'. l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Executive Summary .............................................2 A. Preface .................................................2
B. Significant Findings ........................................2 C. Conclusion ..............................................5 II. Compliance Summary and Recommendations .......................... 6 III. Introduction .................................................. 14 A. General Statement .........................................15
1. Norman Population ............................... . .....15 2. Cash Assistance ........................................ 16 B. Monitoring Methodology and Activities ........................ 17 IV. Monitoring Compliance Issues ...................................... 19 A Whether defendant is properly determining who is and who is not a class member [Paragraph 3(b)] ..................... 19
B. Whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance to eligible class members [Paragraph 5] .... 25
C. Whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify families to class members by provision of hard services [Paragraphs 1 and 4] ................ 32
D. The status of defendants' efforts to implement and the guidelines for caseworkers' initiation of the court action mandated by Paragraph 9(c) [Paragraph 9(c), (f)] ......................... 34
E. Whether DCFS worker trained in the ides, procedures and rules
related to the implementation Q^^t is C rder {Paragraph 121 ......... 36
Court

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F. Whether the policies, procedures and rules related to the terms of this Order are being properly applied and enforced through the administrative review process and the review provided in Paragraph 13(b), including whether children who are to be returned home by a set date have been returned home, and if not, whether the failure to return such children home results from non-compliance with the terms of this Order [Paragraph 4, 9(a), 13] ............... 37
G. Whether class members are provided the full notice and appeal rights provided by the Order [Paragraph 10] ............ 38
H. Whether defendant is making good faith efforts to reach necessary interagency agreements and to maximize funding and resources for hard services to class members [Paragraph 5(c), 6(a), 7] ...................... 39
I. Whether DCFS is taking all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA benefits toeligible persons [Paragraph 6(b)] ........................... 39
J. Whether defendants risk assessment practices and policies are consistent with the terms of the Order ...................... 42
K. Whether the decision, if made, that a child cannot be expected to return within 90 days as contemplated by Paragraphs 6(a)(i)(A) is not being made for reasons of administrative or fiscal convenience ................ 43
L. Whether the liaisons provided to handle the compliance of class counsel are performing in a satisfactory manner [Paragraph 13(a)] ...................... 43
M. Housing Advocacy Program [Paragraph 7(a)] .................... 44
N. Whether the manual of referral services is complete and adequate [Paragraph 7(a)] ......................................... 46
O. Whether DCFS is implementing its protocol for locating absentparents [Paragraph 9(e)] .............................. 47
P. Whether DCFS is implementing domestic violence policy [Paragraph 4(c)] ......................................... 47

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Q. Whether DCFS has sought all federal funds available to assist class members in obtaining hard services [Paragraph (7)] ............... 50
V. Conclusion .....................................................51 Appendix............................... ........................ 52

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List of Tables

Table I Table II
Table III Table IV Table V Table VI Table VII

Currently Certified Families by Region December 31, 1995 ....................................... 15
Comparison Assistance Expendures by Purpose: Downstate and Cook County Eighthand Ninth Periods ................................... 17
Comparison of Total Children Returned Home with Norman Children Returned Home ............................ 22
Norman Certified Families and Children Placed in Homeof Relatives ....................................... 23
Comparison of Cash Expenditures Periods-8 and 9 Calendar Year 1995 By Region and Percent of State .............. 25
Title IV-E Eligible Children in Placement by Region .............. 27
HAP Agencies Number of Clients Served ....................... 45

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. PREFACE The fact sheet introducing the Federal Unification Funds and
stating the results of several studies of children in foster care stimulated their concern for housing issues and their impact upon the child welfare system and resulted in the development of the FUP projects. A study conducted over ten years ago by the National Black Child Development Institute found that housing problems were a factor in 30 percent of the out of home placements of children and only six percent of the families were offered any kind of housing assistance before their children were removed. A study of children in foster care in the Washington, D.C. area in 1990, conducted by the Metropolitan Council of Governments, found that homelessness was a contributing factor in 18 percent of the placements they reviewed. The Washington, D.C. agency is currently in receivership and now under the direction of Jerome Miller, who recently stated in the New York Times that lack of adequate housing was a major issue in the cause of placement of children and in the reunification of children in the District. A study of foster care in New Jersey found homelessness was a contributing factor in 20 percent of the cases reviewed, and a contributing factor in 40 percent of the placements.
A study discussed in earlier reports published by The Institute for Child and Poverty, "Homelessness: the Foster Care Connection", indicates that children who grew up in foster care face a higher risk of becoming homeless as adults, and that homeless adults face a higher risk of having their children placed in foster care. Thirty-five percent of homeless parents had an open case with the city's child welfare department. These facts clearly reflect the correlation between these two issues: poverty and child placement. Illinois has been on the "cutting edge" of ameliorating this problem by entering into the Norman Consent Decree.
B. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 1. Accomplishments During This Reporting Period
The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (hereafter the Department or DCFS) has implemented a number of the recommendations from previous reports and from discussions with Plaintiffs' Counsel, Laurene Heybach, Supervising Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (hereafter LAFC). The following are areas of accomplishment toward full compliance with this Consent Decree:
• There are currently 3,552 families certified statewide representing 4,670 children. (Appendix E.)
• Total cash assistance given directly to families for placement prevention or reunification is $930,014. (Appendix H.)
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4I

A conservative cost benefit analysis of the Norman cash assistance program is estimated at $24 million benefitting 1,466 families during the past calendar
year.

The Department has developed an Automated Cash Assistance System which will become operation on July 1, 1996. (See Appendix A.)

The areas which utilize the cash assistance program the most also have the lowest rate of increase of children coming into substitute care, have the highest percentage of children being served in their own homes and have the lowest caseload increase. East St. Louis for example, has a zero increase in children in placement. This is a major accomplishment, providing services to all new children entering the system and providing permanent planning for the children already in the system.

• The Department has completed, developed and trained over 7,000 social workers statewide on the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP). (See Appendix M.)

• The Housing Advocacy Programs have been successful in locating housing for certified families.

• Three additional housing authorities have received Section 8 certificates under Federal Unification Program (FUP). The areas awarded the certificates are E. St. Louis, Cook County (not Chicago), and Champaign.

• The hiring of the Housing Specialist and the Domestic Violence Specialists have enhanced the quality of these programs.

• The Domestic Violence Protocol (Appendix Q.) has been approved and will be

p

incorporated in the DCFS pilot areas implementing the protocols for the

Redesign of the Front Door. (Appendix B.)

• 4,688 children returned home in 1994 while 4,673 returned home in 1995 922 children returned home from Norman certified families in 1994 while 993 returned home in 1995.

2. Areas Needing Improvement

There remain areas needing improvement, most are recognized by the Department and there are subsequent plans to ameliorate the issues however, they have not yet been implemented to change performance standards to date. The areas for improvement are as follows:

• The need for accurate and timely data to the Monitor regarding cash assistance expenditures is problematic. Currently, this information is secured from the manually kept logs in the field which are inconsistent. It is believed there are more expenditures are being made than is properly recorded. Data from the financial division of the Department reflects $1.9 monies spent in FY'95. While this total includes the cost of the Housing Advocacy Programs (hereafter HAP) and other administrative costs, it is believed more monies are being spent on direct cash assistance to families than is being reported.
Several cash assistance (Appendix K.) agencies ran out of money both downstate and in Cook County due to a series of occurrences. This is particularly of concern in Cook County where the loss of this resource for families perhaps extended stays of children in foster care and may not have prevented placements.
Norman Class Certification needs to occur at a higher rate; the rate of certifications is not commensurate with the high rate of children entering substitute care even though there is some increase in certifications. (Appendix E.)
In January, 1996 a review of "02" (return home goal) cases from Cook County and the Northern Region reveals that DCFS has not improved its certification of families. This compares with similar studies in 1993 and 1994. The lack of certification could be 27% to 48% of the cases given the margin of error used for the stratified random sampling. (Appendix F.)
• A random sample of Division of Child Protection investigations (hereafter DCP) finds a lack of proper "indication" of child abuse/neglect reports of Norman allegations and a lack of certification. (Appendix G.)
• While a recent increase in permanent planning may be a trend; the lack of return home of children in Cook County is a serious problem.
• During the past year only 52 families have been referred to the Illinois Department of Public Aid (hereafter DPA) for expedited checks to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereafter AFDC).
• While training sessions have been held, ongoing training is essential in the further implementation of Norman programs. It is critical that training occur with the Purchase of Service (hereafter POS) agencies.
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C. CONCLUSION: The Department is to be lauded for entering into this innovative and creative
Consent Decree with the LAFC. The Department has been responsive to most of the recommendations of the Monitor in areas needing improvement. Recognizing the problems in the child welfare system, Director McDonald has demonstrated the courage to embark on massive reform efforts to the system. These reforms will effect the positive implementation of the Norman Consent Decree. Some of the programs established as a result of this Decree are in full compliance while others are not. There are plans to come into compliance with those areas which are problematic, however, they are in varying degrees of implementation and the outcome results have not yet occurred. Those areas needing improvement include many aspects of the certification and cash assistance system, the expedited AFDC benefits and developing protocol with the Cook County Juvenile Court to expedite the return home of children. Therefore, the Honorable Judge Hart entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order on April 11, 1996 (Appendix A) which includes many of these areas to be monitored during the calendar year 1996.
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II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Whether defendant is properly determining who is and is not a class member [Paragraph 3(b)]
1. Conclusion: a. Downstate regions are in compliance.Southern and Central Region is in compliance.
b. Northern Region is in partial compliance.
c. Cook County is in non-compliance.
2. Recommendation: a. DCFS re-consider the certification process.
b. That POS agencies establish certification for families for a one year period until they are knowledgeable about the appropriate use of Norman funds and programs.
c. The issue of indicating inadequate shelter, food, and clothing and environmental neglect becomes highly significant indicated in investigatory findings.
d. The Department Review the use of permanent relative home and permanent foster care as permanency goals.
B. Whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance to eligible class members. [Paragraph 5]
1. Conclusion: a. Cook County is out of compliance.
b. Downstate is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: a. HAP program and cash assistance monies not be co-mingled into one contract. Instead there should be two separate contracts. This will help ensure that funds are not depleted to lowerthan $10,000. This should be done for FY'97 at least until the Automated Cash Assistance System is running, tested and identified problems are corrected, since unpredictable problems always occurs in any new system.
6

(i
b. That contracts for HAP and cash assistance agencies be completed well before the beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, 1996.
c. That one contract person write all of these contracts which could help in coordation. That the contract negotiator he in close communication with OLM.
d. The Statewide Norman Liaison continue bi-monthly contact with all Cook County cash assistance agencies to assess current status of each agency about their cash on hand and expedite processing of vouchers, when necessary, and to notify the field offices immediately where funds are available if any agency has depleted their funds.
e. DCFS should ensure that all agencies have sufficient monies to carry them until FY'97.
f. DCFS require all cash assistance approved in from January 1, 1996 to June 30, 1996 be entered into the Automated Cash Assistance System to ensure the accounting for these expenditures are not lost to the information system.
g. All current print outs on cash assistance record individual amount for each region but don't total them. The Automated Cash Assistance System must be set up to total individual amount figures for each region both Downstate and Cook. This means writing the program to produce totals of figures entered oth vertically and horizontally. The print out should generate the individual totals and the grant total for each region for at least the following: the amount of cash assistance for a) placement prevention or b) reunification and c) a breakdown of each type of expenditure (for secuity deposit, furniture, utilitie, etc.) A summary sheet should also generate a subtotal for all Downstate and Cook County Regions and one Statewide grand total.
h. That along with regularly scheduled sessions for training supervisors on the Automatic Cash Assistance System, regularly scheduled make-up sessions for that purpose be set up to ensure that all supervisors have the opportunity to be trained.
i. DCFS hold a statewide Nonnan Liaisons meeting in September or with major agenda items the automated cash assistance system, the discussion of any problems and to discuss the progress of the expedited AFDC checks and food stamps situation.
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j. Ongoing training of Norman programs is essential for field staff within DCFS and with POS agencies.

k. Communication between the Department and their Contract agencies must improve. The handling of this should be assigned to a person in DCFS who is well identified to the agencies.
1. That DCFS consider training a specific person or persons in the POS agencies to approve up to $800 for their staff. For higher amounts then Norman Regional Liaisons must approve.
C. Whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify families to class members by provision of hard services as defined in Paragraphs 1 and 4.
1. Conclusion: a. Cook County is coming into compliance.
b. Downstate is within compliance.
2. Recommendations: a. The Department should continue its reform efforts to increase the clincial skills of its staff and developing best practices initiatives.
b. The protocol for filing petitions in Cook County be completed and implemented.

D. The status of defendants' efforts to implement and the guidelines for caseworkers' initiation of court action mandated by Paragraph 9(c) (i.e., timeliness guidelines for the caseworkers initiation of court action or reunification. [Paragraph 9(c),(f)]
1. Conclusion: a. Cook County is in non-compliance.
b. Downstate is in compliance.
2. Recommendations: a. That DCFS complete its protocol for initiating return home petitions in Cook County Juvnile Court.
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b. That DCFS share a copy of the protocol before finalization with Monitor and with Plaintiffs' Attorneys in order to allow input.
E. Whether DCFS workers and case reviewers are sufficiently trained on the policies, procedures and rules related to the implementation of this Order [Paragraph 121. 1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance. 2. Recommendations: While DCFS is in compliance the follwing is recommended or order to ensure continued improvement in the use of the programs: a. Continue the training of DCFS supervisors on the use of the automated cash assistance system. b. Develop a more comprehensive training of private agency staff on the Norman programs and how to access them.
F. Whether the policies, procedures, and rule related to the terms of this Order are being properly applied and enforced through the administrative review process and the review provided in paragraph 13 (b) including whether children who are to be returned home by a set date have been returned home, and if not, whether the failure to return such children home results from non-compliance with the terms of this Order. [Paragraph 4, 9(a), 13] 1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance. 2. Recommendation: None
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G. Whether class members are provided the full notice and appeal rights provided by the Order. [10]
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: None.
H. Whether defendant is making good faith efforts to reach necessary interagency agreements and to maximize funding and resources for hard services to class members. [Paragraph 5(c), 6(a), 7]
1. Conclusion: a. DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: None
I. Whether DCFS is taking all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA benefits to eligible persons. [Paragraph 6(b)]
1. Conclusion: a. DCFS is out of compliance in the utilization of expedited AFDC benefits to families whose children are reunited.
2. Recommendation: a. More training of staff at all levels including private agency staff.
b. DCFS needs to develop a more efficient way for purchase of service agencies providing full service to DCFS families to access DPA expedited checks. Once they are aware of the resource it should be another way to access monies needs to be developed other than through Norman Regional Liaisons. DCFS needs to authorize more people to authorize more people in the Department to be responsive to this need
10

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J. Whether defendant's risk assessment practices and policies are consistent with the terms of the Order. [Paragraph 1, 4, 9(d)]
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: None.
K. Whether the decision, if made, that a child cannot be expected to return within 90 days as contemplated by Paragraph 6(a) (i) (A) is not being made for reasons of administrative or fiscal convenience.
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: None.
L. Whether the liaisons provided to handle the compliance of class counsel are performing in a satisfactory manner. [Paragraph 13(a)]
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in basic compliance.
2. Recommendation: That DCFS name another person to serve as backup to Mr. Egan and Ms. Morsch when neither are available. Or, name a full time person to this function.
M. Housing Advocacy Program is successful; [Paragraph 7(a)]
1. Conclusion:
a. DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: a. DCFS should host or co-host a statewide Housing Conference which has been discussed extensively in previous reports.
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b. The housing specialist should develop performance criteria for HAP agency evaluations.
N. Whether the manual of referral services is complete and adequate. [Paragraph 8]
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in minimal compliance.
2. Recommendation: a. While DCFS is in basic compliance, it is recommended DCFS develop an automated resource manual. This idea has been recommended by committee members of the Front End Redesign. How this might be accomplished has been discussed in all previous monitoring reports.
b. That DCFS make known, especially to DCFS staff in Cook County, the contractual resources it has developed by stating the program plans and referral process for service.
0. Whether DCFS is implementing its protocol for locating absent parents. [Paragraph 9(e)]
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: None
P. Whether DCFS is implementing domestic violence policy [Paragraph 4(c)]
1. Conclusion: The Department is in full compliance and should be applauded for its efforts. To remain in full compliance, DCFS must address the recommendations in this section particularly in regard to centralizing both responsibility and authority for this initiative under the domestic violence specialist and the Advisory Council on Domestic Violence.
2. Recommendations: None
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d)

Q. Whether DCFS has sought all federal funds available to assist class members in obtaining hard services. [Paragraph (7)].
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in full compliance.
2. Recommendation: None

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

James Norman, et. al. Plaintiffs,
vs
Jess McDonald, Defendant

} } } } } No. 89 C 1624 } Judge William T. Hart } } }

SEVENTH MONITORING REPORT

Date:

June 3, 1996

Period Covered: January 1, 1995 - December 31, 1995

This report is submitted to the Court pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the Consent Order which mandates that the Monitor gather valid and reliable information to "measure and ensure compliance" with the terms of the Order. Other issues related to compliance which deserve special mention are included in addition to each issue specifically noted in paragraph 15.

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III. INTRODUCTION
This report covers the monitoring activities from January 1, 1995, through December 31, 1995, except where otherwise noted. Monitoring activities were completed with the Assistant Monitor, Diane Fager, except for the writing of this report. Ms. Fager resigned her duties as Assistant Monitor in April, 1996. Other aspects of monitoring activities have been assisted by Marilyn Donahue with research and data consultants Christine George and Deborah Puntenney. This report is later than usual due to a motion filed on February 12, 1996 by the Plaintiffs' Attorneys requesting "... (1) continued monitoring and/or (2) declaratory and injunctive relief addressing substantial non-compliance with the Consent Decree and the Court Order of March 10, 1995." The Honorable Judge William T. Hart issued the Memorandum Opinion and Order on April 11, 1996. (Appendix .) In summary, Jess McDonald is substituted for Sue Suter. Motion [209-1] is granted in part and denied in part. Motion [209-2] is denied without prejudice. Seventh Report due April 30,1996. Eighth Report covering 1996 shall be limited to 1fi 5(a) Cook County), 6(b) and 9(c) and Norman eligibility. For 1996, defendant shall comply with ¶lI 15(a), (b) (Cook County), (d), and (i), 11, 15 (e), and 15(f). The term of the Monitor's appointment shall continue until the date beyond December 31, 1996 permitted for preparing the Eighth Monitoring Report and necessary to complete the additional procedures set forth of the Consent Order." The date for the Eighth was extended to May 31, 1996.
The extensive reform efforts of Director Jess McDonald, mentioned at length in the Sixth Monitoring Report, are in varying degrees of planning and implementation; among them are: 1) large numbers of supervisors are pursuing their graduate training in social work; 2) agency accreditation committees have been working all year on developing plans for agency accreditation on the many areas to be studied; 3) more staff has been deployed to provide leadership to the Child and Adolescent Local Area Networks (LANS); 4) a proposal for the Redesign of Front End Services (response and service delivery system for reports of Child Abuse and Neglect); 5) development of the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (hereafter CERAP); 6) a Redesign of the Purchase of Service for substitute care; 7) A Model of Practice for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services prepared by Richard H. Calica (Director of The Juvenile Protective Association and Chairperson of the Practice Task Group) and Thomas D. Morton (Executive Director, Child Welfare Institute) whose preliminary report is dated August, 1995; (Appendix D.) 8) initiatives in managed care; and 9) the establishment of the Child Welfare Research Institute with the University of Illinois.

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A. GENERAL STATEMENT 1. Norman Population The Child Abuse/Neglect allegations of inadequate food, clothing, shelter
and environmental neglect are potentially those allegations in which Norman certification can occur if there is risk of placement. The statewide total for 1995 shows SCR reports with only Noonan allegations were 57,656 (13,454 were indicated, 1,308 were still pending and 42,894 were unfounded).

At the end of this report year, there were 3,552 families certified state wide representing 4,670 children. This is the largest number of families certified to date. Increases occurred both in Downstate Regions and in Cook for a total statewide increase of 12% over the first semi-annual period and an almost 18% increase over the certified families at the end of 1994. Administrative Case Reviewers (ACR) continues to be the major certifier and inadequate shelter continues to be the largest single reason for certification (Appendix E.). Table I below depicts this, it should be noted there are more reasons for certification than families certified because a family can be certified for more than one reason. Appendix E. contains more detailed certification data.
TABLE I Currently Certified Families Reasons By Certifier Statewide

Cases Certified

Inadeq. Food

Inadeq. Shelter

Inadeq. Envir.

Total

Clothing Neglect Reasons

ACR

2639

CPS

535

CWS

378

389

2447

229

913

3987

92

380

47

204

724

48

323

17

68

457

TOTAL

3552

529

3150

293

1185

5168

It was determined, by a case review conducted in January, 1996 based on case information from December, 1995, that the Northern and Cook County Regions are still not certifying some families that qualify. Given statistical error of plus or minus ten percent, one third of possible eligible families are not certified in those Regions. (See Appendix F.). A statewide study of the Division of Child Protection (hereafter DCP) regarding investigations of allegations of "substantial risk of injury" and "inadequate supervision" finds substantiation for one of the four Norman allegations which were not "indicated" in 45 of these situations the reviewer thought the case should have been certified and was not.(Appendix G.) More detailed information on Norman population is found in Section III, A.

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H. Cash Assistance to Families Total cash assistance to families for this report year was $930,014; Downstate
Regions account for 57% of the total case assistance expenditure while Cook County Regions account for 43%. Cook County data shows a dramatic reduction from the first semi-annual period to the second, dropping $62,847; at that same time, Downstate Regions increased expenditures by $117,627. It is known that Cook County was going through extensive changes during the second semi-annual period, including moving from four regions to three and bringing on a large number of new supervisors. However, in February, 1996, the Department implemented a Purchase of Service (POS) Redesign whereby social work responsibility for the children and families was totally transferred to the private agencies. Until this time DCFS also had an assigned social worker. Norman programs and cash assistance were initiated by the DCFS monitoring social worker. However, this now creates a problem for families accessing Norman services since private agency staff tend not to know about the services. This issue will be discussed later in this report.
Several problems were identified that interfered with the cash assistance disbursements. On one occasion near the middle of the fiscal year, almost all agencies in Cook were out of money; those that had funds had a minimal amount or were unwilling to write checks for people who were outside their area. This has been an on-going problem at the beginning of every fiscal year because agencies have no carry over from the previous year and funds are slow to arrive after July 1st. This problem should be solved with the initiation of the Automated Cash Assistance System, slated to be operational by July 1, 1996.
Systemic and communication problems created chaos for agencies disbursing cash assistance in Cook. One example was when supervisors were approved to sign for funds but agencies were not advised. Fortunately, the agencies honored the requests without the listing available to them of newly authorized signatures. For specific information on cash assistance, see Section III, B.
Of interest are the trends in expenditures by purpose i.e. rent, utilities, etc. (Appendix H.) Total expenditures went up for Peoria, Marion and E. St. Louis especially. An increase is seen across each of the specific spending categories. The decrease in Cook County is problematic and may be due to reasons already sited. South Region is the only region showing an increase; it is improbable this is due to the boundary change alone. Downstate pulled the statewide expenditure up between the two semi-annual periods. Predictably, rent increased between the two periods as well. Utilities increased in the summer. This may be due to city ordinances which do not allow cut off of utilities when temperatures are below a certain level for non-payment of utility bill. During the calendar year 1995, the Department spent a total of $930,014. Table II shows the disbursement of funds between downstate and Cook County.
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TABLE II Cash Expenditures by Purpose Eighth and Ninth Periods
Calendar Year 1995

No. of Families

Category

Total Cost of Category

Average Cost Per Family

DOWNSTATE 345 498 160
1,003

Unknown Prevention Reunification Subtotal

$195,380 $233,681 $104,574 $533,635

$566.32 $469.24 $653.59

COOK COUNTY 64 289 110 463
1,466

Unknown Prevention Reunification
Subtotal TOTAL

$ 48,195 $246,524 $101,660 $396,379 $930,014

$752.86 $853.02 $924.18

Data Source: Norman Regional Liaisons Manual Logs

A cost benefit analysis estimates an almost $24 million. This figure is based on a conservative estimate; it is based on the average size of a family being two children, placements being prevented for a one year period and reunification occurring six months earlier. Some regions did not report their expenditures by placement prevention or reunification but only a total figure for the area. Where the reason for the expenditure was unknown the less costly reunification category was used. A year of foster care was computed at $10,000 per child for a regular foster care placement. This shows that an an appropriation of almost $2 million saves $24 million. Therefore, it is efficient most importantly to the lives of children and to the financial savings to the state.
The Department allocated $1.8 million for FY'92 for Norman services. Last fiscal year the allocation was increased to $1.9 million and FY'97 allocation is increased to over $2 million. This is a small appropriation when one considers the savings in tax dollars it generates.

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B. MONITORING METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES
The monitoring activities for this reporting period consisted of the following:
• Interviews and discussions with staff from the Department: Mary Sue Morsch, Administrator, Office of Litigation Management; Bobbie Evans, previous Statewide Noonan Liaison; John Cheney-Egan, Housing Specialist; and Marion Houston, Domestic Violence Specialist
• Conferences with Laurene Heybach, Supervising Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago. (LAFC)
• Assistant Monitor's attendance at the Cook County Housing Program contractual meetings and Domestic Violence Advisory Committee meetings.
• Monitor's appointment to and participation in the following committee: The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol Advisory Committee; The Work Group to Define the DCFS Practice Model; Co-chair of the Practice Group for Redesigning the Front Door. Participation in these efforts ensures that Norman programs and issues are included in all reform efforts.
• Conferences with DCFS counsel Nancy Eisenhauer.
• Interviews with various Nonnan Regional Liaisons statewide.
Review of monthly and quarterly reports generated by the DCFS Office of information Services and the Bureau of Research, Planning and Development. The major reports reviewed at the monthly Executive Statistical Summary and the monthly Child Abuse/Neglect Statistics and the Executive Summary Five Year Trend Report: Fiscal Years 1990 - 1994.
Review of various other DCFS statistical reports and publications.
Periodic record reviews for specific compliance issues. During this period two such stratified random samples of case records were surveyed: a. January, 1995, a random sample of cases from all children placed in
substitute care in the Northern Region and Cook County with a return home goal to determine proper Norman certification. (Appendix E.)
b. Division of Child Protection (DCP) stratified random sample review of Child Abuse/Neglect investigations with the non-Norman allegations of "subsequent risk of harm" and "inadequate supervision" to determine if Nonnan allegations were present and if appropriate for certification. (Appendix F.)
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IV. MONITORING COMPLIANCE ISSUES [Paragraph 15] A. Whether defendant is properly determining who is and is not a class member [Paragraph 3(b)]
1. Findings and Discussion: Perhaps it is worthwhile here to quote the CLASS CERTIFICATION, as defined in Paragraph 3(b):
"All parents and guardians on or after date of entry of this Consent Order: (a) whose children are in the temporary custody or under the legal guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ('DCFS'), and upon whom, during such custody or guardianship, DCFS has imposed, in a service plan or otherwise, a condition that such parents obtain for themselves or their children such shelter, utility services, food, clothing, or income as DCFS deems necessary or appropriate for the return home of their children; or (b) for whom there is an 'indicated report' or pending report pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.23, ¶1i 2051 se_c ., that is or should have been designated as allegation of 'inadequate shelter', 'inadequate food', 'inadequate clothing', 'environmental neglect', or any successor allegations that cover these categories of reports and DCFS has taken or could take protective custody of the children pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 23, ¶ 2055, because of that allegation."
At the end of 1995 there were 3,552 families certified state wide which included 4,670 children; this represented a twelve percent increase from the previous reporting period and the largest number of certified families to date. Of the 3,552 families, 1,928 are families with children who have an "02" (return home) goal. The regions continue to certify at approximately the same rate. There continued to be concern regarding the certification of the Northern and Cook County regions. The last report found the Northern region to be in partial compliance while the Cook County regions were found in non-compliance.
The monitors thought there might be a data entry problem in Cook County and in the Northern regions that could explain fewer families being registered in the computer system. A case review can indicate the nature of the problem. If there is a data entry problem the case recording could reveal whether any consideration was given to Norman certification. Cases from December, 1995, were requested since they were more likely to reveal improvement in the situation.
A stratified random sample review of all children in those regions with an "02" goal was conducted to determine what type of problem existed. The cases were then reviewed for Norman issues. In addition, all cases were then checked on the Cysis system, the Department's information system, to assure that all certification information in the case records was accurate. In this study, of the total 80 certifiable cases, 38% were not certified by DCFS. From the information in the case review, the
19

reviewers determined that they should have been certified. In most of these cases, the case plan for the parent required that a Norman issue be resolved before the children could return home. Given our margin of statistical error of plus or minus ten percent, DCFS, in the Cook and Northern Regions, is not certifying within a range of 28% to 48% of certifiable Nonnan Cases. Therefore, one-third of potentially eligible families were not certified. We found that DCFS has not significantly improved its certification of "02" cases since the 1993 review. This study was based on standard research methodology which is statistically valid.
The Department previously changed its policies to allow direct service supervisors to certify families and initiate cash assistance without making a subsequent child abuse/neglect report on intact families when this action could avoid placement. (See Appendix I.) These are positive steps; however, one would hypothesize this might result in an even greater increase in certifications. The Monitor thinks this change in policy will progressively increase the number of certifications and the total number of families receiving Norman services. Cook County has not caught up with the rest of the state in this projected increase since they have had to hire many new supervisors and provide ongoing training; this, naturally, delays implementation of new policies.
In the Response To The Sixth Monitoring Report, January 1 December 31, 1994, the Department raises several questions regarding the Monitor's findings regarding compliance on certification. (Appendix J.[pp. 7-14]) The report states the analysis is not probative because of the number of possible variables which cannot be ascertained. This is true; there is no absolute methodology to determine exact numbers of families within the system which could be certified. This defies any research methodology short of reviewing every case in the system. Therefore, the Monitor has relied on those characteristics which each tell part of the story. The general child welfare population has some similarities. No comparison is absolute. However, when one compares several of the variables which are measurable coupled with the Monitors own thirty years of experience in the field, there is a logic and a common sense factor which would lead one to conclude non-compliance, especially in Cook County. For instance, when the number of children in placement in Cook represents 77% of the number of children in placement who are IV E eligible in the entire state, it is logical to assume that the number of families certifiable might also increase in percentage. While this increase may not be in direct proportion to the percentage of IV E eligible children in placements, because of other variables, one can conclude that it should be an appreciably higher number than Downstate (with 23% of the state children eligible for IV E in placement). (See Table VI p.18.) In the first semi-annual report, Downstate had 52% of the state wide certified families and the second semi-annual period had 51%. (See Table VI p.18.)
20

^I
As another example, the Department takes exception to the statement that the large number of missing permanency goals is not a Norman issue. While it is true a family can receive services without having a permanency goal, a criteria for certification is that there must be an "02" (return home) goal. Therefore, if there is no goal, there is no opportunity to determine if certification is appropriate. According to data supplied from Planning and Development there were 4,767 children who had no recorded goal on 1/3/96; since so many children are in this category, there is no reason to modify the determination on this issues. The Monitor continues to question the large number of children who have a long term foster care goal (8,228) and long term home of relative goal, (12,884). Neither of these goals can be considered permaneny. While there are exceptions, these numbers are very large and some of these children may be able to return home with more assertive efforts, meaning they may be potentially eligible for Norman services.
The footnote 8 on page 9 in the second paragraph, indicates comparing the return home rates of non-Norman children with Norman certified children might be an indicator of non-certification. The essence of the Consent Decree is that children have been placed because of poverty and the return home of children is delayed because of shelter issues, previously mentioned research substantiates this. Also, the return home of all children is a general comparison which is one indicator of several factors including reasonable efforts and initiation of court petitions.
It is interesting to compare the numbers of children returning home who are certified as Norman against the general population of children who return home between regions. It is an indicator that Cook County is in non-compliance. Certainly no area has a higher poverty rate than Cook. In demographics, on a smaller population ratio, East St. Louis has very similar characteristics, i.e., abject poverty levels to affluent suburban areas.The Monitor makes numerous comparisons between the Cook County Regions and the East St. Louis Region. The comparative percentages of each does indicate issues. (See Table III.)
21

Ir

TABLE III COMPARISON

Number Of Children Returned Home With Norman Children Returned Home

1995

Eighth Period

Ninth Period

REGION
Rockford Peoria Aurora Springfield Champaign E.St. Louis Marion Downstate Cook Adm. Cook North Cook Central Cook South Cook Total STATE

# Child. Return Home
162 286 244 195 316 176 137 1,516
741 2,257

#Norman Child.
Returned 32 110 27 24 114 58 11 376 15 30 31 43 119 495

% Norman
20% 38% 11% 12% 36% 33% 8% 25%
16% 22%

# Child Returned
Home 174 349 294 175 327 197 120 1,636 100 186 142 372 800 2,436

#Norman Child.
Returned 45 85 33 25 95 51 12 346 6 16 33 97 152 498

% Norman
26% 24% 11% 14% 29% 26% 10% 21% 6% 9% 23% 26% 19% 20%

One factor which might effect a lower certification rate than one would expect is the large numbers of children in substitute care who are in Home of Relatives; making the assumption that fewer children in Home of Relative might mean fewer certifications. However, there is a substantial proportion of Norman certified families whose children are in Home of Relatives. See Table IV next page:

22

I!

0

TABLE IV Norman Certified Families and Children
Home of Relative 12/31/95

REGION

FAMILIES HMR % of State

JA-Rockford IB-Peoria 2A-Aurora 3A-Springfield 3B-Champaign 4A-East St. Louis 5A-Marian Downstate Tom/ Cook North Cook Central Cook South Cook Other Cook Total Statewide To al
Data Source: DCFS Norman pullfile & ISD 5/26/96

49 (3%) 87 (5%) 61(3.5%) 43 (2.5%) 141 (8%) 88 (5%) 16 (1%) 485 (28%) : 376 (21%) 463 (26%) 443 (25%)
1,282 (72%) 1,767 (100%)

CHILDREN HMR % of State 97 (3%) 157 (5%) 115 (3%) 74 (2%) 254 (7%) 169 (5%) 38 (1%) 904 (26) 715 (21%) 957 (28%) 879 (25%) 2,551 (74%)
3,455 (100%)

The Department has always provided timely information in regard to certification. There is a large data base on certification which the Monitor receives upon request. Any statement interpreted to mean that certification data has not been made available was a misstatement by the Monitor or was misunderstood by the Department. In addition, the Department has tried to accommodate all of the Monitor's requests about certification; establishing the pull-down file has been most helpful and allows information on many different variables upon request. Data on cash assistance and for what purpose it was given along with some other issues have been problematic but not data on certification.

While the data from the certification process has been very helpful in understanding and counting the class, the Monitor continues to recommend that the process be eliminated for DCFS staff. It should be seen as any other resource a DCFS
23

1 1

Cl

family can be provided. For instance, if a social worker determines a child needs day care or a family can benefit from a homemaker, psychological counseling, drug treatment, etc. there is no eligibility test. The clinical judgement of the worker should be sufficient. The collection of this data is expensive and the forms completion is time consuming for workers and supervisors whose time is critical to providing service for children and their families. Certification does nothing to enhance sound social work practice. While we have used this procedure as a measurement, the monitor can develop another way of determining this. Certification itself serves no purpose other than to identify families who potentially may need service. The real issue is the living circumstances of the family which need cash assistance and other services in order to prevent placement or to be reunited.
With the POS redesign and the lack of understanding of the Norman by many of the private agencies it is recommended the POS agencies have certification for the next year until they are knowledgeable of the appropriate use of these funds and programs.
2. Conclusion:
a. Downstate regions are in compliance.
b. Cook County is in non-compliance.
c. Northern Region is in partial compliance.
3. Data Source: a. Monitors' random sample review of "02" records from the
b. Northern and Cook Regions, January, 1996;
c. All DCFS CFCM 4610, CFCM 4625 certification data.
4. Recommendations: a. DCFS should consider eliminating the certification process.
b. That POS agencies establish certification for families for a one year period until they are knowledgeable about the appropriate use of Norman funds and programs.
c. The issue of indicating inadequate shelter, food, and clothing and environmental neglect becomes highly significant indicated in investigatory report findings.
d. The Department review the use of permanent relative home and permanent foster care as permanency goals.
24

1_

B. Whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance eligible class members. [Paragraph 51
1. Findings and Discussion: Direct cash assistance to families for the 1995 calendar year
was $930,014. (First semi-annual period was $437,617 and the second was $492,397.) This represents the eighth and ninth semi-annual periods of the monitoring. Table V depicts the original regions and the amount spent (Also, see Appendix H.). The total expenditure for calendar year 1994 was $825,000 reflecting a $105,000 increase in 1995. This data was collected from the manually kept logs of the Norman Regional Liaisons and others. Cook County cannot be compared by regions because during this period Cook County consolidated from four regions to three.
TABLE V Comparison of Cash Expenditures-Periods 8 and 9
Calendar Year 1995 by original region and percent of state

REGION Rockford
Peoria Aurora Springfield Champaign E. St. Louis Marion Downstate Total Cook, Other Cook, North Cook, Central Cook, South Total Cook STATE TOTAL

CASH 8TH $ 38,202 $ 24,040 $ 22,912 $ 26,666 $ 36,231 $ 46,343 $ 13,610 $208,004
$229,613 $437,617

STATE % 9% 5% 5% 6% 8% 11% 3% 48%
52% 100%

CASH 9TH $ 42,263 $ 51,207 $ 25,557 $ 32,142 $ 51,872 $ 38,702 $ 38,702 $325,631
$ 23,890 $ 17,466 $ 77,225 $ 48,185 $166,766 $492,397

STATE % 8.5% 10.5% 5.0% 6.5% 10.5% 17.0% 8.0% 66%
5% 3.5% 15.5% 10 % 34% 100%

25

4

'.1

Downstate increased cash assistance in that comparable period (eighth period to ninth period) by $117,627 while Cook County decreased their cash assistance expenditure by $62,847. The most dramatic increases in percentage of statewide expenditures occurred in Peoria (from 5% to 10.5%), E. St. Louis (from 11% to 17%) and Marion (from 3% to 8%). These percentage increases are, of course, influenced by the dramatic decrease in Cook County.
Receiving accurate data regarding the exact amount of cash assistance spent, whether it was provided for placement prevention efforts or for reunification and the purpose of the grant (i.e. shelter, furniture, utilities) remains problematic. The Monitor continues to rely on the Norman regional liaisons logs for this information. Beginning July 1, 1995 supervisors were given the authority to approve cash assistance up to $800 and to make referrals for Housing Advocacy Program services and for expedited DPA benefits. The massive training effort this required made this policy implementation occur gradually. Some supervisors are not keeping the manual logs, from which the purpose and type of expenditure was gathered. It is probable that this type accounting will not be possible again until the implementation of the Automated Cash Assistance System scheduled to begin July 1, 1996. When supervisors were trained they were informed to keep their own manual log of cash assistance approvals. Hopefully, these supervisors have retained the forms sent to request money so that all funds approved can be entered into the System from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996 to show the purpose for and type of every cash expenditure approved.
In drawing inferences about amounts of expenditures between Downstate and Cook, it is of value to note the number of children who came into the custody or guardianship of DCFS who were from families eligible for public assistance at the time of placement. This is one indicator of the children being placed whose families were poor and could potentially be eligible for Norman services at the time of reunification. Please refer to Table VI for details. The percentage of monies spent in Cook dramatically decreased in this report year, particularly during the last six month period (See 2Table V). Cook clearly has the largest percentage of placed children from poor families (77% of the state wide children in placement See Table VI. ) It is logical to expect larger expenditures of money for the 77% of the placed children in the state than a smaller expenditure, which was the case in Cook in 1995, representing only 43% of the state wide expenditure. While it is a clear indication of under-utilization of direct cash assistance in Cook County, other factors that created a disruptive effect might include: 1) Cook County reorganized staff from four regions into three; 2) many new supervisors were hired; 3) a large number of Cook County supervisors were out of their offices at least two days per week completing their graduate studies in social work; 4) all supervisors were not fully trained until the end of the reporting period; 5) new Normnan Liaisons were named meaning that all expenditure might not have been properly recorded (See Appendix K for names of all Norman Liaisons) and 6) the Automated Cash Assistance System was not in operation and is not now slated to begin operation until July 1, 1996. Because of the many changes it is highly probable that monies were
b.

t

I.1

spent and not recorded. However, another requirement of the Consent Decree is to keep accurate records so that program evaluation can be made.
TABLE VI Title IV-E Eligible Children In Placement
By Region December 31, 1995

REGION

# OF CHILDREN

% OF STATE

IA-Rockford

981

2%

1B-Peoria

1,901

4%

2A-Aurora

2,053

5%

3A Springfield

1,290

3%

3A-Champaign

2,138

5%

4A-E.St. Louis

1,540

3%

5A-Marion

625

1%

Downstate

10,528

23%

6A-Cook Adm.

7,136

16%

6B-Cook North

7,901

17.5%

6C Cook Central

7,972

17.5%

6D-Cook South

11,606

26%

Cook County

34,615

77%

Total

STATEWIDE TOTAL
Data Source: DCFSFFPD 1/16/96

45,143

100%

Another correlation that is emerging is most positive. Those regions that use Nonnan cash assistance the most are those with the highest return home rates for children. For example, the Southern Region, East St. Louis, has been at almost zero rate of growth for children in placement. This means they conduct permanent planning for the children in care and serve the new children coming into the system without an overall growth to the placement caseload. They also have a large in-home services caseload. This adds a logical variation to the correlation; there seems to be a one to two correlation between use of Nonnan funds (as one) and a lack of growth of

27

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1!

placement cases but a growthof children served in their own homes (as two). According to Norman Jacobs, Assistant Administrator for the Southern Region, the lack of overall growth of children in foster care is largely due to the use of Norman programs and funds.
A major problem is the lack of cash flow available to the cash assistance agencies discussed earlier in this report. This problem has occurred at the beginning of all previous fiscal years and then periodically throughout the year. Usually the Norman Regional Liaisons are able to determine which agency has money and refers all requests to that agency; the referrals then go to the other agencies as they begin to receive money and they suffer a "run" until their funds are depleted. It is largely a "domino" effect. This should not occur when all agencies are stabilized with funds. However, as might be expected with this type of situation in place, on a few occasions in Cook County it has been reported that all cash assistance agencies were out of money at the same time. An example occurred in 1995, when, at a HAP meeting in Chicago on December 11, 1995, the HAP agencies reported they had been out of money since approximately mid-November and could not write checks. At this meeting one of the DCFS administrators reported families going into placement because of lack of monies. Subsequently, cash assistance agencies reported lost housing because they could not write checks. The Housing Specialist and the head of the Office of Litigation Management determined one agency, CEDA, an infrequently used County agency, had $10,000 and checks could be immediately written. A memo was sent to all liaisons the next day to that effect. Unfortunately, some of the liaisons claim they never received the memo; others stated they received it several days later; some supervisors stated the word never reached them although they were the persons approving the cash assistance at that time. It was discovered that another agency had money in the HAP program contract at that time but they contended they could not write any more checks because they risked not meeting their payroll if the reimbursement check were not received on time. While it is fortunate that agencies who handle cash assistance can make funds available quickly once a request is made, it is unfortunate that agencies who request funds from the Department have had to wait at least six weeks for those funds'. It normally takes weeks for a voucher to be processed. Also, DCFS can process a check but the release of the check is controlled by the State Comptroller's Office which is beyond DCFS's control. Unfortunately, the cash assistance system must allow for these realities.

1 For example, Sullivan House "walked" a request to DCFS on 9/11/95. They received the $50,000 requested on 10/24/95 (6 weeks later) and in one day, after receiving that amount, wrote $17,000 worth of checks. On 11/8/95 they filed another request for $50,000 and on 12/15/95, when the Norman Liaison contacted them, they had not yet received the money.
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11
In this particularly troublesome time, money did not reach the agencies until after Christmas; it was only after immediate and extraordinary efforts by the staff of the Office of Litigation Management, consuming countless hours, that the situation was remedied. Besides the obvious, there are a number of other reasons why this situation cannot continue to occur. Only three will be noted here. First, with six agencies in Chicago, individual supervisors may call several and, not finding funds, become discouraged at this time consuming task and give up. Frequently, one of the agencies might have adequate funds but are not called. Secondly, it becomes impossible for individual agencies to make budget projections because requests for their dollars surge when another agency is out of money. The third problem is that sometimes agencies who have money have refused to write checks for other areas because of their concern they will run out and have no money for their own HAP contract clients when they need it. Also, Bobbie Evans, who had been the statewide Norman Regional Liaison, had left that position in November, 1995 until then she had been the person responsible for troubleshooting these cash assistance problems which may explain why the Department was not on top of the situation. This is even more reason why the Automated Cash Assistance System is critical, it will not rely on individual situations to drive the system. See Appendix L. for the cash assistance agencies statewide.
DCFS has been aware of all of these problems and made a commitment to rectifying the problem. The Norman Cash Management System has been in the development stage for almost two years and is to become fully operational on July 1, 1996. This system allows supervisors to data enter all cash assistance requests while eliminating additional paperwork; it automatically keeps track of monies encumbered by contract and immediately supplies information when the agency has reached a $10,000 level so that more monies can be issued to the agency.
Many problems occur because of a lack of communication between the Department and the contract agencies. Just before the period when no agency had funds in Cook, supervisors had been approved to sign for Norman Funds. This had been a recommendation of the Monitor and had the desired effect of identifying cases and approving expenditures more quickly for the most effective results. It's difficult to believe there could be a "downside" to this but, unfortunately, there was. The Department had failed to notify the agencies about the new authorized signatures and when requests were received, there was a confusion at the agencies who wrote checks. Fortunately, the agencies honored the request but certainly put themselves in jeopardy of being accused of expending funds with unauthorized signatures. In addition to this problem, the agencies might have been able to at least prepare for the increase in requests since it is probable that with supervisors being able to approve requests, a certain increase did result.
29

FA

/_ b

The above situation clearly shows the lack of communication between the Department and their contract agencies. Another example of this was when Bobbie Evans was transferred and no longer was the liaison to HAP agencies; not only were the agencies not informed about the change, they weren't given the name of the person who replaced Bobbie. A comment from one agency person says it all, "The burden is always on agencies working with D.C.F.S. to figure out what is going on there".

2. Conclusion: Downstate is in compliance. Cook County is out of compliance.
3. Data Source: Norman Liaisons cash assistance logs. Interviews with staff of Office of Litigation Management.
4. Recommendations:
a. HAP program and cash assistance monies are not co-mingled into one contract. Instead there could be two separate contracts. This will help ensure that funds are not depleted to lower than $10,000. This should be done for FY97, at least until the Automated Cash Assistance System is running, tested and identified problems are corrected, since unpredictable problems always occurs in any new system.
b. That Contracts for HAP and cash assistance agencies be completed well before the beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, 1996.
c. One contract person write all of these contracts which could help in coordination. That the contract negotiator be in close communication with the OLM.
d. The Statewide Norman Liaison continue bi-monthly contact with all Cook County cash assistance agencies to assess current status of each agency about their cash on hand and to expedite processing of vouchers, when necessary, and to notify the field offices immediately where funds are available if any agency has depleted their funds.
e. DCFS should ensure that all agencies have sufficient monies
30

I1
to carry them until FY'97 vouchers can be processed.
f. DCFS require all cash assistance approved in from January 1, 1996 to June 30, 1996 be entered into the Automated Cash Assistance System to ensure that the accounting for these expenditures are not lost to the system.
g. All current print outs on cash assistance record individual amounts for each region but don't total them. The Automated Cash Assistance System must be set up to total_ individual amount figures for each region both Downstate_and in Cook. This means writing the program to produce totals of figures entered both vertically and horizontally. The print out should generate the individual totals and the grant total for each region for at least the following: the amount of cash assistance spent, the number of families families receiving cash assistance for a) placement prevention or b) reunification and a break down of each type of expenditure (for which coding is done) such as security deposit, first month rent, furniture, utilities, etc. A summary sheet should also be generated that shows one sub-total for all Downstate Regions and one sub-total for all Cook County Regions and a State-Wide Grand Total.
h. That along with regularly scheduled sessions for training supervisors in the Automated Cash Assistance System, regularly scheduled make-up sessions for that purpose be set up to ensure that all supervisors have the opportunity to be trained.
i. DCFS hold a statewide Norman Liaisons meeting in September or October with major agenda items the automated cash assistance system, the discussion of any problems and to discuss the progress of the expedited AFDC checks and food stamps situation.
j. Ongoing training of Norman programs is essential for field staff within DCFS and with POS agencies.
k. Communication between the Department and their Contract Agencies must improve. The handling of this should be
31

(I
assigned to a person in DCFS who is well identified to the agencies.
1. That DCFS consider training a specific person or persons in the POS agencies to approve cash assistance up to $800 for their staff. For higher amounts then Norman Regional Liaison must approve.
C. Whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify families of class members by provision of hard services as defined in [Paragraphs 1 & 4]
1. Findings and Discussion: The Department takes exception to the conclusion that Cook
County was in non-compliance with this issue in the last report; it is true, our surveys have determined that DCFS was making certain reasonable efforts and that services were being provided. The finding was based upon the fact the while providing a service complies with providing reasonable efforts, reasonable efforts alone does not give the outcome measures of whether children are returning home within an appropriate time frame, especially when compared with other regions. Reasonable efforts are to be provided for a purpose, not an end in themselves. The Monitors' Fourth Report dated August 23, 1993, states on page 23, "Review of case records has consistently shown some level of services are being provided to clients. Case files however, are often incomplete, or in some instances, information is vague and sketchy. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the level of service provision. When reviewing records, the determination was made that reasonable efforts existed if any services were being provided, not necessarily a clinical judgement about the appropriateness of those services." Outcome measures such as reasonable efforts which resulted in permanent planning for children was not a standard used at that time.
The Department took exception to the finding that Cook County was out of compliance with reasonable efforts to prevent placements and to reunify families. Other regions in the state were able to make permanent plans for children at a higher rate. While there are demographic differences and other variables between Cook County Regions and most other Downstate Regions, the disparity between Cook and Downstate was significant. One criteria for this comparison might be the rate of incidence of Child Abuse/Neglect Reporting. The DCFS Fiscal Year 1995: Child Abuse and Neglect Annual Report Preview indicates that E. St. Louis Region, which has the most similar demographic make up and some of the same variables as Cook County, has the
32

A

1_ ,

highest reporting rate of 49% while Cook County's was 45.5%. Table II compares the total number of children returned home with the number of children returned home from Norman certified families.
The Executive Statistical Summary - January 1996 Prepared by: DCFS Office of Quality Assurance indicates some encouraging statistics regarding permanent planning. The open family cases has increased by 8.4% from the past year, while child cases have increased 10% The end of FY'95 statistics showed a substitute care growth of 20%. The number of wards adopted in the first seven months of FY'96 was 914 which is a 37.2% increase from the previous fiscal year.The Executive Summary - Five Year-Trend Report: Fiscal Years 1990-1994 indicates a 98% increase of children in care from 1990 (22,509) to FY'94 (44,517). The Department states the recommendations made in the Sixth Monitoring Report were outside the scope of the Norman Consent Decree. However, the Monitor contends class members are effected and therefore they were within the purview. At any rate, the programmatic recommendations made are being addressed by the Department. For instance, timely permanent planning efforts are being addressed by the Best Practices document and the development of training curriculum. Also, issues of timely provision emergency services and a return to a more social work orientation to Child Abuse/Neglect investigations is addressed in the Front End Redesign. The beginning of this initiative is found in From Child Protective Services to Family Intervention: Redesigning the Front Door Concept Paper. (Appendix B.)
From 1990 to 1994 out of home placements in Cook County increased by 126% while the downstate increase during the same time period was 44%. The current estimated out of home care caseload over 50,000 however, the last few months has shown a 12% increase in placements. While these statistics are encouraging the outcome goal of reasonable efforts is to increase the permanent planning for children. In Cook County much work on the planned changes is required before significant improvements will be noted.
2. Conclusion: a. Evidence is that Cook County is coming into compliance.
a. Downstate is in compliance.
3. Data Source:
a. Various DCFS statistical reports.
b. Upfront Redesign Committee, Practices Committee

33

d 1
4. Recommendations: a. The Department continue its reform efforts to increase the clinical skills of its staff and developing best practices initiatives.
b.The protocol for filing petitions in Cook County be completed and implemented.
D. The status of defendants efforts to implement and utilize the guidelines for caseworkers initiation of court action mandated by Paragraph 9(c) (i.e. timeliness guidelines for the caseworkers initiation of court action or reunification. [Paragraph 9(c),(f►]
1. Findings and Discussion: There continues to be concern by the Plaintiffs' Counsel
regarding the proper use, especially in Cook County, of the Juvenile Court to expedite the return home of children. This has been an issue since the first monitoring period. Policies established for implementation of the Consent Decree states that if the living circumstances are the primary factor preventing the return home of child, the achievement time frame for return home is 30 to 60 days. However, if the need can be alleviated within a much shorter time period, the worker shall immediately begin the process of petitioning the court for return home of the child. This policy has been in existence since the 1993. DCFS has, in the past, agreed that this is a problem in Cook County.
The Agreed Order entered into March 10, 1995 states in Paragraph 4, "By July 1, 1995, defendant will develop and implement a plan for Cook County providing for DCFS to:
(a) actively initiate petitions in Cook County Juvenile Court to return class members' children home and further family reunification, seek prompt, timely hearings of such petitions and initiate other related-activity as required by paragraph 9 (f) of the Consent Order; and
(b)provide screening of cases for compliance with the Consent Order prior to DCFS staff initiating legal action.
This plan will be submitted to the plaintiffs' counsel and the Monitor for their review and comment within 90 days of the entry of this Order."
While DCFS indicates they have had ongoing contact with the Cook County Juvenile Court, it is the monitor's understanding that they are still in the process of developing a protocol. Presiding Judge Salyers has been very cooperative with the Department. Under Judge Salyers administration The Citizen's Committee of
34

the Cook County Juvenile Court has sponsored several lunch and learn programs for the judges at the court. The Monitors attended one of those sessions in December, 1995, for a discussion regarding the Norman Consent Decree. Several of the Juvenile Court Judges expressed concern at this time that Norman programs were not being implemented to the extent they should. Several of the judges said that with many new DCFS staff on board, they had to inform the workers of the Norman resources.
The issue of developing a protocol with the Cook County Juvenile Court to initiate petitions for children's return home remains unresolved to date. The Department has hired four attorneys and plans to add two more to be assigned in the Cook County field offices to advise and counsel social workers for pre-screening of children's cases for adoption and for reunification. The Department is in the process of developing a protocol for initiating petitions for return home and for termination of parental rights. Plaintiffs' attorneys have been involved in an initial review of the protocol. The attorneys have already begin regularly scheduled training sessions in each of the Cook County field offices on Cook County Juvenile Court procedures and training on other legal issues related to their work in child welfare. This is a creative and innovative move toward helping staff help their clients through the Juvenile Court system. When these plans are fully implemented, DCFS should be in compliance with this provision of the Nonnan Consent Decree. However, since the protocol is not yet finalized or implemented DCFS is not in compliance.
2. Conclusion: Cook County DCFS is in non-compliance in Cook County.
3. Data Source:
a. Plaintiffs' Counsel and DCFS Counsel Nancy Eisenhauser.
b. Nancy Katz, DCFS legal counsel, Cook County Juvenile Court.
c. The Agreed Order entered February 27, 1995
4. Recommendations:
a. That DCFS complete its protocol for the initiating of return home petitions in Cook County Juvenile Court.
b. That DCFS share a copy of the protocol before finalization with the Monitor and with the Plaintiffs' Attorneys in order to allow input.
35

eI
E. Whether DCFS workers and case reviewers are sufficiently trained on the policies, procedures and rules related to the implementation of this Order [Paragraph 12].
1. Findings and Discussion: Training has been included in the Core training curriculum of
the Department. As stated in the Department's Response To The Sixth Monitoring Report, January 1 - December 31, 1994, December 11, 1995, page 4, all supervisors in the Department were trained as a result of the change in procedures to allow supervisors to certify families, approve cash assistance up to $800, refer families to HAP agencies and to directly access expedited AFDC checks. Currently the Housing Specialist is training all supervisors statewide on the use of the new Automatic Cash Assistance Program. It is somewhat ironic that immediately after the Department approved supervisors to sign for cash assistance, bringing the process closer to the Direct Service Worker, a massive transfer of cases to private agencies occurs; this takes the process of requesting cash assistance out of the Department's control and necessitates the development of a new system to insure private agencies' access to Norman resources. It might be recommended that each agency location have a list of supervisors at the Department who serve the same LANs sites to whom they might FAX the same form used by DCFS workers following approval by the private agency supervisor. That receiving DCFS supervisor would approve the request and data enter it into the Automated System; the private agency worker handling the case would then be advised to pick up the check from the agency that supplies the cash.
While the use of Norman programs were included in the training for Purchase of Service agencies it is obvious that more training is now needed, especially for private agency supervisors. No training has occurred of the private agencies on the Automated Cash Assistance Program. At present, POS agencies do not have access to the Department's computer system and a decision is needed to determine what method would be more effective for POS agencies to access referrals and funds. As the procedures develops, on-going training will be essential. Mr. Egan conducted Training of Chicago HAP workers and the Cook County Norman Liaisons regarding the operations and services of the Chicago Housing Authority occurred.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
3. Data Source: DCFS Response To The Sixth Monitoring Report, January 1 - December 31, 1994, December 11, 1995. Discussion with OLM staff, as well as Norman Regional Liaisons and supervisors and direct service staff.
36

-

I1

4. Recommendations: While DCFS is in compliance the following is recommended in order to ensure continued improvement in the use of the programs:
a. Continue the training of DFCS supervisors on the use of automated cash assistance system.
b. Develop a more comprehensive training of private agency staff on the Noonan programs and how to access them.
F. Whether the policies, procedures, and rule related to the terms of this Order are being properly applied and enforced through the administrative review process and the review provided in paragraph 13 (b) including whether children who are to be returned home by a set date have been returned home, and if not, whether the failure to return such children home results from noncompliance with the terms of this Order. [Paragraph 4, 9(a), 13]
1. Findings and Discussion: The ACR continue to be the major certifier of Norman
families although this is expected to decrease as supervisors can certify when living circumstances of a family are a barrier to the family regaining custody of their children. The ACR occurs every six months for children in substitute care and they are to ensure that all of the terms of this Consent Decree are followed. Quarterly reports are submitted to the Monitor which document the name of the client, the reason for involvement with the family, which requirements relate the parents' living circumstances which have been imposed in a service plan or otherwise, whether the parents' living circumstances are an obstacle to family preservation or reunification, the services or referrals, if any, provided by DCFS to correct the problem and the date on which any child in DCFS custody has returned or is projected to return home or a statement why return home is not the goal for the child.
ACR is also to conduct an special review of all children in Norman certified families when they do not return home on the projected date. The new automated ACR system provides an automatic tickler system to trigger these reviews. These reviews are being held. ACR staff think social workers continue to have a tendency to mark the next scheduled s ix month review however, this situation has improved. For most of the Nonnan children who have not returned home as scheduled, the reason tends to be due to things other than conditions of the living environment; often it is because of very special housing needs of the family. An example is a family finally housed last month with extraordinary housing needs. The wheelchair bound
37

mother was living in a nursing home because she had no adequate housing; her four teenage children were ready for return home, two of whom were in residential care. The mother, who received SSI, needed low income handicapped accessible housing. There is a dearth of housing for the disabled at any cost, it took extensive efforts by the HAP agency and the POS agency staffs finally working with the local governmental officials to secure low income housing for this family. Without the Norman funds this reunification would have been unlikely because of the special needs of this mother. The savings of the nursing home costs of the mother, the regular foster care of two children and the cost of residential care for two others is an example of the cost savings of this program in tax dollars but more importantly to the quality of life of this family. It took over a year to secure this housing after the scheduled return home date due to these conditions.
While there continues to be problems of children staying in the system longer than necessary especially in Cook County, the case review process helps to speed up even a very slow system. As the Department mentions in their response to the Sixth report other entities effect the return home of children such as the Cook County Juvenile Court which often makes excessive requirements, sometimes by the Guardian Ad Litem office, etc.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
3. Data Source: ACR automated report, interviews with several ACR and staff.
4. Recommendation: None
G. Whether class members are provided the full notice and appeal rights provided by the Order. [Paragraph 101
1. Findings and Discussion: This notification of the clients rights to appeal is part of the
Automated Cash Assistance System. Also automated is the ACR system therefore, if parents attend the ACR they are made aware of their Notice to Appeal. At the time of placement parents are given the Parent's Handbook.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
3. Data Source: Review of ACR printouts, review of Automated Cash Assistance System.
4. Recommendation: None
38

A

/.1

H. Whether defendant is making good faith efforts to reach necessary interagency agreements and to maximize funding and resources for hard services to class members. [Paragraph 5(c), 6(a), 7]
1. Findings and Discussion: The housing specialist has already sent letters to 63 housing
authorities inviting them join with DCFS for more unification funds for FY'97. Family Unification Funds have been awarded to the housing authorities and DCFS in Champaign, East St. Louis, Waukegan, and Cook County. There is an agreement with the Chicago Housing Authority and meetings did occur during this past reporting period, one of which included Director Jess McDonald. This agreement needs continued attention in the future to ensure maximum utilization. Some areas of the state have entered into agreements while other areas of the state report the lack of cooperation from their local housing authority. As DCFS has stated in their response, they can only enter into agreements with parties who are willing to do so. Many smaller communities have good working relationships between the staff of both agencies and see no need for a formal agreement. However, better working relationships need to be developed in some areas of the State.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance
3. Data Source: John Cheney-Egan, DCFS housing specialist.
4. Recommendation: None
I. Whether DCFS is taking all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA benefits to eligible persons. [Paragraph 6(b)] 1. Findings and Discussion: During the past year DCFS has referred 52 families, DPA scheduled 43
appointments with 37 interviews held for expedited AFDC benefits. This compares to 25 families referred and 19 interviews held for the previous year.
The agreement between the Illinois Department of Public Aid, DCFS provides for money to be available at the time the children return home. Normal channels means a process of several weeks before the monies are available. This is a valuable resource to help families adjust to the reunification process. The purpose of this agreement is to ensure that eligible families have AFDC checks and food stamps on the day the children return home from substitute care. This is extremely important for poor families in order to help stabilize the reunification process and lessen the financial stress.

39

eI
For mothers not currently receiving AFDC benefits but who might be eligible if the children were not in placement, the Child Welfare Supervisor must contact the DPA liaison at least 30 days before a firm return home date. If the family qualifies the check will be available on the day the children return home.
For families already receiving AFDC benefits a decision to approve or deny the request must be made within five (5) working days and authorization for the assistance must be initiated within two (2) working days. If eligible, the family will have the first months check and food stamps on the date the children return home. Previous to this agreement families had to utilize the regular application process which can take many weeks and can jeopardize the stability of the family reunification process.
During the past year 993 children from Norman certified families returned home. This represents over 476 families. While every family certified may not require funds in order to more quickly facilitate the return home; with over 75% of the families in Cook County eligible for Title IV-E funds at the time of placement one can only deduct that many more families are potentially in need of these funds.
When DCFS has determined a family is threatened with separation because of poverty and the children are in danger of foster care placement, DPA can authorize special assistance. In this case the family must file a written application to DPA by way of DCFS. The financial payment can be approved for rent, food, clothing, household supplies and household furnishings.
This situation does not provide for the immediate provision of monies when the placement of children is imminent. Therefore, this Consent Decree allows for immediate cash monies from cash assistance agencies with whom DCFS has a contract, which is paid directly to vendors in order to prevent placement. The current cash assistance programs are designed to issue checks within twenty-four hours.
Another agreement between DCFS and DPA is the continuance of the adult only portion of the AFDC grant. Under current policy children who are taken into DCFS temporary custody must be removed from the AFDC grant. However, if DCFS anticipates the children can return home within 90 days they can authorize the adult-only portion of the grant to continue if no other children reside in the home.
While retaining the adult only portion of the grant is a great stride forward, it has been discussed between Plaintiffs' Counsel and the Defendants, on several occasions, the possibility of requesting a federal waiver for federal reimbursement for preservation of the entire AFDC grant 30 days prior to reunification and during the 90 days after placement. Plaintiffs' Counsel concern is the prevention of homelessness which could once again delay the return home of children.
CIi]

l
The DCFS response to the last monitoring report indicates the monitor partially found DCFS in non-compliance due to the lack of a request for a federal waiver. The Monitor's report only indicated the opinion of partial compliance rather than noncompliance on this issue.
Non-compliance was found on the issue of utilizing expedited AFDC benefits for the reunification of children in substitute care based on the data provided. DPA speculates that this procedure is known to staff in both Departments and the expedited process may in fact occur without the knowledge of the Central Offices. Due to other issues of non-compliance the Monitor finds it unlikely that the expedited process is occurring at the rate it should. The Monitor's interviews with liaisons and staff supports the finding that it is not being utilized to anywhere near the extent it could be, although the Monitor agrees it may be occurring in some instances. Supporting documentation is necessary to find DCFS in compliance on this issue since none of the information of the Monitor supports any significant use of an expedited AFDC process. The Purchase of Service Design will also effect this process since many private agency personnel are unaware of this resource. Norman issues were mentioned in the POS redesign training however, more is needed for the large private agency staff to fully understand and integrate this process into their case planning. Of course, the ACR staff reviews all children in private agency foster homes which provides a check point on this issue.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in non-compliance in the utilization of expedited AFDC benefits to families whose children are re-unified.
3. Data Source: Statewide Report of DCFS Norman (Reunification) Cases: Yearto-Date -- 1995 Prepared by Program Management Section (Norm 1994), Illinois Department of Public Aid, January 10, 1996, interviews with OLM staff and DCFS field staff.
4. Recommendations:
a. More training of staff at all levels including private agency staff.
b. DCFS needs to develop a more efficient way for purchase of service agencies providing full service to DCFS families access DPA expedited checks once the are aware of the resource other than through the Norman Regional Liaisons. DCFS needs to authorize more people in the Department to be responsive to this need.
41

'I
J. Whether defendant's risk assessment practices and policies are consistent with the terms of the Order. [Paragraph 1, 4, 9(d)] 1. Findings and Discussion: In Paragraph 1 of the Consent Order, "risk assessment" is
defined as "the process by which DCFS determines whether children can safely remain in or return to the custody of their parents." and in Paragraph 4, 9(d) it states, " DCFS shall establish risk assessment methods dealing with issues of living circumstances that are consistent with the provisions of this Consent Order."
As stated in previous reports of the Monitor DCFS established a Comprehensive Social Assessment process which includes risk assessment. Risk Assessment Factor 4-Environmental Condition of the Home specifically assesses issues of this Consent Decree. Definitions of the ratings for this factor can be seen in Appendix M.
In response to the implementation of a safety assessment protocol, which was mandated by the Illinois legislature PA 88-614 in September, 1994, a multi-disciplinary Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP) Advisory Committee was formed. This legislation required that DCFS develop: a standardized child endangerment risk assessment protocol; related training procedures for all DCFS workers and supervisory staff and contract staff; a standardized demonstration of proficiency in the use of the protocol; an evaluation of the reliability and validity of the protocol.
The advisory committee and key DCFS staff developed, with the consultants from the American Humane Association (Children's Division), the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol. (See Appendix N.) Barbara Shaw, Chairperson of the Domestic Violence Advisory Committee (which was formed as part of this Decree), was a member of this advisory committee as well as the Monitor who also became a certified trainer and helped to train DCFS and private agency staff. Over 6,000 child welfare staff statewide have been trained in this protocol. Of these approximately 90% of the trainees passed the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Certification Test. The safety plan for children, which is part of this protocol, includes environmental issues and the programs specified in this Decree. All issues pursuant to this Consent Decree are included in these two documents.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in Compliance
3. Data Source: Membership in the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Advisory Committee. Training in the Risk Assessment Protocol.
4. Recommendation: None
42

A.
K. Whether the decision, if made, that a child cannot be expected to return within 90 days as contemplated by [Paragraph 6(a) (i) (A] is not being made for reasons of administrative or fiscal convenience.
1. Findings and Discussion: While the number of children in substitute care has risen to
staggering proportions, there is no indication that children are remaining in placement because of any administrative or fiscal convenience.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
3. Data Source: Review of DCFS statistical data from all regions and other DCFS reports and interviews with staff at all levels.
4. Recommendation: None
L. Whether the liaisons provided to handle the compliance of class counsel are performing in a satisfactory manner. [Paragraph 13(a)]
1. Findings and Discussion: The person responsible for this function has changed during
this reporting period. This function has been delegated to John Cheney-Egan, the housing specialist, and his supervisor, Mary Sue Morsch, who is head of the Office of Litigation Management. While both individuals are extremely competent they both have heavy responsibilities elsewhere. Plaintiffs' Counsel report it would be preferable to have the single person responsible who can be more readily accessible in crisis situations. It always works more smoothly when there is one designated person to handle the many issues from the field related to this Consent Decree. They also contend that to add the responsibility of liaison to Mr. Egan will take time away from his very sensitive position as housing specialist. This is a critical year for the housing specialist as he sets up the FUP programs in the state, seeking new housing authorities Statewide and assists in planning a housing conference. The duties of the Statewide liaison includes approving all cash assistance requests above the maximum amount allowed by regional liaisons, dealing with the many cash assistance issues for over twenty agencies statewide and dealing with questions and complaints statewide.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in basic compliance.
43

4.1
3. Data Source: Plaintiffs' Counsel and DCFS Office of Litigation staff.
4. Recommendation: That DCFS name another person to serve as backup to Mr. Egan and Ms. Morsch when neither are available or to name a full time person to this function.
M. Whether the Housing Advocacy Program is successful; [Paragraph 7(a)]
1. Findings and Discussion: During this reporting period the Housing Specialist has worked
vigorously with Housing Advocacy Programs statewide. On July 31, the response to the Statewide Review of the Housing Advocacy Prograins was submitted. (Appendix 0.) Prior to this report, it was not possible to adequately assess the success of the programs because of inadequate data collection. He has changed the reporting requirements of the HAP agencies to DCFS; it is now a single form which will make data collection easier and more reliable. (Appendix P.)
There are currently twenty-one HAP agencies statewide. (Appendix 0.) There were 175 families housed for the last six months of 1995. The new form was not devised until July 1, 1996, also, due to some technical data entry problems, the detailed information on all families referred is not available however, Table VII depicts the activity of the HAP that is available. These numbers approximate the numbers from the Monitors' housing report included in the last monitoring report. At that time the housing specialist was not hired. Since that time he has implemented most of the recommendations of the Monitors' housing report and while there continues to be problems in collecting the data from the HAP agencies there is much improvement in this area.
The HAP programs have been successful in placing referred clients into housing. Since this a new program to the field of child welfare the Monitor suggests the housing specialist begin to develop some criteria from which performance evaluations could be made on the different programs. Now that more realistic reporting requirements from the HAP agencies are in place some initial evaluations can be made. The housing specialist has visited all of the DCFS regions to discuss staffs satisfaction with the HAP agencies performance and to determine future need. Two new agencies will be added beginning July 1, 1996.
TABLE VII
44

E

I!

HAP Agencies Number of Clients Served

AGENCY

SERVED HOUSED STABILIZED

Bridgeway

9

6

3

Champaign County Regional Planning

21

11

1

Community Economic Dev. Assoc.

1

Community Home Service Plus

1

Fifth Renaissance

24

Habilitative Systems

8

Lutheran Children & Family Services

30

12

0

SER/Jobs for Progress

1

Traveler's & Immigrants Aid

49

Urban League of Metro E. St. Louis

31

19

Total

91.

132

4

2. Conclusion: DCFS is in Compliance.

3. Data Source: a. Discussions with the DCFS housing specialist.

b. Data reports supplied by DCFS

4. Recommendation: a. DCFS should host or co-host a statewide Housing Conference which has been discussed extensively in previous reports.

b. The housing specialist should develop performance criteria for HAP agency evaluations.

45

II
N. Whether the manual of referral services is complete and adequate. [Paragraph 8]
1. Findings and Discussion: Since the beginning of monitoring, concerns have been raised
regarding the accessibility and usability of the Resource Manual originally developed to be in compliance with this Consent Decree. Previous reports have recommended the development of a computerized resource directory. Computerization was considered far too expensive to develop during the five years of monitoring. Finally, it was agreed the original localized resource directory was considered too costly to update because it is a hard copy. Unfortunately, it becomes out of date quickly. Therefore, it was agreed that DCFS would provide various localized hard copy resource directories already available in many of the communities such as those published by United Ways from varied locations. One big omission by DCFS is a lack of communicating to its own staff about the many resources held by DCFS through contractual agreements, especially in Cook County. Staff in this region are not familiar with the Department's own resources developed contractually. The Monitor has deemed the Department at minimal compliance with this section; it is imperative that the Department make available to staff information related to their own resources. As a result the Monitor will take the liberty of making this recommendation.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in minimal compliance.
3. Data Source: Interviews with Department staff at all levels.
4. Recommendations: a. While DCFS is in basic compliance, it is recommended DCFS develop an automated resource manual. This idea has been recommended by committee members of the Front End Redesign. How this might be accomplished has been discussed in all previous monitoring reports.
b. That DCFS make known, especially to DCFS staff in Cook County, the contractual resources it has developed by the program plans and referral process for service.
46

I
O. Whether DCFS is implementing its protocol for locating absent parents. [Paragraph 9(e)]
1. Findings and Discussion: DCFS has automated the Administrative Case Review system. One
element on this review is the question of whether the locating absent parent protocol is being followed. Also, with more emphasis upon terminating parental rights for those children for which it is appropriate, many more diligent searches for absent parents are being made. A recent study in the Bates Consent Decree found an encouraging number of children being returned to non-custodial parents with indications that locating absent parent protocols have been used when children are removed from custodial parents for reasons of abuse and or neglect.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
3. Data Source: DCFS automated case review data. Discussion with ACR staff, social workers, and administrators.
4. Recommendation: None
P. Whether DCFS is implementing domestic violence policy [Paragraph 4(c)]
1. Findings and Discussion: Barbara Shaw, Executive Director of the Illinois Council for the
Prevention of Violence has spearheaded the DCFS Domestic Violence Advisory Committee with the assistance of the DCFS Domestic Violence Specialist, Marion Houston. They have worked diligently in the development of program plans, training and general awareness of domestic violence which is a major issue affecting the abuse and neglect of children. The literature is replete with the correlation between the two factors. This growing body of research points to a definite link between adult domestic violence and child abuse and the connections are pervasive. Forty-five to seventy percent of battered woman in shelters report that their batterers have also committed some form of child abuse. Even using the conservative figure, child abuse is 15 times more likely to occur in households where adult domestic violence is also present. Women who have been beaten by their spouses are, in turn, reportedly twice as likely as other women to abuse a child. It is also estimated that 3.3 million to 10 million children witness domestic violence each year. Many child witnesses of domestic violence experience increased problems themselves.
47

A variety of family dynamics are at work in homes where spouse abuse leads to child abuse and neglect. Sometimes a child is the unintended victim when he or she attempts to intervene in an attack on a parent. In other instances, a child is accidentally struck by a blow directed at the mother. However, many other children are deliberate targets in violent households. The severity of wife beating is also predictive of the severity of child abuse, and the manner in which children are abused bears a strong resemblance to the type of maltreatment experienced by their mothers.
For these reasons the work of the DV Task Force is so important. This group has finalized the Domestic Violence Protocol.(Appendix R.) This is a pilot project which will be included in the Department's Front End Redesign pilots. The ICPV and the Department have entered into a contractual agreement whereby ICPV will assist the Department in the development of the Domestic Violence Project. The goal of the project is to integrate domestic violence sensitive policies and procedures within child protection, family preservation, and family support practice. It will also help facilitate coordination between domestic violence service providers and DCFS workers. The ICVP will be working with DCFS on the following tasks during the next year:
"1. Assisting in the coordination of staffing of the DCFS Domestic Violence Advisory Committee;
2. Assisting in the integration of the Domestic Violence Protocol into the Front-End Redesign pilots;
3. Development of a training curricula for pilot site DCFS supervisors and workers on domestic violence and use of the protocol;
4. Development of data collection methods for measuring incidence of domestic violence in the DCFS caseload and for evaluating supervisor/worker responses to CERAP screening, safety and service planning, and coordination with specialized domestic violence service providers;
5. Development of a training video and curriculum for training of local LANS on domestic violence and its relationship to child protection, family preservation and family support;
6. Development and start-up of a training plan to provide all local LANS on domestic violence training over the next 18 months;
7. Continued participation in various DCFS work groups (Risk Assessment, Family Centered Services, Front-End Redesign, etc.) represents domestic violence issues."
The Nonnan Consent Decree has stated in Paragraph 4 (c) that rather than removing children from the parent's custody based on domestic violence when the child is not in imminent danger, it should refer the parents for services to obtain an order of protection, explore possible alternative housing (e.g. relatives) and locating and transporting the family to a shelter for battered woman. It requires the abused parent receive direct services in order to protect the children. Because of this
48

Consent Decree the link between domestic violence and child abuse has been further recognized and has brought together members of the child welfare community and the domestic violence community in seeing the abused also as a victim rather than a passive participant in the abuse. It recognizes when the abused seeks help in protecting herself and her children the women will receive help rather than scorn from the child welfare professionals. DCFS has gone far beyond the recognition of the problem and has wholeheartedly supported this effort.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in full compliance
3. Data Source: Interviews with DCFS Domestic Violence Specialist Marion Houston and Barbara Shaw, Executive Director, Illinois Council on the Prevention of Violence, and attendance at the Domestic Violence Advisory Committee meetings.
4. Recommendation: None
Q. Whether DCFS has sought all federal funds available to assist class members in obtaining hard services. [paragraph (7)1.
1. Findings and Discussion: Every year DCFS responded to the Notice Of Filing An Application
(NOFA) for the Family Unification Program (hereafter FUP). This is an innovative program developed by the Federal government to bring together local housing authorities and child welfare agencies to provide Section 8 certificates to child welfare families. The FUP was authorized by Congress as part of the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 and received first time funding of $50 million in 1992 and raised to $75 million in 1993. The Child Welfare League of American has provided technical assistance to member agencies and to housing authorities to bring together these two local public agencies to administer this new housing subsidy program.
This program was developed because families with children are the fastest growing population among the homeless, accounting for one-third of the nation's homeless population in 1992. This number has only increased in the last 3 1/2 years. The Federal government recognizes that homelessness often results in the unnecessary separation of children. The Family Unification Program provides housing assistance, through the Section 8 program, to families who meet the regular Section 8 eligibility criteria and whose children are at risk of placement in substitute care, or delayed in returning home from care, because of homelessness or severe housing conditions. It is a catalyst for public child welfare agencies and housing authorities to work together to meet the housing needs of families and children and to better understand the links
49

between housing and child welfare issues.
For the purpose of these funds, the definition of inadequate housing is defined in the regulations of the Family Unification Program as one or any combination of the following: 1) living in substandard housing; 2) homeless; or 3) involuntary displacement from housing units because of actual or threatened violence against a family member. As mentioned earlier, lack of adequate housing is an increasing problem of families in the child welfare system. The monies spent in Illinois during the past year on housing alone was almost $600,000 which includes security deposits, first months rent, and repairs. When we compare these and other costs of subsistence for families, as has already been stated, the cost savings to the State is approximately $23 million. The greatest cost savings is to the lives of the children who have been spared the trauma of separation from family and friends. The savings to the psychological development of the children cannot be measured.
The significance of the Section 8 certificates is that it ensures a reduced rent for families in poverty. It is known, with our experience with the Housing Assistance Program, low rents for housing, which families can continue to maintain after the initial assistance to secure the housing, is becoming more and more difficult to obtain. For instance, this spring in Chicago the Chicago Tribune had a lead story indicating that rents were going up an average of ten percent. These increases occur on a regular basis and the AFDC grant to the family is remaining basically the same; as housing costs increase, it is taking up the major portion of the AFDC grant. This is forcing many families to move with other families and forcing more families into more and more crowded conditions. The stress of overcrowding itself can lead to the abuse and neglect of children.
Four Illinois areas have received funding for Section 8 certificates: East St. Louis - 50; Waukegan - 50; Champaign - 25; Cook County, excluding the City of Chicago) - 31. John Cheney-Egan, DCFS Housing Specialist has met with all of the housing authorities and DCFS staff in those areas to establish the linkage between the housing authorities and the child welfare families who will be recipients of these certificates.
Mr. Egan has already sent out sixty-three letters to housing authorities throughout Illinois inviting them to join DCFS is applying for Family Unification funds for FY'97. The Federal fiscal year begins October 1, 1997.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in full compliance.
3. Data Source: Discussions with John Cheney-Egan, Housing Specialist.
4. Recommendations: None
50

FA

'_

V. CONCLUSION
Many accomplishments are credited the Department during this reporting period. The approval of supervisors to sign for and approve Norman funds and resources and the finalization of the Automnated Cash Assistance Program are major strides. The addition of the domestic violence specialist and the housing specialist has aided tremendously in the implementation of these programs. Mr. Egan's knowledge of housing has been a tremendous asset resulting in improved services to the HAP agencies. Now that he is involved in the cash assistance issues improvement is expected in that area. The only concern is additional duties will detract from his many duties related to the housing programs.
The Department is to be lauded for entering into this innovative and creative Consent Decree with the LAFC. The Department has been responsive to most of the recommendations of the Monitor in areas needing improvement. Recognizing the problems in the child welfare system, Director McDonald has demonstrated the courage to embark on massive reform efforts to the system. These reforms will effect the positive implementation of the Norman Consent Decree. Some of the programs established as a result of this Decree are in full compliance while others are not. There are plans to come into compliance with those areas which are problematic, however, they are in varying degrees of implementation and the outcome results have not yet occurred. Therefore, the Honorable Judge Hart entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order on April 11, 1996 (Appendix A) which includes many of these areas to be monitored during the calendar year 1996.
The major issues for this current year are many aspects of the certification and cash assistance system, the expedited AFDC benefits and developing protocol with the Cook County Juvenile Court to expedite the return home of children. The POS Redesign needs to be reviewed as it relates to the Norman programs in order to make these services more available to the private sector. The reporting of the cash assistance expenditures by region, downstate, and statewide needs to be developed in compliance with the Decree so that it can be tabulated relative to the amount of monies spent for placement prevention and reunification and the category for which the grants were made (i.e. shelter, furniture, etc.).
The cost effectiveness of this program has been documented with an estimated $23 million for the past year. Recommendations by the Monitor have been made for those areas needing improvement to help move the Department into compliance with this Consent Decree, these are made in the spirit of providing assistance to the Department.

JE"ANINE SMITH LCSW 51

V
APPENDICES A NORMAN CASH MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:
Automated Cash Assistance Program
B From Child Protective Services to Family Intervention: Redesigning the Front Door: Concept Paper
C Memorandum Opinion and Order, April 11, 1996 D A Model of Practice for the Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services E Norman Certification Data: Currently Certified Norman Families, % of
State Periods 1-9; Norman Families & Children with 02 Goal; Currently Certified Norman Families Reason & Certifier 9 F January, 1996 Review of 02 Cases
G DCP Statewide Review Norman Cash Assistance: Purpose of Cash Assistance Periods 8 & 9;
H Expenses by Prevention/Reunification and Average Expenditure Per Family Per Region 8 & 9
I Policy Transmittal 95.21 Revision to the Norman Procedures
J DCFS Response to Sixth Monitoring Report January I - December 31, 1996 K List of Norman Liaisons L List of Cash Assistance Agencies Statewide M Risk Assessment Factor 4 - Environmental Conditions of the Home
Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP) N Safety Assessment Form
0 Response to Statewide Review of Housing Advocacy Program P List of HAP Agencies Statewide Q HAP Closing Form and Draft Request for Cash Assistance /Housing
Assistance R Draft Domestic Violence Protocol
52

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, et. al.

}

}

Plaintiffs,

vs

}

} No. 89 C 1624

} Judge William T. Hart

Jess McDonald,

}

}

Defendant

}

EIGHTH MONITORING REPORT

Date:

May 7, 1997

Period Covered: January 1, 1996 - December 31, 1996

This report is submitted to the Court pursuant the Consent Order which mandates that the monitor gather valid and reliable information to "measure and ensure compliance" with the terms of the Order. This report relates to only those issues of monitoring stipulated in the Order of April 11, 1996, which states, "... The Eighth Monitoring Report shall cover the calendar year 1996. That report will basically be limited to the areas of non-_ compliance that have been shown. It will be limited to reporting compliance with nT 5 (a) (Cook County only), 5(b) (Cook County only), 6(b), and 9(c) of the Consent Order and DCFS's methods of determining eligibility, whether through certification or otherwise. For calendar year 1996 defendant shall comply with the information reporting requirements of I![ 15(a), (b) (Cook County only), (d), and (i). Defendant shall also comply with 11 1 9 11, ¶ 15(e), 15(f), as they relate to n^[ 5(a), 5(b), 6(b) and 9(c)."

John Cheney-Egan DOE'S Office of Litigation Management
160 N. LaSalle, 6th floor Chicago IL 60601

I.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. PREFACE The Norman Consent Decree requires the Monitor file semiannual reports providing information regarding compliance with
the stipulation of the Decree. This, the Eighth Monitoring
Report, covers the calendar year 1996 and limits the reported
information pursuant to The Honorable Judge William T. Hart
issuing a Memorandum o p inion and Order on April 11, 1996. The information subject to report is confined mainly to Cook County (See Appendix A.)
In recognition that Child Neglect is the most commonly
reported form of child maltreatment and the link between poverty and the likelihood of child neglect reports exists, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, hereafter the Department or DCFS, has made good faith efforts
and a real commitment to complying with the Norman Consent
Decree. This is one possible solution to ensure that families are not reported to the system simply because of a poverty.
Throughout the period of monitoring this Decree, improvements have been obvious; this eighth period is no exception.
B. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1. Accomplishments During This Report Period.
• In the last six months of this calendar year, the Norman Computerized Automated Case Assistance Payment Authorization System has been put in place and, during this period, cash assistance data was correct in determining the exact expenditures to families, identifying the purpose for which the money was given and maintaining a current balance of funds to every cash assistance agency so that funds are not depleted. (See Appendix F for all cash assistance data.)
• Currently there are 2,394 certified Norman families with a child with a return home goal; this compares with the largest
number previously reported for the 8th and 9th period of 1,529 and 1,729, respectively. (See Appendix C all certification data).
• The Department has authorized that direct line supervisors can now certify cases for Norman services which has resulted in this being the largest category of staff currently certifying.
• A comparative study completed in 1996 reveals 14% of the cases in Cook County had Norman issues and were not certified compared to 23% in the previous year. (See Appendix E.)
2

• Cook County disbursed more Norman funds during this period than had ever been reported previously. $574,432 was given to 637 families in this, the 11th period. Prior to this, the single highest expenditure had been in Period 8 with $229,613 distributed to 262 families.
• The Administrative Case Review Process is working well in relation to policies, procedures and rules related to the terms of this Order.
^., • During this past year the Norman programs have become integrated into the ongoing resource bank of DCFS services to children and families.
•A cost benefit analysis estimates that in this final six month period, almost $27 million was saved ($26,760,568).
2. - Areas Needing Improvement The accomplishments are impressive but there remains areas in which improvement is needed.
• While the certification rate is up, it is not in line with the increase in children entering the system. More work on identifying families who are certifiable is needed.
• The Cook County Regional Counsels Screening Packets for Return Home of Children are "ready to go" and should be initiated as quickly as the packets are received. A Regional Counsel is in the process of being hired for Cook County Protective Services. This issue has been discussed for the six years of the Consent Decree and implementation (See appendix I.)
• There is under-utilization of the expedited AFDC, hereafter known as the Department of Public Aid Norman Application Program or DPA-NAP.
• That more training of Cook County direct service workers on DPA-NAP be conducted as indicated in the recommendations of the DPA-NAP study conducted by Office of Litigation Management be implemented. The Monitor supports all of the recommendations made in this well done study conducted by the DCFS Office of Litigation Management. (See Appendix G.)
CONCLUSIONS
The Department has been effective in developing innovative programs to support good child welfare practice. This effort is continuing in order. to take their place in the arena of "best practice" concepts.
3

Cook County still struggles to come up to the standards of expectation in regard to this Decree. More families must be identified for certification, more funds can be made available for
reunification and prevention and more children must be returned home. More training is needed especially in the area of utilizing
DPA NAP. The Cook County Regional Counsels Screening Packet for Return Home of Children needs to be in place as, quickly as possible to take advantage of this important review. Primarily, the conclusions deal with effecting ways to ensure the return of children to their homes with as much speed and resources backing that decision as possible.
4

II. COMPLIANCE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Whether defendant is properly determining who is and is not a class member (Cook County) [Paragraph 3(b)]
1. Conclusion: Cook County continues in non-compliance but significant improvement is noted.
2. Recommendation: a. Continued training of staff at all levels to ensure the gains of the past six months are sustained.
B. Whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance to eligible class members. In addition, DCFS is not to use this program as a replacement for or result in any action to eliminate any other source of cash assistance for class members to which DCFS has access including "exceptions to policy." Whether DCFS has administered this program in such a way as to maximize federal reimbursement for DCFS's expenditures. Also, whether DCFS has maintained records of every grant made including the needs it was intended to meet, etc. (Cook County) [Paragraph 5(a),(b).
1. Conclusion: Cook County is coming into compliance.
2. Recommendation Continued re-training of Cook County staff is needed.
C. Whether DCFS provides plaintiffs' counsel with drafts of all' new policies, procedures, programs, rules, etc. for implementation of the provisions of this Consent Order at least 30 days prior of effective date. [Paragraph 11].
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
2. Recommendation: None
D. Whether DCFS has determined if not permitted by federal law, that DPA will maintain eligibility for a family at least 90 days during a period of DCFS protective or temporary custody, if permitted by law the amount of such AFDC benefits will not be reduced because DCFS has protective or
k,

temporary custody of such children, if the temporary custody is not expected to last beyond the 90 days.[Paragraph 6(a)].
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in non-compliance
4. Recommendation: a. DCFS continue its Norman training effort.
b. DCFS should explore the possibility of an AFDC family retaining the children's portion of the grant for 90 days after the children are placed when reunification is anticipated during that time frame and providing the children's portion thirty days in advance of reunification.
E. Whether DCFS is taking all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA benefits to eligible persons. [Paragraph 6(b)].
1. Conclusion: DCFS is in non-compliance statewide. Good faith efforts are being made to come into compliance.
4. Recommendations: a. DCFS should ensure that the Norman Divisional Liaison position remain a permanent position within the Department. b. An additional staff person be assigned to the DCFS Norman Divisional Liaison due to the large volume of work and that social work interns continue to be assigned to this unit for the purpose of implementation of Norman programs. c. That DCFS and Plaintiffs' Counsel convene a meeting to discuss any possible impact of Welfare Reform on this provision of the Consent Decree. d. That the recommendations of the survey conducted by OLM be implemented.
F. Whether DCFS has established reasonable time guidelines within which DCFS workers should ordinarily return children home or initiate court action for use in cases where problems with living circumstances are preventing reunification. [Paragraph 9(c),15 (c)(f)]. (i.e. timeliness guidelines for the caseworkers initiation of court action for reunification.)
6

1. Conclusion: While the protocol has been finalized and the structure is in place to begin, the protocol has not yet been implemented therefore, at this writing DCFS is in noncompliance in Cook County.
4. Recommendation: That DCFS initiate the screening of cases for return home as soon as packets are received by the Regional legal counsels.

G. That DCFS workers and case reviewers are sufficiently trained on the policies, procedures and rules related to the implementation of this Order. [Paragraph 15 (e)]

1. Conclusion: DCFS is in non-compliance on training regarding the DPANAP program. The number of training -sessions is impressive as well as the comprehensive nature of the training itself. However, more ongoing training is needed.

4. Recommendation:

DCFS continue training sessions on all

_

Norman programs with emphasis upon the DPA-NAP.

H. That the policies, procedures and rules related to the terms of this Order are being properly applied and enforced through the Administrative Case Review process and the review provided in Paragraph 13 (b) [Paragraph 15 (f)]
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance
4. Recommendation: None

7

III. INTRODUCTION
'This is the eighth report representing the eleventh semiannual reporting period for the monitoring of the Norman Consent Decree entered into on March 31, 1991. Paragraph 15 of the Consent Decree stipulates those areas which were to be monitored on a semiannual basis. Prior to the entering of the Seventh Monitoring Report, Plaintiffs' Counsel filed a petition to extend the monitoring period. The Honorable Judge William T. Hart issued a Memorandum O p inion and Order, April 11, 1996. The essence of this order is as follows:
"Jess McDonald is substituted for Sue Suter. Motion [209-1] is granted in part and denied in part. Motion [209-2] is denied without prejudice. Seventh Report due April 30, 1996. Eighth Report covering 1996 shall be limited to $5 5(a)(Cook County), 5(b) (Cook County), 6(b), and 9(c) and
Norman eligibility. For 1996, defendant shall comply with 1[1[ 15(a),(b), (Cook County), (d), and (1) 11, 15e, and 15(f)..." (See Appendix A.)
The areas stipulated above for review by the monitor for this report are related to: 1) Norman certification for Cook County; 2) sufficient cash assistance for Cook County and the proper data reporting requirements; 3) whether federal funds are being maximized; 4) expedition of AFDC benefits for Norman certified families; and 5) whether there are guidelines for the initiation of return home petitions in Cook County Juvenile Court.
The Seventh Monitoring Report was filed on June 3, 1996. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (hereafter known as the Department or DCFS) filed their response with a work plan in November, 1996. (See Appendix B.)
As described in detail in the Sixth and Seventh Monitoring Reports the Department is moving forward in the many ambitious reform efforts initiated by Director Jess McDonald. The
most significant of these efforts include; 1) large numbers of
direct line supervisors are nearing completion of their Masters Degree in Social Work; 2) agency accreditation process is proceeding with seven sites having already passed; thirty additional sites are scheduled for accreditation review; 3) the pilots for the Front End Redesign are starting to be implemented; 4) several new initiatives for permanency planning for children have begun, which include emphasis upon adoption and obtaining a federal waiver to initiate subsidized guardianship of children; 5) extensive training efforts are taking place with an emphasis upon professional social work practice; 6) the Purchase of Service (hereafter POS) redesign has been initiated with almost threefourths of the Cook County foster care children now under the total supervision and case management of the private sector and; 7) the
8

Child Welfare Research Institute has been established at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.
During this past year under the leadership of Mary Sue Morsch, Administrator of the Office of Litigation Management and John Cheney-Egan, Divisional Norman Liaison, the programs made available through this innovative Consent Decree have become integrated into the ongoing resource bank of DCFS services and programs to children and families. While more utilization is indicated in some areas, the Department has made great strides.
The outcome measures for other areas of services to children also reflect improvement toward the permanency planning for children. It appears the Department has been able to stop the hemorrhaging of children into the system. The January, 1997 Executive Statistical Summary , prepared by DCFS Office of Quality Assurance reports some encouraging results. These data reflect changes from January, 1996, which include 4.7% increase of children in substitute care; a 2.6% decrease in the number of protective custodies taken; a 10% decrease in the number of children in institution/group home care; an 18.1% increase in the number of children serviced in non-substitute care (home of parent, etc.); and a 10.3% increase in adoptions. These data reflect commendable efforts on behalf of children. The return home rate of children however, continues to be a serious issue.
A. Norman Population The Child Abuse/Neglect allegations of inadequate
food, clothing, shelter and environmental neglect are potentially those allegations in which Norman certification can occur. Therefore, data on these allegations received by the State Central Registry are recorded. Tracked are those reports of allegations which are "Norman only" and "Norman and Other"." The latter cases., may be coupled with other allegations of child abuse and neglect. The total number of reports with Norman and Other allegations indicated for this period is 15,188 with 940 pending at the end of 1996. Of the 3,527 protective custodies of children taken, 749 children returned before initiation of court action. Of 33,108 reports received for Norman only allegations, 7,418 were indicated with 541 pending on December 3, 1996. The percentage of reports indicated are consistent with all eleven reporting periods.
There are currently 4,701 families certified for Norman services, 1,068 families were certified during the past twelve month period. This is the largest increase in the number of families certified in one year since the inception of the Consent Decree. There are 2,090 families with children currently in placement with a return home goal representing 5,088 children. (See Appendix C for all certification data.) Prior to the sixth reporting period there was a problem in decertification, therefore most of the data was related to cumulative totals not current
7

3..... a a.

_... . .

numbers certified.
The Norman Consent Decree's primary purpose is to ensure that no child enters or remains in substitute care for reasons of poverty. In the DCFS publication, Performance Contracting: Goals, Outcomes, and Strate g ies, March 3, 1997, the Department states, "The quarterly rate of reunification of children with their natural parents has plummeted from 7.4 per 100 in care during the first quarter of FY90 to less than 2.0 per 100 children during the first quarter of FY96..... the length of stay in foster care in Illinois now extends to a median duration of 32.7 months as compared to 17.2 months in California, 11.4 months in Michigan, 23.0 months in New York, and 8.4 months in Texas."
The Department has now begun aggressive planning efforts to focus on the permanency planning for children. These efforts are laudable. While the Department considers this concern outside the purview of the Norman Consent Decree, it is the Monitor's opinion that considering the under-certification of families. Some children may remain in foster care only because of Norman issues.
The Table below depicts the comparison of the children returned home whose families were Norman certified and total number of children returned home.

10

Table I Norman Children Returned Home Compared to All Children Returned Home
11th Period 7/1/-12/31/96

Region
1A-Rockford 1B-Peoria

Norman Children
19
101

% of State
3%
17%

All Children Returned
183.
296

2A-Aurora

40

7%

331

3A-Springfield 3B-Champaign

33

6%

208

104

17%

325

4A-E St. Louis 5A-Marion Total Downstate 6A-Cook Adm. 6B-Cook North 6C-Cook Central 6D-Cook South Total Cook Co. TOTAL STATEWIDE

51

9%

202

30

5%

152

378

64%

1697

0

0%

28

76

13%

309

43

7%

215

98

16%

319

217

36%

871

595

100%

2568

Data source: DCFM5061B (1/7/97)

% of State
7% 12% 13% 8% 13% 8% 6% 66% 1% 12% 8% 12% 34% 100%

While the overall reunification of children remains problematic, the placement of children in substitute care for Norman reasons only has not been noted. The Monitor has conducted several studies throughout the six years of this Consent Decree. These studies have failed to show any significant evidence that the placement of children was due to only reasons of poverty. The last such study was conducted on all protective custodies taken through Cook County Division of Child Protection for the months of September and October, 1996. Every third case was pulled for review. This study again substantiated the previous findings.

B. Cash Assistance DCFS spent approximately $2.2 million in FY'96,
and anticipates a total expenditure of over $3 million for FY'97. The budget for FY'98 has earmarked $3.3 million for all Norman programs. On July 1, 1996, the Department implemented the computerized Automated Cash Assistance Payment Authorization
11

System. This system has been discussed at length in previous reports. The Seventh Monitorin g Report contains the manual for this system which provides a complete description of its use. With this system, the Department can determine the exact expenditures to families, the purpose for which the money was spent, and whether it was spent for reunification or placement prevention. It also maintains a current balance of funds allocated to every cash assistance agency so that no agency depletes funds; this ensures rapid receipt of funds by the families.

Extensive statewide training on the new system was conducted for all DCFS supervisors and regional liaisons. A DCFS supervisor can authorize up to $800 per family; a Regional Norman liaison can approve up to $1200 per family and the Divisional Norman Liaison can approve up to $2,000. The training was conducted by John Cheney-Egan the Division Norman Liaison with the Office of Litigation Management.

Since the computerized Automated Cash Assistance Payment Authorization System was not operational until July 1, 1996 and supervisory authority to approve all Norman services was in effect January 1, 1996, the cash assistance data for the tenth reporting period is totally incorrect. Although supervisors were told at training to keep manual logs of their approvals many did not. Therefore, the cash assistance data for the tenth reporting is not available for this report. The Table II depicts the disbursement of funds for the eleventh reporting period, while this report relates to the compliance aspects of Cook County a comparison to downstate has merit.

TABLE II Cash Expenditures by Purpose Eleventh Period
July 1 - December 31, 1996

No. of Families

Category

Total Cost of Average Cost

Category

Per Family

DOWNSTATE

711

Prevention

$ 391,314

$ 550

194

Reunification $ 113,934

$ 587

905

Subtotal

$ 505,248

$ 558

COOK COUNTY

411

Prevention

$ 365,429

$ 889

226

Reunification $ 229,575

$ 1,016

637

Subtotal

$ 595,004

$ 934

TOTAL COST

$ 1,079,432

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A cost benefit analysis estimates that in this final six month period, almost $27 million was saved ($26,760,568). This figure is based on a very conservative estimate; it is based on the average size of a family being two children, placements being prevented for a one year period and reunification occurring six months earlier. We computed a yearly cost of care for a child at $10,000.
An updated Norman Manual has been developed. This manual is an excellent resource for all social workers with clear instructions of how to access Housing Advocacy Program Services, Expedited AFDC for family reunification, cash assistance and the Federal Family Unification Program. (See Appendix D.)
IV. MONITORING COMPLIANCE ISSUES A. Whether defendant is properly determining who is and is not a class member (Cook County) [Paragraph 3(b)] 1. Findings and Discussion: There are a total of 4,701 families of Norman
certified families. The biggest increase in certification occurred in Cook County which was found in non-compliance at the last report. While downstate was considered in compliance and is no longer a element of analysis for this report, it is interesting to note the certifications statewide for purposes of comparison. The most significant data regarding certifications relates to the number of families with children with a return home or "02" goal. The following table depicts the certifications statewide of the certified Norman families with children with a return home goal for the period covering this report.
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TABLE III Norman Certified Families with Children with a Return Home Goal
December 31., 1996

REGION
1A-Rockford 1B-Peoria 2A-Aurora 3B-Springfield A-Champaign A-E. St. Louis A-Marion otal Downstate A-Cook. Adm. B-Cook-North [6C-Cook-Centra 6D-Cook-South Total Cook County Statewide Total Source: cfcm461OF 1/29/97

10th PERIOD
87 224 102 91 321 171 45 1041 11 341 340 333 1025 2066

% OF STATE
4% 11% 5% 4% 16% 8% 2% 50% 1% 17% 16% 16% 50% 100%

11TH PERIOD
76 215 74 82 315 137 58 957 11 375 395 352 1133 2090

% OF STATE
4% 10% 4% 4% 15% 7% 3% 46% 1% 18% 19% 17% 54% 100%

The significant finding in the above table is the improvement of Cook County in certifying families whose children have a plan to return home. Another significant finding for this reporting period related to the certifier. The CFCM4655A1/14/97 is data related to the number of cases certified by reason for certification (inadequate food, clothing, shelter and environmental neglect) and certifier. Inadequate shelter continues to be the largest single reason for certification. Of the 1898 new cases certified during this period the largest number of staff certifying is the child welfare supervisor while in the past, it has been the administrative case reviewer. The current report reflects the following: ACR-602; CPS-238; and CWS-1058. This could be an indicator of the results of the extensive training efforts with supervisory and direct service staff so that certification is occurring at the point closest to the client, which is an encouraging finding. However, Cook County tends to certify after a child has been in placement a greater length of time. This could mean that Cook County has a tendency to certify when a return home is more imminent. Also, Cook County has a much lower return home

14

rate and children stay in foster care longer.
The Purchase of Service Redesign project has resulted in approximately 75% of the children residing in substitute care in Cook County being supervised by agencies in the private sector. These agencies are responsible for the complete provision of services. During this period John Cheney-Egan conducted over twenty-five training sessions for POS workers.
While the number of certifications has increased, proper certification continues to be problematic. The monitor and the assistant monitor conducted another review during this reporting period to determine the level of certification of families. In a review conducted in December 1996, the cases reviewed consisted of currently opened child cases with a permanency goal of return home or "02" to ascertain if cases in Cook County with Norman issues of insufficient food, shelter, clothing and/or environmental neglect were being appropriately certified. A sample of 150 cases from each Cook County Regional Office was requested. While only 97 cases were needed from each region for a statistically reliable sample, more were requested in order to ensure a sufficient number for review. Because case records were not as easily accessible for review, this was a more difficult study to conduct because seventy-five percent of the children cases in substitute care are now in POS agencies. Therefore, a large number of the cases were located in the private agencies since DCFS no longer retains files on POS cases. Cases from the larger POS agencies were reviewed: Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services each had ten percent or more of the POS cases with 25 agencies having less than five cases.
This study found an increase in families being appropriately certified from an identical study conducted in January, 1996. In the previous study, 23% of the cases should have been certified and were not, in this study 14% of the cases surveyed should have been certified and were not. The patterns of certification were the same among the three Cook County Regions. However, the study did find that Norman cases were more likely to be found in the POS cases than in DCFS supervised cases. Of the cases which should have been certified and were not, only 2% were found in the POS cases as opposed to 18% in the DCFS cases. Since DCFS personnel continue to certify, this finding cannot be related to the certifier but most likely is due to the type of cases DCFS now carries and to the fact that a higher percentage of DCFS cases as compared with POS cases were reviewed. DCFS will be more likely to supervise children in long term substitute care situations such as residential treatment facilities and in hospitals along with children who have severe developmental disabilities; all representing a population whose return home might be more unlikely to occur quickly. Another reason is DCFS does not always immediately refer a case to a POS agency therefore, certification may not occur until a service plan is developed and a more stable
15

placement is secured especially where serious abuse and neglect is associated with issues of basic sustenance. (See Appendix E.)
The monitor has previously recommended that certification be eliminated since determining eligibility for a service has no meaning until the client is in need of the service. No other resource needed by a client that is provided by DCFS requires such a process. There has been much discussion regarding this between DCFS and the Plaintiffs' Counsel. At the point the work plan was written it was decided that certification would continue, but in a less cumbersome manner i.e. through a checklist at the Administrative Case Review. DCFS staff finally concluded that the certification process has value clinically and therefore it should continue as it currently exists. The certification data is the only manner that DCFS reports class members to Plaintiffs' Counsel or any other interested party. The Department is aware that under-certification is likely to continue if staff members do not request certification from their supervisor until the need for a Norman service is imminent. However, after more serious discussion within the Department and with the Plaintiffs' Counsel it was decided to continue the certification process as it currently exists. It is the monitor's opinion that serious consideration was made to the recommendation and it was rejected for reasons important to DCFS even though the monitor still contends it is a cumbersome and expensive process. Because certification is not the central issue of ensuring that families receive the needed services the Monitor continues to question its usefulness. The Monitor still wants to be clear that certification does not ensure services. The central point of this Consent Decree is that all families receive the services at the time they are needed. However, since the Department has discussed this issue at length, the Monitor is satisfied that serious consideration has been given to the previous recommendation.
2. Conclusion: Cook County is rapidly coming into compliance.
3. Data Source: DCFS data reports and monitors survey.
4. Recommendation: a. Continued training of staff at all levels.
B. Whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance to eligible class members. In addition, DCFS is not to use this program as a replacement for or result in any action to eliminate any other source of cash assistance for class members to which DCFS has access including "exceptions to policy." Whether DCFS has administered this program in such a way as to maximize federal reimbursement for DCFS's expenditures. Also,
16

whether DCFS has maintained records of every grant made including the needs it was intended to meet, etc. (Cook County) (Paragraph 5(a),(b).
1. Findings and Discussion: The most significant accomplishment during
this period has been implementing the Norman Automated Cash Assistance System. Special mention should be given to Paula Matea and Angell Dietz of DCFS Information Services Division for their diligent efforts to operationalize this system and to Jim Gregory who first developed the design of the concept. Many hours have been devoted to the implementation of this system without which the Norman cash assistance program could never have the potential of becoming fully operational or could the Department ever have the data needed to evaluate the Norman cash assistance program.
Unfortunately, specific information for the first six months of this report year is not available due to the failure of many of those authorizing payments to keep manual records. The computerized Automated Cash Assistance Authorization Payment System became operational July 1, 1996, which has resulted in no agency running out of money to write checks for needy families. Every payment must be authorized through use of this system which ensures that every payment made is properly recorded. Most agencies are able to have the checks available within two days and in emergencies some can make checks available within hours. The information required of this Consent Decree is collected on this system. (See Appendix F.)
Appendix F contains tables of expenditures since the inception of the Consent Decree. The Tenth reporting period: January 1, 1996 to June 30, 1996, reflects an expenditure' of $338,000. This data was secured from supervisors manually kept logs. There are hundreds of supervisors in DCFS and many did not keep manual logs of their expenditures therefore, recorded are only those expenditures reported to the monitor. We know that DCFS spent $2.2 million for the total of Norman services in FY'96 (7/1/95 through 6/30/96) therefore the information for the tenth period is meaningless. However, Table IV shown on the next page depicts the expenditures for the eleventh period (July 1-December 31,1996) when the computerized system became operational. We know this is accurate data because no payment could be made without use of the system. While the report regarding compliance is only limited to Cook County, the expenditures of the entire state is used for comparative purposes.
17

TABLE IV ELEVENTH PERIOD Expenditures July 1-December 31, 1996, Showing Per-Cent of Expenditure by Region, With number of Families Served

REGION
1A-ROCKFORD 1B-PEORIA 2A-AURORA 3A-SPRINGFIELD 3B-CHAMPAIGN 4A-E ST. LOUIS 5A-MARION Total Downstate 6A-COOK ADM. 6B-COOK NORTH 6C-COOK CENTRAL 6D-COOK-SOUTH TOTAL COOK COUNTY TOTAL STATEWIDE
Data source: ISD 7/1- 12/31/962

# FAMILIES
109 224 63 93 144 122 150 905 47 168 206 216 637 1542

AMOUNT
$ 57,315 $118,531 $ 47,592 $ 52,656 $ 85,030 $ 70,116 $ 74,008 $505,248 $ 35,979 $149,501 $180,741 $206,163 $574,432 $1,079,432

% OF STATE EXPEND. 5% 11% 4% 5% 8% 7% 7% 47% 3% 14% 17% 19% 53% 100%

This reflects the single greatest expenditure by Cook County since the inception of this Consent Decree. In the First reporting period Cook County spent 24% of the statewide expenditures and the next highest expenditure occurred in the third reporting period with 46%. Fifty-four percent is a significant improvement for Cook County.

It is interesting to note the average cost per family between downstate and Cook County. Cook County gave cash assistance to a total of 905 families at an expenditure of $505,247 while Cook County served 637 families at a cost of $595,004. Since housing is the major expenditure, the higher cost of rents in Chicago as well as the expectation of most landlords in Chicago to provide first month and last month rent as a security is a logical explanation for the increased expenditure per family in Cook County.

18

The Monitor conducted a review of all the Norman certified families of children returned home during the eleventh period to determine how many of the Norman certified families actually received cash assistance at the time of family reunification. The Monitor checked all files of families with children returning home on the DCFS computer system CYCIS. The Table below depicts the findings of that review.

TABLE V Certified Families Receiving Funds at Time of Reunification And Percentage of Certified Families Who Received funds, by Region

REGION

# RECEIVED CASH

Rockford - 1A

6

Peoria - 1B

38

Aurora - 2A

17

Springfield - 3A

9

Champaign - 3B

44

E.St. Louis - 4A

16

Marion - 5A

9

Downstate Total

139

Cook North - 6B

18

Cook Central - 6C

14

Cook South - 6D

31

Cook Total

63

STATEWIDE TOTAL

202

Data source: DCFS CFCM5061 -A 1/07/97

# NO CASH
7 13 7 11 27 12 7 84 21 11 18 50 134

TOTAL
13 51 24 20 71 28 16 223 39 25 49 113 336

% OF REGION
46% 75% 71% 45% 62% 57% 56% 62% 46% 56% 63% 56% 60%

The return home of children remains a serious problem in Cook County; the families of the children returning home in Cook County are receiving cash assistance at a slightly lower rate than downstate families. As discussed often in previous monitoring reports there is no baseline data from which to evaluate the total number of families who should receive these services however, a comparison with downstate is valid. The survey shows that of the Norman children returning home, the percentage of families receiving cash assistance was lower in Cook County than downstate. This finding is significant and could indicate that the families of children who do return home in Cook are not receiving the needed cash assistance.

19

When one compares the utilization of cash
assistance to prevent the placement of children we find a similar picture. Of the funds used for placement prevention, 37% of the families in Cook County received monies to prevent placement while 63% were used by families by downstate regions.(See Appendix F.) This may be one notable indicator of why downstate has a lower placement rate of children.

Previous reports have discussed at length the problems related to services to biological parents in Cook County. It is not disputed by most child welfare professionals that Cook County as a community has a reluctance to advocate for and provide services to biological families in order to prevent the placement of children or to reunify children with their families once placement has occurred. Department personnel have quoted a recent study stating that Illinois shows the lowest reunification rate of children to biological families of the major child welfare states in the country.

The January, 1997, Department statistical report
shows that a total of 5,978 intact families were being served downstate by DCFS and 791 served by POS compared to 5,030 in Cook County by DCFS with an additional 1,209 by POS agencies in Cook County bringing the total number of intact families cases for downstate to 6,759 and Cook County to 6,239.

The improvement in the amount of cash assistance in Cook County is an achievement to be lauded. However, when one considers the numbers of children in care and the percentage of children which are Title IV-E eligible in Cook with those eligible downstate and the amounts spent in downstate compared to Cook
County, improvement is needed. Table VI depicts this comparison
from the Ninth Reporting Period to the Eleventh Reporting Period..

REGION
1A-ROCKFORD 1B-PEORIA 2A-AURORA 3A-SPRINGFIELD 3B-CHAMPAIGN 4A-E. ST.LOUIS Total Downstate

Table VI Title IV-E Eligible Children
Periods 9 and 11 by Region

9TH PERIOD
981

9TH% STATE
2%

11TH PERIOD
790

1,901

4%

1820

2,053

5%

2,289

1,290

3%

772

2,138

5%

1,562

1,540

3%

1,128

10,528

23%

8,871

11TH% STATE
2% 5% 6% 2% 4% 3% 22%

20

6A-COOK ADM. 6B-COOK NORTH 6C-COOK CENTRAL 6-D COOK SOUTH TOTAL COOK COUNTY TOTAL STATEWIDE
DCFS financial services

7,136 7,901 7,972 11,606 34,615 45,143

16% 18% 18% 26% 77% 100%

80 10,099 10,718 9,831 30,728 39,599

0% 26% 27% 21% 78$ 100%

2. Conclusion:
Cook County is coming into compliance as reflected in the significant increase of expenditures during the past year.
3. Data Source Data from the DCFS automated cash assistance program.
4. Recommendation That DCFS implement plans to conduct retraining of Cook County staff on this program.

C. Whether DCFS provides plaintiffs' counsel with drafts of all new policies, procedures, programs, rules, etc.
for implementation of the provisions of this Consent
Order at least 30 days prior of effective date. [Paragraph 11].
1. Findings and Discussion:
The major policy establishing the programs developed as a result of this Consent Decree have been established with the input of the Plaintiffs' Counsel. The only procedure developed during this reporting period has been the guidelines for initiating return home court action in Cook County Juvenile. This procedure has been developed with Plaintiffs' Counsel.

