IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DMSION

J rVmw c. WILSON,
Plaintiff,

)

)

)

Civil Action

CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal

)

corporation, TERRY G. HILLARD,

)

GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK, DANIEL G. )AGlSTRATE

MAHONEY and RICHARD MAJDER, I~ I

JUDG

Defendants.

GEF~A_.DiNE SeAT BROWN )

[’I,
E

COMPLAINT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF CONSENT DECREE, DAMAGES AND OTHER RELIEF
NOW COMES the Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON, by his attorney JOSEPH T. FitzSIMMONS, who p~titions th/s Court for enforcement of the provisions of the "Consent Decree" heretofore entered; for the designation of TERRY G. I-KLLARD, DANIEL G. MAHONEY, GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and RICHARD MAJDER as specifically named Defendants; for the issuance of a Rule that the aforesaid parties and Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO show what cause exists, if any, to excuse the wilful and wanton disregard of the terms and provisions of the "Consent Decree" with respect to the Plaintiff; for an award of damages to Plaintiff as compensation and sanctions for the conduct &the parties and Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, with fees and costs and attorneys’ f _e~s_. taxed to Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO and to the individually named Defendants; and for such other, and further, relief as this Court finds appropriate. In support of his Complaint, the Plaintiff states the following:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This is an action brought to enforce the provisions of the Judgment Orders and Permanent Injunctions concerning First Amendment Rights previously entered in Civil Actions number .74 C 3268, 75 C 3295 and 76 C 1982 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in or about 1982 andtherea£ter reaffirmed from t/me to time. This court asserted jurisdiction of the subject matter in those earlier cases and judgment orders; and the jurisdictional
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basis of this action is an extension of such earlier jurisdictional findings and orders.
2. Venue is proper in this United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in that all of the unlawful acts, practices and conduct of Defendants occurred within Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Further, the permanent and binding injunctions in those earlier cases were entered in this United States District Court for the Northen District of Illinois and it is proper for the Plaintiffto seek enforcement of the orders of this court here.
PARTIES TO THE ACTION 3. The Plaintiff, JEFFREY C. WILSON, is a resident of the City of Chicago, the County of Cook and the United States of America, He is a native-born citizen of the United States of America who has never renounced or waived his citizenship. The Plaintiff is a person who is entitled to the protections provided by the "Consent Decree". 4. Defendant TERRY G. HILLARD is a policy-making employee of Defendant CITY OFCHICAGO, holding the chief executive position of Superintendent of Defendant’s Department of Police, ultimately responsible for all of the policies and decisions the command, or executive, level of the Chicago Police Department. In that capacity he is subject to all of the restrictions and limitations [with respect to the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights] created by the "Consent Decree". 5. Defendant DANIEL G. MAHONEY is a policy-making employee of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, holding the appointed position of "Department Advocate" in the Internal Affairs Division of Defendant’s Department of Police. In that capacity he is subject to all of the r~strictions and limitations [with respect to the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights] created by the "Consent Decree". 6. Defendant GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK is a policy-making employee of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, holding the "Senior Executive Service" position of "Commander" in the Management and Labor Affairs Section of Defendant’s Department of Police. In that capacity he is subject to all of the restrictions and limitations [with respect to the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights] created by the "Consent Decree". 7. Defendant RICHARD MAJDER is an employee of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, a sworn police officer holding the rank of"sergeant of police" in the Internal Affairs Division of Defendant’s Department of Police. In that capacity he is subject to all of the restrictions and limitations [with respect to the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights] created by the "Consent Decree".
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STATEMENT OF TI~ CASE 8. The Plaintiff JEFbTLEY C. WILSON is an employee of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO who has been, at all times relevant hereto, actively and regularly involved in the activities of organized labor on behalf of sworn supervisory employees in the Department of Police of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO [to wit: as the duly elected President of the Chicago Police Lieutenants Association, also known as "Polieemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois - Unit 156/Lieutenants" - a collective bargaining unit [ "labor union"] as certified by the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board]. 9. In April of 2001 the Plaintiff, acting in his capacity as an elected labor representative, made statements to the local Chicago print and electronic news media which criticized certain practices and policies of the Chicago Police Department and Defendant TERRY G. I-I~LARD. Those statements were made for the purpose of supporting the interests and fights of the members of Plaintiff’s collective bargaining unit. Defendants HILLARD and MAHONEY thereafter initiated and directed an unlawful investigation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment conduct and, moreover, concealed and hid that investigation from internal auditors charged with reporting such investigations to this court and from the external auditing firm charged with ongoing public reports of "First Amendment investigations". 10. In February of 2001 the Plaintiff, acting in his capacity as an elected labor representative, published political commentary and opinion on a local "electronic bulletin board" which was critical of labor relations between sworn police officers employed by the Chicago Police Department and the Department’s management. Defendants HILLARD, ROSEBROCK and MAJDER thereafter initiated, orchestrated and conducted an unlawful investigation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment conduct and, moreover, also concealed and hid that investigation from internal auditors charged with reporting such investigations to this court and from the external auditing firm charged with ongoing public reports of"First Amendment investigations".
COUNT I INVESTIGATION OF POLITICAL OPINIONS PUBLISHED IN NEWS MEDIA 11. On or about April 13, 2001 the Plaintiff was interviewed by members of the print media in his official rote as the eteeted president and spokesperson of the collective bargaining unit representing Chicago police officers holding the rank of Lieutenant of Police. During the interview, which was later reported in print in the Chicago Sun-Times newspaper of April 13, 2001, Plaintiff expressed his opinion that Chicago Police Department district commander Marienne Perry (and others) .had been "promotext beyond their competency level because of pressure to increase minority
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participation". 12. The newspaper article reporting Plaintiff’s political opinion was "reviewed" by
Defendants MAHONEY and HILLARD. Defendants MAHONEY and H]LLARD then immediately caused a formal investigation, focused solely and exclusively on the nature and subject of Plaintiff" s statements, to be initiated.
13. This investigation was initiated on April 13,2001 and was subsequently documented in the records of the Chicago Police Department as "Complaint Register number 270605".
14. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffstates that no other organized labor leader, representing police officer employees of the City of Chicago, has been subjected to a similar or analogous investigation of’his/her First Amendment conduct.
15. The investigation conducted by Defendants MAHONEY and HILLARD ("270605") was directed toward P.lai-ntiff’s First Amendment conduct in that it:
1. included the collection and/or handling of information about First Amendment conduct;
2. had as a subject or target a person (i.e., Plaintiff) who was actively and substantially engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the ¯ investigative activity .related only to that conduct; and
3. was designed to interfere with Plaintiff’s First Amendment conduct. 16. The investigation conducted by Defendants MAHONEY ,and H]LLARD was not a "Criminal Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-17 [Section VII (I) (3.2)lwhich implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within the scope of Chicago Police Department activities. 17. The investigation conducted by Defendants MAHONEY and HILLARD was not a "Dignitary Protection Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-17 [Section VII (i) (3.3)]which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within the scope of Chicago Police Department activities. 18. The investigation conducted by Defendants MAHONEY and HILLARD was not a "Public Gathering Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-t7 [Section VII (t) (3.4)]which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within the scope of Chicago Police Department activities. 19. The investigation conducted by Defendants MAHONEY and HILLARD was not a "Regulatory Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision
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of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-17 [Section VII (1) (3.5)]which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within the scope of Chicago Police Department activities.
20.. 7ITne conduct and ac.~ivities .of..both defendants HILLARD and MAHONEY in connection with the investigation, stigmatization and isolation of Plaintiff WILSON were undertaken solely and exclusively for the purpose of silencing and harassing WILSON for his First Amendment conduct in the course of representing members of the Chicago Police Lieutenants Union, a recognized collective bargaining unit.
21. The"Consent Decree" and the explicit directives of"General Order Number 88-17" notwithstanding, the CITY’s Department of Police/Internal Affairs Division has a historical practice of "targeting" First Amendment conduct by employees, harassing the First Amendment activities of employees who criticize Police Department policies, or who participate in organized police labor union actions, and of actively interfering with non-employees who associate with such employees. That practice is well documented in the secret records of Internal Affairs Division investigative files.
22. Beginning in about 1990, the Internal Affairs Division began an "open file" consisting of investigative reports and documentation aimed at identifying the parties responsible for publishing satirical sheets such as the "25~ District Gallows", "Stalag 017", the "Rogers Park Follies", "Rodent Control" and others. The purpose of the investigation is to penalize those parties (all of whom are clearly Police Department sworn-member employees) solely and exclusively on accoura of personal embarrassment caused to exempt-level supervisors by the First Amendment commentary and political eriticism. The targets of this long-term and ongoing investigation are "person[s] who [are] actively and substantially engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity relates to that conduct". See "Consent Decree’, at See. 1.3.
23. The ongoing "Gallows" investigation is not justified by any claim that official misconduct or corruption by sworn police officers is implicated. The purpose is simply to silence those subordinate Department members who have the temerity and audacity to question the decisions and actions of higher level government employees - in the context of a free society that traces its history of political satire more than 3000 years to the golden age of Hellenic civilization.
24. Beginning .in 1995 or 1996, Police Officer Toby Hensgen of .the tnternat Affairs Division became assigned to the "Gallows" investigation -- at the direction of the predecessor of Defendant HILLARD -- after it was found that some of the satirical essays published months and years before could be found on an "Internet w...e. bsite". I.A.D. agent Hensgen traced this "site" to a young police officer assigned to the Police Department’s 015~ District .(Police Officer "D").
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25. In conducting his investigation under the supervision and command of command rank agents of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, Hensgen interviewed the owner of the "Internet" "web server" as .to ,the First Amendment activities of Police Officer "D". Moreover, Hensgen then interviewed the leasing agents of the building where this "web server" business was physically located and obtained business documents concerning the "web server" business for the purpose of implicating Police Officer "D" in business activities associated with the publication ofpolitical essays which violated only the rules of English grammar. Hensgen further caused building, zoning and revenue inspectors from the Defendant CITYOF CHICAGO to come to the buiiding wherein the "web server" business was located for the purpose of harassing that private enterprise, its proprietor and its employees solely and exclusively because of the cotmectiort between-the business and the publication of documents which certain high-ranking Police Department officials, including Michael t-Ioke and Frank-Radtke, -found-to-be.embarrassing. As a -result .of-the activities of the Internal Affairs Division, through its agent Hensgen, at least one license violation citation was issued for an insignificant and. rarely enforced violation.
26. The use of Internal Affairs Division investigations, such as the one described .immediately.above and t2.omplaint .Register Number ’:270605"., .is a pattern, .policy and .practice regularly used by the Chicago Police Department to target persons such as Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON who are actively and substantially involved in legitimate First Amendment conduct.
27. The use of hatemal Affairs Division investigations, such as the one described immediately above and Complaint Register Number "270605", is a pattern and practice regularly used by the Chicago Police Department to interfere with and to quash legitimate First Amendment conduct by Police Department employees who engage in organized labor activities that are critical of the Department’s regressive disciplinary system or promote fair and equitable treatment of subordinate employees.
28. Upon information and belief, your Plaintiff states that Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO has adopted, and practices, a policy of concealing Internal Affairs Division investigations, such as the Investigation of Plaintiff under "270605" and of Officer "D’" (as described above) from the regular auditing and monitoring of compliance with the provisi0ns of the ¯ Consent Decree.
29. Upon information and belief, your Plaintiff states that Section 5 of the "Judgment Orders in cases 74 C 3268 and 75 C3295 (i.e., the "Consent Decree") provides for "AUDITING AND MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH TH[E] JUDGMENT".
30. Upon information and belief, your Plaintiff states that Defendant CITY OF
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CHICAGO and HILLARD have intentionally and purposefully concealed the investigations referenced herein, as well as other Internal Affairs Division investigations directed toward First Amendment activity, from auditing and monitoring authorities and, further, have intentionally and actively prevented the reporting of such investigations to this court.
31. As a result of the condiact of Defendants MAHONEY and HILLARD, as described herein, your Plaintiff JEFFREY C~ WILSON has been harassed, has been stigmatized and has suffered damages.
32. The Plaintiff is entitledto an award of damages pursuant tothe provisions of the "Consent Decree" establishing therein a fight for aggrieved parties (such as Plaintiff) to bring a "private action for damages" seeking "enforcement" under the terms of the "Consent Decree".
33. The Plaintiffis entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation pursuant to the provisions of the "Consent Decree" establishing therein a right for aggrieved parties (such.as Plaintiff) seeking "enforcement" under the terms of the "Consent Decree" as an ancillary matter.

WB[EREFORE, the Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON prays this Honorable Court for
relief as follows:
A. For the issuance of a Rule that the Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, TERRY G. HILLARD and DANIEL G. MAHONEY show what cause exists, if any, to excuse the wilful and wanton disregardof the terms and provisions of the "Consent Decree" with respect to the Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON;

Bo

For an award of damages to Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON as and for compensation

and sanctions for the conduct of TERRY G. HILLARD, DANIEL G. MAHONEY

and Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO;

For the entry of an Order herein awarding fees and costs and attorney’s fees taxed to TERRY G. HILLARD (individually), DANIELG. MAHONEY (individually) and Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO;

For the entry of an Order herein finding the individual Defendants TERRY G. HILLARD and DANIEL G. MAHONEY to be in criminal contempt of this Court for the willful and wanton disregard of the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the "Consent Decree" and remanding those individual Defendants into the custody of the United States Marshall for a period of incarceration as determined by the Court; and

E. For such other, and further relief as this Court in equity finds to be appropriate.

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COUNT II INVESTIGATION OF INTERNET PUBLICATIONS 1 - 10. Your Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON realleges and reincorporates Paragraphs 1 through t0 -herein-as iffully set forth-as -Paragraphs -1 -through 10-of this Count tI, 11. On or about February 10, 2001 the Plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity by posting an explanatory article about labor activities of.the Policemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois ["P.B.& P.A.] on an Intemet message board frequented by police officers-of .the-Chicago .Poi.ice Department .(i.¢., .the "Second City Copl~rs Network" at www.secondcitycoppcrs.net). t2, Oa February 1_6, 200[ Defendant GEORGE A.. ROSEBROCK initiated and investigation by the Chicago Police Department’s IntemaI Affairs Division which was thereafter designated "Complaint Register Investigation 269257". 13. The investigation was conducted by Defendant RICHARD MADJER from February 16, 2001 through April 5, 2001. During the course of the investigation, Defendant GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK participated in investigative activities, in the submission of reports and actively directed the investigation. 14. The investigative activities 0fboth Defendant GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and of Defendant RICHARD MAJDER included the regular "monitoring and review" of Internet public service websites containing political commentary andunion information for the generalpubIic and for law enforcement employees who hold membership in public employee labor unions (.g., the statement of Defendant MAJDER that he "monitored the website, www,SeeondCityeoppers.net"). 15, The investigative activities of both Defendant GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and of Defendant RICHARD MAJDER included: the submission of reports to superiors analyzing and synopsizing the public statements of Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON in the forum of the Internet website; downloading, printing and attaching First Amendment.commentary into.permanent files of the Chicago Police Department; distributing their analyses, theirsynopses, the downloaded copies of Plaintiffs First Amendment labor statements to various other officers and. superiors w/thin the Chicago Police Department; and targeting the Plaintiff for retaliatory action by the Employer because of his First Amendment conduct as a labor representative. 16. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffstates that no other organized labor leader, representing petite officer eznployees of the City of Chicago, has been subjected to a similar or analogous investigation of his/her First Amendment conduct.
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17. The investigation conducted by Defendants GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and RICHARD MADJER (’"269257") was directed toward Plaintiffs First Amendment conduct in that it:
1. included the collection and/or handling of information about First Amendment conduct;
2. had as a subject or target a person (i.e.,.Plaintiff) who was actively and substantially engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity related only to that conduct; and
3. -was designed.to interfere with Plaintiff’s ~First Amendment conduct. 16. The investigation conducted by Defendants ROSEBROCK and MADJER was not a"Criminal Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-17 [Section VII (1) (3.2)] which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within .the scope of Chicago Police D.epartment activities. I7. The investigation conducted by Defendants ROSEBROCK and MADJER was not a "Dignitary Protection Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-17 [Section VII (I)(3,3)] which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within the scope of Chicago Police Department activities. I 8. The investigation conducted by Defendants ROSE-’BROCK and MADJER was not a "Public Gathering Investigation" as defined and referenced in the Consent Decree and in the provision oftheChicagoP01iceDepartment’s General Order 88-17’[Section VII (I)(3,4)] which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within the scope of Chicago Police Department activities. 19. The investigation conducted by Defendants ROSEBROCK and MADJER was not a "Regulatory Investigation" as defined and refereneedintheConsent Decree andin-the.provision of the Chicago Police Department’s General Order 88-17 [Section VII (I) 0.5)]which implements the provisions of the Consent Decree within, t-he scope of Chicago Police Department activities. 20. The conduct and activities Of both Defendants ROSEBROCK and MADJER in connection with the investigation, stigmatization and isolation of Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON were undertaken solely and exclusively for the purpose of silencing and harassing WILSON for his First Amendment conduct in the course of representing members of the Chicago Police Lieutenants Union, a recognized collective bargaining unit. 21. The "Consent Decree" and the explicit directives of"General Order Number 88-17"
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notwithstanding, the CITY’ s Department of Police/Internal Affairs Division has a historical practice of "targeting" First Amendment conduct by employees, harassing the First Amendment activities of employees who criticize Police Department policies, or who participate in organized police labor union actions, and of actively interfering with non-employees who associate with such employees. That practice is well documented in the secret records of Internal Affairs Division investigative files.
22. Beginning in about 1990, the Internal Affairs Division began an "open file" consisting of investigative reports and documentation aimed at identifying the parties responsible for publishing satirical sheets such as the "25t~ District Gallows", "Stalag 017", the "Rogers Park Follies", "Rodent Control" and-others: The purpose of the investigation, isto~ penalize those parties (all of whom are clearly Police Department sworn-member employees) solely and exclusively on account .of.personal .embarrassment.caused ,to-exempt-level-supervisors ,by .the First Amendment commentary and political criticism. The targets of this long-term and ongoing investigation are "person[s]. who. [are]. actively and substantially engaged, in. First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity relates to that conduct". See "Consent Decree", at See. 1,3,
23.. The ongoing "Gallows" investigation is not justified by any claim that official misconduct or corruption by sworn police officers is implicated. The purpose is simply to silence those subordinate Department members who have the temerity and audacity to question the decisions and actions of higher level government employees - in the context of a free society that traces its history of political satire more than 3000 years to the golden age of Hellenic civilization.
24. Beginning in 1995 or 1996, Police Officer Toby Hensgen of the Internal Affairs Division became assigned to the "Gallows" investigation -- at the direction of the predecessor of Defendant HILLARD -- after it was found that some of the satirical essays published months and years before could be found on an "Internet" "’web site". I.A.D. agent Hensgen traced this "site" to a young police Officer assigned tothe Police Department’s015t~ District (Police Officer"D").
25. In conducting his investigation under the supervision and command of command rank agents of Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO; Hensgen interviewed the ownerof the "Irrternet" "’web server" as to the First Amendment activities of Police Officer "D". Moreover, Hensgen then interviewed the leasing agents of the building where this "web server" business was physically located and obtained business documents concerning the "web server" business for the purpose of implicating Police Officer "D" in business activities associated with the publication of political essays which violated only the rules of English grammar. Hensgen further caused building, zoning and revenue .inspectors .from .the ,Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO .to .come .to the building wherein
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the "web server" business was located for the purpose of harassing that private enterprise, its proprietor and its employees solely and exclusively because of the connection between the business and the publication of documents which certain high-ranking Police Department officials, including Michael Hoke and Frank Radtke, found to be embarrassing. As a result of the activities of the Internal Affairs Division, through its agent Hensgen, at least one license violation citation was issued for an insignificant and’rarely enforcedviolation.
26. The use of Internal Affairs Division investigations, such as the one described immediately above andComplaintRegister Number"’269257", is a pattern, policy and practice regularly used by the Chicago Police Department to target persons such as Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON. who are actively and substantially involved in legitimate First Amendment conduct.
27. The use of Internal Affairs Division investigations, such as the one described immediately above and Complaint Register Number "269257", is a pattern and practice regul~arly used by the Chicago Police Department to interfere with and to quash legitimate First Amendment conduct by Police Department employees whoengage.in organized labor activities that are critical of the Department’s regressive disciplinary system or promote fair and equitable treatment of subordinate employees.
28. Upon information and belief, your Plaintiff states that Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO has adopted, and practices, a policy of concealing internal Affairs Division investigations, such as the Investigation of Plaintiff under "269257" and of Officer "D" (as described above) from the regular auditing and monitoring of compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree.
29. Upon. information and belief, your Plaintiff states that Section 5 of the "Judgment Orders in cases 74 C 3268 and 75 C3295 (i.e., the "Consent Decree") provides for "AUDITING AND MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH TH[E] JUDGMENT".
30. Upon information and belief, your Plaintiff states that Defendant CITYOF CHICAGO has intentionally and purposefully concealed all of the investigations referenced herein, as well as other Internal Affairs Division investigations directed toward First Amendment activity, from auditing and monitoring authorities and, further, has intentionally and actively prevented the reporting of such investigations to this court.
31. As a result oft.he conduct of Defendants GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and RICHARD MADJER, as described herein, your Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON has been harassed, has been stigmatized and has suffered damages.
32. The Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages pursuant to the provisions of the
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~’Consent Decree" establishing therein a right for aggrieved parties (such as Plaintiff) to bring a
"private action for damages" seeking "enforcement" under the terms of the "Consent Decree".
33. The Plaintiffis entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation pursuant
to the provisions of the "Consent Decree" establishing therein a right for aggrieved parties (such as
Plaintiff) seeking "enforcement" under the terms of the "Consent Decree" as an ancillary matter.
WItEREFORE, the Plaintiff JEFFREY C. WILSON prays this Honorable Court for relief as follows:
A. For the issuance of a Rule that the Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and RICHARD MADJER show what cause exists, if any, to excuse the wilful and wanton disregard of the terms and provisions of the "Consent Decree" with respect to the Plaintiff Jeffrey C. Wilson;
B. For an award of damages to Plaintiff Jeffrey C. Wilson as and for compensation and sanctions forthe conduct of GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK,RICHARD MADJER and Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO;
C. For the entry of an Order herein awarding fees and costs and attorney’s fees taxed to GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK (individually), RICHARD MADJER (individually) and Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO;
D. For .the entry of an Order herein finding the individual Defendants GEORGE A. ROSEBROCK and RICHARD MADJER to be in criminal contempt of this Court for the willful and wanton disregard of the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the "’Consent Decree" and remanding those individual Defendants into the custody of the United States Marshall for a period of incarceration as determined by the Court; and
E. For such other, and further relief as this Court in equity finds to be appropriate.
I, JEFFREY C. WILSON, the Plaintiff herein, make the statements and assertions contained in this instrument under the provisions of certification contained in Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure; and, under the penalties provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, I certify that the statements and assertions contained in this instrument are true and correct, except felr stgt~rnents made based upon in~rmation and belief; and as to such statement~h o eb ~me and co,rrect~//

~Jeffrev

~- ...... ~

Attorney at Law

~

"

\t "~

~

[Cook Coun~y~ttomey Code 91409] ~

c/o: Chicago Police Lieutenants Association

111 West Washington St. --Suite 1000 Chicago IL 60602

773.631. 8022

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G.O. 88-17 N..OYE..!,

Chicago Police Department

TITLE:

FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS

ISSUE DATE:

8 September 1988

EFFECTIVE DATE:

9 September 1988

DISTRIBUTION:

C

RESCINDS:

GENERAL ORDER 82-10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PURPOSE .............................................................................................1..................... II. POLICY ..........................................................................................................1............ III. GENERAL INFORMATION ...........................................................................1......... IV. D EFIN ITION S ...............................................................................................1.......... V. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................2........
A. Superintendent of Police .....................................................................2........ B. First Deputy Superintendent ................................................................2........ C. Coordinator of Special Events ..............................................................3....... D. Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services .....................3...... E. District/Unit Commander of Exempt Rank ..............................................4...... F. Individual Member’s Responsibility .......................................................7........ CASE REPORT PROCEDURES .....................................................................9....... VII, JUDGMENT ORDERS CONCERNING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN GENERAL (74 C 3268 AND 75 C 3295) ................................................................. 10

I. Permanent Injunction .......................................................................1..0........

G,O, 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

The Scope of this Judgment; Definitions ....................................1..0.... 1.1 Applies Only to Investigations Directed Towards First
Amendment Conduct; Great Majority of Police Activity Not Affected by this Judgment .................................................... 10
1.2 "Investigative Activity". .....................................................1..0..... 1.3 "Directed Toward". .........................................................1...0.... 1.4 "Incidental References". .................................................1..0.... 1.5 "First Amendment Conduct". ...........................................1...0... 1.6 "First Amendment Information" .......................................1..1.... Prohibitions that Apply to All Agencies of the City of Chicago ......1...1. Police Department Investigations ...............................................1..1.... 3.1 Basic Procedures for Investigations ..................................1...1..
3.1.1 Avoidance of First Amendment Information .............1..1. 3.1.2 Minimization ........................................................1...2.... 3.1.3 Intrusive Methods ................................................1..2..... 3.1.4 Authorization .......................................................1..2..... 3.1.5 Termination ..........................................................1..2..... 3.1.6 Security ...............................................................1..2...... 3.1.7 Purging ................................................................1..2..... 3.2 Criminal Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct .................................................................................. 13 3.2.2 Reasonable Suspicion ...........................................1..3... 3.3 Dignitary Protection Investigations ...................................1...3..

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 2

3.4 Public Gathering investigations .......................................1...4... 3.5 Regulatory Investigations ...............................................1..4..... 3.6 Intrusive Methods ..........................................................1..5......
Informant ..................................................1..5..... Infiltrator ....................................................1...5.... Impfementation of this Judgment ................................................1...6.... Auditing and Monitoring Implementation of and Compliance with this Judgment ............................................................................................
o Index to Definitions ...................................................................1...7...... 6.2 Agent ............................................................................1...7...... 6,2.2 Person .................................................................1..7..... 6.2.3 Record ................................................................1...7.....
~1. Retention of Jurisdiction and Ancillary Matters ..................................1...7.... A. Retention of Jurisdiction ............................................................1..7..... B. Final Disposition of Claims for Injunctive Relief Against City Defendants ....................................................................................... 18 C. Ancillary Matters .....................................................................1..8.......
VIII. JUDGMENT ORDER CONCERNING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS (76 C 1982) .................................................................................................................. 18
Prohibited Activity .............................................................................1...9...... Enforcement .....................................................................................1..9........ Ancillary Matters ...............................................................................2..0........

GoO, 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 3

I. PURPOSE
This order:
informs members that the City of Chicago will continue to comply with the two Judgment Orders entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, concerning investigations directed toward the exercise of First Amendment rights by individuals or groups (Alliance to End Repression, et al., v. City of Chicago, et al.; 74 C 3268, American Civil Liberties Union, et al., v. City of Chicago, et al.; 75 C 3295) and concerning investigations of attorney-client relationship (Chicago Lawyers’ Committee, et al., v. City of Chicago, et al.; 76 C 1982).
B. provides members with copies of the provisions of the Judgment Orders.
defines the phrase "directed toward First Amendment conduct" (Judgment Order-Section 1.3).
D. defines "unit" for the purpose of this order.
continues responsibilities and procedures relative to investigations and the retention and security of records directed toward First Amendment conduct.
II. POLICY
It shall be the policy of the Chicago Police Department not to conduct investigations directed toward the exercise of First Amendment rights unless a valid governmental purpose is served. Investigations which impact on First Amendment rights will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Judgment Orders contained in this directive.
II1. GENERAL INFORMATION
FIRST AMENDMENT
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
APPENDIX D TO AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE (74 C 3268 AND

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 4

75 C 3295)

"Legal Notice to all employees of the City of Chicago:

By the consent of the City of Chicago, the United States District Court has entered an order dated April 8, 1982, protecting the rights of individuals and groups to speak out, to petition the government, and to associate in the furtherance of economic, political, and religious objectives as provided by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. No investigation, collection of information, or other action may be taken against individuals or groups exercising such rights except under exceptional circumstances for legitimate governmental reasons. The Court order provides that any investigation concerning activities protected by the First Amendment must follow specified procedures. Most of these matters are properly handled only by the Department of Police, but you are advised that the Court order binds all City employees and agents so far as investigation or other action taken against individuals or groups exercising such rights."

APPENDIX A TO AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE (76 C 1982)

"Under court order, city employees are forbidden to interfere with or investigate relations between attorneys and their clients. Violation of this order may subject
you to discipline, citation for contempt of court, and a fawsuit for damages. If you suspect that a Department employee has violated this order, notify your supervisor immediately."

IV. DEFINITIONS

Investigative activity is directed toward First Amendment conduct when it does or foreseeably will (other than by incidental reference):

1. include the collection or handling of information about First Amendment conduct;

have as a subject or target a person who is actively and substantially = engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity
refates to that conduct; or

3. interfere with First Amendment conduct.

go Unit - For purposes of this order, unit will be defined as any subdivision of the Department which is commanded by a member of exempt rank.

V. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 5

Ao

The Superintendent of Police:

may authorize a cdminal or regulatory investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct by utilizing the Authorization For First Amendment Investigation form (CPD-11.437).

may authorize a dignitary protection or public gathering investigation by utilizing the Authorization For First Amendment Investigation form.

has designated the First Deputy Superintendent as the "Police Executive" for purposes of administering the provisions of the
Judgment Orders and this directive as they relate to public gathering and dignitary protection investigations.

has designated the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, as the "Police Executive" for purposes of administering the provisions of the Judgment Orders and this directive as they relate to criminal and regulatory investigations directed toward First Amendment conduct.

o will personally approve in writing, when appropriate, any "infiltration" and certify the necessity for such use.

o will recertify, if appropriate, any previously approved "infiltration" at intervals of not more than thirty (30) days.

will specifically authorize and limit access to purged information kept in sealed files.

will initiate, annually, a Departmental audit of First Amendment investigations and submit copies of the audit report(s) to the Mayor, the Police Board, and the Court of Jurisdiction in the Judgment
Orders.

9. will ensure that proper training and supervision is afforded to members in accordance with the provisions of the Judgment Orders.

The First Deputy Superintendent:

will review all requests to conduct public gathering or dignitary protection investigations.

2. may authorize a public gathering investigation to be conducted solely

G.O, 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 6

for the purpose of:

preventing substantial interference with traffic in the area contiguous to the public gathering, or

b= providing adequate public services to protect public health and safety in compliance with applicable laws, or

c. protecting the exercise of constitutionaf rights.

may authorize a public gathering investigatior~ to be conducted when there is reasonable suspicion that the:

ao public gathering is likely to produce an imminent and substantial breach of the peace or riot, or

b. information on a permit application is false.

may authorize a dignitary protection investigation to provide for the physical safety of a visiting public official or other dignitary, and:

there is reasonable suspicion that the subject(s) of the investigation poses a threat to the physical safety of the dignitary, and

commence such investigation only after being made aware of an anticipated visit and terminate the investigation upon the visitor’s departure or receiving notice that the visit will not
occur.

will complete and Authorization For First Amendment Investigation form to:

authorize and set parameters, establish duration, reauthorize or terminate a First Amendment investigation.

establish appropriate minimization procedures to be employed during public gathering or dignitary protection investigations.

authorize, when appropriate, the use of intrusive method(s) and document why such use is necessary.

6. will assign a First Amendment investigation number to authorized

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

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public gathering and dignitary protection investigations as follows:
a. the number will consist of the letters "OS," the last two digits of the current year, and a number beginning with "1" and running consecutively in ascending order, which indicates the number of times that a First Amendment investigation has been authorized that year (e.g., OS-88-1).
a bond ledger log will be used to record the number of First Amendment investigations authorized.
will ensure that an authorized public gathering or dignitary protection investigation is reviewed every thirty (30) days and either reauthorize the investigation, if appropriate, or terminate the investigation if:
ao the standard of "reasonable suspicion of crime" is no longer met, or,
b. the purpose of the investigation has been achieved, or,
the event to which it related has taken place or been cancelled.
will be responsible for ensuring the maintenance of files of purged information on all public gathering and dignitary protection investigations forwarded to him on an annual basis.
will ensure the security of such files by only authorizing the dissemination of information to persons or agencies as set forth in the Judgment Orders.
10. will designate the Coordinator of Special Events to be responsible for those procedures outlined under Item V-C.
will ensure that the complaint register procedure as prescribed in the directive entitled "Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures" is followed when activity by a Department member involves a violation o.f First Amendment rights or the provisions of the Judgment Orders.
The Coordinator of Special Events will:
1. be notified by the First Deputy Superintendent of all:

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 8

a. proposed dignitary protection and public gathering activities.

b. authorized dignitary protection and public gathering investigations.

provide a staff review of all proposed dignitary protection and public gathering activities.

perform and provide staff supervision of all authorized dignitary protection and public gathering investigations.

be responsible for ensuring that any documentation resulting from
dignitary protection activities or authorized dignitary protection investigations forwarded to him by the First Deputy Superintendent is maintained in a separate dignitary protection file.

be responsible for the maintenance and retention of all files
generated as a result of pubtic gathering activities or authorized public gathering investigations forwarded to him by the First Deputy Superintendent.

ensure adherence to the minimization procedures set forth by the First Deputy Superintendent for authorized First Amendment investigations.

review and forward all reports of authorized First Amendment investigations generated by members under his supervision to the First Deputy Superintendent prior to being filed and retained in his unit.

ensure that the complaint register procedure as prescribed in the directive entitled "Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures" is followed when an allegation is made or information comes to his attention that
a member under his supervision has taken an action that is a violation of First Amendment rights or the provisions of the judgment Orders.

The Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of investigative Services

When criminal investigations are directed toward First Amendment conduct, the Deputy Superintendent will:

ao

review alt requests to continue criminal investigations directed

toward First Amendment conduct which will exceed 72 hours.

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

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review and, if appropriate, authorize a criminal investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct to continue beyond 72 hours when:
(1) such investigation is being conducted solely for the
purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal conduct that has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, and

(2) there is reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the subject(s) has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime.

Co complete the Authorization For First Amendment investigation form to:
(1) authorize and set parameters, establish duration,
reauthorize or terminate a First Amendment investigation.

(2) establish appropriate minimization procedures to be employed during criminal investigations directed toward
First Amendment conduct.

(3) authorize, when appropriate, the use of intrusive method(s) and document why such use is necessary.

assign a First Amendment investigation number to authorized criminal investigations as follows:
(i) the number will consist of the letters "IS," the last two
digits of the current year, and a number beginning with "1" and running consecutively in ascending order, which indicates the number of times that a First Amendment investigation has been authorized that year (e.g., IS-881).

(2) a bound ledger log will be used to record the number of First Amendment investigations authorized.

84 ensure that an authorized criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct is reviewed every thirty (30) days and either reauthorize the investigation, if appropriate, or terminate the investigation if:

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE; 8 September 1988

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(1) the standard of "reasonable suspicion of crime" is no longer met, or,

(2) the purpose of the investigation has been achieved, or,

(3) the event to which it related has taken place or been cancelled.

fo be responsible for maintaining files of purged information on all criminal investigations directed toward First Amendment conduct.

go ensure the security of such files by only authorizing the dissemination of information to persons or agencies as set forth in the Judgment Ordersl

ensure that the complaint register procedure as prescribed in the directive entitled "Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures"
is followed when activity by a Department member involves a violation of First Amendment rights or the provisions of the Judgment Orders.

For regulatory investigations which have a significant focus on First Amendment information, the Deputy Superintendent:

upon receiving requests to conduct such investigations will ensure that:

they are conducted solely for the purpose of fulfilling regulatory responsibilities as set forth by statute or ordinance, and

(2) the security of First Amendment information is maintained.

when authorizing such investigations will similarly comply with the procedural provisions of Items V-D-I-c through h.

Eo District/Unit Commander of Exempt Rank

1. Criminal Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct

a. The responsibility of the district/unit commander of exempt

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988 -

Page I1

rank for criminal investigations directed toward First
Amendment conduct commences at the time at which he receives a To-From-Subject report from a subordinate member who is/was conducting an investigation, or learns that an investigation is under way or has been conducted.

NOTE:

In the absence of a district/unit commander of
exempt rank, the on-duty assists deputy superintendent, Operations Command, may assume this responsibility.

bo The authority to continue or terminate an investigation after the initial 24 hour period rests with the district/unit commander of exempt rank. Upon receipt of a member’s report describing a First Amendment criminal investigation, the district/unit commander of exempt rank will personally review the report and concur or not concur with the member’s request to terminate or continue the investigation and then proceed as follows:

(1) If the investigation is to be terminated, the responsible district/unit commander of exempt rank will order the
investigation terminated and follow the procedures outlined in Item V-E-4 of this order.

(2) If the district/unit commander of exempt rank authorizes the continuation of a criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct which will extend beyond 24 hours, but not more than 72 hours from the time the investigation was initiated, he will order the investigation continued, and

(a) provide written approval in a To-From-Subject report. The written authorization will contain
minimization procedures (as defined in the Judgment Order-Section 3.1.2) to be followed by
the member.

(b) notify the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services that a criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct has been initiated.

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

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NOTE:

At any time, up to the 72nd hour, the investigation may be terminated. When termination occurs, the district/unit commander of exempt rank will follow the procedures outlined under Item VE-4 of this order without delay.

If at any time prior to the 72nd hour of the investigation the district/unit commander of exempt rank determines that the investigation should continue beyond that time limit, he wilt:

(1) review and, if appropriate, prepare a To-From-Subject
report requesting an authorized criminal investigation
directed toward First Amendment conduct from the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, for an investigation which will exceed 72 hours. The report will summarize the conduct of the criminal investigation to date and state the results
expected to be achieved.

(2) prepare the Request For Authorization For First Amendment Investigation form (CPD-11.438) and check
the square for initial authorization.

(3) attach a copy of the member’s report requesting an extension of the criminal investigation beyond the 24th
hour, and

(4) attach a copy of his report authorizing the extension of the criminal investigation beyond the 24th hour.
(5) forward these reports and any other reports in the
investigation to date to ~he Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigation Services, by messenger, in a sealed file.

NOTE:

If approval for an investigation which will
exceed 72 hours is not received within 72 hours from the time the investigation was initiated, the investigation must be
terminated. The procedures outlined under Item V-E-4 of this order wiil be

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

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followed without delay.

do Authorization is continue a criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct beyond 72 hours will be received from the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, on an Authorization For First Amendment Investigations form. The authorization will contain:

(1) minmization measures to be followed and a listing of any intrusive methods authorized. District/unit commanders of exempt rank are forbidden to go
beyond the parameters established for the conduct of the investigation and will ensure that members of their command follow the minimization procedures.

(2) a cancellation date limited to 30 days from the date the investigation was first initiated. If at any time prior to
the expiration of the cancellation date the district/unit commander of exempt rank determines that the investigation should be terminated, he will order the investigation terminated and follow the procedures
outlined in Item V-E-4 of this order.

Public Gathering, Dignitary Protection and Regulatory Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct

Upon receipt of a report from a member requesting
authorization to conduct a public gathering investigation, dignitary protection investigation, or regulatory investigation which has a significant focus on First Amendment information, a district/unit commander of exempt rank will:

(1) review the report to determine the justification for the request and approve or disapprove the request.

(2) forward disapproved requests to either the First Deputy Superintendent or the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau
of investigative Services, as appropriate, and order the requesting member to refrain from conducting the investigation into First Amendment conduct.

(3) authorize the requesting member to prepare a Request

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 14

For Authorization For First Amendment Investigation form in those cases where he approves the request, attach the endorsed report of the requesting member and forward both documents, by messenger, in a sealed file to either:
(a) the First Deputy Superintendent, for a public
gathering or dignitary protection investigation,
or;
(b) the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, . for a regulatory investigation.
Authorization to initiate a public gathering, dignitary protection, or a regulatory investigation which has a significant focus on First Amendment information, will be received from the First Deputy Superintendent or the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, as appropriate, on an Authorization for First Amendment Investigation form. The authorization form will contain:
(1) minimization measures to be followed and a listing of any intrusive methods authorized. District/unit commanders of exempt rank are forbidden to go beyond the parameters established for the conduct of the investigation and will ensure that members of their command follow the minimization procedures.

(2) a cancellation date which is limited to 30 days from the date the investigation was first authorized. If at any time prior to the expiration of the cancellation date the district/unit commander of exempt rank determines that the investigation into First Amendment conduct should be terminated, he will order the investigation terminated and follow the procedures outlined in Item V-E-4 of this order.
o Criminal, Regulatory, Public Gathering or Dignitary Protection Investigation Continued Beyond 30 Days.
When a district/unit commander of exempt rank determines that a criminal, regulatory, public gathering or dignitary

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 15

protection investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct should continue beyond 30 days, he will:
(1) prepare a Request For Authorization For First Amendment Investigations form indicating reauthorization.
(2) prepare a To-From-Subject report summarizing the investigation to date and what the continued investigation is expected to accomplish. This report will be attached to the request form.
(3) attach copies of all reports of the investigation prepared to date to the request form.
(4) forward these reports to either:
(a) the First Deputy Superintendent for public
gathering or dignitary protection investigations,
or
(b) the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, for criminal or regulatory investigations.
Requests of this kind will normally be submitted at least 5 days before the expiration of the current authorization in order to provide time for review and administrative procedures.
There is no limit to the number of 30 days reauthorizations which can be granted. However, if at any time it is determined that the investigation should be terminated as specified by the Judgment Order, the district/unit commander of exempt rank must then terminate the investigation without delay.
Termination of a First Amendment Investigation (Judgment OrderSection 3.1.5)
ao The district/unit commander of exempt rank wilt terminate a criminal, regulatory, pubtic gathering or dignitary protection investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct when its written authorization expires, or earlier when:

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page16

(1) the standard under which it was initiated is no longer met (i.e., it is determined that no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity relating to the First Amendment
exists) or,

(2) its purpose has been achieved or the event to which it was related (i.e., a public gathering) has taken place or been cancelled.

bo If at any time the district/unit commander of exempt rank determines that an investigation directed toward First
Amendment conduct should be terminated, he will order the investigation terminated, and:

(1) complete a Request For Authorization For First Amendment Investigation form and indicate termination.

(2) prepare a To-From-Subject report to the First Deputy Superintendent, or the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, as appropriate, noting the termination and summarizing the investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct.

(3) ensure that in those investigations that contain an RD number, the Supplementary Report (CPD-11.411-A or
B) indicates that First Amendment information was purged and the location to which it was forwarded.

(4) attach all copies of any reports prepared during the investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct to the Request for Authorization for First Amendment Investigation from.

(5) purge (Judgment Order-Section 3.1.7) all First
Amendment (other than incidental references-Section 1.4) from all reports and forward the purged material
along with the items listed under Item V-E-4-b-(1 ) to (4) of this directive to the First Deputy Superintendent or Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, as appropriate, by messenger, in a sealed
file.

(6) attach a copy of the Authorization For First Amendment

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 17

Investigation form(s) to the authorized investigation file from which First Amendment information was purged.

District/unit commanders of. exempt rank will ensure that the complaint register procedures prescribed in the directive entitled "Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures" are followed and that the appropriate deputy superintendent is notified when he becomes aware of activity by a Department member involving a violation of either First Amendment rights or the provisions of the Judgment Orders.

ndividuaf Member’s Responsibility

t. Criminal Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct

Any member may, when necessary, initiate a criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct without the approval of his district/unit commander of exempt rank for
a period not to exceed 24 hours; however, the member must notify his district/unit commander of exempt rank as soon as possible that the has initiated such an investigation. For the
purposes of this order, 24 hours is defined as 24 consecutive hours from the time the investigation is initiated. The minimizaion procedures set forth in the Judgment Orders
(Section 3.1.2.) will be followed. Such an investigation may continue up to 72 hours with the written approval of the district/unit commander of exempt rank.

(1) A member who uses any intrusive method [authorized
under V-D-l-c-(3)] directed toward First Amendment conduct must promptly submit a To-From-Subject report setting forth the details of the methods used and the information gathered.

(2) A member who uses an informant under Section 3.6.2 must instruct the informant as to the binding effect of the prohibitions of Part 2 of the Judgment Orders and
the duties under Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the Judgment Orders.

Prior to the expiration of the 24 hour period, the member must determine whether or not to continue the investigation. In either event or in the case of a criminal investigation that was

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 18

approved for up to 72 hours, the member will submit a ToFrom-Subject report to his district/unit commander of exempt rank setting forth:

(1) the basis, purpose and methods of the initial investigation, and

(2) any particulars of the manner in which the investigation is, or has been, directed toward First Amendment conduct.

(3) the DATE AND EXACT TIME OF INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION on the initial report.

(4) if the member elects to terminate the investigation, or

(5) if the member elects to request permission to continue
the investigation.

NOTE:

The authority to continue or terminate the investigation after the initial 24 hour period rests
with the district/unit commander of exempt rank. In the absence of a member of exempt rank, the on-duty Assistant Deputy Superintendent, Operations Command, may assume this
responsibility.

When the advocacy of the use of unlawful force or violence during the exercise of First Amendment conduct comes to the attention of Department members, prudent and reasonable inquiries should be made to determine if such advocacy is an
expression ideas only or whether it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless conduct and likely to incite or
produce such action. Such inquiries will comply with the procedures and reporting requirements for conducting a criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment
conduct.

o Public Gathering, Dignitary Protection and Regulatory Investigation ’ Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct.

ao Any member may initiate a public gathering investigation without authorization solely for the purpose of:

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 19

(1) gathering published announcements of future public gatherings and reviewing permit applications.

(2) communicating overtly with the organizers of the public gathering concerning the number of persons expected to participate and similar information about the time, place and manner of the gathering.

NOTE:

Information obtained during the course of the above investigation will be made the subject of
an Information Report (CPD-11.461), with pertinent attachments to the First Deputy Superintendent. Audio/visual and photographic recordings will not be made pursuant to a public
gathering investigation without the approval of the First Deputy Superintendent. However, the officer in charge of a public gathering may direct that audio/visual and photographic equipment be
at the scene of a public gathering to be used only in the event criminal conduct occurs.

bo

Prior to conducting a public gathering investigation (except as

set forth in Item V-F-2-a) or a dignitary protection investigation,

a member will prepare and submit a To-From-Subject report to

the First Deputy Superintendent, through his district/unit

commander of exempt rank, requesting permission to conduct

the investigation.

Co Prior to conducting a regulatory investigation with a significant
focus on First Amendment information, a member will prepare and submit a. To-From-Subject report to the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, through his
district/unit commander of exempt rank requesting permission to conduct the investigation.

Requests by members to conduct a public gathering, dignitary protection or regulatory investigation will be reviewed by the district/unit commander of exempt rank and he wilt either disapprove or approve the investigation.

(1) If disapproved, the requesting member will refrain from conducting the investigation into First Amendment
conduct.

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Page 20

(2) If approved, the requesting member will be authorized to prepare a Request For Authorization For First
Amendment Investigation form and return the completed form to his district/unit commander of exempt rank.

NOTE:

the requesting member will not initiate an investigation unless authorization is received from the First Deputy
Superintendent or the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, as appropriate.

Criminal, Regulatory, Public Gathering and Dignitary Protection Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct.

An investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct will be terminated when its written authorization expires or earlier when:

the standard of "reasonabfe suspicion of crime" is no longer met, or,

(2) the purpose of the investigation has been achieved, or,

(3) the event to which it related has taken place or been cancelled.
When in doubt as to the proper course of action to take retative to First Amendment conduct, members will seek the advice of their district/unit commander of exempt rank.
Members shall not be deterred from conducting investigations of, or taking enforcement action against, criminal activity.
The complaint register procedures as prescribed in the directive = entitled "Complaint Disciplinary Procedures" will be followed when an
allegation is made against a member concerning violation of First Amendment Rights or the provisions of the Judgment Orders.
IV. CASE REPORT PROCEDURES

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Page 21

During the conduct of a criminal, public gathering, dignitary protection or regulatory investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct, members will attempt to report First Amendment considerations (other than incidental references) on separate Supplementary Reports to facilitate ultimate purging of First Amendment information from case files.
District/unit commanders of exempt rank responsible for purging First Amendment information will ensure that no initial case or Supplementary Reports or other reports containing First Amendment information (other than incidental references) are distributed through normal records processing channels. These reports will be kept isolated to facilitate purging. When the case is closed, suspended, or terminated and has an RD number assigned, the district/unit commander of exempt rank will ensure the preparation of a Supplementary Report indicating that First Amendment information has been purged from the case file and forwarded to the First Deputy Superintendent, or the Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Investigative Services, as appropriate. He will attach the Authorization for First Amendment Investigation form(s) to his unit file. He will then submit the Supplementary Report through normal reporting channels for inclusion in the Records Division case file.
LeRoy Martin Superintendent of Police
87-018 FGP (FRC)

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 22

G.O. 88-17
NoTE!

Chicago Police Department

TITLE: ISSUE DATE: EFFECTIVE DATE: DISTRIBUTION: RESCINDS:

FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS 8 September 1988 9 September 1988 C GENERAL ORDER 82-10

VII. JUDGMENT ORDERS CONCERNING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN GENERAL (74 C 3268 AND 75 C 3295)
I. PERMANENT INJUNCTION
The City of Chicago, the City defendants, their officers, employees and agents, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Judgment, are hereby permanently enjoined as follows:
1. SUMMARY OF THE SCOPE OF THIS JUDGMENT
1.1 The principal provisions of this Judgment apply only to investigative activity (as defined in 1.2) that is directed toward First Amendment conduct (as defined in 1.3 - 1.5).
1.1.1 This Judgment does not apply to investigative activity that is not directed toward First Amendment conduct or that merely includes incidental references to such conduct. It is the expectation of the parties, for example, that the great majority of police activity (e.g., investigation of property crimes, personal violence, narcotics and gambling, as well as routine patrol and on-view enforcement action) will not be affected by this Judgment.
1.1.2 This Judgment prohibits any investigation of First Amendment
G,O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

conduct in the absence of one of the valid governmental purposes specified herein (e.g., criminal investigation) and also prohibits investigation or disruption of a person because of the person’s First
Amendment conduct. It is the expectation of the parties, for example, that systematic investigation and record keeping about political and
social action organizations unrelated to criminal conduct is prohibited by this Judgment.

1.1.3 This Judgment permits, but regulates, investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct in the course of performing a valid governmental function specified herein. The regulatory provisions of the Judgment are intended to permit functions such as
criminal investigations (including investigations of criminal activity in
furtherance of political goals) to be conducted effectively while controlling and limiting their impact on First Amendment conduct. The regulatory provisions generally require that investigative activity
that is directed toward First Amendment conduct have a valid purpose, a reasonable factual basis and supervisory authorization; that the impact on First Amendment conduct be minimized; and that
the retention and dissemination of First Amendment information be strictly limited.

1.1.4 This Judgment acknowledges the propriety of criminal intelligence investigations as a law enforcement technique, including the collection, analysis and dissemination of information about systematic
criminal conduct. This Judgment applies to such investigations only when they are directed toward First Amendment conduct.

1.1.5 This Judgment does not address or affect the use of covert police investigative techniques, such as informants, except when such techniques are directed toward First Amendment conduct.

1.2 Investigative activity means THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ElY
ANY MEANS, INCLUDING ITS ACQUISITION FROM ANOTHER AGENCY OR FROM ANOTHER UNIT WITHIN THE SAME AGENCY, OR THE RECORDING, FILING, RETENTION, INDEXING, OR DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.

1.3 Investigative activity is directed toward First Amendment conduct when it does or foreseeably will (other than by incidental reference):

1.3.1 INCLUDE THE COLLECTION OR HANDLING OF INFORMATION ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT;

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 2

1.3.2 HAVE AS A SUBJECT OR TARGET A PERSON WHO IS ACTIVELY AND SUBSTANTIALLY ENGAGED IN FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT, WHERE THE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATES TO THAT CONDUCT; or

1.3.3 INTERFERE WITH FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT.

1.4 Investigative activity is not directed toward First Amendment conduct merely because it includes relevant incidental references to First Amendment
conduct. An incidental reference is AN OCCASIONAL OR ISOLATED REFERENCE to First Amendment conduct WHERE:

1.4.1 THE CONDUCT IS NOT ITSELF A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE iN OR FOCUS OF AN INVESTIGATION; and

1.4.2 THE REFERENCE IS RELEVANT TO THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY.

Examples of incidental references include information that a community organization was a burglary victim, information that a person reasonably suspected of narcotics crimes might be found at a certain church or political
organization, or a name and address index maintained by a police or other city official of persons dealt with in the course of overt community relations activity or a file of correspondence with such persons concerning such
activity.

1.5 First Amendment conduct means CONDUCT PROTECTED BY THE RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY, PETITION AND RELIGION, PETITION AND RELIGION, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS:

1.5.1 THE RIGHT TO HOLD IDEAS OR BELIEFS CONCERNING PUBLIC OR SOCIAL POLICY, OR POLITICAL, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, PHILOSOPHICAL OR RELIGIOUS MATTERS;

1.5.2 THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE OR RECEIVE SUCH IDEAS OR BELIEFS, PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, ORALLY, IN WRITING OR BY SYMBOLIC MEANS;

1.5.3 THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE AND ASSEMBLE PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY WITH OTHER PERSONS CONCERNING IDEAS OR
BELIEFS ABOUT PUBLIC OR SOCIAL POLICY, OR POLITICAL,

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EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, PHILOSOPHICAL OR RELIGIOUS MATTERS (BUT NOT A RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE OR ASSEMBLE FOR PURPOSES UNRELATED TO THE RIGHT TO HOLD AND EXPRESS SUCH IDEAS OR BELIEFS);

1.5.4 THE RIGHT TO ADVOCATE, FOR PURPOSES RELATED TO SUCH IDEAS OR BELIEFS, "THE USE OF FORCE OR OF LAW
VIOLATION, EXCEPT WHERE SUCH ADVOCACY tS DIRECTED TO INCITING OR PRODUCING IMMINENT LAWLESS CONDUCT AND IS LIKELY TO INCITE OR PRODUCE SUCH ACTION," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); with respect to the
above, it is the duty of the Chicago Police Department, when it learns of an instance of such advocacy of the use of force or of law violation,
to make prudent and reasonable inquiry to determine whether it is an exercise of the expression of ideas only or whether it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless conduct and is likely to incite
or produce such action; this inquiry shall be conducted in accordance
with §3.2.5;

1.5.5 THE RIGHT TO ADVOCATE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT;

1.5.6 THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES; and,

1.5.7 THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEEKING AND GIVING LEGAL ADVICE AS WELL AS ADVANCING LITIGATION.

1.6 First Amendment information means INFORMATION ABOUT A PERSON’S FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT.

2. PROHIBITIONS THAT APPLY TO ALL AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO

No agency or agent of the City of Chicago shall:

2.1 investigate or prosecute a person, solely because of the person’s First Amendment conduct, or selectively for political, religious, or personal reasons (except as permitted by law in the discipline of public employees);

2.2 disrupt, interfere with or harass any person because of the person’s First Amendment conduct;

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2.3 gather any First Amendment information by intrusive methods except pursuant to Part 3.6 of this Order, or by iliega~ methods, or receive or maintain information so gathered by others;

2.4 authorize, assist or encourage any person to violate this Order, or to commit an act that would violate this Order if committed by a City agent; or

2.5 conduct any investigation, or maintain any file or file system, directed toward First Amendment conduct that the Police Department may not conduct or maintain under the provisions of Part 3 of this Judgment.

3. POLICE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS

Police Department employees and agents may engage in investigative activity directed toward First Amendment conduct ONLY in a criminal, dignitary protection,
public gathering, or regulatory investigation that is conducted in compliance with Part 3 of this Judgment.

3.1 Basis Procedures for Investigations. In every criminal, dignitary protection, public gathering or regulatory investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct:

3.1.1 First Amendment information shall not be gathered nor become part of any investigative file unless it is so necessary to and inseparable from the purpose of the investigation that its gathering and retention
cannot be avoided. First Amendment information shall not be gathered which violates the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.

3.1.2 Minimization procedures shall be employed with respect to First Amendment conduct. Minimization means:

3.1.2.1

TO TAKE EVERY REASONABLE PRECAUTION TO
AVOID GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT, OR INTERFERING WITH, FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT, AND WHEN IT CANNOT BE AVOIDED, TO FOLLOW A CONSCIOUS COURSE OF CONDUCT THAT REDUCES, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, THE IMPACT ON FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT.

3.1.2.2

TO USE THE LEAST INTRUSIVE METHODS OF EFFECTIVELY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT.

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3.1.2.3

For exampfe, unless unavoidably necessary to the
investigation of a reasonably suspected crime, no information shall be gathered about a political group to which a criminal suspect belongs or about other members of the group or about other persons attending
political meetings where the suspect is present, including their identities, statements and photographs.

3.1.3 Intrusive Methods. No First Amendment information shall be gathered by intrusive methods, except in compliance with Part 3.6 of this Judgment.

3.1.4 Authorization. The investigation shall not be initiated unless authorized in writing by the Superintendent of Police, or by a member of his executive staff [i.e., Deputy Superintendents or Executive Assistant to the Superintendent] designated by him in the following manner:

3.1.4.1

The written authorization shall specify in detail the factual basis for the investigation; the apparent criminal
offense or other specific reason for the investigation; the person(s) to be investigated, if known; the investigative methods to be used; minimization measures to be employed; and the duration of
investigation ( [not to exceed 30 days] ).

3.1.4.2

The investigation shall not be continued unless the executive reviews and reauthorizes it in the same manner at intervals of not more than [30 days].

3.1.5 Termination. The investigation shall be terminated when its written authorization expires or earlier when:

3.1.5.1

the standard under which it was initiated (e.g., reasonable suspicion of crime) is no longer met; or

3.1.5.2

its purpose has been achieved or the event to which it related (e.g., a public gathering) has taken place.

3.1.6 Security of all First Amendment information shall be strictly maintained. Security of information means that THE UNIT
COLLECTING THE INFORMATION MAKES OR PERMITS NO DISSEMINATION OF THE iNFORMATION WHATSOEVER except:

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3.1.6.1

to a Chicago police officer conducting a criminal investigation in compliance with this Judgment;

3.1.6.2

to a state or federal prosecutor who requests the information for a criminal prosecution;

3.1.6.3

in response to a subpoena;

3.1.6.4

to another governmental law enforcement agency upon its signed written request certifying that the information
is needed in a criminal investigation based upon reasonable suspicion of crime, and only if such agency agrees to make no further dissemination of the
information except in a criminal prosecution and to destroy or return it when no longer needed; or

3.1.6.5

to the subject of the information when required by legislation or when permitted by departmental policy.

For each dissemination, complete documentation shall be maintained, including the recipient, date, reason, and a copy of the information disseminated.

3.1.7 Purging. Upon completion or termination of an investigation, all
information gathered shall be reviewed, and any First Amendment information (other than incidental references) shall be purged unless there exists reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and some nexus is established showing that the criminal activity is being sheltered
under the guise of exercising First Amendment rights.

3.1.7.1

Purging of information means TO REMOVE IT FROM
ALL FILES OR DOCUMENTS AND PLACE IT IN A
SEALED FILE. No one shall have access to such sealed files except for the purposes of auditing and enforcing compliance with this Judgment; such access shall be limited to persons specifically authorized by the Superintendent of Police, designated representatives of the Chicago Police Board, and persons acting under judicial authority.

3.1.7.2

On an [annual] basis, information in sealed files shall
be transferred to a sealed retention file under the personal control of an executive designated by the

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Superintendent and there retained for [ten years] and then destroyed. The destruction may be delayed if the information is relevant to pending litigation. If the information is relevant to anticipated litigation either party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief.

3.2 Criminal Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct. Any criminal investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct must comply with Part 3.1 and also with the following:

3.2.1 tt shall be conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal conduct that has occurred, is occurring or
is about to occur.

3.2.2 It shall not be conducted unless there is reasonable suspicion* based on specific and articufable facts that the subject has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

*REASONABLE SUSPICION: THE BELIEF OF A
REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, BASED ON SPECIFIC AND ARTiCULABLE FACTS, THAT INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHETHER "PROBABLE CAUSE" EXISTS TO JUSTIFY AN ARREST, A WARRANT OR OTHER APPROPRIATE
POLICE ACTION. "REASONABLE SUSPICION" LESS THAN THE "PROBABLE CAUSE" REQUIRED FOR AN ARREST OR A WARRANT, BUT IS AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD RATHER THAN A SUBJECTIVE "GOOD FAITH" BELIEF.

3.2.3 No First Amendment information other than incidental references shall become part of any investigative file unless some nexus is established showing that criminal conduct is
being sheltered under the guise of exercising First Amendment rights.

3.2.4 An investigation may be initiated without the executive authorization required by Section 3.1.4, but only if it does not
continue more than [24 hours] without the review and written approval of the [section commander or equivalent ] nor more
than [72 hours] without the executive authorization. A report

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shall be submitted to the executive detailing the basis, purpose and methods of the initial investigation and any particulars in
which it is, or has been, directed toward First Amendment conduct. If the executive does not authorize an investigation in accordance with Section 3.1.4, the report shall be purged.

3.2.5 when the police learn of the advocacy of the use of unlawful force or violence in furtherance of political, religious or other First Amendment ideas, the police may conduct a brief preliminary inquiry as follows:

3.2.5.1

The sole purpose of the inquiry shall be to determine whether the advocacy is an exercise of the expression of ideas only, or whether the
advocacy is both .... directed to inciting or
producing imminent violent conduct, and likely to incite or produce such action.

3.2.5.2

The inquiry shall fotiow the same procedures as
set out in §3.2.4: [section commander or equivalent] approval within [24 hours]; and
termination and purging unless the executive authorizes a full investigation based on reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred,
is occurring or is about to occur.

3.2.5.3

In making the inquiry whether there is a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, the inquiry shall
focus on whether there are facts indicating that the person is currently engaged in conduct preparing for the imminent use of force or violence. Ideological rhetoric is relevant but cannot be the sole basis for a full investigation
or for repeated preliminary inquiries. A full investigation shall not be authorized of a person
or group which only advocates the use of force without currently engaging’ in actions that make
violence a credible threat.

3.3 Dignitary Protection Investigations. Any dignitary protection investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct must
comply with Part 3.1, and also with the following:

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3.3.1 It shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ensuring the physical safety of a visiting public official or other dignitary. It shall commence only after police learn of an anticipated visit,
and shall cease upon the visitor’s departure or upon notice that the visit wilt not occur.

3.3.2 A dignitary protection investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct shall not be conducted unless the appropriate police executive certifies in writing that there is a
reasonable suspicion that the subject(s) of the investigation poses a threat to the physical safety of the dignitary. The certification shall detail the specific and articulable facts upon
which the reasonable suspicion is based.

3.3.3 All dignitary protection investigations shall be supervised by one police unit designated by the Superintendent. Information gathered shall be kept by that unit in dignitary protection files separate from all other police investigative files.

3.3.4 Security of First Amendment information shall be maintained, except that information needed to ensure the dignitary’s
physical safety may be disseminated to the dignitary and to other law enforcement personnel assigned to protect the dignitary.

3.3.5 If the dignitary protection investigation uncovers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the information concerning that activity may be transferred to an appropriate police unit for a criminal investigation. If the criminal investigation is directed
toward First Amendment conduct, it shall be conducted in accordance with Part 3.2.

3.3.6 Nothing in this Part 3 restricts the on-view enforcement activities of plain clothes officers in connection with dignitary protection.

3.4 Public Gathering Investigations. Any public gathering investigation must comply with Part 3.1, and also with the following:

3.4.1 Definition. Public gathering means:

3.4.1.1

ANY GATHERING OF PERSONS IN A PUBLIC PLACE, OR IN A PLACE TO WHICH THE

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PUBLIC HAS REASONABLE ACCESS, FOR WHICH A PERMIT OR NOTICE TO POLICE OR OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IS
REQUIRED BY LEGISLATION; OR,

3.4.1.2

ANY MARCH, DEMONSTRATION, OR RALLY
IN A PUBLIC PLACE, OR IN A PLACE TO WHICH THE PUBLIC HAS REASONABLE ACCESS, THAT IS REASONABLY LIKELY TO SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT TRAFFIC OR PUBLIC HEALTH OR SAFETY.

3.4.2 A public gathering investigation shall be conducted solely for the purposes of preventing substantial interference with traffic in the area contiguous to the public gathering, ensuring
adequate pubtic services to protect public health and safety in
accordance with applicable penal and regulatory statutes and ordinances, and protecting the exercise of constitutional rights.

3.4.3 All public gathering investigations shall be supervised by one police unit designated by the Superintendent. Information gathered shall be kept in public gathering files separate from all other police investigative files.

3.4.4 A public gathering investigation may be initiated without the written authorization required by Part 3.1.4, but without such authorization may only:

3.4.4.1

gather published announcements of future public gatherings and permit applications in the form specified by City ordinance; and

3.4.4.2

communicate overtly with the organizers of the
public gathering concerning the number of persons expected to participate and similar information about the time, place, and manner of
the gathering that is necessary for the purposes stated in Part 3.4.2 above.

3.4.5 No further information may be gathered unless there is reasonable suspicion that the public gathering is likely to
produce an imminent and substantial breach of the peace or riot or that the information on a permit application is false, and

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unless the further investigation is authorized pursuant to 3.1.4. The authorization shall certify the specific and articulable facts upon which the reasonable suspicion is based. The investigation shall not gather information about the identity of individual participants in the pubiic gathering or about the content of the program unless there is compelling necessity to do so.

3.4.6 Security of all First Amendment information shall be maintained. However, it may be disseminated on a need-to-
know basis to governmental agencies whose services will likely be needed or directly affected by the public gathering, provided they agree to make no further dissemination and to
destroy the information within [30 days] after the gathering
OCCURS.

3.4.7 If the public gathering investigation uncovers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the information concerning that activity may be transferred to an appropriate police unit for a
criminal investigation. If the criminal investigation is directed
toward First Amendment conduct, it shall be conducted in accordance with Part 3.2.

3.4.8 Police presence at a public gathering shall be no greater in nature and extent than reasonably necessary to enforce the criminal laws, to protect the exercise of constitutional rights, to
prevent substantial interference with traffic and to protect the public health and safety in accordance with applicable penal and regulatory statutes and ordinances. The police presence
shall be planned and organized to avoid discouraging persons from lawfully participating in the public gathering. The police
presence may include plain clothes officers who are present solely for on-view enforcement purposes, as observers and not as participants except in the carrying out of authorized intrusive investigations under Part 3.6.

3.5 Regulatory Investigations. Any regulatory investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct shall comply with §§3.1.1 through 3.1.3, and with the following:

3.5.1 It shall be conducted sotely for the purpose of fulfilling regulatory responsibilities as set forth by statute or ordinance
(such as processing license applications or conducting traffic

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accident and missing person investigations).

3.5.2 The requirements of §§3.1.4 through 3.1.7 do not apply where First Amendment information incidental to the regulatory investigation, such as information that a church vehicle involved in a traffic accident. However, these requirements must be complied with whenever First Amendment information is a significant focus of a regulatory investigation. In this event, security of First Amendment information shatl be maintained.

3.4 Intrusive Methods

3.6.1 Definitions. Intrusive method means ANY of the following

3.6.1.1

AN INFORMANT, which means AN AGENT WHO COLLECTS INFORMATION WITHOUT DISCLOSING TO THE SOURCE HIS FUNCTION AS AN AGENT;

3.6.1.2

AN INFILTRATOR, which means AN INFORMANT WHO IS, OR POSES OR ACTS AS, A MEMBER OR PARTICIPANT IN A GROUP OR ORGANIZATION WITHOUT
DISCLOSING TO THE GROUP OR ORGANIZATION AND TO ITS MEMBERS HIS
FUNCTION AS AN AGENT;

3.6.1.3

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR EAVESDROPPING OF ANY KIND;

3.6.1.4

A MAIL COVER (ACQUIRING INFORMATION FROM THE OUTSIDE SURFACE OF MAIL);

3.6.1.5

A NONCONSENSUAL ENTRY OR SEIZURE
which means AN AGENT’S ENTRY ONTO A PERSON’S PREMISES, OR ACQUISITfON OF
A PERSON’S PRIVATE PAPERS, MAIL OR EFFECTS OR THEIR CONTENTS, WITHOUT A
JUDICIAL WARRANT. OR THE PERSON’S PRIOR EXPRESS CONSENT GIVEN WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGENT’S FUNCTION AS AN AGENT. Private papers include all

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papers that a person has not made available to the general public.

3.6.2 A police investigation may use an intrusive method that is directed toward First Amendment conduct only under the following conditions:

3.6.2.1

Other methods are insufficient to effectively obtain information necessary to the investigation;

3.6.2.2

The police executive’s written authorization under {}3.1.4 specifically permits the use of the intrusive method and explains why it is justified;

3.6.2.3

The details of the method’s use, including all First Amendment information gathered, are fully documented for review;

3.6.2.4

Judicial warrants are obtained for any
nonconsensual seizure of First Amendment information, including such seizures by informants and infiltrators;

3.6.2.5

The use of electronic surveillance or mail cover is in compliance with applicable state and federa! statutes and regulations; and

3.6.2.6

Every informant or infiltrator is instructed as to the binding effect of the prohibitions of Part 2
and the duties under §§3.t.1 and 3.1.2 to avoid or minimize any impact on First Amendment conduct.

3.6.3 Infiltration of a group or organization engaged in First Amendment conduct is permitted only if it meets the requirements of Part 3.6.2, and in addition:

3.6.3.1

there exists reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur,
and additional information from a reliable inside source is necessary to prevent serious injury to the public or to assure identification and

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apprehension of the persons engaging in criminal conduct.

3.6.3.2

the Superintendent of Police personally approves the infiltration in writing, by a certification that particularly describes the group
to be infiltrated; the crime which has been, is being or is about to be committed by the group or its members; the reasons why it could not be
prosecuted or prevented without the infiltration; and the minimization procedures to be used by
the infiltrator;

3.6.3.3

the scope and conduct of the infiltration is limited to the specific crime that is suspected, and no
First Amendment information (other than incidental references) is gathered; and

3.6.3.4

the infiltration does not continue unless recertified by the Superintendent in the same
manner as originally, at intervals of not more than [30 days].

3.6.4 While it is the intention of the parties that the requirements of this Part 3.6 be enforceable both as an injunction and through departmental discipline, it is not the intention of the parties that
Part 3.6 create any right to the exclusion or suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecution.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS JUDGMENT

4.1 The Police Department shall adopt and maintain Department-wide administrative regulations implementing this Judgment (after notice to and consultation with counsel for the plaintiffs). The Department may modify such regulations from time to time, but only after
reasonable notice to, and consultation with, the Chicago Police Board and counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights. All such regulations shall be consistent with this Judgment. Violations of such regulations,
including by supervisory personnel, shall subject the violator to departmental discipline.

4.2 All current employees of the Police Department, and all future

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employees at the time of their hiring, shall be served with a copy of this Judgment. Training with respect to the requirements of this Judgment and the implementing regulations shall be provided:

4.2.1 to new recruits as part of the Police Academy curriculum; and

4.2.2 on a continuing, in-service basis to personnel of the Bureaus of Investigative and Community Services, all district tactical
units, and all other units likely to engage in investigative activity covered by this Judgment.

4.3 All employees of the City of Chicago shall be given notice of this Judgment once every five (5) years, in the form of the summary ... Appendix D (see Item Ill-General Information), through enclosure in pay envelopes or a similar method. New employees, at the time of their employment, shall be furnished with a copy of the same notice.

4.4 The Superintendent of Pofice shall annually conduct a departmental audit of the implementation of and compliance with this Judgment and the regulations adopted under {}4.1, and submit the audit report to the Mayor, the Police Board, and this Court for filing as a public record.
The annual report shall include the number of authorizations issued under Parts 3.2 - 3.5, respectively; the number of infiltration approvals given under {}3.6.3; a statistical analysis of the purposes for which authorizations and approvals were granted, the types of unlawful activities involved, the number of arrests and prosecutions based on
such investigations, and other meaningful information; a summary of any internal disciplinary complaints concerning compliance with this
Judgment or the related Departmental regulations and the findings made and actions taken on such complaints; and a description of other actions taken to implement this Judgment. The Superintendent’s report shall not give information that would identify criminal informants or current sensitive criminal investigations, designated, by the Superintendent, that might be compromised by
disclosure.

AUDITING AND MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS JUDGMENT

5.1 The Chicago Police Board shall have the following functions:

5.1.1 To audit, monitor and evaluate compliance with this Judgment, and with administrative regulations adopted pursuant to the

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Judgment, and to report to the Mayor, the Superintendent of Police and the public concerning its findings.

5.1.2 To consult with and make recommendations to the Mayor, the Superintendent, and other appropriate executive branch officials, from time to time, concerning the implementation and functioning of this Judgment, both to effectuate the purposes of the Judgment and to simplify its administration.

5.2 The Board shall conduct audits and inquiries appropriate to its responsibilities concerning this Judgment. In particular, it shall cause management audits to be conducted, by a national independent public accounting firm, of the implementation of and compliance with this Judgment and the regulations adopted under {}4.1. The audit report shall include a description and evaluation of such implementation and compliance, as well as a discussion of any substantial violations observed or detected and any recommendations for improvement of performance that the auditors deem appropriate. Such audits shall be conduct in 1982, 1984, and thereafter at intervals of not more than five years. The audit report shall be made public, along with any report or recommendations which the Board, the Superintendent or the Mayor wishes to issue. The Board may make and may publish such other reports and recommendations as it deems necessary.
5.3 The Board and the management auditors, for the purposes of §5.1 and 5.2, shall have access to all relevant data in the possession of the city, including without limitation complete documentation of all investigations, except as provided in this paragraph. The auditors shall not have access to information specifically identifying criminal informants, or to current sensitive criminal investigations designated by the Superintendent that might be compromised by disclosure to the auditors (but all documentation of such investigations shalf be retained under {}3.1.7 to be audited after termination of the investigation). The auditors shall not disclose any information to anyone but the Board, or to the Superintendent of Police upon his request.
5.4 The Board shall have the following duties and limitations concerning the disclosure of information obtained from City agencies:

5.4.1 the Board shall not disclose, in any manner, details that specifically identify any investigations, except as provided in

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§5.4.3. However, it may disclose general policy and performance data concerning the implementation of and compliance with this Judgment and the regulations, including paraphrased examples of investigations.
5.4.2 The Board shall not disclose, in any manner, information that would reveal the identity of a criminal informant, compromise an ongoing criminal investigation, or constitute an invasion of a persons’ privacy.
5.4.3 If the Board learns of any substantial violation of this Judgment, is shall promptly notify the Superintendent of Police (or the Office of Municipal investigations if the matter involves personnel of a City agency other than the Police Department.) The official notified shall report back to the Board within 30 days what investigation was made and what corrective action was taken.
6. INDEX TO DEFINITIONS
6.I Definitions appear at appropriate points in the text (and have been capitalized to facilitate understanding of the detailed provisions of the Judgment.)
6.2 Additional Definitions.
6.2.1 Agent means ANY OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO; OR ANY PERSON PAID, CONTROLLED, OR DIRECTED BY AN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF THE CITY; OR ANY PERSON WHO IS REQUESTED BY AN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF THE CITY TO ENGAGE IN INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY.
6.2.2 Person means ANY INDIVIDUAL, GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS, OR ORGANIZATION.
6.2.3 Record means ANY PHYSICAL OR ELECTRONIC METHOD OF RETAINING INFORMATION.
II. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION AND ANCILLARY MATTERS
A. Retention of Jurisdiction by the Court.

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Jurisdiction is retained by the Court for the following purposes.
To enable the parties to this Order to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Order, for the enforcement of compliance with the provisions contained herein, and for the punishment of the violation of any such provisions. Application to enforce such provisions or to impose punishment for any such violation may be presented to this Court by any person affected by the conduct complained of. Prior written notice of all such applications and other matters in this action shall be given to counsef for the named parties hereto. Except where emergency relief is sought, seven days written notice shall be given.
For the trial and adjudication of the damage claims against the City defendants.
The parties recognize that modification of certain procedural provisions of Part III (time periods and specification of authorizing police personnel) may be warranted in the future, on the basis of experience with implementation and administration of this Judgment. Those provisions are set off in brackets in the text of Part Ill.
Accordingly, after five years from the entry of this Order, the City of Chicago may undertake such modification in the following manner:
The City shall serve the proposed modification of the bracketed provision(s) upon counsel for the named plaintiffs, together with a detailed statement of the reasons why the modification is warranted.
bo The parties shall consult for a period of 60 days to determine if the modification can be made by agreement.
If agreement is not reached the City may file its proposed modification and statement with the Court, and if no objection is filed by the named plaintiffs the modifications shall take effect 30 days after filing.

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If the named plaintiffs file written objection to the proposed modification within 30 days, the Court shall determine whether the modification should be
approved. The Court should approve the modification unless it does not meet the following standards:

I) it facilitates police administration;

it is calculated to effectuate and not to thwart the basis purpose of this Judgment;

it is consistent with the substantive and the remaining procedural provisions of this Judgment; and,

iv) it maintains or increases the effectiveness of the
procedure it replaces, provided that an increase
of a time period or a decrease of command level for an authorization shall not per se be
considered less effective.

go Final Disposition of Claims for Injunctive Relief Against City Defendants.

This Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree constitutes the final disposition of the claims for injunctive relief against the city defendants. The Court expressly finds and determines, pursuant to
Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay and directs that this Judgment be entered forthwith.

C, Ancillary Matters.

The Chicago Police Department intelligence files held in the document depository at Police Headquarters pursuant to this Court’s orders of October t4, 1976, and May 4, 1977, shall be retained in the depository under the terms of those Orders until
the final disposition of the damage claims against the city defendants and of all claims against the federal defendants,
and their status thereafter shall be determined by future order of Court.

2. Plaintiffs will petition the Court to determine whether and in

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what amount fees and costs will be awarded with respect to the matters resolved by this Agreed Order, Judgment and
Decree. Defendants will file objections. The parties have made no agreement with respect to these questions.

END OF TEXT OF JUDGMENT ORDERS (74 C 3268 75 C 3295)

VIII. JUDGMENT ORDER CONCERNING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS (76 C 1982)

The plaintiff having filed its complaint, and the plaintiff and the defendants having consented to the entry of this agreed order, judgment, and decree as to such parties without trial or adjudication of any factual allegation in the complaint or any issue of fact with respect to the alleged commission by said defendants of any unconstitutional, unlawful, or wrongful act, and without this Judgment constituting evidence of or an admission by any defendant with respect to any issue of fact herein or the commission of any unconstitutional, unlawful, or wrongful act;

Plaintiff in its complaint alleges in part:

surveillance at meetings of the attorneys and other individuals
employed by, or working under the auspices of, the plaintiff, and the compilation of reports listing all persons in attendance at these meetings and detailing the statements made during these meetings;

use of secret informers and undercover agents to attend and
report on private meetings and discussions during which attorneys employed by or working under auspices of the plaintiffs were engaged in private and privileged discussions
related to pending and potential litigations;

maintenance by the Chicago Police Department of files reporting on the activities of the plaintiff and its employees, agents, and cooperating attorneys, including reports on meetings attended by officers, agents or employees of plaintiff, and further including detailed summaries of confidential or privileged conversations relating to the planning, investigation, prosecution of potential and pending lawsuits in state and federal courts;

4. disseminating and making available, both to other law

G.O. 88.17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 21

enforcement agencies and to individuals not involved with the functions of law enforcement, the information collected and maintained in the files of the Chicago Police Department relating to and reporting on the activities of the plaintiff;

all done with the improper purpose of interfering with the attorney-client relationship and with the intent of obtaining confidential and privileged information relating to pending and
potential lawsuits;

Defendants deny the above five allegations of plaintiff’s complaint. The parties however agree that the public interest requires the observance of and respect for the attorney-client
privileges;

NOW, THEREFORE, this court having jurisdiction of the
parties to this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree and the subject matter of these actions under sections 1331 and 1343 (3) of Titfe 28 of the United States Code; and upon consent of
the parties and approval of the court, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follow:

The City of Chicago, the individual defendants, their offic.ers, employees, and agents, and all persons in active concert or participation with them [hereinafter referred to as defendants], are hereby permanently enjoined as follows:

I. PROHIBITED ACTIVITY.

Defendants shafl not conduct surveillance at, gather information or compile reports on, or maintain files or records regarding, meetings or communications, if--

as to the meeting or communication, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the attorney-client privilege will attach; and

2. the meeting or communication--

a. is between--
1) attorneys discussing the giving of legal advice or
assistance in anticipated or pending litigation; or

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 22

2) an attorney and one seeking legal advice or assistance in anticipated or pending litigation; or

3) an attorney or attorneys and one or others engaged in assisting the attorney in the rendering of such advice or
the giving of such assistance; and

b. involves--

1) the giving or seeking of legal advice; or

2) anticipated or pending litigation.

This prohibition shall not apply:

1. if the attorney, attorneys, or their assistants are, by such meetings or communications, participating in criminal activity; or

2. to a person who is a police officer, if such a person--

a. is know to the other participants in the meeting or conversation as a police officer; or

both--

1) is attending the meeting or participating in the conversation as a private individual; and

2) does not in his or her capacity as a police officer report
on the meeting or conversation to any other defendant,
except as allowed in lB.1.

II. ENFORCEMENT.

A. Institutional.

1. Training:

Training with respect to the requirements of this Judgment shall be provided to new recruits as part of the Police Academy curriculum;
and on a continuing, in-service basis to personnel of the Bureaus of Investigative, and Community Services, all district tactical units, and
all other units likely to engage in investigative activity.

G.O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 23

2. Notice to defendants.
All present employees of the Chicago Police Department, and, in the future, all new employees, before resuming or assuming their official duties, shall be given a copy of this Order. In addition, the summary attached hereto as,Exhibit A" shall be given, through enclosure in pay envelopes or by a similar method, to each Chicago Police Department employee no less frequently than once every five years.
3. Internal reporting.
At any point at which any defendant knows or, by the use of reasonable diligence, should know that any defendant is engaged in activity prohibited by Part I hereof, the defendant with such knowledge shall h’ave the duty to report such activity in writing to his or her immediate superior. Such superior shall have the duty to forward a copy of this written report, along with the superior’s report, if any, to the office of the Superintendent of Police.
Judicial.
1. Continuing jurisdiction.
This court shall retain jurisdiction of this cause for the enforcement of this Order and to punish violations thereof.
a. Persons who may apply for sanctions.
Application to enforce this Order or to punish violations thereof may be presented to this court by any person affected by the conduct complained of.
b. Notice.
Prior written notice of all such applications and other matters in this action shall be given to counsel for the named parties hereto. Except where emergency relief is sought, seven days notice shall be given.
2. Private action for damages.
Any person affected by the conduct complained of, independent of a

G,O. 88-17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 24

request to this court for sanctions, may bring an action for damages if such cause of action apart from this order exists in state or federal court.
III. ANCILLARY MATTERS.
Ao This judgment represents the agreed disposition of all substantive claims by plaintiff against defendants.
go The court expressly finds, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), that there is not just reason for delay, and directs that this judgment be entered forthwith.
C. Attorney’s Fees.
Plaintiff will petition the court to determine whether and in what amount fees and costs will be awarded with respect to the matters resolved by this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree. Defendants witl file objections. The parties have made no agreement with respect to these questions.
END OF TEXT OF JUDGMENT ORDER (76 C 1982)

G,O. 88~17 FIRST AMENDMENT INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE DATE: 8 September 1988

Page 25

G.O. 92-1-2

Chicago Police Department

TITLE:

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

ISSUE DATE:

3 July 1992

EFFECTIVE DATE:

4 July 1992

DISTRIBUTION:

C

RESCINDS:

I. PURPOSE

This addendum:

A. cites the First Amendment to the constitution of the United States.

Bo

provides examples of specific rights of citizens protected by the First

Amendment.

states Department policy relative to citizens expressing First Amendment conduct.

D. states Department policy relative to First Amendment investigations.

I1. FIRST AMENDMENT

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONDUCT

A. General Information

First Amendment conduct means conduct protected by the rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America to freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition and religion, including but not limited to the following rights:

G.O. 92-1-2 THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE DATE: 3 July 1992

Page 1

the right to hold ideas or beliefs concerning public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious matters;

the right to communicate or receive such ideas or beliefs, publicly or privately, orally, in writing or by symbolic means;

the right to associate and assemble publicly or privately with other persons concerning ideas or beliefs about public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious
matters (but not a right to associate or assemble for purposes unrelated to the right to hold and express such ideas or beliefs);

the right to advocate, for purposes related to such ideas or beliefs, "the use of force or of law violation, except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless conduct and is likely to incite or produce such action."

5. the right to advocate alternative system of government;

the right to petition the government or governmental officials for redress of grievances;

o the right to associate for the purpose of seeking and giving legal advice as well as advancing litigation.

First Amendment Rights Upon Public Way or Public Place

1. Any person on the public way or in any public place has a right to:

ao express his views through any form of communication, including distribution or sale of newspapers, magazines, handbills or other printed matter; and

b. solicit financial contributions for political or religious causes.

Persons expressing political or religious views on a public way or in
any public place are required to comply with all laws and ordinances prohibiting physical obstruction of the movement of persons and
vehicles on the public way or place, damage to public or private property, and any and all other applicable laws or ordinances.

3. The sections of the Municipal Code of Chicago (MCC) delineated

G.O. 92-1-2 THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE DATE: 3 July 1992

Page 2

betow do not apply to persons who distribute or sell material containing political or religious ideas 0n a public way or other public place:

al rescinded.!’ [Item .lll-B-3,(a)(Peddlers): resem~i~ :~ Jun "[996, FacSimile Message’~96:002.31’l]~~

b. Chapter 4-152 (Itinerant Merchants).

Co The geographical restrictions on peddling in Section 10-8-520 (Street Vendors) and Chapter 10-36 (Parks, Playgrounds and Airports).

do The prohibition against the distribution of handbills, dodgers and other material as contained in Section 10-8-270 (Distribution of Advertising Matter).

The prohibition against the placing of handbills, dodgers or other material on the windshield of automobiles or the distribution of those item to occupants of automobiles as contained in Section 10-8-310 (Placing Advertising Matter in Automobiles).
The prohibition against the solicitation of financial contributions on the public way or other public place as contained in Chapter 10-8 (Use of the Public Ways and Places) or Section 8-4-010-f (Begging or Soliciting Funds on the Public Ways).

C. First Amendment investigations

1. Policy

It is the policy of the Chicago Police Department not to conduct
investigations directed toward the exercise of First Amendment rights unless a valid governmental purpose is served. Police Department employees and agents may engage in investigative activity directed toward First Amendment conduct ONLY in a criminaf, dignitary protection, public gathering, or regulatory investigation. Investigations which might impact on First Amendment rights will be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Judgment Orders contained in the current Department directive entitled "First Amendment Investigations".

G.O. 92-1-2 THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE DATE: 3 July 1992

Page 3

Appendix D to Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree (74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295)
"Legal Notice to all empfoyees of the City of Chicago: By the consent of the City of Chicago, the United States District Court has entered an Order dated April 8, 1982, protecting the right of individuals and groups to speak out, to petition the government, and to associate in the furtherance of economic, political, and religious objectives as provided by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. No investigation, collection of information, or other action may be taken against individuals or groups exercising such rights except under exceptional circumstances for legitimate governmental reasons. The Court order provides that any investigation concerning activities protected by the First Amendment must follow specified procedures. Most of these matters are properly handled only by the Department of Police, but you are advised that the Court Order binds all City employees and agents so far as investigation or other action taken against individuals or groups exercising such rights."
3. Appendix A to Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree (76 C 1982)
"Under court order, city employees are forbidden to interfere with or investigate relations between attorneys and their clients. Violation of this order may subject you to discipline, citation for contempt of court, and a lawsuit for damage. If you suspect that a Department employee has violated this order, notify your supervisor immediately."

91-071 RMM(AJB)

Matt L. Rodriguez Superintendent of Police

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Issue Date:

14 June 1996

Message Number:

96-002311

To:

Alf Department Members

G.O. 92-1-2 THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE DATE: 3 July 1992

Page4

~:ro m: Message:

Matt L. Rodriguez Superintendent of Police

Reference: General Order 92-1, Addendum 2

Municipal Code of Chicago - Chapter 4-244-030 and 140 (Formerly 4-232)
The City of Chicago, Department of Law, has informed this Department that they have rendered a legal opinion relative to persons peddling merchandise (including items containing political or religious idea) in certain designated geographical districts within the City.

Members are advised that individuals selling merchandise in the areas prohibited by ordinance are peddling in violation of the ordinance and may be arrested without regard to the message that may be contained on the merchandise they are distributing or selling, individuals may not circumvent the peddling ordinance by claiming their illegal actions are protected by the first amendment.
Members are advised to warn persons in violation of the ordinance, prior to taking enforcement action.

General Order 92-1, Add 2 entitled "First Amendment" is revised as follows:

Item I]l-B-3(a) (Peddlers)is rescinded.

Matt L. Rodriguez Superintendent of Police

G.O. 92-1-2 THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE DATE: 3 July 1992

Page 5

JS 44
(Rev 12t96)

~=/
f ~/ ...~_#-~, " ’ / ¯ CIVIL COVER SHEET
~

~ JS-44 civil cover ~et and ~e i~o~ati~¢on~in~ herein ne~er repla~ nor suppteme~ ~e filing and se~i~ of ptesdings ~ o~er

b~ law. exce~ as provid~l~ ~u~: This to~, approved by ~e Judicial ~nference of ~e United S~tes in Septem~r 1974.

~ ~e Cle~ of ~u~ f~ p~~a~ ~ civil d~ket sh~t. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERS

’r THE FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

JU;6a

DEFENDA

~,

JEFFREY C. WILSON

(b) COUNW O~ RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF o COOK

..,,

(EXCEFT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)
MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GERALDINE SCAT BROWN

~ORGE A. ROSEBRO~

~

~~ C. ~O~ V-’,~.

~C~ ~ER

~’~~

COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIR~-7" LISTED DEFENDANT C- 3 ;’. COOK

(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASE-".~.ONLY) -;:" 3>. NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES. USEr’,de LOC,.~ON OF THE
TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED,

(C) A’r:r0RNEYS (FIRM NAME, AD~2~I,F_S~, AND TELEPHONE NUMB~CR)

A’t’I’ORNEYS (F I~WOWN)

JOSEPH T. FITZSIMMONS ..

ATTORNE~ AT LAW

5908 N. NEV-~ ST.

C~I-CAGO IL

773.631.8022

CORPORATI-I’ON COIHqSEL - CITY OYCHTCAC_.O 30 R. LASPJ..LE ST CHTChGO TL 60602

11. BASIS OF JURISDICTION p~CE~’X’,NONE SOXONLV~

D 1 U.S. Government P~nt~
D 2 U.S, Govemment Defendam

~ Federal Question (U.S. Govemmen! Not a Party)
n 4 Dtverst~ (Indicate Citizenship of Parties
in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (~.E~-X" ,N ONE

(For Diversity Cases Only)

AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDANI~

Citizen of This State 2~F ~F

incorporated or Princil::~ Place of E~usiness ~n ThLs ~’o’o’o’o’o’o’o’o’o~ate

Citizen of Another State

incorporated and Pdnclpat Pla¢~ of Business In Another State

Citizen or Subject of a D s O 3 Foreign Na~n Foreign Country

IV. ORIGIN
~/~ Odginal ~, Proceeding

~ 2 Removed from State Court

(PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

~ ~ Remanded from AppeIlate Court

[] ~ Reinstated or Reopened

Transferred from
D s another district (specify)

[2 ~ Multidistfict Litigal~on

Appeal to Dislrk
Judge from [] 1, Magistrate
Judgment

V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

CONTRACT

TORTS

PER~OKAL INJURY ""

PERSONAL INJURY

FORFEITURE/PENALTYI BANKRUPTCY

OTHER STATUTES
[] ~ Stme Reappo~onme~t [] 410 Attlltfust

PROPERTY RI,G.HTS
[] $~o Copy~g~s C] s~o Patent t-I $40 Trad~

O 4~ ~~ ~t~ O ~ ~t~n 0 470 ~ I~ ~
O 010 ~ ~

T7 15S ContraCt prodt~,. Liability
REAL PR .O_P. ERTY.
[] 210 Lat~ Con0em~atlon [] ~0 Forec~um [] ~0 R~t Lea~ & Electme~t
17 245 To~ Product 17 ~ NI 0~l~r Real propelty

710 F~lr Labor Act
0 720 LaborJMgrnt. Relalion$
O 7~ Labor/l~gmt. Reponlng & Of’~ctosure Act
I=1 740 Hallway Labor
rl 7~00the~ Labor Litigation
n 791 EmpL Pet. In. Secu rlty Act

S~IAL SECURI~. O eSs 0 O~ B~ck Lu~ (023) ~ 863 ~WC~ (4~(g)) ~ ~ ~IDT~ ~1
FEDERAL T~ ,~.UITg
070 Taxes (U.S. o~ Defen<l~nt)
17t IP~ - Third 26

0 0@I ~t~uhuml A~S

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (c~~TNHcE~.cur,~sa, uC~M=Ls~DA~T¢L~qO’ENU~N.=D~~rRr~WsuHNIO~HOY~OrwU,~) EFIU~DWR~BRIEF~A~ME~’~E. ...... This is an action seek~ng~enforcement of the permanent injunctions issued in cases 74C 3268,

75 C 3295 and 76 C 1982 all~g violations of the First Amendment rights of the Plaintiff.

VII. REQUESTED IN

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT

O UNDER F.R.C.R 23

CHECK YES onty if demanded in ~n, ~t~l JURY DEMAND; o YES

V I I i, This case

~l~s not a raffling ofa prcviousiy dismissed action. [] ’sa r¢filing of c~.~.~ prcvi0us’Y dismissal by ,udg¢ .

/

UNITED STATES DISTR1CT COURT

Inthe Matter of

~NORTHERN D1STRICT OF ILLINOIS

jUDGE ’"

JEFFREY C. WILSON~ P1aint~ff~

DEC I 9 ~001

MAGISTRATE JUDGE ,-,,-~--,~,.~nlNE SOAT BROWN

~o
De~euda~ts.

Casc~umber:

L,~ ~’

~

958 , r-

....

r.vl ~

~PE~CES ~ HE--BY FILED BY T~ ~ERSIG~D AS A~O~Y(S) FOR: "~4 }~’

Plaintiff ’ JEF~ C. ~LSON

~

~

~^m Jps ph T. Fi~zSimmons

~

c/o: Chicago Police Lieutenants A~soc.

ADDreSS
lll West WAshington. St, cn~^~icago, IL 60602

773. 631. 8022I 77q. ~t1_ 707Z.

$ltZSXnmms@aoi.com

(c)

(~)

CrFYmTATEtZI~
MEMBER OF T~IAL TRIAL A~’rORNEY?
LOCAL COUNSEL?

IDL~:NTIFICA’ftON NIJ’MB~ {SE~ ITE~I ¯ ON RI~’E-t~E) DF.~I(~A~ED AS LOCAL COUN’Si=.I.?

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1994)

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment Distinguished by Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of Addison, Illinois, N.D.Ill., August 17, 2001
1994 WL 86690 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268. | March 15, 1994.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“§ 1988”) against defendant City of Chicago (“City”). Specifically, Alliance and ACLU plaintiffs seek compensation for counsel’s time spent monitoring the City’s compliance with the Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree (“Judgment”) entered in this case on April 21, 1981. This motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Joan Lefkow, and she issued her Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) granting the motion with a few exceptions. For the reasons explained below, the court adopts Magistrate Judge Lefkow’s report and recommendation as modified.
Background
This attorney’s fee dispute arises out of two civil rights class action suits brought by a coalition of individuals, churches, political groups, and civil liberties organizations against numerous federal and local governmental defendants including the City.1 Plaintiffs claimed that defendants unlawfully conducted surveillance and gathered information about plaintiffs’ lawful political activities, in violation of their constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and federal privacy statutes. After being litigated for several years, both cases were settled.2
The consent decree with the City is memorialized in the Judgment. The Judgment established numerous

procedures governing Police Department investigations, and also provided that the Police Board shall “audit, monitor and evaluate compliance with this Judgment, and with administrative regulations adopted pursuant to the Judgment, and ... report to the Mayor, the Superintendent of Police and the public concerning its findings.” (Judgment, Art. I., § 5.1.1). To that end, the Police Board was required to hire an independent national public accounting firm to conduct management audits of the City’s implementation of and compliance with the Judgment. (Judgment, Art. I., § 5.2). These audits were to be conducted in 1982, 1984 and every five years thereafter. (Id.)
In 1982 and 1984, an accounting firm conducted audits and made recommendations. The parties responded to the recommendations, resolved as many disputed recommendations as they could, and submitted the remaining disputed issues to the court for resolution. The City voluntarily compensated plaintiffs’ counsel for the time devoted to this review process. However, sometime after the 1984 audit, the Police Board determined that it could no longer carry out its monitoring and oversight responsibilities. After counsel refused to seek relief from the court, the Police Board wrote the court of its “incapacity to be responsible monitors of compliance with the terms of the Judgment Order,” and asked to be relieved of this responsibility. (March 24, 1988 Letter, ACLU Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for Attorney’s Fees, Ex. 4).
The court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Lefkow to assist the parties in resolving this monitoring problem. The parties then met several times privately, and with the Magistrate Judge, to try to formulate a plan that would comply with the Judgment. Also, from April 1988 through the first few months of 1989, plaintiffs conducted discovery to investigate the issues which the Police Board raised in its March 24, 1988 letter. Although plaintiffs concluded that the Police Board’s default in monitoring and compliance was inexcusable, they researched appointing a master as a replacement for the Police Board.
*2 In December 1988, plaintiffs informed the City of their findings and stated that (1) the parties could agree to an independent, jointly selected monitor to replace the Police Board, or (2) plaintiffs would petition the court for appointment of a master. After conferring with the Mayor, the City chose the former option. However, plaintiffs continued contingency preparations to petition for a master, and researched the enforceability of the Judgment and the requirements for appointment of a master.
In April 1989, the parties agreed upon a Compliance Agreement (“Agreement”) which provided for an independent monitor, jointly appointed by the Mayor and
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1994)

plaintiffs, to take over the Police Board’s responsibilities under the Judgment. On April 18, 1988, the Agreement was approved by the Magistrate Judge and executed by Mayor Sawyer and Corporation Counsel, but still awaiting approval by the City Council.
However, in April 1990, the new City administration concluded that the Agreement was void because it had not been approved by the City Council, and found that the cost of funding a monitor was not justified. The City also represented that the new Police Board “could and would devote the necessary resources to monitoring compliance with the 1981 Consent Judgment.” Yet, after four years of default, plaintiffs were reluctant to revert back to Police Board monitoring. Nevertheless, plaintiffs decided to negotiate further with the City and reserve court action while the Police Board conducted the new audit.
The City allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to be extensively involved in the formulation of the new audit process. In addition, the scope of the audit was expanded because plaintiffs persuaded the City that its “primary focus” interpretation of the Judgment’s constraints on investigative activity was wrong.3
At issue here is plaintiffs’ petition for attorney fees for counsel in the Alliance and the ACLU cases for their (1) post-judgment monitoring of the Judgment, (2) research regarding the enforceability of the consent decree and appointment of a master, and (3) time spent negotiating the Agreement. In general, the City argues that fees should not be awarded to plaintiffs for their voluntary decision to “monitor” compliance with the Judgment.
Discussion
In general, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, permits the court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in actions brought under § 1983 and other civil rights statutes. In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 559 (1986), sanctions the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee under § 1988 for certain post-judgment monitoring of consent decrees. See also Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir.1980); Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979).
*3 In Delaware Valley, the plaintiff citizen’s organization and the United States filed suit in 1977 to compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”) to implement a vehicle emission inspection and maintenance (“I/M”) program as required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. In 1978, the court

approved a consent decree which provided, inter alia, (1) the Commonwealth would establish an I/M program for ten counties by August 1980, and (2) the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) would propose legislation instituting a franchise I/M system with private garages, or promulgate regulations permitting the state to certify private garages to perform the inspections if the legislature rejected the franchise system. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 549.
The legislature refused to enact a franchise system, and PennDOT did not publish the required regulations until Delaware Valley moved for contempt. After the regulations were published, Delaware Valley continued to monitor the Commonwealth’s performance under the consent decree, and submitted comments on the regulations. Id. at 550. The implementation of the I/M program did not go smoothly. First, implementation was delayed several times by agreement. Later, the court found that the Commonwealth violated the consent decree. Id. Then, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted legislation prohibiting the expenditure of state funds for the I/M program. Finally, a new implementation schedule was approved and the contempt vacated, after the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed legislation in May 1983, authorizing the Commonwealth to proceed with the I/M program. Id. at 551.
Delaware Valley then sought attorney’s fees and costs under the Clean Air Act for all of the work it performed after issuance of the consent decree. This fee petition included the time spent monitoring the Commonwealth’s compliance under the consent decree, and spent in hearings before the Environmental Protection Agency.4 Significantly, the Court affirmed the district court’s award of these attorney’s fees, emphasizing that numerous courts had permitted monitoring fees under § 1988. Id. at 559. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the fees were appropriately awarded because in that case, “measures necessary to enforce the remedy ordered by the District Court [could not] be divorced from the matters upon which Delaware Valley prevailed in securing the consent decree.” Id. However, the Court emphasized that such work is compensable as a reasonable attorney’s fee only if it is “ ‘useful and of a type ordinarily necessary’ to secure the final result obtained from the litigation.” Id. at 561 (quoting Webb v. Board of Ed. of Dyer County, 471 U.S. 234 (1985)).
In the instant case, Magistrate Judge Lefkow applied the “reasonable and necessary” standard articulated in Delaware Valley in her evaluation of plaintiffs’ petition. After reviewing the relevant law, plaintiffs’ briefs and the City’s objections, the Magistrate Judge recommended that
*4 the petition of Futterman & Howard and the petition of Alliance
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1994)

plaintiffs on behalf of Richard A. Gutman for attorney’s fees be granted in all respects with the following exceptions: (1) the amount of time compensated for research concerning enforceability of the consent decree should be reduced by 25 percent; and (2) the billing rate for Mr. Gutman and Mr. Howard should be set at $225 per hour for work performed in 1991 and $250 per hour for work performed in 1992. The objections of the defendant City of Chicago should in all other respects be overruled.
(R & R at 24–25).
The City agrees that the time counsel spent investigating and responding to the Police Board’s March 24, 1988 letter is compensable. The City also acknowledges that, to the extent that counsel’s efforts in negotiating the Agreement were reasonable and necessary to obtaining certain relief such as the resolution of the “primary focus” language, this time is also compensable.5 However, the City has numerous objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.6 The court will discuss each in turn.
The City’s Objections
In general, the City contends that (1) plaintiffs’ monitoring of the Judgment is not compensable because that duty is assigned to the Police Board with limited exceptions, (2) the compensable time devoted to negotiating the Compliance Agreement should be significantly decreased due to the limited success achieved, and (3) the time spent researching the enforceability of the Judgment is not compensable.

the majority of plaintiffs’ services were compensable because they were “reasonable and necessary to secure enforcement of the Judgment.” (R & R at 19). Thus, this objection is meritless.
The City also makes much of the fact that the Judgment requires the Police Board to “audit, monitor, and evaluate compliance.” In addition, the City emphasizes that plaintiffs need only be consulted if the Police Department changes its regulations implementing the terms of the consent decree. (Objections at 3). This objection is rejected.
Although the Judgment charges the Police Board with monitoring duties, this fact alone, does not preclude a fee award for plaintiffs’ reasonable monitoring activities. In fact, fees have been awarded in several cases where the consent decree imposes monitoring duties on another entity. See e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850, 858 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that the consent decree’s creation of other monitoring entities did not preclude an award of attorney’s fees because counsel’s services were not duplicative); Brewster v. Dukakis, 786 F.2d 16, 18–19 (1st Cir.1986) (although the consent decree created a defendant-funded monitor, fees were allowed because the reduced fees seemed reasonable, counsel’s activities were not duplicative, and defendants had no authority supporting their position that fees were unavailable).
*5 This court is certainly mindful of the fact that plaintiffs should not be reimbursed for general oversight and monitoring of the Judgment, especially when the decree provides for a monitor. However, as the Magistrate Judge noted, there is no need to place a time limit on plaintiffs’ oversight because the court will deny fees if plaintiffs are doing unnecessary work. Moreover, the court will not award fees where plaintiffs’ efforts just duplicate the work of the Police Board. Of course, the City cannot argue that plaintiff’s work was duplicative here because the very reason that plaintiffs became actively engaged in such monitoring was because the Police Board informed them that it could not perform its auditing and monitoring duties.9

A. Fees for Monitoring the City’s Compliance As an initial matter, the court rejects the City’s contention that “[t]he Magistrate Judge simply assumed that describing activity as ‘monitoring,’ without more, justified the award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.’ ” (Objections at 2).7 Magistrate Judge Lefkow never held that monitoring “in and of itself” is compensable. Instead, she made clear that the governing standard for the award of post-judgment monitoring is the reasonable and necessary standard discussed in Delaware Valley.8 (R & R at 14, 17). The Magistrate Judge then evaluated the disputed work in light of this standard. (R & R at 17, 19–21). Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge concluded that

B. Downward Adjustment Based on Limited Success The City also suggests that under Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566, 574 (1992), the total amount of attorney’s fees awarded must be decreased because of the limited degree of success achieved. Specifically, defendant points out that (1) there was never a judicial finding that the Police Board actually failed to comply, and (2) the Compliance Agreement, which would have modified the Judgment, was never adopted. (Objections Memo at 4, 11–13).10
The court does not agree that the principles articulated in Farrar should be applied to the instant case. In Farrar,
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1994)

the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a plaintiff who wins only nominal damages is a “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 1988. The Court answered “yes,” but noted that a plaintiff’s overall success is the most critical factor in determining the “reasonableness” of the fee award. Id. at 574. In that case, the plaintiffs requested declaratory relief and $17 million in damages against several defendants for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The jury determined that one defendant violated the plaintiffs’ civil rights, but only awarded them one dollar. Thus, the Court addressed the reasonableness of fees under circumstances where the plaintiffs had technically “prevailed,” but only achieved a very limited degree of success on the merits. Such is not the case here.
In this case, plaintiffs are undoubtably “prevailing parties” because the Judgment provisions make it clear that they obtained significant relief on the merits. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760–61 (1987) (noting that relief on the merits can be obtained through settlement or a consent decree). Moreover, such relief was causally linked to their lawsuit, and defendants did not act wholly gratuitously.11 See Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264, 266–68 (7th Cir.1981) (discussing requirements for “prevailing party” status in cases which settle or result in a consent decree). Furthermore, the City has failed to provide, and this court’s research has not uncovered, authority indicating that Farrar is applicable under these circumstances.
In contrast, Delaware Valley clearly holds that reasonable fees are compensable in this case if the services were “useful” and “ordinarily necessary” to ensure compliance or protect and enforce rights awarded to the prevailing party under the consent decree. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 561. There is simply no requirement that a prevailing party prove that all of the work performed was “successful.” Rather, it is generally appropriate to award fees in these cases if the disputed work was “reasonably related to the claims upon which plaintiffs were definitely successful.” Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346, 349 (5th Cir.1980). See also Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 739 (1st Cir.1984) (allowing attorney’s fees associated with unsuccessful claims because they were related to the successful claims).
*6 In Miller, the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the notion that an attorney’s fee award for post-judgment services must be evaluated in terms of the outcome of each issue standing alone. Miller, 628 F.2d at 348. Likewise, in Garrity, the First Circuit affirmed an award of monitoring fees despite the defendant’s argument that such work “was not related to any matter on which plaintiffs ‘may be said to have prevailed.’ ” Garrity, 752 F.2d at 738. In rejecting defendant’s claim, the First Circuit explained that the district court “was entitled to believe that relief would occur more speedily and reliably

if the monitoring referred to occurred, and that [the monitoring] was a necessary aspect of plaintiffs’ ‘prevailing’ in this case.” Id. at 738–39. Similarly, in Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1233 (7th Cir.1980), the Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of post-summary judgment attorney’s fees because “plaintiffs’ diligent efforts to secure compliance with the district court’s order were effectively catalytic to the state’s eventual submission of an acceptable ... plan.”
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that the § 1988 prevailing party requirement bars attorney’s fees for monitoring activities. In Keith, 833 F.2d at 855, individuals living in the path of a proposed freeway and several civil rights groups brought suit against the Federal Highway Administration and various government officials. After seven years of study and negotiation, the parties reached a settlement permitting the freeway project to proceed. Id. at 852. As implementation began, the parties agreed on an amendment to the decree and various supplemental attorney’s fee petitions. Id. at 853. After construction of the freeway and relocation of displaced residents began, the plaintiffs filed another supplemental attorney’s fee petition. The majority of the petition was granted, and the defendants appealed. Id.
On appeal, the defendants argued, among other things, that the plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties” in matters for which supplemental fees were awarded, and that a finding of contempt or obstruction was a prerequisite to an award of fees. Id. at 855. The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. In so doing, the court reasoned that plaintiffs had been “productively” involved in several activities, and that the “prevailing party” requirement must be interpreted “in a practical, not formal, manner.” Id. at 857. In addition, the court determined that “a finding of contempt or obstruction of implementation is not a prerequisite to an award of attorney fees for reasonable post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree.” Id.
Based upon the law and the facts of this case, the court rejects defendant’s argument that the fee award must be decreased because of the “limited success” achieved. Rather, such fees are proper if they were reasonable and necessary. Here, the monitoring fees are proper because: (1) plaintiffs needed to take action after the Police Board admitted that it was not fulfilling its obligations, (2) the work on finding an alternative monitor was a reasonable and necessary response to the Police Board’s admission, (3) the negotiations leading to the Compliance Agreement were a productive and reasonable way to enforce the rights guaranteed under the Judgment, and (4) plaintiffs’ participation in the new Police Board’s 1984 audit resulted in the City rejecting its incorrect “primary focus” analysis. (See R & R at 17–19).
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1994)

C. Fees for Research on the Enforceability of the Judgment *7 The City argues that it should not have to compensate plaintiffs for their decision to research the enforceability of consent decrees. In particular, the City emphasizes that ACLU counsel spent over 178 hours researching the enforceability of consent decrees based upon dicta in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 877 (7th Cir.1987) which questioned whether the Consent Decree was binding on future City administrations.12 In short, the City contends that this research was not reasonable and necessary to secure the Judgment.

the fact that ACLU plaintiffs seek to charge the City with 178 hours of time devoted to researching the enforceability of the Judgment. Since the City did not question the enforceability of the Judgment, it would appear that only the most cursory research was necessary to look into this issue and determine whether plaintiffs should proceed with their plan to obtain a court-appointed monitor. Moreover, the court does not believe that the City should be charged for any research expended on this issue before the Police Board’s letter was received. Therefore, the court imposes a 50% reduction on this portion of the petition. The remainder of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is adopted.

Magistrate Judge Lefkow determined that it was necessary for plaintiffs to research the Judgment’s enforceability after they received the Police Board’s letter in March 1988. However, she questioned whether it was reasonable for an associate to devote 70 hours to this question in August 1987. The Magistrate Judge also correctly noted that, without looking at the work product, it was impossible to determine whether certain work was duplicative or misdirected. (R & R at 20). Consequently, the Magistrate Judge resolved her doubts by reducing this portion of the fee petition by 25 percent. (Id.)
This court has scrutinized plaintiffs’ fee petition, and agrees with Magistrate Judge Lefkow’s reasoned recommendations. However, the court is also troubled by

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted as amended. Pursuant to Alliance counsel’s December 15, 1993, attorney’s fee calculation, Counsel Richard Gutman, is awarded $39,718.82. Counsel for ACLU should prepare a draft order setting out the fees payable pursuant to this court’s opinion by March 25, 1994.13 Such order will be entered forthwith.
	  

Footnotes

1

Alliance to End Repression, et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 74 C 3268, was filed as a class action on November 13, 1974.

American Civil Liberties Union, et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 75 C 3295, was filed as a class action on October 3, 1975.

2

Former Judge Susan Getzendanner approved settlement agreements with the federal defendants (excluding the Department of

Defense defendants) on August 11, 1981. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182, 186 (N.D.Ill.1981).

On April 21, 1981, she approved plaintiffs’ later settlement agreements with the City defendants and the Department of Defense

defendants. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.Supp. 537, 544 (N.D.Ill.1982).

3

In the 1984 audit report, the auditors and the Police Department interpreted the Judgment so that the Judgment’s constraints on the

City’s investigative activity would apply only if the “primary focus” of the investigative activity was on non-criminal First

Amendment conduct. (See R & R at 8–10). Plaintiffs eventually convinced the City that this interpretation was unduly narrow.

4

“[T]he Commonwealth unsuccessfully sought [the EPA’s] approval of an I/M program covering a smaller geographical area.” Id.

at 553.

5

The court also notes that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the “time spent litigating their claim for fees.” Bond, 630 F.2d

at 1235.

6

Richard Gutman, counsel in Alliance, objects to the hourly rate recommended by the Magistrate Judge. Counsel contends that he

should be paid an hourly rate of $250 for 1991, $275 for 1992, and that he should not be awarded the same $225 hourly rate for

1990 and 1991. After considering the Magistrate Judge’s report, the National Law Journal’s surveys of attorneys’ fees and

plaintiffs’ objection, the court finds that Magistrate Judge Lefkow’s recommendation for $225 per hour for 1991, and $250 per

hour for 1992, is entirely appropriate. Counsel’s objection is rejected.

7

City of Chicago’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Objections).

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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1994)

8

In fact, the Magistrate Judge expressly noted that future fees for monitoring should be denied if the court concludes that plaintiffs

are doing unnecessary work. (R & R at 18).

9

The court also notes that monitoring activities may be necessary in a case such as this because the consent decree “imposed

extensive ongoing and future obligations” on the City. (ACLU Response at 3). See also In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 832 F.2d

422 (7th Cir.1987). In Burlington Northern, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant should not have to pay for post-judgment

monitoring work because the consent decree just required it to create a it to create a $10,000,000 settlement fund and “drop out of

the picture.” Id. at 425–27. In denying fees under these circumstances, the court distinguished Brewster v. Dukakis, 786 F.2d 16

(1st Cir.1986), where the consent decree “bestowed various responsibilities on the parties.” Id. at 127 (quoting Brewster, 786 F.2d

at 17).

10

Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge Concerning

Attorneys’ Fees (“Objections Memo”).

11

For a detailed discussion of plaintiffs’ settlement with the City, see Former Judge Getzendanner’s opinion approving the settlement

in Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 548.

12

In Alliance, the court held that there was no “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees because there was no justiciable

controversy. Id. at 878.

13

ACLU counsel’s December 17, 1993 attorney’s fee calculation should be amended to clearly reflect this court’s order concerning

the 50% reduction in fees relating to the enforcement research, and the appropriate interest calculation.

	  

6

 
 Case: 1:74-cv-03268 Document #: 3476 Filed: 09/30/08 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:965

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION )

OF ILLINOIS et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

Case No. 74C 3268

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

) ) Judge Joan B. Gottschall ) ) ) )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The defendants City of Chicago et al., (collectively the “City”) have moved to

dissolve the modified consent decree (the “MCD”) entered into between the City and

plaintiffs the American Civil Liberties Union (the “ACLU”), American Friends Service

Committee (“AFSC”), and various other public interest groups and individuals

(collectively the “ACLU plaintiffs”). For the reasons set forth below, the City’s motion

to dissolve the modified consent decree is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1974 and 1975, two class actions, later consolidated into the instant case, were

filed by the plaintiffs against the City of Chicago. The suits alleged that the Chicago

Police Department (“CPD”) Intelligence Division “Red Squad’s” covert investigations of

the plaintiffs’ allegedly subversive activities1 had violated the class members’ First

1 As the Seventh Circuit related:
From the 1920s to the 1970s the intelligence division of the Chicago Police Department contained a unit nicknamed the “Red Squad” which spied on, infiltrated, and harassed a wide variety of political groups that included but were not limited to left- and right-wing extremists. Most of the groups, including most of the politically extreme groups, were not only lawful, and engaged in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, but also harmless. The motives of the Red Squad were largely political and ideological, though they included a legitimate concern with genuine threats to public order. Demonstrations against U.S. participation in the Vietnam War that climaxed in the disruption of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968, race

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Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 1981, the parties agreed to a consent decree imposing detailed restrictions on the CPD’s investigative activities; the decree was
approved by the court in 1982. In 2001, the Seventh Circuit held that the consent decree should be modified to
remove “a dizzying array of highly specific restrictions on investigations of potential terrorists and other politically or ideologically motivated criminals,” but leaving intact the core provisions forbidding “investigations intended to interfere with or deter the free expression that the First Amendment protects.” Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 800 (7th Cir. 2001). Upon remand from the Seventh Circuit, the MCD was entered by Judge Williams on March 23, 2001.
Specifically, the MCD: (1) enjoined the City from “investigating, prosecuting, disrupting, interfering with, or harassing any person for the purpose of punishing or retaliating against that person for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, or for the purpose of preventing them from engaging in such conduct”; (2) required all current and future employees to be served with a copy of the MCD; (3) required the Superintendent of Police to conduct a departmental audit of the CPD’s compliance with the MCD during the ensuing five years, the results of which were to be communicated to the Mayor, the Police Board, and the court; (4) directed the Police Board to review the
riots in Chicago and other major cities in the same period, and the contemporaneous criminal activities of the Black Panthers, the Weathermen, and Puerto Rican separatists, all against a backdrop of acute racial and Cold War tensions, political assassinations (notably of President Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr.), and communist subversion, fueled a widespread belief in the need for zealous police activity directed against political militants. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 2001)
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Superintendent’s audit annually and report to the Mayor, the Superintendent of Police, and the public concerning its findings; and (5) also required an audit of the City’s compliance with the terms of the MCD to be performed by a national independent public accounting firm within five years of the MCD’s entry. The MCD also added the threats of civil and criminal contempt to the usual sanctions for infringing civil rights and noncompliance with the decree. Id. Presently before the court is the City’s motion to dissolve the MCD.
II. ANALYSIS “Decrees that vest federal district judges with supervisory powers over organs of state or local government are extraordinary, and the goal should be to wind them up as fast as possible rather than to perpetuate them indefinitely….” U.S. v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1989). In deciding whether to dissolve a consent decree, a district court must take into account the specific terms of the decree when deciding whether to terminate it. Dyer v. City of Chicago, No. 83 C 5376, 1997 WL 308843, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1997) (citing Heath v. DeCourcy, 992 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1993)). Specifically, when looking to dissolve a consent decree, the court should look to: (1) any specific terms providing for continued supervision and jurisdiction over the consent decree; (2) the consent decree’s underlying goals; (3) whether there has been compliance with prior court orders; (4) whether defendants made a good faith effort to comply; (5) the length of time the consent decree has been in effect; and (6) the continuing efficacy of the consent decree’s enforcement. Dyer, 1997 WL 308843, at *5 (citing Heath, 992 F.2d at 632). As an initial matter, the City has stipulated that an order dissolving the consent decree will not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the petitions for enforcement of the MCD that are pending before the court. Alternatively, the City represents to the court that it will not object to an order of dissolution that includes a specific reservation of jurisdiction to adjudicate pending petitions to enforce the MCD. The court finds that
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even if it were to dissolve the MCD, it will implicitly and explicitly retain jurisdiction to hear the pending petitions to enforce the MCD. Federal courts have inherent power to enforce an injunction via contempt proceedings, even if that injunction has ended the lawsuit. Shapo v. Engle, 463 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that when a lower court reserves its power to enforce a settlement, “a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 378-82 (1996); see also Lucille v. City of Chicago, 31 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1994). The court finds, therefore, that an order dissolving the MCD, but reserving jurisdiction to hear those pending petitions to enforce the MCD, would not deprive the ACLU plaintiffs of possible relief.
The City contends that it has fully complied with the terms of the MCD and that the court’s supervisory role should therefore be terminated. Specifically, the City quotes the “quasi-sunset” provision of the MCD, which states that “[u]pon completion of the independent audit called for in this order, and its submission to the court, the court will consider whether further modification or dissolution of this decree is warranted at that time.” Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve, Ex. A at 6. The City points to the report submitted by the accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche LLP (the “Deloitte report”), that it claims fully addresses the MCD’s requirement of an independent audit. The Deloitte report comprises a single page of conclusory statements establishing that Deloitte has “examined [the City] management’s assertion … that the City of Chicago complied with the April 24 Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree as amended by the March 2, 2001 Consent Decree….” Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dissolve Ex. B. Accompanying the Deloitte report are four pages of conclusory “management assertions” made by the
4

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City management and signed by the Superintendent of Police, the President of the Chicago Police Board, and Corporation Counsel for the City. The Deloitte report states that the examination “was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the City of Chicago’s compliance with those requirements and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.” Id. The Deloitte report concludes that, with the exception of one instance of material noncompliance: “[T]he City of Chicago complied with the aforementioned requirements [of the MCD] during the period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2005, in all material respects.” Id. The material noncompliance in question related to the City’s failure to provide a copy of the MCD to existing or new non-CPD employees. The City argues that because the independent audit, as well as the annual CPD internal audits, have been satisfactorily completed and submitted to the court, the time for dissolution is ripe.
Furthermore, the City claims that because the unconstitutional activities that were the subject of the MCD have long since ceased, the MCD has effectively fulfilled its purpose and should be dissolved. The City points to, inter alia, People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 246 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 2001), in support of their contention that once a decree has achieved its immediate aims it should properly be dissolved. The City also argues that, for purposes of comity, district courts should promptly relinquish oversight of local governmental functions as soon as the offending
behavior ceases. The ACLU, however, contends that the City has not yet met any of the terms of
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the MCD and thus the City’s motion for dissolution is premature.2 The ACLU points to
the AFSC’s petition to enforce the MCD that is pending before the court, alleging that the
City violated the MCD by publicly disclosing that the AFSC was the subject of a 2002
police investigation, and further alleges that there was an attempt by the CPD to
intentionally destroy documents which the City was required to maintain pursuant to the
MCD. Moreover, the petition further alleges that the document destruction prevented the
adequate performance of the external audit required by the MCD. In short, the ACLU’s
petition alleges that the City attempted to cover up (via depriving auditors of necessary
documents) a cover-up (via document destruction) of an unconstitutional investigation of
the AFSC. The ACLU points to the fact that the court has previously denied the City’s
motion to dismiss the AFSC’s petition to enforce the MCD, finding that if these
allegations are proven, then a violation of the MCD occurred.
Moreover, the ACLU contests the adequacy of the Deloitte report as an
independent audit. The ACLU points to the fact that the report comprises but a single
page, backed by four pages of the City management’s assertions related to the City’s
compliance with the MCD. According to the ACLU, full discovery must be conducted with respect to the Deloitte report of the City’s compliance for the prescribed five-year period. The ACLU further contends the Deloitte report supplied to the court does not rise to the level of full disclosure of methodology and data underlying the conclusions required for the court to adequately review the MCD. The ACLU submits no authority concerning the requisite scope of the materials that are required to be submitted to the court, other than an affidavit from Kerry Miller (“Miller”), an attorney cooperating with the ACLU. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n Ex. F. Miller avers that the statement of conclusions supplied to the court does not provide any basis for an interested party to actually
2 Plaintiff Alliance to End Repression does not oppose the City’s motion to dissolve the MCD. Plaintiff AFSC has joined the ACLU’s response in opposition only to preserve its right to discovery in connection with the alleged violation of the MCD in connection with the 2002 CPD’s investigation of the AFSC. The ACLU seeks discovery in connection with Deloitte’s independent audit and in connection with the City’s motion to dismiss, which is the only discovery that the City’s motion to dissolve opposes. The City claims, therefore, that the AFSC’s concern to preserve its discovery rights is not in tension with, and does not comprise an objection to, any position taken by the City in connection with its motion to dissolve.
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evaluate the City’s assertions or Deloitte’s conclusions or methodology. Id. ¶ 6. The ACLU has no basis, at this point, to dispute the accuracy of the Deloitte report’s conclusions; rather, it seeks full discovery of Deloitte’s work papers to verify the accuracy of the audit.
Finally, the ACLU argues that the City has failed to comply with another of the basic criteria of the MCD: the requirement that all current and newly-hired City employees be issued a copy of the MCD. This failure was cited in the Deloitte report as being the sole instance of material noncompliance insofar as certain non-CPD City employees failed to receive a copy of the MCD.
With respect to the first factor of the six-factor analysis cited above, the court notes that the MCD provides that after the conditions set forth in the MCD are fulfilled, “the court will consider whether further modification or dissolution of this decree is warranted.” Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dissolve Ex. A. Thus, there is in place a provision in the MCD requiring that the court determine at this time whether the MCD should be dissolved or modified.
Second, the underlying goals of the MCD, viz., preventing the organized, systematic and protracted activities of the CPD in infiltrating, disrupting, harassing, and prosecuting various public interest and civil rights organizations, as well as prominent individuals associated with them, appear, at least from what is presently before the court, to have been largely met. As the Seventh Circuit observed some seven years ago when modifying the original consent decree to the version presently before the court:
The era in which the Red Squad flourished is history, along with the Red Squad itself. The instabilities of that era have largely disappeared. Fear of communist subversion, so strong a motivator of constitutional infringements in those days, has disappeared along with the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Legal controls over the police, legal sanctions for the infringement of constitutional rights, have multiplied. The culture that created and nourished the Red Squad has evaporated. The consent decree has done its job.
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Alliance, 237 F.3d at 801.3
That is not to say that the CPD has not occasionally conducted unlawful
investigations that may violate the First Amendment-protected rights of individuals or
organizations in Chicago; however, if these instances of unlawful activities are only
“temporally limited, … isolated, and very much [ ] situation specific” offenses, then they
do not rise to the level of systematic and organized unlawful activity that the MCD was
crafted to prevent. Id. Therefore, absent evidence of systematic and unlawful activities
infringing on the First Amendment-protected rights of the people of Chicago,
continuation of the MCD is not warranted.
It is the third factor, viz., whether there has been compliance with prior court
orders, which is problematic for the City’s motion for dissolution. Paragraph 5 of the
MCD requires, in relevant part, that:
[t]he Chicago Police Board shall also cause an audit of the City’s compliance with the terms of this decree to be performed by a national independent accounting firm within five years of the entry of the order adopting this modified Decree. The audit report shall contain a description and evaluation of any conduct believed by the auditors to constitute a probable violation of the Decree. The Police Board may require further investigation of any such possible violations. The audit report, together with any additional findings or recommendations made by the Board, the Superintendent of Police, or the Mayor shall be made public.
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dissolve Ex. A. Furthermore, the final clause of the
3 However, the court is mindful of the fact that, in a post-9/11 world, government investigations of the activities of citizens and groups have gained new purchase, with concomitant concerns for the free exercise of civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the specific activities by the CPD’s disbanded “Red Squad” that gave rise to the original consent decree and the MCD belong to the past, the needs of the people to be protected from organized and systematic surveillance of their lawful activities, as well as from illegal harassment and arrest based upon lawful political associations, remain a source of vital concern to the court and to the country in general.
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MCD prescribes that:
Upon completion of the independent audit called for in this order, and its submission to the court, the court will consider whether further modification or dissolution of this Decree is warranted at that time.
Id.
The plain language of the MCD therefore contemplates a review of the
independent audit by the court prior to modification or dissolution of the decree. The
City has failed to meet fully this requirement of the MCD of an independent audit,
submitted to the court for review. The Deloitte report, which comprises a one-page
conclusory report of its examination of the City management’s assertion that the City has complied with the MCD, is meaningless.4 It is merely the auditor’s report of what the
City managers asserted. The report provides no information concerning the methodology
employed in the “audit” (other than that the methods employed are in accordance with established accounting procedures), nor does it supply any data whatsoever; as far as the court can tell; the report merely parrots the City’s “management assertions.” Such a “review” does not comply with either the letter or the spirit of the independent audit required by the MCD, and the court cannot perform its prescribed function of reviewer of the audit without anything more than the superficial and unreviewable information submitted by the City. If a proper independent audit of the City’s compliance has been performed by Deloitte, the court requires that that audit be submitted in full to the court so that the court can perform its role as reviewer of the audit prior to considering the dissolution of the MCD.
The City appears to have largely complied with the remaining requirements of the
MCD, with the exception of its failure to provide certain non-CPD City employees with a
copy of the MCD. Although this is a material failure to comply with the terms of the
MCD, the question the court must attempt to resolve is whether such noncompliance
justifies a continuation of the MCD. Given that the unlawful activities that resulted in the
4 The court contrasts the one-page Deloitte report submitted by the City in this instance with Deloitte’s exhaustive “1990 First Amendment Compliance Audit of the City of Chicago,” submitted prior to the entry of the MCD; the latter totals 224 pages. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n Ex. H.
9

Case: 1:74-cv-03268 Document #: 3476 Filed: 09/30/08 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:974
MCD were situated entirely within the CPD, the City’s failure to comply with this requirement (only with respect to non-CPD personnel) would not, by itself, justify the continued supervision of local government functions by the court. This is particularly so given the direction by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit in the intervening years that the federal judiciary must endeavor to return the control of local governmental activities to local government at the earliest possible time compatible with achievement of the objectives of the decree that transferred that control to the federal courts. See Alliance, 237 F.3d at 800; see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378-81 (1992); Bd of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
With respect to the fourth factor, viz., whether the City has made a good faith effort to comply with the MCD, the Deloitte report submitted by the City fails to set forth sufficient information for the court to make the required determination.
With respect to the fifth factor, the consent decree, both in its original and modified forms, has had an unusually long lifespan: approximately three decades. This is an extraordinary time for a district court to exert supervisory power over a local government entity. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the time and culture of the era when the MCD was decreed are past. Id. at 800.
In summary, the court believes that the MCD is probably ripe for dissolution. However, absent submission of a complete and detailed independent audit, containing a description of the methods employed as well as the data upon which the audit’s conclusions are based, as required by the terms of the MCD, the court cannot exercise its prescribed review of the City’s compliance. Since the court cannot perform a meaningful review of the City’s compliance based upon the audit submitted in conjunction with its motion to dissolve, the City’s motion to dissolve the MCD is denied without prejudice.
10

Case: 1:74-cv-03268 Document #: 3476 Filed: 09/30/08 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:975 III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the City’s motion to dissolve the modified consent decree is denied without prejudice.
ENTER: /s/____
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL United States District Judge DATED: September 30, 2008
11

 
 Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 1 of 71
PROTO,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:74−cv−03268

Alliance To End, et al v. Rochford, et al Assigned to: Honorable Joan B. Gottschall Demand: $0 Case in other court: 08−03688 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 11/13/1974 Date Terminated: 06/04/2009 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Alliance To End Repression

represented by Edward J. Koziboski Cook County Public Defender's Office Felony Trial Division 2650 South California Avenue Chicago, IL 60608 (312) 890−3217 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Chicago Area Unitarian − Universalist Council

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Chicago Community To Defend The Bill of Rights

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Chicago Heights Unitarian Universalist Community Church

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Chicago Peace Council Clergy and Laity Concerned

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ethical Humanist Society of Chicago

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff First Unitarian Church of Chicago

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 2 of 71

TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Near North Fellowship

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Sacred Heart Church

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Socialist Workers Party

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wheaton United Methodist Church

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Young Socialist Alliance

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Young Workers Liberation League

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Richard Criley

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 3 of 71

Plaintiff Dennis J Cunningham
Plaintiff Courtney Esposito
Plaintiff Janice Gutman
Plaintiff Jeffrey H Haas
Plaintiff John Hill
Plaintiff William Hogan Reverend
Plaintiff John Kearney
Plaintiff Lisa Lawrence
Plaintiff Sidney Lens

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 4 of 71

TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jack Mendelsohn Reverend

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lucy Montgomery

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joe Petzel

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff A A Rayner, Jr

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John Rossen

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jay Schaggner

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/06/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jack Spiegel

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
G Flint Taylor, Jr on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Edward J. Koziboski (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lawrence V. Jackowiak Law Offices of Lawrence V. Jackowiak

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 5 of 71
20 North Clark Street #1700 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 795−9595 Fax: (312) 750−0632 Email: ljackowiak@jackowiaklaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant James M Rochford Superintendent of Police
Defendant Mitchell Ware Deputy Superintendent for Inspectional Services
Defendant Walter Murphy Director of the Intelligence Division
Defendant John Doe Commander of the Security Section
Defendant Richard Roe Commander of the Staff Section

represented by Mardell Nereim City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9010 Email: mnereim@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti Illinois Department of Transportation 100 W. Randolph Street Suite 6−600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312)793−2255 Email: Michael.Forti@Illinois.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 6 of 71

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Joe Grubisic

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Patrick Maurice Dailey

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Unkown Agents of the Chicago Police Department

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Marlin W Johnson

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Wilbur N Daniels

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Paul Goodrich

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Louis F Peick

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 7 of 71

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Sebastian Rivera Police Board, City of Chicago

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Richard J Daley Mayor, City of Chicago; individually and in their official capacities

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant R Bock Vaisvilas

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant William L Vick

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Terrence R Zagotta

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
John T Stibich Seargant

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 8 of 71

Leroy Privoznik

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James J Cunningham

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Donald Cowen

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Otto Kral

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Lovejoy Foster

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Peter Rivera

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Morgan organ Mitchen

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 9 of 71

Defendant Kenneth Moranz
Defendant Leason Linzy Sargeant
Defendant Ricardo Abreu
Defendant Truman Stromberg
Defendant Anthony Romano
Defendant Louis Cuddy
Defendant Mort Franklin

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 10 of 71

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Thomas Kinsella

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Peter Schurla Sargeant

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Howard Pointer

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James E Ostro

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Burton Lovely Sargeant

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Elgia C Cook Sargeant

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Samuel Abich Sargeant

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 11 of 71

Defendant Joseph Arquilla
Defendant Anthony Jablon
Defendant John O'Brien
Defendant Joseph Barnes
Defendant Martin Walsh
Defendant David Cushing
Defendant Andrew Rodriquez

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 12 of 71

Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Terrence Knox

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Thomas McDermott

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
T O'Connor Inv.543

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James Nolan

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Burian

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant William J Benes

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 13 of 71

Defendant Kenneth Carcerano
Defendant Eugene Hill
Defendant John Ritenour
Defendant Frank Baxter
Defendant George Patton
Defendant Jerroll Pope
Defendant Irwin Rock

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 14 of 71

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Earl Armstead

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Albert Jordan

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Earl Nevels

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Thomas West

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James Tobin

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Toby Burton

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Michael Fera

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 15 of 71

Defendant Milton Carson
Defendant M Sullivan Inv. 597
Defendant R Sieczkowski
Defendant Vito A Clescerti
Defendant J Desenfants
Defendant F O Bonke
Defendant Walter Biszewski

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 16 of 71

Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Eugene Dofneker

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Jesse Resendez, Jr

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant L Struck

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Hastings

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant L Boston

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Philpin

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 17 of 71

Defendant Milton Smith
Defendant Jacob Bouer
Defendant William McWhinney
Defendant Daniel Kentala
Defendant Marcus Salone
Defendant Cory Daniel Chan
Defendant Thomas Czapiewski

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 18 of 71

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Geno Addams

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Melvin C Barna

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Purtill

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Clarence Williams

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant John Volkenberg

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Michael Randy

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant David Lemarc

represented by Sharon Baldwin City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 19 of 71

Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9010 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick Walter Johnson United States Attorney's Office (NDIL) 219 South Dearborn Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353−5300 Email: patrick.johnson2@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 06/08/2005

Scott A. Frey Gorman &Caporusso 542 South Dearborn Street Suite 1060 Chicago, IL 60605 (312) 427−2313 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005

Defendant Alfred Vallejo

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant William Olson

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James Conlisk

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Robert Osmondson

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 20 of 71

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Roy Robinson

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant James Grant

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Albert J Heitman Sargeant

represented by Edward W. Feldman Miller Shakman &Beem LLP 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 263−3700 Fax: (312) 263−3270 Email: efeldman@millershakman.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Edward M. Ordonez Cozen O'Connor 333 W. Wacker Drive #1900 Chicago, IL 60606−1293 (312) 382−3100 Email: eordonez@cozen.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Harry Joshua Nelson Butler Rubin Saltarelli &Boyd LLP Three First National Plaza 70 West Madison Suite 1800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 444−9660 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth Paul Dobbs Dobbs and Hutchison 47 West Polk Street Dearborn Station Suite M−2 Chicago, IL 60605 (312) 461−9200 Fax: (312) 461−9008 Email: roghutch@prodigy.net

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 21 of 71
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Paul Anthony Tanzillo Nora &Tanzillo, LLP 10 S. LaSalle Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 650−7900 Fax: (312) 650−7910 Email: scamacho@ntllplaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William V. Johnson Johnson &Bell, Ltd. 55 East Monroe Street Suite 4100 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−0770 TERMINATED: 01/06/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY
Bruce William Melton Email: bmelton@uchicago.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Davida Kay Berk The Blake Horwitz Law Firm 20 North Clark Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 676−2100 Email: davidak1@aol.com
Ellen M. Babbitt Franczek Radelet P.C. 300 South Wacker Drive Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 986−0300 Email: emb@franczek.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Howard Patrick Morris Johnson &Bell, Ltd. 33 West Monroe Street Suite 2700 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−0770 Email: morrisp@jbltd.com TERMINATED: 11/17/2005
Imani Chiphe Federal Defender Program 55 East Monroe Street Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 621−8300 Email: imani_chiphe@fd.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 22 of 71

