Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 1 Filed 10/26/15 Page 1 of 13 PageID 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISON

ARTURO MERCADO, PABLO CARRANZA, SERGIO DIAZ, JOSE ARTURO GALVAN RESENDIZ, JOSE GUTIERREZ, HEYDY JARQUIN JIMENEZ, JOSE LOPEZ-ARANDA, MOISES MARTINEZ, JAVIER NAVARRETE, EFREN PEREZ VILLEGAS, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, ELEAZAR SAAVEDRA, ANDRES TORRES CABRERA, MOISES VEGA COSTILLA, MARIO GARIBALDI, and RODOLFO MARMOLEJO,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-3841
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs,

v.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, and LUPE VALDEZ,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution. “This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951). “The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). Defendants held Plaintiffs in Dallas County jail for months pending trial, even for purported misdemeanors, without allowing immediate release on bond. Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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PARTIES 1. Plaintiffs were held by Dallas County in detention. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) requested that Dallas County detain each Plaintiff for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released to facilitate ICE’s arrest of that Plaintiff. As a result, an “immigration hold” appears in each Plaintiff’s file. No Plaintiff is currently in Dallas County custody. 2. Dallas County is located in North Texas. Process for Dallas County may be effected on Clay Jenkins, County Judge, who is located at 411 Elm St., Dallas, Texas, 75202. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.024(a). 3. Lupe Valdez is the Sheriff of Dallas County and is the highest ranking lawenforcement officer in Dallas County. She is responsible for the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, Dallas County jails, and Dallas County inmates. Sheriff Valdez lives and works in Texas and in this District. Plaintiffs sue Sheriff Valdez in her personal and official capacity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This is a civil-rights case arising under the United States Code, title 42. The Court thus has subject-matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5. Defendants work and reside in Texas and in this District. Defendants regularly conduct business in Texas and this district. Defendants’ acts in Texas form the basis of this lawsuit. The Court thus has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 6. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because many of the complained-of acts in this case occurred in Dallas County, Texas, and because Defendants reside and work in this District.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 1 Filed 10/26/15 Page 3 of 13 PageID 3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7. Plaintiffs were arrested and placed in Dallas County custody within the last two years. On information and belief, ICE requested that Dallas County detain each Plaintiff for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released to facilitate ICE’s arrest of that Plaintiff. As a result, each Plaintiff’s file includes an “immigration hold.” As an example, the following appears in the file for Plaintiff Moises Martinez:
“Illegal Alien” is often used by Dallas County as shorthand for an immigration hold. At times, the hold indicates that no bond is allowed, as shown by the file for Plaintiff Efren Perez Villegas:
Similarly, the file for Plaintiff Jose Lopez-Aranda states “H/F IMMIGRATION/NO BOND.” 8. ICE often provides a form to Dallas County entitled “Immigration Detainer.”
The Immigration Detainer for Plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera is attached as Exhibit A. The Torres Cabrera Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Torres
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Cabrera] is subject to removal from the United States.” Under federal law, being “subject to removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Torres Cabrera has a prior felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr. Torres Cabrera has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County maintain custody over Mr. Torres Cabrera:
IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take custody of the subject. Ex. A. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County provide a copy of the Detainer to the subject, id., but Mr. Torres Cabrera did not receive a copy of the Detainer. 9. Dallas County generally honors ICE’s requests to detain. Dallas County detains individuals after they would otherwise be released to allow ICE an opportunity to take custody of those individuals. ICE picks up detained individuals from Dallas County on a regular schedule, approximately two times a week. As a result, at times, Dallas County detains individuals for ICE for more than 48 hours. ICE does not always take custody of the individuals with immigration holds. For example, Dallas County detained Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez after he otherwise would have been released for transfer to ICE. ICE did not take custody, and Dallas County eventually released Mr. Rodriguez. 10. Dallas County imposes pretrial detention on individuals subject to immigration holds (like Plaintiffs) in at least two ways. First, as shown in Mr. Perez Villegas’ file (which states “IMMIGRATION DETAINER NO BOND ALLOWED”) and Mr. Lopez-Aranda’s file (“H/F
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IMMIGRATION/NO BOND”), Defendants do not allow bond for those with immigration holds, resulting in pretrial detention. Second, even if individuals subject to immigration holds are cleared for release (such as after a plea hearing), Dallas County detains those individuals pending transfer to ICE. Thus, even if Defendants accept bond, the bond does not result in release. On payment, Dallas County instead maintains pretrial detention, pending transfer to ICE. Under either method, Dallas County refuses immediate release on bond for individuals with immigration holds.
11. The first method—refusing to allow bond—directly imposes pretrial detention. If Dallas County will not allow bond, bail is illusory. Dallas County imposes pretrial detention by not allowing bonds for individuals with immigration holds.
12. The second method—detaining individuals for transfer to ICE based on an ICE request to detain—indirectly imposes pretrial detention. If an individual with an immigration hold attempts to post bond in Dallas County, and Dallas County allows the bond, Dallas County will not immediately release the individual. Instead, Dallas County will maintain custody for transfer to ICE. Dallas County’s practices are widely known. As a result, attempting to post bond is known as a futile exercise for those with immigration holds, because it will not result in immediate release. The scheme has predictable effects. Because Dallas County will not immediately release those on bond, individuals with immigration holds generally do not attempt to post bond, and Dallas County maintains pretrial detention over almost all individuals with immigration holds.
13. The second method is independently wrongful. Under state law, Dallas County must “at once set the accused at liberty” upon payment of bond. Tex. Crim. Code § 17.29(a).
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Defendants cannot rely solely on a request to detain from ICE to justify any further arrest or detention, for at least the following reasons:
 Pursuant to Texas statute, all arrests generally require a warrant. An ICE request to detain is not a warrant, and the ICE request to detain does not satisfy any statutory exception that would allow Dallas County to arrest Plaintiffs without a warrant.
 Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other authority to detain that satisfies Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution.
 Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other authority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
14. Dallas County’s wrongful two-part scheme predictably results in pretrial detention over most individuals with immigration holds. Dallas County reported to the Texas Commission on Jail Standards that, in June 2015, Dallas County held 557 prisoners that were subject to an ICE request to detain. Due to its two-part practice of refusing immediate release on bond to those with immigration holds, Dallas County unconstitutionally imposed pretrial detention on most of those individuals.
15. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for Dallas County’s policy and practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by (i) refusing to allow bond for those with immigration holds, and (ii) detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals make bail or are otherwise cleared for release. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i) whether to allow bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that make bail or are otherwise cleared for release.
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16. Dallas County imposed pretrial detention on most Plaintiffs, as detailed below:
i. Bail was nominally set for Arturo Mercado in February 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Mercado. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Mercado remained in Dallas County custody until around April 2015.
ii. Bail was nominally set for Pablo Carranza in May 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Carranza. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Carranza remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.
iii. Bail was nominally set for Sergio Diaz in January 2015 for $50,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Diaz, even though Mr. Diaz is a permanent resident of the United States. As a result, Dallas County initially would not allow Mr. Diaz immediate release on bond, resulting in pretrial detention. Dallas County imposed pretrial detention until ICE withdrew its request to detain, in around August 2015.
iv. Bail was nominally set for Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz in November 2014 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Galvan Resendiz. As a result, Dallas County initially would not allow Mr. Diaz immediate release on bond, resulting in pretrial detention. Dallas County held Mr. Diaz until December 2014.
v. Bail was nominally set for Jose Gutierrez in July 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gutierrez. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Gutierrez remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.
vi. Bail was nominally set for Heydy Jarquin Jimenez in November 2014 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez remained in Dallas County custody until around February 2015.
vii. Bail was nominally set for Jose Lopez-Aranda in May 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez-Aranda. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. LopezAranada remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.
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viii. Bail was nominally set for Moises Martinez in April 2015 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Martinez. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Martinez remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.
ix. Bail was nominally set for Javier Navarrete in December 2014 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Navarrete. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Martinez remained in Dallas County custody until later that month or January 2015.
x. Bail was nominally set for Efren Perez Villegas in June 2015 for $10,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Perez Villegas. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Perez Villegas remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.
xi. Bail was nominally set for Miguel Rodriguez in February 2015 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Rodriguez remained in Dallas County custody until around March 2015.
xii. Bail was nominally set for Eleazar Saavedra in April 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Saavedra. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Saavedra remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.
xiii. Bail was nominally set for Andres Torres Cabrera in May 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Torres Cabrera. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Torres Cabrera remained in Dallas County custody until around August 2015.
xiv. The 363d District Court in Dallas County granted Moises Vega Costilla’s Motion for New Trial in April 2015. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega Costilla. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Vega Costilla remained in Dallas County custody until around May 2015.
17. Dallas County detained each Plaintiff listed in the previous paragraph for vary-
ing periods of time after the Plaintiff should have been released, relying solely on an ICE re-
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quest to detain. For example, Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez’s case was disposed of on March 20,
2015, but Dallas County detained him until March 22, 2015, based solely on ICE’s request to
detain. In addition to the Plaintiffs in the previous paragraph, Dallas County detained the
following Plaintiffs after they should have been released, based solely on an ICE request to
detain:
i. On August 20, 2015, the State of Texas filed a “Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Revoke or its Motion to Proceed with Adjudication” in the case against Mario Garibaldi. As a result of that filing, Mr. Garibaldi should have been released immediately. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Garibaldi’s file. As a result, Dallas County detained Mr. Garibaldi, relying solely on the ICE request to detain, after he should have been released. Mr. Garibaldi remained in Dallas County custody until around August 21, 2015.
ii. Plaintiff Rodolfo Marmolejo was arrested for failure to pay a fine. The fine was paid on October 19, 2015, which should have resulted in Mr. Marmolejo’s release. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Marmolejo’s file. As a result, Dallas County detained Mr. Marmolejo, relying solely on the ICE request to detain, after he should have been released. Mr. Marmolejo remained in Dallas County custody until around October 19, 2015 (later in the same day) or October 20, 2015.
18. Defendants abridged, in two ways, Plaintiffs’ freedom from pretrial detention
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. First,
Dallas County’s practice of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration holds di-
rectly results in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are re-
sponsible for the County’s policy of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration
holds, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation. Second, even if Dallas Coun-
ty accepts the bond, because Dallas County has a policy and practice of wrongfully detaining
individuals with immigration holds for ICE on request (e.g., in violation of Texas statutes,
the Texas Constitution, and the United States Constitution), Dallas County denies immediate
release on bond, indirectly resulting in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County
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and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.
19. Dallas County’s practice of honoring ICE requests to detain, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, denies Plaintiffs their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After individuals are otherwise cleared for release, Dallas County does not have probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed and has no other authority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.
COUNT 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT MARIO GARIBALDI AND RODOLFO MARMOLEJO) 20. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs. 21. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect every person against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, unless the interference is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 22. Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental and clearly established right. 23. Defendants imposed pretrial detention on Plaintiffs, infringing the Plaintiffs’ strong interest in liberty. This intentional or reckless pretrial detention is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 24. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by (i) refusing to allow bond for
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those with immigration holds, and (ii) honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, in violation of Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and/or the United States Constitution. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for these policies and practices. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i) whether to refuse bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.
25. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
COUNT 2: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—FOURTH AMENDMENT (ALL PLAINTIFFS)
26. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs. 27. The Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause. 28. When an individual pays bail or is otherwise eligible for release, Dallas County must release that individual, absent a separate showing of probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 29. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established. 30. Dallas County has a policy and practice of detaining individuals who have otherwise been cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed or other authority that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Instead, Dallas County justifies its detentions with ICE-issued requests to detain that neither satisfy the Fourth Amendment nor show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed.
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31. Dallas County detained Plaintiffs after they were available for release, without probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Further, Dallas County detained certain Plaintiffs for more than 48 hours.
32. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s policy of honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for this policy. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decision on whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.
33. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
JURY DEMAND 34. Plaintiffs demand a jury on all issues so triable.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs request the following relief:
i. That the Court award Plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
ii. That the Court award pre-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, continuing until such judgment is paid, at the maximum rate allowed by law;
iii. That Defendants pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees and costs as permitted by law, including as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
iv. That the Court enjoin Defendants from detaining Plaintiffs solely based on an immigration hold, Immigration Detainer, or a request from ICE; and
v. That the Court award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Dated: October 26, 2015

Respectfully submitted,
THONY M. Gi Texas State Bar No. 24050644
agarza@ccrglaw.com
Charhon Callahan
Robson & Garza, PLLC 3333 Lee Parkway, Suite 460 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 521-6400 Telecopier: (214) 764-8392
Eric Puente
Texas State Bar No. 24069225
epuente@phflaw.com
Raymond M. Hindeah
(Application for admission to be filed)
Texas State Bar No. 24078666
rhindieh@phflaw.com
Puente & Hindieh PLLC
3300 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 401 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 730-0485 Telecopier: (214) 730-0520
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

ARTURO MERCADO, et al., Plaintiffs,
VS. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.

§ § § § Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-3481-D § (Consolidated with Civil Action No. § 3:15-CV-4008-D) § § §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

defendants Dallas County, Texas (“Dallas County”) and Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez

(“Sheriff Valdez”), alleging that defendants violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by refusing to grant them immediate release on bond and by detaining

them based on immigration holds after they were otherwise eligible for release. Defendants

move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that plaintiffs have failed to state

a claim on which relief can be granted and that Sheriff Valdez is entitled to qualified

immunity. Sheriff Valdez separately moves to require that plaintiffs file a Rule 7(a) reply.

For the following reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss, denies without

prejudice as moot Sheriff Valdez’s separate request to require a Rule 7(a) reply, and grants

plaintiffs leave to replead.

I
The facts in this case are largely undisputed.1 Plaintiffs are former detainees2 of the
Dallas County jail. They allege that, while they were being held in detention by defendant
Dallas County in connection with state criminal charges, they were the subjects of federal
immigration detainers (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Form I-247), issued
by U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a component of DHS. The
detainers requested that Dallas County detain them for up to 48 hours after the time they
otherwise would have been released, in order to facilitate their arrest by ICE.3 According to
plaintiffs’ complaints, Dallas County detained plaintiffs for varying periods of time after they
1In deciding this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court construes the complaints in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. See, e.g., Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004). “The court’s review [of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
2No plaintiff in this case is currently in Dallas County custody. Although the complaint refers to “inmates,” the proper term is more likely “detainees.”
3For example, the immigration detainer issued for plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera states that “there is reason to believe the individual is an alien subject to removal from the United States,” and it requests that Dallas County
[m]aintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the subject.
Mercado Compl. Ex. A (bold font and underlining omitted).
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should have been released, solely on the basis of immigration detainers issued by ICE.
Plaintiffs allege that, in doing so, Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez violated their
constitutional rights. Plaintiffs bring these consolidated actions4 against Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible
for Dallas County’s policy and practice of refusing immediate release on bond of individuals
as to whom ICE has issued immigration detainers (resulting in “immigration holds” being
placed in their files) by (1) refusing to allow bond for those with immigration holds and (2)
detaining individuals subject to immigration holds, even after they have made bail or are
otherwise cleared for release. Plaintiffs contend that Dallas County’s practice of refusing
immediate release on bond of individuals with immigration holds violates plaintiffs’ Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from pretrial detention.
They also allege that Dallas County’s policy and practice of detaining individuals who
otherwise have been cleared for release on the basis of an ICE-issued request to detain that
neither satisfies the Fourth Amendment nor shows probable cause to believe that a different
4In one lawsuit, plaintiffs Arturo Mercado, Pablo Carranza, Sergio Diaz, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Jose Gutierrez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez-Aranda, Moises Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Moises Vega Costilla, Mario Garibaldi, and Rodolfo Marmolejo sued Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez in her personal and official capacity. See Mercado v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., No. 3:15-CV-3841-D (N.D. Tex.). In the other suit, plaintiffs Ricardo Garza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Cheves, Miguel Flores, Felipe Gonzales Lujan, Luis Hernandez, and Jose Valenciano filed a nearly identical complaint against Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez (in her personal capacity only). See Garza v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., No. 3:15CV-4008-D (N.D. Tex.). On January 8, 2016 the court consolidated the cases.
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criminal offense has been or is being committed violates their Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)5 and to dismiss the claims against
Sheriff Valdez based on qualified immunity. Sheriff Valdez separately moves to require plaintiffs to file a Rule 7(a) reply. Plaintiffs oppose the motions.
II Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the pleadings by “accept[ing] ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s].’” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive defendants’ motions, plaintiffs’ complaints must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
5Defendants filed their motion to dismiss in the Mercado action before the court consolidated the cases. They then filed a nearly identical supplemental motion to dismiss the consolidated action.
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complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (brackets omitted) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” it demands more than “‘labels and conclusions.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And “‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U. S. at 555).
III The court begins by considering plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Dallas County. “Section 1983 provides a private right of action against parties acting ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State’ to redress the deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal law.” Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988)). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating already conferred federal rights.” Id. (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs “must show that: 1) the offending conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.” Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). Because plaintiffs are suing Dallas County, they also must satisfy additional requirements to recover under § 1983. A county “can be found liable under § 1983 only
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where the [county] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978)) (addressing municipal liability). A county cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, to recover against Dallas County under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
IV Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by detaining them after they were eligible for release, without probable cause that satisfied the Fourth Amendment,6 and by detaining certain plaintiffs for more than 48 hours. Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment-based § 1983 claim on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation as a result of their pretrial detention in the Dallas County jail.
6Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he moving force for [their Fourth Amendment] claim is Dallas County’s policy of honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release.” Mercado Compl. ¶ 32.
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A The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Pretrial detention constitutes a ‘seizure’ . . . within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Whittington v. Maxwell, 455 Fed. Appx. 450, 458 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998)). Under the Fourth Amendment, “a fair and reliable determination of probable cause” must be provided “as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (citation omitted); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“[W]e hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”). The Supreme Court has defined “probable cause” as “facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.’” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “Probable cause exists if, under the totality of circumstances, there is a fair probability that . . . an illegal act is taking place.” United States v. Thompson, 2012 WL 1161609, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing United States v. Newman, 472 F.3d 233, 236-37 (5th Cir. 2006)).
B The court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims of those plaintiffs who have failed to plausibly allege that they had “pa[id] bail or [were]
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otherwise eligible for release” but were detained solely on the basis of an ICE-issued request to detain. See Mercado Compl. ¶ 28; Garza Compl. ¶ 28.
Plaintiffs allege that bond was set in amounts ranging from $2,500 to $100,000 for the following Mercado plaintiffs: Arturo Mercado, Pablo Carranza, Sergio Diaz, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Jose Gutierrez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez-Aranda, Moises Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Eleazar Saavedra, and Andres Torres Cabrera. They assert that bond was set in amounts ranging from $500 to $102,500 for all of the Garza plaintiffs (Ricardo Garza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Miguel Flores, Filipe Gonzalez Lujan, Luis Hernandez, and Jose Valenciano). With respect to each of these individuals, plaintiffs allege that an immigration hold was placed on the individual and that “[t]he immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds.”7 Mercado Compl. ¶ 16; Garza Compl. ¶ 16.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to state a viable Fourth Amendment claim because, inter alia, there is no factual or legal basis to support plaintiffs’ claims that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated based on defendants’ purported practice of “refusing to allow bond.” They argue that as to the plaintiffs named above, there is no allegation that any one of them actually tendered bond in the requisite amount in order to become eligible for release on bond, and, absent specific allegations that the plaintiffs
7Plaintiffs use slightly different wording with respect to Sergio Diaz and Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, but the allegations are substantially the same.
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actually posted bonds, they did not have a right to be released regardless of the existence of an immigration detainer. The court agrees.
In Tovar v. United States, 2000 WL 425170 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2000) (Fitzwater, J.), this court held that although an immigration detainer had been issued concerning the plaintiff, because the plaintiff did not post the bail that a county magistrate set on the charges pending against her, “[a] reasonable trier of fact could only find that [she] remained in the county jail because she did not post the bail[.] . . . The detainer itself did not deprive [the plaintiff] of her freedom during the time she was held under the terms of the county bail order.” Id. at *6. Similarly, in the present case, without an allegation that the plaintiffs listed above actually posted the bail that was set on the charges pending against them (or, at the very least, attempted to post bail but were refused due to the ICE detainer), the only plausible inference that the court can reasonably draw is that they were held in the Dallas County jail because of their failure to post bail, not because of the immigration detainers lodged against them. Id.
In response to defendants’ motion, plaintiffs contend that “[i]n two cited files, Dallas County explicitly tied immigration holds to a directive forbidding bond,” and they argue that “[f]or the purposes of a motion to dismiss, based on this evidence, it is plausible that Dallas County would not allow bond for any Plaintiff with an immigration hold.” Ps. 2/12/16 Br. 19. But the allegation that two of the plaintiffs’ files contained a “no bond” notation is insufficient, without more, to enable the court to reasonably infer that, but for the immigration hold, these two plaintiffs and the other plaintiffs would have been “otherwise
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eligible for release.” Mercado Compl. ¶ 28; Garza Compl. ¶ 28. Stated differently, even
considering the “no bond” notation in these two plaintiffs’ files, there is still no allegation
that these plaintiffs or the plaintiffs listed above posted bonds and, as a result, had a right to
be immediately released, or attempted to post bonds but were denied release due to ICE
detainers.
Plaintiffs also argue that attempting to post bond is known as a futile exercise for
those with immigration holds because posting bond will not result in immediate release, and
that tendering bond is not an absolute requirement to filing suit. The court at this point
expresses no view on plaintiffs’ futility argument. Plaintiffs allege, in general terms, that
[i]f an individual with an immigration hold attempts to post bond in Dallas County, and Dallas County allows the bond, Dallas County will not immediately release the individual. Instead, Dallas County will maintain custody for transfer to ICE. Dallas County’s practices are widely known. As a result, attempting to post bond is known as a futile exercise for those with immigration holds, because it will not result in immediate release. The scheme has predictable effects. Because Dallas County will not immediately release those on bond, individuals with immigration holds generally do not attempt to post bond, and Dallas County maintains pretrial detention over almost all individuals with immigration holds.
Mercado Compl. ¶ 12 (bold font omitted); Garza Compl. ¶ 12 (bold font omitted). These
allegations are insufficient to plausibly plead, for each of the individuals named above, that
the individual did not post bond because he believed that doing so would be futile. Even at
the motion to dismiss stage, where the court must construe the complaints in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw all reasonable
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inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim based facts that have
not been alleged.
Accordingly, because the plaintiffs listed above have not plausibly pleaded that they
posted bail or were “otherwise cleared for release,” Mercado Compl. ¶ 32; Garza Compl. ¶
33, their § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment must fail. The
court therefore grants defendants’ motion to dismiss the following plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment-based § 1983 claims: Arturo Mercado, Pablo Carranza, Sergio Diaz, Jose Arturo
Galvan Resendiz, Jose Gutierrez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez-Aranda, Moises
Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera; Moises Vega Costilla8; Ricardo Garza,9 Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Miguel
Flores, Filipe Gonzalez Lujan, Luis Hernandez, and Jose Valenciano.
C
1
Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Miguel
Rodriguez, Mario Garibaldi, and Rodolfo Marmolejo were detained based on the existence
of an immigration detainer after they otherwise would have been entitled to be released due
8Although plaintiffs do not allege that bond was set for plaintiff Moises Vega Costilla—they instead allege that a state district court granted his motion for new trial in April 2015—they also do not plausibly allege any facts that would suggest that Costilla was otherwise eligible for release. Accordingly, for the reasons explained, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Costilla’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim.
9Plaintiffs allege that Ricardo Garza was not released after he tendered a $25,000 bond following his arrest in Grand Prairie, Texas. But they do not allege that he similarly posted the $100,000 or $25,000 bail that was set once he was transferred to Dallas County.
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to developments in their criminal cases.10 They move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment
claims of these plaintiffs, however, contending that there is no allegation that probable cause
was lacking to support the immigration detainers and that there is no requirement that there
be probable cause to believe these plaintiffs had committed a different criminal offense
unrelated to the issue of whether plaintiffs were detainable as aliens subject to removal.11
In their response, plaintiffs contend that, even though the federal government and its
agents may, in some circumstances, and without a warrant, arrest and detain individuals
suspected of immigration violations, this power does not extend to Dallas County.12
10Plaintiffs allege that Miguel Rodriguez was detained until March 22, 2015, after his criminal case was “disposed of” on March 20, 2015; that Mario Garibaldi was detained until August 21, 2015, after the state filed on August 20, 2015 a “‘Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Revoke or its Motion to Proceed with Adjudication in the case against Mario Garibaldi”; and that Rodolfo Marmolejo was detained until October 20, 2015, after paying an outstanding fine on October 19, 2015. Mercado Compl. ¶ 17.
11Defendants also contend that, even if the immigration detainers were issued in the absence of probable cause, there is no allegation that the immigration detainers were facially invalid. They posit that it is well-established that, when a law enforcement officer detains a person based on some form of legal process authorizing the detention, the official’s actions do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the process relied upon is facially valid. And they contend that although plaintiffs allege that Texas law does not authorize Dallas County to arrest or detain a person based on a federal detainer, alleged violations of state law do not constitute a deprivation of federal rights actionable under § 1983. Because the court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that defendants lacked probable cause to detain Rodriguez, Garibaldi, or Marmolejo, and it is dismissing plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim on this basis, the court will not address defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.
12Plaintiffs argue that the power to arrest without a warrant under the federal immigration statutes extends only to those specifically authorized by the Attorney General of the United States, and that the Attorney General has not authorized Dallas County officials to make arrests without a warrant; ICE cannot unilaterally delegate its federal immigration authority to Dallas County through immigration detainers; and ICE officers are generally
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Plaintiffs maintain that for Dallas County to further detain them after they were otherwise
eligible for release, it was required under the Fourth Amendment to have probable cause to
believe, for each plaintiff, “that [the plaintiff] has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime.” Ps. 1/8/16 Br. 12 (quoting Fontenot v. Cormier, 56 F.3d 669, 674 (5th Cir.
1995)). Plaintiffs argue that because immigration violations are generally civil in nature, and
unlawful presence in the United States is not a crime, the immigration detainers (which are
based on a belief that the individual is an alien subject to removal from the United States) do
not show probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and thus do not provide
probable cause sufficient for Dallas County to arrest the plaintiffs.13
2
The parties appear to agree that, under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, absent
“probable cause,” defendants were not permitted to detain the plaintiffs after they were
otherwise eligible for release. Probable cause exists when the arresting officer has reason
only permitted to make a warrantless arrest when an alien is likely to escape before an arrest warrant can be obtained, and, in this case, Dallas County received immigration detainers weeks to months before it held each plaintiff, and ICE could have used that time to obtain a warrant. In sum, they maintain that “neither Dallas County nor ICE had authority to arrest Plaintiffs without [a] warrant.” Ps. 1/8/16 Br. 11.
13Plaintiffs also argue that, even if Dallas County was permitted to hold them pursuant to the immigration detainers, it was not permitted to hold any plaintiff for more than 48 hours, and at a minimum, the court should refuse to dismiss plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims until plaintiffs can determine which plaintiffs were held for more than 48 hours based on the detainer. But plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that Rodriguez, Garibaldi, or Marmolejo was held in Dallas County custody for more than 48 hours after he was otherwise eligible for release. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs base their § 1983 claim on the allegation that some plaintiffs were unconstitutionally detained for more than 48 hours, the court dismisses this claim because it has not been plausibly pleaded.
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to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a criminal offense. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12; see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”). Generally, a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a civil offense is insufficient to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.14 See, e.g., John Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t of D.C., 445 F.3d 460, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Because the four Jane Does were arrested for a civil offense, their claims state a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1995) (“probable cause can only exist in relation to criminal conduct”); McKinney v. Fields, 2010 WL 3583017, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2010) (“The concept of probable cause makes sense only in relation to criminal offenses . . . [and as] a result, an arrest for a ‘civil infraction,’ . . . is ‘unreasonable.’” (citations omitted)).
The Supreme Court has characterized deportation and removal proceedings as “civil in nature.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010); see also Arizona v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.”). Lower federal courts have done the same. See, e.g., Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir.
14The court’s holding today is limited to the facts alleged and does not address whether, and to what extent, the Fourth Amendment limits federal immigration officials (or those to whom immigration authority has been properly delegated) from arresting individuals suspected of immigration violations.
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2013) (“Because civil immigration violations do not constitute crimes, suspicion or knowledge that an individual has committed a civil immigration violation, by itself, does not give a law enforcement officer probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.”); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause mere unauthorized presence is not a criminal matter, suspicion of unauthorized presence alone does not give rise to an inference that criminal activity is ‘afoot.’” (citation omitted)). In Santos the Fourth Circuit held that “absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.” Santos, 725 F.3d at 465.
Plaintiffs contend that defendants were not permitted to detain them unless they had probable cause to believe plaintiffs had committed a crime, and they argue that, because being subject to removal is a civil offense, the immigration detainers did not provide defendants with sufficient probable cause to detain them after they were otherwise eligible for release. Even if the court assumes that plaintiffs’ statement of the law is generally correct, it nonetheless holds that plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Dallas County lacked probable cause to detain Rodriguez, Garibaldi, or Marmolejo.
In their response brief, plaintiffs contend, in reference to the immigration detainer for plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera (which they attach to the Mercado and Garza complaints), that “[t]he detainer suggests unlawful presence, but does not show probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. The detainer thus does not provide probable cause sufficient
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for Dallas County to arrest Plaintiffs.” Ps. 1/8/16 Br. 12-13 (citing Mercado Compl. Ex. A). In their complaints, plaintiffs allege:
[t]he Torres Cabrera Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Torres Cabrera] is subject to removal from the United States.” Under federal law, being “subject to removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Torres Cabrera has a prior felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr. Torres Cabrera has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. Mercado Compl. ¶ 8; Garza Compl. ¶ 8. Although these allegations may be sufficient to plausibly allege that Dallas County did not have probable cause to detain Cabrera, plaintiffs do not similarly allege that Rodriguez, Garibaldi, or Marmolejo was held on the basis of an immigration detainer that provided probable cause only on the basis of a civil offense. Plaintiffs plead that Dallas County detained Rodriguez “based solely on ICE’s request to detain,” and that “an immigration hold was placed on [Garibaldi’s and Marmolejo’s] file[s].” Mercado Compl. ¶ 17. These allegations are insufficient of themselves to plausibly allege that any of these three plaintiffs was held in Dallas County custody based on probable cause to believe only that he had committed a civil immigration violation. Because plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Dallas County lacked probable cause to believe Rodriguez, Garibaldi, or Marmolejo had committed a criminal offense, defendants are entitled to dismissal of these plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.
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V
Plaintiffs also allege § 1983 claims against defendants based on an alleged violation of their substantive due process rights.15 They contend that the “moving force” behind these
claims is
Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by (i) refusing to allow bond for those with immigration holds, and (ii) honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, in violation of Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and/or the United States Constitution.
Mercado Compl. ¶ 24; Garza Compl ¶ 24.
A
To the extent plaintiffs base their substantive due process claims on the allegation that
Dallas County refused to allow bond for individuals with immigration holds, the court raises
sua sponte that, for the reasons explained above, see supra § IV(B), plaintiffs have failed to
plausibly allege that Dallas County or Sheriff Valdez refused to allow the following plaintiffs
to post bond and secure their release: Arturo Mercado, Pablo Carranza, Sergio Diaz, Jose
Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Jose Gutierrez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez-Aranda, Moises
Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera,
15Plaintiffs appear to bring their § 1983 substantive due process claims under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Mercado Compl. ¶ 21; Garza Compl. ¶ 21. “Because the due process component of the Fifth Amendment applies only to federal actors, [the court] will analyze [plaintiffs’] claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 930 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Moises Vega Costilla, Ricardo Garza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Miguel
Flores, Filipe Gonzalez Lujan, Luis Hernandez, or Jose Valenciano. Nor have plaintiffs
plausibly pleaded that defendants refused to allow the three remaining plaintiffs—Rodriguez,
Garibaldi, or Marmolejo—to post bond. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs base their
substantive due process claims on Dallas County’s alleged practice of “refusing to allow
bond for those with immigration holds,” Mercado Compl. ¶ 24; Garza Compl ¶ 24, the court
sua sponte dismisses these claims.16
B
In their motion to dismiss, defendants contend, inter alia, that “because plaintiffs’
periods of allegedly improper pretrial detention were ‘seizures’ covered by the ‘specific
protections of the Fourth Amendment,’ there is no basis for a separate claim under the rubric
of substantive due process.” Ds. 12/18/15 Br. 9 (quoting Lawson v. City of Coatesville, 42
F.Supp.3d 664, 675-76 (E.D. Pa. 2014).17 The court agrees.
16A district court has the authority to consider the sufficiency of a complaint and dismiss an action sua sponte, as long as the procedure it employs is fair. See, e.g., Biggers v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 767 F.Supp.2d 725, 733 n.7 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (noting that district court has authority to consider sufficiency of complaint and dismiss action on its own motion as long as procedure employed is fair, raising ground for dismissal sua sponte, and concluding that procedure was fair because court was granting leave to replead). Here, because the court is granting plaintiffs leave to replead, it can raise this ground for dismissal sua sponte.
17In response, plaintiffs cite United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and LopezValenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)—cases in which the validity of statutes restricting bail were addressed in the context of substantive due process—and argue that the Due Process Clause limits Dallas County’s ability to restrict pretrial release. In a footnote, they state that, “[i]f the Court finds that this claim[] sounds more appropriately under the Fourth Amendment, despite Salerno and Lopez-Valenzuela, Plaintiffs request leave
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“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Plaintiffs’ remaining substantive due process claim is based on the allegation that Dallas County honored ICE requests to detain, and detained, individuals subject to immigration holds, even after those individuals were otherwise cleared for release. See Mercado Compl. ¶ 24; Garza Compl ¶ 24. This is the same factual basis that plaintiffs rely on to support their Fourth Amendment claim. As explained above, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. It is undisputed that pretrial detention constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whittington, 455 Fed. Appx. at 458 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 844). Because the Fourth Amendment protects against the type of conduct plaintiffs allege in support of their substantive due process claim, this claim is “covered by” the Fourth Amendment and should be analyzed only under that constitutional provision.18 Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 843; see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 2012) (“To the extent that [plaintiff] seeks to assert a distinct cause of action under substantive due process, that claim must fail. . . . Here, [plaintiff’s] claims are rooted in procedural due process, the Equal
to replead.” Ps. 1/8/16 Br. 21 n.14. For the reasons explained below, see infra § VII, the court grants plaintiffs leave to replead this claim.
18It is immaterial that the court today dismisses plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
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Protection Clause, and the First Amendment. Those provisions are our exclusive guideposts.”). Accordingly, the court dismisses this claim against Dallas County.
VI The court now turns to plaintiffs’ claims against Sheriff Valdez. Defendants move to dismiss these claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity,19 and Sheriff Valdez separately moves to require plaintiffs to file a Rule 7(a) reply.
A Qualified immunity jurisprudence is well settled. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity applies to state officials sued for constitutional violations under § 1983. See id. at 818 n.30 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1999). “The Supreme Court has characterized the doctrine as protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
19Defendants also move to dismiss the Mercado plaintiffs’ claims against Sheriff Valdez in her official capacity as duplicative of their claims against Dallas County. Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute this basis for dismissal. Accordingly, the court grants the motion and dismisses the claims against Sheriff Valdez in her official capacity. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55 (stating that a suit against a government official in her official capacity is “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which [the official] is an agent.”).
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Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). “To decide whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the court must first
answer the threshold question whether, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the parties asserting the injuries, the facts they have alleged show that defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right.” Ellis v. Crawford, 2005 WL 525406, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2005) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.”)).20 “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “[I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. “Even if the government official’s conduct violates a clearly established right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable.” Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal, 400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2005). “The objective reasonableness of allegedly illegal conduct is assessed in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time it was
20Saucier’s two-step procedure for determining qualified immunity is no longer mandatory. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009). Courts are free to consider Saucier’s second prong without first deciding whether the facts show a constitutional violation. Id. at 236. The “decision does not prevent the lower courts from following the Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that those courts should have the discretion to decide whether that procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.” Id. at 242.
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taken.” Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). “‘The defendant’s acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have then known that the defendant’s conduct violated the’ plaintiff’s asserted constitutional or federal statutory right.” Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 284 (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)).
“[W]hen a plaintiff sues a public official under § 1983, the district court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff.” Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Although a plaintiff may comply with ordinary pleading standards in his initial complaint, and need not anticipate a qualified immunity defense, “[w]hen a public official pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in his answer, the district court may, on the official’s motion or on its own, require the plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail” pursuant to Rule 7(a). Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. “[T]he reply must be tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engage its allegations.” Id. “Heightened pleading requires allegations of fact focusing specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiffs’ injury.” Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999). The case should not be allowed to proceed unless plaintiff can assert specific facts that, if true, would overcome the defense. See Morin, 77 F.3d at 120 (“Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 unless it is shown by specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established law.”); Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434 (“The district court need not allow any discovery unless it finds
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that plaintiff has supported his claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity[.]”). The “district court’s discretion not to [require a Rule 7(a) reply] is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist.” Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; see also Reyes, 168 F.3d at 161 (“Faced with sparse details of claimed wrongdoing by officials, trial courts ought routinely require plaintiffs to file a reply under [Rule] 7(a) to qualified immunity defenses.”).
B The court concludes above that none of the Mercado or Garza plaintiffs has plausibly alleged that his Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated as a result of his pretrial detention in the Dallas County jail. Because plaintiffs have failed to state a facially plausible claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims asserted against Sheriff Valdez in her individual capacity are dismissed, and Sheriff Valdez’s motion for a Rule 7(a) reply is denied without prejudice as moot.21
VII Plaintiffs request leave to amend if the court dismisses any of their claims. “[D]istrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the
21Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief under the doctrine of mootness. Because the court is dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims, it need not address defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief.
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court that they are unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal.” In
re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F.Supp.2d 552, 567-68 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (Fitzwater,
J.) (quoting Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329
(5th Cir. 2002)). Because there is no indication that plaintiffs cannot, or are unwilling to,
replead in an attempt to state claims against defendants, the court grants them leave to file
an amended consolidated complaint within 28 days of the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed.22 Moreover, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint will ensure that the
court has employed a fair procedure in raising certain grounds for dismissal sua sponte. See
supra note 16.
* * *
For the reasons explained, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss, denies without prejudice as moot Sheriff Valdez’s separate
request to require a Rule 7(a) reply, and grants plaintiffs leave to replead.
SO ORDERED.
June 7, 2016.
_________________________________ SIDNEY A. FITZWATER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22To the extent plaintiffs intend to pursue their § 1983 claims against Sheriff Valdez in an amended complaint, they are now on notice that Sheriff Valdez has invoked the qualified immunity doctrine as a defense. Accordingly, if plaintiffs file an amended complaint that includes claims against Sheriff Valdez, they should plead these claims with the heightened pleading that the court would require if it ordered plaintiffs to file a Rule 7(a) reply.
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 Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 1 of 128 PageID 318

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISON

ARTURO MERCADO, PABLO CARRANZA, SERGIO DIAZ, JOSE GUTIERREZ, HEYDY JARQUIN JIMENEZ, JOSE LOPEZ-ARANDA, MOISES MARTINEZ, JAVIER NAVARRETE, EFREN PEREZ VILLEGAS, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, ELEAZAR SAAVEDRA, ANDRES TORRES CABRERA, MOISES VEGA COSTILLA, MARIO GARIBALDI, RODOLFO MARMOLEJO, RICARDO GARZA, CARLOS ALVAREZ CASTRO, JEREMIAS CHEVEZ, MIGUEL FLORES, FELIPE GONZALEZ LUJAN, LUIS HERNANDEZ, and JOSE VALENCIANO,

No. 3:15-CV-3481-D (consolidated with No. 3:15-CV-4008-D)
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs,

v.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendant.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution. “This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). “The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). Dallas County held Plaintiffs in Dallas County jail for months pending trial, even for purported misdemeanors, without allowing immediate

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release on bond. Dallas County also overdetained Plaintiffs without probable cause. Plaintiffs seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PARTIES 1. Plaintiffs were detained by Dallas County. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued detainers requesting that Dallas County facilitate ICE’s arrest of each Plaintiff, generally by (i) detaining each Plaintiff for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released, or (ii) notifying ICE when Dallas County intended to release each Plaintiff. As a result, an “immigration hold” appears in each Plaintiff’s file. At the time each lawsuit was filed, no Plaintiff remained in Dallas County custody. 2. Dallas County is located in North Texas. Process for Dallas County may be effected on Clay Jenkins, County Judge, who is located at 411 Elm St., Dallas, Texas, 75202. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.024(a). Lupe Valdez1 is the Sheriff of Dallas County and is the highest ranking law-enforcement officer in Dallas County. She is responsible for the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, Dallas County jails, and Dallas County inmates.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This is a civil-rights case arising under the United States Code, title 42. The Court thus has subject-matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 4. Dallas County is located in this District. Dallas County regularly conducts business in Texas and this district. 5. Dallas County’s acts in Texas form the basis of this lawsuit. The Court thus has personal jurisdiction over Dallas County.
1 Presently, Sheriff Valdez is not a defendant in this case. Although Plaintiffs originally brought claims against Sheriff Valdez, the Court dismissed those claims. (ECF No. 30). Plaintiffs do not replead those dismissed claims in this Amended Complaint.
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6. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because many of the complained-of acts in this case occurred in Dallas County, Texas, and because Dallas County is located in this District.
LOCAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: THE NEW FRONT LINE IN ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAWS 7. ICE is a large, sophisticated federal agency charged with enforcing our nation’s
immigration laws. ICE has a $6 billion budget and more than 20,000 employees. Ex. C (Morgan Smith & Terri Langford, Texas Sheriffs, Jails on Immigration Front Line, Texas Tribune, Feb. 16, 2016) at C1. Despite its size and resources, ICE has “no proactive way [to use] watch lists, data mining or the like . . . to systematically search for dangerous undocumented immigrants, including those who have returned to the United States after being deported for committing crimes.” Id. “Instead, if an immigrant criminal is caught and thrown out of the country, the process most likely begins when a local police officer or sheriff’s deputy pulls them over for a traffic stop or arrests them as part of a criminal investigation.” Id.
8. For many decades, local law-enforcement officers have fingerprinted detainees during booking. Over the last few years, however, technology has changed in an important way—local law-enforcement agencies now route detainees’ fingerprints through federal databases at the FBI and Homeland Security during booking. Ex. D (Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, The N.Y. Times, May 11, 2012) at D2; Ex. E (Dianne Solís, Police Use of Federal Databases to ID Illegal Immigrants after Arrests Raises Profiling Concerns, The Dallas Morning News, July 25, 2010), at E1-3. In particular, law enforcement can now routinely check fingerprints taken in local arrests against (i) the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”) of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, and (ii) the Automated Biometric Identification
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 4 of 128 PageID 321 System (“IDENT”) of the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT Program. See Ex. F (Secure Communities Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sept. 1, 2009) at F1. After submission, “ICE evaluates each case to determine the individual’s immigration status and communicate their findings to law enforcement within a few hours.” Id. A presentation created by the Texas Department of Public Safety shows the data flow from local arrests to federal databases (including IAFIS and IDENT) in the graphic below.
Ex. G at G5. According to one commentator, the submission of fingerprints for ICE’s use “turn[s] local jails into tiny immigration outposts.” Ex. H (Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies Withdraw, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 16, 2014), at H1.
9. When fingerprints submitted by a local agency match an IDENT record, the information about the match (called an “IDR”) is forwarded to the FBI. Ex. I (Secure Communi-
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ties: Removing Criminal Aliens from Communities through Biometric Information Sharing, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) at I2; Ex. G at G5. The FBI then populates and forwards an Immigration Agency Query (“IAQ”) to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center. Ex. I at I2; Ex. G at G5. The Support Center responds to the Query (the response is called an “IAR”), which is then forwarded to other ICE offices. Ex. I at I2; Ex. G at G5. ICE ultimately uses the information to determine whether ICE will seek to remove the detainee. See Ex. J (Secure Communities Standard Operating Procedures, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement) at J8.
10. If ICE believes it can meet its burden to deport a detainee, ICE can arrest and take possession of that detainee, hold the detainee pre-removal, and then remove the detainee. But if ICE were to deport the detainee immediately, the detainee would not stand trial for the original, local criminal offense. Consequently, ICE generally waits until after the local criminal offense is resolved to arrest the detainee and commence the removal process. See Ex. A (Torres Cabrera detainer) (“DHS discourages dismissing criminal charges based on the existence of a detainer.”) at A1; Ex. J (ICE Secure Communities Operating Procedures) at J8 (“Normally, ICE will not remove an alien until pending criminal charges are adjudicated.”).
11. To facilitate ICE’s arrest of detainees after local criminal offenses are resolved, ICE requests that local law-enforcement agencies (i) notify ICE when they intend to release targeted detainees and/or (ii) hold targeted detainees after those detainees otherwise would be released, to allow ICE time to show up and take custody of the detainees. ICE uses forms called “detainers” to formally request assistance. See, e.g., Exs. A-B (detainers). The Code of Federal Regulations describes detainers as “request[s]” that “advise” local law-enforcement agencies that ICE seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency:
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(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Act and this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue a Form I-247, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). Because detainers are “requests,” local law-enforcement agencies need not respond or comply with detainers. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2014).2 In 2013, ICE stated that detainers served three functions: (i) to notify a local lawenforcement agency that ICE intends to assume custody of an alien in the local agency’s custody once the alien is no longer subject to the local agency’s detention; (ii) to request information from a local agency about an alien’s impending release so that ICE may assume custody before the alien is released from the local agency’s custody; and (iii) “to request that the [local agency] maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be released for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) to provide ICE time to assume custody.” Ex. K (ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, visited Mar. 20, 2013) at K1. 12. In February 2016, the Texas Tribune created a flowchart showing how detainers interact with the Texas criminal-justice system, shown below:
2 See also Ex. L (Letter from ICE Acting Director Daniel H. Ragsdale to Rep. Mike Thompson dated February 25, 2014) at L1 (“While immigration detainers are an important part of ICE’s effort to remove criminal aliens who are in federal, state, or local custody, they are not mandatory as a matter of law.”).
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13. On December 21, 2012, the Director of ICE issued a memorandum describing Form I-247, the detainer form used by the Dallas ICE Office until at least May 2015. See Ex. A at A1 (I-247 form issued to Dallas County in May 2015). “The revised detainer form . . . will . . . require the issuing officer or agent to identify [the grounds for removal] that apply so that the receiving agency and alien will know the specific basis for the detainer.” Ex. M (Morton memorandum dated December 21, 2012) at M3. The memorandum states that ICE should issue a detainer only where (i) ICE has reason to believe that the alien is subject to removal, and (ii) one or more of the following conditions apply:
· The individual has a prior felony conviction; · The individual has three prior misdemeanor convictions;
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· The individual has a prior misdemeanor conviction or pending charge that involves violence, sexual abuse, driving under the influence of alcohol, unlawful flight from the scene of an accident, unlawful possession of a firearm, trafficking of a controlled substance, or other significant threats to public safety;
· The individual has been convicted of illegal entry; · The individual has illegally re-entered the country after a previous removal or re-
turn; · The individual has an outstanding order of removal; · The individual has been found by an immigration officer or an immigration judge to
have knowingly committed immigration fraud; or · The individual otherwise poses a significant risk to national security, border securi-
ty, or public safety. Id. at M2. As stated in the memorandum (id. at M3), the I-247 detainer form reflects these conditions, and includes checkboxes for each of the above conditions, as shown in the excerpt below:
Ex. A at A1. 14. The “conditions” identified in the Morton memorandum are not criminal im-
migration offenses.3 It is not a crime to “be subject to removal,” to have prior felony or mis-
3 Criminal immigration offenses are found at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324-1328 and include: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 10 of 128 PageID 327 demeanor convictions, or to be charged with a crime. It is often a crime to for an alien to reenter the United States after the alien has been deported or removed. But the checkbox on the I-247 form is not limited to this situation—it lists re-entry after a previous “removal or return,” and reentry after “return” is not listed at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (listing reentry after being “denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed” as a crime).
15. On June 12, 2015, ICE released two new detainer forms: the I-247N and the I247D. Ex. HH (Why ‘PEP’ Doesn’t Fix S-Comm’s Failings, National Immigration Law Center) at HH1. ICE explained that the I-247N Form was a “Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien,” while the I-247D Form was a “Request for Voluntary Action”:
certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328).
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 11 of 128 PageID 328 Ex. GG (ICE brochure on Priority Enforcement Program) at GG1.
16. ICE uses the new detainer forms. See Ex. DD at DD8 (I-247N for F. Lara Martinez served on Dallas County in September 2015). The I-247N forms explicitly “does not request or authorize that [the local law-enforcement agency] detain the subject beyond the time he or she is currently scheduled for release from [agency] custody,” as shown below:
Id. Like the I-247 form, the I-247N form provides checkboxes for certain conditions that do not identify criminal probable cause:
Id. Prior convictions, alone, do not provide Dallas County with probable cause to believe that a detainee is committing or has committed a new criminal offense.
17. Unlike the I-247N form, the I-247D form requests that local law enforcement detain for up to 48 hours:
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Ex. II (Sample form I-247D) at II1. Form I-247D provides checkboxes to show that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien” (emphasis added), but does not show that probable cause exists that the subject is committing or has committed a new criminal violation:
Id. 18. Neither the I-247D nor the I-247N provide local law enforcement with proba-
ble cause of an independent criminal violation that might allow Dallas County to detain under the Fourth Amendment. The I-247D explicitly only states that ICE has probable cause of a civil violation—removability. Ex. II at II1. The I-247N only states that DHS “suspects” that the subject is removable. Ex. DD at DD8. The checkboxes in both forms do not provide Dallas County with sufficient facts to conclude that any detainee is committing or was committing a crime. No detainer issued using Form I-247D or I-247N provides probable cause of an inde-
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pendent criminal violation that might allow Dallas County to detain under the Fourth Amendment.
19. Further, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, most detainers are lodged against individuals who have never been convicted of a crime. During April 2015, only 19% of detainers related to those with a felony conviction, and only 32% of detainers related to those with any convictions. Ex. N (Further Decrease in ICE Detainer Use: Still not Targeting Serious Criminals, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Aug. 28, 2015) at N2. Two-thirds of the detainers issued by ICE targeted individuals without any prior criminal convictions. Id.
20. ICE regularly issues detainers. In August 2011, ICE issued over 27,000 detainers. Ex. C at C2. More recently, as of October 2015, ICE issued over 7,000 detainers. Ex. N at N2. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, approximately 59% of the individuals removed from the United States were originally arrested and held in local jails and prisons. Id.
21. ICE regularly issues detainers in Texas. Texas jails detained, on average, around 3,700 undocumented immigrants each month in 2015. Id. To “highlight the burden . . . placed on county budgets” caused by complying with detainers, the Texas Legislature passed S.B. 1698,4 which “requires jails to track the number of inmates held on federal detainers along with the number of days those prisoners are housed and how much counties are paying to hold them.” Ex. O (Sarah Thomas, Officials Grapple with Costs of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants, Longview News-Journal, Oct. 16, 2013) at O1. From those records, the Texas Tribune concluded that Texas county jails have spent over $218.9 million housing
4 Portions of that bill are codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 511.0101. 13

