2007 WL 2590363

2007 WL 2590363 (N.D.Ill.) (Verdict, Agreement and Settlement) United States District Court, N.D. Illinois. Eastern Division
Keith SMITH, Ria McDougal, John Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers, Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbee,
Marquisha Hudson, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey, Dajauna Young, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated African-American employees, Plaintiffs, v. NIKE RETAIL SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
No. 03 C 9110. July 30, 2007.

Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree

Ines Monte, Brennan & Monte Ltd., 20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1530, Chicago, IL, (312) 422-0001, (312) 422-0008 (facsimile), for the Plaintiffs & Plaintiff Classes.

Nike Retail Services, Inc., By: Brenda H. Feis, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 131 S. Dearborn Street, Suite 2400, Chicago, Illinois 60603, (312) 460-5000, (312) 460-7000 (facsimile), for the Defendant.

Judge Shadur. Magistrate Judge Denlow.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................................................

1

II. DEFINITIONS ..............................................................................................................................................................................

3

2.1. “Best Efforts” ..............................................................................................................................................................................

3

2.2. “Claimant” ...................................................................................................................................................................................

3

2.3. “Claim Form” .............................................................................................................................................................................

3

2.4. “Claim Reviewer” .....................................................................................................................................................................

3

2.5. “Class” and/or “Plaintiff Class” ...........................................................................................................................................

3

2.6. “Class Counsel” .........................................................................................................................................................................

4

2.7. “Class Member” .........................................................................................................................................................................

4

2.8. “Compliance Officer” ..............................................................................................................................................................

4

2.9. “Consent Decree” or “Decree” .............................................................................................................................................

4

2.10. “Counsel of Record” ..............................................................................................................................................................

5

2.11. “Court” ........................................................................................................................................................................................

5

2.12. “Diversity Consultant” ..........................................................................................................................................................

5

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2.13. “Effective Date” ......................................................................................................................................................................

5

2.14. “Eligible Claim” ......................................................................................................................................................................

5

2.15. “Eligible Claimant” and/or “Eligible Class Member” ...............................................................................................

5

2.16. “Final Approval” .....................................................................................................................................................................

6

2.17. “Liability Period” ....................................................................................................................................................................

6

2.18. The “Litigation” and/or This “Case” ................................................................................................................................

6

2.19. “Named Plaintiffs” .................................................................................................................................................................

6

2.20. “Nike” .........................................................................................................................................................................................

6

2.21. “Niketown Chicago” or “NTC” .........................................................................................................................................

6

2.22. “Parties” .....................................................................................................................................................................................

6

2.23. “Preliminary Approval” ........................................................................................................................................................

6

2.24. “Settlement” ..............................................................................................................................................................................

7

2.25. “Settlement Class Member” ................................................................................................................................................

7

2.26. “Settlement Administrator” .................................................................................................................................................

7

2.27. “Service” ....................................................................................................................................................................................

7

III. FINDINGS ....................................................................................................................................................................................

7

IV. GOALS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CONSENT

7

DECREE ...............................................................................................................................................................................................

4.1. Goals Of The Consent Decree and Settlement Agreement .........................................................................................

7

4.2. Release ..........................................................................................................................................................................................

8

4.3. Covenant Not to Sue .................................................................................................................................................................

9

4.4. No Admission Of Liability .....................................................................................................................................................

9

4.5. No Court Findings As To Liability .....................................................................................................................................

10

4.6. Not Admissible In Any Other Proceeding ........................................................................................................................

10

4.7. Failure to Obtain Final Approval Of Consent Decree ..................................................................................................

11

V. JURISDICTION ...........................................................................................................................................................................

11

VI. EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF THE CONSENT DECREE .............................................................

11

6.1. Effect Of Consent Decree .......................................................................................................................................................

11

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6.2. Joint Request For A Court Order .........................................................................................................................................

12

6.3. Effective Date .............................................................................................................................................................................

12

6.4. Expiration Date ..........................................................................................................................................................................

12

VII. SCOPE OF THE CONSENT DECREE ...........................................................................................................................

12

7.1. Scope Of The Consent Decree ..............................................................................................................................................

12

7.2. Persons Covered ........................................................................................................................................................................

12

7.3. On-Going Best Efforts To Ensure The Effectuation Of The Settlement ................................................................

13

VIII. RECOGNITION OF RETAINED MANAGERIAL DISCRETION ....................................................................

13

8.1. Overall Management Discretion Over The Workplace And Workforce ................................................................

13

8.2. Managerial Discretion Over Human Resource Functions ...........................................................................................

13

8.3. No Requirement To Violate Any Law ...............................................................................................................................

13

IX. EQUITABLE RELIEF .............................................................................................................................................................

13

9.1. No Automatic Injunction ........................................................................................................................................................

13

9.2. Compliance Officer at World Headquarters and Ombudsperson at Niketown Chicago ..................................

14

9.3. Duties of Compliance Officer ...............................................................................................................................................

14

9.4. Duties of Ombudsperson ........................................................................................................................................................

15

9.5. EEO and Diversity Training ..................................................................................................................................................

15

9.6. Court-Appointed Diversity Consultant ..............................................................................................................................

