DMN] (Entered: 11/28/2011)
59 Motion for attorney Diana S. Sen to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Main Document replaced on 11/29/2011 to substitute a signed Motion for the unsigned version that was initially e−filed) (cc, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/29/2011: # 2 Affidavit and Certificate of Good Standing) (cc, ). (Entered: 11/28/2011)
60 Motion for attorney John Foster S. Maer to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Main Document replaced on 11/29/2011 to substitute a signed Motion for the unsigned version that was initially e−filed) (cc, ). (Additional attachment(s) added on 11/29/2011: # 2 Affidavit and Certificate of Good Standing) (cc, ). (Entered: 11/28/2011)
61 ORDER that 27 Motion for Kristi L. Graunke to Appear Pro Hac Vice is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2011. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
62 ORDER that 28 Justin B. Cox to Appear Pro Hac Vice is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2011. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
63 ORDER that 34 Motion for Jamie L. Crook to appear in this case pro hac vice and 58 Motion for Lee Gelernt to appear in this case pro hac vice are granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2011. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
64 Proposed Findings of Fact by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
MOTION to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order by Julie Magee. See 57 Notice for pdf for this entry. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
65 ORDER that, on or before 5:00 p.m. on November 29, 2011, the plaintiffs are to file a written response to the defendants' 57 motion to dissolve temporary restraining order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/28/2011. (cc, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
***Attorney Lee Gelernt, Diana S. Sen, Foster S. Maer added for Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama pursuant to motions to appear pro hac vice (see Doc. Nos. 58 , 59 , and 60 for pdfs). (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
66 NOTICE of Correction: 59 and 60 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice were e−filed on 11/28/2011 with unsigned pdf's attached. The signed documents have been substituted on the docket sheet and are attached to this notice. Additionally the supporting Affidavits and Certificates of Good Standing were omitted at the time of e−filing and have since been added to the docket sheet. They are attached to this Notice as well (Attachments: # 1 Corrected 59 Motion, # 2 Affidavit Certificate of Good Standing for Diana S. Sen, # 3 Corrected 60 Motion, # 4 Affidavit Certificate of Good Standing for John Foster S. Maer)(cc, ) (Entered: 11/29/2011)
67 RESPONSE in Opposition to 57 Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 8, # 2 Exhibit 9, # 3 Exhibit 10, # 4 Exhibit 11, # 5 Exhibit 12, # 6 Exhibit 13, # 7 Exhibit 14)(Crook, Jamie) [Modified on 11/30/2011 to include actual title of document.−DMN] (Entered: 11/29/2011)
68 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing Regarding Temporary Restraining Order Proceedings (PDF ACCESS

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11/30/2011 11/30/2011
11/30/2011
11/30/2011 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/01/2011 12/02/2011 12/02/2011

RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on November 23, 2011, in Montgomery, AL before Judge Myron H. Thompson. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 12/20/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/30/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/27/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
69 ORDER that the motions for admission pro hac vice (Doc. Nos. 59 and 60 ) are granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/30/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
70 Emergency MOTION and Incorporated Memorandum to Enforce Judgment (to Enforce TRO and to Stay Enforcement of Registration Deadline) by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Ex 15 − Brooke 3d Supp Decl, # 2 Ex 16 − Tumlin Decl, # 3 Ex 17 − Singh Decl, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) [Modified on 12/1/2011 to reflect that the memorandum is incorporated.−DMN] (Entered: 11/30/2011)
71 ORDER directing as follows: (1) defendant Julie Magee is to file a response to the 70 Emergency MOTION to Enforce TRO and to Stay Enforcement of Registration Deadline by 11:00 a.m. on December 1, 2011; (2) the 70 Emergency MOTION to Enforce TRO and to Stay Enforcement of Registration Deadline is set for Hearing on 12/1/2011 @ 2:00 PM at the FMJ USCC, Montgomery, AL in Courtroom 2FMJ before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 11/30/11. Furnished to calendar group &AG.(djy, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
72 PRO HAC VICE Filing fees for DIANA S. SEN, LEE GELERNT, and JOHN FOSTER S. MAER received re 58 , 59 , and 60 Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice: $ 150.00, receipt number 4602020712. (dmn, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
73 RESPONSE in Opposition State Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion to Enforce Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 70 ), and Reply in Support of Notice of Supplemental Evidence and Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 57 ) by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Davis, James) [Modified on 12/2/2011 to create actual hyperlink to Doc. 70 and 57 .−DMN] (Entered: 12/01/2011)
74 OPINION AND ORDER that defendant Julie Magee's 57 Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order is denied as further set out in the opinion and order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/1/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
75 ORDER: Based upon the representations made in open court on 11/23/2011, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs' 9 Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym is granted, subject to the conditions stated in court. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/1/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
ORAL MOTION to Withdraw 70 Emergency MOTION to Enforce Judgment (to Enforce TRO and to Stay Enforcement of Registration Deadline) by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama. (ag, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
77 ORDER: At the oral request of counsel for plaintiffs made on the record on 12/1/2011, it is ORDERED that plaintiff's 70 Emergency Motion to Enforce Temporary Restraining Order and to Stay Enforcement of Registration Deadline is withdrawn. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/2/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/02/2011)
78 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alvaro M. Huerta on behalf of All Plaintiffs by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Cert of Good Standing, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke,

