Co

JI-ME-00 -001

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

3

4 JON DESKOSIERS, a minor, by and through his next friends Norma and Gonzaque
5 Desrosiers; and BILLIE JO GRANT, a minor, by and through her next friend Margaret
6 Jordan, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
7 Plaintiffs,
8
v.
9 ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, MAINE;
10 RONALD B. GAGNON, individually
11 and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Androscoggin County, Maine;
12 CAROL BOYCE, JAMES DOUGHERTY, and
13 EMILE JACQUES, individually and in their official capacities as County
14 Commissioners of Androscoggin County, Maine,
15
Defendants. 16

Civ. No. 85-00091P
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE, AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
(CLASS ACTION)

17

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

18

1. This is a civil rights class action challenging the conditions of

19

confinement for juveniles at the Androscoggin County jail, in Auburn,

20 Maine, and the policies and practices of defendants in confining juveniles

21

therein. Plaintiffs JON DESROSIEIRS, through his parents Norma and Gonzaque

22

Desrosiers as his next friends, and BILLIE JO GRANT, through her mother

23

Margaret Jordan as her next friend, bring this action for declaratory,

24

injunctive, and other equitable relief and damages, on behalf of themselves

25

and all other juveniles similarly situated who are, have been, or will in

26

the future be confined in the Androscoggin County jail, and thereby

1 subjected by defendants to cruel, unconscionable, and illegal conditions of

2 confinement in the jail; to illegal incarceration in the jail without

3 adequate separation from confined adult offenders; to unlawful secure

4 detention in the jail of juveniles who are charged with who have comnitted

5 offenses which would not be criminal if committed by adults ("status

6 offenses"); and to denial of adequate and appropriate community placements

7 as alternatives to the jail.

8

2. Plaintiffs bring this action under the federal Civil Rights Act,

9

42 U.S.C. Section 1983, to redress the violations by defendants, acting

10 under color of state law, of the rights of plaintiffs under the Fourteenth

11 Amendment to the United States Constitution, specifically the right to due

12 process of law and the right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishments.

13 Plaintiffs also bring this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to redress

the violations by defendants, under color of state law, of plaintiffs'

statutory rights under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act

of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 5601 et seq. ["Juvenile Justice

Act"], as more particularly set forth in this complaint.

18

3. Plaintiffs also bring this action under the Juvenile Justice Act-to

challenge (a) the detention of plaintiffs by defendants in the Androscoggin

20 County jail, without adequate separation from confined adult offenders;

(b) the detention by defendants in the jail, a secure facility, of plaintiffs

22 who are charged with or who have committed offenses which would not be

23 criminal if committed by adults; (c) the failure and refusal of defendants

24 to provide and utilize adequate and appropriate placements as alternatives

25

to the jail

26 4. Plaintiffs also bring this action under applicable Maine statutes.

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1

JURISDICTION

2

5. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. Section

3 1343(3), this being an action to redress the deprivation, under color of

4 state law, of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and

5 the Juvenile Justice Act.

6

6. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C.

7 Section 1343(4), this being an action to recover damages and to secure

8 declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief under Acts of Congress

9 providing for the protection of civil rights, specifically the Civil Rights

10 Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and the Juvenile Justice Act.

11

7. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C.

12 Sections 2201 and 2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil

13 Procedure, this being an action for a declaration of the rights of

plaintiffs, and for injunctive and other equitable relief based upon said

declaratory judgment, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,

and the Juvenile Justice Act.

8. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C.

18 Section 1331(a), this being an action wherein the matter in controversy

arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

20

9. This Court has jurisdiction of plaintiffs' state law claims under

the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which permits federal courts to

22 determine state law claims which form separate but parallel grounds for

relief also sought in substantial claims based on federal law.

24

PLAINTIFFS

25

10. Plaintiff JON DESROSIERS is fifteen years old and is a citizen of

26 the United States. At all times during the events described herein, he has

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1 resided in Androscoggin County,. Maine. On February 19, 1985, he was taken

2 into custody and charged with escape and burglary, and was incarcerated by

3 defendants in the Androscoggin County jail. Defendants have confined the

4 plaintiff in the Androscoggin County jail from February 19, 1985, through

5 and after the date of filing of the initial complaint in this action.