Defendant Emmett Ebert
Defendant Harry L Anderson Sargeant
Defendant Adele Noren

Margaret A Unger Johnson &Bell, Ltd. 55 East Monroe Street Suite 4100 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−0770 Email: ungerm@jbltd.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Lincoln Johnson Johnson &Bell, Ltd. 55 East Monroe Street Suite 4100 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−0770 TERMINATED: 01/06/1998
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roger Sanford Hutchison Hutchison Law 9031 W. 151st Street Suite 203 Orland Park, IL 60462 708 349 9333 Email: roghutch@prodigy.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas M. Staunton Miller, Shakman &Beem LLP 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 263−3700 Email: tstaunton@millershakman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 23 of 71

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
U. S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R Joseph Sher United States Department of Justice 2100 Jamieson Ave. Washington, DC 22314 703 299 3747 Email: joe.sher@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation

represented by R Joseph Sher (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Chicago City of TERMINATED: 12/21/2000

represented by Mardell Nereim (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael A. Forti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patrick F McGovern City of Chicago Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street 1040 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−6437 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Forgue City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9010 Email: tforgue@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 24 of 71

William Macy Aguiar City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9010 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant City Of Chicago

represented by Andrew W Worseck City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9010 Email: aworseck@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/25/1991
04/25/1991
04/25/1991 05/21/1993 05/21/1993
06/14/1993 06/17/1993
06/25/1993 07/06/1993 11/19/1993

# Docket Text

2869 MOTION by plaintiff Alliance To End for leave to file supplemental memorandum of ACLU in opposition to FBI objections to the report and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge ; Notice of motion. (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (vmj) (Entered: 05/17/1995)

2870

MINUTE ORDER of 4/25/91 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Granting petitioner ACLU's motion for leave to file supplemental memorandum of ACLU in opposition to FBI objections to the report and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge [2869−1]. No notice (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (vmj) (Entered: 05/17/1995)

2871 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alliance To End in opposition to FBI objections to the report and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge (Temporarily unavailable for docketing). (vmj) (Entered: 05/17/1995)

2803 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (vkd) (Entered: 05/24/1993)

2804

MINUTE ORDER of 5/21/93 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Report and Recommendation regarding Chicago CISPES' request for an order requesting additional training and notification is hereby submitted to Judge Williams. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, these cases are returned to the assigned judge terminating case referral . Mailed notice (vkd) (Entered: 05/24/1993)

2805 MOTION by defendant FBI for an extension of time to 6/25/93 to seek review of the Report and Recommendation of 05/21/93 (fce) (Entered: 06/16/1993)

2806 MINUTE ORDER of 6/17/93 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Granting motion for an extension of time to 6/25/93 to seek review of the Report and Recommendation of 05/21/93 [2805−1] (This order concerns related case number 75 C 3295). Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 06/18/1993)

2807 OBJECTIONS by defendants to Report and Recommendation [2803−1] of the Magistrate Judge regarding training of FBI agents in Chicago (fce) (Entered: 06/28/1993)

2808 RESPONSE by CISPES petitioners' and plaintiff ACLU's to FBI's objections regarding training; Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) Modified on 07/07/1993 (Entered: 07/07/1993)

2809 MOTION by Alliance and ACLU plaintiffs and defendant Chgo, Cty of to amend order concerning disposition of documents (Attachments); Notice of motion. (cdh) (Entered: 12/01/1993)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 25 of 71

11/19/1993 11/19/1993
12/16/1993 12/16/1993 12/16/1993
12/17/1993 12/17/1993 12/20/1993 03/01/1994 03/01/1994 03/08/1994 03/11/1994 03/11/1994
03/21/1994 03/21/1994 03/30/1994 03/30/1994
04/04/1994 04/12/1994 04/21/1994 04/21/1994

2810 ORDER regarding motion to amend order concerning disposition of documents [2809−1] (cdh) (Entered: 12/01/1993)

2811 MINUTE ORDER of 11/19/93 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Granting agreed motion to amend order concerning disposition of documents [2809−1]. No notice (cdh) Modified on 12/01/1993 (Entered: 12/01/1993)

2812 SUPPLEMENT by plaintiffs' Alliance to attachment a to attorney's fees motion. (cdh) (Entered: 12/17/1993)

2815 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER (cdh) (Entered: 12/30/1993)

2816 MINUTE ORDER of 12/16/93 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set for 03/08/94 at 9:30 am. *( this order concerns related case 75 C 3295) Pursuant to memorandum opinion and order, petitioners motion for an order requiring further training and notification is gratned. Telephone notice (cdh) (Entered: 12/30/1993)

2813 TOTAL FEES by plaintiffs' ; Notice of filing. (cdh) (Entered: 12/20/1993)

2814 STATEMENT OF SERVICES by plaintiffs' 3/1/93 through 12/17/93. (cdh) (Entered: 12/20/1993)

2817 12/15/93 ATTORNEY'S FEES CALCULATION by plaintiffs'; Notice of filing. (cdh) (Entered: 12/30/1993)

2818 SUBMISSION OF SUPPLEMENTAL TRAINING MATERIALS by respondent FBI (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)

2819 LETTER from respondent FBI to H. Stuart Cunningham dated 02/28/94. (jmp) (Entered: 03/03/1994)

2820 MINUTE ORDER of 3/8/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing held. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/09/1994)

2821 MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER (jmp) (Entered: 03/15/1994)

2822

MINUTE ORDER of 3/11/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pursuant to memorandum opinion and order, the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation is adopted as amended. Plaintiffs motion for an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Acto fo 1976, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 against defendant City of Chciago is granted. Counsel Richard Gutman, is awarded $39,718.82. Draft to follow. Plaintiffs second amended motion for an award of attorney's fees is denied. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/15/1994)

2823 FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT (jmp) (Entered: 03/25/1994)

2824 MINUTE ORDER of 3/21/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter final order and judgment. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/25/1994)

2825 ORDER (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 03/31/1994)

2826

MINUTE ORDER of 3/30/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter judgment in favor of the ACLU plaintiffs and against the City of Chicago in the amount of $149,303. The City of Chicago is ordered to make prompt payment of that amount to the firm of Futterman &Howard, counsel for the ACLU plaintiffs. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/31/1994)

2827 OBJECTIONS by unknown Service List to FBI's draft "final order and judgment"; Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) (Entered: 04/05/1994)

2828 LETTER from Robert C. Howard to the Clerk of the Court dated 4/12/94. (fce) (Entered: 04/14/1994)

2829 JUDGMENT (vkd) (Entered: 04/25/1994)

2830 MINUTE ORDER of 4/21/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant City of Chicago in the amount of $39,718.82. The City of Chicago is ordered to make payment of that amount plus post−judgment interest to the law firm of Richard Gutman, P.c., 54 Parker Street,

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 26 of 71

04/22/1994 04/22/1994 04/22/1994 04/22/1994 04/22/1994
05/02/1994 05/06/1994
06/01/1994 06/06/1994 06/21/1994 06/21/1994 06/27/1994 07/01/1994
07/08/1994 07/11/1994
07/15/1994

Carlisle, PA 17013−2818. Mailed notice (vkd) (Entered: 04/25/1994)

2831 OPPOSITION by defendant FBI to the enforcement petition of the American Civil Liberties Union. (vkd) (Entered: 04/25/1994)

2832 MOTION by American Civil Liberties Union and CISPES to alter , or amend judgment (Attachment); Notice of motion (vkd) (Entered: 04/26/1994)

2833 PETITION by American Civil Liberties Union to enforce FBI Consent Decree (Exhibit); Notice of motion (vkd) (Entered: 04/26/1994)

2834 AMENDED NOTICE of motion by plaintiff regarding petition to enforce FBI Consent Decree [2833−1] (vkd) (Entered: 04/26/1994)

2835

MINUTE ORDER of 4/22/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Reply to answer brief due 05/02/94 on American Civil Liberties Union's motion to enforce FBI Consent Decree [2833−1]. Pretrial conference set for 06/06/94 at 9:00 a.m. Ruling on motion of the American Civil Liberties Union and of CISPES petitioners to alter or amend judgment to be made by mail. No notice (vkd) (Entered: 04/26/1994)

2836 REPLY by Amer Civil Liberties Union to the FBI's opposition to its petition to enforce FBI Consent Decree [2833−1] (Attachment). (vkd) (Entered: 05/03/1994)

2837

REFERRAL ORDER of 05/06/94: Case referred to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b) to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: conduct necessary proceedings and enter Order/Report and Recommendation on all nondispositive motions and dispositive pretrial matters through filing of pretrial materials including final pretrial order. Referral made for ruling on American Civil Liberties Union's petition to enforce FBI consent decree. (For further detail see order). Mailed notice (vkd) Modified on 05/11/1994 (Entered: 05/11/1994)

2843 LETTER to Clerk from R Joseph Sher dated 05/27/94 (temporarily unavailable for docketing). (vkd) (Entered: 07/12/1994)

2838 MINUTE ORDER of 6/6/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 06/27/94 at 9:30 a.m. No notice (vkd) (Entered: 06/07/1994)

2839 MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its findings upon Alliance plaintiffs . (vkd) (Entered: 06/24/1994)

2840 BRIEF by in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its findings upon Alliance plaintiffs [2839−1] (Exhibits). (vkd) (Entered: 06/24/1994)

2841 MINUTE ORDER of 6/27/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 08/08/94 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (vkd) (Entered: 06/29/1994)

2842

MINUTE ORDER of 7/1/94 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Briefing schedule on plaintiffs' motion to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its findings upon Alliance plaintiffs [2839−1] is as follows: FBI's brief in opposition is due on or before 07/08/94 and plaintiffs' reply is due on or before 7/29/94. No notice (fce) (Entered: 07/06/1994)

2844 OPPOSITION by respondent FBI to motion of the former Alliance plaintiffs to compel the FBI to serve them with filings in this proceeding [2839−1] (Attachments). (vkd) (Entered: 07/12/1994)

2845

MINUTE ORDER of 7/11/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : The Clerk of Court is directed to send all notices on behalf of defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation to R. Joseph Sher, Senior Trial Counsel Torts Branch, Civil Division, P.O. Box 7146 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044 and to add attorney Sher to the docket to receive notices. No notice (vkd) (Entered: 07/12/1994)

2846 REPLY brief by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its findings upon Alliance plaintiffs [2839−1] (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (vkd) Modified on 07/19/1994 (Entered: 07/19/1994)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 27 of 71

08/08/1994 09/09/1994 10/14/1994 11/03/1994 11/04/1994 11/29/1994 11/29/1994
12/02/1994 12/02/1994 12/02/1994
12/14/1994 12/19/1994 12/20/1994 12/22/1994 12/23/1994 12/23/1994 12/27/1994 12/30/1994 01/03/1995

2847 MINUTE ORDER of 8/8/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 09/09/94 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (vkd) (Entered: 08/09/1994)

2848 MINUTE ORDER of 9/9/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset for 10/14/94 at 3:00 p.m. Mailed notice (temporarily unavailable for docketing). (vkd) Modified on 09/21/1994 (Entered: 09/21/1994)

2849 MINUTE ORDER of 10/14/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held; continued to 11/04/94 at 2:30 p.m. No notice (vkd) (Entered: 10/19/1994)

2850 BRIEF by Alliance plaintiffs brief regarding service (Attachment). (vkd) (Entered: 11/07/1994)

SCHEDULE set on 11/4/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 12/2/94 at 2:30 p.m. Pretrial conference to be held by telephone on 12/2/94. No notice (dl) (Entered: 11/08/1994)

2851 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to enforce FBI Consent Decree [2833−1] (vkd) (Entered: 11/30/1994)

2852

MINUTE ORDER of 11/29/94 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Enter Report and Recommendation: It is recommended that the court enter a finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the terms of the consent decree has occured or is occurring. It is further recommended that the parties be permitted to conduct appropriate discovery limited to the issues raised by the petition. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been completed, case is returned to the assigned judge. terminating case referral to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow . Mailed notice (vkd) (Entered: 11/30/1994)

2853 JOINT MOTION by parties for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served ; Notice of motion. (fce) (Entered: 12/07/1994)

2854 MEMORANDUM by parties in support of motion for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served [2853−1] (Attachments). (fce) (Entered: 12/07/1994)

2855 MINUTE ORDER of 12/2/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Answer brief to joint motion for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served [2853−1] due 12/16/94. Reply to answer brief due 12/23/94 Pretrial conference held; continued to 12/22/94 at 10:30 am. No notice (fce) (Entered: 12/07/1994)

2856 OBJECTIONS by respondent FBI to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge filed on 11/29/94 [2851−1] and proposed briefing schedule (Attachment). (vkd) (Entered: 12/23/1994)

2858 MINUTE ORDER of 12/19/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and REcommendation due 01/17/95. Responses to objections due 01/24/95. Mailed notice (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)

2859 BRIEF by respondent regarding service on the original plaintiffs in proceedings to enforce the agreement. (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)

SCHEDULE set on 12/22/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 1/13/95 at 12:00 p.m. by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 12/28/1994)

2860 REPLY brief concerning service by Alliance plaintiffs (Exhibits). (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)

2861 REPLY memorandum of ACLU on entry of standing order regarding parties to be served (Attachment). (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)

2862 STATEMENT by respondent regarding the petitioners' motion to alter [2832−1] or amend judgment [2832−2] (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)

2863 MEMORANDUM of points and authorities by respondent in support of respondent's objections to the Magistrate Judge's 11/29/94 report and recommendation [2856−1] (vkd) (Entered: 01/12/1995)

2857 COMMENTS by Alliance plaintiffs regrding plaintiff ACLU's proposed "standing order regarding parties to be served" (ar) (Entered: 01/04/1995)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 28 of 71

01/13/1995
01/18/1995 02/03/1995 02/17/1995 02/17/1995 02/17/1995
06/15/1995 08/24/1995
09/27/1995 09/27/1995
09/27/1995 10/02/1995 11/03/1995 11/22/1995 11/22/1995 11/22/1995 03/28/1996 03/28/1996
03/28/1996

2865 MINUTE ORDER of 1/13/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing held; continued to 02/03/95 at 11:00 a.m. Date for filing briefs and/or objections is extended to 02/03/95. Pretrial conference to be held by telephone on 02/03/95. No notice (vkd) (Entered: 01/20/1995)

2864 RESPONSE by Alliance plaintiffs to respondent FBI's objections to Magistrate Judge's 11/29/94 Report and Recommendation (Attachments). (vkd) (Entered: 01/19/1995)

SCHEDULE set on 2/3/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held. Parties directed to present to the court draft orders by 2/10/95. The court will select and enter an order by 2/17/95. No notice (dl) (Entered: 02/03/1995)

2866 NOTICE of planned destruction of records. (fce) (Entered: 02/22/1995)

2867 STIPULATION AND ORDER dismissing this proceeding. (fce) (Entered: 02/22/1995)

2868

MINUTE ORDER of 2/17/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter stipulation and order dismissing this proceedings. American Civil Liberties Union's petition to enforce FBI consent is dismissed with prejudice. Court retains jurisdiction for a period of one year for the purpose of enforcing this settlement agreement. No notice (fce) (Entered: 02/22/1995)

2872 NOTICE by Richard Gutman of change of address. (vmj) (Entered: 06/19/1995)

2873

MINUTE ORDER of 8/24/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams: (This order concerns related case number 75 C 3295) Cispes petitioners are given leave to file their motion to determine amount of attorney's fees award and brief in support on 11/22/95. Response to be filed on 11/22/95 and served on 09/22/95. Reply to be filed and served on 11/22/95. Ruling to be made by mail. Said motion received by the court on 08/21/95 returned to petitioners by mail on 08/24/95 with leave to resubmit according to the schedule set above. Briefing schedule is pursuant to agreement of parties. Court notes that the motion has been served on opposing parties by mail on 08/19/95. Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered: 08/25/1995)

2874 AGREED MOTION by defendant FBI to extend time to serve response to CISPES' attorney fee petition ; (jmp) (Entered: 10/02/1995)

2875 MINUTE ORDER of 9/27/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Agreed motion of defendant FBI to extend time to serve response to CISPES' attorney fee petition [2874−1] to and including 09/29/95 is granted. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 10/02/1995)

2877 NOTICE of motion by defendant FBI regarding motion to extend time to serve response to CISPES' attorney fee petition [2874−1] (jmp) (Entered: 10/04/1995)

2876 MEMORANDUM by respondent in opposition to the Cispes petitioners' motion to determine the amount of attorney's fee award (jmp) (Entered: 10/03/1995)

2878 NOTICE by unknown Service List of change of address (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 11/06/1995)

2879 MOTION by Cispes petitioners to determine amount of attorney's fee award (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 11/28/1995)

2880 AMENDED attorney's fee computation (fce) (Entered: 11/28/1995)

2881 REPLY BRIEF by Cispes petitioners on attorney's fees (Attachments); Notice of filing. (fce) (Entered: 11/28/1995)

2882 ORDER (jmp) (Entered: 04/02/1996)

2883 MINUTE ORDER of 3/28/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : The court grants the joint motion for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served [2853−1] and hereby enters the order proposed by Alliance. (See reverse of minute order) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/02/1996)

2884 MINUTE ORDER of 3/28/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion by Alliance plaintiffs to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its findings upon Alliance

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 29 of 71

03/28/1996 03/28/1996
04/04/1996
04/04/1996 04/10/1996 04/12/1996 04/12/1996 04/12/1996 05/13/1996 05/24/1996 05/28/1996 05/28/1996 05/30/1996 05/30/1996 06/04/1996 06/06/1996 06/07/1996 06/13/1996

plaintiffs [2839−1] and American Civil Liberties Union's petition to enforce FBI Consent Decree [2833−1] are stricken as moot pursuant to stipulation and order dismissing proceedings [docs #2867 and #2868]. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/02/1996)

2885 FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT (jmp) (Entered: 04/02/1996)

2886

MINUTE ORDER of 3/28/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noting that there are no objections, the court grants the motion of American Civil Liberties Union and of CISPES Petitioners' to alter [2832−1] and amend judgment [2832−2] and grants CISPES Petitioners' objections to FBI's draft "Final Order and Judgment" [doc #2827], Stricking final order and judgment entered on 03/21/94 [doc #2823]. Enter attached final order and judgment. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/02/1996)

2887 REFERRAL ORDER of 4/3/96: Referring from Judge Ann C. Williams to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow the motion to determine amount of attorney's fee award [2879−1] pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b). (For further detail see order). Mailed notice(yap) Modified on 04/08/1996 (Entered: 04/08/1996)

2888 NOTICE of audit by defendant Police Board of the City of Chicago; Notice of filing. (yap) (Entered: 04/08/1996)

2892 BILL OF COSTS submitted by Richard Gutman on behalf of petitioners Chicago CISPES, et al in the amount of $238.60 (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 05/06/1996)

2889 MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs' for attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree ; Notice of motion and certificate of service (jmp) (Entered: 04/15/1996)

2890 BRIEF by plaintiffs' in support of Allliance plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [2889−1] (jmp) (Entered: 04/15/1996)

2891 DECLARATION by Richard Gutman in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [2889−1] (Attachments) (jmp) Modified on 04/15/1996 (Entered: 04/15/1996)

2893 OPPOSITION of the respondent to the former Alliance plaintiffs' attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [2889−1] (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 05/14/1996)

2896 NOTICE OF APPEAL by respondent FBI from motion minute order entered on 03/28/96 [2883−1] [2882−1] (No fee required) (hp) (Entered: 05/30/1996)

2894 AMENDED Attorney's fees computation for compliance monitoring by Alliance plaintiffs; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 05/29/1996)

2895 REPLY BRIEF by plaintiff regarding motion for attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [2889−1] (jmp) (Entered: 05/29/1996)

MAILED LETTER regarding docketing statement unacknowledged by respondent FBI. (hp) (Entered: 05/30/1996)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal regarding [2896−1]. Mailed notice to all counsel. (hp) (Entered: 05/30/1996)

2897 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal USCA 96−2347 (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 06/05/1996)

2898 REFERRAL ORDER of 6/5/96: Case referred to Honorable Joan H. Lefkow pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b). (For further details see order.) Mailed notice (smm) (Entered: 06/07/1996)

2899 DESIGNATION by Chicago Cispes in 1:74−cv−03268, Chicago Cispes in 1:75−cv−03295 of appeal record no. 96−2347 (fce) (Entered: 06/10/1996)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. #96−2347 consisting of two volumes of pleadings, designation of record with pleadings under

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 30 of 71

09/01/1996 09/05/1996 09/05/1996
09/16/1996 09/19/1996 09/20/1996 09/23/1996 09/30/1996
10/02/1996 10/02/1996 10/09/1996 10/16/1996 10/21/1996 11/01/1996

separate certificate. (with case number 75cv3295) Mailed notice to all counsel. (pmp) (Entered: 06/13/1996)

2907 MEMORANDUM of points and authorities by defendant in support of the respondent's objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation filed on 09/09/96 regarding the petitioners' claim for attorney fees (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 10/02/1996 (Entered: 10/02/1996)

2900 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion for attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [2889−1] (fce) (Entered: 09/09/1996)

2901

MINUTE ORDER of 9/5/96 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : It is hereby recommended that an attorney's fee be awarded to petitioners as set out in the order. Expenses should be allowed in the amount of $3,709.59. Petitioners are directed to prepare a revised calculation of fees, in conformity with this report and recommendation, to be submitted to the Honorable Ann Claire Williams by 09/20/96. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 09/09/1996)

2902 JOINT MOTION by parties for a briefing schedule regarding objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation regarding attorney fees (fce) (Entered: 09/18/1996)

2903 OBJECTIONS by petitioners Chicago Cispes, et al to the Magistrate Judge's 09/06/96 Report and Recommendation [2900−1] ; Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) (Entered: 09/25/1996)

2904 SECOND OBJECTIONS by petitioners Chicago Cispes, et al to the Magistrate Judge's 09/05/96 Report and Recommendation [2900−1] (jmp) (Entered: 09/25/1996)

2905 OBJECTIONS by respondent's to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [2900−1] filed on 09/09/96 regarding the petitioner's claim for attorney fees (jmp) (Entered: 09/25/1996)

2906

MINUTE ORDER of 9/30/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : The court adopts the RRin its entirety and denies the parties joint motion for a briefing schedule regarding objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation regarding attorney fees [2902−1]. Petitioenr CISPES's objection and second objection to the RRare denied. Respondent's objections to the RRare denied. Pursuant to the revised calculation of fees [2889−1] submitted by petitioner on 09/16/96, the court awards petitioner [2879−1] $288,295.00 in fees and $3,709.59 in expenses. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/30/1996)

2908 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of petitioners Chicago CISPES et al's objections to the Magistrate Judge's 09/05/96 report and recommendation (Attachments) (jmp) (Entered: 10/04/1996)

2909 NOTICE of filing and certificate of service by plaintiff regarding memorandum [2908−1] (jmp) (Entered: 10/04/1996)

2910 SUPPLEMENTAL filing and second amended attorney's fees computation for compliance monitoring by plaintiff (Attachments) ; Notice of filing and certficate of service (jmp) (Entered: 10/10/1996)

2911 OBJECTIONS by defendant FBI to the former Alliance plaintiffs' supplemental filing and second amended attorney's fees computation for compliance monitoring (jmp) (Entered: 10/17/1996)

2912 REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs' to respondent FBI's objections to supplemental filing; Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) (Entered: 10/22/1996)

2915 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file the appearance of attorney Edward J. Koziboski ; Notice of motion and Certificate of service (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 11/18/1996 (Entered: 11/18/1996)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 31 of 71

11/04/1996 11/05/1996 11/07/1996 11/08/1996 11/13/1996
11/27/1996 12/04/1996 12/04/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996
12/12/1996
12/23/1996 01/06/1997 01/06/1997 01/07/1997 01/14/1997 01/15/1997 01/21/1997 01/31/1997
02/05/1997

2916 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to withdraw appearance ; Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 11/25/1996)

2913 MINUTE ORDER of 11/5/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file appearance granted. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 11/06/1996)

2914 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Edward J. Koziboski (ar) (Entered: 11/08/1996)

RULE 39 letter mailed to Edward J. Koziboski (ar) (Entered: 11/08/1996)

2917

MINUTE ORDER of 11/13/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Defendant City of Chicaog's motion to withdraw appearance [2916−1] of assistanct corporation Douglas Marshall McMillan and that notices and orders relating to this matter should be directed to sharon Baldwin is granted. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 11/25/1996)

2918 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant FBI from motion minute order [2906−1] (FEE WAIVED) (pmp) (Entered: 12/04/1996)

LETTER regarding docketing statement unacknowledged by defendant FBI. (Mailed) (pmp) (Entered: 12/04/1996)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal . Mailed notice to all counsel. (pmp) (Entered: 12/04/1996)

2919 INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT by defendants' (Attachments) (jmp) Modified on 12/16/1996 (Entered: 12/16/1996)

2920 LETTER from defendants' to Office of the Police Board dated 11/8/96 (Exhibits) (jmp) (Entered: 12/16/1996)

2921 LETTER from defendants' to the Office of the Police Board dated 11/08/96 (jmp) Modified on 12/16/1996 (Entered: 12/16/1996)

2922 FIRST AMENDMENT JUDGMENT ORDER compliance examination narrative by Chgo, Cty of (Attachments) (jmp) Modified on 12/16/1996 (Entered: 12/16/1996)

2923 NOTICE of filing and certificate of service by defendants' regarding City of Chicago First Amendment Judgment Order Compliance Examination; Independent Accountant's Report, two letters (jmp) (Entered: 12/16/1996)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. consisting of one volume of pleadings. Mailed notice to all counsel. (fce) (Entered: 12/23/1996)

RULE 39 letter mailed to Edward J. Koziboski (ar) (Entered: 01/06/1997)

2924 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal USCA 96−4245 (Attachments) (jmp) (Entered: 01/06/1997)

2925 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by plaintiffs' (jmp) (Entered: 01/07/1997)

2926 CERTIFIED copy of Order from the 7th Circuit. ( 96−2347 and 96−4014) (jmp) (Entered: 01/15/1997)

2927 CERTIFIED copy of Order from the 7th Circuit. ( 96−4245) (jmp) (Entered: 01/16/1997)

2928 CERTIFIED copy of Order from the 7th Circuit. ( 96−2347 &96−4014) (fce) (Entered: 01/27/1997)

2929 MINUTE ORDER of 1/31/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Pursuant to the order of 09/30/96 by Judge Williams, all matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Terminating case referral to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 02/05/1997)

2932 MOTION by Nona Farrar to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree (Attachments); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 02/21/1997)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 32 of 71

02/10/1997 02/12/1997 02/19/1997
02/25/1997 03/05/1997
03/07/1997
03/07/1997 03/07/1997 03/07/1997 03/12/1997
03/12/1997 03/12/1997 03/17/1997 03/20/1997 03/31/1997 04/01/1997 04/02/1997 04/03/1997

2930 LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal no. 96−4245 consisting of one (1) volume of pleadings (jmp) (Entered: 02/13/1997)

2931 CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: Dismissing the appeal [2918−1] . ( 96−4245) (jmp) (Entered: 02/13/1997)

2933 MINUTE ORDER of 2/19/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion of Nona Farrar to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree [2932−1] is entered and contiued to 2:00 p.m. on 03/05/97. Mailed notice (jmp) Modified on 02/27/1997 (Entered: 02/21/1997)

2934 MOTION by Nona Farrar to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree ; (jmp) (Entered: 02/27/1997)

2935 MINUTE ORDER of 3/5/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Response to Nona Farrar's motion to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree [2932−1] [2934−1] to be filed by 04/02/97. Reply to be filed by 04/21/97. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/07/1997)

2936

REFERRAL ORDER of 3/7/97: Case referred to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow from Hon. Ann c. Williams. Pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b). Conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: Perform such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hearing on Nona Farrar's motion for enforce current City of Chicago consent decree. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/10/1997)

2937 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to modify consent decree (Exhibits); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)

2938 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to file memorandum in excess of 15 pages ; Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)

2939 MEMORANDUM by Chgo, Cty of in support of its motion to modify the 1982 Alliance consent decree [2937−1] (Attachments) (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)

2940

MINUTE ORDER of 3/12/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set for 9:00 a.m. on 04/25/97. Motion of City of Chicago to file memorandum in excess of 15 pages [2938−1], is granted. Motion of City of Chicago to modify consent decree [2937−1] is entered and continued to 9:00 a.m. on 04/25/97. Proposed agreed discovery plan to be filed by 04/25/97. If parties cannot agree on discovery plan they should file separate plans. Court to refer case to another judge to conduct a settlement conference within a short date. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)

2941 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Amer Civil Liberties, Roger Baldwin by Imani Chiphe (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)

2942 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Amer Civil Liberties, Roger Baldwin by Edward W. Feldman, Thomas M. Staunton ; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)

2943 ADDENDUM TO Nona Farra's motion to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree (Attachment) (jmp) (Entered: 03/24/1997)

ISSUED two originals and two copies of subpoenas to Adrian Heigal − Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago (jmp) Modified on 03/24/1997 (Entered: 03/24/1997)

2944 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Walgreen Co by William V. Johnson, Matthew Lincoln Johnson ; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 04/01/1997)

2946 MOTION by Walgreen Co to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Exhibit); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 04/11/1997)

2947 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to enforce ; Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 04/11/1997)

2945 ADDENDUM TO COMPLAINT (Attachment) by plaintiffs' (jmp) (Entered: 04/04/1997)

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04/03/1997 04/07/1997 04/08/1997 04/09/1997
04/09/1997 04/10/1997
04/14/1997
04/14/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997
04/18/1997 04/21/1997 04/21/1997 04/23/1997 04/24/1997 04/24/1997 04/24/1997

2951 AMENDED MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to enforce ; Notice of motion (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 04/16/1997 (Entered: 04/16/1997)

2948 MOTION by plaintiff to consolidate case #96 C 8062 with case #74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295 (AtAttachments); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 04/11/1997)

ISSUED Original and one copy of subpoena to Matthew Johnson (jmp) (Entered: 04/09/1997)

2949

MINUTE ORDER of 4/9/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for an enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motin to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree renoticed for hearing before Magistrate Judge Lefkow. Nona Farrar's motion to consolidate case #96 C 8062 with case #74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295 [2948−1] is denied for the reasons stated in open court. Nona Farrar is given until 04/18/97 to file response to Walgreen Co.'s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [2946−1]. Reply to be filed by 04/25/97. Ruling on said motion to dismiss to be made by mail. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/11/1997)

2950 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 03/12/97. Before Honorable Ann C. Williams. (jmp) (Entered: 04/14/1997)

2952

MINUTE ORDER of 4/10/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's amended motion for enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to enforce [2947−1], [2951−1] current City of Chicago Consent Decree [2932−1], [2934−1] is granted to and including 04/23/97. Petitioner to reply to the City 's response on or before 05/11/97. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/16/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 4/14/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Settlement conference set for 9:00 a.m. 4/21/97 before Judge George Marovich in chambers 1956. All parties in connection with motion of City of Chicago to modify consent decree to appear at the settlement conference. Mailed notice (dl) (Entered: 04/14/1997)

2953 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to bar discovery (Exhibits); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 04/16/1997)

2955 MINUTE ORDER of 4/16/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Response to motion of City of Chicago to bar discovery [2953−1] to be filed by 04/25/97. Reply to be filed by 05/02/97. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/22/1997)

2963 MOTION by plaintiffs Alliance To End, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and Festival of Life Committee to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants (Exhibit); Notice of filing (fce) (Entered: 04/30/1997)

2954 RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to defendant Walgreens, motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [2946−1] (jmp) (Entered: 04/22/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 4/21/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Settlement conference held before Judge Marovich. No notice (dl) (Entered: 04/22/1997)

2964 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to substitute counsel (Attachments); Notice of motion (fce) (Entered: 04/30/1997)

2956 REPLY by defendant Walgreen Co to plaintiff's response to its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [2946−1]; Notice of filing (fce) (Entered: 04/24/1997)

2957 PROPOSED DISCOVERY plan by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties ; Notice of filing (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

2958 MOTION by defendant City of Chgo for an enlargement of time to respond to motion to enforce ; Notice of motion. (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

2959 MINUTE ORDER of 4/24/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's motion for an enlargement of time to respond to motion to enforce [2958−1] is granted to and including 5/21/97. Petitioner's reply to the response to the motion to enforce

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 34 of 71

04/25/1997 04/25/1997 04/25/1997
04/28/1997 05/01/1997 05/01/1997 05/01/1997 05/02/1997 05/05/1997 05/07/1997
05/09/1997 05/09/1997 05/12/1997 05/15/1997 05/19/1997 05/21/1997 05/28/1997

current City of Chicago consent decree [2934−1] due on or before 6/11/97. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

2960 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alliance To End in opposition to motion to bar discovery [2953−1]; Notice of filing. (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

2961 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties in opposition to motion to bar discovery [2953−1] (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

2965

MINUTE ORDER of 4/25/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants [2963−1] is continued to 5/30/97. Motion to substitute counsel [2964−1] is granted. Order appearances of Lawrence Rosenthal, Sharon Bladwin, Kenneth Schmetterer and Adrienne Hiegel substituted and all other appearances for the City of Chicago withdrawn. Status hearing held; continued to 10:00 am on 5/30/97. Alliance plaintiffs, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and Festival of Life Committee's petition to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants to be referred to magistrate judge. Parties to file joint discovery plan with respect to this petition. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 04/30/1997)

2962 ADDITION to complaint by plaintiff Alliance To End (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1997)

2966 AMENDED petition by Aliance plaintiffs to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants [2963−1] (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 05/05/1997)

2967 REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to ACLU plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to City's motion to bar discovery [2953−1] ; Notice of filing. (fce) (Entered: 05/05/1997)

2968 AMENDED brief by Alliance plaintiffs in opposition to motion of City of Chicago to bar discovery [2953−1] (Exhibits) (fce) (Entered: 05/05/1997)

2969 REPLY by defendant Chgo, Cty of to plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition to City's motion to bar discovery [2953−1] ; Notice of filing. (fce) (Entered: 05/05/1997)

2970 JOINT PROPOSED DISCOVERY PLAN by defendants', plaintiffs'; Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) Modified on 05/06/1997 (Entered: 05/06/1997)

2971

REFERRAL ORDER of 5/6/97: Case referred to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow from Hon. Ann C. Williams pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b). Conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: Discovery supervision. Perform such additional duties as are not inconsistsent with the Constitution and laws of the United States: Hearing on Alliance plaintiffs Active Resistance Organizing Collective. Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and Festival of Life Committee's petition to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants. Supervision of discovery regarding said petition. Resolution of discovery disputes with respect to said petition. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/08/1997)

2972 AMENDMENED LIST by defendant (jmp) (Entered: 05/16/1997)

2972 AMENDMENDED LIST by defendant (jmp) (Entered: 05/16/1997)

2973 MOTION by non−party CTA to quash plaintiff's subpoena (Exhibits); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 05/16/1997)

2974 MINUTE ORDER of 5/15/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Non−party, motion to quash plaintiff's subpoena [2973−1] is granted. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/16/1997)

2975 ISSUED Original and one copy subpoena as to Clinton Companies (jmp) (Entered: 05/21/1997)

2976 RESPONSE by Chgo, Cty of to contempt motion (Attachments) (jmp) (Entered: 05/23/1997)

2977 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for TJX Co Inc by Harry Joshua Nelson, Bruce William Melton, Ellen M. Babbitt (jmp) (Entered: 05/29/1997)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 35 of 71

05/28/1997 05/30/1997
06/03/1997 06/03/1997 06/03/1997 06/05/1997
06/09/1997 06/10/1997 06/10/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997
06/11/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997
06/11/1997 06/16/1997

2978 MOTION by Chgo Crime Comm to file its friend of the court brief ; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 05/29/1997)

2979

MINUTE ORDER of 5/30/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : This order concerns related case # 75 C 3295. Hearing on motion to file its friend of the court brief [2978−1] is set for 6/11/97 at 9:30 a.m. Motion to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants [2963−1] is continued to 7/3/97 at 9:30 a.m. Status hearing held; continued to 7/3/97 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 06/05/1997)

2980 MOTION by Amer Drug Stores for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs' complaint ; Notice of motion (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 06/11/1997 (Entered: 06/11/1997)

2981 DEMAND for jury trial by Amer Drug Stores (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 06/11/1997 (Entered: 06/11/1997)

2982 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Amer Drug Stores by Paul Anthony Tanzillo, Margaret A Unger, Howard Patrick Morris (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 06/11/1997 (Entered: 06/11/1997)

2983

MINUTE ORDER of 6/5/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case # 75 C 3295) Motion by American Drug Stores, Inc. d/b/a Osco for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead is granted [2980−1]. American Drug Stores, Inc. d/b/a Osco is given until 07/03/97 to answer or otherwise plead to Nona Farrar's motion to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree [2977−1]; which the court notes is the only matter pending with resepct to Nona Farrar rearding this case. American Drug Stores, Inc. d/b/a Osco is given leave to file an appearance as respondent o Ms. Farrar's motion to enforce. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/11/1997)

2985 MOTION by IL St Police to file amicus curiae brief ; (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 06/17/1997 (Entered: 06/17/1997)

2984 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Marshall Field &Co by Edward M. Ordonez, Davida Kay Forrest; Notice of filing (jmp) Modified on 06/11/1997 (Entered: 06/11/1997)

2993 MOTION by Marshall Field &Co to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (Exhibits); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 06/24/1997)

2986 AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF by IL St Police (jmp) (Entered: 06/17/1997)

2987

MINUTE ORDER of 6/11/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case #75 C 3295) Motion of the Chicago Crime Commission to file its friend of the court brief is granted [2978−1]. Chicago Cirme Commission's brief to be filed by 07/10/97 and is limited to five pages. Motion of Illiois State Police to file amicus curiae brief is granted [2985−1]. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/17/1997)

2988 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez ; Notice of motion (jmp) Modified on 06/17/1997 (Entered: 06/17/1997)

2989 MEMORANDUM by Chgo, Cty of in support of City of Chicago motion for a protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent matt L. Rodriguez [2988−1] (jmp) (Entered: 06/17/1997)

2990

MINUTE ORDER of 6/11/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's motion for protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez [2988−1] is entered. Plaintiff's to file response on the motion on or before 06/16/97. Hearing and ruling on the motion [2988−1] set for 10:00 a.m. on 06/19/97. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/17/1997)

2994 NOTICE of motion by Marshall Field &Co regarding motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint [2993−1] (jmp) (Entered: 06/24/1997)

2991 REPLY by plaintiff to Citys motion for protective order regarding plaintif (Nona Farrar) deposing Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez [2988−1] (Attachment) (jmp)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 36 of 71

06/17/1997 06/19/1997
06/19/1997 06/19/1997
06/20/1997
06/23/1997 06/27/1997 06/27/1997 06/27/1997 07/03/1997 07/03/1997 07/03/1997 07/03/1997 07/08/1997 07/18/1997

(Entered: 06/17/1997)

2996 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for an order entering the joint proposed DNC discovery plan (Attachments); Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 06/27/1997)

2995

MINUTE ORDER of 6/19/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case #75 3295) Marshall Field &Company's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint [2993−1] and Walgreen Co's fully briefed motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are denied [2946−1] without prejudice because there is no complaint pending within this action by Nona Farrar. Nona Farrar is advised not to refer to her motion to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree as a complaint. Nona Farrar directed to send Marshall Field &Company, Walgreen Co., and American Drugs Stores, Inc. d/b/a Osco copies of her motion to enforce consent decree. Matters relating to Nona Farrar's motion to enforce consent decree to be noticed before Magistrate Judge Lefkow for hearing until termination of referral. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/24/1997)

ORAL MOTION by Nona Farrar for additional time in which to reply in support of motion to enforce consent decree (jmp) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

3000

MINUTE ORDER of 6/19/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's motion for protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez is granted [2988−1]. Petitioner Farrar's oral motion for additional time in which to reply in support of motion [0−1] to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants [2963−1] is granted to and including 06/26/97. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

2992

REFERRAL ORDER of 6/20/97: Case referred to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow from Hon. Ann C. Williams pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b). Conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: Discovery motions: Motion of City of Chicago to Bar Discovery. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/23/1997)

3001 MINUTE ORDER of 6/23/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Status hearing set for 11:00 a.m. on 08/14/97. City of Chicago's motion for an order entering the joint proposed DNC discovery plan is granted [2996−1]. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

2997 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 04/09/97. Before Honorable Ann C. Williams. (jmp) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

2998 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 04/25/97. Before Honorable Ann C. Williams. (jmp) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

2999 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 06/19/97. Before Honorable Ann C. Williams. (jmp) (Entered: 06/30/1997)

3002 MINUTE ORDER of 7/3/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *This order concerns related case # 75 C 3295). Prties to file an agreed written status report by 09/19/97. motion of City of Chicago to modify consent decree [2937−1] is entered and continued generally. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 07/07/1997)

3003 NOTICE by plaintiff of change of address; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 07/08/1997)

3004 REPLY by Nona Farrar to City's motion to dismiss (jmp) (Entered: 07/08/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 7/3/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing held. No notice (dl) (Entered: 07/22/1997)

3005 BRIEF by Chgo Crime Comm of Amicus Curiae in support of the City of Chicago's motion to modify consent decree [2937−1] (Exhibits) ; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 07/09/1997)

3006 SECOND AMENDED MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone and countermedia's petition to enforce the City of Chicago consent deree (Attachment); Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) (Entered: 07/21/1997)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 37 of 71

07/18/1997 07/22/1997 07/24/1997 07/24/1997 07/28/1997 07/28/1997
07/29/1997 07/30/1997 08/04/1997 08/06/1997 08/06/1997
08/07/1997 08/21/1997 08/21/1997 08/26/1997 08/26/1997

3007 SECOND AMENDED DECLARATION by Richard Gutman regarding motion to enforce the City of Chicago consent deree [3006−1](jmp) Modified on 07/21/1997 (Entered: 07/21/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 7/22/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set to 9:00 a.m. 8/1/97 regarding fee award vacated by the 7th Circuit . Mailed notice (dl) (Entered: 07/22/1997)

3008 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of an extension of time in which to answer plaintiffs' petition ; Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 07/29/1997)

3009 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for a ruling on its motion to bar discovery ; (jmp) (Entered: 07/29/1997)

3010 RESPONSE by Alliance plaintiffs' to defendant City of Chicgo's motion for a ruling on its motion to bar discovery [3009−1] (jmp) (Entered: 07/29/1997)

3011

MINUTE ORDER of 7/28/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Defendant City of Chicago's motion an extension of time in which to answer plaintiffs' petition is granted [3008−1] to and including 09/02/97. Defendant City of Chicago's motion for a ruling on its motion to bar discovery is granted [3009−1]. Hearing and ruling on City of Chicago's motion to bar discovery [2953−1] is set for 10:30 a.m. on 08/07/97. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 07/29/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 7/29/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set for 8/1/97 is stricken. Telephoned notice (dl) (Entered: 07/29/1997)

3012 MOTION by plaintiffs' to withdraw Edward Koziboski as attorney ; Notice of motion (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 08/07/1997 (Entered: 08/07/1997)

3013 MOTION by Nona Farrar for clarification as to degree this action can address last arrest ; Notice of motion (jmp) (Entered: 08/07/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 8/6/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference set to 2:00 p.m. 8/26/97 by telephone on CISPES enforcement petition. Mailed notice (dl) (Entered: 08/06/1997)

3014

MINUTE ORDER of 8/6/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case #75 C 3295) Edward Koziboski's motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs, Allilance to End Repression, the Autonomous Zone, Countermedia, and Active Resistance Organizing Committee [3012−1] is granted and so ordered. Appearance of Richard Gutman to remain as counsel for forementioned plaintiffs. Petitioenr Nona Farrar's motion for clarification is granted [3013−1] and so clarified as stated in open court. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 08/07/1997)

3015 MINUTE ORDER of 8/7/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Status hearing held. City of Chicago's motion to bar discovery is denied [2953−1] for reasons stated on the record in open court. Draft scheduling order to follow. No notice (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 08/18/1997 (Entered: 08/18/1997)

3019 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order (Attachments) ; (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (jmp) Modified on 09/05/1997 (Entered: 09/05/1997)

3020 NOTICE of motion by Chgo, Cty of regarding motion to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [3019−1] and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [3019−2] (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (jmp) (Entered: 09/05/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 8/26/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset to 2:00 p.m. 8/27/97 by telephone on CISPES enforcement petition. Telephoned notice (dl) (Entered: 08/26/1997)

3016 LETTER from the 7th Circuit: Retaining record on appeal no. 96−2347 &96−4014 consisting of three (3) volumes of pleadings; five (5) loose pleadings (jmp) (Entered: 08/27/1997)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 38 of 71

08/26/1997 08/26/1997 08/27/1997 08/27/1997
09/02/1997 09/09/1997 09/09/1997 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 09/11/1997 09/11/1997
09/12/1997
09/16/1997

3017 OPINION from the 7th Circuit: Argued 04/24/97; Decided 07/02/97. ( 96−2347 &96−4014) (jmp) (Entered: 08/27/1997)

3018

CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: The judgment of the District Court is Reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings; no costs are awarded. The fee award is vacated. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. [Appeal [2918−1] and [Appeal [2896−1] . ( 96−2347 &96−4014) (jmp) (Entered: 08/27/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 8/27/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 10:30 a.m. 9/25/97 by telephone regarding CISPES petition. No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/03/1997)

3021

MINUTE ORDER of 8/27/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case # 75 C 3295) Response to motion of City of Chicago to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [3019−1] and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [3019−2] to be filed by 09/08/97. Reply to be filed by 09/15/97. Ruling on said motion [3019−1], [3019−2] set for 9:30 a.m. on 09/19/97. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/05/1997)

3022 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by Chgo, Cty of to petitioners' second amended Alliance plaintiffs, Active REsistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone and Countermedia's petition to enforce the City of Chicago consent deree [3006−1]; Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 09/10/1997)

3030 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file instanter response to motion to set adside magistrate Judge's order and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order ; Notice of motion (jmp) Modified on 10/09/1997 (Entered: 09/24/1997)

3031 RESPONSE by ACLU plaintiffs' to motion of City of Chicago to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [3019−1] and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [3019−2] (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (jmp) (Entered: 09/24/1997)

3023 OPPOSITION by Alliance plaintiffs' to City's motion to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [3019−1] to bar all discovery and to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [3019−2] (Attachments) (jmp) (Entered: 09/11/1997)

3027 NOTICE of filing and certificate of service by plaintiffs' regarding opposition to the City's motion to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [3019−1] in its place to a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [3019−2] (jmp) (Entered: 09/18/1997)

3024 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree [2932−1] and [2934−1] (jmp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)

3025

MINUTE ORDER of 9/11/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : It is hereby recommended that petitioner Farrar's motions to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree [2932−1] and [2934−1] be denied wthout prejudice to her repleading, on or before 10/14/97, any claims that can be pleaded properly in compliance with the limitations set out in this report and recommendation. Enter report and recommendation. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)

3028

MINUTE ORDER of 9/12/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case # 76 C 3295) On 09/12/97 Magistrate Judge Lefkow submitted a report and recommendation ("R) that petitioner Nona Farrar's motions to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree be denied without prejudice. Copies of RRare available in chambers. Any objections must be filed by Friday, 09/26/97. The court will notify the parties if responses are required. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/18/1997)

3026 REPLY by Chgo, Cty of in support of its motion to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [3019−1] and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [3019−2] (Exhibit); Notice of filing (jmp) (Entered: 09/16/1997)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 39 of 71

09/17/1997
09/18/1997 09/19/1997
09/25/1997 09/29/1997
10/02/1997 10/03/1997 10/08/1997 10/08/1997 10/21/1997 10/21/1997 10/23/1997 10/28/1997 11/13/1997 11/19/1997
11/20/1997

3032

MINUTE ORDER of 9/17/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case # 76 C 3295) Plaintiffs' motion for leave to [3030−1] file instanter response to motion to set adside magistrate Judge's order and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order is granted [3030−2]. Telephoned notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/24/1997)

3029 AGREED STATUS REPORT by parties ; Notice of filing and certificate of sersvice (jmp) (Entered: 09/22/1997)

3033

MINUTE ORDER of 9/19/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case #75 C 3295) The court denies the City of Chciago's motion to set aside Magistrate Judge Lefkow's discovery order [3019−1]. The parties are instructed to comply with Magistrate Judge Lefkow's discovery order. (See reverse of minute order) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/29/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 9/25/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 12:00 p.m. 10/2/97 No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/29/1997)

3034

MINUTE ORDER of 9/29/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this order concerns related case #75 C 3295) There having been no objections filed, and after carefully reviewing Magistrate Judge Lefkow's well−reasoned Report &Recommendation ("R), the court adopts the RRin full. The court denies petitioner Farrar's motion to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree [2932−1], [2934−1], [2937−1], [2963−1], [3006−1] without prejudice. If Farrar wishes to replead, she must do so on or by 10/29/97. The parties should attempt to settle this matter before Farrar repleads. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/30/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 10/2/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:15 a.m. 10/8/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/02/1997)

3035 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 08/07/97. Before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. (jmp) Modified on 10/06/1997 (Entered: 10/06/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 10/8/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:30 a.m. 10/28/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/08/1997)

3036 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff by Lawrence V. Jackowiak (jmp) (Entered: 10/10/1997)

3037 ORDER (jmp) (Entered: 10/22/1997)

3038 MINUTE ORDER of 10/21/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Enter order regarding discovery plan. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 10/22/1997)

3039 MOTION by Nona Farrar to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants (Attachments) ; Notice of filing (jmp) Modified on 10/27/1997 (Entered: 10/27/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 10/28/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:30 a.m. 11/20/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/30/1997)

3040 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for leave to unseal sealed files for purposes of responding to discovery requests ; Notice of motion (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (fce) (Entered: 11/26/1997)

3041

MINUTE ORDER of 11/19/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : *(this case involves related case #75 C 3295) Defendant's motion for leave to unseal sealed files for purposes of responding to discovery requests is granted [3040−1]. The Chicago Police Department are hereby authorized to unseal and photocopy any sealed or purged documents, solely for purposes of providing copies of those documents to the undersigned counsel and to counsel for the plaintiffs in this case. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 11/26/1997)

SCHEDULE set on 11/20/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:45 a.m. 12/18/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 11/25/1997)

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12/10/1997
12/10/1997 12/11/1997 12/11/1997
01/26/1998 01/28/1998 01/28/1998
02/20/1998 02/25/1998
03/13/1998 03/20/1998 03/23/1998 03/24/1998 03/25/1998 03/30/1998

3042

MINUTE ORDER of 12/10/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion by petitioner Nona Farrar for status of petition is granted. STatus of petition stated in open court. Motion by Nona Farrar to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants [3039−1] is denied for the reasons stated in open court. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 12/11/1997)

3043 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (mak) (Entered: 12/12/1997)

3044 FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER (mak) (Entered: 12/12/1997)

3045

MINUTE ORDER of 12/11/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter final order and judgment that the enforcement proceedings of Chicago CISPES petitioners be dismissed pursuant to settlement agreement approved by the parties and the court. Telephone pretrial conference set for 12/18/97 is stricken. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 12/12/1997)

3046 MOTION by Countermedia petitioners for order compelling answers to deposition (Attachments); Notice of motion and certificate of service (mak) (Entered: 01/29/1998)

3047 MINUTE ORDER of 1/28/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Countermedia petitioners' motion for order compelling answers to deposition withdrawn [3046−1] No notice (mak) (Entered: 01/29/1998)

3048

MINUTE ORDER of 1/28/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : The court denies defendant the City of Chicago's motion to modify the consent decree and plaintiffs Alliance to End, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and Festial of Life Committee's motion and second amended motion to enforce the City of Chicago's consent decree without prejudice with leave to re−file when discovery is completed. The parties are instructed to file a written agreed status report by 03/13/98. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 01/29/1998)

3049 MOTION by City of Chicago for relief under section 3.1.7.2 of the decree ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 02/26/1998)

3050

MINUTE ORDER of 2/25/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for relief under section 3.1.7.2 of the decree [3049−1] is granted. The City is authorized to retain the videotapes and use them in connection with the litigation surrounding the Alliance petitioners enforecement petition and in connection with the civil case captioned as Tocwish v. Jobian, Case Number 97 C 6098 pursuant to Section 3.1.7.2. of the Decree. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 02/26/1998)

3051 JOINT STATUS REPORT (mak) (Entered: 03/17/1998)

3053 MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs to extend discovery deadline regarding defendant City's motion to modify the consent decree ; Notice of motion and certificate of service. (mak) Modified on 03/31/1998 (Entered: 03/27/1998)

3054 MOTION by ACLU plaintiffs for extension of discovery ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 03/27/1998)

3052 RESPONSEby City of Chicago to plaintiffs' motions to etend the discovery deadline regarding the City's motion to modify the consent decree; Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 03/25/1998)

3055 MINUTE ORDER of 3/25/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Referral order to be entered on Allianceplaintiffs motion to extend discvoery regarding defendant City's motion to modify the consent decree and ACLU plaintiffs' mtoion for extension of discvoery. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 03/27/1998)

3056

REFERRAL ORDER of 03/27/98: Case referred to Hon. Edward A. Bobrick from the Hon. Ann C. Williams to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: Discovery motions as specified: Alliance plaintiffs' motion to extend discovery deadline regarding defendant City's motion to modify the consent decree adn ACLU plaintiffs' motion for extension of discovery, all discovery motions and discovery supervision. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 03/30/1998)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 41 of 71

04/09/1998 04/21/1998
05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/29/1998 06/22/1998 06/22/1998 06/22/1998
07/13/1998 07/13/1998 07/22/1998 07/30/1998

SCHEDULE set on 4/9/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing set before Magistrate Judge Bobrick in Courtroom 1812 for 10:00 4/21/98 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 04/09/1998)

3057

MINUTE ORDER of 4/21/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Alliance plaintiffs' motion to extend discovery deadline regarding defendant City's motion to modify the consent decree [3053−1] is granted as stated in open court. Status hearing held; continued to 10:00 a.m. 6/22/98. Fact discovery to close 06/22/98. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 04/22/1998)

3058 MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members ; Notice of motion/filing and certificate of service (ar) (Entered: 05/28/1998)

3059 BRIEF by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members [3058−1] (ar) (Entered: 05/28/1998)

3060 MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 05/29/1998)

3061 BRIEF by plaintiff in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion against defendatn City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members [3060−1] (Exhibits) (mak) (Entered: 05/29/1998)

3062 MINUTE ORDER of 5/27/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs' motion agaginst defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members [3060−1] is entered and continued to 06/22/98 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 05/29/1998)

3063 MINUTE ORDER of 5/27/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Alliance Plaintiffs' motion to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members [3060−1] is entered and continued to 06/22/98 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 05/29/1998)

3064 SUPPLEMENT by Alliance To End to brief in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion to compel disclosure of CCTF names [3061−1]; Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 06/03/1998)

3065 STIPULATION regarding confidentiality. (lal) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

3066 AGREED ORDER (lal) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

3067

MINUTE ORDER of 6/22/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 a.m. on 8/6/98. Fact discovery to close 08/06/98. Plaintiffs' oral motion to withdraw their motion against defendant, City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members is granted and the motion to compel is hereby withdrawn as stated in open court. [3060−1], [3058−1] Plaintiff to identify experts and submit reports by 08/20/98. Defendant to identify counter−experts and submit reports by 09/10/98. Stipulation regarding confidentiality is granted. Enter Agreed Protective Order. Mailed notice (lal) (Entered: 06/26/1998)

3068 PETITION by Alliance plaintiffs to enforce City consent decree as to CPD's terrorism investigations ; Notice of motion and certificate of service (ar) Modified on 07/27/1998 (Entered: 07/27/1998)

3069 MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of petition to enforce City consent decree as to CPD's terrorism investigations [3068−1 (Attachments) (ar) Modified on 07/27/1998 (Entered: 07/27/1998)

3070 MINUTE ORDER of 7/22/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs' petition to enforce City consent decree as to CPD's terrorism investigations is denied without prejudice [3068−1]. No notice (ar) (Entered: 07/27/1998)

3071

REFERRAL ORDER of 07/29/98: Referral to Hon. Edward A. Bobrick from Hon. Ann C. Williams pursuant to General Rule 2.41(b). The reaons for my recommendation is to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: Referral made for setting date for refiling of City of Chicago's motion to modify the consent decree; setting of briefing schedule on

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 42 of 71

08/06/1998
08/18/1998 08/27/1998 08/27/1998 09/01/1998 09/01/1998 09/01/1998 09/04/1998 09/08/1998 09/10/1998 09/10/1998 09/10/1998 09/10/1998 09/14/1998 09/17/1998 09/17/1998

motion and to conduct necessary proceedings and enter report and recommendation on motion. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 07/31/1998)

3072

MINUTE ORDER of 8/6/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held; continued to 10:00 9/8/98. Fact discovery to close 09/08/98 pertaining to defendant's petition to modify. Fact discovery to close 11/05/98 pertaining to Alliance's petition to enforce consent decree relating to the Democratic National Convention of 1996. Defendants' amended motion to modify the consent decree (with a 12m statement attached) to be filed by 09/01/98. Plaintiffs' responses (2 separate briefs and 12n statements attached) to be filed by 10/01/98. Defendants' reply to be filed by 10/22/98. Parties' agreed oral motion to exceed page limitation on all briefs is granted as stated in open court. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 08/07/1998)

3073 MOTION by Amer Civil Liberties to enter stipulated protective order (Exhibit); Notice of motion; Amended notice of motion (ar) Modified on 08/28/1998 (Entered: 08/28/1998)

3074 STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER (mak) (Entered: 08/28/1998)

3075 MINUTE ORDER of 8/27/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Plaintiff's motion to enter stipulated protective order [3073−1] is granted, there being no objections. Enter stipulated protective order. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 08/28/1998)

3076 MOTION of City of Chicago to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 09/02/1998)

3077 MEMORANDUM of City of Chicago in support of renewed motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1] (Exhibits) (mak) (Entered: 09/02/1998)

3078 RULE 12(M) Statement of undisputed material facts in support of its renewed motion to modify the ll982 Alliance consent decree (Exhibits). (mak) (Entered: 09/02/1998)

3079 BRIEF of Amicus Curiae Chicago by Chgo Crime Comm in support of the City of Chciago's motion to modify Consent Decree (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 09/09/1998)

SCHEDULE set on 9/8/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 9/23/98. Fact discovery is closed as stated in open court. Three Protective Orders to follow . No notice (tmh) (Entered: 09/08/1998)

3080 AGREED MOTION for entry of agreed stipulated protective order (mak) (Entered: 09/15/1998)

3081 AGREED STIULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER (Attachments) (mak) (Entered: 09/15/1998)

3082 MINUTE ORDER of 9/10/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Agreed motion for entry of agreed stipulated protective order granted [3080−1]. Enter Agreed stipulated protective order. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 09/15/1998)

3084 MOTION by City of Chicago to place filing under seal (Attachments); Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 09/18/1998)

3083 AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF by IL St Police; Notice of filing; Introduction. (mak) (Entered: 09/16/1998)

3085 ORDER (mak) (Entered: 09/18/1998)

3086

MINUTE ORDER of 9/17/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Defendants, City of Chicago's unopposed motion to place filing under seal [3084−1] is granted as stated in open court. The Clerk of the court is directed to place under seal Exhibit 5 attached to the Brief in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion against defendant City to compel disccclosuyre of the names of CPD CCTF Members that appears in the court file; and to place under seal the Exhibits to supplement to brief in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion to compel disclosure of CCTF names, if said exhibits are in court file. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 09/18/1998)

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09/22/1998 09/23/1998
09/24/1998 09/25/1998 09/29/1998 09/29/1998 10/28/1998 10/30/1998
11/06/1998 11/12/1998
11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/18/1998 11/19/1998

3087 MOTION of City of Chicago to file corrected memorandum instanter ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 09/24/1998)

3088

MINUTE ORDER of 9/23/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendant City of Chicago's unopposed motion to file corrected memorandum instanter [3087−1] is granted as stated in open court. Plaintiff's response to defendant City's renewed motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1] is to be filed by 11/05/98. Defendant's reply to be filed by 11/27/98. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 09/24/1998)

3092 NOTICE of filing regarding motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1] (mak) (Entered: 10/06/1998)

3091 MOTION by FBI for leave to file a brief Amicus Curiae ; Notice of motion (mak) (Entered: 10/01/1998)

3089 ORDER on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion for leave to file a brief Amicus Curiae (mak) (Entered: 09/30/1998)

3090 MINUTE ORDER of 9/29/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Enter Order. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's motion for leave to file a brief Amicus Curiae is granted there being no objection. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 09/30/1998)

3093 MOTION by ACLU plaintiffs for extension fo time to file response brief ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 11/02/1998)

3094

MINUTE ORDER of 10/30/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : ACLU plaintiffs' unopposed motion for extension of time to file response brief granted [3093−1]. Plaintiffs' response brief to defendant City's renewed motion to modify the l982 consent decree [3076−1] is to be filed by 11/17/98. Defendant's reply to be filed by 12/09/98. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 11/02/1998)

3095 MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for extension of time to complete certain discovery or in the alternative to compel response (Exhibits); Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3096

MINUTE ORDER of 11/12/98 by Hon. Morton Denlow : Defendant's motion for extension of time to extend discovery cutoff for specified discovery requests [3095−1−2] is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is to answer interrogatories #16 and #18 and produce documents to request 7 and 8 on or before 12/10/98. Defendant's motion to answer #17 is denied. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3097 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alliance To End to defendant City of Chicago's statement of material facts; Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3098 MOTION by plaintiffs Alliance To End for an interpretation of City Consent Decree (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3099 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alliance To End in support of motion for an interpretation of City Consent Decree [3098−1] (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3100 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alliance To End in support of their motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding Ciuty's motion to modify consent decree (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3101 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Alliance To End in opposition to defendant City's motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1] (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3102 APPENDIX filed by plaintiff Alliance To End in opposition to defendant City's motion to modify consent decree [3101−1] (Two volumes: 3102−1 − 3102−1) (mak) (Entered: 11/17/1998)

3103 AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to file response brief instanter ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 11/20/1998)

3104 MINUTE ORDER of 11/19/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : motion for leave to file response brief instanter granted ACLU Plaintiffs' agreed motion for leave to file response brief instanter [3103−1] is granted. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered:

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 44 of 71

11/19/1998 11/19/1998 11/24/1998 12/08/1998 12/08/1998 12/09/1998
12/10/1998 12/29/1998 01/04/1999
01/05/1999
01/05/1999
01/05/1999 01/05/1999 01/06/1999 01/06/1999 01/07/1999
01/07/1999 01/08/1999

11/20/1998)

3105 RESPONSE by ACLU plaintiffs to renewed motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1] (Attachment) (mak) (Entered: 11/20/1998)

3106 LOCAL RULE 12(N) STATEMENT by ACLU plaintiffs (ar) (Entered: 11/23/1998)

SCHEDULE set on 11/24/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing reset from 10:00 11/30/98 to 10:00 12/9/98 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/24/1998)

SCHEDULE set on 12/8/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held. Status hearing set for 12/9/98 is stricken. Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 12/08/1998)

3107 AGREED MOTION for extension of time too file reply brief in support of its motion to modify decree ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 12/09/1998)

3108

MINUTE ORDER of 12/9/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing set for 12/09/98 is stricken and reest to 01/05/99 at 10:00 a.m. Defendant's unopposed motion to extend time to file reply brief to and including 01/04/99 decree granted [3107−1]. Reply brief to motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1] due 1/4/99. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 12/09/1998)

3109 STATEMENT by defendant as amicus curiae (fce) (Entered: 12/16/1998)

3114 MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to file amicus brief instanter ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

3110 MINUTE ORDER of 1/4/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing set for 01/05/99 is stricken and reset to 10:00 1/7/99. Defendant's oral request for a one−day extension of tiem to file reply brief is granted. Reply brief to be filed by 01/05/99. Telephoned notice (mak) (Entered: 01/06/1999)

3111 CONSOLIDATED REPLY memorandum of the City of Chicago in support of its renewed motion to modify the l982 Alliance Consent Decree [3076−1] with oppositioon to Alliance plaintiffs motions for hearing and constructionof the decree (mak) (Entered: 01/06/1999)

3111 CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to the Alliance plaintiffs' motions for an evidentiary hearing and construction of the Consent Decree [3098−1] by City of Chicago with reply memorandum (mak) (Entered: 01/06/1999)

3112 REPLY to the Alliance Plaintiffs' response to defendant City of Chicago's statement of material facts [3097−1] (Exhibits) (mak) (Entered: 01/06/1999)

3113 RESPONSE by City of Chicago to the ACLU's statement of facts under Local Rule 12(N)(Exhibits) (mak) (Entered: 01/06/1999)

3115 MINUTE ORDER of 1/6/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion for leave to file amicus brief instanter granted [3114−1]. No notice (mak) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

3116 AMICUS BRIEF of concerned citizens of the City of Chicago in support of Alliance Plaintiffs (mak) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

3117

MINUTE ORDER of 1/7/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held continued to 10:00 a.m. 1/14/99. Plaintiff's oral motion for leave to file sur−reply brief is denied at this time. If deemed necessary, the court will notify parties for additional briefing. Ruling to be by mail. Mailed notice by magistrate judge's staff. (mak) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

3118 REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to response to motion for an interpretation of City Consent Decree [3098−1] (Attachments); Notice of filing and certificate of service. (mak) (Entered: 01/11/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 1/8/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing reset from 10:00 1/14/99 to 10:00 1/20/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 01/08/1999)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 45 of 71

01/14/1999 01/20/1999 01/20/1999
01/25/1999 01/27/1999 02/03/1999
02/17/1999 02/26/1999 03/09/1999 03/09/1999
03/11/1999
03/12/1999 03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/15/1999

3120 THIRD AMENDED PETITION by Alliance Plaintiffs, Countermedia, Active Resistance ORganizing Collective and Auronomous Zone's to enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree (mak) Modified on 10/19/1999 (Entered: 01/25/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 1/20/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 2/3/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 01/20/1999)

3121

MINUTE ORDER of 1/20/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Countermedia Petitioners' motion to set trial date [3119−1] is entered and continued generally. Third Amended Alliance plaintiffs, Countermedia, Active Resistance Organizing Collective and Autonomous Zone's petition to enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree [3120−1] to be referred to magistrate judge Bobrick for hearing. Response to said petition to be filed by 02/17/99. Reply to be filed by 03/03/99. Parties to file a one−page written status report by 05/07/99. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 01/25/1999)

3119 MOTION by Countermedia Petitioners' to set trial date ; Notice of motion. (mak) Modified on 10/19/1999 (Entered: 01/25/1999)

3122 REFERRAL ORDER of 01/25/99: Referring to Hon. Edward A. Bobrick the motion to enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree [3120−1] to enter Order/Report and Recommendation (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (mak) Modified on 01/28/1999 (Entered: 01/28/1999)

3123

MINUTE ORDER of 2/3/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held; continued to 9:30 2/26/99. Defendant's oral motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead by 02/26/99. Attorney Richard Gutman to be available by telephone for the status hearing on 02/26/99 at 9:30 Chicago time. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 02/04/1999)

3124 UNCONTESTED MOTION by CounterMedia for leave to file fourth amended petition ; Notice of motion and certificate of service. (dmkf) Modified on 03/04/1999 (Entered: 03/01/1999)

3125 MINUTE ORDER of 2/26/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick: Uncontested Countermedia petitioners' motion for leave to file fourth amended petition is granted parties to contact chambers with a settlement conference dated [3124−1]. Status hearing held. Mailed notice (dmkf) (Entered: 03/01/1999)

3126 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning motion to enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree [3120−1] (mak) (Entered: 03/10/1999)

3127

MINUTE ORDER of 3/9/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick: Report and recommendation regarding motion of defendants City of Chicago, et al to modify the consent decree in two cases is hereby submitted to Judge Williams. This court recommends that the defendants' motion for modification of the consent decree by denied. Mailed by judge's staff notice (mak) Modified on 03/10/1999 (Entered: 03/10/1999)

3128

MINUTE ORDER of 3/11/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Magistrate Judge Bobrick has submitted a report and recommendation ("R) that the City of Chicago's motion to modify the consent decree be denied. Copies are available in chambers, Room 1988. Objections are due by 03/25/99. The court will notify parties if responses are required. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 03/12/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 3/12/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Settlement conference set for 11:00 4/26/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 03/12/1999)

3129 OBJECTIONS to [3126−1] Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of March 9, l999; Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 03/16/1999)

3130 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for leave to file memornadum in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99 and to file record of materials before the magistrate judge Notice of motion. (tlm) (Entered: 03/19/1999)

3132 APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS o Rule 12(m) Statement with Exhibits (two volumes) (mak) (Entered: 03/22/1999)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 46 of 71

03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/17/1999
03/22/1999 03/23/1999
03/24/1999
04/05/1999 04/05/1999 04/05/1999 04/09/1999 04/09/1999 04/15/1999 04/23/1999 04/23/1999 04/26/1999

3133 MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for summary judgment ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 03/24/1999)

3134 MEMORANDUM by Chgo, Cty of in support of motion for summary judgment [3133−1] (mak) (Entered: 03/24/1999)

3135 STATEMENT of facts pursuant to Local Rule 12(m) by Chgo, Cty of (mak) (Entered: 03/24/1999)

3131

MINUTE ORDER of 3/17/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for leave to file memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99 and [3130−1] to file record of materials the magistrate judge granted [3130−2] to and including 04/05/99. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 03/19/1999)

3137 MOTION by ACLU for leave to file memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Bobrick's report and recommendation ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 03/25/1999)

3136

MINUTE ORDER of 3/23/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendants' motion for summary judgment [3133−1], memorandumin support of motion for summary judgment, 12(m) statement and appendix of exhibits is entered and continued. Briefing to be set after the settlement conference on 04/26/99. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 03/24/1999)

3138

MINUTE ORDER of 3/24/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : ACLU's motion for leave to file memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Bobrick's report and recommendation granted [3137−1]. City of Chicago to file its objections and memorandum in support and record of materials held by the magistrate judge on 04/05/99. All other objections and memorandum in support and response to City of Chicago objections to be filed on 05/03/99. Replies limited to 10 pages to be filed on 05/17/99. Mailed notice (mak) (Entered: 03/25/1999)

3139 MEMORANDUM of City of Chicago in support of its objections [3129−1] to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation (Appendices); Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 04/06/1999)

3140 RECORD ON OBJECTIONS to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99 (Eight volumes: 3140−1 through 3140−8) through (mak) (Entered: 04/06/1999)

3141 BRIEF of the Illinois State Police as Amicus Curiae in support of the City's objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation [3129−1]; Notice of filing. (mak) (Entered: 04/06/1999)

3142 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for leave to file corrected appendix ; Notice of motion. (fce) (Entered: 04/16/1999)

3144 CORRECTED appendix of exhibits to rule 12(m) statement by Chgo, Cty of; (Volumes I and II) (fce) (Entered: 04/16/1999)

3143 MINUTE ORDER of 4/15/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendant's motion for leave to file corrected appendix of exhibits is granted without objection [3142−1]. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 04/16/1999)

3146 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for leave to file supplemental record on objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendations of March 9, 1999 ; Notice of motion. (fce) (Entered: 04/29/1999)

3147 SUPPLEMENTAL record on objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of March 9, 1999 by Chgo, Cty of; (Attachments); Notice of filing. (fce) Modified on 04/29/1999 (Entered: 04/29/1999)

3145

MINUTE ORDER of 4/26/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Settlement conference held. Defendant not available to settlement at this time. Plaintiffs' response to defendants' motion for summary judgment [3133−1] and 12(n) statement to be filed by 6/4/99. Defendants reply to be filed by 6/25/99. Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 04/27/1999)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 47 of 71

04/28/1999
04/28/1999 04/28/1999 05/05/1999
05/07/1999 05/13/1999 05/13/1999 05/17/1999 05/18/1999 05/19/1999
05/24/1999 06/03/1999
06/10/1999 06/11/1999 06/11/1999 06/11/1999 06/11/1999 06/25/1999 06/28/1999

3148 MINUTE ORDER of 4/28/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion for leave to file supplemental record on objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendations of March 9, 1999 is granted [3146−1]. Mailed notice (fce) Modified on 04/29/1999 (Entered: 04/29/1999)

3149 MINUTE ORDER of 4/28/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion for leave to file supplemental record on objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is granted. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 05/03/1999)

3150 MOTION by American Civil Liberties for extension of time to file response brief ; Notice (fce) (Entered: 05/07/1999)

3151 MINUTE ORDER of 5/5/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : ACLU plaintiffs motion for extension of time to file response brief from 5/3/99 to 5/13/99 and objections is granted [3150−1]. Date for filing reply briefs is extended to 5/20/99. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 05/07/1999)

3152 STATUS REPORT by plaintiff Alliance To End; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 05/10/1999)

3153 RESPONSE by the ACLU plaintiffs to the City's objections to Magistrate Judge's 3/9/99 report and recommendation [3129−1] (fce) (Entered: 05/14/1999)

3154 REQUEST by ACLU for adoption of magistrate's report and recommendation with modifications (fce) (Entered: 05/14/1999)

3157 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for additional time to file reply , and for leave to file an oversized reply memorandum in support of objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation of March 9, 1999 ; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 05/27/1999)

3155 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alliance To End to defendant City's objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of March 9, 1999 [3129−1]; Notice; (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 05/19/1999)

3158

MINUTE ORDER of 5/19/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for additional time to and including 6/10/99 [3157−1] and for leave to file an oversized reply memorandum up to 20 pages in support of objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation of March 9, 1999 is granted [3157−2]. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 05/27/1999)

3156 REPLY by plaintiff Alliance To End to ACLU plaintiffs' objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation [3129−1]; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 05/25/1999)

3159 MINUTE ORDER of 6/3/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick: Plaintiff's oral motion for extension of time to file response to defendants' motion for summary judgment and 12(n) statement by 6/11/99 is granted. Defendants' reply to be filed by 7/2/99 [3133−1]. Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 06/04/1999)

3160 CONSOLIDATED reply memorandum by Chgo, Cty of in support of its objection to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of 3/9/99 [3129−1]; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 06/11/1999)

3161 MEMORANDUM by Countermedia in opposition to City's motion for summary judgment [3133−1]; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 06/14/1999)

3162 RESPONSE by Countermedia to City's statement of facts pursuant to local rule 12(m) [3135−1] (fce) (Entered: 06/14/1999)

3163 APPENDIX filed by Countermedia to petitioners' memorandum in opposition to City's motion for summary judgment [3161−1] (fce) (Entered: 06/14/1999)

3164 APPENDIX filed by Countermedia to memorandum in opposition to City's motion for summary judgment [3161−1]; (4 Volumes: 3164−1 through 3164−4) (fce) (Entered: 06/14/1999)

3167 UNOPPOSED MOTION by City of Chicago for extension of time to file its reply brief ; Notice. (lal) (Entered: 07/08/1999)

3165 MOTION by plaintiffs for discovery regarding 2/27/99, police photography (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 07/01/1999)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 48 of 71

06/30/1999 07/07/1999
07/16/1999 07/16/1999 07/16/1999
07/21/1999
07/23/1999 07/26/1999 07/26/1999 07/28/1999
07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 08/02/1999 08/05/1999
08/05/1999

3166 MINUTE ORDER of 6/30/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 2/27/99, police photography [3165−1] is continued to 7/16/99 at 9:00 a.m. No notice (fce) (Entered: 07/01/1999)

3168 MINUTE ORDER of 7/7/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's unopposed motion for extension of time to and including 07/16/99 to file its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment is granted. [3167−1] Mailed notice (lal) (Entered: 07/08/1999)

3169 DECLARATION of Robert Boyle; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 07/19/1999)

3170 MOTION by the City of Chicago for extension of time on the briefing schedule on its motion for summary judgment ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 07/22/1999)

3172

MINUTE ORDER of 7/16/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs motion for discovery regarding 2/27/99 police photography to be held before Magistrate Judge Bobrick. Referral order to follow. Order is to be entered within a short date regarding stay of the statue as it relates to this matter. Status hearing set for 9/23/99 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 07/26/1999)

3171 MINUTE ORDER of 7/21/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : The City of Chicago's unopposed motion for extension of time from 07/16/99 to 07/23/99 to file reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment is granted [3170−1] [3133−1]. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 07/23/1999 (Entered: 07/22/1999)

3174 AGREED motion by Chgo, Cty of for extension of time to file its reply ; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 07/29/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 7/26/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing reset to 9:00 9/24/99 . Mailed notice (dl) (Entered: 07/26/1999)

3173 REFERRAL ORDER of 7/26/99: The case is referred to the Hon. Edward A. Bobrick pursuant to general rule 2.41(b) for discovery motions specified below (For further details see order). Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 07/27/1999)

3175 MINUTE ORDER of 7/28/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendants' agreed motion for extension of time to file its reply is granted without objection [3174−1]. Defendants' reply brief to be filed by 7/30/99. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 07/29/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 7/30/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing set for 9:00 8/10/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 07/30/1999)

3177 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to strike affidavit of Jeffrey Perlstein (Attachment); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3178 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of leave to file oversized brief instanter (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3179 REPLY by Chgo, Cty of in support of its motion for summary judgment (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3180 STATEMENT of facts pursuant to local rule 12(n)(3) by Chgo, Cty of (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3181 EXHIBITS by Chgo, Cty to rule 12(n) statement [3180−1] (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3176 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support its motion for discovery regarding 2/27/99, police photography [3165−1]; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 08/04/1999)

3182

MINUTE ORDER of 8/5/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendant, City of Chicago's motion for leave to file oversized brief instanter is granted without objection [3178−1]. Defendant, City of Chicago's motion to strike affidavit of Jeffrey Perlstein [3177−1] is entered and continued to 8/10/99 at 9:00 a.m. by telephone. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3183 ORDER (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 49 of 71

08/05/1999 08/10/1999
08/20/1999 08/25/1999 08/27/1999
08/27/1999 09/02/1999 09/21/1999
09/24/1999 09/30/1999
10/01/1999 10/01/1999 10/01/1999 10/04/1999 10/05/1999 10/06/1999 10/07/1999

3184 MINUTE ORDER of 8/5/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter order concerning the tolling of any limitations period during the pendency of the City's investigation into an incident of alleged photography. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

3185

MINUTE ORDER of 8/10/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendant withdraws its motion to strike the affidavit of Jeffrey Perlstein, with leave to reinstate in the event that Mr. Perlstein is designated a witness at trial in this matter and he is not made available by the plaintiff for a timely deposition. Defendant to file a response to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 2/27/99, police photography by 8/17/99. Alliance plaintiffs' to file a reply by 8/31/99. Telephone status hearing held. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 08/11/1999)

3187 AGREED motion by Chgo, Cty of for leave to file brief instanter ; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 08/30/1999)

3186 COPY of 1997 Annual Compliance Audit First Amendment Audit 98−1 (1 vol.) (ar) (Entered: 08/26/1999)

3188 MINUTE ORDER of 8/27/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendant, City of Chicago's agreed motion for leave to file brief instanter is granted [3187−1]. Plaintiffs to file their reply brief by 9/3/99 [3165−1]. Telephoned notice (fce) (Entered: 08/30/1999)

3189 RESPONSE by Chgo, Cty of in opposition to Allicance plaintiff's motion for discovery concerning potential petition to enforce (Attachments) [3165−1] (fce) (Entered: 08/30/1999)

3190 REPLY memorandum by plaintiff in support of plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 2/27/99, police photography [3165−1] (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 09/03/1999)

3191 MINUTE ORDER of 9/21/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Enter memorandum order. Plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 2/27/99, police photography is denied [3165−1]. (Entered memorandum order) Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 09/22/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 9/24/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 10/20/99 . No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/28/1999)

3192

MINUTE ORDER of 9/30/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : For the reasons set forth above the court adopts the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Bobrick as modified in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court therefore denies the City's motion to modify the l982 Alliance consent decree [3076−1]. The court also denies as moot Alliance plaintiff's motion to interpret the consent decrees (3098−1), Countermedia plaintiff's motion to set a trial date (3119−1) and plaintiffs' third amended petition to enforce the consent decree as moot (3120−1). [3119−1] [3120−1]. (Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order) Mailed notice (emd) (Entered: 09/30/1999)

3193 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to Magistrate Judge's 9/21/99 memorandum order (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 10/04/1999)

3194 REPLY by plaintiffs to 9/22/99 City of Chicago motion to consider the ACLU's petition in adjudicating City's motion to modify decree (fce) (Entered: 10/04/1999)

3195 RECORD on objections by plaintiff to magistrate judge's 9/21/99, memorandum order (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 10/04/1999)

3196 MOTION by ACLU for extension of time to file reply brief ; Notice of filing (eav) (Entered: 10/06/1999)

3197 NOTICE of change of address of Lawrence V. Jackowiak (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 10/07/1999)

3198 MOTION by Countermedia petitioner to alter 9/30/99, opinion and order denying their enforecement petition as moot ; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 10/15/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 10/7/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 10/13/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/07/1999)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 50 of 71

10/12/1999 10/13/1999
10/15/1999
10/19/1999 10/20/1999
10/22/1999 10/22/1999 10/25/1999 10/25/1999 10/25/1999 10/25/1999 10/26/1999 10/27/1999
10/28/1999

SCHEDULE set on 10/12/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion hearing held. Telephoned notice (dl) (Entered: 10/12/1999)

3199

MINUTE ORDER of 10/13/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Countermedia Petitioners' motion to alter 9/30/99, opinion and order denying their enforecement petition as moot is granted [3198−1]. Order regarding said motion to be entered within a short date. Plaintiff ACLU's motion for extension of time to and including 10/20/99 to file reply brief is granted [3196−1]. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 10/15/1999)

3200

MINUTE ORDER of 10/15/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pursuant to palintiff CounterMedia's motion to alter the 9/30/99 opinion and order, the court now strikes those portions of its 9/30/99 memorandum opinion and order denying as moot both CounterMedia's motion to set a trial date and plaintiffs' third amended petition to enforce the consent decree. Therefore the court reinstates both motions and will issue a ruling within a short date after Magistrate Judge Bobrick submits his report and recommendation. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 10/19/1999)

3201 REQUEST by Alliance plaintiffs for decision (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 10/22/1999)

3202

MINUTE ORDER of 10/20/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs' request for decision is granted [3201−1]. Referral order to be entered on Alliance plaintiffs' attorney's fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI Consent Decree. Date for filing response to objections to magistrates judge's 9/21/99 memorandum order is extended to 11/10/99. Leave is granted to file reply brief in support of petition to enforce consent decree relating to reported spying by the City of Chicago in excess of 15 pages but limited to 20 pages. Status hearing held. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 10/22/1999)

3203 RESPONSE by defendant FBI to the Alliance plaintiffs' request fo ra decision (fce) (Entered: 10/25/1999)

3204 REFERRAL ORDER of 10/22/99: The case is referred to the Hon. Edward A. Bobrick pursuant to Local Rule 72.1 to perform such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 10/25/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 10/25/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 11/3/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/25/1999)

3205 PETITION by Raymond Risley to enforce the City of Chicago Consent decree (fce) (Entered: 10/26/1999)

3206 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Raymond Risley by Kenneth Paul Dobbs, Roger Sanford Hutchison (fce) (Entered: 10/26/1999)

3214 NOTICE by Raymond Risley regarding motion to enforce the City of Chicago Consent decree [3205−1] (fce) (Entered: 11/09/1999)

3207 BILL OF COSTS submitted by Richard Gutman, attorney for Alliance plaintiffs; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 10/27/1999)

3208

MINUTE ORDER of 10/27/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Report and recommendation regarding defendant City of Chicago's motion for summary judgment on the fourth amended petition of Alliance plaintiffs active resistance organizing committee, the Autonomous Zone and CounterMedia, to enforce the consent decree to which the parties agreed in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 74 c 3268 and American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago 75 C 3295 is hereby submitted to Judge Williams. This court recommends that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. (Entered report and recommendation regarding motion for summary judgment [3133−1]) Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 10/28/1999)

3209 NOTICE OF APPEAL from motion minute order [3192−1] (FEE DUE) (mak) (Entered: 11/01/1999)

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10/28/1999 11/01/1999 11/01/1999 11/01/1999 11/03/1999
11/04/1999 11/04/1999 11/05/1999 11/08/1999 11/09/1999 11/10/1999
11/10/1999
11/12/1999
11/15/1999
11/15/1999
11/23/1999 11/24/1999 11/24/1999 11/29/1999
11/30/1999

3210 LETTER regarding docketing statement by City of Chicago, unacknowledged . (mak) (Entered: 11/01/1999)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal appeal [3209−1] . Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) (Entered: 11/01/1999)

3211 BILL OF COSTS submitted by plaintiff; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/03/1999)

3215 MOTION by Raymond Risley to attach exhibit to petition (Attachment); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/09/1999)

3216 MINUTE ORDER of 11/3/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Plaintiff/Petitioner Raymond Risley's motion to attach exhibit to petition is granted [3215−1]. Referral order to be entered on Raymond Risley's petitioner to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 11/09/1999)

3212 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal [3209−1] USCA 99−3825 (fce) (Entered: 11/05/1999)

3213 CIRCUIT Rule 3(b) Notice (fce) (Entered: 11/05/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 11/5/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing set for 9:00 11/12/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/05/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 11/8/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing reset from 9:00 11/12/99 to 11:00 11/10/99 . No notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/08/1999)

3217 NOTICE by Chgo Cty of regating 1997 Chicago Police Dept annual compliance audit (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 11/10/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 11/10/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held and continued by telephone to 9:00 11/30/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/10/1999)

3218 REFERRAL ORDER of 11/10/99 The case is referred to the Hon. Edward A. Bobrick pursuant to Local Rule 72.1. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (fce) Modified on 12/03/1999 (Entered: 11/12/1999)

3219 OBJECTIONS by Countermedia petitioner's to magistrate's 10/27/99 report and recommendation regarding City's motion for summary judgment [3208−1] (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/15/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 11/15/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing set before Magistrate Judge Bobrick in Courtroom 1812 for 10:00 11/29/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/15/1999)

3220 COPY of Order from the 7th Circuit. It is ordered that the motion is granted. The record on appeal in this matter is due by 12/13/99. (99−3825) (fce) (Entered: 11/16/1999)

3223 MOTION by Cty of Chgo for extension of time to file response to objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation ; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 12/03/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 11/24/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 12/1/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 11/24/1999)

3221 RESPONSE by Countermedia petitioners to City's motion for extension of time; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 11/26/1999)

3222

MINUTE ORDER of 11/29/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendant to file motion to dismiss under F.R.Cv.P. 12(b)(6) by 1/7/00. Raymond Risely and any plaintiff to file responses by 2/1/00. Defendant to file reply by 2/22/00. Status hearing held and continued to 2/22/00 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 11/30/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 11/30/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held and continued by telephone to 9:00 12/7/99 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/30/1999)

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12/01/1999
12/07/1999 12/08/1999 12/09/1999 12/10/1999 12/10/1999
12/15/1999 12/27/1999 12/27/1999 12/27/1999 12/29/1999 12/29/1999 12/29/1999 01/04/2000 01/04/2000 01/08/2000 01/10/2000
01/10/2000

3224 MINUTE ORDER of 12/1/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for extension of time to file response to objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation is granted to and including 12/15/99 [3223−1]. Reply to be filed by 12/29/99. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 12/03/1999)

SCHEDULE set on 12/7/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held. No notice (tmh) (Entered: 12/08/1999)

3225 SUPPLEMENTAL attorney's fees computation for monitoring and enforcing compliance with FBI consent decree by plaintiffs (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 12/09/1999)

3250 STIPULATION TO DESIGNATE Certain Items of District Court Record for transmittal to the Court of Appeals record no. 99−3825 (mak) (Entered: 02/14/2000)

3226 COPY of Order from the 7th Circuit. It is ordered that the motion is granted. The district court shall file the record on appeal with the clerk of this court by 1/10/00. (99−3825) (fce) (Entered: 12/13/1999)

3227

MINUTE ORDER of 12/10/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Report and recommendation regarding motion of the Alliance plaintiffs for attorney's fees incurred in monitoring FBI compliance with the consent decree in 74 C 3268 is hereby submitted to Judge Williams. This court recommends that the plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees be denied. (Entered report and recommendation) Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 12/13/1999)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER of 12/15/99: Case reassigned to Hon. Joan B. Gottschall. (nlf) (Entered: 12/17/1999)

3228 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to the 12/10/99, magistrate's report and recommendation regarding attorney's fees against the FBI; Notice. (fce) (Entered: 12/29/1999)

3229 APPENDIX filed by plaintiff to Alliance plaintifs' objections to the 12/10/99, magistrate's report and recommendation regarding attorney's fees against the FBI [3228−1] (fce) (Entered: 12/29/1999)

3230 AMENDED attorney's fees request by plaintiffs for monitoring and enforcing complaince with FBI consent decree (Attachments) (fce) (Entered: 12/29/1999)

3235 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for attorney fees for City consent decree monitoring (Attachments). (tlm) (Entered: 01/24/2000)

3236 MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion for attorney fees for City of Chicago consent decree monitoring (Attachments). [3235−1] (tlm) (Entered: 01/24/2000)

3237 NOTICE of motion and certificate of service by Alliance plaintiffs for supplemental motion for attorney fees for City consent decree monitoring [3235−1] (tlm) (Entered: 01/26/2000)

3231 LETTER dated 12/29/99 from R. Joseph Sher to Clerk of Court (fce) (Entered: 01/05/2000)

3232 MOTION by parties upon consent to establish a briefing schedule (Attachment); (fce) (Entered: 01/05/2000)

RECEIPT No. 10611685 in the amount of $105.00 for payment of appeal. (mak) (Entered: 01/09/2001)

3233 REFERRAL ORDER of 1/10/00 The case is referred to the Hon. Edward A. Bobrick pursuant to Local Rule 72.1 to conduct necessary proceedings and enter order/report and recommendation on nondispositive pretrial motions. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 01/11/2000)

3234 COPY of Order from the 7th Circuit. It is ordered that the motion is granted. The district court shall file the record on appeal with the clerk of this court by 2/4/00. (Attachments) (99−3825) (fce) (Entered: 01/11/2000)

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01/20/2000 01/25/2000 01/26/2000 01/26/2000
01/26/2000
01/27/2000 02/01/2000 02/01/2000 02/01/2000 02/01/2000 02/03/2000
02/07/2000 02/09/2000
02/10/2000 02/14/2000 02/22/2000
02/24/2000

3241 AGREED MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for leave to file instanter response to objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ; Notice (Attachment) (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2000)

3238 MOTION by respondent FBI to modify the briefing schedule (tlm) (Entered: 01/27/2000)

3239 MINUTE ORDER of 1/26/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing on ACLU's petition for fees is set to 10:00 a.m. on 04/13/2000 before Magistrate Judge Bobrick. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 01/27/2000)

3240

MINUTE ORDER of 1/26/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Defendants, City of Chicago to file response to Alliance plaintiffs' supplemental motion for attorney fees for City consent decree monitoring by 03/13/00. [3235−1] Alliance plaintiffs' to file a reply by 04/10/2000. Telephone status hearing held and continued by telphone to 2:30 p.m. on 2/10/2000. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 01/27/2000)

3242 MINUTE ORDER of 1/26/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion for leave to file instanter response to objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation instanter and petitioners to file reply on or before 02/09/2000 is granted. [3241−1] Telephoned notice (tlm) (Entered: 01/28/2000)

RESPONSE by Chgo Cty of to counter−media petitioner's objections to Judge Bobrick's report &recommendation concerning Counter−Media Petition to enforement; Notice (mak) Modified on 01/13/2003 (Entered: 01/06/2003)

3243 MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 alliance consent decree (Attachments); Notice. (tlm) (Entered: 02/02/2000)

3244 LETTER from defendant FBI to Clerk dated 01/31/00. (tlm) (Entered: 02/04/2000)

3245 BRIEF by defendant in support of the Magistrate Judge's 12/10/99 Report and Recommendation denying the Alliance Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees (Attachments). [3227−1] (tlm) (Entered: 02/04/2000)

3248 MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Concent Decree ; Notice. (tlm) (Entered: 02/11/2000)

3247

CERTIFIED copy of Order from the 7th Circuit. Upon consideration fot he defendant−appellant's motion for an extension of time to file record on appeal, filed on 02/01/2000, by counsel for appellant, It is ordered that the motion is granted. The district court shall file the record on appeal with the clerk of this court by 02/11/2000. (99−3825) (tlm) (Entered: 02/09/2000)

3246 REPLY by CounterMedia petitioners to City response regarding Magistrate's 10/27/99, Report and Recommendation; Notice (yap) (Entered: 02/08/2000)

3249 MINUTE ORDER of 2/9/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Answer brief to motion due 03/22/2000. [3248−1] Reply to answer brief due 4/19/2000. Ruling on motion of City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Consent Decree will be by mail. Status report due 3/10/2000. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 02/11/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 2/10/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing hearing reset from 2:30 2/10/00 to 1:30 2/24/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 02/10/2000)

3251 REPLY to FBI's brief in support of Magistrate's Report and Recommendation by Alliance Plaintiffs (Attachments); Notice. (tlm) (Entered: 02/17/2000)

3252

MINUTE ORDER of 2/22/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Plaintiff's oral motion to extend briefing schedule on the motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs' response to be filed by 02/25/00. Alliance plaintiffs' response to be filed by 03/01/00. Defendants' reply to be filed by 03/22/00. Ruling will be by mail. Mailed notice by judge's staff (tlm) (Entered: 02/23/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 2/24/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing hearing held and continued by telephone to 3:00 3/23/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 02/24/2000)

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03/01/2000 03/07/2000 03/09/2000
03/15/2000
03/22/2000 03/23/2000 03/23/2000 03/24/2000 03/27/2000 03/27/2000 03/29/2000 04/05/2000 04/05/2000 04/06/2000 04/12/2000 04/12/2000 04/13/2000

3253 RESPONSE by ACLU's to City's motion to dismiss petition of Raymond Risley; Notice. (tlm) (Entered: 03/07/2000)

3254 JOINT STATUS REPORT by Alliance Plaintiffs and CounterMedia Petitioners; Notice. (tlm) (Entered: 03/10/2000)

3255

MINUTE ORDER of 3/9/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Entered Report and Recommendation regarding motion of Defendant City of Chicago to dismiss the petition of petitioner Raymond Risley to enfroce the consent decree in Alliance to End Repression, et al vs. City of Chicago, et al No. 74 C 3268 is hereby submitted to judge Gottschall. This Court recommends that the respondents' motion to dismiss the petition be granted. Mailed notice by judge's staff (tlm) (Entered: 03/10/2000)

3256

MINUTE ORDER of 3/15/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : See Order on reverse side of this minute order. These cases recently were reassigned to this court. There are many procedural motions on the dockets that do not appear to have been resolved explicitly on the record, and so are still classified as pending motions. The court believes that they are immaterial to any current issues in the case. Accordingly, the court administratively terminates the following motions as moot−−Plaintiff's motion to set trial date, filed 01/25/99 [3119−1]. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 03/17/2000)

3260 AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs for extension of time in which to file a brief ; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 03/31/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 3/23/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held. No notice (tmh) (Entered: 03/23/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 3/23/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing set for 4:00 4/12/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 03/23/2000)

3257 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff/petitioner Raymond S Risley to the Magistrate's report and recommendation of 3/9/00; (Attachments); Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 03/28/2000)

3258 OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Alliance To End to the 3/9/00 Magistrate's report and recommendation; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 03/28/2000)

3259 RESPONSE by plaintiff Alliance To End to City of Chicago's motion for city consent decree interpretation [3248−1]; (Attachment); Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 03/28/2000)

3261 MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by plaintiffs for extension of time in which to file a reply brief by 4/5/00 is granted. [3260−1] Telephoned notice (mbw) (Entered: 03/31/2000)

3264 MOTION by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties Union for leave to file oversize brief instanter , with response; (Attachments); Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 04/14/2000)

3264 RESPONSE by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties to City's motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Concent Decree [3248−1], with motion; (Attachments); Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 04/14/2000)

3262 CITATION of supplemental authority by Countermedia Petitioners'; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 04/07/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 4/12/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing reset from 4:00 4/12/00 to 3:00 5/2/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 04/12/2000)

3263 NOTICE by plaintiff G Flint Taylor Jr of change of address of counsel, Lawrence V. Jackowiak. (mbw) (Entered: 04/13/2000)

3265 MINUTE ORDER of 4/13/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 a.m. on 4/18/00. Filing of plaintiff's fee petition is continued generally, as stated in open court. No notice (mbw) (Entered: 04/14/2000)

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04/14/2000
04/18/2000 04/19/2000
04/26/2000 04/28/2000 04/28/2000 05/02/2000 05/03/2000 05/05/2000 05/05/2000 05/08/2000
05/10/2000 05/10/2000 05/10/2000 05/12/2000 05/17/2000

3266

MINUTE ORDER of 4/14/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The court overrules Alliance Plaintiffs' Objection to the Magistrate Judge's 9/21/99 Memorandum Order 3193 . The court affirms the denial of Alliance Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery Regarding 2/27/99 Police Photography, dated 6/28/99. (Entered Order) Mailed notice (mbw) (Entered: 04/19/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 4/18/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 5/10/00 . No notice (tmh) (Entered: 04/18/2000)

3267

MINUTE ORDER of 4/19/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order on reverse side. The court requests supplemental briefs regarding the Magistrate Judge's 12/10/99 Report and Recommendation denying the Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. The point to be addressed is explained on the reverse side of this order. Briefs are to be filed simultaneously by the FBI and the Alliance plaintiffs on or before 5/5/00. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice(mbw) Modified on 04/27/2000 (Entered: 04/20/2000)

3270 MOTION by defendant Cty of Chgo for additional time to file memorandum in response to objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of 3/9/00 ; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 05/05/2000)

3268 MOTION by defendant Chgo, City of for additional time to file reply memorandum in support of motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree ; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 05/02/2000)

3269 MINUTE ORDER of 4/28/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by City of Chicago for additional time to file reply memorandum in support of motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree by 5/10/00 is granted. [3268−1] Telephoned notice (mbw) (Entered: 05/02/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 5/2/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing hearing reset from 3:00 5/2/00 to 11:00 5/12/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 05/02/2000)

3271 MINUTE ORDER of 5/3/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : City of Chicago's motion for additional time to file memorandum in response to objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of 3/9/00 by 5/2/00 is granted. [3270−1] Telephoned notice (mbw) Modified on 05/09/2000 (Entered: 05/05/2000)

3272 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF by plaintiff Alliance To End regarding postjudgment attorney's fees against FEB (Attachments) (rmm) (Entered: 05/08/2000)

3273 STATEMENT by defendant FBI of the case. (mbw) (Entered: 05/09/2000)

3274

MINUTE ORDER of 5/8/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : CounterMedia Petitioners' objections to Magistrate's 10/27/99, Report and Recommendation regarding City's motion for Summary Judgment are sustained in part and overruled in part. The City's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. [3133−1] This case is set for status on 5/25/00 at 9:30 a.m. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (mbw) Modified on 05/09/2000 (Entered: 05/09/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 5/10/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 5/24/00 . No notice (tmh) (Entered: 05/10/2000)

3275 REPLY memorandum by defendant Cty of Chgo in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Concent Decree [3248−1]; (Attachments); Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 05/12/2000)

3276 MOTION by Cty of Chgo for leave to file an oversize reply memorandum in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree ; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 05/18/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 5/12/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 10:00 5/25/00, in Courtroom 1300 after the status before Judge Gottschall . No notice (tmh) (Entered: 05/12/2000)

3277 MINUTE ORDER of 5/17/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : City of Chicago's motion for leave to file an oversize reply memorandum in support of its motion for

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05/24/2000
05/25/2000 05/25/2000 05/25/2000
05/25/2000 05/25/2000
05/25/2000 06/09/2000 06/09/2000 06/19/2000
07/10/2000 07/31/2000 08/08/2000

interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree is granted. [3276−1] Mailed notice (mbw) (Entered: 05/18/2000)

3278

MINUTE ORDER of 5/24/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held. The court hereby continues generally the time for the ACLU to file its formal petition for attorney's fees regarding the motion to modify and all proceedings regarding those fees are stayed pending final resolution of the City's appeal of the motion to modify. (Entered Agreed Order). Mailed notice by judge's staff (fce) (Entered: 05/25/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 5/25/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held. Telephone status hearing set for 11:30 7/10/00 . Status hearing set for 1:00 10/6/00 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 05/25/2000)

3279 MINUTE ORDER of 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion of City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Concent Decree is denied [3248−1]. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/26/2000)

3280

MINUTE ORDER of 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The court denies the Alliance plaintiffs' attorney's fees for City consent decree monitoring compliance with FBI Consent Decree [3235−1] but not for the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge's 12/10/99 Report and Recommendation. Plaintiffs' objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report are granted in part and denied in part. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/26/2000)

3281

MINUTE ORDER of 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant's motion to dismiss ACLU's petition to enforce consent decree [dated 9/22/99] is granted. The Chicago Tribune Company's motion to appear as Amicus Curiae [dated 10/20/99] is granted. The ACLU's enforcement petition [dated 7/29/99] is dismissed. (Entered order). Mailed notice (rmm) (Entered: 05/26/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held. Pretrial conference set to 2:00 9/22/00 . Bench trial is set to 9:00 11/13/00 for five days . Modified pretrial order which includes trial briefs, witness lists, exhibit list, deposition transcripts, and motions in limine is due by 9/8/00. Petitioner is required to submit submissions to Respondent by 8/25/00. In court notice (rj) Modified on 05/31/2000 (Entered: 05/31/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Pretrial conference reset to 2:00 9/22/00. Date set for pretrial conference 10/6/00 at 2:00pm is stricken. Mailed notice (rj) (Entered: 05/31/2000)

3282 MOTION by the Alliance plaintiffs Jeffrey H Haas, Dennis J Cunningham and G Flint Taylor Jr for reconsideration of attorney's fees request against FBI ; Memorandum in support; (Attachments); Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 06/19/2000)

3283 EXHIBIT number 4 by Alliance plaintiffs G Flint Taylor Jr, Jeffrey H Haas and Dennis J Cunningham regarding motion for reconsideration of attorney's fees request against FBI [3282−1] (RESTRICTED) (mbw) (Entered: 06/19/2000)

3284

MINUTE ORDER of 6/19/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The court adopts the parties' requested briefing schedule for The Alliance Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney's Fees request against FBI. [3282−1] The FBI's response is due 7/31/00, and the Alliance plaintiffs' reply is due 8/31/00. The parties need not appear at the scheduled hearing on 6/21/00. Mailed notice (mbw) (Entered: 06/19/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 7/10/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing reset from 1:00 10/6/00 to 1:00 9/22/00 . Telephone status hearing held and continued by telephone to 11:00 8/8/00 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 07/10/2000)

3285 OPPOSITIION by defendant FBI to the Alliance plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of attorney's fees request against FBI [3282−1]. (mbw) (Entered: 08/02/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 8/8/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing hearing held and continued to 1:00 9/7/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered:

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08/09/2000 08/16/2000
08/23/2000 08/29/2000 09/05/2000 09/05/2000 09/08/2000 09/08/2000
09/15/2000 09/19/2000
09/20/2000
09/28/2000 10/02/2000

08/08/2000)

3286 MINUTE ORDER of 8/9/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The parties are requested to submit a Joint Status Report setting forth pending matters by 8/25/00. Mailed notice (mbw) (Entered: 08/11/2000)

3287

MINUTE ORDER of 8/16/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order on reverse side. Because of the unique docketing system employed in these cases, many motions that are no longer at issue are still classified as pending motions in the court's records. The court believes that they are immaterial to any current issues in the case, or else have already been resolved. Accordingly, the court administratively terminates as moot the motions listed on the reverse side of this order. If the parties believe that any of these motions are both unresolved and material to any current issues in the case, please advise the court. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (mbw) (Entered: 08/18/2000)

3288 MOTION by defendant Cty of Chgo for an extension of time to file final pretrial order ; Notice. (mbw) (Entered: 08/30/2000)

3289 MINUTE ORDER of 8/29/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant City of Chicago's motion for an extension of time to file final pretrial order by 9/29/00 is granted. [3288−1] (Original motion filed in 74C3268) Telephoned notice (mbw) (Entered: 08/30/2000)

3290 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Chgo Cty of by Sharon Baldwin, Patrick Walter Johnson, Patrick Francis McGovern, Scott A. Frey (yap) (Entered: 09/06/2000)

3291 MOTION by City of Chicago for substitution of counsel and for leave to file appearances ; Notice. (vmj) (Entered: 09/12/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 9/8/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held. No notice (tmh) (Entered: 09/08/2000)

3292

MINUTE ORDER of 9/8/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by defendant City of Chicago for substitution of counsel [3291−1] and for leave to file appearances [3291−2] is granted. All attorney appearances currently listed shall be replaced with appearances of Mara S. Georges, Lawrence Rosenthal, Sharon Baldwin, Patrick W. Johnson, Scott A. Frey and Patrick F. McGovern. Appearances of these attorneys to be filed forthwith. Pretrial conference set for 9/22/00 at 2:00 p.m. is stricken and reset to 2:00 p.m. on 10/20/00. Mailed notice (vmj) (Entered: 09/12/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 9/15/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing reset from 1:00 9/22/00 to 1:00 10/23/00, by telephone . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 09/15/2000)

3293

MINUTE ORDER of 9/19/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The Alliance plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of attorney's fees request against FBI is granted. [3282−1] The Alliance plaintiffs' attorney's fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI Consent Decree is granted. Plaintiffs are to submit a breakdown of reasonable and necessary monitoring fees by 10/6/2000, and any objections by the FBI to the amounts claimed are due by October 20. The original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in Case No. 74 C 3268. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (eav) (Entered: 09/21/2000)

3294

MINUTE ORDER of 9/20/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The objections to the Magistrate Judge's 3/9/2000 Report and Recommendation filed by petitioner Raymond Risley and the Alliance plaintiffs are granted in part and denied in part. Risley's Petition to Enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree is dismissed. The original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in Case No. 74 C 3268. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (eav) (Entered: 09/21/2000)

3296 JOINT MOTION by defendant City of Chicago and petitioner's counsel Richard Gutman for extension of time to file final pre−trial order ; Notice (hp) (Entered: 10/05/2000)

3295 NOTICE of filing by Chicago Police Board of 1998 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 99−1) (Attachment). (mw) (Entered: 10/04/2000)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 58 of 71

10/04/2000
10/05/2000 10/06/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/23/2000
10/23/2000 10/24/2000 10/25/2000
10/30/2000 10/31/2000
11/09/2000 11/09/2000 11/13/2000 11/14/2000 11/15/2000 11/16/2000 12/01/2000 12/01/2000 12/12/2000 12/15/2000

3297 MINUTE ORDER of 10/4/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Joint motion by the parties for extension of time to file final pre−trial order by 10/06/00 is granted. [3296−1] Original motion is filed in case 74 C 3268. Telephoned notice (hp) (Entered: 10/05/2000)

3298 UPDATED ITEMIZATION of attorney's fees for FBI consent decree monitoring by plaintiff Alliance To End (Attachments); Notice. (fce) (Entered: 10/06/2000)

3299 MODIFIED FINAL PRE−TRIAL ORDER; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 10/11/2000)

3300 RESPONSE by respondent FBI to the former Alliance plaintiffs' updated itemization of attorney's fees. (fce) (Entered: 10/23/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 10/20/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Pretrial conference held. In court notice (rj) (Entered: 10/30/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 10/23/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held and continued by telephone to 9:00 10/25/00 . Telephone notice (tmh) (Entered: 10/23/2000)

3301 MOTION by plaintiff Alliance To End for order and judgment regarding attorneys' fees agreements (Attachments); Notice. (kef) (Entered: 10/26/2000)

3303 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Alliance To End by Edward Koziboski. (fce) (Entered: 10/26/2000)

3302 MINUTE ORDER of 10/25/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick: Alliance plaintiffs' motion for order and judgment regarding attorneys' fees agreements [3301−1] is entered and continued to 11/9/00. Telephone status hearing held and continued by telephone to 11/9/00 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (kef) (Entered: 10/26/2000)

3304 REPLY by plaintiffs to FBI's response regarding attorneys' fees [3300−1] (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 10/31/2000)

3305

MINUTE ORDER of 10/31/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The Alliance plaintiffs are awarded $43,644.93 in attorneys' fees for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the FBI Consent Decree. Original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in case 74C3268. (Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order.) Mailed notice (tlm) Modified on 3/24/2010 (vcf, ). (Entered: 11/02/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 11/9/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing held. No notice (tmh) (Entered: 11/09/2000)

3306 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiff Alliance To End by Edward Rozeboski. (fce) (Entered: 11/14/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 11/13/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Bench trial held and continued to 9:00 11/14/00 . In court notice (rj) (Entered: 11/14/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 11/14/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Bench trial held and continued to 10:30 11/15/00 . In court notice (rj) (Entered: 12/06/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 11/15/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Bench trial held and continued to 10:00 11/16/00 . In court notice (rj) (Entered: 12/06/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 11/16/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Closing argument hearing set for 2:00 12/6/00 . In court notice (rj) (Entered: 12/06/2000)

3307 CLOSING ARGUMENT by petitioners CounterMedia (Attachment). (mw) (Entered: 12/05/2000)

3308 WRITTEN portion of its closing argument by defendant City of Chicago; Notice. (mw) (Entered: 12/05/2000)

SCHEDULE set on 12/12/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Telephone status hearing set for 9:00 12/19/00 . Mailed notice (tmh) (Entered: 12/12/2000)

3309 RENEWED MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for order orders compelling City to execute its attorneys' fees agreements (Attachments); Notice of motion and certificate of service (eav) (Entered: 12/20/2000)

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12/19/2000
12/20/2000 12/20/2000 12/21/2000
12/21/2000
12/21/2000
12/27/2000 01/04/2001 01/05/2001 01/05/2001 01/08/2001 01/09/2001

3310

MINUTE ORDER of 12/19/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Renewed Alliance plaintiffs' motion for orders compelling City to execute its attorneys' fees agreements is granted in part and denied in part. [3309−1], [3301−1] Defendant is to pay plaintiff the mutually agreed amount of $30,000 for certain "other monetary" work the parties have identified, together with interest at the statutory rate (or as agreed upon by the parties) under the Fed.R.Civ.P. calculated from 10/7/2000 to date of payment, as soon as practicable. The parties are to file a stipulated agreement concerning the computation of the remainder of plaintiff's fee petition. Telephone conference set for 01/17/00 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (eav) Modified on 3/24/2010 (vcf, ). (Entered: 12/20/2000)

3311 STIPULATION to dismiss by parties (Atttachments) (las) (Entered: 12/22/2000)

3312 NOTICE OF RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT filed by plaintiffs and defendant City of Chicago (Attachments) (las) (Entered: 12/22/2000)

3313

MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : The claims for attorneys fees for the services reflected in Appendix A to this order is dismissed, with each side bearing its own costs and attorneys' fees relating to that claim, and (by order of this court), with interest at the rate of 6.02% (federal judgment rate) accrued after 10/7/00: and, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the provision of the Release and Settlement Agreement filed herein and this dismissal order. (Entered Agreed Order of Dismissal.) Mailed notices by judge's staff. (las) (Entered: 12/22/2000)

3314

MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : The parties have concluded contested fee petition proceedings with the entry of the agreed order of dismissal relating to city consent decree monitoring. The parties are granted leave to file further fee petitions at the conclusions of other ongoing matters currently before the district court and U.S. Court of Appeals. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, this case is returned to the assigned judge. Telephone status set for 1/17/01 is hereby stricken. Mailed notices. by judge's staf notice (las) (Entered: 12/22/2000)

3315

MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : After a bench trial, the court determines that CounterMedia, Active Resistance Organizing Committee, Autonomous Zone, and the Alliance named plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the consent decree was violated by police misconduct during the 1996 Democratic National Convention. Judgment is entered for the City of Chicago on all claims. Original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in case no. 74C 3268. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice. (las) (Entered: 12/22/2000)

3319 NOTICE OF APPEAL by FBI from Memorandum Opinion and Order [3305−1] motion minute order [3305−2] of 10/31/00 (NO FEE) (mak) (Entered: 01/14/2001)

3316 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): Held on 11/13/00, 11/14/00, 11/15/00 and 11/16/00 appeal [3209−1], before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall. (Items 3316−1 through 3316−4). (cem) Modified on 01/05/2001 (Entered: 01/05/2001)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit supplement to appeal no. 99−3825 consisting of: Four volumes of transcripts of proceedings held on 11/13/00, 11/14/00, 11/15/00 and 11/16/00 before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall (Items 3316−1 through 3316−4). Mailed notice to all counsel. (cem) (Entered: 01/05/2001)

3317 PETITION by Joseph T Fitzsimmons, Jeffrey C Wilson for leave to intervene as additioanl and specifically named plaintiffs , for appointment of attorney and for other relief (Attachment); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 01/08/2001)

3318 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff Alliance To End from order (Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order) [3305−1], motion minute order [3305−2] ($105.00 PAID); Notice (mak) (Entered: 01/09/2001)

MAILED LETTER regarding docketing statement unacknowledged to plaintiff Alliance To End. (mak) (Entered: 01/09/2001)

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01/12/2001 01/14/2001 01/14/2001 01/18/2001 01/18/2001 01/19/2001 01/22/2001 01/24/2001
01/25/2001
02/08/2001 02/14/2001
02/14/2001 02/14/2001 02/14/2001
02/21/2001 02/26/2001
03/02/2001
03/05/2001
03/15/2001
03/23/2001

MAILED LETTER regarding docketing statement unacknowledged to FBI (mak) (Entered: 01/14/2001)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal [3318−1], [3319−1]. Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) (Entered: 01/14/2001)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal appeal [3318−1], [3319−1] . Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) (Entered: 01/14/2001)
3320 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal [3318−1] USCA 01−1113. (cem) (Entered: 01/22/2001)
3321 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal [3319−1] USCA 01−1114. (cem) (Entered: 01/22/2001)
3323 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its bill of costs ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
3322 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Service List. (cem) (Entered: 01/22/2001)
3324 MINUTE ORDER of 1/24/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its bill of costs up to and including 2/20/01 is granted [3323−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
3325 ORDER dated 01/23/01 from the 7th Circuit: The court, on its own motion, orders that these appeals are consolidated for purposes of briefing and disposition (01−1113 and 01−1114). (cem) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
3326 ORDER dated 02/06/01 from the 7th Circuit: Dening the petitions for rehearing en banc (99−3825). (cem) (Entered: 02/09/2001)
3327 LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal no. 99−3825 consisting of: Three volumes of pleadings and fourteen loose pleadings. (cem) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
3328 BILL OF COSTS submitted by 7th Circuit. (cem) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
3329 OPINION from the 7th Circuit: Argued 11/27/00; Decided 01/11/01 (99−3825). (cem) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
3330 CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: Reversing and remanding the Decision of the District Court [Appeal [3209−1] (99−3825). (cem) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
3331 STIPULATION agreement by parties regarding attorney's fee Lodestar; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 02/22/2001)
3333 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for entry of judgment of its "proposed modified decree" pursuant to the seventh circuits instructions (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
3334 MINUTE ORDER of 3/2/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by defendant City of Chicago for entry of judgment of its "proposed modified decree" pursuant to the seventh circuits instructions [3333−1] is granted. Status hearing set for 4/5/01 at 9:30 am . Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
3332 MINUTE ORDER of 3/5/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiffs to file objections to defendant−City of Chicago's bills of costs on or before 3/27/01. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
3340 MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs' for attorneys' fees for City consent decree monitoring October 5, 1994−−−March 10, 2001 ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 04/10/2001)
3335 MINUTE ORDER of 3/23/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: (Entered proposed modified decree nunc pro tunc 3/2/01). Original is filed in case 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 03/26/2001)

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03/27/2001 03/29/2001
04/04/2001 04/04/2001 04/04/2001 04/04/2001 04/05/2001
05/02/2001 05/02/2001 05/02/2001 05/04/2001
05/07/2001 05/07/2001 05/08/2001 05/09/2001
05/11/2001

3336 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs to City's bill of costs (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 03/28/2001)

3341

MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Answer brief to plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees for city consent decree monitoring October 5, 1994−−−March 10, 2001 [3340−1] due 5/7/01. Reply to answer brief due 6/6/01. Brief in support of motion due 4/5/01. Ruling will be by mail. Oral motion by defendant−City of Chicago for extension of time to file bill of costs by 5/2/01 is granted. Plaintiffs to respond by 5/16/01. Defendant to reply by 5/23/01. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 04/10/2001)

3337 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion for attorneys' fees agains City; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 04/05/2001)

3338 ATTACHMENT D, PART 2 by plaintiffs to memorandum in support of motion for attorneys' fees against City [3337−1]. (cem) (Entered: 04/05/2001)

3339 ATTACHMENTS by plaintiffs to memorandum in support of motion for attorneys' fees against City [3337−1] (Attachments). (cem) (Entered: 04/05/2001)

3342 LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal no. 99−3825 consisting of: Four volumes of transcripts. (cem) (Entered: 04/10/2001)

3343

MINUTE ORDER of 4/5/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held and continued to 5/24/01 at 9:30 am . Fee petition by plaintiff to be filed by 5/4/01. Response by 6/6/01. Reply by 6/21/01. Ruling will be by mail. Defendant−City of Chicago to consolidate reply to plaintiff's opposition to the bill of costs with response to fee petition by plaintiff. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 04/25/2001)

3351 BILL OF COSTS submitted by defendant City of Chicago. (cem) (Entered: 05/15/2001)

3352 AFFIDAVIT of Patrick F. McGovern defendant's counsel regarding costs. (cem) (Entered: 05/15/2001)

3353 BILL OF COSTS submitted by defendant City of Chicago incurred on its successful motion to modify the consent decree (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 05/15/2001)

3345

AGREED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago, Alliance plaintiffs and the American Civil Liberties Union to modify the briefing schedules on (1) Alliance Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees; (2) the ACLU's motion for attorney's fees and (3) City's bill of costs ; Notice. (cem) Modified on 05/10/2001 (Entered: 05/10/2001)

3347 OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs ALCU et al to the City of Chicago's bill of costs [3328−1] (Attachments); Notice. (cem) Modified on 05/14/2001 (Entered: 05/14/2001)

3348 AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs ALCU et al for leave to file instanter their petition for fees and expenses ; Notice. (cem) Modified on 05/14/2001 (Entered: 05/14/2001)

3344 OPPOSITION by plaintiff to City's second bill of costs; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 05/09/2001)

3346

MINUTE ORDER of 5/9/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by Defendant−City of Chicago to modify the briefing schedules on (1) Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees; (2) the ACLU's motion for attorney's fees; and (3) the City's bill of costs is granted [3345−1]. Defendant−City of Chicago's response to Plainitffs−Alliance motion for attorneys fees [3340−1], consolidated with its reply to Plaintiffs' Alliance objections to the City's bill of cost is due by 6/8/01. Plaintiffs−Alliance reply to City's response to motion for attorney's fees is due by 7/20/01. Defendant−City to respond to ACLU's motion for attorney's fees by 6/22/01. ACLU's reply is due by 7/13/01. Original motion is filed in case 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 05/10/2001)

3349 MINUTE ORDER of 5/11/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by plaintiffs−ALCU et al for leave to file instanter their petition for fees and expenses

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05/11/2001 05/15/2001 05/24/2001 06/08/2001 06/13/2001 06/13/2001
06/20/2001 06/20/2001
06/20/2001 06/20/2001 06/20/2001 06/22/2001 06/22/2001 06/28/2001 06/28/2001 06/29/2001

is granted [3348−1]. Original motion filed in case 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 05/14/2001)

3350 PETITION by plaintiffs ALCU et al for an award of attorney fees and expenses ; Memorandum in support (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 05/14/2001)

3354 DECLARATION of David F. Graham in support of petition of plaintiffs ACLU et al. for an award of attorney fees and expenses [3350−1]; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 05/16/2001)

SCHEDULE set on 5/24/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 6/28/01. In court notice (rj) (Entered: 05/24/2001)

3356 AGREED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for a one week extension of time for City to file its response to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for fees and its reply in further support of its bill of costs ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 06/20/2001)

3355 CITATION by plaintiffs of supplemental authority regarding City's bills of costs (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 06/14/2001)

3357 MINUTE ORDER of 6/13/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by the City of Chicago for a one week extension of time for City to file its response to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for fees and its reply in further support of its bill of costs by 6/15/01 is granted [3356−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 06/20/2001)

3358 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for leave to file its consolidated fees and costs brief in excess of fifteen pages ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 06/21/2001)

3359 MINUTE ORDER of 6/20/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by defendant − City of Chicago for leave to file its consolidated fees and costs brief in excess of fifteen pages is granted [3358−1]. Original file in 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 06/21/2001)

3360 RESPONSE by defendant City of Chicago to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees [3340−1]; with reply (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 06/21/2001)

3360 REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in further support of its bill of costs [3353−1]; with response (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 06/21/2001)

3361 NOTICE by Police Board of the City of Chicago of filing regarding the 1999 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 2000−1) (Attachment). (cem) Modified on 06/26/2001 (Entered: 06/26/2001)

3362 RESPONSE by defendant City of Chicago to the ACLU's motion for attorney's fees [3350−1]; with reply; Notice. (cem) Modified on 06/26/2001 (Entered: 06/26/2001)

3362 REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in further support of its bill of costs [3353−1]; with response; Notice. (cem) Modified on 06/26/2001 (Entered: 06/26/2001)

SCHEDULE set on 6/28/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 8/23/01 . In court notice (rj) (Entered: 06/28/2001)

3364 UNCONTESTED MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for leave to file a brief in excess of 15 pages ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 07/12/2001)

3363

MINUTE ORDER of 6/29/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Plaintiffs' petition for leave to intervene as additional and specifically named plaintiffs [3317−1]; for appointment of attorney [3317−2]; and for other relief [3317−3] is denied without prejudice for failure to comply with this court's local rules and Section II(A)(1) of the consent decree governing this case. Should plaintiffs wish to refile their petition, they should do so by filing a "Motion to enforce the consent decree against [defendants' name]" with the clerk of the district court; serving a copy of this motion on counsel for all the parties to this case; and serving a "Notice of Motion " or "Notice of Presentment" with the court in compliance with Local Rule 5.3 of the District Court. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 07/03/2001)

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07/11/2001 07/11/2001 07/13/2001 07/13/2001
07/18/2001
07/20/2001 07/20/2001 07/27/2001 08/23/2001 11/21/2001 11/30/2001 12/05/2001
12/11/2001 01/23/2002 01/30/2002
03/18/2002 03/27/2002

3365 MINUTE ORDER of 7/11/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Uncontested motion by plaintiff−Alliance for leave to file a brief in excess of 15 pages is granted [3364−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 07/12/2001)

3368 AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs ACLU et al. for an enlargement of time until 7/27/01 to file their reply in support of their fee petition ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 07/19/2001)

3366 ORDER dated 7/11/00 from the 7th Circuit: There was no record filed with this court in this cause. (01−1113 &01−1114) (cem) (Entered: 07/17/2001)

3367

CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss filed by the parties on 7/11/01, it is ordered that the parties have settled this matter in accordance with discussions held under Circuit Rule 33. This cause is dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), appeals [3318−1] and [3319−1]. (01−1113 &01−1114) (cem) (Entered: 07/17/2001)

3369 MINUTE ORDER of 7/18/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by plaintiff − ACLU et al for an enlargement of time until 7/27/01 to file their reply in support of their fee petition is granted [3368−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 07/19/2001)

3370 REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to defendant City of Chicago's response to attorneys' fees motion [3362−1]; Notice. (cem) Modified on 07/24/2001 (Entered: 07/23/2001)

3371 APPENDIX filed by Alliance plaintiffs to its reply to defendant City of Chicago's response to attorneys' fees motion [3370−1] (Attachments). (3371−1 through 3371−4) (cem) Modified on 07/24/2001 (Entered: 07/24/2001)

3372 REPLY by ACLU plaintiffs in support of their petition for fees and expenses [3350−1]; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 07/30/2001)

SCHEDULE set on 8/23/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held. Pending fee petitions. In court notice (rj) (Entered: 08/23/2001)

3402 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by unknown Service List (Gutman). (lc) (Entered: 11/22/2002)

3373 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to cite additional authority in further support of its opposition to "Alliance plaintiffs" motion for attorneys' fees (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 12/05/2001)

3374 MINUTE ORDER of 12/5/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : City of Chicago's motion to cite additional authority in further support of its opposition to "Alliance plaintiffs" motion for attorneys' fees is granted [3373−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 12/05/2001)

3375 RESPONSE by Alliance plaintiffs to City of Chicago's citation of additional authority (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 12/13/2001)

3376 LOCAL RULE 40.4 MOTION by defendant Chgo Cty of to reassign case number 01 C 9586 to this court based on a finding that it is related to case numbers 74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295 (Attachments); Notice (yap) (Entered: 01/31/2002)

3377

MINUTE ORDER of 1/30/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: City of Chicago's motion to reassign case number 01 C 9586 to this court based on a finding that it is related to case numbers 74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295 [3376−1] is granted. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead on or before 3/18/02. No further extensions will be given. Status hearing is set for 5/2/02 at 9:30 a.m. in case 01 cv 9856 only. This date will become moot, if a dispositive motion is filed. Original motion is filed in case 74 cv 3268. Mailed notice (yap) (Entered: 01/31/2002)

3379 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the alliance consent decree ; Memorandum in support (Attachments); Notice. (yp) Modified on 02/27/2003 (Entered: 03/28/2002)

3378 MINUTE ORDER of 3/27/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Answer brief to respondents' motion to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition

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03/29/2002
04/18/2002 04/19/2002 04/23/2002 04/26/2002 05/01/2002 05/07/2002
05/08/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/12/2002 06/18/2002 06/25/2002 06/25/2002

under the Alliance consent decree due 5/22/02. Reply to answer brief due 6/12/02. Ruling on respondents' motion to dismiss will be by mail. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 03/27/2002)

3380

MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Alliance plaintiffs' petition for an award of attorney's fees [3340−1] is granted. ACLU plaintiffs' petition for an award of attorney fees [3350−1] is granted. Defendant City of Chicago's bills of costs [3328−1], [3353−1] are denied. However, on the record, the court is unable to determine the proper amount to be awarded. Therefore, the plaintiffs are requested to submit documents that clearly indicate their proposed lodestar figures for each particular legal action, as specified in this order. Plaintiffs should submit their documents within 20 days of this order. Defendants are permitted to submit objections to plaintiffs' figures within 10 days of plaintiffs' filing. (Entered order). The original order is filed in case no. 74 C 3268). Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 03/29/2002)

3382 AGREED MOTION by ACLU plaintiffs for enlargement of time to submit documents relating to fees, costs, and expenses ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 04/23/2002)

3381 BILLING STATEMENT by Alliance plaintiffs regarding attorneys' fees; Notice. (cem) Modified on 8/27/2009 (aac, ). (Entered: 04/22/2002)

3383 MINUTE ORDER of 4/23/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : ACLU plaintiffs' agreed motion for enlargement of time to submit documents relating to fees, costs, and expenses by 4/26/02 is granted [3382−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 04/23/2002)

3384 SUBMISSION by ACLU plaintiffs responding to order of 3/29/02 (Attachments); Notice. (cem) Modified on 04/29/2002 (Entered: 04/29/2002)

3385 (PARTIALLY) AGREED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its objections to fee submissions and its reply for its motion to cite additional authority ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 05/07/2002)

3386

MINUTE ORDER of 5/7/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant, City of Chicago's (partially) agreed motion for an extension of time to file its objections to fee submissions and its reply for its motion to cite additional authority is granted [3385−1]. Defendant, City of Chicago to submit its fee objections and its reply in further support of its motion to cite additional authority by 6/3/02. Original motion filed in 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 05/07/2002)

3387 NOTICE by Police Board of the City of Chicago of filing and certificate of service regarding the 2000 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 2001−1). (cem) (Entered: 05/10/2002)

3388 REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in further support of its motion to cite additional authority. (cem) Modified on 4/28/2010 (tc, ). (Entered: 06/04/2002)

3389 OBJECTIONS by defendant City of Chicago to the court−ordered supplemental fee submissions filed by the Alliance plaintiffs and the ACLU (Attachments); Notice. (cem) Modified on 4/28/2010 (tc, ). (Entered: 06/04/2002)

3390 CONTESTED ALLIANCE MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to reply to defendant City of Chicago's 6/3/02, "objections" (Attachments); Notice. (cem) (Entered: 06/19/2002)

3391 MINUTE ORDER of 6/18/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Contested Alliance Plaintiffs' motion for leave to reply to defendant City of Chicago's 6/3/02, "objections" is granted [3390−1]. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 06/19/2002)

3392 REPLY by plaintiff Alliance To End to defendant City's "objections" [3389−1]; Notice of filing and certificate of service (eav) Modified on 8/27/2009 (aac, ). (Entered: 06/26/2002)

3393 EXHIBITS by plaintiff Alliance To End to reply [3392−1] (eav) (Entered: 06/26/2002)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 65 of 71

09/27/2002
10/15/2002 10/15/2002 10/16/2002 10/25/2002 10/25/2002 11/04/2002 11/04/2002 11/08/2002 11/12/2002 11/14/2002 11/14/2002 12/06/2002 01/17/2003 01/17/2003 02/06/2003 02/26/2003
03/04/2003

3394

MINUTE ORDER of 9/27/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The ACLU plaintiffs are granted attorney's fees in the amount of $249,487.30 and costs in the amount of $9,555.23. The Alliance plaintiffs are granted fees in the amount of $762,269.55 and costs in the amount of $35,422.84. The original order is filed in case no. 74 C 3268. (Entered order). Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 10/01/2002)

3408 BILL OF COSTS submitted by Richard Gutman (Attachment). (cem) (Entered: 04/28/2003)

COSTS taxed bill of costs [3408−1] for plaintiffs in the amount of $ 640.24 against defendant City of Chicago. (cem) (Entered: 04/28/2003)

3395 MINUTE ORDER of 10/16/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Any objections by defendants to Alliance plaintiffs bill of costs must be filed on or before 10/29/02. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 10/18/2002)

3396 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Chgo Cty of from motion minute order [3394−1], motion minute order [3380−1] [3380−1] ( $105.00 PAID) (mak) (Entered: 10/28/2002)

3397 CIRCUIT RULE 3(C) DOCKETING STATEMENT by defendant Chgo Cty of regarding appeal [3396−1] . (mak) (Entered: 10/28/2002)

3398 NOTICE OF CROSS−APPEAL by plaintiffs Alliance To End, et al from minute order [3394−1] ( $105.00 PAID); Notice (mak) (Entered: 11/12/2002)

3399 DOCKETING STATEMENT by plaintiffs Alliance To End, et al [3398−1] regarding cross−appeal [3398−1] . (mak) (Entered: 11/12/2002)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal [3396−1] . Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) (Entered: 11/08/2002)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on appeal [3398−1]. Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) (Entered: 11/12/2002)

3400 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal [3396−1] USCA 02−3981. (cem) (Entered: 11/15/2002)

3401 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal [3398−1] USCA 02−3982. (cem) Modified on 4/1/2010 (aac, ). (Entered: 11/15/2002)

3403 ORDER dated 12/2/02 from the 7th Circuit: The court, on its own motion, orders that these appeals are consolidated for purposes of briefing and disposition. (02−3981 and 02−3982) (cem) (Entered: 12/06/2002)

3404 STIPULATION TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN ITEMS of District Court Record Record docketed under case number 74 C 3268 for transmittal to the court of appeals for record no. 02−3981 &02−3982 (mak) (Entered: 01/24/2003)

3405 STIPULATION TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN ITEMS of District Court Record docketed under Case Number 75 C 3295 for transmittal to the Court of Appeals regarding 02−3981 &02−3982 (mak) (Entered: 01/25/2003)

3406 NOTICE by defendant City of Chiago of filing regarding 2001 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 2002−1) (Attachment). (cem) (Entered: 02/07/2003)

3407

MINUTE ORDER of 2/26/03 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter order. Respondent City of Chicago's motion to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the alliance consent decree [3379−1 for 74 C 3268; 0−1 for 75 C 3295; 0−1 for 01 C 9586] is granted. Case Number 01 C 9586 is terminated. Mailed notice (cem) Modified on 3/24/2010 (vcf, ). (Entered: 02/27/2003)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. 02−3981 (02−3982) consisting of Seven volumes of pleadings and four volume of transcript, seven volumes of exhibits and seventeen volumes loose pleadings transmitted in two boxes under separate certificate appeal [3398−1], appeal [3396−1] with certified copy of docket entries. Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) Modified on 03/04/2003 (Entered: 03/04/2003)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 66 of 71

04/25/2003 05/02/2003
05/12/2003
02/09/2004 03/08/2004 03/08/2004 03/08/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004 11/15/2004 11/17/2004 11/18/2004

3409 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to supplement the record on appeal ; Notice. (cem) (Entered: 05/06/2003)

3410

MINUTE ORDER of 5/2/03 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant, City of Chicago's motion to supplement the record on appeal is granted [3409−1]. The following documents shall be submitted and transmitted for inclusion on the record on appeal as follows: (1) Memorandum of City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree, (2) Motion of City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree, (3) Alliance plaintiffs' response to City of Chicago's motion for City consent decree interpretation, (4) ACLU's repsonse to City's motion for interpretation of the consent decree, (5) 4/19/00 order of district court, (6) Reply memorandum of City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 alliance consent decree, (7) 5/25/00 Memorandum opinion and order. Mailed notice (cem) (Entered: 05/06/2003)

TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit supplement to appeal no. 02−3981 &02−3982 consisting of: 02/01/00 [3243−1] Memorandum of City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree, 02/01/00 [3248−1] Motion of City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree, [3259−1] Alliance plaintiffs' response to City of Chicago's motion for City consent decree interpretation, [3264−1] ACLU's response to City's motion for "interpretation" of the consent decree, 04/14/00 [3266−1] 4/19/00 order of district court, 05/10/00 [3275−1] Reply memorandum of City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree, 05/25/00 [3279−1] 05/25/00 Memorandum opinion and order and 05/02/03 [3410−1] Minute order dated 5/2/03: Defendant, City of Chicago's motion to supplement the record on appeal is granted...... Mailed notice to all counsel. (cem) (Entered: 05/12/2003)

3411 NOTICE by defendant of filing regarding the 2002 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Attachment). (cem) (Entered: 02/11/2004)

3412 LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal no. 02−3981 &02−3982 consisting of: Nine volumes of pleadings, seventeen loose pleadings, four volumes of transcripts and seven volumes of exhibits. (cem) (Entered: 03/09/2004)

3413 OPINION from the 7th Circuit: Argued 12/11/03; Decided 1/28/04. ( 02−3981 &02−3982) (cem) Modified on 4/5/2010 (aac, ). (Entered: 03/09/2004)

3414

CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: The fee award is reversed, with costs. The plaintiffs are entitled to no fees for the legal services rendered during the period in issue, and a fortiori the Alliance is not entitled to the additional half millon dollars sought in its cross−appeal. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date [Appeal [3398−1], [Appeal [3396−1]. (02−3981 &02−3982) (cem) Modified on 4/5/2010 (aac, ). (Entered: 03/09/2004)

3415 BILL OF COSTS submitted from 7th Circuit. (rbf) (Entered: 10/19/2004)

3416

CERTIFIED copy of Order dated 10/12/04 from the 7th Circuit: Upon consideration of the motion for addition of statement of costs to the mandate, filed on 04/13/04, by counsel for the appellant/cross−appelle, it is ordered that the motion is granted. Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P.39(d)(3), the clerk of the district court shall add the awarded $904.60 in costs to the mandate issued in this appeal. (02−3981 and 02−3982). (rbf) (Entered: 10/19/2004)

3417 MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to withdraw attorney appearance , and to substitute new attorneys ; Notice of motion. (rbf) Modified on 8/27/2009 (aac, ). (Entered: 11/18/2004)

3418

MINUTE ORDER of 11/17/04 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant City of Chicago's motion motion to withdraw appearance of Sharon Baldwin [3417−1] exclusively and substitute Tom Forgue and William Aguiar as counsel [3417−2] is granted. The appearance of Sharon Baldwin is hereby withdrawn. Mailed notice (rbf) Modified on 8/27/2009 (aac, ). (Entered: 11/18/2004)

3419 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Chgo Cty of by Thomas Forgue, William Aguiar; Notice. (rbf) Modified on 4/5/2010 (aac, ). (Entered: 11/19/2004)

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06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/08/2005
06/08/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/30/2005
06/30/2005 06/30/2005

3420 MOTION by City defendants to correct record, allow withdraw of old attorneys and appearance of new attorney (gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)

