News Release: Court Settlement Reached in Lawsuit Challenging Inmate Preaching Ban at ACI-... Page 1 of 2

NEWS RELEASE MONDAY JULY 30, 2007

ACLU of Rhode Island
128 Dorrance Street / Suite 220 / Providence, RI 02903 email: riaclu@riaclu.org / web: www.riaclu.org

COURT SETTLEMENT REACHED IN LAWSUIT CHALLENGING INMATE PREACHING BAN AT ACI
The ACLU of Rhode Island today announced the favorable settlement of its lawsuit on behalf of ACI inmate Wesley Spratt, who since 2003 had been barred by the Department of Corrections from preaching during Christian religious services at the state prison. Spratt had been preaching at ACI services for seven years before he was unilaterally stopped from doing so based on vague and generalized “security” concerns. A federal district judge initially upheld the ban, but in April the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed that ruling and ordered a trial on the merits of the case. The settlement obviates the need for a trial.
In challenging the ban, RI ACLU volunteer attorney Lynette Labinger had argued that the preaching ban violated a federal law designed to protect the religious freedom of institutionalized persons. That law, known by its acronym RLUIPA, bars states from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s exercise of religion unless it furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means available.
A consent judgment entered by U.S. District Judge William Smith today supports those arguments, concluding that DOC’s “policy of blanket prohibition against all preaching by inmates substantially burdened [Spratt’s] rights under RLUIPA,” and was not “the least restrictive means available to achieve its compelling interest in maintaining prison security.” A separate settlement agreement entered between the parties notes that the DOC has adopted a new policy that specifically authorizes inmates to conduct religious sermons under the direction of an institutional chaplain. The settlement agreement further provides that the DOC will pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.
Spratt, who considers his preaching a “calling” from God, had been preaching at religious services on a weekly basis under the supervision, and with the support, of clergy at the ACI. The DOC provided no evidence of security problems during, or as the result of, his supervised preaching during the seven years he had been doing so. Nonetheless, Spratt was ordered to stop preaching when a new warden took over the maximum security facility in 2003.
ACLU attorney Labinger said today: “The ACLU is very pleased with the settlement reached in this case, which allows Mr. Spratt to resume his preaching at the ACI. I commend the Department of Corrections for its work in adopting a policy designed to fulfill the letter and spirit of both the First Circuit’s ruling and RLUIPA’s goal of respecting the exercise of religious freedom by incarcerated individuals.”

http://www.riaclu.org/20070730PF.htm

10/30/2007

News Release: Court Settlement Reached in Lawsuit Challenging Inmate Preaching Ban at ACI-... Page 2 of 2

http://www.riaclu.org/20070730PF.htm

10/30/2007

 
 Case 1:04-cv-00112-S Document 94 Filed 07/30/2007 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

)

WESLEY SPRATT,

)

Plaintiff

)

)

v.

)

)

A.T• WALL, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

C.A. No.: 04-112S

CONSENT JUDGMENT

The Court finds, by and with the agreement of the parties, plaintiff Wesley Spratt and

defendant A.T. Wall, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Corrections of the

State of Rhode Island (hereinafter "defendant RIDOC"), as follows:

1. Plaintiff s preaching is a religious exercise within the meaning ofthe Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1, et seq. ("RLUIPA").

2. The RIDOC policy of blanket prohibition against all preaching by inmates substantially

burdened plaintiff s rights under RLUIPA.

3. The RIDOC policy ofblanket prohibition against inmate preaching is not the least restrictive

means available to achieve its compelling interest in maintaining prison security.

301. ~ ENTERED as the Judgment ofthe Comt this

y of

2007.

Enter: W~
United States District Judge

Case 1:04-cv-00112-S Document 94 Filed 07/30/2007 Page 2 of 2

AGREED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

}2b A orne for plaintiff '1 I
Lynette Labinger #1645 Roney & Labinger LLP Cooperating counsel, Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union 344 Wickenden Street Providence, Rhode Island 02903 (401) 421-9794 (401) 421-0132 (fax)

ttorneys Dr e

7- r2 tL -tJ7

Patricia A. Coyne-Fague #5198

Executive Counsel

RI Department of Corrections

40 Howard Avenue

Cranston, RI 02920

(401) 462-0145

(401) 462-2583 (fax)

 
 Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
2005 WL 348315 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.
Wesley SPRATT, Plaintiff, pro se v.
A.T. WALL, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, and the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections, Defendants.
No. C.A.04–112 S. | Jan. 13, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Wesley Spratt, for Plaintiff, pro se.
Patricia Ann Coyne–Fague, for Defendant.
Opinion
Report and Recommendation
HAGOPIAN, Magistrate J.
*1 Wesley Spratt (“Spratt” or “plaintiff”), pro se, an inmate legally incarcerated at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Cranston, Rhode Island, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges a a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Spratt names as defendants the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and its Director, A.T.Wall.
Currently before the Court are the motions of the plaintiff and defendant Wall for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). These matters have been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied, and defendant Wall’s motion for summary judgment granted on plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. I further recommend plaintiff’s claim made under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc be stayed pending the resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.2004), cert. granted 125 S.Ct. 308 (Oct. 12, 2004)(No. 03–9877).
Undisputed Facts

The following are the undisputed facts gleaned from the parties submissions in this matter:
In March 1996, a state court jury convicted Wesley Spratt of murder and related offenses. See State v. Spratt, 742 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I.1999). The state court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Adult Correctional Institutions(“ACI”). Id. During the times relevant in the Complaint, plaintiff was and continues to be confined in the Maximum Security Unit at the ACI.
While housed in maximum security, Spratt began to preach and lead Christian religious services within that unit for other inmates, with the apparent knowledge of officials at the Department of Corrections. In October of 2003 correctional officers and defendant Wall ended this practice, forbidding Spratt from preaching at or leading religious services for other inmates. The defendant based this restriction on maintaining institutional security. Spratt may pray, participate, and communicate with other inmates during religious services, just as any other inmate. He simply may not lead or preach at religious services.
Spratt has brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 citing an infringement of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also alleges a violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Both plaintiff and defendant Wall have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ .P. 56(c).
Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment’s role in civil litigation is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d. 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). Summary judgment can only be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
*2 Rule 56 has a distinctive set of steps. When requesting summary judgment, the moving party must “put the ball in play, averring ‘an absence of evidence to support a nonmoving party’s case.” ’ Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (quoting Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The nonmovant then must document some factual
1

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition. Not every discrepancy in the proof is enough to forestall summary judgment; the disagreement must relate to some issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–248 (1986).
On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See id. at 256–257. This evidence “can not be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a fact finder must resolve at an ensuing trial.” Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). Evidence that is merely colorable or is not significantly probative cannot deter summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–257.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In order to maintain a section 1983 action, the conduct complained of must be committed by a “person” acting under color of state law and the conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, (1980); see also, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (constitutional deprivations); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (statutory deprivations). Here, there is no dispute that defendant Wall acted under the color of state law. The only question presented is whether the uncontested facts demonstrate a violation of plaintiff’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
1. First Amendment Claims Plaintiff first alleges claims under the First Amendment.

There is no dispute that the defendant interfered with Spratt’s exercise of his religion and interfered with his speech by forbidding him to preach at or lead inmate religious services. There is no dispute that Spratt may attend religious services, and pray and participate as any other inmate. There is also no dispute regarding the sincerity of Spratt’s religious beliefs. The only issue at hand is whether the defendant may restrict Spratt from leading or preaching at religious services.
*3 The First Amendment, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech....” See U .S. CONST. amend. I. Plaintiff’s claims, if raised by the general public, would receive a strict scrutiny analysis; however, such claims made by an incarcerated individual are evaluated under a lesser standard of scrutiny in the context of a prison setting. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987). Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351–352 (1987)(finding that the Constitution does not require the prison to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to satisfy an inmate’s desire to exercise his religion so long as an inmate is not deprived of all forms of religious exercise). A prisoner only “retains those ... rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
Prison regulations alleged to infringe a constitutional right are judged under a reasonableness test. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81; O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. A regulation or restriction must have a logical connection to the legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. That connection may not be so remote at to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. Id.
In Turner, the United States Supreme Court set forth four factors that courts should consider in determining whether a restriction is reasonable. Id. First, courts are to ask whether there a is a valid rational connection between the restriction and the interest justifying it. Id. Second, courts are to consider whether there is an alternative means available to the prisoner to exercise the right. Id. at 90. Third, courts are to examine whether an accommodation would have “a significant ‘ripple effect” ’ on the guards, other inmates, and prison resources. Id. Fourth, courts are to consider whether there is an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner “at de minimis cost” to valid penological interests. Id. at 90–91.
Defendant asserts that the restriction is based on
2

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
maintaining institutional security. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, 6. The defendant contends that when inmates are given positions of authority, or perceived authority, other inmates’ relation to the prison administration is not as clear. Id. The defendant explains that permitting the plaintiff to be in a position of authority, or perceived authority, creates an unsafe environment. Id. This, defendant says, justifies Spratt’s restriction on preaching at or leading religions services. I agree. To permit an inmate to hold such a position where he or she is perceived as a leader could risk the safety and security of other inmates, correctional officers, and staff at the Department of Corrections. See Johnson–Bey v. Lane 863 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir.1988); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 577–578 (2nd Cir.1990); Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 129(3rd Cir.1988). Thus, I find that there is a rational connection between the restriction and legitimate governmental interest of maintaining institutional security.
*4 Next, courts are to consider whether there is an alternative means available to the prisoner to exercise the right. As any other inmate, Spratt can pray and participate in religious services at the prison. He simply may not lead or preach at religious services. Thus, Spratt has a means to exercise his First Amendment right to practice his religion and to speak during religious services as any other inmate would. Spratt “... need not be afforded his preferred means of practicing his religion as long as he is afforded sufficient means to do so,” Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979 at 5, (8th Cir.2004), and he may communicate with other inmates at religious services through permitted inmate interactions.
The final two factors also support a conclusion that the restriction on Spratt is reasonable. A decision to permit Spratt to continue to preach at or lead religious services could increase demands on correctional officers and prison resources. It could also create a hierarchy, or perceived hierarchy, among inmates. Additionally, there appears to be no other alternatives that would further both Spratt’s interest in preaching and leading religious services and the defendant’s interest in maintaining security at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Considering all of the factors of Turner, I find that the defendant’s restriction on Spratt leading or preaching at Christian religious services entirely reasonable and rationally related to the legitimate government interest of maintaining institutional security. Spratt, as a legally incarcerated individual, has no First Amendment right to lead or preach at religious services held for inmates. A prison need not permit “convicted felons, frocked or unfrocked, to conduct religious services in the prison.” Johnson–Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1310 (7th Cir.1988).