6

11. Plaintiff BILLIE JO GRANT is seventeen years old and is a citizen

7 of the United States and a resident of Androscoggin County, Maine. From on

8 or about June 2, 1985, to on or about June 4, 1985, she was confined in the

9

Androscoggin County jail. At that time, she was charged with criminal

10

trespass and theft by receiving stolen property, both of which are

11 - misdemeanors.

12

DEFENDANTS

13

12. Defendant ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, MAINE is a local government unit in

14 the state of Maine. In its capacity as a local government unit, it has

15

implemented, executed and adopted the policies, practices, acts and

16 omissions complained of herein through formal adoption or pursuant to

17 governmental custom. The policies, practices, acts and omisssions

18

complained of herein are customs and usages of defendant ANDROSCOGGIN

19

COUNTY, MAINE.

20

13. Defendant RONALD B. GAGNON is the sheriff of Androscoggin County,

21

Maine. As such, he is responsible under, inter alia, 30 M.R.S.A. Sections

22

1701, 1852, 1853, and 1854 for the custody and charge of the jail and of

23

all prisoners therein, for seeing that the jail is kept as clean and

24

healthful as may be, for paying strict attention to the personal

25

cleanliness of the prisoners, for providing prisoners with books and

26

instruction, and for supervising the service of food to prisoners. He is

_ 4_

1 sued individually and in his official capacity.

2

14. Defendants CAROL BOYCE, JAMES DOUGHERTY, and EMILE JACQUES are the

3 County Commissioners of Androseoggin County, Maine. As such, they are

4 responsible under, inter alia, 30 M.R.S.A. Sections 1851, 1854, and 1858,

5 for periodically examining the jail, for taking necessary precautions for

^ the security of prisoners, the prevention of infection and sickness and

7

for their accommodations; for procuring all necessary supplies, including

8 necessary food, fuel, bedding and clothing for the jail and the prisoners

9

therein; and for making such additions in suitable accommodations in the

10 jail as may be found necessary for the safekeeping of prisoners therein.

11 . These defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities.

12

CLASS ACTION

13

15. Plaintiffs JON DESROSIERS and BILLIE JO GRANT bring this action on

14 behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule

15 23(a), (b)(l) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

16 class consists of all juveniles who are currently, have been during the

17 past year or in the future will be confined in the Androscoggin County

18 jail.

19

16. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all

20 members is impracticable. According to available information, more than

21

300 juveniles were confined in the Androscoggin County jail during 1984.

22

In addition, there are questions of law and fact common to the members of

23 the plaintiff class regarding practices of the defendants, and the claims

24 of the named plaintiff are typical of the claims of the members of the

25 plaintiff class. The named plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel will fairly

26 and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class.

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1

17. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the

2 class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with

3 respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical

4 matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to

5 the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to

6 protect their interests.

7

18. By their policies, the defendants have acted and continue to act

8 on grounds and in a manner generally applicable to the class, thereby

9 making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory

10 relief with respect to the class as a whole.

19. The injuries suffered by the named plaintiffs and the members of

12 the plaintiff class as a result of the policies and practices of defendants

13 are capable of repetition, yet may evade review, thereby making class relief

14

appropriate.

15

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

16

I. CONDITIONS IN THE ANDRQSCOGGIN COUNTY JAIL

20. The Androscoggin County jail is a secure building located in

Auburn, Maine.

17

21. Defendants use the Androscoggin County jail to confine male and

20 female juveniles, and male and female adults.

22. Defendants incarcerate juveniles for short periods of time, 22 usually less than six hours, in holding cells on the first floor of the

•" jail. The holding cells are totally bare, devoid of any chairs, benches,
24 beds, bunks, or other furniture,, Juveniles confined in the cells must either stand or sit on the floor.
26 23. The holding cells are filthy, strewn with trash, debris, cigarette

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1 butts, and dirt. The paint on the walls and ceilings is peeling off. The

2 doors to the holding cells are made of crossed metal strips, making it

3 difficult, if not impossible, for jail personnel to monitor persons

detained in the holding cells. Defendants fail and refuse to provide any

adequate sanitation or maintenance of the holding cells.

24. Defendants incarcerate juveniles for longer periods of time,

usually more than six hours, in a barred cellblock in the basement level of

the jail. The cellblock consists of three individual cells, each

containing an institutional-type bed attached to the wall and an

institutional toilet-sink combination, and a small open area outside of the

individual cells.