3421 NOTICE of Motion by all defendants for presentment of MOTION by City defendants to correct record, allow withdraw of old attorneys and appearance of new attorney 3420 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/9/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)

3422 MOTION by City defendants for additional time to reply to petition and discovery (gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)

3423 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of MOTION by City defendants for additional time to reply to petition and discovery 3422 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/9/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)

3424

MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : City defendants' motion to correct record, allow withdraw of old attorneys and appearance of new attorney 3420 is granted. City defendants' for additional time to reply to petition and discovery 3422 by 06/28/05 is granted. The appearances of counsel of record of Sharon Baldwin, Patrick Johnson, Scott Frey, Patrick McGovern and William Aguiar in case # 74C3268 is hereby withdrawn. The appearances of counsel of record of Sharon Baldwin, Adrienne Hiegel, Patrick Johnson, Patrick McGovern, Scott Frey, and William Aguiar in case # 75C3295 is hereby withdrawn. Michael A. Forti and Andrew Worseck are given leave to file appearance as counsel on behalf of City defendants in case #'s 74C3268 and 75C3295. Mailed notice (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)

3425 LETTER from Tom Forgue, Assistant Corporation Counsel dated 06/06/05. (rbf, ) (Entered: 06/13/2005)

3426 MOTION by Defendants to correct record nunc pro tunc(gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3427 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of MOTION by Defendants to correct record nunc pro tunc 3426 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/30/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3428 MOTION by Defendants to dismiss petition (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3429 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of MOTION by Defendants to dismiss petition 3428 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/30/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3430 MOTION by Defendants to file memorandum in excess of fifteen pages instanter(gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3431 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of MOTION by Defendants to file memorandum in excess of fifteen pages instanter 3430 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/30/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3432 MEMORANDUM by Chicago City of in Support of MOTION by Defendants to dismiss petition 3428 (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

3433

MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : City defendants' motion to correct the 06/08/05 motion nunc pro tunc and allow Mardel Nereim, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel to file her appearance on behalf of City defendants 3426 is granted. City defendants' motion for leave to file memorandum in excess of fifteen pages instanter 3430 is granted. Briefing as to City defendants' motion to dismiss 3428 is as follows: Responses due by 7/28/2005. Replies due by 8/11/2005. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rbf, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)

3434 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants by Mardell Nereim, Michael A. Forti (rbf, ) (Entered: 07/06/2005)

3435 NOTICE of filing by City defendants regarding memorandum in support of City motion to dismiss petition and appearance. (rbf, ) (Entered: 07/06/2005)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 68 of 71

06/30/2005 07/22/2005 07/22/2005 07/25/2005 11/18/2005 03/24/2006
04/19/2006
04/26/2006
04/26/2006 05/03/2006 06/07/2006 06/08/2006 10/25/2006 01/11/2007
01/11/2007 03/01/2007

3436 MEMORANDUM by defendants in Support of City motion to dismiss petition. (rbf, ) (Entered: 07/06/2005)

3438 NOTICE of filing by Police Board of the City of Chicago regarding the 2003 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)

3439 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit by the Chicago Police Department (Exhibits). (jmp, ) (Entered: 08/04/2005)

3437 NOTICE by Lawrence J. Suffredin, Jr of Change of Address. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)

3440 LETTER to Thelma Murry−Sykkes from H. Patrick Morris dated 11/18/05. (ar, ) (Entered: 11/23/2005)

3441

MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order. The City of Chicago's motion to dismiss the petition to enforce [3428 in 74 C 3268] is granted in part and denied in part 3428 . Petitioner's motion to compel [66 in 75 C 3295] is denied as moot. Status is set for April 19, 2006 at 9:30 A.M. Mailed notice (rmm, ) (Entered: 03/29/2006)

3442

MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held on 4/19/2006 and continued to 5/3/2006 at 09:30 AM. Defendant, City of Chicago is ordered to turnover 2002 First Amendment Investigation File #193−2002−01 without redaction (attorneys' eyes only) within one week. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 04/19/2006)

3443

2004 Chicago Police Department Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit: Audit 2005−1 by Chicago City of (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Audit 2005−1: 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Cover# 2 Appendix Audit 2005−1: 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Text# 3 Appendix Audit 2005−1: 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Appendicies)(Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 04/26/2006)

3444 NOTICE by City Of Chicago re other, 3443 Filing of Audit 2005−1: Chicago Police Department 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 04/26/2006)

3445 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing set for 5/3/2006 is stricken and reset to 6/7/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 05/04/2006)

3446 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing reset for 6/8/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 06/07/2006)

3447 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing set for 6/8/2006 is stricken. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 06/09/2006)

3448 NOTICE by Lawrence V. Jackowiak of Change of Address (tlm, ) (Entered: 10/27/2006)

3449

Audit 2006−01: 2005 Chicago Police Department Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Cover Sheet by City Of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Audit 2006−01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Part 1: Cover thur Chapter 5 (page 40))# 2 Appendix Audit 2006−01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Part 2: Chapters 6 thru 8 (pp 41−61))# 3 Appendix Audit 2006−01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Part 3: Appendix (p. 62−end))(Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 01/11/2007)

3450 NOTICE by City Of Chicago re other,, 3449 Filing of Audit 2006−01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit: Cover Sheet, Text, Appendix, Certificate of Service (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 01/11/2007)

PRELIMINARY Rebuttal to Defendant's Response by Victor M. Crown (original document filed in 75 C 3295) (mb, ) (Entered: 05/07/2007)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 69 of 71

05/22/2007 05/22/2007 07/27/2007
07/27/2007 08/09/2007
11/29/2007
12/14/2007 01/18/2008 06/23/2008 09/30/2008 10/21/2008 10/23/2008 10/23/2008 10/23/2008 10/24/2008 12/05/2008 12/05/2008 01/29/2009

3451 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The to compel (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16)Associated Cases: 1:75−cv−03295, 1:74−cv−03268(Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 05/22/2007)

3452 EXHIBITS D and E to City Defendants' motion to compel Filed 5/22/07 3451 . (RESTRICTED) (smm) (Entered: 05/23/2007)

3453 Independent Accountants' Report for the Period January 1, 2001 to December 31 2005 by City Of Chicago Cover Sheet (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Independent Accountants' Report For the Period January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2005)(Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 07/27/2007)

3454 NOTICE by City Of Chicago re other, 3453 Notice of Filing and Certificate of Service (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 07/27/2007)

3455 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of U. S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation by R Joseph Sher; Order entered granting leave by Judge Joan B. Gottschall. (gej) (Entered: 08/21/2007)

3456

MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall :Defendant's motion to compel 3451 is stricken because defendant failed to accompany its motion with a notice of presentment, in violation of Local Rule 5.3, which requires every motion to be accompanied by a notice of presentment specifying the date and time on which the motion is to be presented. Where a party fails to comply with this rule, the court has the discretion to dismiss the motion. Defendant may file a new motion with the proper notice if it so wishes. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/29/2007)

3457 RESPONSE by Alliance Plaintiffs to City Defendants' motion to dissolve modified consent decree. (gmr, ) (Entered: 12/18/2007)

3458 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall :Motion hearing held on 1/17/08. Enter Stipulation and Agreed Order. Motion by Plaintiffs for entry of stipulation and agreed order 139 is granted. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 01/23/2008)

3459 EXHIBIT A to memorandum in support of City defendants' motion to supplement record.(RESTRICTED) (vcf, ) (Entered: 06/25/2008)

3476 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 9/30/2008. (aac, ) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

3460 NOTICE of appeal by Defendants City of Chicago, et al. Filing fee $ 455. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/23/2008)

3461 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record. (gej, ) (Entered: 10/23/2008)

3462 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 3460 . Notified counsel (gej, ) (Entered: 10/23/2008)

3463 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City Of Chicago by Andrew W Worseck (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 10/23/2008)

3464 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 3460 ; USCA Case No. 08−3688. (aac, ) (Entered: 10/27/2008)

3465 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 3460 (USCA no. 08−3688) consisting of 2 volumes of pleadings and 1 vaulted item. (gej, ) (Entered: 12/05/2008)

3466 USCA RECEIVED on 12/5/2008 the long record regarding notice of appeal 3460 . (gej, ) (Entered: 12/10/2008)

3467

COPY of order dated 1/29/2009 from the USCA regarding notice of appeal 3460 ; Appellate case no. : 08−3688. The parties' request to return the sealed document to the district court is GRANTED. The clerk of this court shall RETURN document no. 3452 to the district to be maintained under seal in that court. (aac, ) (Entered: 01/30/2009)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 70 of 71

02/03/2009 02/03/2009 02/06/2009
02/19/2009 02/19/2009 02/19/2009 02/26/2009
02/26/2009
03/13/2009 03/13/2009 03/19/2009 03/23/2009 03/23/2009 05/01/2009
05/01/2009

3468 MOTION by Defendant City Of Chicago to amend/correct Docket and Record Nunc Pro Tunc (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 02/03/2009)

3469 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of motion to amend/correct 3468 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/19/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 02/03/2009)

3470

CERTIFIED copy of order dated 1/29/2009 from the USCA regarding notice of appeal 3460 ; Appellate case no. : 08−3688. The parties' request to return the sealed document to the district court is GRANTED. The clerk of this court shall RETURN document no. 3452 to the district to be maintained under seal in that court. (Exhibits) (aac, ) (Entered: 02/09/2009)

3471 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion to amend/correct 3468 is denied without prejudice for failure to deliver a courtesy copy to chambers as required. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/19/2009)

3472 MOTION by Defendant City Of Chicago to amend/correct Docket and Record Nunc Pro Tunc (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 02/19/2009)

3473 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of motion to amend/correct 3472 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/26/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 02/19/2009)

3474

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: City Motion to Correct Docket and record nunc pro tunc 3472 is granted. It is hereby ordered that the court's September 30, 2008 memorandum opinion and order denying the City's motion to dissolve the modified consent decree and its September 20, 2008 minute order to the same effect is entered on the docket of 74 C 3268 nunc pro tunc to 9/30/2008, with the same force and effect as in case no 75 C 3295 from that date forward. Mailed notice (aac, ) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

3475

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum opinion and order, defendants City of Chicago et. al.'s motion to dissolve the modified consent decree is denied nunc pro tunc 9/30/2008. [ For further detail see separate order(s).] Mailed notice (aac, ) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

3477 MOTION by Defendant Chicago City of to supplement record on appeal (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 03/13/2009)

3478 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew W Worseck for presentment of motion to supplement 3477 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 3/19/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 03/13/2009)

3479 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Unopposed motion by Defendants City of Chicago et al to supplement record on appeal with documents 3406 ; 3411 is granted. 3477 Mailed notice (aac, ) (Entered: 03/23/2009)

3480 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit supplemental record on appeal 3460 (USCA no. 08−3688) consisting of two volumes of pleadings document no. ( 3406 &3411 ). (aac, ) (Entered: 03/23/2009)

3481 USCA RECEIVED on 3/23/09 the supplemental record on appeal. (aac, ) (Entered: 03/23/2009)

3482

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Enter order. On 9/30/08, the court denied the defendant's motion to dissolve the modified consent decree in this case 3475 and in the consolidated case, American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, No. 75 C 3295. The plaintiffs in the consolidated case have filed a Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider the court's order, which is currently on appeal in both cases (case nos. 08−3688 and 08−3689). The court issues the attached Agreed Seventh Circuit Rule 57 Certification Order and takes the motion to reconsider under advisement pending remand of the case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Mailed notice (aac, ) (Entered: 05/04/2009)

3483 AGREED Seventh Circuit Rule 57 Certification Order. Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/1/2009. (aac, ) (Entered: 05/04/2009)

Case: 1:74-cv-3268 As of: 10/22/2014 03:10 PM CDT 71 of 71

05/12/2009
06/04/2009
08/04/2009 08/04/2009 08/04/2009 08/11/2009 04/13/2011

3484

COPY of order dated 5/12/2009 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 3460 ; Appellate case no. : 08−3688. IT IS ORDERED that the parties' joint motion is GRANTED. The record is REMANDED to the district court under Circuit Rule 57. The schedule for further briefs and oral argument is VACATED. After the district court has vacated the consent decree, the notices of appeal should be dismissed under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). (aac, ) (Entered: 05/13/2009)

3485

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiff's motion for entry of an order dissolving the Modified Consent Decree ("MCD") (Doc. No. 251 in Related Case No. 1:75−cv−3295)] is granted. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, and this Court's Agreed Seventh Circuit Rule 57 Certification Order entered on 5/1/09, the MCD entered in 1:74−cv−3268 and 1:75−cv−3295 is dissolved. Case number 1:74−cv−3268 is terminated. Mailed notice (aac, ) (Entered: 06/05/2009)

3486 LETTER from the USCA retaining the record on appeal in USCA no. 08−3688 consisting of 5 pleadings, 1 loose pleading and 1 sealed envelope. (ber, ) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

3487 MANDATE of USCA dated 7/13/2009 regarding notice of appeal 3460 ; USCA No. 08−3688. The appeals are DISMISSED. The parties will bear their own costs. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (ber, ) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

3488 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 7/13/2009 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 3460 ; Appellate case no. : 08−3688. The appeals are dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. (ber, ) (Entered: 08/06/2009)

3489 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 08−3688 consisting of five volumes of pleadings, one volume of loose pleadings, and one sealed envelope. (aac, ) (Entered: 08/20/2009)

3490

MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Petitioner's motion to dismiss petition pursuant to settlement agreement 347 is granted. It is hereby ordered that the Petition is dismissed without prejudice. Petitioners are permitted to seek reinstatement of the Petition if the City fails to satisfy paragraphs 5 and 6 of the parties' settlement agreement. If Petitioners have not file a motion seeking such reinstatement of the Petition within 45 days from the date of entry of the order, the dismissal of the Petition is with prejudice. Mailed notice. (et, ) (Entered: 04/22/2011)

 
 CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...
PROTO, TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:75-cv-03295

Amer Civil Liberties, et al v. Chgo, Cty of, et al Assigned to: Hon. Joan B. Gottschall Demand: $0 related Case: 1:74-cv-03268
Case in other court: 96-04014 Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

Date Filed: 10/03/1975 Date Terminated: 08/27/1997 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc.

represented by Edward W. Feldman Miller Shakman & Beem LLP 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 263-3700 Fax: (312) 263-3270 Email: efeldman@millershakman.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Imani Chiphe Federal Defender Program 55 East Monroe Street Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 621-8300 Email: imani_chiphe@fd.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shannon P. Bartlett Jenner & Block LLP 330 North Wabash Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 222-9350 Email: sbartlett@jenner.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Staunton Miller, Shakman & Beem LLP 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 263-3700

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Plaintiff American Friends Service Committee Plaintiff Better Government Association Plaintiff Community Renewal Society Plaintiff Independent Voters of Illinois Plaintiff Raymond Risley
V. Defendant

Email: tstaunton@millershakman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zachary J. Freeman Miller Shakman & Beem LLP 180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3600 Chicago, IL 60601 312-263-3700 Fax: 312-263-3270 Email: zfreeman@millershakman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Shannon P. Bartlett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Shannon P. Bartlett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Shannon P. Bartlett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Shannon P. Bartlett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Roger Sanford Hutchison Dobbs and Hutchison 47 West Polk Street Suite M-2 Chicago, IL 60605 (312) 461-9200 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shannon P. Bartlett (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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City of Chicago, The

represented by Sharon Baldwin City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-9010 TERMINATED: 11/17/2004 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adrienne L. Hiegel Moved, No Forwarding Address TERMINATED: 04/28/2005 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrew W Worseck City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-9010 Email: aworseck@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael A. Forti City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-9010 Email: mforti@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patrick Walter Johnson United States Attorney's Office (NDIL) 219 South Dearborn Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353-5300 Email: patrick.johnson2@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 06/08/2005
Patrick F McGovern United States Attorney's Office 219 South Dearborn Street Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353-5300 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005

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Defendant Richard J Daley
Defendant James M Rochford
Defendant Marlin W Johnson
Defendant Wilbur Daniel
Defendant Paul Goodrich
Defendant Louis F Peick
Defendant Sebastian Rivera
Defendant Mitchell Ware

Scott A. Frey Gorman & Caporusso 542 South Dearborn Street Suite 1060 Chicago, IL 60605 (312) 427-2313 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005
Thomas Forgue City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-9010 Email: tforgue@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William Macy Aguiar City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-9010 TERMINATED: 06/08/2005

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Defendant Walter Murphy Defendant Joseph Grubisic
Defendant

represented by Harry Joshua Nelson Butler Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP Three First National Plaza 70 West Madison Suite 1800 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 444-9660 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William V. Johnson Johnson & Bell, Ltd. 55 East Monroe Street Suite 4100 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372-0770 TERMINATED: 01/06/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY
Bruce William Melton Babbitt & Melton LLP 332 S. Michigan Avenue Suite 710 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)427-5555 Email: bmelton@babbittandmelton.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ellen M. Babbitt Babbitt, Land, Silverstein & Warner LLP 332 S. Michigan Avenue Suite 710 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)427-5555 Email: ebabbitt@babbittandmelton.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Lincoln Johnson Johnson & Bell, Ltd. 55 East Monroe Street Suite 4100 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372-0770 TERMINATED: 01/06/1998

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John P Clarke
Defendant Howard Pointer
Defendant Marcus Salone
Defendant Melvin Barna
Movant Chicago Tribune Company

represented by Richard J. O'Brien Sidley Austin LLP One South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 853-7000 Email: robrien@sidley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/25/1991 04/25/1991 04/25/1991 06/14/1993 06/25/1993 07/06/1993

#

Docket Text

MOTION by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties for leave to file supplemental memorandum of ACLU in opposition to FBI objections to the report and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge ; Notice of motion (Original in 74 CV 3268) (fce) Modified on 05/22/1995 (Entered: 05/22/1995)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/25/91 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Granting plaintiff's motion for leave to file supplemental memorandum of ACLU in opposition to FBI objections to the report and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge [0-1]. No notice (fce) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
MEMORANDUM by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties in opposition to FBI objections to the report and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge [0-1] (Original in 74 CV 3268) (fce) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
MOTION by FBI for extension of time to and including 06/25/93 within which to determine whether to seek review by the court of the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Lefkow (fce) Modified on 06/16/1993 (Entered: 06/16/1993)
OBJECTIONS by respondents' to Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge regarding training of FBI agents in Chicago (original in 74C3268) (fce) Modified on 06/28/1993 (Entered: 06/28/1993)
RESPONSE by CISPES PETITIONERS' and plaintiff ACLU's to FBI's objections regarding training; Notice of filing and certificate of service (jmp) Modified on 07/07/1993 (Entered: 07/07/1993)

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11/19/1993 12/16/1993 12/16/1993 03/21/1994 03/21/1994 03/24/1994
03/30/1994 03/30/1994
04/22/1994 04/22/1994 04/22/1994 04/22/1994 05/02/1994 06/01/1994

MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of, plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties to amend order concerning disposition of documents (Attachments); Notice of motion (Original in 74 C 3268) (fce) (Entered: 12/07/1993)
SUPPLEMENT TO ATTACHMENT A to attorney's fees motion by Alliance (Attachments) (Original in 74 C 3268) (fce) Modified on 12/20/1993 (Entered: 12/20/1993)
MEMORANDUM, OPINION, AND ORDER (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (fce) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT (jmp) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/21/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter final order and judgment. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/24/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Granting motion by FBI for extension of time to and including June 25, 1993 within which to determine whether to seek review by the court of the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Lefkow filed June 14, 1993 pursuant to order entered on June 17, 1994 in case number 74 C 3268 [0-1]. Granting motion by defendant City of Chicago and plaintiff to amend order concerning disposition of documents filed November 19, 1993 pursuant to order entered November 19, 1993 in case number 74 C 3268 [0-1]. No notice (is) (Entered: 03/25/1994)
ORDER (Attachments) (is) (Entered: 03/31/1994)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/30/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter judgment in favor of the ACLU plaintiffs and against the City of Chicago in the amount of $149,303. The City of Chicago is ordered to make prompt payment of that amount of the firm of Futterman & Howard, counsel for the ACLU plaintiffs. Mailed notice (is) (Entered: 03/31/1994)
OPPOSITION by respondent FBI to the enforcement petition of the American Civil Liberties Union (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
MOTION by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties and of Cispes petitioners to alter or amend judgment (Attachments); Notice of motion (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
PETITION by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties Union to enforce FBI consent decree (Exhibits); Notice of motion (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
AMENDED NOTICE of motion by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties Union regarding petition to enforce FBI consent decree [0-1] (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
REPLY by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties Union to the FBI's opposition to its petition to enforce FBI consent decree [0-1] (Exhibit) (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 05/04/1994)
LETTER from R. Joseph Sher to clerk dated May 27, 1994 (Attachment) (Original in 74 C 3268) (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (is) (Entered: 07/12/1994)

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06/21/1994 06/21/1994 07/08/1994 07/11/1994
07/15/1994 11/04/1994 12/02/1994 12/02/1994 12/02/1994
12/14/1994 12/14/1994 12/20/1994

MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its filings upon Alliance plaintiffs (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 06/27/1994)
BRIEF by Alliance plaintiffs in support of Alliance plaintiffs' motion to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its filings upon Alliance plaintiffs [0-1] (Exhibits); Notice of filing and certificate of service (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 06/27/1994)
OPPOSITION by respondent FBI to the motion of the former Alliance plaintiffs to compel the FBI to serve them with filings in this proceeding [0-1] (Exhibits) (Original in 74 C 3295) (is) (Entered: 07/12/1994)
MINUTE ORDER of 7/11/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : The clerk of court is directed to send all notices on behalf federal defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation to R. Joseph Sher Senior Trial Counsel Torts Branch, Civil Division P.O. Box 7146, Benjamin Franklin Station Washington D.C. 20044 and to add attorney Sher to the docket to receive notices. No notice (is) (Entered: 07/12/1994)
REPLY brief by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its filings upon Alliance plaintiffs [0-1] (Exhibits); Notice of filing (original in 74 C 3268). (vkd) Modified on 07/19/1994 (Entered: 07/19/1994)
SCHEDULE set on 11/4/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held on 11/4/94 and continued to 12/2/94 at 2:30 p.m. Pretrial conference to be held by telephone on 12/2/94. No notice (dl) (Entered: 11/08/1994)
JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs and defendants for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served ; Notice of motion (0riginal in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 12/08/1994)
MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs ACLU on entry of standing order regarding parties to be served [0-1] (Attachments) (Original in 94 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 12/08/1994)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/2/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Joint motion for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served [0-1]. Answer brief to motion due 12/16/94. Reply to answer brief due 12/23/94. Pretrial conference held; continued to 12/22/94 at 10:30 a.m. Original joint motion for entry of standing order regarding parties to be served and all others briefs filed in related case number 74 C 3268. No notice (is) (Entered: 12/08/1994)
OBJECTIONS by FBI to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge filed on 11/29/94 with proposed briefing schedule (Attachment) (Original in 74 CV 3268) (fce) (Entered: 12/27/1994)
PROPOSED briefing schedule by FBI with objections of the respondent to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge filed on 11/29/94 (Original in 74 CV 3268) (fce) (Entered: 12/27/1994)
BRIEF by the respondent regarding service on the original plaintiffs in proceedings to enforce the agreement (original in 74 C 3268). (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)

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12/22/1994 12/23/1994 12/23/1994 12/27/1994 12/30/1994
01/03/1995 01/13/1995 01/18/1995 02/03/1995 02/17/1995 02/17/1995 02/17/1995
06/15/1995 09/27/1995 09/27/1995

SCHEDULE set on 12/22/94 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 1/13/95 at 12:00 p.m. by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 12/28/1994)
REPLY brief concerning service by Alliance plaintiffs (Exhibits) (original in 74 C 3268). (vkd) Modified on 01/05/1995 (Entered: 01/05/1995)
REPLY memorandum of ACLU on entry of standing order regarding parties to be served (Attachment)(original in 74 C 3268). (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)
STATEMENT by respondent regarding the petitioners' motion to alter or amend judgment [0-1] (original in 74 C 3268). (vkd) (Entered: 01/05/1995)
MEMORANDUM by respondent FBI of points and authorities in support of the respondent's objections to the magistrate judge's November 29, 1994 report and recommendation [0-1] (Attachment) (Original in 74 C 3268) (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (is) (Entered: 01/13/1995)
COMMENTS by Alliance plaintiffs regarding plaintiff ACLU's proposed "standing order regarding parties to be served" (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 01/04/1995)
SCHEDULE set on 1/13/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 2/3/95 at 11:00 a.m. by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 01/20/1995)
RESPONSE by Alliance plaintiffs to respondent FBI's objections to Magistrate Judge's November 29, 1994 Report and Recommendation (Exhibits) (Original in 74 C 3268) (is) (Entered: 01/20/1995)
SCHEDULE set on 2/3/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held. No notice (dl) (Entered: 02/03/1995)
STIPULATION and ORDER dismissing this proceeding (smm) (Entered: 02/22/1995)
NOTICE of planned destruction of records (smm) (Entered: 02/22/1995)
MINUTE ORDER of 2/17/95 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter stipulation and order dismissing this proceeding. American Civil Liberties Union's petition to enforce FBI consent is dismissed with prejudice. Court retains jurisdiction for a period of one year for the purpose of enforcing this settlement agreement. No notice. (smm) (Entered: 02/22/1995)
NOTICE by petitioner's of change of address of attorney Richard Gutman (Original in 74 CV 3268) (fce) (Entered: 06/20/1995)
AGREED MOTION by defendant FBI to extend time to serve response to CISPES' attorney fee petition ; (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/02/1995)
NOTICE of motion by defendant FBI regarding motion to extend time to serve response to CISPES' attorney fee petition [0-1] (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/04/1995)

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10/02/1995 11/22/1995 11/22/1995 11/22/1995 03/29/1996
04/11/1996
04/12/1996 04/12/1996 04/12/1996 05/13/1996 05/24/1996 06/07/1996 06/13/1996

MEMORANDUM by respondent in opposition to the Cispes petitioners' motion to determine the amount of attorney's fee award (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/03/1995)
REPLY BRIEF by Cispes petitioners on attorney's fees (Attachments); Notice of filing. (Original in 74 C 3268). (fce) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
AMENDED attorney's fee computation (Original in 74 C 3268). (fce) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
MOTION by Cispes petitioners to determine amount of attorney's fee award (Attachments) (Original in 74 C 3268). (fce) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pursuant to order entered on 09/27/95 in 74 C 3268, motion by FBI to extend time to serve response to CISPES' attorney fee petition [0-1] is granted. Pursuant to orders entered on 03/28/96 in 74 C 3268, motion by American Civil Liberties Union to alter or amend judgment [0-1] is granted and motion by plaintiff for entry of standing regarding parties to be served [0-1] is granted. Pursuant to stipulation and order entered 02/17/95 in 74 C 3268, motion to compel respondent FBI to serve a copy of its findings upon Alliance plaintiffs [0-1] and American Civil Liberties Union's motion to enforce FBI consent decree [0-1] are stricken as moot. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 03/29/1996)
REFERRAL ORDER of 04/09/96: Case referred to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow from Hon. Ann C. Williams. The above-captioned cause is currently pending on my calendar. I recommend to the Executive Committee that this case be referred to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Lefkow to whom related case number 74 C 3268 has been referred. (For further detail see order.) Mailed notice (fce) Modified on 04/11/1996 (Entered: 04/11/1996)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs' attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree ; Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) Modified on 04/15/1996 (Entered: 04/15/1996)
BRIEF by plaintiffs' in support of Alliance plaintiffs' attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [0-1] (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/15/1996)
DECLARATION by Richard Gutman in support of Alliance plaintiffs' attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [0-1] (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/15/1996)
OPPOSITION of the respondent to the former Alliance plaintiffs' attorney fees motion for monitoring compliance with FBI consent decree [0-1] (Attachment) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/14/1996)
NOTICE OF APPEAL by FBI from motion minute order entered on 03/28/96 (Original in 74 C 3268) (hp) (Entered: 05/30/1996)
DESIGNATION by Chicago Cispes in 1:74-cv-03268, Chicago Cispes in 1:75-cv-03295 of appeal record no. 96-2347 (fce) (Entered: 06/10/1996)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. #96-2347 consisting of one volume of pleadings. (Also with case number 74cv3268.

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08/06/1996 09/01/1996
09/05/1996 09/05/1996
09/13/1996 09/16/1996 09/16/1996 09/19/1996 09/20/1996 09/23/1996 10/09/1996 10/16/1996

Mailed notice to all counsel. (pmp) (Entered: 06/13/1996)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/6/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Cipces' petitoners' motion to determine amount of attorney's fee award filed on 11/22/95 [0-1] is terminated. Motion will be handled and ruled on in related case number 74 c 3268. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 08/08/1996)
MEMORANDUM of points and authorities by respondent in support of the respondent's objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation filed on 09/09/96 regarding the petitioners' claim for attorney fees (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 10/02/1996 (Entered: 10/02/1996)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning attorney fee recommendation. (tlm) (Entered: 09/10/1996)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/5/96 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : It is hereby recommended that an attorney's fee be awarded to petitioners as set out in the order. Expenses should be allowed in the amount of $3,709.59. Petitioners are directed to prepare a revised calculation of fees, in conformity with this report and recommendation, to be submitted to the Honorable Ann Claire Williams by 09/20/96. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 09/10/1996)
CITATION fo additional authority by Cispes petititioners' and Alliance plaintiffs; Notice of filing and certificate of service. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
JOINT MOTION for a briefing schedule regarding objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation regarding attorney fees. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
REVISED CALCULATION of fees as ordered by magistrate judge by the Chicago CISPES et al; Notice of filing and certificate of service. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 10/01/1996)
OBJECTIONS by petitioners Chicago Cispes, et al to the Magistrate Judge's 09/05/96 Report and Recommendation [0-1]; Notice of filing and certificate of service (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) Modified on 09/25/1996 (Entered: 09/25/1996)
SECOND OBJECTIONS by petitioners Chicago Cispes, et al to the Magistate Judge's 09/05/96 Report and Recommendation [0-1] (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
OBJECTIONS by respondent's to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [0-1] filed on 09/09/96 regarding the petitioners' claim for attorney fees (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/25/1996)
SUPPLEMENTAL filing and second amended attorney's fees computation for compliance monitoring by plaintiffs' (Attachment) ; Notice of filing and certificate of service (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/10/1996)
OBJECTIONS to the former alliance plaintiffs' supplemental filing and second amended attorey's fees computation for compliance monitoring by Respondent

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10/21/1996 11/01/1996
11/21/1996
12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996
01/06/1997 01/14/1997 01/21/1997 01/31/1997
02/05/1997 02/25/1997

FBI. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs' to respondent FBI's objections to supplemental filing ; Notice of filing and certificate of service (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file the appearance of attorney Edward J. Koziboski ; Notice of motion and Certificate of service (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (jmp) Modified on 11/18/1996 (Entered: 11/18/1996)
MINUTE ORDER of 11/21/96 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pursuant to the court's order of 09/30/96 entered in related case number 74 C 3268, parties joint motion for a briefing schedule regarding objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation regarding attorney fees [0-1] filed 09/16/96 is denied nunc pro tunc 09/30/96. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT by defendants' (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/16/1996)
LETTER from defendants' to Office of the Police Board (Exhibits) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/16/1996)
LETTER from defendant to the Office of the Police Board dated 11/08/96 (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/16/1996)
FIRST AMENDMENT JUDGMENT ORDER compliance examination narrative by Chgo, Cty of (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) Modified on 12/16/1996 (Entered: 12/16/1996)
NOTICE of filing and certificate of service by defendants' regarding City of Chiago First Amendment Judgment Order Compliance Examination, Independent Acocountant's Report, Two letters (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/16/1996)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal USCA 96-4014 (Attachments). (tlm) Modified on 01/08/1997 (Entered: 01/08/1997)
CERTIFIED copy of Order from the 7th Circuit. ( 96-2347 and 96-4014) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 01/15/1997)
CERTIFIED copy of Order from the 7th Circuit. ( 96-2347 & 96-4014) (Original in 74 C 3268) (fce) (Entered: 01/27/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 1/31/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Pursuant to the order of 09/30/96 by Judge Williams, all matters relating to the referral of this actino having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. terminating case referral to Hon. Joan H. Lefkow No notice (tlm) (Entered: 02/06/1997)
MOTION by Nona Farrar to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree (Attachments); Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
MOTION by Nona Farrar to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree ; (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 02/27/1997)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

03/07/1997 03/07/1997 03/07/1997 03/12/1997 03/12/1997 03/17/1997 03/20/1997 03/31/1997 04/01/1997 04/02/1997 04/03/1997 04/03/1997 04/07/1997 04/08/1997 04/09/1997 04/10/1997

MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to modify consent decree (Exhibits); Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 CV 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to file memorandum in excess of 15 pages ; Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
MEMORANDUM by Chgo, Cty of in support of its motion to modify the 1982 Alliance consent decree [0-1] (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Amer Civil Liberties, Roger Baldwin by Imani Chiphe (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Amer Civil Liberties, Roger Baldwin by Edward W. Feldman, Thomas M. Staunton; Notice of filing (Original in case nubmer 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
ADDENDUM TO Nona Farrar's motion to enforce current City of Chicago Consent Decree (Attachment) (Original in case number 74 C 3258) (jmp) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
ISSUED two originals and two copies of subpoenas to Adrian Heigal Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago (jmp) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Walgreen Co by William V. Johnson, i Matthew Lincoln Johnson ; Notice of filing (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/01/1997)
MOTION by Walgreen Co to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Exhibit) ; Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) Modified on 04/11/1997 (Entered: 04/11/1997)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to enforce ; Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/11/1997)
ADDENDUM TO COMPLAINT (Attachment) by plaintiffs' (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/04/1997)
AMENDED motion by Chgo, Cty for enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to enforce ; Notice of filing. [0-1] (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 04/15/1997)
MOTION by plaintiff for the court to consolidate case #96 C 8062 with csae #74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295 (Attachments); Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) Modified on 04/11/1997 (Entered: 04/11/1997)
ISSUED Original and one copy subpoena to Matthew Johnson (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) Modified on 04/09/1997 (Entered: 04/09/1997)
TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 03/12/97. Before Honorable Ann C. Williams. (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/14/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/10/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's amended motion for enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

04/14/1997 04/16/1997
04/16/1997 04/18/1997 04/21/1997 04/23/1997 04/24/1997 04/24/1997
05/01/1997
05/01/1997 05/05/1997 05/05/1997 05/09/1997

enforce [0-1] current City of Chicago consent decree is granted to and including 04/23/97. Petitioner [0-1] to reply to the City's response on or before 5/11/97. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 04/15/1997)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to bar discovery (Exhibits); Notice of motion (Original in case number 75 C 3295) (jmp) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
PETITION by Alliance plaintiffs, Active Resistance Organizing Colletive, Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and Festival of Life Committee to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against City defendants ; Notice of filing. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 05/01/1997)
DECLARATION of Edward Koziboski regarding motion to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against City defendants (Exhibit). [0-1] (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 05/01/1997)
RESPONSE by plaintiffs' to defendant Walgreens, motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [0-1] (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of to substitute counsel (Exhibit); Notice of motion. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 05/01/1997)
REPLY by defendant Walgreen Co to plaintiff's response to its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [0-1]; Notice of filing (Original in 75 C 3295) (fce) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for an enlargement of time to respond to motion to enforce ; Notice of motion. (tlm) (Entered: 04/29/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/24/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's motion for an enlargement of time to respond to petitioner's motion to enforce [0-1] current City of Chicago consent decree is granted to and including 05/21/97. Petitioner to [0-1] reply to response on or before 06/11/97. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 04/29/1997)
AMENDED PETITION by Alliance Plaintiffs, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Automomous Zone, Countermedia and Festival of Life Committee's to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree against City defendants (Exhibit) (Attachments). (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
AMENDED BRIEF by Alliance Plaintiffs in opposition to motion of City of Chicago to bar discovery (Exhibits). [0-1] (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
JOINT PROPOSED DISCOVERY PLAN by defendants, plaintiffs; Notice of filing and certificate of service (Original in case number 74 C 3298) (jmp) Modified on 05/06/1997 (Entered: 05/06/1997)
REPLY by Alliance Plaintiffs to ACLU Plaintifs memorandum in opposition to City's motion to bar discovery ; Notice of filing and certificate of service. (In 74 C 3268) [0-1] (tlm) (Entered: 05/09/1997)
AMENDMENDED LIST by defendant (Original in case number (74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/16/1997)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

05/12/1997 05/15/1997 05/19/1997 05/21/1997 05/28/1997 05/28/1997 06/03/1997 06/03/1997 06/03/1997 06/09/1997 06/10/1997 06/10/1997 06/11/1997 06/11/1997
06/11/1997

MOTION by CTA to quash plaintiff's subpoena ; (Exhibits); Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/16/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/15/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Non-party, Chicago Transit Authority's motion to quash plaintiff's subpoena [0-1] is granted. No notice (tlm) (Entered: 05/16/1997)
ISSUED Original and one copy subpoena as to Clinton Companies (Original in case number 74 C 3295) (jmp) (Entered: 05/21/1997)
RESPONSE by Chgo, Cty of to contempt motion (Attachments) (Origial in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/23/1997)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for TJX Co Inc by Harry Joshua Nelson, Bruce William Melton, Ellen M. Babbitt (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/29/1997)
MOTION by Chgo Crime Comm to file its friend of hte court brief ; Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/29/1997)
MOTION by defendant American Drug Stores, Inc. for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead ; Notice of motion (mjc) (Entered: 06/17/1997)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant American Drug Stores by Paul Anthony Tanzillo, Margaret A Unger and Howard Patrick Morris (mjc) (Entered: 06/17/1997)
JURY DEMAND by Amer Drug Stores Inc. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 06/20/1997)
MOTION by Illinois State Police to file amicus curiae brief ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 06/20/1997)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Marshall Field & Co by Edward M. Ordonez and Davida Forrest; Notice of filing. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) Modified on 06/20/1997 (Entered: 06/20/1997)
MOTION by Marshall Field & Co to dismiss complaint (Exhibit) (Attachments); Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3295). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) Modified on 06/24/1997 (Entered: 06/24/1997)
AMICUS CURIAE brief of the Illinois State Police. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 06/20/1997)
MOTION by City of Chicago for a protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 06/20/1997)
MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago in support of its motion for a protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 06/20/1997)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

06/11/1997 06/16/1997 06/17/1997 06/19/1997 06/27/1997 07/08/1997 07/18/1997
07/18/1997 07/22/1997 07/29/1997 07/30/1997
08/05/1997

NOTICE of motion by Marshall Field & Co. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 06/24/1997)
REPLY by Nona Farrar-pro se to City's motion for a protective order regarding plaintiff (Nona Farrar) deposing Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) Modified on 06/20/1997 (Entered: 06/20/1997)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for an order entering the joint proposed DNC discovery plan (Attachments); Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/27/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 6/19/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for a protective order regarding the deposition of Police Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez is granted [0-1]. No notice (ar) (Entered: 06/27/1997)
TRANSCRIPTS of proceedings for the following date(s): 04/09/97, 04/25/97 and 06/19/97 before Honorable Ann C. Williams. (Originals in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 06/30/1997)
BRIEF of Amicus Curiae Chgo Crime Comm in support of the City of Chicago's motion to modify consent decree [0-1] (Exhibits) ; Notice of filing (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 07/09/1997)
SECOND AMENDED petition by Alliance plaintiffs, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone and Countermedia's to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree [0-1] [0-1] (Attachment). (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) Modified on 07/28/1997 (Entered: 07/28/1997)
DECLARATION by Richard Gutman regarding Alliance plaintiffs, et al's second amended petition [0-1] to enforce City of Chicago consent decree. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 07/28/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 7/22/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set to 9:00 a.m. 8/1/97 regarding fee award vacated by the 7th Circuit . Mailed notice (dl) (Entered: 07/22/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 7/29/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing set for 8/1/97 is stricken. Telephoned notice (dl) (Entered: 07/29/1997)
MOTION by plaintiffs' Alliance to End Repression, the Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and the Active Resistance Organizing Committee to withdraw Edward Kozibowski as attorney for the those plaintiffs ; Notice of motion. (Original in 94-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 08/15/1997)
MOTION by Nona Farrar seeking clarification as to the degree petitioner's current petition before this court can or can't address the private companies and private individuals alleged to be involved in the conspiracy with the Chicago police against petitioner... (Attachments); Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) Modified on 08/15/1997 (Entered: 08/15/1997)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

08/06/1997 08/07/1997 08/21/1997 08/21/1997 08/26/1997 08/26/1997 08/26/1997 08/26/1997
08/27/1997 09/02/1997
09/09/1997

SCHEDULE set on 8/6/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference set to 2:00 p.m. 8/26/97 by telephone on CISPES enforcement petition. No notice (dl) (Entered: 08/06/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/7/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : City of Chicago's motion to bar discovery is denied for reasons stated on the record in open court [0-1]. Draft scheduling order to follow. No notice. (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) Modified on 08/18/1997 (Entered: 08/18/1997)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order ; (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (jmp) Modified on 09/05/1997 (Entered: 09/05/1997)
NOTICE of motion by defendant Chgo, Cty of regarding motion to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [0-1] and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify judgment order [0-2] (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/05/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 8/26/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference reset to 2:00 p.m. 8/27/97 by telephone regarding CISPES enforcement petition. Telephoned notice (dl) (Entered: 08/26/1997)
LETTER from the 7th Circuit, dated 08/25/97: Retaining record on appeal nos. 96-2347 and 96-4014 consisting of three volumes of pleadings and five loose pleadings. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 08/29/1997 (Entered: 08/29/1997)
OPINION from the 7th Circuit: Argued 04/24/97; Decided 07/02/97 (USCA Case Nos. 96-2347 and 96-4014). (Original in 75-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/29/1997)
CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit, dated 07/02/97 regarding Appeal [0-1] (USCA Case Nos. 96-2347 and 96-4014): "The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings; no costs awarded. The fee award is vacated. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered this date." (Original in 75-CV-3268). (ar) Modified on 08/29/1997 (Entered: 08/29/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 8/27/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 10:30 a.m. 9/25/97 by telephone regarding CISPES petition. No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/03/1997)
ANSWER by Chgo, Cty of and affirmative defenses to petitioners' second amended Alliance plaintiffs, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone and Countermedia's petition to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree [0-1] ; Notice of filing (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/10/1997)
MOTION by plaintiff ACLU for leave to . file response to motion of City of Chicago to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order an in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order ; Notice of motion (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/24/1997)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

09/09/1997 09/10/1997 09/11/1997 09/11/1997
09/18/1997 09/25/1997 09/29/1997
10/02/1997 10/03/1997 10/08/1997 10/21/1997 10/21/1997 10/23/1997

RESPONSE by ACLU plaintiffs' to motion of City of Chicago to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [0-1] and in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [0-2] (Temporarily unavailable for docketing) (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/24/1997)
NOTICE of filing and certificate of service by plaintiffs' regarding opposition to City's motion to set aside Magistrate Judge's Order [0-1] in its place to set a briefing schedule on motion to modify the judgment order [0-2] (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/18/1997)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning Non Farrar's motions to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree [0-1] [0-1] (ar) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/11/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : It is hereby recommended that petitioner Farrar's motions to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree [0-1] [0-1] be denied without prejudice to her repleading, on or before 10/14/97, any claims that can be pleaded properly in compliance with the limitations set out in this report and recommendation. Enter Report and Recommendation. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 09/16/1997)
AGREED STATUS REPORT by parties; Notice of filing (Original in case number 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/22/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 9/25/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 12:00 p.m. 10/2/97 No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/29/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/29/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : There having been no objections filed, and after carefully reviewing Magistrate Judge Lefkow's well-reasoned Report & Recommendation ("R&R"), the court adopts the R&R in full. The court denies petitioner Farrar's motion to enforce current City of Chicago consent decree [0-1] without prejudice. If Farrar wishes to replead, she must do so on or by 10/29/97. The parties should attempt to settle this matter before Farrar repleads. Mailed notice (meg) (Entered: 09/30/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 10/2/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:15 a.m. 10/8/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/02/1997)
TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): 08/07/97. Before Honorable Joan H. Lefkow. (Original in case #74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/06/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 10/8/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:30 a.m. 10/28/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/08/1997)
ORDER (ar) (Entered: 10/22/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 10/21/97 by Hon. Joan H. Lefkow : Enter order regarding discovery plan. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 10/22/1997)
MOTION by Nona Farrar to enforce City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants (Attachments); Notice of filing (Original in case numer 74 C 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/27/1997)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

10/28/1997 11/13/1997 11/18/1997 11/20/1997 12/02/1997 12/10/1997
12/10/1997 12/10/1997
12/11/1997 12/11/1997
12/18/1997 01/28/1998

SCHEDULE set on 10/28/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:30 a.m. 11/20/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/30/1997)
MOTION by City of Chicago for leave to unseal sealed files for purposes of responding to discovery requests ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/26/1997)
LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal nos. 96-2347 and 96-4014 consisting of three volumes of pleadings and four transcripts (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 11/20/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference held and continued to 9:45 a.m. 12/18/97 by telephone. No notice (dl) (Entered: 11/25/1997)
MOTION by petitioner Nona Farrar for status ; Notice of filing; Notice of motion (meg) (Entered: 12/04/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/10/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion by petitioner, Nona Farrar, for status of petition is granted [0-1]. Status of petition stated in open court. Motion by Nona Farrar to enforce City of Chicago consent decree against city defendants is denied for the reasons stated in open court [0-1]. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 12/11/1997 (Entered: 12/11/1997)
SETTLEMENT agreement between the FBI and CISPES petitioners (ar) (Entered: 12/12/1997)
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by Chicago Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, the Metro-Chicago Chapter of Clergy and Laity Concerned, the 8th Day Center for Justice, Illinois Justice Foundation, Phyllis Hasbrouck, Sheila Brady and the FBI regarding the settlement of claims of the July, 1988, CISPES enforcement petition. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (ar) (Entered: 12/16/1997)
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT (ar) (Entered: 12/12/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/11/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter final order and judgment that the enforcement proceedings of Chicago CISPES petitioners be dismissed pursuant to settlement agreement approved by the parties and the court. Telephone pretrial conference set for 12/18/97 is stricken. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 12/12/1997)
SCHEDULE set on 12/18/97 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Pretrial conference is stricken. No notice (dl) (Entered: 12/18/1997)
MINUTE ORDER of 1/28/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : The court denies defendant the City of Chicago's motion to modify the consent decree and plaintiffs Alliance to End, Active Resistance Organizing Collective, Autonomous Zone, Countermedia and Festival of Life Committee's motion and second amended motion to enforce the City of Chicago's consent decree without prejudice with leave to re-file when discovery is completed. The parties are instructed to file a written status report by 03/13/98. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 01/29/1998 (Entered: 01/29/1998)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

02/20/1998 02/25/1998
03/13/1998 03/20/1998 03/23/1998 03/24/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/27/1998 05/29/1998 06/22/1998

MOTION by City of Chicago for relief under Section 3.1.7.2 of the decree ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (Temporarily unavailable for docketing.) (ar) (Entered: 02/26/1998)
MINUTE ORDER of 2/25/98 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motion for relief under Section 3.1.7.2 of the decree is granted. The City is authorized to retain the videotapes and use them in connection with the litigaion surrounding the Alliance petitioners enforcement petition and in connection with the civil case captioned as Tocwish v. Jobian, Case No. 97-C-6098, pursuant to Section 3.1.7.2. of the decree. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 02/26/1998 (Entered: 02/25/1998)
JOINT STATUS REPORT (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) Modified on 03/17/1998 (Entered: 03/17/1998)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs to extend discovery dedline regarding defendant City's motion to modify the consent decree ; Notice of motion and certificate of service. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 03/31/1998 (Entered: 03/31/1998)
MOTION by Amer Civil Liberties for extension of discovery ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 03/31/1998)
RESPONSE by City of Chicago to plaintiffs' motions to extend the discovery deadline regarding the City's motion to modify the consent decree; Notice of filing. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 03/26/1998)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members ; Notice of motion/ filing and certificate of service. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
BRIEF by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 05/28/1998)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/27/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Alliance plaintiffs' motion against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members is entered and continued to 10:00 am on 06/22/98. Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 06/01/1998 (Entered: 05/28/1998)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs against defendant City of compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members ; Notice of motion/filing and certificaate of service. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (ar) Modified on 06/01/1998 (Entered: 06/01/1998)
BRIEF by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion against defendant City to compel disclosure of the names of CPD CCTF members [0-1] (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268). (ar) Modified on 06/01/1998 (Entered: 06/01/1998)
SUPPLEMENT by Alliance plaintiffs to brief in support of motion to compel disclosure of CCTF names [0-1] [0-1]; Notice of filing and certificate of service (Original in 74 C 3268) (rmm) (Entered: 06/05/1998)
STIPULATION regarding confidentiality. (Original in 75-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 07/01/1998)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

07/13/1998 07/13/1998 08/18/1998 08/27/1998 08/27/1998 09/04/1998 09/10/1998 10/28/1998 11/06/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998 11/16/1998

PETITION by Alliance plaintiffs to enforce City consent decree as to CPD's terrorism investigations ; Notice of motion and certificate of service (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 07/27/1998 (Entered: 07/27/1998)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of petition to enforce City consent decree as to CPD's terrorism investigations [0-1] (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 07/27/1998)
MOTION by Amer Civil Liberties to enter stipulated protective order (Exhibit); Notice of motion; Amended notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/28/1998)
STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER (ar) (Entered: 08/28/1998)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/27/98 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Plaintiff's motion to enter stipulated protective order is granted, there being no objection [0-1]. Enter stipulated order. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 08/28/1998)
BRIEF of Amicus Curiae by the Chicago Crime Commission in support of the City of Chicago's motion to modify consent decree (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (Original in 74-V-326) (ar) (Entered: 09/10/1998)
MOTION by City of Chicago to place filing under seal (Attachment); Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 09/21/1998)
MOTION by the ACLU for extesnion of time to file response brief ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3298) (ar) Modified on 11/02/1998 (Entered: 11/02/1998)
MOTION by City of Chicago for extension of time to complete certain discovery or in the alternative to compel response (Exhibits); Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
RESPONSE by Alliance plaintiffs to defendant City of Chicago's statement of material facts; Notice of filing and certificate of service. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for an interpretation of City consent decree . (Original in 74-CV-3268). (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of motion for an interpretation of City consent decree [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3298) (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their mtoion for evidentiary hearing regarding City's motion to modify consent decree. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in opposition to defendant City's motion to modify decree. (Original in 74-CV-3268). (ar) (Entered: 11/18/1998)
APPENDIX by Alliance plaintiffs to their memorandum in opposition to defendant City's motion to modify decree [0-1] (2 vols.) (Originals in 74-CV-3268). (ar) Modified on 11/18/1998 (Entered: 11/18/1998)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

11/18/1998 11/19/1998 11/19/1998 12/08/1998 12/10/1998 01/05/1999 01/05/1999 01/06/1999 01/07/1999
01/14/1999 01/14/1999 02/17/1999 03/11/1999
03/15/1999

MOTION by ACLU plaintiffs for leave to file response brief instanter ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 11/23/1998 (Entered: 11/23/1998)
RESPONSE by ACLU plaintiffs to the City's renewed motion to modify the 1982 Allicane consent decree (Attachment). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 11/23/1998 (Entered: 11/23/1998)
LOCAL RULE 12(N) STATEMENT by ACLU plaintiffs. (Original in 75-C-3295) (ar) (Entered: 11/23/1998)
AGREED MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for extension of time to file reply brief in support of its motion to modify decree ; Notice of agreed motion (fce) (Entered: 12/16/1998)
STATEMENT by FBI as amicus curias (Original in 74 c 3268) (fce) Modified on 12/16/1998 (Entered: 12/16/1998)
REPLY memorandum by of the City of Chicago in support of its renewed motion to modify the 1982 Alliance consent decree with opposition (1 vol.) (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
REPLY of City of Chicago to the Alliance plaintiffs' response to defendant City of Chicago's statement of material facts (Exhibits) (1 vol.) (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
RESPONSE of City of chicago to the ACLU's statement of facts under Local Rule 12(N) (Exhibits) (1 vol.) (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 01/06/1999)
REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to the ACLU plaintiffs to the City's renewed motion to modify the 1982 Alliance Consent Decree; Notice of filing and certificate of service. (Original in 75-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 01/13/1999 (Entered: 01/13/1999)
MOTION by countermedia petitioner to set trial date (Attachment); Notice of motion and filing (Original in 74 cv 3268) (fce) (Entered: 01/28/1999)
THIRD AMENDED PETITION by plaintiffs, countermedia, active resistance organization Collective and Autonomous Zone to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree (Original in 74 cv 3268) (fce) (Entered: 01/28/1999)
UNCONTESTED MOTION by CounterMedia for leave to file fourth amended petition ; Notice of motion and certificate of service. (Original in 74 C 3268) (dmkf) (Entered: 03/04/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/11/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Magistrate Judge Bobrick has submitted a report and recommendation ("R&R") that the City of Chicago's motion to modify the consent decree be denied. Copies are available in chambers, Room 1988. Objections are due by 03/25/99. The court will notify parties if responses are required. Mailed notice (lal) (Entered: 03/15/1999)
OBJECTIONS by defendant Chgo, Cty of to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 3/9/99; Notice of filing (Filed in 74 C 3268) (vmj) (Entered: 03/18/1999)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

03/15/1999
03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/15/1999 03/22/1999 03/24/1999
04/05/1999
04/05/1999 04/05/1999 04/09/1999 04/09/1999 04/23/1999 04/23/1999

MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for leave to file memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of 03/09/99, and to file record of materials before the magistrate judge ; Notice of motion. (In 74 C 3268) (tlm) (Entered: 03/19/1999)
APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS to Rule 12(m) Statement with exhibits (two volumes) (Original document in 74 C 3268) (mak) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
MOTION by Chgo, Cty of for summary judgment (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) Modified on 03/24/1999 (Entered: 03/24/1999)
MEMORANDUM by defendant Chgo, Cty of in support of motion for summary judgment [0-1] (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) Modified on 03/24/1999 (Entered: 03/24/1999)
LOCAL RULE 12(m) Statement of facts by defendant Chgo, Cty of (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) Modified on 03/24/1999 (Entered: 03/24/1999)
MOTION by Amer Civil Liberties for leave to file memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Bobrick's report and recommendation ; Notice of motion. (mak) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/24/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams: ACLU's motion for leave to file memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Bobrick's report and recommendation is granted. City of Chicago to file its objections and memorandum in support and record of materials held by the magistrate judge on 4/5/99. All other objections and memorandum in support and response to City of Chicago objections to be filed on 5/3/99. Replies limited to 10 pages to be filed on 5/17/99. Mailed notice (fce) (Entered: 03/25/1999)
MEMORANDUM of City of Chicago in support of its objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of March 9, l999 (Appendices); Notice of filing. (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) Modified on 04/06/1999 (Entered: 04/06/1999)
RECORD on objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of 03/09/99 (Eight volumes)(Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) (Entered: 04/06/1999)
BRIEF of the Illinois State Police as Amicus Curiae in support of the City's objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation; Notice of filing. (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) Modified on 04/06/1999 (Entered: 04/06/1999)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for leave to file corrected appendix ; Notice of motion; (Original in 74 C 3268) (fce) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
CORRECTED appendix of exhibits to rule 12(m) statement by defendant Chgo, Cty of; (Volumes I and II); (Original in 74 C 3268) (fce) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
MOTION by the City of Chicago for leave to file supplemental record on objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99 ; Notice of motion. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 04/29/1999)
SUPPLEMENT by the City of Chicago on objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99 (Vol. I); Notice of filing. (Original in 74-C-3268) (ar) (Entered: 04/29/1999)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

04/28/1999 05/05/1999 05/13/1999 05/17/1999 05/18/1999 05/19/1999 05/24/1999 06/10/1999 06/11/1999 06/11/1999 06/11/1999 06/11/1999 06/25/1999

MOTION by ACLU plaintiffs for extension of time to file response brief ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 05/10/1999 (Entered: 05/10/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/5/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : ACLU plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file response brief from 05/03/99 to 05/13/99 and objections is granted. Date for filing reply briefs is extended to 05/20/99. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 05/07/1999)
REQUEST by Amer Civil Liberties for adoption of Magistrate's Report and Recommendation with modifications . (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 05/14/1999)
MOTION by the City of Chicago for additional time and to file an oversize reply memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99 ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 05/28/1999)
RESPONSE by Alliance to End Repression plaintiffs to defendant City's "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of March 9, 1999" [0-1] (Attachments); Notice. (Original in 75-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 05/19/1999 (Entered: 05/19/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/19/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's motio for additional time to and including 06/10/99 and for leave to file oversize reply memorandum, up to twenty pages, in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is granted. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 05/27/1999)
REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to ACLU plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [0-1]; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 05/26/1999)
CONSOLIDATED REPLY memorandum by the City of Chicago in support of its objections to the Magistrate Judge's to report and recommendation of 03/09/99 [0-1]; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 06/11/1999)
MEMORANDUM by CounterMedia petitioners in opposition to City's motion for summary judgment [0-1]; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
RESPONSE by CounterMedia petitioners to City's statement of facts pursuant to Local Rule 12(m) [0-1]. (Original in 74-Cv-3268) (ar) Modified on 06/15/1999 (Entered: 06/15/1999)
APPENDIX filed by CounterMedia petitioners to memorandum in opposition to City's motion for summary judgment consisting of excerpts from City's police radio audio tape [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 06/15/1999 (Entered: 06/15/1999)
APPENDIX filed by CounterMedia petitioners to memorandum in opposition to City's motion for summary judgment consisting of four volumes [0-1] (Originals in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
UNOPPOSED MOTION by the City of Chicago for extension of time of the briefing schedule on the City's motion for summary judgment (ar) (Entered:

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

06/28/1999 06/30/1999 07/07/1999
07/16/1999 07/16/1999 07/16/1999
07/23/1999 07/29/1999 07/29/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999

07/09/1999)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for discovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 07/01/1999 (Entered: 07/01/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 6/30/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography is continued to 9:00 am on 07/16/99. No notice (ar) (Entered: 07/01/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 7/7/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : City of Chicago's unopposed motion for extension of time to and including 07/16/99 to file its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment is granted. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 07/07/1999)
DECLARATION of Robert Boyle; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 07/19/1999)
MOTION by the City of Chicago for extension of time on the briefing schedule on its motion for summary judgment ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 07/22/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 7/16/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Alliance plaintiffs' motion for recovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography to be held before Magistrate Judge Bobrick. Referral order to follow. Order to be entered within a short date regarding stay of the statue as it relates to this matter. Status hearing is set for 9:00 am on 09/23/99. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 07/27/1999)
AGREED MOTION by City of Chicago for extension of time to reply to motion for summary judgment ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/04/1999)
PETITION by Amer Civil Liberties to enforce consent decree relating to reported spying by the City of Chicago in violation of the consent decree (Attachment); Notice (ar) Modified on 09/03/1999 (Entered: 09/03/1999)
PETITION by ACLU of Illinois to enforce consent decree relating to reported spying by the City of Chicago in violation of the consent decree (Attachment); Notice (ar) (Entered: 09/08/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 7/30/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 9/1/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 07/30/1999)
MOTION by the City of Chicago to strike affidavit of Jeffrey Perlstein ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
MOTION by City of Chicago for leave to file oversized brief instanter . (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
REPLY brief by City of Chicago in support of its motion for summary judgment [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
STATEMENT of facts pursuant to Local Rule 12(n)(3) by City of Chicago. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

07/30/1999 08/02/1999 08/05/1999 08/05/1999
08/20/1999 08/20/1999 08/25/1999 09/01/1999
09/02/1999 09/21/1999 09/22/1999
09/24/1999 10/01/1999 10/01/1999

EXHIBITS to Rule 12(n) statement by City of Chicago [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance Plaintiffs in support of their motion for discovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography [0-1]; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
ORDER regarding Alliance Plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography [0-1] (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/5/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Enter order concerning the tolling of any limitations period during the pendency of the City's investigation into an incident of alleged photography. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
AGREED MOTION by the City of Chicago for leave to file response brief instanter ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 09/02/1999 (Entered: 09/02/1999)
RESPONSE by City of Chicago in opposition to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for discovery concerning potential petition to enforce (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
COPY of 1997 Annual Compliance Audit First Amendment Audit 98-1 (1 vol.) (Original filed in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/26/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/1/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Answer brief to ACLU's petition to enforce consent decree relating to reported spying by the City of Chicago in violation of the consent decree due 09/22/99. Reply to answer brief due 10/06/99. Status hearing set for 9:30 am on 10/20/99. No discovery to be taken in the interim. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 09/03/1999)
REPLY memorandum by Alliance plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs' motion for discovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography [0-1] (Attachments); Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 09/07/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 9/21/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing reset to 9:00 9/24/99 . No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/21/1999)
MEMORANDUM by the City of Chicago in support of City of Chicago to dismiss ACLU's petition to enforce consent decree, or alternatively, to consider the petition in support of City's pending motion to modify consent decree and stay further proceedings on the petition (Attachment); Notice (ar) (Entered: 09/23/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 9/24/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Status hearing held and continued to 10:00 10/20/99 . No notice (dl) (Entered: 09/28/1999)
OBJECTION by Alliance plaintiffs to Magistrate Judge's 09/21/99 memorandum order (Attachments); Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/05/1999)
REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to 09/22/99 City of Chicago motion to consider the ACLU's petition in adjudicating City's motion to modify decree. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/05/1999)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

10/01/1999
10/04/1999 10/05/1999 10/06/1999
10/19/1999 10/20/1999
10/20/1999
10/22/1999 10/25/1999 10/25/1999 10/25/1999 10/25/1999
10/26/1999 10/26/1999 10/28/1999 10/28/1999 11/01/1999

RECORD filed by Alliance plaintiffs to Magistrate Judge's 09/21/99 memorandum order (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/05/1999)
MOTION by ACLU for extension of time to file reply brief ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/06/1999)
NOTICE by Lawrence V Jackowiak of change of address. (Attachments) (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 10/12/1999 (Entered: 10/07/1999)
MOTION by CounterMedia Petitioners to alter 09/30/99 opinion and order denying their enforcement petition as moot ; Notice (ar) Modified on 10/19/1999 (Entered: 10/19/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 10/19/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : In court hearing hearing set for 10/20/99 is vacated. No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/19/1999)
REPLY by Amer Civil Liberties in support of petition to enforce consent decree relating to reported spying by the City of Chicago [0-1] (ar) (Entered: 10/22/1999)
MOTION by Chgo Tribune Co to appear as Amicus Curiae and to file statement in suport of the petition to enforce settlement decree ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 11/15/1999)
RESPONSE by FBI to teh Alliance plaintiffs' request for a dcision (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/25/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 10/25/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 10/27/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 10/25/1999)
PETITION by Raymond Risley to enforce the City of Chicago's consent decree . (Original in 75-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 11/02/1999 (Entered: 10/26/1999)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Raymond Risley by Roger S. Hutchison. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/26/1999)
NOTICE of motion by Raymond Risley regarding his motion to enforce the City of Chicago's consent decree [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/12/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 10/26/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion reset for 9:30 11/10/99 Telephoned notice (dl) (Entered: 10/26/1999)
BILL of costs submitted by Alliance plaintiffs (Attachment); Notice. (Original in 74-C-3268) (ar) (Entered: 10/28/1999)
NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant Chgo, Cty of of order of 09/30/99 (FEE DUE) (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) (Entered: 11/01/1999)
LETTER regarding docketing statement acknowledged by defendant Chgo, Cty of (Original in 74 C. 3268) . (mak) (Entered: 11/01/1999)
BILL OF COSTS by City of Chicago (Attachment); Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/04/1999)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

11/01/1999 11/09/1999 11/09/1999 11/10/1999
11/12/1999
11/23/1999 11/24/1999 11/24/1999 12/01/1999 12/02/1999 12/07/1999
12/08/1999 12/10/1999

MOTION by Raymond Risley to attach exhibit to petition (Attachment); Amended notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 11/12/1999 (Entered: 11/12/1999)
NOTICE of filing by the Police Board of the City of Chicago regarding its 1997 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 98-1). (1 vol.) (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 11/12/1999)
NOTICE by Sidley & Austin of change of address (ar) (Entered: 11/12/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 11/10/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Response to the Chicago Tribune Company's motion to appear as Amicus Curiae and to file statement in suport of the petition to enforce settlement decree to be filed on or before 12/01/99 [0-1] [0-2]. Reply to be filed on or before 12/13/99. Ruling on said motion to be made by mail. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 11/15/1999)
OBJECTIONS by petitioners CounterMedia, Active Resistance, Zone Autonomous Zone, Alliance to Magistrate Judge's 10/27/99 Report and Recommendation regarding City's motion for summary judgment [0-1] (Attachments); Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 11/17/1999 (Entered: 11/17/1999)
MOTION by the City of Chicago for extension of time to file response to objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 12/06/1999 (Entered: 12/06/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 11/24/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 12/1/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 11/24/1999)
RESPONSE by CounterMedia Petitioners to City's motion for extension of time; Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 11/30/1999 (Entered: 11/30/1999)
MOTION by the City of Chicago for additional time to file reply memorandum ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 12/08/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 12/2/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Noticed motion set for 9:30 12/8/99 No notice (dl) (Entered: 12/02/1999)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/7/99 by Hon. Ann C. Williams : Motion of City of Chicago for additional time to file reply memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss ACLU's petition and in response to the statement of amicus curiae Chicago Tribune Company is granted to and including 12/10/99. Date for filing reply is extended from 12/13/99 to 12/22/99. Mailed notice (ar) (Entered: 12/08/1999)
SUPPLEMENTAL attorneys' fees computation for monitoring and enforcing compliance with FBI consent decree by Richard Gutman, counsel for Alliance plaintiffs (Attachment); Notice. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) Modified on 12/10/1999 (Entered: 12/10/1999)
REPLY MEMORANDUM in opposition by the City of Chicago to statement of Amicus Curiae Chicago Tribune Company and in support of its motion to dismiss ACLU's petition to enforce consent decree; Notice (ar) (Entered: 12/13/1999)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

12/10/1999
12/10/1999 12/13/1999 12/15/1999 12/22/1999 12/22/1999 12/27/1999 12/27/1999 12/27/1999 12/29/1999 12/29/1999 12/29/1999 12/29/1999 12/30/1999

MINUTE ORDER of 12/10/99 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Report and Recommendation regarding motion of the Alliance plaintiffs for attorney's fees incurred in monitoring FBI compliance with the consent decree in 74-C-3268 is hereby submitted to Judge Williams. The Court recommends that the plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorneys' fees be denied. (Entered Report and Recommendation) Notice mailed by Magistrate Judge's staff (ar) (Entered: 12/13/1999)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION concerning attorneys' fees against the FBI (ar) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
RELY MEMORANDUM in opposition by the City of Chicago to statement of Amicus Curiae Chicago Tribune Company and in support of its motion to dismiss ACLU's petition to enforce consent decree; Notice (ar) (Entered: 12/13/1999)
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER of 12/15/99: Case reassigned to Hon. Joan B. Gottschall. (nlf) (Entered: 12/17/1999)
SCHEDULE set on 12/22/99 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Noticed motion set for 9:30 1/5/00 No notice (rj) (Entered: 12/22/1999)
AGREED MOTION by Chgo Tribune Co to reset the due date for reply brief ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 01/07/2000)
OBJECTIONS by Alliance plaintiffs to the 12/10/99 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation regarding attorney's fees against the FBI. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
APPENDIX filed by Alliance plaintiffs to their objections to the 12/10/99 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation regarding attorney's fees against the FBI [0-1] (1 vol.) (ar) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
DECEMBER 22, 1999, AMENDED REQUEST by Alliance plaintiffs for attorney fees for monitoring and enforcing compliance with FBI consent decree (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 12/29/1999)
MOTION by plaintiff to set schedule for filing fee peitition ; Notice (ar) (Entered: 01/07/2000)
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for attorney fees for the City consent decree monitoring (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 01/25/2000)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of their motion for attorney fees for the City consent decree monitoring [0-1] (Attachments) (ar) (Entered: 01/25/2000)
NOTICE of motion and certificate of service of Alliance plaintiffs' for supplemental motion for attorney fees for the City consent decree monitoring [0-1]. (In 74C3268). (tlm) (Entered: 01/26/2000)
REPLY MEMORANDUM by movant Chgo Tribune Co in support of its motion to appear as Amicus Curiae and [0-1] motion to file statement in suport of the petition to enforce settlement decree [0-2] (eav) (Entered: 01/03/2000)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

01/03/2000 01/04/2000 01/05/2000
01/19/2000 01/20/2000 01/25/2000 01/26/2000 01/27/2000 02/01/2000 02/01/2000 02/01/2000 02/01/2000 02/07/2000

SCHEDULE set on 1/3/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Noticed motion set for 9:30 1/12/00 No notice (rj) (Entered: 01/03/2000)
LETTER from R Joseph Sher to Michael W. Dobbins, dated 12/29/99 (Attachments). (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 01/05/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 1/5/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Chicago Tribune's agreed motion to reset the due date for reply brief to 12/30/99 is granted. ACLU plaintiffs' motion to set schedule for filing fee peitition is granted. Schedule as follows: ACLU to provide time records to the City, per Local Rule 54.3(d)(1)-(3), by 01/29/00. City to provide information under Local Rle 54.3(d)(5) by 02/28/00. Parties to complete consultation required by Local Rule 54.3(d) by 03/20/00. ACLU to file fee motion, with supporting materials, by 04/15/00. Case is referred to Magistrate Judge Bobrick for Report and Recommendations - see referral for additional details. No notice (ar) (Entered: 01/07/2000)
MOTION by City of Chicago to dismiss Raymond Risley's petition to enforce consent decree ; Memorandum in support (Attachment); Notice (ar) Modified on 01/24/2000 (Entered: 01/24/2000)
AGREED MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for leave to file instanter response to objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation (Attachment); Notice (Original in 74 c 3268). (fce) (Entered: 02/01/2000)
MOTION by FBI upon consent to modify the briefing schedule on ACLU's request for attorney's fees . (tlm) (Entered: 01/27/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 1/26/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion for leave to file instanter response to objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations instanter and Petitioners to file reply on or before 02/09/00 is granted. Telephoned notice (jmp) Modified on 01/28/2000 (Entered: 01/28/2000)
RESPONSE by defendant Chgo, Cty of to Countermedia petitioner's objections to Judge Bobrick's report and recommendation concerning Countermedia petition to enforce; Notice (Original in 74 C 3268). (fce) (Entered: 02/01/2000)
MEMORANDUM by Chgo, Cty of in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Consent Decree (Attachments); Notice. (In 74C3268) (tlm) (Entered: 02/02/2000)
LETTER from R. Joseph Sher to Clerk dated 01/31/00. (In 74C3268.) (tlm) (Entered: 02/04/2000)
BRIEF in support of the Magistrate Judge's 12/10/99 Report and Recommendation denying the Alliance Plaintiffs Request for attorney fees (Attachments). [0-2] (In 74C3268) (tlm) (Entered: 02/04/2000)
MOTION by City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree ; Notice. (Original in 75-CV-3295) (ar) Modified on 02/11/2000 (Entered: 02/11/2000)
REPLY by Countermedia petitioners to City's response regarding Magistrate October 27, 1999, report and recommendation [0-1]; Notice. (Original in 74 C 3268) (hp) (Entered: 02/09/2000)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

02/09/2000 02/14/2000 02/25/2000 03/01/2000 03/07/2000 03/09/2000
03/15/2000
03/24/2000 03/27/2000 04/05/2000

MINUTE ORDER of 2/9/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Answer brief to City of Chicago's motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree [0-1] due 03/22/00. Reply to answer brief due 4/19/00. Joint status report is due 03/10/00. No notice (ar) (Entered: 02/11/2000)
REPLY to FBI's brief in support of Magistrate's Report and Recommendation by Alliance plaintiffs (Attachments); Notice. (In 74C3268) (tlm) (Entered: 02/17/2000)
RESPONSE by Raymond Risley to City of Chicago's motion to dismiss [0-1] (Attachments); Notice (ar) (Entered: 02/28/2000)
RESPONSE by Amer Civil Liberties to City's motion to dismiss petition ; Notice. [0-1] (In 74C3268) (tlm) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
JOINT STATUS REPORT by Alliance Plaintiffs and CounterMedia Petitioners. (In 74C3268) (tlm) (Entered: 03/10/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/9/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Report and Recommendation regarding motion of defendant, City of Chicago, to dismiss the petition of petitioner Raymond Risley to enforce the consent decree in Allicance to End Repression, et al, vs. City of Chicago, et al, No. 74-CV-3268, is hereby submitted to Judge Gottschall. This Court recommends that the respondents' motion to dismiss the petition be granted. (Entered Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick) Entered Report and Recommendation regarding [0-1]. Notice mailed by Magistrate Judge's staff (ar) (Entered: 03/10/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/15/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : These cases recently were reassigned to this court. There are many procedural motions on the dockets that do not appear to have been resolved explicitly on the record, and so are still classified as pending motions. The court believes that they are immaterial to any current issues in the case. Accordinly, the court administratively terminates the following motions as moot: City of Chicago's motions for leave to file corrected appendix, for additional time, for leave to file an oversize reply memorandum in support of objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of 03/09/99, for extension of time on the briefing schedule on its motion for summary judgment, for extension of time to reply to motion for summary judgment, for leave to file oversized brief, for leave to file response brief instanter and to file record of materials before the magistrate judge. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 03/17/2000 (Entered: 03/17/2000)
OBJECTIONS by plaintiff/petitioner Raymond Risley to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation of March 9, 2000 (Exhibits); Notice of filing. (Original in numbrer 74 cv 3268) (jmp) Modified on 03/27/2000 (Entered: 03/27/2000)
OBJECTIONS by alliance plaintiffs' to the March 9, 2000, Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 03/28/2000)
MOTION by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties for leave to file oversized brief instanter ; Notice of motion (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) Modified on 04/13/2000 (Entered: 04/13/2000)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

04/05/2000 04/06/2000 04/06/2000
04/12/2000 04/12/2000 04/12/2000
04/12/2000 04/17/2000 04/26/2000
05/02/2000 05/05/2000 05/05/2000 05/10/2000 05/10/2000

RESPONSE by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties to City's motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree [0-1] (Exhibits) (Original in case number 74 cv 3268)(jmp) Modified on 04/13/2000 (Entered: 04/13/2000)
CITATION of supplemental authority by counter media petitioners (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/11/2000)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for extension of time to respond to Raymond Risely's objections to report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Edward Bobrick dated 03/09/00 ; Notice of motion (jmp) Modified on 04/13/2000 (Entered: 04/13/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/12/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : ACLU Plaintiff's motion for leave to [0-1] file oversized brief instanter, is granted [0-2]. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/13/2000)
RESPONSE by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties to Risley's and the Alliance plaintiffs' objections to the Magistrate's report and recommendation of 03/09/00 [0-1] (jmp) (Entered: 04/13/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/12/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant City of Chicago's motion for extension of time to respond to Raymond Risely's objections to report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Edward Bobrick dated 03/09/00, to and including 04/26/00, is granted [0-1]. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/13/2000)
NOTICE by plaintiff of change of address (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/14/2000)
RESPONSE by plaintiff Amer Civil Liberties to City's motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree [0-1] (Exhibits) (jmp) (Entered: 04/18/2000)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for additional time to file memorandum in response to objections to Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation of 03/09/00 ; Notice of filing. (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
RESPONSE by defendant Chgo, Cty of to petitioner's objections to the Magistrate's report and recommendation of 03/09/00; Notice of filing. (jmp) (Entered: 05/03/2000)
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF by Alliance plaintiffs' regarding postjudgment atorney's fees against FBI [0-1] (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/08/2000)
STATEMENT of the Case by Alliance plaintiffs (Original in case No. 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/09/2000)
REPLY MEMORANDUM by defendant Chgo, Cty of in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree [0-1]; Notice of filing. (Original in case number 94 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/12/2000)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for leave to file an oversize reply memorandum in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1892 Alliance Consent Decree ; (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered:

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

05/24/2000
05/25/2000
05/25/2000 05/25/2000 06/09/2000 06/09/2000 07/31/2000 08/09/2000 08/16/2000

05/22/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/24/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Status hearing held. Enter Agreed Order. The Court hereby continues generally the time for the ACLU to file its formal petition for attorney's fees regarding the motion to modify, and all proceedings regarding those fees are stayed pending final resolution of the City's appeal of the motion to modify. (Entered Order) Notices mailed by judge's staff (jmp) (Entered: 05/25/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court denies the Alliance plaintiffs' attorney's fees for monitoring and enforcing compliance with FBI consent decree, but not for the reasons stated in the Magistrate Judge's 12/10/99 Report and Recommendation. Plaintiffs' objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report are granted in part and denied in part. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order. Defendant's motion to dismiss ACLU's petition to enforce consent decree [dated 09/22/00] is granted [0-1]. The Chigaco Tribune Company's motion to appear as Amicus Curiae is granted [0-1]. The ACLU's enforcement petition [dated 07/29/99] is dismissed. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/25/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Motion of City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree is denied [0-1]. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. No notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/26/2000)
MOTION by plaintiff Amer Friends Svc for reconsideration of attorney's fees request agaisnt FBI (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
EXHIBIT Number 4 by plaintiff motion for reconsideration of attorney's fees request agaisnt FBI [0-1] (RESTRICTED) (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/19/2000)
OPPOSITION by FBI the Alliance Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of attorney's fees request agaisnt FBI (Attachment) [0-1]. (Original in 74-CV-3268) (ar) (Entered: 08/03/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/9/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The parties are requested to submit a joint status report setting forth all pending matters by 08/25/00. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 08/10/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/16/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Because of the unique docketing system employed in these cases, many motions that are no longer at issue are still classified as pending motions in the court's records. The court believes that they are imaterial to any current issues in the case, or else have already been resolved. Accordingly, the court administratively terminates as moot the motions listed on the reverse of this order. If the parties believe that any of these motions are both unresolved and material to any current issues in the case, please advise the court. Motion for summary judgment, motion for adoption of Magistrate's Report and Recommendation with modifications, motion for discovery regarding 02/27/99 police photography, motion to strike affidavit of

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

08/23/2000 08/24/2000 08/29/2000 09/05/2000 09/08/2000
09/19/2000
09/20/2000
10/02/2000

Jeffrey Perlstein, motion for extension of time to file reply brief, motion to alter 09/30/99 opinion and order denying their enforcement petition, motion to attach exhibit to petition, motion for extension of time to file response to objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, motion to modify the briefing schedule on ACLU's request for attorney's fees, motion for leave to file instanter response to objections to magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and motion to file statement in suport of the petition to enforce settlement decree. (See reverse of minute order.) Mailed notice (ar) Modified on 08/29/2000 (Entered: 08/29/2000)
JOINT STATUS REPORT by Alliance plaintiffs and CounterMedia petitioners, ACLU, City of Chicago and FBI; Notice. (kef) Modified on 08/25/2000 (Entered: 08/24/2000)
CONCURRENCE by plaintiff Raymond Risley with the joint status report filed 8/21/00; Notice. (kef) (Entered: 08/25/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 8/29/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by defendant for an extension of time to file final pretrial order by 9/29/00 is granted. Original motion filed in 74 C 3268. Telephoned notice. (las) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant Chgo, Cty of by Sharon Baldwin, Patrick Walter Johnson, Patrick Francis McGovern, and Scott A. Frey (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 09/07/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/8/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by defendant City of Chicago for substitution of counsel and for leave to file appearance is granted. All attorney appearances currently listed shall be replaced with the appearance of Mara S. Georges, Lawrence Roenthal, Sharon Baldwin, Patrick W. Johnson, Scott A. Frey and Patrick F. McGovern. Appearances of these attorneys to be filed forthwith. Pretrial conference set for 2:00 p.m. on 09/22/00 is stricken and reset to 10/20/00 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (jmp) Modified on 09/12/2000 (Entered: 09/12/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/19/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Alliance Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of attorney's fees request against FBI is granted [0-1]. The Alliance plaintiffs' are to submit a breakdown of reasonable and necessary monitoring fees by 10/06/00, and any objections by the FBI to the amounts claimed are due by 10/20/00. The original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in case number 74 cv 3268. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/21/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/20/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. The objections to the Magistrate Judge's 03/09/00 Report and Recommendation filed by petitioner Raymond Risley and the Alliance plaintiffs are granted in part and denied in part. Risley's petition to enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree is dismissed. The original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in Case No. 74 cv 3268. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 09/21/2000)
NOTICE of filing by defendant Police Board of the City of the Chicago; the 1998 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 99-1) (Attachments) (Original in case number 74 ccv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 10/05/2000)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

10/04/2000
10/05/2000 10/06/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/23/2000 10/24/2000 10/30/2000 10/31/2000
11/09/2000 12/01/2000 12/01/2000 12/15/2000 12/21/2000 12/21/2000

MINUTE ORDER of 10/4/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Joint motion by the parties for additional time to file final pretrial order by 10/06/00 is granted [0-1]. Original motion is filed in case number 74 cv 3268. Telephoned notice (jmp) Modified on 10/05/2000 (Entered: 10/05/2000)
UPDATED ITEMIZATION of attorney's fees for FBI consent decree monitoring by plaintiff Alliance To End (Attachments); Notice (Original in 74 C 3268). (fce) (Entered: 10/06/2000)
MODIFIED FINAL PRE-TRIAL ORDER (Attachments); Notice (Original in 74cv3268). (fce) (Entered: 10/13/2000)
RESPONSE by respondent FBI to the former Alliance plaintiffs' updated itemization of attorney's fees (Original in 74 cv 3268). (fce) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
RESPONSE by respondent FBI to the former Alliance plaintiffs' updated itemization of attorney's fees (original in case 74 C 3268). (mw) (Entered: 10/30/2000)
MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs' for order and judgment regarding attorneys' fees agreements (Attachments);Notice of motion and certificate of service (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) Modified on 10/26/2000 (Entered: 10/26/2000)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Service List by Edward J. Koziboski (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) Modified on 11/01/2000 (Entered: 11/01/2000)
REPLY by plaintiffs to FBI's response regarding motion for order [0-1] and judgment regarding attorneys' fees agreements [0-2] (Attachments) (Original in 74 Cv 3268) (rmm) (Entered: 11/03/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 10/31/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The Alliance plaintiffs are awarded $43,644.93 in attorneys' fees for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the FBI consent decree. Original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in case 74 C 3268. (Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order.) Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 11/02/2000)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Service List by Edward J. Koziboski (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) Modified on 11/17/2000 (Entered: 11/17/2000)
WRITTEN PORTION of its closing argument by defendant Chgo, Cty of (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
CLOSING ARGUMENT by CounterMedia petitioners' (Attachment) (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
RENEWED MOTION by plaintiffs' for orders compelling City to execute its attorenys' fees agreements (Attachments); Notice of motion and certificate of service (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (jmp) Modified on 12/23/2000 (Entered: 12/23/2000)
STIPULATION TO DISMISS (jmp) Modified on 12/23/2000 (Entered: 12/23/2000)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

12/21/2000
12/21/2000
12/21/2000
01/04/2001 01/05/2001 01/05/2001 01/19/2001 01/24/2001

MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/00 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. After bench trial, the court determines that CounterMedia, Active Resistance Organizing Committee, Autonomous Zone, and the Alliance named plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the consent decree was violated by police misconduct during the 1996 Democratic National Convention. Judgment is entered for the City of Chicago on all claims. Original Memorandum Opinion and Order is filed in case No. 74 c 3268. Mailed notice (jmp) Modified on 12/26/2000 (Entered: 12/23/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : The parties have concluded contested fee petition proceedings with the entry of the agreed Order of Dismissal relating to City consent decree monitoring. The parties are granted leave to file further fee petitions at the conclusion of other ongoing matters currently before the District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Terminating the case referral. Telephone status set for 01/17/01 is hereby stricken. Notices mailed by judge's staff (jmp) (Entered: 12/23/2000)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/21/00 by Hon. Edward A. Bobrick : Enter Agreed Order of Dismissal. The claims for attorneys fees for the services reflected in Appendix A to this order are dismissed, with each side bearing its own costs and attorneys' fees relating to that claim, and (by order of this Court), with interest at the rate of 6.02 percent (federal judgment rate) accrued after 10/07/00; and, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Release and Settlement Agreement filed herein and this Dismissal Order. Notices mailed by judge's staff (jmp) (Entered: 12/23/2000)
TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date(s): Held on 11/13/00, 11/14/00, 11/15/00 and 11/16/00, appeal [3209-1], before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall. (Items 3316-1 through 3316-4). (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 01/05/2001)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit supplement to appeal no. 99-3825 consisting of: Four volumes of transcripts proceedings held on 11/13/00, 11/14/00, 11/15/00 and 11/16/00 before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall. (Items 3316-1 through 3316-4). Mailed notice to all counsel. (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 01/05/2001)
PETITION by Joseph T Fitzsimmons, Jeffrey C Wilson for leave to intervene as additional and specifically named plaintiffs , for appointment of attorney , and for other relief (Attachment); Notice. (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its bill of costs ; Notice. (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) Modified on 01/25/2001 (Entered: 01/25/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 1/24/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its bill of costs up to and including 2/20/01 is granted [0-1]. Mailed notice (Original in case 74 C 3268) (cem) (Entered: 01/25/2001)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

01/24/2001 02/08/2001 02/21/2001 02/26/2001
03/05/2001 03/15/2001 03/23/2001 03/27/2001 03/29/2001
04/04/2001 04/04/2001 04/04/2001 04/05/2001

MINUTE ORDER of 1/24/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its bill of costs up to and including 02/20/01 is granted. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
ORDER dated 02/06/01 from the 7th Circuit: Dening the petitons for rehearing en banc (99-3825). (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 02/09/2001)
STIPULATED agreement regarding attorneys' fee Lodestar; Notice (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 02/27/2001)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for entry of judgment of its "proposed modified decree" pursuant to the seventh circuit's instructions (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case 74 c 3268). (cem) Modified on 03/06/2001 (Entered: 03/06/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/5/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Plaintiff's to file objections to defendant - City of Chicago's bills of costs on or before 03/27/01. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
MOTION by plaintiffs for attorney fees for City consent decree monitoring 10/05/94 -- 03/10/01 ; Notice (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 04/13/2001)
1 MINUTE ORDER of 3/23/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter proposed modified decree nunc pro tunc 03/02/01. (Original filed in case number 74 c 3268) Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
OBJECTIONS by plaintiff Alliance to City's bill of costs (Attachments); Notice and certificate of service (Original filed in 74 C 3268). (yp) Modified on 03/29/2001 (Entered: 03/29/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Brief in support of motion for attorney fees for City consent decree monitoring 10/05/94 -- 03/10/01 [0-1] due 04/05/01. Answer brief to motion due 05/07/01. Reply to answer brief due 06/06/01. Ruling will be by mail. Oral motion by defendant - City of Chicago for extension of time to file Bill of Costs by 05/02/01 is granted. Plaintiff's to respond by 05/16/01. Defendant to reply by 05/23/01. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/16/2001)
MEMORANDUM by Alliance plaintiffs in support of motion for attorneys' fees agains city; Notice. (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
ATTACHMENT D, PART 2 by Alliance plaintiffs to its memorandum in support of motion for attorneys' fees against City [0-1] (Attachments). (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
ATTACHMENTS by Alliance plaintiffs' to memorandum in support of motion for attorneys' fees against City [0-1] (Attachments). (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/5/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held and continued to 9:30 a.m. on 05/24/01. Fee petition by plaintiff to be filed by 05/04/01. Response by 06/06/01. Reply by 06/21/01. Ruling will be by mail. Defendant - City of Chicago to consolidate reply to plaintiff's opposition to the bill of costs with response to fee petition by plaintiff. Mailed notice (jmp)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

05/02/2001 05/02/2001 05/02/2001 05/04/2001 05/07/2001 05/07/2001 05/07/2001 05/08/2001 05/09/2001
05/11/2001 05/15/2001 06/08/2001

(Entered: 04/25/2001)
BILL OF COSTS submitted by defendant City of Chicago. (Original filed in case 74 C 3268). (cem) Modified on 05/15/2001 (Entered: 05/15/2001)
AFFIDAVIT of Patrick F. McGovern defendant's counsel regarding costs. (Original filed in case 74 C 3268). (cem) Modified on 05/15/2001 (Entered: 05/15/2001)
BILL OF COSTS submitted by defendant City of Chicago incurred on its successful motion to modify the consent decree (Attachments); Notice. (Original filed in case 74 C 3268). (cem) Modified on 05/15/2001 (Entered: 05/15/2001)
AGREED MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of to modify the briefing schedules on (1) Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees; (2) the ACLU's motion for attorney's fees; and (3) the City's bills of costs ; Notice (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/12/2001)
OBJECTIONS by plaintiffs ALCU et al to the City of Chicago's bill of costs (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case number 74 ccvv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs ALCU et al for leave to file instanter their petition for fees and expenses ; Notice. (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
PETITION by plaintiffs ALCU et al for an award of attorney fees and expenses ; Memorandum in support; (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) ; (jmp) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
OPPOSITION by plaintiff to City's second bill of costs; Notice (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 05/12/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/9/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by City of Chicago to modify briefing schedule on (1) Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees; (2) the ACLU's motion for attorney's fees; and (3) the City's bill of costs is granted. Defendant-City of Chicago's response to plaintiffs Alliance motion for attorneys fees, consolidated with its resonse to motion for attoreny's fees is due by 07/20/01. Defendant-City to respond to ACLU's motion for attorney's fees by 06/22/01. ACLO's reply is due by 07/13/01. Original motion is filed in case 74cv3268. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/10/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/11/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by plaintiffs- ACLU et al for leave to file instanter petition for fees and expenses is granted. Original motion is filed in case 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/14/2001)
DECLARATION of David F. Graham in support of petition of plaintiffs ACLU et al. for an award of attorney fees and expenses [0-1]; Notice. (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 05/16/2001)
AGREED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for a one week extension of time for City to file its response to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for fees and its reply in further support of its bill of costs ; Notice. (Original in case 74 CV 3268). (cem) (Entered: 06/20/2001)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

06/13/2001 06/13/2001
06/20/2001 06/20/2001
06/20/2001 06/20/2001 06/20/2001 06/22/2001 06/22/2001 06/28/2001 07/11/2001 07/11/2001 07/20/2001 07/20/2001

CITATION by plaintiffs of supplemental authority regarding City's bills of costs (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case 74 CV 3268). (cem) (Entered: 06/14/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 6/13/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Agreed motion by the City of Chicago for a one week extension of time to file its response to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for fees and its reply in further support of its bill of costs is granted [0-1]. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/20/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 6/20/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by defendant City of Chicago for leave to file its consolidated fees and costs in excess of fifteen pages is granted [0-1], Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
RESPONSE by defendant Chgo, Cty of to to Alliance plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees for City consent decree monitoring 10/05/94 -- 03/10/01 [0-1]; with reply (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) Modified on 06/25/2001 (Entered: 06/25/2001)
REPLY by defendant Chgo, Cty of in further support of its bill of costs [3353-1]; with response (Attachments); Notice. [0-1] (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/25/2001)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of for leave to file its consolidated fees and costs brief in excess of fifteen pages ; Notice (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/25/2001)
NOTICE by Police Board of the City of Chicago of filing regarding the 1999 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 2000-1). (Original case in 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 06/26/2001)
RESPONSE by defendant Chgo, Cty of to the ACLLU's motion for attorney's fees [0-1]; with reply (Attachments); Notice (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/25/2001)
REPLY by defendant Chgo, Cty of to the ACLU in further support of its bill of costs [0-1] with response (Attachments); Notice. [0-1] (Original in case number 74 cv 3268) (jmp) (Entered: 06/25/2001)
UNCONTESTED MOTION by Alliance plaintiffs for leave to file a brief in excess of 15 pages ; Notice (jmp) (Entered: 07/13/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 7/11/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : motion for leave to file its consolidated fees and costs brief in excess of fifteen pages is granted [0-1] Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 07/12/2001)
AGREED MOTION by plaintiffs ALCU et al for enlargement of time until 7/27/01 to file their reply in support of their fee petition ; Notice. (Original in 74 C 3268). (cem) (Entered: 07/19/2001)
REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to defendant City of Chicago's response to attorneys' fees motion [0-1]; Notice. (Original in case 74 C 3268). (cem) Modified on 07/24/2001 (Entered: 07/23/2001)
APPENDIX filed by plaintiff to its reply to defendant City of Chicago's response to attorneys' fees motion [0-1] (Attachments). (3371-1 through 3371-4) (Original in case 74 C 3268) (cem) (Entered: 07/24/2001)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

07/27/2001 11/30/2001 12/05/2001 12/11/2001 01/23/2002 01/30/2002
03/18/2002 03/27/2002
03/29/2002

REPLY by ACLU plaintiffs in support of their petition for fees and expenses; Notice. (Original in 74 C 3268) (cem) (Entered: 07/30/2001)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to cite additional authority in further support of its opposition to "Alliance plaintiffs" motion for attorneys' fees (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case 74 C 3268) (cem) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
MINUTE ORDER of 12/5/01 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : City of Chicago's motion to cite additional authority in further support of its opposition to "Alliance plaintiffs" motion for attorneys' fees is granted [0-1]. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 12/06/2001)
RESPONSE by Alliance plaintiffs to City of Chicago's citation of additional authority (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case 74 c 3268) (cem) (Entered: 12/13/2001)
LOCAL RULE 40.4 MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of to reassign case number 01 cv 9586 to this court based on a finding that it is related to case numbers 74 C 3268 and 75 cv 3295 (Attachments); Notice (Original in case file 74 cv 3268) (yap) (Entered: 01/31/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 1/30/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : City of Chicago's motion to reassign case number 01 cv 9586 to this court based on a finding that it is related to case numbers 74 C 3268 and 75 cv 3295 is granted [0-1]. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead on or before 03/18/02. No further extensions will be given. Status hearing is set for 9:30 a.m on 05/02/02 in case case 01 cv 9856 only. This date will become moot, if a dispositive motion is filed. Original motion filed in case 74 c 3268. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/01/2002)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the Alliance consent decree ; Memorandum in support (Attachments); Notice (Original in 74cv3268). (yp) Modified on 03/28/2002 (Entered: 03/28/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/27/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Answer brief to motion to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the Alliance consent decree due 05/22/02. Reply to answer brief due 06/12/02. Ruling on respondents' motion to dismiss will be by mail. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 03/28/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 3/29/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Alliance plaintiffs' petition for an award of attorney's fees [3340-1] is granted. ACLU plaintiffs' petition for an award of attorney fees [3350-1] is granted. Defendant City of Chicago's bills of costs [3328-1], [3353-1] are denied. However, on the record, the court is unable to determine the proper amount to be awarded. Therefore, the plaintiffs are requested to submit documents that clearly indicate their proposed lodestar figures for each particular legal action, as specified in this order. Plaintiffs should submit their as specified in this order. Plaintiffs should submit their documents within 20 days of this order. Defendants are permitted to submit objections to plaintiffs' figures within 10 days of plaintiffs' filing. (Entered order). Mailed notice (Original filed in case No. 74 cv 3268). (jmp) (Entered: 03/29/2002)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

04/18/2002 04/19/2002 04/23/2002 04/26/2002 05/01/2002
05/07/2002
05/08/2002 06/03/2002 06/03/2002 06/12/2002 06/18/2002 06/25/2002 06/25/2002 09/27/2002

AGREED MOTION by ACLU plaintiffs for enlargement of time to submit documents relating to fees, costs, and expenses ; Notice. (Original in case 74 C 3295) (cem) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
BILLING STATEMENT by Alliance plaintiffs regarding attorneys' fees; Notice. (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 04/22/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 4/23/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : ACLU plaintiffs' agreed motion for enlargement of time to submit documents relating to fees, costs, and expenses is granted [0-1]. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 04/24/2002)
SUBMISSION by ACLU plaintiffs responding to order of 3/29/02 (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case 74 c 3268) (cem) (Entered: 04/29/2002)
(PARTIALLY) AGREED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for an extension of time to file its objections to fee submissions and its reply for its motion to cite additional authority ; Notice. (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 05/07/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/7/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant, City of Chicago's (partially) agreed motion for an extension of time to file its objections to fee submissions and its reply for its motion to cite additional authority is granted [0-1]. Defendant, City of Chicago to submit its fee objections and its reply in further support of its motion to cite additional authority by 05/03/02. (Original motion filed in 74 c 3268). Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/08/2002)
NOTICE by Police Board of the City of Chicago of filing and certificate of service regarding the 2000 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 2001-1). (cem) (Entered: 05/10/2002)
REPLY by defendant City of Chicago in further support of its motion to cite additional authority. (Original in case 75 cv 3298) (cem) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
OBJECTIONS by defendant City of Chicago to the court-ordered supplemental fee submissions filed by the Alliance plaintiffs and the ACLU; Notice. (Original in case 74 cv 3298) (cem) (Entered: 06/04/2002)
CONTESTED ALLIANCE MOTION by plaintiffs for leave to reply to defendant City of Chicago's 6/3/02 "objections" (Attachments); Notice. (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) Modified on 06/19/2002 (Entered: 06/19/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 6/18/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Plaintiff's motion for leave to reply to defendant City of Chicago's 6/3/02 "objections" is granted [0-1]. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 06/19/2002)
REPLY by Alliance plaintiffs to City's objections to court ordered supplemental fee submissions filed by alliance plaintiffs [0-1]; Notice. (jmp) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
EXHIBITS to Alliance plaintiffs' reply to defendant City's objections [0-1] (Attachments). (jmp) (Entered: 06/26/2002)
MINUTE ORDER of 9/27/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : The ACLU plaintiffs are granted attorney's fees in the amount of $249,487.30 and costs in the amount of $9,555.23. The Alliance plaintiffs are granted fees in the amount of

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...

12/06/2002 01/17/2003 01/17/2003 02/06/2003 02/26/2003 03/04/2003 04/25/2003 05/02/2003
02/09/2004

$762,269.55 and costs in the amount of $35,422.84. The original order is filed in case number 74 C 3268. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 10/01/2002)
ORDER dated 12/02/02 from the 7th Circuit: The court, on its own motion, orders that these appeals are consolidated for purposes of briefing and disposition. (02-3981 and 02-3982) (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) Modified on 12/06/2002 (Entered: 12/06/2002)
STIPULATION TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN ITEMS of District Court Record docketed under case No. 74 C 3268 for transmittal to the Court of Appeals (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) (Entered: 01/24/2003)
STIPULATION TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN ITEMS of District Court Record docketed under Case Number 75 C 3295 for transmittal to the Court of Appeals for appeal record no. 02-3981 & 02-3982 (Original in 74 C 3268) (mak) (Entered: 01/25/2003)
NOTICE by defendant City of Chicago of filing regarding 2001 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit (Audit 2002-1). (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 02/07/2003)
MINUTE ORDER of 2/26/03 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order. Respondent City of Chicago's motion to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the Alliance Consent Decree [3379-1 for 74 c 3268; 0-1 for 75 c 3295; 0-1 for 01 c 9586] is granted. Case Number 01 C 9586 is terminated. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 02/27/2003)
TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal no. 02-3981; 02-3981 consisting of one volume of pleadings on appeal with certified copy of docket entries [0-1] Mailed notice to all counsel. (mak) Modified on 03/04/2003 (Entered: 03/04/2003)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to supplement the record on appeal ; Notice. (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) Modified on 05/06/2003 (Entered: 05/06/2003)
MINUTE ORDER of 5/2/03 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Defendant, City of Chicago's motion to supplement the record on appeal is granted. The following documents shall be submitted and transmitted for inclusion on the record on appeal as follows (1) memorandum of City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Consent Decree, (2) motion of City of Chicago for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Consent Decree, (3) Alliance plaintiffs' response to City of Chicago's motion for City Consent Decree Interpretation, (4) ACLU's response to City's motion for Interpretation of the Consent Decree, (5) 4/19/00 order of district court, (6) Reply memorandum of City of Chicago in support of its motion for interpretation of the 1982 Alliance Consent Decree, (7) 5/25/00 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (jmp) (Entered: 05/06/2003)
NOTICE by defendant of filing regarding the 2002 Chicago Police Department Anuual Compliance Audit (Attachment). (Original in case 74 c 3268) (cem) (Entered: 02/11/2004)

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03/08/2004
03/08/2004 03/08/2004
08/05/2004 08/05/2004 10/14/2004 10/14/2004
11/15/2004 11/17/2004
11/18/2004 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 04/25/2005 04/25/2005

LETTER from the 7th Circuit returning the record on appeal no. 02-3981 & 02-3982 consisting of: Nine volumes of pleadings, seventeen loose pleadings, four volumes of transcripts and seven volumes of exhibits. (Original in case 74cv3268) (cem) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
OPINION from the 7th Circuit: Argued 12/11/03; Decided 1/28/04. ( 02-3891 & 02-3892) (cem) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
CERTIFIED COPY of order from the 7th Circuit: The fee award is reversed, wiht costs. The plaintiffs are entitled to no fees for the leagal services rendered during the period in issue, and a fortiori the Alliance is not entitled to the additional half million dollars sought in its cross-appeal. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (02-3891 & 02-3892) (Original in case 74 cv 3268) (cem) (Entered: 03/09/2004)
BILL OF COSTS submitted by U. S. Court of Appeals in favor of City of Chicago in the amount of $904.60. (jmp) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
COSTS taxed bill of costs [0-1] for defendant Chgo, Cty of in the amount of $ 904.60 against Alliance to End Repression. (jmp) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
BILL OF COSTS submitted (Original in 74cv3268). (rbf) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
CERTIFIED copy of Order dated 10/12/04 from the 7th Circuit. Upon consideration of the motion for addition of statement of costs to the mandate, filed on 04/13/04, by counsel for the appellant/cross-appellee, it is ordered that the motion is granted. Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P.39(d)(3), the clerk of the district court shall add the awarded $904.60 in costs to the mandate issued in this appeal. ( 02-3981 and 02-3982) (Original in 74cv3268). (rbf) (Entered: 10/19/2004)
MOTION by defendant Chgo, Cty of to withdraw attorney appearance , and to substitute attorneys ; Notice of motion (rbf) (Entered: 11/18/2004)
MINUTE ORDER of 11/17/04 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Defendant, City of Chicago's motion to withdraw attorney appearance of Sharon Baldwin, exclusively and substitute Tom Forgue and William Aguiar as counsel is granted [0-1]. The appearance of Sharon Baldwin is hereby withdrawn. Original motion filed in case 74C3268. Mailed notice (jmm) Modified on 11/18/2004 (Entered: 11/18/2004)
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Chgo, Cty of by Thomas Forgue, William Macy Aguiar; Notice. (Original in 74cv3268). (rbf) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
2 NOTICE by Miller Shakman & Hamilton LLP, counsel for Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., of Change of Address (ar, ) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
NOTICE by Edward W. Feldman of Change of Address. (Original in 66cv1459) (air, ) (Entered: 04/25/2005)
3 MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave additional appearance. (Attachments: # 1)(rbf, ) (Entered: 04/26/2005)
4 NOTICE of Motion by all plaintiffs for presentment of motion for leave to file additional appearance 3 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 4/28/2005 at

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04/25/2005 04/25/2005 04/28/2005 04/28/2005
06/06/2005 06/06/2005 06/07/2005 06/08/2005
06/27/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005

09:30 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 04/26/2005)
5 NOTICE of petition by American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for presentment of PETITION to enforce modified consent decree before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 4/28/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 04/26/2005)
6 PETITION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., and American Friends Service Committee to enforce modified consent decree (Attachments). (jmp, ) (Entered: 04/28/2005)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago, The by Andrew W Worseck; Notice. (jmp, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
8 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Plaintiffs' Motion for leave to file additional appearance 3 is granted. Attorney Shannon P Bartlett is given leave to file an appearance in this matter. Briefing schedule as to American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois and American Friends Committee's petition to enforce modified Consent Decree 6 is as follows: City of Chicago to Respond by 6/13/2005. Oral motion by City of Chicago to withdraw appearance of Attorney Adrienne L. Hiegel is granted. Plaintiff to serve request to City of Chicago within 48 hours as indicated in open court. Docketing to mail notice (jmp, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
MOTION by City defendants to correct record, allow withdraw of old attorneys and appearance of new attorney (Original in 74cv3268)(gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
MOTION by City defendants for additional time to reply to petition and discovery (Original in 74cv3268)(gma, ) (Entered: 06/06/2005)
10 CONSOLIDATED DRESPONSE by petitioners' to defendants' motion for additional time to reply to petition, and renewed request for discovery (Attachment); Notice.(jmp, ) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
9 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : City defendants' motion to correct record, allow withdraw of old attorneys and appearance of new attorney is granted. City defendants' for additional time to reply to petition and discovery by 06/28/05 is granted. The appearances of counsel of record of Sharon Baldwin, Patrick Johnson, Scott Frey, Patrick McGovern and William Aguiar in case # 74C3268 is hereby withdrawn. The appearances of counsel of record of Sharon Baldwin, Adrienne Hiegel, Patrick Johnson, Patrick McGovern, Scott Frey, and William Aguiar in case # 75C3295 is hereby withdrawn. Michael A. Forti and Andrew Worseck are given leave to file appearance as counsel on behalf of City defendants in case #'s 74C3268 and 75C3295. Mailed notice (jmp, ) (Entered: 06/09/2005)
MOTION by Defendants to correct record nunc pro tunc (Original in 74cv3268)(gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
MOTION by defendants to dismiss petition (Original in 74cv3268) (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
MOTION by Defendants to file memorandum in excess of fifteen pages instanter (Original in 74cv3268) (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

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06/27/2005 06/30/2005
07/22/2005 07/22/2005 07/25/2005 07/25/2005 07/25/2005 07/28/2005
08/25/2005 08/25/2005 09/01/2005
09/19/2005

MEMORANDUM by defendants in support of MOTION by defendants to dismiss petition (Original in 74cv3268) (gma, ) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
11 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : City Defendants' motion to correct the June 8, 2005 motion nunc pro tunc and allow Mardel Nereim, Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel to file her appearance on behalf of City Defendants [3426] is granted. City Defendants' motion for leave to file memorandum in excess of fifteen pages instanter [3430] is granted. Briefing as to City Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [3428] is as follows: Responses due by 7/28/2005. Replies due by 8/11/2005. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (jmp, ) (Entered: 07/05/2005)
NOTICE of filing by Police Board of the City of Chicago regarding the 2003 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit. (Original in 74cv3268) (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/01/2005)
2003 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit by Chicago Police Department (Original in case number 74 C 3268). (jmp, ) (Entered: 08/04/2005)
12 MOTION by Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc. for extension of time to Respond to City's Motion to Dismiss Petition to Enforce Modified Consent Decree (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
13 NOTICE of Motion by Edward W. Feldman for presentment of motion for extension of time12 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 7/28/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 07/25/2005)
NOTICE by Lawrence J. Suffredin, Jr of Change of Address. (Original in 74cv3268) (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/29/2005)
14 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion hearing held. Petitioners' Motion for extension of time12 is granted. Briefing schedule as to motion to enforce modified consent decree6is as follows: Responses due by 8/29/2005. Replies due by 9/12/2005. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 08/02/2005)
15 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for extension of time to respond to City's motion to Dismiss Petition to Enforce Modified Consent Decree (Agreed) (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
16 NOTICE of Motion by Edward W. Feldman for presentment of motion for extension of time15 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 9/1/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 08/25/2005)
17 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Petitioners' agreed motion for extension of time 15 is granted. Briefing schedule as to City's motion to dismiss petition to enforce modified consent decree is as follows: Responses due by 9/20/2005. Replies due by 10/21/2005. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 09/01/2005)
18 AGREED MOTION by Plaintiffs for extension of time to file response to motion to dismiss (gma, ) (Entered: 09/19/2005)

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09/19/2005 09/22/2005 10/03/2005 10/03/2005 10/03/2005
10/03/2005 10/06/2005
10/11/2005 10/11/2005 10/20/2005 10/20/2005 10/26/2005

19 NOTICE of Motion by all plaintiffs for presentment of AGREED MOTION by Plaintiffs for extension of time to file response to motion to dismiss 18 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 9/22/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 09/19/2005)
20 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Petitioners' agreed motion for extension of time to file their response to defendant's motion to dismiss18 is granted. Responses due by 10/4/2005. Replies due by 11/4/2005. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 09/26/2005)
21 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to withdraw as attorney Shannon P. Bartlett (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
22 NOTICE of Motion by Harvey Michael Grossman for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney21 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 10/6/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
23 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for extension of time to file response/reply as to order on motion for extension of time, set motion and R&R deadlines/hearings,, 20 to extend time to file response to 10/11/05 and for defendant to file reply to 11/11/05 (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
24 NOTICE of Motion by Harvey Michael Grossman for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief,,,, 23 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 10/6/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
25 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Plaintiffs agreed motion for extension of time to file their response to defendant's motion to dismiss by 10/11/05 is granted. Defendant to file reply by 11/11/05 23. Motion by plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, inc., American Friends Service Committee to withdraw appearance of attorney Shannon P. Bartlett 21 is granted. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
26 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for leave to file brief in excess of fifteen pages (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
27 NOTICE of Motion by Edward W. Feldman for presentment of motion for leave to file26 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 10/20/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 10/11/2005)
28 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to City's Motion to Dismiss Petition to Enforce Modified Consent Decree (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits 1-4# 2 Exhibit Exhibits 5-6)(Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
29 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Petitioners motion for leave to file brief in excess of fifteen pages 26 is granted. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
30 NOTICE by George Michael Keane, Jr of Change of Address. (cdy, ) (Entered: 10/31/2005)

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11/07/2005 11/07/2005 11/10/2005 11/14/2005 11/14/2005
11/16/2005 11/16/2005 11/17/2005
11/29/2005 12/01/2005 12/01/2005

31 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The for extension of time to file response/reply as to Response, 28 to motion to dismiss Petition (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
32 City Defendant(s) NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief31 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/10/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
33 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion of City Defendants for an additional thirty-five (35) days to reply to Plaintiffs response to motion to dismiss petition 31 is granted. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/14/2005)
34 EMERGENCY MOTION by Victor Crown to enforce a portion of ACLU consent decree relating to pending document shredding and retaliatory prosecution in violation of the ACLU decree and a pre-existing court order in re: USA v. Miriam Santos (99-cr-47) (gma, ) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
35 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of EMERGENCY MOTION by Victor Crown to enforce a portion of ACLU consent decree relating to pending document shredding and retaliatory prosecution in violation of the ACLU decree and a pre-existing court order in re: USA v. Miriam Santos (99-cr-47) 34 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/17/2005 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
36 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Protective Order)(Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
37 NOTICE of Motion by Edward W. Feldman for presentment of motion for protective order36 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/1/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 11/16/2005)
38 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion hearing held on 11/17/2005 regarding motion to enforce 34. Briefing schedule as to Victor M. Crown's emergency motion to enforce a portion of ACLU consent decree relating to pending document shredding and retaliatory prosecution in violation of the ACLU decree and pre-existing court order in re: USA v. Miriam Santos (99 cr 47) 34 is as follows: Responses due by 12/1/2005. Replies due by 12/15/2005. By agreement of the parties, the City of Chicago Board of Ethics will not destroy documents until ninety (90) days from the date of this Order or when the court rules on motion whichever comes last. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/17/2005)
48 PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Joan B. Gottschall on 11/29/2005:Mailed notice(eav, ) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
39 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, The in Opposition to MOTION to enforce34 Portion of Modified Consent Decree (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 12/01/2005)
47 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for protective order 36 is granted. Enter protective order. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 12/13/2005)

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12/02/2005 12/02/2005 12/05/2005 12/05/2005 12/08/2005 12/12/2005 12/12/2005
12/12/2005
12/12/2005
12/15/2005 12/15/2005 12/15/2005 12/22/2005

40 MOTION by Unknown Victor Crown for leave to file brief in excess of fifteen pages. (td, ) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
41 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of motion for leave to file brief exceeding fifteen pages 40 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/8/2005 at 09:30 AM. (td, ) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
42 MOTION by Victor Crown for leave to file brief in excess of fifteen pages (cdy, ) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
43 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of motion for leave to file a brief exceeding 15 pages 42 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/8/2005 at 09:30 a.m.(cdy, ) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
44 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion by Victor Crown for leave to file brief in excess of fifteen pages 42 is granted. No notice. (tlp, ) (Entered: 12/08/2005)
45 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The for extension of time to file response/reply as to Response, 28 to Motion to dismiss Petition (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
46 City of Chicago's NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief45 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
49 MOTION and court order under the Fourteenth Amendment affecting the state of Illinois and the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act and the Illinois Crime Victim Compensation Act and compliance with the ACLU Consent Decree. (td, ) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
50 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of motion and court order under the Fourteenth Amendment affecting the state of Illinois and the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act and the Illinois Crime Victim Compensation Act and compliance with the ACLU Consent Decree 49 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. (td, ) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
51 TAKING Judicial Notice Under Rule 203 by Victor Crown (eav, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
52 EXHIBITS (2 Volumes) by Unknown Victor Crown regarding Taking Judicial Notice Under Rule 20351 (eav, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
53 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion of City Defendants for extension of time to file reply to the response to the Motion to dismiss Petition by 1/20/200645 is granted. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
54 MOTION by Victor Crown and court order under the 14th amendment affecting the State of Illinois and the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act, the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act and compliance with the ACLU Consent Decree in re: USA v. Miriam Santos [99-cr-47] (gma, ) (Entered: 12/22/2005)

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12/22/2005 01/05/2006
01/09/2006 01/09/2006 01/11/2006
01/20/2006 01/20/2006 01/24/2006 02/02/2006

55 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of MOTION by Victor Crown and court order under the 14th amendment affecting the State of Illinois and the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act, the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act and compliance with the ACLU Consent Decree in re: USA v. Miriam Santos [99-cr-47] 54 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/5/2006 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
56 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion hearing held on 1/5/2006. MOTION by Victor Crown and court order under the 14th amendment affecting the State of Illinois and the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act, the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act and compliance with the ACLU Consent Decree in re: USA v. Miriam Santos [99-cr-47]54 is taken under advisement. City of Chicago is given leave to file surrely in support of its motion by 1/27/2006. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 01/06/2006)
57 MOTION by Unknown Victor Crown for leave to file a short statement and appointment of plaintiff as special master on the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act (gma, ) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
58 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of MOTION by Unknown Victor Crown for leave to file a short statement and appointment of plaintiff as special master on the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act 57 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/12/2006 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 01/09/2006)
59 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Victor Crown's emergency motion to enforce a portion of ACLU consent decree relating to pending document shredding and retaliatory prosecution 34; motion for court order under the Fourteenth Amendment affecting the State of Illinois and the Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act and the Illinois Crime Victim Compensation Act and compliance with the ACLU Consent Decree 49, 54; and motion for leave to file a short statement and appointment of plaintiff as Special Master 57 are denied. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 01/12/2006)
60 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The for leave to file excess pages for City Defendants' Reply In Support Of Their Motion To Dismiss the Petition (Attachments: # 1 Appendix City Defendants' Reply In Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Petition# 2 Appendix Appendix A to City Defendants' Reply In Support of Motion to Dismiss the Petition)(Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
61 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas Forgue for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages, 60 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/2/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
62 POSITION PAPER by Victor Crown on Jurisdictional inquiry affecting Court Order for payment of State funds (Exhibit) (eav, ) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
63 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : The City of Chicago's motion to dismiss [3428] is taken under advisement. The ACLU and American Friends Service Committee ("AFSC") are directed to advise the court as detailed below. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 02/03/2006)

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02/02/2006 02/16/2006 02/17/2006 02/17/2006 02/17/2006 02/17/2006 02/23/2006
03/09/2006 03/09/2006 03/16/2006 03/20/2006 03/24/2006

64 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The for leave to file reply memeorandum in excess of 15 pages 60 is granted. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/04/2006)
65 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to text entry, 63 the Court's February 2, 2006 Minute Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4)(Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 02/16/2006)
66 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to compel City to Produce Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Part 1# 2 Exhibit Part 2)(Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
67 NOTICE of Motion by Edward W. Feldman for presentment of motion to compel66 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/23/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
68 EXHIBIT 1 by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc. and American Friends Service Committee to motion to compel City to Produce Documents 66. (RESTRICTED) (cem, ) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
69 EXHIBIT 2 by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc. and American Friends Service Committee to motion to compel City to Produce Documents 66. (RESTRICTED)(cem, ) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
70 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion hearing held on 2/23/2006 regarding motion to compel66. Briefing schedule as to American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois and American Friends Service Committee's motion to compel City to produce documents 66is as follows : Responses due by 3/9/2006. Replies due by 3/16/2006. Ruling by mail. City of Chicago is given fourteen (14) days to file sur-reply as requested. Zackary Freeman is given leave to file an appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/25/2006)
71 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, The to MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to compel City to Produce Documents66 (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
72 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago, The to Response, 65 of Petitioners to the Court's February 2, 2006 Minute Order (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
73 REPLY by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to motion to compel66, response to motion71 City to Produce Documents (Feldman, Edward) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
74 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc. by Zachary J. Freeman (Freeman, Zachary) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
75 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order. The City of Chicago's motion to dismiss the petition to enforce [3428 in 74 C 3268] is granted in part and denied in part. Petitioner's motion to compel 66 in 75 C 3295] is denied as moot. Status is set for 4/19/2006 at 9:30 AM. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 03/29/2006)

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03/24/2006 04/19/2006
04/26/2006
04/26/2006 05/03/2006 05/05/2006 05/05/2006
05/10/2006
05/31/2006 05/31/2006 05/31/2006

76 ORDER Signed by Judge Joan B. Gottschall on 3/24/2006:Mailed notice(rmm, ) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
77 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing held on 4/19/2006 and continued to 5/3/2006 at 09:30 AM. Defendant, City of Chicago is ordered to turnover 2002 First Amendment Investigation File #193-2002-01 without redaction (attorneys' eyes only) within one week. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 04/19/2006)
78 Cover Sheet: 2004 Chicago Police Department Annual Compliance Audit: Audit 2005-1 by City of Chicago, The (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Audit 2005-1: Chicago Police Department 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Cover# 2 Appendix Audit 2005-1 Chicago Police Department 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Text# 3 Appendix Audit 2005-1: Chicago Police Department 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Appendicies)(Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
79 NOTICE by City of Chicago, The re other, 78 Filing of Audit 2005-1: Chicago Police Department 2004 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
80 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing set for 5/3/2006 is stricken and reset to 6/7/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
81 MOTION by Victor Crown and request for court order affecting the City of Chicago Department of Buildings and retention of City records afftecting ACLU MCD retaliations (gma, ) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
82 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of MOTION by Victor Crown and request for court order affecting the City of Chicago Department of Buildings and retention of City records afftecting ACLU MCD retaliations 81 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/11/2006 at 09:30 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 05/05/2006)
83 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Victor Crown's motion and request for court order 81 is denied. In its order dated 1/11/06, this court denied Mr. Crown's pending motions because he did not have standing to seek enforcement of the consent decree. His current motion alleges largely the same facts as his previous motions. The proper way for mr. Crown to pursue any claims he might have is to file a new civil action. if he continues to file motions in this case in spite of this court's order, the court may enter sanctions against him. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
84 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The for reconsideration (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
85 MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago, The in Support of motion for reconsideration84 (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
86 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew W Worseck for presentment of motion for reconsideration84 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/8/2006 at 09:30 AM. (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 05/31/2006)

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06/07/2006 06/08/2006 06/29/2006 07/10/2006 07/10/2006 07/28/2006 07/28/2006 01/11/2007
01/11/2007 01/26/2007 01/26/2007 02/01/2007 02/07/2007

87 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Status hearing reset for 6/8/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 06/07/2006)
88 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Briefing schedule as to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for reconsideration 84is as follows: Responses due by 6/29/2006. Replies due by 7/10/2006. Ruling by mail. Status hearing set for 6/8/2006 is stricken. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
89 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to memorandum in support of motion85, motion for reconsideration84 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-F)(Freeman, Zachary) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
90 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago, The In Support of Motion for Reconsideration (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
91 NOTICE by City of Chicago, The re reply90 in Support of Motion for Reconsideration (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
92 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Enter Order. The City's motion to reconsider 84 is denied. Mailed notice (eav, ) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
93 ORDER Signed by Judge Joan B. Gottschall on 7/28/2006:Mailed notice(eav, ) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
94 Audit 2006-01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit Cover Sheet by City of Chicago, The (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Audit 2006-01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Part 1: Cover thru Chapter 5 (Cover thru page 40))# 2 Appendix Audit 2006-01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Part 2: Chapters 6 thru 8 (pp. 41-61))# 3 Appendix Audit 2006-01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit (Part 3: Appendix (p. 62- end)))(Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
95 NOTICE by City of Chicago, The re other,, 94 Filing of Audit 2006-01: Chicago Police Department 2005 Annual First Amendment Compliance Audit: Cover Sheet, Text, Appendix, Certificate of Service (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
96 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The To Correct Prior Statements (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
97 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew W Worseck for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief96 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/1/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
98 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion hearing held on 2/1/2007 regarding City of Chicago's motion to correct record based on newly-discovered facts 96 and continued to 2/7/2007 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
99 MOTION by Victor Crown seeking enforcement of ACLU MCD and stay of declaratory judgment (eav, ) (Entered: 02/07/2007)

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02/07/2007 02/07/2007 02/13/2007 02/15/2007 02/28/2007 03/01/2007 03/12/2007 03/15/2007 04/19/2007 04/19/2007
05/22/2007

100 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall : Motion hearing held. Briefing schedule as to City of Chicago's motion to correct record based on newly-discovered facts 96is as follows: Responses due by 3/1/2007. Replies due by 3/15/2007. Defendant to produce documents and tapes as indicated in open court by 2/15/2007. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
101 NOTICE of Motion by Victor Crown for presentment of motion to enforce, motion to stay99 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/15/2007 at 09:30 AM. (eav, ) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
102 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago, The to motion to enforce, motion to stay99 Preliminary Response of Defendant City of Chicago to Motion of Victor Crown 99 (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 02/13/2007)
103 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall :Motion hearing held on 2/15/2007. Briefing schedule set on motion to enforce and stay99 : Responses due by 3/1/2007 Replies due by 3/12/2007.Mailed notice (clw, ) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
104 RESPONSE by American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The To Correct Prior Statements96 (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 02/28/2007)
105 PRELIMINARY REBUTTAL by Victor Crown to defendant's response ; Notice of filing (eav, ) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
106 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago, The to other105 Victor Crown Preliminary Rebuttal (No. 105, Mar. 1, 2007) to Preliminary Response of City of Chicago (No. 102, Feb. 13, 2007) to Motion of Victor Crown to Enforce and Stay (No. 99, Feb. 7, 2007) (Forgue, Thomas) (Entered: 03/12/2007)
107 REPLY by City of Chicago, The to response to motion104, MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The To Correct Prior Statements96 (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
108 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall :Defendant City of Chicago's motion to correct record based on newly-discovered facts 96 is granted to the extend that defendant seeks to supplement the record with additional representations regarding the Investigative File.Mailed notice (smm) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
109 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall :Non-party Victor M. Crown's motion to enforce and stay 99 is denied. The court has denied virtually the same motion twice already because Mr. Crown does not have standing to file motions in this case, but Mr. Crown is clearly not deterred. If he files another frivolous motion in this case, sanctions will be imposed to compensate the court and counsel for the time spent dealing with the motion. In addition, because it appears that Mr. Crown's repeated filing of baseless motions is not a problem limited to this case, this matter is referred to the Executive Committee so that it may consider whether additional action should be taken.Mailed notice (smm) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
110 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, The to compel (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15 # 16)Associated Cases:

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05/22/2007 05/22/2007 05/31/2007 06/18/2007 06/18/2007 06/19/2007

1:75-cv-03295, 1:74-cv-03268(Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
111 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew W Worseck for presentment of motion to compel, 110 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/31/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
EXHIBITS D and E to City Defendants' motion to compel filed 5/22/07 110 (RESTRICTED) (Original filed in case 74 C 3268 doc. #3452). (smm) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
112 MINUTE entry before Judge Joan B. Gottschall :Motion hearing held on 5/31/2007. Briefing schedule as to City Defendants' motion to compel, 110is as follows : Responses due by 6/21/2007. Replies due by 7/6/2007. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
113 MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to compel, 110 (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
114 NOTICE of Motion by Harvey Michael Grossman for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief, 113 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/21/2007 at 09:30 AM. (Grossman, Harvey) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
115 RESPONSE by City of Chicago, The to MOTION by Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Inc., American Friends Service Committee for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to compel, 110113 (Worseck, Andrew) (Entered: 06/19/2007)

PACER Service Center

Transaction Receipt

06/21/2007 11:16:24

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Description: Docket Report Search Criteria: 1:75-cv-03295

Billable Pages: 30

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 CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket... https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?100062563803063-L_35...
BROWN, TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:01-cv-09586

Wilson v. Chgo, Cty of, et al Assigned to: Hon. Joan B. Gottschall Demand: $100,000 related Case: 1:74-cv-03268 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury
Plaintiff
Jeffrey C Wilson

Date Filed: 12/17/2001 Date Terminated: 02/26/2003 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 360 P.I.: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Joseph Thomas Fitzsimmons Law Offices of Joseph T. FitzSimmons 5908 N. Neva St. Chicago, IL 60631-2443 (773) 631-8022 Email: fitzsimmns@yahoo.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Chicago a municipal corporation
Defendant Terry G Hillard Defendant George A Rosebrock Defendant Daniel G Mahoney Defendant Richard R Majder

represented by Patrick F McGovern City of Chicago Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street 1040 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744-6437 Email: patrick.mcgovern@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Date Filed 12/17/2001 12/17/2001 01/30/2002
01/31/2002 03/18/2002 03/27/2002 02/26/2003

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (Attachments) -Civil cover sheet - Appearance(s) of Joseph Thomas Fitzsimmons as attorney(s) for plaintiff ( Five original and five summons summons(es) issued.) ( Documents: (1-1 through 1-3)) (ntf) Modified on 12/20/2001 (Entered: 12/19/2001)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 12/17/01 in the amount of $ 150.00, receipt # 10617244. (ntf) Modified on 12/19/2001 (Entered: 12/19/2001)
4 MINUTE ORDER of 1/30/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : City of Chicago's Local Rule 40.4 motion to reassign case number 01C9586 to this court based on a finding that it is related to case numbers 74C3298 and 75C3295 granted. Defendants to answer or otherwise plead on or before 3/18/02. No further extensions will be given. Status hearing is set for 5/2/02 at 9:30 a.m. in case 01C9856 only. This date will become moot, if a dispositive motion is filed. Original motion is filed in case 74C3268. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 03/29/2002)
2 REASSIGNMENT ORDER of 1/31/02 This case is reassigned to the Hon. Joan B. Gottschall from Hon. William T. Hart. Case related 1:74-cv-3268 with member cases 1:75-cv-3295 and 1:01-cv-9586. (For further detail see order). Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 02/01/2002)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the Alliance consent decree ; Memorandum in support (Attachments); Notice (Original in 74cv3268). (yp) (Entered: 03/28/2002)
3 MINUTE ORDER of 3/27/02 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall : Answer brief to City of Chicago's motion to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the Alliance consent decree [0-1] due 5/22/02. Reply to answer brief due 6/12/02. Ruling on Respondents' motion to dismiss will be by mail. Mailed notice (yp) (Entered: 03/28/2002)
5 MINUTE ORDER of 2/26/03 by Hon. Joan B. Gottschall: Respondent City of Chicago's motion to dismiss petitioner Jeffrey C. Wilson's enforcement petition under the Alliance consent decree is granted [0-1]. Case number 01 C 9586 is terminated terminating case . (Entered Order) Mailed notice (air) Modified on 02/27/2003 (Entered: 02/27/2003)

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 237 F.3d 799 (2001)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 99-3825.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued November 27, 2000. Decided January 11, 2001.
Richard Gutman, Montclair, NJ, Lawrence V. Jackowiak, Edward W. Feldman (argued), Miller, Shakman & Hamilton, Harvey M. Grossman, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Roger S. Hutchinson, Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Lawrence Rosenthal (argued), Benna R. Solomon, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellant.
Before BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
More than a quarter of a century ago a number of individuals and organizations brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the United States and the City of Chicago, claiming that the FBI's Chicago office and the Chicago Police Department's intelligence division were violating the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by overly intrusive and improperly motivated investigations of alleged subversive activities. In 1981, before a trial could be held, the defendants agreed to a consent decree, which was approved by then district judge Getzendanner the following year, imposing detailed and onerous restrictions on the defendants' powers of investigation. 561 F.Supp. 537 (N.D.Ill.1982). The City has now asked the district court to modify the decree to make the restrictions that it 800 places on the City less onerous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). The district court has *800 refused, and the City has appealed, pointing out that the decree is so strict that Judge Getzendanner said she would not have awarded the plaintiffs such draconian relief (but for the defendants' acquiescence) even if they had proved all the allegations of their complaint in a trial. 561 F.Supp. at 551.
The City argues that it has been in compliance with the decree throughout the almost two decades in which the decree has been in force and it points out that during this period the Supreme Court and this court have become ever more emphatic that the federal judiciary must endeavor to return the control of local governmental activities to local government at the earliest possible opportunity compatible with achievement of the objectives of the decree that transferred that control to the federal courts. The City also argues that the culture of local law enforcement and the character of the threats to public safety by ideologically motivated criminals have so far changed as to make much of the decree obsolete and points out that the Supreme Court has adopted a more flexible standard for the modification of decrees entered in institutional reform litigation than the Swift standard of yore. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378-81, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992); Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991); see also Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194, 197-98 (4th Cir.1996). Although the federal government has not joined the City in seeking to modify the decree, the provisions applicable to the FBI are different and were interpreted by us in an earlier phase of this litigation to impose far lighter restrictions on FBI investigations than the district court had interpreted the decree to impose. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1984) (en banc).
The core of the decree, which the City does not seek to modify, forbids investigations intended to interfere with or deter the exercise of the freedom of expression that the First Amendment protects, and requires the City to commission independent periodic audits of the City's compliance with the decree. The effect of these provisions is to add the threat of civil and criminal contempt to the usual sanctions for infringing civil rights and, through the

requirement of the audits, to make it easier to detect such infringements. These are substantial enhancements of the ordinary deterrent effect of constitutional law. Id. at 1014-15. They annex swift and severe sanctions to the ordinary tort remedies (mainly 42 U.S.C. § 1983) for violations of that law.
The periphery of the decree, which the City considers insufficiently protective of the public safety and wishes to have lanced, comprises a dizzying array of highly specific restrictions on investigations of potential terrorists and other politically or ideologically motivated criminals. Investigations "directed toward First Amendment conduct," a defined term referring to any investigation likely to involve the collection of information about protected activity or the investigation of anyone engaged in such activity, may be conducted only for the purpose of obtaining evidence of past, present, or impending criminal conduct and only if the Chicago police already have a reasonable suspicion of such conduct. Unless "unavoidably necessary to the investigation of a reasonably suspected crime," the police may not collect information about the political group to which the target of an investigation belongs or about other members of the group or people attending the group's meetings. The investigation must terminate as soon as reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct is dispelled and upon termination all information protected by the First Amendment must be purged from the investigatory file. An investigation may not be conducted on the basis of mere advocacy of violent conduct (what the decree terms "ideological rhetoric"); only a "brief preliminary inquiry" is permitted on that basis and it must cease unless it 801 generates a reasonable suspicion *801 of criminal conduct. Use of undercover informants is strictly limited along with the gathering of information at rallies or other public assemblies of advocates of violence and other political extremists. There is more to the decree, and some qualifications and other nuances that we have omitted, but our summary gives the flavor.
From the 1920s to the 1970s the intelligence division of the Chicago Police Department contained a unit nicknamed the "Red Squad" which spied on, infiltrated, and harassed a wide variety of political groups that included but were not limited to left0907 and right-wing extremists. Most of the groups, including most of the politically extreme groups, were not only lawful, and engaged in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, but also harmless. The motives of the Red Squad were largely political and ideological, though they included a legitimate concern with genuine threats to public order. Demonstrations against U.S. participation in the Vietnam War that climaxed in the disruption of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968, race riots in Chicago and other major cities in the same period, and the contemporaneous criminal activities of the Black Panthers, the Weathermen, and Puerto Rican separatists, all against a backdrop of acute racial and Cold War tensions, political assassinations (notably of President Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr.), and communist subversion, fueled a widespread belief in the need for zealous police activity directed against political militants.
The era in which the Red Squad flourished is history, along with the Red Squad itself. The instabilities of that era have largely disappeared. Fear of communist subversion, so strong a motivator of constitutional infringements in those days, has disappeared along with the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Legal controls over the police, legal sanctions for the infringement of constitutional rights, have multiplied. The culture that created and nourished the Red Squad has evaporated. The consent decree has done its job. To this the plaintiffs reply mainly by pointing us to accusations that during the 1996 Democratic National Convention, the first to be held in Chicago since the disaster of 1968, some Chicago police officers, fearing a repetition, reverted to the old ways and harassed demonstrators. But that was at worst a temporally limited, an isolated, and very much a situation-specific lapse; in its ad hoc, unorganized, and episodic character it resembled not at all the activities of the Red Squad, which were organized, systematic, and protracted.
Mere compliance with a decree over a period of years, the plaintiffs argue, does not in itself justify the lifting of the decree. We have our doubts whether this position is correct when the period of substantial compliance is as long as it has been in this case and the decree is one that constrains a core function of state (or, what for these purposes is the same thing, local) government as tightly as this one does. The states and their subdivisions have a right to the restoration of control over the institutions of state and local government upon proof of decades of compliance with a decree that had shifted that control to a federal judge. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995); Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1065 (7th Cir.1998); People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 153 F.3d 834 (7th Cir.1998) (per curiam); United States v. Board of School Commissioners, 128 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir.1997). Federal decrees that hand ultimate control of state functions to

federal courts "are not intended to operate in perpetuity." Board of Education v. Dowell, supra, 498 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 630; United States v. Board of School Commissioners, supra, 128 F.3d at 510. These cases involved school-desegregation decrees but their principles apply with equal force to police-reform decrees. Policing is as much, and as important, a local function as education.
802 *802 The City in any event is asking only that the decree be modified, not that it be abrogated; and its grounds for modification go beyond a mere history of compliance. The City wants flexibility to meet new threats to the safety of Chicago's citizens. In the heyday of the Red Squad, law enforcers from J. Edgar Hoover's FBI on down to the local level in Chicago focused to an unhealthy degree on political dissidents, whose primary activity was advocacy though it sometimes spilled over into violence. Today the concern, prudent and not paranoid, is with ideologically motivated terrorism. The City does not want to resurrect the Red Squad. It wants to be able to keep tabs on incipient terrorist groups. New groups of political extremists, believers in and advocates of violence, form daily around the world. If one forms in or migrates to Chicago, the decree renders the police helpless to do anything to protect the public against the day when the group decides to commit a terrorist act. Until the group goes beyond the advocacy of violence and begins preparatory actions that might create reasonable suspicion of imminent criminal activity, the hands of the police are tied. And if the police have been forbidden to investigate until then, if the investigation cannot begin until the group is well on its way toward the commission of terrorist acts, the investigation may come too late to prevent the acts or to identify the perpetrators. If police get wind that a group of people have begun meeting and discussing the desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda, a due regard for the public safety counsels allowing the police department to monitor the statements of the group's members, to build a file, perhaps to plant an undercover agent.
All this the First Amendment permits (unless the motives of the police are improper or the methods forbidden by the Fourth Amendment or other provisions of federal or state law, see Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 742 F.2d at 1014-15, and cases cited there), but the decree forbids. The decree impedes efforts by the police to cope with the problems of today because earlier generations of police coped improperly with the problems of yesterday. Because of what the Red Squad did many years ago, today's Chicago police are fated unless the decree is modified to labor indefinitely under severe handicaps that other American police are free from. First Amendment rights are secure. But under the decree as written and interpreted, the public safety is insecure and the prerogatives of local government scorned. To continue federal judicial micromanagement of local investigations of domestic and international terrorist activities in Chicago is to undermine the federal system and to trifle with the public safety. Every consideration favors modification; the City has made a compelling case for the modification that it seeks.
Modification is not abrogation. The modified decree will leave the Chicago police under considerably greater constraints than the police forces of other cities. A violation of the constitutional rights of any person whom the Chicago police investigate will be a violation of the decree and not just of the Constitution itself and so will invite summary punishment by the exercise of the contempt power, while the requirement of outside audits will make it more difficult for the Chicago police than for their counterparts in the other big cities to commit constitutional violations undetected.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded with instructions to make the modifications in the consent decree that the City has requested.
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 407 F.Supp. 115 (1975)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James M. ROCHFORD, Superintendent of Police, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268.
United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.
May 16, 1975.
116 *116 Val Klink, Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix and Howard Eglit, Chicago, for plaintiffs.
William R. Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, Jerome A. Siegan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LYNCH, District Judge.
This is a civil action brought under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, by eighteen named individuals and fifteen named groups and/or organizations. The named plaintiffs also seek to bring the action in the name of all others similarly situated. The plaintiffs are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages as a result of alleged violations of their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution as well as their rights under 18 U.S.C., Sections 2510-2520.
The complaint amounts to a broad-based attack on allegedly unlawful intelligence gathering activities of the Intelligence Division of the Chicago, Illinois, Police Department. Plaintiffs allege that said activities are carried out under the auspices of a vague and overly broad mandate contained within a general order of the Chicago Police Department directing its Intelligence Division to gather intelligence on organizations and individuals who pose "a threat to the security of the country, state or city." It is alleged that as a result of the above mandate, the defendants have engaged in a continuing pattern and practice involving the following activities: (1) surveillance and intelligence-gathering on individuals and organizations engaged in lawful activities; (2) unlawful wire-tapping and other forms of electronic surveillance; (3) unlawful entry and seizure; (4) dissemination of derogatory information concerning plaintiffs; (5) summary punishment and harassment, and (6) infiltration of private meetings and political organizations by informers and provocateurs. These activities are said to have the effect of chilling, 117 harassing and disrupting plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights of speech *117 and association and violate other rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and statutes.
The defendants include the commanders of the security and staff sections of the Intelligence Division of the Chicago Police Department. They, along with other defendants referred to as Unknown Agents of The Chicago Police Department and two specifically named police officers, are said to be the agents directly involved in the allegedly illegal intelligence gathering activities. The remaining defendants include the direct superiors of the above defendants, including the superintendent of the Department, as well as the members of the Police Board of the City of Chicago and the Mayor of the city. The illegal activities are alleged to take place with the knowledge, consent and direction of these remaining defendants.
The cause is now before this Court due to the submission by defendants of a motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion to dismiss contains three grounds: (1) that plaintiffs lack standing to sue for injunctive relief since the complaint does not present a justiciable controversy; (2) that the claims of certain plaintiffs for damages are barred by the applicable state statute of limitations; and (3) that the failure of three named plaintiffs to include factual allegations in support of their damage claims should lead to dismissal of these claims.

