.
F I t :E D
SEP 242003
. . . .... . . . cJL- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIt:T t:QURT Phil Lombardi. Clerk
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOiVPAS, DISTRICT COURT

03C V6 5 7 (1) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY} COMMlSSION,

Plaintiff,

}

EA(C) )

}

v.

}

No.

}

(1) BANK OF OKLAHOMA, a National

}

Banking Association and subsidiary of

}

BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

}

an Oklahoma Corporation,

}

}

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendant.

}

-----------------------}

COMPLAINT

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. and Title I of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of retaliation and to

provide appropriate relief to Herbert Phillip Woodend. The Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission alleges that the Defendant, Bank of Oklahoma, violated Title VIl when it retaliated

against Herbert Phillip Woodend for his opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

I. JurisdictionofthisCourtisinvokedpUTsuantto28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331, 1337,1343,

and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to §§ 706(f)(1) & (3) ofTitle VTI ofthe

Civil Rights Act of1964. as amended, ("Title VTI"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and Section 102 ofthe

Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981a. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were

and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the

I

·
Northern District of Oklahoma. PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement ofTitle VII and is expressly authorized to bring this action by §706(f)(l) & (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
3. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Oklahoma and the City ofTulsa, and has continuously had at least fifteen employees.
4. At all relevant times, Defendant has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- (b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 5. More than thirty days prior to the institution ofthis lawsuit, Herbert Phillip Woodend filed a charge with the Commission alleging a violation of Title VII by the Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 6. Since at least May 2002, the Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices in its facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3(a), by terminating Herbert Phillip Woodend's employment in retaliation for
engaging in protected activity, including his opposition to the gender harassment of an employee
who reported to Woodend. 7. The practices complained ofabove were intention~ and designed to deprive Herbert
Phillip Wood end of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an
2

employee. 8. The unlawful emplo)111ent practices complained of above were committed with
malice or with reckless indiffere,llce to. the fe9.e::ral1y protected rights of Herbert Phillip Woodend. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a pennanent injunction enjoining the Defendant, Bank of Oklahoma, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from retaliating against employees. B. Orderthe Defendant to institute andcarryoutpolicies,practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for Herbert Phillip Woodend and other employees and which eradicate the effects its past and present unlawful employment practices.
C. Order the Defendant to make whole Herhert Phillip Woodend by providing
appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be proved at trial, and other affinnative reliefnecessary to eradicate the effects ofDefendant's unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to rightful-place reinstatement or front pay in lieu of reinstatement.
D. Order the Defendant to make whole Herbert Phillip Woodend byproviding compensation for past and future pecuniary and. non-pecuniary losses resulting from the Wllawful employment practices described above, including, but not limited to emotional pain, suffering, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, and inconvenience, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order the Defendant to pay Herbert Phillip Woodend pWlitive damages for its malice
or reckless indifference to 'Mr. Woodend's fede~ally protected rights described above, in amounts
3

to be detennined at trial. F. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper. G. Award the Commission its costs in this action. nJRY TRIAL DEMAND The Commission requests aJury Trial on all questions offact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel ROBERT CANINO
Regional Attorney Oklahoma State Bar No. 011782
SUZANNE M. ANDERSON

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Sr. .al Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Oklahoma Area Office 210 Park Avenue, Suite 1350 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 405-231-4363 405-231-4340 (fax)
4

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHQMA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

)

OPPORTUNITY COM.MISSIO.N,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

BANK OF OKLAHOMA, a National

)

Banking Association and subsidiary of

)

BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION, an )

Oklahoma Corporation,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

--AND-

)

)

HERBERT PHILLIP WOODEND,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

vs.

)

)

BANK OF OKLAHOiVIA, a National

)

Banking Association and subsidiary of

)

BOK FINANCIAL. CORPORATION, an )

OkJahoma Corporation,

)

)

Defendant.

)

JURY TRIAL REQUESTED ATTORNEY LIEN CLAIMED

INTERVENING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Intervening Plaintiff, Herbert Phillip Woodend ("Plaintiff-Intervenor"), for his causes

of action against Defendant, Bank of Oklahoma ("BOK"), alleges and states as follows:

JURISDICTION

AND ,

VE- NUE,.,

1. Plaintiff-Intervenor brings this federal claim of retaliation arising under Title

VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) ct seq., as amended ("Title VII").

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-S(f), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

.......
t :.)
3. Venue is properly in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because Plaintiff-Intervenor's claims arise in this district.
PARTIES 4. Plaintiff-Intervenor is a citizen of the United States and, at all times relevant to BOK's unlawful employment practices, was a resident of Tulsa, Oklahoma and this judicial district. 5. BOK is a corporation operating and doing business in the State of Oklahoma and in this judicial district. 6. At all times relevant to Plaintiff-Intervenor's Complaint, llOK was engaged in industry affecting commerce as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 7. At all times relevant to Plaintifl:Intervenor's Complaint, BOK has employed fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each oftwenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the preceding calendar year. BOK was and is, therefore, an employer within the meaning ofTitle Vll, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 8. Plaintiff-Intervenor timely filed a Charge ofDiscrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on or about Junc 24, 2002, and that Charge is the underlying basis for this litigation. A copy ofPlaintiff-Intervenor's charge is attached hereto as Exhibit A. All conditions precedent to the institution ofthis lawsuit have been fulfilled. 9. Since at least May 2002, BOK has engaged in conduct in violation of Section 704(a) ofTitle VII, 42 U.s.C. § 2000e-3(.) by terminating Plaintifj:lntervenor's employment in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity, includin~ his opposition to gender harassment and the imposition of a hostile work environm.ent on a female employee who
-2-

reported to Plaintiff-Intervenor. 10. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 9 were
intentional. 11. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 9 above has been to
deprive Plaintiff-Intervenor ofequal employment opportunities because ofhis opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII, and to retaliate against him for his engaging in protected activity, including his opposition to unlawful gender discrimination.
12. As a result ofBOK's actions, Plaintiff-InterverlOr has lost wages and benefits. PlaintilT-Intervenor has also suffered mental and physical distress, including but not limited to, mental anguish, embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life as a result ofBOK's lmlawliJl conduct.
13. The actions ofBOK were undertaken willfully, intentionally. and with malice and/or with reckless disregard for the federally protected rights of Plaintiff-Intervenor, thereby warranting an award of punitive damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Herbert Phillip Woodend, demands judgment against Defendant, Bank of Oklahoma, and prays:
(1) that this Court enjoin the Defendant from retaliating against employees who oppose Defendant's unlawful employment practices;
(2) that this Court award Plaintiff-Intervenor an amount to be determined at trial for his actual damages, including but not limited to lost past and future compensation, and lost past and future benefits;
(3) that this Court award Plaintiff-Intervenor damages to compensate him for the mental and physical distress, including but not limited to, mental anguish, embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life, resulting from BOK's unlawful conduct;
-0o -

(4) that this Court award Plaintiff-Intervenor puuitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
(5) lhal this Court award Plaintiff-Intervenor his reasonable attorney fees and any other costs of this action; and
- (6) that this Court award Plaintiff-Intervenor such. other and further relief as mav
be deemed just and proper by the Court. Respectfully submitted,
SHOOK, HUGGINS & JOHNSON, P.C.
By: '7t-"F.----;;-;;~:;__;_~~_o==-­ J than E. Shook, OBA #17343 Randall D. Huggins, OBA# 17875 2727 E. 21" Street, Suite 500 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74114 (918) 293-1122 - Telephone (918) 293-1133 - Facsimile Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervener, Herbert Phillip Woodend
-4-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the ~ day ofDecember, 2003, a true and correct copy ofthc above
and foregoing document was sent via U.S. Mail, postage pr~paid, to: Michelle M. Robertson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Oklahoma Area Office 210 Park Avenue, Suite 1350 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 J. Patrick Cremin
HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE,
GOLDEN & NELSON, P,C. 320 S. Boston Ave., Ste. 400 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-3708
-5-

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

- and -

)

)

HERBERT PHILLIP WOODEND,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

BANK OF OKLAHOMA, a National

)

Banking Association and subsidiary of

)

BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

)

an Oklahoma Corporation,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. 03-CV-0657-CVE-PJC

ORDER

Now before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiffs Equal Em

ployment Opportunity

Commission and Intervenor for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 44). Plaintiff Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Plaintiff-Intervenor Herbert Phillip Woodend (“Woodend”)

assert that, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.,

defendant Bank of Oklahoma (“BOK”) terminated Woodend’s employment. In particular, plaintiffs

assert that BOK te rminated Woodend’s employment because he supported a subordinate who

claimed that she was subjected to gender harassment and a hostile work environment. BOK claims

that it eliminated Woodend’s position essentially because it was redundant and it amde his superior’s

management of lower level managers less effective.