25. Like the holding cells on the first floor of the jail, the cells

and open area in the juvenile cellblock are filthy, strewn with trash,

debris, cigarette butts, and garbage. The toilets in the juvenile

cellblock are foul, fetid, and feculent. Defendants fail and refuse to

provide any adequate sanitation or maintenance of the juvenile cellblock.

18 19 20 21
I 22 23 24 25 26

26. Defendants fail to provide and maintain an adequate classification
system for juvenile inmates. Consequently, unadjudicated juveniles are not separated from adjudicated juveniles, and juveniles charged with minor offenses are not separated from juveniles charged with serious offenses.
27. Defendants fail to provide adequate medical or psychological screening or examination for plaintiffs when plaintiffs are taken into custody. Defendants fail to provide regular medical or mental health services to plaintiffs.
28. Defendants confine plaintiffs in the holding cells or in the juvenile cellblock for virtually the entire periods of their incarceration,

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1 allowing plaintiffs out of the holding cells only to use a toilet in

2 another part of the jail, and allowing plaintiffs out of the juvenile

3 cellblock only to go to the dining hall for meals.

4

29. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with any opportunities for

5 exercise or recreation during their periods of confinement.

6

30. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with any programming or

7 activities during their periods of confinement.

8

31. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with an adequate educational

9 program during their periods of confinement.

10

32. Defendants fail to provide jail personnel who are trained in

11 identifying and responding to problems of juveniles. Defendants1 failure

12 to provide adequately trained staff results in lack of attention to

13 problems of plaintiffs during their confinement, lack of appropriate

14 assessment of plaintiffs' physcial and emotional needs, and lack of

15 programs for plaintiffs during their confinement. Such failure subjects

16 plaintiffs to serious danger at. the hands of institutional personnel, other

17 inmates, and themselves.

18

33. Defendants fail to hire qualified personnel who can respond to and

19 provide for the needs of plaintiffs in the jail.

20

34. Defendants fail to adequately supervise jail personnel who are

21 responsible for plaintiffs in the jail.

22

35. Defendants fail to adequately monitor plaintiffs in their cells.

23

36. Defendants fail to equip and maintain an adequate audio or visual

2 4 monitoring system at the jail.

25

37. Defendants fail to keep plaintiffs separated by sight and sound

26 from adult inmates confined in the jail. Plaintiffs confined in the

1 holding cells on the first floor of the jail have sight and sound contact

2 with virtually all inmates brought into the jail during said plaintiffs'

3 periods of confinement, since adult inmates are brought into the jail

4 directly past the holding cells where said plaintiffs are confined.

5 Plaintiffs confined in the juvenile cellblock in the basement level of the

6 jail have contact with adult inmates when they are taken by jail personnel

7 through an adult male cellbock to the dining hall, and when they receive

8 their food in the dining hall from adult male trustees.

9

38. Defendants fail to implement and promulgate rules and regulations

10 for the proper handling and treatment of plaintiffs.

11

39. As a result of defendants' policies, practices, acts and

12 omissions, as described herein, plaintiffs' confinement by defendants in

13 the Androscoggin County jail is cruel, harsh, punitive, and oppressive.

14

II. SECURE DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS

15

40. Since 1980, the State of Maine has received funds totalling more

16 than $1,400,000 from the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency I-7 Prevention, an agency of the United States Department of Justice. These

18 funds have been granted to the state for implementation of the Juvenile

19 Justice Act.

20

41. Section 223(12) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. Section

21 5633(12), provides that, in order to receive funding under the Act, a state

22 must comply with the requirement that juveniles who are charged with or who

23 have committed offenses which would not be criminal if committed by an

adult ("status offenses"), or offenses which do not constitute violations

25 of valid court orders, and such non-offenders as dependent or neglected

children, shall not be placed in secure juvenile detention or correctional

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1 facilities. Instead, a state must require that such juveniles, if placed
2 in facilities at all, are placed in facilities which are the least restrictive alternatives appropriate to the needs of the child and the community, are in reasonable proximity to the family and the home community, and provide "community-based" services, as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 5630(1). 42. The defendants regularly confine and detain in the Androscoggin County jail juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses which would not be criminal if committed by an adult, where such offenses do not constitute violations of valid court orders. 43. Similar numbers of status offenders have been confined in the Androscoggin County jail in previous years under similar circumstances, and similar numbers will be confined in the future under such circumstances unless plaintiffs are granted the relief requested herein. III. DETENTION OF JUVENILES IN JAIL WITHOUT

17

44. Section 223(13) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. Section

18

5633(13), provides that, in order to receive funding under the Act, a state

19

must comply with the requirement that juveniles alleged to be or found to

20

be delinquent shall not be detained or confined in any institution in which

21

they have regular contact with adult persons incarcerated because they have

22

been convicted of a crime or are awaiting trial on criminal charges.

