Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 1 Filed 06/10/14 Page 1 of 35

FILED
2014 Jun-10 AM 09:08 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

APRIL AARON-BRUSH and GINGER AARONBRUSH,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No.

vs.

ROBERT BENTLEY in his official capacity as Governor of Alabama; LUTHER STRANGE in his official capacity as Attorney General of Alabama; JULIE MAGEE in her official capacity as Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Alabama; Colonel HUGH B. McCALL in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT 1. Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple who were lawfully married outside the State of Alabama. They sue to challenge the constitutionality of Section 36.03 of the Alabama Constitution and Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (referred to collectively as the “Alabama Marriage Prohibitions”) which prohibit the State of Alabama from recognizing the marriages of samesex couples entered into in other jurisdictions. Alabama, like other states,

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encourages and regulates marriage through hundreds of laws that provide benefits to and impose obligations on married couples. In exchange, Alabama receives the well-established benefits that marriage brings: stable, supportive families that contribute to both the social and economic well-being of the State. It is because of the well-recognized benefits of marriage that Alabama has traditionally recognized lawful marriages performed in other states.
2. Alabama’s refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage unlawfully denies them many of the legal protections available to different-sex couples, including, but not limited to, the right to make medical decisions for an incapacitated spouse, access to health insurance and retirement benefits, property protections, and inheritance.
3. The refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage undermines the couples’ ability to achieve their life goals and dreams, threatens their mutual economic stability, and denies them “a dignity and status of immense import.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). They and their family are stigmatized and relegated to a second-class status by being barred from marriage, a bar that serves no legitimate state interest. The exclusion “tells [same-sex] couples and all the world
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that their otherwise valid relationships are unworthy” of recognition. Id. at 2694. And it “humiliates ... children now being raised by same-sex couples” and “makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.” Id.
4. Alabama’s exclusion of married same-sex couples from the protections and responsibilities of marriage violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This discriminatory treatment directly affects the fundamental right to marry and serves no compelling state interest.
5. Alabama’s refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples discriminates against such couples on the basis of sexual orientation and sex.
6. The State’s discrimination against Plaintiffs and other married same-sex couples not only serves no compelling state interest, but also is not substantially related to an important state interest. It is not rationally related to the furtherance of any legitimate state interest.
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7. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs seek: (a) a declaration that Alabama’s refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution where Alabama refuses to treat same-sex couples legally married in other jurisdictions the same as different-sex couples; and (b) a permanent injunction directing Defendants to legally recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples validly entered into outside of Alabama.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. Plaintiffs sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction over all claims for relief pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights). 9. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.
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PLAINTIFFS 10. Plaintiffs April Aaron-Brush and Ginger Aaron-Brush were married in Massachusetts in June 2012. They have been together for 17 years and reside in Jefferson County, Alabama. April works for the Social Security Administration in Birmingham. As a federal employee, April’s marriage to Ginger is recognized by her employer and she has access to all employee benefits enjoyed by married couples. Ginger is a tenured elementary school teacher decorated for excellence as a classroom teacher. Because of Alabama’s Marriage Prohibitions, Ginger does not enjoy the same entitlement and respect for her marriage by her employer; her employer, as an Alabama public entity, denies the very existence of her marriage. 11. April and Ginger have a seven year old daughter they are raising together equally. They always wanted to be parents and adopted a child to provide a nurturing and loving home. Because of Alabama’s prohibition on marriage, only one of them could adopt and now Ginger is a legal stranger to their daughter. But for Alabama’s Marriage Prohibitions, Ginger would be entitled to adopt their daughter. See Ala. Code § 26-10A-27 (“[A]ny person may adopt his or her spouse’s child
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according to the provisions of this chapter … .”). Their concern for their daughter is the driving force behind April’s and Ginger’s resolve to bring this civil action.
12. Because of Alabama’s Marriage Prohibitions, Ginger and April Aaron-Brush were unable to file joint tax returns and paid twice as much in 2014 for preparation of their federal and state tax returns as they would have if they had filed joint returns for both the state and federal governments. Also because of Alabama’s Marriage Prohibitions, both Ginger and April Aaron-Brush had to take additional steps beyond what an individual in a different-sex marriage must take to effectuate a name change on their Alabama driver’s licenses, incurring financial expenses and a time commitment significantly beyond what would be required of an individual changing her name because of a different-sex marriage.
13. Plaintiffs April Aaron-Brush and Ginger Aaron-Brush have been, and continue to be, harmed by Alabama’s Marriage Prohibitions which deny the validity of their marriage and all the benefits and obligations of their marriage.
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DEFENDANTS 14. Robert Bentley is the duly elected Governor of the State of Alabama. He holds the “supreme executive power” of the state and is charged to ‘‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” See Ala. Const. §§ 113, 120. By virtue of his position, Governor Bentley maintains, and has exercised, enforcement authority in connection with the Alabama Marriage Prohibitions. As an example, he announced in September 2013 he would not permit the Alabama National Guard to provide benefits to same-sex spouses, despite a federal directive to do so. According to news reports, Governor Bentley stated: “When they’re under my command we will obey Alabama state law.” 15. When he was a candidate, Governor Bentley stated, I will ensure that Alabama does not follow the trend of allowing gay marriages or civil unions, and I will protect our state's right to define marriage as between one man and one woman. I support the Defense of Marriage Act, affirming the right of states not to recognize same-sex marriages licensed in other states. Alabamians should work together to protect traditional marriage. The two-parent family provides the best environment of stability, discipline, responsibility, and character. Robert Bentley for Governor 2010 – Family & Social Values “The Issues” (copy attached as Exhibit A).
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16. After the U.S. v. Windsor decision in the U.S. Supreme Court, Governor Bentley reaffirmed his belief that “marriage is between a man and woman,” and went on to compare marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriage. “VIDEO: Governor Bentley shares his views on gay marriage,” South Union Street, June 28, 2013, http://goo.gl/8p9Jmr (last visited on June 10, 2014).
17. Gov. Bentley resides in Tuscaloosa and has his office in Montgomery. He is sued in his official capacity only.
18. Luther Strange is the duly elected Attorney General of the State of Alabama. Attorney General Strange is the state officer who “shall appear in the courts of ... the United States, in any case in which the state may be interested in the result.” Ala. Code § 36-15-1(2). He maintains enforcement authority regarding the Alabama Marriage Prohibitions and their application to conduct of the State and its subdivisions and court system. He resides in Jefferson County and has his office in Montgomery. He is sued in his official capacity only.
19. Julie Magee is Commissioner of Revenue. The Commissioner of Revenue serves as the chief executive officer of the Alabama Department of Revenue. The Department of Revenue collects all income taxes due to
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the State of Alabama. She has her office in Montgomery County, Alabama. The Department has taxpayer service centers throughout the state, including the Northern District of Alabama. She is sued in her official capacity only.
20. Hugh B. McCall is the Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. His office is in Montgomery County, Alabama. The Department has offices throughout the state, including the Northern District of Alabama. He is sued in his official capacity only.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 21. In 1983, Attorney General Charles Graddick issued an advisory opinion (Ala. A.G. Op. No. 83-206) to Probate Judge Wallace Wyatt stating it is the opinion of the Attorney General that because Alabama has no statutory definition of marriage, marriage must be defined according to its common usage as a legal union between a man and a woman and therefore, persons of the same sex cannot enter into marriage in Alabama. Furthermore, a license issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex would be null and void. 22. In August 1996, Gov. Fob James issued Executive Order 199624 which declare[d] that same-sex marriage is against the public policy and laws of the State of Alabama; that it is and shall remain
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the public policy of this State that only a marriage between a man and a woman, who are both otherwise qualified by law to marry, is valid in this State ... . A marriage in another state or foreign jurisdiction between persons of the same sex, regardless of when such marriage took place, shall not be recognized as a valid marriage in this state and shall produce no civil effects nor confer any of the benefits , burdens or obligations of marriage under the laws of the State of Alabama.