Woodend’s position was eliminated on May 7, 2002. On June 24, 2002, Woodend filed a

claim with the EEOC. On Septem ber 24, 2003, the EEOC filed this action in fede ral court. On

November 12, 2003, Woodend moved to intervene, and was permitted to do so on December 10, 2003.
The EEOC and Woodend (collectively “plaintiffs”) seek summary judgment on the following affirmative defenses asserted by BOK: that plaintiffs’ claims are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of lim itations; that W oodend failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of this action; that W oodend’s employment was terminable at will; and that Woodend failed to mitigate his damages. Based upon discovery, BOK now agrees that the EEOC’s claim is not barred by the statute of limitations and that Woodend has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. BOK also agrees that the at-will doctrine does not apply to Title VII claims, but it denies that it committed any violation of Title VII with regard to Woodend. It also denies that Woodend has adequately mitigated his alleged damages and it wants the ability to address the procedures in the EEOC’s investi gation of W oodend’s Charge of Discrimination.
I. Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). The palin language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing suf ficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bearthe burden ofproof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
2

rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Id. at 327.
“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is som e metaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts. . . . W here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rationaltrier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insuf ficient; there must be evidence on which the [ trier of fact] could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court is “whether the evidence p resents a sufficient disagreem ent to require subm ission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 250. In its review, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
II. A successful Title VII plaintif f may be entitled to an award of back pay as an equitable remedy unless the defendant pleads and proves, as aanffirmative defense, that the plaintiff has failed to use “reasonable diligence” to attain “substantially equivalent” employment and thereby mitigate his damages. See Daniels v. Loveridge, 32 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1994); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Westway Motor Freight, Inc. , 949 F.2d 317, 320 (10th Cir. 1991) ; 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). A reasonable, honest, good faith effort to mitigate damages is required, but the charging party “is not held to the highest standards of diligence,” and the duty to m itigate “does not require him to be successful . . . .” United Staet s v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 938 (10th Cir. 1979);
3

see Spulak v. K Mart Corp. , 894 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir, 1990). To prove this affirm ative defense,
“the defendant must establish (1) that the damage suffered by plaintiff could have been avoided, i.e. that there were suitable positions available which plaintiff could have discovered and for which he was qualified; and (2) that plaintiff failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking such position.” EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Sias v. City Dem onstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978)). Woodend began an extensive job search withinone week fromthe date his employment with BOK ended. He mailed out hundreds of resumes, utilized BOK outplacement services, registered with recruiters, and registered with on-line jobsearches. One website made over 790 contacts with his resume. Woodend expanded his search to numerous other states outside Oklahoma, and talked with friends and acquaintances about possible jobopportunities. He applied to more than 15 banks, and expanded his search to ifelds outside the banking industry. Eventually, he accepted employment with a bank in Colorado in November 2002 – approximately five months after his the termination of his employment at BOK. BOK does not dispute that Woodend applied for jobs after his BOK position was eliminated; however, BOK points out that Woodend was unable to recall, at his deposition, whether and how many job offers he received after he left BOK and before he accepted his current job. Further, of the offers that he could recall, it appears that he may have rejected them either because the salary was too low, or the job was “too small,” not “a good fit” for him, or not “a good match.” See Def. Resp. Br. (Dkt. # 50) at 2-3. Thus, BOK has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to (1) whether the posi tions he rejected were subs tantially similar, or suitable, and that he was
4

qualified for them; and (2) whether he used “r easonable” care and diligence by rejecting them . Summary judgment is not appropriate as to this affirmative defense at this time.
III. BOK does not deny that Woodend exhausted his administrative remedies, but argues that it should have the ability to address the proceduresin the EEOC’s investigation of Woodend’s Charge of Discrimination. On August 11, 2004, the Court sisued an order granting the EEOC’s motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition of the EEOC investigator on Woodend’s charge of discrimination, but it required the EEOC to identify teh individual that the investigator interviewed. BOK contends that the EEOC investigator failed to interview the two individuals who m ade the decision to eliminate Woodend’s position and, thus, BOK should not be perm itted to assert the affirmative defense that Woodend failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court finds that the EEOC’s challenge to the EEOC’s investigation is not relevant to whether Woodend failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. It may present issues related to the admissibility of evidence, but it is not related to the assertion of an affirmative defense. The trial of this matter, a federal Title VII suit, is de novo. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1979). Although the Tenth Circuit has notspoken directly to the issue of whether a Title VII defendant m ay challenge the sufficiency of an EEOC i nvestigation, it has recognized that no cause of action against the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim. Scheerer v. Rose State College, 950 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir.1991). Other courts have spoken directly to the issue and held that allowing a Title VII defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the EEOC’s investigation would significantly increase the potential for delay and divert the attention of the Court andthe parties from the merits of the case. EEOC v.
5

Keco Industries, Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984) (cintig EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (allowing such challenge “would effectively make every Title VII suit a two-step action” -- first as to the EEOC’s determination and then to the merits); EEOC v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del. 1974) (“It is one thing for courts to insist upon procedural compliance with the Act and quite another for themto test the factual basis for Commission action.”) As explained in Keco Industries, Inc.:
The purpose of the EEOC’s investigation ofa discrimination charge is to determine if there is a basis for that charge. The reasonable cause of determination issued as a result of the investigation is designed to notify the employer of the EEOC’s findings and to provide a basis for later conciliation proceedings. 748 F.2d at 1100. It is not designed to serve as an adjudication on the merits of the case. The Court agrees with those cases prohibiting a“mini-trial” into the adequacy ofthe EEOC investigation. That is not to say that BOK cannot challenge the evidence underlying the determination or impeach the testimony of EEOC witnesses who may seek to rely upon the EEOC determination, as opposed to the underlying evidence, as probative of the plaintiffs ’ claims. The BOK simply cannot challenge the adequacy or sufficiency of the EEOC investigation itself. More to the point, there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact as to whe ther BOK m ay rely upon an affirmative defense that Woodend failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.
IV. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion of Plaintif fs Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission and Intervenor for Pa rtial Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 44) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is granted as to thedefendants’ affirmative defenses that: (1) plaintiffs’ claims are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) Woodend failed to properly e xhaust his administrative remedies as a condition precedent to the
6

filing of this action; and (3) Woodend’s employment was terminable at will. It is denied as to the defendant’s affirmative defense that Woodend failed to mitigate his damages.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2005.
7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

- and -

)

)

HERBERT PHILLIP WOODEND,

)

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

BANK OF OKLAHOMA, a National

)

Banking Association and subsidiary of

)

BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

)

an Oklahoma Corporation,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. 03-CV-0657-CVE-PJC

ORDER

Now before the Court is the Defendant’ s Motion for Sum mary Judgment (Dkt. # 56).

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and Plaintiff-Intervenor Herbert

Phillip Woodend (“Woodend”) assert that, in violation of Title VII of theCivil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., defendant Bank of Oklahom a (“BOK”) term inated Woodend’s

employment. In particular, plaintiffs assertthat BOK terminated Woodend’s employment because

he supported a subordinate who claimed that she was subjected to gender harassment and a hostile

work environment.