23 45. The defendants regularly confine and detain juveniles alleged to
24 be or found to be delinquents, as well as juveniles alleged to be or found

to be status offenders, in the Androscoggin County jail, where such
26 juveniles have regular contact with adult persons incarcerated because

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they have been convicted of a crime or are awaiting trial on criminal

2 charges.

3

46. 15 M.R.S.A. Section 3203 provides, inter alia, that a juvenile may

be detained in a jail or other security facility intended or used primarily

for the detention of adults only when the facility provides for no regular

contact between the juveniles and the adult inmates.

47. The defendants regularly confine and detain plaintiffs in the

Androscoggin County jail where plaintiffs have regular contact with adult

inmates.

48. Similar numbers of children have been confined in the

Androscoggin County jail in previous years under similar circumstances, and

similar numbers will be confined in the future under such circumstances

unless plaintiffs are granted the relief requested herein.

14

IV. FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO PROVIDE AND UTILIZE

APPROPRIATE COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO

i->

PLACEMENT OF JUVENILES IN THE ANDROSCOGGIN

..

COUNTY JAIL,

io

49. Section 223(12) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
18
5633(12), requires states receiving funding under the Act to provide non-
19 secure placements for status offenders and non-offenders as alternatives to
20 placement in jails and other secure facilities. Such non-secure placements
21 must be the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the needs of the
22 children and the community, must be in reasonable proximity to the
23 children's families and the hone communities, and must provide "community-
24 based" services. Section 103(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 42 U.S.C.
25 Section 5603(1), defines "community-based" facility, program or service as "a
26 small, open group home or oth-er1s1u-itable place located near the juvenile's

1 hare or family and programs of community supervision and service which

2 maintain community and consumer participation in the planning, operation,

3 and evaluation of their programs which may include, but are not limited to,

4 medical, educational, vocational, social, and psychological guidance,

5 training, counseling, alcoholism treatment, drug treatment, and other

6 rehabilitative services."

7

50. The defendants fail and refuse to provide and utilize

8 appropriate, less restrictive, cxxnmunity-based placements as alternatives

9 to detention of plaintiffs in the Androscoggin County jail. Defendants

10 will continue to fail and refuse to provide and utilize such alternatives

11 unless plaintiffs are granted the relief requested herein.

12

V. CRUEL, UNCONSCIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

13

51. Defendants regularly subject plaintiffs to the cruel,

14 unconscionable and illegal conditions of confinement described above.

15 Defendants have similarly confined and detained juveniles in the Androscoggin

16 County jail under such conditions in previous years, and defendants will

17 continue to confine juveniles under such conditions in the future unless

18 plaintiffs are granted the relief requested herein.

19

52. Plaintiffs JON DESROSIERS and BILLIE JO GRANT and the members of

20 the plaintiff class have been and continue to be subjected by defendants to

21 the conditions of confinement and policies and practices of defendants

22 complained of herein.

23

53. As a proximate result of the policies, practices, acts, and

L*

omissions of defendants complained of herein, plaintiffs have suffered and

25 continue to suffer serious physical, psychological, and emotional injuries. 26 //

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LEGAL CLAIMS

54. For plaintiffs' claims, each enumerated below, they reallege

paragraphs 1 through 53 above, as if fully set forth herein, in each and

every statement of claim, and further allege:

FIRST CLAIM

55. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions complained of

'

herein, and specifically defendants' subjection of plaintiffs to the cruel,

°

unconscionable and illegal conditions of confinement in the Androscoggin

County jail, subject plaintiffs to denial of due process of law and to

cruel and unusual punishments, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

*•*• Amendments to the United States Constitution; and violate plaintiffs'

rights under the Maine statutory sections cited herein.

13

SECOND CLAIM

56. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions complained of

herein, and specifically defendants' secure confinement and detention in

the Androscoggin County jail of status offenders and other juveniles

presenting no danger to themselves or others, violate plaintiffs' rights

18

under the Juvenile Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 5633(12); subject

19

plaintiffs to denial of due process of law and to cruel and unusual

20

punishments, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

21

United States Constitution; and violate plaintiffs' rights under the Maine

22

statutory sections cited herein.

