ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

)

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE

)

CORPORATION

)

)

Defendant.

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT

This is an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to

correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of age and to provide

appropriate relief to individuals 40 years of age and older who were employed by

Defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and discharged or forced to retire

during a purported reduction-in-force, as a class (these individuals are named in

Attachment A hereto, and are hereinafter refen’ed to as "Claimants"). The Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that the Claimants, as a class, were

discharged, forced to retire, and otherwise denied equal employment opportunities

because of their age by Defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation in violation

of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 133 l, 1337, 1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (the "ADEA"), which incorporates by reference Sections 16(c) and 17of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA’), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c) and 217. 2. The unlawful employment practices alleged were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division,
PARTIE~ 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of the ADEA and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U,S.C. § 626(b), as amended by Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and by Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705. 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

(hereinafter referred to as "Defendant Employer"), a Georgia corporation, has continuously been a corporation doing business in the State of Georgia and in the City of Savannah, and has continuously maintained at least twenty (20) employees.
5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 1 l(b), (g) and (h) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(b), (g) and (h).
CONCILIATION 6. Prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the Commission’s representatives attempted to eliminate the unlawful employment practices alleged below and to effect voluntary compliance with the ADEA through informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion within the meaning of Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. Since at least August 2000, Defendant Employer has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Savannah, Georgia facility in violation of Section 4(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), by discharging the Claimants, or forcing the Claimants to retire, because of their age.

8. The effect of Defendant Employer’s practices complained of in paragraph 7, above, has been to deprive the Claimants of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees because of their age.
9. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 7, above, were willful within the meaning of Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from discharging, or forcing to retire, employees 40 years of age and older because of their age and any other employment practice which discriminates because of age against individuals 40 years of age and older. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for individuals 40 years of age and older, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.

C. Grant a judgment requiring Defendant Employer to pay appropriate back wages in an amount to be determined at trial, an equal sum in liquidated damages, and prejudgment interest, to individuals whose wages are being unlawfully withheld as a result of the acts complained above, including but not limited to the Claimants.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole all individuals adversely affected by the unlawful practices described above, by providing the affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of Defendant Employer’s unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstating the Claimants and awarding the Claimants all appropriate back pay, loss of pension, retirement, health benefits, insurance benefits, and other benefits (including employer contributions), an equal sum in liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and front pay.
E. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
F. Award the Commission its costs of this action. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by this

Complaim.

GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION W 180a1s"hLi"nSgttroeent,,ND.W.C. . 20507~
g. RbBE~F ROYAL~ Regional Attorney STEVEN M. TAPPER Acting Supervisory Trial Attorney Georgia Bar No. 698018 U. S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ATLANTA DISTRICT OFFICE 100 Alabama St., SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Telephone: (404) 562-6820 or 6932 Facsimile: (404) 562-6905

ATTACHMENT A
ADAMS, DEBBIE Y ALDERMAN SR, DAVID G ALVAREZ, PEDRO P. ARNOTT, DAVID K ASHCRAFT, VAL A BALL, DEREK A BARNHA_RT, C. ROBERT BAZEMORE, HAROLD L BLACKMON, CHARLES E. BLAND, KENNETH W BOLEBRUCH, DANIEL F BOLET, ANTONIO BRACKEEN, MAR/GAIL R. BRANNEN, RALPH D BRICHACEK, JOSEPH J BROOKS, OLIVER L BROWN, JOHN W BURK, BRIAN J. BURNSED, WANDA L BUTLER, BOBBY L. BUTRYMOWICZ, THOMAS J CA/IN, RICHARD F CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS, JOAN A COLLETT, GREG J. COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVIN, CECIL B. COSPER, WOODROW E CRABB, BRENDA J DANIEL, RONALD E. DAVIES, CURTIS R DAVIS, CHARLES A DAVIS, MARVIN DENTON, ROBERT R DERHAMMER, ROY A D1CKSON, DONALD R DOAN, LONG DODD, SARAH A DOUGHTY, RUSSELL H.

DUHACK, JOSEPH S EDWARDS, RALPH W. ELLIS, ROY M ELRICK, STANLEY M EMERSON, FLORA M. EMERSON, LUCILLE ENG, HARRY M. FAUCETTE, NORMAN E FERGUSON, RITA S. FLOWERS, CHARLES L FOLKS, CLARENCE E FRENCH, KENNA R. FRIEDENBERG, BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD, DAVID L GLADIN JR, JAMES S GONZALEZ, JORGE F. GOODARD, CHARLES B. GRANT, DONNA N. GREEN, JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKI, PAUL M. GUEDIRI, FARID HARRELSON, JAMES T HART JR, ROBERT E HAZARIWALA, RAMESH C HEBERT, DWAYNE HERNANDEZ, CARLOS R HOUGHTBY, ARTHUR D. HOUSER, WILLIAM F. HOWARD 111, GEORGE ITOI, NORITOSHI KALINOWSKY, ROY KEITH, MICHAEL W KENNEDY, LORRINDA M KIMBREW, MOLLIE A KNIGHT II, WALLACE R KRAMER, DEBORAH S LANCON, TERESA M LAZARUS, ALBERT LEFEVRE, DOUGLAS J. LEVENGOOD, JOHN LOLLIS, DONALD R. LOVE, LORI A MACKEY, GORDON N

MARTIN, JAMES T MAUGHAN, DAWN H. MCCORMICK, HERBERT L. MCCURRY, TAMMY A. MCDERMOTT, PATRICK J MCKENZIE, MARTY MCLAIN, LARRY G. MEDLIN, WAY-LAND R. MIDDLETON, EDGAR P MINCEY, RICHARD D MOORE, NAOMI R NAGY, JOHN NHUONG, NGUYEN V ODELL, DAVID J. O’KELLEY, MARCHETA B PACKER, GRAHAM J PALMER, ROBERT E PARKER SR., BRUCE K. PARKER, JAMES E PEAVY, BARBARA J PERIGARD, LYNN M. PHILLIPS, JAMES D PURCELL, ROBERT W RAINE, SUSAN C. READ, IVAN F REARS, JACQUELINE F REESE, DONNA B. REYES JR, EUGENE C RIPPEY, MICHAEL G ROBERTS, CHARLES E SAMMONS, DAVID E, SR SCHMIDT, HAROLD R SHUBBER, ADEL SLAVEN, DONALD E. SMITH, GAYLE C SMITHWICK, DENNIS M SOFFEL, JEAN B. STAHL, GEORGE T TAYLOR, CARL H. TAYLOR, JOHNNY D TAYLOR, MARGARET L TEBBETTS, ALAN R
TIDWELL, DAVID TIMBERLAKE JR, EDDIE H

TUINDER, TIMMY J. VAN GORP, DAVID H. VILLARI, JOSEPH VINCENT, DIAN E WALLIS, PAUL A WATERS, KEVIN P. WELLS, DAVID A WHITE, THOMAS C. WILLIAMS, JANICE WILLIAMS, JUDITH B WOOD, ROBERT J.

ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Civil Action No.CV 4 0 2 " 2 4 3

Plaintiff,

V.

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CONSENT DECREE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction II. Scope Ill. Term and Dismissal IV. Compliance with ADEA V. Settlement Fund VI. Procedure VII. Exclusion Notice to Alleged Voluntary Separations VIII. Fairness Hearing IX. Future Reductions in Force X. Notification of Vacancies Xl. Management Trainittg

XII. Non-Discrimination Policy

XIII. Reporting and Posting of Notice

XIV. Monitoring Compliance and Compliance Official

XV. Return/Destruction of Documents XVIo Enforcement XVII. Appeal

XVIII. Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

XIX. Press Release

XX. Notices

XXI. Governing Law

XXII. Exhibits XXIII. Entire Agreement

XXIV. Modification XXV. Severability

XXVI. Counterparts

Attachments

Covered Persons List A

Eligible Claimants List B

Timely Charging Parties C

Private Plaintiffs List

D

Alleged Voluntary Separation List E

Exclusion Notice F

Notice of Fairness Hearing and Opportunity to Object G

Notice of Final Approval H

Release

I

Posted Notice J

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter was instituted by Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("Commission"), an agency of the United States, alleging violation of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §

621 et seq~ The Commission has alleged that the Defendant, Gulfstream Aerospace

Corporation ("Gulfstream"), discriminated against employees age 40 and above at its

Savannah, Georgia location when it selected them for layoff in reductions in force

betweenAugust 20, 2000, andDecember 31, 2000.

B. Gulfstream denies that it engaged in any discrimination based on age, or

committed any other violation of law, in connection with RIFs or any other actions

alleged in the complaint. Nonetheless, the Commission and Gulfstream (collectively,

the "Parties") advise this Court that they wish to avoid the expense, delay and

uncertainties of protracted litigation in this matter, and therefore agree to settle this

action by this Consent Decree ("Decree").

C. The Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter

of and the Parties to this lawsuit.

D. The Parties agree that this Decree is voluntarily entered into by the

Parties, that it shall not constitute an adjudication and finding on the merits of the case, and that it shall not be construed as an admission by Gulfstream that it violated the ADEA.
E. This Decree is final and binding upon the Parties, their successors and assigns. Further, the Parties agree jointly to defend this Consent Decree should it be challenged by a non-party, including but not limited to an assertion during the term of this Decree by any Covered Person, as defined below, that his or her claim is not extinguished by this Decree, the Parties to bear their own legal fees and costs in any such defense, provided, however, the EEOC shall not be required to intervene as a defendant in any action brought against Gulfstream.
F. The Parties agree that this Decree fairly resolves the issues alleged in this lawsuit, and constitutes a complete resolution of all claims by the Commission of discriminatory retirement, layoff or termination under the ADEA or other applicable laws enforced by the Commission that were made or could have been made by the Commission in this action based on acts or omissions of Gulfstream regarding its Savannah, Georgia location, occurring between August 20, 2000 andthc date of the Complaint, and that its entry shall further the purposes of the ADEA.
G. The Parties have undertaken investigation, information-gathering, interviews, research, statistical reviews, and analysis sufficient to permit them to sufficiently assess the desirability of this resolution.
H. The Parties’ officers, agents, employees, successors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them shall not interfere with the relief

herein ordered, but shall reasonably cooperate in the implementation of this Decree.

This provision shall not expand the Court’s personal jurisdiction to any natural person

presently beyond that jurisdiction.

I. The Parties respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve

this Decree on or before

, pending final approval pursuant to

notice to interested parties and a fairness hearing (the "Fairness Hearing") as provided

in paragraph Viii of this Decree. Upon preliminary approval, and pending final

approval, the Parties will begin taking certain actions as set forth in paragraphs V, VI

and VII of this Decree.

J.

THIS DECREE CONTAINS IMPORTANT DEADLINES. FAILURE

TO MEET THESE DEADLINES CAN CAUSE RIGHTS TO BE LOST.

NOW THEREFORE, it is the preliminary finding of this Court, made on the

pleadings and the record as a whole, that this Decree constitutes a fair and equitable

resolution and shall further the purposes of the ADEA. This Court will make further

findings, and may finally approve this Decree, following notice to interested persons as

provided herein and a Fairness Hearing to be held on

, at the hour of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: This Court has jurisdiction over the Parties to and the subject matter of this action.
II. SCOPE A. This Decree resolves all claims for both monetary and non-monetary relief on the claim that Gulfstream laid off employees or forced employees to retire

in lieu of layoff because of their age for employees who meet the following criteria (hereinafter "Covered Persons"):
(1) They were age 40 or over at the time of their voluntary or involuntary layoff or retirement;
(2) They were regular full-time employees of Gulfstream at its Savannah, Georgia facility;
(3) Their involuntary layoff or retirement date, or involuntary date in the case of non-exempt employees, took effectbetween August 20, 2000 and December 31, 2000;
(4) They have not instituted or opted into an action that remains pending as of the date of the complaint arising from or relating to a layoff or retirement described in paragraph ILA.(3); and
(5) They have not previously entered into an agreement with Gulfstream that fully resolves and releases the claims encompassed in this Decree. The agreement, including the release and waiver, must have complied with Section 7(f) of the ADEA, as amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, in order for the claim to be resolved and released by the earlier agreement rather than this Decree.
This Decree includes employees, if any, meeting these criteria who have been issued a notice of right to sue that expired prior to the date of final Court approval of this Decree. A list of Covered Persons is attached hereto as Attachment A.
B. Attachment B ("Eligible Claimants") is a list of Covered Persons, less

persons that the Commission, after reviewing the list of Alleged Voluntary Separations prepared by Gulfstream and any objections filed by the recipients of the corresponding Exclusion Notices, determines voluntarily separated from their employment with Gulfstream. Attachment B will be provided to the Court after the procedure set forth in paragraph VII has been completed.
C. Attachment C ("Timely Charging Parties") is a list of all Covered Persons who filed timely charges with the Commission alleging age-based termination due to a reduction in the workforce during the relevant time period.
D. Attachment D ("Private Plaintiffs") is a list of persons who either instituted or opted into a private action that remains pending as of the date of filing of the Commission’s complaint arising from or relating to a layoff or retirement described in paragraph II.A.(3), whether or not they filed charges. This Decree does not affect the rights of Private Plaintiffs to proceed with those lawsuits, nor does it compromise the defenses of Gulfstream against such claims. It is the intent of the Parties that, consistent with Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Decree shall not be admissible for any purpose in such lawsuits or in any other proceeding of any kind other than a proceeding for enforcement or amendment of the Decree.
E. Attachment E ("Alleged Voluntary Separations") is a list of all Covered Persons who, according to Gulfstream’s current records, voluntarily separated from Gulfstream between August 20, 2000 and December 31, 2000.
F. To effect this paragraph lI, on or before the date of filing of the motion seeking preliminary Court approval of this Decree, the Commission shall

have filed its complaint consistent with subparagraph I.A of this Decree. Upon the filing of the complaint, the right of any Eligible Claimant to institute or opt into a private action asserting claims arising from or related to the subject matter of the Commission’s complaint shall be deemed to have terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1105 (llth Cir. 1996).
III. TERM AND DISMISSAL A. The term of this Decree shall be two (2) years from the date of final Court approval. Upon final approval of this Decree, this Court shall dismiss all claims by the Commission in this action with prejudice. During the two-year term of this Decree, however, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over the Parties for purposes of compliance with this Decree, including issuing such orders as may be required to effectuate its purposes. B. The Parties agree that all disputes between them regarding any provision of this Decree, including but not limited to any issue involving potential enforcement of the Decree, shall first be raised informally between them, and that they shall attempt in good faith to meet and confer regarding such matters with the view to prompt and informal resolution. If such matters are not resolved informally within 30 days, the Parties shall then exchange written notices setting forth their positions, and shall consider whether resort to mediation is in the best interests of the Parties. If the Parties cannot agree to mediate, or if the mediation does not result in an agreement between them, then they may bring the dispute to this Court for resolution, provided that they set forth with specificity the efforts they have made to comply with the provisions of

this paragraph. C. The dismissal of this action in accordance with the provisions of
subparagraph A of this paragraph III shall bar the Commission from bringing any administrative proceeding or suit under the ADEA against Gulfstream based in whole or in part on any acts or omissions occurring at its Savannah, Georgia facility on or before the date of the complaint, that either (1) were or could have been alleged in this lawsuit and as provided in paragraph II.A, or (2) involve class, systemic or pattern and practice allegations concerning employees of Gulfstream’s Savannah, Georgia facility, provided it occurred on or before the date of the complaint.
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH ADEA During the term of this Decree Gulfstream agrees it shall not: A. Undertake any reductions in force that discriminate against employees age 40 and over on the basis of their age in violation of the ADEA. B. Retaliate against any person because that person has opposed allegedly discriminatory policies or practices or has filed an EEOC charge, or because such person made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or litigation under the ADEA or concerning this case or this Decree.
V. SETTLEMENT FUND A. Gulfstream shall pay the gross sum of $2,176,307 ("Settlement Fund") for the use and benefit of Eligible Claimants as provided in this paragraph V. B. Following preliminary Court approval of this Decree, Guifstream

shall maintain the Settlement Fund in its account, and shall credit interest to the Settlement Fund at the current average money market rate of interest as published from time to time in the Wall Street Journal, the interest to inure to the benefit of Eligible Claimants. Except as provided in subparagraphs F and G of paragraph VI, Gulfstream may not use this Settlement Fund for any reason other than the benefit of Eligible Claimants pursuant to the terms of this Decree.
C. Each Eligible Claimant shall be allocated a share in the Settlement Fund, which shall be determined by the Commission based on the following factors: (1) the age(s) and number(s) of the Eligible Claimant’s omparators(s) retained and/or subsequently hired by Gulfstream, if any; (2) the Eligible Claimant’s hourly rate as of September 29, 2000 (or as of the Eligible Claimant’s date of termination if such date is prior to September 29, 2000); (3) whether the Eligible Claimant is a Timely Charging Party; (4) the Eligible Claimant’s age as of September 29, 2000; (5) the Eligible Claimant’s years of service with Gulfstream as of September 29, 2000;and (6) the length of time, if applicable, that the Eligible Claimant was out of work before being rehired by Gulfstream; provided, however, that no single Eligible Claimant’s share may exceed four times the average share of all Eligible Claimants or may be less than one-fourth of such average share. This process is further described in paragraph VI.A.
D. Because the parties disagree on the relative merits of the back pay, front pay, liquidated damages, and interest claims, and Gulfstream in particular does not agree or admit that any of the predicate requirements for such damages
10

have occurred, including willful discrimination, no allocation between the categories of back pay, front pay, liquidated damages, interest, or other categories of relief shall be made pursuant to this Decree.
VI. PROCEDURE A. No later than 30 days after the mailing described in paragraph VII.A of this Decree, the Commission shall provide Gulfstream with its preliminary allocation of the Settlement Fund among all Covered Persons, applying the factors set forth in paragraph V.C. Gulfstream shall have 15 days to respond to the Commission in writing regarding this preliminary allocation. During this 15-day period, Gulfstream will review the Commission’s proposed allocation for fairness and reasonableness. If the Parties disagree as to such allocation, the Parties shall confer in good faith to reach an appropriate resolution. However, the Commission, subject to Court approval of the Decree and the provisions of paragraph V.C, shall determine how the Settlement Fund is allocated. B. Not later than 15 days after the completion of the process relating to Alleged Voluntary Separations described in paragraph VII, the Commission shall provide Gnlfstream with a final allocation of the Settlement Fund among Eligible Claimants. This final allocation shall exclude all Covered Persons determined to have been voluntarily separated from employment with Gulfstream pursuant to paragraph VII.B, and shall reallocate the Settlement Fund to all remaining Eligible Claimants in the same proportion and according to the same formulas applied in the preliminary allocation described in subparagraph A of this paragraph.
11

C. Using the amounts to which the Commission has determined each Eligible Claimant is entitled as described in subparagraph B, Gulfstream shall create a report listing the net amount to be paid to each Eligible Claimant, including allocable interest from the Settlement Fund (and the amount of the employee share of FICA and mandatory income taxes withheld, along with the amount of the employer share of FICA and other contributions made), and shall provide a brief, general summary of the method used to calculate these amounts. The Settlement Fund shall not under any circumstances be used to pay the employer’s share of FICA.
D. If no appeal from final Court approval and dismissal of the Commission’s claims in this action is taken~ then within 30 days after expiration of the last deadline within which to appeal, Gulfstream shall mail to each Eligible Claimant, at the same address used for the Notice of Fairness Hearing and Opportunity to Object described in paragraph VIII.B or any such updated address as may be obtained thereafter, a Notice of Final Approval in substantially the same form as Attachment H, which gives notice of the Court’s order of final approval and of the amount to be distributed to that Eligible Claimant pursuant to the calculations set forth in subparagraphs B and C. The Notice of Final Approval shall also advise the Eligible Claimant that, in order to receive payment, he or she must sign a release, substantially in the same form as Attachment I, and return it to Gulfstream at the indicated address no later than 60 days of the date of mailing of the Notice of Final Approval.
E. Within 30 days of the expiration of the 60-day period described in subparagraph D, Guifstream shall draw on the account established according to

paragraph V.B and mail to each Eligible Claimant (or his or her estate or heirs) who has satisfactorily completed and returned the release described in subparagraph D a check in the net amount indicated in the report described in subparagraph C, subject to the conditions described below and elsewhere in this Decree. The right of any Eligible Claimant to receive any monetary relief shall be subject to and contingent upon timely and satisfactory completion and return of the release described in subparagraph D. All payments under this Decree shall also be subject to any deductions or withholding required by law.
F. If any checks are returned or are not cashed within 90 days of mailing, Gulfstream shall notify the Commission promptly so that the Commission may take, at its expense, further steps to reach those Eligible Claimants. In the event that any funds, including accrued interest, are not distributed as required by this Decree for any reason, including the failure of an Eligible Claimant to complete or return a release, then they shall be paid to the Hospice Savannah, subject to the deadlines provided in this Decree.
G. If this Decree does not receive final Court approval, or if the Decree (as approved by the Court) is not upheld on appeal or becomes null and void for any other reason, the Parties shall confer in good faith and attempt to make such modifications that will facilitate approval of the Court or satisfaction of the appellate court. If the Parties are not able to agree on such modifications, the Settlement Fund, plus accrued interest, shall revert to Gulfstream, and both Gulfstream and the Commission shall be relieved of all further obligations under the Decree.
13

VII. EXCLUSION NOTICE TO ALLEGED VOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS

A. No later than 10 days after the Court’s preliminary approval of this

Decree, Gulfstream shall mail an Exclusion Notice (Attachment F) to the Alleged

Voluntary Separations, who shall have 30 days from the date of this mailing to

deliver to Gulfstream an objection in writing to their exclusion from relief under

this Decree. Gulfstream shall, within 60 days after the above-referenced mailing,

provide the Commission with a list of Alleged Voluntary Separations who timely

object according to this subparagraph A, along with a copy of each objection.

B. Within 30 days after receipt of the list described in subparagraph A,

the Commission shall determine whether it believes any objecting Alleged Voluntary

Separation was not voluntarily separated for purposes of the Decree, and shall give

notice to Gulfstream of any such determination. If Gulfstream disagrees with any

such determination by the Commission, the parties shall confer in good faith

concerning the resolution of any disagreements, subject to the procedures set forth

in paragraph III.B above.

C. Any Alleged Voluntary Separation, as identified in Attachment E, for

whom it has been agreed that he or she was not voluntarily separated pursuant to

subparagraph B shall thereafter be treated for all purposes as an Eligible Claimant

under this Decree.

VIII. FAIRNESS HEARING

A. The Court shall conduct a Fairness Hearing on

., at

a.m. at U.S. District Court, 125 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 31401.

B. No later than 60 days prior to the date of this Fairness Hearing, the Parties shall jointly mail to each Eligible Claimant, at Gulfstream’s expense, a Notice of Fairness Hearing and Opportunity to Object, substantially in the form set forth in Attachment G. This Notice shall, at a minimum, summarize the terms and conditions of the Decree and advise Eligible Claimants of their rights under the settlement, including the right to object and the procedure for exercising that right.
C. If any Eligible Claimant wishes to object to the entry of this Decree, the objector must: (i) file with the Court a detailed, written statement of the objection not later than 30 days prior to the Fairness Hearing; and (ii) serve copies of the written statement of objection on counsel for the Parties postmarked not later than 30 days prior to the Fairness Hearing. Any objector may, but is not required to, appear at the Fairness Hearing either in person or through counsel hired by the objector.
D. The Parties may file a written position statement on any objections at least 7 days prior to the Fairness Hearing.
IX. FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN FORCE A. In the event Gulfstream engages in a reduction in force involving the termination or retirement of at least 75 employees over 6 months at its Savannah, Georgia location during the term of this Decree, Gulfstream shall provide to the Commission, within 30 days after completion of the reduction in force, a report that includes:
1. The date(s) of the reduction in force;
15

2. An indication as to whether the reduction in force applied to exempt employees, non-exempt employees, or both;
3. A list of each individual terminated in the reduction in force, including name, date of birth, date of hire, and date of termination; a list of the department numbers and corresponding department names in which any employee was terminated as a result of the reduction in force; and
4. For each department in which any employee was terminated as a result of the reduction in force, the total number of employees employed in the department before the reduction in force, the total number of employees employed in the department before the reduction in force who were age forty or over as of the date of the reduction in force, the total number of employees in the department who were terminated in the reduction in force, and the total number of employees in the department who were over 40 years of age as of the date of the reduction in force who were terminated in the reduction in force.
B. Gulfstream shall simultancously provide the Commission with any WARN notices sent to state or local governments during the term of this Decree. Nothing contained in this subparagraph B shall be deemed to impose any obligation whatsoever on Gulfstream to postpone or change any planned layoff, even if the Commission disputes Gulfstream’s compliance with these notice provisions.
C. All written information described in this paragraph IX shall be subject to retention under subparagraph XIII.B. and production under subparagraph XIV.A. of this Decree.

X. NOTIFICATION OF VACANCIES During the term of this Decree, Gulfstream will maintain a web page that includes vacancies at its Savannah, Georgia facility, which Eligible Claimants and other individuals who may be interested in applying can check at their convenience. Any Eligible Claimant hired by Gulfstream, at any time within two years of the date that the Court gave final approval of the Decree, shall be required to forfeit to Gulfstream a proportionate share of the monetary award under this Decree that is deemed to represent front pay, which, solely for purposes of this paragraph, shall be assumed to be 35 percent of the total award. The proportional amount of front pay to be forfeited shall be determined by calculating the number of months from the Eligible Claimant’s date of hire through the two year expiration date after the Court gave final approval of the decree, and dividing the latter number by twentyfour. Any Eligible Claimant hired beyond the two years expiration date after the Court gave final approval of the Decree shall not be required to forfeit any part of his/her award to Guifstream. Eligible Claimants who apply in this manner shall be considered in the same manner as any other applicants. If an Eligible Claimant is re-hired by Gulfstream, he or she shall be treated in the same manner as any other employee at Gulfstream, shall be subject to the same performance and attendance requirements as other employees, and shall not be accorded any special or preferential treatment. Within ninety (90) days after any Eligible Claimant is re-hired, Gulfstream’s designated compliance officer shall provide to the Regional Attorney a notification
17

list of the rehiring.
XI. MANAGEMENT TRAINING A. Beginning not later than 90 days after final Court approval of this Decree or Commission approval of the training, whichever is later, Gulfstream shall provide a reasonable amount of training, whose content has been previously reviewed and approved by the Commission (which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld), to substantially all employees in its Savannah, Georgia facility who hold a supervisory position as of the date of final Court approval, subject to reasonable availability of the employees to be trained. B. Training shall consist of at least the following:
I. Gulfstream’s obligations under the Decree; 2. Gulfstream’s statutory obligations under the ADEA in general, and in particular its obligation not to discriminate on the basis of age in employment decisions concerning the continuing employment of current staff; and 3. Objective, non-discriminatory decision-making and proper procedures for evaluations, reductions in force and layoffs. C. Gulfstream shall complete this training not later than 270 days after final Court approval of this Decree, subject to reasonable availability of the employees to be trained, and shall notify the EEOC within two weeks after completion.
XII. NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICY
18

A. Gulfstream shall develop and tender to the Commission, within 60

days of final Court approval of this Decree, a copy of its written non-discrimination

policy which establishes specific procedures for receiving, investigating and

resolving complaints of discrimination lodged by any employee. Gulfstream’s non-

discrimination policy shall include, at a minimum, the following safeguards:

i.