2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance.
3. Data Source: DCFS OLM staff and Plaintiffs' Counsel
4. Recommendation: None
21

D. Whether DCFS has determined if not permitted by federal law, that DPA will maintain eligibility for a family at least 90 days during a period of DCFS protective or temporary custody, if permitted by law the amount of such AFDC benefits will not be reduced because DCFS has protective or temporary custody of such children, if the temporary custody is not. expected to last beyond the 90 days.[Paragraph 6(a)].
1. Findings and Discussion:
Effective on May 1, 1993 the agreement between the Illinois Department of Public Aid and DCFS included a provision
for the continuance of the adult only portion of the AFDC grant.
Under current policy children who are taken into DCFS temporary custody must be removed from the AFDC grant. However, if DCFS anticipates the children can return home within 90 days they can authorize the adult-only portion of the grant to continue if no other children reside in the home. The study conducted related to children who had returned home from 1/1/96 through 6/30/96. During this period twenty-five children were in placement for 90 days or less; of these, 14 children (or 56%) returned to families who were ineligible to receive AFDC. None of the remaining eleven children returned home to families that received an adult-only grant. One child of the eleven returned to a family that received its full AFDC grant within 7 days of the child's return.
This study was conducted by the DCFS Office of Litigation Management to determine compliance with this issue. The complete report is discussed at length in. the next section; a copy of the study can be found in Appendix G.
The policy agreement between DPA and DCFS pertaining to the retention of the adult only portion of the grant is a great stride forward. This procedure is found in Section 4.2 of the Norman Manual. (See Appendix H.) However, discussed at length in previous years is the issue of requesting a federal waiver for federal reimbursement for preservation of the entire AFDC grants 30 days prior to reunification and during the 90 days after placement. Plaintiffs' concern is the prevention of homelessness which could once again delay the return home of children. This is of importance because a "mother only" grant does
not provide sufficient funds for acquiring or maintaining housing
to enable overnight visitation at the child's home in preparation for reunification. In the past this recommendation was agreed upon by both parties. Previous efforts to achieve this involved collaborative efforts between DPA and DCFS to obtain the federal waiver. The waiver was not received and subsequently an exploration was discussed of DCFS absorbing the children's portion of the grant. DCFS states DPA is not interested in submitting for
such a waiver; a factor which DCFS cannot control, however, this
22

issue should be explored further.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in non-compliance
3. Data Source: Norman Application Pro gram at DPA study
conducted by John Cheney-Egan, Lori Moreno and Debra Dyer Walker,
4. Recommendation:
a. DCFS continue its Norman training efforts.
b. DCFS should explore the possibility of an AFDC family retaining the children's portion of the grant for 90 days after the children are placed when reunification is anticipated during that time frame and providing the children's portion thirty days in advance of reunification.
E. Whether DCFS is taking all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA benefits to eligible persons. [Paragraph 6(b)].
1. Findings and Discussion:
Formally referred to as the Expedited AFDC, the Department of Public Aid Norman Application Program hereafter DPANAP, allows for the head of the household to apply for the full AFDC grant 30-45 days prior to the return home of children from substitute care. This allows sufficient time for the check to be available at the time of reunification. The procedures of this process are described in Section 4.1 of the Norman Manual. If the proper procedures are followed a family receive their grant by the time the children return home or no later than one week after they return home.
DCFS has been found in non-compliance with this particular Norman program. We received our data from DPA Central Office. In interviewing DCFS staff, many said their clients received the grant within 7 days but did not go through local offices. As a result of receiving this information, DCFS, through the Office of Litigation Management, decided to conduct its own study. Lori L. Moreno and Debra Dyer Walker, social work interns, working under the direction of John Cheney-Egan, conducted the study to determine the problems in implementing this program. The Monitor was actively involved with the design of the study.
23

The purpose of the study was to determine the actual number of children who returned home to families who received their AFDC check on the date of return home. The sample consisted of the total population of the 469 children who returned home during the tenth reporting period, January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996. The dates of the return home were compared with the DPA computer system which reflects the date the first check was issued. After this data was secured a data collection form was send to each social worker of the children in the study. The intended results of this phase was to increase utilization of the program. Therefore, questions for the social workers were developed around reasons for not applying for DPA-NAP for eligible clients, caseworker knowledge of return home, and obstacles interfering with the appropriate application of the program.
Findings of the sample included the following: 469 children were in the sample; 255 returned home to a family that did not receive (were ineligible) for AFDC; 213 returned to families that did receive AFDC; and 40 children were outside the parameters of the study, i.e. child over 18, grant was legitimately reduced,etc. The study states, "Of the Norman Certified families that were return home during the study time frame almost 54% or 93 of the remaining 173 eligible children, returned to families where AFDC applications were filed prior to return home. Twenty percent of the 173 children received a full AFDC grants within 7 days of the date the children were returned home."
The questionnaires completed by the social workers gave valuable information regarding ways the Department can help increase the utilization of this program and served as the basis for recommendations listed below for program improvement made in the study and reinforced by the Monitor.
This was an excellent study completed by the Department in an effort to make this valuable Norman program more accessible to the class members. The social work interns, Ms. Moreno and Ms. Dyer-Walker as well as John Cheney-Egan are to be commended for this effort.
2. Conclusion: DCFS is in non-compliance statewide. Good faiths efforts are being made to come into compliance.
3. Data Source: Norman A pp lication Program at DPA April 8, 1997, by John Cheney-Egan, Lori L. Moreno, and Debra Dyer Walker. (See Appendix G.)
24
0

4. Recommendations:
a. DCFS should ensure that the Norman Divisional Liaison position remain a permanent position within the Department.
b. An additional staff person be assigned to the DCFS Norman Divisional Liaison due to the large volume of work and that social work interns continue to be assigned to this unit for the purpose of implementation of Norman programs.

c. That DCFS and Plaintiffs' Counsel convene a meeting to discuss any possible impact of Welfare Reform on this provision of the
Consent Decree.

d. That the recommendations of the survey conducted by OLM be implemented. These are:

i. Data collection and surveys be conducted yearly to increase DPA-NAP program utilization.

ii.

Caseworkers should be given

certificates of achievement

congratulating them on appropriately

applying for DPA-NAP and other similar

incentives to reinforce utilization.

iii. A Norman Liaison be appointed to, train/help POS agencies to learn about this and other Norman programs.

iv. Contact people should be regularly updated on the latest materials and procedures at both DCFS and DPA.

v. The relationship between court personnel and DCFS staff should be improved to foster better communication to determine client readiness for return home and establish realistic return home dates.

vi. A synopsis of directions on how to use Norman programs and the Norman Manual should be sent to DCFS and POS workers in memorandum form.

25

vii. Forms for application should be standardized and readily available at DCFS Central Stores as well as local offices.
viii. This program should be given more attention at the regularly scheduled Norman Liaison meetings. Making attendance at this training a requirement and qualifying a Norman Liaison by requiring satisfactory completion of a test.
iv. Increase communication and coordination with DPA.
x. Include a check on the service plan for ACR so that reviewers instruct caseworkers to apply for the program.
xi. Standardize the procedure for applying for AFDC.
xii. Supervisors should be instructed to follow-up on all completed DPA-NAP.
F. Whether DCFS has established reasonable time
guidelines within which DCFS workers should ordinarily
return children home or initiate court action for use in cases where problems with living circumstances are
preventing reunification. (Paragraph 9(c),15 (c)(f)].
(i.e. timeliness guidelines for the caseworkers initiation of court action for reunification.)
1. Findings and Discussion:
During this period the procedures for Norman certified families have been finalized according to Cheryl Cesario, Chief Legal Counsel for DCFS. These procedures meet with approval of the Monitor and Plaintiffs' Counsel. DCFS now has attorneys assigned to each region who will screen all Norman certified cases for Norman services and ensure the quick initiation of petitions for return home. It is the Monitor's understanding these procedures were agreed upon in a meeting on October 16, 1996. The Monitor is informed that the implementation of these procedures is imminent. According to Ms. Cesario all DCFS regional counsel are going to begin the process by reviewing every Norman certified family case in their assigned region to determine if all other issues are resolved in the case and to immediately file a return home petition if Norman issues are the only issues. The regional counsels are prepared to begin this review process as soon as the packets are received. (See Appendix I.)
26

vii. Forms for application should be standardized and readily available at DCFS Central Stores as well as local offices.
viii. This program should be given more
attention at the regularly scheduled
Norman Liaison meetings. Making attendance at this training a requirement and qualifying a Norman Liaison by requiring satisfactory completion of a test.
iv. Increase communication and
coordination with DPA.
x. Include a check on the service plan for ACR so that reviewers instruct caseworkers to apply for the program.
xi. Standardize the procedure for applying for AFDC.
xii. Supervisors should be instructed to follow-up on all completed DPA-NAP.
F. Whether DCFS has established reasonable time guidelines within which DCFS workers should ordinarily return children home or initiate court action for use in cases where problems with living circumstances are preventing reunification. [Paragraph 9(c),15 (c)(f)1. (i.e. timeliness guidelines for the caseworkers initiation of court action for reunification.)
1. Findings and Discussion:
During this period the procedures for Norman certified families have been finalized according to Cheryl Cesario, Chief Legal Counsel for DCFS. These procedures meet with approval of the Monitor and Plaintiffs' Counsel. DCFS now has attorneys assigned to each region who will screen all Norman certified cases
for Norman services and ensure the quick initiation of petitions
for return home. It is the Monitor's understanding these procedures were agreed upon in a meeting on October 16, 1996. The Monitor is informed that the implementation of these procedures
is imminent. According to Ms. Cesario all DCFS regional counsel
are going to begin the process by reviewing every Norman certified family case in their assigned region to determine if all other issues are resolved in the case and to immediately file a return home petition if Norman issues are the only issues. The regional counsels are prepared to begin this review process as soon as the packets are received. (See Appendix I.)
26

Ms. Cesario states she is presently interviewing for a regional counsel to be assigned to the Protective Services region of Cook County and the same process will begin there as soon as an attorney is hired.
2. Conclusion: While the protocol has been finalized and the
structure is in place to begin, the protocol has not yet been implemented therefore, at this writing DCFS is in non-compliance in Cook County.
3. Data Source: Discussion with Cheryl Cesario, DCFS Chief Legal Counsel, and DCFS Response to Seventh Monitoring Report and Work Plan. (See Appendix B.)
4. Recommendation:
a. That DCFS initiate the screening of cases for return home as soon as packets are received by the Regional legal counsels.
G. That DCFS workers and case reviewers are sufficiently trained on the policies, procedures and rules related to the implementation of this Order. [Paragraph 15 (e)]
1. Findings and Discussion:
Extensive training has occurred during this past year. During the first six months alone twenty-five training sessions were held for DCFS supervisors, POS workers, and Norman liaisons. The Norman liaisons continue to have regularly scheduled meetings. One must contribute much of the reason for the increase in family certifications, HAP referrals and direct cash assistance to families to this training effort. However, the low utilization of the DPA-NAP indicates training on this program is especially needed. The Monitor attends the Norman liaisons meetings and attended two of the training sessions. It should be noted there are several Norman programs and it is difficult to grasp the totality of these programs in one training session. The Norman Manual is comprehensive and the training was well organized and skillfully conducted. However, ongoing training is essential for the continued success of the Norman programs.
2. Conclusion: • DCFS is in non-compliance on training regarding the DPA-NAP program. The number of training sessions is impressive as well as the comprehensive nature of the training itself.
27

However, more ongoing training is needed.

3. Data Source:
DCFS reports, discussions with DCFS staff, the Monitor's attendance two of the training sessions and Norman liaison meetings.

4. Recommendation:

DCFS continue training sessions on all

_

Norman programs with emphasis upon the DPA

NAP.

F. That the policies, procedures and rules related to the terms of this Order are being properly applied and enforced through the Administrative Case Review process and the review provided in Paragraph 13 (b) [Paragraph 15 (f)]
1. Findings and Discussion:
ACR staff document the identification of where living circumstances are a factor in class member's inability to regain custody of their children. At the ACR, they are to ensure that all terms of this Consent Order are being followed. The ACR system is automated to capture much of the data available to the Monitor. Reports are submitted regularly to the monitor. This large data collection system records the certification information contained in this report. These reports document the name of the client, the reason for involvement with the family, which requirements relating to parents' living conditions have been imposed in a service plan or otherwise, whether the parents' living circumstances are currently an obstacle to family preservation or reunification, service plan to correct the parents' living conditions, and the date on which any child in DCFS custody has returned home or is projected to return home.
ACR also conducts a special review of all children in Norman certified families when they do not return home on a projected date. The ACR automated tickler system triggers these review dates. There continues to be a tendency by social workers to make the next six month review date the return home date but this situation has improved. There is no indication that this process prohibits the return home of children. The Norman children tend to return home as scheduled.

2. Conclusion: DCFS is in compliance
3. Data Source:
28

Case record reviews.
4. Recommendation: None
V. CONCLUSION:
The Department has made considerable efforts in training staff during this past year. John Cheney-Egan has trained extensively with supervisors in Cook County and downstate on the Automated Cash Assistance Program and POS workers on all of Norman programs. The increase in the number of families receiving these services can be attributed to these efforts. In the next year more training is planned with direct service staff in Cook County on the total Norman program and statewide on the Norman Application Program at DPA.
The greatest achievements during this past year is operationalizing the Automated Cash Assistance System and the increase in the number of families receiving cash assistance. Much of the credit for this can be attributed to John Cheney-Egan the Divisional Norman liaison and to his supervisor Mary Sue Morsch, Administrator of the Office of Litigation Management. They have worked tirelessly to make these two objectives a reality. The Monitor cautions that Mr. Cheney-Egan was originally hired as the Housing Specialist and this needed role cannot become diluted by many other duties without additional staff. The Department has integrated Norman programs into the ongoing services of DCFS. They
have consolidated the administration the Family Reunification Fund
(Harris Fund) with Mr. Cheney-Egan and the Norman funds. This is logical management. However, in order for DCFS to sustain the
improvements in the use of, these programs, additional training is
needed during the next year; Mr. Cheney-Egan needs additional staff. The Federal Unification Funds have been received in twelve cities in Illinois. This is a statewide program and is labor intensive.
The Housing Advocacy Programs will require more attention as difficulty in locating affordable housing becomes more severe. The relationship between the housing authorities and DCFS is unique. His is the only position of its kind within a public child welfare agency in the country. This is a special expertise which is
greatly needed. The programs continue to be relatively new and the
ongoing work is necessary in order to sustain the strides made to date.
The impact of Welfare Reform is another area which Plaintiffs' Counsel and DCFS should analyze as to how it effects the Norman population of children and families.
29

There are areas mentioned in this report that the Department will need to continue to address to come into full compliance with this Consent Decree and/or to maintain the improvements made. Under 11 15 the Consent Decree states information which shall be gathered to supply information regarding the Decree to the monitor. It remains silent as to the responsibility to supply information to Plaintiffs'Counsel after monitoring has ended. This is an issue which should be addressed.
The programs developed as a result of the Norman Consent Decree remain some of the most innovation in the country in child welfare services. The Department and Plaintiffs' Counsel are to be applauded for their efforts to improve the lives of children and families by this effort. When one considers the accomplishments of the past six years the results are significant.
J NINE SMITH, SW
30

APPENDICES

A

Memorandum Opinion and Order, A pril 11, 1996

B

Response To Recommendations Found in Seventh

Monitoring Re port, January 1 - December 31, 1996

with Work Plan For Items Slated for Continued

Monitoring

C

Norman Certification Data

D

Norman Manual

E

Review of Cook County "02" Cases -December, 1996

F

Cash Assistance Data

G

Norman Ap p lication Program at DPA April 8, 1997

by John Cheney-Egan, Lori Moreno, Debra Dyer

Walker

H

Illinois Department of Public Aid Policy

Memorandum

I

Cook County Regional Counsels Screening Packet for

Return Home of Children

31

 
 04/11/1996 10 :46 FKOM LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE

TO

4334336 F.@3

a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NOP.MAN, et a1.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
JESS McDONALD, Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,
Defendant.

No. 89 C 1624

Tzis is a class action that challenged certain practices
of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
("DCFS") as being in violation of relevant federal statutes and
the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs are impoverished parents or
legal guardians who are or were at risk of losing their children
because the y were unable to provide adequate food or shelter for
the children.' Plaintiffs alleged that DCFS had policies and
Jess McDonald, the present Director of DCFS, is substituted for Sue Suter as the defendant in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(l).
:The class that was certified is defined as follows:
All parents and guardians on or after the cafe of entry of this Consent Order: (a) whose children are in the temporary custody or under the legal guardianship of DCFS and upon whom, curing such custody or guardianship, DCFS has imposed, in a service plan or otherwise, a
(continued.._)

04/11/1996 10:47 FROM LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE

TO

4334336 F.04

practices of failing to assist plaintiffs in securing the
resources and services necessary to keep their faa;ilies intact
that were in violation of federal statutory and constitutional
requirerents_
_n May 1990, this court granted preliminary injunctive relief to two of the named plaintiffs in this case. See Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. I11. 1590). Defendant appealed that ruling. Prior to this court resolvin g the case on its rerits or the Seventh Circuit resolvin g the appeal of the grant of preliminary relief, the parties settled the case. Folloc:ir= notice to the class and a hearin g , the rar:ies'
proposed consent order was signed on March 28, 1991 (hereinafter
the "Consent Order"). The Consent order required that DCFS
implement and develop certain procedures and provide certain
services. The Consent order also contains a requirement that
defendant provide certain information and that a aonitor
:(...continued)
condition that such parents obtain for themselves
or their children such shelter, utility services, food, clothing, or income as DCFS deems necessary
or apprcpriate Afor the return of their children;
or (b) for whom there is an "indicated report" or pending report pursuant to (325 ILCS 5), that is or should have been designated as an allegation of "inadequate shelter," "inadequate food," "inadequate clothing," "environmental neglect." or any successor allegations that cover these categories of reports, and DCFS has taken or could take protective custody of the children oursuant to (325 ILCS 5/5], because of that allegation-
March 2a, 1991 Consent Order 13(b).

e4'11':9S6 10.47 FROM LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE

TO

4334336 P.05

(hereinafter the "Monitor") be appointed to receive the reports

and make recommendations concerning the implementation of the Consent order. The tern of the Monitor's appointment was to be

for approximately four years, expiring July 1, 1995. In February

1995, the parties agreed to move the court to extend that term to

February 15, 1997. The basis of this motion was unresolved

disputes regarding defendant's compliance with the Consent Order.

An extension was granted, but only to February 15, 1996.

Cn February 12, 1996, plaintiffs moved to extend the

monitoring period to February 15, 1998 on the ground that

defendant had not complied with certain provisions of the Consent

Order. This tine defendant opposes the extension. Defendant

contends that he has substantially complied with the requirements

of the Consent Order and that the additional expense of gathering

information and employing the Monitor are no longer necessary.

He also contends that changes in the law since March 1991

t

preclude the Consent Order from being enforced further. For

purposes of resolving plaintiffs' pendin g motion, defendant

concedes that the Sixth Monitoring Report dated May 24, 1995 and

covering calendar year 1994 (the "Sixth Report") accurately

reports defendant's compliance.

Under the terms of the Consent Order, defendant agreed to

implement three general policies. (1) A child is rot to be

'-Alternatively, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the alleged noncompliance.
- 3-

04/11/1996 10:4? FROM LAFC - GENERPL OFFICE TO

4334336 P.06

9

separated from a parent- because of living conditions or lack of

subsistence unless there is reason to believe that the

circumstances or conditions-of the child present an-"ii inent

danger" to the child's life or health and defendant has made

"reasonable efforts" to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, unless reasonable efforts would not eliminate the need

for remcval. "'Reasonable efforts' includes, for example,

provision of hard services such as assistance in locating and

securin g housing, temporary shelter, cash assistance (directly paid by defendant or otherwise provided), in-kind services

including food or clothing, child care, emergency caretakers, o
advocacy with public and community agencies providin g such

services." Consent Order 14(a). (2) A child shall not be

separated from a parent riving in a shelter or substandard

housing, unless there is reason to believe that the conditions

present an "inninent dan g er" to the child's life or health.
Before returning a child to such conditions, defendant shall

determine the child ::ill be allowed to reside there and have a

j . G(b). bed.

(3) Instead of removing a child from a parent

because f failure to protect the child from a perpetrator of

domestic violence, defendant shall make "reasonable efforts" to

keep the child in the parent's custody unless an imminent danger

to the child's 'Life or health is presented or reasonable efforts

would be to no avail_ "In this context, 'reasonable efforts'

'As defined in the Consent Order, parent also includes a legal guardian, but not a foster parent.

- 4-

04'11'1996 10:48 FROM LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE TO

4_Z4336 P.07

includes• not only the efforts listed in paragraph 4(a) of this order, but also, for example, referring the parent for services

to obtain an order of protection, exploring possible alternative

housing with, e.g., relatives, and locating and transporting the

family to a shelter for battered women."

y 4(c).

The Consent Order also contains more specific pro ,inns.

By July 1, 1991, defendant was to establish a cash assistance
program providing a family with up to $800 per calendar year for

rent, security deposits, utility fees, furniture, or other items

if the assistance would prevent the separation of parent and

child. Certain record keeping is also required. Records of the

money disbursed and whether the recipients remained united or

were reunited are to be kept. Id. 15.
3y July 1, 1991, DCFS was to seek to enter into an
agreement with the Department of Public Aid ("DPA") and jointly

seek feceral approval to continue AFDC benefits for up to 90 days

durin g periods of DCFS temporary custody not expected to exceed

90 days. The agreement is also to provide that a parent can

apply to DPA for benefits while a child is in DCFS custody and

obtain payments prior to return of the child that will aid the

parent n regaining custody. Id. g 6.
By October 1, 1091, DCFS was to establish a h ousi ng advocacy program to provide certain housing services that would
aid class members in finding suitable housing. DCFS was also to
seek agneex^ents with public hour _ngauthorities that would aid class members in findin g housing. j 1 7.

- 5 -

04/11/1996 10:48 FROM LAFC - 3ENERPL OFFICE TO

4334336 P.08

0

By July 1, 1991, DCFS was to establish a referral service

for eac:a office consisting of a localized manual containing an

annually updated list of community resources relevant to the

needs of the class. DCFS employees are to receive annuz.1

instruc_ion regarding use of the manual. , „ 18.

It was also agreed that DCFS would implement the

following procedures by July 1, 1991: (a) require pertinent

personnel to follow the requirements of the Consent Order and

ensure timely adminis trative case reviews; (b) develop with the

Monitor a means of docurenting specific information regarding imminent dancer determinations and the implementation of

reasonable efforts; (c) "establish reasonable time guidelines

within which DCTS workers should ordinarily return children home

or init:ate court action to do so for use in cases where problems

with living circunstances are preventin g family reunification;"

(d) establish risk assessment methods based on living conditions;

(e) establish a protocol for locating absent parents; and (f)

prorptl} initiate court actions for the return of children.

"he Consent Order contains a provision for notifying class members of their rights under the Consent Order and a method for appealing certain determinations. This was to be implemer.ted by July 1, 1991. 1 10.
"Defendants shall provide to plaintiffs' counsel drafts
of all rew policies, procedures, programs, rules, re gulations and notices for implementation of the p rovisions of this consent

- 6 -

04/11/1996 10:49 FROM LPFC - GENERAL OFFICE

TO

4334336 P.09

j .r ..
Order at least thirty days prior to the relevant effective date specified in this Consent Order. Plaintiffs' counsel shall inform defendant's counsel of any objections they have to any such drafts because of plaintiffs' contention that said draft may violate the terms of this Consent Order, and the parties shall negotiate in good faith regarding any such objections." -1 11. The Consent Order contains provisions regarding training of DCFS Dersonnel and provides plaintiffs' counsel with the opportunity to monitor that training until July I, 1995. Initial training was to be conp:eted by December 1, 1991. Id. -5 12. The Consent Order also contains specific provisions regarding reporting and monitoring. Th e parties joi ntly nominate a monitor who was approved by the court. The Monitor
was to produce semi-annual reports beginning January 1, 1992 and
concluding July 1, 1995. The Monitor and the parties were to jointly ievelop the procedures for gathering "reliable and valid inforn,at.on necessary to measure compliance with the terms of the Consent Drder," includin g (a) whether defendant is properly
deterninLng what persons are class members; (b) whether timely
and sufficient cash assistance was provided; (c) whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to unify families;
(d) implementation of the time guidelines; (e) the adequacy of
trainin g ; (f) whether the provisions of this order are properly applied during administrative case reviews; (q) whether class
members are afforded full notice and appeal rights; (h) whether
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4334336 P.10

DCFS is making good faith efforts to seek interagency agreements;
(i) whether DCFS is maximizing DPA payments; (j) the adequacy of
risk assessment practices; and (k) whether determinations that a
child cannot be returned within 90 days are being made for
administrative or fiscal convenience. The Monitor was to Suit
a report within 60 days after receiving the required semi-annual
data from DCFS. She was to report on compliance with the Consent
Order and make recommendations regarding any noncompliance.
Defendant was required to consider the recommendations and, with
the Monitor's assistance, negotiate with plaintiffs' counsel a
plan `c: compliance. id. ¶T 14-16.
The Consent Order also contains the followin g two
provisions:
20. This court retains jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with this order or the recommendations of the Monitor. Plaintiffs may file a motion with this court at any time to see: compliance with the provisions of this Order or the recommendations of the Monitor, provided that, to the extent such a motion is based upon a report or recommendation of the Monitor under Paragraph 16, no notion shall be filed until plaintiffs have made attempts to negotiate the development and Implementation of a compliance plan with defendant, with the assistance of the Monitor as set forth under Paragraph 16.
21. Defendant may file a motion with this court at any tire seeking modification of the terms of this Consent order if factual or legal circumstances materially chan g e, experience with the administration of the Consent order shows the need for modification in order to more effectively accomplish the goals of this Consent Order, it is no longer equitable that the Consent Order should have prospective effect, or such modification is necessary due to the hardship caused defendant by the Consent Order because of
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4334::s P.11

new and unforeseen conditions. Any decision by the court allowing or denying such a modification
shall be made by weighing the interests of the class members in the immediate and strict enforcement of the terms of the Consent Order against the interests and harm to defendant
without the proposed modification, and against
the public interest.
Plaintiffs point to five areas of noncompliance that they
contend support extending the period of monitoring: (a) failure
to provide timely, accurate, and complete information; (b) failure to certify many eligible families as eligible for
Consent Order services; (c) failure to provide tinely and
sufficiert cash assistance to families in Cook County; (d) failure to screen cases for Consent ordercom liance prior_to
initiating juvenile court actions and failure to initiate prompt
return hc.;e activity as required by 19(c) of the Consent Order;
and !e) failure to adequately utilize public aid resources as
required by 5 6(b) of the Consent Order. For purposes of
evaluating these contentions, defendant does not dispute the
findings contained in the Sixth Report.
Cefendant raises questions as to the need for
certification, which is not a specific requirement of the Consent
order. In the Sixth Report (at 27-28), the Monitor states:
Certification determines who is potentially
eligible for services when the need is present to
prevent placement and to enable swift
reunification of children with their families when other safety issues are no longer present. The request to receive those services must be
approved. The real issue is not certification, tut approval. I recommend that re-consideration ^e given to the certification process.
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43343?5 P.12
;.

A large data system developed to capture the information is questionable. It is bureaucratic; the certification process itself does not provide help to the family. Since the determination to access the services has administrative safeguards, it seems consideration not to certify has merits. The Department can place the emphasis upon the service delivery and the development of data collection to determine who receives the service, for what service goal ;placement prevention or reunification) and for what purpose (food, clothing, shelter, etc.), issues which are the purpose of the Norman ?rogram.
Defendant also points to data that 76 to 83 per cent of eligible
families are correctly certified and contends this is
satisfactory.^'
I.
As plaintiffs point out, accurately certifying
approxiirately 80 per cent of eligible families is a less than
satisfactory rate when certification is required in order to
receive benefits under the Consent Order. While defendant argues
here that the certification process is an unnecessary procedure,
in his Z'ecember 11, 1995 written response to the Sixth Report, he
argued that it was a necessary procedure, though one that should
be nodi:ied. Def. App., Exh. 3 at 11-12. DCFS still needs to
improve its procedures for ensuring that eligible families have
Norman ;oenefits available to the,-n. Whether a certification
process should continue, in its present or a modified form, or
whether an alternative procedure should be developed, is an
issue, the resolution of which, could be aided by the continued
input of the Monitor and class counsel.
Regarding the cash assistance program, the Monitor found:

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0411/1996 10 :51 FROM LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE TO

4334336 P.13

An effective, computerized cash assistance data system is critical to the ongoing operation of this program. With the Department decentralizing the approval process, this becomes even more important. During every reporting period, cash period, cash assistance agencies in Cook County and downstate have depleted their funds and could not supply needed checks to vendors for clients. This past year was no exception. This results in clients losing scarce housing due to the lack of timely submission of
becks. It also has a negative impact on the direct service workers who become discouraged -pith utilizing this resource for their clients.__ Some staff have stated to the Monitors that they 3o not use this resource because it is too time :onsuming. While this is a small number of :staff, there should be no worker who takes this stance. The system developed by the Management Systems team has safeguards to ensure such situations do not occur.
Sixth Report 35.
-he Monitor concluded that Cook County was out of
compliance, but that Downstate was in compliance. Id. She
recommended:
a. DCFS finalize an automated cash assistance data system. It should contain the number of families receiving cash assistance and the amount, indicate whether for the purpose of placement prevention or reunification, the amount spent for food, clothing, shelter, utilities, etc., and the amount remaining in individual agency accounts_
b. DCFS complete the internal audit and share the results with plaintiffs' attorneys and tie Monitor.

`The Monitor has an assistant who is sometimes also referred to as a monitor.
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04/11/1996 10 : 51 FROM LPFC - GENERRL CFFiCE

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43343 F.14

Defendant contends that it has corrected cash shortfalls when they have occurred. As plaintiffs point out, however, the
shortfalls continue to occur and, as found by the Monitor, this has a discouraging effect on the use of the cash assistance
prograr, which is a central element. of the Consent Order.
Further efforts are necessary to ensure compliance, in Cook
County, with the cash assistance program required by the Consent Order.
Defendant concedes that OCFS has yet to develop procedures that comply with the requirements of 19(f) of the Consent Order regarding initiating court procedures to return childrsn to their homes. However. defendant contends that, as previcusly agreed with _he Monitor- and plaintiffs' counsel, defendant is still working on a plan, but he does not believe that ncnitorinq is necessary to ensure completion of a successful plats. This is a question of appropriate relief; iz is not denied that there is noncompliance.
parag raph 6(b) of the Consent Order requires that DCFS
take the steps necessa--: to maximize obtaining Public Aid payments for eligible families for financial assistance in reunit:.ng families. Defendant contends DCFS has complied because it has established a relationship with DvA as required by 1 6(a)of the Consent Order. However, DCFS has not ensured that thgseprocedires will be regularly used. As the Monitor points out, 75% o` Norman children in Cook County potentially would benefit from .iese procedures, but durin g one reporting period 475
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04/11 16°6 10:52 FROM LPFC - GE}€RL OFFICE"0

43336 F.15

children-►ere returned home with the procedure being fully invoked in only 19 of those cases and attempted in six others_ The Monitor concluded: "There is clearly under-utilization of this extremely needed resource." Sixtn Report 46. Defendant: is not in compliance with 16(b) of the Consent Order.
Plaintiffs also complain that defendant has not fully complied with data repor`ing requirements of the decree. The Consent Order has a number of requirements, not all of which are readily quantifiable, or data readily gathered, for purposes of determining compliance. Plaintiffs do not point to any specific area where they believe there may be noncompliance, but complain there is no data to make an accurate assessment. Plaintiffs point to various subjects for which data is lacking, but an examination of the Sixth Report shows that the monitor only recotnmen3ed further data collection in one of those areas.° Sixth Report 59 ("ACR nccds to automate the summary of the number of parents who need to be located and if the locating absent parent protocol or delegate search was conducted_") There are other ar2ns where the Monitor has indicated information was inadequate for her to reach conclusions, but she does not suggest that tur:her data collection is necessary. The lack of certain data is -got a sufficient problea to justify extending the Monitoring period.
'ThE Monitor also made recommendations regarding data collecti,n for the cash assistance program.. As was ;revously discussed that is an area of noncorpliance. Presently under consider•ition are othar alleged data collection deficiencies.
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0411/1996 10:5z FROM LAFC - GE €R L OFFICE TO

4334336 P.16

Defendant contends he is in compliance in a number of other areas not discussed by plaintiffs. But even it defendant were out of Compliance in only one area, pursuant to 1 20 of the Consent_ Order, plaintiffs could seek court enforcement :.s to that one issue. It must be considered whether the undisputed areas of noncompliance support extending the term of the Monitor or other appropriate relief. That defendant has complied in other areas, though, is a factor to consider in determining whether there is still a need for the Monitor.
Defendant contends there is no longer a need for a Monitor to follow DCFS's conpliance with the Consent order_ Defendant complains that the cost of the Monitor could be better spent on providing direct services or funds to the clientele DCFS serves. The cost for the Monitor has averaged approximately S107,000 per year. White that is not a small sum and likely could to usefully used elsewhere as well, it may be appropriate to compare it to a conservative estimate that the cash assistance
prograr, alone saved $11,093,894 for the state during a six-month
period of 1994. See Six rh Re ort ?.. While the Monitor alone did not produce that savings, it shows that her contributions to the effort may more than offset the costs of her services.
As is indicated by the six reports of the Monitor, her collection and reportin g of information has been an important and useful aspect of the improvements that have resulted from implenentation of the Consent order. It must be recognized, ho.evsr, that the monitor's role involves more than just data

04/11/195 10:53 FROM LAFC - GENERFL OFFICE .0

433436 ,=.17

collection. It is also her duty to make recomendations, many of which have been followed by DCFS and accepted by pla;.ntiffs. It
is further tier role to help mediate disputes between the parties to the c=nsent Crder. moreover, the C^rsent order expressly provides that, upon motion of plaintiffs, this court may enforce complian.e with recommendations of tie N.onitor. The Monitor in
this case has served an important and crucial function in the implementation of the Consent Order that appears to have been more tha-T worth its cost. Extending the term of the Monitor would be more than just extending an information gathering requirement.
Even absent the Consent Order, DCFS could decide it was beneficial to retain the *'.onitor as an outside consultant. Defendant, however, believes the Monitor is no longer a necessity for achieving full compliance_ This view of defendant must be
given serious consideration, especially in light of the Monitor's
indicaticn that defendant is concnitted to implementin g the Consent Crdcr.See Sixth Report 6 ("There is no question
J regarding the commitment of Director Jess 2ScDo:nald and his staff \__
to meet the requirements of this Decree at the administrative
level."). Also, any extension must be Considered in light of the
limited areas of noncompliance that have been found.
This provision alone may have saved substantial litigation
costs. Prior to the present dispute, there has been virtually no need for court proceedin g s related to implementation of the Consent Order. Even in the present dispute, the availability of
the Monitor's independent report avoided the need for any evidcrtia:y hearing and its attendant costs.
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0411/1°96 10 : 54 FROM LAFC - GENERFL OFFICE

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44336 P.18

wile defendant's opinion that there is no further need for monitoring is respected, it is found that further monitoring
is likely to be beneficial in reacting compliance with the Ccnscnt order_ Areas of noncomr:iance exist in which the Monitor's input would be beneCicial. Her continued involvement
may also be helpful in avoiding any need to resolve tte specifics of noncompliance through litigation, a more costly procedure and
one that would not necessarily produce a better result.
Additionally, the costa of the Monitor are not found to be a sufficien= basis for discontinuing her involvement. While allowing goverr=ent a gencies to proceed independent of direct monitoring is a valid goa:, it appears that, in the present situation, a relatively good working relationship has developed amongst the involved parties. An approximately one-year extension of the Monitoring period is appropriate enforcement relief, ene far better than the court now attempting =o directly
implement specific compliance with remaining aspects of the decree.
–he extension of the monitoring period, however, will not
be a general one. At to time the prior extension expired, the
Monitor was near completion of her Seventh Monitorin g Report coveri:sc calendar year 1995. It was previously ordered that a
report be issued coverin g this time period, but nc date had been specified_ The prior order extending the Monitor's term until
February 15, 1996 did not specify whether she could issue the report after that date. in liqht of the reporting deadlines set
- 16 -

04/11'1S9E 1

F;C1 LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE

TO

4334?3E F ..

L1k

I

forth in t`.e Consent Order, it was implicit that the report could

'~

be issued after February 15, 1?96. Ir' any event, it vill now be

expressly ordered that the monitor shall issue the Seventh Ionitcrinq Report no later than April 30, :996.' :he raspcnsa and negotiation procedures contained in 1 16 of the Consent Order

shall be rullowed in regard to that report. TbR Eighth Monitoring Report shall cover ttie calendar
year 1996. That report will basically be limited to the areas of tconcompiiance that have been shown. It Will be limited to reporting on compiiance with 11 5(a) (Cook County only), 5(b) (Cook County only), 6(b), and 9(c) of the Consent Order and DCFS's ne'iods of deter.nining Norman eligibility, whether through certification or ether: ise . For calendar year 1996, defendant shall comply with the information :eportinq requirements of 1$ 15(a), (b) (Cock County only), (d), and (i). Defendant shall aleo comply with =1 11, 15(e) and 15(f) as they relate to T= 5(a), 5(b), 6(b), and 9!c). The term of the Monitor's appointment shall continue until the date beyond December 31, 1996 permitted for preparing the report and the reasonable time

"Under the terms of the consent order, the Monitor has 60 days after receiving information from defendant to issue the report. Thus, even if she received the calendar year 1995 data on January 1, 1996, her report was not due until after February 15.
'it is the court's understanding that the report is near completior.. However, if it cannot be completed by April 30, the Monitor sr.ouid request that the parties bring a joint motion ext pndirc the deadline.
- 17 -
'tl

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s.^c
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^Th

04/11/1996 jØ:5 FROM LcFC - GEiEPPL OFFICE

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433433 6 P.20 't

necessary to complete the additional prcccduxes set forth fn S 16

of the Consent order.

Still to be discussed are defendant's contentions that

this court lacks authority to order any relief. First, .:efendant

contends that enforcement is limited to situations of contempt.

Paragraph 20 of the Consent order, however, specifically retains

jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the Consent Order.

McCall-Be. Franzen, 777 '.2d 1178, 15.88 (7th Cir. 1985). It

does net require a finding of contempt. But ever. if jurisdiction

had not been expressly retained, this court has inherent power to

enforce an injunction, which is the form of relief contained in J
the Cor ant Order. See :ted S*.ates v. Fisher 354 F.2a 434,

436 (7t:Z Cir. 1966)

The relief thar willbe granted is enforcement of the

decree, not modification. The Consent Decree has no time limit.'

AAbsenta ch►, ange of circumstances justifying modification. s_ee_

gene- Y ?ufo v. I=ates of Su U o1k Countv .. Za , 50

367

(1992), defendant has a continuin g oblication to conpi.y with the

terms of the Consent Order- Onlyy monitoring had a time limit. Monitoring , however. w•^s an intecral aspect of achieving compliance. Since compliance has not been achieved, monitoring

may be ordered as a means to achieve and enforce compliance. rut-

even if :ontinued monitoring would be considered a modification

10The present motion is unlike Sough v_ Rowe, 759 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1985), where ar intervenor sought to extend the applicable time limit for the substantive reguirenents of the decree in that case.

- is -

it

04,11'1G9 1ti : 56 F=O1 LAFC
:s of the decree, modification would be supported by a change in circumstances. The consent Order contemplated compliance ritt variotz, requirements wculd be reached between July and December
1991_ Since full compliance has yet to be actieved, that is a
changed circumstance that justifies extending a means
Contemplated by the Consent Order for reaching compliance.
Defendant also contends that the Consent Order cannot be enforce- because of a chance in the law that has occurred since the order was first entered. one of plaintiffs' claims was that defendant vas required to comply with the statutory requirement thnt "reasonable efforts . . . be made (A) prior to placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his hose, and (B) to make i; possible for the zhild to return to his home." 42 U.S.C. S 571(a)(15).
In granting preliminary relief, this court held, as had a number
of other courts, that the "reasonable efforts" standard was enforceable in a sui:. under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983. a cTa , 739
F. Supp. at 1185-87. Subse quent to entry of the Consent Order, however, the Supreme court ruled to the contrary_ Skt er -r. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (_992). Plaintiffs contend the Consent order is ztizl enforceable because they had a number of other
still substantial claims 4n their complaint.
The parties agree that the t i rab _nt -irtd r& i w ether there is a substantial federal claim. Evans v, city of chicago,
10 F.3d 4 4 , 479-80 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. de._j , 114 S. Ct.
1831 (1994). Ey rs does not delineate what it means by
-19-

t^ 4: ^E IL
T.^
^ y T
iY^ Y
L' lv:

04/-1/1996 10 : 57 r FROM LAFC - GENERPL CF- CE

•0

43343?E F.22

"subs-antial." plaintiffs argue it means nontrivolous. ,fie

Hagant v. I,ev ne, 415 U.S. 523, S36-37 (1974); C.A. Wright,

A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federa lrectice s Procedure S 3564 (2d

ed. 1984)_ The discussion of the claims in mss, 3owever,

indica:as a standard somevhet higher than mere nonfrivolousness. It must be an issue over which there are "genuine uncertainties."
Evans, 10 F.3d at 479. This court understands Evans as meaning

the federal claim may not by one that early is without

In the preliminary in-unction ruling, this court held

(adopting the magistrate's recommendation) that a number of

provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of

1980 (";AA") were enforceable, not just 42 V.S.C. S 571(a)(15).

jge Nornar., 739 F. Supp. at 1135 n.8; 1203-08 (cirin? <2 U.S.G.

SS 622, 627, 671(a)(4), 571(a)(16), 675(1)). Other courts have

also held that provisions other than 5 671(a)(15; arc

enforceable. see ;..J. yam cinaa, 838 F.2d 119, 123 (4th Cir.

1988), Sgrt. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989) (SS 627(a)(2)(B),

671(a)(9), (10), (SG), 675); L nch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504,

510-1. (1st Cir. 1983) (S9 608, 671(a)(16), 675); Jeanine 8. v,

Thom

877 F. Supp. 1258, 12a3-A5 (E.D. Wis. 1095)

(SS 671(a)(2), (3), (7), (10`,, (11), (13), 627(x)(2), 627(b)(3));

LaShavn ,_ v. ixon, 762 F. Supp_ 959, 988-89 (D.D_C. 1991),

alf_' d on Rther _go, uds suh nom. , I,aShaW}^,p , v. ISe l y , 990 F.2d

1319 (C.C. Cir. 1993), cerj. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994)
{55 627, 571 (a) (10) , 675) . 5ee alto Ang le R_ V. Clinton, 999 F.2d 220, 323-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (claims to enforce provisions of

- 20 -

.F.
r,j=
l}
- Vii; 'rr
'
'

04t11i1°6 10 : ,` F1 LC - GEt RPL OFF I CE

TO

4334336 R.23

the W. other than §S 671(a)(9) & (15) are not frivolous). Plaintiffs' complaint included clai:s based on § 621(a)(2)(c), requiring participating states to have "a serv.ce program
designe3 to belp children, where appropriate. return to I=i,Iias
from which they have been removed; 55 622(b)(2) and 671(a)(4), requiring participating states to coordinate child welfare program with other procrams that provide benefits and services to poor faatilies; 55 671(a)(16), 675(1), and 675(5)(c), requiring case plans for every child and the development of a case review system; and 55 627(a)(2)(B) and 671(a)(12), providing for notice and hearing rights."
Defendant conterdc the claims seeking enforcement of the additio-.a. provisions arc insubstantial in light c. Artist M because the additional provisions are, like the "reasonable efforts" standard in A t _ At N., too vague to be enforced . '2 Again, t1e merits of a case are not to be fully reconsidered when

. ...i.

—*r..V.ib N..a as. .

a. 4r. ..M..v v..G pata. n.aac.al

'-Section 627 is being repealed effective October 1, 1996. ee Pub. L. 103-a32, Title II, 55 202(c), (e), 109 Stat. 4454 (1994.. Effective the sane date, provisions regardin g returning children to their fanii1ics are being added at 42 C.S.C.
§ 622(b)'9). 2" Pub. L. 103-432, Title II, 55 202(a), (e), 108
Stat. 44 °3, 4454 (1994).
12AL st _ also relied in part on S 671 only being required to be included in a state plan. Subsequent legislation essentially overruled that aspect of Aztist H. except ac t
S 671(a)(15). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, -10. Defendant concedes that suer an argument as to the provisions under consideration
Would have no sp rit in li ght of the new legislation.

.Ii

04/11/1996 10 :59 FROM LAFC - GENERAL CFFiCE Tf 43343_5l P.24

•

injunction ruling in the present case, at least five pu is2ted

cases decided before Artist M. held that some or all of the

prov_s ons presently under consideration were sufficiently clear

to be enforced. Subse gLently, twc published cases have

considered the enforceability of pertinent provisions of the AAA.

in light of the pertinent holding in Artist M. One holds the

provisions can be enforced, see Jeanine B., su pra, and the other
holds it is not frivolous to contend the provisions are

enforceable, see Angela R., supra. In light of the existing

precedents, it cannot be held that plaintiffs' clai.^:s are clearly

without merit.
It also must be kept in mind that this court is only grantin g enforcement of parts of the Consent Order. The relief that will be granted does not include the enforcement of any of

the "reasonable efforts" provisions of the Consent Order." None

of the provisions of the Consent Order that are being enforced

are ones that could only have been obtained based on a compromise

of the S 671(a)(15) claim. The enforcement that is bein g granted

is based on still viable claims. Therefore, this court has

authority to grant the relief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

15Since not at issue, it need not be considered whether use

of that language in provisions of the Consent Order necessarily

means those provisions are based solely on enforcement of,

671(a)(15). Issuance of the Seventh Report will involve

^+

reporting on certain reasonable efforts requirements. That,

however, is merely a report of previously gathered information

and does not directly involve enforcing the reasonable efforts

requirement.

04/11/1996 10 : 59 FROM LAFC - GENERAL OFFICE

TO

433433E P.25

(1) Jess McDonald is substituted for Sue Suter as the

defendant in this case.

(2) Plaintiffs' motion for continued monitoring (209-11

is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' motion for

declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non

-complianewthcosnderathcourdef

03/10/95 [209 -2] is denied without prejudice.

•

(3) The Monitor shall issue the Seventh Monitoring Report

no later than April 30, 1996.

(4) An Eighth Monitoring Report shall be filed covering

calendar year 1996, but shall be limited to reporting on

compliance with 55 5(a) (Cook County), 5(b) (Cook County), 6(b),

and 9(c) of the Consent Order and DCFS's methods of determining

Norma eligibility. For calendar year 1996, defendant shall
comply with the information requirements of Iy 15(a), (b) (Cook

County), (d), and (i) of the Consent Order. Defendant shall also

comply with 11 11, 15(e) and 15(f) of the Consent Order as they
relate to 5$ 5(a), 5(b) (Cook County), 6(b), and 9(c). The term of the Monitor's appointment shall continue until the date beyond

Decenber 31, 1996 permitted for preparing the Eighth Monitoring

Report and necessary to complete the additional procedures set

forth in 1 16 of the Consent Order.

ENTER:

DATED: APRIL

1996

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 23 -

TOTAL P.25

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE

)

PATTERSON, WANDA LHI ILARD, )

JOANN MITCHELL, on their own

)

behalf and on behalf of all

)

others similarly situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.
JESS MCDONALD, Director Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,

-------3_
_.... FED) ) ), j

D^ /

= - = ►y
1 ^

C (# p p ,

M'

CUNNINGHAM, ct.
STATES DISTRICT COUR

No. 89 C 1624

Judge William T. Hart

gistrate Judge Joan B. Gottschall

r , m.,....-^m,

♦,

y ^` f

Defendant.

) =

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CONTINUED MONITORING AND/OR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Defendant Jess McDonald, Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS" or the "Department"), respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for (1) continued monitoring and/or (2) declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non-compliance with the Consent Decree and the Court Order of March 10, 1995, filed on February 7, 1996 ("Motion").
Preliminary Statement DCFS takes its obligations under federal court orders very seriously. From the day the Consent Decree in this Court was entered, the Department has devoted substantial resources, both monetary and staff, to implementing this systemic reform Decree. These efforts have continued to this day, even in the face of a caseload that has grown from 20,000 to over

52,000 children. As a result of this work, among other things, over $3 million in cash assistance has been distributed to the plaintiff parents to help them keep or be reunited with their children, new Housing Assistance Programs have been established throughout the state, and improvements far beyond this Decree have been made in DCFS's response to domestic violence. These achievements are consistent with the Department's overall reforms to mount programs that will deflect children from entering State custody and return them safely home more quickly, goals that are consistent with the best interests of these abused and neglected children and with the State's need to efficiently manage scarce public resources by reducing the costs of caring for children in foster care.
Plaintiffs' Motion does not even include a passing reference to this record. The Motion would have this court believe that DCFS has "barely implemented" this Decree (Motion 1 3) -- a charge that is patently false. Indeed, while asking for the extension of court-ordered monitoring, plaintiffs ignore the record of the past five years of monitoring, which, as summarized below, sets forth DCFS's wide-ranging efforts, including achievements, obstacles and improvements to overcome obstacles. Perfect compliance has not been achieved, and, despite significant efforts, there are areas of the State that are in non-compliance with certain provisions of the Decree. However, DCFS continues to make improvements. Overall, the record is one of good faith, diligence, and continued energies directed toward implementing this Decree.
Plaintiffs' Motion also overlooks the fundamental legal reality that whatever federal statutory claims they may have had five years ago, those claims no longer exist following the Supreme Court decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992). The plaintiff parents here also have no constitutional claims that support the State services and programs provided under the Decree. Accordingly, as mandated under the Seventh Circuit's rulings of the past
Fa

decade, this Court has no jurisdiction over this case, and not only should plaintiffs' Motion be denied, but this Decree should be vacated.
Moveover, even if this Court fords that it has jurisdiction, there are no legal bases to impose continued monitoring on DCFS. As this case was compromised and settled, there is no adjudication or admission of liability, and thus the Decree itself provides no authority for enjoining the State to perform obligations that exceed the four corners of that agreement. Instead, plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS is guilty of contempt -- a standard which cannot be met where, as is the case here, defendant has been reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to comply with the Decree, even though areas of noncompliance may exist. Plaintiffs' Motion as a matter of law is simply without merit, and must be denied in its entirety.'
Background Procedural Background
In 1989, the plaintiff parents filed this class action against DCFS, challenging alleged DCFS policies and practices that resulted in plaintiffs' children being taken into or remaining in State custody because plaintiffs lacked housing or subsistence means, while DCFS failed to provide housing and subsistence services. ee First Amended and Supplemental Complaint, filed November 3, 1989 (included in accompanying Appendix as Exhibit 1). A preliminary injunction hearing on the claims of three of the named plaintiffs was held before Magistrate-Judge Gottschall, following which this Court issued an opinion providing for
As set forth below, the Court can render this conclusion based upon an examination of the six Monitoring Reports already submitted by the Monitor. Having already invested substantial State resources in these Reports, there is no need to burden the Court and the
1parties with additional discovery and hearings, as requested by plaintiffs. Motion, at 18, D. If, however, plaintiffs proffer evidence beyond the Monitoring Reports, defendant respectfully requests the opportunity to do the same.
3

individual injunctive relief, pursuant to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990). DCFS appealed this decision.
On March 28, 1991, this Court entered the Consent Decree settling this action (included in Appendix as Exhibit 2). The substantive sections of the Decree set forth general policies to be promulgated, including a requirement that DCFS will provide "reasonable efforts" to prevent the removal of children from their homes because of living circumstances and lack of subsistence (Decree 14(a)); begin operation of a cash assistance program and enter into an interagency agreement with the Illinois Department of Public Aid to increase the availability of welfare benefits (11 5-6); establish a new housing advocacy program (Z 7); develop internal mechanisms to access other non-DCFS services (1 8); and issue other general policies and notices, and hold appeals (11 9-10). The balance of the Decree established procedures to implement the substantive portions of the Decree and to resolve disputes between the parties prior to court proceedings (q1 11-23). These procedures included the appointment of a monitor "for a period of four years from July 1, 1991." (1 14).
Prior to the expiration of that period, the parties discussed and reached agreement on an Agreed Order providing for an extension of the Monitor's term, as well as four other obligations by DCFS. See Agreed Order (attached as Appendix A to plaintiffs' Motion). The original compromise reached by the parties provided for a two-year extension to monitoring; however, this Court on its own motion reduced the extension to one year, referring to the Seventh Circuit precedent cautioning against lengthy consent decrees.
During this past year, the Monitor issued a Sixth Monitoring Report in May 1995, and submitted two shorter reports on specific areas, pursuant to her own recommendations and with the agreement of the parties. See Statewide Review Housing Advocacy Programs, December 1994, submitted March 30, 1995 (an independent study of the Housing Advocacy
4

Program); Cook County Division of Child Protection Compliance Review, December 1994, submitted March 10, 1995 (examination of level of compliance of DCP). The Department continued implementation, including working with the Monitor on the recommendations in the Sixth Report and providing the Monitor with data (Agreed Order 1 2), appointing an ombudsperson (id. 1 3), working on developing a court plan (id. 14) and hiring a housing specialist (i4. 5). On December 11, 1995, defendant provided plaintiffs' counsel and the Monitor with a formal written response to the Sixth Report ("Response"), even though one is not called for under the Decree. Decree 1 16 (Response included in Appendix as Exhibit 3; accompanying letter from N. Eisenhauer to L. Heybach and D. Redleaf, dated December 11, 1995, included as Exhibit 4). As noted in the Response, the Department disputed some of the Monitor's conclusions on non-compliance because, for example, the Monitor was attempting to measure Norman compliance by extrapolating data from the general DCFS population (even when Norman-specific surveys indicated high rates of compliance) (e. g.., Response, 17-18, 810); or the Monitor imposed obligations beyond the terms of the Decree (id. at 24-25, 27-28, 39-46). Nonetheless, DCFS responded favorably to all but six of the 49 recommendations in the Sixth Report, and of these six, four recommendations were on issues that were not under this Decree.' Response, 1-2 (summarizing), 35, 38, 41 (individual responses). DCFS also set forth its implementation activities. Response, 3-6.

Z

Thus, there are factual disputes as to the Monitor's findings of non-compliance.

However, these need not be resolved in order to decide the Motion, because even

assuming arguendo that the Monitor's findings of non-compliance are correct, these

findings are not sufficient to justify the injunctive relief plaintiffs seek. All of the Moni-

tor's reports have been previously filed with the Court. Defendant can provide the Court

with additional copies upon request. For the Court's information, the Monitoring

Reports are dated as follows: First Monitoring Report (March 1, 1992); Second

Monitoring Report (September 28, 1992); Third Monitoring Report (March 17, 1993);

Fourth Monitoring Report (August 23, 1993); Fifth Monitoring Report (March 15, 1994);

and Sixth Monitoring Report (May 24, 1995).

5

From the outset, DCFS has worked diligently to implement the terms of the Decree, and to work with the Monitor and her assistant. As set forth below, this is consistently reflected in the monitoring reports submitted to the Court. In light of the Department's implementation efforts, and in view of the costs of monitoring (a total of $431,276 since 1991, with an annual cost of approximately $107,819), DCFS decided that further court-ordered monitoring beyond February 15, 1996 was not justifiable. See accompanying Affidavit of Mary Sue Morsch, 1 1 2-3. Accordingly, although DCFS was willing to work on continued implementation of services to reunite families and deflect children from entering State custody, DCFS was not willing to continue to invest limited time, personnel and resources into federal courtordered monitoring.
Plaintiffs then filed this Motion asking this Court to im pose monitoring on DCFS, although plaintiffs "do not here claim across-the-board non-compliance with the Decree...." Motion at 1. Ironically, in moving to extend monitoring, plaintiffs overlook the product of the past five years of monitoring, and instead claim in sweeping, unsubstantiated generalizations that "several programs and procedures are barely implemented at all ... [or] have not begun .... (Motion 1 13). This assertion is patently untrue, as revealed in a review of all six of the Monitor's Reports. Summary of Monitoring Reports
Briefly, the Monitor's Reports taken together demonstrate that the Department has worked continuously since the entry of the Decree to implement the Decree, even in the face of budget cuts, an increasing caseload, and changes in its administration.' Plaintiffs' implication

3

See, e,g., Second Rep., General Statement, at 1-3; Third Rep., General Statement, at

1-2.

0

(also attributed to the Monitor) that the Department focuses on implementation only "during
monitoring activities" (Motion 124(a)) is baseless.a
As for DCFS's efforts overall, the Monitor stated as early as March 2, 1992, one
year after the entry of the Norman Consent Decree, that DCFS
has developed a program through the provisions of the Norman Consent Order which is on the `cutting edge' of progressive child welfare practice. The DCFS staff involved have been exceptionally competent and committed individuals who have worked beyond what is normally expected in order to comply with this Order.... Many families have already benefitted from the programs developed from this Decree. Children have remained at home who might otherwise have been placed in foster care. Other children have returned home sooner to their parents because of these new programs. These efforts are to be applauded.
First Rep., Conclusion, at 21 (emphasis added). In the Second Report, the Monitor described
the Decree as "a bench mark in terms of collaborative efforts between the child welfare
community and the housing community." Second Rep., Conclusion, at 34. She went on to state
her estimate that "1,167 children from 467 families have been either spared the trauma of
separation from their families or have been reunited more quickly because of the Norman
Consent Decree." Such laudatory comments can be found in every Monitoring Report,
including the most recent Sixth Reports
Plaintiffs also state that "[w]hen the Decree was entered almost five years ago, the
1 parties anticipated that the programs and procedures it establishes would be fully
operational by the end of 1991. They are not." Motion 13. The implication, of course, is that the Department has failed to live up to an expectation that even in hindsight remains reasonable. However, as the Monitor stated in her First Report, "since the inception of the implementation of the Consent Decree, it became clear that in order to produce high quality products and work staying within some of the designated time frames was not possible. Thus it was agreed upon by all parties that certain deadlines be extended. First Rep., Introduction, at 1.
See, e.g., First Rep., 19, regarding the issue of referral services ("DCFS is in compliance with the development and distribution of a localized referral manual by July 1, 1991. The Department did a tremendous amount of work to produce a document of such magnitude in a limited amount of time and thus, should be commended for this effort.");
(continued...)
7

These citations to the Monitor's laudatory comments are not to suggest that
implementation of the Decree has been trouble-free, or even that there are no outstanding areas
of concern or non-compliance. However, these comments show that, contrary to plaintiffs'
implications, the Department has worked diligently and in good faith to implement the Decree,
and has made concerted efforts to solve problems that have become apparent, and indeed could
only have become apparent, during the course of its implementation efforts. This is simply not a
record that evinces a pattern of willful violations of this Decree, nor certainly of any contuma-
cious behavior by DCFS. The Monitor's Reports on several major areas is illustrative:
Reasonable Efforts.' The Decree requires the Department to make reasonable
efforts to prevent removal and reunify families through the provision of certain services, unless
1 such efforts would not eliminate the need for removal. Decree 4. By March 1, 1992, one
year after the entry of the Decree, the Department had created the Cash Assistance Program and
the Housing Assistance Program, negotiated interagency agreements with CHA and DPA,
5(... continued) Second Rep., 18, discussing interagency agreement with CHA ("[The agreement] represents a benchmark in collaborative efforts between the housing and child welfare communities. DCFS should be applauded for its persistence in this effort."); Third Rep, 7, discussing Monitor's detailed analysis of Cook's North office and Department's Response ("The Department has shown a conscientious effort to be responsive to the recommendations of the Monitor's Report, [yet] North office must still be considered to be in non-compliance."); Fourth Rep., 35, discussing HAP ("[Low utilization] is particularly distressing in light of the good faith efforts that the Department is currently making to strengthen the relationship between DCFS and the HAP agencies.); Sixth Rep., 1, ("[DCFS] under the visionary leadership of Director Jess McDonald has embarked upon a massive strategy for change. ... if the reform efforts are successful, all aspects of the Norman Consent Decree will have a greater chance to be implemented. The Monitors and the Plaintiffs' counsel have had input into the reform efforts to ensure inclusion of Norman Consent Decree programs and issues.").
For sections of Monitoring Reports discussing reasonable efforts, see First Rep., 5-6; Second Rep., 14-15; Third Rep., 14-16; Fourth Rep., 23-24; Fifth Rep., 18-22; Sixth Rep., 35-40.
8

created a manual of referral services, trained workers, and promulgated a number of policies and

procedures designed to facilitate the delivery of the new services. See First Rep., 6-21.

Although the Monitor and the Department had also devised a monitoring plan to be used to

evaluate the individual programs set up under the Decree, the parties had not come to an

agreement on a form to be used to document the exertion of "reasonable efforts" in individual

cases. First Rep., 2-3, 5-6. Instead, the parties agreed to delay creation of the form, and to

work with the B.H. Reform Panel which was also considering the same issue. First Rep., 5-6.

In every subsequent year, DCFS continued to provide hard services through Norman programs

in an effort to prevent placement and reunify families.

First-Sixth Reports. The Depart-

ment, plaintiffs' counsel, and the Monitor, in conjunction with the B.H. panel, also continued to

work together to design an appropriate reporting form. Second Rep., 15; Third Rep., 16.

In every year of implementation, the Monitor, based on a random sample of

cases, had determined that the Department's efforts to provide hard services had successfully

prevented children from being placed in foster care due to poverty. See, , Third Rep., 14.

In 1993, the Department finalized the Comprehensive Social Assessment Form, which was

approved by the Monitor after testing in a pilot project. Fourth Rep., 23; Fifth Rep., 19. By

1994, the Monitor had determined that the Department was in compliance with the Decree's

reasonable efforts, requirement, with the exception of Cook County where the Monitor ques-

tioned the impact of such efforts on reunification cases.

Sixth Rep., 39. The Department,

in its Response to the Sixth Report took issue with the Monitor's fording of non-compliance,

arguing, as the Monitor had conceded in earlier reports (Fourth Rep., 23) that there was no way

to measure any direct correlation between the number of children actually returned home and the

Department's "reasonable efforts," and that a survey of the Comprehensive Social Assessment

forms had revealed that the Department had made reasonable efforts in anywhere from 80-98% of the cases in Cook County. See Response, 12-18.
Cash Assistance Program.' The Decree's requirement that DCFS "begin operation of a cash assistance program" is a centerpiece of the Decree and has been in place since 1991, with a separate line item appropriation in the DCFS budget. 8 The Decree also requires the Department to maintain detailed records of the cash assistance grants made to Norman families. Decree 15(b). In the first year of operation of the program, the Department distributed cash assistance, 9 although admittedly, all parties hoped for greater utilization in the future. See Second Rep., 9, 13 (Department's efforts described as "commendable" and "in compliance" although utilization relatively low.)."
In the next six month period, the expenditures increased dramatically, with a 99% increase overall and a 157% increase in Cook County. Third Rep., 11-14 ("this is a dramatic increase and DCFS should be commended. ... [However], efforts need to continue to be

For Monitoring Report discussions of the Cash Assistance Program see First Rep., 7-8; Second Rep., 9-10, 13-14; Third Rep., 11-15; Fourth Rep., 22-23; Fifth Rep., 15-18; Sixth Rep., 29-35.

8

The appropriation for cash assistance and housing referral services increased in Fiscal

year 1996 to $1,997,200. Response, 4.

Although the Decree directs the Department to provide cash assistance grants of up to $800, the Department, in the first year of implementation, raised the cap to $2,000 in certain circumstances. First Rep., 5.

10 In the spring of 1992, HAP agencies in Cook County ran out of cash for a brief period of time. Second Rep., 13. Although the Department rectified the problem, id., the problem continued to recur in every reporting period through November, 1995. Sixth Rep., 35, 51, 53. It has been determined that the shortages occur because of problems in the reporting and record keeping of the local agencies, who distribute cash assistance directly. See Third Rep., 5; Response, 33. These agencies receive substantial cash advances from DCFS so that checks to individuals can be distributed quickly. As the Monitor's Sixth Report and the Department's Response indicate, the problem is expected to be rectified by the new automated data systems. See Sixth Rep., 35; Response, 33.

10

strengthened, particularly in Cook County."). Since that increase, cash assistance outlays have
consistently increased, culminating in the "largest cash expenditure to date" in 1994. Sixth Rep., 29. In fact, the Department has, since its inception, provided cash subsidies totaling $3.8 million to cash assistance agencies and HAP agencies throughout the State through the Cash Assistance Program. Response, 4. Of that amount, nearly $3 million has gone directly into the hands of Norman families."
As for the Decree's reporting requirements, the Department initially provided the required information by way of manual logs. See,, Third Rep., 14; Fifth Rep., 18. In 1994, the Department began serious efforts to design a fully automated state-of-the-art system for collecting cash assistance data; the system is expected to become operational in March 1996. See Sixth Rep., 34; Response, 16. The problem with the current system is that it under reports the Department's cash outlays. Fifth Rep., 18.
Housing Services." It is undisputed that the housing program developed under the Decree, known as the Housing Assistance Program ("HAP"), is a great success. See Sixth Rep., 54 ("[T]he Housing Advocacy Program created by the Norman Consent Decree is a state of the art program addressing the housing needs of child welfare families. Over the course of the three years of implementation, many of the barriers impeding successful implementation have
" The Monitor has consistently found the Department to be in compliance with regard to the Cash Assistance Program, with the exception of Cook County where, the Monitor believes, expenditures do not match projected needs. See, g, Sixth Rep., 31. The Department, as indicated in its Response, does not agree that it is in non-compliance, as DCFS disputes the Monitor's speculation as to the "projected need"; however, DCFS is implementing the recommendations in an effort to increase utilization. See Response, 15 (describing new procedures for streamlining process).
12 For discussions of HAP see First Rep., 14-17; Second Rep., 23-30; Third Rep., 24-28, Fourth Rep.; 34-37; Fifth Rep., 34-40; Sixth Rep., 51-55. 11

been addressed and corrected. "). 13 The establishment of the HAP program is a story of cooperation, diligence, good faith and flexibility on the part of the Department and the Monitor and her assistant who played a major role in developing the program. See Second Rep., 23; Third Rep., 25.
Domestic Violence Program. 1 ' The Monitoring Reports also set forth a record of good faith and diligence as to DCFS's response to domestic violence, with activities that far exceed the requirements of the Decree. Sixth Rep., 59 ("The Department is in full compliance and should be applauded for its efforts."); Response, 39-45. The Department has gone above and beyond the requirements of the Decree, creating a Domestic Violence Task Force, the position of Domestic Violence Specialist, and training numerous staff on domestic violence issues. Currently, among other initiatives, the Department's General Counsel is exploring the possibility of developing a Domestic Violence Advocacy Program cooperation with the Juvenile Court of Cook County. Response, 44. Response to Plaintiffs' Five "Critical Problems"
Plaintiffs' Motion makes no mention of any of the above accomplishments, nor any of the implementation activities listed in the Department's response. Response, 4-6. Plaintiffs focus solely on five "critical" problems they contend persist, including issues relating to 1) monitoring activities, 2) certification, 3) cash assistance, 4) screening and return home activity, and 5) utilization of public aid benefits. Each of these areas, with the exception of monitoring, was addressed in the Response, and plaintiffs have yet to substantively articulate any
13 The Monitor also continues, "[njevertheless, there is still room for improvement," id., citing the difficulties with the delivery of cash assistance, as described above.
14 For discussions of Domestic Violence Programs see First Rep., 4; Second Rep., 11-12; Third Rep., 29-31; Fourth Rep., 38-41; Fifth Rep., 43-44; Sixth Rep., 59-65. 12

disputes they may have with the substance of the implementation plans or other response set forth by the Department. Moreover, in each of these areas the record refutes plaintiffs' assertions.
(1) Monitoring Activities Plaintiffs cite no evidence that the Department has practiced "delay and inaction"
leading to an inability by the Monitor to "carry out her commitment." Motion 118. Indeed, the breadth and detail in the six Monitoring Reports themselves belie this contention. In these Reports, the Monitor has acknowledged the assistance DCFS has provided in assembling the necessary data, despite also pointing out admitted problems with data. See First Rep., 2-3, discussing development of data systems and monitoring activities; Second Rep., 3-4; Third Rep., 5-9; Fourth Rep., 8-9; Fifth Rep., 9; Sixth Rep., 18. Plaintiffs' complaints (indeed, their entire Motion) appear to be directed solely to imposing greater data collection costs and monitoring, without any regard to the actual provision of services -- which, of course, was the real focus of the Decree. DCFS's decision to oppose further monitoring is based in large measure on the reluctance to direct scarce resources from service delivery to simply monitoring and informationgathering.
For example, plaintiffs' assertions about data on cash assistance- completely ignores the actual operation of the program. As noted in the Sixth Report, capturing aggregate and specific data on cash assistance has been difficult "since the inception" of the program, Sixth Rep., 34, but this can be attributed to the decentralized nature of the program itself (cash advances are given to local community agencies so that funds can be rapidly provided to clients) and the manual record-keeping used. See Norman Payment Authorization System General Design Document, 4-7, (included as Tab B of Ex. 3; see also Third Rep., 14.) With the Moni-
13

tor's assistance, building on this experience, DCFS has developed an automated system and is
now completing this work. Sixth Rep., 34; Response, 15. Plaintiffs also cite the requirement of "reasonable efforts" documentation. Motion
q 20. However, the Monitor has found the forms being used by DCFS for documentation to be sufficient, although concerns remain with worker training and follow-through on properly completing the forms. Fifth Rep., 19; Sixth Rep., 36. Such management issues are not unexpected in a system that includes over 3,000 staff and 160 private agencies, and are being ad-
dressed by DCFS in its overall management and training reforms. These issues, however, do not give rise to the level of contempt of court."
Finally, plaintiffs cite defendant's voluntary, good-faith actions in informing plaintiffs' counsel (as well as plaintiffs' counsel in other cases) of plans that are being developed
1 to restructure portions of the entire child welfare system. Motion 23. Plaintiffs' speculation
that this would somehow negatively affect this Decree is unwarranted -- especially in view of the Department's manifest good faith intentions in sharing its initial plans long in advance of full development and implementation, and the Department's inclusion of the Monitor and her assistant (in their individual capacities, not as Norman monitors) in helping to design this restructuring. Id. 1 23 n. 2. It strains credulity that a defendant's efforts to openly keep plaintiffs informed should be twisted into a reason for imposing court-ordered monitoring.
(2) Norman Certification
15 Plaintiffs also list specific issues where they allege insufficient data collection, such as providing notice of appeal rights and risk assessment practices. Motion, 1 21. Again, plaintiffs' complaint is simply about data, and suggests that major investments in simply reporting and collecting data is required as distinct from actually doing the substantive work under the Decree, or providing the services. There is no suggestion from the plaintiff parents that they have not been receiving adequate notice, for example, to suggest that compliance with the substantive requirements of the Decree is problematic. 14

Plaintiffs' next complaint centers around the Department's efforts to certify

Norman eligible families, which is a process not required by the Decree but instead devised,

with input from the Monitor, to create systems and procedures for tracking Norman clients.

Even the Monitor has questioned its continuation:

[a] large data system developed to capture the information is questionable. It is bureaucratic; the certification process itself does not provide help to the family. Since the determination to access services has administrative safeguards, it seems consideration not to certify has merits. The Department can place the emphasis upon service delivery and the development of data collection to determine who receives the service, for what purpose (food, clothing, shelter, etc.), issues which are the purpose of the Norman program."

Sixth Rep., 28. Moreover, even the statistics identified by plaintiffs show that the Department is
1 correctly certifying Norman families in 76 to 83 percent of the cases. Motion 25. Again, this

does not support a finding of contempt.

(3) Timely Cash Assistance As the Monitor's Reports reveal, the Department has consistently increased its

outlays of cash assistance every year, culminating with record distributions in the last fiscal year.

Second Rep., 9; Third Rep., 11-14, Fourth Rep., 5-6; Fifth Rep., 16; Sixth Rep., 29. The

problem of cash shortages experienced by local HAP agencies is being addressed, as noted

above. The agencies do not always notify DCFS sufficiently in advance when their cash

advances are low, and thus there is a time lag between depletion and the next cash advance from

the Department. This situation has been promptly resolved evertyime it has occurred, and

should be alleviated by the automated cash assistance system.

Sixth Rep., 34-35; Response,

33.

(4) Screening and Return Home Activity

Plaintiffs complain about defendant's activities with regard to the Decree's

1 9(f), requirement, found at

that the defendant promulgate rules, policies, and procedures as

15

appropriate, "in cases where court action is necessary to return children home or to further

reunification." Decree 19(f). The subsection further provides that "it shall be the duty of the

caseworker to initiate such court proceedings promptly." j,

the Department promul-

gated a rule within the first year of implementation (First Rep., 9), all of the parties eventually

agreed that the rule was not having the desired effect. Second Rep., 16. In response, the

Department and plaintiffs' counsel have attempted, over the last several years, to come to some

sort of agreement as to an effective protocol or procedure. As the monitoring reports indicate, the fault for the lack of progress does not lie wholly with the Department. See, e.g_, Sixth Rep., 40-41 (describing impact of Joseph Wallace case); Fifth Rep., 24 (describing problems with Cook County Juvenile Court); First Rep., 10 (describing impact of continuances that are "beyond the control and responsibility of DCFS").
Indeed, much of the difficulty stems from the fact that DCFS is not the party that petitions the Juvenile Court to return children home. Rather, it is the plaintiff parents here, through the attorneys at Juvenile Court (usually the Public Defender's office) who must do so. In an effort to try and resolve this issue, defendant and plaintiffs agreed in the Agreed Order that DCFS would submit a plan to plaintiffs' counsel and the monitor. Agreed Order 1 4. This plan has not been completed, although DCFS is continuing to work on it, including recently meeting with plaintiffs' counsel. The work has been complicated, however, by changes and vacancies in the legal staff for the Department, the Cook County Juvenile Court, and the Cook County Public Defender's Office (neither the current DCFS General Counsel nor the current chief of the DCFS Juvenile Court unit were at the Department when the Agreed Order was negotiated), as well as the pressures of Juvenile Court and the necessity of working with the Cook County Public Defender's office. Nonetheless, DCFS is still attempting to develop a plan that will work. This does not require monitoring, however, to complete.
16

(5) Public Aid Plaintiffs' own Motion admits that DCFS has complied with the Decree, "includ-
ing developing liaisons within DCFS to work with DPA, developing a streamlined process for DCFS to access benefits for eligible clients and training DCFS workers on utilization of DPA resources." Motion 129; compare Decree 16. The Monitoring Reports support this conclusion. See First Rep., 12-13; Second Rep., 20-21; Third Rep., 22-23; Fourth Rep., 31-32; Fifth Rep., 30-32; Sixth Rep., 46-48. The Decree does not require DCFS to guarantee a certain level of utilization of the dwindling welfare benefits available in this State. Plaintiffs' assertion in this regard is simply not grounded in any requirement of this Decree.
In sum, plaintiffs have overlooked the monitoring record here and have misread the Decree. Not only does the record fail to support plaintiffs' Motion, but the picture that emerges is of an agency that has worked diligently and invested time, staff and resources to fulfilling the obligation under this Decree. Full compliance is still being worked on in some areas, but given the Department's overall diligence, it is not legally sound, justifiable or fair for this Court to respond to these efforts by enjoining the Department and imposing what amounts to contempt sanctions.
Argument I. THERE IS NO LONGER A "SUBSTANTIAL CLAIM UNDER FEDERAL LAW"
TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT OF THIS DECREE The Seventh Circuit has held that "entry and continued enforcement of a consent
decree regulating the operation of a governmental body depend on the existence of a substantial claim under federal law. Unless there is such a claim, the consent decree is no more than a contract, whose enforcement cannot be supported by the diversity jurisdiction and that has in
17

court no more force than it would have outside of court." Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d
474, 480 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1831 (1994) (citing League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 847 (5th Cir. 1993)) (en banc). This is especially true where, as here, the decree "requires continuing supervision by the district court," and implicates the principles of federalism by "entangl[ing] an arm of the federal government in the administration of another sovereign ..." Evans, 10 F.3d at 477; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (reversing injunction against city officials because of the application of "principles of federalism"). Thus,
the court must ensure that there is a substantial federal claim, not only when the decree is entered but also when it is enforced, and that the obligations imposed by the decree rest on this rule of federal law rather than the bare consent of the officeholder. Evans, 10 F.3d at 479 (discussing "a series -of decisions in this circuit" over the past decade supporting this holding). Accordingly, the court must engage in its own inquiry as to the "propriety or scope of an injunction," and may refuse to enter injunctive relief, even where "the injunction is contained in a proposed consent decree." ACORN v. Ed gar, 56 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 1995). See Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to enter consent decree that would propel court into regulating local elections). As set forth below, this inquiry makes clear that there is no longer a "substantial claim" under federal statutory or constitutional law. Thus, there is no federal jurisdiction even to support the continuation of this Consent Decree, let alone the relief plaintiffs seek in their Motion. A. Plaintiffs No Longer Have An y Federal Statutory Claims The gravamen of plaintiffs' action was that the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-26 (Title IV-B of the Social Security
18

Act), 670-79a (Title IV-E), provided the plaintiff parents with privately enforceable rights to cash, housing and other subsistence assistance, and to other "reasonable efforts" to prevent the removal of children from plaintiffs and to provide for family reunification. See Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Hart, J.) (quoting plaintiffs' complaint). Defendant argued at the time that the AAA did not provide such individual rights, either under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or as an implied right of action. Similar arguments had already been made on this same question in other cases against DCFS in this district. See B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1357, 1403-04 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Grady, J.) (no right to "reasonable efforts" or substantive services under AAA); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Williams, J.) (same); Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 696-97 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Shadur, J.) (right to "reasonable efforts" does exist), rev'd sub nom. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
This Court and the Magistrate considered this debate at length. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1185-87, 1203-09. The Court examined not only the "reasonable efforts" clause set forth under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), but also the related provisions under Titles IV-B and IV-E regarding coordination of services, case plans and a case review system. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 622, 627, 671(a)(4), (16), 675(1); Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1203-05 (setting forth provisions). The Court rejected Judge Grady's ruling in B.H. that "Congress intended Title IV-B to be an expression of goals and guiding principles" (B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1401); the "reasonable efforts" clause did not create an individual right(id.); and an individual federal right to case plans and a case review system did not give rise to "sweeping rights" to services. Id. at 1402. See Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1185-86. Instead this Court agreed with Judge Shadur's ruling in Artist M. that the "reasonable efforts" clause did create an individually enforceable federal right
19

which entitled the plaintiff parents to "preventive and reunification services." Id. at 1207 (Magistrate's Report and Recommendation); see id. at 1187.
Since the date of the Court's opinion in 1990, and the entry of this Consent Decree in 1991, the Supreme Court reversed Judge Shadur's opinion in Artist M. The Court held that the "reasonable efforts" clause lacks any statutory guidance as to how such efforts are to be measured, and thus fails to establish an individually enforceable federal right. Suter, 503 U. S. at 359-60. Thus, the linchpin of the purported federal claims asserted by plaintiffs no longer exists.
Plaintiffs likely will point to the other provisions of Titles IV-B and IV-E previously construed by this Court for support that a substantial federal claim still remains in this case. However, it is plain from both the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation and this Court's opinion that the ruling on the "reasonable efforts" clause -- namely that there was a federal right to require the State to make "reasonable efforts" to "prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and ... to make it possible for the child to return to his home ..." (42 U.S.C. § 617(a)(15)) -- formed the basis for this Court's holding that the statutory provisions regarding coordination, case plan and a case review system created rights to substantive services, as distinct from merely procedural or monitoring activities. See Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1185-87 (construing only the "reasonable efforts" clause), 1188 (fording rights for parents in AAA because statute "provides for the continued unification or reunification of a family ... "), 1207 n.6 (Magistrate's Report and Recommendation rejecting Judge Grady's ruling limiting the rights created by the case plan and case review provisions, because monitoring is of no use "without efforts aimed at family unification or permanent placement ... ")
Moreover, under the reasoning in Suter, the specific statutory provisions cited by plaintiffs to coordination of services, case plans and case reviews are themselves not sufficiently
20

i

i

i

n

III Ili

i

well-defined to create the individually enforceable rights plaintiffs seek. Unlike the plaintiff
class of children in B.H., the parents here did not seek to enforce the mere procedures to have
case plans developed and case reviews held. B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1402. Rather, plaintiffs
cited these provisions in order to assert rights to cash assistance, housing and other services. See First Am. Compl. at 28-29 (prayer for relief). In response to DCFS's argument that the
AAA was too "vague and amorphous" to create such federal rights, the Magistrate wrote that
"[w)hat difficulty there is inheres rather in the lack of any clear definition of what is specifically required. `Coordination' is required, but it is not clear from the statute exactly what coordinaLion entails. `Reasonable efforts' are required, but `reasonable efforts' are nowhere defined." Id. at 1207. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444, 448 (1989) (among other things, in order to create enforceable rights, statute must not be "'too vague and amorphous' to be `beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.'") (quoting Wri ghtt v. Roanoke Redevelopment Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldeman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (federal spending statutes must "unambiguously" impose conditions on States in order to create enforceable rights).16
This lack of definition, which permeates all of the provisions cited by plaintiffs, is fatal. As the Supreme Court ruled in Suter:
No further statutory guidance is found as to how "reasonable efforts" are to be measured. This directive is not the only one which Congress has given to the States, and it is a directive whose meaning will obviously vary with the circumstances of each individual case. How the State was to comply with this directive,
16 Section 1320a-10 of the Social Security Act explicitly does not alter this analysis or limit the effect of the Suter opinion insofar as it applies the precedent of Pennhurst and its progeny. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-10. This section only limited any argument, as stated in footnote 10 of Suter, that could be made that a statutory provision would not create a federal right simply because it was included as an item in a State plan required by the Social Security Act. Id. 21

and with the other provisions of the Act, was, within broad limits, left up to the State.
Suter, 503 U.S. at 360. Likewise, as the Magistrate noted, no statutory guidance is found as to
"coordination" or the return home services to be provided in the case plan or reviewed at the
case review; indeed, as in Suter, the meaning of these requirements "will obviously vary with
the circumstances of each individual case."" Id. Accordingly, the individual federal rights
under the AAA previously asserted by plaintiffs simply do not now exist.
Plaintiffs apparently contend that defendant is somehow barred from raising Suter
now because the ruling was not raised when it was issued in 1992. Tr. of 2/12/96 Hearing at 9-
10 (included in Appendix as Exhibit 6). 18 However, plaintiffs misunderstand the nature of the
obligation inherent in the exercise of federal court authority that plaintiffs seek to invoke in their
Motion. As the Seventh Circuit has held repeatedly, this Court must independently satisfy itself
that there are substantial federal grounds for the continued enforcement of this Decree.
See Evans, 10 F.3d at 478; Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338 ("A judge has obligations to other litigants, who may depend on the availability of [the court], and to members of the public whose interests may not be represented by the litigants."). Even if the parties were in agreement as to the
issuance of an injunction, the Court "has the power to refuse even when both parties are pressing it to approve ..." ACORN, 56 F.3d at 797. See also Firefighters Local Union No.
17 The individual injunction proceedings in this case underscore this point. See Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1207-08 (finding that Gina Johnson's case plan complied with federal law while Wanda Hilliard's and Joan Mitchell's did not).
18 Plaintiffs' counsel also incorrectly suggested at the hearing on this Motion that the pendency of the Artist M. case was acknowledged in this Decree. Id. No such acknowledgment is contained in the Decree. Contrast B.H. v. Suter, No. 88 C 5599, Consent Decree at 4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1991) (acknowledging Artist M. appeal) (relevant sections included in Appendix as Exhibit 5). Indeed, when this Consent Decree was entered by the Court on March 28, 1991, certiorari had not yet been granted in Artist M. See Suter v. Artist M., 500 U.S. 915 (1991) (granting certiorari). 22

1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576 n.9 (1984) (the court's "authority to adopt a consent decree
comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce," not from the parties'
consent to the decree") (quoting Railway Emplo yees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961)). Moreover, the parties here are not in agreement as to the issuance of further
injunctive orders by this Court. Thus, unlike even the precedent cited by the Seventh Circuit, this Court does not even have an agreement between the parties to serve as a basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the State. The fact that the State never previously brought the Suter decision to this Court is irrelevant.19 B. The Constitutional Claims Asserted In The Complaint Are Without Merit
Plaintiffs' complaint also invokes the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Compl. 11 44(a), 45(b). Defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the claims before the Magistrate, although these constitutional issues were never reached as the Magistrate found that plaintiffs had stated statutory claims under the AAA.
Plaintiffs have simply not asserted cognizable constitutional claims. Plaintiffs' assertion apparently is that DCFS has infringed upon their fundamental family rights by taking or keeping custody of their children without providing for cash assistance, housing or other services that would avoid this infringement. However, as the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have repeatedly explained, the Bill of Rights acts to limit the power of government, and "generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not
19 To the extent that plaintiffs' argument is based on laches, they clearly cannot make the requisite two-prong showing of both unreasonable delay and prejudice to plaintiffs. See, g.., Smith v. City of Chicago, 769 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Laches may be invoked only when unreasonable delay and prejudice of the other party coincide.") Indeed, instead of any prejudice to plaintiffs, any supposed delay in raising Artist M. inured to plaintiffs' benefit as they continued to receive the benefit of the Decree. 23

deprive the individual." DeShaney v. Winneba go County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (no right to protective services for abused and neglected children); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (Due Process Clause "says that a state shall not `deprive' residents of life, liberty, or property, save with due process. It does not require the state to furnish residents with property they lack ... "). Thus, plaintiffs cannot sustain claims challenging DCFS's alleged policies and practices of "taking and retaining custody of children from impoverished parents and legal guardians because of their inability to obtain cash, food, shelter or other subsistence, while failing to assist the parents and children to meet [ ] these needs ..." First Am. Compl. 1 1. See Donald v. Polk Count y , 836 F.2d 376, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Because the right to receive social services is not a constitutionally protected right," parents in abuse case could not state claim to social services to avoid losing custody of children) .
Notably, this case is not a challenge to the process by which plaintiffs were alleged to be abusive or neglectful toward their children. Nowhere do plaintiffs assert that in the absence of the provision of the affirmative services they seek, that their children were not at some risk of harm warranting intervention by DCFS. See, eg., First Am. Compl. 1 32 (asserting challenges to DCFS policies of removing children "without determining whether provision of the family's subsistence needs would enable the child to remain safely at home, and without providing or arranging for provision of such subsistence...") (emphasis added). Regardless, such a challenge would be similarly unavailing. It is well established that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest," Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944), and the Constitution is not violated when custody of a child is taken first and due process hearings are provided later. See, , Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 291
24

(7th Cir. 1983) ("When a child's safety is threatened, that is justification enough for action first and hearing afterward."); see also Donald, 836 F.2d at 380. Plaintiffs' complaint describes the procedural steps in the Illinois child welfare and juvenile court systems and nowhere asserts that these procedures were insufficient to protect plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. First Am.
Compl. q1 12-16.
Finally, plaintiffs' claims cannot be grounded in the substantive due process rights afforded children in State custody. First, the existence of an affirmative obligation on the State to provide for such rights is based on "the proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)). The plaintiff parents here are not in State custody. Second, even if plaintiffs were in custody, the constitutional obligations that are then imposed only reach the "basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety ..." Id.; see also K.H. ex rel. Murph y v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 856 (7th Cir. 1990); B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1394-96. These rights do not include the social services, cash assistance and housing that plaintiffs seek in this action. See B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1396-98 (children in custody do not have constitutional rights to "training necessary to reunite them with their families, to ensure parental and sibling visitation, stable placement .. . and an adequate number of follow-up case workers.").
II. THIS COURT CANNOT IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE DECREE AS THERE HAS BEEN NO ADJUDICATION OR ADMISSION OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW It is well established that "[a] district court may not ... circumvent the express
terms of a defendant party's consent in the absence of an adjudication or admitted violation of
25

law. In the absence of an adjudication or admission of [a violation of law], the district court authority to impose additional obligations on a defendant is constrained by the terms of agreement entered by the parties to the consent decree." Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1153 (6th Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2998 (1993). See also Fox v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1982) ("To impose additional duties under the decree ... is to disregard the basic rights of litigants who waive their right to litigate defense by consenting to have a decree entered against them. The conditions upon which rights are waived must be respected.").
In addition, it is well settled that the starting point in interpreting a consent decree is the decree's plain language. South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985). As the Supreme Court has stated, the "scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it" or by "what might have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation." Firefighters Local v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 579 at 574, (quoting United States v. Armour & Co, 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971)); see also Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1012. Accordingly, in Stotts, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to use an equal employment opportunity consent decree to enjoin impending layoffs and demotions, and overturned the court of appeals ruling that such an injunction "did no more than enforce the terms of the consent decree" because under the decree "the City was under a general obligation to use its best efforts to increase the proportion of blacks on the force..." Stotts, 467 U.S. at 574. An injunction to carry out the purpose of a decree is not valid unless "the express terms of the decree contemplated that such an injunction would be entered." Id. at 575. Cf. Missouri v.

26

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I

.III .V

ii. i

Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2054 (1995) (reversing lower court remedial orders that exceeded
constitutional violations at issue in the case).20
Here, it is clear there has been no adjudication or admission as to any violations
of federal law. See Decree 1 2 ("By agreeing to this Consent Order neither party makes any express or implied admission of fact or law for any purpose.") 21 Plaintiffs' Motion seeks an
extension of monitoring because "plaintiffs have not received the monitoring they are entitled to
receive under the Decree." Motion 1 30(a). This is apparently based on plaintiffs' claim that
the "Decree calls for monitoring for a three and a half year period after implementation." Id.
1 22. However, the Decree does not base the term of the monitor's appointment on an interval
after implementation has been reached. The Decree states that:
The court shall appoint an impartial monitor who shall receive reports from defendant and make recommendations concerning the implementation of this Consent Order for a period of four years from July 1, 1991.
Decree 1 14. See also Agreed Order 1 1 (extending term to February 15, 1996 "with the same
duties and authority as currently embodied in the Consent Order... ").
20 This case does not involve a judgment order following a finding that federal law has been violated, as was the case in Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995), cited in plaintiffs' Motion. Motion 130(b)(c). Moreover, Youakim involved a challenge to the implementation of recently-enacted state law that the plaintiffs contended conflicted with the judgment order. Here, there are no challenges to any actions by defendant that plaintiffs contend are violative of the Decree. They merely complain that the Decree has not been fully implemented. As set forth below, this argument cannot be used to circumvent the necessity of meeting the contempt standard before imposing sanctions on DCFS.
21 The preliminary injunction proceedings in 1989-90 addressed only the specific individual plaintiffs, and did not reach the merits of any broader systemic claims by plaintiffs as addressed under the Consent Decree. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1191. 27

Plaintiffs try to rewrite these provisions by pointing to the interval between the
various due dates in the Decree and the four year monitor's term in paragraph 14. 1 Motion
q 16. However, the Decree does not link that Monitor's term to "full implementation of the
Decree." Id. Contrast B.H. Decree 1 74 (monitoring continues until compliance has been
maintained for a period of five years) (Exhibit 5). Nor does the Decree "create[ I a central role
for the monitor," "made part and parcel of the implementation methodology the parties devel-
oped and the Court approved." Motion ¶ 15. The Decree simply provides for a set term under
which an impartial monitor will collect data, report on implementation and make recommen-
dations for improvements. Once the monitor's term expires, the Decree does not provide any
other basis for extending that term. 13 The fact that plaintiffs' interpretation "might satisfy the
purposes of one of the parties ... " provides no legal grounds for expanding the terms of the
existing Decree. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 574.24
22 To the extent plaintiffs' argument is with any delays in implementation of the Decree beyond the July 1 and December 31, 1991 deadlines in the Decree, the parties and Monitor have known since the First Monitoring Report that these deadlines were overly ambitious. First Rep., 1; supra at n.4. Plaintiffs, however, have not previously contested this finding, nor have they availed themselves of any of the remedial measures contained in the Decree to challenge these acknowledged delays. If laches exists in this case, it is most likely plaintiffs who should be barred from asserting these arguments, rather than defendant.
23 Plaintiffs' reliance on the fact that DCFS agreed last year to resolve the parties' dispute by asking this Court for an extension of the Monitor's time to 1997 is unavailing. Motion 1 10. Obviously, any prior settlement offers or agreements by the parties cannot now be used to prove liability on the disputed claims. Fed. R. Evid. 408.
24 To the extent plaintiffs are seeking a modification for the Decree, they similarly have failed to establish any grounds for such modification. See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576 (analyzing and rejecting argument that district court had "inherent authority to modify the decree when an economic crisis unexpectedly required layoffs"). Modification of this Decree must meet the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). Under Rufo, modification of an institutional reform decree such as this one may be made where the movant establishes "a significant (continued...)
28

M. THE MONITORING REPORTS MAKE CLEAR THAT PLAINTIFFS CANNOT MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING CONTEMPT
Pursuant to the Seventh Circuit holding in South, the appropriate remedy for the
alleged violations of the Consent Decree asserted by plaintiffs is a civil or criminal contempt
action, South, 759 F.2d at 614. Plaintiffs, however, eschew any attempt to show contempt, with
good reason. See Motion at 1 ("Plaintiffs do not here claim across-the-board non-compliance
with the Decree but raise specific non-compliance issues of significance to the Decree as a
whole."). The record in this case -- as set forth by the court-appointed monitor -- simply does not support a fording that this Department has acted in contempt of the Consent Decree.
DCFS "was required, at the very least, to make a good faith effort to comply with the district court's order." American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. Bass, 688 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1982). Civil contempt requires a showing that the Department was not "'reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was ordered.'" Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting American Fletcher, 688 F.2d at 517)). However, to prevail, plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS is in contempt. Id.; see also Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1995).
As set forth above, for the past five years, DCFS has been "reasonably diligent and energetic" in attempting to accomplish the multiple requirements of this Decree. Indeed, the monitoring reports praise the Department for its innovations and response, and acknowledge the
24(...continued) change either in factual conditions or in law." Id. at 384. The only changes in law since 1991 do not favor plaintiffs' request su ra, Section I), and the only factual conditions cited by plaintiffs are purported violations of the Decree. However, the Seventh Circuit has held that violations of a decree do not justify modification, as "[a] violation of a consent decree is not extraordinary or unforeseeable. Rather than rewrite the decree, the appropriate remedy is a civil or criminal contempt action." South, 759 F.2d at 614. 29

sustained efforts of its staff. Supra at 6-7; see also Third Rep., 25 (discussion of HAP program); First Rep., 21 ("DCFS staff involved [in implementation] have been exceptionally competent and committed individuals who have worked beyond what is normally expected in order to comply with this Order.") There have been areas of non-compliance, unanticipated problems and the need for changes in implementation strategies, although in some areas, DCFS has questioned the Monitor's findings of non-compliance. Id. However, even where compliance has fallen short, the Department's response has been to attempt to resolve any problems. Supra at 5, 10-12, 15. Moreover, it must be noted that these efforts were mounted during a time when DCFS experienced unprecedented and accelerated growth in its caseload; from 1991, the year this decree was entered, to 1994, the number of children in Illinois in DCFS custody grew by over 86 percent, from 20,965 to 39,154. See B.H. v. Ryder, 856 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1994); see also Second Rep., 2. By December 1995, the number of children in custody had grown to 52,990. Response, 3 n.5.
Plaintiffs' Motion overlooks these overall efforts and focuses on five specific areas. Plaintiffs' assertions as to the five "critical problems" they contend "persist" (Motion 1 14) are inaccurate, as set forth above. Supra at 12-17. Moreover, even in those areas where DCFS has not yet fully complied with the Decree, this failure alone cannot support a finding of contempt. Where a defendant has engaged in diligent efforts leading to "substantial," if not complete, compliance with a consent decree, contempt of court does not exist. See Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1220-22 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding district court ruling refusing to fmd state officials in contempt of court where compliance with decree governing state treatment facility was "short of perfect compliance"); United States v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 890 F.2d 507, 510 (1st Cir. 1989) (district did not err in finding that non-compliance with staffing ratios in consent decree did not constitute contempt). Cf. Howard Johnson Co.
30

Inc. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Conduct that evinces substantial, but not complete, compliance with the court order may be excused if it was made as part of a good faith effort at compliance."). Thus, assuming arguendo that all of the Monitor's assertions of non-compliance are correct, the relief plaintiffs seek cannot be imposed as contempt sanctions, as plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proving that DCFS is in contempt.
IV. BY THE TERMS OF THE DECREE AND AGREED ORDER, AS WELL AS FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR SUBMISSION OF A SEVENTH MONITORING REPORT For all of the foregoing reasons, including that there is no longer any federal
jurisdiction for the continued enforcement of this Decree, there is no basis for the submission of a Seventh Monitoring Report. Neither the Decree nor the Agreed Order provide for a final report, or a "final assessment as to the future consideration of implementation of the Decree, including the issue of continued monitoring" as argued by plaintiffs. Motion 1 24(d). Instead, the specific provisions of the Decree provide for DCFS to submit information to the Monitor "on a semi-annual basis beginning January 1, 1992 and concluding o n July 1. 1995 ..." Decree 1 15 (emphasis added). "Within 60 days after receipt of the semi-annual information described under Paragraph 15, the monitor shall submit to the parties and the court a report regarding compliance with the terms of this Order ..." Id. 1 16.
These terms were not altered by the Agreed Order entered last year. Paragraph 6 of the Agreed Order provided that "[t]he monitor is excused from the filing of the semi-annual report due September 1994 and will resume reporting for the next semi-annual period." This next report was the Sixth Monitoring Report, due in early 1995, which was submitted by the monitor. Nor does paragraph 1 of the Agreed Order alter the provisions of paragraphs 15-16 of the Decree, as this provision simply extends the term of the monitor to February 15, 1996 "with
31

the same duties and authorities as currently embodied in the Consent Order..." Agreed Order 1 1 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs argue that monitoring must nonetheless be extended because defendant did not provide a written response to the Sixth Monitoring Report until December 11, 1995, which "allowed little or no time for the monitor in the function of facilitating a compliance plan." Motion 124(d). As an initial matter, the Decree does not require the submission of a written response, although in the past DCFS has voluntarily prepared such a response in or.'er to facilitate discussions with plaintiffs' counsel. Nor does the Decree set forth time frames for any response by DCFS; the Decree simply states that any recommendation contained in a report by the Monitor "shall be considered by defendant in developing a plan to comply with the terms of this Order, which plan shall be negotiated with plaintiffs' counsel, with the assistance of the monitor." Decree 1 16.
The timing of DCFS's written response to the Sixth Monitoring Report (Exhibit 3) was occasioned by staffing changes at both DCFS and counsel for the Department, as well as the press of other litigation demands on the Department and counsel (including the emergency preliminary injunction proceedings and subsequent expedited appeals in Youakim v. McDonald, which also involved plaintiffs' counsel). However, as defendant's counsel has previously noted in writing to plaintiffs' counsel, the delay in the written response is not indicative of DCFS's efforts to implement and comply with the recommendations of the Sixth Monitoring Report. See Dec. 11, 1995 Ltr. from N. Eisenhauer (Exhibit 4). Rather, as set forth in the Response, DCFS was already implementing the vast majority of the recommendations in the Report, and only
32

disagreed with two recommendations that were within the scope of this Decree. Dec. 11, 1995 Ltr.; Response, 1. This work was taking place with the active participation of the Monitor and her assistant. See ems►., Dec. 11, 1995 Ltr. at 2-3 (regarding meetings with Monitor); Response, 1 n.1. Moreover, to this date, despite repeated requests from defendant's counsel, plaintiffs have yet to articulate any disagreements with the compliance plans and efforts outlined in the Response to the Sixth Report. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' wishful interpretation of the Decree and Agreed Order, the four comers of these documents do not provide a basis for this Court to enjoin DCFS to incur the expense of a Seventh Monitoring Report.26
u There were four additional recommendations that DCFS disagreed with, but these concerned issues not within the scope of this Consent Decree. See Response, 1-2 (summarizing), 35, 38, 41 (individual responses).
26 Plaintiffs likely will contend that without the Seventh Monitoring Report, the extension of the Monitor's term contemplated by the Agreed Order was meaningless. To the contrary, during the past year, the Monitor has worked on special Norman reports, pursuant to her own recommendations and the agreement of the parties, and she has continued to work with DCFS in implementation, as well as to review compliance data submitted by DCFS. 33

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny plaintiffs' Motion in its entirety and should vacate the Consent Decree.

Dated: Chicago, Illinois February 26, 1996

Respectfully

JAMES E. RYAN Attorney General of Illinois

Offistina M. Tchen Special Assistant Attorney General
Nancy S. Eisenhauer Tiffanie N. Cason SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2010 Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 407-0700
Counsel for Defendant Jess McDonald

34 ,._

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nancy S. Eisenhauer, hereby certify that I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CONTINUED MONITORING AND/OR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF to be served upon:
Laurene M. Heybach Diane Redleaf John Bouman Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 343 South Dearborn Street, Suite #700 Chicago, Illinois 60604 by hand delivery on the 26th day of February, 1996.
Nancy S. Eisenhauer

 
 G S i7i4i; y

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1(_

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE PATTERSON, WANDA MILLIARD JOANN MITCHELL, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

I ^v

Plaintiffs,
JESS MCDONALD, Director Illinois Department of Children and Family Services

FOR LL ML

-v

No. 89 C 1624

Judge William T. Hart

Magistrate Joan B.

Gottschall

Defendant.

MOTION FOR (1) CONTINUED MONITORING AND/OR (2) DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REDRESSING SUBSTANTIAL NON- COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONSENT
DECREE AND THE COURT ORDER OF MARCH 10, 1995.

Plaintiffs move, pursuant to 520 of the Consent Decree

("Decree") of March 28, 1991 and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and

2202, for declaratory and injunctive relief redressing defendant's

substantial non-compliance with the Consent Decree and the Agreed

Order of March 10, 1995 ("Order" or "1995 Order" attached as

Appendix A) including an order directing continuing monitoring

beyond February 15, 1996 for an additional two year period or such

lesser time as the Court determines may be necessary to fulfill the

purposes of the Consent Decree. Plaintiffs do not here claim

across-the-board non-compliance with the Decree but raise specific

non-compliance issues of significance to the Decree as a whole.

In support of this Motion, plaintiffs state:

A. THE DECREE AND SUBSEQUENT IMPLEMENTATION ORDERS

1. The Decree was approved by the Court on March 28, 1991,

1. The Decree was approved by the Court on March 28, 1991, after extensive litigation. See Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D.Il1. 1990). In the Decree, the defendant, director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS" or "the Department") agreed:
(a) to cease removing children from the custody of the class members (impoverished parents or guardians involved with DCFS) , and failing to return custody of their children to class members because those families lacked basic subsistence needs, i.e. food, clothing, or adequate housing, Q4 (all cites to paragraphs are paragraphs of the Decree, unless otherwise noted); and
(b) to implement policies and procedures to prevent the unwarranted separation of children and parents, including providing inter alia: (i) provision of timely cash assistance to class members who require initial rent, security deposit, utility connections, furniture or other items necessary for their children to remain in or return to their custody, ¶q4, 5; (ii) housing assistance services to locate and secure shelter and housing and to assist class members in obtaining subsidized housing and utility assistance where possible, ¶7; 1 (iii) efforts to locate parents who are unstably housed before DCFS takes any adverse action affecting their children, 19(e); (iv) timely court action to ensure prompt restoration of custody of class members' children after provision
I The cash assistance and housing services mandated by the Decree are now generally known as "Norman" services. Parents identified by DCFS as eligible class members are referred to as "Norman certified."
2

of Norman services, 19(c) and (f); (v) timely Administrative Case Reviews to ensure that class members are identified and receiving all Norman services for which they are eligible, Z9; (vi) expedited public aid benefits to eligible families to prevent removal of children and to reunite families, ¶9; and (vii) specialized services to victims of domestic violence, 14(c).
2. Each requirement of the Decree had a specific target date for implementation. The Decree requires defendant to implement all terms, the vast majority of which impose on-going obligations, no later than December 1, 1991.
3. Integral to the Decree's plan for full implementation was a plan written in detail into the Decree itself for monitoring by an individual selected by the parties and paid for by the defendant, 114-19. Defendant agreed to "cooperate fully" with the monitor, 114, and to work with plaintiffs and the monitor to "devise procedures for gathering on a semi-annual basis beginning January 1, 1992 and concluding on July 1, 1995, reliable and valid information necessary to measure and ensure compliance." 115.
4. The Decree sets forth the minimal information to be gathered and provided to the monitor. 115 (a) through (k). This information consists of eleven different categories including, as relevant to this Motion, information concerning: whether the defendant is properly determining who is or is not a class member, ¶15(a); whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance to class members, 115(b); whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of children
3

the provision of cash, food, housing assistance and other "hard services," 115(c); whether DCFS is taking "all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA [public aid) benefits" to class members, 115(i); and whether the terms of the Decree are being implemented and enforced through the Case Review process, 115(f).
5. The Decree provides that the monitor is to receive the information from DCFS semi-annually and then, within sixty days thereafter, the monitor is to submit a report to the parties and the Court regarding the defendant's compliance, 116. The Monitor's report is to contain recommendations on how the Department can achieve compliance where necessary. ¶16. These specific recommendations are then to be "considered by defendant in developing" a compliance plan "which plan shall be negotiated with plaintiffs' counsel, with the assistance of the monitor," ¶16.
6. Under the Decree, the court specifically retains jurisdiction "to enforce compliance with this order or the recommendations of the monitor." 120. Monitoring is to continue "for a period of four years from July 1, 1991." 114. While the monitoring was to cease on July 1, 1995, an order of March 10, 1995 extended the monitor's term to February 15, 1996.
7. Subsequent to the approval of the Consent Decree after a fairness hearing, Jeanine Smith was selected as monitor. Ms. Smith is a child welfare expert with extensive credentials, including background working in the DCFS Administration, and expertise in an array of child welfare programs, particularly in-home services for children and families. The defendant proposed Ms. Smith but the
4

children and families. The defendant proposed Ms. Smith but the parties agreed that plaintiffs' nominee, Diane Fager, would be a co-monitor assisting Ms. Smith. The appointment was effective July 1, 1991. Order of Reference to Court Appointed Monitor (April 8, 1991).
8. The monitor has filed six semi- annual reports in this case, beginning with the "First Report" dated March 1, 1992, to the "Sixth Report" dated May 24, 1995. The monitor has also done a series of shorter reports regarding specific regions, DCFS area offices and special problems. The monitor is currently preparing a seventh report which is expected to submitted in February, 1996.
9. This Court's entry of the March 10, 1995 Order extending monitoring until February 15, 1996, followed negotiations arising out of the Fifth Monitoring Report (dated March 15, 1994). That report documented extensive non- compliance by the defendant with numerous terms of the Decree. See Fifth Rep. at 10-46 (finding noncompliance by defendant with 8 of 17 provisions of the Decree).
10. In accordance with the procedure set forth in the Decree 116, the parties and the monitors sought to resolve by negotiation some of the non-compliance issues presented in the Fifth Report. In February of 1995, the parties presented to this Court for approval an agreed order which provided inter alia that (1) the term of the monitor would be extended to February 15, 1997; (2) the defendant would provide all information sought by the monitor within thirty days of the monitor's request, Order y2; (3) the defendant would provide an employee to act immediately to resolve individual
E j

disputes regarding class members, Order q3; (4) defendant would appoint a housing specialist for DCFS, Order 15; and (5) defendant would develop and implement a plan by July 1, 1995 to (a) actively initiate petitions in the Juvenile Court of Cook County to return class members' children to their custody and seek prompt hearings thereon; and (b) provide "screening" of cases to determine DCFS' own compliance with the Consent Decree prior to initiating juvenile custody proceedings, Order Z4. Notably, the agreement was presented to the Court in a joint motion which asserted that these modifications, including the then-two year proposed extension of monitoring, "will effectuate the underlying purposes of the Consent Decree." Joint Motion For Entry of Agreed Order filed February 23, 1995 at y4 (attached as Appendix B).
11. The agreement described in ¶10 did not address many of the non-compliance issues identified in the Fifth Report. See Order at 17.
12. The Agreed Order that this Court entered was identical to the one that the parties tendered jointly except that the extension of monitoring was limited by the Court to February 15, 1996. In amending the monitoring term, however, the Court indicated that it would entertain a motion for an additional extension of the monitoring period if such relief proved necessary. B. DEFENDANT'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SIGNIFICANT TERMS OF THE
DECREE 13. When the Decree was entered almost five years ago, the parties anticipated that the programs and procedures it establishes would be fully operational by the end of 1991. They are not. To the
6

contrary, several programs and procedures are barely implemented at all. Many programs and procedures are still promised to come in 1996, or later years, and have not begun, let alone been fully implemented.
14. As relevant here, five critical problems persist respecting compliance with the Decree:
(a) DCFS has failed to produce timely, accurate and complete information as required by the Decree. This failure impedes both compliance with the substantive provisions as well as frustrates the effective monitoring which is itself a substantive requirement of the Decree, and part of its implementation process.
(b) DCFS has consistently failed to certify many families eligible for Norman services. Without certification, benefits under the Decree are denied to otherwise eligible class members.
(c) DCFS has frequently failed to provide timely and sufficient cash assistance to families in Cook County causing numerous children unnecessarily to be removed from home or not returned home in violation of ¶4(a) and 5(b).
(d) DCFS has failed to develop a plan to "screen" cases for Consent Decree compliance prior to initiate juvenile court actions and failed to initiate prompt return home activity in violation of ¶9(c) of the Decree and 14 of the March 10 Order.
(e) DCFS has not adequately utilized public aid resources for families whose children are returning home in violation of 16(b).
(1) MONITORING
7

15. The Decree creates a central role for the monitor. Specifically, her responsibilities are to: (1) develop methods for gathering "reliable and valid" data "necessary to measure and ensure compliance," 115; (2) assess compliance and report those findings to the parties and the court, ¶!15, 16; (3) make recommendations for the purpose of improving compliance in each specific area covered by the Decree, ¶9, 14, 15; (4) work directly on developing case records information as set forth in the Decree, 19(b); and (5) negotiate (with plaintiffs and defendants) concerning the implementation of recommendations related to compliance 116. These provisions establish that, unlike decrees in which monitoring is ordered as relief upon a finding of noncompliance, monitoring here is a substantive requirement of the Decree itself, made part and parcel of the implementation methodology the parties developed and the Court approved.
16. Under the Decree the monitor was to begin work prior to the full implementation of the Decree (December 1, 1991) and then to assess compliance for a three and a half year period after implementation or July 1, 1995. 114. The Decree was structured in this manner to permit the monitor to oversee the functioning of specific programs and procedures required by the Decree and to intervene promptly to address practice problems as well as policy issues. Due to the complexity of the child welfare area, a long
to-rangetimfsentialforhubenfitomrng be realized in effective implementation of and compliance with the Decree.
8

17. The monitor, Jeanine Smith, has, with the assistance of the co-monitor, Diane Fager, performed her role conscientiously. Thorough reports containing extensive information, analysis and practical recommendations have been compiled and shared with the parties. The monitor has spent hundreds of hours working with Department staff, counsel for the defendant and counsel for plaintiffs on the reports and on implementation. When the Defendant has requested special assistance from the monitor in developing service models and pilot project designs, these requests have been honored. The monitor has undertaken extensive efforts to assist the Department and its service providers in understanding the compliance problems identified by the monitor. And much additional time has been spent attempting to negotiate practical solutions to non-compliance.2
18. Significantly, however, the monitor's ability to carry out her commitment, and thereby to bring about improvements in implementation of the Decree, has been frustrated by delay and
inaction on the part of the defendant.
19. Specifically, the monitor has been unable to fully carry out the implementation role envisioned by the Decree in large
measure because she has been unable to gather information necessary
to accurately measure whether the Department is providing timely
and adequate cash assistance. To date, the information required by
2 On February 1, 1996, the Director of DCFS, Jess McDonald,
in apparent recognition of the skill and expertise of the Norman
monitor and co-monitor, named each of them to chair one of three committees overseeing a major redesign of DCFS's front-end. See 124 below.
9

¶15(b) and 15(b) has been entirely incomplete. Children have gone into DCFS' custody or remained in DCFS' custody because timely, adequate cash assistance has been unavailable in violation of 114 and 5. The Sixth Report notes that "an effective, computerized cash assistance data system is critical to the ongoing operation" of the Norman cash assistance program. Rep. at 35. Though the Department
has been aware of the data problem "since the inception" of the Decree, "[s]ecuring accurate (cash) data continues to be a
problem." Rep. at 34. Basic information about cash assistance, i.e. the amount given to a family, for what purpose and with what result has not been provided by the defendant since the Decree took effect. Id. A DCFS audit of cash assistance commissioned more than two years earlier still had not been completed when the Sixth Report was issued in May, 1995. Id. A system of data collection was devised with the help of the monitor in December 1994, but DCFS administrators rejected it. j. Now, defendant promises an automated cash system will take effect in March--one month after the monitor's term is set to expire.
20. The Decree requires that the monitor, together with DCFS, implement "on or before Jul y 1. 1991, a means of capturing and documenting in each case file and centrally" information concerning the taking of custody and reasonable efforts to remedy living circumstances, Decree at ¶9(b). Throughout the monitoring of this
Decree, information contained in case files continues to be insufficient to assess compliance with this central obligation.
21. The Decree sets forth additional specific areas for
10

monitoring. Those provisions establish a baseline of information to be provided to the monitor, much of which has been difficult or impossible to secure, including:
(a) Risk assessment practices (Ig9(d) and 15(j)); (b) The status of defendant's efforts to implement and
utilize return home guidelines or initiate court-related activity (15(d)); (c) Provision of notice and appeal rights to class members (110 & 15(g)); (d) The effectiveness and timeliness of administrative case reviews in enforcing Norman mandates (115(f)); and (e) Caseworker efforts to locate parents deemed "absent" by DCFS (9(e) and 15(c) and (j)). 22. The absence of critical information in turn has made the task of determining compliance difficult or impossible in many areas. And no monitoring has been possible for those aspects of the Decree that are not yet operational. The Decree calls for monitoring for a three and a half year period after implementation. Defendant cannot use the complete failure to implement aspects of the Decree as a means to avoid monitoring of his eventual compliance. 23. On January 31, 1996, DCFS presented to plaintiffs' counsel and the monitors an overview of a redesign of the DCFS investigation, assessment and intact family services programs. As DCFS envisions this redesign of the "front-end" of the child welfare system, sharp divisions between investigation and service delivery functions will be eliminated for families in which children are not removed from their homes, and for families in which the removal of children is intended to be short-term (30 to
11

90 days). DCFS contemplates that the implementation of this redesign will begin in June, 1996, and training on it will require 18 months. This redesign carries with it a long-term possibility of improving implementation of the Decree, as well as a considerable risk of reduced services to class members if caseloads and caseworker functions are not closely monitored. The magnitude of the potential change, coupled with its risks, suggest that it would be premature to conclude monitoring before the new, thoroughly overhauled system is functioning and its effectiveness can be assessed.
24. Continued monitoring past February 15, 1996 is essential to carrying out the purposes of the Decree because:
(a) Monitoring, in and of itself, improves compliance. For example, the monitor has noted improvements in DCFS performance during monitoring activities, which had not occurred prior to direct monitoring.
(b) Monitoring furnishes plaintiffs' counsel with
information essential to negotiating improvements in compliance or, when necessary, bringing non-compliance issues to this Court. In the absence of monitors who gather information, apply their unique expertise, and report to the parties and the Court, plaintiffs would be required to undertake potentially a more costly, disruptive, and adversarial discovery process.
(c) Monitoring also enables the court to rely on a
mutually-selected expert in conducting fact-gathering, assessing compliance and making recommendations regarding the fashioning of
12

appropriate remedies. Without a monitor, the court, in the face of a claim of non-compliance, would have to rely exclusively on an adversarial fact-presentation rather than on the agreed-upon expert and consultant who has a history of close involvement in the case, an in-depth knowledge of the issues and a working relationship with both parties.
(d) A cut-off of monitoring on February 15, 1996 will not permit the Decree's negotiated compliance process to occur regarding the soon anticipated 7th Report. The Decree provides that the monitor's recommendations shall be "considered by the defendant and a "plan to comply" shall be "negotiated with plaintiffs counsel." 116. This provision has, until the Sixth Report (submitted on May 24, 1995) been followed with some regularity. However, defendant did not respond to the Sixth Report until December 11, 1995, and thus allowed little or no time for the monitor in the function of facilitating a compliance plan. The Seventh Monitoring Report--covering the entire year, 1995, is in any event, to be completed shortly. This comprehensive report for the critically important last year of monitoring under the Decree and under the Order of March 10, 1995, is essential to any final assessment as to the future course of implementation of the Decree, including the issue of continued monitoring. If the monitor's role were to end abruptly on the February 15, 1996 schedule, it would
short -circuit the reporting, negotiation and compliance planning
contemplated by the Decree itself. (2) UNDERCERTIFICATION OF NORMAN FAMILIES
F V]

25. Throughout the duration of the Decree, DCFS has consistently failed to properly certify families (particularly in Cook County) as Norman-eligible. See, e. g ., Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Monitoring Reports. Two state-wide studies reviewed by the monitor revealed significant undercertification: 19% of cases sampled were not certified when they should have been, according to a 1992 study; 24% of cases were not certified according to a 1993 study. Sixth Report at 12-20. Most recent data from Cook County and the northern region (the collar counties) shows that, of 133 cases which were Pot Norman-certified, 46 such cases should have been certified. The 1993 study indicated that Cook County--the county with the largest DCFS caseload in the state--failed to certify 17% of the cases reviewed. Data from January, 1996 shows that Cook County failed to certify 23% of cases reviewed. Thus, there has been no progress in improving the certification rate in Cook County in over two years. Without certification, families will be deprived of essential Norman services to enable them to regain or retain custody of their children.
(3) LACK OF TIMELY CASH ASSISTANCE 26. The monitor indicates in her Sixth Report that "djuring every reporting period (under the Decree), cash assistance agencies in Cook County and downstate have depleted their funds and could not supply needed checks to vendors for clients." Sixth Rep. at 35. The repeated lack of promised resources has a negative impact on caseworkers who then simply cease utilizing the cash program to assist class members. Lack of timely issuance of needed checks has
14

resulted in class members' loss of much-needed and scarce housing.
Ia. In November of 1995, all six cash-providing agencies in Cook
County ran out of funds to distribute to class members. Failure to access cash has caused children to unnecessarily go into DCFS custody and has prevented class members' children from returning home.
(4) LACK OF SCREENING AND RETURN HOME ACTIVITY 27. The essential purpose of the Decree is to prevent the placement of children in foster care where the provision of subsistence needs will alleviate the need for removal and to return children out of foster care where the provision of basic needs will
remedy an obstacle to reunification. In cases involving class
members where juvenile court action is necessary to return children home or to further family reunification, the Decree provides that DCFS caseworkers must initiate such court proceedings promptly 19(f). Under the Decree, DCFS is to establish reasonable time guidelines for the initiation of such activity, ¶9(c), and the monitor is to measure the status of defendant's efforts, ¶15(d).
28. In the Agreed Order of March 10, 1995, defendant committed to develop and implement a plan to (a) actively initiate petitions for return home of class members' children including seeking timely hearings and other court-related activity; and (b) provide an initial screening of cases in Cook County to determine whether DCFS was complying with the Decree before initiating foster care placement proceedings. Order at 14. The Department was to submit a plan 90 days after the Order was entered and to implement
15

the plan by July 1, 1995. To date, no. plan has been provided to plaintiffs by defendant and ng plan has been implemented.
(5) UNDERUTILIZATION OF PUBLIC AID RESOURCES 29. Under the Decree, DCFS is to "maximize payment of DPAadministered benefits to eligible families", including developing liaisons within DCFS to work with DPA, developing a streamlined process for DCFS to access benefits for eligible clients and training DCFS workers on utilization of DPA resources. 16(b). Though DCFS has developed such a process, the Sixth Report finds DCFS out of compliance due to its gross underutilization of DPA resources. "Not more than 19 cases of public aid utilization" were reported during the last half of 1994--a time when more than 475 children in Norman-certified families were returned home. Sixth Rep. at p.46. Because class members are impoverished, loss of these additional resources works immense hardship on them and causes delay of, or frustration of the plan to return or regain custody of their children. C. THE COURT'S AUTHORITY 30. This Court has authority to order the relief requested below on any the following grounds:
a) In so far as the relief requesting an extension of monitoring is concerned, the plaintiffs have not received the monitoring they are entitled to receive under the Decree. Numerous provisions of the Decree were not implemented at all, and could not therefore be monitored, while other provisions were implemented later than the Decree mandated, and some provisions were
16

implemented without capturing information critical to measuring

whether, in fact, the programs work. In this context, for the Court

to order continuation of monitoring would enforce the substance of

what plaintiffs were to get under the Consent Decree.

b) The relief sought is "further relief" within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. §2202 which is essential to carry out this

court's injunctive order (the Decree) . See Youakim v. McDonald, 71

F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. Dec. 6, 1995) (affirming district court's order

providing additional relief under 28 U.S. 2202 against DCFS

Director on behalf of children in DCFS care).