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over 180,000 undocumented immigrants with federal detainers between October 2011 and June 2014. Ex P. (Dan Hill, Interactive: The Cost of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants, Texas Tribune, July 21, 2014) at P1.
ICE REGULARLY ISSUES DETAINERS TO DALLAS COUNTY 22. Dallas County receives a large number of ICE detainers. In 2015, eight jails received more than 1,000 detainers, including Dallas County. Ex. C at C2. In fiscal 2014, ICE placed about 1,930 holds in Dallas County (about 160 a month). Ex. Q (Dianne Solís, Dallas County Sheriff Eases Immigration Holds on Minor Offenses, The Dallas Morning News, Oct. 11, 2015) at Q2. In fiscal 2015, ICE placed about 2,048 holds in Dallas County (about 170 a month). Id. “Dallas County spent more than $22 million housing more than 12,000 undocumented immigrants.” Ex. O at O2; see also Ex P at P2 (Dallas County spent over $22 million between October 2011 and June 2014). Judge Michael Snipes, who served as a criminal district-court judge in Dallas County until December 31, 2014, confirms that ICE would serve detainers on Dallas County. Ex. JJ ¶ 3. Judge Snipes’ statements cited throughout the Amended Complaint are informed by his personal experience with and personal knowledge of the Dallas County criminal-justice system until December 31, 2014. Id. 23. Detainers are generally not publicly available. Plaintiffs attach three examples of detainers directed to Dallas County. First, the Immigration Detainer for Plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera is attached as Exhibit A. The Torres Cabrera Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Torres Cabrera] is subject to removal from the United States.” Ex. A at A1. But under federal law, being “subject to removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Torres Cabrera has a prior felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth
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Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr. Torres Cabrera has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. See id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County maintain custody over Mr. Torres Cabrera:
IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take custody of the subject. Ex. A. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County provide a copy of the Detainer to the subject, id., but Mr. Torres Cabrera did not receive a copy of the Detainer. 24. Second, the Immigration Detainer for Jesus Nava Arriola is attached as Exhibit B. Mr. Nava Arriola is not a plaintiff. The Nava Arriola Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Nava Arriola] is subject to removal from the United States.” Ex. B at B1. Again, under federal law, being “subject to removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Nava Arriola has a prior felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr. Nava Arriola has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. See id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County maintain custody over Mr. Nava Arriola: IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take custody of the subject. Id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County provide a copy of the Detainer to the subject, id., but Mr. Nava Arriola did not receive a copy of the Detainer.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 16 of 128 PageID 333 25. Third, the Immigration Detainer for Francisco Lara Martinez is attached Exhib-
it DD, at DD8. Mr. Lara Martinez is not a plaintiff. The Lara Martinez Detainer has the title “Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien.” Ex. DD at DD8. The Lara Martinez Detainer states that “DHS suspects that [Mr. Lara Martinez] is a removable alien and that the subject is an immigration enforcement priority because [he] . . . has been convicted of a ‘significant misdemeanor,’ as defined by DHS policy.” Id. Under federal law, being “suspected” of being a removable alien is not a crime. The Detainer states that Mr. Lara Martinez has a prior misdemeanor, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth Amendment, that is, probable cause to believe that Mr. Lara Martinez has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. See id.
26. Most Plaintiffs were not provided copies of their detainers. Plaintiffs have requested copies of those detainers from Dallas County. Dallas County has not provided copies of those detainers, claiming that “only Sheriff Valdez” might have access and be able to provide the detainers, as shown in the below email exchange between Anthony Garza (counsel for Plaintiffs) and Peter Harlan (counsel for Dallas County):
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Ex. R at R1. Plaintiffs also formally requested the detainers before the Court stayed discovery. Ex. S (Dallas County Response to Request for Production) at S3 (Dallas County objecting to Plaintiffs’ request for “[a]ll immigration detainers for any Plaintiff” as “vague, ambiguous, confusing, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”).
27. In light of the three detainers attached to the Complaint, each of which do not show probable cause of a criminal offense, Plaintiffs claim as fact (especially in light of Dallas County’s refusal to provide them) that no detainer relating to any Plaintiff states facts sufficient to show that any Plaintiff had committed a different criminal offense or was committing a different criminal offense.
DALLAS COUNTY OVERDETAINED FOR TRANSFER TO ICE 28. Dallas County generally honors ICE’s requests to detain. Ex. T (Dallas Sheriff Responds to Texas Governor: All ICE Detainers Honored this Year, The Dallas Morning News Trailblazers Blog, Oct. 26, 2015) at T1 (stating that Sheriff Valdez had not rejected any detainers in 2015: “we have accepted 1469 detainers from ICE and declined zero.”). Dallas County is not alone—the Houston Chronicle reported in October 2014 that “every county jail [in Texas] continues to comply with ICE detainer requests by holding suspects whose finger-
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prints match the immigration database.” Ex. H at H1. Between January 2014 and September 2015, Texas law enforcement agencies refused only 146 detainers.5 Ex. U (Andy East, U.S. Citizen Jailed in Immigration Status Mistake, Texas Tribune, Feb. 27, 2016) at U2. A review of ICE records obtained by the Texas Tribune showed that Dallas County had only twice declined to enforce a detainer. Ex. V (Morgan Smith and Jay Root, Jails Refused to Hold Thousands of Immigrants for Feds, Texas Tribune, Jan. 15, 2016) at V3.
29. Upon receipt of an ICE detainer, Dallas County places an “immigration hold” in that detainee’s file. As an example, the following appears in the file for Plaintiff Moises Martinez:
“Illegal Alien” is often used by Dallas County as shorthand for an immigration hold. The immigration hold in each Plaintiff’s file is evidence that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for each Plaintiff, often requesting that Dallas County detain each Plaintiff for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released to facilitate ICE’s arrest of that Plaintiff, like the example requests attached for Mr. Torres Cabrera and Mr. Nava Ar-
5 An earlier article in the Texas Tribune suggested that the number of refused detainers was artificially inflated because it included “cases where inmates were transferred to other jurisdictions in response to outstanding warrants or had to be released after federal authorities failed to pick them up within 48 hours.” Ex. V (Morgan Smith & Jay Root, Jails Refused to Hold Thousands of Immigrants Sought by Feds, Texas Tribune, Jan. 15, 2016) at V2.
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riola. Exs. A-B. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County places ‘immigration holds’ on detainees that are subject to an ICE detainer.” Ex. JJ ¶ 4.
30. Dallas County detains individuals after they would otherwise be released to allow ICE an opportunity to take custody of those individuals. ICE picks up detained individuals from Dallas County on a regular schedule, approximately twice a week. As a result, at times, Dallas County detains individuals for ICE for more than 48 hours. ICE does not always take custody of the individuals with immigration holds. For example, Dallas County detained Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez after he otherwise would have been released for transfer to ICE. ICE did not take custody, and Dallas County eventually released Mr. Rodriguez. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County would sometimes hold detainees more than 48 hours based on an ICE detainer.” Ex. JJ ¶ 5.
31. The fact that Dallas County overdetains based on immigration holds is reflected in emails authored by Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner, the “ICE Liaison” employed by Dallas County. For example, the below email from Sr. Sgt. Bruner to Ray Hindieh (an attorney) shows that Dallas County does not immediately release detainees subject to an immigration hold. Instead, Dallas County treats the immigration hold as if it were a criminal warrant from a sister county and holds individuals based solely on that hold:
Ex. W (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated July 28, 2015) at W1. Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s analysis notwithstanding, Dallas County ignores the constitutional problems with detaining based solely with ICE holds—the Fourth Amendment allows Dallas County to detain based on probable cause
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 20 of 128 PageID 337 of criminal violations (such as a Denton County charge of theft), but not based on probable cause of civil violations (such as a civil immigration violation). Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County will treat a detainer from ICE just like Dallas County treats an arrest warrant from a different Texas county” and “Dallas County treats ‘immigration holds’ based on ICE detainers just like Dallas County treats holds occasioned by arrest warrants from other Texas counties.” Ex. JJ ¶ 6. Sr. Sgt. Bruner confirmed in an email dated December 7, 2015, that Dallas County would not release an immigration hold caused by an ICE detainer:
Ex. X (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated December 7, 2016) at X1. The email exchange, below, is an example of Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release when a detainee with an immigration hold tenders bond:
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Ex. Y (Email exchange between Sr. Sgt. Bruner and Mr. Hindieh dated December 2, 2014) at Y2. The email exchange above is evidence of the fact that Dallas County overdetains based solely on immigration holds.
32. On October 11, 2015, about two weeks before Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, Sheriff Valdez announced that she “changed policies on holding immigrants in the Dallas County jail for federal immigration officials once the person is past his or her release date.” Ex. Q at Q1. According to The Dallas Morning News, Sheriff Valdez stated that detainees who committed “minor offenses” would not be held for up to an additional 48 hours for ICE. Id. This change in policy is evidence of the fact that, before October 2015, Dallas County held detainees subject to immigration holds (including those who had committed minor offenses) for up to an additional 48 hours for ICE, even after the person was past his or her release date. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County would not immediately release a detainee subject to an immigration hold that, absent the immigration hold. . . . [but would] instead hold the detainee, based on the immigration hold and ICE detainer, for transfer to ICE.” Ex. JJ ¶ 7. Judge Snipes also confirmed that “Dallas County would not immediately release a detainee subject to an immigration hold that had paid bail, was found not guilty, had all charges dropped against him or her, served his or her sentence, or pleaded guilty and received no additional jail time. . . . [but would] would instead hold the detainee, based on the
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immigration hold and ICE detainer, for transfer to ICE.” Id. ¶ 8. In fact, Judge Snipes “does not know of any detainees with immigration holds that were not held for ICE after they otherwise should have been released, absent the immigration hold.” Id. ¶ 9.
33. Dallas County’s practices sharply contrast with those of Harris County. In October 2014, the Houston Chronicle reported that Harris County “almost instantaneously” transferred detainees to ICE custody, minimizing Fourth Amendment concerns. Ex. H at H1. Harris County manages to avoid prolonged detention even though Harris County processes around 300 detainers a month—almost twice that of Dallas County. Compare id. at H2 (300 detainers per month for Harris County) with Ex. Q at Q2 (160-170 detainers a month for Dallas County).
34. According to the Texas Tribune, Melinda Urbina, a spokesperson at the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, confirmed in February 2016 that if ICE asks Dallas County to hold an inmate for 48 hours, “the additional time typically does not begin until after the prisoner’s county charges are resolved.” Ex. U at U2. Ms. Urbina also stated that “[w]e follow what [ICE asks] us to do.” Id. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County holds detainees with immigration holds, at ICE’s request, after the detainee’s county charges are resolved.
DALLAS COUNTY DENIES PRE-TRIAL RELEASE BASED ON ICE DETAINERS 35. Before November 2014, Dallas County would allow pretrial release for certain detainees with immigration holds. Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner, the Dallas County ICE Liaison Officer, was responsible for determining which detainees subject to an ICE detainer were nevertheless eligible for bond. In the April 2014 email below, Sr. Sgt. Bruner provided Mr. Hindieh with stipulation forms to use when a detainee with an immigration hold was approved for pretrial release.
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Ex. Z (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated April 23, 2014) at Z1. 36. At this time, if an immigration hold was in place, a detainee generally was not
eligible for pretrial release. The June 2014 email below, from Sr. Sgt. Bruner to Mr. Hindieh, allows bond for a detainee because ICE intended to withdraw its request to detain.
Ex. AA (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated June 3, 2014) at AA1. The February 2015 email below, from Sr. Sgt. Bruner to Eric Puente (an attorney), also states that a detainee can leave jail only after ICE cancels its detainer:
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Ex. BB (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated February 26, 2015) at BB1. These emails are evidence of the fact that Dallas County generally would not allow bond for those with immigration holds. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, the detainee was generally not eligible for pretrial release.” Ex. JJ ¶ 10; see also id. at ¶ 11 (“I do not know of any detainees with immigration holds that received immediate release on bond.”)
37. Dallas County changed its policies in late 2014, and stopped processing “stip bond forms” for pretrial release. Instead, if a detainee with an immigration hold were to pay bond, either (i) Dallas County would hold the detainee (ostensibly for less than 48 hours) for transfer to ICE (as described above), or (ii) on request from ICE, Mr. Bruner would ask a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney to notify the Court that the bond was insufficient, so that Dallas County could maintain custody over the detainee. Under either scenario, Dallas County refused immediate release on bond. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, Dallas County would not immediately release the detainee if he or she paid bond. . . . Dallas County would instead either (i) continue to detain the detainee for transfer to ICE, based on the ICE detainer, or (ii) ask an Assistant District Attorney to petition a court to find the bond insufficient.” Ex. JJ ¶ 12.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 25 of 128 PageID 342 38. Plaintiffs have evidence of the policy in the previous paragraph. First, as ex-
plained earlier, Dallas County treats immigration holds as if they were criminal warrants from a sister county:
Ex. W at W1. But an ICE hold is fundamentally different than a hold from a sister county. Unlike a hold from a sister county, an ICE hold is usually based on civil immigration violations, rather than suspicion of a crime. As explained earlier, the following email is an example of Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release when a detainee with an immigration hold tenders bond:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 26 of 128 PageID 343 Ex. Y at Y2. The email exchange above is evidence of the facts that (i) Dallas County would detain inmates based solely on an immigration hold, and (ii) Dallas County had a practice of seeking to hold bonds insufficient for those with immigration holds.
39. Second, an email shows that Dallas County will affirmatively hold a detainee’s bond insufficient to ensure that the detainee remains in custody for ICE. In December 2015, Sr. Sgt. Bruner explained to Mr. Puente that if a detainee cannot avoid removal, ICE will inform Dallas County of the same, and Dallas County will refuse bond on the basis of that determination:
Ex. CC (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated December 14, 2015) at CC1. For example, on September 20, 2015, bail was set for Mr. Francisco Lara Martinez, for $15,000. Ex. DD (various records for F. Lara Martinez) at DD2. ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County. Id. at DD8. Mr. Lara Martinez tendered bond on September 21, 2015. Id. at DD6-7. But Dallas County nevertheless refused to release Mr. Lara Martinez. Instead, Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office requested that an ADA file a “notice of flight risk.” The form used by Dallas County explicitly recognizes that Mr. Lara Martinez had already paid bail:
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Id. at DD9. The Court held bond insufficient the next day, on September 22, 2015. Id. at DD10-11. Mr. Lara Martinez’s treatment is evidence of the fact that Dallas County would not immediately release those with immigration holds, even if they paid bond. Instead, Dallas County would continue to hold the detainee while Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office sought to hold the bond insufficient.
40. As explained earlier, when Dallas County receives an ICE detainer, Dallas County places an “immigration hold” in the detainee’s file. At times, the hold indicates that no bond is allowed, as shown by the file for Plaintiff Efren Perez Villegas:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 28 of 128 PageID 345 Similarly, the file for Plaintiff Jose Lopez-Aranda states “H/F IMMIGRATION/NO BOND.” The notation in these two files is evidence of the fact that Dallas County does not allow bond to those with immigration holds.
41. On January 27, 2016, Sr. Sgt. Bruner emailed a number of attorneys, including Mr. Puente and Mr. Hindieh. Sr. Sgt. Bruner advised the attorneys that Dallas County would seek to hold bonds insufficient when (i) ICE tells Dallas County that the detainee cannot remain in the United States, (ii) a detainee is ordered removed by an immigration judge, or (iii) a detainee requests a voluntary removal:
Ex. EE (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated Jan. 27, 2016) at EE1. The email is evidence of the fact that, at ICE’s request, Sr. Sgt. Bruner will ensure that a detainee is refused pre-trial release by asking an assistant district attorney to petition a court to hold a bond insufficient. Judge Snipes confirmed that he “[has] personal knowledge of detainees in Dallas County with immigration holds that (i) attempted to post bond, and (ii) were not granted pretrial release” and that he “[has] heard, from others, of detainees in Dallas County with immigration holds that (i) attempted to post bond, and (ii) were not granted pretrial release.” Ex. JJ ¶¶ 13-14.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 29 of 128 PageID 346 42. Plaintiffs requested that Dallas County identify the procedures by which a de-
tainee with an immigration hold might secure pretrial release. As shown below, Dallas County refused to respond to the interrogatory.
Ex. FF (Dallas County Response to Interrogatories) at FF3. 43. By refusing pretrial release, Dallas County has effectively agreed to detain
those awaiting civil removal proceedings for ICE. Unquestionably, the federal government generally has the constitutional power to detain those awaiting civil removal proceedings, subject to limits imposed by Congress. But the Constitution treats Dallas County differently. Dallas County cannot constitutionally detain based solely on civil immigration violations, even if both Dallas County and ICE agents would prefer that Dallas County do so. And Dallas County cannot abridge the constitutional guarantee of criminal pretrial release and the presumption of innocence, even if that requires ICE to build additional detention centers to house those awaiting civil removal proceedings. Dallas County must allow the opportunity for immediate pretrial release on bond, even if ICE would prefer that Dallas County hold certain individuals pending civil removal proceedings.
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44. In sum, Dallas County imposes pretrial detention on individuals subject to immigration holds (like Plaintiffs) in at least two ways. First, Dallas County denies bond by affirmatively seeking to hold a detainee’s bond insufficient to ensure that the detainee remains in custody for ICE. This directly imposes pretrial detention. Because Dallas County will not release a detainee with an immigration hold even when bond is met, bail is illusory. Dallas County imposes pretrial detention by not allowing bonds for individuals with immigration holds. Second, even if individuals subject to immigration holds are cleared for release (such as after a plea hearing), Dallas County detains those individuals pending transfer to ICE. Thus, even if Defendants accept bond, the bond does not result in release. On payment, Dallas County instead maintains pretrial detention, pending transfer to ICE. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, Dallas County would not immediately release the detainee if he or she paid bond. . . . Dallas County would instead either (i) continue to detain the detainee for transfer to ICE, based on the ICE detainer, or (ii) ask an Assistant District Attorney to petition a court to find the bond insufficient.” Ex. JJ ¶ 12.
45. Based on the evidence above, Plaintiffs claim the following fact: Dallas County refuses immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, the detainee was generally not eligible for pretrial release” and that he “[does] not know of any detainees with immigration holds that received immediate release on bond.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
46. Dallas County’s practices are widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County’s refusal to allow pretrial release for detainees subject to immigration holds was widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community” and that “[i]t is
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widely known that Dallas County will not immediately release detainees with immigration holds, even if they post bond.” Ex. JJ ¶¶ 16-17. As a result, attempting to post bond is known as a futile exercise for those with immigration holds, because it will not result in immediate release. Judge Snipes confirmed that he “would not expect detainees with immigration holds to attempt to pay bond, because Dallas County would not release those detainees on payment of the bond.” Ex. JJ ¶ 18. The scheme has predictable effects. Because Dallas County will not immediately release those on bond, individuals with immigration holds generally do not waste money by attempting to post bond, and Dallas County maintains pretrial detention over almost all individuals with immigration holds.
47. Plaintiffs claim the following fact: it is widely known that Dallas County will not immediately release a detainee with an immigration hold, even if they post bond. Judge Snipes confirmed that “detainees with immigration detainers would not receive immediate release on bond,” “Dallas County’s refusal to allow pretrial release for detainees subject to immigration holds was widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community,” and “it is widely known that Dallas County will not immediately release detainees with immigration holds, even if they post bond.” Ex. JJ ¶¶ 15-17.
48. Dallas County’s failure to provide immediate release on bond offends state law. Under state law, the accused must “shall at once be set at liberty” upon payment of bond. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 17.29(a). Defendants cannot rely solely on a request to detain from ICE to justify any further arrest or detention, for at least the following reasons:
· Pursuant to Texas statute, all arrests generally require a warrant. An ICE request to detain is not a warrant, and the ICE request to detain does not satisfy any statutory exception that would allow Dallas County to arrest Plaintiffs without a warrant.
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· Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other authority to detain that satisfies Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution.
· Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other authority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
49. Dallas County’s wrongful two-part scheme predictably results in pretrial detention over most individuals with immigration holds. Dallas County reported to the Texas Commission on Jail Standards that, in June 2015, Dallas County held 557 prisoners that were subject to an ICE request to detain. The Dallas Morning News reported that, between January 1, 2015, to October 26, 2015, Dallas County “accepted 1469 detainers from ICE and declined zero.” Ex. T at T1. Due to its two-part practice of refusing immediate release on bond to those with immigration holds, Dallas County unconstitutionally imposed pretrial detention on most of those individuals subject to detainer.
50. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for Dallas County’s policy and practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by (i) refusing to allow bond for those with immigration holds, and (ii) detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals make bail or are otherwise cleared for release. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i) whether to allow bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that make bail or are otherwise cleared for release.
DALLAS COUNTY OVERDETAINED PLAINTIFFS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OF A CRIMINAL VIOLATION 51. As explained in more detail below, Plaintiffs were overdetained by Dallas
County. Dallas County held Plaintiffs for transfer to ICE, even after they paid bail or other-
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wise should have been released. Dallas County did not have probable cause of criminal activity when it held each Plaintiff for transfer to ICE.
52. Dallas County’s practice of honoring ICE requests to detain, even after those individuals otherwise would otherwise be released, denies Plaintiffs their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After individuals have served their sentence, are sentenced to time served, are found not guilty, or have their charges dismissed, Dallas County does not have probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed (based on a detainer that only lists civil immigration violations) and has no other authority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for Dallas County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals otherwise would be released, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.
53. Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims do not turn on the availability of bail. Each Plaintiff, below, was detained after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. Whether or not each Plaintiff paid bail, each Plaintiff should have been released after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. Because Dallas County continued to maintain custody without separate probable cause of a criminal offense, Dallas County’s overdetention of the Plaintiffs offends the Fourth Amendment.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 34 of 128 PageID 351 54. Overdetention of Arturo Mercado. After he was arrested, an immigration
hold was placed on Mr. Mercado, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Mercado, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Mercado after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Mercado pleaded guilty to a class C misdemeanor, which does not carry any jail time, in April 2015, as shown below:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Mercado was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Mercado for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Mercado for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Mercado’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Mercado due to that immigration hold, and ultimately
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 35 of 128 PageID 352
because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Mercado. Mr. Mercado does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Mercado, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Mercado nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Mercado had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Mercado was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Mercado’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Mercado had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Mercado claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Mercado claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE de-
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 36 of 128 PageID 353 tainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Mercado for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
55. Overdetention of Pablo Carranza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Carranza, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Carranza, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Carranza after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Carranza pleaded guilty September 2015, and received no jail time for this offense, as shown below:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Carranza was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Carranza for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Carranza for transfer to ICE. The
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only hold listed in Mr. Carranza’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Carranza due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Carranza. Mr. Carranza does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Carranza, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Carranza nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Carranza had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Carranza was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)), marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Carranza’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Carranza had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Carranza claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 38 of 128 PageID 355 that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Carranza claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Carranza for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
56. Overdetention of Jose Gutierrez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gutierrez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gutierrez, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gutierrez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Gutierrez. Mr. Gutierrez pleaded guilty in September 2015, and was sentenced to time in Dallas County jail:
Because Mr. Guiterrez received credit for time served (as shown below), he did not spend 45 additional days in Dallas County jail.
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Mr. Gutierrez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody when his sentence ended, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Gutierrez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Gutierrez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Gutierrez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gutierrez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Gutierrez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Gutierrez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Gutierrez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Gutierrez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Gutierrez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Gutierrez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based off
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of information contained in the IDENT database. Because Mr. Gutierrez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Gutierrez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Gutierrez was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Gutierrez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Gutierrez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
57. Overdetention of Heydy Jarquin Jimenez. After she was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. Evidence of this hold includes (i) the fact that bail was set at $100,000, which was standard practice for those with immigration holds, and (ii) the fact that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was overdetained for transfer to ICE. This is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, requesting that Dallas County detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez after she otherwise would be re-
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 41 of 128 PageID 358 leased for transfer to ICE. Dallas County voluntarily dismissed the two charges brought against Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, as shown below:
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Despite Dallas County dismissing both charges, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold her for her original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, for more than 48 hours, for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Ms. Jarquin Jimenez for transfer to ICE. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County
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held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Ms. Jarquin Jimenez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 44 of 128 PageID 361 show that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained her based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
58. Overdetention of Jose Lopez-Aranda. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez-Aranda, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Lopez-Aranda, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Lopez-Aranda pleaded guilty in September 2015, and received time served for this offense, as shown below:
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Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Lopez-Aranda was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Lopez-Aranda for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. LopezAranda for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Lopez-Aranda’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Lopez-Aranda due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda. Mr. Lopez-Aranda does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Lopez-Aranda, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Lopez-Aranda nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Lopez-Aranda had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime. This is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 46 of 128 PageID 363 ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Based on this evidence, Mr. LopezAranda claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Lopez-Aranda for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
59. Overdetention of Moises Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Martinez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Martinez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Martinez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Martinez was found not guilty in September 2015, as shown below:
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Despite this finding, Mr. Martinez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Martinez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Martinez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Martinez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Martinez. Mr. Martinez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Martinez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Martinez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Martinez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Martinez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Martinez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 48 of 128 PageID 365
Because Mr. Martinez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Martinez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Martinez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
60. Overdetention of Javier Navarette. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Navarette, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Navarette, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Navarette after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Navarette pleaded guilty in December 2014, and received a thirty-day sentence in Dallas County Jail, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 49 of 128 PageID 366
When he finished serving his sentence, Mr. Navarette was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Navarette for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Navarette for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Navarette’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Navarette due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Navarette. Mr. Navarette does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Navarette, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Navarette nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Navarette had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime. This is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Based on this evidence, Mr. Navarette claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Navarette for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 50 of 128 PageID 367 61. Overdetention of Efren Perez Villegas. After he was arrested, an immigra-
tion hold was placed on Mr. Perez Villegas, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Perez Villegas, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Perez Villegas after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Perez Villegas pleaded guilty in September 2015, and received time served for his offense, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Perez Villegas was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Perez Villegas for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Perez Villegas for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Perez Villegas’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Perez Villegas
50

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 51 of 128 PageID 368
due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Perez Villegas. Mr. Perez Villegas does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Perez Villegas, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Perez Villegas nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Perez Villegas had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Perez Villegas was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Perez Villegas’ claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Mr. Perez Villegas had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Perez Villegas claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing
51

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 52 of 128 PageID 369 a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Perez Villegas claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Perez Villegas for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
62. Overdetention of Miguel Rodriguez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez for ICE, after he should have been released, is evidence of that hold. This is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Rodriguez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Rodriguez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County dismissed its claims against Mr. Rodriguez in March 2015, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 53 of 128 PageID 370
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Rodriguez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Rodriguez, for over 48 hours, for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Rodriguez for transfer to ICE. Mr. Rodriguez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County
53

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 54 of 128 PageID 371
and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Rodriguez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Rodriguez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Rodriguez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Rodriguez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Rodriguez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Rodriguez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr.
54

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 55 of 128 PageID 372
Rodriguez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
63. Overdetention of Eliazar Saavedra. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Saavedra, as shown below:
This hold is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Saavedra, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Saavedra after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Saavedra pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to time in Dallas County Jail. After serving his sentence, Mr. Saavedra was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Saavedra for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Saavedra for transfer to ICE. Mr. Saavedra knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Saavedra due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Saavedra. Mr. Saavedra does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Saavedra, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Saavedra nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 56 of 128 PageID 373
The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Saavedra had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Saavedra was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Saavedra’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Saavedra had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Saavedra claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Saavedra claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Saavedra for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 57 of 128 PageID 374 64. Overdetention of Andres Torres Cabrera. After he was arrested, an immigra-
tion hold was placed on Mr. Torres Cabrera, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Torres Cabrera, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Torres Cabrera after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Torres Cabrera pleaded guilty in August 2015, and received time served, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Torres Cabrera was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained cus-
57

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 58 of 128 PageID 375 tody over Mr. Torres Cabrera for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Torres Cabrera for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Torres Cabrera’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Torres Cabrera due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Torres Cabrera. The detainer for Mr. Torres Cabrera only shows that he was “subject to removal” and “has a prior felony conviction,” as shown below:
The detainer only provides evidence of a civil immigration violation, and not evidence that Mr. Torres Cabrera is committing or has committed a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Torres Cabrera claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Torres Cabrera had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Torres Cabrera for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Torres Cabrera had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
65. Overdetention of Moises Vega Costilla. A court granted Mr. Vega Costilla’s Motion for New Trial in April 2015, and he was returned to Dallas County custody. An im-
58

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 59 of 128 PageID 376 migration hold was placed on Mr. Vega Costilla, which is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Vega Costilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Vega Costilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County dismissed the charges against Mr. Vega Costilla on May 27, 2015:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 60 of 128 PageID 377
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Vega Costilla was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Vega Costilla for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Vega Costilla for transfer to ICE. Mr. Vega Costilla knows of no other hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Vega Costilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Vega Costilla. Mr. Vega Costilla does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Vega Costilla, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Vega Costilla nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Vega Costilla had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Vega Costilla was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Vega Costilla’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Vega Costilla
60

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 61 of 128 PageID 378 had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Vega Costilla claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Vega Costilla claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Vega Costilla for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
66. Overdetention of Mario Garibaldi. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Garibaldi. The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Garibaldi, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Garibaldi after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Garibaldi was ordered released from jail on August 20, 2015, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 62 of 128 PageID 379
Despite the order to release, Mr. Garibaldi was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Garibaldi for transfer to ICE, as shown by the email exchange between Mr. Hindieh and Sr. Sgt. Bruner, below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 63 of 128 PageID 380
Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Garibaldi for transfer to ICE. Mr. Garibaldi knows of no other hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Garibaldi due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Garibaldi. Mr. Garibaldi does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Garibaldi, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Garibaldi nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Garibaldi had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Garibaldi was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Garibaldi’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by
63

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 64 of 128 PageID 381
ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Garibaldi had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Garibaldi claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Garibaldi claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Garibaldi for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
67. Overdetention of Rodolfo Marmolejo. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Marmolejo, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Marmolejo, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Marmolejo after he otherwise
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 65 of 128 PageID 382 would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Marmolejo was arrested for failure to pay a fine, which was paid on October 19, 2015. Despite paying the fine, Mr. Marmolejo was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Marmolejo for transfer to ICE, as shown by the exchange between Mr. Puente and Sr. Sgt. Bruner:
Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Marmolejo for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Marmolejo’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Marmolejo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Marmolejo. Mr. Marmolejo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Marmolejo, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Marmolejo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 66 of 128 PageID 383
indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Marmolejo had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Marmolejo was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Marmolejo’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Marmolejo had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Marmolejo claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Marmolejo claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Marmolejo for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 67 of 128 PageID 384 68. Overdetention of Carlos Alvarez Castro. After he was arrested, an immigra-
tion hold was placed on Mr. Alvarez Castro, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Alvarez Castro, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Alvarez Castro after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Alvarez Castro. Mr. Alvarez Castro pleaded guilty in October 2015 and received a suspended sentence, as shown below:
Despite receiving a suspended sentence, Mr. Alvarez Castro was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Alvarez Castro for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Alvarez Castro for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Alvarez Castro’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Alvarez Castro due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Alvarez Castro
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 68 of 128 PageID 385
does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Alvarez Castro, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Alvarez Castro nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Alvarez Castro had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Alvarez Castro was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Alvarez Castro’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Alvarez Castro had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Alvarez Castro claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Alvarez Castro was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 69 of 128 PageID 386 Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Alvarez Castro claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Alvarez Castro for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
69. Overdetention of Jeremias Chevez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Chevez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Chevez, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Chevez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Chevez. Mr. Chevez pleaded guilty in November 2015 to time served, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 70 of 128 PageID 387
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Chevez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Chevez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Chevez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Chevez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Chevez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Chevez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Chevez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Chevez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Chevez had not been charged with an immigration crime. Finally, because Mr. Chevez was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Chevez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 71 of 128 PageID 388 indicate that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Chevez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
70. Overdetention of Miguel Flores. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Flores, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Flores, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gutierrez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Flores. Mr. Flores was sentenced to time in Dallas County Jail, as shown below:
After serving his sentence, Mr. Flores was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Flores for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Flores for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Flores’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 72 of 128 PageID 389
County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Flores due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Flores does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Flores, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Flores nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Flores had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Flores was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Flores’ claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based off of information contained in the IDENT database. Because Mr. Flores had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Flores claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Flores
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 73 of 128 PageID 390 was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Flores claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Flores for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
71. Overdetention of Felipe Gonzalez Lujan. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Gonzalez Lujan. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was required to serve time in Dallas County Jail. After his sentence, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was not immediately released from Dallas County custody,
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 74 of 128 PageID 391
even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Gonzalez Lujan for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Gonzalez Lujan for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Gonzalez Lujan’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Gonzalez Lujan’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had not been charged with an
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immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
72. Overdetention of Luis Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 76 of 128 PageID 393
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Hernandez was sentenced to time served in October 2015, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Hernandez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Hernandez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Her-
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nandez. Mr. Hernandez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Hernandez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Hernandez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Hernandez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and
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that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
73. Overdetention of Jose Valenciano. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Valenciano, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Valenciano, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Valenciano after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Valenciano. Mr. Valenciano received a sentence to Dallas County Jail. After serving his sentence, Mr. Valenciano was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Valenciano for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Valenciano for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Valenciano’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Valenciano due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because
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of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Valenciano does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Valenciano, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Valenciano nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Valenciano had not been charged of an immigration crime. Finally, because Mr. Valenciano was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Valenciano claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Valenciano for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment.
DALLAS COUNTY DENIED PLAINTIFFS PRE-TRIAL RELEASE BASED ON AN ICE DETAINER 74. As described earlier, Plaintiffs claim the fact that Dallas County refuses immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold. More particularly, Dallas County denied pre-trial release to the Plaintiffs listed below. 75. Dallas County abridged, in two ways, Plaintiffs’ freedom from pretrial detention protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. First, Dallas County’s practice of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration
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holds directly results in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration holds, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation. Second, even if Dallas County accepts the bond, because Dallas County has a policy and practice of wrongfully detaining individuals with immigration holds for ICE on request (e.g., in violation of Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and the United States Constitution), Dallas County denies immediate release on bond, indirectly resulting in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.
76. Each of the Plaintiffs listed below either (i) posted bond and was denied pretrial release due to an ICE detainer, or (ii) did not attempt to post bond because he believed that doing so would be futile, as a result of Dallas County’s policies and practices explained above. In particular, Plaintiffs claim as fact that, under Dallas County’s policies and practices, if a detainee with an immigration hold were to pay bond, either (i) Dallas County would hold the detainee (ostensibly for less than 48 hours) for transfer to ICE (as described above), or (ii) on request from ICE, Mr. Bruner would ask a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney to notify the Court that the bond was insufficient, so that Dallas County could maintain custody over the detainee. See supra ¶¶ 37-45. As explained supra, Dallas County’s policies and practices are widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community. See supra ¶¶ 46-47.
77. Plaintiffs claim as fact that immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, the community, and the Plaintiffs identified below, knew that Dallas County never afforded
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immediate release on bond for those with immigration holds and ICE detainers. Because Dallas County set up a system where those with immigration holds and ICE detainers could not receive immediate release on bond, Dallas County cannot claim surprise when most detainees with immigration holds or ICE detainers do not waste the time or money to secure bond in a futile effort to obtain immediate release.
78. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Arturo Mercado. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Mercado, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Mercado, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Mercado after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Mercado in February 2015, showing that Mr. Mercado was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Mercado did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Mercado knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Mercado could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Mercado to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Mercado, as Dallas County had no
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other basis to believe that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Mercado, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Mercado. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Mercado’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Mercado due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Mercado. Mr. Mercado does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Mercado, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Mercado nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Mercado had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Mercado was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)), marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Mercado’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based off of in-
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formation contained in the IDENT database. Because Mr. Mercado had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Mercado claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Mercado claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Mercado pretrial.
79. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Pablo Carranza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Carranza, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Carranza, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Carranza after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Carranza in May 2015, showing that Mr. Carranza was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Carranza did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Car-
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ranza knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Carranza could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Carranza to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Carranza, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Carranza, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Carranza. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Carranza’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Carranza due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Carranza. Mr. Carranza does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Carranza, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Carranza nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Carranza had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Carranza was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose
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role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Carranza’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Carranza had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Carranza claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Carranza claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Carranza pretrial.
80. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Sergio Diaz. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Diaz, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Diaz, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Diaz after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Diaz in January 2015, showing that Mr. Diaz was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Diaz did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Diaz knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Diaz could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. In fact, after ICE withdrew the detainer in August 2015, Dallas County allowed Mr. Diaz to pay bond, and Mr. Diaz could only then pay bond and be released, pretrial. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Diaz to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Diaz, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Diaz had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Diaz, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Diaz. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by the fact that Dallas County did, in fact, release Mr. Diaz after Dallas County finally allowed him to pay bail. Based on this evidence, Mr. Diaz claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Diaz pretrial.
81. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jose Gutierrez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gutierrez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gutierrez, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gutierrez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Gutierrez. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Gutierrez in July 2015, showing that Mr. Gutierrez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Gutierrez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Gutierrez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Gutierrez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Gutierrez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Gutierrez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Gutierrez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Gutierrez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported
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by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Gutierrez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gutierrez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Gutierrez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Gutierrez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Gutierrez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Gutierrez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Gutierrez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Gutierrez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Gutierrez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Gutierrez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr.
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Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Gutierrez was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Gutierrez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Gutierrez pretrial.
82. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Heydy Jarquin Jimenez. After she was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. Evidence of this hold include (i) the fact that bail was set at $100,000, which was standard practice for those with immigration holds, and (ii) the fact that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was overdetained for transfer to ICE. This is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, requesting that Dallas County detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez after she otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Ms. Jarquin Jimenez in November 2014, showing that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was eligible for pretrial release. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez did not attempt to pay bond because she believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Ms. Jarquin Jimenez knew that she had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individu-
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als with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Ms. Jarquin Jimenez to pay bail on her original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral pur-
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pose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Ms. Jarquin Jimenez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based off of information contained in the IDENT database. Because Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez pretrial.
83. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jose Lopez-Aranda. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez-Aranda, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Lopez-Aranda, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Lopez-Aranda in
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May 2015, showing that Mr. Lopez-Aranda was eligible for pretrial release. On information and belief, Mr. Lopez-Aranda attempted to pay bond, and Dallas County would not accept the bond. In the alternative, Mr. Lopez-Aranda did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Lopez-Aranda knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Lopez-Aranda could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Lopez-Aranda to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Lopez-Aranda, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Lopez-Aranda’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Lopez-Aranda due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda. Mr. Lopez-Aranda does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Lopez-Aranda, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Lopez-Aranda nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr.
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Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Lopez-Aranda had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime. This is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Based on this evidence, Mr. Lopez-Aranda claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Lopez-Aranda pretrial.
84. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Moises Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Martinez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Martinez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Martinez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Martinez in April 2015, showing that Mr. Martinez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Martinez attempted to pay bond, but Dallas County would not allow Mr. Martinez to do so, due to the immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Martinez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. In fact, after being held pretrial for over a month on a purported misdemeanor (on which he was later found innocent), Mr. Martinez sought to be granted “time served” to avoid further pretrial detention:
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Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Martinez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Martinez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Martinez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Martinez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed
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in Mr. Martinez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Martinez. Mr. Martinez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Martinez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Martinez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Martinez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Martinez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Martinez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Martinez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Martinez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Martinez had committed or
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was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Martinez pretrial.
85. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Javier Navarette. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Navarette, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Navarette, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Navarette after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Navarette in December 2014, showing that Mr. Navarette was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Navarette did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Navarette knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Navarette could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Navarette to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Navarette, as Dallas
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County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Navarette, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Navarette. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Navarette’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Navarette due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Navarette. Mr. Navarette does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Navarette, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Navarette nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Navarette had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime. This is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Based on this evidence, Mr. Navarette claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Navarette pretrial.
86. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Efren Perez Villegas. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Perez Villegas, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Perez Villegas, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Perez Villegas after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Perez Villegas in June 2015, showing that Mr. Perez Villegas was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Perez Villegas did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Perez Villegas knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Perez Villegas could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Perez Villegas to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Perez Villegas, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Perez Villegas, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Perez Villegas. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Perez Villegas’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact
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that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Perez Villegas due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Perez Villegas. Mr. Perez Villegas does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Perez Villegas, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Perez Villegas nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Perez Villegas had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Perez Villegas was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)), marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Perez Villegas’ claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Based on this evidence, Mr. Perez Villegas claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Perez Villegas pretrial.
87. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Miguel Rodriguez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodri-
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guez for ICE, after he should have been released, is evidence of that hold. This is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Rodriguez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Rodriguez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Rodriguez in February 2015, showing that Mr. Rodriguez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Rodriguez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Rodriguez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Rodriguez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Rodriguez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Rodriguez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Rodriguez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Rodriguez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Rodriguez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Rodriguez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the
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detainer does not indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Rodriguez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Rodriguez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Rodriguez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Rodriguez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Rodriguez pretrial.
88. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Eleazar Saavedra. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Saavedra, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Saavedra, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Saavedra after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Saavedra in April 2015, showing that Mr. Saavedra was eligible for pretrial release. On information and belief, Mr. Saavedra attempted to pay bail, but Dallas County would not allow him to because of the pending immigration hold. In the alternative, Mr. Saavedra did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Saavedra knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Saavedra could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Saavedra to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Saavedra, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Saavedra, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Saavedra. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense
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is supported by evidence. Mr. Saavedra knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Saavedra due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Saavedra. Mr. Saavedra does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Saavedra, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Saavedra nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Saavedra had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Saavedra was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Saavedra’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Saavedra had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Saavedra claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 104 of 128 PageID 421 committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Saavedra claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Saavedra pretrial.
89. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Andres Torres Cabrera. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Torres Cabrera, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Torres Cabrera, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Torres Cabrera after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Torres Cabrera in May 2015, showing that Mr. Torres Cabrera was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Torres Cabrera did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Torres Cabrera knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Torres Cabrera could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 105 of 128 PageID 422 with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Torres Cabrera to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Torres Cabrera, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Torres Cabrera had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Torres Cabrera, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Torres Cabrera. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Torres Cabrera’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Torres Cabrera due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Torres Cabrera. The detainer for Mr. Torres Cabrera only shows that he was “subject to removal” and “has a prior felony conviction,” as shown below:
The detainer only provides evidence of a civil immigration violation, and not evidence that Mr. Torres Cabrera is committing or has committed a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr.
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Torres Cabrera claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Torres Cabrera pretrial.
90. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Moises Vega Costilla. A court granted Mr. Vega Costilla’s Motion for New Trial in April 2015, and he was returned to Dallas County custody. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega Costilla, which is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Vega Costilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Vega Costilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Vega Costilla in April 2015, showing that Mr. Vega Costilla was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Vega Costilla did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Vega Costilla knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Vega Costilla could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Vega Costilla to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Vega Costilla, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Vega Costilla, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Vega Costilla. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Vega Costilla knows of no other hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Vega Costilla
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due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Vega Costilla. Mr. Vega Costilla does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Vega Costilla, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Vega Costilla nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Vega Costilla had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Vega Costilla was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Vega Costilla’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Vega Costilla had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Vega Costilla claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a
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crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Vega Costilla claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Vega Costilla pretrial.
91. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Ricardo Garza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Garza even though Mr. Garza is a U.S. Citizen. The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Garza, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Garza after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Garza. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Garza in Dallas County November 2015, showing that Mr. Garza was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Garza did not attempt to pay bond in Dallas County because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Garza knew that he had an immigration hold. After the ICE hold was removed, Dallas County allowed Mr. Garza to pay bail, as shown in the excerpt below from Mr. Garza’s docket sheet:
After Dallas County allowed bail, Mr. Garza paid bail and secured immediate pretrial release. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Garza could have and would have secured a bond in November 2015 to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Garza to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County
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should have released Mr. Garza, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Garza had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Garza, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Garza. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by the fact that Dallas County did, in fact, release Mr. Garza on bail once the ICE hold was removed. Finally, because Mr. Garza was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Garza claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Garza pretrial.
92. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Carlos Alvarez Castro. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Alvarez Castro, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Alvarez Castro, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Alvarez Castro after
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he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Alvarez Castro. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Alvarez Castro in October 2015, showing that Mr. Alvarez Castro was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Alvarez Castro did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Alvarez Castro knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Alvarez Castro could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Alvarez Castro to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Alvarez Castro, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Alvarez Castro, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Alvarez Castro. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Alvarez Castro’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Alvarez Castro due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Alvarez Castro does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Alvarez Castro, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Alvarez Castro nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Alvarez
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Castro had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Alvarez Castro had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Alvarez Castro was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Alvarez Castro’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Alvarez Castro had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Alvarez Castro claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Alvarez Castro was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this
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evidence, Mr. Alvarez Castro claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Alvarez Castro pretrial.
93. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jeremias Chevez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Chevez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Chevez, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Chevez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Chevez. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Chevez in February 2015, showing that Mr. Chevez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Chevez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Chevez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Chevez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Chevez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Chevez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Chevez had com-
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mitted or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Chevez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Chevez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Chevez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Chevez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Chevez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Chevez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Chevez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Chevez had not been charged with an immigration crime. Finally, because Mr. Chevez was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Chevez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Chevez pretrial.
94. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Miguel Flores. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Flores, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Flores, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Flores after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Flores. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Flores in October 2015, showing that Mr. Flores was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Flores did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Flores knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Flores could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Flores to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Flores, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Flores, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Flores. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr.
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Flores’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Flores due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Flores does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Flores, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Flores nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Flores had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Flores was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Flores’ claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Flores had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Flores claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 31 Filed 07/05/16 Page 116 of 128 PageID 433 did not show that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Flores was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Flores claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Flores pretrial.
95. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Filipe Gonzalez Lujan. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Gonzalez Lujan. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Gonzalez Lujan in August 2015, showing that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr.
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Gonzalez Lujan knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Gonzalez Lujan to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Gonzalez Lujan’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employ-
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ment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Gonzalez Lujan’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. Finally, because Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan pretrial.
96. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Luis Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Hernandez in May 2015, showing that Mr. Hernandez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Hernandez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Hernandez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Hernandez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Hernandez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Hernandez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Hernandez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Hernandez. The fact that Dallas County did not have
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probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Hernandez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Hernandez, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Hernandez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 8-9. Because Mr. Hernandez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez
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had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Hernandez pretrial.
97. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jose Valenciano. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Valenciano, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Valenciano, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Valenciano after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Valenciano. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Valenciano in September 2015, showing that Mr. Valenciano was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Valenciano did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Valenciano knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Valenciano could have and
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would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Valenciano to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Valenciano, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Valenciano, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Valenciano. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Valenciano’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Valenciano due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. Mr. Valenciano does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County, and Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez will not provide that detainer to Mr. Valenciano, despite requesting the detainer from their attorney. Mr. Valenciano nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a crime. The forms used by ICE generally indicate civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Valenciano had not been charged of an immigration crime. Finally, because Mr. Valenciano was arrested after June 2015, ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that the subject is a removable alien.” Based on this evidence, Mr. Valenciano claims as fact that Dallas County did not have
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probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Valenciano pretrial.
COUNT 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—DENIAL OF PRETRIAL RELEASE (ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT MARIO GARIBALDI AND RODOLFO MARMOLEJO) 98. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs. 99. The Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause. 100. Dallas County must allow an opportunity for pretrial release that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 101. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established. 102. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments protect every person against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, unless the interference is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 103. Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental and clearly established right. 104. Defendants imposed pretrial detention on Plaintiffs, infringing the Plaintiffs’ strong interest in liberty. This intentional or reckless pretrial detention is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 6 105. Based on the facts and allegations at ¶¶ 7-18, 22-50, and 74-77, which are incorporated by reference, Plaintiffs claim that Dallas County did not allow an opportunity for pretrial release for those with immigration holds, even when a court nominally set bail. In 6 The Court originally dismissed Plaintiffs’ pretrial-release claims for (i) failure to plead adequate facts and (ii) because the claims sound under the Fourth Amendment instead of the Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 30). Plaintiffs replead the pretrial-release claims under both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs do not expect that the dueprocess claims will survive if the Court reapplies the reasoning in its prior opinion, but Plaintiffs seek to protect the appellate record by reurging the Due Process claim with the more fulsome factual explanation in the Amended Complaint.
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particular, if any detainee with an immigration hold (such as plaintiffs) paid bail, Dallas County would either (i) continue to hold the detainee for transfer to ICE, or (ii) Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office would ask an assistant district attorney to petition a court to find the bail insufficient. Based on this evidence, Plaintiffs claim that Dallas County did not allow immediate release on bond to Plaintiffs. Further, each Plaintiff either (i) attempted to pay bail, and was not released, or (ii) believed paying bail to be a futile exercise, based on the widespread knowledge of Dallas County’s refusal to allow immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds.
106. Plaintiffs make more particularized allegations at ¶¶ 78-97, which are incorporated by reference. Based on those allegations and evidence, as well as those found at ¶¶ 718, 22-50, and 74-77, Plaintiffs claim that Dallas County did not allow immediate release on bond to Plaintiffs. Further, Plaintiffs either (i) attempted to pay bail, and were not released, or (ii) believed paying bail to be a futile exercise, based on the widespread knowledge of Dallas County’s refusal to allow immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds.
107. If Dallas County had allowed bail, Dallas County would have needed to release Plaintiffs if Plaintiffs had paid bail, as Dallas County had no other probable cause to believe that any Plaintiff had committed or was committing criminal activity, for the reasons stated at ¶¶ 78-97, which are incorporated by reference. Further, Plaintiffs either (i) attempted to pay bail, and were not released, or (ii) believed paying bail to be a futile exercise, based on the widespread knowledge of Dallas County’s refusal to allow immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds.
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108. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds. In particular, if any detainee with an immigration hold (such as plaintiffs) paid bail, Dallas County would either (i) continue to hold the detainee for transfer to ICE, or (ii) Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office would ask an assistant district attorney to petition a court to find the bail insufficient. Holding plaintiffs without an adequate opportunity for bail violates Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and/or the United States Constitution. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for these policies and practices. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i) whether to refuse bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.
109. As a result of Dallas County’s actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
COUNT 2: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—OVERDETENTION (ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT SERGIO DIAZ AND RICARDO GARZA) 110. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs. 111. The Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause. 112. When an individual is found not guilty, has all charges dropped against him or her, serves his or her sentence, or pleads guilty and receives no additional jail time, Dallas County must release that individual, absent a separate showing of probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 113. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established. 114. Dallas County has a policy and practice of detaining individuals with immigration holds who have otherwise been cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed or other authority
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that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Instead, Dallas County justifies its detentions with ICE-issued requests to detain that neither satisfy the Fourth Amendment nor show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed.
115. As shown at ¶¶ 7-18, 22-34, and 51-53, which are incorporated by reference, Dallas County detained Plaintiffs after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail, without probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Further, Dallas County detained certain Plaintiffs for more than 48 hours.
116. Plaintiffs make Plaintiff-specific allegations at ¶¶ 54-73, which are incorporated by reference. As explained therein, along with the allegations and facts at ¶¶ 7-18, 2234, and 51-53 (which are incorporated by reference), Plaintiffs were detained after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. But, as explained at at least ¶¶ 54-73, Dallas County did not know of any facts that showed that each Plaintiff had committed or was committing a new criminal violation sufficient to show probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, each Plaintiff should have been released after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail.
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117. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s policy of honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even if Dallas County has no probable cause of a new criminal violation, and (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for this policy. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decision on whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.
118. As a result of Dallas County’s actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
JURY DEMAND 119. Plaintiffs demand a jury on all issues so triable.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiffs request the following relief:
i. That the Court award Plaintiffs actual and compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
ii. That the Court award pre-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, continuing until such judgment is paid, at the maximum rate allowed by law;
iii. That Defendants pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees and costs as permitted by law, including as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
iv. That the Court award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Dated: July 5, 2016