Accordingly, I find that Spratt’s motion for summary judgment should be denied, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted on the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. I so recommend.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claim. In his Complaint, plaintiff also indicates that he is seeking redress for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Plaintiff does not set forth an additional facts to support such a claim. Plaintiff’s claims, as addressed above, are more appropriately analyzed under the First Amendment.
However, out an abundance of caution, this Court will add a further thought on a Fourteenth Amendment claim. To the extent that plaintiff may be claiming that preaching or leading religious services implicates some sort of “liberty” interest beyond the scope of his First Amendment claims, there is no indication that Spratt’s restriction is “atypical” and “significant” in relation to the ordinary instances of prison life. Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Therefore, I find that the undisputed facts fail to state a claim for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, I find that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied, and defendant’s granted on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. I so recommend.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc *5 In addition to the constitutional claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff asserts a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.1 RLUIPA provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, ..., unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person -
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). Congress enacted RLUIPA in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), declaring unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as applied to the states. Although other courts have debated the constitutionality of RLUIPA, see Madison v. Ritter, 355
3

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2003)(finding RLUIPA constitutional); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir2003)(same); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.2002)(same); But see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.2003) (finding RLUIPA unconstitutional), defendant in this case has not made a constitutional challenge, nor has this circuit addressed the issue. However, the United States Supreme Court is about to weigh in on the matter. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, cert. granted 125 S.Ct. 308 (Oct. 12, 2004). Accordingly, I recommend that this claim be stayed until the Supreme Court has ruled on RLUIPA’s constitutionality.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied on his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted on plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA should be stayed pending the resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, cert. granted 125 S.Ct. 308 (Oct. 12, 2004)(No.03–9877).
Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court’s decision. United States v. Valencia–Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.1986)(per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.1980).
	  

Footnotes

1

Plaintiff initially brought this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 2000bb, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This Act has

been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, as applied to the states. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

Accordingly, plaintiff changed course and instead seeks relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc.

	  

4

 
 Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
2005 WL 348314 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.
Wesley SPRATT, Plaintiff, pro se v.
A.T. WALL, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, and the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections, Defendants.
No. C.A.04–112 S. | Jan. 18, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Wesley Spratt, for Plaintiff, pro se.
Patricia Ann Coyne–Fague, for Defendant.
Opinion
Report and Recommendation
HAGOPIAN, Magistrate J.
*1 Wesley Spratt (“Spratt” or “plaintiff”), pro se, an inmate legally incarcerated at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Cranston, Rhode Island, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Spratt names as defendants the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and its Director, A.T.Wall.
Currently before the Court are the motions of the plaintiff for a preliminary injunction and for “immediate injunctive relief.” Defendant Wall has objected. These matters have been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction and for “immediate injunctive relief” be denied. I have determined that a hearing is not necessary.
Background
Wesley Spratt is a legally incarcerated individual confined at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Adult Correctional Institutions(“ACT”). While housed in the maximum security unit, Spratt began to lead and preach at Christian religious services within that unit for

other inmates, with the apparent knowledge of officials at the Department of Corrections. In October of 2003, correctional officers and defendant Wall ended this practice, forbidding Spratt from leading or preaching at religious services for other inmates. The defendant rested this restriction on the basis of maintaining institutional security.
Spratt brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the restriction and citing an infringement of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also alleges a violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Currently before the Court are plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief. Defendant Wall has objected.
Discussion
To determine the appropriateness of granting preliminary injunctive relief, the First Circuit employs a quadripartite test, taking into account (1) the potential for immediate, irreparable injury; (2) the likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (3) the relevant balance of hardships if the injunction does not issue; and (4) the effect on the public interest of a grant or denial of the motion. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F .2d 4, 5 (1st Cir.1991). A failure to demonstrate one of the requirements necessitates a denial of the motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
Here, however, plaintiff has failed to address any aspect of the quadripartite test. Plaintiff also does indicate what exactly he is seeking by way of the instant motions. Thus, this Court is unsure what type of Order it would be issuing, or the substance of that Order, if the plaintiff were entitled to relief.
Notwithstanding the above mentioned deficiencies in the instant motions, plaintiff can not show a likelihood of success on the merits of his case. First, with regard to plaintiff’s constitutional claims, plaintiff does not have a First or Fourteenth Amendment right to lead or preach at religious services at the ACI for other inmates. See Spratt v. Wall, C.A. No. 04–112 S, M.J. Hagopian, Report and Recommendation, January 11, 2005, at 4–8. And second, with respect to plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, the constitutionality of this statute is debatable. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.2003) (finding RLUIPA unconstitutional); But see Madison v. Ritter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2003)(finding RLUIPA constitutional); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir2003)(same); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.2002)(same). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, cert.
1

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
granted 125 S.Ct. 308 (Oct. 12, 2004)(No.03–9877), to resolve the issue. *2 Since plaintiff can not demonstrate a First and Fourteenth Amendment violation, and since there is some constitutional doubt cast upon the viability of RLUIPA, plaintiff can not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of this case.
Conclusion Accordingly, I find that plaintiff’s motions for a

preliminary injunction and “immediate injunctive relief” should be denied. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court’s decision. United States v. Valencia–Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.1986)(per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.1980).
	  

2

 
 Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Report and Recommendation Adopted by Spratt v. Wall, D.R.I., June 6, 2006
2005 WL 3434739 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.
Wesley SPRATT v.
A.T. WALL, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, and the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections,
No. C.A. 04–112 S. | Nov. 21, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Wesley Spratt, for Plaintiff, pro se.
Patricia Coyne–Fague, for Defendant.
Thaddeus Taylor, for Plaintiff, pro se.
Michael J. Wheelock, Sr., for Plaintiff, pro se.
Opinion
Report and Recommendation
HAGOPIAN, Senior Magistrate J.
*1 Wesley Spratt (“Spratt” or “plaintiff”), pro se, an inmate legally incarcerated at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”), Cranston, Rhode Island, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1. Spratt named as defendants the RIDOC1 and its director, A.T. Wall (“Wall” or “defendant”).
Both Spratt and Wall filed motions for summary judgment. On January 13, 2005, I issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that summary judgment be granted in Wall’s favor, and against Spratt, on plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. I further recommended that Spratt’s RLUIPA claim be stayed pending the resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.2004)(finding RLUIPA violated the First Amendment), cert. granted 125 S.Ct. 308 (2005). The District Court accepted my recommendations. On May 31, 2005, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Cutter, reversing the Sixth Circuit and finding that RLUIPA did

not offend the First Amendment. See Cutter v. Wilkinson 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005). Accordingly, plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is now ripe for consideration.
This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and defendant’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED on plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. I have determined that a hearing is not necessary.
Undisputed Facts
The following are the undisputed facts ascertained from the parties’ submissions in this matter:2
In March 1996, a state court jury convicted Wesley Spratt of murder and related offenses. See State v. Spratt, 742 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I.1999). The state court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Adult Correctional Institutions (“ACI”). Id. At all times relevant in the complaint, plaintiff was and continues to be confined in the Maximum Security Unit (“maximum security”) at the ACI.
While housed in maximum security, Spratt began to preach at and lead Christian religious services within that unit for other inmates under the supervision of the ACI’s clergy and with the knowledge of officials at the Department of Corrections. Spratt preached at religious services on a weekly basis in the ACI’s Chapel or in a dining room for at least seven years. Plaintiff indicates that preaching is his “calling” from God and a “gift” from God. Indeed, while incarcerated, Spratt received his “Credentials of Ministry” and his commitment to his faith has garnered praise from several ACI chaplains. No evidence has been presented which indicates that there have been any disciplinary problems during plaintiff’s supervised preaching or any disciplinary problems resulting therefrom.
In October 2003, the administration changed within maximum security. With the new administration came a new restriction for Spratt. The new administration forbade Spratt to preach at or lead religious services. Defendant Wall rested this new restriction on the basis of maintaining institutional security. Much to plaintiff’s dismay, plaintiff may only participate in religious services as any other inmate.
*2 After pursuing the matter internally without a favorable result, plaintiff filed suit seeking relief. The
1

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
Court has already ruled in the defendant’s favor on plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. The only claim that remains is pursuant to the RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1. Both parties have moved for summary judgment.
Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment’s role in civil litigation is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). Summary judgment can only be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Rule 56 has a distinctive set of steps. When requesting summary judgment, the moving party must “put the ball in play, averring ‘an absence of evidence to support a nonmoving party’s case.” ’ Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (quoting Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The nonmovant then must document some factual disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition. Not every discrepancy in the proof is enough to forestall summary judgment; the disagreement must relate to some issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–248 (1986).
On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See id. at 256–257. This evidence “cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a fact finder must resolve at an ensuing trial.” Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). Evidence that is merely colorable or is not significantly probative cannot deter summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–257.
B. RLUIPA The plaintiff has brought suit under the RLUIPA. The RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
The RLUIPA protects institutionalized persons who are dependent upon the government for permission and accommodation for religious exercise. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005). The RLUIPA creates a higher standard of review for free exercise claims than that applicable to constitutional free exercise claims. See Murphy v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir.2004). “Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997). Therefore the strict level of scrutiny of the RLUIPA affords inmates more protection against religious infringement by correctional facilities’ regulations than the rational basis analysis under the First Amendment. Cf. Id. with O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
*3 Both parties have moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, each contending that the other cannot sustain his burden of proof under the RLUIPA.3 I shall discuss each parties’ burden in turn.
1. Plaintiff’s Burden Under the RLUIPA Under the RLUIPA, plaintiff bears the initial burden to demonstrate that the prohibited activity is a religious exercise and that the defendant substantially burdened that exercise. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1. Defendant claims that the plaintiff cannot sustain his burden. I disagree.
a. Religious Exercise In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court declared the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, unconstitutional as applied to the states. In order to fall within the meaning of “religious exercise” under the RFRA, the religious exercise had to be a central tenet of the religion. See Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir.1997); Werner v. Cotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir.1995). Congress responded to Flores and enacted the RLUIPA. Among the changes, Congress eliminated the “central tenet” requirement and broadly defined “religious exercise” to “include[ ] any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
2