C)

The Decree itself provides for the court's

jurisdiction to "enforce compliance" with the Decree. The relief

sought is essential to enforce compliance. See Youakim v.

McDonald, 71 F.3rd 1274 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming provision of

additional relief under paragraph in 1976 order providing for

continuing jurisdiction over the order).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray for entry of an order:

A. Extending monitoring for an additional two year period or

such other period as this Court determines may be necessary in

order to fulfill the purposes of the Decree, or, in the event this

relief is not granted, awarding the relief set forth in JIB and C

below.

B. Declaring that the defendant has violated and/or is violating ¶4(a) and (b), 5(a) and (b), 8(f), 9(c), 15 and 16 of

the Decree and ¶2, 4(a) and (b) of the 1995 Order.

17

C. Enjoining defendant from failing to: 1. provide cash benefits promptly to all eligible
families by requiring defendant to distribute cash reserves to the Housing Advocacy Programs in ample time for the need to be met;
2. establish and submit to the monitor a plan for improving certification rates for class members in Cook County;
3. develop a plan for improving utilization of IDPA resources.
4. submit to the Court a plan for (a) screening of cases and (b) initiation of return-home related court activity.
D. Establishing a process for determination of this motion that includes an order:
1. Permitting monitoring to continue pending resolution of the allegations in this motion;
2. Granting plaintiffs leave to take discovery necessary to prepare for a hearing on their claims.
3. Setting this matter for such fact-finding hearing before this Court or before the assigned Magistrate at the earliest practicable time.
E. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or as otherwise authorized by law, award plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorneys fees in connection with enforcing the Decree, through this motion and otherwise.
F. Granting plaintiffs such other relief as this Court deems appropriate.
28

Respectfully submitted,
Laurene Heybach Diane Redleaf John Bouman Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 343 South Dearborn, Suite #700 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (304) 347-1070 Attorney # 91017
19

_. •mot:_. _.

... -r:-a - - .

-..yr._

- - r. -•`ti... __....--^.•-r.^:

• 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE PATTERSON, WANDA HILLIARD JOANN MITCHELL, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
V.

No. 89 C 1624 Judge Hart

JESS MCDONALD, Director Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,

Defendant

AGREED ORDER

This _s a class action lawsuit _n w ich a detailed

Consent Order was entered by this Court on March 28, 1991.

Presently before the Court is a joint motion for entry of an

acreed order filed by plaintiffs and defendant. This Court

having read the motion and being duly advised of the purpose and

nature of the re q uest, hereby enters the following order:

1. The term of the court-appointed monitor, Jeanine Smith,

is extended to February 15, 1996 with the same duties and author-

ity as currently embodied in the Consent Order including reten-

ticn of her assistant, Diane Fager.

2. Defendant shall fully provide all data required by the

Consent Order and requested by the monitor within thirty (30)

days of the monitor's request.

3. Defendant shall provide a DCFS "Norman" ombudsperson whose responsibility Will be to act prcmpt_v to resolve all

APPENDIX A

r

- .

individual case problems involving Norman class members. This

person will have authority to act immediately to resolve individ-

ual case disputes.

4. By July 1, 1995, defendant will develop and implement a

plan for Cook County providing for DCFS to:

(a) actively initiate petitions in Cook County Juvenile

Court to return class members' children home and further

family reunification, seek prompt, timely hearings of such

petitions and initiate other related-activity as required by

paragraph 9(f) of the Consent Order; and

(b) provide screening of cases for compliance with the

Consent Order prior to DCFS staff initiating legal action.
T 1 s Flan will be subs tted to plaintiffs' counsel and the

monitor for their review and comment within 90 days of the entry

of this Order.

5. Defendant will appoint within 90 days of the date of

this order an individual with appropriate expertise to act as a

hc;sinc specialist.

E. The monitor is excused from the filin g of the semi-

annual report due September 1994 and will resume reporting for

the next se'r:i-annual period.

7. Nothing in this Order relieves defendant of any obliga-

tion imposed by the Consent Order of March 28, 1991. The entry

of this Order is in settlement and compromise of any possible

non-compliance with paragraphs 9(f), i3(a',, 15 and 16 of the
Consent. O r der through this date, and with the entry of this

2

i Order, defendant is relieved of liability for such possible noncompliance with paragraphs 9(f), 13(a), 15 and 16.
ENTER:

APPROVED:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: ,Z — 2 7'

'

C-e of Plaintiffs' A^t.ameys i:_ane Redleaf _ g ene M. Heybach _=GAL A SS ISTANCE FOUNDATION
^F C- CAGO .-. S. : -b _.. S- eet
C-._cago, Illinois 60604 --2% 34:-1C70

One'of Defendant's Attorneys Christina M. Tchen SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER
& FLOM 333 W. Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicacc, Illinois 60606 Special Assistant
Attorney General

` /

f

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE PATTERSON, WANDA HILLIARD JOANN MITCHELL, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,
V.

No. 89 C 1624 Judge Hart

JESS MCDONALD, Director Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,

Defendant.

JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AGREED ORDER REGARDING CONSENT DECREE

!-t. + _ CLEFJ'. c.

=.

,-..

. =.:.

u'r AAA COUR

Class plaintiffs and defendant Jess McDonald, Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Service, ("DCFS" or the "Department"), through their undersigned counsel, respectfully move this Court for entry of the attached proposed Agreed Order to extend the term of the court-appointed monitor and to provide for other implementation provisions consistent with the Consent Decree. In support of this motion the parties state as follows:
1. On March 28, 1991, a Consent Decree settling the above-captioned federal class action was entered. The entry of the Consent Decree resolved issues pertaining to Department practices relating to plaintiffs who were at risk of losing custody of their children because they were unable to provide adequate living circumstances for their children. The Decree additionally

4PPENDIX B

provided for the appointment of a monitor who receives reports
from the defendant and makes recommendations concerning the implementation of the Consent Decree. The term of the monitor as
set forth in the Decree was for four years. Jeanine Smith was appointed by the Court as monitor, to be assisted by Diane Fager.
2. Since entry of the Consent Decree, the Department, together with the monitor have worked to implement the Decree. Notwithstanding these efforts, issues remain among plaintiffs' counsel, DCFS and the monitor. Accordingly, the parties have been involved in extensive negotiations over the last six months to resolve disagreements regarding the Defendant's compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree.
4. As a result of these negotiations, the parties have reached an agreement regarding a course of action which will effectuate the underlying purposes of the Consent Decree. This agreement includes the entry of the accompanying proposed Agreed Order which, among other things, will extend the term of the monitor for an additional two years.
5. The parties believe that entry of the Agreed Order provides benefits in the interest of all parties and will avoid litigation over these issues.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, the parties respectfully request that this motion be granted and the attached proposed Agreed Order entered.

Dated:

Chicago, Illinois February 15, 1995

One of Plaintiffs'

eys

Laurene M. Heybach

LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION

343 South Dearborn Street

Room 700

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 341-1070

Respectfully submitted,
/.Th
e f Defendant's Attorneys Christina M. Tchen SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER
& FLOM 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2100 (312) 407-0700 Special Assistant
Attorney General

3

The undersigned attorney certifies that on February 7, 1996, prior to 4:00 p.m. she served a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF MOTION and MOTION FOR (1) CONTINUED MONITORING AND/OR (2) DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REDRESSING SUBSTANTIAL NON
ORDER OF MARCH 10,-COMPLIANEWTHCOSNDERATHCOU 1995, to the following counsel of record by hand delivery:

TO: Christina M. Tchen Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom 333 W. Wacker Drive Suite #2100 Chicago, IL 60606

Cheryl D. Cesario DCFS General Counsel 100 W. Randolph Chicago, IL 60601

Laurene M. Heybach Diane Redleaf John Bouman Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago 343 S. Dearborn, #700 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 341-1070 Atty. No. 91017

One of Plai iffs tes

 
 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
James NORMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Jess McDONALD, Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, Defendant. No. 89 C 1624.
April 11, 1996.
After settlement of class action involving allegations that Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to assist impoverished parents and legal guardians in securing resources and services necessary to prevent removal of children, plaintiffs moved to extend monitoring period in consent order. The District Court, Hart, J., held that one-year extension of monitoring period was warranted.
Motion granted in part and denied in part.
*1220 Laurene Marie Heybach,Susan Gail Wishnick, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Joan Matlack, Putterman & Howard, Chicago, IL, Diane L. Redleaf, Lehrer & Redleaf, Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs. Christina M. Tchen, Susan Getzendanner, Charles F. Smith, Jr., Kimberley K. Baer, Nancy S. Eisenhauer, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Chicago, IL, Bart T. Murphy, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, IL, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HART, District Judge. This is a class action that challenged certain practices of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) FN1 as being in violation of relevant federal statutes and the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs are impoverished parents or legal guardians who are or were at risk of losing their children because they were unable to provide adequate food or shelter for the children.FN2 Plaintiffs alleged that DCFS had policies and practices of failing to assist plaintiffs in securing the resources and services necessary to keep their families intact that were in

*1221 violation of federal statutory and constitutional requirements.
FN1. Jess McDonald, the present Director of DCFS, is substituted for Sue Suter as the defendant in this case. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1).
FN2. The class that was certified is defined as follows:
All parents and guardians on or after the date of entry of this Consent Order: (a) whose children are in the temporary custody or under the legal guardianship of DCFS and upon whom, during such custody or guardianship, DCFS has imposed, in a service plan or otherwise, a condition that such parents obtain for themselves or their children such shelter, utility services, food, clothing, or income as DCFS deems necessary or appropriate for the return of their children; or (b) for whom there is an “indicated report” or pending report pursuant to [325 ILCS 5], that is or should have been designated as an allegation of “inadequate shelter,” “inadequate food,” “inadequate clothing,” “environmental neglect,” or any successor allegations that cover these categories of reports, and DCFS has taken or could take protective custody of the children pursuant to [325 ILCS 5/5], because of that allegation.
March 28, 1991 Consent Order ¶ 3(b).
In May 1990, this court granted preliminary injunctive relief to two of the named plaintiffs in this case. See Norman v. Johnson, 739 F.Supp. 1182 (N.D.Ill.1990). Defendant appealed that ruling. Prior to this court resolving the case on its merits or the Seventh Circuit resolving the appeal of the grant of preliminary relief, the parties settled the case. Following notice to the class and a hearing, the parties' proposed consent order was signed on March 28, 1991 (hereinafter the “Consent Order”). The Consent Order required that DCFS implement and

develop certain procedures and provide certain services. The Consent Order also contains a requirement that defendant provide certain information and that a monitor (hereinafter the “Monitor”) be appointed to receive the reports and make recommendations concerning the implementation of the Consent Order. The term of the Monitor's appointment was to be for approximately four years, expiring July 1, 1995. In February 1995, the parties agreed to move the court to extend that term to February 15, 1997. The basis of this motion was unresolved disputes regarding defendant's compliance with the Consent Order. An extension was granted, but only to February 15, 1996.
On February 12, 1996, plaintiffs moved to extend the monitoring period to February 15, 1998 on the ground that defendant had not complied with certain provisions of the Consent Order.FN3 This time defendant opposes the extension. Defendant contends that he has substantially complied with the requirements of the Consent Order and that the additional expense of gathering information and employing the Monitor are no longer necessary. He also contends that changes in the law since March 1991 preclude the Consent Order from being enforced further. For purposes of resolving plaintiffs' pending motion, defendant concedes that the Sixth Monitoring Report dated May 24, 1995 and covering calendar year 1994 (the “Sixth Report”) accurately reports defendant's compliance.
FN3. Alternatively, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the alleged noncompliance.
Under the terms of the Consent Order, defendant agreed to implement three general policies. (1) A child is not to be separated from a parent FN4 because of living conditions or lack of subsistence unless there is reason to believe that the circumstances or conditions of the child present an “imminent danger” to the child's life or health and defendant has made “reasonable efforts” to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, unless reasonable efforts would not eliminate the need for removal. “ ‘Reasonable efforts' includes, for example, provision of hard services such as assistance in locating and securing housing, temporary shelter, cash assistance (directly paid by defendant or otherwise provided), in-kind services including food or clothing, child care, emergency

caretakers, or advocacy with public and community agencies providing such services.” Consent Order ¶ 4(a). (2) A child shall not be separated from a parent living in a shelter or substandard housing, unless there is reason to believe that the conditions present an “imminent danger” to the child's life or health. Before returning a child to such conditions, defendant shall determine the child will be allowed to reside there and have a bed. Id. ¶ 4(b). (3) Instead of removing a child from a parent because of failure to protect the child from a perpetrator of domestic violence, defendant shall make “reasonable efforts” to keep the child in the parent's custody unless an imminent danger to the child's life or health is presented or reasonable efforts would be to no avail. “In this context, ‘reasonable efforts' includes not only the efforts listed in paragraph 4(a) of this order, but also, for example, referring the parent for services to obtain an order of protection, exploring possible alternative housing with, e.g., relatives, and locating and transporting the family to a shelter for battered women.” Id. ¶ 4(c).
FN4. As defined in the Consent Order, parent also includes a legal guardian, but not a foster parent.
The Consent Order also contains more specific provisions. By July 1, 1991, defendant was to establish a cash assistance program providing a family with up to $800 per calendar year for rent, security deposits, utility*1222 fees, furniture, or other items if the assistance would prevent the separation of parent and child. Certain record keeping is also required. Records of the money disbursed and whether the recipients remained united or were reunited are to be kept. Id. ¶ 5.
By July 1, 1991, DCFS was to seek to enter into an agreement with the Department of Public Aid (“DPA”) and jointly seek federal approval to continue AFDC benefits for up to 90 days during periods of DCFS temporary custody not expected to exceed 90 days. The agreement is also to provide that a parent can apply to DPA for benefits while a child is in DCFS custody and obtain payments prior to return of the child that will aid the parent in regaining custody. Id. ¶ 6.
By October 1, 1991, DCFS was to establish a housing advocacy program to provide certain housing

services that would aid class members in finding suitable housing. DCFS was also to seek agreements with public housing authorities that would aid class members in finding housing. Id. ¶ 7.
By July 1, 1991, DCFS was to establish a referral service for each office consisting of a localized manual containing an annually updated list of community resources relevant to the needs of the class. DCFS employees are to receive annual instruction regarding use of the manual. Id. ¶ 8.
It was also agreed that DCFS would implement the following procedures by July 1, 1991: (a) require pertinent personnel to follow the requirements of the Consent Order and ensure timely administrative case reviews; (b) develop with the Monitor a means of documenting specific information regarding imminent danger determinations and the implementation of reasonable efforts; (c) “establish reasonable time guidelines within which DCFS workers should ordinarily return children home or initiate court action to do so for use in cases where problems with living circumstances are preventing family reunification;” (d) establish risk assessment methods based on living conditions; (e) establish a protocol for locating absent parents; and (f) promptly initiate court actions for the return of children. Id. ¶ 9.
The Consent Order contains a provision for notifying class members of their rights under the Consent Order and a method for appealing certain determinations. This was to be implemented by July 1, 1991. ¶ 10.
“Defendants shall provide to plaintiffs' counsel drafts of all new policies, procedures, programs, rules, regulations and notices for implementation of the provisions of this Consent Order at least thirty days prior to the relevant effective date specified in this Consent Order. Plaintiffs' counsel shall inform defendant's counsel of any objections they have to any such drafts because of plaintiffs' contention that said draft may violate the terms of this Consent Order, and the parties shall negotiate in good faith regarding any such objections.” Id. ¶ 11.
The Consent Order contains provisions regarding training of DCFS personnel and provides plaintiffs' counsel with the opportunity to monitor that training

until July 1, 1995. Initial training was to be completed by December 1, 1991. Id. ¶ 12.
The Consent Order also contains specific provisions regarding reporting and monitoring. The parties jointly nominated a monitor who was approved by the court. The Monitor was to produce semi-annual reports beginning January 1, 1992 and concluding July 1, 1995. The Monitor and the parties were to jointly develop the procedures for gathering “reliable and valid information necessary to measure compliance with the terms of the Consent Order,” including (a) whether defendant is properly determining what persons are class members; (b) whether timely and sufficient cash assistance was provided; (c) whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to unify families; (d) implementation of the time guidelines; (e) the adequacy of training; (f) whether the provisions of this order are properly applied during administrative case reviews; (g) whether class members are afforded full notice and appeal rights; (h) whether DCFS is making good faith efforts to seek interagency agreements; (i) whether DCFS is maximizing DPA payments; (j) the adequacy of risk assessment practices; and (k) whether determinations that a child cannot be returned within 90 days are being made for administrative or fiscal convenience. The Monitor was to submit a report within 60 days after receiving the required semi-annual data from DCFS. *1223 She was to report on compliance with the Consent Order and make recommendations regarding any noncompliance. Defendant was required to consider the recommendations and, with the Monitor's assistance, negotiate with plaintiffs' counsel a plan for compliance. Id.¶¶ 14-16.
The Consent Order also contains the following two provisions:
20. This court retains jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with this order or the recommendations of the Monitor. Plaintiffs may file a motion with this court at any time to seek compliance with the provisions of this Order or the recommendations of the Monitor, provided that, to the extent such a motion is based upon a report or recommendation of the Monitor under Paragraph 16, no motion shall be filed until plaintiffs have made attempts to negotiate the development and implementation of a compliance plan with defendant,

with the assistance of the Monitor as set forth under Paragraph 16.
21. Defendant may file a motion with this court at any time seeking modification of the terms of this Consent Order if factual or legal circumstances materially change, experience with the administration of the Consent Order shows the need for modification in order to more effectively accomplish the goals of this Consent Order, it is no longer equitable that the Consent Order should have prospective effect, or such modification is necessary due to the hardship caused defendant by the Consent Order because of new and unforeseen conditions. Any decision by the court allowing or denying such a modification shall be made by weighing the interests of the class members in the immediate and strict enforcement of the terms of the Consent Order against the interests and harm to defendant without the proposed modification, and against the public interest.
Plaintiffs point to five areas of noncompliance that they contend support extending the period of monitoring: (a) failure to provide timely, accurate, and complete information; (b) failure to certify many eligible families as eligible for Consent Order services; (c) failure to provide timely and sufficient cash assistance to families in Cook County; (d) failure to screen cases for Consent Order compliance prior to initiating juvenile court actions and failure to initiate prompt return home activity as required by ¶ 9(c) of the Consent Order; and (e) failure to adequately utilize public aid resources as required by ¶ 6(b) of the Consent Order. For purposes of evaluating these contentions, defendant does not dispute the findings contained in the Sixth Report.
Defendant raises questions as to the need for certification, which is not a specific requirement of the Consent Order. In the Sixth Report (at 27-28), the Monitor states:
Certification determines who is potentially eligible for services when the need is present to prevent placement and to enable swift reunification of children with their families when other safety issues are no longer present. The request to receive those services must be approved. The real issue is not certification, but approval. I recommend that reconsideration be given to the certification process.

A large data system developed to capture the information is questionable. It is bureaucratic; the certification process itself does not provide help to the family. Since the determination to access the services has administrative safeguards, it seems consideration not to certify has merits. The Department can place the emphasis upon the service delivery and the development of data collection to determine who receives the service, for what service goal (placement prevention or reunification) and for what purpose (food, clothing, shelter, etc.), issues which are the purpose of the Norman program.
Defendant also points to data that 76 to 83 per cent of eligible families are correctly certified and contends this is satisfactory.
As plaintiffs point out, accurately certifying approximately 80 per cent of eligible families is a less than satisfactory rate when certification is required in order to receive benefits under the Consent Order. While defendant argues here that the certification process is an unnecessary procedure, in his December 11, 1995 written response to the Sixth Report, he argued that it was a necessary procedure, though one that should be modified. Def.App., Exh. 3 at 11-12. DCFS *1224 still needs to improve its procedures for ensuring that eligible families have Norman benefits available to them. Whether a certification process should continue, in its present or a modified form, or whether an alternative procedure should be developed, is an issue, the resolution of which, could be aided by the continued input of the Monitor and class counsel.
Regarding the cash assistance program, the Monitor found:
An effective, computerized cash assistance data system is critical to the ongoing operation of this program. With the Department decentralizing the approval process, this becomes even more important. During every reporting period, cash period, cash assistance agencies in Cook County and downstate have depleted their funds and could not supply needed checks to vendors for clients. This past year was no exception. This results in clients losing scarce housing due to the lack of timely submission of checks. It also has a negative impact on the direct service workers who become discouraged with utilizing this resource for their clients. Some staff

have stated to the Monitors FN5 that they do not use this resource because it is too time consuming. While this is a small number of staff, there should be no worker who takes this stance. The system developed by the Management Systems team has safeguards to ensure such situations do not occur.
FN5. The Monitor has an assistant who is sometimes also referred to as a monitor.
Sixth Report 35.
The Monitor concluded that Cook County was out of compliance, but that Downstate was in compliance. Id. She recommended:
a. DCFS finalize an automated cash assistance data system. It should contain the number of families receiving cash assistance and the amount, indicate whether for the purpose of placement prevention or reunification, the amount spent for food, clothing, shelter, utilities, etc., and the amount remaining in individual agency accounts.
b. DCFS complete the internal audit and share the results with plaintiffs' attorneys and the Monitor.
Id.
Defendant contends that it has corrected cash shortfalls when they have occurred. As plaintiffs point out, however, the shortfalls continue to occur and, as found by the Monitor, this has a discouraging effect on the use of the cash assistance program, which is a central element of the Consent Order. Further efforts are necessary to ensure compliance, in Cook County, with the cash assistance program required by the Consent Order.
Defendant concedes that DCFS has yet to develop procedures that comply with the requirements of ¶ 9(f) of the Consent Order regarding initiating court procedures to return children to their homes. However, defendant contends that, as previously agreed with the Monitor and plaintiffs' counsel, defendant is still working on a plan, but he does not believe that monitoring is necessary to ensure completion of a successful plan. This is a question of appropriate relief; it is not denied that there is noncompliance.

Paragraph 6(b) of the Consent Order requires that DCFS take the steps necessary to maximize obtaining Public Aid payments for eligible families for financial assistance in reuniting families. Defendant contends DCFS has complied because it has established a relationship with DPA as required by ¶ 6(a) of the Consent Order. However, DCFS has not ensured that those procedures will be regularly used. As the Monitor points out, 75% of Norman children in Cook County potentially would benefit from these procedures, but during one reporting period 475 children were returned home with the procedure being fully invoked in only 19 of those cases and attempted in six others. The Monitor concluded: “There is clearly under-utilization of this extremely needed resource.” Sixth Report 46. Defendant is not in compliance with ¶ 6(b) of the Consent Order.

Plaintiffs also complain that defendant has not fully complied with data reporting requirements*1225 of the decree. The Consent Order has a number of requirements, not all of which are readily quantifiable, or data readily gathered, for purposes of determining compliance. Plaintiffs do not point to any specific area where they believe there may be noncompliance, but complain there is no data to make an accurate assessment. Plaintiffs point to various subjects for which data is lacking, but an examination of the Sixth Report shows that the Monitor only recommended further data collection in one of those areas.FN6 See Sixth Report 59 (“ACR needs to automate the summary of the number of parents who need to be located and if the locating absent parent protocol or delegate search was conducted.”) There are other areas where the Monitor has indicated information was inadequate for her to reach conclusions, but she does not suggest that further data collection is necessary. The lack of certain data is not a sufficient problem to justify extending the Monitoring period.

FN6. The Monitor also made

recommendations regarding data collection

for the cash assistance program. As was

previously discussed that is an area of

noncompliance.

Presently

under

consideration are other alleged data

collection deficiencies.

Defendant contends he is in compliance in a number

of other areas not discussed by plaintiffs. But even if defendant were out of compliance in only one area, pursuant to ¶ 20 of the Consent Order, plaintiffs could seek court enforcement as to that one issue. It must be considered whether the undisputed areas of noncompliance support extending the term of the Monitor or other appropriate relief. That defendant has complied in other areas, though, is a factor to consider in determining whether there is still a need for the Monitor.
Defendant contends there is no longer a need for a Monitor to follow DCFS's compliance with the Consent Order. Defendant complains that the cost of the Monitor could be better spent on providing direct services or funds to the clientele DCFS serves. The cost for the Monitor has averaged approximately $107,000 per year. While that is not a small sum and likely could be usefully used elsewhere as well, it may be appropriate to compare it to a conservative estimate that the cash assistance program alone saved $11,093,894 for the state during a six-month period of 1994. See Sixth Report 2. While the Monitor alone did not produce that savings, it shows that her contributions to the effort may more than offset the costs of her services.
As is indicated by the six reports of the Monitor, her collection and reporting of information has been an important and useful aspect of the improvements that have resulted from implementation of the Consent Order. It must be recognized, however, that the Monitor's role involves more than just data collection. It is also her duty to make recommendations, many of which have been followed by DCFS and accepted by plaintiffs. It is further her role to help mediate disputes between the parties to the Consent Order.FN7 Moreover, the Consent Order expressly provides that, upon motion of plaintiffs, this court may enforce compliance with recommendations of the Monitor. The Monitor in this case has served an important and crucial function in the implementation of the Consent Order that appears to have been more than worth its cost. Extending the term of the Monitor would be more than just extending an information gathering requirement.
FN7. This provision alone may have saved substantial litigation costs. Prior to the present dispute, there has been virtually no need for court proceedings related to

implementation of the Consent Order. Even in the present dispute, the availability of the Monitor's independent report avoided the need for any evidentiary hearing and its attendant costs.
Even absent the Consent Order, DCFS could decide it was beneficial to retain the Monitor as an outside consultant. Defendant, however, believes the Monitor is no longer a necessity for achieving full compliance. This view of defendant must be given serious consideration, especially in light of the Monitor's indication that defendant is committed to implementing the Consent Order. See Sixth Report 6 (“There is no question regarding the commitment of Director Jess McDonald and his staff to meet the requirements of this Decree at the administrative level.”). Also, any extension must be considered in light of the limited areas of noncompliance that have been found.
*1226 [1] While defendant's opinion that there is no further need for monitoring is respected, it is found that further monitoring is likely to be beneficial in reaching compliance with the Consent Order. Areas of noncompliance exist in which the Monitor's input would be beneficial. Her continued involvement may also be helpful in avoiding any need to resolve the specifics of noncompliance through litigation, a more costly procedure and one that would not necessarily produce a better result. Additionally, the costs of the Monitor are not found to be a sufficient basis for discontinuing her involvement. While allowing government agencies to proceed independent of direct monitoring is a valid goal, it appears that, in the present situation, a relatively good working relationship has developed amongst the involved parties. An approximately one-year extension of the Monitoring period is appropriate enforcement relief, one far better than the court now attempting to directly implement specific compliance with remaining aspects of the decree.
The extension of the monitoring period, however, will not be a general one. At the time the prior extension expired, the Monitor was near completion of her Seventh Monitoring Report covering calendar year 1995. It was previously ordered that a report be issued covering this time period, but no date had been specified. The prior order extending the Monitor's term until February 15, 1996 did not specify whether

she could issue the report after that date. In light of the reporting deadlines set forth in the Consent Order, it was implicit that the report could be issued after February 15, 1996.FN8 In any event, it will now be expressly ordered that the Monitor shall issue the Seventh Monitoring Report no later than April 30, 1996.FN9 The response and negotiation procedures contained in ¶ 16 of the Consent Order shall be followed in regard to that report.
FN8. Under the terms of the Consent Order, the Monitor has 60 days after receiving information from defendant to issue the report. Thus, even if she received the calendar year 1995 data on January 1, 1996, her report was not due until after February 15.
FN9. It is the court's understanding that the report is near completion. However, if it cannot be completed by April 30, the Monitor should request that the parties bring a joint motion extending the deadline.
The Eighth Monitoring Report shall cover the calendar year 1996. That report will basically be limited to the areas of noncompliance that have been shown. It will be limited to reporting on compliance with ¶¶ 5(a) (Cook County only), 5(b) (Cook County only), 6(b), and 9(c) of the Consent Order and DCFS's methods of determining Norman eligibility, whether through certification or otherwise. For calendar year 1996, defendant shall comply with the information reporting requirements of ¶¶ 15(a), (b) (Cook County only), (d), and (i). Defendant shall also comply with ¶¶ 11, 15(e) and 15(f) as they relate to ¶¶ 5(a), 5(b), 6(b), and 9(c). The term of the Monitor's appointment shall continue until the date beyond December 31, 1996 permitted for preparing the report and the reasonable time necessary to complete the additional procedures set forth in ¶ 16 of the Consent Order.
[2][3] Still to be discussed are defendant's contentions that this court lacks authority to order any relief. First, defendant contends that enforcement is limited to situations of contempt. Paragraph 20 of the Consent Order, however, specifically retains jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the Consent Order. McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1188 (7th Cir.1985). It does not require a finding of

contempt. But even if jurisdiction had not been expressly retained, this court has inherent power to enforce an injunction, which is the form of relief contained in the Consent Order. See United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir.1988).
The relief that will be granted is enforcement of the decree, not modification. The Consent Decree has no time limit.FN10 Absent a change of circumstances justifying modification, see generally Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), defendant has a continuing obligation to comply with the terms of the Consent Order. Only monitoring had a time limit. Monitoring, however, was an *1227 integral aspect of achieving compliance. Since compliance has not been achieved, monitoring may be ordered as a means to achieve and enforce compliance. But even if continued monitoring would be considered a modification of the decree, modification would be supported by a change in circumstances. The Consent Order contemplated compliance with various requirements would be reached between July and December 1991. Since full compliance has yet to be achieved, that is a changed circumstance that justifies extending a means contemplated by the Consent Order for reaching compliance.
FN10. The present motion is unlike South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610 (7th Cir.1985), where an intervenor sought to extend the applicable time limit for the substantive requirements of the decree in that case.
Defendant also contends that the Consent Order cannot be enforced because of a change in the law that has occurred since the order was first entered. One of plaintiffs' claims was that defendant was required to comply with the statutory requirement that “reasonable efforts ... be made (A) prior to placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). In granting preliminary relief, this court held, as had a number of other courts, that the “reasonable efforts” standard was enforceable in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Norman, 739 F.Supp. at 1185-87. Subsequent to entry of the Consent Order, however, the Supreme Court ruled to the contrary. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).

Plaintiffs contend the Consent Order is still enforceable because they had a number of other still substantial claims in their complaint.
The parties agree that the applicable standard is whether there is a substantial federal claim. Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 479-80 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1082, 114 S.Ct. 1831, 128 L.Ed.2d 460 (1994). Evans does not delineate what it means by “substantial.” Plaintiffs argue it means nonfrivolous. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-79, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3564 (2d ed.1984). The discussion of the claims in Evans, however, indicates a standard somewhat higher than mere nonfrivolousness. It must be an issue over which there are “genuine uncertainties.” Evans, 10 F.3d at 479. This court understands Evans as meaning the federal claim may not be one that clearly is without merit.
In the preliminary injunction ruling, this court held (adopting the magistrate's recommendation) that a number of provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (“AAA”) were enforceable, not just 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). See Norman, 739 F.Supp. at 1185 n. 8; 1203-08 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 622, 627, 671(a)(4), 671(a)(16), 675(1)). Other courts have also held that provisions other than § 671(a)(15) are enforceable. See L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 805 (1989) ( §§ 627(a)(2)(B), 671(a)(9), (10), (16), 675); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 510-11 (1st Cir.1983) (§§ 608, 671(a)(16), 675); Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1283-85 (E.D.Wis.1995) ( §§ 671(a)(2), (3), (7), (10), (11), (13), 627(a)(2), 627(b)(3)); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 988-89 (D.D.C.1991), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 659 (1994) (§§ 627, 671(a)(10), 675). See also Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 323-24 (8th Cir.1993) (claims to enforce provisions of the AAA other than §§ 671(a)(9) & (15) are not frivolous). Plaintiffs' complaint included claims based on § 627(a)(2)(c), requiring participating states to have “a service program designed to help children, where appropriate, return to families from which they have

been removed;” §§ 622(b)(2) and 671(a)(4), requiring participating states to coordinate child welfare programs with other programs that provide benefits and services to poor families; §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1), and 675(5)(c), requiring case plans for every child and the development of a case review system; and §§ 627(a)(2)(B) and 671(a)(12), providing for notice and hearing rights.FN11
FN11. Section 627 is being repealed effective April 1, 1996. SeePub.L. 103-432, Title II, §§ 202(c), (e), 108 Stat. 4454 (1994). Effective the same date, provisions regarding returning children to their families are being added at 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(9). SeePub.L. 103-432, Title II, §§ 202(a), (e), 108 Stat. 4453, 4454 (1994).
[4] Defendant contends the claims seeking enforcement of the additional provisions *1228 are insubstantial in light of Artist M., because the additional provisions are, like the “reasonable efforts” standard in Artist M., too vague to be enforced.FN12 Again, the merits of a case are not to be fully reconsidered when deciding whether to enforce a consent decree, only whether the claims are now clearly without merit. Including the preliminary injunction ruling in the present case, at least five published cases decided before Artist M. held that some or all of the provisions presently under consideration were sufficiently clear to be enforced. Subsequently, two published cases have considered the enforceability of pertinent provisions of the AAA in light of the pertinent holding in Artist M. One holds the provisions can be enforced, see Jeanine B., supra, and the other holds it is not frivolous to contend the provisions are enforceable, see Angela R., supra. In light of the existing precedents, it cannot be held that plaintiffs' claims are clearly without merit.
FN12. Artist M. also relied in part on § 671 only being required to be included in a state plan. Subsequent legislation essentially overruled that aspect of Artist M. except as to § 671(a)(15). See42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, 10. Defendant concedes that such an argument as to the provisions under consideration would have no merit in light of the new legislation.

It also must be kept in mind that this court is only granting enforcement of parts of the Consent Order. The relief that will be granted does not include the enforcement of any of the “reasonable efforts” provisions of the Consent Order.FN13 None of the provisions of the Consent Order that are being enforced are ones that could only have been obtained based on a compromise of the § 671(a)(15) claim. The enforcement that is being granted is based on still viable claims. Therefore, this court has authority to grant the relief.
FN13. Since not at issue, it need not be considered whether use of that language in provisions of the Consent Order necessarily means those provisions are based solely on enforcement of § 671(a)(15). Issuance of the Seventh Report will involve reporting on certain reasonable efforts requirements. That, however, is merely a report of previously gathered information and does not directly involve enforcing the reasonable efforts requirement.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
(1) Jess McDonald is substituted for Sue Suter as the defendant in this case.
(2) Plaintiffs' motion for continued monitoring [2091] is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial noncompliance with the consent decree and the court order of 03/10/95 [2092] is denied without prejudice.
(3) The Monitor shall issue the Seventh Monitoring Report no later than April 30, 1996.
(4) An Eighth Monitoring Report shall be filed covering calendar year 1996, but shall be limited to reporting on compliance with ¶¶ 5(a) (Cook County), 5(b) (Cook County), 6(b), and 9(c) of the Consent Order and DCFS's methods of determining Norman eligibility. For calendar year 1996, defendant shall comply with the information requirements of ¶¶ 15(a), (b) (Cook County), (d), and (i) of the Consent Order. Defendant shall also comply with ¶¶ 11, 15(e) and 15(f) of the Consent Order as they relate to ¶¶ 5(a), 5(b) (Cook County), 6(b), and 9(c). The term of the Monitor's appointment shall continue until the

date beyond December 31, 1996 permitted for preparing the Eighth Monitoring Report and necessary to complete the additional procedures set forth in ¶ 16 of the Consent Order.
N.D.Ill.,1996. Norman v. McDonald 930 F.Supp. 1219
END OF DOCUMENT

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, et al.

)

H 1019/5~6

Plaintiffs,

)

V.

)

No. 89 C 1624

)

Judge William T. Hart

3"

JESS MCDONALD, Director

)

Magistrate Joan

L , [_., `

Illinois Department of Children

)

Gottschall

and Family Services ("DCFS")

)

Defendant.

)

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CONTINUED MONITORING AND/OR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The Director admits that he has failed to comply with important aspects of the Consent

Decree. His non-compliance affects thousands of homeless families in Illinois. While the

Director gives assurances that he will in the future comply, he also insists that the Decree be

vacated. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order ensuring that the Director does what the Decree

obligates him to do. The Director's memorandum in opposition ("Def. Mem.") presents three

insubstantial defenses.

The first defense suggests that there is a factual dispute concerning his non-compliance

with the Decree. See Def. Mem. at 2, 6-12, passim. No such dispute exists. Indeed, the

Director ultimately concedes that he is not complying with the Decree in the respects plaintiffs

allege. See Section II, infra.

The Director's second defense is that plaintiffs cannot obtain a modification of the Decree,

and that the "plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proving contempt." Def. Mem. at 29. See

id. at 29-31. Since plaintiffs have not moved for modification or contempt, this is a curious

defense indeed. The Director's argument is apparently that contempt is the onl y remedy available

2 to plaintiffs--a remarkable notion that is contradicted by the Decree and by settled principles of law.' See Section III, infra.
The Director's third defense--by far his most ambitious--is that "there is no longer a `substantial claim under federal law' to support the continued enforcement of this decree," and that it should therefore be vacated. Def. Mem. at 17 (quoting Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 482 (7th Cir. 1993)(en banc), cert. denied. U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 1831 (1994)). See Def. Mem. at 17-24. To the contrary, plaintiffs advance numerous substantial federal constitutional and statutor y claims that support the Decree. See Section IV, infra. 1. THE CLAIMS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND THE CONSENT DECREE.
Plaintiffs in this class action are thousands of parents who "have lost, are at risk of losing, will lose, or cannot regain custod y of their children from the Illinois Department of Children and Famil y Services because they are homeless or unable to provide food or shelter for their children." Norman v. Johnson. 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D.I11. 1990). They challenged the state's policies of "taking and retaining custod y of children from impoverished parents" based on the parents' inability to obtain cash, food. shelter, or other subsistence, and its failure to assist these parents in meeting the conditions the state itself was imposing on the return of their children to their- custody. First Amended and Supplemental Complaint ("Am. Comp.") ¶1. See 739 F. Supp. at 1184.
' The Director's argument can be summarized in an analogy. A defendant was ordered to pay a plaintiff $100 by a date certain; several years after the date certain, he has paid $75. Plaintiff files a motion seeking an order enforcing the original order to pay $100. Defendant resists the motion by describing in ample detail his payment of the $75, claiming that this is sufficient activity to avoid a finding of contempt, and asserting that, absent contempt, the court has no power to order him to pay the other $25.

3 The plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their statutory rights under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§627(a)(2)(c) and (b)(2) and Title IV-E of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§671(a)(12), (14), (15), and (16). Am. Comp. ¶544, 45. Only the claim under §671(6)(15) (the "reasonable efforts" claim) was ultimately decided adversely to plaintiffs' position in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), on which the Director relies so heavily. See §§IV.B., infra. Contrary to the Director's contention (Def. Mem. at 19), plaintiffs have never claimed that they have a privately enforceable constitutional or statutory right to "cash, housing and other subsistence assistance" from DCFS. Id. The constitutional claims sought to vindicate First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unwarranted governmental interference in the parent-child relationship. See § IV(B). infra. And none of the statutes on which plaintiffs relied conferred a right to "subsistence assistance," but rather to services (eg g, case plans, coordination of services). Id. After a full hearing before Magistrate Gottschall. this Court entered a preliminary injunction directing case plans on behalf of two of three named plaintiffs and adopting the Magistrate's recommended findings of fact. Norman v. Johnson, 739 F.Supp. 1182, 1192 (N.D.Ill. 1990). The defendant appealed the preliminary injunction ruling, but then agreed to settle the case. The resulting Consent Decree constituted a "complete resolution of [all] the claims in this action...." Decree at T23. Also, on March 10, 1995, the Court, resolving specific claims of noncompliance, entered a supplementary order enforcing the Decree. Order of March 10, 1995 at 7. That order required defendant to: (a) provide all data required by the Decree and requested by the Monitor; (b) provide a Norman ombudsperson with increased authority; and

4 (c) implement. by July 1, 1995, a plan for DCFS actively to initiate court petitions to return class members' children home and further family reunification and properly "screen" class members' cases. The order also extended the term of the Monitor to February 15, 1996, with the same duties and authority as were already embodied in the Decree. In entering its Order, the Court stated that plaintiffs "can tell me in a year if [further monitoring] is necessary." Transcript of February 27. 1995 at 3. (Appendix A hereto).
The Director did not respond to the Monitor's Sixth Report, covering the calendar 1994, until December 11, 1995. Plaintiffs immediately sought, unsuccessfully, an agreement to continue the monitoring. Plaintiffs recently furnished a detailed letter replying to the Director's December II Response. The reply shows that DCFS has disagreed with or failed to respond to more than half of the Monitors recommendations in the Sixth Report. See Letter of February 26, 1996, (Appendix B hereto). II. THE DIRECTOR CONCEDES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE DECREE.
In their motion, plaintiffs state that they "do not here claim across-the-board noncompliance with the Decree but raise specific non-compliance issues of significance to the Decree as a whole.'' Motion at I (emphasis added). They then identify five "critical" compliance defaults. establishing non-compliance principally by reference to the Monitor's findings. Id. at ^, l4. See id. at «l 5-29.
The Director says that plaintiffs allege DCFS has "barely implemented" the Decree. Def. Mem. at 2. This is merely a straw man that the Director sets up so that he can describe the extent to which he has complied with the Decree. Id. at 12. See id. at 6-12. But it is the Director's non-compliance that is at issue here. His recitation of accomplishments is beside the

5 point and may be ignored for purposes of this motion.
As to the five areas of non-compliance that are at issue here, the Director winds up admitting to most, if not all, of plaintiffs specific charges?
A. Monitoring Activities r
The Director acknowledges the "admitted problems with data [collection]" (Def. Mem. at l 3)(citing First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Reports), as well as "difficult[ies]" and "concerns" that have prevented the proper and complete collection and reporting of data on his famil y unification efforts. Id. at 13-14 (citing Sixth Report at 34, 36; Fifth Report at 19).
These acknowledgments amount to a concession of plaintiffs allegations. Motion at ¶1921. The points the Director makes to cushion this concession do not help him. He emphasizes, for example. that the incompleteness of the monitoring data does not necessarily mean that DCFS has defaulted on its obligations with "regard to the actual provision of services." Def. Mem. at 13. Yet. absent data. there is no way for the Director (or plaintiffs or the Court) to establish that he is providing the services in question in compliance with the Decree. The Director also says that the blame for the non-compliance is properly attributable to the "decentralized nature of the [cash assistance] program itself' and to DCFS "worker[s]." Def. Mem. at 13-14. But this is only to say that compliance is challenging; it does not excuse non-compliance. Moreover, the Director controls the "nature of the program" and the "workers", so he is not passively at the mercy of
2 The Director's concessions make detailed citations to the Monitor's factual findings unnecessary here. Review of the last four reports issued (covering 1992-1994), reveals a finding of noncompliance or only partial compliance in each of the five categories at issue. The concessions and findings are ample support for the relief sought here. If this Court concludes that, those admissions and findings notwithstanding, factual questions decisive of the motion remain, it should set an evidentiary hearing.

0 either. The Director claims that the "automated system" he is developing will cure some of the acknowledged problems. Def. Mem. at 14. But this promise supports continued monitoring to enable plaintiffs and DCFS to determine whether the new system actually cures the Director's default. Similarly, a longer monitoring period is necessary to help determine the curative effect of the Director's redesign of the "front-end" of the child welfare system (see Def. Mem. at 14), which is scheduled to be implemented over an 18 month period beginning June 1996.3
B. Undercertification of Norman Families The Director notes that the certification process is not expressly required by the Decree. Def. Mem. at 15. However, the Decree does require that eligible families receive Norman services and benefits. Decree at ¶5. Only families that are "class members" are "eligible." Id. And defendant himself selected certification as the administrative tool for identifying class members. Thus. the Director's acknowledgement that DCFS is "correctly certifying Norman families in 76 to 83 percent of the cases" (Dir. Mem. at 15) itself concedes substantial noncompliance with the Decree. A 17% to 24% non-compliance rate means that several hundred eligible families each year are deprived of the benefit of the Decree. C. Timely Cash Assistance In the Sixth Report. the Monitor found that "[d]uring every reporting period [under the Decree] cash assistance agencies in Cook County and downstate... could not supply needed checks to vendors for clients." Sixth Report at 35. The Director acknowledges such problems through November 1995. but says that the "problem of cash shortages.. .is being addressed" and "should
The front end redesign itself is predicated on the Director's acknowledgment of massive difficulties in delivering timely services to children and families entering the child welfare system. See Appendix C hereto (relevant pages of redesign document).

7 be alleviated by the automated cash assistance system." Def. Mem. at 15. As with the data collection and reporting issues, the promised implementation of the automated system supports, rather than defeats, continued monitoring. See §II.A., su ra.
D. Screening and Return Home Activity v
The Director also does not dispute his default on his obligation to initiate prompt court proceedings to return children to their homes pursuant to ¶9(f) of the Decree. Def. Mem. at 16. This default is doubly significant, since the Director specifically settled the plaintiffs' ongoing claims of non-compliance with ¶9(f) by making a renewed and expanded commitment to "implement a plan" for compliance with ¶9(f) and "to provide for screening of cases" by July 1. 1995. March 10. 1995 Order at ¶4. The Director concedes he has no plan yet. Def. Mem. at 16. He onl y states that he is "continuing to work" on a "plan that will work" to remedy his non-compliance. Id.
The Director contends that completion of the plan "does not require monitoring." jd. The Director's admitted violation of both the Decree and March 10. 1995 Order justifies the need for the continued oversight monitoring provides. (see Motion, at Prayer for Relief ¶C.4.) Once a plan is submitted. only continued monitoring will permit the plaintiffs and the Court to determine whether the plan in fact "works."
E. Underutilization Of Public Aid Resources Plaintiffs alleged that the Director is in violation of his obligation under the Decree to "maximize payment of DPA-administered benefits to eligible families." Motion at ¶29 (citing Decree ¶6). The Director. replies that "[p]laintiffs admit[ ] that DCFS has complied" with this mandate. Def. Mem. at 17. But Plaintiffs acknowledged only that DCFS had "developed...a

8 process' for utilizing DPA resources, which is separately required by the Decree (at ¶6(a)(ii) and (iii)), not that it had maximized payment of DPA-administered benefits. Motion at ¶29. Plaintiffs cited the Monitor's finding--which the Director does not dispute--that there were "not more than 19 cases of public aid utilization" during the last half of 1994. Id. This tiny figure-during a period when more than 475 children in Norman-certified families were returned home-establishes a prima facie case of non-compliance with the "maximization" provision of ¶6 of the Decree. The Director's contention that the Decree does not require a certain level of utilization of welfare benefits is not responsive to the issue of whether he has maximized utilization. III. THIS COURT HAS BROAD AUTHORITY, FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES, TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE THE DECREE Plaintiffs seek an order enforcing the Decree, not modifying it. The basis for the principal relief plaintiffs seek. continued monitoring, illustrates this point. Plaintiffs are entitled to continued monitoring under existing provisions of the Decree itself, and. alternatively, as a remedy for the Director's non-compliance with other provisions of the Decree. A. The Decree Provides for Further Monitoring The guiding principle of construction is to read the "consent decree.. .within its four corners...." Firefi ghters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984). See Def. Man. at 26. Application of that principle requires giving effect to each of its many provisions and then reconciling those provisions, to accomplish the Decree's intended purposes. See U.S. National Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. A gents, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993)("text" must be read in the "aggregate", all "'words... taking their purport from the setting in which they are used")(citation omitted). The Director reads the Decree, as modified by the March 10, 1995 Order, as setting an absolute end of monitoring on February 15, 1996. Def. Mem. at 27. But pertinent provisions

6 of the Decree include those requiring implementation of all programs and policies on or before December 1, 1991--3 and 1/2 years before the Monitor's term was to expire. Decree ¶t4-10, 12, 13. 14. Another pertinent provision states that during the 3 and 1/2 year post-implementation phase. DCFS is required to provide "reliable and valid information" respecting the implemented programs and policies. Id. at ¶15. The Director concedes that he has not yet fully implemented significant portions of the Decree, that he has implemented others long after the required date, that the data system is still not reliable, and that numerous recommendations have not been implemented. See §11. supra. Reading the provisions requiring full implementation by December 1. 1991. with the provisions requiring monitoring of the (implemented) policies and programs and reconciling those provisions, requires that the Monitor's term be understood as linked to the timely implementation of the Decree's other requirements. Late implementation of nonmonitoring Decree provisions extends the monitoring term. Moreover, the Decree's process for the parties to respond to the Monitor's reports through compliance planning (Decree at ¶16) means that the Decree provides sufficient time for the parties properly to address delayed reports, such as the Sixth Report (the Director's response to this calendar 1994 report not'being filed until December 11. 1995) and the yet-to-be-completed Seventh Report (covering 1995).
The Director also misreads the Decree when he contends there should be no Seventh Monitor's Report. Specifically, he says that his duty to submit information to the Monitor expired on July 1, 1995. His contention is that the Sixth Report (covering calendar 1994) fully discharged the duty to file monitoring reports under the Decree. Id. at 31-32.
Even under the Director's reading, the Decree directs monitoring at least until July 1, 1995. And the March 10. 1995, Order extended such monitoring "under the same terms and

10 conditions" until February 15, 1996. Nevertheless, the Director argues that the Monitor's authority even to submit a report expired when the report was not filed by February 15, 1996. Def. Mem. at 31. This is wrong; neither the Decree (even as the Director reads it) nor the March 10, 1995 Order excuse a 1995 report. Prior practice in this case (under which reports have, in fact. followed the monitoring period) also requires a Seventh Report.
In any event, this Court has already put the issue of 1995 monitoring and reporting to rest by directing the Monitor to submit "[a] consolidated report covering the period 1-1-95 through 12-31-95 9 [to] be filed after the completion of that time period." Order of October 26, 1995 (attached as Appendix D hereto).
B. Continued Monitoring Is An Appropriate Remed y For NonCompliance
The Director say s that, if his reading of the Decree (barring continued monitoring and prohibiting submission of a Seventh Monitoring Report) is correct, then there is no basis for directing continued monitoring because there has been no "adjudication or admission" that he has violated an y law for which continued monitoring might be an appropriate remedy. He thereby implicitly concedes that, as plaintiffs averred in their Motion (at 24), monitoring is an appropriate remedy for (admitted or judicially determined) non-compliance. The Director, of course, has admitted to such non-compliance here. See §II, supra. Thus, the factual and the legal predicates for the monitoring relief plaintiffs seek are clearly established.
The relief plaintiffs seek in addition or as an alternative to continued monitoring would simply enforce existing provisions of the Decree, or remedy non-compliance with them. See Motion at ¶ 25-29 (describing existing provisions and Director's non-compliance with them); Prayer for Relief at B, C. No element of the relief sought is grounded on a requested

ry

b

p

1

11
modification of the Decree. The Director's reliance on cases concerning modification of decrees,
., South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1985), and Fox v. United States Dep't. of Housing
and Urban Development, 680 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1982), is therefore misplaced.
C. This Court Has Broad Authority To Enforce The Decree, Other Than Through Its Contempt Powers
The Director argues that the only way the Court can enforce the Decree is through a
finding of contempt. and that the level of his partial compliance makes a contempt finding
unwarranted. Def. Mem. at 29-31.°
The Director is mistaken. Whether the Court orders additional monitoring because it reads
the Decree alread y to require it. or whether the Court orders monitoring (and/or other remedies)
to bring about compliance with other provisions of the Decree, the Court has power from at least
three sources. other than its contempt powers. to enforce the Decree.'
First. the Decree explicitly provides that:
This court retains jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with this order or the recommendations of the monitor. Plaintiffs may file a motion with this court at any time to seek compliance with the provisions of this Order or the recommendations of the monitor...
4 While plaintiffs do not seek an adjudication of contempt, a finding of contempt would not be inappropriate. For example, the Director's complete failure to "implement a plan" for compliance with ¶;9(f) of the Decree and "to provide for screening of cases" by July 1, 1995, see §II.D, supra. is such a substantial and willful violation of the March 10, 1995, order as to justify a contempt finding.
S The difference is exemplified in Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1991), where the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought contempt sanctions after a 20-year process of attempting to obtain compliance with consent decrees involving residential care for the mentally ill. In deferring to the district court's decision not to find contempt of court in light of the defendant's substantial. though imperfect, compliance, the court of appeals specifically noted that the district court "entertained numerous enforcement actions brought under the ... consent decrees." Id. at 1222. This motion is just that type of "enforcement action" and not an effort to obtain contempt sanctions.

12 Decree ¶20. This provision empowers the Court to "enforce compliance" and authorizes this motion as the appropriate procedure to invoke the Court's power. See, McCall-Bev v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1188-90 (7th Cir. 1985).
Second, this Court has inherent power to enforce its orders. The Decree is an order of this Court, incorporating mandatory language in the form of an injunction. Plaintiffs are seeking further injunctive relief to enforce it. "Injunctions ... are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree." Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516. 2524 (1994) (emphasis added). The Court has the power to enforce by injunction its prior injunctive order. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.- Co., 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1677 (1994)("[I]f the parties obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement ... [is] made part of the order ... by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order ... a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and the ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.") See also, McCall-Bev, 777 F.2d at 1189-90 ("federal jurisdiction to enforce agreements to settle federal suits...[exists if there is] a deliberate retention of jurisdiction. as by- issuin g an injunction") (emphasis added).
Third. under 28 U.S.C. §2202 the Court can enter an injunction providing for "further relief' pursuant to a declaratory judgment that the defendant has failed to comply with the Decree. See Motion at 1. The Director admits he is out of compliance. A corresponding finding by this Court would constitute sufficient declaratory relief to support a remedial order under 28 U.S.C. §2202.

13 IV. THE DECREE COMPROMISED NUMEROUS STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS THAT WERE AND REMAIN SUBSTANTIAL AND THESE CLAIMS CONFER FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE DECREE
A. Evans Affirms That, If A Consent Decree Settles A Federal Claim That Is And Remains Substantial. A Federal Court May Enforce The Decree
Evans Hi holds that a federal court lacks jurisdiction to enforce a consent decree that at the time of enforcement, does not rest upon a "substantial federal claim." 10 F.3d at 482. It also holds that where a consent decree resolves a federal claim that is and remains substantial, a federal court may enforce the decree Id. at 478-79. A claim is "substantial" for jurisdictional purposes unless it "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or ... is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). Only a claim "patently without merit," Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1974), or "foreclosed b% prior decisions of th[e] [Supreme] Court," Oneida Indian Nation v. Count y of Oneida. 414 U.S. 661. 666 (1974). is "insubstantial." See Holida y Magic. Inc. v. Warren, 497 F.2d 687. 697 (7th Cir. 1974). See also 13B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §3564. at 71.
Evans embraces the established understanding of what a "substantial" claim is for jurisdictional purposes when it states that "a settlement of a dispute about the meaning of...[a] law may be enforced if the agreement compromises genuine uncertainties." Evans, 10 F.3d at 478-79. Measured by this standard, the Decree resolved at least five substantial federal claims in addition to the "reasonable efforts" statutory claim now foreclosed by Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347

14
(1992). This Court may therefore enforce the Decree. Evans, 10 F.3d at 478-79.6
B. The Federal Statutory Claims Are Substantial And Support the Relief Encompassed in the Decree.
Plaintiffs brought four statutory claims in addition to the "reasonable efforts" claim
rejected in Suter: a right under 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(c) and § 627(b)(2) to a services program
designed to prevent placement in foster care and facilitate return of a child to his or her family,
where appropriate (Am. Comp. ¶44(a)): a right under §§622(b)(2) and 671(a)(4) to have DCFS
coordinate its child welfare services with existing programs that provide benefits and services to
poor families (Am. Comp. ¶44(b)): a right under §§671(a)(16) and 675(1) and (5)(c) and to a
case plan for each child that provides services which will facilitate return of the child to his
parents (Am. Comp. «21(b) and (c) and 44(d)); and the right under §§627(a)(2)(B) and 671
(a)(12) to notice and fair hearing whenever DCFS denies benefits to a parent (Am. Comp.
¶45(a)). These claims support the scope of relief defendant agreed to in the Decree: programs and
policies designed to solve poverty-related obstacles to family unity or reunification, return
The Director's reliance on Evans (Def. Mem. at 17-25) is therefore misplaced. Moreover. unlike Evans. there are no legitimate federalism concerns here that might limit the Court's authority to enforce the Decree. See Def. Mem. at 18 (suggesting such concerns). The Director did not unwillingly inherit the obligations of the Decree, but negotiated its terms. In fact, he strategically decided to pursue his arguments about plaintiffs' reasonable efforts claim elsewhere, petitioning for certiorari in Suter just one week before the Decree was entered. He does not now wish to alter DCFS's policies embodied in the Decree, but continues to embrace them. See Def. Mem. at 6-13. Compare id. with Evans, 10 F.3d at 478. Moreover, the Decree here was drafted to respect the right of the Director to administer DCFS. It sets up an orderly process for evaluation and negotiation utilizing the Monitor as a facilitator, and carefully keeps the parties from inordinately involving this Court in their differences. In a five year period, the parties have come to this Court in disagreement only one other time. This Court has not become unduly entangled in the management of DCFS. Plaintiffs request no such entanglement now. Moreover, the $100.000 yearly monitoring costs the Director claims are very modest, given the size of DCFS' program.

15 children home speedily, and ensure that services are coordinated with existing resources from
Public Aid, CHA and other programs.'
In its ruling on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief, this court specifically determined
that 42 U.S.C. §§627(a)(2)(C), 622(b)(2), 671(a)(12) and 675(5)(c) all create rights in the parent-
plaintiffs. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1188. It also determined that 42 U.S.C. §§622, 627 and 675 create an enforceable right to services, including the right to have DCFS coordinate with other agencies. Id. at 1185 n.8 (adopting Magistrate's analysis). $ Defendant's withdrawal of his appeal rendered these determinations final. Decree at p. 2 and S20
The Director relies entirely on the Supreme Court's decision. in Suter to establish that all these federal statutory claims are so "insubstantial" as to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to enforce the Decree. Def. Mem. at 20-23. His argument is that the "reasoning in Suter ...[urges that] the specific statutory provisions cited by plaintiffs... are themselves not sufficiently welldefined to create the individuall y enforceable rights plaintiffs seek." Def. Mem. at 20-21.
Suter held onl y- that 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15) was unenforceable. not that other provisions
It is of no account that the relief afforded in the Decree may go somewhat beyond the specific requirements of these statutory provisions. Parties are free to enter into settlements that require more of them than the specific federal provisions upon which they are based. Suter, 503 U.S. at 354-55 n.6; Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 762 (1992). See Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1993) (it is "rare case when a consent decree establishes only.. .bare minimums required by...constitution).
$ See also Magistrate's Report, 739 F.Supp. at 1203-1208; Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support of Private Rights of Action Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (filed Aug. 15, 1989) at 11-15 (discussing enforceability of the case plan and case review requirements of §671 (a)(l 6)); 24-27 (addressing enforceability of §§622(a) and (b) and 627); 28-29 (discussing the coordinated services requirement of 622(a)).

16 of Title IV-E. or an y provisions of Title IV-B, were. 503 U.S. at 364. 9 Moreover, the Suter
Court emphasized that, in assessing the enforceability of a particular provision, "each statute must
be interpreted according to its own terms." Id. at 358 n.8. The contention that Suter "forecloses"
all of plaintiffs' statutory claims under Titles IV-B and IV-E, see Oneida Indian Nat., 414 U.S.
at 666, is therefore wholly without merit; it could hardly foreclose such claims when it did not
even address them.
The Director's argument seeking to apply the "reasoning" of Suter to the statutory claims
in this case is directed towards the merits of plaintiffs' statutory claims and exhorts an extension
of Suter. It does not address the "substantiality" of the claims in the Evans sense. The Eighth
Circuit, in An gela R. v. Clinton. 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1993), rejected exactly this approach.
The court stated:
[T]he analysis in Suter might ultimately compel the conclusion that the other federal statutes upon which plaintiffs rely do not create an enforceable private right of action...but these questions go to the merits of plaintiffs claims, not to the district court's jurisdiction. Because Suter does not "inescapably render the claims frivolous" [citation omitted]...the district court had jurisdiction to approve the proposed settlement and to enter a consent decree resolving the claims... . 999 F.2d at 324. The court in Evans III vacated the decree after holding that none of the plaintiffs' claims were substantial. 10 F.3d at 480-83. In contrast, there is a formidable body of law both before and after Suter upholding statutory claims based on the very statutory provisions plaintiffs advanced and the Decree resolved. See Memorandum of August 15, 1989 (citing pre-Suter cases);
9 Legislation after Suter explicitly clarifies that the holding of Suter applies only to 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). 42 U.S.C. §1320(a)(10)(as amended October 31, 1995). See Harris v. James. 833 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1995)(applying 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, as amended, to limit breadth of the Suter analysis); Ward v. Thomas, 895 F. Supp. 406 (D. Conn. I995)(same).

17 An gela R., 999 F.2d at 323, 324 (claims under §§ 620-28 and §§670-679; rejecting jurisdictional challenge to entry of decree and holding that Suter does not "inescapably render [other] claims frivolous"); Jeanine B. B y Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp 1268, 1282 -84 (E.D. Wis. I995)(denying motion to dismiss claims under §§627(a)(2) and (b)(3) and §§671(a)(2), (3), (7), (10), (11) and (c3)).
The Decree here compromised "genuine uncertainties" (Evans III, 10 F.3d at 479) as to all of plaintiffs' federal statutory claims. Suter ended the uncertain federal enforceability as to one of these claims only (42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15)). The other statutory claims remain substantial, and offer a jurisdictional predicate for this Court's enforcement of the Decree.
C. The Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claims are Substantial. Plaintiffs challenged the Director's "standardless" removal of their children from their homes as an "unwarranted intrusion" into their families solely because of their poverty, in violation of their associational, privacy and due process rights. See Am. Comp. ¶j1, 9, 14, 16, 32(b). 33(f) and (h). 44(e). 45(b); See e.g .. Pl. Reply Mem (3/24/89) at 3. The Director wrongly characterizes this claim as asserting a constitutional right to "specific substantive services." Def. Mem. at 23. But plaintiffs' constitutional complaint is not about DCFS's taking of custody "without providing for cash assistance housing or other services," Def. Mem. 23; it concerns DCFS's taking of children from the home without due process of law and without fair regard for the plaintiffs' weighty associational, privacy and liberty interests. See P. Reply Mem. 3/24/89) at 3. The constitutional claims concern intrusive removal and separation policies, not the failure to afford aid and services to the plaintiffs. See Pl. Reply 3/24/89 at 3. DeShaney V. Winnebago County Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), which the

Director relies on heavily, persuasively supports the conclusion that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims are substantial enough to support jurisdiction. Joshua DeShaney sued the county child welfare agency for failingto protect him by removing him from the abusive home. While holding that no constitutional duty to protect Joshua existed, the Court recognized that some "special relationships" may impose on the State "affirmative duties of care and protection," id..
p at 197-98, when "the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will." Id. at 199-200. This action imposes on the state a "corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and well being." Id, (citinge.g.. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)). The Court noted. "it is the State's affirmative act" to "restrain" personal liberty that "trig ger[s]" due process protections, not its failure to act. 489 U.S. at 200. The Court stated that a harmful placement "in a foster home operated by [State] agents. ..might [be] a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect." Id. at 200 n.9. More significantly, it also stated that the premature or otherwise unwarranted removal of Joshua from his parents would create a substantial federal claim of "improperly intruding in the parent-child relationship based on the ... Due Process Clause." Id. at 203. That is the claim plaintiffs brought here. Am. Comp. at 32, 41-43, 45. See Pl. Reply Mem. (3'24!89) at 3.
Child welfare law is replete with the recognition of the fundamental liberty interest parents and children have in their relationship. Stanle y v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Ouilloin v. Walcott. 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Me yer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). This interest is so substantial that only "clear and convincing evidence" of parental unfitness can completely sever it. Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Here,
18

the defendant cannot and does not contend that the homeless plaintiffs lose their liberty interests in care and custody of their children upon eviction, loss of public aid or other financial hardship. DCFS's child removal policies plaintiffs challenged--policies of not returning children to homes considered "too small", or without nicely made beds for each child--cannot be squared with the plausible liberty interests of the plaintiffs. These policies implicate substantial constitutional claims.
The complaint further alleges that the state's standardless and coercive removal and separation policies violate the impoverished plaintiffs' due process rights to be free from arbitrary governmental interference in their lives. Am. Comp 1, 14, 45(a). These claims also are substantial. See White v. Rou ghion. 689 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1982); Care y v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978); Doston v. Coler. 732 F.Supp. 857, (N.D.Ill. 1988). The complaint also challenged the unfair conditions imposed upon plaintiffs' exercise of their custodial rights, including the "Catch 22" conditions imposed on the return of their children home. Am. Comp.
33. 44(e). See Norman. 739 F.Supp. at 1194. These claims likewise are substantial. See, e. g .. Youakim v. McDonald. 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)(indefinitely long civil commitment unrelated to its purpose violates due process).
Finally, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffsp'r operty interests in continuation of public benefits were arbitrarily abridged (they lose eligibility for benefits such as AFDC when they lose custody of their children) without notice and an opportunity for a hearing when the unlawful child removal polices are applied to them. Am. Comp. SS 35(f), 37(c), 43, 45(a). This claim is substantial under cases such as Goldberg v. Kell y, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Varas v. Trainor. 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008.
19

In short, plaintiffs stated a number of substantial constitutional claims. Some of these
claims are unsettled, but others are well-settled in favor of the plaintiffs. Had plaintiffs prevailed
at trial, they may well have secured broader relief than the Decree provides, perha ps barring
man), of the Director's removal policies altogether. The Director chose to settle the case by
agreeing to provide affirmative services to help homeless families involved with DCFS, rather
than risk an injunction against his removal policies. That choice, because it was made in
settlement of substantial constitutional claims (which remain substantial). cannot be rescinded
simply because the plaintiffs now seek to secure the "affirmative services" promised them in the
settlement.
V. CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs' motion should be granted.
Respectfully Submitted,
0
One of Plaintiffs' Attorneys
John M. Bouman Laurene M. Hevbach Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 343 South Dearborn. Suite 700 Chicaeo. Illinois 60647 (312) 347 -1070 #97107
Of Counsel:
Robert E. Lehrer Diane L. Redleaf Lehrer & Redleaf 205 W. Monroe, 2nd Floor Chicago. Illinois 60606 (312) 409-2240
20

1

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

2

EASTERN DIVISION

3

JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE

4 PATTERSON, WANDA HILLIARD

JOANN MITCHELL, on their own 5 behalf and all others

similarly situated,

6

,p

I•

Plaintiff,

7

vs.

Docket No. 89 C 1624

8 STERLING M. RYDER, Director Illinois Department of
9 Children and Family Services,

10

Defendants.

Chicago, Illinois February 27, 1995 9:30 o'clock a.m.

11

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - Motion

12

BEFORE TEE HONORABLE WILLIAM T. HART

13
APPEARANCES:
14

15 For the Plaintiff Class:
16
17

LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION OF CHICAGO BY: MS. LAURENE M. HEYBACH 343 S. Dearborn, Suite 700 Chicago, Illinois 60604

18 For the Defendant: 19 20

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM BY: MS. CHRISTINA M. TCHEN and
MS. JENNIFER LEVI 333 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 2100 Chicago, Illinois 60606

21 Court Reporter:
22

FRANCES CACIOPPO, CSR, RPR Official Court Reporter .219 S. Dearborn Street, Suite 2502-A

23

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 435-5561

24

PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY

25

MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY

TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY COMPUTER

APPENDIX -A-

1

THE CLERK: 89 C 1624, James Norman, et al. vs.

2 McDonald. Motion.

3

THE COURT: Good morning.

4

MS. HEYBACE: Good morning, your Honor.

5

MS. TCEEN: Good morning, your Honor. Christina

6 TchenAnd Jennifer Levi for defendant.

r

7

MS. HEYBACH: Laurene Heybach for the plaintiff

8 class.

9

MS. TCEEN: Your Honor, this is a consent decree case)

10 that was entered by you in 1991.

11

THE COURT: Yes. I am willing to extend it, but why

12 two years?

13

MS. TCEEN: Well, your Honor, we have had extensive

14 discussions with plaintiff's counsel. We have also discussed

15 this with Ms. Smith, the monitor. I think it's sort of the

16 considered judgment of everyone that two years will give the

17 Department an additional period of time within which to work

18 with Ms. Smith toward fully implementing the consent decree.

19

THE COURT: Yes, but, you know, our Court of Appeals

20 has spoken out on extending consent decrees for too long and

21 being concerned about their becoming out of date and saying

22 that in many ways sometimes they become an incubus.

23

MS. HEYBACE: Your Honor, if I could be heard on

24 this?
25

The decree itself does not expire, Judge. It's the

3

1 monitoring issue. I know that many reports --

2

THE COURT: I know.

3

MS. HEYBACE: -- have been filed with the Court.

4 This order, amongst the things it does --

5

TEE COURT: Right.

6

MS. HEYBACH: -- is excuse the last report. But

7 following those reports, one can tell that there are many areas

8 in which the defendants have not accomplished -- the defendant,

9 rather -- has not accomplished the things mandated in the

10 decree.

11

THE COURT: I don't have any real quarrel with that

12 except that I think that the extension will be limited to one

13 year. You can tell me in a year if it's necessary to extend

14 again. But keeping in mind that these things should have a

15 life that is not beyond my vision anyway, I am going to only

16 extend it a year at this time.

17

MS. HEYBACH: Your Honor, I appreciate the concerns

18 that you have articulated about things not going on forever,

19 but this is a case in which all parties have worked

20 extensively.

21

THE COURT: I am not quarreling with that. I am not

22 disputing you on that. I am simply saying I will do it for a

23 year and another year if it's necessary. Come in and tell me

24 why it's necessary then.

25

MS. TCHEN: Thank you, your Honor.

4

1

2 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
3

4

`^-rc^. Co-C^- „^_

Official Court Reporter

5

1995.

6

7

8

9

10 11 12

13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Writer& Direct Number:

•w LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION OF CHICAGO

(312) 347-1040

343 South Dearborn Sveei • Chicago, IWnos 60604 • (312) 341.11070
FAX (312) 341.1041

February 26, 1996

TOO No.: (312)431.12%

Christina Tchen, Nancy Eisenhauer Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom
333 West Wac, cer Drive Chicago, Illinois

Dear Tina and Nancy:
The length of your December 11, 1996, response to the Norman Consent Decree 6th Monitoring Report, the urgency of the issue of the continued monitoring of the Decree, as well as other pressing work, prevented us from giving you a point-by-point reply. A detailed discussion may not be useful, but we believe it is necessary to highlight where we agree and disagree.
General Comments.
The response claims to "already have implemented 22 recommendations and to be in the process of implementing 18 more." This suggests only 9 recommendations are in doubt. But the text is otherwise. See e. g ., comment below regarding Recommendation #1 (recommendation is listed as one "agreed to" when substance shows strenuous disagreement). Many recommendations have been dismissed, disagreed with, or considered "outside the scope of the Decree." Equally significant is that many recommendations concern matters of long-standing non-compliance, for which the promise of future compliance, in or after 1996, for findings related to 1994, is ver gg inadequate and insufficient.
A special comment must be made about matters "outside the scope of the Decree." This comment is particularly inappropriate. The monitoring reports are not merely meant to parrot the Decree.
1 Contrary to the representation that 22 recommendations are "already implemented" and 18 others are "being implemented," the plaintiffs' count is that DCFS agrees to only 21 recommendations (# #3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 25-29, 30-34, 37, 47, 49), not , with partial disagreement or lack of clarity even as to 3 of the otherwise agreed recommendations only. Future implementation is promised as to two (##6, 12). 19 recommendations are viewed as "outside the scope of Norman (# #4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 30, 31, 38-46, 48); DCFS plainly disagrees with six recommendations (##11, 18, 21, 23, 35, 36); and gives unclear or unresponsive answers to six others (## 1, 2, 4, 14, 22, 24).
APPENDIX -8-

The monitors are to assess underlying and related problems, and to
consider whether solutions to problems previously identified are working. No recommendation, when it relates to underlying and related problems, is beyond the "scope of the Decree." While recommendations may not all be feasible to implement, and all recommendations are subject to discussion, the "outside the scope of the Decree" comment misses the point that monitoring was intended to be broad based so long as recommendations do impact on provisions of the Decree. See particularly the reply to recommendation ##9 and 10 below as examples of basic disagreements regarding the scope of this case.
Sp ecific comments on the text of the res ponse follow.
We strenuously disagree with all efforts to blame HAP agencies for cash depletion. (p. 5)
We have concern that only one part of the DV protocol is being implemented, and that the chosen part (screening for domestic violence) is likely to lead to further dramatic caseload increases in the absence of concomitant services to families to prevent placement. (p. 6)
We continue to be concerned that training is insufficient.
Even trained workers lack proficiency. Private agency staff remain largely untrained on Norman.
A. Class Certification 1,3(b). (p. 7) (Finding of Cook County non-compliance). DCFS questions the monitor's methodology, but this seems unfair post hoc. DCFS had ample opportunity to insure a fair methodology in advance of the review.
Plaintiffs consider the monitor's conclusions regarding undercertification to be fair and reasonable. DCFS's response, quibbling with methodology and assumptions, does not address the problem the monitor has consistently found.
The front end redesign will not be fully effective, at best for 18 more months. More training on certification is unlikely to suffice.
Recommendation #1 2 . (p. 10)
The plaintiffs believe the monitor is correct that a complete review of certification should be undertaken, and decentralization is insufficient. These recommendations do not entail "doing away"
2 Hereinafter, the recommendations are designated by the number sign followed by the number, "# ". Compliance and non-
compliance findings are discussed following the letter section of
the decree (A-Q) to which the discussion relates.

with certification. DCFS's response is insufficient. This
response indicates that, contrary to DCFS' own presentation of the recommendation as one it implemented, DCFS has not "already implemented it.
12 . (p. 13) It is apparently agreed the DCFS should certify
under the allegations indicated, though the answer is unclear how DCFS claims the new cash information system will alleviate this problem, or whether the system will work as expected.
3 . (p. 13) ,^ The monitor recommends that indicated findings of inadequate phelter, etc, "must be properly indicated in report findings." DCFS agrees and believes that "new procedures may alleviate problems that may exist". DCFS is working on these new procedures.
j4. (p. 14) The monitor recommends that DCFS review the issue of missing permanency goals. DCFS considers this issue "outside the scope of the Norman Decree". Plaintiffs strenuously disagree, since permanency goals are meant to determine whether children of Norman class members should return home, and services related to goals are central to the Decree. This area is one that requires continued monitoring to see if efforts to limit the number of missing permanency goals are successful.
5. (p. 14) The monitor recommends review of the use of permanent relative home and permanent foster home permanency goals. DCFS claims this is only a B.H. issue, not a Norman issue. Plaintiffs disagree, in so far as Norman class members may be assigned such goals and such an assignment could operate as an obstacle to the return of Norman children home.
B. Cash Assistance. (p. 15)
J,6. (p. 16) The cash assistance data system "has been finalized," according to DCFS but a start date is not indicated. The system will "collect necessary information" but won't issue cash unless a worker does the inputting. Whether this new design itself will introduce delays in securing cash for clients who need timely assistance should be monitored, as should the triggering by 10% of initial funds.
17. (p. 7) DCFS has furnished the internal audit to the Monitor. DCFS has complied with the recommendation, after a long delay.
C. Reasonable Efforts. (p. 16)
DCFS questions the conclusion that Cook County is out of compliance based on a survey that found reasonable efforts in 80-90% of cases
reviewed. DCFS questions the monitor's resting the conclusion that
there is a lack of reasonable efforts in part on the shockingly low
3

return home activity in Cook County, and disclaims its own
responsibility for that result. In plaintiffs' view, if children are not going home who reasonably could, with effort on DCFS's part, then DCFS's efforts are not sufficient. In light of DCFS's utter failure to initiate return home action (in violation of f4 of the supplemental order), DCFS cannot simply blame the courts or other parties for failure to return children home and then contend
its own reasonable efforts are sufficient.

fie. (p. 18) DCFS contends that use of "best practices" to provide permanent planning efforts is outside Norman, and falls
with B.H. See comment p. 1 above regarding such "beyond the scope" claims.

j. (p. 18) DCFS contends that the recommendation that *DCFS have a service orientation" is a "B.H." but not a "Norman" issue. This statement entirely misunderstands the focus of Norman on
services at the front end of the system, to prevent family
separation. If this is not what Norman concerns, what I&, in
DCFS's view, Norman about?

This disavowal of any connection of service delivery issues to Norman is ironic in view of the Department's proposal to plaintiffs to limit the monitor's future role to the front end redesign issues.

Q . (p. 19) DCFS claims that the recommendation concerning "renewed emphasis" on working with biological parents is also outside the scope of the Decree but falls within B.H. (where parents are not even class members!) See comments about J 9. It is clear DCFS considers Norman issues only to be the literal provisions of the Decree, while it considers B.H. issues to be anything and everything concerning DCFS, even if those issues concern non- B.H. class members! This view of the Norman Decree
makes meaningless any monitoring or recommendation process, which
of necessity must be somewhat broader and deeper than the literal
language of the Decree.

11. (p. 19) DCFS claims that case assignment is outside of

Norman, but- part of B.H. The monitors have noted that a

significant case assignment services. DCFS must remedy

problem impacts that problem in

on delivery Norman (as

woefllNoarsmainn

B .H.).

D. Court Action Initiation: (p. 20)

The

DCFS agrees it is monitor's finding

in "partial is vastly

tcooomplgieannecre"ouwsi.thDtChiFsSpriso,viinsiotnh.e

plaintiffs' view, fully out of compliance.

12. (p. 20) The monitor recommends immediate discussions of the agreed order's screening and petition provision DCFS claims it is

4

actively working on this, but the plaintiffs consider the response--to a recommendation itself issued in May 1995, before the implementation deadline expired--to be much too little, much too late. Plaintiffs first met to discuss the plan with Cheryl Cesario shortly after the July 1995 deadline had already expired. Ms. Cesario abruptly ended that meeting to attend to a crisis. No further effort of any kind was undertaken until December when Ms.
Cesario indicated she would be assigning Ms. Katz to the project.
Ms. Katz has only just begun to develop one aspect of the plan and the ideas she has were very preliminary. As of December 22, 1995 she was unaware that her duties extended to a "protocol for screening ases" and she had focused only on "return home
petitions", and then, only to a very limited extent. Since that
date, no further plan has been presented to plaintiffs' counsel, despite plaintiffs' counsel's repeated requests for more information. The Department's promise to "meet with plaintiffs' counsel shortly "to discuss the protocol" rings hollow, when as of February 23rd, no further plan had been tendered and no further discussion had been scheduled.
E Trainin g . (p. 21)
The Department concedes it "may have been in 'partial' compliance at the time of the Report, but contends it now is in
full compliance. DCFS claims, without furnishing evidence or
details, cannot satisfy plaintiffs or the monitors. The monitor's
report found a continuing lack of full awareness of Norman
policies, despite training. In that context, DCFS's claim to full compliance must be considered skeptically. DCFS mentions "future" training plans but also provides no information as to those plans.
13. (p. 21) Class membership training should be conducted. Same DCFS response as to #12. Same plaintiff reply.
#14. (p. 21) The monitor recommends that private agencies should
be required to attend training. DCFS's answer is non- responsive:
DCFS merely notes that agencies "have attended." The plaintiffs request that DCFS take this recommendation seriously and that the process of 116 of the Decree for negotiation concerning the recommendations occur.
F. Prompt Retu rn : (p. 22) Not monitored in this report.
G Notice and Appeal Ri ghts--(p. 22) Undetermined.
The monitor contends that she did not receive data necessary to assess compliance with this requirement, and no independent assessment was done. The monitor indicated a lack of means of checking whether parents received the materials mandated by the Decree. DCFS asserts it does provide notices. The accuracy of this assertion in neither verified nor questioned by the monitor.
5

nteraaency Ag reements. (p. 23)
The plaintiffs agree with the monitor that only partial compliance is shown. DCFS objects, claiming "good faith". Good faith is not the test of actual compliance, however; it is the test for whether the lack of actual compliance should be overlooked or
excused. The underutilization of the CHA agreement is a matter
largely within DCFS control. Despite the good faith addition of a housing specialist to DCFS staff, more work is urgently needed
before any finding better than "partial compliance" would be
appropriate.
As to efforts "elsewhere," the plaintiffs would appreciate some greater documentation as to those efforts so that the adequacy and progress in achievement of further interagency agreements can be assessed.
15. (p. 25) The monitoring report recommends more coordination between DCFS, housing authorities and HAP staff. DCFS apparently agrees with this recommendation and promises a housing conference this spring. Plaintiffs sincerely hope that this future plan will be implemented as promised. but are concerned that without the efforts of the monitors, particularly here, Ms. Fager, plaintiffs are concerned that such an undertaking may not occur.
16. (p. 26) DCFS agrees to look at the housing authorities by LANs and to consider the statewide service delivery system
developed in Missouri and Minnesota. DCFS claims it is "not
required" to do so under the Decree. Plaintiffs disagree with this limited view of the monitor's powers to make recommendations under the Decree. . Plaintiffs also note that the monitors were specifically requested by the Director to design an alternative pilot model, in partial resolution of the plaintiffs' ongoing
concerns about the barriers Norman certification imposed in service
delivery. DCFS should not be able to have it both ways: engage in broad discussions with the plaintiffs and monitors regarding service delivery and utilize monitor time on such tasks, and then, whenever the monitors make suggestions regarding that service delivery, claim there is no requirement that they consider the suggestions.
17. (p. 26) DCFS agrees that it will host a Housing Conference. See # 15 above.
I. Maximizing payment of DPA benefits (p. 26) --finding of noncompliance.
DCFS offers that a new procedure for direct supervisors to contact DPA on behalf of DCFS has been put into place and that downstate supervisors as well as 170 Cook County supervisors have been trained in the procedure. This development is promising but needs to be reinforced until well-utilized. DCFS also disclaims
6

responsibility for DPA's failure to provide the full grant prior to return home. Plaintiffs believe that a renewed request for such an agreement should immediately be made, as well as a new submission f a request for a federal waiver.' The dramatic underutilization
found by the monitors fully supports the non- compliance finding and merits DCFS's more sustained attention.
,$. (p. 27) DCFS claims that "reassessing" the provision of the
full AFDC grant is not required by the Decree. But the Decree does require maximizing payment of DPA benefits. DCFS has given no reason for rejecting this recommendation by the monitor.

19. (p. 281 DCFS claims that it has implemented the procedures to access expedited AFDC benefits. In. light of the dramatic underutilization of these benefits, the implementation of these procedures has clearly Dot occurred.
20. (p. 28) The monitors recommend core training on AFDC. DCFS
claims to be considering this recommendation.

21. (p. 28) The monitors recommend that utilization of AFDC be

included in staff performance evaluations.

The Department

disagrees, viewing consideration of performance standards as

untimely. Plaintiffs are concerned that, in the absence of

concrete incentives for staff to utilize procedures, the fact that

the procedures impose new demands on staff will mean that the

procedures will be underutilized. While performance standards may

not be the best tool to address the problem, some tools must be

developed. The plaintiffs request that DCFS develop a plan to

better increase the utilization of these resources beyond the

procedure itself and the training. Collaborative work with the

monitor on this point is overdue.

22. (p. 29) The Department agrees that private agency staff should be trained on AFDC resources and is working with the Illinois Counsel on Training to incorporate it into ongoing training. Plaintiffs wish to have some assurance that this training is mandated and actually received by private agency staff, uniformly. Until then, it remains just another promised future undertaking five years after the Norman decree was entered.

J. Risk assessment. (p. 29)
The Department was found to be in compliance. The plaintiffs note, however, that this finding is a substantially delayed one, in light of the Decree's requirement of risk assessment protocols by

3 Federal waivers were freely granted during 1995 and DPA received an extensive waiver from the federal Department of Health and Human Services on a majority of the provisions for which it requested one.
7

July 1, 1991.
The plaintiffs are extremely concerned about the defendant's
decision to proceed on increasing domestic violence screening
without at the same time increasing the services available to
domestic violence victims. In the absence of increased services,
it is very likely that many children will be removed from their mothers when the children, with services, could remain in their care. The Domestic Violence Advisory Group, created following the recommendations of the monitor here, has not recommended a onesided approach, reassessment of domestic violence without providing services.
K. 90 Day Return Home. (p. 30)
The monitoring report found that children are "not returning home" within 90 days because of administrative or fiscal convenience and thus found compliance. The plaintiffs disagree with the monitor's conclusions. In the absence of a screening and active court process for returning children home promptly, the conclusion that "administrative convenience" accounts for some children not returning home is very likely.
L. Ombuds. (p. 30) The monitors find the Ombuds office is performing in compliance with the Decree. The plaintiffs have been satisfied with Bobbie Evans' performance but are very concerned with her recent assignment to other duties and information which suggests that the housing specialist is being forced to take on her work.
23. (p. 30) The monitors recommend that an Ombuds person with extensive clinical experience have authority to implement the Decree. The Department objects to expanding the qualifications and role of the Ombuds this way. The plaintiffs believe that, while in compliance with the Decree's provision regarding the ombuds, adopting the monitor's suggestion would be an improvement.. The plaintiffs do not think that DCFS should reject the suggestion out of hand.
M. Housin g Advocacy Prog ram. (p. 31)
DCFS claims now to be in full compliance. This assertion must be assessed in the next monitoring report. DCFS claims to have implemented the "vast majority" of the monitor's recommendations concerning the HAP program.'
` This is another example of how Department delay has prevented effective review by the monitor. Had DCFS timely responded to the Sixth Report, there would have been a completed review of the alleged full compliance.
8

24. (p. 32) The monitor recommends that the HAP contracts
contain provisions for data collection. The Department has
redesigned the HAP report format but does not indicate any change in the HAP contract
(p. 32) The monitor recommends flexibility in extending HAP contracts. DCFS claims this flexibility exists and has been
utilized. Without the monitor's evaluation, plaintiffs cannot
independently assess the truth about this assertion.
26. (P. 33) The monitor recommends immediate action on developing an accurate reporting mechanism for HAP and cash assistance data. DCFS has developed this mechanism and expects it to be operating in March, 1996.
27. (p. 33) The monitor recommends targeting areas of the state without HAP contracts to assess reasons for lack of such contracts.
DCFS claims to have begun this evaluation, and is considering alternatives to HAP programs. The plaintiffs would like a fuller report on these alternatives.
28. (p.32) The monitor recommends targeting areas of low utilization. DCFS claims it is doing so, but expects the new cash systems to improve utilization significantly. Plaintiffs suggest that DCFS and the monitor look particularly at the areas of low utilization as the new systems come in to see if the underutilization problems are addressed fully by the new systems.
29. (p. 35) The monitor recommends that DCFS DCP liaisons be required to attend HAP meetings. DCFS has decided to hold these meetings at DCP offices, but does not respond to the recommendation for re quired attendance. In light of the serious attendance problem in the past, further action to insure better attendance, such as making some number of meetings mandatory, or mandatory on certain staff, is warranted.
Q . (p. 35) 'The monitor recommended work with emergency shelters to reserve beds for DCFS families. DCFS considers this recommendation outside the scope of the Decree. It is not, particularly since the absence of such beds may lead immediately to violations of the Decree. The plaintiffs believe that DCFS should consider it and should provide some response to this recommendation.
31. (p. 35) The monitor recommends that DCFS "explore the issue of lack of adequate housing for unsupervised visits." DCFS claims this is not relevant, and that, moreover, it is addressing the
9

concerns through the "front end reform", Bates and B;' Plaintiffs counsel here are Bates counsel too and are unaware of any efforts to address parents' housing needs through Bates (indeed, were such an issue to arise in Bates, the likely response would be that "housing is a Norman issue.") The lack of housing for extended unsupervised visits (which are typically required by juvenile court judges) can be a serious and long term obstacle to returning children home. As such, it raises the likelihood of more systemic Norman violations. DCFS should respond to this recommendation, and at least investigate the extent to which lack of housing for visits delays return of children otherwise ready to return homet-
. (p. 36) The monitor recommends mote training on housing resources. DCFS says it is doing so and cites the upcoming Housing Conference as evidence of its efforts.
33. (p. 37) The monitor recommends fax machines for Norman liaisons. DCFS denies any reports of difficulty reaching liaisons. DCFS promises to "provide any equipment it deems necessary."
34. (p. 37) The monitor has recommended lead responsibilities for the above and for the housing conference be assigned to the new housing specialist. DCFS agrees to this recommendation and has acted on it.
N. Manual of Referral Services. (p. 37)--Undetermined. DCFS claims that it is in compliance because the manuals were provided, and objects to the voicing of concern about usage by the monitor. DCFS appears to have completely abandoned its own manual developed a few years ago and never updated.
35. (p. 38) The monitor recommends that DCFS "explore the feasibility of having a more state of the art, user friendly resource manual." DCFS says it has no plans to change and will not even explore this suggestions. Plaintiffs are concerned that DCFS is rejecting but-of-hand a proposal that may assist in service delivery.
36. (p. 38) The monitor recommends consultation on such a manual. DCFS says it will so consult if it ever decides to update the manual in this way. Plaintiffs believe that some response indicating a time frame for reconsideration of the proposal would be helpful.
5 Defendant's counsel has informed plaintiffs' counsel that the detailed front-end redesign plan will not be provided for plaintiffs' review.
^I.7

Protocol for Locatin g Absent Parents. (p. 38)--undetermined.

DCFS contends that compliance has been shown in Champaign County. Plaintiffs do not quarrel with DCFS's limited contention. DCFS also claims to be addressing problems with implementation and monitoring of the protocol "elsewhere" but does not explain in detail how that is being done. Plaintiffs believe they are entitled to know in more details the steps DCFS is taking to implement the protocol.

37. (p. 39) The monitor recommends automation of AR to summarize t1e number of parents needed to be located and if a diligent search was conducted. DCFS agrees to explore a regular report, and claims the information is already documented.

P. Domestic Violence Policy . (p. 39)

The monitors find full compliance, but DCFS disagrees that following the recommendations of the task force it established is necessary to remain in full compliance. The plaintiffs urge DCFS to follow those recommendations, particularly in the area of expanded service delivery. Without the capacity to protect women who reveal domestic violence in the course of expanded assessments, children will be at greater risk of removal from their non- abusive parent, in violation of the Decree.
38. (p. 40) The monitor recommends coordination of
implementation of the Task Force's recommendations by the domestic violence specialist. Here, too, DCFS considers the recommendations "outside the scope". But see comments at p. 1 and directly above. Domestic violence issues are the direct subject of the Decree and the advisory committee itself was created as a result of a monitor's recommendation, as a means of addressing the glaring inadequacies regarding domestic violence information and service delivery. If the domestic violence committee is to be a forum for front end redesign, plaintiffs would like to be apprised of what issues are being brought to the Task Force for consideration and what response DCFS is making to the Task Force's recommendations.

39. (p. 41)' The monitor strongly recommends against use of the

new domestic violence screen until court personnel are trained and

the "capacity for referrals" is adequate. DCFS does not respond to

this recommendation, claiming the subject is "outside the scope" of

the in

Decree, but insists that the DCFS training is proceeding, even
the absence of training for court personnel and adequate

referrals. Plaintiffs consider this response inadequate. See

comments on #38 above.

40. (p. 41) The monitor recommends designation of staff in field offices to address domestic violence. The Department says it will consider the suggestion but then appears to disagree with it and claims that it is not "required under the Norman Consent Decree."

11

Plaintiffs believe that DCFS should respond to the need for improved field office staffing to respond to the domestic violence issues the screening will uncover.
41. (p. 42) The monitor recommends DCP be represented at the DV task force. DCFS claims this is "outside the scope" but nevertheless to be implementing it. ee same comments as are above regarding "outside the scope".
42. (p. 43) DCFS claims that while the recommendation that the Advisory Committee make recommendations regarding DV curriculum to DCFS is "outside the scope of the Decree", it nevertheless has been done. 4^
43. (p. 43) Same response, regarding coordination between the Task Force and various other committees and positions in DCFS.
44 . (p. 43) The monitor recommends work with Judge Salyers on establishing DV advocates at juvenile court. Same response by DCFS as above. Plaintiffs consider that the issue of court liaison positions and advocate positions should be addressed in connection with the initial petition screening and return home system DCFS is required to establish both by the Decree and S4 of the supplemental Order.
45. (p. 44) The monitors recommend that DCFS work with the Advisory Committee to assess the current statewide capacity of domestic violence services. DCFS again that this is "outside the scope of the Decree" (though it claims to be doing a "preliminary assessment of needs and capacity." This recommendation is hardly outside the Decree: screening is likely to increase demands for services and threaten violation of key paragraphs of the Decree in the event children are removed from their domestic violence victim/mothers in the absence of services.
46. (p. 44) The monitor recommends that DCFS apply for federal programs funding DV training. DCFS has documented its efforts in this area.
47. (p. 45) The monitor recommends that the DV and housing specialists have adequate support staff. DCFS claims this recommendation also falls outside the Decree. It is not: the supplemental order specifically calls for the appointment of the housing specialist. Clearly, if the specialist is unable to perform his duties due to lack of support staff, the supplemental order would be violated. Nevertheless, DCFS claims it will "evaluate their requests for support." The monitors has subsequently raised concerns about increasing demands placed on the housing specialist without adequate support. DCFS must immediately address these concerns.
Seeking federal funds (p. 46) full compliance. Plaintiffs do
12

not quarrel with this conclusion.
48. (p. 46) DCFS indicates it has applied for federal domestic violence funds.
Conclusion.
The unusual detail and formality of Defendant's response to the Sixth Monitoring Report appears designed more to defend assertions of non-compliance than to negotiate and resolve concerns in the manner anticipated by the Decree. Within the response, however, ar*-numerous explicit and implicit admissions that the commitments 'of the Decree have not yet been achieved.
Plaintiffs seek to invoke (and to bring to a satisfactory
conclusion) the process provided in the Decree for negotiation and
resolution of the non-compliance and monitor-recommendation issues. DCFS' belated response to the Sixth Report has short-circuited that process as has the failure of DCFS to provide timely and accurate data to the monitors. The promise of future action on many of these issues is welcomed, but in light of past delays, viewed with caution. That view is colored also by DCFS' eleventh hour attempt to define much of the monitor's work--for which the department both engaged and paid Ms. Smith and Ms. Pager--as "beyond the scope of the Decree." The recommendations in fact are carefully tailored to respond to the very practical day-to-day operational problems of DCFS which impede the agency from meeting its mandates under the Decree and Order. The plaintiffs regret that defendant has chosen to meet this thorough and practical report with a litigation-type defense, rather than with the sort of negotiation the Decree contemplates.
Plaintiffs suggest that the issues raised by the report, its reply and their response only heighten the need for monitoring by the mutually selected and qualified individual who did this and prior reports. Instead of debates of compliance and disputes over the scope of •the decree, real benefits to the plaintiffs and defendant would be achieved if that process were to continue.
You truly,
Di a Re of
i Laurene Heybach
13

DRA H a
From Child Protective Services to Family Intervention:
Redesigning the Front Door
Concept Paper for the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services Jess McDonald, Director February 1996

Prepared by

Hornby Zeller Associates, Inc.

•

Troy, New York

518 273-1614

Dennis Zeller, Ph. D., M.S.S.W. Helaine Hornby, M.A.

APPENDIX -C-.

Part I. Reasons for Redesigning the Front Door
The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services has embarked on an effort to redesign the way the initial services are delivered to families who have been the subject of ap abuse allegation. The project most directly impacts the investigative function and ii-home services but also affects prevention and out-of-home services. Its genesis is a series of issues that have been articulated by planning groups, agency administrators, caseworker staff and community leaders. For example, the July 1994 Framework for Illinois Child Welfare System cites, as one of its central themes, the need for "Front Door" improvements to the child and family services system.
In the current model, the State Central Register receives a report of abuse and/or neglect and assigns a specific allegation to the report which is then transmitted to the Child Protection Investigator (CPI). The investigator goes out to evaluate the situation, focusing on the specific allegations. His or her goal is essentially to verify the truth in the allegations. Because of this single focus, the investigator provides few if any links to services to the family. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigative worker passes the case on to the Division of Child Welfare if additional services are needed.
Statute requires that the investigation worker not only establish the truth of the allegations but also conduct a safety assessment. There is, however, no direct connection between the simple truth of an allegation and the jeopardy to the child's current safety. The . safety assessment is therefore a distinct function performed by the investigator which requires consideration both of the immediate dangers the child faces and of the resources that may eliminate that danger. In short, the safety assessment is a casework function, yet the investigator has neither access to nor training in the use of services other than out of home placement. Thus the separation between the investigative and the casework functions and the simultaneous assignment of the assessment to the investigator leaves only two strictly correlated choices: either the child is safe and can remain in the home or the child is not safe and must be removed.
To evaluate the proposed model adequately, it is important to understand the problems the model is attempting to address, the goals of the system of which it will be part, the theoretical framework behind the solution, the objectives of the model, the strategies for pursuing those goals and the questions which have to be resolved before implementation can be completed. This paper provides an overview of these points.

Problems to be Addressed by Model
Between fiscal years 1990 and 1994, the number of child abuse and neglect reports accepted by the State Central Register (SCR) rose by 24 percent, from 60,737 to 75,514. Because the indication rate has remained constant during that period, the number of families needing services has risen by an equal proportion.
Many of the families coming into the child protective system in Illinois, require
more intensive interventions than those seen in early times. While child abuse reports were rising by one-quarter, the number of protective custodies taken by DCFS rose by more than 40 percent. Moreover, families who receive services are staying in the system longer now than previously, whether they are served while intact or while a child is placed in foster care.
No change the agency can make will have an impact on the numbers and types of families appearing before it. What the agency can do, however, is create mechanisms through which it is better able to respond to families in need. DCFS now struggles with its ability to respond to the families in greatest need, to select the most appropriate service strategy, and to define the specific outcomes which it can reasonably expect to achieve. The model proposed here is intended to address internal barriers to DCFS' ability to provide responsi%a and effective services. Some of these barriers include the following.
Investigative approach towards families: Perhaps the biggest problem to be addressed by the model is a problem endemic in child protective services nationally, the approach public agencies take towards the families they serve, spawned by the inv estigatory function of the state. Since the federal adoption of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974 child protective services have gradually and consistently evolved toward a quasi-police function in many states. Under current rules the investigator is responsible for deciding what happened, who did it, what are the safety and risk issues, and what resources should be employed to assure the immediate safety of the child. The initial investigatory process which focuses on substantiating or proving an allegation of abuse can be a process which alienates families, placing them on the defensive and making it difficult to establish a helping relationship once the agency has decided to intervene.
2

Lack of capacity for differential treatment: At present there is little differentiation in the way investigations are conducted or in the decisions that are made, even when different family issues are discovered. That means that if a family's primary needs result from poverty and not abuse, they receive the same type of investigation as a sexual perpetrator. Conversely, if a family has committed egregious acts against a child and does not acknowledge them and has no prospects of improving, they too are treated in the same manner as anyone else. DCFS has not taken a position on what are acceptable levels of risk and what service strategies should be used under different family scenarios. Except for the selective involvement of law enforcement and the state's*a'horney, there is no mechanism for the differential handling of cases which results in an inefficient use of resources and delays in identifying children for whom reunification is not an option.
Delays in helping families: Because the current process focuses on investigating the allegation, there are few up-front efforts to provide social services to families, unless there is an immediate need for removal. Moreover, because the need for services is determined by the staff in the Child Welfare unit who do not receive or consider the case for days or weeks after the investigation is completed, the family's situation can actually deteriorate before services are forthcoming. For both reasons, the state loses the opportunity to engage a client who may be motivated to change in a time of crisis.
Inefficient use of community resources: Because service recommendations come late in the process. the natural supports available in the community are often not used to the family's best advantage. In addition, by the time more formalized services are offered, such as famil y counseling and parent education, the immediate family crisis may have abated, with a concomitant loss in motivation on the part of the family.
Nebulous follow-up: In Illinois, as in many other child protective service systems, the heavy focus on abuse investigations has resulted in a watered-down focus on follow-up services. In vestigations are specific, time-limited functions carried out by highly-trained staff. However, investigations serve no function if the state has not the will, the ability or the serv ice resources to act. Assessments of family needs and follow-up services must be as professionally rendered, as well defined, and as guided by a sense of urgency as are in vestigative services.
Waste of resources in investigating new reports of abuse: Often DCFS receives a new report of abuse or neglect on a family who has.already been identified. This may occur during either the investigative or the ongoing phases. At present a new
3

Minute Order Form (r•v 12190)

10

UNfTED ST(T S DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN

RICT OF IWNOIS

Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge WILLIAM T.MART

Case Number

89 C 1624-

Case

Norman v. McDonald

Title

Sitting Judge it Other Than Assigned Judge

Date

October 26, 1995

fin the following bos (a) indicate the party filing the motion. e p , plaintiff. defendant, 3rd-party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature of the motion being presented J

K
4

WVKET Cry 1 M 1 :

(1)

Filed motion of (use listing in MOTION bor above)

(2)

Brief in support of motion due

(3)

Answer brief to motion due

Reply to answer brief due

(4)

Fut1ng

on

set for

at

Nearing

(5)

Status hearing

held

continued to

f1 set for

reset for

at

(6)

Pretrial cont

fl held

continued to

set for

re set for

at

(7)

1i Trial

Set for

re set for

•t

(8)

Bench Trial

Jury Trea t

f1 Hear no

held and continued to

at

(9)

This case is dismissed

f +.

prejudice and * shot costs

by aoreement ripursuant to

n F R C C 4(j' (t s^ l u re tc se • ve'

tie^e,al ci e ?1 (wa r• 1 C.t prosecu t- c r 1

FRCP 411a1f11

FRCP 41(x)(2)

No separate monitoring report covering the period January 1,

(10)

(Other docket entry) 1995 through June 30, 1995 is to be filed. A

consolidated report covering the period January 1, 1995 through

December 31, • 1995 shall be filed after the completion of that time

period.

I 7 (11)

(For further detail see

f1 order on the reve r se Of

[1 order attac h ed t o the original minute order form.)

No notices required, advised in open court
No notices tequrred.
Notices mailed by judge's staff.
Notified counsel by telephone
Docketing to mail notices
Mast AO 450 form Cop to udpe'magistrate Judge
3
courtroom d eputt' Initials

Da e'tme received rn central Clerk's 011ree
APk NDIX —D-

Cib I
__ .
T r„
^^

number of nn otices
date docketed
docketing dply initials
dale mailed notice
mailing dpty initials

DOCUTTtem #
r•
I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that the undersigned served the attached Notice of Filing and REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS,' MOTION FOR CONTINUED MONITORING AND/OR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, by hand delivery this 11th day of March, 1996 to the persons listed above at the addresses stated.

Laurene M. Heybach John Bouman Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago 343 S. Dearborn, #700 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 341-1070 Atty. No. 91017

Laurene M. Heybach

 
 [ITj

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE PATTERSON, WANDA HILLIARD, JOANN MITCHELL, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
V.
JESS MCDONALD, Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,
Defendant.

No. 89; C. 1624

a7 p
/P
J

CONSENT ORDER Plaintiffs in this action seek declaratory and injunctive relief on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated against alleged policies and practices of the defendant under which plaintiffs alleged they had lost, were at risk of losing, or would in the future lose custody of their children to the defendant or, having lost custody, could not regain it from the defendant, because they are unable to provide what defendant accepts as adequate living circumstances for their children. Prior to a ruling on class certification, in an Order dated May 18, 1990, this court entered a preliminary injunction on behalf of certain named plaintiffs, affirming the recommended decision of the Magistrate and adopting the Magistrate's findings of fact on the motion by certain named plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction.

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint and denies

all of the allegations of plaintiffs' Complaint and First Amended
and Supplemental Complaint particularly all legal contentions that
any alleged policies or practices have violated any state or
federal law, has contested certification of a class in this case,
and has appealed the May 18 Preliminary Injunction Order, which appeal is currently pending, No. 90-2337 (7th Cir.).
In an effort to avoid the burden, costs and inherent risks of further litigation, plaintiffs and defendant have determined that
it is in the interests of the putative class and the public interest to settle this action with the entry of this Consent Decree, including certification of a class for purposes of this Decree only and an agreement by defendant to withdraw the appeal in
No. 90-2337 (7th Cir.). Having carefully reviewed this Consent Order, the parties
being in agreement hereto, and the court fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
DEFINITIONS 1. As used herein, the following terms have the following meanings: "Class members" and "DCFS clients: means all members of the class certified and defined in paragraph 3(b) of this Consent Order. "Department of Children and Family Services" or "DCFS" or "defendant" means the defendant and his agents and includes all successor Directors of DCFS and their agents. "Parent" means the natural and adoptive parent of a child or, unless otherwise specified, the guardian of a child. "Parent" does not include foster parents. "Guardian" means persons other than DCFS or its designees or agents who have actual or legal custody of a child.
- 2 -

"Living circumstances" means income, shelter, utility services, food, clothing, furniture, other subsistence needs, or any other feature of the physical environment that DCFS deems relevant to the issue of whether a child should be retained in or returned to the custody of a parent.
"Return of the children is otherwise appropriate" means that, ignoring the family's living circumstances, DCFS could return the children to the custody of their parents subject to approval of the juvenile court where necessary.
"Temporary custody" includes all children residing in DCFS custody for whom DCFS does not have guardianship. As used here, "temporary custody" includes "protective custody."
"DPA" refers to the Illinois Department of Public Aid.
"Case plan" or "service plan" means the plan required by 42 U.S.C. § 675(1), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23 } 2058.2 and [insert DCFS regulation cite].
"ACR" or "administrative case review" refers to the case review procedure specified under 42 U.S.C. § 675(5), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, } 5006a and [insert DCFS regulation cite].
"Indicated case" refers to reports of abuse of neglect for which DCFS has made a determination that the report is "an indicated report," as specified under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act ("ANCRA"), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, }} 2051, et sec.
"Hard services" refers to provision of, or assistance in obtaining cash, shelter, utility services, food, clothing, furniture, or other goods or services to meet subsistence needs or other needs relating to features of the physical environment that DCFS deems relevant to the issue of whether a child should be retained in or returned to the custody of their parents.
"Allegations" refers to the DCFS system for classification of categories of reports of abuse and neglect [insert any relevant DCFS regulations cites].
"Risk assessment" is the process by which DCFS determines whether children can safely remain in or return to the custody of their parents.
DISCLAIMER
2. By agreeing to this Consent Order neither party
- 3 -

makes any express or implied admission of fact or law for any
purpose.
CLASS CERTIFICATION
3. (a) The parties have stipulated, solely for the
purposes of this settlement and by way of compromise, and the court
finds that the class defined herein is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable; there are questions of law and fact
common to the class; the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical
of those of the class; the named plaintiffs will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class; and the defendant
has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate
for the class as a whole.
(b) Solely for purposes of settlement and by way of
compromise, the parties have agreed that this court shall certify
a plaintiff class defined as:
All parents and guardians on or after the date of entry of this Consent Order: (a) whose children are in the temporary custody or under the legal guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and upon whom, during such custody or guardianship, DCFS has imposed, in a service plan or otherwise, a condition that such parents obtain for themselves or their children such shelter, utility services, food, clothing, or income as DCFS deems necessary or appropriate for the return of their children; or (b) for whom there is an "indicated report" or pending report pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23 }} 2051 et seq., that is or should have been designated as an allegation of "inadequate shelter", "inadequate food", "inadequate clothing", "environmental neglect", or any successor allegations that cover these categories of reports, and DCFS
- 4 -

has taken or could take protective custody of the children pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, } 2055, because of that allegation.
(c) At any time prior to the completion of the monitor's report for the quarter ending April 1, 1995, class members may seek a modification of the class definition on the basis that there are parents or guardians with an indicated or pending report designated as an allegation of other than "inadequate shelter," "inadequate food," "inadequate clothing", "environmental neglect," or any other successor allegations, who nonetheless have had their children removed from their custody by DCFS because of their failure or inability to provide adequate living circumstances for their children. Plaintiffs and defendant shall first attempt to negotiate any modification of the class definition, with the assistance of the monitor, if necessary. If the parties are unable to resolve this issue, plaintiffs may petition the court for a modification of the class definition. GENERAL POLICIES
4. Upon entry of this Consent Order, defendant shall comply with the following policies:
(a) DCFS shall not remove any child from a parent or continue the removal by another person authorized to take custody under state law because of the living circumstances of the family, or lack of provision for the child's subsistence needs, unless there is reason to believe that the circumstances or conditions of the child are such that continuing in his place of residence or in the care and custody of the person responsible for
- 5 -

the child's welfare presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health (in accordance with Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, } 2055), and unless defendant has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child, or unless such reasonable efforts, if provided, would not prevent or eliminate the need for removal. "Reasonable efforts" includes, for example, provision of hard services such as assistance in locating and securing housing, temporary shelter, cash assistance (directly paid by defendant or otherwise provided), in-kind services including food or clothing, child care, emergency caretakers, or advocacy with public and community agencies providing such services.
(b) DCFS shall not remove any child from or prevent any child's return to a parent or guardian because the parent or guardian resides in a shelter, with friends or relatives, in housing with building-code violations, or in housing that is considered too small for the family size, unless there is reason to believe that the circumstances or conditions of the child are such that continuing in his place of residence or in the care and custody of the person responsible for the child's welfare presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health. Before returning a child to such living situations, defendant shall ascertain that the child will be allowed to reside there and that a bed is provided for the child.
(c) Rather than removing children from a parent's custody based upon the failure of the parent to protect the children from the perpetrator of domestic violence, DCFS shall make
- 6 -

reasonable efforts to keep the children in the parent's custody, unless there is reason to believe that the circumstances or conditions of the child are such that continuing in his place of residence or in the care and custody of the person responsible for the child's welfare presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health (in accordance with Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, { 2055), and unless such reasonable efforts, if provided, would not prevent or eliminate the need for removal. In this context, "reasonable efforts" includes not only the efforts listed in paragraph 4 (a) of this order, but also, for example, referring the parent for services to obtain an order of protection, exploring possible alternative housing with, e.g., relatives, and locating and transporting the family to a shelter for battered women. DCFS shall not remove children from the custody of a parent on the ground that the parent resides in such a shelter, and DCFS shall return children to the custody of a parent who resides in such a shelter, if the return of the children to the parent is otherwise appropriate. CASH ASSISTANCE AND INTERACTION WITH DPA
5. (a) Not later than July 1, 1991, defendant shall begin operation of a cash assistance program for class members that shall provide up to $800 to a family in any calendar year, if such assistance would prevent the imminent removal by DCFS of children from class members or allow the immediate return of children who are in placement, for the purpose of paying initial rent, security deposit, utility connection charges, utility
- 7 -

deposits, furniture, and other items necessary to retain or regain custody of the children. This cash assistance program shall not be a replacement for or result in any action by DCFS to eliminate any source of cash assistance for class members to which DCFS has access on the date of entry of this decree, including "exceptions to policy'. DCFS shall administer this cash assistance program in such a way as to maximize federal reimbursement for DCFS's expenditures.
(b) DCFS shall maintain records of every grant made, including the needs it was intended to meet, the amount paid, the other sources of assistance used to meet the needs, the amount, if any, above the $800 maximum that was needed, any exceptions to the maximum that DCFS has granted, and the outcome of the case as to the family's retaining or regaining custody of the children.
(c) If DCFS' best efforts to obtain the interagency agreement described in Paragraph 6 are unsuccessful by July 1, 1991, defendant and plaintiffs shall meet and confer as to whether the amount of cash assistance available to class members under this Paragraph is adequate and, if not, the amount of increase in such benefits that may be warranted.
6. (a) Effective not later than July 1, 1991, DCFS shall enter into an interagency agreement with DPA that provides that:
(i) (A) DPA will maintain AFDC eligibility for a family at least 90 days during a period of DCFS protective or temporary custody of a child or children. If permitted by federal law and federally reimbursable,
- 8 -

such AFDC benefits will be paid at the same rate as the

family was entitled to prior to such custody. This

eligibility and benefit amount may be extended for up to

30 additional days, if the protective or temporary

custody is not expected to last beyond the 30 additional

days;

(B) If federal law does not permit payment

of AFDC at the full family rate or if such payment is not federally

reimbursable (and IDPA is unable to secure a federal waiver

permitting such payment to be federally reimburseable), DCFS shall

make best efforts to obtain an interagency agreement with IDPA to

increase emergency or special assistance to such families to avoid

the loss of housing and other basic subsistence needs during the

period of temporary custody.