Respectfully submitted,
/s Anthony M. Garza ANTHONY M. GARZA
Texas State Bar No. 24050644 agarza@ccrglaw.com CHARHON CALLAHAN ROBSON & GARZA, PLLC 3333 Lee Parkway, Suite 460 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 521-6400 Telecopier: (214) 764-8392
ERIC PUENTE Texas State Bar No. 24069225 epuente@phflaw.com
RAYMOND M. HINDIEH Texas State Bar No. 24078666 rhindieh@phflaw.com
PUENTE & HINDIEH PLLC 3300 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 401 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 730-0485 Telecopier: (214) 730-0520
Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On July 5, 2016, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic-case-filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).
/s Anthony M. Garza ANTHONY M. GARZA

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

ARTURO MERCADO, et al., Plaintiffs,
VS. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,
Defendant.

§ § § § Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-3481-D § (Consolidated with Civil Action No. § 3:15-CV-4008-D) § § §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

defendant Dallas County, Texas (“Dallas County”), alleging that it violated their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to grant them immediate release on bond and by

detaining them based on immigration holds after they were otherwise eligible for release.

Dallas County moves in a first amended motion1 to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),

(6), and (7) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, and failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19. It separately moves

under Rule 12(f) to strike the exhibits to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (“amended

complaint”). Plaintiffs move to lift the discovery stay currently in place and to compel

1Dallas County filed its motion to dismiss on August 19, 2016 and filed its first amended motion on August 30, 2016. In the first amended motion, Dallas County has withdrawn the affidavit of Jim Patterson that it filed in support of its motion in order to assert a facial attack in lieu of a factual attack on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In this memorandum opinion and order, the court will refer to the amended motion as Dallas County’s motion to dismiss. The original motion is deemed to have been superseded by the first amended motion.

Dallas County to produce their individual immigration detainers. For the following reasons,
the court grants in part and denies in part Dallas County’s motion to dismiss, denies Dallas
County’s motion to strike, and denies plaintiffs’ motion to compel detainers and lift stay as
moot.
I
Because this case is the subject of a prior memorandum opinion and order, see
Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas, 2016 WL 3166306 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2016) (Fitzwater,
J.) (“Mercado I”), the court will recount only the background facts and procedural history
that are pertinent to this decision.
Plaintiffs are former detainees of the Dallas County jail (“DCJ”).2 They allege that,
while they were being held in detention by Dallas County in connection with state criminal
charges, they were the subjects of federal immigration detainers issued by U.S. Immigration
2In deciding Dallas County’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court construes the amended complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. See, e.g., Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004). “The court’s review [of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] is limited to the [amended] complaint, any documents attached to the [amended] complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the [amended] complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can mount either a facial or factual challenge. See, e.g., Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 2013 WL 607151, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981)). When a party makes a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without including evidence, the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial. Id. The court assesses a facial challenge as it does a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that it “looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523).
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and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”), that requested, inter alia, that Dallas County detain them for up to 48 hours after
the time they otherwise would have been released, in order to facilitate their arrest by ICE.
According to the amended complaint, each plaintiff either attempted to post bond and was
denied pretrial release due to an ICE detainer or did not attempt to post bond because he
believed that doing so would be futile. In addition, after each plaintiff was cleared for release,3 he was detained solely on the basis of the ICE detainer.
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs sue Dallas County4 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that Dallas County did not allow them immediate release on bond,5 in violation
of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and detained them after they were
otherwise cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that they had committed a criminal offense,6 in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Dallas County
moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (6), and (7). It also moves under Rule 12(f) to strike
the exhibits attached to plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Plaintiffs oppose Dallas County’s
3Plaintiffs allege that each plaintiff was detained after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in the DCJ.
4Although plaintiffs initially sued Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez (“Sheriff Valdez”), they do not name Sheriff Valdez as a defendant in their amended complaint.
5All plaintiffs except Mario Garibaldi and Rodolfo Marmolejo assert the § 1983 claim for denial of pretrial release.
6Plaintiffs refer to this claim as their “overdetention” claim and assert it on behalf of all plaintiffs except Sergio Diaz and Ricardo Garza.
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motions and move to lift the discovery stay currently in place and to compel Dallas County to produce plaintiffs’ ICE detainers.
II The court first considers Dallas County’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under Rules 12(b)(1), in which it challenges plaintiffs’ standing.7
A “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can mount either a facial or factual challenge. See, e.g., Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 2013 WL 607151, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2013) (Fitzwater, C. J.) (citing Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981)). When a party makes a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without including evidence, the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial. Id. The court assesses a facial challenge as it does a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that it “looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that
7“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
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jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
B The standing doctrine addresses the question of who may properly bring suit in federal court, and “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”8 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). It “involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To establish standing, a plaintiff must meet both constitutional and prudential requirements. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir. 2001). Dallas County contends that plaintiffs lack constitutional standing, which requires that a litigant establish three elements: (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete and actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) a fairly traceable causal link between the injury and the defendants’ actions; and (3) that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).
C Dallas County maintains that plaintiffs cannot meet the “causal link” requirement of constitutional standing with respect to their “overdetention” claim because 8 C.F.R. §
8“‘Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus can be contested by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.’” Little v. Tex. Attorney Gen., 2015 WL 5613321, at *2 n.5. (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2015) (Fitzwater, J.) (citation omitted), aff’d, 655 Fed. Appx. 1027 (5th Cir. 2016).
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287.7(d) provides that the local law enforcement agency “shall” maintain custody of an alien pursuant to an ICE detainer, and plaintiffs’ alleged detention in the DCJ after they were otherwise eligible for release was caused by the independent action of ICE in issuing the immigration detainers, not by Dallas County. Regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based on Dallas County’s alleged failure to allow bond, Dallas County contends that plaintiffs have failed to allege that Dallas County or Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez (“Sheriff Valdez”) had the authority to set bond or to allow them to post bond in connection with the state criminal charges pending against them (only the presiding judge in these cases had authority to set bonds in connection with the state criminal charges); plaintiffs do not allege that they actually tendered bond in the requisite amount in order to become eligible for release; and plaintiffs have therefore failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the injury complained of (denial of bond) that is fairly traceable to Dallas County or Sheriff Valdez and is not the independent action of a third party not before the court (the presiding judge in each respective criminal case).
Plaintiffs respond that Dallas County’s standing argument raises issues that should be addressed on the merits (i.e., whether Dallas County is ultimately responsible for the overdetention of plaintiffs and whether it was futile for plaintiffs to attempt to post bail); that Dallas County’s treatment of plaintiffs (i.e., detaining them for 48 hours rather than almost instantaneously transferring them to ICE custody) was a policy choice that resulted in plaintiffs’ overdetention; that plaintiffs did not post bail because attempting to do so is known to be futile for those with immigration holds because it will not result in immediate
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release and it is Dallas County’s policy choices that caused plaintiffs’ pretrial detention, regardless of whether plaintiffs attempted to post bail; and that Dallas County’s policies and practices removed the possibility of pretrial release because a detainee with an immigration hold will not be released even if he posts bail, thus nullifying the judges’ decisions to set bail for the plaintiffs.
D Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs were injured for purposes of Article III standing or that their injuries are redressable. To the extent Dallas County challenges the “fairly traceable” element of standing, the court rejects Dallas County’s arguments, concluding that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the facts necessary for the court to conclude that they have Article III standing. “[T]he fairly traceable element of standing doctrine imposes a causation standard that is lower than the tort standard of proximate causation.” TF-Harbor, LLC v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 18 F.Supp.3d 810, 820 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Dist. 19 v. City of Boerne, 659 F.3d 421, 431 (5th Cir. 2011)), aff’d, 592 Fed. Appx. 323 (5th Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting cases and discussing difference between “fairly traceable” standard and proximate causation). “[T]he fairly traceable element does not require that the defendant’s challenged action be the last act in the chain of events leading to the plaintiff’s injury. TFHarbor, 18 F.Supp.3d at 820 (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168-69). In support of their “overdetention” claim, plaintiffs allege that ICE detainers are
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“requests” that Dallas County could have refused to honor,9 and that it was Dallas County’s decision to honor ICE detention requests that resulted in the deprivation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court addresses below the merits of the parties’ arguments regarding the voluntary nature of the ICE detainers. See infra § III (C)(3). But for purposes of the “fairly traceable” element of Article III standing, it is sufficient that plaintiffs have alleged that ICE detainers are “requests” that Dallas County could have refused to honor, and that Dallas County’s policy of honoring these requests and detaining individuals subject to immigration holds after they were otherwise eligible for release violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
In support of their denial of pretrial release claim, plaintiffs allege that, even when a court nominally sets bail, Dallas County does not allow an opportunity for pretrial release because if a detainee with an ICE detainer posts bail, Dallas County either continues to hold the detainee for transfer to ICE or asks the District Attorney to petition the court to find that the amount of bail is insufficient. In other words, plaintiffs assert that the actions of Dallas County (not of the presiding judge who sets the bail amount) in refusing to release on bond detainees with immigration holds results in depriving these detainees of their constitutional rights. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the “fairly traceable” element of Article III standing.
As to the plaintiffs who did not post bond in the requisite amount (i.e., all but Jose
9Plaintiff allege that “[b]ecause detainers are ‘requests,’ local law-enforcement agencies need not respond or comply with detainers.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
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Lopez-Aranda, Moises Martinez, and Eleazar Saavedra), it is clearly established in this circuit that
[t]o achieve standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, and generally, “must submit to the challenged policy” before pursuing an action to dispute it. Ellison v. Connor, 153 F.3d 247, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1998). However, strict adherence to the standing doctrine may be excused when a policy’s flat prohibition would render submission futile. Ellison, 153 F.3d at 255 (citing Moore v. United States Dept. of Agric., 993 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1993)). LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2005) (some citations omitted). The plaintiffs who did not post bond have alleged that they could have and would have done so to secure their pretrial release, but because it “was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold,” and because they each knew that they were the subject of an immigration hold, they did not attempt to post bond because they believed that doing so would be futile. Am. Compl. ¶ 78. In other words, plaintiffs have alleged that Dallas County’s well-known practice of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold made it futile for the plaintiffs who were the subject of these immigration holds to post bond. Based on these allegations, the court concludes that “[t]he non-conforming plaintiffs’ [posting bond in the requisite amount] would have been a futility for standing purposes,” LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 414, and that despite their failure to post bond, plaintiffs have standing to pursue their denial of pretrial release claim. The court thus concludes that plaintiffs have standing to bring their § 1983 claims, and it denies Dallas County’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(1).
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III The court now turns to Dallas County’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ constitutional claims brought under § 1983 for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
A In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court evaluates the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ amended complaint “by accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s].” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (brackets omitted)
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(quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” it demands more than “labels and conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
B “Section 1983 provides a private right of action against parties acting ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State’ to redress the deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal law.” Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988)). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating already conferred federal rights.” Id. (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs “must show that: 1) the offending conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.” Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). Because plaintiffs are suing Dallas County, they also must satisfy additional requirements to recover under § 1983. A county “can be found liable under § 1983 only where the [county] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton, Ohio
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v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978)) (addressing municipal liability). A county cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, to recover against Dallas County under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).
C The court first considers whether plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when they were detained for up to 48 hours10 after they were otherwise eligible for release, without probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense had been or was being committed.
1 Dallas County contends that plaintiffs’ “overdetention” claim does not allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It maintains that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether probable cause exists to support a detention; that “[t]he unchallenged
10Plaintiffs allege that “at times, Dallas County detains individuals for ICE for more than 48 hours,” Am. Compl. ¶ 30, and that Dallas County detained plaintiffs Heydy Jarquin Jimenez and Miguel Rodriguez for more than 48 hours for transfer to ICE. Dallas County disputes these allegations, but does move to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim on the basis that holding a detainee for more than 48 hours based solely on an ICE detainer would not result in a violation of the detainee’s constitutional rights.
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existence of probable cause to support removability under the immigration laws was all that was required to support the Plaintiffs’ immigration detainers,” D. 8/19/16 Br. 20; that plaintiffs have not alleged that any of their immigration detainers were not supported by probable cause; that after the plaintiffs were otherwise entitled to release from custody, no plaintiff was detained for a period in excess of the time authorized by the federal regulation; that if any plaintiff was detained after the time he was eligible for release on state criminal charges, such detention was mandated by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d); and that even if plaintiffs had alleged that the immigration detainers were unsupported by probable cause, they still would not be able to state a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim because they do not allege that the immigration detainers were facially invalid.
Plaintiffs respond that, to detain a suspect, the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; that because immigration violations are generally civil in nature, belief that a detainee has committed a run-of-the mill immigration violation does not meet the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard; that although federal immigration officials may arrest based on probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a civil immigration violation, Dallas County cannot rely on this exception and instead must satisfy the traditional criminal probable cause standard; that ICE requests to detain do not confer federal immigration authority to arrest, without a warrant, those in the country illegally; that even an ICE officer cannot arrest without a warrant unless special circumstances (not present here) exist, and ICE officers cannot delegate powers that they cannot exercise themselves; that an ICE detainer
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suggests unlawful presence, but does not show probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and an ICE detainer does not therefore provide probable cause sufficient for Dallas County to arrest plaintiffs; that ICE detainers only show probable cause of a civil violation, not a crime; and that, even if Dallas County were permitted to hold plaintiffs, it was not allowed to hold them for more than 48 hours, and plaintiffs should be permitted to determine through discovery which plaintiffs were overdetained more than 48 hours.
2 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated [.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Pretrial detention constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Whittington v. Maxwell, 455 Fed. Appx. 450, 458 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998)). Under the Fourth Amendment, “a fair and reliable determination of probable cause” must be provided “as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979) (citation omitted); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“[W]e hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”). The Supreme Court has defined “probable cause” as “facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.’” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “Probable cause exists if, under the totality of circumstances, there is a fair probability that
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. . . an illegal act is taking place.” United States v. Thompson, 2012 WL 1161609, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing United States v. Newman, 472 F.3d 233, 236-37 (5th Cir. 2006)).
The parties appear to agree that, under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, absent “probable cause,” Dallas County was not permitted to detain the plaintiffs after they were otherwise eligible for release. As stated above, probable cause exists when the arresting officer has reason to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a criminal offense. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12; see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”). Generally, a reasonable belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a civil offense is insufficient to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., John Doe v. Metro. Police Dep’t of D.C., 445 F.3d 460, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Because the four Jane Does were arrested for a civil offense, their claims state a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1995) (“probable cause can only exist in relation to criminal conduct”); McKinney v. Fields, 2010 WL 3583017, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2010) (“The concept of probable cause makes sense only in relation to criminal offenses . . . [and as] a result, an arrest for a ‘civil infraction,’ . . . is ‘unreasonable.’” (citations omitted)).11
11As the court noted in Mercado I:
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The Supreme Court has characterized deportation and removal proceedings as “civil in nature.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010); see also Arizona v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.”). Lower federal courts have done so as well. See, e.g., Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Because civil immigration violations do not constitute crimes, suspicion or knowledge that an individual has committed a civil immigration violation, by itself, does not give a law enforcement officer probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.”); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause mere unauthorized presence is not a criminal matter, suspicion of unauthorized presence alone does not give rise to an inference that criminal activity is ‘afoot.’” (citation omitted)).12 In Santos the Fourth Circuit held that “absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.” Santos, 725 F.3d at 465.
The court’s holding today is limited to the facts alleged and does not address whether, and to what extent, the Fourth Amendment limits federal immigration officials (or those to whom immigration authority has been properly delegated) from arresting individuals suspected of immigration violations. Mercado I, 2016 WL 3166306, at *6 n.14. 12Dallas County agrees that “[i]mmigration proceedings are civil in nature.” Supp. Reply 4.
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In Mercado I the court dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, holding, inter alia, that
they had failed to plausibly allege that Dallas County lacked probable cause to believe that
they had committed a criminal offense. Mercado I, 2016 WL 3166306, at *7. In their
amended complaint, plaintiffs allege, inter alia, for each individual plaintiff, that after he was
arrested, an immigration hold was placed on his file; that ICE sent detainers requesting that
Dallas County detain each plaintiff for transfer to ICE after he would otherwise have been
released; that each plaintiff was eligible for release due to Dallas County’s dropping all
pending criminal charges, the detainee’s being found innocent of all pending criminal
charges, the detainee’s pleading guilty but receiving no additional jail time, or the detainee’s
pleading guilty and serving his sentence in the DCJ, such that Dallas County no longer had
probable cause to hold him for his original alleged criminal offense; that instead of releasing
each plaintiff, Dallas County maintained custody over him for transfer to ICE; that the ICE
detainer for each plaintiff does not indicate that he had committed or was committing a crime13; that no plaintiff was charged or convicted of an immigration crime and or guilty of
13Dallas County has refused to provide plaintiffs copies of the detainers that ICE sent to Dallas County for each individual plaintiff. For some plaintiffs, the amended complaint alleges that “the detainer does not indicate that [the individual plaintiff] had committed or was committing a crime,” and that “[t]he form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations.” Am. Compl. ¶ 54; see also id. at ¶¶ 55-63, 65-73. For plaintiffs who were arrested after June 2015, plaintiffs allege:
ICE used either the I-247N or I-247D form. Neither the I-247D form nor the I-247N form provides probable cause of a criminal violation. The I-247D form explicitly only claims that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien,” and the I-247N form explicitly only claims that “DHS suspects that
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an immigration crime14; that there was nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate
that the plaintiff had committed or was committing a crime; that Dallas County overdetained
each plaintiff solely based on an ICE detainer that did not indicate that he had committed or
were committing a crime; and that Dallas County held each plaintiff for transfer to ICE
without probable cause to believe that he had committed or was committing a crime. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 54-73. The court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to allege that
Dallas County detained the plaintiffs after they were otherwise eligible for release, solely on
the basis of Dallas County’s belief that plaintiffs had committed a civil immigration offense
and without probable cause to believe they had committed a criminal offense. In other
words, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged—and Dallas County does not dispute—that Dallas
the subject is a removable alien.”
Id. at ¶¶ 56, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73. And for plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera, the amended complaint alleges that “[t]he detainer for Mr. Torres Cabrera only shows that he was ‘subject to removal’ and ‘has a prior felony conviction.’” Id. at ¶ 64.
14Plaintiffs allege, for each individual detainee other than Jose Lopez-Aranda, Javier Navarette, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jeremias Chevez, and Jose Valenciano, that they were
innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328).
Am. Compl. ¶ 54. -18-

County detained them after they were otherwise eligible for release, without probable cause
to believe they had committed or were committing a criminal offense. These allegations
plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
3
Dallas County maintains that its conduct was justified based on the mandatory nature
of the ICE detainers. It contends that, to the extent it detained any plaintiff after he was
otherwise eligible for release, it did so “in compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) and the ICE
detainer,” and it “was simply complying with its duty to cooperate with ICE and follow
federal law.” Reply 6. The court concludes, however, that 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) does not
mandate that local law enforcement detain persons who are subject to detainers; instead, it
only requests voluntary compliance in detaining suspected aliens.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) authorizes the issuance of detainers, providing, in pertinent part:
[a] detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (emphasis added). Section 287.7(d) states, under the heading
“Temporary detention at Department request”:
Upon a determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays
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in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department. Id. § 287.7(d).
In Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014), the Third Circuit addressed whether immigration detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 impose mandatory obligations on state and local law enforcement agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to removal. Id. at 639. It concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 does not compel state or local law enforcement agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to removal pending release to immigration officials. Instead, it “merely authorizes the issuance of detainers as requests to local [law enforcement agencies].” Id. at 645. In reaching its holding, the court first considered the language of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. It explained that
[t]he words “shall maintain custody,” in the context of the regulation as a whole, appear next to the use of the word “request” throughout the regulation. Given that the title of § 287.7(d) is “Temporary detention at Department request” and that § 287.7(a) generally defines a detainer as a “request,” it is hard to read the use of the word “shall” in the timing section to change the nature of the entire regulation. Id. at 640. The court then noted that, even if the use of the word “shall” in § 287.7(d) created some ambiguity, no court of appeals had ever described ICE detainers as anything but requests; no provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., authorized federal officials to command local or state officials to detain suspected aliens subject to removal; and all federal agencies and departments having an interest in the matter had consistently described such detainers as requests. Id. Moreover, the court held that, “[e]ven if there were any doubt about whether immigration detainers are requests and not
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mandatory orders to local law enforcement officials, settled constitutional law clearly establishes that they must be deemed requests.” Id. at 643. This is because “[u]nder the Tenth Amendment, immigration officials may not order state and local officials to imprison suspected aliens subject to removal at the request of the federal government,” and “a conclusion that a detainer issued by a federal agency is an order that state and local agencies are compelled to follow, is inconsistent with the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.” Id. Accordingly, on the basis that ICE detainers are requests, not mandatory orders, the Third Circuit concluded that the defendant county “was free to disregard the ICE detainer, and it therefore [could not] use as a defense [to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim] that its own policy did not cause the deprivation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Id. at 645.
Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, several district courts have agreed with the reasoning in Galarza and have held that ICE detainers are requests that state law enforcement agencies are not required to follow. See, e.g., Flores v. City of Baldwin Park, 2015 WL 756877, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (“federal law leaves compliance with immigration holds wholly within the discretion of states and localities.”); Lucatero v. Haynes, 2014 WL 6387560, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2014) (“As the regulation itself explains, a Form I-247 detainer is merely a request, not a directive, for law enforcement agencies to inform the [DHS] of a pending release date for the person for whom a detainer has been issued.”); Moreno v. Napolitano, 2014 WL 4911938, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (“[T]his Court is persuaded that state and local [law enforcement agencies] are not legally required to comply with I-247 detainers.”); Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791, 802
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(N.D. Ill. 2014) (“The Third Circuit’s well-reasoned opinion [in Galarza] and the plain language of the detainer itself persuade the Court that the [defendants] were not obligated to detain [the plaintiff] pursuant to the ICE detainer.”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., 2014 WL 1414305, at *8 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (“[T]his court concludes that 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 does not require [law enforcement agencies] to detain suspected aliens upon receipt of a Form I-247 from ICE and that the Jail was at liberty to refuse ICE’s request to detain [the plaintiff] if that detention violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, the County cannot avail itself of the defense that its practice and custom did not cause the allegedly unlawful detention”).
Absent Fifth Circuit authority to the contrary, the court will follow Galarza and the district courts that rely on its reasoning or otherwise reach the same result. Under Galarza although 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) uses the word “shall,” “the word ‘shall’ serves only to inform an agency that otherwise decides to comply with an ICE detainer that it should hold the person no longer than 48 hours.” Galarza, 745 F.3d at 640. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 does not compel state or local law enforcement agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to removal pending release to immigration officials, but “merely authorizes the issuance of detainers as requests to local [law enforcement agencies].” Id. at 645. Accordingly, the court rejects Dallas County’s argument that “if any of the Plaintiffs was detained in the DCJ after the time he was eligible for release on state criminal charges it was mandated by [8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)].” D. 8/19/16 Br. 21.
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4
The court also declines to accept Dallas County’s argument that plaintiffs have failed
to state a claim because they have not alleged “that the immigration detainers were facially
invalid.” Id. Dallas County maintains that, when a law enforcement official detains a person
on the basis of some form of legal process authorizing the detention, the official’s actions do
not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the process relied on is facially valid. The two Fifth Circuit cases on which Dallas County relies, however, are not factually on point.15
In Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 1996), the arresting officer acted in
compliance with a facially valid court order. Id. at 113 (holding that official acting within
scope of his authority is entitled to absolute immunity when he acts in compliance with
facially valid judicial order issued by court acting within its jurisdiction). In Duckett v. City
of Cedar Park, Texas, 950 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1992), the arresting officer was acting pursuant
to a facially valid warrant. Id. at 280 (holding that facially valid warrant provided probable
cause to arrest suspect, and officer who made arrest pursuant to facially valid warrant was
entitled to qualified immunity). The present case involves neither a facially valid court order
15Dallas County also cites Chavez v. City of Petaluma, 2015 WL 6152479, at *6, 11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015), Gardner v. California Highway Patrol, 2015 WL 4456191, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2015), and Puccini v. United States, 1996 WL 556987, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1996), for the proposition that, when a law enforcement official detains a person on the basis of some form of legal process authorizing the detention—including detainers or holds issued by non-judicial entities—the official’s actions do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the process relied upon is facially valid. These cases, however, are not binding on this court. Nor are they factually persuasive because none involves detention on the basis of a non-binding ICE detainer that does not provide probable cause to believe that the detainee has committed a criminal offense.
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nor a facially valid warrant. Instead, plaintiffs allege that they were detained “solely based
on an ICE detainer,” Am. Compl. ¶ 54, that, unlike a warrant, did not provide Dallas County
probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs had committed or were committing a criminal
offense. And unlike a facially valid court order, which leaves the official charged with
executing it “no choice but to do so,” Mays, 97 F.3d at 113, an ICE detainer is a “request”
that Dallas County was at liberty to ignore.16 Thus although plaintiffs have not alleged that
the ICE detainers were facially invalid, they have plausibly pleaded that, on their face, the
ICE detainers did not provide Dallas County sufficient probable cause to withstand Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. The court concludes above that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the ICE
detainers were facially invalid does not change this conclusion.17
16Mays and Duckett are also distinguishable because they address an arresting officer’s ability to rely on a facially valid court order/warrant in the context of the doctrines of absolute immunity and qualified immunity.
17In their first supplemental reply to plaintiffs’ response, Dallas County makes the following arguments: (1) the detainer authority of DHS arises from the Secretary’s power under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) and from DHS’s general authority to arrest and detain individuals subject to removal pursuant to §§ 236 and 287 of the INA; (2) under 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, DHS may delegate arrest authority to state and local officials; (3) detention by state and local government officials pursuant to a federal immigration detainer is authorized by federal law, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(10), which states that a formal agreement is not necessary for “any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State . . . to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States”; (4) state and local law enforcement agencies may rely on a detainer as a matter of comity and pursuant to the “collective knowledge doctrine”; and (5) immigration proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in the immigration context. Dallas County did not raise any of these grounds for dismissal in its initial motion, however, and this court has long declined to consider arguments raised for
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D The court next considers Dallas County’s challenge to plaintiffs’ § 1983 substantive due process claim based on Dallas County’s alleged refusal to allow plaintiffs pretrial release on bond.
1 Dallas County contends that, to the extent plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based on the denial of pretrial release on bond is brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this claim must be dismissed because plaintiffs have also invoked the Fourth Amendment, which provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures by governmental officials, and the Fourth Amendment, rather than the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the exclusive guide for analyzing plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983. Plaintiffs respond that freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that due process protections are not duplicative of those provided by the Fourth Amendment; that under the decisions in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772
the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Tapscott, 2006 WL 2728827, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006) (Fitzwater, J.) (“[T]he court will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief.” (citing Senior Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. of First RepublicBank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758, 772 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater, J.))), aff’d, 277 Fed. Appx. 483 (5th Cir. 2008). To the extent that Dallas County is doing anything more than merely responding to plaintiffs’ arguments in their opposition brief, the court declines to consider these arguments as new grounds supporting dismissal.
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(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), Dallas County’s policy of denying pretrial release for those with immigration holds offends due process, because Dallas County does not use “narrowly focused,” “carefully limited exceptions” to the general prohibition against pretrial detention before a finding of guilt, P. Br. 21 (brackets and citations omitted); that Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate pretrial release on bond after Dallas County courts set bail violates due process by imposing punishment before trial; and that Dallas County also offends due process by ignoring the liberty interest created by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 17.29,18 which guarantees immediate release on bond.
2 In Mercado I the court sua sponte dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1983 substantive due process claim based on the denial of pretrial release on bond, holding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Dallas County or Sheriff Valdez had refused to allow them to post bond and secure their release. Mercado I, 2016 WL 3166306, at *8. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1983 substantive due process claim based on Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez’s policy of honoring ICE requests to detain, and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold even after they were otherwise cleared for release. As the court explained:
“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the
18Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 17.29(a) provides: “[w]hen the accused has given the required bond, either to the magistrate or the officer having him in custody, he shall at once be set at liberty.”
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guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Plaintiffs’ remaining substantive due process claim is based on the allegation that Dallas County honored ICE requests to detain, and detained, individuals subject to immigration holds, even after those individuals were otherwise cleared for release. This is the same factual basis that plaintiffs rely on to support their Fourth Amendment claim. As explained above, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. It is undisputed that pretrial detention constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because the Fourth Amendment protects against the type of conduct plaintiffs allege in support of their substantive due process claim, this claim is “covered by” the Fourth Amendment and should be analyzed only under that constitutional provision.
Mercado I, 2016 WL 3166306, at *9 (some citations omitted).
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs plead their substantive due process claim only
in connection with their allegation that they were denied pretrial release on bond. In support
of this claim, plaintiffs allege that “Defendants imposed pretrial detention on Plaintiffs,
infringing the Plaintiffs’ strong interest in liberty. This intentional or reckless pretrial
detention is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”19 Am. Compl. ¶ 104.
As in Mercado I, however, the factual basis on which plaintiffs rely in support of their due
process claim—i.e., that Dallas County denied them the opportunity for pretrial release on
bond—is the same factual basis that they rely on to support their Fourth Amendment claim.
19Plaintiffs acknowledge in footnote 6 of their amended complaint that, although they have repleaded their “pretrial-release claims” under both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, they “do not expect that the due process claims will survive if the Court reapplies the reasoning in its prior opinion.” Am. Compl.¶ 104 n.6.
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Plaintiffs allege that the Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause; that Dallas County must allow an opportunity for pretrial release that satisfies the Fourth Amendment; and that “[i]f Dallas County had allowed bail, Dallas County would have needed to release Plaintiffs if Plaintiffs had paid bail, as Dallas County had no other probable cause to believe that any Plaintiff had committed or was committing criminal activity[.]”20 Id. ¶ 107. Accordingly, the court holds, as it did in Mercado I, that “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment protects against the type of conduct plaintiffs allege in support of their substantive due process claim, this claim is ‘covered by’ the Fourth Amendment and should be analyzed only under that constitutional provision.” Mercado I, 2016 WL 3166306, at *9 (citation omitted). The court therefore grants Dallas County’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim for the reasons explained in Mercado I and here. Id.
E The court now turns to Dallas County’s remaining arguments directed at plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based on the allegation that Dallas County’s alleged refusal to allow them pretrial release on bond violated their constitutional rights.
1 Dallas County argues that plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment “failure to allow bond claim”
20Plaintiffs clarify in their response their belief that Dallas County violated their Fourth Amendment rights by denying them pretrial release on bond (i.e., by further detaining or “seizing” them), without probable cause to believe they had committed or were committing a crime.
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fails because they have not alleged that Dallas County or Sheriff Valdez had the authority to set or allow them to post bonds in connection with the state criminal charges pending against them; plaintiffs do not allege that any of them actually posted bond in the requisite amount to become eligible for release on bond, and, absent specific allegations that the plaintiffs actually posted bonds, none of them had a right to be released regardless of the existence of an immigration detainer; and the uncontroverted evidence submitted by Dallas County establishes that none of the plaintiffs was denied bond because of an immigration detainer or detained after he posted bond.
Plaintiffs respond that they have plausibly alleged that Dallas County does not allow immediate pretrial release of those with immigration holds, regardless of whether they post bail; that accepting the pleaded facts as true, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Dallas County would have refused immediate release for any plaintiff who may have posted bail; that certain plaintiffs allege that they attempted to post bail but were rebuffed; and that for the remaining plaintiffs—all of whom have alleged a belief that posting bail would be futile—the court should not require plaintiffs to attempt to post bail to bring suit.
2 Plaintiffs have alleged that Jose Lopez-Aranda “attempted to pay bond, and Dallas County would not accept the bond,” Am. Compl. ¶ 83; that Moises Martinez “attempted to pay bond, but Dallas County would not allow Mr. Martinez to do so, due to the immigration hold,” id. at ¶ 84; and that Eleazar Saavedra “attempted to pay bail, but Dallas County would not allow him to because of the pending immigration hold,” id. ¶ 88. For each remaining
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plaintiff, they allege that bail was nominally set for the plaintiff, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release; that the plaintiff did not attempt to post bond because he believed it was futile to do so; that “[i]t was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold”; that the plaintiff knew he had an immigration hold; and that but for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, the plaintiff “could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 78; see also ¶¶ 79-82, 85-87, 89-97. The court has already concluded that, under the futility doctrine, plaintiffs have standing to bring their § 1983 claim based on the denial of pretrial release. See infra § II (D). The court concludes that the allegations in the amended complaint are also sufficient to plausibly allege that Dallas County had a widespread and widely known practice of refusing to release on bond pretrial detainees with immigration holds, that bond was set for each of the plaintiffs, and that, despite bond being set, each plaintiff was denied pretrial release on bond either because (i) he attempted to post bond and it was refused, or (ii) any attempt to post bond would have been futile due to Dallas County’s widely known practice of refusing to release on bond pretrial detainees who were subject to immigration holds.21
21Defendants contend that “the uncontroverted evidence submitted by Dallas County establishes that (1) none of the Plaintiffs was denied bond because of an immigration detainer; or (2) detained after he posted bond.” D. 8/19/16 Br. 24-25 (citing D. App. 3). But the court cannot rely on evidence outside of the complaint and not referenced by it without converting Dallas County’s motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Sivertson v. Clinton, 2011 WL 4100958, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.). The court declines to convert Dallas County’s motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.
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Dallas County does not otherwise argue that plaintiffs’ denial of pretrial release on bond claim fails to allege a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court will assume, for purposes of this motion, that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a violation of the Fourth Amendment as a result of Dallas County’s practice of denying pretrial release on bond.
F Dallas County contends that plaintiffs have failed to plead a policymaker and an official policy or practice that served as the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.
1 A municipality is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 under certain circumstances. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Although a municipality cannot be held liable simply on a theory of respondeat superior, id. at 691, it can be held liable if a deprivation of a constitutional right was inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom, Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001). Municipal liability requires proof of three elements: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 541-42 (quoting Pineda, 291 F.3d at 328). The first element requires that plaintiffs adequately plead an official policy or custom. “[A] policy can be shown through evidence of an actual policy, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers or others with policymaking authority.” Id. at 542 (citing Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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Although a “single decision by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which a municipality may be liable[,] . . . this ‘single incident exception’ is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal liability only if the municipal actor is a final policymaker.” Id. (citations, brackets, and some internal quotation marks omitted). A custom is “a persistent, widespread practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam)).
To satisfy the second element, plaintiffs must adequately plead the identity of a policymaker with “final policymaking authority.” Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). “A ‘policymaker’ must be one who takes the place of the governing body in a designated area of city administration.” Webster, 735 F.2d at 841 (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). “City policymakers not only govern conduct; they decide the goals for a particular city function and devise the means of achieving those goals. . . . [T]hey are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance.” Bennett, 728 F.2d at 769. “[The court’s] analysis must also take into account the difference between final decisionmaking authority and final policymaking authority, a distinction that this circuit recognized as fundamental[.] . . . [D]iscretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final policymaking authority over that function.” Bolton v. City of Dallas,
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Tex., 541 F.3d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1246-47 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining distinction between final policymaking authority and mere decisionmaking).
The third element requires that plaintiffs adequately plead that the municipal policy or custom was the “moving force” of the constitutional deprivation, which requires a “high threshold of proof.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 580 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Plaintiffs “must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Plaintiffs therefore “must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla., 520 U.S. at 411). Simple or even heightened negligence is insufficient to meet the deliberate indifference requirement. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 407).
2 Dallas County’s argument with respect to the additional requirements for municipal liability is as follows:
Here the plaintiffs have failed to articulate any specific facts to establish that an official governmental policy of Dallas County promulgated by an official county policy maker was the moving force behind or actual cause of the violation of their constitutional rights. . . . The Plaintiffs have also failed to show
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that the alleged governmental policy was adopted with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact that a constitutional violation would result from complying with the federal regulation under the immigration detainers. Because the Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts upon which the Court might reasonably infer that an official Dallas County policy, as defined above, was the moving force behind the violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment their claims against it should also be dismissed for this reason.
D. 8/19/16 Br. 23. With respect to plaintiffs’ claim for failure to allow bond, Dallas County
argues:
Finally the Plaintiffs have also failed to show that a Dallas County policy, promulgated by an official policymaker with deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights, denied them bond or detained them after they made bail or were otherwise cleared for release. . . . Because the Plaintiffs have also failed to plead specific facts upon which this Court might reasonably infer that an official Dallas County policy was the moving force behind the violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment in this regard, this claim must also fail as a matter of law.
Id. at 25. The court disagrees.
In support of their denial of pretrial release claim, plaintiffs allege that Dallas County
had a widespread policy and practice of refusing immediate release on bond for detainees
with immigration holds and that this policy is the “moving force” for their § 1983 claim.
They further allege that “Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for these policies
and practices,” and that, in particular, “Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas
County’s decisions on (i) whether to refuse bond posted for those with immigration holds,
and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for
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release.” Am. Compl. ¶ 108. In support of their “overdetention” claim, plaintiffs allege that Dallas County had a policy and practice of detaining individuals with immigration holds who have otherwise been cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed or other authority that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment, and that this policy was the “moving force” for plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. In addition, they allege that “Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the policy,” and that “[i]n particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decision on whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.” Id. ¶ 117. These allegations are sufficient at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage to plausibly allege the elements for municipal liability. Moreover, this court has explained that “it is not sufficient in the context of [a] motion[] to dismiss for defendant[] to effectively shift to the court the burden of scrutinizing the amended complaint to determine whether there are deficiencies with respect to” plaintiffs’ allegations. Clapper v. Am. Realty Inv’rs, Inc., 2015 WL 3504856, at *13 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2015) (Fitzwater, J.). “Generally, a movant under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . must show why the pleading being challenged is insufficient rather than simply point to the pleading and assert that it is defective.” Id. at *13 n.21. Dallas County has failed to point to any specific deficiency in the amended complaint with respect to plaintiffs’ pleading of municipal liability under § 1983. Accordingly, the court denies Dallas County’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint on this basis.
In sum, the court concludes that Dallas County is not entitled to a dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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Accordingly, the court denies Dallas County’s motion to dismiss this claim.
IV
Dallas County moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(7),
contending that, under Rule 19(a),22 the United States is a required and indispensable party
to this action, and that it may not feasibly be joined because it is entitled to sovereign
immunity.
Rule 12(b)(7) enables a party to move for dismissal for “failure to join a party under
Rule 19.” “‘Once an issue of compulsory joinder is raised, the court initially must determine
whether the absent person’s interest in the litigation is sufficient to satisfy one or more of the
tests set out in the first sentence of Rule 19(a).’” Johnston v. Capital Accumulation Plan of
Chubb Corp., 1998 WL 907002, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 1998) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting 7
Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1604, at 40 (2d ed. 1986)).
If joinder is warranted, then the person will be brought into the lawsuit. But if such joinder would destroy the court’s jurisdiction, then the court must determine under Rule 19(b)
22Rule 19(a) provides, in pertinent part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
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whether to press forward without the person or to dismiss the litigation. Factors to consider under Rule 19(b) include “(1) prejudice to an absent party or others in the lawsuit from a judgment; (2) whether the shaping of relief can lessen prejudice to absent parties; (3) whether adequate relief can be given without participation of the party; and (4) whether the plaintiff has another effective forum if the suit is dismissed.” HS Res., Inc. v. Wingate, 327 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2003) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Johnston, 1998 WL 907002, at *4 (“The ‘[joinder] decision has to be made in terms of the general policies of avoiding multiple litigation, providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single action, and protecting the absent persons from the possible prejudicial effect of deciding the case without them.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). The court concludes that the reasons that Dallas County offers in support of joinder fail to show that the United States should be joined as a party under Rule 19. Dallas County contends that the regulation at issue here, 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, is ambiguous because subsection (a) states that an ICE detainer is a “request” while subsection (d) provides that the local law enforcement agency “shall” maintain custody of the alien pursuant to the ICE detainer. It argues that the detention of any plaintiff in the DCJ after the time he was otherwise eligible for release was mandated by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d); that challenges to the federal regulation itself must be addressed to the United States, which has not been joined as a party to this suit; that the United States cannot be feasibly joined because it is entitled to sovereign immunity from the plaintiffs’ claims for damages; that a judgment rendered in the absence of the United States will cause substantial prejudice to the United
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States if the court’s decision creates doubt as to the validity of the federal regulation and its applicability to state and local law enforcement agencies that detain aliens pursuant to immigration holds, and will cause substantial prejudice to Dallas County because the decision may expose it to multiple lawsuits in different courts with the threat of inconsistent liabilities and obligations for detaining individuals identified as aliens, and subject to federal immigration detainers; that the court cannot fashion an adequate remedy because there is no judgment that will effectively settle the plaintiffs’ claims without causing substantial prejudice to both the United States and Dallas County; and that plaintiffs have adequate remedies available to them if this action is dismissed for non-joinder, including seeking postdeprivation compensatory relief against the individual ICE agents for wrongful issuance of immigration detainers.
The court rejects these arguments. It has already concluded, see supra § III (C)(3) that 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 is unambiguous and does not require Dallas County to detain individuals subject to an ICE detainer. Accordingly, there is no reason that the United States should be joined as a necessary party under Rule 19. Moreover, there is no reason that complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, and none of the general policy concerns discussed above is present in this action.
The court therefore denies Dallas County’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7). V
Dallas County moves under Rule 12(f) to strike the exhibits to plaintiffs’ amended complaint, contending that these exhibits are not permissible as written instruments under
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Rule 10(c) and should be stricken from the record. “The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Rule 12(f). The decision to grant a motion to strike is within the court’s discretion. Jacobs v. Tapscott, 2004 WL 2921806, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2004) (Fitzwater, J.), aff’d on other grounds, 277 Fed. Appx. 483 (5th Cir. 2008). Motions to strike a portion of a pleading are generally viewed with disfavor and are seldom granted, because these motions seek a “drastic remedy” and are often “sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.” FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F.Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (Cummings, J.) (citing Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 206 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962)). “Matter will not be stricken from a pleading unless it is clear that it can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation. If there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion should be denied.” Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 428 n.13 (5th Cir. 1962) (citation omitted); see also Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F.Supp.2d 618, 645 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Ramirez, J.) (stating that Rule 12(f) motions “are viewed with disfavor” and should be granted “only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.” (citations omitted)), rec. adopted, 500 F.Supp.2d 618 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Lynn, J.).
Dallas County has not shown that the exhibits to plaintiffs’ amended complaint are redundant, scandalous, immaterial, or impertinent to the controversy itself. See United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to strike where “disputed statements were material and pertinent
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to the underlying controversy”).23 Accordingly, Dallas County’s Rule 12(f) motion to strike is denied.
VI The court denies as moot plaintiffs’ motion to compel Dallas County to provide them with copies of their ICE detainers. On March 3, 2016, the court granted defendants’ motion to stay discovery, staying “all initial disclosures and discovery . . . pending the court’s decisions on defendants’ motions to dismiss and on whether defendant Sheriff Lupe Valdez is entitled to qualified immunity.” Mar. 3, 2016 Order at 1. Plaintiffs do not name Sheriff Valdez as a defendant in their amended complaint, and the court is deciding today all pending motions to dismiss. Accordingly, as of the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed, the discovery stay is lifted. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is therefore denied as moot.
* * * For the foregoing reasons, Dallas County’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) is denied; its motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted to the extent of dismissing plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, but is otherwise denied; its motion under Rule 12(f) to strike the exhibits to plaintiffs’ amended complaint is denied; and plaintiffs’ motion to compel detainers and
23The court has not relied on any of the exhibits to plaintiffs’ amended complaint in deciding Dallas County’s motions to dismiss.
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lift stay is denied as moot. SO ORDERED. January 17, 2017.