I.

BOK hired Woodend in February 2001, in connection with its decision to im plement a

program designed by Cohen Brown Management Consulting Group, Inc. (“Cohen Brown”). BOK

created the position of Senior Vice President, Consumer Banking Sales Manager for Woodend to

act as a “champion” over the sales and service process. BOK entered into the three-year contract with Cohen Brown the following May. Four rgeional managers reported to Woodend, and Woodend reported to Steven Bradshaw, Executive Vice President, Consumer Banking. One of the regional managers was Heather Pellerin, a woman with whom Woodend had previously worked. Woodend told Pellerin about the position as Regional Branch and Services Manager at the Bank of Albuquerque (“BAQ”), a subsidiary of BOK Financial Corporation, and BOK hired her on June 18, 2001.
BOK claims that Pellerin’s job performance was consistently unsatisfactory. Pellerin claims that she was continually subjected to gender harassment and a hostile work environment by two coworkers: John Barela, BAQ Manager of Regi onal Services, and Jason Anderson, BAQ Publ ic Relations/Marketing Manager, and that she discussed these m atters with Judy Luttrell, Regional Human Resources Manager at BAQ. Upon receiving complaints in late September or early October 2001 about Pellerin’s unsatisfactory performance, Bradshaw asked Woodend to investigate. Pellerin denied the allegations and complained to Woodend about the situation as she perceived it. Woodend claims that he informed Bradshaw about the situation, and reported to Bradshaw that Pellerin told him that the subject “hos tile work environm ent” came up in a conversation Pellerin had with Luttrell. Woodend also claims that he told Bradshaw of the possibility of Pellerin filing a gender discrimination lawsuit.
Bradshaw claims that, in January or Feburary 2002, he thought abouteliminating Woodend’s position because W oodend’s duties duplicated his own, a nd an “interm ediary” position like Woodend’s “diluted” Bradshaw’s management of his lower level managers under the Cohen Brown program. Bradshaw also claim s that he later com municated his concerns to Jill Hall, the Cohen
2

Brown Results Consultant. However, in March, he evaluated Woodend as “fully m eets expectations” as part of an annual perform ance review. He m entioned Woodend as a pos sible replacement for his own position, but he actually listed Vane Lucas, Senior Vice President of Consumer Support and In-Store Banking, as his “immediate replacement candidate.”
Early that same month, March 2002, Pellerin submitted a resignation letter, butshe withdrew it after Bradshaw asked that she reconsider. Nonetheless, Bradshaw determined later that month to terminate Pellerin’s employment, and Woodend went to Albuquerque to do so on April 3, 2002. Although Pellerin did not tell Woodend that she planned to assert a gender discrim ination claim, Woodend reported to Bradshaw that Pellerin couldfile a gender discrimination lawsuit. Woodend claims that, on both occasions when he m entioned to Bradshaw the possi bility of a lawsuit by Pellerin, he told Bradshaw that he would support Pellerin’s claim. Woodend also had lunch with Larry Wagner, BOK’s Senior Vice President ofHuman Resources, but the parties dispute whether Woodend mentioned any possible lawsuit by Pellerin atthat time. In any event, Pellerin never filed a claim or lawsuit related to the alleged discrimination against her at BAQ.
Bradshaw claims that, in April 2002, he spoke with Wagner about eliminating Woodend’s position, and the position was eliminated thereafter on May 7, 2002. On June 24, 2002, Woodend filed a claim with the EEOC. In December 2002, Bradshaw’s superiors directed him to take over responsibility for BOK’s operations in Texas, and he hired Jill Hall to become the Senior Vice President, Consumer Branch Delivery Manager, on July 1, 2003. Her duties include some of those previously performed by Woodend. On September 24, 2003, the EEOC filed this action in federal court. On Novem ber 12, 2003, Woodend m oved to intervene, and was perm itted to do so on December 10, 2003.
3

II. Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). The palin language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing suf ficient to establish the existence of an el ement essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bearthe burden ofproof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut , but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Id. at 327. “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is som e metaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts. . . . W here the record taken as a whole could notlead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insuf ficient; there must be ev idence on which the [ trier of fact] could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submi ssion to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 250. In its review, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
4

III. Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers against employees in retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices. It provides, in relevant part: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made unlawful by th is subchapter, or because he has m ade a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiffs assert thatBOK terminated Woodend because he opposed what he reasonably believed to be unl awful discrimination against a subordinate fem ale employee, Pellerin. A prima facie case of retaliation is established under Title VII if the plaintiff shows that:(1) he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse em ployment action. E.g., Hertz v. Luzenac American, Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1015 (10th Cir. 2004); O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001); Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 123-64 (10th Cir. 1998). BOK’s motion for summary judgment is directed primarily at the first and third elements of a prima facie case: BOK argues that Peller in was not subjected to sexual harassment or a hostile work environm ent as those term s are understood in a l egal sense and,thus, there was no Title VII discrimination for Woodend to oppose; BOK also argues that there is no causal connection between Woodend’s termination and his alleged opposition to the alleged discrimination against Pellerin. Based on the record, the Court seriously doubtswhether Pellerin was subjected to Title VII discrimination. Pellerin adm its that she was not subject to any “sexual harassm ent,” but she
5

contends that she was subj ected, nonetheless, to harassment due to her gender, and that she was

forced to endure a “hostile work environment.” Yet neither she, nor the human resources person to

whom she reported, described her situation in terms which conclusively prove that she was subject

to gender discrimination or a hostile work environment as prohibited by Title VII. As set forth in

Penry,

[f]or a hostile environment claim to survive a summary judgment motion, “a plaintiff

must show that a ratio nal jury could find that the workplace is p ermeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently s evere or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.” Davis v. U.S. Postal Service , 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th

Cir.1998) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). The plaintiff m ust

produce evidence that she was the object of harassm ent because of her gender.

Conduct that is overtly sexual may be presumed to be because of the victim’s gender;

however, actionable conduct is not limited to behavior motivated by sexual desire.

See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, ----, 118 S. Ct. 998,

1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 ( 1998); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. , 833 F.2d 1406, 1415

(10th Cir. 1987). While the plaintiff must make a showing that the environment was

both objectively and subjectively hostile, she need not demonstrate psychological

harm, nor is she required to show that her work suffered as a result of t

he

harassment. See Davis, 142 F.3d at 1341.

Penry, 155 F.3d at 1261.

Pellerin characterized the alleged ge nder harassment as constant backbiting, “stirring up

trouble” out in the field, questioning Pellerin’s personnel decisions, undermining her, discrediting

her in the eyes of her subordinates, deliberately fabricating information to discredit her, and falsely

claiming that (1) she was missing excessive amounts of work; (2) not participating in the “rollout”

of the new bank program; and (3) not visiting her branch managers. She also com plained about

jokes and comments that she found offensive, such as those relating to blondes or to her being a

blonde, as well as foul language. She specificallydescribed the BAQ workplace as a “good old boy