(ii) DPA will accept applications for AFDC

benefits at any time from parents whose children are in

the custody or under the guardianship of DCFS or are

threatened with removal of their children by DCFS, and

DPA will commence eligibility for AFDC benefits for such

families so that the first payment is received 30 days

prior to any firm date on which the child will be

returned home, and further, the monthly AFDC payment

amount will include the child's portion unless the child

is otherwise ineligible for it (for example, due to

receipt in the concurrent time period of benefits under

Title IV-E of the Social Security Act); and

- 9 -

(iii) DPA will provide liaisons to DCFS to facilitate the provision of services by DPA to class members and will streamline its application processes for class members, including, for example, whenever possible, the elimination of the need for current AFDC recipients who are DCFS clients to apply in person for DPA's Emergency Assistance Program, allowing the DCFS worker to handle the entire transaction with DPA.
(b) DCFS shall take those steps necessary within the Department to maximize payment of DPA-administered benefits to eligible families as outlined in paragraph 6(a) above, including but not limited to making efforts to obtain firm "return home" dates from juvenile courts; establishing working liaisons with DPA; and regularly training DCFS workers on DPA program requirements.
HOUSING SERVICES
7. (a) Not later than October 1, 1991, defendant shall establish a housing advocacy program to provide the following services to class members, as appropriate: Assisting class members to locate and secure shelter and housing assisting class members who are domestic violence victims to locate and secure housing or shelter and providing transportation to such housing or shelter, assisting class members to apply and qualify for low-income housing and utility services, assisting class members to secure funds needed to meet initial or ongoing rental obligations, compiling and providing class members with up-to-date information about available
- 10 -

housing in the communities in which DCFS clients seek to reside, and advocating with private and public providers of housing and utility services that such services be provided to class members who meet eligibility requirements for such services.
(b) Defendant shall made good-faith efforts to secure interagency agreements with the Chicago Housing Authority and other public housing authorities and human services agencies throughout the state to secure housing, preferences for housing, and subsidies for class members. Defendant shall report on his efforts and shall provide any interagency agreements he secures to plaintiffs' counsel every six months.
(c) DCFS shall develop and implement a plan for identifying all federal funds available to assist class members in obtaining hard services, and either will take any steps necessary to obtain those funds or will coordinate with any appropriate state or local agency to make those funds available to class members. REFERRAL SERVICES
8. Not later than July 1, 1991, defendant shall develop for each DCFS office in the state a localized referral manual containing up-to-date community resources for payments, goods, and services related to living circumstances that may be relevant in DCFS cases. Defendant shall revise the manual at least annually and _shall insure that each DCFS employee in a client-contact s position has immediate access to such manual. Not later than December 1, 1991 defendant shallissue instructions concerning the use of this manual to all DCFS employees in client-contact
- 11 -

positions, and shall insure that all new employees in such positions receive instructions on the use of this manual. All employees shall receive at least annual instruction on the content and use of the manual. OTHER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
9. Effective not later than July 1, 1991, defendant shall promulgate rules, policies, and procedures concerning the following:
(a) DCFS shall specifically incorporate the requirements of this Consent Order into the responsibilities of DCFS personnel who perform administrative case reviews for class members whose children are in the custody of DCFS and shall ensure that timely ACRs are provided on an ongoing basis for class members whose children are in the custody of DCFS.
(b) Together with the monitor, DCFS shall develop and implement on or before July 1, 1991 a means of capturing and documenting in each case file and centrally (to the extent deemed necessary by DCFS specific information regarding:
(i) contemporaneous with the taking of custody, the specific reasons the DCFS worker relies upon to determine that there is imminent danger warranting the taking of custody; and
(ii) the reasonable efforts undertaken to remedy the problems with living circumstances that are a factor in retaining or regaining the custody of children including such information as the event or condition
- 12 -

leading to DCFS involvement, the services needed to eliminate the imminent danger, alternatives considered to avoid removal, the hard and soft services provided, why services were not offered or were ineffective, services currently required and steps the agency will take to procure or provide them;
(c) DCFS shall establish reasonable time guidelines within which DCFS workers should ordinarily return children home or initiate court action to do so for use in cases where problems with living circumstances are preventing family reunification.
(d) DCFS shall establish risk assessment methods dealing with issues of living circumstances that are consistent with the provisions of this Consent Order.
(e) DCFS shall establish a protocol for locating absent parents and instructions for its use and shall make the use of this protocol mandatory upon DCFS workers in the risk assessment process and whenever the absence of a parent from the home is an issue in whether DCFS will take or retain custody of the child.
(f) In cases where court action is necessary to return children home or to further reunification, it shall be the duty of the caseworker to initiate such court proceedings promptly.
NOTICE AND APPEAL RIGHTS
10. Not later than July 1, 1991, defendant shall provide the following notice and appeal rights to class members:
(a) On the following occasions, defendant shall provide a written notice of the policies set forth in paragraph 4
- 13 -

of this Consent Order, a listing of the hard services available from the defendant or upon referral, and a description of the right to request such services and to appeal from the delay, denial, or reduction of any such service as well as the right to appeal and how to make an appeal:
(i) upon the removal of a child from the custody of the class member or upon the class member's first contact with DCFS worker thereafter;
(ii) during the course of an ACR; and (iii) Prior to any request that a class member sign a service plan. (b) Whenever DCFS provides funds or denies funds under paragraph 5 of this Consent Order, DCFS shall provide written notice to the class member of the decision. Such notice shall include the amount of the funds provided, the basis for determining the amount provided, the basis for a decision, if any, to provide less funds than requested or required to meet the needs that must be met under the service plan, and notice of the right to appeal the decision. A copy of this notice shall be retained in the class member's case file. (c) Defendant shall provide all class members with an administrative appeal as set forth in [cite DCFS Service appeal regulations]. It shall be the policy of DCFS that issues related to the provision of hard services shall be appealable only by the parents or guardian or child and their representatives. No notice related to such appeal shall be furnished to any other persons.
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REVIEW OF NEW POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 11. Defendant shall provide to plaintiffs' counsel
drafts of all new policies, procedures, programs, rules, regulations and notices for implementation of the provisions of this Consent Order at least thirty days prior to the relevant effective date specified in this Consent Order. Plaintiffs' counsel shall inform defendant's counsel of any objections they have to any such drafts because of plaintiffs' contention that said draft may violate the terms of this Consent Order, and the parties shall negotiate in good faith regarding any such objections. TRAINING
12. Not later than December 1, 1991, defendant shall conduct training of all staff at DCFS in direct-service positions, including supervisors and administrators, as to the policies and procedures that have been or will be promulgated and effectuated pursuant to this Consent Order; and the duties of each employee to carry out his/her respective res p onsibilities consistent with these policies and p rocedures. This training will also be provided to private agencies, including agencies providing family preservation services, that provide services to class members. Defendant shall provide such training to all new direct-service staff, supervisors, and administrators prior to such staff assuming their responsibilities. Defendant shall provide such training to all staff on a regular and periodic basis. Defendant shall provide plaintiffs' counsel with advance notice of all such training sessions, together with copies of the materials to be used or
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distributed at such sessions, and shall permit plaintiffs' counsel or their designees to attend at least once a year. RELIEF FOR CLASS MEMBERS CURRENTLY WITHOUT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
13. (a) Defendant shall retain a liason to respond to and act upon complaints made by plaintiffs' counsel on behalf of class members.
(b) Not later than September 1, 1991, defendant shall complete a review of all cases of class members whose children are, at the time of the review, in DCFS custody and were taken into the temporary or permanent custody of DCFS prior to September 1, 1991, as to which
(i) there has been an indicated report of inadequate food, shelter, or clothing or environmental neglect; or
(ii) the DCFS worker has identified the case as one where living circumstances are a factor in the class member's inability to regain the custody of the children.
(c) At each review of a case under paragraph 13 (b) , the administrative case reviewer shall insure that the policies set forth in this Consent Order are applied. Plaintiffs' counsel or their designees shall be allowed to attend each of the case reviews, for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the terms of this Consent Order.
(d) Defendant shall submit a quarterly report to plaintiffs' counsel and the monitor 14 days after the end of each
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quarter in which reviews of cases under paragraph 13(a) are performed. The report shall contain the following information as to each case reviewed in the quarter just ended:
(i) the name of each parent and child whose case is reviewed;
(ii) this basis for DCFS's involvement with the family (original allegations);
(iii) which requirements relating to the parents' living circumstances have been imposed in a service plan or otherwise;
(iv) whether the parents' living circumstances are currently an obstacle to family preservation or reunification;
(v) the services or referrals, if any, provided by DCFS to correct the parents' living conditions; and
(vi) the date on which any child in DCFS custody has returned or is projected to return home or a statement as to why return home is not the goal for the child.
(e) Where, during the case review, DCFS sets a for the return home of a child in its custod y , the department shall cause an examination to be made of such case within 30 days after that date if the child is not, in fact, returned home and to report such results to the monitor. REPORTING AND MONITORING
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D
14. The court shall appoint an impartial monitor who shall receive reports from defendant and make recommendations concerning the implementation of this Consent Order for a period of four years from July 1, 1991. The parties shall agree upon the identity of the monitor by January 30, 1991. In the event the parties cannot agree, each party shall submit the name of one person together with that person's qualifications to the court, and the court shall select one of the names. Defendant shall pay reasonable compensation to the monitor. Defendant shall cooperate fully with the monitor.
15. The monitor together with plaintiffs and defendant on or before March 30th, 1991 shall devise procedures for gathering on a semi-annual basis beginning January 1, 1992 and concluding on July 1, 1995, reliable and valid information necessary to measure and ensure compliance with the terms of this Decree. Such procedures will be designed to provide information on at least the following:
(a) whether defendant is properly determining who is and is not a class member;
(b) whether defendant is providing timely and sufficient cash assistance to eligible class members;
(c) whether defendant is making reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to reunify families of class members by the provision of hard services as defined in Paragraphs 1 and 4;
(d) the status of defendant's efforts to implement and utilize the guidelines mandated by Paragraph 9(c);
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(e) whether DCFS workers and case reviewers are sufficiently trained on the policies, procedures and rules related to the implementation of this Decree;
(f) whether the policies, procedures and rules related to the terms of this Decree are being properly applied and enforced through the Administrative Case Review process and the review provided in Paragraph 13(b) including whether children who are to be returned home by a set date have been returned home, and if not, whether the failure to return such children home results from noncompliance with the terms of this decree.
(g) whether class members are afforded the full notice and appeal rights provided by this Decree;
(h) whether defendant is making good faith efforts to reach necessary interagency agreements and to maximize funding and resources for hard services to class members;
(i) whether DCFS is taking all necessary steps to maximize payment of DPA benefits to eligible persons;
(j) whether defendant's risk assessment practices and policies are consitent with the terms of this Decree;
16. Within 60 days after receipt of the semi-annual information described under Paragraph 15, the monitor shall submit to the parties and the court a report regarding compliance with the terms of this decree, including recommendations to bring DCFS into compliance should the monitor find that defendant is not complying with this Decree. Any such recommendation shall be considered by defendant in developing a plan to comply with the terms of this
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7
Decree, which plan shall be negotiated with plaintiffs' counsel, with the assistance of the monitor.
17. For the quarters ending July 1 and October 1, 1991, and January 1 and April 1, 1992, and thereafter until July i, 1995 as the monitor shall determine, the defendant shall provide the information it maintains under paragraph 5(b) of this Consent Order to the monitor and plaintiffs' counsel. The information shall be provided within 30 days after the close of the relevant reporting period.
18. Within 30 days after securing interagency agreements under paragraphs 6 or 7 of this Consent Order or contracts for services under paragraph 7, or renewals thereof, defendant shall provide copies thereof to plaintiffs' counsel and the monitor. Within 30 days after a non-renewal, amendment, or rescission of any such contract or agreement, defendant shall provide notice and copies thereof to plaintiffs' counsel and the monitor.
19. Defendant has agreed to voluntarily dismiss appeal No. 90-2337 upon entry of this Consent Order.
20. This court retains jurisdiction over this case to enforce compliance with this order or the recommendations of the monitor. Plaintiffs may file a motion with this court at any time to seek compliance with the provisions of this order or the recommendations of the monitor, provided that, to the extent such a motion is based upon a report or recommendation of the monitor under Paragraph 16, no motion shall be filed until plaintiffs have made attempts to negotiate the development and implementation of a
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compliance plan with defendant, with the assistance of the monitor, as set forth under Paragraph 16.
21. Defendant may file a motion with this court at any time seeking modification of the terms of this Decree if factual or legal circumstances materially change, experience with the administration of the Decree shows the need for modification in order to more effectively accomplish the goals of this Decree, it is no longer equitable that the Decree should have prospective effect, or such modification is necessary due to the hardship caused defendant by the Decree because of new and unforeseen conditions. Any decision by the court allowing or denying such a modification shall be made by weighing the interests of the class members in the immediate and strict enforcement of the terms of the Decree against the interests and harm to defendant without the proposed modification, and against the public interest.
22. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, although defendant reserves the right to contest the amount of those costs and fees. Plaintiffs may file an application for attorneys' fees within the time provided in Rule 46 of the General Rules of this court. Plaintiffs may file a bill of costs within 90 days from the entry of this order or within such further time as the court may allow.
23. The provisions of this Consent Decree shall constitute a complete resolution of the claims in this action as to the class certified herein.
ENTER:
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3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated:

APPROVED:
One of Plaintiffs' Attorneys Diane Redleaf Laurene M. Heybach Joan Matlack Susan Wishnick John M. Bouman Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago 343 S. Dearborn Street
Room 700 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 341-1070
for such return

One of Defendant's Attorneys Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom 333 W. Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 407-0700

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II

CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution
A. Requirements for Use of the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol
The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP) is utilized within the larger protocols of CPI and CWS practice. It is a "life-of-the case" protocol designed to provide workers with a mechanism for quickly assessing the potential for moderate to severe harm immediately or in the near future and for taking quick action to protect children. Workers utilize the Protocol to help focus their decision-making to determine whether a child is safe or unsafe and, if unsafe, deciding what measures or actions must be taken to assure the safety of the child. The major steps which are required to apply the Protocol include an assessment and analysis of the safety factors, the completion of the CFS 1441, Safety Determination Form, implementing and monitoring of the safety plan when necessary.
Department staff and contracted private agency staff are required to utilize the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP) and complete the CFS 1441 at the specified time frames and at any other time when the worker suspects or believes that a child may be unsafe. The CERAP helps to assess the safety of each child with whom there is contact, either through child protection services or child welfare services.
B. Definitions
"Degree of Harm" means the severity of harm which could range from slight to moderate to severe.
"Immediate" means that an incident can happen now or in the very near future.
"Moderate to Severe Harm" means the threat of danger to a child's life or health, impairment to his or her physical or mental well-being or disfigurement.
"" "Near Future"
"Risk Determination" means the likelihood of any degree of long-term future harm or maltreatment.

Procedures 305 -Appendix K (1)

CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT Draft - Not for further distribution
* * "Risk Factors"
* * "Safe"
"Safety Determination" means a child is considered to be safe when an assessment of available information supports the belief that a child in a household or in custodial care is not in immediate (or near future) danger of moderate to severe harm.
** "Safety Factors"
C. Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol
The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP) is a process whose purpose is to identify the risk of moderate to severe harm (i.e. "safety" concerns) in the immediate future. When such immediate risk to the child's safety is identified, the protocol requires the implementation of a safety plan to control or immediately resolve or reduce the potential imminent risk of moderate severe harm to the child(ren). These safety concerns and the safety plan to control them must be documented on the CFS 1441, Safety Determination Form. The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol (CERAP) is a process that is NOT unique to just one stage of a case, but is to be adhered to throughout the life of an open case from the initial intake (child protection or child welfare) through services to case closure. This protocol must be integrated with the Department's ongoing determination of "longer-term risk of harm" which is currently documented on the CFS 1440 series of forms and which serves as a basis for client service planning efforts to resolve long-term risk issues.
1. Safety and Risk
Safety is best understood when it is compared to risk. Safety and risk of children are determined by the consideration of behavior, condition, and accessibility of the child(ren) and the persons who have contact with the child(ren). Safety is a subset of the broader concept of risk, therefore all factors which apply to safety also apply to risk. However, not all risk factors apply to safety because safety is a form of risk which is more precisely defined or specialized.
Procedures 305 -Appendix K (2)

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CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution

Safety concerns are restricted to the essential criteria of "immediacy and degree of harm". Since risk allows a broader concept for evaluation of the family, safety concerns are depicted within the broader meaning of risk. The purpose of the broader area of risk is not control, but rather to decrease the risk of future maltreatment and resolve problems that cause risk. Safety factors are to be controlled and risk factors are to be resolved or reduced.

2.

Similarities Between Safety and Risk

Safety and risk are similar in some very important ways, one being the prediction of harm. In the case of both safety and risk, there is a concern about the potential for future harm. Past harm and threats of future harm may describe both an immediate and long-term concern regarding a child's safety and are common to safety and risk.

Safety and risk both relate to the conditions of the home environment, or the behavior or the physical/mental condition of a family member or an interaction in the family. These conditions may predict immediate or short-term potential for harm (safety) or longer-term potential for harm (risk). Safety and risk elements can change quickly. Often they can be controlled or reduced by utilizing family strengths or other mitigating strengths and circumstances. In some cases, it may be necessary to address the problems with specific interventions designed to protect the child.

3. Differences Between Safety and Risk

The time element is the major difference between safety and risk. Safety means now or in the very near future and risk means longerterm. Safety and risk also differ by the degree of harm or the severity of the potential harm. Primarily, safety concerns itself with the potential for moderate to severe harm but risk is concerned with a full range of severity of harm from low to severe.

The primary purpose of safety is to control the situation to prevent harm from occurring in the short-term while the primary purpose of risk is to reduce or resolve the problems that lead to risk. Safety and risk both require intervention in order to prevent harm, but safety must always be assessed quickly while risk may be assessed over a longer period of time.

Procedures 305 -Appendix K (3)

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dI

CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution

D. Instructions for Completing the Safety Determination Form

The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol must be completed on the CFS 1441, Safety Determination Form, minimally at the following times:

1. For child protection purposes (investigation):

o

Within 24 hours after the investigator first SEES the alleged

child victim(s) and all other children in the home.

o

Whenever circumstances suggest that the child's (ren) safety

may be in jeopardy.

2. For child welfare services (follow-up):

o Within five working days after case assignment. (The children must be SEEN in order for the safety assessment to be conducted.)

o Whenever evidence or circumstances suggest that the child's (ren) safety may be in jeopardy, regardless of the placement of the child(ren).

o

Every six months (from case opening) on intact family cases.

o

Immediately prior to returning a child home. (Assess the child's

safety in the child's return home environment.)

o

When considering the commencement of unsupervised visits.

o Before each Administrative Case Review where one or more child(ren) are still in placement or one or more child(ren) are still in the home. (Document the conditions or behavior which continue to prevent return home and to document the continuous safety of any child(ren) still in the home.)

o

Immediately prior to closing a service case.

3. The Risk Assessment Protocol must be completed in five sequential steps which correspond with the order of the CFS 1441:

Procedures 305 -Appendix K (4)

l6
CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution
a) Section 1: Safety Assessment (pages 1 & 2)
Step 1 (Part A, Safety Factor Identification) - Identify which of the 14 safety factors listed on the CFS 1441 relate to behaviors or conditions which may be associated with child(ren) who are in immediate danger of moderate to severe harm by checking the "YES" box corresponding to the identified factor. ALL child(ren) in the home, whether alleged victims or not, are to be assessed. When assessing the child(ren)'s safety, consider the effect that adults who have contact with the child(ren) may have on the safety of the child(ren).
Step 2 (Part B, Safety Factor Description) - When safety factors have been identified, record the safety factor by number from Section 1 A, page 1 and describe how the particular factor relates to specific individuals, behaviors, conditions and circumstances.
Step 3 (Part B, Mitigating Circumstances /Family Strengths) When safety factors are recorded, describe any mitigating circumstances and the family strengths which may serve to control or manage the safety factors. Sometimes the presence of a safety factor can be partially or fully controlled or eliminated by a family strength or mitigating circumstance. Therefore, consider all of the factors known about family strengths when making a decision regarding safety.
When there are no safety factors which were checked "YES", the available information which indicates that none of the child(ren) are likely to be in immediate danger of moderate to severe harm is to be summarized.
b) Section 2: Safety Decision (page 3)
Step 4 (Safe/Unsafe Decision) - Identify the safety decision as safe or unsafe based upon the assessment of all safety factors and any other information which is known about the case. When a decision is made that the child(ren) are "UNSAFE", a safety protection plan must be developed and implemented to avoid immediate danger to the child(ren).
Procedures 305 -Appendix K (5)

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CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution

c)

Section 3: Safety Protection Plan

Step 5 (Development/Implementation) - When the category of "UNSAFE" is checked in Section 2, a safety protection plan must be developed. A safety protection plan is implemented when it is likely that a child could be moderately or severely harmed now or in the very near future. The plan must be based on the safety assessment which indicates whether safety factors are a concern but also if there are mitigating factors that would permit the child to remain at home if a protective plan is developed and implemented. After the safety protection plan has been developed, it must be implemented to ensure that all of the designated tasks are completed effectively. The plan is to contain a time frame for implementation and a contingency plan if the primary safety protection plan is no longer useful. The worker who is responsible for implementing the plan must explain the plan to the family and, whenever the family has an active role in carrying out the plan, obtain the family's commitment to cooperate and participate in carrying out the plan. The worker shall document the family's agreement and commitment in the appropriate case record. The worker shall develop a backup plan which will be documented whenever necessary, particularly when family members have an active role in carrying-out the primary goal.

The safety protection plan is to be used to control and manage the situation until a more stable/permanent change can take place. This step requires a written description of what will be done or what actions will be taken to protect the child(ren), who will be responsible for implementing the components of the safety protection plan and how/who will monitor the safety protection plan.

The worker (DCFS or Purchase of Service) who initiates a safety plan is continuously responsible for implementation of the safety plan and the safety of the child(ren). If services to a child(ren) and family are to be transferred to another worker (DCFS or POS) after the safety plan has been initiated, the worker who initiated the safety plan will remain responsible for the safety plan until the responsibility for services to the child(ren) and family are effectively transferred to another worker. This responsibility is applicable regardless of whether the worker is DCFS or POS staff.

Procedures 305 -Appendix K (6)

dl CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution d) Section 4: Signatures and Distribution of Form
The completed CFS 1441, Safety Determination Form must be signed and dated by the worker (DCFS or contracted private agency staff) after completion. The respective supervisor or designee shall sign the completed CFS 1441 within 24 hours after the worker has signed it. The completed CFS 1441 shall be filed in the child/family case file of the child protection investigator or the child welfare worker and forwarded to the appropriate service worker when a case is transferred.
Procedures 305 -Appendix K (7)

CLIENT SERVICE PLANNING
APPENDIX K - CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
Draft - Not for further distribution THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Procedures 305 -Appendix K (8)

 
 I

11

CFS 1441 IL 418-0601 Rev. 9/95

State of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL
Safety Determination Form

Case Name

Report Date

Agency Name

RTO/RSF

Worker Name

ID

SCR/CYCIS #

When To Complete The Fonts:

For child protection purposes, the safety assessment must be conducted, at a minimum, at the following case milestones (check the appropriate box):
0 1. Within 24 hours after the investigator first SEES the alleged child victim. 0 2. Whenever circumstances suggest that the child's safety may be in jeopardy. For child welfare services (follow-up), the safety assessment must be conducted, at a minimum, at the following case milestones (check the appropriate box): O 1. Within 5 working days after case assignment. (The child must be seen in order for the safety
assessment to be conducted.) 0 2. Whenever circumstances suggest that the child's safety may be in jeopardy. O 3. Every 6 months on intact family cases. 0 4. Immediately prior to returning a child home.(Assess safety in the child's return home environment.) 0 5. When considering the commencement of unsupervised visits. O 6. Before an administrative case review where one or more children are still in placement and one or
more children are still in the home. O 7. Immediately prior to dosing a service case.

SECTION 1. SAFETY ASSESSMENT Part A. Safety Factor Indenttflcatlon DIrectlons: The following list of factors are behaviors or conditions that may be associated with a children) being in
immediate danger of moderate to severe harm. All children in the home are to be assessed whether or not they were the alleged victims. When assessing their safety, consider the effects that adults who have access to them could have on their safety. Identify the presence of each factor by checking 'Yes," which is defined as "clear evidence or other cause for concern." 1.Yes O No O Caretakers behavior is violent and out of control.
2. Yes O No O Caretaker describes or acts toward child in predominantly negative terms or has extremely unrealistic expectations.
3. Yes O No O Caretaker caused moderate to severe harm or has made a plausible threat of moderate to severe harm to the child.
4. Yes O No O Child's whereabouts cannot be ascertained and/or there is reason to believe that the family is about to flee or refuses access to the child.
5. Yes O No O Caretaker has not, will not, or is unable to provide sufficient supervision to protect child from potentially moderate to severe harm.
6. Yes O No O Caretaker has rot, or is unable to meet the child's medical care needs that may result in moderate to severe health care problems if left untreated.
7. Yes O No O Caretaker has previously or may have previously abused or neglected a child, and the severity of the maltreatment, or the caretakers response to the prior incident, suggests that child safety may be an urgent and immediate concern.
8. Yes O No O Child is fearful of people living in or frequenting the home.
9. Yes 0 No O Caretaker has not, or is unable to meet the child's immediate needs for food, clothing, and/or shelter; the child's physical living conditions are hazardous and may cause moderate to severe harm.
10.Yes O No O Child sexual abuse is suspected and circumstances suggest that child safety may be an immediate concern.
11.Yes O No 0 Caretakers alleged or observed do g or alcohol use may seriously affect his/her ability to supervise, protect, or care for the child.
12.Yes O No O Caretakers alleged or observed mental illness or developmental dwbiity may seriously affect his/her ability to supervise, protect, or care for the child.
13. Yes O No O Caretaker may be a victim of domestic violence which affects caretakers ability to care for and/or protect child from imminent, moderate to severe harm.
14.Yes O No O Other (specify)
Paso I

Part B. Safety Factor Description and Mitigating Clncxnstancas/Famlly Strengths Directions: IF SAFETY FACTOR(S) ARE CHECKED "YES":
• Note the applicable safety factor number and then briefly describe the specific individuals, behaviors, conditions and circumstnaces associated with that particular factor.
• Identify and describe family strengths and any mitigating circumstances. IF NO SAFETY FACTORS ARE CHECKED "YES": • Summarize the information you have available that leads you to believe that no children
are likely to be in immediate danger of moderate to severe harm.
rage c

SECTION 2: SAFETY DECISION Directions: Identify your safety decision by checking the appropriate box below. (Check one box only.) This
decision should be based on the assessment of all safety factors and any other information known about this case.
A. UNSAFE: 0 A safety protection plan must be developed and implemented or one or more children will likely be in immediate danger of moderate to severe harm.
B. SAFE: 0 There are no children likely to be in immediate danger of moderate to severe harm at this time.
SECTION 3: SAFETY PROTECTION PLAN Describe the safety protection plan as follows:
1) what actions have or will be taken to protect each child In relation to current safety concerns; and 2) who Is responsible for implementing each plan component; and 3) how will the plan be monitored and by whom.

SECTION 4: SIGNATURES/DATES

The safety assessment and decision were based on the Information known at the time and were made in good faith.

Worker

Date

Supervisor - _

Date

DIRECTIONS: Use this space to continue any additional documentation from pages 2 or 3. Page 4

 
 di t , tt'

6' , 'L, T%

RESPONSE TO THE NORMAN MONITORS' STATEWIDE REVIEW OF THE HOUSING ADVOCACY PROGRAMS
The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) respectfully submits this response to the monitors' Statewide Review of the Housin g Advocacy Programs. DCFS appreciates the monitors' thorough review of the Housing Advocacy Program (HAP). DCFS also appreciates the recommendations made in the report. Responses to these recommendations are found at the end of this report. This report also contains responses to the findings that were discussed in the monitor's report.
DCFS agrees with the monitors' overall assessment that HAP is "a state of the art program addressing the needs of child welfare families." DCFS is committed to the concept that children who are not in danger should not be removed or kept from their families. Therefore, we are encouraged by the monitors' assessment that HAP has stabilized families thereby allowing children to stay with their families, or be returned home early, which assumes significant foster care savings.
While some Norman certified families need only cash assistance to obtain permanent housing, others require the assistance of experienced housing advocates. DCFS created HAP to assist families who need such assistance. DCFS believes that providing effective housing assistance includes developing a housing plan with the family, working together to implement the plan, assisting the family in applying for any housing subsidies or other benefits for which they are eligible and following up with the family after placement to ensure that the family remains stable. The HAP agencies continue to demonstrate their commitment to this philosophy.
DCFS agrees that the HAP caseworkers have competently served families that have been referred to their program. This assertion is proven by the fact that 70% of the families referred to HAP were placed in housing in 1993 and 81 % in 1994. We are therefore heartened by the monitors' findings that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of families that have been referred to the HAP agencies over the past two years.
The monitors report that DCFS has addressed and corrected many of the barriers that have in the past impeded the ability of the HAP agencies to effectively serve families. However the monitors also state that there is room for improvement. The monitors report that although the numbers of referrals to the HAP agencies have significantly increased over the past two years, some DCFS offices continue to under utilize HAP. The monitors are also disturbed by the lack of accurate data from DCFS. Finally, the monitors continue to state the problem of the depletion of cash assistance and the difficulty to increase contracts of the agencies that have reached capacity.
DCFS agrees that HAP can improve. DCFS has already begun to address the concerns raised in the report. A Housing Specialist was hired to work with the HAP agencies. In
1

addition, DCFS is in the process of developing a new computerized information system to record information on HAP. Finally, we will authorize casework supervisors to certify families into the Norman class and approve cash assistance. This report outlines how these new developments will address the findings that were discussed in the monitor's report. This report also contains responses to the specific recommendations made at the end of the monitors' report.
Housing Specialist On June 19, 1995, DCFS hired John Cheney-Egan to assume the Housing Specialist
position. John Cheney-Egan has assisted homeless families and individuals obtain housing for six years. He is also familiar with housing subsidy programs that can serve Norman families.
Mr. Cheney-Egan has assumed the responsibility of monitoring all HAP contracts and conducting reviews of HAP. The Housing Specialist has already begun to meet with HAP caseworkers and Norman Liaisons. He will consult with HAP agencies regularly and provide service discussed below to assist HAP agencies serve Norman families.
Computerized Information System DCFS is currently waiting for a decision from Paula Matea from the State's Information
Systems Department regarding setting up a computerized information system. This system would be very similar to the NOMAD system that had been discussed with the monitors at previous meetings. This system would allow DCFS to monitor the amount of cash assistance that each HAP agency has in their budget.
Authorizing Regional Supervisors to Certify Norman Families Partially in response to the monitors' recommendation and partially due to the Director's
policy to give greater responsibility to the casework supervisors, DCFS will authorize supervisors at regional offices to certify Norman families and approve up to $800 for cash assistance. We are hoping that this policy will take effect on August 1, 1995. This will allow us to serve more Norman families and expedite the receipt of cash assistance. DCFS is currently scheduling trainings for these supervisors. The Office of Litigation Management (OLM) met with Norman Liaisons on June 22, 1995 to prepare them for these trainings. In addition to familiarizing DCFS staff on the Norman Consent Decree, these trainings will include how to utilize the HAP agencies and the cash assistance program.
RESPONSES TO FINDINGS DISCUSSED IN THE MONITOR'S REPORT
Relationship Between DCFS Staff and HAP Agencies While most HAP agencies reported to the monitors that their relationships with the
Norman Liaisons were either good or excellent,' some HAP agencies report that they would like
'According to the monitors report, most agencies evaluated their relationship with their Norman Liaison positively, with 56% identifying it as excellent. The majority of HAP agencies
2

ik

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to have a better relationship with their liaison. To develop better relationships, DCFS will encourage Norman Liaisons to meet with employees of the HAP agencies. HAP agencies in Cook County will be invited to attend the trainings for DCFS supervisors. Norman Liaisons from Cook County DCP will be encouraged to attend Cook County HAP meetings. OLM will meet with John Goad, Administer of Protective Services, to ask him to require that a Norman Liaison from DCP attend Cook County HAP meetings.
While the number of families referred to HAP has dramatically increased since 1993,2 the monitors report that two area offices continue to under utilize HAP. The Housing Specialist will meet with DCFS supervisors and Norman Liaisons to educate them on the benefits of HAP and encourage them to utilize the program. The decision to authorize casework supervisors to certify Norman families and approve cash assistance payments will decrease the importance of the relationship between the HAP agencies and the individual Norman Liaison. The regional supervisors will be trained on the Norman Consent Decree. The supervisors will receive information about the HAP agencies and will be encouraged to refer appropriate families for assistance. We believe that this action will increase the number of families referred to the HAP agencies.
HAP agencies reported to the monitors that a number of new workers and supervisors are not properly trained and versed on the Norman Consent Decree. The HAP agencies report that a number of families are referred incorrectly. In addition to training supervisors, DCFS will review the CORE training to determine what changes need to be made to ensure that workers throughout DCFS are using the program appropriately.
The monitors report that in many parts of the state, a family has to be literally "on the streets" before a DCP worker will indicate the report and that the DCP worker will often unfound the report if the family enters a shelter. This problem should be resolved since intact families no longer need to be called into the hotline. DCFS will make sure that upcoming trainings include how to deal with this issue.
DCFS agrees that the referral form needs to contain all the information that the HAP agencies require to begin to serve families. HAP agencies have reported that the referral forms often lack important information which causes delays in the placement of families into housing. The Housing Specialist will meet with the Norman Liaisons and the HAP agencies to determine what additional information should be included on the referral form. DCFS will develop a new referral form that will be used throughout the state by December 31, 1995.

also evaluated their relationship with the caseworkers positively.
2 The monitors reported that 254 families were referred to HAP in fiscal year 1993. The number of families referred increased to 355 in fiscal year 1994 and 164 in the first quarter of fiscal year 1995.
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Areas Not Served by HAP DCFS is committed to providing housing services to Norman families throughout the
State. 3 In some areas of the state, DCFS has contracted with private Homemakers Services to assist families find housing. Some Norman families have been successfully placed in housing by these programs. In addition to providing housing services, these programs offer other services such as budgeting and parenting training. DCFS does not believe that services should be duplicated if the families are being served adequately.
The Housing Specialist will meet with the Norman Liaisons and the previous HAP agencies from the regional offices in areas of the state that do not have a HAP contract. DCFS will determine the need for a HAP agency in those regions and report back to the monitors by December 31, 1995. If it is determined that families would benefit from receiving services from a HAP agency, the Housing Specialist will work with the Norman Liaisons in the area to locate an appropriate agency to serve that area.
Cash Assistance DCFS agrees that cash assistance must be delivered quickly to ensure that families are
placed in appropriate housing. HAP agencies have told DCFS that they are usually able to receive cash assistance in a timely manner. However, at times requests for assistance have been late. Occasionally this occurs because the HAP agency is unable to reach the Norman Liaison. This should occur far less frequently once the regional supervisors are approved to authorize cash assistance payments. The Housing Specialist will meet with the HAP agencies and the Norman Liaisons to determine what other barriers exist and how to expedite the process.
One barrier that has been suggested in the past is the lack of fax machines. DCFS understands the importance of fax machines to ensure that cash assistance payments are expedited. Due to the reorganization of DCFS agencies and the new policy to allow supervisors to authorize cash assistance payments, DCFS needs to determine if and where more fax machines are needed. DCFS will review the need for more fax machines and report back to the monitors by December 31, 1995.
According to the HAP agencies, the failure to obtain cash assistance quickly usually occurs when the HAP agency has depleted their cash assistance funds. 4 The frequency that this will occur will be dramatically reduced once the ISD program is in operation. The Housing Specialist will meet with the HAP agencies regularly to monitor their funds.
3The monitors reported that six agencies had withdrawn from HAP or had an inactive contract resulting in counties and cities that are not served by a HAP agency.
4HAP agencies recently told the Housing Specialist that they usually receive cash assistance within 2 to 7 day of their request. Although they did report that there have been incidents when it took as long as three weeks to receive cash assistance, this usually occurred when they had to seek assistance from another HAP agency because their funds had been depleted.
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Programmatic Reporting and Data Collection DCFS shares the monitors' concerns that accurate data regarding the number of referrals
to the HAP agencies and the number of families placed into housing is not available. Contracts with the HAP agencies stipulate that they are expected to submit a Status report to DCFS within 10 days of the initial referral (section 8.5.1). Information contained in the Status Reports include the DCFS office and caseworker that referred the family, family demographics and the plans to stabilize the family. The contracts also stipulate that the HAP agencies are expected to complete Progress Reports every 30 days (section 8.5.2) and Summary Data for every family placed in housing (Section 8.6). Information contained in these reports includes assessments of the families housing needs, plans to meet their housing and other subsistence needs and whether the family was placed in permanent housing.
DCFS will combine these three reports into one report this fiscal year. This will reduce the reporting requirements of the HAP agencies thus allowing them to spend more time serving their clients. This report will still allow OLM to collect information regarding the number of families referred to the HAP agencies and the number of families housed. The Housing Specialist will contact the HAP agencies regularly to make sure that they submit their reports timely. The Housing Specialist will also keep accurate records on the number of referrals and families placed in housing.
The Housing Specialist will also monitor other programmatic requirements stipulated in the contracts. HAP agencies are asked to provide DCFS with names, address and phone numbers of their employees (Sections 8.2). The Housing Specialist will keep an accurate list of the HAP agencies and employees.
Difficulties Placing Families The monitors report that the HAP agencies have been very successful at placing families
in housing. DCFS understands the barriers families face when seeking affordable housing and is encouraged by the performance of the HAP agencies. Obviously many of the barriers faced by the HAP agencies are beyond their control. The Housing Specialist was hired to assist the HAP agencies negotiate any obstacles that thwart placement of families into housing. These obstacles differ from area to area. Some HAP agencies have a more difficult task housing their families than others because of the number of obstacles families in the communities they serve face. The Housing Specialist will provide additional assistance to these HAP agencies to assist them place families in affordable housing.
The Housing Specialist will contact the HAP agencies bi-monthly to disseminate information. Many caseworkers from the HAP agencies have told the Housing Specialist that they need more housing resources to help place the families they serve. The Housing Specialist will help the HAP agencies maintain a list of vacant housing by providing lists of private subsidized housing throughout Illinois by October 1, 1995. He will develop a network of agencies that assist families in the Chicago area obtain housing to share housing resources.
Unfortunately, as the monitors note, most affordable housing in Illinois, especially in the
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Chicago area, has long waiting lists. To address the length of time it takes to place a family in affordable housing, DCFS has developed agreements with local public housing authorities to prioritize the applications of Norman families. These agreements have significantly reduced the amount of time that a Norman family will wait before entering subsidized housing. The Housing Specialist will meet with public housing authorities (PHA) throughout the state to negotiate similar agreements.
An agreement with the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) has allowed Norman families to move into apartments quickly. DCFS is currently in the process of renewing the agreement with CHA. HAP agencies have reported that they are satisfied with this agreement although they are not always satisfied with the way it is implemented by employees of the local developments. DCFS met with the Director of CHA's Occupancy Department, J. Joy Bailey, to discuss these problems. Ms. Bailey agreed to work with the Housing Specialist to ensure that Norman families are placed in CHA housing as quickly as possible.
While some families have been placed in public housing, many others are not interested in applying. As the monitors state in their report, most families do not want to be housed in high rise public housing. Most low-income families, if given the option, would prefer to be part of the Section 8 tenant based or project based programs. In their report, the monitors praise an agreement made between a HAP agency in Lake County and the Lake County Housing Authority which gives Norman families preferential status. In Waukegan, the PHA was awarded Section 8 certificates through the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Family Unification Program. The Housing Specialist will work with local PHAs and HUD to assist Norman families obtain affordable housing through the Section 8 programs. The Housing Specialist will also train HAP employees how to apply for subsidized housing programs.
The Monitors and the HAP agencies have made a number of other excellent suggestions with regard to accessing housing through Section 8 programs. These include developing a Section 8 contact person at the local public housing authorities and developing agreements with public housing authorities to grant extensions for person who have a Section 8 number until their children have been returned home. The Housing Specialist will work to develop these and other innovative solutions, such as fully utilizing the Gautreaux program, 5 to help the HAP agencies place their families in affordable housing.
Some HAP agencies have requested that DCFS help them access subsidized housing managed by private developers. We are fortunate that many of the most successful not-for-profit developers in the country are located in Illinois. DCFS agrees that this is an important resource that must be fully utilized. The Housing Specialist will develop lists of private developers that manage subsidized apartments to assist the HAP agencies house their families. The Housing
5In Chicago the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities offers a program to assist families who are currently or were formerly in CHA housing or are on the CHA waiting list obtain Section 8 certificates to obtain housing in the suburbs.

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Specialist will also work with these developers to develop agreements to access affordable housing for Norman families.
Another concern raised in the monitors' report is that the HAP requirement of placing families in housing that costs within 30-50% of their income is unrealistic. The contracts with the HAP agencies stipulate that the HAP agency work with the family until they are stabilized in permanent, affordable housing (Section 4.2.5). The contract defines affordable as 30% of the households income. Although DCFS believes that assisting families obtain affordable housing is a worthwhile goal, it understands the difficulty HAP agencies face. During times when affordable housing is in short supply some households will have to spend over 50% of their income on housing. Because of this DCFS has considered this stipulation as a goal rather than a requirement. DCFS will consider ways to make this goal more practical and realistic. Two possible solutions could be to allow the HAP agencies to include food stamps in the households budget6 and to require that HAP agencies assist families apply for subsidized housing when placing them in housing that is not affordable. DCFS will determine if changes need to be made to the contracts with the HAP agencies for the 1997 fiscal year.
Follow-Up Services DCFS believes that follow-up services are an important part of family stabilization.
According to the contracts with the HAP agencies, follow-up services will begin once the family is housed to identify any housing or subsistence problems and help the family access resources that will facilitate stabilization. The Housing Specialist will work with the HAP agencies to ensure that families fully utilize public and private services located in their community.
The contract further stipulates that follow-up visits will occur every other week for the first month and once a month thereafter (Section 4.2.5). HAP agencies are allowed to bill DCFS for providing follow-up services (Section 9.2.10). The Housing Specialist will monitor the HAP agencies compliance with this portion of the contract.
According to the Monitor's report, some agencies are concerned that discontinuing follow-up services after only three months limits their ability to stabilize some families. DCFS realizes that some families may require follow-up services for a longer period of time than others. While there are some predictors to the likelihood that a family will remain stable after being placed in housing (e.g. stability of income, percentage of income apportioned for rent, quality of apartment and landlord etc.), the best predictor continues to be the caseworker's assessment of the family's situation. The contracts with the HAP agencies already allow for the agency to extend the length of time that follow-up services can be offered to the family when the HAP agency and the Department agree in writing to do so (Section 4.2.5). OLM is not
6The concept of including the value of food stamps and other non-cash benefits is not new. The National Research Council suggests that the federal government include the value of noncash benefits when determining poverty levels. The National Research Council believes that this would give a more realistic measure of household budgets.
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aware of any request that a HAP agency has made to extend follow-up services that has been denied by the DCFS regional office.
Over the next year the Housing Specialist will examine situations that will likely lead to families losing their housing after placement. These indicators will be specified in a report which will be distributed to HAP agencies by April 1, 1996. The Housing Specialist will also determine the costs and benefits of extending the period that the HAP agency will be expected to provide follow-up services for certain families. DCFS will determine if HAP agencies should be required to provide follow-up services for more than three months for certain families.
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RESPONSES TO RECONEMENDATIONS MADE IN THE MONITOR'S REPORT
1. HAP contracts need to include provisions for monthly data collection of the number of referrals, placements and ongoing cases. This data needs to be monitored consistently.
DCFS Response: Beginning July 1, 1995, the Housing Specialist will assume the responsibility of closely
monitoring the HAP agencies compliance with the programmatic reporting section of the contracts. The contracts with the HAP Agencies stipulate that HAP agencies are expected to submit a Status report to DCFS within 10 days of the initial referral (section 8.5.1), a Progress Report every 30 days (Section 8.5.2) and a Summary Data for each family placed in housing (Section 8.6). Information contained in these reports will allow DCFS to document the number of families referred to HAP agencies and the number of families placed in housing by HAP agencies. DCFS will combine these three reports into one report this fiscal year. This report will still allow OLM to collect information regarding the number of families referred to the HAP agencies and the number of families housed.

2. HAP contracts should incorporate the flexibility of extending follow-up services beyond three months, if needed, in order to ensure family stabilization.
DCFS Response: DCFS agrees with the monitors' assertion that some families need follow-up services for
a greater period of time. DCFS currently relies on the expertise of the HAP caseworker to decide whether the follow-up period needs to be extended. The contracts with the HAP agencies already allow for the agency to extend the length of time that follow-up services can be offered to the family when the HAP agency and the Department agree in writing to do so (Section 4.2.5). The Office of Litigation Management is not aware of any request that a HAP agency has made to extend follow-up services that were denied by a DCFS regional office. The Housing Specialist will remind the HAP agencies that they can extend follow-up services beyond three months.
Over the next year the Housing Specialist will examine situations that will likely lead to families losing their housing after placement. These indicators will be specified in a report which will be distributed to HAP agencies by April 1, 1996. The Housing Specialist will also determine the costs and benefits of extending the period that the HAP agency will be expected to provide follow-up services for certain families. DCFS will determine if HAP agencies should be required to provide follow-up services for more than three months for certain families.

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3. The Department must decide immediately on an accurate reporting mechanism for both HAP and cash assistance data.
DCFS Response: DCFS is currently waiting for a decision from Paula Matea from the State's Information
Systems Department regarding setting up a computerized information system. This system would be very similar to the NOMAD system that was previously discussed with the monitors. This system would help us monitor the amount of cash assistance that each HAP agency has in their budget. DCFS will continue to update the monitors regarding the status of this system.
4. The Department should target those areas of the State without HAP contracts to determine need and reason for lack of contract.
DCFS Response: The Housing Specialist will meet with the Norman Liaisons from the regional offices and
the previous HAP agencies in areas of the state that do not have a HAP contract. DCFS will determine the need for a HAP agency in those regions and report back to the monitors by December 31, 1995. If it is determined that an area that is not currently being served by a HAP agency would benefit from receiving such services, the Housing Specialist will work with the Norman Liaisons to locate an appropriate agency to serve as a the HAP agency.
5. The Department should target areas with low-utilization rates to determine the reasons, especially in Cook County DCP, South Area Office, Aurora and Peoria.
DCFS Response: The Housing Specialist will meet with DCFS Liaisons at Cook County DCP, South Area
OFFICE, Aurora and Peoria by October 1, 1995 to determine the reasons for not utilizing HAP agencies and to express the usefulness of the HAP agencies.
DCFS intends to train casework supervisors on HAP by August 1, 1995. DCFS will also review the CORE training to determine if new information regarding HAP is needed. These trainings will inform DCFS staff of the usefulness of HAP and encourage them to refer Norman families to HAP agencies that could benefit from their services.
6. The Department should require Cook County Liaisons from DCP to attend Cook County HAP Meetings.
DCFS Response: Norman Liaisons will continue to be encouraged to attend the Cook County HAP
meetings. The Office of Litigation Management will meet with John Goad, Administer of Protective Services, to ask him to require that a Norman Liaison from DCP attend Cook County
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HAP meetings. The Office of Litigation Management will send copies of all HAP meeting notices to John Goad.

7. Training is needed at all levels about housing and other Norman resources. More in depth training needs to be included in the CORE training, and the Department should offer training throughout the State for internal and private agency staff on housing resources, including a statewide conference.
DCFS Response: DCFS intends to train all casework supervisors on the Norman Consent Decree by August
1, 1995. DCFS will review the CORE training to determine what additional information should be added to ensure that all DCFS workers understand the consent decree. OLM will also conduct inservices on Norman and the HAP program. The Housing Specialist will coordinate the statewide housing conference which will be held this fiscal year.

8. There should be more fax machines in DCFS offices available to the Norman Liaisons. HAP agencies should be informed that purchase of fax machines can be incorporated into their costs for service.
DCFS Response: Due to the reorganization of DCFS agencies and the new policy to allow supervisors to
authorize cash assistance payments, DCFS needs to determine if and where more fax machines are needed. DCFS will review the need for more fax machines at both the DCFS regional offices and at the HAP agencies and report back to the monitors by December 31, 1995.

9. The housing specialist needs to be hired as soon as possible to strengthen the Housing Advocacy Program. In addition to the other policy and practice issues, this person should be given the responsibility to conduct the reviews mentioned above, coordinate a statewide housing conference and monitor all HAP contracts.
DCFS Response: DCFS hired John Cheney-Egan to fill the Housing Specialist position on June 19, 1995.
The Housing Specialist has assumed the responsibility of monitoring all HAP contracts and conducting reviews of HAP immediately. The Housing Specialist will coordinate the statewide housing conference which will be held this fiscal year.

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STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTOCOL

Insuring the safety and protection of children is the primary focus of all DCFS rest to families In order to assess the safety and protection of children in families who have been reported for abuse or neglect, or who are receiving other child protective services, it is necessary to continually assess various family issues - for example, substance abuse, mental illness, poverty, domestic violence - factors which contribute to the level of risk of involved children. Accurate assessment of these issues will result in the reduction of unnecessary removals of children, the development of meaningful service planning and contribute to appropriate decision-making when children cannot be safely maintained in their families.

CHILD ENDANGERMENT RISK ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL
The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment protocol is designed to identify important safety issues which require immediate intervention in order to ensure that the involved children are protected without delay. One of these issues is domestic violence.
The Child Endangerment Risk Assessment protocol includes a Preliminary Assessment of Safety (see Appendix A) that will help identify serious domestic violence situations, and other issues, that place children at immediate and severe risk of harm. To be effective, this assessment screen must be administered with an understanding of the unique dynamics of family violence. This will enable DCFS workers to better determine the impact of the domestic violence on the safety of children and to develop safety plans that factor in the risks associated with domestic violence. Thus it is important that child protective staff administer these screening questions with the following considerations in mind:
• While being a victim of domestic violence does not absolve a mother from responsbility for her actions in abusing or neglecting her children, in cases where domestic violence is present the safety of the children can often be achieved by, increasing the safety of the mother.
• There is no more dangerous time for the woman or for the involved professional than at the time the woman is revealing her situation to an "outsider".
• It is pointless to ask the screening questions in the presence of others, whether the alleged offender, children or other involved individuals. The woman MUST be interviewed in a private setting. To the extent that the investigator finds it difficult to arrange to interview the woman out of the presence of others, the likelihood of serious abuse increases.

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• As a woman-victim prepares to leave an abuser, the risk to her and to her children increases.
Questions about domestic violence are impacted by the crisis generated by the child protection investigation, and the impact of this upon the responses of the woman must be adequately considered. The more severely she has been traumatized by abuse, the more impaired is her judgment about its severity. Tendencies to minimize the seriousness of incidents are common as an attempt to protect her family.
The child protective services staff must be sensitive to denials that do not "ring true" and explore whether domestic violence may play a role in the level of risk to the children through LEADS or CANTS checks, through contacts with local law enforcement agencies or through inquiries with neighbors and/or relatives or children, if appropriate.

SAFETY PLANNTNG
When the Child Endangerment Protocol indicates that there is imminent risk to the involved children due to the severity of domestic violence in the family, immediate steps to protect the children must be taken, though without unnecessarily taking children into protective custody.
The immediacy of the need for protective action will affect the safety planning that occurs, but child protective staff must discuss the following areas with the woman/victim, and provide emergency services as needed:
• Women must be given immediate information about the level of risk to them and to their children, and about he services and legal options that are available to help protect these. Most women do not realize that the violence is likely to escalate, how the violence is likely to impact their children or that there are legal protections and services available - services that offer alternative shelter as well as advocacy and support services.
• Women must be given an accurate assessment of the likelihood that the children will be removed from their custody if they do not avail themselves of the protective services that are available. This information must be delivered in a non-threatening but factual manner and be based on the assessment of the level of risk to the children. Child protective staff must assure the woman-victim that protective custody will only be taken if there is no other option to assure the safety of the children.
• Women must be offered immediate access to available services, including transportation to a protective site, whether that be a women's shelter or home of relative or friend, an emergency referral to a specialized domestic violence service, and

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a means to access orders of protection through the local court system or other services that will protect them and their children.

Multiple Risk Concerns
Domestic violence may be just one of multiple factors that may threaten a child's safety. Safety planning, including protective custody, may focus on other factors; for example, mother's cocaine addiction may be the most serious risk to the child's safety, not the concurrent presence of domestic violence. In those instances, workers must take all necessary steps to insure the protection of the child, and must also document that domestic violence is present in the household. In this way, the domestic violence, along with the other risk factors, will be a subject of case assessment and service planning.
If the Woman Implements a Safety Plan and Accepts Services:
The woman and children will be transported to a place of safety (if necessary) and assured immediate linkage to the appropriate service provider. The appropriate service may be available either through a Specialized DCFS contractual provider or through community domestic violence service agencies.
The child protective investigator will also ensure appropriate follow-up via emergency referrals to DCFS child welfare workers, private agency service providers or specialized domestic violence service contracts in order to provide adequate on-going support, advocacy and other assistance to the family.
If the Woman Refuses to Accept Services or Has Difficulty Implementing a Safety
Plan;
In instances when level of risk to the involved children is high and the woman refuses immediate protective services or has difficulty implementing the safety plan, the staff will follow the normal course of action in ensuring adequate protection of the children through protective custody or voluntary placement with others.
As is commonly done in child sexual abuse cases, if the safety plan depends upon the willingness or ability of the mother to limit the male's access to the child, an assessment must be made of the mother's ability to manage the implementation of the safety plan, and she should receive assistance in obtaining legal supports, an Order of Protection (under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act or under the Juvenile Court Act), shelter and other support services to help her implement the service plan.
An immediate referral will be made to a Domestic Violence Advocate or to other specialized Domestic Violence services.

CONCLUDING THE INVESTIGATION AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT
During the administration of the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment protocol, the presence of domestic violence may not be identified, or domestic violence issues in the family appear to be not so serious that they pose immediate threats to the safety of the children. However, it is still necessary to determine what role, if any, domestic violence plays in the level of family functioning and how it impacts the safety and well-being of the children and the family. Without identification of this important issue, service planning and delivery often will not be targeted toward the family's true service needs.
Thus, all female clients will be interviewed regarding the presence of domestic violence in their relationships with significant partners using the Domestic Violence Mini Screen outlined below (see Appendix B also). Caseworkers should inform female clients that because domestic violence is such a common problem, such inquiries are a routine part of the family assessment:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MINI SCREEN QUESTIONS
• Has your partner/former partner ever threatened yos. or done something else that .frightened you?
• Has he ever pushed, slapped; punched, kicked, or hurt you in other ways?
• Has he ever tried to keep you away from your family, friends or neighbors?
• Has he ever prevented you from going somewhere you wanted to go?
• Has he ever used your children to keep track of what you are doing when he's away?
If the answer to any of these questions is positive, it will be an indication of domestic violence in the relationship. It will then be necessary to begin a process of more thoroughly assessing the forms and patterns of abuse, and the level of dangerousness, by initiating a Comprehensive Assessment of these issues. The presence of domestic violence should be noted on the 17A form and should impact responses to the Family Assessment Factor Worksheet (caretaker to caretaker, etc.).
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Staff should use their discretion concerning the timing of this preliminary assessment. Investigative staff may want to identify these issues at the time of the administration of the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment protocol, or it may be more appropriate at another time in the investigation. However, all investigations involving a female caretaker must include at a minimum a preliminary assessment of the presence of domestic violence. In instances where domestic violence issues exist but child protective issues are not significant, (for example, the report will be unfounded, or very minimal risk issues exist and no on-going services will be recommended), the woman should be given the Domestic Violence Packet and information about how to contact a Domestic Violence specialist.
When other risk issues predominate and the case will be referred for on-going services, documentation of a positive preliminary screening for domestic violence issues will be noted, with a recommendation for a follow-up comprehensive assessment of the family dynamics.
Staff providing on-going child protective services must be alert to the possible presence of a male partner whenever intact family services are being provided, or there is a permanency goal of return home, and inquire about him. As needed, the above Suggested Questions should be utilized whenever the mother becomes involved in a new relationship. Preliminary indications of the presence of domestic violence should be followed with a Comprehensive Assessment, as described below.

COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT AND SERVICE PLANNING
Whenever there are indications of domestic violence in a child protective service situation, the child welfare follow-up worker will be responsible for conducting a Comprehensive Assessment of the forms and patterns of domestic violence in the family and an assessment of dangerousness and risk. The child welfare follow-up worker is also responsible for incorporating domestic violence service needs into the service planning process. In some cases, the presence of domestic violence may be identified during the child protective investigation; in others, it may not be identified until the Social History is obtained; or, domestic violence may not become an issue until the mother forms a new relationship later in the life of the case.
PRACTICE PRINCIPLES
• While the safety and protection of children is always paramount, in cases where domestic violence is present jt is often possible to protect the children by assisting the mother in accessing safety services. In no instance is the presence of domestic violence or the existence of an Order of Protection a sole basis for placement of the children. Women should be supported in their efforts to protect themselves and their children.

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• No battered woman should ever be encouraged to stay in a situation that is abusive or dangerous.
• Where there is domestic violence, the family unit to be considered for preservation or reunification may need to be only the children and the non-abusing parent.
• Inquiries about domestic violence should be made of every female client, and never when her partner is present.
• If the victim discloses domestic violence, the practitioner must keep that disclosure confidential from the perpetrator, unless the victim requests otherwise, and then only after the possible consequences of such a disclosure have been discussed with the victim.
• The autonomy of the woman to decide her own life and course of action must be respected. She also has a right to know how the decisions she makes may, or may not, affect the placement of her children.
• If the perpetrator reveals the presence of domestic violence, the practitioner should confidentially discuss this with the victim and initiate safety planning. Practitioners should never agree with the perpetrator to keep such disclosures confidential.
• Perpt.trators of violence are accountable - women-victims must Never be blamed for the abuse they have experienced.
• A safety plan should be developed for each adult and child victim. The most effective way to protect the child is usually through assuring protection to the woman.
• Interventions that explore domestic violence issues with both the abuser and the victim present, such as joint interviews, couples counseling or mediation, should not be recommended.
THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The initial investigative response of the Department is designed to focus on the immediate safety needs of the children involved in a report of abuse or neglect. Once immediate safety needs are met, a process of more thoroughly assessing the dynamics of a family, the strengths and problems and service needs that must be met in order to preserve the family unit, or reunite a family that has been separated, must begin. The family unit to be preserved or re-united will often be only the woman and her children.
Whenever domestic violence has been identified as an issue during the initial child endangerment risk assessment, whether children have been into protective custody, have
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been allowed to remain with their mother in a temporarily safe environment or when other informal placement and safety plans have been implemented, a more in-depth assessment must follow. The comprehensive assessment and service planning process focuses upon an in-depth assessment of the impact of domestic violence upon the family, especially as it affects the safety of the children, and defines the services that must be made available to all family members - the mother, children and the abuser - in order to achieve the permanency goal that has been established for the children.
The Comprehensive Assessment includes an assessment of dangerousness, safety planning and service planning. The following areas of inquiry into domestic violence issues and problems must be undertaken:
Assessing the forms and patterns of domestic violence
Domestic violence includes Isolation, financial control intimidation and threats (with or without a weapon), emotional abuse/degradation, physical abuse (pushing, choking, hitting, or slapping), sexual abuse and the use of children to control and punish the mother.
Suggested questions: Does your partner prevent you from going places you want to go? Does he prevent you from seeing friends or family' Has he every followed you? Has he call -d you degrading names or insulted you in public? Has he threatened to hurt you or kill you? Has he pushed hit, kicked or choked you? Haves you ever needed medical care after a fight with him? Has he made you have sex when you told him no?
It is important to established the pattern of abuse and whether the abuse is intensifying in frequency or severity.
Suggested questions: Tell me about the first incident that ever happened between you when was it? What was the worst incident or the one that frigiziened you the most when was it? When was the last incident? Are you more scared of him now than a month (6 months, a year) ago - why? Have you noticed that the incidents are happening more or less frequently?
Assessing Dangerousness
Women who are victims of domestic violence may not realize the level of danger they experience. The domestic violence assessment includes a joint honest assessment, in conjunction with the woman, of the reality of the situation she faces. Some of the perpetrator characteristics which significantly increase risk are substance abuse, history of criminal violence in home and community, woman has left or is threatening to leave, perpetrator was abused child, weapons are present, perpetrator has threatened to kill woman or talks of suicide.

rn—^G1'

MLLL^t o. YUUiM

Suggested questions: Have the assaults become more brutal or more frequent or has he become more obsessed with controlling your behavior? Are there guns or knives in the home? Has he ever brutalized you during sex? Has he threatened to kill you, the children or himself. Has he abused you or the children while drunk or high, or has his substance abuse become more frequent?
Safety Planning
Through open and honest discussion of the forms, patterns and severity of the abuse being experienced in the home, it is intended that both the worker and the woman-victim will have developed an understanding of the level of risk that she and the involved children are experiencing and, with the assistance of the worker, a safety plan for her and the children will be developed.
If the woman is living apart from the perpetrator, discuss the following:
• Changing locks and improving the overall security of the house/apartment.
• Teaching children when and how to call the police or nearby relatives or friends.
• Informing the children's school and daycare providers of who is authorized to pick up the children.
• Assuring that she is receiving adequate legal and advocacy services, is pursuing an Order of Protection and is alert to the possibility of being followed or confronted outside the home.
If the woman indicates a wish to leave, discuss the following:
• How and when can she most safety leave? Where will she go? Does she have money and transportation? What can the worker provide that will help ensure her safety and that of the children?
• Who can she safely tell that she is leaving and how to contact her, and who should she not tell?
• Will she call the police if needed? What other telephone numbers does she need, e.g. local women's shelter, legal aid, court advocate?
• Can she arrange for someone to keep items she will need in an emergency, e.g., some money, the children's school and health records, other important documents, a change of clothing for her and the children?
If the woman intends to stay with the perpetrator, discuss the following:
8

rIILDREN & YOUTH

^u 7GL^1 (1 r. l^ ^l a.

• If the violence begins how can she best ensure her safety - can she flee to a neighbor? Lock herself in a room? What will she do to ensure that the children are safe?
• Is she prepared to call the police if needed? Is there a phone in the house or a neighbor that the children can ask to summon help?
• Review escape routes from the house, pointing out areas where she might be trapped, e g., a bathroom or basement.
• Provide the woman with an honest assessment of the danger you have assessed that she may be in, and the risk and effect the domestic violence presents to the children. Inform her of how her decisions to stay with the perpetrator may or may not affect DCFS' decision to allow the children to remain, or be reunited, with her.
SERVICE PLANNING
As in other cases, service planning with families where domestic violence is an issue must focus on resolving the problems that threaten the protection and permanency of the children. In most instances, unless the domestic violence problems can be resolved, other services will not be sufficient to allow achievement of the permanency goal. Thus, it is vital that the following issues be integrated into service planning and delivery:
• Just as families may require specialists in substance abuse treatment or services to the mentally ill, families where domestic violence presents a major threat to family preservation or reunification require specialty services. The dynamics of domestic violence, with its intimidation and dis-empowerment of women and child victims, often results in a need for focused efforts by the case manager to ensure appropriate service planning and linkage of family members with needed specialty services, which include emergency shelter, counseling, support groups and legal advocacy.
• Case managers must continue to be conscious of on-going risk and safety issues throughout the service planning and implementation period. Woman-victims should always be alerted to any contacts that might be necessary with the perpetrator, or any disclosures that will be necessary to the Courts, Administrative Case Review staff Public Guardian/Guardian ad Litum or others that might result in an escalation of the level of danger. Case Managers should urge women/victims to obtain necessary Orden of Protection and then work to ensure appropriate enforcement of such orders.
• When parent-child visitation is an important part of the service planning, either because children are in state custody or because of orders issued through other courts, the visitation plan must include provisions to ensure both the safety and well-being of the involved children, as well as the woman. If the mother and father are separated, visitation times should be scheduled so that mother and father do not come onto
9

r=-02-15 6 21 : 01

CHILDREN & YOUTH
t

.>1G 7tG 71ri ^^. --
tI

contact with one another in order to ensure the safety of the mother and protect the children from exposure to further conflict.
• Most families with a history of domestic violence who are also involved in child protective services will require a mix of services. These may include: concrete services, such as referrals and linkages with housing assistance, Public Aid, job training, food pantries; substance abuse treatment; individual counseling to assist the woman in re-building their self esteem, to understand the dynamics of abusive relationships and to plan for her future. The case manager should work to ensure communication and coordination among the involved service providers.
• The abuser may be referred to an approved abuser treatment program, but couple counseling should not be recommended until the relationship has been totally violencefree for an extensive period and only then after thorough discussion with the woman. It is important that the abuser continue to be held solely accountable for his violence and that the case manager not give him any indication that he/she accepts or condones the violence. Abusers are often manipulative and will attempt to involved professionals working with the family in criticizing and blaming the victim.

10
TOTAL P.11

It

d.

U
CONTINUUM OF ABUSE : s}f
ABUSE •is the m' isuse of powienrai; oelhdu'omosrhci• lontrol

•611 NOW111 nRC I)WAV. MUrI'K 2.1i
MII.WA IKKILWI X)NiIN t^z . n s
,:k,^,^ ,., N ,: ,,,,, ppWN IY)%VN O FICE N u1 !)!-r•19rl

(i?)

PHYSICAL

-;

DEATI'I

pushing punching slapping kicking throwing objects choking using weapons io homicide/suicide

VERBAL

EMOTIONAL

y

name—calling criticizing "you're no good" ignoring yelling

t

SUICIDE

isolation humiliation

SEXUAL

RAPE

unwanted visuals unwanted sexual unfaithfulness false forced sex hurtful +six

touch

looking, name-calling

accusations

Without some kind of help, the violence usually gets worse.
DEATH can ALWAYS be the result

.
Adapted from: VI L .AGBTO VILLAGE, Alaska Dept. of Public Safety

 
 I )
i I R M A NI[ r_ S l f W n -N(A M \T )i ft
GIll rank` NK Li f^i®LUMTHfi T

d.1

F
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION PURPOSE:....................................................................................4 BACKGROUND:............................................................................4
PROBLEMSWITH CURRENT SYSTEM .....................................5 REQUIREMENTS
FUNCTIONALSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS ..................................7 CASHADVANCE PROCESS ......................................................... 9 CASHASSISTANCE PROCESS ....................................................10 APPENDICES Appendix A - SCREENS:
-- NM -01 NORMAN PAYMENT AUTHORIZATION....13 - NM-02 NORMAN FAMILY PAYMENT DATA........14 - NM -03 CASH ASSISTANCE BY CONTRACT............15 - NM-04 CASH ADVANCE.BY CONTRACT .................16 - NM-05 CASH ASSISTANCE BY R/S/F ....................17 - NM-06 NORMAN PRIORITY .....................................18 - NM-07 CASH ADVANCE TRANSFER ........................19 Appendix B - GENERAL SCREEN SPECIFICATIONS ...............20 AppendixC - ERROR MESSAGES :............................................23
2

1.1

r

/_ b

Appendix D - Letter to family ......................................................29 - Appeal Rights .........................................................30
Appendix E - NORMAN TYPE OF SERVICE CODES :..............32 AppendixF - REQUEST FOR CASH FORM :............................33 Appendix G - NORMAN EMERGENCY ASSIST BILLING...... 37 Appendix H - REPORTS
- PAYMENT AUTHORIZATION REPORT :...............38 - CASH ASSISTANCE LOW REPORT :.....................39 - APPROVED PAYMENTS NOT MADE REPORT......40 - CONTRACT MONEY LOW REPORT :......................41 - MONEY AUTHORIZED OVER $1200....................42 - MONEY AUTHORIZED OVER $1200 SUMM........43 Appendix I - DATA BASE REQUIREMENTS ..........................44

4..;

^.

IP

®_I

C sill MkHk r^ 1\ rt 111T

GENERAL DESIGN

PURPOSE:
The purpose of the Norman Payment Authorization System is to allow Norman Liaisons the ability to determine how much money an Agency has remaining within their DCFS Norman Cash Advance funds before authorizing additional funds to be used. This system will also give the Norman Liaisons and the Norman Monitor access to information regarding Norman cash assistance for individual families and specific providers as well as cash advance funds. In addition, it will automatically generate several reports which will be used as informational, preventative, and tracking tools.
BACKGROUND:
The Norman consent decree mandates DCFS to provide certain emergency services/money (see Appendix E - Norman Type of Service Codes) to prevent separation of families who are in jeopardy for reasons of money alone or to reunify families whose only barrier is monetary.
ACR, DCP supervisors and Norman Liaisons currently certify and decertify families and Nor ian Certification/Decertification is tracked historically on CYC S. Case Managers, identifying a cash assistance need, complete a 'Request for Cash, AFDC and Housing Assistance" form (Appendix F) to be sent to their Norman Liaison for approval. If the request is approved, the Liaison contacts the provider Agency that writes out the checks.

9

E

4.1

DCFS provides monies to the provider agencies in the form of a lump sum cash advance. As the need arises for the Agency to provide money or services to the Norman families, they use the lump sum cash advance and later send detail vouchers to DCFS identifying what family the money was used for and what services were provided. This, along with the cash advance, is processed through the Department's Vouchering System and ultimately, the Office of the Comptroller generates a check to the provider agency.
The current, mostly manual system, has numerous inadaquacies:
1. Liaisons and supervisors have no way of knowing 'cash on hand' for an agency.
2. Although DCFS staff have asked the Agencies to notify them when their cash advance gets low, typically we do not find out until the Agency is totally out of money. This means the Agency can not write any more checks until another cash advance can be processed - approximately 2 to 5 weeks. If the Comptroller is out of general revenue funds, the request may be put in hold status also.
3. Norman Liaisons have no way of enforcing that the family who is to receive the money from the Agency is a Norman certified family or even an open family case.
4. Detailed vouchers which tell us which individual family received money are not received from the Agency for several weeks which makes tracking cash advances and actual family payments virtually impossible with the current system.
5. An individual family is only allowed to receive a set amount of money within a set time period but there are no checks on the current system to alert the Norman Liaison to this condition before more money is approved.
6. If the family ID on the billing statement is incorrect, these cases may never be entered into the Voucher System making it impossible to track Norman expenditures.
7. It is not easy for the Liaison to identify Norman payments as relating to reunification services, preventative services or both.
5

F

®j

8. The only cash assistance reporting which has been available is hard copy and is not as up to date as is required.
9. Manual logs must be kept to trace authorization and expenditures. Data from logs and an unreconciled financial system is used to prepare Norman monitoring/reporting requirements.
10. The Norman Liaisons do not have an established/consistent way with which to communicate with provider agencies.
11. Business staff have no way of knowing what monies have been authorized prior to entry into the vouchering system for payment.

C

1.1
FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Enhancements and modifications to the existing Norman system can be broken into two parts; those functions affecting the cash advance tracking and those affecting the cash assistance tracking. The following summarizes the functional "requirements" necessary to meet the needs of the Norman Monitor and the Norman Liaisons.
CASH ADVANCE
• Automatic cash advance "referral" when agency lump sum cash advance is lower than desired ("less than desired amount" calculated per provider's initial FY contract amount). • Automatic contract extension "referral" when agency contract balance is less than desired ("less than desired amount" calculated per provider's initial FY contract amount). • Online display of cash advance monies and contract monies available by contract (Appendix A).. Contract number can be found on currently available CO-09 screen by inputting provider ID. • Online display of cash assistance monies by region/site/field. (Appendix A). • Online transfer of cash advance monies that have been requested but not used from previous contract to current contract (Appendix A).
7

1
CASH ASSISTANCE
• Require family case to be opened and certified prior to payment authorization.
• Create online authorization entry and historical tracking system.
• Track payments as "reunification", "prevention", or both.
• Generate report of authorized payments to Norman Liaisons.
• Require agency to have enough 'cash advance' before authorizing payment.
• Generate semi-annual court monitor reporting.
• Reconcile authorized payments with vouchered payments and generate reporting.
• Identify cases that have received previous cash assistance over the last year prior to authorization of payment- if over allowance, do not authorize payment.
• Provide display of payment information by variables including family, contract number, prevention/reunification/both, payment status, date range, region/site/field.
• Automatic decertification of cases .- When last child in placement is returned to "HMP" or "HAP" automatically decert after 6 months regardless if child cases closed or not.
• Create shell document on AS400 for form "Request for Cash, AFDC, and/or Housing Assistance" (Appendix F).
• Create shell document on AS400 for "Letter to Family" and Appeal Rights document. (Appendix D).
• Provide security for access to NM-01 for both screen entry and print capability and ability for Division Norman Liaison to change Norman priority as supervisiors become trained or staff turnovers occur (Appendix A).
8

(r

CASH ADVANCE PROCESS

• Weekly batch database job will identify all Norman providers who

have less than desirable amounts of cash advance monies or contract

monies left. Providers will be categorized as follows:

INITIAL CONTACT

REMAINING CONTRACT

REMAINING

AMOUNT

AMOUNT

ADVANCE

$200,000 +

$20,000

$20,000

$90,000 4200,000

$10,000

$10,000

$20,000-$ 89,999

$5000

$5000

<$20,000

$2000

$2000

(IE. If a provider has a contract for $100,000, and if the

remaining contract amount and/or the remaining cash

advance amount is $10,000 or less, this provider will be

identified as needing additional funding.)

• - System will automatically generate cash advance request notification report (Appendix H) thru electronic mail to the lead Norman Liaison and the Division Norman Liaison.

• System will automatically generate 'contract extension' notification request (Appendix H) thru electronic mail to the lead Norman Liaison and the Division Norman Liaison.

• Norman Liaison (downstate) or Division Norman Liaison (Cook) completes 'Norman Emergency Assistance Billing Summary' (Appendix G) form for cash advance request and sends to regional business office for entry.

• Cash advance request entered into vouchering system - balance displays on NM-01 (Appendix A) and history on NM-04 (Appendix A).

• NM-04 lists cash advance by Contract number. If correct contract number is not known, it can be determined by accessing already existing screen CO-09 and keying provider ID.

• If there is a contract extension problem, Norman Liaison (downstate) or Division Norman Liaison (Cook) needs to get an extension before applying for any more cash advances.

• Division Norman Liaison has the ability to transfer cash advance amount requested on the prior years contract but not used to current year's contract using NM-07 screen.

9

F

d_ r

CASH ASSISTANCE PROCESS

• Case Manager sends "Request for Cash, AFDC and/or Housing Assistance" form on AS400 to Norman Liaison/Supervisor with filled out Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Appendix F).
• Norman Liaison/Supervisor approves/disapproves request.
• If approved, Norman Liaison/Supervisor enters information into the Norman Payment Authorization System via the NM-01 Screen (Appendix A).
* Liaison/Supervisor enters whether this is a Reunification case, a Prevention case, or both. * The system will edit against "type" entered and display an informational message when the following is not adhered to:
- If intact family case, type is prevention. - If placement case and goal for all children in family is 'return home', type is reunification. - If placement case where some of the children are at home and goal for all children in placement is not 'return home', type is prevention. - If placement case and some children in family have a "return home" goal but others have a different goal, type is both. * If cash assistance received this last year is equal to or greater than staff is allowed to authorize, transaction will not be generated. -'Last year' is calculated from current date back one year. -Supervisors can approve up to $800 per year. -Norman Liaisons can approve up to $1200 per year. -Divison Norman Liaison must approve anything over $1200. -Division Norman Liaison has the ability to change Norman priority as supervisiors become trained or staff turnover occurs using NM-06.
10

ii
* If cash advance remaining less than amount needed, will not allow entry of transaction. * Contract amount displayed on screen will alert Norman Liaison/Supervisor to future shortages * If case not certified, message will inform Norman Liaison/Supervisor and they can depress PF4 (CM-35) to certify. * If case not open, it must be opened/reopened before approval of Norman money can occur. * RACF (System security package) will allow only Norman Liaisons and Supervisors to authorize cash assistance.
• Supervisors will send a form letter on the AS400 to the family notifying them of Norman funds authorized and appeal rights (Appendix D).
• Norman Liaison/Supervisor may screen print NM-01 (Appendix A) and fax it to the provider agency along with AS400 form filled out by Case Manager that shows who is to receive checks.
• Agency cuts the check.
• Agency completes 'Norman Emergency Billing Summary' form (Appendix G) which shows what families and for what services their money has been spent on and returns to the Norman Liaison for signoff.
• Norman Liaison performs signoff and sends to regional business unit for entry.
• The Vouchers are entered onto the Voucher System via already existing screens VP-11 and VP-15 after business office data entry staff validate that voucher information is authorized.
11

di
• These vouchers are then reconciled weekly thru a job which checks payment amount, Family ID, Provider ID and Type of Service code entered thru the vouchering process against preapproved payments on NM-01, Payment Authorization Screen, (Appendix A).
Payments that are reconciled will display on screen NM-02 (Appendix A) by family ID, NM-03 (Appendix A) by contract number, and NM-05 by region or region/site/field as "PAID/APRV"status. * Payments that have not been reconciled but have been authorized thru NM-0l will show as "APRV" status on screen NM-02 (Appendix A) and NM-03 (Appendix A). * Payments that have been paid but not approved will show on NM-02 and NM-03 as "PAID" status. * System will generate report 'Norman Authorized Payments which have not been Paid' (Appendix H) to Norman Liaison. This will be a running record of all payments authorized but not vouchered and vouchered but not authorized. • 'Norman Assistance Authorization Notification' report (Appendix H) will be generated monthly for the Norman Liaisons to track authorizations sent to the provider agencies. • "Money authorized by Division Norman Liaison over $1200" report (Appendix H) will be generated quarterly.
12

APPENDIX A- SCREENS

"►Weil

........1.........2.........3.........4.........5..........6.........7.........8

01 DCFS

NORMAN PAYMENT AUPHORIZATICN SYSTEM

MM/DD/Y 01

02 ISM - 01

PAYMENT AUDI-IORIZATION

HH : M'4: SS I 02

03

M)REI 03

04 FAMILY ID:

AUTHORIZATION DATE: XX/XX/XXI 04

05

05

06 PRCNIDIIR ID:

06

07

07

08 C ' RACT*

CASEWJR= ID:

08

09

09

10 TYPE (P/R/B): _ TYPE SERVICE CODE:

10

11

11

12 AMOUNT RD)UESTED :

PAYMENT DATE: XX/XX/XX VOUCHER:

12

13

13

14 (ELEVEN THOUSAND 'IVY) HUNDRED TWENTY THREE)

14

15

15

16

C'URP

INF RMATICN

16

17

17

18

18

19

19

20

20

21

21

22

22

ur

23

23

24 ................................................................................ 24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

* Systen will validate bj ID the appropriateness of the transaction. * Systen will redisplay data on an "add" of mamerous related transactions for easy entry.

13

NM-02

.........1....... .2.........3.........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

01 I DC'FS

N RMAN PAYMENT AUT ORIZATIQ SYSTEM

NCI/DD/YY 1 01

02 I ISM - 02

NOF N FAMILY PAYMEI'TT DATA

HII:NM:SS I 02

03 1

MJRE 103

04 I

FAMILY ID

FAMILY NAME

CASE STATUS

I 04

05 I

xxxxxx

105

06 1

106

07 I DATE: _-f_ TD _/_ TYPE: (P/RJB) _ PR(Y\TIDER ID:

STATUS: (A/P/N) _ I 07

08 I--------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----I 08

09 I DATE

PAYMENT TYPE SERVICE PROVIDER ID CONTRACT#

TYPE

10 I XX/)QX/XX

$XX XXXX

XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX PREVENTION

11 I XX/XX/XX $X,XXX XXXX

XXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX PREVENTION

STATUS 109

APPR/PAIDI 10

PAID

I 11

12 I XX/XX/XX

$XX XXXX

XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX REUNITICATION APPR

112

13 I XX/XX/XX

$XXX

xxxx

xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxPRE E[\rrION APPR

I 13

14 I XX/XX/XX $X, XXX

XXXX

XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX RED NIFICATIC N PAID

I 14

15 I XX/XX/XX

$XXX

XXXX

XXXXXX

XXXB XXXXJXXIX H

APPR

I 15

16 I XX/XX/XX

$XX

xxxx

Xxxxxx

oxxx PFEVIIVTION APPR

116

17 I XX/XX/XX

$XX

Xxxx

xxxxxx XXXXXPXXRXEXXVENTION APPR

117

18 I

118

191

119

20)

120

21 1

1 21

22 1

1 22

23 I PF7-FWD, PF8 H)D

I 23

24 I

oco 0000 QXXXXXXXXXXX (MESSAM LINE) 0000 XX0OXXXXX124

................................................ ...............................

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

14

.........1.........2.........3.........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

01 DCFS

NORMAN PAYMENT' AU ORIZATICN SYSTEM

NCI/DD/YY 1 01

02 ISM - 03

CASH ASSISTANCEBY CONTRACT

HH: MM: SS 102

03

IRE 1 03

04 CONIRACT# :

PROVIDER ID: XXXXK

f 05 DATE _,

'Ili __ TYPE SERVICE:

'TYPE: (P/R/B) - STATUS: (A/P/N) _

I 04
I 05

06

06

07

N FM7 N CASH ADVANCE FUNDS R MAIN.II\13

$XX, XXX

I 07

08

CC'TIRACI' AMOUNT PJIPJ 3

$XX, XXX

I 08

09 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----I 08

10

C TE

PAYMENT

TYPE SERV

FAMILY ID

TYPE (R/P/B)

STATUS 109

11

10

t`

12 XX/XX/XX

$XXX

XXXX

xxxxxx x PREVENfla'J APR/PAID I 11

13 XX/XX/XX

$XX

XXXX

XXXXXXXX REUNITICATICN PAID

112

14 XX/XX/XX

$XXX

XXXX

X XXXXKX PREVENT

APPR

13

15 XX/XX/XX

$X,XXX

XXXX

XXXXXXXX REUNIF

PAID

114

16

15

17

16

18

17

19

18

20

19

21 i

120

22

22

23

PF7 FWD, PF8-Bi D

I 23

24

000

XXXXXX (MESSAGE LINE)

124

.........1....... .2.........3.........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

iv

NM-04

1.........2.........3 .........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

01 1 DCFS

NORMAN PAYMENT AUTHORIZATICIV SYSI M

NNI/L'D/YY I 01

02 I - 04

CASH ADVANCE BY CXTIWCT

HH:NM: SS I 02

03

MORE 103

04 I CCNIRACT# :

PROVIDER ID: XXXXX

I 04

05 I CATE /_ TO /__

I 05

06

06

07

N NORMAN CASH ADVANCE FUNS R MAINDn

$XXx, XXX

I 07

08

I\DRMAN CUNIRACT AMJUN= FEMAINl\ $XXX, XXX

I 08

09 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----I 09

-

10

10

11

LATE

PAYMENTt

#

111

12

XX/XX/XX

$XX<

xxxxxxxx

112

13

XX/XX/XX

$XX

xxxxxxxx

113

14

Xx/XX/XX

$XXX

xxxxxxxx

114

15

xX/x/xx

$X,Xxx

xxxxxxxx115

16

16

17

17

18

18

19

19

20

1 20

21

1 21

22

1 22

23

PF7-FWD, PF8-Hi1D

I 23

24

(NESS LIB)

OOXXX 124

................................................ ...............................

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

0

NM-05

.........1.........2..........3.........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

01 DCFS

NiFJ4AN PAYMENT AUIHORIZATICN, SYSTEM

MM/DD/YY I 01

02 ISM — 05

CASH ASSISTANCE BY RE^ICN/SITE/FIEL,D

HH:NM:SS 102

03

MDRE 103

04 I RBSIDN/SITE/FIELD:

104

05 EI TE _1— TO ___/--

I 05

06 TYPE SERVICE:

TYPE (P/R/B) - STATUS: (A/ P/N) -

1 06

07

1 07

08 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------I 08

09 i

109

10

DATE

PAYMENT TYPE RV ID

RA

RSF

FAMILY RE TAR STATUS

TYPI 10

11

SERV

ID

RPB I 11

12 I XX/XX/XX

$XXX XXXX XXXX XX}O) X XXX X X MOOM XXXXX APPR/ PAID RUN I 12

13 XX/XX/X(

$XX XXXX XXXXXX XX>XXXXXXX XMM ) <XXX X XXXXX PAID

PRV i 13

14 I XX/XX/XX

$XXX XXXX XX= X} XXXXX MOM Xxxxxxxx XXXX?x APPR/PAID BTHI 14

15 XX/XX/XX

$X,XXX XXXX XXXXXX ) XXXXXXX XXXXXX )Q 0000 XXX?X APRV

RUN I 15

16

16

17

17

18

118

19 I

119

20

120

21

121

22 I

23

PF7—FD, PF8—BnJD

24

(MESSA

122
I 23 LIT1E) X 00000000000000000000KXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I 24

................................................ ...............................

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

17

1.........2.........3 .........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

01 E FS

N FAN PAYMENT ALTMRIZATIC^T, SYSTEM

MM/DD/YY 101

02 I"M - 06

NORMAN PRIORITY

IHH : Ml: SS I 02

03

03

04

04

05

05

06

06

07

URKER ID:

OQXXXXXXX SSN: XO{X-O(-X}Q

1 07

08

1 08

09

INS ID:

PRIORITW: (FRa4 0 `10 3)

1 09

10

110

11

111

12

12

13

13

14

14

15

115

16

16

17

17

18

118

19

19

20

20

21

21

22

22

23

PF2 - CHNr E IMS ID AND NORMAN PRIORITY

123

24

(MESSAGE LINE)

I 24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

N'3

NM-07

1.........2 .........3 .........4.........5.........6.........7.........8

01 DCFS

NORMAN PAYMF W AUI'liORIZATIU' SYS'T'EM

MM/DD/YY I 01

02 ISM - 07

CASH ADJAI E TRANSFER

HH : NM: SS I 02

03

03

04 FROM C IRAC T# :

P1W ID: XXXXXX

I 04

05

05

06

'ICS CONTRACT# :

PRV ID: XXXXXX

I 06

07

1 07

08 TRANSFER AMOUNT' (NORMAN CASH AD'JANCE F

RE INIl\I)

I 08

09

09

10 OXNIRACT ANtUNT

I 10

11

11

12 PAID B r NJT APPROVED ANIJUNT

XXXXXXXXXXXX

I 10

13

13

14 APPROVED BUr NJT PAID PM)UNr

I 10

15

15

16 APMJVED AND PAID AMOUNT

I 10

17

17

18

118

19

19

20

1 20

21

21

22

122

23

PF2 - TRANSFER (XUIRACT CASH AD\IANCE

I 23

24 ..............................(M.E.S.S.A.G.E..L.IN.E.)....................................... 1 24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

It

rr

APPENDIX B

GENERAL SCREEN SPECIFICATIONS

NM-01 - NORMAN PAYMENT AUTHORIZATIO N

INQUIRY ADD CHANGE DELETE

This is the Main Norman screen where entry of any and all cash assistance information is completed.

Required Fields family ID provider ID contract number caseworker ID type type service code amount requested

Display Onl y Fields family name provider name caseworker name type service code narrative cash assistance received last year contract amount remaining norman cash advance remaining

NM-02 - NORMAN FAMILY PAYMENT DATA

INQUIRY

This is an inquiry only screen used to determine the history of Norman payments to an individual family. For a family, the following information will be displayed: payment date, payment amount, type service code, provider ID, type(prevention, reunification, or both) and paid/approved status.

Required Fields family id date

Optional Fields type (prevention, reunification, or botl provider ID status

El

1.1

NM-03 - PROVIDER CASH ASSISTANCE

INQUIRY

This is an inquiry only screen used to determine currently available cash assistance funds for contract. The following information will be displayed: provider id and name, payment date, payment amount, type service code, family ID, type (reunification,prevention, or both), and pay/approved status.

Required Fields

Optional Fields

contract number

type service

date

type

status

NM-04 - PROVIDER CASH ADVANCE

INQUIRY

This is an inquiry only screen used to look at a history of what cash advances have been paid to a provider. For eac h provider, the following information will be displayed: payment date of cash advance and cash advance amount.

Req uired Fields contract number date

Optional Fields

NM-05 - CASH ASSISTANCE BY REGION/SITE/FIELD

INQUIRY

This is an inquiry only screen used to look at a history of what cash assistance payments have been made. Region or region/site/field code and date is all that is required entry for viewing this screen. For each region or region/site/field the following information will be displayed: payment date, payment amount, type service code, provider ID, contract number, region/site/field, family ID, requesting caseworker ID, paid/approved status, type (reunification,prevention, or both).

Req uired Fields region/site/field date

Optional Fields type service type status

21

di

NM-06 - NORMAN PRIORITY

INQUIRY CHANGE

This is an inquiry and change screen used to set up IMS ID and Norman priority. Worker ID is all that is required entry for viewing this screen. For each worker the following information will be displayed: worker name, worker social security number, IMS ID, Norman Priority.

Required Fields worker ID

Optional Fields

NM-07 - CONTRACT CASH ADVANCE TRANSFER

INQUIRY CHANGE

This is an inquiry and change screen used to transfer cash advance from one contract to another. Contract number "from" required entry for viewing this screen. For transfer Contract number "to" is required The following information will be displayed: provider "from" ID an Name, provider "to" ID an Name, suggested transfer amount, contract,amount remaining, paid but not approved amount, approved but not pay amount, approved and paid amount.

Required Fields Contract number "from"

Optional Fields Contract number "to" Transfer amount

22

w APPENDIX C
NORMAN AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM ERROR MESSAGES
INQUIRY FUNCTIONS: 1. Family ID required for processing. 2. Inquiry required prior to scrolling. 3. Information is already on screen.. 4. Top of data.. 5. End of data.. 6. No data available. 7. Invalid PFKey depressed. 8. Invalid screen selection. 9. Critical error has occurred.... Call ISD at (217) 785-0590. 10. Screen transfer error... Call ISD at (217) 785-0284.
23

E
ADD FUNCTION 1. "ADD" (PF 1) not valid with transfer. 2. Family ID required for processing. 3. Invalid/Missing family ID. 4. Case closed - Must have open family case. 5. Family case must be Norman certified. 6. Approval data missing. 7. Approval data invalid. 8. Provider ID required for processing. 9. Invalid/Missing provider ID. 10. Caseworker ID required for processing. 11. Invalid/Missing caseworker ID. 12. Contract Number required for processing. 13. Invalid/Missing contract number. 14. "Type" must be "R" , "P", or "B". 15. Type service code must be valid for Norman (Cash Advance) payments. 16. Approval amount invalid. 17. Family not registered. Press PFl to confirm approval.
24

4.
ADD FUNCTION (CONT)
18. Family does not contain children in valid placement - Press PF1 to confirm appr. 19. No children in family with return home goal. Press PF1 to confirm approval. 20. "Type" entered does not match "type" calculated "x". Press PF1 to confirm Appr. 21. Amount requested exceeds amount of cash advance. **Request Denied**. 22. No money remaining in contract. **Request Denied.** 23. Requested payment amount exceeds that which is allowed. **Request Denied*". 24. Requested amount of payment approved. 25. . Requested amount of payment reconciled. 26. Approval date must not exceed current date. 27 Critical error has occurred ... call ISD at (217) 785-0284.
25

V

r

CHANGE FUNCTION 1.."Change" (PF2) not valid with transfer. If transferring, press enter. 2. Family ID required for processing. 3. Invalid/Missing family ID. 4. Case closed - Must have open family case. 5. Family case must be Norman certified. 6. Approval data missing. 7. Approval data invalid. 8. Provider ID required for processing. 9. Invalid/Missing provider ID. 10. Caseworker ID required for processing. 11. Invalid/Missing caseworker ID. 12. Contract Number required for processing. 13. Invalid/Missing contract number. 14. "Type" must be "R" , "P", or "B".
26

E'

ii

CHANGE FUNCTION (CONT.)
15. Type service code must be valid for Norman (Cash Advance) payments.
16. Approval amount invalid.
17. Family not registered. Press PF2 to confirm approval.
18. Family does not contain children in valid placement - Press PF2 to confirm appr.
19. No children in family with return home goal. Press PF2 to confirm approval. 20. "Type" entered does not match "type" calculated "x". Press PF2 to confirm Appr.
21. Amount requested exceeds amount of cash advance. *"Request Denied"". 22. No money remaining in contract. "'Request Denied.** 23. Requested payment amount exceeds that which is allowed.
*Request Denied*;.
24. Requested amount of payment approved.
25. Requested amount of payment reconciled.
26. Approval date must not exceed current date. 27. Critical error has occurred ... call ISD at (217) 785-0284.

27

II

I,

DELETE FUNCTION 1.."Delete" (PF3) not valid with transfer. If transferring, press enter. 2. Approval amount invalid. 3. Authorization deleted. 4. Record does not exist. Please re-enter. 5. Date for delete past. Record can not be deleted. 6. Reconciliation complete. Record can not be deleted. 7. Provider ID can not be changed for delete. 8. Contract number can not be changed for delete. 9. Type service code can not be changed for delete. 10. "Type" can not be changed for delete. 11. Case worker ID can not be changed for delete. 12. Approval amount can not be changed for delete. 13. Family ID can not be changed for delete. 14. Approval date can not be changed for delete. 15. Critical error has occurred ... call ISD at (217) 785-0284.

28

11 APPENDIX D

Date

Dear

This is to advise you that your rtquazt for cash assistance

pursuant to the provisions of the Nor-; been review -d and decided as follaus :

in

cor'.

t

t

de-=rep hair

0 Approved s

for

approved S

for

Approved S

for

0 Di s approve-d for s

for

Re on:

Disrpproved for S

for

t;^E50:1:

Should you hove atny que tioa bout this decision, p1CV_%2 contr_ct your cane Worker. You i ay z?so c-&ll rD a.t ( )

In

rcr w th parz:grspb 10 of th Noon, con Ent

decr , you ray apps n1 this -decision. Thy ttxchnd notice

reg.r Ling your app€c1 rightz plisiizhzyw to file $.n app=al

Yourw truly,

R gion a No LA Lianasof

Atttchtont: Notice of A` nL.1 P.1ghtE

F

lA

NOTICES 10 CLASS N_' £t S

o Children, Parents and Guardians (not including foster Farsnts):

::nder the Consent Oder .. \orcin v. Suter (89 C 1624, I11. N.D.,
F.D. ), the Illinois Depar-.yent c= Children and Family Services ("DCFS") i=
:eouirid to notify y ou, for the pur p oses of the Consent Order only, of (1)
DCFS' general policies, (2) the list of available hard services DCFS nay provide ::ou or assist you in o:taining, (3) your right to request such services, (4+) your right to appeal from the delay, denial or reduction of ;,nv of such services, and (3) how You nay make an appeal.

.:: cc=plia.ncc with t::n Cc.^.sent Order, this latter is being sent to vou. GAL POL.IC S DC=5' Sencral policies are as follows; A. -CPS shall not re_m-ove or assist in the re evnl of your child btc. use of

1. your ?iving conditions; 2. y our inability to provide your child's subsistenca needs*

3. y our lack or absence cf

a. inccr-r

b. shelter

c. utility services

c. food

C. clothing;

f. furniture

•

. ctrer s-ubxiztence needs

h.. any othFr • fezture of your phyziczl' emrirornt which DCFS hzs

considered in the decision to rc rc or return

r child.

Your child y Lam. removed froze your hons or th.a horn of the person'

responsibl for your c3tild's welfare if DC.FS has ca4c reasonable efforts to

vli prevent or

inat t a re oval of your child, but the reasonable efforts

would not

crt your child's life or her:lth of truing in rink of icinent

dzn;er. l .•law of rsaxonable efforts are assi^etancs. in loczting and

securing how. in temporary shelter, cash zszistance, food, clothing, child

care, c^rrgcncy czret&kcrs, or advocacy with public and co g a±t7 . Zencita

providing such wervicr:.E.

B. DCFS nh.11 not re vc any child or prevent the return of any child becf.ulc you 1. live in t shcltcr;
2. live with friends or relatives; 3. live in z plr.ce with buildint-code violations;
. live in a place that is eonuidered • too z=11 for the fa. -ily size.

A

'!

.. .__ . c _c =av cc reocved _. e r_s a reasc tc

rc,-= :i.-^cai or _cndit?cns ci _-e ..,.?c . _ . _,..... _.._t cc ;t_ __-3

ace _. :esicc^c: .tsu;s an _._.._ c^t range: to t child , ., __

we

^:aa1t`.. Before _:turning the c::___ .., such l_ •^: g dace ._::a _j the child :i.? :es.cs ^ .-ere and a be ^ c::lc.

sit.:at_cr.s •C' , - - y _cQC .c:

c:-:ei _ e

C.

DC--- mall -c-- remove a c':.. parent's fire to F;e;ec:

.: a

co a parent's c::stodv Seca child :=en the perpetrate:

.:sn cf t` z of a ce..ast:c

v_c -ince. DC:S ray te:sova a c :'_d :=:a a pare^t's c_srcdv

stav? g _.. the place of residence places the child's life c_ health in r'_sk ci i='_nant risk ci ranger, and
3C1S has made reasonable a:fcrts to keep the child in the parent's custod y , and
_. Despite s.:ch reasonable efi:rts, ::;n need to re ova the ch il d still exits.

.zb_c cf crts _.-clude not cnl y the efforts listed above but also efforts such as referring the p arent for services * to obtain an c:dcr of p rotection, exile: i^.,, possible t1zrr;.ative housing, and lo zinc a i _.^.spc_._ g t c _.ici l y _c a she tc_ :or bntturad s:c=sri. DC S shall not rc^ova z :;1!d _.cn the custod y ci a parent on the Sroud that :::a parent lives _n such a- shelter, and DCFS shall return the c::' ld to the custody of a
parent -o lives in st:ch a shciter, if the ietut-n of the child to the parent is c. ¢:-ti.• isc apprcrriztc.

FUJD SERY.FcxS. The list of available hz.rd nnz-;.ice. DS ray provide ::cu cr assist "cu in obtaining are as follcvc:

_. Cash Shelter
J. ltiliz scr` icy
Food 5. Clothier 6. Furniture 7. Other goodz or services to nest subzir.tence or other needs relating
to fe.Pturev of the physical c.nviro:za nt which DS has considered in its decision to rt ove or return your child.

RIG7

Mid S?Y;; lcm. You hzvo the right to request any of DCFS'

avail.-hlc hard services to prevent the rasyoval of y our child fr your

custody or to help the return of . your child to y our custody, when

,r-'•, rarz.o for r vr.l or failure to return v cu; child is th-at you arc

not n3eting a'ubxi^tence needs of your child or y on are unable to

provide ndequxtt: living circa stances for your child.

RIGES 1`p APPEAL .MJ EO 1 TO !=- If y our req €t for hr rd serric&s

ii

dtlr:yc , vr.n denir:d cr rcduccd, you hvo the right to appal the

DCYS -crion or inLction. To zppflnl a 1GS decixicr^,_^'ou- t_sent z urittcn

requcrt within 60 cElcndzr dnyr of date of tnotice of decirion .' You

should send your written request to appeal to - Theresa: Hnyb-crry-D DCpyty

Director, Division of Ad. inistrztive Review,. DCYS, 10 r?'U.—Pzndolph Street,

Suite 6-200, Chicano, Illinoir, 60601.

F

®I

APPENDIX E

NORMAN TYPE OF SERVICE CODES

4001 4002 4003 4004 4005 4006 4007 4008 4009 4010 4 0 1 1 401 2 4013 4014

ADVANCE TO CASH ASSIST PROV-NORMAN CLASS SHELTER/SECURITY DEPOSIT/NORMAN CLASS SHELTER-FIRST MONTHS RET/NORMAN CLASS SHELTER-ADDIT RENT PAYMENT/NORMAN CLASS SHELTER - REPAIRS / NORMAN CLASS UTILITIES - PREVIOUS / NORMAN CLASS UTILITIES - INITIAL COSTS / NORMAN CLASS FOOD/NORMAN CLASS ADMINISTRATION FEE / NORMAN CLASS HOUSING ADVOCACY / NORMAN CLASS CLOTHING / NORMAN CLASS FURNITURE / EQUIPMENT / NORMAN CLASS TRANSPORTATION / NORMAN CLASS MISCELLANEOUS / NORMAN CLASS

32

A

dl ' S5 11:5? t.o .024 :,

APPENDIX F

Rt QUEST FOR CAS. ]AFDC AND/OR HOUSING ASSTSTANCE

Tvc V

2

C.

^^

^'t

r:C

= i itii

c ;.cam:

( ccmplete v Seczion_s 1 & 2)

1 .'Ce of Cash kss_stanc9 (cr..pete Sectc^s , 2 , )

r'^erre cy Eous.ing

Ncr-mar. _

io:;yTe=r Ecus yn5

Ba.r_is

F= .:.n; )

Income Ass:.s:.ance

DP ^.

. (re' ' f)__..

Access to Ccun!ty Resources -,__ rtinance^rt

MrIX: Reu.ti iczticn Asitaice: (complete Section 1)
Section 1: (to be completed by case r..atager on kLL cases)

Name of Client: C'C. S It:

R F
POS F►ge:1cy .

C1r ; Mailing ?dd.ress:

!ow holdd ^o: o_ition:

C i"R ZN'i' BIRTE

NA!?^

LIVAR DATE

PT2ON i0 C ;T

?I `zti' 02 D7-,=-

Problem Description:

Family Income/Resaurces:

E.Ls client been ctified as a me.^,..be; of the No:-r..an class?

o Yes 0 No

If "yes", by who i?

C? supervisor d,CR Norman liaison

Cormp1 ewe ONLY for b?A Specic.l Assistance

b?. Case

S5

-

Items Rec_ruested (indicate § for each furniture item) :

beds

Crib

}itchen Tzb1P

Rent ^.

Clothing

Kitchen Chairs

Food

W Supplies -

I:

DCI95 17:57 \o.O24

kn

!VT EW of case Xss_sr 21 C Z REOJ_S S

5 ec^ _or.? (to be cor^_ctc- by DC_S r..c:.i toxin c agency managed case)

C

V± a ed c,'d aam rcva1 reccm4me.^_ded as r E:=ueste.

o App roval = ecor.rneaded with the fol_owing changes:

. Lva:E

D isappova1 reccrimeadea

-Novi Lori, g Wcrker :

Date:

scc Zion 2: (to be corcra^ eted by

0 l:pp .Z-aved as tcilows :

Payee:

Payee: '

Payee:

c Diza p^ oved as follows:

Payee:

.

Reason:

Payee:

Reason:

Payee:

r Reason.

Norman
Amount: s A*no t: S A.*aou-:t: S Amount: S
Amoustt: S
Amount: S

TSC: TSC: TSC: -

zm !1 v Aoorove (YTD) . S

(No: tiar. only)

4

io^e Z Norrr.a_n Liaiso -1". 3tcT ERA

Date:

?gi r.a? Ad.rr irxistr otor :

Date;

(r net::.: ed __ division approval is beirg requested)

A

D-rC j

E

i, 5 r.o.G24 = .Cl_

Seo:!cn 2: ;alternative Resc .ices other Resources -plored/available to C? ient:

Eecie:: 3: Cas:^ Assistance Recuest A. Payee:
Purpose:

A•aount : S -

Cite-ck to be: 0 Mailed to

o ?icked up by

B. Payee: Purpose:

.. T+Lam:m_t S

Cieck to be: o Kai1ec to

o Picked u-j by

C. Payee: Purpose:

Ar our.t: {^,

Check to be: 0 M -!i ed to

0 Picked up by

Case Manager: Supervisor:

Date; Date:

II

DEC (^' ^,S j7:59 .o .O24 - .C•..

Client Na..e
Type Cash Assistznce

s w - : or. 2: (-o be ccm^ l eted by d ; v'_sion Nc^ar i aison, if rev_-.:4 : cc

O ? pp- Cved as f O 1 lows :

?ayee : ,, ,
Payee: Payee:

-i--

t=Ou' ntt : .S
Amount: S -;mount : S

0 Disapproved as follows : Payees:

Amont : s

reason: Payee;

Aount: $

P.eason:
Payee: Reason

Amount: $

Divis or. No-:;:an Liaison:

Date:

Section 3- •;to be cornpi eted and returned to DCFS by cash assis :.acf pro' v . we;)

Cash Assistance Provider (name )

Contract #F

Check r, .

Pa y ee:

Amount: c

Check t :

Payee:

Amo nt : $

Check R:

Payee:mount: $

Cash F,ssistarce Provider:

Date:

36

F0i OCI UL 0N1"

/_^Zr ;cz ; ,,

1 11 -, ,

' •^:

-L! Vouchor Dato

L^L`LL

_

i•

i S L11U, I

^ O O

^•

c i !

,

I

(I / t-f I ^I n O d ( 0 l

l^1niIGL':oci ,

i' ,

(

DCp2rir1 cn Oi Ci`iidror1 .11 cl i7a.i- lil)'.Scr' cCf,'

i%•tyu

:.

,-,ORMAN EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE BILLING SUM MAR'(

1. Providor to : O p I' rl

7

;.. •: :.' '. ;'. ::

2 Contract No: ::; ' :-'::. • ::..+ : '.

U^

11^1^

I

ProvicorNamo_C.n.t;ho1_1 Gh as'ft (r llQ.c.LLpLÔJ:FEINNo.:

6 218199P ....

AcfcJross 9.' 1__W.— LaL', il' 'r c_ t ,

'71

i

:. r

Phono (815)

t

1.

965-0895

'

'Li Cociu ri 1 109
:

Gorvicu fuportinp I'u,i ,d I = 11OM: _01_UL9 11_ — ---._.

, ' .. -

^S ; , ;.: - .r•• • t •.:.. 'CO:•.

)

_

-

5. Dato ,ubciittod

09 -66-9r,

!

G. t oflional Norman Liaison TLinda

Ropion +tui=,ok1 E2-[

^.

•

Woi'.or Nomo

• ,;.:1.

j D0

I :;, ..; i., i. ..

' ; : i '': ;•... r

0. ''..'::

: 'r:..:.:

•' Cliont's Noma ' ?'

.......... :t• r. :• ,•

.....-.U.:'•'..

:,.... ^: :' DCFS I.DD.

i0. Sorvica
Dato

— - - --

11. Sorvico Codo

I

^.

12.
Chock No. ' "'

^-

•1:1,• ='. ..
Tct.^l
_... . .

!^••.s^^ t, :mss

. . • •.... . ..c..•:;.... :... ..

..

.

.

.

..

rC.,

:. . '

• ADVANCE REQUEST

:•

...

.. Dato of

SoMco

Advanco-Contract

I:' ::: ::'':' ::

.i^

1'r:toDo ^'; '':. ':' 12,50/,5Q

S.C,' 4001

o t o 2^-1^I•^

Unils

$ 5 '2 50.00

•

Expondilun, s-Contract•

a: ':S.C. 4009

Y. to Dalu

(—. C pJ. ^)

• •

Administrat ;,-Contract( •Yr. to Daw

GG2.50

• Cash on Hand

$ —

•'

.

$ Total ;

5

'

203^

.

UU

DISTI?IDUTION OF COPIES

'
• CI it ,* 1n o''t 4V3 .M

'i

•
101".•N( :;'.::

(1) Comptroilar ... ' • (2) CCFS Conual
(3) Ropional.011ico •, (•t) Ilocaivinq 011lcor
(S) I tu,idur...'
•

c:'• : •.",:. 37

14. Sub Total 15. AW. Pagos 16 TOTr1L;:

.:

•

Tho mordtandiso or sorvico billed abo;o has boon recohvd and compllo, o :th • our pocifjç4tionn or request.

RE-CE \'ING OFFIC .,i`i :

(o/LL//

'• 4• ' .

ØATt_ • I•

• CERTIFICAT ON C'- RECEIVING AGENCY

' •

Ii Is hereby coni6od that the sonicos or matarlal ropcaionlod :t th s

•

;• woro rocoiwd or authodzad, that the arraunl is coruct and rosy ap^rc.vd

for payment. II applicable. the tap:rt:np ccgcuo:unu cl ;oca^n 5.1 91

'Act to create Cho } uroau of •no Uud flor' l , on mot :

• :•

r

- -- •".%.–rte ^"y^•i 1 ILAD o%c^rr on null lortlzub

c r

u:, ; t.

_

.

APPEND I R H - REPORTS

NORMAN PAYMENT AUTHORIZATION NOTIFICATION

REPORT DATE: MM/DD/YY REPORT NAME: CFCM4038-A

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
NORMAN PAYMENT AUTHORIZATION NOTIFICATION

REGION: XX - XXXXXXXXXX(XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PROVIDER ID: XXXXXX PROVIDER NAME: XXXXXXXX:!KXKXXXXX)X:LKvXXXXXX.KXXXXX:{XXX

FAMILY
IL

FAMILY
NAME

SERVICE

CASE

CODE

MANAGER. ID

CASE M+NkGFR NAME

AUTHORIZATION AMOIINT

PACE: 999.999 JOB NAME: CFSCHMXX
TYPE

X=%XXy X

X.Kx:(XXX.KXXXXXXX

XXXX

XXXXXX

X}:xx1Xxx Vxx:•:};Xx XXXXXXXXX

$7CK.XXX

PREVENTION

XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXYA

:{YJ(fx.K

XXXXXXX}:XX,KX.KXX XX:{XXXY.XX

$XX.X.KX

REUNIFICATION

XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXX

XX.KXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

$}:.K.XXX

BOTH

XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXX

XXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

SXY..XXX

BOTH

XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXX

XXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

SXX.XXX

REUNIFICATION

XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXX

XXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

$XX.XXX

REUNIFICATI:N

XXYXXYYX

X.'{XXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXX

XXX.XXX

:C-*.XXXXXX:{ XK.YXXX XXXXXXXXX

$XY.. XY.X

BOTH

XXXXXXXX

XXY.XXXXXX%(XXXX

XXXX

:{`_::{:;:{

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX

M.XXX

PREVENTION

XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXY.

::x•::{ Y

X.'{XX.K.K.KXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXX

$XX.XXX

PREVENTION

XXXXXXXX

YX XXXXXXXX.KYXX

XXXX

vvv

vvv vvv v Xv:CKY.!.'{:•:K

$XX.YXX

PREVENTION

Notes: 1) Sequence Family ID within Provider ID within Region. Break by Region. 2) Distribution: Division Norman Liaison (All Regions) Norman Liaison (Region Specific) 3) Frequency: Monthly

38

PROVIDERS WHOSE CASH ASSISTANCE MONEY IS LOW

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REPORT DATE: MM/DD/YY

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

PAGE: 999,999

REPORT NAME: CFCM3001-A

OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES

JOB NAME: CFSCMWXX

PROVIDERS WHOSE CASH ASSISSTANCE MONEY IS LOW

AS OF XX /XX /XX

REGION X.X / XX / X% XXXXX%Y.MXXXXXXXX.XXX % x`:

PROVIDER ID
---------
XXY. %.\.r XXXXXX xxxxxx

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTR4CTS 5200.000 PROVIDER NAME --------
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%XX%XXXXXXx::•:::`:XXXXXXx XXXXXXXXXXXXXIt:{X{%XX%X?(XXX%?::: `:%X?X (Y}: % XXXXXXXXXXXXXX:{Xx:{ LrXXXXXXYx::Y?:?X'?XX }:%

CURRENT CASH BALANCE
------------
SX.X I :.ix S.XX. YXX S.7.X. X:tY

PROVIDER ID
---------
XXxXXX :?X:{XJ(X x;'J.XXX

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTPJCTS 590.000 - 5100.000

PROVIDER

CURRENT CASH

NAME

BALANCE

--------

------------

XXX XXXXXXXXX%XXX:{XX%\:{XX}::{.`:::}:::.:•::?xxX.'C?X r XXXJU(XXXXXXxxxxx•:% YY.XXXX'r::{X:?.•:::•:%.0+X:..{'r::: XXXXXXXXXXXXX Y.XXXXXY.X:{xY.XXx};Cxi:%%xxxxx

SX % xxx
SXX,.X%::: SXX. Y.}' x

PROVIDER ID
---------
XX'{XXX X%.{:?:{X XY.XXXX

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTP=^'TS 57n.nn0 - eRO_oo9

PROVIDER

CURRENT CASH

NAME

BALANCE

--------

------------

XXXXXXXXX.KXX%XXY\\YJ (xxlxlux ::?%ix:XXXXX:{}::{
XXX%XXXXXXX: XXx*CxXxxxXXXXX Xx %••::? %.C:{X%.'?%v XXXXXXXXXXXXXY.XNv,Yvq%XX%Xxvx: %•r•{Xx,•{X) xxx

Sxx, XXX Sxx.xx.Y 5?:%. %%X

PROVIDER ID
---------
XXXXYx XXXXXX % XX:c?

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTRACTS < S20.000 PROVIDER NAME --------
Y'?XXY.XXXXX:{XXI•X}.'.%::%%:L'•:Y3.XX.•.:ttx%XXXX:{,IX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXU.:::::%:•:XYx': Y v; xxxxXxxXXXX X;?XXXXXXXXXX%7(.:'<x:.:IXXY%:•'.X.*C,..,°; :':C{X:U::?Y.

CURRENT CASH BALANCE
--------'---
SXXI%::,;? s:.x • •: vv 5:{'?...i::?

KITES

1) SequencA report by contract amount categories 2) Distribution rhru E-MAIL to: Lead Norman Liaison !Region Specific)
Division Norman Liaison !Ali Regions)
3) Frequency: WEEKLY

39

i

NORMAN AUTHORIZED PAYMENTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PAID
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REPORT DATE: MM/DD/YY REPORT NAME: CFCM40j7-A

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
NORMAN AUTHORIZED PAYMENTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN RECONCILED

PACE: 999,999 JOB NAME: CFSCMMXX

REGION: XX - YX (tx? :::::•:::\:}::t\}::LX\ CXX

FAMILY
IL

FAMILY NAME^_

XXx]:XXY.x xxxxxxxxxx<xxxx XxxxxxxX xxxxxxx:xxxxxxx XXXXXKXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX xxxXYxxx xxxxxx CXX XVXxxx XYY': Xxxx XXXXY' ''' Y:. X:tY::r: xXXXX:i:•:x xxxX'X:c:x: _c:x •. V: xxxXxxxx XXxXxxX ::::1•:xXXX
XXXXXXXX XYXXYX:•:.C::1XYX.'•:X XXXXXXXX xxxxxxXXxx •:xx:•:X XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXY.XXXXXX XXXXXXXX xxxy.xxxxxxxxxXx XXXXXXXX xxxxxxXXX:Xxxx:•1.x XXxxXXxx XXXXxXX?(X:CxXxxx XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXyxX YyXXXXxXxx.'txxtx XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XUUXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XxXXXXXX XXXxXXxXXXXXXVX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PROVIDER ID

PROVIDER NAME

xxxxxx XXXXxX xXXxXX XXXXXX rXXXX •: xxxxxx XXXXXX XXXXXX
XXXXXX XXxXXx XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX X`IXXXX XXXXXX xxxxxx XXxXXX xxxxxx

xxxxxXxxXxxXxxxxxx:tx XXXXXxxxXXxKXXXXx uxx xxx xxx xxScxxxx xxxx X xX XXXXXXXXYXXXX V XXXYXX
XXXYXXXXXXXX'' XXXXXXX X XXxXXXXX.XX'•;X XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX X }::•:X XXY. XXX XXXXXXxXX`:xx•:X:xxxxxx XXXhxxX YxXXXXXXXXX X X.KY.XXXXXXXXXXXXY.:CSX XXX XXXXXXXx"..xXxXXXX XXXXXXXXX`CXXXXXXXXxX XXXXXXXXXXXXXX:O(YXXx XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX XXXXXXXXYXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXxXXxxX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxX XXXXXXXxXXXxXXXxXXXX XXXXXXXxXXXXXXXXXXxX XXXXXXXXxxxXXXXXXYXX

CASE MANAGER ID

CASE MANAGER NAME

XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX XX:tX':X xxXXXX XXX.XXX XXXXYX xXxx :X XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX xxxxxx XXXXXX XXxxXx XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXYX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXY?:xx3.x
xXXxXXXY.xXCX:'-,. XXXXXXXX XtXxXxxxxxxxXx•. XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX:!:ix. x XXXXXXXXXXXXXYX XXXXXXXX xxXxxxxxXxxx •yX xxxy.xx;:x XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX. X`(XXXxxxxxxX.XXx Xx.C.:xxXx xxxxxXXXXXXXXxx XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXYX XXXXXXYY. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXYX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXYX

AUTHORIZATION AMOUNT
SXX.XXX
SXX.XXX
SXX.XXX S XX, XXX Sxx.xxX SXY..!!YJ. SXX.XXX SXx.XXX sxx, xxx SXX.XXX SXX.Xxii SxX.XXX SXX,XXX SXX.XXX SXX.XXX SXX.XXX SXX.XXX SXX,X.XX SXX.XXX SXX,XXX

DATE AUTHORIZED
XX/XX/XX
XX/XX/XX XY./XX /XY. XX /XX /XX X%/xX/Xx XX/XX/XX Xx,xx :'x. XX/XXIXX xx/.,WXX XX/X'(/X': XX/XX/XX Xx/XX/X'! XX/Y-X/XX XX/XX/XX XX/YX/XX XX/XX/XX XX/XX/XX XX/XX/XX XX/XX/XX XX/XX/XX

NOTES:

1) Sequence report by Family ID 2) Distribution : Lead Norman Liaison (Region Specific)
Division Norman Liaison (All Regions) I) Frequency: !4.'nthly

r

M

PROVIDERS WHOSE CONTRACT MONEY IS LOW

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REPORT DATE: FP1/DD/YY

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

PAGE: 999,999

REPORT NAME: CFCM2002-A

OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES

JOB NAME: CFSCMDXX

PROVIDERS WHOSE CONTRACT MONEY IS LOW

AS OF XX/XX/XX

REGION XX/XX/X.'! vvXY.'!XY!:.:?:!X:!XX:?:!:(!:!XX:{k1!X:CxX:!:{:{r

PROVIDER ID
---------
XXXXXx XXXXXX Y:{XXX}:

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTRACTS S200.000 PROVIDER NAME --------
XXXXX: xYXX.'{XXxx LXXXxv.*C% {xXXX::}:XXX: {X:xxxX XXXX:•::::•,_XxYK:{X:^ 1*CXxyxxxxxxxYJ: ri:.KXXXXX>:XX XxXX:•::•::•{YX:?XXxx xxxX:•:XXXXXX.ICQ.X):x x ..l I., XXx

CURRENT CASH BALANCE
------------
$XX. XXX $XX, XXX $XX,XXX

PROVIDER ID
---------
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

N PM-. y PROVIDERS WITH CONTRACTS SQ0.noo - 5200.000

PROVIDER

CURRENT CASH

NAME

BALANCE

--------

------------

XXX`' :{: 'SXX:?X:!:{:!:{XXXXXx'!X:•'!X:!i:Y,Xv ZvixY.XX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.'SXXXXXXXXXXXXXYXXXXXX.XSXX XXXXX.* iXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxXXXYX,* XXYXXYXXX

$XX. XXX $XX,XXX $X:{. XXX

PROVIDER ID
---------
XXXXXX XX.'•:X:_x X,v.,:Y.?(:!

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTRACTS 520.000 PROVIDER NAME --------

- SR9.999 CURRENT CASH BALANCE ------------

XY.X:t%.,!ILYXXXXXXXXXXXx.xx.X:! Xy:•:Y_xx:4,.MX. XX XY.XX:!}'..ex{XY.Y•X.'{XY,:{Xx:' X:LxYJ{XXY.::Y:•:::.':.'?X}::?XX Y.vrv_••:::C4 X7:X:.°•XY.YXXXX:::C{.'?.'!::X:: 4_'?Xi:f.

$XX..X:•:X $XX,XXX $XX. XYx

PROVIDER ID
---------
XX.U)CX X:^...{.A . .^...1.. :Stif..1: J.

NORMAN PROVIDERS WITH CONTRACTS < $20.000 PROVIDER NAME --------
XXXXXXR:{XXXXYAXXXXXX .'?Y-•XX:!x::XXYxx":C "X X.•tri..^r..C...:.....^..,r.y.....L. ,.•..XX.U....r.y.r.v:...:.::.• t..:...:...:.....:...:.....!..:.r...r.......,....^......:..y X.':...{:..1...Y.'.A:.x.!:;.{...-.... u...............u..........

CURRENT CASH BALANCE
------------
$XX. XXX $Xn,XX:S
XX,

NOT F.

1) Sequence report by contract amount categories 2) Distribution thru E-MAIL to: Lead Norman Liaison Regicn Specific)
Division Norman Liaison !All Regions)
3) Frequency: Daily

41

M

MONEY AUTHORIZED BY DIVISION NORMAN LIAISON OVER $1200
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REPORT DATE: MM/DD/YY REPORT NAMEt CFCM5001-A

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
MONEY AUTHORIZED BY DIVISION NOR?1AN LIAISON OVER $1200

PACE: 99949 JOB NAME: CFSC1KXX

FAMILY ID
xLXxXxX xxxyxxxx xx:cxxxx vvvvvr'.v
xxxxxxxx XXxXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXYXXXYX xxxxxxxx xx:'_'xxxx

FAMILY NAME
xxxxxxxxxxv xxxx

SERVICE

CASE

CODE

MANAGER ID

XXXX

XXXxXY

CASE MANKER NAME
xxx xxxxxx:<xxx xxxxxxxxx

AUTHORIZATION AMOUNT
$Xx.XXX

R/S/F 1A/ /01

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxx

xx':xx.x

xxx xx.xx:cxxxx xxxxxx.<xx

SXX.XXX

IA/ /04

x<x:<xxx:• xxxxx

xxxx

xx<xxx

:x:•::c:xxxxxx'xxx::xxxxxx

sXx.XXX

IB/ /12

:ox:c<xxxx:':xxxx

xxxx

xx xxx

%L% X..,

xxxy."xxxx

1B/ /17

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxx

XXXXXXY.C'XXXXXX

XXXX

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxx

xxxxxxxxx:c<xxxx

XXXX

,cv.xxxxxx_v.xxxx

xxxx

xxx'xxxxxxxxxxx

xxxx

x.xxxxx XXXXXX xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx

xxx:• xxxxxx,xx xxxyxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxx.'xxxxx xxxc:xxxxxxxxxx xxxyxxxxx xx:• xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxx:xxxxxxxxxx xx:•.xxxxxx
xxxx<x:c•:':x xxxxxx.'txx

sxy.,xxx $XX.XXX sx':.xxx $Y.X.XXX $XX.XXX

2A/ /01 3A/ /71 5A/ /45 6B/04/12 6C/01/01 6D/01/12

Notes: 11 Sequence Family ID 2) Distribution: Jeanine Smith. Norman Court Monitor Ikry Ste Mcrsch, Associate Director 3 1 Freuency: Quarterly

42

MONEY AUTHORIZED BY DIVISION NORMAN LIAISON OVER $1200 SUMMARY

REPORT DATE: MH/Dr'/YY REPORT NAME: CFCW.001-B

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES
MONEY AUTHORIZED BY DIVISION NORMAN LIAISON OVER $1200 SUMMARY

PACE: 999,999 JOB NAME: CFSCMQXX

R/S/F x::,xxixx xx,:•:xixx xx,xXiXX

TOTAL A MOUNT OF rUITHORIZTION Sx,xxx $xx,xxx $xx.xxx

XX xx,:xix:<

SXx,XXX $XX.XXX

XX.'XX/XX xx,:xixx xx,xx,x:'.