A procedure to report the complaint to someone other than the

alleged discriminator, if the immediate supervisor is the alleged discriminator; A provision that establishes a prompt investigation of the

complaint;

3. A provision prohibiting retaliation against persons who file

complaints or participate in the process; and

4. A provision that warns of appropriate sanctions against

persons who violate the policy. B. Gulfstream may include in the non-discrimination policy a disclaimer

that the policy does not constitute an express or implied contract.

XIII. REPORTING AND POSTING OF NOTICE

A. Within one month after the end of each six-month period during the

term of this Decree, Gulfstream shall submit a report to the Commission listing all

complaints or charges of age discrimination made by employees or former

employees of Gulfstream’s Savannah, Georgia facility to the persons designated to receive such complaints with the following information:

1. The date of the complaint or charge;

19

The name and contact information of the person making the
t
complaint or charge 3. The name and title of the person against whom the complaint
or charge was made; 4. The underlying allegations of the complaint or charge; 5. The name and contact information of the persons receiving the
complaint or charge; 6. A summary of the action taken by Gulfstream in response to
the complaint or charge; and 7. The current status of the investigation of the complaint or
charge and a summary of its resolution. B. Gulfstream shall retain for the term of this Decree, or as required by
the Commission’s Recordkeeping Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1627, whichever is longer, all documents related to selection of employees for actual reductions in force and the reports referenced in subparagraph A of this paragraph.
The reports required by this paragraph XIII shall be sent postage prepaid to:
Regional Attorney Atlanta District Office Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama Street, S.W., Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
D. Upon entry of this Decree and continuing during its term, Gnlfstream
20

will keep posted a copy of the Notice attached to this Decree (as Attachment J) at Gulfstream’s place(s) of business. The posting required by this paragraph shall be made on bulletin boards or locations selected so that each employee at these facilities shall have the opportunity to observe at least one such posting when at the facility. Gulfstream will fulfill the posting requirement within fifteen (15) days of the entry final approval of this Decree and shall certify, within thirty (30) days of such date, that posting has been accomplished.
Gulfstream shall not withhold the right of the Commission to enter upon Gulfstream’s premises to monitor compliance with this posting requirement. Should the Notice become defaced, marred, or otherwise unreadable, Gulfstream will ensure that a new, readable copy of the Notice is posted in the same manner as heretofore specified within five (5) working days of discovering the defective Notice.
XIV. MONITORING COMPLIANCE AND COMPLIANCE OFFICIAL A. During the term of this Decree the Commission shall have the right to
review compliance with this Decree at Gulfstream’s facility located in Savannah, Georgia. The review shall consist of, but not necessarily be limited to, inspecting and copying (at Gulfstream’s expense) a reasonable number of relevant, unclassified documents and interviewing Gulfstream employees. Before scheduling any on-site compliance review, the Commission shall notify Gulfstream in writing of each issue it seeks to review, including particular jobs or departments that are of concern to the Commission and any specific information that has led the Commission to request a review. The Commission shall further give Gulfstream at least 3 business days’ prior
21

notice of any visit to Gulfstream*s premises, which visit shall occur during normal business hours and be conducted according to Gulfstream’s security and safety procedures. Gulfstream shall be allowed to have an attorney and a Human Resources representative present during any Commission interview of an employee holding a supervisory or management position, as determined by Gulfstream. The Commission shall give Gulfstream at least 7 business days within which to copy documents. Gulfstream shall be required promptly to comply with all reasonable requests of the Commission for such monitoring information, including provision of personnel data previously described by this Decree in a machine-readable format as agreed to by the Parties, subject to any agreements or protections that may bc reasonably necessary to protect the confidentiality of any information, documents, or data provided to the Commission.
B. During the term of this Decree, the Commission shall not disclose documents or other information obtained pursuant to this Decree outside of the agency, shall use the documents and information solely for the purpose of monitoring or enforcing compliance with this Decree and shall protect the information from disclosure under exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act, U.S.C. § 552(b), to the maximum extent permitted by law, subject to one or more of the following exemptions: (i) confidential commercial and financial information, (ii) confidential personal information, or (iii) information, disclosure of which would interfere with the Commission’s enforcement activities.
C. Gulfstream shall designate a compliance official who shall be responsible
22

for compliance with this Decree, and also responsible for coordinating and overseeing Gulfstream’s compliance with this Decree.
XV. RETURN/DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS A. Within 60 days of the expiration of the Decree, the Commission shall destroy all information provided to the Commission by Gulfstream in machinereadable form in any way relating to this action or the underlying administrative investigation, including all copies of this information, whether under the direct control of the Commission or under the control of third parties to whom the Commission provided the information, provided that during the term of this Decree Gulfstream shall maintain this information substantially in the form provided to the Commission. B. During the term of this Decree, the Commission shall retain all reports and related information provided to the Commission by Guifstream as required or permitted by this Decree ("Monitoring Information"). After expiration of this Decree, the Commission shall continue to preserve the confidentiality of Monitoring Information as required by paragraph XII| of this Decree, and shall process this information according to the Commission’s record retention policy then in effect, which currently contemplates destruction after three years.
XVI. ENFORCEMENT A. There is no private right of enforcement in connection with Gulfstream’s obligations under the Decree and only the Commission, Gulfstream, or their successors or assigns may enforce compliance herewith or otherwise have any

rights hereunder. B. Enforcement may be had by either Party subject to paragraph III.B
of this Decree. XVII. APPEAL
In the event of an appeal from an order of the Court finally approving this Decree, all of Gulfstream’s obligations under this Decree, except for accrual of interest on the Settlement Fund under paragraph V.B, shall be suspended, and shall resume only upon complete non-appealable affirmance, with the date the Court of Appeals issues its final, non-appealable mandate then being treated as the date of final Court approval.
XVIII. COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES Each Party shall be responsible for and shall pay its own attorney’s fees and costs, except as to costs and expenses expressly allocated by this Decree.
XIX. PRESS RELEASE The Parties’ officers, agents, employees, successors, and all other persons in active concert with them, shall make no comment to the public at large in the form of a press release, news conference or similar disclosure concerning this Decree or settlement of the claims between them in this case, prior to the date of preliminary Court approval of this Decree as contemplated by subparagraph I.J. of this Decree. The Parties shall reasonably attempt to exchange preliminary draft press releases and coordinate the timing and recipients of their initial press releases subsequent to the date of preliminary Court approval, and shall make themselves available for
24

discussions in good faith concerning any such draft initial press releases that are exchanged, but the Parties shall ultimately have sole control over the contents of their respective press releases.
XX. NOTICES All notices required or desired to be given under this Decree shall be in writing and delivered by hand, by registered or certified mail, by courier, or by facsimile confirmed by first-class mail, to counsel for the respective Parties at their respective addresses set forth below, or to such other address as any such Party may designate in a notice delivered pursuant to this paragraph.
XXI. GOVERNING LAW The Parties agree that the validity, construction and enforcement of this Decree shall be governed by federal law. To the extent that it is determined that the validity, construction or enforcement of this Decree or any release executed pursuant to its terms is governed by state law, the law of the State of Georgia shall apply.
XXII. EXHIBITS All of the Exhibits to this Decree are material and integral parts hereof and are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
XXIII. ENTIRE AGREEMENT This Decree, including the Exhibits hereto, contains the entire agreement and understanding of the parties with respect to the settlement all claims described herein. This Decree does not impose any obligations on the parties beyond the terms

and conditions stated herein. Accordingly, this Decree shall not prevent or preclude Gulfstream from revising its employment practices and policies or taking other personnel actions during the term of this Decree that do not violate specific requirements of this Decree.
XXIV. MODIFICATION The Parties may jointly agree to modify the Decree, subject to approval of the Court pursuant to a joint motion of the Parties.
XXV. SEVERABILITY Whenever possible, each provision and term of this Decree shall be interpreted in such a manner as to be valid and enforceable. However, in the event that any provision or term of this Decree or its application to any specific person or circumstance should be determined to be or rendered invalid or unenforceable, all other provisions and terms of this Decree and the application thereof to all other persons and circumstances subject thereto shall remain unaffected to the extent permitted by law.
XXVI. COUNTERPARTS To facilitate execution, this Decree may be executed in counterparts, and such counterparts when so executed shall constitute a single agreement, as if one document has been signed by the parties hereto.

BY CONSENT: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Gwendolyn Reams Associate General Counsel 1801 L Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507

Regional Attorney Georgia Bar No. 617505

Da’te

Steven M. Tapper

Date

Acting Supervisory Trial Attorney Georgia Bar No. 698018

Atlanta District Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

100 Alabama Street, S.W., Suite 4R30

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 562-6812 or-6820

(404) 562-6905 (facsimile)

GULFST~

CORPORATION

Ira Berm~"~E

Date

Senior Vice President, Administration and General Counsel

Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

500 Gulfstream Road

Savannah, Georgia 31407

(912) 965-5201

(912) 965-4764 (facsimile)

27

GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

William l~x~g, Esq.

Date

Pro Hac Vice

Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP

1050 Connecticut Avenue

Washington, DC 20036

202-955-8573

202-530-9559 (facsimile)

Counsel for Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

HUNTER, MCLEAN, EXLEY & DUNN P.C.

Wade W. Herring, II

Date

Georgia Bar No.

Hunter, Maelean, Exley & Dunn PoC.

200 East Saint Julian Street

P.O. Box 9848

Savannah, Georgia 31412

(912) 236-0261

(912) 236-4936 (facsimile)

Counsel for Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

28

PRELIMINARILY APPROVED this __ day of BY THE COURT:
THE HONORABLE B. AVANT EDENF|ELD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2002.

FINALLY APPROVED this __ day of Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
BY THE COURT:

200__, subject to the

THE HONORABLE B. AVANT EDENFIELD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29

ATTACHMENT A
LIST OF COVERED PERSONS
ADAMS, DEBBIE Y ALDERMAN SR, DAVID G ALVAREZ, PEDRO P. ARNOTT, DAVID K ASHCRAFT, VAL A BALL, DEREK A BARNHART, C. ROBERT BAZEMORE, HAROLD L BLACK_MON, CHARLES E BLAND, KENNETH W BOLEBRUCH, DANIEL F BOLET, ANTONIO BRACKEEN, MARIGAIL R. BRANNEN, RALPH D BRICHACEK, JOSEPH J BROOKS, OLIVER L BROWN, JOHN W BURK, BRIAN J. BURNSED, WANDA L BUTLER, BOBBY L. BUTRYMOWICZ, THOMAS J CAHN, RICHARD F CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS, JOAN A COLLETT, GREG J. COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVIN, CECIL B. COSPER, WOODROW E CRABB, BRENDA J DANIEL, RONALD E. DAVIES, CURTIS R DAVIS, CHARLES A DAVIS, MARVIN DENTON, ROBERT R DERHAMMER, ROY A DICKSON, DONALD R DOAN, LONG DODD, SARAH A DOUGHTY, RUSSELL H.

DUHACK, JOSEPH S EDWARDS, RALPH W. ELLIS, ROY M ELRICK, STANLEY M EMERSON, FLORA M. EMERSON, LUCILLE ENG, HARRY M. FAUCETTE, NORMAN E FERGUSON, RITA S. FLOWERS, CHARLES L FOLKS, CLARENCE E FRENCH, KENNA R FRIEDENBERG, BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD, DAVID L GLADIN JR, JAMES S GONZALEZ, JORGE F. GOODARD, CHARLES B. GRANT, DONNA N. GREEN, JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKI, PAUL M. GUEDIRI, FARID HARRELSON, JAMES T HART JR, ROBERT E HAZARIWALA, RAMESH C HEBERT, DWAYNE HERNANDEZ, CARLOS R HOUGHTBY, ARTHUR D. HOUSER, WILLIAM F. HOWARD III, GEORGE ITOI, NORITOSHI KALINOWSKY, ROY KEITH, MICHAEL W KENNEDY, LORRINDA M KIMBREW, MOLLIE A KNIGHT II, WALLACE R KRAMER, DEBORAH S LANCON, TERESA M LAZARUS, ALBERT LEFEVRE, DOUGLAS J. LEVENGOOD, JOHN LOLLIS, DONALD R. LOVE, LORI A MACKEY, GORDON N

MARTIN, JAMES T MAUGHAN, DAWN H. MCCORMICK, HERBERT L. MCCURRY, TAMMY A. MCDERMOTT, PATRICK J MCKENZIE, MARTY MCLAIN, LARRY G. MEDLIN, WAYLAND R. MIDDLETON, EDGAR P MINCEY, RICHARD D MOORE, NAOMI R NAGY, JOHN NHUONG, NGUYEN V ODELL, DAVID J. O’KELLEY, MARCHETA B PACKER, GRAHAM J PALMER, ROBERT E PARKER SR., BRUCE K. PARKER, JAMES E PEAVY, BARBARA J PERIGARD, LYNN M. PHILLIPS, JAMES D. PURCELL, ROBERT W RAINE, SUSAN C. READ, IVAN F REARS, JACQUELINE F REESE, DONNA B. REYES JR, EUGENE C RIPPEY, MICHAEL G ROBERTS, CHARLES E SAMMONS, DAVID E, SR SCHMIDT, HAROLD R SHUBBER, ADEL SLAVEN, DONALD E. SMITH, GAYLE C SMITHWICK, DENNIS M SOFFEL, JEAN B. STAHL, GEORGE T TAYLOR, CARL H. TAYLOR, JOHNNY D TAYLOR, MARGARET L TEBBETTS, ALAN R TIDWELL, DAVID TIMBERLAKE JR, EDDIE H

TUINDER, T1MMY J. VAN GORP, DAVID H. VILLARI, JOSEPH VINCENT, DIAN E WALLIS, PAUL A WATERS, KEVIN P. WELLS, DAVID A WHITE, THOMAS C. WILLIAMS, JANICE WILLIAMS, JUDITH B WOOD, ROBERT J.

ATTACHMENT B
LIST OF ELIGIBLE CLAIMANTS
[To be provided to the Court, pursuant to paragraph IIB of the Decree, upon completion of the Exclusion Nohce process set forth in paragraph VII of the Decree]

ATTACHMENT C
LIST OF TIMELY CHARGING PARTIES
ARNOTT, DAVID K BARNHART, C. ROBERT BRANNEN, RALPH D BRICHACEK, JOSEPH J BROOKS, OLIVER L BROWN, JOHN W BURNSED, WANDA L BUTRYMOWICZ, THOMAS J CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS, JOAN A COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVfN, CECIL B. COSPER, WOODROW E DANIEL, RONALD E. DAVIES, CURTIS R DAVIS, CHARLES A DENTON, ROBERT R DOAN, LONG DODD, SARAH A ELRICK, STANLEY M EMERSON, LUCILLE FAUCETTE, NORMAN FRIEDENBERG, BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD, DAVID L GONZALEZ, JORGE F. GREEN, JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKI, PAUL M. HARRELSON, JAMES T HAZARIWALA, RAMESH C HEBERT, DWAYNE HOWARD IlI, GEORGE ITOI, NORITOSHI KENNEDY, LORRINDA M MARTIN, JAMES MCKENZIE, MARTY MEDLIN, WAYLAND MINCEY, RICHARD D MOORE, NAOMI R NHUONG, NGUYEN V

O’KELLEY, MARCHETA B PARKER, JAMES E PERIGARD, LYNN M RA1NE, SUSAN C. READ, IVAN F REYES JR, EUGENE C SAMMONS, DAVID E, SR SCHMIDT, HAROLD R SMITHWICK, DENNIS M TEBBETTS, ALAN R WILLIAMS, JUDITH B

ATTACHMENT D
LIST OF PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
BARNHART, C. ROBERT BRANNEN, RALPH D BRICHACEK, JOSEPH J BROOKS, OLD,’ER L BROWN’, JOHN W BURNSED, WANDA L BUTRYMOWICZ, THOMAS J CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS, JOAN A COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVIN, CECIL B COSPER, WOODROW E DANIEL, RONALD E DAVIES, CURTIS R DAVIS, CHARLES A DAVIS, MARVIN DENTON, ROBERT R DOAN, LONG DODD, SARAH A DUHACK, JOSEPH S ELRICK, STANLEY M EMERSON, LUCILLE FAUCETTE, NORMAN E FRIEDENBERG, BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD, DAVID L GONZALEZ, JORGE F. GREEN, JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKJ, PAUL M. HAZARIWALA, RAMESH C HEBERT, DWAYNE HOWARD III, GEORGE KENNEDY, LORRINDA M LANCON, TERESA M LEVENGOOD. JOHN MCKENZIE, MA~RTY MINCEY, RICHARD D MOORE, NAOMI R NHUONG, NGUYEN V O’KELLEY, MARCHETA B PARKER, JAMES E PEAVY, BARBARA J

PHILLIPS, JAMES D PURCELL, ROBERT W RAINE, SUSAN C. READ, IVAN F R_EYES JR, EUGENE C ROBERTS, CHARLES E SAMMONS, DAVID E, SR SMITHWICK, DENNIS M SOFFEL, JEAN B. TEBBETTS, ALAN R WILLIAMS, JUDITH B

ATTACHMENT E
LIST OF ALLEGED VOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS
ALDERMAN SR, DAVID G ALVAREZ, PEDRO P. COLLETT, GREG J. DICKSON, DONALD R DOUGHTY, RUSSELL H ELLIS, ROY M EMERSON, FLORA M. GLADIN JR, JAMES S GOODARD, CHARLES B. MAUGHAN, DAWN H MCCORMICK, HERBERT L. MCDERMOTT, PATRICK J NAGY, JOHN PALMER, ROBERT g REARS, JACQUELINE, F SMITH, GAYLE C TAYLOR, MARGARET L WALLIS, PAUL A WELLS, DAVID A WILLIAMS, JANICE

ATTACHMENT F

EXCLUSION NOTICE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

C~wl Action No

Platntfff,

v
GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION

Defendant.

EXCLUSION NOTICE

To: Former Gulfstream Aerospace Corporatton Employee:

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and Gulf stream Aerospace Corporation ("Gulfstream"), have entered into a Consent Decree in the case of EEOC v. Gulfstream Aerospace Comoration, filed ,2002. The Court has prehminarily approved this Decree and this notme is being sent to you with the Court’s approval The Decree resolves the EEOC’s clmms that Gulfstream dmcnmlnated against regular, full-time, non-union employees age 40 and older who were lind off or forced to retire ~n lieu of layoff between August 20, 2000, and December 31, 2000. Gulfstream denies all allegations ofdiscnrnination but has agreed to the Consent Decree and settlement to avoid litigation.

Gulfstream’s current records show that you were 40 or older when you left Gulfstream. Those records also show that:

a. you were not laid off, or

b. you voluntarily left your employment w~th Gulfstream.

Because these records show that you were not laid off involuntarily or forced to retire, you are being excluded from obtaining any benefits under the Consent Decree.

If you did not leave the Company voluntarily, and you wish to object to being excluded from the benefits of the Consent Decree, you must send your written objection to the following address:
[NAME OF COMPLIANCE OFFICER] Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation 500 Gulfstream Road Savannah, Georgia 31402
Your objection must be received at this address by 5:00 p.m. on [30 DAYS AFTER MAILING DATE], or else the EEOC will not consider your objection. It is not enough to mail your objection on that date. To avoid problems over this timeliness issue, we suggest you mail any objection, if you have one, early, or that you send it by certified mail, return receipt requested.
You must include a detailed written explanation of whatever facts you have that show that your separation from Gulfstream was not voluntary. At the end of your written statement of objection, you must write. "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct," then sign your name. social security number, current address and telephone number(s) and the date.
If you have any questions about this Exclusion Not,ce, contact Marcus Keegan at (404) 562-6818 (He works for the EEOC.)
The EEOC will notify you of its decision concerning your objection. If you are later allowed to participate m the benefits of this Decree, you will be sent a package of information explaining what to do. You must follow all instructions carefully and Ln a t,mely fashion.

ATTACHMENT G

NOTICE OF FAIRNESS HEARING AND OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

C~wl Action No.

Plaintiff,

V.
GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION
Defendant

NOTICE TO ELIGIBLE CLAIMANTS OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

To Former Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Employee

On

,2002, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") filed a class action age discrtmmatlon lawsuit against

Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation ("Gulfstream" or "the Company"). The lawsuit alleges that the Company discriminated against persons ("Covered Persons") who were

at the time of their separation from employment regular, full-tm3e employees at the

Company’s Savannah, Georgia, facility age 40 and older, and that such separation occurred between August 20, 2000, and December 31,2000. Gulfstream denies that it

engaged ~n any dlegal discrim~natlon or that it committed any other wolatlon of law ~n

connection with these separations from employment or any other actions alleged ~n the complaint, but it has agreed to a settlement and Consent Decree to avoid the expense,

delay and uncertainties of protracted litigation. The Consent Decree is not an admission by the Company that it violated any law.
The proposed Consent Decree agreed to by the EEOC and Gulfstream has been filed with the Court, whtch must approve the Consent Decree before it becomes final and effective. You have been sent this notice because the Company’s records show that you are a person ("Eligible Claimant") who may be entitled to rehef under the proposed Consent Decree upon satisfaction of certain conditions.
THIS NOTICE IS TO ADVISE YOU OF THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE THAT MAY APPLY TO YOU AND TO ADVISE YOU OF YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE CONSENT DECREE IF YOU SO CHOOSE. NOTHING IN THIS NOTICE CONSTITUTES A CONTRACT OR CREATES ANY OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPANY OR RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES ENFORCEABLE AS A CONTRACT. THERE WILL BE A FAIRNESS HEARING ON THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE before the Umted States Distr~ct Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah D~vision.
None of the parties can predict the final outcome of this lawsuit ~f ~t went to trial and were finally decided by the Court. Such a trial, however, would involve considerable costs, uncertainty and delay. The EEOC and Gulfstream, therefore, have agreed to a settlement which they believe is fair and in the best interests of the public; Ehg~ble Claimants, including you; and Gulfstream.
IF YOU QUALIFY FOR ANY RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF

THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE

ANY ACTION AT THIS TIME TO PRESERVE YOUR RIGHTS. THE

REMAINDER OF THIS NOTICE PROVIDES A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF

THE TERMS OF THE DECREE, INCLUDING THE RELIEF THAT MAY BE

PROVIDED TO YOU UPON FINAL COURT APPROVAL IF YOU MEET THE

REQUIRED CONDITIONS. IF AND WHEN THE PROPOSED CONSENT

DECREE RECEIVES FINAL COURT APPROVAL, YOU WILL RECEIVE A

FURTHER NOTICE DESCRIBING THE EXACT RELIEF THAT WILL BE

PROVIDED TO YOU AND THE CONDITIONS YOU MUST MEET TO

RECEIVE IT.

A. Summa..ry of the Terms of the Consent Decree

The terms of the proposed settlement are contained in the Consent Decree given

preliminary approval by the Court on

,2002. This notice is intended as a

summary only. If there is a dLfferenee between the language of this Notice and the

Consent Decree, the language of the Consent Decree is controlhng. Copies of the

Consent Decree can be obtained by visiting the Clerk of the Court’s office located at 125

Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 31401.

The proposed Consent Decree provides in part as follows:

1. Payments totaling two million one hundred seventy six thousand three

hundred and seven dollars ($2,176,307.00) will be distributed to those Covered Persons

who are Eligible Claimants, excluding those who filed or joined private actions against

Gulfstream prior to the filing of the EEOC complaint and those who voluntarily separated

from employment w~th Gulfstream during the relevant period. Upon the fihng of the EEOC’s complaint, the right of any Eligible Claimant to institute or opt ~nto a private

action asserting claims arising from or related to the subject matter of the Commission’s

complaint was deemed to have terminated pursuant to 29 U.S C § 626(c)(1). Grayson v

K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1105 (1 l th Cir. 1996). The $2,176,307.00 amount will be

dlwded among all Eligible Claimants as determined by the EEOC xn accordance with the followLng criteria

a. the age(s) and number(s) of the Eligible Claimant’s comparators(s)

retained and/or subsequently hired by Gulfstream, if any;

b. the Eligible Claimant’s hourly rate as of September 29, 2000 (or as

of the Eligible Claimant’s date of termination if such date ~s prior to September 29, 2000);

c. whether the Eligible Claimant filed ttmely charges w~th the EEOC

alleging age-based termination due to a reduction in the workforce during the relevant

time period; d.

the Eligible Claimant’s age as of September 29, 2000;

e. the Eligible Claimant’s years ofserwce with Gulfstream as of

September 29, 2000; and

f. the length of time, ff applicable, that the Eligible Claimant was out of work before being rehired by Gulfstream.
b~ no event w~ll any Eligible Claimant’s share be more than four times ~be

average share of all Eligible Claimants or less than one-fourth the average share of all

Eligible Claimants.