I
The defendants assert in the motion to dismiss that plaintiffs have no standing to seek injunctive relief because the plaintiffs have alleged no more than a subjective "chill" of their rights and that such allegations are insufficient to sustain the complaint because they do not present a justiciable controversy under the holding in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).
In Laird, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that the mere existence of the Army system of surveillance of unlawful and peaceful civilian activity chilled the exercise of their First Amendment rights did not present a justiciable controversy in the absence of a showing of objective harm or a threatened future harm. The High Court indicated that the plaintiffs in Laird did not allege that the Army took any specific action against them but only alleged that they were subjected to a "chilling" effect on the exercise of their First Amendment rights merely by the existence of the intelligence gathering and distribution system. 408 U.S. at 3, 92 S.Ct. 2318. The Court also pointed out that the information that was gathered appeared to contain nothing more than information which might be gained through clippings from newspaper articles or attendance at public meetings.
An examination of the complaint in the instant case reveals that the allegations contained therein differ greatly from those contained in the Laird case and that, consequently, the decision in Laird is inapposite to the instant suit. The plaintiffs in the case at bar have alleged that they were the specific objects of both overt and covert surveillance on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs' claims contain assertions that defendants specifically impinged upon their constitutional rights through various types of activities as outlined below.
A. Intelligence Gathering and Dissemination of Information
The plaintiffs' allegations as to the intelligence gathering system employed by the police go much further than the "newspaper clipping" approach employed in Laird. It is alleged that various agents of the Intelligence Division have visited plaintiffs at their homes, places of business and other locations in order to interrogate them or their friends and acquaintances. It is further alleged that defendants have contacted other law enforcement agencies 118 and requested that they obtain information on the plaintiffs that might be added to the files maintained *118 by the Intelligence Division on the various plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs further allege that the contents of these files are disseminated to newspaper reporters, prospective employers, academic officials and others. It is alleged that the purpose and effect of this intelligence gathering is to invade the personal and associational privacy of plaintiffs. The purpose and result of the information dissemination is said to be the invasion of the plaintiffs' privacy as well as damage to their academic or professional lives and to subject them to ridicule and to make them targets of further police surveillance and harassment.
Complaints alleging similar practices of information dissemination have been sustained in cases decided since the Laird decision. See Bach v. Mitchell, No. 71-C-22 (W.D.Wis.1973); Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F.Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
B. Surveillance and Provocation by Paid Informers and Undercover Agents
Plaintiffs allege that members of the Intelligence Division have infiltrated various plaintiff organizations. Having so infiltrated, the agents have exhorted members of the organizations to commit unlawful acts. Certain Unknown Agents of The Chicago Police Department are alleged to have posed as newspaper reporters and photographers in order to infiltrate the organizations. These activities allegedly abridge plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

Judge Weinfeld wrote in the Handschu decision, supra, that similar police infiltration in that case gave rise to a chilling potential which, ". . . would seem by far to exceed the passive observational activities upheld in Tatum." 349 F.Supp. at 771. The Court held that allegations such as the allegations made in the instant case presented a justiciable controversy.
C. Electronic Surveillance
Plaintiffs allege that certain telephone conversations that they have engaged in have been intercepted and recorded unlawfully by Unknown Agents of The Chicago Police Department. Plaintiffs base their beliefs that such surveillance has taken place due to their observation of a defendant whose presence at O'Hare Airport coincided with the plaintiffs' concurrent presence solely because he overheard earlier telephonic communications of the plaintiffs. One plaintiff was allegedly ridiculed by Unknown Agents over a telephone line he was speaking on.
Such unlawful electronic surveillance has been held to be a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). Plaintiffs also allege that this activity violates their rights under 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2520.
D. Unlawful Entry and Seizure
Plaintiffs allege that defendants Unknown Agents broke into the offices of a plaintiff organization and seized files, membership lists and other materials all in violation of plaintiff's First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965).
E. Overt Surveillance
Defendants Unknown Agents are alleged to have engaged in activities involving photographing, videotaping, and recording of the proceedings at: (1) Various rallies that plaintiff organizations have participated in; (2) Their places of business; (3) Private gatherings such as picnics and outside a private residence in which a party was being held.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has sustained allegations of police photography as 119 establishing *119 a cause of action. In doing so the Court stated:
Although the taking of photographs may in and of themselves be completely proper, when combined with allegations of physical violence, threats, excessive surveillance, illegal searches and seizures, illegal electronic surveillance, and the denial of the right to counsel, this normally proper activity may become suspect of being excessive. By focusing upon the whole chain of alleged acts or harassment rather than on one, a cumulative injury may be displayed. Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.Pa.1972) at 145.
F. Summary Punishment and Harassment
The plaintiffs allege that various defendants have engaged in numerous activities which amount to summary punishment and undue harassment. These activities allegedly include: (1) Refusal to protect members of a plaintiff organization when assaulted by another group at a rally plaintiff organization was holding; (2) Administering a beating to a plaintiff after arresting him at a lawful political demonstration; (3) Shouting verbal abuse at plaintiffs while engaging in lawful political demonstrations and (4) Conducting illegal searches. Plaintiffs allege that these activities violate their rights as guaranteed under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Symkowski v. Miller, 294 F.Supp. 1214 (E.D.Wis.1969); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

The many allegations made by the plaintiffs in their thirty-eight page complaint contain instances of police conduct which, if proved through proper evidence, would establish a course of conduct which would be substantially more intrusive than the conduct engaged in by the defendants in the Laird case. Furthermore, the allegations of the complaint, as seen from the above distillation, amount to more than a claim of a "subjective chill" from the mere existence of the system. Plaintiffs have clearly charged that they are among the targets of the intelligence gathering system. These observations indicate to this Court that the dictates of the Laird decision do not call for the dismissal of the instant complaint.
The defendants also cite the decision in Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) in support of their theory seeking dismissal. However, an examination of the holding in that case shows that the court placed great reliance on the holding in Laird. Such reliance was justified because the complaint in Donohoe challenged the, "`. . . mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity'." 465 F.2d at 202. Furthermore, the claims in Donohoe did not amount to an intelligence gathering system which was nearly as widespread or intrusive as in the case at bar.
Defendants also allude to a failure of the plaintiffs to allege any future harm and argue that such failure is a bar to injunctive relief. A reading of the complaint, however, indicates that plaintiffs have alleged that the objected-to activity has not only taken place in the past but is part of an ongoing course of conduct which will continue unless injunctive relief issues.
It is a firmly established principle that the complaint's allegations must be taken as true for purposes of defendant's motion to dismiss. With this principle in mind, the Court finds that the instant complaint does present a justiciable controversy.
Nothing that is contained in this opinion should be construed as a wholesale condemnation of an intelligence gathering system being maintained in the City of Chicago Police Department. In fact, such a system must be considered to be not only legitimate but necessary in order to fully protect the best interests of the citizenry of the 120 City of Chicago. The operation of such a system is absolutely necessary to apprehend certain *120 criminal activity which might otherwise go completely unnoticed until serious and irreparable damage might result from such activity.
The Court, of course, is in no position at this early stage of pleading to comment upon the truth, or lack thereof, of the many allegations contained in the complaint. Whether or not plaintiffs can sustain these serious allegations is not before the Court at this time. However, it is the Court's ruling that if the plaintiffs can prove a set of facts in support of the allegations contained in their complaint regarding the questioned intelligence gathering activities, they would be entitled to relief. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to present a justiciable controversy is overruled.
II
As a second ground for dismissal of certain enumerated paragraphs in the complaint relating to money damages, defendants argue that the claims for damages are barred by the statute of limitations.
The defendants correctly point out that the applicable period of limitations in civil rights actions is that which the state would enforce had the action been brought in the state court. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1959). Defendants then argue that the damage claims of eleven plaintiffs are barred by the Illinois statute of limitations in that they arose more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint. This argument is founded upon Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 83, Paragraphs 14 and 15 which provide respectively for a one year limitation period for actions arising out of the publication of matters violating the personal right of privacy and a two year limitation period in actions for damages to the person.
Defendants cite no cases in support of their theory that Sections 14 and 15 of Chapter 83 delineate the applicable limitations period. In fact, a review of the decisions of the Seventh Circuit as well as decisions of the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois indicates that in actions brought under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 the

applicable period of limitations is prescribed by Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 83, Section 16. That section contains a five year limitation period. Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958); Amen v. Crimmins, 379 F.Supp. 777 (N.D.Ill.1974).
Because all the acts complained of in the instant case took place within the last five years, none of the claims contained in the complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
III
Finally, defendants argue that one of the plaintiff organizations, Young Socialist Alliance, and two of the individual plaintiffs, Janice Gutman and Sidney Lens, have advanced no factual allegations in support of their damage claims. Notwithstanding this contention by defendants, a review of the complaint reveals allegations of unlawful activities of defendants which were taken against these three plaintiffs as well as all other plaintiffs. Many, if not all, of these allegations fall into the categories of activities outlined in Section I of this opinion. The language of the complaint indicates that these allegations apply to the three plaintiffs in question and, because the allegations would support claims for damages against defendants, the motion to dismiss the damage claims of these three plaintiffs is denied.
Accordingly, in light of the above, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby denied.
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 561 F.Supp. 537 (1982)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
March 30, 1982. Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree April 8, 1982.
538 *538 Robert C. Howard, Matthew J. Piers, Douglas W. Cassel, Alexander L. Polikoff, Robert J. Vollen, Robert L. Tucker, Chicago, Ill., for ACLU plaintiffs.
Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix, Chicago, Ill., for Alliance plaintiffs.
539 *539 Stanley Garber, Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., for City of Chicago defendants.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preliminary Statement of Principles .................................... 559

Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights ....................... 560

The Importance of Effective Law Enforcement .......................... 560

City Policies Concerning First Amendment Conduct ..................... 560

I. Permanent Injunction ................................................... 561

1. The Scope of this Judgment; Definitions ......................... 561 1.1 Applies Only to Investigation Directed Towards First Amendment Conduct; Great Majority of Police Activity Not Affected by this Judgment ............................................. 561

1.2 "Investigative Activity" .................................. 561

1.3 "Directed Toward" ......................................... 561

1.4 "Incidental References" ................................... 562

1.5 "First Amendment Conduct" ................................. 562

2. Prohibitions that Apply to All Agencies of the City of Chicago ................................................. 562

3. Police Department Investigations ................................ 563
3.1 Basic Procedures for Investigations ....................... 563
3.1.1 Avoidance of First Amendment Information .......... 563
3.1.2 Minimization ...................................... 563
3.1.3 Intrusive Methods ................................. 563
3.1.4 Authorization ..................................... 563
3.1.5 Termination ....................................... 563
3.1.6 Security .......................................... 563
3.1.7 Purging ........................................... 564
3.2 Criminal Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct ................................... 564
3.3 Dignitary Protection Investigations ....................... 565
3.4 Public Gathering Investigations ........................... 565
3.5 Regulatory Investigations ................................. 566
3.6 Intrusive Methods ......................................... 567
4. Implementation of this Judgment ................................. 568
5. Auditing Implementation and Compliance with this Judgment ................................................... 568
6. Index to Definitions ............................................ 569
II. Retention of Jurisdiction and Ancillary Matters ........................ 570
A. Retention of Jurisdiction ....................................... 570
B. Final Disposition of Claims for Injunctive Relief Against City Defendants ......................................... 570
C. Ancillary Matters ............................................... 570 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH THE CITY OF CHICAGO AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GETZENDANNER, District Judge. These proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are submitted jointly on behalf of the plaintiff proponents of two settlement agreements entered into between all named plaintiffs in the ACLU case, certain named plaintiffs in the Alliance case (hereinafter "the participating Alliance plaintiffs"), and certain defendants in both cases. One settlement agreement is with the City of Chicago and certain of its employees (hereinafter "the City of Chicago defendants") identified in Appendix C to the Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree embodying that

settlement which was filed with the Court on June 12, 1981 and a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix I (hereinafter the "City of Chicago Settlement").[*] The other settlement agreement is with defendants the Secretary of Defense, Richard Norusis, Thomas Filkins, and Gerald Borman (hereinafter "the Department of Defense defendants"). The proposed settlement with the Department of Defense defendants is embodied in a Joint Motion and Stipulation which was filed with the Court on July 2, 1981, and a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix II (hereinafter the "Department of Defense Settlement").[*] The identity of the Alliance plaintiffs who join in the proposed settlements is shown on Appendix A to the City of Chicago Settlement and on Exhibit A to the Department of Defense Settlement. The City of Chicago defendants and the Department of Defense defendants are sometimes hereinafter referred to collectively as "the settling defendants."
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Cases
540 1. Alliance to End Repression ("Alliance"), et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. *540 74 C 3268, was filed as a class action on November 13, 1974. American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 75 C 3295, was filed as a class action on October 3, 1975.
B. Parties
2. The 32 Alliance named plaintiffs, 14 of which are organizations and 18 of whom are individuals, include churches, political groups, civil liberties organizations, and individual political, community, and religious activists.
3. Initial Alliance defendants included officials and employees of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department. The City of Chicago was added as an Alliance defendant on November 19, 1979.
4. On July 8, 1977, Alliance plaintiffs added as defendants, in their official capacities only, certain federal officials, including the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), and the Secretary of Defense. On January 28, 1980, Alliance plaintiffs added as defendants the United States Department of Justice, the FBI, and the CIA.
5. The 24 ACLU named plaintiffs, 10 of which are organizations and 14 of whom are individuals, include community groups, religious groups, civil rights and civil liberties groups, and individual community and political activists, lawyers, journalists and public officials.
6. Initial ACLU defendants included the City of Chicago and various city officials, the Attorney General of the United States and various FBI officials, and the Department of Defense defendants.
7. On December 27, 1979, ACLU plaintiffs added as defendants the United States Department of Justice and the FBI.
8. On August 11, 1981, this Court 91 F.R.D. 182 approved a settlement of all claims against the federal defendants in both cases except claims against the Department of Defense defendants.
C. Jurisdiction
9. Jurisdiction in these cases is asserted on the basis of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, 18 U.S.C. § 2520, and 5 U.S.C. § 552a; and declaratory relief is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
D. Claims
10. Plaintiffs in both cases claim that the settling defendants have conducted surveillance of, and compiled dossiers on, plaintiffs' lawful political and other lawful activities; gathered information about plaintiffs by unlawful

means, including warrantless wiretaps and break-ins, unlawful use of infiltrators and informers, and by other unlawful means; disrupted and harassed plaintiffs' lawful activities; and that defendants have committed these alleged wrongs against members of the plaintiff classes, all as part of a continuing course and pattern of alleged illegal conduct.
11. Plaintiffs claim that this alleged conduct violates their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, and 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
12. The relief asked for on behalf of the named plaintiffs and plaintiff classes in both cases includes a declaration by the court that the conduct complained of is unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting the continuation of such conduct.
13. No damages are sought on behalf of the plaintiff classes in either case. The named plaintiffs ask for monetary damages against certain of the defendants.
14. In both lawsuits the settling defendants denied all allegations of unlawful government intrusions. Except as noted in the following paragraph, no findings of fact have been made by the Court relating to the allegations made against any of the defendants.
15. In connection with motions for sanctions to compel discovery in the Alliance case, the Court held that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing as to certain material allegations in the complaint against the City of 541 Chicago defendants, and *541 that these defendants had the burden of showing that they had not engaged in the activities described therein.
E. History of Litigation
16. Both cases have been actively litigated and sharply contested throughout the years since they were filed.
17. The City of Chicago defendants' motion to strike and dismiss the complaint in the Alliance case was denied May 16, 1975. 407 F.Supp. 115 (N.D.Ill.). The motion of defendants Mayor of Chicago and Chicago Police Board to dismiss the Alliance plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was denied on September 12, 1975. The motion of defendants Rochford, Ware and Murphy to strike certain paragraphs of Alliance plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was denied on September 12, 1975. The City of Chicago defendants' motion to strike paragraph 84 of Alliance plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was denied on March 31, 1976. The motion to strike and dismiss the Alliance plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint as to 70 named Chicago Police defendants was denied on November 10, 1976. Defendant City of Chicago's motion to dismiss Alliance plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was denied on October 15, 1980.
18. A motion to dismiss by the City of Chicago defendants in the ACLU case was denied on May 26, 1976. 431 F.Supp. 25 (N.D.Ill.1976). A motion by the City of Chicago to reconsider that denial was denied on October 1, 1976.
19. A motion by the Department of Defense defendants to dismiss the complaint in the Alliance case was denied November 15, 1977.
20. A motion to dismiss by the Department of Defense defendants in the ACLU case was denied May 26, 1976.
21. On March 25, 1976, the Court certified the following two plaintiff cases in the Alliance case:
(a) The plaintiff individuals.
The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration,

physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
(b) The plaintiff organizations.
The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
22. On May 24, 1976, the Court certified the following two plaintiff classes in the ACLU case:
(a) The plaintiff individuals.
The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, surveillance, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
(b) Plaintiff organizations.
The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of 542 Chicago who engage or have engaged in lawful political, *542 religious, educational or social activities and who,
as a result of these activities, have been, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, surveillance, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
23. On appeal by the Department of Defense defendants and defendant City of Chicago, the class certifications in both cases were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on November 22, 1977, and petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc by the Department of Defense defendants were denied February 13, 1978. 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.1978).
24. The Alliance and ACLU cases were consolidated for discovery purposes on July 2, 1976, and both cases were consolidated for discovery purposes on December 8, 1976 with Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 76 C 1982, which is not a class action, and which does not involve the federal defendants or the proposed settlements.[1]
25. On November 10, 1976, the Alliance plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction against the City of Chicago defendants' surveillance of plaintiffs' legal team. 75 F.R.D. 435 (N.D.Ill.1976), 558 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828, 98 S.Ct. 108, 54 L.Ed.2d 87 (1977).
F. Discovery Against City of Chicago Defendants
26. Many of plaintiffs' early discovery requests were vigorously resisted by the City of Chicago defendants on several grounds, principally relevance, opposition to classwide discovery, burden of the discovery, the informer's privilege, and "governmental privilege." On November 10, 1976, the Alliance plaintiffs obtained the previously described prima facie findings of fact as discovery sanctions.
27. Plaintiffs' discovery requests ultimately resulted in production of massive discovery concerning intelligence activities by the City of Chicago. On July 1, 1976, plaintiffs obtained a court order, further expanded on October

14, 1976, allowing them to copy all index cards of the Chicago Police Department Intelligence Division other than those concerning organized crime, and allowing them to release documents to the named subjects thereof. On May 4, 1977, plaintiffs obtained a court order establishing a depository for their access to approximately 500,000 pages of undeleted pre-1976 files and index systems of the Chicago Police Department Intelligence Division Subversive Unit (commonly known as the Red Squad) and the Gang Intelligence Unit. Plaintiffs have analyzed tens of thousands of these documents. Since September, 1977, plaintiffs have also engaged in periodic review of all current Intelligence Division administrative and "Terrorist Squad" documents, and have obtained copies of many of those which do not concern ongoing criminal investigations. All of the files reviewed and received by the plaintiffs were undeleted.
28. Plaintiffs have also obtained numerous interrogatory answers and taken approximately 100 depositions of Chicago Police Department intelligence agents and officers, as well as other police officials and relevant witnesses. They have further reviewed documents other than those generated by the Intelligence Division such as the files of other Chicago Police Department sections, including the Neighborhood Relations Division, the Beat Representative Program, and the Special Operations Group; the City of Chicago Department of Investigations; the audits and papers of a Mayor's "blue ribbon" commission to investigate police intelligence practices (the Policy Review Commission); the Chicago Police Department Liaison File of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the index/identification cards of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit. Under a protective order dated 543 October 14, 1976, plaintiffs have released thousands of Chicago Police Department *543 Subversive Unit documents to the subjects thereof.
G. Discovery Against Department of Defense Defendants
29. As part of pretrial discovery, plaintiffs received hundreds of pages of Department of Defense documents, including the following:
(a) Department of Defense domestic intelligence reports in the files of the Chicago Police Department Intelligence Division Subversive Unit;
(b) Department of Defense domestic intelligence reports in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
(c) Department of Defense domestic intelligence reports regarding four of the named plaintiffs obtained directly from the Department of Defense. Reports concerning one named plaintiff consisting of a background investigation pursuant to that named plaintiff's induction into the United States Army. The Department of Defense defendants state that reports concerning the three other named plaintiffs are currently being maintained only for purposes of continuing litigation and will be destroyed at the conclusion of the litigation.
30. In response to plaintiffs' interrogatories and document requests, representatives of the Secretary of Defense have stated that except for documents currently being maintained solely for purposes of pending litigation, all Department of Defense domestic intelligence files relating to persons not affiliated with the Department of Defense have been destroyed. During pretrial discovery, plaintiffs did not receive any Department of Defense domestic intelligence files or records which originated after the year 1971.
31. With respect to class discovery, the Department of Defense defendants vigorously resisted plaintiffs' efforts to conduct discovery on behalf of the certified plaintiff classes. The Department of Defense defendants relied in part on the informer's privilege, which was litigated extensively in connection with discovery requests directed to other federal defendants (Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 11, 1981 at pp. 8-9); and in part on the state secrets privilege. Objections based on the state secrets privilege were overruled by this Court (Memorandum Opinion and Order of March 28, 1978, at pp. 3-4), were initially sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir.1979), and, after rehearing en banc by the Court of Appeals, were remanded in part for further determinations by this Court, American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir.1980).

H. Other Information
32. In evaluating the desirability of the proposed settlement with the Department of Defense defendants, plaintiffs had access to a large number of Executive Branch, Department of Defense, and military service regulations and directives issued since 1970 purporting to restrict or prohibit domestic intelligence activities by Department of Defense agencies, and purporting to prohibit or restrict acquisition, storage and dissemination of information by such agencies about non-Department of Defense personnel. These Executive Orders, Department of Defense directives, and military service regulations and policy letters purport to establish a comprehensive set of prohibitions and restrictions on the acquisition, storage or dissemination of intelligence information concerning persons not affiliated with the Department of Defense, and purport to establish enforcement responsibilities and procedures both within and without the Department of Defense to enforce these prohibitions and restrictions. Representatives of the Secretary of Defense assert that these restrictions and prohibitions are currently being enforced within the Department of Defense.
33. In negotiating and deciding whether to enter into the proposed settlement with the Department of Defense defendants, plaintiffs have also had the benefit of information concerning military domestic intelligence policies and practices, including military intelligence files and record systems, from extensive Congressional hearings and 544 *544 reports. See, e.g., "Army Surveillance of Civilians: A Documentary Analysis," by the Staff of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print, 1972); Hearings on Military Surveillance Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, (93d Cong., 2d Sess., April 9-10, 1974); Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, (94th Cong., 2d Sess., Report No. 94-755, April 23, 1976), particularly the chapter entitled "Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens By The Military," Book III, pp. 785-834.
I. The City of Chicago Settlement
34. The City of Chicago Settlement contains specific agreements with respect to future activities of the City of Chicago which would for the first time specifically prohibit political spying and harassment by the City. Because of the importance of these specific agreements, the Court has attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order, as Appendix I, a copy of the City of Chicago Settlement.
35. The City of Chicago Settlement would terminate all injunctive claims that plaintiffs have asserted in these actions against the City of Chicago defendants.
36. The proposed City of Chicago Settlement is the result of a negotiating process described at the fairness hearing by counsel for both sides as arduous and adversary, and lasting over two years, in which counsel for all plaintiffs and for all City of Chicago defendants participated.
37. Counsel for all parties agree that nearly every line and paragraph of the City of Chicago Settlement, and in many cases individual words, are the product of vigorous negotiations, and that the agreements reflect concessions by all parties.
38. There is no evidence that the negotiations were other than adverse. On the contrary, the whole history of these lawsuits is one of vigorous, hotly-contested litigation. Extensive discovery and trial preparation continued throughout the period of negotiations. At two points in the last year of negotiations, impasses between counsel were reached and negotiations broke off for significant periods of time.
39. The City of Chicago Settlement was entered into after sufficient facts were developed, through discovery and investigation, fairly to apprise all parties of the facts likely to be adduced at trial and to enable them fairly to assess the likely outcome of trial. Massive pretrial discovery was substantially complete, and pursuant to court order plaintiffs and defendants had completed and filed separate draft final pretrial materials.

40. Counsel for the participating parties state that the City of Chicago Settlement negotiated by them in their considered opinion, is fair, reasonable and adequate.
41. The City of Chicago Settlement was approved by all ACLU named plaintiffs, and by all Alliance named plaintiffs except two organizations and three individuals. These five objected to the settlement and are hereafter referred to as the non-participating Alliance plaintiffs.
42. The City of Chicago Settlement has also been approved by the City of Chicago and the Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, and has been consented to by the other City of Chicago defendants through their counsel.
43. It is likely that further litigation, absent the proposed settlement, would be extremely complex, lengthy and expensive.
J. The Department of Defense Settlement
44. The Department of Defense Settlement contains specific agreements with respect to future domestic intelligence activities by Department of Defense intelligence units and agencies in the City of Chicago. Because of the importance of the Department of Defense Settlement, the Court has attached it to this Memorandum Opinion and Order as Appendix II.
545 45. Settlement discussions between the plaintiffs and Department of Defense defendants *545 began in August of 1979 and continued until June of 1981, when final approval of all participating parties was obtained. During that nearly two year period, counsel for the parties engaged in extended, adversarial negotiations on virtually every term of the proposed settlement. In addition to the internal Executive Branch regulations which had already been issued relating to domestic intelligence activities by the military, plaintiffs' attorneys considered the difficult legal precedents which would have to be distinguished in order to achieve success at a trial on the merits. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972); American Civil Liberties Union v. Laird, 463 F.2d 499 (7th Cir.1972). Plaintiffs' counsel also considered the results of Congressional investigations of military domestic intelligence activities, which indicated that little evidence of post-1971 military intelligence activities directed against civilians was likely to be found in Department of Defense files and records.
46. Counsel for the Department of Defense defendants, for the ACLU plaintiffs, and for the participating Alliance plaintiffs have informed the Court that in their judgments the Department of Defense Settlement is a fair, reasonable and adequate resolution of the claims of the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff classes. That settlement has been approved by all ACLU named plaintiffs and by all Alliance named plaintiffs except the non-participating Alliance plaintiffs. The settlement has also been approved at all appropriate levels of the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice, a process which required many months to complete.
47. It is likely that further litigation of the plaintiffs' claims against the Department of Defense defendants would be extremely complex, lengthy and expensive.
K. The Preliminary Hearing Concerning The City of Chicago Settlement
48. In June, 1981, the plaintiff proponents of the City of Chicago Settlement moved to have the Court establish procedures for approval of that settlement. On June 12 and 15, 1981, the Court held a preliminary hearing on the proposed City of Chicago Settlement, and found in its Order of June 15 that the proposed settlement was within the range of possible approval and that there was probable cause to notify members of the plaintiff classes of the proposed settlements pursuant to Rule 23(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to hold a fairness hearing.
49. At the preliminary hearing, the Court heard from counsel for the proponents of the settlement. The Court also heard from counsel for three of the non-participating Alliance plaintiffs. The Court found that the form of notice to class members, which also included statements from the non-participating plaintiffs, was fair, reasonable and adequate, directed that notice be given in a prescribed manner, and scheduled a fairness hearing for October 9,

1981. The form of notice to class members of both the City of Chicago and the Department of Defense Settlements which was approved by the Court is attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order as Appendix III.[**]
L. Preliminary Hearing Concerning the DOD Settlement
50. On July 2, 1981 proponents of the Department of Defense settlement jointly moved the Court to establish procedures for consideration of the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement with the Department of Defense defendants. On July 6, 1981 the Court held a preliminary hearing on the proposed Department of Defense Settlement and found in its Order of July 6, 1981 that the proposed settlement was within the range of possible approval, and that there was probable cause to notify members of the plaintiff classes of the proposed settlements pursuant to Rule 23(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to hold a hearing to 546 determine the fairness, *546 reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed settlement.
51. Prior to the July 6 preliminary hearing, the court reviewed the proposed Department of Defense Settlement and the proposed form of notice to class members, which included the statement of the non-participating Alliance named plaintiffs in opposition to the proposed Department of Defense Settlement.
52. At the preliminary hearing the Court heard from counsel for the proponents of the Department of Defense Settlement. The Court found that the form of notice to class members was fair and adequate, directed that notice by mail and by publication be given to members of the plaintiff classes in a prescribed manner, and scheduled a hearing for October 9, 1981 on the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed settlement (see Appendix III to this Memorandum Opinion and Order).
M. Notice to Class Members
53. On July 6, 1981 the Court ordered that individual notice of the City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements be given by first class mail not later than August 10, 1981 to all members of the plaintiff classes who could be identified and located through reasonable effort. Specifically, the Court required the following:
(a) Individual notice by first class mail to each organization and person in the City of Chicago on which or whom the defendants maintain or had maintained intelligence files which had been produced during discovery in these actions, and whose current addresses were known to the plaintiffs;
(b) Individual notice to members of organizations described in (a) above, to be accomplished by requesting the officers or other responsible persons in the organization to notify the organization's members of the terms of the Settlements;
(c) Individual notice by first class mail to all other members of the plaintiff classes whose names and current addresses were known to the named plaintiffs or their attorneys; and
(d) Reasonable additional efforts to identify, locate and individually notify by first class mail members of the plaintiff classes not notified, nor reasonably likely to be notified, by the efforts made pursuant to (a), (b) and (c) above.
54. The Court found that notice by publication was the most reasonable form of notice to those class members who were not notified by the efforts described above, and ordered that such notice by publication be given, not later than August 10, 1981, on three consecutive weekdays in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the Chicago metropolitan area. Such published notice was to include one advertisement in the general news section of each of the newspapers on the first day, occupying 1/8 of a tabloid or 1/16 of a broadsheet page, directing readers to the legal notice appearing the same day in the legal notice section of the newspaper.
55. The Court ordered that the mail and published notices should advise that "[a]ny person who believes that he or she is a member of any of the plaintiff classes, and any organization which believes itself to be a member of

any of the plaintiff classes, may appear at the hearing in person or through an attorney and present his, her or its views on the proposed settlement," if they complied with certain minimal procedural requirements.
56. The steps prescribed in the Court's July 6, 1981 order concerning notice to members of the plaintiff classes were complied with (Affidavit of Richard M. Gutman dated August 28, 1981, filed August 31, 1981; Affidavit of Matthew J. Piers dated October 7, 1981, filed October 9, 1981). In addition to the first class mail and published notice required by the Court, the proposed settlements with City of Chicago and the Department of Defense received extensive coverage in the news media (Gutman Affidavit at pp. 2-3 and attachments thereto; Piers Affidavit at pp. 2-3 and attachments thereto).
547 57. The direct mail and published notices to members of the plaintiff classes, *547 both individuals and organizations, are likely to have reached, as far as practicable, the members of the plaintiff classes. The ordered notices constituted the best notice that was reasonably practicable under the circumstances of these cases.
58. As of the date of these findings, no members of the plaintiff classes have notified the Court that notice of the proposed City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements was received too late to permit that class member to present his, her or its views on the proposed settlements to the Court.
N. The Fairness Hearing
59. On October 9, 1981, and continuing on October 16, 1981, the Court conducted a hearing on whether the proposed City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements are fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be approved by the Court. More than 100 persons attended during the two days of hearing.
60. In addition to attorneys for proponents of the City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements, 38 individuals who were putative class members, or representatives of organizations which were putative class members, filed notices of intention to appear and address the Court concerning one or both of the proposed settlements.
61. The Court received 17 written statements of views by persons and organizations who did not appear at the hearing, most expressing support for the proposed City of Chicago Settlement, and written notices by 16 additional persons stating their intention to appear at the fairness hearing, but who did not in fact appear. Also, the five non-participating Alliance plaintiffs and others prepared a form objection presenting a choice of objections to the City of Chicago Settlement: "for the reasons stated by [the non-participating Alliance plaintiffs]," or "because I/we feel that any negotiated settlement with these agencies without public trial in which they are held accountable for their crimes is an unjust compromise of this lawsuit." The non-participating Alliance plaintiffs distributed these forms, and 20 persons or organizations filed them, checking one or more of the multiple-choice reasons. In addition, one of these purported class members filed a form, writing in her objection that "a promise by these agencies ... is not a sufficient guarantee that they will not engage in such illegal activity in the future." Written objections to the Department of Defense Settlement were filed by the same five non-participating Alliance plaintiffs, by one individual plaintiff class member, and by one organizational plaintiff class member.
62. At the hearing held on October 9 and October 16, 1981, the Court heard presentations concerning the City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements by attorneys for the proponents who spoke in support of the proposed settlements. In addition, the Court heard oral presentations by five representatives of the Alliance and ACLU named plaintiffs speaking in favor of the proposed City of Chicago Settlement, and from 22 persons who were not named plaintiffs, some of whom were counsel for others, and more than half of whom supported the proposed City of Chicago Settlement. Of the 26 putative class members who appeared to make oral presentations on October 9 and 16, 1981 (out of 38 who had originally filed notices of intention to appear), only six spoke in opposition to the Department of Defense Settlement. All persons and organizations that had filed requests to speak prior to that hearing, whether or not they had done so in a timely manner or otherwise satisfied the minimal procedural requirements specified in the notice to class members, and who were present on either day of the hearing, were provided an opportunity to address the Court with respect to the proposed settlements. All class members who requested to be heard concerning the proposed Settlements were given a reasonable and fair opportunity to present their views to the Court.

63. At the conclusion of the hearing on October 16, 1981, the Court took under advisement the fairness, 548 reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed settlements, and *548 directed attorneys of record for the settling
parties in these actions to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II. Conclusions of Law
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of these cases, and of all parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343; 18 U.S.C. § 2520; 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
2. Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
Rule 23(e) notice must sufficiently convey the required information and afford reasonable time for interested persons to make their appearance with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case. Air Line Stewards, et al. v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101, 108 (7th Cir.1972).
3. Having reviewed the affidavits of plaintiffs' counsel regarding the manner and extent of notice, and taking into account the further information presented at the fairness hearing, the Court finds that notice was provided in a fair and adequate manner. Notice was consistent with the Court's orders of June 15 and July 6, 1981 directing notice, with Rule 23(e), and with due process. Notice was also timely, having been given two months prior to the fairness hearing. In contrast, notice in Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.1980), a leading case in this Circuit on settlements of civil rights class actions, was mailed only 12 days before the fairness hearing. 616 F.2d at 310; 471 F.Supp. at 805. See also, Airline Stewards, supra, 455 F.2d at 108 (three weeks' notice held timely).
4. There is an "overriding public interest in favor of settlement," especially in class actions. Armstrong, supra, 616 F.2d at 312-13. By definition, a fair settlement need not satisfy every concern of the plaintiff class, but may fall anywhere within a broad range of upper and lower limits. "The essence of settlement is compromise ... a solution somewhere between the two extremes." Id. at 315.
5. The Court has a limited role in reviewing the settlement.
Because settlement of a class action, like settlement of any litigation, is basically a bargained exchange between the litigants, the judiciary's role is properly limited to the minimum necessary to protect the interests of the class and the public. Judges should not substitute their own judgment as to optimal settlement terms for the judgment of the litigants and their counsel. Id.
Moreover, the Court cannot "modify the terms of a settlement proposal; it can only accept or reject the proposal as presented to it." Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F.Supp. 800, 804 (E.D.Wis.1979). This principle is especially important where, as here, virtually every line and paragraph of the settlement documents, and in many instances individual words, are the end products of intense, adversary, and prolonged negotiations.
6. Because a class action settlement affects the rights of absent class members, and often, as here, the larger public interest, the Court may not uncritically accept it. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 313. The settlement may be approved only if the Court finds it to be "fair, reasonable and adequate." Id. The burden of persuasion on the issue of fairness, reasonableness and adequacy is on the proponents of the settlement. The Court must "clearly set forth in the record its reasons for approving the settlement," stating its reasoning "with particular clarity." Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315, 319.
7. Although the decision whether to approve the settlement is within the discretion of the District Court, and the decision is necessarily made on a case-by-case basis, certain factors have been consistently identified as relevant to the fairness determination. Among them are:
549

*549 (a) The strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.
(b) The defendant's ability to pay.
(c) The complexity, length and expense of further litigation.
(d) The amount of opposition to the settlement.
(e) Presence of collusion in reaching a settlement.
(f) The reaction of members of the class to the settlement.
(g) The opinion of competent counsel.
(h) The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed.
(i) Whether the settlement initiates or authorizes an illegal conduct. Id.
Each of these factors will be discussed.
Factor 1: Strength of Plaintiffs' Case vs. Amount Offered in Settlement
8. The first factor, which is generally regarded as the most important, is the strength of the plaintiffs' case balanced against what is offered in settlement by the defendants. While it requires some consideration of the merits, the Court must refrain from reaching conclusions on issues which have not been fully litigated.
9. The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaints against the settling defendants is a constitutional challenge to an alleged classwide course and pattern of conduct consisting of three basic types of alleged domestic intelligence practices: (a) investigations of persons and groups based on their lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, (b) disruption and harassment of persons and groups engaged in the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, and (c) the use against such persons and groups of investigative means which are overly intrusive, in violation of First and Fourth Amendment rights, or which are otherwise illegal.
10. The relief sought on behalf of the plaintiff classes is essentially twofold: a declaration that such investigations, disruption, and investigative means are unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting their continuation.
11. The City of Chicago Settlement provides the plaintiffs with the injunctive relief they sought in this litigation. Its contents include the following key points:
(a) The settlement is in the form of a permanent injunction, enforceable by the Court, entitled "Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree", and is attached hereto as Appendix I.
(b) The key definitions that establish the scope of the injunction are broad. For example, in the City of Chicago Settlement, Appendix I to this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the definition of First Amendment conduct (Section 1.5), which is the core concept of the injunction, includes not only political and religious speech and assembly, but is stated broadly to include "the right to hold ideas or beliefs concerning public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious matters," the right to assemble privately concerning such ideas or beliefs, the right to advocate alternative systems of government, and the right to associate in connection with legal advice and litigation.
12. The City of Chicago Settlement includes a set of prohibitions against improper activities which apply to any agent or agency of the City of Chicago. They include the proscription of any investigation undertaken because of a person's First Amendment conduct; of any disruption of or interference with a person because of such conduct; and of any collection of First Amendment information by illegal methods.

13. Extensive regulatory provisions were written into the injunction, concerning areas of police activity that are proper but have the potential to interfere with First Amendment activities. While there are many such provisions in Part 3 of the injunction, the highlights of this section are as follows:

(a) Investigative activity directed toward First Amendment conduct is entirely prohibited except in four specific types of investigations: criminal, dignatory protection, public gathering, and regulatory investigations (Section 3).

550

*550 (b) For each type of investigation, a commencement standard is articulated. Most important

of these is the requirement that a criminal investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct

cannot be commenced unless there is "reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable

facts that the subject has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." The

reasonable suspicion standard is taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), which is a Fourth Amendment decision establishing

the factual prerequisite for a stop-and-frisk. By this injunction, that standard is borrowed from the

Fourth Amendment and incorporated as a protection against investigation of First Amendment

conduct. Similar commencement standards are stated for the other types of investigations.

(c) Any investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct requires a written executive authorization specifically stating the grounds for the investigation (Section 3.1.4).

(d) Another basic requirement applicable to all investigations directed toward First Amendment conduct is that First Amendment information must be entirely left out of the investigative process, "unless it is so necessary to and inseparable from the purpose of the investigation that its gathering and retention cannot be avoided" (Section 3.1.1).

(e) Where investigative activity cannot entirely avoid First Amendment conduct, the impact upon First Amendment conduct must be consciously minimized (Section 3.1.2). This means, for example, that the least intrusive methods of investigative activity must be used in connection with First Amendment conduct.

(f) All investigations directed toward First Amendment conduct have a limited time period, and must be terminated when that time period expires or when the initial reason for the investigation no longer exists. If the investigation is to be continued beyond its original term, a new written authorization must be obtained (Section 3.1.5).

(g) There are strict limitations on dissemination by the police of First Amendment information (Section 3.1.6). In substance, such information may be disseminated only to a person conducting a criminal investigation based on reasonable suspicion of crime, or for a court proceeding.

(h) The injunction also contains limitations on the use of intrusive methods (Section 3.6). To note only some of the most important provisions in this part of the injunction, the use of any intrusive method must be specifically authorized by a police executive in writing; a judicial warrant must be obtained for any nonconsensual seizure of First Amendment information; and any infiltration must be personally approved in writing by the Superintendent of Police and no references except incidental references to any First Amendment information may be gathered by an infiltration (Section 3.6.3.3).

14. All of city government is subject to the same restrictions as Part 3 of the City of Chicago Settlement imposes upon the Police Department.

15. In addition to provisions for internal implementation and monitoring of the City of Chicago Settlement by city government, there is also a provision for an independent audit by a national independent public accounting firm. Such audits are to be conducted in 1982, 1984 and thereafter at intervals of not more than five years, with the audit report to be made public. The auditors are to have access to all relevant data in the possession of the City of Chicago. In addition, there is provision that any violation of the judgment is to be discussed in the audit reports.

Any substantial violation of the injunction must be investigated by the City of Chicago, with a report concerning the investigation to be presented to the Police Board.
16. More important than any internal enforcement mechanism, of course, is the character of the settlement as an 551 injunction *551 enforceable by the Court. Jurisdiction is explicitly retained by the Court (part II) for enforcement of
compliance with the injunction. The enforcement provision is taken verbatim from the Consent Decree in Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, et al., entered May 15, 1972 and reprinted at 481 F.Supp. 1356 (N.D.Ill.). Application to enforce the Settlement may be presented "by any person affected by the conduct complained of.".
17. No judicial decision or legislative enactment regarding intelligence activities by any governmental entity has been cited to the Court, and the Court is aware of none, which is as protective of citizens' First Amendment rights as is the proposed City of Chicago Settlement.
18. The legal protections conferred upon the plaintiff classes by the proposed City of Chicago Settlement not only correspond well with the relief sought in the complaints, they also go far beyond the legal relief plaintiffs would likely have obtained if the cases had gone to trial. Counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the City of Chicago defendants all recognized that the Court would not likely have entered such a detailed and restrictive injunction following trial, assuming plaintiffs prevailed. Indeed, the Court is aware of no permanent judicial declaration or injunction ever entered against City of Chicago intelligence activities, even on behalf of a single litigant, much less in a class action.
19. The law with respect to government spying and intelligence activities is largely unsettled. See generally, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). Indeed, as recently as December 1980, the City of Chicago asserted before this Court the legal position that the Constitution and the case law do not prohibit governmental surveillance of any First Amendment activity as distinguished from preventing or interfering with such activity.
20. Absent the proposed settlement, plaintiffs' proof of their case at trial would have encountered a number of difficulties, some of which, in other litigation involving similar issues, have seriously hampered or proved fatal to proof of the plaintiffs' case. These include the risk that the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief would have been denied as moot.
21. Also, there was the risk that even if the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, and their claims for injunctive relief were held not moot, the Court might nonetheless decline to issue an injunction, or might issue an injunction less protective of their rights than the provisions of the proposed settlement. The City of Chicago defendants have made plain their intention to contend at trial that the Chicago Police Department should not be run by injunction. See, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
22. In sum, with respect to the first factor as it applies to the City of Chicago Settlement, the amount offered in the City of Chicago Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate when balanced against the strength of plaintiffs' case on the merits against the City of Chicago defendants.
23. The Department of Defense Settlement agreement provides the plaintiffs with a portion of relief they sought in this litigation. (Paragraph references that follow are to the Department of Defense Settlement, Appendix II to this Memorandum Opinion and Order.) Paragraph 3.3 of the Department of Defense Settlement incorporates provisions of certain statutes, executive orders and internal Department of Defense regulations. Although some of these provisions may be modified by future legislative action or Presidential Executive Orders, and others may be modified by written Department of Defense regulations, guidelines and procedures, the settlement incorporates "the principle that no information shall be acquired about a person or organization solely because of that person's or organization's lawful exercise of First Amendment rights" (¶ 3.4(c)).
24. This principle is made permanent and legally enforceable by the Department of Defense Settlement. Under 552 the provisions of paragraph 3.4(c), future Department of Defense regulations, guidelines, *552 procedures and
conduct relating to the use of investigative techniques described in paragraph 3.3 must comply with this principle. Under paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2, "any of the terms" of the settlement, including this principle, may be enforced by a petition in this Court "for an appropriate order to enforce the Stipulation."

25. In short, the principle of paragraph 3.4(c), together with the enforcement provisions of paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the Department of Defense Settlement, addresses one of the purposes of these class actions against the Department of Defense defendants, in that it articulates a legally enforceable prohibition on Department of Defense utilization of investigative techniques directed solely against lawful First Amendment activities.
26. Although less fundamental than this principle, the Department of Defense settlement places the following additional limitations on Department of Defense utilization of investigative techniques directed against United States persons not employed by the Department of Defense:
(a) Electronic surveillance in the City of Chicago must comply with the Constitution and applicable federal statutes. (¶ 3.3(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811). These statutes, of course, can be amended only by legislative action.
(b) Unlawful unconsented physical searches, unlawful entries, and unlawful disruption or harassment of lawful activities of United States persons for intelligence purposes in Chicago are prohibited (¶ 3.3(b)). This prohibition cannot be lifted by the Department of Defense (¶ 3.4(c)). It can be lifted only by a statute or by a Presidential Executive Order "specifically authorizing or directing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military service, or their subordinates to utilize any investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.3" (¶ 3.4(a) and (b)).
(c) The provisions of statutes, Presidential Executive Orders and Department of Defense and military service regulations apply to the following types of intelligence conduct in the City of Chicago by Department of Defense agents: physical or photographic surveillance of United States persons not employed by the Department of Defense; covert participation in any organization; acquisition, dissemination or storage of information about United States persons not employed by the Department of Defense; and the provision of services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Chicago Police Department, except for emergency assistance as part of disaster relief (¶ 3.3(c)).
27. The legal protections conferred upon the plaintiff classes by the Department of Defense Settlement compare well with the legal relief plaintiffs would likely have obtained if the cases had gone to trial. Counsel for the plaintiffs candidly stated that by the Department of Defense Settlement they did not obtain all that they desired to obtain. Counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the Department of Defense defendants all recognized that the plaintiffs' cases against the Department of Defense defendants contained evidentiary and legal weaknesses. Those infirmities have been considered by the Court in determining the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Department of Defense Settlement. After evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs' case, and what the plaintiffs did receive and did not receive in the settlement agreement, the Court concludes that what was obtained in the Department of Defense Settlement agreement fairly reflects the potential strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs' case on the merits against the Department of Defense defendants.
28. Absent the proposed Department of Defense Settlement, plaintiffs' proof of their case against the Department of Defense defendants at trial would have been difficult, as plaintiffs' counsel candidly concede. There was a risk that important evidence would have been impossible to find because of internal Defense Department purges of 553 domestic intelligence information *553 from its files, or because of evidentiary privileges such as the "state secrets" privilege, which Department of Defense defendants have already successfully asserted in this litigation. American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir.1979), after rehrng. en banc, 619 F.2d 1170 (1980) .
29. Also, there was the risk that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of Defense defendants would have been denied as moot. See Halkin v. Helms, No. 75-1773 (D.D.C. 1980), affirmed, Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.1982). The Department of Defense defendants have already made plain their intention to assert this defense, and there is at least some evidence to support it (¶¶ 2.1 and 2.2). It is noteworthy that despite extensive pretrial discovery, plaintiffs did not receive any Department of Defense domestic intelligence files or records which originated after 1971, several years prior to the filing of plaintiffs' claims against the Department of Defense defendants.

30. In sum, with respect to the first factor as applied to the Department of Defense Settlement, the amount offered in the Department of Defense Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate when balanced against the strength of plaintiffs' case on the merits against the Department of Defense defendants.
Factor 2: Defendants' Ability to Pay
31. Since the claims of plaintiff classes are only for declaratory and injunctive relief, this factor is not relevant here. Cf. Armstrong, supra, 471 F.Supp. at 805.
Factor 3: Complexity, Length and Expense of Further Litigation
32. The Court has already found that it is very likely that further litigation, absent the proposed settlements, would be extremely complex, lengthy and expensive. The reasons for this conclusion 0907 the factual breadth of these cases, the number and difficulty of legal issues they pose, and the sharply adversary relation of the parties and history of the litigation 0907 need no further elaboration.
Factor 4: Amount of Opposition to the Settlement
33. The Court may approve a fair settlement over objections by some or many class members, and even despite criticism by some named plaintiffs. Armstrong, 471 F.Supp. at 804; 616 F.2d at 326.
34. The number of objectors here is not large under any standard, but particularly given the many thousands of plaintiff class members who received notice, the unsettled nature of some of the relevant law, and the depth of antagonism between many of the plaintiff class members and the settling defendants. Indeed, the amount of opposition by class members here is much less than that in Armstrong, where 45 persons testified at the fairness hearing and numerous others sent in written statements, "most to express their dissatisfaction with the settlement," which was nonetheless approved as fair. 616 F.2d at 326; 471 F.Supp. at 805.
35. Moreover, most of the objections here, as in Armstrong, although "thoughtful and informative," are also "somewhat misinformed," both in their understanding of the proposed settlements and as to the state of the relevant law. 616 F.2d at 326, quoting 417 F.Supp. at 812. Based upon the written comments received by the Court and upon hearing the presentations of the attorneys and individuals who spoke at the hearing, it was readily apparent to the Court that many of those individuals who spoke were not familiar with the details of the proposed settlements. Some comments appeared to be based more on opposition to any agreement with the government, than on a specific assessment of these proposed settlements. Also, while certain of the objectors were clearly well informed and forceful in their objections, they were persons, or counsel for persons, who were litigating in other unresolved cases concerning either similar issues, the same defendants, or both.
Factor 5: Presence of Collusion in Reaching a Settlement
36. No suggestion of collusion has been made, nor, on this record, would any such suggestion be credible.
554 *554 Factor 6: Reaction of Members of the Class to the Settlement
37. The law in this Circuit as implied in Armstrong is that the Court must consider all objections, but need not state individualized findings with respect to each of them. 616 F.2d at 326, 471 F.Supp. at 812-13. However, the Court's reasoning must be stated "with particular clarity." 616 F.2d at 319. In light of this last admonition, and the case law elsewhere requiring a reasoned response on the record to all objections of substance and some explicit statement concerning all objections, Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1976), the Court will discuss all objections of substance. Objections which were made to both the City of

Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements are discussed first; then objections made to the City of Chicago Settlement only; and finally objections made to the Department of Defense Settlement only.
38. Findings and Admissions. Some objectors argue that both the City of Chicago and the Department of Defense Settlements make no findings and contain no admissions of wrongdoing by the City of Chicago, the Department of Defense, or their agents. But the essential purpose of a settlement is to avoid adjudication of the lawfulness or propriety of conduct which is the subject of allegations of the complaint. It would defeat an important purpose of settlement, and therefore render settlements less attractive to the parties, if the settlement agreement were required to include admissions of wrongdoing by the defendants, or if the Court itself made such findings in connection with a proposed settlement. Such a procedure would constitute an unwarranted interference by the Court in the efforts of the parties to resolve their differences short of adjudication of the allegations of the complaint.
39. Alleged Continuing Abuses. Allegations have been made that both the Chicago Police Department and the Department of Defense continue to engage in some of the practices alleged in the complaints. The Court, of course, expresses no opinion on the substance of these allegations. However, if true, such facts would argue for approving the settlements, not disapproving them. If such alleged practices continue after the settlements are approved, any person affected can present his or her claim to the Court for a ruling on whether the activities in question are improper under the Settlements. If they are, the complainant may obtain an appropriate order, including enforcement of the terms of the settlements.
40. Vagueness. It is objected that the provisions of the City of Chicago Settlement are so vague as to render it a sham. The Court does not agree. The City of Chicago Settlement is, in fact, remarkably detailed and specific. The ambiguities which do exist in the potential applications of these provisions arise from the fact that they are, for good reasons, worded in general terms. Plaintiffs' central claims are constitutional in nature. Like any legal restrictions grounded in constitutional values, it is appropriate that the remedial provisions of the settlement be generally framed to some extent. They are meant to govern a great variety of specific situations, many of which cannot now be foreseen, over an extended period of time. Moreover, the proposed City of Chicago Settlement resolves class actions, the comprehensive scope of which embraces a great variety of City of Chicago practices. Generally worded restrictions are probably indispensable to the settlement of such lawsuits. The alternative 0907 attempting to agree in advance on a wide variety of specific questions in hypothetical settings 0907 is neither practical nor necessarily wise.
41. The presentations of the parties at the fairness hearing demonstrate that they would not necessarily agree on all possible applications of the language of the provisions in the abstract or in hypothetical cases. However, both sides have agreed to submit to enforcement by the Court, if and when specific disagreements arise in concrete cases in the future. Having examined the language of the City of Chicago Settlement, as well as the various 555 questions *555 raised and views expressed concerning the possible interpretations, the Court is confident that in the context of concrete cases, it will be able to perform the judicial function of reasonably interpreting the language to accomplish the purpose of the document as a whole. As the Court made clear at the October 16 hearing, the parties' various interpretations of the principles are not binding. All that is binding now is the language of the document; the only binding interpretations will be made later, by the Court, in the context of real disputes.
42. Mislabeling of Political Investigations. Some objectors argue that the Chicago police can evade the terms of the City of Chicago injunction by simply labeling a political intelligence investigation as a criminal, dignitary protection, public gathering or regulatory investigation. They are wrong. The injunction does not turn on labels. For example, in order to carry out a criminal, dignitary protection, or regulatory investigation that is directed to First Amendment conduct, the police must satisfy appropriate objective standards regarding the investigation's origins and purposes (see Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.5.1). In a case of disputed investigation, the Court, not the police, will determine whether the investigation complies with the injunction.
43. Overbroad Criminal Investigations. Some objectors maintain that the City of Chicago injunction permits unlimited spying and disruption against anyone who has ever engaged in civil disobedience or other unlawful political activity. The Court finds that the injunction does provide fair, reasonable, and appropriate protection to such individuals from overbroad criminal investigations. See Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of the injunction.

44. Disruption. Some objectors argue that the City of Chicago Settlement does not prohibit all unlawful disruption activities, such as the type alleged to have occurred in the FBI's COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program). The Court does not agree. Section 2.2 of the Settlement states that "No agency or agent of the City of Chicago shall disrupt, interfere with or harass any person because of the person's First Amendment conduct." Section 3.1.2.1 requires the City of Chicago "to take every reasonable precaution to avoid gathering information about, or interfering with, First Amendment conduct, and when it cannot be avoided to follow a conscious course of conduct that reduces, as much as possible, the impact on First Amendment conduct."
45. Authorization of Illegal Activity. Some objectors assert that the City of Chicago Settlement authorizes or legitimizes future police misconduct of the type alleged in these lawsuits. Such concerns are based on a misreading of the Settlement. The purpose and effect of the City of Chicago Settlement is to forbid political spying and harassment, not to support it. The Settlement does not declare the lawfulness of any investigative or intelligence procedure. Because something is not restricted or prevented by the injunction does not mean that it is lawful 0907 only that it is not dealt with in this decree.
46. Furthermore, all persons affected retain their full rights to challenge any future misconduct by the City or its agents either under this agreed injunction or in a separate lawsuit or other appropriate proceeding.
47. "United States Persons." With respect to the Department of Defense Settlement, it is objected that certain provisions of that Settlement protect only "United States persons," defined to include United States citizens, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, unincorporated associations organized in the United States or substantially composed of United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and corporations incorporated in the United States (¶ 6.3). Objectors express concern that because of this definition, some portion of the plaintiff classes is left without protection.
48. As a practical matter, persons not lawfully or permanently admitted to residence in this country are covered by 556 the settlements when their activities are through groups organized in this country, *556 since "United States
persons" include all unincorporated associations "organized" in this country and all corporations incorporated here. To the extent individual aliens not lawfully or permanently admitted to residence, and not acting through groups, are not covered by the principles, this distinction reflects the greater uncertainty in the law with respect to the legal rights of such persons. See generally Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980), and cases cited therein.[2]
49. Moreover, non-"United States persons," even when not acting through groups which are themselves "United States persons," are nonetheless protected by several provisions of the Department of Defense Settlement. Electronic surveillance of them must be "in accordance with the Constitution and applicable federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976) and 5 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. II 1978)" (¶ 3.3(a)). They are protected by the ban on "unlawful uncontested physical searches" (¶ 3.3(b)); the ban on "any `unlawful entries' that constitutes searches under the Fourth Amendment" (Id.); the requirement that Defense Department infiltration of organizations comply with applicable laws, regulations and guidelines (¶ 3.3(c)(2)); the ban on intelligence assistance by the Department of Defense to the Chicago Police Department (¶ 3.3(c)(4)); and the requirement that investigative techniques comply with the Constitution (¶ 3.4(c)). All of these requirements may be enforced by any non-United States person who is "a member of the plaintiff classes" (¶ 5.1).
50. Disruption and Harassment. Some objectors argue that the Department of Defense Settlement does not declare that Department of Defense disruption and "neutralization" activities are unconstitutional, and does not unequivocally ban such activities. In fact, however, the Settlement does provide that the Secretary of Defense and his agents "shall not conduct in the City of Chicago for intelligence purposes ... any unlawful disruption or harassment of lawful activities of any United States person" (¶ 3.3(b)). Since the Secretary of Defense has refused, as is common in settlement agreements, to admit that he or his agents have engaged in any of the conduct alleged in the complaint (¶ 1.1), it would be wholly inappropriate for the Court to make findings or conclusions concerning the constitutionality of such alleged activity. Moreover, since the Department of Defense Settlement prohibits "any unlawful disruption or harassment of the lawful activities of any United States person," it is left for the Court to determine, in the context of a future enforcement action, what disruption or harassment is "unlawful."

51. Future Modifications of the Joint Stipulation. Some objectors argue that all of the protections of the Department of Defense Settlement may be superseded by unilateral Department of Defense action. This is incorrect. Statutory protections can be changed only by Congress and Executive Orders can be changed only by the President. Furthermore, any changes in departmental, service or agency regulation, guideline or other procedure, as permitted by paragraph 3.4(c) of the Department of Defense Settlement, must be in accordance with "the principle that no information shall be acquired about a person or organization solely because of that person's or organization's lawful exercise of First Amendment rights and shall not be contrary to any applicable federal statutes or the United States Constitution." (¶ 3.4(c)). Plaintiffs, of course, remain free to challenge any such future modifications on the grounds that they are not consistent with the Constitution, applicable federal 557 statutes, *557 or the restriction of the Department of Defense Settlement just quoted. At the fairness hearing, plaintiffs' attorneys expressed their willingness to mount such challenges in appropriate cases. They also conceded to the Court that while the modification provisions of the Department of Defense Settlement were not as favorable to plaintiffs as those in the settlements with the FBI and the CIA, this difference was accounted for by plaintiffs' weaker case against the Department of Defense defendants.
52. Enforcement. The enforcement standards and procedures (¶¶ 5.1, 5.2) are said to place an unreasonable burden on members of the plaintiff class. In fact, under the Department of Defense Settlement enforcement is triggered by a threshold finding of "reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the terms of the Stipulation has occurred or is occurring" (¶ 5.1). The purpose of this "reasonable grounds" standard is to prevent frivolous or harassing enforcement petitions; both the purpose and the language chosen to accomplish it are fair, adequate and reasonable. If, after hearing, the Court finds "a pattern of substantial non-compliance or a serious intentional non-compliance" it may make "such order as it deems just and necessary to ensure future compliance with the Joint Stipulation" (¶ 5.2). This language, too, reflects a fair, adequate and reasonable compromise, which permits civil enforcement of the Department of Defense Settlement without subjecting the Department of Defense to court orders based on minor or technical violations.
53. Geographic Scope. The objectors criticize the Department of Defense Settlement because its geographic scope is restricted to the corporate limits of the City of Chicago. However, the definition of the plaintiff classes was limited to persons located at various times in the City of Chicago. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the Department of Defense to decline to agree to a settlement which imposed restrictions on Defense Department conduct beyond the geographic scope covered by the allegations of the complaint and the class definition approved by this Court.
54. Inadequate Restrictions. One objector objected that the Department of Defense Settlement does not impose a total ban on Department of Defense domestic intelligence activities, similar to the Central Intelligence Agency settlement approved earlier by this Court. Any greater restriction on domestic intelligence activities by the Central Intelligence Agency is merely a reflection of the fact that while the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403, specifically bars the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising any law enforcement or internal security functions, no comparable statutory ban exists in the case of the Department of Defense.
55. Superseding Regulations Unavailable. One opponent of the Department of Defense Settlement objected at the fairness hearing that some of the Department of Defense directives which, under paragraph 3.4 of the Settlement, might supersede restrictions on Department of Defense domestic intelligence activities might be classified, and that persons seeking to enforce the Department of Defense Settlement would thus never learn of the existence of such directives. This argument apparently refers to paragraph 3.5 of the Settlement which entitles any class member upon request to be provided a copy "of the unclassified portions of any then existing procedures" which would modify the protections in paragraph 3.3. This objection is not a grounds for disapproval of the Department of Defense Settlement for two reasons. First, the prohibitions on Department of Defense domestic intelligence activities contained in paragraph 3.3 of the Settlement are public, and would be enforced by the Court unless and until the Court became convinced that those provisions had been modified by some written Department of Defense directive or other authority described in paragraph 3.4 of that Settlement. Thus, the burden would be on the Department of Defense to justify to the Court, as authorized by written Defense 558 Department directive of the type described in paragraph *558 3.4, any course of conduct in conflict with the prohibitions in paragraph 3.3. Second, even if classified documents allegedly modifying terms of the Department

of Defense Settlement are not produced pursuant to a paragraph 3.5 request, they can be reviewed by the Court in camera to determine if they do, in fact, supersede the Settlement as claimed.
56. Court Supervision Intermittent. It was objected at the fairness hearing that judicial supervision of Department of Defense domestic intelligence activities in Chicago would be only "intermittent and cursory." This Court is not a super-Defense Department, and the Department of Defense Settlement is not intended to make it so. The Court's function under the Settlement is limited to adjudicating charges of violations of the Settlement. The Court is not responsible for permanent and continuing supervision of all aspects of Defense Department intelligence activities in the City of Chicago. Such a responsibility would be an insupportable burden which this Court would not undertake, even if it could.
57. Reports of Non-Compliance. It was objected that internal Department of Defense reports on compliance with its own regulations restricting domestic intelligence activities by military authorities could be "censored" by Department of Defense officials. This was apparently a reference to reports described in paragraphs 5.3 and 5.4 of the Department of Defense Settlement made by the Inspector Generals and General Counsels of the Department of Defense and the military services to identify unlawful or improper domestic intelligence activities. Under the terms of the Settlement, the Department of Defense may exclude from such reports the identities of persons providing information under a promise of confidentiality and may summarize, rather than producing verbatim, portions of such reports which are classified. Such a summary must be accompanied by a declaration under penalty of perjury that the summary is as accurate and complete as it can be without disclosing the information which the classification was intended to protect (¶ 5.4). These provisions are a reasonable compromise between the plaintiffs' interest in monitoring Department of Defense compliance with its own regulations, and the Department of Defense's interest in protecting the identity of legitimate intelligence sources and maintaining the security of intelligence methods. The Court finds these provisions to be fair, adequate and reasonable.
58. No Sanctions for Prohibited Conduct. Another objection was that the Department of Defense Settlement contains no sanctions against either the Department of Defense or its agents if they engage in conduct which is prohibited by the Settlement. The Settlement does provide in paragraph 5.2 that the Court may "make such order as it deems just and necessary to ensure future compliance with the Joint Stipulation," whenever it finds that a pattern of substantial non-compliance or a serious intentional non-compliance with the Joint Stipulation has occurred or is occurring (¶ 5.2). Since the Department of Defense Settlement is the product of a negotiated settlement of plaintiffs' claims, and not a criminal statute or an administrative regulation, the authorization to the Court to enter orders which are, of course, enforceable by the usual means is an appropriate sanction.
59. In summary, for the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that none of the various objections raised to the City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements, either alone or taken together, raises any serious question as to the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of those settlements.
Factor 7: Opinion of Competent Counsel
60. The Court is "entitled to rely heavily on the opinion of competent counsel." Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 325. Counsel for the participating plaintiffs, for the City of Chicago, defendants, and for the Department of Defense 559 defendants all spoke in favor of the proposed settlements. They stated that the suits were difficult and complex, *559 that the negotiating process had been difficult and at arms length, and that the proposed Settlements provided a fair, reasonable and adequate disposition of these actions. All of those counsel stated that the Settlements, like any settlement, involved concessions on both sides which made final agreement possible. The Court has found that counsel for the parties participating in the settlements are highly competent, and relies in part on their strong endorsement of the proposed settlements.
Factor 8: Stage of Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed
61. The proposed City of Chicago Settlement was entered into when massive discovery was substantially complete. Plaintiffs' and defendants' draft final pretrial materials had been served, and both sides were fairly

apprised of the facts likely to be adduced at trial, and fairly enabled to assess the likely outcome of trial. Plaintiffs' discovery against the Department of Defense defendants had progressed far enough to provide plaintiffs and their counsel with a reasonable idea of the type of evidence which might be available to them at a trial on the merits. In addition, plaintiffs had the benefit of other information concerning the nature and extent of Department of Defense domestic intelligence activities since 1971 to permit them to make a reasonable evaluation of the terms of the proposed Department of Defense Settlement.
Factor 9: Whether the Settlement Initiates or Authorizes Illegal Conduct
62. A fair settlement may not initiate or authorize any illegal conduct. However, the Court must not decide unsettled legal questions. Any illegality or unconstitutionality must appear "as a legal certainty on the face of the agreement." Further, the conduct must be illegal "as a general rule," according to the state of the law at the time the settlement is presented to the District Court for approval. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 319-322. No illegal or unconstitutional conduct is authorized by either of the proposed settlements.
Conclusion
63. Considering all of the foregoing findings and conclusions, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that the City of Chicago and the Department of Defense Settlements are fair, reasonable and adequate, and accordingly that they should be, and hereby are, approved by this Court.
64. Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby expressly finds that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs the entry of final judgment upon all of the claims which are resolved by the proposed settlement agreements. Proponents of the City of Chicago and Department of Defense Settlements shall submit to the Court separate proposed forms of Judgment Order.
AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
The named plaintiffs in these two actions (who are listed in Appendix A) having filed their complaints herein, and said plaintiffs (on behalf of themselves and the classes they represent herein as determined by previous Orders of Court and set out in Appendix B) and the City of Chicago defendants (named in Appendix C) having consented to the entry of this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree as to such parties, without trial and without adjudication of any allegation in the complaints or any issue of fact with respect to the alleged commission by said defendants of any unconstitutional, unlawful or wrongful act, and without this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree constituting evidence of or an admission by any defendant with respect to any issue of fact herein or the commission of any unconstitutional, unlawful or wrongful act;
This Court having jurisdiction of the parties to this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree and of the subject matter of these actions under Sections 1331 and 1343(3) of Title 28 of the United States Code; and,
560 *560 The parties to this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree having agreed upon the following general principles which govern the constitutional protection of individual rights, the law enforcement duties of the City defendants, and City policy concerning First Amendment conduct:
A. Purpose of the Statement of Principles.
By this statement of principles, it is not the intent of the parties to make a complete statement of the applicable constitutional and state law as it has been interpreted by the courts; but it is the intent, by this joint statement, to manifest the strong agreement of the parties on principles which

govern their conduct, in the expectation that as the general principles are accepted and understood, the day-to-day pattern of conduct will more readily conform to the principles.
B. Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights.
1. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the rights of a person to freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition and religion, including without limitation the rights to hold, communicate and receive ideas and beliefs, to speak and dissent freely, to associate for the advancement of litigation, to write and publish, to advocate and organize concerning public policy and social issues and to associate publicly and privately with other persons concerning political and social issues.
2. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the rights of a person to be secure in person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right to be secure in communications which are engaged in with reasonable expectation of privacy. This Amendment protects the innocent and the guilty alike against governmental intrusion not justified by an appropriate governmental interest or function.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to a person equal treatment under the law unless an appropriate governmental interest or function justifies an exception.
C. The Importance of Effective Law Enforcement.
1. It is the duty of the Chicago Police Department to aggressively enforce the penal and regulatory laws of the State of Illinois and ordinances of the City of Chicago. The Department must apprehend persons who have violated the criminal law and must, by lawful means, anticipate and endeavor to prevent the commission of crime.
2. It is the duty of the Chicago Police Department to protect the physical safety of visiting public officials and other dignitaries.
3. It is the duty of the Chicago Police Department in connection with public gatherings to maintain the public peace by enforcing the regulatory statutes and ordinances of the State and City and to protect the exercise of Constitutional rights of all persons.
4. It is the duty of the City of Chicago and its Police Department to respect, to affirmatively protect and to minimize interference with the Constitutional rights of all persons.
D. City Policies Concerning First Amendment Conduct.
1. No investigation shall be conducted for political, religious or personal reasons. First Amendment information may be gathered only for valid governmental purposes in accordance with this Judgment.
2. No person shall be prejudiced in dealings with government because of, nor disrupted in the exercise of, the person's political beliefs, associations or other First Amendment conduct.
3. All employees and agents assigned to or engaged in investigative activity shall be trained and supervised to perform their duties in accordance with the law.
NOW, THEREFORE, upon consent of the parties and approval of the court, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
561 *561 I. PERMANENT INJUNCTION
The City of Chicago, the City defendants, their officers, employees and agents, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Judgment, are hereby permanently enjoined as follows:

1. SUMMARY OF THE SCOPE OF THIS JUDGMENT; BASIC DEFINITION.[*]

1.1 The principal provisions of this Judgment apply only to investigative activity (as defined in 1.2 below p. 10) that is directed toward First Amendment conduct (as defined in 1.3-1.5 below p.10).

1.1.1 This Judgment does not apply to investigative activity that is not directed toward First Amendment conduct or that merely includes incidental references to such conduct. It is the expectation of the parties, for example, that the great majority of police activity (e.g., investigation of property crimes, personal violence, narcotics and gambling, as well as routine patrol and onview enforcement action) will not be affected by this Judgment.

1.1.2 This Judgment prohibits any investigation of First Amendment conduct in the absence of one of the valid governmental purposes specified herein (e.g., criminal investigation) and also prohibits investigation or disruption of a person because of the person's First Amendment conduct. It is the expectation of the parties, for example, that systematic investigation and record keeping about political and social action organizations unrelated to criminal conduct is prohibited by this Judgment.

1.1.3 This Judgment permits, but regulates, investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct in the course of performing a valid governmental function specified herein. The regulatory provisions of the Judgment are intended to permit functions such as criminal investigations (including investigations of criminal activity in furtherance of political goals) to be conducted effectively while controlling and limiting their impact on First Amendment conduct. The regulatory provisions generally require that investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct have a valid purpose, a reasonable factual basis and supervisory authorization; that the impact on First Amendment conduct be minimized; and that the retention and dissemination of First Amendment information be strictly limited.

1.1.4 This Judgment acknowledges the propriety of criminal intelligence investigations as a law enforcement technique, including the collection, analysis and dissemination of information about systematic criminal conduct. This Judgment applies to such investigations only when they are directed toward First Amendment conduct.

1.1.5 This Judgment does not address or affect the use of covert police investigative techniques, such as informants, except when such techniques are directed toward First Amendment conduct.

1.2 Investigative activity means the collection of information by any means, including its acquisition from another agency or from another unit within the same agency, or the recording, filing, retention, indexing or dissemination of information.

1.3 Investigative activity is directed toward First Amendment conduct when it does or foreseeably will (other than by incidental reference):

1.3.1 include the collection or handling of information about First Amendment conduct;

1.3.2 have as a subject or target a person who is actively and substantially engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity relates to that conduct; or

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*562 1.3.3 interfere with First Amendment conduct.

1.4 Investigative activity is not directed toward First Amendment conduct merely because it includes relevant incidental references to First Amendment conduct. An incidental reference is an occasional or isolated reference to First Amendment conduct where:

1.4.1 the conduct is not itself a significant issue in or focus of an investigation; and
1.4.2 the reference is relevant to the law enforcement purpose of the investigative activity.
Examples of incidental references include information that a community organization was a burglary victim, information that a person reasonably suspected of narcotics crimes might be found at a certain church or political organization, or a name and address index maintained by a police or other city official of persons dealt with in the course of overt community relations activity or a file of correspondence with such persons concerning such activity.
1.5 First Amendment conduct means conduct protected by the rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States to freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition and religion, including but not limited to the following rights:
1.5.1 the right to hold ideas or beliefs concerning public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious matters;
1.5.2 the right to communicate or receive such ideas or beliefs, publicly or privately, orally, in writing or by symbolic means;
1.5.3 the right to associate and assemble publicly or privately with other persons concerning ideas or beliefs about public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious matters (but not a right to associate or assemble for purposes unrelated to the right to hold and express such ideas or beliefs);
1.5.4 the right to advocate, for purposes related to such ideas or beliefs, "the use of force or of law violation, except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless conduct and is likely to incite or produce such action," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); with respect to the above, it is the duty of the Chicago Police Department, when it learns of an instance of such advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, to make prudent and reasonable inquiry to determine whether it is an exercise of the expression of ideas only or whether it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless conduct and likely to incite or produce such action; this inquiry shall be conducted in accordance with § 3.2.5;
1.5.5 the right to advocate alternative systems of government;
1.5.6 the right to petition the government or governmental officials for redress of grievances; and,
1.5.7 the right to associate for the purpose of seeking and giving legal advice as well as advancing litigation.
1.6 First Amendment information means information about a person's First Amendment conduct.
2. PROHIBITIONS THAT APPLY TO ALL AGENCIES OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO.
No agency or agent of the City of Chicago shall:
2.1 investigate or prosecute a person, solely because of the person's First Amendment conduct, or selectively for political, religious, or personal reasons (except as permitted by law in the discipline of public employees);
2.2 disrupt, interfere with or harass any person because of the person's First Amendment conduct;
2.3 gather any First Amendment information by intrusive methods except pursuant to Part 3.6 of this Order (p. 27), or by illegal methods, or receive or maintain information so gathered by others;
563

*563 2.4 authorize, assist or encourage any person to violate this Order, or to commit an act that would violate this Order if committed by a City agent; or,
2.5 conduct any investigation, or maintain any file or file system, directed toward First Amendment conduct that the Police Department may not conduct or maintain under the provisions of Part 3 of this Judgment.
3. POLICE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS.
Police Department employees and agents may engage in investigative activity directed toward First Amendment conduct ONLY in a criminal, dignitary protection, public gathering or regulatory investigation that is conducted in compliance with Part 3 of this Judgment.
3.1 Basic Procedures for Investigations. In every criminal, dignitary protection, public gathering or regulatory investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct:
3.1.1 First Amendment information shall not be gathered nor become part of any investigative file unless it is so necessary to and inseparable from the purpose of the investigation that its gathering and retention cannot be avoided. First Amendment information shall not be gathered which violates the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.
3.1.2 Minimization procedures shall be employed with respect to First Amendment conduct. Minimization means:
3.1.2.1 to take every reasonable precaution to avoid gathering information about, or interfering with, First Amendment conduct, and when it cannot be avoided to follow a conscious course of conduct that reduces, as much as possible, the impact on First Amendment conduct.
3.1.2.2 to use the least intrusive methods of effectively conducting investigative activity about First Amendment conduct.
3.1.2.3 For example, unless unavoidably necessary to the investigation of a reasonably suspected crime, no information shall be gathered about a political group to which a criminal suspect belongs or about other members of the group or about other persons attending political meetings where the suspect is present, including their identities, statements and photographs.
3.1.3 Intrusive Methods. No First Amendment information shall be gathered by intrusive methods, except in compliance with Part 3.6 (p. 27) of this Judgment.
3.1.4 Authorization. The investigation shall not be initiated unless authorized in writing by the Superintendent of Police, or by a member of his executive staff [i.e., Deputy Superintendents or Executive Assistants to the Superintendent] designated by him, in the following manner:
3.1.4.1 The written authorization shall specify in detail the factual basis for the investigation; the apparent criminal offense or other specific reason for the investigation; the person(s) to be investigated, if known; the investigative methods to be used; minimization measures to be employed; and the duration of investigation ([not to exceed 30 days]).
3.1.4.2 The investigation shall not be continued unless the executive reviews and reauthorizes it in the same manner at intervals of not more than [30 days].
3.1.5 Termination. The investigation shall be terminated when its written authorization expires or earlier when:
3.1.5.1 the standard under which it was initiated (e.g., reasonable suspicion of crime) is no longer met; or
3.1.5.2 its purpose has been achieved or the event to which it related (e.g., a public gathering) has taken place.

3.1.6 Security of all First Amendment information shall be strictly maintained. Security of information means that the unit collecting the information makes or permits no dissemination of the information whatsoever except:

564

*564 3.1.6.1 to a Chicago police officer conducting a criminal investigation in compliance with this

Judgment;

3.1.6.2 to a state or federal prosecutor who requests the information for a criminal prosecution;

3.1.6.3 in response to a subpoena;

3.1.6.4 to another governmental law enforcement agency upon its signed written request certifying that the information is needed in a criminal investigation based upon reasonable suspicion of crime, and only if such agency agrees to make no further dissemination of the information except in a criminal prosecution and to destroy or return it when no longer needed; or

3.1.6.5 to the subject of the information when required by legislation or when permitted by departmental policy.

For each dissemination, complete documentation shall be maintained, including the recipient, date, reason, and a copy of the information disseminated.

3.1.7 Purging. Upon completion or termination of an investigation, all information gathered shall be reviewed, and any First Amendment information (other than incidental references) shall be purged unless there exists reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and some nexus is established showing that the criminal activity is being sheltered under the guise of exercising First Amendment rights.

3.1.7.1 Purging of information means to remove it from all files or documents and place it in a sealed file. No one shall have access to such sealed files except for the purposes of auditing and enforcing compliance with this Judgment; such access shall be limited to persons specifically authorized by the Superintendent of Police, designated representatives of the Chicago Police Board, and persons acting under judicial authority.

3.1.7.2 On an [annual] basis, information in sealed files shall be transferred to a sealed retention file under the personal control of an executive designated by the Superintendent and there retained for [ten years] and then destroyed. The destruction may be delayed if the information is relevant to pending litigation. If the information is relevant to anticipated litigation either party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief.

3.2 Criminal Investigations Directed Toward First Amendment Conduct. Any criminal investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct must comply with Part 3.1 and also with the following:

3.2.1 It shall be conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal conduct that has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur.

3.2.2 It shall not be conducted unless there is reasonable suspicion[1] based on specific and articulable facts that the subject has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

3.2.3 No First Amendment information other than incidental references shall become part of any investigative file unless some nexus is established showing that criminal conduct is being sheltered under the guise of exercising First Amendment rights.

3.2.4 An investigation may be initiated without the executive authorization required by Section 3.1.4 (p. 16), but only if it does not continue more than [24 hours] without the review and written approval of the [section commander or equivalent] nor more than [72 hours] without the executive authorization. A report shall be submitted to the executive detailing the basis, purpose and

565

methods of the initial investigation and *565 any particulars in which it is, or has been, directed

toward First Amendment conduct. If the executive does not authorize an investigation in

accordance with 3.1.4, the report shall be purged.

3.2.5 When the police learn of the advocacy of the use of unlawful force or violence in furtherance of political, religious or other First Amendment ideas, the police may conduct a brief preliminary inquiry as follows:

3.2.5.1 The sole purpose of the inquiry shall be to determine whether the advocacy is an exercise of the expression of ideas only, or whether the advocacy is both 0907

0907 directed to inciting or producing imminent violent conduct, and,

0907 likely to incite or produce such action.

3.2.5.2 The inquiry shall follow the same procedures as set out in § 3.2.4: [section commander or equivalent] approval within [24 hours]; detailed report to a police executive within [72 hours]; and termination and purging unless the executive authorizes a full investigation based on reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur.

3.2.5.3 In making the inquiry whether there is a reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, the inquiry shall focus on whether there are facts indicating that the person is currently engaged in conduct preparing for the imminent use of force or violence. Ideological rhetoric is relevant but cannot be the sole basis for a full investigation or for repeated preliminary inquiries. A full investigation shall not be authorized of a person or group which only advocates the use of force without currently engaging in actions that make violence a credible threat.

3.3 Dignitary Protection Investigations. Any dignitary protection investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct must comply with Part 3.1 (p. 14), and also with the following:

3.3.1 It shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ensuring the physical safety of a visiting public official or other dignitary. It shall commence only after police learn of an anticipated visit, and shall cease upon the visitor's departure or upon notice that the visit will not occur.

3.3.2 A dignitary protection investigation that is directed toward First Amendment conduct shall not be conducted unless the appropriate police executive certifies in writing that there is a reasonable suspicion that the subject(s) of the investigation poses a threat to the physical safety of the dignitary. The certification shall detail the specific and articulable facts upon which the reasonable suspicion is based.

3.3.3 All dignitary protection investigations shall be supervised by one police unit designated by the Superintendent. Information gathered shall be kept by that unit in dignitary protection files separate from all other police investigative files.

3.3.4 Security of First Amendment information shall be maintained, except that information needed to ensure the dignitary's physical safety may be disseminated to the dignitary and to other law enforcement personnel assigned to protect the dignitary.

3.3.5 If the dignitary protection investigation uncovers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the information concerning that activity may be transferred to an appropriate police unit for a criminal investigation. If the criminal investigation is directed toward First Amendment conduct, it shall be conducted in accordance with Part 3.2.

3.3.6 Nothing in this Part 3 restricts the on-view enforcement activities of plain clothes officers in connection with dignitary protection.

3.4 Public Gathering Investigations. Any public gathering investigation must comply with Part 3.1 (p. 14), and also with the following:

566

*566 3.4.1 Definition. Public gathering means:

3.4.1.1 any gathering of persons in a public place, or in a place to which the public has reasonable access, for which a permit or notice to police or other government officials is required by legislation; or,

3.4.1.2 any march, demonstration, or rally in a public place, or in a place to which the public has reasonable access, that is reasonably likely to significantly affect traffic or public health or safety.

3.4.2 A public gathering investigation shall be conducted solely for the purposes of preventing substantial interference with traffic in the area contiguous to the public gathering, ensuring adequate public services to protect public health and safety in accordance with applicable penal and regulatory statutes and ordinances, and protecting the exercise of constitutional rights.

3.4.3 All public gathering investigations shall be supervised by one police unit designated by the Superintendent. Information gathered shall be kept in public gathering files separate from all other police investigative files.

3.4.4 A public gathering investigation may be initiated without the written authorization required by 3.1.4 (p. 16), but without such authorization may only:

3.4.4.1 gather published announcements of future public gatherings and permit applications in the form specified by City ordinance; and

3.4.4.2 communicate overtly with the organizers of the public gathering concerning the number of persons expected to participate and similar information about the time, place, and manner of the gathering that is necessary for the purposes stated in 3.4.2 above.

3.4.5 No further information may be gathered unless there is reasonable suspicion that the public gathering is likely to produce an imminent and substantial breach of the peace or riot or that the information on a permit application is false, and unless the further investigation is authorized pursuant to 3.1.4 (p. 16). The authorization shall certify the specific and articulable facts upon which the reasonable suspicion is based. The investigation shall not gather information about the identity of individual participants in the public gathering or about the content of the program unless there is compelling necessity to do so.

3.4.6 Security of all First Amendment information shall be maintained. However, it may be disseminated on a need-to-know basis to governmental agencies whose services will likely be needed or directly affected by the public gathering, provided they agree to make no further dissemination and to destroy the information within [30 days] after the gathering occurs.

3.4.7 If the public gathering investigation uncovers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the information concerning that activity may be transferred to an appropriate police unit for a criminal investigation. If the criminal investigation is directed toward First Amendment conduct, it shall be conducted in accordance with Part 3.2.

3.4.8 Police presence at a public gathering shall be no greater in nature and extent than reasonably necessary to enforce the criminal laws, to protect the exercise of constitutional rights, to prevent substantial interference with traffic and to protect the public health and safety in accordance with applicable penal and regulatory statutes and ordinances. The police presence shall be planned and organized to avoid discouraging persons from lawfully participating in the public gathering. The police presence may include plain clothes officers who are present solely for on-view enforcement purposes, as observers and not as participants except in the carrying out of authorized intrusive investigations under Part 3.6 (p. 27).

567 3.5 Regulatory Investigations. Any regulatory investigation that is directed toward *567 First Amendment conduct shall comply with §§ 3.1.109073.1.3 (p. 14), and with the following:
3.5.1 It shall be conducted solely for the purpose of fulfilling regulatory responsibilities as set forth by statute or ordinance (such as processing license applications or conducting traffic accident and missing person investigations).
3.5.2 The requirements of §§ 3.1.4 0907 3.1.7 (p. 16) do not apply where First Amendment information is incidental to the regulatory investigation, such as information that a church vehicle is involved in a traffic accident. However, these requirements must be complied with whenever First Amendment information is a significant focus of a regulatory investigation. In this event, security of First Amendment information shall be maintained.
3.6 Intrusive Methods.
3.6.1 Definitions. Intrusive method means any of the following:
3.6.1.1 An informant, which means an agent who collects information without disclosing to the source his function as an agent;
3.6.1.2 An infiltrator, which means an informant who is, or poses or acts as, a member or participant in a group or organization without disclosing to the group or organization and to its members his function as an agent;
3.6.1.3 electronic surveillance or eavesdropping of any kind;
3.6.1.4 a mail cover (acquiring information from the outside surface of mail);
3.6.1.5 a nonconsensual entry or seizure, which means an agent's entry onto a person's premises, or acquisition of a person's private papers, mail or effects or their contents, without a judicial warrant or the person's prior express consent given with knowledge of the agent's function as an agent. Private papers include all papers that a person has not made available to the general public.
3.6.2 A police investigation may use an intrusive method that is directed toward First Amendment conduct only under the following conditions:
3.6.2.1 Other methods are insufficient to effectively obtain information necessary to the investigation;
3.6.2.2 The police executive's written authorization under § 3.1.4 (p. 16) specifically permits the use of the intrusive method and explains why it is justified;
3.6.2.3 The details of the method's use, including all First Amendment information gathered, are fully documented for review;
3.6.2.4 Judicial warrants are obtained for any nonconsensual seizure of First Amendment information, including such seizures by informants and infiltrators;
3.6.2.5 The use of electronic surveillance or mail cover is in compliance with applicable state and federal statutes and regulations; and
3.6.2.6 Every informant or infiltrator is instructed as to the binding effect of the prohibitions of Part 2 (p. 13) and the duties under §§ 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 (p. 14) to avoid or minimize any impact on First Amendment conduct.
3.6.3 Infiltration of a group or organization engaged in First Amendment conduct is permitted only if it meets the requirements of 3.6.2, and in addition:

3.6.3.1 there exists reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur, and additional information from a reliable inside source is necessary to prevent serious injury to the public or to assure identification and apprehension of the persons engaging in criminal conduct.

3.6.3.2 the Superintendent of Police personally approves the infiltration in writing, by a certification

that particularly describes the group to be infiltrated; the crime which has been, is being or is

about to be committed by the group or its members; the reasons why it could not be prosecuted or

568

prevented *568 without the infiltration; and the minimization procedures to be used by the

infiltrator;

3.6.3.3 the scope and conduct of the infiltration is limited to the specific crime that is suspected, and no First Amendment information (other than incidental references) is gathered; and 3.6.3.4 the infiltration does not continue unless recertified by the Superintendent in the same manner as originally, at intervals of not more than [30 days].

3.6.4 While it is the intention of the parties that the requirements of this Part 3.6 be enforceable both as an injunction and through departmental discipline, it is not the intention of the parties that Part 3.6 create any right to the exclusion or suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecution.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS JUDGMENT

4.1 The Police Department shall adopt and maintain Department-wide administrative regulations implementing this Judgment (after notice to and consultation with counsel for the plaintiffs). The Department may modify such regulations from time to time, but only after reasonable notice to, and consultation with, the Chicago Police Board and counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights. All such regulations shall be consistent with this Judgment. Violations of such regulations, including by supervisory personnel, shall subject the violator to Departmental discipline.
4.2 All current employees of the Police Department, and all future employees at the time of their hiring, shall be served with a copy of this Judgment. Training with respect to the requirements of this Judgment and the implementing regulations shall be provided:
4.2.1 to new recruits as part of the Police Academy curriculum; and
4.2.2 on a continuing, in-service basis to personnel of the Bureaus of Inspectional, Investigative and Community Services, all district tactical units, and all other units likely to engage in investigative activity covered by this Judgment.
4.3 All employees of the City of Chicago shall be given notice of this Judgment once every five years, in the form of the summary attached hereto as Appendix D, through enclosure in pay envelopes or a similar method. New employees, at the time of their employment, shall be furnished with a copy of the same notice.
4.4 The Superintendent of Police shall annually conduct a departmental audit of the implementation of and compliance with this Judgment and the regulations adopted under § 4.1, and submit the audit report to the Mayor, the Police Board, and this Court for filing as a public record. The annual report shall include the number of authorizations issued under parts 3.209073.5, respectively; the number of infiltration approvals given under § 3.6.3; a statistical analysis of the purposes for which authorizations and approvals were granted, the types of unlawful activities involved, the number of arrests and prosecutions based on such investigations, and other meaningful information; a summary of any internal disciplinary complaints concerning compliance with this Judgment or the related Departmental regulations and the findings made and actions taken on such complaints; and a description of other actions taken to implement this Judgment. The Superintendent's report shall not give information that would identify criminal informants or current sensitive criminal investigations, designated by the Superintendent, that might be compromised by disclosure.

5. AUDITING AND MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF AND COMPLIANCE WITH THIS JUDGMENT

5.1 The Chicago Police Board shall have the following functions:

5.1.1 To audit, monitor and evaluate compliance with this Judgment, and with administrative

569

regulations adopted pursuant to the Judgment, and to *569 report to the Mayor, the

Superintendent of Police and the public concerning its findings.

5.1.2 To consult with and make recommendations to the Mayor, the Superintendent, and other appropriate executive branch officials, from time to time, concerning the implementation and functioning of this Judgment, both to effectuate the purposes of the Judgment and to simplify its administration.

5.2 The Board shall conduct audits and inquiries appropriate to its responsibilities concerning this Judgment. In particular, it shall cause management audits to be conducted, by a national independent public accounting firm, of the implementation of and compliance with this Judgment and the regulations adopted under § 4.1. The audit report shall include a description and evaluation of such implementation and compliance, as well as a discussion of any substantial violations observed or detected and any recommendations for improvement of performance that the auditors deem appropriate. Such audits shall be conducted in 1982, 1984, and thereafter at intervals of not more than five years. The audit report shall be made public, along with any report or recommendations which the Board, the Superintendent or the Mayor wishes to issue. The Board may make and may publish such other reports and recommendations as it deems necessary.

5.3 The Board and the management auditors, for the purposes of § 5.1 and 5.2, shall have access to all relevant data in the possession of the city, including without limitation complete documentation of all investigations, except as provided in this paragraph. The auditors shall not have access to information specifically identifying criminal informants, or to current sensitive criminal investigations designated by the Superintendent that might be compromised by disclosure to the auditors (but all documentation of such investigations shall be retained under § 3.1.7 to be audited after termination of the investigation.) The auditors shall not disclose any information to anyone but the Board, or to the Superintendent of Police upon his request.

5.4 The Board shall have the following duties and limitations concerning the disclosure of information obtained from City agencies:

5.4.1 The Board shall not disclose, in any manner, details that specifically identify any investigations, except as provided in § 5.4.3. However, it may disclose general policy and performance data concerning the implementation of and compliance with this Judgment and the regulations, including paraphrased examples of investigations.

5.4.2 The Board shall not disclose, in any manner, information that would reveal the identity of a criminal informant, compromise an ongoing criminal investigation, or constitute an invasion of a person's privacy.

5.4.3 If the Board learns of any substantial violation of this Judgment, it shall promptly notify the Superintendent of Police (or the Office of Municipal Investigations if the matter involves personnel of a City agency other than the Police Department.) The official notified shall report back to the Board within 30 days what investigation was made and what corrective action was taken.

6. INDEX TO DEFINITIONS.

6.1 Definitions appear at appropriate points in the text as follows:

Term

Section

Page

Directed toward Executive First Amendment conduct First Amendment information Incidental references Infiltrator Informant Intrusive method Investigative activity Minimization Public gathering Purging Reasonable suspicion Security of information

1.3 & 1.4 3.1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.1 3.6.1 1.2 3.1.2 3.4.1 3.1.7 3.2.2 3.1.6

p.11 p.16 p.11 p.13 p.11 p.27 p.27 p.27 p.10 p.15 p.23 p.17 p.19 p.17

570 *570 6.2 Additional Definitions.

6.2.1 Agent means any officer or employee of the City of Chicago; or any person paid, controlled, or directed by an officer or employee of the city; or any person who is requested by an officer or employee of the city to engage in investigative activity.

6.2.2 Person means any individual, group of individuals, or organization.

6.2.3 Record means any physical or electronic method of retaining information.

II. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION AND ANCILLARY MATTERS

A. Retention of Jurisdiction by the Court. Jurisdiction is retained by the Court for the following purposes.
1. To enable the parties to this Order to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Order, for the enforcement of compliance with the provisions contained herein, and for the punishment of the violation of any such provisions. Application to enforce such provisions or to impose punishment for any such violation may be presented to this Court by any person affected by the conduct complained of. Prior written notice of all such applications and other matters in this action shall be given to counsel for the named parties hereto. Except where emergency relief is sought, seven days written notice shall be given.
2. For the trial and adjudication of the damage claims against the City defendants.
3. The parties recognize that modification of certain procedural provisions of Part III (time periods and specification of authorizing police personnel) may be warranted in the future, on the basis of experience with implementation and administration of this Judgment. Those provisions are set off in brackets in the text of Part III.
Accordingly, after five years from the entry of this Order, the City of Chicago may undertake such modification in the following manner:
a. The City shall serve the proposed modification of the bracketed provision(s) upon counsel for the named plaintiffs, together with a detailed statement of the reasons why the modification is warranted.
b. The parties shall consult for a period of 60 days to determine if the modification can be made by agreement.

c. If agreement is not reached the City may file its proposed modification and statement with the Court, and if no objection is filed by the named plaintiffs the modification shall take effect 30 days after filing.
d. If the named plaintiffs file written objection to the proposed modification within 30 days, the Court shall determine whether the modification should be approved. The Court should approve the modification unless it does not meet the following standards:
i) it facilitates police administration;
ii) it is calculated to effectuate and not to thwart the basic purpose of this Judgment;
iii) it is consistent with the substantive and the remaining procedural provisions of this Judgment; and,
iv) it maintains or increases the effectiveness of the procedure it replaces, provided that an increase of a time period or a decrease of command level for an authorization shall not per se be considered less effective.
B. Final Disposition of Claims for Injunctive Relief Against City Defendants. This Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree constitutes the final disposition of the claims for injunctive relief against the city defendants. The Court expressly finds and determines, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay and directs that this Judgment be entered forthwith.
C. Ancillary Matters.
1. The Chicago Police Department intelligence files held in the document depository at Police Headquarters 571 pursuant to this Court's orders of October 14, 1976, and May *571 4, 1977, shall be retained in the depository
under the terms of those Orders until the final disposition of the damage claims against the city defendants and of all claims against the federal defendants, and their status thereafter shall be determined by future order of Court.
2. Plaintiffs will petition the Court to determine whether and in what amount fees and costs will be awarded with respect to the matters resolved by this Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree. Defendants will file objections. The parties have made no agreement with respect to these questions.
APPENDIX A
TO AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
The following are the named Plaintiffs who have consented to the entry of the Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree in the three cases cited below:
NO. 74 C 3268: Alliance to End Repression Chicago Area Unitarian Universalist Council Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights Chicago Heights Unitarian Universalist Community Church Chicago Peace Council Clergy and Laity Concerned Ethical Humaninist Society of Chicago First Unitarian Church of Chicago Near North Fellowship Wheadon United Methodist Church Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Young Workers Liberation League Richard Criley Dennis Cunningham Courtney Esposito Janice Gutman Jeffrey Haas John Hill Rev. William Hogan John Kearney Liza Lawrence Sidney Lens Rev. Jack Mendelsohn Lucy Montgomery Joe Petzel A.A. Rayner, Jr. John Rossen Jay Schaffner Jack Spiegel G. Flint Taylor NO. 75 C 3295: American Civil Liberties Union American Friends Service Committee Better Government Association Community Renewal Society Independent Voters of Illinois League to Improve the Community Medical Committee for Human Rights Organization for a Better Austin People United to Save Humanity Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc. Paul Booth Ronald J. Clark Leon Despres Ronald Dorfman Jesse L. Jackson Ralph Knoohuizen Peter Kuttner G. Marie Leaner David McLendon Don Rose Augustus Savage Jeffery Schnitzer Dick Simpson Quentin Young NO. 76 C 1982: Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.

APPENDIX B
TO AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
The classes represented by the named Plaintiffs in Alliance to End Repression, et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 74 C 3268, and in ACLU, et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 75 C 3295, as certified by District Court Orders 572 on March 25, 1976 and May *572 24, 1976, respectively, and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on November 22, 1977 (565 F.2d 975), are as follows:
1. Alliance Classes (as first alleged on November 13, 1974)
a. The Plaintiff Individuals:
The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage in or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
b. The Plaintiff Organizations:
The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage in or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
2. ACLU Classes
a. The Plaintiff Individuals:
The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage in or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, surveillance, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
b. The Plaintiff Organizations:
The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, surveillance, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
APPENDIX C

TO THE AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
The following are the named City Defendants who have consented to the entry of the Agreed Order, Judgment and Decree in the three cases cited below:
No. 74 C 3268: The City of Chicago Richard Brzeczek Walter Murphy John Doe Richard Roe Joe Grubisic Maurice J. Dailey R. Vaisvilas R. Bock William L. Vick Terrence Fahey John T. Stibich Leroy Privoznik James J. Cunningham Donald Cowen Lovejoy Foster Peter Rivera Morgan Mitchem Kenneth Moranz Ricardo Abreu 573 Truman Stromberg *573 Anthony Romano Louis Cuddy Mort Frankin (misnamed Mort Franklin in Complaint) Thomas Kinsella Peter Schurla Howard Pointer James E. Kostro Elgia C. Cook Samuel Babich Andrew Rodriguez David Cushing Thomas McDermott T. O'Connor William Benes Kenneth Carcerano Eugene Hill John Ritenour George Patton Earl Armstead Albert Jordan Earl Nevels James Tobin Toby Burton Michael Fera Milton Carson R. Sieczkowski Vito A. Clesceri J. Des Enfants F.O. Bonke Walter Biszewski Jesse Resendez L. Struck L. Boston John Philbin Milton Smith Jacob Bouyer William McWhinney Daniel Kentala Marcus Salone Cory Daniel Chan Thomas Czapiewski Melvin C. Barna Robert Putill Clarence Williams John Valkenberg Alfredo Vallejo William Olson James Conlisk, III Robert Osmondson James Grant Emmett Ebert Harry L. Anderson Unknown agents of the Chicago Police Department Wilbur Daniel Saul Epton Norval Morris Justin A. Stanley Ann Ida Gannon Nancy Jefferson Marshall Korshak David Cintron Frances Zemans Jane M. Byrne No. 75 C 3295: The City of Chicago Jane M. Byrne Richard Brzeczek Wilbur Daniel Saul Epton Norval Morris Justin A. Stanley Ann Ida Gannon Nancy Jefferson Marshall Korshak David Cintron Frances Zemans Walter Murphy Joseph Grubisic John Doe's # 1-75 Howard Pointer Marcus Salone Melvin Barna James Kostro James T. Fitzgibbons James Tobin Raymond Vaisvilas (misnamed Raymond Vace in Complaint) Maurice J. Dailey (misnamed Patrick Maurice Daley in Complaint) Morton Frankin (misnamed Morton Franklin in Complaint) No. 76 C 1982: The City of 574 Chicago Jane M. Byrne Richard Brzeczek Wilbur Daniel *574 Saul Epton Norval Morris Justin A. Stanley Ann Ida Gannon Nancy Jefferson Marshall Korshak David Cintron Frances Zemans Walter Murphy Joseph Grubisic
NOTE: Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the following public officers have been substituted as defendants in place of their predecessors in office: Jane M. Byrne, Mayor of the City of Chicago; Richard Brzeczek, Superintendent of Police of the City of Chicago; and Saul Epton, Norval Morris, Justin A. Stanley, Ann Ida Gannon, Nancy Jefferson, Marshall Korshak, David Cintron and Frances Zemans, members of the Police Board of the City of Chicago.
The following City Defendants are not included in the above lists because they are not currently employees or agents of the City of Chicago and are therefore not in a position to consent to injunctive relief concerning City activities:
74 C 3268: James M. Rochford Mitchell Ware R. Zagotta Otto Kral Leason Linzy Burton Lovely Joseph Arquilla Anthony Jablon John O'Brien Joseph Ternes Martin Walsh Terrence J. Knox James Nolan John Burian Frank Baxter Jerroll Pope Irwin Bock Thomas West Eugene Dorneker John Hastings Geno Addams Michael Randy David LeMarc Roy Robinson Albert J. Heitman Adele Noren Sheli Lulkin 75 C 3295: James Rochford Mitchell Ware John Clarke James Nolan Thomas S. McInerney 76 C 1982: Mitchell Ware James Rochford
APPENDIX D
TO THE AGREED ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO
By the consent of the City of Chicago, the United States District Court has entered an order, dated ________ __, 19__, protecting the rights of individuals and groups to speak out, to petition the government, and to associate in the furtherance of economic, political, and religious objectives as provided by the first amendment of the U.S.

Constitution. No investigation, collection of information, or other action may be taken against individuals or groups exercising such rights except under exceptional circumstances for legitimate governmental reasons. The Court order provides that any investigation concerning activities protected by the first amendment must follow specified procedures. Most of these matters are properly handled by the Department of Police, but you are advised that the Court order also binds all City employees and agents so far as investigation or other action taken against individuals or groups exercising such rights.
_______________________________ Judge, U.S. District Court
[*] Appendices I, II and III have been omitted from publication with the consent of the Court. The Appendices are filed in the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
[1] The Chicago Lawyers' Committee case was settled earlier this year, at the same time the named plaintiffs agreed to the settlement agreement with the City of Chicago subject to the Court's approval on behalf of the plaintiff classes.
[**] Appendices I, II and III have been omitted from publication with the consent of the Court. The Appendices are filed in the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
[2] The distinction in the national security intelligence field between "United States persons" and others was created by both Presidential and Congressional directives. Executive Order 12036, § 4-214 (governing national security intelligence activities) (from which the settlement's definition of "United States person" is taken verbatim); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (the less inclusive definition of "United States person" in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). Plaintiffs would therefore encounter legal difficulties in challenging the distinction. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-85, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1890-94, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976).
[*] The summary in Part 1 is for the purpose of facilitating understanding of the detailed provisions of the Judgment; the latter are controlling in the event of uncertainty of interpretation or scope of the Judgment. Terms underscored are defined in Part 1 or at appropriate points in the text. An index of definitions appears in Part 6, p. 34.
[1] Reasonable suspicion is the belief of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, based on specific and articulable facts, that investigation should be made to determine whether "probable cause" exists to justify an arrest, a warrant or other appropriate police action. "Reasonable suspicion" is less than the "probable cause" required for an arrest or a warrant, but is an objective standard rather than a subjective "good faith" belief.
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 627 F.Supp. 1044 (1985)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
December 30, 1985.
1045 *1045 Richard Gutman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Peter Fitzpatrick, Sp. Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
1046 *1046 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GETZENDANNER, District Judge:
This civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, presents the question of whether the first amendment permits local police authorities to infiltrate, observe, record, and disseminate information gathered on the lawful speech activities of private individuals and private organizations when the police have no reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. This question is now before the court on cross motions for summary judgment.
The moving plaintiffs are the only remaining named plaintiffs in this historic civil rights litigation. The class claims were resolved through a consent decree entered in 1981 and the claims of all other named plaintiffs have been resolved through settlements. The court's decision on the cross motions for summary judgment will end this litigation because the parties have agreed to settlement of any successful claim and all parties have agreed not to appeal this decision.
I. Background and Factual Summary
The parties have stipulated to the following material facts as to which there is no genuine dispute: Plaintiff Alliance to End Repression ("Alliance") is a civil liberties organization that seeks what it deems to be reforms in the criminal justice system of Chicago. Plaintiff Chicago Peace Council ("CPC") is a peace organization which advocates positions on peace issues and organizes demonstrations regarding United States foreign policy. Plaintiff William Hogan, a Roman Catholic priest, plaintiff Lucy Montgomery, a retired social worker, and plaintiff A.A. (Sammy) Rayner, Jr., a former Chicago alderman, are all United States citizens who in the past have actively exercised their first amendment rights. There is no evidence in the record that any of the plaintiffs conducted, or ever planned on conducting any violent or otherwise unlawful activity. Plaintiffs indicate that if the case were brought to trial, they would testify that their activities were always lawful. The only defendant in this case is the City of Chicago ("City"); claims against individual members of the Chicago Police Department have been settled and dismissed. The actions complained of in this case are deemed to have been done under color of state law and represent the official policy of the City of Chicago.
Plaintiffs, it is agreed, were the subjects of investigations carried out by a unit of the Chicago Police Department, the explicit purpose of which was to gather intelligence on non-criminal activity. The unit has been variously known as the Subversive Activities Section, the Subversive Activities Unit, and the Security Section. This unit investigated, without any reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, the admittedly lawful activities of plaintiffs relating to their political speech and associations. The investigations were conducted by a variety of means. Among the more striking examples was the use of certain organization infiltrators. Specifically, some of the information accumulated on CPC was obtained by means of an informer who became CPC's treasurer and participated in the CPC decision-making process. Information was obtained on Alliance by means of an informer

and an undercover agent, both of whom became Alliance board members and who participated in the Alliance decision-making process. More generally, a sizeable amount of information on the two organizations was obtained from newspaper clippings and clippings from other public sources of information. Intelligence was also gathered from various other informers whose level of infiltration or association with the plaintiffs is not specified. Finally, photographing, filming, videotaping and recording of plaintiffs' activities were also techniques employed in acquiring information. One such instance occurred when CPC, along with other groups, rented the grounds of a summer camp one weekend for a conference on nonviolent ways to "end war, racism, and repression." The police set up equipment opposite the camp and took photographs of all who were present at the conference.
1047 *1047 Similarly, information gathered on the three individual plaintiffs was also obtained through the techniques of informer interviews, newspaper clippings and photographs. There does not, however, appear to be any evidence that the informers were (or were not) specifically recruited by the police to duplicitously befriend the individuals and obtain their confidence. Finally, there is no evidence that any of the five plaintiffs were electronically surveilled, wiretapped, or photographed in their homes or other private enclaves.
The various forms of information thus obtained were filed and recorded in police dossiers on each of the plaintiffs. These dossiers are extensive. There are 13 volumes of reports on Alliance, 1,760 reports on CPC, 499 reports on Hogan, 220 on Montgomery, and 513 on Rayner. The contents of these reports include the identities of many members of the CPC and Alliance, what was discussed at meetings, and who made particular comments during the discussions. The reports on the individual plaintiffs contain the identities of their political associates and numerous other details of their public and personal lives.
The parties agree that the police department maintained a policy, directed against Alliance, which sought to "neutralize" and "nullify" its political influence, financial organization and support, and operational activities. The parties also have stipulated that as a result of the surveillance of CPC at the summer camp, a reporter who "accompanied" the police to the camp published a newspaper story in the Chicago Tribune which stated that "radicals" and "Communists" had used the property for a "secret revolutionary planning session." There is evidence, the parties agree, that a Security Section police officer, an undercover officer, and an informer testified inaccurately before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that Alliance was a "Communist Party front group." Alliance and CPC have indicated that, if the case were tried, they would testify that these statements were false and have injured their reputations. All five plaintiffs have indicated that they would testify that the entire surveillance operation has chilled their exercise of first amendment rights.
One year after this lawsuit was filed, the subversive unit of the Chicago Police Department was abolished. In 1981, the defendant City of Chicago agreed to a permanent injunction. Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 561 F.Supp. 537 (N.D.Ill. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1984). Consent decrees were also signed with the federal defendants. Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.1982). The only remaining issue in this case is the constitutional validity of the police department's tactics with respect to the five remaining plaintiffs.
II. Justiciability
Before the merits of the plaintiffs' claim can be decided the court must first address the defendant's argument that, under the authority of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), the plaintiffs have no standing to bring this claim because it is nonjusticiable. Only if the plaintiffs can establish that their injury is justiciable can this court then undertake to determine whether the injury was inflicted in a manner inconsistent with the first amendment.
A. The Relevant Case Law
In Laird v. Tatum, the plaintiffs had alleged that the mere existence of an Army surveillance system which investigated lawful and peaceful civilian activity chilled the exercise of their first amendment rights. The Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that "in the absence of a showing of objective harm or a specific threatened future harm," any claimed chill is merely "subjective" and therefore not justiciable.

Although the surveillance system under attack in Tatum and the one in this case are similar in that much of the intelligence was garnered from news publications, none of the information in Tatum was obtained through the clandestine infiltration some of the plaintiffs experienced here. In Tatum, when news publications were insufficient 1048 to satisfy Army intelligence needs, the *1048 Army, which apparently was not claiming to have had any suspicion of criminal conduct, properly kept its surveillance limited to the public domain. The Court emphasized the public scope of the investigation as follows:
The information itself was collected by a variety of means, but it is significant that the principal sources of information were the news media and publications in general circulation. Some of the information came from Army Intelligence agents who attended meetings that were open to the public and who wrote field reports describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring organization, the identity of speakers, the approximate number of persons in attendance, and an indication of whether any disorder occurred. And still other information was provided to the Army by civilian law enforcement agencies.
408 U.S. at 6, 92 S.Ct. at 2322.
It was in this context that the plaintiffs in Tatum claimed that the compilation and storage of the acquired information chilled their exercise of first amendment rights. The Court felt that the intrusions the plaintiffs were objecting to were unlike and much less significant than those the Court had previously condemned on first amendment grounds, so any "chill" the plaintiffs claimed to be suffering was purely "subjective." The types of intrusions which the Court felt would cause an objective chill occurred in cases like Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 702, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971) (state may not compel a person to disclose that person's associations in order to be admitted to state bar); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) (state may not discharge employees because of their political associations); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965), and Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). In those cases, "the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging." 408 U.S. at 11, 92 S.Ct. at 2324. By contrast, the chill involved in Tatum, based as it was on knowledge of the mere existence of a surveillance system, which collected data from information open to the public, and which caused no tangible harm to plaintiffs, could only have caused a subjective chill and was therefore nonjusticiable.
In the years since Tatum, courts have struggled to determine when a surveillance system became so intrusive as to create a reasonable or objective chill in a plaintiff and therefore present a justiciable controversy. As a substantial amount of time has elapsed since Tatum, it is possible to glean a pattern from these various court decisions. For example, as Tatum itself suggested, when the intelligence-gathering tactic involves only the use of police surveillance of meetings held open to the public, no objective chill is involved; conversely, when infiltration into private enclaves is present, a first amendment claim may be justiciable. See e.g., Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (surveillance by illegal wiretapping and infiltration into "meetings and private associations" held to be factors rendering Tatum distinguishable and the claim justiciable); Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir.1975) (only public surveillance involved; Tatum governs); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.1974) (Socialist Workers Party convention open to any person under 29; surveillance by FBI informants did not present justiciable controversy under Tatum). When Justice Marshall was presented with the facts of Socialist Workers Party as Circuit Justice on an application to stay the Court of Appeals decision, he decided the issue of justiciability differently. While not disagreeing with the Court of Appeals' holding that the openness of the convention was a factor against justiciability, he wrote that Tatum should nevertheless be distinguished and the 1049 claim considered justiciable because of *1049 the presence of other, apparently more important factors pertinent to an objective chill: "[T]he challenged investigative activity will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA delegates from participating actively in the convention and leading to possible loss of employment for those identified as being in attendance." Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314, 1319, 95 S.Ct. 425, 428, 42 L.Ed.2d 627 (1974). Subsequent lower court cases have picked up on the potential injury-toemployment factor as helping establish justiciability. See e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir.1975)

(justiciable claim presented when FBI maintained a `mail cover' file on plaintiff, pursuant to a regulation which directed an investigation and record-keeping on all persons who wrote letters to Socialist Workers Party; file was alleged to possibly cause injury to future employment prospects); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (library worker who was investigated by FBI because of his political associations presented justiciable claim when he alleged the investigation cost him employment opportunities).
Thus it appears that in determining whether a claimed chill is objective, the Supreme Court in Tatum and the appellate courts in Philadelphia Yearly and Socialist Workers Party relied chiefly on the public nature of the surveillance tactics in concluding nonjusticiability. By contrast, Justice Marshall, Paton, and Clark focused on the specific adverse effects that the investigation was claimed to have on the plaintiffs. Some of the adverse effects which other courts have considered relevant to justiciability relate to issues other than employment, such as the damaged reputations caused by the dissemination of the accumulated information when such dissemination has occurred. See e.g., Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.Mich. 1979) (justiciability where false and misleading reports of plaintiff's activities were disseminated in course of FBI investigation causing injury to reputation); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C.1976) (public dissemination of accumulated information in a false or defamatory manner was a factor in rendering claim justiciable); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F.Supp. 115 (N.D.Ill. 1975) (where police files were allegedly disseminated so as to damage academic and professional lives of plaintiffs, justiciable claim was presented).[1] Even police dissemination of truthful but stigmatizing information, such as police statements that certain individuals are the subjects of police intelligence files, if done without any lawful purpose, may be justiciable. See Philadelphia Yearly, 519 F.2d at 1339.
Other adverse effects relevant to justiciability, and closely related to the issue of how the surveillance is conducted, pertain to the instability and disruption of political associations caused by intrusive infiltrators and investigators. See Founding Church of Scientology v. FBI, 459 F.Supp. 748 (D.D.C.1978) (surveillance and infiltration of church group presented justiciable claim where FBI activities had effect of disrupting plaintiff organization and its growth by deterring supporters from joining); Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F.Supp. at 149 (claim justiciable when infiltrators disrupted private organization by providing it with false information and soliciting illegal actions); Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F.Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (government 1050 may use infiltrators and informers generally, but not to solicit unlawful activity or create feelings of mutual *1050 distrust and suspicion among group members). See also Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314, 95 S.Ct. 425, 42 L.Ed.2d 627 (1974) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (surveillance which has effect of deterring supporters from joining organization, even when surveillance conducted in public, may present justiciable claim); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich.1979) (investigation of individual which has effect of deterring others from associating with him is factor in favor of justiciability), vacated in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S.Ct. 193, 78 L.Ed.2d 170 (1983).
To summarize, these various considerations have been restated by the Philadelphia Yearly and Berlin opinions:
We think it is clear that Tatum supports the action of the district court here [dismissing the complaint] to the extent the complaint alleges a constitutional violation on the basis of mere police photographing and data gathering at public meetings. We say this because such activity by law enforcement authorities, without more, is legally unobjectionable and creates at best a so-called subjective chill which the Supreme Court has said is not a substitute for a claim of specific present harm or a threat of specific future harm. [footnote omitted]
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, 519 F.2d at 1337. And in explaining when a claim presents a justiciable controversy, the Berlin court stated:
Thus, while collection and retention of information, if collected in a legal manner, cannot be challenged, public dissemination of that information in a false or defamatory manner and with no lawful purpose, disruption of legitimate activities, termination of employment, illegal electronic surveillance, and other forms of harassment are subject to challenge as beyond "legitimate surveillance activities."
Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F.Supp. at 151.

B. Application of Law to Parties
Having surveyed the case law, the court can now determine whether the parties here have presented a justiciable claim. Careful examination of the evidence leads this court to conclude that the actions of the police department with respect to Alliance, CPC, and Montgomery created justiciable claims, but there is insufficient evidence in the record to warrant a similar conclusion as to the individual plaintiffs Hogan and Rayner.
1. Alliance
The case for Alliance is the strongest of all the plaintiffs. The record establishes that the police surveillance of Alliance was far more intrusive than the "passive observational activities upheld in Tatum." Handschu, 349 F.Supp. 766, 771. First, an informer and an undercover agent both became board members of Alliance and participated in the Alliance decision-making process. This sort of infiltration, especially as to the undercover police officer, weighs heavily in the determination that Alliance's claimed chill is reasonable. The board of a political organization is certainly not open to the public. Almost by definition, the "board" is a select group of an organization's members who develop and decide the goals and directions that the organization is going to take. When the police are permitted to infiltrate and record comments made by the members of an organization's highest levels, and to participate in the organization's top decisional authority, there will inevitably be some distrust and suspicion bred among the organization's members. The use of police officers to infiltrate an organization and thereby cause disruption of the organization through the creation of distrust, has already been held to be a factor establishing justiciability. See e.g., Handschu, 349 F.Supp. 766.
These objections to the police undercover infiltrator can also be raised against the informer who also became an 1051 Alliance board member. In general, of course, *1051
there is nothing wrong with the police receiving and retaining information freely reported to it by informers. Plaintiffs themselves are willing to recognize this principle. See Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to City's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6. Thus, if an Alliance board member decided to turn against her or his organization and inform the police of Alliance's activities, the police would be free to question the individual. But that is not what happened here. The record clearly states that an informer "became" a board member. The implication is that a person who had already been a police informer took on the additional duplicitous role of an Alliance board member. For the same reasons that the police may not use its own undercover agents to infiltrate the high, private levels of an organization0907it risks fostering the disruptive feelings of organizational distrust 0907the police may not participate in a venture whereby existing informers are used to infiltrate the private levels of a political association. Admittedly, the record does not indicate as clearly as it might that the police here actually told its informer to become an Alliance board member. Possibly (though unlikely) the police played no role in encouraging the informer to become a board member. Nevertheless, the court cannot find any evidence in the record to lend support to this view. To the contrary, the evidence suggesting that the police did participate in the decision to have its informer become a board member is too weighty to ignore. In particular, the defendant has agreed that the police department targeted Alliance to "nullify" its sympathetic and political influence, its financial and organizational support, and its operational activities. This glaring admission not only supports the court's earlier conclusion that the effect of the infiltration into the private levels of the organization was to disrupt Alliance, but it also strongly suggests that the police participated in the decision to have the informer infiltrate the Alliance board.
Another factor relevant to justiciability present in this case is the evidence, uncontradicted in the record, that Alliance's reputation was injured as a result of the police surveillance activities. Specifically, there is uncontradicted evidence that a Security Section police officer, an undercover police officer, and an informer all testified inaccurately before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that Alliance was a "Communist Party Front Group." The police dissemination of false information pertaining to an organization or person under police surveillance has been previously discussed as rendering a chill more objective. While it is not clear that the defamatory statements about Alliance were intended to be false, the court is again able to infer such intent from the police department's admitted policy of targeting Alliance for "nullification" and "neutralization."

In sum, the police infiltration into the private high levels of the Alliance organization, the "nullification" policy, and the injury the police caused to Alliance's reputation through disseminating false information together make the "chill" Alliance has claimed reasonable and objective. Alliance's first amendment claim is therefore justiciable and not barred by Tatum. It remains to be decided, however, whether the claim is nevertheless defeated because the first amendment permits the sort of police activity involved here.
2. CPC
The CPC case, though perhaps not as strong as Alliance's, still demonstrates enough police intrusiveness so that the chill is objective. As with Alliance, the parties here agree that an informer became a treasurer of CPC and participated in CPC's decision-making process. However, unlike Alliance, there is no evidence that an undercover agent was involved, or that CPC was the target of a nullification plan. Therefore, it is not so easy to conclude that the police participated in the decision to have its informer become the treasurer. Nevertheless, because the position of treasurer is obviously one of the most select and sensitive of all possible levels, and because 1052 infiltration at such a level implicates the very essence of the first amendment *1052 right to freely associate, the court is willing to infer police complicity on less strong evidence. For CPC, sufficiently convincing evidence exists to infer police complicity. The record establishes that independent of its specific policy targeting Alliance for neutralization, the police department had a neutralization policy against other civic organizations that the defendant admits are peaceful, including the Spanish Action Committee of Chicago, the Citizens Action Program, and the National Lawyers Guild. The existence of such an extensive "neutralization" program against organizations which, like CPC, are peaceful, leads this court to conclude that the police department at least knew of and concurred in the CPC's informer's decision to move into the rank of treasurer, thus making the police accountable for the infiltration.
As with Alliance, there is also present here another factor in favor of justiciability 0907evidence of damaged reputation from disseminated information. The record shows that when the police took photographs of CPC members at the weekend camp conference from their position "opposite" the camp,[2] the police were accompanied by a reporter for the Chicago Tribune. Subsequently, the reporter wrote a story stating, falsely, that "radicals" and "Communists" had used the property for a "secret revolutionary planning session." In fact, the purpose of the conference was to study nonviolent ways "to end war, racism, and repression." The police, then, by inviting[3] the reporter to the camp scene and conveying some of their information about CPC to him, contributed to the dissemination of damaging information. The consequence, for which there is evidence in the record, was that CPC's reputation was injured.
In sum for the case of CPC, the court is convinced that the very high level of infiltration, and the damaged reputation from the police0907caused disseminated information make CPC's chill objective. CPC's first amendment claim is therefore justiciable.
3. Rayner and Hogan
Unlike their organizational counterparts, these two individual plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that establishes a justiciable controversy. These plaintiffs do claim that they have been chilled as a result of the police surveillance and record-keeping of their peaceful activities. But unlike the claims of the organizations, there is no evidence that the surveillance tactics resulted in any of the specific effects or was conducted in any of the ways which courts have previously identified as relevant to rendering the chill objective. For example, unlike the organizational plaintiffs, there is no evidence that police have damaged the plaintiffs' reputations or that the police created feelings of distrust among the plaintiffs' political associates. In particular, unlike Jabara, there is no evidence that other people are now deterred from associating with the individual plaintiffs. Unlike Clark, there is 1053 no evidence *1053 that plaintiffs' employment opportunities have been injured. Unlike Founding Church of Scientology, there is no showing that these two individual plaintiffs were harassed.

Finally, the police surveillance tactics, unlike the complaint allegations at issue in the Alliance opinion, were not shown to be illegal or otherwise an invasion of some reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to these individual plaintiffs. The Rayner file consists, almost entirely, of nothing more intrusive than clippings from Chicago newspapers. The Hogan file similarly contains many newspaper clippings. There is no showing of illegal wiretaps, or other forms of unlawful surveillance. Although informers gave the police some of the information in the files, there is no showing that the police directed or paid the informers to duplicitously befriend or remain friends with the plaintiffs while informing on them. Without any such evidence, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs, the court can only presume that these informers volunteered information to the police on their own initiative when the police interviewed them. There is certainly nothing illegal or unconstitutional about this, even in the absence of some reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.[4]See e.g., Handschu, 349 F.Supp. 766, 769; Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 510 F.2d 253, 257 (2d Cir.1974) ("no one has yet suggested that the FBI be restrained from receiving information freely reported to it"). Any chill resulting from this sort of activity must be considered subjective under Tatum.
Thus, all that the court has in the record with respect to these two plaintiffs is a claim of a chill from a police surveillance system which acquired its information from various publications and from interviews with persons who knew the plaintiffs. This is the sort of situation which Tatum found nonjusticiable: a claim of chill based on the mere existence of a general system of public surveillance and no showing of any specific adverse effects. Under Tatum, such a chill is considered subjective and cannot support a justiciable claim.
4. Montgomery
The Montgomery file is troubling to the court. The file contains much more than newspaper clippings. Besides extensive biographical information, such as her date of birth, weight, eye color, schooling, marriages, and current address, the file contains a detailed chronology on Montgomery's political activities and her social and personal activities. Specifically, this chronology outlines when Montgomery participated in certain political and social groups, where the participation took place, and the nature and extent of the participation. There is even a report included in the file on the conversations that took place during a private cocktail party at Montgomery's home. The file contains other information that is generally not considered public. There is an extensive report on various 1054 checks Montgomery drafted and the accompanying bank statements. The file also *1054 contains details on her then current and former husbands. Specifically, the file describes where her then current husband went to college and law school, where he had positions of trustee and membership on boards of directors, and the clubs to which he belonged. Details on Montgomery's children, by both husbands, their names, ages, and schooling are all in the file. Medical information about the husband and one child are detailed in the file. Other details about Montgomery's past and then current political, social, and personal activities are enumerated at length.
If all this information was obtained from published sources or informants whom the police did not recruit, then Tatum would likely bar Montgomery's claim. Nevertheless, the information covers such a wide range of Montgomery's public and personal activities that one cannot help but get an entire character portrait from reading the file. It seems that there should come a point when, in tenaciously tracking and piecing together the details of a person's life from multifarious sources, the resulting probe becomes so intrusive as to amount to an invasion of privacy even if the individual pieces of the probe are from public sources. Such an intrusion has happened here. In these circumstances, the burden of proving that the information indeed did come from exclusively public sources, such as newspapers or volunteer informants whom the police did not direct themselves, should be on the defendant before Tatum bars the claim. Because the City has not presented any evidence suggesting that all the information was accumulated from public sources, and because it is reasonable to infer that much of the extensively personal information in the file could only be obtained from nonpublic sources, the court concludes that Montgomery's chill is reasonable, objective and justiciable.

III. The Merits of the First Amendment Claims

Having established that Alliance and CPC present justiciable claims, the court must now decide whether those claims are meritorious under first amendment doctrine. Put another way, given that the police tactics have reasonably chilled Alliance and CPC, is that chill nevertheless justified under first amendment standards?

The first amendment, of course, protects the rights of all citizens to hold differing political beliefs and belong to lawful political parties and associations. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-60, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2681-83, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11, 96 S.Ct. 612, 630, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430, 83 S.Ct. 328, 336, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). As stated before, the parties to this case do not dispute the lawfulness of the Alliance and CPC associations. Significant impairments of these first amendment rights, as in the case of an objective chill, must withstand exacting scrutiny and may not be justified on a showing of a mere legitimate state interest. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 362, 96 S.Ct. at 2684, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. at 656; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58, 94 S.Ct. 303, 308, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973). The District of Columbia Circuit in Clark v. Library of Congress carefully articulated these first amendment standards as applied to the police surveillance context:

1055

Exacting scrutiny is especially appropriate where the government action is motivated solely by an individual's lawful beliefs or associations, for government action so predicated is imbued with the potential for subtle coercion of the individual to abandon his controversial beliefs or associations. Whether or not the government intended to punish or coerce the individual cannot be the sole test of legitimacy in such governmental action. Where the government action inflicts a palpable injury on the individual because of his lawful beliefs, it has the direct and consequent effect of chilling his rights to freedom of belief and association. For these reasons, the Supreme Court has held such governmental actions may be justified only upon a showing of a paramount *1055 or vital government interest. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 362 [96 S.Ct. at 2684]. The burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest. Id. Moreover, the government must demonstrate that the means chosen to further its compelling interest are those least restrictive of freedom of belief and association. Id. at 362-63 [96 S.Ct. at 2684-85].

Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C.Cir.1984).

1. Alliance

The City admits that the police surveillance of Alliance was conducted without any reasonable suspicion that Alliance was engaged in criminal conduct. Nevertheless, the police infiltrated the Alliance board pursuant to a "neutralization" policy and disseminated false and damaging information about Alliance while testifying to a congressional committee. In the discussion below I conclude that the City has not sustained its burden of demonstrating that these tactics were the least drastic means to achieving a compelling state interest.
There can be no doubt that, even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the government has an interest in investigating civilian conduct so that it may determine whether some further action is needed to protect the public from criminal behavior. This interest, including specifically the government's interest in using informers and infiltrators to investigate lawful conduct, has been described elsewhere as "legitimate." Handschu, 349 F.Supp. at 769. But, as Elrod teaches, a mere legitimate interest is insufficient to justify an investigatory tactic that creates an objective chill of first amendment rights. The City must show that infiltrating a high, private level of Alliance, without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, was the least drastic means in furtherance of a compelling state interest. Similarly, the City must show a compelling state interest in intentionally giving false testimony about Alliance at congressional hearings.
The court first examines the infiltration activities. The Alliance case is unlike the typical case of police surveillance. The City has not simply sent informers and infiltrators to open meetings to observe and record events. It has sent its agents to participate in private meetings which are reasonably expected to be open only to

those who have a sincere interest in exercising responsibility for the organization. The court cannot find, and the City does not proffer, a compelling reason for permitting this sort of disruptive infiltration in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. In similar cases, such police conduct, in the absence of any "good faith" basis for an investigation, has been held to be violative of the first amendment. See e.g., Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. 561 (government cannot justify deterring political associations in the absence of a good faith criminal investigation); Clark, 750 F.2d 89 (objective chill can be justified only by a good faith investigation), Paton v. LaPrade, 469 F.Supp. 773 (D.N.J.1978) (good faith criminal investigation needed before a mail cover regulation can issue).[5] Even if there were a compelling interest in private, high level infiltration without a reasonable 1056 suspicion of criminal conduct, the City has not shown why the information sought could not also be acquired by *1056 less drastic means, such as sending infiltrators to Alliance meetings open to the public. In short, the police infiltration into Alliance's board in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity violated Alliance's first amendment rights.
The City has also failed to demonstrate, or even argue, any interest whatever in intentionally testifying falsely to a congressional committee. Although the City certainly has an interest, indeed the duty, to answer Congress' lawful requests for testimony as to the information the police have lawfully accumulated, this court can conceive of no reason, let alone a compelling one, which would justify the intentional giving of false testimony to that or any investigative body. Therefore, this particular action of the police also violated Alliance's first amendment rights.
2. CPC
The discussion as to the Alliance infiltration applies with equal force to CPC. The police, it is admitted, had no reasonable suspicion that CPC was engaged in any criminal conduct. Therefore, the police involvement in infiltrating one of its informers into the position of treasurer, and the inevitable disruption and distrust within the organization caused by such infiltration, cannot be justified on first amendment grounds, especially in the absence of any argument that the information thus obtained could have been acquired by less drastic means.
The police action in inviting the Tribune reporter to the CPC weekend conference at the camp location also unnecessarily infringed on CPC's first amendment rights. Even if this court were to assume that all of the statements the police made to the reporter about CPC were true, and it was only the reporter who then published the falsehoods, there is no reason why the police had to invite the reporter to the campsite at all. The court fails to see how the police investigation was advanced by the presence of a newspaper reporter at the scene of investigation. If anything, the published story may have made it more difficult for the police to conduct their investigation. In any event, the City offers, and I find, no compelling reason for permitting the police to render available to a reporter information about CPC's lawful conference activities to a newspaper, thereby enabling that reporter to write a story on those activities. See Philadelphia Yearly, 519 F.2d at 1338 ("It is not apparent how making information concerning the lawful activities of plaintiffs available to non-police groups [television broadcasters] or individuals could be considered within the proper ambit of law enforcement activity.") Therefore, the police action in inviting the newspaper reporter to the campsite violated CPC's first amendment rights.
3. Montgomery
As to Montgomery, the police again admit they had no reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Yet the police accumulated an extensive dossier detailing almost all facets of Montgomery's life, from her participation in political events to conversations at a cocktail party, to medical facts about her child. Without any reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, the court cannot conceive of any remotely compelling interest the City has in recording which political activities an individual chooses to involve herself in, let alone to whom the individual writes her checks, and any family medical problems that may exist. The recordation of such information can only serve to stifle the very sort of lawful, robust dissent that the first amendment, from its inception, was intended to protect. Therefore, the police maintenance of a dossier on Montgomery which was so extensive as to create an entire portrait of her personal, family, financial, and political life, violated her first amendment rights in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and in the absence of any evidence that the information came from exclusively public sources.