23. Governor James’s Executive Order further asserted his
authority to issue the Order as follows:
WHEREAS, the Constitution mandates that the Governor shall see that the laws of the State are faithfully executed; and
WHEREAS, the Constitution vests in the Executive Department the whole of the executive power which, in turn, is vested in the Governor; and
WHEREAS, the executive power includes the power to administer and enforce the laws as enacted by the legislature and as interpreted by the courts; and
WHEREAS, the Governor, as chief executive, is given the authority and it is his duty to act to enforce the laws, duly and constitutionally enacted, in every portion of the State, so that every citizen and all property will have the protection of the laws ... .
24. In 2000, Senator Bobby Denton asked Attorney General Bill
Pryor for an opinion on the effect of the then-proposed law authorizing
“civil unions” in Vermont. Attorney General Pryor stated that civil unions
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were homosexual marriages in all but name and against the public policy
of Alabama. Therefore,
the State of Alabama, its subdivisions, businesses doing business in the State, and the citizens of Alabama would not be required to recognize the proposed “civil unions” of homosexual couples currently under consideration in the General Assembly of the State of Vermont. The Alabama Marriage Protection Act clearly expresses the State’s legitimate public policy not to recognize such “civil unions.”
Ala. A.G. Op. No. 2000-129.
25. The Alabama Legislature adopted Ala. Code § 30-1-19 in 1998.
The statute provides as follows:
(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Alabama Marriage Protection Act.”
(b) Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting the unique relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.
(c) Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman, which, when the legal capacity and consent of both parties is present, establishes their relationship as husband and wife, and which is recognized by the state as a civil contract.
(d) No marriage license shall be issued in the State of Alabama to parties of the same sex.
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(e) The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued.
26. In 2006 the Legislature proposed an amendment to the state
Constitution. It was approved by the people in an election on June 6,
2006, and proclaimed ratified June 28, 2006, as Amendment 774. Now
designated as Section 36.03 of the Recompiled Constitution, the Section
reads as follows:
(a) This amendment shall be known and may be cited as the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment.
(b) Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting this unique relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.
(c) Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman, which, when the legal capacity and consent of both parties is present, establishes their relationship as husband and wife, and which is recognized by the state as a civil contract.
(d) No marriage license shall be issued in the State of Alabama to parties of the same sex.
(e) The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any
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jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued. (f) The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any common law marriage of parties of the same sex. (g) A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same sex in the State of Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in all respects as having no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or other union replicating marriage. 27. As a result, marriage in Alabama is legally available only to different-sex couples. Same-sex couples may not marry in Alabama, and if they are married elsewhere, their marriages are not recognized in Alabama for any purpose. 28. Gay and lesbian individuals have faced a long and painful history of societal and government-sponsored discrimination in this country. Although their sexual orientation bears no relation to their ability to contribute to society, gay men and lesbians have been singled out for discriminatory treatment. They have faced unconstitutional criminal penalties for private sexual conduct between consenting adults, harassment, hate crimes, and discrimination in employment and many other areas. They have even been the subject of laws stripping them of rights afforded to all other citizens.
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29. Alabama has been among the states that have enacted laws stripping gay men and lesbians of rights afforded to all other citizens. Gay men and lesbians also have been the subject of hate crimes in Alabama.
30. Alabama’s refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples denies those couples numerous protections afforded to differentsex married couples. For example, among married couples, only married same-sex couples are denied the benefits and protections of the following Alabama statutes:
a. “A husband or a wife ... may insure the life of his or her spouse for the benefit of himself or herself, or for the benefit of himself or herself and any child or children of the marriage; or a husband or a wife may insure his or her own life for the benefit of his or her spouse, or for the benefit of his or her spouse and children, or for the benefit of their children ... ; and such insurance and the proceeds and avails thereof ... is exempt from liability for the debts or engagements of the insured, or for the torts of the insured, or for any penalty or damages recoverable of the insured.” Ala. Code § 6-10-8.
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b. Various provisions of Alabama law provide for survivors’ benefits to be paid to the surviving spouse. E.g., Ala. Code §§ 11-40-17, -18, -18.1.
c. A spouse is in the line of priority to act as surrogate for deciding matters relating to life-sustaining treatment (where no advance directive for health care has been made). Ala. Code § 22-8A11. Alabama allows banks to turn over small accounts (up to $5,000) to a surviving spouse. Ala. Code § 5-5A-38.
d. There is a right of action for damages for injuries or death of employee “for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin.” Ala. Code § 25-5-31.
e. A surviving spouse has a right to the balance of payments for the deceased spouse’s disability, under certain circumstances. Ala. Code § 25-5-57.
f. “[A]ny person may adopt his or her spouse’s child according to the provisions of this chapter …” Ala. Code § 26-10A-27.
g. State employees or retirees may cover a spouse under their health insurance plan, Ala. Code § 36-29-7.
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h. Alabama provides compensation for the death or disability of peace officers and firemen to such person’s dependents, including spouse. Ala. Code, Sec. 36-30-1.
i. Any income earned by the spouse of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States killed in action in a United States Department of Defense designated combat zone shall be exempt from Alabama income tax during the taxable year in which the individual is declared deceased by the Armed Forces. Ala. Code § 40-9-37.
j. In the event one dies without a will, the surviving spouse may receive all, or a portion, of the estate as set out in Ala. Code § 43-841.
k. If real estate is sold in a foreclosure, Alabama law allows the spouse of the debtor and the spouse of the mortgagor (among others) to redeem the property. Ala. Code § 6-5-248.
l. Damages against a health care provider for lost future earnings (to be paid in periodic payments) are payable to the surviving spouse or both. Ala. Code 6-5-543.
m. After death of an employee, compensation for exposures to hazards of occupational disease are payable to a surviving spouse
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(and personal representative, parents, dependents, next of kin). Ala. Code §§ 25-5-118, 25-5-194.
n. A spouse of a married incapacitated person may appoint by will a guardian of the incapacitated person. Ala. Code § 26-2A100(b).
o. Notice must be given to a spouse in a proceeding to appoint a guardian of an incapacitated person. Ala. Code § 26-2A-103.
p. A spouse is first in line to be appointed guardian of an incapacitated person. Ala. Code § 26-2A-104.
q. A spouse has a right to obtain life or disability insurance upon the other spouse. Ala. Code § 27-14-6.
r. Same-sex spouses are excluded from all of Alabama’s provisions for divorce and alimony, Ala. Code Title 30, Chapter 2, and all matters of Child Custody and Support, Title 30, Chapter 3.
s. A spouse may receive educational benefits for a deceased or totally disabled veteran or prisoner of war (Ala. Code § 31-6-5) or a partially disabled veteran (§ 31-6-6).
t. A spouse may retain certain license plates after the death of the other spouse: medal of honor recipient or prisoner of war (§ 32-
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6-254), “retired military” (§ 32-6-292), “retired educator” (§ 32-6-302), and “Alabama Gold Star Family” for the spouse of a person who died while on active military duty (§ 32-6-630).
u. Alabama provides health insurance for the spouse of an officer or employee of Alabama state docks, Ala. Code § 33-1-5.2.
v. The surviving spouse of a licensed funeral director may make application for examination to become a funeral director, Ala. Code § 34-13-74.
w. The spouse of a law enforcement officer or firefighter killed or totally disabled in the line of duty is entitled to educational benefits, Ala. Code § 36-21-102.
x. Alabama allows a spouse and dependents of a person covered under the State Employees Insurance Board (SEIB) health insurance plan killed in the line of duty or who dies because of any injury received in the line of duty to continue to be covered under the SEIB plan, with the cost to be paid from the State Treasury. Ala. Code Section 36-29-19.9.
y. Alabama allows local unit participants (e.g., any county, city, town or quasi-public organization of the state) to extend their
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Employee Retirement System (or State Retirement System) health insurance plan to their retirees and to the surviving spouses of active employees of the local units receiving benefits from the retirement system insurance coverage. Ala. Code §§ 36-34-1 and 2.
z. Alabama law provides for a monthly payment to the surviving spouse of any official who died before reaching 60 years of age, but who otherwise qualified to be appointed a supernumerary official. Under Ala. Code § 40-6-3, the official must be “survived by a spouse lawfully married to the official at the time of his or her death.”
aa. The surviving spouse of a tax collector, tax assessor, revenue commissioner, license commissioner, or other elected official charged with the assessment or collection, or both, of any ad valorem taxes of the county receives a payments due to the deceased under Ala. Code § 40-6-4.