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12/02/2011 12/05/2011
12/05/2011 12/06/2011 12/06/2011
12/07/2011 12/07/2011 12/07/2011 12/08/2011 12/09/2011 12/09/2011 12/12/2011 12/12/2011 12/12/2011

Samuel) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/5/2011: # 3 Corrected Certificate of Service to Doc. 78 ) (dmn, ). (Attachment 1 replaced on 12/7/2011 due to wrong certificate was filed originally.−DMN] (Entered: 12/02/2011)
***Attorney Alvaro Moises Huerta added for Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, and John Doe #2 pursuant to Doc. 78 . (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/05/2011)
79 Evidentiary Submission State Defendant's Supplemental Evidence in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 13 ) filed by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Davis, James) [Modified on 12/5/2011 to create actual hyperlink to Doc. 13 .−DMN] (Entered: 12/05/2011)
80 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 13] filed by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) [Modified on 12/5/2011 to create link to Doc. 13 .−DMN] (Entered: 12/05/2011)
81 ORDER that the 78 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/6/2011.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/06/2011)
82 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING re 13 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, MOTION for Preliminary Injunction REGARDING WHETHER CLASS C FELONY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 30 SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Ex 15 − Lopez Dec &DOJ−OIG Report)(Brooke, Samuel) [Modified on 12/7/2011 to reflect this is a "Supplemental" brief.−DMN] (Entered: 12/06/2011)
83 OPINION AND ORDER that the temporary restraining order entered on 11/23/2011, (doc. no. 50 ), is extended to 12/12/2011, at 4:30 p.m., at which time it will expire. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/7/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. 74 Opinion and Order mailed to Jimmy Stubbs returned by USPS with the following notation, "Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward." Document re−mailed 12/7/2011 to correct address.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
84 PRO HAC VICE Filing fee for Alvaro M. Huerta received re 78 Motion: $ 50.00, receipt number 4602020836.(dmn, ) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. 75 Order and 77 Order mailed to Jimmy Stubbs returned by USPS with the following notation, "Return to Sender, Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward." Documents re−mailed to current address on docket. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/08/2011)
85 MOTION to Dismiss by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 12/09/2011)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. 69 &71 Orders and 74 &83 Opinions and Orders sent to Jimmy Stubbs were returned with the following USPS notation, "Return To Sender, Not Deliverable As Addressed, Unable To Forward." (No pdf attached) (wcl, ) (Entered: 12/09/2011)
86 ORDER re 85 MOTION to Dismiss. Motion Submission Deadline set for 1/9/2012 without oral argument, with any opposition briefs due by 12/30/2011, and any reply to the opposition due by 1/9/2012. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/12/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
87 OPINION. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/12/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
88 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: In accordance with the opinion issued today, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows: (1) The plaintiffs' 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction is granted. (2) Defendants Julie Magee and Jimmy Stubbs, and all those acting in concert with them, are preliminarily ENJOINED as further set out in the order. (3) Defendants Magee and Stubbs, and all those acting in concert with them, are preliminarily ENJOINED as