23

THIRD CLAIM

24 57. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions complained of
25 herein, and specifically defendants' detention and confinement of juveniles
26 in the Androscoggin County jail without adequate separation from adult

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1 offenders, violate plaintiffs' rights under the Juvenile Justice Act, 42

2 U.S.C. Section 5633(13); subject plaintiffs to denial of due process of

3 law and to cruel and unusual punishments, in violation of the Eighth and

4 Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and violate

5 plaintiffs' rights under the Maine statutory sections cited herein.

6

FOURTH CLAIM

7

58. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions complained of

8 herein, and specifically defendants' failure and refusal to provide and

9 utilize appropriate community-based alternatives to placement of juveniles

10 in the Androscoggin County jail, violate plaintiffs' rights under the

11 Juvenile Justice Act, 42 U.S.C. Sections 5633(12) and 5603(1); subject

12 plaintiffs to denial of due process of law and to cruel and unusual

13 punishments, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

14 United States Constitution; and violate plaintiffs' rights under the Maine

15 statutory sections cited herein.

16

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

17

59. As a proximate result of the defendants' policies, practices, acts

18 and omissions complained of herein, and the conditions and circumstances

19 described herein to which plaintiffs are subjected, plaintiffs have

20 suffered, do suffer, and will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable

21 injury. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to

22 redress the wrongs described herein. Plaintiffs will continue to be

23 irreparably injured by the policies, practices, acts and omissions of the

24 defendants unless this Court grants the injunctive relief which plaintiffs

25 seek.

26

//

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1

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court:

3

A. Assume jurisdiction of this action;

4

B. Issue an order certifying this action to proceed as a class action

5 pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(l) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

6 Procedure;

7

C. Issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and

8 2202, and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the

9 policies, practices, acts and emissions conplained of herein:

10

(1) violate plaintiffs' rights under the Juvenile Justice Act,

11 42 U.S.C. Section 5601 et seq.;

12

(2) subject plaintiffs to denial of due process of law,

13 guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

14

(3) subject plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment, in

15 violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

16 Constitution;

17

(4) violate plaintiffs' statutory rights under the Maine Revised

18 Annotated Code, as indicated above.

19

D. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the

20 defendants from confining plaintiffs in the Androscoggin County jail, or,

21

in the alternative, issue preliminary and permanent injunctions sufficient

22 to rectify the unconstitutional acts and omissions and statutory violations

23 alleged herein, as follows:

^

(1) Restraining and prohibiting the defendants from failing to

25 provide plaintiffs with any of the following during their periods of

2" confinement:

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1

(a) a clean, sanitary, well-maintained environment;

2

(b) an adequate classification system;

3

(c) adequate medical and psychological screening and

4 examination, and adequate regular medical and mental health services;

5

(d) regular opportunities for exercise and recreation;

6

(e) programming and other activities;

7

(f) an adequate educational program;

8

(g) adequately trained jail personnel;

9

(h) adequately qualified jail personnel;

10

(i) adequate supervision of jail personnel;

(j) adequate monitoring;

12

(k) complete separation from adult inmates;

13

(1) adequate rules and regulations for the proper handling

and treatment of plaintiffs.

(2) Restraining and prohibiting defendants from confining or

1° detaining in the Androscoggin County jail or in any other secure facility

1' any juvenile who is charged with or who has committed an offense which

would not be criminal if committed by an adult, where such offense does not

constitute a violation of a valid court order.

20

(3) Restraining and prohibiting all defendants from failing to

provide and utilize appropriate community-based alternatives to placement

22 of juveniles in the Androscoggin County jail.

^

E. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining and

24

prohibiting all defendants from transferring any plaintiff to any other

J

jail or any other facility where; there exist the conditions complained of

herein.

- 16 -

F. Order the defendants to develop and implement a comprehensive plan

for the correction of the unlawful policies, practices, acts and omissions

„

complainted of herein, and to submit said plan to the Court and to the

.

attorneys for plaintiffs for review.

_

G. Appoint a Special Master to review and insure implementation of the

.

plan submitted by defendants and to protect the rights of plaintiffs during

the pendency of this action.