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)
belief.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). With such a broad definition, plaintiff’s preaching easily qualifies as a religious exercise within the meaning of RLUIPA.
b. Substantial Burden Next, plaintiff must demonstrate that his religious exercise was substantially burdened. “Substantial burden” is not defined in the RLUIPA, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has yet to weigh in on the matter. Courts of Appeals addressing this issue have come to mixed results. See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 568 (5th Cir.2004)(a substantial burden “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his beliefs”); Civil Liberties For Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir.2003)(a substantial burden is one “that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... effectively impracticable”); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.2004)(a substantial burden imposes “a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.2004)(a substantial burden is one that results from pressure that “forces adherents to forgo religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct”).
When the words of a statute create ambiguity a court should consult legislative history to ascertain an appropriate statutory interpretation. See Ma. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 545 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir.1976). “[The] court’s duty in matters of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of Congress.” Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958). The congressional intent behind the RLUIPA was not to create a new standard for “substantial burden.” Rather, the RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” should “be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence.” See 146 Cong. Rec. S7776 (July 27, 2000).
*4 The Supreme Court has found that a substantial burden occurs when a state “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Instant Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981), or when a person is required to “choose between following the precepts of her religious and forfeiting the benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning the precepts of her religion ... on the other.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). However, “incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not fall within these parameters. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988).

Mindful of Supreme Court precedent, decisions from other circuits, RLUIPA’s legislative history, the plain wording of the statute, and considering Congress’ intent to afford a wider array of religious practices the benefit of greater protection, see 42 U.S.C.2000cc–5(7), I find that a “substantial burden” on religious exercise occurs, in the context of RLUIPA, when an individual is forced to significantly modify his or her religious behavior and violate his or her religious beliefs. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. Restriction or regulations that impose mere inconveniences or have an incidental effect upon an individual’s religious exercise will not be deemed substantial. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450–51.
Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff has preached to other inmates at the ACI for at least seven years, with the apparent blessings of RIDOC personnel. There is also no dispute that the defendant’s restriction forced plaintiff to forgo this religious exercise, significantly modifying his religious behavior. Moreover, plaintiff alleges, and the defendant does not dispute, that plaintiff views his ability to preach as a “gift” from God and that preaching is his “calling” from God. Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate that defendant’s restriction forces the plaintiff to violate his beliefs by not answering his “calling.”
Since plaintiff is no longer permitted to follow his “calling” by preaching under the supervision of the ACI’s chaplain, as he has done for the past seven years while incarcerated, defendant’s restriction imposed a significant limitation on the plaintiff’s religious exercise, violating his religious beliefs. Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff has demonstrated a “substantial burden” on his “religious exercise” within the meaning of RLUIPA.
2. Defendant’s Burden Under the RLUIPA. Since plaintiff has sustained his burden under the RLUIPA, the focus now shifts to the defendant. In order to repel plaintiff’s claim, defendant must set forth evidence to demonstrate that the restriction on plaintiff’s supervised preaching is in furtherance of a compelling interest and that the restriction is of the least restrictive means. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)(1) and (2).
a. Compelling Interest *5 Defendant contends, and it is undisputed that he based the restriction on maintaining institutional security. See Affidavit of Jake Gadsen (“Gadsen Affidavit”), Assistant Director for Institutional Operations at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, filed November 11, 2005, at ¶ 3 (the reason for the restriction is because inmate preachers “threaten[ ] security”). It is also undisputed that
3

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

the prison administration’s authority is compromised when inmates are given positions of authority or perceived authority, such as an inmate who is allowed to preach. See Gadsen Affidavit at ¶¶ 3, 4, and 5. Indeed, the defendant asserts that individuals or groups who wielded authority, or perceived authority, were a contributing factor to unrest and violence at the prison during the 1970’s.4 See Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment at 5.
The RLUIPA does not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety.” Cutter, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005). A correctional institution’s “security is a compelling interest and deference is due to institutional official’s expertise.” Id. It is plainly evident here that allowing the plaintiff to be in a position of authority, or perceived authority, creates a security concern. Thus, prohibiting Spratt from preaching to other inmates furthers Wall’s compelling interest of maintaining institutional security.

of ACI chaplains and with the knowledge of RIDOC officials for the past seven years,5 it is undisputed that the defendant’s interest in maintaining institutional security could not be achieved by a narrower restriction that burdens the plaintiff to a lesser degree. There are no least restrictive means available to accomplish Wall’s compelling interest of maintaining institutional security, while at the same time, permitting the plaintiff to preach to other inmates.
*6 Under RLUIPA, any substantial burden imposed upon an inmate’s religious exercise cannot stand unless that burden is of the least restrictive necessary to further a compelling governmental interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a); Murphy, 372 F.3d at 989. Mindful of the defendant’s primary obligation and responsibility to preserve good order and maintain discipline, custody and control of those who have been legally convicted of criminal offenses, I find that the restriction placed on Spratt is necessary to further Wall’s compelling interest in maintaining safety and security at the prison. The defendant has legitimately and reasonably concluded that plaintiff’s preaching cannot continue.

b. Least Restrictive Means Next, the defendant must demonstrate that the restriction is of the least restrictive means. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)(2). In other words, the defendant must demonstrate that the complete prohibition of the plaintiff’s supervised preaching was the least restrictive available to satisfy his security interest.
Gadsen indicates in his affidavit that inmate preachers compromise security at the prison, even one preaching under RIDOC’s supervision. See Gadsen Affidavit at ¶ 4. Gadsen’s affidavit demonstrates that an inmate in a position of authority, or perceived authority, threatens security, concluding that an outright ban on inmate preaching is the only manner to ensure that security is not compromised. Id. at ¶ 4 and ¶ 5. Gadsen indicates, and, it is undisputed that there are no means to accommodate the plaintiff’s preaching while, at the same time, maintaining institutional security. Id. I accept this, and defer to the prison officials’ judgment.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I recommend that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted on plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to filed timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court’s decision. United States v. Valencia–Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.1980).
	  

Although the plaintiff has preached under the supervision

Footnotes

1

The District Court dismissed RIDOC from this action on February 11, 2005.

2

The Court has construed plaintiff’s submissions liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

3

The defendant concedes that RLUIPA applies here. See 42 U.S . C. § 2000cc–1(b)(providing that the RLUIPA applies to any

program or activity that receives federal financial assistance); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, n. 4 (2005).

4

Although there is no evidence that there has been any incidents of violence or mischief during the seven years that plaintiff has

been preaching, prison officials do not have to wait for misdeeds to occur before acting to prevent such misdeeds. Prison officials

4

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

may act preemptively.

5

Several ACI chaplains support and have praised plaintiff’s preaching abilities. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Exhibit 1.

	  

5

 
 Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006)

KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Judgment Reversed by Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. Of Corrections, 1st Cir.(R.I.), April 6, 2007
2006 WL 1582402 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.
Wesley SPRATT, Plaintiff, v.
A.T. WALL, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections; and the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections, Defendants.
No. 04–1112 S. | June 6, 2006.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Wesley Spratt, Cranston, RI, pro se.
Patricia Anne Coyne–Fague, Department of Corrections, Cranston, RI, for Defendant.
Opinion
DECISION AND ORDER
SMITH, J.
*1 Plaintiff Wesley Spratt (“Spratt”), an inmate with the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religous Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1, alleging that Defendants substantially burdened his religious practices by prohibiting him from preaching in prison.

Recommendation, which addressed the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment by recommending that summary judgment enter in favor of Defendant A.T. Wall (“Wall”) on Spratt’s § 1983 claim and that a decision on Spratt’s RLUIPA claim against Wall be stayed pending the outcome of an appeal of the Sixth Circuit’s RLUIPA decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.2003). On May 31, 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s finding that RLUIPA did not offend the First Amendment. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). With the Supreme Court’s newly pronounced guidance in hand, Magistrate Judge Hagopian issued another Report and Recommendation on November 21, 2005 recommending that Spratt’s motion for summary judgment be denied and Wall’s motion for summary judgment be granted on Spratt’s RLUIPA claim. Specifically, Judge Hagopian found Spratt succeeded in establishing that the restrictions imposed upon him by Wall constituted a substantial burden on Spratt’s religious exercise, but that the restriction was nevertheless lawful because it was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.
This matter is now before the Court on Spratt’s Objection to Judge Hagopian’s November 21, 2005 Report and Recommendation. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Court must make a “de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written objection has been made....” Id.
Following de novo review of the filings in this matter, this Court finds that while the issue is somewhat of a close call, the Magistrate Judge’s R & R on balance represents both a fair and reasonable interpretation of the RLUIPA claim. Therefore, Spratt’s Objection is DENIED and this Court adopts the well-reasoned Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Hagopian in full.1

The procedural history of this case already consists of several dispositive rulings by the Court. This Court dismissed RIDOC from the case on February 11, 2005. On the same day, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Hagopian’s January 13, 2005 Report and

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

1

The Court notes that after oral argument was heard on Spratt’s Objection, the Court, utilizing its discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72,

permitted Wall to file “additional evidence” relating to a disciplinary matter involving Spratt. Apparently, after years of

maintaining a relatively clean disciplinary record as a prisoner, on April 13, 2006 (only one week after oral argument in this

matter), Spratt received a 30–day segregation sentence for “Engaging in or Encouraging a Group Demonstration and/or Activities.”