_________________________________ SIDNEY A. FITZWATER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISON

ARTURO MERCADO, PABLO CARRANZA, SERGIO DIAZ, JOSE GUTIERREZ, HEYDY JARQUIN JIMENEZ, JOSE LOPEZARANDA, MOISES MARTINEZ, JAVIER NAVARRETE, EFREN PEREZ VILLEGAS, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, ELEAZAR SAAVEDRA, ANDRES TORRES CABRERA, MOISES VEGA COSTILLA, MARIO GARIBALDI, RODOLFO MARMOLEJO, RICARDO GARZA, CARLOS ALVAREZ CASTRO, JEREMIAS CHEVEZ, MIGUEL FLORES, FELIPE GONZALEZ LUJAN, LUIS HERNANDEZ, JOSE VALENCIANO, JOSE DELCID BONILLA, JUAN CAMACHO, MARIA CASTILLO, CARLOS FUENTES PÁRAMO, ABEL HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR JAUREQUI, JULIO LOERA, ARTURO MUÑOZ MARTINEZ, ALBERTO SANCHEZ CHAVEZ, ABRAHAM SANTANA, JESUS LOPEZ, GONZALO RAMIREZ VASQUEZ, CARLOS REYNA ESPARRAGOZA, JOSE RODRIGUEZ, EPIFANIO URIBE ORTIZ, RAUL GOMEZ, JORGE MARRUFO, FERNANDO HUERTA, JACINTO HERNANDEZ, MARIO HERNANDEZ JASSO, FLORENCIO VEGA, FRANCISCO LARA MARTINEZ, and JESUS PADILLA,

No. 3:15-CV-3481-D (consolidated with No. 3:15-CV-04008-D
and 3:17-CV-201-D)
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs,

v.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendant.

TEXAS, Permissive Intervenor.

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SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution. “This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). “The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). Dallas County held Plaintiffs in Dallas County jail for months pending trial, even for purported misdemeanors, without allowing immediate release on bond. Dallas County also overdetained Plaintiffs without probable cause. Plaintiffs seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PARTIES 1. Plaintiffs were detained by Dallas County. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) issued detainers requesting that Dallas County facilitate ICE’s arrest of each Plaintiff, generally by (i) detaining each Plaintiff for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released, or (ii) notifying ICE when Dallas County intended to release each Plaintiff. As a result, an “immigration hold” appears in each Plaintiff’s file. At the time this lawsuit was filed, no Plaintiff remained in Dallas County custody. 2. Dallas County is located in North Texas. Process for Dallas County may be effected on Clay Jenkins, County Judge, who is located at 411 Elm St., Dallas, Texas, 75202. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.024(a). 3. Texas has intervened in the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B). ECF No. 75.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This is a civil-rights case arising under the United States Code, title 42. The Court thus has subject-matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5. Dallas County is located in this District. Dallas County regularly conducts business in Texas and this district. 6. Dallas County’s acts in Texas form the basis of this lawsuit. The Court thus has personal jurisdiction over Dallas County. 7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because many of the complained-of acts in this case occurred in Dallas County, Texas, and because Dallas County is located in this District. LOCAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: THE NEW FRONT LINE IN ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAWS 8. ICE is a large, sophisticated federal agency charged with enforcing our nation’s immigration laws. ICE has a $6 billion budget and more than 20,000 employees. Ex. C (Morgan Smith & Terri Langford, Texas Sheriffs, Jails on Immigration Front Line, Texas Tribune, Feb. 16, 2016) at C1. Despite its size and resources, ICE has “no proactive way [to use] watch lists, data mining or the like . . . to systematically search for dangerous undocumented immigrants, including those who have returned to the United States after being deported for committing crimes.” Id. “Instead, if an immigrant criminal is caught and thrown out of the country, the process most likely begins when a local police officer or sheriff’s deputy pulls them over for a traffic stop or arrests them as part of a criminal investigation.” Id. 9. For many decades, local law-enforcement officers have fingerprinted detainees during booking. Over the last few years, however, technology has changed in an important
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 4 of 390 PageID 1643 way—local law-enforcement agencies now route detainees’ fingerprints through federal databases at the FBI and Homeland Security during booking. Ex. D (Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, The N.Y. Times, May 11, 2012) at D2; Ex. E (Dianne Solís, Police Use of Federal Databases to ID Illegal Immigrants after Arrests Raises Profiling Concerns, The Dallas Morning News, Jan. 18, 2010), at E1-3. In particular, law enforcement can now routinely check fingerprints taken in local arrests against (i) the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”) of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, and (ii) the Automated Biometric Identification System (“IDENT”) of the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT Program. See Ex. F (Secure Communities Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sept. 1, 2009) at F1. After submission, “ICE evaluates each case to determine the individual’s immigration status and communicate their findings to law enforcement within a few hours.” Id. A presentation created by the Texas Department of Public Safety shows the data flow from local arrests to federal databases (including IAFIS and IDENT) in the graphic below.
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Ex. G at G5. According to one commentator, the submission of fingerprints for ICE’s use “turn[s] local jails into tiny immigration outposts.” Ex. H (Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies Withdraw, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 16, 2014), at H1.
10. When fingerprints submitted by a local agency match an IDENT record, the information about the match (called an “IDR”) is forwarded to the FBI. Ex. I (Secure Communities: Removing Criminal Aliens from Communities through Biometric Information Sharing, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) at I2; Ex. G at G5. The FBI then populates and forwards an Immigration Agency Query (“IAQ”) to the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center. Ex. I at I2; Ex. G at G5. The Support Center responds to the Query (the response is called an “IAR”), which is then forwarded to other ICE offices. Ex. I at I2; Ex. G at G5. ICE ultimately uses the
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information to determine whether ICE will seek to remove the detainee. See Ex. J (Secure Communities Standard Operating Procedures, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement) at J8.
11. If ICE believes it can meet its burden to deport a detainee, ICE can arrest and take possession of that detainee, hold the detainee pre-removal, and then remove the detainee. But if ICE were to deport the detainee immediately, the detainee would not stand trial for the original, local criminal offense. Consequently, ICE generally waits until after the local criminal offense is resolved to arrest the detainee and commence the removal process. See Ex. A at A22 (Torres Cabrera detainer) (“DHS discourages dismissing criminal charges based on the existence of a detainer.”) at A1; Ex. J (ICE Secure Communities Operating Procedures) at J8 (“Normally, ICE will not remove an alien until pending criminal charges are adjudicated.”).
12. To facilitate ICE’s arrest of detainees after local criminal offenses are resolved, ICE requests that local law-enforcement agencies (i) notify ICE when they intend to release targeted detainees and/or (ii) hold targeted detainees after those detainees otherwise would be released, to allow ICE time to show up and take custody of the detainees. ICE uses forms called “detainers” to formally request assistance. See, e.g., Ex. A (detainers). The Code of Federal Regulations describes detainers as “request[s]” that “advise” local law-enforcement agencies that ICE seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency:
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Act and this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue a Form I-247, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.
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8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). Because detainers are “requests,” local law-enforcement agencies need not respond or comply with detainers. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2014); ECF No. 53 at 21.1 In 2013, ICE stated that detainers served three functions: (i) to notify a local law-enforcement agency that ICE intends to assume custody of an alien in the local agency’s custody once the alien is no longer subject to the local agency’s detention; (ii) to request information from a local agency about an alien’s impending release so that ICE may assume custody before the alien is released from the local agency’s custody; and (iii) “to request that the [local agency] maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be released for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) to provide ICE time to assume custody.” Ex. K (ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, visited Mar. 20, 2013) at K1.
13. In February 2016, the Texas Tribune created a flowchart showing how detainers interact with the Texas criminal-justice system, shown below:
1 See also Ex. L (Letter from ICE Acting Director Daniel H. Ragsdale to Rep. Mike Thompson dated February 25, 2014) at L1 (“While immigration detainers are an important part of ICE’s effort to remove criminal aliens who are in federal, state, or local custody, they are not mandatory as a matter of law.”).
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14. On December 21, 2012, the Director of ICE issued a memorandum describing Form I-247, the detainer form used by the Dallas ICE Office until at least May 2015. See Ex. A at A22 (I-247 form issued to Dallas County in May 2015). “The revised detainer form . . . will . . . require the issuing officer or agent to identify [the grounds for removal] that apply so that the receiving agency and alien will know the specific basis for the detainer.” Ex. M (Morton memorandum dated December 21, 2012) at M3. The memorandum states that ICE should issue a detainer only where (i) ICE has reason to believe that the alien is subject to removal, and (ii) one or more of the following conditions apply:
· The individual has a prior felony conviction; · The individual has three prior misdemeanor convictions;
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· The individual has a prior misdemeanor conviction or pending charge that involves violence, sexual abuse, driving under the influence of alcohol, unlawful flight from the scene of an accident, unlawful possession of a firearm, trafficking of a controlled substance, or other significant threats to public safety;
· The individual has been convicted of illegal entry; · The individual has illegally re-entered the country after a previous removal or return; · The individual has an outstanding order of removal; · The individual has been found by an immigration officer or an immigration judge to
have knowingly committed immigration fraud; or · The individual otherwise poses a significant risk to national security, border security,
or public safety. Id. at M2. As stated in the memorandum (id. at M3), the I-247 detainer form reflects these conditions, and includes checkboxes for each of the above conditions, as shown in the excerpt below:
Ex. A at A22; see also Ex. B at B1 (example Form I-247). 15. The “conditions” identified in the Morton memorandum are not criminal immi-
gration offenses.2 It is not a crime to “be subject to removal,” to have prior felony or misdemeanor convictions, or to be charged with a crime. It is often a crime to for an alien to re-enter
2 Criminal immigration offenses are found at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324-1328 and include: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain
10

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 11 of 390 PageID 1650 the United States after the alien has been deported or removed. But the checkbox on the I-247 form is not limited to this situation—it lists re-entry after a previous “removal or return,” and reentry after “return” is not listed at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (listing reentry after being “denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed” as a crime).
16. On June 12, 2015, ICE released two new detainer forms: the I-247N and the I247D. Ex. HH (Why ‘PEP’ Doesn’t Fix S-Comm’s Failings, National Immigration Law Center) at HH1; Ex. B at B4, B7 (sample forms). ICE explained that the I-247N Form was a “Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien,” while the I-247D Form was a “Request for Voluntary Action”:
Ex. GG (ICE brochure on Priority Enforcement Program) at GG1. aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328).
11

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 12 of 390 PageID 1651 17. ICE used the new detainer forms. See Ex. DD at DD8 (I-247N for F. Lara Mar-
tinez served on Dallas County in September 2015). The I-247N form explicitly “does not request or authorize that [the local law-enforcement agency] detain the subject beyond the time he or she is currently scheduled for release from [agency] custody,” as shown below:
Id.; see also Ex. B at B7. Like the I-247 form, the I-247N form provides checkboxes for certain conditions that do not identify criminal probable cause:
Ex. DD at DD8; Ex. B at B7. Prior convictions, alone, do not provide Dallas County with probable cause to believe that a detainee is committing or has committed a new criminal offense.
18. Unlike the I-247N form, the I-247D form requests that local law enforcement detain for up to 48 hours:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 13 of 390 PageID 1652 Ex. B at B4 (Sample form I-247D). Form I-247D provides checkboxes to show that “probable cause exists that the subject is a removable alien” (emphasis added), but does not show that probable cause exists that the subject is committing or has committed a new criminal violation:
Id. 19. Neither the I-247D nor the I-247N provide local law enforcement with probable
cause of an independent criminal violation that might allow Dallas County to detain under the Fourth Amendment. The I-247D explicitly only states that ICE has probable cause of a civil violation—removability. Ex. B at B4. The I-247N only states that DHS “suspects” that the subject is removable. Ex. DD at DD8. The checkboxes in both forms do not provide Dallas County with sufficient facts to conclude that any detainee is committing or was committing a crime. No detainer issued using Form I-247D or I-247N provides probable cause of an independent criminal violation that might allow Dallas County to detain under the Fourth Amendment.
20. In Plaintiffs’ situation, Dallas County can only arrest based on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 426 (5th Cir. 1985). None of the detainer forms are signed by neutral and detached magistrates—they are signed by immigration officers. See Ex. A. Further, even if detainers showed probable cause of a felony
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(which they do not), Dallas County must ensure that a judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate follows any warrantless arrest. Id. at 424. Dallas County does not do so.
21. Sometime after June 2015, ICE began using Forms I-247X (Request for Voluntary Transfer) and Form 1-247A (Immigration Detainer—Notice of Action). Ex. B at B8-B11 (sample forms); Ex. S at S1 (ICE guidance on use of I-247A). Plaintiffs do not believe that any detainers at issue in this lawsuit use these forms. Nevertheless, for reasons similar to those for the other forms, these forms do not provide probable cause of an independent criminal violation that might allow Dallas County to detain under the Fourth Amendment.
22. Further, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, most detainers are lodged against individuals who have never been convicted of a crime. During April 2015, only 19% of detainers related to those with a felony conviction, and only 32% of detainers related to those with any convictions. Ex. N (Further Decrease in ICE Detainer Use: Still not Targeting Serious Criminals, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Aug. 28, 2015) at N2. Two-thirds of the detainers issued by ICE targeted individuals without any prior criminal convictions. Id.
23. ICE regularly issues detainers. In August 2011, ICE issued over 27,000 detainers. Ex. C at C2. More recently, as of October 2015, ICE issued over 7,000 detainers. Ex. N at N2. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, approximately 59% of the individuals removed from the United States were originally arrested and held in local jails and prisons. Id.
24. ICE regularly issues detainers in Texas. Texas jails detained, on average, around 3,700 undocumented immigrants each month in 2015. Id. To “highlight the burden . . . placed on county budgets” caused by complying with detainers, the Texas Legislature passed S.B.
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1698,3 which “requires jails to track the number of inmates held on federal detainers along with the number of days those prisoners are housed and how much counties are paying to hold them.” Ex. O (Sarah Thomas, Officials Grapple with Costs of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants, Longview News-Journal, Oct. 16, 2013) at O1. From those records, the Texas Tribune concluded that Texas county jails have spent over $218.9 million housing over 180,000 undocumented immigrants with federal detainers between October 2011 and June 2014. Ex. P (Dan Hill, Interactive: The Cost of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants, Texas Tribune, July 21, 2014) at P1.
ICE REGULARLY ISSUES DETAINERS TO DALLAS COUNTY 25. Dallas County receives a large number of ICE detainers. In 2015, eight jails received more than 1,000 detainers, including Dallas County. Ex. C at C2. In fiscal 2014, ICE placed about 1,930 holds in Dallas County (about 160 a month). Ex. Q (Dianne Solís, Dallas County Sheriff Eases Immigration Holds on Minor Offenses, The Dallas Morning News, Oct. 12, 2015) at Q2. In fiscal 2015, ICE placed about 2,048 holds in Dallas County (about 170 a month). Id. “Dallas County spent more than $22 million housing more than 12,000 undocumented immigrants.” Ex. O at O2; see also Ex P at P2 (Dallas County spent over $22 million between October 2011 and June 2014). Judge Michael Snipes, who served as a criminal district-court judge in Dallas County until December 31, 2014, confirms that ICE would serve detainers on Dallas County. Ex. JJ ¶ 3. Judge Snipes’ statements cited throughout the Amended Complaint are informed by his personal experience with and personal knowledge of the Dallas County criminal-justice system until December 31, 2014. Id. ¶ 2.
3 Portions of that bill are codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 511.0101. 15

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26. Detainers are generally not publicly available. Plaintiffs nevertheless attach around 20 detainers that they have received, mostly through discovery in the instant matter, as Exhibit B. As an example, the Immigration Detainer for Andres Torres Cabrera is attached at Ex. A at A22. The Torres Cabrera Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Torres Cabrera] is subject to removal from the United States.” Id. But under federal law, being “subject to removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Torres Cabrera has a prior felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr. Torres Cabrera has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. See id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County maintain custody over Mr. Torres Cabrera:
IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take custody of the subject. Id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County provide a copy of the Detainer to the subject, id., but Mr. Torres Cabrera did not receive a copy of the Detainer. 27. The Immigration Detainer for Arturo Mercado is attached as Exhibit A, at A1. The Mercado Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Mercado] is subject to removal from the United States.” Id. Again, under federal law, being “subject to removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Mercado has a prior felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr. Mercado has
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committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. See id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County maintain custody over Mr. Mercado:
IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take custody of the subject. Id. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County provide a copy of the Detainer to the subject, id., but Mr. Mercado did not receive a copy of the Detainer. 28. Third, the Immigration Detainer for Francisco Lara Martinez is attached Exhibit DD, at DD8. Mr. Lara Martinez is a plaintiff. The Lara Martinez Detainer has the title “Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien.” Ex. DD at DD8. The Lara Martinez Detainer states that “DHS suspects that [Mr. Lara Martinez] is a removable alien and that the subject is an immigration enforcement priority because [he] . . . has been convicted of a ‘significant misdemeanor,’ as defined by DHS policy.” Id. Under federal law, being “suspected” of being a removable alien is not a crime. The Detainer states that Mr. Lara Martinez has a prior misdemeanor, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would support arrest under the Fourth Amendment, that is, probable cause to believe that Mr. Lara Martinez has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different criminal offense. See id. 29. Many Plaintiffs do not have copies of their detainers. Dallas County claims that “only Sheriff Valdez” might have access and be able to provide the detainers, as shown in the below email exchange between Anthony Garza (counsel for Plaintiffs) and Peter Harlan (counsel for Dallas County):
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Ex. R at R1. Dallas County has now produced the detainers for the 21 plaintiffs from the original Mercado and Garza lawsuits, which are attached as Exhibit A. Dallas County has not yet produced the detainers for (i) the plaintiffs from the Delcid-Bonilla matter or (ii) the plaintiffs added to the lawsuit through the instant amended complaint.
30. In light of the detainers attached to the Complaint, each of which do not show probable cause of a criminal offense, Plaintiffs claim as fact that no detainer relating to any Plaintiff states facts sufficient to show that any Plaintiff had committed a different criminal offense or was committing a different criminal offense. Plaintiffs also claim as fact that no detainer relating to any Plaintiff was reviewed by a neutral magistrate, and instead were only reviewed by ICE officials.
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DALLAS COUNTY OVERDETAINED FOR TRANSFER TO ICE 31. Dallas County generally honors ICE’s requests to detain. Ex. T (Dallas Sheriff Responds to Texas Governor: All ICE Detainers Honored this Year, The Dallas Morning News Trailblazers Blog, Oct. 26, 2015) at T1 (stating that Sheriff Valdez had not rejected any detainers in 2015: “we have accepted 1469 detainers from ICE and declined zero.”). Dallas County is not alone—the Houston Chronicle reported in October 2014 that “every county jail [in Texas] continues to comply with ICE detainer requests by holding suspects whose fingerprints match the immigration database.” Ex. H at H1. Between January 2014 and September 2015, Texas law enforcement agencies refused only 146 detainers.4 Ex. U (Andy East, U.S. Citizen Jailed in Immigration Status Mistake, Texas Tribune, Feb. 27, 2016) at U2. A review of ICE records obtained by the Texas Tribune showed that Dallas County had only twice declined to enforce a detainer. Ex. V (Morgan Smith and Jay Root, Jails Refused to Hold Thousands of Immigrants for Feds, Texas Tribune, Jan. 15, 2016) at V3. 32. Upon receipt of an ICE detainer, Dallas County places an “immigration hold” in that detainee’s file. As an example, the following appears in the file for Plaintiff Jose Delcid Bonilla:
4 An earlier article in the Texas Tribune suggested that the number of refused detainers was artificially inflated because it included “cases where inmates were transferred to other jurisdictions in response to outstanding warrants or had to be released after federal authorities failed to pick them up within 48 hours.” Ex. V (Morgan Smith & Jay Root, Jails Refused to Hold Thousands of Immigrants Sought by Feds, Texas Tribune, Jan. 15, 2016) at V2.
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“Illegal Alien” is often used by Dallas County as shorthand for an immigration hold. The immigration hold in each Plaintiff’s file is evidence that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for each Plaintiff, often (but not always) requesting that Dallas County detain each Plaintiff for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released to facilitate ICE’s arrest of that Plaintiff, like the example requests attached for Mr. Torres Cabrera and Mr. Mercado. Ex. A at A1, A22. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County places ‘immigration holds’ on detainees that are subject to an ICE detainer.” Ex. JJ ¶ 4.
33. Dallas County detains individuals after they would otherwise be released to allow ICE an opportunity to take custody of those individuals. ICE picks up detained individuals from Dallas County on a regular schedule. As a result, at least in the past, Dallas County detains individuals for ICE for more than 48 hours. ICE does not always take custody of the individuals with immigration holds. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County would sometimes hold detainees more than 48 hours based on an ICE detainer.” Ex. JJ ¶ 5.
34. The fact that Dallas County overdetains based on immigration holds is reflected in emails authored by Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner, the “ICE Liaison” employed by Dallas County. For example, the below email from Sr. Sgt. Bruner to Ray Hindieh (an attorney) shows that Dallas County does not immediately release detainees subject to an immigration hold. Instead, Dallas
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 21 of 390 PageID 1660 County treats the immigration hold as if it were a criminal warrant from a sister county and holds individuals based solely on that hold:
Ex. W (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated July 28, 2015) at W1. Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s analysis notwithstanding, Dallas County ignores the constitutional problems with detaining based solely with ICE holds—the Fourth Amendment allows Dallas County to detain based on probable cause of criminal violations (such as a Denton County charge of theft), but not based on probable cause of civil violations (such as a civil immigration violation). Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County will treat a detainer from ICE just like Dallas County treats an arrest warrant from a different Texas county” and “Dallas County treats ‘immigration holds’ based on ICE detainers just like Dallas County treats holds occasioned by arrest warrants from other Texas counties.” Ex. JJ ¶ 6. Sr. Sgt. Bruner confirmed in an email dated December 7, 2015, that Dallas County would not release an immigration hold caused by an ICE detainer:
Ex. X (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated December 7, 2016) at X1. The email exchange, below, is an example of Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release when a detainee with an immigration hold tenders bond:
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Ex. Y (Email exchange between Sr. Sgt. Bruner and Mr. Hindieh dated December 2, 2014) at Y2. The email exchange above is evidence of the fact that Dallas County overdetains based solely on immigration holds.
35. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County would not immediately release a detainee subject to an immigration hold that, absent the immigration hold, would have been immediately released. . . . [but] would instead hold the detainee, based on the immigration hold and ICE detainer, for transfer to ICE.” Ex. JJ ¶ 7. Judge Snipes also confirmed that “Dallas County would not immediately release a detainee subject to an immigration hold that had paid bail, was found not guilty, had all charges dropped against him or her, served his or her sentence, or pleaded guilty and received no additional jail time. . . . [but] would instead hold the detainee, based on the immigration hold and ICE detainer, for transfer to ICE.” Id. ¶ 8. In fact, Judge Snipes “do[es] not know of any detainees with immigration holds that were not
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held for ICE after they otherwise should have been released, absent the immigration hold.” Id. ¶ 9.
36. Dallas County’s practices sharply contrast with those of Harris County. In October 2014, the Houston Chronicle reported that Harris County “almost instantaneously” transferred detainees to ICE custody, minimizing Fourth Amendment concerns. Ex. H at H1. Harris County manages to avoid prolonged detention even though Harris County processes around 300 detainers a month—almost twice that of Dallas County. Compare id. at H2 (300 detainers per month for Harris County) with Ex. Q at Q2 (160-170 detainers a month for Dallas County).
37. According to the Texas Tribune, Melinda Urbina, a spokesperson at the Dallas County Sheriff’s Department, confirmed in February 2016 that if ICE asks Dallas County to hold an inmate for 48 hours, “the additional time typically does not begin until after the prisoner’s county charges are resolved.” Ex. U at U2. Ms. Urbina also stated that “[w]e follow what [ICE asks] us to do.” Id. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County holds detainees with immigration holds, at ICE’s request, after the detainee’s county charges are resolved.
DALLAS COUNTY DENIES PRE-TRIAL RELEASE BASED ON ICE DETAINERS 38. Before November 2014, Dallas County would allow pretrial release for certain detainees with immigration holds. Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner, the Dallas County ICE Liaison Officer, was responsible for determining which detainees subject to an ICE detainer were nevertheless eligible for bond. In the April 2014 email below, Sr. Sgt. Bruner provided Mr. Hindieh with stipulation forms to use when a detainee with an immigration hold was approved for pretrial release.
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Ex. Z (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated April 23, 2014) at Z1. 39. At this time, if an immigration hold was in place, a detainee generally was not
eligible for pretrial release. The June 2014 email below, from Sr. Sgt. Bruner to Mr. Hindieh, allows bond for a detainee because ICE intended to withdraw its request to detain.
Ex. AA (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated June 3, 2014) at AA1. The February 2015 email below, from Sr. Sgt. Bruner to Eric Puente (an attorney), also states that a detainee can leave jail only after ICE cancels its detainer:
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Ex. BB (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated February 26, 2015) at BB1. These emails are evidence of the fact that Dallas County generally would not allow bond for those with immigration holds. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee had an immigration hold, the detainee was generally not eligible for pretrial release.” Ex. JJ ¶ 10; see also id. at ¶ 11 (“I do not know of any detainees with immigration holds that received immediate release on bond.”)
40. Dallas County changed its policies in late 2014, and stopped processing “stip bond forms” for pretrial release. Instead, if a detainee with an immigration hold were to pay bond, either (i) Dallas County would hold the detainee (ostensibly for less than 48 hours) for transfer to ICE (as described above), or (ii) on request from ICE, Mr. Bruner would ask a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney to notify the Court that the bond was insufficient, so that Dallas County could maintain custody over the detainee. Under either scenario, Dallas County refused immediate release on bond. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, Dallas County would not immediately release the detainee if he or she paid bond. . . . Dallas County would instead either (i) continue to detain the detainee for transfer to ICE, based on the ICE detainer, or (ii) ask an Assistant District Attorney to petition a court to find the bond insufficient.” Ex. JJ ¶ 12.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 26 of 390 PageID 1665 41. Plaintiffs have evidence of the policy in the previous paragraph. First, as ex-
plained earlier, Dallas County treats immigration holds as if they were criminal warrants from a sister county:
Ex. W at W1. But an ICE hold is fundamentally different than a hold from a sister county. Unlike a hold from a sister county, an ICE hold is based on civil immigration violations, rather than suspicion of a crime. As explained earlier, the following email is an example of Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release when a detainee with an immigration hold tenders bond:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 27 of 390 PageID 1666 Ex. Y at Y2. The email exchange above is evidence of the facts that (i) Dallas County would detain inmates based solely on an immigration hold, and (ii) Dallas County had a practice of seeking to hold bonds insufficient for those with immigration holds.
42. Second, an email shows that Dallas County will affirmatively hold a detainee’s bond insufficient to ensure that the detainee remains in custody for ICE. In December 2015, Sr. Sgt. Bruner explained to Mr. Puente that if a detainee cannot avoid removal, ICE will inform Dallas County of the same, and Dallas County will refuse bond on the basis of that determination:
Ex. CC (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated December 14, 2015) at CC1. For example, on September 20, 2015, bail was set for Mr. Francisco Lara Martinez, for $15,000. Ex. DD (various records for F. Lara Martinez) at DD2. ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County. Id. at DD8. Mr. Lara Martinez tendered bond on September 21, 2015. Id. at DD6-7. But Dallas County nevertheless refused to release Mr. Lara Martinez. Instead, Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office requested that an ADA file a “notice of flight risk.” The form used by Dallas County explicitly recognizes that Mr. Lara Martinez had already paid bail:
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Id. at DD9. The Court held bond insufficient the next day, on September 22, 2015. Id. at DD1011. Mr. Lara Martinez’s treatment is evidence of the fact that Dallas County would not immediately release those with immigration holds, even if they paid bond. Instead, Dallas County would continue to hold the detainee while Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office sought to hold the bond insufficient. See also infra ¶ 80 (similar facts for Plaintiff Carlos Reyna Esparragoza). In another email dated November 11, 2015, Sr. Sgt. Bruner admitted that he has gone to a particular judge “several times over the years to get bonds held insufficient.”
43. As explained earlier, when Dallas County receives an ICE detainer, Dallas County places an “immigration hold” in the detainee’s file. At times, the hold indicates that no bond is allowed, as shown by the file for Plaintiff Carlos Reyna Esparragoza:
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Additionally, the file for Plaintiff Julio Loera states “H/F INS NO BOND.” Also, the file for Jose Lopez-Aranda states “H/F IMMIGRATION/NO BOND,” and the file for Efren Perez Villegas states “H/F IMMIGRATION NO BOND ALLOWED.” The notation in these files is evidence of the fact that Dallas County does not allow bond to those with immigration holds.
44. Dallas County’s internal computer records confirm its practice. Many of the plaintiffs have explicit redcheck indications in their file showing that “no bond [is] allowed,” including the plaintiffs shown below:
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Ex. FF at FF1-FF12. 35

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 36 of 390 PageID 1675 45. On January 27, 2016, Sr. Sgt. Bruner emailed a number of attorneys, including
Mr. Puente and Mr. Hindieh. Sr. Sgt. Bruner advised the attorneys that Dallas County would seek to hold bonds insufficient when (i) ICE tells Dallas County that the detainee cannot remain in the United States, (ii) a detainee is ordered removed by an immigration judge, or (iii) a detainee requests a voluntary removal:
Ex. EE (Sr. Sgt. Bruner email dated Jan. 27, 2016) at EE1. The email is evidence of the fact that, at ICE’s request, Sr. Sgt. Bruner will ensure that a detainee is refused pre-trial release by asking an assistant district attorney to petition a court to hold a bond insufficient. Judge Snipes confirmed that he “[has] personal knowledge of detainees in Dallas County with immigration holds that (i) attempted to post bond, and (ii) were not granted pretrial release” and that he “[has] heard, from others, of detainees in Dallas County with immigration holds that (i) attempted to post bond, and (ii) were not granted pretrial release.” Ex. JJ ¶¶ 13-14.
46. By refusing pretrial release, Dallas County has effectively agreed to detain those awaiting civil removal proceedings for ICE.
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47. Unquestionably, the federal government generally has the constitutional power to detain those awaiting civil removal proceedings, subject to limits imposed by Congress. But the Constitution treats Dallas County differently. Dallas County cannot constitutionally detain based solely on civil immigration violations, even if both Dallas County and ICE agents would prefer that Dallas County do so. And Dallas County cannot abridge the constitutional guarantee of criminal pretrial release and the presumption of innocence, even if that requires ICE to build additional detention centers to house those awaiting civil removal proceedings. Dallas County must allow the opportunity for immediate pretrial release on bond, even if ICE would prefer that Dallas County hold certain individuals pending civil removal proceedings. Furthermore, Dallas County must allow for a neutral, detached probable-cause review before a judicial offer to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“[T]he detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty.”).
48. In sum, Dallas County imposes pretrial detention on individuals subject to immigration holds (like Plaintiffs) in at least two ways. First, Dallas County denies bond by affirmatively seeking to hold a detainee’s bond insufficient to ensure that the detainee remains in custody for ICE. This directly imposes pretrial detention. Because Dallas County will not release a detainee with an immigration hold even when bond is met, bail is illusory. Dallas County imposes pretrial detention by not allowing bonds for individuals with immigration holds. Second, even if individuals subject to immigration holds are cleared for release (such as after a plea hearing), Dallas County detains those individuals pending transfer to ICE. Thus, even if Dallas County accepts bond, the bond does not result in release. On payment, Dallas County instead maintains pretrial detention, pending transfer to ICE. Judge Snipes confirmed
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that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, Dallas County would not immediately release the detainee if he or she paid bond. . . . Dallas County would instead either (i) continue to detain the detainee for transfer to ICE, based on the ICE detainer, or (ii) ask an Assistant District Attorney to petition a court to find the bond insufficient.” Ex. JJ ¶ 12.
49. Based on the evidence above, Plaintiffs claim the following fact: Dallas County refuses immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold. Judge Snipes confirmed that “if a detainee has an immigration hold, the detainee was generally not eligible for pretrial release” and that he “[does] not know of any detainees with immigration holds that received immediate release on bond.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
50. Dallas County’s practices are widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community. Judge Snipes confirmed that “Dallas County’s refusal to allow pretrial release for detainees subject to immigration holds was widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community” and that “[i]t is widely known that Dallas County will not immediately release detainees with immigration holds, even if they post bond.” Ex. JJ ¶¶ 16-17. As a result, attempting to post bond is known as a futile exercise for those with immigration holds, because it will not result in immediate release. Judge Snipes confirmed that he “would not expect detainees with immigration holds to attempt to pay bond, because Dallas County would not release those detainees on payment of the bond.” Ex. JJ ¶ 18. The scheme has predictable effects. Because Dallas County will not immediately release those on bond, individuals with immigration holds generally do not waste money by attempting to post bond, and Dallas County maintains pretrial detention over almost all individuals with immigration holds.
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51. Plaintiffs claim the following fact: it is widely known that Dallas County will not immediately release a detainee with an immigration hold, even if they post bond. Judge Snipes confirmed that “detainees with immigration detainers would not receive immediate release on bond,” “Dallas County’s refusal to allow pretrial release for detainees subject to immigration holds was widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community,” and “it is widely known that Dallas County will not immediately release detainees with immigration holds, even if they post bond.” Ex. JJ ¶¶ 15-17.
52. Dallas County’s failure to provide immediate release on bond offends state law. Under state law, the accused must “shall at once be set at liberty” upon payment of bond. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 17.29(a). Dallas County cannot rely solely on a request to detain from ICE to justify any further arrest or detention, for at least the following reasons:
· Pursuant to Texas statute, all arrests generally require a warrant. An ICE request to detain is not a warrant, and the ICE request to detain does not satisfy any statutory exception that would allow Dallas County to arrest Plaintiffs without a warrant.
· Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other authority to detain that satisfies Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution.
· Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other authority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
53. Dallas County’s wrongful two-part scheme predictably results in pretrial detention over most individuals with immigration holds. Dallas County reported to the Texas Commission on Jail Standards that, in November 2016, Dallas County held 497 prisoners that were subject to an ICE request to detain. The Dallas Morning News reported that, between January 1, 2015, to October 26, 2015, Dallas County “accepted 1469 detainers from ICE and declined
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zero.” Ex. T at T1. Due to its two-part practice of refusing immediate release on bond to those with immigration holds, Dallas County unconstitutionally imposed pretrial detention on most of those individuals subject to detainer.
54. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for Dallas County’s policy and practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by (i) refusing to allow bond for those with immigration holds, and (ii) detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals make bail or are otherwise cleared for release. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i) whether to allow bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that make bail or are otherwise cleared for release.
DALLAS COUNTY DETAINS EVEN ABSENT AN ICE REQUEST 55. As explained earlier, one of the detainer forms that ICE has used is I-247N, which requests notification of the date the detainee is to be released, rather than requesting additional detention. That form states: “This voluntary notification request does not request or authorize that you detain the subject beyond the time he or she is currently scheduled for release from your custody.” Ex. B at B7. 56. Dallas County received I-247N forms for at least six of the plaintiffs: Ricardo Garza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Miguel Flores, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Francisco Lara Martinez and Jose Valenciano—around 20% of the Plaintiffs that have a copy of their detainers. Ex. A at A14-15, A17-18, A20. Dallas County held those six plaintiffs unconstitutionally, even absent any direction to detain from ICE. There is no question that Dallas County had no legal right to hold these individuals (or deny pretrial release) on a basis of a Form I-247N, which did not request detention.
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DALLAS COUNTY IS PAID FOR HOLDING UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 57. Dallas County applies for and receives funding from the U.S. Government, based on Dallas County’s arrest of undocumented immigrants, through SCAAP (State Criminal Alien Assistance Program), administered through the U.S. Department of Justice. The SCAAP instructions limit the detainees that Dallas County might claim for reimbursement under the program: “To be eligible for reporting, inmates must have been convicted of a felony or second misdemeanor for violations of state or local law, and housed in the applicant’s state or local correctional facility for 4 or more consecutive days during the reporting period.” See Ex. II at II3 (FY2014 SCAAP Guidelines); II9 (FY2015); II15-16 (FY2016). 58. Dallas County has received over $16.3 million from SCAAP since fiscal year 1997. See Ex. LL at LL1 (Memorandum to Commissioners Court dated November 1, 2016). 59. The amount of funds that Dallas County receives depends, in part, on the number of days that it holds an undocumented immigrant. Thus, if Dallas County were to release an undocumented immigrant on bond before trial, Dallas County would lose the ability to claim funds for the days that the undocumented immigrant would otherwise have been held. If Dallas County were to ignore ICE detainers, it would be not be eligible to claim SCAAP funds for the days that it holds immigrants under detainers. 60. For example, Dallas County held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez pretrial for the time period between November 15, 2014 (the date the Court allowed bail) and March 20, 2015 (the date that the Court dismissed her charges for lack of prosecution), and held her for ICE until March 24, 2015. An entry from Dallas County’s SCAAP Application shows that it claimed funds for the entirety of Ms. Jarquin Jimenez’ detention—from November 15, 2014, to March 24, 2015:
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Ex. MM at MM7. (The number below the word “Heydy” begins with “20141115,” which indicates the date that Dallas County began detaining her, 11/15/2014, and continues with “20150324,” the date that Dallas County released her, 3/24/2015.)
61. Dallas County claimed funds in its FY2016 SCAAP application for detentions that occurred between July 1, 2014, and July 30, 2015, which included at least part of the detentions for Plaintiffs Moises Vega Costilla, Arturo Mercado, Sergio Diaz, Efren Perez Villegas, Pablo Carranza, Eleazar Saavedra, and Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, as shown below:
Ex. MM at MM2-MM7. Of those seven plaintiffs, four were not eligible for reporting, per the SCAAP guidelines, which require that the “inmate . . . have been convicted of a felony or
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second misdemeanor for violations of state or local law.” Moises Vega Costilla and Heydy Jarquin Jimenez were not found guilty of any crime, and Arturo Mercado and Eleazar Saavedra had been convicted of only one misdemeanor. Because Plaintiffs located four ineligible entries on a brief review, Plaintiffs expect that a comprehensive review of the 1700 entries submitted by Dallas County to SCAAP as “eligible” detainees in FY2016 may include many entries claiming funds for holding detainees who had not been convicted of a felony or two misdemeanors.
62. Dallas County still holds immigrants on detainers. For April 2017, Dallas County reported holding 573 individuals on an immigration detainer, resulting in 10,917 inmate days. See Ex. KK at KK2 (Tex. Comm’n on Jail Standards Immigration Detainer Report for April 2017). Based on the evidence cited above, Dallas County will attempt to claim SCAAP funds for these inmate days in its FY2018 application.
DALLAS COUNTY OVERDETAINED PLAINTIFFS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OF A CRIMINAL VIOLATION 63. As explained in more detail below, Plaintiffs were overdetained by Dallas
County. Dallas County held Plaintiffs for transfer to ICE, even after they paid bail or otherwise should have been released. Dallas County did not have probable cause of criminal activity when it held each Plaintiff for transfer to ICE.
64. Dallas County’s practice of honoring ICE requests to detain, even after those individuals otherwise would otherwise be released, denies Plaintiffs their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After individuals have served their sentence, are sentenced to time served, are found not guilty, or have their charges dismissed, Dallas County does not have probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed (based on a detainer that only lists civil immigration violations) and has no other authority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County and
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 44 of 390 PageID 1683 Sheriff Valdez are responsible for Dallas County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals otherwise would be released, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.
65. Plaintiffs’ overdetention claims do not turn on the availability of bail. Each Plaintiff, below, was detained after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. Whether or not each Plaintiff paid bail, each Plaintiff should have been released after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. Because Dallas County continued to maintain custody without separate probable cause of a criminal offense, Dallas County’s overdetention of the Plaintiffs offends the Fourth Amendment.
66. Overdetention of Arturo Mercado. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Mercado, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 45 of 390 PageID 1684 The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Mercado, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Mercado after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Mercado pleaded guilty to a class C misdemeanor, which does not carry any jail time, in April 2015, as shown below:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Mercado was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Mercado for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Mercado for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Mercado’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Mercado due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Mercado. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A1. Based on this evidence, Mr. Mercado claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Mercado for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 46 of 390 PageID 1685 County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
67. Overdetention of Pablo Carranza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Carranza, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Carranza, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Carranza after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Carranza pleaded guilty September 2015, and received no jail time for this offense, as shown below:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Carranza was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Carranza for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Carranza for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Carranza’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state,
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 47 of 390 PageID 1686 and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Carranza due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Carranza. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A2. Based on this evidence, Mr. Carranza claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Carranza for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
68. Overdetention of Jose Gutierrez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gutierrez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gutierrez, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gutierrez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Gutierrez. Mr. Gutierrez pleaded guilty in September 2015, and was sentenced to time in Dallas County jail:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 48 of 390 PageID 1687
Because Mr. Guiterrez received credit for time served (as shown below), he did not spend 45 additional days in Dallas County jail.
Mr. Gutierrez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody when his sentence ended, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Gutierrez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Gutierrez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Gutierrez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gutierrez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A5. Based on this evidence, Mr. Gutierrez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Gutierrez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
69. Overdetention of Heydy Jarquin Jimenez. After she was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. Evidence of this hold includes (i) the fact that bail was set at $100,000, which was standard practice for those with immigration holds, and (ii) the fact that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was overdetained for transfer to ICE. This is also
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 49 of 390 PageID 1688 evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, requesting that Dallas County detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez after she otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County voluntarily dismissed the two charges brought against Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 50 of 390 PageID 1689
Despite Dallas County dismissing both charges, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold her for her original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, for more than 48 hours, for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Ms. Jarquin Jimenez for transfer to ICE. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Ms.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 51 of 390 PageID 1690 Jarquin Jimenez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A4. Based on this evidence, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained her based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
70. Overdetention of Jose Lopez-Aranda. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez-Aranda, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Lopez-Aranda, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Lopez-Aranda pleaded guilty in September 2015, and received time served for this offense, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 52 of 390 PageID 1691
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Lopez-Aranda was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Lopez-Aranda for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Lopez-Aranda for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Lopez-Aranda’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Lopez-Aranda due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. LopezAranda. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A6. Based on this evidence, Mr. Lopez-Aranda claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Lopez-Aranda for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. LopezAranda had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 53 of 390 PageID 1692 Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
71. Overdetention of Moises Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Martinez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Martinez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Martinez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Martinez was found not guilty in September 2015, as shown below:
Despite this finding, Mr. Martinez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Martinez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Martinez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Martinez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 54 of 390 PageID 1693 did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Martinez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A7. Based on this evidence, Mr. Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Martinez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
72. Overdetention of Javier Navarette. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Navarette, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Navarette, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Navarette after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Navarette pleaded guilty in December 2014, and received a thirty-day sentence in Dallas County Jail, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 55 of 390 PageID 1694
When he finished serving his sentence, Mr. Navarette was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Navarette for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Navarette for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Navarette’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Navarette due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Navarette. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A8. Based on this evidence, Mr. Navarette claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Navarette for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
73. Overdetention of Efren Perez Villegas. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Perez Villegas, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 56 of 390 PageID 1695
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Perez Villegas, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Perez Villegas after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Perez Villegas pleaded guilty in September 2015, and received time served for his offense, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Perez Villegas was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Perez Villegas for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Perez Villegas for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Perez Villegas’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Perez Villegas due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Perez Villegas. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 57 of 390 PageID 1696 offense. See Ex. A at A21. Based on this evidence, Mr. Perez Villegas claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Perez Villegas for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
74. Overdetention of Miguel Rodriguez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez for ICE, after he should have been released, is evidence of that hold. This is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Rodriguez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Rodriguez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County dismissed its claims against Mr. Rodriguez in March 2015, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 58 of 390 PageID 1697
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Rodriguez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Rodriguez, for over 48 hours, for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Rodriguez for transfer to ICE. Mr. Rodriguez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Rodriguez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A9. Based on
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 59 of 390 PageID 1698
this evidence, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
75. Overdetention of Eleazar Saavedra. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Saavedra, as shown below:
This hold is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Saavedra, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Saavedra after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Saavedra pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to time in Dallas County Jail. After serving his sentence, Mr. Saavedra was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Saavedra for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Saavedra for transfer to ICE. Mr. Saavedra knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Saavedra due to that immigration hold, and
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 60 of 390 PageID 1699 ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Saavedra. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A10. Based on this evidence, Mr. Saavedra claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Saavedra for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate. Mr. Saavedra served his time as of August 17, 2015, but was not released to ICE until almost a month later—on September 16, 2015. Thus, Mr. Saavedra was overdetained for longer than 48 hours based on the detainer.
76. Overdetention of Andres Torres Cabrera. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Torres Cabrera, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Torres Cabrera, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Torres Cabrera after he otherwise
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 61 of 390 PageID 1700 would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Torres Cabrera pleaded guilty in August 2015, and received time served, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Torres Cabrera was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Torres Cabrera for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Torres Cabrera for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Torres Cabrera’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Torres Cabrera due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Torres Cabrera. The detainer for Mr. Torres Cabrera only shows that he was “subject to removal” and “has a prior felony conviction,” as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 62 of 390 PageID 1701
Ex. A at A22. The detainer only provides evidence of a civil immigration violation, and not evidence that Mr. Torres Cabrera is committing or has committed a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Torres Cabrera claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Torres Cabrera had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Torres Cabrera for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Torres Cabrera had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate. Mr. Torres Cabrera served his time as of June 4, 2015, but was not released to ICE until over two months later—on August 22, 2015. Thus, Mr. Saavedra was overdetained for longer than 48 hours based on the detainer.
77. Overdetention of Moises Vega Costilla. A court granted Mr. Vega Costilla’s Motion for New Trial in April 2015, and he was returned to Dallas County custody. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega Costilla, which is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Vega Costilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Vega
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 63 of 390 PageID 1702 Costilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County dismissed the charges against Mr. Vega Costilla on May 27, 2015:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Vega Costilla was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 64 of 390 PageID 1703
original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Vega Costilla for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Vega Costilla for transfer to ICE. Mr. Vega Costilla knows of no other hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Vega Costilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Vega Costilla. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A11. Based on this evidence, Mr. Vega Costilla claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Vega Costilla for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
78. Overdetention of Mario Garibaldi. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Garibaldi. The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Garibaldi, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Garibaldi after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Garibaldi was ordered released from jail on August 20, 2015, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 65 of 390 PageID 1704
Despite the order to release, Mr. Garibaldi was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Garibaldi for transfer to ICE, as shown by the email exchange between Mr. Hindieh and Sr. Sgt. Bruner, below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 66 of 390 PageID 1705
Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Garibaldi for transfer to ICE. Mr. Garibaldi knows of no other hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Garibaldi due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Garibaldi. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A12. Based on this evidence, Mr. Garibaldi claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Garibaldi for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Garibaldi had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
79. Overdetention of Rodolfo Marmolejo. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Marmolejo, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 67 of 390 PageID 1706
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Marmolejo, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Marmolejo after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Marmolejo was arrested for failure to pay a fine, which was paid on October 19, 2015. Despite paying the fine, Mr. Marmolejo was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Marmolejo for transfer to ICE, as shown by the exchange between Mr. Puente and Sr. Sgt. Bruner:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 68 of 390 PageID 1707
Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Marmolejo for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Marmolejo’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Marmolejo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Marmolejo. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A13. Based on this evidence, Mr. Marmolejo claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Marmolejo for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Marmolejo had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
80. Overdetention of Carlos Alvarez Castro. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Alvarez Castro, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Alvarez Castro, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Alvarez Castro after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Alvarez
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 69 of 390 PageID 1708
Castro. Mr. Alvarez Castro pleaded guilty in October 2015 and received a suspended sentence, as shown below:
Despite receiving a suspended sentence, Mr. Alvarez Castro was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Alvarez Castro for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Alvarez Castro for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Alvarez Castro’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Alvarez Castro due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A15. Based on this evidence, Mr. Alvarez Castro claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Alvarez Castro for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
81. Overdetention of Jeremias Chevez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Chevez, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 70 of 390 PageID 1709
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Chevez, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Chevez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Chevez. Mr. Chevez pleaded guilty in November 2015 to time served, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Chevez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Chevez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Chevez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Chevez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Chevez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 71 of 390 PageID 1710 cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A16. Based on this evidence, Mr. Chevez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Chevez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
82. Overdetention of Miguel Flores. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Flores, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Flores, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gutierrez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Flores. Mr. Flores was sentenced to time in Dallas County Jail, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 72 of 390 PageID 1711
After serving his sentence, Mr. Flores was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Flores for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Flores for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Flores’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Flores due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A17. Based on this evidence, Mr. Flores claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Flores for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
83. Overdetention of Felipe Gonzalez Lujan. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 73 of 390 PageID 1712
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Gonzalez Lujan. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was required to serve time in Dallas County Jail. After his sentence, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Gonzalez Lujan for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Gonzalez Lujan for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Gonzalez Lujan’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A18. Based on this evidence, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan for transfer to ICE without probable
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 74 of 390 PageID 1713 cause that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
84. Overdetention of Luis Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Hernandez was sentenced to time served in October 2015, as shown below:
Despite receiving no additional jail time, Mr. Hernandez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 75 of 390 PageID 1714
Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Hernandez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A19. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
85. Overdetention of Jose Valenciano. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Valenciano, as shown below:
86. The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Valenciano, requesting that Dallas County either (i) detain Mr. Valenciano after
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 76 of 390 PageID 1715
he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE or (ii) notify DHS before releasing Mr. Valenciano. Mr. Valenciano received a sentence to Dallas County Jail. After serving his sentence, Mr. Valenciano was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Valenciano for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Valenciano for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Valenciano’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Valenciano due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A20. Based on this evidence, Mr. Valenciano claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Valenciano for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
87. Overdetention of Jose Delcid Bonilla. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Delcid Bonilla, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 77 of 390 PageID 1716
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Delcid Bonilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Delcid Bonilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Delcid Bonilla pleaded guilty to a class C misdemeanor, which does not carry any jail time, in May 2016, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 78 of 390 PageID 1717
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Delcid Bonilla was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Delcid Bonilla for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Delcid Bonilla for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Delcid Bonilla’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Delcid Bonilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Delcid Bonilla. Mr. Delcid Bonilla does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Delcid Bonilla nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Delcid Bonilla had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Delcid Bonilla was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or
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assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Delcid Bonilla’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Delcid Bonilla had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Delcid Bonilla claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Delcid Bonilla claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Delcid Bonilla for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
88. Overdetention of Juan Camacho. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Camacho, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 80 of 390 PageID 1719
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Camacho, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Camacho after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Camacho was convicted of attempted assault and was sentenced to time in county jail. After serving his sentence, Mr. Camacho was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Camacho for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Camacho for transfer to ICE. Mr. Camacho knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Camacho due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Camacho. Mr. Camacho does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Camacho nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Camacho
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 81 of 390 PageID 1720
had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Camacho was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Camacho’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Camacho had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Camacho claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Camacho claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Camacho for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 82 of 390 PageID 1721 89. Overdetention of Maria Castillo. After she was arrested, an immigration hold
was placed on Ms. Castillo, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Ms. Castillo, requesting that Dallas County detain Ms. Castillo after she otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Ms. Castillo was convicted and given a suspended setence. But Ms. Castillo was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold her for her original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Ms. Castillo for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Ms. Castillo for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Ms. Castillo’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Ms. Castillo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Ms. Castillo. Ms. Castillo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Ms. Castillo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Ms. Castillo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Based on this evidence, Ms. Castillo claims
82