6

network,” and she claimed that Bradshaw himself set that tone. Evenif these allegations were true, none definitively qualifies as “hostilework environment” evidence as outlined in the case law above.
Nonetheless, for purposes of W oodend’s retaliation claim , the question is not whether Pellerin was subjected to gender discrimination, but whether Woodend had a reasonable good faith belief that she was, and whether Bradshaw thought she might have been. An informal complaint to a superior about potential discrim ination constitutes protected activity or opposi tion, as contemplated by Title VII. E.g., Pastran v. K-mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000). The complaint need not be made by the person subjected to the potential discrimination, but can be made the person opposed to discrim ination allegedly experienced by a co-worker. See Petersen v.Utah Dept. of Corrections, 301 F.3d 1182, 118-89 (10th Cir. 2004). Woodend claims that he told Bradshaw on two occasions that Pellerin could file a claim or lawsuit of gender discrimination or hostile work environment and, if she did so, he would support her. Bradshaw disputes that Woodend mentioned anything about supporting Pellerin, alt hough he adm its the subject of hosti le work environment came up. To t he extent that W oodend’s statements to Bradshaw about possible discrimination experienced by Pellerin constitute a complaint, he engaged in protected opposition. Whether the statements constitute a complaint is a question of fact for the jury.
More importantly, the alleged com plaints, if the j ury were to believe that W oodend’s statements constitute complaints, signify Woodend’s belief that Pellerin might have been subject to a “hostile work environment.” BAQ Human Resources Manager Luttrell testified that she warned Pellerin about the difficulties Pellerin might experience as a woman in a position of power at BAQ. Pellerin claims that she often complained to Luttrell about what Pellerin perceived was harassment due to her gender. Luttrell sent an email to Wagner stating that she understood her role in relation
7

to Pellerin was “to protect em ployees from a hostile work environment.” She testif ied that she understands the phrase to refer to an unlawful act whi ch violates one or m ore federal antidiscrimination laws. After Pellerin was terminated, Luttrell again characterized Pellerin’s situation as a “hostile work environment.”
Luttrell made these statements despite testifying that she had never perceived any gendrebias by Anderson or Barela, and neither Anderson nor Barela had any docum ented problems with a woman who was Pellerin’s predecessor. Nonetheless, the fact that Luttrell, as well as Woodend, characterized Pellerin’s work environment as hostile lends credence to Woodend’s argument that he had a reasonable good faith belief that she was usbjected to gender discrimination. That Pellerin never filed suit is insignificant. “Action taken against an individual in anticipation of that person engaging in a protected opposition to discrimination is no less retaliatory than action taken after the fact; consequently, we hold that this form of preemptive retaliation falls within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).” Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993).
Defendant has presented considerable evidence to challenge Woodend’s good faith belief. For example, Woodend never mentioned any concerns about a hostile work environment for Pellerin when he sent an email to Bradshaw immediately after Pellerin was terminated. Nor did he mention any such concerns to Margaret Gayle, BOK Senior Human Resource Compliance Officer, who helped Woodend prepare a severance package for Pellerin. Further, prior to accepting employment with BOK, Woodend made a similar retaliation claim against his former employer, and settlement of that claim resulted in payments to Woodend that ended in September 2001, when Woodend first suggested that Pellerin could be in an allegedly hostile work environment. Yet, these allegations go to Woodend’s credibility and the weight of Woodend’s evidence supporting the reasonableness
8

of his belief. They raise a genuine issue of material fact; they do not warrant summary judgment.
Opposition activity is protected, for the purposes of a retalia tion claim, “even when it is based on a m istaken good faith belief that Title VII has been violated,” Love v. RE/MAX of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984), unless the mistake is unreasonable. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269-71 (2001). In other words “[a] plaintiff need not convince the jury that his employer had actually discriminated against him; he need only show that when he engaged in protected opposition, he had a reasona ble good-faith belief that the opposed behavior was discriminatory.” Hertz, 370 F.3d at 1015-16 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Crumpacker v. Kansas Dep’t. of Human Resources, 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003)). The record ta ken as a whole raises a genuine issue of m aterial fact as to whether W oodend engaged in protected opposition to discrimination.
Further, plaintiffs have shown that W oodend suffered an adverse em ployment action contemporaneous with or subsequent to his alleged opposition. It is not disputed that Woodend’s position was eliminated. Thus, Woodend’s employment was effectively terminated. Termination of an employee’s employment constitutes adverse action. E.g,.Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). BOK denies Woodend’s employment was terminated due to protected opposition, but that argum ent goes to the issue of whether BOK had a l egitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for taking the disputed em ployment action -- an issue separately analyzed if the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case.
Finally, plaintiffs have m et their prim a facie third elem ent, viz., that there is a causal connection between the protectedactivity and the adverse employment action. “A causal connection
9

may be shown by ‘evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action.’” O’Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Burrus v. United Tel. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982)). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that such temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action must be “very close.” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (quoting O’Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253). The Tenth Circuit has held that a one and one-half month period between the protected activityand the adverse action is sufficient. Anderso,n 181 F.3d at 1179. Yet, a three-month period between employee’s single request for overtime pay and her termination was insufficient to establish causal connection for purposes of FLSA retaliation claim in Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997).
Woodend claims that he informed Bradshaw about discrimination against Pellerin twice: once when he returned from Albuquerque in October 2001, and again after Pellerin’s termination on April 3, 2002. Woodend’s employment terminated on May 7, 2002. Plaintiffs submit that the 34-day period between Pellerin’s termination and Woodend’s termination is sufficient to establish a causal connection. W hile the tim e period betwee n the October 2001 “com plaint” date and Woodend’s termination in May 2002 would be insufficient, that Woodend allegedly complained to Bradshaw a second tim e, and was term inated approximately one month later, is sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. That W oodend allegedly complained in October 2001, prior to the dates that Bradshaw allegedly begnaconsidering the elimination of Woodend’s position, also counters BOK’s argum ent that a causal conn ection cannot be established. Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of retaliation, albeit without direct evidence.
10

Absent direct evidence of retaliation, a retaliation claim is analyzed according to the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). E.g. , Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070-71 (10th Cir. 2004). Under this framework, once an employee presents a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for taking the disputed employment action. Id. BOK argues that it elim inated Woodend’s position for reasons unrelated to Pellerin’s allegations of discrimination. Specifically, Bradshaw claim s that the Cohen Brown process m ade Woodend’s position redundant, and that having Woodend as an intermediary between him and the four regional managers “diluted” his effectiveness. Plaintiff may challenge Bradshaw’s credibility, but BOK has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for e liminating Woodend’s position and terminating his employment.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the em ployer’s proffered reason, if legitim ate and nondiscrim inatory, is a pr etext for discrimination. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071. “Plaintiffs typically show pretext by revealing such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the em ployer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable f actfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” Jones v. Barnhar,t349 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations om itted). Sum mary judgment in favor of the em ployer is warranted only if the employee has “failed to produce any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that [the employer’s] proffered reasons were pretextual.” Id.
Initially, the fact that Woodend was terminated approximately a month after he allegedly told Bradshaw, for the second tim e, about alleged discrimination against Pellerin is a factor showing
11

pretext as well as the causal connection elem ent of a prim a facie case. Y et, close tem poral proximity, though a factor in showni g pretext, “is not alone sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Annett v. Univ. of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Pastran v. K-Mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff arguesi,n addition, that BOK expended a great deal of money and effort to recruit Woodend as part ofits plan to implement and reinforce the principles of the Cohen Brown program, and to eventually replace Bradshaw, only to fire its “champion” of the sales and service process 15 months after he accepted the position, and two years before the end of the Cohen Brown contract. Bradshaw di d not document the reason for Woodend’s position elimination, as required by BOK separation/termination policy. Nor did BOK secure a release from liability from Woodend in return for his severance package, as is BOK’s normal practice.
Further, Bradshaw evaluated Woodend as a possible replacement candidate who had “the right tools” to perfor m Bradshaw’s job, while evaluating the person he listed as his “im mediate replacement candidate” as only “marginally acceptable.” The evidence suggests that Bradshaw also contemplated a greater role for Woodend in BOK’s 2003 budget process that would begin in the Fall of 2002. In February 2002, Bradshaw offered to nominate Woodend for a “ten-month experience” in an annual program known as “Leadership Tulsa.” Finally, the fact that another person was hired to take on his duties eight or ninemonths after he left could be indicative of pretext. Of course, that person was hired after Bradshaw was given additional responsibilities for banks in Texas, and the person he hired to assume Woodend’s duties assumed other responsibilities as well. Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of these facts or all egations leads the Court to f ind that there is suf ficient evidence of pretext to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
12

IV. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 56) is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of January, 2005.
13

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(1) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

(2) HERBERT PHILLIP WOODEND,

)

)

Plaintiff Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

(1) BANK OF OKLAHOMA, a National

)

Banking Association and subsidiary of

)

BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

)

an Oklahoma Corporation,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. 03-CV-0657-CVE-PJC

CONSENT DECREE THIS CONSENT DECREE is made and entered into by and between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission C"EEOC"), and Bank ofOk lahoma, ("BOK") in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, with regard to the EEOC's Complaint filed on September24, 2003 (Complaint), in Civil Action No. 03-CV-6S7-EA. The Complaint is based upon a Charge of Discrimination filed by Herbert Phillip Woodend, Charging Party, against the Defendant employer. The above-referenced Complaint alleges that the Defendant BOK violated Title VII orthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title 1of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, by subjecting Mr. Woodend, Plaintifr Intervenor, to retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. The Defendant employer denies all of the allegations made in the Complaint filed by EEOC. Mr. Woodend intervened in this action, as permitted by law.