$XX. XXX $Xx.xxx sxx,xxx

XX/xX/XX

$XX.XXX

XX/XX/XX

$XXXXX

XX/XX/XX

$XX.XXY.

Notes:

1) Sequence R/S/F 2) Distribution: Jeanine Smith, Norman Court Monitor
Mary Sue Morsch, Associate Director 3) Frequency: Quarterly

NUNRER OF FAMILIES xx•:x x•xx
xxxX x;•.xx XXXX XXXX xxxx XXXX XXXX XXXX

43

F

rr

APPENDIX I

DATA BASE REQUIREMENTS

CFTBNM1000

91x0 (APPROVAL / VOUCHER TABLE. 8,000 RECORDS PER YEAR. READ/ADD/CHANGE/DELETE)

PRV_ID+OBLIG_ID+FAM_ID+TIME_STAMP IS A KEY

PRV_ID OBLIG_ID FAM_ID TIME_STAMP RSF_CODE PAY_IND APRV_IND TYPE_SERV_CODE
REUN_PREV_ENT REUN_PREV_CLC WKR_ID ENT_WKR_ID AUTH_DATE
PMT_DATE AUTH_PMT_AMT
VOUC_ID CASH_ADV_TYPE RPT DATE CHNG_DATE ENT DATE

CHAR(06) CHAR(10) CHAR(08) TIMESTAMP
CHAR(06) CHAR(01) CHAR(01) CHAR(04)
CHAR(01) CHAR(01)
CHAR(06) CHAR(06) DATE DATE DECIMAL(11:2)
CHAR(08) CHAR(01) DATE DATE DATE

NOT NULL NOT NULL NOT NULL NOT NULL NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT
NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

Data Set for load CFS9986.PPF96.N4001

44

is
CFTBNM2000

New (CASH ADVANCES TABLE. 500 RECORDS PER YEAR. READ/ADD/CHANGE/DELETE)

PRV_ID+OBLIG_ID+PMT DATE+PMT TIME IS A KEY

PRV_ID OB LIG_ID PMT_DATE PMT TIME TYPE_SERV_CODE CASH_ADV_AMT VOUC_ID CHNG_DATE ENT DATE

CHAR(06) CHAR(10) DATE TIME CHAR(04) DECIMAL(11:2) CHAR(08) DATE DATE

NOT NULL NOT NULL NOT NULL NOT NULL NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

Data Set for load CFS9986.PPF96.Y4001

45

®_i CFFBNM9000

New (REGION SITE FIELD.TABLE 50 RECORDS PER YEAR. 700 RECORDS CURRENT READ/ADD/CHANGE/DELETE)
RSF_CODE IS A KEY

RSF CODE REGN_S ITE_CODE TEAM TYPE ESTABL_DATE
CLOS_DATE FLD_NAME RSI? STR_ADDR RSF_CITY_ADDR RSF? ST ADDR RSF_ZIPS_ADDR RSF_ZIP4_ADDR PRT NAME CHNG_DATE ENT DATE

CHAR(06) CHAR(04) CHAR(03) DATE DATE CHAR(25) CHAR(40) CHAR(20) CHAR(02) CHAR(05) CHAR(04) CHAR(06) DATE DATE

NOT NULL NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT
NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

46

14

4I

CFFBNM9100

New (REGN/SITE TABLE 40 RECORDS CURRENT READ ONLY)

REGN_SITE_CODE IS A KEY

REGN_SITE_CODE REGN_CODE SITE_NAME SITE_STR_ADDR SITE_CITY_ADDR SITE_ST ADDR SITE_ZIP5_ADDR SITE_ZIP4_ADDR
CHNG_DATE ENT DATE

CHAR(04) CHAR(02) CHAR(25) CHAR(40) CHAR(20) CHAR(02) CHAR(05) CHAR(04) DATE DATE

NOT NULL NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

47

F

di

CFTBNM9200

New (REGION TABLE. 16 RECORDS CURRENT READ ONLY)

REGN CODE IS A KEY

REGN_CODE ADMN_REGN_CODE REGN_NAME REGN_STR_ADDR REGN_CITY_ADDR REGN_ST ADDR REGN_ZIP5_ADDR REGN_ZIP4_ADDR CHNG_DATE ENT DATE

CHAR(02) CHAR(01) CHAR(25) CHAR(40) CHAR(20) CHAR(02) CHAR(05) CHAR(04) DATE DATE

NOT NULL
NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT
NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT
NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

48

W

W

CFTBNN49300

New (ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 4 RECORDS CURRENT. READ ONLY)

ADMN REGN CODE IS A KEY

ADMNREGN_CODE ADMNREGN_NAME COOK_DOWN_STATE ADMN_REGN_STR_ADDR ADMN_REGN_CITY_ADDR ADMN_REGN_ST ADDR ADMN_REGN_ZIP5_ADDR ADMN_REGN_ZIP4_ADDR CHNG_DATE ENT DATE

CHAR(01) CHAR(25) CHAR(01) CHAR(40) CHAR(20) CHAR(02) CHAR(05) CHAR(04) DATE DATE

NOT NULL NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT
NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

49

u

C,

CFTBAC9100

Mod CWKR_ID
SOC_SECUR_NUM NEW IMS_ID NEW NORMAN_ PRIORITY
ENT DATE CHNG_DATE

CHAR(6) CHAR(9) CHAR(8) CHAR(1) DATE DATE

NOT NULL NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT NOT NULL WITH DEFAULT

50

r

1

 
 DRAFT
From Child Protective Services to Family Intervention: Redesigning the Front Door
Concept Paper
for the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services Jess McDonald, Director February 1996
Prepared by Hornby Zeller Associates, Inc.
Troy, New York 518 273-1614 Dennis Zeller, Ph. D., M.S.S.W. .Helaine Hornby, M.A.
1

Contents

Part I.

Reasons for Redesigning the Front Door

1

Part II. Structure of the New Front Door System

6

Part III. Issues to be Resolved

16

Part IV. Implementation Steps

33

t I

1.

Part I. Reasons for Redesigning the Front Door

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services has embarked on an effort to redesign the way the initial services are delivered to families who have been the subject of an abuse allegation. The project most directly impacts the investigative function and in-home services but also affects prevention and out-of-home services. Its genesis is a series of issues that have been articulated by planning groups, agency administrators, caseworker staff and community leaders. For example, the July 1994 Framework for Illinois Child Welfare System cites, as one of its central themes, the need for "Front Door" improvements to the child and family services system.
In the current model, the State Central Register receives a report of abuse and/or neglect and assigns a specific allegation to the report which is then transmitted to the Child Protection Investigator (CPI). The investigator goes out to evaluate the situation, focusing on the specific allegations. His or her goal is essentially to verify the truth in the allegations. Because of this single focus, the investigator provides few if any links to services to the family. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigative worker passes the case on to the Division of Child Welfare if additional services are needed.
Statute requires that the investigation worker not only establish the truth of the allegations but also conduct a safety assessment. There is, however, no direct connection between the simple truth of an allegation and the jeopardy to the child's current safety. The safety assessment is therefore a distinct function performed by the investigator which requires consideration both of the immediate dangers the child faces and of the resources that may eliminate that danger. In short, the safety assessment is a casework function, yet the investigator has neither access to nor training in the use of services other than out of home placement. Thus the separation between the investigative and the casework functions and the simultaneous assignment of the assessment to the investigator leaves only two strictly correlated choices: either the child is safe and can remain in the home or the child is not safe and must be removed.
To evaluate the proposed model adequately, it is important to understand the problems the model is attempting to address, the goals of the system of which it will be part, the theoretical framework behind the solution, the objectives of the model, the strategies for pursuing those goals and the questions which have to be resolved before implementation can -be completed. This paper provides an overview of these points.

D
Problems to be Addressed by Model
Between fiscal years 1990 and 1994, the number of child abuse and neglect reports accepted by the State Central Register (SCR) rose by 24 percent, from 60,737 to 75,514. Because the indication rate has remained constant during that period, the number of families needing services has risen by an equal proportion.
Many of the families coming into the child protective system in Illinois require more intensive interventions than those seen in early times. While child abuse reports were rising by one-quarter, the number of protective custodies taken by DCFS rose by more than 40 percent. Moreover, families who receive services are staying in the system longer now than previously, whether they are served while intact or while a child is placed in foster care.
No change the agency can make will have an impact on the numbers and types of families appearing before it. What the agency can do, however, is create mechanisms through which it is better able to respond to families in need. DCFS now struggles with its ability to respond to the families in greatest need, to select the most appropriate service strategy, and to define the specific outcomes which it can reasonably expect to achieve. The model proposed here is intended to address internal barriers to DCFS' ability to provide responsive and effective services. Some of these barriers include the following.
Investigative approach towards families: Perhaps the biggest problem to be addressed by the model is a problem endemic in child protective services nationally, the approach public agencies take towards the families they serve, spawned by the investigatory function of the state. Since the federal adoption of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974 child protective services have gradually and consistently evolved toward a quasi-police function in many states. Under current rules the investigator is responsible for deciding what happened, who did it, what are the safety and risk issues, and what resources should be employed to assure the immediate safety of the child. The initial investigatory process which focuses on substantiating or proving an allegation of abuse can be a process which alienates families, placing them on the defensive and making it difficult to establish a helping relationship once the agency has decided to intervene.
2
4

'I
Lack of capacity for differential treatment: At present there is little differentiation in the way investigations are conducted or in the decisions that are made, even when different family issues are discovered. That means that if a family's primary needs result from poverty and not abuse, they receive the same type of investigation as a sexual perpetrator. Conversely, if a family has committed egregious acts against a child and does not acknowledge them and has no prospects of improving, they too are treated in the same manner as anyone else. DCFS has not taken a position on what are acceptable levels of risk and what service strategies should be used under different family scenarios. Except for the selective involvement of law enforcement and the state's attorney, there is no mechanism for the differential handling of cases which results in an inefficient use of resources and delays in identifying children for whom reunification is not an option.
Delays in helping families: Because the current process focuses on investigating the allegation, there are few up-front efforts to provide social services to families, unless there is an immediate need for removal. Moreover, because the need for services is determined by the staff in the Child Welfare unit who do not receive or consider the case for days or weeks after the investigation is completed, the family's situation can actually deteriorate before services are forthcoming. For both reasons, the state loses the opportunity to engage a client who may be motivated to change in a time of crisis.
Inefficient use of community resources: Because service recommendations come late in the process, the natural supports available in the community are often not used to the family's best advantage. In addition, by the time more formalized services are offered, such as family counseling and parent education, the immediate family crisis may have abated, with a concomitant loss in motivation on the part of the family.
Nebulous follow-up: In Illinois, as in many other child protective service systems, the heavy focus on abuse investigations has resulted in a watered-down focus on follow-up services. Investigations are specific, time-limited functions carried out by highly-trained staff. However, investigations serve no function if the state has not the will, the ability or the service resources to act. Assessments of family needs and follow-up services must be as professionally rendered, as well defined, and as guided by a sense of urgency as are investigative services.
Waste of resources in investigating new reports of abuse: Often DCFS receives a new report of abuse or neglect on a family who has already been identified. This may occur during either the investigative or the ongoing phases. At present a new
3

investigation is launched, following the same procedure that would be used if a family were unknown to the system. While the current approach ensures that only specially trained investigators examine abuse allegations, this approach also results in the inefficient use of investigative resources, the confusion to the family of introducing a new worker, and the possible disruption of a helping relationship which may have been established by the current worker.
Family confusion about workers' functions: Because the case moves from worker to worker and unit to unit, the family may become confused about the different functions and approaches being taken. Families who may be getting used to one worker are then presented with another. Families have a fundamental need to know the answer to the questions: who are you, how long will you be involved with my family, and to what end?
Virtues to Be Maintained
Despite the problems with the current system, it does contain features that benefit families and should not be lost in any restructuring. These include the following:
Focus on child maltreatment: Due to the allegation-based features of the current system, families who receive services are generally those who have been confirmed as perpetrators of child maltreatment. From one perspective this is problematic; families who have not already hurt children cannot receive help through the public agency. From another perspective this is a virtue: it keeps the mandate of the child protective services agency consistent with one essential purpose, to protect children from future abuse.
Highly trained and competent investigators: Because their functions are relatively narrow and their activities must be performed within specified timeframes, the ability to train investigators has been a successful endeavor in DCFS. In a sense the CPIs are perceived to form an elite core of workers within the agency. Both internally and externally they are generally perceived as knowledgeable and efficient, especially in relation to other staff whose functions are more diffuse and whose cases tend to lack the sense of urgency that is present in light of a new abuse report.
Highly specified processes: DCFS has placed a lot of effort in developing tools and processes for workers to use at the beginning of a case. These include the new
4

i1

^_►

Child Protective Investigators handbook which is being developed by the American Humane Association, the Child Endangerment Risk Assessment Protocol, the Family Assessment Factor Worksheet, and the Safety Determination Protocol training curriculum. Not only will these efforts not be lost in the redesign, they will become the building blocks for further structuring of the casework process which places greater emphasis on improving service delivery.
Controlled capacity of service system: The ability of DCFS to respond to reports is controlled in part by the number of investigators who have been assigned to that function. Due largely to litigation settlements, investigators are limited in the number of cases they can investigate within any given month. These controls play a salutary function in the system, maintaining consistency in the agency's ability to respond. That ability to respond must be not only maintained but improved.
Summary
The separation of the first contact made by DCFS from the service delivery function misses the opportunity to motivate families at the point at which they are most likely to respond, namely, the point of crisis. By the time DCFS is ready to deliver services, the family has already had to deal with at least two workers approaching the case with different perspectives. From the family's perspective, DCFS lacks a service orientation.
The current system requires essentially the same response to every type of problem. It separates the substantiation of an allegation with an assessment of need and the identification of needed services, particularly those that can be provided in the home. It does not capitalize on the use of natural helpers in the family's life and community and it does not involve service providers in the community until a great deal of time has elapsed. Once the investigation is complete, the case gets passed on to another unit, creating delays and inefficiencies as well as confusion to the family.
The virtues of the current system are the training of the investigative workers, their competency in performing the relatively defined and limited task of investigation, the degree to which their function is specified in policy, procedures and forms, and the positive perception CPIs enjoy among the professional community. To the extent possible, these virtues should be maintained.

5

Part H. ' Structure of the New Front Door System
Goals of the System The Department of Children and Family Services is in the process of defining child and family outcomes for the entire service system. Any redesign of services must be able to achieve these outcomes. Changing a process should enhance the results. The major domains and outcome areas are as follows': • Safety
The risk of harm to children will be minimized. Children are protected from abuse and neglect in their homes whenever possible. • Permanency Children will have permanency in their living situations The length of time children spend in out-of-home care is consistent with the child's and family's needs • Family and Child Well-Being Families will have enhanced capacity to provide for their children's needs School age children will have educational achievements appropriate to their abilities Children will receive adequate services to meet their health and medical needs
' Please see Child and Famil y Outcomes. December. 1995. Department of Children & Family Services for a listing of each
indicator and data on current performance in relation to these outcomes.

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Children residing in substitute care will have a sense of well-being
Parents of children residing in substitute care will be satisfied with services provided by the Department
The Department will work in partnership with foster parents.
The redesigned system will most directly affect the safety indicators and will least directly affect the family and child well-being indicators in that the latter are currently directed primarily towards families of children who are in substitute care.
Theoretical Framework: Reengineering Principles
In developing the redesigned front door, three kinds of background research were conducted: a review of the literature on practice and structural reforms in child welfare services; a survey of twelve states relating to their intake practices; and reviewing the management literature for concepts that can be applied to social services in general and child welfare in particular. One particular area of interest here is the findings from the management literature, specifically the principles behind "business process reengineering." Some of these principles, which have been adopted at some level by social service agencies, have direct bearing on Illinois' efforts to reengineer the casework process. They include the following:
Work should be organized around the basic functions which are to be accomplished, not around the specific tasks which are currently used to perform that function.
2. Jobs should be combined to avoid handing work off from one unit to another.
3. Elaborate controls should be minimized, allowing the majority of cases to be handled in a generic, routine fashion within relatively broad but welldefined guidelines.
4. A case manager should act as a single point of contact for the customer or client, assuming responsibility for all activities dealing with that case.
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Applying these principles to child welfare results in the following:
1. Work should be organized around the three goals described above: safety, permanency and child and family well-being and should be documented around key decisions that inform these goals.
2. The functions of investigating allegations and assessing risk to the child should be combined into one job.
3. The majority of cases should be handled by non-specialized workers, while cases which cannot be handled routinely are referred to specialists.
4. One person should be responsible for all aspects of the case, including investigation, family assessment and service delivery at any given time for intact families, and this person is the single point of contact for the client.
The above are basic work engineering principles designed to ensure efficient accomplishment of agency goals. Their unifying principle is that the organizational structure should enhance rather than impede moving the case through the system to a successful client outcome. To accomplish that purpose, the following objectives need to be achieved.
• Reduce the amount of time it takes for services to be initiated to families
• Reduce the number of caseworkers a family has to one for as long as the child(ren) remain at home
• Make greater use of purchased and specialized services through local area networks (LANs) now called Child Protection Family Networks
• Make greater use of other public services as the families' needs indicate
• Enhance the helping relationship by assessing family strengths as well as needs during the course of an investigation and distinguishing between persons who should be prosecuted for criminal activity and persons who should be evaluated for service
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• Differentiate the initial response to families by the types of problems they face
• Increase the role of the family in making decisions
• Handle subsequent reports of abuse on the same family in a more efficient and family-friendly manner.
In a more complete articulation of the redesigned system these principles must be operationalized so- that people can determine whether they are being met. Baseline information will be developed to determine, for example, what the current role of the family is in making decisions and how the agency will know if the role has been increased.

Strategy
The primary strategy of the redesigned system is to deliver what will now be called family intervention services through highly trained generalists capable of performing specialized tasks. These highly trained generalists are caseworkers who know how to perform the specialized tasks of conducting investigations, determining the child's immediate safety, assessing the child's future risks in the context of the family's strengths and needs, developing service plans directly delivering and managing other services, supervising short-term placements as needed, and determining when a child is sufficiently safe to close a case. In addition to having appropriately trained and experienced people in these jobs, they also must be very well supervised. The functions are discussed in more detail below.

Work Organization: Three Case Stages and Three Types of Units
The proposed redesign affects both the structural design of the system and the functions performed by caseworkers. The proposed new structure would divide casework practice into three stages and casework staff into three units: the State Central Register; the Family Intervention Unit; and Permanency Services.

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Stage One: From Initial Call to Field Referral for Family Intervention

During this stage reports of suspected child abuse and neglect are received by the State Central Register (SCR). The caseworker, commonly known as the Call Floor Worker, determines if a child protective investigation is necessary and assesses the urgency of the report based upon specific factors prescribed by policy and law. 2 If the worker decides that an investigation is not warranted, he or she informs the reporter of other community resources that may be available. If the report is accepted the caseworker decides whether the allegation is Priority I, II, or III, which determines how quickly the field needs to respond. A report is considered high priority if the child is in imminent risk of harm, among other criteria.

DCFS Unit:

State Central Register

Functions: 1. Gather referral information 2. Determine if report meets acceptance criteria 3. Assign allegations 4. Assign emergency response code

Decisions 1. Whether the referral is a bona fide report 2. What priority to assign for field investigation 3. Whether an emergency response is needed 4. What community services would be useful if the report does not warrant investigation.

2 The description of Stage one is derived from the Illinois CPI Handbook Draft, chapter 1, Planning the Investigation,
which is being developed for the agency by the American Humane Association and is currently in draft form.
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The functions and decisions made by the State Central Register staff would not change from current practice.
Stage Two: From Family Intervention to Case Closure or New Permanent Goal
Most families served by DCFS will have their longest engagement with the system at this stage. It combines what was formerly Child Protective Investigations and Child Welfare Services, the latter encompassing intact family or in-home services. A primary reason for joining the concepts of investigation and family assessment is that the information gathered in any investigation should be used directly for service planning. The investigation must serve both the case planning and service delivery functions.
Calica and Morton (1995) articulate strategies for human change which can be used to benefit the child and the family. These strategies can be more fully realized in the proposed redesign. In a child protective investigation the family's motivation is often to get the state out of the family's life. Unlike other social services, in child protective services coercion plays a role. While an abusive parent has grave concern for his child and generally regrets the harm he has inflicted, he is also angry about the intrusiveness of the state's investigation. The more potent motivation for change may be to "rid itself of the agency's intrusion." (p.15) "It implies that the best the agency has to offer is the hope of being left alone. Nevertheless, this may be the best way to reach the client psychologically..." What is needed is workers who combine the helping function with the coercion function.
In the proposed redesign the concepts of investigation, family assessment, service planning and service delivery are joined. This does not mean that one person performs every function by him- or herself, but that one person, who is the family's primary point of contact, has responsibility for ensuring that each function is carried out. This may include responsibility for removal if the safety concerns are sufficiently great. Only when the case planning goal has established that the child needs an extended placement outside the home does responsibility for the case move to another worker and the third stage of the case.
The kinds of decisions that would have to be made are whether the report implies sufficient danger or potentially criminal activities so that law enforcement or
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the state's attorneys must become involved in the case; whether safety concerns are so great that emergency action is needed; whether the child is at sufficient risk to open the case beyond the initial period of checking out the allegation; whether the service strategy requires change; and, ultimately, whether risk has been sufficiently reduced to close the case.
DCFS Unit: Family Intervention Unit
Functions
1. Involve law enforcement or the state's attorney for possible consideration of criminal charges; to request assistance in helping the child; to request assistance in preserving evidence; or to request assistance in conducting the investigation.
2. Participate in parallel (conducted by another investigative team) , delegated (investigation turned over to someone else), and cooperative (jointly planned and carried out with another agency) investigations
3. Develop a plan for the investigation and assessment including who will be contacted, who will be interviewed, whether the worker's safety is a potential problem, whether the family speaks the language, whether medical care or assessment may be needed,
4. Intervene to resolve crises
5. Assess child's current safety and future risk, and document same
6. Refer to community services if risk is not sufficient to open a services case
7. Develop plan to prevent placement and reduce risk of further maltreatment
8. Supervise short-term placement
9. Manage services to case
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10. Directly deliver services
Decisions
1. Determine if sufficient danger or potentially criminal activities exist so that law enforcement or the state's attorneys must become involved
2. Determine if emergency intervention is required
3. Determine whether allegations are substantiated
4. Determine whether the child is at sufficient risk to open the case
5. Determine whether the service strategy requires change
6. Determine whether risk has been reduced sufficiently to close the case
The worker responsible for investigating the allegations would also be responsible from the beginning to deliver or arrange for needed services, working through the Child Protection Family Networks. So long as children were not removed from the home except on a short-term basis, the same worker would have responsibility for the case. Service delivery would be the focus of the work from the first day on. He or she could call upon specialists to assist in the assessment or treatment of specifically-defined family problems.'
Following an assessment of family needs he or she would develop a service plan and work with community providers and local area networks to ensure the delivery of services in a timely manner. If short-term or emergency removal of the child were warranted, the worker would perform that function, returning the child after the situation were stabilized and services were established for the family. Only after a determination was made that the child could not be returned home in the near term, perhaps a period of 30 to 90 da s, would the case be transferred to the permanency
' As the next section indicates, the nature of these problems and the type of intervention warranted, will be developed as
part of the redesign effort.
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services unit and the third stage of the casework process. If, on the other hand, the child was considered safe and the protection of the state were no longer required, .the caseworker would close the case.

Stage Three:

From New Permanent Goal to Permanent Outcome

At the point at which a plan was developed for an extended placement of the child, the permanency services unit would assume responsibility for the case. Its functions would be theoretically similar to those of the family intervention unit, but the work would involve regular contact with the child's substitute caregiver. If adoption were the goal, specialists in the unit would prepare the child for a permanent adoptive home and work with the adoptive parents to assure a smooth transition.

The kinds of decisions that would be made in permanency services are whether risk has been reduced sufficiently for the child to return home, whether other permanency options, such as adoption, should be pursued, what permanent home should be selected, and when the case should be closed.

DCFS Unit: Permanency Services Unit

Functions

1. Develop permanency plan to return child home or find other permanent home

2. Supervise placement, ensuring child is safe and well cared for

3. Manage services to case

4. Deliver services directly

5. Participate in administrative and judicial reviews if so indicated

6. Oversee the termination of parental rights process, if so indicated

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1.

Decisions 1. Determine that risk has been reduced sufficiently for child to return home or that other permanency options should be pursued
2. Select a permanent home 3. Determine when case should be closed

Implementation
DCFS management is committed to improving its services to families through changing the nature of its initial approach to families. The above structure represents an outline of the strategy which has been settled upon as one of the mechanisms for accomplishing that improvement. This is, however, a large change in the operations of the agency and a host of questions remain to be answered.
The first of those questions has to do with the scope and speed of the implementation. The objectives laid out for the redesign will be implemented on a statewide basis. All offices and all regions will be expected to demonstrate the extent to which they have been able to achieve those objectives.
The actual structural change will begin in Cook County. Because Cook County represents such a substantial portion of the state's child welfare population, the largest impact can be achieved by starting there. To begin the change, DCFS will identify strong, capable offices within the county and initiate the merger of units, the implementation of new procedures and new training for workers and supervisors in those offices. As the agency learns from those experiences, the changes will be expanded to cover the entire state.
The question of where to begin is, however, only the first question. In the following sections, questions of law, policy, practice, personnel, the involvement of community agencies and strategies for effecting organizational change will be discussed. It is with these questions that the Department turns to its staff and advisors for assistance in fording ways to provide services that are more responsive to the needs of families.

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Part M. Issues to Be Resolved

To design and implement a new front door, many issues must be addressed and resolved. These pertain both to modifying current requirements and procedures and to developing new tools and even policies to govern the new system. This chapter highlights some of the changes that would be required and the issues that need to be resolved. The topics addressed are legal and policy; practice; personnel; community services; and organizational change.
Legal and Policy Issues
The redesign of the front door will need to take into account the laws, court orders and policies affecting DCFS practice. In most cases, there does not appear to be any conflict between the requirements and the proposal, but this is an issue which requires continued examination throughout the course of the implementation.
Legislation
Three statutes govern the operations of DCFS and need to be examined for their potential impact on the redesign. These statutes include: An Act Creating the Department of Children and Family Services, Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act and the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.
The only obvious issue raised by these statutes is the requirement in the Abused and Neglect Child Reporting Act that substance affected newborns and infants as well as abused and neglected newborns and infants and pregnant substance abusing women be subject to special procedures. These special populations will have to be considered separately in the design of the program. There is no requirement that a different type of staff deal with these cases, but that is one possibility which should be considered.
Litigation Settlements and Orders
DCFS operates under a relatively large number of consent decrees and court orders. These will become important factors in the final design of the proposed
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system, in part because their implementation is monitored far more than is DCFS' compliance with state statutes.
Of the three court cases settled by consent decrees the B.H. order is the most comprehensive and has the most wide ranging implications. It contains specific requirements that affect the organizational structure of DCFS, e.g., supervisory staffing requirements, staff training and qualifications, and workloads as well as service delivery e.g., case planning, case management, and provision of services by private agencies.
The most obvious impact of B.H. on the implementation of the redesign lies in the caseload requirements. Under the terms of the agreement, DCFS may assign to a caseworker no more than 12 new abuse or neglect investigations per month during nine months of a calendar year. During the other three months of the calendar year, the investigator is to be assigned no more than 15 new abuse or neglect investigations per month. DCFS child protective supervisors were to be responsible for supervising no more than seven investigators each.
Follow-up caseworkers may be assigned both to intact and to foster family care cases, although such mixtures are not anticipated as part of the redesign. Workers for intact families may be assigned no more than twenty families, while permanency services workers are expected to handle no more than twenty-five children at a time.
Norman v. Suter is a class action suit involving DCFS that was settled by consent order in March 1991. The class was defined as all parents and guardians on or after March 91 whose children were in the temporary custody or under legal guardianship of DCFS with an indicated report or allegations that the children suffered adequate living conditions for their children. The major provisions of Norman which could affect the redesign include the following:
• DCFS must make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of a child from the home before removing any child due to a lack of basic needs;
• DCFS has created a housing advocacy program to assist families to find adequate housing; and
• families may receive up to $800 per year to pay for basic needs to prevent the removal of a child.
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The impact of Norman, if it is to be felt at all, is likely to be in the decision as to which special skills are likely to be required by the Department. Most particularly, the housing advocacy function may not be one that can reasonably be expected of all caseworkers.
DCFS Policies
A number of current DCFS policy provisions assume the current organizational structure. One of the issues with which the implementation of the front door redesign will need to deal is the revision of existing policy to make its provisions consistent with the reform. Examples of some of the policies which may require change include the following:
• DCFS policy calls for child welfare workers who became aware of information constituting a CA/N report to complete a CANTS 5 and submit it to the local investigative unit. In the generalist model where investigations and services are combined for at least a portion of the population, this procedure may have to be modified.
• DCFS has an agreement with the State Policy/Division of Criminal Investigation to investigate all child sexual abuse and Priority I physical abuse cases involving a prior indicated abuse report in the family. A second indicated report also has to be reported to the State's Attorney. If under a new design the applicable procedures for subsequent reports and special populations will be changed, the current procedure will have to be modified accordingly.
• DCFS' notification process regarding child abuse reports is very specific in identifying the different positions involved. For example, investigators notify follow-up caseworkers, caseworkers in turn notify the child's parents. In a redesigned system, both the notification process and the types of positions carrying out the various notification responsibilities would change to accommodate the new positions and functions.
• One section of policy covers the entire range of interventions from investigators placing children, referring families to services, initiating family preservation services and subsequent referrals to follow-up caseworkers. It elaborates that youth in the circumstances cited above are referred directly by the SCR to crisis intervention or community-based
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agencies. The procedures contained in this section are the most likely to be subject to extensive revisions under a redesigned delivery system since they constitute the basis of the current service delivery approach utilized by DCFS.
• Policy requires that all activities are carried out by investigators under the supervision of child protective supervisors. In regard to the handling of subsequent reports, it should also be noted that if a death due to abuse and neglect involves a child victim who had been subject (involved or non involved) of a prior completed CA/N investigation, the worker investigating the death has to be a different worker than the one who conducted the previous investigation.
Practice Issues
This category encompasses a wide variety of issues. The most obvious is the issue of setting caseload sizes and organizing case assignments under a very different organizational structure. Concern with the management of the caseload relates to the second issue, that is, which families to open for services and, once opened, which to close. For open cases a related issue is what is the Department's perceived responsibility to provide particular types of services to particular classes of families over what time period.
Third is the issue of the remaining separation within DCFS between in-home and out-of-home services. Even by itself this represents a complex of issues, including when to transfer cases back and forth, how to assure a smooth transition which a child or family receives a new worker, and how to handle "mixed" cases when one child is in care and another isn't.
The fourth issue is one of specialization. Although the model proposed here involves a heavy reliance on "generalists," it is also clear that some cases will require more specialized staff. The questions include: which types of cases should receive specialized treatment, should limits be placed upon the amount of service delivered to families with particular problems given our knowledge about what works, and should the specialization occur within or outside of DCFS.
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Caseloads
The caseload standards set out by B.H. have been discussed above. In any attempt to meet those standards, however, attention must be paid to the larger impact on the agency's operation and direction. In broad stroke there are at least three possibilities, without increasing the caseworker resources available: continue the same levels of compliance with B.H. standards as is now being achieved; attempt full compliance for investigation standards and reduce either the number of intact families served or the rate of compliance with the standard for serving intact families; and attempt full compliance with the intact family standard, reducing compliance with the standard for investigations.
As the reorganization takes shape, DCFS will have to make a decision among these three choices. If full compliance could be met in both areas, the average family intervention caseworker in Cook County would be able to handle six investigations per month and eleven intact families. With current staffing and the same levels of compliance now being achieved, that same caseworker would handle eight investigations per month and carry fifteen intact family cases.
Choosing either of the other options could, of course, have unforeseen consequences for the agency's ability to meet its mandates. If, for instance, the decision were that full compliance with the standard for investigations would be achieved, the cost would most likely be that fewer families would receive intact services. In that event, one would have to ask whether it was reasonable to achieve the goal of getting services to families faster at the cost of serving fewer families. Alternatively, if the decision were to meet the standard for serving intact families, fewer investigations would occur, leaving some abused and neglected children without even a cursory determination of the level of their safety.
Services to Intact Families
The primary motivation for the proposal contained in this paper is to provide earlier and more effective services to families whose children are at risk of maltreatment. Changing the structure of the organization to eliminate barriers to earlier services is, however, only one component of the solution.
Equally important is the delivery of the right services to each family. This will be affected by the availability and accessibility of services and also by controlling the workload of caseworkers to ensure that they are capable of handling all of their cases

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adequately. Ultimately, delivering effective services means making decisions about which families to open for service, how much service to provide and for how long. The question of who should actually deliver the services, public or private agency caseworkers, is addressed in the section on Community below.
In the health field, the "managed care" model begins to address the issues of how much service to provide and for how long to particular classes of individuals. Each diagnosis is tied to a set of interventions with a known chance of success. Cases in which there is little chance of succeeding may not be treated at all. Increasingly, child welfare agencies are beginning to follow this model for out-of-home care. Intact families is another question. This concept of differentiation is not yet well developed in child welfare. The field does not yet have the will and perhaps the knowledge either to prescribe a definitive set of interventions or to know the chances of success for all types of clients. There is some evidence, however, about what works well with whom. Some of the classes of clients may include those with substance abusing problems, those where the mother is mentally ill but does not follow a treatment regimen that may have been prescribed, and those where domestic violence is a chronic issue, placing the child at risk. Information on successful interventions will need to be used and further developed if the effectiveness of services to intact families is to be maximized. That will include determining both who is to be served and how much service to provide using what preferred method of treatment and with what outcome.
Through the local area networks, DCFS has increasingly been drawing community providers into the planning of services to child welfare families. The implementation of the generalist model will require even more reliance on community providers for a broader array of cases (see Community Issues section below). That in turn requires a mechanism for determining when the family needs direct DCFS intervention and when the family can be better served outside of the DCFS system.
Transfers of Cases Among Units
The model proposed here foresees the investigation and in-home services stages of each case handled by the same worker. It even makes sense from some perspectives to maintain the case with the same worker when a short-term placement is involved and the child will be quickly reunited with the family. However, when the child is to remain in foster care for an extended period, the model includes a separate set of units being responsible for the case management.
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One question, then, about transfers among units has to do with defining the point at which a family's case is to be sent to the permanency services unit. This may be particularly difficult when a placement is made during the investigation stage of the case and the investigation work is not yet concluded. There is, however, also a workload issue if short-term placements are to be handled by the family intervention unit. Clearly, a family in which at least one child is placed in foster care, even briefly, involves a different level of workload than a family in which all children remain in the home.
Even defining a short-term placement can be problematic. That could be simply a judgment on the part of the family intervention worker who makes the placement, or it could be a defined point in the case. For instance, one option would be to define all placements as short-term, until there was a case plan in place which projected a return date beyond, say, ninety days. Whatever decision is made on this issue, the impact on the number of cases a worker can carry will have to be determined.
This issue is not merely a front door issue. One may also legitimately ask whether a case in which one child is in placement while others are at risk of placement is an intact case or a permanency services case. Likewise, when a child is returned home from care, a decision has to be made as to whether the case is to be transferred back to the family intervention unit or is to continue to be handled by the permanency services unit.
Because part of the motivation for this proposal is to simplify the system, specifically by reducing the number of workers with whom a family has to deal, the obvious decision is to transfer cases as seldom as possible. At the same time, the family intervention unit may not be reasonably burdened with both the emergency responses to reports of maltreatment and the emergency responses typical of foster care placements. These considerations may suggest that families with at least one child in care and families with a child who has just returned from care are considered permanency services cases. The latter would imply that there are no transfers from the permanency services unit back to the family intervention unit.
One of the transfer difficulties in the current system is the handling of subsequent reports of maltreatment on open cases. The division of labor in the present system dictates that such cases are referred back to the investigative unit, and usually not to the same investigator, introducing yet another caseworker into the family's issues. Many of these cases are already so well known to either the intact family services worker or the permanency planning worker that the effort expended by the
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investigator is duplicative. Equally important is the fact that decision-making moves away from the worker who has had that responsibility to another who is less familiar with the case.
Under the model proposed here, the natural mechanism for handling subsequent reports on intact families would be to have the responsible worker conduct the investigation. In some instances, however, there may be a feeling that the worker is too close to the case and a more objective view is needed. That suggests that some determination as to which types of cases can be investigated by the case manager needs to made.
The issue is both clearer and more difficult when the subsequent report comes on a child in foster care. Because the permanency planning worker is not expected to be trained to handle investigations, the responsibility for the investigation would logically be expected to revert back to the family intervention unit. This, however, replicates the current situation and its inefficiencies. Again, there may need to be some distinction made as to the types of subsequent maltreatment reports which require a formal investigation according to the usual protocol.
Specialization
Having highly trained generalists who are capable of handling specialized tasks does not imply that all workers can handle all kinds of cases. For both investigations and service delivery, special skills and knowledge are required for certain types of cases. Sexual abuse, substance abuse, and mentally ill parents are three issues which often require something more than most caseworkers can provide.
There are several ways in which to think about specialization. The most typical is to see it as needed when a case presents particularly difficult issues. Here, the worker who conducts the intake process identifies the issue at an early stage and transfers the case to a worker with special skills and training. The result is usually a more intense level of service delivery specifically geared to the primary issue presented by the client.
A second way in which to think about specialization is one that is expressed in the B.H. settlement order. Here, caseworkers are supposed to have access to specialists in health, mental health, education, substance abuse and other areas. The implication is that the case does not get transferred and the specialist does not assume responsibility for the basic decision-making about the family. Rather, the specialist
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provides either consultation to the caseworker or specialized treatment to the client for a single issue: In either case the worker maintains overall responsibility for the case.
The third way is the converse of the first. Rather than viewing specialization as a special set of skills which may be applied to cases in need of those skills, this is the recognition that some cases are easier than most and can be handled very quickly and with relatively minimal skill. Investigations on substance exposed infants may, under current Illinois law, be one of these functions.
The crucial issues for all specialization questions are what types of specialties the Department should maintain or develop and what the processes for referring cases to specialists should be. Whatever the answers, there will be an impact on the workload ultimately assigned to the family intervention unit.
Personnel Issues
The question this section addressees is what are the current job descriptions and agency qualifications for the investigative and child welfare services positions, how do they compare to national standards, how would they have to be modified to serve the redesigned system and the training which will be required to achieve adequate implementation of the front door redesign.
In the current system, the relevant jobs are Child Protective Investigator, Child Welfare Specialist II, the Public Service Administrator, and the Child Welfare Administrator II. Using sample position descriptions, one sees a clear distinction between the role of the investigator and that of the child welfare specialist. The Child Protective Investigator position has a narrowly defined job description in that its responsibilities are limited strictly to conducting investigations, assisting law enforcement officers and state attorneys in reviewing child death and serious abuse cases, testifying in court and performing related functions. The closest these descriptions come to casework types of activities are participating in case staffmgs as indicated. The Child Welfare Administrator II position is a specialized position supervising Child Protective Services Investigators.
Child Welfare Specialists, in contrast, "formulate an assessment of the emotional, social or mental health problems and participate in the development of treatment plans for children and families;" participate in multi-disciplinary diagnostic and technical staff conferences to access needed services; and work with community agencies to obtain specialized services for clients. These position descriptions draw a
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clear distinction between the skills and activities required of the two types of jobs. A major restructuring of the positions will be required in the redesign which combines skills in both investigation and assessment. Child Welfare Specialists are supervised by Public Service Administrators.
The requirements for the investigative and service positions also differ. The Child Protective Investigator must have a Bachelor's degree in law enforcement, social work or a related field or a Bachelor's degree in an unrelated field with two years of experience in child welfare. The Child Welfare Specialist must have a Master's degree in social work or a related field, a Bachelor's degree in social work or a related field and one year of experience or a Bachelor's degree in an unrelated field and two years of experience. The primary difference lies in the allowance for law enforcement education without additional experience for investigators and the allowance for a graduate degree in social work without additional experience for the service related job.
Under the front door redesign plan, one worker would be performing both functions. Currently, meeting the educational requirements for the Child Welfare Specialist position would also qualify a person for the Child Protective Investigator position. The opposite is, however, not true. The primary question for the redesign is, therefore, likely to be whether to permit people to fill the generalist position with a law enforcement degree and no experience.
The specific professional criteria for child protective service workers, as laid out by the Council on Accreditation, suggest that broader skills are needed. These criteria require the worker to be:
• competent in using the authority of the agency to intervene on behalf of abused, neglected and exploited children;
• knowledgeable in child development and family functioning, able to exercise good judgment, and motivated to serve abused, neglected and exploited children;
• skilled in working with resistant families;
• able to collaborate with other agencies and disciplines; and
• familiar with court procedures, the laws of evidence, procedures for
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preparing petitions, qualifying as an expert witness, and helping witnesses organize their testimony.
One of the Council on Accreditation's founding sponsors, the Child Welfare League of America, has formulated standards to be used as goals for practice in the child welfare field. In fact, COA standards are based, in part, on CWLA standards.
CWLA recommends a system of at least two levels of social workers based on competencies. Both position levels should be eligible to obtain state and/or national professional licensing or certification standards. Neither suggests law enforcement as an allowable background without additional training and/or experience.
Proficiencies for Level 1 social worker positions, constituting the entry level, include developing service plans, conducting assessments, organizing multiple priorities, decision-making regarding permanency planning, communicating effectively with a variety of persons, and termination of services. Educational standards for the Level I position include a B.S.W. degree or B.A. in a related discipline supplemented by knowledge of the child welfare field.
Level II competencies for experienced social workers include all of the requirements for Level I positions plus designing and implementing service treatment plans in complex family situations, developing written treatment plans with measurable outcomes and as a basis for legal action, serving as a liaison with other agencies, monitoring service delivery, and understanding the impact of legislation and public policy on families. Educational standards for the Level U position include an M.S.W. degree from an accredited school of social work with concentrations in clinical, interpersonal, family treatment or child welfare practice.
In addition to revamping the job qualifications for the new generalist position, an enormous amount of work will need to be done in training and retraining workers. According to a 1990 survey by the American Public Welfare Association, 24 states provide preservice training for direct service workers; 15 states provide pre-service training for supervisors. The average length of these training programs is 17.5 days for workers and 8 days for supervisors. In-service training is mandatory for workers in 35 states and the average number of required days is 9. Illinois is currently revamping its core training based upon A Model of Practice for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services developed by Calica and Morton. The training ultimately will require both a theoretical foundation for practice and specific skill development in the critical investigative and casework functions. The work currently being done on the
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new core training should be re-considered, taking into account the demands of the new generalist position. Moreover, consideration should be given as to whether the Permanency Services workers, who will not be expected to conduct investigations, will be expected to take the same core training as the Family Intervention workers who will both investigate and provide services.
Community Services
Illinois has embarked on an ambitious effort to develop a mechanism for coordinating services to families and children among public and private agencies. The entire state has been divided into 62 local area networks, newly termed Child Protection Family Networks (CPFNs), which represent consortia of local operating agencies with strong collaborative agreements. Their geography and structure are recognized by the Departments of Children and Family Services, Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Alcoholism and Substance Abuse and the Illinois State Board of Education.
For the CPFNs to be effective as a resource for families within the structure of the front door to DCFS, at least two conditions must be met. First, DCFS must be clear on the criteria which will be used for determining when it will provide services directly to a family, when it will maintain case management responsibility for the case but refer to the CPFN for a substantial portion of the service delivery and when a family should simply be served by the CPFN without further DCFS intervention or oversight (see also the section on practice issues above). Second, DCFS and the CPFNs must develop a mechanism for payment and accountability which ensures that the appropriate resources are available within the CPFNs for the families who will be referred there.
In meeting the first condition, DCFS needs to define clearly and publicly the categories of cases for which it sees itself as the primary responsible agency. The first criterion is already established in statute: DCFS has a mandate only where there is an allegation of child maltreatment. Among families where there is such an allegation, however, even a substantiated allegation, the case is often closed immediately after the investigation without further services. The criteria for determining when that is appropriate have to be made explicit and applied consistently across the agency. Some type of protocol with structured guidelines for case specific decision-making is the most likely vehicle for applying those criteria.
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DCFS will undoubtedly make its decision on which families to serve based on child safety issues. The protocol will need to draw a line as to the level of safety at which it will maintain responsibility. This decision must be made within the context of what is feasible for other providers to give families, because it partially defines the families for which DCFS will make referrals to the CPFNs.
Once DCFS has determined the range of families it will serve, it can then begin to determine which kinds of issues it can best deal with directly and which issues it can best deal with through outside providers. The distinction here is not as above between cases which will be closed and cases which will remain open, but rather between open cases for which DCFS is the primary service provider and open cases for which DCFS is the case manager but not the primary provider. Even more explicitly than with the previous decision, this determination will have to be made in the light of the capacities of other agencies, both public and private, to provide more effective services than can be provided by DCFS itself. Because of that dependence on the outside resources, this decision may be made differently in different parts of the state. Where other resources are plentiful and proven effective, more work may be contracted; where DCFS has relatively more capacity than any other provider, few services may be contracted.
The second condition for successful integration of the CPFNs into the DCFS front door process is the development of an effective payment and accountability system for contracted services. Traditionally, contracting has worked in two ways. In some cases the public agency pays a fixed amount of money annually to an agency to provide at least a minimum number of units of service or some level of service to at least a minimum number of clients. This type of contract might call, for instance, for an annual contract worth $100,000 for the delivery of at least 5000 hours of counseling or some level of counseling to at least 100 clients. The private provider in these cases is guaranteed a certain level of support and is expected to provide a defined level of service in return. Under these contracts the provider has enough stability of income to be able to create a program of services with a defined capacity. There is little uncertainty. On its side the public agency is paying in part for the creation and maintenance of the resource itself.
Other contracts have relied on an explicit unit cost payment mechanism. Here, the provider is paid a fixed amount for each unit of service delivered, e.g., $130 for each day of residential care. In theory, the provider is paid only for the actual number of units of service delivered. In practice, however, many of these contracts also include either an implicit or an explicit understanding of a minimum number of referrals. Again, the motivation of the public agency in entering into such contracts is
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to provide the private agency with sufficient stability that the service is available when it is needed.

DCFS has already taken a significant step towards overcoming the limitations of the traditional contracting mechanisms through the development of outcome measures and performance contracts. Most of this effort, however, has focused on out-of-home placements and has no direct impact on services to intact families. More particularly, the relationship of the CPFNs to DCFS and to the individual providers making up each network has not yet been defined in relation to the responsibility for achieving desired outcomes. As consideration is given to providing statutory status to CPFNs, the issue of who is responsible for the achievement of outcomes is likely to become larger.

While the basic thrust of this proposal deals with the organization of DCFS workers, the motivation behind the proposal is broader, namely, more effective services for intact families. Traditional contracting methods provide mechanisms for the creation and support of service resources, but often do not provide adequate mechanisms for ensuring that services are effective. Nor do they always take into account the variations in local needs and the flexibility that must exist to develop different models of services in different parts of a state.

Local control of services is often used as the mechanism for ensuring that the needs peculiar to a particular locality are met. From the perspective of a state agency, however, local control is not always entirely consistent with the effort to ensure the effectiveness of the purchased service through accountability mechanisms. The goal of enhancing local control of services may best be achieved through a payment mechanism similar to a block grant, while the goal of ensuring that the state agency pays only for what it receives may be better accomplished through outcome funding or capitation schemes. The former may leave the state agency responsible for a broader array of client families to serve than it intends, because it includes so few controls. The latter may force localities to focus on issues which they do not perceive to represent their most pressing needs.

The tension between local control and statewide accountability may be heightened if the CPFNs become a primary contracting partner of DCFS. In that context, DCFS would have no direct relationship with the providers comprising each network, but would instead have one contract with the network itself. It would then fall to the consortium to determine for each individual case which provider can best serve the family. That would involve a double level of accountability, one from DCFS to the CPFN and one from the CPFN to the individual provider.

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Even this scenario will require a number of broad policy level decisions before it can be implemented. For instance, DCFS will have an interest in determining which cases receive which services and how much will be expended for those services. The agency may decide that for certain types of issues presented by families, only a limited amount of effort should be devoted to reunification before a decision is made to fmd an alternative permanency plan for the child. The agency's payment and accountability procedures will need to incorporate those concerns, and that will have a direct impact on the way in which the CPFNs relate both to DCFS and to their own member agencies.
In sum, DCFS has expressed its intention to expand its use of community providers and to change the nature of its relationships with those providers. This will have a direct impact on the manner in which it provides services to intact families. Before it can complete its redesign of its services to intact families, however, questions of which cases to maintain under its own jurisdiction, which families to refer to community providers while maintaining oversight over the case, where the networks fit within the relationship between DCFS and individual providers, how payments for services will be made and what methods will be used to assure the effectiveness of services must be answered.
Organizational change
The proposed change represents a structural/functional response to issues caused by the current service delivery system. It will require re- thinking many of the practices which are currently followed in DCFS, as well as of the basic approach taken to families at the start of services. If the transition is to occur in a smooth fashion, considerable attention will have to be paid to a strategy for changing, in some respects, the basic culture of the organization.
Organizational development (OD) is the modem approach to managing change and developing human resources. Bennis (1969), French and Bell (1978), and Burke (1982) have defined OD in similar ways. Bennis views OD as a response to change, a complex educational strategy intended to change the beliefs, attitudes, values and structure of organizations so that they can better adapt to new technologies markets and challenges.... French and Bell call OD "a long-range effort to improve an organization's problem-solving and renewal processes, particularly through a more effective and collaborative management of organization culture." Burke has a simple definition: Organizational development is a planned process of change in an
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organization's culture through the utilization of behavioral science technology, research and theory.
Management experts Filley, House and Kerr as reported in Luthans (1985) have suggested that the following major characteristics must be employed in organizational change:
• Planned change: This acknowledges the need for change in any organization as well as the virtue of planned as opposed to haphazard change. DCFS is currently undertaking a process of planned change. Having established major goals and principles governing the change, it will use at least six months to fully develop the change components and resolve the issues outlined in this paper.
• Comprehensive change: This may relate to an identifiable unit within an organization or the entire organization. In the case of DCFS, the changes will be comprehensive but the change itself will be staged. Several LANs in Cook County will be selected as early implementers of the newly redesigned system. Based upon the experiences there, any necessary changes to the design will be made before implementation takes place in other communities. In the meantime, some jurisdictions will be allowed to develop their own implementation strategies provided the principles outlined in Part II are demonstrably adhered to.
• Emphasis on work groups: While some OD efforts are focused on individual change, the majority are focused on groups. That is true in Illinois where units within specific LANs will be selected for the first stage of change. Direct forms of feedback will be instituted so that changes and improvements can be made to the system before it is implemented elsewhere.
• Long-range change: The process of change may take months or years to realize. OD is not intended to be stop-gap. Illinois will develop a 24-month plan which includes design, staging, revisions, and follow-up to make DCFS's initial response to families more conducive to the provision of services.
• Participation of change agent: Most OD experts stress the need for an outside party or catalyst. DCFS is employing two types of change agents. One is a consulting firm, Hornby Zeller Associates, to assist not only in defining the change, but in carrying the message to the public and to the field. The change agent can absorb some of the brunt of the inevitable criticism and serve as an impartial force in helping DCFS make modifications, where warranted, to its initial plan. The other agent is the
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advisory committee of community representatives that has been formulated to oversee the change.
• Emphasis on intervention and action research. The OD approach results in an active intervention in the ongoing activities of the organization. Action research differs from applied research in that the change agent becomes involved in the actual change process. In Illinois, the consultants will collect information from the field as change is being instituted to assist in providing feedback to management and in making mid-course corrections as well as refinements to the proposed redesign.
DCFS is already taking many of the appropriate steps to assure that the change process is well conceived and smooth; making the change comprehensive and longrange; engaging in thoughtful planning; and using change agents on its behalf. There are other techniques that can be used. Understanding the basis for resistance to change in the field will enable management to create strategies to overcome the resistance. One of the standard practices is to identify up front what the worries, concerns or prejudices of the detractors are and then addressing those prejudices one by one. This approach lets the field know that management is aware of its concerns and that steps have been taken to address them. Another is to create rewards or incentives for people who embrace the change. This may mean public recognition, pay bonuses (this has been done in other public systems), or time off. Creating healthy competition among work units has also been used successfully. Another strategy is to publish the results of specific measures which have been established to demonstrate improvements in client and family functioning by work units. This fosters a spirit of teamwork among the members of the unit to achieve the goals established by the agency. Finally, training is a necessary component of change both to stimulate enthusiasm and to convey the specific skills and knowledge required by caseworkers to assume their new functions.
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IV. Implementation Steps
The changes proposed above reflect major alterations to the way in which DCFS conducts its business. For them to be effective as mechanisms for improving family life and reducing risk to children, their implementation will require both careful attention to detail and determined leadership. This section outlines the first version of the implementation plan. As progress is made in the implementation process, some of the steps will change and greater detail will be added.
Advisory Group
Representatives of all of the major advisory groups with which DCFS works are being invited to participate in advising the Department on the implementation of the front door redesign. This structure was chosen because the front door redesign is intended as the Department's overarching reform under which all other efforts will be subsumed.
Up to this point DCFS has tended to create a new advisory committee for each new initiative. While memberships may overlap, there is no systematic mechanism for bringing all of the initiatives together to create a single vision of how the Department should accomplish its work. The advisory committee for the front door redesign, and indeed the redesign itself, is intended to bring all of the initiatives together into a coordinated effort at improving the agency's operations.
The advisory committee's work is expected to be relatively intense during the first six months to a year of the implementation process. All issues involved in the design and implementation of the front door redesign will be discussed with the committee, and it is expected that a variety of subcommittees will assist DCFS with specific issues. The most important set of issues with which the advisory committee will be asked to help, however, are those which involve the Department's partnerships with various community groups. Some parts of the proposal involve redefining the work of community providers and reshaping the relationship between DCFS and those providers. Leadership from the advisory committee will be an important factor in the success of these efforts.
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Legal and Policy Issue Steps
The reform of any child welfare agency requires attention to the statutory mandates and limits placed on the agency. In Illinois consideration of all the legal issues is a much larger undertaking because of the extensive set of litigation orders under which DCFS operates.
Existing requirements should not, however, be taken simply as limitations on the scope of the reforms which can take place. What is needed is for a process through which the prevailing requirements and the components of the reform effort conform to one another. This could mean restructuring the redesign effort to conform to the limits of existing laws, policies and court orders. Alternatively, however, it may mean seeking changes in law, rewriting policy and/or renegotiating settlement orders. Next steps in the legal and policy areas relate to investigations and caseloads.
Determine if legal changes are needed in investigations: The primary legal requirements which must be attended to, and probably the first to be addressed, are the state statute which give DCFS the mandate to investigate child abuse and neglect and the B.H. settlement order, which specifies appropriate caseload standards. In relation to the first, DCFS has committed itself to continued compliance with the existing law, at least in so far as the broad intent is concerned. There may be specific details of the statute which need to be altered, but DCFS will continue to investigate all bona fide reports of child maltreatment and will continue to provide special attention to cases in which the parent have exhibited a substance abuse issue. The front door redesign must therefore be tailored to meet that requirement.
Modify caseload requirements: The caseload standards in B_H, were developed with the existing organizational structure in mind. Thus, the standards which determine the maximum number of intact families or out-of-home children a caseworker may be assigned assumed that these caseloads would not be mixed and also that neither type of worker would conduct child protective investigations. Changing the organizational structure of the agency and mixing caseloads, even to the relatively limited extent proposed here, requires a new set of formulas for calculating appropriate caseloads.
One of the primary mechanisms for assisting compliance with the spirit of the various settlement decrees is the DCFS effort to obtain accreditation from the Council on Accreditation. In general, the court monitor for the B.H. settlement has tended to accept compliance with the COA standards as compliance with the major provisions of
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the litigation settlement. Continued work will have to occur with both the court monitor and with COA to ensure compliance.

Practice Issue Steps
There are at least four sets of decisions which need to be made to resolve the practice issues discussed in the previous section. The first of these is the decision as to how staff time is to be allocated. In an organizational structure such as the current one, that decision is made through the assignment of staff to different units with different functions. In the generalist model, that decision is made with every case assignment, but it should also be made at a broader policy level.
Examine caseflows: To provide the DCFS administration with the information it needs to make the decision, further analysis of the case flows is needed. The question is not merely how large the caseloads are, or how many of each type of case should be handled by each worker, but also what the frequency of openings and closings is. The latter determines both the level of the caseload and the amount of work involved with each caseload. By examining the case flows, a better picture of the workload involved in the generalist model can be obtained.
Develop protocols and guidelines for differentiation: The second set of decisions has to do with the delivery of services to intact families. These decisions will again be made at two levels, but in this case, the policy level decision should come in the form of a decision-making protocol which guides case decision-making. The protocol needs to lead the worker through a structured thought process to assist him or her in deciding which families to serve, how much service to provide and whether the service can best be provided by DCFS or by a private agency. The advisory committee will play a key role in the development of the protocol, with membership from both inside and outside of DCFS.
Develop procedures for case transfers: The third set of decisions deals with the flow of cases from one unit to another. DCFS needs to decide when cases are transferred from the family intervention unit to the permanency services unit and, perhaps, when the cases are transferred back to the family intervention unit. Unlike the decision as to which families receive intact services, what is needed here is a clear definition, not merely a structured decision-making process. This work should result in additions to or changes in Departmental policy and should include few if any exceptions.
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Develop plan for specialization: The fourth set of decisions relates to specialization. - Sometimes, providing the most effective service to families means providing a service which most caseworkers cannot reasonably be expected to provide. Either decision-making or treatment responsibilities are assumed by a professional with extra training and skill on that particular issue. Alternatively, specializing may mean defining a set of circumstances in which the issues are so clear that a caseworker is not required to go through the normal processes and some of the work does not even require the level of expertise that a caseworker possesses.
DCFS, with the assistance of the advisory committee, needs to determine which specialties it needs and what the impact of retaining or developing those specialties will be. The first step in making these decisions will be the analysis of existing information to determine the prevalence of certain types of problems, particularly those which are especially intractable to current practices. Simultaneously, decisions need to be made about whether the special services can best be provided by DCFS staff or by contract agencies. Once those decisions are made, an inventory of the existing resources will need to be made and, if needed, a plan for development of additional resources drawn up.
Personnel Issue Steps
There are two critical next steps in the personnel area that relate to this redesign initiative: examine the current education and experience requirements to determine what modifications, if any, are needed both for direct service staff and for supervisors, and develop both core training and intensive inservice training to reflect the job requirement and competencies.
Examine the current education and experience requirements to determine what modifications, if any, are needed both for direct service staff and for supervisors: Education and experience requirements will need to be tailored to the competencies and job description. Basically, this will boil down to determining whether law enforcement education requirements, without additional experience or training, will continue to qualify someone for a generalist worker position, as they now qualify for an investigative position. It is presumed that all existing staff will be grandfathered into the new positions, but this may require some administrative action.
Develop both core training and intensive inservice training to reflect the job requirements and competencies: A strong program of preservice training as well as retraining will be critical to achieving the goals of the redesign effort. In many cases
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workers will have to unlearn existing attitudes as well as develop new skills. These will need to be reinforced on the job through strong supervisory practice. The core training now being revised needs to incorporate the job functions of both investigative and service delivery staff, and a decision needs to be made as to whether Permanency Services staff will receive the same training as the Family Intervention staff.
Community Issue Steps
DCFS must develop the answers to five questions: which cases to maintain under its own jurisdiction, which families to refer to community providers while maintaining oversight over the case, where the networks fit within the relationship between DCFS and individual providers, how payments for services will be made and what methods will be used to assure the effectiveness of services must be answered.
Decide which cases to maintain under DCFS jurisdiction: This decision will be made within the context of the practice issues discussed above. Its impact on community providers will be that many of the cases DCFS decides are not its responsibility will inevitably be served elsewhere.
Determine which families to refer to community providers while maintaining oversight over the case: From a statewide perspective, DCFS can only develop broad guidelines as to when to use community providers and when to serve a family directly. The final decision on those matters will be made jointly between DCFS and the CPFNs, or between DCFS and individual providers, based on the availability of resources in each locality.
Determine where the networks fit within the relationships between DCFS and individual providers: If CPFNs obtain statutory status, DCFS will be able to contract directly with the networks, rather than with individual providers. The advantage will be that the agency's contractual relationships will be somewhat simplified and a wider array of services will become available under each contract. A disadvantage may be that the network becomes in some instances a new layer and delays services to families.
Decide how payments will be made: Whether payments are made to CPFNs or to individual providers, the payment mechanism should both enhance local control over the community's available services and help to ensure that the state agency is getting what it pays for. The payment question is also tied to the question of who holds final
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decision-making authority for a case when DCFS retains legal responsibility for serving the family.
Establish what methods will be used to ensure the effectiveness of services: The answer to this question will ideally be made within the context of the payment mechanism. Whether or not that occurs, there does need to be some mechanism for ensuring that as control of community services moves to the localities, DCFS still has some means of ensuring that its clients get served for the purposes and within the limits set by DCFS. The front door redesign will have little impact if there are no structures within which DCFS can obtain appropriate services for the families it serves.
Organizational Change Steps
Using some of the principles outlined above, the agency must develop an organizational change strategy that addresses both the concrete steps that will be pursued to bring about the change (in effect a work plan for addressing the issues laid out in this paper) as well as the strategies that will be incorporated for changing the attitudes and behaviors of the people who will be expected to carry out the redesign effort. These should include directly confronting the fears that people will hold about the change, developing a training plan and written documentation so that people understand what the change really is, employing a mechanism for gathering feedback as the change is moving forward in selected Child Protection Family Networks, and designing incentives for work units that embrace the changes and further the goals of the organization.

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 11
A Model of Practice for the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services Jess McDonald, Director
Prepared by Richard H. Calica, Executive Director The Juvenile Protective Association
Chair, Practice Task Group and
Thomas D. Morton Executive Director Child Welfare Institute PRELIMINARY REPORT
AUGUST 1995

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Table of Contents

ExecutiveSummary .........................................................1

Introduction

3

Foundationsand Assumptions .................................................5 WhatIs Practice? ...................................................... 5 WhatIs a Model of Practice? .............................................6 WhatResults and for Whom? .............................................7 WhatResults from Whom? ..............................................8 BasicAssumptions .....................................................9

Elements of a Model of Practice ..............................................11 A Model of Human Change .............................................12 AModel for Decision-making ........................................... 14 A Model for Changing Environmental Conditions ............................ 14 Strategiesfor Human Change ............................................15

Strategiesfor Practice .......................................................17 General Practice Strategies and Principles ..................................17

Dynamics of a Model of Practice ..............................................21 Safetyand Child Maltreatment .......................................... 21 Strategiesfor Child Safety ............................................. 29 Resolution of Underlying Family Conditions ................................ 35 Influencing Caregiver Parental Role Functioning ............................. 35 InfluencingFamily Functioning .......................................... 43 InfluencingChild's Response to Caregiver ................................. 47 Influencing Child's Ability to Protect Self .................................. 49 EmotionalSecurity ....................................................50 Strategiesfor Emotional Security ........................................ 55 Permanence.........................................................60 FamilyPreservation .................................................. 61 Strategiesfor Family Preservation ....................................... 69 InfluencingAlternative Caregivers ....................................... 71 Foster Care, Relative Care and Residential Care .............................. 74 Strategiesfor Foster Care ............................................. 76 Strategiesfor Relative Care ............................................ 78 Adoptionand Relative Guardianship ..................................... 79 Strategies for Adoption and Relative Guardianship ............................ 90 InfluencingAdoptive Families .......................................... 92 InfluencingCurrent Caregivers .......................................... 94 Influencingthe Child ................................................. 94

e.
Preface
In December 1994, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) Director Jess McDonald commissioned a work group to define a practice model for DCFS. He appointed Richard H. Calica, Executive Director of the Juvenile Protective Association, as Chair and contracted with the Child Welfare Institute to provide consultation and support.
The accompanying paper represents the culmination of work by the members of the practice work group and its consultants. Members of the group include:
Denise Kane, Inspector General Diane Scruggs, Chicago Child Care Society Bernadette McCarthy, DCFS Ed Cotton, DCFS Jeanine Smith, Jewish Children's Bureau Elsie Pinkston, Ph.D., University of Chicago
In addition, Thomas D. Morton, Executive Director of the Child Welfare Institute, served as a member of the group and primary consultant. Other consultants to the group included:
Wayne Holder, Action for Child Protection Dr. Vera Fahlberg Ronald Davis Michael Budlong, Child Welfare Institute George Veltri, Child Welfare Institute
The following paper reflects the range of practice issues considered by the group and consultants. It is not represented as a consensual document. Primary authorship rests with Richard Calica and Thomas Morton. The opinions and recommendations expressed by them are an attempt to represent the best thinking by group members, with the acknowledgement that there were many points of individual disagreement, some of which may be included here as recommendations for practice.

A Model of Practice
Executive Summary
The Department of Children and Family Services, in its attempts to remain responsive to categorical streams of funding, various lawsuits, and an ever-shifting political context, has lost its focus on its core business as well as its social contract as a government agency. Put simply, DCFS has lost its core focus on the safety and emotional security of abused and neglected children and its position as a leader in the area of services to abused/neglected children and their families.
This document is intended as a much needed road map for DCFS. It is based upon the assumptions that society has a right and responsibility to intervene in families where parents (or caregivers) have so violated prevailing standards as to put the safety and well being of children in danger. This road map has implications for job descriptions, training, assessment, organization of work units, models of service delivery and parental involvement and responsibility, standards for intervening to change behavior, and standards for critical decisions regarding removal of children on a temporary or permanent basis.
The outstanding features of this Model of Practice for DCFS include:
■ A clear explication of the variables associated with child safety and developmental opportunity;
■ A practice model that distinguishes between persons who should be prosecuted for criminal activity and persons who should be evaluated for service;
■ A set of principles which will serve as a foundation for DCFS' organizational structure, training, and seeking accreditation from the Council on Accreditation;
■ A rationale for limiting the number of children removed from their birth parents and the limiting of time to decide on permanent plans for those children who are removed;
■ A practice model that makes clear the positive incentives, both from the child and system viewpoint, to leave children in their own homes unless they are at imminent risk of severe physical injury;
■ A rationale for simplifying the case management structure and reducing the number of helping professionals who are involved with any particular family;
• A practice model that allows for maximum participation of clients in determining what problems are being worked on, how those problems are being worked on, and what results are expected. Clients are treated with respect, are given options, and accept the consequences of their choices and behaviors;
• A practice model that clarifies what DCFS has a right to expect from its employees and its contract agencies on behalf of the children and families they serve;

L

I.

Introduction

A Model of Practice

This paper is designed to offer the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) a road map for practice with children and families. It seeks to answer the question, "What is the problem to which DCFS is the solution?" and it attempts to describe how DCFS can be a solution to this problem.
DCFS is confronted with the charge of responding to a serious social problem: child maltreatment. Its response is expected to be simultaneously quick, compassionate, reasoned, resolute, and unerring. The public expects that DCFS will not intrude upon families where no maltreatment occurs and leave no child unsafe where maltreatment has occurred or is likely to occur. The public also expects that parents who will do significant harm to their children will be prohibited from doing so, and that children who are not in danger will be left with their families. Finally, this public expects that these results will be achieved with efficiency and at a minimum of cost.
Meeting these expectations requires finessing a lengthy walk down a tightrope where each successful journey is likely to be forgotten or go unnoticed, each slip magnified, and each fall memorialized. While it is unlikely that DCFS can succeed with every family and child in the political realm, it is possible for DCFS to experience success in practical terms. This requires a framework to describe the decisions DCFS must make and the actions it must take to implement these decisions. DCFS must have a model of practice which clearly lays out its theoretical assumptions about what causes child maltreatment, what variables must be influenced to stop it, and what is the best way to exercise this influence.
This report is an attempt to lay out the details of these assumptions. Any endeavor to describe an approach to a social problem as complex and varied as child maltreatment inevitably will suffer two faults. The diversity of the problem requires too much differentiation to be concise. At the same time, readers looking for answers to specific issues in practice will complain that the level of analysis is too shallow.
Hopefully the trail has been laid clearly enough so that there will be a path to follow. For those who seek a condensed meaning of what follows, the authors have attempted to find some simple truths. The three most important of these are:
Most parents are capable of and motivated to protect and nurture their children;
2. Most caseworkers can be developed and are motivated to help families in which children are at risk of maltreatment;
All change for the better takes place in the context of a helping, supportive relationship.
To these statements we may add some corollaries:
4. The role of the caseworker is to offer the helping, supportive relationship that enables change;

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Foundations and Assumptions

A Mddel of Practice

What Is Practice?
All organizations employ technologies to convert inputs into outputs. In human service organizations, these technologies are generally referred to as practice. Practice is the means by which human beings (inputs) are helped to change their behavior, live in better conditions, or become eligible for benefits (outputs). Practice varies among human service organizations. In mental health services, practice includes verbal therapies, medication, and environmental control. In health care, practice includes surgery, medication, and verbal efforts to influence changes in lifestyle that cause or contribute to health problems. In child welfare, practice includes interpersonal efforts to influence understanding of a problem and action to resolve it (e.g. verbal therapies), making available necessary resources, and safety interventions to control behaviors of caregivers that present the possibility of harm to a child.
Better results are believed to be achieved with best practices. There are different ways of viewing best practices. One is like ingredients in cooking, better inputs make better results. In child welfare, this means that better techniques and services get better results. A second view is like the chefs skill in combining ingredients. There is both a best order in which to combine ingredients and a best technique for incorporating them. In child welfare, the work of helping is enhanced when attention to relationship precedes or accompanies a focus on instrumental acts to achieve goals. A third view is similar to the kitchen in which the chef works. Properly organized, it supports efficient work. Poorly organized, it hinders even the most skilled chef using the best ingredients. In child welfare, this pertains to the organization of supervision, continuity of contact by the intervenor, DCFS organizational culture, workload, and other organizational variables.
Unfortunately, discussions of practice tend to wander among these three views. All are relevant to good outcomes. For purposes of the discussion that follows, a distinction is made among the concepts of practice, which incorporates aspects of the first two views, and service design which pertains to the third view. In fact, the discussion here is based strongly on the belief that service design flows from a clear concept of practice, rather than the reverse. As Frank Lloyd Wright once said, "Form follows function." Therefore, primary emphasis here is on the questions of: 1) what results are intended, 2) what variables must be influenced in order to achieve these results and 3) what sequence of activities employing what techniques is likely to have the desired influence?

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What Results and for Whom?
DCFS has stated a commitment to five outcomes. They are:
Family care of a child is at or above a threshold level of safety and developmental opportunity;
2. When the family's care of the child falls short of that threshold, the level of care will be raised to that threshold;
When the above is not possible and children are placed outside the family, the child's physical, emotional, and cognitive developmental needs are met;
4. When the family will meet the child's needs for safety and development, the child will be returned to the family;
5. When the family will not meet the child's needs for safety and development, the child will live in an appropriate permanent living arrangement.
Achieving these outcomes requires serving several consumer groups. Foremost among these are children and their families. They are clearly linked to these results. However, DCFS also serves two other important groups. Identification of children who might be unsafe requires that professionals and other citizens who have reason to believe a child might be maltreated inform DCFS of what they have observed. By accepting their reports, DCFS provides a way for these citizens to respond to the public problem of child abuse and neglect, and to ease the personal anxiety created by what they may have witnessed. Each reporter of maltreatment is a consumer of the DCFS investigative and family assessment capabilities.
A second group are the creators of the public policy that requires each accepted report of maltreatment to have a determination. This group is made up of the legislative representatives of the people and advocates for specific policies. Did maltreatment occur or not? Who is the maltreator? DCFS is mandated to answer these questions and to found or unfound the report. One might simply view this as a means to determine who is safe or not and who will receive a protective intervention. Even where no protective intervention may be needed, DCFS is required to make a determination of the report. Indeed, a significant amount of resources and staff time are consumed in the pursuit of a determination.
A determination is a result, in the same way that a judicial decision is an outcome of a court process. Presumably, the quality of determinations is important to both protecting children and public acceptance of DCFS' legitimacy. Further, each reported family is impacted by the inquiry that follows, even if the report is eventually unfounded and no intervention is necessary. The act of engaging a family in an inquiry or subjecting a family to an investigation can have positive or negative effects on the family regardless of the outcome. The focus of this effort has been on the means of helping children and families. Defining practice relative to each of the other two groups and functions is important and should follow as a subsequent effort. Each is important to the success of DCFS.
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Current practice reflects central themes of protection, permanence, family preservation, adoption, and independent living. These concepts remain viable. The problem with current practice is the variable meaning and use that surrounds these terms. How one defines a problem often dictates how one will attempt to solve it. In selecting a practice model, it is important for DCFS to choose definitions that guide practice toward the right variables, strategies, and decisions. At the beginning of subsequent sections are definitions that guide the suggested practices. In some instances these definitions may vary from current practice. Therefore, each should be considered in light of its implications for changing current practice.

The above outcomes do not represent the entirety of DCFS' responsibility. Rather, they reflect those aspects of its work that directly affect children and families at risk due to maltreatment. A complete examination of practice would also include such functions as licensing of foster homes and day care facilities, approval of relative caregivers and adoptive families, regulatory services, and so on. For purposes of the following discussion, practice has been limited to those interactions directly designed to make decisions about and changes on behalf of families in which children are unsafe or may soon be.

Basic Assumptions

Model building is a component of theory building. Models rest on assumptions about relationships between variables and about cause and effect. In describing a model of practice, several assumptions have been used as a basis for construction. These are:

• A child's safety takes precedence over all other concerns;

■ A child's emotional security powerfully influences development;

■ Where maltreatment does not make a child unsafe, the child's emotional security takes precedence over agency safety;

■ A child's emotional security is strongly linked to family membership, and particularly to continuity in the relationship with the birth parent(s), followed by continuity of caregiver relationships;

■ Family members' emotional security powerfully influences their focus on the child's needs versus their own;

■ Interventions to assure safety invariably affect the emotional security of the child and other family members;

■ A child's need for emotional security takes precedence over certain parental rights and, therefore, limits the time that can or will be afforded a parent to demonstrate the ability to meet a child's need for safety and development;

•

Success in meeting the child's needs requires attention to both safety and emotional

security;

z

Elements of a Model of Practice

A Model of Practice

As stated in the previous section, practice is the means by which people are helped to change behavior or environmental conditions. In DCFS, there are three types or categories of results. They are changes in behavior, in environmental conditions, and in decisions. Changes in behavior may relate to the pattern or frequency of a behavior. For instance, a parent who was previously unresponsive to a child's initiation of contact may now demonstrate awareness of the child's behavior as an invitation and respond by giving the child affection or engaging in play. Another behavioral change is acquiring a skill or ability. For example, a parent may be able to demonstrate the ability to employ forms of discipline other than physical punishment as the result of coaching. Having the skill is a necessary condition for its use, but it is not the same as employing the skill regularly. These are separate behavioral results and often require different practice interventions.
Since DCFS services are not universal, it is necessary to determine who receives what help. Decisions tend to categorize clients and make them eligible for services or interventions. This is part of DCFS' people processing function and supports its people changing function. The most obvious form of this initial decision-making includes determining which calls to accept as reports of maltreatment, which reports require immediate response, which children are safe or unsafe, which cases to open and which safety plan to employ.
In some instances, it is the environment that requires change. Families may require housing, access to income, clothing, or food. Families may need access to services. Children may need a safe environment or an adoptive family. Such changes alter the environment around a client but do not necessarily require a change in client behavior.
Subsequent decisions include which interventions are needed to address which underlying conditions, which providers will guide the intervention, when the intervention has succeeded or is not succeeding, when to close a case or recommend termination of parental rights, and which children will be adopted. These are only a few of the many decisions that support other elements of practice.
Although decision-making and change in environmental conditions do not require behavioral change, these interventions will inevitably lead to changes in behavior patterns. Assessment is often the first intervention and does begin a change process. The mere act of being asked questions begins to alter people's perception of themselves, others, and their view of the world. This may be the family's first experience with what may later be an offer of ongoing help. Being in a different environment requires adaptation, leading to new or different behavior. The behavior of a child in a foster home will not mirror exactly the child's behavior in his own home. Change, whether planned or unplanned, is a companion of all interventions.

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A Model of Practice

Variables Influencing Human Change

Internalization of Some Responsibility

Present Discomfort

Change

Emotional Security

Efficacy

A Preferred Different Future

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A Model of Practice
One of the most significant environmental modifications made by DCFS and caseworkers is the change in the caregiver relationship and residence of children. Placement as a safety intervention is an environmental change. Changes in environmental condition can have powerful effects on the pattern of behavior. However, the change may be only temporary and occur as long as the new environmental conditions holds. Parents may not be able to maltreat the child if no access is possible. However, absence of maltreatment in these circumstances does not mean that the parent will not maltreat the child again.
Sometimes resources are available, but the client may be unwilling or unable to access them. Practice should address ability, opportunity, and motivation of the client and not focus singularly on access or availability. Changes in environmental conditions are often necessary elements of both nurture and control. However, they should not be confused with actual behavioral change.
Strategies for Human Change
At the point of entry into families, there are several sources of discomfort that can serve as sources of energy for change. First, there is the loss of privacy and autonomy accompanying the report and investigation. Second, for families in which maltreatment has occurred, there is the pain associated with the tension and conflict between the caregiver's positive intentions for the child and the real consequences for the child of the caregiver's current behavior. Focusing on the caregiver's concern for the child, the pain within the family, and discrepancy between positive intent and reality is more powerful in creating change than the will of the family to rid itself of the agency's intrusion. The latter offers a convenient source of focus and identifies with the family's anger about the intrusion. But its use will more often lead to compliance than change. Further, it implies that the best the agency has to offer is the hope of being left alone. Never the less, this may be the best way to reach the client psychologically, and therefore could be the place to start. If the client is left at this place it may be as far as the intervention proceeds.
The emotional security necessary to risk change comes through the formation of a trusting relationship. This relationship begins with empathy for the family's present experience and validation of their strengths. The intervenor must demonstrate that the family will be supported as well as confronted. This requires balancing nurture and positive feedback with clinical use of confrontation and environmental control. The former communicates understanding. The latter communicates that the intervenor has limits that will be maintained. Other core conditions such as warmth, positive regard, respect, genuineness, and concreteness are also used to support empathy.
Empathy permits the internalization of responsibility. Influencing the internalization of responsibility requires reconciliation of the differences between family's espoused goals and present actions. Families who perceive themselves as victims who have contributed nothing to their present discomfort will continue to blame others and focus their attention on avoidance of or conflict with externally perceived sources of family problems, one of which is the caseworker.
Families who come to see their own contributions find power in their own ability to grow and change. The principle strategy for internalization involves helping the family develop a picture
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Strategies for Practice

A Model of Practice

The preceding discussion provides a framework for selecting strategies for practice. Strategies will be discussed at two levels. The first level involves principles that apply in almost all elements of practice. The second are more tactical elements of strategy, applying to the specific variables that must be influenced in order to achieve DCFS' stated outcomes.

General Practice Strategies and Principles
Different forms of maltreatment have different etiologies and require different treatment in assessment and intervention. Physical abuse, physical neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional abuse may derive from different underlying family conditions. These differences may require distinctions in the way the family is served.
2. There should be a distinction in the use of legal authority between families in which there are criminal forms of maltreatment versus social forms of maltreatment. Where legal intervention is required for reasons of possible violation of criminal statutes, both an investigation and assessment are indicated. Where the nature of maltreatment does not suggest criminal behavior and the family does not contest the need for or legal basis for intervention, an assessment approach should be used.
Child safety should be the primary focus of assessment when initially entering a family and should remain a focus throughout the life of the case. While concerns about safety are always evident at initial contact, there should be a systematic way of applying safety criteria at regular decision points throughout the service life of DCFS' relationship with a family.
4. The distinction between child safety and risk of maltreatment should be reflected in differential practice with families. Safety refers to the imminent danger of significant harm to a child without immediate or ongoing interventions. Risk concerns the presence of conditions within the family known to be associated with maltreatment. Its presence makes intervention desirable or necessary to assure that a child can and will be safe in the care of a family in which maltreatment exists. Safety decisions lead to changes in environmental conditions that make the child unsafe. Risk assessment guides changes in caregiver behavior. As with safety, periodic and systematic reassessment of risk should be a component of practice.
5. Interventions in families should be based on need. What caseworkers often identify as problems are actually symptoms of underlying conditions in families. These underlying conditions are needs for which the problem behavior is perceived as a solution by the family members exhibiting these behaviors. Services often include interventions, but are not the same thing. DCFS practice should be based on interventions to meet needs rather than services to address problems.

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11. The emotional security of family members can best be supported when interventions occur within and are supported by the family's social network and within the family's home community. The family's social network contributes to the family's current functioning and is the most valuable resource in sustained change. Sustained change generally requires restructuring of the contributions of network members as individuals and altering the interactions among network members. Attachments, identity, and family efficacy can best be maintained when families are served within the area they define as their home community and from which they will use ongoing resources.
12. The emotional security of family members requires continuity of relationships. Multiple caseworkers, even with the benefit of specialized expertise, cannot compensate for the lost emotional security due to fragmented attachments. Continuity of care requires minimal changes in caregiver relationships for children and in helping relationships for the child and family.
13. The primary intervenor must be responsible for assessing and treating the maltreatment dynamic in families. Families who are subdivided into contributing symptoms and sent to symptom targeted services do not receive sufficient help in resolving the interaction of these variables. It is most often the interaction of these dynamics within families that lead to maltreatment, rather than simply the cumulative presence of separate factors.
14. Practice must differentiate between ends and means. Family preservation, reunification, adoption, and independent living are all means to ends. The ends are safety and emotional security. An intact family with a child who, because of DCFS intervention, no longer feels emotionally secure in the parent-child relationship is not a preserved family. Similarly, a child is only prepared for adoption to the extent the child feels emotionally secure enough to risk a new attachment to an adoptive parent.
15. The child and birth parent(s) attachment represents the most powerful resource for change in child and parent interactions. While the threatened loss of this attachment creates discomfort in both parent and child, the purposeful use of this discomfort by the agency creates emotional insecurity in both parent and child, which undermines real change and often extracts only compliant behavior. Therefore, all acts of intervention should be based on principles of maintaining and strengthening the attachment between child and parent.
These general strategies and principles imply several things for the formulation of a service response and a practice strategy. First, except in extreme cases of child maltreatment where there is criminal behavior or strong caregiver denial of the maltreatment, the family should be approached with an offer of concern and help for the child's safety rather than through a quasicriminal investigative procedure. This expression of concern must recognize and validate the positive contributions of the parents to the child's present development as well as supportively confront the parents' contributions to the child's maltreatment.
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Dynamics of a Model of Practice

A Model of Practice

Defining a model of practice involves several steps. The first is a statement of believed causal relationships. DCFS' responsibility for child safety is related to circumstances in which the threat to safety arises from child maltreatment. This social problem drives practice at the front end of service delivery and continues to do so throughout the life of services to families

General definitions:

•

FAMILY

The definition of family varies with the context in which it is defined. For a child, there

are three families, which may be different or the same. First there is the genetic family, defined by those persons who share the same genetic heritage. Second there is family of circumstance, which is a network of related and non-related persons, who serve as a

source of identity, safety, and developmental opportunity for a child. Third there is an ideological family, created in the child's mind and woven from fabric of the child's perception of family experience and the child's wishes.

•

CAREGIVER

A caregiver is a person who accepts responsibility for and acts to meet a child's needs for safety and development. A child may have multiple caregivers, both within and external to the family.

•

SERVICE PLAN

The service plan defines the goals and interventions that will address the family's needs (including the child). A service plan may contain one or more component plans to

address specific needs such as safety, risk, visitation between children in out-of-home care and birth family members, and permanency.

Safety and Child Maltreatment

Key Definitions:

•

CHILD MALTREATMENT

Child maltreatment is a symptom of underlying family conditions. It is expressed through caregiver-child interaction in which the child is physically, emotionally, and/or sexually treated in such a manner that the child's emotional, cognitive, and/or physical development is or will be impaired and the caregivers are unwilling or unable to behave differently.

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A Model of Practice
Diagram 2 identifies the primary intervention variables associated with child safety and child maltreatment. Safety is a condition, whereas maltreatment is an action or behavior. Assuring safety requires decisions and environmental interventions. Ensuring the family's capability for providing safety additionally requires behavior change. Behavior change requires influencing the variables associated with maltreatment.
Because the proposed definition of child maltreatment focuses on caregiver-child interactions, the key variables have been separated into child -influences and caregiver influences. The primary caregiver influences are the caregiver(s)' individual functioning and the family's functioning. The primary child influences are the child's capability for self-protection and the child's response to the caregiver. The child variables in no way imply that children cause their maltreatment. However, it does say that certain child responses together with certain caregiver attributes increase the likelihood that a child will experience maltreatment.
The caregiver influences derive from both the caregiver's family and self. Variables influencing family functioning include environment and resources, family members' ways of expressing their needs, the size and nature of the family's social network, family members' interaction management skills, the family's awareness and perception of present functioning, and culture.
Variables influencing individual caregiver functioning include parenting capability, caregiver's acceptance of responsibility for child's needs, caregiver's attachment to the child, availability and access to environmental resources, presence and impact of disabling conditions (e.g. substance abuse, mental illness, developmental disability, physical health), the individual's availability for the caregiver role, the caregiver's behavioral means of expressing needs, and the maturity level and developmental task accomplishment of the caregiver.
Intervention may require influencing any or all of these variables. Some variables may be directly and sufficiently influenced through the casework relationship. However, other variables may require dependence on relationships with other persons or agencies.
Successful management of this interdependence is a critical component of effective service delivery. To the extent that caseworkers are uncomfortable with mutual dependence and are forced to rely on others, there are incentives to employ placement as a safety plan. Placement reduces the risk associated with the provider's failure to follow through or the family's unresponsiveness to the treatment intervention.
The child variables tend to receive inconsistent treatment in practice. At one level, they appear to be blaming the victim and making the victim responsible for his or her own maltreatment. Yet a child's response to a caregiver taken in the context of the caregiver's ability to meet the child's needs represent an important combination of variables.

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Variables Influencing Family Functioning

Culture ^MALTREATM ENT'
Family's Awareness, Perception of Present Functioning

Environment/ Resources

Member's - Expression
of Need

Family Functioning

Family's Interaction Management
Skills

Family Social Network

Diagram 3

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Variables Influencing Child's Response to Caregiver

Child's Needs

Temperament
(at birth)

Child's
Response
to
Caregiver

I E— Effects of Maltreatment

A

Child's Attachment

to Caregiver

Child's Trust in Caregiver

Caregiver's Behavior toward Child

Diagram 5

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Strategies for Child Safety
The components of practice in child safety are:
Determine mutually (with the family) the specific safety factors that are present;
2. Mutually determine whether or not the child is safe;
3. Mutually develop a safety plan;
4. Implement the safety responses contained in the safety plan;
5. Mutually determine the underlying conditions in the family (risk influences) that influence the safety factors;
6. Mutually select and develop a plan of interventions to meet underlying needs and conditions;
7. Implement the interventions;
8. Mutually reassess the safety factors and risk influences;
9. Modify the safety and service plan in response to changes in the safety factor and risk influences.
For DCFS, practice begins with a call to the hotline. This initial phase of practice involves a decision. The decision is whether the reporter is conveying a concern about child safety." Presently, DCFS focuses on the question of "Does what the reporter is conveying fit the statutory and policy definitions of child abuse and neglect?" These are related, but are not necessarily the same concepts.
The question of the definition of child abuse and neglect is very relevant to an allegation-based system and remains relevant for those cases in which an investigation is required. However, in a safety-based model of practice, the initial question is more focused on: "What have you seen or do you know that would cause you to believe the child might be in imminent danger of significant harm?" rather than "What have you seen the parent do to the child?"
The question of safety arises quickly at initial intake as another decision requirement, i.e., "Is an immediate response indicated?" Therefore, there is no attempt to convey that current practice lacks a safety focus. A consistent application of criteria to the evaluation of the safety concerns is needed.
DCFS has moved recently to adopt a modification of New York state's approach to safety assessment. The Illinois version of the preliminary assessment of safety focuses on thirteen identified factors, with an option to include others based on professional judgement. The 14 factors are listed below:
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Missouri has passed legislation creating a differential response to families at initial contact, distinguishing between families in which an investigation or assessment will occur. The latter has been designated as a Family Intervention Determination (FID). The caseworker determines any risk to the child's safety, whether the family needs assistance from the department, and what service needs exist. While Missouri appears to offer preventive services to greater proportions of its caseload than does Illinois, it still stands to reason that cases not indicating criminal violations of statutes and emergency placement could initially be approached similarly.

When the Missouri department chooses a FID response, the family is approached as follows:

The Division of Family Services has received a report of concern regarding your child(ren). Missouri law, Chapter 210 RSMO, requires the Division to conduct either a family intervention determination or an investigation when a report is received. Because the report does not seem to be criminal in nature, a family intervention determination will be completed with your family. The purpose is to discuss:

• Your family's strengths,

■ Your family's needs, and

■ Your family's need for services.

If the family intervention determination indicates that your family could benefit from services, a plan will be developed with you. This will be done by discussing with you and your family the reported concerns, as well as other areas that may worry you. We will then make plans with you on how to address your concerns, what services will be arranged, and what changes may need to be made.

If a family chooses not to cooperate with the family intervention determination process, we may proceed with a child abuse/neglect investigation to confirm the safety of the child. If the result of an investigation is that abuse or neglect occurred, the individual who committed abuse or neglect will have his/her name placed in the Child Abuse Central Registry.

While the above language is not being suggested literally, it does offer a framework for approaching families. Even in those families where an investigation will be conducted it could be approached from the standpoint that DCFS has received a report of concern about the family's child and is required by Illinois law to determine the safety of the child. This deviates from a pure investigative approach that might begin with a statement that DCFS has received a report of child abuse and neglect and is required by law to determine if it occurred and who may have maltreated the child.

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There are different formulations of risk influences. DCFS is examining use of the safety factors used by New York, so it may be useful to examine the risk influences used in their model. New York separates risk influences into five categories. These are caretaker (caregiver), child, family, intervention, and abuse/maltreatment influences. Under each there are specific influences. These include:

Caretaker Influences

Abuse/maltreatment of caretaker Alcohol or drug use Expectations of child Acceptance of child Physical capacity to care for child Mental capacity to care for child

Child Influences

Child's vulnerability Child's response to caretaker Child's behavior Child's mental health and development Child's physical health and development

Family Influence

Domestic violence Ability to cope with stress Availability of social supports Living conditions Family identity and interaction

Intervention Influence

Caretaker's motivation Caretaker's cooperation with, intervention

Abuse/maltreatment Influences

Access to child by perpetrator Intent and acknowledgement of responsibility Severity of abuse/maltreatment History of abuse/maltreatment committed by present caretaker(s)

These are not proposed as the specific set of risk influences DCFS should accept. However, DCFS needs to adopt a practice perspective on risk assessment and its relevance to family intervention.

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Resolution of Underlying Family Conditions

A Model of Practice

Underlying conditions are those conditions in a family that specifically drive risk and safety influences. They may relate to capabilities, motivation opportunity, or dynamics of relationships affecting all three. The diagrams illustrating dynamics of safety and maltreatment identify clusters of underlying conditions. There may be others as well.
This goal begins to link a model of causation with a model of change. Presumably, intervention to achieve change will need to address both safety (and maltreatment) variables and emotional security variables. It requires influencing individuals, family systems, family and community networks, and community service systems. The purposes are to enable families to use available resources, develop their capabilities, and to alter patterns of behavior within families.

Influencing Caregiver Parental Role Functioning
The key components of practice include:
Engaging the caregiver based on identification of positive intent toward the child and strengths in the parental role;
2. Joining with the caregiver through sharing in concerns about emotional security and mutual (family and agency) goals for the child;
3. Engaging the caregivers' social support network to achieve an understanding of the caregivers' family's needs and the child's specific needs;
4. Determining with the caregiver the nature of the underlying conditions that influence the child's safety;
5. Exploring earlier successful interventions with the caregiver;
6. Supporting the caregiver's identification of interventions to meet these needs;
7. Determining the threats to emotional security and experiences of loss of security for the caregiver and implementing supportive interventions to restore this condition.
8. Supporting and enabling the caregiver's use of these interventions;
9. Providing feedback and coaching the caregiver toward successful use of the interventions or reassessment and selection of new interventions if desired results are not being obtained;
10. Coaching and developing network members' (including foster parents) development and demonstration of a positive helping alliance with the parental caregivers;
11. Periodically redetermining the current level of safety factors and risk influences;
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• Providing for the emotional needs of the child, including love, security, affection, and the emotional support necessary for healthy development;
• Providing necessary stimulation for normal intellectual, social and spiritual development (if the family believes spiritual development to be important);
• Helping socialize the child;
• Disciplining the child and keeping him from developing patterns of behavior and attitudes disapproved of by society;
■ Protecting the child form physical, emotional, or social harm;
• Presenting a model for the identification of sex-linked behavior;
• Maintaining family interaction on a stable, satisfying basis so that effort is made to meet the needs of all members of the family;
■ Providing a fixed place of abode for the child and providing a clearly defined place for him in the community; and
• Acting as an intermediary between the child and the outer world, defending the child's rights in the community, and protecting the child from unjust demands of the community.
Different cultures and changing social norms may suggest some modification of how these elements are expressed. However, most cultures have relevant equivalent applications for the intent of each element.
Caregivers need several capabilities in the parenting role. First among these is the ability to recognize and interpret the child's behavior and the underlying needs for which the behavior is an expression. Without this, the parent cannot competently respond and the child cannot experience efficacy.
The parent must be capable of several basic responses. These include protection, assurance of safety, emotional reassurance, feeding, holding, responding to a child's initiation, initiation with the child, development of social skills, development of conscience and a set of values, cognitive stimulation to aid mental development, and learning and physical stimulation to aid physical development. As children develop, the caregiver needs to be able to balance structure with the child's growing need for autonomy and self-control.
Neglect occurs through failure to recognize a child's expression of needs and/or to respond with need-meeting behavior. Assessing parenting capability requires examination of parent-child interactions. Simply noting developmental deficiencies in a child, even if deprivation is obvious, is not sufficient to determine what needs exist in the child's caregiver. Similarly, generic parenting skills training may not respond to the caregiver's unique conditions and requirements.
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■ Intervention to moderate the contribution of environmental stressors.

AVAILABILITYIACCESS To ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
A child may be endangered when caregivers are unable to provide food, shelter, clothing, or utilities. An immediate intervention strategy is to alter this condition through linking the family to resources. There may be underlying conditions within the family that raise the probability that these conditions will retu rn . Assessment should focus both on the presence of resources and the caregiver's contributions to the absence of these resources in the family.

Key practice strategies include:

■ Determination of caregiver's resource needs relative to the child's needs;

■ Engagement of social network members as resources;

■ Information and advocacy regarding access to resources;

■ Follow-up with caregiver and provider;

■ Reassessment.

CAREGIVER'S ATTACHMENT TO THE CHILD
A caregiver who is not attached to the child may fail to initiate or complete the cycle of need. The caregiver may fail to respond to the child's expressed needs. The child's response to the caregiver may consequently be a failure to attach. A caregiver with low frustration tolerance may either punish the child for failing to engage or choose to ignore needs. Intervening to address this variable requires examining the cycle of child-caregiver interactions and increasing the accuracy of caregiver perception, timeliness of response, and accuracy of response to the child's needs.

Key practice strategies include:

■ Determination of caregiver's attachment to child;

• Support caregiver's decisions about future commitment to child's needs;

• Provide caregiver-child interventions to resolve attachment disorders.

PRESENCE AND IMPACT OF DISABLING CONDITIONS
Caregiver disabling conditions represent a series of challenges for DCFS, generally requiring specialized services to address the contribution of the disabling condition. This dependency creates ambiguity about who is responsible for treating the maltreatment dynamic, DCFS or the specialized service. While there is presumed to be a relationship, treatment does not necessarily assure elimination of the problem. The services may have different success criteria. For example, a drug treatment program may consider itself successful if a client demonstrates an adequate period of non-use of the substance, whereas DCFS considers the caregiver's functioning in relationship to the child as a criteria for success. The substance abuse program may be able to

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• For children in relative or foster care, determine the impact of the disabling condition on visitation and structure visitation, in response to the child's needs and the caregiver's ability;

• For treatment, evaluate change in risk and safety status, along with progress of treatment.

AVAILABILITY FOR THE CAREGIVER ROLE
This variable is relevant in two contexts. First, absent caregivers cannot meet a child's needs. Parents who are incarcerated or whose whereabouts are unknown cannot meet a child's ongoing needs. Decisions about continuation in the role need to be based on the length of time the caregiver will be absent relative to the child's developmental stage and needs.

The second context concerns parents of children in out-of-home care. These parents or caregivers cannot develop in the role nor work on improvement of child-caregiver interactions without access to the child. Further, absence from the role on an active basis leads to deterioration in the parent-child attachment. Attachment is a learned behavior and, therefore, can be unlearned. Visitation that includes only social contact without opportunities for a range of caregiver role performances does not develop a caregiver's ability and undermines the child's and caregiver's attached relationship.

Key practice strategies include:
• Determine the duration of the caregiver's expected absence relative to the child's developmental needs;

■ Determine and implement a plan of visitation that will respond to the child's needs;

■ Where no visitation is possible within a timeframe appropriate to the child's needs, terminate parental rights and seek adoption.
CAREGIVER'S EXPRESSION OF NEEDS
How a caregiver expresses needs to the child partially determines the child's response to the caregiver. Continued failed responses with a caregiver who has a low frustration tolerance may lead to physical abuse or to neglect if the caregiver gives up. Assessment of this variable must focus on the caregiver's verbal, para-verbal and non-verbal expressions of needs and the match of these expressions with the child's cognitive ability, prior life experiences, and developmental stage.

Key practice strategies include:

■ Observe caregiver-child interactions and determine nature of caregiver initiation with the child and caregiver's response to the child's initiation;

■ Determine caregiver preferences in communication of needs to the child and in responding to the child's communication of need with the caregiver;
• Determine caregiver communications and responses likely to result in an abusive interaction or neglect of the child's needs;

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4. Exploring earlier successful interventions with the family members;
5. Supporting the family members' identification of interventions to meet these needs;
6. Determining threats to emotional security and experiences of loss of security for the caregiver and family members, and implementing supportive interventions to restore this condition;
7. Supporting and enabling the family's use of these interventions;
8. Providing feedback and coaching the family members toward successful use of the interventions or reassessment and selection of new interventions if desired results are not being obtained;
9. Periodically redetermining the current level of safety factors and risk influences;
10. Determining the maximum time feasible for the child's need for permanence during which evidence of the family's ability to assure safety must be demonstrated;
11. Where safety cannot be achieved within the family in the timeframe of the child's developmental needs, assuring the safety and emotional security of the child through relative guardianship or adoption.
When safety influences require placement in foster or relative care, the following additional component of practice applies:
12. Developing a positive alliance between the alternate caregiver and the family members on behalf of the child.
The following six variables were identified as influencing family functioning. They are: culture, environment and resources, family member's expression of needs, the family's social network, family member's interaction management skills, and the family's awareness and perception of present functioning. In addition, the individual functioning of members other than the caregiver will affect family functioning.
CULTURE Culture is "a pattern of shared basic assurnptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems." (Schein, 1992). Culture is expressed at several levels, these being artifacts (visible behaviors, symbols, and customs), espoused values (statements about preferred choices and solutions) and basic assumptions (beliefs that are taken for granted and exhibit very little variation within a cultural unit).
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Key practice strategies include:

■ Observe family member interactions and determine nature of members' initiation with each other and the response to this initiation;

■ Determine member preferences in communicating needs and in responding;

■ Determine member communications and responses likely to enable an abusive interaction or neglect of the child's needs;

■ Determine with the family previously successful interactions and alternatives that might lead to success;

■ Coach and support the family members in new interactions.

FAMILY SOCIAL NETWORK
The family's immediate support system is defined by its existing social network. Families in which neglect occurs have been characterized as lacking sizeable networks or as having networks that do not support problem solutions. In fact, some network members may enable current problems (e.g. a friend who engages in substance abuse or denies a family member's problem). The network is both a source and resource, and can contribute to the present problem. Attaining sustained change without involving formal helping systems may require reconstruction of the family network.

Key practice strategies include:

• Engage the caregiver and family members in an identification and assessment of the current social network;

■ Identify the positive and negative contributions of current network members and needs not met within the network;

• Engage and involve network members by emphasizing concern for the welfare of the child or concern for the welfare of the caregiver;

■ Support and enable network members in the roles they have agreed to perform in support of the family.

FAMILY MEMBERS' INTERACTION MANAGEMENT SKILLS
A family's management of interactions will depend on the family's rules, boundaries, role organization, power distribution, and communication process. In addition, it depends on the individual contributions of members. Most adult skills are a combination of skills learned from parental modeling during childhood and adaptations made to adult family life. Because the family is a social unit, the ability of its members to successfully interact is as important as the individual capabilities of its members. Unfortunately, individual capability doesn't always mean system capability.

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Influencing Child's Response to Caregiver

A Model of Practice

The key components of practice include:
Determining the child's expected behavioral capabilities based on age;
2. Determining present functioning through evaluation of patterns of initiation, expression of need to the caregiver, and response to caregiver;
3. Determining prior experiences with maltreatment and the adaptive patterns exhibited by the child in response to these experiences;
4. Determining caregiver capabilities indicated by the child's needs and adaptive responses;
5. Determining caregiver patterns of initiation and response to child's initiation;
6. Altering the caregiver's patterns of initiation and response to match with the child's needs through direct coaching and feedback;
7. Depending on the age and verbal ability of the child, engaging the child in clinical services designed to ameliorate the effects of maltreatment with the explicit permission and cooperation of the caregiver;
8. Engaging the child and caregiver in clinical services designed to support improved interaction;
9. Developing the capability of relative caregivers and foster parents to recognize and respond to children who have experienced maltreatment and who demonstrate adaptive responses that are a risk to the child.
There are three contexts to consider with this variable cluster. The first is the child-caregiver interaction where the caregiver is the birth parent. The second is where the caregiver is a relative or foster parent. The third is adoptive parents.
It bears repeating that this variable is not an indication that children cause their abuse. However, there are child characteristics that, when taken in relationship to caregiver characteristics, raise the risk of a child's maltreatment. To the extent that the child's characteristics can be modified, the probability of abuse may be lowered.
CHILD'S NEEDS, TEMPERAMENT
These variables are generally given and practice should take into context the demands these variables place on the caregiver.
Key practice strategies include:
■ Determine needs and temperament tendencies;

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CHILD'S TRUST IN CAREGIVER
Trust is an easy quality to destroy and a difficult one to build, especially after it has been violated. The cycle of maltreatment represents repeated violations of the -child's trust in the caregiver. As trust deteriorates, the child may withdraw from the caregiver, inviting caregiver rage or abandonment. Restoring this trust is particularly important for children who have had continuity of their relationship disrupted by placement. Restoration of trust generally requires repeated success over time, a difficult condition when the child is with the birth parent for only briefs periods during visitation. Current caregiver and caseworker misgivings about the trustworthiness of the birth parents may be communicated unintentionally in much the same way that a birth parent non-verbally communicates anxiety to a child.
Key practice strategies include:
• Identify, through observation and verbally eliciting the child's perceptions, the child's trust concerns about the caregiver;
• Identify what actions on the part of the caregiver would provide reassurance;
• Coach the caregiver in trust-building interactions.
Influencing Child's Ability to Protect Self
The key components of practice include:
Providing the child with information to develop the child's differentiation of maltreatment from acceptable parental behavior;
2. Coaching the child in responses to caregiver initiation of maltreatment and in reporting maltreatment if it occurs.
Physical size differences and adult-child authority relationships render resistance to maltreatment difficult if not impossible. Yet a child who is able to recognize maltreatment may be able to report incidents and avoid subsequent repetition of episodes. Four variables appear to be related to the child's capacity for self protection. Two of these, age and disabling conditions, are not directly open to influence. The others, awareness of acceptable caregiver-child interaction and a trusting relationship with a protector, are open to influence.
AWARENESS OF ACCEPTABLE CAREGIVER-CHILD INTERACTION
Influencing this variable may require a trusting relationship, for the child may be fearful of even discussing maltreatment. Given this relationship, there are strategies for influence.
Key practice strategies include:
• Give the child information about acceptable adult and caregiver interactions with children;

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As a result of this type of caregiving, a child develops a sense of basic trust, the capacity to give up immediate gratification for later reward, a sense of self, a sense of efficacy, the capacities to cooperate, compete and to love, and ultimately functional autonomy. Without emotional security, a child has little capacity to devote any energy or attention to the tasks of either cognitive or emotional development.

Basic trust comes from a primary attachment to a caregiver. It derives from having biological needs met consistently and in a manner that does not allow an infant to become overwhelmed. Basic trust is the feeling that one will survive and is not at the hands of a violent caregiver or in danger of annihilation through neglect.

Frustration tolerance presupposes the capacity for basic trust. It develops within an attachment relationship, encouraging the child to give up his immediate gratification for the love of the primary attachment object. This is possible because the love of the other is valued by the child and because the delay in gratification is kept to a tolerable level. Admiration and love is consistently supplied as the promised substitute. It is the ability which allows developmental progress in areas such as toilet training and learning to read.

Identity is a state of being which is experienced as continuous over time. It comes from being treated as a valuable individual with wishes, needs, and motives of one's own. It develops within the primary attachment relationship with a consistent caregiver who treats the child as real, i.e. a person who is able to reflect to the child that he is being experienced by another as important and that the child's accurate perceptions are validated rather than ignored, defended against, or denied.

A sense of efficacy comes from the context of the primary attachment relationship, and later through successful interactions with others. It evolves from both the experience of having an effect on the environment and from being loved and admired for one's development. Thousands of day-to-day experiences contribute to one's sense of efficacy. Events such as a child finding his own thumb and being able to consistently put it in his mouth, moving a toy, attaching a sound to a word with meaning, making his caregiver respond positively, and being able to throw a ball all contribute to a sense of efficacy. Likewise, the lack of appropriate admiration and mirroring can .lead to a sense of failure and doubt about efficacy. A caregiver's admiration, sense of hope, and confident expectation, or the lack thereof, all contribute to a child's sense of efficacy.

Cooperation and competition are developed within the family and with peers and other adults. These capacities develop as a result of having shared goals and rules about how to proceed. Cooperation and competition are interpersonal skills acquired in a social context and nurtured by the giving and receiving of positive regard and support for goal achievement.

Love is the capacity to put another's needs, wishes, and gratification before one's own. It allows one to share ones self and belongings with another. The capacity to love is a necessary condition to be able to provide for a child.

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For birth parents, it is difficult to trust those who have taken away the family's children. Similarly, it is difficult for the parents to trust the motives of the alternate caregiver. Typical birth parents' reactions to this loss of emotional security may include efforts to undermine the child-caregiver relationship, or to forego the attachment to the child as a way of easing the pain and shame of the loss.

Similar issues exist for alternate caregivers and caseworkers. Foster parents who experience emotional insecurity may undermine the child birth parent relationship. Caseworkers experiencing emotional insecurity may seek to employ controlling strategies with birth families and alternate caregivers.

Resistance, common in efforts toward human change, comes from underlying feelings associated with vulnerability and loss of control. While it is a natural component of change, it can be significantly increased when the impact of interventions on emotional security is not recognized. Intervenors can be both proactive and reactive. Proactive efforts minimize threats to emotional security in the basic design of the intervention. Reactive approaches seek to ameliorate the effects of loss and to demonstrate empathy for the loss.

What is commonly labeled as non-cooperation on the part of parents is most often a reflection of their reaction to the emotional insecurity created in their lives as a result of the intervention. The impact of this on efforts to help can range from simple resistance to a refocus of the entire intervention on control issues.

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Strategies for Emotional Security
The components of practice in emotional security include:
1. Assuring the physical safety of family members;
2. Maintaining attachments that are essential to the long-term plan for safety;
Retaining elements of identity essential to a sense of self and well-being;
4. Developing trust with and between family members;
5. Promoting and restoring autonomy.
A child experiences loss of emotional security due to maltreatment and to interventions by DCFS to address maltreatment. In the former instance, threats to physical safety and survival represent a major source of insecurity. However, placement of a child in foster care, while it may provide for practical safety, does not alleviate this insecurity. In fact, it raises new areas of concern for the child who may now depend on persons previously unknown to the child or his family for survival.
Where children are separated from their family of origin, the cumulative effect of time raises new issues of emotional security. Because it appears less likely that permanence will be experienced in a relationship with the birth parent, the child inevitably wonders if it will exist all. In other words, will there be attachments that offer continuity and trust over time? This forms a basis for permanency planning and the desire to resolve the issue of permanence quickly. Replacement from home to home tends to destroy the basic capability for trust (Littner, 1977).
For parents, the primary threat to emotional security stems from the loss of family autonomy inherent in state intervention. With loss of control comes loss of trust. Similarly, the removal of the child leads to loss of family identity and attachments. Whether or not placement actually occurs, these threats are present in parents' minds.
Five primary variable clusters support emotional security. These are physical safety, attachment, identity, trust, and autonomy. Intervenors must consider their impact on each of these variables. While the ultimate goal is emotional security, emotional insecurity is one form of present discomfort that supplies energy for change.
One of the dilemmas of long-term foster care is that the discomfort of the separation of child and family dissipates, thus removing the tension necessary to resolve the parent and child's ambivalence and create permanence for the child. This implies an element of practice using existing feelings of insecurity as an element of the change process. However, utilizing discomfort arising as a logical consequence of a family's behavior is distinct from the creation of discomfort as an arbitrary or punitive act of the intervenor.

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For purposes of discussion Fahlberg's distinction between attachment and bonding is used here. Attachment refers to the child's connection to the parent and others. Bonding refers to the parent's link to the child. Interference in the parent-child bond and attachment presents the possibility of harm to the child, a harm that may be just as consequential for the child's development as maltreatment by the parent.
For this reason, separation of child and parent must be considered carefully. The attachment between child and parent must be considered even when the child remains in the care of parents.
When children move into foster care, they are faced with forming new attachments to their caregivers. It is not sufficient that the child remain attached to the birth parent. Attachment to the caregiver is necessary for continued growth and development. Similarly, attachment to birth parents is essential to maintaining the motivation and commitment to remain in the original parent-child relationship.
The requirements for bonding and attachment vary with the child's stage of development. For infants, the nervous system becomes progressively more organized over the first year of life. Children gain muscle control from their head downward; therefore, attachment begins with the control the infant gains in his face. An infant first learns to focus on objects eight or nine inches away, often the distance between the infant and a mother's face. Face-to-face contact is important to the formation of attachments in early life. Infants who are separated from their mothers at birth may require significant visual contact with the mother in order for attachment to develop.
Significant aspects of bonding and attachment occur during the first three years. This does not mean that attachment cannot develop later. Otherwise, adoption of older children would not be possible. However, it does imply that visitation between parent and child for very young children needs to be frequent if the plan is to reunite the parent and child. Without frequent visitation, the child may exhibit characteristics of the insecurely attached child. These children have less selfesteem, express more negative affect, are less resilient, independent, compliant, empathetic, and socially competent than others (Stroufe, 1983).
Key practice strategies include:
• While loss of attached relationships may be a consequence of a caregiver's failure to protect or nurture a child, the threatened loss of the child should not be used as an inducement to change;
• Intervenors should create an alliance in support of the parental bond with the child and the child's attachment to the parent;
• Alternate caregivers should form an alliance with the birth parent in support of the parental bond and the child's attachment to the parent;
• Interventions should demonstrate a concern for strengthening the parent-child connection;
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TRUST
According to Rutter (1981), children between six months and four years of age experience the most emotional distress over parental separation. Younger children have not yet developed the capacity for selective attachments, and older children are more likely to have the skills necessary to know that attachments can be maintained. The risk associated with separation during the toddler years is the interference with the balance of autonomy and dependency (Fahlberg 1991). This leads to the fear in children that adults will not be there when needed.
Maltreating parents have likely experienced their own broken trust relationship early in life. Removal of a child from the family may be seen as yet another confirmation that one can't count on relationships. When this occurs, the parent may conclude that reliance on the child is not possible, leading to emotional abandonment.
Key practice strategies include:
• Assure consistency and immediacy in responses to child and parent;
■ Assure continuity in relationships between caseworker and family and between child and caregivers;
• Enable the grieving process by supporting the expression of feelings by both child and parent;
■ Explore the child's perception of the separation from the parent and the reasons for it, resolving instances of magical or egocentric thinking;
■ Resolve the separation to enable new attachments;
■ Minimize the trauma of moves through pre-placement preparation and post-placement contacts;
■ Enable the birth parents to help the child move;
■ Minimize loyalty conflicts for the child and parent;
■ Prepare the child and family members (birth, foster, relative and adoptive) for moves and expected changes.
AUTONOMY The resolution of dependence versus autonomy is a basic developmental task. Both children who have been maltreated and parents who maltreat may have histories indicating difficulty with resolution of these issues. Even where resolution occurred successfully, one might expect resistance to the loss of autonomy. In involuntary child welfare interventions, the loss of control can be even more significant.

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attachments to birth family members (family preservation). Because safety, both present and future, represents the greatest threat to permanence within the birth family, safety criteria take precedence in decisions. These competing variables should be reflected in the model for permanence.

Among the key variables DCFS must influence are the birth family's ability to provide for safety, the agency's ability to demonstrate reasonable efforts, the child's emotional security (including resolution of the loss of the birth family and resolution of the effects of maltreatment) and the agency's ability to influence and support a commitment to the child by another family (including relatives, an adoptive family, or a foster family).

The dynamics of permanence depend partially on whether permanence is experienced within the birth family or in an alternate permanent living arrangement such as adoption or relative guardianship. Separate discussions follow about each situation. For purposes of the practice model, family preservation, by preventing the threats to the birth family inherent in placement of the child, and family preservation through the restoration of the autonomy and efficacy of family functioning through reunification, operate on similar variables. Practice and service strategies will differ in each context.

While the child receives care within the family, the greatest threats to family preservation are the treatment dynamics and environmental conditions that raise issues of child safety. Once the child is removed from the family, significant agency and system variables come into play.

Family Preservation

Key Definition:

•

FAMILY PRESERVATION

Family preservation is a strategy for assuring emotional security for a child through the

development and maintenance of attachments, identity, autonomy, and efficacy in family

member's relationships.

■ When children are safe in their family of origin, family preservation first means providing permanence by having the child remain in the care of the family of origin caregiver(s), and second by the child returning to their care in the shortest time possible.

• When children cannot be considered safe in the care of their birth parent(s), the child's attachments and identity are preserved through extended family or relative caregivers. Though identity and attachments are preserved, this arrangement means the loss -- temporary or permanent -- of the full autonomy and efficacy of the birth parent and child relationship.

■ When children are not safe within their extended family network, children are assured that attachments and elements of identity with their family of origin which present no threat to safety should be maintained according to the child's

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containing the structural elements listed previously. Yet no other term fits the expanded practice concept as well as family preservation.

The principle variables influencing family preservation are shown in Diagram 8. There are four principal variable clusters. These are agency, parent/family, caregiver (in circumstances where the child is in out-of-home care), and child.

Examination of the agency cluster appearing in Diagram 8 quickly reveals why entry into care makes the achievement of permanence more complicated. The addition of significant additional parties expands the alliance network and multiplies the number of people who must reach agreement to proceed.

The caregiver cluster also reveals new dynamics of practice. The birth parent and child clusters also have new relationship dynamics. Where the focus of practice could once be placed primarily on the birth parent-child interaction, multiple interactions now require management with a corresponding increase in time, personnel, and resources.

When the birth parent's physical caregiving responsibility has been interrupted by a safety plan that includes placement, family preservation interventions exist at two levels. The first level includes efforts to restore the autonomy of the birth family as the primary caregiver. The second involves efforts to assure continuity of identity and the efficacy of the birth parent in that do not represent threats to child safety. The maintenance of these roles is essential to the emotional security of the child and birth family, and to maintenance of attachment. The exchange of needs and responses between parent and child represents the principle means of maintaining and building attachment. Placement disrupts this cycle of need, leading to lost attachment over time.

When the permanency goal is attained through relative guardianship, elements of family preservation remain possible. Siblings can remain together, and birth parents may still be able to have some connection to the child, even at the level of a legacy of information about origins. Self worth is closely tied to identity. Acceptance of these origins by adoptive families provides a basis for the child's emotional security.

Even when permanency cannot be attained and the child exits care to independent living, elements of family preservation are essential. As many as 50 percent of youth exiting care return to their families within one year. This suggests that a component of work with these youth should involve family restructuring, or preserving the elements of the birth family that can become a source of support for the young adult.