Based on data supplied by the Company, there are 138 total Covered Persons, 52 of whom are plaintiffs in existing private actions and 20 more of whom left employment voluntarily and not as part of the reduction m force. Unless these numbers change prior to final approval of the Consent Decree, this would result m an a total of 66 Ehg~ble Claimants who would receive an average payment, prior to taxes or other legally required withholding, of approximately $33,000. Under this scenario, the maximum possible payment, prior to withholding, would be approximately $132,000 and the minimum possible payment would be approximately $8,250. If there are any changes, such as ~nd~viduals shown by the Company to have left voluntarily who are determined to be part of the reduction in force, it could result in some adjustment of these figures, but the changes are not anticipated to be large. The Company will be responsible for making federal, state, and local income tax deductions and FICA deductions from these amounts before they are d~stributed to the EEOC class members.
2 The Company wilt maintain a web page that includes vacancies at its Savannah, Georgia facility, which Ehglble Claimants and other ~nd~viduals can check at their convenience. Any Eligible Claimant hired by Gulfstream, at any tmae w~thin two years of the date that the Court gave final approval of the Decree, will be required to forfeit to Gulfstream a proportionate share of the monetary award under the Consent Decree that is deemed to represent front pay, which shall be assumed to be 35 percent of the total award. This proportional amount of front pay shall be adjusted by calculating the number of months from the Eligible Claimant’s date of hire through the two year expiration date after the Court gave final approval of the decree and d~wdtng the latter

number by twenty-four. Eligible Claimants who apply will be considered Ln the same manner as any other applicants, except for this forfeiture of award, and ~f h~red w~ll be treated in the same manner as any other employee at Gulfstream and shall be subject to the same performance and attendance requirements as other employees They will not, however, be accorded any specLal or preferential treatment.
3. The Company has committed that it will comply with the Age Discrimination ~n Employment Act and will not discriminate on the basis of age during any future layoffs or reductions-in-force of employees. The Company must make reports to the EEOC concerning any layoffs or reductions-m-force involwng more than 75 employees over 6 months at its Savannah location during the two-year term of the Consent Decree. The Company also will provide training to its supervisors regarding the Company’s obligations under the Consent Decree and the Age Discrimination ~n Employment Act. The EEOC has the right to monitor the Company’s compliance w~th the Consent Decree.
4. The Company has further committed that it will not retaliate against any person because that person has opposed allegedly discrimxnatory pohcies or practices or has filed an EEOC charge, or because such person made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or litigation co~aceming the ADEA or the Consent Decree. This includes a commLtment not to retaliate against Ehg~ble Claimants who obtain relief pursuant to the Consent Decree.
5. The United States District Court for the Southern D~stnct of Georgia, Savannah Division, shall retain power to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree for a

period of two years after tts final approval by the Court.

6. The Consent Decree does not constitute an adjudication against the

Company or an admission of liabdlty or guilt by the Company.

7. There is no private right of enforcement in connection with the Company’s

obhgations under the Consent Decree.

B. Fairness Heanng

THE COURT WILL CONDUCT A HEARING TO CONSIDER THE

FAIRNESS OF THE CONSENT DECREE AT _:00 _.M. ON

, 2002, IN

THE COURTROOM OF THE HONORABLE B. AVANT EDENFIELD, UNITED

STATES COURTHOUSE, 125 BULL STREET, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA 31401.

If you believe the settlement is not fair, just and reasonable, you will not be heard by the

Court unless you follow the following rules: (1) You must prepare in writing a precise

statement of your objection, including whether you or your attorney intends to appear at

the hearing; (2) At the top of your written statement, you must set forth the following:

"EEOC v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, Case No.

,

Objection to Proposed Consent Decree"; (3) The original and one copy of your written

statement must be marled and received or personally dehvered by

., 2002, to

the Clerk of the Court, United States D~strict Court for the Southern D~stnct of Georgia,

125 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 31401; and (4) At the time you file the original and a

copy of your written statement w~th the Court, you must also mail one copy to each of the

following.

EEOC Atlanta Distric~ Office Aft’n: Steve Tapper, Acting Supervisory Trial Attorney

Legal Unit 100 Alabama Street, SW, State 4R30 Atlanta, GA 30303
AND William Kilberg, Esq. G~bson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue Washington, DC 20036
AND
Wade W. Hernng, II Hunter, Mac/can, Exley & Dunn P.C. 200 East Saint Julian Street Savannah, Georgia 31412
You may also appear as an objector at the heating, e~ther in person or through an attorney,
~fyou wish to do so, but you are not required to do so for your objection to be heard and considered by the Court.
You may object to the Consent Decree and still be eligible for benefits under the Consent Decree. If the Court hears your objection but does not modify the Consent Decree based on your objection, you will be ehglble for relief under the Consent Decree
as long as you meet the reqmrements for eligibility and the condttions for payment.
C. Distribution of Monetar, and Non-Monetary Relief Any relief to be provJded pursuant to the Consent Decree will not be distributed Io
you until after the fairness hearing; the Court’s final approval of the Consent Decree; and the expiration of the last deadline within which to appeal or the resolution of any appeals,
whichever date ~s later. At that point, you will receive a further Notice of Final Approval,
which will include a form ~nd~cat~ng that you waive and release all claims covered by the

Consent Decree, which you must stgn and return in order to receive payment. Thus, it is

anticipated that you will not receive any monetary payment until at least sometime next year, assuming final Court approval.

D. Ouestions

If you have any questions regarding the subject of thts Notice, do no~t contact the

Judge, the Clerk of the Court, or the Company. Instead, contact Marcus Keegan at (404)

562-6818. (He works for the EEOC.) Thts Notice has been approved by the EEOC, by Gulfstream, and by the Court.

Dated

,2002.

ATTACHMENT H

NOTICE OF FINAL APPROVAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Pla,ntlff,

C~vil Action No.

V.
GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION
Defendant.

NOTICE OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CONSENT DECREE

On

,2002, you recexved a Notice To Ehgible Claimants Of

Proposed Consent Decree ("Initial Notice"), describing a class action age discrimination lawsmt filed by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Gulfstrearn Aerospace Corporation ("Gulfstream" or "the Company")

and a proposed Consent Decree resolving all claims m that lawsmt. You received the

Intt~al Notice because the Company’s records showed that you are an Ehgble Claimant under the Consent Decree. For your convenience, a copy of the lmtial Notice is

enclosed This Notice of Final Approval of Consent Decree ("Final Notice") is to reform

you that the Court, after holding the Fairness Heanng on

,2002 as described

in the Initial Nohce, has g~ven its final approval to the Consent Decree. All

appropriately flied objections to the Consent Decree were heard at that t~me, and no further objections are permitted.
You have been identified as an Eligible Claimant entitled, upon compliance with the conditions imposed m the Consent Decree, to a monetary payment as determLned by the EEOC consistent with the terms of the Consent Decree. Your share of the $2,176,307 in total payments under the Consent Decree was deten~uned by the EEOC in accordance with the following criteria:
a. the age(s) and number(s) of the Eligible Claimant’s comparators(s) retained and/or subsequently hired by Gulfstream, if any;
b. the Eligible Claimant’s hourly rate as of September 29, 2000 (or as of the Eligible Claimant’s date of termination if such date ~s prior Io September 29, 2000);
c. whether the Ehgible Claimant filed Umely charges with the EEOC alleging age-based termination due to a reduction in the workforce during the relevant time period;
d. the Ehgible Claimant’s age as of September 29, 2000; e. the Eligible Claimant’s years of service with Gulfstream as of September 29, 2000; and f. the length of time, if applicable, that the Ehg~ble Claimant was out of work before being rehired by Gulfstream. In no event was your share allowed to be more than four times the average share of all Ehgible Claimants or less than one-fourth the average share of all Ehgible Claimants. The EEOC, in accordance w~th the above conditions, has determined your share

to be $

. If you comply with the condxtions described below, but only if you

comply with those conditions, a cheek for th~s payment, minus any deductions or

w~thholding required by law, wall be mailed to you by Gulfstream no later than

IN ORDER TO RECEIVE YOUR SHARE, YOU MUST COMPLETE
THE ENCLOSED RELEASE OF CLAIMS FORM, HAVE IT NOTARIZED IN
THE SPACE PROVIDED ON THE FORM, AND RETURN AN ORIGINAL
COPY OF THE FORM TO:
[NAME OF COMPLIANCE OFFICER] Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation 500 Gulf stream Road Savannah, Georgia 31402
TIfE PROPERLY COMPLETED AND NOTARIZED FORM MUST BE
RECEIVED AT THIS ADDRESS NO LATER THAN 5:00 P.M. ON

If you do not properly complete, notarize, and return the form by this deadline,

or tfyour share cannot be delivered to you for any other reason such as an mabihty to

locate you or your failure to cash the cheek, you wall forfeit your rtght to th~s payment

and it will be donated to charity.

If you have any questions regarding the subject of this Nohce, do no~t contact the

Judge, the Clerk of the Court, or the Company. Instead, contact Marcus Keegan at (404)

562-68 t 8. (He works for the EEOC.)

This Notice has been approved by the EEOC, by Gulfstream~ and by the Court.

Dated

,200 .

Enclosures: /nitlal Notice Release of Claims

ATTACHMENT I

RELEASE OF CLAIMS

, Socm| Security No.

(the "Class

Member"), has stgned a Claim Form to participate m benefits created by virtue of a

consent decree (the "Consent Decree") between Gulfstream Aerospace (the "Company"),

and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "Commission") entered on

by the Umted States Distract Court for the Southern District of Georgia,

Savannah D~vision, in Case No.

As a further requirement of participating in those benefits, to which the Class

Member would not otherwise be entitled, the sufficiency of which is hereby

acknowledged, on the Class Member’s own behalf and on behalf of the Class Member’s

heirs and assigns and all persons claiming under the Class Member, the Class Member

hereby fully and forever uncondittonally releases and dtscharges the Company, all of its

past and present parent, subsidiary, affiliated and related corporations, their predecessors,

successors and asstgns, including any trustee in bankruptcy, together wrth thetr d~v~s~ons

and departments and all past or present officers, d~rectors, employees, insurers, attorneys

and agents or independent contractors of any of them (hereinafter referred to collectively

as the "Company Releasees"), of and from, and the Class Member covenants not to sue or

assert against the Company Releasees or any of them for any purpose, claims,

administrative complaints, demands, actions and causes of action, of any k~nd or nature

whatsoever, both at law and in equity, negligent and intentional, arising from or in any

way related to alleged age discrimination by the Company between August 20, 2000, and

December 31, 2000, whether contrary to state or federal statute or whether creating any common law tort or contract claim, m connection wLth the te~vntnat~on of the Class Member’s employment by the Company, wLthout regard to the Class Member’s present actual knowledge of any prior act or omission by the Company Releasees or any of them which may have constituted, or may be alleged to have constituted, unlawful treatment of the Class Member as a result of age. This Release of Claims has no effect on the Class Member’s pension rights or other benefits being recewed from the Company, ~f any, arising from the Class Member’s employment by the Company.
The Class Member has been informed of the dollar amount of the payment that he or she will receive under the Consent Decree, as set forth ~n the Notice of Final Approval of Consent Decree, but understands that the amount of money to be received ~s subject to legally required deductions and/or withholding. The Class Member further understands that the Company’s obhgat~on under the Consent Decree concermng the hst~ng of vacancies does not provide a guarantee of reemployment to the Class Member, that no preferential treatment will be accorded to any applicants, and that any Class Members who are rehired during the two-year term of the Consent Decree wall be required to forfeit a portion of the monetary payment they have received under the Consent Decree. Based on th~s understanding, the Class Member acknowledges that the Class Member will continue to be bound by this Release of Claims and that the Class Member shall never bring any claim described in the preceding paragraph against the Company Releasees, even ~f the Class Member xs not reh~red or does not otherwise receive further monetary or non-monetary rehefbeyond the payment described in the Notice of Final Approval of

Consent Decree. The Class Member further understands that the Class Member has no lndiwdual rights under the Consent Decree, but that the EEOC may, in its sole discretion, assert rights on the Class Member’s behalf under the Consent Decree.
In consideration of the release and other covenants and agreements contmned herein and in the Consent Decree, the Company fully and forever unconditionally releases and discharges the Class Member and the Class Member’s heirs, assigns, insurers, agents and personal representatives (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Class Member Releasees") of and from, and the Company covenants not to sue or assert against the Class Member Releasees or any of them for any purpose, claims, administrative complaints, demands, actions and causes of action, of any kind or nature whatsoever, both at law and m eqmty, negligent and intentional, arising from or m any way related to facts underlying the above-referenced lawsuit, including but not l~mited to the Class Member’s part~cipatmn in such lawsmt and recovery therefrom, whether contrary to state or federal statute or whether creating any common law tort or contract claxm, ~n connectmn with the termination of the Class Member’s employment by the Company, w~thout regard to the Company’s present actual knowledge of any prior act or omission by the Class Member Releasees or any of them which may have constituted, or may be alleged to have constituted, inappropriate or unlawful action, ~ for claims based ~n whole or ~n part upon Class Member’s misuse, d~sclosure or exploitation of confidenttal, proprietary or trade secret xnformation of the Company, in violation of either other written agreements with the Company or applicable Georgia trade secrets law. The Company agrees not to seek tender back of any benefits previously received by the Class Member ~n exchange

for signing a prior release, or to take any other adverse action against the Class Member, by virtue of the Class Member’s partlmpation in the benefits created by the Decree.
The Class Member and the Company understand that they may later dLscover clmms or facts now unknown or unsuspected and the Class Member and the Company expressly assume all risk that the facts and law concerning this Release of Claims and the Consent Decree may be other than as currently known to them. The Class Member acknowledges that, in signing this Release, the Class Member Ls not relying on any informatmn provided to the Class Member by the Company Releasees or upon the Company Releasees to provide information to the Class Member. The Company acknowledges that, in mgmng this Release, the Company ts not relying on any information prowded to the Company by the Class Member Releasees or upon the Class Member Releasees to prowde reformation to the Company.
The Class Member understands that this Release is not an admisston of hability by the Company, but is only a means of compromising a dispute in hght of the costs and uncertainties of litLgation. The Class Member and the Company agree that th~s Release w~ll be construed under Georgia law, and that if part of this Release is found ~nvalid, the remainder shall be enforceable.
In the event of any claim that may be precluded in whole or in part by th~s Release, the Class Member and the Company agree that the underlying clmm shall first be submitted at the request ofetther party to non-blnd~ng med~atmn ~n Atlanta before
, with the party asserting the underlying clmm to bear all costs of the first day of mediation, and the parties to share equally any further mediatton costs,

prior to either party seeking any form of judicial relief. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Class Member and the Company have read this
Release and they voluntarily s~gn it, after having been advised to seek their own legal counsel, without threat or coercion, with full knowledge and understanding of its contents, and without promise of benefit, except as expressly described m this Release of Clmms and the Summary of Consent Decree. This Release of Clmms constitutes the entire agreement and merges all prior negotiations, dlscuss~ons, and promises. This Release of Clmms will only be enforceable ~fand when the Consent Decree is approved and entered by the Court and no successful appeal ~s taken therefrom.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and conect.

DATE:

SIGNATURE

STATE OF

COUNTY OF

Subscribed and sworn to before me thts by
Witness my hand and official seal.

day of

(SEAL)

Notary Public

My commission expires:

DATE.

2002,

[title] Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

STATE OF
SS.
COUNTY OF Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
by Witness my hand and official seal. (SEAL)
Notary Public My commission expires:

1996,

ATTACHMENT J
POSTED NOTICE
Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation ("Gulf stream" or "the Company") has reached a settlement w~th the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in a lawsuit captioned EEOC v. Gulfstream Aerosgace Corporation, which was finally approved by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, and entered as a Consent Decree on ~, 200_ The EEOC cla~med that Gulfstream violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") by discriminating against employees age 40 and older in effectuating ~ts reductmns in force between August 20, 2000, and December 3 l, 2000. The Company demed and continues to deny any wrongdoing, but accepted the settlement to avoid the expense and burden of further litigation. The Consent Decree includes all regular, full-time, employees age 40 and older at the time of their termination who were employed by Gulfstream at its Savannah, Georgia, facility, and who were laid off or retired betweenAugust 20, 2000, and December 31, 2000 (the "EEOC class") In addition to payments for certain persons in the EEOC class totahng $2,176,307.00, the Decree provides in ~ as follows:
1. The Company has committed that it will comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in that it will not discriminate on the basis of age in any future layoffs or reductions m force of employees and that it will not retaliate against any person because that person has opposed allegedly d~scnminatory policies or practices, has filed an EEOC charge or has testified, assisted or parhcipated m any manner in an investigation, proceeding or htigation concerning the Decree. Th~s commitment does not constitute a contract or create any legal obligations of the Company or rights of employee, beyond rights and obligations existing by virtue of the ADEA.
2. The EEOC has the right to monitor the Company’s comphance with the Consent Decree. The Conapany will provide training regarding age d~scrxmination to supervisors and the Company will provide reports to the EEOC concermng any layoffs or reductions-in-force involving more than 75 employees over 6 months at ~ts Savannah location dunng the two-year term of the Decree.
3. The Court will retain power to enforce the terms of the Decree for a period of two years.
4. The Decree does not constitute an adjudication against the Company or an adm~ssmn of liabihty or guilt by the Company
5. You may obtain additional information by contacting Human Resources at or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at (9! 2) 652-4234,
or at www eeoc ’oggy_. You may also review a copy &the Decree by contacting

of the Company’s Human Resources Department at (912)
If you believe that the Company has in any way violated the Decree, or if you have any questions, you should contact:
Office of the Regional Attorney Attn: Steve Tapper, Acting Supervisory Trial Attorney United States Equal Employment Opportumty Commission Atlanta District Office 100 Alabama Street, SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 562-6820 - direct (404) 562-6932 - general

 
 0 R fGl NAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

U .S . FILED COURRTT IAH
2m3 APR 17 Ni 9* 23
CLERKso. O - A .

Plaintiff,

V.

Civil Action No . 402-243

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION,

Defendant .

ORD E R

Before the Court is Gulfstream's Emergency Motion For Protective Order . For good

cause shown, the Court GRANTS the motion. The subpoenas served upon Wade W . Herring, II,

Harlan S . Miller and Lee Parks demanding all documents related to Cosper et al . v . Gulfstream
Aerospace Corporation and General Dynamics Corporation, Case No . CV 402-013 (S .D . Ga.)

and Podger v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and General Dynamics Corporation, Case No .

CV 401-277 (S .D . Ga .), as well as the portion of the subpoena served upon Herring demanding

all documents in the above-styled case, are stayed pending the Court's ruling on Gulfstream's

motion to quash the subpoenas at issue . Herring, Miller and Parks shall not produce any

documents in response to such subpoenas unless and until ordered otherwise by the Court .

P

So Ordered this /7-day of

, 2003.

UNITED

S DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

9~

UN ITED S TATE S D IS TRI C T C OURT Sou th ern Di st ric t of G eor gi a
Case Number : 4 :02-cv-00243 Date Served : Ap it 17, 2003 Served By :
Attorneys Served :
S . Robert Royal, Esq . Steven M . Tapper, Esq . Wade Wilkes Herring II, Esq . William J . Kilberg, Esq . Derry Dean Sparlin Jr ., Esq . Douglas LeFevre Edward D . Buckley III, Esq . Edgar P . Middleton Gayle Smith Adel Shubber
V/ Copy placed in Minutes Copy given to Judge
Copy given to Magistrate

 
 ..

~ OR~ IGINA~ L. - --

'F'ILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SAMr:211iAN DIV.

SO UT H ER N DISTRICT OF GE ORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

7103 1 11',Y 12 M 10- 5 q

EQUAL EN IPLOYIIIENT OPP ORT UN I TY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,

parties . Id. at 5 .

SO . 0151 OF GA .

v. 402CV243

GULFSTREAD i AEROS PACE CORPORATIO N ,

D e fendant .

oRnFR

I.
On 12/3/02, the Court preliminarily approved the Consent Decree entered into between the
plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (Gulfstream) in this action for alleged violation of the Age
Discrimination Employment Act (AREA), 29
U.S .C. § 623(a), fordischarging employees over 40 because of their age . The Court held a fairness hearing on 4/28/03, at which time arguments from the parties and objections to the settlement were heard . The parties now seek the Court's final approval of the Decree.

The EEOC then began conciliation discussions with Gulfstream . Id. Many of the discharged employees joined in their own class action. Cosper v. Gu(stream Aerospace Corp ., Case 402CV013 (S .D.Ga . 10/4/01) . After a lengthy conciliation process, the EEOC and Gulfstream agreed upon a settlement, and on 11/15/02 the EEOC filed this action (doc . # 1), then submitted the proposed Consent Decree . Doc . # 4 . Gulfstream denies liability but is settling to avoid the expense and uncertainty of litigation . Id. at 3 .
B . The Consent Decree
This Consent Decree seeks to resolve, on behalf of all "covered persons,"' all actions for both monetary and non-monetary relief on claims that Gulfstream laid off employees, or forced them to retire, because of their age . Id. at 5-6. It provides both compensatory and injunctive relief. It thereby seeks to vindicate

II .

A. Th e Redu ction In Forc e
In 9/00, Gulfstream implemented a reduction in force (RIF) that discharged 150 employees from its Savannah facility. Doc . # 22 at 1 . Subsequently, the EEOC received numerous charges of age discrimination from discharged employees. Doc . # 24 at 2 . After extensive investigation and data gathering, the EEOC determined that the RIF had a disproportionate impact on employees aged 40 and above, and it issued "cause" determinations to the charging

A "covered person" is an employee : ( 1 ) who was over the age o f 40 at the time of the "voluntary or involuntary layoff or retirement," d oc. # 4 a t 6 ; (2 ) who was a "regu lar full-time e mployee [] of Gulfstream at it s Savannah, Georgia facility," id.; (3) whose "involuntary l ayoff or retirement date . . . t ook e ffec t between [8/20/00 and 12/3 1 /00] ," id. ; (4) who has not instituted or opte d into an ac t ion, arising from or relating t o their l ayoff or retirement for the above time pe r iod, and still pending a s of the date of t he filing o f this Comp l ain t , id. ; and (5 ) who has n ot previously entered into an agreement with Gulfstream resolving and releasing any claim encompassed by this D ecree . Id. The "Decree inc l udes e mployees, i f any, meeting these criteria who have been issued a notice of right to sue that e xpired prior to the date o f final C ourt approva l of this D ecree ." Id. at 6 .

30

both the interests of those who were directly injured by the RIF as well as of the public more broad ly, by preven ting fut ure such discrimination .
For the benefit of all "eligible claimants,"2
Gulfstream has agreed to establish a $2,176,307 settlement fund . Id. Each such claimant is to be allocated a share calculated according to : (1) the claimant's hourly rate as of 9/29/00, id . at 10 ;' (2) whether the claimant timely filed an EEOC charge, id. ; (3) the claimant's age as of 9/29/00, id.; (4) the claimant's years of service with Gulfstream as of 9/29/00, id .; and (5) the length of time, if applicable, the claimant was out of work before being rehired by Gulfstream . Id.
There are 66 eligible settlement claimants who will receive an average pre-tax payment of approximately $33,000 . Doc . # 24 at 1, 17 . The Decree's payment schedule limits maximum payment to four times that average $33,000 payment (i.e., $132,000) and minimum payment to no less than one-quarter that amount (i.e., $8,250). Doc . # 4 at 10.
During the Decree's term, Gulfstream also agrees not to undertake any ' RIF that discriminates against an employee over forty on the basis of age, nor retaliate against any person who has opposed a practice or policy as discriminatory. Id. at 9 . Should, during that term, Gulfstream engage in any Savannah facility RIF involving at least 75 employees over the course of six months, it must provide the
2 The class of"eligible claimants" includes a ll "covered employees" less those the EEOC "determines voluntarily separated from their employment with Gulfstream." Doc.
# 4 at 7 . Those who "voluntarily separated" receive no monetary compensa tion u nder the settlement .
Or, this would be based on the rate as of the t ime of t er mination, i f it o ccurred prior to 9 /29/00 .

EEOC wi th a report documenting various specified RIF aspects . Id. at 1 5-16 .
Gulfstream will also, during the Decree's term, maintain a web page posting all vacancies at its Savannah facility so eligible claimants may apply. Id. at 17 . And, it will provide management training concerning the Decree and Gulfstream's obligations under the ADEA . Id. at 18 . It will also develop and submit to the EEOC anon-discrimination policy, with specific reporting, investigative, and resolution procedures . Id. at 19.
Gulfstream further agrees to submit a report to the EEOC, at the end of each six month period, listing all employee complaints of age discrimination at the Savannah facility. Id. at 19-21 . Gulfstream must also satisfy specified notice requirements regarding the Decree, so as to provide its employees with full information concerning the settlement . Id. at 21 . Finally, the EEOC retains the right to enter Gulfstream's premises to monitor its compliance with these provisions and to review documents and interview employees for this purpose . Id. at 21 .
With respect to enforcement, the Decree specifies that the individuals ofthe affected class have no private right of enforcement . Id. at 23 . It permits the parties, Gulfstream and the EEOC, to appeal to this Court for enforcement only as a last resort. While the Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the Decree, the Parties agree to seek its assistance only after private negotiations have broken down, and then only
after setting forthwith specificity the efforts they
have made to comply with the Decree's enforcement provisions . Id. at 8 . Finally, the Decree terminates this Court's jurisdiction two years from the date ofthe Court's final approval . Id.

2

.J

On 12/3/02, the Court granted preliminary approval of the Decree, doc . # 4, and scheduled a fairness hearing for 4/28/03 (as required by ¶ VIII of the Decree, doc . # 4 at 14) . The parties were then to send notice to all affected persons, in accordance with JT VII & VIII of the Decree, informing them of the proposed settlement and of their right to voice objections .
In all, six objections were filed, five ofwhich came from eligible claimants . The Court held the 4/28/03 fairness hearing, at which time those persons and counsel for those persons who had timely filed written objections were permitted to address the Court .
H. ANALYSIS
A. General Standards
"A consent decree is essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial
policing ." iVillianrs v. Vukovich, 720 F .2d 909,
920 (6th Cir. 1983) ; United States v. City of
Miami, 664 F.2d 435,439-40 (5th Cir.19$1) (en
banc). It has attributes of both a contract and of a judicial act . United States a I7T Continental Baking Co ., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n . 10 (1975) ; Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d
541, 556 (6th Cir. 1982) .
So "[o]n the one hand, a consent decree is a voluntary settlement agreement which could be fully effective without judicial intervention ." TVillian :s, 720 F.2d at 920 . But on the other, it is "a final judicial order .... [and judicial approval of a settlement agreement places the power and prestige of the court behind the compromise struck by the parties ." Id.
"Once approved, the prospective provisions of the consent decree operate as an injunction ." Id. The Court retains jurisdiction over the

Decree during the terms of its existence and may enforce the Decree with its contempt powers or modify its terms should that become necessary . See In re Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 1999 WL 775830 at * 6 (6th Cir . 1999) .
Judicial approval, therefore, may not be obtained for an agreement which is illegal, a product of collusion, unconstitutional, or contrary to the public interest . See City of Miami, 664 F .2d at 441 . The Court granted preliminary approval on 12/3/02 on its initial assessment that none of the provisions were the result of fraud, overreaching, or collusion .
This preliminary approval of the Consent Decree rendered the Decree presumptively
reasonable . United Slates v. City ofAlexandria,
614 F.2d 1358, 1362 (5th Cir . 1980) ("[a] Consent Decree proposed by a private defendant and government agency in an employment discrimination case carries with it a presumption of validity that is overcome only if the decree contains provisions which are unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional, or against public policy") ; Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F.Supp.2d 894, 904 (S .D.Ohio 2001); In re
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 173 F.R.D.
205, 211 (S .D.Ohio 1997).
This Court now must make a final determination of whether the "proposed decree is lawful, fair, reasonable, and adequate ."
E.E.O.C. v. Hirant Walker & Sons, Inc., 768
F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985) . "The Court must eschew any rubber stamp approval in favor of an independent evaluation, yet, at the same time, it must stop short of the detailed and thorough investigation that it would undertake if it were
actually trying the case ." Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974) ;
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S . 79,
88 n. 14 (1981) .