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 83 of 390 PageID 1722 as fact that Dallas County overdetained her solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Ms. Castillo had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Ms. Castillo for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Ms. Castillo had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
90. Overdetention of Carlos Fuente Páramo. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Fuente Páramo, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Fuente Páramo, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Fuente Páramo after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Fuente Páramo was convicted and received a suspended sentence. But Mr. Fuente Páramo was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Fuente Páramo for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Fuente Páramo for transfer to ICE. Mr. Fuente Páramo knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause
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of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Fuente Páramo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Fuente Páramo. Mr. Fuente Páramo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Fuente Páramo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Fuente Páramo had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Fuente Páramo was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Fuente Páramo’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Fuente Páramo had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Fuente Páramo claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Fuente Páramo claims as fact
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 85 of 390 PageID 1724 that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Fuente Páramo for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
91. Overdetention of Abel Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County dismissed the charges against Mr. Hernandez, pretrial, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 87 of 390 PageID 1726
Despite the dismissal of the charges, Mr. Hernandez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Hernandez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Hernandez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Hernandez had not been
87

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 88 of 390 PageID 1727 charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
92. Overdetention of Salvador Jauregui. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Jauregui, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 89 of 390 PageID 1728 The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Jauregui, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Jauregui after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas County dismissed the charges against Mr. Jauregui, pre-trial, as shown below:
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 91 of 390 PageID 1730
Despite the dismissal of the charges, Mr. Jauregui was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offense. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Jauregui for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Jauregui for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Jauregui’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Jauregui due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Jauregui. Mr. Jauregui does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Jauregui nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Jauregui had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Jauregui was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Jauregui’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Jauregui had not been charged with an immi-
91

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 92 of 390 PageID 1731 gration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Jauregui claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Jauregui claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Jauregui for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
93. Overdetention of Julio Loera. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Loera, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Loera, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Loera after he otherwise would be released
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for transfer to ICE. Mr. Loera entered a plea bargain that included deferred adjudication and probation:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Loera was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Loera for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Loera for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Loera’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Loera due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Loera. Mr. Loera does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Loera nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Loera had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Loera was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or
93

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assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Loera’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Loera had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Loera claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Loera claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Loera for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
94. Overdetention of Arturo Muñoz Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Muñoz Martinez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Muñoz Martinez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Muñoz Martinez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Muñoz Martinez entered a plea bargain that included 7 years deferred community supervision, in lieu of confinement:
Despite receiving no jail time, Mr. Muñoz Martinez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Muñoz Martinez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Muñoz Martinez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Muñoz Martinez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Muñoz Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Muñoz Martinez. Mr. Muñoz Martinez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas
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County. Mr. Muñoz Martinez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Muñoz Martinez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Muñoz Martinez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Muñoz Martinez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Muñoz Martinez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Muñoz Martinez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Muñoz Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Muñoz Martinez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 97 of 390 PageID 1736 Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
95. Overdetention of Alberto Sanchez Chavez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Sanchez Chavez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Sanchez Chavez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Sanchez Chavez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Sanchez Chavez received a sixty-day sentence in Dallas County Jail.
After he served his sentence, Mr. Sanchez Chavez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Sanchez Chavez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Sanchez Chavez for transfer to ICE. The only hold listed in Mr. Sanchez Chavez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense
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from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Sanchez Chavez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Sanchez Chavez. Mr. Sanchez Chavez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Sanchez Chavez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Sanchez Chavez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Sanchez Chavez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Sanchez Chavez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Sanchez Chavez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Sanchez Chavez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Sanchez Chavez claims as fact
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 99 of 390 PageID 1738 that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Sanchez Chavez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
96. Overdetention of Abraham Santana. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Santana, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Santana, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Santana after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Santana received an order of deferred adjudication, and was placed on community supervision for five years:
Even though he was not sentenced to further jail time, Mr. Santana was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained
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custody over Mr. Santana for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Santana for transfer to ICE. Mr. Santana knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Santana due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Santana. Mr. Santana does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Santana nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Santana had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Santana was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Santana’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Santana had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Santana claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing
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a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Santana claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Santana for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
97. Overdetention of Jorge Marrufo. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Marrufo, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Marrufo, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Marrufo after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Marrufo pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to less time than he had already served in Dallas County Jail. Although he was not sentenced to further jail time, Mr. Marrufo was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Marrufo for
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transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Marrufo for transfer to ICE. Mr. Marrufo knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Marrufo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Marrufo. Mr. Marrufo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Marrufo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Marrufo had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Marrufo was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Marrufo’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Marrufo had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Marrufo claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime,
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 103 of 390 PageID 1742 the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Marrufo claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Marrufo for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
98. Overdetention of Fernando Huerta. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Huerta, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Huerta, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Huerta after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas Country dropped its charges against Mr. Huerta for failure to locate a complaining witness:
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Even after his charges were dropped, Mr. Huerta was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Huerta for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Huerta for transfer to ICE. Mr. Huerta knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Huerta due to that immigration
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 105 of 390 PageID 1744 hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Huerta. Mr. Huerta does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Huerta nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Huerta had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Based on this evidence, Mr. Huerta claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Huerta had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Huerta for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Huerta had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
99. Overdetention of Jacinto Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Hernandez pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to less time than he had already served in Dallas County Jail. Although he was not
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sentenced to further jail time, Mr. Hernandez was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE. Mr. Hernandez knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Hernandez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Hernandez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 107 of 390 PageID 1746 crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
100. Overdetention of Mario Hernandez Jasso. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez Jasso, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez Jasso, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez Jasso after he otherwise
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 108 of 390 PageID 1747 would be released for transfer to ICE. Dallas Country dropped its charges against Mr. Hernandez Jasso for failure to locate a complaining witness:
Even after his charges were dropped, Mr. Hernandez Jasso was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over
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Mr. Hernandez Jasso for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Hernandez Jasso for transfer to ICE. Mr. Hernandez Jasso knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez Jasso due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez Jasso. Mr. Hernandez Jasso does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Hernandez Jasso nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez Jasso had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez Jasso was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez Jasso’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Hernandez Jasso had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez Jasso claims as fact that there is nothing in the
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IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez Jasso claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez Jasso for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
101. Overdetention of Florencio Vega. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Vega, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Vega after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Vega pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 90 days in Dallas County Jail. After serving his sentence, Mr. Vega was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold
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him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over Mr. Vega for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Vega for transfer to ICE. Mr. Vega knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Vega due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Vega. Mr. Vega does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Vega nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Vega had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Vega was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Vega’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Vega had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Vega claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 112 of 390 PageID 1751 that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Vega claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Vega for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
102. Overdetention of Jesus Padilla. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Padilla, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Padilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Padilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Mr. Padilla’s charges were no-billed, and thus were not brought to trial, as shown by the following entry from his file:
Although Mr. Padilla’s charges were no-billed, Mr. Padilla was not immediately released from Dallas County custody, even though Dallas County no longer had probable cause to hold him for his original purported criminal offenses. Instead, Dallas County maintained custody over
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Mr. Padilla for transfer to ICE. Dallas County thus overdetained Mr. Padilla for transfer to ICE. Mr. Padilla knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Padilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Padilla. Mr. Padilla does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Padilla nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Padilla had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Padilla was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Padilla’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Padilla had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Padilla claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided
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by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Padilla claims as fact that Dallas County overdetained him solely based on an ICE detainer, and that the ICE detainer did not indicate that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. Thus, Dallas County held Mr. Padilla for transfer to ICE without probable cause that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. As a result, Dallas County violated the Fourth Amendment. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the Plaintiff on a detainer without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
DALLAS COUNTY DENIED PLAINTIFFS PRE-TRIAL RELEASE BASED ON AN ICE DETAINER 103. As described earlier, Plaintiffs claim the fact that Dallas County refuses immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold. More particularly, Dallas County denied pre-trial release to the Plaintiffs listed below. 104. Dallas County abridged, in two ways, Plaintiffs’ freedom from pretrial detention protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. First, Dallas County’s practice of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration holds directly results in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration holds, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation. Second, even if Dallas County accepts the bond, because Dallas County has a policy and practice of wrongfully detaining individuals with immigration holds for ICE on request (e.g., in violation of Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and the United States Constitution), Dallas County denies immediate release on bond, indirectly resulting in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to an
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immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.
105. Each of the Plaintiffs listed below either (i) posted bond and was denied pretrial release due to an ICE detainer, or (ii) did not attempt to post bond because he believed that doing so would be futile, as a result of Dallas County’s policies and practices explained above. In particular, Plaintiffs claim as fact that, under Dallas County’s policies and practices, if a detainee with an immigration hold were to pay bond, either (i) Dallas County would hold the detainee (ostensibly for less than 48 hours) for transfer to ICE (as described above), or (ii) on request from ICE, Mr. Bruner would ask a Dallas County Assistant District Attorney to notify the Court that the bond was insufficient, so that Dallas County could maintain custody over the detainee. See supra ¶¶ 37-45. As explained supra, Dallas County’s policies and practices are widely known by immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, and the community. See supra ¶¶ 46-47.
106. Plaintiffs claim as fact that immigration attorneys, criminal attorneys, judges, the community, and the Plaintiffs identified below, knew that Dallas County never afforded immediate release on bond for those with immigration holds and ICE detainers (during the time period at issue in this lawsuit). Because Dallas County set up a system where those with immigration holds and ICE detainers could not receive immediate release on bond, Dallas County cannot claim surprise when most detainees with immigration holds or ICE detainers do not waste the time or money to secure bond in a futile effort to obtain immediate release.
107. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Arturo Mercado. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Mercado, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A1. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Mercado in February 2015, showing that Mr. Mercado was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Mercado did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Mercado knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Mercado could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Mercado to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Mercado, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Mercado had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Mercado, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Mercado. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Mercado’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Mercado due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas
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County to detain Mr. Mercado. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A1. Based on this evidence, Mr. Mercado claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Mercado pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
108. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Pablo Carranza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Carranza, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A2. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Carranza in May 2015, showing that Mr. Carranza was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Carranza did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Carranza knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Carranza could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted
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in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Carranza to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Carranza, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Carranza had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Carranza, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Carranza. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Carranza’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Carranza due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Carranza. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A2. Based on this evidence, Mr. Carranza claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Carranza pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
109. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Sergio Diaz. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Diaz, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A3. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Diaz in January 2015, showing that Mr. Diaz was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Diaz did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Diaz knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Diaz could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. In fact, after ICE withdrew the detainer in August 2015, Dallas County allowed Mr. Diaz to pay bond, and Mr. Diaz could only then pay bond and be released, pretrial. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Diaz to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Diaz, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Diaz had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Diaz, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Diaz. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by the fact that Dallas
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County did, in fact, release Mr. Diaz after Dallas County finally allowed him to pay bail, as is his detainer, which does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. Ex. A at A3. Based on this evidence, Mr. Diaz claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Diaz pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
110. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jose Gutierrez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gutierrez, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A5. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Gutierrez in July 2015, showing that Mr. Gutierrez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Gutierrez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Gutierrez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Gutierrez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds
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resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Gutierrez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Gutierrez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Gutierrez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Gutierrez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Gutierrez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Gutierrez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gutierrez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A5. Based on this evidence, Mr. Gutierrez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Gutierrez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
111. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Heydy Jarquin Jimenez. After she was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. Evidence of this hold include (i) the fact that bail was set at $100,000, which was standard practice for those with immigration holds, and (ii) the fact that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was overdetained for transfer to ICE. ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A4. Bail was nominally set for Ms. Jarquin Jimenez in November 2014, showing that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez was eligible for pretrial release. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez did not attempt to pay bond because she believed it was futile to do so.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 122 of 390 PageID 1761
It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Ms. Jarquin Jimenez knew that she had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Ms. Jarquin Jimenez to pay bail on her original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Ms. Jarquin Jimenez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A4. Based on this evidence, Ms. Jarquin Jimenez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Ms. Jarquin Jimenez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
112. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jose Lopez-Aranda. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez-Aranda, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A6. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Lopez-Aranda in May 2015, showing that Mr. Lopez-Aranda was eligible for pretrial release. On information and belief, Mr. Lopez-Aranda attempted to pay bond, and Dallas County would not accept the bond. In the alternative, Mr. Lopez-Aranda did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Lopez-Aranda knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Lopez-Aranda could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Lopez-Aranda to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Lopez-Aranda, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Lopez-Aranda had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal
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offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Lopez-Aranda’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Lopez-Aranda due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Lopez-Aranda. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A6. Based on this evidence, Mr. Lopez-Aranda claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Lopez-Aranda pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
113. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Moises Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Martinez, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A7. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Martinez in April 2015, showing that Mr. Martinez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Martinez attempted to pay bond, but Dallas County would not allow Mr. Martinez to do so, due to the immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Martinez could have and would have
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 125 of 390 PageID 1764 secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. In fact, after being held pretrial for over a month on a purported misdemeanor (on which he was later found innocent), Mr. Martinez sought to be granted “time served” to avoid further pretrial detention:
Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Martinez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Martinez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Martinez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Martinez, Dallas County must show
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 126 of 390 PageID 1765
probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Martinez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Martinez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Martinez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A7. Based on this evidence, Mr. Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Martinez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
114. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Javier Navarette. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Navarette, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A8. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Navarette in December 2014, showing that Mr. Navarette was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Navarette did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well
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known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Navarette knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Navarette could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Navarette to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Navarette, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Navarette had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Navarette, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Navarette. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Navarette’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Navarette due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Navarette. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A8. Based on this evidence, Mr. Navarette claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Navarette pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
115. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Efren Perez Villegas. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Perez Villegas, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A21. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Perez Villegas in June 2015, showing that Mr. Perez Villegas was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Perez Villegas did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Perez Villegas knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Perez Villegas could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Perez Villegas to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Perez Villegas, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Perez Villegas had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Perez Villegas, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Perez Villegas. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Perez Villegas’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence
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of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Perez Villegas due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Perez Villegas. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A21. Based on this evidence, Mr. Perez Villegas claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Perez Villegas pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
116. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Miguel Rodriguez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez for ICE, after he should have been released, is evidence of that hold. ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A9. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Rodriguez in February 2015, showing that Mr. Rodriguez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Rodriguez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Rodriguez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Rodriguez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Rodriguez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Rodriguez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a criminal
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offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Rodriguez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Rodriguez knew of no hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Rodriguez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A9. Based on this evidence, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Rodriguez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
117. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Eleazar Saavedra. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Saavedra, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A10. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Saavedra in April 2015, showing that Mr. Saavedra was eligible for pretrial release. On information and belief, Mr. Saavedra attempted to pay bail, but Dallas County would not allow him to because of the pending immigration hold. In the alternative, Mr. Saavedra did not attempt
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to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Saavedra knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Saavedra could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Saavedra to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Saavedra, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Saavedra had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Saavedra, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Saavedra. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Saavedra knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Saavedra due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A10. Based on this evidence, Mr. Saavedra claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Saavedra pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
118. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Andres Torres Cabrera. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Torres Cabrera, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A22. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Torres Cabrera in May 2015, showing that Mr. Torres Cabrera was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Torres Cabrera did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Torres Cabrera knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Torres Cabrera could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Torres Cabrera to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Torres Cabrera, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Torres Cabrera had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Torres Cabrera, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Torres Cabrera. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 133 of 390 PageID 1772 by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Torres Cabrera’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Torres Cabrera due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Torres Cabrera. The detainer for Mr. Torres Cabrera only shows that he was “subject to removal” and “has a prior felony conviction,” as shown below:
Ex. A at A22. The detainer only provides evidence of a civil immigration violation, and not evidence that Mr. Torres Cabrera is committing or has committed a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Torres Cabrera claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Torres Cabrera pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
119. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Moises Vega Costilla. A court granted Mr. Vega Costilla’s Motion for New Trial in April 2015, and he was returned to Dallas County custody. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega Costilla. ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal
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offense or felony. See Ex. A at A11. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Vega Costilla in April 2015, showing that Mr. Vega Costilla was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Vega Costilla did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Vega Costilla knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Vega Costilla could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Vega Costilla to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Vega Costilla, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Vega Costilla had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Vega Costilla, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Vega Costilla. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Vega Costilla knows of no other hold besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that Dallas County held Mr. Vega Costilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Vega Costilla. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A11. Based on this evidence, Mr. Vega Costilla claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Vega Costilla pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
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120. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Ricardo Garza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Garza even though Mr. Garza is a U.S. Citizen. ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A14. Mr. Garza did not attempt to pay bond in Dallas County because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Garza knew that he had an immigration hold. After the ICE hold was removed, Dallas County allowed Mr. Garza to pay bail, as shown in the excerpt below from Mr. Garza’s docket sheet:
After Dallas County allowed bail, Mr. Garza paid bail and secured immediate pretrial release. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Garza could have and would have secured a bond in November 2015 to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Garza to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Garza, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Garza had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Garza, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Garza. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by the fact that Dallas County did,
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in fact, release Mr. Garza on bail once the ICE hold was removed. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A14. Based on this evidence, Mr. Garza claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Garza pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
121. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Carlos Alvarez Castro. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Alvarez Castro, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A15. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Alvarez Castro in October 2015, showing that Mr. Alvarez Castro was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Alvarez Castro did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Alvarez Castro knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Alvarez Castro could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals
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with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Alvarez Castro to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Alvarez Castro, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Alvarez Castro had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Alvarez Castro, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Alvarez Castro. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Alvarez Castro’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Alvarez Castro due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A15. Based on this evidence, Mr. Alvarez Castro claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Alvarez Castro pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
122. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jeremias Chevez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Chevez, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A16. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Chevez in February 2015, showing that Mr. Chevez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Chevez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Chevez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Chevez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Chevez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Chevez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Chevez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Chevez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Chevez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Chevez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal
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offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Chevez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See [cite]. Based on this evidence, Mr. Chevez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Chevez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
123. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Miguel Flores. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Flores, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A17. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Flores in October 2015, showing that Mr. Flores was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Flores did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Flores knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Flores could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice
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of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Flores to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Flores, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Flores had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Flores, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Flores. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Flores’ file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Flores due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A17. Based on this evidence, Mr. Flores claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Flores pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
124. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Felipe Gonzalez Lujan. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A18. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Gonzalez Lujan in August 2015, showing that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Gonzalez Lujan did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Gonzalez Lujan knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Gonzalez Lujan to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Gonzalez Lujan had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Gonzalez Lujan. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 142 of 390 PageID 1781 is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Gonzalez Lujan’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A18. Based on this evidence, Mr. Gonzalez Lujan claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Gonzalez Lujan pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
125. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Luis Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A19. Mr. Hernandez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Hernandez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing
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immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Hernandez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Hernandez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Hernandez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Hernandez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Hernandez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Hernandez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A19. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Hernandez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
126. Refusal of Pre-trial Release for Jose Valenciano. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Valenciano, as shown below:
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ICE sent Dallas County a detainer for this plaintiff, but that detainer did not show probable cause of a separate criminal offense or felony. See Ex. A at A20. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Valenciano in September 2015, showing that Mr. Valenciano was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Valenciano did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Valenciano knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Valenciano could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Valenciano to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Valenciano, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Valenciano had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Valenciano, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Valenciano. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Valenciano’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did
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not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Valenciano due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s detainer. The detainer, attached to this complaint, does not show probable cause of a criminal offense. See Ex. A at A20. Based on this evidence, Mr. Valenciano claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Valenciano pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
127. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Jose Delcid Bonilla. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Delcid Bonilla, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Delcid Bonilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Delcid Bonilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Delcid Bonilla in February 2015, showing that Mr. Delcid Bonilla was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Delcid Bonilla attempted to pay bail, but Dallas County would not allow him to. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Delcid Bonilla to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Delcid Bonilla, as Dallas County had
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no other basis to believe that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Delcid Bonilla, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Delcid Bonilla. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Delcid Bonilla’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Delcid Bonilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Delcid Bonilla. Mr. Delcid Bonilla does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Delcid Bonilla nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Delcid Bonilla had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Delcid Bonilla was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Delcid Bonilla’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Delcid Bonilla had not been charged
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 147 of 390 PageID 1786 with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Delcid Bonilla claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Delcid Bonilla had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Delcid Bonilla claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Delcid Bonilla pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
128. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release For Juan Camacho. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Camacho, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Camacho, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Camacho after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Camacho in September 2015, showing that Mr. Camacho was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Camacho did not attempt to pay
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bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Camacho knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Camacho could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Camacho to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Camacho, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Camacho, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Camacho. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Camacho knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Camacho due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Camacho. Mr. Camacho does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Camacho nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Camacho had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Camacho was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a);
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willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Camacho’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Camacho had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Camacho claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Camacho had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Camacho claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Camacho pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
129. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release For Maria Castillo. After she was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Ms. Castillo, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Ms. Castillo, requesting that Dallas County detain Ms. Castillo after she otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Ms. Castillo in November 2015, showing that Ms. Castillo was eligible for pretrial release. Ms. Castillo did not attempt to pay bond because she believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Ms. Castillo knew that she had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Ms. Castillo could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Ms. Castillo to pay bail on her original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Ms. Castillo, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Ms. Castillo had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Ms. Castillo, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Ms. Castillo. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence.
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The only hold listed in Ms. Castillo’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Ms. Castillo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Ms. Castillo. Ms. Castillo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Ms. Castillo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Ms. Castillo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Based on this evidence, Ms. Castillo claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Ms. Castillo pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
130. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release For Carlos Fuente Páramo. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Fuente Páramo, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Fuente Páramo, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Fuente Páramo after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Fuente Páramo in November 2014, showing that Mr. Fuente Páramo was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Fuente
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Páramo did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Fuente Páramo knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Fuente Páramo could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Fuente Páramo to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Fuente Páramo, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Fuente Páramo, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Fuente Páramo. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Fuente Páramo knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Fuente Páramo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Fuente Páramo. Mr. Fuente Páramo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Fuente Páramo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Fuente Páramo had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Fuente Páramo was innocent of any of the
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following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Fuente Páramo’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Fuente Páramo had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Fuente Páramo claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Fuente Páramo had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Fuente Páramo claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Fuente Páramo pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
131. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Abel Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Hernandez in October 2015, showing that Mr. Hernandez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Hernandez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Hernandez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Hernandez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Hernandez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Hernandez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Hernandez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Hernandez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Hernandez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a
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criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Hernandez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Hernandez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 156 of 390 PageID 1795 offense, and should not have held Mr. Hernandez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
132. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Salvador Jauregui. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Jauregui, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Jauregui, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Jauregui after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Jauregui in October 2015, showing that Mr. Jauregui was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Jauregui did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Jauregui knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Jauregui could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Jauregui to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas
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County should have released Mr. Jauregui, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Jauregui, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Jauregui. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Jauregui’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Jauregui due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Jauregui. Mr. Jauregui does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Jauregui nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Jauregui had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Jauregui was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Jauregui’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the
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IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Jauregui had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Jauregui claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Jauregui had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Jauregui claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Jauregui pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
133. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Julio Loera. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Loera, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Loera, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Loera after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Loera in March 2015, showing that Mr. Loera was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Loera did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release
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on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Loera knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Loera could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Loera to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Loera, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Loera, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Loera. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Loera’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Loera due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Loera. Mr. Loera does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Loera nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Loera had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Loera was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 160 of 390 PageID 1799 fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Loera’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Loera had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Loera claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Loera had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Loera claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Loera pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
134. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Arturo Muñoz Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Muñoz Martinez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Muñoz Martinez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Muñoz Martinez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Muñoz Martinez in December 2014, showing that Mr. Muñoz Martinez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Muñoz Martinez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Muñoz Martinez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Muñoz Martinez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Muñoz Martinez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Muñoz Martinez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Muñoz Martinez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Muñoz Martinez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Muñoz Martinez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Muñoz Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Muñoz Martinez. Mr. Muñoz Martinez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Muñoz Martinez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr.
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Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Muñoz Martinez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Muñoz Martinez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Muñoz Martinez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Muñoz Martinez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Muñoz Martinez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Muñoz Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Muñoz Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Muñoz Martinez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 163 of 390 PageID 1802 135. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Alberto Sanchez Chavez. After he was ar-
rested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Sanchez Chavez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Sanchez Chavez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Sanchez Chavez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Sanchez Chavez in November 2015, showing that Mr. Sanchez Chavez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Sanchez Chavez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Sanchez Chavez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Sanchez Chavez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Sanchez Chavez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Sanchez Chavez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr.
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Sanchez Chavez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Sanchez Chavez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Sanchez Chavez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Sanchez Chavez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Sanchez Chavez. Mr. Sanchez Chavez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Sanchez Chavez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Sanchez Chavez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Sanchez Chavez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Sanchez Chavez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Sanchez Chavez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Sanchez
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Chavez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Sanchez Chavez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Sanchez Chavez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Sanchez Chavez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
136. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Abraham Santana. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Santana, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Santana, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Santana after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Santana in November 2015, showing that Mr. Santana was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Santana did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Santana knew
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that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Santana could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Santana to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Santana, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Santana, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Santana. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. Mr. Santana knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Santana due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Santana. Mr. Santana does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Santana nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Santana had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Santana was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud
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(8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Santana’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Santana had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Santana claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Santana had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Santana claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Santana pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
137. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Jesus Lopez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Lopez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Lopez after he otherwise would be released
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for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Lopez in October 2015, showing that Mr. Lopez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Lopez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Lopez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Lopez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Lopez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Lopez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Lopez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Lopez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Lopez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Lopez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Lopez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Lopez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Lopez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Lopez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Lopez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in
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and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Lopez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Lopez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Lopez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Lopez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Lopez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Lopez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Lopez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Lopez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
138. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Ramirez Vasquez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Ramirez Vasquez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Ramirez Vasquez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Ramirez Vasquez in January 2015, showing that Mr. Ramirez Vasquez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Ramirez Vasquez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Ramirez Vasquez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Ramirez Vasquez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Ramirez Vasquez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Ramirez Vasquez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Ramirez Vasquez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Ramirez Vasquez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Ramirez Vasquez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Ramirez Vasquez’s file is the immigration hold.
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This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Ramirez Vasquez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Ramirez Vasquez. Mr. Ramirez Vasquez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Ramirez Vasquez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Ramirez Vasquez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Ramirez Vasquez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Ramirez Vasquez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Ramirez Vasquez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Ramirez Vasquez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Ramirez Vasquez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Ramirez Vasquez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Ramirez Vasquez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Ramirez Vasquez
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 172 of 390 PageID 1811 had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Ramirez Vasquez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Ramirez Vasquez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
139. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Carlos Reyna Esparragoza. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Reyna Esparragoza, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Reyna Esparragoza, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Reyna Esparragoza after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Reyna Esparragoza in June 27, 2015, for $1,500, showing that Mr. Reyna Esparragoza was eligible for pretrial release.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 173 of 390 PageID 1812 The same day, Mr. Reyna Esparragoza tendered a bail bond in the amount of $1,500 to secure pretrial release, as shown below:
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Dallas County did not release Mr. Reyna Esparragoza pre-trial, even though he tendered bail. One of the docket sheets for Mr. Reyna Esparragoza shows the indicator “BOND” crossed out, and replaced with “Jail.”
Instead of releasing Mr. Reyna Esparragoza after he paid bail, on August 5, 2015 (around six weeks later), Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner (or another Dallas County employee) caused a Dallas County district attorney to seek to hold the bond insufficient because of the detainer lodged against Mr. Reyna Esparragoza:
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The Court granted Dallas County’s request, and continued to hold Mr. Reyna Esparragoza pretrial. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Reyna Esparragoza to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Reyna Esparragoza, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Reyna Esparragoza, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense.
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Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Reyna Esparragoza. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Reyna Esparragoza’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Reyna Esparragoza due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Reyna Esparragoza. Mr. Reyna Esparragoza does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Reyna Esparragoza nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Reyna Esparragoza was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Reyna Esparragoza’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Reyna Esparragoza claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT
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database that would indicate that Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Reyna Esparragoza had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Reyna Esparragoza claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Reyna Esparragoza pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
140. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Jose Rodriguez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Rodriguez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Rodriguez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Rodriguez in December 2015, showing that Mr. Rodriguez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Rodriguez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Rodriguez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Rodriguez could
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have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Rodriguez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Rodriguez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Rodriguez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Rodriguez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Rodriguez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Rodriguez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Rodriguez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Rodriguez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. §
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1328). Mr. Rodriguez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Rodriguez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Rodriguez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Rodriguez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Rodriguez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
141. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Epifanio Uribe Ortiz. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Uribe Ortiz, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Uribe Ortiz, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Uribe Ortiz after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Uribe Ortiz in August 2015, showing
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that Mr. Uribe Ortiz was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Uribe Ortiz did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Uribe Ortiz knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Uribe Ortiz could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Uribe Ortiz to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Uribe Ortiz, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Uribe Ortiz had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Uribe Ortiz, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Uribe Ortiz. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Uribe Ortiz’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Uribe Ortiz due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Uribe Ortiz. Mr. Uribe Ortiz does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Uribe Ortiz nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Uribe Ortiz had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Uribe Ortiz had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Uribe Ortiz was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes:
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bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Uribe Ortiz’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Uribe Ortiz had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Uribe Ortiz claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Uribe Ortiz had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Uribe Ortiz had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Uribe Ortiz had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Uribe Ortiz claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Uribe Ortiz pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
142. Refusal of Pre-Trial Release for Raul Gomez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Gomez. Evidence of this hold includes (i) the fact that bail was set at $100,000, which was standard practice for those with immigration holds, and (ii) the fact that Mr. Gomez was overdetained for transfer to ICE. This is also evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Gomez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr.
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Gomez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Gomez in December 2014, showing that Mr. Gomez was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Gomez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it was futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Gomez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Gomez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Gomez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Gomez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Gomez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Gomez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Gomez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense is supported by evidence. The only hold listed in Mr. Gomez’s file is the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Gomez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Gomez. Mr. Gomez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Gomez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Gomez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Gomez had not been charged or convicted of a separate immigration crime. Mr. Gomez claims as fact that the detainer provided
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by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Gomez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Gomez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held Mr. Gomez pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
143. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Jorge Marrufo. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Marrufo, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Marrufo, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Marrufo after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Mr. Marrufo in November 2015, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Marrufo did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Marrufo knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Marrufo could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed
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Mr. Marrufo to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Marrufo, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Marrufo, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Marrufo. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Marrufo knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Marrufo due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Marrufo. Mr. Marrufo does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Marrufo nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Marrufo had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Marrufo was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Marrufo’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on
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information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Marrufo had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Marrufo claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Marrufo had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Marrufo claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
144. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Fernando Huerta. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Huerta, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Huerta, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Huerta after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Huerta in April 2016, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Huerta attempted to pay bond, but was not allowed to. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Huerta knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas
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County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Huerta could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Huerta to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Huerta, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Huerta had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Huerta, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Huerta. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Huerta knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Huerta due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Huerta. Mr. Huerta does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Huerta nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Huerta had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Based on this evidence, Mr. Huerta claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
145. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Jacinto Hernandez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez, as shown below:
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The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Hernandez in March 2016, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Hernandez did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it futile to do so. As shown above, his hold stated “NO BOND.” It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Hernandez knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Hernandez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Hernandez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Hernandez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Hernandez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Hernandez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Hernandez knew
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of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Hernandez nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Hernandez had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr.
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 189 of 390 PageID 1828 Hernandez had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
146. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Mario Hernandez Jasso. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Hernandez Jasso, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Hernandez Jasso, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Hernandez Jasso after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Hernandez Jasso in April 2016, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Hernandez Jasso did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Hernandez Jasso knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Hernandez Jasso could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice
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of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Hernandez Jasso to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Hernandez Jasso, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Hernandez Jasso, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Hernandez Jasso. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Hernandez Jasso knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Hernandez Jasso due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Hernandez Jasso. Mr. Hernandez Jasso does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Hernandez Jasso nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Hernandez Jasso had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Hernandez Jasso was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and
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importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Hernandez Jasso’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Hernandez Jasso had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Hernandez Jasso claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Hernandez Jasso had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Hernandez Jasso claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
147. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Florencio Vega. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Vega, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Vega after he otherwise would be released for
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transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Vega in March 2016, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Vega did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Vega knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Vega could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Vega to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Vega, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Vega, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Vega. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Vega knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Vega due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Vega. Mr. Vega does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Vega nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Vega had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration
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crime. In particular, Mr. Vega was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Vega’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Vega had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Vega claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Vega had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Vega claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
148. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Francisco Lara Martinez. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lara Martinez, as suggested by the following entry from his file:
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ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Lara Martinez, which is attached to the Complaint. Ex. DD at DD8. Bail was nominally set for Lara Martinez in September 2015, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Lara Martinez attempted to pay the bond, but was unsuccessful, for the reasons detailed earlier in the complaint. See supra ¶ 42. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Lara Martinez could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Lara Martinez to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Lara Martinez, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Lara Martinez had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Lara Martinez, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Lara Martinez. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Lara Martinez knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Lara Martinez due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr.
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Lara Martinez. Mr. Lara Martinez’s detainer does not indicate that Mr. Lara Martinez had committed or was committing a crime. Ex. DD at DD8. Based on this evidence, Mr. Lara Martinez claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
149. Refusal of Pretrial Release for Jesus Padilla. After he was arrested, an immigration hold was placed on Mr. Padilla, as shown below:
The immigration hold is evidence of the fact that ICE sent a detainer to Dallas County for Mr. Padilla, requesting that Dallas County detain Mr. Padilla after he otherwise would be released for transfer to ICE. Bail was nominally set for Padilla in February 2016, showing that he was eligible for pretrial release. Mr. Padilla did not attempt to pay bond because he believed it futile to do so. It was well known that Dallas County refused immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, and Mr. Padilla knew that he had an immigration hold. But for Dallas County’s practices of refusing immediate release on bond for any detainee with an immigration hold, Mr. Padilla could have and would have secured a bond to ensure pretrial release. Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds resulted in pretrial detention. If Dallas County had allowed Mr. Padilla
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to pay bail on his original purported criminal offense, Dallas County should have released Mr. Padilla, as Dallas County had no other basis to believe that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Thus, to further detain Mr. Padilla, Dallas County must show probable cause of a different criminal offense. Dallas County did not have such probable cause, but continued to detain Mr. Padilla. The fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense or felony is supported by evidence. Mr. Padilla knew of no hold that might justify further detention besides the immigration hold. This is evidence of the fact that (i) Dallas County did not have probable cause of a criminal offense from another county or state, and (ii) Dallas County held Mr. Padilla due to that immigration hold, and ultimately because of ICE’s request for Dallas County to detain Mr. Padilla. Mr. Padilla does not have a copy of the detainer that ICE sent Dallas County. Mr. Padilla nevertheless claims, as a fact, that the detainer does not indicate that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. The form used by ICE generally indicates civil immigration violations, not criminal violations. Further, Mr. Padilla had not been charged or convicted of an immigration crime, and was not guilty of an immigration crime. In particular, Mr. Padilla was innocent of any of the following immigration crimes: bringing in and harboring aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324); unlawful employment of aliens (8 U.S.C. § 1324a); willful failure to disclose role as document preparer (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)(1)); improper entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); marriage fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)); immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)); illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter (8 U.S.C. § 1327); and importation of alien for immoral purpose (8 U.S.C. § 1328). Mr. Padilla’s claimed innocence of these crimes is evidence of the fact that the detainer used by ICE did not show probable cause of a criminal violation. Further, the detainer is based on information contained in the IDENT database, see
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supra ¶¶ 9-10. Because Mr. Padilla had not been charged with an immigration crime, convicted of an immigration crime, or guilty of an immigration crime, Mr. Padilla claims as fact that there is nothing in the IDENT database that would indicate that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. Because nothing in the IDENT database indicated that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime, the detainer provided by ICE to Dallas County did not show that Mr. Padilla had committed or was committing a crime. Based on this evidence, Mr. Padilla claims as fact that Dallas County did not have probable cause of a different criminal offense, and should not have held him pretrial. Dallas County also violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing the Plaintiff pretrial release due to a detainer issued without the oversight of a neutral magistrate.
COUNT 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—DENIAL OF PRETRIAL RELEASE (ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT MARIO GARIBALDI AND RODOLFO MARMOLEJO) 150. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs. 151. The Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause. 152. Dallas County must allow an opportunity for pretrial release that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 153. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established. 154. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendments protect every person against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, unless the interference is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 155. Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental and clearly established right.
197