IV. Conclusion
The defendant has violated the first amendment rights of Alliance, CPC, and Montgomery in the specific ways 1057 described *1057 above. Rayner and Hogan have not presented justiciable first amendment claims so the court
does not consider the merits of those claims. In accordance with the agreement of the parties, the court enters judgment in favor of plaintiffs Alliance and CPC, and against defendant City of Chicago, for $20,625 apiece plus costs, and enters judgment in favor of plaintiff Montgomery for $10,000 plus costs. Judgment is entered in favor of defendant City of Chicago as against plaintiffs Hogan and Rayner for lack of justiciability.
It is so ordered.
[1] In their brief in answer to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argue that the Alliance opinion, written in response to defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint in this case ten years ago, governs whether Tatum applies to the facts of this case. It is true that Alliance held that Tatum and its progeny did not bar plaintiffs' claim, as set forth in the allegations of the complaint. However, that opinion is not dispositive of the current motions for summary judgment, since the court is no longer working with the same set of allegations. Instead, the court has been presented with a set of stipulated facts which are in many ways different from the allegations of the complaint. The court must therefore reassess the relevance of Tatum in light of this new set of facts.
[2] It is not clear from the record whether the police position "opposite" the camp was open to the public, or whether CPC and the other groups had some reasonable expectation that no one would have access to that position without their permission. Plaintiffs do not argue that the police concealed their position or placed themselves somewhere that was not generally accessible to the public. In the absence of any arguments on the impropriety of the police setting up their equipment "opposite" the camp, the court will not rule on that question. It is worth noting, however, that police photography from places open to the public has been held not to produce a justiciable first amendment claim. See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335, 1337 (3d Cir.1975).
[3] Although the record indicates that the reporter merely "accompanied" the police to the camp, I think the conclusion is inescapable that the police invited the reporter to watch the conference events. To conclude otherwise would be to suggest the uncanny coincidence that the police and the reporter were investigating the same organization at the same time and place and just happened to independently arrive at the campsite together. Without at least some argument by defendant that this is what in fact happened, I must conclude that the reporter was actually invited to attend.
[4] A different question might be presented if plaintiffs had presented evidence showing that the police did more than simply interview informers who had come to the police with information on the plaintiffs. In particular, if after receiving information for the first time from an informer, the police directed the informer to keep up the appearance of a friendly relationship with the person informed on while continuing to inform on him, a constitutional claim might be stated since the police admit they never had any reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Although Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) permits police participation in informer duplicity, the Hoffa investigation took place in the context of reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Hoffa's holding was based on the fourth amendment, but in Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. 561, 570-75, after a lengthy discussion, the court held that a first amendment analysis leads to the same result. Thus, under Jabara, when police participate in getting an informer to maintain a duplicitous relationship with an individual, there must be a "good faith" investigation underway. There was no good faith investigation underway here. However, since the record for the individual plaintiffs does not establish any police complicity in getting the informers to maintain a duplicitous relationship with the individual plaintiffs, no constitutional claim is presented.
[5] None of the cases provides a precise definition of a "good faith" criminal investigation. However, it appears clear that a good faith investigation requires more than a mere "subjective perception of a threat." Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. 561, 574 n. 7. Accordingly, the court is of the opinion that a good faith criminal investigation requires at least some reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. While the standard of reasonable suspicion of

criminal conduct is itself imprecise, it is not as stringent as probable cause. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir.1985). The Supreme Court has often recognized a difference between a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and0907what is required for probable cause a 0907 reasonable probability of criminal conduct. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421-22, 101 S.Ct. 690, 696-97, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922-23, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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 66 F.Supp.2d 899 (1999)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. American Civil Liberties Union, et al. Plaintiffs,
v. The City of Chicago, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
September 30, 1999.
90012 *900 *901 *902 Edward J. Koziboski, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Edward W. Feldman, Thomas M. Staunton, Miller, Shakman, Hamilton, Kurtzon & Shlifke, Chicago, IL, Harry Joshua Nelson, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd, Chicago, IL, Paul Anthony Tanzillo, McBreen, Kopko, McKay & Nora, Chicago, IL, Imani Chiphe, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Chicago, IL, Edward M. Ordonez, Davida Kay Forrest, Sanchez & Daniels, Chicago, IL, Howard Patrick Morris, Margaret A. Unger, Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Kenneth Paul Dobbs, Law Offices of Kenneth P. Dobbs, Chicago, IL, Roger Sanford Hutchison, Chicago, IL, Bruce William Melton, Ellen M. Babbitt, Babbitt & Melton, Chicago, IL, for defendant Albert J. Heitman.
R. Joseph Sher, Torts Branch Civil Division, Washington, DC, for F.B.I.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, District Judge.
Before the court are the parties objections to a Report and Recommendation ("R & R") issued by Magistrate Judge Bobrick on March 9, 1999. Defendant City of Chicago ("City") asks the court to modify a consent decree entered into nearly twenty years ago. Both sets of plaintiffs, the Alliance to End Repression ("Alliance") and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") filed a motion with the court to enforce the consent decree. In his R & R, Judge Bobrick denied defendant's motion. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts Judge Bobrick's R & R as modified and denies defendant's motion to modify the consent decree.
Background
Magistrate Bobrick does an excellent job detailing the long history of this case and the facts involved. Therefore, the court will not burden the parties, long familiar with this litigation, with a protracted review of what has happened thus far. Instead, the court will simply summarize the points most salient to the issues presented by the current motions.[1]
The consent decree at issue here stems from two prior class action suits in which a number of organizations claimed the City and its agents abridged their First Amendment rights through use of various investigative practices. The consent decree provides extensive regulations intended to govern the City's investigation of political and other activities engaged in by plaintiffs. As Judge Bobrick noted,
the heart of the decree pertains to police department investigations that are directed toward First Amendment activity, setting out procedures for such investigations (citation omitted) ... It prohibits the gathering of First Amendment information unless it is so necessary to and inseparable from an

investigation that its gathering cannot be avoided.... Investigations will be terminated when there is no longer reasonable suspicion of a crime, the investigation's purpose has been achieved, or written authorization has expired... At the conclusion of the investigation, all First Amendment information shall be purged 0907 that is, placed in sealed files 0907 unless there remains reasonable suspicion of a crime and there is a nexus between that and the exercise of First Amendment rights.
903 *903 (Mag. Bobrick's R & R at 10.) ("R & R"); see also Alliance, 561 F.Supp. 537 (N.D.Ill. 1982) ("Alliance I") The decree also provided various procedures whereby the police would obtain authorizations to investigate protected First Amendment activity. It permits the criminal investigation of First Amendment conduct to obtain evidence of ongoing, past or potential criminal activity where reasonable suspicion exists and a variety of conditions, intended as procedural safeguards, are met. Furthermore, when the police discover that a group is advocating the use of unlawful force in furtherance of the First Amendment, the consent decree permits the City to conduct a brief preliminary investigation that can be extended where use of violence is a credible threat. The decree requires independent audits of police activity and compliance is monitored by the Chicago Police Board.
The City now asks the court to modify the consent decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Arguing that Magistrate Bobrick incorrectly recommends denial of its motion, the City urges the court to permit modification of the decree. Plaintiffs of course ask the court to adopt Magistrate Bobrick's R & R and continue enforcement of the consent decree.
Analysis
The United States Magistrates Act, as amended, allows district court judges to refer pre-trial motions to magistrate judges, who read the submissions of the parties, hold hearings if necessary, and prepare reports and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. The appropriate standard of review of the magistrate judge's recommendation is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For dispositive motions, such as this one, the statute requires that the district court judge "make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge's] ... recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "A district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." Id.
Referring motions to magistrate judges is intended to help ease the heavy workloads of the district courts and to aid in the efficient resolution of the disputes. Anna Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Constr. Co., 747 F.Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (S.D.Ill.1990). Efficiency in judicial administration requires that all arguments be presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. Anna Ready Mix, 747 F.Supp. at 1303. The court need not conduct a new hearing, but must give "fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections have been made." Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, No. 90 C 1476, 1994 WL 171660, *1 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 1994), citing 12 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3076.8. It is with these principles in mind that the court reviews each party's objections.
In essence, Magistrate Judge Bobrick ruled that the City's motion must be denied because it fails to meet the burdens established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).[2] Under Rule 60(b)(5), "the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application" Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). The Supreme Court has construed Rule 60(b) to require a party seeking modification of a consent decree to 904 "bear[] the *904 burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree. If the moving party meets this standard, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing either a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 382, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992).
Judge Bobrick suggests that defendant's motion can be denied on two separate bases: (1) the City's motion is untimely and therefore the court has no jurisdiction to consider it and (2) under Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County

Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the City cannot establish that modification is warranted. (R & R at 17, 21.) The following objections have been submitted to the court.
I. City's Objections
According to the City, Judge Bobrick has wrongly concluded that it fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b). Defendant maintains that in light of the circumstances, its filing of the Rule 60(b) motion is timely and that it has met the burdens established by Rufo.
A. Timeliness
Magistrate Bobrick rightly points out that Federal Rule of Procedure 60(b) provides that a motion brought under this provision "shall be made within a reasonable time." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The City's principal argument on the merits is that a Seventh Circuit opinion issued in 1984 warrants a modification of the consent decree. Judge Bobrick arrives at the very reasonable conclusion that thirteen years (from 1984 to 1997 when the City filed its motion to modify the consent decree) "is not just an unreasonable delay in filing such a motion, but an incredibly unreasonable delay." (R & R at 14.) Citing several cases in which the court denies a party's request to modify judgment for unreasonable delay, Judge Bobrick suggests that dismissal of the City's request would be appropriate here as well. U.S. v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1992) (two-year delay unreasonable); Lee v. Village of River Forest, 936 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir.1991) (two-year delay is unreasonable); Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir.1986) (four month delay).
In response to Magistrate Bobrick's concerns, the City asserts that its delay was reasonable "both because it wished to establish that its prior and quite egregious investigation practices had been completely eliminated before seeking modification of the doctrine, and because the law governing the modification of the decree in 1984 contained a significantly more onerous standard for modification than the standard subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Rufo." (Def's Mem. at 2.) While courts tend to find multi-year delays inexcusable, "[t]here is no hard and fast rule as to how much time is reasonable for the filing of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion; courts have found periods of as little as a few months unreasonable, and have found periods of as long as three years reasonable." Sudeikis v. Chicago Transit Authority, 774 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir.1985) (eight year delay unreasonable).
On its face, the City's thirteen year delay does seem unreasonable. Yet under certain circumstances, the court may excuse such a delay. "What constitutes `reasonable time' depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and [the consideration of] prejudice [if any] to other parties." Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir.1986), citing Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.1981). Although the court finds the City's delay at the very least, curious, it is reluctant to dispose of such a vital matter on procedural grounds 0907 regardless of how irresponsible the City's actions appear. The Court in Rufo reminds us, "The upsurge 905 in institutional *905 reform litigation since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), has made the ability of a district court to modify a decree in response to changed circumstances all the more important. Because such decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380-81, 112 S.Ct. 748. The court agrees wholeheartedly with Magistrate Judge Bobrick's characterization of the City's delay and finds defendant's arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. Yet, given the import of the issues involved here, the court will nonetheless proceed to the merits.[3]See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 376, 112 S.Ct. 748 (motion to modify based upon decision rendered 10 years earlier); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (motion to modify based, in part, upon decision nine years earlier). Although the court finds that the City's motion can be denied for failure to file in a timely manner, it will also set forth alternative bases for denial.

B. Rufo standard
The City sets forth several arguments in support of its contention that it satisfies the burdens delineated in Rufo. First, it argues that the law governing the City's investigative practices changed in 1984 when the Seventh Circuit rendered its decision in Alliance to End Repression, et al. v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1984) ( Alliance II). Second, it contends that the factual circumstances have changed in that defendant no longer engages in the misconduct that gave rise to the decree. Third, the City asserts a two policy arguments in support of modification. It argues that the decree constrains local power in perpetuity and that it is unduly burdensome. The court will address each argument in turn.
1. Change in the law under Alliance II
Under Rufo, "a decree must be modified if one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties later becomes impermissible under federal law, and may be modified when the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent.... [or] if the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of governing law." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 369, 112 S.Ct. 748. The City maintains that the Seventh Circuit "changed the legal landscape in which the parties entered into the Alliance decree and substantially eroded the federal claims upon which the Decree was based." (Def. Mem. at 24.) Alternatively, the City suggests that the law was so unsettled at the time the consent decree was created, the parties agreement is based on a misunderstanding of the law. The City submits that "the parties could have concluded that the decree was a permissible remedy for at least arguable constitutional violations." (Def.'s Mem. at 28.)
Magistrate Judge Bobrick rejected both of the City's arguments and concluded that "The [Alliance II] court did not announce a change in the law, as the City would have it ... Rather, the court found that the new guideline was not inconsistent with the consent decree." (R & R at 20.) Judge Bobrick also discarded the City's argument that the decree was based upon a misunderstanding of the governing law. "The City does not even address the purported misunderstanding or provide evidence of it anywhere in its statement of facts." (R & R at 21.)
906 This court agrees with both Judge Bobrick's and plaintiffs' assessment of Alliance *906 II's effect. In Alliance II, the Seventh Circuit, en banc, considered whether a portion of national guidelines governing domestic security and terrorism investigations by the FBI violated a consent decree, similar to the one in this case and intended to prevent infringement of First Amendment rights. In that case, the relevant portion of the consent decree read as follows:
The parties agree that the following general principles apply to FBI activities relating to the domestic activities of United States persons: (a) The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Alliance II, 742 F.2d at 1010; citing paragraph 3.4(a), 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill. 1981). Plaintiffs sought to exclude the following sentence from the new FBI guidelines ("Smith guidelines"), charging that they violated the mandates of the consent decree: "When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm." Alliance II, 742 F.2d at 1010. The district court agreed with plaintiffs that this sentence violated the consent decree and issued an injunction barring the language of the Smith guidelines. Alliance, 561 F.Supp. 575, 582-83 (N.D.Ill.1983); aff'd 733 F.2d 1187 (1984). However, on rehearing en banc the court reversed the district court decision. Alliance II, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1984).

The Seventh Circuit held that the consent decree and the new guidelines were not irreconcilable on their face. Rather than finding that the decree trumped the new guidelines or vice versa, the court held that a reasonable interpretation of the decree and the guidelines allowed for a reconciliation of the two means of governing FBI investigations. "By reading the critical sentence in the decree as prohibiting improperly motivated investigations (other parts of the decree, not in issue in this appeal, prohibit improper investigative techniques), we can reconcile the decree and the new guidelines, maintain a proper separation of powers, yet protect the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and the other class members." Alliance II, 742 F.2d at 1019-20.
Alliance II did not announce a change the law warranting modification of the consent decree. The court stopped well short of doing that. It stated, "Any actual as distinct from purely verbal threat to compliance with the decree lies in the future; we decline to anticipate that the Justice Department will so interpret the new FBI guidelines as to violate the district court's decree." Alliance II, 742 F.2d at 1019. Rather than finding that, as defendant suggests, it is legal to conduct investigations of First Amendment activity without reasonable suspicion, the court simply held that the language of the consent decree is open to an interpretation that does not prohibit the police from performing investigations of First Amendment activity where a proper motive is found-a proper motive being one that is supported by evidence that an investigation is warranted and that the investigating agency is not infringing upon the rights of those who are simply exercising their First Amendment rights.[4]
907 *907 Just as the holding in Alliance II was consistent with the FBI consent decree, it is so with the decree in this case. The ACLU plaintiffs say it well. "The Alliance court did not change First Amendment law. Instead, the focus of the opinion was contractual construction, not constitutional adjudication. To understand the `context' of the FBI Decree in order to construe it (citation omitted), the Court found it necessary to set forth the law, as it was, not make new law." (ACLU's Mem. at 60.) The holding in Alliance II is limited, confined to the unique provisions of the FBI consent decree and the proposed guidelines whose implementation plaintiffs argued would create noncompliance under the decree. Therefore, this court rejects the City's contention that the Alliance II court eroded the First Amendment claims upon which the decree in this case were based, or that it "made legal" anything the decree was designed to prevent.
2. Misunderstanding of the law
Citing Judge Getzandanner's comments concerning the uncertainty of the law on government investigations of political and First Amendment activity, the City urges the court to interpret Alliance II as a clarification of the law warranting modification of the consent decree. According to the City, "when a decree is based on the parties' uncertainty about an unsettled area of law, a subsequent clarification in the law will warrant relief under Rule 60 (b)(5)." (Def.'s Mem. at 29-30.) The court in Rufo suggests otherwise. "To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and would serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-90, 112 S.Ct. 748.
Before a court will modify a consent decree based upon a misunderstanding of the law, the court must find that both parties were mistaken as to the law and that the decree was founded upon that mistaken view. "While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in circumstances that would support modification if the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 748. Plaintiffs contend that no such misunderstanding existed at the time the parties entered into the consent decree. "[T]he parties did not base their City decree on any joint belief as to the constitutionality of police intelligence activities .... If the parties simply disagreed as to the law, as was the case here, a clarification does not constitute a Rufo-type change in the law" (Alliance Mem. at 5.) An examination of the decree finds support for the Alliance plaintiffs' version of events.
A review of the decree makes clear that the parties were not in agreement as to the state of the law. "The 908 Settlement does *908 not declare the lawfulness of any investigative or intelligence procedure." Alliance, 561
F.Supp. at 555. It appears that, at the decree's inception, both parties anticipated the possibility of disagreement over the decree's meaning in the future. "The presentations of the parties at the fairness hearing demonstrate

that they would not necessarily agree on all possible applications of the language of the provisions in the abstract or in hypothetical cases. However, both sides have agreed to submit to enforcement by the Court, if and when specific disagreements arise in concrete cases in the future ... The parties' various interpretations of the principles are not binding. All that is binding now is the language of the document; the only binding interpretations will be made later, by the Court, in the context of real disputes." Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 554-55. The City has offered this court no evidence to suggest that the decree was based upon a misunderstanding of the law that has now been clarified by the ruling in Alliance II. As such, the court rejects both of defendant's arguments that a modification of the consent decree is warranted by a change in the law under Rufo.
In light of the City's argument that the "decree's numerous and onerous restraints on police intelligence work have no basis in federal law and do not secure any federal right, the Decree should be modified," (Def.'s Mem. at 34), further discussion of the actual mandates of the decree and the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment is warranted. The City devotes significant energy to the advancing the argument that no federal interest is served by continued enforcement of the consent decree. The court disagrees. The district court approving the decree set forth the document's main points.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaints against the settling defendants is a constitutional challenge to an alleged classwide course and pattern of conduct consisting of three basic types of alleged domestic intelligence practices: (a) investigations of persons and groups based on their lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, (b) disruption and harassment of persons and groups engaged in the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, and (c) the use against such persons and groups of investigative means which are overly intrusive, in violation of First and Fourth Amendment rights, or which are otherwise illegal.
10. The relief sought on behalf of the plaintiff classes is essentially twofold: a declaration that such investigations, disruption, and investigative means are unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting their continuation....
12. The City of Chicago Settlement includes a set of prohibitions against improper activities which apply to any agent or agency of the City of Chicago. They include the proscription of any investigation undertaken because of a person's First Amendment conduct; of any disruption of or interference with a person because of such conduct; and of any collection of First Amendment information by illegal methods.
13. Extensive regulatory provisions were written into the injunction, concerning areas of police activity that are proper but have the potential to interfere with First Amendment activities.
Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 549. Defendant seems to suggest that Alliance II concluded that plaintiffs' federal rights under the First Amendment are limited to freedom from government activity which prevents an individual or group from engaging in protected activity. This is a misreading of the opinion. The Alliance II court expressed the belief that perhaps the cost of diminished First Amendment protections was outweighed by the benefits in preventing crimes of violence. It did not announce a rule of law sanctioning the abandonment of the right to be free from First Amendment intrusions altogether.
909 *909 Defendant's reading of two additional Seventh Circuit cases is also misguided. Neither the holding in Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), nor the holding in David B. v. McDonald, 116 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir.1997) suggest that the consent decree is not built upon a protectable federal right. In its memorandum, the City correctly argues that both Evans and McDonald stand for the proposition that a decree must be modified or even abandoned when it no longer serves a substantial federal interest. In Evans, the court made clear that "[a] consent decree may be under System Federation must be-based on more than consent. It depends upon rules of law that govern the public official's conduct." Evans, 10 F.3d at 478 (referencing System Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961)).
The Evans court rejected the plaintiffs' argument in that case that the consent decree was necessary to continue protection of their purported due process and equal protection rights to obtain prompt payment of tort judgments. The Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the plaintiff creditors' equal protection argument and intimated that a due

process claim would fail as well. "Unless there is a substantial claim under federal law, the district judge should not enter or continue to enforce a consent decree affecting the operation of a governmental body." Evans, 10 F.3d at 482. In McDonald, the court questioned whether any federal law or interest was furthered by the mandates of the decree and held that an Illinois statute passed subsequent to entry of a consent decree between plaintiffs and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) required modification or construction of the decree that would permit DCFS to comply with the statute. McDonald, 116 F.3d at 1150. In so doing, the court affirmed the principles espoused in Evans, noting that "a substantial federal claim is essential to both entry and enforcement of a consent decree." Id.
The facts of these cases are distinguishable from the case now before the court. In both Evans and McDonald, either a court (in Evans) or a legislature (in McDonald) made clear that the federal right the consent decree sought to protect was not viable. A reading of Alliance II that suggests the Seventh Circuit no longer considers it a protectable right to be free from having political speech or other forms of expression effectively "chilled," cannot be reconciled with the current state of the law. That court recognized that the First Amendment does not only protect citizens against outright infringements upon or suppression of one's right to free speech or to engage in political, artistic or other forms of expression. It protects against other more subtle intrusions as well. The court notes:
Admittedly the repressive effect [of the Smith guidelines] will not be zero. No one wants his name in an FBI investigatory file; and the knowledge that the FBI investigates groups that advocate violent change could deter some people from joining such groups and deter the groups themselves from engaging in lawful though minatory forms of advocacy. There would therefore be a cost to the values protected by the First Amendment, if the groups never stepped over the boundary that separates privileged from indictable speech.
Alliance II, 742 F.2d at 1016.
A review of Supreme Court First Amendment cases suggests that the right to hold ideas or beliefs concerning public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious matters, the right to assemble privately concerning such ideas or beliefs, the right to advocate alternative systems of government, and the right to associate in connection with legal advice and litigation 0907 protections sought by plaintiffs under the decree 0907 are alive and well and still protected under the First Amendment. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 910 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) *910 ("The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed"); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (holding that a statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) citing, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) ("[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular view-points, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic"). Courts still recognize that the Constitution still protects citizens against harassment, unwarranted investigation and surveillance based upon the exercise of First Amendment rights. They have simply held that these rights are not without limitation. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 754, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (balancing right of abortion opponents to protest in front of abortion clinics against government interest in protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services, ensuring public safety and order, and protecting citizens' property rights). This court found no holdings that would render the rights furthered by the consent decree in this case unprotected.
Furthermore, the law does not require modification simply because the consent decree here operates at a level above the constitutional floor. "It is well-established that consent decrees may embody conditions beyond those imposed directly by the Constitution itself .... The condition must, of course, be one that is related to elimination of the condition that is alleged to offend the Constitution." See Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir.1996). The procedural safeguards, reporting requirements and prohibitions against unwarranted investigations or surveillance established in the consent decree meet this burden. Each of the conditions are grounded in one principal goal: to protect citizens' against potential First Amendment violations by the City's agents who perform

investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct. See Decree, 1.1; Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 561.
3. Changed circumstances under Dowell
Next, the City argues that the fact that it has complied for several years necessitate that the decree be modified. Principally, defendant contends that under Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 89, Oklahoma County, Okl. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), the mandates of the consent decree are no longer necessary to protect plaintiffs against infringements of their constitutional rights. According to defendant, "the City has undisputedly complied with the Decree's provisions for a substantial period of time and there is no claim that it has continued or is likely to resume the practices that gave rise to the Decree." (Def.'s Mem. at 34.) As such, since it appears "unlikely" that the City will "revert to the misconduct that spawned the decree," the court should lift "requirements upon the Chicago Police Department that go beyond the First Amendment limitations for other police departments." (Def.'s Mem. at 34, 43.)
Magistrate Judge Bobrick once again rejected the City's argument. Judge Bobrick first disputes the City's contention that Dowell controls on this issue. He suggests that the consent decree in Dowell and cases like it are distinguishable from the one here and that compliance alone is not enough to obligate the court to modify the decree. In Dowell, the Supreme Court distinguished desegregation decrees from other types of decrees and held 911 that "a finding by the District Court that the *911 school system was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its former ways, would be a finding that the purposes of the desegregation litigation had been fully achieved." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 238, 111 S.Ct. 630.
The court agrees with Judge Bobrick's interpretation of Dowell. The standard established in that case does not apply here. The Dowell court makes very clear that ordinarily "compliance alone cannot become the basis for modifying or dissolving an injunction." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246, 111 S.Ct. 630 (citations omitted). However, in the case before the Court the consent decree was aimed at reaching a different end. "From the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 630. Therefore, once that end 0907 remedying past discrimination 0907 was met, it can be argued that, the work of the consent decree was complete. The same cannot be said here. The goals of the consent decree in this case were proscriptive, not remedial. "The City of Chicago Settlement contains specific agreements with respect to future activities of the City of Chicago which would for the first time specifically prohibit political spying and harassment by the City .... They include the proscription of any investigation undertaken because of a person's First Amendment conduct; of any disruption or interference with a person because of such conduct; and of any collection of First Amendment information by illegal methods." Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 543, 549.
Further proof of Dowell's inapplicability in this case is the Court's discussion of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). The Court maintained that the standard enunciated in Swift, that a decree could not be lifted or modified absent a showing of "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions," Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, would be inappropriate in assessing the need for continuing a desegregation decree. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248, 111 S.Ct. 630. Unlike the decree in this case, in Swift, and others where the parties agree to refrain forever from certain activity, the decrees in desegregation cases like Dowell are intended as temporary remedies and are to be lifted once the specified goal is achieved. Of course, the Swift, "grievous wrong" standard was eventually replaced by the more flexible one announced in Rufo, not the Dowell standard. The distinction the Dowell court makes between the desegregation decree and the one in Swift suggests that it would be inappropriate to use the Dowell standard in considering modification of the Alliance.
The court therefore rejects the City's argument that the Dowell standard should apply in this case and as such, without a showing of either a significant change in factual conditions or in law under Rufo, the court cannot modify the decree.
Judge Bobrick concluded that, even if showing compliance were sufficient, the City's compliance under the consent decree was not undisputed. In light of plaintiffs' allegations of at least six instances of noncompliance,

Judge Bobrick found that "it is not beyond dispute that the City has complied with the decree." (R & R at 22). Of course, the City maintains first that none of plaintiffs' allegations can be assumed true for the purposes of this motion. However, just as plaintiffs' allegations should not be assumed true, they cannot be ignored and assumed false either. This court need not reach the question of whether or not the City has established a record of compliance under the decree. As noted above, the appropriate standard for modifying a decree under Rule 60(b) was enunciated in Rufo, not Dowell. As such, the issue of whether the City has fully complied with the decree is not relevant.
4. Policy Arguments
912 First, the court notes that much of the City's policy argument is based upon a *912 misinterpretation of the consent decree. Many of the "prohibited activities" the City complains of, are in fact, not prohibited under this court's reading of the Decree. The decree expressly permits the investigation of First Amendment conduct in the course of performing a valid governmental function. "The Judgment permits, but regulates, investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct in the course of performing a valid governmental function specified herein." Decree, ¶ 1.1.3; Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 561. Both the Alliance and ACLU plaintiffs agree. (See Alliance Mem. at 36) ("The City's purported interpretation of the decree as prohibiting or impeding law enforcement is not based on any expressed interpretation by the court or the Plaintiffs"); ACLU Mem. at 21 ("the City bases its claim for modification on an alleged need to perform activities that the Decree already permits"). Since many of the City's claimed prohibited activities are actually permitted, the court finds that the City's concerns that continued enforcement of the decree is bad public policy are exaggerated.
The City specifically makes two additional arguments aimed at persuading the court to consider the policy implications of the continued enforcement of the consent decree. First, the City raises a number of federalism concerns. Defendant writes, "[i]n determining whether to vacate or modify a consent decree, a court should consider the importance of restoring control over local functions to those officials that are accountable to the local electorate, rather than having an unelected and unaccountable judiciary control local institutions indefinitely." (Def.'s Mem. at 43.) Whenever a court is called upon to exercise its monitoring function, it must constantly keep in mind the hallowed principles of separation of powers and federalism. This court is no exception. As the Evans court reminds us, a consent decree "entangles an arm of the federal government in the administration of another sovereign, monitoring the budgetary decisions of a Mayor and City Council rather than enforcing strictly legal rights." Again, such a step "may be taken with justification." Evans, 10 F.3d at 477-78. Such a justification exists here.
While the court does not believe modification of the consent decree is warranted here, it is mindful of the boundaries courts must respect when balancing the individual freedoms protected under the Constitution and the rights of local and State governments to fashion their own laws and policies so as to protect their citizens. Were there no federal interest to be protected in this case, the court would be obligated to extract itself. Evans, 10 F.3d at 479. However there is an important federal interest involved in this litigation. As noted above, the First Amendment protections the decree was designed to further are still recognized under the law.
Furthermore, the consent decree does not mandate that "municipal officials 0907 and the electorates to which they are accountable 0907 should forever be deprived of their right to control the instrumentalities of local government." (Def.'s Mem. at 44.) If that were so, the court is quite sure that the City would not have entered into the consent decree, regardless of which administration was in charge. In fact, "[c]ounsel for both parties state that the City of Chicago Settlement negotiated by them in their considered opinion, is fair, reasonable and adequate." Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 544. The consent decree does not require the City to relinquish control over investigations, it merely provides procedural safeguards to ensure that the City does not abuse the control it maintains to investigate and prevent criminal activity.
The City also maintains that the decree must be modified because of the significant burdens continued compliance and enforcement places on it's ability to serve and protect Chicago citizens. Each of the parties engage in an extensive discussion of various investigative activities the City believes the decree prohibits. The 913 court has thoroughly examined each parties' submissions and concludes that much of what the *913 City

believes is prohibited is not. The City is authorized, under relevant law and the decree to engage in investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct, as long as a "valid governmental purpose" exists. Alliance, 561 F.Supp. at 561. Therefore, contrary to what the City argues, much of its proposed investigative activity directed at terrorism or political crimes, gangs, policing demonstrations, hate crimes, and interjurisdictional efforts falls within the boundaries of the decree. "It is the expectation of the parties ... that the great majority of police activity (e.g. investigation of property crimes, personal violence, narcotics and gambling, as well as routine patrol and on view enforcement action) will not be affected this Judgment." Id.[5]
Additional Related Motions
The court assumes that its discussion concerning the parameters of the consent decree will assist the parties in future construction of the decree and therefore, the court denies the Alliance plaintiffs' motion for an interpretation of the consent decree as moot. Under Section II.A.1 of the decree, the parties may request interpretation of the decree. To the extent the parties still have questions, the court invites each of the parties to submit a motion for an interpretation of the consent decree that is directed at specific provisions of the decree as well as proposed conduct. The court also denies Countermedia Petitioners' motion to set a trial date and Alliance Plaintiffs, et al.'s petition to enforce the consent decree as moot.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above the court adopts the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Bobrick as modified in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The court therefore denies the City's motion to modify the Chicago Consent Decree [3076-1]. The court also denies as moot, Alliance plaintiffs' motion to interpret the consent decree [3098-1], Countermedia plaintiffs' motion to set a trial date [3119] and plaintiffs' third amended petition to enforce the consent decree as moot [3120].
[1] Throughout this opinion, the court may however reference the more detailed facts provided in Magistrate Bobrick's R & R. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, et al., 74 C 3268 and ACLU v. City of Chicago, et al., 75 C 3295 Report and Recommendation (Magistrate Judge Bobrick, Mar. 9, 1999).
[2] Even though the parties have submitted factual statements similar to those required on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews defendant's request to modify the consent decree under Rule 60(b), not Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the court's view that the parties utilized the mechanisms provided in Local Rule 12 as a practical matter, to facilitate the court's consideration of the extensive submissions, not to establish a distinct procedural posture for review. Furthermore, the issues involved on this motion are principally legal in nature.
[3] Furthermore, the City bases its argument for modification, in part, on their claim that factual circumstances no longer warrant the decree as it now reads. The City seems to argue that it has taken several years for these changed circumstances to come to fruition and as such, defendant's delay is justified. Although this position seems more like a posthoc rationalization than a reasonable excuse, the fact that there is no clear start date for the changed circumstances provides an additional reason for the court not to deny defendant's motion as untimely.
[4] The court is puzzled by the City's repeated references to the "clear holding enunciated in Alliance II." For example, "The en banc Alliance opinion makes plain that much of what the Decree is designed to prevent is in fact entirely legal." (Def.'s Mem. at 24); and "it is plain that the Decree's prohibition on investigations that are begun as a result of statements that are protected by the First Amendment, but which have a proper law enforcement purpose, enjoins investigative activity that is entirely lawful." (Def.'s Mem. at 25.); and "this Decree merits modification because it enjoins conduct that the opinion makes plain a federal injunction should not proscribe." (Def.'s Mem. at 27.); and "The en banc Alliance opinion makes clear that the Decree's prohibition on investigations based on conduct protected by the First Amendment in the absence of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot is not properly related to remediating a federal constitutional violation; indeed the opinion

explains that such a prohibition impermissibly intrudes on legitimate law enforcement prerogatives." (Def.'s Mem. at 28.) The court finds no such pronouncement. Given the Alliance II court's rather circuitous path to its holding, the court strains to identify the ruling repeatedly referenced by the City. This task is made especially difficult given the absence of cites directly to the Alliance II opinion. Judge Cudahy's comments from the dissent are instructive, "I have found it hard to pinpoint precisely what the majority has held [in Alliance II]." Alliance II, 742 F.2d at 1020, (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
[5] Having found that no modification of the consent decree is warranted, the court need not consider whether the City's proposed decree is sufficiently tailored to conform to the current state of the law and the facts of the case. However, the court notes for the record that the City's proposal appears to be a significant deviation from the original consent decree.
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 561 F.Supp. 575 (1983)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.
April 18, 1983.
576 *576 Richard Gutman, Chicago, Ill., for Alliance plaintiffs.
Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, Chicago, Ill., for ACLU plaintiffs.
J. Charles Kruse, Sp. Litigation Counsel, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GETZENDANNER, District Judge:
These actions come before the court on motions for preliminary relief. Plaintiffs seek an order temporarily restraining the Federal Bureau of Investigation from implementing within the City of Chicago portions of the Attorney General's newly-announced Guidelines on Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. (Hereafter referred to as the "Reagan Guidelines"[1]) Plaintiffs contend that the challenged portions of the new Guidelines are inconsistent with the "permanent principles," Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182, 200 (N.D.Ill.1981), underlying the settlement agreement concluding these two lawsuits. For the reasons to follow, the court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled in part to relief they seek.
I.
These cases commenced nearly ten years ago with the filing of complaints asserting that various "federal defendants"[2] had engaged in conduct within the City of Chicago violative of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. In particular:
Plaintiffs in both cases claim that the settling defendants have conducted surveillance of, and compiled dossiers on, their lawful political and other lawful activities; gathered information about plaintiffs by unlawful means, including warrantless wiretaps and break-ins, unlawful use of infiltrators and informers, and by other unlawful means; disrupted and harassed plaintiffs' lawful activities; and further, that defendants have also committed these alleged wrongs against members of the plaintiff classes, all as part of a continuing course and pattern of alleged illegal conduct.
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 186. After many years of "sharply contested" litigation, id. at 187, the parties proposed in late 1980 a settlement agreement for the court's approval.
As both suits had been certified as class actions, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.1977) (affirming the certification order), a fairness hearing on the terms of the proposed settlement was held.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). The court heard arguments from numerous objectors, but ultimately entered the agreement on August 11, 1981, finding it "fair, reasonable and adequate." Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 204.
577 *577 In broad brush, the agreement sets forth in ¶ 3.4 several "general principles" the FBI must follow while conducting "domestic security investigations." Paragraph 3.5 of the agreement further restricts in more specific ways the Bureau's latitude of operation. In particular, ¶ 3.5(c) incorporates, inter alia, the rules set forth in the then-governing Guidelines on domestic security investigations promulgated by former Attorney General Edward H. Levi. The Reagan Guidelines supersede the Levi document.
The prospect of superseding Guidelines was considered and dealt with by the parties in drafting their agreement. Paragraph 3.6(c) holds that superseding regulations must in general be employed in construing ¶ 3.5(c). However, the final proviso to ¶ 3.6 makes explicit that "future or amended written Departmental or Bureau regulations, guidelines or other procedures, or conduct relating to the use of investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.5 shall be in accordance with the principles stated in Paragraph 3.4, and the applicable provisions of federal statutes and the United States Constitution." Because of this caveat, the court dismissed the objection voiced at the settlement hearing "that the proposed FBI settlement rests on government assurances or on Attorney General Guidelines which can be unilaterally withdrawn. It does not. The FBI agreement rests on permanent principles (¶ 3.4) which govern Justice Department and FBI procedures and conduct in Chicago, and which are subject to independent, external construction and enforcement by this Court. (¶¶ 5.1 and 5.2) [authorizing, inter alia, petitions by any plaintiff "for an appropriate order to enforce the Stipulation."]" Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 200-01. At oral argument on the present motions, the Government acknowledged that it is within the court's power to enjoin the implementation within Chicago of the new Guidelines to the extent they embody standards for action inconsistent with those established by the settlement agreement.[3] The court will now address whether this is in fact the case.[4]

II.

Paragraph 3.4(a) of the agreement explicitly bars the FBI from "conduct[ing] an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." The Reagan Guidelines encourage violations of this norm by permitting investigations to commence solely on the basis of a target's exercise of protected First Amendment rights.

The reasoning leading to this conclusion begins with section III.B.1.a. of the new Guidelines which provides:

A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when the facts or circumstances

reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of

furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence

578

and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States. The standard *578 of "reasonable

indication" is identical to that governing the initiation of a general crimes investigation under Part

II. In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider all of the

circumstances including: (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur;

(3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an

investigation.

The cross-referenced standard of "reasonable indication" (section II.C.(1))

is substantially lower than probable cause. In determining whether there is a reasonable indication of a federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.

Section I of the Guidelines 0907 entitled "General Principles" 0907 offers further guidance as to when the requisite "objective, factual basis" for investigation is present:
In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.
Plainly read, the final sentence of the passage last quoted allows investigations when (1) the target "advocate[s] criminal activity"; and (2) it is not "apparent ... that there is no prospect of harm." Much of the advocacy covered by this standard, however, falls within the protective shield of the First Amendment.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam), teaches that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." The standard embraced by the Reagan Guidelines is more lenient in three respects. First, under the Guidelines, the feared "harm" need not be, as it must under Brandenburg, "imminent."[5] Second, and also contrary to Brandenburg, the feared "harm" need not be "likely."[6] Finally, the speech need not be "directed" (i.e., intended)[7] to cause imminent, lawless action.
To the extent, then, that the statement in paragraph 3.4 of the settlement agreement proscribing investigations 579 "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First *579 Amendment" means "solely on the basis of activities
protected under Brandenburg," plaintiffs are clearly entitled to relief. The response pressed in the Government's briefs (but not in oral argument) is that this equation should not be drawn. The Brandenburg decision dealt with attempts by the state to punish speakers through criminal sanctions. The Reagan Guidelines, by contrast, deal only with the "more limited" power to investigate. Thus, according to the Government, an activity may be "protected" from punishment, but not from investigation.
As a matter of "pure" constitutional law, this line of argument may or may not have validity. The court expresses no opinion on this question since it is simply irrelevant. The present proceedings were not brought to vindicate First Amendment rights per se. The court is hearing an enforcement proceeding authorized by a settlement agreement, and it therefore follows that the issue is whether the promulgation and implementation within Chicago of the Reagan Guidelines violate the rights conferred by the agreement, not whether such activity violates the plaintiffs' rights under the Constitution. In other words, to the extent the agreement affords protection greater than that demanded by the Constitution,[8] plaintiffs may be entitled to prevail, whatever the outcome of the "pure" constitutional analysis.[9] The phrase "protected by the First Amendment" found in paragraph 3.4, though it refers by its very terms to a provision of the Constitution, cannot be construed in the abstract. It is to be given the meaning intended by the parties when they signed their agreement.
The terms of the Joint Motion and Stipulation containing the settlement agreement clearly indicate that the questioned provision in paragraph 3.4 incorporates the Brandenburg standard. Paragraph 3.1 of the Joint Motion states that both parties entered into the settlement on the basis of the "understanding of [various Governmental regulations, including in particular the Levi Guidelines] reflected in ¶ 2.2." In ¶ 2.2 the plaintiffs expressed their view, confirmed through extensive discovery, that the Levi Guidelines were "not intended to permit domestic security investigations of groups which advocate the necessity for violent revolution at some time in the indefinite future, but which do not now engage in serious crimes or violence or advocate imminent serious crime or violence." The plaintiffs believed in short that the Levi Guidelines embraced the Brandenburg test (a point expressly made in testimony 0907 cited in the Joint Motion 0907 before Congress by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General). The plaintiffs further believed that, so construed, the Levi Guidelines were "consistent with the principles of Paragraph 3.4 below." Thus, one of the understandings "reflected in ¶ 2.2" was that the phrase

"protected by the First Amendment" found in ¶ 3.4 incorporated the test enunciated in Brandenburg. And, as noted before, both parties entered into the agreement on the basis of this understanding.
In arguing for a contrary construction, the Government relies wholly on two letters it wrote to the court during the fairness hearings on the settlement. These letters express the view that "advocacy of illegal conduct, however general or unspecific in nature, is not immune from investigation." But as the court made clear in its opinion approving the settlement, the parties' unilateral "interpretations of the principles expressed to date are not 580 binding. *580 All that is binding now is the language of the document; the only binding interpretations will be made later 0907 by the Court 0907 in the context or real disputes." Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 200.
Moreover, it is significant that in drafting their agreement, the parties chose to employ a phrase 0907 "protected by" 0907 that is often used in First Amendment litigation to embrace the meaning ascribed by plaintiffs. The two letters cited by the Government, both written after the agreement was signed, do not justify a holding that an unusual and different meaning was intended.
In sum, the court finds that the settlement agreement embraces the principles of Brandenburg as the test for initiating investigations. The court further finds that the Reagan Guidelines authorize investigations on much lesser showings. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, and the only question that remains on this phase of the case is the form it will take. Plaintiffs initially sought a preliminary injunction, but as defendants themselves point out in their brief, there is no reason not to make a permanent ruling now.[10] The court has found a facial inconsistency between the Guidelines and the agreement. The parties sharply disagreed over the legal meaning of the agreement, and the court has ruled. No further factual or legal issues remain to be resolved on this issue, and the value of further proceedings is accordingly difficult to detect. A permanent injunction will issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2).
III.
With respect to four of the remaining challenges to the Guidelines, a different form of dispute has emerged among the parties. As to these points, there is little, if any, disagreement as to the type of conduct permissible under the agreement. The disagreement centers instead over the wording of the Guidelines. The Government asserts that the challenged language, as interpreted by the FBI, does nothing more than authorize the type of behavior all concede is allowable. The plaintiffs are not so sanguine, and fear that at some future point in time the defendants will exploit the allegedly "loose" language in the Guidelines to the hilt, and thereafter engage in conduct forbidden by the agreement.
The court will not grant plaintiffs' request for relief on this phase of the case for the simple reason that the court is not convinced that the challenged provisions mean anything more than what the FBI now represents. The defendants have made showings, both through the representations of counsel and through the documents tendered as exhibits to the defendants' brief, that the Administration does not read the disputed passages in the way plaintiffs fear. Future discovery may cast doubt on these assertions, but at present there is no basis for the court to doubt the defendants' words. As there is thus no basis upon which to conclude that the settlement agreement has been or is likely to be violated, injunctive relief is neither required nor appropriate. Courts do not lightly tread into the realm of the Executive Branch, especially when concerns of national security are implicated.
In reaching this conclusion, the court has carefully considered and rejected each of the arguments pressed by the plaintiffs as to why the FBI should be required to place its "narrowing constructions" explicitly in the Guidelines, and not simply in internal memos and briefs. Plaintiffs first assert that ¶ 3.6 of the settlement agreement requires that the Guidelines themselves comport with the principles in ¶ 3.4. Second, plaintiffs fear that the FBI's "informal" assurances might change at some future point, and without notice. They recognize that even 581 Guidelines can be revoked (as the Levi Guidelines were), but assert *581 that such actions by their nature attract great attention and notice. Finally, it is charged that in the First Amendment realm, the allegedly imprecise drafting found in the Guidelines simply will not do. Precision of regulation is needed. Otherwise, the exercise of rights may be chilled by the fear of what the assertedly vague language could mean.

The first point clearly lacks merit. The documents and briefs filed with this court have no independent significance; they are simply aids for interpreting the Guidelines. The only reason they were introduced was to establish what the Guidelines themselves mean.
As to the second point, it is simply too speculative to form a basis for relief. Moreover, should the Government's interpretation of the Guidelines change, the court fully expects to be informed. The court is expressly relying upon the representations made thus far as to the manner the Government will construe the disputed provisions, and has no doubt that counsel for the Government will inform the court of any change in the Government's position. [11]

The "chilling effect" argument is simply out of place. As pointed out before, the court is concerned at this moment with contractual rights, not with First Amendment rights per se. Thus, plaintiffs' argument is cognizable only to the extent plaintiffs are contractually entitled not to be "chilled" under any circumstances. They are not. The contract plaintiffs signed guarantees that they will not be subjected to various forms of investigation, and that the defendants will not promulgate documents inconsistent with these precepts; it does not afford blanket protection from being inadvertently "chilled" in some way. In any event, much of the "chilling effect" problem can be ameliorated by the simple expedient of having the court list the disputes that have arisen, and the Government's representations of what it believes the provisions at issue to mean. These disputes are as follows:

(1) The "General Principles" statement notes that "[n]othing in these Guidelines is intended to prohibit the FBI from collecting and maintaining publicly available information consistent with the Privacy Act." Plaintiffs fear that the FBI might maintain a dossier on controversial groups that do not qualify for a full (or even preliminary, see below) investigation. Director Webster's "Airtel" temporarily limits, pending further study, the "collection of publicly available information to cases under preliminary inquiry or full investigation in accordance with the Guidelines." In light of the court's prior comments, it should go without saying that if later study results in a new policy, the court expects to be informed.

(2) Section III.B.1.c. authorizes "the collection of information about public demonstrations by enterprises that are under active investigation pursuant to paragraph [III.]B.1.a. above." The fear here is that the FBI might not confine its surveillance to the group already under investigation, but might instead investigate other groups that appear at the demonstration as well. The FBI maintains that the former, more restrictive interpretation will be followed.

(3) Section III.B.3.a.(1) allows for the investigation of both "members of the enterprise and other

persons likely to be knowingly acting in furtherance of its criminal objectives, provided that the

information concerns such persons' activities on behalf or in furtherance of the enterprise."

Plaintiffs theorize that the "acting in furtherance" language is so broad it could even apply to,

among others, lawyers who defend revolutionaries on trial for their prior acts. The FBI represents

582

that individuals lawfully *582 exercising their rights, such as the lawyer, are not covered.

(4) Section IV.B.3. states that "[u]ndisclosed participation in the activities of an organization by an undercover employee or cooperating private individual in a manner that may influence the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment must be approved at FBIHQ, with notification to Department of Justice." According to plaintiffs, this provision countenances even deliberate attempts to influence a target's First Amendment activity, provided only that the necessary approval is obtained. Compare ¶ 3.4(b) of the agreement (banning the use of "any technique designed to impair [plaintiffs'] lawful and constitutionally protected political conduct"); ¶ 3.5 of the agreement (banning "any unlawful disruption or harassment of the lawful activities of any United States person.") Director Webster's "Airtel," however reveals that the challenged provision "does not grant authority to influence rights protected by the First Amendment. It is intended to be a safeguard to insure that our investigations do not unintentionally influence the exercise of those rights." So construed, the challenged language acts as an extra safeguard, over and above that already provided by the agreement.

IV.
The final challenge concerns the use of informers and infiltrators during "preliminary inquiries." Such inquiries 0907 which are geared solely to determining whether a full-scale investigation is warranted (section II.B.(1)) 0907 may commence if the FBI "receive[s] information or an allegation not warranting a full investigation 0907 because there is not yet a `reasonable indication' of criminal activities 0907 but whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond the prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads." (Id.) Sections II.B.(4)-(6) describe the types of investigative techniques that may be used during this initial phase. The final proviso to section II.B. (6) makes clear that "highly intrusive" techniques are permissible "only in compelling circumstances and when other investigative means are not likely to be successful." The wording of Director Webster's "Airtel" indicates, however, that the development of new informants and infiltrators does not fall within the "highly intrusive" category. Accordingly, this technique may be employed if authorized by "a supervisory agent." (section II.B.(6)) Such agents "should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means." (section II.B.(4))
Plaintiffs claim that the FBI has violated the requirements of ¶ 3.4(c) of the settlement accord by not subjecting the use of informants and infiltrators to the more stringent requirements governing "highly intrusive" techniques. Paragraph 3.4(c) obligates the FBI to act "with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and [to] conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights."
To hold for the plaintiffs the court must thus conclude that preliminary inquiries will be conducted in a manner violative of the principles set forth in ¶ 3.4(c) due to the FBI's failure to categorize the use of informants and infiltrators as "highly intrusive." However, there is simply no evidence to sustain such a charge, and the court is not willing to assume that the FBI will pay only lip-service to the admonitions of section II.B.(4) quoted above. As before, discovery may reveal a much different picture. But at present, plaintiffs have not shown enough to prevail.
V.
For the reasons stated, defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from implementing within the City of 583 Chicago the following provision found in the Attorney *583 General's Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprises and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations promulgated March 7, 1983:
When, however, statements advocate criminal activity ... an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.
In all other respects, plaintiffs' motions for temporary relief are denied. Discovery should commence promptly. Hearings on the remaining requests for a permanent injunction will begin at 11:00 a.m. on June 27, 1983.
It is so ordered.
Appendix
3.4. The parties agree that the following general principles apply to FBI activities relating to the domestic activities of United States persons:
(a) The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(b) The FBI, in investigating United States persons, shall not employ any technique designed to impair their lawful and constitutionally protected political conduct or to defame the character or reputation of a United States person.
(c) The FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and shall conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.
3.5. In return for the release of all claims, as more fully set forth in Paragraph 3.8, below, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, on behalf of themselves, their successors, and their subordinates, agree that:
(a) Any electronic surveillance activities in the City of Chicago shall be in accordance with the Constitution and applicable federal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976) and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (Supp. II 1978).
(b) They shall not conduct in the City of Chicago any warrantless unconsented physical searches in domestic security investigations, any unlawful unconsented physical searches of premises or property of U.S. persons in foreign intelligence collection or foreign counterintelligence investigations, any unlawful entries that constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment, or any unlawful disruption or harassment of the lawful activities of any United States person. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a warrantless search in circumstances in which a warrant is not required to conduct a search for law enforcement purposes. As used in this subsection the term "unconsented physical searches" does not apply to a search for the purpose of placing, maintaining, or removing authorized electronic surveillance devices or conducting surveys in connection therewith; or to the receipt by the FBI of information, property or materials furnished by individuals acting on their own initiative, without direction or request by the FBI, regardless of the manner of acquisition.
(c) Any of the following investigative activities in domestic security investigations or in foreign intelligence collection or foreign counterintelligence investigations concerning U.S. persons shall comply with all applicable federal statutes, Presidential Executive Orders, written Departmental or Bureau regulations, guidelines and other procedures established in accordance with such statutes or Executive Orders, including but not limited to the 584 procedures and instructions listed in ¶ 2.1 above. The statutes, Executive Orders, regulations, guidelines *584 and procedures referred to in the preceding sentence are those in effect on the effective date of this Joint Stipulation.
(1) Physical or photographic surveillance of any U.S. person in the City of Chicago not employed by the Department of Justice.
(2) Participation in any organization in the City of Chicago by FBI personnel or informants or assets without disclosing their intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials in the organization; and
(3) The acquisition, dissemination and storage of information about U.S. persons in the City of Chicago not employed by the Department of Justice.
3.6. Any provision of Paragraph 3.5 shall be superseded by:
(a) Any future federal statute or Presidential Executive Order specifically authorizing or directing the Attorney General or the Director of the FBI, or their subordinates, to utilize any investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.5, or
(b) Any future written Departmental or Bureau regulation, guideline or other procedure relating to the use of the investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.5, which is established in accordance with and is consistent with such statute or Presidential Executive Order, or
(c) Any future or amended written Departmental or Bureau regulation, guideline or other procedure relating to the use of the investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.5(c), which is established in accordance with and is consistent with an existing statute or Presidential Executive Order or pursuant to the Attorney General's supervisory responsibilities to manage and direct the activities of the Department of Justice,

Provided, that future or amended written Departmental or Bureau regulations, guidelines or other procedures, or conduct relating to the use of investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.5 shall be in accordance with the principles stated in Paragraph 3.4, and the applicable provisions of federal statutes and the United States Constitution.
[1] This document, promulgated March 7, 1983, also contains Guidelines relating to "General Crimes Investigations" and "Racketeering Enterprise Investigations." These standards are not relevant here, except for the portion of the "General Crimes" section dealing with "Preliminary Inquiries." See Part IV., infra. The full text of the new Guidelines can be found at 32 Crim.L.Rep. (BNA) 3087 (1983).
[2] The "federal defendants" are specifically listed at 91 F.R.D. 186.
[3] There can be no doubt that the plaintiffs have standing to mount the sort of facial challenge outlined in the text. Paragraph 3.6 of the agreement flatly prohibits the promulgation of new Guidelines (to the extent they pertain to Chicago) if the principles they contain conflict with those found in ¶ 3.4. In the language of the agreement, such Guidelines "shall be in accordance with the principles stated in Paragraph 3.4." (emphasis added) As the court previously remarked, "[u]nder the final proviso to ¶ 3.6, future Justice Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, procedures and conduct relating to investigative techniques described in paragraph 3.5 must comply with these principles." Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 197 (emphasis added). Thus, plaintiffs have suffered injury-in-fact by the very promulgation of the new Guidelines, assuming of course that the allegations of facial inconsistency are in fact correct. Under such circumstances, defendants have breached an obligation owed directly to the plaintiffs under the terms of the agreement.
[4] The full text of paragraphs 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 of the settlement agreement are reproduced in the Appendix following this opinion.
[5] This fact is clearly apparent from the very lack of any "imminence" requirement in the passages quoted in the text. Moreover, in an "Airtel" (a form of internal FBI memorandum) dated March 17, 1983, FBI Director William H. Webster further remarked that the new Guidelines "should eliminate any perceptions that actual or imminent commission of a violent crime is a prerequisite to investigation." (See Exhibit B to the Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Alliance Plaintiffs' Motion)
[6] Indeed, under a literal reading of the statement of "General Principles," an investigation may be warranted even if there exists only "some" prospect of harm, however small. In the "Airtel" cited in note 4, supra, Director Webster narrowed the Guidelines' language somewhat, stating that an investigation should not commence unless "the statement of advocacy taken in context presents a credible threat of harm." (emphasis added) This interpretation does not eliminate the gap between the Reagan Guidelines and Brandenburg. Many threats may be "credible," but not "likely."
[7] See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109, 94 S.Ct. 326, 329, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (per curiam).
[8] both the objectors and the plaintiff proponents have represented to the Court that the FBI and the Justice Department, in pending litigation elsewhere, currently assert that the Constitution does not prohibit them from engaging in practices which would be prohibited in Chicago by the principles of the settlement here.
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, supra, 91 F.R.D. at 198.
[9] On the other hand, even if the agreement provides less protection than the Constitution, plaintiffs might once again be entitled to relief, but not in this proceeding. Raising an argument directly under the Constitution would entail bringing a separate lawsuit, not a proceeding to enforce a settlement agreement. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel agreed with these sentiments.
[10] Clearly, some form of injunctive relief is needed, as there is no adequate remedy at law to rectify the harm suffered by plaintiffs. The court can conceive of no meaningful way to calculate whatever damages might be due. Moreover, the public interest in enjoining the Government to live by its agreements is patent.

[11] For the same reason the court declines to rule for plaintiffs on the basis of their assertion that the FBI "cannot be trusted" since the Bureau has in the past "always" interpreted its restrictions expansively once "the heat was off."
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 565 F.2d 975 (1977)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
James M. ROCHFORD, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. Griffin B. BELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 77-1680 and 77-1679.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued September 30, 1977. Decided November 22, 1977. Rehearing and Rehearing Denied February 13, 1978.
Thomas P. Sullivan, U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., Robert E. Kopp, Jonathan B. Smith, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., William R. Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, Jerome A. Siegan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.
Robert J. Vollen, Richard M. Gutman, Robert C. Howard, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
976 *976 Before SWYGERT and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges, and CROWLEY, District Judge.[*]
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied February 13, 1978.
SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.
The only issue raised in this interlocutory appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying the plaintiffs' suits as class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
This is a consolidated appeal of two class certification decisions by the same district court in separate, but quite similar, law suits. In both cases the plaintiffs are various individuals and organizations that claim that they, and others like them, have been the subjects of an institutionalized course and pattern of unconstitutional conduct[1] by the defendants, various city and federal investigative or intelligence-gathering agencies and their employees. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against this allegedly unconstitutional course of conduct.[2]
Both suits have withstood motions to dismiss and both have been certified by the district court as class actions under subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules. There are two classes of plaintiffs defined in each suit, and their definitions, with minor variations not relevant here, are as follows:
1. Plaintiff individuals.
The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
2. Plaintiff Organizations.

The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
The defendants in both cases moved the district court to reconsider its class certification order or alternatively to 977 certify its order for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).[3] The district court denied the defendants' *977 motions to
reconsider, but granted the defendants' motions to certify the orders for appeal. Defendants filed petitions for permission to file an interlocutory appeal which this court granted. Thus, this court properly has jurisdiction over this appeal under section 1292(b).
II
In order for a suit to be certified as a class action in a federal court, it must satisfy all four of the requirements set out in Rule 23(a)[4] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, in addition, it must satisfy one of the conditions of Rule 23(b).[5] In reviewing a district court's decision to certify a particular class, our review is limited to whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1976); King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 519 F.2d 20, 25 (7th Cir. 1975). Also, we must be mindful that the district court has the power at any time before final judgment to revoke or alter class certification if it appears that the suit cannot proceed consistent with Rule 23's requirements. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1); Walsh v. City of Detroit, 412 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.N.Y.1973). Defendants argue that the district court has already abused its discretion in certifying these suits as class actions because they allegedly violate the requirements of Rule 23 in several respects. Since we disagree with each of defendants' contentions, we affirm the district court's order certifying these classes.
Defendants initially argue that the district court's description of the classes of plaintiffs is too vague to define any ascertainable class. While there is nothing explicit in Rule 23 regarding this contention, many courts have held that there is a "definiteness" requirement implied in Rule 23(a).[6]See, e. g., DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815, 93 S.Ct. 66, 34 L.Ed.2d 72 (1972); Metcalf v. Edelman, 64 F.R.D. 407, 409-10 (N.D.Ill.1974); Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F.Supp. 445, 448 (S.D.Miss.1964), aff'd 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam). We do not disagree with that conclusion of law. However, whether the description of a class is sufficiently definite to permit ascertainment of the class members must, of necessity, be determined on a case-by-case basis. We hold that the 978 classes described by the *978 district court are sufficiently clear to satisfy any definiteness requirement of Rule 23.
The important distinguishing characteristic of these two classes is that their scope is defined by the activities of the defendants. They include only those individuals and organizations operating in Chicago that have been subjected to the alleged pattern of unconstitutional harassment by the defendants. This fact alone distinguishes all of the cases cited by defendants, places this case squarely within this court's previous holding in Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified in part on rehearing en banc, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (equally divided court), and creates the most compelling policy argument for certifying this class.
In those cases in which class certification has been denied on account of indefiniteness, the primary defect in the class definition has been that membership in the class was contingent on the state of mind of the prospective class members. See, e. g., DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970); Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Benecke, 63 F.R.D. 675, 679-80 (W.D.Mo.1974); Eisman v. Pan American World Airlines, 336 F.Supp. 543, 547 (E.D.Pa.1971). In Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F.Supp. 445 (S.D.Miss.1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), the purported class included "workers for the end of discrimination and segregation in Mississippi, for the encouragement of the exercise by Negroes in Mississippi of their right to vote . . . and for the exercise and preservation of civil rights generally in Mississippi." Id. at 448. The court concluded:

The vague and indefinite description of the purported class depends upon the state of mind of a particular individual, rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether any given individual is within or without the alleged class.
Id.[7]
In our case membership in the classes certified by the district court is based exclusively on the defendants' conduct with no particular state of mind required. Thus, there is no definiteness problem, as read into Rule 23 by other courts, created by these classes.
That conclusion is reinforced by this court's holding in Pilliod, supra. There the class at issue consisted of all persons of Spanish surname in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the class had been subjected to a "pattern and practice of harassment." 540 F.2d at 1065. This court held that the class was neither "ill-defined" nor "amorphous" because it "consists of all individuals who by virtue of defendants' policy are likely to be subjected to the illegal conduct." Id. Thus, this court has made it clear that a class that satisfies all of the other requirements of Rule 23 will not be rejected as indefinite when its contours are defined by the defendants' own conduct.
Any other conclusion in this situation would give rise to an extremely incongruous result. To hold as defendants request would permit class action certification to be avoided by a potential defendant merely by expanding the scope of his illegal conduct in order to make the class of plaintiffs less well-defined. We reject any such result by holding that the classes certified by the district court are sufficiently definite to satisfy Rule 23.
III
979 Defendants contend that there are no common questions of fact or law. It is *979 their view that this suit really involves an aggregation of individual claims, as is often the case in securities law and antitrust suits. See, e. g., Feldman v. Lifton, 64 F.R.D. 539 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y.1971); Kekich v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 64 F.R.D. 660 (W.D.Pa.1974). Defendants argue that the variety of practices complained of (see note 1 supra) and the variety of constitutional amendments allegedly violated make this suit inappropriate as a class action.
Defendants' arguments ignore the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint 0907the existence of an unconstitutional pattern and practice of intelligence gathering concerning various law abiding organizations and individuals. It is this pattern of unconstitutional activity, fostered by the existence of a conspiracy among various federal and state agencies, that creates the common question of law or fact sufficient to satisfy Rule 23.[8]
Once that common issue of law or fact is alleged it makes no difference that a variety of specific activities are complained of or constitutional violations are alleged. See Pilliod, supra at 1066-67; Medrano v. Allee, 347 F.Supp. 605, 610 (S.D.Tex.1972), aff'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F.Supp. 361, 372 (D.S.C.1974). We feel that the analysis of the Ninth Circuit regarding the common question of law or fact requirement in a securities case is equally appropriate here. "The common question requirement should not be restrictively interpreted . . . [when] to do so would eliminate the class action deterrent for those who engage in complicated and imaginative rather than straightforward schemes to" violate constitutional rights. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 903 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 57, 50 L.Ed.2d 75 (1976).[9]
IV
In a similar vein, defendants argue that the disparate claims involved in this case preclude a finding that "the party opposing the class has acted . . . on grounds generally applicable to the class . . ." as required by Rule 23 (b)(2). Defendants again focus on the individual qualities of this suit and ignore the "pattern or practice"

characteristic of defendants' conduct that is "generally applicable to the class." See Medrano v. Allee, supra; Green v. Cauthen, supra.
V
Defendants, relying on Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D.Ill.1973), also argue that the size of this class makes it unmanageable. This argument is frivolous. First, Boshes was a (b)(3) class action for damages where manageability is a serious concern. Second, Boshes dealt with a suit involving a conservative estimate of between 30 and 40 million plaintiffs whereas here, the plaintiff class will likely be in the thousands. Third, this court previously has rejected the notion that the size of the plaintiff class, alone, is sufficient to bar certification even in (b)(3) class actions. Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 135 n. 14 (7th Cir. 1974). In Appleton the plaintiff class of shippers numbered "perhaps several million." Id. at 127.
VI
980 Defendants' final argument is that the district court can fashion relief sufficiently *980 broad to take account of all potential members of this class and, therefore, there is no need to certify this case as a class action. Defendants here rely heavily on the district court's decision in Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C.1976). There the court declined to certify a class that was quite similar to the one involved in this case[10] both because there was no "need" for the class in order to fashion adequate relief and because there would be substantial burdens on the parties and the court "due to the discovery problems that will inevitably arise." Id. at 164. With all due respect to that court, we decline to follow its analysis.
It is our view that while there may be appropriate cases in which there is no "need" to have a suit brought as a class action, this is not one of them. Some federal courts have adopted the view that a class should not be certified for want of "need." See, e. g., Berlin Democratic Club, supra; Stewart v. Wohlgemuth, 355 F.Supp. 1212 (W.D.Pa.1972); Gray v. Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 73 F.R.D. 638 (D.D.C.1977). See generally 3B Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 23.40, at 91-94 (Supp.1976-77). Those cases, however, provide very little explanation of when a "need" for a class action exists.
Without attempting an exhaustive examination of the "need" requirement, we suggest two factors that may assist in making this determination. First, it is important to note whether the suit is attacking a statute or regulation as being facially unconstitutional. If so, then there would appear to be little need for the suit to proceed as a class action. In such a situation, it can be assumed that if the court declares the statute or regulation unconstitutional then the responsible government officials will discontinue the statute's enforcement. If, however, the suit is based on the constitutionality of a statute as applied or of a general practice, as is the case here, then the scope of the appropriate remedy can be defined more clearly by reference to the definition of the plaintiff class.[11]
Second, if the institution of the suit as a class action affects the admissibility of evidence at trial, then the class should be certified. In this case, there might be some doubt about the relevance to the named plaintiffs' suit of evidence relating to alleged harassment or illegal investigation of non-named individuals or organizations. Since discovery in this case is still in the formative stages, it would seem premature to say that there is no need, as an evidentiary matter, for this suit to be brought as a class action. For both of these reasons, we conclude that this action satisfies whatever "need" requirement exists under Rule 23(b).
With regard to the court's conclusion in Berlin Democratic Club that the burdens of discovery should be a factor, we disagree that that should be a consideration in this type of a case. It is the scope of the defendant's alleged illegality that has created the need for extensive discovery. The scope of the illegality should not now shield the defendant from defending against a class action.[12]
981 *981 In light of all of the above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying these two classes and therefore we affirm its order.

AFFIRMED.
[*] The Honorable John Powers Crowley, District Judge of the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.
[1] The activities are alleged to include systematic dossier collection, maintenance and dissemination; use of infiltrators, informers, unlawful entries and electronic surveillance; and physical and verbal disruption and intimidation of plaintiffs' constitutionally protected speech and association.
[2] In two of the counts in plaintiffs' complaint, money damages were sought, but the class action involved here was not certified as to those two counts.
[3] That section provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
[4] to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). There is no dispute in this case regarding requirements (1), (3) and (4).
[5] Given our disposition of this case, we need only concern ourselves with subsection (b)(2)'s requirements. That subsection reads as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
* * * * * *
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. . . .
The district court certified these classes under both 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2), but since we hold that the suit is properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2), we decline to pass on the appropriateness of the 23(b)(1)(A) certification.
[6] It is not clear whether the source of this implied requirement is the express "common issue of law or fact" requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) or more simply something inherent in the very notion of a "class." Compare Metcalf v. Edelman, 64 F.R.D. 407, 409-10 (N.D.Ill.1974) with DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). Less problematic, however, is the justification for such a requirement. Since the outcome of a class action suit is res judicata as to all unnamed class members, it is crucial to have a clear definition of what groups or individuals are members of the class. See 3B Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 23.40, at 98 (Supp.1976-77): "The definition of the class represented is important, of course, when the defendant loses, since it marks the boundaries of res judicata."
[7] Similarly, in Koen v. Long, 302 F.Supp. 1383 (E.D.Mo.1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), the court held uncertifiable a class of plaintiffs who "belong to organizations which . . . [allegedly] are unpopular

with defendants, and who . . . wish to continue participating . . . in activities which are controversial and unpopular with defendants. . . ." The court reasoned:
The deficiency here urged by the defendants is precisely this one stated in Chaffee. Such a defect is even more pronounced here where membership in the class is dependent both upon the state of mind of the particular individual involved and upon the state of mind of the particular defendant involved in a situation in which it is perfectly apparent that the defendant's individual opinions as to any given organization may differ.
Id. at 1388-89.
[8] For purposes of class certification, we cannot consider the merits of the plaintiffs' lawsuit. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 1870, 26 L.Ed.2d 290 (1970); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 130 (E.D.Pa.1973).
[9] Defendants also argue that since the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated are all individual rights there is no common question of law or fact. This argument, if adopted, would put a halt to almost all class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) since that rule is devoted primarily to civil rights class actions which allege violations of constitutional rights. See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23. Defendants' argument also overlooks the alleged pattern and practice of unconstitutional activity.
[10] The proposed class in that case was
all United States civilians currently or formerly residing in the Federal Republic of Germany and the City of West Berlin who engage or have engaged in lawful, constitutionally protected political, religious, educational and social activities . . . and who as a result of these activities have been, are now or hereafter may become, the subjects of covert physical or electronic surveillance by the defendants and their agents, resulting in the maintenance and dissemination of dossiers, reports and files about them and their constitutionally protected activities in and from defendants' data banks and intelligence network.
410 F.Supp. at 163.
[11] See Ridgeway v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 134, 74 F.R.D. 597 (N.D.Ill.1977) (requirement of "need" held to be generally inappropriate in suits for injunctive relief brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
[12] We are not unmindful of the potential burden that this suit can create. However, we are quite confident that the district court will take pains to guarantee that discovery will continue for only so long as is absolutely necessary and will not permit it to be used as a device to harass or unduly inconvenience the defendants.
We should also note that defendants argue that these classes should not be certified because of the privacy interests of the unnamed members of plaintiffs' classes. There are two responses to that argument. First, accepting plaintiffs' allegations as true, it seems to us too late in the game for defendants to acquire now a zealous concern for the interest in privacy of these plaintiffs whose privacy they have literally destroyed. Second, the district court has already taken significant precautions it 0907 issued a protective order strictly limiting dissemination of personal files to the subjects thereof and their attorneys to 0907 insure against undue invasion of privacy. See also Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D.Ill.1976) (an additional order further restricting public disclosure of discovered files).
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 733 F.2d 1187 (1984)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, and United States Department of Justice, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 83-1853, 83-1854.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued October 17, 1983. Decided February 23, 1984. Vacated on Grant of Rehearing April 18, 1984.
Freddi Lipstein, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellants.
Joseph Hassett, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C., Richard Martin Gutman, Richard Gutman, P.C., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before CUDAHY and POSNER, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD,[*] Senior District Judge.
Vacated on Grant of Rehearing En Banc April 18, 1984.
1188 *1188 DUMBAULD, Senior District Judge.
On March 7, 1983, Attorney General William F. Smith announced new guidelines to govern "Domestic Security/ Terrorism Investigations" by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Separate actions were brought by appellees Alliance to End Repression (Alliance) and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to enjoin enforcement of certain parts of said guidelines on the ground that they conflict with the terms of a settlement agreement (hereinafter referred to as the consent decree) approved by District Judge Susan Getzendanner on August 11, 1981, in class actions brought by appellees herein at Nos. 74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295, and reported at 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.E.D.1981).[1] On August 18, 1983, Judge Getzendanner granted a permanent injunction.[2]
The only provision enjoined was that stating:
When, however, statements advocate criminal activity ... an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm. [Appellants' Brief, p. 17a; 561 F.Supp. at 583.]
Paragraph 3.6 of the consent decree contemplates that the provisions of paragraph 3.5 regulating investigative activities in Chicago shall be superseded by future federal statutes or executive orders or Department or Bureau regulations or guidelines
"Provided, that future or amended written Departmental or Bureau regulations, guidelines, or other procedures, or conduct relating to the use of investigative techniques described in Paragraph 3.5 shall be in accordance with the principles stated in Paragraph 3.4, and the applicable provisions of federal statutes and the United States Constitution." [Joint Appendix (J.A.) 22]
Paragraph 3.4(a) of the consent decree prescribes as a general principle applicable to FBI activities in Chicago:
The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United

States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. [J.A. 19]

The above paragraph embodies the distinction recognized in the challenged Smith guidelines between "preliminary inquiries" (which "shall be promptly terminated when it becomes apparent that a full investigation is not warranted") and "investigations." Investigations must be "based upon a reasonable factual predicate and shall have a valid law enforcement purpose."

The guidelines then proceed to the paragraph the last sentence of which was stricken down by the District Court's decision:

1189

In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime the FBI must at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances of the context in which *1189 the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm. [J.A. 77]

Investigations include "general crimes investigations" (J.A. 81) and "criminal intelligence investigations" (J.A. 83), which are subdivided into "racketeering enterprise investigations" (J.A. 84) and "Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations" (J.A. 87). This last category is the type of investigation under scrutiny in the case at bar, and to which the challenged guidelines are addressed.

The definition of criminal intelligence investigations and the policies to be practiced in their conduct are set forth clearly in the guidelines. These investigations deal with "enterprises." Such enterprises may

see either to obtain monetary or commercial gains or profits through racketeering activities or to further political or social goals through activities that involve criminal violence. These investigations differ from general crimes investigations ... in several important respects. As a general rule, an investigation of a completed criminal act is normally confined to determining who committed that act and with securing evidence to establish the elements of the particular offense.... An intelligence investigation of an ongoing criminal enterprise must determine the size and composition of the group involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended criminal goals, and its capacity for harm. While a standard criminal investigation terminates with the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, the investigation of a criminal enterprise does not necessarily end, even though one or more of the participants may have been prosecuted.

In addition, the organization provides a life and continuity of operation that are not normally found in a regular criminal activity. As a consequence, these investigations may continue for several years. Furthermore, as Justice Powell noted, the focus of such investigations "May be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2139, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). Unlike the usual criminal case, there may be no completed offense to provide a framework for the investigation. It often requires the fitting together of bits and pieces of information many meaningless by themselves to determine whether a pattern of criminal activity exists. For this reason, the investigation is broader and less discriminate than usual, involving "the interrelation of various sources and types of information." Id.

Members of groups or organizations acting in concert to violate the law present a grave threat to society. An investigation of organizational activity, however, may present special problems particularly where it deals with politically motivated acts. "There is often a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values," in such matters that is "not found in cases of `ordinary' crime." Id. Thus special care must be exercised in sorting out protected activities from those which may lead to violence or serious disruption of society. As a consequence, the guidelines establish safeguards

for group investigations of special sensitivity, including tighter management controls and higher levels of review. (J.A. 83-84, italics supplied)

With respect to domestic security/terrorism investigations the guidelines explain that these deal with "enterprises, other than those involved in international terrorism, whose goals are to achieve political or social change through activities that involve force or violence." Like racketeering enterprise investigations, they are "concerned with the investigation of entire enterprises, rather than individual participants and specific criminal acts," and include "investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members." (J.A. 87)

More specifically, the guidelines provide that:

1190

*1190 A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States. The standard of "reasonable indication" is identical to that governing the initiation of a general crimes investigation.... In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider all of the circumstances including: (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation. (J.A. 87-88)

With this context of the structure of the guidelines in view, we turn to the specific question addressed by the District Court: Whether in fact the new guidelines embody standards inconsistent with those established by the consent decree.

In reviewing the passage enjoined in the District Court's judgment, the District Court points out that: "Plainly read, the final sentence of the passage last quoted allows investigations when (1) the target `advocate[s] criminal activity'; and (2) it is not `apparent ... that there is no prospect of harm.'" [561 F.Supp. at 578]

The District Court then states that: "Much of the advocacy covered by this standard, however, falls within the protective shield of the First Amendment" and fails to comply with the teaching of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."

According to the District Court:

The standard embraced by the Reagan Guidelines is more lenient in three respects. First, under the Guidelines, the feared "harm" need not be, as it must under Brandenburg, "imminent." Second, and also contrary to Brandenburg, the feared "harm" need not be "likely." Finally, the speech need not be "directed" (i.e., intended) to cause imminent, lawless action. [561 F.Supp. at 578]

These deviations from Brandenburg are not substantial. Indeed, were we construing the guidelines by themselves, without the guidance afforded by the consent decree and by the argument of government counsel, we should be tempted to suppose that the guidelines were substantially equivalent to the Brandenburg formulation, and constituted an attempt to paraphrase the traditional principle in operational bureaucratic prose.

As the District Court points out, paragraph 3.1 of the consent decree states that the settlement agreement "is entered into voluntarily by the parties, based on the ... [Levi] guidelines ... and on the understanding of them reflected in ¶ 2.2 ..." (J.A. 17).

Paragraph 2.2 of the consent decree indicates the view that "the Guidelines are not intended to permit domestic security investigations of groups which advocate the necessity for violent revolution at some time in the indefinite future, but which do not now engage in serious crimes or violence or advocate imminent serious crime or violence." (J.A. 12)

In other words, it was understood that the phrase "protected by the First Amendment" in paragraph 3.4 "incorporated the test enunciated in Brandenburg." 561 F.Supp. at 579.
Likewise at the argument in the case at bar government counsel rejected the suggestion that the Brandenburg standard and that set forth in the challenged Smith guidelines were substantially the same with a vigorous thwertutnay.[3]
1191 *1191 Government counsel seek to escape Brandenburg as an authoritative precedent by arguing that it deals only with punishment, rather than with investigation. They contend that:
The Brandenburg decision dealt with attempts by the state to punish speakers through criminal sanctions. The Reagan Guidelines, by contrast, deal only with the "more limited" power to investigate. Thus, according to the Government, an activity may be "protected" from punishment, but not from investigation. [561 F.Supp. at 379]
This ingenious distinction may or may not be true as a matter of constitutional law, but it has no impact on the case at bar, and like the District Court we do not pause to determine its validity.
The case at bar involves a proceeding to enforce the consent decree, not one to vindicate constitutional rights per se. The government may improvidently or as a matter of trial tactics have entered into a voluntary settlement of broader scope than what was required by the Constitution. And the subject matter of the consent decree was investigations. See paragraphs 1.4 and 3.5. If with respect to investigations they adopted the Brandenburg standards, it is immaterial that that case was not strictly speaking an applicable binding precedent. The then Attorney General's authority to enter into consent decrees included "the power to make erroneous decisions as well as correct ones," Swift & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 311, 332, 48 S.Ct. 311, 317, 72 L.Ed. 587 (1928), and, we might add, improvident as well as judicious ones.
For that matter, Brandenburg could be viewed as an inapplicable precedent, not only because it dealt with punishment rather than investigation, but because it dealt with State rather than federal prosecution.
But this would be an equally fatuous distinction. The traditional principle which the consent decree derived from Brandenburg had been applied to the federal government in Dennis.[4] Since five verbose opinions were published in Dennis, it was natural to rely on the clearer statement in Brandenburg, even when referring to limitations on the activities of federal agencies such as the FBI. Indeed, the traditional principle involved in Brandenburg was nothing new. It was enunciated by Thomas Jefferson in the celebrated Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom in these words: "it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order."[5] And the Supreme Court had declared that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."[6]
Since the government has rejected the interpretation of the guidelines as paraphrasing the Brandenburg standards, and since there is therefore a violation of the settlement agreement which appellees are entitled by the terms thereof to enforce judicially, the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed, except with regard to the scope of relief granted.
We are not satisfied that an injunction against the offending passage of the guidelines is necessary. Recurring to what Justice Frankfurter often spoke of as "the traditional requisites of equity jurisdiction," the extraordinary 1192 remedy of injunction *1192 should not be resorted to unless there is lack of an adequate remedy at law and a sufficient showing of irreparable damage is made. The District Court (561 F.Supp. at 580) could "conceive of no meaningful way to calculate whatever damages might be due." But the injunction provided no pecuniary compensation to any plaintiff, and merely dealt with conduct in futuro. The government should be given the benefit of the Brandenburg doctrine which appellees espouse: unless there is substantial and imminent danger of action by the FBI violating the Brandenburg principle as embodied in the consent decree, an injunction is inappropriate, for there is no irreparable injury sustained by any plaintiff.

We do not believe that there is sufficient likelihood of such violations by the FBI in disregard of this Court's decision and of the provisions in the guidelines themselves, quoted hereinabove, recognizing the importance of the rule that "investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States," and calling for exercise of "special care" and "safeguards ... of special sensitivity, including tighter management controls and higher levels of review" in cases where there could be impact on such constitutionally "protected activities."
We note especially the specific provision, hereinabove quoted, from the guidelines which mandates (in terms reminiscent of the Brandenburg-Dennis principle) that the FBI "shall consider all of the circumstances including: (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation." (J.A. 87-88).
We note also the clear statement of Director Webster that "These guidelines do not alter our clearly stated obligation to respect constitutional safeguards reflected especially in the First Amendment" (J.A. 129) and shall expect his review of the propriety of commencing and continuing investigations in "advocacy" cases to be in keeping with the obligation he has here enunciated. Moreover, the lack of need for an injunction is further reinforced by the terms of paragraph 3.6(c) of the consent decree. In substance this provision is self-operative, and has the effect of preventing the Reagan guidelines from going into effect in Chicago or superseding the provisions of Paragraph 3.5 as they stood prior to the new guidelines unless the new guidelines were consistent with Paragraph 3.4 of the consent decree.[7]
Accordingly we direct that the District Court retain continuing jurisdiction of the case at bar, so that if any occasion for future relief might arise the proceedings may be reinstated in statu quo, without unnecessary formalities or delays, to consider any supervening alleged violations.
The judgment of the District Court will be modified by striking out the passage granting injunctive relief, and as so modified and treated as a declaratory judgment interpreting the terms of the consent decree of August 11, 1981, will be
AFFIRMED.
POSNER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.
The district judge enjoined a provision of the new Department of Justice guidelines for FBI investigations as being inconsistent with a consent decree that terminated a suit which charged the FBI with abusing its investigatory powers by harassing political organizations in Chicago. The decree, and the injunction, are limited to Chicago. I agree with my brethren that the injunction should be set aside 0907 but not that the district judge's interpretation of 1193 the consent *1193 decree should be affirmed. I both disagree with her interpretation and think she misused her equitable powers in not waiting till there was a concrete dispute between the parties before interpreting the decree.
Judge Dumbauld's opinion for this court is concise 0907 one might say summary 0907 and not without wit. I admire witty and concise opinions, remembering Holmes' adage that a judge doesn't have to be heavy in order to be weighty. But I question the appropriateness of treating the consent decree as if it were a contract between two flour dealers one of whom had "improvidently" agreed to the provision that the other is seeking to enforce, when in fact it is a federal court order circumscribing the FBI's investigative powers 0907 and not with respect to particular individuals or groups but across the board, and not in some neighborhood or small town but in America's thirdlargest city, and at a time not of domestic tranquillity but of justifiable public anxiety about domestic as well as international terrorism. As a result of the district judge's interpretation of the decree, investigatory guidelines that have not been found to violate any constitutional or statutory provision will be operative everywhere in the nation except Chicago. And while it would be overly dramatic to suggest that as a result terrorist organizations will flock to Chicago, this specter should at least give us pause before we conclude that in the consent decree the FBI tied its hands to the extent found by the district judge.
Consent decrees are like contracts (see, e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 935, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975); White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 119-20 (7th Cir.1982)), but the analogy

should not be pressed to the point of ignoring the potential consequences of the plaintiffs' interpretation for the public safety. The Second Circuit observed in a case involving an attempt to enjoin the FBI from conducting surveillance of a convention of the Young Socialist Alliance that "while the possibilities of the dissident wing in SWP [the Socialist Workers Party] being able to gain control and effectuate its desires to convert YSA into a violent movement may be less than the risks of serious student disorders in the late 1960's, the stakes are greater. The FBI has a right, indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crimes; it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention." Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 510 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir.1974) (per curiam). No more should the FBI be so obliged here.
It is true that the decree provides, under the heading of general principles, that "The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment ...." The district court and this court understand this to mean that the federal government has no greater power to investigate seditious, subversive, or otherwise menacing utterances than it has to punish criminally those who utter them. I disagree. Paying due regard to the latent issues of public safety in this appeal and reading the provision against the background of the original complaint, which alleged that the FBI had "conducted surveillance of and compiled dossiers on, [the] lawful political and other lawful activities" of the plaintiffs, Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182, 186 (N.D.Ill.1981), including such organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Friends Service Committee, I interpret the provision as merely prohibiting the FBI from conducting an investigation the object of which is to observe and thereby intimidate individuals or groups whose politics the FBI dislikes rather than to obtain evidence (or leads to evidence) of illegal conduct.
Suppose that a new organization calling itself the Islamic Revoluntionary Army announced that its goal was the 1194 violent overthrow of the United States as soon as conditions *1194 permit. Standing alone the statement probably
could not be made the basis for a prosecution. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam). Yet in these parlous times it would be simple prudence for the FBI to open a file on the IRA, to collect and collate public statements by and about it, to seek to discover (at least by nonintrusive means) who its members were, and to keep track of its activities until it was apparent that the IRA's aggressiveness was purely rhetorical. Such an investigation as I have described would not be based "solely on ... activities protected by the First Amendment"; its basis would be a concern with public safety in its most literal sense of preventing violence, even though the concern was triggered by a statement that was protected by the First Amendment from being made the basis of criminal punishment.
I grant that even the most discreet and least intrusive investigation 0907 the investigation that consists of clipping newspaper stories and dropping them in a file 0907 could if it ever came to light have some deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights. No one wants his name in an FBI investigative file. But the deterrent effect would be much less than that of an actual prosecution and would be offset by the public's interest in being protected from a more than theoretical danger of terrorist activity in this country and this city at this time. And the danger that the FBI might resort prematurely to such intrusive investigative methods as wiretapping, bugging, and breaking and entering is slight. The decree regulates those methods separately; and the new guidelines provide, "Before employing a[n investigative] technique, the FBI should consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means. Some of the factors to be considered in judging intrusiveness are adverse consequences to an individual's privacy interests and avoidable damage to his reputation. Whether a highly intrusive technique should be used depends on the seriousness of the crime and the strength of the information indicating the existence of the crime. It is recognized that choice of technique is a matter of judgment." Despite the last sentence, this passage suggests that a preliminary, nonintrusive inquiry will usually precede an intrusive investigation 0907 invariably I should think when the FBI's only basis for acting was a verbal threat to commit a crime in the indefinite future; how otherwise could the FBI gauge "the strength of the information indicating the existence of the crime"?
I have suggested that the part of the decree that is relevant to this appeal strikes the same balance as the First Amendment itself between public safety and freedom of speech. Statements which though ominous could not be made the basis of criminal punishment still can be investigated; since the repressive effect is less, a less immediate danger is adequate justification for the government action, as many cases teach. See, e.g., Zurcher v.

Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1980-82, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 488-93, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2792-95, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-95, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2662-63, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1052 (D.C.Cir.1978). Against this it can be argued that if all the decree did was to incorporate the constitutional limitations on the FBI's investigatory activities, the plaintiffs gained nothing from signing it; the decree must therefore mean more. But the "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment" passage is only one provision of the decree. And just getting constitutional limitations written into a decree benefited the plaintiffs. It put the FBI in Chicago under threat of criminal contempt if it disobeys the Constitution. The FBI faces no equivalent sanction anywhere else in the country. Antitrust decrees typically repeat the 1195 prohibitions of the statute in order to add the sanction of contempt to the other *1195 sanctions for disobeying the statute; it is the same here.
Having read "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment" to place more stringent limitations on the FBI's investigatory powers than the Constitution does, the district judge then found inconsistency between this provision and the part of the guidelines which states that, "In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment .... When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm." The last sentence in this passage is the one the district judge enjoined. The scope of the injunction is unclear, however, because it is unclear whether the word "investigation" in the sentence means just a "full investigation" or includes "preliminary inquiries." If the former, then notwithstanding the injunction (converted by my brethren into a declaration) the FBI may conduct preliminary inquiries on the basis of "statements [that] advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence ...." I attribute the ambiguity in the district judge's injunction and this court's declaration to the lack of a concrete factual context for the interpretation of the decree (a point to which I shall return). But since the parties assume that "investigation" in the quoted passage runs the gamut from "full investigation" to "preliminary inquiry," I suppose I must assume too that after today the FBI may not use a statement not itself actionable as an incitement to violence to kick off any investigative activity in Chicago, however tentative, discreet, and unobtrusive. FBI agents presumably will still be allowed to file information in their minds, but if they write down anything they are investigating.
Unlike my brethren I find no inconsistency between the decree and the guidelines. The offending sentence of the guidelines does not state that an investigation "is" warranted under the postulated conditions, only that it may be warranted. To discover when an investigation is warranted you must go to the section of the guidelines that provides, "A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaging in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.... In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider all of the circumstances including (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation." Thus before the FBI may investigate it must assess the magnitude, likelihood, and imminence of the threatened harm from the activities to be investigated (and, as is evident from the first sentence in the quoted passage, the harm must be of a type that the government is entitled to prevent through its criminal laws); and then it must compare the results of this assessment 0907 which is to say the benefits of investigating 0907 with the costs in impairing privacy and free speech. It is fairly to be inferred that if the benefits do not exceed the costs the investigation will not be authorized. Thus the guidelines read as a whole authorize an investigation only when the expected danger to society from particular criminal activity exceeds the danger that the investigation poses to the values protected by the First Amendment. This balancing process adequately protects free speech and therefore does not violate a prohibition against the FBI's conducting investigations "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment."
1196 *1196 Of course the balance might be struck incorrectly in a particular case. But if that happened the investigating officers, and their superiors who authorized the investigation, could not hide behind the guidelines; compliance with the guidelines is not a defense to a contempt proceeding for violating the decree. And in fact the

plaintiffs have not been able to show 0907 though the decree empowers them to monitor closely the FBI's compliance with it 0907 that the FBI has conducted any investigation forbidden by the decree. Their only complaint is about the entirely speculative possibility that the guidelines, if interpreted by the FBI in such a way as to be inconsistent with the consent decree, may encourage the FBI to violate it and run the risk of contempt sanctions. And this would require a misinterpretation.
In saying that the new guidelines do not contravene anything in the consent decree I do not mean to suggest that I think the new guidelines an improvement over the old ones. I do not have the kind of experience that would enable me to opine confidently on such a question. For all I know the only enhancement of domestic security brought about by the new guidelines is rhetorical. What is ominous about the district judge's interpretation of the consent decree is that it prevents the FBI in Chicago, under any form of words, from conducting any investigation that is triggered by a statement that could not be punished as an incitement or solicitation to crime. This may force the FBI to wait too long before it can begin investigating threats to domestic security.
The fact that the plaintiffs' concerns about the new guidelines are speculative suggests a second objection to enjoining or declaring invalid any portion of the new guidelines at this time: prematurity. I do not mean that we lack jurisdiction to interpret the decree. The original lawsuit was justiciable. Although the mere existence of a government program for gathering political intelligence would not create the sort of injury, actual or threatened, upon which a federal court action can be founded, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2325, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), the plaintiffs alleged a scheme that included illegal wiretapping, burglaries, and other traditionally justiciable misconduct. Even if (improbably) the pure data-gathering part of the scheme would not be actionable even in combination with the other parts, an equity decree can "fence in" a wrongdoer by forbidding activities that would not by themselves support a federal court action. See, e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429-30, 77 S.Ct. 502, 509, 1 L.Ed.2d 438 (1957); Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.1983). So the decree, even as addressed to nonintrusive investigations, was within the district court's power; and once the decree was entered, the district judge, having retained jurisdiction to supervise compliance with it, had, I should think, the power to interpret it at the request of a party even if there was no independently justiciable dispute over its application. Cf. EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir.1979); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 428, 440-48 (1977). But I question the wisdom of her exercising that power, in a case remote from the garden-variety type of equity suit in which interpretations normally are sought, before there was an actual threat to violate the decree and thus before there was a dispute over actions rather than just words.
When she originally approved the decree she had noted that the parties had "candidly admitted that they would not necessarily agree on all possible applications of the language of the principles in the abstract or in hypothetical cases," but she was "confident that in the context of concrete cases" she would be "able to perform the normal judicial function of reasonably interpreting the language to accomplish the purpose of the document as a whole.... All that is binding now is the language of the document; the only binding interpretations will be made later 0907 by the Court 0907 in the context of real disputes." 91 F.R.D. at 200. But she changed her mind, and 1197 decided not to wait for the FBI to conduct an *1197 investigation that the plaintiffs would argue violated the decree. I have argued that there is no conflict between the decree and the guidelines, if these documents are read with appropriate sensitivity to purpose and context; but I also think it premature to decide whether there is any conflict. Not so premature as to deprive the district court or this court of jurisdiction to interpret the decree but premature from the standpoint of a prudent exercise of the equitable power of interpretation.
The country has grown accustomed to federal district judges' presiding over prison systems, school systems, and mental institutions, often pursuant to consent decrees. But to put a district judge in charge of the FBI in Chicago would write a new chapter in the annals of federal judicial enterprise, and though the decree does not go quite that far it does give the judge a great deal of power over the FBI in Chicago just by virtue of the inherent ambiguity of language 0907 enough power to make her role in enforcing the decree an extraordinary one that if it is to be played well must be underplayed. A due regard for the separation of powers, the flexibility of equity, the ambiguity of the decree, the generality of the guidelines, the sensitivity and importance of the subject matter, and the limitations of judicial competence should have dissuaded her, and should dissuade us, from precipitating a premature confrontation between the judicial and executive branches in a setting where inevitably some people will say, with pardonable exaggeration, that the federal judiciary is playing fast and loose with the public safety.

I do not depreciate the abuses of police power that led to the decree, though it should be noted that they ended a decade ago and that much has changed since then 0907 not only the management of the Bureau, whose present director is a former federal circuit judge, but the magnitude of the terrorist threat, which has increased. But we must remember that the FBI will continue subject to the decree until and unless it is modified; that the decree contains effective sanctions for disobeying it; and that the new Department of Justice guidelines provide no immunity to anyone who disobeys it. Consequently there is no reason to rule, in advance of any questionable investigating by the FBI in Chicago 0907 and there has been none since the decree went into effect 0907 that a general provision of those guidelines violates a general principle of the consent decree. It should be quite enough to remind the Department that the consent decree remains in force until modified and that the Department's unilateral understanding of the decree, as embodied in its new guidelines, cannot bind the district judge should she be asked to punish disobedience of the decree by FBI agents engaged in an investigation forbidden by it. That the FBI in Chicago should operate under the pervasive constraints of a comprehensive consent decree is testament enough to the contemporary power of the federal judiciary. Let us be restrained in the exercise of that power.
[*] The Honorable Edward Dumbauld, U.S. Senior District Judge of the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
[1] Paragraph 5.1 of the consent decree authorizes petitions to enforce the settlement to be brought by appellees and others. In any event the court would have inherent power to enforce a judgment.
[2] Her opinion and order are reported in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.Supp. 575 (N.D.Ill.E.D.1983).
[3] According to John W. Davis, this term is an old English expression signifying an emphatic denial. "If the question warrants a negative answer, do not fence with it but respond with a bold thwertutnay 0907 which for the benefit of the illiterate I may explain as a term used in ancient pleading to signify a downright No." John W. Davis, "The Argument of an Appeal," 26 Am.Bar Assn.J. (1940) 895, 897.
[4] Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 509-510, 71 S.Ct. 857, 867, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951), adopting the formulation by Learned Hand in the court below.
[5] 12 Hening, The Statutes at Large [of Virginia], 84-86 (1823).
[6] Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878). See also other cases cited in Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today (1957) 111.
[7] Paragraph 3.6 reads: "Any provision of Paragraph 3.5 shall be superseded by ...
(c) Any future ... guideline ...
Provided, that future ... guidelines ... shall be in accordance with the principles stated in Paragraph 3.4, and the applicable provisions of federal statutes and the United States Constitution." J.A. 21-22.
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 742 F.2d 1007 (1984)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, and United States Department of Justice, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 83-1853, 83-1854.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued October 17, 1983. Reargued June 13, 1984. Decided August 8, 1984.
10089 *1008 *1009 Richard Martin Gutman, Richard Gutman, P.C., Chicago, Ill., Joseph M. Hassett, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Richard K. Willard, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellants.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, BAUER, CUDAHY, ESCHBACH, POSNER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and PELL, Senior Circuit Judge.[*]
Reargued En Banc June 13, 1984.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal (under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)) by the Justice Department from an order enjoining it from putting into effect in Chicago a provision of the Department's new guidelines for FBI investigations requires us to consider the proper standards for interpreting an equity decree that restricts the executive branch of the federal government in the performance of its constitutional responsibilities.
The suit out of which the order under review arose was brought in 1973 and charged, so far as is pertinent here, that the FBI's Chicago office had in the name of domestic security conducted investigations (some protracted) of the plaintiffs, among them the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Independent Voters of Illinois, the Better Government Association, the American Friends Service Committee, and a Congressman. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs posed no actual or potential threat to domestic security, that the motivation for the investigations was the FBI's dislike of their political views, and that the goal and consequence of the investigations were to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs. These allegations repair the deficiencies that led the Supreme Court to hold in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), that a challenge to the Army's domestic surveillance activities 1010 was not justiciable because the surveillance was not alleged to have *1010 affected the plaintiffs' conduct in any way. See id. at 13 and n. 7, 92 S.Ct. at 2325 and n. 7; see also United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 at 1378-1381 (D.C.Cir.1984).
In 1976 the Department of Justice published guidelines for FBI investigations (the "Levi Guidelines," after the then Attorney General). The guidelines led to a sharp reduction in the number of domestic security investigations and set the stage for the settlement of the suit. The parties signed a settlement agreement in the fall of 1980. The agreement runs to 31 doublespaced typewritten pages and includes among other extraordinary provisions a section that gives standing not only to the plaintiffs but to every resident of Chicago at the time of the settlement to enforce the decree by application to the district court, and a section that empowers the plaintiffs' representatives to monitor compliance with the decree for five years with the help of periodic reports that the decree requires the Justice Department to furnish them. The provision of particular importance in this enforcement proceeding, however, is paragraph 3.4(a), which provides (we italicize the portion most pertinent to this appeal):

The parties agree that the following general principles apply to FBI activities relating to the domestic activities of United States persons:
(a) The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
After the usual comment period, Judge Getzendanner in August 1981 approved a consent decree containing the settlement agreement. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.1981).
Eighteen months later Attorney General Smith announced new guidelines for FBI investigations ("The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations," March 7, 1983), superseding the Levi Guidelines of 1976. This too is a formidable document 0907 19 single-spaced typewritten pages. In Part I ("General Principles") the following appears (again we italicize the key portion):
In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under these Guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent, from the circumstances or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.
The plaintiffs applied to Judge Getzendanner for an injunction against the Smith Guidelines, charging that they were inconsistent with the consent decree in a variety of respects. She agreed to the extent of enjoining the last sentence quoted above (actually only the part of the sentence that we have italicized). 561 F.Supp. 575, 582-83 (N.D.Ill.1983). This appeal followed. The panel of this court that first heard the appeal modified the district court's decree to change the injunction to a declaratory judgment and affirmed the decree as so modified (one judge, however, would have reversed). 733 F.2d 1187 (1984). The full court granted rehearing en banc because of the sensitive issue of separation of powers raised by a decision invalidating in a major city a part of the FBI's nationwide investigatory guidelines.
1011 *1011 The task of interpreting the decree in this case is complicated by the absence of a concrete factual context. Usually a question about the meaning of a consent decree arises because a party does, or proposes, an activity that may violate the decree or fails to undertake an activity required by the decree; and the task is then to apply the decree to the activity. There is no activity here. As far as we know, the FBI has yet to conduct or even propose a specific investigation that might run afoul of the decree; it only wants to be allowed to tell its agents in Chicago to follow the new guidelines that the Justice Department has issued to govern FBI investigations nationwide. Although the district judge had the power to interpret the decree even in this rather bare setting, cf. EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir.1979); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 428, 440-48 (1977), the bareness of the setting requires us to resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of an interpretation of the guidelines that will avoid conflict with the decree. We do not lightly assume in advance of anything more ominous than a general statement of enforcement policy intended to be applicable nationwide that the Justice Department is trying to evade a judicial decree.
But that is what the plaintiffs are asking us to assume in pressing on us the following syllogism: Paragraph 3.4(a) of the decree forbids the FBI to "conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment"; the government may not suppress or punish statements advocating criminal activity unless they pose an immediate and substantial danger to the public safety (see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam)); therefore the Smith Guidelines, in permitting investigations based on "statements [that] advocate criminal activity" without requiring that the statements be

shown to pose an immediate and substantial danger, contravene paragraph 3.4(a). Reminding us that a consent decree "is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract," United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 935, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975), and that "the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners," United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971); see also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2586, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984), the plaintiffs argue that the quoted language from paragraph 3.4(a) is clear, and clearly inconsistent with the quoted language from the Smith Guidelines, and therefore that the injunction was proper.
We agree that our function is interpretation, and also that the words of paragraph 3.4(a) will bear the plaintiffs' interpretation of them. But the question whether the interpretation is compelled is less clear. In searching for an answer we are of course not confined to the language of paragraph 3.4(a). The relevant "four corners" are those of the decree, not of one provision of the decree. White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 119 (7th Cir.1982). Like any document, a consent decree must be read as a whole. Cf. United States v. Morton, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984) ("We do not, however, construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole"); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063-64, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). The plaintiffs concede as much by citing in support of their interpretation of paragraph 3.4(a) paragraph 2.2(2), which states that "the [Levi] Guidelines are not intended to permit domestic security investigations of groups which advocate the necessity for violent revolution at some time in the indefinite future, but which do not now engage in serious crimes or violence or advocate imminent serious crime or violence." Notice, however, that this does not say "the consent decree is not intended to permit ...." It says the Levi Guidelines are not intended to permit, and they are not part of the decree. Paragraph 2.2(2) is not even in the 1012 consent agreement, which begins with Part *1012 III. When Judge Getzendanner set forth what she called "the pertinent provisions of the FBI settlement agreement" in an appendix to her opinion approving the consent decree, she did not include paragraph 2. See 91 F.R.D. at 205-06.
Paragraph 2.2(2) appears in a statement of the reasons why the plaintiffs decided to settle the lawsuit: "the [Levi] Guidelines and other post-filing laws and procedures governing the FBI afford a reasonable basis upon which to settle this litigation. In arriving at this conclusion, plaintiffs take particular note of the following ...." ¶ 2.2. In the same vein is the statement in the decree that the parties signed the agreement on the basis of "statutes, guidelines and other procedures referred to in" the decree, including the Levi Guidelines, and on the "understanding of them reflected in ¶ 2.2." The Levi Guidelines and the other restrictions that had been placed on the FBI persuaded the plaintiffs that the defendants were acting in sufficiently good faith to warrant settling the litigation in advance of trial. The plaintiffs' reasons for settling were relevant because the suit was a class action and the district judge therefore had to approve the settlement; and indeed some members of the class objected to the settlement that the plaintiffs' lawyers had negotiated with the Justice Department. To read paragraph 2.2 as if it were a part of the agreement rather than a statement of the plaintiffs' reasons for agreeing would thus neglect the balance of the passage quoted earlier from Armour: "the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it." 402 U.S. at 682, 91 S.Ct. at 1757. It would also neglect the fact that paragraph 3.6 of the decree envisages and accepts the possibility that the Levi Guidelines would be superseded; the plaintiffs assumed the risk that a subsequent set of guidelines might not be as much to their liking as the Levi Guidelines were. And it would neglect some pertinent remarks by Judge Getzendanner when she approved the decree: "The parties have candidly admitted that they would not necessarily agree on all possible applications of the language of the principles [in the decree] in the abstract or in hypothetical cases." 91 F.R.D. at 200. The plaintiffs may not force their unilateral interpretation on the defendants.
But in any event we are far from clear that there are substantive, as distinct from verbal, inconsistencies between the Levi Guidelines and the pertinent sentences in the Smith Guidelines. See Elliff, The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 785, 798-99 (1984). The Levi Guidelines authorize a "full investigation" when there is reason to believe that a group "may be engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of federal law ...." The reason to believe might be a statement that could not itself be made the basis of a prosecution without violating the First Amendment and that did not even indicate that any law was being violated. Moreover, the Levi Guidelines, we are authoritatively told, would authorize a "preliminary investigation" on the basis of so tepid a statement, delivered by a group with no

known propensity for violence, as "The rulers have set the time for the party; let us bring the fireworks." FBI Oversight, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of H. Comm. on Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., ser. no. 2, pt. 3, at 268-69 (1976) (testimony of Attorney General Levi). And we must attend very carefully to the precise wording of paragraph 2.2(2). The domestic security investigations that the Levi Guidelines are said to forbid are investigations "of groups which advocate the necessity for violent revolution at some time in the indefinite future ...." This is a veiled but unmistakable reference to those Marxist groups that are known to preach the inevitability of the proletarian revolution as a tenet of ideology rather than as a practical 1013 goal. It need not be read to forbid investigations of groups that may be planning to turn to *1013 violence in pursuit of their aims, though not in the immediate future.
Although we do not think that paragraph 2.2 carries the day for the plaintiffs, we do agree with them, as we have said, that in interpreting paragraph 3.4(a) we are not limited to the particular words being interpreted. It is a great fallacy to think that by staring hard at an isolated sentence one can come up with a meaningful interpretation. The sentence may look clear and yet if one understood its background and context one might read it quite differently from its superficially clear meaning. To take an example far removed from law, almost everyone today thinks that "a custom more honored in the breach than the observance" means a custom that is not observed. That is what the expression viewed in isolation seems plainly to mean. But if you go back to the passage in Hamlet from which the expression comes (Act I, sc. iv, lines 8-20), you will see that the custom referred to is that of getting drunk on festive occasions, and that what "a custom more honored in the breach ..." actually means is a custom better disregarded than observed. The Complete Works of Shakespeare 1081 nn. 15-16 (Bevington ed., 3d ed. 1980).
The point is general: context, in the broadest sense, is the key to understanding language. That is why the Supreme Court in the Continental Baking case on which the plaintiffs rely refused "to ignore the flexibility of the English language, as well as the circumstances surrounding the [consent] order and the context in which the parties were operating." 420 U.S. at 243, 95 S.Ct. at 938. It is why we held in White v. Roughton 0907 like this a case requiring interpretation of a decree limiting a government agency's freedom of action 0907 that "it is permissible to construe unambiguous language where construction is necessary to determine the intended rather than the literal meaning of the decree." 689 F.2d at 120. For "the overriding purpose in construing a contract is to give effect to the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract was made; and while the language of the contract is normally the best evidence of that intent, a court can properly disregard even unambiguous language when it is convinced that the parties meant something different from what they said." Id., citing 2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 202, comment c; § 212, comment b (1981); see also Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.10, at pp. 492-93 (1982).
One thing to consider is the consequences of alternative interpretations. Suppose that the result of reading a contract in a particular way is that one of the parties assumed enormous risks and got nothing in return; this would argue against the reading. Cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City of Sheboygan Falls, 713 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir.1983). This principle of interpretation has particular relevance when a court is construing a consent decree regulating a public institution, rather than an ordinary contract (and we must keep in mind that such a consent decree "is no mere contract, even though reference to contract principles may be useful," New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1979)). The consequences of alternative interpretations may be much greater than in the case of an ordinary contract; and naturally a court will hesitate to assume that by signing a consent decree the government knowingly bartered away important public interests merely to avoid the expense of a trial. In White v. Roughton, for example, where the issue was whether a township had agreed to make a "commitment to a fixed level of benefits paid out of its tax revenues for the indefinite future [that] could seriously imperil its fiscal health," we declined to read the decree literally, because it would have meant that "the township [had] made just such an improvident commitment," id. at 121, and we were reluctant to assume that the township had discharged its duty to the public improvidently. Cf. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2585.
1014 *1014 The panel majority in this case acknowledged that under its reading of the consent decree the Justice Department may have acted "improvidently" in signing the decree, 733 F.2d at 1191, and this acknowledgment gives us pause, especially as the degree of improvidence would be altogether greater than in the White case. This is because the First Amendment, as currently interpreted, places tight limits on the government's authority to punish those who counsel or advocate violence. The Supreme Court's decisions from Schenck v. United States,

249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919), to Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra, describe a circle, ending where they began with a test of incitement. Compare 249 U.S. at 52, 39 S.Ct. at 249 ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater, and causing a panic.... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent"), with 395 U.S. at 447, 89 S.Ct. at 1829 (a state may forbid only "advocacy ... directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite or produce such action"). If, therefore, a new sect of religious fanatics announced that unless Chicagoans renounce their sinful ways it may become necessary to poison the city's water supply, or a newly organized group of white supremacists vowed to take revenge on Chicago for electing a black mayor, these statements, made by groups with no "track record" of violent acts, might well be privileged. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3433, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment protected "references to the possibility that necks would be broken"); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 296, 298, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1520, 1521, 6 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961) (same, for the statements "`he was the kind of a guy they hoped to shoot some day'" and "`Sometime I will see the time we can stand a person like this S.O.B. against the wall and shoot him,'" and for other "off hand remarks that certain individuals hostile to the [Communist] Party would one day be shot"). Or suppose the leaders of a newly formed organization of Puerto Rican separatists went around Chicago making speeches to the effect that, if the United States does not grant Puerto Rico independence soon, it will be necessary to begin terrorist activities on the mainland United States. These speeches could not, in all probability, be made the basis of a prosecution. Therefore, under the interpretation of the consent decree urged by the plaintiffs, whereby the Justice Department would have no power to investigate anything that cannot be punished, the FBI probably could not even investigate any of these hypothetical groups. And since the sentence in the Smith Guidelines that the district court enjoined applies to all investigations, not just investigations of groups, many threats made by individuals against other individuals could not be investigated either, for such threats, too, enjoy broad protection under the First Amendment, as we know from cases like Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1400, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (per curiam) ("If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.").
We doubt that in agreeing to the consent decree the Justice Department tied its hands to such an extent; for if it did, it was trifling with the public safety of the people of Chicago and maybe even violating the President's constitutional obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, § 3, cl. 3. (A variety of federal laws forbid terrorist acts: e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 231, 351, 372, 871, 875, 878, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1361, 1751, 2101, 2113, 2383, 2384; 49 U.S.C. § 1472.) The Levi Guidelines had not gone so far (and this is another reason why we find no substantive inconsistency between them and the Smith Guidelines, at least so far as the issue in this appeal is concerned). The FBI always has investigated people who advocate or threaten to commit 1015 serious violations *1015 of federal law, even if the violations are not imminent; and it always will. It "has a right, indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crimes; it is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention." Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 510 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
And what did the Department get in return for abandoning that duty, if that is what it did? By the time the case reached the settlement stage all that the plaintiffs were seeking was an injunction, and they would not have gotten a broader injunction if they had pressed the case to trial and won than they got in the consent decree. Equity decrees may "fence in" the violator, see, e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429-30, 77 S.Ct. 502, 509-10, 1 L.Ed.2d 438 (1957), but there are limits beyond which such a decree could not properly tie the hands of the FBI in investigating terrorist activities. The decree as it stands is a remarkable judicial intervention in vital executive functions; a proper decree formulated after a trial would not have been more Draconian. Cf. Judge Getzendanner's remarks in 91 F.R.D. at 197-98. Thus, if the plaintiffs are right in their reading of the decree, the Justice Department bargained away some of its essential investigative powers and got nothing in return but a saving of some litigation expenses. It did not even save "face"; for though the consent decree contains a disclaimer of any admission of liability by the federal defendants, it admits 500 "black bag jobs" by them, and says they "resulted in the obtaining of information concerning lawful political activities of the persons or organizations targeted," and in the disruption and harassment of "the lawful activities of some United States persons in the City of Chicago," "much of that activity [having] no statutory basis or justification."

We shall see in a moment that the plaintiffs, no longer willing to defend a position that would make consequences entirely irrelevant to interpretation of the consent decree, argue that the decree allows the government to make "preliminary inquiries" based on statements that could not be made the subject of a prosecution. And we shall also see that there is no basis in the decree for such an exception. The plaintiffs are willing to condone reparative surgery to save the decree from an absurd interpretation, but they reject the alternative: an interpretation of the decree with some basis in the language 0907 a free but not a reckless interpretation 0907 that avoids imputing to the Justice Department indifference to its responsibilities to the public. This interpretation is that the FBI may not base an investigation solely on the political views of a group or an individual; it must have a basis in a genuine concern for law enforcement. Thus it may not investigate a group solely because the group advocates Puerto Rican independence, a cause that most of the men and women of the FBI no doubt have little fondness for; but it may investigate any group that advocates the commission, even if not immediately, of terrorist acts in violation of federal law. It need not wait till the bombs begin to go off, or even till the bomb factory is found.
We are not speaking metaphorically. Between 1970 and 1980, domestic terrorist organizations committed more than 400 bombings in the United States. (Computed from Motley, US Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism 16 (1983) (table 1.1).) The FBI cannot hope to nip terrorist conspiracies in the bud if it may not investigate proto-terrorist organizations. That is why, as cases such as Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1980-82, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 488-93, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2792-95, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-95, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), and Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1052 (D.C.Cir.1978), make clear, the FBI would not be violating the First Amendment itself (as distinct from the plaintiffs' conception of the consent decree) if it decided to investigate a threat that was not so immediate as to 1016 permit punitive *1016 measures against the utterer. Since the repressive effect of an investigation is less than that of a prosecution but the benefits in preventing violent crime may be as great, a less immediate danger will justify the government's action. Cf. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, supra, 510 F.2d at 256; Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F.Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (Weinfeld, J.).
Admittedly the repressive effect will not be zero. No one wants his name in an FBI investigatory file; and the knowledge that the FBI investigates groups that advocate violent change could deter some people from joining such groups and deter the groups themselves from engaging in lawful though minatory forms of advocacy. There would therefore be a cost to the values protected by the First Amendment, if the groups never stepped over the boundary that separates privileged from indictable speech. But we think the cost would be outweighed by the benefits in preventing crimes of violence, provided that the FBI did not prolong its investigation after it became clear that the only menace of a group under investigation was rhetorical and ideological.
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the consent decree went further than the First Amendment 0907 it must have, they say, or they got nothing in return for agreeing to settle the case rather than litigating it. Alternatively they argue that the sentence in paragraph 3.4(a) on which the district judge based the injunction would be redundant if it merely commanded the FBI to do0907 what the Constitution commands it to do 0907 indeed, what the preceding sentence commands. In either form the argument overlooks three points. The first is that, much lore to the contrary notwithstanding (see, e.g., Pierce v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 46 Ill.App.3d 42, 54, 4 Ill.Dec. 615, 624-25, 360 N.E.2d 551, 559-60 (1977)), not every sentence in a negotiated document can be assumed to have independent operative significance. White v. Roughton, supra, 689 F.2d at 120. Paragraph 3.4(a) apparently emerged from a negotiating session. We do not know who proposed it, or how much forethought was given to it. The second sentence may have been included not as the plaintiffs conjecture to put the FBI under a different duty from the first ("The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct ...") but to ensure that the first would not be misunderstood 0907 in other words, to emphasize by repetition.
Second, since if the case had gone to trial and the plaintiffs had won the district judge would almost certainly not have gone further than to enjoin the FBI from violating the Constitution, it is unlikely that the Justice Department agreed to go further in the consent settlement. A rational litigant does not give up in a settlement more than he can expect to lose at trial. True, by settling on any terms the Department avoided the expenses of trial and the slight probability of a decree that would hem it in more than the consent decree; but knowing that the plaintiffs too

wanted to avoid the expense of litigation and the possibility that they would lose at trial or obtain an unsatisfactory decree, the Department could not have thought it must make all the concessions in the settlement negotiations. And yet on the plaintiffs' reading of the decree they gave up nothing to settle the case and the Department gave up everything.
Third, even if the consent decree did no more than enjoin the FBI from violating the Constitution, the plaintiffs won a good deal 0907 and we do not refer just to their symbolic victory. As a result of the decree, if the FBI now conducts an investigation in Chicago that violates the Constitution it will be violating a judicial decree, and will be subject to the summary and severe sanctions, criminal as well as civil, that are visited on government agencies and agents as on others who willfully violate federal court decrees. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402; Fed.R.Crim.P. 42; In re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1979); Ex parte Craig, 282 Fed. 138, 153 (2d Cir.1922), aff'd 1017 under the name of *1017 Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 44 S.Ct. 103, 68 L.Ed. 293 (1923). Nowhere else in the country does the FBI labor under such a constraint. Should it conduct an unconstitutional investigation elsewhere the victims would have to bring a suit like the present, which took eight years to be resolved; or they would have to bring damage actions against individual FBI agents, with all the immunity and solvency problems that such suits entail. And the consent decree did go further than just enjoining the FBI from violating the Constitution; only in Chicago must the FBI report on its investigatory activity periodically to civil rights lawyers.
The plaintiffs argued for the first time at the oral argument of this appeal that the district court's injunction does not forbid the FBI to conduct a "preliminary inquiry," as distinct from a full-fledged "investigation," solely on the basis of statements that are not criminally punishable. The purpose of the argument is to show that the district court's injunction does not leave the FBI helpless to investigate potential terrorist groups. Its basis is a comparison between the first sentence in paragraph 3.4(a) of the consent decree, which refers to "domestic security investigations and inquiries," and the second sentence (the basis of the injunction), which refers only to "investigation." But as neither "investigation" nor "inquiry" is defined anywhere in the consent decree and "inquiry" does not even appear in the Levi Guidelines, it seems more likely that the omission of "inquiries" from the second sentence of paragraph 3.4(a) was inadvertent, or that "investigation" in that sentence was understood to be a short-hand expression for "domestic security investigations and inquiries," than that the decree meant to distinguish between more and less extensive investigations and give the FBI a completely free hand with regard to the latter. Maybe "inquiry" in paragraph 3.4(a) means "preliminary investigation" in the Levi Guidelines, but this is entirely speculative.
We are surprised that the plaintiffs are willing to interpret paragraph 3.4(a) as permitting the FBI to conduct, on the basis of constitutionally protected advocacy, "preliminary inquiries" as defined in the Smith Guidelines. A preliminary inquiry is a limited investigation, but not so limited that it could not be used to harass inoffensive organizations; it could include the planting of undercover agents in the organization. See Part II.B(4)-(6) of the Smith Guidelines. So in conceding that preliminary inquiries are not regulated by paragraph 3.4(a) the plaintiffs have conceded too much. See Elliff, supra, at 804-05. But they have also conceded too little, because preliminary inquiries are not an adequate investigative tool for coping with groups or individuals that may be engaged in the long-range planning of terrorist acts. The term "preliminary inquiry" appears in the part of the Smith Guidelines that deals with "general crimes investigations" rather than the part that deals with "domestic security/terrorism investigations." The latter are defined as "investigations of enterprises, other than those involved in international terrorism, whose goals are to achieve political or social change through activities that involve force or violence." (Neither the decree nor the Guidelines deal with terrorism within or without the United States by foreign terrorist organizations.) The Guidelines describe "preliminary inquiries" as intended for situations where the FBI has ambiguous or incomplete information regarding a specific crime and needs to make further, generally unobtrusive, inquiries before deciding whether to launch a full-scale investigation. In contrast, a domestic security/terrorism investigation "is concerned with the investigation of entire enterprises, rather than individual participants and specific criminal acts, and authorizes investigations to determine the structure and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members." Normally, moreover, preliminary inquiries must be completed within 90 days. In short, they are not designed for keeping watch on an organization not suspected of engaging in criminal activity at present or of planning criminal activity in the immediate future.
1018 *1018 We understand the plaintiffs' concern with the repressive effect of prolonged and intrusive investigations of inoffensive groups and individuals. But their concern does not require that paragraph 3.4(a) be interpreted to

protect organizations with violent aims from such investigations. The organizations that the decree sought to protect, organizations such as the ACLU and the NAACP, do not go around making threats to commit violent acts, and are not the acorns from which grow such trees as the FALN, the Posse Comitatus, the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Liberation Army, the New World Liberation Front, the Republic of New Africa, the Weather Underground, the Jewish Armed Resistance, Omega 9, and other menacing groups discussed in Motley, supra. Nor should the plaintiffs worry that unless Judge Getzendanner's injunction stands, overzealous government officials will interpret "statements advocat[ing] criminal activity" in the sentence she enjoined in the Smith Guidelines so broadly as to embrace the harmless statements of people whose politics the officials happen to dislike. That would be a reckless interpretation, especially since the Guidelines do not authorize the FBI to base a domestic security/terrorist investigation on the advocacy of non-violent crimes such as draft resistance 0907 advocacy that might conceivably if improbably be imputed to an organization like the ACLU by hostile lawenforcement officers. It still would not be an organization that advocated political or social change through violence; passive resistance and civil disobedience are nonviolent.
But if despite all this some law enforcers do misread the Smith Guidelines as authorizing them to resume the abuses that led to this lawsuit in the first place, they will, of course, be violating the consent decree. Whether intelligently or stupidly interpreted the Smith Guidelines confer no immunities and do not supersede the decree (except for the dispensation in ¶ 3.6, not in issue here, that permits new guidelines to supersede parts of ¶ 3.5, which relate to the techniques rather than purposes of investigations). Those who follow them are not thereby raised above the law; and the plaintiffs' lawyers are busy monitoring compliance with the decree to make sure the new guidelines do not result in investigations that violate the decree.
Moreover, the sentence the district court enjoined is not the only sentence in the Smith Guidelines that defines the scope of FBI domestic security investigations. It says that an investigation "may be warranted," but does not explain when it would be warranted. For that you must go elsewhere in the Guidelines 0907 to the provision that states:
A domestic security/terrorism investigation may be initiated when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.... In determining whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider all of the circumstances including (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation.
Thus, before the FBI can be authorized to investigate, it is required to assess the magnitude, likelihood, and imminence of the threatened harm from the activities to be investigated (and as is evident from the first sentence in the quoted passage, the harm must be of a type that the government is entitled to prevent though its criminal laws). Having been directed by the Guidelines to make such an assessment, the FBI is not free to ignore the results.
The Smith Guidelines, like the Levi Guidelines before them, are nationwide in their intended application. We doubt that any neutral observer would think it appropriate that the FBI should be governed by other than a uniform national set of investigatory standards 0907 that it should operate under one set of constraints everywhere 1019 but Chicago, and under another and tighter *1019 set in Chicago, so that this city can become a sanctuary for nascent terrorist organizations. To some extent the FBI is unavoidably under a tighter rein in Chicago than elsewhere, because of the consent decree, which applies only to Chicago. But there is no reason to magnify the disparity by looking for conflict between two sets of general language 0907 the general principles of the decree and the general principles of the Smith Guidelines. Should they conflict in practice there will be time to force revision of the Guidelines. It would be different if the Guidelines and the decree were completely irreconcilable on their face. They are not. See Elliff, supra, at 812.
There is no longer any novelty to federal district judges' presiding over prison systems, school systems, and mental institutions, often pursuant to consent decrees. See Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, in The Courts: Separation of Powers 39 (Goulet ed. 1983). But to put a district judge in charge of the FBI in Chicago would write a new chapter in the annals of federal judicial enterprise, and

though the consent decree does not go that far it does give the judge a great deal of power over the FBI in Chicago just by virtue of the inherent ambiguity of language 0907 enough power to make her role in enforcing the decree an extraordinary one that if it is to be played well must be underplayed. A due regard for the separation of powers, the flexibility of equity, the ambiguity of the decree, the generality of the new Justice Department guidelines, the sensitivity and importance of the subject matter, and the limitations of judicial competence argues against precipitating a premature confrontation between the judicial and executive branches in a setting where inevitably some people will say, with pardonable exaggeration, that the federal judiciary is playing fast and loose with the public safety. Fine-tuning investigative guidelines is the responsibility of the executive branch, not us. Our duty is to enforce the decree. Any actual as distinct from purely verbal threat to compliance with the decree lies in the future; we decline to anticipate that the Justice Department will so interpret the new FBI guidelines as to violate the district court's decree.
We do not depreciate the abuses of police power that led to the decree 0907 abuses that were part of a national pattern that included such grotesque incidents as the following: after Martin Luther King was "named `Man of the Year' by Time magazine, the FBI decided to `take him off his pedestal,' [`]reduce him completely in influence,' and select and promote its own candidate to `assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people.'" Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S.Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976). See generally Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System (1980); Theoharis, Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan (1978). These abuses ought not be forgotten. But neither do we want to emulate the Bourbon kings, of whom it was said that they learned nothing and forgot nothing. The abuses that gave rise to this suit ended a decade ago, and much has changed since then, including the management of the Bureau, whose present director is a former federal circuit judge, and the amount of supervision of the FBI by the Attorney General, which, as the issuance of published guidelines suggests, is greater than it used to be. Also, although the number of bombings and other violent acts by domestic terrorist organizations has not risen over this period, public concern with domestic terrorism has risen 0907 which is understandable considering the continued rise in international terrorism and the increasing lethality of the weapons available to terrorists. See generally S.Rep. No. 755, supra, at 112 n. 20; Motley, supra, ch. 1; Monroe, Addressing Terrorism in the United States, 463 Annals of the AAPSS 141, 143 (1982); Snitch, Terrorism and Political Assassinations: A Transnational Assessment, 1968-80, 463 Annals of the AAPSS 54, 58 (1982) (figure 1020 1); Special Report/Terrorism, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 9, 1984, at 24. By reading the *1020 critical sentence in the decree as prohibiting improperly motivated investigations (other parts of the decree, not in issue in this appeal, prohibit improper investigative techniques), we can reconcile the decree and the new guidelines, maintain a proper separation of powers, yet protect the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and the other class members.
If the Justice Department had really consented to a foolish decree, the only recourse for the government would be to seek modification of it. District judges who preside over "institutional reform litigation" in this circuit should be mindful of Judge Friendly's recent observation that, "As experience with this type of litigation increases, a consensus is emerging among commentators in favor of modification with a rather free hand." New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir.1983). But even if the more demanding requirements of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932), for the modification of equitable decrees had to be satisfied, there would be no justification for misreading the decree. Not even the government will benefit in the long run from being excused from having to honor its agreement; for who will make a binding agreement with a party that is free to walk away from an agreement whenever it begins to pinch? But it is one thing to misread a decree and another to draw back from concluding that a coequal branch of government "improvidently" surrendered its constitutional obligations and exposed the people of the nation's third-largest city 0907 exposed everyone in this country, for there is no way to keep a Chicago-nurtured terrorist organization in Chicago, any more than the Nazi party could be confined to Munich 0907 to the dangers posed by embryonic terrorist groups that are immunized from FBI investigation. If the consent decree will bear an alternative interpretation it ought to be given one.
The order of the district court is reversed with directions to dissolve the injunction.
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

This is a case, if there ever was one, where the result dictates the rationale. It is possible to understand the very high priority which the majority accords to inquisitorial freedom at the possible expense of free speech. But it is difficult to discern exactly how the majority proposes to deal with the legal doctrines which until now I thought most clearly applicable to the interpretation of consent decrees.
While I have found it hard to pinpoint precisely what the majority has held, I think tentatively that its holding can be distilled into two propositions. First, the FBI's agreement not to investigate "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment" meant, according to the majority, only that the FBI would decline to conduct an investigation in violation of the Constitution. Second, the majority appears to have decided that the only "unconstitutional" FBI investigations are those which are motivated solely by an unambiguous desire to suppress a political movement. On the other hand, investigations motivated by some (perhaps dimly discernible) law enforcement purpose are in all instances constitutional. In my view, the majority's reading of the Decree as a restatement of the Constitution is wholly incredible. And, in any event, neither the majority nor anyone else has suggested a guide to what the constitutional limitations, if any, on investigations might be.
Aside from the errors identified above, the majority erroneously views this proceeding as premature. This prematurity view leads the majority to ignore the long-established legal doctrines which govern our review of decisions interpreting consent decrees. Most seriously, the majority relies primarily on perceived public safety concerns which are unsupported by any evidence and which, in my view, may be wholly illusory. In my view, the district court correctly interpreted the Consent Decree which it had earlier approved and its decision should be affirmed.
1021 *1021 I.
The majority's initial mistake is its view that the present proceeding is somehow "premature." Instead, Paragraph 3.6 of the Consent Decree specifically addresses the possibility that the FBI would adopt guidelines inconsistent with the Decree. The FBI agreed that such inconsistent guidelines would not go into effect in Chicago. Thus there is no prematurity problem. If the FBI attempts to put into effect guidelines that are inconsistent with the Decree, the violation of the Decree, by its own terms, is fully mature. Although I have no information that the FBI is currently conducting investigations in violation of the Decree, the whole purpose of guidelines is to provide from the outset a framework within which security can be served while liberty is not snuffed out. Once politically repressive investigations actually begin, it may already be too late.
The majority's mistaken view that redressing the present violation of the Decree is "premature" leads it into very serious error. The majority concludes that "the bareness of the setting requires us to resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of an interpretation of the guidelines that will avoid conflict with the decree." At 1011. There is, of course, no authority whatever for the application of such a standard, which ends the argument before it is ever begun. Instead of the normal deference to a district court's interpretation of its own decree, the majority has substituted a deference to guidelines which as a matter of plain language conflict with the Decree. With this unprecedented and incorrect approach, it is no wonder that the majority has reached an erroneous result. With these observations in mind, I shall now approach the problem of applying the principles which, until now, have been thought controlling in the interpretation of consent decrees.
II.
The majority recites, but fails to apply, the universally recognized principle that consent decrees are to be treated like contracts. Instead, without citation or rationale, the majority places the burden on the plaintiffs to show that their proffered interpretation of the Decree is "compelled." At 1011. The majority carries this standard to its logical extreme and, without any evidence that the Decree is a threat to public safety, concludes that "[i]f the consent decree will bear an alternative interpretation it ought to be given one." At 1020. Thus the majority admittedly creates a meaning for the Decree having no support in what the parties intended. Nor is there any indication that the parties would have settled the litigation if they had known that this court would impose these novel terms and conditions on their agreement.[1]

The rules of consent decree interpretation are simplicity itself. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a consent decree is a contract and as such must be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties as embodied in the terms of the agreement. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2586, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984) ("Memphis Firefighters"); id., 104 S.Ct. at 2603 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 233-37, 95 S.Ct. 926, 932-35, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757-58, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U.S. 19, 20-24, 79 S.Ct. 944, 945-947, 3 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1959). See also Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357-58, 72 S.Ct. 306, 308, 96 L.Ed. 394 (1952). As this court very recently put it, "[i]t is clear that consent 1022 decrees are construed according to *1022 precepts of contract construction." United States v. City of Chicago, 717 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir.1983). See Freedman v. Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Assoc., 730 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir.1984); White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 119-20 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1524, 75 L.Ed.2d 947 (1983); Sportmart, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 601 F.2d 313, 316-17 (7th Cir.1979). [2]
But a consent decree is a contract with a twist, because, as we recently recognized, a district judge has lived with the case and presided over the entry of the decree. Thus, "[t]he district court's views on interpretation [of a consent decree] are entitled to deference." United States v. City of Chicago, 717 F.2d at 382 (citing Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 558 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1981)). In this case, the majority has, as we shall see, interpreted the Decree in a way contrary to the plain words used by the parties and has completely ignored the district court's understanding of these words. Instead of placing on the plaintiffs a burden to show that their interpretation is the only possible or conceivable meaning of the Decree, we should require the government to prove that the district judge did not understand the Decree she entered and that the parties meant to give their words some novel and unnatural meaning.[3] Instead, we should take an impartial stance and construe the provisions of the Decree without regard to our own predispositions respecting the power of the police to conduct surveillance of political activity.[4]
Our task, then, is to determine what the parties meant when they agreed in ¶ 3.4(a) of the Consent Decree that the FBI would not conduct domestic security investigations "solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment." Most strikingly, the majority simply declines to discuss the only generally accepted meaning of this key language: "The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment ...." (Emphasis supplied). "[P]rotected by the First Amendment" means simply and plainly protected against adverse governmental action which frequently takes the form of prosecution and punishment. In the context of speech threatening future violence or illegal conduct, these words constitute a term of art referring to the principles developed in the leading Supreme Court cases on the subject, such as Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951), and, more recently, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 1023 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 *1023 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). This is the only body of existing law which I know of to give meaning in this context to the phrase, "protected by the First Amendment."
The government has argued, and the majority has agreed, that this phrase does not have its obvious meaning but instead means "protected from investigation." This conclusion is wrong because there is no preexisting law about what is "protected from investigation." Judge Getzendanner specifically noted in approving the settlement that "the law with respect to government spying which these cases concern is largely unsettled." 91 F.R.D. at 198 .[5] The majority therefore seems to be saying that the parties wrote, and the district court entered, an agreement with no fixed meaning. Instead, it was one of the purposes of the Consent Decree to supply this deficiency in settled law governing investigations, at least in Chicago.
In sum, the majority cites no evidence, and I know of none, to support the notion that at the time of the settlement the parties intended paragraph 3.4(a) to mean "protected from investigation."[6] Had the parties intended such a meaning, they could easily have conveyed it in plain language. It would have been simple to agree that "the FBI will obey the Constitution and laws of the United States when investigating speech." Cf. Consent Decree ¶ 3.5(a) (FBI "electronic surveillance activities in the City of Chicago must comply with the Constitution and applicable federal statutes").

I have noted that, unless one interprets "activities protected by the First Amendment" to mean activities protected from punishment under Dennis and Brandenburg, the term is without discernible meaning in existing constitutional law. The majority suggests that that meaning can be supplied by reading "the critical sentence in the decree as prohibiting improperly motivated investigations." Slip op. at 1020. But to persons whose first amendment rights may be under siege from a massive "domestic security/terrorism investigation," the motives of the investigators seem of slight importance. People with the best of motives can become over-zealous in their treatment of political dissent. In any event, the first sentence of ¶ 3.4(a) addresses motive and purpose, by requiring that the FBI be "concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law ...." Since motive or purpose is covered by this first sentence, it is not clear why the second sentence should be read as somehow also providing a motive test.
Instead of following the usual course of contract interpretation, the majority has created a new analysis whereby agency guidelines are the subject of deference and whereby we should "decline to anticipate that the Justice Department will so interpret the new FBI guidelines as to violate the district court's decree." Further, the majority asserts that any interpretation which would constrain FBI discretion is to be eschewed as a threat to public safety. Based on these safety concerns, the majority concludes that "if the consent decree will bear an alternative interpretation it ought to be given one." But the majority has failed to tie these safety concerns to any evidence of the parties' intent at the time the Decree was signed. Thus, these concerns are legally irrelevant to the question before us.
III.
1024 The majority's extensive reliance on the potential safety-related problems it has *1024 conjured up is a serious departure from the accepted judicial role in interpreting consent decrees. By considering at length "public safety" factors which are outside the Consent Decree and of which there is no evidence in the record, the majority has violated a cardinal principle of consent decree construction. The meaning of a decree must be determined from within its "four corners" and not from extraneous factors a party may have had in mind or from the "purpose" the decree might have had.[7]See Memphis Firefighters, 104 S.Ct. at 2586; United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at 682, 91 S.Ct. at 1757; White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d at 119.
The majority's error here is strikingly similar to that of the Court of Appeals in Memphis Firefighters, where the Supreme Court adhered to the "four corners" rule and rejected a construction of a consent decree that purported "to effectuate the purposes of the decree" but which was not supported by the words of the decree. Memphis Firefighters, 104 S.Ct. at 2585. If the government wanted to agree to follow the Constitution and if it thought that the constitutional limits on investigations are as the majority claims, the government should have insisted on words reasonably susceptible of conveying that intent and understanding. Cf. id. ("Had there been any intention to depart from the seniority plan in the event of layoffs or terminations, it is much more reasonable to believe that there would have been an express provision to that effect"). The Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly insisted that the unrecorded motives of the parties are not determinative. Rather, we have been instructed, and we have professed, to look only to the words of the decree to find the agreement.
The majority invokes the spectre of terrorism to justify its decision to ignore the words of the Decree because it refuses to believe that "the government knowingly bartered away important public interests merely to avoid the expense of a trial." But at the time the Decree was entered the parties had no idea what limits the law would otherwise place on the relevant FBI activity. Perhaps it will ultimately be held 0907 without reference to the Decree 0907 that the first amendment places significant limits, possibly coterminous with Brandenburg, on FBI surveillance of domestic political groups when such surveillance is based solely on protected speech. Perhaps such a possibility is what the Justice Department officials who signed the Decree had in mind.[8] Further, there is no evidence before this court to suggest that the FBI's efficiency would be hampered in any respect by adherence to the Brandenburg standard for initiating investigations.[9]
1025 *1025 The majority's unsupported conclusion that the first amendment forbids only improperly motivated investigations leads it into two more serious errors. The majority believes that, if the FBI agreed to the plaintiffs'

version of the Consent Decree, then "the Justice Department bargained away some of its essential investigative powers and got nothing in return but a saving of some litigation expenses." But as Judge Getzendanner knew when she signed the Decree, the first amendment limits on investigations were unsettled at that time. For all the Justice Department knew, the ultimate relief that might have been ordered after a trial would have been more extensive than that provided in the Decree.[10] The majority, once it fastens upon its "motivation" interpretation of the first amendment, takes the mistaken position that the FBI agreed only to this "motive" test and not to apply Brandenburg standards because, according to the majority, the district court would not have ordered relief going beyond the Constitution.[11] The majority cites no authority for its erroneous belief that a contract going beyond the legal rights available in court is unenforceable. In fact, the Supreme Court has decided that such contracts are enforceable. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 99 S.Ct. 1096, 59 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979). In any event, the fact is that the parties had no way of knowing what relief might have been available after trial. Thus, the FBI could not have actually weighed the remedial possibilities in the sort of cost-benefit analysis the majority ascribes to it.[12]See at 1016.
In general, I would take the more conservative approach and enforce the Decree according to its terms. I would not reach out without compelling reason to decide important constitutional questions, especially where those issues have not been adequately addressed either by the parties or by the district court. It is certainly inappropriate to consider potential problems the FBI might have in operating under the Decree unless and until we are presented with evidence in support of a request to modify the Decree. And, above all, I would not establish a new legal standard and then make the unrealistic assumption that the parties intended to apply that standard four years ago, in the face of plain words to the contrary.
IV.
In the course of its heavy reliance on the prospect of terror, the majority shuts its eyes to some of the safetyrelated features of the Decree. First, it is vital to note the use in the key phrase of the Decree of the word "solely." This word limits the reach of ¶ 3.4(a) to situations where nothing is known about the possible subject of an investigation except its pure speech activities. There can be no travel in suspicious patterns, no consorting with 1026 suspicious persons, no purchasing of supplies suitable for *1026 criminal purposes, no possession of anything capable of a suspicious interpretation. Certainly the FALN and the Posse Comitatus, cited by the majority, could gain no solace from the rule since protected speech is one of the less noteworthy of their activities. In fact, one reason I question that the Consent Decree as I interpret it would hobble the FBI is the unlikelihood that any situation meriting investigation would ever be characterized by pure speech and nothing more.
Second, paragraph 3.4(a) makes it abundantly clear 0907 and this was fully recognized by the original panel opinion 0907 that only "domestic security/terrorism investigations" are affected by the protected speech limitation, not "preliminary inquiries."[13]See Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 883, 889-90 (1984). Even the purest, most protected speech of the Socialist Afternoon Tea Circle of Hyde Park could trigger a preliminary inquiry to determine whether there were any threat of a criminal violation.[14] The majority is concerned that such an inquiry could presumably not be permanent or ongoing for several years. But if the inquiry failed to disclose anything other than the purest protected speech, it is difficult for me to see any legitimate purpose in continuing the inquiry for years. The majority also states its disbelief that the plaintiffs would have agreed to allow "inquiries" based solely on protected speech. It is ironic that the majority is thus not willing to enforce the Decree as written because to do so would not give the plaintiffs enough relief.
1027 *1027 It seems to me that the parties to the Consent Decree limited the availability of "domestic security/terrorist investigations" in situations where only protected speech was involved because this formidable sort of investigative procedure could become a heavy burden on the target 0907 a form of penalty, and of repression, which the signatories of the Decree thought improper in the case of free speech alone. It becomes an academic point whether free speech is protected only from formal criminal penalties or from government investigative action which might be every bit as punitive and painful. Therefore, I think the distinction drawn by the Decree between a "domestic security/terrorist investigation" and an "inquiry" makes eminently good sense both from the standpoint of public safety and the standpoint of freedom of speech.