bb. To form a family limited liability entity, eighty percent or more of the profits and capital interests must be directly or constructively owned by an individual and the members of the individual’s family, with family being defined as including a spouse. Ala. Code § 40-14A-1. A family including same-sex spouses would not
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qualify for this benefit because Alabama law refuses to recognize such a marriage.
cc. Normally, the basis of property for tax purposes is the cost of the property, but if the property was acquired from a spouse or former spouse in a transaction in which a gain or loss was determined, then the basis shall be determined under 26 U.S.C. § 1041, which provides favorable treatment for a spouse to, or for the benefit of, a spouse. Ala. Code § 40-18-6.
dd. Although generally, upon the sale or exchange of property, the entire gain or loss determined under Section 40-18-7 must be recognized, the gain or loss on transferring property to a spouse or former spouse is determined more favorably under 26 U.S.C. § 1041. Ala. Code § 40-18-8.
ee. The threshold for filing an Alabama tax return is more if a person is married and lives with his or her spouse than if the person is single and living with someone else. Ala. Code § 40-18-25.1.
ff. Alabama law allows favorable tax treatment to the surviving spouse of a taxpayer who at the time of his or her death owned a catastrophe savings account. Ala. Code § 40-18-312.
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gg. Under 41-9-902, the Alabama Insurance Board may negotiate for and establish a health insurance plan for residents of the State of Alabama. Any insured electing this coverage may include his or her spouse and dependent children in the coverage if the insured pays for dependent coverage. Ala. Code § 41-9-904.
hh. The devolution of a decedent’s estate is subject to the elective share of a surviving spouse. Ala. Code § 43-2-830(c).
ii. A surviving spouse, whether provided for in a will or not, can take an elective share of the decedent’s estate as set out in Ala. Code § 43-8-70.
jj. Regardless of whether he or she elects to take an elective share, a surviving spouse is entitled to a homestead allowance (§ 43-8110), exempt property (§ 43-8-111), and family allowance (§ 43-8-112). Ala. Code § 43-8-74.
kk. If a testator fails to provide by will for his or her surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will, with certain exceptions, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate he or she would have received if the decedent left no will. Ala. Code § 43-8-90.
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ll. The surviving spouse may retain possession of the dwelling house where the surviving spouse resided with the decedent, with the offices and buildings appurtenant thereto and the plantation connected therewith until homestead is assigned, free from the payment of rent. Ala. Code § 43-8-114.
mm. Whenever an employee dies intestate and is owed wages or salary, the employer may pay the amount due to the surviving spouse, and the money received will be treated as part of the exempt property, and, if the amount exceeds $3,500.00 the excess shall be part of the family allowance. Ala. Code § 43-8-115.
31. Similarly, various departments and/or agencies of the State of Alabama have enacted policies or procedures that prohibit same-sex couples from enjoying the benefits of marriage that different-sex couples enjoy. For example, after the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Windsor, Defendant Julie Magee, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Alabama, issued a document entitled “Tax Guidance: Alabama Income Tax Filing Status for Same‐Sex Couples” (available at http://revenue.alabama.gov/incometax/TaxGuidance.pdf) (last visited June 10, 2014). A copy of the Tax Guidance is
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attached as Exhibit B. Under the Tax Guidance, same-sex couples married in another state may not file a joint return in Alabama, because Alabama refuses to recognize their marriages.
32. Spouses filing a joint federal income tax return will generally file a joint state income tax return, as a matter of convenience and the avoidance of paying to prepare two sets of returns – one joint and one separate. For instance, Ginger and April Aaron-Brush have paid twice as much in 2014 for preparation of their federal and state tax returns as they would have if they had filed joint returns for both the state and federal governments. But for Defendant Magee’s policy, Ginger and April would have filed joint returns.
33. Defendant Hugh B. McCall, in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, refuses to recognize name changes made as a matter of law through marriage in other states. Plaintiffs Ginger and April Aaron-Brush had to take additional steps beyond what an individual in a different-sex marriage must take to effectuate a name change on their Alabama driver’s licenses, incurring financial expenses and a time commitment significantly beyond what
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would be required of an individual changing her name because of a different-sex marriage.
34. Plaintiffs are harmed in numerous ways by excluding same-sex couples from the freedom to have an out-of-state marriage recognized and protected.
35. Marriage plays a unique and central social, legal, and economic role in American society. Being married reflects the commitment that a couple makes to one another, and represents a public acknowledgement of the value, legitimacy, depth, and permanence of the married couple’s private relationship. Marriage is the sole legal institution in Alabama through which couples can create a complete family unit that the state recognizes and protects.
36. Conversely, denial to some couples of the status of being married in the eyes of the State conveys the State’s view that the couple’s private relationship is of lesser value and unworthy of legal recognition and support. This public rejection of what is among the Plaintiffs’ most significant relationships damages them and their children, invites and facilitates private discrimination against them, and promotes the view
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their relationships and families are inferior to those of other committed couples.
37. Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, harm because of Alabama’s laws and policies regarding same-sex couples. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law because the denial of their constitutional rights cannot be remedied through legal relief.
38. The Supreme Court has called marriage “the most important relation in life,” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted), and an “expression[] of emotional support and public commitment.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free [people].”). It is “a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people ... .” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. This is as true for same-sex couples as it is for different-sex couples.
39. Same-sex married couples such as Plaintiffs are similarly situated to different-sex married couples in all of the characteristics relevant to the recognition of their legal marriages.
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40. When they marry, same-sex couples make the same commitment to one another as different-sex couples do. Like married different-sex couples, married same-sex couples build their lives together, plan their futures together, and hope to grow old together. Like married different-sex couples, married same-sex couples support one another emotionally and financially and take care of one another physically when faced with injury or illness.
41. Like many married different-sex couples, many married samesex couples – such as Plaintiffs April and Ginger Aaron-Brush – are parents raising children together.
42. Plaintiffs have accepted and will assume the legal obligations that would flow from having their marriages recognized under Alabama law.
43. Plaintiffs were married legally under the laws of Massachusetts, and their marriage would be recognized by the State of Alabama but for the fact that they are married to a person of the same sex.
44. Refusing to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples harms the children raised by lesbian and gay couples – including the child of
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Plaintiffs April and Ginger Aaron-Brush – by denying their families significant benefits and by branding their families as inferior to families headed by different-sex couples and less deserving of respect, thereby encouraging private bias and discrimination.
45. By refusing to recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples, Alabama excludes those couples from the myriad of protections the State affords other married couples.
46. Section 36.03 of the Alabama Constitution and Ala. Code § 301-19 have the “purpose and effect to disparage and injure” lesbian and gay couples. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
DEPRIVATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
47. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-46 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
48. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes any State from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Governmental interference with a fundamental right may be sustained only upon a showing the legislation is closely tailored to serve an important governmental interest.
49. Marriage is a fundamental right, and the choice about whom to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
50. Alabama law denies Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples this fundamental right by refusing to recognize the lawful marriages they entered into in other jurisdictions.
51. Alabama’s refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions serves no compelling state interest.
52. Alabama’s refusal to recognize marriages entered into by samesex couples in other jurisdictions violates the Due Process Clause.
53. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
54. As a result, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be harmed and therefore seek the relief set forth in the Request for Relief below.
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COUNT II DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
55. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-46 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
56. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. Same-sex married couples and different-sex married couples are similarly situated for purposes of marriage.
58. By refusing to respect the marriage of Plaintiffs who married out-of-state, the State of Alabama discriminates against lesbians and gay men on the basis of their sexual orientation and denies them significant legal protections.
59. Classifications based on sexual orientation demand heightened scrutiny.
29