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156. Dallas County imposed pretrial detention on Plaintiffs, infringing the Plaintiffs’ strong interest in liberty. This intentional or reckless pretrial detention is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 5
157. Based on the facts and allegations at ¶¶ 8-62 and 103-106, which are incorporated by reference, Plaintiffs claim that Dallas County did not allow an opportunity for pretrial release for those with immigration holds, even when a court nominally set bail. In particular, if any detainee with an immigration hold (such as plaintiffs) paid bail, Dallas County would either (i) continue to hold the detainee for transfer to ICE, or (ii) Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office would ask an assistant district attorney to petition a court to find the bail insufficient. Based on this evidence, Plaintiffs claim that Dallas County did not allow immediate release on bond to Plaintiffs. Further, each Plaintiff either (i) attempted to pay bail, and was not released, or (ii) believed paying bail to be a futile exercise, based on the widespread knowledge of Dallas County’s refusal to allow immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds.
158. Plaintiffs make more particularized allegations at ¶¶ 107-149, which are incorporated by reference. Based on those allegations and evidence, as well as those found at ¶¶ 862 and 103-106, Plaintiffs claim that Dallas County did not allow immediate release on bond to Plaintiffs. Further, Plaintiffs either (i) attempted to pay bail, and were not released, or (ii) believed paying bail to be a futile exercise, based on the widespread knowledge of Dallas
5 Plaintiffs plead the pretrial-release claims under both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The Court has already dismissed the due-process claims for the original Mercado and Garza Plaintiffs. The remaining plaintiffs (the original Delcid Bonilla plaintiffs and the plaintiffs added for the first time in this amended complaint) do not expect that the dueprocess claims will survive a motion to dismiss, but Plaintiffs seek to protect the appellate record by urging the Due Process claim along with the Fourth Amendment claim.
198

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County’s refusal to allow immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds. As
examples:
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Abel Hernandez, Moises Vega Costilla, Florencio Vega, Miguel Rodriguez, Jose Valenciano, Arturo Mercado, and Mario Hernandez Jasso for more than a month, pretrial;
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Jose Gutierrez, Jesus Lopez, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Jose Rodriguez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, and Jeremias Chevez for over two months, pretrial;
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Raul Gomez, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Maria Castillo, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jacinto Hernandez, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Efren Perez Villegas, Jorge Marrufo, and Salvador Jaurequi for over three months, pretrial;
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Pablo Carranza, Luis Hernandez, Jose Lopez-Aranda, and Eleazar Saavedra for over four months, pretrial;
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Jose Declid Bonilla, Moises Martinez, and Francisco Lara Martinez for over five months, pretrial;
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Fernando Huerta, Abraham Santana, Sergio Diaz, and Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez for over six months, pretrial;
· Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Julio Loera for over ten months, pretrial; · Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Carlos Fuentes Paramo for over a year,
pretrial; and · Dallas County unconstitutionally detained Arturo Muñoz Martinez for over a year
and a half, pretrial.
159. If Dallas County had allowed bail, Dallas County would have been required to
release Plaintiffs if Plaintiffs had paid bail, as Dallas County had no other probable cause to
believe that any Plaintiff had committed or was committing criminal activity, for the reasons
stated at ¶¶ 107-149, which are incorporated by reference. Further, Plaintiffs either (i) at-
tempted to pay bail, and were not released, or (ii) believed paying bail to be a futile exercise,
based on the widespread knowledge of Dallas County’s refusal to allow immediate release on
bond for detainees with immigration holds. Finally, in Plaintiffs’ situation, Dallas County can
199

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only arrest based on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 426 (5th Cir. 1985). None of the detainer forms are signed by neutral and detached magistrates—they are signed by immigration officers. See Exs. A, B. Further, even if Plaintiffs’ detainers showed probable cause of a felony (which they do not), Dallas County must ensure that a judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate follows any warrantless arrest. Id. at 424. Dallas County does not do so.
160. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond for detainees with immigration holds. In particular, if any detainee with an immigration hold (such as plaintiffs) paid bail, Dallas County would either (i) continue to hold the detainee for transfer to ICE, or (ii) Sr. Sgt. Bruner’s office would ask an assistant district attorney to petition a court to find the bail insufficient. Holding plaintiffs without an adequate opportunity for bail violates Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and/or the United States Constitution. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for these policies and practices. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i) whether to refuse bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.
161. As a result of Dallas County’s actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
COUNT 2: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—OVERDETENTION (ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT SERGIO DIAZ, RICARDO GARZA, JESUS LOPEZ, GONZALO RAMIREZ VASQUEZ,
CARLOS REYNA ESPARRAGOZA, JOSE RODRIGUEZ, EPIFANIO URIBE ORTIZ, RAUL GOMEZ, AND FRANCISCO LARA MARTINEZ)
162. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs. 163. The Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause.
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164. When an individual is found not guilty, has all charges dropped against him or her, serves his or her sentence, or pleads guilty and receives no additional jail time, Dallas County must release that individual, absent a separate showing of probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
165. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established. 166. Dallas County has a policy and practice of detaining individuals with immigration holds who have otherwise been cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed or other authority that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Instead, Dallas County justifies its detentions with ICEissued requests to detain that neither satisfy the Fourth Amendment nor show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed. In Plaintiffs’ situation, Dallas County can only arrest based on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 426 (5th Cir. 1985). None of the detainer forms are signed by neutral and detached magistrates—they are signed by immigration officers. See Exs. A, B. Further, even if Plaintiffs’ detainers showed probable cause of a felony (which they do not), Dallas County must ensure that a judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate follows any warrantless arrest. Id. at 424. Dallas County does not do so. 167. As shown at ¶¶ 8-37 and 55-65, which are incorporated by reference, Dallas County detained Plaintiffs after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail, without probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Further, Dallas County detained certain Plaintiffs for more than 48 hours.
201

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168. Plaintiffs make Plaintiff-specific allegations at ¶¶ 66-102, which are incorporated by reference. As explained therein, along with the allegations and facts at ¶¶ 8-37 and 55-65 (which are incorporated by reference), Plaintiffs were detained after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. But, as explained at least ¶¶ 66-102, Dallas County did not know of any facts that showed that each Plaintiff had committed or was committing a new criminal violation sufficient to show probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, each Plaintiff should have been released after (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail.
169. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s policy of honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even when Dallas County has no probable cause of a new criminal violation, and (i) Dallas County dropped all pending criminal charges, (ii) the detainee was found innocent of all pending criminal charges, (iii) the detainee pleaded guilty, but received no additional jail time, or (iv) the detainee pleaded guilty and served his sentence in Dallas County Jail. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for this policy. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decision on whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.
170. As a result of Dallas County’s actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
202

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 203 of 390 PageID 1842 JURY DEMAND
171. Plaintiffs demand a jury on all issues so triable. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs request the following relief: i. That the Court award Plaintiffs actual and compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial; ii. That the Court award pre-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, continuing until such judgment is paid, at the maximum rate allowed by law;
iii. That Dallas County pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees and costs as permitted by law, including as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
iv. That the Court award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Dated: June 16, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
/s Anthony M. Garza ANTHONY M. GARZA
Texas State Bar No. 24050644 agarza@ccrglaw.com CHARHON CALLAHAN ROBSON & GARZA, PLLC 3333 Lee Parkway, Suite 460 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 521-6400 Telecopier: (214) 764-8392
ERIC PUENTE Texas State Bar No. 24069225 epuente@phflaw.com
RAYMOND M. HINDIEH Texas State Bar No. 24078666 rhindieh@phflaw.com
PUENTE & HINDIEH PLLC 3300 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 401 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 730-0485 Telecopier: (214) 730-0520
Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On June 16, 2017, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic-case-filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).
s/ Anthony M. Garza ANTHONY M. GARZA

204

 
 Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 205 of 390 PageID 1844

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISON

ARTURO MERCADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-3481
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendant.

TEXAS, Permissive Intervenor.

Exhibit A B C
D
E
F G
H
I
J
K
L
M

INDEX OF EXHIBITS TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Description 22 Immigration Detainers produced by Dallas County, listing various Plaintiffs Immigration Detainer Forms I-247, I-247D, I-247N, I-247X, and I-247A Morgan Smith & Terri Langford, Texas Sheriffs, Jails on Immigration Front Line, The Texas Tribune, Feb. 16, 2016 Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, The N.Y. Times, May 11, 2012 Dianne Solís, Police Use of Federal Databases to ID Illegal Immigrants after Arrests Raises Profiling Concerns, The Dallas Morning News, Jan. 18, 2011 Secure Communities Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sept. 1, 2009 PowerPoint presentation entitled “Electronic Arrest Reporting (EAR) and Livescan,” Tex. Dep’t of Public Safety Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies Withdraw, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 16, 2014 Secure Communities: Removing Criminal Aliens from Communities through Biometric Information Sharing, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security ICE Secure Communities Standard Operating Procedures, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Letter from Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting Director of ICE, to Rep. Mike Thompson, dated February 25, 2014 ICE Memorandum dated December 21, 2012, re: “Civil Immigration Enforcement: Guidance on the Use of Detainers in the Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Criminal Justice Systems”
1

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 206 of 390 PageID 1845

N

Further Decrease in ICE Detainer Use Still Not Targeting Serious Criminals, Transac-

tional Records Access Clearinghouse, Aug. 28, 2015

O

Sarah Thomas, Officials Grapple with Costs of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants,

Longview News-Journal, Oct. 16, 2013

P

Dan Hill, Interactive: The Cost of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants, The Texas Trib-

une, July 21, 2014

Q

Dianne Solís, Dallas County Sheriff Eases Immigration Holds on Minor Offenses, The

Dallas Morning News, Oct. 12, 2015

R

E-mail thread between counsel for Dallas County and counsel for Plaintiffs, dated

June 9-10, 2016

S

ICE Guidance for Completing Form I-247A, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enfro-

cement

T

Dallas Sheriff Responds to Texas Governor: All ICE Detainers Honored this Year, The

Dallas Morning News Trailblazers Blog, Oct. 26, 2015

U

Andy East, U.S. Citizen Jailed in Immigration Status Mistake, The Texas Tribune,

Feb. 27, 2016

V

Morgan Smith & Jay Root, Jails Refused to Hold Thousands of Immigrants Sought by

Feds, The Texas Tribune, Jan. 15, 2016

W

E-mail thread between Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner and Raymond Hindieh dated July 27-

28, 2015

X

E-mail thread between Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner and Eric Puente dated December 7, 2015

Y

E-mail thread between Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner and Raymond Hindieh dated December

2, 2014

Z

E-mail from Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner to Raymond Hindieh dated April 23, 2014

AA

E-mail from Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner to Raymond Hindieh dated June 3, 2014

BB

E-mail thread between Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner and Eric Puente dated February 26, 2015

CC

E-mail thread between Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner and Eric Puente dated December 14,

2015

DD

Documents related to Plaintiff Francisco Lara Martinez, including Form I-247N

EE

E-mail from Sr. Sgt. Ric Bruner to Eric Puente, Raymond Hindieh, and others dated

January 27, 2016

FF

Screenshots from Dallas County’s AIS Computer System, produced by Dallas

County

GG

Document entitled “Priority Enforcement Program (PEP),” U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement

HH

Why ‘PEP’ Doesn’t Fix S-Comm’s Failings, National Immigration Law Center, June

2015

II

SCAAP Guidelines and Application, FY2014, FY2015, and FY2016, produced by

Dallas County

JJ

Declaration of Hon. Michael Snipes, dated July 1, 2016

KK

Immigration Detainer Report, Texas Commission on Jail Standards, May 19, 2017

LL

Memorandum to Commissioners Court dated November 1, 2016, re: “FY2016 State

Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) Funds Acceptance,” produced by Dal-

las County

MM

Dallas County FY2016 SCAAP Application, produced by Dallas County

2

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 207 of 390 PageID 1846
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000002

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 208 of 390 PageID 1847
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000005

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 209 of 390 PageID 1848
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000007

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 210 of 390 PageID 1849
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000015

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 211 of 390 PageID 1850
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000017

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 212 of 390 PageID 1851
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000019

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 213 of 390 PageID 1852
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000021

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 214 of 390 PageID 1853
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000023

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 215 of 390 PageID 1854
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000025

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 216 of 390 PageID 1855
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000028

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 217 of 390 PageID 1856
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000030

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 218 of 390 PageID 1857
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000034

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 219 of 390 PageID 1858
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000036

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 220 of 390 PageID 1859
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000038

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 221 of 390 PageID 1860
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000040

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 222 of 390 PageID 1861
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000042

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 223 of 390 PageID 1862
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000044

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 224 of 390 PageID 1863
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000046

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 225 of 390 PageID 1864
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000048

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 226 of 390 PageID 1865
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000050

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 227 of 390 PageID 1866
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000863

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 228 of 390 PageID 1867
DALMER000916

Ex. A

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Case 3:15-cv-0348IM1-MSIGDRoAcTuImOeNnDt 8E0TAFINileEdR0-6N/1O6/T1I7CE POaFgAeC2T29IOoNf 390

PageID 1868 Ex. B

Subject ID: Event #:

File No: Date:

TO: (Name and Title of Institution - OR Any Subsequent Law

FROM: (Department of Homeland Security Office Address)

Enforcement Agency)

MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF ALIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS

Name of Alien: _____________________________________________________________________________________

Date of Birth: _________________________ Nationality: __________________________________ Sex: ____________

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTION RELATED TO

ly THE PERSON IDENTIFIED ABOVE, CURRENTLY IN YOUR CUSTODY:

Determined that there is reason to believe the individual is an alien subject to removal from the United States. The individual (check

all that apply):

has a prior a felony conviction or has been charged with a felony

has been convicted of illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

n offense;

1325;

has three or more prior misdemeanor convictions;

has illegally re-entered the country after a previous removal

has a prior misdemeanor conviction or has been charged with a

or return;

misdemeanor for an offense that involves violence, threats, or assaults; sexual abuse or exploitation; driving under the influence
O of alcohol or a controlled substance; unlawful flight from the
scene of an accident; the unlawful possession or use of a firearm or other deadly weapon, the distribution or trafficking of a controlled substance; or other significant threat to public safety;

has been found by an immigration officer or an immigration judge to have knowingly committed immigration fraud;
otherwise poses a significant risk to national security, border security, or public safety; and/or other (specify): __________________________________.

Initiated removal proceedings and served a Notice to Appear or other charging document. A copy of the charging document is
n attached and was served on ______________________ (date).

Served a warrant of arrest for removal proceedings. A copy of the warrant is attached and was served on _________________ (date).

Obtained an order of deportation or removal from the United States for this person.

tio This action does not limit your discretion to make decisions related to this person's custody classification, work, quarter
assignments, or other matters. DHS discourages dismissing criminal charges based on the existence of a detainer.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU:

Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the subject. This request derives from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. For purposes of this immigration detainer, you are not authorized to hold
a the subject beyond these 48 hours. As early as possible prior to the time you otherwise would release the subject, please notify
DHS by calling________________during business hours or_______________after hours or in an emergency. If you cannot reach a DHS Official at these numbers, please contact the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center in Burlington, Vermont at: (802) 872-6020.
Provide a copy to the subject of this detainer.

rm Notify this office of the time of release at least 30 days prior to release or as far in advance as possible.

Notify this office in the event of the inmate's death, hospitalization or transfer to another institution.

Consider this request for a detainer operative only upon the subject's conviction.

Cancel the detainer previously placed by this Office on ____________________ (date).

fo(Name and title of Immigration Officer)

(Signature of Immigration Officer)

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY CURRENTLY HOLDING THE SUBJECT OF THIS NOTICE:

InPlease provide the information below, sign, and return to DHS using the envelope enclosed for your convenience or by faxing a copy

to

. You should maintain a copy for your own records so you may track the case and not hold the

subject beyond the 48-hour period.

Local Booking/Inmate #: ___________ Latest criminal charge/conviction: ________ (date) Estimated release: __________(date)

Last criminal charge/conviction: _____________________________________________________________________________
Notice: Once in our custody, the subject of this detainer may be removed from the United States. If the individual may be the victim of a crime, or if you want this individual to remain in the United States for prosecution or other law enforcement purposes, including acting as a witness, please notify the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center at (802) 872-6020.

(Name and title of Officer)
DHS Form I-247 (12/12)
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

(Signature of Officer)

Page 1 of
B1

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 230 of 390 PageID 1869 Ex. B
NOTICE TO THE DETAINEE
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has placed an immigration detainer on you. An immigration detainer is a notice from DHS informing law enforcement agencies that DHS intends to assume custody of you after you otherwise would be released from custody. DHS has requested that the law enforcement agency which is currently detaining you maintain custody of you for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) beyond the time when you would have been released by the state or local law enforcement authorities based on your criminal charges or convictions. If DHS does not take you into custody during that additional 48 hour period, not counting weekends or holidays, you should contact your custodian (the law enforcement agency or other entity that is holding you now) to inquire about your release from state or local custody. If you have a complaint regarding this detainer or related to violations of civil rights or civil liberties connected to DHS activities, please contact the ICE Joint Intake Center at 1-877-2INTAKE (877-246-8253). If you believe you are a United States citizen or the victim of a crime, please advise DHS by calling the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center toll free at (855) 448-6903.
ly NOTIFICACIÓN A LA PERSONA DETENIDA
El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DHS) de EE. UU. ha emitido una orden de detención inmigratoria en su contra. Mediante esta orden, se notifica a los organismos policiales que el DHS pretende arrestarlo cuando usted cumpla su reclusión actual. El DHS ha solicitado que el organismo policial local o estatal a cargo de su actual detención lo mantenga en custodia por un período no mayor a 48 horas (excluyendo sábados, domingos y días festivos) tras el cese de su reclusión penal. Si el DHS no procede con su arresto
n inmigratorio durante este período adicional de 48 horas, excluyendo los fines de semana o días festivos, usted debe
comunicarse con la autoridad estatal o local que lo tiene detenido (el organismo policial u otra entidad a cargo de su custodia actual) para obtener mayores detalles sobre el cese de su reclusión. Si tiene alguna queja que se relacione con esta orden de detención o con posibles infracciones a los derechos o libertades civiles en conexión con las actividades del DHS, comuníquese con el Joint Intake Center (Centro de Admisión) del ICE (Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas)
O llamando al 1-877-2INTAKE (877-246-8253). Si usted cree que es ciudadano de los Estados Unidos o que ha sido víctima de
un delito, infórmeselo al DHS llamando al Centro de Apoyo a los Organismos Policiales (Law Enforcement Support Center) del ICE, teléfono (855) 448-6903 (llamada gratuita).
n Avis au détenu
Le département de la Sécurité Intérieure [Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] a émis, à votre encontre, un ordre d'incarcération pour des raisons d'immigration. Un ordre d'incarcération pour des raisons d'immigration est un avis du DHS informant les agences des forces de l'ordre que le DHS a l'intention de vous détenir après la date normale de votre remise en liberté. Le DHS a requis que
tio l'agence des forces de l'ordre, qui vous détient actuellement, vous garde en détention pour une période maximum de 48 heures
(excluant les samedis, dimanches et jours fériés) au-delà de la période à la fin de laquelle vous auriez été remis en liberté par les autorités policières de l'État ou locales en fonction des inculpations ou condamnations pénales à votre encontre. Si le DHS ne vous détient pas durant cette période supplémentaire de 48 heures, sans compter les fins de semaines et les jours fériés, vous devez contacter votre gardien (l'agence des forces de l'ordre qui vous détient actuellement) pour vous renseigner à propos de votre libération par l'État ou l'autorité locale. Si vous avez une plainte à formuler au sujet de cet ordre d'incarcération ou en rapport
a avec des violations de vos droits civils liées à des activités du DHS, veuillez contacter le centre commun d'admissions du
Service de l'Immigration et des Douanes [ICE - Immigration and Customs Enforcement] [ICE Joint Intake Center] au 1-877-2INTAKE (877-246-8253). Si vous croyez être un citoyen des États-Unis ou la victime d'un crime, veuillez en aviser le DHS en appelant le centre d'assistance des forces de l'ordre de l'ICE [ICE Law Enforcement Support Center] au numéro gratuit (855) 448-6903.
rmAVISO AO DETENTO
O Departamento de Segurança Nacional (DHS) emitiu uma ordem de custódia imigratória em seu nome. Este documento é um aviso enviado às agências de imposição da lei de que o DHS pretende assumir a custódia da sua pessoa, caso seja liberado. O DHS pediu
fo que a agência de imposição da lei encarregada da sua atual detenção mantenha-o sob custódia durante, no máximo, 48 horas
(excluindo-se sábados, domingos e feriados) após o período em que seria liberado pelas autoridades estaduais ou municipais de imposição da lei, de acordo com as respectivas acusações e penas criminais. Se o DHS não assumir a sua custódia durante essas 48 horas adicionais, excluindo-se os fins de semana e feriados, você deverá entrar em contato com o seu custodiante (a agência de imposição da lei ou qualquer outra entidade que esteja detendo-o no momento) para obter informações sobre sua liberação
Inda custódia estadual ou municipal. Caso você tenha alguma reclamação a fazer sobre esta ordem de custódia imigratória ou
relacionada a violações dos seus direitos ou liberdades civis decorrente das atividades do DHS, entre em contato com o Centro de Entrada Conjunta da Agencia de Controle de Imigração e Alfândega (ICE) pelo telefone 1-877-246-8253. Se você acreditar que é um cidadão dos EUA ou está sendo vítima de um crime, informe o DHS ligando para o Centro de Apoio à Imposição da Lei do ICE pelo telefone de ligação gratuita (855) 448-6903

DHS Form I-247 (12/12)
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 2 of
B2

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 231 of 390 PageID 1870 Ex. B
THÔNG BÁO CHO NGƯỜI BỊ GIAM GIỮ
Bộ Quốc Phòng (DHS) đã có lệnh giam giữ quý vị vì lý do di trú. Lệnh giam giữ vì lý do di trú là thông báo của DHS cho các cơ quan thi hành luật pháp là DHS có ý định tạm giữ quý vị sau khi quý vị được thả. DHS đã yêu cầu cơ quan thi hành luật pháp hiện đang giữ quý vị phải tiếp tục tạm giữ quý vị trong không quá 48 giờ đồng hồ (không kể thứ Bảy, Chủ nhật, và các ngày nghỉ lễ) ngoài thời gian mà lẽ ra quý vị sẽ được cơ quan thi hành luật pháp của tiểu bang hoặc địa phương thả ra dựa trên các bản án và tội hình sự của quý vị. Nếu DHS không tạm giam quý vị trong thời gian 48 giờ bổ sung đó, không tính các ngày cuối tuần hoặc ngày lễ, quý vị nên liên lạc với bên giam giữ quý vị (cơ quan thi hành luật pháp hoặc tổ chức khác hiện đang giam giữ quý vị) để hỏi về việc cơ quan địa phương hoặc liên bang thả quý vị ra. Nếu quý vị có khiếu nại về lệnh giam giữ này hoặc liên quan tới các trường hợp vi phạm dân quyền hoặc tự do công dân liên quan tới các hoạt động của DHS, vui lòng liên lạc với ICE Joint Intake Center tại số 1-877-2INTAKE (877-246-8253). Nếu quý vị tin rằng quý vị là công dân Hoa Kỳ hoặc nạn nhân tội phạm, vui lòng
Information Only báo choDHS biết bằngcách gọi ICE Law Enforcement SupportCenter tại số điện thoạimiễn phí (855) 448-6903.

DHS Form I-247 (12/12)
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 3 of
B3

Case

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)
3:15IM-cMv-I0G3R48A1T-ISONDDoEcuTmAIeNnEt R80– RFEileQdU0E6S/1T6/F1O7R VPOagLeU2N3T2AoRfY39A0CTPIOagNeID

1871 Ex.

B

Subject ID: Event #:

File No: Date:

TO: (Name and Title of Institution - OR Any Subsequent Law Enforcement Agency)

FROM: (DHS Office Address)

Name of Subject: ____________________________________________________________________________
Date of Birth: ____________________ Citizenship: __________________________ Sex: ____________
1. DHS HAS DETERMINED THAT (mark at least one option in subsection A and one option in subsection B, or skip to section 2): A. THE SUBJECT IS AN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITY BECAUSE HE/SHE:
has engaged in or is suspected of terrorism or espionage, or otherwise poses a danger to national security; has been convicted of an offense of which an element was active participation in a criminal street gang, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 521(a), or is at least 16 years old and intentionally participated in an organized criminal gang to further its illegal activities; has been convicted of an offense classified as a felony, other than a state or local offense for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status; has been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) at the time of conviction; has been convicted of a “significant misdemeanor,” as defined under DHS policy; and/or has been convicted of 3 or more misdemeanors, not including minor traffic offenses and state or local offenses for which immigration status was an essential element, provided the offenses arise out of 3 separate incidents.
B. PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS THAT THE SUBJECT IS A REMOVABLE ALIEN. THIS DETERMINATION IS BASED ON:
a final order of removal against the subject; the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the subject; biometric confirmation of the subject’s identity and a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in addition to other reliable information, that the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and/or statements made voluntarily by the subject to an immigration officer and/or other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate the subject either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law.
2. DHS TRANSFERRED THE SUBJECT TO YOUR CUSTODY FOR A PROCEEDING OR INVESTIGATION. Upon completion of the proceeding or investigation for which the subject was transferred to your custody, DHS intends to resume custody of the subject to complete processing.
IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT YOU: • Serve a copy of this form on the subject and maintain custody of him/her for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS beyond the
time when he/she would otherwise have been released from your custody to allow DHS to assume custody. This request takes effect only if you serve a copy of this form on the subject, and it does not request or authorize that you hold the subject beyond 48 hours. This request arises from DHS authorities and should not impact decisions about the subject’s bail, rehabilitation, parole, release, diversion, custody classification, work, quarter assignments, or other matters.
• As early as possible prior to the time you otherwise would release the subject, please notify DHS by calling □ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or □ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at _________________________________________________.
If you cannot reach an official at the number(s) provided, please contact the Law Enforcement Support Center at: (802) 872-6020. • Notify this office in the event of the subject’s death, hospitalization or transfer to another institution.
□ If checked: Please cancel the detainer related to this subject previously submitted to you on _____________ (date).

(Name and title of Immigration Officer)

(Signature of Immigration Officer)

Notice: If the subject is taken into DHS custody, he or she may be removed from the United States. If the subject may be the victim of a crime or you want the subject to remain in the United States for a law enforcement purpose, please notify the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center at (802) 872-6020. You may also call this number if you have any other questions or concerns about this matter.

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY CURRENTLY HOLDING THE SUBJECT OF THIS NOTICE: Please provide the information below, sign, and return to DHS by mailing, emailing, or faxing a copy to _________________________. Local Booking/Inmate #: ____________ Est. release date/time: _____________ Date of latest criminal charge/conviction: __________ Latest offense charged/convicted: _______________________________________________________________________________

This Form I-247D was served upon the subject on _____________________, in the following manner:

 in person

 by inmate mail delivery

 other (please specify): ___________________________________.

(Name and title of Officer) DHS Form I-247D
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

(Signature of Officer)

Page 1 of 3
B4

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 233 of 390 PageID 1872 Ex. B
NOTICE TO THE DETAINEE The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has placed an immigration detainer on you. An immigration detainer is a notice to a law enforcement agency that DHS intends to assume custody of you ( after you otherwise would be released from custody) because there is probable cause that you are subject to removal from the United States under federal immigration law. DHS has requested that the law enforcement agency that is currently detaining you maintain custody of you for a period not to exceed 48 hours beyond the time when you would have been released based on your criminal charges or convictions. If DHS does not take you into custody during this additional 48 hour period, you should contact your custodian (the agency that is holding you now) to inquire about your release. If you have a question or complaint regarding this detainer, please contact the ICE ERO Detention Reporting and Information Line at (888) 351-4024. For complaints related to alleged violations of civil rights or civil liberties connected to DHS activities, please contact the Joint Intake Center at (877) 2INTAKE (877-246-8253). If you believe you are a United States citizen or the victim of a crime, please advise DHS by calling the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center toll free at (855) 448-6903.
NOTIFICACIÓN AL DETENIDO El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DHS) ha emitido una orden de detención inmigratoria en su contra. Una orden de detención inmigratoria es un aviso a la autoridad de seguridad pública que DHS tiene la intención de asumir custodia sobre usted (después que normalmente hubiera sido liberado de su custodia) porque existe causa probable que usted esté sujeto a ser removido de los Estados Unidos bajo la ley federal de inmigración. DHS ha pedido que la autoridad de seguridad pública que actualmente lo tiene detenido lo / la mantenga en su custodia por un período que no sobrepase 48 horas después del momento cuando usted hubiera sido liberado basado en sus cargos o condenas criminales. Si DHS no lo toma bajo su custodia durante este período adicional de 48 horas, usted debe contactar a la agencia responsable por su custodia (la que actualmente lo tiene detenido) para preguntar acerca de su liberación. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta o queja concerniente a esta orden de detención, por favor contacte la Línea para Reportar e Información de ICE ERO al (888) 351-4024. Para quejas relacionadas a violaciones alegadas de derechos civiles o libertades civiles conectadas a las actividades de DHS, por favor contacte al Joint Intake Center (Centro de Admisión) al (877) 2INTAKE (877-246-8253). Si usted cree ser un ciudadano de los Estados Unidos o víctima de un crimen, por favor avísele a DHS llamando gratis al ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (Centro de Apoyo de ICE para las Agencias para el Cumplimiento de la Ley) al (855) 448-6903.
AVIS AU DETENU Le Département de la Sécurité Nationale (en anglais: DHS) a émis un ordre d’arrêt d’immigration contre vous. Un ordre d’arrêt d’immigration est un avis à un organisme d’application de la loi que DHS a l’ intention d’assumer votre garde (après votre libération) car il existe cause probable que vous soyez sujet à l’expulsion des Etats-Unis en vertu du droit fédéral de l’immigration. DHS a demandé à l’agence d’application de la loi qui actuellement vous détient, de vous maintenir sous garde pendant une période n’excédant pas 48 heures après avoir été libéré en fonction des accusations ou condamnations criminelles contre vous. Si DHS ne vous prend pas en garde à vue au cours de cette période de 48 heures supplémentaires, vous devez contacter votre gardien (l’agence qui vous retient aujourd’hui) pour enquérir au sujet de votre libération. Si vous avez une question ou une complainte au sujet de cette demande, veuillez contacter la Ligne pour Rapporter et d’Information de ICE ERO au (888) 351-4024. Pour les plaintes relatives à des violations présumées des droits et libertés civils liés à des activités de DHS, veuillez contacter Joint Intake (Centre d’Admissions) au (877) 2INTAKE (877-246-8253). Si vous croyez que vous êtes un citoyen américain ou victime d’un crime, veuillez prévenir DHS, en appelant gratuitement ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (Centre d’Appui de ICE pour les Organismes d’Application de la Loi) au 855 448-6903.
AVISO AO DETENTO O Departamento de Segurança Interna (DHS, pela sigla americana) emitiu uma ordem de custódia imigratória em seu nome. Este documento é um aviso enviado às agências de aplicação da lei de que o DHS pretende assumir a custódia da sua pessoa, caso seja libertad. O DHS pediu que a agência de aplicação da lei encarregada da sua atual detenção mantenha-o sob custódia durante, no máximo, 48 horas após o periodo em que seria libertado pelas autoridades estaduais ou municipais de aplicação da lei, de acordo com as respectivas acusaçoes e penas criminais. Se o DHS nao assumir a sua custódia durante essas 48 horas adicionais, voce deverá entrar em contato com a agência custodiante (a agência de aplicação da lei ou qualquer outra entidade que esteja detendo-o no momento) para obter informações sobre sua libertação da custódia estadual ou municipal. Caso voce tenha alguma reclamação a fazer sobre esta ordem de custódia imigratória ou relacionada a violações dos seus direitos ou liberdades civis decorrente das atividades do DHS, entre em contato com o Joint Intake Center, que seja o Centro de Entrada Conjunta da Agência de Controle de Imigração e Alfândega (ICE, pela sigla americana) pelo telefone 1-877-246-8253. Se você acreditar que é cidadao dos EUA ou está sendo vítima de um crime, informe ao DHS, ligando para o Law Enforcement Support Center, que seja o Centro de Apoio para Aplicação da Lei do ICE pelo telefone de ligação gratuita (855) 448-6903.

DHS Form I-247D
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 2 of 3
B5

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 234 of 390 PageID 1873 Ex. B
THÔNG BÁO CHO NGƯỜI ĐANG BỊ GIAM

Lý do là, theo

th

Nếu trong vòng 48 tiếng đồng hồ bổ

sung này mà DHS không đến nhận ông/bà, thì ông/bà nên liên lạc với nhân viên quản lý của mình

Nếu ông/bà có thắc mắc hoặc khiếu nại về lệnh tạm giữ này, xin liên lạc với ICE

ERO Detention Reporting and Information Line ở số (888) 351-4024. Nếu ông/bà có phàn nàn về các hoạc động, công tác của

DHS mà ông/bà cho là có vi phạm đến dân quyền hoặc tự do dân quyền, xin liên lạc Joint Intake Center ở số (877) 2INTAKE

(877-246-8253). Nếu ông/bà tin rằng mình có quốc tịch Mỹ, hoặc mình là nạn nhân trong vụ tội, xin gọi ICE Law Enforcement

Support Center ở số điện thoại miễn phí (855) 448-6903 để báo cho DHS biết.

DHS Form I-247D
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 3 of 3
B6

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)
Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 235 of 390

PageID 1874 Ex. B

REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF RELEASE OF SUSPECTED PRIORITY ALIEN

Subject ID: Event #:

File No: Date:

TO: (Name and Title of Institution - OR Any Subsequent Law Enforcement Agency)

FROM: (DHS Office Address)

Name of Subject: ______________________________________________________________________________
Date of Birth: _____________________ Suspected Citizenship: ___________________ Sex: ___________
1. DHS SUSPECTS THAT THE SUBJECT IS A REMOVABLE ALIEN AND THAT THE SUBJECT IS AN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITY BECAUSE HE/SHE (mark at least one option below, or skip to section 2):
has engaged in or is suspected of terrorism or espionage, or otherwise poses a danger to national security; has been convicted of an offense of which an element was active participation in a criminal street gang, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 521(a), or is at least 16 years old and intentionally participated in an organized criminal gang to further its illegal activities; has been convicted of an offense classified as a felony, other than a state or local offense for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status; has been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) at the time of conviction; has been convicted of a “significant misdemeanor,” as defined under DHS policy; and/or has been convicted of 3 or more misdemeanors, not including minor traffic offenses and state or local offenses for which immigration status was an essential element, provided the offenses arise out of 3 separate incidents.
2. DHS TRANSFERRED THE SUBJECT TO YOUR CUSTODY FOR A PROCEEDING OR INVESTIGATION. Upon completion of the proceeding or investigation for which the subject was transferred to your custody, DHS intends to resume custody of the subject to complete processing.
IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT YOU: • Provide notice as early as practicable (at least 48 hours, if possible) before the subject is released from your custody to allow DHS
an opportunity to determine whether there is probable cause to conclude that he or she is a removable alien. This voluntary notification request does not request or authorize that you detain the subject beyond the time he or she is currently scheduled for release from your custody. This request arises from DHS authorities and should not impact decisions about the subject’s bail, rehabilitation, parole, release, diversion, custody classification, work, quarter assignments, or other matters.
• As early as possible prior to the time you otherwise would release the subject, please notify DHS by calling □ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or □ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at _________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________. If you cannot reach a DHS official at the number(s) provided, please contact the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center at: (802) 872-6020.
• Notify this office in the event of the subject’s death, hospitalization or transfer to another institution.
□ If checked: Please disregard the notification request related to this subject previously submitted to you on _____________ (date).

(Name and title of Immigration Officer)

(Signature of Immigration Officer)

Notice: If the subject is taken into DHS custody, he or she may be removed from the United States. If the subject may be the victim of a crime, or if you want the subject to remain in the United States for a law enforcement purpose, please notify the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center at (802) 872-6020. You may also call this number if you have any other questions or concerns about this matter.
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY CURRENTLY HOLDING THE SUBJECT OF THIS NOTICE: Please provide the information below, sign, and return to DHS by mailing, emailing, or faxing a copy to _________________________. Local Booking/Inmate #: ___________ Est. release date/time: ______________ Date of latest criminal charge/conviction: __________ Latest offense charged/convicted: _______________________________________________________________________________

(Name and title of Officer)
DHS Form I-247N
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

(Signature of Officer)

B7

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 236 of 390 PageID 1875Ex. B
Information Only

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

B8

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Case 3:15-cv-0348IM1-MSIGDRoAcTuImOeNntD8E0TAFINileEdR0-6/N1O6/T1I7CE POaFgeAC23T7IOoNf 390

PageID 1876 Ex. B

Subject ID: Event #:

File No: Date:

TO: (Name and Title of Institution - OR Any Subsequent Law Enforcement Agency)

FROM: (Department of Homeland Security Office Address)

Name of Alien:

Date of Birth:

Citizenship:

Sex:

1. DHS HAS DETERMINED THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS THAT THE SUBJECT IS A REMOVABLE ALIEN. THIS DETERMINATION IS BASED ON (complete box 1 or 2).

A final order of removal against the alien; The pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the alien; Biometric confirmation of the alien’s identity and a records check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by themselves or in addition to other reliable information, that the alien either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law; and/or
Statements made by the alien to an immigration officer and/or other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate the alien either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. immigration law.

2. DHS TRANSFERRED THE ALIEN TO YOUR CUSTODY FOR A PROCEEDING OR INVESTIGATION (complete box 1 or 2).

Upon completion of the proceeding or investigation for which the alien was transferred to your custody, DHS intends to resume custody of the alien to complete processing and/or make an admissibility determination.

IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT YOU:

• Notify DHS as early as practicable (at least 48 hours, if possible) before the alien is released from your custody. Please notify

DHS by calling

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at

. If you cannot reach an official at the number(s) provided, please contact the Law Enforcement Support

Center at: (802) 872-6020.
• Maintain custody of the alien for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS beyond the time when he/she would otherwise have

been released from your custody to allow DHS to assume custody. The alien must be served with a copy of this form for the detainer to take effect. This detainer arises from DHS authorities and should not impact decisions about the alien’s bail, rehabilitation, parole, release, diversion, custody classification, work, quarter assignments, or other matters
• Relay this detainer to any other law enforcement agency to which you transfer custody of the alien. • Notify this office in the event of the alien's death, hospitalization or transfer to another institution.

If checked: please cancel the detainer related to this alien previously submitted to you on

(date).

(Name and title of Immigration Officer)

(Signature of Immigration Officer) (Sign in ink)

Notice: If the alien may be the victim of a crime or you want the alien to remain in the United States for a law enforcement purpose, notify the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center at (802) 872-6020. You may also call this number if you have any other questions or concerns about this matter.

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY CURRENTLY HOLDING THE ALIEN WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS NOTICE:

Please provide the information below, sign, and return to DHS by mailing, emailing or faxing a copy to

.

Local Booking/Inmate #:

Estimated release date/time:

Date of latest criminal charge/conviction:

Last offense charged/conviction:

This form was served upon the alien on

, in the following manner:

in person

by inmate mail delivery

other (please specify):

(Name and title of Officer)
DHS Form I-247A (3/17)
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

(Signature of Officer) (Sign in ink)

Page 1 of 3
B9

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 238 of 390 PageID 1877 Ex. B
NOTICE TO THE DETAINEE
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has placed an immigration detainer on you. An immigration detainer is a notice to a law enforcement agency that DHS intends to assume custody of you (after you otherwise would be released from custody) because there is probable cause that you are subject to removal from the United States under federal immigration law. DHS has requested that the law enforcement agency that is currently detaining you maintain custody of you for a period not to exceed 48 hours beyond the time when you would have been released based on your criminal charges or convictions. If DHS does not take you into custody during this additional 48 hour period, you should contact your custodian (the agency that is holding you now) to inquire about your release. If you believe you are a United States citizen or the victim of a crime, please advise DHS by calling the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center toll free at (855) 448-6903.
NOTIFICACIÓN A LA PERSONA DETENIDA
El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (DHS) le ha puesto una retención de inmigración. Una retención de inmigración es un aviso a una agencia de la ley que DHS tiene la intención de asumir la custodia de usted (después de lo contrario, usted sería puesto en libertad de la custodia) porque hay causa probable que usted está sujeto a que lo expulsen de los Estados Unidos bajo la ley de inmigración federal. DHS ha solicitado que la agencia de la ley que le tiene detenido actualmente mantenga custodia de usted por un periodo de tiempo que no exceda de 48 horas más del tiempo original que habría sido puesto en libertad en base a los cargos judiciales o a sus antecedentes penales. Si DHS no le pone en custodia durante este periodo adicional de 48 horas, usted debe de contactarse con su custodio (la agencia que le tiene detenido en este momento) para preguntar acerca de su liberación. Si usted cree que es un ciudadano de los Estados Unidos o la víctima de un crimen, por favor avise al DHS llamando gratuitamente al Centro de Apoyo a la Aplicación de la Ley ICE al (855) 448-6903.
AVIS AU DETENU OU À LA DÉTENUE Le Département de la Sécurité Intérieure (DHS) a placé un dépositaire d'immigration sur vous. Un dépositaire d'immigration est un avis à une agence de force de l'ordre que le DHS a l'intention de vous prendre en garde à vue (après celà vous pourrez par ailleurs être remis en liberté) parce qu'il y a une cause probable que vous soyez sujet à expulsion des États-Unis en vertu de la loi fédérale sur l'immigration. Le DHS a demandé que l'agence de force de l'ordre qui vous détient actuellement puisse vous maintenir en garde pendant une période ne devant pas dépasser 48 heures au-delà du temps après lequel vous auriez été libéré en se basant sur vos accusations criminelles ou condamnations. Si le DHS ne vous prenne pas en garde à vue au cours de cette période supplémentaire de 48 heures, vous devez contacter votre gardien (ne) (l'agence qui vous détient maintenant) pour vous renseigner sur votre libération. Si vous croyez que vous êtes un citoyen ou une citoyenne des États-Unis ou une victime d'un crime, s'il vous plaît aviser le DHS en appelant gratuitement le centre d'assistance de force de l'ordre de l'ICE au (855) 448-6903
NOTIFICAÇÃO AO DETENTO
O Departamento de Segurança Nacional (DHS) expediu um mandado de detenção migratória contra você. Um mandado de detenção migratória é uma notificação feita à uma agência de segurança pública que o DHS tem a intenção de assumir a sua custódia (após a qual você, caso contrário, seria liberado da custódia) porque existe causa provável que você está sujeito a ser removido dos Estados Unidos de acordo com a lei federal de imigração. ODHS solicitou à agência de segurança pública onde você está atualmente detido para manter a sua guarda por um período de no máximo 48 horas além do tempo que você teria sido liberado com base nas suas acusações ou condenações criminais. Se o DHS não leva-lo sob custódia durante este período adicional de 48 horas, você deve entrar em contato com quem tiver a sua custódia (a agência onde você está atualmente detido) para perguntar a respeito da sua liberação. Se você acredita ser um cidadão dos Estados Unidos ou a vítima de um crime, por favor informe ao DHS através de uma ligação gratuita ao Centro de Suporte de Segurança Pública do Serviço de Imigração e Alfândega (ICE) pelo telefone (855) 448-6903.