The EEOC, Plaintiff Intervenor and Defendant BOK agree to compromise and settle the

differences embodied in the Complaint and intend that the terms and conditions of the compromise

and settlement be set forth in this Consent Decree ("Consent Decree").

NOW. THEREFORE. in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements set forth

herein. the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged. the parties agree as follows, the Court

finds appropriate and therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

I. This Consent Decree resolves all issues raised in EEOC Charge No. 311 A20 1114.

This Decree further resolves all issues in the Complaint filed by the EEOC in this civil action and

the Complaint filed by Mr. Woodend. The EEOC and Mr. Woodend waive further claims and/or

litigation on all issues raised in the above-referenced Charge and Complaint. The EEOC does not

waive processing or litigating charges other than the above-referenced Charge.

2. The parties agree that this Consent Decree does not constitute an admission by BOK

or any violation of Title VII or any state law claim alleged by Plaintiff Intervenor. This Consent

Decree docs not constitute an adjudication and/or finding on the merits of the case, and shall not be

used as evidence of liability, res judicata, parent liability or collateral estoppel in any other legal

proceeding against Defendant or any of its parent companies, subsidiaries and/or affiliates. The

Defendant expressly denies any violation of local, state or federal law, common or statutory,

including but not limited to, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended or Title I of the

Civil Rights Act of 1991.

3.

Defendant agrees that it shall conduct all etnploynlent practices in a manner which

does not subject any employee to discrimination as prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964. DeICndant further agrees that there shall be no retaliation against any employee because

2

that person has opposed any practice made unlawful under Title VII, or has filed a charge of discrimination, or has given testimony, assistance, or has participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII.
4. Defendant agrees to post the Notice appended hereto as Attachment "A" on the employee bulletin board at all Defendant's work sites within ten (10) days after the entry of the Consent Decree. Defendant will report to the EEOC that it has complied with this requirement within 14 days after posting the notice. The notice shall remain posted during the term of the Consent Decree.
5. The Defendant agrees to continue the implementation and notice of its human resources policy and practice relating to discrimination and its complaint procedure for its employees, now in effect, respecting any alleged complaints of discrimination.
6. The Defendant agrees to conduct training for all management and supervisory employees advising them ofthe requirements and prohibitions ofthe federal anti discrimination laws with a special emphasis on retal iation, at least once per year during the terms ofthis Consent Decree. The training will inform the employees of the complaint procedure for individuals who believe they have experienced discrimination. The training will also advise the employees of the consequences of violating the federal anti discrimination laws. The training shall be at least one (I) hour in duration. Defendant agrees to send a letter to the EEOC confirming that the training occurred; the date and location of the training; the name of the person providing the training and the substance of the training.
7. Defendant agrees to remove from all personnel files of Herbert Phillip Woodend all documents, entries and references relating to: the facts and circumstances which led to the filing of
3

his charge of discrimination; the charge itself; and the complaint filed by the EEOC in federal court

based upon his charge.

8. Defendant agrees to pay monetary relief to Mr. Woodend, for all claims, in the sum

of two hundred sixty two thousand five hundred and noll 00 dollars ($262,500.00).

0.

The payment referenced in paragraph 8, above, shall be made 10 days after the date

of entry of the Consent Decree, by cashier's check made payable to Mr. Woodend and his counsel.

The check shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested or by hand delivery to Mr.

Woodend's attorney.

J O. AII reports to the EEOC required by the Consent Decree shall be sent to Michelle M.

Robertson, Sr. Trial Attorney, EEOC, 210 Park Avenue, Suite 1350, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

73102.

II. Defendant agrees to provide a neutral employment letter of reference for Mr.

Woodend which includes the dates of his employment, the last position held, the last salary earned

by Mr. Woodend including bonuses and benefits.

12. If Defendant, 801(, fails to tender payment or otherwise fails to timely comply with

the terms of paragraphs 8-0 above, Defendant BOI(, shall:

a. Pay interest at the rate calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.c. Section 6621 (b) on

any untimely or unpaid amounts; and

b. Bear any additional costs incurred by the EEOC caused by the non-

compl iance or delay of the Defendant.

13. Neither the EEOC, Mr. Woodend, nor Defendant BOI(, shall contest the validity of

this Consent Decree nor the jurisdiction ofthe federal district court to enforce this Consent Decree

4

and its terms or the right of either party to the Consent Decree to bring an enforcement action upon breach of any term of this Consent Decree by either such party. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed to preclude the EEOC from enforcing this Decree in the event that Defendant BOK, fails to perform the promises and representations contained herein. The EEOC shall be authorized to seek compliance with the Consent Decree through civil action in the United States District Court.
14. The parties to this Consent Decree agree to bear their own costs and attorney's fees associated with the above-referenced Complaint.
IS. The term 0 fth is Decree shall be for three (3) years from the effective date. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Decree until the expiration of the term of the Consent Decree.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND DECREED this 8th day of March, 2005. Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion (Dkt. # 130) is hereby granted.

APPROVED fOR ENTRY:
FOR PLAINTIFF U.S. E.E.O.C.:
ROBERT CANINO Regional Attorney Oklahoma Bar No.
SUZANNE ANDERSON Supervisory Trial Attorney Texas Bar No. 14009470

('i.AIR!~ V. I':AG/\N lINlT!:]) ST/\TI~S DISTRICT JUDGE
5

/s/ Michelle. M. Robertson MICHELLE M. ROBERTSON, OBA #14084 Sr. Trial Attorney EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Area Office l'or the State of Oklahoma 210 Park Avenue, Suite 1350 Oklahoma City. Oklahoma 73102 Tel No. 405-231-4363 Fax "10. 405-231-4340
FOR PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR:
/s/ Jonathan E. Shook Jonathan E. Shook, OBA No. 17343 Randall D. Huggins, OBA#I7875 SHOOK, HUGGINS & JOHNSON, P.e. 2727 E. 21 SI Street, Ste. 310 Tulsa, OK 74114 Tel. No. 918-744-0833 Fax No. 918-293-1133
FOR DEFENDANT BOK:
/s/ .J. Patrick Cremin J. PATRICK CREMIN, OBA# HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE, GOLDEN & NELSON 320 South Boston Avenue. Suite 400 Tulsa, OK 74103 Tel. No. 918-594-0594 Fax No. 918-594-0505
6

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Dallas District Office

207 S I!mlston Street, 3''] Floor Dallas, TX 75202-4726 (214) 655-3355 TTY (214) 655-3363
FAX (214) 655-3443

ATTACHMENT A

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES

This NOTICE is being posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered in Federal Court between BANK OF O](LAIIOMA and the U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC). This NOTICE will be conspicuously posted for a period of three (3) years at this facility and in all places where employment notices are posted. It must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

POLICY: Discrimination of any kind can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, keep employees from advancing in their careers and lowers overall employee morale and productivity. It is the policy of Bank of Oklahoma that retaliation of any kind as prohibited by Cederal anti discrimination law is unacceptable conduct and will not be condoned.

PURPOSE: It is the purpose of this policy to reaffirm and amplify the position of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. as amended, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guidelines on retaliation and to reiterate Bank of Oklahoma's pol icy on discrimination.