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60. Lesbians and gay men are members of a discrete and insular minority that has suffered a history of discrimination in Alabama and across the United States.
61. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society.
62. Prejudice against lesbians and gay men continues to seriously curtail the operation of the political process, preventing this group from obtaining redress through legislative means. Lesbians and gay men lack statutory protection against discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and housing at the federal level and in more than half of the states, including Alabama. They have been stripped of the right to marry through 30 state constitutional amendments and have been targeted through the voter initiative process more than any other group.
63. Alabama’s refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions serves no compelling state interest.
64. Alabama’s refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions is not substantially related to an important state interest.
30

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65. Alabama’s refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.
66. Alabama’s refusal to recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions violates the Equal Protection Clause.
67. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
68. As a result, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be harmed and therefore seek the relief set forth in the Request for Relief below.
COUNT III DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
69. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-46 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
70. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall ... deny to
31

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any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. The marriage bans discriminate against Plaintiffs on the basis of sex, barring Plaintiffs’ marriage from being recognized, solely because Plaintiffs have married a person of the same sex.
72. But for the sex of each plaintiff’s spouse, their marriage would be recognized under Alabama law.
73. The State’s unequal treatment of Plaintiffs based on their sex is not substantially related to an important state interest. State law prohibiting recognition of marriage for same-sex couples violates the Equal Protection Clause.
74. Defendants, acting under color of state law, are depriving Plaintiffs of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
75. As a result, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be harmed and therefore seek the relief set forth in the Request for Relief below.
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court: 1. Enter a declaratory judgment that Ala. Code § 30-1-19 and Ala. Constitution §36.03 violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution insofar as they refuse to treat same-sex couples legally married in other jurisdictions the same as different-sex couples; 2. Enter a declaratory judgment that Ala. Code § 30-1-19 and Ala. Constitution §36.03 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution insofar as they refuse to treat same-sex couples legally married in other jurisdictions the same as different-sex couples; 3. Enter a permanent injunction directing Defendants to recognize marriages validly entered into by Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples outside of the State of Alabama; 4. Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants’ enforcement of Ala. Code § 30-1-19 and Ala. Constitution §36.03 insofar as they refuse to treat same-sex couples legally married in other jurisdictions the same as different-sex couples;
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5. Award costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
6. Enter all further relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.
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Respectfully submitted,

s/ Randall C. Marshall Randall C. Marshall (ASB-3023-A56M) Avery C. Livingston* (ASB-3780-G22R) ACLU of Alabama Foundation P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106-0179 334-265-2754 rmarshall@aclualabama.org alivingston@aclualabama.org
Chase Strangio** James Esseks** ACLU Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, New York 10004 212-284-7320 cstrangio@aclu.org jesseks@aclu.org
* Application for admission pending
** Applications for pro hac vice to be filed.

s/ Wendy Brooks Crew Wendy Brooks Crew (ASB-5609-e42w) The Crew Law Firm 2001 Park Pl Ste 550 Birmingham, AL 35203-2714 205-326-3555 wbcrew4@aol.com
s/ Joel E. Dillard Joel E. Dillard (ASB-5418-R62J) Baxley, Dillard, McKnight & James 2008 Third Avenue South Birmingham, Alabama 35233 205-271-1100 JDillard@BaxleyDillard.com
s/ Robert D. Segall Robert D. Segall (ASB-7354-E68R) Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, P.A. P.O. Box 347 Montgomery, Alabama 36101-0347 334-834-1180 segall@copelandfranco.com
/s Edward Still Edward Still (ASB-4786-i47w) Edward Still Law Firm LLC 130 Wildwood Parkway STE 108-304 Birmingham AL 35209 205-320-2882 still@votelaw.com

Cooperating Attorneys for the ACLU of Alabama Foundation

35

 
 Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 54 Filed 12/08/15 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

APRIL AARON-BRUSH, Plaintiff,
v. ROBERT BENTLEY, et al,
Defendants.