DHS Form I-247A (3/17)
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THÔNG BÁO CHO NGѬӠI Bӎ GIAM
Bӝ Nӝi An (DHS) ÿã ra lӋnh giam giӳ di trú ÿӕi vӟi quý vӏ. Giam giӳ di trú là mӝt thông báo cho cѫ quan công lӵc rҵng Bӝ Nӝi An sӁ ÿҧm ÿѭѫng viӋc lѭu giӳ quý vӏ (sau khi quý vӏ ÿѭӧc thҧ ra) bӣi có lý do khҧ tín quý vӏ là ÿӕi tѭӧng bӏ trөc xuҩt khӓi Hoa KǤ theo luұt di trú liên bang. Sau khi quý vӏ ÿã thi hành ÿҫy ÿӫ thӡi gian cӫa bҧn án dӵa trên các tӝi phҥm hay các kӃt án, thay vì ÿѭӧc thҧ tӵ do, Bӝ Nӝi An ÿã yêu cҫu cѫ quan công lӵc giӳ quý vӏ lҥi thêm không quá 48 tiӃng ÿӗng hӗ nӳa. NӃu Bӝ Nӝi An không ÿӃn bҳt quý vӏ sau 48 tiӃng ÿӗng hӗ phө trӝi ÿó, quý vӏ cҫn liên lҥc vӟi cѫ quan hiӋn ÿang giam giӳ quý vӏ dӇ tham khҧo vӅ viӋc trҧ tӵ do cho quý vӏ. NӃu quý vӏ là công dân Hoa KǤ hay tin rҵng mình là nҥn nhân cӫa mӝt tӝi ác, xin vui lòng báo cho Bӝ Nӝi An bҵng cách gӑi sӕ ÿiӋn thoҥi miӉn phí 1(855) 448-6903 cho Trung Tâm Hӛ Trӧ Cѫ Quan Công Lӵc Di Trú.
塓㊀䔁侭忂䞍㚠
⚳⛇⬱ℐ悐(Department of Homeland Security炻䯉䧙DHS)⶚䴻⮵Ἀ䘤↢䦣㮹㊀䔁Ẍˤġ 䦣㮹㊀䔁Ẍ䁢ᶨ䴎Ḱ➟㱽㨇㥳䘬忂䞍㚠炻斉㖶DHSシ㫚䌚⍾⮵Ἀ䘬估㉤㪲(劍朆㚱㬌估㉤ 㪲炻Ἀ⮯㚫塓慳㓦)烊⚈䁢㟡㒂倗恎䦣㮹㱽ἳ炻᷎➢㕤⎰䎮䘬⍇䓙炻Ἀ⮯㚫塓怆妋暊伶ġ ⚳⚳⠫ˤDHSṎ⶚天㯪䎦㬋㊀䔁Ἀ䘬➟㱽㨇㥳炻⛐Ἀ⚈⍿⇘↹ḳ㩊㍏ㆾ⭂伒⼴炻侴⛐㛔 ㅱ塓慳㓦䘬䦳⸷ᶳ炻两临⮵Ἀἄ↢ᶵ崭忶⚃⋩ℓ⮷㗪䘬䚋䭉ˤ劍Ἀ⛐忁旬≈䘬⚃⋩ℓ⮷ 㗪ℏ炻ṵ㛒⍲䦣Ṍ军DHS䘬䚋䭉ᶳ炻Ἀㅱ䔞倗䴉Ἀ䘬䚋䭉Ṣ(⌛䎦㬋䚋䭉Ἀ䘬㨇㥳)㞍娊ġ 㚱斄Ἀ慳㓦䘬ḳ⭄ˤ劍Ἀ娵䁢Ἀ㗗伶⚳℔㮹ㆾ䁢伒㟰⍿⭛侭炻婳农暣ICE➟㱽悐㓗㎜ᷕ⽫ (Law Enforcement Support Center)䞍㚫DHS炻⃵屣暣娙嘇䡤烉(855)448-6903ˤ

DHS Form I-247A (3/17)
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 296 of 390 PageID 1935 Anthony Garza

From: Sent: To: Subject:

Peter Harlan <PETER.HARLAN@dallascounty.org> Friday, June 10, 2016 9:09 AM Anthony Garza RE: Mercado: detainers for plaintiffs

Anthony:
Unfortunately I must respectfully decline your request for voluntary discovery at this time. Dallas County administration does not have custody of any of the documents relevant to the Plaintiffs claims in this suit. Assuming the documents you request exist and can be located, only Sheriff Valdez would have access and be able to produce them. Any voluntary production of these documents by her at this juncture of the case might be construed as a waiver of her qualified immunity from discovery and suit which she is understandably not willing to do at this time.
Of course, if you would like to discuss the matter further please do not hesitate to contact me at your convenience.
Kind regards,
Peter L. Harlan Assistant District Attorney Federal Litigation Section 133 N. Riverfront Blvd. LB 19 Dallas, Texas 75207 (214) 653-3691 Telephone (214) 653-2899 Fax pharlan@dallascounty.org
From: Anthony Garza [agarza@ccrglaw.com] Sent: Thursday, June 09, 2016 5:20 PM To: Peter Harlan Subject: Mercado: detainers for plaintiffs
Mr. Harlan-
Good afternoon. Discovery is stayed in the Mercado matter. We nevertheless request that Dallas County voluntarily provide the immigration detainers in its possession for Plaintiffs. We intend to attach them to our amended complaint.
Feel free to call me if you have any questions.
Anthony M. Garza Charhon Callahan Robson & Garza (469) 587-7242

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ICE GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING FORM I-247A
1. Form I-247A (Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action). Effective April 2, 2017, the Department rescinded Form I-247D (Immigration Detainer – Request for Voluntary Action), Form I-247N (Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien), and Form I-247X (Request for Voluntary Transfer), and replaced them with a consolidated detainer form, the Form I-247A (Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action). The Form I-247D, Form I-247N, and Form I-247X may not be issued after April 2, 2017. Detainers issued on prior versions of the detainer form remain active and need not be replaced with a Form I-247A.
2. Form I-247A, Box 1.
1) When Box 1 is checked, Form I-247A requests that the receiving LEA: (1) notify DHS as early as practicable, at least 48 hours, if possible, before a removable alien is released from criminal custody; and (2) maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours beyond the time he or she would otherwise have been released to allow DHS to assume custody for removal purposes.
2) Prior to issuing an immigration detainer to an LEA, immigration officers must have probable cause to believe that the individual they seek to detain is a removable alien.
3) The Form I-247A advises that a copy of the form must be served on the alien in order for the detainer to take effect.
3. Form I-247A, Box 2.
1) When a federal, state, local, or tribal LEA requests that ICE transfer an alien detained in ICE custody for a proceeding or investigation, the immigration officer will check Box 2 on Form I-247A.
2) If using Box 2, the immigration officer should not complete Box 1.
3) Immigration officers who transfer an alien into the custody of another federal, state, local, or tribal LEA must serve a copy of the completed detainer form on the alien before transfer.
4) When Box 2 is checked, Form I-247A requests that the receiving LEA: (1) notify DHS as early as practicable, at least 48 hours, if possible, before a removable alien is released from criminal custody; and (2) maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours beyond the time he or she would otherwise have been released to allow DHS to assume custody for removal purposes.

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From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 10:05 AM To: Raymond Hindieh Subject: RE: ICE question

Hey Ray,

Mr.

case hasn’t been filed yet with us. Due to his prior conviction for Poss MJ and Assault F/V, he is mandatory

detention and was sent to Haskell awaiting a hearing with the immigration judge. If his case is filed with us, we will not

bring him back. There will be a warrant waiting on him if he returns to the U.S.

To answer your question regarding bonds: if you bond someone out on the state bond and they have an ICE hold, then they will be transferred to ICE custody. The federal hold works similar to a state hold with another agency. For example: Defendant posts a bond with Dallas County for BMV, but there is also a hold on him from Denton county for Theft. The jail notifies Denton County that the defendant posted the required bond with Dallas and Denton has 72 hours to pick him up or he will be released. ICE works the same way. The jail notifies ICE when the defendant has either posted their bond, has time served, probation, etc… and ICE has 48 hours to pick them up. A federal hold has the same weight as a state hold, unless the agency cancels the hold. The difference with federal holds (ICE holds) is unlike a state hold where the defendant (a United States citizen) posts the Dallas bond, he/she can also go to Denton and post their bond there and be released to the streets. A non-citizen can because he/she isn’t a citizen and is here in the country illegally. If they do have some sort of visa or paperwork that allows them to be here, then because they were arrested and charged (not convicted), then they have violated the agreement to enter our country. ICE can choose to give them a bond (no prior criminal history, no prior immigration history, no conviction) if the offense they were arrested for is not a violent crime or a crime that if released, poses a threat to society (like DWI, drugs, etc..). Any drug conviction no matter what degree, is mandatory detention for ICE. What that means is if a person has a drug conviction in their background,
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they wont automatically be deported (unless they are a prior deport, etc..), but if they want to fight their immigration
case to remain in the country, they will have to do it from behind bars.

I hope this helps,

Ric

Ric Bruner #480 Criminal Investigator Dallas County District Attorney’s Office ICE Liasion/NTFTF U.S. Marshals (214) 653-3893 office (972) 273-9676 cell

From: Raymond Hindieh [mailto:rhindieh@phflaw.com] Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 4:38 To: Ric Bruner Subject: ICE question

Hi Ric,

Hope you're well. I have a client that hired us,

. He has a Poss MJ case that

has not been closed out but he has been sent to Haskell. Do you know why? Also, I had a more general

question, since there are not really anymore ICE bonds since November of last year, if we post a state bond for

someone that has an ICE hold will they bond out? Or will they be kept in on the hold? Thanks Ric.

Best,

Ray

Raymond M. Hindieh Attorney and Counselor at Law

Puente, Hindieh & Fernandez, PLLC 3300 Oak Lawn Ave, Suite 401 Dallas, TX 75219

Office: (214) 730-0485 Fax: (214) 730-0520

ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGED. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: E-mail may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. Do not read this email if you are not the intended recipient. This email transmission, and any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, or a person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying,

distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is

. If you have received this transmission in

error, please immediately notify us by reply e-,ail, or by telephone at 214 730-0485 and destroy the original transmission and its attachments without reading or

saving in any manner. Thank you.

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________________________________________ From: Raymond Hindieh Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 4:32 PM To: Ric Bruner Subject: Oh ok, thanks, we'll take care of it then. Best, Ray Raymond M. Hindieh Attorney and Counselor at Law
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Puente, Hindieh & Fernandez, PLLC
3300 Oak Lawn Ave, Suite 401 Dallas, TX 75219
Office: (214) 730-0485
Fax: (214) 730-0520
ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGED. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: E-mail may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. Do not read this email if you are not the intended recipient. This email transmission, and any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, or a person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately notify us by reply e-,ail, or by telephone at (214) 730-0485 and destroy the original transmission and its attachments without reading or saving in any manner. Thank you.
________________________________________ From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 4:22 PM To: Raymond Hindieh Subject: RE:
Hey Ray,
I never said he wouldn't be held on his immigration hold. I said we (the DA's office) wont seek to hold his bond insufficien t for that charge. He still has to go to ICE. He is going to ICE tomorrow morning.
Ric
-----Original Message----From: Raymond Hindieh [mailto:rhindieh@phflaw.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 2:23 PM To: Ric Bruner Subject:
Hey ric!
We discussed this guy with you before, and you had said that as long as we bond him out he won't be held on his immigration hold. We bonded him out and he wasn't released, and the bond desk is saying the won't release him because he has an immigration hold. Is there anything we can do to show the bond desk that he's ok to be bonded out? Thanks man! Sorry to hit you with a complicated issue in between the holidays. Ray
Sent from my iPhone
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From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Wednesday, April 23, 2014 12:32 PM To: Raymond Hindieh Subject: Stip forms Hey Ray, Here are the stip bond forms that we are using now. Please don’t hesitate to shoot me an email regarding any requests you have. Just remember if your client has a misdemeanor case and is approved to receive an ICE bond, you need to go to LaQuita Long to sign off on the stip. If it’s a felony, then please go to the ADA handling the case. Thanks bro, Ric
Sr. Sgt Ric Bruner #480 Criminal Investigator DCDA I.C.E. Liaison Officer NTFTF Officer/U.S. Marshals (214) 653-3893 office
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Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 313 of 390 PageID 1952
(972) 273-9676 cell (214) 653-5774 fax
2
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 314 of 390 PageID 1953
________________________________________ From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Tuesday, June 3, 2014 2:46 PM To: Raymond Hindieh Subject: Re: Hey Ray, ICE is dropping the detainer on this guy today. He will probably be able to bond out today, or if he makes it to ICE, they will just release him. No need to do a stip in him. Thanks, Ric Ric > On Jun 3, 2014, at 2:35 PM, "Raymond Hindieh" <rhindieh@phflaw.com> wrote: >
1
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80
> Hey man, > > Just wanted to check his eligibility. Thanks! > > Sent from my iPhone >

Filed 06/16/17

Page 315 of 390 PageID 1954

2
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 316 of 390 PageID 1955
From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2015 3:27 PM To: Eric Puente Subject: Hey Eric, Her detainer is going to be dropped. Should be today. She will be able to post bond from the jail and leave. Ric From: Eric Puente [mailto:epuente@phflaw.com] Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2015 1:17 PM To: Ric Bruner Subject: Ric, I have a client that just hired me. She has been charged with a harassment case, but she's a full Permanent Resident Alien with an ICE HOLD. Her name is
1
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 317 of 390 PageID 1956
Can you please run her and let me know if she is eligible for a bond? Thank you sir! Eric Puente Puente, Hindieh & Fernandez, PLLC 3300 Oak Lawn Ave., Suite 401 Dallas, TX 75219 Office: (214) 730-0485 Fax: (214) 730-0520 epuente@phflaw.com ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILAGED. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: E-mail may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. Do not read this email if you are not the intended recipient. This email transmission, any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, or a person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately notify us by reply e-mail, or by telephone at (214) 730-0485 and destroy the original transmission and its attachments without reading or saving in any manner. Thank you.
2
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 318 of 390 PageID 1957
From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 4:39 PM To: Eric Puente Subject: Re: Eric, We arent really doing those anymore. Instead we are going back to the normal Dallas county bond schedule and letting them go to ICE. You can contact ICE once she gets there to see if she will get a bond with them. If she is a reinstate or has no options to stay, then ICE will contact me before she goes to them and we will hold her bond insufficient and keep her here. If she does have options, then she will be sent to Johnson county or Haskell and wait until her IJ hearing. If you want her back to Dallas county after she gets there, you will need to get the judge to issue a bench warrant or hold her bond insufficient in order to get her back. If she is ordered removed before her criminal case is dispo'd, then ICE will contact me. What we dont want to happen is she goes there, cant post bond if she is eligible, and then we bench her back only to send her back with no dispo on her case. Once she is ordered removed and we bring her back, then you will need to go to trial, plea or dismiss her case before she returns to ICE.
1
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 319 of 390 PageID 1958 Thanks, Ric On Dec 14, 2015, at 4:12 PM, Eric Puente <epuente@phflaw.com> wrote:
Hi Ric, I wanted to run this person by you to see if she would qualify for a stip bond.
Please le me know. Best regards, Eric Puente Puente & Hindieh, PLLC 3300 Oak Lawn Ave., Suite 401 Dallas, TX 75219 Office: (214) 730-0485 Fax: (214) 730-0520 epuente@phflaw.com ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILAGED. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: E-mail may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. Do not read this email if you are not the intended recipient. This email transmission, any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, or a person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately notify us by reply e-mail, or by telephone at (214) 730-0485 and destroy the original transmission and its attachments without reading or saving in any manner. Thank you.
2
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

 
 Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 320 of 390 PageID 1959
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 321 of 390 PageID 1960
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 322 of 390 PageID 1961
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 323 of 390 PageID 1962
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 324 of 390 PageID 1963
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 325 of 390 PageID 1964
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 326 of 390 PageID 1965
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 327 of 390 PageID 1966
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 328 of 390 PageID 1967
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 329 of 390 PageID 1968
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 330 of 390 PageID 1969
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 331 of 390 PageID 1970
From: Ric Bruner <RIC.BRUNER@dallascounty.org> Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 10:12 AM To: Dan Wood (danwoodjr@sbcglobal.net); Attorney Daniel Hernandez (hernandezlawfirm@me.com); Clark Birdsall (clarkbirds@aol.com); Diana Alonzo (diana@alonzolawfirm.com); Eric Puente; 'fernandez105@aol.com'; Katherine Reed (katherine@sualaw.com); omarnawazlaw@gmail.com; r.banda@yahoo.com; ROBERT DUENO (duenoroberto@icloud.com); Raymond Hindieh; 'Valeria Umpire (receptionist@alonzolawfirm.com)' Cc: Beatriz Gutierrez; Randall Johnson; Robert David Miller II Subject: Bonds and Bench Warrants Good morning all, As most of you know, the DA’s office recently went back to giving defendants with immigration holds bonds based on the Dallas County bond schedule. What this means is no more $2500 cash for misdemeanors and $100,000 cash or surety for felonies. Instead, the defendant’s with immigration holds will receive the same bond as U.S. citizens based on the Dallas County bond schedule for that offense and we will not seek to hold the bonds insufficient unless: 1. ICE tells me that the defendant doesn’t have options to remain in the United States (ie: reinstates, ICE fugitives, etc..) before he is transferred to ICE custody or 2: they go to ICE and get ordered removed by an Immigration judge or request a voluntary return/departure. What we are doing is letting them go to ICE and if they bond out, then they will be on bond for both the county and ICE. If they don’t bond out or are mandatory detention (drug convictions) or Federal interest cases, then the appropriate action to be taken if you want your client back to Dallas County (that do not fall in 1 or 2 above) is to request and complete a Bench Warrant. Once the bench warrant has been signed by the judge, then the courts must send the original down to the Sheriff’s office, who will contact ICE and make arrangements for pick up. ICE WILL NOT honor a bench warrant that is faxed to them by you (defense attorneys). This request must come from the Sheriff. Once
1
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 332 of 390 PageID 1971
the Sheriff’s office receives the original bench warrant from the courts, then it takes a minimum of 10 business days to go get the defendant. This is because the division that picks up prisoners goes all over the country to get them. Please do not email me stating the judge just signed a bench warrant and you need him the next day. I can call ICE and give them a heads up once I verify the bench warrant was signed, but that is all I can do. I will refer you back to the Sheriff’s office. Please be mindful of how long it takes when requesting your bench warrants. Thank you, Ric Ric Bruner #480 Criminal Investigator Dallas County District Attorney’s Office ICE Liasion/NTFTF U.S. Marshals (214) 653-3893 office (972) 273-9676 cell
2
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 333 of 390 PageID 1972
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000383

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 334 of 390 PageID 1973
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000080

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 335 of 390 PageID 1974
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000419

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 336 of 390 PageID 1975
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000327

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 337 of 390 PageID 1976
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000438

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 338 of 390 PageID 1977
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000156

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 339 of 390 PageID 1978
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000456

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 340 of 390 PageID 1979
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000175

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 341 of 390 PageID 1980
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000061

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 342 of 390 PageID 1981
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000232

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 343 of 390 PageID 1982
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000270

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 344 of 390 PageID 1983
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER000289

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 345 of 390 PageID 1984
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 346 of 390 PageID 1985
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

 
 Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 347 of 390 PageID 1986
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 348 of 390 PageID 1987
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 349 of 390 PageID 1988
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 350 of 390 PageID 1989
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 351 of 390 PageID 1990
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001508

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 352 of 390 PageID 1991
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001509

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 353 of 390 PageID 1992
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001510

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 354 of 390 PageID 1993
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001511

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 355 of 390 PageID 1994
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001512

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 356 of 390 PageID 1995
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001513

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 357 of 390 PageID 1996
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001514

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 358 of 390 PageID 1997
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001650

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 359 of 390 PageID 1998
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001651

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 360 of 390 PageID 1999
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001652

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 361 of 390 PageID 2000
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001653

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 362 of 390 PageID 2001
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001654

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 363 of 390 PageID 2002
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001655

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 364 of 390 PageID 2003
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001738

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 365 of 390 PageID 2004
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001739

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 366 of 390 PageID 2005
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001740

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 367 of 390 PageID 2006
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001741

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 368 of 390 PageID 2007
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001742

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 369 of 390 PageID 2008
Mercado -- 2d Am. Com DALMER001743

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 370 of 390 PageID 2009
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 371 of 390 PageID 2010
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 372 of 390 PageID 2011
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 373 of 390 PageID 2012
Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Ex. KK
ImmigrCaatsieo3n:15D-cev-t0a3i4n81e-rS RDeopcuomretnt 80 Filed406//116//21701P7age 374 of 390 PageFIDrid2ay0,1M3ay 19, 2017 1:28:59 PM

COUNTY

# of Inmates # of Inmate Days

Cost

ANDERSON

5

91

$2,002.00

ANDREWS

1

10

$752.30

ANGELINA

3

68

$3,172.20

ARANSAS

5

10

$498.50

ARCHER

0

0

$0.00

ARMSTRONG

0

0

$0.00

ATASCOSA

5

123

$8,532.51

AUSTIN

0

0

$0.00

BAILEY

8

145

$5,615.85

BANDERA

1

30

$1,449.90

BASTROP

31

595

$26,602.45

BAYLOR

0

0

$0.00

BEE

2

42

$1,687.98

BELL

27

640

$36,883.20

BEXAR

262

4614

$212,244.00

BLANCO

1

23

$1,426.00

BORDEN

0

0

$0.00

BOSQUE

0

0

$0.00

BOWIE (P)

0

0

$0.00

BRAZORIA

26

700

$23,807.00

BRAZOS

53

1195

$29,970.60

BREWSTER

0

0

$0.00

BRISCOE

0

0

$0.00

BROOKS

3

46

$2,363.48

BROWN

4

104

$3,328.00

BURLESON

2

34

$1,196.80

BURNET

5

150

$8,889.00

CALDWELL

0

0

$0.00

CALHOUN

2

60

$2,386.20

CALLAHAN

5

12

$864.00

CAMERON

230

5963

$277,935.43

CAMP

2

33

$1,300.20

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 1 of 8

KK1

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a7y5s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2014

CARSON

6

158

$3,950.00

CASS

0

0

$0.00

CASTRO

4

76

$5,611.08

CHAMBERS

3

31

$1,240.00

CHEROKEE

3

90

$3,132.00

CHILDRESS

3

90

$2,700.00

CLAY

0

0

$0.00

COCHRAN

1

30

$1,200.00

COKE

0

0

$0.00

COLEMAN

0

0

$0.00

COLLIN

170

3361

$169,360.79

COLLINGSWORTH

0

0

$0.00

COLORADO

2

36

$1,683.36

COMAL

19

364

$30,262.96

COMANCHE

2

33

$1,118.04

CONCHO

0

0

$0.00

COOKE

6

134

$6,639.70

CORYELL

1

30

$1,528.20

COTTLE

0

0

$0.00

CRANE

0

0

$0.00

CROCKETT

0

0

$0.00

CROSBY

0

0

$0.00

CULBERSON

0

0

$0.00

DALLAM

5

136

$6,842.16

DALLAS

573

10917

$578,273.49

DAWSON

0

0

$0.00

DEAF SMITH

6

119

$4,713.59

DELTA

0

0

$0.00

DENTON

111

2774

$125,773.16

DEWITT

0

0

$0.00

DICKENS

0

0

$0.00

DIMMIT

4

43

$2,326.30

DONLEY

0

0

$0.00

DUVAL

0

0

$0.00

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 2 of 8

KK2

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a7y6s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2015

EASTLAND

1

22

$737.00

ECTOR

34

697

$37,512.54

EDWARDS

0

0

$0.00

EL PASO

89

2038

$152,564.68

ELLIS

35

805

$36,225.00

ERATH

5

128

$5,760.00

FALLS

2

52

$1,378.00

FANNIN 1(P)

0

0

$0.00

FAYETTE

1

30

$609.00

FISHER

0

0

$0.00

FLOYD

0

0

$0.00

FOARD

0

0

$0.00

FORT BEND

123

2766

$135,091.44

FRANKLIN

0

0

$0.00

FREESTONE

6

144

$11,854.08

FRIO (P)

1

28

$784.00

GAINES

4

105

$5,400.15

GALVESTON

16

468

$22,492.08

GARZA

0

0

$0.00

GILLESPIE

6

128

$21,157.12

GLASSCOCK

0

0

$0.00

GOLIAD

1

30

$1,350.00

GONZALES

0

0

$0.00

GRAY

2

44

$1,936.00

GRAYSON

19

499

$29,191.50

GREGG

17

381

$11,788.14

GRIMES

4

60

$2,205.00

GUADALUPE

11

227

$10,160.52

HALE

5

99

$3,762.00

HALL

0

0

$0.00

HAMILTON

0

0

$0.00

HANSFORD

4

100

$3,500.00

HARDEMAN

0

0

$0.00

HARDIN

0

0

$0.00

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 3 of 8

KK3

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a7y7s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2016

HARRIS

977

21974

$1,648,050.00

HARRISON

9

212

$7,451.80

HASKELL (P)

0

0

$0.00

HAYS

42

1117

$85,874.96

HEMPHILL

0

0

$0.00

HENDERSON

0

0

$0.00

HIDALGO

540

11473

$580,648.53

HILL

7

95

$2,596.35

HOCKLEY

4

68

$3,071.56

HOOD

3

67

$3,333.92

HOPKINS

5

82

$3,280.00

HOUSTON

1

30

$1,327.50

HOWARD

2

37

$1,861.84

HUDSPETH

7

133

$2,073.47

HUNT

14

319

$12,791.90

HUTCHINSON

0

0

$0.00

IRION

0

0

$0.00

JACK

5

134

$2,879.66

JACKSON

6

166

$8,245.22

JASPER

0

0

$0.00

JEFF DAVIS

0

0

$0.00

JEFFERSON

11

212

$11,660.00

JIM HOGG

0

0

$0.00

JIM WELLS

0

0

$0.00

JOHNSON

39

807

$43,586.07

JONES

0

0

$0.00

KARNES

1

13

$273.00

KAUFMAN

24

440

$16,324.00

KENDALL

11

239

$15,719.03

KENEDY

0

0

$0.00

KENT

0

0

$0.00

KERR

10

173

$7,115.49

KIMBLE

0

0

$0.00

KING

0

0

$0.00

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 4 of 8

KK4

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a7y8s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2017

KINNEY

2

60

$2,757.60

KLEBERG

3

17

$803.08

KNOX

0

0

$0.00

LA SALLE

0

0

$0.00

LAMAR

5

42

$1,244.04

LAMB

2

60

$3,216.00

LAMPASAS

1

30

$3,566.70

LAVACA

1

30

$1,337.40

LEE

0

0

$0.00

LEON

0

0

$0.00

LIBERTY (P)

7

136

$6,324.00

LIMESTONE

6

122

$5,124.00

LIPSCOMB

0

0

$0.00

LIVE OAK

3

61

$3,291.56

LLANO

2

36

$810.00

LOVING

0

0

$0.00

LUBBOCK

29

716

$37,862.08

LYNN

0

0

$0.00

MADISON

4

73

$2,564.49

MARION

0

0

$0.00

MARTIN

0

0

$0.00

MASON

0

0

$0.00

MATAGORDA

6

132

$3,693.36

MAVERICK

0

0

$0.00

MCCULLOCH

0

0

$0.00

MCLENNAN

63

1523

$81,602.34

MCMULLEN

0

0

$0.00

MEDINA

2

35

$2,192.75

MENARD

0

0

$0.00

MIDLAND

54

686

$60,299.40

MILAM

2

43

$2,021.00

MILLS

2

55

$3,159.20

MITCHELL

2

60

$2,280.00

MONTAGUE

1

21

$746.76

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 5 of 8

KK5

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a7y9s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2018

MONTGOMERY

114

2085

$89,905.20

MOORE

7

178

$16,137.48

MORRIS

1

4

$120.00

MOTLEY

0

0

$0.00

NACOGDOCHES

8

194

$6,014.00

NAVARRO

6

151

$9,060.00

NEWTON

0

0

$0.00

NOLAN

3

38

$1,710.00

NUECES

11

167

$5,355.69

OCHILTREE

5

118

$7,000.94

OLDHAM

1

7

$472.50

ORANGE

2

42

$1,585.50

PALO PINTO

1

30

$1,197.90

PANOLA

2

60

$2,760.00

PARKER

21

386

$20,087.44

PARMER

18

308

$9,052.12

PECOS

0

0

$0.00

POLK

2

40

$791.60

POTTER

28

603

$36,270.45

PRESIDIO

0

0

$0.00

RAINS

0

0

$0.00

RANDALL

0

0

$0.00

REAGAN

2

56

$2,053.52

REAL

0

0

$0.00

RED RIVER

1

30

$720.90

REEVES

5

70

$3,243.80

REFUGIO

0

0

$0.00

ROBERTS

0

0

$0.00

ROBERTSON

3

32

$1,600.00

ROCKWALL

17

282

$5,140.86

RUNNELS

0

0

$0.00

RUSK

5

95

$1,793.60

SABINE

0

0

$0.00

SAN AUGUSTINE

0

0

$0.00

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 6 of 8

KK6

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a8y0s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2019

SAN JACINTO

2

37

$1,016.02

SAN PATRICIO

0

0

$0.00

SAN SABA

5

20

$2,478.80

SCHLEICHER

0

0

$0.00

SCURRY

0

0

$0.00

SHACKELFORD

0

0

$0.00

SHELBY

2

58

$2,436.00

SHERMAN

0

0

$0.00

SMITH

26

647

$35,817.92

SOMERVELL

3

46

$1,748.00

STARR

5

49

$1,106.42

STEPHENS

0

0

$0.00

STERLING

1

30

$1,350.00

STONEWALL

0

0

$0.00

SUTTON

0

0

$0.00

SWISHER

0

0

$0.00

TARRANT

319

6978

$279,120.00

TAYLOR

7

105

$5,040.00

TERRELL

0

0

$0.00

TERRY

1

30

$1,682.10

THROCKMORTON

0

0

$0.00

TITUS

7

131

$3,602.50

TOM GREEN

0

0

$0.00

TRAVIS

161

4139

$469,983.45

TRINITY

0

0

$0.00

TYLER

0

0

$0.00

UPSHUR

0

0

$0.00

UPTON

2

6

$225.00

UVALDE

0

0

$0.00

VAL VERDE (P)

7

180

$1,800.00

VAN ZANDT

4

93

$2,560.29

VICTORIA

5

118

$5,160.14

WALKER

6

170

$5,514.80

WALLER

17

375

$13,822.50

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 7 of 8

KK7

Ex. KK

COUNTY Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 #FoifleIndm0a6te/1s 6/1#7of InPmaagtee D3a8y1s of 390 PagCeoIDst 2020

WARD

0

0

$0.00

WASHINGTON

0

0

$0.00

WEBB

127

1930

$107,732.60

WHARTON

7

174

$8,700.00

WHEELER

1

4

$244.44

WICHITA

13

350

$16,093.00

WILBARGER

0

0

$0.00

WILLACY

4

120

$3,703.20

WILLIAMSON

64

1282

$70,510.00

WILSON

2

7

$343.00

WINKLER

0

0

$0.00

WISE

2

60

$1,619.40

WOOD

0

0

$0.00

YOAKUM

1

30

$1,407.00

YOUNG

1

30

$759.00

ZAPATA

9

179

$4,478.58

ZAVALA

0

0

$0.00

4977

106044

$6,049,908.40

Mercado -- 2d Am. Compl.

Page 8 of 8

KK8

Case 3:15-cv-03481-S Document 80 Filed 06/16/17 Page 382 of 390 PageID 2021
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 Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 1 of 43
CASREF,CLOSED,JURY,LEAD
U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas (Dallas) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:15−cv−03481−S−BK

Mercado et al v. Dallas County, Texas et al Assigned to: Judge Karen Gren Scholer Referred to: Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 10/26/2015 Date Terminated: 01/07/2019 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Arturo Mercado TERMINATED: 08/22/2018

represented by Anthony Matthew Garza Charhon Callahan Robson & Garza PLLC 3333 Lee Parkway, Suite 460 Dallas, TX 75219 214−521−6400 Fax: 214−764−8392 Email: agarza@ccrglaw.com TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Eric Puente Puente Hindieh & Fernandez PLLC 4400 S Zang Blvd Suite 103 Dallas, TX 75208 214−760−0485 Fax: 214−760−0520 Email: epuente@phflaw.com TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Raymond Mark Hindieh Puente & Hindieh PLLC 3300 Oak Lawn Ave Suite 408 Dallas, TX 75219 214−730−0485 Fax: 214−730−0520 Email: rhindieh@phflaw.com TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Plaintiff Pablo Carranza

represented by Pablo Carranza 2520 Coombs Creek Dr. #529 Dallas, TX 75211 972−803−0372 PRO SE

Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Raymond Mark Hindieh

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 2 of 43

Plaintiff Sergio Diaz
Plaintiff Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz TERMINATED: 06/16/2017
Plaintiff Jose Gutierrez TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Plaintiff Heydy Jarquin Jimenez TERMINATED: 09/13/2018

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Sergio Diaz 754 Comanche Trail Irving, TX 75060 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 3 of 43

Plaintiff Jose Lopez−Aranda
Plaintiff Moises Martinez TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Plaintiff Javier Navarrete TERMINATED: 08/22/2018

Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jose Lopez−Aranda 523 Arbor View Dr. Garland, TX 75043 214−716−9615 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 4 of 43

Plaintiff Efren Perez Villegas TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Plaintiff Eleazar Saavedra TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera TERMINATED: 08/22/2018

Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 5 of 43

Plaintiff Moises Vega Costilla TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Plaintiff Mario Garibaldi
Plaintiff Rodolfo Marmolejo TERMINATED: 09/13/2018
Plaintiff Carlos Alvarez Castro

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Mario Garibaldi 1425 Santa Fe Trail Grand Prairie, TX 75052 469−677−4328 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Carlos Alvarez Castro 1602 Pine Street Grand Prairie, TX 75050

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 6 of 43

Plaintiff Jose Valenciano
Plaintiff Jeremias Chevez

PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber Charhon Callahan Robson & Garza 3333 Lee Parkway Suite 460 Dallas, TX 75219 214−521−6400 Fax: 214−764−8392 Email: mzweber@ccrglaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jose Valenciano 13510 Maham Road, #285 Dallas, TX 75240 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jeremias Chevez 2941 Kingsford Avenue Dallas, TX 75227 214−859−4035 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 7 of 43

Plaintiff Miguel Flores
Plaintiff Ricardo Garza TERMINATED: 12/04/2018

Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Miguel Flores 2523 Stonegate Drive Seagoville, TX 75159 214−527−8431 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/02/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 8 of 43

Plaintiff Luis Hernandez TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Plaintiff Felipe Gonzalez Lujan TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Plaintiff Jacinto Hernandez

represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Charles Zweber (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jacinto Hernandez 18809 Lina Street Dallas, TX 75287 214−664−3031 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 9 of 43

Plaintiff Jesus Padilla
Plaintiff Jorge Marrufo TERMINATED: 09/13/2018
Plaintiff Mario Hernandez Jasso TERMINATED: 09/13/2018
Plaintiff Fernando Huerta TERMINATED: 08/22/2018

Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jesus Padilla Quetzalcoalt 28 col. Centro tula hgo. C.P.42800 01152−1−551−116−4612 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 10 of 43

Plaintiff Francisco Lara Martinez TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Plaintiff Florencio Vega TERMINATED: 08/22/2018

Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

V. Consol Plaintiff Jose Rodriguez TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Consol Plaintiff

represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 11 of 43

Carlos Fuentes Paramo TERMINATED: 08/27/2018
Consol Plaintiff Alberto Sanchez Chavez TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Consol Plaintiff Abel Hernandez
Consol Plaintiff Jose Delcid Bonilla

Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Abel Hernandez 11526 CF Hawn Freeway, Trlr 69 Dallas, TX 75253 214−874−8749 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jose Delcid Bonilla 1845 W Walnut St #B Garland, TX 75042 469−740−8107 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 12 of 43

Consol Plaintiff Juan Camacho
Consol Plaintiff Raul Gomez TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Consol Plaintiff Epifanio Uribe Ortiz

Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Juan Camacho 3534 Idaho Avenue Dallas, TX 75216 469−643−0852 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Epifanio Uribe Ortiz 6415 Melody Ln. #2031 Dallas, TX 75231 214−983−4424 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 13 of 43

Consol Plaintiff Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez
Consol Plaintiff Maria Castillo
Consol Plaintiff Salvador Jaurequi TERMINATED: 09/13/2018

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez 1322 Trewitt Rd. Dallas, TX 75217 972−213−8558 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Maria Castillo 6105 Military Parkway Dallas, TX 75227 469−865−7420 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 14 of 43

Consol Plaintiff Jesus Lopez
Consol Plaintiff Abraham Santana
Consol Plaintiff Carlos Reyna Esparragoza TERMINATED: 08/22/2018

Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Jesus Lopez 9633 Old Seagoville Rd. #16 Dallas, TX 75217 469−867−0498 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Abraham Santana 2224 Vaga St. Dallas, TX 75219 469−335−2953 PRO SE
Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 15 of 43

Consol Plaintiff Arturo Munoz Martinez TERMINATED: 08/22/2018
Consol Plaintiff Julio Loera TERMINATED: 08/27/2018

TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Anthony Matthew Garza (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Eric Puente (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Raymond Mark Hindieh (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/23/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

V. Defendant Dallas County Texas

represented by David Jonathan Hacker Office of the Texas Attorney General 209 W 14th Street PDB Ground Floor Austin, TX 78701 512−936−2330 Fax: 512−935−0545 Email: david.hacker@oag.texas.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Tammy Jean Ardolf Dallas County District Attorney's Office Federal Litigation Section Frank Crowley Courts Building 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., L.B. 19 Dallas, TX 75207−4399 214−653−3692 Fax: 214−653−2899 Email: Tammy.Ardolf@dallascounty.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 16 of 43

Defendant Lupe Valdez TERMINATED: 07/06/2016
V. Movant Texas

Courtney Brooke Corbello Office of the Attorney General 300 W 15th St. Austin, TX 78701 512−463−2080 Fax: 512−936−2109 Email: courtney.corbello@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Not Admitted
Heather Kriscenski Rhea Thompson & Horton LLP 500 North Akard Street Suite 3150 Dallas, TX 75201 469−421−6619 Fax: 972−767−0089 Email: heather.rhea@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Peter L Harlan Law Offices of Marc Michman 304 South Record Street Suite 200 Dallas, TX 75202−4738 214−742−4159 Fax: 214−939−3759 Email: pharlan@marcrichman.com TERMINATED: 01/07/2019 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Shanna Elizabeth Molinare Office of the Texas Attorney General PO Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711−2548 512−463−2080 Fax: 512−370−9897 Email: shanna.molinare@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Peter L Harlan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/07/2019 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
represented by Todd Lawrence Disher Terrill & Waldrop 810 West 10th Street Austin, TX 78701 512−474−9100 Fax: 512−474−9888 Email: Todd.Disher@oag.texas.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 17 of 43
Andrew D Leonie Office of Attorney General PO Box 12548 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711−2548 512−475−3281 Email: andrew.leonie@texasattorneygeneral.gov TERMINATED: 10/29/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Austin Nimocks Office of the Attorney General of Texas 209 West 14th Street 8th Floor Austin, TX 78701 512−936−2902 Fax: 512−936−0545 Email: austin.nimocks@oag.texas.gov TERMINATED: 09/27/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
David Jonathan Hacker (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2017 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Joel Stonedale Texas Public Policy Foundation 901 Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701 512−472−2700 Fax: 512−472−2728 Email: joel.stonedale@oag.texas.gov TERMINATED: 10/29/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing
Michael Christopher Toth Office of the Attorney General of Texas 209 W 14th Street 8th Floor Austin, TX 78701 512−936−0631 Fax: 512−936−0545 Email: michael.toth@oag.texas.gov TERMINATED: 10/29/2018 Bar Status: Admitted/In Good Standing

Date Filed 10/26/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against All Defendants filed by Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Miguel Rodriguez, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Javier Navarrete, Arturo Mercado, Eleazar Saavedra, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Mario Garibaldi, Andres Torres Cabrera, Moises Vega Costilla, Pablo Carranza, Jose Gutierrez, Moises Martinez, Efren Perez Villegas, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Sergio Diaz. (Filing fee $400; Receipt number 0539−7144324) Clerk to issue summons(es). In each Notice of Electronic Filing, the judge assignment is indicated, and a link to the Judges Copy Requirements is provided. The court reminds the filer that any required copy of this and future documents must be delivered to the judge, in the manner prescribed, within three business days of filing. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Cover Sheet) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered:

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 18 of 43

10/26/2015
10/26/2015
10/26/2015 11/05/2015 11/05/2015
11/19/2015 12/18/2015 12/18/2015 12/18/2015 01/08/2016
01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/12/2016 01/12/2016 01/12/2016 01/12/2016

10/26/2015)
2 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Pablo Carranza, Sergio Diaz, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Jose Gutierrez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Moises Vega Costilla. (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
3 New Case Notes: A filing fee has been paid. File to Judge Fitzwater. Pursuant to Misc. Order 6, Plaintiff is provided the Notice of Right to Consent to Proceed Before A U.S. Magistrate Judge (Judge Toliver). Clerk to provide copy to plaintiff if not received electronically. (ndt) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
4 Summons Issued as to Dallas County Texas, Lupe Valdez. (ndt) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
5 Unopposed MOTION to Extend Time (), Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
6 ORDER granting 5 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint and Defendants Dallas County, Texas, and Lupe Valdez, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas must file their original answer or other pleading including, but not limited to a Motion to Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to Plaintiffs Complaint not later than 12/21/2015. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 11/5/2015) (ykp) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed as to Dallas County, Texas, served on 11/2/2015; Lupe Valdez, served on 11/2/2015. (axm) (Entered: 11/19/2015)
8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
9 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
10 Order for Scheduling Order Proposal: Scheduling Proposal due by 1/19/2016. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 12/18/2015) (chmb) (Entered: 12/18/2015)
11 RESPONSE filed by Pablo Carranza, Sergio Diaz, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Jose Gutierrez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Moises Vega Costilla re: 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
12 Unopposed MOTION to Consolidate Cases Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Plaintiffs' (Garza) Complaint () (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
13 ORDER: Member case(s) 3:15−cv−04008−D consolidated with lead case 3:15−cv−03481−D. Parties added to case pursuant to consolidation. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 1/8/2016) (ran) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
14 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer In Consolidated Case filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
15 ORDER granting 14 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer In Consolidated Case filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 1/12/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
Hearing/Deadline Modification: Deadlines/hearings set per 15 Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. Answer to Complaint due by 2/19/2016. (ndt) (Entered: 01/12/2016)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:15. Tue Jan 12 16:33:07 CST 2016 (crt) (Entered: 01/12/2016)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 19 of 43

01/15/2016
01/22/2016 02/03/2016 02/05/2016 02/05/2016 02/10/2016 02/10/2016 02/11/2016
02/12/2016 02/18/2016 02/23/2016
02/23/2016 02/26/2016 03/03/2016 06/07/2016

16 Proposal for contents of scheduling and discovery order Jointly Filed By All Parties by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Dallas County, Texas, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Lupe Valdez, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla. (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
17 REPLY filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez re: 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
18 ORDER setting deadline for motion to join parties and deferring setting other pretrial scheduling deadlines. Joinder of Parties due by 5/19/2016. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 2/3/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 02/03/2016)
19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
20 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
21 MOTION For A Rule 7(a) Reply To Qualified Immunity Defense filed by Lupe Valdez with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
22 MOTION to Stay, MOTION For Protective Order filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter). (Entered: 02/10/2016)
23 RESPONSE filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 22 MOTION to Stay Discovery Or In the Alternative For Protective Order MOTION for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−C) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
24 RESPONSE filed by Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Miguel Flores, Ricardo Garza, Luis Hernandez, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Jose Valenciano re: 19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
25 REPLY filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez re: 22 MOTION to Stay Discovery Or In the Alternative For Protective Order MOTION for Protective Order (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/18/2016)
26 RESPONSE filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 21 MOTION For A Rule 7(a) Reply To Qualified Immunity Defense (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
27 REPLY filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez re: 19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
28 REPLY filed by Lupe Valdez re: 21 MOTION For A Rule 7(a) Reply To Qualified Immunity Defense (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
29 ORDER granting 22 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Dallas County, Texas, Lupe Valdez. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 3/3/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 03/03/2016)
30 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 8 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Dallas County Texas, Lupe Valdez; granting 19 MOTION Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Dallas County Texas; denying without prejudice MOTION to require Rule 7(a) reply filed by Lupe Valdez; and granting plaintiffs 28 days to file amended consolidated complaint. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 6/7/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 06/07/2016)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 20 of 43

07/05/2016
07/05/2016 07/08/2016 07/08/2016 07/11/2016 07/18/2016 08/01/2016 08/03/2016 08/16/2016

31 AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against Dallas County Texas filed by Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Miguel Rodriguez, Ricardo Garza, Javier Navarrete, Luis Hernandez, Jose Valenciano, Arturo Mercado, Eleazar Saavedra, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Mario Garibaldi, Moises Vega Costilla, Andres Torres Cabrera, Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Miguel Flores, Jose Gutierrez, Moises Martinez, Jeremias Chevez, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Efren Perez Villegas, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Sergio Diaz. (One or more defendant(s) is no longer named.) Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Exhibit(s) I, # 10 Exhibit(s) J, # 11 Exhibit(s) K, # 12 Exhibit(s) L, # 13 Exhibit(s) M, # 14 Exhibit(s) N, # 15 Exhibit(s) O, # 16 Exhibit(s) P, # 17 Exhibit(s) Q, # 18 Exhibit(s) R, # 19 Exhibit(s) S, # 20 Exhibit(s) T, # 21 Exhibit(s) U, # 22 Exhibit(s) V, # 23 Exhibit(s) W, # 24 Exhibit(s) X, # 25 Exhibit(s) Y, # 26 Exhibit(s) Z, # 27 Exhibit(s) AA, # 28 Exhibit(s) BB, # 29 Exhibit(s) CC, # 30 Exhibit(s) DD, # 31 Exhibit(s) EE, # 32 Exhibit(s) FF, # 33 Exhibit(s) GG, # 34 Exhibit(s) HH, # 35 Exhibit(s) II) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 07/05/2016)
32 ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS to 31 Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla. (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 07/05/2016)
33 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer Or Other Pleading to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
34 ORDER granting 33 Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline to File an Original Answer or Other Pleading to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. Dallas County, Texas, must file its original answer or other pleading not later than August 19, 2016. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 7/8/2016) (ash) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
35 MOTION to Compel and Lift Stay filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A−D) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
36 SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 11/18/2016. Discovery due by 9/5/2017. Joinder of Parties due by 11/18/2016. Motions due by 9/18/2017. Status Report due by 9/5/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 7/18/2016) (sss) (Entered: 07/18/2016)
37 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas re: 35 MOTION to Compel and Lift Stay (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
38 REPLY filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 35 MOTION to Compel and Lift Stay (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
39 MOTION to Strike 32 Additional Attachments to Main Document, 31 Amended Complaint, filed by Dallas County Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 08/16/2016)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 21 of 43

08/19/2016 08/30/2016 08/31/2016
09/09/2016
09/12/2016 09/12/2016
09/12/2016 09/20/2016 09/23/2016 09/23/2016
09/26/2016 09/26/2016 09/26/2016

40 Second MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) filed by Dallas County Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit(s) Affidavit of Jim Patterson) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
41 Amended MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) filed by Dallas County Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 08/30/2016)
42 RESPONSE filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 39 MOTION to Strike 32 Additional Attachments to Main Document, 31 Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order Denying Motion to Strike Exhibits). (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
43 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Brief in Excess of Page Limitations filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
44 ORDER granting 43 Motion for Leave to File Brief Exceeding Page Limitations. (Unless the document has already been filed, clerk to enter the document as of the date of this order.) (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 9/12/2016) (mem) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
45 RESPONSE filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 41 Amended MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) (mem) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
46 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 39 MOTION to Strike 32 Additional Attachments to Main Document, 31 Amended Complaint. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 09/12/2016)
47 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 40 Second MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 09/20/2016)
48 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 40 Second MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
49 OBJECTION filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 48 Reply (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 09/23/2016)
50 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Reply filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Additional Page(s)) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
51 ELECTRONIC ORDER granting 50 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Reply filed by Dallas County Texas. (Unless the document has already been filed, clerk to enter the document as of the date of this order.) (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 9/26/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
52 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 40 Second MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7). (rekc) (Entered: 09/27/2016)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 22 of 43

01/17/2017
01/23/2017 01/25/2017 02/06/2017
02/13/2017 02/13/2017 03/01/2017
03/02/2017 03/03/2017 03/08/2017 03/08/2017 03/08/2017 03/15/2017 03/15/2017

53 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying as moot 35 MOTION to Compel and Lift Stay filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gon zalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla; denying 39 MOTION to Strike 32 Additional Attachments to Main Document, 31 Amended Complaint, filed by Dallas County Texas; and granting in part and denying in part 40 Second MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) filed by Dallas County Texas and 41 Amended MOTION to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(6)(7) filed by Dallas County Texas. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 1/17/2017) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 01/17/2017)
54 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
55 ORDER granting 54 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. Dallas County Texas answer due 3/2/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 1/25/2017) (epm) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
56 ORDER: No later than the scheduling proposal due date, counsel must confer (in person or by other means) and submit a joint scheduling proposal that addresses the matters contained in the cour's 12/18/2015 scheduling proposal order so that the court can enter an amended scheduling order. Proposed Scheduling Order due by 3/6/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 2/6/2017) (sss) (Entered: 02/06/2017)
57 Unopposed MOTION for Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 02/13/2017)
58 PROTECTIVE ORDER (as modified by the court). ORDER granting 57 Unopposed MOTION for Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) filed by Dallas County Texas. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 2/13/2017) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 02/13/2017)
59 ANSWER to 31 Amended Complaint, filed by Dallas County Texas. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
60 Agreed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Scheduling Proposal filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
61 ORDER granting 60 Agreed Motion for Extension of Time to File Joint Scheduling Proposal. Joint scheduling proposal due by 4/7/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 3/3/2017) (ran) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Answer). Party Texas added.Attorney Austin R Nimocks added to party Texas(pty:intvd) (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
63 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Texas re 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
64 Appendix in Support filed by Texas re 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 03/08/2017)
65 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Austin Nimocks for Andrew D. Leonie, David J. Hacker, Joel Stonedale, and Michael C. Toth on behalf of Texas. (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
66 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 23 of 43