3

` . . ./

Moreover, where the Court has found the Decree presumptively reasonable, as it has here, the burden of demonstrating that the Decree is unreasonable rests with the individuals objecting
to the Decree. Williams, 720 F.2d at 921 (6th Cir. 1983); Association For Disabled
Americans, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D.
457, 467 (S.D.Fla. 2002); U.S. v. State of New
Jersey, 1995 WL 1943013 at * 11 (D.N.J. 3/14/95) (unpublished) .
That means that the burden is not on the
EEOC and Gulfstream to affirmatively demonstrate its reasonableness . Securities & Exchange Conrn:'n v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525,
529 (9th Cir. 1984) ("the courts should pay deference to the judgment of the government agency which has negotiated and submitted the
proposed judgment'; E.E. 0. C. v. Pan American Morld Airways, Inc., 1988 WL 224232 at * 14 (N.D.Cal . 6/17/88) (unpublished) ("The fact that
a government agency took part in the settlement negotiations is an important factor in weighing the overall fairness of the settlement' .
To that end, the Court rejects Objector Noritoshi Itoi's argument (doc . # 28 at 4 ; Fairness Hearing Transcript (hereafter, "T") at 30) -- placing this burden on the settlement's
proponents -- because that erroneously relies on
F.R.Civ .P. 23, private class action law, where the risks of collusion or the neglect of minority
interests are high . See Holmes v. Continental
Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147 (11th Cir. 1993) . Here, where the EEOC is a party and no provision in the Decree suggests collusion or
fraud, the burden shifts to the objectors. City of Miami, 614 F .2d at 1334 ; accord Wilkerson v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 171 F.R.D. 273, 289
(D.Col. 1997).
The Court finally must focus on the overall fairness and reasonableness of the settlement,

and not on its fairness to any one individual
claimant. Wilkerson, 171 F. R.D. at 283. It
therefore may not withhold approval simply because the benefits accrued from the Decree are not what a successful plaintiff would have received in a fully litigated case :
Objections based purely upon individual claims of loss do not warrant disapproval of the proposed settlement .... In assessing the fairness of a settlement, the Court's role is not to make a de novo determination of whether the measures applied to all claimants provide each individual with a satisfactory recovery . Rather, the criteria or methodology employed by the litigants is sufficient if its terms, when applied to the entire group of individuals represented, appear reasonable .
Wilkerson, 171 F.R.D. at 283 (quoting EEOC v. nn McDo ell Douglas, 894 F.Supp . 1329, 1335
(E.D.Mo. 1995)) ; see also U.S. v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F .2d 313, 317 (D.C.Cir. 1977) ; Hiran: Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d at 889 ("the parties to a settlement will not be heard to complain that the relief is substantially less than what they would have received from a successful resolution after trial") . A decree is,
after all, a compromise which has been reached
after the risks, expense, and delay of further
u litigation have been assessed . See L evano v.
Campbell, 93 F.R.D . 68, 86 (D .D.C. 1981) . That typically means that both sides have accepted something less than what they expected had they fully litigated the case .
B . Notice
"It is incumbent upon the district judge to ensure before entering a consent decree that the interests of all real parties in interest have been adequately represented." In re Birmingham

4

~, U

~ -~

Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation,

833 F.2d 1492, 1499-1500 ( 1 lth Cir . 1987)

Union (citing Firefighters Local

No. 1784 v.

Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 588 n . 3 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[I]f innocent employees are to

be required to make any sacrifices in the final

consent decree, they must be represented and

have had full participation rights in the

negotiation process")) . As a matter of due

process, members of plaintiff class must receive

the "best notice practical under the

circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through

reasonable effort ." Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) ; Williams, 720 F.2d at 921 ("[n]otice should be given to all individuals who may be affected by

the decree").

Here the Consent Decree provides extensive
direct-mail notice requirements . Gulfstreamwas
required to mail an Exclusion Notice
(attachment F) to all those determined by
Gulfstream to have voluntarily left the company
and thus who are not covered by the Decree . See
Doc. # 4 at 14 (Decree ¶ VII). That provided
those parties with an opportunity to file
objections and for Gulfstream and the EEOC
together to review same.

Similarly, the Parties were to mail to each Eligib l e Claiman t (i, e ., involun tarily severed/retired employees) a Notice of Fairness Hearing and Opportunity to Object (attachment G) summarizing the terms and conditions of the Decree and explaining the procedure for issuing any objections . See doc . # 4 at 1 5 (D ecree ¶ VIII) .

all 66 eligible claimants. Doc . # 22 at 7 n . 4 . "Several notices were returned as undeliverable, some on multiple occasions . Notices were resent where Gulfstream could locate more recent addresses through forwarding orders ." Id. The EEOC also provided more recent addresses where possible. Id. Gulfstream reports that "ultimately, all but five of the eligible claimants have indicated their receipt of the notices ." Id.°
In light of these thorough notice provisions and Gulfstream's self-reporting of the steps taken, the Court concludes that notice was adequately given and that due process protections were sufficiently afforded .
C. Fairn ess
"Although this is an AREA enforcement action as opposed to a class action, the settlement agreement embodied in the Consent Decree proposed here is subject to the same standard of fairness, adequacy and reasonableness that applies to settlements of
class actions governed by Fed .R.Civ.P. 23." EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp ., 1993 WL
468903 at * 4 (E .D.Mo . 8/12/93) (unpublished)
n n (citing Bi ker v. Con:nro wealth of Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 747 (3d Cir.
1992)) . In assessing the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy, then, of proposed Consent Decrees like this one, courts generally consider the following factors :
(1) whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated ;

In conformity with these provisions, Gulfstream reports that it mailed notices via certified mail, return receipt requested, to the most recent address on file with the company for

The parties d o not address G u l fstream's c omplianc e with $ VII of the Decree ( Excl usion N otice m ail ing) . Neve rthel ess, because n otice to e xcluded parties does not impl icate the same d ue p rocess c oncerns a s notice to eligible claimants, the absence ofthis information need not p revent the Court from approving the Decre e.

5

(2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation ;
(3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount o fdiscovery comp leted ;
(4) the likelihood of success at trial ;
(5) the range of possible recovery ;
(6) the judgment of the parties and their counsel that the settlement is fair and reasonable ;
(7) the substance and amount of opposition to the settlement ;
(8) whether the Decree protects the public interest .
See EEOCx Reed v. General Motors Corp ., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) ; Olliams, 720 F.2d at 923; Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); Ingram v. The Coca-Cola
Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 688-89 (N.D.Ga. 2001) ;
Milkerson, 171 F.R.D. at 283 .
1 . Honest and Fair n Negotiatio
The EEOC and Gulfstream have documented the "extensive and difficult negotiations" that produced the proposed settlement here . See doc . # 22 at 6-7 ; # 24 at 5-9,13. The EEOC initially undertook extensive investigations 'of the charges against Gulfstream. This included interviews with corporate officials with knowledge of the 2000 RIF policies and of Gulfstream's employee data system . Doc . # 24 at 3 . It also included detailed analysis of Gulfstream's employee data, id. at 4, with the aid of the EEOC's statistical expert . Id.
Beginning in 10/01, the EEOC and

Gulfstream convened a number of conciliation meetings . Id. at 5 . Counsel for the Cosper class action (which had already been filed) also met with the parties at many of these discussions and took part in the early negotiations. Id. A fundamental disagreement over the interpretation of RIF data, however, divided the EEOC and Gulfstream throughout these negotiations . Gulfstream contended that the 2000 RIF had a statistically significant disparate impact on 23 persons age 40 and older . Id. Gulfstream challenged this analysis, and argued that "using the appropriate methodology the maximum statistical [disparity] was seven persons for the entire RIF." Id. at 6 .
The continued disagreement overthe analysis
of this data, as well as over "the merits of the charging parties' allegations, and [the] appropriate measure of damages" led the EEOC
to conclude "that further settlement discussions
would not be productive." Id. at 6. Upon
Gulfstream's subsequent request, however, the EEOC agreed to re-open the case. Id. The EEOC also shifted its focus at that time, limiting its demands now to those claimants who were not part of the Cosper private lawsuit . Id. at 7. It based its new offer on information from individuals it believed would most strongly represent the remaining class . Id. With this approach, an agreement was finally reached on the $2,176,307 monetary settlement . Id . at 8 .
Agreement on non-monetary provisions and the
terms of the Decree soon followed, and the EEOC's office of General Counsel gave its approval of the overall settlement in 11/02 . Id. Detailing this process, both the EEOC and Gulfstream recite extensive negotiations involving a variety of EEOC and private lawyers . Id. at 9 ; doc. # 22 at 6-7 .
In light of these extensive and informed negotiations, and the fact that both sides were

6

well represented by such experienced and able counsel, the Court has no reason to doubt that both parties had their respective positions
vigorously advocated . Furthermore, no objector
even alleges, much less advances, any facts or evidence of fraud, collusion or overreaching in connection with the lengthy discussions or the terms of the Consent Decree .
The Court thus concludes that the result reached here was the product of arms-length,
honest and fair negotiations . See McDonnell Douglas, 894 F.Supp . at 1333-34 (no evidence
of fraud or collusion where EEOC undertook a lengthy and thorough investigation of discrimination charges, the parties engaged in extended negotiations, and both sides were represented by counsel experienced in the area of employment discrimination law) ; IVilkerson, 171 F.R.D at 285 .
2. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation
As Gulfstream emphasizes, "class action employment discrimination lawsuits have a
well-deserved reputation for being complex."
Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1331 . And "[t]he track record for large class action employment discrimination cases demonstrates that many
years may be consumed by trial(s) and appeal(s)
before the dust finally settles ." Officers for
Justice v. Civil Service Conunn of City and County ofSan Francisco, 688 F.2d 615,629 (9th
Cir. 1982) .
This case is no exception . While the Court can only speculate, further discovery and trial preparation would very likely be burdensome and expensive . And the trial itself would no doubt be lengthy, with almost certain appeals of
all unfavorable results . See McDonnellDouglas,
894 F.Supp . at 1334 (concluding in Title VII

discrimination case that "expense involved in prosecuting and defending this action would be great" and "[t]hat the attorneys fees and litigation costs could easily reach an amount equal to a significant percentage of the monetary settlement is not beyond the realm of possibilities") .
3 . The Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed
While no formal discovery has been conducted in this case, the EEOC carried out an extensive and thorough investigation and analysis of the facts, prior to filing its Complaint, as described supra . The Court thus concludes that the case was brought to "a point at which an informed assessment of its merits and the probable future course of the litigation ... [could reasonably] be made ." McDonnell Douglas, 894 F.Supp . at 1334 ; see also McDonnell Douglas, 1993 WL 468903 at * 5 ; iVilkerson, 171 F .R.D. at 289 (amount of discovery and investigation "support[ed] the conclusion that the settlement was the result of an informed and carefully considered decision by the [p]arties") .
4 . The Likelihood ojSuccess at Trial
It is well-documented that "[inn general, plaintiffs face an uphill battle in prevailing on employment discrimination cases in federal
court." IIngram, 200 F.R.D. at 689. The Ingram
court noted that there "Class Counsel submitted
a[n academic] report ... analyzing data on federal
employment discrimination cases, and the report concluded that employment discrimination
plaintiffs are much less likely than other types of
plaintiffs to win their cases at trial and sustain
their victories on appeal ." Id. at 689 & n. 2.
Indeed, the "data show[ed] ... [that]

7

~~

u

employees win only about one-fourth of th[eir] cases ." Id. And "[i] f the employer appeals one of those rare plaintiff wins, the employer has a 44% chance of getting the verdict reversed .... By contrast, if an employee attempts to get an employer win reversed, the plaintiff has only a 5.8% chance of success." Id. at 689 n. 2 .
Furthermore, serious questions of law and fact exist here, placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt . Gulfstream continues to deny any liability in this matter, and at all stages of the negotiation disputed the EEOC's charge that the 2000 RIF violated the ADEA . Doc . # 22 at 18 . Gulfstream contends that the contested issues include :
(1) whether the RIF was due to age or Gulfstream's need to restructure given market conditions and future business plans ; (2) the proper statistical model to be utilized in analyzing the RIF, the
admissibility ofcertain statistical evidence,
and the strength and validity of that evidence ; (3) the effect of the decentralized decision-making process utilized to make RIF decisions ; (4) the admissibility, weight and relevance of anecdotal evidence offered to show age animus ; and (5) relevant damage calculations .

"From a statistical standpoint," it submits, "for the ... 2000 RIF [which discharged 150
employees], there were approximately 18 layoffs
of persons aged 40 and older, above what would
have been expected by mere chance or random
selection ...:' Id. At the fairness hearing the EEOC agreed that "there would have been very
difficult problems facing [it] in the event it had gone to litigation, to trial." T at 19.
The EEOC also acknowledges that "there is no assurance that the EEOC could have obtained [at trial] the[] damages [obtained here in the settlement] for any of the claimants ." Id. at 18 . The absence of mitigation by some parties, and the limited availability of liquidated damages exacerbates the difficulty. Id.
"At this stage of the proceedings the Court has not been called upon nor should it attempt to
determine the merits of either party's position ." McDonnell Douglas, 894 F.Supp . at 1334;
Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625 ("the settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial on the merits"). The positions taken by the parties make clear,
however, that the prospects for establishing both
liability and damages at trial are anything but certain in this case . On balance, the Court has been shown no substantial likelihood of the EEOC's success at trial .

Id. Particularly significant is the EEOC's heavy reliance during the negotiations on their statistical analysis of the RIF's disparate impact on employees over age 40 . Disparate impact is not a valid theory of recovery under the AREA . Adams v. Florida Power Co., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (1 1 th Cir. 2001) ("disparate impact claims may not be brought under the ADEA' ).
The EEOC itselfconcedes that "this is not an overly strong statistical case ." Doc . # 24 at 17 .

n 5. The Ra gc ojPossible Recovery
The proposed settlement provides monetary benefits of $2,176,307 for 66 claimants, an average of $32,974 per claimant. Doc. # 24 at 17 . No evidence, however, has been presented by any party as to what the range of possible recovery could be should the EEOC prevail at trial . Nor can the Court accurately speculate .
But the genuine difficulties of litigating the

8

U~

case have already been noted supra . And a comparison of this Decree's monetary amount with court-approved EEOC settlements in other
discrimination cases favors a finding that the amount here is fair and reasonable . See, e.g.,
Binker v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738,742 (3d Cir. 1992) ($2 .6 million for 83 AREA claimants, or an average of $31,325 per
claimant); EEOC v. Foot Locker Specialty Inc .,
99 CN 4758 (S.D.N.Y. 11/6/02) (unpublished)
($3 .5 million for 678 ADEA claimants, or an average of $5,162 per claimant) ; EEOC v. State, 1997 WL 159435 at * 1 (N .D.N.Y. 2/11/97) (unpublished) ($1 .2 million for 48 AREA claimants, or an average of $25,000 per
claimant); Wilkerson, 171 F.R.D . at 280 ($13 million for 1,777 claimants, or an average
$7,315 per claimant and a settlement range of approximately $1,400 - $11,700) ; EEOC v.
Consolidated Edison Co. ojNetiv York, Inc., 557 F.Supp . 468,469 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ($3 .5 million
for 126 ADEA claimants, or an average of $27,777 per claimant).
Claimant Noritoshi Itoi objects to the amount of the monetary settlement, arguing that his direct damages alone were over $500,000 . Doc .
# 11 at 19. But he has not presented any evidence that a jury could award the 66 claimants here anything approximating that amount were the EEOC to prevail at trial . See
tn h Linnet' v. CellularAlaska Par ers ip,151 F.3d
1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators" at
trial) (quoting Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv . Conun'n, 688 F.2d at 625).

presented showing the inadequacy of this amount relative to a likely jury verdict, the settlement amount appears fair and reasonable . See Batchelder v. KerrMcGee Corp., 246 F.Supp .2d 525, 529 (N .D.Miss . 2003) ("No evidence has been offered to the court indicating that the value of the proposed settlement is inadequate in relation to the amount that a jury could have awarded . Under these circumstances, the court concludes that the amount of the settlement, in comparison with the range of potential recovery by jury verdict, supports the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement") .
6. The Judgment of the Parties
Although the Court is not bound by Gulfstream counsel's opinion, it is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight . Cotton, 559
F.2d at 1330-3 1 . "Likewise, the opinion of the
Commission as to the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement is accorded great weight in light of the agency's expertise in employment discrimination litigation in general and its intimate knowledge of this case in
particular." McDonnell Douglas, 1993 WL 468903 at * 6 (citing Holden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 665 F.Supp. 1398, 1422
(D .Minn . 1987)).
Here, both counsel for Gulfstream, doc . # 22 at 43, and the EEOC, doc . # 24 at 15, strongly support this Decree and argue in lengthy briefs that it is fair, adequate, and reasonable to the claimants . See also T . at 6-29 . Their positions thus substantially favor the Court's final approval of the Decree .

Here, where the monetary recovery compares favorably to other court-approved EEOC settlements, where success at trial is highly uncertain, and where no evidence has been

7. The Substance and Amount of
Opposition to the Settlement
The Court received just six objections to the

9

. .% ..

Consent Decree . One objector was simply first file his own private claim'. Doc. # 11 . He ,

mistaken about his inclusion among the eligible also argues that the allocation of the settlement

claimants and now no longerhas anyopposition . amount among the claimants is unfair . Id.

Doc. # 9 (LeFevre Objection) ; see also doc. # 24 attachment B (list of eligible claimants) .

a. Inadequacy of Settlenreirt Anrouirt

Similarly, another raises issues unrelated to the

RIF, doc. # 14 (Smith Objection), and need not

Several respondents object that the total

be considered in detail here.'

settlement amount is inadequate for the number

of persons involved . Doc . ## 10, 11, 12, 15 . In

Of the 66 eligible claimants, then, only 4 particular, two parties point to a comment made

object to the Decree . Approximately 94% of the in the press by counsel in Cosper v. Culfstreanr

eligible claimants thus express no opposition to the recently settled private ADEA class action

the settlement . This extremely small number of -- that the settlement here was "woefully,

objectors is highly significant and is persuasive drastically inadequate." Doc . # 11 exh . 1 at 2 .

evidence that the Decree should be approved . They argue that Gulfstream should disclose the

See Ingrain, 200 F .R .D. at 692 n . 7 ("While the confidential settlement reached in Cosper so as

number of objectors is not controlling, a to compare this settlement and determine its

relatively small number of objectors can be reasonableness and adequacy. Doc . # 11 at 19-

_1

taken as some indication that the class members 20 ; # 12 at 1 . The Cosper settlement allegedly

as a group did not think the settlement was included reimbursement of lost retirement and

funfair") (cites and quotes omitted) .

other benefits, something not included here .

Doc. # 11 at 20.

Among the 4 remaining objectors, the primary

objection to the Decree is that the settlement

Comparison with the Cosper private

amount is inadequate . Doc. ## 10-12 . Objector settlement, however, is irrelevant to assessing

Itoi additionally argues that the EEOC should this agreement . First, that settlement was

have provided him with notice of the filing of its reached in 3/03, over four months after the

Complaint so as to afford him the opportunity to parties here agreed to the Decree sub judice.

Doc. # 22 at 34 ; # 24 at 29. The settlement here

is completely independent of whatever

' Smith was not l aid off or fired during the 2 000 W F, but n ow neve rthe less a rgues that she shoul d n o t be exc l uded from the el igible cl ass o f cl aimants. D oc. # 14 . This complaint is without merit i nsofa r as Smith ca nno t show she was unreasonably e xc l uded from the settlement class. "[T]he Commission has the sole discretion to d etermine whethe r and on whose beha l f t o litigate cl aime d violations of the AD EA ." McDonnell D ouglas Co rp., 1993 WL 468903 at * 9 (citing 29 U.S .C. § 626(b)) . D rawing the l ine between those who were laid o ff ( or forc ed t o retire) and those who c h ose to re t ire i s c ertainly reasonabl e, especia lly i f her departure has n othing t o d o with the RIF as Gu l fstream c ontends . See doc . # 22 at 8 . Certainly, nothing prevented Smith frombringing her own private claim against Gulfstream for whatever d iscrimination she fee l s she experienced.

subsequently occurred in the Cosper case .
Moreover, "[t]he EEOC is a public agency `charged with the vindication of public policy, not merely with the enforcement of private
rights."' Donovan v. University of Texas at El
Paso, 643 F.2d 1201, 1208 n . 15 (5th Cir . 1981)
(quoting EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of
California, 535 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1976), aJJ"d, 432 U.S. 355 (1977)) .
Hence, any alleged differences between this settlement and the private settlement in Cosper

10

~~1;

may well be justified in light of the public
benefits of deterring future discrimination that the EEOC secured ." See Riddle v. Cerro Wire and Cable Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 918, 922-23
(l lth Cir. 1990) ("When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination. . . . [T]he relationship between the
EEOC and an individual victim of discrimination indicates that the interests of the two parties are not always identical . The EEOC is primarily interested in securing equal employment opportunity in the workplace .... The aggrieved individual, on the other hand, is primarily interested in securing specific personal relief .... The differing interests of the EEOC and of the aggrieved individual are not necessarily
compatible).
Moreover, all parties had until 9/9/02 to "opt-
in" on the Cosper class action and assume whatever private risks and costs that entailed . Doc. # 11 at 14 . ObjectorNoritoshi Itoi "elected to stay with the EEOC rather than opt into the Cosper class action." Id. He and the other objectors must now live with that choice .

of loss do not warrant disapproval of the proposed settlement ." lYilkerson, 171 F .R.D. at 283 . The Court's role in assessing the fairness of the Decree is to determine whether its terms, "when applied to the entire group of individuals represented, appear reasonable ." Id. (emphasis added) . To the extent any of the other objectors are implying that the Decree is unreasonable because their share of the settlement fails to adequately compensate them for individual losses and injury, see, e.g., doc . # 11 at 11, their objections fail for the same reason .
b. Notice ofEEOC Filing
Another major complaint is that the EEOC failed to give the members of the class proper notice of the date upon which they had to decide whether to join the EEOC class or to file their own private claim against Gulfstream . See doc. # 10 at 1 ; # 11 at 2 . The potentially most meritable objection alleges that, prior to the EEOC's filing ofits Complaint in this case, class member Itoi notified EEOC attorney Tapper that he had decided to file a separate lawsuit and therefore would be opting out of the EEOC settlement . Doc . # 11 at 16 .

Finally, objector Shubber's claim that his
share will not cover all his damages (in
particular, his relocation and new-job-related
expenses) is without merit . As explained supra,
"objections based purely upon individual claims

According to Itoi, however, Tapper never returned his call concerning his opt-out decision . He later learned through a private attorney, before he had a chance to file his own Complaint, that the EEOC had filed its Complaint and that a settlement was reached, with Itoi included as a claimant . Id. at 16-17.

6 Thus, the terms of the Cosper settlemen t s imp ly aren' t rel evant to the fairness and reasonableness of this D ecree . The Court t herefore overrules I toi's O bjec t ion (doc . # 2 8) to the Magistrate Judge's (MJ's) 4/25/03 Order, which granted G u l fstream's motion to quash I toi's subpoenas seeking, inter alia, information about the Cosper settlement . Th e Court agrees tha t "the reasons b ehind the settlement a n d t he amount o f the sett lement [ in Cosper] cannot be assumed to be relevant to the fairness of the c onsent decree in this c ase ." D oc . # 27 at 8.

The Consent Decree specifies that "[u]pon the filing of the complaint, the right of any Eligible Claimant to institute or opt into a private action asserting claims arising from or related to the subject matter of the Commission's complaint shall be deemed to have terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C . § 626(c)(1) . Grayson v. Kinart Corp .,

11

.J

79 F.3d 1086, 1105 (11th Cir . 1996)." Doc. # 4
at 8 (Decree at ¶ II(F)); see also 29 U.S.C. §
626(c) (the EEOC's filing bars a private
litigant's action) . According to Itoi, his decision to opt out of the settlement was ignored by the
EEOC, depriving him of the alternative path he
chose of filing a private complaint against Gulfstream . Doc. # 1 1 at 17.
Itoi supports this argument by contending that
the EEOC breached its fiduciary duty in failing to inform him of the imminent filing of its action against Gulfstream, which deprived him of the opportunity to file his own claim . Id. at 22 . He
argues that the EEOC'attorneys were acting as
"de facto counsel for the employees," rd., and
that therefore they "should have given prior notification to Mr . Itoi of the time that they would file an action which would preclude him from filing a separate action when the attorneys had been informed that Mr . Itoi intended to do so." Id. at 24 .
Itoi's fiduciary duty argument is without legal
support. See Wilkerson, 171 F.R.D. at 294
("EEOC does not function as a private attorney who is required to gather information from his or her clients and to confer with them regarding the
litigation and potential settlement') ; 6Villiams v. U.S., 665 F.Supp. 1466,1469-70 (D.Or. 1987)
("EEOC did not have an attorney-client relationship with the potential claimants against
[employer] . Therefore, even if the EEOC was
negligent in carrying out the consent decree, it
owed no duty to the plaints and thus is not liable under this theory") (emphasis added) ; see & also E.E.O.C v. Johnson Higgii:s, Inc., 887 F.Supp . 682, 688 (S .D.N.Y. 1995) ("Where there is a violation ofthe AREA, the EEOC may
proceed . .. without the consent of, and indeed
even against the wishes of, those individuals
aggrieved' (emphasis added) .