} } } } } Case No.: 2:14-cv-01091-RDP } } } }

FILED
2015 Dec-08 PM 01:15 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. # 49). The matter has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 52 and 53).
In federal civil rights litigation, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Because Plaintiffs have elected not to submit an itemized fee summary at this time, whether they are the prevailing party in this litigation is the only question before the court.
Plaintiffs filed this case on June 10, 2014. (Doc. # 1). Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple who were lawfully married outside the State of Alabama. They brought this action to challenge the constitutionality of Section 36.03 of the Alabama Constitution and Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (the “Alabama Marriage Prohibitions”) which prohibit the State of Alabama from recognizing the marriages of same sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions. (Doc. # 1). However, while this action was pending, in June of this year, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). In Obergefell, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other States. Following the Obergefell decision, Defendants acknowledged that Obergefell is now the law of the land and

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 54 Filed 12/08/15 Page 2 of 3
that Obergefell binds them in this and other cases. While this case was pending, the Honorable Callie V. Granade in the Southern District of
Alabama granted permanent injunctions with respect to Attorney General Luther Strange which (1) prohibit him from enforcing Alabama’s marriage laws to deny same-sex couples the right to marry, and (2) require the recognition of marriages performed in other states. Searcy v. Strange, 2015 WL 328728 (S.D. Ala. 2015); Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Ala. 2015).
In light of Obergefell, on July 21, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss this case as moot. (Doc. # 30). On October 8, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Status Report indicating that Defendants had effectuated all of the specific injunctive relief Plaintiffs sought in this case. (Doc. # 43). Therefore, because no live case or controversy remained, the court dismissed this case without prejudice. (Doc. # 44).
Plaintiffs now argue that they are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees as prevailing parties pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Doc. # 49). The court’s inquiry in determining a party’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is whether the party has ‘prevailed’ in the statutory sense. Dillard v. Colbert Cty. Comm’n, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1299 (M.D. Ala. 2007). The prevailing party inquiry is governed by Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and our circuit’s law that interprets and applies that decision. “It is now established that in order to be considered a prevailing party under § 1988(b), there must be a court-ordered material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees. In other words, there must be: (1) a situation where a party has been awarded by the court at least some relief on the merits of his claim or (2) a judicial imprimatur on the change in the legal relationship between the parties.” Smalbein v. City of
2

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 54 Filed 12/08/15 Page 3 of 3
Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 904-05 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citations omitted). This second option, the “judicial imprimatur,” requires a settlement agreement the court has approved, either by incorporating the terms of the settlement into the final judgment or by explicitly retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement. Id. at 905 (citing Am. Disability Ass’n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002)). Thus, the second is not applicable here.
As to the first option, there has not been any court-ordered change in the legal relationship between these parties. Plaintiffs have not shown that they (or their actions) generated any judicial relief. Instead, this case became moot because Defendants voluntarily came into compliance with new law created by decisions in other cases. “Buckhannon requires that the plaintiff be a party to the judicial relief, not simply benefit from the defendant’s compliance with a court order entered” in another case or cases. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605–06. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not “prevailing parties” entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under Section 1988.
Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. # 49) is DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this December 8, 2015.
_________________________________ R. DAVID PROCTOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 1 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 1 of 9

FILED
2017 Feb-28 AM 10:55 U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 16-10028 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-01091-RDP

APRIL AARON-BRUSH, GINGER AARON-BRUSH,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF ALABAMA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Alabama, JULIE MAGEE, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Alabama, HUGH B. MCCALL, Colonel, in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(January 30, 2017)

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 2 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 2 of 9
Before WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and BARTLE,* District Judge. PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs April and Ginger Aaron-Brush, a same-sex couple married in Massachusetts and living in Alabama, sued the Alabama Attorney General, Commissioner of Revenue, and Director of the Department of Public Safety under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Alabama’s refusal to recognize their legal marriage. During the course of the parties’ litigation but before the district court ruled on the merits of the Aaron-Brushes’ claims, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), recognized a constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry and the obligation of states to recognize those couples’ marital rights. After Obergefell, the district court convened a conference with the parties at which the defendants agreed to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision and, specifically, to ensure that the Aaron-Brushes were able to receive new driver’s licenses from the Department of Public Safety and to file their taxes jointly. After the conference, the district court dismissed the Aaron-Brushes’ claims as moot and denied the couple’s motion for attorney’s fees. In this appeal from the denial of attorney’s fees, we must decide whether there was a judicially sanctioned change in the relationship of the parties that would justify an award of attorney’s fees.
* Honorable Harvey Bartle III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that there was no such judicially sanctioned change and affirm the district court’s ruling.
I. Background The Aaron-Brushes were married in Massachusetts in 2012. Despite the legality of their marriage under Massachusetts law, Alabama refused to recognize the marriage and its appurtenant rights, including the rights to file tax returns jointly and to obtain driver’s licenses that reflected their marriage, because Alabama banned same-sex marriage under its state constitution and statutory code. See Ala. Const. art. 1, § 36.03; Ala. Code § 30-1-19. The couple sued the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the refusal to recognize their marriage violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The couple requested relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that Alabama’s same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional and permanent injunctions directing the defendants to recognize marriages validly entered into outside of Alabama and preventing the defendants from enforcing the state’s marriage ban. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Obergefell, the parties jointly asked the district court for an extension of time to file dispositive motions. The district court granted the motion. When the Supreme Court in Obergefell recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry and the obligation of states to
3

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recognize these marriages, the parties filed a joint motion to set a briefing schedule, which stated: “The parties are now in agreement that the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges . . . conclusively resolves the legal issues in this case and that no further briefing on the merits is necessary.” Doc. 26 at 1.1 Nonetheless, “the parties disagree[d] as to the proper course of action.” Id. The parties asked the court for a new briefing schedule pursuant to which they could address these remaining disagreements.
In response to the motion, the district court held a status conference. The court opened the conference by asking, “Do we all agree that [Obergefell] is now the law of the land?” Doc. 50-1 at 4. Both sides agreed that it was the law of the land and was binding on the defendants. When asked whether “each of the defendants [was] committed to complying with the Supreme Court’s decision,” the defendants affirmed that they were. Id.
Notwithstanding the defendants’ concessions, the Aaron-Brushes requested that the district court grant them relief, either in the form of an injunction, a consent judgment, or a declaratory judgment. The district court expressed skepticism that these forms of relief would be necessary or appropriate because the defendants had already conceded that Obergefell bound them. But, when the Aaron-Brushes reiterated that, in addition to a statement that the defendants would
1 “Doc.” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket in this case. 4