For another population of children, efforts toward permanency are even more confusing. These are children who remain in care while other siblings are returned home. Such circumstances increase the likelihood of self-blame and loss of self-esteem. While the decision may pragmatically make sense, the effects on children remaining in care should become an additional focus of work with the child and family.

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Agency Cluster

r I- nFcalmudIiPnrg^IoumnrIvfIsatltoInar - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Work4or Sscurlty I

DIslncantI , s

RRsu4noP5foIasa1tsJtl•oin

Ag®ncy

R

Functioning

CoS4mbrmvlcu4nwisty

Family aunlflcatIarJ
/ Psrmanancy

Panels

Emotional Socurlty

CCF 8 ARdmmvIin^lwstratI.,
RPsotlalorr4a0l,SSoouhrooo4lbs,s Advooat^s
I GuardIan Ad Iltdwn- I
\ Court
LStat Attorn4wy

Diagram 9

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Birth Family Cluster

------------------Family Preservation
including Reunification
Birth Parent/Family Functioning

Birth Parent's Relationship with CG
1
Birth Parents Social Network
Relationship
Birth PaCrents Ability to Me•et Childs Needs

Birth Family's Management of Family /Birth Parent's Disabling
Conditions (including Substance Abuse)

Birth Parents/Child Relationship
Birth Parents/Extended Family Relationships
Birth Parents/CW Relationship

Dia^nm II

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Strategies for Family Preservation
Four variable clusters have been identified for family preservation. These clusters relate to the birth parent and family, the child, the agency, and the caregiver who is not the birth parent. The integrity of the birth family is threatened when the safety of the child cannot be assured. Certain circumstances may preclude safety interventions that permit the child to remain in the birth family. These include a caregiver who is violent and out of control, a child who has suffered significant harm, a child who has been sexually abused (and the child cannot be protected from the abusing person in the home) or a caregiver whose substance abuse seriously affects their ability to assure the child's safety.
Family preservation services are most commonly used where crises within the family have reduced caregiver and family functioning to a level where the child may become unsafe. The nature of the crises will determine the intensity of the intervention. Traditional models have focused on short-term (90-180 days) intensive interventions to stabilize the crises, address concrete service needs, and restore the family to baseline functioning, such that the child may still be at risk but is no longer unsafe.
It is recommended that a continuum of family preservation strategies be employed, all in the same practice model but with different levels of intensity (a dimension of the service model). All caseworkers would work with families based on the same causal model and intervention strategy, but the service model might vary with intensity of effort and availability of resources.
Of the elements identified by Whittaker and Tracy (see page 62), four contain elements of practice strategy. These are: focusing on the family as a unit, a crisis orientation, teaching skills to family members, and basing services on family need rather than strict service categories.
Consistent with the definition offered earlier, family preservation services would be defined by the following categories:
Intensive interventions to prevent separation of a child from the current caregiver. These services would be short-term and intensive family-centered interventions where crises in the family, including maltreatment, suggest that a child may become separated from the family. These services would be used primarily in instances where the child's continuation in the birth family is threatened by issues of safety. The second use of these services would be in adoptive families where adoption disruption or dissolution is threatened. The third use of these services would be in reunited families where new crises threaten re-entry into care. These services also would be in foster and relative care placements, where continuation of the placement is in the best interests of the child.
2. Placement of a child outside of the birth family but within the family kinship system. As noted previously, this allows the child to retain elements of identity and attachments to members of the child's kinship network.

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Influencing Alternative Caregivers
The key components of practice include:
Preparing and selecting caregivers capable of and willing to develop a positive alliance with birth parents on behalf of the child;
2. Placing children with caregivers whose strengths match child and birth family needs;
3. Developing a team relationship between the caregiver and agency;
4. Including the caregivers as part of the family's social network;
5. Including the caregiver in the development of the helping strategy with the birth family;
6. Establishing regular contact between the caregiver and birth parents based on the caregiver's reinforcement of the birth parents' positive actions toward the child.
AGENCY/CAREGIVER RELATIONSHIP
The influence of this relationship begins with the recruitment, preparation, and selection of the caregiver and is reinforced through the ongoing qualities of the relationship. Caregivers must be recruited for a role that includes supporting birth families and that is not based on rescuing children from undesirable families. Preparation and mutual selection is preferable to strategies of training and assessment. Preparation includes role competency development, but also addresses one's own readiness to accept the role. Mutual selection requires open disclosure of mutual expectations, mutual examination of each party's capacity and interest in responding to these expectations, and explicit offers of support and exchange when expectations are met.
Current practice tends to emphasize assessment and training. Often an agency's approach to assessment is experienced by parents as an investigatory means test in which the "means" are kept secret. Caregivers feel the experience is very one-sided. At worst, this dynamic begins a process of keeping information closely guarded rather than openly sharing it. Once children are placed with the caregiver, the dynamic erodes trust, cooperation, and teamwork.
Key practice strategies include:
• Base decisions and actions on joint agreements;
• Negotiate clearly defined role agreements between the caseworker and caregivers;
■ Support direct expression of feelings and needs, and model through the agency/caregiver relationship the type of relationship, the agency wants the caregiver to have with the birth family and child.

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Key practice strategies include:

■ Identify strengths the child has gained from network members;

• Facilitate continuity of relationships that have been a source of support for the child and offer continued strength in the future, including family and peer relationships.

CASEWORKER/BIRTH FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
A positive working relationship between the caseworker and the birth family enables a positive relationship between the caregiver and child and the caregiver and birth family. The caseworker is a source of reassurance to both families in regard to their uncertainties about each other and about the child.

Key practice strategies include:

■ Focus on providing positive feedback to the birth family about the caregiver's respect for the birth family and child relationship;

■ Avoid, at all costs, triangulating birth parents and caregivers;

■ Help the birth family include the caregivers as part of their support network.

CAREGIVER/CHILD RELATIONSHIP
The caregiver/child relationship offers the child a sense of emotional security and a source of nurture. The child's emotional security depends on a sense of physical safety and on the continuity of the child's relationship with attachments and sources of identity. These are necessary ingredients for reunification and preservation of the birth family in the long term. Historically, practice has focused on the daily care and nurture of the child, with the assumption that a positive environment would ameliorate past damage and continue normal development.

Unfortunately, this thinking overlooked the impact of lost emotional security on the child's development. Although many caregivers implicitly recognized needs stemming from the loss experience, response to these needs has been neither consistent nor systematic.

The child's attachment to the alternative caregiver is necessary for continued development. The continuity of the child's attachment to the birth family is necessary for reunification with the birth family and for the resolution of the birth parent/child relationship. Caseworkers appear most comfortable with the caregiver's parenting role and least comfortable with the caregiver's role in permanency planning. Permanency is most likely to occur when the caregivers identify with the permanency planning role and view getting children safely back home as their responsibility as well.

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Whatever the choice, the standard of care for out-of-home care must be well above the minimal standard it uses to justify the decision to remove children from their families. Where there is not a sufficient difference, the lost emotional security means a net loss for both child and birth family.

Is foster care a practice or a tool for practice? Historically it has been seen as a field of practice, a subset of the larger field of endeavor called out-of-home care. It has been financed and administered. It contains it own unique requirements owing to the recruitment, preparation, and selection of foster families.

Yet the most relevant question may be how foster care fits in the DCFS model of practice rather than what should the model of foster care practice be. Foster care is primarily used as a safety intervention. With the intent to reunify the child and birth parents. Foster care can offer a shortterm safe circumstance where the child can continue development and be assisted with physical, cognitive, and developmental needs arising from the experience of maltreatment. The separation of parent and child provides tension and discomfort needed to resolve the parent's ambivalence about their role in the child's permanency and safety.

There are several implications for the design and practice of foster care. First, it must be considered as a specialized service in the child protection intervention rather than a separate "holding" system where the child remains while work continues with the birth family. It must be viewed as an extension of the birth family system. The child and birth family must be treated as a unit even though its members are separated. The fact that other caregivers have a principle responsibility for the child's care requires special efforts to keep the child connected to the birth family system.

Second, because this is not the traditional role of foster families, careful consideration should be given to preparing and selecting foster families. This role is important to the success of the childbirth parent relationship. Foster families who cannot perform this role should not foster children in the child welfare system.

Third, the caseworker must be an active bridge to support and enable the success of the relationship among the child, birth family, and foster family. There are significant trust barriers to the success of this relationship. Active direct work is required to facilitate the development of this trust.

Fourth, maltreated children often have special needs. These unique needs can create significant stresses for foster families. Families should be prepared for these specific stresses and children matched with caregivers who exhibit strengths matched to the child's needs.

Since 1977, there has been a concerted national focus on permanency planning for children in foster care. This movement has stressed timely decision-making, by applying pressure to parents, agency, courts, and other systems to resolve the child's emotional limbo. If there is a downside to this movement it is that there has been more emphasis on decision-making than on the work with families necessary to permit reunification. Foster care caseloads nationally have risen more from absence of exit than increased entry (Toshio Tatara, APWA). Without effective practices enabling families to be reunited, increased decision-making may push more children into the

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Following the Oregon Project, much attention was focused on decision-making for children in care. While PL 96-272 contained provisions requiring periodic case review, pre-placement preventive services, and reunification services, little substance was required to meet the terms of the legislation in the last two areas. Though case review became institutionalized, practice in many states evolved into an effort to assure certification for Title IV-E funding rather than developing a true utilization review mechanism.

Practice seemed to be separated, with the foster family caring for the child and the agency focusing on permanency decision-making. Two studies by the Child Welfare Institute during the 1980s examined the role of foster parents in permanency planning. One found that caseworkers were strongly resistant to foster parent's participation in the permanency planning role. Another, demonstrated that the foster parents' ownership of the permanency planning responsibility and role was a significant predictor of a child leaving care to a permanent placement rather than another placement.

These and other studies suggest that foster care must be an active resource in the permanency solution. Though foster parents seem willing, agencies have been resistant to developing foster parents in these roles. Practice suggests that foster parents are more willing to have direct contract with birth families, participate in case review, and advocate for permanence than agency staff are willing to acknowledge. It also suggests that outcomes improve when these roles are played by foster parents.

This suggests a model of foster care practice based on the concept of supplemental care and shared parenting rather than substitute care. The foster family supplements the capabilities of birth families in areas of safety and development, while not trying to replace the birth family as the psychological parent. Further, there is an active effort to develop a positive parenting alliance between the foster parents and the birth parents.

Unfortunately, this is not the social contract offered to most foster families. Agencies are frequently reluctant to forward these conditions for fostering for fear of having no resources. Ironically, the quality of care may decrease more because agencies fear demanding quality than because they demanded it and frightened prospective families away.

This suggests an approach to practice similar to that posed for adoption. In this context, the key components of practice include:

Basing recruitment messages on the child and birth family's needs rather than on the child's past experiences;

2. Combining preparation and selection processes;

3. Basing preparation and selection on criteria related to accepted child needs in foster care and implications for family strengths;

4. Basing approval decisions on a process of mutual selection between the family and agency;

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These factors suggest a different strategy for relative care practice. Though an emphasis on
permanence remains, the preservation of the family in an extended context offers less tension to resolve the ambivalence in the birth parent and child relationship than does foster care. Further, there is some evidence to suggest that relative placements are more stable and that children fare better in these placements.

The key components of relative care practice include:
Selecting relative caregivers for a child with the broadest possible participation of the extended family network;
2. Since placement in relative homes often occurs in close proximity to the birth family crisis and without time for preparation of caregivers, an educational support group format should be used in lieu of traditional training or preparation methods with foster and adoptive families;

3. The unit of intervention should be the extended family network responsible for caregiving and should include the birth parents and the relative caregivers;

4. Case plans should be developed jointly with the birth parents and the relative caregivers and the relative caregivers, should be defined as part of the support system for implementing the plan;
5. The relative caregiver's goals for the children should be clarified at the beginning, and their commitment to these goals made part development of the plan for the birth parents;
6. Interventions should take into account the impact of the agency on the social organization of the extended family system and include as part of the intervention members impacted by the intervention;
7. Given the longer duration of relative placements, selection of caregivers should be based on different expectations about the duration of care than with non-relative caregivers, unless the agency foresees shorter terms of care.

Adoption and Relative Guardianship

Key Definitions:

•

ADOPTION

Adoption is a strategy for assuring safety and permanence for children by legally

transferring ongoing parental responsibilities from their birth parents to their adoptive

parents.

•

RELATIVE GUARDIANSHIP

Relative guardianship is a strategy for assuring the safety and permanence of a child through a commitment by relatives to the permanent care of a child.

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A Model of Practice Another dynamic emerges as to the decision process of which relative will assume care for the child. At the time guardianship is assigned, the relative will have been selected, but the earlier decision for the child to live with the relative may have been made either primarily by the agency or primarily through a broader family decision process. A third consideration is the child's self-blame for the separation and sense of responsibility for the condition of the parent leading to the separation. Pre-existing family dynamics may either compound or support the child's needs relative to these issues. Consideration of relatives should include an assessment of the history and family dynamics.
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Adoption - Adoptive Family Cluster

L Adoption

Knowledge of Child's History Resources

Adoptive Family A
N
Impact of Adoption on Family \
Commitment to Permanency

Acceptance of Child's History Adaptive Strategies with Child
Adoptive Family's Extended Family's Acceptance of Adoption
Preparation for the Role Parent/Past CG Relationship

.Resolution of Losses

Nature of D ecision to Adopt

iAbility to Mee t C h ild's Needs (Culture, Race)

Diagram 14

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6. Assuring continuity of the casework for the child, birth parents, and caregivers during the transition to adoption;

7. Preparing the birth parents to leave the child's information and other items that may be necessary to the child's future adjustment and development;

8. Supporting the birth family's loss experience;

9. Supporting the caregiver's loss experience;

10. Supporting the child's loss experience and attachment needs;

11. Assisting the adoptive family with formation of a support network specific to the needs of their family in adoption;

12. Enable the adoptive family to access resources, including adoption subsidies, that may be necessary to meet the ongoing needs of the child;

13. Coaching the adoptive family through the initial crisis of integration of the child into the family.

DECISION-MAKING ABOUT ADOPTION AND RELATIVE GUARDIANSHIP
Children remain in care without permanence for several reasons. Prominent among these is failure of the agency to establish clear criteria with families for meeting safety needs of the child and for demonstrating the capability to do so. Frequently, case plans are developed with goals identifying tasks for families rather than behavioral change indicators.

The development of indicators should consider the child's developmental stage and needs along with the prognosis for the parent's ability to assure the safety of the child. Though public policy has used eighteen months for a determination, actual practice varies, with many children and families extending long beyond this timeframe. While there are few rules applicable to human behavior for which there are not exceptions, practice must still have guidelines. The following principles are suggested, and are consistent with current DCFS policy:

■ For individual children under the age of three, the permanency option should be resolved in no longer than one year. This means that children should be in a permanent placement within two years, from entry into care;

■ For children in sibling groups, in which there are children over the age of three, the permanency option should be resolved in no longer than 18 months. This means that the sibling group should be in a permanent placement within three years;

•

For children who will enter relative guardianship or be adopted by their foster parents,

the timeframe should be shortened by six months.

These guidelines will obviously be modified in contested procedures. But delays in court proceedings should not routinely be accepted as a reason for delay without first considering the agency's contribution to these delays.

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The second and third objectives are made more difficult by the use of "rescue the child or agency" themes. Families respond and then are often told to wait. They are angered by the mixed message of "We need families desperately but we don't need your family right now."

Optimal results can be achieved when preparation and selection are combined, rather than performed separately. Results also improve when families are given clear criteria for selection that are the basis for both approval and parent development. The message is that the agency needs families who can demonstrate these capabilities, and it will invest in helping families who want to consider adoption by helping them develop these capabilities.

The process of preparation involves six interrelated components. First, families must receive information about what capabilities are needed. Second, they must be helped to acquire the skills needed to succeed in the role, while recognizing strengths from past experiences. Third, they need to use these skills in simulated activities so they can assess how this role feels. Families may be not comfortable with aspects of the role.

Fourth, they must be helped to decide if they want to perform the role. This decision is usually based on assessment of their capability to succeed and their perception that performing the role will lead to satisfaction. Next, they must be helped to decide if they want the role. For part of the adoption process, the family and agency will work as a team. It is always possible that a family may want to adopt but not through a specific agency. Finally, families must be helped to decide if they want to adopt a specific child.

Key practice strategies include: • Base recruitment messages on the child's future needs rather than on past experiences; • Combine preparation and selection processes; • Base preparation and selection on criteria related to accepted child needs in adoption and
implications for family strengths; • Base approval decisions on a process of mutual selection between the family and agency;

■ The preparation strategy should include skill self-assessment, skill development, on personal feelings about use of the skills and the role, and assessment of impact on family and lifestyle;
• Selection strategy should be based on clear and announced criteria, open disclosure of information to families, and mutual consideration of all information used to determine the family's fit with the agency's needs;

■ Upon placement, the family should be supported with coaching rather than monitored.

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Therefore, influencing the child requires direct work with the child and with the adoptive family to help them address the child's needs at future stages of development. This work takes place in several contexts. One is identity. Children in care frequently lose contact with elements of their history. They may have moved several times and lost many of the artifacts of childhood such as pictures, stories about when they did.. ., or possessions from earlier ages. Life books and similar techniques have proven useful as ways to help children reintegrate memories and deal with losses.

A second context is the transition to adoption. This means a new status and identity. Surprisingly, many children adopted by their foster families reported not knowing they were adopted. Children may have fears and questions about what it means to become adopted. Moving to a new family forces the issue of whether the child will lose contact with yet another family.

The third context is loss. There are losses and gains associated with adoption. Though gaining a permanent family, the child loses aspects of identity from the foster or relative home, friends made in the neighborhood, and the security that may have come from familiarity with surroundings. These and other losses need to be addressed.

Key practice strategies include:

• Enabling the child to express feelings associated with the transition;

• Preparing adoptive parents to address developmental grieving issues as they arise;

• Enabling foster parents or relative caregivers to express their positive feelings about the child's transition to adoption and giving the child psychological permission to leave;

• Matching the child's needs with adoptive family strengths;

■ Placing the child with siblings, and if not, assuring ongoing contact and visitation to reassure the child about the well-being of siblings;

• Providing the child with information (over time) about members of the birth family who were left behind.

Influencing the Birth Parent and Family
In many cases, parental rights will be involuntarily terminated. This does not justify a lack of effort to support the birth parents' contribution to the child's future. The focus of practice should be on separating the parent's feelings about the loss of the child and the positive feelings the parent has for the child. This is accomplished by helping the birth parent focus on the child's needs in the future and their ability to make a positive contribution.
In some instances it may be desirable for birth parents and family members to have direct contact with the child. In other cases, it may be difficult to avoid. Older children may know the location and phone number of the birth family. The degree of openness in adoption should be based on a

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Strategies for Child Development
Child development refers to the acquisition of cognitive, behavioral, emotional, and social capabilities needed for self-sufficiency and interdependent functioning in society. Variables influencing child development appear in Diagram 21. A primary reason for DCFS' and the public's concern about child maltreatment is its effect on child development. Interventions designed to interrupt the cycle of abuse and neglect presumably permits natural resiliency to take hold and allow normal development to proceed. However, the policy position in regard to child development is less clear.
There are two primary interests in child development. First, child neglect, a form of maltreatment, represents a failure on the part of caregivers to assure developmental opportunity for a child. Neglect is often referred to as an act of omission rather than commission. If caregiver actions necessary to assure minimal developmental opportunity are present, a child's failure to develop is not considered maltreatment. Therefore, the first interest rests with the presence of caregiver behavior rather than with the condition of the child. The child's condition will be a factor in determining the extent of the maltreatment.
The second interest arises when children enter the custody of DCFS and live in DCFS care arrangements. Here DCFS has assumed responsibility for meeting the child's developmental needs. When DCFS has taken custody and the child is in the care of a DCFS approved or licensed caregiver, there is responsibility to assure optimal development within the child's range of developmental capabilities. For children adopted from DCFS' custody, adoption subsidy establishes the precedent for financial participation in services designed to support the child's development.
There are inherent conflicts in either position. Assumption of responsibility requires significant resources. Avoidance of responsibility may only defer ultimate responsibility and at higher costs. In either case, no practice model may be achievable until the matter of public policy is clarified in regard to DCFS' responsibility.
Given the general agreement on some responsibility for children in custody, some assumptions are possible. Parents and other caregivers are the primary socializers of children. In modern society, their capacities are supplemented by institutional resources such as schools. For children above the age of five, peers, neighborhood and school may have the greatest influence on social development. These three variables, along with family functioning and caregiver individual functioning, may account for the most variance in child development, and therefore would be the best targets of intervention.

Influencing Child Development
Parents (or those who perform the parental role) are the single most significant source of developmental opportunity for a child. Following parents are school and neighborhood. The focus of DCFS' responsibility for child development is twofold. The first is to assure that the family of origin meets a minimal threshold of behavior to assure the child minimal developmental opportunity. When this does not occur and the child is placed with others, a
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Variables Influencing Child Development

Nutrition

Schools

Community/ Nsiphborhood

Child Development

Child-Carsplvar Interaction

Car. glvsr's
IlM aronting Capability

Child's Disabling Condition Diagram 21

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Provide resources to support the physical and financial needs of the youth during transition;

6. Enable the youth and foster family, or youth and relative caregivers, to negotiate roles and boundaries for the relationship following the youth's exit from care.

Effects of Maltreatment
The principal clusters of impact variables for ameliorating the effects of maltreatment are displayed in Diagram 22. The clusters are the caregiver's relationship with the child; the caregiver's extended family and network's response to child's needs; resources available to meet the child's physical, emotional, social, and cognitive developmental needs; and the child's cognitive/behavioral adaptations to prior abuse and neglect experiences.

Influencing the Effects of Maltreatment
Research on resiliency in children suggests that an important factor in recovery from traumatic life events is a positive relationship with an interested, caring adult. The adult frequently is not an immediate family member. This finding punctuates the important role foster parents and caseworkers can play in a child's recovery from the effects of maltreatment.
Effects of maltreatment can be separated into physical, cognitive, and emotional impacts. Physical impacts include trauma requiring medical treatment and delayed physical development requiring a combination of social, medical and nutritional interventions. They are visible and commonly receive attention. Cognitive impacts are most frequently expressed as developmental delays. Individualized work with the child to accelerate development of skills and capabilities can overcome many such delays. Psychological impacts are more difficult to determine. Symptoms of these effects may not be visible for years. In other cases, they may be immediately obvious.
Effective practice should include assessment of the impact of maltreatment on the child in each of these areas and development of a plan with alternative caregivers to remedy the observed impacts. Responsibility for implementation should be transferred to the birth family upon reunification, and should be a specific part of work with the family where the goal is reunification. If the goal is adoption or relative guardianship, responsibility for future work will be transferred to the adoptive family or guardian.
The key components of practice in treating the effects of maltreatment include:
Determining the physical, cognitive and emotional impacts of prior maltreatment;
2. Determining the child's needs that exist as a result of these impacts;
Developing specific intervention plans with caregivers to meet the child's needs;

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Variables Influencing Effects of Maltreatment

Caregiver's Relationship
with Child

Relationship with a Trusted Adult other
than Caregiver

Effects of Maltreatment

Resources for Child's Physical, Emotional and Cognitive Development

Child's Adaptive Behavior

Diagram 22

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The caseworker responding to an allegation of abuse or neglect is the family's first contact with that part of the helping system designed specifically to assure the long-term safety and development of children at risk. The presenting conditions of children and families and the timing with which they present themselves are largely unpredictable. DCFS must be equipped to provide a sufficient response to the child's safety concerns and to protect the family and child's openness to intervention.

The first critical decision concerns the degree of safety of the child and whether the threat to safety is created by caregiver maltreatment. The second decision concerns the timing of DCFS physical response to the child's need for protection. Absolute verification of safety is difficult within the limits of information provided by reporters, so policy should error on the side of physical verification. This implies a standard of reason to believe that a child may be or become unsafe without immediate intervention. It also requires staff flexibility in the response to assure sufficient time to make a reasonably valid determination.

Responding child protection investigators who feel pressured to make quick decisions will probably err on the side of agency safety in the name of child safety. As a result children will enter out-of-home care who might be safely maintained at home and who may avoid the loss of emotional security derived from separation and placement.

It is recommended that DCFS differentiate its initial response, moving from an investigatory model to an approach that distinguishes circumstances necessitating an investigation from those better approached with a safety assessment. In either case, if severe physical injury with criminal intent or severe sexual abuse is not suspected, a safety assessment approach should be the basis of initial contact with the family.

This requires that DCFS risk compromising investigations by seeing the caregiver before the child, where circumstances do not indicate that immediate access to the child is necessary to assure the child's safety or that the family does not leave the jurisdiction with the child before intervention can occur. The result will be the greater acceptance by caregivers of the role DCFS may play in aiding the safety and development of their children.

The role of the hotline worker will remain similar to the present role, of determining which reports to accept and setting priorities for response. However, there are distinctly different expectations for the role of the worker who follows this decision.

The second worker may be considered a member of a child safety assessment team. This worker's role is to engage the caregivers in a preliminary assessment of safety, determine the need for law enforcement involvement and a possible investigative response, share investigative responsibilities as necessary with law enforcement, determine with the family any necessary safety response, implement any required safety responses, and engage a family service team member if preliminary assessment information suggests ongoing intervention with the family.

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Similarly, the family service specialist would retain responsibility for children having the goal of independent living. In effect, the same worker would follow the child throughout the life of the service relationship.

Support to the Casework Role
Core recommendations are listed below:
Align core training with the DCFS model of practice;
2. Develop or revise core training so that practice application level competencies are developed in training sessions rather than in lower-level verbal information competencies;
3. Structure OJT experiences to support transfer and generalization of training, as well as learning about and applying DCFS policy and procedures. Further, OJT should be a protected and adequately supervised experience;
4. Shorten time spent in core training during the first six months, moving specialized training to a follow the end of probationary employment;
5. Assure that supervisors have equal or greater practice competence in the same areas as caseworkers, and that caseworkers have access to supervision and clinical consultation;
6. Prepare and select foster families, adoptive families, and relative caregivers who are able and willing to work within the DCFS model of practice;
7. Restructure case review as a form of utilization review and as a clear component of the agency's quality assurance strategy;
8. Develop on-line, computerized client and agency information management technologies to support casework decision-making and information sharing;
9. Develop locally-based staff capacities, separate from the specialist and supervisor roles, designed to support teams in areas of clinical assessment of cases, application of needbased and family-centered practice principles, and with specialized service needs such as placement, termination of parental rights, diagnosis of mental illness, etc.;
10. Provide line discretion for the use of wrap-around funds necessary to meet unique service needs of families;
11. Provide local staff with a direct role in negotiating and evaluating services provided by local purchase of service agencies;
12. Restructure management practices to parallel preferred practice with children and families.

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Peter Block wrote that the "essence of supervision is helping people to trust their instincts and take responsibility for the success of the organization." This is also true with families. Making them independent of the agency requires that their instincts in parenting be developed, that they learn to trust these instincts and that they take responsibility for the success of their family and the safety of their children. Doing so ultimately requires that DCFS learn to trust the family's instincts. It is difficult for caseworkers to achieve this trust in an organizational context that doesn't trust their instincts and help them take responsibility for the success of DCFS.

To this end, DCFS must align its management practices, information systems, and internal relationships to model and reflect the practice relationship it seeks with families. This means replacing blame with problem-solving and compliance mandates with developmental assistance. Central office must work in partnership with local offices in the same manner that local offices are expected to work in partnership with communities.

Assuring Quality
DCFS is currently developing a new strategy for quality assurance. As the American auto industry faced loss of market share and declining quality, it came to a simple realization. There is no stronger component of quality assurance than the person who does the original work. As quality dropped, auto companies added more inspectors to the assembly line in an effort to catch more errors. To their dismay, more inspectors resulted in more defects, not fewer. As they examined Japanese methods they discovered two important differences that seemed to account for higher quality in Japanese auto production. First, the employee felt responsible for the product and didn't rely on someone down the line to catch errors. Second, each employee had the discretion to stop the line and make it right.
DCFS cannot assure quality until it has the commitment of line caseworkers and supervisors. They are the first line of quality. Future DCFS strategy should be to alter the organizational culture that currently rewards persistence, but not achievement. Even the most sophisticated research institute cannot substitute for the discretionary will of a single caseworker. Unlike surgery where many professionals are present, DCFS most often must rely on the observations, interpretations and judgments of a single person, the caseworker. Secondary reviews do not always benefit from information provided by other observers. Because of this reality, DCFS remains critically dependent of the powers of observation and judgment of its front line staff

Limitations and Risks
Human systems are dynamic. Observations and judgments made on any given day may only hold true until the next experience occurs within a family. Consequently, predicting the human behavior remains more art than science. No model of practice will assure perfect performance. Any procedure, no matter how perfect, can be subverted by the will or malfeasance of an individual.

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Because the primary service transaction occurs between the caseworker and the family, the competency of the caseworker is essential to the success of DCFS' mission. Accomplishing the mission depends on achieving the outcomes stated earlier. Competence implies the ability to get these outcomes. Actual performance depends not only on ability, but on opportunity and motivation as well. A part of motivation is the self-confidence derived from competence.
DCFS core training should be based on competencies or abilities directly tied to accepted outcomes. The practice model implies a range of decision, behavior change, and environmental condition change outcomes. These support the broader outcomes. Following are core abilities, along with supporting enabling abilities, that are directly related to the identified DCFS outcomes.
Competence is built through a hierarchy of enabling abilities. Robert Gagne identifies five types of learned behavior. These are intellectual skills, cognitive skills, verbal information, motor skills, and attitudes. Intellectual skills make it possible for individuals to respond to their environment through symbols, such as language and numbers. Words stand for objects or can represent relationships between objects. Gagne identifies a hierarchy of five intellectual skills, with each higher level skill dependent on a fabric of lower level skills. The five skills are:
Problem Solving
which requires the formation of
Higher-Order Rules
which require as prerequisites
Rules and Defined Concepts
which require as prerequisites
Concrete Concepts
which require as prerequisites
Discriminations
A discrimination is the capability of making a different response to stimuli or objects that differ from each other along one or more physical dimensions, a simple example being that arms and legs are both long but differ physically. A concrete concept is a capability that makes it possible to identify something as a member of a class, for example recognizing marks as burns. Defined concepts are acquired when an individual can demonstrate the meaning of a particular class of objects, events, or relations. A defined concept in child welfare would be the designation of a child as maltreated. Rules have been learned when the learner is able to respond to a class of relationships among classes of objects or events. An example of this type of learning would be the determination that a maltreated child is also unsafe. Finally, problem-solving occurs through

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DCFS Outcomes and Supporting Abilities

Outcome 1.0: Family care of a child is at or above a threshold of safety and developmental .opportunity.
Core and Enabling Abilities
1.1 Given a family in which maltreatment is suspected or known, a caseworker is able to determine the need for immediate or ongoing intervention to assure that a child is not in imminent danger of significant harm.
To demonstrate this core ability, the caseworker should be able to:
1.1.1 Engage family members, network members, and persons having knowledge of the child's and family's condition for the purpose of disclosing information relevant to determining the child's safety.
1.1.2 Determine the nature and extent of threats to the child's safety.
1.1.2.1 Determine if the caregiver's behavior is violent and out of control.
1.1.2.2 Determine if the caregiver acts toward the child in predominantly negative terms or has extremely unrealistic expectations.
1.1.2.3 Determine whether the caregiver has caused or has made a plausible threat that has or would result in serious physical harm to the child.
1.1.2.4 Determine the child's whereabouts.
1.1.2.5 Determine if there is reason to believe that the family is about to flee or refuse access to the child.
1.1.2.6 Determine that the caregiver has not or will not provide sufficient supervision to protect the child from potentially serious harm.
1.1.2.7 Determine if the caregiver has not met or is unable to meet the child's immediate needs for food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.
1.1.2.8 Determine whether the caregiver has previously abused or maltreated the child.
1.1.2.9 Determine the severity of prior maltreatment.
1.1.2.10 Determine the caregiver's response to prior instances of maltreatment.
1.1.2.11 Determine if the child is fearful of living at home.

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1.2.1.4 When in court, present factual testimony and information in support of the agency's recommendation for founding or unfounding the allegation and the disposition of the case.

1.2.1.5 Engage parents, family members, and others in a positive alliance on behalf of the child's needs for safety, developmental opportunity, and emotional security.

1.3 Given a report of maltreatment, determine the need for an investigation.

1.4 Given the need for law enforcement involvement, work collaboratively with law enforcement to complete an investigation and/ or implement a safety plan.

1.4.1 Given a report of maltreatment, determine the need for law enforcement involvement.

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2.1.1.17 Determine the caregivers' motivation to seek help.
2.1.1.18 Determine the caregivers' acceptance of the intervention(s) as a desired approach to meeting family needs.
2.1.1.19 Determine the maltreator's access to the child.
2.1.1.20 Determine the intent of the parent with respect to the child and the caregivers' acknowledgement of responsibility.
2.1.1.21 Determine the severity of the child's abuse and/or maltreatment.
2.1.1.22 Determine the history of abuse/maltreatment of the child by present caregivers.
2.1.1.23 Determine the caregiver's level of maturation and developmental task achievement.
2.1.1.24 Determine the caregiver's parenting capability.
2.1.1.25 Determine the caregivers level of acceptance of responsibility for the child's needs.
2.1.1.26 Determine the caregiver's attachment to the child.
2.1.1.27 Determine the behaviors used by the caregiver to express needs to the child.
2.1.1.28 Determine barriers to the caregiver's availability for the caregiving role.
2.1.1.29 Determine the presence and contribution of the caregiver's disabling conditions to performance of the caregiver role.
2.1.1.30 Determine the caregiver's access to environmental resources necessary to meet the child's needs.
2.1.2 Determine the family's view of its needs relative to identified risk influences.
2.1.2.1 Determine the caregiver's current response to the child's expression of needs.
2.1.2.2 Determine the caregivers' current strategies to meet the family's and child's needs for maintenance and development.
2.1.3 Determine the family's view of which interventions would meet risk related needs and needs created by the use of the interventions themselves.
2.1.3.1 Determine earlier successful interventions.
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2.1.19 Execute interventions to meet caregiver developmental needs that interfere with the caregivers' ability to meet the child's needs.

2.1.20 Execute interventions in a manner that is culturally responsive and congruent with the family's beliefs and values.

2.1.21 Mediate relationships between the caregivers, extended family, and network members in order to facilitate agreement on interventions to meet the child's needs.

2.1.22 Provide feedback to family members about their contributions to the child's safety and development.

2.2 Determine the nature of the child's response to the caregiver in interactions that lead to maltreatment of the child.

2.2.1 Determine the child's temperament.

2.2.2 Determine the effect of maltreatment on the child's response to the caregiver.

2.2.3 Determine the nature of the child's attachment to the caregiver.

2.2.4 Determine the nature of the child's trust in the caregiver.

2.3 Enable the child to take courses of action that lead to self-protection.

2.3.1 Determine the child's age.

2.3.2 Enable the child to form a trusting relationship with a protector.

2.3.3 Enable the child to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable caregiverchild interaction.

2.3.4 Implement safety responses that counter the effects of the child's disabling conditions on the child's ability to protect self.

2.3.4.1 Determine the effect of the child's disabling conditions on the child's ability to protect self.

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Outcome 4.0: When the birth family (original caregivers) will meet the child's needs for safety and developmental opportunity, the child will be returned to the family. Core and Enabling Abilities 4.1 Given a birth family capable of meeting the child's needs for safety and developmental
opportunity, the caseworker is able to re-integrate the child into the birth family. In order to demonstrate this core ability, the caseworker should be able to: 4.1.1 Determine the nature and extent of threats to the child's safety (see 1.2). 4.1.2 Determine the nature, extent, and interaction of risk influences within the family
(see 2. 1). 4.1.3 Enable the family to determine its needs relative to returning to the role of direct
care of the child. 4.1.4 Enable the family to determine the child's needs relative to leaving the alternative
caregiver and re-entering the birth family. 4.1.5 Coach the family in their response to problems and crises following reunification. 4.1.6 Generate reports and other materials necessary for a judicial determination of
return home. 4.1.7 Present oral information in court in support of the agency's recommendation of
return home. 4.1.8 Negotiate with the alternative caregiver and birth family a plan for meeting the
child's and birth family's needs following reunification. 4.1.9 Enable alternative caregivers and the birth family to execute the plan for support
of the child following reunification.
121

A Mbdel of Practice Outcome 6.0: The child and birth family demonstrate emotional security in relation to the agency's interventions. Core Abilities 6.1 Assure the physical safety of family members. 6.2 Design and execute interventions to minimize the loss of emotional security for child and
family. 6.3 Identify behavior by a child or family member that indicates loss of emotional security. 6.4 Demonstrate empathy, warmth, and genuineness. 6.5 Enable a child or family member to express security needs and to identify interventions
that would meet these needs. 6.6 Demonstrate behaviors necessary for development of trust in the relationship with the
child and birth family. 6.7 Preserve elements of family members' identity necessary to a sense of emotional security 6.8 Execute interventions that preserve attachments necessary to family members' emotional
security. 6.9 Execute interventions to maintain all aspects of family and child autonomy not necessary
to assuring the safety of the child. 6.10 Carry out interventions that enhance the child's ability to protect self from further
maltreatment. 6.11 Execute interventions that alter the child's adaptive responses to past maltreatment that
would place the child at risk of future maltreatment.
123

A Model of Practice
References
Fahlberg, V. A Child's Journey Through Placement. Indianapolis: Prospective Press, 1991. Gagne, Robert. The Conditions of Learning. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1997. Holder, Wayne. "Risk Assessment Training Handouts." Aurora, Colorado: Action for Child Protection, 1995. Kadushin, Alfred. Child Welfare Services, Third Ed New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980. Klaus, M.H. and Kennell, J.H. Maternal-Infant Bonding. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Company, 1976. Littner, Ner. "The Importance of the Natural Parents to the Child in Placement", Child Welfare, vol. LIV, 54, March, 1975. Rutter, M. Maternal Deprivation Reassessed London. Penquin Books, 1981. Schein, Edgar H. Organizational Culture and Leadership, Second Ed San Francisco: JosseyBass Publishers, 1992. Stroufe, L.A., Fox, N.E. and Pancake, V.R. "Attachment and Dependency in Developmental Perspective." Child Development 54, 1615-1627, 1983. Tatara, Toshio. Personal communication. Whittaker, J.K. and Tracy, E.M. Reaching High Risk Families: Intensive Family Preservation in Human Services. New York: Hawthorne, 1990.
125

 
 January, 1996 Review of "02" Cases
Introduction
In January of 1996 a review was done of a representative sample of cases with a "return home goal" ("02" cases) from the Cook and Northern regions. The reviewers found that DCFS has not significantly improved its certification of 02 cases since the 1993 review.
Methodology
DCFS was asked to draw a representative sample of cases from each of the two regions. 115 cases were requested from Northern Region and 120 cases were requested from Cook. There was a 62.5% return rate from the Cook Region and 86% from the Northern Region. These returns were adequate to ensure a sample size for precision of plus or minus ten percent with a 95% confidence interval from each region.
The cases were then reviewed for Norman issues by the Monitor and her associates. In addition, all cases were then reviewed on the Cysis system to assure that all certification information in the case records was accurate.
Findings
22% of the cases reviewed were already certified as Norman. Another 18% of the cases had a goal change. The reviewers found 35 cases, 16% of the whole sample for which there was evidence of a Norman issues but were not certified. In addition, in seven of the twelve cases with insufficient information of whether they had been certified or not, there were indications of Norman issues.
No changes in DCFS performance in past two and half years.
In 30 cases the monitors judged that the cases should be certified. In the remaining twelve they felt that there was insufficient information in the record for them to make a determination. There was no significant difference in the performance of DCFS between the Cook and Northern regions (Table 1) .
There is no significant change in DCFS's performance when you compare these results to those from the previous 1993 survey which has comparable and adequate data for the Cook Region' (Table 2).
' The number of cases for the Northern Region in 1993 are not adequate to draw statistically significant conclusions.

r3

F

Over one-third of Norman cases missed by workers.

The error rates that we determined in Table 2 could be affected by factors unrelated to Norman that impacted the denominator. For example, a change in DCFS policy might increase the number of non-Norman cases, thereby causing the percentage of "02" Norman certified cases to decrease. To test the validity of these numbers it is therefore advisable to develop another measure of the performance of DCFS workers that is not impacted by changes in the denominator.
We can measure the proportion of all certifiable Norman cases that were in fact certified by DCFS. We have this data for both the 1996 and the 1993 "02" surveys. In 1993, in the Cook and North regions, DCFS workers certified twenty-seven of the reviewed cases. In addition, the Norman monitor and her associates identified an additional 14 certifiable Norman cases that were not certified by DCFS. Therefore, there is an error rate of 34%. In 1996, we find a comparable error rate. Fifty cases from the Cook and North survey were certified by DCFS workers. An additional 30 certifiable cases were identified by the monitoring review team. Therefore of the total 80 certifiable cases, 38% were not certified by DCFS. Given our margin of statistical error, DCFS in the Cook and North Regions is not certifying within a range of 28% to 48% of certifiable Norman Cases.

What were the issues in these cases?

Of the cases for which the reviewers could clearly identify the Norman issues, the most prevalent Norman issues were lack of shelter (28 cases) and environmental neglect (12 cases). ( Table 3)
The monitors found much better documented case records than in previous 02 reviews. The timeliness of ACR reviews has improved. This allowed them to ascertain with certainty when the worker missed Norman issues. Monitors' comments included:

"On the 7/16/95 service plan, it states that maintain safe and stable housing for herself."

will

"Case notes indicate pts. face eviction. Also drug prob. but tested negative May and July for drugs, 1995."

"Mo in drug treatment in Minn... moving in with kids there to be close to mom. permanent return home. Has no means of support-will need housing."

"In the Family Assessment work sheets under whatever actions/service were provided there is the following 'emergency food and listing of CHA scattered site housing.""

"On the Client Service Plan 9/27/93 says family should 'find and move into place of their own."'

January 22, 1996

2

I

d_►

"In the 9-26-95 Service Plan it states 'the mother needs to find adequate housing and demonstrate she can provide a stable environment for the children and herself."'
"Case rec'd indicates lack of food as an issue when ch @ home and inadq. housing a problem for return home."
"Mother undomiciled."
"Service plan 2/28/95 states 'mo will inform wkrs when housing is found."
"Mother came from jail to recovery home for drugs treatment -will need housing before 6/96 return home date. No indication of certification."
"When the family entered system in 1988 --father was working but not making enough money to support his family and landlord selling apartment, so they had to move."
"Mo moved in with her mo when she left husband --lives only on SSI--will need housing if children are to be returned home."
"Mother's service plan indicates housing is to be secured."
"First report indicated for inadequate shelter."
"DOS rept. indicates mom's July, Aug, and Sept rent pd by 'exception to policy to maintain residence."
"Unclear how well prepared mother can be for return for adequate housing.i2
"It states in the Aug. 30th. 1995 case plan that he mother and father need to get 'stable housing' in order to get their kids home."
"There is a description in the 491 dated 12/19/95, 'their home was found to be dirty and there was no food."
"In the case plan dated 12/06/95, it states on goal #6 . 'mother needs to demonstrate the ability to budget money and pay for housing and groceries.""
"No one has seen mother's residence to determine what needs

2 In this case, the monitor felt the case should be further reviewed and there was not sufficient information in the case record for her to definitely ascertain that the case should be certified.

January 22, 1996

3

she has and return home still goal.i3

"In the 10-25-95 service plan it states 'maintain adq. housing free of observable hazards such as....''

"In the case plan on 7-13-94 it was stated that the mother 'will secure a residence to stay at by 8/30/94.'"

" Norman issues remain before return home.i4

"Not in service plan, mentioned in case notes mo. needs better housing before return home. Drug problem with mom."

"Many other issues but service plan states 'At the time of her return home for the children , Ms will need to provide adequate housing and furniture."'

"7/17/95 service plan states ' will need to locate and secure safe and adequate housing...' There are other issues-drug treatment."

"Case record refers to mo's homelessness as a factor in lack of return home."

"Service plan for mother states she is to obtain and maintain safe and adequate housing."

"11/95 service plan states 'The family needs counseling,

adequate housing and

maintain sobriety."'

"The child removed because were living in filthy motel -should be certified. Why was't she certified and Norman funds utilized to prevent placement?"

"Ongoing review for certification so long as 02 is goal. Mother's whereabouts occasionally unknown. But no indication her living arrangements has EVER been seen to know about space needs and furniture needs if children were to be returned.i5

"Case indicated for inadq. food, environmental neglect, indicated for inadq. supr. --have no clue what really happen here. i6

3 See footnote #1.

4 See footnote #1

5 See footnote #1

6See footnote #1.

January 22, 1996

4

4'

rd

"On the 2-23-94 service plan, it says "mother needs to locate adequate housing for the family."

TABLE 1 1996 REVIEW BREAKDOWN BY REGION

COOK

NORTHERN

# OF CASES

125

99

% GOAL CHANGES

24%

11%

% CERTIFIED BY DCFS

26%

17%

% CASES THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN

11%

16%

CERTIFIED IDENTIFIED BY REVIEWER

TOTAL 224 18% 22% 13%

January 22, 1996

5

% NON-CERTIFIED 02 CASES THAT

23%

23%

SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED PER

REVIEWER

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF THREE "02" REVIEWS

1992

1993

Statewide sample

n=89

n=177

% of sample that should have been Norman

19%

11%

% of non-certified 02 that should have been certified

19%

17.6%

Cook sub-sample

n=64 n=97

Northern sub-sample
Cook % sample that should be Norman

n= 9 22% 7

n=17 10%

% sample of non-certified 02 22%

17%

cases

23%
1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n=125 n=99 11% 23%

Northern

0%

% sample that should be Norman

% sample of non-certified 02

0%

cases

24% 8

16%

57%

23%

TABLE 3 NORMAN ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY REVIEWERS

The sub-samples for Cook and Northern, respectively, have an insufficient "n" for us to test for statistical significance.

8 Due to the small size of the 1993 Northern sub-sample we cannot test for statistical significance.

January 22, 1996

6

4

Norman Issue

Number of
Cases (n359')*

Food

8

Shelter

28

Clothing

4

Environmental Neglect

12

*1L is poSSLDle Lo nave more l.ita[1 U1LC a1.1. yQ .1V11 .LL a

9 In addition to the 30 cases which the reviewers thought should be certified there were an additional five cases in which the reviewer could identify a Norman issue but there was insufficient information to determine certification.

January 22, 1996

7

'.

(b

d►

"02" Monitoring QUESTIONNAIRE *****************************************************************

Reviewer: D J M Date:

R/S/F

Worker:

Supervisor

SCR#: Family name

(first)

(last)

Names of children: 1.

,(first)

(last)

2. ****************************************************************

l.case number _ _ _ _(this is our number, leave blank)

2.Cysis #

3.Region: 1ARockford .......................01 1BPeoria .........................02 2AAurora .........................03 2B01 Cook County, North Region. ...04 2B02 Cook County, East Region .....05 2B03 Cook County, South Region. ...06 2B04 Cook County, West Region .....07 2B05 Cook County, CPS .............08 3ASpringfield ....................09 3BChampaign ......................10 4AEast St. Louis .................11 5AMarion .........................12 Other.............................13

4. Has the permanency goal changed?

Yes..........1

No .........2 If yes, go to 5. If no, go to 6.

5i Circle. goal 01 03 04

and then STOP. HERE: 05 06 07 08

6, Is the case currently certified2

Yes,.... 1 No: ...:; . 2 Insuf. info :... ;, 3

IF YES,:. STOP

. .,> .

7.. Evidence of: lack. of return home due to Norman- issues'

yes .. :. 1

no.. .:. , 2 insuf data'.:

..IF

YES,

.

:PROCEED

..IF

:::NO,

,.............:..... ........:... :...STOP ::HERE .:::::::..

...

.. $

 
 Ifs

a_ i

Report on DCP Statewide Review, December, 1995
Draft, January 28, 1996 Christine George
Introduction In previous reviews of DCP, the monitoring team found that in cases in which there were non-Norman allegations, the Norman issues present were less likely to be addressed and identified as allegations. To further investigate the matter, the monitor and her assistants reviewed a state-side sample of reports investigated by DCP from December, 1995, in which the non-Norman issues of "Inadequate Supervision" and "Subsequent Risk of Injury" were present. According to SCR data the allegation "subsequent risk of injury" is the most frequently coupled allegation. In other words, many reports contain more than one allegation of abuse or neglect. However, this allegation is the one most frequently found with other allegations. The reviewers saw as an anecdote in other reviews that a Norman allegation might be unfounded when there is clear indication in the investigation that Norman condition existed but that the other allegation was indicated. An assumption made in those reviews that maybe the other allegation was considered more serious and therefore, a risk of harm or lack of supervision indication was given rather that the Norman allegation. Laurene Heybach, Supervising Attorney, LAFC, had expressed concern that Norman allegations might not be indicated when the lack of supervision and the subsequent risk of injury allegations were present. Therefore, the monitor conducted this review to determine the validity of this question.
This review found a large percentage of cases with Norman issues were still not being identified and certified.

Methodology
The monitor requested that DCFS draw a random sample of 140 CA/N reports from each of Cook County and from the aggregate downstate regions. The monitor received 188 reports for review from DCFS. Two reports had neither of the above mentioned nonNorman allegations, leaving a total of 186 reports for review. One hundred and two reports were from Cook and the remaining 84 were from downstate (see Table 1).

1

Table 1 Distributions of Sampled Reports by Region

Unweighted Sample

Weighted Sample

Regions

Reports

Regions

Reports

COOK North East South West DCP Other
subtotal

23 10 21 22 23 3
102

COOK North East South West DCP Other
Subtotal

23 10 21 22 23 3
102

ROCKFORD PEORIA AURORA SPRINGFIELD CHAMPAIGN EAST ST LOUIS MARION

14 ROCKFORD

24

6 PEORIA

10

21 AURORA

35

5 SPRINGFIELD

8

12 CHAMPAIGN

20

8 EAST ST LOUIS

13

18 MARION

30

TOTAL

186 TOTAL

243

An adequate number of cases were received to have a reliability of 95% with a precision rate of ± 10% for the Cook sub-sample and the state-wide sample. However, the low return rate for downstate left that sub-sample nine cases short for the sought for reliability. To insure that the statewide results did not reflect the skewing of the sample toward Chicago, the downstate reports were weighted to reflect the distribution of reports to DCFS between the Cook Region and downstate (42% and 58%, respectively).
Data Analysis
Cook: The reviewers found twenty-six reports -- 20% of sample -- with Norman allegations. In close to two-thirds of these cases, the DCFS worker had identified a Norman allegation. However, in the remaining third no allegation was made, although the reviewer found evidence of Norman issues. The reviewers determined that 15 cases should have been certified and should have been given an indicated Norman allegation. Only one of these cases was certified by DCFS. This means that 54% of the cases with Norman allegation should have been certified and weren't. It is worthwhile noting that if you include cases with insufficient information, the reviewers questioned DCFS workers in 81% of the cases with Norman issues. (See Table 2)
E

i!

d►

SAMPLE
Reports with Norman issues (Worker identified Reviewer Identified)
Insufficient Information to ID Norman Issue Certified
Additional cases reviewer thought should be certified Insufficient Information to Evaluate for certification Error Rate: Percentage of Reports with Norman Issues that should have been certified

Table 2

Cook n=102
26 (17 9) 5 1
14

Downstate n= 84
11 (10 1) 0 2 5

State-wide n= 186
37 (27 10) 5 3
19

Weighted State-wide n=243
45 (34 11)
5
4
23

7

3

10

12

54% 45%

51%

51%

Downstate: The reviewers found eleven cases that had Norman issues. Of these ten had been identified by the DCFS worker. DCFS had certified two of these cases. The reviewers felt that an additional five should have been certified. This error rate of 45% is lower than Cook's, but not significantly so. In addition, the downstate sample is not sufficiently robust for us to draw definite conclusions about the performance of downstate. (Table 2).
State-wide: As we see in Table 2, the error rate for the state is 51%. About two-thirds of the difference in certification rates between the DCFS workers and the reviewers might be explained by their differences in identifying issues. If all the issues identified by the reviewers were also identified by the workers, 12 more allegations would have been identified. Table 3 shows comparisons of the Norman Issues identified by the DCFS workers and the additional Norman issues identified by the reviewers. The DCFS workers identified 81% of the food allegations, 30% of the shelter allegations, 66% ofthe clothing allegations, and 92% (all but one) of the environmental neglect allegations.

3

Sample
Norman Allegations Identified by Reviewers
Norman Allegations Identified by DCFS workers

Table 3 Types of Norman Issues Identified

Cook n = 26 reports

Food

= 3

Shelter = 6

Clothing = 1

En Neglect = 1

Food

= 8

(1 indicated)

Shelter = 2

(2 indicated)

Clothing = 6

(2 indicated)

En Neglect = 6

(2 indicated)

Downstate n = 11 reports

Food

= 0

Shelter = 1

Clothing = 0

En Neglect = 0

Food

= 5

(0 indicated)

Shelter = 1

(1 indicated)

Clothing = 0

(0 indicated)

En Neglect = 5

(3 indicated)

Statewide n = 37 reports

Food

= 3

Shelter = 7

Clothing = 1

En Neglect = 1

Food

=13

(1 indicated)

Shelter = 3

(3 indicated)

Clothing = 6

(2 indicated)

En Neglect =11

(5 indicated)

Yet this non-identification and indication is not the whole picture.Of the 33 allegations identified by DCFS workers, ten where indicated and inly three cases were ultimately certified. By contrast, of the 45 allegations either found or concurred with by the reviewer, in 19 cases the reviewer :hought the case should be certified. So the DCFS workers both underndicated an under certified cases with Norman issues.

1/28/96CG

4

Report on DCP Statewide Review, December, 1995
Draft, January 28, 1996 Christine George
Introduction In previous reviews of DCP, the monitoring team found that in cases in which there were non-Norman allegations, the Norman issues present were less likely to be addressed and identified as allegations. To further investigate the matter, the monitor and her assistants reviewed a state-side sample of reports investigated by DCP from December, 1995, in which the non-Norman issues of "Inadequate Supervision" and "Subsequent Risk of Injury" were present. According to SCR data the allegation "subsequent risk of injury" is the most frequently coupled allegation. In other words, many reports contain more than one allegation of abuse or neglect. However, this allegation is the one most frequently found with other allegations. The reviewers saw as an anecdote in other reviews that a Norman allegation might be unfounded when there is clear indication in the investigation that Norman condition existed but that the other allegation was indicated. An assumption made in those reviews that maybe the other allegation was considered more serious and therefore, a risk of harm or lack of supervision indication was given rather that the Norman allegation. Laurene Heybach, Supervising Attorney, LAFC, had expressed concern that Norman allegations might not be indicated when the lack of supervision and the subsequent risk of injury allegations were present. Therefore, the monitor conducted this review to determine the validity of this question.
This review found a large percentage of cases with Norman issues were still not being identified and certified.
Methodology
The monitor requested that DCFS draw a random sample of 140 CA/N reports from each of Cook County and from the aggregate downstate regions. The monitor received 188 reports for review from DCFS. Two reports had neither of the above mentioned nonNorman allegations, leaving a total of 186 reports for review. One hundred and two reports were from Cook and the remaining 84 were from downstate (see Table 1).
1

Table 1 Distributions oz 5amplea Reports Dy Region

Unweighted Sample

Weighted Sample

Regions

Reports

Regions

Reports

COOK North East South West DCP Other
subtotal

23 10 21 22 23 3
102

COOK North East South West DCP Other
Subtotal

23 10 21 22 23
3 102

ROCKFORD PEORIA AURORA SPRINGFIELD CHAMPAIGN EAST ST LOUIS MARION

14 ROCKFORD

24

6 PEORIA

10

21 AURORA

35

5 SPRINGFIELD

8

12 CHAMPAIGN

20

8 EAST ST LOUIS

13

18 MARION

30

TOTAL

186 TOTAL

243

An adequate number of cases were received to have a reliability of 95% with a precision rate of ± 10% for the Cook sub-sample and the state-wide sample. However, the low return rate for downstate left that sub-sample nine cases short for the sought for reliability. To insure that the statewide results did not reflect the skewing of the sample toward Chicago, the downstate reports were weighted to reflect the distribution of reports to DCFS between the Cook Region and downstate (42% and 58%, respectively).
Data Analysis
Cook: The reviewers found twenty-six reports -- 20% of sample -- with Norman allegations. In close to two-thirds of these cases, the DCFS worker had identified a Norman allegation. However, in the remaining third no allegation was made, although the reviewer found evidence of Norman issues. The reviewers determined that 15 cases should have been certified and should have been given an indicated Norman allegation. Only one of these cases was certified by DCFS. This means that 54% of the cases with Norman allegation should have been certified and weren't. It is worthwhile noting that if you include cases with insufficient information, the reviewers questioned DCFS workers in 81% of the cases with Norman issues. (See Table 2)

2

I_I

a_t

SAMPLE
Reports with Norman issues (Worker identified Reviewer Identified)
Insufficient Information to ID Norman Issue Certified
Additional cases reviewer thought should be certified Insufficient Information to Evaluate for certification Error Rate: Percentage of Reports with Norman Issues that should have been certified

Table 2

Cook n=102
26 (17 9)
5 1 14

Downstate n=84
11 (10 1) 0 2 5

State-wide n= 186
37 (27 10) 5 3
19

Weighted State-wide n=243
45 (34 11)
5
4
23

7

3

10

12

54%' 45%

51%

51%

Downstate: The reviewers found eleven cases that had Norman issues. Of these ten had been identified by the DCFS worker. DCFS had certified two of these cases. The reviewers felt that an additional five should have been certified. This error rate of 45% is lower than Cook's, but not significantly so. In addition, the downstate sample is not sufficiently robust for us to draw definite conclusions about the performance of downstate. (Table 2).
State-wide: As we see in Table 2, the error rate for the state is 51%. About two-thirds of the difference in certification rates between the DCFS workers and the reviewers might be explained by their differences in identifying issues. If all the issues identified by the reviewers were also identified by the workers, 12 more allegations would have been identified. Table 3 shows comparisons of the Norman Issues identified by the DCFS workers and the additional Norman issues identified by the reviewers. The DCFS workers identified 81% of the food allegations, 30% of the shelter allegations, 66% ofthe clothing allegations, and 92% (all but one) of the environmental neglect allegations.

3

Sample
Norman Allegations Identified by Reviewers
Norman Allegations Identified by DCFS workers

Table 3 Types of Norman Issues Identified

Cook n = 26 reports

Food

= 3

Shelter = 6

Clothing = 1

En Neglect = 1

Food

= 8

(1 indicated)

Shelter = 2

(2 indicated)

Clothing = 6

(2 indicated)

En Neglect = 6

(2 indicated)

Downstate n = 11 reports

Food

= 0

Shelter = 1

Clothing = 0

En Neglect = 0

Food

= 5

(0 indicated)

Shelter = 1

(1 indicated)

Clothing = 0

(0 indicated)

En Neglect = 5

(3 indicated)

Statewide n = 37 reports

Food

= 3

Shelter = 7

Clothing = 1

En Neglect = 1

Food

=13

(1 indicated)

Shelter = 3

(3 indicated)

Clothing = 6

(2 indicated)

En Neglect =11

(5 indicated)

Yet this non-identification and indication is not the whole picture.Of the 33 allegations identified by DCFS workers, ten where indicated and only three cases were ultimately certified. By contrast, of the 45 allegations either found or concurred with by the reviewer, in 19 cases the reviewer thought the case should be certified. So the DCFS workers both under.idicated an under certified cases with Norman issues.
1/28/96CG

4

Ii
Report on DCP Statewide Review, December, 1995
Draft, January 28, 1996 Christine George
Introduction In previous reviews of DCP, the monitoring team found that in cases in which there were non-Norman allegations, the Norman issues present were less likely to be addressed and identified as allegations. To further investigate the matter, the monitor and her assistants reviewed a state-side sample of reports investigated by DCP from December, 1995, in which the non-Norman issues of "Inadequate Supervision" and "Subsequent Risk of Injury" were present. According to SCR data the allegation "subsequent risk of injury" is the most frequently coupled allegation. In other words, many reports contain more than one allegation of abuse or neglect. However, this allegation is the one most frequently found with other allegations. The reviewers saw as an anecdote in other reviews that a Norman allegation
might be unfounded when there is clear indication in the investigation that Norman condition existed but that the other
allegation was indicated. An assumption made in those reviews that maybe the other allegation was considered more serious and
therefore, a risk of harm or lack of supervision indication was
given rather that the Norman allegation. Laurene Heybach,
Supervising Attorney, LAFC, had expressed concern that Norman
allegations might not be indicated when the lack of supervision and the subsequent risk of injury allegations were present. Therefore, the monitor conducted this review to determine the
validity of this question.
This review found a large percentage of cases with Norman issues were still not being identified and certified.
Methodology
The monitor requested that DCFS draw a random sample of 140 CA/N reports from each of Cook County and from the aggregate downstate regions. The monitor received 188 reports for review from DCFS. Two reports had neither of the above mentioned nonNorman allegations, leaving a total of 186 reports for review.
One hundred and two reports were from Cook and the remaining 84
were from downstate (see Table 1).
1

Table 1 Distributions of Sampled Reports by Region

Unweighted Sample

Weighted Sample

Regions

Reports

Regions

Reports

COOK North East South West DCP Other
subtotal

23 10 21 22 23
3 102

COOK North East South West DCP Other
Subtotal

23 10 21 22 23
3 102

ROCKFORD PEORIA AURORA SPRINGFIELD
CHAMPAIGN EAST ST LOUIS MARION

14 ROCKFORD

24

6 PEORIA

10

21 AURORA

35

5 SPRINGFIELD

8

12 CHAMPAIGN

20

8 EAST ST LOUIS

13

18 MARION

30

TOTAL

186 TOTAL

243

An adequate number of cases were received to have a reliability of 95% with a precision rate of ± 10% for the Cook sub-sample and the state-wide sample. However, the low return rate for downstate left that sub-sample nine cases short for the sought for reliability. To insure that the statewide results did not reflect the skewing of the sample toward Chicago, the downstate reports were weighted to reflect the distribution of reports to DCFS between the Cook Region and downstate (42% and 58%, respectively).
Data Analysis
Cook: The reviewers found twenty-six reports -- 20% of sample -- with Norman allegations. In close to two-thirds of these cases, the DCFS worker had identified a Norman allegation. However, in the remaining third no allegation was made, although the reviewer found evidence of Norman issues. The reviewers determined that 15 cases should have been certified and should have been given an indicated Norman allegation. Only one of these cases was certified by DCFS. This means that 54% of the cases with Norman allegation should have been certified and weren't. It is worthwhile noting that if you include cases with insufficient information, the reviewers questioned DCFS workers in 81% of the cases with Norman issues. (See Table 2)
2

SAMPLE
Reports with Norman issues (Worker identified Reviewer Identified)
Insufficient Information to ID Norman Issue Certified
Additional cases reviewer thought should be certified Insufficient Information to Evaluate for certification Error Rate: Percentage of Reports with Norman Issues that should have been certified

Table 2

Cook n=102
26 (17 9) 5 1
14

Downstate n=84
11 (10 1) 0 2 5

State-wide n= 186
37 (27 10) 5 3
19

Weighted State-wide n=243
45 (34 11)
5
4
23

7

3

10

12

54% 45%

51%

51%

Downstate: The reviewers found eleven cases that had Norman issues. Of these ten had been identified by the DCFS worker. DCFS had certified two of these cases. The reviewers felt that an additional five should have been certified. This error rate of 45% is lower than Cook's, but not significantly so. In addition, the downstate sample is not sufficiently robust for us to draw definite conclusions about the performance of downstate. (Table 2).
State-wide: As we see in Table 2, the error rate for the state is 51%. About two-thirds of the difference in certification rates between the DCFS workers and the reviewers might be explained by their differences in identifying issues. If all the issues identified by the reviewers were also identified by the workers, 12 more allegations would have been identified. Table 3 shows comparisons of the Norman Issues identified by the DCFS workers and the additional Norman issues identified by the reviewers. The DCFS workers identified 81% of the food allegations, 30% of the shelter allegations, 66% ofthe clothing allegations, and 92% (all but one) of the environmental neglect allegations.

3

Sample
Norman Allegations Identified by Reviewers
Norman Allegations Identified by DCFS workers

Table 3 Types of Norman Issues Identified

Cook n = 26 reports

Food

= 3

Shelter = 6

Clothing = 1

En Neglect = 1

Food

= 8

(1 indicated)

Shelter = 2

(2 indicated)

Clothing = 6

(2 indicated)

En Neglect = 6

(2 indicated)

Downstate n = 11 reports

Food

= 0

Shelter = 1

Clothing = 0

En Neglect = 0

Food

= 5

(0 indicated)

Shelter = 1

(1 indicated)

Clothing = 0

(0 indicated)

En Neglect = 5

(3 indicated)

Statewide n = 37 reports

Food

= 3

Shelter = 7

Clothing = 1

En Neglect = 1

Food

=13

(1 indicated)

Shelter = 3

(3 indicated)

Clothing = 6

(2 indicated)

En Neglect =11

(5 indicated)

Yet this non-identification and indication is not the whole picture.Of the 33 allegations identified by DCFS workers, ten where indicated and rely three cases were ultimately certified. By contrast, of the 45 allegations either found or concurred with by the reviewer, in 19 cases the reviewer .Bought the case should be certified. So the DCFS workers both underrrdicated an under certified cases with Norman issues.
1/28/96CG

4

 
 E
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES

POLICY TRANSMITTAL 95.21

Distribution: X, Z, C-3

Revisions to the Norman Procedures

DATE:

August 1, 1995

TO: FROM:

Ru es arW Proc u!res B o olders, Direct Service Staff ess Donald, Director

EFFECTIVE:
I. Purpose

August 1, 1995

The purpose of this Policy Transmittal is to issue revisions to the Norman Procedures, which are found in Section 302.385, Services to Meet Basic Needs, and Section 302.386, Housing Advocacy Services, of Procedures 302, Services Delivered by the Department.
II. Primary Users

The primary users of these procedures are child welfare follow-up staff.
III. Changes

Procedures 302.385 (a) and (b) have been restructured with the result that former subsections (a) and (b) have been combined into one subsection (a) Identification and Certification of Class Members. The major substantive changes are:

1) Child Welfare Supervisors can now certify families as members of the Norman class in return home situations. Previously only the Regional Norman Liaison could certify these families.

2) Child Welfare Supervisors can now certify families as members of the Norman Class in intact family situations. Previously in intact family cases, if a worker determined that the family met the criteria for Norman services, the worker had to make a neglect report to SCR, alleging either allegation #76, Inadequate Food, #77, Inadequate Shelter, #77, Inadequate Clothing or #78, Environmental • Neglect. Norman services can now be offered without a report to SCR.

O

3) Child Welfare Supervisors can now approve requests for cash assistance, make referrals for housing advocacy services, and work directly with the Department of Public Aid's Regional Liaison on behalf of Norman certified clients who

require DPA benefits and services. Previously these were tasks reserved for the Regional Norman Liaison.
4) The procedures regarding referrals to the Department of Public Aid have been reformatted and a section has been added regarding how to continue the adult only portion of an AFDC grant when all AFDC eligible children have been removed from the family by DCFS and DCFS anticipates that the children will be returned home within 90 days from the date of the removal.
5) Housing Advocacy providers are no longer required to file 1 0-day Status Reports or 30-day Progress Reports. They are required to file a closing report describing what services were provided and whether the client was successfully placed in permanent housing.
6) Form CFS 370-1, Norman Class Certification for Reunification Cases, has been revised and retitled to Norman Class Certification for Reunification or Intact Family Cases (attached). It may now be used to certify intact families for Norman services, as well as for reunification cases. Supplies of the new form may be ordered from Central Stores. Any existing stock of the old form CFS 370-1 may continue to be used for reunification cases until the stock is depleted.
IV. Filing Instructions
Remove yellow procedure pages P302 - (33)/(34) through P302 - (40) and replace with the attached revised pages Procedures 302- (33)/(34) through Procedures 302.385-(1) through (10) and Procedures 302.386-(1)/(2).

IL 418-0472 CFS 370-1

4
Department of Children and Family Services
Norman Class Certification For Reunification or Intact Family Cases

This form is to be completed by the Supervisor every time a reunification or intact family situation is presented for consideration of Norman Class certification.

Family Name (Last)

Chiid(ren)

(Last)

(First) (First)

CYCIS I.D. Region Field

Determination of Class

1. Is the permanency goal for this child(ren) REMAIN HOME or RETURN HOME ? If yes, go to Question 2; if no, the family Is not a class member.

q Yes q No

2. Does the Service Plan reflect that the living circumstances are a barrier to the chiid(ren) remaining at home or returning the child(ren) home?

q Yes q No

Certification of Class

I have reviewed the case situation and hereby certify that the living circumstances of the family are a barrier to the chiid(ren) remaining at home or returning the child(ren) home. This family is a therefore certified as a Norman Class member for the following reasons: (check all that apply)

F7 Inadequate Food
7 Inadequate Shelter

Inadequate Clothing Environmental Neglect

I have reviewed this case situation and have found that the living circumstances of the family are not a barrier to the children remaining at home or to returning the child(ren) home. This family is q therefore NOT a Norman Class member.

COMMENTS:

Child Welfare Supervisor

Date

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4

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT
August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21
Assignment of Homemaker
The coordinator of homemaker services (or other staff designated by the Regional Administrator) shall assign a homemaker or homemaker agency to the case and shall immediately notify the Department worker of assignment of the homemaker. Within five working days of assignment of the homemaker, the worker will contact the assigned homemaker by phone or in person to confirm assignment and to set a time for meeting with the client. The initial meeting between the client, the homemaker and the worker is to take place within five days of the phone call. Some agency contracts may specify shorter time frames for assignment of the homemaker and the initial meeting with the clients. The resource coordinator will notify staff of those contacts which specify shorter time frames so these time frames can be adhered to. In the case of clients with hearing impairments or limited/non-English speaking clients, a homemaker shall be assigned who can communicate in the client's preferred mode of communication or speaks the client's primary language. If one is not available, an interpreter shall be used to facilitate communication between the homemaker and client.
302.380 Information and Referral Services
DCFS offices receive a variety of calls for services to children and families. Calls include, but are not limited to, requests for names and addresses of day care providers from parents looking for day care, requests for shelter, financial assistance and live-in housekeepers as well as reports of alleged child abuse or neglect and referrals for child welfare services. Department staff receiving incoming calls need to be aware of services available from other state and local agencies in order to be of assistance in directing the caller to a resource which can meet their needs.
Department staff shall ensure that information and referral services are accessible to hearing impaired and limited/non-English speaking clients through the use of TDD's, interpreters or other auxiliary aids or devices. Accommodation shall be made for the communication needs of persons with other disabilities such as persons with visual impairments who may need written materials read to them or provided in braille.
Additionally, Department service staff must be aware of other resources to which clients receiving child welfare services can be referred for services other than those which the Department provides. Such resources include, but are not limited to: the Departments of Public Aid, Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Rehabilitation Services, Veterans' Affairs, and Aging; the University of Illinois Division of Specialized Care for Children; Legal Assistance Foundation; local mental health centers; local Centers for Independent Living (See Appendix L); Job Service; local health clinics, the Chicago Hearing Society, the Illinois Relay Center (for hearing impaired clients), the Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, and the Social Security Administration. See Procedures 351, Federal Benefits and Other Public Funds, for a description of some of these resources.

Procedures 302 - (33)

SERVICES DEUVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT
August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21
(This page left intentionally blank)

Procedures 302 - (34)

?i i ,

4

a►

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1,1995-PT. 95.21

302.385 Services to Meet Basic Needs

//

a)

Identification and Certification of Class Members

Department staff are to arrange for or provide services to meet the family's basic needs, including housing advocacy services, when the family's living conditions or the parent's failure or inability to provide for the child's subsistence needs are threateningthe removal of a child from the home or preventing the return home of a child in substitute care or improving these living conditions has been imposed as a condition of the child's return home. There are four ways in which such children will be identified:

1) Child Abuse/Neglect Investigations

Child protective investigation team supervisors will certify families who are the subjects of pending or indicated child abuse and neglect reports in which a reason for taking protective custody is one of the following four allegations:

#76, Inadequate Food; #77, Inadequate Shelter; #78, Inadequate Clothing; #82, Environmental Neglect.

Refer to yellow page Procedures 300.130, Taking Children into Temporary Protective Custody, of Procedures 300, Reports of Child Abuse and Neglect for a complete description of this process.

//

2) Administrative Case Reviews

The Administrative Case Review System (see Rules and Procedures 305, Client Service Planning) will identify cases during the review process where living conditions or the provision of basic subsistence needs have been imposed as a condition of the child's return home and the parent's failure or inability to meet these needs is preventing the return home of children. The Administrative Case Reviewer will certify these cases as belonging to the Norman Class via the case review information packet. When this is the case, the service plan will specify the changes in conditions necessary to alleviate the living circumstances of the family. The worker handling the case shall then follow the procedures listed below for the provision of services. Certification as a member of the Norman class will continue for six months following return home of the child.

Procedures 302.385-(1)

Fl
SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1,1995-PT. 95.21
// 3) Child Welfare Supervisors - Return Home Situations
When child welfare workers identify a child in their caseload who could return home if services to meet a subsistence need were provided to the family, staff shall initiate the certification process. The worker shall submit the form CFS 370-1, Norman Class Certification for Reunification or Intact Family Cases, to the Child Welfare Supervisor. The Child Welfare Supervisor will make the final decision within 24 hours of receiving the form as to whether the family is a member of the class. A request for services may be submitted with the request for certification. All certifications and requests for services shall be approved by the Child Welfare Supervisor with an informational copy sent to the Regional Norman Liaison.
In addition to the above procedures for Norman certification, workers shall initiate the process of returning the child home by following the Regional protocol for approval to return a child home, obtain the necessary court approval, and complete the required documentation needed. Certification as a member of the Norman class will continue for six months following the return home of the child.
// 4) Child Welfare Supervisors - Intact Family Situations
When child welfare workers identify a child(ren) in their caseload who needs to be removed from an intact family due to living conditions, i.e. inadequate food, clothing, shelter, or environmental conditions, workers shall initiate the certification process. The worker shall submit the form CFS 370-1, Norman Class Certification for Reunification or Intact Family Cases, to the Child Welfare Supervisor. The Child Welfare Supervisor will make the final decision within 24 hours of receiving the form as to whether the family is a member of the class. A request for services may be submitted with the request for certification. Informational copies of the approved certification and request for services shall be sent to the Regional Norman Liaison. Certification as a member of the Norman class will continue until the case is closed.
In situations involving intact family cases, workers do not need to report families to the State Central Register in order to initiate Norman certification and services. Certification is appropriate where the families' subsistence needs could constitute one of the following allegations: #76, Inadequate Food; #77, Inadequate Shelter; #78, Inadequate Clothing; or #82, Environmental Neglect, and there are no other conditions which merit a report to the State Central Register.
Procedures 302.385-(2)

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()

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21

b) Notice of Class Membership

Within 24 hours following a decision regarding certification, the Child Welfare Supervisor will send form CFS 370-4, Notice to Class Members, to the family that is the subject of the request for certification, informing the family of the Department's policies to provide services to meet the family's basic needs. The Notice also informs the family of the services available and how to appeal the Department's decision.

c) Provision of Services

Child welfare staff are to make use of all available services necessary to expedite the return home of children when lack of subsistence needs is a factor. Such services include, but are not limited to:

o

Provision of hard services such as cash assistance, shelter, utility services,

food, clothing, furniture or other goods or services to meet subsistence needs.

o

Referral to the Department of Public Aid, including the Department of Public

Aid's Emergency Assistance Program.

o

Family Reunification Fund

o

Referrals to community agencies, food pantries, emergency shelters, public

housing and church sponsored programs

o

Homemaker Services

o

Day Care

o

Referral for money management counseling

o

Employment and Training referrals

d) Cash Assistance

H For Norman Class Members - When cash assistance is appropriate for families certified as belonging to the Norman class, the worker shall submit the form CFS 370-5, Request for Cash, AFDC and/or Housing Assistance, to the Child Welfare Supervisor. Certification as a member of the Norman class will continue for six months following return home of the child. The worker shall indicate on the form the purpose for which cash assistance is being requested, the amount, and the type of cash assistance requested. If other types of assistance are inappropriate or unavailable, the worker shall apply for Norman funds. However, the final decision regarding the types and amounts of cash assistance rests with the Child Welfare Supervisor. The final decision

Procedures 302.385-(3)

r

I1

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21

must be made within 24 hours of the request. An informational copy of the form CFS 370-5 shall be sent to the Regional Norman Liaison. Refer to yellow page Procedures 359.5(j), Norman Services for payment instructions.

For Families Who Are Not Members of the Norman Class - When cash assistance is necessary for families who are not members of the Norman Class, workers shall complete the CFS 370-5, indicate the type of cash assistance requested such as the Family Reunification Fund, etc., and submit it to their supervisor. Norman cash assistance shall not be used for these families. Refer to yellow page Procedures 359.5(i), Family First Services for payment instructions.

Notice of Decision Regarding Request for Cash Assistance - When a decision regarding cash assistance has been made, the Child Welfare Supervisor will send form letter CFS 370-6. Letter to Family Regarding Cash Assistance, within 24 hours to the family indicating whether cash assistance has been approved or denied, and (if the request is approved) the amounts and purposes of the assistance. The form letter will also notify the family of the right to appeal the decision regarding cash assistance. A copy of the CFS 370-6 shall be kept in the case file.

e) Amount of Cash Assistance

Depending on the need, up to $800 in cash assistance in a 12 month period may be provided on behalf of a family who is certified as a member of the Norman Class. This may be provided, if necessary, in addition to funds from DPA or other local community resources. There is no limit on the number of times cash assistance can be provided in a 12 month period, provided the total cash assistance for that year does not exceed $800.00. In situations where higher amounts are essential, exceptions to policy may be sought through the Regional Norman Liaison.

f) Referrals to the Department of Public Aid

//

1) Special Assistance Program

The Department of Public Aid (DPA) administers the Special Assistance program which is targeted toward preventing the disruption of families through the provision of special payments to the family, a vendor or service provider. This special assistance is available to:

o

AFDC recipients

o

non-AFDC recipients with children under 21 who meet the income and

asset level of AFDC standards

o

pregnant female(s) deemed eligible for AFDC who meet the income and

asset level of the AFDC standards.

Procedures 302.385-(4)

a_►
SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21
When DCFS has determined that a family is threatened with separation due to insufficient income to meet their subsistence needs and the children are in danger of foster care placement, DPA can authorize special assistance. The family must file a written request to DPA via DCFS Regional staff or a DCFS contracted service provider. A financial payment may be authorized, up to the maximum specified in DPA policy, for rent, food, clothing, household supplies and household furnishings.
Staff of both Departments shall work cooperatively to ensure timely authorization of the special assistance for eligible families. The specific time frame for a decision and/or authorization of assistance by DPA to a family are:
AFDC Recipients
A decision to approve/deny the request must be made within five (5) working days from the date of request and the assistance must be authorized within two (2) working days from the date of the decision.
Non-AFDC Recipients
A decision on the request must be made within five (5) working days from the date that DPA staff receive all requested verifications of income and assets and if eligible, assistance is to be authorized within five (5) working days from the date of decision.
2) Regular AFDC Assistance - Non AFDC Recipients
For those families who are not AFDC recipients, but may be eligible an expedited application process has been established.
Expedited AFDC Applications
For families who may be eligible for AFDC benefits except for the fact that the child(ren) is in placement, the Child Welfare Supervisor will contact the Department of Public Aid's regional liaison a minimum of approximately 30 days prior to a firm, anticipated return date of the children by DCFS to the parents.
The return date will generally be the anticipated court date at which DCFS' decision to return a child(ren) will be court affirmed or negated. Alternatively, it may be a date set by DCFS following a fitness hearing. In the event that the court unexpectedly orders return home, the agencies will jointly expedite the AFDC application process.
Procedures 302.385-(5)

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21
The Child Welfare Supervisor will provide the IDPA Regional Liaison with the parent's name(s), the name and birth date of each child(ren) anticipated to be returned, and the address where it is anticipated the family will be residing. Upon receiving the above information, the IDPA Regional Liaison will contact the appropriate IDPA Local office to determine:
A) that no active AFDC case exists, or B) that an active AFDC case exists.
If there is no active AFDC case for the family, the IDPA Regional Liaison will arrange, with the appropriate IDPA local office, an intake screening appointment for the DCFS referred parent(s). The screening appointment is to be scheduled by the IDPA local office within three (3) days from the date of contact by the Child Welfare Supervisor with the IDPA Regional Liaison. The IDPA Regional Liaison will notify the Child Welfare Supervisor of the appropriate local office, date and time of the screening appointment.
DCFS will notify the parent(s) of the scheduled IDPA screening appointment. It is the prerogative of DCFS whether they wish to accompany the applicant to the screening interview or not.
Upon completion of the screening interview, the IDPA local office, per current procedures, will ensure that an eligibility interview appointment date is scheduled within 14 days of the screening interview and that an appropriate DPA 267, Application for Assistance, is provided to the applicant and a copy sent to the appropriate DCFS Child Welfare Supervisor.
Upon completion of the IDPA eligibility interview the case, if eligible, will be processed with the understanding that the first-issued IDPA assistance warrant and food stamps will be sent to the appropriate IDPA local office and be available for pickup by the applicant on the date of reunification.
It will be the responsibility of the Child Welfare Supervisor to notify the IDPA Regional Liaison, no later than noon the day following the court date, of the court decision. In the event that DCFS fails to notify IDPA within the above time frame, IDPA will void the assistance warrant, return food stamps benefits, and cancel the AFDC case.
Upon notification by the Child Welfare Supervisor, the IDPA Regional Liaison will contact the IDPA local office and advise either to release the assistance benefits to the client, if the child(ren) is returned or void the assistance and cancel the case if the court fails to return the child(ren) to the parent(s).
Procedures 302.385-(6)

R

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SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995 - PT. 95.21
3) Regular AFDC Assistance - AFDC Recipients
Continuing the Aduk Only Portion of the AFDC Grant
Children who are in temporary DCFS custody are ineligible for AFDC and must be removed from the AFDC grant. A Norman certified parent of a child in DCFS custody remains eligible for AFDC in an adult-only case for up to three months after the month in which the child(ren) was removed from the home, based on the fact that DCFS anticipates that the child(ren) will be returned to the home within 90 days from the date of the removal.
In order to alert Public Aid to continue the adult only portion of the grant to Norman certified families whose children are taken into protective and/or temporary custody, the DCP worker and supervisor or follow-up worker and supervisor must:
A) Determine if the case should be Norman certified.
B) After the supervisor certifies the case, determine if the child(ren) could go home in 90 days if the family cooperated with services.
C) If yes, and the adult portion of the grant should continue, write "NORMAN" on the child's emergency medical card.
D) Process the emergency medical card as usual per Procedures 302.360, Health Care Services.
E) Inform the family that the child(ren) will be removed from the AFDC grant, but that the adult only portion will continue.
F) If DCFS does not obtain temporary custody of the child(ren), and the emergency medical card has already been processed, the DCP or followup worker must notify the Eligibility Determinations Unit to inform Public Aid not to change the AFDC grant.
Returning a Child to the Home
In the event that DCFS is returning a child(ren) to an active AFDC case, the IDPA Regional Liaison will make arrangements with the IDPA local office for a scheduled appointment for the parent(s). The appointment will generally be scheduled for the anticipated reunification date (court date) or no later than three days after the court date. The IDPA Regional Liaison will notify the Child Welfare Supervisor of the scheduled appointment date. It will be the

Procedures 302.385-(7)

I

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1,1995-PT. 95.21

responsibility of the Child Welfare Supervisor to notify the client of the scheduled appointment time at the appropriate IDPA local office.

At the scheduled appointment the parent/AFDC grantee may come into the local office to sign form DPA 243, Request For Assistance For Additional Family Members, to have the children) added back to the AFDC case and to the food stamp case. In these cases the benefits will be mailed to the address of the grantee based upon the IDPA Mercury schedule, which generally provides benefits to the client within two to seven days after signing the DPA 243.

g) Resource Manual

Each Department office has been provided with a region specific resource manual which contains community resources for payments, goods and services related to living circumstances and includes providers with whom the Department has contracts. Workers shall make use of their manuals when attempting to locate services that would reunite children separated from their families because of living circumstances.

h) Locating Absent Parents

When the absence of a parent is an issue affecting whether the Department will retain custody of a child in those case situations where living conditions are a factor, child welfare staff will make reasonable efforts to locate the absent parent. Such efforts include but are not limited to:

o

Checking the local telephone directory or directory assistance.

o

Asking the landlord of the parent (if applicable).

o

Asking relatives and friends of the absent parent to provide information to help

locate the absent parent.

o

Contacting the local post office, DPA office, utility companies and school to

request a check of their records.

o

Contacting past and present employers of the absent parent.

o

Requesting the local, county, and state law enforcement agencies to check

their records for information which would locate the absent parent.

o

Conducting a records check of Department of Public Aid and Secretary of

State, Division of Motor Vehicles (if a license number is known).

Procedures 302.385-(8)

1.1
SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995 -PT. 95.21
The worker shall document in the case file all efforts to locate the absent parent(s) and the reasons why those efforts were unsuccessful.
Procedures 302.385-(9)

1.1
SERVICES DEUVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995-PT. 95.21
(This page left intentionally blank)
Procedures 302.385-(10)

I-)

SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT
August 1. 1995 - PT. 95.21
302.386 Housing Advocacy Services

DCFS staff shall utilize available sources to advocate for financial assistance and other services which meet the basic needs of families in preventing the placement of children or assist in the return of placed children back to the home. Such services shall be provided directly, obtained by referrals and/or purchased by providers.

a) Housing

When a child is at risk of placement or cannot be returned home due to inadequate housing/shelter and the family has been certified as members of the "Norman" class, a referral for housing advocacy services may be requested using the CFS 370-5, Request for Cash, AFDC and/or Housing Assistance form. Once this form has been completed, it should be submitted to the child welfare supervisor who can approve or deny the referral. If the referral has been approved, the child welfare supervisor will phone the Housing Advocacy provider and/or fax a copy of the referral form.

The Housing Advocacy providers are community based organizations statewide with whom the Department has contracted to provide housing services to Norman Class members. The services the Housing Advocacy providers can be expected to offer include:

1) Referral to emergency or domestic violence shelter, if needed;

2) Assistance in securing affordable housing;

–

consumer education for the family on how to look for housing;

–

housing location to help the family identify vacancies;

–

secure affordable housing-advocacy on behalf of family to help them

secure housing or utilities and determine that it is affordable;

3) Assistance in applying for income assistance to meet initial or ongoing rental obligations;

4) Linkages to community resources to meet subsistence needs such as food or
clothing or energy assistance;

5) Follow-up with the family to identify housing problems before they reach the crisis stage.

// Housing Advocacy providers will be expected to work closely with DCFS workers and to submit a closing report describing what services were provided and whether the client was successfully placed in permanent housing.

Procedures 302.386-(1)

A

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SERVICES DELIVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT August 1, 1995-PT. 95.21

b)

Utilities

The State offers a program to assist families to secure or maintain utility services. This program is administered by the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs and operated through local community agencies. The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program provides both Home Energy Assistance and Weatherization Assistance.

1) Home Energy Assistance

The primary purpose of this program is to assist low income households to better afford the rising cost of energy through direct financial assistance, energy counseling, outreach and education.

Families may receive a one-time payment to meet their heating costs, and can receive energy counseling or education through the local administering agency.

Families may also be eligible for Emergency Assistance. Emergency Assistance is available to households only after heat or medically necessary cooling has been shut off and if a family has made a good-faith effort to maintain service or provides a portion of the amount needed to reconnect (no more than 10% of the family's income).

Emergency Assistance will be provided within 48 hours from application or within 18 hours if the crisis is life threatening.

Families should be referred to the Local Administering Agency.

2) Home Weatherization Assistance Program

Under the provisions of this assistance program, families may receive repair of home heating units. When appropriate and/or cost effective, weatherization and repair of the dwelling structure is completed to help reduce high utility bills. These services are provided by local community agencies contracted through the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs.

Procedures 302.386-(2)

 
 '?AV--2–ø3 09-51 FROM-A.G. CHILD WELFARE LIT.

ID=1312G146e85

PACE

1/9

Lisa Madigan
.VlTORNl•:Y GI\F RAL

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF ILLINOIS
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

DATE- t '

.2003

TO JO

OF:

FAXNUMBER:

/°^ TOTAL # OF PAGES

FROM ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL:

0 Barbara J. Greenspan, Chief rJ James C. Stevens. Deputy Chief

0 Kimberly Soo Miller

Danielle J. Steimel

RE:

13D V ► V t (,^^

COMMENTS:

If there is an error in this transmission, please call 312-814-6747. Thank you. The information contained in this transmission is privileged and confidential, intended for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this transmission is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.
500 South Second Street. Springficld, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY; (2)7) 785-2771 • Fax; (217) 782-7046 100 Wcsr Randolph Sttcct. Chicajo. Illinois 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • 'TTY. (312) 81 .1-3374 • F;^x: (31!) 814-3806

MAY-22-03 09=51 FROM=A.G. CHILD WELFARE LIT.

ID:131281469 S

LEHRER & -.REDL-BAF A twW PArN21SHIF
36 SOUTH WA5ASFI AV2 UE SUrrE 60Q
CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60603
(312) 932 2121
FACE (3U) 3314717
F-a[w(i.: kitndt^eteamu ww4 ildFamiYpd MghbllwtOM
May21, 2003

PACE 2/9

Barbara. Greenspan Danielle Steimel Assistants Attorneys General Child Welfare Litigation Bureau 100 W_ R.andoIph, State 4-600 Chicago, 1L 6060I .

Dear Counsel:

This letter responds to boththe Febnaary 11, 2003 -data report we received and your April 17, 2003 transmittal to us ofrevised procedures pursuant to Paragraph I I of the Consent Order. As we agreed, plaintiffs' 30 day comment period on the policies runs front the date you sent us a letter
summarizing the changes being provided, winch is May.2.

As an initial meaner, we believe it would be appropriate and useful to meet with the new DCFS Director and the new or acting General Counsel regarding jnnan generally and also about some of the ongoing concerns plaintiffs' counsel have raised. While some of the points raised below are technical, others relate to sonic fuudffinental concerns and might be appropriate for such a
discussion. As you know, we continue toviewNormanasanextreuuly successful and cost-effective program, and we hope that we could have an opportunity in the very near future to meet with Director Samuels to discuss the Decree and its implementation.

Y. Concerns Regarding February 11, 2003 Data Report

jV

1 1. Your letter to us references a "delay" in gettcxig underlying data related to ¶(c) of the
reporting agreement(. , concerning certification rates for each region and a review of the two subregions with the lowest certification rates in the reporting period_ We did receive the summary reports Al, A4 and A5 and raise some concerns about these below, but would like to received the delayed information as soon as reasonably possible so we can fully air our concerns with you.

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^^ a l J^

2. We have compared the number of farxzi iies served with Norman funds ins this report against the report given to us in February 2002. The following stutistics concern us;

(a) R ion iA (Rockford) had a drop of approximately 113 in the number of families served and an even higher drop in the amount of funds authorized.

(b) Region 4A had a drop of more than 1/3 in the number of farnilics served and

a.

commensurate drop in the amount authorized.

(c) Region SA also bad a similar drop in the number of families served, though slightly less of a drop in the amount authorized_

(d). Average payments have dropped by $43 per month throughout the state. Since re s continue to rise and other housing- related expenses are alsaincreasing (especially energy bills), we are concernedthat caseworkers are shaving authorized expenditures to the bone, making it harder for the class to meet basic subsistence needs.

We note that incases in'families served occuired in each of Regions 6A-J) (all Cook) and offset some of the drops in other regions (though amount authorized in 6C was less than in 2002 even though more families were served)_ These increases serve in part to explain why the decrease in families served is only 300 families overall, rather than a much greater decrease. We would like to emphasize, however, that Norman is a statewide case and we would be surprised if the need for Morman services bas decreased so substantially in the past year in tine regions we mention, especially in light of the economic climate during the reporting period. Therefore, we request that Noxxzian requirements be re-emphasized in Regions IA, 4A and 5A especially,. but also in each of the other
nog ons in which the number of faafilies served fall: 1 B, 3A, 3B.

3_ There is a discrepancy in the report as to the number of families served. The cash assistance report first states 2,282 families were served, then late' says 3,239 families were served, though the amount of cash reported authorized is the same. Oue of these figures must be wrong, and we believe it is the latter one given the regional figures showing reductions in families served in mUnerous regions- Please clarify this point

4. We find the amount of housing assistance authorized for 30 families (in Springfield aizi Marion combined) of slightly more than $8,000 to be extremely low. This is less than $300 per firmly and we would be very surprised if this amount even covers either a first month's rent or a security deposit in these areas. Siindarly, S 12,144 for 64 families in Rockford comes out to less than $200 per family there. We would like additional informanon,as to the available rentals in these mamas or explanations as to why such low amounts should be considered acceptable. Also, the amount of housing assistance underthe Housing Assistance Datareport dropped by S100,000-more
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Page 3 May 21. 2003
than 1/4_ This is a very substantial reduction, and we would like to know what accounts for it, given that the number of families has served has not dropped substantially (956 families this year cornparcd to 971 families last year).
5. We continue to have difficulty in understanding the information in report A-1 as to what "children of certified families" and `families with no children" refers to. Assuming this means children with certified families means children in placement and families with ab children means intact cases, we would much prefer that these reports be reformatted to say so.
6. The rates of "average days in placement after certification" are shockingly higtz These rates are actually increasing from their abysmally high rates last year. Average days in placement rates in Peoria, Aurora, East St. Louis and Chicago Central are considerably worse than last year. Only Springfield shows a very considerable drop: We would like to know what Springfield did in order to cause this result. Obviously,'N unan certification is intended to assist with reunification in these cases, yet re mification is not occurring within months of certification. DCFS upper management should be alerted to these concerns and ium rcdiate steps taken too press for reunification particularly in the regions where the delays are increasing.
7_ The reports on services `needed now" versus `needed later" continue to trouble us. Indeed, we see a possible correlation between the low rates of cash assistance, low numbers of families served and the regions in which services are almost never determined to be `heeded now.' For example, Region 1A (Rockford) lists 91 reviewed families and finds only one has a need for services now, and none of the reviewed families are receiving cash_ Either the wrong families are being reviewed in the reports (i.e. this is supposed to be a Norman review, not all cases) or workers in this region are simply not attending to the subsistence needs in their cases and taking prompt steps to meet those needs. We would liketo examine underlying documents for Rockford so that we can understand why it is that so few families are getting services "now." Other regions with similar problems include Aurora, Springfield (though to a lesser degree insofar as at least some services are identified as "needed nov") , East St. Louis, Marion (similar to Springfield), Cook North and South (same issue as Springfield). The sole region that seems to "get this right" is Champaign. Here again, we request that this issue be discussed with managers in Champaign to find out what accounts for the differences shown on these reports, and that whatever findings there are as to why Champaign workers are able to determine services are "needed now" should be provided to the managers in other regions. Finally, we note that there is no data provided for region 6C and we request such data.
$. We are surprised that there are 'no renewal agreements or new agreements with housing authorities. Can you please provide us with information about renewal dates so that we can verify that authorities are continuing to renew their agreements with DCFS when they come up for renewal.

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Conclusion to analysis ofreporte4 information. In addition to the supplemental information requested here, we ask you to consider the con== raised here. Within the next thirty days, we would also like to meet with you (and of course with John Cheney Egan and any other person who has a substantial role in Norman) to discuss these concerns.
11. Comments on Proposed Reviscd Procedures
A. 302.385 a) Identification of Class Members
I. We prefer the original version of this policy's emphasis on provision of services, rather than to- the new draft's focus on identification of class members. Moreover, the description of living conditions is misleading in the new draft because it suggests there must be a complete absence of shelter to qualify.
2. The first sentence should include, after living conditions, (i.e. Lack of shelter or lack of nimal1y ad uate shciter such as "adequate eat, tm ,tart' uQN.fe coon o r carious livinggemeats. a Consent Decree at'g3(b)(class defined byct shell tc), ¶4(a) (prohibiting removal based on mmirnally adequate conditions):
b) Certification of Class Members
1. We have become aware, thanks to Diane's reccatwork in Dui uy IL that consideration of protective custody does not ordinarily occur in many cases in which there may be a subsistence need, andthat when it dens occur, the child protection managct must be involved. This nay be one reason for the inadequate identification of Nolnnan class members we have seen over the years by DCP and inadequate service provision_ Therefore, the reference here should not be to "a reason for taking protective custody."
2. We propose die following language in b(l).
Cad protective investigation team supervisors will certify families who are the subject of pending abuse or neglect investi nations. or indicated rcoorts as to the following alleizations. where there is evidenceof a need for services in these areas:
(Continue dot points here)
3, As you know, we would prefer to move away front the allegation based system altogether and would like to discuss with Director Samuels and any of his designees the ways in which the Norman program could become more effective if it were not allegation based- This could
present an opportunity to modify the Decree in ways helpful to both the plaintiffs and the
CS

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Department_
c. Notice of Class Membership
1. As written, the policy eliminates notification of class membership but only provides for notice of the Norman program. This language potentially violates the requirement that class members be notified when they arc denied beacfits or services wader the decree, because the denial of class membership is a denial of benefits or services. Consent Decree 110..While we have no problem with the idea of extending the time for such notice by another 24-48 hours, we do require that such notice continue.
d. Provision of Services
1. We object to the curtailed list of services. The original draft states that "Such services include but are not limited to... "Provision of hard services such as cash assistance, shelter, utility services, food, clothing, further or other goods or services to meet subsistence needs_" and adds to this direct requirement "Family Reunification Fund" "Homemaker Services, "Day Care." This language must be manned_ As rewritten, the policy allows for mere referrals for these services (and `' eliminates some services like Family Retmifca ion Furl and Homemaker Services altogether, even for referral purposes). The original policy requires that child welfare and DCP staff"make use or the listed services. This is essential language and we do not agree to moving any of the listed services to the category of ones for which the obligation is merely to "seek" or `make referrals" for such services.
Omitted/moved section on cash assistance.
1. The revised draft moons casiressistance but has moved the cash assistance section to a new section g which follows the public aid discussion of"retuxning children from custody." This is a confusing and misleading reorganization. The cash assistance section should remain as section (d), as in the original policy,.
e. Housing assistance_
1. As we understand the draft proposal, it replaced the previous section 302.386. Please confirm that this is correct. We have no objection to moving all of the provisions concerning Norman related services to 302.385; indeed, we approve of that decision. We do not see the language your letter refers to ("or in the child welfare-worker's professional judgment the family will have such needs when the child is to return home" from what you call the 'eligibility criteria." Indeed, we see no eligibility criteria at all other than the general'description at the beginning (which is acceptable). However, we believe housing advocacy referrals may be necessary in some cases in
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which the family will need advocacy assistance with housing related needs after return borne. Therefore, we would propose language such as: " DCP or child welfare worker should also refer f milies to the IiousingA4vocacyproxam if the family is likely to need any of the services listed below upon r I^rn me "
2. (e) 4 should include the description of subsistence needs that was in the previous draft ("such as food or clot or enerav assisrance' and add or other basic_ reeds").
(f) IDHS Norman TANF (Public Aid) Application (DHS--NAP).
I . This new section should follow, not precede the cash assistance section that is (g) in the proposal. Also, the second sentence at the top' of page 7 does not make sense as written. The phrase "when their child is" should probably be stricken.
2. This section provides more technical information and confusing jargon than is neccssaty. It also does not start with any expressed understanding of why it matters for DCFS staff. The opening section should be changed to make clear that workers have an important obligation to assist families in accessing public aid. Because this section is "almnost...eutsre^lyj new" as you say, we would like to provide a proposed revision wheti we meet on the policy and the report We arc currently working on further comments on this new section and can provide those to you before a meeting.
(g) Cash Assistance
1. We would like to discuss with you modifying the basic $800 fwad_ As you know, this amount was set twelve years ago. Given inflation and housing costs:, it is difficult to rent any apartment on the private market for less than $600 per month, While in 1991 apartments could be rented for $400 per month. An upward adjustment is overdue, not just in the exceptional cases (over $2,000) but in the usual case.
2. The language "Wbetheran item is appropriate is determined on a case-by-case basis" is probleaaatic. As our analysis of the reporting information shows, workers are questioning amounts that should be presumed to be reasonable and necessary. we believe that DCFS should have a table -^ of costs (including rent) under which workers would not be second guessing costs that were within the table. The proposed language gives too much discretion to workers to reject reasonable expenses.
Old g (the resource manual).
I - There is a requirement in the Decree-(¶ 8) for a resource manual. While we are open

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• Page 7 May 2I, 2003
to discussing the manner in which.this requirement is fulfilled, DCFS may not simply rewrite the Decree to exclude the manual. At one time, we envisioned a computer database of current information. This is a matter that requires discussion with plaintiffs' counsel.
h. Locating Absent Parents
1. We do not agree to the elimination of this section, as it is also a Decree requirement, see Decree ¶9(e), and we wish to discuss it with you.
B. Amendments to Procedures 300 (300.80)_
b2. Your letter of May 2 states that the policy "has omitted non- Norman services that are no longerprovided statewide." We are unaware as to which services these are or why they arc no Ionger provided. The omissions show that Family First referrals, the Family Reunification Fund, and Regional CPS Enhancement Projects arc no longer included. We don't know what the last category is, but Family First and the Family Rzunifcation Fund were services provided at the time of the Nrman Decree, and the decree provides: "This cash assistance grogram [i.e. the Norman program] shall not be a replacement for or result in any action by DCFS to eliminate any source of cash assistance for class members to which DCFS has access on the date of entry of this Order, including `exceptions to policy." Decree, ¶5. Therefore, we wish to discuss with you the provision of enhanced cash services and other services in those areas in which these services are no longer provided. We need additional information from you as to the status of these programs, since your letter suggests that some still exist, but not statewide.
b.3. See comment regarding "old g" above.
d_3_ and Procedure 300 section gennarally: dw duty not to take children into custody if hard services can prevent their removal is not stated as dearly as it should be. First, d.3 should reiterate the point (it is only stated at the end of b. I. and then in the context of "evaluating services" not "taking custody-" In bl, the use of the term "in home" services isn't clear. We suggest a parenthetical there ("listed below including cash and housin g assistance to meet basic needs")_
IIL Conclusion
We appreciate your consideration of the above concerns and comments and hope we cal, meet on these matters shortly. We also hope you will discuss our request for a meeting with Director Samuels so that we can provide him an overview of the significance of 1Vorntan, the ongoing
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concerns plaintiffs' counsel regarding its implementation, and possible areas in which modifications might be in the interests of both parties.
1
Y
Y0117

Viri Hji i lJianeL.Redleaf g )

Lauren M. Heybach

'7

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 DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD

Department of Health and Human Services

SUBJECT: Illinois Department of

DATE: April 13, -1989

Children and Family Services

Docket No. 87-154

Decision No. 1037

DECISION

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (State) appealed a determination by the Administration for Children, Youth and Families (ACYF, Agency) of the Office of Human Development Services. ACYF found that the State was ineligible for $1,034,619 awarded to the State for fiscal year (FY) 1984 under section 427 of title IV-B of the Social Security Act (Act). Section 427 of the Act provides that a state may receive additional funds for child welfare services, beyond the amount available under section 420 of the Act, if the state meets certain requirements for protecting children in foster care.

ACYF initially approved the State's request for section 427 funds for FY 1984 based on a written certification by the State that it met the requirements of section 427. Subsequently, ACYF performed a compliance review to validate the State's self-certification. ACYF evaluated the State's compliance on two levels: whether the State had established policies and procedures for implementing the-section 427 requirements and whether these policies and procedures were operational. ACYF determined that the State had policies and procedures for implementing the section 427 requirements; however, after surveying a sample of foster care case records, ACYF found that the requirements were not actually met in a sufficient number of cases to constitute compliance. ACYF required a 90% rate of compliance in order for the State to be found eligible for section 427 funds, based on the number of years the State had participated in the section 427 program.,/ ACYF found a total of 14 out of 32 cases
to be unacceptable. The State contested ACYF's findings
in 11 of these cases. There is no dispute that if the

I/ ACYF usually reviewed a state's first, second and
fifth years of participation in the section 427 program,
requiring 90% compliance in the last of these reviews,
known as the "triennial" review. Here, the review of the
State's fourth year of participation was considered the
triennial review since the biennial review was omitted.

APPENDIX 1

-2-
Board reversed ACYF's findings on even one of the failed cases, there would not be a sufficient number of failed cases to find that the State was ineligible for the FY 1984 section 427 funds ./ As discussed below, however, we sustain ACYF's findings with respect to all of the contested cases. We also reject the State's more general argument that the Agency's application of a 90% compliance standard was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm ACYF's determination that the State was ineligible for the FY 1984 section 427 funds.
App licable Law
As one of the conditions for the receipt of additional child welfare funds, section 427(a)(2)(B) requires that a state have implemented and be operating to the satisfaction of the Secretary--
A case review system (as defined in section 475(5)) for each child receiving foster care under the supervision of the State. . . .
Section 475(5) provides that--
The term "case review system" means a procedure for assuring that--
(A) each child has a case plan designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child,
(B) the status of each child is reviewed periodically but no less frequently than once every
21 ACYF asserted that if the Board were to reverse its
determination that the State was ineligible for the FY 1984 section 427 funds, it could continue the case record survey until it reached a point at which there was a sufficient number of cases to find the State either eligible or ineligible. The State took the position that if the Board accepted its argument that a certain class of children (those placed in relatives' homes which were not approved as meeting licensing standards) was improperly included in the survey, a new survey would have to be done using a new sample which excluded those children. In view of our conclusion that all of the 11 cases were properly failed, however, we need not reach this issue.

-3-
six months by either a court or by administrative review (as defined in paragraph (6)) in order to determine the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, the-extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to project a likely date by which the child may be returned to the home or placed for adoption or legal guardianship, and
(C) with respect to each such child, procedural safeguards will be applied, among other things, to assure each child in foster care under the supervision of the State of a dispositional hearing to be held, in a family or juvenile court or another court (including a tribal court) of competent jurisdiction, or by an administrative body appointed
or approved by the court, no later than eighteen
months after the original placement (and periodically thereafter during the continuation of foster care),
which hearing shall determine the future status of
the child (including, but not limited to, whether the child should be returned to the parent, should be continued in foster care for a specified period, should be placed for adoption, or should (because of the child's special needs or circumstances) be continued in foster care on a permanent or long-term basis); and procedural safeguards shall also be applied with respect to parental rights pertaining to the removal of the child from the home of his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to any determination affecting visitation privileges of parents.
Section 475(6) defines an "administrative review" to mean--
a review open to the participation of the parents of the child conducted by a panel of appropriate persons at least one of whom is not responsible for the case management of, or the delivery of services to, either the child or the parents who are the subject of the review.
These provisions were added by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Public Law 96-272, which amended the program of child welfare services under title IV-B of the Social Security Act and also established a new foster care maintenance program under title IV-E of the Act. These amendments had three major goals:

-4-

(1) prevention of unnecessary separation of a child from

its parents; (2) improved quality of care and services to

children and their families; and (3) permanency for foster

care children through reunification with parents or

_

through adoption or other permanency planning. See

45 Fed. Reg. 86818 (December 30, 1980).

The State's arguments

The State raised several different arguments concerning the 11 contested cases. The State argued that six failed cases (#1, 7, 13, 18, 26, and 28) involved children in relatives' homes who were not in "foster care" within the meaning of section 427 and, therefore, should not have been included in the case universe or the sample. This issue was considered particularly significant by the parties because it arises not only in FY 1984 but in succeeding years as well.

One of the cases raising this "relative" issue (#18) was originally failed because no case record could be located. The State argued that the proper procedure would have been either to pass the case or to substitute another case.

The State argued that four additional cases (#19, 27, 31 and 32), which failed on the ground that there was inadequate documentation of dispositional hearings, had hearings on Calendar 18/19 or Calendar 70/80 of the Cook County Juvenile Court which constituted dispositional hearings.

In one of the cases raising the "Calendar 18/19" issue (#27), the State contended that there was also a hearing (at which parental rights were terminated) which could be considered a timely dispositional hearing because it was scheduled before the due date although it was then continued to a later date. The State also argued that even if the later date was the relevant date, the hearing should not be considered untimely since it was only two days past the 30-day grace period which the Agency agreed was applicable.j,/

V Two of the cases mentioned above (#31 and #32) were also failed on the ground that there was no timely periodic review. In view of our conclusion, discussed below, that the dispositional hearing requirement was not met in these cases, we do not consider whether the periodic review requirement was met.

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The last contested case (*10) was failed on the ground that no dispositional hearing had been held since 1981. The State asserted that a, regulatory exception exempting children in adoptive placements from the dispositional hearing requirement applied in this case. The State also argued that prior year failings were outside the scope of the FY 1984 review.
The arguments noted here, as well as the State's general argument that the 90% compliance standard was not proper, are discussed below.
Whether children placed with relatives were in foster care
Section 427(a) of the Act requires that a state have "a case review system (as defined in section 475(5)) for each child receiving foster care under the supervision of the State . • • ." The term "foster care" is not further defined in the Act or in the Agency's implementing regulations. This led to a dispute with respect to the definition of foster care to be used in selecting the universe for the FY 1984 case review. The State took the position that the universe should consist of children in homes which were licensed by the State as foster family homes or approved by the State as meeting foster family home licensing standards. The State thus used as the definition of "foster care" the definition of the term "foster family home" set out in section 472(c) of title IV-E of the Act. The State asserted that under this definition it could exclude from the universe children in those relatives' homes which the State referred to as "approved only" homes since "approved only" homes were not approved as meeting foster family home licensing standards.
The Agency contended that all children placed with relatives were in foster care within the meaning of section 427, and required that they be included in the universe. Six cases (l, 7, 13, 18, 26, and 28) which the State contended involved children living in "approved
J A "foster family home" under State licensing regulations could provide child care only for unrelated children. Thus, relatives' homes could not be licensed as foster family homes although they could be approved as meeting the licensing standards for foster family homes.
There is no dispute that the universe properly included only children who had been in foster care, however defined, for at least six months during FY 1984.

-6-
only" relative homes failed the case record survey because they lacked timely periodic reviews or dispositional hearings. The State argued that the cases fell outside its definition of foster care and were thus improperly included in the universe.L/
We first note that this argument may not be material here. As discussed later, the State failed to establish, even when specifically given an opportunity to do so, that any of the children in question were in "approved only" homes. Since it is possible that the State could establish this as a matter of fact if given a further opportunity, however, we proceed to consider the legal issue which the State raised.
We find that, contrary to what the State alleged, "approved only" homes were approved as meeting licensing standards for foster family homes. Thus, children placed in "approved only" homes were in foster care, even under the definition of that term the State contended applied, and should have been afforded the section 427 protections. (Accordingly, we need not reach the question'whether the State's definition of foster care is correct.) We make this finding even if the policy adopted by the State after these homes were approved for placement can be read as providing that "approved only" homes were not approved as meeting foster family home licensing standards. As explained in detail below, these homes were approved as
.,/ It is difficult to assess the impact in this case of excluding "approved only" children from the ambit of section 427. In response to questions at the hearing, a State witness (formerly Chief of the Office of Rules and Procedures in the Division of Policy and Plans, DCFS) testified that she did not know the percentage of children under the supervision of the State who were placed with relatives in FY 1981 or 1984 or the percentage of children placed with relatives who were excluded (or would have been excluded) from the FY 1981 or 1984 sample. Transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 122. The witness made a "guesstimate" that 10% of children under the State's supervision were placed with relatives but the Agency suggested that this figure may have been as high as 25%. ^, p. 119. We find it highly unlikely that someone in the position occupied by the State's witness during the years in question would have so little command of these facts. The witness' evasive testimony thus leads us to infer that the exclusion of children in "approved only" homes may have substantially reduced the number of children considered by the State to be in foster care.

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meeting the licensing standards in effect until October 1981. When the licensing standards were changed, these homes were unable to meet the new standards but were regularly reapproved as meeting the earlier standards. Under these circumstances, the State was not justified in distinguishing between "approved only" homes and homes approved as meeting the new licensing standards for purposes of determining which children should have been afforded the section 427 protections.
In order to explain our determination on this issue, we set out here what the record shows about the situation as it existed prior to November 30, 1981. At that time, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) required that a caseworker fill out a one-page Relative Foster Care Approval Checklist (Form CFS 454) in order to determine whether a child could appropriately be placed in the home of a relative. State's appeal file, Ex. 42, Child Welfare Manual section 2.8.3. In Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, DAB No. 478 (1983), the State contended that, although the process used for approving homes of relatives was less formal than the process used for licensing other homes in which children were placed, the same standards were applied so that relatives' homes were properly considered as approved as meeting licensing standards (and thus as "foster family homes") for purposes of qualifying for foster care payments under section 408 of title IV-A of the Act providing for Aid to Families with Dependent Children - Foster Care (AFDC-FC).§,/ The Board concluded that the Checklist--which summarized the more detailed health and safety standards in the licensing regulation-was sufficient to remind the caseworkers of the standards that should apply and thus adequately documented that the licensing standards were applied and met. Accordingly, the Board reversed the disallowance of FFP claimed by the State for AFDC-FC payments for children in approved relatives' homes.
In October 1981, the State's licensing standards were revised. Letter from Engman to Ford dated November 18, 1988, attachments. Thereafter, effective December 1, 1981, DCFS adopted rules which provided as follows:
New Relative Caretaker. When a child for whom DCFS is legally responsible is placed with a relative caretaker after November 30, 1981 the relative home
/ The AFDC-FC program was subsequently transferred to the new title IV-E, which adopted the same definition of "foster family home" originally used in title IV-A.

-8-
must be evaluated to determine whether foster family home licensing standards are met within three (3) months after placement.
Relatives Ap proved Prior To November 30. 1981. Current relative caretaker homes must be approved as meeting foster family home licensing standards no later than one year from the last approval date (most recent CFS 454).
State's appeal file, Ex. 47, section 332.5. The DCFS rules further provided that relative homes approved prior to November 30, 1981 which were unable to meet licensing standards could be "grandfathered as approved only following determinations by Department staff that the health, safety and well-being of the related children are insured through continuation of the placement." State's appeal file, Ex. 46, section 332.5.21 These determinations were to be made using Form CFS 454, the same checklist utilized previously to approve all relatives' homes. State's appeal file, Ex. 47, section 332.4, 332.5. Thus, such homes, although not meeting current licensing standards, could continue to be approved as meeting the earlier licensing standards.
Nevertheless, the DCFS rules specifically stated that approval of the grandfathered homes was "not synonymous with `approval as meeting foster family home licensing standards" (Id., section 332.5), and that "(t)hese homes shall not be designated `approved as meeting licensing standards"section 332.4). The State took the position that this meant that children in "approved only" homes were not considered to be in foster care for purposes of section 427. There is nothing in the DCFS rules that expressly states that as the State's policy, however. The only basis for such an argument lies in the
J Exhibit 46 was a rule adopted by DCFS pursuant to authority in Section 1 et sea. of An Act Creating the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979, Ch. 23, Sec. 5001 et sea.). ee Ex. 46, p. 1, Authority Note. The DCFS rules were filed with the Illinois Secretary of State. ee transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 49. Exhibit 47 was part of the procedures adopted by DCFS to implement its own rules. S eSeg Ex. 47, p. 1, caption, and transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 50. Exhibit 7, cited below, was a DCFS rule. See transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 46.

-9-

fact that other DCFS rules required "administrative case

reviews" only for children "in foster family homes which

are licensed or approved as meeting licensing standards,

group homes, or child care institutions." State's appeal

file, Ex. 7, p. 4, section 305.6 a) 1). A State witness

indicated in testimony at the hearing that administrative

case reviews were designed to meet the requirements of

V section 427. Transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, pp. 46 -47,

58-59.

Thus, the DCFS rules could be read as not

requiring periodic reviews within the meaning of section

427 for children placed in "approved only" homes.

In our view, however, this does not conclusively establish that these children were not in foster care even as that term is defined by the State. The DCFS rules also provided that "the Department may elect to conduct administrative case reviews on other groups of children [than those in foster family homes which are licensed or approved as meeting licensing standards, group homes or child care institutions] as fiscal and staffing resources permit." State's appeal file, Ex. 7, p. 4. There is, moreover, no indication in the DCFS rules furnished for the record in this case that children in "approved only" homes were not required to be given dispositional hearings as called for by section 427. Furthermore, the fact, discussed later, that the State included children in "approved only" homes in the inventory required by section 427, and that the State did not rule out the possibility that federal foster care maintenance payments were claimed for these children also casts some doubt on the State's position. Thus, it appears that the distinction alleged by the State to exist for purposes of section 427 between children in "approved only" homes and other children placed with relatives may have been developed after-thefact in order to avoid the loss of section 427 funds, rather than intended at the time the DCFS rules were amended in 1981.

Even if the State's formal policy did not consider children in "approved only" homes to be in foster care, this is not dispositive. The Board has previously

Q/ The DCFS rules required only "regular six -month case reviews" for "all other children and families served by the Department." State's appeal file, Ex. 7, p. 4, section 305.6 a) 2). The same witness testified that these reviews were distinguishable from the administrative case reviews because they did not involve the independent third party required by section 427. Transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 47.