SCOPE: This policy extends to all employees of Bank of Oklahoma both management, non-management, and temporary/probationary.

DEFINITION: Title VII prohibits retaliation because allowing such conduct would have a chilling effect upon the willingness of individuals to speak out against employment discrimination, to participate in an internal investigation or to participate in the EEOC process. Retaliation has been defined as taking adverse action against a person who has:

•

Opposed any practice made unlawful under Title VII

•

lIas filed a charge of discrimination

•

Has given testimony, assistance, or has participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding

or hearing under Title VII.

Examples of adverse action include but are not limited to the following: Firing a person, denial of a promotion, refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, suspension, discharge, reprimands, negative evaluations, harassment, negative job references and limiting access to other privileges allowed all employees.

RESPONSIBILITY: Each manager and supervisor has a responsibility to maintain a workplace free of retaliation. Each level of management is responsible for ensuring that all personnel policies, procedure. and activities arc in full compliance with applicable federal, state, and local equal employment laws, statutes, rules, and regulations regarding discrimination and retaliaion. Employees are expected to read, understand, and follow Bank of Oklahoma's policies against discrimination.

REPORTING PROCEDURES: Any employee who believes that he or she has been subjected to retaliation is expected to report the alleged act as soon as possible to either that person's immediate supervisor, any supervisor or manager vvith Bank of Oklahoma or to the Human Resources Department. The Human Resources Department

may be contacted at (main office address)

or by telephone at

Supervisors and mangers who are informed of an

alleged incident of discrimination must immediately notify the I-Iuman Resources Department.

A person either alternatively, or in addition to reporting such an allegation to company officials, may contact the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for the purposes of filing a charge of employment discrimination. The address and telephone number ofthe U.S. EEOC office is 21 0 Park Avenue, Suite 1350, Oklahoma City, OK 73102; (405) 231-4911. Information about your rights and how to file a charge is available on the Internet at www.eeoc.gov.

INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS: A complete investigation of each complaint will be undertaken immediately by the Human Resources Department. The investigation may include interview of all employees and supervisors at the facility, the inspection of documents, including personnel records, and full inspection of the premises.

PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATION: Employees engaged in retaliation as prohibited byTitle VII can expect serious disciplinary action. After appropriate investigation, any employee, whether management or non-management, who has been found to have diseriminated against another employee will be subject to appropriate sanctions, depending on the circumstances, from a written warning in his or her personnel file up to and including termination of employment.

RETALIATI ON: There shall be no retaliation against any employee because that person has opposed what they believe to be unlawful employment practices; or has filed a charge of discrimination, or has given testimony, assistance, or has participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bank of Oklahoma will not punish you for reporting discrimination simply because you have made a complaint under the above guidelines.

PROTECTION OF PRIVACY: The question of whether a particular action or incident constitutes gender discrimination requires a determination based on all available facts. Bank of Oklahoma will therefore make a concerted eHort to protect the privacy of all personnel. Confidential information will bc shared on a need-to-know basis to complete the investigation and to deal appropriately with the situation.

EXCEPTIONS: There are no exceptions to this policy.

TIllS IS AN OrFIC1AL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE REMOVED OR DEFACED BY ANYONE. THIS NOTICE WILL BE POSTED FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS.

Signed this ______ day 01' ___________

Date

Bank of Oklahoma

Date

Donald Stevens, Area Director

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

 
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CLOSED, DISCREF, LC-1, PROTO, SETCON
U.S. District Court U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. (Tulsa)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:03-cv-00657-CVE-PJC

EEOC v. Bank of Oklahoma Assigned to: Judge Claire V Eagan Referred to: Magistrate Judge Paul J Cleary Demand: $0 Cause: 28:451 Employment Discrimination Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
V. Defendant Bank of Oklahoma a National Banking Association and subsidiary of BOK Financial Corporation, an Oklahoma Corporation BOK Financial Corporation

Date Filed: 09/24/2003 Date Terminated: 04/26/2005 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by Michelle M Robertson Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (OKC) 215 DEAN A MCGEE STE 524 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 405-231-4363 Fax: 405-231-5816 Email: michelle.robertson@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanne M Anderson US Equal Employment Dallas District Office 207 S HOUSTON ST DALLAS, TX 75202 214-655-3326 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by J Patrick Cremin Hall Estill Hardwick Gable Golden & Nelson (Tulsa) 320 S BOSTON STE 400 TULSA, OK 74103-3708 918-594-0594 Fax: 918-594-0505 Email: pcremin@hallestill.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Molly A Bircher

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Intervenor Plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend

Hall Estill Hardwick Gable Golden & Nelson (Tulsa) 320 S BOSTON STE 400 TULSA, OK 74103-3708 918-594-0400 Fax: 918-594-0505 Email: MBircher@hallestill.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jonathan Everett Shook Shook Huggins & Johnson PC 2727 E 21ST ST STE 500 TULSA, OK 74114 918-293-1122 Fax: 918-293-1133 Email: jshook@shjlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall Derek Huggins Shook Huggins & Johnson PC 2727 E 21ST ST STE 500 TULSA, OK 74114 918-293-1122 Fax: 918-293-1133 Email: rhuggins@shjlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/24/2003 09/24/2003 09/24/2003 10/22/2003 10/24/2003 10/24/2003

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (Summons(es) issued) (Consent form sent) (fee status: wv ); jury demand (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
2 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff EEOC by Michelle M. Robertson (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
SUMMONS issued as to defendant Bank of Oklahoma (tjc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/24/2003)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE executed upon defendant Bank of Oklahoma on 10/6/03 (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/23/2003)
4 MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to extend time to answer cmplt until 11/11/03 (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
5 ORDER by Court Clerk granting motion to extend time to answer cmplt until 11/11/03 [4-1] (cc: mvt counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/27/2003)

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10/24/2003 11/10/2003 11/12/2003 11/13/2003
12/08/2003
12/10/2003 12/10/2003 12/10/2003 12/15/2003 12/16/2003 12/16/2003 12/16/2003 12/18/2003
02/06/2004 02/06/2004
02/11/2004
02/18/2004

6 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Bank of Oklahoma by J Patrick Cremin (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/27/2003)
7 ANSWER by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to complaint [1-1] (pll, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/12/2003)
8 MOTION by Herbert Phillip Woodend to intervene (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/13/2003)
9 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan directing parties to submit a Joint Status Report on or before 12/15/03 (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/14/2003)
10 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to intervene [8-1]; intervenor's cmplnt shall be filed w/i 10 days of date of this ord (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/09/2003)
11 INTERVENOR'S COMPLAINT by intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend; jury demand (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/11/2003)
12 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend by Randall D Huggins (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/11/2003)
13 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend by Jonathan E Shook (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/11/2003)
14 MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to extend time to subm jt stat rpt until 12/16/03 (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/16/2003)
15 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to extend time to subm jt stat rpt until 12/16/03 [14-1] (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2003)
16 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT as to defendant Bank of Oklahoma (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2003)
17 JOINT STATUS REPORT Received (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2003)
18 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan ; motion filing ddl set for 7/23/04 ; discovery due 6/24/04 ; proposed pretrial order due 9/28/04 ; PRETRIAL CONF set for 9:30 10/5/04 ; JURY TRIAL set for 9:30 10/18/04 (see sched ord for further ddlns) (cc: all cnsl) (pll, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/22/2003)
19 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to extend time to 2/20/04 to resp to EEOC's disc reqs (o/j) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/06/2004)
20 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : referring to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary the motion to extend time to 2/20/04 to resp to EEOC's disc reqs [19-1] (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/06/2004)
21 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary granting motion to extend time to 2/20/04 to resp to EEOC's disc reqs [19-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/12/2004)
22 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend for protective order (o/mj) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/19/2004)