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 5 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 5 of 9
recognize their marriage, they wanted their names changed on their driver’s licenses to reflect their marriage and assurances that they could file taxes jointly, the district court facilitated those requests. The court proposed that the defendants: (1) deliver to the Aaron-Brushes a letter stating that the Alabama Department of Revenue would allow them to file their taxes jointly; (2) help coordinate the Aaron-Brushes’ visit to the Department of Public Safety to obtain new licenses; and (3) notify the court in writing that they had completed these two steps and agreed to be bound by Obergefell. The defendants agreed to take these steps.
The defendants thereafter filed a notice in conformance with the district court’s directive. The Aaron-Brushes responded to the notice by requesting that the district court issue a declaratory judgment and permanent injunctions as sought in their complaint. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as moot. The district court denied the Aaron-Brushes’ request and granted the defendants’ motion. The Aaron-Brushes did not appeal the mootness order; rather, they moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which permits a “prevailing party” (other than the United States) in § 1983 litigation to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee. The district court denied the motion for attorney’s fees, concluding that the Aaron-Brushes were not prevailing parties.
This is the Aaron-Brushes’ appeal of the denial of an attorney’s fee award.
5

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 6 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 6 of 9
II. Standard of Review “We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s determination regarding ‘prevailing party’ status for clear error.” Church of Scientology Flag Serv., Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1993). “Whether the facts as found suffice to render the plaintiff a ‘prevailing party’ is a legal question reviewed de novo.” Id. at 1513. Because the parties dispute whether the facts as found sufficed to render the Aaron-Brushes prevailing parties under § 1988(b), our review is de novo.
III. Discussion “In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney’s fees—the prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser . . . . Congress, however, has authorized the award for attorney’s fees to the ‘prevailing party’ in numerous statutes,” including § 1988(b). Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). A plaintiff “prevails” within the meaning of Buckhannon when an action of the district court involves a “court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,” such as a judgment on the merits of her claim, a consent decree, or a settlement agreement that the district court either incorporates into its final order of dismissal or explicitly retains jurisdiction to enforce. Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Am. Disability Ass’n v.
6

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 7 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 7 of 9
Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the judicial actions discussed in Buckhannon—relief on the merits and consent decrees—are merely examples of actions through which a plaintiff may “prevail,” emphasizing that “[t]he essential test established by the [Buckhannon] Court requires the plaintiff to achieve a ‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.’” (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605)). Conversely, a “defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
The characteristic shared by judicial actions that pass Buckhannon’s test is that such actions entail district court oversight and enforcement authority. See Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 279-81 (4th Cir. 2002). Whereas private settlements “do not entail . . . judicial approval and oversight” and therefore cannot satisfy Buckhannon, consent decrees and settlement agreements approved by the court—which do satisfy Buckhannon—involve an “obligation to comply” with the court’s directives. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2003) (“In the case of both consent decrees and private settlement agreements over which a district court retains enforcement jurisdiction, the district court has the authority to force compliance with the terms agreed upon by the parties.”).
7

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The Aaron-Brushes contend that the district court’s directives during the status conference constituted a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ relationship within the meaning of Buckhannon. Again, these three directives were that the defendants submit a letter confirming that the couple could file taxes jointly, coordinate the couple’s trip to the Department of Public Safety for new driver’s licenses, and file a notice with the court stating the defendants’ intent to comply with Obergefell. In our view, the district court’s directives were too informal to satisfy Buckhannon’s test. The record reflects that after the parties jointly notified the district court that Obergefell resolved the legal issues in the case, the district court confirmed the defendants’ recognition of the AaronBrushes’ rights under Obergefell and moderated the parties’ agreements to satisfy the couple’s specific concerns about their ability to exercise those rights in Alabama. Instead of directing the parties to act or else face the court’s enforcement, the district court supplied the parties with suggestions for facilitating the defendants’ voluntary compliance.
Put another way, the defendants’ agreement to comply with Obergefell, rather than district court’s directives, was the impetus for the parties’ resolution of their dispute. Thus, on this record, the Aaron-Brushes have not demonstrated that they benefitted from a judicially sanctioned change in their legal relationship with the defendants such that they must be deemed prevailing parties under § 1988(b).
8

Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 9 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 9 of 9
IV. Conclusion For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Aaron-Brushes’ motion for attorney’s fees. AFFIRMED.
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Case 2:14-cv-01091-RDP Document 60-1 Filed 02/28/17 Page 10 of 10 Case: 16-10028 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 Page: 1 of 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

David J. Smith Clerk of Court

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
January 30, 2017

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 16-10028-FF Case Style: April Aaron-Brush, et al v. Attorney General State of Alab, et al District Court Docket No: 2:14-cv-01091-RDP

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause. Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 41(b).
The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.
Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.11. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See 11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .
Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher system.
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, costs taxed against the appellants.
The Bill of Costs form is available on the internet at www.ca11.uscourts.gov
For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Janet K. Mohler, FF at (404) 335-6178.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Djuanna Clark Phone #: 404-335-6161

OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs

 
 Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 1 of 8
U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama (Southern) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:14−cv−01091−RDP

CLOSED

Aaron−Brush et al v. Bentley et al Assigned to: Judge R David Proctor Case in other court: USCA, 16−10028−FF Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
April Aaron−Brush

Date Filed: 06/10/2014 Date Terminated: 10/13/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Avery Corinne Livingston American Civil Liberties Union Of Alabama P.O. Box 6179 Montgomery, AL 36106 334−420−1747 Email: alivingston@aclualabama.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Chase Strangio AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 Broad Street 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2627 Fax: 212−549−2651 Email: cstrangio@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D Esseks AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 212−549−2627 Fax: 212−549−2651 Email: jesseks@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joel E Dillard BAXLEY DILLARD MCKNIGHT JAMES & MCELROY 2700 Highway 280 Suite 110 East Birmingham, AL 35223 205−271−1100 Fax: 205−271−1108 Email: jdillard@baxleydillard.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Steven Segall LAW OFFICES OF JOSHUA S. SEGALL 444 S. Perry St. P.O. Box 4236 Montgomery, AL 36103 334−324−4546 Email: Joshua.segall@segalllaw.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Randall C Marshall AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ALABAMA FOUNDATION, INC P.O. Box 6179

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 2 of 8

Montgomery, AL 36106−0179 334−420−1741 Fax: 334−269−5666 Email: rmarshall@aclualabama.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert D Segall COPELAND FRANCO SCREWS & GILL PA 444 South Perry Street P O Box 347 Montgomery, AL 36101−0347 334−834−1180 Fax: 334−834−3172 Email: segall@copelandfranco.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