According to the RIDOC offender report, Spratt, while working in the prison dining room, refused to comply with an officer’s

requests to remove his jacket. After removing his jacket, Spratt stood up, asked the other eleven inmates in the room to stop

working, and proceeded to ask the inmates if they were allowed to wear their jackets. In so doing, Spratt “disrupted the work being

done and created a scene.” Wall asserts this incident validates prison officials’ concerns that an inmate in a position of leadership is

a plague to prison security.

1

Spratt v. Wall, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2006) Although the Court considered this evidence, it ultimately added little value to Wall’s position and was not outcome-determinative. While the disciplinary incident could stand for what Wall says it does, the timing of the infraction, coupled with the fact that Spratt complied with the officer’s requests and simply asked others what the jacket-wearing rule was, discounts a majority of the incident’s purported significance.
	  
2

 
 News Release: Court Upholds Ruling Barring Inmate From Preaching; ACLU Considers Appeal ... Page 1 of 2

NEWS RELEASE WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 2006

ACLU of Rhode Island
128 Dorrance Street / Suite 220 / Providence, RI 02903 email: riaclu@riaclu.org / web: www.riaclu.org

COURT UPHOLDS RULING BARRING INMATE FROM PREACHING AT CHRISTIAN SERVICES; RI ACLU CONSIDERS APPEAL
In a setback to the religious freedom of institutionalized persons, U.S. District Judge William Smith has ruled that the Department of Corrections could bar an ACI inmate from preaching during Christian religious services at the state prison. The plaintiff, Wesley Spratt, had been preaching at ACI services for seven years before he was unilaterally stopped from doing so based on vague and generalized “security” concerns. In an appeal filed earlier this year, the RI ACLU had argued that the preaching ban violated a federal law designed to protect the religious freedom of the institutionalized. However, in a brief three-page opinion, Judge Smith, while calling the case “somewhat of a close call,” rejected that argument.
Spratt, who considers his preaching a “calling” from God, had been preaching at religious services on a weekly basis under the supervision, and with the support, of clergy at the ACI. The DOC provided no evidence of security problems during, or as the result of, his supervised preaching during the seven years he had been doing so. Nonetheless, when a new warden took over the maximum security facility in 2003, Spratt was ordered to stop preaching.
Ruling on Spratt’s pro se lawsuit in November, U.S. Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian upheld the ban. Notwithstanding the lack of any security problems in the years Spratt had been preaching, Hagopian ruled that he would “defer” to the warden’s judgment that there was no means to accommodate Spratt’s preaching while maintaining institutional security. In taking over Spratt’s appeal, RI ACLU volunteer attorney Carly Beauvais Iafrate argued earlier this year that the DOC failed to meet the standards of a federal law, known by its acronym RLUIPA, protecting prisoners’ religious freedom. That law bars states from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s exercise of religion unless it furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means available.
The ACLU’s Iafrate had argued that, unlike a ban, “supervised preaching that existed in an unremarkable way for seven years” was clearly the least restrictive means available to prison officials. She pointed out that supervised preaching is also the method used in federal prisons to accommodate inmates’ exercise of religion. However, Judge Smith upheld the Magistrate’s ruling. The ACLU is considering appealing to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

http://www.riaclu.org/friendly/20060607pf.html

10/30/2007

News Release: Court Upholds Ruling Barring Inmate From Preaching; ACLU Considers Appeal ... Page 2 of 2
RI ACLU executive director Steven Brown said today: “The court’s ruling gives virtually unfettered discretion to prison officials to deny inmates the right to practice their religion. This not only damages the rehabilitative goals of prison, it undermines a fundamental legal right that Congress recognized even inmates should possess.”

http://www.riaclu.org/friendly/20060607pf.html

10/30/2007

 
 News Release: Appeals Court Overturns Ban on Inmate Preaching at Christian Services--Rhode I... Page 1 of 2

NEWS RELEASE MONDAY APRIL 9, 2007

ACLU of Rhode Island
128 Dorrance Street / Suite 220 / Providence, RI 02903 email: riaclu@riaclu.org / web: www.riaclu.org

APPEALS COURT OVERTURNS BAN ON INMATE PREACHING AT CHRISTIAN SERVICES
In an important victory for religious freedom, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Boston has reversed a lower court ruling that allowed the Department of Corrections to bar an inmate from preaching during Christian religious services at the state prison.
The plaintiff, Wesley Spratt, had been preaching at ACI services for seven years before he was unilaterally stopped from doing so based on vague and generalized “security” concerns. In appealing the ban to the First Circuit, RI ACLU volunteer attorney Lynette Labinger argued that the preaching ban violated a federal law designed to protect the religious freedom of institutionalized persons. That law, known by its acronym RLUIPA, bars states from imposing any substantial burden on an inmate’s exercise of religion unless it furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means available. The appellate court agreed with the ACLU that the state had failed to demonstrate that the ban was the least restrictive means necessary to promote the prison’s interest in security, and ordered a trial on the merits of the case.
Spratt, who considers his preaching a “calling” from God, had been preaching at religious services on a weekly basis under the supervision, and with the support, of clergy at the ACI. The DOC provided no evidence of security problems during, or as the result of, his supervised preaching during the seven years he had been doing so. Nonetheless, when a new warden took over the maximum security facility in 2003, Spratt was ordered to stop preaching, and the U.S. District Court upheld the ban.
In reversing the lower court ruling, the appeals court noted: “Spratt’s seven-year track record as a preacher, which is apparently unblemished by any hint of unsavory activity, at the very least casts doubt on the strength of the link between his activities and institutional security. While we recognize that prison officials are to be accorded substantial deference in the way they run their prisons, this does not mean that we will rubber stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators.”
.
RI ACLU executive director Steven Brown said today: “This court ruling makes clear that mere generalizations and rank speculation cannot provide the basis for stifling the religious freedom of inmates. It is too precious a right to be so arbitrarily denied to individuals in the custody, and at the mercy, of government officials.”

http://www.riaclu.org/20070409PF.html

10/30/2007

News Release: Appeals Court Overturns Ban on Inmate Preaching at Christian Services--Rhode I... Page 2 of 2

http://www.riaclu.org/20070409PF.html

10/30/2007

 
 CLOSED, JH
U.S. District Court District of Rhode Island (Providence) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04-cv-00112-S

Spratt v. RIDOC, et al Assigned to: Judge William E Smith Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 03/31/2004 Date Terminated: 08/01/2007 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Wesley Spratt

represented by Lynette J. Labinger Roney & Labinger 344 Wickenden Street Providence, RI 02903 421-9794 Fax: 421-0132 Email: Labinger@roneylabinger.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Rhode Island Department of Corrections TERMINATED: 02/11/2005
Defendant A. T. Wall Director, RIDOC

represented by Patricia Anne Coyne-Fague Department of Corrections 40 Howard Avenue Cranston, RI 02920 462-0145 Fax: 462-2583 Email: patricia.coynefague@doc.ri.gov LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/31/2004 03/31/2004 03/31/2004 03/31/2004 04/01/2004
04/05/2004
04/05/2004
04/05/2004 04/23/2004
05/10/2004
05/28/2004 06/14/2004 06/14/2004

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT filed; (McCabe, F) (Entered: 04/01/2004)

2 MOTION by Wesley Spratt to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (McCabe, F) Modified on 04/01/2004 (Entered: 04/01/2004)

3 MOTION by Wesley Spratt for Appointment of Counsel (McCabe, F) (Entered: 04/01/2004)

CASE assigned to Judge William E. Smith . Assigned to Magistrate Judge Hagopian (McCabe, F) (Entered: 04/01/2004)

Motion(s) referred: [3-1] motion for Appointment of Counsel referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian, [2-1] motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 04/01/2004)

5 MEMORANDUM and ORDER denying [3-1] motion for Appointment of Counsel ( signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian ) (mailed to ptf.) (Mercurio, A) Modified on 04/05/2004 (Entered: 04/05/2004)

4 MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting [2-1] motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis ( signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian )(mailed to ptf.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 04/05/2004)

(2) SUMMONS(ES) issued (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 04/05/2004)

Installment Payment; PAYMENT # 1: AMOUNT $ 20.00; RECEIPT # 57035 Total Paid to Date: $ 20.00 (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 03/16/2005 (Entered: 07/22/2004)

Installment Payment; PAYMENT # 2: AMOUNT $ 42.40; RECEIPT # 57158 Total Paid to Date: $ 62.40 (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 03/16/2005 (Entered: 07/22/2004)

6 ANSWER to Complaint by A. T. Wall (Attorney Patricia Anne Coyne-Fague), (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 05/28/2004)

7 Plaintiff's ANSWER to Defendant's answer (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 06/15/2004 (Entered: 06/15/2004)

7 MOTION by Wesley Spratt for Summary Judgment and answer to Defendant's answer. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 06/15/2004)

06/23/2004 06/25/2004 07/12/2004 07/20/2004
07/20/2004 07/22/2004 07/23/2004 07/28/2004 07/28/2004 07/28/2004 07/30/2004

Installment Payment; PAYMENT # 3: AMOUNT $ 22.00; RECEIPT # 57466 Total Paid to Date: $ 84.40 (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 03/16/2005 (Entered: 07/22/2004)
8 MOTION and memorandum by RIDOC, A. T. Wall for an extension of time to July 23, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [8-1] motion for an extension of time to July 23, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 07/12/2004)
9 ORDER granting [8-1] motion for an extension of time to July 23, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. ( signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian ) (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
Deadline updated; Objection to Motion reset to 7/23/04 for [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 07/20/2004)
Installment Payment; PAYMENT # 4: AMOUNT $ 22.40; RECEIPT # 57757 Total Paid to Date: $ 106.80 (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 03/16/2005 (Entered: 07/22/2004)
10 MOTION and memorandum by A. T. Wall to Enlarge Time up to August 10, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 07/23/2004)
11 OBJECTION by Wesley Spratt to [10-1] motion to Enlarge Time up to August 10, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [10-1] motion to Enlarge Time up to August 10, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment referred to Judge William E. Smith (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
12 MOTION by Wesley Spratt for Preliminary Injunction (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 07/28/2004)
13 ORDER granting [10-1] motion to Enlarge Time up to August 10, 2004 in which to answer plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ( signed by Judge William E. Smith )faxed to all counsel of record. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 07/30/2004)