The history of this case suggests concern both for public safety and for relief from political harassment as the twin goals which the Decree seeks to reconcile. There was an extensive history of deployment of police resources ostensibly for purposes of political intimidation, which the majority virtually concedes. Certainly, there must be a concomitant concern about terrorism, which if it is not becoming more frequent, appears to be becoming more pervasive.[15]
V.
I doubt that there is a conflict between the principles underlying the Decree and the safety-related concerns cited by the majority. We have seen that the "preliminary inquiry" authority contained in the Decree and in the guidelines is more than adequate to deal with menacing exercises of free speech with nothing more. Perhaps more fundamentally, I am chagrined by the lopsided policy analysis which the majority engages in. Of course, I could not agree more that the FBI should not be hobbled, or put at any disadvantage, in the fight against terrorism. But the first amendment rights of political eccentrics need not be snuffed out in the process. The majority unfortunately seems reluctant to give adequate weight to the importance of preserving constitutionally protected free speech rights as a goal of government.
As a matter of fact, as far as I am aware, the FALN, the Posse Comitatus, the New World Liberation Front and the Weather Underground (cited by the majority) are not organizations that got their start merely from exercises in protected speech. It is simply erroneous and unhistorical to suggest that organizations having deviant political objectives inevitably progress along a continuum starting with protected speech and ending with murder. For example, even orthodox Marxists do not practice terrorism as a necessary facet of their ideology.
The majority thus denies substantial weight to the policies of the first amendment, which the Consent Decree seeks to further. The majority asserts that it does "not depreciate the abuses of police power that led to the decree" 0907 like the effort to destroy Martin Luther King, Jr. or 500 "black bag jobs" in Chicago targeted against lawful political activity. See slip op. at 1015, 1019. Yet in fact the majority is apparently so unconcerned about these abuses and their possible recurrence that it gives the benefit of every doubt to Department of Justice guidelines which emasculate the Decree.[16] The entire history of this case is a story of investigative excesses used as a powerful weapon against political dissent. Anyone who has lived in the twentieth century surely does 1028 not have to be instructed on the threat which unrestrained *1028 investigative activities can pose to political liberty. I share the majority's high regard for Judge Webster 0907 currently Director of the FBI 0907 but I think the Consent Decree was crafted to establish long-term limits and as a means of counteracting in the long run the institutional pressures toward abuse. These pressures will be present no matter how well-intentioned the leadership or how well-trained the rank and file of the FBI may be at any point in time.
Finally, I am not so naive as to believe that investigative excesses will ever be subject to "summary and severe sanctions, criminal as well as civil," as suggested by the majority. It is at least doubtful that an FBI agent can be subjected to liability for constitutional violations in the Seventh Circuit. See Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 324-25 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (Posner, J. concurring), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 284, 78 L.Ed.2d 262 (1983); id. 710 F.2d at 325-28 (Coffey, J. concurring). If the needs of effective FBI activity are as compelling as four of my brethren thought in Egger, I do not see why contempt penalties will be any more fully available or forthcoming than damage liability under the Constitution. Cf. Beard v. O'Neal, 728 F.2d 894, 900 (7th Cir.1984) (refusing to consider whether FBI agent was "personally responsible" for death allegedly caused by agent's failure to supervise informant). Certainly, no district judge in this circuit who has read today's majority opinion will move forcefully against alleged investigative excesses by the FBI. The majority's new rule that, in matters which may implicate something called "security," all conceivable doubts must be resolved in favor of the government makes sanctions against the government or its agents seem fanciful.
Therefore, the solace which the majority offers the plaintiffs that the Decree is still in place and may be invoked to prevent abuses is illusory. The fact is that in its first test, the plain meaning of the Decree has been rejected and presumptions have been invoked which make it next to impossible that the government could ever lose a future contest. Further, the majority has adopted a "motive" test for first amendment limitations on investigations

apparently without much thought or concern for the consequences. For all practical purposes, the Decree has been gutted and I would advise plaintiffs' lawyers to put their time to better use than "monitoring compliance."
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
[*] Judges Wood and Flaum did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
[1] The majority concedes that "the words of paragraph 3.4(a) will bear the plaintiffs' interpretation of them." The majority then says "but the question whether the interpretation is compelled is less clear." (Emphasis added). But whether any interpretation is "compelled" is simply not relevant. The majority must be aware that since the language of the Decree will "bear" the plaintiffs' interpretation, the government's version is also not "compelled." Rather, the majority should simply seek the intent of the parties as embodied in the Decree.
[2] The majority may be attempting to avoid (or even overrule) the Seventh Circuit law on consent decrees when it cites a Second Circuit case for the proposition that a consent decree with a public institution "is no mere contract." New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836, 100 S.Ct. 70, 62 L.Ed.2d 46 (1979). See at 1013. However, the majority cannot avoid the Supreme Court cases which say that consent decrees are to be construed as contracts.
[3] The majority's disposition creates a new canon of consent decree interpretation, under which all doubts are to be resolved in favor of sustaining governmental power. See at 1014-1015. Such a rule of construction would be plainly contrary to the Supreme Court's cases, and to our cases noted above, many of which involve government consent decrees.
[4] The majority's repeated references to a "decree that restricts the executive branch of government in the performance of its constitutional responsibilities" are seriously misleading. Whenever the executive enters into a contract, within or without the context of litigation, it agrees to a limitation on the employment of its powers. Under the majority's standard all parties to contracts with the government should be on notice that all such contracts will be strictly construed against limitations on governmental power, regardless of the plain meaning of the words used in the contract. Further, the majority's characterization is misleading because the majority also concludes that the Decree goes no farther than the Constitution. A decree going no farther than the Constitution does not restrict the executive branch at all. As a matter of elementary constitutional law, the executive branch obviously does not have the power, and is forbidden, to exceed the limits of the Constitution. As Justice Black put it, the United States government "is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with the limitations imposed by the Constitution." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1224-1225, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1956), quoted in In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 at 1484 (7th Cir.1984) .
[5] In fact, the uncertainty of the law was cited as a factor in support of settling the case; the uncertainty of the law meant that the outcome was uncertain and settlement might be a prudent course.
[6] In this regard, perhaps conclusive evidence that the government knew it was agreeing to Brandenburg is the fact that it joined with the plaintiffs in citing Brandenburg (together with other first amendment punishment cases) to rebut an objection that the settlement allowed investigations solely on the basis of speech. See Appendix to Alliance Brief at 10. I have found nothing in the record to support the majority's view that the sentence of ¶ 3.4(a) which is at issue speaks somehow to the motivation underlying the investigation.
[7] The origins of the "four corners" rule lie in Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 72 S.Ct. 306, 96 L.Ed. 394 (1952) and United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U.S. 19, 79 S.Ct. 944, 3 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1959). In Atlantic Refining, the Supreme Court adopted a strong preference for giving the words of a consent decree their "normal meaning" and for honoring the district court's interpretation of what the parties intended. The Supreme Court further noted that the government's construction in Atlantic Refining was strained and contrary to that applied during previous operation under the decree. 360 U.S. at 22-24, 79 S.Ct. at 946-947.
[8] The majority, I think correctly, does not rely on the letters purporting to state the Justice Department's interpretation of the Decree, sent to Judge Getzendanner by Justice Department officials after the signing of the

Decree. The Decree was signed on October 29, 1980. The letters were sent in March and April of 1981. The dates of the various documents indicate that intervening events may have played a role in the formulation of the Justice Department's position as expressed in the letters. In any event, letters written subsequent to the signing of the Decree cannot vary the terms of the Decree.
[9] The majority, I think unwisely, has, without the benefit of any briefing and without the benefit of district court consideration, decided that the first amendment has no application to properly motivated investigations. I am less certain than the majority that the first amendment does not limit such investigations. The Supreme Court has found that there is significant protection under the first amendment for political organizations against state regulation. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-67, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170-74, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), the Court held that NAACP members have a first amendment right, as applied to Alabama through the fourteenth amendment, to keep their membership in the organization a secret. Presumably, under the majority's view of this case, Alabama could conduct a full investigation of the NAACP, including covert discovery of its membership lists, as long as Alabama was motivated by a desire to defeat lawlessness. This seems to me dubious.
[10] The majority's conclusion that the parties agreed to the majority's version of first amendment protections is unpersuasive because that interpretation of the first amendment was not suggested by anyone at the time the Decree was signed.
[11] The majority ignores Judge Getzendanner's finding in her order approving the settlement that "both the objectors and the plaintiff proponents of the proposed FBI settlement have represented to the Court that the FBI and the Justice Department, in pending litigation elsewhere, currently assert that the Constitution does not prohibit them from engaging in practices which would be prohibited in Chicago by the principles of the settlement here." 91 F.R.D. at 198. The defendants do not deny that they have made such assertions in other litigation. Thus the defendants apparently believed that the settlement granted relief more extensive than the Constitution.
[12] Even if the Decree could not go beyond the Constitution, the FBI may have settled the litigation to avoid an imposed injunction that would have been more specific than the general principles contained in the Decree. It is, of course, much more unlikely that a district court would ever make findings of contempt if the limitations were general rather than specific.
[13] The first sentence of ¶ 3.4(a) provides that, "The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute." (Emphasis added). This sentence applies to both "inquiries" and "investigations" and basically regulates FBI investigations with respect to motive and purpose. The second sentence of ¶ 3.4(a) forbids the FBI from "conduct[ing] an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment[.]" (Emphasis added). This distinction between inquiries and investigations thus appears on the face of the Consent Decree and the majority's refusal to honor it seems quite arbitrary.
The majority apparently believes that the plaintiffs fabricated the distinction between full investigations and preliminary inquiries and that the use of the word "inquiries" in ¶ 3.4(a) was "inadvertent." Nothing in the record supports the majority's "inadvertence" conclusion. Further, the Levi Guidelines distinguished between full and preliminary investigations. And the new guidelines explicitly provide for "preliminary inquiries." Joint Appendix at 78. Director Webster also testified before a Senate committee investigating the new guidelines that "A preliminary inquiry can be conducted ... to make an informed judgment as to whether a full investigation is warranted." Joint Appendix at 121. In light of the facts, I fail to see how the majority can justify its refusal to acknowledge the distinction between investigations and preliminary inquiries.
[14] Whether such an inquiry would violate the first amendment is an issue not now before us. I note, however, that at the time of the settlement the parties agreed that the Levi Guidelines on FBI investigations did not permit investigations of groups that advocate violent revolution unless the groups "engage in serious crimes or violence or advocate serious crime or violence." Consent Decree ¶ 2.2. This is strong evidence that the FBI did not, at the time, believe that motive was the sole determinant of the legality of an investigation.

The majority's conclusion that ¶ 2.2 is not part of the Decree is quite remarkable. It is, after all, an integral part of the Decree. That paragraph was written to bolster the argument in favor of settlement. For example, all of the facts recited in ¶ 2.2 were being used by the defendants to establish a mootness defense. The plaintiffs were acknowledging, by agreeing to those understandings, that the factual bases for the defendants' mootness defense were accurate. Judge Getzendanner noted when she approved the settlement that a defense victory on mootness grounds was a very real possibility. 91 F.R.D. at 198. Also, the plaintiffs and defendants wanted to show that the defendants were acting in good faith because members of the plaintiff class might otherwise have been reluctant to enter into an agreement with the FBI after the serious abuses allegedly engaged in. Further, ¶ 3.1 of the Decree specifically provided that the settlement was entered into "based on the post-filing statutes, guidelines and other procedures referred to in ¶ 2.1 and on the understanding of them reflected in ¶ 2.2[.]" The defendants thus endorsed the accuracy of that understanding. Further, if the defendants entered into the agreement knowing the plaintiffs' understandings to be false, they would presumably be parties to a fraud.
[15] In any event, the various strands of concern were brought together in the Consent Decree approved by Judge Getzendanner.
[16] One commentator has noted that the "permissive standards of the Smith guidelines" highlight the need for a restrictive FBI charter. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 883, 893-94 (1984). Apparently, the new guidelines have caused some consternation among members of Congress who are concerned that the new guidelines may constitute a "retreat" from the principles of the Levi Guidelines. See id., notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text.
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 820 F.2d 873 (1987)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 86-2609.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 10, 1987. Decided May 26, 1987.
874 *874 Sharon Baldwin, Acting Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Richard M. Gutman, Richard Gutman, P.C., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
The City of Chicago spied on and infiltrated several organizations of political dissidents. The organizations and some of their members claimed that the infiltration and subsequent adverse publicity violated their rights under the first amendment to the Constitution, applied to the states through the fourteenth. In 1975 the City stopped the infiltration and abolished the unit of the Police Department that had been responsible for it. In 1981 the City consented to the entry of an injunction against investigation and infiltration in the absence of reasonable grounds to believe that the targets are violating or likely to violate the law. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.Supp. 537 (N.D.Ill.1982). The federal government consented to similar relief. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.1981), 561 F.Supp. 575 (1983) (injunction implementing decree), reversed, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1984) (en banc).
The plaintiffs wanted damages as well as an injunction. One group of plaintiffs agreed with the City that the organizations would accept $20,625 and the individuals $10,000 apiece. The plaintiffs in all pending actions accepted this, with five exceptions: the Alliance to End Repression, the Chicago Peace Council, William Hogan, Lucy Montgomery, and A.A. (Sammy) Rayner, Jr. These five were happy with the money offer and the terms of the injunction but also wanted a judicial declaration that their rights had been violated. The parties discussed the possibility of the City's adding a confession of misconduct to the money and injunction, but they could not agree. The lawyer for these five plaintiffs explained in open court:
THE COURT: If the City were to agree that the conduct of the Red Squad in the mid-60s was in fact unconstitutional, would that satisfy you?
MR. GUTMAN: If we could do it in a form 0907 our damage claims are secondary. If we could have that in a form that would serve as a legal precedent 0907 for example, if they did not contest that part, and we might agree to limiting the damages, as long as it was something that would serve as a legal precedent, because as we said, we are not interested in the money, it's the principle of the constitutionality of secret police operations.
The parties ultimately agreed to submit the case to the court on stipulated facts and not to appeal the disposition. Plaintiffs agreed to accept as complete relief $10,000 for any prevailing individual and $20,625 for any prevailing organization. The district judge then held that Rayner and Hogan had not established the sort of "chilling effect" that, under Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), is an essential ingredient of a justiciable controversy about surveillance. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F.Supp. 1044, 1052-53 (N.D.Ill.1985). The other three plaintiffs, the court concluded, had justiciable claims and were entitled to judgment on the merits. Id. at 1050-56. The court awarded $10,000 to Montgomery and $20,625 to each organization. The parties kept their bargain; no one appealed. The plaintiffs' lawyer then asked for attorneys' fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the district judge awarded him about $129,000. The City has appealed that award to the extent it reflects time spent after the parties agreed on the money damages.
Only "prevailing" parties are entitled to fees under § 1988, and the two sides disagree about what it means to prevail. The City observes that by insisting on a judicial decision, two plaintiffs gave up a sure $10,000 while the others obtained only what they would have had without a trial. The marginal value of the decision to the plaintiffs 875 was a negative $20,000. Why, the City asks, should it be required to pay for *875 the many hours the plaintiffs' counsel spent to reduce the plaintiffs' recovery? It relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Spanish Action Committee v. City of Chicago, 811 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.1987); Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir.1987); Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir.1986); and other cases saying that courts may not award fees for aspects of the case on which the plaintiffs lost (or achieved no material victory). The plaintiffs reply that they won the case. The City said it was not liable; the judge disagreed; and the marginal cost of litigating on behalf of the two losing plaintiffs was negligible.
More, the plaintiffs say, they won the only thing that mattered to them: the precedent. The precedential aspect of a decision may be valuable, and the award of fees may reflect the benefits judicial decisions provide for other people. E.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2694-95, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (plurality opinion), id. 106 S.Ct. at 2700 (Powell, J., concurring); Lenard, 808 F.2d at 1248; Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir.1986). The City rejoins that this precedent was worthless because the injunction issued in 1981 gave the plaintiffs and others similarly situated all they could hope for. See our en banc opinion, 742 F.2d at 1015-16. Spanish Action Committee, 811 F.2d at 1136, relied on the injunction to conclude that a similar suit could not "generate any `external benefits' in civil rights enforcement, beyond the damages awarded, for which the plaintiff should be compensated." But the district court distinguished Spanish Action Committee on the ground that the legal issue here was unsettled and that the court's opinion therefore may benefit people not covered by the injunction 0907 for example, residents of other cities faced with similar surveillance. The plaintiffs add that the precedent will prevent public officials from invoking qualified immunity defenses in future cases, which will either induce compliance with the constitutional rules or smooth the path of future plaintiffs.
We have some doubts about the value of this precedent. The parties agreed not to appeal, which ensured that the decision would not become authoritative within the Seventh Circuit. (A decision is authoritative when it is binding because of the hierarchy among courts, rather than solely because it is persuasive.) A decision of a district judge has persuasive rather than authoritative effect, see Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (7th Cir.1987). That effect is diminished when appeal is impossible; a constraint on a judge's decision has been removed. Unappealable decisions often lack preclusive effects between the parties, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1) and comment a (1982), because the absence of a threat of review makes them less reliable. The value of an unreviewable opinion depends on the persuasiveness of its reasoning rather than on the authority of its author as a judge. This means that the opinion would not overcome an immunity defense, for public officials are entitled to immunity until it has been authoritatively decided that certain conduct is forbidden. Even after an authoritative decision, "[u]ntil the constitutional right has been stated so that reasonably competent officers would agree on its application to a given set of facts, it has not been `clearly established'." Chapman v. Pickett, 801 F.2d 912, 923 (7th Cir.1986) (dissenting opinion), adopted in Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir.1987). See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir.1986); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 275-76 (7th Cir.1986).
Whether the slight precedential effect of an unreviewable decision is the sort of victory for which fees may be awarded is a nice question, but not one we shall decide. There is a more fundamental problem: the absence of a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III. This case was settled before the judge decided it. The defendants accepted an injunction against the conduct; the parties agreed on the monetary remedy too. There 876 followed a wager of law: the plaintiffs staked $10,000 *876 (or $20,625) apiece that they were right. Two lost all; three won and got both the money and the precedent. The parties' sole dispute concerned the contents of the court's opinion. That is not a justiciable controversy. It is a request for an advisory opinion 0907 one that cannot help the plaintiffs and has effects, if at all, on strangers to the litigation.
The parties proceed as if the legal views of the district court were the "stakes" of the litigation. The plaintiffs want to acquire an opinion containing certain views; the defendants want to avoid the expression of these views. If this

kind of "controversy" were enough to keep a case alive, then an advisory opinion would be its own justification 0907 the fact that the parties cared enough to fight would show that they had a real controversy. Whatever the merits of this as an original interpretation of Article III, it is not the Supreme Court's view and never has been. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.Cir.1987) (three opinions exploring every corner of the case-or-controversy requirement). The expression of judicial views is a byproduct of the need to decide the case. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). A discussion of constitutional law is a means to resolve a real dispute between the parties, to be avoided unless essential to that end. No matter how desirable it may be to have a constitutional question settled, the resolution must await the concrete controversy, for only then does the judge have an adequate justification for giving an opinion. Understanding that the constitutional decision is a byproduct of a need to develop all of the premises used to resolve a concrete controversy, rather than the raison d'etre of the judicial system, leads to the conclusion that the parties should not have asked the judge to decide this case, and she should not have acquiesced.
Our case is much like Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977). The police killed a fleeing suspect, whose heirs argued that the use of deadly force violated the fourth amendment. Because of the officers' qualified immunity the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages, and obviously they were not entitled to an injunction; there was no risk of the deceased being shot again. Nonetheless the court of appeals, seeking to resolve a recurrent question of constitutional law, declared that the use of deadly force is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court thought the opinion advisory, because no relief turned on the court's answer to the question. We have the same situation except for the stipulated damages: $10,000 (or $20,625) formally changed hands as a result of the answer to the question. But because the plaintiffs were entitled to those sums whether or not a court answered the question, the cases are fundamentally the same 0907 unless the wager of law preserves the justiciable controversy.
The Supreme Court has never dealt with a pure wager of law. It has held that the existence of monetary stakes is not enough to keep a suit alive, if the underlying question has been settled or does not concern the litigants. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1707-08, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986). So a "pure" wager, in which A bets B $100 that a court will say a particular thing about C's rights vis a vis D, is not justiciable. Monetary stakes are not enough, if the issue in the case involves strangers. The "redressability" rule 0907 the principle that a case is justiciable only when a constitutional adjudication is capable of solving the plaintiff's problems, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) 0907 supports the same conclusion. Under this approach, a suit in which the parties dispute about the creation of a precedent simpliciter, where the plaintiff wants to bestow the precedent on other people, is not justiciable even if the plaintiff is willing to forfeit a stake in order to show his bona fides. Yet that describes our case. The plaintiffs, satisfied with the relief they had been offered, elected to forfeit that relief to obtain a chance on a precedent that would help only strangers.
877 *877 Two cases might offer plaintiffs some support. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743-44, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697-98, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370-71, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1119-20, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), the parties settled part of their dispute on terms that looked like wagers of law. For example, Nixon paid Fitzgerald $142,000, in exchange for which Fitzgerald agreed to accept another $28,000 as full damages if the Supreme Court should reject Nixon's argument that former Presidents have absolute immunity from civil liability for acts committed in the course of their duties. The Court held that this partial settlement did not deprive the Court of its power under Article III to resolve the case. The parties had a concrete dispute that would have been justiciable in the absence of the agreement; the resolution of the legal question (was Nixon absolutely immune?) would control the disposition of $28,000; that the parties had fixed their own damages and agreed not to contest any further issues (such as Nixon's substantive liability) did not distinguish the case from many others in which the parties focused on a single, dispositive issue of law and resolved other parts of the dispute amicably. In Nixon Fitzgerald could have had his $28,000 only by prevailing on the point of law. Our plaintiffs could have their $10,000 (or $20,625) whether or not they prevailed. By folding up his cards and leaving the table, Fitzgerald would have lost $28,000; by folding their hands plaintiffs Hogan and Rayner would have locked up $10,000 apiece; the other plaintiffs staked their offers against a precedent and nothing but. The difference between a plaintiff who must win on the law to prevail under the settlement (as in Nixon) and a plaintiff who can prevail under the settlement by not litigating (our five plaintiffs) is the difference between a

concrete dispute and an abstract one. Fitzgerald was in it for the money and the principle; our plaintiffs were in it for the principle alone.
There is yet another way in which this litigation may have been live. The injunction entered in 1981 was a consent decree rather than the result of contested litigation. We have hinted that governments may be able to withdraw from consent decrees entered without authority. See Kasper v. Board of Election Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332, 340-42 (7th Cir.1987); Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 559-60 (7th Cir.1986). Agents of the government have limited powers 0907 limited temporally as well as substantively. Incumbents may be tempted to consent to relief that settles political rather than constitutional questions, thereby enhancing their authority at the expense of their successors (and the people who vote for their successors). The parties have not briefed the question whether the agents of the City of Chicago who gave consent in 1981 had authority to bind the City if it should turn out that the decree is more restrictive than the Constitution. It is at least possible that our five plaintiffs wanted a judicial decree to ensure against the possibility that the City would change its mind.
As it turns out, however, the plaintiffs did not ask for an injunction. They were satisfied with damages. So the case did not increase the longevity of the 1981 injunction or insulate it from a change of mind by a subsequent city administration. Moreover, the 1981 decree suspends the controversy for the time being. Voluntary discontinuation of a practice usually does not make a case moot, but it will end the "case or controversy" when recurrence of the dispute among these parties is very unlikely. See Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979); United States v. 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.1987). We do not detect any significant possibility that the City will again pry into the affairs of these plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; to do so, the City would have to renounce its obligations under the consent decree, leading to proceedings that would offer the parties ample 878 opportunity to discuss their different interpretations of the *878 first amendment. So as we concluded in Spanish Action Committee, the 1981 decree eliminates both need and justification for judicial resolution of constitutional questions affecting prospective relief against infiltrations by the City.
Our conclusion that this case is not justiciable answers a question raised in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980): whether a plaintiff who is offered all the relief he demands may refuse the offer and go to trial. The answer is no. Roper observed that a "party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording that relief and cannot appeal from it" (445 U.S. at 333, 100 S.Ct. at 1171) and suggested that the same principle probably would apply to a plaintiff offered all he wanted before trial. The Court held that rule (if it is one) not controlling in Roper, because the plaintiff was a class representative, and in that capacity he might be entitled to different treatment (including the award of attorneys' fees) than he would receive as a single claimant. The Court was influenced by the concern that a class action filed on behalf of five million people with $2 claims apiece not be demolished the day before trial by the tender of a $2 bill to the sole representative plaintiff. Appellate courts generally have treated Roper as establishing that a party must have an economic dispute with the defendant, one surviving the offer of settlement, to be allowed to press on in the face of the defendant's willingness to satisfy the plaintiff's initial demand. Klein v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 404 (2d Cir.1983); Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1042-43 & n. 10 (5th Cir.1981). Cf. Balcom v. Lynn Ladder & Scaffolding Co., 806 F.2d 1127 (1st Cir.1986); Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C.Cir.1983). Defendants, like the courts, have an interest in peace; once there is no more dispute, there is no case. Both the parties and the court may save the costs of litigation.
In our case only the desire of these five plaintiffs to obtain an advisory opinion led them to decline the City's offer of settlement. The plaintiffs pressed on to a trial that they could lose but not win. They got an opinion useless to themselves. Section 1988 does not contemplate that a party may "prevail" by obtaining an advisory opinion. The party must get relief useful to himself. Three of our plaintiffs obtained such relief, but they had obtained it as of the date they agreed to liquidate the damages. The attorney's time after that date, devoted to the pursuit of judicial advice (at the expense of two plaintiffs), is not compensable.
We should not be understood as holding that an award of attorneys' fees may not take into account the value of a precedent. The precedent may be valuable beyond price, and the award can recognize this. We hold only that

the precedent, valuable though it is, must be a byproduct of the resolution of a real controversy. A party does not "prevail" by obtaining a precedent divorced from any other results. The award of fees is vacated, and the case is remanded so that the judge may award to counsel the fees appropriate for work done before the parties agreed on the liquidated damages.
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 899 F.2d 582 (1990)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Richard M. Gutman, Appellee, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 87-2638, 89-2898.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted March 12, 1990. Decided March 22, 1990. Rehearing and Rehearing Denied April 17, 1990. Order on Petition for Rehearing April 17, 1990.
583 *583 George Murtaugh, Jr., Richard M. Gutman, Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., Stanley J. Garber, Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, Lance Haddix, Michael Deutsch, Peoples Law Office, Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., for Alliance To End Repression.
John H. Mathias, Jenner & Block, Ruth M. Moscovitch, ACC, Thomas J. Royce, Frederick S. Rhine, ACC, Kelly R. Welsh, ACC, Judson H. Miner, CC, Sharon Baldwin, Office of the Corp. Counsel, Appeals Div., Roger Baldwin, Robert C. Howard, Hartunian, Futterman & Howard, Matthew J. Piers, Gessler, Flynn, Fleischmann, Hughes & Socol, Douglas McMillian, Office of the Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., Robert M. Rader, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., George Keane, Albert B. Friedman, Lawrence J. Suffredin, Simon & Spitalli, Chicago, Ill., J. Charles Kruse, Washington, D.C., Linda Fisher, James L. Coghlan, Coghlan, Joyce, Kukankos, Urbut & D'Arcy, Chicago, Ill., for City of Chicago.
Richard M. Gutman, Chicago, Ill., pro se.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 17, 1990.
PER CURIAM.
In two earlier opinions, this court held that Richard M. Gutman, who represented the plaintiffs in these actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is entitled to attorneys' fees through the date the parties agreed on the damages but not thereafter. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.1987); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 840 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 1988) (unpublished memorandum). A magistrate then held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the damages had not really been agreed until November 14, 1985, but that the principles underlying the settlement had been agreed to in March. The district judge concluded that the right date is the one of actual agreement rather than of narrowing the scope of differences.
Which date is right is a fact-specific question. Our earlier opinions establish the legal rules governing its disposition. The resolution of the dispute must be respected unless clearly erroneous 0907 which it is not. Proceedings before the magistrate established to her satisfaction (and the district judge's) that the plaintiffs agreed to reduced damages in order to get a better shot at obtaining a precedent. As we held in 1987, this precedent turned out to be an advisory opinion. But until November 1985 plaintiffs retained the option of spurning the City's monetary offer and going to trial in an effort to get higher damages. The case was settled on the basis of less money for more precedent. This is not a trade Article III permits a court to participate in, but because until the very end the possibility of a different resolution was present, the district judge was entitled to conclude that the damages were not fixed until November. We accordingly affirm the judgment under review in No. 89-2898.
Richard Gutman, counsel for the plaintiffs, has requested sanctions in No. 87-2638, which reached final decision in 1988, on the ground that the City misrepresented to this court the events of a meeting in August 1984 between

Gutman and Peter Fishman, an attorney for the City. This motion oversteps the line of responsible advocacy. This appeal was concluded two years ago, and we sent down the mandate long before Gutman filed his motion. What is more, parties are free to put the best face on events, as the City did on Fishman's notes. That the district court later disagreed with the City's characterization 0907 a characterization that at least for a time Gutman himself shared 0907 hardly makes the advocacy sanctionable. It is essential to maintain the line between vigorous advocacy (which the City engaged in) and frivolous conduct. District No. 8 v. Clearing, 807 F.2d 618, 622 (7th Cir.1986). Hairtrigger motions for sanctions by lawyers who do not recognize this difference are themselves sanctionable. Foy v. First National Bank of Elkhart, 868 F.2d 251, 258 (7th Cir.1989). The request for sanctions was especially foolish because under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Gutman will receive his fees for appellate work as a prevailing party. The 584 motion for sanctions complicated *584 the case without improving Gutman's chances of being paid for his time.
Because Gutman has prevailed on the merits of this appeal, he is entitled to fees under § 1988. He should submit within 15 days a statement of the fees reasonably incurred in No. 89-2898, excluding any time attributable to the motion for sanctions in No. 87-2638. The City is entitled to recover from Gutman under Fed.R. App.P. 38 its attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in defending against the motion for sanctions in No. 87-2638. It should submit a statement of these fees within 15 days. The award to Gutman will be his fees in No. 89-2898 less the City's fees in defending the motion in No. 87-2638.
AFFIRMED.
ORDER
On April 5, 1990, Richard M. Gutman filed a petition for rehearing with suggestion of rehearing en banc in No. 87-2638, contesting the court's disposition of that case to the extent it awards the City fees under Fed.R.Civ.P. 38. All of the judges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing, and no member of the court has called for a vote on the suggestion of rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing is denied. Gutman's "supplement" to the petition, received on April 16, is returned to counsel on the ground that such a document requires a motion for leave to file (there was none), and that a motion would in any event be denied as untimely.
The court's opinion required each side to file statements of attorneys' fees. We allowed counsel to respond to each other's statements. Gutman asked for $8,584 in fees in No. 89-2898. The City represents that it has no objection, so we award Gutman this sum under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for services on appeal. The City requests $3,109.17 in fees in No. 87-2638. Gutman does not object to the amount of this request but asked only that we withhold decision until acting on his petition for rehearing. Now that the petition has been denied, we grant the City's request under Fed.R.App.P. 38 in the amount it requested. As our opinion explained, these sums are offset, so that the City is now required to pay Gutman $5,474.83. It is so ordered.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
On April 5, 1990, Richard M. Gutman filed a petition for rehearing with suggestion of rehearing en banc in No. 87-2638, contesting the court's disposition of that case to the extent it awards the City fees under Fed.R.Civ.P. 38. All of the judges on the panel have voted to deny rehearing, and no member of the court has called for a vote on the suggestion of rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing is denied. Gutman's "supplement" to the petition, received on April 16, is returned to counsel on the ground that such a document requires a motion for leave to file (there was none), and that a motion would in any event be denied as untimely.
The court's opinion required each side to file statements of attorneys' fees. We allowed counsel to respond to each other's statements. Gutman asked for $8,584 in fees in No. 89-2898. The City represents that it has no objection, so we award Gutman this sum under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for services on appeal. The City requests $3,109.17 in fees in No. 87-2638. Gutman does not object to the amount of this request but asked only that we withhold decision until acting on his petition for rehearing. Now that the petition has been denied, we grant the City's request under Fed.R.App.P. 38 in the amount it requested. As our opinion explained, these sums are offset, so that the City is now required to pay Gutman $5,474.83. It is so ordered.

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 119 F.3d 472 (1997)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, and
Chicago CISPES, et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, and
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Respondent-Appellant.
Nos. 96-2347, 96-4014.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 24, 1997. Decided July 2, 1997.
473 *473 William T. Barker, Soinnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
William T. Barker, Soinnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Chicago, IL, Harvey M. Grossman, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Chicago, IL, Richard Gutman, Montclair, NJ, for Plaintiff-Appellee American Civil Liberties Union.
Richard Gutman, Montclair, NJ, for Petitioners-Appellees.
Susan S. Sher, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Frank W. Hunger, Office of the United States Attorney General, William Kanter, John F. Daly, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Section, R. Joseph Sher, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, James B. Burns and Thomas P. Walsh, Office of the United States Attorney, Civil Division, Chicago, IL, Howard M. Shapiro, John McNamara, Larry R. Parkinson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellant.
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.
These are consolidated appeals growing out of a petition to enforce a 1981 consent decree. In one appeal, the Federal Bureau of Investigation claims that the order enforcing the decree is based on a flawed interpretation of its language; the other appeal is from an award of attorney fees to the petitioners.
In 1974, the original plaintiffs in this case, including the Alliance to End Repression and the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a class action complaint against the City of Chicago, the Chicago Police Department, the U.S. Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI, alleging that the defendants were engaging in unconstitutional conduct directed at their First Amendment activities. After several years, the case was settled in August of 1981 by the entry of a consent decree which was approved by a district judge.[1]Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.1981).
The consent decree purported to give standing for enforcement petitions to all former named plaintiffs, any 474 member of the plaintiff class, or any U.S. person residing in *474 Chicago prior to the effective date of the
stipulation. That is why the current petitioners, including the Chicago Committee in Solidarity with the people of El Salvador 0907 CISPES 0907 claim to have standing to bring this enforcement action. CISPES falls within the plaintiff classes in the original actions; and because in the current petition it alleges injury-in-fact, we agree that the organization has standing to bring this enforcement action.

The allegation before us is that the FBI violated the consent decree during its investigation of CISPES from March 1983 through June 1985. In the suit, CISPES sought an order requiring the FBI to expunge records growing out of its investigatory surveillance. CISPES also sought an order requiring the FBI to provide additional training concerning the consent decree to its agents in Chicago. Both sides filed for summary judgment. Ultimately, the district judge found that the defendants had violated the decree. She ordered the relief requested. The FBI has appealed, concentrating on a narrow question: Was the investigation, in the words of the consent decree, in "serious intentional non-compliance" with the decree?
The record shows that in September 1981 the FBI began an investigation of CISPES to see whether it was in compliance with the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. No violations of the Act were found, although it was discovered that in its literature CISPES endorsed the objectives of two Salvadoran terrorist groups. This investigation was closed in December 1981.
Then in March 1983, the Dallas field office of the FBI received information from a Central American expatriate named Frank Varelli, which prompted a new investigation of CISPES to see whether it was offering active financial or other support to El Salvadoran terrorist groups and whether it was planning terrorist activities in the U.S. The investigation began in Washington but spread, including to Chicago, and lasted from March 1983 through June 1985. In Chicago, in addition to the investigation of CISPES itself, there were 19 spin-off investigations.
The investigation involved checks of public records, photographic and visual surveillance, undisclosed attendance by government agents at public meetings, reviews of financial, utility, and telephone records, and checks of law enforcement records. There were no court-ordered searches, telephone monitoring, nor other electronic surveillance.
The FBI filed periodic reports within the United States Department of Justice. In response to a report in March 1985, overseers at the DOJ questioned whether there was a sufficient basis to continue the investigation. In June 1985 the investigation was closed.
When William Sessions became head of the FBI in 1987 he ordered an in-depth inquiry into the CISPES investigation. He acknowledged in congressional testimony that the national investigation of CISPES was flawed. He said that informant Varelli's background and reliability, and thus the accuracy of his information, were never adequately verified by the Dallas field office of the FBI. He concluded that there was "negligence all along the line" with the way Varelli was handled, but he also maintained that there were no violations of constitutional rights committed by the FBI.
Director Sessions requested that the Attorney General approve the formation of a working group consisting of members of the FBI and of other officials within the Department of Justice but outside the FBI to make recommendations regarding the modification of existing FBI guidelines; he restricted to FBI headquarters the decision to initiate an international terrorism investigation; he refined the review process; he ordered additional training of agents in regard to First Amendment activities; and he moved all records accumulated during the CISPES investigation to the National Archives. He also disciplined certain personnel involved in the CISPES investigation. CISPES contended in this 1988 enforcement suit that the same activity which displeased Director Sessions violated the consent decree.
A consent decree is a form of contract, so we review a district court's interpretation of such a decree as we would 475 its interpretation of a contract 0907 de novo. Ordinarily the "scope of a consent decree must be *475 discerned
within its four corners...." United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971); Goluba v. School District of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir.1995). In an en banc decision in another proceeding growing out of the decree before us, we noted that the four corners required a focus on the entire decree, not just a single provision. In interpreting the decree, we said a court can "properly disregard even unambiguous language when it is convinced that the parties meant something different from what they said." The decree must be put in a larger context. Context, we said, "is the key to understanding language." The context involves what each side gave up to arrive at a consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, et al., 742 F.2d

1007 (7th Cir.1984). Put another way, a court must "look at the evil which the decree was designed to rectify." Armour & Co., at 682; see also Goluba.
First, looking to the four corners of the document, we see, in paragraph 3.4, that the parties agreed that three general principles apply to FBI investigations of domestic groups. These are:
(a) The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(b) The FBI, in investigating United States persons, shall not employ any technique designed to impair their lawful and constitutionally protected political conduct or to defame the character or reputation of a United States person.
(c) The FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and shall conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.
The procedures to enforce the decree are in paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2. Paragraph 5.1 provides that if the court finds that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the terms of the Stipulation has occurred ... the Court shall permit petitioners to conduct ... discovery ... and shall thereafter hold a hearing to determine the factual and legal issues raised by the petition." Paragraph 5.2 provides that the court shall make an order designed to ensure future compliance if it "finds ... a pattern of substantial non-compliance or a serious intentional non-compliance" with the decree.
Our concern here is with the meaning of the words "intentional non-compliance." That the noncompliance is "serious" is not at issue, and our discussion assumes that seriousness exists. The word which seems to cause the trouble is intentional. The district court found that
because the FBI signed the Consent Decree with full knowledge of its terms, and because the investigation at issue was undertaken deliberately, the FBI's actions were intentional. Therefore ... the FBI had engaged in "serious intentional non-compliance" with the Consent Decree.
What alarms the FBI about this conclusion is that it can be read too broadly. All FBI investigations are done deliberately. Therefore, any investigation which violates the decree can be "intentional noncompliance." Under this reading, FBI agents could feel in danger of being held responsible under what amounts to a negligence standard. The petitioners take slightly differing approaches to the language. CISPES acknowledges that negligence is not a sufficient basis for remedial action for "serious intentional non-compliance" with the decree. But it maintains, however, that the district court's interpretation would permit an enforcement order whenever there has been a substantial violation caused by more than just negligence. Therefore, it sees nothing wrong with the district court's interpretation. According to the ACLU, civil remedies normally do not require any special 476 showing of intent. Here, that intent is required is seen as a compromise *476 to permit civil enforcement without subjecting the FBI to court orders based on minor or technical violations.
As we see it, the issue involves defining exactly what it is that must be intentional. To us that comes down to a basic question of what is modified by the adjective intentional. The parties discuss whether an intentional violation of the decree means that the FBI can or cannot plead ignorance of the decree and therefore argue that the violation is not intentional. If an agent did not know about that decree, how could she intentionally violate it? Such a discussion is off the mark. As the FBI plainly acknowledges, neither it nor an individual agent can defend a claim by pleading ignorance of the decree. On the other hand, neither can the FBI or its agents be held accountable during deliberately conducted investigations by negligent violations of the decree, as if intentional somehow modified investigations. This latter interpretation is that of the district court: the investigation was

undertaken deliberately; therefore the FBI engaged in intentional noncompliance with the decree. We disagree with that interpretation.
In the decree, intentional does not modify investigation. Paragraph 5.2 provides for remedies for "serious intentional non-compliance" with the decree. Intentional modifies noncompliance. What is noncompliance? Noncompliance means that the FBI took one of the actions forbidden in paragraph 3.4. In this case, the action alleged was to "conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment." To conduct such an investigation solely on that basis would be "noncompliance." To conduct such activity with the intention of investigating purely First Amendment activities would be a basis for the entry of a court order under paragraph 5.2 of the decree.
Conversely, to conduct an investigation for the purpose of routing out terrorist activity only to find out that the basis for thinking that the organization engaged in terrorism was flimsy or nonexistent, and thus to have 0907 during the course of a deliberate, intentional investigation-inadvertently violated the First Amendment rights of citizens, is to have been in noncompliance with the decree. But, the noncompliance would be negligent, not intentional. To meet the requirements of paragraph 5.2 under the "serious intentional noncompliance" prong, the FBI must conduct an investigation with the intent to interfere with First Amendment rights. This is not a new reading of the decree. It is the distinction made over 12 years ago by our en banc panel:
Thus it [the FBI] may not investigate a group solely because the group advocates Puerto Rican independence, a cause that most of the men and women of the FBI no doubt have little fondness for; but it may investigate any group that advocates the commission, even if not immediately, of terrorist acts in violation of federal law. It need not wait till the bombs begin to go off, or even till the bomb factory is found.
742 F.2d at 1015.
To those who might think the decree, as we interpret it, means nothing, we say they have a short memory. When this case was filed in 1974, the possibility that an investigation aimed exclusively at First Amendment activity would be launched was not at all remote. The plaintiffs in this case originally alleged that the Chicago field office conducted "domestic security" investigations with the intent to harass and intimidate various groups and individuals for expressing their political views. From 1948 to 1966 the FBI is said to have committed numerous "black bag jobs" (breakings and enterings) in the Chicago area, many of which resulted in the gathering of information concerning lawful political activities. To repeat an example from our en banc decision: After Martin Luther King was "named `Man of the Year' by Time magazine, the FBI decided to `take him off his pedestal'...." If, indeed, that sort of investigative activity seems a lot less likely today, then this consent decree as well as other guidelines issued to and by the FBI have done their job. The existence of the decree today, as we have interpreted it, remains an effective deterrent to returning to a time when it had more meaning.
That the times may be different now does not mean that the phrase "intentional non-compliance" should be 477 expanded and strengthened to prevent, not just intentional, *477 but negligent noncompliance. Put conversely,
the FBI should not be penalized if it is, in fact, better than it was. Furthermore, as we also noted in our en banc decision, the decree "restricts the executive branch of the federal government in the performance of its constitutional responsibilities." To interpret the decree so that it expands the intrusion into the operations of the FBI is unwarranted.
On a more mundane note, our interpretation also gives meaning to the other road by which remedies can be justified: for "a pattern of substantial non-compliance." If the FBI engages in a pattern of noncompliance, an order can be issued whether or not the pattern has intentionally or negligently occurred. We think two roads to a remedy exist for a reason, and the second should not be rendered superfluous by watering down the first.
Our interpretation of the phrase "intentional non-compliance" requires that we reverse the judgment and send this case back to the district court for an analysis of the CISPES investigation under the standard we have enunciated. If, upon remand, violations of the decree are found under the standard we have just set out, the district court will need to revisit the issue of what relief is appropriate, an issue we do not reach at this time.

That said, we must also extend our regret that we must remand such an old petition. At oral argument we questioned why the FBI cares whether the relief ordered in this case is granted or not. Our impression was that the FBI's concern was not primarily with the particular order in this specific case, but rather with an overly broad reading of the language we have been discussing, a reading with potentially far-reaching effects. Given that the possibility of a broad reading has been made less likely by our decision today, it seems to us that a settlement should be reached before more resources are expended in this hoary proceeding.
Which brings us to the final point. A second appeal in this case involves the FBI's challenge to the award of attorney fees to the petitioners under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). At this point in the litigation the petitioners are no longer prevailing parties; accordingly, the fee award is VACATED. The judgment is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings. No costs are awarded.
[1] The judge who signed the decree was Susan Getzendanner, who joined the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1980, 6 years after the suit was filed. Judge Getzendanner was no longer a district judge in 1988 when this enforcement action was filed. The present appeals grow out of orders issued by Judge Ann Claire Williams.
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 356 F.3d 767 (2004)
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
No. 02-3981, 02-3982.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
ARGUED December 11, 2003. DECIDED January 28, 2004. Rehearing and Rehearing Denied February 27, 2004.
768 *768 Richard M. Gutman (argued), Montclair, NJ, Edward Koziboski, Harvey M. Grossman, Adam D. Schwartz (argued), Roger S. Hutchinson, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Myriam Zreczny (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BAUER, POSNER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied February 27, 2004.[*]
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
In 1974 and 1975, two classes of plaintiffs, represented by the Alliance to End Repression and the American Civil Liberties Union respectively, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the United States and the City of Chicago. The suit charged that the FBI's Chicago office and the Chicago Police Department's intelligence division were violating the class members' First Amendment rights by overly intrusive and improperly motivated investigations of alleged subversive activities. In 1981, before a trial could be held, the defendants agreed to a consent decree, which was approved by the district court the following year, imposing detailed restrictions on the defendants' investigative authority. 561 F.Supp. 537 (N.D.Ill.1982). The decree did not, however, vest monitoring or other responsibilities in the plaintiffs or their lawyers.
In 1997, long after this court had interpreted the decree as imposing fewer restrictions on the FBI than the district court had thought it did, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1984) (en banc), the City asked the district court to modify it to make the restrictions on the City less onerous. The district court refused even though the judge who had approved the decree in the first place had said it was so strict that she wouldn't have awarded the plaintiffs such draconian relief even if they had proved all their allegations in a trial. 561 F.Supp. at 551.
The City appealed from the refusal to modify the decree. It pointed out that it had complied with the decree throughout the entire period of almost two decades in which it had been in force, that during this period the Supreme Court and this court had become ever more emphatic that the federal judiciary must endeavor to return the control of local governmental activities to local government at the earliest possible opportunity compatible with achievement of the objectives of the decree that transferred that control to the federal courts, and that the culture of law enforcement in Chicago and the character of the threats to public safety by ideologically motivated criminals had so far changed as to make much of the decree obsolete. We agreed with the City and ordered that its motion be granted in its entirety. 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.2001). We pointed out that the decree was frustrating 769 the efforts of the police to cope with the problems of today because earlier generations of police had *769 coped improperly with the problems of yesterday. Because of what the police department's "Red Squad" had done many years ago, the Chicago police would, unless the decree was modified, labor indefinitely under severe handicaps from which other police forces were free. Under the modified decree, which forbids investigations intended to impede freedom of expression and requires the City to commission independent periodic audits to determine the City's compliance, First Amendment rights would, we held, be secure, while under the original decree the public safety was insecure and the prerogatives of local government scorned. And this was before the terrorist attacks

on the United States of September 11, 2001, brought about a renewed appreciation of the weight of security considerations in determining the point of balance between safety and liberty that we call our civil liberties.
All this is by way of background to the present appeal (and cross-appeal, in which the ACLU, however, does not join), which is by the City from an award by the district court to the class representatives of more than $1 million in attorneys' fees. That is on top of at least $450,000 in fees awarded (and paid) for legal services rendered earlier in the proceedings; the true figure is undoubtedly higher but the parties' records are incomplete, doubtless because of the great age of the case.
The $1 million award is for the following legal services rendered between 1994 and 2001: two proceedings for contempt of the decree, which failed; the opposition, just described, which also failed, to the modification of the decree; and efforts, which also bore no fruit so far as anyone can say, to monitor the City's compliance with the decree 0907 no fruit, that is, except the failed contempt proceedings. The order is appealable now because the activities for which the fees were awarded are complete in a sense that will become clearer in our discussion of the merits.
The awarding of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which authorizes such awards only to the prevailing party. See Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). The plaintiffs argue that by virtue of obtaining the consent decree in the first place they became the prevailing party for the entire life of the decree (which contains no sunset provision) 0907 indeed, beyond, for they contend that even if the decree had been dissolved in 2001, rather than just being modified, they would be entitled to the legal fees they incurred in opposing that result, provided only that the fees were reasonable in amount and the opposition to dissolution not frivolous. They base this claim primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 557-61, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), which allowed the reimbursement of attorneys' fees for postjudgment proceedings brought by the plaintiffs' lawyers. But those postjudgment proceedings were at least partly successful. These plaintiffs' postjudgment proceedings were not. They argue that they shouldn't be penalized for failure because they were duty-bound to oppose the modification of the decree, to monitor compliance with the decree before and after it was modified, and to bring contempt proceedings against anyone who they thought might be violating it. In support of the argument they cite our decision in Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir.1988), where we said that the plaintiff, having won a judgment in the district court, "had no choice" but to incur attorneys' fees to defend the judgment in our court. But 770 in that case, too, the plaintiff was successful 0907 not entirely, but *770 enough to make him the prevailing party. Had he lost on appeal he would not have been entitled to any award of fees.
In only two classes of case governed by section 1988(b) or similar fee-shifting provisions (see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)) has a plaintiff who obtained no relief in postdecree proceedings nevertheless been awarded fees for those proceedings. The first class consists of cases in which the consent decree itself authorized the court to award fees to the plaintiff that would be incurred in disputes brought to the court in the wake of the decree. Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 276 n. 1, 279 n. 4 (4th Cir.1990); Turner v. Orr, 785 F.2d 1498, 1500 nn. 2, 3 (11th Cir.1986). The contractual entitlement (there is none in our case) supplemented or superseded the statutory one. Granted, Plyler contains language suggesting that the case would probably have been decided the same way without benefit of the decretal provision. Similar dicta can be found in other cases as well, such as Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir.2002); San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District, 284 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2002), and Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 716-19 (8th Cir.1997). But partly by its approving reference (902 F.2d at 281) to our decision in Ustrak, where, to repeat, the plaintiff had some success, and partly by its observing that the plaintiffs had merely not been "successful in detail," id., the court in Plyler indicated that it thought the plaintiffs' efforts had contributed to compliance with the decree, and thus had not been fruitless after all. Indeed, the court noted that the defendant hadn't even appealed part of the district court's order in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 276, 279. This statement may have been erroneous, see Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208, 210, 215-16 (4th Cir.1988) (an earlier round, in which the court vacated the district court's order in its entirety), but it shows the court's thinking.
And likewise in Turner the court made clear its belief that the postdecree efforts had been valuable in inducing compliance with the decree, even though they, too, had failed in detail. 785 F.2d at 1504; cf. Bond v. Stanton, 630

F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (7th Cir.1980); Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346, 347-49 (5th Cir.1980). These cases can be thought of as extensions of the principle that a plaintiff is not to be denied full attorneys' fees merely because he lost some interim rulings en route to ultimate success. Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 414 (7th Cir.1998); Jenkins v. Missouri, supra, 127 F.3d at 714-16. Such setbacks are well-nigh inevitable, and a lawyer who nevertheless was sedulous to avoid them might lose a good case through an excess of caution. Likewise in postdecree litigation there may be inevitable setbacks en route to victory, partial or complete. But in the present case there has for a decade now been nothing but loss 0907 a million dollars' worth of legal services poured down the drain. There was not even a disappointing partial success, as there would have been if the City had moved to dissolve the decree and the plaintiffs had fended off dissolution yet had not averted a substantial modification.
In the second and more numerous class of cases, attorneys' fees incurred in efforts to monitor compliance with the consent decree are said or assumed to be compensable even if no postjudgment order results from the efforts. Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 996 F.2d 846, 850-51 (7th Cir.1993); San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District, supra, 284 F.3d at 1166; Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Services, 28 F.3d 1056, 1059-61 (10th Cir.1994); Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850, 855-57 (9th Cir.1987); Garrity v. Sununu, 771 752 F.2d 727, 738-39 (1st *771 Cir.1984); Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979). These cases are best explained on a deterrence rationale: careful monitoring reduces the likelihood that the decree will be violated. The rationale is attenuated in a case such as this in which someone else 0907 not the plaintiff 0907 is the appointed monitor. More fundamentally, the cases we have cited 0907 all of which except San Francisco NAACP precede Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, supra, and in San Francisco NAACP no fees were in fact awarded 0907 are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejection in Buckhannon of the "catalyst" theory of fee-shifting. As may also be such cases as Plyler, Turner, Bond, and Miller, insofar as they 0907 though Plyler and Turner only in dictum, for remember the contractual fee-shifting provisions in those cases 0907 reward lawyers for promoting compliance with the original decree rather than for obtaining supplementary court-ordered relief.
The catalyst idea was that if a lawyer's effort produces a good result albeit not an actual judgment or other judicial relief, it should be compensable. The Court described it as the idea that a fee-shifting statute "allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties," 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835 0907 and rejected it. Monitoring may reduce the incidence of violations of a decree, but if it does not produce a judgment or order, then under the rule of Buckhannon it is not compensable.
The plaintiffs are left to argue that the fact that the failed proceedings were offshoots of a pending case rather than entirely free-standing lawsuits should make a difference. Some cases have suggested that if postjudgment proceedings are "inextricably intertwined" with the original decree, in the sense of involving the same facts and legal issues, they can be considered part of the original case in which the plaintiff prevailed. Cody v. Hillard, supra, 304 F.3d at 773; Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196, 200-02 (4th Cir.1994). That is a questionable extension of the sound and settled principle that attorneys' fees incurred in interim defeats en route to a successful conclusion are compensable because, as we have noted, such skirmishes are indispensable inputs into a successful conclusion of litigation. Time, however, runs in only one direction. Interim defeats can contribute to ultimate victory, but failed efforts to follow up that victory contribute to nothing.
In any event, the postjudgment proceedings here, coming as they did so many years after the consent decree went into effect, are clearly separable from the proceeding that led up to the entry of the decree. Just as a bankruptcy proceeding provides a venue and procedural framework for prosecuting discrete claims ("adversary proceedings") by and against the debtor 0907 for example, a tort claim by the debtor that were he not in bankruptcy would be prosecuted as a civil suit in state court 0907 so a consent decree will often, and here does, provide a venue and procedural framework for prosecuting discrete claims. For example, persons complaining of violations of the Shakman decree (actually decrees, Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 481 F.Supp. 1315, 1356-59 (N.D.Ill.1979), vacated under the name Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir.1987); 569 F.Supp. 177, 183-207 (N.D.Ill.1983)), which limits patronage practices in employment by the City of Chicago, litigate the violations as contempts of court, see Smith v. City of Chicago, 769 F.2d 408, 411-13 (7th Cir.1985), rather than having to prosecute them as independent suits. That procedural short-cut does not earn a legal fee 772 paid by the *772 City if the claim fails. Ancillary or offshoot proceedings in class actions (such as contempt proceedings under the Shakman decree), or in bankruptcy, are treated by the law as if they were independent,

free-standing proceedings, see, e.g., In re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160, 166-67 (7th Cir.1992) (bankruptcy), with the decisions ending the proceedings thus being treated as appealable final decisions. That is one reason why the fee awards that the district court ordered are appealable now rather than only after the decree is dissolved, cf. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201-03, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988), if it is ever dissolved 0907 a matter to which we return at the end of this opinion. Another reason for allowing an immediate appeal is that a decree might never be dissolved, so that to treat fee awards as interlocutory might defer appeal to the end of time. Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1063 (7th Cir.1998).
We do not think that our plaintiffs would argue that if a member of the class went to a lawyer who does not represent the class, and that lawyer filed a motion for contempt on behalf of his client and lost, the lawyer would be entitled to a fee, on the ground that the class member was a prevailing party by virtue of the consent decree. They would attempt to distinguish the case on the ground that the lawyers who negotiated the decree, or their successors (it has been, after all, more than two decades since the decree was entered), were "duty-bound" to enforce the decree 0907 to monitor it, to file contempt proceedings on the basis of information obtained through the monitoring or otherwise, and to oppose any effort to lift or alter the decree. The attempt would fail. The decree imposes no such duties; nor does the law. The original decree contained provisions for audits and other methods of assuring compliance with the decree that were to be administered by the Chicago Police Board, while the modified decree requires annual audits by the Chicago Police Department and one audit to be performed by a national independent public accounting firm within five years. Neither the original nor the modified decree imposes on these lawyers any duty of operating the compliance machinery. They could have walked away from the case as soon as the consent decree was approved confident that a compliance machinery in which they had been given no role had been established. They would not have been letting down the class had they done so.
This brings out an important difference between this case and Plyler and Turner. Consider why the decrees in those cases but not in this one authorized the award of attorneys' fees for postdecree litigation without requiring that the plaintiffs prevail in that litigation. The answer is that they must have been expected to be the enforcers of the decree. This is explicit in Turner: "the consent judgment provided that the representatives of the plaintiff class would establish the PMC [Plaintiffs' Monitoring Committee, the entity seeking the award of fees] to, as its name suggests, monitor and ensure the continuing enforcement of the consent judgment." 785 F.2d at 1500. The present decree contains no contractual attorneys' fees provision because, rather than the lawyers for the class being the appointed enforcers of compliance with the degree, a public body, the Chicago Police Board, was given that task. We are mindful that some cases have authorized compensation for piggyback monitoring of the type involved in this case, e.g., Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492, 1495-97 (10th Cir.1989); Keith v. Volpe, supra, 833 F.2d at 857-58, but they do not survive Buckhannon.
773 We are not suggesting that the lawyers for the class had to walk away from the *773 decree once it was entered. But they could not appropriate for themselves a guaranteed lifetime income by bringing and losing a series of actions to enforce the decree and charging the expense to the City and thus to the taxpayers. The class-action device is not intended to be a lawyers' gravy train. The law does not reward lawyers for losing cases, or reimburse them for a prefiling investigation (which is the character of the plaintiffs' monitoring of compliance with the decree) that leads to the filing of a losing suit. The plaintiffs sue and lose, the City defends and wins 0907 but, we are told, the City is to pay its own expenses plus the plaintiffs'. We do not see the sense of that. The plaintiffs argue that unless they are reimbursed when they lose, their incentive to sue will be diminished because there is always a danger of losing a suit. Yes, and if section 1988 said that losing plaintiffs were entitled to awards of attorneys' fees, they would have a good argument.
Their strongest claim is to fees for defending the decree against the modification sought by the City. It is strongest because they were responding rather than initiating and because modification is perhaps not as readily conceptualized as a separate suit adventitiously embedded in the underlying class action as is a proceeding for contempt or what we have characterized as a prefiling investigation. But we reject the claim for three reasons. First, we have conceptualized postdecree litigation, including collection litigation, broadly as a discrete phase analogous to a free-standing suit. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (7th Cir.1993); King v. Ionization International, Inc., 825 F.2d 1180, 1184-85 (7th Cir.1987); see Bogard v. Wright, supra, 159 F.3d at 1062-63; In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 22 F.3d 755, 760-65 (7th Cir.1994). This does not mean that every procedural order that follows the entry of a consent decree or other judgment

requiring continuing supervision is immediately appealable. Bogard v. Wright, supra, 159 F.3d at 1062-63; compare SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988, 990 (7th Cir.1987). That would lead to an unmanageable proliferation of appeals. But orders modifying or refusing to modify injunctions are appealable immediately, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1), and that principle supports treating a proceeding to modify a consent decree as a discrete phase of an otherwise open-ended proceeding.
Second, as we have noted already, the plaintiffs had no duty 0907 statutory, contractual, or ethical 0907 to oppose modification. Third, and further demonstrating the absence of even an ethical duty to oppose, their opposition verged on the unreasonable. The decree had been in force for 15 years when the City asked that it be modified.
If not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law, remedies outlined in consent decrees involving state [or, we add, local] officeholders may improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers. They may also lead to federal court oversight of state programs for long periods of time even absent an ongoing violation of federal law.... Rule 60(b)(5) allows a party to move for relief if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."... In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), the Court explored the application of the Rule to consent decrees involving institutional reform. The Court noted that district courts should apply a "flexible standard" to the modification of consent decrees when a significant change in facts or law warrants their amendment. Id., at 393, 112 S.Ct. 748.
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 124 S.Ct. 899, 905-06, 157 L.Ed.2d 855, 2004 WL 57266, at *7 (U.S. Jan.14, 774 2004). In the *774 present case, the circumstances out of which the class action suit had arisen had changed
dramatically when modification was sought. The decree in its original form had accomplished its purpose and had become obsolete. There would have been no ignominy in the plaintiffs' acceding to the modification. They might have breathed a sigh of relief, since if the City had asked that the decree be dissolved, it probably would have been. The plaintiffs' opposition to modification gained the class nothing. Section 1988 does not reward failure. The contrast with Plyler is sharp, where the court described "the position taken" by the plaintiffs as "essential to the preservation of the integrity of the consent decree as a whole." 902 F.2d at 281.
Another point and we are done. The fees awarded in this case are for work dating back to 1994, a dozen years after the decree had been entered. This suggests the unwisdom of "conduct," or "regulatory," decrees (that is, equitable decrees that do not merely tell the defendant not to do or to stop doing something, but instead regulate his behavior and so impose a continuing duty of judicial supervision) that contain no sunset provision. Beginning in the Clinton Administration and continuing in the present Administration, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have both decided to include sunset provisions in their regulatory antitrust decrees. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Division Manual ch. 4, p. 55 (3d ed.1998); Federal Trade Commission, Final Rule, "Duration of Existing Competition and Consumer Protection Orders," 60 Fed.Reg. 58514, 58515 (Nov. 28, 1995). The absence of such a provision from the decree involved in the present case is, in retrospect, a considerable defect. It has meant that the plaintiffs have been encouraged to pursue enforcement efforts bound to fail because the decree, a response to the turmoil of the Vietnam War era now almost forgotten, is merely a relic.
The modified decree has a quasi-sunset provision. It provides that upon the completion of the independent audit that the modified decree orders but in any event no later than 2006, the district judge is to consider whether to dissolve the decree. We urge expedited completion of the audit, to clear the way to a prompt consideration of whether the decree has indeed outlived its usefulness, as in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 171 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (7th Cir.1999); 246 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir.2001). As the Supreme Court reminded us just weeks ago, "The federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials." Frew v. Hawkins, supra, at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 906, 2004 WL 57266 at *7.
The fee award is reversed. The plaintiffs are entitled to no fees for the legal services rendered during the period in issue, and a fortiori the Alliance is not entitled to the additional half million dollars sought in its cross-appeal.
REVERSED.

[*] Hon. Joel M. Flaum, Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner and Hon. Ann Claire Williams did not participate in the consideration of the petitions.
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 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (1976)

75 F.R.D. 428 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James M. ROCHFORD, Superintendent of Police, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268. | March 5, 1976.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*428 Richard M. Gutman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, George M. Keane, Jr., James Daley, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Lance Haddix, Val R. Klink, for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIRKLAND, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on motion of defendant Richard J. Daley for entry of a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By this motion defendant seeks a Court order that his oral deposition not go forward at this time. Alternatively, defendant requests that discovery by plaintiffs be obtained by means other than oral deposition as to him.
As grounds defendant argues that his schedule and position is such that a requirement *429 to sit for an oral deposition would be annoying, oppressive and unduly burdensome. [1] Defendant states that it is not uncommon for the Courts to deny requests for discovery from a public official. The cases defendant cites in support of that proposition, however, apply only to members of the President’s Cabinet, and this immunity from oral deposition is limited to cases where plaintiff has failed to show the necessity of such testimony in order to prevent injustice to him. The purpose behind the rule for Cabinet members is that a member of the Cabinet should not be called upon to explain why he acted as he did in regard to a particular matter in the exercise of his official discretion. See, U. S. Board of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 2625, 41 L.Ed.2d

224; U. S. v. North Side Realty Associates, 324 F.Supp. 287 (D.C.Ga.,1971).
[2] These cases do not apply here for two reasons. First, with no intent whatever to assign a particular status to the office of Mayor of Chicago, it is clear that said position is not a Cabinet level post in the federal government. Second, defendant Daley is not joined in this action because of his exercise of official discretion. Rather, plaintiffs allege defendant was an active participant in illegal activity. Of necessity then, oral deposition is the best means of determining the extent of defendant Daley’s participation, if any; and inability to depose him orally would work an injustice upon plaintiffs.
Defendant speculates that the deposition sought by plaintiffs could be a form of harassment, requested in bad faith, or made the basis for seeking discovery relating to another case in contravention of an order entered in that case.
This Court will not speculate as to plaintiffs’ motivation in seeking this deposition. Further, any questions at the deposition not directed to the subject matter of the instant case may be properly objected to at that time.
This Court holds that an oral deposition is properly sought by plaintiffs and is necessary to the preparation of their case against defendant Daley. [3] [4] Defendant next requests that a different method of discovery be substituted for oral deposition. The only reasonable alternative to oral deposition would be discovery by written interrogatories. Without doubt, oral deposition is preferable to written interrogatories when dealing with a recalcitrant or hostile witness. See Investment Properties International, Ltd. v. IOS Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972); Novel v. Garrison, 42 F.R.D. 234 (E.D.La.1967); Interlego A.G. v. Leslie-Henry Co., 32 F.R.D. 9 (M.D.Pa.1963).
The Court is persuaded that all defendants in this case are hostile to plaintiffs’ suit. Examination of discovery objections raised by defendants since the outset of this litigation indicates defendants’ intention to resist any significant disclosure at every step. All interrogatories directed to defendant Daley were objected to on grounds which could have been mooted by defendant Daley’s own reasonable cooperation. Defendants have indicated no willingness to cooperate in discovery matters in order to move this litigation forward; and surely counsel for defendant Daley cannot seriously suggest that the Court order a method of discovery which would produce an endless stream of objections for resolution. The Court will not put plaintiffs to that burden.
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Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (1976)

Defendant Daley is ordered to appear for deposition by plaintiffs at a time and day mutually convenient to the parties within thirty days from entry of this order.
Finally, it should be noted as a part of this order that the undersigned Judge has no desire or intention to abuse or flaunt whatever power is vested in U.S. District judges. This issue, purely and simply, is whether one particular party to a lawsuit in this instance the Mayor of Chicago

should be excused from the routine, legal and customary pre-trial procedure of submitting to an oral deposition.
*430 This Court concludes that no basis has been shown for granting defendant Daley preferred treatment in this regard and that it would be unfair to plaintiffs for the Court to do so.
	  

2

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 430 (1976)

75 F.R.D. 430 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James M. ROCHFORD, Superintendent of Police, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268. | March 5, 1976.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*430 Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix, Val R. Klink, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, George M. Keane, Jr., James Daley, Asst. Corp. Counsels, for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIRKLAND, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion to compel answers to written interrogatories. Plaintiffs seek answers to many interrogatories which defendants have not sought to contest in their responsive brief. The Court grants plaintiffs’ motion as to all interrogatories not specifically addressed by this opinion. *431 [1] Defendants object to the form of interrogatories 11, 12, 15, 29, and 30 on grounds that plaintiffs seek the compilation of information by six month periods. Defendants object that such categorization is unduly burdensome and annoying. With reference to interrogatories 11 and 12, the Court construes the six month request as a mechanism by which plaintiffs may determine when and how policies of defendants have

changed since January of 1967. To the extent no changes have taken place from one period to another, defendants can properly respond with the words “no change”. The court does not find such effort required of defendants to be unduly burdensome.
As to interrogatories 15, 29, and 30, the Court again finds that no substantial additional burden will be placed on defendants by ordering them to reply in the manner requested by plaintiffs. [2] Defendants invoke the “informer’s privilege” in their objection to interrogatory 25. Defendants’ objection to this interrogatory is not timely and that is dispositive; however, to the extent that such a privilege exists, it is applicable only to individuals furnishing information on violations of law, or information that purports to reveal commission of a crime. See, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280 (N.D.Ill.1959). Plaintiffs, by contrast, seek disclosure of the identity of persons who participated in intelligence gathering procedures, seeking information on lawful activities. As to persons so involved, no “informer’s privilege” exists.
[3] Plaintiffs seek further answer to interrogatory 79 on grounds that defendants’ previously filed answer was unresponsive. Defendants argue that a complete answer would require an audit, and as such, it would be unduly burdensome and expensive to respond. To the extent the question requires an audit, the Court agrees that it is excessively burdensome. However, defendants may respond to the question in part by disclosing any sources of external funds. Such disclosure would not be burdensome to defendants under the objection articulated.
It is the order of this Court that defendants are required to answer all interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs, save for the exception carved out as to part of interrogatory 79. Defendants are ordered to answer said interrogatories on or before March 30, 1976.
	  

1

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (1976)

75 F.R.D. 431 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James ROCHFORD et al., Defendants. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et al.
v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.
Nos. 74 C 3268 and 75 C 3295. | Oct. 14, 1976.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*432 Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix, Val R. Klink, Robert J. Vollen, Lois Lipton Kraft, Robert C. Howard, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, George M. Keane, Jr., James Daley, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Samuel K. Skinner, U. S. Atty., Thomas A. Dent, Asst. U. S. Atty., James L. Coghlan, Chicago, Ill., Jonathan B. Smith, Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Sp. Litigation Section, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIRKLAND, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on two motions; (1) plaintiffs’ motion to modify the Protective Order entered by this Court on July 31, 1975, and (2) plaintiffs’ objection to the extension of the Protective Order to certain defendants’ depositions pursuant to Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 31, 1975 Judge Flaum entered the Protective Order which limited disclosure of documents produced in discovery. The Order provided that access to such documents should be limited to plaintiffs’ attorneys. The Order further provided that the Court would review its Order if plaintiffs’ attorneys could demonstrate legitimate reasons for disclosure of documents to persons other than themselves.
In September, 1975 defendants moved to extend the Protective Order to cover depositions of three Police Department Intelligence Division agents. On December

16, 1975 defendants moved to extend the Protective Order to all discovery taken in the case, not simply to documents; that motion was denied without opinion. On April 15, 1976 defendants moved for a protective order with regard to certain interrogatories. In light of the constant stream of motions dealing with protective orders, on July 1, 1976 this Court ordered the parties to brief all issues pertaining to modification of the July 31 Protective Order so that one definitive Order could be issued and thereby prevent piecemeal determinations. The necessity of such an order again became clear on October 12, 1976 when defendants made a motion for a protective order over an additional deposition.
I. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
A. Alliance Plaintiffs’ Modification Arguments
Alliance plaintiffs adopt arguments raised in earlier briefs and further argue that the Protective Order previously entered should be modified in the following respects: (1) Plaintiffs’ attorneys should now be permitted to consult with and disclose to each plaintiff his own and only his own file. Only plaintiff (and not his attorney) would have the authority to disclose information in the file to the public.
*433 (2) Plaintiffs should be permitted to disclose only that information which pertains to their own activities. Names of third parties would be deleted before the dissemination of any information to the public.
(3) Motions or court documents referring to information produced by defendants should initially be filed with the Court and the Court would then determine whether papers contain confidential information. If the documents were found to contain confidential information the Court would not docket the motion; if they were not found to contain confidential information the Court would docket the motion.
City defendants agree that the Protective Order should be modified to allow disclosure to each plaintiff named in the documents. However, defendants argue that any such disclosure to organizational plaintiffs should be limited to the “governing group” of the organization. In addition, defendants oppose lifting the Protective Order to allow any disclosure to the public.
B. ACLU Plaintiffs’ Modification Arguments
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Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (1976)

ACLU plaintiffs argue that this Court should adopt an order allowing full disclosure of information to both named and unnamed members of plaintiff class. These plaintiffs also urge that past and present officers of plaintiff organizations be given access to documents regarding their organization and that the officers decide whether to reveal the information to the general membership and/or to the public.
Federal defendants agree that the Protective Order should allow for communication among plaintiffs and their attorneys, but oppose the release of information to the general public. Specifically these defendants are concerned that such release would deter citizens from reporting incidents which they believe to be unlawful. Federal defendants state that:
It requires scant judicial notice to conclude that public release of investigatory records at the mere filing of a civil suit would quickly evaporate public assistance enjoyed by law enforcement agencies. Cooperation by the public . . . has generally been pursued in the realm of confidentiality . . . for the purpose of citizen protection. (Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Entry of a Protective Order at p. 5.)
Federal defendants also have submitted for the Court’s consideration copies of protective orders entered in other civil litigation involving federal investigatory bodies.
C. Summary of the Arguments
After careful examination of the parties’ briefs this Court finds that the parties agree that plaintiffs should be informed of all discovery materials which pertain to those plaintiffs. However, the parties do not agree on the issue of dissemination of those materials or their contents to the general public. This Court is therefore called upon to decide whether defendants have adequately shown that they are entitled to a protective order limiting public disclosure of discovery materials and, if so, what form that protective order should take.
II. THE LAW ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Rule 26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that:

Upon motion by a party . . . and for good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense including one or more of the following:
(2) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions. (emphasis added)
[1] [2] Generally, all documents filed and proceedings held in federal civil litigation are open and a matter of public record, Olympic Refining Company v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964). Absent a showing of good cause there can be no limitation on *434 public access to judicial proceedings and documents. The burden of showing good cause rests on the movant, General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Company, 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973).
City and federal defendants contend that the protection of arguably valid governmental activities constitutes good cause for the issuance of a protective order. Federal defendants further contend that public revelation of details of governmental activities would disrupt law enforcement procedures and destroy the confidence of concerned citizens who report to government officials on the understanding that such reports will be treated confidentially.
Plaintiffs argue that the only valid reason for limitation of access to discovery materials is the protection of the privacy of persons and organizations who have been subjects of alleged government surveillance. Plaintiffs therefore contend that the privacy interest is protected when each individual decides whether to reveal information that pertains to him personally. Plaintiffs also contend that disclosing discovery data to past and present officers of the organization and allowing those officers to decide whether to disclose the information to the organizations’ membership and/or the public similarly protects the organizations’ privacy interest. Plaintiffs cite Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), for the proposition that the First Amendment dictates public access to judicial proceedings. [3] This Court does not agree that Bauer mandates full public disclosure of all phases of judicial proceedings. In Bauer the Seventh Circuit was faced with challenges to rules which dictated that attorneys make “no comment” about certain phases of civil litigation. The Court there recognized that such “no comment” rules (and by implication other restrictions on disclosure to the public) are constitutionally impermissible if they “presumptively prohibit” comment without regard to the necessity of prohibition. That is not the case here. Defendants have not relied on a presumption that disclosure of discovery materials should be limited, but rather have presented arguments in support of limited disclosure. Therefore the
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issuance of a protective order is not constitutionally proscribed by Bauer.
III. CONCLUSION

thereof. The “subject” of each writing or recording is defined as: (a) any individual named in a writing or recording; or
(b) with respect to any organization named in a writing or recording, the organization’s present or past officers, staff and governing body members.

Upon careful consideration of the briefs and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the opinion that a protective order is necessary. [4] The Protective Order does not restrict plaintiffs from revealing personal information to persons of their own choosing. The Court agrees that the only protectible interest as to personal data is the interest of individual or organizational plaintiffs in constitutionally protected privacy. Allowing plaintiffs to choose whether to reveal personal data obtained by government entities will adequately protect that interest.
However, this Court is of the opinion that until a judicial determination is made as to the constitutional validity of defendants’ surveillance activities, the Court should protect the system by which such data is gathered. Revelation of that system prior to a judicial determination of unconstitutionality would effectively destroy defendants’ information-gathering system. Since plaintiffs have sought both a declaration that the defendants’ information-gathering activities are unconstitutional and an injunction restraining those activities, the revelation of defendants’ system would effectively amount to granting plaintiffs the requested relief prior to such judicial determination. This should not be permitted at this time for the reasons stated above.
Accordingly, the Protective Order of July 31, 1975 is hereby vacated and the Order attached to this Opinion is entered.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties pursuant to the Court’s Order of July 1, 1976, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
(1) Paragraph 4(b) of Pretrial Order No. 2 entered July 1, 1976 is hereby set aside. The Protective Order entered by this Court on July 31, 1975 is hereby vacated.
*435 (2) Plaintiffs’ counsel may disclose any writings, recordings or their contents which contain the names of plaintiffs or members of plaintiff class to the subjects

(3) Any individual named in a writing or recording may elect to make further disclosure of that writing or recording or the contents thereof, but only insofar as it concerns that subject. That individual may not disclose the contents of the writing or recording insofar as the contents identify another individual or organization and insofar as the contents identify the system by which the information was obtained. The “system” is defined as:
All information produced by defendants in discovery which concerns the structure of the intelligence-gathering government entity and the manner or mechanics by which defendants gather, compile, record, or otherwise obtain information about plaintiffs’ activities.
(4) Any organization named in a writing or recording may elect to make further disclosure of the writing or recording or the contents thereof, but only insofar as it concerns that organization. An organizational subject may not disclose the contents of the writing or recording to members of the organization or others insofar as the document identifies another individual or organization and insofar as the writing or recording identifies the system, as defined in paragraph (3) above, by which information was obtained.
(5) Prior to the dissemination of writings, recordings or the contents thereof to any plaintiff or class member, plaintiffs’ counsel will deliver a copy of this Order to that plaintiff or class member and will explain the binding nature of this Order.
(6) Plaintiffs’ counsel may adopt any more restrictive approach that they believe is in the best interest of members of plaintiff class.
(7) This Order does not prohibit plaintiffs’ attorneys from discussing the writings, recordings or their contents with counsel who have participated or are participating in litigation of a similar nature so long as the following conditions are satisfied: (a) Before disclosing the writings, recordings, or their contents to such outside counsel, plaintiffs’ counsel will deliver a copy of this Order to such outside counsel and explain the binding nature of this Order;
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Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (1976)

(b) Before disclosing the writings, recordings, or their contents to such outside counsel, plaintiffs will obtain the consent of such counsel to the jurisdiction of this Court for the limited purpose of enforcing this Order;
(c) Such outside counsel may not disclose the writings, recordings, or their contents in any way.

(8) This Order in no way prohibits the parties from reporting any violations of law and any and all information relating to such violations to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
	  

4

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 435 (1976)

75 F.R.D. 435 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James ROCHFORD et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268. | Nov. 10, 1976.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*436 Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix, Val R. Klink, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, George M. Keane, Jr., James Daley, Asst. Corp. Counsels, for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIRKLAND, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from engaging in the following alleged activities: (1) joining plaintiffs’ legal team; (2) gathering information about plaintiffs’ evidence, legal strategy, legal preparations, legal objectives and litigation schedule; and (3) utilizing any of the above information in the litigation of this suit. Plaintiffs further seek an order compelling defendants to impound any information already gathered by defendants while engaged in the above-named activities. *437 [1] The parties agree that since the written memoranda and exhibits submitted with regard to this motion constitute the evidence and there is no serious dispute as to critical facts, the motion for injunctive relief may be decided by this Court without an evidentiary hearing, Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline, and French Labs, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).
INJUNCTION AGAINST INFILTRATION AND INFORMATION-GATHERING
Plaintiffs argue that defendants must be restrained from infiltrating plaintiffs’ legal team to obtain information and

establish files about plaintiffs’ legal preparations and evidence. In support of this argument plaintiffs present documentary evidence that defendants have engaged in the following activities: (1) infiltrated the Surveillance Task Force meetings of plaintiff Alliance to End Repression (“Alliance”); (2) photographed members of the Surveillance Task Force; (3) ordered background reports about members of the Surveillance Task Force and the attorney for plaintiff Alliance; (4) infiltrated plaintiffs’ legal team and actively participated in interviewing potential plaintiffs; (5) attended private meetings of plaintiffs and their counsel; (6) attended a law school class in which pending litigation was discussed.
Defendants respond that they are no longer engaged in the infiltration activities described above and submit the affidavit of the Commander of the Intelligence Division which verifies that there has been no such activity during the past year, and there is no “present intention” to initiate such activity. Defendants further note that plaintiffs’ most current documentary evidence of infiltration is dated July, 1975. [2] In order to grant a preliminary injunction this Court must find that movants have shown: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to movants; (3) minimal harm to the non-moving parties and to the public, Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, No. 75-2019 (August 17, 1976).
[3] Upon careful examination of the parties’ arguments and evidence in this case, this Court concludes that it is necessary to enter a preliminary injunction against defendants’ infiltration of plaintiffs’ legal team. The Court finds plaintiffs have demonstrated that: (1) Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits.
(2) Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed by defendants’ infiltration. While there is no evidence that infiltration is currently going on, plaintiffs have shown that defendants’ infiltration activities are likely to recur if an injunction is not granted. Defendants’ representations that they are no longer engaged in the infiltration activities described are not enough, Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963).
(3) There is no harm to defendants or the public generally since this Order only bars infiltration activities of defendants and not other methods of pre-trial discovery.
Accordingly, this Court hereby orders that defendants and their agents are enjoined from joining plaintiffs’ legal team.
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INJUNCTION AGAINST USE OF INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY GATHERED
[4] Plaintiffs next argue that defendants should be enjoined from using any information that has been gathered already and that any such information should be impounded to insure that it will not be used in defendants’ preparation for trial.
Defendants respond by making two arguments: (1) that plaintiffs’ interests are not protectible interests, and (2) that plaintiffs have no right to the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction because they have an adequate legal remedy to protect any interests they might have. Defendants argue that since Judge Perry has already ordered that established files are not to be *438 destroyed, this Court has insured the availability of the evidence to plaintiffs.
Defendants further argue that plaintiffs’ interest in defendants’ use of files may later be protected by motions in limine or for a protective order. Defendants argue that under these circumstances plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law and that no injunction should issue.
This Court does not agree that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law to protect them from the effects of defendants’ surveillance activities. This Court finds plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that defendants have gathered information about litigation plans and strategy by infiltration of meetings between organization members and at least one of plaintiffs’ attorneys.
This Court strongly disapproves of the method by which defendants “discovered” information in preparation for trial in defiance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Infiltration allowed defendants to obtain “discovery” from plaintiffs in circumvention of orderly discovery procedures required by the Federal Rules. Further, defendants’ surveillance allowed them to discover materials which would have not been discoverable under the Federal Rules, e. g., privileged materials.
This Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated: (1) a likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2) irreparable harm because defendants’ circumvention of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has prevented plaintiffs from exercising their rights to challenge such discovery; and (3) minimal harm to defendants in light of the fact that this order does not bar lawful discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby enjoins defendants from joining plaintiffs’ legal team. Defendants are enjoined from using any and all data which has been obtained by defendants or their agents as a result of joining plaintiffs’ legal team and gathering information about plaintiffs’ evidence, legal strategy, legal preparations, legal objectives, and litigation schedule by means other than orderly discovery procedures. Defendants are further enjoined from gathering information about non-public communications concerning plaintiffs’ evidence, legal strategy, legal objectives or litigation schedules. This Court will impose stronger sanctions if defendants continue, as hereinbefore discussed, to gather information about plaintiffs’ legal preparation.
	  

2

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (1977)

75 F.R.D. 441 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James ROCHFORD et al., Defendants. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants. CHICAGO LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW, Plaintiff, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295 and 76 C 1982. | June 7, 1977. | Amended June 24, 1977.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*443 Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix, Val R. Klink, Robert J. Vollen, Lois Lipton Kraft, Robert C. Howard, Gerald J. Muller, Robert L. Byman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, George M. Keane, Jr., James Daley, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Samuel K. Skinner, U.S. Atty., Thomas A. Dent, Asst. U.S. Atty., James L. Coghlan, Chicago, Ill., Jonathan B. Smith, Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Sp. Litigation Section, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIRKLAND, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Federal defendants’ Objections to plaintiffs’ Discovery Requests and on Federal defendants’ Motion to Stay Class Discovery pending interlocutory appeal of this Court’s certification of class.
I. DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY
Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Pretrial Order Number 6, defendants are required to file memoranda in support of

objections to discovery requests. Federal defendants object to plaintiffs’ first set of document requests on the grounds that: (1) certain information in the files of named plaintiffs is not relevant to the named plaintiff who is the subject of the file; (2) certain information is not relevant to issues raised in the Complaint; (3) certain information is privileged from disclosure for the protection of confidential informants; (4) certain information is so sensitive that disclosure could jeopardize or obviate the effectiveness of F.B.I. operations in furtherance of its investigative responsibilities; (5) certain information could jeopardize an ongoing investigation; and (6) certain documents are internal memoranda containing suggestions or *444 recommendations rather than factual material. This Court considers defendants’ relevancy objections first, then each of defendants’ other arguments.
A. Defendants’ Relevancy Objections
[1] Rule 26(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . .. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (emphasis added)
While relevancy objections may be raised by parties to litigation, courts have treated the issue of relevancy with great flexibility and liberality. See, e. g., Sylgab Steel and Wire Corporation v. Imoco-Gateway Corporation, 357 F.Supp. 659 (N.D.Ill.1973); Heathman v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 503 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1974); La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Company, 60 F.R.D. 164 (D.Del.1973). If requested materials are relevant, discovery is allowed without regard to admissibility at trial, Smith v. Schlesinger, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 513 F.2d 462 (1975).
“[2] Relevance” for purposes of discovery is determined by reference to the subject matter in issue and not particular pleadings, United States v. International Business Machines, 66 F.R.D. 180 (D.N.Y.1974).
[3] This Court notes that the scope of discovery in civil cases is extremely broad. Relevancy objections, while permissible, will not be sustained where discovery sought is relevant to the subject matter.
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These principles should guide the parties as discovery progresses.
1. Relevancy of Materials in Named Plaintiffs’ Files
[4] Federal defendants first object that certain information in files of named plaintiffs is not relevant to the named plaintiffs who are the subject of those files. Defendants contend that
certain documents which contain information relevant to a number of individuals and/or organizations are placed in the files . . . of each individual organization (named in the documents). The information concerning individuals other than the named plaintiff who is the subject of the file is not relevant to that named plaintiff’s claim and is therefore objectionable.
After careful in camera inspection of deleted and undeleted versions of these files, this Court concludes that this objection is without merit. In many cases, the files contain material about persons or organizations with which the named plaintiff has been associated or affiliated. The subject matter of this suit is the broad-based continuing course and pattern of overt and covert governmental surveillance of persons and organizations engaged in lawful activities. The action also challenges defendants’ infringement of plaintiffs’ associational privacy. To allow deletions of these materials on grounds that they are irrelevant would deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to fully investigate the scope of defendants’ activities and to assess the extent to which their associational privacy has been violated.
2. Relevancy of Discovery Requests to Issues in the Complaint
[5] Likewise without merit are defendants’ objections to plaintiffs’ interrogatories seeking both statistical data about the scope of defendants’ intelligence operation and documents recording public statements of F.B.I. and Justice Department personnel. Plaintiffs’ suit seeks relief for constitutional violations, the scope of which may be determined only by reference to statistical information about the scope and standards under which surveillance was conducted. This information is relevant to the subject matter of the suit and is therefore discoverable.

*445 [6] Defendants also object that some of the information about named plaintiffs relates to “criminal” or “foreign-related” activities and is therefore irrelevant. This Court agrees with plaintiffs that this information is relevant as an indicator of whether any of plaintiffs’ activities gave defendants legal justification for maintaining files on plaintiffs or for engaging in surveillance of plaintiffs.
[7] Defendants’ objection to production of documents and information concerning interagency cooperation because the information would be irrelevant is without merit. Defendants’ irrelevancy claim is based on a contention that these “other” agencies are not parties to this suit. However, in light of the fact that plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that named defendants conspired with others to carry out the alleged unlawful intrusions, and that the activities of defendants are broadly based, information about the scope of defendants’ dissemination and receipt of intelligence data is relevant to the subject matter of this suit.
[8] Finally, defendants’ objection to interrogatories seeking information about the means of gathering intelligence data is without merit. This information is relevant to plaintiffs’ understanding of the intelligence system and terminology used by defendants. Plaintiffs’ ability to decipher documents produced in discovery will clearly “lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and is therefore relevant.
Accordingly, defendants’ objections to discovery on grounds of relevancy are overruled.
B. Defendants’ Privilege Objections
1. The Informer’s Privilege
Defendants first invoke the informer’s privilege to justify their deletion of informer numbers, F.B.I. file numbers and information which would tend to jeopardize the anonymity of informers. Defendants further invoke the privilege to protect the identity of sources who requested or presumed that their identities would not be revealed.
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) the Supreme Court evaluated and discussed the nature and scope of the so-called “informer’s privilege” in the context of a criminal case:
What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to withhold
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Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (1977)

from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law (citations omitted). The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation. Id. at 59, 77 S.Ct. at 627 (emphasis added)
The informer’s privilege encourages citizen cooperation in law enforcement by insuring the anonymity of informers who have good reason to fear that disclosure of their identity could bring physical harm. At least implicitly, the privilege recognizes that the stakes are high in a criminal case and that the information transmitted by an informer may make the difference between acquittal and conviction. [9] When, on the other hand, a citizen reports on purely lawful activities, law enforcement goals are not furthered and the informer need not fear bodily harm if his identity is disclosed. In cases in which purely lawful activity is reported, the informer’s privilege does not apply, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (D.C.1976).
[10] Because defendants in Alliance had been permitted to remove files which were the subject of pending criminal investigations, this Court was called upon to decide ONLY whether the privilege applied to persons who gave information about LAWFUL activities.
This Court is now asked to decide whether the privilege should apply where the *446 lawfulness of activities reported by informers has not been decided. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges both that plaintiffs’ activities were lawful and that defendants’ surveillance of plaintiffs was unlawful. Neither of these allegations has yet been proven, nor should they be the basis of a decision as to whether the informer’s privilege applies.
The privilege would be an empty one if it could be defeated merely through commencement of a civil suit by an individual seeking to learn whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation. Further, until the Court knows the risks to which informers might be subjected, they must be protected.
At the same time, this Court recognizes that discovery

cannot wait until the issue of lawfulness of plaintiffs’ activities is determined. Plaintiffs need this information to analyze the extent of defendants’ activities. The balance between these interests is clearly a delicate one.
In light of the above competing interests, this Court concludes that recognition of an informer’s privilege would be unduly restrictive. However, until the Court is able to adequately assess the risk to the informers here involved, some restrictions upon disclosure of informer’s names is in order.
This Court hereby orders that Federal defendants: (1) produce the informer numbers, F.B.I. file numbers, and information they claim would tend to jeopardize the anonymity of informers; and (2) reveal the names of sources who requested or presumed that their identities would not be revealed. However, all productions made pursuant to this Order shall be subject to a protective order limiting to plaintiffs’ legal team disclosure of materials identifying informers. Only in this way may the Court protect those informers who are ultimately found to have given information in the context of a criminal investigation. This Court finds persuasive the opinion of the district court in Kenyatta v. Kelley, 375 F.Supp. 1175 (E.D.Pa.1974) where the court recognized that:
Concomitant with the duty to investigate the criminal must exist the privilege to investigate the suspect, for until information has been acquired, classified, analyzed, and disseminated neither guilt or innocence can be even surmised. (Id. at 1177.)
This Court views the protective order as the means of giving plaintiffs necessary discovery while allowing defendants to proceed with allegedly criminal investigations.
Accordingly, defendants’ objection to discovery on the grounds of the informer’s privilege is overruled, but all productions shall be subject to the protective order limiting to plaintiffs’ legal team disclosure of materials identifying informers.
2. Privilege for Internal Government Communications
[11] Defendants next object to interrogatories on the grounds that they relate to internal government memoranda containing recommendations and opinions rather than factual materials. Plaintiffs argue that there is an exception to the general privilege when the case in which such discovery is sought is one which challenges governmental misconduct.
3

Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (1977)

This Court agrees with defendants that the cases which have recognized an exception to the privilege are distinguishable from this case because all those cases involved a Court’s ultimate determination that various government defendants’ activities were unlawful. In the instant case, no such determination has yet been made.
In the present case, this Court cannot rule on the governmental communications privilege issue without in camera review of documents for which that privilege is claimed. Although the Court recognizes that this ruling will place additional burdens on the parties and the Court, no intelligent ruling on this privilege may be made without inspection of the materials in question.
Accordingly, this Court hereby enters and continues defendants’ objection to production of all materials for which the privilege relating to internal governmental communications is claimed. Federal defendants will *447 produce, for in camera inspection, all such materials along with a memorandum setting forth arguments in support of these claims, within 21 days of the date of this Order.
3. Defendants’ Other Privilege Claims
Defendants invoke, but do not discuss, privileges for ongoing investigations, confidential sources and interference with foreign relations. Defendants’ relevancy objections having now been ruled on for these issues, defendants are hereby given 21 days from the date of this Order in which to raise these objections formally; plaintiffs are given 21 days to respond, and defendants are given 14 days to reply.

Accordingly, Federal defendants’ objection to discovery on grounds of undue burden is overruled.
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY CLASS DISCOVERY
[13] On May 24, 1977 this Court granted Federal defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery on class issues until resolution of Federal defendants’ interlocutory appeal of class certification. This Court recognized that there was a possibility that needless discovery might occur if the Circuit Court were to decide to modify the class.
Accordingly, class discovery is stayed as follows: (1) Federal defendants need not produce files on any persons or organizations unless named as plaintiffs in the suit; and
(2) Federal defendants need not produce files on any persons or organizations that are not named plaintiffs in the suit but make reference to named plaintiffs.
The production of these files is to be consistent with this Court’s ruling on the relevancy objections supra and Federal defendants may not make deletions from the files of named plaintiffs on the grounds that class discovery has been stayed.
III. CONCLUSION

C. Defendants’ Claim of Undue Burden
[12] Defendants finally object to certain discovery on the grounds that production of such information would be unduly burdensome. That motion primarily seeks to withhold from discovery materials which would be difficult to produce because these materials are not stored in an organized filing system. Defendants’ objection is totally without merit. This Court agrees with the reasoning of the district court in Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 73 F.R.D. 73 (1976):
To allow a defendant whose business generates massive records to frustrate discovery by creating an inadequate filing system, and then claiming undue burden, would defeat the purposes of discovery rules. (Id. at 76.)

Defendants’ relevancy objections to discovery are overruled.
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Class Discovery is granted as follows: (1) Federal defendants need not produce files on any persons or organizations unless named as plaintiffs in the suit; and
(2) Federal defendants need not produce files on any persons or organizations that are not named plaintiffs in the suit but make reference to named plaintiffs.
Production of files is to be consistent with this Court’s ruling on relevancy objections and Federal defendants may not make deletions from the files of named plaintiffs on the grounds that class discovery has been stayed.
Defendants’ objection to discovery on the grounds of the informer’s privilege is overruled, but all productions shall
4

Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (1977)

be subject to a protective order described in Section B.1. of this Opinion, supra.
Defendants’ objection to discovery on the grounds that the interrogatories relate to internal government communications is entered and continued. The Court hereby orders that defendants produce, for in camera inspection, all materials for which the *448 privilege is claimed, with a memorandum setting forth arguments in support of these claims within 21 days of the date of this

Order.
Defendants’ other privilege claims are given a briefing schedule of 21, 21 and 14, such schedule to run from the date of this Opinion.
Defendants’ objection to discovery on grounds of undue burden is overruled.
	  

5

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438 (1976)

75 F.R.D. 438 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al., Plaintiffs, v.
James ROCHFORD et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268. | Nov. 10, 1976.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*439 Richard M. Gutman, Lance Haddix, Val R. Klink, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, George M. Keane, Jr., James Daley, Asst. Corp. Counsels, for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KIRKLAND, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion to impose sanctions for defendants’ failure to answer certain interrogatories pursuant to Rule 37(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On December 12, 1974 plaintiffs served interrogatories on defendants, including the three interrogatories which are the subject of this motion. On March 5, 1976 this Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel answers to the interrogatories and ordered defendants to answer on or before March 30, 1976.
Defendants answered the interrogatory seeking the identities of 180 confidential informants by stating that some identity records were destroyed between May and August, 1974 and others in November, 1974. Defendants answered interrogatories seeking data about information dissemination beyond the Intelligence Division of the Chicago Police Department by stating that dissemination records were destroyed after a one-year holding period and that the most current records of information dissemination could not be found. Plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to produce any authorizations for the destruction of records as outlined above.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ answers to these interrogatories are incomplete and *440 must be treated as

failures to answer under Rule 37(a)(3). Plaintiffs therefore argue that this Court should impose sanctions.
Defendants respond that plaintiffs have not established that there was anything improper about the fact that no written documents exist and none can be found. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions admits that defendants answered the interrogatories and therefore plaintiffs cannot validly express dissatisfaction with those answers by a motion for sanctions. This Court does not agree.
Rule 37(a)(3) provides that: For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 37 state that: Rule 37 provides generally for sanctions against parties or persons unjustifiably resisting discovery.
(F)lexibility as to sanctions eliminates any need to retain the requirement that failure to . . . respond be “wilful”.
[1] Upon careful examination of these interrogatories and defendants’ answers, this Court concludes that the answers given by defendants were both “incomplete” and “evasive” within the meaning of Rule 37. Defendant Walter Murphy’s sworn answers to these interrogatories refer only to the unavailability of information because certain documents were not available, but make no mention of defendant’s personal knowledge of the information sought. This Court finds that interrogatory answers which are limited to information affiant obtained from documents and which make no statement as to affiant’s personal knowledge of facts which the documents would have revealed are both incomplete and evasive. This Court must therefore assume that affiant had personal knowledge of the facts but did not swear to anything more than the fact that documents were unavailable. Such interrogatory answers are unacceptable.
[2] This Court is further convinced that defendants’ document destruction between May and November, 1974 makes it impossible for plaintiffs to obtain definitive answers to the interrogatories. While the destruction of documents here in issue occurred before suit was filed in November, 1974, plaintiffs have convincingly demonstrated that defendants obtained reports that plaintiffs were about to file suit from paid informants who infiltrated plaintiff Alliance to End Repression. One such informant warned defendants:
Note: it seems this time they are finally ready to proceed with the law suit. It would only seem reasonable
1

Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438 (1976)

that any steps that can be taken to prepare for the possible problems should be taken as soon as possible. It may be too late if postponed. (Exhibit B, Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum on Motion for Sanctions)
Defendants have nowhere stated that document destruction here in issue was in the ordinary course of business nor have they shown any written authorization for that destruction.
The destruction of documents before suit and defendant Murphy’s failure to answer interrogatories from personal knowledge renders useless plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain meaningful answers to interrogatories on the issues of identity of confidential informants and of information dissemination by the Intelligence Division. This Court therefore finds that plaintiffs are entitled to sanctions for defendants’ failure to answer interrogatories in a meaningful way. [3] This Court concludes that defendants must be prohibited from introducing as evidence at trial any documents which they now allege to be lost or destroyed. In addition to prohibiting the use of these unavailable documents at trial, there is need for a sanction which protects plaintiffs’ ability to prove allegations of infiltration and information dissemination and protect defendants’ ability to rebut plaintiffs’ allegations. Treating allegations of the complaint as true because of defendants’ failure to comply with discovery does not allow defendants to rebut those allegations.

plaintiff’s case and that defendant intended to show that plaintiff’s damage was caused by intervening and superceding causes. The Court balanced the interests of the parties and ordered that it be deemed established for trial that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of causation in fact. Defendants were free to rebut that case by introducing evidence on their own behalf.
This Court believes that a similar balancing of interests should occur here. Because of the unavailability of information about the names of confidential informants and about information dissemination beyond the Intelligence Division, plaintiffs will be unable to prove the allegations of paragraphs 82, 96, and 97 of their complaint. It is therefore ordered that paragraphs 82, 96, and 97 of plaintiffs’ complaint be admitted prima facie. Defendants have the burden of rebutting the allegations of these paragraphs to show that they did not: Disseminate derogatory information to Chicago Tribune reporter Ronald Koziol in order to smear and defame . . . plaintiffs in a major newspaper at specified dates. (See Paragraph 82, plaintiffs’ complaint)
Regularly assign informers and undercover police officers to infiltrate political, community, religious, and social organizations to report on and monitor the activities of such organizations and their members. (See Paragraph 96, plaintiffs’ complaint)
Instruct informers and undercover agents to provoke, encourage, and solicit members of the target organization to participate in unlawful activities. (See Paragraph 97, plaintiffs’ complaint)

*441 In order to protect the parties’ right to prove their respective contentions, this Court follows the approach taken by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Black v. United States, 389 F.Supp. 529 (1975). In that case, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s unlawful electronic surveillance and dissemination of information damaged him financially. The Court was faced with defendant’s failure to produce logs kept on the electronic surveillance of plaintiff.
The Court recognized competing interests, i. e., that the withheld documents constituted necessary proof in

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the Court finds and holds that plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing as to Paragraphs 82, 96, and 97 of the complaint. It is ordered that defendants have the burden of showing that they have not engaged in the activities therein described.
	  

2

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

91 F.R.D. 182 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Aug. 11, 1981.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*185 William Quinlan, Corp. Counsel, Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., Gregory C. Jones, Edward J. Moran, Asst. U.S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., J. Charles Kruse, Washington, D.C., Lawrence Suffredin, Jr., Robert C. Christenson, George Murtaugh, Jr., Thomas Royce, Albert Brooks Friedman, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
Richard M. Gutman, Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., Joseph R. Lundy, Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Matthew J. Piers, John H. Mathias, Jr., Jenner & Block, Sybille C. Fritzsche, Lawyers Committee, Lance Haddix, Robert C. Howard, Pressman & Hartunian, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GETZENDANNER, District Judge.
These cases are before the court for approval of proposed settlements of plaintiffs’ claims against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Justice Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), and certain individual defendants. There are two separate settlement agreements, one of which will be referred to as the FBI agreement and the other as the CIA agreement. The FBI agreement includes claims asserted against the FBI, United States Department of Justice, Attorney General, the Director of the FBI and two former employees of the FBI. The CIA agreement includes claims asserted against the CIA and its Director. In this opinion the defendants who are settling are sometimes referred to as the “settling defendants” or the “federal defendants.”
The court previously determined that the proposed settlements were within a range of possible settlement and

directed that notice of a hearing on the proposed settlements be given to the plaintiff class. Notice was given and a hearing was held on February 13, 1981. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were submitted by the proponents of the settlement; objections thereto were filed by certain objectors; and supplemental materials and proposed findings and conclusions were submitted to the court. The record was closed on June 11, 1981.
The court has decided to approve the proposed settlements and adopt, with only minor changes, the proponents’ proposed findings and conclusions. The proponents’ proposed findings and conclusions clearly and accurately state the relevant facts and legal principles and, in fact, were impossible to substantially improve.
*186 Plaintiffs have now also entered into settlement agreements with the remaining defendants, principally the City of Chicago, the Secretary of Defense, and various former military intelligence personnel. A preliminary determination of fairness has been made and a hearing on the fairness of the proposed settlements is set for October 9, 1981.
FINDINGS OF FACT
THE CASES
Alliance to End Repression (“Alliance”), et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 74 C 3268, was filed as a class action on November 13, 1974. American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), et al. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 75 C 3295, was filed as a class action on October 3, 1975.
PARTIES
The 32 Alliance named plaintiffs, of whom 14 are organizations and 18 are individuals, include churches, political groups, civil liberties organizations, and individual political community, and religious activists.
Initial Alliance defendants included officials and employees of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department. The City of Chicago was added as an Alliance defendant on November 19, 1979.
On July 8, 1977, Alliance plaintiffs added as defendants, in their official capacities only, certain federal officials, including the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI,
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

the Director of the CIA, and the Secretary of Defense. On January 28, 1980, Alliance plaintiffs added as defendants the United States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The 24 ACLU named plaintiffs, of whom 10 are organizations and 14 are individuals, include community groups, religious groups, civil rights and civil liberties groups, and individual community activists, lawyers, journalists and public officials.
Initial ACLU defendants included the City of Chicago and various city officials, the Attorney General of the United States and various FBI officials, and the Secretary of Defense and various former military personnel.
On December 27, 1979, ACLU plaintiffs added as defendants the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

conduct.
No damages are sought on behalf of the plaintiff classes in either case. Certain of the named plaintiffs ask for monetary damages against certain of the defendants.
In both lawsuits the settling defendants denied all allegations of unlawful government intrusions.
*187 No findings of fact have been made by the Court relating to the allegations made against the settling defendants.
HISTORY OF LITIGATION Both cases have been actively litigated and sharply contested throughout the years since they were filed.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in these cases is asserted on the basis of 28 U.S.C. ss 1331 and 1343, 18 U.S.C. s 2520, and 5 U.S.C. s 552a; and declaratory relief is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ss 2201 and 2202.
CLAIMS
Plaintiffs in both cases claim that the settling defendants have conducted surveillance of, and compiled dossiers on, their lawful political and other lawful activities; gathered information about plaintiffs by unlawful means, including warrantless wiretaps and break-ins, unlawful use of infiltrators and informers, and by other unlawful means; disrupted and harassed plaintiffs’ lawful activities; and further, that defendants have also committed these alleged wrongs against members of the plaintiff classes, all as part of a continuing course and pattern of alleged illegal conduct.
Plaintiffs claim that this alleged conduct violates their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. s 1983, 18 U.S.C. ss 2510-20, and 5 U.S.C. s 552a.
The relief asked for on behalf of the named plaintiffs and plaintiff classes in both cases includes a declaration by the court that the conduct complained of is unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting the continuation of such

MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Federal defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Alliance case was denied November 15, 1977. Federal defendants’ motion to strike portions of the Alliance plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, adding federal agencies as defendants and alleging violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552a, was denied March 28, 1980.
A motion to dismiss by the federal defendants in the ACLU case was denied May 26, 1976. 431 F.Supp. 25.
CLASS CERTIFICATIONS
On March 25, 1976, the Court certified the following two plaintiff classes in the Alliance case:
(a) The plaintiff individuals. The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage in or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

the federal defendants or the proposed settlements.1

(b) The plaintiff organizations. The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage in or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been within the last five years, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
On May 24, 1976, the Court certified the following two plaintiff classes in the ACLU case:
(a) The plaintiff individuals. The class represented by plaintiff individuals consists of all residents of the City of Chicago, and all other persons who are physically present within the City of Chicago for regular or irregular periods of time, who engage in or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, surveillance, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
(b) Plaintiff organizations. The class represented by plaintiff organizations consists of all organizations located or operating in the City of Chicago who engage or have engaged in lawful political, religious, educational or social activities and who, as a result of these activities, have been, are now, or hereafter may be, subjected to or threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, surveillance, or dossier collection, maintenance, and dissemination by defendants or their agents.
On appeal by the federal defendants, the class certifications in both cases were affirmed by the Court of Appeals on November 22, 1977, and rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied February 13, 1978. 565 F.2d 975.
The Alliance and ACLU cases were consolidated for discovery purposes on July 2, *188 1976, and both cases were consolidated for discovery purposes on December 8, 1976 with Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. City of Chicago, et al., No. 76 C 1982, which is not a class action, and which does not involve

1

The Chicago Lawyers’ Committee case was settled

earlier this year, at the same time the plaintiff classes in

these cases entered into settlement agreements with the

City of Chicago and all other defendants in this case

who are not included in the FBI and CIA settlement

agreements.

DISCOVERY AGAINST FBI AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DEFENDANTS
Many of plaintiffs’ discovery requests were vigorously resisted by the FBI and Justice Department defendants throughout the litigation on numerous grounds, principally relevance, opposition to class-wide discovery, burden and privileges including the informer’s privilege and claims of “state secrets.” E. g. 75 F.R.D. 441 (June 7, 1977); 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979), 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (upon rehearing en banc, remanding in part for further consideration.) The defendants’ claim of informer’s privilege was litigated extensively, overruled twice (75 F.R.D. at 445-46; Mem. Op. and Order of March 13, 1979), reconsidered twice, and ultimately not resolved. The Court’s Decision of April 18, 1980, ruled disclosure of informers “not yet appropriate” (p. 4) and suggested “exploring the settlement of this issue.” (p. 7).
The Court’s orders ultimately resulted in the production of massive discovery concerning FBI domestic intelligence activities in Chicago. Throughout most of the period from mid-1977 through late 1980, FBI files and documents were produced to plaintiffs at a rate substantially in excess of 1000 pages per week. Despite numerous deletions, mainly on the ground of the informer’s privilege and “state secrets” privilege, these files cumulatively totalled several hundred thousand pages, and reflect an extensive cross-section of FBI domestic intelligence activities in Chicago during the period 1940 through 1980. They include:
(a) All Chicago Field Office and Headquarters files on all ACLU named plaintiffs, and on all but two Alliance named plaintiffs. (With respect to these two, all Chicago Field Office files concerning FBI activities since 1972 and 1974, respectively, were produced.) The Chicago Field Office files on ACLU named plaintiffs alone, counting only the period since January 1, 1966, amount to approximately 15,000 pages.
(b) Every one-hundredth Chicago Field Office file opened in FBI file classifications “100” (“subversive”) and “157” (“extremist”), and in 11 other file classifications regarded by the FBI as
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

“security-related,” since January 1, 1966. These include approximately 143 “subversive” files, 103 “extremist” files, and 65 files in 9 additional file classifications, including classifications 14 (sedition), 65 (espionage) and 176 (anti-riot).
(c) Every five-hundredth Chicago Field Office file opened in the same classifications prior to January 1, 1966. These include approximately 85 “subversive” files, and approximately 36 files in the other classifications.
(d) Approximately 75 additional files on class members designated by plaintiffs, including approximately 25 organizations and 50 individuals. These include a broad cross-section of files on civil rights, anti-war, political and civic groups; labor unions; the women’s liberation and gay liberation movements; and individual civic, community and political activists.
(e) All or portions of the Chicago Field Office files on approximately 25 individuals whose “subversive” or “extremist” files were on a list of investigations purportedly closed pursuant to FBI directives implementing the 1976 Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations.
(f) The Chicago Field Office informant files, totalling several thousand pages, *189 with virtually no deletions, on four FBI domestic security informants identified by plaintiffs, whose periods of principal activity for the FBI covered, respectively, 1966-69, 1971-76, 1971-78 and 1975-1978.
(g) The Chicago Field Office files on the COINTELPRO programs targeted at the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, “White Hate”, “New Left”, and “Black Extremist” groups, as well as portions of Headquarters files on these programs.
(h) Voluminous Headquarters and Field Office files on FBI domestic intelligence policies and practices. These include manuals; handbooks; FBI “control” files incorporating policy documents relating to each file classification; “SAC letters” (periodic Headquarters instructions to the field); reports of FBI inspections of the Chicago Field Office and the Headquarters divisions and sections responsible for domestic security; files of policy documents relating to particular investigative techniques, such as “black bag jobs”, electronic surveillance, informers, photographic surveillance, mail covers, mail opening, trash covers, obtaining tax records, and other techniques; policy files on dissemination and destruction of files; policy files on standards and procedures under the various Attorney General’s Guidelines and Executive Orders promulgated during 1976-1980; files on indexing policies; FBI liaison files with other intelligence

agencies, including the Chicago police, the military and the CIA; “COINTELPRO” policies; various statistics on the numbers of FBI investigations and informers in various categories, at both the Chicago and Headquarters levels; FBI budget information; public statements and congressional testimony by FBI officials; various FBI indices, including the “Security Index”; and other policy documents.
(i) FBI publications evidencing dissemination of domestic security information (such as the “FBI Summary of Extremist Activities.”)
(j) Files on the authorization, continuation and closing of specific domestic security wiretaps in Chicago.
(k) FBI Interrogatory answers stating that Chicago Field Office files on the ACLU named plaintiffs since January 1, 1966, contain the names of 837 FBI informants, and a June 16, 1978 stipulation between ACLU plaintiffs and federal defendants, for all purposes in this litigation, that none of these informants reported on any activities of the named plaintiffs which the federal defendants claim were unlawful, and that all of them provided information to the FBI concerning plaintiffs’ lawful activities, views or beliefs.
(l) Other information in miscellaneous categories.
Plaintiffs also obtained numerous interrogatory answers, and deposed numerous FBI agents and officials including case agents, field supervisors, the Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Field Office, Headquarters officials in charge of domestic security investigations nationwide, and the second-ranking official in the FBI, as well as a Justice Department official responsible for overseeing FBI compliance with relevant Attorney General Guidelines. Relevant portions of FBI personnel files pertaining to many of the FBI deponents were also produced.
On October 14, 1976, to protect the privacy of individuals and organizations reported on by the FBI in these files, the Court entered a protective order limiting dissemination of information obtained in discovery. 75 F.R.D. 431.
DISCOVERY AGAINST CIA
As part of pretrial discovery, plaintiffs received hundreds of pages of CIA documents including the following:
(a) CIA documents concerning the CIA’s relationship with the Chicago Police Department.
(b) The CIA files on 30 of the 32 named plaintiffs. (The 4

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

CIA had previously furnished named plaintiffs Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance their CIA files in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 73 Civ. 316 (S.D.N.Y.).)
*190 (c) The CIA files on plaintiffs’ counsel.
During pretrial discovery, plaintiffs did not receive any documentation of CIA surveillance after 1973 of lawful First Amendment activity in Chicago.

OTHER INFORMATION
In negotiating and deciding whether to enter into the proposed FBI settlement, plaintiffs have also had the benefit of extensive additional information concerning FBI and CIA domestic intelligence policies and practices, including FBI and CIA files obtained in other lawsuits and under the Freedom of Information Act, and numerous congressional hearings and investigations.2

2

E. g., Final Report of the Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence

Activities, United States Senate, 94th Cong., 2d sess.

Report No. 94-755, April 23, 1976; General

Accounting Office reports No. GGD-76-50, February

24, 1976, “FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations Their

Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need to Be Resolved,”

and No. GGD-78-10, November 9, 1977, “FBI

Domestic Intelligence Operations: An Uncertain

Future”; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on

Administrative Practice and Procedure of the

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th

Congress, 2d sess., especially part 2, pp. 91-129 (1978);

Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary,

United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st sess., Serial No.

96-53, Part 1, “FBI Charter Act of 1979, S. 1612”

(1980); Report to the President by the Commission on

CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office);

and “CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans:

CHAOS Program and the Office of Security”, pp.

679-732.

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
The settlement agreements contain specific agreements with respect to future CIA and FBI activities in Chicago. Because of the importance of these specific agreements, the Court has attached to this Memorandum Opinion and Order, as Exhibits A and B, respectively, copies of the relevant portions of the FBI agreement and the CIA agreement.

The FBI settlement would terminate all claims that plaintiffs have asserted in these actions against the United States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and two former employees of the FBI. The CIA agreement would terminate all claims plaintiffs have asserted against the CIA and its Director.
The proposed settlements are the result of a negotiating process described by counsel for both sides as arduous, adversary and lasting nearly a year, in which counsel for all named plaintiffs and for all settling defendants participated.
Counsel for all parties agree that nearly every line and paragraph of the agreements, and in many cases individual words, are the product of intense negotiations, and that the agreements reflect compromise by all parties.
There is no evidence that the negotiations were other than adverse. On the contrary, the whole history of these lawsuits is one of vigorous, hotly contested litigation. Significant discovery and trial preparation continued throughout the period of negotiations. At one point, late in the negotiations, an impasse between counsel was reached, but was resolved after a meeting between client representatives, attended also by ACLU plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Dr. Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J. Berman.
The settlements were entered into after sufficient facts were developed, through discovery and otherwise, fairly to apprise all parties of the facts likely to be adduced at trial and to enable them fairly to assess the likely outcome of trial. Massive pretrial discovery was substantially complete, and pursuant to court order plaintiffs had completed and filed their draft final pretrial materials. Late in 1980 the Court set the cases for trial in March of 1981. Although this trial date was stricken when the cases were reassigned to a newly-appointed judge, it was clear that the cases would have been tried in 1981 but for the proposed settlements.
Counsel for the participating parties state that the agreements negotiated by them, in their considered opinion, are fair, reasonable *191 and adequate. At the March 13, 1981 hearing on the settlement, the Court expressed high regard for the competence of counsel for the participating named plaintiffs. (Tr., at p. 25)
The FBI agreement was approved by all ACLU named plaintiffs and by all Alliance named plaintiffs except two organizations (Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance) and three individuals (Dennis Cunningham, Jeffrey Haas and G. Flint Taylor), all five of whom voluntarily dismissed with prejudice their claims against the FBI and Department of Justice defendants on December 22, 1980. The two organizations did, however,
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

reserve their claims against the FBI in certain other litigations. On February 11, 1981, two additional Alliance named plaintiffs (Young Workers Liberation League and Jay Schaffner) also withdrew from the settlement and voluntarily dismissed with prejudice their claims against the FBI and Department of Justice defendants.
The FBI agreement has also been approved by the FBI and by the United States Department of Justice, and has been personally approved by the present FBI Director, William Webster, and by senior officials of the Department of Justice, in their official capacities.
The CIA settlement has been approved by all named plaintiffs except for the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance, both of which voluntarily dismissed with prejudice their claims asserted in this action against the CIA defendants, but without prejudice to their pending claims in SWP, et al. v. Attorney General, et al., No. 73 Civ. 3160 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y.).
The CIA settlement has also been approved by the CIA and personally approved by appropriate officials of the CIA and senior officials of the Department of Justice, in their official capacities.
It is very likely that further litigation, absent the proposed settlements, would be extremely complex, lengthy and expensive.

Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance, concerning the reasons for their nonparticipation in the proposed FBI settlement. Prior to the hearing the Court had received in writing the views of Alliance named plaintiffs Cunningham, Haas, and Taylor, explaining why they had chosen not to participate in the proposed FBI settlement. The preliminary hearing was attended on their behalf by an attorney from the same law office as these three plaintiffs, all of whom are attorneys.
The Courts’ questions and suggestions at the hearing resulted in a number of changes in the parties’ proposed form of notice to class members, including clarifications of the status of the litigation with respect to those defendants not joining in the settlements; the fact that no damage claims on behalf of plaintiff class members had been alleged in the cases, and accordingly none were affected by the proposed settlements; *192 and a summary of the criticisms of the proposed settlements by the nonparticipating Alliance named plaintiffs.
At the Court’s suggestion, the wording of the summary of these criticisms was negotiated and agreed upon immediately following the preliminary hearing, by counsel for the proponents (ACLU named plaintiffs, Alliance named plaintiffs, and the federal defendants), counsel for the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance, and counsel for Alliance plaintiffs Cunningham, Haas, and Taylor.

THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
In December of 1980 the proponents of the settlements jointly moved to have the Court establish procedures for approval of the settlements. On December 30, 1980, the Court held a preliminary hearing on the proposed settlements, after which it found in its Order of the same date that the proposed settlements were within the range of possible approval and that there was probable cause to notify members of the plaintiff classes of the proposed settlements pursuant to Rule 23(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to hold a fairness hearing.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the Court reviewed the settlement agreements and the proposed notice to class members, which had been filed with the Court on December 22, 1980.
At the preliminary hearing, the Court heard from counsel for the proponents of the settlements, all of whom, orally at the hearing and in their joint motions filed beforehand, urged approval of the proposed settlements.
At the preliminary hearing the Court also heard from counsel for nonparticipating Alliance named plaintiffs,

Following the hearing, that same day, the Court found that the form of notice to class members, as thus amended (Appendix B hereto) was fair and adequate, directed that notice be given in a prescribed manner, and scheduled a fairness hearing for February 13, 1981.
NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS
[1] The Court ordered that individual notice by first-class mail be mailed not later than January 23, 1981 to all members of the plaintiff classes who could be identified and located through reasonable effort. The Court found that such reasonable effort included the following:
(a) Individual notice by first-class mail to each organization located in the City of Chicago on which the FBI or CIA maintains or maintained an intelligence file which has been produced in whole or in part to plaintiffs during discovery in these actions;
(b) Individual notice to all members of the organizations referred to in (a) above, to be accomplished by requesting the officers or other responsible persons in the organization to notify the organization’s members of the contents of the notice;
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

and
(c) Individual notice by first-class mail to all other plaintiff class members whose names and current addresses are known to plaintiffs.
The Court also found that notice by publication was the most reasonable form of notice to those class members not notified pursuant to the provisions listed above, and ordered that such notice by publication be given not later than January 15, 1981 on three consecutive days in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the Chicago metropolitan area.
The Court ordered, and the mailed and published notices advised, that “(a)ny person who believes that he or she is a member of any of the plaintiff classes, and any organization which believes itself to be a member of any of the plaintiff classes, may appear at the hearing in person or through an attorney and present his, her, or its views on the proposed settlements,” if they complied with certain minimal procedural requirements.
The requirements established in the December 30, 1980 Order regarding notice to class members were satisfied. Between January 8 and January 23, 1981, more than 69,000 notices were mailed by first class mail to persons and organizations in or possibly in the plaintiff classes.
The notices to plaintiff class member organizations and to their mailing lists likely reached the great majority of individual plaintiff class members, because the overwhelming majority of such individuals were investigated or surveilled because of their affiliation with an organization. In a sampling, the General Accounting Office found that approximately 92% of FBI Chicago Field Office domestic intelligence cases on individuals were based on their affiliations with organizations suspected of being “subversive” or “extremist” by the FBI. (Report No. GGD-76-50, supra.)
The total of approximately 69,000 notices is a satisfactory number in the circumstances of this settlement. While the total number of plaintiff class members cannot be specified with certainty, the FBI Chicago Field Office has opened approximately 57,000 “subversive” files and approximately 11,000 “extremist” files, for a total of approximately 68,000 persons in the FBI file classifications most relevant to the plaintiff classes.
With respect to the three plaintiff class members who later objected that they did *193 not receive notice sufficiently in advance of the fairness hearing:
(a) Notice was mailed to the Industrial Workers of the World on January 12, 1981. ACLU plaintiffs’ counsel discussed the notice and the February 13 hearing with their General Secretary-Treasurer, to whose Chicago

address the notice had been mailed, on January 13, 1981.
(b) The National Director of the Veterans Coalition telephoned ACLU plaintiffs’ counsel about the notice on January 15, 1981, stating that the Coalition had seen the notice in the newspapers (which printed the notice on January 13, 14, and 15, 1981).
(c) The record does not reflect when Mr. Hugh Wilson received the notice. However, his counsel, Ms. Donna Marie Gilligan, is also the attorney for the Socialist Workers Party, and she knew about the February 13 hearing since at least early January, 1981, and possibly earlier.
THE FAIRNESS HEARING
On February 13, 1981, the Court conducted a hearing on whether the proposed FBI settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be approved by the Court. The hearing lasted all day and was attended by more than two hundred persons.
At the hearing, in addition to oral presentations by counsel who signed the settlement and by four representatives of the Alliance and ACLU named plaintiffs speaking in favor of the proposed FBI settlement, the Court heard oral presentations from 23 persons, some of whom were counsel, and most of whom objected to or criticized the proposed FBI settlement. All persons who had satisfied the minimal procedural requirements specified in the Notice and who were present at the hearing were given an opportunity to be heard.
Evidence introduced at the hearing included the testimony of two expert witnesses, Dr. Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J. Berman, called by ACLU plaintiffs in support of the FBI settlement; cross-examination of Dr. Halperin by one of the counsel for objecting class members; and voluminous documentary exhibits offered by counsel for nonparticipating Alliance named plaintiffs Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance.
In addition, the Court received 26 written statements of views by persons and organizations who did not appear at the hearing, most expressing objections to or criticisms of the proposed FBI settlement; written statements by 23 additional persons adopting the written statement filed by nonparticipating Alliance plaintiffs Cunningham, Taylor and Haas; written notices by 23 additional persons stating their intention to appear at the fairness hearing, but who did not in fact appear; an affidavit of Dr. Halperin summarizing his testimony; and stipulations of dismissal
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

of claims against the FBI and Justice Department defendants, by the Communist Party, U.S.A., Young Workers Liberation League, Jay Schaffner, and National Lawyers Guild, all dated February 11, 1981; and by the Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, dated February 12, 1981.
The credentials presented by Dr. Halperin and Mr. Berman qualify them as expert witnesses in these cases on matters relating to the impact on civil liberties and privacy of FBI and CIA domestic intelligence and national security investigative practices, and establish that their relevant writings, testimony before numerous congressional committees, and litigation efforts have been sharply critical of such practices and strongly supportive of civil liberties.
Both Dr. Halperin and Mr. Berman have followed the progress of these cases over a period of years; are generally familiar with the allegations and the evidence; have carefully studied the proposed settlements; reviewed prior drafts of the agreements and advised plaintiffs concerning them; and participated in a meeting in which representatives of plaintiffs met with FBI and Justice Department officials in an effort to break an impasse in the negotiations.
Both witnesses testified that in their opinion the proposed settlements are fair, *194 reasonable and adequate. For example, Dr. Halperin testified, “My opinion is that there is not the slightest doubt that this (FBI) settlement meets that standard; in my view goes substantially beyond that.” (Tr. at 7.) Mr. Berman similarly testified, “My opinion is that it is a fair and adequate settlement, and that is a major step forward in control of the activity of a federal agency engaged in domestic security investigations which impinge on the First Amendment activity.” (Tr. at 26-27.)
The exhibits introduced at the hearing by the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance tend to support two basic allegations:
(a) that the United States Department of Justice and the FBI, as defendants in the pending case of Socialist Workers Party, et al. v. The Attorney General, et al., 73 Civ. 3160 (TPG), S.D.N.Y., apparently assert that they are not prohibited by the Constitution and the laws from engaging in certain practices, including investigations based on lawful political activity, which are not permitted by the terms of the proposed FBI settlement in these Chicago cases; and
(b) that the FBI allegedly continues currently to investigate and harass the Socialist Workers Party, Young Socialist Alliance, and their members, in a variety of ways (although the exhibits contain no evidence concerning such activities in Chicago).

The Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance remain free to litigate any factual and legal issued presented by these claims in their pending New York litigation. The stipulation dismissing their claims against the FBI and Justice Department defendants in the Chicago litigation, dated December 22, 1980, provides, in pertinent part:

The dismissal of these claims in this action is with prejudice except that it is expressly understood that this dismissal shall not prejudice the claims that the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance are litigating in (their New York lawsuit.)

At the close of the February 13 hearing, the Court continued the matter until March 13, and directed the federal defendants to indicate by that date by letter whether they agreed or disagreed with the understandings of the proposed FBI settlement expressed in the testimony of Dr. Halperin and Mr. Berman.3 The Court also invited all objecting parties to file whatever motions they deemed appropriate, and to supplement their views in writing if they so desired, prior to the March 13 date.

3

This procedure was adopted by the Court in response to

certain of the objectors’ demands that the Court require

senior officials of the CIA and the FBI to testify

regarding their understanding of the agreements.

No such motions were received by the Court prior to March 13. However, on March 13 counsel for the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance moved to reopen the record. This motion was granted only insofar as it sought leave to file additional documents but denied insofar as it sought leave to call additional witnesses.
On March 12, 1981 the federal defendants delivered to the Court their letter of that date, responding to the Court’s directive. The letter states federal defendants’ belief that the interpretations of the FBI agreement by Dr. Halperin and Mr. Berman are “generally consistent” with federal defendants’ interpretation, and also clarified federal defendants’ understanding on three particular points. Counsel for both ACLU plaintiffs and federal defendants then emphasized their joint position that what they have agreed to is the language of the settlement, recognizing that they would not necessarily agree on all possible questions of interpretation which might arise in abstract or hypothetical situations. In particular, ACLU plaintiffs’ counsel stated that ACLU plaintiffs do not necessarily agree with the abstract applications that might be inferred or suggested from the government’s letter. Counsel for
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

objecting parties were then given ten days to respond to the government’s letter.
*195 On March 18, federal defendants filed a second letter, dated March 18, further clarifying one point in the March 12 letter, and indicating that a basic purpose of that letter was to establish that their interpretation of certain language in the FBI agreement is the same as their interpretation of parallel language in the proposed legislative FBI Charter, as expressed in testimony and commentary.
On March 23, 1981 and thereafter, further statements were filed by several objecting class members. The last set of objections, these to certain proposed supplementary proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law requested by the Court, was filed June 11, 1981.

School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980), the leading case in this Circuit on settlements of civil rights class actions, was mailed 12 days before the fairness hearing. 616 F.2d at 310; 471 F.Supp. at 805. See also Air Lines Stewards, supra, 455 F.2d at 108 (three weeks’ notice timely).
[4] [5] There is an “overriding public interest in favor of settlement,” especially in class actions. Armstrong, supra, 616 F.2d at 312-13. By definition, a fair settlement need not satisfy every concern of the plaintiff class, but may fall anywhere within a broad range of upper and lower limits. “(T)he essence of settlement is compromise ... a solution somewhere between the two extremes.” Id. at 315.
[6] The Court has a limited role in reviewing the settlement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of these cases, and of all parties. 28 U.S.C. ss 1331 and 1343; 18 U.S.C. s 2520; 5 U.S.C. s 552a.
[2] Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.”
Rule 23(e) notice must sufficiently convey the required information and afford reasonable time for interested persons to make their appearance with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case. Air Lines Stewards, et al. v. American Airlines, Inc., 455 F.2d 101, 108 (7th Cir. 1972).
Having reviewed the affidavits of plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the manner and extent of notice, and taking into account the further information presented at the fairness hearing, the Court finds that notice was provided in a fair and adequate manner, consistent with the Court’s order of December 30, 1980 directing notice, with Rule 23(e), and with due process.
[3] Notice was also timely. The three class members raising the issue of timeliness were notified, respectively, at least 31, 29, and more than 30 days before the fairness hearing. In contrast, notice in Armstrong v. Board of

Because settlement of a class action, like settlement of any litigation, is basically a bargained exchange between the litigants, the judiciary’s role is properly limited to the minimum necessary to protect the interests of the class and the public. Judges should not substitute their own judgment as to optimal settlement terms for the judgment of the litigants and their counsel. Id.
[7] Moreover, the Court cannot “modify the terms of a settlement proposal; it can only accept or reject the proposal as presented to it.” Armstrong, supra, 471 F.Supp. at 804. This principle is especially important where, as here, virtually every line and paragraph of the settlement document, and in many instances individual words, are the end products of intense, adversary, and prolonged negotiations.
[8] [9] Nonetheless, because a class action settlement affects the rights of absent class members, and often, as here, the larger public interest, the Court may not uncritically accept it. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 313. The settlement may be approved only if the *196 Court finds it to be “fair, reasonable and adequate.” Id. The burden of persuasion on the issue of fairness is on the proponents of the settlement. The Court must “clearly set forth in the record its reasons for approving the settlement,” stating its reasoning “with particular clarity.” Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315, 319.
[10] Although the decision whether to approve the settlement is within the discretion of the District Court, and the decision is necessarily made on a case-by-case basis, certain factors have been consistently identified as
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

relevant to the fairness determination. Among them are:
(1) The strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.
(2) The defendant’s ability to pay.
(3) The complexity, length and expense of further litigation.
(4) The amount of opposition to the settlement.
(5) Presence of collusion in reaching a settlement.
(6) The reaction of members of the class to the settlement.
(7) The opinion of competent counsel.
(8) The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed.
(9) Whether the settlement initiates or authorizes an illegal conduct. Id.
Each of these factors will be discussed.
Factor 1: Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case vs. Amount Offered in Settlement
[11] This factor is generally regarded as the most important. While it requires some consideration of the merits, the court must refrain from reaching conclusions on issues which have not been fully litigated.
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaints against the CIA, FBI and the other settling defendants is a constitutional challenge to an alleged class-wide course and pattern of conduct consisting of three basic types of alleged CIA and FBI domestic intelligence practices: (a) investigations of persons and groups based on their lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, (b) disruption and harassment of persons and groups engaged in the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, and (c) the use against such persons and groups of investigative means which are overly intrusive, in violation of First and Fourth Amendment rights, or which are otherwise illegal.
The relief sought on behalf of the plaintiff classes is essentially twofold: a declaration that such investigations, disruption, and investigative means are unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting their continuation. The FBI settlement agreement’s general principles provide the plaintiffs with an enforceable equivalent of the injunctive relief they sought in this litigation.

With respect to investigations based on lawful First Amendment activities, P 3.4(a) of the FBI settlement agreement declares:
“The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
With respect to disruption and harassment of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, P 3.4(b) of the FBI settlement agreement declares:
“The FBI, in investigating United States persons, shall not employ any technique designed to impair their lawful and constitutionally protected political conduct or to defame the character or reputation of a United States person.”
With respect to investigative means, and the scope and intrusiveness of investigations, P 3.4(c) declares:
“The FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and shall conduct investigations in a manner *197 reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.”
These principles are made permanent and legally enforceable by the FBI settlement agreement. Under the final proviso to P 3.6, future Justice Department and FBI regulations, guidelines, procedures and conduct relating to investigative techniques described in paragraph 3.5 must comply with these principles. Under PP 5.1 and 5.2, “any terms” of the settlement, including these principles, may be enforced by a petition in this Court “for an appropriate order to enforce the stipulation.”
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

In short, the principles of P 3.4, together with the enforcement provisions of PP 5.1 and 5.2 of the FBI agreement, substantially accomplish the central purposes of these class actions against the FBI and Justice Department defendants, in that they articulate legally enforceable prohibitions on FBI investigations and investigative techniques.
Although less fundamental than the principles, the following additional significant limitations are placed on FBI investigations and investigative techniques by the settlement:
(a) FBI electronic surveillance in Chicago must comply with the Constitution and applicable federal statutes. (P 3.5(a); 18 U.S.C. ss 2510-20; 50 U.S.C. ss 1801-1811.) These statutes, of course, can be amended only by legislative action consistent with the Fourth Amendment. (P 3.6.)
(b) FBI warrantless unconsented physical searches in domestic security cases in Chicago (P 3.5(b)) are prohibited. This prohibition cannot be lifted by the FBI or by the Attorney General (P 3.6(c)). It can be lifted only by the Congress or by Presidential Executive Order (P 3.6(a) and (b)), and then only to the extent such warrantless searches comply with the Fourth Amendment (final proviso to P 3.6). Cf. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (Fourth Amendment required judicial warrant for domestic security wiretaps).
(c) All applicable federal statutes, Executive Orders, and Justice Department and FBI regulations governing physical or photographic surveillance, infiltration, and data collection, dissemination, and storage (P 3.5(c)) are made legally enforceable (PP 5.1 and 5.2).
The central prohibitory provision of the CIA settlement agreement, Section 2.4, requires the CIA to comply in Chicago with the U.S. Constitution and with all operative federal statutes, Presidential Executive Orders and written CIA internal regulations and procedures. Among the operative federal statutes is the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. s 403, which forbids the CIA from exercising any “... law enforcement powers or internal security functions.”
Section 4 of the CIA agreement gives plaintiffs and all U.S. persons currently residing in Chicago the right to enforce in this Court the settlement provisions. Compare, Halkin v. Helms, No. 75-1773 (D.D.C. June 5, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-2214, D.C. Cir. Together, Sections 2.4 and 4 substantially accomplish the central purpose of the class action.

[12] Not only do the legal protections conferred upon the plaintiff classes by the proposed settlement agreements correspond well with the relief sought in the complaints, they also compare well with the legal relief plaintiffs would likely have obtained if the cases had gone to trial. Counsel for the plaintiffs candidly stated that by the settlement agreements they did not obtain all that they desired to obtain. At the same time, counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the federal defendants all recognized that the plaintiffs’ cases contained certain potential legal weaknesses. Those potential legal infirmities have been considered by the Court in determining the reasonableness, fairness and adequacy of any proposed settlement agreement. After evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs’ case, and what the plaintiffs did receive and did not receive in the settlement agreements, the Court concludes that what was obtained in the settlement agreements fairly reflects the strengths and potential *198 weaknesses of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits.
No case has been cited to the Court, and the Court is aware of none, affording declaratory or injunctive relief against the CIA or FBI which provides the plaintiffs more relief than the proposed settlements here in any single particular, much less with respect to comprehensive relief for broad classes of persons. Indeed, the Court is aware of no judicial declaration or injunction ever entered against CIA or FBI domestic intelligence activities, even on behalf of a single litigant, much less in a class action. While in this Circuit the subject of FBI covert action has been adjudicated in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), that case did not reach the question of injunctive relief.
The law with respect to government spying which these cases concern is largely unsettled. See generally United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). Indeed, both the objectors and the plaintiff proponents of the proposed FBI settlement have represented to the Court that the FBI and the Justice Department, in pending litigation elsewhere, currently assert that the Constitution does not prohibit them from engaging in practices which would be prohibited in Chicago by the principles of the settlement here.
Absent the proposed settlements, plaintiffs’ proof of their case at trial would have encountered a number of risks, some of which, in other litigation involving similar issues, have seriously hampered or proved fatal to proof of the plaintiffs’ case. These include the risk that important evidence would have been unavailable because of evidentiary privileges, especially the “state secrets” and informer’s privilege, which the FBI and Justice Department defendants have extensively asserted in this litigation. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (state secrets); In re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 217, 62 L.Ed.2d 141 (1979) (informer’s privilege).
Also, there was the risk that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief would have been denied as moot. See Halkin v. Helms, No. 75-1773 (D.D.C. June 5, 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-2214 (D.C. Cir.). While the parties vigorously dispute the extent to which the FBI practices alleged in the complaints are continuing or are likely to resume if not enjoined, and the court, of course, cannot rule on this question without its being fully litigated, the FBI and Justice Department defendants have made plain their intention to assert this defense, and there is at least some evidence to support it. See proposed FBI settlement, PP 2.1(1), (2) and (3). With respect to the claims against the CIA, it is noteworthy that despite extensive pretrial discovery, plaintiffs have not uncovered any evidence of CIA internal security or law enforcement activities in Chicago since 1973, several years prior to the filing of their claims against CIA defendants.
Finally, there was the risk that even if the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, and their claims for injunctive relief were held not moot, the court might nonetheless decline to issue an injunction, or might issue an injunction less protective of their rights than the provisions of the proposed settlements. The FBI and Justice Department defendants have made plain their intention to contend at trial that “the FBI simply should not be run by traditional injunction,” for both “public policy and legal reasons.” (Transcript of opening statements by counsel, February 13, 1981, at 30.)
In sum, with respect to the first factor, the amount offered in settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate when balanced against the strength of plaintiffs’ case on the merits.
Factor 2: Defendants’ Ability to Pay
Since the claims of plaintiffs classes are only for declaratory and injunctive relief, this factor is not relevant here. Cf. Armstrong, supra, 471 F.Supp. at 805.

and the sharply adversary relation of the parties and history of the litigation need no further elaboration.
Factor 4: Amount of Opposition to the Settlement
[13] The court may approve a fair settlement over objections by some or many class members, and even despite criticism by some named plaintiffs. Armstrong, 471 F.Supp. at 804; 616 F.2d at 326.
The number of objectors here is not undue, given the many thousands of plaintiff class members who received notice, the unsettled nature of some of the relevant law, and the depth of antagonism between many of the plaintiff class members and the CIA, the FBI and Justice Department defendants. Indeed, the amount of opposition by class members here is comparable to that in Armstrong, where 45 persons testified at the fairness hearing and numerous others sent in written statements, “most to express their dissatisfaction with the settlement,” which was nonetheless approved as fair. 616 F.2d at 326; 471 F.Supp. at 805.
Moreover, most of the objections here, as in Armstrong, although “thoughtful and informative,” are also “somewhat misinformed,” both in their understanding of the proposed settlements and as to the state of the relevant law. 616 F.2d at 326, quoting 417 F.Supp. at 812. Based upon the written comments received by the Court and upon hearing the testimony of the attorneys and individuals who spoke at the hearing, it was readily apparent to the Court that many of those individuals who spoke were not familiar with the details of the settlement agreements. Many of their comments were based solely upon the Notice rather than upon the provisions of the detailed agreements. While the comments of some speakers were helpful to the Court, the comments of many of those speakers have been evaluated with the understanding that the speakers had never examined the full terms of the proposed agreement. Also, while certain of the objectors were clearly well informed and forceful in their objections, they were persons, or counsel for persons, who were litigating against some of the defendants in other cases.