To protect his right, ltoi was required to file
his action ahead of the EEOC's•-- and if not, he's foreclosed from complaining about it now . His privately filed ADEA action would have remained viable post-EEOC filing, even if Itoi had been named in the EEOC complaint .
E.E.O.C. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 635,
640-41 (11th Cir . 1984) . Itoi's own delay in filing deprived him of the advantage and opportunity he now seeks .
Itoi also was on notice that the settlement might not satisfy his expectations . He explains that, "after several months, [he] began to have concerns that the case was moving along too slowly." Doc, # 11 at 11 . Itoi's daughter, on his behalf, began contacting EEOC counsel on 4/9/02, more than seven months before the EEOC filed its complaint . Id. And sometime in late September, his daughter told EEOC counsel Tapper that Itoi "would expect no less than $350,000 .00 ." Id. at 15 . Tapper replied that "the settlement probably would not be that much ...: ' Id.
Aware that the settlement would "probably"
be less than he expected, Itoi had plenty of time to file his own action ahead of the EEOC's . Had he done so, the EEOC complaint would not have
w extinguished his claim, and he no would be
free to choose either to accept the current settlement or go forward with his private action .
Wilkerson, 171 F.R.D. at 279 .
c. Allocatio n ojSettle»rent Amount
Itoi further argues that the settlement allocation is unfair. Id. at 27. But here he relies on caselaw concerned with disparity in the distribution of benefits, while this Decree carefully prevents any such disparity by limiting the maximum payment to four times the average share and the minimum to one-fourth . Doc . # 4

12

~1 J ~

at 10 . Although expressed in "disparity" language, then, Itoi's real complaint is that he is individually being forced to accept reduced compensation for his more valuable claims, so as ultimately to benefit other class members with less valuable claims . Id. at 2 .
This can be a genuine issue of concern in Rule 23 private class actions where counsel has its own financial stake in the outcome . See Staton v. Boeing Co ., _ F.3d ~ 2003 WL 1964051 at * 9 (9th Cir. 3/29/03) ("concerns about the fairness of settlement agreements warrant special attention when the record suggests that settlement is driven by fees ; that is, when counsel receive a disproportionate
distribution of the settlemenf ). But the interests
and incentives of the EEOC are presumed to differ from those of counsel in a private class
action. See Wilkerson, 171 F.R.D. at 289.
The risks of collusion, or of inadequate representation of some of the class, are simply not present here to the same degree . And the court finds no evidence to otherwise suggest that Itoi's interests went unrepresented . The fact here that relief is equitably afforded all 66 claimants, despite the relative weakness ofmany of their claims, is a strength of this particular
n settlement . See McDo nell Douglas, 1993 WL
468903 at * 6 (emphasizing that "the proposed settlement clearly affords a greater opportunity for a larger number ofpotential victims to obtain
relief") ; EEOC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 772 F.Supp. 217, 221 (M.D.Pa.
1991) ("there exists the risk that the interests of some class members may be sacrificed in the effort to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number .. . . In fact, settlement distributions premised on a basis other than the merits of individual claims are common") (quotes and cites omitted) .

Finally, Itoi's argument that the Court should permit him to opt-out of the settlement, to pursue his own claim, must fail . Doc . # 11 at 29. Unlike in Rule 23 private class actions, no opt-out provision exists in AREA enforcement
actions . Compare Holmes v. Co ntinental Can
Co., 706 F .2d 1144 (11th Cir . 1983) (Rule 23),
ivith McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) ("[The ADEA's] remedial provisions incorporate by reference the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938" ; it is not enforced according to Rule 23) .
8. The Public luterest
"In making the reasonableness determination after the fairness hearing, the court is under the mandatory duty to consider the fairness of the decree to those affected, the adequacy of the
settlement to the class, and the public interest."
Lindsey v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport
Authority, 2000 WL 1182446 at * 5 (6th Cir.
8/15/00) (unpublished) (emphasis added) . This is because "the AREA is designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further important social policies such as deterrence of employment discrimination and prevention of
future discrimination through class-wide relief." EEOC v. North Gibson School Corp., 266 F.3d
607, 616 (7th Cir. 2001) ; US EEOC v. Massey
Yardley ChryslerPlyniouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244,
1253 (11th Cir. 1997) .
Important provisions of this Consent Decree are indeed aimed at vindicating the public interest . These include reporting requirements imposed on Gulfstream concerning certain future RIFs, doc . # 4 at 15-16, as well as any employee complaints of age discrimination at the Savannah facility . Id. at 19-21 . Gulfstream also agrees to develop and implement a detailed non-discriminatory policy, id. at 19, and to provide management training regarding the

13

. ~ . .,

Decree and the ADEA . Id. at 1 8. Finally, it consents to EEOC monitoring of its compliance with the terms o f the Decree. Id. at 2 1 .

This Zf-day of May, 2003 .

Objector Itoi's criticism that this injunctive relief in no way benefits class members like him (i.e., ex-employees) thus misses the point . See doc . # 11 at 29 . These provisions are aimed at preventing future discrimination ; securing such provisions constitutes a critical component of the EEOC's role under the ADEA scheme .

B! AVAPQTEDENFIELD, J1
UNITED STATES DISTRIC SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

IV. CONCLUSION

"A settlement is in large measure a reasoned choice of a certainty over a gamble, the certainty being the settlement and the gamble being the risk that comes with going to trial ." Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. ojEduc., 897 F .Supp . 1535,
1550 (M .D.Ala. 1995) (cite and quotes omitted) .
"As a result, the question is not whether the proposed consent decree is the best deal
possible, but whether it is at a minimum, fair,
adequate, and reasonable." Id. (cite and quotes
omitted) .

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds the Consent Decree fair, adequate, and reasonable . Accordingly, the Court GRANTS final approval ofthe EEOC/Gulfstream Consent Decree . Doc . # 4 . For the two-year term of the Decree, the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the parties for purposes of compliance with this Decree . Otherwise, the EEOC's Complaint (doc . # 1) is DISMISSED {VITff PREJUDICE . Finally, the Court OVERRULES the Objection (doc . #28) to the Magistrate Judge's 4/25/03 Order.

 
 t
`~ ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF G EORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORT UNITY COMMISSION,

V 2 - 2 4 3 Civil Action No.C 4 O

Pl ai nt iff,

V.
GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
Defendant .

CONSENT DECREE TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

I ntrodu ctio n

II. Scope

III . Ter m and D ismi ssa l

Page

IV. Compl iance with ADEA V. Sett lement F und VI . Procedure VII. Exclusion Notice to Alleged Voluntary Separations VIII. Fa irness Hearing IX. Future Reductions i n Force X. Noti fication of Vaca ncies XI . Management Trai ning

..
XII . Non-Discrimination Policy XIII. Reporting and Posting of Notice XIV. Monitoring Compliance and Complianc e Official XV . Return/Destruction of Document s XVI. Enforcement XVII . Appeal XVIII . C osts and Attorne ys' Fee s XIX. Pre ss Release XX. Notice s XXI. Governing Law XXII. Exhibits XXIII . Entire Agreement XXIV . Modification XXV. Severability XXVI . Co unterparts Attac hments Covere d P erso ns List A Eligibl e Claimants Li st B Timely C harging P arties C Private Pl aintiffs List D Alleged Voluntary Separation List E
2

Exclusion Notice F

Notice of Fairness Hearing and Opportunity to Obj ect G

Notice of Final Approval H

R e le a se

I

Posted Notice J

I. INTRODUCTI ON

A. Thi s matter was institut ed b y Plaintiff, Eq u al Empl oyme nt Opportunity

Commission ("Co mmission "), an agency o f the United S tates, a lleg ing violation of t h e

Age Discr im in ation in Empl oyment Act of 1 967, as amended ("A DEA"), 29 U .S.C. §

621 et s. eq The Commission has alleged that th e Defendant, Gulfstream Aerospa ce

Corporation ("Gulfstream"), discriminated agai nst e mployees age 40 a nd above at its

Sava nnah , Geo rgia lo c ati on wh en it selecte d them for layoff in re du ction s i n force

betwee nAugust 20, 2000, andDecember 3 1 , 2000.

B. Gulfstream d enies th at it engaged in any discri min ation based on age, or

co mmit ted any oth er violation of law, in co nn ect ion with RIFs or any ot her actio ns

allege d in th e co mpl aint. Noneth eless, th e Commission a nd Gulfstrea m (co llectively,

the " Parties") advise this Court that they wish to avoid th e ex pen se, delay and

uncertainties o f protrac ted litigation in this matter, and therefore agree to sett le t his

action by thi s Consent Decree ( " Decree ").

C. The Parties agree that this Co urt has ju ris diction over t he s ubj ect matter

of and the Parties to this lawsuit.

D. The Parties agree that this D ecree is voluntarily e ntered int o by th e

3

Parties, th at it shall n ot constitute an adjudi cation and finding on the merits of the case, an d th at it sh all n ot be co nstrued as an admi ssion by G ulfstrea m that it violate d the ADEA.
E. Thi s Decree is final and binding upon the Parties, their s uccessors and assigns. Further, the Parti es agree jointly to d efend thi s C on sent D ecree should it b e challenged by a non-party, includin g but not limi ted to an assert ion d uring t he term of this Dec ree by a ny Covered P erso n, as defin ed b elow, t hat his or her c laim is n ot ext inguished by this Decree, th e Parties to b ear their own lega l fees and costs in a ny such d efense, provided, however, th e EE OC s h all n ot be req uired to intervene as a d efendant in any act ion bro ught against Gulfstream.
F. T he Parties ag ree th at this Decree fairly resolves the issues a lleged in this lawsu it, a nd co nstit ut es a co mplete reso lution of al l claims by the Commiss ion of discriminatory retirement, layo ff o r termination under t he A D EA or other app licable laws e nforced by the Commission th at were made or cou ld h ave been made by the Commission in th is action b ased on acts or omissions of G ulfstream regar ding its Savann ah, Georgia locatio n, occ urrin g betwee n August 20, 2000 a ndthe date of the Complaint, and th at its e ntry s hall fu rth er the purposes o f the ADEA.
G. Th e Parties have und er taken investigation, informatio n-gat heri n g, interv iews, research , statistica l rev iews, and analysis sufficient to permit t hem to sufficientl y assess t he desira bili ty of thi s reso lution.
H. The Parties' o fficers, agents, e mpl oyees, successors, a nd all other persons in active concert or parti cipation with an y of th em shall not interfere w ith th e reli ef
4

here in or dere d, bu t s hall reaso nably cooperate in t h e im plementatio n of this Decree.

This provision shall not ex pand th e Court's perso nal ju risdict ion to any n atura l p erso n

prese ntly beyo nd th at jurisdiction.

I.

The Parti es respectfully request that th e C ourt preliminarily appro ve

this Decree on or before , pending fina l app roval p ursua nt to

notice to int eres ted p arties and a fairness hearing (the "Fa irness Hearing") as provi ded

in p aragra ph VIII of this Decree . Upon p re limin ary approval, and p ending fina l

approval, the Parties will b egin t aking certain actions as set fort h in paragraphs V, V I

and VII of this Decree .

J. THIS DECREE CONTAINS IMPORT ANT DEADLINES. FAIL URE

TO MEET THESE DEADLINES CAN C AUSE RIGHT S TO BE LO ST.

NOW TH EREFOR E, it is the prelimin ary finding of t his Court, made o n the

pleadings a nd th e record as a w hole, that t his Decree co nstitutes a fair and equitab le

resolution and shall furth er the purposes of th e ADEA. Thi s C ourt will mak e furth er

findings, a nd may finally a pp rove thi s Decree, following notice to i nterested persons as

prov ided h ere in and a Fa irness Hear ing to b e held on lGb.3, at t h e hour of

3 D am.

IT IS FU RTHER ORDERED, DEC REED AND ADJU DGED AS FOLLOWS :

Thi s C ourt has juri sdiction o ver the Partie s to and th e s ubj ec t matt er of thi s action .

II. SCOPE

A. Thi s Decree reso lves all claim s for both monetary a nd non- mon etary

relief on th e claim that G ulfstrea m l aid off empl oyees or force d emp loyees to retire

in li eu of layo ff b ecause of th eir age for e mpl oyees who meet the follow ing criteria (here inafter "Covered Perso ns") :
(1) They were age 40 or over at th e time o f their voluntary or invo lun tary layoff or retir ement;
(2) They were reg ular full-time employees of Gulfstrea m at its Sava nnah, Georg ia fac ility;
(3) Their in volunt ary layoff or retirement date, or invo luntary date i n the case of non-exempt employees, took effeetbetween A u gust 20, 2000 an d D ece mber 31 , 2000 ;
(4) T h ey have not instituted or op ted into an action th at re mains pending as of th e date of th e co mpl aint arising fro m or re lati ng to a layoff or retire ment d escri bed in p aragraph II .A .(3) ; and
(5) They have not prev iously e ntered into an agree ment w ith Gulfstream th at fully reso lves and re leases th e claims e ncomp assed i n this Decree . The agree ment , includin g t he release a nd waiver, must have complied wit h Sect ion 7(f) of t he A DEA, as a mend ed b y the Old er Workers Benefit Protection Act, in or der for the c laim to be resolved and release d b y the ear lier agree ment rather t h an thi s Decree.
This Decree includes employees, if an y, meetin g th ese crit eria who ha ve bee n issued a notice of right to sue that expired prior t o the date of final Court approval of this Decree. A list of Covere d P ersons is attac h ed hereto as Attac h ment A.
B. At tac hment B ("E ligibl e C laimants") is a list of Covered Perso ns, less

...
perso ns th at th e Commission, a fter rev iewing th e list o f Alleged Volun tary Se parations prepared by Gulfstream and an y obj ection s filed b y th e recipi ent s of the corres pondin g Exclusion Not ices, deter min es vo lun tarily sepa rated fro m their empl oyment wi th Gulfstrea m. A tta chment B will b e provi ded to th e Court after t h e p rocedur e set forth in p aragra ph VII h as bee n co mpl eted.
C. Attachment C ("Timely Charging Parties") is a list of all Covered Persons w ho filed timely c harges w ith the Commiss ion alleg ing age-based termination due to a reduction in th e workforce durin g t he releva nt time period.
D. Attachment D ( "Private Plaintiffs ") is a li s t of persons who eith er instituted or opted into a private action that remain s pending as of th e dat e of filing of the C ommission's complaint arising from or relating to a layoff or retirement described in paragraph II .A.(3), whether or not they filed charges . This Decree does n ot affect t he rights o f Private Pl aintiffs to procee d with those laws uits, nor does it compromi se the d efen ses of Gulfstream again st such claims. It is th e intent of th e Parties t h at, co nsistent wi th Rul e 408 of the Federal Rul es of Evi dence, t his Decree shall n ot b e a dmissible for any purp ose in such l aws uits o r in any other procee ding of a ny kind oth er than a procee ding fo r enforce ment or amendment of th e Decree .
E. Attachment E ("A llege d Voluntary Separatio ns") is a list o f all Covere d P ersons w ho, acco rdin g to Gulfstrea m's c urre nt records, vo lun taril y separated from Gulfstream betwee n August 20, 2000 and December 31, 2000 .
F. To e ffect thi s par agraph II , on or b efore the date of filing o f the motion seekin g preliminary Co urt approval of thi s Decree, the Comm ission shall

ha ve filed it s complaint consi stent with subparagraph LA of this Decr ee . Upon th e filin g of the complaint, the right of any E ligibl e C laimant to insti tute or o pt into a private act ion asserti n g c laims arising from or re lated to the s ubj ect matter o f the Commission's co mplaint s hall b e dee med t o have termin ated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626 (c)(1). Gravs on v. K Mart Corp ., 79 F.3d 108 6, 1105 ( 11th Cir. 1 996).
lII . TERM AND DISMI SSAL A. T h e ter m of thi s Decree s h all b e two (2) years from the date of final Court approval. U pon fina l app roval of thi s Decree, this Court s hall dismiss a ll claims by t he Commiss ion in th is ac tion with p rejudi ce. During t he two-year term of this Decree, however, this Cou rt s hall retain ju risdiction over the Parties for purposes of complianc e with this Decree, including is suing such orders as may be required to effect uate its purposes . B. The Part ies agree that all disputes between them regardin g any prov isio n of this Decree, includin g b u t not limited to any iss ue involving pote ntial enforcement of th e Decree, shall fir st b e rai sed informally between th em, and that th ey s hall attempt in goo d faith to meet a nd confer r egardin g s u ch matters w ith the view to p ro mpt a nd informal reso luti on. I f s uch m atters are not reso lved informally wit h in 30 days, the Part ies s h all then exc hange wr itten n otices settin g fort h th eir pos itions, and sha ll consider w hether resort to mediation i s in th e best interests of th e Parties . If the Part ies cann ot agree to mediate, or if th e mediation d oes not res ult in an agree ment between them, then th ey may bring the dispute to this Court for reso lution, prov ided that t hey set forth with spec ificity t he effor ts they have made to co mpl y with the provisions of
8

this paragra ph. C. T he dismi ssa l of th is action in accor dance w ith the provisions of
subparagraph A of this p aragraph III shall bar t h e Commission fro m bringi ng a ny administrative proceeding or suit under the A DEA aga inst Gulfstrea m based in whole or in part on any acts or omissions occurring at it s S avannah , Georgia facilit y on or before the dat e of th e complaint , that either (1) were or could have been all eged in thi s lawsuit a nd a s prov ided in p aragraph II .A, o r (2) involve class, syste mic or pattern and pract ice a ll egations concernin g e mployees o f Gulfstrea m's Savannah, Georgia fac ility, provi ded it occurre d on or before th e date of the com plaint .
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH AD EA Durin g the ter m of th is Decree Gulfstream agrees it s hall n ot : A. U ndertake any redu ctions in force that discriminate against employees age 40 a nd over o n the basis o f their age in violation of the A DEA. B. Reta liate aga inst any person b eca use that person h as op pose d allege dly discriminatory policies or pr actices or has filed an EEOC c harge, or because s uch p erson m ade a c harge, testified, ass iste d or partic ipate d in any manner in an in ves tigation, procee ding or litigatio n und er t he A DEA or co ncer nin g this case or this Dec ree .
V. SETTLEMENT FUND A. Gulfstream shall pay the gross s um of $2,176 ,307 (" Settlement Fund " ) for the use a nd benefit o f Eligible C laimants as provi ded in thi s paragraph V. B. Fo llowing preliminary C ourt approval of thi s D ecree, Gulfstream

...

.~

shall m aintai n th e Settlement Fund in its account, a nd shall credit interest to the Sett lement F und at t he c u rrent average mon ey mar ket rate of interest as published fro m time to time in t he Wa ll Street Journal, the i nterest to inu re to t he b enefit o f Eligible C laim ants. Except as prov ided in subp aragraphs F an d G o f paragra ph VI , Gulfstream may not use this Settlement Fund for any reason other than the benefit of Eligible Claimants pursuant to the term s of thi s Dec ree .
C. Eac h Eligib le C laimant s hall b e allocate d a s hare in the Sett lement Fund, w hich shall be determi ned by th e Commission based on the fo llowing factors : (1) t he age(s) a nd num ber(s) o f th e E ligible C laim ant's comparators(s) retai ned and/or sub seq uently hir ed by G ulfstream, if any; (2) the E ligible C laimant's hourly rate as of Se ptember 29, 2000 (or as o f the E ligible C laimant's date of ter mination if such d ate is prior to Se ptember 29, 20 00); (3) w hether t he E ligible Claima nt is a Timely C harging Party; (4) the E ligi ble C laim ant's age as of September 29, 2000 ; (5) the E ligib le Claimant's years of service w ith Gulfstream as of Septem ber 29, 20 00;and (6) t h e length of time, if appli cable, that the Eligible C laimant was o ut o f work before being re hire d b y G ulfstream; provided, however, t hat no s ing le E ligibl e Claimant's s hare may excee d four tim es t he average s hare of all Eli gible C laim ants or may be less t han one-fourth of such ave rage s hare. Thi s p rocess is fu rth er descri bed in paragra ph VI .A.
D. Because the parties disagree o n th e relative merits of t he back pay, front pay, liqu idate d d amages, and int erest c laims, a nd Gulfstrea m in p artic ular does not agr ee or admit that any of the pr edicate requirements for such dama ges
10

..
have occ u rre d, includin g willful di scr imination, n o a llocation be tween the categories of bac k p ay, front pay, liquid ate d d amages, interest, or ot her categor ies of relief shall be made pur suant to this Decree.
VI. PROCEDURE A. No late r th an 30 days after the mailing described in paragra ph VILA o f this Decree, the Commission sh all p rovide Gul fstream w ith i ts pre liminary a llocation of the Se ttlement Fund among a ll Covere d Persons, applyin g the factors set for th in p aragraph V.C. Gulfstrea m sh all h ave 1 5 days to respon d to the Commission in writi ng regardin g this pre limin ary allocat ion. During this 1 5-d ay period, Gulfstream wi ll rev iew th e Commission 's p ro posed allocation for fairness and reasona bleness . If the Part ies disagree as to s uch alloc ation, the Part ies s hall con fer i n good faith to reac h an appro priate resolution. Howeve r, the Commission, subject to Court approval of t h e Decree and th e provis ions o f paragraph V.C, shall determine how t he Settlement Fund is a llocate d. B. Not later than 1 5 days a fter the co mpl etion of the process re lati ng to Allege d Volun tary Separatio ns desc rib ed in p aragra ph VII, the Commiss ion shall p rovide Gulfstrea m with a fin al allocat ion of the Settlement F und among E ligibl e Claimants. This fin al allocation shall exclud e al l Covered Persons determine d to have bee n volun tar ily separated fro m employment w ith Gulfstrea m pu rsu ant to paragraph VII . B, a nd shall rea lloca te t he Settl ement F und to all remaining E ligi ble Claimants in the s ame proportion and according to th e s ame formula s applied in th e pr eliminary allocatio n d esc rib ed in sub paragra ph A of t h is paragrap h .
11

C. Using t he a mount s to whi ch the Commiss ion has deter min ed each Eli gible C laim ant is entitled as describ ed in subp aragrap h B , Gulfstream s hall crea te a report listin g th e net a mount to be paid to eac h Eligible Claim ant, i ncluding a ll ocable interest from the Se ttlement Fund (and the a moun t of the empl oyee share of FICA a nd mand atory inco me taxes withheld, along w ith the amo u nt of the emp loyer s hare of FICA and oth er co ntribu tions made), a nd shall provi de a brief, ge nera l summary of th e method u sed to calcul ate these amounts. T he Sett lement Fun d shall n ot under any circumstances be used to pay the employer's shar e of FI CA .
D. If no appeal from final Court approval and dis missal of the Commission's c laims in this action i s taken, then within 30 days after expiration of the last dea dlin e w ithin which to appea l, Gulfstream shall m ail to each Eligib le C laimant, at t he same a dd ress used for the Notice of Fairness Hear ing a nd O pport uni ty to Obj ect describe d in paragra ph VIII . B or any s uch upd ate d address as may be obtai ned thereafter, a Notice of Fi nal Appr oval in sub sta ntially the same form as A ttach ment H, which gives notice o f the Court's or der of final approval and of th e a mount to be d istr ibuted to th at Eligi ble C laimant pursuant to the calcul ations set fo rth in subparagra ph s B an d C. T he Not ice o f Final App roval sha ll also advise t he E ligi ble Claimant that, in o rder to receive payment, he or s he mu st sign a re lease, s ubstan tially in the same form as Attachment I, and retu rn it to G ulfstrea m at the indicated address no later th an 60 days of the d ate o f m ailing of the Not ice of Fin al Approval.
E. W ithin 30 days o f the expir ation o f the 60-day per iod described in subpara graph D , Gulfstream shall draw on th e account establi sh ed a cc ordin g to
12

paragraph V.B and m ail to each Eligible C laimant (or his or her estate or heirs) w ho h as satisfactor ily co mpl eted and r eturn ed th e release descri bed in s ubparagra ph D a check i n the net amoun t indi ca ted in th e report descr ibed in s ubparagra ph C, s ubj ect to the condition s desc ribed below and elsewhere in thi s Dec ree. The right of an y Eligible C laimant to receive a ny monetary relief s hall be subject to and continge nt upon timely a nd sa tis factory co mpletion and ret urn of t h e release describe d in s ubparagraph D. All p ayments und er this Decree s hall also be s ubj ect to a ny deductions or withholding required by law .
F. If any c hec ks are returned or are not cas hed within 90 days of mailin g, Gulfstream shall notify t he Commission promptly so that t he Com missio n m ay take, at its expense, fu rther steps to reach th ose E ligibl e C laim ants. I n t he eve nt that a ny fun ds, includ ing accrued interest, are not distrib uted as required by t his Decree for any reason, includin g t he failu re o f an Eligibl e C laimant to compl ete or return a re lease, th en th ey sh all be pai d to the Hospice Sava nn ah , subject to the dea dlin es provid ed in this Decree.
G. If this Decree does not rece ive fina l Cou rt ap proval, or if the Decree (as app roved by the Court) is not uph eld on appeal or beco mes null and voi d for any other reason, th e Parties s hall co nfer in good faith and attempt to make suc h modificatio ns th at will facilitate approval of the Court or sati sfaction of th e app ellate court. If the Parties are no t able to agree o n such modifications, the Settlement Fund, p lus accrued int erest, shall reve rt to Gulfstream, and both Gulfstream and th e Commission shall b e relieve d of all furth er obligation s under th e Dec ree .
13