07/30/2004 08/02/2004 08/02/2004 08/02/2004 08/02/2004 08/03/2004
08/04/2004
08/04/2004
08/09/2004 08/13/2004 08/13/2004 08/19/2004 08/30/2004

Deadline updated; Objection to Motion reset to 8/10/04 for [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 07/30/2004)
14 OBJECTION by A. T. Wall to [12-1] motion for Preliminary Injunction (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
15 OBJECTION and memorandum by A. T. Wall to [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
15 CROSS MOTION and memorandum by A. T. Wall for Summary Judgment (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
16 Statement Of Undisputed Fact by A. T. Wall RE: [15-1] motion for Summary Judgment (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/02/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [12-1] motion for Preliminary Injunction referred to Judge William E. Smith, [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment referred to Judge William E. Smith (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 08/03/2004)
Motion(s) no longer referred to Judge Smith: [15-1] motion for Summary Judgment, [12-1] motion for Preliminary Injunction, [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 08/04/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [15-1] motion for Summary Judgment referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian, [12-1] motion for Preliminary Injunction referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian, [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 08/04/2004)
17 Statement Of Undisputed Fact by A. T. Wall RE: [15-1] motion response (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
MOTION by Wesley Spratt to Amend [1-1] complaint (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/13/2004)
18 MOTION by Wesley Spratt to Enlarge Time to amend complaint (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 08/13/2004)
Installment Payment; PAYMENT # 5; AMOUNT $ 22.00; RECEIPT # 57948 Total Paid to Date: $ 128.80 (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 03/16/2005 (Entered: 08/20/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [18-1] motion to Enlarge Time to amend complaint referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 08/30/2004)

09/03/2004 09/03/2004 09/07/2004
09/17/2004 09/20/2004 09/29/2004 10/04/2004 10/19/2004 10/21/2004 10/29/2004 01/13/2005

19 MOTION by Wesley Spratt for extension of time to 30 days to send his amended answer and motion for summary judgment. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [19-1] motion for extension of time to 30 days to send his amended answer and motion for summary judgment. referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 09/03/2004)
20 ORDER granting [18-1] motion to Enlarge Time to amend complaint. The Court shall construe plaintiff's complaint to include a claim under 42 USC Section 2000 cc. The defendants have not objected. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within ten (10) days ( signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian ) (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 09/07/2004)
21 ORDER granting [19-1] motion for extension of time to 30 days to send his amended answer and motion for summary judgment. ( signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian )faxed to all counsel of record. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 09/17/2004)
22 MOTION by Wesley Spratt to Enlarge Time to send his amended answer and motion for summary judgment the ACI copy machine is broken. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
23 MOTION by Wesley Spratt for Summary Judgment and Immediate injunctive Relief (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 09/29/2004)
Installment Payment; PAYMENT # 6: AMOUNT $ 21.20; RECEIPT # 58291 Total Paid to Date: $ 150.00 (Baldinelli, D) Modified on 03/16/2005 (Entered: 10/05/2004)
Motion(s) referred: [23-1] motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate injunctive Relief referred to Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
24 OBJECTION and memorandum by RIDOC, A. T. Wall to [231] motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate injunctive Relief (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 10/21/2004)
25 Answer by Wesley Spratt in opposition to [24-1] motion response (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
26 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian Re: [23-1] motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate injunctive Relief, [15-1] motion for Summary Judgment, [7-1] motion for Summary Judgment -

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recommending plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, and defendant Wall's motion for summary judgment be granted on plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. It is further recommended that plaintiff's claims made under 42 USC Section 2000cc be stayed pending the resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted 125 S.Ct 308 (Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-9877). ; Motion no longer referred Objections to R and R due by 1/31/05 (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 01/13/2005)
27 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian Re: [12-1] motion for Preliminary Injunction, [23-1] motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate injunctive Relief recommending plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and for "immediate injunctive relief" be denied ; Motion no longer referred Objections to R and R due by 2/4/05 (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
28 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE in writing by February 10, 2005 why case against defendant, Rhode Island Department of Corrections should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution ( signed by Judge William E. Smith ) (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 01/18/2005)
29 MOTION by Wesley Spratt for extention of Time to answer the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 02/01/2005)
30 ORDER, to Dismiss defendant, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, for lack of prosecution ( signed by Judge William E. Smith ) (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
31 ORDER: The Court hereby accepts the R and R of Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian dated January 18, 2005 pursuant to 28 USC 686(b)(1) denying [12-1] motion for Preliminary Injunction and for "immediate injunctive relief". signed by Judge William E. Smith . (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.)(Mercurio, A) Modified on 04/01/2005 (Entered: 02/11/2005)
32 ORDER: The Court hereby accepts the R and R of Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian dated January 13, 2005 pursuant to 28 USC 686(b)(1) denying [23-1] motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate injunctive Relief, granting [15-1] motion for Summary Judgment on First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff's claim under 42 USC Section 2000cc is stayed

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pending the resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 , signed by Judge William E. Smith . (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
OBJECTION by Wesley Spratt to [26-1] report and recommendations (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
33 RETURNED DOCUMENT Obection to R&R as improperly filed by Wesley Spratt ( signed by Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond ) (Mercurio, A) (Entered: 03/03/2005)
34 MOTION and memorandum by Wesley Spratt for Reconsideration of [30-1] order to Dismiss defendant, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, for lack of prosecution (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
35 OBJECTION by Wesley Spratt to [32-1] report and recommendations (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 03/07/2005)
36 ORDER granting [34-1] motion for Reconsideration of [30-1] order to Dismiss defendant, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, for lack of prosecution, granting [29-1] motion for extention of Time to answer the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. the court sees no reason contained inPlaintiff's filing for upsetting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is adopted in total and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims is GRANTED and Plaintiff's claim under 42 USC Section 200 (cc) is stayed pending the resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2004) cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004) ( signed by Judge William E. Smith ) (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, A) Modified on 7/20/2005 (Mercurio, Alba-Sue). (Entered: 04/01/2005)
37 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL of [36-1] order by Wesley Spratt - Notice of Appeal; Order dated 3/31/05; Plaintiff's Objection to the MJ R&R (doc #35); Plaintiff's letter to the Court (doc #34); order dated 2/10/05; R&R dated 1/18/05; R&R dated 1/13/05; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate Injunctive Relief (Doc #23) (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: Notice of Appeal; Certified Docket; Order dated 3/31/05; Plaintiff's Objection to the MJ R&R (doc #35); Plaintiff's letter to the Court (doc #34); order dated 2/10/05; R&R dated 1/18/05; R&R

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dated 1/13/05; Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate Injunctive Relief (Doc #23) (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
38 MOTION by Wesley Spratt to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
39 NOTICE of Docketing ROA from USCA Re: Interlocutory Appeal (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
40 ORDER granting [38-1] motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis ( signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian ) Mailed to all parties. (Baldinelli, D) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
41 ORDER - Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim is now ripe for consideration. The parties shall submit, in writing, within ten days, any further documentation and/or arguments in support of, or against, plaintiff's RLUIPA claim. Thereafter, the Court shall take the matter under advisement.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 8/29/05. (mailed and faxed to parties of record)(Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 08/29/2005)
42 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by A. T. Wall in support of [15] Motion for Summary Judgment. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 09/09/2005)
43 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by Wesley Spratt in support of [7] Motion for Summary Judgment. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 09/13/2005)
44 ORDER (Submissions on plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, this Court finds an issue unaddressed.) The parties are hereby ordered to address this issue in writing within ten days.. Signed by Judge Jacob Hagopian on October 3, 2005. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 10/04/2005)
45 MEMORANDUM addressing whether RLUIPS is Applicable to the Rhode Island Department of Corrections in Light of The Federal Funding Requirement of 42 USC ? 2000 cc-1(b)(1) by A. T. Wall 44 Order. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
46 MEMORANDUM Adressing whether RLUIPA is Applicable to the RI Department of Corrections re: 44 Order. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 10/14/2005)
47 MOTION for Reasonable Attorney Fees by Wesley Spratt. Responses due by 11/1/2005 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 10/18/2005)
48 MOTION for Special Damages Rule 9 (G) by Wesley Spratt.

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Responses due by 11/1/2005 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 10/18/2005)
49 MOTION to Amend the [1] Complaint by Wesley Spratt. Responses due by 11/1/2005 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 10/18/2005)
50 ORDER - After a review of the parties submissions on the plaintiff's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 USC Section 2000cc-1, the Court finds yet another issue unaddressed by the parties. The defendant shall detail, by way of affidavit or otherwise, how the restriction on the plaintiff's supervised preaching "is the least restrictive means" of furthering the Department of Corrections' security interest. The defendant shall comply within ten days. The plaintiff may provide a reply within ten days thereafter.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 10/18/05. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.)(Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 10/19/2005)
51 MEMORANDUM by A. T. Wall in support of 50 Order. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
48 MOTION for Special Damages Rule 9 (G), 47 MOTION for Attorney Fees, 49 MOTION to Amend/Correct [1] Complaint REFERRED to MJ Hagopian. (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
52 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by Wesley Spratt 50 Order,,. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 11/14/2005)
53 ORDER denying 47 Motion for Attorney Fees. No basis exists to award attorney's fees to the Pro Se plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 11/21/05. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) Modified on 11/23/2005 (Gilfillan, Barbara)(correct spelling error). (Entered: 11/21/2005)
54 ORDER denying 49 Motion to Amend/Correct . Amendment of the Complaint to include special damages would be futile. I have recommended that Summary Judgement be entered against the Plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 11/21/05. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, AlbaSue) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
55 ORDER denying 48 Motion for Special Damages . No basis exists to award Pro Se Plaintiff the damages he seeks. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 11/21/05. (mailed to ptf.