W Edward Still EDWARD STILL LAW FIRM LLC 429 Green Springs Hwy STE 161−304 Birmingham, AL 35209 205−320−2882 Fax: 205−320−2882 Email: Still@votelaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy Brooks Crew CREW LAW FIRM, P.C. Park Place Tower, Suite 550 2001 Park Place, North Birmingham, AL 35203 326−3555 Fax: 326−1081 Email: wbcrew4@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ginger Aaron−Brush

represented by Avery Corinne Livingston (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Chase Strangio (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James D Esseks (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel E Dillard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Steven Segall (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Randall C Marshall (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Robert D Segall (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 3 of 8

W Edward Still (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wendy Brooks Crew (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Robert Bentley in his official capacity as Governor of Alabama TERMINATED: 09/22/2014
Defendant Luther Strange in his official capacity as Attorney General of Alabama
Defendant Julie Magee in her official capacity as Commissioner of Revenue of the State of Alabama
Defendant

represented by David B Byrne , Jr ALABAMA SECURITIES COMMISSION 401 Adams Avenue, Ste. 280 Montgomery, AL 36104 334−242−2984 Fax: 334−353−4690 Email: david.byrne@asc.alabama.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James W Davis OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue P O Box 300152 Montgomery, AL 36130−0152 334−242−7300 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: jimdavis@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−242−7300 Fax: 334−353−8440 Email: lhowell@ago.state.al.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laura E Howell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 4 of 8

Hugh B McCall Colonel, in his official capacity as Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety

represented by Frank Timothy McCollum ALABAMA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 301 South Ripley Street P O Box 1511 Montgomery, AL 36102−1511 334−242−4392 Fax: 334−242−0894 Email: tim.mccollum@alea.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

J Haran Lowe , Jr P.O. Box 286 Montevallo, AL 35115 205−283−4129 Email: Haran@jhlatty.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James W Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura E Howell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/10/2014 06/10/2014 06/10/2014
06/17/2014 06/18/2014 06/18/2014 06/18/2014 06/18/2014 06/18/2014
06/23/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange, filed by April Aaron Brush, Ginger Aaron Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(AVC) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
2 NOTICE REGARDING CONSENT. (AVC) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
Filing Fee: Filing fee $400.00 receipt_number 1126−2186381−−ALND receipt number B4601053753. related document 1 COMPLAINT against Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange, filed by April Aaron Brush, Ginger Aaron Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(AVC). (Marshall, Randall) Modified on 6/10/2014 (MSN) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
3 Summons Issued as to Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange; returned to plaintiff for service.(AVC) (Entered: 06/17/2014)
PHV Fee paid for James Esseks: $50, Receipt# 1126−2191389 (ALND# B4601053912). (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
4 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice −− James Esseks by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
PHV Fee paid for Chase Strangio: $50, Receipt# 1126−2191428 (ALND# B4601053913). (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
5 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice −− Chase Strangio by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
6 ORDER−re: Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice 4 & 5 . The motions are CONDITIONALLY GRANTED. By 6/25/2014, Attorneys Esseks and Strangio SHALL Certify to the Court that they have read and understand: any local rules applicable in this District; the Alabama State Bar Pledge of Professionalism; and this Court's CM/ECF requirements. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 6/18/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 06/18/2014)
7 CERTIFICATE of Counsel− re 6 Order (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of James Esseks, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Chase Strangio)(Marshall, Randall)

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 5 of 8

06/24/2014 07/14/2014 07/14/2014
07/15/2014 07/15/2014 07/15/2014 07/23/2014
07/28/2014 07/31/2014 08/04/2014 08/04/2014
08/07/2014 09/03/2014
09/15/2014

(Entered: 06/23/2014)
8 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Process (Summonses and Complaint) served on Office of the Attorney General, State of Alabama (by agreement) on June 19, 2014, filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 06/24/2014)
9 MOTION to Dismiss by Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
10 ORDER− re: 9 MOTION to Dismiss. The parties SHALL brief the issues raised by the Motion in accordance with "Exhibit B". Pltf's responsive submission shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the entry date of this order. Dfts' reply submissions shall be filed no later than seven (7) calendar days after the responsive submission is filed. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/14/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua Steven Segall on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Segall, Joshua) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
12 INITIAL ORDER GOVERNING ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS−reminding parties of their obligations under FRCP 26(f) and LR26.1(d)− with appendices attached. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/15/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
13 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange.(Davis, James) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
14 RESPONSE in Opposition re 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: September 12, 2013, The News Courier, # 2 Exhibit 2: September 11, 2013 (updated December 4, 2013), WSFA 12 News, # 3 Exhibit 3: Hard v. Bentley Complaint, # 4 Exhibit 4: Hard v. Bentley Answer, # 5 Exhibit 5: Executive Order 1996−24)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 07/23/2014)
15 RESPONSE in Support re 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Hard − Doc. 48 − Motion to Dismiss Bentley)(Davis, James) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
16 MOTION for Leave to Submit Additional Material in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss 9 by Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Davis, James) (Entered: 07/31/2014)
17 RESPONSE to Motion re 16 MOTION for Leave to Submit Additional Material in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss 9 filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 6: WSFA 12 News, # 2 Exhibit 7: WAFF.com, # 3 Exhibit 8: ABC 33)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
18 TEXT ORDER − This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Leave to Submit Additional Material In Support of their Motion to Dismiss 16 . The Motion seeks to submit a Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Katherine Nelson of the Southern District of Alabama [16−1]. Plaintiffs do not opposed the proposed submission, but have filed a response addressing the proposed submission 17 . Therefore, the Motion 16 is GRANTED. The court will consider the additional authority submitted with Defendants' Motion. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 8/4/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
19 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 08/07/2014)
20 ORDER SETTING RULE 16(b) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE for 9/15/2014 at 10:00a.m., in chambers of the undersigned located at the Hugo L Black US Courthouse. Out of town counsel for Pltfs and Dfts may participate in the conference via telephone. The court will initiate the call. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/3/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/03/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Scheduling Conference held on 9/15/2014. A separate Scheduling Order will be entered by the court. (KLL) (Entered: 09/15/2014)

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 6 of 8

09/15/2014 09/19/2014 09/22/2014
02/04/2015 02/05/2015 07/08/2015 07/09/2015
07/13/2015 07/16/2015 07/19/2015 07/21/2015 07/21/2015 07/31/2015 08/07/2015 08/10/2015 08/11/2015