03/15/2017
03/28/2017 03/29/2017 04/07/2017
04/12/2017 04/12/2017
04/17/2017 04/26/2017 05/08/2017 06/05/2017
06/16/2017

Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
67 ORDER granting 66 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla. Response due by 4/12/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 3/15/2017) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 03/15/2017)
68 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response To State's Motion To Intervene filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
69 ORDER granting 68 Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline to File Response to State of Texas' Motion to Intervene. Responses due by 4/12/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 3/29/2017) (axm) (Entered: 03/29/2017)
70 Proposal for contents of scheduling and discovery order Jointly Filed with Defendant Dallas County by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla. (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 04/07/2017)
71 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas re: 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
72 RESPONSE filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla re: 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony M. Garza, # 2 Index of exhibits, # 3 Appendix) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
73 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Amended Pleadings due by 8/9/2017. Joinder of Parties due by 8/9/2017. Discovery due by 7/13/2018. Joint Status Report due by 7/13/2018. Motions due by 9/14/2018. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 4/17/2017) (ndt) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
74 REPLY filed by Texas re: 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 04/26/2017)
75 ORDER granting 62 MOTION to Intervene as Defendant filed by Texas. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 5/8/2017) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 05/08/2017)
76 MOTION for Discovery Limitations on Intervenor Texas filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
77 MOTION to Consolidate Cases, MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Juan Camacho, Maria Castillo, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Raul Gomez, Abel Hernandez, Salvador Jaurequi, Julio Loera, Jesus Lopez, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 24 of 43

06/16/2017
06/16/2017 06/16/2017
06/19/2017 06/19/2017 06/20/2017

Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 3 Proposed Appendix, part 1, to Second Amended Complaint, # 4 Proposed Appendix, part 2, to Second Amended Complaint) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
78 ORDER granting 77 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Juan Camacho, Maria Castillo, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Raul Gomez, Abel Hernandez, Salvador Jaurequi, Julio Loera, Jesus Lopez, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla. (Unless the document has already been filed, clerk to enter the document as of the date of this order.) (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 6/16/2017) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
79 ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES: Member case(s) 3:17−cv−0201−D consolidated with lead case 3:15−cv−3481−D. Jose Delcid Bonilla, Juan Camacho, Maria Castillo, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Abel Hernandez, Salvador Jaurequi, Julio Loera, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Jesus Lopez, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz and Raul Gomez, Jose Rodriguez, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abel Hernandez, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Juan Camacho, Raul Gomez, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Maria Castillo, Salvador Jaurequi, Jesus Lopez, Abraham Santana, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Arturo Munoz Martinez and Julio Loera added to case pursuant to consolidation. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 6/16/2017) (axm) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
80 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND against Dallas County Texas filed by Miguel Rodriguez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Ricardo Garza, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Javier Navarrete, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Salvador Jaurequi, Arturo Mercado, Abraham Santana, Juan Camacho, Moises Vega Costilla, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Jeremias Chevez, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Raul Gomez, Abel Hernandez, Luis Hernandez, Jose Valenciano, Maria Castillo, Jose Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Mario Garibaldi, Julio Loera, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Pablo Carranza, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Miguel Flores, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Jose Gutierrez, Moises Martinez, Jesus Lopez, Efren Perez Villegas, Sergio Diaz, Jacinto Hernandez, Jesus Padilla, Jorge Marrufo, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Francisco Lara Martinez, Florencio Vega. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (ndt) (Entered: 06/16/2017)
81 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer To Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
82 ORDER: The Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline to File an Original Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint of Defendant Dallas County, Texas, is GRANTED, and Dallas County, Texas must file its original answer or other responsive pleading to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Document 80 ) not later than 7/31/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 6/19/2017) (aaa) (Entered: 06/20/2017)
83 Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 06/20/2017)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 25 of 43

06/20/2017 06/23/2017 06/26/2017
07/06/2017
07/28/2017
07/31/2017
07/31/2017 08/18/2017 10/27/2017 10/30/2017 11/03/2017 11/15/2017

84 ORDER granting 83 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. It is ORDERED that Intervenor−Defendant, Texas, answer Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on or before 7/31/2017. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 6/20/2017) (aaa) (Entered: 06/20/2017)
85 RESPONSE AND OBJECTION filed by Texas re: 76 MOTION for Discovery Limitations on Intervenor Texas (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
86 REPLY filed by Juan Camacho, Pablo Carranza, Maria Castillo, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Abel Hernandez, Jacinto Hernandez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Jesus Lopez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Andres Torres Cabrera, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Jose Valenciano, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 76 MOTION for Discovery Limitations on Intervenor Texas (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/26/2017)
87 ORDER denying without prejudice 76 MOTION for Discovery Limitations on Intervenor Texas filed by Pablo Carranza, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Moises Vega Costilla. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 7/6/2017) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater) (Entered: 07/06/2017)
88 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,,,,, filed by Dallas County Texas. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
89 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint, filed by Texas. Unless exempted, attorneys who are not admitted to practice in the Northern District of Texas must seek admission promptly. Forms, instructions, and exemption information may be found at www.txnd.uscourts.gov, or by clicking here: Attorney Information − Bar Membership. If admission requirements are not satisfied within 21 days, the clerk will notify the presiding judge. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
90 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS/DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
91 NOTICE of Service of Initial Disclosures Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) filed by Dallas County Texas (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
92 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order on Unopposed Motion to Withdraw) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
93 ORDER ON 92 UNOPPOSED MOTION TO WITHDRAW: David J. Hacker's representation of Intervenor−Defendant Texas in above−referenced case is terminated. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 10/30/2017) (sss) (Entered: 10/30/2017)
94 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by David Jonathan Hacker on behalf of Dallas County Texas. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
95 MOTION for Bellwether Trial Plan filed by Juan Camacho, Pablo Carranza, Maria Castillo, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Abel Hernandez, Jacinto Hernandez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez,

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 26 of 43

12/06/2017 12/20/2017
02/22/2018
02/23/2018 03/02/2018 03/09/2018 03/12/2018 03/15/2018 03/20/2018

Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Jesus Lopez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Andres Torres Cabrera, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Jose Valenciano, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 11/15/2017)
96 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 95 MOTION for Bellwether Trial Plan (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 12/06/2017)
97 REPLY filed by Juan Camacho, Pablo Carranza, Maria Castillo, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Abel Hernandez, Jacinto Hernandez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Jesus Lopez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Andres Torres Cabrera, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz, Jose Valenciano, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 95 MOTION for Bellwether Trial Plan (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
98 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs filed by Juan Camacho, Pablo Carranza, Maria Castillo, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Miguel Flores, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Abel Hernandez, Jacinto Hernandez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Jesus Lopez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
99 ORDER granting 98 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Eric Puente; Anthony Matthew Garza and Raymond Mark Hindieh terminated. No later than March 2, 2018, Counsel shall provide to the clerk of court the last known addresses and telephone numbers for these plaintiffs. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 2/23/2018) (ndt) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
100 NOTICE of Plaintiffs' Certificate of Last−Known Addresses filed by Juan Camacho, Maria Castillo, Carlos Alvarez Castro, Jeremias Chevez, Miguel Flores, Abel Hernandez, Jacinto Hernandez, Jose Valenciano (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
101 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Karen Gren Scholer for all further proceedings per Special Order 3−318. (Ordered by Chief Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn on 3/8/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:101. Mon Mar 12 12:43:55 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
102 ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE AFTER CASE TRANSFER: Lead counsel for each party, or alternatively, counsel with authority to bind their respective clients and lead counsel, and all unrepresented parties, shall be present. Status Conference set for 3/22/2018 09:00 AM in US Courthouse, Courtroom 1632, 1100 Commerce St., Dallas, TX 75242−1310 before Judge Karen Gren Scholer. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 3/15/2018) (ewd) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
103 Mail returned as undeliverable. 101 Order received back from Jacinto Hernandez as 101. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 27 of 43

03/21/2018 03/21/2018 03/21/2018 03/22/2018 03/30/2018 03/30/2018
03/30/2018 04/02/2018
04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/02/2018 04/05/2018

re−mailed. (epm) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
104 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests for Production filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
105 MOTION to Compel Responses to Interrogatories filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Exhibit(s) G, # 8 Exhibit(s) H, # 9 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
106 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of Requests for Admissions Nos. 3, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, & 26 filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Exhibit(s) C, # 4 Exhibit(s) D, # 5 Exhibit(s) E, # 6 Exhibit(s) F, # 7 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 03/21/2018)
107 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Karen Gren Scholer: Status Conference held on 3/22/2018. Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Anthony Matthew Garza; Defense − David Jonathan Hacker and Austin Nimocks. (Court Reporter: Keith Johnson) (No exhibits) Time in Court − :30. (mcrd) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
108 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs filed by Pablo Carranza, Jesus Lopez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
109 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Motion Hearing set for 4/19/2018 at 1:30 p.m. in US Courthouse, Courtroom 1632, 1100 Commerce St., Dallas, TX 75242−1310 before Judge Karen Gren Scholer. re: 105 MOTION to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, 108 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs, 95 MOTION for Bellwether Trial Plan, 106 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of Requests for Admissions 104 and MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests for Production. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 3/30/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 03/30/2018)
111 ORDER denying 95 MOTION for Bellwether Trial Plan. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 3/30/2018) (ykp) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
110 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Motion Hearing RESET for 4/13/2018 at 9:30 AM in US Courthouse, Courtroom 1632, 1100 Commerce St., Dallas, TX 75242−1310 before Judge Karen Gren Scholer. re: 105 MOTION to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, 108 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs, 95 MOTION for Bellwether Trial Plan, 106 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of Requests for Admissions and 104 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests for Production. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 4/2/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:110, 111. Mon Apr 2 11:05:36 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
ELECTRONIC Notice: Per the Court's Order, Dkt. 111 , Plaintiffs' Motion for Bellwether Trial Plan, Dkt. 95 , will not be heard on 4/13/18. (chmb) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
112 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 108 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
113 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Texas re 105 MOTION to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, 106 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of Requests for Admissions Nos. 3, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, & 26, 104 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests for Production (Joinder by Texas) (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 04/02/2018)
114 Proposal for contents of scheduling and discovery order amended and jointly filed with the Represented Plaintiffs and Intervenor−Defendant Texas by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/05/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 28 of 43

04/09/2018 04/09/2018
04/09/2018
04/10/2018 04/10/2018 04/11/2018 04/11/2018 04/13/2018 04/13/2018

115 ORDER granting 108 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Anthony Garza, Eric Puente, and Raymond Hindieh are granted leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs Pablo Carranza, Jose Lopez Aranda, Jesus Lopez, and Epifanio Uribe Ortiz. No, later than 4/16/2018, Counsel shall provide to the clerk of court the last known addresses and telephone numbers for there plaintiffs. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 4/9/2018) (axm) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
116 RESPONSE filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 105 MOTION to Compel Responses to Interrogatories, 106 MOTION to Determine the Sufficiency of Requests for Admissions Nos. 3, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, & 26, 104 MOTION to Compel Responses to Requests for Production (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Appendix) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
117 NOTICE of Joint Letter to the Court Concerning Deposition Discovery Matters filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Abraham Santana, Andres Torres Cabrera, Jose Valenciano, Florencio Vega (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Unopposed Protective Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:115. Tue Apr 10 14:45:39 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
118 Mail returned as undeliverable. 109 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing received back from Jacinto Hernandez as return to sender, insufficient address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (axm) (Entered: 04/11/2018)
119 Mail returned as undeliverable. 111 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 110 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as Return to Sender, Insufficient Address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ndt) (Entered: 04/12/2018)
120 Mail returned as undeliverable. 111 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, 109 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing, 110 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing, 101 Order received back from Abel Hernandez as Return to Sender, Not deliverable as addressed, Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (Attachments: # 1 Additional Page(s), # 2 Additional Page(s)) (ndt) (Entered: 04/12/2018)
126 ELECTRONIC Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Karen Gren Scholer: Discovery Hearing held on 4/13/2018. In light of the parties' agreement at the hearing, the Court DENIES as MOOT Defendant Dallas County's Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Requests for Admission 106 . Attorney Appearances: Plaintiff − Anthony Garza; Defense − Austin Nimocks, Courtney Corbello and David Hacker. (Court Reporter: Keith Johnson) (No exhibits) Time in Court − 3:04. (chmb) Modified on 5/1/2018 (chmb). (Entered: 04/20/2018)
127 ELECTRONIC ORDER: The Court Grants in Part and Denies in Part Dallas County's Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production 104 , and Dallas County's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories 105 . To the extent issues remain unresolved following the discovery hearing held on 4/13/18, refer to the Court's rulings on the record. The parties resolved all other issues. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 4/13/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 04/20/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 29 of 43

04/17/2018 04/18/2018 04/18/2018 04/19/2018 04/20/2018 04/20/2018 04/20/2018
04/20/2018
04/20/2018
04/20/2018
04/20/2018
04/20/2018
04/20/2018 04/20/2018

121 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Heather K Rhea on behalf of Dallas County Texas. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Rhea, Heather) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
122 Mail returned as undeliverable: 115 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
123 NOTICE of Certificate of Last Known Addresses filed by Pablo Carranza, Jesus Lopez, Jose Lopez−Aranda, Epifanio Uribe Ortiz (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 04/18/2018)
124 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in Excess of Page Limits filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
125 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 115 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney received back from Abel Hernandez as return to sender − not deliverable as addressed. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
128 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
129 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment Volume 1 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2, # 3 Exhibit(s) 3 (Part 1), # 4 Exhibit(s) 3 (Part 2), # 5 Exhibit(s) 4, # 6 Exhibit(s) 5 (Part 1), # 7 Exhibit(s) 5 (Part 2), # 8 Exhibit(s) 6, # 9 Exhibit(s) 7, # 10 Exhibit(s) 8) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
130 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment Volume 2 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 9, # 2 Exhibit(s) 10, # 3 Exhibit(s) 11 (Part 1), # 4 Exhibit(s) 11 (Part 2), # 5 Exhibit(s) 11 (Part 3), # 6 Exhibit(s) 12, # 7 Exhibit(s) 13, # 8 Exhibit(s) 14, # 9 Exhibit(s) 15, # 10 16) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
131 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment Volume 3 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 17, # 2 Exhibit(s) 18, # 3 Exhibit(s) 19, # 4 Exhibit(s) 20, # 5 Exhibit(s) 21, # 6 Exhibit(s) 22, # 7 Exhibit(s) 23, # 8 Exhibit(s) 24, # 9 Exhibit(s) 25, # 10 Exhibit(s) 26) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
132 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment Volume 4 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 27, # 2 Exhibit(s) 28, # 3 Exhibit(s) 29, # 4 Exhibit(s) 30, # 5 Exhibit(s) 31 (Part 1), # 6 Exhibit(s) 31 (Part 2), # 7 Exhibit(s) 32, # 8 Exhibit(s) 33, # 9 Exhibit(s) 34, # 10 Exhibit(s) 35) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
133 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment Volume 5 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 36, # 2 Exhibit(s) 37, # 3 Exhibit(s) 38, # 4 Exhibit(s) 39, # 5 Exhibit(s) 40, # 6 Exhibit(s) 41 (Part 1), # 7 Exhibit(s) 41 (Part 2), # 8 Exhibit(s) 42, # 9 Exhibit(s) 43 (Part 1), # 10 Exhibit(s) 43 (Part 2)) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
134 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment Volume 6 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 44 (Part 1), # 2 Exhibit(s) 44 (Part 2), # 3 Exhibit(s) 45, # 4 Exhibit(s) 46, # 5 Exhibit(s) 47, # 6 Exhibit(s) 48, # 7 Exhibit(s) 49, # 8 Exhibit(s) 50, # 9 Exhibit(s) 51, # 10 Exhibit(s) 52) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
135 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Hacker, David) (Entered: 04/20/2018)
136 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 124 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO EXCEED PAGE LIMITS: Dallas County is granted leave to file its Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, not to exceed 65 pages in length. (Ordered by Judge

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 30 of 43

04/23/2018 04/23/2018 04/24/2018 04/26/2018 04/26/2018 05/01/2018 05/02/2018
05/03/2018 05/07/2018 05/07/2018
05/08/2018 05/08/2018 05/08/2018 05/08/2018 05/09/2018

Karen Gren Scholer on 4/20/2018) (sss) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:127. Mon Apr 23 09:03:59 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:136. Mon Apr 23 15:13:21 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 04/23/2018)
137 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 115 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney received back from Juan Camacho as return to sender − attempted not known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 04/24/2018)
138 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs filed by Ricardo Garza, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Abraham Santana with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
139 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 138 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 04/26/2018)
140 Mail returned as undeliverable. 115 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, received back from Miguel Flores as RTS. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (epm) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
141 ORDER granting 138 Motion for Anthony Garza, Eric Puente, and Raymond Hindieh to Withdraw as Counsel for plaintiffs Abraham Santana, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, and Ricardo Garza. No later than May 3, 2018, Counsel shall file the last known addresses and telephone numbers for these plaintiffs with the clerk of the court. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 5/2/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 141. Thu May 3 10:31:57 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
142 NOTICE of Third Certificate of Last Known Addresses filed by Ricardo Garza, Gonzalo Ramirez Vasquez, Abraham Santana (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/07/2018)
143 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/07/2018)
144 Mail returned as undeliverable. 127 Order, 136 Order, received back from Abel Hernandez as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
145 Mail returned as undeliverable. 127 Order, 136 Order, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
146 Mail returned as undeliverable. 136 Order, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 05/08/2018)
147 ORDER granting 143 Motion to Extend Time to File Response to 128 Motion for Summary Judgment. Responses due by 5/25/2018. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 5/8/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 147. Wed May 9 09:29:27 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 05/09/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 31 of 43

05/09/2018 05/09/2018 05/10/2018 05/11/2018 05/14/2018 05/14/2018 05/15/2018 05/17/2018
05/18/2018 05/18/2018 05/21/2018 05/21/2018 05/22/2018
05/22/2018 05/22/2018

148 Mail returned as undeliverable. 127 Order, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as not at this address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
149 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re: 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1 − SB4 Order Denying Rehearing, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2 − SB4 Opinion) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
150 Mail returned as undeliverable. 136 Order on Motion for Leave to File, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as Return to Sender − Not Deliverable as Addressed − Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
151 Mail returned as undeliverable. 127 Order on Motion to Compel received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as RTS. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (epm) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
152 Mail returned as undeliverable. 141 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as Return to Sender− Insufficient Address−Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
153 Mail returned as undeliverable. 141 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as Return to Sender − Not Deliverable as Addressed − Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 05/14/2018)
154 Mail returned as undeliverable. 141 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, received back from Abel Hernandez as Return to Sender − Not Deliverable as Addressed − Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
155 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Appendix in Support of First Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas (Attachments: # 1 Supplement to Table of Contents, # 2 Exhibit(s) 20.5, # 3 Exhibit(s) 53, # 4 Exhibit(s) 54, # 5 Exhibit(s) 55, # 6 Proposed Order on Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Appendix) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
157 ORDER granting 155 Motion for Leave to File A Supplemental Appendix to Defendants' Joint First Motion for Summary Judgment. (Unless the document has already been filed, clerk to enter the document as of the date of this order.) (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 5/18/2018) (axm) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
158 Supplement Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas re 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment . (axm) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
156 Proposal for contents of scheduling and discovery order amended and jointly filed with the Represented Plaintiffs and Intervenor−Defendant Texas by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
159 Mail returned as undeliverable. 147 Order on Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficent address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
160 Fourth MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs filed by Carlos Alvarez Castro, Luis Hernandez, Francisco Lara Martinez, Jesus Padilla, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of A. Garza, # 2 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/22/2018)
161 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 160 Fourth MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 05/22/2018)
162 Mail returned as undeliverable. 141 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, received back from Pablo Carranza as attempted − not known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 05/23/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 32 of 43

05/22/2018
05/23/2018 05/23/2018 05/24/2018 05/25/2018 05/25/2018
05/25/2018

163 Mail returned as undeliverable. 147 Order on Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply received back from Abel Hernandez as not deliverable as addressed; received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known; received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as not deliverable as addressed. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:157. Wed May 23 12:25:19 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
164 Proof of Service for Subpoena served on Guadalupe Valdez on 5/19/2018. (rekc) (Entered: 05/23/2018)
165 Mail returned as undeliverable. 141 Order, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 05/24/2018)
166 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Anthony Matthew Garza on behalf of Ricardo Garza. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
167 MOTION for Leave to File Summary−Judgment Response Brief in Excess of Page Limits filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A (Proposed Response to Summary−Judgment Motion), # 2 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
168 Appendix in Support filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re 167 MOTION for Leave to File Summary−Judgment Response Brief in Excess of Page Limits APPENDIX TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO SUMMARY−JUDGMENT MOTION (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) 1, # 2 Exhibit(s) 2a, # 3 Exhibit(s) 2b, # 4 Exhibit(s) 2c, # 5 Exhibit(s) 3a, # 6 Exhibit(s) 3b, # 7 Exhibit(s) 3c, # 8 Exhibit(s) 4a, # 9 Exhibit(s) 4b, # 10 Exhibit(s) 4c, # 11 Exhibit(s) 5a, # 12 Exhibit(s) 5b, # 13 Exhibit(s) 5c, # 14 Exhibit(s) 6a, # 15 Exhibit(s) 6b, # 16 Exhibit(s) 6c, # 17 Exhibit(s) 7a, # 18 Exhibit(s) 7b, # 19 Exhibit(s) 7c, # 20 Exhibit(s) 8a, # 21 Exhibit(s) 8b, # 22 Exhibit(s) 8c, # 23 Exhibit(s) 9a, # 24 Exhibit(s) 9b, # 25 Exhibit(s) 9c, # 26 Exhibit(s) 10a, # 27 Exhibit(s) 10b, # 28 Exhibit(s) 10c, # 29 Exhibit(s) 11a, # 30 Exhibit(s) 11b, # 31 Exhibit(s) 11c, # 32 Exhibit(s) 12a, # 33 Exhibit(s) 12b, # 34 Exhibit(s) 12c, # 35 Exhibit(s) 13a, # 36 Exhibit(s) 13b, # 37 Exhibit(s) 13c, # 38 Exhibit(s) 14a, # 39 Exhibit(s) 14b, # 40 Exhibit(s) 14c, # 41 Exhibit(s) 15a, # 42 Exhibit(s) 15b, # 43 Exhibit(s) 15c, # 44 Exhibit(s) 16a, # 45 Exhibit(s) 16b, # 46 Exhibit(s) 16c, # 47 Exhibit(s) 17a, # 48 Exhibit(s) 17b, # 49 Exhibit(s) 17c, # 50 Exhibit(s) 18a, # 51 Exhibit(s) 18b, # 52 Exhibit(s) 18c, # 53 Exhibit(s) 19a, # 54 Exhibit(s) 19b, # 55 Exhibit(s) 19c, # 56 Exhibit(s) 20a, # 57 Exhibit(s) 20b, # 58 Exhibit(s) 20c, # 59 Exhibit(s) 21a, # 60 Exhibit(s) 21b, # 61 Exhibit(s) 21c, # 62 Exhibit(s) 22a, # 63 Exhibit(s) 22b, # 64 Exhibit(s) 22c, # 65 Exhibit(s) 23a, # 66 Exhibit(s) 23b, # 67 Exhibit(s) 23c, # 68 Exhibit(s) 24a, # 69 Exhibit(s) 24b, # 70 Exhibit(s) 24c, # 71 Exhibit(s) 25a, # 72 Exhibit(s) 25b, # 73 Exhibit(s) 25c, # 74 Exhibit(s) 26a, # 75 Exhibit(s) 26b, # 76 Exhibit(s) 26c, # 77 Exhibit(s) 27a, # 78 Exhibit(s) 27b, # 79 Exhibit(s) 27c, # 80 Exhibit(s) 28a, # 81 Exhibit(s) 28b, # 82 Exhibit(s) 28c, # 83 Exhibit(s) 29a, # 84 Exhibit(s) 29b, # 85 Exhibit(s) 29c, # 86 Exhibit(s) 30a, # 87 Exhibit(s) 30b, # 88 Exhibit(s) 30c, # 89 Exhibit(s) 31a, # 90 Exhibit(s) 31b, # 91 Exhibit(s) 31c, # 92 Exhibit(s) 32, # 93 Exhibit(s) 33, # 94 Exhibit(s) 34, # 95

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 33 of 43

05/25/2018
05/25/2018
05/29/2018 05/29/2018 05/29/2018
05/30/2018 05/31/2018 06/04/2018 06/04/2018 06/05/2018 06/06/2018

Exhibit(s) 35, # 96 Exhibit(s) 36, # 97 Exhibit(s) 37, # 98 Exhibit(s) 38, # 99 Exhibit(s) 39, # 100 Exhibit(s) 40, # 101 Exhibit(s) 41, # 102 Exhibit(s) 42, # 103 Exhibit(s) 43, # 104 Exhibit(s) 44, # 105 Exhibit(s) 45, # 106 Exhibit(s) 46, # 107 Exhibit(s) 47, # 108 Exhibit(s) 48, # 109 Exhibit(s) 49, # 110 Exhibit(s) 50, # 111 Exhibit(s) 51, # 112 Exhibit(s) 52, # 113 Exhibit(s) 53, # 114 Exhibit(s) 54, # 115 Exhibit(s) 55, # 116 Exhibit(s) 56, # 117 Exhibit(s) 57, # 118 Exhibit(s) 58a, # 119 Exhibit(s) 58b, # 120 Exhibit(s) 58c, # 121 Exhibit(s) 59, # 122 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
169 MOTION to Continue Summary−Judgment Briefing Under Rule 56(d) filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
170 MOTION for Reconsideration re 53 Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed by Sergio Diaz, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Moises Vega Costilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
171 ORDER granting 167 Motion for Leave to File brief in Excess of Page Limits. (Unless the document has already been filed, clerk to enter the document as of the date of this order.) (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 5/29/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 171. Tue May 29 15:08:39 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
172 RESPONSE filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment. (zkc) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
173 NOTICE of Pro Se Plaintiffs' Failure to Respond to Defendants' Joint First Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas (Hacker, David) (Entered: 05/30/2018)
174 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 172 Response/Objection,, filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 05/31/2018)
175 ORDER granting 174 Motion for an Extension of Time: The deadline for Defendants' Reply in Support of Summary Judgment is 6/15/2018. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 6/4/2018) (sss) (Entered: 06/04/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:175. Mon Jun 4 12:32:41 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 06/04/2018)
176 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 157 Order on Motion for Leave to File, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as return to sender − insufficient address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/05/2018)
177 MOTION for Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) filed by Lupe Valdez with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) Ex. A; Subpoena)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 34 of 43

06/07/2018 06/07/2018 06/07/2018 06/08/2018 06/08/2018 06/12/2018 06/12/2018 06/12/2018 06/13/2018 06/15/2018 06/15/2018 06/15/2018 06/15/2018 06/15/2018

(Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
178 Mail returned as undeliverable. 171 Order on Motion for Leave to File received back from Abel Hernandez as Return to Sender−Not Deliverable as Addressed−Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 06/08/2018)
179 Mail returned as undeliverable. 171 Order on Motion for Leave to File received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as Return to Sender−Not Deliverable as Addressed−Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 06/08/2018)
180 Mail returned as undeliverable. 157 Order on Motion for Leave to File, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as Return to Sender−Not Deliverable as Addressed−Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 06/08/2018)
181 Mail returned as undeliverable. 171 Order on Motion for Leave to File received back from Jacinto Hernandez as Return to Sender−Insufficient Address−Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 06/11/2018)
182 Mail returned as undeliverable. 171 Order on Motion for Leave to File received back from Carlos Alvarez Castro as Return to Sender−Attempted−Not Known−Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ykp) (Entered: 06/11/2018)
183 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 175 Order on Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply received back from Jacinto Hernandez as return to sender − insufficient address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
184 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 157 Order on Motion for Leave to File, received back from Abel Hernandez, Richardo Garza as return to sender − not deliverable as addressed. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
185 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 171 Order on Motion for Leave to File received back from Juan Camacho as return to sender − attempted − not known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
186 Fifth MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for a Certain Plaintiff filed by Jorge Marrufo with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza, # 2 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/13/2018)
187 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 170 MOTION for Reconsideration re 53 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
188 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 169 MOTION to Continue Summary−Judgment Briefing Under Rule 56(d) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B, # 3 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
189 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 171 Order on Motion for Leave to File, 157 Order on Motion for Leave to File, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as return to sender − attempted − not known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
190 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 175 Order on Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as return to sender − no such number. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
191 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 175 Order on Motion to Extend Time to File Response/Reply received back from Abel Hernandez as return to sender − not deliverable as addressed. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 06/15/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 35 of 43

06/15/2018 06/15/2018 06/15/2018
06/18/2018 06/18/2018 06/18/2018 06/21/2018 06/25/2018 06/26/2018 06/26/2018
06/28/2018 06/28/2018 06/28/2018
06/28/2018

192 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 128 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Hacker, David) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
193 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 186 Fifth MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for a Certain Plaintiff (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
194 ORDER ON INTERROGATORY VERIFICATION SIGNATURES: Plaintiffs will be permitted to submit verifications to interrogatories using electronic signatures so long as the verifications contain the following language as set forth in this Order. Amended verifications are to be submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel no later than 10 days before a Plaintiff's deposition. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 6/15/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 194. Mon Jun 18 09:51:02 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
195 Mail returned as undeliverable. 171 Order, 157 Order, received back from Pablo Carranza as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
196 Joint MOTION to Strike 168 Appendix in Support, Exhibits 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 54 filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas and Mercado, et al (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) Modified on 6/19/2018 to add joint filer and enhance text(dss). (Entered: 06/18/2018)
197 ELECTRONIC ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 6/21/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
198 Mail returned as undeliverable. 157 Order, received back from Juan Camacho as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 06/25/2018)
199 Mail returned as undeliverable. 194 Order, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
200 RESPONSE filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 177 MOTION for Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Michael Zweber) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
201 Mail returned as undeliverable. 194 Order, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
202 Mail returned as undeliverable. 194 Order, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
203 REPLY filed by Sergio Diaz, Ricardo Garza, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Javier Navarrete, Efren Perez Villegas, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Andres Torres Cabrera, Moises Vega Costilla re: 170 MOTION for Reconsideration re 53 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/28/2018)
204 MOTION Requesting the Court to Enter the Proposed Joint Amended Scheduling Order re 156 Proposed Scheduling and Discovery Order filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 06/28/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 36 of 43

06/29/2018
07/06/2018 07/06/2018 07/09/2018 07/09/2018
07/12/2018 07/23/2018 08/06/2018 08/06/2018 08/06/2018 08/07/2018 08/07/2018 08/07/2018

205 REPLY filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 169 MOTION to Continue Summary−Judgment Briefing Under Rule 56(d) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 06/29/2018)
206 Mail returned as undeliverable. 175 Order received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
207 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 197 Electronic Order received back from Abel Hernandez as moved, left no address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
208 REPLY filed by Lupe Valdez re: 177 MOTION for Protective Order Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 07/09/2018)
209 RESPONSE filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Raul Gomez, Jose Gutierrez, Luis Hernandez, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Fernando Huerta, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Francisco Lara Martinez, Julio Loera, Felipe Gonzalez Lujan, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Moises Martinez, Arturo Mercado, Arturo Munoz Martinez, Javier Navarrete, Jesus Padilla, Efren Perez Villegas, Carlos Reyna Esparragoza, Jose Rodriguez, Miguel Rodriguez, Eleazar Saavedra, Alberto Sanchez Chavez, Andres Torres Cabrera, Florencio Vega, Moises Vega Costilla re: 196 Joint MOTION to Strike 168 Appendix in Support, Exhibits 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 54 (Garza, Anthony) Modified on 7/10/2018 to enhance text (dss). (Entered: 07/09/2018)
210 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 194 Order received back from Pablo Carranza as return to sender − attempted not known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
211 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 196 Joint MOTION to Strike 168 Appendix in Support, Exhibits 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, and 54 (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 07/23/2018)
212 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Dallas County Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
213 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas re 212 MOTION for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) A, # 2 Exhibit(s) B) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
214 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Dallas County Texas re 212 MOTION for Protective Order (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
215 STANDING ORDER ON NON−DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS: The following order governs the filing and disposition of all discovery−related motions, pleading disputes, and other non−dispositive motions in this case. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 8/7/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
216 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Joinder of Parties due by 8/23/2018. Amended Pleadings due by 8/23/2018. Discovery due by 10/5/2018. Deadline for mediation is on or before 10/19/2018. Status Report due by 10/19/2018. Motions due by 10/26/2018. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 8/7/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 08/07/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 215, 216. Tue Aug 7 16:57:27 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 08/07/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 37 of 43

08/21/2018
08/21/2018
08/21/2018
08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/22/2018 08/24/2018
08/24/2018

217 Mail returned as undeliverable. 216 Scheduling Order, 215 Order, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
218 Mail returned as undeliverable. 216 Scheduling Order, 215 Order, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
219 Mail returned as undeliverable. 216 Scheduling Order, 215 Order, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
220 STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Raul Gomez by Dallas County Texas, Raul Gomez, Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
221 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Felipe Gonzalez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
222 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Fernando Huerta by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
223 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Francisco Lara Martinez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
224 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Moises Martinez Gomez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
225 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Arturo Mercado by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
226 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Arturo Munoz Martinez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
227 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Javier Navarette by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
228 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Efrain Perez Villegas by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
229 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Carlos Reyna Esparragoza by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
230 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Jose Rodriguez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
231 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Eleazar Saavedra by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
232 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Alberto Sanchez Chavez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
233 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Andreas Torres Cabrera by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
234 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Moises Vega Costilla by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
235 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Florencio Vega by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/22/2018)
236 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Pretrial Conference is set for 2/21/2019 01:30 PM in the US Courthouse, Courtroom 1632, 1100 Commerce St., Dallas, TX 75242−1310 before Judge Karen Gren Scholer. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 8/24/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
237 ORDER: The Court, on its own initiative, sets this case for trial on a three−week docket beginning 2/25/2019 before Judge Karen Gren Scholer. The parties must notify

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 38 of 43

08/24/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018 08/27/2018
09/05/2018 09/05/2018 09/06/2018
09/06/2018
09/10/2018 09/10/2018 09/12/2018
09/12/2018 09/13/2018 09/13/2018

the Court of any conflicts with the trial date by 9/7/2018. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 8/24/2018) (ykp) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:237. Fri Aug 24 16:29:56 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 08/24/2018)
238 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Carlos Fuentes Paramo by Dallas County Texas, Carlos Fuentes Paramo, Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
239 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Jose Gutierrez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
240 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Luis Hernandez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
241 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Julio Loera by Dallas County Texas, Julio Loera, Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
242 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
243 RESPONSE filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Mario Garibaldi, Ricardo Garza, Mario Hernandez Jasso, Heydy Jarquin Jimenez, Salvador Jaurequi, Rodolfo Marmolejo, Jorge Marrufo, Jesus Padilla, Jose Rodriguez, Alberto Sanchez Chavez re: 212 MOTION for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 08/27/2018)
244 Mail returned as undeliverable. 237 Order, received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
245 Mail returned as undeliverable. 237 Order, received back from Jeremias Chevez as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 09/05/2018)
246 Mail returned as undeliverable. 236 NEF of Electronic Order received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
247 Mail returned as undeliverable re: 237 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as return to sender − attempted − not known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (sss) (Entered: 09/06/2018)
248 REPLY filed by Dallas County Texas re: 212 MOTION for Protective Order (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
249 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas re 248 Reply (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s) C − Second Affidavit of Sheriff Marian Brown) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 09/10/2018)
250 Sixth MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Mario Garibaldi with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza) (Garza, Anthony) (Attachment 1 replaced to upright page 4 on 9/12/2018) (dsr). (Entered: 09/12/2018)
251 RESPONSE filed by Dallas County Texas, Texas re: 250 Sixth MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Corbello, Courtney) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
252 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Todd Lawrence Disher on behalf of Texas. (Filer confirms contact info in ECF is current.) (Disher, Todd) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
253 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Mario Hernandez Jasso by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 09/13/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 39 of 43

09/13/2018 09/13/2018 09/13/2018 09/13/2018 09/17/2018
09/17/2018 09/18/2018 09/18/2018 09/21/2018 09/27/2018

254 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Heydy Jarquin Jimenez by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
255 STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Salvador Jauregui by Dallas County Texas, Salvador Jaurequi, Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
256 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Rodolfo Marmolejo by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
257 Agreed STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL with Prejudice of Plaintiff Jorge Marrufo by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
258 ELECTRONIC ORDER: Anthony Garza's, Eric Puente's, and Raymond Hindieh's Fourth Motion To Withdraw as Counsel for Certain Plaintiffs 160 ; Anthony Garza's, Eric Puente's, and Raymond Hindieh's Fifth Motion To Withdraw as Counsel for a Certain Plaintiff 186 ; and Anthony Garza's, Eric Puente's, and Raymond Hindieh's Sixth Motion To Withdraw as Counsel for Certain Plaintiffs 250 are each DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Movants resubmitting the motions with the last known addresses and phone numbers of the subject Plaintiffs. The Court fails to find good cause to dispense with the requirement that a motion to withdraw "must set forth the name, address, and telephone number of the client." See Local Civil Rule 83.12(a) (emphasis added). This is especially so in light of the prejudice it would cause to the Court and opposing parties to be unable to contact or effectuate service on the subject Plaintiffs if counsel are permitted to withdraw without providing the information. The Court further agrees with Defendants that Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.05(b) does not prevent counsels' disclosure of Plaintiffs' contact information since it is required by the Court. For the same reasons stated here, Movants' concurrent requests for protective orders are also DENIED. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 9/17/2018) (Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
259 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Nimocks, Austin) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
260 Mail returned as undeliverable. 236 Order, 237 Order, received back from Pablo Carranza as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
261 Seventh MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney for Certain Plaintiffs filed by Jose Delcid Bonilla, Sergio Diaz, Mario Garibaldi, Jesus Padilla with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration(s) of Anthony Garza, # 2 Proposed Order) (Garza, Anthony) (Entered: 09/18/2018)
262 MOTION Joint Motion for Appointment of Mediator filed by Dallas County Texas (Hacker, David) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
263 ELECTRONIC ORDER GRANTING Doc. 259 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney.

09/27/2018

Attorney Austin Nimocks is terminated as counsel of record for the State of Texas. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 9/27/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 09/27/2018)
264 ELECTRONIC ORDER GRANTING Doc. 261 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney.

10/02/2018 10/02/2018

Attorney Anthony Matthew Garza, Eric Puente and Raymond Mark Hindieh are terminated as counsel of record for the Plaintiffs named in the Motion to Withdraw. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 9/27/2018) (chmb) Modified on 9/27/2018 (mcrd). (Entered: 09/27/2018)
265 Mail returned as undeliverable. 258 NEF of Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney received back from Pablo Carranza as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
266 Mail returned as undeliverable. 258 NEF of Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 40 of 43

10/03/2018
10/09/2018
10/10/2018 10/18/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 10/26/2018 10/29/2018 10/29/2018 10/29/2018 10/29/2018 10/30/2018 11/05/2018 11/07/2018 11/15/2018

been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
267 Mail returned as undeliverable. 258 NEF of Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney received back from Jacinto Hernandez as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward.. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 10/03/2018)
268 Mail returned as undeliverable. 258 NEF of Electronic Order, received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
269 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 258 Order received back from Abel Hernandez as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 10/10/2018)
270 Joint STATUS REPORT filed by Dallas County Texas. (Hacker, David) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
271 Joint MOTION to Dismiss the Pro Se Plaintiffs filed by Dallas County Texas (Hacker, David) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
272 Appendix in Support filed by Dallas County Texas re 271 Joint MOTION to Dismiss the Pro Se Plaintiffs (Hacker, David) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
273 Brief/Memorandum in Support filed by Dallas County Texas re 272 Appendix in Support, 271 Joint MOTION to Dismiss the Pro Se Plaintiffs (Hacker, David) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
274 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Andrew D. Leonie) filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Disher, Todd) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
275 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Joel Stonedale) filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Disher, Todd) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
276 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Michael Toth) filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Disher, Todd) (Entered: 10/26/2018)
277 ELECTRONIC ORDER GRANTING Doc. 274 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Andrew D Leonie is TERMINATED as counsel of record. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 10/29/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
278 ELECTRONIC ORDER GRANTING Doc. 275 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Joel Stonedale is TERMINATED as counsel of record. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 10/29/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
279 ELECTRONIC ORDER GRANTING Doc. 276 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Michael C. Toth is TERMINATED as counsel of record. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 10/29/2018) (chmb) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:277, 278, 279. NEF Mon Oct 29 11:10:23 CDT 2018 (crt) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
280 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 264 Order, received back from Sergio Diaz as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
281 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 258 Order received back from Jose Valenciano as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
282 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 236 Electronic Order received back from Jose Valenciano as no such number, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 11/07/2018)
283 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 279 Order, 278 Order, 277 Order received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 11/15/2018)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 41 of 43

11/21/2018 11/30/2018 11/30/2018 12/04/2018
12/04/2018 12/07/2018 12/11/2018
12/13/2018
12/13/2018 12/21/2018 12/26/2018 12/27/2018 12/27/2018 01/02/2019 01/02/2019

284 Mail returned as undeliverable. 237 Order Setting Deadline/Hearing received back from Jose Valeciano as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (axm) (Entered: 11/27/2018)
285 Mail returned as undeliverable. NEF of 279 Order, 278 Order, 277 Order received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
286 Joint MOTION for Judgment filed by Texas (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Agreed Final Judgment) (Hacker, David) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
287 AGREED FINAL JUDGMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF RICARDO GARZA AND DEFENDANTS: The State of Texas shall pay Plaintiff Ricardo Garza $9,500.00, in complete and total satisfaction of all his claims, including claims for costs and attorneys' fees. All relief not expressly granted herein shall be denied. Ricardo Garza terminated. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 12/4/2018) (zkc) (Entered: 12/04/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 287. Tue Dec 4 14:16:03 CST 2018 (crt) (Entered: 12/04/2018)
288 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment, Add and Terminate Parties, received back from Sergio Diaz as not deliverable. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (mla) (Entered: 12/07/2018)
289 Mail returned as undeliverable. 279 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, 278 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, 277 Order on Motion to Withdraw as Attorney received back from Juan Camacho as Return to Sender Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ndt) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
290 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE: Defendants' Joint Motion 271 to Dismiss the Pro Se Plaintiffs should be GRANTED, all claims of each of the Pro Se Plaintiffs should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, the Clerk of the Court should be directed to close this case. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 12/13/2018) (mcrd) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No:290. Thu Dec 13 14:29:07 CST 2018 (crt) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
291 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney, added attorney Peter L Harlan,Tammy Jean Ardolf for Dallas County Texas. Motion filed by Dallas County Texas with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Harlan, Peter) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
292 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
293 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment, Add and Terminate Parties, received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as Return to Sender Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ndt) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
294 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment, Add and Terminate Parties, received back from Juan Camacho as Return to Sender Unable to Forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (ndt) (Entered: 12/27/2018)
295 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as Attempted − Not Known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 01/03/2019)
296 Mail returned as undeliverable. 290 Findings and Recommendations on Motion re: 271 Motion to Dismiss filed by Dallas County Texas. received back from Juan Camacho as Attempted − Not Known. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 01/03/2019)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 42 of 43

01/02/2019 01/07/2019

297 Mail returned as undeliverable. 290 Findings and Recommendations on Motion re: 271 Motion to Dismiss filed by Dallas County Texas. received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as insufficient address. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (rekc) (Entered: 01/03/2019)
298 ELECTRONIC ORDER:

This matter came on for consideration before the Court on Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Withdraw and Substitute Counsel, Doc. 291 . The Motion is GRANTED.

01/07/2019 01/07/2019 01/07/2019 01/07/2019 01/07/2019 01/08/2019
01/14/2019 01/23/2019
01/25/2019 01/29/2019 02/27/2019

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Peter L. Harlan, Assistant District Attorney, is withdrawn as counsel for Defendant Dallas County, Texas, and Tammy J. Ardolf, Assistant District Attorney, Texas Bar No. 90001536, is substituted as lead counsel for said Defendant. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver on 1/7/2019) (Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
299 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment received back from Jose Valenciano as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
300 Mail returned as undeliverable. 290 Findings and Recommendations received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
301 Order Accepting 290 Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 1/7/2019) (zkc) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
302 JUDGMENT: Pro Se Plaintiffs' case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Ordered by Judge Karen Gren Scholer on 1/7/2019) (zkc) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
***Clerk's Notice of delivery: (see NEF for details) Docket No: 301, 302. Mon Jan 7 14:40:09 CST 2019 (crt) (Entered: 01/07/2019)
303 Mail returned as undeliverable. 287 Judgment received back from Sergio Diaz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. Mail returned as undeliverable. 290 Findings and Recommendations received back from Jacinto Hernandez as insufficient address, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 01/08/2019)
304 Mail returned as undeliverable re 290 Findings and Recommendations on Motion; received back from Jose Valenciano as Not Deliverable As Addressed. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (aaa) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
305 Mail returned as undeliverable. 301 Order, 302 Judgment received back from Juan Camacho as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. Mail returned as undeliverable. 301 Order, 302 Judgment received back from Jacinto Hernancez as not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 01/23/2019)
306 Mail returned as undeliverable. 301 Order, 302 Judgment received back from Epifanio Uribe Ortiz as attempted − not known, unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
307 Mail returned as undeliverable. 301 Order, 302 Judgment, received back from Pablo Carranza as vacant, unabe to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
308 Mail returned as undeliverable. 290 Findings and Recommendations received back from Sergio Diaz as Attempted − not known. Unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 02/27/2019)

Case: 3:15-cv-3481 As of: 03/24/2020 07:13 PM CDT 43 of 43

02/28/2019 04/30/2019

309 Mail returned as undeliverable. 301 Order, 302 Judgment received back from Sergio Diaz as Attempted − not known. Unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 02/28/2019)
310 Mail returned as undeliverable. 301 Order, 302 Judgment received back from Jose Lopez−Aranda as Attempted − not known. Unable to forward. No address update from last filed document. The current document has not been re−mailed. (zkc) (Entered: 04/30/2019)