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12/12/2011 12/13/2011 12/13/2011 12/14/2011 12/15/2011 12/19/2011 12/21/2011 12/21/2011 12/21/2011 12/22/2011
12/22/2011 12/22/2011 12/22/2011

further set out in the order. (4) Defendant Magee is to notify immediately all county officials, who are responsible for enforcing the manufactured home registration requirements of 1975 Ala. Code § 40−12−255, of this preliminary injunction. (5) The court preliminarily DECLARES that it is not a criminal violation of § 30 of HB 56 for an individual who owns, maintains, or keeps a manufactured home to make or attempt to make a registration payment and obtain a registration decal without providing proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. The plaintiffs are not required to post any security while this preliminary injunction remains in effect. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(2). Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/12/2011. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Appeals Checklist) (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
89 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by Jimmy Stubbs. (Clements, Fred) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
90 Corporate/Conflict Disclosure Statement by Jimmy Stubbs. (Clements, Fred) (Entered: 12/13/2011)
Mail Returned as Undeliverable. 81 Order mailed to Jimmy Stubbs returned by USPS with the following notation, "Return to Sender, Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward." Documents 69 , 71 , 74 , 81 , and 83 re−mailed on 12/13/2011 to correct address for Jimmy Stubbs. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/13/2011)
91 ORDER that the 89 Motion to extend time for filing responsive pleading is granted. Answer due from Jimmy Stubbs on 12/30/2011. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/14/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/14/2011)
92 RULE 26(F) ORDER directing the parties to file the Rule 26(f)report containing the proposed discovery plan as further set out in the order. Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 12/30/2011. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/15/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/15/2011)
93 NOTICE of Appearance by Kendrick Emerson Webb on behalf of Jimmy Stubbs (Webb, Kendrick) (Entered: 12/19/2011)
94 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Julie Magee (Davis, James) Modified on 12/22/2011, to reflect that James Davis counsel for the State Defendant, Commissioner Julie Magee, is appealing 87 OPINION and 88 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, entered on 12/12/2011. (Entered: 12/21/2011)
95 MOTION for Leave to File Additional Evidence in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 85 ) by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) [Modified on 12/21/2011 to create actual link to Doc. 85 .−DMN] (Entered: 12/21/2011)
96 ORDER directing the other parties TO SHOW CAUSE, if any there be, as to why the 95 Motion for Leave to File Additional Evidence filed by Julie Magee should not be granted. Show Cause Response due by 12/28/2011. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/21/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
NOTICE of Docket Text Correction is issued this date to advise that 94 Notice of Appeal, was edited to reflect that Attorney James W. Davis counsel for State Defendant, Commissioner Julie Magee, is appealing the 87 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 88 Preliminary Injunction, entered on 12/12/2011. (ydw, ) (Entered: 12/22/2011)
Transmission of Notice of Appeal, 87 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 88 Preliminary Injunction, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 94 Notice of Appeal. (ydw, ) (Entered: 12/22/2011)
97 Appeal Instructions sent to James Davis counsel for State Defendant, Commissioner Julie Magee, re 94 Notice of Appeal. A copy of the Transcript Information Form must be mailed to each court reporter from whom you are requesting a transcript. (ydw, ) (Entered: 12/22/2011)
98 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number 4602020988 re 94 Notice of Appeal filed by Julie Magee (ydw, ) (Entered: 12/22/2011)

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12/28/2011
12/29/2011 12/29/2011 12/30/2011 12/30/2011 12/30/2011 12/30/2011 01/03/2012
01/03/2012 01/04/2012 01/04/2012 01/04/2012 01/06/2012

99 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE re 96 Order to Show Cause, 95 MOTION for Leave to File Additional Evidence in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 85) filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Cox, Justin) Modified on 12/29/2011 to correct the docket text to reflect as a response to show cause order and not a response to motion; also to add the link to the 96 Order (wcl, ). (Entered: 12/28/2011)
100 ORDER granting 95 Motion for Leave to File Additional Evidence. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/29/2011. (wcl, ) (Entered: 12/29/2011)
101 Evidentiary Submission re 85 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) (Entered: 12/29/2011)
102 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Second Amended Complaint)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
103 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
104 ORDER directing that the 102 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint be set for Submission, without oral argument, on 1/9/2012, with all briefs due by said date. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 12/30/11. (djy, ) Modified on 12/30/2011 to correct typographical error (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 12/30/2011)
105 BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 85 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Graunke, Kristi) (Entered: 12/30/2011)
106 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of ORAL ARGUMENT REGARDING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (PDF ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR 90 DAYS) held on November 18, 2011 before Judge Myron H. Thompson, re 94 Notice of Appeal. Court Reporter/Transcriber Risa L. Entrekin, Telephone number 334−240−2405. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. NOTICE OF INTENT TO REQUEST REDACTION DUE WITHIN 7 BUSINESS DAYS. Redaction Request due 1/24/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/03/2012)
107 TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM re 94 Notice of Appeal by Julie Magee with the following notation, "All necessary transcript(s) on file. (Payne, Joshua) [Modified on 1/3/2012 to create link to Doc. 94 .−dmn] (Entered: 01/03/2012)
108 AMENDED TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by Julie Magee for proceedings held on 11/18/11 &11/23/11 before Judge Myron Thompson, (Payne, Joshua) . (Entered: 01/04/2012)
109 USCA Case Number 11−16114−CC for 94 Notice of Appeal filed by Julie Magee. (ydw, ) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 11(c), the Clerk of the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: 94 Notice of Appeal, Appeal No. 11−16114−CC. The entire record on appeal is available electronically. (ydw, ) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
110 UNIFORM SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/31/2013 before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Non−Jury Trial set for 2/25/2013 trial term before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson. Amended Pleadings due by 4/2/2012. Discovery due by 10/5/2012. Motions due by 11/2/2012. Mediation Notice due by 11/28/2012. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/6/2012. Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/06/2012)