H. Retain jurisdiction over the defendants until such time as the

Court is satisfied that their unlawful policies, practices, acts and

omissions complained of herein no longer exist and will not recur.

,,

I. For the injuries to plaintiff JON DESROSIERS, award general damages

,2

against each of the defendants, except defendants SCALES, BELIVEAU, and

KRAVCHUCK, in the amount of $200,000, or such damages as may be proven at

trial.

J. For the injuries to plaintiff JON DESROSIERS, award special damages

against each of the defendants, except defendants SCALES, BELIVEAU, and

KRAVCHUCK, in such amount as may be proven at trial.

K. For the injuries to plaintiff JON DESROSIERS, award punitive

19

damages against defendants GAGNON, BOYCE, DOUGHTERY, and JACQUES in the

20

amount of $500,000.

L. For the injuries to plaintiff BILLIE JO GRANT, award general

22

damages against each of the defendants, in the amount of $50,000, or such

23

damages as may be proven at trial.

24

M. For the injuries to plaintiff BILLIE JO GRANT, award special

25

damages against each of the defendants, in such amount as may be proven at

26

trial.

- 17 -

N. For the injuries to plaintiff BILLIE JO GRANT, award punitive

2

damages against defendants GAGNON, BOYCE, DOUGHTERY, and JACQUES, in the

3

amount of $10,000.

4

O. Award plaintiffs the cost of this proceeding, attorneys' fees, and

such other and further relief as to this Court seems just and proper.

Dated this

day of July, 1985.

7

ANDREW CHOATE

8

145 Lisbon

Lewiston, Maine 04240

9

(207) 784-8099

10

MARK I. SOLER

CAROLE SHAUFFER

11

YOUTH LAW CENTER

1663 Mission Street, 5th floor

12

San Francisco, CA 94103

(415) 543-3379

13

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24 25 26
- 18 -

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ,. ,.

DISTRICT OF MAINE

J'^

JON DESROSIERS, et al.,
PLAINTIFFS, VS. ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, et al.
DEFENDANTS.

lilfl 1(1

•''

. - . - ' • '\

CIVIL NO. 85-00091P
Desrosiers v. Androscoggin Co

CONSENT JUDGMENT

™ ™

V H •*• • • •

•

JI-ME-001-002

Plaintiff, Jon Desrosiers, having filed on April 5, 1985 a civil rights Complaint for a declaratory judgment and other equitable relief on behalf of a class of certain juveniles incarcerated in the Androscoggin County Jail in Auburn, Maine; Plaintiff, Billie Jo Grant, being added as a named representative of the class for purposes of a. declaratory judgment and other equitable relief; Defendants having duly answered and denied the material allegations of the Complaint; Plaintiffs and Defendants, by their respective attorneys, having consented to this entry of Consent Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein and without this Consent Judgment constituting any evidence against or an admission by any party with respect to any such issue, and without the Consent Judgment constituting an admission or waiver by any party of whether attorneys' fees may

-2-
be awarded to any party or whether any party is the prevailing party under Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code;
NOW, THEREFORE, before the taking of any testimony and without trial or adjudication any issue of fact or law herein, and upon consent of the parties hereto, and it appearing that this consent decree adequately protects the interests of the class, it is hereby;
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter and will maintain continuing jurisdiction of this action for a period of one year from the date of entry of this decree.
2. This action, seeking equitable and declaratory relief, is properly maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class of all juveniles who 'have been since April 15, 1984, or who will be in the future, confined in the Androscoggin County Jail is certified.
3. On June 1, 1986, Defendants Androscoggin County, Maine and Sheriff Ronald B. Gagnon in his official capacity as Sheriff of Androscoggin County, Maine will cease utilizing the Androscoggin County Jail for the detention of any and all j uveniles.

-3 -
4. Any facility maintained by Androscoggin County on or after June 1, 1986 for the purpose of detaining or housing juveniles will be staffed on a regular basis by persons who have had special training or education in handling juveniles accused or convicted of criminal offenses, and will not be used for the confinement of adults accused or convicted of criminal offenses.