..,

.,

V II. EXCL USION NOTICE TO ALLEGED VOLUNTARY SE PARATION S A. No later than 1 0 d ays a fter the Court's preliminary ap p roval of t his
Decree, Gulfstream sh all mail an Exc lusion Notice (Attachment F) to the A llege d Voluntary Se p arat ions, who s hall h ave 30 days from the date of this mai ling to deliver to G ulfstrea m an objection in writing to their exc lusion from relief under this Decree . Gul fstrea m shall, w ithin 60 days after t he above-refere n ced mai ling, provi de the Commiss ion with a list of Alleged Volun tary Separations w h o ti mely object according to t his s ubp aragra ph A, a long w ith a copy of each objectio n.
B. Within 30 days after r eceipt of the li st d esc rib ed in subp aragraph A , the Commission shall d eter mine wheth er it believes a ny obj ect ing A lleged Volun tary Se paration was not vo lun tar ily se para ted for purposes of t he Decree, a nd s hall give notice to Gulfstream of any such d etermination. If Gulfstream disagrees wit h any suc h d eterminat ion by th e Comm issio n , the part ies s ha ll confer in good fait h concernin g t he resolu tion of any disagreements, subject to the procedures set forth in paragraph 111 .11 above.
C. A ny A llege d Voluntary Separation, as i dentifie d i n Attachment E, for whom it h as bee n agree d th at h e or s he was not vol untari ly separate d pu rsuant to subpara graph B s hall thereafter be treated for all purp oses as a n E li g ibl e C laimant und er this Decree.
VIII . FA IRNESS HEARING A. The Court shall conduct a Fairness Hearing on at q 3o a .m. at U.S. District Court, 125 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 31401 .
14

B. No later than 60 days pri or to t he date of this Fa irness H earing, t he Parties s hall j ointly mail to eac h Eligible C laimant, at Gu lfstrea m's expense, a Notice o f Fairness Heari ng a nd Opp ortuni ty to Object, s ubstantia ll y in t he form set fort h in Attachment G. T his Notice shall, at a minimum, summarize the terms a nd conditions o f th e Decree a nd advise E ligibl e C laima nts of t heir rig h ts under t he sett lement, includin g the r ight to obj ect a nd the procedure for exercisi ng t hat righ t.
C. If a ny E ligible Claimant wis hes to object to t he entry of this Decree, the objector must: ( i) file w ith the Cour t a detailed, writte n state ment of the objection n ot later than 30 days prior to the Fairness Heari ng; and (ii) serve copies of th e written state ment of obj ection o n counsel for t he Part ies post marked not later than 30 days prior to the Fa irness Hearing . A ny objector may, b ut is not req uired to, a ppear at t h e Fairness Hearin g either in person or t hrough co un sel h ired by t h e objector.
D. T h e Parties may file a written p os ition statement on any objectio ns at leas t 7 d ays prior to the Fa irness Hea ring.
IX. FUTURE RED UCTIONS IN FORCE A. In the eve nt G ulfstream engages in a reduction in force invo lving the ter min ation or retirement of at least 75 empl oyees over 6 months at its Sava nn ah, Georgia location during th e ter m of thi s Decree, G ulfstrea m shall provide to t he Commiss ion, w ithin 30 days after co mpletion of t h e redu ction i n force, a report t h at inc ludes :
The dat e(s) of the reduction in force ;
15

2 . An indication a s to wh ether th e reduction in force appli ed to exe mpt employees, non-exempt emplo yees, or b oth ;
3 . A list of each individu al termi nated i n the red uction in force, includin g name, d ate of birth, date o f hi re, a nd date of ter min ation; a list of t h e department numb ers an d corres ponding depart ment names in w hich any e mployee was termin ate d as a result o f the reduction in force ; and
4. For eac h d epartment in which any employee was ter minated as a res ult of t h e redu ction in force, th e total num ber of e mployees employe d in the department before the redu ction in force, the total number o f employees e mploye d in the dep art ment before the redu ction in force w ho were age forty or over as of the date o f the red uction in force, t he total numb er of employees i n the departmen t who were ter min ate d in the redu ction in force, a nd the total number of emp loyees in the depart ment who were over 40 yea rs o f age as of t h e date of t he reductio n in force who were terminat ed in the r eduction in force .
B. G ul fstrea m shall simultaneously prov ide t h e Commiss ion with any WARN notices sent to state or loca l gover nments du ring t he term of th is Decree . Not hing co ntaine d in thi s s ubp ara graph B shall be dee med to impose a ny o bli gatio n wh atsoever o n Gulfstrea m to post pone or chan ge a ny p lanned l ayoff, even if t he Commission dispu tes G ulfstream's co mpliance with these n otice provis ions .
C. All written information d escrib ed in this p aragraph IX sh all b e su bj ect to retentio n und er s ubp aragraph XIII .B. a nd production under su bparagra ph XIV.A. o f this Decree .
16

X. NOTI FICATION OF VACA N CIES During t h e ter m of thi s Decree, Gulfstrea m will mai n tain a web page that includes vaca ncies at i ts Sava nn ah, Georgia faci l ity, which Eli gib le Claimants a nd other indi vidual s who may be interested in appl ying ca n ch eck at th eir co nvenience. Any Elig ible Claimant hire d b y G ulfstrea m , at any time w ithin two years of the date that the Court gave fi nal approval of the Decree, shall be req uired to forfe it to Gulfstream a p ro p or tionate s h are o f the mon etary award u nder th is Decree th at is deemed to re prese nt front pay, which, so lely for purposes of this paragraph, shall be ass umed to be 35 perce nt of the total awar d. T he proportiona l amount of fro n t p ay to be forfeited sh all b e deter min ed b y ca lculatin g t he number of mont hs from th e Eligib le C laimant's date o f h ire t hro ugh th e two year expiration date after the Court gave fina l approval of t he decree, a nd divi ding t h e latter number by twe ntyfour. Any E ligib le C laimant hire d b eyo nd th e two years expiration date after t he Cou rt gave fi n al approval of th e Decree shall n ot be require d to forfeit a ny part of his/her awar d to Gul fstrea m. E ligibl e C laimants w ho apply in this ma nner s hall b e considered in the same manner as a ny other appl icants. If an E lig ible C laima n t is re- hired by G ulfstrea m, he or she s hall b e treated in th e same man ner as any ot her employee a t Gulfstream, s hall b e s ubj ect to the same perfor mance and atte ndan ce requirement s as oth er emplo yees, and shall not b e acc ord ed any s pec ial or preferential treatm ent. Within nin ety (90) days a fter any E ligibl e C laimant is re- hire d, G ulfstream's designate d compl iance officer s h all provide to th e Regiona l Attorney a notification
17

list of the rehi ring.
XI. MANAGEMENT TRAINING A. Begi nn ing not late r than 90 days after fin al Co u rt approva l of this Decree or Co mmission app roval of t he tra inin g, w hichever is later, G ulfstream shall provi de a reasonab le a moun t o f trainin g, w hose co ntent has been previou sly reviewed an d app roved by the Commission (w hich approval shall not be unreaso nab ly wi thh eld), to s ubstanti ally all employees in its Savanna h, Georgia fac ility w ho hold a superv isory position as of th e date of fin al Cou rt approva l, subj ect to reaso n able ava ilability of th e e mpl oyees to be tra in ed . B. Training shall consist o f at least t he followi n g:
Gulfstrea m's o bligations und er t h e D ecree ; 2. G ulfstrea m's statu tory obli gations u nd er the A DEA in general, an d in partic ular i ts ob ligation n ot to discrimi nate o n the bas is o f age in emp loyment decisio ns concerni ng t he continuin g empl oyment of c urre nt staff; a nd 3. Objective, non-discrimin atory decision- mak ing a nd proper procedu res for evaluatio ns, reductions in force a nd layoffs . C. Gulfstream shall complete thi s training not later than 2 70 da ys after final Court appro val of thi s Decree, subject to reasonabl e availability of th e employees to be tra ined, a nd shall n otify th e EE OC within two weeks after co mpletion.
XII . NON -DISCRIMINATION POLI CY
18

A. Gulfstream shall de velop and t ender to the C ommission , within 60 days of fin al Court approval of this Decree, a copy of its wr itte n non- discr imin ation policy which esta bli shes s p ecific proce du res for receiv ing, invest igat ing an d reso lving compl aints of di scrimin ation lodged by a ny e mployee. G ulfstream's nond iscrimi nation p olicy sh all i nclude, a t a minimum, the followi ng safeguar ds :
1 . A proce du re to report t he co mpl aint to so meone ot her th an the allege d d iscriminator, if the immediate s u pervisor is the a lleged discriminator ;
2. A prov ision th at establi shes a prompt investigatio n of the complain t;
3. A prov ision p ro hibiting retaliation agai n st perso ns w ho file complain ts or partic ipate in the process ; and
4. A prov ision th at war n s o f ap propriate sanctions agai nst persons w ho vio late th e policy.
B. G ulfstrea m may includ e in th e non- discrimi nation policy a disclaimer th at t he policy does not constitute a n ex press or implied contract.
XIII. REPORTING AND PO STI NG OF N OTICE A. Wit hin one month after the e nd of eac h six-month perio d d uring t he term o f this Decree, G ulfstream shall submi t a report to th e Commissio n l isti n g a ll complaints or ch arges o f age discr imination m ade by em ployees or former emplo yees of Gulfstream 's S avannah , Georgia facili ty to th e person s designat ed to rece ive suc h compl aints with the following information :
The date of t he co mpl aint or c harge;
19

2. The nam e and contact information of th e person m akin g th e complaint or char ge
3. The name a nd title o f the perso n agai nst w hom th e compl aint or charge was made;
4. The underlying allegation s of the co mpl aint or c harge ; 5. The name and contact information of th e perso ns rece iving th e complaint or c harge; 6. A s ummary o f the act ion taken by Gu lfstrea m in response to the co mpl aint or c harge; and 7. The c urrent status of th e investigation of th e comp laint or ch arge and a s ummary of its resolution. B. G ulfstream shall retain for th e ter m of th is Decree, or as requ ired by the Co mmission's Recordkeeping Regulations, 29 C .F.R. § 1 627, w hichever is longer, a ll documents re lated to selection of empl oyees for actu al r edu ctions in force and th e reports re feren ced in subp aragraph A o f th is paragrap h. C. T h e reports re qu ired b y this paragraph XIII shall be se nt postage prepaid to :
Regional Attorney Atlanta District Office Equal Employment Opp ortuni ty Co mmission 100 Alaba ma Street, S .W., Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
D. Upon entry of t his Decree and co ntinuing du ring its term, G ulfstrea m
20

I-
wi ll keep p oste d a copy o f the Notice a ttac hed to t his Decree (as Attachment J) at Gulfstream's place(s) of bu siness . The pos ting required by this pa ragrap h shall b e made o n bulletin b oards or locations selected so t h at eac h empl oyee at t hese facilities shall h ave the o pp ortunity to observe at least o n e such post in g w hen at t h e facility . Gulfstream will fulfill the post ing req uire ment w ithin fifteen ( 1 5) days of t he entry fina l appr ova l of this Decree a nd shall ce rtify, w ithin thirty (30) days o f su ch d ate, th at posti ng has bee n accom plished.
Gulfstream shall n ot withhold the right of the Commission to enter up o n Gulfstream's premi ses to monitor compliance with this posti ng req uireme nt. S hould the Notice become deface d, marre d, or otherwise u nreadab le, G ulfstrea m will ensu re that a new, rea dable copy o f the Notice is poste d in the same manner as h ereto fore specified within five (5) working days of discover in g t h e defective Notice .
XIV. MONITORING COMPLIANCE AN D COMPLIANCE OFF IC IAL A. During th e term of t his Decree th e Commissio n sh all have th e right to
rev iew co mpl iance w ith this Decree at G ulfstrea m's facility located in Sava nn ah, Georg ia. T he review shall co nsist of, bu t not necessarily be limite d to, inspect ing and copying (at Gulfstrea m's expe nse) a reasonabl e nu mber of relevant, un class ified doc uments and interv iewi ng G ulfstream empl oyees . Before sc hedul ing a ny on-site compliance review, t he Commission shall n otify Gu lfstrea m in writing of each i ssue it seeks to review, includin g part icular job s or departments t hat are of concern to the Commi ssion and any specific infor mation th at has led t he Commission to req uest a review. The Commission shall further give Gulfstrea m at least 3 business days' prior
21

not ice o f any v isit to Gulfstream's premises, which visit s hall occur d urin g nor mal business hours a nd b e condu cted accor din g to Gulfstrea m's security a nd safety proce du res. Gulfstrea m shall be allowe d to have an attor ney and a Human Reso urces representat ive presen t du ring any Co mmission in terview of an emp loyee h oldin g a supervisory or manage ment pos ition, as determined by G ulfstream . The Comm ission sh all give G ulfstream at least 7 bu siness days w ithin which to copy documents. Gulfstream shall be required promptly to comply with all reason able requests of th e Commission for s uch m onitor ing infor mation, includ ing prov ision of perso nnel d ata previously described by t his Decree in a machine-readable format as agreed to by t he Parties, s ubj ect to any agree ments or protec tions t hat may be reaso nably necessary to protect the c onfid entiality of an y information , documents, or data pro vided to th e Co mmi ss i on .
B. During the ter m o f this Decree, the Commi ssion s h all not disclose documents or oth er information obta ined pu rsuant to t his Decree o utside of t h e agency, sh all u se the docu ments a nd i nformation solely for t he purpose o f m onitori ng or enforc ing compl iance w ith thi s Decree a nd shall p rotect t he information fro m disclosure under exceptions to t he Freedom of Information Act, U .S.C . § 552(b), to the maximum exte nt permi tte d b y law, s ubj ect to one or more of t he fo llowi ng exempt ions : (i) confident ial co mm erc ial and fin ancial information, (ii) confidential perso n al information, or ( iii) information, disclos ure of which would interfere with th e Commission's e nforcement activities.
C. G ulfstream shall d esignate a compliance official w ho s h all be responsible
22

for compl iance with this Decree, and also responsib le for coordin ating and overseeing Gulfstrea m's co mpliance with th is Decree .
XV . RETURN/DESTRUCTION OF DO CUM ENTS A. Wit hin 60 days o f the expiration of t he Decree, t he Com miss ion s h all destroy all information provided to the Commission b y Gulfstrea m in machin erea dable form in any way re lat ing to this act ion or t h e un der lying administrative inves tigation, includ ing a ll co pies of this information, w hether un der the direct contro l of the Commiss ion or under the control of third p arties to w hom the Comm issio n p rov ide d the information, provided th at duri ng t he term of this Decree Gulfstream sh all maint ain this infor mation substantia lly i n th e form provided to the Commission . B. During the ter m of th is Decree, the Commiss ion shall retai n all reports an d relate d in formation p rov ided to the Commission by Gu lfstrea m as req uired or permitte d b y this Decree (" Monitoring Information") . A fter expiration of this Decree, th e Commission shall continu e to preserve the confidentiality of Monitoring Information as re qu ire d by paragraph X III of this Decree, a nd s hall process this in formation accordin g to th e Commission's record retentio n po licy then in effect, w h ich c urre ntly contemplates destruction after t h ree years .
XV I . A. T here is no private r ight of enforce ment in connection w ith Gulfstream's ob ligations und er the Dec ree a nd o nly the Commissio n, G ulfstream, or their s uccessors or ass igns may e nforce co mpliance herew ith or ot h erwise have a ny
23

rig hts here und er . B. E nforcement may be had by e ith er Party subject to p aragra ph III .B
of this Decree . XVII. A PPEAL
In the eve nt of an appea l fro m an order o f the Court fina lly approving this Decree, a ll of Gulfstrea m's o bligat ions under this Decree, except for accrual of interes t on th e Se ttlement F und und er p aragra ph V.B, shall b e suspended, and shall res ume onl y upon compl ete non-a pp ealable affirmance, w ith th e date the Co urt of Appeals issues its final, non-a pp ealabl e mand ate t hen being treated as t he date of final Court app roval.
XVIII . COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES Eac h P arty s hall be responsible for a nd shall pay its own attorney's fees a n d costs, except as to costs and ex penses ex press ly a llocated by t h is Decree .
XIX. PRESS RELEASE The Parties' officers, agents, e mployees, su ccessors, a nd all other persons in act ive concert w ith them, shall m ake no comm ent to the publi c at large in the for m of a press re lease, news con fere nce o r simil ar disclos u re co ncerning th is Decree or sett lement o f the c laims betwee n them in thi s case, pr ior to t he date of pre limin ary Court ap proval of this Decree as co ntempl ated by s ubp aragra ph I .J . of t his Decree . The Part ies s hall reaso nably a ttempt t o exc han ge prelimin ary draft press re leases an d coordinate t he t iming and r ec ipi ent s of their initial press re leases s ubseque nt to the dat e of pr eliminary C ourt appro val, and shall make th emselves ava ilable for
24

disc ussions in goo d faith co ncerning any s uch d raft ini tia l p ress re leases t h at are exc hange d, bu t the Parties s h all ultimately have so le contro l over the co ntents of their respecti ve pre ss relea ses .
XX . NOTICES All n otices re qui red or desired to be given u nder t his Decree s hall be in writin g an d delivered b y h and , by registered or certified mai l, by co u rier, or by facs imile co nfirmed by first-class mail, to co un sel for t h e respective Part ies at t heir respect ive a dd resses set fort h b elow, or to such other address as a ny suc h P arty may d esignat e in a notic e delivered pursuant to this par agraph .
XXI. GOVERNING LAW The Parties agree t hat the v alidity, constr uction a nd enforceme nt o f this Decree s hall b e gover ned by federa l law. To the extent that it is determined t hat t h e validi ty, construction or enforcement of this Decree or a ny re lease executed pursuant to its terms is governed b y s tate law, th e law of the State of Georg ia s hall a pply .
XX II. EX HIBI TS All of the Exhibi ts to this Decree are material and integral parts hereof and are fully i nco rpora ted h erein b y th is reference .
XXIII . ENTIRE AGREEM ENT This Decree, includin g t he Exhibits hereto, contains the e ntire agree ment a nd u nderstan din g o f the parties w ith res pect to t he settlement a ll cl aims described h erein. This Decree does not imp ose a ny obligations on t he parties beyond the terms
25

and condition s s tat ed h erein. A ccordin gly, this Decree s hall n ot preve nt or prec lud e Gulfstrea m from revising its e mpl oyment p ractices and policies or taking ot her perso nnel actions d uring t he ter m of thi s Decree that do not vio late s pecific req uirements o f this Decree.
XXIV . MODIFI CATION Th e Parties may j ointly agree to modify t he Decree, su bject to approval of th e Court pursu an t to a j oint motion of the Parties.
XXV. SEVERABILI TY Wheneve r po ss ibl e, each provision and term of thi s Dec ree s hall b e inter prete d in such a ma nner as to b e va lid and e n forceab le. H owever, in the eve nt that any provision or term of this Decree or its ap plication to any s p eci fic person or circumsta nce s hould b e deter mined to be or rendered inva lid or un enforceab le, a ll other provisions a nd terms of thi s Dec ree and the application thereof to a ll oth er persons a n d circ umsta nces s u bject t h ereto s h all remain unaffected to the extent p ermitte d by law.
XXVI. C OUNTE RPA RTS To fac ilitate execution , this Decree may be execu ted in co unterparts, a nd such co un terparts w hen so executed sh all constitute a single agree ment, as if one doc ument has bee n signed by the parties hereto.
26

BY CONSENT : EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORT UNITY COMM ISSION
Gwendolyn Reams Associate Genera l Coun sel 1801 L Stre et N .W. Washington , D.C. 20507

. Robert Royal Region al Attorney Georgia Bar No . 617505

Date -

I / /~ y/0 4,

Steven M. Tapper

D ate

Act ing S upervisory Trial Attorney

Georgia Bar No . 698018

Atlanta Di strict Office, E qual Employment Opp ortunity C ommiss ion

100 Alabama Stree t, S .W., Suite 4830

Atlanta , Georgia 30303

(404 ) 562-6812 or -6820

(404 ) 562 -6905 (fa csimile )

GULFST A S ACE C ORPORATION

Ira Berman

//,~,0 2 D ate

Senior Vice Pres ident, A dministration and General Counsel

Gulfstream Aeros pace Corporation

500 G ulfstrea m Road Savannah, Georgia 31407

(912) 965-5201

(912) 965-4764 (facsimile)

27

.,

`.

GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCH ER LLP
William rg, Esq. Pro Ha c Vi ce Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LL P 1050 Co nnectic ut Ave nu e Washington, DC 20036 202-955-8573 202-530-9559 (facsimile)
Cou nse l for Gu lfstream Aeros pace Corporation

1,I z/ ~. Date'

H UNTE R, MCLEAN, EXLEY & DUNN P.C.
Wade W. Herrin g, II Georgia B ar No. Hunter, Maclean, Ex ley & Dunn P.C. 200 E ast Saint Julian Street P.O. Box 9848 Savannah , Georgia 3 1412 (9 12) 236 -0261 (9 12) 236 -4936 (facsimile)
Counse l for Gul fstrea m Aeros pace Cor poration

IA4~
D ate

28

PRELIMINARILY APPROVED this _a_ day of 2002. BY THE
AV . UNITED STATES

FI NALLY APPROVED this

day o f

Cou rt's Findin gs o f Fact a nd Conclusions o f L aw.

BY T H E COURT :

200, subj ect to t h e

THE HO N ORABLE B . AVANT EDENFIELD UN ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29

ATTAC HM ENT A
LIST OF COVERED PERS ONS
ADAMS , DEBBIE Y ALDERMAN SR, DAVID G ALVAREZ, PEDRO P. ARNOTT, DAVID K ASHCRAFT , VAL A BALL, DEREK A BARNHART, C . ROBERT BAZEMORE , HAROLD L BLACKMON , CHARLES E . BLAND, KENNETH W BOLEBRUCH , DANIEL F BOLET, ANTONIO BRACKEEN, MARIGAIL R . BRANNEN , RALPH D BRICHACEK, JOSEPH J BROOKS , OLIVER L BROWN , JOHN W BURK, BRIAN J . BURNSED, WANDA L BUTLER , BOBBY L . BUTRYMOWICZ, THOMAS J CAHN, RICHARD F CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS , JOAN A COLLETT , GREG J. COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVIN, CECIL B . COSPER, WOODROW E CRABB, BRENDA J DANIEL, RONALD E . DAMES, CURTIS R DAMS, CHARLES A DAMS , MARVIN DENTON , ROBERT R DERHAMMER , ROY A DICKSON , DONALD R DOAN, LONG DODD , SARAH A DOUGHTY , RUSSELL H .

I
DUHACK, JOSEPH S EDWARDS , RALPH W . ELLIS , ROY M ELRICK, STANLEY M EMERSON , FLORA M . EMERSON, LUCILLE ENG, HARRY M . FAUCETTE , NORMAN E FERGUSON, RITA S . FLOWERS , CHARLES L FOLKS, CLARENCE E FRENCH , KENNA R FRIEDENBERG, BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD , DAVID L GLADIN JR , JAMES S GONZALEZ , JORGE F . GOODARD , CHARLES B . GRANT, DONNA N . GREEN, JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKI, PAUL M . GUEDIRI, FARID HARRELSON, JAMES T HART JR, ROBERT E HAZARIWALA , RAMESH C HEBERT , DWAYNE HERNANDEZ , CARLOS R HOUGHTBY, ARTHUR D . HOUSER, WILLIAM F . HOWARD III , GEORGE ITOI, NORITOSHI KALINOWSKY , ROY KEITH, MICHAEL W KENNEDY , LORRINDA M KIMBREW, MOLLIE A KNIGHT II, WALLACE R KRAMER, DEBORAH S LANCON, TERESA M LAZARUS, ALBERT LEFEVRE, DOUGLAS J . LEVENGOOD , JOHN LOLLIS, DONALD R . LOVE , LORI A MACKEY, GORDON N

MARTIN, JAMES T MAUGHAN, DAWN H . MCCORMICK, HERBERT L . MCCURRY , TAMMY A . MCDERMOTT, PATRICK J MCKENZIE, MARTY MCLAIN , LARRY G . MEDLIN, WAYLAND R . MIDDLETON , EDGAR P MINCEY, RICHARD D MOORS , NAOMI R NAGY, JOHN NHUONG , NGUYEN V ODELL, DAVID J . O'KELLEY, MARCHETA B PACKER , GRAHAM J PALMER, ROBERT E PARKER SR ., BRUCE K . PARKER, JAMES E PEAVY, BARBARA J PERIGARD , LYNN M . PHILLIPS , JAMES D . PURCELL , ROBERT W RAINS, SUSAN C . READ, IVAN F REARS , JACQUELINE F REESE, DONNA B . REYES JR, EUGENE C RIPPEY , MICHAEL G ROBERTS , CHARLES E SAMMONS, DAVID E, SR SCHMIDT , HAROLD R SHUBBER,ADEL SLAVEN, DONALD E . SMITH, GAYLE C SMITHWICK, DENNIS M SOFFEL, JEAN B . STAHL, GEORGE T TAYLOR , CARL H . TAYLOR, JOHNNY D TAYLOR , MARGARET L TEBBETTS , ALAN R TIDWELL, DAVID TIMBERLAKE JR, EDDIE H

TUINDER, TIMMY J . VAN GORP , DAVID H . VILLARI , JOSEPH VINCENT , DIAN E WALLIS , PAUL A WATERS, KEVIN P. WELLS, DAVID A WHITE, THOMAS C .
WILLIAMS , JANICE WILLIAMS , JUDITH B WOOD, ROBERT J .