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01/06/2012 01/09/2012 01/09/2012 01/10/2012
01/11/2012 01/17/2012 01/19/2012 01/20/2012 01/24/2012 01/24/2012
01/25/2012 01/26/2012 01/27/2012

111 MOTION for Protective Order by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support, # 2 Proposed Order)(Cox, Justin) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
112 REPLY to Response to Motion re 85 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 01/09/2012)
113 NOTICE by John Doe #1, John Doe #2 re 11 MOTION to Certify Class JOINT REPORT Re: Briefing Motion to Certify Class (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 01/09/2012)
114 ORDER: (1) Defendant Julie Magee's 85 MOTION to Dismiss is reset for submission, without oral argument, on 1/31/2012. Motion Submission Deadline set for 1/31/2012. (2) By 1/17/2012, the defendants are to file a brief on whether the court's preliminary injunction is still necessary. (3) By 1/24/2012, the plaintiffs are to file a brief on whether this case is moot and, if not, whether the preliminary injunction is still necessary. (4) By 1/31/2012, the defendants may file a reply. In their briefs, the parties should also address whether the court may dissolve a preliminary injunction while the injunction is on appeal. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/10/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/10/2012)
115 ORDER directing the defendants TO SHOW CAUSE as to why the 111 Motion for a Protective Order should not be granted. Show Cause Response due by 1/25/2012. Signed by Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody on 1/11/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/11/2012)
116 Response to 114 Order Dated January 10, 2012 by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) [Modified on 1/17/2012 to create link to Doc. 114 .−dmn] (Entered: 01/17/2012)
117 Objection to 110 Uniform Scheduling Order filed by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) [Modified on 1/20/2012 to create actual link to Doc. 110 .−dmn] (Entered: 01/19/2012)
118 Transcript Redaction Request re 52 Transcript,, 68 Transcript,, 53 Transcript,,, 54 Transcript,,, by attorney Jamie L. Crook. (Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 01/20/2012)
119 Redacted Transcript re 52 Transcript of MOTION HEARING REGARDING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, Excerpt of Proceedings−Testimony of Kerry Galen Rich held on 11/23/2011. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/24/2012)
120 SURREPLY to State Defendant's 85 Motion to Dismiss and Response to the Court's Request for Briefing (Memorandum in Response to State Defendant Magee's 112 Reply in Support of 85 Motion to Dismiss, and Response to Court's 1/10/2012 114 Order; and State Defendant's 116 Response to Court's 1/10/2012 114 Order) filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Crook, Jamie) [Modified on 1/24/2012 to reflect actual title of document and to clean up text.−DMN] (Entered: 01/24/2012)
121 RESPONSE TO 115 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) Modified on 1/26/2012 to create a link with 115 Order (cc, ). (Entered: 01/25/2012)
122 MOTION for Leave to File a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cox, Justin) (Entered: 01/26/2012)
123 ORDER that plaintiff's 122 Motion for Leave to File a Reply Memorandum is granted. The plaintiff shall file a reply memorandum in support of its 111 Motion for Protective Order on or before 2/3/2012. It is further ORDERED that the 111 Motion for Protective Order be and is hereby set for Oral Argument on 2/14/2012 at 3:30 PM by telephone conference before Honorable Charles S. Coody. The plaintiffs shall set up the telephone conference. It is further ORDERED that on or before 2/9/2012, the parties shall confer in an attempt to reach an agreement on the scope of a protective order. No later than 2/20/2012, the parties shall file a joint status report as further set out in the order. Signed by Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody on 1/27/2012. Copies furnished to calendar group, WS. (dmn, ) (Entered:

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 19 of 22

01/31/2012 02/02/2012
02/03/2012
02/09/2012 02/09/2012 02/14/2012 03/05/2012 03/05/2012 03/07/2012 03/12/2012 03/14/2012 03/14/2012 03/14/2012

01/27/2012)
124 REPLY BRIEF re 114 Order, Set Deadlines,,,, 120 Reply Brief,, Pursuant to Order Dated January 10, 2012 (Doc. 114) filed by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 01/31/2012)
125 ORDER: (1) The 117 Objection to 110 Uniform Scheduling Order is sustained. (2) The 110 Uniform Scheduling Order is amended to reflect that the plaintiffs have until 4/2/2012, to amend their pleadings or to join parties and that the defendants have until 4/2/2012, to amend their pleadings or to join parties unless the plaintiffs file an amended complaint within less than 30 days of 4/2/2012, in which case the defendants will have 30 days from the date of such filing to amend their pleadings or to join parties. Amended Pleadings due by 4/2/2012. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/2/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/02/2012)
126 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support re 111 MOTION for Protective Order, 115 Order to Show Cause, 121 Response to Order to Show Cause, filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Cox, Justin) Modified on 2/6/2012 to clarify the docket text (wcl, ). (Entered: 02/03/2012)
127 NOTICE by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #1, John Doe #2 of Voluntary Dismissal of Individual Plaintiff John Doe #1 (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 02/09/2012)
128 Joint Report re Plaintiffs' 111 Motion for Protective Order filed in Response to 123 Order by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2, Julie Magee. (Cox, Justin) [Modified on 2/10/2012 to clean up text and create link to Doc. 111 .−dmn] (Entered: 02/09/2012)
129 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody: Oral Argument held on 2/14/2012 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR:3:34 − 4:16.) (ws, ) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
130 ORDERED that Daubert motions shall be filed on or before the dispositive−motions deadline, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/5/2012. (wcl, ) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
131 PROTECTIVE ORDER granting 111 MOTION for Protective Order, as further set out in order; ORDERED that a Discovery Scheduling Conference be and is hereby set on 4/24/2012, at 01:30 PM by telephone set up by the plfs before Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody on 3/5/2012. (furn: Calendar, ws) (wcl, ) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
132 ORDER: On 3/5/2012, the court entered a 131 Protective Order governing discovery in this case. Nothing in that order should be understood as precluding the parties from making initial disclosures as required by FED.R.CIV.P. 26. Signed by Honorable Judge Charles S. Coody on 3/7/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/07/2012)
133 NOTICE by Julie Magee State Defendant's Notice of Injunction of Section 30 Pending Appeals in HICA and U.S. Cases (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) (Entered: 03/12/2012)
134 Objection to re 131 Protective Order, Terminate Motions, Set Hearings,,, filed by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 03/14/2012)
MOTION to Extend Agreed Time to Respond to 11 MOTION for Class Certification by Julie Magee. (dmn, ) (This document has no pdf attached, see Doc. 134 for pdf.) (Entered: 03/14/2012)
135 ORDER that on or before 3/30/2012 the parties are to file briefs addressing whether the preliminary injunction is moot in light of the defendants' 133 Notice. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/14/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/14/2012)

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 20 of 22

03/15/2012
03/15/2012 03/15/2012 03/16/2012
08/13/2012 08/16/2012 08/16/2012 12/31/2012 01/02/2013
01/02/2013
01/16/2013 01/16/2013 02/04/2013