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and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
56 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re [23] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt,, [15] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by A. T. Wall,, [7] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt. Recommending plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied and the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted on plaintiff's RLUIPA claim. Objections to R&R due by 12/6/2005. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 11/21/05. (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 11/21/2005)
57 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION by Wesley Spratt re 55 ORDER denying 48 Motion for Special Damages . No basis exists to award Pro Se Plaintiff the damages he seeks. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jacob Hagopian on 11/21/05. (Baldinelli, Doreen) Modified on 12/6/2005 (Baldinelli, Doreen). Modified on 12/6/2005 (Baldinelli, Doreen). (Entered: 12/06/2005)
58 MOTION for Extension of Time to file his objection to the Report and Recommondation dated November 22, 2005. by Wesley Spratt. Responses due by 12/19/2005 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
59 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by Wesley Spratt re 53 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
58 MOTION for Extension of Time to File REFERRED to Judge Smith. (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
60 ORDER granting 58 Motion for Extension of Time. 1. Plaintiff has until January 9, 2006, to file his Memorandum in Support of his Objection to Magistrate Hagopian's Report and Recommendation. 2. The Government shall file its response by January 23, 2006. Signed by Judge William E Smith on 12/8/05. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to defts.) (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
61 OBJECTION to 56 Report and Recommendations WITH SUPPORTING MEMO filed by Wesley Spratt. (Baldinelli, Doreen) Additional attachment(s) added on 1/12/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen). (Entered: 01/12/2006)
62 MOTION for Extension of Time up to and including February 28, 2006 in which to file a response to Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation WITH SUPPORTING MEMO by A. T. Wall. Responses due by

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2/6/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
62 MOTION for Extension of Time up to and including February 28, 2006 in which to file a response to Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation REFERRED to Judge Smith. (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
63 ORDER granting 62 Motion for Extension of Time . Signed by Judge William E Smith on 1/23/06. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.) (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
64 MEMORANDUM by A. T. Wall in Opposition of 61 Objection to Report and Recommendations. (Attachments: # 1 Correspondence)(Baldinelli, Doreen) Modified on 3/7/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen). (Entered: 03/02/2006)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to [15] Motion for Summary Judgment, [23] Motion for Summary Judgment, [7] Motion for Summary Judgment, 56 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re [23] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt,, [15] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by A. T. Wall,, [7] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt. Motion Hearing set for 4/6/2006 10:00 AM before Judge William E Smith. (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
65 ORDER denying 57 Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate's Ruling for Special Damages, filed by Wesley Spratt, . Signed by Judge William E Smith on 3/7/06. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.)(Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
66 ORDER denying re 59 Plaintiff's Objection to the Magistrate's Motion for Reasonable Attorney Fees filed by Wesley Spratt. Signed by Judge William E Smith on 3/7/06. (mailed to ptf. and faxed to deft.)(Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
67 MOTION to Extend Time of five (5) days, or up to and including Friday, March 17, 2006 for filing Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Objection to R&R. by Wesley Spratt. Responses due by 3/30/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
68 REPLY MEMORANDUM by Wesley Spratt in support of 61 Objection to Report and Recommendations. Exhibit A Program Statement (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William E Smith : Motion Hearing held on 4/6/2006 re [23] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt,, [15] Motion for

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Summary Judgment filed by A. T. Wall,, [7] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt. Carly Iafrate, Esq. argues for ptf. and Patricia Coyne-Fague argues for deft. Ct. Rprtr: Anne Clayton. After hearing arguments by counsel, court will issue a written decision within a couple of months. (Court Reporter Anne Clayton.) (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
69 MANDATE of USCA as to [37] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by Wesley Spratt, - Dismissing the instant appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
70 USCA JUDGMENT as to [37] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by Wesley Spratt, - DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
71 USCA Case Number 05-1583 for [37] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by Wesley Spratt,. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
72 MOTION to File a Supplemental Memorandum Based on New Information WITH SUPPORTING MEMO by A. T. Wall. Responses due by 5/26/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen) Additional attachment(s) added on 5/9/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen). (Entered: 05/09/2006)
73 ORDER granting 72 Motion for Leave to File . Signed by Judge William E Smith on 5/11/06. (mailed to ptf. and counsel of record) (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
75 RESPONSE in Opposition re 72 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Wesley Spratt. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
74 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by A. T. Wall in support of 72 MOTION for Leave to File. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Report)(Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
76 MEMORANDUM by Wesley Spratt in opposition to 74 Supplemental Memorandum(Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
77 DECISION AND ORDER DENYING [23] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wesley Spratt, GRANTING [15] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by A. T. Wall, 56 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Judge William E Smith on 6/5/06. (mailed and faxed to parties of record)(Mercurio, AlbaSue) (Entered: 06/06/2006)

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78 JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants against Plaintiff. Signed by Deputy Clerk on 6/6/06. (mailed and faxed to parties of record)(Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
79 AFFIDAVIT filed by Wesley Spratt re: [23] Motion for Summary Judgment. (Baldinelli, Doreen) Modified on 6/19/2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen). (Entered: 06/19/2006)
80 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 78 Judgment by Wesley Spratt. Filing fee $ 455. Sent to USCA - Court File, Notice of Appeal and Certified docket(Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
81 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 80 Notice of Appeal - Sent Court File, Certified Docket, Notice of Appeal. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
82 USCA Case Number 06-2038 for 80 Notice of Appeal filed by Wesley Spratt,. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 07/13/2006)
83 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on April 6, 2006 before Judge William E. Smith. Court Reporter: Anne Clayton.. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
84 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 80 Notice of Appeal - Sent to USCA - Transcript dated April 6, 2006 (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
85 USCA Case Number 06-2038 for 80 Notice of Appeal filed by Wesley Spratt,. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
86 STIPULATION to correct record by Wesley Spratt, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, A. T. Wall. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
87 STIPULATION supplementing record to Court of Appeals. Signed by Judge William E Smith on 8/28/06. (Mercurio, AlbaSue) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
88 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 80 Notice of Appeal; sent 86 Stipulation and certified docket (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/28/2006 (Mercurio, Alba-Sue). (Entered: 08/28/2006)
CORRECTIVE DOCKET ENTRY re: 88 Supplemental ROA Sent to USCA - Error: Document not attached; Correction: attached document (Mercurio, Alba-Sue) (Entered: 08/28/2006)

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89 USCA JUDGMENT as to 80 Notice of Appeal filed by Wesley Spratt. The district court's judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further disposition in accordance with the opinion issued this day. (Geile, Wendy) (Entered: 04/10/2007)
90 MANDATE of USCA (Certified Judgment) as to 80 Notice of Appeal filed by Wesley Spratt, [37] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by Wesley Spratt. The district court's JUDGMENT IS REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further disposition in accordance with the opinion issued this day. (Geile, Wendy) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
Appeal Record Returned: 80 Notice of Appeal, [37] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, (Geile, Wendy) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
NOTICE of Hearing: In Chambers Conference set for 5/16/2007 at 9:30 AM in Judge Smith Chambers before Judge William E Smith. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William E Smith : Status Conference held on 5/16/2007. Lynette Labinger for Plaintiff. Patricia Anne Coyne-Fague for Defendant. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
91 ORDER OF SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. So Ordered by Judge William E Smith on 05/16/2007. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
92 REVISED ORDER OF SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. So Ordered by Judge William E Smith on 05/25/2007. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 05/29/2007)
93 ORDER of USCA as to 69re: [37] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, filed by Wesley Spratt. (Geile, Wendy) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
94 CONSENT JUDGMENT. So Ordered by Judge William E Smith on 07/30/2007. (Baldinelli, Doreen) (Entered: 07/30/2007)

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 482 F.3d 33 (2007)
Wesley SPRATT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v.
RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; A.T. WALL, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 06-2038.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard February 7, 2007. Decided April 6, 2007.
34 *34 Lynette Labinger, with whom Roney & Labinger LLP Cooperating Counsel, Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, was on brief, for appellant.
Patricia A. Coyne-Fague, Chief Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department of Corrections, was on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, LYNCH, and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
Wesley Spratt ("Spratt") is a prisoner in the Adult Correctional Institution ("ACI") in Rhode Island. After prison officials prohibited Spratt from preaching to his fellow inmates, he filed suit against the Rhode Island Department 35 of Corrections and its director, A.T. Wall (collectively, *35 "RIDOC") under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. ("RLUIPA"). The district court granted summary judgment to RIDOC. After careful consideration, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
Spratt is a prisoner in the maximum security unit and is serving a life sentence for murder. See State v. Spratt, 742 A.2d 1194 (R.I.1999). In 1995, Spratt underwent a religious awakening, and began attending Christian services at the ACI. Impressed with his commitment and devotion, the prison chaplains began allowing Spratt to preach[1] to inmates during weekly services. In 2000, Spratt was ordained as a minister by the Universal Life Church. From 1995 until 2003, no prison official interfered with Spratt's religious activities.[2] Spratt's preaching during this seven year period did not lead to any apparent disciplinary problems at the ACI.
In 2003, then-Warden Whitman was replaced by Warden Weeden, who remains the warden of the ACI. On October 15, 2003, Spratt was told by a correctional officer that he was no longer allowed to preach in the chapel. When Spratt approached Warden Weeden about the matter, he was told that preaching by prisoners was not allowed under prison regulations. Spratt formalized his complaint in writing, and Warden Weeden responded that inmate preaching was prohibited by RIDOC Policy # 26.01-2DOC, which states that all religious services are scheduled, supervised, and directed by institutional chaplains.[3] Weeden also informed Spratt that if he was found to be preaching, he would be subject to disciplinary action. Spratt then filed a complaint with A.T. Wall, director of RIDOC, stating the aforementioned facts, and asking that Wall allow him to preach. Wall responded in a letter dated December 15, 2003, which states:
Mr. Spratt, you do have the right to practice your religion under the constitution subject to reasonable restrictions. Because you are not an acknowledged member of the clergy, you do not have the right to proselytize or preach to the inmate population. Therefore, your request for my intervention is denied.