Factor 3: Complexity, Length and Expense of Further Litigation
The Court has already found that it is very likely that further litigation, absent *199 the proposed settlements, would be extremely complex, lengthy and expensive. The reasons for this conclusion the factual breadth of these cases, the number and difficulty of legal issues they pose,

Factor 5: Presence of Collusion in Reaching a Settlement
No suggestion of collusion has been made, nor, on this record, would any such suggestion be credible.
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

Factor 6: Reaction of Members of the Class to the Settlement
[14] The law in this Circuit as implied in Armstrong is that the Court must consider all objections, but need not state individualized findings with respect to each of them. 616 F.2d at 326, 471 F.Supp. at 812-13. However, the Court’s reasoning must be stated “with particularly clarity.” 616 F.2d at 319. In light of this last admonition, the case law elsewhere requiring a reasoned response on the record to all objections of substance and some explicit statement concerning all objections, Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1976), the Court will discuss all objections of substance.4

4

The spectrum of objections raised by objecting class

members ranged from frivolous to serious. The Court

has considered all the various objections. The more

serious objections collectively constitute a “wish list”

of concerns, many of which counsel for plaintiffs

advised they shared and would have adopted if they

could unilaterally dictate the terms of settlement, but

which the settling defendants adamantly oppose, and

which plaintiffs would be far from certain of winning at

trial. However, some of the points raised by objectors

are not even within the scope of the lawsuit or in any

conceivable way related to the issues.

Vagueness [15] It is objected that the principles of the proposed settlements are so vague as to render them a sham. The Court does not agree. The ambiguities in the potential applications of these principles arise from the fact that they are, for good reasons, *200 worded in general terms. Plaintiffs’ central claims are constitutional in nature. Like any principles grounded in constitutional values, it is appropriate that the remedial principles of the settlement be generally framed. They are meant to govern a great variety of specific situations, many of which cannot now be foreseen, over an extended period of time. Moreover, the proposed settlements resolve class actions the comprehensive scope of which embrace a great variety of CIA and FBI practices. Generally worded principles are, if not indispensable, at least invaluable to the settlement of such lawsuits. The alternative attempting to agree in advance on a wide variety of specific questions in hypothetical settings is neither practical nor necessarily wise.
The parties have candidly admitted that they would not necessarily agree on all possible applications of the language of the principles in the abstract or in hypothetical cases. However, both sides have agreed to submit to enforcement of the principles by the Court, if and when specific disagreements arise in concrete cases in

the future. Having examined the language of the principles, as well as the various questions raised and views expressed concerning the possible interpretations, the Court is confident that in the context of concrete cases, it will be able to perform the normal judicial function of reasonably interpreting the language to accomplish the purpose of the document as a whole. In this task, the Court will be aided by the considerable “legislative history” of the settlement agreements. As the Court made clear at the March 13 hearing, the parties’ various interpretations of the principles expressed to date are not binding (Transcript at 3-4, 14, 20). All that is binding now is the language of the document; the only binding interpretations will be made later by the Court in the context of real disputes.
Alleged Continuing Abuses [16] Allegations have been made that the CIA and FBI continue to engage in some of the practices alleged in the complaints. The Court, of course, expresses no opinion on the substance of these allegations. However, if true, such facts would argue for approving the settlements, not disapproving them. If such alleged practices continue after the settlements are approved, plaintiffs and the plaintiff class can bring their evidence before the Court and, if warranted, obtain full discovery, and thereafter a ruling by the Court on whether the activities in question are lawful, and if they are not, an appropriate remedial order.
Enforcement [17] The enforcement procedures are said to be too burdensome. Objectors argue that enforcement should be triggered by a “sworn claim of reasonable belief that a violation is taking place, together with a description of the activity complained of.” (Notice of Dismissal under protest, filed December 24, 1980, at 2.) In fact, under each of the agreements enforcement is triggered by a threshold finding of “reasonable grounds” to believe that a violation has occurred or is occurring, based on facts alleged in a petition supported by affidavit or declaration. The purpose of the “reasonable grounds” requirement is to prevent frivolous or harassing enforcement petitions; both the purpose and the language chosen to accomplish it are reasonable.
A related objection to both settlement agreements is that they condition enforcement orders on a finding of “a pattern of substantial noncompliance or a serious intentional noncompliance.” This language, too, reflects a reasonable compromise which permits civil enforcement of the settlements without subjecting the CIA or FBI to court orders based on minor or technical violations.

13

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

Changes in Government Regulations Some objectors argue erroneously that the proposed FBI settlement rests on government assurances or on Attorney General Guidelines which can be unilaterally withdrawn. It does not. The FBI agreement rests on permanent principles (P 3.4) which govern Justice Department and FBI procedures and conduct in Chicago, and which are subject to independent, external *201 construction and enforcement by this Court. (PP 5.1 and 5.2.)

Findings and Admissions Some objectors argue that both settlement agreements are fatally defective because they lack more extensive admissions or finding of wrongdoing by the Court. As the Court stated at the March 13 hearing:
“Well, certainly the whole purpose of the settlement is to avoid adjudication with respect to the activity which is the basis of the complaint. I think the parties would be stunned if in submitting a class action settlement to the Court, the Court started to decide the issues. That’s why people enter into settlements and I am not going to interfere in the settlement process.” (Transcript at 22.)

Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations [18] Some objectors argue that the FBI can evade the FBI settlement agreement by simply relabeling a “domestic security” investigation as a “foreign counterintelligence” investigation. They are wrong. The settlement does not turn on labels. Whether an investigation is truly a “foreign” intelligence or counterintelligence investigation, or instead a domestic security investigation, does not necessarily depend on what the FBI chooses to call it, but on the facts underlying the investigation. See, e. g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1684, 48 L.Ed.2d 187 (1976) (purported “foreign intelligence” wiretap).5

5

In a variety of contexts, federal courts have been alert

to pierce questionable claims of “national security.” E.

g., ACLU v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979)

(Cummings, J., dissenting), panel majority reversed in

pertinent part on rehearing en banc, 619 F.2d 1170, (7th

Cir. 1980) (purported “state secrets”); Ray v. Turner,

587 F.2d 1187 (D.C.Cir.1978) (de novo judicial review

of Executive Branch security classifications under

Freedom of Information Act); United States v.

Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied,

429 U.S. 1120, 97 S.Ct. 1155, 51 L.Ed.2d 570 (1977)

(purported “national security” burglary).

Moreover, even “foreign” intelligence and

counterintelligence investigations of “United States persons” (P 6.3) in Chicago are covered by various provisions of the FBI agreement, including three of its four basic principles (P 3.4(b) and (c)). Neither “international terrorism,” as defined in the FBI agreement (P 6.5), nor “activities in preparation therefor,” nor knowingly aiding and abetting such terrorism, includes the “lawful exercise of First Amendment rights” (P 2.2(5)). To the extent the provisions of the proposed FBI settlement are more relaxed with respect to “foreign” intelligence or counterintelligence than “domestic” security investigations, this distinction is not without foundation in the current state of the law. E. g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (requiring judicial warrants for domestic security wiretaps, but leaving open the question of whether warrants are required for taps on agents of foreign powers).
“United States Persons” [19] The principles of each of the settlement agreements protect “United States persons,” defined to include United States citizens, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, unincorporated associations organized in the United States or substantially composed of United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and corporations incorporated in the United States. Objectors express concern that aliens not lawfully or permanently admitted to residence in this country, including “undocumented workers,” are left without protection.
As a practical matter, such persons are indeed covered by the principles of the settlements when their activities are through groups organized in this country, since “United States persons” include all unincorporated associations “organized” in this country and all corporations incorporated here. For example, in the past most FBI domestic intelligence investigations of individuals in Chicago have been based on their affiliations with groups (92% according to the G.A.O. sample). To the extent individual aliens not lawfully or permanently admitted *202 to residence, and not acting through groups, are not covered by the principles, this distinction reflects the greater uncertainty in the law with respect to the legal rights of such persons. See generally Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980), and cases cited therein.6 In any event, the proposed settlements do not sanction CIA or FBI investigation of such persons. The agreements simply do not address such persons specifically, and leave them free in the future to press any constitutional arguments against FBI or CIA surveillance of them, either under the agreements or in a separate lawsuit.
14

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

6

The distinction in the national security intelligence field

between “U.S. persons” and others was created by both

Presidential and Congressional directives. Executive

Order 12036, s 4-214 (governing national security

intelligence activities) (from which the settlement’s

definition of “U.S. person” is taken verbatim); 50

U.S.C. s 1801(i) (the less inclusive definition of “U.S.

person” in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).

Plaintiffs would therefore encounter legal difficulties in

challenging the distinction. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426

U.S. 67, 78-85, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1890-1894, 48 L.Ed.2d

478 (1976).

Non-U.S. persons, not acting through groups which

are themselves “U.S. persons,” are nonetheless

protected by several provisions of the settlement.

Electronic surveillance of them must be “in

accordance with the Constitution and applicable

federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. ss 2510-20 (1976) and 50

U.S.C. ss 1801-1811 (Supp. II 1978.” (P 3.5(a), p.

20.) They are included within the ban on

“warrantless unconsented physical searches in

domestic security investigations” (P 3.5(b), p. 20);

the prohibition of “any unlawful entries that

constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment”

(id.); the requirement that FBI infiltration of

organizations in domestic security investigations

comply with applicable laws, regulations and

guidelines (P 3.5(c)(2), pp. 20-21); and the

requirement of compliance with the Constitution (P

3.6, p. 22). All of these requirements may be

enforced by any non-U.S. person who is “a member

of the plaintiff classes” (P 5.1, p. 25).

Disruption Objectors argue that the FBI settlement (P 3.5(b)) prohibits only “unlawful” FBI disruption activities, and should prohibit all disruption of lawful political activity. Two separate provisions of the settlement prohibit such disruption. One is a basic principle prohibiting techniques “designed to impair” lawful political activity, or to defame the character or reputation of a United States person (P 3.4(b)). The other provision, which prohibits “any unlawful disruption or harassment of the lawful activities of any United States person” (P 3.5(b)) is in addition to the basic principle of P 3.4(b). It leaves for the Court to determine what disruption beyond that covered by P 3.4(b), if any, is unlawful,“ in the context of a future enforcement case.
Miscellaneous Objections It is objected that controls on investigative techniques, unlike the principles, are not made permanent. However, those techniques subject to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, in the present state of the law, are tightly restricted.

It is objected that plaintiff representatives who examine future government reports on questionable intelligence activities should not be bound to secrecy on pain of contempt of court. However, such plaintiff representatives can report the contents of such reports to the Court for enforcement purposes. (P 15.3).
It is objected that there should be no constraints on retention or publication of documents produced in discovery, other than that victims of wrongdoing should have their names withheld unless they specifically consent to disclosure. However, the effect of the proposed settlement (P 7.3) is that there are no other constraints.
It is objected that informers’ identities should be revealed. However, it is doubtful whether their names would be revealed in any case. See In re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 217, 62 L.Ed.2d 141 (1979).
It is objected that the settlement does not address abuses of the federal Grand Jury system. Neither do the lawsuits. Grand Jury proceedings are under the control of the federal court and the United States Attorney, neither of whom are defendants in this case.
*203 It is objected that “minimal” intrusion is too much; and that there should be no intrusion. But all investigations involve some degree of intrusion, however slight. The only practical safeguard is to minimize such intrusion to that which is necessary.
It is objected that not enough court costs are to be paid. However, the settlements provide for payment of all costs taxable by the applicable statute.
It is objected that no damages are to be paid. However, no damage claims on behalf of the plaintiff class members were asserted against the CIA, the Justice Department and FBI defendants in these cases, and none are affected by the settlement.
It is asserted that the named plaintiffs and their counsel inadequately represent the class. This assertion is conclusory with no basis in the record.
[20] The objection that the defendants are not being criminally prosecuted is frivolous in these civil cases.
The objection that the settlement is limited to Chicago overlooks the fact that the activities challenged were those in Chicago. See the class definitions in the Findings of Fact.
It is objected that the settlements permit some surveillance of First Amendment activity in the course of criminal investigations, and that only investigations based
15

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

“solely” on First Amendment activity are prohibited. However, the Court can imagine circumstances in which some such surveillance could be justified, as when a written manifesto is released by a political organization explaining its reasons for bombing a corporate headquarters.
It is objected that the FBI agreement does not limit the FBI’s ability to gather information about lawful political activity through informers or other private parties. However, the prohibition on investigations of lawful political activity (P 3.4(a)), does not turn on the means by which such an investigation is conducted.
It is objected that the principles of the FBI settlement apply only to FBI activities relating to “domestic” activities, i. e., activities within the borders of the United States and does not regulate the FBI’s behavior with respect to a person’s activities outside the country. However, these lawsuits do not concern FBI surveillance of persons in other countries and the fact that the settlement goes no further than it does is justified.

fairness hearing and in their *204 written objections to the settlement’s effect on non-U.S. persons.
Factor 7: Opinion of Competent Counsel [21] The Court is “entitled to rely heavily on the opinion of competent counsel.” Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 325.
Counsel for the participating plaintiffs and for the federal defendants all spoke in favor of the proposed settlement agreement. They all stated that the suits were difficult and complex, that the negotiating process had been difficult and at arm’s length, and that the proposed settlement agreement provided a fair, reasonable and adequate disposition of the suits. All of those counsel stated that these agreements, like any settlement, involved concessions on both sides which made final agreement possible. The Court has found that counsel for the parties participating in the settlement are highly competent and relies in part on their strong endorsement of the proposed settlements.

The Socialist Workers Party objection that the settlements incorrectly characterize that Party as advocating the necessity of violent revolution, misreads the agreements, neither of which characterizes either the Party or its advocacy.
The Socialist Workers Party objects that warrantless unconsented physical searches in domestic security cases are permitted by the FBI agreement “in circumstances in which a warrant is not required to conduct a search for law enforcement purposes” (P 3.5(b)). This exception merely recognizes established Fourth Amendment law permitting warrantless searches in certain situations, e. g., when FBI agents are in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.
The Socialist Workers Party objection that P 3.5 of the FBI agreement authorizes warrantless searches to place wiretaps, misreads the settlement. This paragraph merely states that it “does not apply” to searches related to electronic surveillance, because the subject matter of electronic surveillance is covered instead by P 3.5(a).
The objection that the settlement permits the FBI to disrupt the lawful political activities of a group, once that group is under investigation, is incorrect. See P 3.4(b) and P 3.5(b) of the agreement.
The objection that the class notice did not explain the status of non-U.S. persons overlooks the fact that the notice used the term “United States persons,” and indicated that the notice was only a summary of the settlement document. Interested persons were fairly on notice to examine the document to determine the meaning of “United States persons” and the status of non-U.S. persons, and, in fact, several persons did object at the

Factor 8: Stage of Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed
The proposed settlements were entered into when massive discovery was substantially complete,7 plaintiffs’ draft final pretrial materials had been served, and both sides were fairly apprised of the facts likely to be adduced at trial, and fairly enabled to assess the likely outcome of trial.

7

While full discovery of all files of organizations such as

the Black Panther Party, the Young Lords, and CORE

was restricted, the discovery conducted by the plaintiffs

was adequate.

Factor 9: Whether the Settlement Initiates or Authorizes Any Illegal Conduct
[22] A fair settlement may not initiate or authorize any illegal conduct. However, the Court must not decide unsettled legal questions. Any illegality or unconstitutionality must appear “as a legal certainty on the face of the agreement.” Further, the conduct must be illegal “as a general rule,” according to the state of the law at the time the settlement is presented to the District Court for approval. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 319-322. No illegal or unconstitutional conduct is authorized by the proposed settlements.
16

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

Considering all of the foregoing factors, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that the FBI settlement agreement and the CIA settlement agreement are fair, reasonable and adequate, and accordingly that each should be, and hereby is, approved by the Court.
The settlement agreements resolve all claims asserted in these actions by all ACLU named plaintiffs, the participating Alliance named plaintiffs, and the plaintiff classes, against the settling defendants. It does not resolve all claims of all parties against all defendants in these cases. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby expressly finds that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs the entry of final judgment upon all claims resolved by the proposed settlement agreements.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED AND FINALLY ADJUDGED THAT: [23] 1. The settlements embodied in the Joint Motions and Stipulations (and Attachments thereto) heretofore filed by the proponents of the settlements are hereby approved and incorporated herein.
2. Pursuant to the Joint Motions and Stipulations and the Court’s approval of them, the claims asserted against the settling defendants in these cases by all ACLU named plaintiffs, the participating Alliance named plaintiffs, and the plaintiff classes as established by earlier orders in these cases, are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
3. Pursuant to the Joint Motions and Stipulations the settling defendants shall pay the taxable costs incurred in these cases by the ACLU named plaintiffs and the Alliance named plaintiffs.
4. The Court shall enforce the FBI settlement agreement in accordance with Part V of the Joint Motion and Stipulation relating to that agreement.
5. The Court shall enforce the CIA settlement agreement in accordance with Part *205 IV of the Joint Motion and Stipulation relating to that agreement.
EXHIBIT A
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE FBI SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
“3.4 The parties agree that the following general principles apply to FBI activities relating to the domestic activities of United States persons:

(a) The FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, shall be concerned only with conduct and only such conduct as is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by federal statute. The FBI shall not conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or on the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(b) The FBI, in investigating United States persons, shall not employ any technique designed to impair their lawful and constitutionally protected political conduct or to defame the character or reputation of a United States person.
(c) The FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and shall conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.
“3.5 In return for the release of all claims, as more fully set forth in Paragraph 3.8, below, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, on behalf of themselves, their successors, and their subordinates, agree that:
(a) Any electronic surveillance activities in the City of Chicago shall be in accordance with the Constitution and applicable federal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. ss 2510-20 (1976) and 50 U.S.C. ss 1801-1811 (Supp. II 1978).
(b) They shall not conduct in the City of Chicago any warrantless unconsented physical searches in domestic security investigations, any unlawful unconsented physical searches of premises or property of U.S. persons in foreign intelligence collection or foreign counterintelligence investigations, any unlawful entries that constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment, or any unlawful disruption or harassment of the lawful activities of any United States person. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a warrantless search in circumstances in which a warrant is not required to conduct a search for law enforcement purposes. As used in this subsection the term “unconsented physical searches” does not apply to a search for the purpose of placing, maintaining, or removing authorized electronic surveillance devices or conducting surveys in connection therewith; or to the receipt by the FBI of information, property or materials furnished by individuals acting on their own initiative, without direction or request by the FBI, regardless of the manner of acquisition.
(c) Any of the following investigative activities in
17

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (1981)

domestic security investigations or in foreign intelligence collection or foreign counterintelligence investigations concerning U.S. persons shall comply with all applicable federal statutes, Presidential Executive Orders, written Departmental or Bureau regulations, guidelines and other procedures established in accordance with such statutes or Executive Orders, including but not limited to the procedures and instructions listed in P 2.1 above. The statutes, Executive Orders, regulations, guidelines and procedures referred to in the preceding sentence are those in effect on the effective date of this Joint Stipulation.
(1) Physical or photographic surveillance of any U.S. person in the City of Chicago not employed by the Department of Justice.
(2) Participation in any organization in the City of Chicago by FBI personnel or informants or assets without disclosing their intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials in the organization; and
*206 (3) The acquisition, dissemination and storage of information about U.S. persons in the City of Chicago not employed by the Department of Justice.“

EXHIBIT B
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CIA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
“2.4 In return for the release of all claims, as is more fully set forth in Paragraph 2.6 below the Director of the CIA, on behalf of himself, his successors, and their subordinates, agrees that all of the CIA’s activities involving United States persons in the City of Chicago shall comply with the United States Constitution and with all operative applicable federal statutes, Presidential Executive Orders, and written CIA regulations, guidelines, and procedures.
“2.5 Upon written request to the CIA General Counsel, a former named plaintiff or a United States person residing in the City of Chicago will be provided free a citation to, or alternatively, a copy of the unclassified portions of the then existing written regulations, guidelines and procedures referred to in subparagraph 2.4 above, at the rate of reimbursement then applying under the Freedom of Information Act.”

	  

18

 
 Alliance To End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Order Vacated by Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 7th Cir.(Ill.), May 26, 1987
1986 WL 9762 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.
No. 74 C 3268. | Sept. 4, 1986.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN GETZENDANNER, District Judge:
*1 This civil rights action is before the court on the motion of plaintiffs for attorney’s fees. Four separate petitions have been consolidated in this motion: a petition for 701.25 hours obtaining $357,500 in damages and a constitutional ruling on December 30, 1985; a petition for 28.75 hours monitoring the earlier judgment order; a petition for 76.75 hours in serial 17 file litigation; and a petition for 43.25 hours plus expenses of $740 in negotiating and litigating the above three petitions. Defendant City of Chicago objects to the requested hourly rate, to the number of hours on all but the serial 17 and monitoring litigation, and to the plaintiffs’ request for a multiplier.
The starting point for attorneys’ fees in a civil rights case like the present is to compensate the attorneys for all time reasonably expended in a matter based on the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892–94 (1984). The requested hourly rate is $165 per hour; defendant instead insists that $150 per hour is an appropriate rate. The evidence put forth by petitioner to justify a $165 per hour rate is 1) a national survey showing that the average rate for partners in antitrust firms is $159 three years ago; and 2) that petitioner’s own market rate was held to be $150 per hour back in August 1984. Petitioner therefore argues that his rate should now be increased to $165 to adjust for inflation.
Petitioner’s former argument, while not without merit, loses sight of the fact that partners billing at $159 per hour work on cases along with associates who bill at

considerably lower rates with the result that the net fee per hour billed to the client is substantially less than the amount per hour billed by the partner. In this case, plaintiffs’ attorney worked singlehandedly on the suit, and therefore is recovering a high hourly rate for work much of which could have been done at a lower rate. Since the rate is intended to simulate the results lawyers obtain with paying clients, Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 195 (7th Cir.1984), $165 per hour is too high. The court notes further that $150 per hour is still on the high end of what attorneys in civil rights cases ask in this district. Thus, although plaintiffs’ attorney has been receiving this fee for some time, the court finds $150 per hour to be an appropriate hourly rate.
The second issue is the number of hours. Defendant City does not object to the petition seeking 76.75 hours for the serial 17 file litigation or the petition seeking 28.75 hours for judgment order implementation. Defendant does contend, however, that the request for 701.25 hours should be limited to the 144.37 hours which were expended by the ACLU attorneys in achieving substantially similar monetary settlements for their clients in 1984, and that only 10 hours should be compensated for the number of hours spent negotiating fees. Defendant makes no objections to specific expenditures of time as unreasonable.
*2 In this case, the monetary levels for the settlement were set more or less in 1984. Defendant was unwilling to settle the cases on an individual by individual basis, and several plaintiffs were unwilling to accept a settlement which did not include a ruling on the constitutional issue. The desire for a ruling was not sparked by vexatiousness, but by the concern that absent an affirmative ruling, individual police officers would successfully claim immunity in spying cases and such unconstitutional conduct would go undeterred. Eventually the parties agreed to a procedure whereby stipulated facts would be presented to the court as on a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs obtained a favorable ruling as to three of the five defendants who remained in the case at that time.
The case is therefore distinguishable from the Spanish Action case, where I found the plaintiffs’ insistence on trial unreasonable due to the defendants’ willingness to settle. In that case, the chief factor motivating trial—recovery of punitive damages—was an issue on which plaintiff didn’t prevail. Here, the plaintiffs did obtain the desired ruling. Under these circumstances, the court finds that plaintiffs’ attorney Richard Gutman should receive compensation for the full 701.25 hours spent in the primary case, and the 42.25 hours collectively spent preparing the three fee petitions. This time was expended over four years on behalf of 26 plaintiffs in a case of considerable complexity.
1

Alliance To End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1986)

The court denies the request for a multiplier, however. The Supreme Court has indicated that multipliers are to be awarded only under exceptional circumstances. Plaintiffs claim such circumstances here due to the historic nature of this litigation, and the significance of the constitutional ruling. The court agrees that its ruling broke some new ground, and adopted a liberal reading of previous case law as urged by plaintiffs, but the briefs filed in support of the ruling did not make any representations that the question was truly novel or of first impression. Had the court felt it was departing from previous case law, it would not have ruled as it did. The court also finds that the historic significance of this litigation results chiefly from the injunctive relief obtained many years ago for which plaintiffs’ counsel has already been compensated.
In denying this request, the court is aware that plaintiffs’ counsel has foregone other income to pursue this action,

but also notes that the overall fee even without a multiplier remains high in relation to what a paying client would have been required to pay, due to the lack of lower level people assisting and the unusually high number of hours spent on many tasks. While the number of hours is not so high that particular disallowances are called for, the number is too high to justify further amplification.
In conclusion, the court grants plaintiffs’ petitions for fees in the following amounts: $11,512.50 for work on the serial 17 file litigation; $4,312.50 for judgment order implementation; $6,337.50 for work on the fee petitions; and $105,187.50 for work on the case-in-chief.
*3 It is so ordered.
	  

2

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1989)

1989 WL 88237 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs,
Chicago Cispes, et al., Petitioners, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Respondent.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | July 28, 1989.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 The FBI has asked the court to withdraw the referral to Magistrate Lefkow with regard to discovery matters involving state secrets. The court denies this motion.
The FBI’s main contention appears to be that Magistrate Lefkow lacks the necessary security clearance, as that term is defined in the executive branch, to be granted access to classified information. The FBI concedes that Magistrate Lefkow “has already undergone a full field investigation by the FBI prior to appointment to the Bench.” FBI’s brief, p. 4. However, the FBI claims that

this was merely a “suitability determination,” not a security clearance. Nowhere does the FBI explain what the difference is—if indeed there is any real difference—between these two procedures.
The FBI cites to 28 C.F.R. § 17.98, but this provision, besides applying to Department of Justice employees rather than the courts, does not mention the term “suitability determination.” Neither does 28 C.F.R. § 17.96(f), which governs access to classified information by persons within the judicial branch. Section 17.96(f) does refer to the need to conduct a “full-field background investigation to allow a determination of eligibility for a security clearance to be made.” This language sounds similar to the kind of investigation that the FBI concedes Magistrate Lefkow has already undergone, lacking only the imprimatur of the Department Security Officer. The only other authority provided by the FBI is the “Security Procedures ... For the Protection of Classified Information” developed by the Chief Justice under authority of 18 U.S.C. Appendix § 9(a). As the FBI acknowledges, however, these procedures only govern criminal cases. Bowers v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 690 F.Supp. 1483, 1486 (W.D.N.C.1987).
In sum, the FBI has not provided the court with any authority for the Bureau’s objection to disclosing state secrets to Magistrate Lefkow. Its appeal to an unexplained distinction between “suitability determination” and “security clearance” is not sufficient. The court denies the motion to partially withdraw the reference to Magistrate Lefkow.1
	  

Footnotes

1

Nothing in this order prevents the FBI from implementing its “security clearance” procedures for Magistrate Lefkow, which,

because of the FBI’s apparent concession in its brief that Magistrate Lefkow has undergone a full background check, would

probably take considerably less time than the usual 90 days. However long it takes, the FBI can begin that process now.

	  

1

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1989)

1989 WL 92030 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs,
Chicago Cispes, et al., Petitioners, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Respondent.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Aug. 8, 1989.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 The court adopts Magistrate Lefkow’s order of June 28, 1989. In its objections, the FBI attempts to create a

distinction between “the manner in which an investigation is conducted” and “the manner in which records generated by an investigation are maintained.” FBI’s July 10 Brief, p. 3. The distinction is chimerical. Both aspects of an investigation are subsumed under ¶ 3.4(c) of the FBI’s 1981 agreement to “conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information....” CISPES’ petition asks for information well within ¶ 3.4(c), and the FBI must comply with Magistrate Lefkow’s order to supply it.
The FBI must also comply with Magistrate Lefkow’s order with regard to file numbers, including those outside of Chicago. An investigation of a person or group named in the Chicago CISPES file is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
The court adopts Magistrate Lefkow’s June 28 order in its entirety. The front of that order reads: “Petitioners’ motion to compel production of information deleted on grounds of alleged irrelevancy is granted.”
	  

1

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1990)

1990 WL 115571 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division. ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, Plaintiff,
v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant. No. 74 C 3268. | Aug. 9, 1990.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

*1 The court grants Mr. Gutman’s fee petition in its entirety. Mr. Gutman’s hourly rate of $225/hour is well within the market rate for an attorney with his experience. The court agrees with Mr. Gutman that previous billing rates may be a guide, but are not a ceiling to later rates in a free market. Mr. Gutman’s experience as well as his consistently superb briefs easily justify his hourly rate.
The court rejects the City’s objection to time spent on a post-hearing brief before Magistrate Lefkow. As the transcript submitted by Mr. Gutman demonstrates, it was at best unclear whether or not the Magistrate wanted Mr. Gutman to file a brief. He should be compensated for complying with the court’s apparent request. The City’s other objections are meritless.
The court grants Mr. Gutman’s fee petition of $62,921.26 for himself and $2,910.00 for Linda Fisher.
	  

1

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago CISPES, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

1991 WL 117915 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CHICAGO CISPES, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268. | June 25, 1991.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 On February 4, 1991, Magistrate Judge Lefkow issued an order denying the respondent FBI’s motion to strike certain exhibits offered in support of plaintiff CISPES’s motion for summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s order.
The Brady Affidavit Respondent FBI moved to strike the affidavit of CISPES member Sheila Brady. The FBI contends that Brady’s mere membership in CISPES since a certain date does not make her competent to testify as to how long CISPES has resided in Chicago. The FBI contends that in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990), the affidavit is not admissible. This court disagrees.
First, Lujan was a fairly fact specific case. The Court found that given the amount and type of evidence contained in the affidavits at issue, the affidavits were not strong enough to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In the instant case, the evidence presented in Ms. Brady’s affidavit indicates that she is competent to testify about how long CISPES has resided in Chicago. In her affidavit, Ms. Brady stated that she had been a member of Chicago CISPES since 1980. Further, in her supplemental affidavit, dated December, 1989, Ms. Brady explained that she has been a member of CISPES since no later than the summer of 1980, and that CISPES has been located at 3411 West Diversy since that date. Ms. Brady stated that throughout the period of her membership she has visited the CISPES office, received publications and literature from Chicago CISPES, and has

telephoned Chicago CISPES.
Rule 56(e) states that affidavits offered in support of a motion for summary judgment “shall be made with personal knowledge, shall set forth facts such as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” The court finds that the facts presented are enough to establish Ms. Brady’s personal knowledge that CISPES has resided in Chicago since the summer of 1980, and that the affidavit should not be stricken.
Further, since the court finds that the affidavit should not be stricken, we need not consider the FBI’s argument for reconsideration of the court’s February 20, 1990, ruling denying the FBI’s motion for summary judgment.
The 1976 Senate Report The FBI moved to strike petitioner’s Exhibits H and I, which are extracts from Book II of the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, S.Rep. No. 94–775, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The FBI argues that the exhibits are irrelevant to the present proceedings because the report was issued seven years before the CISPES investigation and does not refer to the activities of the FBI’s field office after the date of the decree.
The Magistrate Judge determined, and the court agrees, that even through the report contains no reference to CISPES, it does tend to show that prior to 1976, it was routine practice of the FBI to investigate political dissenters, and that it tends to counter the argument that the CISPES investigation was a unique occurrence that could not happen again.
*2 The Magistrate Judge found that the exhibits were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 406, and denied the motion to strike. The court agrees that the Exhibits are admissible under Rule 404(b). The evidence was admitted to show proof of motive, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake with respect to the CISPES investigation. The court agrees that evidence of the FBI’s behavior prior to the entry of the consent decree has some relevance to this proceeding, since it is more likely that the FBI engaged in certain activity after 1981, if the activity was routine before 1981.
The FBI’s argues that in light of its new practices and regulations, the Senate Reports says nothing about the FBI’s “routine practice” that is pertinent to this proceeding. This argument goes to the weight to be given to the pre–1976 activity, not to its admissability. The
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Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago CISPES, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

Magistrate did not find that the evidence proved a pattern of non-compliance with the consent agreement, she simply found that it was relevant.

involved, and that the exhibit goes to the FBI’s claims that its investigations were not overly intrusive. Finally, CISPES contends that the FBI’s 12(k) argument is irrelevant since CISPES did not seek production of the deleted information.1

Deletion Code The FBI also moves to strike petitioner’s Exhibit T, which is a list of letters used by the FBI to code deletions from documents produced in discovery and their meanings. Paragraph 32 of CISPES’ statement of material facts claims, with the use of exhibit T, that a large amount of the information collected by the FBI was collected through the use of informants. The FBI maintains that the list is irrelevant because it does not show that the FBI violated the consent decree, nor does it show whether the gathering of certain information, the disclosure of which might invade a third person’s privacy, was inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement. Finally, the FBI argued that if CISPES was dissatisfied with the deletions, they should have objected to the list under Local Rule 12(k).

The Magistrate denied the motion to strike, concluding that the FBI’s objections to the admission of the exhibit really concerned the weight of the evidence, not to its admissability. The Magistrate determined that the deletion code was relevant, in that it provided some information on the amount of intrusion involved in the FBI’s investigation of CISPES. The court agrees with these findings, as well.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s order.

CISPES maintains that the code shows that the FBI

	  

gathered information, the disclosure of which would be an

unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individuals

Footnotes

1

The FBI dropped the 12(k) argument in their objections to the Magistrate’s order, but raises the relevance argument once more.

	  

2

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Reversed in Part, Vacated in Part by Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 7th Cir.(Ill.), July 2, 1997
1991 WL 206056 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Oct. 3, 1991.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the court on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by the FBI and by Chicago CISPES. The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed a brief in support of Chicago CISPES’ motion. The court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Lefkow for a report and recommendation. In a thorough and well reasoned report, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the respondent’s motion be denied. For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is adopted in whole.
Background
The undisputed facts of this case were explained in great detail in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and those findings of fact are adopted by this court. For purposes of this opinion, the court notes the following. The Consent Decree at issue was signed in 1980 and approved by the court on August 11, 1981, Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.1981).
The Chicago Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (Chicago CISPES), and several other petitioners brought this action against the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the enforcement provisions of the Consent Decree, ¶ 5.1 and ¶ 5.2. The petitioners are representatives of the class as defined in the August 1981

Consent Decree.
Paragraph 3.4 sets out the basic tenets of the Consent Decree. It provides in part that the FBI, in conducting domestic security investigations and inquiries, will only be concerned with conduct that is forbidden by a criminal law of the United States, or by a state criminal law when authorized by a federal statute, and that the FBI will not investigate activities protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, or the lawful exercise of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Paragraph 3.4 also states that:
(b) The FBI, in investigating United States persons shall not employ any technique designed to impair their lawful and constitutionally protected political conduct or to defame the character or reputation of a United States person.
(c) The FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely and effective manner, and shall conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.
Paragraph 5.1, one of the enforcement provisions of the Decree states that any former named plaintiff, member of the plaintiff classes, or a U.S. person1 residing in the City of Chicago prior to the effective date of the Decree may petition the Court for a finding that a violation of any of the terms of the Decree has occurred or is occurring, and for an appropriate order to enforce the Decree.
Paragraph 5.2 states that
If the Court finds that a pattern of substantial noncompliance or a serious intentional noncompliance with the terms of the Stipulation has occurred or is occurring, it shall make such order as it deems just and necessary to insure future compliance with the Stipulation.
Petitioners claim that the Decree was violated when the FBI investigated them from March 1983 through June 1985, in connection with the National CISPES investigation. Petitioners were investigated following paid informant Frank Varelli’s “tip” that CISPES was involved in international terrorist activity. The National CISPES investigation led to investigations of groups closely related to CISPES. There were 178 “spin-off” investigations nationally, lasting for varying periods of time. There were 19 spin-off investigations in Chicago, aside from the investigation of Chicago CISPES.2 Many of the individuals and organizations the FBI investigated,
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

and kept information on, had extremely limited contacts and connections with Chicago CISPES.
*2 The FBI has admitted that there were clear deficiencies with the way in which they dealt with Varelli, in that neither his reliability or his background were ever investigated, and the FBI did not verify the accuracy of Varelli’s information during much of the investigation. One year after the CISPES investigation began, the FBI learned that some of Varelli’s information was unreliable. FBI Director Sessions said that the FBI should have known, at that time, that the CISPES investigation should be discontinued. The investigation nonetheless continued for another year until June, 1985.
The investigative techniques used by the FBI in Chicago Field Office are also relevant to this discussion. To note a few of these techniques, the FBI used infiltrators who joined, or were already members of Chicago CISPES and reimbursed them for any costs they incurred. FBI Headquarters sent the Chicago Field Office airtels, stating that penetration of Chicago CISPES inner circles was imperative, and that penetration would be accomplished through the use of informers. The Chicago Field Office of the FBI used undercover agents to attend CISPES meetings and fund-raising events which were open to the public. Without Chicago CISPES’ knowledge, the FBI obtained copies of all deposits, cancelled checks, transfer requests, notations, authorized representatives signature cards for CISPES’ accounts at the Community Bank and Trust of Edgewater. Also, without the knowledge or consent of Chicago CISPES and without the required signature of at least an Assistant Director or a higher Headquarters official, the FBI obtained long distance telephone records of the Chicago CISPES office to determine the identity of its membership and contacts.
Finally, at the direction of Headquarters, the FBI conducted a photographic surveillance on April 1, 1985 outside the private residence of one Chicago CISPES leader and on April 8, 1985, submitted his photograph and background data for inclusion in the Terrorist Photograph Album, and sent copies to the FBI’s International Terrorism Unit II and the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center. The FBI gathered unpublished telephone and social security numbers of Chicago CISPES members and associates.
The information gathered, maintained and disseminated by the Chicago Field Office concerned the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights by Chicago CISPES, its members and associates. (Mag. R & R, pp. 8–11). On June 3, 1985, in their review of the CISPES investigation, the Department of Justice (“Justice”) concluded that CISPES was involved in political activities involving First Amendment rights, and was not involved in international terrorism. Even though Justice instructed the receiving offices to close their investigations of CISPES,

the Chicago Field Office continued to collect and record information regarding Chicago CISPES’ lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.
William Sessions became head of the FBI in November, 1987. He ordered an in-depth inquiry into the CISPES investigation in response to Congressional interest in the issue. At a Congressional hearing, Sessions admitted that the FBI had investigated essentially political activities, and that FBI field offices ignored instructions from Headquarters regarding these investigations.
*3 After reviewing the results of the CISPES inquiry, Sessions took action to prevent recurrence, and requested that the Attorney General approve the formation of a joint Department of Justice–FBI working group to make recommendations to the Attorney General regarding the modification of existing FBI guidelines in light of the CISPES experience. Sessions made a number of additional changes regarding investigations, including restricting to FBI Headquarters the decision to initiate an international terrorism investigation. He refined the review process to insure that if essentially political activities are investigated, high level officials are aware of that surveillance and that the surveillance must be fully justified. (Mag. R & R pp. 12–13). The Director also ordered additional training of FBI agents nationwide on how to deal with activities protected by the First Amendment. Further, the FBI has disciplined the appropriate personnel connected with the CISPES investigation, and made arrangements to move all the records that were accumulated throughout the course of the investigation to the National Archives.
In light of the above facts, both sides now seek summary judgment in this matter. The FBI contends that petitioners have no cause of action, since the FBI’s changes in policy and procedure moot petitioner’s request for relief. Petitioners and the ACLU3 contend that the evidence presented in this case indicates that the FBI has violated the Consent Decree, and that their requests for relief are not moot. Petitioners seek enforcement of the Decree, and order of compliance, expungement of the records that were collected about them, and training of FBI personnel about the Decree.
Conclusions of Law
Before considering the motions for summary judgment, the court must determine whether there is a cause or controversy present in this case for the court to hear, which is the first major area of contention between the parties. As was noted above, the court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation in whole. However, since numerous objections to the report were
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

filed repeating or slightly modifying the arguments before the Magistrate Judge, the court will reiterate the Magistrate Judge’s findings where necessary. The court also adopts those findings by the Magistrate Judge which are not specifically reiterated in this opinion.
Res Judicata The FBI contends that the petitioners are estopped from bringing this action by the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Committee in Solidarity With the People of El Salvador v. Sessions, 738 F.Supp. 544 (D.D.C.1990) (“CISPES I”).4 Res judicata requires the same parties, their privies, and the same claims. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Further, “under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Id.
*4 Res judicata (claim preclusion) does not apply to this action, since res judicata cannot bar litigation which could not have been raised in the prior adjudication. This case is an action to enforce a 1981 consent decree which was issued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Since, any proceeding to enforce the decree must be filed in this court, the District of Columbia’s court’s ruling cannot constitute res judicata as to this proceeding.
Second, res judicata requires a prior decision on the merits. Allen v. McMurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 1980. Since no court has ever found that defendants’ actions were lawful, the FBI cannot utilize the doctrine of res judicata to preclude the plaintiffs from showing that those actions were unlawful. Continental Casualty Co. v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 605 F.2d 1340, 1345 (5th Cir.1979). Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or lack of justiciability does not constitute an adjudication on the merits, and does not preclude this action. Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4436, pp. 338, 340–344; McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230, 232–34 (8th Cir.1981).
Finally, res judicata does not apply here because the petitioners were not parties to the prior claim, or in privity with parties in the prior adjudication. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). CISPES I was filed by CISPES headquarters and certain individuals, none of whom are petitioners in this suit. Evidence that the D.C. plaintiffs were not “privies” of the petitioners stems from the fact that the D.C. plaintiffs could not adequately represent the legal interests of the petitioners since they could not move to enforce the Chicago consent decree. The court also notes that the D.C. plaintiffs did not seek to expunge the FBI files, or seek any training of the FBI regarding the First Amendment rights of FBI targets. Hence, the court

agrees that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to this action.
Collateral Estoppel The FBI also contends that this action is moot because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the petitioners from relitigating the issues of mootness and their lack of standing. The Magistrate Judge found that the doctrine is not applicable to this action for a number of reasons, and the court agrees.
In general, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues in a subsequent proceeding when (1) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior adjudication, (2) the issues which form the basis of the estoppel were actually litigated and decided on the merits in the prior suit, (3) the resolution of the particular issues was necessary to the court’s judgment, and (4) those issues are identical to the issues raised in the subsequent suit.
Amoco Oil Co. v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 967, 969 (7th Cir.1988).
As the Magistrate Judge correctly found, collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. First, this litigation involves different parties from CISPES I. Further, none of the mootness or standing issues which were resolved in the prior litigation recur in this proceeding. Here, petitioners do not seek transfer of the CISPES files, they seek expungement of the files, based on the legal right to expunge illegally obtained information. Petitioners also seek judicial interpretation of the consent decree, and further training of the FBI regarding the terms of the Consent Decree. All relief sought is based upon fears of future improper intelligence gathering. None of these issues were actually litigated, or resolved by the D.C.Court. Finally, petitioners have standing to enforce the consent decree, which is fundamentally different from standing to file a new lawsuit. For these reasons, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.
The Petitioner’s Claim is Not Moot
I
*5 Aside from the FBI’s arguments that CISPES I moots this action, the FBI also suggests that the case is moot because the FBI is no longer investigating CISPES, so the petitioners are no longer being harmed. Further, since the Director of the FBI has ordered far-reaching measures to
3

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

ensure greater direction and future control of investigations, there is no danger of future harm to the petitioners, there is no actual controversy, and no further relief is necessary. The Magistrate Judge rejected each of these arguments, and the court agrees with her reasoning.
The Magistrate Judge found that the petitioners’ claim is not moot. While recognizing that Article III limits subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to the adjudication of actual controversies between parties, Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975), the Magistrate Judge noted that judicial review is also appropriate where, in the case of government action, controversies may recur but, because of their nature may continue to defeat review. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974). The standard of proof for showing likelihood of repetition is that there is a “reasonable expectation” of recurrence, which means that a controversy is “capable of repetition based on expectations that while reasonable, [are] hardly demonstrably probable.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988).
As the Magistrate Judge correctly explained, to establish mootness based on voluntary cessation of unlawful activity, the FBI has the burden of showing that there is no likelihood of recurrence. United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1953). Voluntary discontinuation of a practice “will end the case or controversy when recurrence of the dispute among the parties is very unlikely.” Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 877 (7th Cir.1987).
The Magistrate Judge found that although the FBI has enacted new guidelines, they have also enacted new guidelines in the past which were meant to prevent this type of investigation, and those guidelines were not completely effective.5 Hence, in light of these circumstances, the FBI’s new regulations are not sufficient proof that the Decree will not be violated in the future. See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 541 (D.D.C.1978) (City and Department of Corrections’ sporadic attempts to deal with overcrowding conditions in jail were not enough to moot case when previous efforts had been ineffective). Further, since FBI guidelines can be repealed or modified in the future they do not guarantee future compliance. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.1963). Finally, the FBI has not shown that there is no reasonable expectation of recurrence against either the named petitioners or other members if the class protected by the consent decree. The Magistrate Judge reasonably concluded that because there is a reasonable likelihood of repetition this claim is not moot.
*6 Further, to establish mootness, the FBI must also

demonstrate that its conduct did not evade review during the time that the allegedly illegal action occurred. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498 (1911); see also, Ross v. Lucey, 349 F.Supp. 264, 267–68 (E.D.Wis.1972)6 In the instant case, the FBI’s investigation did, for the most part, evade review. Much of the information Chicago CISPES would have needed to bring an action against the FBI was classified while the investigation was in progress. Chicago CISPES had no way of knowing the extent of the FBI’s investigation, or determining whether the FBI was violating the consent decree while the investigation was in progress.7 In sum, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that this action is not moot because the challenged activity is capable of repetition, and capable of evading review. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
II
The FBI argues that the petition should be dismissed as moot because even if a violation of the Decree were found, paragraph 5.2 of the Consent Decree does not authorize further proceedings.8 The FBI contends that the consent decree limits court orders to those which are “necessary to insure future compliance with the Stipulation.” The FBI contends that since they voluntarily discontinued the practices in question no relief is necessary, and the court cannot offer a remedy to the petitioners. The FBI comments that the petitioners desire to have an opinion from the court regarding whether the decree was violated is not enough to sustain their claim if no other relief is necessary.
The ACLU argues that the Consent Decree is in some respects, a contract made in settlement of a dispute, and that it therefore creates rights in the parties and designated beneficiaries to the contract. Chicago CISPES is invoking relief provided by the Decree, and because relief is available under the Decree, petitioners’ claims cannot be moot. Paragraph 5.1, allows the court to find that a violation occurred, and paragraph 5.2, provides for enforcement orders.9 Findings can be made under ¶ 5.1 even if an order is not necessary because the Decree was crafted to present systematic abuses. A finding would take the form of a declaratory judgment, providing relief to the plaintiff by finding that a violation has occurred, and would serve to prevent future misconduct by clarifying what conduct is forbidden. The ACLU also argues that a finding of a violation is equivalent to an award of nominal damages, which is an appropriate remedy for breach of contract. The court agrees with this analysis.
Further, the FBI’s arguments concerning mootness with respect to these petitioners are misplaced. As the Magistrate Judge found, the petitioners are seeking relief
4

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

in addition to a statement of the law, because they are seeking expungement of the records collected by the FBI. The Magistrate Judge also correctly found that the since the petitioners in this case are representatives of a class, even if there is little likelihood of recurrence as to Chicago CISPES and the other petitioners, if there is a danger of recurrence within the protected class, this is enough to keep the controversy alive. United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398–99 (1980).10
III
*7 In her discussion on mootness the Magistrate Judge also correctly considered court rulings in other cases involving alleged harm from the existence of harmful records. In Paten v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir.1975) the plaintiff sought to expunge a record which the FBI gathered about her. The file was designated “SM–SWP”, for “subversive material Socialist Worker’s Party”, but it was not clear whether the file would be disseminated to others. Citing, Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C.Cir.1974), a case involving the maintenance of arrest records, the Paten court determined that while the plaintiff could not determine the exact consequences of her file, it was clear that she had alleged a cognizable legal injury. Paten, 524 F.2d 868.
The files in this case are designated “IT” for “International Terrorism”, and are classified with the number “199C” which designates “Foreign Counterintelligence—Terrorism.” 44 Fed.Reg. 58981–86 (1970). All of the information contained in these files concerns the petitioners’ protected First Amendment activity. This court agrees that the injury to petitioners in this case, as in Paten, is obvious.
Where expungement is sought due to the violation of constitutional rights, “determination of the propriety of an order directing expungement involves a balancing of interests; the harm caused to an individual by the existence of any records must be weighed against the utility to the Government of their maintenance.” Doe v. U.S. Air Force, 812 F.2d 738, 741 (D.C.Cir.1987) quoting Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 65 (D.C.Cir.1984), quoting Paten, 524 F.2d at 868. The transfer of the CISPES files to the National Archives does not moot petitioners’ request for expungement. See Doe, 812 F.2d at 741 (Fact that unconstitutionally gathered material was held in a closed file which would be destroyed in a period of years did not establish that an expungement order would be inappropriate if the constitutional violation were proven). The court agrees that petitioners’ claims is not moot because a remedy is clearly available to them.

IV
The FBI contends that it cannot be said that the entry of an order will change the FBI’s behavior toward the petitioners, and that since the petitioners do not seek any changes in the procedures recently adopted by the Attorney General and the Director, the case is moot.
The court disagrees with this argument. First, the petitioners correctly argue that the burden is on the respondent FBI to show that there is no reasonable likelihood of recurrence, and the FBI has failed to meet that burden. As was noted above, there is evidence that future violations of the decree are possible despite the FBI’s recent changes. Our finding that there is a reasonable likelihood that future violations will occur is influenced, in part, by the FBI’s contentions that there was no violation of the Decree. Continued claims of legality weigh heavily against assertions that the challenged activity is unlikely to recur. See e.g., Jaeger v. Douglas County School District, 862 F.2d 824, 833–34 (11th Cir.1989).
*8 The FBI also contends that the petitioners lack standing “in the Article III sense” to seek further relief from this court, since the court is without power to award prospective relief in this proceeding. The FBI consent decree has only two requirement for standing, which are set forth in ¶ 5.1. First a putative petitioner must be either a former named plaintiff, a member of the plaintiff class, or a U.S. person. Second the plaintiff must have resided in the City of Chicago prior to August 11, 1981, the effective date of the consent decree. All six named petitioners satisfy these requirements, so no further showing is necessary to establish standing.
The Motion for Summary Judgment
Chicago CISPES claims that the FBI is guilty of “a pattern of substantial non-compliance” and/or “a serious intentional non-compliance” with ¶ 3.4(c) of the Consent Decree, within the meaning of ¶ 5.2 of the Consent Decree, and that the Decree has been violated in Chicago, not just outside of the City as claimed by the FBI.11 The violations include overly intrusive investigations by the FBI in which they unnecessarily collected and recorded First Amendment information in violation of ¶ 3.4(c) of the Consent Decree, an overly broad scope and duration of the investigations, and the use of overly intrusive investigative techniques. Petitioners claim that a court order is necessary to insure further compliance with the Decree. Petitioners also request expungement of the files

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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

gathered on them, notification and training of the FBI agents about the Decree, and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and common law for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Consent Decree.
The FBI argues that Chicago CISPES has not shown a violation of § 3.4 of the Decree because it has shown neither a pattern of substantial non-compliance or serious intentional non-compliance, as required by ¶ 5.2. They further argue that no violation of the decree took place in Chicago, because only the Chicago Field Office is bound by the Decree. They claim that the Chicago investigations by the Field Office were not overly intrusive, and that the Office’s investigative techniques were appropriate.
Paragraph 5.2 of the Consent Decree authorizes the entry of an enforcement order if the court finds either “a serious intentional noncompliance” or “a pattern of substantial noncompliance.” The Magistrate Judge found that the FBI was guilty of serious intentional noncompliance with the Decree. In determining whether the FBI’s investigation complied with the Decree, the Magistrate Judge considered the actions of the FBI as a whole, as they effected events in the City of Chicago. As was noted above, the basis for the CISPES investigation were allegations by Frank Varelli that CISPES was taking orders and sending military assistance to the El Salvadoran guerrillas, and that certain individuals in the Dallas CISPES were planning terrorist acts. The FBI’s director has admitted that the FBI never adequately investigated Varelli’s background, or reliability and that the FBI did not adequately verify the accuracy of Varelli’s information during much of the investigation. Sessions admitted that the investigation would not have developed as it did if Varelli’s reliability had been properly scrutinized, since without the Varelli’s tip there would not have been sufficient predication for an international terrorism investigation of CISPES.
*9 The FBI argues that these facts are not relevant because they did not take place in Chicago. This argument is not persuasive. As the cause of the actions that took place in Chicago, these actions are relevant. The court notes that certain especially intrusive investigative techniques were needlessly used in Chicago, including infiltration, gathering of telephone toll records, gathering of bank checking account records, photographic surveillance at a private residence and labeling a Chicago CISPES leader as a “terrorist”. Paragraph 3.4(c) provides that “[T]he FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in a timely manner.” The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that:
there was no verified basis for the CISPES investigation, so there was no need for the collection of information or evidence, as permitted by ¶ 3.4(c), within the city of Chicago, so investigation of the breadth and scope of the

Chicago investigation in which only information regarding the petitioner’s lawful exercise of First Amendment rights was collected, certainly constitutes non-compliance with the Consent Decree. The voluminous records collected by the FBI in Chicago regarding petitioner’s exercise of First Amendment right pretty well speaks for themselves that the scope and breadth of the investigation went beyond that contemplated by the Decree. Had the facts demonstrated that the FBI verified Varelli’s reliability as they should have, it would have known that the Chicago investigation was not justified in either scope or duration. The FBI’s actions constitute a serious violation of the Consent Decree.
Magistrate Judge’s R & R at 29.
In their objections to the report and recommendation, the FBI suggests that the incidents described and relied upon in the Magistrate Judge’s findings do not amount to a violation of the decree because all of these errors were committed by FBI personnel outside of Chicago, and that FBI personnel in Chicago were only following orders when they acted pursuant to other officials’ requests. The FBI argues that in order to prove an intentional violation of the Consent Decree, Chicago CISPES must show that the Chicago Field Office of the FBI knew that there was no basis for the FBI’s investigation, that carrying on the investigation would violate the Consent Decree, and that there was a decision to proceed with the investigation in violation of the Consent Decree. These arguments are unpersuasive. First, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the respondent in this case is the FBI, not the FBI’s Chicago Field Office, meaning that the Agreement regulated the conduct of the entire FBI, not just the FBI’s Chicago Field Office. FBI officials both inside and outside of the Chicago area are bound not to cause the forbidden actions to occur in Chicago. Plainly, any investigation conducted in the City of Chicago by any part of the FBI is subject to the Consent Decree.12
*10 The Magistrate Judge also found that the FBI’s violations of the decree were intentional. She noted that Volume 22, Words and Phrases defines “intentional violation” (Pocket Part 1989) as requiring that the actor commit the forbidden act with culpable knowledge of the nature, but not necessarily the illegality of the act. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, (1979), states that intention “when used with reference to civil and criminal responsibility, a person who contemplates any result, as not as likely to follow from a deliberate act of his own, may be said to intend that result, whether he desires it or not.” The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that because the FBI signed the Consent Decree with full knowledge of its terms, and because the investigation at issue was undertaken deliberately, the FBI’s actions were intentional. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the FBI had engaged in “serious intentional
6

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

non-compliance” with the Consent Decree.13
Remedies
The FBI argues that, because ¶ 5.2 of the decree only allows for relief “just and necessary to insure future compliance with the Stipulation”, and that since the FBI has already assured future compliance through its internal rule changes, no remedy is necessary in this action. This argument was rejected by the Magistrate Judge, because (as explained above) this remedy is not sufficient to prevent future recurrences.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that some of the remedies requested by CISPES are appropriate. She found that a proposed remedy which would directly effect Chicago CISPES for damage already done is expungement of the files. As the Magistrate Judge explained, federal courts are empowered to order the expungement of government records, where necessary, in order to vindicate Constitutional rights. In addition, a right not to be adversely affected in the future by information may exist if the information was acquired by “fatally flawed procedures.” Doe, 812 F.2d at 741. Further, even “statutes requiring the maintenance and regulating destruction of agency records do not prevent an order requiring expungement, but must yield to statutory or constitutional rights elsewhere guaranteed.” Id.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the factors weighing in favor the destruction of these records are the correction of the FBI’s misconduct by the destruction of the fruits of the violation and the protection of the subjects of this investigation. The Magistrate Judge also noted the stigma attached to being included in a file designated as “international terrorism.” The Magistrate Judge noted, however, that the government’s historical interest in maintaining the files, and that the alleged protection to the petitioners’ from future investigative uses of the documents weighs against destruction. While favoring expungement of the files given the record presented, the Magistrate Judge found that the parties had presented little evidence as to their interest in maintaining or destroying the files, so it might be appropriate for the court to collect additional evidence on this issue. The court adopts this recommendation, and will allow the parties to brief the issue of expungement, despite their objections, before making a final determination on this issue.14
The FBI is Ordered to Comply with the Decree

*11 Chicago CISPES asked that the court either issue an interpretation of the Decree stating that the FBI investigation violated the Decree, or issue an order requiring the FBI to comply. The FBI argues that these remedies are not necessary because even if it did violate the Decree, the Decree allows relief only if there is danger of future violation of the Decree, and because the court may not merely interpret the Decree.
The FBI contends that any proposed enforcement order must meet two requirements. First, by the terms of the Consent Decree itself (¶ 5.2), the order must be a means to “insure future compliance” with the Consent Decree. Second, as a matter of constitutional law, it must operate to “redress” the grievances of the parties before the court by affecting the future behavior of the FBI toward those parties.
In the instant case, many possible enforcement orders would satisfy both the constitutional test and the terms of the Consent Decree by operating to increase the likelihood of future compliance. The court is persuaded that a declaration that a violation of the Consent Decree occurred “would affect the behavior” of the FBI by disabusing it of the notion that the Consent Decree places no limits on the ability of portions of the FBI to utilize the Chicago Field Office to conduct investigations or maintain records which, unbeknownst to it, do not comply with the Consent Decree. The FBI would recognize that the organization as a whole has the responsibility to ensure that each investigation conducted in Chicago must comply with the Decree. As the ACLU notes, a simple order to henceforth comply with the decree would “affect the behavior” of the FBI by exposing it to the clear threat of contempt penalties for future violations of a court order.
Finally, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the standard set by the Consent Decree is that an order is appropriate to prevent future violations. In the instant case, there is a disagreement between the parties arising from a concrete situation as to the interpretation of the Consent Decree. Since there is a possibility of repetition of this type of behavior, and the Consent Decree prohibiting this behavior is still in effect, an interpretation of the Consent Decree stating that the FBI violated it would lend appropriate guidance to all parties in the future. The court agrees, and finds that the investigation at issue violated the Consent Decree. The FBI is ordered to henceforth comply with the Consent Decree.
The court is also persuaded that further training of FBI personnel is also a proper subject for the enforcement order. While the FBI contends that the issue is whether there are specifically identified deficiencies in the present FBI training, the court finds that what is at issue is whether future compliance with the consent decree could be improved with additional training. FBI personnel in
7

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

Chicago and elsewhere should be made aware that all investigations in Chicago must comply with the Consent Decree, regardless of where they are initiated. Additional or better training should reduce the negligence and error which produced the violations in this case. As recommended by the Magistrate Judge, the court will reopen discovery for the limited purpose of exploring what training regarding compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree the FBI now provides, and what additional or different training might better assure future compliance. The court will then determine whether an order for notification and training is appropriate.
Contempt Finding
*12 Petitioners’ July 1988 Petition to Enforce the Consent Decree requested “a finding that the FBI is in contempt of Court.” CISPES did not request a contempt finding in their October 1989 motion for summary judgment because of their confusion regarding what terms of what Consent Decree applied in this case. Once CISPES determined which Agreement applied, they renewed their demand for a finding of contempt against the respondent in their reply memorandum to the motion for summary judgment.
The Magistrate Judge declined to rule on the request that the FBI be found in contempt of court. In light of the petitioners’ failure to present this request in their opening memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, the court finds that Magistrate Judge’s decision was proper. The court will not excuse CISPES’ failure to properly brief, or to properly request a contempt finding in a timely manner, by ruling on that issue at this juncture in the proceedings.
Fees
Chicago CISPES requests an award of costs and

attorney’s fees under common law for monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with the Consent Decree, or for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The FBI argued that it is protected by sovereign immunity from an award of fees, and that CISPES cannot collect fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because it did not prove a violation of the Civil Rights Act.
As the Magistrate Judge explained, the court has power to impose attorney’s fees as part of its inherent power to impose sanctions for violations of its decrees. Wisconsin Hospital Assoc. v. Revitz, 820 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir.1987). The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) allows for an award of attorney’s fees against the government “to the same extent that another party would be liable under common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.” Because the FBI violated the decree, attorney’s fees and costs should be awarded to Chicago CISPES. The court agrees.
The court rejects the FBI’s argument that petitioners have not prevailed. This court has found that the FBI violated the consent decree, and has the ordered the FBI to comply with the decree. In addition, the court will be considering additional remedies. In its objections to the report and recommendation, the FBI contends that fees may not be appropriate because whether this is a civil action is “another, far more difficult question”. This is a new argument which could have been, but was not raised before the Magistrate Judge. Further, there is no law or any real development of the argument as presented.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is adopted. The petitioners’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and the respondent’s motion is denied.
	  

Footnotes

1

Under paragraph 6.3:

The term “United States person” means a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an

unincorporated association or organized in the United States or substantially composed of United States citizens or aliens

admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation incorporated in the United States.

The parties before the court were parties to the original Consent Decree, or have standing to enforce the Decree under its terms.

Chicago CISPES has resided in Chicago since the summer of 1980, most likely July 1980. The other petitioners have resided in

the City since the 1970s, or the late 1960s. The FBI is a party to the consent decree.

2

Petitioner CISPES notes that 18 of the 19 targets of these investigations were identified by the FBI.

3

The FBI objects to the ACLU’s participation in these proceedings. The court finds that the ACLU is a proper party to this action.

8

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

The ACLU argues that the Consent Decree is in some respects, a contract made in settlement of a dispute, and that it, therefore, creates rights in the parties and designated beneficiaries to the contract. Breach of a promise included in the contract is actionable both by the beneficiary who is deprived of the intended benefit and the contracting party who gave consideration for the promise to confer those benefits. As a contracting party, the ACLU is aggrieved by every violation or threatened violation of the contract, and therefore has right to participate in these proceedings to enforce the decree. See Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1564–65 (2d Cir.1985) (Above analysis applied to analogous fact pattern).

4

National CISPES’ action against the FBI in CISPES I, was based on the same investigation at issue here. Plaintiffs in CISPES I

argued that the FBI investigation violated their rights under the First Amendment, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

The court dismissed CISPES’ complaint for mootness, finding 1) that plaintiffs’ demand for an injunction directing the CISPES

FBI files to be sent to the National Archive was moot when the FBI agreed to send all copies of the files to the Archives; 2) that

plaintiffs’ fears regarding possible future injury from use of the FBI files did not create sufficient tangible personal injury to grant

plaintiffs standing to pursue their First amendment claim; and 3) that the Privacy Act did not confer standing to plaintiffs’

organizations.

5

The Magistrate Judge noted that in the 1970’s the FBI and the Justice Department issued new executive orders, regulations and

guidelines forbidding the needless gathering of First Amendment information, yet the FBI conducted its overly broad, overly

intrusive CISPES investigation. The Magistrate Judge also noted that during the CISPES investigation from 1983 to 1985 the

Chicago Field Office was instructed by FBI Headquarters not to gather information about lawful First Amendment activity, but the

Chicago Field Office collected such information anyway.

6

In that case, the court found that the challenged government action evaded review even though it was not of short duration. The

case indicates that the “capable of repetition, but evading review exception” is intended to deal with the “risk that effective

remedies cannot be provided except in the event of repetition.” See also, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d §

3533.8, p. 370. The court agrees with petitioners’ argument that this concern is as relevant to clandestine violations as to violations

of short duration.

7

The petitioners’ ability to file suit against the FBI is greatly constrained. CISPES petitioners could file this enforcement proceeding

only because they previously obtained portions of their files under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Petitioners

were still forced to file proceedings after investigations were over since 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1) (1986) permits the FBI to refuse to

confirm or deny the existence of files of an on-going investigation, and 5 U.S.C. § 5529(b)(7)(A) permits the FBI to refuse to

produce the reports of an ongoing investigation. It would appear that petitioners could not file a enforcement proceedings until

after the could confirm their suspicions regarding the breadth and extent of the FBI investigation, without subjecting themselves to

sanctions under Rule 11.

8

Section 5.2 of the provision provides:

5.2 If the Court finds that a pattern of substantial noncompliance or a serious intentional non-compliance with the terms of the

Stipulation has occurred or is occurring, it shall make such order as it deems just and necessary to insure future compliance with

the Stipulation.

9

The provisions of 5.2 have been noted above (See infra, fn. 8. Section 5.1 provides as follows:

5.1 A former named plaintiff, a member of the plaintiff class, or a U.S. person residing in the City of Chicago prior to the

effective date of this Stipulation may at any time after final approval of the settlement petition the Court for a finding that a

violation of any terms of the Stipulation has occurred or is occurring and for an appropriate order to enforce the Stipulation.

Each such petition shall be supported by an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury, setting forth the facts upon which

the petition is based. If the Court finds, based upon facts alleged, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of

the terms of the Stipulation has occurred or is occurring, the Court shall permit petitioner to conduct such discovery as the Court

deems appropriate as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and shall thereafter hold a hearing to determine the

factual and legal issues raised by the petition.

10

In a related argument, the FBI cites Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336 (7th Cir.1990) to argue that the claim is barred because only

those individuals who would be personally affected by future violations of the Decree may seek protection against future

violations. The reliance on Martin is misplaced. Martin is distinguishable from this case because in that case the plaintiff did not

seek enforcement of the Consent Decree. Plaintiff filed a new action, attempting to remedy the government’s action only “against

him”, without concern for the other class members. Id. at 339. In addition the plaintiff was not a certified class member, and his

claim was partially barred by the doctrine of res judicata. This action is not moot with respect to the petitioners or to the class.

Further, the court is persuaded that the petitioners will be personally affected by violations of the Decree.

11

Paragraph 3.4(c) of the Consent Decree states:

(c) The FBI shall conduct its investigations with minimal intrusion consistent with the need to collect information or evidence in

a timely and effective manner, and shall conduct investigations in a manner reasonably designed to minimize unnecessary

collection and recording of information about the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.

12

The petitioners rightly argue that the FBI as an institution must arrange its affairs to ensure that the Decree will be complied with,

9

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1991)

and that the record in this case shows that the FBI has failed to do this by intentionally conducting activities in Chicago which violated the decree. In the instant case, the complained of investigations took place in Chicago, in violation of the Decree. The FBI Director admitted that the scope of the Dallas investigation was improperly expanded to include an investigation of Chicago CISPES, and that based on the information they had and subsequently obtained, the scope of their investigation should have been limited to specific individuals allegedly involved in planning terrorist acts in Washington, D.C.
Similarly, the FBI’s argument that law enforcement officers commit no violation of the Constitution by relying on the information or advice received from other law enforcement officers of agencies, is unpersuasive. First, whether the Chicago office relied on the orders of the Dallas office of Headquarters is of little importance, since the entire FBI was bound to ensure that the Decree was not violated. Further, the misconduct of one FBI field office cannot be insulated from challenge by that office’s requesting other offices to perform the wrongful acts. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) (Court found that police officers called upon to aid other officer in arrest could assume that officer had probable cause; “where, however, the contrary turns out to be true an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.”)

13

CISPES objects to the fact that the Magistrate did not evaluate whether there was a pattern of non-compliance. Having determined

that the FBI violated the terms of the Decree by engaging in serious intentional non-compliance with the Decree, the court is not

required to evaluate whether there was also a “pattern of substantial non-compliance.”

14

The FBI claims that mere compensation for past violations, such as the destruction of files which were obtained in violation of the

decree, is not permissible purpose for an enforcement order, since only future violations may be considered. The court disagrees,

since destruction of the fruits of the FBI’s unlawful conduct would certainly deter future violations, by placing the Government on

notice that it will not be permitted to derive any benefit from these sorts of violations.

	  

10

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

1992 WL 80527 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs,
Chicago Cispes, Petitioners, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Respondent.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | April 9, 1992.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW, Executive Magistrate Judge:
*1 This ruling concerns petitioners’ motion to permit supplemental discovery. The motion seeks discovery from respondent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), concerning interviews admittedly conducted by FBI of “Arab–Americans” during the time period surrounding the Persian Gulf War in early 1991. Petitioners assert, based on reports published in the Congressional Record and attached to petitioners’ supporting memorandum, that FBI conducted interviews of individuals who were not suspected of criminal activity; rather, FBI selected individuals to interview based on their ancestry or national origin. The entries in the Congressional Record reported that the Arab–Americans interviewed were asked questions about their political beliefs. FBI vigorously opposes the motion for additional discovery.
This is the second occasion on which petitioners have sought this discovery. In April, 1991, while a ruling on the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation concerning cross motions for summary judgment was pending, petitioners moved before Judge Williams to allow the discovery as further evidence that the controversy was not moot as FBI then contended. The district judge denied the motion with leave to reinstate after she had ruled on the objections. On October 2, 1991, the court ruled in favor of petitioners that the controversy was not moot.
Despite the favorable ruling, petitioners renewed their discovery motion, this time casting the need for discovery in terms of its relevance to open issues concerning relief,

namely whether additional training for FBI agents and employees would improve future compliance with the consent decree in this case. Petitioners argue that it has become clear as a result of a settlement conference with the court, that the parties are unable to settle the training issue. They represent that plaintiff ACLU advised the court at the settlement conference that it was important to discover whether the FBI had recently engaged in an intrusive, politically overbroad investigation in order to determine whether the FBI’s training, which had changed after the 1988 CISPES investigation, was now adequate.
FBI makes several arguments in opposition. First, FBI suggests that the magistrate judge cannot entertain the motion because it is brought under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FBI asserts, “That Rule does not authorize discovery after a district court rules on objections to the report and recommendation of a Magistrate Judge on a dispositive matter.” FBI seems to ignore the fact that the district judge has ruled on the objections and recommitted matters yet to be resolved—the issues of relief and discovery necessary for resolution of issues of relief—to the magistrate judge, expressly including the pending motion for supplemental discovery. Rule 72(b) permits the district judge to “recommit the matter to the magistrate [judge] with instructions.” Moreover, 28 U.S.C § 636(b) specifies the matters a judge may refer to a magistrate judge and broadly includes “such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id. at subsection (b)(3). Inasmuch as FBI makes no argument that the order of referral violates § 636(b)(3), its argument is overruled.
*2 To the extent the argument is intended more simply to mean that there can be no discovery after a ruling on summary judgment, this argument lacks any basis in the rules or case law. Rule 56(d) explicitly permits the court in a case not fully adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment to “[direct] such further proceedings in the action as are just.” Nor can FBI’s argument that petitioners waived discovery by not including it in their objections to the report and recommendation be sustained. Although a number of comments could be made about this argument, the one most to the point is that Judge Williams has already deemed additional discovery appropriate as reflected in her statement in her memorandum opinion of October 2, 1991, page 29,
As recommended by the Magistrate Judge, the court will reopen discovery for the limited purpose of exploring what training regarding compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree the FBI now provides, and what additional or different training might better assure future compliance. The court will then determine whether an order for notification and training is appropriate.
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

Next, FBI argues that the consent decree, paragraph 5 of the Agreement, permits discovery only on a verified petition showing reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the decree has occurred or is occurring. Because no attempt to file such a petition has been made, FBI believes no discovery can be authorized. Turning from procedure to substance, FBI lastly argues that the pending petition concerns members of CISPES, who have no demonstrated connection with FBI’s interest in Arab–Americans, and thus the discovery can have no bearing on whether the petitioners here have any basis to fear future investigation.
The proper focus here is not on the terms of the Agreement or the connection between the discovery and the CISPES petitioners but whether the as yet unspecified discovery concerning the Arab–American interviews is relevant in Rule 26 terms to whether additional or different training is needed to improve FBI’s compliance with the consent decree. Petitioners’ theory of relevance derives from FBI’s position on the summary judgment motion that new training procedures put in place after the CISPES investigation eliminated any danger of recurrence. The court did not reject that view but opened the issue for further exploration. The recurrence of violations after the implementation of new training procedures is relevant because it would tend to lead the

court to believe that the new procedures were not as effective as FBI had hoped. It is not appropriate to limit petitioners’ discovery to evidence of recurrence precisely concerning CISPES members. The very notion of governmental investigation of political beliefs implies that investigations will follow the controversial issues of the day, not issues that have been resolved or are presently on the back burner. Discovery confined to a recurrence of an investigation involving CISPES activists would likely produce nothing since all will presume that FBI will obey the rulings of the court and not engage in such activity in the future. The area of discovery sought on the motion is relevant to whether the FBI has in place effective training to prevent future violations of the decree. Therefore, some discovery will be allowed.
*3 Petitioners are given 30 days to propound discovery. Objections to particular requests may be timely asserted as appropriate under the rules governing discovery. Within the next 30 days, the parties are directed to meet together in the spirit of local Rule 12(k) in an effort to outline a scope of discovery adequate to the need but nevertheless limited to the training issue remaining to be resolved.
	  

2

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

1992 WL 159495 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs,
Chicago Cispes, Petitioners, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Respondent.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | June 26, 1992.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated October 2, 1991, this court granted summary judgment in this case in favor of petitioners, CISPES, and determined that discovery in this case would be reopened “for the limited purpose of exploring what training regarding compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree the FBI now provides, and what additional or different training might better assure future compliance.”
On January 24, 1992, the petitioners renewed their motion to permit supplemental discovery in this case.1 CISPES’ motion seeks discovery from respondent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) concerning interviews admittedly conducted by the FBI of Arab–Americans during the time surrounding the Persian Gulf War in early 1991. Petitioners assert, based on reports published in the Congressional Record,2 that the FBI conducted interviews of individuals who were not suspected of criminal activity, and selected individuals to interview based on their ancestry or national origin. The entries in the Congressional Record also report that Arab Americans were asked questions about their political beliefs.
Petitioners seeks discovery of these interviews on the grounds that the interviews are relevant to open issues concerning relief, namely whether additional training for FBI agents and employees would improve future compliance with the consent decree in this case. Plaintiff ACLU also argues that it is important to discover whether the FBI has recently engaged in intrusive, politically over broad investigation in order to determine whether the FBI’s training, which had changed after the 1988 CISPES

investigation, was now adequate. The court ordered full briefing on the supplemental motion, and referred the motion to the Magistrate Judge for ruling.
In a well reasoned decision, dated April 7, 1992, Magistrate Judge Lefkow determined that some discovery concerning the Arab–American interviews should be allowed. She specifically explained that:
The proper focus here is not on the terms of the Agreement or the connection between the discovery and the CISPES petitioners but whether the as yet unspecified discovery concerning the Arab–Americans is relevant in Rule 26 terms to whether additional or different training is needed to improve the FBI’s compliance with the consent decree. Petitioner’s theory of relevance derives from FBI’s position on the summary judgment motion that new training procedures put in place after the CISPES investigation eliminated any danger of recurrence. The court did not reject that view but opened the issue for further exploration. The recurrence of violations after the implementation of new training procedures is relevant because it would tend to lead the court to believe that the new procedures were not as effective as FBI hoped. It is not appropriate to limit petitioners’ discovery to evidence of recurrence precisely concerning CISPES members. The very notion of government al investigation of political beliefs implies that investigations will follow the controversial issues of the day, not issues that have been resolved or are presently on the back burner. Discovery confined to recurrence of an investigation involving CISPES activists would likely produce nothing since all will presume that FBI will obey the rulings of the court and not engage in such activity in the future. The area sought on the motion is relevant to whether the FBI has in place effective training to prevent future violation of the decree. Therefore, some discovery will be
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

allowed.
*2 Memorandum Decision, April 7, 1992, p. 4.
This matter is currently before the court on respondent FBI’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling. After review of the Magistrate Judge’s order, the parties briefs, and the relevant case law, the court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s order.
Discussion Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), a Magistrate Judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive matter, such as discovery, should be overruled by the district court only if the ruling is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), (b). Since the FBI does not argue that the discovery sought is privileged, or that production would be unduly burdensome, the only issue is whether the discovery sought is relevant, or could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Keeping these standards in mind, the court considers the respondents’ objections to the ruling on supplemental discovery.
The FBI contends that the Arab–American interviews have nothing in common with the CISPES investigation, and did not violate the consent decree. Therefore, the FBI argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by not requiring the petitioners to show how they would benefit from the discovery sought, and by allowing the petitioners to conduct discovery on “non justiciable” claims. The court rejects these arguments. CISPES’ motion for supplemental discovery identifies the specific aspects of the FBI’s Arab–American interviewing which CISPES argues are “evidence of overly-broad, overly-intrusive FBI investigative activity.”
The respondents are not required to demonstrate specific instances of illegality in the FBI’s interviews prior to conducting discovery. As the Magistrate Judge explained, discovery with respect to the interviews of Arab–Americans is relevant in Rule 26 terms to whether additional or different training is needed to improve the FBI’s compliance with the consent decree. “[T]he recurrence of violations after the implementation of new training procedures is relevant because it would tend to lead the court to believe that the new procedures were not as effective as FBI hoped.”3 The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the discovery is appropriate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.
The court specifically rejects the FBI’s argument that discovery is inappropriate because the petitioner’s request for a training remedy is not justiciable. The FBI contends that adjudication of the training issue “is [not] capable of solving the plaintiff’s problems.” In the October 2, 1991,

order this court specifically held that there is a danger of future harm to CISPES petitioners from recurrence of illegal FBI investigations of the petitioners. Accordingly, the court rejects the FBI’s unsupported contentions that adjudication of the training issue will not benefit the petitioners.4
The FBI’s other objections to the discovery ruling also stem from its contentions that the requested discovery is unauthorized given the facts of this case. The FBI contends that no discovery is authorized with respect to the Arab–American interviews because no petition has been filed challenging the FBI’s interview of Arab–Americans, and there has been no showing that the interviews of Arab–Americans violated the consent decree. The court also rejects these arguments.
*3 First, the court finds that the requested discovery is authorized for the reasons explained in the Magistrate Judge’s ruling at pp. 3–4. Further, the court agrees that once liability was found in this case, the court has authority to issue supplemental orders to prohibit extrinsic policies whose effect is to block progress towards the goals of the decree. Section 5.2 of the Consent Decree specifically provides that when the court has found a violation, “it shall make such order as it deems just and necessary to insure future compliance with Stipulation.” The court is allowing supplemental discovery in this case because the requested discovery may aid the court in insuring future compliance with the Decree.
With respect to the FBI’s concerns that there has been no showing that the interviews of Arab–Americans violated the consent decree, again the court notes that no such showing is required at this point in the case. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 the discovery sought need only be relevant to these proceedings, or likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. The discovery concerning the Arab–American interviews is sought to show that the FBI’s new training program has failed to stop overly broad, overly-intrusive investigations. Given this goal, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “some discovery” regarding the interviews is warranted.5
As the Magistrate Judge ordered, the petitioners are given 30 days to propound discovery. Objections to particular requests may be timely asserted before the Magistrate Judge as appropriate under the rules governing discovery. As directed by the Magistrate Judge in her April 7th order, within the next thirty days, the parties are directed to meet together in the spirit of local Rule 12(k) in an effort to outline a scope of discovery adequate to the need but nevertheless limited to the training issue remaining to be resolved.
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

Conclusion
	  
For the foregoing reasons the court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s order permitting supplemental discovery.

Footnotes

1

Petitioner’s motion for supplemental discovery was originally filed on April 11, 1991.

2

See Attachments C–1 through E–2 to petitioner’s Motion to Permit Supplemental Discovery.

3

Memorandum Decision, April 7, 1992, p. 4.

4

Respondents’ reliance on City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), to support its position on the training issue is equally

unpersuasive, because Harris is not on point. As CISPES notes, Harris concerns the issue of the degree of insufficiency in training

required to establish liability, and neither CISPES or the ACLU have ever claimed that the FBI’s insufficiency in training created

liability in this case. The question is, given the FBI’s liability based upon illegal FBI investigative activity, should the court order

additional training to ensure future compliance with the decree.

5

The court is of the opinion that almost all of the FBI’s objections go more toward the amount of discovery which should be

allowed in this case than towards whether any discovery is permissible. Since the FBI claims that its manner of investigating

individuals involved in first amendment activity has changed, their interviews with the Arab–Americans concerning their political

beliefs are relevant. How much of the interview material will be available to the petitioners is the more difficult question, which

will be resoled by the Magistrate Judge after review of the requested discovery.

	  

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 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 562480 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268. | May 8, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, District J.
BACKGROUND
*1 Before the court are plaintiffs’ objections to a Report and Recommendation (R & R) issued by Magistrate Judge Bobrick on October 27, 1999. Plaintiffs—CounterMedia, Active Resistance Organizing Committee, Autonomous Zone, and the Alliance named plaintiffs—filed an enforcement petition under a consent decree entered into nearly twenty years ago by the City of Chicago, the ACLU, and the Alliance plaintiffs. The consent decree stems from two prior class action suits in which a number of organizations claimed that the City and its agents violated their First Amendment rights through various investigative practices. The consent decree provides extensive regulations intended to govern the City’s investigation of First Amendment conduct by organizations and individuals in Chicago. It also prohibits harassment of, disruption of, or interference with persons because of their First Amendment conduct.
In the enforcement petition, plaintiffs claim that the City, through the Chicago Police Department, committed various violations of the consent decree during and around the time of the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago in August 1996. Plaintiffs were involved in various political demonstrations, workshops, and rallies around the time of the DNC. The Autonomous Zone is a collective, community activist center located in Chicago. CounterMedia is a coalition of media groups, political organizations and individuals which provided coverage of the DNC. Active Resistance Organizing Committee is a coalition of activists and organizations which organized the Active Resistance

CounterConvention. The CounterConvention took place in Chicago in August 1996, partially overlapping with the DNC. Approximately 700 participants attended. The CounterConvention’s two principal locations—the “Ballroom” and the “Spice Factory”—were both located within one mile of the United Center, where the DNC took place.
Plaintiffs’ allegations defy easy summarization, but they broadly outline a campaign of harassment by the police against plaintiffs and other protestors during the Democratic National Convention. They allege that police spied on the CounterConvention, monitored CounterMedia radio communications, and followed, questioned, and generally harassed CounterConvention participants and CounterMedia journalists. Plaintiffs also allege that police unlawfully arrested and physically assaulted protestors and journalists during the convention, interrogated them about their First Amendment activities, unlawfully searched and ransacked their vehicles, and unjustifiably seized, damaged and destroyed their cameras, film, and communication radios. The CounterConvention sites were allegedly subject to unlawful police raids.
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the court grant summary judgment on behalf of the City. Plaintiffs have filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R & R. The court’s review of the R & R is de novo. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). The court accepts and rejects the R & R to the extent and for the reasons stated below.
ANALYSIS
*2 Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Standard of Proof
In granting summary judgment to defendants, the Magistrate Judge applied the “clear and convincing” standard of proof to plaintiffs’ claims, ruling that “[t]o
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

gain any of the relief they seek, plaintiffs must prove the City violated the decree; this they must do by clear and convincing evidence.” (R & R at 17) Plaintiffs contend that this was the wrong standard of proof because “[t]he standard of proof in enforcement proceedings for relief other than contempt is ‘a preponderance of all the evidence’... while the standard of proof in contempt proceedings is the higher standard of ‘clear and convincing evidence.” ’ (Pets.’ Objections at 5)
The Seventh Circuit appears to have resolved this issue. “[I]t is settled that a party asserting a violation of a consent decree has the burden of proving the violation by clear and convincing evidence.” Bartsh v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1297, 1303 n. 3 (7th Cir.1987) (citing Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 533 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976)); see also South Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Berry, 186 F.3d 851, 853 (7th Cir.1999) (recognizing “clear and convincing” standard in determining violation of consent decree). Nevertheless, the court will address plaintiffs’ arguments in support of their proposition to the contrary.
Under the terms of the consent decree, the court retains jurisdiction to allow the parties to apply for “further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Order, for the enforcement of compliance with the provisions contained herein, and for the punishment of the violation of any such provisions.” (Consent Decree § II(A)(1)) Unfortunately—or perhaps by design—the decree does not set forth what standard of proof should be applicable to such subsequent actions.
Plaintiffs insist that “the type of relief sought for a violation of a consent decree does dictate the evidentiary standard.” (Pets.’ Objections at 5) Presumably, plaintiffs would have the court apply the “clear and convincing” standard only to their request for a finding of contempt, and apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to their requests for damages and injunctive relief. If the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to meet the “clear and convincing” standard as to any alleged violation, plaintiffs ask that the court dismiss the contempt charge as to that violation and allow “a trial seeking relief other than contempt.” (Id. at 6)
*3 Plaintiffs’ distinction between a finding of contempt and all other remedies sought misconstrues the nature of civil contempt, which is not merely a remedy, but an action by which other remedies are possible. The remedies available in a civil contempt proceeding go beyond the finding of civil contempt itself. A finding of contempt may entail injunctive relief to bring about compliance with the previous order, as well as compensatory damages:

Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes; to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.... Where compensation is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the complainant. Such fine must of course be based upon evidence of complainant’s actual loss, and his right, as a civil litigant, to the compensatory fine is dependent upon the outcome of the basic controversy.
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 738 (7th Cir.1999) (“Civil contempt proceedings are coercive and remedial, but not punitive, in nature and sanctions for civil contempt are designed to compel the contemnor into compliance with an existing court order or to compensate the complainant for losses sustained as a result of the contumacy.”), cert. denied, No. 99–1336, 2000 WL 381492 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Premex, Inc., 655 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1981) (“The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding ... is remedial, with its purpose being either enforcement of a prior court order or compensation for losses or damages sustained as a result of noncompliance with the provisions of the order at issue.”).
Plaintiffs urge their view of the standard of proof based primarily on three cases. First, they rely on United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 567 F.Supp. 272 (N.D.Ill.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.1983), in which the court applied a “preponderance of the evidence” standard in making findings of fact regarding the federal government’s compliance with a desegregation plan agreed to by the Chicago school board. Id. at 273. The court found that, while the school board had “made every good faith effort to find and provide every available form of financial resources adequate to pay the cost of full implementation of the Plan,” id. at 274, the federal government “failed to use its best efforts to find and provide all available financial resources adequate for full implementation of the Plan.” Id. at 280.
The Board of Education court’s inquiry was fundamentally different from the one presented by plaintiffs’ enforcement petition. The Board of Education court described the action as a “proceeding to enforce compliance” with the consent decree: “[s]pecifically it is to determine the nature and extent of the United States’

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obligations undertaken by the inclusion” of a particular provision in the consent decree. Id. at 274. The court interpreted the provision at issue, found that the federal government’s conduct had not comported with that provision as interpreted, and ordered certain remedies to ensure future compliance with the provision as interpreted. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit held that the remedies ordered by the district court were premature because the federal government was given no opportunity to comply with its newly interpreted obligations under the consent decree. Board of Education, 717 F.2d at 385.
*4 Here, the focus of plaintiffs’ enforcement petition is primarily backward-looking: awarding compensatory damages, declaring that past conduct violated the decree, enjoining certain behavior based on past violations, and requiring that certain actions be taken because of the past violations. (See Petition at 9) The majority of remedies sought do not require the interpretation of any particular provision of the consent decree, but rather the determination as to whether the evidence submitted by plaintiffs constitutes a violation of the decree, as already understood and interpreted.
More fundamentally, the Board of Education court never substantively addressed the standard of proof issue. The court merely mentioned in passing that its factual findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. 567 F.Supp. at 273. There is no indication that the parties even raised the “clear and convincing” standard as potentially applicable. Under these circumstances, the Board of Education court’s passing reference is an insufficient basis for disregarding the Seventh Circuit’s express language to the contrary.
Plaintiffs also seek support in the federal government’s antitrust case against Microsoft. According to plaintiffs, the Microsoft court “is applying the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard to all of the United State[s’] requested remedies other than contempt.” (Pets.’ Reply at 5) Specifically, plaintiffs look to United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C.Cir.1998), in which the federal government brought a civil contempt proceeding against Microsoft alleging that the company had violated the parties’ previous consent decree. The district court found no contempt, but nevertheless granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the disputed practice. See id. at 940. On appeal, Microsoft argued that, after finding no contempt, the district court should have dismissed the government’s petition. The appellate court disagreed, observing that the government’s “prayer for relief sought not only pure contempt remedies (such as the attention-grabbing request for $1,000,000 a day in damages), but also an order directing Microsoft to cease and desist” from the disputed practice. Id. at 941. “This was plainly a request for clarification of the consent decree,” which “may properly take the form of an injunction.” Id.

To the extent plaintiffs rely on the Microsoft court’s reasoning to urge that a request for clarification of a consent decree not be subject to the “clear and convincing” standard, this court readily agrees. However, plaintiffs’ broader proposition—that clear and convincing evidence is required to support a finding of civil contempt, but other forms of relief require only a preponderance of the evidence—stretches the Microsoft language beyond the bounds of reasonableness.1
Finally, plaintiffs cite language from Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.1999), for the notion that “a consent decree enforcement proceeding more commonly seeks relief other than contempt,” including compensatory relief. (Pets.’ Reply at 2) In Cook, the Seventh Circuit addressed the availability of a laches defense to a consent decree enforcement proceeding. The court noted that to remedy a consent decree violation, the injured party may seek a contempt judgment or a supplementary order “designed to make the party whole for his or her loss,” id. at 695, implying that a party could seek compensatory relief for the violation of a court order without bringing a contempt action. Even if the resulting order is compensatory in purpose, the court recognized that the order is still equitable in nature, and therefore subject to the usual equitable defenses, including laches. Id.
*5 Significantly, the Cook court limited its discussion to the availability of the laches defense, and did not address the proper standard of proof applicable to violations of a consent decree. Further, given that the language cited by plaintiffs is dicta, this court will not construe it as a departure from the “settled” principle “that a party asserting a violation of a consent decree has the burden of proving the violation by clear and convincing evidence.” Bartsh, 831 F.2d at 1303 n. 3.
Besides departing from Seventh Circuit case law, plaintiffs’ suggested approach would render the “clear and convincing” standard largely inapplicable to consent decree litigation. According to plaintiffs, the only remedy for which clear and convincing evidence is required is the contempt judgment itself. Any other remedies may be obtained by a preponderance of the evidence. Of course, if a court can award a plaintiff damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, without finding contempt, then the contempt finding itself is of little discernible value. A plaintiff could circumvent the “clear and convincing” standard—yet be entitled to largely the same spectrum of remedies—merely by unhitching her requested remedies from a contempt finding.
The court declines plaintiffs’ invitation to establish a two-tier standard of proof for establishing violations of the City’s consent decree. Plaintiffs must prove violations by clear and convincing evidence. For evidence to be
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

considered clear and convincing, it must “place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.” ’ Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). This is true only if the material “offered instantly tilted the evidentiary scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence ... offered in opposition.” Id. This standard of proof applies to the summary judgment inquiry, as well as to the ultimate trial on the merits. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254. Of course, if plaintiffs have requested court action that does not require the finding of a violation—e.g., requests for clarification, interpretation, or modification—the “clear and convincing” standard is inapplicable, and likely irrelevant.
Interpretation of Consent Decree
Several provisions of the consent decree are especially relevant to this enforcement action. The decree “prohibits any investigation of First Amendment conduct in the absence of one of the valid governmental purposes specified” in the decree—namely, criminal investigations, dignitary protection investigations, public gathering investigations, and regulatory investigations. (Consent Decree § 1.1.2) The decree “permits, but regulates, investigative activity that is directed toward First Amendment conduct in the course of performing” one of the specified types of investigation. (Id. § 1.1.3) Investigative activity is “directed toward First Amendment conduct” when it: includes the collection or handling of information about First Amendment conduct; has as a subject or target a person who is actively and substantially engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity relates to that conduct; or interferes with First Amendment conduct. (Id. § 1.3)
*6 Investigative activity that meets these criteria only by “incidental reference” is not considered to be directed toward First Amendment activity. “An incidental reference is an occasional or isolated reference to First Amendment conduct where: the conduct is not itself a significant issue in or focus of an investigation; and the reference is relevant to the law enforcement purpose of the investigative activity.” (Id. § 1.4)
Along with regulating investigations directed toward First Amendment conduct, the consent decree also provides that no agent or agency of the City may “disrupt, interfere with or harass any person because of the person’s First Amendment conduct.” (Id. § 2.2)
Plaintiffs argue that the Magistrate Judge misinterpreted the consent decree by finding that alleged instances of name-calling by police officers are not covered by the decree’s provisions. According to the Magistrate Judge,

“While the consent decree prohibits police from disrupting, interfering with or harassing any person due to First Amendment activity, we find it a stretch that it would cover epithets, or asking someone why they were wasting their life.” (R & R at 20) Plaintiffs insist that “the decree expressly bars any harassment if it is motivated by the target’s First Amendment conduct.” (Pets.’ Objections at 14)
By its terms, section 2.2 of the decree contains no qualifying language excluding verbal harassment from its coverage, or establishing a more stringent standard for claims based on verbal harassment as opposed to other forms of harassment, disruption, or interference. Still, the prohibition is subject to two important qualifiers. First, the disruption, interference, or harassment must be based on the person’s First Amendment conduct. Second, for practical reasons, there must be a de minimis exception to the provision. Otherwise, an enforcement action could result every time a stray comment by a police officer gave offense to someone engaged in an activity protected by the First Amendment—e.g., parade participants, churchgoers, or protestors. The court will evaluate plaintiffs’ evidence with these standards in mind.
Plaintiffs also fault the Magistrate Judge for not clarifying a contested section of the consent decree. The parties disagree as to whether the decree applies to information that is gathered but not recorded, filed, or used by police. The consent decree provides that “Police Department employees and agents may engage in investigative activity directed toward First Amendment conduct ONLY in a criminal, dignitary protection, public gathering or regulatory investigation that is conducted in compliance with Part 3 of this Judgment.” (Consent Decree § 3) “Investigative activity,” in turn, is defined as “the collection of information by any means, including its acquisition from another agency or from another unit within the same agency, or the recording, filing, retention, indexing or dissemination of information.” (Id. § 1.2)
*7 The City’s apparent interpretation—that information must be recorded, filed, or used to qualify as “investigative activity”—finds no support in the language of the provision. The definition includes the collection of information “by any means,” and does not require any subsequent use of the information gathered. This expansive definition is tempered by two criteria, however. To be subject to the requirements set forth in part 3 of the consent decree, the “investigative activity” must be “directed toward First Amendment conduct.” Second, the court will read into the provision a de minimis exception, so as to prevent the absurd results predicted by the City. (See City’s Resp. at 11)
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

The Alleged Violations
Rather than repeat the voluminous factual allegations underlying plaintiffs’ enforcement petition, both parties have referred the court to the allegations set forth in the summary judgment briefs submitted to the Magistrate Judge. The court’s analysis is based to a large extent on the allegations and arguments presented in those briefs.
The court notes that an enormous number of factual allegations are at issue in this dispute, and that a given allegation can implicate several separate provisions of the consent decree—in their Fourth Amended Petition, plaintiffs have alleged that no less than eleven provisions of the consent decree were violated. The court does not purport to have weighed each and every allegation against each and every provision of the consent decree. The court has attempted to determine only whether summary judgment in favor of the City is warranted—i.e., for each allegation, the court will determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that at least one provision of the consent decree was violated; the court makes no findings as to whether other provisions may also have been violated.
The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that plaintiffs’ allegations are somewhat of a hodgepodge, with little discernible organizational framework. The most helpful structure for analyzing the various claims was provided by the City in its summary judgment brief. The court’s analysis incorporates the City’s method of categorization.
Surveillance / Police Presence Plaintiffs allege that, by keeping the CounterConvention and CounterMedia under surveillance, the Chicago police conducted an investigation “directed toward First Amendment conduct” without complying with the consent decree’s requirements. Plaintiffs allege that police officers parked near the CounterConvention’s sites, questioned each passing conference participant about the CounterConvention, demanded identification from participants, and threatened to arrest those without identification. A police officer was stationed across from CounterMedia’s office, allegedly “watching” CounterMedia’s staff members.
This conduct by the police clearly was directed toward First Amendment conduct, and thus is governed by the consent decree. The subject of the investigation was the convention participants’ First Amendment conduct—i.e., their public assembly “concerning ideas or beliefs about public or social policy, or political, educational, cultural, economic, philosophical or religious matters.” (Consent Decree § 1.5.3) The First Amendment conduct was not merely an “incidental reference” of the investigation; rather, it was at the center of the investigation. The fact

that the police may have had legitimate reasons for their investigation—e.g., monitoring potential threats to the dignitaries and delegates attending the nearby DNC—does not render the consent decree inapplicable.
*8 However, plaintiffs have not submitted clear and convincing evidence that the surveillance violated the consent decree. Under the decree’s terms, the police are excused from several of the decree’s provisions if they are investigating a “public gathering.” The decree defines “public gathering,” in part, as “any march, demonstration, or rally in a public place, or in a place to which the public has reasonable access, that is reasonably likely to significantly affect traffic or public health or safety.” (Consent Decree § 3.4.1.2) A political convention with 700 participants taking place in a warehouse several blocks north of the Democratic National Convention satisfies this definition. CounterConvention participants camped and cooked food outside the building, further justifying police attention. Several vehicles, including a bus and a 28–foot trailer, were parked behind the Ballroom, near adjoining railroad tracks. Around the corner from the Ballroom, participants parked a van and an 18–foot trailer carrying a “mock nuclear waste cask.” There is no indication that the building was inaccessible to the public; indeed, at the time of the police “raid” on the Ballroom, the building’s back door was standing open. (Exh. 31 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 42) The CounterConvention’s “security” team appears to have been focused primarily on monitoring police activity, not on keeping members of the public away from the Ballroom.
A public gathering investigation is, to a limited extent, exempted from § 3.1.4’s authorization requirement. The police may “communicate overtly with the organizers of the public gathering concerning the number of persons expected to participate and similar information about the time, place, and manner of the gathering that is necessary” to ensure adequate public services to protect public health and safety, and to protect the exercise of constitutional rights. (Consent Decree § 3.4.4.2) To the extent that officers questioned participants about the basic parameters of their gathering, such questions were permissible.
The decree requires that public gathering investigations be “supervised by one police unit designated by the Superintendent,” and that “[i]nformation gathered shall be kept in public gathering files separate from all other police investigative files.” (Consent Decree § 3.4.3) The City contends that the only information report regarding the CounterConvention was purged—i.e., placed in a sealed envelope and segregated from other police files—pursuant to the consent decree. Plaintiffs dispute this, noting that there is no indication on the face of the document that it was purged. In response, the City has submitted correspondence showing that the bates-number
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

stamped on the investigative report was included in the range of bates-numbers corresponding with a set of purged documents. Because the court is aware of no requirement in the consent decree that a document’s “purged” status be indicated on its face, the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the City failed to keep the CounterConvention information report separate from all other investigative files.
*9 As for the requirement that public gathering investigations be supervised by one police unit designated by the Superintendent, plaintiffs contend that “[t]he public gathering unit did not supervise this investigation.” (Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 20) The court notes that the consent decree does not require that only members of the designated unit gather information on public gatherings, but only that a designated unit supervise such investigations. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that such supervision was lacking here. On the contrary, the fact that the information report was purged indicates that some supervision was exercised over the investigation. In any event, plaintiffs have failed to come forward with clear and convincing evidence that the City violated the consent decree by questioning CounterConvention participants regarding the nature of their activities.
Plaintiffs also allege that the police demanded identification and threatened to arrest participants without identification. This conduct would go beyond the scope of what is permissible without authorization under the consent decree. Plaintiffs cite to one deposition as support for this allegation. (See Pets.’ Rule 12(n) Statement ¶ 173) The witness was told by others that police “threatened to take them in and hold them until their identity was ascertained.” (Exh. 27 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 57) This testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Further, the witness personally was never asked for identification by police. The witness recalls that several “young folks” appeared to be asked for identification by police while walking from one convention site to the other. The witness could not hear what was said, and doesn’t “recall seeing exactly what was taking place other than ‘Oh, there’s some more young folks being hassled by the police officers.” ’ (Id. at 60) This does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the police violated the consent decree.
Plaintiffs also allege that “[p]olice officers with a chair were stationed on a continuing basis across the street from where the CounterMedia staff parked their cars, watching the staff.” (See Pets.’ Rule 12(n) Statement ¶ 174) The witness’s testimony on which this allegation is based does not indicate that the officer was there because of CounterMedia, much less because of CounterMedia’s First Amendment conduct. He testified that a uniformed officer was “hanging out” on a street corner across from the office, was there “pretty much” whenever the witness

was at the office, and seemed to be “watching us.” (Exh. 28 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 56–57) The fact that a uniformed police officer was stationed on a street corner near the DNC does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation.
Festival of Life The Festival of Life was a multi-day event at Grant Park during the week of the DNC. The Festival included a number of marches and rallies. Plaintiffs allege that police quashed a Festival of Life peace march on August 29, 1996 by seizing all of the signs, banners, and flyers, and arresting the chief organizer, the assistant organizer and the sound technicians shortly before the march was to begin. The arrests stemmed from mob action that allegedly occurred at an August 27 march. Plaintiffs do not contend that the arrests themselves violated the consent decree, but rather that the timing of the arrests violated the decree. They insist that the suspects could have been arrested after the march or during the two days prior to the march.
*10 Plaintiffs allege that the Magistrate Judge committed legal error in rejecting their claim regarding the Festival of Life arrests. The Magistrate Judge found that the timing of the arrests did not violate the consent decree, and noted that there is no constitutional right to be arrested as soon as probable cause exists. Plaintiffs contend that the absence of a constitutional right is immaterial because they have a right under the consent decree “not to be arrested at a time calculated to stop First Amendment activity .” (Pets.’ Objections at 14) Under plaintiffs’ approach, if the police have probable cause to arrest someone, they must time the arrest so as not to interfere with First Amendment conduct. This approach would lead to outlandish results here, where police would have been required to allow suspects wanted for mob action to lead a mass protest march. The consent decree provision cited by plaintiffs as support for this proposition forbids the City from disrupting, interfering with, or harassing any person because of the person’s First Amendment conduct. (See Consent Decree § 2.2) It does not forbid the City from disrupting a person’s First Amendment conduct when the City has probable cause to arrest the person for a crime. The court overrules plaintiffs’ objection as to the timing of the Festival of Life arrests.
At the time of the arrests, the police impounded a vehicle belonging to one of the arrestees, along with materials—banners, signs, and flyers—that were in or near the vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that police seized these materials in order to stop the march. The City has submitted testimony from the commanding officer who ordered the arrests indicating that “[s]tandard police procedure when persons with a vehicle are arrested is to
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secure the vehicle and the items with the vehicle.” (Exh. 3 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement ¶ 10)
The testimony on which plaintiffs rely—a declaration from one of the arrestees—alleges only that police “removed all of the peace march materials which we had unloaded, placed them in the vehicle and removed the vehicle, making the materials unavailable for the peace march.” (Exh. 19 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the police took materials from the possession of march participants, or took materials that were not next to the impounded vehicle. As the City points out, it is not reasonable to expect the police, when arresting a suspect and impounding his vehicle, to leave materials from that vehicle behind and unattended. Because the impoundment of these materials was incident to the legitimate arrests, plaintiffs cannot show that the impoundment was directed at First Amendment conduct. The City is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims associated with the Festival of Life.
Festival of the Oppressed On the afternoon of Thursday, August 29, 1996, Active Resistance organized a march called the Festival of the Oppressed, which ran from Wicker Park, down Milwaukee Avenue, Ashland Avenue, Damen Avenue, and North Avenue on the north side of Chicago. The march involved several hundred people and various vehicles. The Festival of the Oppressed’s organizers did not obtain, or even apply for, a parade permit from the City. The police were not informed of the route that the march would take. Nevertheless, the police closed some or all of the traffic lanes on Milwaukee, Ashland, and North Avenues to allow the march to pass. Toward the end of the march, participants blocked the six-way intersection at North, Milwaukee, and Damen Avenues for several minutes, bringing traffic on those streets to a halt.
*11 During the Festival of the Oppressed, police officers forced a van operated by the Shundahai Network to pull over. The van was towing an 18–foot long “mock nuclear waste cask” trailer behind it. Because the van had been rerouted, it was late getting to the parade. As a result, the van drove behind the parade, approximately thirty feet behind a line of police on horseback that was at the end of the parade. (Exh. 16 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 66–67) Matteo Ferreira testified that eventually, the van’s occupants asked a police officer if they could drive around the line of police and join the parade itself. (Id. at 68–69) The police officer said they could drive around the horses, which they did. After several blocks, another police officer told them that they needed to drive behind the police horses and a police van, so they moved back to their previous position. Ferreira recalled the officer telling the van’s occupants that because the parade did not have a

permit, they could not be in the parade. (Id. at 71) Ferreira testified that a police van then pulled up, and an officer told the Shundahai van to pull over. Ferreira pulled the van over to the curb and the police ordered them out of the van. Ferreira remembers seeing someone inside the van lock the door. All of the van’s occupants were arrested.
Plaintiffs allege that these actions were taken “without legal justification” (Petition ¶ 24), and rely on the conflicting police orders at the time and confusion in officers’ deposition testimony as support. The fact that an officer may have initially allowed the van to join the parade is irrelevant, as is the conflicting testimony regarding who gave the order to pull over the van. Two facts are relevant: first, the Festival of the Oppressed march took place without a permit, as required by municipal law; second, the Shundahai Network van was pulling an 18–foot long trailer with a mock nuclear waste container on it. The fact that police allowed the majority of demonstrators to continue the march without a permit does not mean that they were required to allow this obvious traffic hazard to continue down the unknown and unauthorized route.
Plaintiffs argue that “[w]hat is at issue is the police’s actual motivation in stopping the van.” (Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 43) Even so, plaintiffs have not provided any clear and convincing evidence that police were motivated to stop the van because of its occupants’ First Amendment conduct. Their decision to pull the van and trailer out of the march—regardless of an individual officer’s earlier statements to the contrary—is not clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation. Further, police were entitled to order the van’s occupants to step out and—especially when one of the occupants locked the door in response to the police order—arrest them. Even if the arrests were somehow improper, there is no clear and convincing evidence that they were made because of First Amendment conduct. The rough treatment of the van’s occupants and ransacking of the van’s interior will be addressed below.
*12 Plaintiffs also allege that Chicago police violated the consent decree at the Festival of the Oppressed march by ordering that anyone with a radio and anyone on a bicycle with a radio be arrested. While police were arresting CounterMedia journalist Lee Wells and seizing his radio, Commander Thomas Folliard ordered that “anybody you see with a radio, he’s interfering with the police, uh, take them into custody.” (Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 45) The order was subsequently clarified, as Folliard instructed a particular lieutenant that “you see people your way on bicycles with radios, take them into custody.” (Id.) Plaintiffs rely on a police radio transmission which indicates that “one of those people with the radios” subsequently was arrested. (Id. at 46) Robert Boyle testified that he and at least seven other “CounterMedia
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

people” were at the march with radios, and that no one else at the march had a radio. (Exh. 23 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 80–81) Those with radios were being fed information from a police scanner in the CounterMedia van. (Id.)
The police were allowing an unauthorized demonstration march to proceed down busy city streets on a weekday afternoon; they were trying to control traffic and provide for the public safety despite not knowing the march’s route. Under these circumstances, arresting demonstrators on bicycles who indirectly were monitoring police transmissions with their radios may have been a reasonable measure. In any event, there is no clear and convincing evidence that Commander Folliard ordered the bicyclists’ arrest because of their First Amendment conduct. Interfering with police efforts to regulate and monitor an unlawful protest march is not First Amendment conduct. While the bicyclists may in fact simply have been monitoring police radio transmissions for their own curiosity and using the radios to talk to each other about the march, plaintiffs have failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that such conduct was the motivating factor behind Commander Folliard’s arrest order.
Police Raids on the Ballroom and Spice Factory Plaintiffs allege that on August 29, 1996, Chicago police raided the Ballroom—one of two principal locations for the CounterConvention. According to plaintiffs, a group of Chicago police officers, without their name tags, badges or hats, approached the rear of the building on foot. One of the convention participants stood up and yelled, “The police are coming!” One of the officers approached and kicked her, saying “What the hell are you doing?” She replied, “What are you doing?,” and he pepper-sprayed her in the face. (Exh. 29 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 37–40)
While several officers detained convention participants behind the building, other officers entered the building, where they searched several participants. They allegedly seized one participant’s documents, along with a communication radio and cell phone. As they left, officers pepper-sprayed another conference participant for attempting to identify the officers. Both participants who were pepper-sprayed were taken to a hospital for treatment.
*13 The court cannot consider the alleged police raid to be “an incidental reference” to First Amendment conduct. Nor does the court find it a stretch—on this record—to conclude that the raid constitutes harassment because of First Amendment conduct. One witness reported that an officer referred to the documents seized in the raid as “subversive.” The focus of the City’s defense and the

Magistrate Judge’s summary judgment order is not whether the raid violated the consent decree, but whether the raid was, in fact, conducted by the Chicago police. To the extent that the City argues that such a raid, even if conducted by the Chicago police, satisfied the requirements of the consent decree, that argument is rejected.
The City admits that Chicago police had a staging area in the vicinity of the Ballroom on the night of August 29, 1996. The purpose was “to deploy individuals not needed for active operations but who were available to respond to any department operation that may arise.” (City’s Rule 12(n)(3) Statement ¶ 101) The City further admits that “a group of persons wearing what some witnesses called Chicago police uniforms, but with no badges or name tags, approached the rear of the [Ballroom] building” at 8:30 PM on that night. (Id. ¶ 104) Rather than dispute that the alleged events took place, the City contends that the perpetrators were not Chicago police. They rely on apparent inconsistencies in the witnesses’ description of the perpetrators’ physical appearance. The Magistrate Judge relied on these same inconsistencies in granting the City summary judgment on this claim. The City characterized the conflicting testimony as follows:
Michelle Xenos testified that approximately eight persons holding ‘billy clubs,’ flashlights, and mace and wearing dark, solid colored uniforms, came to the Ballroom. She did not remember seeing any insignia on them, or any patches.
Miles Mendenhall testified that about five or six persons came to the ballroom. They were wearing police uniforms: dark blue pants, light blue short sleeve shirts, black patent leather shoes, and police equipment belts. He did not see any insignia at all, but did see the holes where insignia could be attached. He did not remember any arm patches, but was not sure they did not have them. They were not wearing hats.
Daniel Whitmore testified that there were about five persons who came. They were wearing what appeared to him to be Chicago police department uniforms of light blue shirts and dark pants. None was wearing a badge or name tag. He did not recall if they were wearing patches. Two of them were wearing bulletproof vests.
Alexander Sakulich testified that he saw eight to twelve persons come to the Ballroom. They wore dark pants, blue shirts with an emblem on both shoulders, and work shoes, like work boots. One or both of the shoulder emblems said “Chicago Police.” None were wearing badges or name tags. Two or three were wearing hats without identifying numbers. Two or three were carrying normal “nightsticks,” and two or three were carrying what Sakulich described as “Tonfas”:
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

swing-around sticks with a short, swivelling handle about a quarter of the way up the stick. At one point, one or more of the persons allegedly stated that they did not need a search warrant, they were Chicago police.
*14 Lynda White testified that six or eight men came into the Ballroom. They were wearing dark blue pants with stripes, blue shirts, and bulletproof vests inside their shirts. None were wearing hats, and none had stars or name tags. One had a cigar, and he may have been wearing a white rather than a blue shirt.
(Id.) Another witness to the raid, Lynn Harrington, testified that she looked at the raiders’ uniforms “closely at the time, and they looked just like Chicago police uniforms.” (Exh. 29 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 35)
To the extent that this testimony is inconsistent, it reflects only on the witnesses’ credibility. The inconsistencies do not suggest that the event never happened, nor do they preclude the trier of fact from concluding that Chicago police officers were responsible for the raid. Given that some witnesses were inside the Ballroom and some were outside, and that some officers remained outside while others went inside, it is understandable that witnesses do not agree on the number of officers involved. More fundamentally, the court does not find it surprising that, months after the event, witnesses have conflicting recollections about uniforms worn during an event as shocking and traumatic as an unprovoked police raid. The City is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Plaintiffs allege that, immediately after the raid on the Ballroom, Chicago police massed near the other CounterConvention site—the Spice Factory. According to plaintiffs, this caused the site to be evacuated. Elisabeth Alexander testified that, after the raid on the Ballroom, “[t]here was a heavy police presence, several squad cars and vans, a large number of police officers waiting on the corner there outside of the spice factory.” (Exh. 21 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 31) Stephane Luchini testified that he remembered “seeing large groups of Chicago Police Department within a block—assembled within a block of the Spice Factory as we drove by.” (Exh. 30 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 53) James Bell testified that by the time he got to the Spice Factory, “everybody had left that scene,” but “there was squads like in the dozens of officers all right in that area.” (Exh. 22 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 69) This testimony does not establish that Chicago police officers raided the Spice Factory, caused it to be evacuated, or violated the consent decree in any way. To the extent that plaintiffs purport to bring a claim based on a “raid” of the Spice Factory, the City is entitled to summary judgment.

Moving Surveillance of Persons by Police Plaintiffs allege that police followed CounterMedia journalists and CounterConvention participants. Robert Boyle testified that, while driving between two abortion clinics, he was followed by an unmarked police car. Boyle was taking photographs for CounterMedia and engaging in “clinic defense,” where Boyle would “physically” prevent anti-abortion protestors from blocking access to abortion clinics. (Exh. 14 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 56) Boyle testified that he went to a clinic where an anti-abortion protest was supposed to take place. Police officers subsequently arrived. The anti-abortion protestors did not show up, and Boyle found out that the protestors were at a different abortion clinic. Boyle testified that he got back into his car, started driving toward the other clinic, and “as soon as I pulled away, there was an unmarked police car following us.” (Id. at 90) Boyle listened on his police scanner and heard the police run the license plate of his car. Boyle managed to get ahead of the unmarked police car in traffic, then pulled over, and the car drove past him. Elisabeth Alexander, who apparently was monitoring police radio transmissions, testified that she heard police run the license plate of the vehicle in which Boyle was traveling. (Exh. 12 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 27)
*15 This testimony does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the consent decree was violated. Based on the evidence, the conclusion could readily be drawn that police arrived at one abortion clinic, found out that the protest would occur at a second clinic, and drove to that second clinic. Boyle, also attempting to get to the second clinic, drove ahead of the police; when Boyle pulled over, the police continued on to the second clinic. The fact that police ran his license plate may have been a sensible precautionary step to determine the likelihood of violence if Boyle and his pro-choice “clinic defense” team physically attempted to prevent the anti-abortion protestors from blocking access to the clinic. Boyle admits that he engaged in “clinic defense” before, and his description of its “physical” aspects goes beyond mere First Amendment conduct. Thus, even assuming that the police followed Boyle, there is no clear and convincing evidence that the “investigation” of him was directed toward First Amendment conduct.
Lee Wells testified that an unmarked car with municipal license plates followed him as he drove people home from the area of Grant Park to the 600 block of West Lake Street. Wells and his companions “assumed we were being followed,” so they “just made a few turns, realized we were [being followed], and then proceeded to drop everybody off.” (Exh. 28 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 50) Wells “believed” the car “to be an undercover City of Chicago vehicle, a Caprice Classic.” (Id. at 52) The car began following Wells “like three blocks from Michigan Avenue” (id. at 53), but stopped following Wells when he dropped off someone who lived in the 600 block of West
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Lake. (Id. at 54) Wells continued on to the CounterMedia office, but he no longer saw the car following him. This does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Wells was being followed or investigated, much less that the investigation was directed toward First Amendment conduct.
Lynda White testified that one evening she left the Ballroom to drive to the grocery store. She testified that “[t]here was a marked Chicago police car that was driving behind me at some point after I left the Ballroom.” (Exh. 31 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 36) When White stopped at the grocery store, the police car parked across the street from where she parked. Two officers entered and stood at the front of the store. On the way back to the Ballroom, White noticed another police car behind her, but she could not tell if it was the same car as before.
Later that night, after the police “raid” at the Ballroom, White drove home. On the way, she was followed by a car that had “the characteristics” of an unmarked police car—“It was a large, late model American car. It had the big search light thing on the side, had that really loud transmission. There were two men in it, Caucasian.” (Id. at 69) White pulled up in front of a restaurant at the corner of Ogden and Grand, and a marked police car pulled up behind her. White then drove down Ogden, where she saw “a huge police presence.” (Id. at 71) Near her building—which apparently was on Ogden—a police car was parked in the street. When she pulled into her driveway, two police officers got out of the car and “looked at” her. (Id. at 72)
*16 As the City points out—and plaintiffs do not contest—Ogden was one of the major arteries to and from the DNC, and was a prime route for shuttling delegates from downtown hotels to the United Center. Police officers were stationed there on an ongoing basis during the convention. White’s testimony is not clear and convincing evidence that White was being followed or investigated, nor that any such investigation was directed toward First Amendment conduct.
Police stopped James Bell after he left a CounterMedia fundraiser at the Ballroom. Bell recounted the event at his deposition:
They [the police] seemed—the officer seemed really concerned about what was going on I assume because they were in that area or had, you know, seen them earlier in that area, so they were the only car there, and they saw all these people—or probably saw all these people around, and that was their line of questioning was, Why are

all these people here? What’s going

on? And I proceeded to tell them

about Active Resistance. And at no

time did they ask me for my license

or any other documentation. And

they—they

then

asked

people—there were some people in

the back of the pickup truck, it was

a cab-cover pickup truck—had

them get out, and then they

searched the back of the truck.

(Exh. 13 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 27–28)

As discussed above, the consent decree does not preclude the police from making basic and overt inquiries into the nature of a public gathering. Even assuming that the police knew that First Amendment conduct was occurring at the Ballroom—rather than simply a large party—the alleged interrogation of Bell is well within the permissible scope of inquiry.

Based on a CounterConvention security log entry and testimony from Elisabeth Alexander, plaintiffs allege that police followed protestors leaving the Immigrants’ Rights March to “see where they were going.” (Exh. 12 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 46) The City contends that this conduct relates to crowd control, and points to Alexander’s subsequent testimony that, at another time, police were “talking about large groups of people they saw walking down the sidewalk from that spice factory area saying, ‘Let’s see if they’re planning on meeting up with that demonstration.” ’ (Id.) The reasonable interpretation of the police communications is that they relate to crowd control. The court does not believe that the consent decree precludes police from monitoring the dispersion of a crowd following a march, including determining whether the crowd is headed to another site. Plaintiffs’ insistence that police may not follow “individuals” is beside the point. The evidence refers only to “protestors,” not “individual protestors,” or even “small groups of protestors.” The evidence regarding the overheard police communications is not clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation.

Police Monitoring and Jamming of CounterMedia Radio Communications *17 Plaintiffs allege that the police monitored CounterMedia’s internal radio communications. This allegation is based on the testimony of Elisabeth Alexander. (See Pets.’ Rule 12(n) Statement ¶ 176) As discussed above, while Robert Boyle was driving from one abortion clinic to another, Alexander was monitoring police radio transmissions and communicating with Boyle via CounterMedia radios. She testified that “a couple of times shortly after I radioed to him to go to a certain
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

location, I would hear police officers dispatched specifically to that location,” or “after he would radio to me that he was going to a specific location, I would hear police officers dispatched to that location.” (Exh. 12 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 27–28) Alexander does not recall what the locations were. This is not clear and convincing evidence that the police were monitoring CounterMedia’s radio communications, nor that the investigation was directed toward First Amendment conduct.
Plaintiffs also allege that the police disrupted CounterMedia’s internal radio communications. While arresting Lee Wells, one of the CounterMedia journalists, during the Festival of the Oppressed, police seized his radio. One witness recalls that after Wells was arrested and his radio was confiscated, CounterMedia was “getting interference from the radio that was confiscated or that we assumed could only be coming from the radio that was confiscated.” (Exh. 22 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 56) He further testified that “we were hearing on the radio transmissions like ‘Storm Troopers are coming’ and ‘Beam me up’ andstuff like that which we knew couldn’t be coming from anybody who was associated with CounterMedia because we had all had nicknames that were Star Wars and they were using Star Trek.” (Id.)
Elisabeth Alexander testified that after the radio was seized, she picked up “communications from people who were not our crew who were giving false information over the airwaves, people who were holding open the mics over the radios in order to block any transmissions from coming through.” (Exh. 12 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 40) Howie Samuelsohn, President of “the Earth Network,” submitted a declaration in which he indicated that he was at the Chicago Police Department Fourteenth District Police Station on August 29, 1996. While at the station, he “heard male voices yelling ‘He’s beating me!’ and other remarks.” (Exh. 16 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J.) Later that day, Samuelsohn “heard the same voices yelling the same remarks emitting from the CounterMedia radio channel.” (Id.)
By interfering with plaintiffs’ radio communications, the police were not gathering information or investigating plaintiffs’ activities. In order to constitute disruption, interference, or harassment that is barred by the consent decree, the police must have interfered with the radio communications “because of the person’s First Amendment conduct.” (Consent Decree § 2.2) Even assuming that plaintiffs’ allegations are true, there is no evidence—much less clear and convincing evidence—that the disruptions occurred because of plaintiffs’ First Amendment conduct. Plaintiffs’ contention that the conduct must be “viewed in the context of a pattern and practice of retaliation” by police against plaintiffs does not lead to a different conclusion. (Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 37) There is no

indication that the officers allegedly involved in the radio shenanigans had any previous contact with plaintiffs—it could just as well be concluded that they were simply clowning arround, not engaged in retaliation against First Amendment conduct. In any event, there is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Improper Questioning of Persons Under Arrest *18 Plaintiffs allege that the police interrogated various CounterMedia journalists and CounterConvention participants while in custody regarding their beliefs and activities. Kristian Williams, a participant in the Festival of the Oppressed march, injured his foot when it was stepped on by a police horse. Members of the Shundahai Network gave him a ride in their van. All of the van’s occupants, including Williams, were subsequently arrested and questioned by the police. Williams testified that Chicago police officers asked him:
How I knew the people in the [Shundahai Network] van, if there were any drugs in the van, if I did drugs, my friends did drugs, if I had been at the criminal justice system demonstration earlier in the week, if I had thrown a bottle at them, why I was demonstrating, if—they asked a lot of very vague sort of general questions like, So why are you doing all of this, and so who organized all this? And they asked if I had only come to Chicago to be in protests, things like that. They asked me if my family knew what I was doing.
(Exh. 33 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 78) Williams refused to answer the officers’ questions regarding politics or his personal relationships. (Id.)
It was proper for the police to ask Williams about his relationship with the van’s other occupants. Deciding whether to charge Williams, and deciding which particular charges to bring against him, could depend on his relationship with the other occupants—as a full participant in any unlawful plans or activities, or, as was the case, someone who just happened to be “along for the ride.” The drug-related inquiries appear to have been proper, as do the inquiries regarding the earlier incident in which a police officer was struck with a bottle during a demonstration. Because the questions focused on the bottle-throwing incident itself, rather than the underlying demonstration, this was not an investigation directed at First Amendment conduct, and therefore did not require written authorization or the preservation of notes. Further, because Williams’ testimony suggests that he provided
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

only basic information such as his name, address, and occupation, there may have been no information to preserve. The police were also entitled to ask Williams who the organizers of the Festival of the Oppressed were.
Asking Williams why he was demonstrating is more problematic. Such a question targets the heart of First Amendment conduct. The fact that Williams apparently did not respond to this line of questioning is not dispositive—the decree governs the process of information-gathering by the police, not just the substantive information gathered. Under § 3.1.4, the police were required to obtain written authorization before investigating Williams’ First Amendment conduct—even if the unauthorized staging of the Festival of the Oppressed gave them a valid factual basis for such investigation. If the trier of fact finds Williams’ testimony credible, it could provide clear and convincing evidence that the consent decree was violated.
*19 Julia Moon–Sparrow and Melissa Rohs were in the van with Williams during the Festival of the Oppressed march, and were also arrested. Moon–Sparrow testified that an officer told Rohs (who was in the same room as Moon–Sparrow) that “she was wasting her life, something like that, you know. I mean, like I said, it’s not verbatim, something like that. That theme that she was stupid for being involved with people like us, things like that.” (Exh. 34 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 35) Especially where the seemingly open-ended § 2.2 (barring harassment because of a person’s First Amendment conduct) is the decree provision at issue, the court is hesitant to allow claims to proceed on vague and abstract recollections of what might have been said by an unidentified officer. Moon–Sparrow’s testimony of what one officer said to Rohs is not clear and convincing evidence that Rohs was harassed because of her First Amendment conduct.
As for Moon–Sparrow, she “was spoken to in a demeaning way about my involvement. And questioned about why I was doing what I was doing and did I know I was wasting my life and things like that.” (Id. at 36) For the same reasons set forth above, the court does not find this to be clear and convincing evidence that Moon–Sparrow was harassed because of her First Amendment conduct. However, Moon–Sparrow’s testimony that she was asked about the reasons for her First Amendment conduct gives rise to a real possibility that the consent decree was violated. At a minimum, the City was required to obtain written authorization before pursuing such lines of inquiry.
CounterMedia journalist Neil Corcoran testified that, after his arrest, officers asked him “a variety of questions concerning who is CounterMedia, what did the name mean, what were we doing.” (Exh. 15 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 25) However, the only specific

question Corcoran recalled is that officers “asked us what CounterMedia means.” (Id. at 26) He could not even remember the “gist” of the other questions. (Id.) This is not clear and convincing evidence that the police harassed Corcoran because of his First Amendment conduct, nor that their questions were directed toward First Amendment conduct. To the extent that an officer’s question regarding the meaning of “CounterMedia” can be construed as a violation of the consent decree, the court dismisses it as de minimis.
CounterMedia journalist Carla West testified that, after her arrest, officers asked her what she was doing in Chicago, along with other questions “along the same lines, where I was from, what I did there, why I was, you know, covering the event, questions like that.” (Exh. 29 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 20) After transporting her to another jail, they asked her similar questions—“why I was there and why I was covering the event and what I thought about the event and the police.” (Id. at 21) This testimony is not clear and convincing evidence that West was harassed because of her First Amendment conduct—indeed, it is not evidence of harassment at all, but could be construed as mere banter by the officers.
*20 As to whether the questions amount to an investigation directed toward First Amendment conduct, the court acknowledges that asking a protestor to explain her protest is qualitatively different than asking a journalist why she is covering a certain event. The former is readily perceived as investigatory; the latter is more sensibly viewed as conversational. However, when that journalist is under arrest, the conversational quality is swallowed up by the custodial circumstances. To engage in such inquiry—even if motivated by officers’ mere curiosity—the authorization and preservation requirements of the consent decree must be followed. West’s testimony, if found credible, could amount to clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation.
Mateo Ferreira was detained after stopping his van and 18–foot “mock nuclear waste cask” trailer along the Vice–President’s motorcade route near Grant Park. Plaintiffs suggest that the City improperly interrogated him, but the cited testimony does not support their characterization. Ferreira testified that police detectives “indicated that they were aware that there was people assembling over in that warehouse district that were there to protest the convention.” (Exh. 16 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 50) Moon–Sparrow testified that FBI agents asked Ferreira various questions about his activities. (Exh. 34 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 55) This is not clear and convincing evidence that the City violated the consent decree.
Berating and Threats of Persons Under Arrest
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Plaintiffs cite four episodes in which Chicago police “assaulted, threatened and berated CounterMedia and CounterConvention participants.” (Petition ¶ 20) First, during the arrests of the occupants of the Shundahai Network van during the Festival of the Oppressed, a police officer taunted Kristian Williams because he had been injured previously. Williams testified that the officer “started kicking my injured foot saying, you know, Be careful of your foot. Watch out for your foot, ha-ha-ha.” (Exh. 45 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 57) Plaintiffs have not provided clear and convincing evidence that this harassment stemmed from Williams’ First Amendment conduct. Moon–Sparrow testified that, when officers ordered everyone out of the van, Williams locked the van’s door. (Exh. 23 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 21–22) It reasonably could be concluded that the police harassment was in retaliation for Williams locking the door, not for the occupants’ participation in the parade. Plaintiffs’ characterization of this as a factual dispute does not preclude summary judgment—they must submit clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation, which they have not done as to the taunting of Williams.
Moon–Sparrow testified that, during the same episode, she was thrown out of the van onto the ground, then lifted up by her wrists handcuffed behind her, thereby injuring her back. She testified that the officer “who reached into the open window and unlocked the sliding door [that Williams had locked] then picked me up forcefully and threw me to the ground forcefully.” (Exh. 34 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 22) She was then “straddled and handcuffed, and then lifted up by my wrists, by my wrists only; and then once standing, was pushed forward against the wall, pushed forward across the sidewalk against a wall, and then guarded.” (Id. at 27) Whether or not the alleged conduct constitutes police brutality, there is no indication that it constitutes a violation of the consent decree. Moon–Sparrow’s testimony is not clear and convincing evidence that she was treated roughly because of her First Amendment conduct. Indeed, given that the same officer unlocked the door and threw her onto the pavement, her mistreatment may have resulted from Williams locking the door in violation of the police order to exit the van.
*21 Plaintiffs also allege that Rohs was improperly harassed at the police station. The only testimony offered in support of this allegation comes from Moon–Sparrow. As explained above, the testimony is too vague and abstract to constitute clear and convincing evidence that Rohs was harassed because of First Amendment conduct.
Finally, plaintiffs allege that, while Lee Wells was at the police station, “a police officer threatened to kill the arrested protestors as he had killed other radicals while in the U.S. military in Guatemala and called the arrestees ‘pussy-ass faggots.” ’ (Petition ¶ 20(d)) The cited testimony does not support this allegation. Wells testified

that:
[T]his one police officer was bragging about killing people in Guatemala, that he was in the military in the ‘70s, and if he thought we were radical and that—you know, what special forces was doing in Guatemala and Honduras in the ‘70s was radical—I mean, he was bragging about it and basically calling us all pussy-ass faggots and stuff like that.
(Exh. 28 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 39) The import of this testimony is that the officer told the protestors that his military experience was more radical than their purportedly radical protests were. While the officer’s vulgar behavior ought not be condoned, to the extent such behavior can be construed as harassment based on the protestors’ First Amendment conduct, the resulting consent decree violation is de minimis.
Breaking of Cameras and Other Equipment Plaintiffs allege that Chicago police “repeatedly seized, destroyed, damaged and jammed film, cameras, radios and radio-scanners of CounterMedia, CounterConvention and their participants.” (Petition ¶ 18) They provide eight supporting examples.
First, while searching a CounterMedia van, police grabbed Stephane Luchini’s camera, opened the camera and pulled out film of the police entering and searching the van, thereby destroying the film. James Bell testified that an officer “had opened up the back and was inspecting the camera, and when he had opened the back, obviously he exposed the film that was in that camera.” (Exh. 13 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 40) Lee Wells testified that he saw an officer “open up a camera and pull the film out of the camera.” (Exh. 41 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 30) Alexander Sakulich testified that he saw an officer carrying something that looked “like developed film they pulled out of the camera and stretched out so that it was ruined.” (Exh. 37 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 41)
If this testimony is found credible by the trier of fact, it may constitute clear and convincing evidence that the police destroyed Luchini’s film because of his First Amendment conduct—namely, taking photographs of the police entering the van in which he was a passenger. While opening up a camera may be necessary to search for contraband under certain circumstances, it strains credulity that, in order to determine whether the van posed a safety threat, police needed to open up its occupants’ cameras and pull out any undeveloped film, thereby destroying it. Because a trier of fact could sensibly conclude that this constituted harassment of a person because of First Amendment conduct, summary judgment is not warranted.2
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

*22 Second, during the same search, police broke Lee Wells’ video camera during an initial stop and destroyed it during a second stop by dropping it to the floor. Wells testified that, during the initial stop, “My camera was—I believe it was damaged at that incident. My camera was grabbed and then given back to me after they left the vehicle.” (Exh. 28 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement at 14) When police pulled the van over again, the camera was completely broken by officers dropping it on the floor of the van. (Id. at 15) There is no indication that the officers dropped the camera intentionally. Unlike the intent inherent in pulling film completely out of a camera, dropping a camera could very well be accidental. Accordingly, Wells’ testimony is not clear and convincing evidence that his camera was broken because of his First Amendment conduct.
Third, during the Festival of the Oppressed march, officers seized Wells’ 35–millimeter camera. Wells testified that at the police station, an officer, while laughing, opened the camera, thereby exposing and destroying the film inside. (Id. at 39) James McGuinness remembers twice seeing an officer “looking through cameras and just opening the back and saying, whoops and laughing and said, film got exposed.” (Exh. 32 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 49–50) This testimony suggests that the officers’ exposure of Wells’ film was not accidental or pursuant to a good-faith search for contraband. The officer intentionally destroyed, for no apparent reason, film belonging to a journalist covering a demonstration. If found credible, this testimony qualifies as clear and convincing evidence that Wells was harassed or interfered with because of his First Amendment conduct.
Fourth, during the Festival of the Oppressed march, officers arrested Jeffrey Perlstein and seized his video camera and backpack as he videotaped the police arresting an Active Resistance demonstrator. When he was released from police custody, the police returned his video camera and backpack, but the backpack had been damaged. Further, the videotape that was in the camera at the time of the arrest was not returned, but had been replaced by another videotape that was in Perlstein’s backpack. Further, twenty dollars and a videotape about events at the 1996 Republican National Convention were missing from Perlstein’s backpack. There is no indication that any of these items were stolen in retaliation for Perlstein’s videotaping of the demonstrator’s arrest. This is not clear and convincing evidence that the loss of these items constitutes harassment because of Perlstein’s First Amendment conduct.
Fifth, police broke a video camera, a still camera, and a CB radio that were in the Shundahai Network van when its occupants were arrested during the Festival of the Oppressed march. Julia Moon–Sparrow testified that she

“briefly” watched officers inside the van before she was taken into the police wagon. (Exh. 34 to Pets .’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 30) She saw a “[v]ideo camera, papers, T-shirts, things like that” being “tossed out from the sliding door” of the van. (Id.) Matteo Ferreira testified that, when he picked up the van from the impounding yard, the interior was ransacked. Their boxes of literature and clothes had been soaked with their drinking water. According to Ferreira, “[i]t appeared that they wanted the film out of the video camera and didn’t realize that they had to turn on the power in order to open the door, so they jammed the door open,” breaking the camera. (Exh. 27 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 108) The police also destroyed the CB radio: “They busted the hands, so the receiver and that was gone and other parts were strewn about the van.” (Id. at 109)
*23 The scope of this alleged destruction gives the court pause. Unlike a few missing items or a dropped camera, it is impossible to explain away the damage to the van’s interior as mere accident or oversight. Further, the seemingly methodical destruction cannot reasonably be viewed as retaliation for Williams’ locking of the van door, nor can it be justified as a search incident to the arrests. Under the circumstances of the arrests, the trier of fact could conclude that Moon–Sparrow and Ferreira’s testimony is clear and convincing evidence that the police destroyed the cameras and CB radio because of the First Amendment conduct of the van’s occupants.
Sixth, police seized a video camera and still camera from CounterMedia journalists Neil Corcoran and Karla West. The cameras contained film of interviews with “suspected government agents spying on a demonstration.” (Petition ¶ 18(f)) When police returned the cameras, the film from the still camera and the video cassette from the video camera were missing, and both cameras were broken. While this may indicate that police were negligent, it is not clear and convincing evidence that the film was stolen, or the cameras broken, because of the journalists’ First Amendment conduct.
Seventh, during the police raid on the Ballroom, officers seized a communication radio and cell phone. Daniel Whitmore testified that, during the raid, when he picked up the radio to contact other CounterConvention participants about the raid, officers took the radio from him. Robert Mendenhall testified that the police took a walkie-talkie, a cell phone, a boom box, and some papers. The propriety of this conduct turns on the propriety of the raid itself. Given that the court has denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the raid, plaintiffs can introduce evidence relating to the items seized. The seizure of these items may constitute additional police harassment and interference because of the CounterConvention participants’ First Amendment conduct.
14

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Eighth, plaintiffs claim that, while arresting CounterMedia journalist Edmund Nix during a demonstration at an abortion clinic, officers allegedly damaged his video camera, rendering it inoperative. (Petition ¶ 18(h)) Nix testified that:
[A]fter I said, “I’m with the press,” twice I was grabbed by a number of police officers at which time they made sure that the camera got out of my hands one way or another. I was trying to hold onto it, but it eventually I believe was smashed down to the ground or someone grabbed it. I’m not sure. It was quite an interaction, and at that point I didn’t resist at all. I just let them grab me and carry me off to the truck.
(Exh. 35 to Pets.’ Opposition to Summ. J. at 42) Nix did not get his camera back for “a number of weeks,” and when he did, “[i]t was damaged to the point where I had to buy a new battery for it because that was broken, but the camera still functioned although to this day it doesn’t really function too well.” (Id. at 45–46)
*24 There are two flaws in plaintiffs’ characterization of this testimony. First, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegation, Nix’s testimony suggests that his camera was not rendered inoperative. Second, and more importantly, Nix’s testimony suggests that his camera was damaged because he resisted handing it over to police, not because police intended to damage it based on Nix’s First Amendment conduct. Deputy Chief Ronald Jablon submitted a declaration in which he indicated that Nix was arrested because he refused a police order to move several feet back from anti-abortion protestors at whom he was yelling obscenities. (Exh. 3 to City’s Rule 12(m) Statement ¶¶ 5–7) The police were attempting to separate the anti-abortion protestors from the pro-choice protestors in order to avoid a violent confrontation. (Id.) Given the circumstances, the damage to Nix’s camera is not clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation.
Municipal Liability Based on Policy or Custom

The court is puzzled by plaintiffs’ reliance on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the proposition that the City is liable because its policy or custom caused plaintiffs’ injury. The Monell Court addressed the circumstances under which a municipality could be held liable under § 1983. See id. at 694. Plaintiffs’ cause of action arises under the consent decree’s jurisdictional provision, not under § 1983. If Monell and § 1983’s “policy or custom” analysis has any relevance to this enforcement proceeding, the court is unable to discern it. The ultimate resolution of plaintiffs’ claims turns on whether the City has violated the consent decree, not on whether plaintiffs may have a separate cause of action under § 1983 case law.
Statute of Limitations
The court finds persuasive the reasoning underlying the Magistrate Judge’s rejection of the City’s statute of limitations argument. The City has offered no reasonable justification for applying the 180–day statute of limitations governing violations of the Shakman decree to this litigation. To the extent that the City objects to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, the objection is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have submitted clear and convincing evidence that, if found credible by the trier of fact, would establish that the following conduct by the City and its agents violated the consent decree: the police raid on the Ballroom; certain aspects of the police interrogations of Kristian Williams, Julia Moon–Sparrow, and Carla West; the destruction of Stephane Luchini’s film during the search of the CounterMedia van; the destruction of Lee Wells’ film at the police station; and the ransacking of the Shundahai Network van. The City is entitled to summary judgment on all other allegations set forth in the Fourth Amended Alliance Plaintiffs, CounterMedia, Active Resistance Organizing Collective and Autonomous Zone’s Petition to Enforce the City of Chicago Consent Decree.
	  