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02/18/2004 02/19/2004 04/02/2004 04/20/2004 05/14/2004 05/21/2004 05/21/2004 05/24/2004 05/28/2004 06/14/2004 06/25/2004 07/09/2004
07/16/2004 07/16/2004
07/20/2004

23 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : referring to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary the motion for protective order [22-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/19/2004)
24 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary ; granting motion for protective order [22-1] (cc: all cnsl) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/19/2004)
25 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy SETTLMT CONF set for 1:30 5/24/04 before Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
26 MINUTE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy : SETTLMT CONF reset for 1:30 5/25/04 before Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 04/21/2004)
27 EXPERT REPORT by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 05/17/2004)
28 MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to extend time to resp to disc rqsts (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
29 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : referring to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary the motion to extend time to resp to disc rqsts [28-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
30 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to extend time to resp to disc rqsts until 6/9/04 [28-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 05/25/2004)
31 EXPERT WITNESS list by defendant Bank of Oklahoma (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
32 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE REPORT by Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy ; settlement conference held 5/25/04 ; advising litigation was not settled; (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
33 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to amend scheduling order (ext remaining ddlns) (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 06/28/2004)
34 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to amend scheduling order (ext remaining ddlns) [33-1] ; motion filing ddl set for 9/6/04 ; discovery due 8/9/04 ; proposed pretrial order due 11/12/04 ; PRETRIAL CONF reset for 10:30 2/7/05 ; JURY TRIAL reset for 9:30 2/21/05 (see ord for further ddlns) (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 07/12/2004)
35 MOTION w/brf by plaintiff EEOC for protective order , and to expedite ruling (o/mj) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 07/19/2004)
36 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : referring to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary the motion for protective order [35-1], referring to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary the motion to expedite ruling [35-2] (sac, Dpty Clk) Modified on 07/19/2004 (Entered: 07/19/2004)
37 MINUTE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary : setting motion for protective order [35-1] HRG set for 2:30 7/29/04 before Magistrate Judge Paul J.

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07/28/2004 07/29/2004 08/09/2004 08/09/2004 08/11/2004 08/11/2004 09/03/2004 09/07/2004
09/07/2004 09/08/2004 09/10/2004 09/15/2004 09/20/2004 10/01/2004 10/05/2004

Cleary, granting motion to expedite ruling (o/mj) [35-2] (cc: all counsel) (hbo, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
38 RESPONSE by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to motion for protective order [35-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
39 MINUTES: Mot Hrg by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary setting motion for protective order [35-1] ; hearing held on 7/29/04, Pltf will provide privl log, matter under advisement. (C2) (hbo, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 07/30/2004)
40 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to extend time to 8/13/04 to resp to pltf's (o/mj-PJC) disc req and pltf-intv's disc req (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
41 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan : referring to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary the motion to extend time to 8/13/04 to resp to pltf's disc req and pltf-intv's disc req [40-1] (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 08/10/2004)
42 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary granting motion for protective order [35-1] (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
43 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Cleary granting motion to extend time to 8/13/04 to resp to pltf's disc req and pltf-intv's disc req [40-1] (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 08/12/2004)
44 MOTION w/brf by plaintiff EEOC for partial summary judgment (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/07/2004)
45 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to amend scheduling order , and for leave to take depo outside discovery cutoff (o/mj-PJC) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
46 MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma for leave to file answer out of time (o/j) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/08/2004)
47 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion for leave to file answer out of time [46-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/09/2004)
48 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to amend scheduling order [45-1] ; motion filing ddl set for 10/6/04 ; proposed pretrial order due 12/13/04 (see ord for further ddlns) (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/13/2004)
49 ANSWER by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to intv complaint [11-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/16/2004)
50 RESPONSE by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to motion for partial summary judgment [44-1] and joined in by pltf-intervenor (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 09/21/2004)
51 RESPONSE by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to motion for partial summary judgment [44-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/04/2004)
52 MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to amend scheduling order (ext disp mot ddl) (o/j) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/05/2004)

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10/05/2004 10/13/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004 10/27/2004 10/28/2004 11/04/2004 11/09/2004 11/09/2004 11/09/2004 11/12/2004 11/12/2004 11/12/2004 11/12/2004 11/12/2004

53 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to amend scheduling order (ext disp mot ddl) [52-1] ; motion filing ddl reset for 10/13/04 (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/06/2004)
54 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to exceed page limitation of mtn/sumjgm (o&mtn/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
55 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to exceed page limitation of mtn/sumjgm (1 mtn rtrnd 2 mvt) [54-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
56 MOTION w/brf by defendant Bank of Oklahoma for summary judgment (oversized doc) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
57 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to change time to 11/11/04 to resp to m/sum jgm (o/j) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
58 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to change time to 11/11/04 to resp to m/sum jgm [57-1] [56-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
59 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma to extend depo/video/interr dsgn ddln for 30 days (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/05/2004)
60 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to extend depo/video/interr dsgn ddln to 12/6/04 and counter designations to 12/16/04 [59-1] (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/10/2004)
61 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to exceed page limitation of resp to mtn/sumjgm (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/10/2004)
62 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to exceed page limitation of resp to mtn/sumjgm [61-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/10/2004)
63 FIRST MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend in limine (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/12/2004)
64 SECOND MOTION w/brf by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend in limine (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/12/2004)
65 THIRD MOTION w/brf by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend in limine (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/12/2004)
66 JOINT RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to motion for summary judgment (oversized doc) [56-1] (seal, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/12/2004)
67 EXHIBITS by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend in support of motion response [66-1] (oversized doc) (seal, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/12/2004)

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11/19/2004 11/19/2004 11/23/2004
11/23/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 11/29/2004 12/01/2004
12/02/2004
12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/06/2004 12/07/2004 12/13/2004
12/15/2004
12/16/2004

68 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to change time to rply re mtn/sumjgm until 12/6/04 (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/22/2004)
69 MOTION by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to exceed page limitation (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/22/2004)
70 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to change time to rply re mtn/sumjgm until 12/6/04 [68-1] [56-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/24/2004)
71 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to exceed page limitation [69-1] (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/24/2004)
72 RESPONSE by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to motion in limine [65-1] (oversized doc) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
73 RESPONSE by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to second motion in limine [64-1] (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
74 RESPONSE by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to first motion in limine [63-1] (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
75 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to extend time (o/j) to file PT discls, transcripts annotated, and exchg premarked exhs (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
76 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to extend time to file PT discls to 12/13/04, transcripts annotated to 12/27/04, and exchg premarked exhs to 2/11/05 [75-1] (cc: all counsel) (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/03/2004)
77 REPLY by defendant Bank of Oklahoma to response to motion for summary judgment [56-1] (oversized doc) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
78 DEPOSITION DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma re Donna M Owens (crp, Dpty Clk) Modified on 12/07/2004 (Entered: 12/07/2004)
79 DEPOSITION DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma re Judy E Luttrell (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
80 DEPOSITION DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma re Heather M Pellerin (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/07/2004)
81 DEPOSITION DESIGNATIONS by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
82 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to amend scheduling order (o/j) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/14/2004)
83 ORDER by Judge Claire V. Eagan granting motion to amend scheduling order [82-1] ; proposed pretrial order due 1/21/05 (see ord for further ddlns) (cc: all counsel) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/16/2004)
84 COUNTER DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma re Jason P Anderson (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2004)

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12/16/2004 12/16/2004 12/16/2004 12/16/2004 12/27/2004 01/03/2005 01/03/2005 01/03/2005 01/04/2005 01/05/2005 01/05/2005 01/05/2005 01/05/2005 01/05/2005 01/05/2005 01/14/2005