Spratt proceeded to file a pro se complaint against Wall and RIDOC in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, asking for relief under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 36 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(C) ("RFRA").[4] Spratt's complaint *36 stated that the prison policy prohibiting inmate preaching did not satisfy the "least restrictive means" test in RFRA, and asked for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages of $40.29 (the cost of legal paper and copies). RIDOC filed an answer stating that they lacked sufficient information to admit or deny Spratt's allegations, but asserted various affirmative defenses. Spratt moved for summary judgment, attaching various letters from prison clergy attesting to his skill as a preacher, his minister's certificate, and the aforementioned correspondence between himself and prison officials. RIDOC responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking that the claims against Wall in his individual capacity be dismissed,[5] and arguing that RIDOC had satisfied the requirements of RLUIPA because (a) Spratt's religious exercise was not substantially burdened and (b) even if it was burdened, RIDOC had a compelling state interest which was accomplished by the least restrictive means. RIDOC attached to their motion for summary judgment a "statement of undisputed facts," which acknowledged that "no material facts are in dispute in this matter."
The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who filed a report and recommendation granting RIDOC summary judgment on Spratt's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims,[6] and staying the RLUIPA claim pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-24, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005), which considered various constitutional challenges to RLUIPA.
After Cutter rejected the constitutional challenges to RLUIPA, the magistrate judge ordered the parties to submit additional briefing as to whether RLUIPA was applicable to RIDOC, and as to the merits of Spratt's RLUIPA claim. RIDOC submitted a supplemental memorandum acknowledging that it was subject to RLUIPA because it accepted federal funding, and attached an affidavit from Jake Gadsden, Assistant Director of Operations for the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. The affidavit briefly reviews Gadsden's professional experience, and states that inmates may not lead religious services in RIDOC facilities. Gadsden explains in the affidavit that inmate preaching could be dangerous because "placing an inmate in a position of actual or perceived leadership before an inmate group threatens security, as it provides the perceived inmate leader with influence within the administration." Gadsden further states in the affidavit that "there is no less restrictive manner to accommodate Spratt's desire to preach to an inmate congregation, other than an outright ban," because even an inmate preaching under RIDOC supervision would be perceived as having influence. Finally, the affidavit states that Gadsden was familiar with a program in the Texas Correctional System which he identified as the "trustee" program, in which inmates were given certain leadership roles. Gadsden states that Texas abolished the program 37 because the *37 inmate leaders abused their positions to garner favors from fellow inmates.
Spratt filed an affidavit in response, which states that he acknowledges Gadsden's "noteworthy" credentials, but that Gadsden's conclusions are "exaggerat[ion] and speculation." Spratt also stated in a memorandum of law that he would willingly submit to further RIDOC supervision of his preaching activities. He also suggested that RIDOC could retain their policy against inmate preaching but grant limited exemptions when enforcement of the policy would result in a violation of RLUIPA. Spratt noted that RIDOC allows inmates to congregate and talk freely about non-religious topics during recreational time, and that this had not been found to pose a threat to prison security.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation granting RIDOC summary judgment on Spratt's RLUIPA claim. The report found that Spratt had satisfied the first two elements of the RLUIPA test: that preaching was part of Spratt's religious exercise and that the religious exercise had been substantially burdened by the RIDOC prohibition. However, the magistrate judge concluded that RIDOC had established that inmate security was a compelling state interest, and that the total ban on inmate preaching was the least restrictive means by which to accomplish that goal.
Spratt objected to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and the issue was referred to a district judge. The court held a hearing on the objection on April 6, 2006. At the hearing on Spratt's objection, Spratt was represented by counsel from the ACLU of Rhode Island. During the hearing, the court initially seemed skeptical of RIDOC's claim that the Gadsden affidavit was sufficient to overcome summary judgment, stating, "What evidence do I have? See, that's the problem here. What evidence is in the record that says it's got to be a total ban.

There's just no other solution. I'm looking at this very high burden and very little evidence." Nevertheless, the court adopted and affirmed the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, noting that "while the issue is somewhat of a close call, the Magistrate Judge's [report and recommendation] on balance represents both a fair and reasonable interpretation of the RLUIPA claim."
II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material disputes of fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

B. RLUIPA

RLUIPA was enacted in 2000 as a response to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, which partially struck down the previously enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Act on the grounds that it exceeded Congress' power to regulate the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 521 U.S. 507, 529-36, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (holding that RFRA may not be applied to purely state, as opposed to federal, action). Whereas RFRA had applied to all action by "Government," RLUIPA is substantially narrower in scope, and the portion of that statute at issue in this case applies only to "a program or activity [in an institution] that receives Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). Substantively, RLUIPA provides that

38

*38 No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person

residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in [42 U.S.C. § 1997], even if the burden results

from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person 0907

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Id. § 2000cc-1(a). Thus, a claim under RLUIPA includes four elements. On the first two elements, (1) that an institutionalized person's religious exercise has been burdened and (2) that the burden is substantial, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Id. § 2000cc-2(b). Once a plaintiff has established that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened, the onus shifts to the government to show (3) that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and (4) that the burden is the least restrictive means of achieving that compelling interest. Id.

1. Spratt's Burden

For purposes of this appeal, the state does not seriously dispute that Spratt's evidence on his prima facie case is sufficient to survive summary judgment. As an inmate in a state correctional facility, Spratt is an institutionalized person within the definition of RLUIPA. See id. § 1997(1) ("The term `institution' means any facility or institution 0907 (A) which is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on behalf of any State or political subdivision of a State; and (B) which is-(ii) a jail, prison, or other correctional facility. . . ."). Furthermore, it is clear that preaching is a form of religious exercise. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978) ("[T]he right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions.").

As to the second prong, RIDOC devotes a footnote in its brief to suggesting that Spratt's "exercise of . . . religion in general is not being substantially burdened." Appellees' Br. at 11 n. 6. RIDOC points out that "Spratt may still attend and participate in religious services. He may pray, sing, or recite during such services just as every other inmate may." Id. We have not yet had the opportunity to define what constitutes a "substantial burden" under RLUIPA. The district court decided that a "substantial burden" is one that "put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs," citing Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment

Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); see also Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.2006) (applying the Thomas standard in a RLUIPA case). Assuming arguendo that Thomas applies, RIDOC has not on this appeal seriously contested the issue and Spratt has stated that RIDOC will not allow him to preach anytime or anywhere, threatening that if he does so, he will be subject to disciplinary sanctions. As such, for the purposes of this appeal, Spratt has made a prima facie showing that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened.
2. RIDOC's Burden
The burden thus shifts to RIDOC to demonstrate that its ban on inmate preaching, as applied to Spratt, furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 39 2000cc-1. We are mindful, however, that in passing RLUIPA, Congress stated that we should *39 continue to give "due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators" in determining prison policy. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 717, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy on RLUIPA)). However, as the Congressional sponsors of RLUIPA stated, "inadequately formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the act's requirements." 146 Cong. Rec. at S7775 (internal quotation marks omitted).
RIDOC asserts that it has a compelling state interest in maintaining prison security. We agree. See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113 ("It bears repetition . . . that prison security is a compelling state interest, and that deference is due to institutional officials' expertise in this area."). However, merely stating a compelling interest does not fully satisfy RIDOC's burden on this element of RLUIPA; RIDOC must also establish that prison security is furthered by barring Wesley Spratt from engaging in any preaching at any time.
RIDOC has offered just one piece of evidence to support this assertion: the Gadsden affidavit.[7] This affidavit, which cites no studies and discusses no research in support of its position, simply describes the equation thus: if Spratt is a preacher, he is a leader; having leaders in prison (even those sanctioned by the administration) is detrimental to prison security; thus, Spratt's preaching activity is detrimental to prison security. But to prevail on summary judgment, RIDOC "must do more than merely assert a security concern." Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir.2004). The Gadsden affidavit offers only one reference to another prison in support of its assertion that inmate preaching is a security concern: the affidavit mentions a situation in Texas which was described as a "trustee" system. We believe that Gadsden was referring to the "building tender" system present in Texas prisons in the 1970s. This situation, of course, is radically different: building tenders were inmates who were armed, served as official guards within the prison, and who were serving in supervisory capacities in the prison system. See generally Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1294-98 (S.D.Tex.1980). Whereas it is quite easy to see how armed prisoners granted nearly indiscriminate authority to brutalize fellow prisoners are a threat to institutional security, the same cannot be said about a preacher who offers a weekly sermon under the direction of the prison chaplain.
Beyond the Texas "trustee system," Gadsden cites no past instances where having inmates in leadership positions endangered security, nor does he explain why a person who expounds on the scripture during a weekly religious service would be considered a leader. Self-serving affidavits that do not "contain adequate specific factual information based on personal knowledge" are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, let 40 alone to sustain one. Quiñones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir.2006); *40 see also Hayes, 8 F.3d at 92 ("Although an expert affidavit need not include details about all of the raw data used to produce a conclusion, or about scientific or other specialized input which might be confusing to a lay person, it must at least include the factual basis and the process of reasoning which makes the conclusion viable in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.").
In addition, RIDOC's initial explanation for the preaching ban was that only ordained ministers were allowed to preach, and that Spratt was not ordained. However, according to materials submitted in connection with Spratt's motion for summary judgment, he had been an ordained minister since 2000.[8] RIDOC now claims that its initial explanation was "incomplete," and that the real reason is that no inmates are allowed to preach at all. At the very least, the inconsistencies between RIDOC's various explanations for its policy require further explanation.[9]