Footnotes

1

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the more recent opinions issued regarding Microsoft, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30

(D.D.C.2000); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C.1999), is wholly misguided. Judge Jackson’s findings of

fact and conclusions of law arise from lawsuits filed in 1998 by the Department of Justice and twenty states’ Attorneys General.

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Nos. 98–1232, 98–1233, 1998 WL 614485, at *1 (D.D.C. Sep. 14, 1998). These lawsuits

alleged violations of federal and state antitrust statutes, not the earlier Microsoft consent decree, which was entered pursuant to a

1994 suit filed by the Department of Justice. See id. at *3.

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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2

The court rejects plaintiffs’ assertion that the underlying searches of the CounterMedia van violated the consent decree. The van

had stopped at an intersection during a march, and the driver had removed the keys, preventing the van from moving when police

ordered it to do so. The police saw an open gas can in the van, and a rag sticking from the mouth of the van’s gas tank. (See City’s

Rule 12(n)(3) Statement ¶¶ 33–34, 118–123) Under these circumstances, there is no clear and convincing evidence that the

searches were directed toward First Amendment conduct, rather than toward the potential hazard posed by the van.

	  

16

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 709485 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | May 26, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, J.
Background
*1 The City of Chicago has asked the court for an interpretation of the 1982 Alliance consent decree that has governed its investigative practices for nearly two decades. The consent decree stems from two prior class action suits in which a number of organizations claimed that the City and its agents violated their First Amendment rights, primarily through various police practices. The decree provides extensive regulations intended to govern the City’s investigation of First Amendment conduct by organizations and individuals in Chicago. It also prohibits harassment of, disruption of, or interference with persons because of their First Amendment conduct.
The City’s current motion for interpretation stems from Judge Williams’ earlier denial of the City’s motion to modify the decree. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 66 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill.1999). In its motion to modify, the City had complained “of the significant burdens continued compliance and enforcement places on [its] ability to serve and protect Chicago citizens.” Id. at 912. Judge Williams concluded “that much of what the City believes is prohibited is not,” and that much of the City’s proposed investigative activity is permissible under the decree. Id. at 912–13. She also invited the parties, to the extent that they still had questions, “to submit a motion for an interpretation of the consent decree that is directed at specific provisions of the decree as well as proposed conduct.” Id. at 913 (emphases in original). In response to this invitation, the

City has served on the court thirteen interrogatories that call for sweeping interpretations of the consent decree based on hypothetical scenarios. Specifically, the City has asked the court to answer the following questions:
Where there is a legitimate governmental purpose unrelated to the suppression of First Amendment activity, can the City permissibly record information about the identity of persons engaged in overt advocacy activity, as well as their statements, without further restriction?
As part of an investigation into an organization reasonably suspected to be a criminal street gang as that concept is defined in Illinois law ... may the City collect identifying information about any individual or organization that associates with the gang and retain it for further use without additional restriction?
Is an investigation of individuals or groups that have advocated hatred based on race, color, ethnicity, creed, religion, gender, or sexual orientation—when a crime is committed against members of a particular group that the subject group or individual has targeted in its own statements—directed toward First Amendment conduct and therefore governed by Part 3 [of the decree] and, if so, can its results be retained for future use as intelligence once the investigation concludes?
When the City is permitted to investigate a hate group, can the City collect information about the identity of individuals who are members of or who associate with the hate group, without first obtaining information that each individual about whom any information is collected has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime?
*2 Can information about the views, beliefs, and statements of groups or individuals collected in the course of a lawful criminal investigation of a hate group, including First Amendment information, be retained after the investigation has been closed and reasonable suspicion has dissipated so that it may be consulted for its intelligence value in future investigations?
When the City knows or has reasonable suspicion that a person committed or was involved in the commission of a hate crime, can the City investigate any other individual or group because they have associated with the subject and share views that may have motivated the crime, and, if so, may the City retain the results of such an investigation so that they may be consulted in future investigations?
When a hate crime has been committed and the City is attempting to pursue an investigation but has yet to
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

develop reasonable suspicion with respect to any particular subject of investigation, may the City question or otherwise investigate individuals or groups that have expressed views sympathetic to the commission of such crimes and, if so, can the results of such an investigation be consulted in future investigations?
When the City learns that individuals or groups advocating racial or ethnic hatred are active within its borders, may it monitor the activities and document the membership of those groups, including collecting their literature or downloading material from their web sites, and retain the information acquired for intelligence purposes, absent reasonable suspicion that these individuals or groups are committing, have committed, or are about to commit a crime?
May City employees record statements that occur in the media or in public places in order to learn and record the views of public officials, constituents, and others?
May the City videotape or photograph First Amendment gatherings in order to deter police misconduct and to document whether such misconduct has occurred, and use such videotapes or photographs in future criminal or civil proceedings?
May the City videotape or photograph First Amendment gatherings for purposes of training police officers on crowd control in such settings?
May the City videotape or photograph non-First Amendment gatherings and retain such videotapes or photographs for purposes of training police officers on crowd control in such settings?
May the City participate in inter-jurisdictional sharing of intelligence information, such as VITAL [Violent Crime Information Tracking and Linking]?
Analysis
“The exercise of judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution depends on the existence of a case or controversy.” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). Because a federal court does not have the power to “render advisory opinions,” the court’s “judgments must resolve ‘a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” ’ Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)). The “case or controversy” requirement “keeps federal courts in the business of resolving existing legal disputes and out of the business of offering advice

on the legality of a proposed course of action.” Deveraux v. City of Chicago, 14 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir.1994).
*3 The Seventh Circuit recently underscored the applicability of these principles to a court’s continuing enforcement of a consent decree. In United States v. Accra Pac, Inc., 173 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir.1999), the court rejected the argument that “a court’s authority to superintend the implementation of a consent decree dissolves all obstacles to judicial review.” The court reasoned that:
[D]istrict judges can’t suspend the application of Article III or grant themselves the power to issue advisory opinions one case at a time, and litigants can’t stipulate to the enlargement of federal jurisdiction. A case or controversy must be present at every moment of the litigation. That’s the point of the mootness doctrine, which is as applicable to consent decrees as to other judgments.
Id.
One aspect of the Article III inquiry is a matter’s ripeness. “Cases are unripe when the parties point only to hypothetical, speculative, or illusory disputes as opposed to actual, concrete conflicts.” Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 975 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.1992). In evaluating the ripeness of a claim, the court must weigh “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
In Massachusetts Ass’n of Afro–American Police, Inc. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.1992), the First Circuit held that a federation’s challenge to a consent decree’s hiring provisions was not ripe because the point at which those provisions would affect the federation’s members had not yet been reached. The court observed that, in evaluating a matter’s ripeness, “[t]he central concern is whether the case involves a merely hypothetical dispute.” Id. at 20. The first ripeness criterion—fitness for review—depends on “whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Id. The court found that the federation’s challenge to the consent decree was based on an event—a vacancy for a promotion beyond the number of promotions exempted from the consent decree—that may not occur as anticipated, or at all. Id. In such circumstances, the “claim is too hypothetical to be fit for judicial review.” Id. at 21. The appellant also failed the second ripeness criterion—hardship of withholding judicial
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

consideration—because “the injury it alleges cannot yet be proven and may never occur.” Id.
Similarly, in Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Wilmington, 824 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.1987), the Third Circuit rejected a challenge to an allegedly discriminatory promotions list compiled in 1984. A group of firefighters claimed that the City of Wilmington had adopted a racially discriminatory scoring system for the fire department’s promotional examination, leading to the discriminatory promotions list. Id. at 263. In an earlier consent decree, the city had agreed that its promotional examinations would not have a disparate impact on minorities. Id. The district court enjoined the promotion of any firefighters based on the 1984 list. Id. at 265. Prior to the appeal of the order, the 1984 promotions list expired, and was replaced by a new list based on new examinations. See id.
*4 On appeal, the city argued that the controversy was moot in light of the expiration of the 1984 promotions list. See id. The firefighters insisted “that a live controversy exists because one purpose of the suit is to prevent the city from restructuring future promotional rankings in accordance with its erroneous interpretation of the ... consent decree, and the certified class includes firefighters whose rank on future lists may be affected by the defendants’ interpretation of its obligations under the ... consent decree.” Id. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that “[a]ny order of this court would merely serve to advise the parties as to the legality or illegality of the specific set of procedures adopted to yield the 1984 list, a list which is no longer relevant to the legal relationship between the parties.” Id. at 266. As for those firefighters whose future rank would depend on the city’s interpretation of the consent decree, the court observed that “[i]t is purely a matter of conjecture whether the city’s interpretation of the consent decree would cause it to ... adopt the same ranking procedures challenged here.” Id. Because the court would be left to “hypothesize” as to the effects the city’s future interpretation might have, the court held that “[n]o justiciable controversy remains.” Id.
Even a cursory review of the list of questions submitted by the City reflects the practical wisdom behind Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement. If the court were to answer the City’s proffered interrogatories, it would be opining not on the facts of a particular dispute, but on the City’s abstract discomfort with the consent decree’s prohibitions. The City is not asking the court to pass judgment on alleged violations of the decree or to apply a specific decree provision to a past or impending event. Rather, the City proposes that the court issue edicts on the applicability of the decree to various ill-defined areas of conduct. Many of the questions do not even appear to be tied to a specific provision of the consent decree, and at least one—whether police may videotape or photograph non-First Amendment gatherings—has no apparent

relation to the decree. Hypothetical questions beget hypothetical answers. Under Article III, this court cannot be in the business of issuing hypothetical answers.
Underscoring the hypothetical nature of the disputes alluded to in the City’s motion is the fact that there is no dispute whatsoever among the parties as to how several of the City’s questions should be answered. Even under the City’s abstract framing of the questions, plaintiffs agree with several of the City’s proposed answers. This alone suggests the fundamentally misguided nature of the City’s motion. At the very least, such questions to the court should arise from an unavoidable realization that the parties are at loggerheads over the permissibility of a proposed course of conduct. Here, the City appears to have brainstormed ways in which the consent decree might affect its investigation practices in the future, and submitted a list of corresponding questions to the court, without ever having asked plaintiffs if they disputed the City’s interpretations.
*5 This failure to consult has contributed to the broad-brush nature of the City’s questions, as well as plaintiffs’ responses. Because the parties did not narrow the areas of real dispute, they are lost in a muddle of peripheral disagreements and stylistic, but not substantive, differences. Even as to those questions where there is a discernible dispute, the contrasting interpretations resemble opening submissions in a negotiation, not insurmountable obstacles to workable agreement. Without question, the murkiness of plaintiffs’ responses also stems from the hypothetical nature of the City’s questions. Because the questions are not based on accessible facts, plaintiffs’ responses are necessarily broad enough to account for various contingencies and interpretations—regardless of how precisely the City has attempted to craft the questions. Where the court has been asked by the City “to adopt an interpretative guideline that will help clarify the proper application” of the decree’s terms (City’s Mtn. at 4), it is no wonder that plaintiffs’ responses are uncertain and unhinged from any discernible facts. As the ACLU recognizes, “The City’s sweeping, undefined and hypothetical questions make answers difficult.” (ACLU Resp. at 1–2) The court has not been asked to settle a dispute, but to enter into a theoretical debate.1
Under these circumstances, the City’s motion fails both ripeness criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories. The City’s questions—due to their hypothetical nature and disconnection from any real dispute—are uniquely unfit for judicial resolution. Further, withholding judicial consideration at this stage would not pose undue hardship to the City. Certainly, it would be more convenient for the City to have judicial approval of its consent decree interpretations before investing time and money into implementing those interpretations as tangible policies or practices. The City
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

is hard-pressed to claim true hardship, however, where it has not even bothered to check to see if plaintiffs disagree with its interpretations. In any event, it is not the business of this court to rubber-stamp the City’s long-term plans for investigation and law enforcement. Given that the City has not undertaken any of the conduct that it fears is proscribed by the consent decree—and plaintiffs have not blocked the City’s efforts to undertake such conduct—the City cannot show any injury from the court’s failure to intervene at this stage. Where plaintiffs prevent or threaten to prevent the operation or implementation of a specific policy or practice, the City can seek relief in this court.
The court takes the City’s motion to be a well-intentioned attempt to guard against violations of the consent decree, and realizes that the motion stems from Judge Williams’ invitation to seek judicial interpretation of disputed “specific” decree provisions. The City’s motion, however,

goes beyond any reasonable scope of Judge Williams’ invitation, which cannot, of course, be read as having lifted the requirements of Article III. Where an interpretation of the consent decree is required to resolve a real dispute between the parties based on real facts and an actual or threatened injury, the court will be ready and willing to intervene. Until then, the questions are not ripe for judicial review.
Conclusion
*6 Because the City’s motion for interpretation seeks an advisory opinion from this court, the motion is denied.
	  

Footnotes

1

There is one matter raised in the City’s motion that is based on a verifiable factual dispute between the parties. The City suggests

that “[i]n light of the recent petition to enforce filed by the ACLU involving City note-taking of public conversations, there is an

obvious need for clarification of whether and when the City may listen to and take notes on public statements without violating the

Decree.” (City’s Mtn. at 12) To the extent that the relevant decree provisions must be interpreted to resolve the specific factual

allegations raised by the ACLU, they will be—in the context of the enforcement proceeding.

	  

4

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment On Reconsideration Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, N.D.Ill., September 21, 2000
2000 WL 709482 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | May 26, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, J.
Background
*1 Before the court are the Alliance plaintiffs’ objections to a Report and Recommendation (R & R) issued by Magistrate Judge Bobrick on December 10, 1999. The Magistrate Judge denied plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees arising from monitoring and enforcement work done pursuant to a consent decree entered into between plaintiffs and the FBI in 1980. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D.Ill.1991). The ACLU, another party to the FBI consent decree, filed an enforcement petition alleging that the FBI had violated the decree by interrogating Arab–Americans during the Gulf War. The ACLU and the FBI subsequently entered into a settlement agreement regarding the ACLU’s allegations.
The Alliance plaintiffs seek their attorney’s fees for work relating to the Arab–American enforcement proceeding initiated by the ACLU. Part of this work stems from the FBI’s refusal to serve the Alliance plaintiffs with pleadings in that enforcement proceeding, and the Alliance plaintiffs’ successful motion to compel service. The Alliance plaintiffs also seek fees for their work on a memorandum submitted in opposition to the FBI’s objections to a Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Lefkow regarding the enforcement petition. The remainder of the fees appears to stem from general “monitoring” of the enforcement proceeding.

Magistrate Judge Bobrick recommended that the Alliance plaintiffs’ fee petition be denied because they failed to establish that they were prevailing parties in the enforcement proceeding and because they failed to establish that their monitoring work was reasonable and necessary. The court agrees that plaintiffs’ fee petition should be denied, but for a different reason.
Analysis
At the outset, the FBI argues that the Alliance plaintiffs’ motion for fees is untimely because it was not filed within 90 days after the FBI and the ACLU settled the underlying proceeding, as required by Local Rule 54.3. According to the FBI, the Alliance plaintiffs’ “claim to ‘prevailing party’ status must depend on the settlement agreement between the ACLU and the FBI.” (FBI Br. in Supp. of Mag. Report at 6) As explained below, this presumption is wrong. Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees based on their “prevailing party” status in winning the initial consent decree—and their subsequent monitoring of the FBI’s compliance with that decree—not because they prevailed in the particular enforcement proceeding to which their monitoring work related. The motion for attorney’s fees is not time-barred.
The FBI’s estoppel argument fails for the same reason. According to the FBI, in seeking an order compelling service before Judge Williams, plaintiffs urged that “the Court should eschew any consideration of the effect a decision on service might have on a fee petition because no such petition was pending and therefore such consideration would be purely advisory.” (Id. at 8) The FBI argues that plaintiffs therefore “should be estopped from now asserting that the order they procured on that representation has some bearing on their fee petition.” (Id.) Even assuming that the FBI has accurately characterized plaintiffs’ earlier representation to the court—which is no small assumption, from the court’s reading of the briefs—plaintiffs’ current fee petition is based on their success in securing the underlying consent decree, not on their success in procuring the service order. The court will not estop plaintiffs from bringing the current fee petition.
*2 The Alliance plaintiffs contend that the Magistrate Judge ignored the law of the case in finding that they were not parties to the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. In allowing the ACLU to participate in summary judgment proceedings between the FBI and Chicago CISPES, the court held that “[a]s a contracting party, the ACLU is aggrieved by every violation or threatened violation of the contract, and therefore has [the] right to participate in these proceedings to enforce
1

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

the decree.” Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295, 1991 WL 206056, at *12 n. 3 (Oct. 3, 1991). The reasoning underlying this holding renders it equally applicable to the Alliance plaintiffs in this context. Their blanket right to act as “parties” to enforcement proceedings would be eviscerated if they were not treated as “parties” for purposes of recovering attorney’s fees to which they would otherwise be entitled.
The FBI contends that this holding is not the law of the case because the order in which it was set forth was reversed by the Seventh Circuit. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472 (7th Cir.1997). However, the Seventh Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s fee award was not based in any way on the ACLU’s right to participate in the proceedings. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit allowed the ACLU to participate in the appeal without making an issue of it. See id. More importantly, however, there is no indication that the FBI appealed the district court’s grant of blanket participatory rights to the ACLU.
Contrary to the FBI’s suggestion, the mere fact that other rulings set forth in the district court’s opinion were reversed does not preclude non-appealed rulings in the same opinion from functioning as the law of the case. “Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a ruling by the trial court, in an earlier stage of the case, that could have been but was not challenged on appeal is binding in subsequent stages of the case.” Schering Corp. v. Illinois Antibiotics Co., 89 F.3d 357, 358 (7th Cir.1996); see also Williams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 F.3d 502, 503 (7th Cir.1993) (“If a final judgment had been entered, the case appealed, the judgment reversed, and the case remanded, the trial judge would be required to adhere on remand to the rulings that he had made before the case was first appealed, provided of course that they had not been set aside by the appellate court.”).
Accordingly, the court finds that under the law of the case, the Alliance plaintiffs, as contracting parties, were “parties” to the ACLU’s enforcement proceeding.1 This determination, of course, does not end the inquiry, for plaintiffs’ mere status as parties to an enforcement proceeding does not entitle them to attorney’s fees. Indeed, under plaintiffs’ framing of the issues, their status as parties to the enforcement proceeding is irrelevant to the inquiry.2
*3 Plaintiffs bring their current fee request under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 3) Only in combination do these statutes provide a potential basis for fee recovery against the federal government. Section 1988 does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity, but provides only that in an action to enforce various statutory provisions, including § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
Through 28 U.S.C. § 2412, as amended by the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub.L. 96–481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980), the United States has partially waived its sovereign immunity. The section under which plaintiffs seek recovery of their attorney’s fees provides that:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys ... to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Thus, if plaintiffs are otherwise entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988, the EAJA allows them, at least in theory, to recover such fees from the FBI.
In construing the EAJA, this court must bear in mind that “limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). The Alliance plaintiffs, in seeking to recover their litigation costs, bear the burden of establishing that they meet the EAJA’s requirements. See Estate of Woll v. United States, 44 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir.1994).
Plaintiffs’ primary obstacle to recovery stems from the fact that the EAJA applies only to matters that were pending on, or commenced after, its effective date—October 1, 1981. Commissioners of Highways v. United States, 684 F.2d 443, 444 (7th Cir.1982). As Judge Getzendanner previously observed, plaintiffs and the federal defendants (including the FBI) entered into the underlying settlements—which gave rise to the consent decree—in late 1980. The court approved the settlements on August 11, 1981, and judgment was entered on September 2, 1981. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295, 76 C 1982, 1985 WL 3300, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 24, 1985).
Before Judge Getzendanner, plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the impact of this chronology by arguing that the case was still “pending” because their petition for
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

attorney’s fees was still pending as of the EAJA’s effective date, and because the statutory time period for appealing had not expired as of that date. Judge Getzendanner properly rejected both arguments. First, she recognized that the Seventh Circuit had “held that a case is no longer ‘pending’ for purposes of the EAJA when the sole issue remaining on the effective date of the Act is the collateral issue of the federal government’s liability for fees.” Id. at *7 (citing, inter alia, Commissioners of Highways, 684 F.2d at 444–45). Second, Judge Getzendanner held that the statutory time period for appealing was irrelevant because “judgment was by consent decree, and neither party had standing to appeal.” Id. As a result, “the September 2, 1981 order was final in all senses of the word,” and thus there “is no authorization for the imposition of fees under the EAJA.” Id.
*4 Plaintiffs now seek to circumvent Judge Getzendanner’s ruling by arguing that the EAJA is applicable because “all of the work for which compensation is now being sought commenced long after the effective date of the Act.” (Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 3) This argument is irrelevant, for the EAJA’s applicability is determined by the timing of the underlying action, not the timing of the work for which fees are sought. See Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1296–97 (7th Cir.1983) (holding that EAJA covers “work performed before and after the effective date of the Act as long as the action was pending on October 1, 1981 or was commenced on or after that date”).
More broadly, according to plaintiffs, the fact that “fees for the case-in-chief were precluded because the case-in-chief was no longer pending when the fee statute became effective does not mean that a plaintiff is ineligible for postjudgment work commencing after the fee statute became effective.” (Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 3) As support for this proposition, plaintiffs cite Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 618, 620–21 (4th Cir.1978), in which the Fourth Circuit upheld an award of attorney’s fees stemming from the plaintiff’s successful attempts to modify an earlier school desegregation order. The Wheeler court’s analysis focused on the availability of fees under § 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (now repealed), but the court observed that “it makes no difference whether plaintiffs base their claim on 20 U .S.C. § 1617 or on 42 U.S.C. § 1988” because both statutes “provide for an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party,” and “there is no indication that Congress intended the language of the two statutes to be interpreted differently.” Id. at 621. The court further observed that “[b]oth have been construed to authorize fee awards in cases pending at the date of enactment.” Id.
The Wheeler plaintiffs were attempting to recover attorney’s fees for their work dating back to the beginning of the desegregation litigation, even though the fee statute

had not been enacted at that time. The plaintiffs argued that, since the court retained jurisdiction to enter further orders necessary to carry out the underlying desegregation order, the case was still “pending” for purposes of determining the fee statute’s applicability. The court rejected this argument:
When § 1617 became effective on July 1, 1972, this case was pending only in the technical sense that jurisdiction to enter such further orders as were necessary and desirable had been retained. There was no certainty, however, that the jurisdiction of the court would ever again be exercised. Indeed, the litigation might have remained inactive for years. Although the legislative history of § 1617 is silent as to the definition of pending claims, we doubt that Congress intended the availability of attorneys’ fees to depend solely on the technical retention of jurisdiction.... We therefore hold that § 1617 does not authorize attorneys’ fees with regard to those phases of the litigation that had been reduced to a final judgment at the time § 1617 became effective.
*5 Id. at 623.
The Wheeler court went on to hold, however, that the plaintiffs could recover attorney’s fees for their work on phases of the litigation that began after the fee statute’s effective date. “As we view § 1617, it authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees only for services in connection with the phase of the litigation that commenced with the filing of a motion for further relief in July, 1972.” Id. Significantly, the Wheeler plaintiffs prevailed on their July 1972 motion. See id. at 620. Indeed, the appellate court instructed the district court that, on remand, the extent to which the plaintiffs prevailed was a factor to be considered in computing the amount of fees to be awarded. See id. at 624.
To the extent that the Alliance plaintiffs are relying on Wheeler to argue that they are eligible for attorney’s fees for postjudgment work on which they prevail, the court readily agrees with their position. When plaintiffs file and prevail on a petition to enforce the consent decree, the effective date of the EAJA is no obstacle to their recovery of attorney’s fees. However, to the extent that plaintiffs are relying on Wheeler to argue that they are entitled to recover attorney’s fees for postjudgment work unrelated to a matter on which they prevail, the court cannot discern
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

support for that proposition in Wheeler’ s holding or analysis.
More fundamentally, plaintiffs’ argument devolves into self-defeating circular logic. Plaintiffs contend that the EAJA applies to their current fee petition because they performed the underlying work after the Act’s effective date. However, the EAJA only allows plaintiffs to recover fees from the United States “to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The basis on which plaintiffs seek fees, § 1988, allows for recovery only by a “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Because plaintiffs do not claim to be prevailing parties in this postjudgment work, fees would appear to be precluded.
In attempting to overcome the “prevailing party” obstacle, plaintiffs circle back to rely on the pre-EAJA consent decree. Plaintiffs argue that they need not have prevailed in the postjudgment work for which they seek compensation because they “obtained their ‘prevailing’ status by obtaining the FBI consent decree” in the first place. (Exh. 24 to Pls.’ Objections at 5) This argument ignores the fact that, as Judge Getzendanner already held, the consent decree is not governed by the EAJA. If the consent decree is not governed by the EAJA, the court does not believe that it can provide the basis for plaintiffs’ fee recovery under the EAJA. As noted above, the EAJA’s applicability hinges on the timing of the underlying action, not the timing of the work for which fees are sought. Accordingly, while a party may recover pre-EAJA fees based on post-EAJA litigation, see Berman, 713 F.2d at 1296–97, plaintiffs have provided no support for the notion that they may recover post-EAJA fees based on pre-EAJA litigation. Because plaintiffs’ claimed entitlement to fees is based solely on their “prevailing party” status in a pre-EAJA action,3 the court denies their fee petition.
*6 Plaintiffs insist that the EAJA “is as applicable to this attorney’s fee request as it was to the request for fees against the FBI for the CISPES enforcement proceeding.” (Pls.’ Supp. Br. at 4) In the CISPES enforcement proceeding, Judge Williams adopted Magistrate Judge

Lefkow’s recommendation that the plaintiffs be awarded attorney’s fees because “the FBI had engaged in ‘serious intentional non-compliance’ with the 1981 consent decree.” (9/5/96 R & R at 2 (quoting Alliance to End Repression, 1991 WL 206056, at *10)) Judge Williams had awarded the fees based on the court’s “inherent power to impose sanctions for violations of its decrees” after finding that “the FBI violated the decree.” 1991 WL 206056, at *12. Judge Williams also “reject[ed] the FBI’s argument that petitioners ha[d] not prevailed” on the enforcement petition. Id.
The CISPES enforcement proceeding does not support plaintiffs’ argument here. First, the court notes that the award of fees was vacated by the Seventh Circuit. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir.1997) (vacating award of fees under § 2412(b) because plaintiffs “are no longer prevailing parties” in light of ruling that FBI did not violate consent decree). More importantly, nothing in Judge Williams’ or Magistrate Judge Lefkow’s analyses suggests that the EAJA allows plaintiffs to recover fees for postjudgment work based on their status as prevailing parties under the pre-EAJA consent decree. In the CISPES proceeding, Judge Williams based the fee award on the plaintiffs’ success in establishing a violation of the consent decree, not on their success in entering into the decree in the first place. This court does not dispute plaintiffs’ ability to recover fees for postjudgment work in which they are prevailing parties. Such is not the case here.
Conclusion
Because the court believes that the above analysis precludes the award of attorney’s fees to the Alliance plaintiffs for their work relating to the Arab–American enforcement proceeding, the court does not reach the other arguments raised by the parties. The Alliance Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Fees Motion for Monitoring Compliance With FBI Consent Decree is denied.
	  

Footnotes

1

To the extent that the FBI contends that plaintiffs do not satisfy the definition of “party” provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B), it

bears noting that plaintiffs’ fee petition is based on § 2412(b). The definitions set forth in § 2412(d) apply only to that subsection.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2).

2

In finding that the Alliance plaintiffs, as contracting parties, are parties to enforcement actions brought under the consent decree,

the court makes no determination as to whether they were prevailing parties in the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. Given

that they did not participate in the resolution of the proceeding or sign the resulting settlement agreement, the court is skeptical that

the Alliance plaintiffs can be said to have prevailed.

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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

3

Specifically, plaintiffs assert that they “never sought fees as prevailing parties in the [Arab–American] enforcement proceeding,”

but that they “gained 42 U.S.C. § 1988 prevailing party status when they and ACLU Plaintiffs won the FBI consent decree.” (Pls.’

Objections at 7)

	  

5

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 1368004 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Sept. 21, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, J.
*1 Petitioner Raymond Risley and the Alliance plaintiffs object to Magistrate Judge Bobrick’s March 9, 2000 recommendation that Risley’s petition to enforce the City of Chicago consent decree be dismissed. Risley served as a high-ranking Chicago police officer from 1991 to 1999. Risley’s petition alleges that police department officials blamed him for certain leaks to the media during an investigation into police corruption. He alleges that the police department violated the consent decree in two ways: first, by investigating his activities without following the decree’s requirements; and second, by retaliating against him because of his First Amendment activities. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition be dismissed because it is untimely, because the petition’s allegations lack credibility, and because Risley did not engage in any First Amendment conduct. The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that a two-year statute of limitations should govern enforcement actions under the consent decree, but disagrees with his conclusion that Risley’s entire petition is time-barred. The court finds, however, that the allegations that are not time-barred do not set forth a consent decree violation.
In Smith v. City of Chicago, 769 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.1985), the court held that Title VII’s 180–day limitations period applies to contempt proceedings brought under the Shakman decree—a consent decree governing the use of political patronage in the City’s employment practices. Contrary to Risley’s and the Alliance plaintiffs’ characterizations, the Smith court did not suggest that the borrowing of limitations periods was appropriate only where litigation over laches defenses has become a recurring problem. While recognizing that “[l]itigation about laches in Shakman cases has become

routine business in the district court,” id. at 410, and that it “diverts time and energy from the central issue in the litigation,” the reasoning underlying the court’s holding was significantly broader:
The litigants and the legal system ... have a common interest in easily stated, easily applied rules of procedure. Bright-line rules save the time of litigants and courts for the merits of the disputes; they tell parties what they must do to protect their rights. Courts should establish understandable, simple rules for the timely filing of litigation whenever possible.... Laches is not the doctrine of choice for determining the outer limit within which to file suit. Its usual role is to terminate the right to sue someplace short of the period of limitations, when inexcusable delay coupled with prejudice makes the regular period too long. Yet laches has so far been the only device for determining the timeliness of litigation under the Shakman decree. The time has come to establish a period of limitations.
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
Although litigation under the consent decree in this case has proceeded without devoting much (if any) time to laches, the court nevertheless believes that a defined limitations period is essential—both to prospective petitioners and to the City. Parties who suffer harm as a result of the City’s decree violations should face a discernible deadline for bringing their actions. As the Smith court recognized, “[i]f no clear rule establishes how much delay is permissible ... injured employees must either forswear their less contentious remedies or risk losing their legal rights.” Id. The City also should be able to rely on a defined period of time in which alleged infractions of the consent decree must be raised. Risley’s fear that a limitations period is inappropriate because many of the City’s violations involve “covert action” is misplaced. If a prospective petitioner should not reasonably have been on notice of the violation, or if the City took action to conceal the violation, the statute of limitations will not run. Where, however, a person is aware of the conduct giving rise to the alleged violation, there is no reason not to enforce a reasonable limitations period.
*2 The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

two-year limitations period governing § 1983 claims should apply to enforcement actions under the consent decree. The claims giving rise to the decree were brought under § 1983, and many of the enforcement petitions closely track claims brought under that statute. Admittedly, the fit is not perfect, as the consent decree gives petitioners a freestanding cause of action without needing to invoke a particular statute or common-law right. Nevertheless, the First Amendment lies at the heart of the consent decree, and alleged violations of the decree are most analogous to First Amendment violations that would otherwise be actionable under § 1983. The court does not believe that borrowing the shorter limitations periods governing employment disputes, as the Smith court did, would be appropriate here given that many enforcement petitions will arise outside the employment context. At the other extreme, the court rejects Risley’s conclusory call for a limitations period of five to ten years. While Risley contends that such a lengthy period would be consistent with the record-keeping requirements of the Chicago Police Department, that is hardly a sturdy ground on which to base a statute of limitations. A plaintiff cannot reasonably expect to be allowed to bring suit for as long as the defendant maintains the relevant records.
The allegations set forth in Risley’s complaint establish that he was on notice of the City’s investigation of him in 1996. In February of that year, he learned that his telephone records had been subpoenaed. In the early summer, he learned that a member of the Internal Affairs Department told two officers that Risley was a member of the Greek Mafia. On October 24, 1996, Risley’s wife—also a member of the Chicago Police Department—was questioned by Internal Affairs, which sought to learn whether Risley was communicating with the media and/or cooperating with a federal probe. During the questioning, she was ordered to answer questions about private conversations with Risley. Because Risley waited until October 25, 1999 to bring this action, and because the only allegation relating to his unlawful investigation claim that falls within the limitations period does not constitute a consent decree violation, the claim is time-barred.
Risley’s half-hearted attempt to invoke a “continuing violation” theory—based on the running of his license plate by a member of the Chicago Police Department on August 26, 1999 (Petition ¶ 114)—is unconvincing. “If [a plaintiff] knows or with the exercise of reasonable diligence would have known after each act that it was discriminatory and had harmed him, he may not sit back and accumulate all the discriminatory acts and sue on all within the statutory period applicable to the last one.” Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279, 282 (7th Cir.1993).
While the running of the license plate itself occurred

within the limitations period, that single allegation is insufficient to state a claim for an unlawful investigation within the meaning of the consent decree. Risley does not explain how running his license plate number was directed toward First Amendment conduct, nor how the method employed by the police in doing so violated the decree’s terms. To fall within the decree’s procedural requirements, the investigative activity must fall within one of three categories: first, it may “include the collection or handling of information about First Amendment conduct”; second, it may “have as a subject or target a person who is actively and substantially engaged in First Amendment conduct, where the investigative activity relates to that conduct”; or third, it may “interfere with First Amendment conduct.” (Consent Decree § 1.3)
*3 None of these categories apply here. First, Risley’s license plate number does not constitute information about First Amendment conduct. Second, Risley does not suggest how running his license plate relates to leaks that allegedly occurred years before. Finally, given that Risley was not even a member of the Chicago Police Department at the time, the petition fails to indicate how running his license plate interfered with his First Amendment conduct. The decree also prohibits the City from investigating a person solely because of his First Amendment conduct. (Consent Decree § 2.1) Again, Risley fails to indicate how running the license plate from his Country Club Hills Police Department vehicle in 1999 relates to the alleged Chicago Police Department leaks in 1995.
While the Magistrate Judge’s statute of limitations analysis was accurate, it was applied with too broad of a brush. Risley’s demotion occurred in August 1998. As the City itself concedes, Risley’s retaliation claim is based on conduct occurring within the two-year limitations period, and therefore is not time-barred. It does, however, suffer from a substantive flaw.
The court agrees with the Alliance plaintiffs and the ACLU that the consent decree’s requirements are not limited to investigations of conduct that is, in fact, First Amendment conduct. The decree is broader, governing investigative activity that “does or foreseeably will” include the collection of information about First Amendment conduct, target a person engaged in First Amendment conduct where the investigation relates to that conduct, or interfere with First Amendment conduct. (Consent Decree § 1.3) When it comes to Risley’s retaliation claim, however, the decree’s scope narrows. The decree provides that the City may not “disrupt, interfere with or harass any person because of the person’s First Amendment conduct.” (Consent Decree § 2.2) Significantly, the decree does not prohibit disruption, interference with or harassment based on perceived First Amendment conduct.
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Risley repeatedly alleges that the City’s investigation and retaliation was based on its mistaken belief that Risley leaked information to the media. (See Petition ¶ 2 (spying based on Risley’s perceived exercise of First Amendment rights), ¶ 70 (another officer leaked information for Southtown Economist article), ¶ 107 (City mistakenly believed Risley exercised First Amendment rights) ¶ 110 (City’s claim that Risley leaked the information leading to superintendent’s resignation was false)) Nowhere in the petition does Risley allege that the City retaliated against him for a communication with the media that actually occurred. The consent decree does not provide a remedy for City actions arising from anti-First Amendment motivations unless those actions disrupt, interfere with, or harass a person because of the person’s actual First Amendment conduct. Risley’s after-the-fact insistence

that he did engage in some First Amendment conduct by talking to the press at other times is besides the point; he alleges in his petition that the City’s retaliation was based on the leak of information relating to particular investigations, not on his general press contacts. Risley’s retaliation claim fails. This action is dismissed.
Conclusion
*4 For the above reasons, Risley’s petition to enforce the consent decree is dismissed.
	  

3

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 1367999 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Sept. 21, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, J.
*1 The Alliance plaintiffs ask the court to reconsider their entitlement to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, as amended by the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub.L. 96–481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). In its May 25, 2000 decision denying plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees against the FBI, the court relied on Judge Getzendanner’s 1985 ruling that the underlying consent decree litigation was no longer pending as of the EAJA’s effective date. (Op. at 5–6) (relying on Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295, 76 C 1982, 1985 WL 3300, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 24, 1985)). Because the case was not pending, the EAJA did not apply, and plaintiffs’ “prevailing party” status in securing the consent decree did not entitle them to attorney’s fees for the post-judgment work for which they now seek compensation.
In their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs take issue with the factual premise extracted by this court from Judge Getzendanner’s ruling. Judge Getzendanner found that, despite the fact that the statutory time period had not expired when the EAJA took effect, the case was no longer pending, reasoning that neither party had standing to appeal because the judgment was by consent decree. Plaintiffs now point out that, while the consenting plaintiffs and the federal defendants had no standing to appeal, a large group of objecting class members did have standing to appeal. Because the time for appeal did not run out until November 1, 1981, and the EAJA took effect on October 1, 1981, plaintiffs insist that the case is governed by the EAJA. The court agrees.
To the extent that Judge Getzendanner’s ruling was based on the parties’ lack of standing to appeal, it appears to

have been based on a misapprehension of the underlying facts. Because this court relied directly on Judge Getzendanner’s reasoning, the court’s denial of plaintiffs’ fee request suffers from the same deficiency. Based on the documentation submitted with plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration—along with the FBI’s failure to dispute plaintiffs’ characterization of the relevant facts—it appears that the consent decree was subject to appeal as of the EAJA’s effective date. The consent decree litigation was still pending at that time, and accordingly is governed by the EAJA’s provisions.
The FBI raises several objections to the court’s reconsideration of its May 25 decision. First, the FBI argues that plaintiffs seek an advisory opinion because “even were the Court now to conclude that Judge Getzendanner erred in deciding that the EAJA did not apply to the underlying litigation, still it would be bound by the earlier decision that treating the Alliance plaintiffs as ‘prevailing parties’ in the underlying litigation ‘would significantly alter the terms of the settlement and would be unjust within the meaning of both [42 U.S.C.] § 1988 and the EAJA.” ’ (Resp. at 4–5) (quoting 1985 WL 3300, at *10) Even assuming that the FBI’s characterization of Judge Getzendanner’s opinion is accurate, the fact that her ruling was based on alternative grounds is irrelevant to whether plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration seeks an advisory opinion. This court’s denial of plaintiffs’ fee request was based on the inapplicability of the EAJA to the underlying consent decree litigation, not on the alternative ground relied on by Judge Getzendanner. Because the motion for reconsideration challenges the validity of the ruling’s factual basis, it sufficiently challenges the ruling itself. Granting the motion for reconsideration would have a practical effect on the fee dispute because it would overturn the basis for the court’s previous denial of the fee request, regardless of whether the court subsequently denies the request on some other ground.
*2 Second, the FBI argues that the motion for reconsideration should be denied because it is a collateral attack on Judge Getzendanner’s final judgment denying them attorney’s fees. Because plaintiffs did not appeal her 1985 ruling, the FBI contends that they may not do now through their motion for reconsideration in this matter. The court rejects this reasoning. Plaintiffs’ motion is an attack on this court’s May 25 ruling, not Judge Getzendanner’s 1985 ruling. While plaintiffs challenge a factual premise that was common to both rulings—i.e., that the underlying consent decree litigation was not pending as of the EAJA’s effective date—that does not preclude plaintiffs from challenging one ruling without challenging the other. As the FBI points out, Judge Getzendanner’s ruling was not based solely on the EAJA’s inapplicability; even if she erred in that respect,
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

the ruling itself would not be invalidated.
Third, the FBI invokes the law of the case doctrine, arguing that plaintiffs “point to no new evidence, no change in the law, and admit that they considered appealing the decision in 1985, but determined not to take an appeal.” (Resp. at 9) Under these circumstances, the FBI argues that “even if the plaintiffs had presented a substantial basis for revisiting Judge Getzendanner’s decision, that ground is waived.” (Id.)
The law of the case doctrine does not block plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration under these circumstances. “As a general principle of judicial decision-making, the doctrine of the law of the case establishes a presumption that a ruling made at one stage of the proceedings will be adhered to throughout the suit.” Alston v. King, 157 F.3d 1113, 1116 (7th Cir.1998). The doctrine “is no more than a presumption, one whose strength varies with the circumstances; it is not a straightjacket.” Id. (quoting Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir.1995)). It is well-recognized that the doctrine will not stand as an obstacle to the correction of clear error. See Key v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing exception to law of the case where previous decision “was clearly erroneous”). The court finds that, in light of the objecting class members’ rights of appeal, it was clear error to conclude that no appeal was possible for purposes of determining whether the case was pending when the EAJA took effect, and that denying plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees on that ground “would work a manifest injustice.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
The court grants plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration because the factual premise underlying the court’s previous denial of plaintiffs’ fee request was inaccurate. Given that the judgment in the underlying consent decree litigation was subject to appeal as of the EAJA’s effective date, the EAJA governs the litigation. Because the Alliance plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees is based on their “prevailing party” status in that litigation, they may be entitled to fees for their post-judgment work. While the court rejected several of the FBI’s challenges to plaintiffs’ fee entitlement in its May 25 ruling, the court now turns to those left unaddressed.
*3 As explained in the previous ruling, plaintiffs base their fee request on the interplay of the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Through 28 U.S.C. § 2412, as amended by the EAJA, the United States has partially waived its sovereign immunity. The section under which plaintiffs are proceeding allows for a fee award to the prevailing party “in any civil action brought by or against the United States,” and provides that “[t]he United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides

for such an award.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Thus, if plaintiffs are otherwise entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988, the EAJA allows them, at least in theory, to recover such fees from the FBI.
Section 1988 provides that in an action to enforce various statutory provisions, including § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The FBI argues that “fees are available under § 1988 only if a plaintiff prevails on his claim under one of the predicate sections—42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1985” (Resp. at 10), and that plaintiffs did not do so because they failed to establish a violation of one of the predicate sections. While plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy between the FBI and City of Chicago, the FBI contends that they “did not prevail on any claim of a conspiracy to employ State or local authority; the Agreement does not discuss or limit in any way the FBI’s activities in cooperation with the Chicago Police Department.” (Id.)
The fact that the consent decree does not specifically address the factual premise of the underlying § 1983 claim does not mean that plaintiffs did not prevail on that claim. The complaint that gave rise to the consent decree alleged that federal officials acted in conspiracy with state officials under the color of state law. In denying the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court held that such an allegation stated a claim under § 1983. See American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 431 F.Supp. 25, 31 (N.D. Ill 1976).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff may be considered a “prevailing party” for purposes of fee recovery under § 1988 “if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A plaintiff can “meet this test without having received a final judgment in its favor.” Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 716 F.2d 915, 919 (D.C.Cir.1983). As the Supreme Court has explained:
The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have been violated. Moreover, the Senate Report expressly stated that “for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.”
*4 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (quoting S.Rep. No. 94–1011, p. 5 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, pp. 5908, 5912).
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Plaintiffs clearly succeeded in obtaining benefit through the underlying litigation, as the consent decree’s provisions “substantially accomplish the central purposes of these class actions against the FBI and Justice Department defendants, in that they articulate legally enforceable prohibitions on FBI investigations and investigative techniques.” Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182, 197 (N.D.Ill.1981). These prohibitions govern all FBI investigations in Chicago—whether undertaken by the FBI alone or in conjunction with city or state officials. The fact that the decree does not carve out a separate regulatory scheme addressing cooperative actions between the FBI and city or state officials does not mean that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims can be disregarded for purposes of fee recovery. The court finds that, by virtue of the consent decree, the Alliance plaintiffs are “prevailing parties” under § 1988 and the EAJA.
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (7th Cir.1984), aff’d sub nom. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985), does not preclude plaintiffs’ fee recovery. The Saxner court simply recognized that where a plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees under § 1988 and the EAJA for prevailing on a § 1983 claim, the court may not overlook § 1983’s “acting under color of state law” requirement. Id. at 673. The plaintiffs had urged that “attorneys’ fees should be allowed under color of federal as well as state law”—a proposition which the court sensibly rejected. Id. As noted above, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the federal defendants—in conspiracy with state officials—acted under color of state law.
The fact that plaintiffs seek their fees for post-judgment work, rather than the work on which they prevailed in the first place, also is not an obstacle to recovery. As the Supreme Court has recognized, under § 1988, “post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree is a compensable activity for which counsel is entitled to a reasonable fee.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 559 (1986).
In this regard, Judge Getzendanner’s 1985 rejection of plaintiffs’ fee request under the FBI consent decree has limited relevance to their current fee request. As explained above, the first ground on which Judge Getzendanner’s ruling was based—that the consent decree

litigation was not pending when the EAJA took effect—was erroneous. As for the second ground, Judge Getzendanner’s finding that “the government in settling reasonably understood the plaintiffs to be giving up their claims for fees,” 1985 WL 3300, at *9, does not suggest that plaintiffs waived their rights to fees for post-judgment monitoring. See Eirhart v. Libbey–Owens–Ford Co., 996 F.2d 846, 849–50 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that letter agreement waived existing attorney’s fees obligations, but if it “was meant to release future attorneys’ fees it should have included unequivocal language to that effect”).
*5 The FBI’s attempt to limit post-judgment monitoring to a five-year period also fails. The provision relied on by the FBI simply provides that plaintiffs would be entitled to inspect certain reports for a period of five years after the consent decree is entered. (Consent Decree § 5.3) The provision does not establish any sort of a cut-off for plaintiffs’ monitoring activities.
That said, the court will not treat plaintiffs’ entitlement to reasonable and necessary monitoring fees as a mandate for blanket reimbursement of all fees that are somehow related to the consent decree. At the same time, plaintiffs’ right to fees is not restricted to enforcement petitions on which they are successful. Because the parties have not addressed the reasonableness and necessity of the fees sought by plaintiffs, the court cannot determine the proper award without further briefing. The court cautions plaintiffs not to request fees for work that is duplicative of work done by the ACLU, nor for monitoring the ACLU’s work in the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. The court does not believe that reasonable and necessary monitoring includes such work.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Alliance plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is granted. The Alliance Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Fees Motion for Monitoring Compliance With FBI Consent Decree is granted. Plaintiffs are to submit a breakdown of reasonable and necessary monitoring fees by October 6, 2000, and any objections by the FBI to the amounts claimed are due by October 20, 2000.
	  

3

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 1947055 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Nov. 2, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, J.
*1 After establishing their entitlement to attorneys’ fees, see Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295, 2000 WL 1367999 (N.D.Ill. Sep. 21, 2000); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Nos. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295, 2000 WL 709482 (N.D.Ill. May 26, 2000), the Alliance plaintiffs have submitted a breakdown of the fees they believe are recoverable. In addition to challenging the amount of attorneys’ fees sought by plaintiffs, the FBI argues once again that plaintiffs are not entitled to any fees whatsoever. The FBI contends that the fee petition is untimely under Local Rule 54.3(b), which provides that a fee motion “shall be filed and served no later than 90 days after the entry of the judgment or settlement agreement on which the motion is founded.” According to the FBI, the judgment or settlement on which plaintiffs’ fee petition is founded “is indisputably the February 17, 1995 Stipulation and Order resolving the ACLU’s enforcement petition.” (Resp. at 4) Because the fee petition was not filed until April 11, 1996, the FBI contends that it is untimely.
The court has already rejected this argument once, ruling that the fee request is not untimely because it is based on plaintiffs’ status as a prevailing party in the underlying consent decree litigation and their monitoring of compliance with that decree, not on the settlement reached in the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. The FBI asserts that “the Local Rule does not focus on the status of the party requesting fees, or on the basis of the fee request. Rather, it provides a time limit based on the termination of the proceeding on which the fee request is based.” (Resp. at 5) According to the FBI, plaintiffs concede in their original motion for fees that their claim is based on the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. In

reality, the portion of the brief cited by the FBI merely states that the Alliance plaintiffs “are now seeking attorney’s fees for monitoring the FBI’s compliance with the consent decree as to two matters”—the Arab–American enforcement proceeding and the litigation resulting from the FBI’s refusal to serve the Alliance plaintiffs with pleadings in the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. (Fee Motion at 2) There is nothing to suggest that plaintiffs seek fees for their success in the Arab–American enforcement proceeding, rather than for monitoring work stemming from their success in the consent decree litigation. Because the fee request is based not on a judgment or settlement, but on post-judgment monitoring work, Local Rule 54.3(b) does not govern.
The court also finds no basis for the FBI’s fear that plaintiffs “could now request fees for work performed years ago,” and that a fee recovery here “would only encourage their counsel to parse the record of two decades for enforcement petitions on which he could base claims for fees.” (Resp. at 5) Such a strategy would find a substantial obstacle in the doctrine of laches. That said, the FBI’s conclusory suggestion that laches bars the current fee petition is unconvincing, as no attempt has been made to establish an unreasonable lack of diligence or resulting prejudice. See Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir.1999).
*2 The FBI next argues that plaintiffs have failed to show that the work for which they seek compensation was reasonably necessary to the achievement of benefits sought under the consent decree. The FBI contends that plaintiffs’ submissions—listing the hours worked, the general category of the hours, and a brief description of the work—does not allow the court to determine whether the work was part of reasonable monitoring efforts. The court agrees that plaintiffs have not established the compensability of some of their requested fees. For other fees, however, the court finds plaintiffs’ descriptions to be sufficient.
The first fee category stems from the FBI’s refusal to serve the Alliance plaintiffs with pleadings in the Arab–American enforcement proceeding. The court has recognized that the Alliance plaintiffs—as signatories to the consent decree—are to be considered parties to every enforcement action brought under the decree. Being provided with copies of court pleadings regarding the consent decree is a fundamental requirement for effective monitoring of consent decree compliance. While the court will not reimburse the Alliance plaintiffs for work that duplicates the ACLU’s work, that does not mean that they can be cut off from all knowledge of decree-related disputes. Given that their own rights to service were at issue, it would not have made sense for the Alliance
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

plaintiffs to defer to the ACLU in pressing this issue; further, judging from their submission of two different proposed service orders, the plaintiff groups did not hold identical views on the matter. Ensuring their rights to service—through the court’s eventual adoption of their proposed standing order on service—was reasonably necessary to securing the benefits of the consent decree, and the resulting fees are recoverable.
The fees sought for work relating to the Arab–American enforcement proceeding are more problematic. The bulk of plaintiffs’ work in that proceeding relates to their filing of a response to the FBI’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. The objections were never ruled on because the ACLU and FBI settled the matter after the Magistrate Judge’s report was issued. Plaintiffs fail to indicate whether the settlement came before the response brief was filed; if it did, the Alliance plaintiffs should have inquired as to whether the dispute was still live before submitting a response. Given that the ACLU did not file a response brief, it seems likely that settlement had already been reached when the Alliance plaintiffs submitted their response. If the ACLU refused to answer the Alliance plaintiffs’ inquiries about the dispute, then perhaps plaintiffs were justified in their ignorance of the settlement. Because they give no basis on which the court could reach that conclusion, however, the court cannot find that their response brief was reasonable and necessary.
Plaintiffs’ other work related to the Arab–American enforcement proceeding consists generally of “studying” papers prepared by the ACLU, the FBI, and the court. While the court readily acknowledges that counsel for the Alliance plaintiffs should make an effort to keep abreast of disputes related to the consent decree, the court does not believe that the FBI must bear the financial burden of those efforts. Under plaintiffs’ approach, the FBI would pay whenever plaintiffs’ counsel decides to read a brief relating to an enforcement action, regardless of whether plaintiffs even have a direct role in that action. The FBI must pay for plaintiffs’ reasonable and necessary costs of monitoring actual compliance, but not for the costs of keeping abreast of disputes about allegations of non-compliance. In this regard, there is a crucial distinction between the fees sought for the service dispute and the fees sought for reviewing pleadings in the Arab–American action: in the former case, the FBI was attempting to prevent plaintiffs from gaining knowledge of non-compliance allegations; in the latter case, plaintiffs were simply reviewing those allegations.
*3 The last category of fees sought stems from work related to the instant fee dispute. Given the tortuous route of this fee petition, these fees have ballooned to an extent that they now dwarf the amounts sought for the underlying work. Plaintiffs’ initial fee request was only $19,371.40 representing 71.62 hours of work: 35.03 hours

winning the service order, 31.66 hours “regarding” the Arab–American enforcement proceeding, 4.93 hours for the fee petition, and $34 in expenses. After years of litigating the issue, the amount requested now stands at over $85,000. That is not to say that the FBI’s opposition to the fee request renders it entirely blameworthy. As shown above, a significant portion of the fee request was, in this court’s view, unrecoverable.
While hours worked in pursuit of recoverable fees are themselves recoverable, the substance of plaintiffs’ fee breakdown is skewed far too heavily toward hours related to the fee dispute, rather than hours spent ensuring compliance with the consent decree. The court does not find it appropriate under the circumstances to award $67,000 for hours spent pursuing $9,000 in recoverable fees. At the same time, plaintiffs cannot reasonably be expected to bear the entire cost of the FBI’s intransigence. Given the degree of merit to the fee petition and the opposition presented by the FBI, the court finds that one-half of the hours worked on the fee recovery are compensable.
The FBI also contends that the hourly rate of compensation sought by plaintiffs’ counsel is excessive, and argues that the rate must be “based on evidence of actual fees charged to actual clients, or of rates similarly experienced attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar services.” (Resp. at 9) Plaintiffs have requested compensation using an hourly rate calculated under a framework previously approved in this litigation by Judge Williams. Given the complexity and scope of this litigation, the court believes the existing framework’s reliance on rates charged by partners at large Chicago law firms is suitable for determining the recoverable hourly rate. Given counsel’s expertise and experience, the court finds that the requested hourly rates—ranging from $250 in 1994 and 1995 to $320 in 1999 and 2000—are entirely reasonable. The court is not convinced that the established framework needs to be abandoned at this stage of the litigation, and will calculate plaintiffs’ fee recovery based on the requested rates.
In total, the court awards the Alliance plaintiffs $43,644.93 in attorneys’ fees. This amount consists of $34,162.48 for 108.78 hours of work performed by Richard Gutman on the fee recovery (1.25 hours at $250 per hour (1994–95), 9.935 hours at $265 per hour (1996), .33 hours at $280 per hour (1997), and 97.265 hours at $320 per hour (1999–2000)); $9106.20 for 36.41 hours of work performed by Gutman related to the litigation over service; and $376.25 for work done by Lawrence Jackowiak related to the fee dispute (one-half of the 4.3 hours claimed at $175 per hour). The court rejects plaintiffs’ request for $267.85 in expenses, as there has been no showing that the costs were necessary to monitoring compliance with the decree.
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Conclusion *4 For the above reasons, the Alliance plaintiffs are

awarded $43,644.93 in attorneys’ fees for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the FBI consent decree.
	  

3

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

2000 WL 1898594 United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268, 75 C 3295. | Dec. 22, 2000.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GOTTSCHALL, District J.
Background
*1 The court conducted a four-day bench trial regarding several of the claims raised in an enforcement petition filed by plaintiffs CounterMedia, Active Resistance Organizing Committee, Autonomous Zone, and the Alliance named plaintiffs. The petition was filed under a consent decree entered into nearly twenty years ago by the City of Chicago, the ACLU, and the Alliance plaintiffs. The consent decree stems from two prior class action suits in which a number of organizations claimed that the City and its agents violated their First Amendment rights through various investigative practices. The consent decree provides extensive regulations intended to govern the City’s investigation of First Amendment conduct by organizations and individuals in Chicago. It also prohibits harassment of, disruption of, or interference with persons because of their First Amendment conduct.
In the enforcement petition, plaintiffs claim that the City, through the Chicago Police Department, committed various violations of the consent decree during and around the time of the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago in August 1996. Plaintiffs were involved in various political demonstrations, workshops, and rallies around the time of the DNC. The Autonomous Zone is a collective, community activist center located in Chicago. CounterMedia is a coalition of media groups, political organizations and individuals which provided coverage of the DNC. Active Resistance Organizing Committee is a coalition of activists and organizations which organized the Active Resistance

CounterConvention. The CounterConvention took place in Chicago in August 1996, partially overlapping with the DNC. Approximately 700 participants attended. The CounterConvention’s two principal locations—the “Ballroom” and the “Spice Factory”—were both located within one mile of the United Center, where the DNC took place.
The court previously ruled that the City was entitled to summary judgment on the majority of claims raised in the petition. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, No. 74 C 3268, 2000 WL 562480 (N.D.Ill. May 8, 2000). The only allegations that survived summary judgment and proceeded to trial concern: 1) a police raid on the Ballroom; 2) improper police interrogations of Kristian Williams, Julia Moon–Sparrow, and Carla West; 3) the destruction of Stephane Luchini’s film during a police search of the CounterMedia van; 4) the destruction of Lee Wells’ film while he was held at the police station; 5) the ransacking by police of a van belonging to the Shundahai Network. A more detailed discussion of these allegations is set forth in the court’s summary judgment ruling.
Analysis
In its summary judgment ruling, this court determined that—in keeping with binding Seventh Circuit precedent—plaintiffs must prove violations of the consent decree by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at *5. This poses a significant hurdle which must be overcome:
*2 Clear and convincing evidence has been various[ly] defined as: evidence which leaves the “mind well satisfied that the allegations are true” ... evidence which “strike[s] all minds alike as being unquestionable” ... evidence which “lead[s] to but one conclusion” ... “more than a preponderance while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense” ... proof which leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact.
Taylor v. Midwestern Distribution, Inc., No. 88 C 5045, 1993 WL 243182, at *8 (N.D.Ill. Jun. 30, 1993) (citations omitted). Although plaintiffs made a credible showing in supporting their allegations with eyewitness testimony, the evidence ultimately falls short of the “clear and convincing” standard on which this court must base any finding of a consent decree violation. The court will address each category of alleged violation in turn.
The Raid on the Ballroom
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

According to plaintiffs’ witnesses, during the evening of Thursday, August 29, 1996—the last night of the DNC—between five and twelve police officers entered the Ballroom from the rear of the building. The officers forced those who were outside the building to sit down on the ground, then searched the Ballroom. One officer picked up a file folder and—without looking at its contents—proclaimed the documents “subversive to the government of the United States.” (Trial Tr. at 57) The officers pepper-sprayed two individuals—one when they arrived (Lynn Harrington) and one who tried to follow them as they left (Alexander Sakulich). When the officers left, they took with them a cell phone, a radio, a boom box, and the folder of papers, all of which belonged to CounterConvention participants.

The court agrees with plaintiffs’ framing of the inquiry into the Ballroom raid as “not whether it happened, but rather the organizational identify of the raiders.” (Pls.’ Closing at 4) For the most part, the court found the eyewitnesses to the raid to be credible and entirely reasonable in their recitation of what happened on the night in question. However, while that testimony does establish that some sort of raid took place, it is not clear and convincing evidence that members of the Chicago Police Department were responsible for it.

The City seeks to cast doubt on the credibility of

plaintiffs’ witnesses by asking the court to recognize that

they “shared a common, overriding trait: a deep-seeded

distrust and resentment for the Chicago Police

Department.” (City’s Closing at 3) Part of this mindset,

according to the City, is reflected in the

CounterConvention’s very nature. It was a “conference of

radicals,” and was “aimed at a wide range of

antiauthoritarian activities.” (Id.) The City contends that

the evidence shows that plaintiffs’ witnesses “had an

overwhelming,

irrational

distrust—indeed

paranoia—about the Chicago Police Department.” (Id.)

The City argues that this paranoia expressed itself in

several ways, including the belief of CounterConvention

participants that the police activity in the area was

focused on their activities, rather than the nearby DNC,

and their expectation of a police raid even before the raid

actually occurred.

*3 The court believes that the City’s portrayal of the witnesses’ bias is, for the most part, overstated. Certainly the CounterConvention attracted participants whose political beliefs are not within the mainstream, and whose chosen forms of public advocacy may bring them into confrontation with the police from time to time. Given their anti-authoritarian leanings, it might even be true that plaintiffs’ witnesses harbored a certain degree of suspicion toward the Chicago police before the CounterConvention began. Nevertheless, to the extent that the City contends that the presumed predisposition of plaintiffs’ witnesses warrants some sort of discount to the

credibility of their testimony, the City goes too far. The court assigns credibility to a witness’s testimony based on first-hand observation of the witness on the stand and an evaluation of the testimony’s substance in the context of the evidence as a whole.
In this case, there is no indication that CounterConvention participants fabricated their testimony about the raid—if they had, they presumably would have ironed out the ambiguities and uncertainties that hinder plaintiffs’ effort to establish the CPD’s liability. Judging from the witnesses’ appearance, demeanor, and matter-of-fact narration of the raid, the court believes that they generally were telling the truth. That said, the substance of the testimony is not sufficient to clear plaintiffs’ evidentiary hurdle.
Plaintiffs point out that six eyewitnesses “all testified that they recognized the raiders as Chicago police officers.” (Pls.’ Closing at 4–5) Four testified at trial, and two others during their depositions. Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the witnesses had lived in Chicago for some time, highlighting that one had lived in Chicago for 11 years and another for 13 years. Presumably plaintiffs believe that this renders them well-qualified to opine on the appearance of Chicago police officers. While the court places great emphasis on the witnesses’ substantive observations the night of the raid, the witnesses’ conclusory statements as to the raiders’ identity are less helpful.
In a limited sense, the possibility of bias raised by the City may be relevant to this conclusory aspect of the witnesses’ testimony. While the court does not believe that any of plaintiffs’ witnesses fabricated their testimony about what they observed during the raid, the conclusions drawn from what they observed may have been affected by a predisposition to expect police aggression. In that regard, the court focuses on the substance of the witnesses’ observations—i.e., the raiders’ appearances—rather than the conclusory statements made by the witnesses about those observations: that the raiders were Chicago police officers. If a witness’s description of a raider’s uniform is inconsistent with CPD uniforms, it matters little if the witness herself concluded that the raider was a Chicago police officer—regardless of how long she had lived in Chicago at the time of the raid.
*4 CounterConvention participant Dan Whitmore testified that he recognized one of the raiders from the Festival of the Oppressed, where the raider was smoking a cigar and talking with higher-ranked police officers. Assistant Deputy Superintendant Thomas Folliard cast doubt on this testimony, claiming that he would not permit officers to smoke while accompanying marches, and Commander Francis Kehoe testified that there is a police department policy against smoking. According to plaintiffs, a videotape of the CounterMedia van’s initial search shows
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

a white-shirted police officer smoking a cigarette as he entered the van, and that he did so in the presence of Folliard and Deputy Chief Frank Radke.
The court certainly believes that it is possible that Whitmore saw a police officer smoking a cigar during the Festival of the Oppressed, either because the officer disregarded the police policy or because no such policy exists in any meaningful way. This does not cast doubt on Folliard’s expressed displeasure toward the prospect of an officer smoking during a march, but simply shows that his expressed displeasure did not translate into a fully enforced, blanket ban of smoking by officers during marches. In any event, assuming that Whitmore believed that he recognized the cigar-smoking raider as the cigar-smoking officer from the march, his subjective belief is not clear and convincing evidence that they were in fact the same person, especially given his failure to recall seeing CPD patches on the raiders’ uniforms and his description of an officer’s bulletproof vest that does not match vests approved by the CPD, as well as the shortcomings of the other CounterConvention participants’ testimony, discussed below.
Michelle Xenos testified at trial that raiders who remained outside the building identified themselves as Chicago police officers. Xenos did not mention this at her deposition even though she was questioned extensively as to how she knew that the raiders were from the CPD. Her failure to mention such a crucial fact at her deposition gives the court pause in weighing her trial testimony. Xenos did not mention seeing any CPD patches on the officers’ uniforms.
Alexander Sakulich did not testify at trial, but during his deposition he stated that the raiders wore “blue shirts with an emblem on both sides, both shoulders.” (Sakulich Dep. at 57) He stated that he saw “what looked like Chicago Police Department with the seal on it” on the shoulders of their shirts. (Id. at 59) Given that Sakulich did not take the stand at trial, the court did not have the opportunity to evaluate his credibility as a witness. The City argues that Sakulich’s willingness to fabricate testimony is shown by his claim to have seen an officer exit the back of the CounterMedia van carrying two strips of film that had been pulled out of a camera. The videotape of the incident showed that the officers carried only a police hat. The court cannot say whether Sakulich lied about that incident—he may have mistaken the black hat for black strips of film, or there may have been another officer that eluded the video camera.
*5 Even so, Sakulich’s deposition statements about the raiders’ patches are not enough to carry the day for plaintiffs. Sakulich also described in considerable detail the “tonfas” that were carried by the raiders. The City established that CPD officers do not carry such weapons. In light of the other discrepancies discussed below, the

court is not prepared to label Sakulich’s deposition testimony as “clear and convincing” proof of the raiders’ identities.
At trial, Lynda White testified that the raiders’ uniforms had Chicago police patches on the sleeves. Two months after the raid, White told Sergeant Joseph Fivelson—who was conducting the CPD’s internal investigation of the incident—that none of the raiders’ uniforms had badges or name tags, but they did have Chicago Police Department patches, as reflected in Fivelson’s report dated October 25, 1996. (City’s Exh. 22) At her deposition, however, she was directly asked whether the raiders had patches on their shirts, and she responded that she did not recall. (Trial Tr. at 41) In a previously filed affidavit, she also failed to mention that the raiders’ shirts had patches. (Id. at 45)
The court must weigh White’s testimony regarding the CPD patches against her failure to recall that fact at her deposition, as well as the claims raised in her other testimony. White testified that she was followed by the police on her way to the grocery store before the raid, and that after the raid, she was sufficiently frightened by a police presence outside her home that she climbed up her building’s fire escape instead of using the door. Given the huge police presence in the area of the Ballroom on the night of the raid, it is hardly shocking that there was a police car behind White as she drove from the Ballroom to the store. As for her trip home, she could not reasonably have believed that the police presence near her home was targeting her, as she lived along a major thoroughfare leading to the DNC. Certainly White may have been shaken by the events of the evening when she chose to climb up the fire escape, and the court does not mean to belittle her fear, whatever its foundation. However, given the plaintiffs’ general lack of supporting evidence other than their witnesses’ testimony, the mindset of those witnesses is highly relevant. The court believes that White’s behavior suggests that she expected that she would be victimized by the police. Regardless of whether her expectation had a legitimate basis, the court cannot simply accept her testimony regarding the patches at face value, but must consider it within plaintiffs’ broader evidentiary showing. Standing alone, White’s testimony is not clear and convincing evidence that the CPD carried out the Ballroom raid.
Miles Mendenhall testified at trial that he does not “have any clear memory of whether they had patches or not.” (Id. at 93) According to Sergeant Fivelson’s report of his conversation with Mendenhall, Mendenhall told him “that the officers who responded had removed stars, name plates and even patches from their blue shirts. He stated that he was looking for the patches as a way of identifying them and noticed that all of them were removed.” (City’s Exh. 24 at 6) Plaintiffs argue that Mendenhall’s testimony was misinterpreted by Fivelson. Because “CPD patches
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

do not identify subjects,” plaintiffs insist that Fivelson misunderstood Mendenhall, who in reality had “been referring to name tags and badge numbers, not CPD patches.” (Pls.’ Closing at 5 n. 1) Plaintiffs refer to no record support for the argument that Mendenhall was referring to name tags and badge numbers, but not patches.
*6 Mendenhall’s failure to see patches—and other witnesses’ failure to remember whether patches were on the uniforms or not—is damaging to plaintiffs’ case. It is highly unlikely that uniformed CPD officers would not be wearing patches on their sleeves. As Officer Mike Jetel demonstrated to the court, the patches are sewn onto the sleeves of officers’ shirts, and can be removed only by being ripped off the sleeve, which would deface the fabric.
There are other inconsistencies between the witnesses’ descriptions of the raiders and the actual appearance of a uniformed CPD officer:
• Xenos testified at her deposition that the raiders’ uniforms were “dark and solid color.” (Trial Tr. at 154) At trial, by contrast, she stated that her memory was refreshed by recently seeing Chicago police officers again, and that she would not characterize their shirts as dark. She also admitted that she did not get a good look at the raiders. At best, Xenos is uncertain as to what she saw on the night of the raid. At worst, her attempt at trial to revise her deposition testimony suggests a desire to make her description of the uniforms fit a preconceived conclusion as to the raiders’ identity. Either way, she does not help plaintiffs link the raid to the CPD.
• White testified at trial that she saw a dark seam on the raiders’ pants, when at her deposition she stated that the pants had a stripe. Either way, the description is inconsistent with CPD pants, which have no stripe or dark seam.
• Sakulich testified that several of the raiders were carrying “tonfas,” which are martial art batons with handles on their sides. In fact, CPD officers do not carry such weapons; the batons they carry do not have any side-handles.
• On the night of the raid, Lynn Harrington told medical personnel that she had been pepper-sprayed by plain-clothes police. (Pls.’ Exh. 4) The other witnesses’ testimony is explicit that the raiders were wearing police uniforms.
• Whitmore testified that one of the raiders wore a dark blue or black bulletproof vest. The CPD dress code requires bulletproof vests to match the color of the officers’ shirt—i.e., light blue or white.

In its summary judgment ruling, the court allowed this claim to proceed to trial notwithstanding the conflicting descriptions of the raiders’ appearances. The court reasoned that under the stress and excitement of a police raid, it would be understandable for the details of witnesses’ observations to diverge to some extent. After hearing the evidence at trial, however, these inconsistencies have become more problematic to the extent that they differ not only from other witnesses’ descriptions, but also from the actual appearance of CPD uniforms. Moreover, the problem of reconciling inconsistencies on the plaintiffs’ side, in the face of their high evidentiary burden, is exacerbated by the fact that the court finds the testimony of CPD supervisors and officers in the area that night to be extremely credible.
*7 In order to accept the CounterConvention participants’ version of the story, the court would have to believe that a group of CPD officers left their assigned posts, ripped off their CPD patches, removed their stars and badges, obtained non-CPD weapons and at least one non-CPD bulletproof vest, then walked along railroad tracks to carry out a senseless and blatantly unlawful raid on a peaceful political gathering. Alternatively, the court would have to accept the broad contours of the story—that a group of uniformed officers carried out the raid—while disregarding those aspects of the eyewitnesses’ descriptions which suggest that the raiders could not have been affiliated with the CPD. Either way, the court does not confront proof that “strike[s] all minds alike as being unquestionable.” Taylor, 1993 WL 243182, at *8 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs also offer what they consider to be circumstantial evidence of the raiders’ identities. White testified that she was followed by Chicago police officers before the raid as she drove to the store and after the raid as she drove home. The court addressed these allegations in its summary judgment ruling and found them lacking, given that White was driving in an area with a huge DNC-related police presence. See Alliance to End Repression, 2000 WL 562480, at *16. For the same reason, the court is not persuaded that White’s allegations warrant the conclusion that Chicago police officers were responsible for the Ballroom raid.
White also told Fivelson that the raiders carried canisters that looked like small fire extinguishers. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that during the DNC, the CPD distributed 200 small gas canisters to officers. At most, this evidence shows that White’s statement to Fivelson was consistent with the raiders being CPD officers. Certainly not all CPD officers carried such canisters during the DNC, nor is there any indication that such canisters are carried only by CPD officers. This is indeed circumstantial evidence of the raiders’ identity, but it is not especially probative, much less clear and convincing.
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Plaintiffs repeatedly highlight the “massive numbers of Chicago police officers [who] were in the vicinity of the Ballroom during the raid.” (Pls.’ Closing at 6) Deputy Chief Radke testified that on the night of the raid, he directed police to wait within a staging area made up of boundaries one block north, one block south, four blocks east, and four blocks west of the Ballroom. Assistant Deputy Superintendant Folliard testified that four or five platoons were stationed there, with 38 officers per platoon. Thus, 152 to 190 police officers were at a staging area that had the Ballroom “at its very center.” (Id. at 7)
Plaintiffs claim that the CPD’s “purported reason for being in the vicinity of the Ballroom on the evening of August 29, 1996 is suspect.” (Id.) Plaintiffs dispute the CPD’s claim that officers were stationed there in case they were needed at the United Center, arguing that other designated staging areas were closer to the United Center. Plaintiffs overlook the evidence that other platoons of officers were already stationed at those other staging areas. The platoons that were moved to the vicinity of the Ballroom had been stationed at other areas in the City, but by Thursday night, there were no events requiring a large police presence other than at the United Center. Deputy Chief Radke testified that the vicinity of the Ballroom was chosen because, as primarily an industrial area, officers could be kept out of public view but still be close enough to the United Center to respond quickly if needed. The court finds nothing suspect about the CPD’s strategic decision to move officers to the area around the Ballroom on the night of the raid.
*8 Suspect or not, plaintiffs argue that the presence of a large number of Chicago police officers near the Ballroom is significant for two reasons: first, “it makes it extremely unlikely that any other group is guilty of the raid,” and second, “it puts a large number of Chicago police officers at the scene of the crime at the time of the crime and thus, in itself, makes them suspects.” (Id. at 8)
The court agrees that the large police presence in the area makes it less likely that a non-CPD group could have carried out the raid undetected. It does not, however, make it impossible. The fact that the raiders came and left via the railroad tracks behind the Ballroom, rather than entering from the street through the front door, could have allowed the raiders to conduct their mission without encountering any CPD officers. Commander Kehoe testified that his officers were waiting in their vans one and one-half blocks from the Ballroom; it is not as if they had established a security perimeter around the Ballroom itself. In any event, plaintiffs’ burden is to show by clear and convincing evidence that the City is responsible for the raid, not simply that other groups are less likely to have pulled it off successfully.
The court also agrees that the CPD’s presence in the area

makes it a possible source of the raiders; this was one factor underlying the court’s decision to allow the claim to proceed to trial. However, the CPD’s mere presence in the area is not clear and convincing evidence that the CPD is responsible for the raid. In fact, it makes it less likely that the raid could have occurred without any of the CPD supervisors in the area being aware of it. Commander Kehoe testified that the officers were under direct orders to stay with the police vans so that they could be dispatched at a moment’s notice. For five to twelve officers to wander away from the vans to conduct an unauthorized raid surely would have attracted someone’s attention. There is no evidence that any CPD officers or supervisors who were in the area of the Ballroom that night were aware of any wayward officers. While it is conceivable that the City’s witnesses are lying, the court finds no reason to believe that such is the case. Nor does it find anything in the record that would support a finding of a widespread CPD cover-up.
Plaintiffs attempt to cast suspicion through their witnesses’ testimony that after the raid on the Ballroom, the CPD vehicles parked near the Ballroom were no longer there, and that the police massed near the CounterConvention’s other facility, the Spice Factory. The police were not required to remain at the staging area for the entire night. As soon as the DNC’s activities ended at the United Center, they were released to go home. The court does not know if or why they would gather near the Spice Factory, but there is no evidence that any raid occurred there. More broadly, this evidence supports the theory that the entire force of police massed near the Ballroom was somehow involved—or at least complicit—in the raid. Absent a cover-up of staggering proportion, it is not possible that there would be no evidentiary trace within the CPD of such a large and widely known operation.
*9 According to plaintiffs, no other police group could have carried out the raid. As for the Chicago Housing Authority police, plaintiffs ask the court to take judicial notice of a newspaper article describing that police force as largely African–American. The court declines to take judicial notice of the racial composition of the CHA police on the basis of a conclusory statement in a newspaper article that was never entered into evidence. That said, the court finds it highly improbable that the CHA police were responsible for the raid. The Ballroom is not on CHA property, nor has the City pointed to any conceivable motivation for the CHA police to leave their jurisdiction and randomly raid a political convention.
The City focuses on the Union Pacific Railroad police as the most likely source of the raiders, given the Ballroom’s proximity to railroad tracks and the similarity between the UP and CPD uniforms. Union Pacific Police Regional Manager Dale Hahne testified that the UP police force consisted of between 20 and 25 officers at the time of the
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

DNC, but that all but three officers were assigned to drive corporate executives or provide protection at various functions hosted by Union Pacific during the DNC. The City points out that Hahne did not specify where each of his officers was on the night of the raid. Hahne’s testimony establishes that the UP police uniforms are similar to the CPD uniforms, but that only officers stationed in the Chicago passenger terminal are required to wear the uniform. He also stated that the officers do not carry tear gas canisters.
The testimony of the CounterConvention participants suggests that the raid had some connection with the railroad tracks behind the Ballroom. Mendenhall testified that the raiders told him they “had a call from the railroad company complaining about people being on the tracks, and that’s why we have come.” (Trial Tr. at 90) Whitmore testified that one of the raiders told him that “we had illegally entered the building from railroad property, and that they were—so they had come in pursuit of us.” (Id. at 55) Xenos testified that the raiders “said that they were there investigating somebody who had allegedly hopped a freight train or hopped a train from that location.” (Id. at 146) Sakulich testified that when he attempted to follow the raiders as they left the Ballroom, they told him that he was trespassing on railroad property. While the court is by no means convinced that the UP police carried out the raid, the court must acknowledge that it is possible for them to have done so. That alone poses a formidable obstacle to plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy their evidentiary burden.
While the City relies on the above testimony of Whitmore, Mendenhall, Xenos and Sakulich to conclude that the UP police carried out the raid, plaintiffs rely on the same testimony to conclude that the CPD was responsible. Plaintiffs’ theory finds support in Hahne’s testimony, who stated that he called the CPD’s 13th District on the day before the raid after some children told him that a group of people camping near the railroad tracks had a van with a sign that said something like “Kill the President.” Hahne did not indicate what he specifically told the 13th District personnel. The City contends that there is no evidence that such a call was received or subsequently investigated.
*10 Even assuming that Hahne did report a possible trespass to the CPD, it requires a leap in logic to conclude that Hahne’s call sparked the Ballroom raid. If Hahne told the CPD about a sign threatening the President, who happened to be coming into town, presumably the CPD would not wait until the following night, after the President’s arrival, to investigate. If Hahne simply reported a potential trespass by campers, the CPD presumably would send only an officer or two to investigate, especially during a labor-intensive event such as the DNC. It would make no sense for the CPD to respond to such a call by committing five to twelve

officers to launch an all-out raid of the building at the site of the alleged trespass, pepper-spraying those outside the building, and stealing personal belongings of the building’s occupants. Whether Hahne reported the threatening sign and/or the trespass, there would be no reason for the CPD to enter and exit through the rear of the Ballroom, walking along railroad tracks, instead of driving their vehicles to the Ballroom’s front door. If the CPD acted on Hahne’s call, it would have been a legitimate police investigation; plaintiffs’ allegations suggest anything but a legitimate police investigation.
Further, if the CPD action was carried out pursuant to Hahne’s phone call, there would be some trace of the action within the CPD. For there to be no documentary record of such an operation would require a cover-up of considerable scope and brashness. Absent some type of supporting evidence, the court cannot presume a cover-up based simply on the fact that the CPD has no record of the event in question. To do so would force the City to prove a negative—i.e ., proving that the lack of documentary evidence of the raid stems from the fact that the CPD did not conduct such a raid, not from a subsequent cover-up. The consent decree does not warrant such a burden. While the court agrees the CPD’s internal investigation of the raid was far from satisfactory, it evidences, at most, a lack of diligence by Fivelson, not a broader or more nefarious scheme by the CPD.
Plaintiffs also purport to find a motive for the raid in the CPD’s “long history of spying upon and harassing liberals and radicals.” (Pls.’ Closing at 9) But there is no foundation in this record for implying guilt based on the CPD’s past misdeeds. On the contrary, the court was impressed at trial with the CPD hierarchy’s awareness of the consent decree, as well as a noticeable concern for its requirements. Based on the City’s witnesses at trial, the court has seen nothing to suggest that the CPD—ranging from the upper echelons of the Department down to the patrol officers—has given short shrift to their obligations under the consent decree. The CPD appears to have made a significant effort to distance itself from the infamous “Red Squad” days, both in mindset and in practice.
But plaintiffs’ case faces another obstacle. Even if the court were convinced that the perpetrators were members of the CPD, it is skeptical that a finding of contempt would be appropriate. It is true that a court “ordinarily does not have to find that the violation [of a court order] was ‘willful’ to find a party in contempt,” and that the party may be in contempt “if he has not been ‘reasonably diligent and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was ordered.” ’ Stotler and Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). However, the evidence before the court shows that the CPD went to great lengths during the DNC to ensure that its officers honored the First Amendment rights of demonstrators. Whether this was motivated by a desire to comply with
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

the consent decree or a desire to avoid scandalous behavior before the world’s television cameras is not important to the court’s present inquiry.
*11 On this record, even if the court were to find that plaintiffs met their burden to show that CPD officers committed the Ballroom raid, it would be inclined to conclude that a rogue band of officers carried out the raid, contrary to their training and without direction from their superiors. While the officers responsible undoubtedly would deserve punishment, the court is not convinced that the CPD itself should be held in contempt of the consent decree for its failure to anticipate and prevent an isolated lawless action. In any event, such a determination is unnecessary, as plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Ballroom raid was carried out by officers from the CPD.
Improper Interrogations While Carla West, Kristian Williams, and Julia Moon–Sparrow were in police custody, plaintiffs claim that officers asked them questions that are prohibited by the consent decree. The interrogations allegedly included questions pertaining to the arrestees’ political beliefs and previous political activities. Carla West testified that three accompanying police officers interrogated her for the duration of her 45–minute to one-hour transport from the police station to a women’s lockup. Two of the transporting officers testified at trial that neither they nor the other officer, Sergeant John Blake, asked West any questions related to political activities or opinions. They claimed that they had no conversation with her whatsoever. For plaintiffs, the prospect “[t]hat three male Chicago police officers would be virtually silent with their female college student arrestee is difficult to believe.” (Pls.’ Closing at 12)
The City challenges West’s recollection that the trip took 45 minutes, arguing that the arrest report shows that she was received in the women’s lockup just 20 minutes after Neil Corcoran—her friend with whom she was arrested—was received in the lockup at the police station where both were initially taken. The court does not find this discrepancy to be of much significance. The City presumes that Corcoran was “received” at the police station’s lockup at the same time West began the ride to the women’s lockup, and that West underwent no other processing or delays between the time she physically arrived at the women’s lockup and the time she was “received.” The court has no evidence that those presumptions are valid.
That said, plaintiffs have not presented clear and convincing evidence that the alleged political interrogations took place. While the court finds that West was a reasonably credible, if bashful, witness, her

testimony is directly refuted by the testimony of two equally credible police officers. In this regard, the court acknowledges the difficulty plaintiffs have in meeting their burden of proof given that there were no impartial eyewitnesses to the interrogation, but only the target of the questioning and the questioners themselves. The difficulty is compounded where, as here, both sides are believable in stating their version of the disputed event. Under such circumstances, it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to convince the court to the level of clear and convincing evidence that West should be believed over the transporting officers. Nevertheless, that is what they must do in order to satisfy their burden. They have not done so, and thus the claim fails.
*12 Moon–Sparrow and Williams testified that they were asked political questions after they were arrested during the stop of the Shundahai Network van. Both claim to have been asked objectionable questions by several different officers while they were held at the 14th District police station. The officers who testified denied asking them any political questions or hearing any other officers ask them any political questions. Williams appeared credible on the stand, but his actions during the stop of the van suggest a significant hostility toward the police. Sergeant James Spratte testified that Williams locked the van’s door and attempted to roll up the window when police attempted to gain entry, and that Williams subsequently kicked Spratte as he entered the van.1
Moon–Sparrow’s testimony also reflected a potential bias against the police. At her deposition, she stated that all of the African–American women held in the lock-up with her were innocent of the charges against them and had been arrested simply because of their race. At trial, she acknowledged that she had no firsthand knowledge of the circumstances leading to her cellmates’ arrests. Without a doubt, Moon–Sparrow is entitled to her opinion. But given the closeness of this evidentiary dispute, the fact that she would make such a baseless statement about a collateral aspect of her time in custody calls her objectivity into question. Absent some type of supporting evidence, her testimony is not sufficient to overcome the officers’ testimony that directly and credibly rebuts her allegations. The court does not have before it clear and convincing evidence that Moon–Sparrow was the victim of improper interrogation.
The court acknowledges that the officers may also have had their own biases and, if they did what they are accused of doing, their motive to fabricate would be substantial. But a swearing contest between apparently credible witnesses on both sides presents a fatal problem when plaintiffs must carry a clear and convincing burden.
Destruction of Film
7

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

Lee Wells testified that a “large white officer” pulled the film out of Wells’ camera while he was being processed by an African–American officer at the police station. At his deposition, he stated only that the officer opened up his camera. Wells’ testimony was supported by his fellow arrestee, James McGuinness, who testified at trial that a police officer was pulling the film out of a few cameras. At his deposition, McGuinness stated only that the officer kept opening up the backs of cameras.
Both witnesses’ testimony was effectively rebutted by Officer Ray Dexter, the officer who processed Wells. Dexter testified that Wells’ camera remained in Dexter’s possession during the entire time of Wells’ processing. He testified that, pursuant to usual police practice, he probably opened up the camera to check for contraband, but he did not pull out the film. He also stated that no one else tampered with Wells’ camera while it was in Dexter’s possession, and that he sealed the camera into an envelope or bag after it was inventoried. The court noted Dexter’s straightforward manner and found him to be a credible witness. While McGuinness also appeared credible on the stand, Wells had some difficulty getting some aspects of his testimony straight, as discussed below. Further, the court notes that neither Wells nor McGuinness testified at their deposition that an officer pulled out Wells’ film. Under these circumstances, their testimony is not clear and convincing proof that officers pulled film out of Wells’ camera.
*13 Matthew Ferreira and Moon–Sparrow also testified that they saw police officers pull film out of cameras at the police station, but their testimony does not pertain specifically to Wells’ camera, and so is not sufficient to overcome Dexter’s testimony. The claim at issue is whether Wells’ film was destroyed by police, not whether police pulled any film out of cameras during the time Ferreira and Moon–Sparrow were in custody. Under these circumstances, the court cannot find that plaintiffs have proved the destruction of Wells’ film by clear and convincing evidence.
The testimony regarding the destruction of Stephane Luchini’s film is not consistent. At his deposition, Wells stated that he was pulled from the CounterMedia van, the officers then entered the back of the van, and he saw them open Luchini’s camera. Perhaps realizing that it would be difficult to see into the back of the windowless van, he modified his testimony to state that he was pulled out of the van after the police opened the camera, or that it all occurred at the same time.
Wells’ version of events finds little support in the other witnesses’ testimony. According to Luchini’s deposition testimony, Jim Bell told him that an officer outside the van exposed Luchini’s film by opening up the camera, then closing it. Luchini himself did not see any officer open his camera, either inside or outside the van. Edmund

Nix, who was seated next to Wells inside the van, did not see any officer open a camera, nor did Robert Boyle, who was at the scene taking photos. Sakulich testified that he saw an officer carrying strips of film as they exited the van. Four officers who were involved in the search testified credibly that they did not open up any cameras. The videotape of the incident shows two officers exiting the back of the van, but the only item either one is carrying is a police hat. Plaintiffs claim that the film destruction was not videotaped by bystanders because it occurred inside the closed back of the van. While it is entirely possible that certain police acts escaped the camera operator’s attention, a finding for plaintiffs would require the court to engage in sheer speculation based on highly conflicting testimony.
Plaintiffs do not spend much time attempting to bolster their evidentiary showing related to the claims of film destruction at issue here, but instead rely on the videotape of the CounterMedia van searches to suggest that police testimony regarding the searches reflected a police “code of silence.” (Id. at 1) First, plaintiffs challenge the testimony of Folliard and Sergeant Richard Grand, who claimed that one reason the van was initially searched was because it was in the path of a protest march. According to plaintiffs, “[t]he video shows that the CounterMedia van had stopped behind another vehicle at an intersection and was not blocking the march.” (Id. at 2) Whether the van was directly in the march’s path or was simply bordering that path, its proximity to the march, coupled with its visible safety hazards, gave police ample justification for investigating.
*14 Second, plaintiffs challenge Folliard’s testimony that the van’s occupants claimed that they could not move the van because they did not have the keys. Plaintiffs argue that the video shows that as police approached, the driver was attempting to start the van. Whether the driver was attempting to start the van is not as clear to the court as it is to plaintiffs. Further, whether the driver had the keys is not essential to the propriety of the police action or the credibility of Folliard’s testimony. Even if the driver could not move the van because it would not start, the police were legitimately concerned. Folliard may well have been wrong on that minor detail. He would have no reason or motive to fabricate that aspect of his testimony, as the police action was reasonable under either factual alternative. The court found his demeanor and the substance of his testimony to be credible.
Third, while officers testified that they were concerned about potential dangers posed by a rag hanging out of the van’s gas tank and a gas can on the van’s floor, plaintiffs contend that the video shows no statements by police reflecting such concerns. Further, plaintiffs argue that the video shows an officer smoking a cigarette, which would be inconsistent with such concerns. The police were not required to identify the nature of the safety hazard when
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

they initially approached the van, especially given that their primary concern was to move the van away from the march as quickly as possible. If an officer did in fact smoke a cigarette near the van, that was, at most, a foolish thing for that officer to do. It does not mean that the police made up the testimony about the rag and the gas can.
Fourth, plaintiffs insist that the video contradicts Sergeant Grand’s testimony that he did not remember seeing any cameras or video equipment in the van, and that he participated in the van’s initial stop. Obviously, plaintiffs point out, there must have been a camera in the van given that the videotape was shot from the front seat of the van during the initial stop. In denying knowledge of any cameras in the van, Grand may have been thinking of the police search of the van once the occupants were removed—presumably, the video camera’s operator took the camera with him as he exited. Or Grand may simply have forgotten about the video camera held by the front seat passenger. There is no reason to believe, however, that Grand remembered seeing an operating video camera pointed at him, then decided to lie about its existence. Such a lie would be pointless (given the immateriality of a single video camera’s presence in the van), as well as hopeless (given the easy refutation of his lie by the videotape itself). Indeed, Grand himself testified that he had seen the videotape of the initial stop.
More fundamentally, plaintiffs’ various challenges to officers’ testimony based on the videotape of the first CounterMedia van stop do little to help their cause. The first stop is no longer at issue in this case, and the second stop is relevant only to the alleged film destruction. The officers’ testimony regarding the search is not so questionable that it casts doubt on their testimony regarding the claims that are at issue.
Ransacking of Shundahai Network Van *15 Matthew Ferreira testified that when he retrieved the Shundahai Network van from the auto pound yard after he was released from jail, the interior of the van appeared to have been ransacked. The CB radio was smashed, a video camera was broken, and water had been poured on the van’s contents. Moon–Sparrow saw the van that same day, and she also testified that the CB radio was smashed, the video camera broken, water and mud had been smeared around, boxes of t-shirts had been dumped out and dirtied, and personal belongings had been ripped up. The City insists that nothing was stolen from the van, and if what plaintiffs claim happened occurred, it was simply an act of senseless vandalism.
Plaintiffs attempt to link the vandalism with the police through the testimony of Moon–Sparrow, who recalled seeing items thrown from the van as she walked to the

squadrol after being arrested. She testified that she was the last person to get into the squadrol, but Melissa Rohs testified that, although she was not certain, she believes that she, not Moon–Sparrow, was the last person into the squadrol. No one besides Moon–Sparrow testified to seeing anything thrown from the van. As noted above, the court is concerned that Moon–Sparrow’s observations were colored by her apparent disdain for the Chicago police. Moreover, the CPD officers involved in the stop of the Shundahai Network van and the arrest of its occupants testified that no one searched the van’s interior, much less destroyed its contents. Officers Michael Bocardo and Joseph Perez testified that they drove the van to the pound, parked it in front of the pound’s gate, and turned the van over to the pound’s employees.
The testimony of Bocardo and Perez is not challenged directly by plaintiffs, who concentrate their firepower on the credibility of Sergeant Spratte. Plaintiffs apparently believe that by casting doubt on Spratte’s narration of the Shundahai Network arrests, the court will be more convinced that the CPD is responsible for ransacking the van’s interior. First, they take issue with Spratte’s statement that Kristian Williams kicked him hard with his injured left foot. According to plaintiffs, “[a] severely injured civilian is unlikely to kick a linebacker-s[i]zed police officer, particularly using the injured limb,” and Williams does not “appear to be the street-fighting type.” (Id. at 11) Second, plaintiffs contend that Spratte lied when he testified that he was unable to observe that Williams was injured at the time of the arrest because “Williams’ shoe was off, and the bare foot had a bag of ice on it.” (Id.) Third, plaintiffs challenge Spratte’s testimony that there were no video cameras at the 14th District police station. In reality, plaintiffs contend, video cameras belonging to the Shundahai Network, Carla West, and Jeff Perlstein were at the 14th District. Fourth, plaintiffs argue that Spratte contradicted the testimony of plaintiffs’ witnesses when he stated that he did not see a CB radio, video camera, literature, books or tapes in the Shundahai Network van.
*16 In a situation where officers’ efforts to enter a vehicle are resisted, some confusion as to what happened and who did what to whom is to be expected. The purported discrepancies in Spratte’s testimony reflect this confusion. The court has seen nothing to suggest that Spratte perjured himself when recounting the events leading up to the arrest of Williams. Whether or not Spratte remembers seeing video cameras at the police station or the van’s contents is not a basis for concluding that Spratte cannot be believed. Even less can it be used to substitute for the lack of any credible evidence suggesting that CPD officers ransacked the van. The fact that police officers temporarily took possession of the van is not clear and convincing evidence that they vandalized it. Employees of the auto pound or intruders in the auto pound could have been responsible. While plaintiffs may have been able to
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2000)

establish that the CPD was negligent in securing their van overnight, they have not offered clear and convincing evidence of a consent decree violation.

claims did not in fact happen. The ruling is simply a recognition that the conflicting but credible evidence on both sides precludes plaintiffs from establishing their claims by clear and convincing evidence. Judgment is entered for the City on all claims.

Conclusion
For the above reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to prove any of their claims against the City by clear and convincing evidence. This ruling should not be interpreted as a finding that plaintiffs’ witnesses did not testify truthfully, or that the incidents underlying their

Parallel Citations
29 Media L. Rep. 1174
	  

Footnotes

1

The kicking evidence was disputed; there was evidence that Williams had a seriously injured foot and could not have kicked

Spratte. The court can find nothing in the record, however, disputing the testimony that Williams tried to prevent the officers’ entry

by locking the door and rolling up the window.

	  

10

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

1985 WL 3300 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al. Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al. Defendants.
No. 74 C 3268 consolidated with 75 C 3295 & 76 C 1982. | October 24, 1985.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUSAN GETZENDANNER, District Judge:
*1 This civil rights action is before the court on several motions: the motion of ACLU plaintiffs to correct a mistaken statement in the court’s memorandum opinion and order dated August 8, 1984; the motion of Alliance plaintiffs for sanctions against defendant City of Chicago; and two petitions for fees. The City’s motion for separate trials on the issue of damages liability has been withdrawn.
Motion to Correct
In this motion, the ACLU plaintiffs have asked for correction of an August 8, 1984 order in which this court denied the City’s motion for a stay pending appeal of an earlier order requiring all public gathering and dignitary protection investigation as defined in § 1.2 of the Judgment Order to be contrally supervised and documented and ordering that periodic independent audits of implementation and compliance encompass all city government, not only the police department. In commenting on the impact of that earlier order, the court on August 8, 1984 said that the Judgment Order did not impose additional procedural safeguards on public gathering investigations beyond central supervision unless those investigations were directed towards First Amendment Conduct.
The plaintiffs report that the City does not object to the timing of the present motion and the City has concurred in that understanding. In addition, the City voluntarily dismissed its appeal of the June 6 order in the fall of

1984, so there is no conflict with the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit. Correction of the August 8 Order is apparently necessary, however, to resolve a disagreement among the parties and to clarify the judicial record.
The language of the Judgment Order in this respect is clear. The Order distinguishes between public gathering, dignitary protection, criminal, and regulatory investigations for purposes of procedural safeguards. Dignitary protection, criminal, and regulatory investigations are subject to specific safeguards only if ‘directed toward First Amendment Conduct.’ Public gathering investigations, however, whether or not directed toward First Amendment Conduct, must comply with the procedural requirements of § 3.1 and also those further requirements specifically set forth in § 3.4. The omission of the language ‘directed toward First Amendment Conduct’ in § 3.4, where every other subsection contains that language, is clear.
The City points out that the language of § 3.1 refers only to investigations directed toward ‘First Amendment Conduct.’ This is perfectly correct as far as it goes. Section 3.4 unambiguously provides, however, that ‘Any public gathering investigation must comply with Part 3.1.’ The latter provision expressly and categorically addresses the issue presented by the parties and therefore controls the more comprehensive language of § 3.1. The court therefore grants the plaintiffs’ motion to correct, and orders its August 8, 1984 memorandum opinion to be modified and corrected by striking the first full paragraph on page 2 and inserting the following in its place:
*2 All the June 6 Order held was that the Judgment Order required that all public gathering and dignitary protection investigations be reported to a central unit, so that as a result there will be some assurance that dignitary protection investigations directed toward First Amendment conduct, and all public gathering investigations, will be conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Judgment Order. The important distinction between dignitary protection investigations directed at First Amendment conduct and other dignitary protection investigations is not disturbed by the June 6th order.
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

Motion for Sanctions
In the motion, the 26 Alliance plaintiffs move for sanctions in the form of a contempt finding, a preclusion order, and attorneys’ fees against the City of Chicago for failure to answer interrogatories and to obey for seven years a court order to produce certain files. The facts underlying this motion are as follows. On May 4, 1977, Judge Alfred Y. Kirkland ordered the City to place in the document depository its ‘transmittal files.’ According to the plaintiffs, the term ‘transmittal files’ refers to all files concerning the transmittal of information between the Chicago Police Department Subversive Unit and other agencies. According to the City, however, the term referred only to files containing so-designated ‘Transmittal Reports,’ and did not encompass a separate filing system for correspondence involving the transmittal of information between the City and police departments in various other cities. It is the City’s failure to produce these ‘letter files’ until expressly asked to do so in September of 1984 which forms the basis for the present motion.
In order to support their understanding of the term ‘transmittal file,’ each side has submitted various materials underlying the background of the May 4, 1977 order. The uncontested parts of the record are as follows. On December 12, 1974, defendants were asked to name all organizations to whom intelligence information from the file room was disseminated and approximately how many instances of dissemination occurred. (Interrogatories #29 and #30). Defendants objected to these interrogatories on the grounds that they were too burdensome, and on March 5, 1976, Judge Kirkland ordered the defendants to respond. On April 1, 1976, defendants answered that ‘Records relating to the dissemination of intelligence file information . . . were kept only . . . for 1 year for dissemination beyond the department. . . . When the files were closed they were physically moved, and the records of dissemination for the 1 year prior to March, 1975 cannot now be located. A further search will be made.’ (Pltf’s Addendum Exhibit A).
On June 23, 1976, the plaintiffs in consolidated discovery took the deposition of Sergeant Jerome Latimer, Commanding Officer of the Records Unit in charge of the Intelligence Division files. Mr. Gutman participated in the deposition. At that deposition, Sgt. Latimer testified that the department kept ‘transmittal reports’ for inter-departmental distribution of intelligence information, (serial 37 reports), but testified that intelligence information sent to outside agencies would be classified under a separate letter file (serial 17 reports). Sgt. Latimer did not, however, testify that the letter file was still in existence, and confirmed the earlier interrogatory answer that such reports were typically kept for one year only.

*3 In the meanwhile, the Alliance plaintiffs moved for sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d) for the defendants’ failure to answer certain interrogatories, including interrogatories 29 and 30. On November 10, 1976, Judge Kirkland found the defendants’ answers ‘incomplete’ and ‘evasive’ within the meaning of Rule 37, and further found that defendants’ document destruction had made it impossible for plaintiffs to prove their allegations of inflitration and information dissemination. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Accordingly, Judge Kirkland sanctioned the defendants by holding that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing on paragraphs 82, 96, and 97 of the complaint, and that defendants therefore had the burden of showing that intelligence files were not circulated to other agencies.
On December 8, 1976, the Alliance and ACLU cases were consolidated for discovery purposes. On December 23, 1976, the City filed its answers to ACLU interrogatories 12 and 19. Interrogatory answer 12 listed four types of records used to transmit intelligence information, including both ‘transmittals’ and ‘letters’ identified as such. The interrogatory answer also says, however, that these documents had been ‘previously submitted’ to plaintiffs.
Also on December 23, 1976, the ACLU plaintiffs filed a motion to establish a document depository for all materials concerning ‘subversive’ matters. In the motion, plaintiffs stated that the City had made its non-criminal, or ‘subversive,’ files available for copying, but that bureaucratic procedures and general disorganization were impeding discovery. On May 4, 1977, Judge Kirkland granted the motion, and listed ‘transmittal files presently located at 843 West Maxwell Street’ among the documents to be deposited. The court also ordered defendants to place any other discovery documents ‘of substantial volume’ in the depository. The City turned over the serial 37 files but not the serial 17 files. According to plaintiffs’ attorney, the relevant serial 17 reports totaled more than 2,000 pages and were thus not ‘insubstantial’ in volume.
On September 27, 1977, plaintiffs obtained a further court order stating that ‘city defendants shall promptly produce for inspection and copying all documents generated by or presently in the custody or control of the Intelligence Division which do not relate to specific criminal investigations.’ Nonetheless, the serial 17 files were still not produced, and plaintiffs never requested copies of the letters. Not until 1980 were any serial 17 files copied and served on plaintiffs: on February 16 of that year, Mary Edwards, on behalf of Mr. Gutman, acknowledged receipt of 55 pages of Intelligence Division reports, all prefixed by code number 17. For reasons which are unclear, however, Mr. Gutman himself did not learn of the serial
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

17 files until early 1984, at which time he contacted the City about the documents and was allowed to inspect and copy all serial 17 files on lawful political activity.
*4 The record established beyond doubt that defendants failed to comply with discovery either by failing to turn over the serial 17 reports as ‘transmittal files’ or by failing to amend their interrogatory answers which indicated that these files had been either destroyed and/or ‘previously submitted.’ The question is what sanctions would be appropriate. The City points out that it appointed a special corporation counsel in November of 1977, and that the City has cooperated in discovery since that time. Given the long time since the omission, the May 1976 order sanctioning defendants for allegedly destroying these documents, and the fact that Mr. Gutman should have known by 1980 at the latest about the serial files, the City asks that the motion for sanctions be denied on grounds of laches.
A district court’s power to sanction a party for failure to provide discovery is expressly set forth in Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as the just, and among others the following:
. . .
(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
. . .
(d) . . . an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders . . .
In lieu of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order and the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The sanctions in appropriate cases may be as severe as dismissal. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 638, 643 (1976).
The present situation presents an unusual situation in that plaintiffs, having obtained preclusion sanctions years ago for destruction of these documents, now seek broader sanctions upon discovering that the documents were in fact available all along. Plaintiffs’ particulars of

disadvantage from the nondisclosure rest largely on the value these files had for proof of dissemination allegations. Because those dissemination allegations were deemed prima facie true as of November 1976, however, plaintiffs had little need to prove their allegations. This is not to condone defendants’ failure to comply with discovery, only to observe that plaintiffs overstate the harm they have suffered from the nondisclosure, particularly where the damages cases have yet to be tried, the files have now (apparently) been fully turned over, and the plaintiffs’ attorney arguably should have uncovered the files’ existence in 1980.
The present situation is also unusual in that defendants switched counsel in late 1977, and the City’s present attorney asked plaintiffs’ lawyers to inform him of all outstanding discovery obligations at that time. While the City’s current attorney failed to amend previously misleading discovery answers, his failure to turn over the serial 17 files before 1984 apparently stemmed from a belief that plaintiffs’ lawyers were disinterested in the files, and not from an awareness that the plaintiffs were ignorant of the files’ existence. The files were indeed turned over once specifically requested. The long lapse of time since the discovery was first requested is not evidence of willful violation which would support a contempt.
*5 However, the court concludes that some sanction beyond that ordered in November 1976 is warranted. Judge Kirkland sanctioned the defendants then for destroying documents after the case was filed, not for lying in response to discovery requests. The plaintiffs’ failure to request the serial 17 files specifically does not excuse the government’s failure to provide that information, and the plaintiffs’ omission was caused by the defendants’ earlier failure to cooperate in discovery. That Mr. Gutman received some ‘17’ files in 1980 should not automatically have alerted him to the existence of full-fledged files which had been withheld. As noted in National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney General, 94 F.R.D. 600, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the need for harsh measures to enforce discovery compliance is ‘particularly evident when the disobedient party is the government.’
Accordingly, the court orders that paragraphs 82–86 of plaintiffs’ complaint concerning dissemination of information be deemed true without being subject to rebuttal by the City, and that Alliance attorney Richard Gutman recover a reasonable attorney’s fee for time spent both in obtaining the serial 17 files during 1984 and in filing the present motion.
Motion for Fees—Audit Appeal

3

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

Also before the court is the motion of the Alliance plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees under § 1988 for time spent defending against the City’s appeal of the court’s June 6, 1984 order requiring the auditing of all city agencies. Notice of appeal was filed by the City on July 5, 1984; a motion for stay pending appeal was briefed by the parties and denied by the court on August 8, 1984. On November 17, 1984, pursuant to the City’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Plaintiffs have itemized 30 hours spent by their attorney Mr. Gutman in connection with the appeal, including time spent opposing the motion to stay and preparing the petition for fees when the City refused to settle the fees.
Plaintiffs have requested an hourly fee of $150 plus a multiplier. The City challenges solely the reasonableness of the hours spent and the request for a multiplier. This court has previously ruled that an hourly rate of $150 per hour fully compensates the attorneys in this case and related litigation for risk. See S.A.C.C. v. City of Chicago, Slip Op. No. 80 C 4714 (Feb. 14, 1985); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Slip Op. No. 74 C 3268 (April 4, 1983). Accordingly, the request for a multiplier is denied.
The court also disagrees that plaintiffs’ initial request of 20.5 hours, or the additional 9.5 hours spent responding to defendants’ objections, are unreasonable in light of the defendants’ decision to dismiss voluntarily. The plaintiffs could not have known defendants would do that and therefore had the right to begin preparing their appeal. Moreover, at least six of those hours were incurred in opposing the motion to stay, another 1.75 are attributed to designating the record on appeal, over three hours were spent reviewing a proposed training bulletin at defendants’ request, and four hours were spent attempting to settle fees and filing the instant petition. Thus, only five hours were spent planning appellate strategy in advance of being served with the appellant’s brief.
*6 In reviewing the plaintiffs’ itemized hours, however, the court notes that plaintiff reports one hour spent ‘studying’ defendants’ four motions for extensions of time, and one hour spent ‘studying’ defendants’ January 1985 motion in this court for an extension of time, including .25 hours for reviewing this court’s one sentence minute order granting the motion. This overstatement apparently results from plaintiffs’ attorney’s habit of billing a minimum of .25 hours for any time spent in connection with the litigation, no matter how de minimis. The court will deduct these two hours as unreasonable, but otherwise the plaintiff’s request for the lodestar amount of fees is sustained.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to a fee award of $4,200 for 28 hours of work in connection with defendants’ unsuccessful appeal of the order requiring

citywide auditing.
Attorneys’ Fees—Equal Access to Justice Act
The final matter before the court is the petition of the Alliance plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees against the federal defendants under § 1988 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The court remembers telling Alliance attorney Mr. Gutman some time ago that this petition would be denied, but has now discovered that no order was ever entered confirming that decision. Accordingly, the court now reaches the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim for fees against the federal government.
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), the United States shall be liable for attorney fees and expenses ‘to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.’ Plaintiffs argue that because this action was brought under the civil rights laws, fees against the federal government are enforceable pursuant to the terms of § 1988, which specifically provides for such an award in civil rights cases against other defendants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), repealed in 1984 but still applicable to prior pending cases, Pub.L. 96–481, Section 204(c), a court shall award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a suit brought by or against the United States, ‘unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.’ Plaintiffs argue that the position of the federal government in this suit was not substantially justified, and that fees should therefore be awarded.
A preliminary issue to be addressed is whether the Act applies at all to plaintiffs’ claim. The EAJA, by its terms, limits the availability of attorneys’ fees against the United States to adversary adjudications ‘pending on, or commenced on or after, [October 1, 1981].’ In the present case, the federal defendants and the plaintiffs entered into settlements in late 1980. Notice was given and a fairness hearing held on February 13, 1981. The record was closed on June 11, 1981, and the settlements were approved by court order on August 11, 1981. By joint motion of the parties, judgment was entered September 2, 1981.
*7 Although the entry of final judgment before October 1, 1981 would appear to end the matter, plaintiffs argue that the pendency of the attorneys’ fee petition in and of itself would suffice for applicability of the EAJA. This argument is incorrect as a matter of law. Numerous courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have held that a case is no longer ‘pending’ for purposes of the EAJA when the sole issue remaining on the effective date of the Act is the collateral issue of the federal government’s
4

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

liability for fees. Tongol v. Donovan, 762 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1985); Nichols v. Pierce, 740 F. 2d 1249, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Commissioners of Highways v. United States, 684 F.2d 443, 444–45 (7th Cir. 1982). The rationale of these cases is that waivers of soverign immunity, like the EAJA, must be strictly construed, and that the mere pendency of issues collateral to liability after October 1, 1981, does not suffice to create statutory liability for fees under the Act. While the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held to the contrary, see Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 679 F.2d 64, 67–68 (5th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Heydt v. Citizens States Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982); this court is bound to follow the authority of the Seventh Circuit.
Plaintiffs also argue that an action for purposes of the EAJA should be considered ‘pending’ so long as a party’s right to appeal has not been exhausted, even though final judgments may have been entered before October 1, 1981. Generally, an action is considered ‘pending’ so long as a party’s right to appeal has not yet been exhausted or expired. United States ex rel. Heydt v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F.Supp. 348, 350–51 (D.D.C. 1982). This rule was adopted by the Seventh Circuit for purposes of the EAJA in Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983). In that case, much like the present one, judgment was entered on August 17, 1981, but was not recorded on the docket until September 2d. In a long footnote, the court noted that Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) gives a losing party in an action involving the federal government sixty days after entry of judgment to file a notice of appeal. Since the time to appeal had not expired as of October 1, 1981, the court determined that the action was still pending as of October 1, 1981, id. at 1293 n.8, and went on to affirm the district court’s award of fees. Id. at 1303.
At first blush, applicability of the EAJA would appear to follow as a matter of course from Berman. Because judgment was entered less than sixty days before October 1, 1981, then the time to appeal had not yet expired, with the consequence that the action was still pending as of the Act’s effective date. Berman, however, involved a grant of summary judgment against the government. An appeal was therefore both practically and realistically possible. In the present case, judgment was by consent decree, and neither party had standing to appeal. The time to appeal therefore lapsed contemporaneously with the entry of judgment, and the September 2, 1981 order was final in all senses of the word. The court thus concludes that Berman is distinguishable and that there is no authorization for the imposition of fees under the EAJA.
*8 Even assuming that the present case was pending as of October 1, 1981, the court still concludes that fees would be inappropriate. In Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367 (9th

Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit held that there were special circumstances warranting a denial of attorneys’ fees under § 1988 where the plaintiff’s complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees, but the consent decree entered into made no provision for such an award. The court emphasized that § 1988 had taken effect ‘only slightly more than two months before the consent agreement was approved by the parties,’id., and that the parties may well have negotiated ‘upon the understanding that the law did not authorize attorneys’ fee awards in such cases.’ In this context the court concluded that an award of attorneys’ fees would alter the compromise of the parties, and would be ‘manifestly unfair’ if not ‘unduly harsh.’ Id. The court also based its conclusion, however, on the particular equities of the case, in which the relief obtained was largely prompted by factors independent of the lawsuit.
Aho thus has obvious relevance for this case. Under the facts at bar, settlement negotiations between the plaintiffs and the federal defendants extended over several years and the issue of attorneys’ fees was discussed from the outset. (See Defendants’ Exhibits A–C). On February 1, 1980, ACLU attorney Douglass Cassel wrote to government attorney Charles Kruse, with a carbon copy going to Alliance attorney Richard Gutman. Mr. Cassel enclosed an outline of a suggested agreed decree, and notes that ‘ancillary matters such as damages, attorneys’ fees and costs’ remained to be resolved. (Exhibit D). The proposed joint motion transmitted in return by Mr. Kruse contained no provision for payment of fees. (Exhibit E).
Mr. Cassel on June 20, 1980, again with a carbon to Mr. Gutman, sent a revised stipulation to the defendants. This stipulation contained a new Section VII, which provided for attorneys’ fees for certain aspects of the litigation. (Exhibit F). After a day-long negotiation session at which Mr. Gutman and Mr. Cassel were present, both plaintiff attorneys signed a letter addressed to Mr. Kruse again raising the matter of fees. Plaintiffs stated that they had previously thought the Attorney General’s authority to settle litigation would include the authority to pay fees, but suggested that attorneys’ fees could be paid to the plaintiffs with respect to their Privacy Act claims. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(B). (Exhibit G). The letter makes no mention of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act or the Equal Access to Justice Act as authorizing fees.
On July 10, 1980, Mr. Kruse sent duplicate letters to the plaintiffs transmitting clean draft copies of the Joint Motion and Stipulation to reflect the latest negotiating session. Paragraph 7.1 provided that each party shall bear its own costs and expenses. (Exhibit H). In a letter dated August 6, 1980, the government urged plaintiffs to waive any provision for payment of money damages and to agree to Section VII as now drafted. (Exhibit J). Mr. Kruse pointed out that the plaintiffs’ tort and privacy act claims were weak, and stated that the tentative agreement
5

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

contained the maximum the government could include in a settlement agreement.
*9 On August 15, 1980, Mr. Cassel responded by agreeing to defer proposals concerning damages provided that the government agree to pay plaintiffs’ costs. (Exhibit K). Mr. Cassel also noted that, in light of Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977), attorneys’ fees should not be a subject of negotiation until agreement was reached on all other matters. A carbon copy of the letter was sent to Mr. Gutman. In response, the government agreed to pay plaintiffs’ costs which would be taxable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. (Exhibit L). On September 3, 1980, Mr. Cassel wrote to Mr. Kruse, with a carbon copy to Mr. Gutman, to express his understanding that the proposed Joint Motion and Stipulation was acceptable to plaintiffs’ counsel and to plaintiffs’ negotiating team. The letter concluded that ‘Rick Gutman, on behalf of his clients, concurs in this letter.’ (Exhibit M). The letter contained no reservation of rights regarding fees.
Based on this agreement, both sides undertook the task of obtaining concurrence from their respective clients. According to the affidavits of Dennis Hoffman, special FBI agent, and Mr. Kruse, the proposed settlement was described to the FBI and CIA clients as not authorizing payment of attorneys’ fees. (Exhibits S & T). This understanding was further reflected in the joint motion of Mr. Gutman and Mr. Cassel to establish procedures for approval of the proposed federal settlement, filed with the court on December 22, 1980. (Exhibit N). Paragraph 12, page 6, of that motion states that ‘No attorney’s fees are to be paid under the proposed settlement.’
The above documents compel the conclusion that the parties negotiated on the understanding that the only statutory authorization for fees was the Privacy Act. Indeed, the ACLU plaintiffs represented to the court long ago that they considered themselves to have waived any right to fees under the settlement, and therefore filed no petition for fees against the federal defendants. Mr. Gutman, by contrast, denies having ever waived any statutory right to fees, and argues (quite correctly) that mere silence of a consent decree on the question of fees does not necessarily preclude a court from awarding fees under § 1988 or analogous statutes. Regaldo v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451–52 (N.D. Ill. 1978). While the evidence is reasonably susceptible of an interpretation finding no waiver, the facts also indicate that the EAJA was simply not considered by the parties. Indeed, Mr. Gutman admits that he didn’t learn of his potential EAJA entitlement until August of 1981 (Gutman Affidavit). Whatever plaintiffs’ intent, however, the government in settling reasonably understood the plaintiffs to be giving up their claims for fees, and the court is hesitant to override that understanding.

Plaintiffs place particular emphasis on the August 15th letter of Mr. Cassel in which he suggests that attorneys’ fees not be a subject of negotiation until reaching agreement on all other matters. The apparent motive behind this was to avoid the improper situation where a lawyer is forced to give up a statutory fee entitlement in exchange for obtaining relief for his clients. Numerous courts have disapproved of simultaneous negotiations of fees and merits in civil rights cases, although many continue to enforce fee waivers obtained during settlement. See generally Moore v. National Association of Securities Dealers, 762 F.2d 1093, 1100–1104 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lazar v. Pierce, 757 F.2d 435 (1st Cir. 1985); Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 2319 (1985); Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1017–1021.
*10 The court agrees that Mr. Cassel’s August 15th letter evidences a deferral of fee discussions, and not an absolute waiver. However, given the lack of statutory authority for awarding fees against the federal government in 1980, the subsequent submission of the settlement for court approval with only costs awarded indicates that the parties would reasonably have concluded the fee question to be a dead letter. Were the EAJA applicable during the settlement negotiations, the federal government’s blanket refusal to pay fees might be viewed as improper under Prandini and its progeny. The documentary evidence shows, however, that the government simply considered itself to have no statutory liability for fees. Under Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1979), retroactive application of the EAJA in contradiction to this understanding would significantly alter the terms of the settlement and would be ‘unjust’ within the meaning of both § 1988 and the EAJA.
The court lays particular stress on the fact that the EAJA was not passed until after the lawyers in this case reached settlement and did not take effect until after the court approved the settlement. As noted in Benitez v. Collazo, 571 F.Supp. 246, 249 (D. P.R. 1983), Aho has been undercut by decisions such as Prandini and should not be followed in cases where the right to civil rights attorneys’ fees is well developed. The view of the particular circumstances and timing of the settlement here, the court views plaintiffs’ representation to the court that attorneys’ fees would not be awarded under the settlement and their failure to reserve a right to petition the court for fees as dispositive. Accordingly, the Alliance plaintiffs’ petition for attorneys’ fees against the federal defendants is denied.
Conclusion
The motion of the ACLU plaintiffs to correct is granted.
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1985)

The Alliance motion for attorneys’ fees in connection with the appeal of the audit issue is granted; plaintiffs are awarded $4,200.000 in fees. The Alliance plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions is granted in part; the court orders that paragraphs 82–86 of plaintiffs’ complaint concerning dissemination of information be deemed true without being subject to rebuttal by the City, and that Alliance attorney Richard Gutman recover a reasonable attorney’s fee for time spent both in obtaining the serial 17 files

during 1984 and in filing the sanctions motion. All petitions for fees against the federal defendants are denied.
It is so ordered.
	  

7

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

KeyCite Red Flag - Severe Negative Treatment Reversed by Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 7th Cir.(Ill.), July 2, 1997
1992 WL 296388 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION, et al., Plaintiffs,
Chicago Cispes, et al., Petitioners, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Respondent.
No. 74 C 3268. | Oct. 14, 1992.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, District Judge.
*1 This case arises out of an investigation of the Chicago Subcommittee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (“CISPES”) which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) conducted between 1983 and 1985. CISPES and several other petitioners brought this action against the FBI claiming that the CISPES investigation violated their Joint Motion and Stipulation (“Consent Decree”) which was signed in 1980 and approved by this court on August 11, 1981. This court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Lefkow for a report and recommendation. In her thorough and well-reasoned report, issued on February 4, 1991, the Magistrate Judge found that the FBI had engaged in serious intentional non-compliance with the Consent Decree and that petitioners were entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. This court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation on October 2, 1991.
The one issue left unresolved with respect to that motion was whether expungement of government records regarding the CISPES investigation was an appropriate remedy for the FBI’s violation of the Consent Decree. In its October 2 opinion, this court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the expungement issue and referred the matter back to Magistrate Judge Lefkow for a report and recommendation. On September 21, 1992, the Magistrate Judge issued her report, recommending that petitioners’ request for expungement be granted. For the reasons stated below, this court adopts the Magistrate

Judge’s report and recommendation. Petitioners’ motion for the expungement of all names and other data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from government records is granted.1
Background
The facts of this case have been fully explained in this court’s October 2, 1991 opinion and the Magistrate Judge’s February 4, 1991 report and recommendation. For the purposes of this opinion, therefore, this court briefly reviews the facts. Petitioners brought this action against respondent under Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 (“Paragraph 5.2”), the enforcement provisions, of the Consent Decree. Of particular importance to this opinion, Paragraph 5.2 provides:
If the Court finds that a pattern of substantial noncompliance or a serious intentional noncompliance with the terms of the Stipulation has occurred or is occurring, it shall make such order as it deems just and necessary to insure future compliance with the Stipulation.
Petitioners claim that this provision was violated when the FBI investigated them from March 1983 through June 1985. Among other things undertaken during the course of the investigation, the FBI gathered, maintained, and disseminated information regarding the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights by CISPES, its members, and its associates. This information was gathered through a variety of techniques including the use of infiltrators, photographic surveillance of CISPES members, and the unauthorized procurement of banking and telephone records.
*2 On June 3, 1985, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) determined that CISPES was involved in political activities involving First Amendment rights, and was not involved in international terrorism as the FBI originally suspected. Although the DOJ ordered the CISPES investigation closed, the Chicago Field Office of the FBI continued to collect and record information regarding CISPES’ lawful exercise of its First Amendment rights.
Then FBI Director William Sessions (“Sessions”) subsequently ordered an in-depth inquiry into the CISPES investigation in response to Congressional interest in it. At a Congressional hearing, Sessions admitted that the FBI had investigated essentially political activities and that FBI field offices ignored instructions from headquarters regarding these investigations. Thereafter,
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Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

Sessions instituted a number of changes with respect to such investigations to prevent reoccurrence of the CISPES investigation problems. In addition, the FBI disciplined the appropriate personnel associated with the investigation and had all the records accumulated throughout the course of the investigation moved to the National Archives and Records Administration (“National Archives”).

The files which were sent to the National Archives are

designated “IT,” which stands for “International

Terrorism,” and their file classification number is “199C,”

which

stands

for

“Foreign

Counterintelligence—Terrorism.” Access to the undeleted

originals is currently available to National Archives

employees. The FBI also has access to the files to the

extent necessary to resolve issues that may arise regarding

informant confidentiality or the propriety of a document’s

security classification. However, since the National

Archives has removed all index references from the files,

the FBI no longer can access the files for investigatory

purposes. Public access to the files is restricted to that

which is permitted by the Freedom of Information and

Privacy Acts. However, under current policy, restrictions

on access to the records by the public may end in

approximately 75 years.

The Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
Where expungement is sought due to the violation of constitutional rights, a “determination of the propriety of an order directing expungement involves a balancing of interests; the harm caused to an individual by the existence of any records must be weighed against the utility to the Government of their maintenance.” Doe v. U.S. Air Force, 812 F.2d 738, 741 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 65 (D.C.Cir.1984); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862,, 868 (3d Cir.1975). In balancing these interests, the court should consider: (1) the accuracy and adverse nature of the information, (2) the availability and scope of dissemination of the records, (3) the legality of the methods by which the information was compiled, (4) the existence of statutes authorizing the compilation and prohibiting the destruction of the records, and (5) the value of the records to the government. Paton, 524 F.2d at 869.
*3 Upon thorough consideration of all the evidence, Magistrate Judge Lefkow properly determined that the balance of interests in this case favors expungement of all names and other data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from the disputed records. For example, the Magistrate Judge noted that the labeling of

the files as “international terrorism” and “foreign counterintelligence-terrorism” could harm petitioners by the stigma that would be improperly attached to them upon release of the files. The Magistrate Judge appropriately found that this harm is compounded by the fact that the files are currently accessible to National Archives employees and could be accessible without restriction to the public in approximately 75 years. As the Magistrate Judge determined, this harm is particularly egregious since petitioners’ activities involved the exercise of their First Amendment rights, and not international terrorism as the files suggest. Despite instructions to close the CISPES investigation, the Chicago Field Office continued to collect information regarding CISPES’ constitutional activities. Therefore, not only are the CISPES files inaccurate, but the information contained in them is obtained as a result of unlawful conduct.
The Magistrate Judge accurately determined that the government’s interest in the retention or destruction of the records does not compare to the significant harm which petitioners would experience if the records are not expunged. The FBI has stressed that the purpose behind the National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984 is to “preserve and make available a full and rich documentary historical record ...” so that the record is not “impoverished, even distorted.”2 However, as the Magistrate Judge properly noted, provisions directing the maintenance or destruction of government records “must yield to statutory or constitutional rights elsewhere granted.” Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C.Cir.1984) (quoting Hobson, 737 F.2d at 64). As the Magistrate Judge concluded, the government’s interest in preserving a historical record is easily overcome by evidence that the information was unlawfully obtained and highly prejudicial to the named individuals. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Lefkow correctly recommended that plaintiff’s request for expungement be granted.
Respondent objects to this determination, claiming that, pursuant to Paragraph 5.2 of the Consent Decree, this court cannot order the expungement of the government records. As previously noted, Paragraph 5.2 only permits this court to enter orders which are “just and necessary to insure future compliance with” the Consent Decree. Respondent argues that the Magistrate Judge fails to adequately address how expungement of CISPES members and associates’ names from government records would affect the FBI’s behavior in the future. Respondent further argues that expungement could not have any significant effect on the FBI’s actions since transfer of the disputed records to the National Archives already assures that the CISPES files cannot be accessed for FBI investigations. Therefore, according to respondent, expungement is not a remedy which this court can appropriately order under the Consent Decree.
2

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

*4 This court disagrees. As both this court and the Magistrate Judge have adequately explained, expungement is an appropriate remedy under Paragraph 5.2. As this court noted in its October 2, 1991 opinion, the FBI’s enactment of new regulations for investigations similar to that of CISPES does not sufficiently demonstrate that the Consent Decree will not be violated. See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 541 (D.D.C.1978). Moreover, future compliance with the new regulations is also not guaranteed because FBI guidelines can be repealed or modified. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.1963).
Destruction of the fruits of the FBI’s unlawful conduct would better deter future violations by placing the Government on notice that it will not be permitted to derive any benefit from previous violations. This court recognizes that the FBI is already prevented from accessing the files to obtain information for future investigations. However, deleting the names of CISPES members and associates from the files better assures that the FBI cannot benefit from the unlawfully obtained information. This is particularly important since the files are currently accessible to National Archives employees and may eventually be accessible, without restriction, to the public. Therefore, contrary to respondent’s contention, this court finds that preventing it from benefitting from its unlawful activity should increase the likelihood of future compliance with the Consent Decree as Paragraph 5.2 requires.
Respondent also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that petitioners’ request for expungement be granted because petitioners have failed to adequately demonstrate that they have suffered irreparable harm. According to respondent, the mere existence of the CISPES investigation records or the court’s finding that respondent violated the Consent Decree does not suffice to establish the requisite irreparable harm. Rather, respondent argues that only a constitutional violation rises to the level of irreparable harm.
Expungement is an equitable remedy designed to prevent future harm as a result of an original violation. As respondent suggests, a court must first find there is a real and immediate threat of irreparable harm before it can allow expungement. See Carter v. Orleans Parish Public Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 263 n. 4 (5th Cir.1984). Thus, federal courts are empowered to order the expungement of government records where it is necessary to vindicate constitutional rights. Doe, 812 F.2d at 741 (quoting Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.Cir.1975)).
As previously noted, respondents began investigating CISPES because it suspected that CISPES associates and members were involved in international terrorism. Even

after it was determined that these individuals were only involved in political activities involving First Amendment rights, the Chicago Field Office of the FBI continued to collect and record information regarding petitioners’ lawful exercise of their Constitutional rights. Contrary to respondent’s assertion, not only did respondent violate the Consent Decree, but it also improperly threatened petitioners’ First Amendment rights.
*5 Moreover, courts have recognized that “there may remain a right not to be adversely affected by the information in the future. Such a right may exist if the information ... was acquired by fatally flawed procedures ...” Chastain, 510 F.2d at 1236; Doe, 812 F.2d at 741. There is no doubt that the information contained in the CISPES files was obtained as a result of “fatally flawed procedures.” Therefore, this court will not overrule the Magistrate Judge’s determination on this basis.
Respondent further objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination because it claims that she improperly sought to balance the harm to petitioners from the continued existence of the records against the government’s interest in their preservation. However, as previously discussed, this is exactly what the court is required to do with expungement requests such as that in this law suit. See Doe, 812 F.2d at 741; Hobson, 737 F.2d at 65; Paton, 524 F.2d at 868. Furthermore, contrary to respondent’s contention, the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that petitioners could be harmed by the retention of the files in the National Archives. In Paton, plaintiff sought to expunge a file designated “SM–SWP” for “subversive material Socialist Worker’s Party” that the FBI had prepared on her. 524 F.2d at 862. The court recognized that the labeling of her file as “SM–SWP” could prove to be extremely damaging to plaintiff’s reputation in the future. Therefore, while the court noted that plaintiff could not determine the exact consequences of her file, it ultimately determined that plaintiff had alleged sufficient injury to seek expungement of her file. Id. at 868.
Like the designation of plaintiff’s file in Paton, the wrongful designation of the CISPES files as “IT” for “international terrorism” could have an equally damaging effect upon petitioners’ reputations. The harm is particularly egregious in this case since the information contained in the files actually pertains to petitioners’ protected First Amendment activity. And, unlike the plaintiff in Paton, this court has already determined that the disputed files are currently accessible to National Archives employees and to the public with certain restrictions, and could become freely accessible to the public in approximately 75 years. Thus, contrary to respondent’s argument, the government’s interest in preserving a historical record is easily overcome by evidence that the information was unlawfully obtained and highly prejudicial to the named individuals.
3

Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1992)

Finally, respondent attacks the Magistrate Judge’s decision to expunge all names and other data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from the disputed records because she did not consider a less extreme remedy. When balancing petitioners and respondent’s interests, this court recognizes that expungement is intended to be a versatile tool. As the court stated in Chastain: “... expungement of only some records, from some Government files, may be enough, as may the placing of restrictions on how the information contained in the records may be used. It is a tool which must be applied with close attention to the peculiar facts of each case.” 510 F.2d at 1236; Hobson, 737 F.2d at 66 n. 86. While this court may have considerable discretion in applying this equitable remedy, its ultimate decision “must be rationally and selectively responsive to [the competing] interests [in the case].” Chastain, 510 F.2d at 1236.
*6 This court is not persuaded that a less extreme measure would better serve the competing interests in this case. As repeatedly noted in this opinion, the designation of the files as relating to international terrorism is highly prejudicial to petitioners’ reputations, particularly in light of the fact that the files actually describe protected constitutional activity. Moreover, the information in the files was obtained through unlawful measures which also violated the Consent Decree in this case. This court finds that expungement of information identifying particular CISPES members and associates is an appropriate remedy, and will best discourage future violations of the law and the Consent Decree.
Respondent counters that in a similar case retention of the disputed records in the National Archives was the very relief sought by other CISPES members. See Committee In Solidarity With The People of El Salvador v. Sessions, 929 F.2d 742 (D.C.Cir.1991). Respondent suggests that

the conclusion of the United States Appellate Court for the District of Columbia that this was the appropriate remedy provides an additional reason for this court to decline to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. However, Sessions and the instant case are distinguishable on the very basis that respondent highlights. Petitioners in Sessions did not request expungement of their names and other information identifying them as petitioners have done in the instant case. Therefore, unlike this court, the appellate court in Sessions had no reason to consider whether expungement was an appropriate remedy.
In sum, this court finds that the expungement requested strikes an appropriate compromise in this case. While the records which the government wishes to maintain in order to preserve the historical record will still be available at the National Archives, CISPES members and associates named in the reports will be protected. Moreover, this court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that expungement is both just and necessary to ensure future compliance with the Consent Decree. Therefore, this court adopts Magistrate Judge Lefkow’s report and recommendation. Petitioners’ motion for expungement of all names and other data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from government records is granted.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. Petitioners’ motion for the expungement of all names and other data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from government records is granted.
	  

Footnotes

1

This court notes that petitioners originally sought to have the CISPES files expunged in their entirety. In December 1991,

petitioners notified the court that they wished to limit their petition to the removal of all names and other data identifying CISPES

members and associates.

2

Sen.Rep. No. 98–373, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3865, 3874.

	  

4

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 558 F.2d 1031 (Table) (1977) 558 F.2d 1031 (Table)
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit Alliance To End Repression v. Rochford No. 76-2293 | 3/1/77
N.D.Ill. Opinion AFFIRMED
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. The Seventh Circuit provides by rule that when a decision does not satisfy the criteria for
publication it will be filed as an unpublished order. Except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case, an unpublished order shall not be cited or used as precedent. Seventh Circuit Rules, Rule 53(b), 28
U.S.C.A.)
1

 
 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 840 F.2d 920 (Table) (1988) 840 F.2d 920 (Table)
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter. The Seventh Circuit provides by rule that when a decision does not satisfy the criteria for
publication it will be filed as an unpublished order. Except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case, an unpublished order shall not be cited or used as precedent. Seventh Circuit Rules, Rule 53(b), 28
U.S.C.A.) United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit. Alliance to End Repression
v. City of Chicago NO. 87-2638 | FEB 01, 1988 Appeal From: N.D.Ill. Opinion VACATED AND REMANDED.
1

 
 Rochford v. Alliance to End Repression, 434 U.S. 828 (1977)

98 S.Ct. 108 Supreme Court of the United States
James M. ROCHFORD et al., petitioners, v.
ALLIANCE TO END REPRESSION et al
No. 76-1702 | October 3, 1977
Facts and opinion, 558 F.2d 1031.

Opinion Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Denied.
Parallel Citations 98 S.Ct. 108 (Mem), 54 L.Ed.2d 87
	  

1