85 COUNTER DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma , re: [79-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2004)
86 COUNTER DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma , re: Dana Elaine Craig (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2004)
87 COUNTER DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma , re: John G Barela (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2004)
88 COUNTER DESIGNATIONS by defendant Bank of Oklahoma , re: [78-1] (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/17/2004)
89 JOINT MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, defendant Bank of Oklahoma, intervenor plaintiff Herbert Phillip Woodend to extend time to 1/3/05 to file transcripts (o/j) annotated w/objs and optional brfs (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 12/27/2004)
90 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, granting 89 Motion to Extend Deadline(s) (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/03/2005)
91 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations (Re: 80 Deposition Designations) by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Herbert Phillip Woodend (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/04/2005)
92 MOTION to Extend Deadline(s) by Bank of Oklahoma (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/04/2005)
93 ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, granting 92 Motion to Extend Deadline(s) (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/04/2005)
94 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations (Re: 86 Counter Deposition Designations, 81 Deposition Designations) by Bank of Oklahoma (crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
95 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations (Re: 88 Counter Deposition Designations, 78 Deposition Designations) by Bank of Oklahoma (s-sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
96 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations (Re: 87 Counter Deposition Designations, 81 Deposition Designations) by Bank of Oklahoma (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
97 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Jason P Anderson (Re: 84 Counter Deposition Designations, 81 Deposition Designations) by Bank of Oklahoma (With attachments) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
98 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Judy E Luttrell (Re: 79 Deposition Designations, 85 Counter Deposition Designations) by Bank of Oklahoma (With attachments) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
99 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations and counter designations re Heather M Pellerin (Re: 80 Deposition Designations) by Bank of Oklahoma (With attachments) (sac, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
100 ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, granting in part and denying in part 44 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/14/2005)

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01/18/2005
01/18/2005 01/21/2005 01/21/2005 01/25/2005 01/25/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005 01/28/2005

101 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, referring motion(s) to Magistrate Judge Cleary (Re: 91 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 96 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 97 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Jason P Anderson, 98 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Judy E Luttrell, 94 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 99 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations and counter designations re Heather M Pellerin, 95 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations) (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
102 ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, denying 56 Motion for Summary Judgment (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
103 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Dates re: depositions out of time by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Bank of Oklahoma, Herbert Phillip Woodend (kjp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
104 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Dates by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Bank of Oklahoma, Herbert Phillip Woodend (kjp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/24/2005)
105 ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, granting 104 Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Dates, setting/resetting scheduling order date(s): (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
106 ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan, granting 103 Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Dates (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 01/25/2005)
107 PROPOSED VOIR DIRE by Bank of Oklahoma (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
108 Final EXHIBIT LIST by Bank of Oklahoma (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
109 Final WITNESS LIST by Bank of Oklahoma (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
110 PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES by Bank of Oklahoma (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
111 PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Herbert Phillip Woodend (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
112 PROPOSED VOIR DIRE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Herbert Phillip Woodend (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
113 Final EXHIBIT LIST by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Herbert Phillip Woodend (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
114 Final WITNESS LIST by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Herbert Phillip Woodend (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
115 PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Herbert Phillip Woodend (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)
116 PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by Bank of Oklahoma (lml, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 01/31/2005)

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02/01/2005 02/02/2005
02/04/2005 02/04/2005 02/04/2005 02/04/2005 02/07/2005
02/07/2005 02/07/2005 02/08/2005
02/09/2005

117 MOTION to Strike Witnesses by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (With attachments) (Robertson, Michelle) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
118 MINUTES of Proceedings - held before Magistrate Judge Paul J Cleary : Status Hearing held on 2/2/2005 scheduling hrg discussed (Re: 91 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 94 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 95 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 96 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 97 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Jason P Anderson, 98 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Judy E Luttrell, 99 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations and counter designations re Heather M Pellerin) (Court Reporter: 05-PJC-3) (s-hbo, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
119 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE by Suzanne M Anderson on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Robertson, Michelle) Modified on 2/7/2005 to reflect correct attorney (s-sac, Dpty Clk). (Entered: 02/04/2005)
120 MOTION to File Motion In Limine Out of Time by Bank of Oklahoma (Cremin, J) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
121 MOTION to Strike Plaintiffs' Witness by Bank of Oklahoma (Cremin, J) (Entered: 02/04/2005)
122 RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion (Re: 117 MOTION to Strike Witnesses) by Bank of Oklahoma ; (With attachments) (Cremin, J) Modified on 2/7/2005 to remove the word "Exhibit" from the attachment description (s-sac, Dpty Clk). (Entered: 02/04/2005)
123 MINUTES of Proceedings - held before Judge Claire V Eagan : Pretrial Conference held on 2/7/2005, granting in part and denying in part 64 Motion in Limine, granting in part and denying in part 65 Motion in Limine, granting in part and denying in part 117 Motion to Strike, granting 120 Motion to File Document Out of Time, granting 121 Motion to Strike, striking/terminating deadline(s)/Hearing(s) (Court Reporter: Joanna Smith) (sjm, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/07/2005)
124 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Sam A Joyner, setting/resetting deadline(s)/hearing(s): (lmc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/07/2005)
125 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiffs' Purported Expert by Bank of Oklahoma (With attachments) (Cremin, J) (Entered: 02/07/2005)
126 MINUTE ORDER by Magistrate Judge Paul J Cleary, setting/resetting deadline(s)/hearing(s): Hrg on depo obj set 2-18-05 at 11:00 a.m., (Re: 91 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 94 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 95 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 96 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 97 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Jason P Anderson, 98 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Judy E Luttrell, 99 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations and counter designations re Heather M Pellerin) (hbo, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/08/2005)
PROPOSED PRETRIAL ORDER by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Bank of Oklahoma, Herbert Phillip Woodend (kjp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/09/2005)

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02/10/2005 02/15/2005
02/18/2005 03/04/2005 03/08/2005 04/26/2005 04/26/2005

127 PRETRIAL ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 02/10/2005)
128 MINUTES of Proceedings - held before Magistrate Judge Paul J Cleary : Miscellaneous Hearing held on 2/15/2005 (Re: 91 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 94 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 95 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 96 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations, 97 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Jason P Anderson, 98 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations re Judy E Luttrell, 99 OBJECTION to Deposition Designations and counter designations re Heather M Pellerin) (Court Reporter: 05-PJC-4) (hbo, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
129 SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE REPORT by Magistrate Judge Sam A Joyner, striking/terminating deadline(s)/Hearing(s) (lmc, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
130 Unopposed MOTION for entry of consent decree by Herbert Phillip Woodend (Shook, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/04/2005)
131 ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan -- Consent Decree, granting 130 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
132 MINUTE ORDER by Judge Claire V Eagan Pursuant to 3/8/05 Consent Decree 131, dismissing/terminating case (Re: 131 Order, Ruling on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, ) (RGG, Chambers) (Entered: 04/26/2005)
***Civil Case Terminated (see document number [132]) (s-crp, Dpty Clk) (Entered: 04/27/2005)

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hs0328 Client Code: eeoc

Docket Report

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4:03-cv-00657-CVE-PJC

7

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0.56

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 EEOC LITIGATION SETTLEMENT REPORT - March 2005

http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/settlements/settlement03-05.html

EEOC v. Bank of Oklahoma No. 03-CV-0657-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. March 8, 2005)
In this Title VII suit, the Dallas District Office alleged that the Bank of Oklahoma, a national banking association, discharged a Sales Manager/Senior Vice President in retaliation for statements supporting a female Regional Manager/Senior Vice President's sexual hostile work environment claim. After defendant terminated the female Regional Manager on April 3, 2002, charging party told his supervisor, an Executive Vice President, that he expected her to file a lawsuit and that if he testified, the bank would not like what he had to say. In late April 2002, Defendant's Director of Human Resources asked charging party about the Regional Manager, and charging party said a lawsuit was possible. The HR Director then asked charging party if believed the Regional Manager had been harassed and charging party said yes. Charging party had received a positive performance evaluation, salary increase, and promise of a promotion in mid- March 2002, but was told on May 7, 2002, that his position was being eliminated immediately and that he was terminated. Under the 3-year consent decree resolving this case, charging party will receive $262,500 in monetary relief.

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