Dated:

States District Judge

A TRUE COPY
ATTEST^wuiiamS. Brojvnell, Clerk
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 District of Maine Version 2.4 - Docket Report

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U.S. District Court District of Maine (Portland) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:85-cv-00091-GC

DESROSIERS, et al v. GAGNON, et al Assigned to: JUDGE GENE CARTER Demand: $0
Plaintiff JON DESROSIERS TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
Plaintiff ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, ME. TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
V. Defendant RONALD B. GAGNON TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
Defendant ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, SHERRIF OF TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
Defendant CAROL BOYCE TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
Defendant EMILE JACQUES TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
Defendant JAMES DOUGHERTY TERMINATED: 03/18/1986
Defendant L. DAMON JR. SCALES TERMINATED: 04/11/1985
Defendant JOHN B. BELIVEAU TERMINATED: 04/11/1985
Defendant

Date Filed: 04/11/1985 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other

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MAGERET KRAVCHUCK TERMINATED: 04/11/1985

Date Filed 06/10/1996

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Docket Text

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 611 F.Supp. 897 (1985)
Jon DESROSIERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 85-0091-P.
United States District Court, D. Maine.
June 24, 1985.
Andrew Choate, Lewiston, Maine, and Mark Soler, Carole Shauffer, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Robert S. Frank, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, Maine, and Martin I. Eisenstein, Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, Maine, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT JUDGES' MOTION TO DISMISS
GENE CARTER, District Judge.
In this action Plaintiff[1] challenges the incarceration of juveniles under allegedly unconstitutional conditions at the 898 Androscoggin *898 County Jail, the incarceration of juveniles in a secure facility where they come into contact
with adults, and the secure detention of status offenders. Plaintiff also challenges Defendants' alleged failure to provide and utilize appropriate community-based alternatives to placement of juveniles in the Androscoggin County Jail. Defendants are Androscoggin County, its Commissioners and Sheriff, and three Maine District Court judges, who have the authority, under Maine law, to order incarceration of juveniles at the Androscoggin County Jail.
Plaintiff sues the Defendant judges in their official capacities only, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from confining Plaintiff in the Androscoggin County Jail. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks injunctions sufficient to rectify the allegedly unconstitutional and otherwise illegal acts and omissions. The Defendant judges have moved to dismiss on the grounds that, as neutral adjudicators, they have no real stake in the litigation and that relief can be afforded to Plaintiffs without their presence in the lawsuit. The Court agrees with Defendants' analysis and will dismiss the complaint as against them.
Judges acting in their official capacities are not immune from suits for prospective injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984). As Defendants point out, however, several courts, including the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, have discussed circumstances in which the maintenance of such suits against judges is inappropriate. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[i]n In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.1982), Judge Breyer cogently demonstrated that in most section 1983 cases, federal courts should refuse to grant relief against state judges." R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1232 (8th Cir.1983). In In re Justices the First Circuit court addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. The court suggested that judges adjudicating claims under a challenged state statute are acting in a purely adjudicative capacity without a personal or institutional stake on either side of the controversy. In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22. Because of this lack of interest in upholding the statute they are not proper party defendants in a section 1983 action. "In short, § 1983 does not provide relief against judges acting purely in their adjudicative capacity, any more than, say, a typical state's libel law imposes liability on a postal carrier or telephone company for simply conveying a libelous message." Id. The court further noted that, as a matter of comity, it was unwise to encourage or force judges to participate as defendants in a federal suit attacking state law because such action would require them to abandon their neutrality and tend to undermine their role as judges. Id. at 25. The court recognized that in certain instances, state judges might be proper parties;