ATTACHMENT B
LI ST OF ELIGIBL E CLAIMAN TS
[To be prov ided to the Court, pursuant to paragraph 11 .13 of the Decree, upon comp letion of t he Exclusion Notice process se t forth in p aragraph VI I of the Decree]

`.
ATTAC H MENT C
LI ST OF TIMELY CHARGI NG P ARTIES
ARNOTT, DAVID K BARNHART, C . ROBERT BRANNEN, RALPH D BRICHACEK, JOSEPH J BROOKS, OLIVER L BROWN, JOHN W BURNSED, WANDA L BUTRYMOWICZ, THOMAS J CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS, JOAN A COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVIN , CECIL B . COSPER , WOODROW E DANIEL, RONALD E . DAMES, CURTIS R DAMS, CHARLES A DENTON, ROBERT R DOAN, LONG DODD , SARAH A ELRICK , STANLEY M EMERSON , LUCILLE FAU CETTE, NORMAN FRI EDENBERG , BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD , DAVID L GONZALEZ, JORGE F . GREEN, JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKI , PAUL M . HARRELSON , JAMES T HAZARIWALA , RAMESH C HEBERT, DWAYNE HOWARD [II, GEORGE ITOI , NORITOSHI KENNEDY , LORRINDA M MARTIN, JAMES MCKENZIE , MARTY MEDLIN , WAYLAND MINCEY , RICHARD D MOORE, NAOMI R NHUONG, NGUYEN V

O'KELLEY , MARCHETA B PARKER , JAMES E PERIGARD , LYNN M RHINE, SUSAN C . READ, IVAN F REYES JR, EUGENE C SAMMONS, DAVID E, SR SCHMIDT , HAROLD R SMITHWICK, DENNIS M TEBBETTS, ALAN R WILLIAMS , JUDITH B

ATTACHME NT D
LI ST O F PRI VATE P LAIN TI FFS
BARNHART, C ROBERT BRANNEN, RALPH D BRICHACEK , JOSEPH J BROOKS , OLIVER L BROWN, JOI-IN W BURNSED, WANDA L BUTRYMOWICZ , THOMAS J CARTER, JESSE D CLABBERS , JOAN A COPELAND, ALLAN G CORVIN, CECIL B. COSPER , WOODROW E DANIEL , RONALD E . DAMES, CURTIS R DAMS , CHARLES A DAMS , MARVIN DENTON, ROBERT R DOAN, LONG DODD, SARAH A DUHACK , JOSEPH S ELRICK, STANLEY M EMERSON, LUCILLE FAUCETTE, N ORMAN E FRIEDENBERG , BARBARA D GAY, CARLTON E GIFFORD , DAVID L GONZALEZ , JORGE F GREEN , JUANITA T GRZYBOWSKI, PAUL M . HAZARIWALA , RAMESH C HEBERT , DWAYNE HOWARD III , GEORGE KENNEDY , LORRINDA M LANCO N, TERESA M LEVENGOOD . JOHN MCKENZIE , M ARTY M[NCEI', RICHARD D MOORE , NAOMI R NHLJONG , NGU YEN V O'KELLEY, MARCHETA B PARKER , JAMES E PEAVY, BARBARA J

PHILLIPS, JAMES D . PURCELL, ROBERT R' RHINE, SUSAN C READ, IVAN F REYES JR, EUGENE C ROBERTS, CHARLES E SAMMONS, DAVID E , SR SMITHWICK, DEWS M SOFFEL, JEAN B . TEBBETTS, ALAN R WILLIAMS, JUDITH B

ATTAC HMENT E
LI ST OF ALLEGED VOL UNTARY SEPARATIONS
ALDERMAN SR , DAVID G ALVAREZ, PEDRO P. COLLETT , GREG J. DICKSON , DONALD R DOUGHTY, RUSSELL H ELLIS , ROY M EMERSON , FLORA M . GLADIN JR , JAMES S GOODARD, CHARLES B . MAUGHAN, DAWN H . MCCORMICK , HERBERT L . MCDERMOTT, PATRICK J NAGY, JOHN PALMER, ROBERT E REARS , JACQUELINE, F SMITH, GAYLE C TAYLOR, MARGARET L WALLIS , PAUL A WELLS, DAVID A WILLIAMS , JANICE

ATTACHM ENT F

EXCLUSION NOTI CE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EM PLOYMENT OPPORTUN ITY COMMISSION,

Civil Acti on No .

Plaintiff,

v.

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION

Defendant .

EXCL USION NOTI CE

To : Former Gu lfstream Aerosp ace C orporation Employee :

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and Gul fstream Aerospace Corporatio n ("G ulfstream"), have entered into a Consent Decree in the case of EEOC v . G ulfstream Aerospace Corporation, filed , 2002 The Court has preliminari ly approved this Decree and this notice is being sent to you with the Court's ap prova l. The Decree resolves the EEOC's claims that Gulfstream discriminated against regu lar, full-time, no n-union empl oyees age 40 and o lder who were laid off or forced to retire in lieu of layoff betwee n August 20, 2000, and December 31, 2000 . Gulfstream denies all al legations of discrimination but has agreed to the Consent Decree and se ttlement to avoid litigation .

Gulfstream's current records sh ow that you were 40 or older when you left Gulfstream Those records also show that :

a. you were not laid off, or

b . you voluntarily left your employmen t with Gulfstream .

Beca use these recor ds s how that you were not laid off in voluntari ly or forced to reti re, you are being exc lud ed from obtaini ng any benefits under the Consent Decree .

,.
If yo u did n ot leave the Company volun tarily, a nd you wish to object to being exc lud ed from the benefits o f the Consent Decree, yo u must send yo u r written object ion to the following address :
[NAME OF COMPLIANCE OFFICER] Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation 500 Gulfstream Road Savannah, Georgia 31402
Your o bj ectio n mu st be rece ived at this address by 5 :00 p.m . o n (30 DAYS AFTER MAILING DATE], or else t he EEOC will not consider your objection . It is not enough to mail your objection on that date . To avoid problems over this timelin ess issue, we s ugges t you m ail any o bj ect ion, if you have one, early, or t h at you send it by certified mail, ret urn receipt req uested .
You must include a detailed written explanation of whatever facts you have that show that your separation from Gulfstream was not voluntary. At the end of your written statement of objection, you must write . "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct," then sign your name . social security number, current address and telephone number(s) and the date .
If you have any ques tions about this Exc lusion Notice, contact Marcus Keegan at (40 4) 562-6818 . ( H e works for the EE OC .)
The E EOC will notify you of its dec ision concerning your objection . I f you are later allowed to participate i n the b enefi ts of this Decree, you wil l be sent a package of informa tion exp laining w hat to do. You mu st follow al l instructions carefu lly and in a time ly fashion.

ATTACHMENT G
NOTI CE OF FAIRNESS HEARING A ND OPPORTUN ITY TO OBJE CT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DI STRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No

V.
GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORAT ION Defendan t .
NOTI CE TO E LI GIB LE CLAIMANTS OF PRO POSED CONSENT D ECREE To Former Gu lfstream Aerospace Cor poration Employee : On , 2002, the United States Equal Employm ent Opportun ity
Commission ("EE OC") fil ed a c lass action age discrimination lawsuit against Gulfstream Aerospace Corporatio n ("Gulfstream" or "the Company") . The lawsuit alleges that the Com pany discriminated against perso ns ("Covered Persons") who were at the time of t heir se paration from empl oyment regular, full-time emp loyees at the Company's Savannah, Georgia, facility age 40 and o lder, and that such separation occ urred between August 20, 2000, an d D ece mber 31, 2000 . Gulfstream denies that it engaged in any illega l discrimination or that it committed any other vio lation of law in connec tion with these separatio ns from employment or any other actions a lleged in the complaint, b ut it has agree d to a settleme nt and Consent Decree to avoid the expense,

delay and uncertain ties of protracted liti gatio n. The Consent Decree is not an admission by the Company t hat it vio lated any law.
The proposed Conse nt Decree agreed to by the EEOC and Gu l fstream has been filed with the Court, which must approve the Consent Decree before it becomes final and effective . You have been sent this notice because th e Company's records show that you are a person ("Eligib le C laimant") w ho may be entit led to re lief under the proposed Consent Decree upon satisfaction of certain condition s.
THIS N OTICE IS T O ADVISE Y OU OF THE TE RMS OF THE PROPOS ED CONSENT DECREE THAT MAY APPLY TO YO U AND TO ADVI SE YO U OF YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO OBJE CT TO TH E C ONSEN T DECREE IF YOU S O CHOOSE. NOTHING I N THIS N OTI CE CONSTIT UTES A CONTRACT OR CREATES ANY OBLIG ATIONS O F TH E C OMPANY OR RI GHTS OF E MPLOYEE S ENFORCEABL E AS A C ONTRACT. TH E RE WI LL BE A FA IRNESS HEARING ON T HE PRO POSED CONSEN T D ECREE before the United S tates District Co urt for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Divis ion .
None of the parties can predict the final outcom e of this lawsuit if it went to trial and were finally decided by the Court. Such a trial , however, would in volve considerab le costs, uncertai nty and delay. T he EEOC and Gu lfstream, therefore, have agreed to a settlement which they believe is fair and in the best intere sts o f the public ; Eligible C laimants, inc luding you ; and Gulfstream .
IF Y OU QUALI FY F OR ANY REL IEF PURSUANT TO T H E TE RMS OF

TH E PROPOSED CONSENT DECRE E, YOU A RE N OT REQUIRED TO T AKE ANY ACTION AT THI S TIME TO PRESERVE YO U R RIGHT S. TH E REMAINDER OF T HIS N OTICE PROVID ES A GENERAL DESCRI PTION O F THE TERMS OF TH E DECREE, INCLU DI NG THE RELIEF T HAT MAY BE PROVIDED TO YO U UPON FINAL COURT APPRO VAL I F YOU MEET THE REQUIRED CO NDITIONS. IF AND WHEN THE PROPOSED CONSENT DEC RE E RECEIVE S FINAL COURT APPROVAL, YOU WILL RECEIVE A FURTHER NOTICE D ESCRIBING THE EXAC T RELI EF TH A T WILL B E PROVIDED TO YO U AND THE CONDITION S YO U MUST MEET TO RECE IVE IT .
A. S ummary of the Terms o f th e Consent Decree The terms of the proposed settlement are contained in the Con sent D ecree given prelimi nary approval by the Court on_, 2002 This notice is intended as a summary on ly. If there is a differe nce between the language of this Notice and the Consent Decree, the language of t he C onsent D ecree is controlling. Copies of the Consent Dec ree can b e obta ined b y v isitin g the C lerk of the Court's office located at 1 25 Bull Street, Savan nah, Georgia 3 14 0 1 . The proposed Co nsent Decree provi des in part as fol lows :
Payments totaling two milli on one hun dred seventy six tho usand three hundred and seven dollars ($2,176,307 .00) wi ll be distributed to those Covered Persons who are Eligible Claimants, excluding those who fil ed or joined pri vate actions against Gulfstream prior to the filing of the EEOC comp laint and those who vo luntari l y separated

from emp loyment wi th Gul fstream during the re levant period . Upon the filing of the EEOC's complaint, the rig ht of any E ligible C laimant to institute or opt into a private action asserting c l aim s arising from or related t o the subject matter of the Commission's complaint was deeme d to have te rminated pursuant to 29 U .S .C, § 626(c)( 1 ) . Grayson v KMart Corp , 79 Fad 1086, 1105 (11th Cir . 1996) The $2, 17 6,307 .00 amount will b e divided among all Eligible C laimants as determ ined by the EEOC in accordance w i th the following criteria :
a. the age(s) and number(s) of the Eligible Claimant's comparators(s) retained and/or subse quent ly hired b y Gulfst ream, if any;
b . the El igible C laimant's hourly rate as of September 29, 2000 (or as of th e E li gible Claimant's date of termination if such d ate is prior to S eptember 29, 2000);
c . whether the Eligibl e C laimant filed time ly charges with the EEOC alleging age-based termination due to a reduction in th e workforc e durin g the relevant time period ;
d. the Eligible Claimant's age as o f S eptember 2 9, 2 000 ; the E ligible Clai mant's years of service with Gulfstream as of
Sept ember 29 , 2000 , and the lengt h of time, if appl icable, that the Eligible C laimant was out
of work before being rehired by Gulfstream . In no event wil l any E ligible C laimant's s hare be more than four times the
average share of a ll Eli gib le C laimants o r less than one-fourth the average share of al l Eligib le Claimants.

Based on data s upplied by the Company, there are 1 38 total Covered Persons, 52 of whom are plaintiffs in existing privat e actions and 20 more of whom left employment vo luntarily and not as part of the reduction in force . Unless these numbers change prior to fi nal approva l of the Co nsent Decree, this would resu lt in an a to tal of 66 Eligible C laimants who woul d receive an average payment, prior to taxes or other legal ly requi red with holding, of approximately $33,000 . Under this scenario, the maximum possib le payment, prior to withho lding, wo uld be approximate ly $ 1 32,000 and the minimum possi ble paymen t would be app roximate ly $8,250 . If there are any changes, such as individuals show n by the Co mpany to have left vo luntarily who are determined to be part of the reduction in force, it co uld res ult in some adjustment of these figures, but the c h anges are not anticipated to be large. The Company wil l be responsib le for making federa l, state, and loca l income tax deductions and F ICA deductions from these amo unts before they are distributed to the EEOC class memb ers.
The Com pany w ill maintain a web page that inc ludes vacancies at its Savannah , Georgia facil ity, which E ligible C laimants and other individua ls can check at their convenie nce . Any Eli gible Claimant hired by Gu lfstream, at any time wi thi n two years of the date that the Court gave final approval of th e Decree , will be requir ed to forfeit to G ulfstream a proportionate share of the monetary award under the Consent Decree that is deemed to represent front p ay, w hich shall be assumed to be 35 percent of the total award . This proportional amount o f front pay shal l be adjusted by calcul ating the number of months from the Eligible Claimant's date of hire throu gh the two year expiration date after the Cou rt gave final approval of the decree and dividing the latter

number by twenty-fo ur. E li gible C laimants w ho apply wi ll be considered in the same

manner as any other applicants , except for this forfeiture of award , and if hired will be

treated in t he same manner as any o ther empl oyee at Gulfstream and shall be subject to

the same performance and attendance requ ire men ts as other emp loyees . They will not,

however, be accorded any spec ial or preferential treatment .

The Company has committed that it will comp ly with the Age

Discrimination in Emp loyment Act and w ill not d iscriminate on the basis of age during

any future layoffs or re ductions-in-force of em ployees The Company must make reports

to the EEOC concerning any layo ffs or redu ctions-in-force invo lving more than 75

empl oyees over 6 months at its Savannah loca tion during the two-year term of the

Consent Decree . The Company a lso will provide training to its supervisors regarding the

Company's obligations und er the C onsent Decree and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act . T he EEOC has the right to monitor the Company's compliance with

the Consent Decree .

4.

The Compa ny has furth er comm itted that it wi ll not retaliate against any

person beca use that person has oppo sed allege dly discriminatory po licies or practices or

has filed an EE OC charge, or because such person made a charge, testified, assisted or

participated in a ny manner in an investigatio n, proceeding or litigation concerning the

ADEA or the Consent D ecree . This includ es a commitment not to retaliate against

Eligible Claimants who obtain relief pursuant to the Consent Decree

The United States Distract Court for the Southe rn D istrict of Georgia,

Savannah D ivisio n , shall retain power to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree for a

period of two years after its final approval by the Court .

6.

The Conse nt Decree does not constitute an adjudication against the

Company or an admission of liab il ity or guilt by the Company.

7. There is no private right of enforcement in connection with the Company's

obligations under the Consent Decree .

B. Fairness Hearing

THE COU RT WILL CONDUCT A H EARING TO CONSID ER TH E

FAIRNESS OF T HE CONSENT DECREE AT - :00 .M. ON , 2002, I N THE COURTROOM OF THE HONORABLE B . AVA NT EDE N FI E LD, UNIT ED STATES C OURTHOUSE, 1 25 BULL ST REET, SAVANNA H, GEO RG IA 31401 . If you believe the settlement is no t fai r, just a nd reasonable, you will not be heard by the Court unless you follow the foll owi ng rules : ( I ) You must prepare in writing a precise

statement of your objection, including w hether you or your attorney intends to appear at

the hearing, (2) At the top of your written statement, you must set forth the fo ll owing : "EEOC v . G ulfstream Ae ros pace C orp oration, Case No Objection to Proposed Co nsent D ecree"; (3) The original and one copy of your wri tten

statement must be mailed and received or personally d eli vered by

, 2002, to

the C l erk of the Court, Unite d States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, 1 25 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 314 0 1 ; and (4) At the time you fi le the original and a copy of yo ur written state ment wit h the C ourt, you must also mai l one copy to each of the following :

EEOC Atlanta District Office Att'n• Steve Tapper, Acting Supervisory Trial Attorney

Legal Unit 100 Alabama Street , SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta , GA 30303
AND
William Kilberg, Esq . Gibson, Dunn & Crotchet LLP 1 050 Connecticut Avenu e Washington, DC 20036
AND
Wade W. Herring, II Hunter, Maclean, Ex ley & Dunn P.C . 200 East Saint Juli an Street Savannah, Georgia 3 1412
You may a lso appear as an objector at the hearing, either in person or through an attorney,
if you wish to do so, but you are not re quired to do so for your objection to be heard a nd
considered by the Court. You may object to the Consent Decree and sti ll be eligib le for benefits under the
Consent D ecree . If the Court hears your objection but does not modify the Consent Decree based on your objection, yo u will b e eligi ble for re lief under the Consent Decree as long as you meet t he requirements for eligibility and the conditions for payment
C. Distribution of Monetary and Non -Monetary Relief
Any re lief to be provided p ursuan t to t he Consent Decree will not be distributed to
you until after the fairness hearing; the Court's fi nal approval of the Consent Decree ; and
the ex piration of the last d eadline within w hich to appea l or the resolution of any appea ls,
which ever date is later. At that point, you will receiv e a further Notic e of Final Approval ,
which wi ll inc lude a form indicat ing that you waive and release all claims covered by the

Consent Decree, which you must sign and return i n order to receive payment . Thus, it is

antici pated that you wi ll not receive any monetary payment until at least sometime next

year, assu ming fi nal Court approval.

D. Questions

If you have any questions reg arding the subject of this Notice, do no t contact the

Judge, the C lerk of t he Co urt , or the C ompany . Instead, contact Marcus Keegan at (404)

562-6818 . (He works for the EEOC .)

This No tice has been approved by the EEOC, by Gulfstream, and by the Court .

Dated

.2002 .

ATTACHMENT H

NOTICE OF FINAL APPROVA L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPO RTUNITY COMMI SS ION,

Civil Acti on No.

Pl aintiff,

v.

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORAT ION

Defendant .

NOTIC E OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CONSEN T D ECREE

On , 2002, yo u received a Notice To E ligib le C laimants Of

Proposed Consent Decree ("Init ial Noti ce"), describing a class action age discrimination

lawsuit fil ed by the United States Equal Empl oyment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC") against Gulfstream Aeros pace Corporation ("Gu lfstream" or "the Company")

and a proposed Consent Decree resolving all claims i n that lawsu it. You received the

Initial Notice because the Company's records showed that you are an E ligb le C laimant

under t he Consent Decree. For yo ur convenience, a copy of the Initial Notice is

enc losed.

This No tice of Fin al Approval of Consent Decree ("Fina l Notice") is to inform

you that the Co urt, after holding the Fairness Hearing on , 2002 as described

in the Initia l Notice, has given its final approval to the Consent Decree A ll

appropriately fi led objections to the Co nsent Decree were heard at that time, and no further o bjections are permitted.
You h ave been identifie d as an Eligible C laimant entitl ed, upon comp liance with the conditions imposed in the Consent Decree, to a monetary payment as determined by the EEOC consistent with the terms of the Consent D ecre e. Your share of the $2, 1 76,307 in tota l payments under th e Consent Decree was determined by the EEOC in accordance wi th the following cri teria:
a. the age(s) and nu mber(s) o f th e E ligible Claimant's comparators(s) retained and/or subsequently hired by Gulfstream, if an y,
b. the Eligible Claimant's hourly rate as o f September 29 , 2000 (or as of the Eligi ble Claimant's date of term ination if such date is prior to September 29, 2000) ;
c. whether the Eligible C laimant filed time ly charges with the EEOC a lleging age-based terminatio n due to a reduction in the workforce during the relevant time period ;
d. the E li gib le Claimant's age as of September 29, 2000 ; e. the E ligi ble Claimant's years o f service with Gu l fstream as of Se ptember 29, 2000 ; and f. the length of time, i f appli cable, that the Eligible Claimant was out of work before being re hired by G ulfstream. In no event was your share allowed to be more than four t imes the avera ge share of all Eligible C laimants o r less than one-fourth th e average share of all Eligible C laimants. The EEOC , in accordance with the above condition s, has determined your share

to be $

If yo u com ply wi th the conditions described below, but only if yo u

comply with those conditions, a c heck for this payment, minus any deductions or

withholdin g required by law, will be mailed to you by Gulfstream no l ater than

IN ORD ER TO REC EIVE YOUR SHARE, YO U M UST COMPLETE
THE ENCLOSED RELEASE OF C LAIMS FORM, HAVE IT NOTARI ZED IN
THE SPACE PROVIDED ON THE FORM, AND RETURN AN ORIGINA L
COPY OF TH E FORM TO:
[NAME OF COMPLIANCE OFFICER] Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation 500 Gulfstream Road Savannah, Georgia 31402 TH E PROPERLY COMPLETED AND NOTARI ZED FORM MUST BE
RECE IVED AT THI S A DDRESS NO LATER THAN 5 :00 P .M . ON

If yo u do not pr operly co mpl ete, no tari ze, and return the form by this dead line,

or if your share cannot be delivered to you for any other reason such as an inability to

loca te you or your failure to c ash the chec k, you wi ll forfeit your right to this payment

and i t will be donate d to charity.

If you have any question s regarding the s ubject of this Notice, do not contact the

Judge, the C lerk of the Court, or the Company. Instead, contact M arcus Keegan at (404)

562-68 1 8 . (He works for the E EOC.)

This Notice has been approved b y the EEOC, by Gu lfstream, and by the Court

Dated

, 200 .

Enc losures : Initial Notice Release of Claims

ATTACHMENT I

RELEASE OF CLAIMS

Social Security No .

(the "Class

Member"), has s i gne d a C laim Form to participate in benefits created by virtue of a

conse nt decree (the "Consent Decree") between Gulfstream Aerospace (the "Com pany"),

and the Equa l Employment Opportunity Com mi ssion (the "Commission") entered on

by the United States District Court for th e Southern District of Geor gia,

Savannah Division, i n Case No .

As a further requiremen t of parti cipatin g in those benefits, to which the C lass

Member would not otherwise be entitled , the sufficienc y of which i s her eby

acknow ledged, on the C lass Member's own behalf and on beha lf of the C lass Member's

heirs and assigns and a ll persons claimin g under the C lass Member, the Class Member

hereby full y and forever unconditionally releases and discharges the Company, al l of its

past and present paren t, subsidiary, affi liate d and related corporations, their predecesso rs,

successors a nd ass igns, includ ing any trustee in bankruptcy, together wit h their divisions

and departments and all past or present officers , directors, emplo yee s, insurers, attorneys

and agents or independent contractors of any of them (h ereinafter referred to collectively

as the "Company Releasees"), of and from, and the Class M ember cov enants not to sue or

assert against the Co mpany Releasees or any of them for any purpose, c l aims,

administrat ive complaints, demands , actions and cau ses of action , of any kind or nature

whatsoever, both at law and i n equity, neg ligent and intentional, arising from or in any

way re lated to alleged age discrimination by the Company between August 20, 2000, and

December 3 1 , 2000, whether contrary to s tate or federa l statute or whether creating any common law tort or contract claim, in connection with the t ermination of the Class Member's emp loyment by the Company, wi thout regard to the Class Member's present actual knowledge of any prior act or o miss ion by the Company Releasees or any of them which may have consti tut ed, or may be a ll eged to have constituted, un lawful trea tment of the C lass Member as a resu lt of age Thi s Re lease of C l aims has no effect on th e C lass Member's pension righ ts or other benefits be ing received from the Company, if any, arising from the C lass Member's employment by the Company
The C lass Member has been informed of the do llar amount of the payment that he or s he wi ll rece ive under the Consent Decree, as set forth in the Notice of Fina l App rova l of Consent Decree, but u nderstands that the amount of money to be received is s ubject to legally required deductions and/or withholding . The Cla ss Member furth er understands tha t the Company's ob ligation und er the Consen t D ecree concerning the listing of vacanc ies does no t p rovide a guarantee o f ree mployment to the C lass Member, that no preferentia l treatment wi ll b e accor ded to any applicants, and that any C lass Members who are rehired during the two-year term of the Consent Decree wi ll be re quired to forfeit a portion of the monetary p ayment they have received under the Consent Decree . Based on this un derstanding, the Class Member ack nowledges that the C lass Membe r will continue to be bound by this Release of Claims and that the Class M ember shall never bring any c laim desc ribed in the pr eceding paragraph against the Company Rel easees, even if the Class Member is not rehired or does not otherwise receive further monetary or non-monetary relief beyond the payment desc rib ed in the No tice of Final Approval of

Consent Decree . T he C l ass Member furth er understands that the C lass Member has no individual rights under the Consent Decree , but that the EEOC may, in its sole di scretion , assert rights on the C lass Member's behalf under the Consent Decree .
In consideration of the release and other covenants and a greements contained herein and in the Conse nt D ecree, the Company fully and forever unconditiona l ly re l eases and discharges the C lass Member and th e Class Member's heirs, assigns, insurers, age nts and personal represe ntatives ( here inafter referred to co ll ective ly as the "C lass Member Releasees") of and from, and the Co mpany covenants not to sue or assert against the Cl ass Member Releasees or any of them for any pu rpose, claims, administra tive comp laints, deman ds, ac tions and causes of action, of any kind or nature whatsoever, both at l aw and in equity, neg ligen t and intentional, arising from or in any way re l ated to facts underl ying the above-referenced lawsuit, including but not limited to th e C lass Member's participation in such lawsuit and recovery therefrom, whether contrary to state or federa l statute or whether creating any common law tort or contract claim, in connection with the terminat ion of the Class Member's employmen t by the Company, without regard to the Company's present act ual knowledge o f any p rior act or omission by the Class Member Releasees or any of them which may have constituted, or may be alleged to have constitu ted, i nappro priate or unl awful action, exce pt for c laims based in who le or in part upon Class M ember's misuse, disclosure or exp loitation of confidential, proprietary or trade secret informatio n of t he Co mpan y, in vio lation of either other written agreements with the Company or applicable Georgi a trade secrets law. The Company agrees not to seek tender back of any benefits previ ous ly received by the C lass Member in exchange

for signi ng a prior re lease, or to ta ke any other adverse action against the C lass Member, by virtue of the Class Member's participation in the benefits created b y the Decree .
The C lass Member and the Com pany understand that they may later discover claims or facts now unknown or un suspected and the C lass Member and the Company expressly assume all ris k that the fac ts and l aw concerning this Release of Claims and the Consen t Decree may be othe r than as c urrentl y known to them . The C lass M ember acknow ledges that, in signing this Release, the C lass Member is not relying on any information provided to t he C lass Member by the Company Releasees or upon the Company Releasees to provi de information to the C lass Member . The Company acknow ledges that, in signing this Release, the Company is not relying on any information provided to the Company by the Class M ember R eleasees or upon the C l ass Member Releasees to pr ovide info rm ation to the Company .
The C lass Member unders tands that th is Release is not an admission of liabi li ty by the Co mpany, but is on ly a means of compromising a dispute i n light of the costs and uncertainties of litigatio n. The C lass Member and the Company agree that t hi s Release wil l be construed under Georgi a law, and that if part of this Release is found inva lid, the remainder sha ll b e enforceable
In the event of any claim that may be prec luded in whole or in part by this Release, the C lass Member and the Co mpany agree that the under lying claim shall first be submit ted at the request of ei ther party to non-binding mediation in Atlanta before
with the party asse rting the underlying claim to bear all costs of the first day of mediation, and the parties to share equa ll y any further mediation costs,

prior to either party seeking any form ofjud icia l relief : IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Class Member and the Company have rea d this
Release a nd they vo luntari ly sign it, after having been advised to seek their own lega l coun sel, w ith out threat or coerc ion, wi th full k nowledge and understanding of i ts contents, and without promise of benefit, except as expressly described in this Release of Claim s a nd the Summary o f Consent Decree . T his Release of C laims constitutes the entire agreement and merges a ll pri or negotiations, discussions, and promises. This Release of Claim s will only be enforceable if and wh en t he Consent D ecree is approved and entered b y the Court and no s uccessful appeal is taken therefrom .
I certi fy under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct .

DATE :

SIGNATURE

STATE OF
COUNTY OF Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 2002 , by Witness my hand an d official seal . (SEAL)
Notary Public My com mission expires : DATE-

[name] [title] Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

STATE OF ss .
COUNTY OF Subscribed and sworn to before me this day o f
by Witness my hand and official seal . (SEAL)
Notary Public My com mi ssion ex pires :

1996 ,

ATTACHMENT J
POST ED NO TICE
Gulfstream Aerospace Co rporati on ("Gulfstream" or "t he Company") has reached a settlement with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in a lawsuit captioned EEOC v . Gulfstream Aerospace Cornoration, which was finally ap prove d b y the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, and entered as a Consent Decree on , 200 The EEOC claimed that G ulfstream violated the Age Disc rimination in Employment Act ("A DEA") by discriminating agai nst employees age 40 and older in effectuating its reductions in force betwee n August 20, 2000, and D ecember 3 1 , 2000 . The Company denied and continu es to deny any wrongdoing, but accepted the settlement to avoid the expense and burd en of further litigatio n. The Consent D ecree inc ludes all regu lar, full-time, employees age 40 an d ol der at th e time of th eir termination who were employed by Gul fstream at its Savannah, Georg ia, facility, and who were laid off or retired betweenAugust 20, 2000, and December 31 , 2000 (the "EEOC c lass") . In addition to payments for certain persons in the E EOC class tota ling $2, 1 76,307 00, the Decree provides in part as fo ll ows :
1 . The Company has co mmitted that it wi ll comply with the Age Discri min ation in Emp loyment Act in that it will n ot discriminate on the basis of age in any future layoffs or reductions in force of employees and that it will not retaliate against any person because that person has opposed a ll egedly discriminatory po licies or prac tices, has fi led an EE OC charge or has testified, assisted or participated in any man ner in an inves tigation, procee ding or litigation co ncern ing t he Decree This commitment does not consti tute a contract or create a ny legal obli gations of the Company or rights of employee, beyond rights a nd ob ligations existing by virtue of the ADEA.
2. The EE OC has the right to monitor the Company's compliance with the Consent D ecree . The Company wi ll provi de training regarding age discrimination to supervisors and the Company wi ll prov ide reports to the EEOC concerning any layoffs or reductions-in-force involving more than 75 employees over 6 months at its Savannah location during the two-year term of the Decree .
The Co urt w ill retain power to enforce the terms of the Decree for a period of two years .
4. The Decree does not co nstitute an adjud i cation against the Company or an admission o f liab ility or gu ilt by t he Co mpany.
5 . You may obtain additional information by contacting Human Resources at or the Equal Empl oyment Opp ortunity Commission at (912) 652- 4234,
or at www .eeoc . gov . You may a lso review a co py of the Decree by contacting

of the Com pany's Human R esources Department at (912)
If yo u b elieve that the Co mpany has in any way violated the Decree, or if you have any questio ns, you shou ld co ntac t:
Office of the Regi onal At torn ey Attn: Steve Tap per, Ac ting Supervisory Tria l Attorney Uni ted S tates Equal Employment Opportunity Commission At lanta District Office 100 Alabama Street , SW, Suite 4R30 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 562-6820 - direct (404) 562-6932 - general

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Southern District of Georgia

Case N umber : Date Served : Served By :

4 :0 2 -cv-00243 December 4, 2002

Attorneys Served :

S . Robert Royal, Esq . Steven M . Tapper, Esq . Wade Wilkes Herring II, Esq . William Kilberg, Esq .

Copy p l aced i n Minutes V Copy given to Judge
Copy given t o Magis t rate

 
 FILED U.S . DISTRICT COURT
SAM;FIAH DIV.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COM~;R 25 Pig u- 24

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
S0 . DIS . 0 '~' -
SAVANNAH DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

V.

Case No. CV402-243

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION,

Defendant .

ORD E R Plaintiff and defendant have both filed motions to quash subpoenas issued by a nonparty to this suit, Noritoshi Itoi . Docs. 18, 19 . Counsel for Mr. Itoi has responded to the motions to quash . Doc. 26 . Based upon the following, plaintiff and defendant's motions to quash are GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND Mr . Itoi is a beneficiary of a proposed consent decree entered into by
plaintiff and defendant concerning alleged violations of the ADEA in a reduction in force by defendant . Doc. 4. A fairness hearing on the terms of
C~;2 +

the decree is scheduled for April 28, 2003. Id . Mr. Itoi has objected to the fairness of the decree and seeks information to support his objections through the subpoenas he has issued . Does . 11, 13 .
The four subpoenas are addressed to Wade Herring, a Savannah attorney who represents defendant in this suit ; Harlan S . Miller, an attorney in Atlanta; Lee Parks, an attorney in Atlanta ; and Steve Tapper, an attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who represents plaintiff in the instant suit . Mr. Herring, Mr . Miller, and Mr. Parks all had involvement in previous suits in this district against defendant . As noted above, Mr . Herring is currently serving as counsel for defendant, and Mr . Miller and Mr . Parks have served as counsel for plaintiffs suing defendant in the past . See Cosper v . Gulfstream Aerospace Corp ., CV402-13 (S .D . Ga.) ; Podger v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp ., CV401277 (S .D. Ga.) . From Mr . Herring, Mr. Miller, and Mr. Parks, Mr . Itoi seeks production of any and all documents concerning the two previous cases and the instant suit by the EEOC . From Mr. Tapper, Mr. Itoi seeks production of any and all documents concerning the instant suit brought by the EEOC against defendant .
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Plaintiff and defendant have both objected to the subpoenas on
several grounds, including the overbreadth of the requests, improper service
of the subpoenas, and issuance from the wrong court .' In response, Mr. Itoi
purports now to have properly served the subpoenas and used the proper
subpoena form.' In response to objections as to the breadth of the requests,
Mr. Itoi has also offered to narrow the scope of his requests and now seeks :
(1) information provided by plaintiff to defendant or defendant to plaintiff for use in negotiating the consent decree ;
(2) documents not subject to attorney-client privilege that are relevant to the declaration in the consent decree that plaintiff and defendant performed "investigation, information gathering, interviews, research, statistical reviews and analysis sufficient to permit them to assess the desirability" of entering a consent decree ;
(3) the settlement agreement in Cosper ; and
(4) Mr. Itoi's EEOC file, including any correspondence between the EEOC and Mr. Itoi or his daughter, Anna Itoi .
'The subpoenas issued to Mr . Tapper, Mr . Parks, and Mr . Miller were all from the Southern District of Georgia, but the documents requested by the subpoena were to be produced in Atlanta, which falls within the Northern District . It should be noted that Mr. Parks and Mr . Miller have not personally moved to quash the subpoenas, but defendant asserts that those subpoenas should also be quashed based on defendant's mutual interest in the documents requested by them .
ZMr. Itoi states in his response that Mr . Tapper, Mr . Parks, and Mr . Miller have now been served with subpoenas from the Northern District and attaches copies of those subpoenas to his response .
3

II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff objected to the original subpoena issued to Mr . Tapper
because it was from the Southern District of Georgia, but requested documents to be produced in Atlanta, in the Northern District . This same defect was noted in the subpoenas originally issued to Mr. Miller and Mr . Parks . Under Rule 45(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a subpoena "for production or inspection shall issue from the court of the district in which the production or inspection is to be made ." Mr. Itoi has apparently responded to that objection by issuing subpoenas from the Northern District to the three attorneys .
This deficiency renders the subpoena issued from the Southern District to Mr . Tapper invalid. See, e .g., McNerney v. Archer Daniels Midland Co ., 164 F .R.D . 584, 588 (W.D .N.Y. 1995). Accordingly, plaintiff s motion to quash is GRANTED . As for the subpoenas now issued by Mr . Itoi in the Northern District, any motion to quash those subpoenas must be presented to "the court in whose name the subpoena is issued ." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment) . It is unclear from Mr . Itoi's response, but if the subpoenas issued to Mr . Miller
4

and Mr. Parks from the Southern District are still outstanding, they would be similarly invalid.
Defendant raises several objections to the subpoena issued to Mr . Herring, arguing that (1) Mr. Itoi does not have standing to issue the subpoena ; (2) the subpoena is facially deficient ; (3) the subpoena requests the disclosure of privileged and otherwise protected documents ; (4) the subpoena subjects defendant to undue burden and expense ; and (5) the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant to the fairness hearing . Mr. Itoi, as noted above, has attempted to address at least some of defendant's objections by narrowing the scope of his requests in the subpoena .
Rule 45(a)(3) and 26(b) contemplate discovery and issuance of subpoenas by the parties to a lawsuit . Mr. Itoi is clearly not a party to this lawsuit in the conventional sense ; this action is solely one brought by the EEOC against Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation . Admittedly, Mr . Itoi does have a significant interest in this suit and its outcome, and he has an opportunity to raise his objections to the consent decree at the fairness hearing. Considering the limited nature of the fairness hearing and Mr . Itoi's questionable status as a "party," the Court is reluctant to even
5

concede that Mr . Itoi is permitted to conduct the extensive discovery that he requests, especially when the parties to the litigation themselves are not yet permitted to engage in formal discovery . Mr. Itoi has provided no precedent for this Court to rely on to allow him to do so . Additionally, his requests seem to have little relevance to a hearing that is intended to determine the overall fairness of the consent decree ; the basis for his requests seem targeted more towards his own claim and his perception that his share of the settlement is wanting . However, even assuming that Mr . Itoi does have standing to issue the subpoena for the purposes of this motion, defendant's motion to quash still must be granted based on the material that Mr . Itoi requests.
Mr. Itoi's curtailed request' now demands production of information provided by defendant to plaintiff (or vice versa) to negotiate the consent decree ; documents concerning the investigation and analysis undertaken by plaintiff and defendant to assess the desirability of entering the consent
'Mr. Itoi's original request to produce asked for "any and all documents" concerning the Cosper case, the Pod er case, and the current lawsuit . This request is clearly overbroad and places an undue burden and expense on defendant .
6

decree ; and the settlement agreement in Cos er .4 Cosper Settlement Agreement The settlement agreement entered into between the Cos er plaintiffs
and defendant Gulfstream is confidential . Mr . Itoi argues that confidential settlement agreements are discoverable when they contain information relevant to determining the appropriateness of a remedy . Mr. Itoi asserts that information as to the settlement in Cosper will assist him in evaluating the fairness of the consent decree in this case, which he perceives to be inadequate in comparison, and "will illuminate the appropriate future course of actions."
There is a strong policy in favor of settlement of cases, and the "confidentiality of settlement agreements is a primary inducement to parties to settle cases ." Centillion Data Sys . v. Ameritech Corp., 193F .R.D. 550, 553 (S .D. Ind. 1999) . Accordingly, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate "a strong countervailing interest to breach that confidentiality." Id .; see also Young v. State Farm Mut . Auto Ins . Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 76 (S .D.W. Va. 1996) . Mr. Itoi has failed to show that such an
'Mr. Itoi's final request is for a copy of his EEOC file, to which the Court assumes defendant would not have access .
7

interest exists here . Although the Cosper case involved AREA claims against defendant as well, the reasons behind the settlement and the amount of the settlement cannot be assumed to be relevant to the fairness of the consent decree in this case .
Mr. Itoi has offered no examples of the relevance of the settlement agreement other than that the claims are similar to his (not necessarily to the group of beneficiaries of the decree) and that the settlement amount was apparently higher . His main objection seems to be that his share of the settlement is substantially smaller than he apparently anticipated . This reasoning is not sufficient to warrant disclosure of the settlement agreement's confidential terms, especially in the context of a fairness hearing. The purpose of the fairness hearing is to evaluate whether a decree is "lawful, fair, reasonable and adequate ." EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F .2d 884, 889 (7th Cir . 1985) . "Objections based purely on individual claims of loss do not warrant disapproval of the proposed settlement ." Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 171 F.R.D . 273, 285 (D . Colo. 1997) .
Information Used to Negotiate /Enter Into Consent Decree
8

Mr. Itoi's more specific requests made in his response to defendant's objections do not appear to remedy the objectionable nature of the requests . Mr. Itoi requests documents relevant to the "investigation, information gathering, interviews, research, statistical reviews and analysis" undertaken by defendant in assessing the settlement option . Mr. Itoi clarifies that he requests only documents not subject to attorney-client privilege . This request is still extraordinarily broad and, in addition, demands material that is protected by the work-product doctrine . Rule 26(b)(3) prevents discovery of material "prepared in anticipation of litigation," unless a party can show substantial need and hardship in otherwise obtaining the information . See also Hickman v . Taylor, 329 U.S . 495 (1947) . Mr. Itoi has failed to substantiate the breadth of his request or that he has substantial need for the information in the context of a fairness hearing .
Mr. Itoi's remaining request is similarly overbroad in that he demands information provided by plaintiff to defendant or defendant to plaintiff used in negotiating the consent decree . The reduction in force at issue in this case took place in September 2000 ; the complaint was filed by plaintiff in
9

November 2002 . As plaintiff describes in its response to objections to the consent decree, defendant and plaintiff engaged in protracted conciliation and negotiations prior to the filing of the complaint . Doc. 24 . Mr. Itoi requests documents that could cover up to a year's worth of correspondence and accompanying material, including sensitive material, such as personnel files. The breadth and burden of this request is also unreasonable in light of the purpose for which it is requested . III . CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff and defendant's motions to quash the subpoenas issued by Mr. Itoi are GRANTED . Docs. 18, 19 .
SO ORDERED this ~51day of April, 2003 .
UNIT1 E SAITAEGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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 Southern District of Georgia CM/ECF 3.05 - Docket Report

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CLOSED, FRC, PROTO
U.S. District Court Southern District of Georgia (Savannah) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:02-cv-00243-BAE

Equal Employment v. Gulfstream Aerospace Assigned to: Judge B. Avant Edenfield Demand: $0 Cause: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)
Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Date Filed: 11/15/2002 Date Terminated: 05/13/2003 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff
represented by S. Robert Royal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama St., SW Suite 4R30 Atlanta, GA 30303 404/562-6817 Fax: 404/562-6905 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steven M. Tapper Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 100 Alabama St., SW Suite 4R30 Atlanta, GA 30303 404/562-6817 Fax: 404/562-6905(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation

represented by Derry Dean Sparlin, Jr. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 202/955-8573 Fax: 202/530-9559(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wade Wilkes Herring, II

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Claimant Noritoshi Itoi
Interested Party Douglas LeFevre Interested Party Harold R. Schmidt Interested Party Edgar P. Middleton Interested Party Gayle Smith
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Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC P.O. Box 9848 Savannah, GA 31412-0048 912/236-0261 Fax: 912/236-4936 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William J. Kilberg Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 202/955-8573 Fax: 202/530-9559(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Edward D. Buckley, III Buckley & Klein, LLP 1180 W. Peachtree St. Suite 1100 Atlanta, GA 30309 404/781-1100 Fax: 404/781-1101(fax) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Douglas LeFevre P. O. Box 38 Eden, GA 912-748-9445 PRO SE
represented by Edgar P. Middleton 34 South Cromwell Road Savannah, GA 31410 912-897-4424 PRO SE
represented by Gayle Smith 335 LN 440 Lake James Angola, IN 46703
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Interested Party Adel Shubber

260-833-3405 PRO SE
represented by Adel Shubber 20504 2nd Drive, SE Bothell, WA 98012 425-806-5528 PRO SE

Date Filed 11/15/2002 11/15/2002
11/25/2002 12/03/2002
12/03/2002 12/03/2002
12/03/2002 12/03/2002 12/03/2002 12/03/2002 12/09/2002
12/09/2002

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT (kts) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
2 GENERAL ORDER of instructions to the parties RE: Rule 26(f) (signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith); [EOD Date 11/15/02] copies served. (kts) (Entered: 11/15/2002)
3 Attorney Receipt of Instructions for filing the Rule 26(f) Report returned by attorney S. Robert Royal (ww1) (Entered: 11/26/2002)
4 ORDER preliminarily approving consent decree and setting the fairness hearing for 4/28/02 at 9:30. ( signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield ); [EOD Date 12/4/02] copies served. (wwp) (Entered: 12/04/2002)
5 MOTION by Gulfstream Aerospace for attorney Derry Dean Sparlin, Jr. to Appear Pro Hac Vice. with brief in support. (ww1) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
Motion(s) referred: [5-1] motion for attorney Derry Dean Sparlin, Jr. to Appear Pro Hac Vice. referred to Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith (ww1) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
6 MOTION by Gulfstream Aerospace for attorney William J. Kilberg to Appear Pro Hac Vice. with brief in support. (ww1) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
Motion(s) referred: [6-1] motion for attorney William J. Kilberg to Appear Pro Hac Vice. referred to Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith (ww1) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
Pro Hac Vice paid by Derry Dean Sparlin Jr. for defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Receipt #400311 Date: 12/3/02 (ww1) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
Pro Hac Vice paid by William J. Kilberg for defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Receipt #400312 Date: 12/3/02 (ww1) (Entered: 12/05/2002)
7 ORDER granting [6-1] motion for attorney William J. Kilberg to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorney added to case. ( signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith ); [EOD Date 12/9/02] copies served. (wwp) (Entered: 12/09/2002)
8 ORDER granting [5-1] motion for attorney Derry Dean Sparlin, Jr. to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Attorney added to case. ( signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith ); [EOD Date 12/10/02] copies served. (wwp) (Entered: 12/10/2002)

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03/18/2003 03/28/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003 03/31/2003 04/03/2003 04/15/2003 04/15/2003 04/15/2003 04/15/2003 04/15/2003 04/16/2003 04/16/2003 04/16/2003 04/17/2003 04/21/2003 04/21/2003 04/22/2003

9 OBJECTION by interested party Douglas LeFevre to proposed consent decree (ww1) (Entered: 03/18/2003)
10 OBJECTION by interested party Harold R. Schmidt to Proposed Consent Decree (ww1) (Entered: 03/28/2003)
11 OBJECTION by claimant Noritoshi Itoi to proposed consent decree (ww1) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
12 OBJECTION by interested party Edgar P. Middleton to Proposed Consent Decree (ww1) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
13 OBJECTION by claimant Noritoshi Itoi to Proposed Consent Decree (ww1) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
14 OBJECTION by interested party Gayle Smith to Proposed Consent Decree (ww1) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
15 OBJECTION by interested party Adel Shubber to Proposed Consent Decree (ww1) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
16 MOTION by Gulfstream Aerospace memorandum to file brief exceeding local rule page limit with brief in support. (wwp) (Entered: 04/15/2003)
17 EMERGENCY MOTION by Gulfstream Aerospace for Protective Order . (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
Motion(s) referred: [17-1] motion for Protective Order referred to Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
18 MOTION by Gulfstream Aerospace to Quash subpoenas with brief in support. (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
Motion(s) referred: [18-1] motion to Quash subpoenas referred to Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
19 MOTION by Equal Employment to Quash . (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
20 MEMORANDUM by Equal Employment in support of [19-1] motion to Quash by Equal Employment (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
Motion(s) referred: [19-1] motion to Quash referred to Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith (kts) (Entered: 04/16/2003)
21 ORDER granting [17-1] motion for Protective Order (signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith); [EOD Date 4/17/03] copies served. (ww1) (Entered: 04/17/2003)
22 Gulfstream's Position Statement (ww1) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
24 RESPONSE by plaintiff Equal Employment to [15-1] objection by Adel Shubber (wwp) (Entered: 04/22/2003)
23 MOTION by Equal Employment to exceed page limit for plaintiff equal employment opportunity commision's response to objections to the proposed consent decree with brief in support. (wwp) Modified on 04/23/2003 (Entered: 04/22/2003)

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04/23/2003
04/24/2003 04/25/2003 04/28/2003
05/01/2003 05/07/2003 05/12/2003
05/12/2003
05/13/2003 05/13/2003 06/26/2006

25 ORDER granting [23-1] motion to exceed page limit for plaintiff equal employment opportunity commision's response to objections to the proposed consent decree (signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield); [EOD Date 4/23/03] copies served. (ww1) (Entered: 04/23/2003)
26 RESPONSE by Noritoshi Itoi to [18-1] motion to Quash subpoenas by Gulfstream Aerospace (ww1) (Entered: 04/25/2003)
27 ORDER granting [19-1] motion to Quash, granting [18-1] motion to Quash subpoenas ( signed by Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith ); [EOD Date 4/28/03] copies served. (wwp) (Entered: 04/28/2003)
MINUTE ENTRY: Fairness hearing conducted this date. The Court heard all objections as well as the position of the plaintiff's counsel as to the terms of the settlement. The Court took the matter under advisement and will issue its findings as soon as possible. (rww) (Entered: 05/07/2003)
28 OBJECTION by plaintiff Equal Employment to Magistrate Judge's Order of April 25, 2003 granting defendant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation's motion to Quash[27-1] order (wwp) (Entered: 05/01/2003)
29 RESPONSE in Opposition by Gulfstream Aerospace in opposition to [28-1] objection by Equal Employment (wwp) (Entered: 05/08/2003)
30 ORDERed the Court grants final approval of and hereby enters as its Final Judgment, the EEOC/Gulfstream consent decree. Doc #4 at 29. The Court therefore dismisses with prejudice the EEOC's Complaint (DOC # 1), but for settlement-enforcement purposes it retains jurisdiction over the parties for two years from thedate of this Judgment's F. R. Civ.P 58 entry. All outstanding motions (including doc # 16) and objections ( including doc # 28) are denied/overruled. ( signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield ); [EOD Date 5/12/03] copies served. (wwp) Modified on 05/13/2003 (Entered: 05/12/2003)
31 JUDGMENT that in accordance with the Court's Order dated 5/12/03, Judgment is hereby entered dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. ( signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield ); [EOD Date 5/12/03] copies served. PLRA Notice mailed. (wwp) (Entered: 05/12/2003)
32 TRANSCRIPT for dates of 4/28/03 (wwp) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
Case closed (wwp) (Entered: 05/13/2003)
Record Transferred to FRC. Group 021, Accession 06 0302, Box 10 of 13, Location # 50114125 (bcw) (Entered: 06/26/2006)

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 GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE TO PAY $2.1 MILLION FOR AGE BI...

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-11-02.html

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 11, 2002

CONTACT: TTY:

S. Robert Royal, Regional Attorney (404) 562-6812 Steve Tapper, Senior Trial Attorney (404) 562-6820 Larry Roby, Program Manager (404) 562-6811 (404) 562-6801

GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE TO PAY $2.1 MILLION FOR AGE BIAS IN EEOC SETTLEMENT

Commission Alleges Class of Older Workers Targeted for Layoffs at Georgia Facility
ATLANTA - The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) today announced that a federal district court judge preliminarily approved a Consent Decree settling a class action age discrimination lawsuit filed against Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (Gulfstream). The Consent Decree provides for $2.1 million, as well as significant injunctive and remedial relief, to 61 former employees who lost their jobs during layoffs at the company's Savannah, Georgia, facility. Gulfstream is a major employer in the aviation industry.
The EEOC's lawsuit (Civil Action No. 02-CV- 243) and the Consent Decree were concurrently filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. In its lawsuit, the EEOC alleged that Gulfstream targeted employees 40 years of age or older for layoffs in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The layoffs occurred during the period of August 2000 through December 2000. Gulfstream denies that it engaged in any discrimination based on age, or committed any other violation of the law in connection with the reduction in force at its Savannah facility.
"We are pleased that Gulfstream has worked cooperatively with the EEOC in bringing a satisfactory resolution to this case," said Commission Chair Cari M. Dominguez. "Age discrimination is the fastest growing category of EEOC charges. Today's settlement along with other recent age discrimination resolutions by the EEOC underscores the importance of ensuring that age is not used as a criterion in layoffs."
The EEOC's lawsuit was buttressed by statistical evidence showing a significant disparity in the impact of the layoffs on older workers. The Commission also identified specific instances in which older workers were laid off while younger, less senior employees were retained in identical job positions. The EEOC's Savannah Local Office conducted the underlying investigation.
In addition to the monetary relief, the Consent Decree provides for management training, reporting and posting by the company, and other injunctive and affirmative relief.
"Companies that layoff older more experienced workers in order to retain younger less senior individuals are violating the law and running the risk of being sued for discrimination," said S. Robert Royal, Regional Attorney for the EEOC's Atlanta District Office. "These lawsuits can result in sizeable monetary awards against companies and damage their reputations. To its credit, Gulfstream has worked cooperatively with the EEOC in arriving at a Consent Decree that provides significant monetary and affirmative relief to the victims without the need for protracted litigation."
Bernice Williams Kimbrough, Director of the EEOC's Atlanta District Office, added: "Reductions-in force may be a necessary fact of economic life. However, employers cannot use downsizing as a means of eliminating older employees from their workforce. Productive, hard- working employees with 20 to 30 years of experience deserve better than to be pushed out the door, while younger, less experienced individuals are retained."
In addition to enforcing the ADEA, which protects workers age 40 and older from discrimination based on age, the EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including sexual harassment or pregnancy) or national origin and protects employees who complain about such offenses from retaliation; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibits gender-based wage discrimination; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the federal sector; Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments; and sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Further information about the Commission is available on the agency's web site at www.eeoc.gov.

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