- 10 -
recognized that "some deference should be accorded to a state's interpretation of its own law and regulations, so long as that interpretation is reasonable and does npt conflict with federal program purposes." Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, supra, p. 11; see also Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DAB No. 414 (1982). It is not clear that the DCFS rules here rise to the level of the State's "own law or regulations," however, since their purpose was (at least in part) to implement the federal section 427 requirements. In any event, as explained below, we conclude that it was unreasonable for the State to provide that children in relatives' homes which were approved as meeting the earlier licensing standards were not in homes approved as meeting licensing standards for purposes of section 427.
As indicated above, DCFS policy before FY 1982 in effect required relatives' homes to meet foster family home licensing standards. This policy did not change in FY 1982; only the licensing standards changed. DCFS rules provided for a:transition between the old and new licensing standards so that a child did not have to be removed from a relative's home which could not comply with some of the new licensing standards which were not critical to assure the child's health, safety, and wellbeing. Although a separate procedure for. the continuing approval of such homes was apparently justified, we see no basis for distinguishing between such homes and homes approved as meeting the new licensing standards for purposes of section 427. The preamble to the final regulations implementing section 427 indicates that a placement which in fact provides foster care and is licensed or approved under some provision of state law may be considered a foster family home even if it is not called that by the state. 48 Fed. Reg. 23104, 23105 (May 23, 1983). Moreover, an underlying purpose of section 427 was to encourage states to take steps to ensure that children do not remain adrift in the foster care system. Id. at 23104. The record is devoid of evidence that children in relatives' homes whose status differed from that of other children in this type of placement only because the licensing standards had been updated were any less in need of the section 427 protections.
It is also significant that the State included children in "approved only" homes in the inventory required by section 427(a)(1). That section requires "an inventory of all children who have been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for a period of six months preceding the inventory. . . ." If the State considered children in "approved only" homes to be in foster care for

- 11 -

purposes of the inventory, their exclusion from the section 427(a) case reviews becomes suspect. The State argued that it was permitted to include children in addition to those in foster care in the inventory, and that the children in "approved only" homes were such additional children. It cited in support of its position 45 C.F.R. 1357.25 (1983), which states that "the inventory must include those children under the placement and care responsibility of the State title IV-B or IV-E agencies. At the State's discretion, other children may be included." The State provided no evidence, however, that it included children in "approved only" homes in the inventory because they were considered "other children" rather than because they were considered to be in foster care.

Our conclusion that the six children in question here were

properly included in the universe sampled can also be

supported on the ground that the State never established

that the children were in fact in "approved only" homes.

The State said that it determined that the six children

were in "approved only" homes "based upon its review of

its computer files." Letter from Engman to Ford dated

November 18, 1988, p. 1. The State did not identify the

nature of these files, although it did indicate elsewhere

that State records had different care codes for children

in homes approved as meeting licensing standards and

children in "approved only" homes.

Attachment, p. 2.

The Agency took the position that it was unwilling to rely

on "case coding or statements made by State staff," but

would require "documentation in the provider record" to

establish that the child was placed in an "approved only"

home. Agency's Reply to State's Responses to Questions

Posed by the Board at Closing Argument, p. 1. The State

declined to provide documentation from the provider

records, contending that it would be too burdensome.

We do not agree with the Agency that the only adequate
documentation of the status of the children in question
would be provider records ./ However, we agree with the Agency that the State's general statement regarding its review of its computer files is not adequate proof of the critical fact that each of the six children was in an "approved only" home. Since the State did not establish

V It is possible that a child's individual case record
might contain information which would show that the child was in an "approved only" home. However, the State failed to provide any portion of the case record for any of the six children.

- 12 -
that the children in cases #1, *7, #13, #18, #26, and #28 were in "approved only" homes, the record contains no factual predicate for the State's legal argument that children in "approved only" homes were not in foster care.jV
Accordingly, we sustain the Agency's findings that cases #1, 7, 13, 18, 26 and 28 were out of compliance.
Whether case #18 was properly failed because the case file could not be located durin g the case record survey
The Agency failed case #18 because the State was unable to locate the child's individual case file during the case record survey. The State contended that it was "arbitrary in the extreme to fail a case for inability to find the file, especially when the case was closed during the year being audited. . . [and) was more likely than not to have met the review criteria." State's brief dated December 16, 1987, p. 53. The State asserted that the procedure used in the FY 1981 case record survey was either to pass a case for which the file was missing or to replace the case with the next available case from the oversample, which consisted of cases drawn from the universe in excess of the maximum number required for a sample. The Agency confirmed that for FY 1981 it did not
QJ We also note that the State failed to prove that no claims had been made under title IV-E for foster care maintenance payments for the children in question. If there were any such claims, this would also undermine the State's position that the children were not in foster care, since children must be in homes which are licensed as foster family homes or approved as meeting foster family home licensing standards in order to receive foster care maintenance payments. Although the State asserted that there had been no such claims, it stated that its assertion was "based upon the knowledge of DCFS personnel," and that it would be too burdensome to verify the response by documentary evidence. Letter from Engman to Ford dated November 18, 1988, p. 2. Moreover, the State's assertion is questionable since the State's practice during the period in question in DAB No. 478 was to claim foster care maintenance payments for children in relatives' homes approved pursuant to the Checklist and the State pointed to no provision of its rules or policies which would have changed this practice.

- 13 -
fail cases where the case file was missing. Transcript of 7/19/88 hearing, pp. 348-349.x,/
During the course of the appeal, the State located information about case #18 which it contended established that the section 427 protections had been met. Neither the State nor the Agency indicated that this information could not have been considered in lieu of a case file during the case record survey. As we explain below, the information submitted shows that the section 427 requirements were not met in this case; thus, the question whether the Agency's treatment of the missing case file was proper has been rendered moot../
The State submitted a computer print-out which showed that the child was first placed in State care, in the home of a relative, on 11/16/83, that a "6 month review" was held 5/9/84, and that the child was released from State guardianship to the relative's home by court order on 7/9/84. State's appeal file, Ex. 40. The State argued that a timely "administrative review" was held, that no dispositional hearing was required, and that in any event the child was not required to be afforded the section 427 protections because of her placement in a relative's home. State's reply brief, p. 27. These arguments do not avail the State. As discussed previously, we reject the State's position that children placed with relatives in "approved only" homes were not subject to the requirements of section 427. Moreover, while it is clear that no dispositional hearing was required since the child was in foster care less than eight months, the evidence shows that the requirement for a periodic review,: which was applicable, was not satisfied. The computer print-out specifically indicates that the review held was a "6 month review"; however, as noted previously, the State distinguished between six month reviews and administrative reviews, acknowledging that only administrative reviews satisfied the requirements of section 427.
jJ However, there is no information in the record for
this case, nor did the State contend, that the Agency's treatment of missing cases was not same for all states' triennial reviews
/ We note, in any event, that the State did not allege that it was prejudiced by any Agency change in the treatment of missing files. To show this, the State would have to establish that it would have passed the case record survey if case #18 had been deemed in compliance or if another case had been substituted for case *18.

- 14 -

Since there is no reason to conclude that information that might have been contained in the actual case file would disprove our conclusion that the section 427 requirements were not met, we sustain the Agency's finding that case #18 was out of compliance.

Whether "Calendar 18/19" and "Calendar 70/80" hearings constituted dispositional hearings

ACYF found four cases (*19, 27, 31, and 32) unacceptable on the ground that the information provided by the State was not sufficient to document that dispositional hearings were held. The State contended that the dispositional hearing requirement was satisfied in all but case #32 (discussed later) by the conduct of a hearing on "Calendar 18/19" of the Cook County Juvenile Court. The State took the position that it was not necessary to document what happened at the hearing in each case because the Calendar 18/19 hearings generally satisfied the section 427 requirements for a dispositional hearing.

According to the State, a hearing on Calendar 18/19

consisted of a meeting or conference between the Guardian

ad Litem (G.A.L.) and a DCFS liaison. The child's

caseworker was instructed to file a written report three

days prior to the hearing date, but was directed not to

appear at the hearing or to tell either the child or the

child's parents to appear. The DCFS liaison would present

the caseworker's report, which dealt with the child's

permanency goal and: objectives and the child's progress

toward achieving those, to the G.A.L. If the G.A.L. was

satisfied with the progress being made, he would recommend

that the child remain in his or her current foster care

placement. The court would then enter an order based on

the G.A.L.'s dispositional recommendation. If the G.A.L.

determined that a change in the child's status was

required, he would refer the case to another calendar for

further proceedings. State's appeal file, Ex. 29, p. 5;

Transcript of 2/18/88 hearing, pp. 172-174, 185.

In

the three cases in question, the G.A.L. determined that

the child's status should remain the same until the date

set for the next Calendar 18/19 hearing. Neither the

child nor the child's parents attended the hearing in any

of these cases. State's appeal file, Ex. 32, Attachment

*2.

I/

The transcript contains two pages numbered "185."

We refer here to both pages.

- 15 -
The State did not establish that the Calendar 18/19 hearings met the requirements for a dispositional hearing in these three cases. Section 475(5)(C) requires that"procedural safeguards will be applied . .--. to assure each child in foster care under the supervision of the State of a dispositional hearing . ... ." An opportunity for parental participation should clearly be considered a procedural safeguard in a proceeding at which their child's future is at stake. Moreover, in PI 82-06, a program instruction dated June 3, 1982 which was sent to the states, ACYF stated that section 475(5)(C) "requires that a hearing be held with the concomitant due process safeguards that apply to court proceedings." State's appeal file, Ex. 3, p. 9. A due process safeguard applicable to any court proceeding is notice and an opportunity to be heard for interested parties. A child's parents whose rights have not been terminated are interested parties to a dispositional hearing since, in the parents' absence, the full range of possible dispositions specified in section 475(5)(C)--notably return to the parent and placement for adoption--could not be explored adequately. Thus, Calendar 18/19 hearings do not qualify as dispositional hearings where parents who are interested parties are not afforded an opportunity to participate 4•4J
The State also asserted that the Act gives procedural rights, such as the right to notice of a hearing, to parents only if certain issues not involved here are raised. The statutory provision on which the State relied, section 475(5)(C), provides that--
1J It appears from the court's instructions that parents
would be notified of the hearing if the caseworker believed their presence was required and obtained the permission of the DCFS liaison. State's appeal file, Ex. 29, p. 5. If notice was given but the parents failed to appear, then arguably the dispositional hearing requirement was met. However, there is no evidence that any attempt was made to notify the parents in any of the
three cases in question here of the hearings.
We need not decide here whether the parents' right to be heard could be satisfied other than by an opportunity to participate directly in the dispositional hearing (such as by the incorporation of their oral or written comments in the caseworker's report to the G.A.L.), since there is no evidence of any such provision for parental participation.

— 16 —
procedural safeguards shall also be applied with respect to parental rights pertaining to the removal of the child from the home of his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to any determination affecting visitation privileges of parents.
We see no basis, however, for the State's view that this provision makes an opportunity for parental participation in dispositional hearings unnecessary. Notice to the parents is required under this provision in a variety of situations, including dispositional hearings which will result in a change in the child's placement. There is nothing in this provision which undercuts our interpretation of the earlier reference in section 475(5)(C) to procedural safeguards as requiring that parents be notified of a dispositional hearing.
The State also asserted that the parents' presence was not required since -cases were placed on Calendar 18/19 only in
those instances where parents were "inactive," i.e.,
neither "working with the DCFS [n)or opposing DCFS's plan. . . ," or had not been located. Transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 171. If the State had established that the parents in the three cases in question here could not be located or that their rights had been terminated, then arguably the Calendar 18/19 hearings could qualify as dispositional hearings. (See note 14.) The State did not provide any evidence to this effect, however. Accordingly, we assume that the cases were placed on Calendar 18/19 because the parents were "inactive" rather than missing. Simply because a child's current plan did not require the parents' involvement does not mean that the G.A.L. should not have considered the possibility of other dispositions requiring their involvement, however. The State's argument makes clear that the scope of the Calendar 18/19 hearings was a very narrow one--to review the progress being made towards goals established in the child's current case plan. The purpose of a dispositional hearing, however, is to provide a forum in which it can be determined whether the child's current case plan or some other case plan is appropriate. In the parents' absence, a meaningful consideration of dispositions other than continuing the child in the current foster care placement was not possible./
S/ The limited nature of the Calendar 18/19 hearings is also evident from the fact that the G.A.L. had to transfer a case to another calendar not under his supervision if he
(continued...)

- 17 -

The State further contended that a "Calendar 70/80"

hearing constituted a dispositional hearing in case #32.

Calendar 70/80 was described by the State as a

•-

"guardianship calendar" for cases which did not have a

pending court date for any matter of status or evidence to

be heard. Transcript of 7/18/88 hearing, p. 170. Based

on the case record survey, the Agency found that the

documentation made available for case #32 was deficient on

the ground that there was no indication "of who was

present at the hearing and what disposition was ordered."

State's appeal file, Ex. 31. The State subsequently

provided a document signed by the judge who presided over

Calendar 70/80 showing that a Calendar 70/80 hearing at

which the G.A.L., a DCFS liaison, and a probation officer

were present was held in this case on two occasions in FY

1984. This evidence does not justify reversing the

Agency's findings, however. The disposition made at each

hearing was described as follows:

Supplemental Petition Reviewed; Return to Guardianship Calendar (i.e. child remains under guardianship and in placement with DCFS)

State's appeal file, Ex. 32, Attachment #1. This fails to specify the period of time for which the child should be continued in foster care as required by section 475(5)(C).

Accordingly, we sustain the Agency's findings that cases #19, 27, 31, and 32 were out of compliance.

The State also argued, however, that the Agency had articulated increasingly strict standards with respect to the level of documentation necessary to show that the dispositional hearing requirement had been met. The State asserted that the Agency's failure to accept the documentation which it provided in response to the

•^,5,/ (...continued) believed a change in the child's status was required. Thus, even if the parents were present, the G.A.L. could not effect a complete disposition of the case unless he found that a continuation of the current foster care placement was appropriate.
The Agency raised additional questions about Calendar 18/19 hearings which we need not address here in view of our conclusion that the specific Calendar 18/19 hearings at issue here were inadequate as dispositional hearings because of lack of notice to the parents.

- is -
Agency's requests was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, since not until recently did the Agency require documentation showing that a hearing included a consideration of all matters specified in section 475(5)(C). According to the State, when the 1984 case record survey was being conducted, "Agency personnel appeared to determine compliance with hearing requirements solely upon the basis of whether an event occurred by a certain due date." State's reply brief dated 5/16/88, p. 21. However, the State could not reasonably conclude that the dispositional hearing requirement was satisfied in
every instance where some form of hearing was held by the
due date. Otherwise, the State could label any hearing which involved the child as a dispositional hearing when such hearings could obviously serve different purposes. See Vir g inia Dept. of Social Services, DAB No. 596 (1984); Delaware Dept. of Services for Children. Youth and Their Families, DAB No. 699 (1985). Moreover, while the Agency indicated at various times that different forms of documentation were acceptable, it was implicit that the documentation would be acceptable only if it demonstrated that a dispositional hearing was held.
Accordingly, since none of the documentation provided by the State showed that hearings were held which qualified as dispositional hearings under the statute, there is no basis for reversing the Agency's findings in these cases.
Whether a dispositional hearing in case #27 which was scheduled to take place before the due date but was continued by the court until after the due date was timely
The State took the position that even if Calendar 18/19 hearings in case #27 were not properly considered dispositional hearings, there was a court hearing (before a judge) which constituted a timely dispositional hearing. According to the State, a dispositional hearing was due in this case by 3/5/84.) The court "half sheet" for this child shows that a hearing to terminate parental rights
IV The Agency asserted that there was no evidence of a dispositional hearing on 3/5/82, which would make the next hearing due on 3/5/84 under the State's then applicable requirement for a dispositional hearing every two years following the initial dispositional hearing. We need not resolve this matter, however, since as discussed below, we do not accept the State's argument which is premised on the existence of such a hearing.

- 19 -
(TPR hearing) was scheduled for 1/27/84.x/ State's appeal file, Ex. 28, p. 1. The "half sheet" entry for this date indicates that the TPR hearing was continued until 4/6/84. The reason for the continuance is unclear from the half sheet;IV however, the State asserted that "(t)he parents apparently did not appear on . . . (1/27/84], and the matter was continued to April 6, 1984." State's brief dated 12/16/87, p. 52. A hearing was held
on 4/6/84 at which parental rights were terminated. The
State argued that since the hearing was scheduled for 1/27/84, that should be considered the date of the dispositional hearing for purposes of section 427. The State argued in the alternative that the hearing on 4/6/84 should be considered a timely dispositional hearing since it was held only two days after the due date, taking into account the 30-day grace period which the Agency agreed was applicable.
We conclude that the 4/6/84 hearing was untimely. The Board has consistently upheld the Agency's view that the granting of a. grace period lies within the Agency's discretion but does not alter the basic statutory requirements and does not authorize a state to grant itself a further extension of time. ee Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DAB No. 643 (1985). The State did not offer any reason why this case should be treated differently.
We cannot find, moreover, that a dispositional hearing was held on 1/27/84. In a decision issued in another case after briefing in this case was completed, the Board found that ACYF had a policy which permitted it to'accept a dispositional hearing as timely as long as one was scheduled for a date which was timely, even if the hearing was continued until a later date. Idaho De pt. of Health and Welfare, DAB No. 1011 (1989). However, we conclude that it was not reasonable to apply this policy under the circumstances present here. The policy is appropriately applied where it would be unfair to a state not to find the dispositional hearing requirement met. It does not excuse states from doing all that they reasonably can to assure that a timely dispositional hearing is held in each case.
The State said that a hearing was scheduled for 1/28/84; however, the date on the court "half sheet" is clearly 1/27/84.
J The "half sheet" uses abbreviations not explained by the State.

- 20 -
Here, the State did not establish that the hearing was continued for any reason other than the convenience of the State. The State alleged that "[t]he State on at least two occasions set hearings well in advance of the March 5,
1984 due date but had to continue them because of
inability to effect service of notice on the parents." State's brief dated 12/16/87, p. 53. However, it is not clear that this was the reason for the continuance granted on 1/27/84 since the State stated specifically with respect to the 1/27/84 hearing not that the parents were not served, but merely that the parents did not appear. Moreover, the State also stated that on December 22, 1983, "the court directed issuance of an alias summons to the
parents for a January 28, 1984 hearing." j., p. 52. An
alias summons is issued to cure a defect in form or manner of service of a prior summons. Black's Law Dictionary 66 (5th ed. 1979). There is no reason to believe that the alias summons was not successfully served, and the record shows no reason why the hearing could not have proceeded despite the parents' absence. Thus, it appears that the hearing was continued merely for the convenience of the State.
Moreover, the State did not offer any reason why the hearing could not have been rescheduled for a date on or before 3/5/84, the due date for the dispositional hearing. The court's failure to set an earlier hearing date because its calendar was too crowded would not be a legitimate reason. As the Board observed in Arkansas Dept. of Human Se rv ices, DAB No. 553 (1984)--
It is implicit in Section 427 that states must provide the resources necessary to implement the required safeguards and insure that courts understand their role in implementing these safeguards. To recognize a court's lack of resources or diligence as an excuse for non-compliance would defeat the purpose of the statute.
Arkansas, p. 8.
Finally, we note that the facts in this case are unlike the situation presented in Idaho, where proceedings were actually commenced before the due date but were continued.
Accordingly, we sustain the Agency's finding that case $27
was out of compliance.

- 21 -
case #10
The Agency failed case #10 on the ground that the only dispositional hearing in this case was held on January 22, 1981. Although a dispositional hearing was due prior to FY 1984 (the fiscal year under review), the Agency stated that it would have passed this case if a dispositional hearing had been held by October 1, 1983 (the first day of FY 1984). The State took the position that the child was exempt from the requirement for dispositional hearings because the child was in an adoptive placement when the dispositional hearing was due. Section 1356.21(e) of 45 C.F.R. (1983) provides that dispositional hearings are not required for children in adoptive placements pending finalization of the adoption. The preamble to this regulation described the elements of an adoptive placement, stating that "[t]o the extent that this child is free for adoption, placed in an approved home for the purpose of adoption and the child's case plan goal is adoption, a subsequent dispositional hearing is not required . . . ." 48 Fed. Reg. 23104, 23109 (May 23, 1983).
The State asserted that the child was in an adoptive placement from November 1982 until May 1983. The Agency agreed that if the child was in an adoptive placement during that time, the case should have passed since the child was not required to have a dispositional hearing until 18 months after the end of the adoptive placement, which fell after the end of FY 1984.9/ The Agency, however, took the position that the child was not in an adoptive placement during the period in question.
The State cited in support of its position that the child was in an adoptive placement in November 1982 a "Client Service Plan" dated 11/17/82, which stated that the family with whom the child was living "plans to adopt." State's appeal file, Ex. 26H, p. 2. It also pointed to a "Report of Child's Progress" of the same date which stated that "[i)f or when parental rights a: re terminated, the . . . [foster parents] plan to pursue adoption." Id., p. 4. The child's mother had signed a document on 8/13/81 surrendering the child in order to permit adoption, and the father had died on 3/28/82, although apparently no
IV We need not decide whether the parties are correct
that the due date was extended to eighteen months after the end of the adoptive placement since we conclude that the child was not in an adoptive placement.

- 22 -
action could be taken to terminate parental rights until the death certificate for the father was obtained in December 1982. State's appeal file, Ex. 26E and Ex. 26H,
pp. 2, 23. The State argued that the child remained in an
adoptive placement until May 1983 when both the "Client Service Plan" and "Report of Child's Progress" indicated that the adoption unit had decided to seek to place the child elsewhere for adoption. The State acknowledged that the records did not show precisely when the decision not to pursue adoption by the family with whom the child was currently living was made. It asserted, however, that the child should be considered to have been in an adoptive placement until the decision was documented in the child's case record in May 1983.
The Agency took the position that the child was not in an adoptive placement during the period in question. It asserted that parental rights were not terminated so that the child was not free for adoption. The Agency also argued that there was never any commitment made by the foster family to adopt the child, as evidenced by the submission of a petition for adoption or the signing of an adoption assistance agreement, bmt that the foster family had merely discussed the matter. The Agency also pointed to the lack of an approved home study for the adoptive parents as evidence that the child was not in an adoptive placement, noting the preamble language requiring that the child be "placed in an approved home for the purpose of adoption."
We agree with the Agency that the child was not in an adoptive placement. Far from supporting the State's position that the child was in an adoptive placement, the child's case record clearly shows that DCFS never considered the placement to be an adoptive placement. The 11/17/82 "Client Service Plan" for the child indicates that, as of 5/26/82, the objective in the case was "to secure an adoptive placement." State's appeal file, Ex. 26H, p. 3. The "Report of Child's Progress" dated 5/12/83 statgs, however, that "jaldoptive placement was not achieved due to the Adoption Unit's decision to place outside of the area." State's appeal file, Ex. 26H, p. 25. (Emphasis added.) In contrast, when the child was subsequently placed with another family, the placement was referred to as an "adoptive placement," with the next step being "legal adoption." State's appeal file, Ex. 26H, p. 1. -Since the State agency responsible for administering the foster care program and implementing the requirements of section 427 did not itself regard this placement as an adoptive placement, the State's arguments to the contrary here can be given little weight.

- 23 -
Even if DCFS had not clearly found that adoptive placement was not achieved during the period of November 1982 through May 1983, we would not be persuaded that the child was in an adoptive placement. While the foster family had indicated that it planned to adopt the child when parental rights were terminated, the record does not clearly show that the foster family still wanted to adopt the child once the child was actually free for adoption. The foster family's plans to adopt made prior to the termination of parental rights may have been tentative since adoption was not possible at that point. Thus, although something short of a petition for adoption or adoption assistance agreement may have been sufficient evidence of a commitment to adopt, there was no evidence here which is sufficient.
The State also argued that the lack of a dispositional hearing due in a prior year was not a basis for failing the case in FY 1984. A similar argument was raised in Connecticut Dept. of Children and Youth Services, DAB No. 952 (1988). There, the Agency failed cases for which there was no hearing within the 18 months plus 30 days preceding FY 1985, the year under review. The Board concluded that it was proper for the Agency to look at whether a hearing was held in prior fiscal years since it was "not possible to determine whether a hearing was due in FY 1985, and if so when, without knowing when the last hearing was held." Connecticut, p. 15. The Board further stated that--
[i)f each year were evaluated without regard to past performance, . . . a dispositional hearing might never be held. . . . This not only violates the specific requirements of the Act with respect to the timing of . . . dispositional hearings, but also frustrates congressional intent to prevent foster care "drift." Thus, although funds are separately appropriated for each fiscal year, the section 427 protections cannot be implemented if each fiscal year is viewed separately in evaluating a state's performance.
, p. 16. The State offered no reason why the Board should reach a different result in the present appeal.
QQ/. We do not here reach the question, raised by the Agency, whether an adoptive placement could exist in the absence of an approved home study.

- 24 -
Accordingly, we conclude that the Agency properly failed case #10 on the ground that no dispositional hearing was held by the first day of the fiscal year under review.
Whether the use of a 901 compliance standard was arbitrary capricious, and an abuse of discretion
Fiscal year 1984 was the fourth consecutive year that the State received section 427 funds, and the second year that the State's compliance with the section 427 requirements was reviewed. The compliance standard applied to the FY 1981 review was 66%. Since that review found that the State complied with the section 427 requirements in more than 80% of the cases in the universe--the standard applied by the Agency in second-year reviews--the Agency agreed not to conduct a FY 1982 review. For the FY 1984 review, the Agency applied the 90% standard applicable to triennial reviews (reviews which the Agency stated it would perform after two unreviewed years). The 90% standard was officially announced by ACYF in PI 85-2, dated January 29, 1985, which was after the fiscal year in question (FY 1984) but before the review for that year was conducted.
The State contended that the application of a 90% standard to the FY 1984 case record survey was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because the standard was a substantive rule promulgated without notice and comment rulemaking as required by section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and because the 90% standard was applied retroactively. As the State noted, however, the Board considered and rejected the same arguments regarding the 90% standard in Connecticut Dept. of Children and Youth Services, DAB No. 952 (1988). The Board, relying in part on Kin g v. Lynch, 550 F. Supp. 325 (D. Mass. 1982), found that--
the 90% compliance standard did not change the statutory requirements; it was merely the level of compliance which the Secretary decided as an administrative matter to enforce in triennial reviews. .Footnote omitted.) The 90% standard was therefore .tot a rule for which notice and comment rulemaking was required. . . .
Connecticut, p. 8. The State made no showing here that this conclusion was wrong as a matter of law. The Board also found in Connecticut that retroactive application of the * 90% standard was not prejudicial to Connecticut, stating--

- 25 -
To argue that the State was harmed by the lack of notice would be to admit that the State never intended to fully comply with the statutory requirements, but had aimed instead for the 80% level of compliance required in the prior review. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the certificatibn submitted by the State . . . that it met the requirements of section 427.
Id., pp. 8-9. The State argued here that this "ignores the realities" because Illinois passed the FY 1981 case record survey with a compliance rate well over 80%. State's reply brief dated 5/16/88, P . 29. The fact remains, however, that the existence of any compliance rate less than 100% for purposes of the section 427 case record survey should not have affected the State's efforts to comply fully with the statute. Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Connecticut that the application of a 90% compliance standard for triennial reviews was proper.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain ACYF's determination that the State was ineligible for FY 1984 section 427 funds.
udith A. Ballard
Alexander G. re tz
Cecilia Spar Ford Presiding Board Member

 
 Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 1 of 10
SuppressAnsRpt, TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.2.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:89−cv−01624

Fields, et al v. McDonald Assigned to: Honorable William T. Hart Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Jacqueline Fields
Plaintiff James Norman

Date Filed: 03/01/1989 Date Terminated: 03/28/1991 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Diane L. Redleaf Family Defense Center 725 S. Wells St., #702 Chicago , IL 60607 (312) 356−3202 Fax: 356−3203 Email: dredleaf@redleaflawyer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joan Matlack Illinois Attorney General's Office (100 W) 100 West Randolph Street Chicago , IL 60601 (312) 793−2394 Email: jmatlack@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurene Marie Heybach The Law Project of the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless 1325 South Wabash Avenue Suite 205 Chicago , IL 60605
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Gail Wishnick Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. 20 East Jackson Boulevard Suite 1600 Chicago , IL 60604 (312) 427−7330
represented by Diane L. Redleaf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joan Matlack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurene Marie Heybach (See above for address)
Susan Gail Wishnick (See above for address)

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 2 of 10

Plaintiff
Paulette Patterson on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated

represented by Diane L. Redleaf (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joan Matlack (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurene Marie Heybach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/1996
Susan Gail Wishnick (See above for address)

V. Defendant Gordon Johnson TERMINATED: 07/26/1990
Defendant Jess McDonald

represented by Bart Thomas Murphy Ice Miller LLP 2300 Cabot Drive Suite 455 Lisle , IL 60532 (630)955−6392 Email: bart.murphy@icemiller.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Getzendanner Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &Flom 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicago , IL 60606 (312) 407−0700 TERMINATED: 03/20/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Barbara Lynn Greenspan Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street Suite 4−600 Chicago , IL 60601 (312)814−7087 Email: barbara.greenspan@illinois.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles F. Smith , Jr. Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom, LLP CH 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicago , IL 60606 (312) 407−0700 Email: cfsmith@skadden.com TERMINATED: 03/20/1997

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 3 of 10

Defendant
Sue Suter Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services TERMINATED: 04/11/1996

Christina M. Tchen Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &Flom, LLP CH 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicago , IL 60606 (312) 407−0700 Fax: (312) 407−0411 Email: ttchen@skadden.com TERMINATED: 03/20/1997
Danielle Jenkins Steimel Office of the Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago , IL 60601 (312) 814−7087 Email: dsteimel@idcfs.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberley K. Baer Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &Flom 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicago , IL 60606 (312) 407−0700 TERMINATED: 03/20/1997
Nancy S. Eisenhauer Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &Flom 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicago , IL 60606 (312) 407−0700 TERMINATED: 03/20/1997
represented by Bart Thomas Murphy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan Getzendanner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/1996 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles F. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/1996
Christina M. Tchen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/1996
Kimberley K. Baer (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/11/1996

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 4 of 10

10/10/1990 10/30/1990 11/15/1990 11/30/1990 11/30/1990 11/30/1990 11/30/1990 12/17/1990 01/03/1991 01/11/1991 01/18/1991
01/22/1991 01/22/1991
01/25/1991 01/25/1991
01/28/1991

151 MINUTE ORDER of 10/10/90 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held and continued to 30 Oct. 90 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (amb) (Entered: 10/17/1990)
152 MINUTE ORDER of 10/30/90 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held; continued to 15 Nov 90 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 11/01/1990)
153 MINUTE ORDER of 11/15/90 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held; continued to 30 Nov 90 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 11/16/1990)
154 MINUTE ORDER of 11/30/90 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held; continued to 17 Dec 90 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 11/30/1990)
155 AFFIDAVIT of Donald D. Schwartz for garnishment; nonwage with interrogatories (fce) (Entered: 11/30/1990)
GARNISHMENT SUMMONS nonwage and one copy with three copies of the affidavit and interrogatories as to St. Charles Savings &Loan Association (fce) (Entered: 11/30/1990)
CITATION to Discover Assets Issued as to Erik Haldorsen (fce) (Entered: 11/30/1990)
156 MINUTE ORDER of 12/17/90 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held; continued to 01/03/91 at 1:45 p.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 12/18/1990)
157 MINUTE ORDER of 1/3/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held; continued to 01/11/91 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 01/04/1991)
158 MINUTE ORDER of 1/11/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held; continued to 01/18/91 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 01/15/1991)
159 MINUTE ORDER of 1/18/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Defendant's oral motion for leave to file additional appearance of attorney Sue Suter by Tuesday, January 22, 1991. Status hearing held; continued to 01/25/91 at 9:15 a.m. Notice not mailed. (fce) (Entered: 01/22/1991)
160 ORDER (fce) (Entered: 01/24/1991)
161 MINUTE ORDER of 1/22/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Enter order that Sue Suter be substituted as the defendant in this action in place of Jess McDonald and that the caption in this case so reflect. The court's January 18, 1991 minute order granting defendant leave to file additional appearance of counsel Sue Suter is stricken. (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order form.) Notice mailed 01/24/91. (fce) (Entered: 01/24/1991)
162 JOINT MOTION for entry of agreed order of preliminary approval of consent decree class notice and setting of fairness hearing order (exhibits). ; notice of motion. (dmkf) (Entered: 01/28/1991)
163 MINUTE ORDER of 1/25/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held. Preliminary approval of consent decree is granted. Fairness hearing set for March 28, 1991 at 2:00p.m. Parties to file before the fainess hearing declaration(s) which explain how notice was given. [62−1] Notice mailed. (dmkf) (Entered: 01/28/1991)
164 AGREED ORDER regarding settlement. (dmkf) (Entered: 02/01/1991)

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 5 of 10

01/28/1991
02/28/1991 02/28/1991
03/06/1991
03/25/1991 03/25/1991 03/28/1991 03/28/1991 03/28/1991
04/03/1991 04/08/1991 04/08/1991 04/17/1991

165 MINUTE ORDER of 1/28/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Enter agreed order on plaintiffs' and defendant's joint motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) for entry of certain agreed upon relief, for preliminary approval of settlement, for approval of the method of giving notice, and for setting of a deadline for comments and date for fairness hearing. (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order form.) Notice distributed by judge's staff. (dmkf) (Entered: 02/01/1991)
166 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning plaintiffs' motion for class certification. (fce) (Entered: 03/01/1991)
167 MINUTE ORDER of 2/28/91 before Magistrate Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Magistrate Judge Gottschall's report and recommendation to Judge Hart. All matters relating to referral of above entitled cause having been resolved, this cause is returned to Judge Hart for further proceedings. (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order form.) terminating case referral Notice mailed 03/01/91. (fce) (Entered: 03/01/1991)
168 MINUTE ORDER of 3/6/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : By 03/21/91, parties shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for fairness hearing. Parties may also submit joint or separate supporting briefs. This court previously withdrew the motion for class certification from the magistrate. Therefore, the magistrate's recent report and recommendation on that motion will not be acted upon. Notice mailed. (fce) (Entered: 03/08/1991)
169 AGREED EMERGENCY MOTION by defendant Sue Suter to extend time for fairness hearing ; notice of motion. (dmkf) (Entered: 03/27/1991)
170 MINUTE ORDER of 3/25/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Defendant's agreed emergency motion to extend the fairness hearing date is entered and continued to March 28, 1991 at 2:00p.m. re [169−1] Notice not mailed. (dmkf) (Entered: 03/27/1991)
171 CONSENT ORDER (dmkf) (Entered: 03/29/1991)
172 ORDER APPROVING CONSENT ORDER (dmkf) (Entered: 03/29/1991)
173 MINUTE ORDER of 3/28/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Judgment is entered as follows: Enter order approving consent order. Enter consent order. Parties to submit nomination for monitor by April 8, 1991 to the court. (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order form.) terminating case Notice mailed. (dmkf) (Entered: 03/29/1991)
174 JOINT RECOMMENDATION to the Court for court−appointed monitor; (exhibit); notice of filing by defendant (dmkf) (Entered: 04/04/1991)
175 ORDER of reference to court−appointed monitor (dmkf) (Entered: 04/10/1991)
176 MINUTE ORDER of 4/8/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Judgment is entered as follows: Enter order of reference to court−appointed monitor. (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order form.) Notice mailed. (dmkf) (Entered: 04/10/1991)
177 COPY OF ORDER from the USCA for the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals dated 04/12/91...It is ordered that the motion is granted and this appeal is dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). (dmkf) (Entered: 04/18/1991)

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 6 of 10

04/23/1991 04/23/1991 05/03/1991 05/03/1991 05/21/1991 05/30/1991 06/05/1991 06/27/1991 06/27/1991 06/27/1991
02/20/1992 03/02/1992 03/02/1992
10/01/1992 11/04/1992 11/06/1992

178 CERTIFIED copy of Order from the USCA for the 7th Circuit Court...It is ordered that the motion is granted and this appeal is dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). (dmkf) (Entered: 04/25/1991)
179 FILED 04/23/91: Letter from the USA for the 7th Circuit Court returning the complete record on appeal, consisting of: 8 volumes of pleadings; 1 Loose pleadings; 7 volumes of transcripts; 1 volume of exhibits. (dmkf) Modified on 04/25/1991 (Entered: 04/25/1991)
180 MOTION by plaintiffs for an award of attorney fees and costs (attachments) ; notice of motion. (dmkf) (Entered: 05/07/1991)
181 MINUTE ORDER of 5/3/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : re [180−1] Plaintiff's motion for award of attorney fees and cost is entered and continued. Status hearing set for 05/21/91 at 9:15a.m. Notice not mailed. (dmkf) (Entered: 05/07/1991)
182 MINUTE ORDER of 5/21/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing held and continued to 06/04/91 at 9:15a.m. Notice not mailed. (dmkf) (Entered: 05/24/1991)
183 MINUTE ORDER of 5/30/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing re−set for 06/12/91 at 9:15a.m. Judge's staff notified counsel by telephone. (dmkf) (Entered: 05/31/1991)
184 MINUTE ORDER of 6/5/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Status hearing reset for 07/16/91 at 9:15a.m. Notice mailed 06/06/91. (dmkf) (Entered: 06/06/1991)
185 AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs for entry of agreed order (Attachment) ; notice of motion. (dmkf) (Entered: 06/28/1991)
186 ENTERED JUDGEMENT. Clerk. (dmkf) (Entered: 06/28/1991)
187 MINUTE ORDER of 6/27/91 before Honorable William T. Hart : Judgment is entered as follows: By agreement of the parties, judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiffs Norman et al and against defendant Suter in the amount of $290.000.00 for attorneys fees plus $13,313.00 for costs. Defendant is ordered to pay the entire judgment to plaintiffs' counsel, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago on or before 07/26/91. Notice mailed 06/28/91. (dmkf) (Entered: 06/28/1991)
188 LETTER from the USCA for the 7th Circuit Court returning the complete record on appeal, consisting of: l in camera material. (ldg) (Entered: 02/25/1992)
189 FIRST monitoring report by Jeanine Smith (Attachments). (ldg) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
190 MINUTE ORDER of 3/2/92 by Hon. William T. Hart : Filed of record First monitoring report by court appointed monitor, Jeanine Smith for period covered 04/01/91 to 01/01/92 pursuant to the consent order. (This first monitoring report is filed without exhibits attached) No notice (ldg) (Entered: 03/04/1992)
191 SECOND monitoring report (Attachments). (ldg) (Entered: 10/05/1992)
192 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to second monitoring report and request for status conference [191−1]; Notice of filing. (ldg) (Entered: 11/06/1992)
193 MINUTE ORDER of 11/6/92 by Hon. William T. Hart : Pursuant to the plaintiffs' objections to second monitoring report and request for status conference filed 11/04/92, a status hearing is set for 12/08/92 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice (ldg) (Entered: 11/09/1992)

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 7 of 10

11/13/1992
11/19/1992 12/08/1992 03/17/1993 08/23/1993 11/26/1993 12/06/1993 03/15/1994 02/27/1995
02/27/1995 02/27/1995
05/24/1995 07/05/1995 08/23/1995 10/26/1995
02/12/1996
02/12/1996

194 RESPONSE by defendant Sterling M. Ryder in opposition to plaintiffs' objection to second monitoring report and request for status conference (Attachment); Notice of filing. (ldg) (Entered: 11/16/1992)
195 REPLY by plaintiff to defendant's response in opposition to plaintiffs' objections (Attachment) [194−1]; Notice of filing. (ldg) (Entered: 11/20/1992)
196 MINUTE ORDER of 12/8/92 by Hon. William T. Hart : Status hearing held. No notice (ldg) (Entered: 12/09/1992)
197 NOTICE OF FILING Third Monitoring Report by Jeanine Smith. (Exhibits) (tlm) (Entered: 03/18/1993)
198 FOURTH monitoring report by Jeanine Smith (Attachments); Notice of filing (ldg) Modified on 08/24/1993 (Entered: 08/24/1993)
199 NOTICE of filing by Jeanine Smith regarding corrections to pages 7,8,28,31 of the fourth monitoring report [198−1] (Attachments). (ldg) (Entered: 12/01/1993)
200 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 03/31/89 Before Honorable William T. Hart. (ldg) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
201 FIFTH MONITORING REPORT; Notice of filing (Attachments). (lal) (Entered: 03/16/1994)
202 JOINT MOTION by class plaintiffs Jacqueline Fields, James Norman and Paulette Patterson and defendant Jess McDonald for entry of agreed order regarding consent decree ; Notice of motion (fce) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
203 ORDER regarding motion for entry of agreed order regarding consent decree [202−1] (fce) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
204 MINUTE ORDER of 2/27/95 by Hon. William T. Hart : Granting class plaintiffs' and defendant Jesse McDonald's joint motion for entry of agreed order regarding consent decree [202−1] to 02/15/96. Agreed order entered. No notice (fce) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
205 MONITORING report by Jeanine Smith (Attachments); Notice of filing. (smm) (Entered: 05/25/1995)
206 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 5/30/90 Before Honorable William T. Hart (smm) (Entered: 07/06/1995)
207 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings − Motion for the following date(s): 2/27/95 Before Honorable William T. Hart (smm) (Entered: 08/24/1995)
208 MINUTE ORDER of 10/26/95 by Hon. William T. Hart : No separate monitoring report covering the period 01/01/95 through 06/30/95 is to be filed. A consolidated report covering the period 01/01/95 through 12/31/95 shall be filed after the completition of that time priod. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
209 MOTION by plaintiff for (1) continued monitoring , and/or (2) declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non−compliance with the consent decree and the court order of 03/10/95 (Exhibits); Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
210 MINUTE ORDER of 2/12/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Answer brief to plaintiffs' motion for (1) continued monitoring [209−1] and/or for (2) declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non−compliance with the consent decree and the court order of 03/10/95 [209−2] due 02/26/96. Replies to answer briefs due 3/11/96. Ruling on pending motions set for 9:15 a.m. 4/11/96. Leave given defendants to file additional appearance of attorney Nancy S.

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 8 of 10

02/12/1996 02/12/1996 02/28/1996 02/28/1996 02/28/1996 02/28/1996 03/04/1996 03/11/1996 03/15/1996 04/11/1996 04/11/1996
04/22/1996 05/15/1996

Eisenhauer, instanter. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
211 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Jess McDonald by Nancy S. Eisenhauer (mak) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
212 RULE 39 Affidavit of Nancy S. Eisenhauer (mak) (Entered: 02/13/1996)
213 MOTION by defendant for leave to file instanter memorandum in excess of fifteen pages ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 03/04/1996)
214 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION by defendant to plaintiffs' motion for (1) continued monitoring [209−1] and/or (2) declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non−compliance with the consent decree and the court order of 03/10/95 [209−2]; Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 03/04/1996)
215 APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS filed by defendant to defendant's memorandum in opposition [214−1] to plaintiffs' motion for continued monitoring and/or declaratory and injunctive relief (Exhibits). (mak) (Entered: 03/04/1996)
217 MINUTE ORDER of 2/28/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Granting defendant's motion for leave to file instanter memorandum in excess of fifteen pages [213−1]. Plaintiff's reply may not exceed 20 pages. No notice (mak) (Entered: 03/04/1996)
216 AFFIDAVIT of Mary Sue Morsch regarding memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion [214−1]. (mak) (Entered: 03/04/1996)
218 REPLY memorandum by plaintiffs in support of motion for (1) continued monitoring [209−1], and/or (2) declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non−compliance with the consent decree and the court order of 03/10/95 [209−2] (Attachments); Notice of filing. (fce) (Entered: 03/15/1996)
219 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 02/12/96, 02/28/96 Before Honorable William T. Hart (Two volumes: 219−1 and 219−2). (fce) Modified on 03/18/1996 (Entered: 03/18/1996)
220 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER (fce) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
221 MINUTE ORDER of 4/11/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Jess McDonald is substituted for Sue Suter. terminating party Sue Suter Motion for (1) continued monitoring [209−1] is granted in part and denied in part. Motion (2) declaratory and injunctive relief redressing substantial non−compliance with the consent decree and the court order of 03/10/95 [209−2] is denied without prejudice. Seventh report due 04/30/96. Eighth report covering 1996 shall be limited to 5(a) (Cook County), 5(b) (Cook County), 6(b), and 9(c) and Norman eligibility. For 1996, defendant shall comply with 15(a), (b) (Cook County), (d), and (i), 11, 15(e) and 15(f). The term of the monitor's appointment shall continue until the date beyond 12/31/96 permitted for preparing the eighth monitoring report and necessary to complete the additional procedures set forth in 16 of the consent order. No notice (fce) (Entered: 04/11/1996)
222 MINUTE ORDER of 4/22/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : The due date for the Seventh Monitoring Report is extended due 05/31/96. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 04/23/1996)
223 AFFIDAVIT of Laurene M. Heybach; Materials in support of motion for fees and costs (Attachments); Notice of filing (ar) (Entered: 05/16/1996)

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 9 of 10

05/15/1996 05/15/1996 05/15/1996 05/15/1996 05/15/1996 05/22/1996 05/22/1996 05/22/1996 05/22/1996
06/03/1996 06/26/1996 06/26/1996 06/27/1996 06/27/1996
07/16/1996
07/23/1996 07/23/1996 12/02/1996

224 AFFIDAVIT of Laurene M. Heybach (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
225 AFFIDAVIT of Diane Redleaf (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
226 AFFIDAVIT of Robert E. Lehrer (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
227 AFFIDAVIT of Julie L. Biehl (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
228 AFFIDAVIT of John M. Bouman (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 05/16/1996)
229 MOTION by plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs and to set a schedule to submit supporting materials ; Notice of motion (ar) (Entered: 05/23/1996)
230 MOTION by plaintiffs for an award of attorneys' fees ; Notice of motion (ar) Modified on 05/23/1996 (Entered: 05/23/1996)
231 DECLARATION by Diane Redleaf regarding plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees [230−1] (Exhibits) (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 05/23/1996)
232 MINUTE ORDER of 5/22/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Answer brief to plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs [229−1] and to set a schedule to submit supporting materials [229−2] due 06/24/96. Reply to answer brief due 7/15/96. Ruling will be by mail. Telephoned notice (ar) (Entered: 05/23/1996)
233 SEVENTH monitoring report by Jeanine Smith (Attachments); Notice of filing (1 vol.) (ar) (Entered: 06/03/1996)
234 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to motion for extension or stay of briefing schedule on attorneys' fees; Notice of filing (ar) Modified on 06/27/1996 (Entered: 06/27/1996)
235 CORRECTED OBJECTION [234−1] by plaintiffs to motion for extension or stay of briefing schedule on attorneys' fees; Notice of filing (ar) (Entered: 06/27/1996)
236 MOTION by Jess McDonald to extend or to stay briefing schedule ; Notice of motion (ar) (Entered: 06/28/1996)
237 MINUTE ORDER of 6/27/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Defendant's motion to extend [236−1] or stay briefing schedule [236−2] re plaintiffs' petitions for attorneys' fees an costs, is entered and continued to 07/16/96 at 9:30. No notice (ar) Modified on 06/28/1996 (Entered: 06/28/1996)
238 MINUTE ORDER of 7/16/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Parties in open court report to the court that they have resolved plaintiffs pending motions for attorneys' fees and costs. Parties to present draft order. Plaintiffs' motions ifor attorneys' fees and costs [230−1] [229−1] and defendants' motion to extend [236−1] [236−2] are dismissed without prejudice as moot. The clerk of the court is directed to terminate all pending motions [229−2]. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 07/19/1996)
239 AGREED ORDER (ar) (Entered: 07/25/1996)
240 MINUTE ORDER of 7/23/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Parties having reached a settlement of all issues on attorneys' fees and costs, agreed order is entered. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 07/25/1996)
241 MOTION by Laurene Heybach to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff class ; Notice of motion (ar) (Entered: 12/09/1996)

Case: 1:89-cv-1624 As of: 12/06/2008 10:07 AM CST 10 of 10

12/05/1996 12/05/1996
12/20/1996 03/18/1997 03/20/1997
03/21/1997 03/24/1997 04/01/1997 05/07/1997

242 ORDER regarding Laureen Heybach's motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff class [241−1] (ar) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
243 MINUTE ORDER of 12/5/96 by Hon. William T. Hart : Motion of Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago attorney Laurene Heybach to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff class [241−1] and to resume her role as one of the counsel for the class on 02/01/97 for limited purposes as described in paragraph 2.(a) &(b) of attached draft order is granted. Order entered. No notice (ar) (Entered: 12/09/1996)
244 NOTICE by plaintiffs' counsel of change of address (Attachment) (ar) (Entered: 12/27/1996)
245 MOTION by Jess McDonald for substitution of counsel ; Notice of motion. (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
246 MINUTE ORDER of 3/20/97 by Hon. William T. Hart : Defendant Jess McDonald's motion for substitution of counsel [245−1] is granted. Leave given attorney Ms. Tchen and all other attorneys from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &Flom (Illinois) to withdraw their appearances in this matter, and for attorneys Barbara L. Greenspan and Daniele J. Steimel, Assistant Attorneys General, to file their appearances on defendant's behalf. Terminating attorneys Nancy S. Eisenhauer, Kimberley K. Baer, Charles F. Smith Jr., Susan Getzendanner and Christina M. Tchen. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 03/24/1997 (Entered: 03/24/1997)
247 NOTICE by Laurene M. Heybach, counsel for plaintiff class, of change of address; Notice of filing (ar) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
MAILED Rule 3.14 letter to Barbara L. Greenspan and Daniele J. Steimel together with together minute order dated 03/20/97 [246−1] (ar) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
248 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Jess McDonald by Barbara L. Greenspan, Danielle Jenkins Steimel (kmt) (Entered: 04/03/1997)
249 EIGHTH monitoring report by Jeanine Smith, LCSW, (Attachments); Notice of filing (1 vol.) (ar) Modified on 05/08/1997 (Entered: 05/08/1997)

 
 4'

JAMES NORMAN and PAULETTE PATTERSON,

on their own behalf and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

V.

GORDON JOHNSON, Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,

Defendant.

yCs{
No. 89 C 1624 (d/,2 9/j

MORANDUX OPINION AND ORDER
This is a putative class action challenging certain practices of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") as being in violation of relevant federal statutes and the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and for preliminary relief for the named class members was referred to a magistrate for a report and recommendation. After a hearing, the magistrate issued recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate recommended granting a preliminary injunction as to plaintiffs Wanda Hilliard and Joann Mitchell and denying preliminary relief to plaintiff Gina Johnson.' Defendant

1 The recommendation as to class certification has not yet been issued.

No. 8'9 C 1624

-2-

objected to the recommendation as regards Hilliard and Mitchell.'
No objection was raised to the recommended denial of relief for
Johnson.
As stated in the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs •are
impoverished parents and legal guardians who have lost, are at
risk of losing, will lose, or cannot regain custody of their
children from the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services ('DCFS') because they are homeless or unable to provide
food or shelter for their children." Defendant Gordon Johnson is
the director of DCFS, an agency of the State of Illinois.
According to the complaint,
Plaintiffs challenge defendant's policies and practices of (1) taking and retaining custody of children from impoverished parents and legal guardians because of their inability to obtain cash, food, shelter, or other subsistence, while failing to assist the parents and children to meet these needs; (2) failing to assist them to secure cash, food, shelter or other subsistence through the coordination of services to needy families and otherwise; (3) failing to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of plaintiffs' children and reunite families; and (4) abridging the liberty and property interests of parents in retaining custody of their children and maintaining the means to support themselves and their families. Plaintiffs allege that these

'Leave was reluctantly granted to defendant to file a

50-page brief in support of his objections to the magistrate's

report. It is now apparent that such a lengthy brief was

burdensome. It is filled with repetitive arguments. See

Fleming v. County of Kane, 855 F.2d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam). Also, defendant (and, to a lesser degree, plaintiffs)

seek to incorporate arguments contained in the briefs before the

magistrate into the already oversized briefs. Cf.

at 498.

Surprisingly, despite the length of the briefs, both parties make

a number of assertions regarding legal rules without citing

authority to support their assertions, thereby further imposing

an undue burden on the court.

policies and practices violate provisions of Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. SS 620 et seg. and 671 et se g, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs seek only injunctive and declaratory relief; no
damages are sought.
Stated succinctly, the magistrate found that plaintiffs
Hilliard, Mitchell, and Johnson were separated from their
children and could not be reunited with them, at least in part,
because of their inability to provide adequate housing for the
children. The magistrate found that, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
S 671(a)(15), 3 DCFS typically does not make a reasonable effort
to assist such parents in finding and obtaining housing so that
they can be reunited with their children. However, with respect
to Johnson, the magistrate found a reasonable effort had been
made and therefore recommended not granting any relief for
Johnson. A preliminary injunction in favor of Hilliard and
'Section 671(a)(15), which is part of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ('AAA") and included in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, provides:
(a) in order for a state to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which-- . . .
(15) effective October 1, 1983, provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home.

c.. ri. V7 V ♦Ybt

^^^

Mitchell was recommended. Defendant challenges some of the factual findings supporting this reconm endation. His primary arguments, however, are that there is no legal basis for granting the relief recommended either because there is no private right of action or because abstention militates against granting such relief.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Defendant's objections to the magistrate's findings of fact have been examined, as have the transcribed testimony and plaintiffs' response to the objections. No material fact contained in the proposed findings requires revision. The magistrate's recommended findings of fact are adopted.`

CONCLUSIONS OF LMe
A number of federal courts, including at least two
circuit courts, ` have held that rights provided for in the AAA
are enforceable either under S 1983, L.J. v. Massinaa, 838 F.2d
118, 123 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 816 (1989);
4 The recommended findings of fact consist of 72 paragraphs -and are on pages 2 through 26 of the magistrate's report. The magistrate's report is attached hereto as an appendix.
` Any finding of fact which is a conclusion of law shall be
deemed to be a conclusion of law as if fully set forth therein. Any conclusion of law that is a finding of fact shall be deemed
to be a finding of fact as if fully set forth therein.
` Where the Seventh Circuit has not yet spoken on an issue,
this court should give the consistent decisions of other circuits
substantial deference. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987).

Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 50.9-12 (1st Cir. 1983)=

Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690., 696-97 (N.D. Ill. 1989);

Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (N.D. Ill.

1989); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1403-04 (N.D. I11.

1989); Joseph A. v. New Mexico Department of Human Services, 575

F. Supp. 346, 353 (D.N.M. 1983),' or because the AAA contains an

implied right of private action. Artist M., 726 F. Supp. at

694-96;

., 715 F. Supp. at 1404-05. The statute can be

enforced pursuant to S 1983;' it is unnecessary to determine if

an implied right of action also exists.

There is a conflict as to whether S 671(a)(15)(B) creates

an enforceable right to "reasonable efforts" to reunify the

family. In Artist M., Judge Shadur held that there is an

enforceable right to prompt assignment of caseworkers. In

determining whether such an enforceable right existed, Judge

Shadur relied on the'"reasonable efforts" language of

S 671(a)(15)(B). In Aristotle P., Judge Williams held that

'In Scrivner v. Andrews, 816 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit apparently agreed with Lynch that the rights under the AAA can be enforced pursuant to S 1983, but held that the AAA did not provide for a right to. meaningful visitations. In Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, vacated for reh'g, 862 F.2d 1107 (1988), a pr>eal dismissed, 867 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1989), a panel of the Fifth Circuit held, in an interlocutory appeal of a qualified immunity issue, that the AAA created rights enforceable under S 1983. That decision, however, was vacated for a rehearing en bancand the appeal was subsequently dismissed when plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their damages claim.
'The magistrate's well-reasoned and thorough discussion of whether the AAA may be enforced through S 1983 is also adopted. That discussion is at pages 30 through 43 of the magistrate's report.

No. 89 C 1624

-6-

"reasonable efforts to reunify families" was too amorphous to create an enforceable right. In B. H, Judge Grady held there is no enforceable right to reasonable efforts to prevent removal and that, while there is a right to individualized case plans and a case review system, there is no right to be provided with particular services.' The state courts have generally found 671(a)(15)(B)'s requirement of reasonable efforts to reunify the family to be enforceable in proceedings to terminate parental rights. See In re Kenny F.., 786 P.2d 699, 703 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); In re S.A.D., 382 Pa. Super. 166, 555 A.2d 123, 127-28 (1989); In re M.H., 444 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); Zfl re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 648-49 (Del. 1986). But see In re Cynthia A., 8 Conn. App. 656, 514 A.2d 360, 365 (1986). 10 The state cases have held that the AAA requires the provision of affirmative services to help reunify the family, including, in appropriate circumstances, providing housing, monetary assistance for obtaining housing, and assistance in finding housing. It has also been held that the state child welfare agency may be

'The other federal cases hold there is an enforceable right to case plans and case reviews, see iassinaa, su pra; Lynch, supra; Joseph A., supra, and maintenance of adequate foster home standards, Massinca, supra. Cases also hold there is no enforceable right to meaningful visitation, Scrivner, supra, nor to a least restrictive, most' family-like placement, Aristotle P.,
D_Es, EFa•
" Cynthia A. holds rights under the AAA are unenforceable primarily because the AAA is an appropriations statute and
therefore cannot create enforceable rights. Such a holding has
been rejected by the federal courts that have considered the enforceability of the AAA under S 1983.

required to provide services ordinarily provided by other
agencies." S. .D., 555 A.2d at 128.
Defendant argues that a standard of "reasonable efforts" is too vague to be enforceable. That argument is supported by Aristotle P., 721 P. Supp. at 1012. It is contradicted by Artist M., by the state cases that have found enforceable rights under S 671(a)(15) and applied the reasonable efforts language, and by the recommendation of the magistrate. Aristotle P., as does defendant, relied on Pennhurst State School & Hos pital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981). In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court stated it was difficult to know what was meant by "appropriate treatment" and "least restrictive" setting as used in 42 U.S.C. S 6010, the bill of rights . provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975. This implied that S 6010 did not create enforceable rights
because "Congress must express clearly its intent to impose
conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or not to accept those funds." The Supreme Court, however, made clear that while the nonapecificity of the language provided some support for interpreting Congress's intent, the "crucial inquiry .-. . is not whether a State would knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke
" Also, as S.A.D., 555 A.2d at 128, points out, even viewed purely in fiscal terms, it is often cheaper to provide initial payments for rent, security deposits, utilities, and other items than to instead incur the much greater expense of placement outside the family.

LV7. O

. 10^^

- -

so clearly that we can fairly say that the state could make an informed choice." 451 U.S. at 25.
The language of S 6010 stated, "Congress makes the
following findings respecting the rights of person with
developmental disabilities." The statute does not state that
those findings create requirements for the states to follow. In contrast, S 671(a) expressly states that "in order for a State jo be eligible for payments under this part, it shallhave a
plan . . . which . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (15) provides a specific date by which a participating state must comply with its requirements. The intent of Congress to mandate compliance with S 671(a)(15) is clearly expressed. Also, unlike the situation in Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has included the "reasonable efforts" provisions among the requirements for a Title IV-E State plan and provides examples to further clarify the meaning of reasonable efforts. ee 45 C.F.R. SS 1356.21(b), 1356.21(d)(4), 1357.15(e). See also .A. ., 555 A.2d at 127-28.
Even absent consideration of the regulations, Judge Shadur is correct that a requirement of "reasonable efforts" is not too ambiguous to be enforceable. See Artist M., 726 F. Supp. at 696-97. Cf. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority , 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987) (provision for a "reasonable" allowance for utilities not too vague or amorphous as to be unenforceable under S 1983). Courts are accustomed to enforcing reasonableness standards and state actors and others

r
are accustomed to being required to comply with such standards. See j at 432. See also Lynch, 719 F.2d at 511-12 (difficulty in determining if state's actual practices are in compliance is no reason to deny enforcement). Also, the state cases cited above show that the states are able to interpret the reasonable efforts requirement. Contrary to defendant's argument, permitting enforcement does not unduly deprive the state of flexibility and discretion in providing child welfare services. A standard of "reasonable efforts" is a flexible standard that leaves much to the discretion of the states.
Defendant argues that even if rights under S 671(a)(15) can be enforced pursuant to S 1983, the child, not the parent, is the only appropriate party to seek enforcement of those rights. Defendants argue that a holding to the contrary would be "absolutely unprecedented" and that plaintiffs can cite no case to support their position. This is a surprising assertion for two reasons. First, defendant's brief contains no case citations in support of his own position. Just as there are no precedents expressly holding that parents can enforce rights under the AAA, there are no precedents holding parents cannot enforce such rights. Second, while no case has been found or cited which explicitly discusses the question of parental standing to enforce rights under the AAA, a number of cases involve parents enforcing rights under the AAA. Lynch was a suit brought by both parents and children. Scrivner was brought by the mother of a child;
relief was denied Dnly because the particular right sought to be

JNO ^ 1V L .LD4

-1N-

enforced was held not to be provided for by the AAA, not because a mother had no enforceable rights under the AAA. The state cases cited above are all suits in which the parents are permitted to enforce rights under the AAA. The magistrate's
conclusion that parents can enforce rights under the AAA is far
from "absolutely unprecedented." The basis of defendant's argument is unclear. Defendant
makes the same argument as regards both an implied private right of action and S 1983. But whether the AAA implies a cause of action for parents is a question distinct from whether a cause of action exists under S 1983. See Artist M., 726 F. Supp at 691-92. Since this court relies only on S 1983, it need only be considered whether parents can have a cause of action under that statute. As previously discussed, the rights contained in the AAA are enforceable under S 1983. Whether the parents are appropriate parties to enforce such rights would appear to be a
standing question, an issue nowhere mentioned in defendant's
brief, but one which must be addressed whenever a substantial question is raised because it goes to this court's jurisdiction. Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 128 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989). The
basic requirements of standing are that "A plaintiff must allege
[1] personal injury[, 2] fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and[, 3] likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Frank Rosenberg, Inc. v. Tazewell County, •82 P.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 726 (1990) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))

(brackets in Rosenbera). Those three requirements are clearly

met by the parents.

There are, however, also prudential requirements of

standing. Ordinarily, "as a matter of prudence courts should not

hear a plaintiff who rests his or her 'claim to relief on the

legal rights or interests of third

Liinndcil,ey,889 F.2d

at 128 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).

Perhaps this is the principle that defendant silently relies
upon. Issues of prudential standing, however, are not

jurisdictional and can be waived. Lindle y , 889 F.2d at 129.

While defendant argues the AAA creates rights only for children,

not their parents, he cites no authority that that has any legal significance, i.e., he. cites no standing cases. Therefore, the

standing issue could be treated as waived, at least as regards the question of a preliminary injunction. The waiver issue need

not be decided, however, because the AAA creates rights for

parents as well as the children." See, e. g ., 42 U.S.C.

SS 622(b); 625(a)(1)(D); 627(a)(1); 627(a)(2)(C); 671(a)(12);

675(5)(C); 675(6). Additionally, when a statute provides for the

continued unification or reunification of a family, it cannot be

said to be only for the benefit of the children, both the

children and the parents are beneficiaries of such a policy.

'"Even if the AAA did not create rights for the parents,
they might still have standing to bring this action. Compare
Lindley, 889 F.2d at 129 (adopted child of recipient of
disability benefits had third-party standing to maintain his parents' claim that denial of child insurance benefits was
unconstitutional).

Noy.85 C 1624

-12-

, Furthermore, contrary to defendant's argument, some of the funding for states is used to provide services to parents as well as children. Plaintiffs in this case have standing. Defendant also argues that the AAA only requires that an adequate system be in place and therefore only systemic deficiencies can violate the AAA. From this, defendant appears* to draw the conclusion that only systemic relief can be granted and no claim for individual relief is available. It is unclear if defendant is making such an argument, but to the extent defendant is arguing this court can only examine the state's statutory and regulatory system to see if it complies with the AAA, the argument is not supported by the cases. Even if, on paper, the state complies with the AAA, the AAA is still violated if the state's actual practices do not comply with the AAA. Lynch, 719 F.2d at 511.: The magistrate found, with this court adopting those findings, that system-wide deficiencies exist. Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine if failure to make reasonable efforts as to only one person could state a claim under the AAA. 13 The question still remains as to whether individual relief can be granted based on systemic violations. Neither party cites any case authority on this question. However, there is no reason why an individual who suffers from systemic violations should not be entitled to relief under.the statute. Koreover, since the court is presently only considering
13 1t is noted that, in the state cases previously referred Lo, individual parents were permitted to claim violations of the AAA without proving systemic deficiencies.

NO.' , b' •G ib14

-1J-

preliminary relief, it is more sensible to permit only individual relief instead of ordering broader systemic relief.
Defendant also argues that the magistrate's analysis essentially results in imposing a successful reunification standard instead of a reasonable efforts standard. It is true, as defendant points out, that the reasonable efforts standard can be satisfied without there being successful reunification." Contrary to defendant's argument, Hilliard and Mitchell are not granted relief simply because they have not found adequate housing nor been reunited with their children, but because they have suffered from systemic deficiencies that included the failure of DCFS to make reasonable efforts on their behalf. That reasonable (or, at least, partially successful) efforts were put forth as regards Johnson is not incompatible with there being systemic deficiencies that generally result in inadequate efforts on behalf of persons in plaintiffs' situations. Since efforts made to assist Johnson have aided her in her effort to reunite with her family, she, unlike Hilliard and Mitchell, has no need for preliminary relief.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from arguing reasonable efforts were not made because the state Juvenile Court made findings that reasonable efforts were made. • Although this court is to accord a decision of a

"This, of course, was also recognized by the magistrate. She did not recommend ordering reunification, but only recommended ordering the development • if, at all possible, • of a
plan to overcome obstacles to reunification.

2 o. 89 -C 1624

-14-

state court the same preclusive effect that courts in that state would accord it, 28 U.S.C. S 1728, Wozniak v. County of DuPaae, 845 P.2d 677, 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1988), defendant cites no
Illinois law in support of his collateral estoppel argument. Two
of the requirements of collateral estoppel are that (1) the issues which form the basis of estoppel were actually litigated and decided on the merits in the prior suit and (2) those issues are identical to issues raised in the subsequent suit. at 682-83 (quoting County of Cook v. MidCon Corp ., 773 P.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Unlike resjudicata, collateral estoppel applies only to issues that were actually litigated, not also to issues that could have been raised in the prior proceeding, but were not. Lester v. Arlington 'Heights Federal Savings & Loan Association, 130 I11. App. 3d 233, 474 N.E.2d 33, 37 (1985) (quoting Godare v. Sterling Steel Casting Co., 103 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50, 430 N.E.2d 620 (1981)). To have a collateral estoppel effect, an issue cannot simply be decided, but must be both actually litigated and decided. Where a court makes a finding on an issue that was not actually litigated, there is no collateral estoppel effect.
ster, 474 N.E.2d at 37-38. See also Grip-Pak. Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). Here, although the Juvenile Court judges made statutorily mandated findings that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunite the families, those were pro for findings that were not actually litigated. Therefore,. there can

be no preclusive effect. Additionally, even if the issue was
actually litigated, the Juvenile Court judges did not decide the
same issues that are presently before this court because they
only decided whether reasonable efforts had been made as of the
time that they issued their rulings. Cf. In re Overton, 21
I11. App. 3d 1014, 316 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1974) (order of a court
depriving a parent of custody of a child is only res judicata as
to facts which existed at the time the order was entered); In re
Pinch, 40 Ill. App. 2d 18, 189 N.E.2d 678, 679 (1963) (abstract
opinion) (same). This court's findings relate to present
circumstances. Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by collateral
estoppel.
Consistent with his shotgun approach in opposing plaintiffs' motion, defendant argues that three abstention doctrines"` go against . granting relief in this case. Abstention
has apparently only been raised in one reported federal case
_ involving enforcement of the AAA; the limited argument made in
that case was summarily rejected." ee Joseph A., 575 F. Supp.
at 350.
0
" As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the doctrine set forth in Colorado River is more properly characterized as one of deference. "[T]he Supreme Court distinguishes between Colorado River deference and traditional abstention doctrines. We abide by that distinction here, while making no claim that we understand it." )"edema v. Medema Builders, Inc., 854 F.2d 210, 212 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988).
t 2 1n at least one unpublished order, a district court declined to invoke Younger abstention. See R.C. v. Hornsby, No. 88-D-1170-N at 5-9 (M.D. Ala. April 19, 1989).

No. 'RS C 1624

-16-

Although not active cases, the Juvenile Court retains continuing jurisdiction over the custody proceedings of the children of Hilliard and Mitchell. Finch, 189 N.E.2d at 679. Absent an interested party petitioning for a modification, this means that the guardian or custodian appointed by the court must file updated case plans every six months. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, 1 602-28(2). Plaintiffs in this case do not seek any order from this court regarding custody nor do they seek to enjoin any action of the state court. While the state court may have the power to order the type of individual relief presently requested, there is no active proceeding in which such relief is being sought. There is no basis for invoking Youngerabstention in this case.
Burford abstention is appropriate only in cases involving difficult questions of state law and where review of that question would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy respecting a matter whose importance transcends the result of the case under consideration. Evans v. City of Chicavo, 689 F.2d 1286, 1295 (1982), overruled on other grounds, 873 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1989). Defendant does not point to any difficult question of state law involved in this case. Plaintiffs do not raise a challenge to any state statute or regulation; they instead charge that the state's actual practices do not measure up to the requirements of the AAA, a federal statute. This case does not involve interpreting the requirements of state statutes

HI

or regulations implemented pursuant to the AAA. There is no
reason to invoke Burford abstention.
The first question to address in considering Colorado
River deference is whether there are parallel proceedings.
Medema v. Medema Builders, Inc., 854 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir.
1988). "Cases are parallel if "'substantially the same parties
are contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in
another forum.'" Id. This requirement is not satisfied; defendant points to no ongoing state proceeding in which the
reasonable efforts question is presently being litigated. Even
if the inactive Juvenile Court proceedings can be considered
parallel proceedings, it is doubtful that this is an appropriate
case for Colorado River deference. ee Interstate Material
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1988)
(setting forth factors to consider). The custody proceedings are
limited to the individuals involved and thus are not the
appropriate place to litigate the. systemic questions involved in
this proceeding; the governing law in this case is federal; and
the state cases are not presently active cases. Proceedings will
not be stayed based on the Colorado River doctrine.
With respect to the standards for preliminary injunctive
relief, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated:
Before a preliminary injunction will issue,
the movant must show, as a threshold matter, that: (1) they have no adequate remedy at law; (2) they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and (3) they have some likelihood of success on the merits in the sense that their "chances are better than negligible." Boland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,

749 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Lawson Products, Inc. v. Avnet. Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986). If the movant can meet this threshold burden, the inquiry then becomes a "sliding scale" analysis of the harm to the parties and the public from the grant or
denial of the injunction and the actual
likelihood of success on the merits. In particular, and keeping in mind that the public interest may become important in a given case, the "more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in
his favor (in order to get the injunction]; the
less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor." Roland Machinery, 749 F.2d at 387.
Thornton v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Ping v. National Education Association, 870 F.2d 1369, 1371-72
(7th Cir. 1989)).
As stated by the magistrate,
A likelihood of success on the merits has been shown with respect to Wanda Hilliard and Joann Mitchell but not with respect to Gina Johnson. Hilliard and Mitchell will be irreparably injured if DCFS does not do what the law requires it to do; they and their children are likely to sustain deep psychological injury and to have their relationships as families irreparably destroyed.
There is no countervailing harm to the defendant;
the cost of working out a viable service plan for these families is de in is. Moreover, the defendant will save money if, by giving these plaintiffs modest assistance, it can get their children out of the foster care system. The public interest in this case is clearly expressed in the AAA: unnecessary foster care placement is detrimental to the individuals involved and to the public.
Defendant argues that this summation fails to take into
consideration the harm of interfering with the state judicial
process and interfering with a caseworker's ability to exercise

I

Ii^1 ' ^

^^

Ii

-

hie or her own judgment._ As previously discussed in regards to abstention, the recommended relief does not interfere with state court proceedings. As regards a caseworker's discretion, the recommended relief leaves to the caseworker the discretion to develop an appropriate plan. Defendant also argues that the interests of the children are ignored. The recommended relief, however, does not require that the children be reunited with their mothers. All that is ordered is that adequate procedures be followed so that the families may have the opportunity to be reunited if possible and appropriate. If it is not in the best interests of the children to be reunited with their mothers, presumably the caseworker will not make such a recommendation to the Juvenile Court and the Juvenile Court will not order such to occur."
Defendant argues that the recommended relief is a mandatory preliminary injunction and that such relief should be granted in only rare circumstances. Typically, the purpose of a
preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending the
resolution of the merits of a case. Jordan v. Wolke, 593 F.2d
772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);_Desert Partners. L.P. V.
USG Cam, 686 F. Supp. 1289, 2293 (N.D. I11. 1988). While
mandatory preliminary injunctions are to be "cautiously viewed
and sparingly issued," there are "situations justifying a
"Defendant makes no argument that the evidence shows that continued attempts at reunification would not be in the best interests of any of the children involved or that continued attempts at reunification would be futile. See. e.a., Kennv F., 786 P.2d at 703-04.

No. 9 C 1624

-20-

V
mandatory temporary injunction compelling the defendant to take affirmative action." Jordan, supra. Where the harm is
substantial and maintaining the status quo would mean further
harm and possibly make a final determination on the merits
futile, the grant of a mandatory preliminary injunction may be appropriate. See Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn. Inc., 729
F.2d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 1984); C.A. Wright & A. Miller, FZDRRU. PB,c icz & PRoc=mtz S 2947 at 424 (1973) . Still, a mandatory preliminary injunction should not be granted unless the law and facts clearly favor the plaintiff. Committee of Central American Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441,amended, 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986). Also, a mandatory preliminary injunction that grants the full relief requested is viewed with greater disfavor than one that grants less than the full relief. Bricklayers. Masons. Marble & Tile Setters, Protective & Benevolent Union No. 7 of Nebraska v. Lueder Construction Co., 346 F. Supp. 558, 561 (D. Neb. 1972); Wright & Miller, S 2948 at 445.
Here, the recommended preliminary relief does not grant the full relief sought; it does not result in a correction of the systemic problems alleged and heretofore proven nor is the broad relief requested in the First Amended Complaint granted. Bore importantly, the potential harm to plaintiffs is great. The longer they are separated from their children without an adequate effort being made to reunite the families, the less likely it is
that reunification will be possible. if no preliminary relief is granted, continuation of present circumstances likely could

i

I. li n,

t1 .^ Of,, 1. ^P

Ii

.2azgq

hog'69 C 1624

-21-

0

result in any relief granted at the termination of this case"=:

T

being of no help to Hilliard or Mitchell. It cannot be f
overstated that permanent loss of the bond with one's child is

one of the most extreme harms that a person can suffer and far outweighs any potential harm to defendant from the improvident grant of preliminary relief. Plaintiffs have made a strong

i `'a

showing both as to the likelihood of success and the balance of

harms. This is one of those situations where issuance of a
at mandatory preliminary injunction is appropriate.

Defendant also argues that the recommended relief usurps

the state's opportunity to decide in the first instance how to

best comply with the statute. That argument borders on the

ridiculous. The recommended relief still leaves to the

caseworker the development of the particulars of any case plan.

It also continues to leaves to DCFS the opportunity to develop a
t.
solution to systemic problems. The recommended relief does not

unduly impinge on DCFS'a opportunity to determine how to comply

• ,.

with the statute. Compare Lynch, 719 F.2d at 513-14.

E

Finally, defendant argues that the recommended relief

violates the Eleventh Amendment because the report of the

magistrate clearly indicates that appropriate action requires

t•

providing cash assistance in finding housing. But even assuming

this to be true, there is no Eleventh Amendment problem because

the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits awarding damages for past

injuries. It does not prohibit ordering prospective relief that i.

may result in future expenditures. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S..332

N.-89 C 1624

'-22-

may result in future expenditures. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 __c..

(1979).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

3

(1) Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief t -: . .. L_ r-
is granted as regards plaintiffs Wanda Hilliard and Joann -`ant

Mitchell and denied as regards Gina Johnson.
,c (2) Within 14 days of the date of this order, defendant

shall assign a caseworker or caseworkers, familiar with the

requirements of the AAA, to meet with the Hilliard and Mitchell
.1.
families and prepare written case plans relating to the possible-

return of each child to his or her home. The case plans sFia11

(a) identify any housing obstacles to family reunification,

(b) identify what if any resources are available to overcome such

obstacles, and (c)'specify how and when, if possible, such

obstacles can be overcome.

(3) Copies of the plans ordered shall be provided to-

plaintiffs and their counsel within 21 days of the date of this

order.

(4) Because of the poverty of plaintiffs, no preliiinary

injunction bonds are required,

ENTER:

. ir.

Dated: MAY

1990

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 
 MAR 2 7 1989

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Jacqueline Fields, James Norman, and Paulette Patterson on their own behalf; and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

No.

GORDON JOHNSON, Director, Illinois Department of Children and Family Services

Defendant.

oycr JUDGE HART

`'

r Cam.CPC'

TIB27l

^+:;^tvGHAM Mi CT
rDURT

3
MAGISTRATE GO s TSCHALC
COMPLAINT
INTRODUCTORY STATE MENT

1. (a) Plaintiffs in this 42 U.S.C. §1983 class action suit are impoverished parents and legal guardians who have lost, are at risk of losing, will lose, or cannot regain custody of their children from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS l ) because they are homeless or unable to provide food or shelter for their children. Defendant is the Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services.
(b) Plaintiffs challenge defendant's policies and practices of (1) taking and retaining custody of children from impoverished parents and legal guardians because of their inability to obtain cash, food, shelter, or other subsistence, while failing to assist the parents and children to meet to these needs; (2) failing to assist them to secure cash, food, shelter or other subsistence through the coordination of services to

needy families and otherwise; (3) failing to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of plaintiffs' children and reunite families; and (4) abridging the liberty and property interests of parents in retaining custody of their children and maintaining the means to support themselves and their families. Plaintiffs allege that these policies and practices violate provisions of Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §620 gt seg. and 671 seq., and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs and plaintiff class members seek declaratory and injunctive relief.
JURISDICTION 2. Jurisdiction of this cause is premised upon 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 1343(3). Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Jacqueline Fields is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Chicago, Illinois. She is the mother of Latasha, age 14, Addarrel, age 12, Latrice, age 11, Chermaine, age 7, Shana, age 4, and Roy, age 3. 4. Plaintiff James Norman is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Chicago, Illinois. He is the father of Jamie, age 10, and Lynetta, age 12. The children's mother is deceased. 5. Plaintiff Paulette Patterson is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Chicago, Illinois. She is the mother of Antonia, age 10, Deandre, age 9, and Richard, age 7.

6. The named plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2). The members of the plaintiff class ("plaintiffs") include:
All parents and legal guardians: (a) whose children on or after January 1, 1988 have been, are, or will be in the temporary custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ('DCFS') or under its legal guardianship; and such parents and legal guardians upon whom DCFS has imposed, in a service plan or otherwise, a condition that such parent or legal guardian secure for themselves and their children such shelter, utility services, food, clothing, -or income as DCFS deems necessary or appropriate for the return of their children; or (b) for whom, or after January 1, 1988, there has been, is, or will be an "indicated" report pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 23 §§2051 et sea. of "inadequate shelter,' 'inadequate food,'
"inadequate clothing," or 'environmental neglect," or a service
plan requiring that such parent or legal guardian secure adequate shelter, utility services, food, clothing, or income meet these or other subsistence needs.
7. There are, at any one time, hundreds of class members throughout the state. Because many class members lack permanent housing, and because the class is so numerous, joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and fact common to the class. The claims of the named plaintiffs are
- 3 -

typical of those of the class, and the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the class members. They have no
interests antagonistic to the class; they seek relief which will
benefit all class members and they are represented by counsel who are experienced at prosecuting class actions and representing parents and children to secure their constitutional and statutory rights. Finally, defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the class as a whole.
8. Defendant GORDON JOHNSON is the Director of DCFS. It is his duty to insure that DCFS complies with the requirements of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, its implementing regulations and the United States Constitution. He is sued in his official capacity.
THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 9. When any person makes a complaint to the DCFS Hotline that a child in Illinois is lacking necessary care, including adequate shelter, food, or clothing, DCFS must immediately investigate that claim and determine whether it is founded in fact. If credible evidence of that complaint is found, the report is "indicated". 10. Defendant maintains a unit of investigative caseworkers to respond to child-.abuse and neglect complaints. This unit is called the Division of Child Protection (DCP). These DCP workers are empowered by state law to take protective custody of
- 4 -

neglected children.

11. Children reported 'neglected" due to inadequate shelter,

food, clothing or other subsistence often are taken into the

protective custody of DCFS, though some such children are allowed

to remain with their families. Those allowed to remain with

their families, however, are at risk that DCFS may later seek

protective-custody of them.

12. Within 48 hours of taking protective custody, DCFS must

have a ~petition for adjudication of wardship" filed in juvenile

court. If DCFS is awarded temporary custody, or later,

guardianship of a child, it has the right to place the child with

a caretaker:other than the parent. This placement is referred to

as 'foster care." DCFS pays regular foster care providers $200-

$300 per month per child. Specialized foster care providers (for

children with special needs) may receive more money for the care

they provide, as much as $100 per day per child.

13. Unless parents lose their parental rights as a result of
a judicial decree terminating parental rights, they may petition

at any time for return of their children.

DCFS makes

recommendations concerning such return of children. Such

recommendations routinely include evaluations as to whether the

parent has adequate shelter and adequate income to provide for

the children. If a DCFS caseworker believes the parent has

inadequate shelter or income, DCFS routinely recommends against

returning the child home.

- 5 -

THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT 14. Titles IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§620 g sec. (Title IV-B) and 670 gt sea. (Title IV-E), as amended by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, provide federal funding for the state administered foster care program and for services to families to avoid the need for foster care. 15. Illinois receives more than $141 million under Title IVB and also receives millions of dollars in Title IV-E funds. As such, it must comply with the Act and its implementing regulations. 16. DCFS is the single state agency designated in Illinois to administer and oversee the state's compliance with Title IV-B and IV-E state plans. 17. Under Title IV-B, Illinois must:
(a) have in effect policies and practices designed: 1) to prevent the unnecessary separation of children from their families, 42 U.S.C. §§625(a) (1) (C); and 627(b) (3); 2) to restore children to their families through the provision of child welfare services, §625(a) (1) (D) and §627(a) (2) (C) ; and 3) to prevent or remedy problems which may result in neglect, abuse and dependency, §625(a)(1)(B) and 45 C.F.R. §§1357.15 (e)(1) and (2).
(b) coordinate programs and services under Title IV-A, IV-E, and XX of the Act, with a view to providing those welfare and related services for children and their families which will best promote their welfare. 42 U.S.C. §622(b)(2).
- 6 -

(c) have in effect an individualized case plan for each child in foster care that details appropriate services to be provided to the parent, child and foster parents in order to improve the conditions that led to removal of the child and to achieve family reunification. 42 U.S.C. §§671(a)(4) and 675; 42 U.S.C. 627(a) (2) (B).
(d) provide written notices to parents and a right to a fair hearing when the agency denied benefits to them. 45 C.F.R. §1355.30(k).
18. Under Title IV-E, Illinois must: (a) make reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal
of a child from his or her family or to make it possible for the child to be reunited with his or her family if the child has been removed. -42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15) and 45 C.F.R. §1356.21(b).
(b) have in effect an individualized case plan for each child in foster care which details appropriate services to be provided to the parents, child and foster parents in order to improve the conditions leading to placement of the child and to achieve family reunification. 42 U.S.C. 675(1).
(c) have in effect a case review system containing procedural safeguards. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(16), §675(5)(c) and 45 C.F.R. §1356.21 (d)(4).
(d) provide for coordination of services with other state programs, including assistance under Title IV-A and Title XX. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(4).
(e) provide written notices to parents and a right to a
- 7 -

fair hearing when the agency denies benefits to them. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(12) and 45 C.F.R. §1355.30(k).
ILLINOIS CASH, FOOD, HOUSING AND UTILITIES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR INDIGENT PARENTS
19. Illinois, through the Illinois Department of Public Aid ("IDPA"), participates in''the federally-funded Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §601 gt sec. The purpose of this program is to provide subsistence benefits to indigent children and the "caretaker relatives" residing with them who meet the eligibility requirements for the program.
20. In Illinois, IDPA also administers three emergency assistance funds to provide cash assistance to families with special needs and to keep families together. These funds provide, inter plia, assistance to forestall eviction, security deposits for homeless families, as well as assistance to secure replacement furniture, stoves and refrigerators and other basic necessities for families. AFDC PO §1300 et seq.
21. Parents whose children are removed from their custody by DCFS for more than one month lose eligibility for AFDC. While the parents whose children have been taken from them may be eligible for the state or locally-funded General Assistance (GA) program, the GA benefit levels are much lower than those for AFDC. For example, while AFDC provides benefits of $250 for a mother and child in Chicago and slightly less in other parts of the state, GA provides benefits of only $154 per month for a single adult, and much less in those parts of the state whose GA programs are not state-funded. Indeed, many localities provide
- 8 -

no cash GA at all. An adult cannot requalify for AFDC unless she regains actual custody of the children.
22. Illinois administers the federally-funded food stamp program through the IDPA. The purpose of the food stamp program is to alleviate hunger and malnourishment in low-income households. 7 U.S.C. §2011,. Under this program, a family's food budget is supplemented by coupons redeemable for food. 7 U.S.C. §2011ett seq.
23. The Illinois Department of Public Health administers the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) food supplement program. This program provides food for_ "high risk" mothers, pregnant women infants and children. Under this program, coupons are provided to eligible women which can be used for milk, cheese, eggs and other highly nutritional foods. 42 U.S.C. §1786; 7 C.F.R. §246.
24. (a) Through a variety of funding mechanisms, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development provides funding for public housing and subsidized housing for low income families. These programs include the Public Housing Program, the Section 8 Housing Program, the Rent Supplement Program, the Section 221(2)(3) Program, the Section 236 Program, and the Housing Voucher Program. 24 U.S.C. §§1437 et se g .; 12 U.S.C. §§1701s, 1715(d)(3), 1715z-1.
(b) The Illinois Housing Development Authority provides subsidized housing for low-income families in Illinois through
several funding mechanisms, some of which are entirely
independent of federal funds, such as state bond issuances. I11.
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Rev. Stat. ch. 67 1/2, §§301 gt sec. (c) Homeless families, families living in substandard
housing, and families paying more than 50% of income in rent are entitled by law to priority placement in. public housing. 24 C.F.R. Parts 215, 880-884, 886 and 960 (1988).
(d) Public housing authorities throughout the state are chartered under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 67 1/2, §§1 gt sea. and provide low-income housing. The Chicago Housing Authority, for example, operates approximately 26,000 units of public housing reserved for low-income families. Approximately 6,000 of those units are vacant. In some of the projects of the Chicago Housing Authority, the waiting list for these is as short as one or two months.
25. Illinois administers the Illinois Home Energy Assistance Program (IHEAP) which is a cash assistance program, providing funds to low-income persons to pay utility bills and to enable persons without utility service to be reconnected. The Illinois Residential Affordable Payment Plan (IRAPP) is a bill-payment program that protects enrolled households from utility disconnection in the winter if they make certain percentage payments on their utility bills.
26. DCFS also has established two funds to meet the subsistence needs of families: the privately funded Harris Fund, which can make grants of $350 or more for families in need of funds to reunite their families, and the statutorily-created and state-funded Family Services Emergency Assistance Fund which can
- 10 -

provide up to $500 each year for families in economic crisis to prevent dissolution or to promote family reunification. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23 §5005.
27. DCFS also administers the Title XX day care program in Illinois which provides subsidized child care to low-income families.
28. In addition to publicly-funded subsistence programs, there are hundreds of private charitable programs in Illinois providing food, cash, clothing and shelter assistance to needy families.
DEFENDANT'S POLICIES AND PRACTICES CONCERNING POOR FAI(ILIES 29. Under defendant's policy and practice: (a) DCP removes children' - from their houses without
determining whether provision of the family subsistence needs would enable the child to remain safely at home, and without providing or arranging for provision of such subsistence in appropriate cases.
(b) DCP does not assist families found "neglectful" because they lack cash, food, shelter or other subsistence in securing such cash, food, shelter, or other subsistence through provision of benefits or referral for benefits and services;
(c) DCP routinely removes children from their parents due to homelessness or other conditions caused by poverty alone.
30. Under defendant's policy and practice, DCFS: (a) authorizes its workers to: intervene to terminate
parents' tenancies or other housing arrangements, place parents
- 11 -

and families in housing facilities that DCFS itself deems inadequate, and to act to cause reductions in assistance available to the family even when parents have custody of their children;
(b) routinely fails to assist parents in applying for the programs described in §§19-28 Apra;
(c) maintains no coordinated program of assistance to poor families to remedy the deprivation of shelter, food, clothing, child care or other subsistence that led to an indicated report or removal of children from their homes;
(d) fails to maintain referral lists for available shelter, utility assistance, food, and cash assistance from other public and private agencies;
(e) routinely fails to provide needed documents to plaintiff class members to enable them to demonstrate their eligibility for federal, state, and local assistance programs, even when plaintiffs themselves take all steps to qualify for available benefits;
(f) routinely requires that plaintiff class members discover and procure shelter, utility services, food, clothing, child care or other provisions that they cannot afford, as a condition of retaining or obtaining custody of their children. Defendant's determination of what .. constitutes "adequate" housing is left to individual caseworkers, without any written standards;
(g) routinely delays notifying IDPA and public housing authorities of the intended or actual return of plaintiff
- 12 -

children. As a result, plaintiff class members' ability to requalify for assistance is delayed and their ability to reunite their families is imperilled for lack of AFDC or public housing benefits.
(h) by enforcement of the policies and practices described in subparagraphs (a) - (g) or otherwise, exacerberates plaintiffs' poverty and takes and retains custody of plaintiffs' children because of conditions caused solely by plaintiffs' poverty.
31. Defendant routinely: (a) fails to notify plaintiffs concerning cash, child care and other benefits available from DCFS; (b) when plaintiffs become aware of benefits available from DCFS and- - apply for such assistance, defendant does not notify them when benefits are denied or of their appeal rights; (c) does not maintain a system allowing for a fair hearing or any other appeal or review when cash assistance, child care or coordinated services to secure cash, food, shelter or child care are denied.
THE PLAINTIFFS AND TAE PLAINTIFF CLASS JACQUELINE FIELDS
32. (a) Plaintiff Jacqueline Fields is the mother of six children. Except at those times DCFS has intervened to reduce her public aid, she has received AFDC benefits of $481 for herself and her children. She lost custody of her youngest children, Roy and Shana, on December 28, 1987 after she entered a
- 13 -

drug rehabilitation program. The children's cousin reported her children to DCFS as "abandoned." The children were returned to Plaintiff Fields' custody on January 21, 1988, with a protective order. That order requires Plaintiff Fields to find suitable housing and to seek assistance from IDPA in securing additional beds for her children.
(b) Plaintiff Fields has attempted to locate suitable housing for her children. At the time her children were returned to her, in January, 1988 she was living in a four room apartment. Her DCFS worker found the apartment unsuitable because it was too small and told her to move. In October, 1988, she moved to an eight room apartment. Two weeks later, she learned that this building had been condemned. She then moved temporarily to a shelter until December 15. She found a five bedroom apartment and moved in shortly thereafter.
(c) Plaintiff Field's DCFS caseworker visited Plaintiff Field's apartment in mid-January 1989. Plaintiff Fields had left that same day to go to her public aid office in order to obtain vouchers for beds for her children. When Plaintiff Fields was not present, her DCFS caseworker told Plaintiff Field's landlord of her history with DCFS. The worker also told the landlord that she had seven children living there. As a result of this conversation, Plaintiff Field's landlord told her to vacate the apartment that day and he returned her January rent money.
(d) On or about January 12, 1989, Plaintiff Field's DCFS caseworker also called IDPA to inform her public aid
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caseworker that Plaintiff Fields was not living at her apartment and that she was "mishandling her AFDC grant." As a result, in the first week of February, 1989, IDPA cancelled the family's AFDC grant.
(e) Plaintiff Fields has now_ found a five bedroom apartment which rents for $390 per month. She cannot move into this apartment until she secures funds. She must wait 45 days for a decision on her renewed AFDC application, and she is likely to lose the apartment if she does not secure funds sooner.
(f) DCFS has acted to cut off Plaintiff Field's AFDC benefits and has caused her to move or be evicted several times.
DCFS has never offered Plaintiff Fields any financial assistance or other assistance, including referral to secure housing or furnishings for her family. At the same time as it has acted to
impair Plaintiff Field's tenancy, DCFS has insisted that Plaintiff Fields on her own secure "adequate housing" for herself and her six children.
g. Plaintiff Fields remains at risk that DCFS will remove her children from her custody due to her lack of adequate housing.
JAMES NORMAN
33. (a) Plaintiff James Norman became the sole caretaker of his two children when his wife died in October, 1987. Plaintiff Norman is a former steel and construction worker. After his wife's death, the family had a monthly household income of $300 in Social Security benefits, occasionally supplemented by
- 15 -

Plaintiff Norman's wages when he could find part-time work. At one time, the family also received $140 per month in AFDC, but IDPA, claiming an overpayment, cancelled the grant in August, 1988. Plaintiff Norman stopped receiving $200 in Social Security benefits for his daughter in November, 1988.
(b) Plaintiff Norman could not meet all the household expenses, which included rent, utility bills, and medication for
his heart condition. Since he could not pay for the mounting
utility bills, the gas and electric service to his apartment was terminated. Plaintiff Norman had applied for an IHEAP grant to assist him with the utility bills in April of 1988, but he was told that it was too late in the year for him to obtain such assistance;
(c) Primarily because he was unable to pay his utility bills and maintain the gas and electric service in his apartment, DCFS accused Plaintiff Norman of "financial neglect" and removed his children from his custody on August 16, 1988. Before and after removing the children, DCFS offered Plaintiff Norman no help in securing cash assistance to maintain the utilities, nor did DCFS ever inform him of cash assistance programs for which he might qualify. DCFS also claimed that Plaintiff Norman was too often absent from the home and the children lacked sufficient supervision. Plaintiff Norman had been trying to increase his family's income and his job opportunities by attending auto mechanic classes a€ the Lincoln Technical Institute and also working part-time. Plaintiff Norman could not afford to pay for
- 16 -

child care services during the time he was attending classes. At no time did DCFS offer help to Plaintiff Norman with child care or other necessities.
(d) After DCFS took his children Plaintiff Norman had to give up his apartment and move into a cramped quarters with relatives. DCFS has told him that he must secure adequate housing and utility service in order to have his children returned to him. DCFS has given him no help however, in relocating housing. In addition, DCFS has never notified him of any funds or other assistance available to him and has not helped him to qualify for such assistance. Instead, DCFS has simply told him to .'gget a job.
PAULETTE PATTERSON 34. (a) Plaintiff Paulette Patterson suffers from ataxia and is confined to a wheel chair. She has been adjudicated disabled by the Social Security Administration and currently receives Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments in the amount of $94 per month.
(b) In July 1983, Ms. Patterson, then receiving SSI and AFDC while caring for her three children, was evicted from her dilapidated apartment for non-payment of rent. She had been withholding rent in an effort to have the landlord make necessary repairs. At the request of DCFS, a church in Maywood, Illinois then housed Plaintiff Patterson and her children in a run-down hotel with no bathroom and no elevator. Shortly thereafter, DCFS informed Plaintiff Patterson that this housing was inadequate.
- 17 -

DCFS took custody of her three children on September 19, 1983. (c) When the children were taken, Plaintiff Patterson
was put out of the hotel and she lost her AFDC grant. Plaintiff Patterson had to live for four days in a park. When she asked her DCFS worker for help, the worker informed her that DCFS helps children, not parents. Ms. Patterson asked the Maywood church for help and eventually was admitted into a shelter.
(d) Once Plaintiff Patterson's children were removed from her and she became homeless, DCFS gave her no help in relocating housing. Her DCFS worker told her that she could neither see nor talk to her children until she located adequate housing.
(e) DCFS refused to permit any visitation with her children for three months. Thereafter, Plaintiff Patterson was permitted to visit her children for one hour per month. Over the strenuous objections of the plaintiff, and approximately six months after they had taken custody, DCFS placed the children with their maternal grandparents in Arkansas where they remain today. DCFS has failed to arrange any regular visitation between Plaintiff Patterson and her children.
(f) In the ensuing four years, DCFS has offered no cash assistance to Plaintiff Patterson and has not told her how she might qualify for any such assistance. DCFS has repeatedly insisted that plaintiff could not have her children returned until plaintiff secured adequate housing. DCFS has offered no assistance in procuring such housing.
- 18 -

(g) DCFS has spent over $600 per month to maintain Plaintiff
Patterson's children in foster care. DCFS has spent nothing to
help Plaintiff Patterson locate or maintain an apartment in which she could be reunited with her children.
THE PLAINTIFF CLASS 35. Plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class have lost custody of their children, or are at risk of losing custody or cannot regain custody because they lack money to provide care food, shelter or other care that DCFS considers necessary. 36. The policies described at paragraphs 29-31 have been applied to plaintiffs and the plaintiff class. 37. As a direct result of the policies and practices of the defendant as stated in paragraphs 29 through 31, the plaintiffs and the members of the plaintiff class have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable injury due to the threatened or the actual dissolution of their families. Plaintiffs' poverty has increased due to defendant's policies, leading to further irreparable injury. Plaintiffs have also suffered profound and irreparable emotional distress due to threatened or actual loss of custody of their children. There is no adequate remedy at law.
CLAIMS 38. The policies and practices described at paragraphs 29-31 violate:
(a) 42 U.S.C. §§ 627(a)(2)(c), 627(b)(2) and 45 C.F.R. §1357.15(e) which require that Illinois have in effect a service program designed to prevent placement and facilitate return of a
- 19 -

child to his or her family, where appropriate; (b) 42 U.S.C. 622§§ (b) (2) and 671 (a) (4) which require that
DCFS child welfare services be coordinated with the IV-A, IV-E and Title XX program, and other related programs;
(c) 42 U.S.C. §§627(a)(2)(C), 671(a)(15), and 45 C.F.R. §1356.21(b) which require that reasonable efforts be made to prevent placement of children and reunite families;
(d) 41 U.S.C. §671(a)(16) and 45 C.F.R. §1356.21 (d)(4), which require the dgvelopment of a written case plan for each child that will facilitate return of the child to his home; and
(e) The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
39. The policies and practices described in paragraph 31 violate:
(a) 42 U.S.0 §627(a) (2) (B) and 42 U.S.C. §671 (a) (12), and 45 C.F.R. §1355.30(k) which require that the Illinois child welfare agency afford parents written notices and a right to a fair hearing when the agency denies benefits to them.
(b) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court: A. Declare that the defendant's policies and practices as described in paragraphs 29 through 31 violate 42 U.S.C. §622(b)(2), 627 (a) (2) (c) , and (b) (2) , 671 (a) (4) , (12) , (15) and (16), and 45 C.F.R. §1335.30(k), §1356.21 (b) and (d)(4),

1357.15(e), and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
B. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendant from: 1. Maintaining policies and practices of removing children from impoverished parents instead of assisting them with cash, food, shelter, utilities or other subsistence or referring them for such assistance; 2. Intervening to terminate plaintiff's housing arrangements or subsistence benefits except pursuant to lawful requirements; 3. Failing to maintain or coordinate services and benefits available to plaintiffs with IV-A, IV-E, Title XX, and other programs related to child welfare; 4. Failing to adopt reasonable written standards as to the nature and quality of housing or other subsistence plaintiffs must secure in order to maintain or reunite their families; 5. Maintaining policies and practices of failing to assist plaintiffs promptly to qualify for assistance to which they may be eligible or impairing their eligibility for assistance; 6. Maintaining policies and practices of failing to notify plaintiffs immediately of cash, food, shelter, utility, child care and other services
- 21 -

available from DCFS, .from other publicly-funded

agencies and from local private agencies;

7. Maintaining policies and practices of failing to

afford plaintiffs the opportunity to appeal the

denial of subsistence benefits or other

assistance;

C. Award the plaintiffs their costs and attorney's

fees; and

D. Award plaintiffs such other relief as this Court deems

just.

/I n
/AY ('/-'CLi/JIj
One of the Attorneys for ftlainti

LAURENE HEYBACH DIANE REDLEAF Children's Rights Project Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago 343 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 341-1070

SUSAN WISHNICK Uptown Office Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago 4753 N. Broadway, #1118 Chicago, IL 60640 (312) 769-1015

JOAN MATLACK Englewood Office Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago 852 West 63rd Street Chicago, IL 60621 651-3100

- 22 -

 
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JACQUELINE FIELDS, et. al. Plaintiffs,
vs. GORDON JOHNSON,
Defendant.

No. 89 C 1624 Magistrate Gottschall

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 filed on behalf of a class of plaintiff parents whose children are the subject of an indicated report of abuse or neglect made by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). 1 Plaintiffs allege that defendant Gordon
Johnson, director of DCFS, has violated and continues to violate
their rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA"), 42 U.S.C. §§620 et sew. and §§671 et sea. and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Now pending for decision are the individual claims of plaintiffs Gina Johnson and James Norman for preliminary injunctive relief. They seek an order (1) enjoining defendant
from continuing to impose financial conditions upon them as a
prerequisite for plaintiffs obtaining custody of their children,

1 The class is defined in plaintiffs' Complaint at Paragraph 6. No class has yet been certified.

while failing to provide any services through which plaintiffs could meet those financial conditions; and (2) directing defendant to provide coordinated services to enable them to find permanent adequate housing.
A five day hearing was held from May 16 to 22, 1989 during which the following witnesses testified for plaintiffs: plaintiffs James Norman; Gina Johnson; Sarah's Inn counsellor Sherrie Parker; Dr. Ner Littner, psychiatric expert on the traumatic effects of parent-child separation; Chicago Urban League low-income housing specialist Smallie Mike Cook; Margaret Hughes, administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Act program in Chicago, and rebuttal child welfare expert Denise Kane. Defendants' witnesses included defendant's designated representative Theresa Mayberry -Dunn; DCFS child protective worker Walter Henry, who investigated the Johnson case; DCFS worker Susan Bobolink (James Norman's worker); DCFS worker John Mukasa-Ssebaana (Gina Johnson's worker); and the head of the DCFS "Family First" program, Diane Yost. Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence as well as the depositions of Mr. MukasaSsebaana, Ms. Bobolink, and Cook County DCFS Regional Administrator Ina Denton for use by plaintiffs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a) (2) . II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the testimony of record, the evidence presented and the briefs and argument of counsel, the Court finds as follows:
A. The Child Welfare System In Illinois
- 2 -

1. Gordon Johnson is the director of DCFS and is, by law, charged with its administration.
2. DCFS receives millions of dollars yearly to-implement the child welfare programs mandated by the AACWA.
3. When DCFS receives information that a child in Illinois is abused or neglected (typically through a call to the DCFS' hotline) a worker from the DCFS's Division of Child Protection (DCP) is assigned to interview the child and must do so within 24 hours. DCFS has published criteria for what constitutes abuse and neglect which, in relevant part, appear in Pls. Exh. 13.
4. The- DCP workers are empowered to take protective custody of children and, as a matter of DCFS policy, have broad discretion to determine in each case whether to do so.
5. When children are taken into protective custody, or later into temporary custody or guardianship, the placement is referred to as substitute care or foster care. The cost of such placement can be more than $100 per day.
6. As a matter of DCFS policy and practice, DCP workers do not routinely assess family needs and do not arrange for the provision of services to enable families to stay together. According to DCFS policy, it is the responsibility of the followup worker, not the DCP worker, to arrange for services to the family. This follow-up worker is assigned 2-3 weeks after children come into custody and often does not actually act on the case until a later time.
7. By DCFS regulation, the follow-up worker must complete
- 3 -

the service plan for a family (hereinafter 'case plan") within 30 days of case opening. The case plan must include a complete listing of services to be provided by DCFS to the family to meet the child's permanency goal, e.g. 'return home".
8. DCFS conducts administrative case reviews (~ACRs") concerning progress on case plans at six month intervals but does not conduct ACRS if the children are in foster placement with a relative.
9. DCFS routinely provides counseling and homemaker services to families either directly or through "purchase of service" (POS) agreements with other agencies. It does not provide services to assist with housing, either directly or through a POS.
10. DCFS has one cash fund to assist families, the Harris Fund. At the time of trial, these funds were still available. To obtain this money, a DCFS worker must process a grant request and receive approval. Money is only given on a limited basis and only when reunification of the family is ~imminent~. The average grant given is $350. DCFS provides no other cash resources to assist
impoverished families in obtaining or furnishing adequate
housing. 11. In order to comply with the AACWA, DCFS has created a
~Family First~ program which serves a very small number of families and provides home-based services to avoid removal of children from the home. This program serves a limited population and has not been offered to plaintiffs since it only serves
- 4 -

intact families. 12. Apart from 'a small project at the Ida B. Wells Homes,
DCFS has no liaison or contract with the Chicago Housing Authority or the Illinois Department of Public Aid, the principal sources of cash and housing for low-income persons in Chicago. DCFS has no job referral program for parents.
B. The Effects of Separation on Parent and Child 13. Children and parents suffer both initial and long term traumatic effects of separation. These harmful effects upon the child include feelings of helplessness, guilt, self-blame, anger, and rejection. Prolonged separation can cause multi-generational effects, including "repetition" of placement of children and possible severe psycho-pathology. Parents also suffer harm and emotional trauma from separation, including feelings of selfblame, loss of self-esteem, and reduced ability to function. C. Appropriate Social Work Practice 14. According to appropriate social work standards for avoiding placement or reuniting families, vigorous services must be provided to families to address their problems as soon as possible. The sooner services are offered, the more likely it is that the family will be able to stay intact or be reunited. Good social work practice dictates that the social worker be involved in developing case plans, working cooperatively with the family and arranging services within a 48-hour period. 15. The aggressive provision of services remains critically important throughout the first year of separation; after a family
- 5 -

has been separated for one year, the rates of successful reunification decline dramatically. In addition, a minimally adequate service plan must contain tasks for the service provider as well as the client to perform.
D. Plaintiff Norman 16. James Norman is the single surviving parent of Lynetta Norman, age 12 and Jamie Norman, age 10. These children were taken into DCFS custody on August 16, 1988 by DCP worker Sylvia Walker when she found the children home alone, with no gas or electric utilities and no working refrigerator. The house was messy with papers and clothes strewn about. The children appeared "very healthy" and denied that they had been frequently left alone by their father. Ms. Walker placed the children with elderly maternal relatives in Harvey, Illinois, where they still remain. 17. Ms. Walker made no effort at the time she removed the children to contact Mr. Norman; she offered no services of any kind to the family; and she later determined that allegations of inadequate food and inadequate supervision were unfounded. She did find "indicated" the allegations of "environmental neglect". 18. The Norman case did not satisfy DCFS own written criteria for neglect since the housing they occupied was not unsafe for the children. 19. All the problems suffered by the Norman family in August of 1988 could have been remedied by the provision of services which already existed in the Chicago area. This would
- 6 -

have enabled the family to remain together. Such available services include: placing a homemaker in the home until Mr. Norman returned; arranging a budgeting skills course for Mr. Norman through United Charities; providing IHEAP and IDPA cash assistance for the refrigerator and utility problems, using Harris fund monies for rent, and advocating for additional public benefits or Social Security on Mr. Norman's behalf. None of these services to prevent placement were offered or arranged for the family.
20. Prior to removal of his children, Mr. Norman had been
working part time and receiving $300.00 per month Social Security
for his children plus food stamps. When the children were removed and DCFS began phoning his place of employment, he lost his job,
food stamps and the $300.00 Social Security payments. This
precipitated the loss of his apartment and he was forced to move into the crowded home of his cousin, where he presently resides. He currently has no income.
21. Both case plans prepared by DCFS for Mr. Norman were done without his participation. Both impose upon him as a condition for return of his children that he obtain "verifiable income" and "adequate" housing with utilities. Neither plan provides that DCFS will offer, or arrange for any other agency to offer services to assist Mr. Norman to obtain housing or income.
22. Mr. Norman's four DCFS workers failed to offer him any assistance in meeting those conditions. They never advised him of the availability of services or his right to receive them.
- 7 -

23. Mr. Norman's current worker, Ms. Bobolink, did nothing on the Norman case for the first three months it was assigned to her. She did finally meet with Mr. Norman in person on April 20th of this year, just prior to the scheduling of this case for
preliminary injunction hearing. She claimed to have made one
call on Mr. Norman's behalf to the Chicago Housing Authority but no assistance has resulted from that call. She also referred Mr. Norman to DCFS' youth employment specialist, a service she concedes is inappropriate for an adult. Ms. Bobolink has never applied for cash assistance for Mr. Norman.
24. Though Mr. Norman has been hospitalized twice for a serious heart ailment, his DCFS workers were not aware of this disability until Mr. Norman was deposed in this action. They have made no effort to help him establish entitlement to possible disability benefits.
25. In response to this litigation, Ms. Bobolink has prepared a case plan addendum in which DCFS for the first time commits to "assisting" Mr. Norman with applications for subsidized housing and for Social Security disability benefits. DCFS has not rendered any assistance with either application however.
26. It has been impossible for Mr. Norman to find employment given his serious heart ailment and the lack of funds for transportation. Without a job or other source of income, it is also impossible for him to afford private housing which would cost him at least $450 per month. Start up costs for private
- 8 -

housing are considerably higher, at least $1350. If Mr. Norman were to regain custody of his children, he would again receive Social Security on their behalf as well as AFDC and food stamps. Unless custody is regained, however, he will be ineligible for these benefits or for subsidized family housing.
27. In addition to DCFS's Harris Fund, there are services which exist in the Chicago area to meet the cash and housing needs of the Norman family. The Federal Emergency Management Assistance (FEMA) program administers housing, utility and cash programs. IHEAP and IRAPP provide utility assistance. The rent and security deposit funds provided through these programs could enable Mr. Norman to obtain housing for himself and his daughter.
28. The Norman family has suffered irreparably and continues to suffer from the needless separation caused by DCFS. DCFS has done nothing to mitigate the harm caused by seperation the Norman family.
E. Plaintiff Johnson 29. Gina Johnson is the natural mother of five children, Wade, age 9, Randy, age 7, Cheryl, age 5, Crystal, age 4 and Terrica age 3. Her children were taken into DCFS custody in March 1988 by DCP worker Walter Henry after Cheryl was sexually abused by Randy. Randy and his brother had lived most of their childhood with their natural father, a convicted murderer. At the time of the assault, they had been in plaintiff Johnson's care for three weeks. DCFS psychological evaluations showed both boys to be severely disturbed.
- 9 -

30. Mr. Walker made no effort to offer any services to the family at that time to attempt to keep the family intact. He also did nothing to minimize the trauma- of separation of the children.
31. Upon entering DCFS custody, Wade and Randy have been placed in one foster home, Crystal and Terrica in another, and Cheryl in a third.
32. Services did exist in the Chicago area at that time which could have been utilized to prevent removal of at least some of the siblings from their mother, including removal of the perpetrator, coupled either with placement of a caretaker in the home or placement of the remaining family members in a protective shelter for the victims of domestic violence.
33. When DCFS intervened to remove the Johnson children, plaintiff Johnson lost her principle source of income -- AFDC of $504 -- and her apartment. She received no income until July, 1988, when she began receiving $154 per month in General Assistance benefits. Through the help of her sexual abuse counselor, Ms. Sherrie Parker, Johnson is receiving specialized treatment and services through a battered women's shelter, Sarah's Inn. Sarah's Inn, in conjunction with the Austin People's Action Center (^'APAC") is providing Ms. Johnson with her own apartment and supportive services as part of its program. The apartment is paid for at least in part through a FEMA grant.
34. Ms. Johnson's DCFS worker has consistently conditioned return of her children upon Ms. Johnson's securing permanent,
- 10 -

stable housing and income. Ms. Johnson has never been advised by DCFS that she had a right to receive any services to meet those conditions. Plaintiff has fulfilled every other requirement in her case plan. Her counselor recommends a phased-in return of her daughters (with initial unsupervised visits, monitoring, and
reunification with one child at a time). The DCFS worker insists
that the phased-in plan cannot proceed until Ms. Johnson has been in her own "permanent" apartment without supportive help for six months.
35. This "permanent" housing requirement, also referred to by the DCFS worker as "independent functioning" is merely an economic condition imposed upon plaintiff for return of her children. Such a requirement runs afoul of social work practice standards which mandate no such "independence" test and, to the contrary, encourage a supportive living arrangement for reunification of a family effected by domestic violence. There is no written DCFS policy requiring any such waiting period.
36. While DCFS has offered services to plaintiff Johnson,
it has failed to provide her with any assistance in meeting the "permanent housing" condition it has imposed upon her. DCFS is not committed in any of the service plans to offering her housing assistance or cash. How she might afford her own apartment remains a mystery: without custody of some of her children she is not ineligible for subsidized housing or AFDC and she cannot afford private housing on her GA grant. If her children are not returned soon, she will lose the housing she does have. By
- 11 -

refusing to proceed with her phased in reunification plan and refusing to offer her housing or cash assistance, DCFS is blocking the only avenues by which she can • return to "independence".
37. The Johnson family has suffered irreparably from their prolonged separation. DCFS did nothing to mitigate the harm caused by separation of the Johnson family.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of success on the merits:
a. Defendant violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights to family integrity by improperly removing their children from them.
b. Defendant violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights to family integrity by intervening excessively into their families, unnecessarily maintaining their children in foster care and taking no action to reunite their families.
c. Defendant violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights to family integrity by causing and perpetuating those very conditions now allegedly requiring separation of these families: lack of adequate housing and income.
d. Defendant has violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' due process rights by imposing conditions for family reunification upon them which are beyond their control.
- 12 -

e. Defendant violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15) to have the state agency make "reasonable efforts" to prevent the• removal of their children from their homes.
f. Defendant violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15) to have the state agency make ongoing "reasonable efforts" to reunite them with their children.
g. Defendant has violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§671(a)(16) and 675(1) to have a case plan which assures the receipt of appropriate services "to facilitate the return of the child".
h. Defendant has violated and continues to violate James Norman's right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(16) to a case review to assure compliance with federal law.
i. Defendant has violated and continues to violate plaintiffs' right to receive services coordinated with other child welfare programs and related services as required by 42 U.S.C. §§622(b)(2) and (7) and §671(a)(4).
2. Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if relief is denied:
a. Deprivation of plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury.
b. Plaintiffs have suffered loss of subsistence income which constitutes irreparable injury.
c. Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional and
- 13 -

psychological trauma due to the removal and separation of their children from them, which constitutes irreparable injury.
3. The hardship to plaintiffs- from denying relief outweighs the hardship to defendant from granting relief.
4. There is no adequate remedy at law. 5. The public interest is served by granting preliminary injunctive relief which will promote family reunification. 6. Defendant's arguments against relief have no merit.
a. The doctrine of abstention is no bar to the relief requested.
b. The eleventh amendment is no bar to the relief requested.
C. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to bar the relief requested, since the issues raised here were not litigated in state court.
7. Plaintiffs are indigent and cannot afford a bond. Respectfully submitted,
One of the attorneys for P1 tiff
- 14 -

DIANE REDLEAF LAURENE M. HEYBACH LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION
OF CHICAGO 343 S. Dearborn, #700 Chicago, IL 60604
JOAN MATLACK ENGLEWOOD OFFICE 852 W. 63rd St. Chicago, IL 60621

SUSAN WISHNICK UPTOWN OFFICE LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION
OF CHICAGO 4753 N. Broadway Ave. Chicago, IL 60640

 
 L_ , . __

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT' COURT

1 E FOR THE,. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS /,Q

^ ^ , _ j lZ.

EASTERN DIVISION

Jacqueline Fields, et. al.

Plaintiffs,
VS.
GORDON JOHNSON,

Jilt. 1

No. 89 C

"'

,
uAffr

IJN/TM

CUhNINGHAXI

CLER_

STATES DIS7 ICT r^

Defendant.

)

0

PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION

1

II. FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL

3

A. DCFS Has an Established Policy and Practice

of Failing to Provide Preventa-

tive and Reunification Services'

4

1. Neglect Reporting Procedures,

Protective Custody and the

Initial Provision of Services

4

2. Casework and Service Delivery

Following Removal of Children

7

3. The Need For Cash, Housing

and Other "Hard Services" for

Families With Children In Foster

Care

10

B. The Effects of Separation on Parents and

Children and Appropriate Social Work

Practice

11

C. The Norman Family

16

D. The Johnson Family

20

III. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS

OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

26

A. Plaintiffs Are Constitutionally Protected From Unwarranted State Intrusion Into Their

Family Lives

26

B. Defendant's Intrusions Into Plaintiffs'

Families Must Promote A Compelling State

Interest and May Not Unnecessarily Impinge --

Upon Their Fundamental Rights

28

C. Defendant May Not Constitutionally Impose

Unreasonable Conditions on Family

Reunification

31

D. Defendant's Intrusions Into Plaintiffs'

Families Here Is Unconstitutionally

Excessive and Improper

32

PAGE

E. Defendant Has Violated James Norman's and

Gina Johnson's Constitutional Rights

34

IV. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS

OF THEIR STATUTORY CLAIMS

36

A. The Plaintiffs Are Likely To Succeed

In Their Claims Under the AACWA; Defendant

Has Violated AACWA's Mandates of

"Reasonable Efforts" to Prevent Placement

and Reunite Families; Case Plans and Case

Review; and Coordinated Services

36

B. Defendant Has Violated and Continues to

Violate Plaintiffs' Rights Under the

AACWA

40

1. Statutory Violations in James

Norman's Case

40

2. Statutory Violations in Gina Johnson's

Case

43

V. PLAINTIFFS NORMAN AND JOHNSON ARE IRREPARABLY

INJURED BY DCFS'S IMPOSITION OF FINANCIAL

CONDITIONS FOR RETURN OF THEIR CHILDREN AND

DCFS'S FAILURE TO ASSIST THEM TO MEET

THESE CONDITIONS

44

IV. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIEF SHOULD

BE REJECTED

45

A. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel

Does Not Apply to Issues Not Litigated

Elsewhere

45

B. The Balance of Harms and Public Interest

Weigh Heavily in Plaintiffs' Favor

48

VII. CONCLUSION

-

'50

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION -

JACQUELINE FIELDS, et al.