136 JUDGMENT that pursuant to 127 notice of voluntary dismissal, plaintiff John Doe #1 and all his claims are dismissed without prejudice and plaintiff John Doe #1 is terminated as a party; that the other plaintiffs and their claims are not dismissed; that the clerk is DIRECTED to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; that this case is not closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/15/2012. (cc, ) (Entered: 03/15/2012)
137 Joint MOTION to Stay Proceedings by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2, Julie Magee, Jimmy Stubbs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 03/15/2012)
BRIEF/MEMORANDUM in Support of 137 Joint MOTION to Stay Proceedings filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2, Julie Magee, Jimmy Stubbs. (dmn, ) (This document has no pdf attached, incorporated in Doc. 137 .) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
138 ORDER: (1) The 137 Motion to Stay Proceedings is granted. (2) All proceedings in this case are stayed. (Set STAYED flag.) (3) All outstanding motions are denied with leave to renew. (Motions terminated: 11 , 39 , 40 , 85 , 102 , 137 .) (4) The parties are to jointly notify this court when the appellant mandates have been issued in the HICA and United States v. Alabama cases. (5) All deadlines in this case are suspended. (6) This case is closed administratively. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/16/2012. (Deadlines terminated: Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/31/2012, Non Jury Trial set for 2/25/2013, Scheduling Conference set for 4/24/2012.) Copies furnished to calendar group, AG. (dmn, ) (Entered: 03/16/2012)
139 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Julie Magee. (Payne, Joshua) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
140 ORDER granting 139 Motion for Joshua K. Payne to Withdraw as Counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 8/16/2012. (dmn, ) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
***Attorney Joshua K. Payne terminated pursuant to Court 140 Order. (dmn, ) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
141 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (MOTION TO WITHDRAW ATTORNEY DIANA SEN) by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 12/31/2012)
142 MOTION to Stay JOINT NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF MANDATE and JOINT MOTION TO STAY FOR THIRTY DAYS by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2, Julie Magee, Jimmy Stubbs. (Attachments: # 1 Ex A − Mandate in United States v. Alabama, # 2 Ex B − Mandate in HICA v. Gov. Bentley, # 3 Ex C − Excerpts of HB658)(Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 01/02/2013)
143 ORDER as follows: The motion to stay proceedings for 30 days 142 is granted as further set out; On or before noon on February 4, 2013, the parties are to file a joint notice setting forth their views on the appropriate next steps in this case; A status conference is set for February 5, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. The parties are to arrange for the conference to be conducted by telephone. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/2/2013. (jg, ) (Entered: 01/02/2013)
144 ORDER that the 141 Motion to Withdraw is granted. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/16/2013. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
*** Attorney Diana S Sen terminated pursuant to Court 144 Order. (dmn, ) (Entered: 01/16/2013)
145 JOINT NOTICE by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2, Julie Magee, Jimmy Stubbs re 143 Order (Crook, Jamie) [Modified on 2/5/2013 to reflect this is

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 21 of 22

02/05/2013 02/08/2013 02/11/2013 02/11/2013 02/11/2013 02/14/2013 02/14/2013
03/08/2013 03/19/2013 05/17/2013
06/04/2013 06/04/2013

a "joint" notice.−dmn] (Entered: 02/04/2013)
146 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson: Telephone Conference held on 2/5/2013 (PDF available for court use only). (Recording Time FTR: 10:00 − 10:06.) (war, ) (Entered: 02/05/2013)
147 ORDER: Based upon representations made on the record on 2/5/2013, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) The clerk of the court is to reopen this case. (2) The stay of the proceeding is dissolved. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/8/2013. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
148 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2 (Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
149 MOTION to Dismiss Claims as Moot by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum, # 2 Attachment 1)(Crook, Jamie) (Entered: 02/11/2013)
MOTION to Dismiss by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2. (dmn, ) (This document has no pdf attached, see Doc. 148 for pdf.) (Entered: 02/14/2013)
150 ORDER re 149 MOTION to Dismiss. Motion Submission Deadline set for 3/19/2013 without oral argument with any opposition brief due by 3/8/2013, and any reply to the opposition due by 3/19/2013. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2013. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/14/2013)
151 ORDER: Because, in light of the complicated proceedings so far in this case, the clerk of the court is reluctant to act on the notice of voluntary dismissal (doc. no. 148 ) without court approval, it is ORDERED that the notice istreated as a Motion to Dismiss and said motion is set for submission, without oral argument, on 3/19/2013, with any opposition brief due by 3/8/2013, and any reply to the opposition due by 3/19/2013. Motion Submission Deadline set for 3/19/2013. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/2013. (dmn, ) (Entered: 02/14/2013)
152 RESPONSE to Motion re 149 MOTION to Dismiss Claims as Moot filed by Julie Magee. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) (Entered: 03/08/2013)
153 REPLY to Response to Motion re 149 MOTION to Dismiss Claims as Moot filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2. (Brooke, Samuel) (Entered: 03/19/2013)
154 ORDER of USCA issued as the MANDATE as to 94 Notice of Appeal filed by Julie Magee, 11th Circuit Appeal No. 11−16114−CC; On March 6, 2013, this Court directed the parties to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. As is discussed in the parties' responses to the show cause order, Alabama Code 31−13−29 was amended in May 2012. The parties submit, and we agree, that based on that amendment, there is no possibility that the challenged code section, as amended, will be applied to future mobile home transactions in Alabama. For that reason, we conclude that this appeal is due to be dismissed as moot because the appeal "no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief." Accordingly, on our own motion, we hereby DISMISS this appeal as MOOT. Furthermore, based on our consideration of principles of equity, we hereby VACATE the district court's December 12, 2011, "Opinion" (Doc. 87) and the December 12, 2011, "Preliminary Injunction" (Doc. 88). This matter is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order. (ydw, ) (Entered: 05/17/2013)
155 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney MARY BAUER by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2. (Bauer, Mary) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
156 NOTICE of Change of Address by Justin B. Cox (Cox, Justin) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-982 As of: 06/12/2015 02:51 PM CDT 22 of 22