Finally, RIDOC claims that it was merely "lucky" that institutional security was not threatened during Spratt's seven year stint as a preacher, and that it need not wait for a dangerous situation to occur before it takes steps to remedy the threat. See Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1521 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that "failure to specify a past event" that threatened institutional security "does not render irrational the adoption and implementation of a . . . policy" to address future events that might pose a threat). RIDOC also claims that its policy is long-standing, and that prison officials who permitted Spratt to preach were in violation of it. However, Spratt's seven-year track record as a preacher, which is apparently unblemished by any hint of unsavory activity, at the very least casts doubt on the strength of the link between his activities and institutional security. While we recognize that prison officials are to be accorded substantial deference in the way they run their prisons, this does not mean that we will "rubber stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators." Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190.[10]
Even if we assume that RIDOC has shown a link between Spratt's preaching and institutional security, RIDOC 41 still has not shown that the blanket ban on all inmate preaching is the "least restrictive *41 means" available to
achieve its interest. A prison "cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice." Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir.2005); Murphy, 372 F.3d at 989 ("It is not clear that MDOC seriously considered any other alternatives, nor were any explored before the district court."); cf. Casey v. City of Newport, 308 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir.2002) ("[T]he narrow-tailoring test requires the district court to consider whether the regulation challenged on First Amendment grounds sweeps more broadly than necessary to promote the government's interest. That consideration, in turn, cannot be done without some evaluation of the alternative measures put in issue by the parties.").[11] Rather than considering alternatives, RIDOC argues that inmate preaching is an "all or nothing" issue: any amount of inmate preaching, it contends, is dangerous to institutional security under any circumstances. As such, RIDOC argues, there are no "less restrictive alternatives." However, it is not clear how RIDOC has come to this conclusion. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999 (explaining that a California prison had done "nothing to . . . discuss whether it has ever considered a less restrictive approach" to a blanket ban on long hair). RIDOC offers no explanation for why alternative policies would be unfeasible, or why they would be less effective in maintaining institutional security.
RIDOC responds by pointing to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.1996), in which that court accepted prison administrators' contention that a regulation requiring inmates to have short hair was the least restrictive means of achieving prison security. However, the court in Hamilton made this determination after considering lengthy testimony by the prison administrators in the district court, something which is notably absent here. Id. at 1555. In addition, the Eighth Circuit relied on several district court decisions upholding hair length regulations against RFRA challenges, at least one of which appears to have considered and rejected alternatives to the regulation. Id. at 1555 n. 12. In contrast, RIDOC offers no case finding that blanket bans on inmate preaching satisfy the least restrictive means test, and none appear to exist.[12] Finally, 42 the Eighth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that "prison *42 on authorities must do more than offer conclusory statements and post hoc rationalizations for their conduct." Id. at 1554 n. 10. Thus, Hamilton lends little support to RIDOC's argument here.
In fact, RIDOC's "all or nothing" argument raises many questions. Why are inmates banned from preaching when they are free to become leaders under other circumstances? Likewise, why is Spratt still allowed to stand in front of his congregation and read scripture if it is his appearance in the pulpit that is problematic? If it is the "teaching" element of scripture that is so troubling, why are inmates permitted to assist instructors in educational programs at the prison? Why would allowing preaching only under strict prison supervision be a less effective solution to the purported "threat to institutional security"? These questions, all unanswered, suggest that RIDOC has not given consideration to possible alternatives.[13]
Furthermore, "[e]qually problematic . . . is that other prison systems, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, do not have such . . . policies or, if they do, [they] provide . . . exemptions." Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999. As Spratt points out, the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy on religious practices appears to contemplate inmate-led religious services in certain circumstances. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement: Religious Beliefs and Practices, Statement P5360.09 (2004) & 7(d) ("Inmate-led religious programs require constant staff

supervision."); id. & 7(a) ("Inmates may recite formulaic prayers in the language required by their religion. Sermons, original oratory, teachings and admonitions must be delivered in English."). We recognize that "prison officials . . . are infinitely more familiar with their own institutions than outside observers," Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 1556 n. 15, and that as such, evidence of policies at one prison is not conclusive proof that the same policies would work at another institution. However, in the absence of any explanation by RIDOC of significant differences between the ACI and a federal prison that would render the federal policy unworkable, the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy suggests that some form of inmate preaching could be permissible without disturbing prison security.
Simply put, RIDOC must "demonstrate, and not just assert, that the rule at issue is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest." O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir.2003). This does not conflict with our policy of deferring to the judgment of prison administrators. Rather, before we can evaluate whether deference is due, we require that prison administrators explain in some detail what their judgment is.[14] Here, RIDOC "offer[s] conclusory statements that a limitation on religious freedom is required for 43 security, health or safety." Weaver v. Jago, 675 *43 F.2d 116, 119 (6th Cir.1982). To prevail on summary judgment, RIDOC must do more.
C. Remedy
Spratt asks that we enter summary judgment in his favor. Alternatively, Spratt asks that we reverse summary judgment and remand the matter for discovery and trial on the merits. Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Denial of summary judgment is also appropriate where factual records are "disturbingly thin," "contain gaps," and require judgment calls which depend on evidence not in the record but readily obtainable. See Mandel v. The Boston Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 205-07 (1st Cir.2006). Notwithstanding Spratt's protestations to the contrary, it is clear that there are factual disputes, including whether a ban on inmate preaching furthers prison security, and whether a blanket ban is the least restrictive means necessary. The factual record on these issues is quite thin. As such, it would also be improvident at this point to grant summary judgment in favor of Spratt. We have held that entry of summary judgment for defendant was not warranted. Each side, on remand, may present further evidence and argument.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further disposition in accordance herewith.
Reversed and Remanded.
[1] To be clear, we use the word "preach" to refer to the activity of commenting or expounding upon some religious text. RIDOC continues to allow Spratt to read scripture aloud during religious services so long as he does not add any commentary.
[2] RIDOC suggests that the then-warden of the prison, Warden Whitman, may not have been aware of Spratt's preaching. However, Spratt stated in an affidavit, uncontroverted by RIDOC, that his preaching was openly known to other prison officials, and that he proudly spoke about his preaching activities during his yearly classification reviews.
[3] This policy, however, does not address the issue of whether inmates may participate in religious services under the supervision of approved clergy, as was the case with Spratt. We defer to RIDOC's interpretation of this policy to prohibit an inmate from expounding upon the scripture, but not to prohibit an inmate from reading religious texts without commentary.
[4] Spratt initially filed suit under RFRA. However, RFRA was found to be unconstitutional as applied to purely state (as opposed to federal) action in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). In its response to Spratt's complaint, RIDOC noted that Spratt would likely refile his complaint under

RLUIPA. Since then, the district court and the parties have treated Spratt's complaint as arising out of RLUIPA. We do not disturb this decision.
[5] This argument was never addressed by the district court, and we express no opinion as to its merit.
[6] Spratt filed an interlocutory appeal of this judgment, which we denied on April 4, 2006. Spratt v. Walls, No. 05-1583 (1st Cir. Apr. 4, 2006). Spratt does not appeal the grant of summary judgment on these claims.
[7] Spratt also objects that the Gadsden affidavit does not satisfy the requirement that an expert affidavit "include the factual basis and the process of reasoning which makes the conclusion viable." Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, 8 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir.1993). Because we find that the affidavit does not provide sufficient evidence to sustain RIDOC's burden under RLUIPA, we need not address this issue now. However, we suggest that on remand, the district court determine whether the Gadsden affidavit satisfies the requirements for the admissibility of an expert affidavit.
[8] Spratt claims that in fact, the ban on preaching was enacted in retribution for a dispute that he had with a guard. If this were true, it would undercut the state's argument that the blanket ban on preaching is essential to prison security.
[9] RIDOC offers a third explanation for its prohibition on inmate preaching. RIDOC suggests that inmate-led religious activities could foment terrorism-related activity. See Appellee's Br. at 18 n. 8 (citing Frank Cilluffo et al., Geo. Wash. Univ. Homeland Sec. Policy Inst. and Univ. of Va. Critical Incident Analysis Group, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization (2006), available at http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/rad/ Outöfthe% 20shadows.pdf). The report cited by RIDOC describes the formation of terror cells in prisons by radicalized Muslim inmates. This explanation for the blanket ban on inmate preaching further demonstrates that RIDOC has not engaged in any individualized consideration of Spratt's preaching whatsoever. Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 1221, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (requiring that the government engage in individualized consideration of the necessity of a burden on religious exercise).
[10] In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit suggested that its result would have been different if "assumptions about the governmental interests involved here had been included in an affidavit by the warden or some other [prison] official." 472 F.3d at 191. We do not think that an affidavit that contains only conclusory statements about the need to protect inmate security is sufficient to meet RIDOC's burden under RLIUPA.
[11] It is important to note that we do not construe RLUIPA to "require prison administrators to refute every conceivable option in order to satisfy the least restrictive means prong of RFRA." Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1556 (8th Cir.1996). However, to meet the least restrictive means test, prison administrators generally ought to explore at least some alternatives, and their rejection should generally be accompanied by some measure of explanation. A blanket statement that all alternatives have been considered and rejected, such as the one here, will ordinarily be insufficient.
[12] Past decisions have found that restricting inmate preaching "reasonably" furthered institutional security. See, e.g., Anderson v. Angelone, 123 F.3d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir.1997) ("Requiring an outside minister to lead religious activity among inmates undoubtedly contributes to prison security."); Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 785 n. 9 (7th Cir.1987). However, these cases were decided under the pre-RLUIPA standard of Turner v. Safley, which states that a "[prison] regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The RLUIPA standard, which requires that prison administrators achieve a "compelling interest" by the "least restrictive means," imposes a different burden on prison officials. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199-200 ("[T]he First Amendment affords less protection to inmates' free exercise rights than does RLUIPA.").
[13] This list of questions is offered by way of example, and is not exhaustive. We leave it to the district court to determine whether RIDOC has adequately shown that its policy is the least restrictive means of achieving prison security.

[14] The level of deference to be accorded to prison administrators under RLUIPA remains an open question. RLUIPA's statutory requirement that we apply strict scrutiny to prison policies that substantially burden religious exercise may be in tension with the legislative history which suggests that courts should continue to defer to the expertise of prison administrators. Obviously, courts will need to find some balance between scrutiny of and deference to prison regulations. We need not resolve that question now because RIDOC has yet to present any reasoned judgment to justify the policies at issue in this case.
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