)

Plaintiffs,

vs. GORDON JOHNSON,

No. 89 C 1624
Magistrate Gottschall )

Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF I. INTRODUCTION' James Norman and Gina Johnson, named plaintiffs in this case, seek to enjoin the defendant, Gordon Johnson, the director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") from imposing on them impossible financial conditions for return of their children. Plaintiffs contend that defendant's arbitrary imposition of financial conditions coupled with his failure to assist them to meet these conditions violates the

1 Plaintiffs earlier fully briefed the power of the district court to grant the relief requested. That discussion will not be repeated here. (See P1. Mems. dated March 3, 1989 and March 24, 1989). Judge Hart has preliminarily denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss but will permit defendant to re-brief issues related to private rights of action after these preliminary injunction proceedings are resolved. (See Minute Order dated June 6, 1989). For that reason, plaintiffs will reserve argument on the issue of a private right of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act for claims under 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15) and Title IV-B. Addressed below are the legal and factual basis of plaintiffs' claims for preliminary relief as developed at trial and the issue of collateral estoppel (raised for the first time in defendant's Pretrial Memorandum).
- 1 -

"reasonable efforts" ,requirement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA") , 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15), the "case plan" and "case review" requirements of 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(16), and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also allege that DCFS workers are unaware of available programs offering cash and housing to families and that DCFS has failed to coordinate its programs and services with those of Title IV-A and Title XX as well as other programs related to child welfare, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§622(b)(2) and 671(a)(4).
The evidence at trial pertaining to the cases of James Norman and Gina Johnson graphically demonstrates DCFS's unwarranted destruction of families, coupled with its failure to work speedily to reunite them. Plaintiff Norman's children were first removed by:DCFS for "environmental neglect" -- in violation of DCFS's own written criteria. At the time of the state's initial intervention, the state offered Mr. Norman no services to prevent placement of his children in foster care. Due to the state's intervention, however, Mr. Norman lost his home, his job and the monthly public benefits and Social Security he used to support his children. He is now told by DCFS that he must regain those very things before DCFS will recommend reunification of his family. DCFS has consistently failed and refused to offer the basic services the Norman family needs to be reunited: cash for housing, assistance in procuring a source of income, assistance in locating housing, and transportation to locate housing. These
- 2 -

services are available and, pursuant to federal law, should either have been provided to reunify the family or the impossible financial conditions for reunification should have been -dropped.
DCFS removed plaintiff Gina Johnson's children following sexual abuse of one sibling by another when Ms. Johnson was out of the house. Despite the possibility that homemaker, day care or other services might have adequately protected her children if they remained in Ms. Johnson's custody, DCFS made no attempt of any kind to provide any services to enable her children to remain at home. Due to the state's intervention and the placement of her children, plaintiff Johnson lost her public benefits. Then, unable to pay rent without such income, she lost her housing. DCFS thereafter imposed upon plaintiff the condition that she acquire "stable permanent housing". While she later procured a spacious apartment, plaintiff Johnson's DCFS worker refuses to permit the reunification plan to proceed, in part because her housing is not "permanent". Ms. Johnson now is in an impossible bind: without her children she cannot afford "permanent housing", but without permanent housing she cannot regain custody.
DCFS thus holds plaintiffs' children hostage as plaintiffs struggle on their own to find housing and sufficient income to satisfy DCFS. Plaintiffs contend that either DCFS must assist them to meet the financial conditions it imposes, or it must cease to impose these burdensome requirements. II. FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL
A. DCFS Has An Established Policy and Practice of Failing to Provide Preventative and Reunification Services

DCFS receives millions of dollars in Title IV-B and IV-E
funding to implement the child welfare program mandated by the
AACWA, 42 U.S.C. §620 and §670 et sue. (Denton Dep. p. 85).2
This funding includes money for family reunification services.
(Id. p. 123).
1. Neglect Reporting Procedures, Protective Custody and the Initial Provision of Services to Families
Cases of abuse or neglect normally come to the attention of
DCFS through a call to the DCFS Hotline in Springfield. DCFS
notifies its Division of Child Protection ("DCP") concerning each
call, and a DCP worker is then assigned to interview the child
involved within 24 hours. (Testimony ("T") of Theresa Mayberry-
Dunn). 3 DCP workers are empowered by state law to take protective
custody of children. Ill.Rev.Stat.ch.23 §2057.4 (b) (2). They are
also charged by law with the duty to assess the need for, and to
render, services to keep families intact. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23,
§2057.4.
In determining whether to take protective custody of
children, DCP workers make use of a "Risk Assessment" Inventory.
2 Plaintiffs submitted three depositions taken prior to trial under Fed.R.Civ.P.30(b)(6), and these depositions were admitted in evidence for use "by an adverse party for any purpose" pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P.32(a)(2). These depositions of DCFS Regional Administrator Ina Denton, caseworker John MukasaSsebanna and caseworker Susan Bobolink, are identified in the text by the last name of the deponent, "dep" and page.
3 Plaintiffs ordered transcripts only of the testimony of James Norman, Gina Johnson and Denise Kane. Their testimony is cited by page, but other witnesses' testimony at trial is cited generally, based on plaintiffs' recollection and notes.
- 4 -

(Denton Dep. pp. 106-107). This inventory relies on the worker's assessment of 13 factors, including the age of the child, history of abuse or neglect, environmental factors, stresses on the family, and the 'cooperativeness of the family". (See Pls. Exhs. 21, 23, and 24). DCFS also has written standards in its rules and regulations for determining if injuries or conditions constitute "neglect", and if so, how serious is the case. If the case is serious enough, DCFS may take protective custody of the child. Protective custody may be taken based on an allegation of "inadequate shelter" or "inadequate food". (Denton Dep. pp. 75, 91). DCP workers have broad discretion, however, to determine whether, in each case, there is adequate reason to remove
children from their home. (Id. pp. 100, 103, 105). DCFS's
standards regarding "inadequate shelter;' "inadequate food" and other "environmental neglect" are set forth at DCFS Manual Pt.88.4, 300(61) (Pis. Exh. 13).
When DCFS removes children, its DCP workers do not assess whether alternative services would enable the family to remain together. (Denton Dep. p. 68; but cf., Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23 §2057.4(b)(3) (DCP workers are mandated to make m an evaluation as to whether there would be an immediate and urgent necessity to remove the child if appropriate family preservation services are provided~)). This duty is not a part of the DCP function (Denton Dep. p. 90), since DCP workers are considered "investigators", not service providers. (Id. p. 67). Thus, if cash or housing assistance is all that a family needs to remain intact, DCFS
- 5 -

would not expect such assistance to be provided by its DCP workers. It would instead expect the DCP workers to use their discretion in determining whether to take protective custody. (Id. pp. 102-103).
Beginning in October, 1988, DCFS initiated a $1.5 million program in Cook County which enables a small group of children to remain home instead of entering the foster care system. This program -- called the "Family First Initiative" -- provides "intensive home-based services", including cash assistance of up to $500 per family, to some families. This program was developed "to meet the mandate" of both state and federal law, i.e., the Family Preservation Act, PA-85-985, embodied in Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23 §2057.4, §5005 and ch. 37 §801 et sec. (to be codified) and the AACWA (T. of Diane Yost). The program currently serves only families:
(1) for whom there is an abuse or neglect report; (2) whose case was reported to DCFS after October, 1988; (3) who have at least one child under the age of six: (4) who have fewer than three prior indicated reports; (5) whose children are in DCFS protective custody or
placement is imminent; and (6) who are referred by DCP. (T. of Diane Yost; Pls. Exh. 15 pp.4-5). There was conflicting testimony at trial as to whether sexual abuse cases were to be included in the Family First Initiative. (Compare T. of Diane Yost (sexual abuse cases included) with T. of DCP worker Walter
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Henry (such cases are ,.not included)). On May 4, 1989, DCFS, through Diane Yost, issued a mem-
randum to its site offices concerning special -assistance available to families threatened with removal of their children. (Def. Exh. 23). This memorandum tells staff that requests for this aid are to be "centralized through Sharon Garber". It does not mandate staff to identify all cases eligible for such funds. It is not clear whether DCP workers have been given this
memorandum or any instructions concerning processing such
requests for assistance. The only other cash or housing assistance available from
DCFS for families threatened with removal of their children is a small demonstration project with the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") at the Ida B. Wells public housing project. (Denton Dep. p. 58). This demonstration project serves 10 families in the DCFS East Area and is currently being revamped. (Id. pp. 50-56).
2. Casework and Service Delivery Following Removal of Children
After children are removed from their families, the children's and family's cases are assigned to a child welfare
worker at a field or site office. (T. of Theresa Mayberry- Dunn).
This assignment takes approximately two to three weeks. jd.
Actual case handling after assignment may take much longer. (The delay is currently challenged in Artist M. et al v. Johnson, No.
88 C 10503 (Dec. 14, 1988; Judge Shadur)). Children who are removed from their families are placed in
substitute care (including "foster care"). (Denton Dep. p. 78).
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Such care may cost more then $100 per day. (Id. pp. 78-80).
Within 30 days, child welfare workers are to develop a
"service plan" for each family. (Id. p. 127). These plans. are to
specify a "permanency goal" for the family, with "return home" a preferred goal. DCFS Policy §305 (29), Def. Exh. 21 p. 7). Service plans must also provide a statement as to why the children were removed and a complete listing of services the agency will provide to remedy the causes for removal. Service plans are to be developed with full consultation with the parent. (Denton Dep. p. 115).
Once service plans are developed, DCFS has an administrative case review ("ACI") system to review progress on the plans every six months. 4 (Id. pp. 81, 135). DCFS exempts children in relatives' homes from its ACR system, (Denton Dep. p. 136) however (despite a decision from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services grant appeal's board disapproving this exclusion). (See Decision, April 13, 1989, attached hereto as Appendix 1).
DCFS provides some services to parents through purchase of service agreements with private agencies. (Id. pp. 20, 28). Services that are routinely provided include counselling and homemaker services. (Id. pp. 112-113, 129-130). DCFS does not itself provide any housing assistance services, nor does it have any purchase of service agreements concerning any form of housing
4 These plans and reviews are intended to comply with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(16).
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assistance. (Id. p. 129; see also Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. p. 102). DCFS does operate one cash fund to assist families with
security deposits, rent or furnishings. This fund, •called the
Harris Fund, is made available only to families who have already located housing and for whose children DCFS has determined return
home is "imminent". (Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. pp. 57, 100). Average
grants from the fund are $350. (Denton Dep. p. 85). Despite defendant's representations at the outset of this litigation that Harris Funds had been depleted, at the time of trial Harris applications still were being processed. (Id. p. 85; Letter of Bart Murphy to Diane Redleaf, April 24, 1989, Appendix 2 hereto; Def. Exh. 22).
Apart from the Harris Fund, DCFS provides no resources to its workers to assist impoverished families with cash or housing. (Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. pp. 54, 102). While DCFS acknowledges its responsibility to link services to clients (Denton Dep. pp. 30, 58, 94, 96-97), DCFS itself has no liaison with the principal state and local agencies that provide cash or housing: i.e. the Illinois Department of Public Aid ("IDPA") and the CHA. (Id. p. 58). At the same time, however, DCFS service plans routinely require parents to secure adequate housing, furnishings and income before DCFS can recommend that children return home (Id. pp. 84, 93, 115; Service Plans of Norman and Johnson, Pls. Exhs. 1, 4, 7, 8) . "Adequate housing" as used in these service plans is defined differently by different workers: for example, Mr. Norman has been told by one worker he needed a one-bedroom
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apartment, while another worker insisted he locate a two-bedroom apartment to have his children returned. (Bobolink Dep. pp. 47 (how many bedrooms Mr. Norman needs depends on how "discrete" he is); see also Denton pp. 82-85; Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. pp. 60-61, 64 -65 (a caseworker will not recommend that a child return home if the parent's housing is "unstable and parent can be thrown out without notice"). The only written guideline as to what constitutes "adequate housing" is the DCFS Manual definition of "inadequate shelter" as a criteria for determining neglect. (DCFS R 300-Appendix B (14) at Pls. Exh. 13; Bobolink Dep. p. 27).
DCFS has no provisions -- including contracts, interagency agreements or specialized staff -- to help parents secure income or employment. DCFS does have a job program for its own minor wards, but not for parents of children in foster care. (Bobolink Dep. pp. 44-45). DCFS also has no internal mechanism for determining if "reasonable efforts", as required by federal law, are being made in an individual case. (Denton Dep. p. 131).
3. The Need For Cash, Housing and Other "Hard Services' For Families With Children In Foster Care
DCFS has acknowledged that lack of housing is a "major obstacle to family preservation". (Letter to Laurene M. Heybach from John Goad, Administrator of DCFS Office of Child Protection (DCP), Pls. Exh. 12). DCFS believes that "many children remain in care because their parents cannot obtain suitable housing." (fl.).
Parents cannot obtain such housing because their own income

often drops precipitously when they lose custody. If they received AFDC or Social Security children's benefits when they had custody of their children, they lose these benefits when their children are removed. (Denton Dep. p. 117). In lowerincome communities in Cook County, efficiency apartments cost approximately $350 per month and two bedroom units cost approximately $450, plus a two-month security deposit. Public housing and the Section 8 program provide federally-funded housing for some low income people, but many people experience a long wait to obtain such housing. (T. of Smallie Mike Cook).
Some initial housing rental funds are available in Cook County through the Federal Emergency Management Act ("FEMA") program. Margaret Hughes testified, in her capacity as administrator of the program, that FEMA grant agencies can provide security deposits, rent money and utility assistance to clients. This money can be used to augment monies from other sources -- e.g., DCFS's Harris Fund, to enable families to break into the housing market.
B. The Effects of Separation on Parents and Children and Appropriate Social Work Practice
When the AACWA was passed, there was growing evidence that the separation of children from their natural families was extremely harmful to children's development. At trial, Dr. Ner Littner, a nationally-recognized psychiatric expert on the traumatic effects of family separation, testified that the ability of a child to reach his or her full potential depends on
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the parent-child relationship. The parent-child relationship is the prototype of all relationships the child will later develop.
Dr. Littner himself conducted pioneering work on the effects of parent-child separation at the Children's Home and Aid Society (CHASI), the largest foster placement agency in Illinois.
Dr. Littner's work shows that the separation suffered by a child at initial placement is always harmful to the child, though the degree of harm depends on the child's age and health. The child views placement with fear. The child is confused, overwhelmed by a feeling of helplessness and guilt, filled with self-blame, and angry at the parents and society. The child's self-esteem is diminished, and he (or she) loses selfconfidence. Regardless of the quality of the prospective foster home, the child becomes very wary and expects punishment, even physical harm. In addition, "placement anxiety" can cause
headaches, colds and increased vulnerability to illrne5s and
infection. If prolonged, separation from a parent is even more
damaging, 5 creating emotional scarring that is "transgenerational". Children placed in substitute care develop what is termed "repetition compulsion": they desire to place their own children in foster care. Dr. Littner indicated that this compulsion has arisen in every child he has studied. Moreover, because the child perceives himself as rejected by his parent, he
.5 A "prolonged" separation for a child under six years of age is one lasting two to three weeks; for an older child, it is any time longer than 30 days. (T. of Littner).
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equates love with rejection. This creates enormous problems for future development, including an inability to trust, difficulty sustaining close relationships and an inability to live up to one's potential. Indeed, the child often goes into adulthood copying the worst aspects of parental behavior.
The effect of separation on the parent is less well-known, according to Dr. Littner, due to the tendency of child welfare agencies to ignore parental needs. Parents do, however, suffer harm from separation: they miss their child, blame themselves,
lose self-esteem, and lose the ability to function as well as
before. If the parent was placed in foster care as a child, the parent also relives that nightmare. Separation can thus seriously impair the parent's mental health.
Placement of children with relatives does not resolve these problems. While such placement may lessen some of the child's fear, it can increase conflicts of loyalty and intensify guilt. Relatives also often are not helpful to the parent seeking reunification.
The traumatic effects of separation are so devastating and so universal, according to Littner, that placement must be avoided wherever possible. If placement cannot be avoided, children must be reunited with their parents as soon as possible.6
6 Where removal of a child from a home is unavoidable, some techniques can lessen some of the devastating effects of separation, including advance preparation of the child and parent, gradual introduction of the child to the foster home, and insuring the continuity of the child-caseworker relationship. (T.
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Child welfare expert Denise Kane testified on rebuttal
concerning the appropriate social work standards for avoiding
placement or achieving speedy family reunification. She testified
that in the 1970's, social workers became aware that children
were entering foster care "too easily" and were remaining in
foster care too long. As they began to take a look at these
unnecessary family separations, they reevaluated intervention
strategies with troubled families and determined that:
[I)ntake is the most important time to make the most vigorous efforts to work on problems of families to keep families together. If families could not be kept together, then such efforts must vigorously be pursued at least crucially for the next year in order to reunite families because statistics dropped off dramatically after that year. It was more than likely the families would linger without reunification.
(T. of Kane pp. 140-141). The imperative to deliver vigorous
services to keep families intact, Ms. Kane explained, is
referred to in the social work field as making "reasonable
efforts". (Id. p. 140).
To accomplish "reasonable efforts", a worker must first make
an objective "risk" and "needs" assessment for the family (Id.
pp. 141, 169-171), documenting all relevant information in the
case file (Id. pp. 218, 233). The worker must work aggressively
and in collaboration with the family. (Id. p. 141). The sooner
services are offered, the better the ultimate outcome. (Id. at p.
146). Both "hard" and "soft" services should be provided: hard
of Littner) .
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services are those aimed at meeting subsistence needs -- housing,

cash and food. (Id. p. 142). These services are particularly

important for the urban poor. ( ,mod . p. 143.). The more ' the agency involves the client in the development of the service plan, the

more effective the outcome. (Id. p. 145). In addition, the

caseworker must "come through" with services to gain the trust

and respect of the client. (Id. p. 146). Good social work

practice, therefore, dictates that a social worker be involved in

the case at the very beginning and that services be arranged

within a 48 hour period. (Id. pp. 147, 231).

In cases of sexual abuse, keeping the child at home (after

removing the perpetrator) can be especially important. (Id. at

pp. 150-151). The child victim tends to blame herself for the

abuse and removal of the child under those circumstances can

intensify self-blame and make the child feel ostracized. (.

p.150).

Ms. Kane also testified that after the children are removed,

the caseworker must immediately begin an aggressive reunification

effort. (Id. p. 151). A case plan should be formulated

immediately as a "partnership" between the service provider,

(d. parents and child.

pp. 151-2, 175). To be minimally

adequate, the service plan must contain specific tasks for the

service provider to perform. (Id. p. 175). The timing of services

is critical: the longer a child remains in foster care, the more

difficult it will be to reunify the family. (Id. p. 153).

C. The Norman Family

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Plaintiff James Norman is the single parent of Lynetta, age
12, and Jamie, age 10 ,. (T. of Norman p. 3.) . Mrs. Norman passed
away in October of 1986. (I.).
Plaintiff Norman has now been separated from his daughters
for almost a full year. DCFS took custody of the Norman children
solely for economic reasons. On August 16, 1988, DCFS investiga-
tor Sylvia Walker removed the Norman children from their home
because the apartment allegedly was messy, with bugs, spoiled
food in the refrigerator, and no utilities. (Bobolink Dep. p. 32;
Pls. Exhs. 21, 22). Norman had lost his utility service because
he was unable to pay the bills.7
Plaintiffs' expert, Denise Kane, testified that there were
no sound social work reasons for DCFS's removal of the Norman
children. (T. of Kane p. 172). In fact, DCFS's removal of the
Norman children violated its own criteria for removal. First, the
risk assessment form filled out by Ms. Walker improperly
identified the children's age as placing them at "high risk",
when the risk assessment instrument defines older children like
Lynetta and Jamie as "low risk" unless they are disabled. (See
Pls. Exh. 24; T. of Kane p. 172) . The entire risk assessment is
7 A former steelworker, Mr. Norman has been unable to secure full-time employment since his wife became ill in 1984. (T. of Norman p. 5). He last worked part-time as a laborer in the summer of 1988, and also attended classes in advanced auto electronics at Lincoln Technical Institute at that time. (Id. pp. 4-5). In addition to the income from his part-time employment, Norman was receiving $300 in Social Security Survivor's Benefits and a small amount in AFDC benefits for himself and his daughters. He was unable to meet all his expenses, including rent, clothing for his daughters, and medication for his heart condition on this limited income. (Id.-pp. 6-7).
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miscoded in a similar fashion and scored incorrectly. (See Pls. Exh. 21 (six high risk categories shown on right but tabulation on left improperly added up to 11)). Second, Ms. Bobolink, Mr. Norman's current caseworker, testified that the children's health must actually be impaired before removal is appropriate. Ms. Walker's risk assessment form indicates that the children both appeared very healthy, and Ms. Bobolink could not identify any records in the Norman file showing evidence to the contrary. (Pls. Exh. 21; Bobolink Dep. pp. 32-3). Finally, DCFS's own standards for "inadequate shelter" define the seriousness of the case by whether the conditions pose a danger to the children's safety (Pls. Exh. 13); here, there was no such evidence.
The condition •of the Norman home -- basically, a household without utilities in the summer or a working refrigerator -- was readily correctable. (T. of Kane pp. 171-2). Yet at no time prior to the removal of :the children did Ms. Walker offer Mr. Norman any assistance in obtaining utilities or refrigeration. (T. of Norman p. 9). Nor did she, after removing the children, offer him any assistance with any of the family needs that had been identified -- utilities, refrigeration, housekeeping, employment, and housing. (Id. pp. 9, 17; see also Pls. Exh. 25 -- no preplacement services deemed "appropriate" by DCP worker).
Instead of offering assistance, DCFS placed economic conditions upon Mr. Norman for the return of his children. His September, 1988 service plan required him to obtain "a verifiable source of income" and "adequate housing". (Pls. Exh. 1). Mr.
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Norman did not participate in the drafting of the service plan,
and the plan does not specify any tasks to be undertaken by DCFS
to assist Mr. Norman. (T. of Norman p. 21). Mr. Norman's first three caseworkers failed to offer him any
assistance in meeting the objectives of the plan. Ms. Earlie, the caseworker who followed Ms. Walker, also offered him no assistance, not even referrals, to obtain housing or employment. (Id. T. of Norman pp. 19-20). Ms. Pickett, the third caseworker, offered him no assistance in obtaining housing or employment except for two inappropriate job referrals. (T. of Norman pp. 2223). While Mr. Norman indicated that he lacked funds to seek employment, no transportation assistance has ever been offered to him for this purpose. (T. of Norman p. 29). Indeed, Mr. Norman's caseworker believes such assistance would be "inappropriate". (Bobolink Dep. p. 44).
Norman's fourth and current caseworker, Ms. Bobolink, was assigned to his case in January of 1989, but did not attempt to contact him until March and did not meet with him in person until April 20. (Id. pp. 27-28). On that date, Ms. Bobolink drafted a second service plan for him. (Def. Exh. 9). As before, Mr. Norman did not participate in the drafting of this plan, which requires him to apply for subsidized housing for the disabled and to continue contact with an employment referral specialist (Pls. Exh. 2; T. of Norman p. 21). Ms. Bobolink made a phone call on Mr. Norman's behalf to CHA and referred him to the employment specialist but has not otherwise assisted him in securing housing
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or meeting any of the other service plan conditions. (Id. p. 26).
An addendum to the service plan, prepared May 1, and which Mr. Norman had not yet received at the time of hearing, also requires Mr. Norman to apply for Social Security Disability and Public Aid, and provides that DCFS shall assist him with such applications. (Pl.Exh 3). However, Mr. Norman has received no such assistance. (T. of Norman pp. 25-26). As Ms. Bobolink admitted in her deposition, this addendum -- the first to discuss any assistance at all to be offered by DCFS -- was prepared in response to this litigation. (Bobolink Dep. p. 58).
As he testified, Mr. Norman has a heart condition which has required him to be hospitalized twice in the last eight months; this, together with his lack of funds for transportation to seek employment, makes it nearly impossible foe him to find and maintain a job. (Id. pp. 27-28). Until his children are returned to him, however, he is not eligible to receive AFDC or Social Security benefits on his children's behalf, the receipt of which income is necessary for him to be able to secure and maintain housing. Nor is Mr. Norman eligible for subsidized family housing while DCFS retains custody of his children. He presently has no income at all.
Mr. Norman has maintained frequent in-person and telephone contact with his daughters since their removal. (T. of Norman p. 30). The prolonged separation has drained him emotionally, however, and he fears that his family is growing apart. (14. pp. 31-32). He feels his daughters are becoming depressed and want to
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return to live with him. . (Ld. p. 30-31) .
DCFS has not only placed impossible conditions on Mr. Norman; it has actually created much of his housing and income problem by improperly removing his children and therefore causing him to lose the housing, Social Security, and employment he t at that time. Now DCFS is offering Mr. Norman no assistance with these problems for which it is largely responsible. Mr. Norman testified that his own efforts to find employment have been extensive but without success (Id. p. 27) and that he cannot search for or secure housing without any income. (Id. p. 29). He is therefore in need of preliminary injunctive relief against all financial conditions imposed upon him and relief requiring DCFS to assist him immediately in reuniting his family.
D. 'The Johnson Family Gina Johnson, the mother of five children in DCFS custody, was joined as a plaintiff on May 3, 1989 and also sought emergency relief. Her claim was consolidated with Mr. Norman's for hearing.
Ms. Johnson lost custody of her children in March, 1988,
after her 7-year-old son Randy, who had just returned to her custody from his father three weeks before, sexually molested her daughter Cheryl, age 5• 8 Ms. Johnson had left her children to go
8 Randy had lived with Ms. Johnson for only four months after his birth before going to live with his father. Ms. Johnson had no housing at the time her sons went to live with their father. (T. of Johnson p. 76). Randy and Wade returned to Ms. Johnson's custody in February, 1988 after their father went into custody for murder. Wade had extension cord marks all over his body at the time he returned to Ms. Johnson. (Id. p.80).
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to the store when the , incident occurred. (T. of Johnson p. 81). Ms. Johnson's children were taken into DCFS's protective
custody after Ms. Johnson took Cheryl to the hospital for her injuries. (T. of Johnson p. 84). DCFS offered Ms. Johnson no
assistance in maintaining her family intact at that time. (Id. p.
84). DCFS also did nothing to assist the children in separating from their mother. DCP worker Walter Henry, who had no previous relationship with the children, did no more to alleviate separation trauma than tell the boys they were going into foster care because Randy had abused Cheryl. He could not recall saying anything to the girls. (T. of Walter Henry).
Following removal of her children, Ms. Johnson was told in
by her public defender in the juvenile court that she had no choice but to agree to DCFS taking temporary custody of her children. (T. of Johnson p. 116). There was no hearing concerning the need for removal of the children. (T. of Walter Henry).
Immediately following her loss of custody of her children, Ms. Johnson lost her AFDC grant of $504 and could no longer pay her rent of $300 per month. (T. of Johnson pp. 77, 79, 80) . She had lived in CHA housing for five years and maintained a stable residence for one year prior to losing her children in March 1989. (jd. p. 77). Following her loss of her AFDC benefits, however, Ms. Johnson was forced to move several times. (. pp. 78-79). When her AFDC benefits were cancelled, she had no income
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at all until July, 1988, when she began receiving General
Assistance benefits of $154 per month. (Id. p. 95, 104).
Ever since Ms. Johnson's children were taken from her, DCFS has insisted that she must obtain an "apartment" or "permanent home" in order to secure their return. (Id. p. 88) (caseworker stated children could not return to a shelter). This housing condition appears in Ms. Johnson's service plans of September 28, 1989 and March 31, 1989. (Pls. Exh. 7 at p. 10; Pls. Exh. 8 at p. 7). None of the apartments in which Ms. Johnson has resided to date have been deemed suitable by Ms. Johnson's DCFS worker. (T. of Johnson p. 94). DCFS has also done nothing to help Ms. Johnson locate a suitable apartment. (. pp. 88, 94 (Ms. Johnson asked her caseworker how she could get an apartment with her income; he did not respond); Id. p. 99; Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. pp. 98, 100 (no Harris Funds provided to Ms. Johnson)).
The loss of Ms. Johnson's children has caused her great hardship, including severe depression (T. of Johnson p. 87), and
thoughts of suicide. (j. p. 102). When her children had to leave
her after visits, they would cry and throw tantrums. (Id. p. 93). Her daughter used to cry all the time and wanted to go home. (Id.
p. 103). One son felt suicidal after the separation. (Zd. p.
102). Ms. Johnson at trial recounted her own history of abuse and
neglect. (Id. p. 95). She herself had been a ward of DCFS, and in state custody became involved with numerous physically and emotionally abusive men. (Id. p. 81). She was discharged from
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DCFS custody when • her oldest son was born. (Zd. p. 75). Beginning in the spring of 1988, however, Ms. Johnson participated actively in several counselling and parenting programs. (See Pis. Exhs. 4 and 5; T. of Johnson p. 87) . Sherry Parker, Ms. Johnson's present counsellor at the Sarah's Inn domestic violence program, testified that Ms. Johnson made remarkable progress in her counselling, and as of March 31, 1989, Ms. Johnson was ready for unsupervised visitation with her children and a phased eventual return of her daughters to her custody. (Pls. Exh. 9 (Case review summary by Sherry Parker and Christine Mendoza); T. of Johnson p. 97).
Sarah's Inn began serving Ms. Johnson in December, 1988, after Ms. Johnson's prior therapist, Julie Norman, referred Ms. Johnson to the Austin People's Action Center for shelter and counseling. (Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. p. 94; T. of Johnson p. 111112). Sarah's Inn has a satellite office located at APAC. At the time Ms. Johnson was referred to Sarah's Inn, Ms. Parker understood that Ms. Johnson needed an apartment to have her children returned by DCFS. (T. of Sherry Parker).
DCFS has acknowledged that Ms. Johnson is a good mother and that the extended separation from her children is harmful to them. (Id. p. 106). Nonetheless, DCFS has stalled steps to reunite her family. Ms. Johnson had requested that she be allowed unsupervised visitation with her children as a first step toward family reunification. (T. of Johnson p. 96-97). At her March 31, 1989 case review, unsupervised visits were denied to her because
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"she had to demonstrate stability and independent functioning." (Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. 79, 86, 95). Ms. Johnson had not demonstrated stability, according to her caseworker, because she had lived in five different apartments between July 1988 and the present. (. p. 96). Moreover, her ~stability" was not "independent". (. p. 96). 9 Mr. Mukasa-Ssebaana explained this "independence" requirement in two ways:
(1) Ms. Johnson must maintain her own permanent (nonshelter provided) apartment for at least 6 months. (T. of Johnson pp. 94, 98; Muskas-Ssebaana Dep. pp. 86, 103).
(2) Ms. Johnson must live outside a supervised, structured living arrangement -- i.e. without the support of Sarah's Inn. (Mukasa-Ssebaana Dep. pp. 87, 96).
To be sure, Mr. Mukasa-Ssebaana also indicated in court that Ms. Johnson must remain out of "abusive relationships". As a result of counselling, however, she has successfully remained out of such relationships for at least six months and plans never to return to such a relationship. Thus, it is unclear for how long Mr. Mukasa-Ssebaana expects Ms. Johnson to "demonstrate" that she will not return to such relationships.
At the time of trial Ms. Johnson had saved about $600 towards an apartment. (T. of Johnson pp. 112, 113). This money
9 This "independence" requirement nowhere appears in DCFS policy manual as a condition for return of children. Indeed, return home with supportive services is anticipated. (See Def. Exh. 21). Moreover, appropriate social work practice standards indicate a supportive living arrangement is an ideal setting for the reunification of family members affected by domestic violence. (T. of Kane p. 163).
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would be immediately exhausted if Ms. Johnson were to attempt to satisfy Mr. Mukasa-SSebaana's requirement that she demonstrate "independent living" by renting an apartment in the private housing market. (Id. p. 121). She will be unable to maintain such accommodations on her $154 income since available housing costs at least $200 per month. (Id. p. 99). Ms. Johnson needs $300$400 per month income to maintain an apartment. (. p. 103). DCFS continues to insist she procure "permanent" housing she cannot afford, and unless this condition is enjoined by this Court, or adequate funding is provided her to secure and maintain housing, she will be unable ever to secure return of her children.
The need for $300 to $400 monthly income to afford private housing might be obviated if DCFS obtained a commitment of CHA housing for Ms. Johnson. To date, DCFS has done nothing of the sort. Rather, after months of prompting by Ms. Johnson, Mr. Mukasa-Ssebaana only sent one letter to CHA which did not contain any reference to a date by which Ms. Johnson's children might be returned. (Def. Exh. 28; T. of Johnson pp. 91, 92, 96 (CHA told Ms. Johnson she must have her children back in order to get CHA housing); Id. p. 102; Muskasa-Ssebana Dep. pp. 75-76). Without such a commitment, CHA will not furnish family housing to Ms. Johnson. (T. of Smallie Mike Cook).
In short, Gina Johnson's own extensive efforts to reunite her family have not been matched by any efforts on the part of DCFS to help her meet the conditions imposed on her. Ms. Johnson
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therefore is in need of preliminary injunctive relief against all financial conditions imposed upon her and relief requiring DCFS to assist her immediately to reunite her family. III. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR
CONSITUTIONAL CLAIMS A. Plaintiffs Are Constitutionally Protected From Unwarranted State Intrusion Into Their Family Lives
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has firmly established that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in matters of family life, particularly in raising and associating with their children. See, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quillion v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Or g anization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 .(1977); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-2 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This liberty interest is framed broadly: substantive due process protections attach to "the parent's right to care, custody, and management of his children," Santosky , 455 U.S. at 753; the "integrity of the family unit," Stanle y , 405 U.S. at 651; see also Bell v, Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1245 (7th Cir. 1984); and "the private realm of family life," Smith, 431 U.S. at 842. Explicitly protected within this constitutional framework are the parent's right to live with his family and to have custody of his minor children. Shondel V. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1985);
Ellis V. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
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This right of the family to remain together without coercive state interference has been called "the most essential and basic aspect of family privacy." Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977). Such interests are "far more precious ... than property rights" and more significant and priceless than liberties "which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements". Stanle y , 405 U.S. at 651. Of all constitutionally protected freedoms of choice in matters of family life, including the decisions to marry and procreate, the freedom of parent and child "to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing relationship" is "among the most important of the liberties accorded this special treatment." Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
These parents' and familial rights repeatedly have been deemed fundamental by the courts, including the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (parents have a "fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management, of their children); Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1985) ("free personal choice in matters involving family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Constitution" is beyond dispute); Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 988-89 (6th Cir. 1983) (parents' liberty interest in family integrity is "essential or fundamental"); cf. Halet v. Wend Investment Company , 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (family life, in particular the right of family members to live together, is part of the fundamental right of privacy).
- 27 -

Plaintiffs Norman and Johnson have a fundamental right to family integrity and to the companionship, care, and custody of their children. These fundamental rights do not evaporate simply because the state has temporary custody of their children; the parents "retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life." See Santosk y , 455 U.S. at 753.
B. Defendant's Intrusion Into Plaintiffs' Families Must Promote A Compelling State Interest And May Not Unnecessarily Impinge Upon Their Fundamental Rights.
The fundamental right of family integrity is the right of family members to be free from state intrusion. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982). Indeed, the "most essential and basic aspect" of the right to family integrity is "the right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state." Duchesne V. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court has set forth the general principle that
state intrusion upon a fundamental right must be narrowly
tailored to promote compelling or substantial state interests. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) . The state may not rely on an irrebuttable presumption that its interests are promoted in a given case; it must make a particularized showing in each case in order to avoid unnecessary infringement of fundamental rights. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The state may not intrude by means "which sweep
- 28 -

unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The level of intrusion may not be greater than necessary to achieve the state's interests:
If there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a state may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 488). This principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the Court where constitutionally-protected familial rights have been threatened. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Care y v. Population Services In'tl, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (right to contraception); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring) (right to contraception). The lower courts have extended this analysis in evaluating state intrusion into family integrity, noting that among such familial rights as the rights to make decisions about marriage and procreation, the right of parent and child "to maintain, cultivate, and mold their ongoing relationship" is one of the most important. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "A parent is entitled to substantive due process protections which prohibit governmental interference with familial privacy, in all but the most compelling and justifiable circumstances." Rivera v. Marcus, 533 F. Supp. 203, 208 (D. Conn. 1982), affirmed, 696 F.2d 1016'(2d Cir. 1982). Where
- 29 -

"ready access to less.-drastic means" are available for achieving the state's goals, "the decision (of the state) not to avail themselves of that option (is) inconsistent with the Constitution." Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d at 607. See Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769, 779 (M.D.Ala. 1976).
The state's removal of children is a serious and substantial infringement upon the fundamental right to family integrity. Although Franz and Roe v. Conn dealt with the termination of parental rights, the same analysis is also appropriate in cases where the state has removed the children from the parents but not yet terminated their rights. As noted by the Seventh Circuit, "actions less than termination of parental rights have a divisive impact on family relations" and "significantly undercut" the liberty interests of family association. Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 1985). "Breaking up the family unit by actual removal, even if temporary, interferes with each family member's interest in familial autonomy in the most severe manner possible. Moreover, removal seriously invades each parent's right to companionship with and control over the child." Note, The Constitution and The Famil y , 93 Han,. L. Rev. 1156, 1316-17 (1980). Cf. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1337 (10th Cir. 1981) (concurring opinion) (in case of interference with father's visitation rights, the state may not impinge upon the parentchild relationship unless it can show "an overriding, compelling interest and the use of the narrowest, least restrictive means to effect that end.").
- 30 -

Thus in cases in which of children are removed where the
interests in and injury to family autonomy are substantial, 10 the
state is permitted to intrude only to enforce a compelling state
interest, and the means used by the state to enforce its interest
must be those which least impinge upon the fundamental rights of
the family members. See Note, The Constitution and the Famil y , 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1314-1315 (1980). Plaintiffs, who because of
defendant's actions have suffered near destruction of their
families, merit the application of this principle to their cases.
C. Defendant May Not Constitutionally Impose Unreasonable Conditions on Family Reunification.
In addition to violating plaintiffs substantive right to
family integrity, the DCFS policy of imposing arbitrary and
unreasonable financial conditions for return of their children
also violates their procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Due process prohibits requiring the
satisfaction of conditions beyond a person's-control. See, e.g.,
McNeil v. Director Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 251 (1972)
(due process does not permit punishment for civil contempt of a
person who lacks the present ability to comply with the court
order). Moreover, DCFS's allowance of caseworkers to make
10 "The interest of parents themselves is threatened because loss of custody necessarily restricts their ability to shape the child's developing personality and to obtain the emotional satisfaction of childrearing. The interest of the child is threatened because removal from the home takes him from those likely to be most sensitive to his needs. Finally, the interest in social pluralism is threatened because stateorganized childrearing may well lead to the standardization of children." Note, The Constitution and the Family, supra, at 135455. (Footnotes omitted).

personal judgments, unsupported by DCFS written policy,
concerning what constitutes adequate housing or sufficient income
for family reunification runs afoul of procedural due process
principles as well. See, e. g ., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750,
754 (7th Cir. 1976); Carey v. Quern 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978);
Doston V. Coler, 85 C 2356 (Nov. 23, 1988, Hart J.) (enjoining
subjective standardless non-cooperation determinations for
welfare eligibility to child support program participants)
(relevant page 88 of decision attached hereto as Appendix 3).11
D. Defendant's Intrusion Into Plaintiffs' Families Here Is Unconstitutionally Excessive and Improper
State intervention based on "environmental" factors, such as
the fitness of the child's surroundings, is particularly
susceptible to due process invalidation, since such intervention
is not"tightly drawn to advance the State's compelling interest
in the child's welfare; a less intrusive alterative would focus
only on the physical or emotional condition of the child ..."
Note, The Constitution and the Famil y , 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156,
1238 (1980).
In view of the strength of the privacy interests at stake, heightened substantive due process scrutiny should limit state intervention to the least restrictive means necessary to ensure that the child is protected from the harm that justified intervention ... If a neglected
11 Judge Hart's decision is over 100 pages, with appendices. Since plaintiffs rely only on one page of the decision here, they did not attach a full copy. Plaintiffs will gladly furnish copies of the full decision to the defense or the court if desired.
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child could be protected through existing social services such as parental training or counseling, provision of homemaking services, or some form of in-home supervision, the state must pursue those other means before removing the child ... Destitution alone would be a constitutionally impermissible basis for removal, for state aid to the family would less intrude on the famil y 's protected rights.

Id. at 1321-22 (Emphasis supplied).

By removing plaintiffs' children and/or retaining them in

state custody because plaintiffs do not have "adequate" housing

or income, defendant has unnecessarily and improperly intruded

directly into the constitutionally protected domain of

plaintiffs' family lives. As plaintiffs have shown at the
preliminary injunction hearing, less intrusive alternatives than

removal and retention of custody were and are available to

defendant to achieve his goal of child protection. However,
defendant consistently has failed and continues to fail to

utilize any of those less restrictive alternatives. Such failure

to use or even consider less restrictive alternatives constitutes

a substantive due process violation.
Defendant clearly misunderstands plaintiffs' constitutional

claims and relies on a line of cases holding that plaintiffs have

no affirmative constitutional right to government aid. ee

DeShaney v Winebaao County De partment of Social Services , 489

U.S.

, 109 S.Ct.

, 103 L.Ed. 249 (1989); Def. Pretrial Mem.

p. 26. However, these cases are inapposite. Plaintiffs are not

- 33 -

claiming a constitutional right to substantive state services12
to repair familial relationships which the state had no part in
destroying. On the contrary, plaintiffs claim that DCFS itself has improperly intervened into their families and improperly conditioned plaintiffs' right to be with their children on plaintiffs success in obtaining financial support; thus it has an obligation to remedy the danger it has caused through improper intervention.
E. Defendant Has Violated James Norman's and Gina
Johnson's Constitutional Rights
DCFS violated James Norman's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to family: integrity by (1) improperly removing the Norman children from the home when there was no evidence of any risk to the children in the home and therefore no compelling state interest in removal, and (2) by creating and perpetuating the very conditions now cited by the state as keeping the Norman family apart -- lack of housing and income. DCFS also violated Norman's Fourteenth Amendment rights to family integrity by removing his children when there were less intrusive and equally effective forms of intervention readily available to it to insure that the children would be protected in the home -- such as the provision of homemaker services and assistance in reconnecting utilities. Moreover, DCFS has violated and continues to violate Norman's rights to family integrity by maintaining his children in placement when less intrusive and less costly state
12 Plaintiffs do claim, however, a statutory right to services under the AACWA. See i nfra at pp. 35-44.
- 34 -

interventions -- such as provision of housing assistance -- would allow the family to be reunited. Finally, DCFS violated Mr. Norman's procedural due process rights by imposing conditions for reunification beyond his control.
DCFS has also violated plaintiff Johnson's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the removal and placement of her
children. Intervention into Johnson's family certainly was not
narrowly tailored to provide assistance in a manner least intrusive to the family since a less intrusive remedy was readily available: i.e. a homemaker or the use of a protective family shelter. Removal of all the children was unnecessary and, when balanced against the grievous harm inflicted on this family by separation, unwarranted.
Like plaintiff Norman, plaintiff Johnson's procedural and
substantive rights are violated by the state's imposition on her
of financial conditions to regain custody where the state
precipitated the very financial problems it now holds her responsible for -- i.e. loss of income and "permanent" housing.
Through its unduly broad intervention, DCFS has triggered catastrophical financial crises for plaintiffs, rendering
plaintiffs homeless and penniless; then it has demanded that plaintiffs rectify the damage themselves, all the while withholding from them the very means to do so. This infringement on their families' integrity furthers no compelling state interests and thus is unconstitutional. IV. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THEIR
STATUTORY CLAIMS - 35 -

A. The Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed in Their Claims Under the 'AACWA'; Defendant Has Violated the AACWA's Mandates of "Reasonable Efforts' to Prevent Placement and Reunite Families; Case Plans and Case Review, and Coordinated Services.
In 1980, after extensive hearings and revisions spanning a four-year period of time, Congress passed the AACWA,42 U.S.C. 620 et sec.. and §670 et seg. This statute amended the Social Security Act foster care payment provisions which had been in existence for over twenty years. The express purpose of the AACWA was to achieve major reform in the child welfare system throughout the United States, a system which - fueled by federal dollars - had removed hundreds of thousands of children from their natural homes only to set them adrift in an abusive, costly and transitory foster care network.
Convinced that many of these children were unnecessarily in foster care and that they could be kept home or returned home at much less expense 'to the government and much less harm to children, Congress imposed through the AACWA new obligations on the states to insure that foster care be utilized only when absolutely necessary. The most pertinent obligations are:
First, as a condition for receipt of new federal funding, Congress required that each state submit a state plan detailing the child welfare services it will provide. 42 U.S.C. §622(a) and (b)(5). This must include a specification of which preplacement and preventative services will be made available, including (but not .limited to) homemakers, 24-hour caretakers, crisis counselling, emergency shelters, procedures and arrangements for
- 36 -

access to available emergency financial assistance, respite care and family-based services. See 45 C.F.R. 1357.15(e).
Second, Congress mandated that state agencies accepting federal foster care money make "reasonable efforts" "in each case" to "prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home" and to "make it possible for the child to return to his home". 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15). This provision is implemented, in part, by a requirement that, in each case where the state removes a child from home, a judicial finding be made that "reasonable efforts" were made prior to removal. 42 U.S.C. §672 (a) (1)
Third, the Act requires that the state agency must develop a "case plan" for "each child" receiving foster care, 42 U.S.C.
§671(a)(16); that such case plan contain, i nter alia, "a plan for
assuring that the child receive proper care and that services are provided to the parents, child and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in the home and facilitate return of the child", 42 U.S.C. §675(1).
Fourth, the Act requires that the case plan requirement be implemented through a periodic case review system, 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(16), which assures that each child has a case plan designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive setting and that the status of each child is reviewed at least every six months to determine the "continuing necessity of placement" and "the extent of compliance with the case plan". 42 U.S.C. §675(5).
Just prior to passage of the final version of the AACWA,
- 37 -

Senator Alan Cranston, its author and a major proponent of the
Act, discussed the case plan and case review provisions of the
AACWA back-to-back with the "reasonable efforts" mandate. 13 After
first noting that case planning was one of the "most important
aspects of this legislation" and that the case review provisions
were "most critical", Senator Cranston stated:
(C)urrent law requires that a child in foster care receive proper care and services... These very generalized provisions have had little specific impact upon a State's responsibility to provide services designed to prevent a child's removal from his or her home, or to help alleviate the problem which caused the child's removal in the first place. Accordingly, some courts have specifically held that social services agencies had no affirmative duty to provide preventative services to a distressed family before the removal of a child. The Senate Amendment provided specific requirements that States must 'include in their (state plan) to assure that in each case reasonable efforts be made prior to the placement of a child in foster care to prevent or eliminate the need for removal...and that reasonable efforts be made to make it possible for a child to return... The [final version of the Act] includes these important provisions from the Senate Amendment.
[T)hese sections are aimed at making it clear that states must make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of children from their homes. In the past, foster care has often been the first option selected when a family is in trouble; the new provisions will require the states to examine alternatives
13 This legislative history fully supports finding a private right of action under the reasonable efforts and case plan requirements of the AACWA. Plaintiffs will present a complete analysis of that issue in later briefing before Judge Hart, if required. (See note 1 supra).
- 38 -

and provide, wherever feasible, home-based services that will keep families together, or help reunite families... where removal can be prevented through the provision of home-based services, these agencies will be required to provide such services before removing the child and turning to foster care. These provisions... are among the most important aspects of this legislation. Far too many children and families have been broken apart when they could have been preserved with a little effort.
Cong. Rec. June 13, 1980 at 14766-14767.
As can be gleaned from the legislative history quoted
above, the case plan requirements of §671(a)(16) and §675(1), the
case review requirement of §671(a)(16) and §675(5) and the
reasonable efforts provisions of §671(a) (15) of the AACWA, as
well as the service provisions of §622 b), all interplay to form
an integrated mandate for the provision of preventative and
reunification services to families. Plaintiffs advance claims
under each of these. provisions.
A further provision of Titles IV-B and IV-E of the AACWA
further requires the state child care agency to provide for the
coordination of its services with all other child welfare
programs in the state, including inter alia, the utilization of
voluntary agencies, the federal AFDC program and Title XX
services "with a view to provision of welfare and related
services which will best promote the welfare of such children and
their families". 42 U.S.C. §§622(b)(2) and (7), and §671(a)(4).
Succinctly stated, this coordination requirement envisions that
the state agency utilize all available resources from all
programs to serve children and families to accomplish its
- 39 -

"reasonable efforts" mandate. Plaintiffs advance claims under each of these provisions.
B. Defendant Has Violated And Continues to Violate Plaintiffs Rights Under the AACWA
1. Statutory Violations In James Norman's Case No clearer case of a violation of the reasonable efforts and service coordination requirements can be shown than that of Mr. Norman. At the time of DCFS intervention, the Norman children
were safe and healthy. Indeed, DCFS intervention under the
circumstances of this case violated state law and DCFS's written policy. What problems the family had -- no utilities, a messy house -- could easily have been rectified by a referral for cash and utility assistance, budgeting classes, and homemaker service. A 24-hour caretaker could have been placed in the home until Mr. Norman returned from his job interviews. Services could have been furnished without removal of the children.
Plaintiff demonstrated at trial that all these services exist -- e.g. United Charities (budgeting), IHEAP (utility assistance), Harris Fund (cash). (T. of Kane pp. 173, 177). Instead of making any effort to access these services, Title XX services or special cash assistance to prevent placement of the Norman children, however, DCFS employed the most drastic, damaging and expensive "remedy" to the family's problem: foster care placement. Not a single service was offered to the Norman family. The DCP worker never even spoke to Mr. Norman before taking his children. No efforts have been made since to provide cash or housing available from public aid and private sources.
- 40 -

The removal of children and prolonged intervention without
reunification efforts is precisely the practice Congress so
clearly condemned.
The conduct of DCFS in removing these children shocks the
conscience when considered in light of Dr. Littner's testimony of
the harm suffered by parent and child when separation occurs.
DCFS took a problem and created a tragedy. As eloquently expressed by Ms. Kane:
My honest opinion, I was ashamed when I
read [Mr. Norman's DCFS file]... No good social work standard would have pulled those children from this working class poor man who had suffered the loss of his wife, who had just launched off an older son graduating from high school in a neighborhood where 50% graduate... where his kids are doing well in school...
(T. of Kane p. 178).
In addition to violating the "reasonable effort" and
"service coordination" requirements of AACWA, DCFS has consistently violated its case plan and case review requirements
as well. During the 11 months his children have been separated
from him, Mr. Norman has had four caseworkers assigned to his
case and received no services at all other than two inappropriate
job referrals. He had no case plan for the first weeks his
children were in custody. (See Pls. Exh. 1) . When the case plan
was prepared and presented to Mr. Norman, without consulting him,
it did not contain a single service or referral to be provided through DCFS that had anything to do with restoring utilities, obtaining cash or cleaning the house. Instead, it imposed a
- 41 -

series of financial conditions upon Mr. Norman (e.g. locate adequate housing, get verifiable income).
While visitation between parent and child is a key factor in the family reunification process, Mr. Norman was denied visits for a month after his children were taken into DCFS custody. (T. of Norman). 14 He was told he would have to undergo a psychiatric evaluation first, even though the removal of his children had nothing to do with his mental health. When visits did commence, DCFS offered Mr. Norman no financial assistance for the cost of transportation even though Mr. Norman now lived in Chicago and DCFS had placed his children in Harvey, Illinois. No one assisted Mr. Norman in obtaining public aid. No worker even established enough contact with Mr. Norman to learn of his hospitalizations fora serious heart ailment.
After this case was filed in February and a preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled, Mr. Norman's fourth DCFS worker created a second service plan (again, without Mr. Norman's input). This service plan was equally inadequate. (Pls. Exh. 2). Just before the caseworker's deposition, the case plan was amended to provide for some transportation assistance and to
commit the agency to assist Mr. Norman in obtaining medical
records. (Pls. Exh. 3). No more was done. The DCFS worker never applied for Harris Funds, never advocated for Mr. Norman with
14 ( see Memorandum Order and Opinion in Bates v. Johnson, No. 84 C 10054, (June 29, 1989 Plunkett J.) -- DCFS held in contempt for non-compliance with visitation mandates). (attached as Appendix 4 hereto). DCFS is also obligated by law to provide transportation costs for visits. (Id.)
w

IDPA, referred him only, to one of many Chicago-based housing assistance programs, never offered him assistance with budgeting, and never provided him with funds to look for affordable housing. The two case plans created by DCFS violate federal law in that they do not offer appropriate services to facilitate return home.
Finally, it is undisputed that Mr. Norman has never received a case review in accordance with 42 U.S.C. §671(a)16 and §675(5). Rather, DCFS has taken the position that children placed with relatives are not entitled to such a case review. (Denton Dep. p. 13). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services which is charged with oversight of the Title IV-B and IV-E programs has expressly disapproved of this DCFS practice. (See HHS Grant Appeals Board Decision of April 13, 1989, Appendix 1 hereto).
2. Statutory Violations in Gina Johnson's Case DCFS has never made reasonable efforts to prevent placement
of Gina Johnson's children or to reunite her family. It is undisputed that DCFS offered no services to the Johnson family at
the time the children were removed. (T. of Walter Henry). In
fact, the DCP worker's early "reunification" efforts were
directed only at placing the children with one of the fathers, a man who had been convicted of murder. A variety of services were available, however, and could have been used to attempt to keep
the family together, including removal of the perpetrator and
placement in a protective shelter with the remainder of the siblings. (T. of Kane at 181-2, 184, 224). Other services which could have been utilized to avoid placement included an
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emergency caretaker, day care, and crisis counseling. (Ld. at
183-224).
Following removal DCFS did refer plaintiff Johnson to
services for domestic violence and sexual abuse, but none of
these help her in meeting the impossible financial conditions
imposed upon her. DCFS requires that she obtain "permanent"
housing and that she live independently of any supportive
services. 15 The imposition of these financial conditions without
correlative services to enable Ms. Johnson to meet them
constitutes a clear violation of the AACWA's "reasonable efforts"
and "case plan" requirements.
V. Plaintiffs Norman and Johnson are . Irreparably Injured By DCFS's Imposition of Financial Conditions For Return of Their Children and DCFS's Failure to Assist Them to Meet These Conditions.
Few interests are considered as compelling as the interest
of parents in maintaining custody of their children. Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Plaintiffs here have suffered
lengthy separation from their children, based on conditions that
are beyond their ability to satisfy. As a result of this
separation, they have suffered psychological trauma and anxiety
about their children, while their children's development has been
15 The AACWA clearly envisions that families should be reunited when supportive services enable them to do so. This is the entire thrust of the Act. (See remarks of Senator Cranston, supra at p. 39: "[T]he new provisions will require the states to...provide, wherever feasible, home-based services that will ...help reunite families". See also the remarks of Representative Stark: "(The AACWA) provides that a whole range of family reunification services be made available to the child and the family in order to bring the child home as quickly as possible". Cong. Rec. August 2, 1979 at 22114.
- 44 -

severely impacted by the separation. (T. of Dr. Littner). Moreover, Mr. Norman has suffered a complete loss of his subsistence income. Ms. Johnson lost her entire income following the separation from her children, and since July 1988 has only received $154 per month. Loss of subsistence income long has been recognized as an "irreparable injury." See Moore v. Miller, 579 F.Supp. 1118, 1191 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see cases cited on pp. 3-5 of P1. Mem. (March 3, 1989).
When constitutional and statutory rights are violated, injury may be presumed. See, e.g, Decker v. United States Department of Labor, 473 F.Supp. 770 (E.D. Wis. 1979). Here, however, no such presumption is required. The testimony at trial establishes clearly that plaintiffs Norman and Johnson have suffered enormously because of the prolonged separation from their children, and risk losing their family bonds altogether if the separation continues much longer. This harm to the plaintiffs clearly constitutes irreparable injury. VI. DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIEF SHOULD BE REJECTED
Judge Hart has denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on abstention and Eleventh Amendment grounds. For that reason, plaintiffs will not reargue those issues here. Rather, plaintiffs here will address only defendant's newly-raised claim for dismissal based on collateral estoppel and their arguments concerning the burdens on them if relief is granted.
A. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply to Issues Not Litigated Elsewhere.
Defendant in his pre-trial memorandum argues that plaintiff - 45 -

here are barred by "issue preclusion" because they previously
litigated and lost in state court the same issues raised here.
(Def. Pre-trial Mem. p. 22). Defendant cites thetest for
collateral estoppel set forth in Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d
1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1986):
(1) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to the earlier proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided on the merits; (3) the resolution of the particular issue was necessary to the result; and (4) the issues are identical.
The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that under
the Kunzelman test, requirements two, three and four have not
been met here.
Defendant has failed to show that, in either case, the issue
of whether reasonable efforts were made to avoid family
separation was actually litigated in state court and decided on
the merits. The facts presented at trial demonstrate the
contrary. The orders for temporary custody of-Lynetta and Jamie
Norman (Def. Exhs. 1 and 2) record no findings on the issue of
"reasonable efforts." 16 Similarly, the juvenile court's
dispositional orders for each of the Johnson children contain
blanket omissions of "reasonable efforts" findings, and defendant
can point to no prior litigation before the juvenile court
16 State law requires that, in making a finding that reasonable efforts have been made, "the court shall state in writing its findings concerning the nature of the services that were offered or the efforts that were made to prevent removal of the child and the apparent reasons that such services or efforts could not prevent the need for removal. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37 §802-10(2). None of the orders presented conform to the requirements of state law.
- 46 -

concerning reasonable efforts. This is not surprising, in light

of the testimony provided by DCP worker Walter Henry. Mr. Henry

testified that, while he was the only employee of the Department

present at the temporary custody hearing for the Johnson

children, he proffered no testimony concerning reasonable efforts

made by the Department, because the issue "never came up". Gina

Johnson also testified that there was no temporary custody

hearing in her case because the public defender consented to

temporary custody without her approval (T. of Johnson p. 116).

Second, the resolution of the "reasonable efforts" issue is

not necessary to the determinations before the juvenile court,

despite defendant's misstatement of law •to the contrary (Def.

Pre-trial Mem. p. 23). The juvenile court in hearing a motion

for temporary custody can and does determine the merits of such

motion if it finds "probable cause" to believe the child was

abused or neglected and "urgent and immediate necessity" exists

for removal. The court may make such findings even if no

reasonable efforts to prevent removal were made.

ee

Ill.Rev.Stat. ch.37 §802-10(2). Thus, resolution of the

"reasonable efforts" issue is not necessary to the result of the

state court proceeding.

Finally, the issue of reasonable efforts before the juvenile

court is not identical to the issue presented here, if only

because the juvenile court at no time has been called to

determine if reasonable efforts currentl y are being made in the

Norman or Johnson case.

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The collateral estoppel rule has also been held to require reference to state law to determine if state courts themselves would give preclusive effect to the findings at issue. Kunzelman supra; Allen v. McCurr y , 449 U.S. 90, 66 L.Ed 2d 308, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980); Mira v. Warren School Dist Bd. of Ed. 465 U.S. 75, 79 L.Ed 2d 56, 104 S.Ct. 892 (1984). Illinois law, however, adopts a similar test to Kunzelman and limits the doctrine only to identical issues "actually litigated and determined". Benton v. Smith, 157 Ill.App 3d 847, 510 N.E. 2d 952 (1st Dist. 1987) (and cases cited therein). The Illinois test is not whether plaintiffs had an opportunity to litigate the issues but whether they actually did litigate. Defendant here cannot meet this test since the "reasonable efforts" issue was never actually litigated in either James Norman's and Gina's Johnson state court cases.
B. The Balance of Harms and Public Interest Weigh Heavily In Plaintiffs Favor 17
Defendant argues he will be harmed if this Court intervenes and "substitutes its judgment" for that of its trained social workers. He further argues that all caseworker judgments will be affected by one federal court order here. Finally, he contends that the interests of plaintiffs' children may not be served by an "infusion of cash" to their parents, since this money will not protect against future DCFS intervention.
These arguments are specious. Plaintiffs do not seek to overturn caseworker judgments as to whether those children should
17 See pp. 8-10 of Pls. Mem. (March 9, 1989) regarding the additional test of absence of adequate remedies at law.
- 48 -

return home. In fact,, the caseworkers here have already made the judgment that the Norman and Johnson children should return home. (See service plans at Pls. Exhs. 1-4 ( N O2 v goal on all plans means "return home" goal). Rather, plaintiffs challenge the
imposition of specific conditions for return of their children--
conditions that plaintiffs cannot on their own satisfy. The caseworkers' judgments as to the appropriateness of services are also not challenged. Rather, plaintiffs challenge the defendant's policies and practices that result in DCFS's inability to provide services to enable plaintiffs to meet those conditions. These policies and practices include: (1) lack of any program to coordinate child welfare service delivery, especially cash and
housing services; (2) authorization of DCP intervention to remove
children from their homes without also empowering DCP workers to offer services to prevent removal; (3) failure to assign followup workers until weeks, or perhaps months, have elapsed with children in placement; and (4) failure to apprise workers of available cash or housing assistance while authorizing the imposition of income and housing requirements to regain custody. These policies and practices of defendant preclude caseworkers from delivering these services even if the workers decide they are most needed. Defendant's interpretation of plaintiffs challenge to defendant's failure to render services to particular families as a challenge to caseworker discretion is thus misplaced.
With respect to defendant's argument that a "cash infusion"
- 49 -

will not assist these plaintiffs, DCFS itself recognizes, albeit in a limited fashion, the importance of meeting clients' subsistence needs. It thus has adopted several modest programs to help clients in need of housing, but none of these programs currently are available to families like James Norman's or Gina Johnson's who are already separated and who cannot now locate permanent housing.
Defendant's strained argument that cash may not protect these children also flies in the face of his own workers' judgment that meeting the housing and income conditions in the service plans will lead to family reunification.18
Finally there is no doubt that* the public interest, articulated in constitutional case law, the Illinois Family Preservation Act and the AACWA is served when families are reunited. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod 540 F.2d 1062, 1071 (7th Cir. 1976), mod., 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc). Defendant has no legal or financial interest in prolonging foster care here, or in delaying family reunification.
VII. CONCLUSION As argued here, plaintiffs have met the prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief, and defendant has offered no persuasive reasons why such relief should not issue. Plaintiff thus seek an order compelling defendant to refrain from imposing
18 Of course, no one can guarantee DCFS will never intervene in these families in the future. But refusing to help plaintiffs now cannot be justified on the basis of speculation as to unknown future possibilities.
^1i

financial conditions on plaintiffs' reunification with their children, or, in the alterative, provide plaintiffs Norman and Johnson with such financial assistance, services and referrals for services as will promptly enable them to obtain housing and otherwise satisfy the financial conditions DCFS has interposed as obstacles to the reunification of their families. This relief is absolutely necessary to prevent further irreparable injury to plaintiffs and their children.

Respectfully,

t

DIANE REDLEAF LAURENE M. HEYBACH LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION
OF CHICAGO 343 S. Dearborn, #700 Chicago, Il 60604 (312) 341-1070

of the Attorneys for 11laintiffs

SUSAN WISHNICK UPTOWN OFFICE LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION
OF CHICAGO 4753 N. Broadway Ave. Chicago, IL 60640 (312) 769-1015
JOAN MATLACK ENGLEWOOD OFFICE 852 W. 63rd St. Chicago, IL 60621 (312) 651-3100

- 51 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION-

JACQUELINE FIELDS, JAMES NORMAN, PAULETTE PATTERSON, on their behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
V.
GORDON JOHNSON, Director Illinois Department •of Children and Family Services,
Defendant.

No. 89 C 1624

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

4' 'c r ((4.')

TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM T. HART, one of the Judges of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

EECOI NDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In their complaint in this action, plaintiffs, a
putative class composed of "impoverished parents and legal guardians who have lost, are at risk of losing, will lose, or cannot regain custody of their children from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") because they are homeless or unable to provide food or shelter for their children," challenge:
defendant's policies and practices of (1) taking and retaining custody of children from impoverished parents and legal guardians
1

k
because of their inability to obtain cash, food, shelter, or other subsistence, while failing to assist the parents and children to*
0
meet these needs; (2) failing to assist them to secure cash, food, shelter or other subsistence through the coordination of services to needyfamilies and otherwise; (3) failing to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of plaintiffs' children and reunite families; and (4) abridging the liberty and property interests of parents in retaining
custody of their children and maintaining the
means to support themselves and their families.
Plaintiffs allege that the challenged practices of
defendant violate Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act,
as amended by the Adoption Assistance and Child welfare Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. S620 et sea. and 670 e sec., and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs initially moved for preliminary injunctive.
relief on behalf of two named plaintiffs, James Norman and Gina
Johnson, seeking unspecified emergency relief. Following the
hearing in this matter, plaintiff James Norman died, and his
action therefore. abated. Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for
preliminary injunctive relief on behalf of two additional members
of the putative plaintiff class, Wanda Hilliard and Joann
Mitchell, and an additional hearing was held relating to their
claims.
Based on the evidence presented at these two
preliminary injunction hearings, the court finds as follows:
RECO1 NDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant Gordon Johnson is the Director of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS') and.
2

J

'.

is charged by law with its administration. DCFS annually

receives millions of dollars of federal funding pursuant to the

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AAA") to

implement the programs mandated by that Act. The AAA provides in

_part that in order for a state to be eligible for federal
funding, it must have a plan in effect which provides that

"reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a

child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for

removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible

for the child to return to his home . .

." 42 U.S.C.

S671(a)(15).

2. DCFS operates a state-wide Child Abuse Hotline.

Calls received, if "accepted," are turned over to the Division of

Child Protection ("DCP") which assigns an investigator, who must
make an initial investigation within 24 hours of a call reporting

abuse or neglect. The investigator makes a determination as to

the validity of the report using a standard risk assessment form.

( ee DXs 8, 12.) If the investigator determines that there has

been abuse or neglect, the report is termed "indicated." See

generally I11. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, 12057.14.

3. The DCP investigator may take the children into

temporary custody if he determines that the circumstances or
conditions of the children are such that continuing in their

place of residence or in the care and custody of the person then

responsible for the child's welfare presents an imminent danger

to the children's life or health, and that there is no time to.`

3

apply for a court order. I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, 52055. Efforts are piade to place the children with a relative. The DCP investigator advises the parent[s] of the children in person or through a letter that the children are being taken into temporary custody.
4. The DCP investigator is required by Illinois law to make "an evaluation as to whether there would be an immediate and urgent necessity to remove the child from the environment if appropriate family preservation services were provided." Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, ¶2057.4(b)(3). In actuality, however, DCP investigators are not trained in what if any services may be available and do not in practice make an assessment of whether there are services, available that would avoid the need to remove the children from their parents.
5. When DCFS takes temporary custody of children, it is required to bring them before a judicial officer within 48 hours, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and court holidays, for a temporary custody hearing to determine whether they- should continue to be held in custody.
6. If a report is found "indicated," it is designated • to a team of social workers. Within two to three weeks, a
follow-up caseworker is assigned. Illinois law provides that.at this stage, DCFS "shall assess the family's need for services, and, as necessary, develop, with the family, an appropriate service plan . . . ." I11. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, 12058.2. - Illinois law further provides that DCFS "shall promptly notify _r
4

children and families of the Department's responsibility to offer and'p;6vide family preservation services," defined generally as "all services to prevent the placement of children in substitute care, to reunite them with their families if so placed and if
reunification is an appropriate goal, or to maintain an adoptive
placement." I11. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, 12058.2. (The statute provides that the availability of family preservation services shall be phased in during the 5 fiscal years following 1987.)
The court finds that no such notification was provided in the
case of any of the movant plaintiffs. According to Teresa Mayberry-Dunn, DCFS Area Administrator, DCFS' primary responsibility at this stage is to deliver the services needed to achieve family reunification.
7. Among the reasons for which children may be removed from their parents' custody are "environmental neglect" and "inadequate shelter."
8. Ultimately, a permanent caseworker is assigned to • the case. The caseworker is to develop a case or service plan
usually with the ultimate goal of reuniting the family or achieving a permanent (non-foster care) placement for the children.
9. Families whose children are taken from them are ineligible for many welfare programs to which they would be entitled if they had custody of their children. In general, parents who have lost custody of their children are ineligible for aid to families with dependent children ("AFDC"), CHA housing
5

'

1

and some programs of the Illinois Department of Public Aid

("IDPA"). Thus, the removal of children from a poor family may

have the effect of disqualifying the family from receiving

various types of public aid and services for which they would

otherwise be eligible, thus seriously worsening their financial

condition and disabling them from making the improvements in

their material circumstances necessary to enable the family to be

reunified. For instance, under normal circumstances, a parent

whose income qualified him or her for CHA housing would be deemed

ineligible for such housing if his or her children were removed;

absent some special arrangement, if the parent were required to

obtain housing in order to secure the return home of his or her

children, and CHA housing were the only housing the parent could

afford, the fact that the children were in DCFS custody would

prevent the parent from obtaining CHA housing. Similarly, where

a family's primary source of income is AFDC, removal of the

children will leave the parent(s) with a drastically reduced

income level. If the parent is required to demonstrate the

existence of a materially adequate home environment to secure the

return of his or her children, his or her ability to do so may be

completely destroyed by the removal of the children. For these

among other reasons, if families are not to be permanently

separated, home environment problems related to lack of money

• must either be alleviated before the children are removed from the home or dealt with by means of coordination between DCFS and

other welfare agencies, with exceptions made to usual eligibility

6

policies. As defense witness Teresa Mayberry-Dunn testified, once 'DCFS has custody .of a family's children, it becomes extremely difficult for the family -to. obtain assistance from agencies such as CHA, IDPA and DCFS. The result is a classic case of "Catch-22": the removal of the children renders th improvement in material circumstances necessary to secure the return of the children impossible.
10. In 1988, DCFS established a program called the Families First Initiative ("Families First"). Families First, defendant admits, is a response to the mandates of the AAA and to the Illinois Family Preservation Act. Like the statutes to which it responds, Families First reflects the prevailing view among social work and child care professionals that family preservation rather than foster care should, wherever possible, be the goal of intervention efforts since children do better if not separated from their families, as long as the families receive adequate support. (,See PX 15;.testimony of Diane Yost.') The purpose of Families First is to provide comprehensive services, including homemaker services, counselling services and emergency assistance, including cash assistance, to maintain intact families and to reunify separated families as quickly as possible. Among the services that Families First is set up to provide are caretakers who can come into a home, counselling, and emergency funds to get utilities turned back on and to pay for
'Where no page number is indicated, references are to untranscribed preliminary injunction hearing testimony.
7

rent and security deposits on apartments. Cash assistance of up to $500 per family may be provided. Intensive services are provided by Families First for 90 days with follow-up services thereafter. Certain CHA housing has been set aside for families served by Families First. (Testimony of Diane Yost.)
11. At present, by the terms of the Families First program, only 350 families statewide can be served by Families First at any one time. For a family to be eligible for Families. First, there must be an indicated finding of abuse or neglect; there must be at least one child in the family under the age of 6; there must be an imminent risk of placement; and there must have been no more than three abuse or neglect reports. (Testimony of Diane Yost.) It has not been suggested that families not meeting these criteria could not equally benefit from this program.- The court finds that the Families First program demonstrates DCFS' understanding of the objectives of the AAA and its understanding of and ability to implement the AAA's requirements that the states make reasonable efforts to prevent separation of families and to reunify them and that the states provide for coordinated services to achieve the AAA's objectives.
12. Apart from Families First, there are in the Cook County area a number of sources of emergency aid for families. IDPA administers a fund called `Special Assistance for Families Threatened with Separation due to Financial Reasons,` which can provide -allowances for rent, food, clothing and household supplies; a DCFS document states, "Public Aid acknowledges that:
8

this fund has not been used readily in the past." (PX 11.) The

• Harris Foundation established a fund, administered by DCFS,
expressly for the purpose of allowing the reunification of

children and their families when the children are in foster care

"primarily because of the lack of adequate housing or utilities";

grants of up to $350 are allowed. (PX 14.) Small grants to

assist families in obtaining housing are available through the

•

Chicago Urban League, Catholic Charities and the Salvation Army.

• (Testimony of Smalley Mike Cook.) The United Way Crusade of

Mercy administers a number of programs including rent-mortgage

assistance to help people who need one month's rent to obtain an

apartment or avoid eviction, utility assistance to help people
with past due bills or whose utilities have been disconnected and

a shelter voucher program which can provide persons with up to 30

days of emergency housing in a hotel or motel. (Testimony of

Margaret Hughes.) There is also a security deposit trust fund,

set up by the Jewish Federation, by which homeless people can

have their security deposits guaranteed. (a.)

13. The practical problem with many of these sources

of assistance is that they are rarely available unless family

reunification is imminent. Since reunification cannot take place

without a court order, since reunification can rarely be achieved

without DCFS approval, and since a judge is unlikely to order

reunification and DCFS is unlikely to approve it unless the

parents have an adequate home to which the children can return,

the parents rarely get access to these sources of assistance ..

until -they have substantially improved their environmental circumstances. In short, the parents cannot get assistance until it is clear that their children are about to be returned to them, and they cannot show that their children are about to be returned to them until they have improved their financial *circumstances. Without a coordinated program to use these resources in conjunction with planning for the return of the children, the services which would permit the return of the children remain out of reach because, due to environmental conditions, the return of the children is not imminent.
14. The.court finds on the basis of the expert social work testimony presented at the hearing that successful reunification of families frequently depends on prompt reunification. The, more quickly needed services are provided, the more likely it is that the family will remain intact or be successfully reunited. Good social work practice dictates that case plans be developed and services be provided whenever possible within 48 hours of the children's removal from the family home. The court further finds that removal of children from their parents, especially when prolonged, is likely to cause severe, irreparable emotional damage to the children and to their parents.
facts Relating to Gina Johnson and Her Children
15. Gina Johnson is a 26-year-old single mother. She has ;five children: Wade Johnson, age 9; Randy Johnson, age 7; Cheryl Brown, age 5; Crystal Phillips, age 4; and Terrica Herron,,,
10

age 3. (Johnson testimony, pp. 74-75.)
16. On March 13, 1988, Gina Johnson and her children were living at 5010 South Justine in Chicago. (Johnson testimony, p. 77.) Wade and Randy had three weeks earlier been returned , to Ms. Johnson's custody from the custody of their father, who had at that point been incarcerated for murder. Randy had previously lived with Ms. Johnson for only four months, immediately following his birth. There was evidence that the boys had been abused and molested while they were in their father's custody. (Johnson testimony, pp. 76, 80.)
17. On March 13,.1988, Cheryl Brown woke up crying and told Gina Johnson she was bleeding from the vagina. Gina Johnson called an ambulance and Cheryl was taken to Mercy Hospital. (Johnson testimony, p. 82.)
18. Walter Henry, an investigator with the Division of Child Protection, Sex Abuse Unit, DCFS, responded to a call to the Child Abuse Hotline that Cheryl Brown had been abused. On March 13, 1988, Henry interviewed Gina Johnson at Mercy Hospital and later at the police station. (Henry testimony; Johnson testimony, pp. 106 -107.)
19. Gina Johnson told Henry that Cheryl received her injuries when her brother Randy injected a stick from a window shade into her vagina. (Johnson testimony, p. 82; Henry testimony; DX 12.)
20. Henry also interviewed Cheryl's examining physician, Dr. Patterson of Mercy Hospital. (DX 12.) Dr.
11

Patterson informed Henry that Cheryl Brown had been bleeding profusely from the vagina and had passed a blood clot the size of a baseball. It was the doctor's opinion that Cheryl's injury could not have been caused in the manner Gina Johnson described. Dr. Patterson informed Henry that Cheryl had a black eye, numerous bruises and welts on her body, and human bite marks on her body. (DXs 13-17; Henry testimony.)
21. Henry concluded that Cheryl's injuries evidenced long term sexual abuse. (Henry testimony; DX 12.)
22. Henry made an "indicated" finding of physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect. (Henry testimony; DXs 12, 18.) Gina Johnson's children were taken into temporary custody. (Johnson testimony, p. 84; Henry testimony.) Henry discussed' with Gina Johnson the possibility of placing the children with relatives, but there was no suitable relative available. (Henry testimony.)
23. On March 16, 1988, a hearing on temporary custody of Gina Johnson's children was held in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Juvenile Division. Gina Johnson was represented by the Cook County Public Defender at this hearing. (Johnson testimony, p. 115.) The Cook County Public Guardian represented Gina Johnson's children at this hearing. A petition for temporary custody was filed and presented by the Cook County State's Attorney. (DXs 3, 7.) Johnson, through her public defender, stipulated to awarding temporary custody of her children to DCFS. (Johnson testimony, p. 116.) The court ordered that Gina;
12

Johnson's children be placed in the temporary custody of DCFS.

•

(DXs 3, 7; Johnson testimony, pp. 115^116.)

•

24. The first service plan in the Johnson case appears

to have been established April 1, 1988. Prepared by Betty

Jenkins, a DCFS follow-up caseworker, at a meeting between Ms.

Jenkins and Ms. Johnson, it provided that Gina Johnson would have

at least one supervised visit with her children each week and

would participate in counselling and parenting training through

DCFS referrals. Ms. Jenkins referred Ms. Johnson to parenting

classes at Mt. Sinai Hospital and to an organization called HELP

for individual and group psychotherapy. (PX 4; Johnson

testimony, pp. 85-87, 111.)

25. DCFS : also arranged for counselling for Cheryl

Brown at HELP and for Wade and Randy Johnson at South Central

Community Services. (Johnson testimony, pp. 111, 114.)

26. The next service plan for Gina Johnson bears the

date of September 28, 1988. The plan indicated that as of that

date, the goals of participation in a psychological evaluation,

participation in parenting training and supervised visitation had

been met. Service tasks, with a planned achievement date of

March 1989., included finding• a permanent home and demonstrating

stability, furnishing the home adequately, attending counselling,

obtaining a G.E.D. and making supervised visits with her

children. Ms. Johnson's primary caseworker at this time was John

Mukasa-Ssebaana. (PX 7.)

i•

27. Between March 1988 and December 1988, having lost'"

13

her children and her eligibility for an AFDC grant, Gina Johnson

lived in approximately five different residences. (Johnson

testimony, pp. 77-79, 110.).

28.. In December 1988, HELP referred Ms. Johnson to

Sarah's Inn, a facility maintained by APAC (Austin People's

Action Center). APAC provides apartments and job and home-

finding counselling, among other services. (DX 25; Johnson

testimony, pp. 111-112.)

29. Sarah's Inn provides Ms. Johnson with individual

counselling and support groups focusing on emotional, physical

and sexual abuse. (Ms. Johnson was herself an abused child and a

ward of DCFS.) She has been provided with a four room apartment

(living room, bedroom, kitchen and bath) in a building with other

women, many of whom have their children with them, and is

receiving counselling and, support services at Sarah's Inn.

Sarah's Inn charges Ms. Johnson no rent but reserves $123 per

month of Ms. Johnson's monthly $154 general assistance and food

stamp grant for the time when Ms. Johnson is ready to get her own

apartment. As of the time of the hearing in this matter, Ms.

Johnson had accumulated savings of approximately $600.

Ms.

Johnson's caseworker at Sarah's Inn is Sherry Parker. (PX 9;

Johnson testimony, pp. 113-114; testimony of Sherry Parker.)

30. A December 27, 1988 Service Plan contains goals

including: Ms. Johnson is to attempt to obtain her high school

diploma, take her asthma medication, get counselling, join a

family support group and retain an attorney to attempt to achieve

14

the return of her children. Progress notes_ entered in her file
indicate substantial progress toward these goals. (DX 26.)
31. A Service Plan of March 31, 1989, indicates:
The natural mother continues in counseling and therapy at H.E.L.P. and A.P.A.C. She is reported to be making satisfactory progress. With the help of A.P.A.C., Gina has an apartment. The plan is for her to save enough money to obtain her own apartment. She applied for C.H.A. low income housing. Both her therapist at H.E.L.P. and her DCFS worker wrote letters of recommendation to C.H.A.
(DX 27.)
32. Despite the progress noted in the March 31, 1989
Service Plan, Ms. Johnson's caseworker did not recommend the
return of her children. He explained, "The natural mother will
have to demonstrate stability and independent functioning in her
own apartment before a recommendation for the return of the
children will be made." The Service Plan notes that Ms. Johnson
has had regular supervised visits with her children and that
"[i]f her satisfactory progress continues, she will be allowed
some unsupervised visits." (DX 27.) It was the caseworker's
view, as of the time of the hearing, that Ms. Johnson was not
ready for unsupervised visits and that she would have to
demonstrate adequate functioning in an unsupervised visitation
setting for a period of approximately six months before he would recommend the return of her children. He further wants to see
her in her own apartment, rather than in transitional housing such as Sarah's Inn, before he will recommend return of her children. (Dep. of John Mukasa-Ssebaana, pp. 103, 117.)
15

• 33. There is a disagreement between Gina Johnson's caseworker Mr. Mukasa-Ssebaana and her counselor at Sarah's Inn as to her readiness for reunification with her children. Based. on the counselling she has been given, Sarah's Inn personnel believe Ms. Johnson has made sufficient progress to justify unsupervised weekend visits with her three daughters. They recommend that if the unsupervised visits are successful, Ms. Johnson be reunited with her daughter Crystal after two months and with the other two girls, Terrica and Cheryl, at successive two-month intervals. (DX 29.)- Ms. Johnson's caseworker at Sarah's Inn disagrees with Mr. Mukasa-Ssebaana's insistence that Ms. Johnson demonstrate an ability to function independently in • her own household.' Ms. Parker would prefer to see Ms. Johnson in transitional housing under Sarah's Inn's supervision so that the family's reunification can be closely monitored and assisted. Neither Ms. Johnson herself nor personnel at Sarah's Inn believes she is ready to take custody of her two boys at this time. (Johnson testimony, pp. 102, 121-122.) 34. DCFS policies dictate that when a private agency is involved in providing counselling to an individual whose children are in DCFS custody, that agency recommends reunification and the DCFS caseworker disagrees, a "staffing" should take place. A "staffing" is a conference with all the involved individuals and DCFS supervisory personnel. (Testimony of Teresa Mayberry-Dunn.) Despite the fact that a staffing was • appropriate in Gina Johnson's case, no staffing had been held. as
16

of the time of the hearing before this court.
35. While Ms. Johnson's caseworker has indicated that he wants her to demonstrate "independent functioning" and "stability" before he will recommend the return of her children
and wants her to demonstrate those qualities by, among other
things, obtaining her own apartment outside the protective context of Sarah's.Inn, this court is persuaded that it is not his purpose to impose a financial condition upon her for the
return of her children but to satisfy his concerns about her
ability, on a sustained basis, to undertake the responsibilities of being a parent. He testified that he has not required her to accomplish tasks (such as obtaining CHA housing) before her children are returned that she cannot as a practical matter• accomplish until her children are returned; he testified that he is able, through coordination with CHA, to obtain CHA housing for various clients pending reunification with their children. (Dep. of John Mukasa-Ssebaana, p. 119.)
36. Since the hearing in her case, Ms. Johnson has obtained a 3-bedroom CHA apartment and has been granted overnight visits with her children by order of the juvenile court. One such visit took place, but there were no beds for the children. Additional. overnight visits have not been allowed due to the lack of beds. Ms. Johnson's caseworker has requested a cash assistance grant for her from the Harris Fund, but no funds have been provided to date. (Stipulation regarding Gina Johnson, filed December 21, 1989.) In a stipulation filed by the parties
17

•
regarding plaintiff Wanda Hilliard, it is stated that due to fiscal limitations, no Harris Fund monies will be available to families whose applications were processed and approved before January 1, 1990.
37. The court is persuaded that there is a difference of professional opinion between Sarah's Inn personnel and Mr. )lukasa-Ssebaana concerning Gina Johnson's readiness for family reunification. Ms. Johnson has received extensive counselling and coordinated services as a result of DCFS referrals and a meaningful Service Plan- has been assembled with conscientious follow-up. While the court may or may not agree with Mr. MukasaSsebaana's professional judgment as to whether Ms. Johnson's children should be returned to her at the present time, it it persuaded that in Gina Johnson's case, the defendant has, at least to date, made reasonable efforts to achieve family reunification.' Facts Relating to Wanda Hilliard and her Children'
38. Wanda Hilliard is the mother of five children: Marvel Hunter, age 12; Kimberly Hunter, age 7; Christopher Duncan, age 6; Ebony Hilliard, age 1; and a newborn infant.
39. In 1987, Ms. Hilliard and her children were living
2 As explained more fully below, see n.8, infra, the suspension of visitation between Ms. Johnson and her children because of lack of beds is troubling to the court, but no evidence has been presented as to whether there are reasonable efforts defendant could make but has failed to make that could rectify this situation.
'Except where otherwise indicated, these factfindings are based on the untranscribed testimony of Ms. Hilliard.
18

with Ms. Hilliard's sister, Queen Esther. On or about August 9, 1987, Queen Esther called DCFS and complained that Ms. Hilliard had left the premises leaving no money for the children and no care plan. DCFS took Christopher and Kimberly into protective custody. Ultimately DCFS was given temporary custody of Christopher, Kimberly and Marvel. The reason for the removal of the children from their mother was an indicated finding of inadequate food and inadequate supervision. (,ee Stipulation, 14.)
40. The three children removed by DCFS were placed in foster care with their maternal grandmother, where they remain to this date.
41. Subsequent to the removal of her children, Ms. Hilliard lived with friends and in shelters. Since August 11,
1989, Ms. Hilliard has been living in a studio apartment with her
two youngest children, both born after the. three oldest children were removed from her custody. The studio apartment, besides the inadequacy of its size, has heating and water problems. It had no heat on the day Ms. Hilliard testified, when the outside temperature was approximately 10 degrees.
42. Ms. Hilliard's • sole source of support is her $250 AFDC grant. (This grant will increase to $342 in January, as a result of the birth of Ms. Hilliard's youngest child.) Ms. Hilliard pays $225 per month rent out of this grant.
43. Ms. Hilliard has had three DCFS caseworkers. At
S.
various times, service plans were drafted which required her to
19

undergo. counselling, parenting training and drug testing. Ms. Hilliard has completed all the tasks which DCFS- views as preconditions to the return of her children other than finding adequate housing. It is the view of the caseworker supervisor with responsibility for the Hilliard case that the only existing obstacle to reunification of the Hilliard family is Ms. Hilliard's need fora larger apartment. (Stipulation, Si7, 8.)
44. Despite Ms. Hilliard's many requests for housing assistance from DCFS, including written requests by her attorney for cash assistance (see PX 79), she has received no cash assistance, no referrals for housing and no help in locating housing. • The only exception to this is that DCFS has made contact on her behalf with the Chicago Public Housing Authority; however, Ms. Hilliard is not eligible for public housing. (Stipulation, 112.)
45. Ms. Hilliard's DCFS caseworker never filed a Harris Fund request. The DCFS caseworker supervisor, Earl Pleasant, completed a Harris Fund request for $500 for Ms. Hilliard on December 1, 1989. (Stipulation, 19.)
46. Due to fiscal limitations, no Harris Funds will be available to families whose applications have been processed and approved before January 1, 1990; none have been made available to Wanda Hilliard. (Stipulation, 110.)
47. The Harris Fund is not the only means by which a caseworker can obtain cash for a family. ( ee Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' Requests to Admit #1.) Using a procedure,.'

known as "exception to policy" or "exceptional payment request" in which a caseworker submits a written request for special funds to her supervisor, Ms. Hilliard's caseworker, in July 1989, obtained $650.00 to send the children to camp. (P1 76. ,See also PX 62: Exceptional payment to plaintiff Joann Mitchell for bus pass and shoes.) There was no evidence as to whether or not exceptions to policy can be used to secure housing assistance.
48. Wanda Hilliard has custody of her two youngest children and DCFS has no indicated reports concerning them. DCFS has taken no action to remove the two youngest children from her custody. (Stipulation, 111.)
49. DCFS has provided no transportation assistance for Ms. Hilliard to locate housing or work.
50. Ms. Hilliard is mildly developmentally delayed; special training may be necessary if she is to find and keep employment. (Dep. of Denise Kane.) She is a mentally healthy individual, however, who has been cooperative with DCFS and has shown concern about her children.
51. Ms. Hilliard's AFDC grant will increase in January to $342.00. If all her children were returned to her, her AFDC grant would be $452.00. She has looked for housing for her family and cannot find even a one-bedroom apartment for less than $300.00. She would need approximately $1500 initially to secure a two-bedroom apartment, assuming rent of $500.00 per month. Without financial assistance, Ms. Hilliard will be unable to procure housing adequate to satisfy DCFS' requirements for the.
21

return of her children.. 52. Ms. Hilliard has experienced depression and loss
of sleep since her children were removed. She is upset and wonders when they will return. Her children have experienced stress and a loss of confidence in their mother.
53. Ms. Hilliard has frequently and consistently visited her children. DCFS' stated goal for the family has always been reunification. (PXs 71-73.)
54. Ms. Hilliard's current service plan requires Ms. Hilliard to secure stable housing but provides no direction as to how she is to achieve that goal, which appears beyond her reach. (PX 89.) Facts Relatin g to Joann Mitchell and her Children`
55. Plaintiff Joann Mitchell is the mother of five children: Sebastian, age 22; Melissa, age 21; Nicole, age 11; Christian, age 10; .arid Dominick, age 5.
56. Sebastian and Melissa are not minors and have their own households. DCFS took protective custody of Nicole, Christian, and Dominick on December 4, 1985, and the children were placed in foster care with Ms. Mitchell's aunt, Jonnie Evans, where they remain today.
57. Ms..Mitchell's children were originally removed by DCFS on December 4, 1985, when the man with whom Ms. Mitchell shared an apartment reported her to DCFS as having abandoned her

_

'Except where otherwise indicated, these factfindings are

based on the untranscribed testimony of Ms. Mitchell.

22

children. There is evidence that the reporter may have lied to the police to get Ms. Mitchell's family out of the apartment. Ms. Mitchell testified that she had left the children in this man's care while she left the apartment for a few hours.
58. The DCP worker indicated Ms. Mitchell for "inadequate supervision" because the children were without a caretaker. Ms. Mitchell was arrested for abandoning her
children and taken into custody. The charge of abandonment was
never prosecuted. 59. Ms. Mitchell was receiving $385 in AFDC benefits
when her children were taken by DCFS. After the children were taken, her grant was cancelled. She had no income until she began receiving General Assistance, $154 per month, two months later.
60. After her children were taken into DCFS custody, Ms. Mitchell repeatedly called DCFS to inquire about her children. DCFS never called her back. At the end of January, 1986, approximately six to seven weeks after the children were taken, Ms. Mitchell finally learned from a friend that the children had been placed with Ms. Evans.
61. On May 21, 1986, Judge Aaron of the Juvenile Court
vacated the December 1985 order granting temporary custody of the
Mitchell children to DCFS. Ms. Mitchell testified that the judge
told the caseworker, Ms. Sheila Johnson, to pick up the children
and bring them to Ms. Mitchell's apartment. Despite Ms. Mitchell's repeated complaints, the children were not returned. ^:j•
23
r

Ms. Mitchell did not go to the foster home herself to pick up the children because the judge had instructed her not to do so.
62. DCFS took temporary protective custody of the three Mitchell children shortly thereafter on June 5, 1986, alleging that Ms. Mitchell had no place for the children to live. (PXs 36, 37.) On June 11, 1986, DCP again indicated Ms. Mitchell for "inadequate supervision" because she did not have enough room for the children in her apartment. DCFS' risk assessment form indicates that Ms. Mitchell should "check into getting an apartment so she can regain custody of her children." (PX 40.) Before retaking custody of the Mitchell children, DCFS offered no services to Ms. Mitchell. (PX 42.)
63. To date, DCFS has prepared six service plans for Ms. Mitchell, dated 1/23/86; 12/2/86; 6/22/87; 12/16/87; 7/25/88; and 12/5/89. (PXs 34,'45, 46, 47, 48, 56.) Ms. Mitchell did not participate in preparing any of these plans and was not present when they were drafted.
64. While none of these service plans identifies
housing as a condition for the reunification of the Mitchell
family, caseworker Sheila Johnson told Ms. Mitchell that she had to secure a three bedroom apartment before the children could be returned to her. None of the service plans commit DCFS to providing housing assistance and/or referrals to Ms. Mitchell, or otherwise mention any housing assistance that DCFS will provide to Ms. Kitchell.
65. Ms. Mitchell asked her first caseworker, Sheila
24

• Johnson,. for assistance in getting an apartment. Ms. Johnson never provided Ms. Mitchell with any assistance in securing housing and refused Ms. Mitchell's requests for assistance with her job search and transportation. 66. Ms. Mitchell also asked her present caseworker, Sherra Jackson, for assistance securing housing, including cash. Ms. Jackson states that she knows of no cash assistance available for housing and that she does not know whether referral to outside agencies for cash is appropriate. (Dep. of Sherra Jackson, pp. 39-41.) She has received no training in how to assist families with poverty-related problems such as lack of housing or lack of food. (Dep. of Sherra Jackson, p. 38.) Caseworker Jackson has obtained exceptional cash assistance for Ms. Mitchell on two occasions, once for transportation to job interviews and realty agencies (PX 62) and once for special shoes needed for a job Ms.-Mitchell had obtained (PX 63). 67. Ms. Mitchell completed counselling DCFS required of her in June 1989. The counselor, Terry Henderson, issued a report on September 23, 1988, recommending that the children be returned home as soon as housing was secured. (PX 49.) 68. Since December 1988, Ms. Mitchell has been homeless, moving from shelter to shelter. Each shelter has limits on the length of time one can stay. Each shelter also has requirements that its residents attend various meetings and perform various chores. Ms. Mitchell's ability to search for employment and housing has been limited by these requirements.
25

• 69. DCFS caseworkers have sporadically scheduled supervised visitation for Ms. Mitchell and have then failed to appear themselves. Ms. Mitchell appeared for three scheduled visits but after the third visit, Ms. Evans, the foster care provider, refused to allow Ms. Mitchell into her home. Ms. Mitchell has arranged visits on her own, but DCFS has failed to assist in implementing any regular visitation.
70. According to expert social worker Denise Kane, visitation between Ms. Mitchell and her children should be undertaken immediately to prevent irreparable damage.
71. In December 1988, Ms. Mitchell discovered bruises on her son Christian's body, from his waist to his ankles. Christian told his mother that his cousin had beaten him. Ms. Mitchell reported the abuse to DCFS, who investigated and found the case indicated for abuse. (PXs 50-55.) DCFS did not remove the children from the foster care placement and they still remain there.
72. According to expert social worker Denise Kane, upon thorough review of the Hilliard and Mitchell DCFS files, reasonable efforts have not and are not being made to reunite these women with their children. (Dep. of Denise Kane, pp. 2635, 62-78, 79.)
RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendant has advanced a battery of theories in support of its contention that plaintiffs are entitled to no relief. These include (1) that the court should abstain from deciding -
26

• this case because of the pendency of state juvenile court proceedings involving the issue of placement of the plaintiffs' children; (2) that plaintiffs' claims are barred by collateral estoppel in that the state court, in awarding temporary custody of plaintiffs' children to DCFS, was required under state law to find that DCFS had made "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal of the children from their families; (3) that there is no private right of action under the AAA, and the AAA cannot be enforced through S1983 because the AAA's own remedial provisions are sufficiently comprehensive to evince congressional intent to preclude S1983 actions; and (4) that plaintiffs are in essence seeking a mandatory injunction that would, if granted, violate the Eleventh Amendment:. ABSTENTION Defendant's first contention can be easily disposed of since the abstention doctrine has no application here. Plaintiff parents seek injunctive relief against the Director of DCFS for allegedly violating federal law in a manner which effectively disables plaintiffs from being able to provide an adequate environment for their children. The issue before the Juvenile Court -- whether, given the family's circumstances, the children should be in the custody of their parents or in foster care -- is
a completely different question. As the court stated in R. C. V.
Hornsby, Cir. No. 88-D-1170-N (M.D. Ala. 1989), an action such as this is not an attempt "to interfere with state court custody determinations, procedures, or any other issue properly before a •
27

state court." Id. at 8. The fact that if the plaintiffs were -given the assistance and services to which they claim they are entitled, a state court might decide the custody issue differently, does not amount to interference with the state court proceedings.
Defendant also asserts, without elaboration, °that
plaintiffs could raise their claims in the state court custody
proceedings. This court finds it hard to take this suggestion
seriously. State courts hearing custody matters must take the parties as they find them and do the best that they can for the children given things as they are. They are hardly in a position
to try the issue of whether DCFS is properly administering
federal funding programs.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Defendant's collateral estoppel argument is similarly
meritless. The reach of this doctrine was described by the Court of Appeals in Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th -Cir. 1986), as follows:
In general, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues in a subsequent proceeding when: (1) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to the earlier proceeding, (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided on the merits, (3) the resolution of the particular issue was necessary to the result, and (4) the issues are identical. Illinois law requires that before the Juvenile Court orders a minor removed from his or her home, the court must a►ake .a finding, on the basis of documentation provided by DCFS, 'that
28

reasonable efforts have been made or that good cause has been shown why reasonable efforts cannot prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor from his or her home . . . .' Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, 5802-10(2). The court is required, in addition, to e state in writing its findings concerning the nature of the services that were offered or the efforts that were made to prevent removal of the child and the apparent reasons that such services or efforts could not prevent the need for removal." g.
There is no evidence that the "reasonable efforts" issue was actually litigated before the Juvenile Court in any of the cases before this court. In the case of three of the Johnson children, the required finding is not made at all; in the case of Cheryl Brown, the form contains the entry, "appropriate services aimed at family preservation and family reunification have been unsuccessful." (DX 4-7.) There is, however, nothing in this record to suggest any services were provided to the Johnson family prior to the children's removal. In the case of Joann Mitchell's children, the pre-printed temporary custody order forms recite that reasonable efforts have been made to avoid removal (PX 64), but it is uncontested that in fact no efforts had been made; Joann Mitchell was immediately taken into custody and charged with neglect. The Hilliard records similarly contain pre-printed disposition orders on which the language, •That appropriate services aimed at family preservation and family reunification have been unsuccessful," is noted with a checkmark. _•
29

The record, however, is clear that no services were prov.i u. Moreover, in none of these cases did the court include in its
order the required written findings concerning what services or efforts were made and why they appear to have been unsuccessful.
Even if the issue of "reasonable efforts" had been litigated in the Juvenile Court proceeding, collateral estoppel
would not bar the instant action since the issue here is not
identical to the issue in that context. Here, the question is what the AAA requires, not whether, on the basis of non-statutory discretionary standards, DCFS acted reasonably. Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not bar litigation of plaintiffs' claims here. ENFQRCE2 NT OF THE AACWA THROUGH A S1983 ACTION
Title 42 U.S.C. S1983 provides a federal remedy for state violations of federal statutory law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).: However, before a S1983 action can be premised on the alleged violation of a federal statute, it must appear that Congress intended, in enacting the statute alleged to be violated, to create enforceable rights and obligations. Where
a funding statute is alleged to have been violated, as is the
case here, the plaintiff must show that Congress intended to condition the grant of federal funds on the state's provision of the rights allegedly denied. Pennhurst State School & Hospital V. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 23 (19Pu8t1a)n.othPerYw.a the funding statute must make clear that it is imposing an obligation on states accepting funding pursuant to its provisions to provide
30

certain rights or benefits. Id. at 25. Even if plaintiffs can

demonstrate the statute's intent to create enforceable

rights, they are not entitled to reliefif the defendant can show

that the statute allegedly violated contains within itself a

remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate

congressional intent to exclude a 51983 cause of action.

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers

Ass' n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981).

The AAA provides for payments to states which have

child welfare plans meeting specified federal criteria. Title 42

U.S.C. S622 states that "[i]n order to be eligible for payment

under this part, a State must have a plan for child welfare

services . . . which meets the requirements of subsection (b) of

this section." (Emphasis added.) Under the designation•

"Requisite features of State plans" set out in subsection (b),

the statute states that "[e]ach plan for child welfare services

under this part shall:--."

•

t.

•

under subsection XX of this chapter (block grants to states for social services, 42 U.S.C. SS1397-1397f), under the State plan approved under part A of this subchapter [AFDC programs including employment training programs, food stamp programs, 42 U.S.C. SS601-615], under the State plan approved under Part E of this subchapter [federal payments for foster care and adoption assistance, 42 U.S.C. SS670-676], and under other State programs having a relationship to the program under this part, with a view to vrovision of welfare and related services
31

which will best promote the welfare of such children and their families . • • .
(Emphasis added.)
Title 42 U.S.C. S627(a) provides for distribution to
the states of certain appropriations but makes clear that 'a
State shall not be eligible for payment" from these
appropriations "unless such State . . . has implemented and is
operating . . ." various programs including:
(2) (B) a case review system (as defined in section 675(5) of this title) for each child receiving foster care under the supervision of the State; and
(C). a service program designed to help children, where appropriate, return to families from which they have been removed or be placed for adoption or legal guardianship.
Further, .S627 provides for reduction of a State's
allotment to 1979 levels if these programs are not in operation.
S627(b)(2).'
Section 675(5) defines the case review system required
by S627 as follows:
The term "case review system" means a procedure for assuring that -
(A) each child has a case plan designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child,
` Plaintiffs rely on these sections. Defendant has not,' suggested that they are inapplicable due to any failure of Congress to appropriate the funds referred to.
32

(B) the status of each child is reviewed periodically but no less frequently than once every six months by either a court
or by administrative review (as defined in
paragraph (6)) in order to determine the
continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of compliance
with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or :mitigating the causes
necessitating placement in foster care, and to project a likely date by which the child may be returned to the home or placed for
adoption or legal guardianship . . . .

Title 42 U.S.C. S671(a) also specifies that u (i]n order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part," it must

have a plan in effect, approved by the Secretary, which, among

other things:

*

•

(4) provides that the State shall assure that the programs at the local level assisted under this part will be coordinated with the programs at the State or local level assisted under parts A and B of this subchapter, under subchapter XX of this chapter, and under any other appropriate provision of federal law;

*

:

a

(15) effective October 1, 1983, provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home; and

(16) provides for the development of a case plan (as defined in Section 675(1) of this title) for each child receiving foster care
maintenance payments under the State plan and
provides for a case review system which meets the requirements described in section
675(5)(B) of this title with respect to such child . . . .

33

Section 675(1), defining the required "case plan,"

provides:

The term "case p lan" means a written document

which includes at least the following: A

description of the type of home or

institution in which a child is to he placed,

including a discussion of the appropriateness

of the placement and how the agency which is

responsible for the child plans to carry out

the voluntary placement agreement entered

into or judicial determination made with

respect to the child in accordance with

section 672(a)(1) of this title; and a plan

for assurin g that the child receives proper

care and that services are provided to the

parents 1 child and foster parents in order to

i

*hc #-^ ,M i4* 4 v c 4r the ri er+e► ^n^e

..v..--

Va.. i.0 V.•

vi--

ilr Vi r.,V 4 £*a.d. ,

and address the needs of the child while in

foster care, including a discussion of the

appropriateness of the services that have

been provided to the child under the

plan. .

(Emphasis added.) Numerous, cases hold that the AAA establishes rights
which may be enforced in a S1983 action. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983), affirmed a district court holding that the AAA creates enforceable rights to a "case plan" and a periodic review of that plan for each child in the state's foster care. In L. J. By and Through Darr v. Massinaa, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), the court held generally that the provisions of the AAA "spell out a standard of conduct, and as a corollary rights in plaintiffs." 838 F.2d at 123. And in this district, Judge Grady, in B. H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989), ruled that the AAA creates enforceable rights to- an'

34

individualized case plan and case review system. g. at 1402. See also Artist M. v. Johnson, No. 88 C 10503, slip op. at 16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1989). These cases similarly concluded that the AAA does not contain within itself a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to indicate Congress' intent to preclude a private right of action. Lynch, su pra at 510-511; H. v. Johnson, supra at 1403; Artist M., supra.
It is thus clear that a S1983 suit may be utilized to enforce appropriate provisions of the AAA. The issue here, then, is whether the wrongs plaintiffs allege are within the scope of the enforceable rights the AAA creates. The defendant argues that plaintiffs are in essence asserting a right to cash assistance and other "substantive services" and that no such rights are inferable from the provisions of the AAA. They rely
on, among other things, Judge Grady's opinion in B. H. V. Johnson, supra, holding that while the AAA creates enforceable
rights to an individualized case plan and case review system, the AAA's enforceable rights are limited to these monitoring procedures and do not encompass such "sweeping rights . . . as the right to an adequate number of case workers, family reunification services, services to 'troubled families,' or
rights of meaningful visitation between siblings." Id. at 1402.
See lso Scrivner v. Andrews, 816 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1987).
Subsequent to Judge Grady's decision in B.H., Judge
Shadur issued'a decision in Artist M. v. Johnson, No. 88 C 10503 (N.D. I11. Nov. 21, 1989). In this decision, Judge Shadur
35

concluded that the AAA's clear mandatory language requires

recognition of some enforceable rights beyond the rights to a

case plan and case review system identified by Judge Grady.

Specifically, Judge Shadur found, after 'a review of the language

of the AAA and its legislative history, that Congress intended to

require that the states provide preventive and reunification

services and that the AAA mandates that "reasonable efforts" to

Id. prevent separation and achieve reunification be made.

at 10

and n.6. He stated:

Courts have consistently confirmed Section 1983--enforceable rights to case plans and case review systems.. This Court has already found those statutory commands equivalent to those called upon by plaintiffs here. And to the extent that B.H., jd. at 1401 concluded that AAA's "reasonable efforts" provisions failed to meet the "clear" and "unambiguous" standard expressed in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), as necessary to create a "contract" between the State and the federal government, this Court .must again disagree. Any State that read (or for that matter neglected to read) AAA and accepted federal funds under it had to know it was obliged both to provide case plan and case review services and to provide services aimed at preventing removal
and facilitating reunification.
. at 13-14. (Citations and footnotes omitted.)

The Supreme Court has made clear that in determining

whether a statute• should be - read to give rise to enforceable

rights, "[t]he key to the inquiry is the intent of the
Legislature." Middlesex County Sewera ge Authority V. National
Sea Clappers Assn, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). In dealing with a

statute enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power, which

36

M

provides for the disbursement of federal funds to states which 'agree to comply with federally-imposed conditions, it is particularly important that Congress make its intent clear, since the legitimacy of Congress' attempt to legislate in this manner
"rests on whether the State voluntarily u d knowingly accepts the
terms of the 'contract."' Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). The court must look to the statute to determine whether Congress clearly "imposed an obligation on the States to spend state money to fund certain rights as a condition
of receiving federal monies under the Act or whether it spoke in
precatory terms." ld. at 19. It must also be clear that Congress intended to benefit persons such as plaintiffs. egg
'Wri ght V. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S.
418, 430 (1987). Title 42 U.S.C. S622 states, in unambiguous terms, that
in order to be eligible for federal funds under the AACWA, the state must have in effect a plan for child welfare services which complies with certain specified requirements, among them, coordination between the services provided for children under the plan and "services and assistance" provided under a number of other listed programs. Title 42 D.S.C. 5627 provides that a State shall not be eligible for payment under that section unless it has implemented and is operating a case review system for each child in foster care (defined in S675(5)) and a "service program" designed to help children, where appropriate, return to families from which they have, been removed. "Case review system" Ss
37

uC11ACU tib o YiuuCuure wnlcn w111 assure tnat eacn cniia nas a case plan designed to achieve certain specific - objectives and that the status of each child is reviewed no less frequently than every -six months in order to determine (1) the need for placement, (2) compliance with the case plan, and (3) the extent of progress in alleviating the causes requiring foster placement. Section 671 also specifies that in order for a state to be eligible for funds under that section, it must have in effect a
plan which provides for coordination with other state and local
welfare programs and provides for a case plan and case review. Section 671 further specifies that the plan in effect must provide that "in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home." 42 U.S.C. S671(a)(15). The case plan, which is a required part of the case review system mandated by 42 U.S.C. S627, must, by the express terms of $675(1), include "a plan for assuring that the child receives proper care and that services are provided to the parents, child and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in the parents' home [and] facilitate return of the child to his own home . . . ."
On the basis of the unambiguous wording of this statute, this court agrees with Judge Shadur that Congress' made
clear its intent to require preventive and reunification
services. There must be a case plan, there must be case review
38

no less frequently than every six months, there must be , coordination with other social welfare programs, and there must be "reasonable efforts" to prevent or eliminate the need for -removal of the child from his home or to make it possible for the child to return to his home. 42 U.S.C. 5671. The case plan defined in detail in S675(l), must include a plan for assuring that proper care and services are provided to the child and the parents "in order to improve the conditions in the parents' home, facilitate return of the child to his own home [or adoption], and address the needs of the child in foster care, including a discussion of the appropriateness of the services that have been provided under the plan."'
Any difficulty presented by these statutory provisions inheres not in Congress' failure to make clear their obligatory nature. Congress not only expressed itself in the language of obligation, but le.ft.no room for doubt that compliance with these provisions was a condition of receiving federal funds. It stated clearly that appropriate services must be provided to the children and their parents to prevent removal and facilitate reunification, that coordination with other welfare programs must
` The court would note that Judge Grady rendered his opinion in B.B. on a motion to dismiss, presumably without a fully
-devlopfactured.Hvinghartednclatigo the specific case histories of the plaintiffs before the court, this court is persuaded that simple monitoring, without efforts aimed at family reunification or permanent placement, is of no more efficacy than no monitoring. Unless the monitoring is for a purpose, unless it is performed in service of an objective, and unless it is accompanied by reasonable efforts to accomplish the law's objectives, it becomes a meaningless paperwork requirement.'
r

be provided for and that reasonable efforts to prevent the need
for removal and to make it possible for the child to return home
must be made. Congress' explicitly provided for a case plan and
case review system to achieve these explicit objectives.
Facilitating reunification of parents and children in foster care
is the unambiguous purpose of this legislation and the
unambiguous reason federal tax dollars are being distributed to
Illinois.' What difficulty there is inheres rather in the lack
of any clear definition of what is specifically required.
"Coordination" is required, but it is not clear from the statute
exactly what coordination entails. "Reasonable efforts" are
required, but "reasonable efforts" are nowhere defined.
Congress'-failure to spell out exactly what the state
is required to do in each case is not surprising, given the vast
diversity in the- problems and potential solutions individual
cases present. Nor is it particularly difficult for a court,
'Defendant has argued that even if the AAA can be enforced in a S1983 action and even if there is a private right of action under the AAA, parents are not the "especial' beneficiaries of the statute and they have no cause of action. The court cannot accept this reading of the statute. The AAA's primary focus is not children or parents but families. Its provisions stress repeatedly the importance of family unification. While it is undoubtedly true that the AAA is concerned with families because it views families-as critical to the well-being of children, its
emphasis on the family unit indicates to this court an intention
that children their parents should be able to seek to have the Act enforced. The court notes in this connection that the Act speaks of the 'provision of welfare and related services which will best promote the welfare of . . . children and their families," 42 U.S.C. S622(b)(2), and requires that a case plan include a plan ensuring that "services are provided to the -parents, child, and foster parents in order to improve 'the i• conditions in the parents' home . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S675(l).
40

once shown the facts of an individual case, to determine whether
there have been reasonable efforts at coordinated services. As Judge Shadur observed in this regard:
Courts have long proved themselves adequate to the task of enforcing contractual "best efforts" obligations, and they equally regularly enforce commitments of parties to conduct themselves "reasonably."
Artist M., supra at -10, n.6.
Gina Johnson's service plans, for all the controversy
about their wisdom, did, in this court's judgment, satisfy the
law's requirements. DCFS looked closely at the problems of Ms.
Johnson and her children and made referrals which led, directly
or indirectly, to the services which have so improved her and her
children's circumstances. It is not this court's role to say
whether Ms. Johnson and her children should be reunited. But it
can say that the emergency that precipitated the removal of Ms.
Johnson's children from her custody made reasonable DCFS' failure
to provide services and counselling before the children were
removed and that shortly after removal, meaningful goals were set
and meaningful assistance toward those goals rendered to
alleviate the causes for which the children were removed and to
make reunification feasible.'
'The court is concerned about the evidence presented after
the Johnson hearing that the family visitation which
Ms. Johnson's caseworker and social worker recommended has been suspended due to lack of beds. ( ee Findings #36, suora.) There is no evidence before the court that Ms. Johnson's caseworker has
failed to try to solve this problem. If there were such evidence, the court might be inclined to reach a different: conclusion as to the Johnson case.
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The Hilliard and Mitchell cases are different. It appears to be uncontroverted that DCFS would be willing to
recommend reunification "of these families if the mothers had
adequate housing for their children. It also appears clear that if the families were reunified, their AFDC grants would be sufficient to permit them to maintain such housing. Hence, from the record before this court, it appears that the only obstacle to the reunification of these families could be overcome with a proper housing referral and possibly some cash assistance, either from DCFS or from another agency. The court need not make judgments on the questionrof .whether DCFS has made reasonable efforts to reunify these families in the past to conclude that federal law requires that reasonable efforts be made now. If
there is no obstacle to reunification other than housing, the service plan should 'either contain some program for obtaining
such housing or document why no program is possible. the separation of these mothers from their children indefinitely for want of housing, when returning the children would ensure an adequate AFDC grant to obtain the necessary housing, is not only
conscience- shocking, but is precisely the kind of pointless
separation of families Congress enacted the AA.A to prevent. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that many DCFS caseworkers
are not trained to implement the requirements of federal law and that if programs for providing coordinated services exist, some caseworkers are unaware of them. The court need not address these systemic problems to conclude that plaintiffs Hilliard and
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Mitchell have a right, under the unambiguous provisions of the AAA, to meaninggful service pllapnprsserpeaarrebeydd pbersons aware of the
requirements of federal law and aware of what resources are
available to achieve family reunification.
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Plaintiffs further maintain that the AAA creates an
implied private right of action to enforce its provisions. In
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (19,75), the Supreme Court identified
four factors as relevant in determining whether a private remedy
is implicit in a statutory provision:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose es pecial benefit the statute was enacted . . . ." Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?, . . . . Third, is it consistent with the • underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the State, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Zd. at 78 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs manifestly satisfy the Cort v. Ash test.
Despite the defendant's contention that the AACWA's concern is
with children and that children are its "especial" beneficiaries,
this court views -this law as focused on families, both parents
and children. Unquestionably, the law's motivation is fostering•
the best interest of children, but its dominant idea is that the
welfare of children is inextricably tied up with the welfare of
families. Where a statute explicitly provides for assistance to
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parents so that they may be rendered adequate custodians for their children, we think the statute must be viewed as creating rights and interests in the parents. These parents' desire to claim the benefits to which this statute entitles them in order to keep their families together is wholly consistent with the purposes of this legislation. Hence, the first and also the third prong of the Cort test are satisfied here.
The second Cort factor, the intent of Congress, has been identified by the Supreme Court as the most crucial factor in this analysis. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redin , 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). Here, as in the analysis under Maine v. Thiboutot, above, the question is whether Congress intended to create a right which may be privately enforced. golchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 1983). For reasons stated above, the court concludes that:the mandatory language of the AAA indicates Congress' intent to create enforceable rights, and the AAA's lack of a comprehensive remedial scheme supports the inference that Congress intended these provisions of the AAA to be privately enforced.
The final factor identified by the court in Cort is whether an implied federal private right of action would displace or intrude upon traditional state causes of action. Were this court to attempt to decide whether plaintiffs' children should be returned to them, this factor might militate against implication of a private right of action. But this court sees its role as very different from that. What this court believes this lawsuit
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requires it to do is to construe the proper reach of the AAA, determining what its provisions require participating states to do. This is a task well within the province of the federal courts and one that threatens no interference with the state courts' traditional role in determining issues of child custody.
Accordingly, the court concludes that it is appropriate to imply a private right of action under the AAA to enforce those of its provisions which create enforceable rights.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ANALYSIS
A likelihood of success on the merits has been shown with respect to Wanda Hilliard and Joann Mitchell but not with respect to Gina Johnson. Hilliard and Mitchell will be irreparably injured if-DCFS does not do what the law requires it to do; they and their children are likely to sustain deep psychological injury and to have their relationships as families irreparably destroyed..* There is no countervailing harm to the defendant; the cost of working out a viable service plan for these families is de in' s. Moreover, the defendant will save money if, by giving these plaintiffs modest assistance, it can get their children out of the foster care system. The public interest in this case is clearly expressed in the AAA: unnecessary foster care placement is detrimental to the individuals involved and to the public.
Accordingly, it is recommended that a preliminary injunction be denied in the case of Gina Johnson and granted in the case of Wanda Hilliard and Joann Mitchell. Defendant should
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t
be ordered to assign a caseworker who is familiar with the requirements of the AAA to meet with the Hilliard and Mitchell families and their counsel within 21 days to create a realistic case plan that will permit the obstacles to family reunification to be overcome promptly, if at all possible. The case plan should, among other things: (1) identify any, obstacles to family reunification; (2) identify what if any resources are available to overcome any such obstacles; and (3) indicate how long overcoming such obstacles can be expected to take. The court should monitor the case plan and its follow-up.'
Counsel are given ten days from the date hereof to file exceptions to this Report and Recommendation with the Honorable William T. Hart. Failure to object constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal.
Respectfully sibmitted,

/V/ , DATED: January

1990

/JOAN 7GOTTSCKALL
U ited States Magistrate

'This recommended relief is prospective in nature and may not ultimately require the expenditure of any state funds. i• Relief of this kind is not prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. ;:
ee Artist M., supra, at 19-20.
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