21 SCHEDULING ORDER that all deadlines apply as further set out: Mediation in 2/2015; Discovery due by 2/4/2015; Dispositive Motions due by 4/6/2015; Pretrial conference ready in 8/2015; This case will be trial ready in 9/2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/15/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
22 Joint MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Bentley by Robert Bentley, Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 09/19/2014)
23 ORDER −re: Joint Motion to Dismiss Dft Bentley 22 . The motion is GRANTED. Pltff's claims against Governor Robert Bentley are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This dismissal shall not affect any other right, claim or cause of action which Pltf has, or may have, against any remaining Dft. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/22/2014. (AVC) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
24 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time (Amend Scheduling Order) by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
25 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER granting 24 Joint MOTION to Amend Scheduling Order. The court's 9/15/2014 Scheduling Order 21 is AMENDED to all potentially dispositive motions should be filed by 7/31/2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 2/5/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 02/05/2015)
26 Joint MOTION to Set Briefing Schedule by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 07/08/2015)
27 TEXT ORDER− This matter is before the court on the parties' Joint Motion to Set Briefing Schedule. 26 This matter is SET for a status conference, in chambers, at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, July 13, 2015. The parties should be prepared to discuss how this case should proceed. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the Joint Motion. 26 . Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/9/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/09/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge R David Proctor: Status Conference held on 7/13/2015. By agreement, the parties will file responsive pleadings as directed. (Court Reporter Chanetta Sinkfield.) (KLL) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
28 NOTICE by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Department of Revenue letter dated July 15, 2015, # 2 Exhibit B − Hard v. Strange − Order granting motion to dismiss)(Davis, James) (Entered: 07/16/2015)
29 RESPONSE to 28 Notice filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Still, W) (Entered: 07/19/2015)
30 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
31 TEXT ORDER − This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 30 . Plaintiff SHALL respond to Defendants' Motion on or before July 31, 2015. Defendants may reply on or before August 10, 2015. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/21/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
32 RESPONSE to 30 Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Proceedings in Eleventh Circuit filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Still, W) (Entered: 07/31/2015)
33 REPLY in Support of 30 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Texas letter brief, # 2 Exhibit B − Mississippi letter brief to 5th Circuit)(Davis, James) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
34 CORECTED Reply in Support of 30 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Texas letter brief, # 2 Exhibit B − Mississippi letter brief to 5th Circuit, # 3 Exhibit C − Alabama AG brief to 11th Circuit)(Davis, James) (Entered: 08/10/2015)
35 NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D (Arkansas), # 2 Exhibit E (Nebraska), # 3 Exhibit F (South Dakota))(Still, W) (Entered: 08/11/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 7 of 8

08/12/2015 08/14/2015 08/20/2015 08/21/2015 08/21/2015 08/26/2015 09/29/2015
10/08/2015
10/13/2015 10/26/2015 10/26/2015 10/26/2015 10/28/2015 11/04/2015 11/04/2015

36 SECOND Amended Supplemental Authority filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit G (Kansas))(Still, W) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
37 NOTICE of Additional Evidence by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment A)(Dillard, Joel) (Entered: 08/14/2015)
38 THIRD NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Eleventh Circuit Orders)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
39 NOTICE of Additional Information by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
40 RESPONSE to 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 Supplemental Authority filed by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Davis, James) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
41 Fifth NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Waters v Ricketts en banc petition)(Still, W) (Entered: 08/26/2015)
42 TEXT ORDER − This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Notice of Additional Information 39 regarding the status of a corrected birth certificate. On or before October 13, 2015, the parties SHALL file a joint status report regarding the status of the corrected birth certificate and any other relief Plaintiffs claim they should be entitled to from Defendants, other than costs and attorneys fees. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/29/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
43 JOINT STATUS REPORT by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Relators Alabama Policy Institute and Alabama Citizens Action Programs Brief Addressing the Effect of Obergefell on this Courts Existing Orders, Case No. 1140460 (Alabama Supreme Court), # 2 Exhibit B: Motion to Exclude the Judicial Inquiry Commission Filing & Request that Chief Justice Moore Not Recuse, Case No. 1140460 (Alabama Supreme Court), # 3 Exhibit C: Respondent Probate Judge Nick Williams Emergency Petition for Declaratory Judgment and/or Protective Order in Light of Jailing of Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis, and Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion, Case No. 1140460 (Alabama Supreme Court), # 4 Exhibit D: Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Order, and Decree That Alabama Will Honor Same−Sex Marriage Licenses Only if Issued Under the Exclusive Licensing Authority of the United States Government or Sister States Whose State Laws Recognize Same−Sex Marriages, Case No. 1140460 (Alabama Supreme Court))(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
44 ORDER GRANTING 30 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Costs are TAXED against Defendants, Attorney General Luther Strange, Julie Magee, and John Richardson. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/13/2015. (JLC) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
45 BILL OF COSTS (taxed against Defendants −− Doc. 44) by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: fees of the Clerk, # 2 Exhibit 2: deposition transcripts)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
46 MOTION for Attorney Fees by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
47 MOTION to Extend Time for Appeal by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
48 ORDER−re: Motion for Attorneys' Fees 46 , and Motion to Extend Time for Appeal 47 . Motion 47 is DENIED. The court DEFERS consideration of Pltfs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees, pending the Eleventh Circuit's disposition of any appeal. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 10/28/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
49 Renewed MOTION for Attorney Fees by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
50 Brief in Support of 49 Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees, Expenses and Non−Taxable Costs. (Attachments: # 1 Transcript)(Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 11/04/2015)

Case: 2:14-cv-1091 As of: 12/20/2018 03:04 PM CST 8 of 8

11/06/2015
11/16/2015 11/20/2015 12/08/2015 01/05/2016 01/05/2016 01/05/2016 01/19/2016 01/25/2016 03/16/2016
02/28/2017
05/26/2017

51 TEXT ORDER − This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees. 49 . Defendants SHALL respond to Plaintiffs' Motion 49 on or before November 16, 2015. Plaintiffs may reply on or before November 23, 2015. Consideration of the appropriate amount of any fee award will be taken up following the court's decision on Plaintiff's current Motion, if necessary. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 11/6/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
52 RESPONSE in Opposition to 49 Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees filed by Julie Magee, Hugh B McCall, Luther Strange. (Howell, Laura) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
53 REPLY Brief in Support of 49 Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees, Expenses and Non−Taxable Costs filed by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
54 ORDER denying 49 Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 12/8/2015. (AVC) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
55 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 54 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush. Filing fee $505, Receipt# 1126−2541464 (ALND# B4601067946). (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
56 Transmittal to USCA re: 55 Notice of Appeal. (AVC) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
57 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 55 Notice of Appeal. (AVC) (Entered: 01/05/2016)
58 USCA Case Number 16−10028−FF for 55 Notice of Appeal. (AVC) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
59 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by April Aaron−Brush, Ginger Aaron−Brush (Marshall, Randall) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 11(c), the Clerk of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: 55 Notice of Appeal, Appeal No. 16−10028−FF. The entire record on appeal is available electronically.(AVC) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
60 USCA JUDGMENT as to 55 Notice of Appeal; Before Wilson, and Jill Pryor, Circuit Judges, and Bartle, District Judge affirming the decision of the District Court. Issued as mandate on February 28, 2017 with per curiam opinion attached. (Attachments: # 1 usca opinion)(AVC) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
61 TEXT ORDER This matter is before the court on the parties' informal notice that counsel no longer seek to pursue costs in this action. Accordingly, the Bill of Costs 45 is deemed MOOT. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 5/26/2017. (KAM, ) (Entered: 05/26/2017)