06/07/2013 06/07/2013 12/27/2013
12/27/2013 01/27/2014
01/31/2014 02/14/2014 03/07/2014 03/07/2014 03/11/2014 04/04/2014 04/14/2014
05/04/2014 05/08/2014

157 ORDER granting 155 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 6/6/2013. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
*** Attorney Mary C Bauer terminated as counsel pursuant to Court 157 Order. (dmn, ) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
158 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Expenses by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, # 2 Declaration of Samuel Brooke, # 3 Declaration of Justin Cox, # 4 Declaration of Stephen Dane, # 5 Declaration of Linton Joaquin, # 6 Declaration of Foster Maer, # 7 Declaration of Faith Cooper, # 8 Declaration of David Cynamon, # 9 Declaration of Augusta Dowd, # 10 Declaration of Mark Sabel, # 11 Declaration of Robert Segall)(Dane, Stephen) (Entered: 12/27/2013)
MEMORANDUM in Support of 158 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Expenses filed by Center for Fair Housing, Inc., Central Alabama Fair Housing Center, Fair Housing Center of Northern Alabama, John Doe #2 (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See Docket Entry 158 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 12/30/2013)
159 ORDER directing that the 158 MOTION for Attorney Fees is set for submission, without oral argument, on 2/14/2014, with any opposition brief and evidentiary materials due by 2/7/2014, and any reply to the opposition due by 2/14/2014. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 1/27/2014. (djy, ) (Entered: 01/27/2014)
160 Joint MOTION to Stay re 159 Order, Set Deadlines,, by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) Modified on 2/3/2014 to clarify text to reflect as filed on behalf of ALL parties (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 01/31/2014)
161 ORDER (1) GRANTING 160 Joint MOTION to Stay briefing schedule; (2) the parties are to file a joint Status Report on or before 3/7/2014, as further set out in order. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 2/14/14. (djy, ) (Entered: 02/14/2014)
162 Response to Order re 161 Order, Terminate Motions, Set Deadlines Joint Report of the Parties by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
Joint report of the parties trated as a MOTION to Continue by Julie Magee. (NO PDF document attached to this notice−See docket entry 162 ). (djy, ) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
163 ORDER directing as follows: (1) treating the joint report as a motion to continue to stay; granting [162 ] Motion to Continue; (2) the stay as to the briefing schedule is extended to 4/4/2014. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 3/11/14. (djy, ) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
164 MOTION to Stay re 163 Order on Motion to Continue, and Joint Report of the Parties by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
165 ORDER GRANTING the 164 joint MOTION to Stay as follows: (1) all pending motions are denied with leave to renew; (2) all proceedings in this case are stayed; (3) the parties are allowed until 5/5/2014, to file the appropriate settlement papers. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 4/14/14. (djy, ) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
166 STIPULATION of Dismissal by Julie Magee. (Davis, James) Modified on 5/5/2014 to clarify text to reflect as also filed on behalf of all plaintiffs and defendant Stubbs (qc/djy, ). (Entered: 05/04/2014)
167 JUDGMENT, pursuant to the 166 stipulation of dismissal, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court that the stay previously entered 165 is dissolved and that this case is Dismissed in its entirety without prejudice; directing the clerk to enter this document on the civil docket as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 FRCP; this case is closed. Signed by Honorable Judge Myron H. Thompson on 5/8/14. (Attachments: # 1 civil appeals checklist)(djy, ) (Entered: 05/08/2014)