for instance, if they had promulgated the rules under attack, or if in some other way their presence was required to give full relief to the parties. Id. at 22. The court emphasized, however, that "[s]uch cases are unusual, for a court should not enjoin judges from applying statutes when complete relief can be afforded by enjoining all other parties." Id.
Although In re Justices involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted the same analysis where, as here, the challenge was to the court's practice. In that case, plaintiffs challenged the court's practice of detaining juveniles without a probable cause hearing. Having determined that such hearings were constitutionally required, the court found that the judges were not proper parties because plaintiffs' rights could apparently be vindicated by an injunction directed to the juvenile officer and because the judges, if acting independently of the juvenile officer's guidance, would comply with the court's determination that such a hearing is necessary.
899 *899 As the Defendant judges point out, if warranted, Plaintiffs can obtain full relief in this case through injunctions awarded against the other parties defendant. An order prohibiting the Sheriff from incarcerating juveniles in the Androscoggin County Jail, or an order to the County to improve conditions at the jail, would provide relief under Count I. Full relief could be obtained under Count III if the Sheriff or the County and its Commissioners are directed to separate adults from juvenile offenders at the jail.
Counts II and IV challenge the placement of status offenders in the Androscoggin County Jail, a secure facility, and further challenge Defendants' failure to seek less restrictive community-based alternatives to confinement at that facility. Maine law requires preconviction detention in the least restrictive residential setting but permits such detention in county jails if the jails meet pertinent requirements for juvenile inmates. 15 M.R.S.A. § 3203. Dispositions for adjudicated juvenile offenders include (1) allowing the juvenile to remain in the custody of the juvenile's parents; (2) requiring the juvenile to participate in a supervised work program; (3) committing the juvenile to the Department of Corrections or Department of Human Services for placement in a group home, foster home, or residential facility; or (4) committing the juvenile to either Department for provision of services to a juvenile within the juvenile's home. 15 M.R.S.A. § 3314(1)(A)-(D). Maine law also provides criteria for withholding an institutional disposition. Id., § 3313. Thus, Maine law permits judges to exercise their discretion, guided by statutory criteria, and confine juveniles to the Androscoggin County Jail.
Plaintiff argues that exercise of this discretion removes the judges from their adjudicative capacity and places them in the role of enforcers of the law, who should be subject to suit under the theory of In re Justices. The Court cannot agree. As the Court stated in R.W.T. v. Dalton:
Although the plaintiffs here characterized their attack as one upon the court's practice rather than upon the constitutionality of the Missouri statutes or Supreme Court Rules, this distinction makes no difference to our analysis. The judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in the course of deciding juvenile cases, are interpreting Missouri law and the United States Constitution as requiring no probable cause hearings for detained juveniles. The fact that we disagree with them does not make their determination any less an act of disinterested adjudication. Their position is no more adverse to that of the plaintiff than the position of any judge who rules adversely on a point of law to any litigant. Thus the judges were not proper defendants in this suit.
R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d at 1233.
Adequate relief can also be obtained by other means. Plainly, the Defendant judges are not charged with providing, nor could they provide, less restrictive alternatives. Such actions are within the purview of the County, its Commissioners and, in cases like this pertaining to juveniles, ultimately the Department of Corrections. See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 1209. Since the Department of Corrections and its Commissioner are not joined as defendants, Plaintiff apparently assumes that they have implemented a plan and set appropriate standards for the county jails and other county detention facilities which, if followed, would make them suitable for juvenile offenders and detainees. See 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1208, 1209. Any failure to conform to the standards must, therefore, be attributed to the County or the Sheriff. If the Court, then, were to determine that the Androscoggin County Jail is an inappropriate place of confinement for juvenile status offenders, it could enjoin the Sheriff or the County from confining such juveniles there and direct them to seek or make available less restrictive alternatives. The

900 presence of the judges in this case is not necessary *900 for the Court to award full relief to the parties. Moreover, if this Court were to determine, in a proceeding against the other defendants, that the Androscoggin County Jail is an inappropriate place of confinement for detained status offenders, the Court presumes, as it must, that the judges would follow that determination of the law. In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22; R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d at 1233.
If the district court judge determines that some sort of confinement is necessary for an adjudicated, rather than detained, juvenile offender, he does not send him to jail, but rather commits him to the custody of the Department of Corrections, which then can choose the appropriate facility including, presumably, a county jail. If the Court were to determine that juvenile status offenders were not being placed in the least restrictive community-based alternatives, an injunction directed to the judges would be of no avail for it is the Department which has the placement power.[2] Both the Department and the Sheriff have statutory authority to effect certain transfers of prisoners.
Although Plaintiff suggests that the Supreme Court in Pulliam endorsed injunctive relief of the type sought here, that is not the case. The narrow holding of that case is that "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity." Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. at ___, 104 S.Ct. at 1981, 80 L.Ed.2d at 579. The Court stated explicitly that it expressed "no opinion as to the propriety of the injunctive relief awarded in this case" because the petitioner had appealed the grant of attorney's fees against her rather than the award of injunctive relief.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Defendant judges Motion to Dismiss be, and is hereby, GRANTED.
So ORDERED.
[1] Plaintiff has brought the complaint as the representative of a proposed class of juveniles. However, no motion for class certification has been filed or acted upon yet.
[2] Any challenge to the judges' exercise of their discretion among the various dispositional alternatives set forth in § 3314 is not a proper subject for injunctive relief since appeal of any disposition is provided by state law.
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