16

9.7. Access to Information ..............................................................................................................................................................

17

9.8. Reporting and Monitoring Function ...................................................................................................................................

17

9.9. Specific Programmatic Relief ...............................................................................................................................................

18

9.10. Additional Affirmative Relief .............................................................................................................................................

22

9.11. Community Outreach ............................................................................................................................................................

24

X. MONETARY RELIEF ..............................................................................................................................................................

25

10.1. Settlement Fund .......................................................................................................................................................................

25

10.2. Creation and Administration of Settlement Fund ........................................................................................................

26

10.3. Claims Filing Procedures for Settlement of Claims of Class Members and Named Plaintiffs ....................

27

10.4. Distribution Formula ..............................................................................................................................................................

28

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10.5. Tax Treatment ..........................................................................................................................................................................

29

10.6. Indemnification by Settlement Class Members and Named Plaintiffs .................................................................

30

10.7. Nike Has No Tax Obligation, Liability or Responsibility ........................................................................................

30

XI. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ...................................................................................................................................

31

11.1. Attorneys’ Fees And Costs ..................................................................................................................................................

31

11.2. Release of Any Claims for Attorney’s Fees and Costs ..............................................................................................

31

11.3. Cost of Employment Practices ...........................................................................................................................................

31

11.4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs of Enforcing the Consent Decree ..................................................................................

31

XII. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING .....................................................................................................................

32

XIII. PRELIMINARY NOTICE, OBJECTIONS, AND OPT-OUTS .............................................................................

33

XIV. FAIRNESS HEARING AND FINAL NOTICE ..........................................................................................................

34

XV. EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF OPT-OUTS ........................................................................................................................

35

XVI. ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE ....................................................................................................................................

35

16.1. Resolution Of Parties’ Disputes .........................................................................................................................................

35

16.2. Court Intervention ...................................................................................................................................................................

35

16.3. No Third-Party Rights ...........................................................................................................................................................

36

16.4. Status of Allegedly Injured Individuals ...........................................................................................................................

36

16.5. No Individual or Independent Right to Seek Enforcement ......................................................................................

36

XVII. CONSTRUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................................

37

17.1. Governing Law ........................................................................................................................................................................

37

17.2. Entire Agreement ....................................................................................................................................................................

37

17.3. Severability ...............................................................................................................................................................................

37

17.4. Joint Document Of The Parties ..........................................................................................................................................

37

17.5. Agreed Modifications ............................................................................................................................................................

38

17.6. Headings .....................................................................................................................................................................................

38

17.7. Non-Waiver ...............................................................................................................................................................................

38

17.8. Calculation Of Time ..............................................................................................................................................................

38

17.9. Notice To The Parties ............................................................................................................................................................

38

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17.10. Counterparts ...........................................................................................................................................................................

39

XVIII. PUBLICITY ..........................................................................................................................................................................

39

18.1. General ........................................................................................................................................................................................

39

18.2. Publicity .....................................................................................................................................................................................

39

18.3. Breach of Publicity Promise ................................................................................................................................................

40

XIX. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE ....................................................................................................

41

EXHIBIT A -- PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER

EXHIBIT B -- PRELIMINARY NOTICE

EXHIBIT C -- REQUEST FOR OPT-OUT STATEMENT

EXHIBIT D -- NOTICE OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CONSENT DECREE

EXHIBIT E -- ORDER ON DISMISSAL

EXHIBIT F -- JOINT PUBLICITY STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith, et al, v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., 03 C 9110 (the “Litigation”), the Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of a class of African-American employees, brought suit alleging, among other things, that Nike violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), by discriminating against and creating a hostile work environment for African-American employees at the Niketown Chicago (“NTC”) store since December 17, 1999.
Nike denied, and continues to deny, all allegations of wrongdoing and liability in the Litigation. More particularly, Nike categorically denies that it discriminated against employees on the basis of their race, harassed African-American employees, created a hostile work environment, or has condoned any such conduct. Contrary to the allegations in the Litigation, Nike also denies that any company-wide pattern or practice of race discrimination or raced-based harassment exists or ever existed at Niketown Chicago.
On March 22, 2006, the Court granted class certification of Plaintiffs’ claims. Specifically, the Court certified the following classes for purposes of liability, monetary and injunctive relief:
• Hostile Work Environment Class: All African-American employees and managers who are or were employed at Niketown Chicago at any time between December 17, 1999 and the present who allegedly were subjected to a hostile working environment.
• Job Segregation/Wage Disparity Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly were assigned to lower paid positions in the stockroom or as cashiers because of their race during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present.
• Promotion Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly were denied promotions or deprived of the ability to pursue promotions because of their race during the period between December 17,1999 and the present.
• Discipline Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly

2007 WL 2590363
were subjected to racially-biased application of workplace rules and regulations that resulted in discipline up to and including termination, during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present.
• Benefits Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly applied for, requested and/or were entitled to benefits but were denied those benefits because of their race, during the period between December 17,1999 and the present.
The Court’s class certification ruling did not make any findings or conclusions about the underlying merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Court has never determined which side is right.
The Parties engaged in extensive and comprehensive class discovery for over two years, including dozens of depositions and the exchange of voluminous documents. Through this exhaustive process, the Parties developed a thorough understanding of the facts and applicable law, which enabled them to assess the relative merits of the claims and defenses asserted by each side. The Parties have participated in mediated settlement negotiations sporadically since June 2006. These negotiations have been conducted at arms-length with the assistance of, at various times, a professional mediator. These efforts resulted in an agreement to settle this action prior to a trial on the merits, subject to this Court’s review and approval after notice, an opportunity for members of the Settlement Class to object or opt out of the settlement, and an evidentiary fairness hearing.
This Consent Decree is entered into by Class Counsel on behalf of Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members and Nike. The Parties agree that, after carefully considering the facts and applicable law, the uncertainty of continued litigation, and as a result of having engaged in extensive arms-length negotiations, it would be in their best interests to finally resolve all matters by entry of this Consent Decree. The Parties anticipate that upon its entry by this Court, this Consent Decree shall be final and binding upon the Class, the Parties, their successors, and assigns and shall release all claims to the extent allowed under Rule 23. The Parties, by and through their respective undersigned counsel, have agreed to this Consent Decree on the terms and conditions set forth below and subject to the approval of this Court.
II. DEFINITIONS
The following terms, when used in this Consent Decree, shall have the following meanings as set forth below. All terms defined in the singular shall have the same meaning when used in the plural, and all terms defined in the plural shall have the same meaning when used in the singular.
2.1. “Best Efforts” means taking steps in good faith and reasonably designed to achieve compliance with specified objectives to which the best efforts are directed.
2.2. “Claimant” means any Class Member who submits a Claim Form pursuant to Paragraph 10.3, infra.
2.3. “Claim Form” means the form on which a Claimant submits a written description of his/her eligible claims to the Settlement Administrator.
2.4. “Claim Reviewer” means the persons or entities selected by Class Counsel to review and evaluate Claim Forms and to recommend to the Court the monetary awards to be distributed from the Class Claims Portion of the Settlement Fund, as described in Section X, infra.
2.5. “Class” and/or “Plaintiff Class” means the classes certified by the Court’s March 22, 2006 order, specifically:
• Hostile Work Environment Class: All African-American employees and managers who are or were employed at Niketown Chicago at any time between December 17, 1999 and the date of Preliminary Approval who allegedly were subjected to a hostile working environment.
• Job Segregation/Wage Disparity Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly were assigned to lower paid positions in the stockroom or as cashiers because of their race during the period between December 17, 1999 and the date of Preliminary Approval.

2007 WL 2590363
• Promotion Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly were denied promotions or deprived of the ability to pursue promotions because of their race during the period between December 17, 1999 and the date of Preliminary Approval.
• Discipline Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly were subjected to racially-biased application of workplace rules and regulations that resulted in discipline up to and including termination, during the period between December 17, 1999 and the date of Preliminary Approval.
• Benefits Class: All current and former non-managerial African-American employees at Niketown Chicago who allegedly applied for, requested and/or were entitled to benefits but were denied those benefits because of their race, during the period between December 17,1999 and the date of Preliminary Approval.
2.6. “Class Counsel” means Noelle Brennan and Ines Monte of the law firm of Brennan & Monte Ltd. and Randall Schmidt of the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law School.
2.7. “Class Member” means any current or former African-American employee who falls within the definition of any of the classes identified in Paragraph 2.4, supra.
2.8. “Compliance Officer” means the corporate Retail Human Resources Director designated to ensure Niketown Chicago’s implementation and compliance with the injunctive relief provisions of the Consent Decree, as described in Section IX, infra.
2.9. “Consent Decree” or “Decree” means this document, which has been signed by counsel of record for the Parties, subject to final approval and adoption by the Court, and which contains the following attached exhibits: EXHIBIT A -- PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER
EXHIBIT B -- PRELIMINARY NOTICE
EXHIBIT C -- REQUEST FOR OPT-OUT STATEMENT
EXHIBIT D -- NOTICE OF FINAL APPROVAL OF CONSENT DECREE
EXHIBIT E -- ORDER ON DISMISSAL
EXHIBIT F -- JOINT PUBLICITY STATEMENT
2.10. “Counsel of Record” means all counsel of record for the Parties and whom are signatories to this Consent Decree.
2.11. “Court” means the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Judge thereof having been assigned to preside over the Litigation, or proceedings relevant to the Case.
2.12. “Diversity Consultant” means the independent monitor appointed by the Court to monitor NTC’s compliance with the injunctive relief provisions in the Consent Decree, as described in Section IX, infra.
2.13. “Effective Date” means the date on which the time for filing an appeal from the Court’s final approval of this Consent Decree has either expired without an appeal being filed, or if later, after any appeal has been fully resolved upholding the agreement (including requests for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and petitions for certiorari), at which time the parties become bound to perform the obligations set forth in this consent Decree, and the terms of this Decree become binding on NTC, the Settlement Class, and anyone else who has undertaken an obligation under this Decree.
2.14. “Eligible Claim” means any race discrimination or racial harassment claim, including class and individual claims, against NTC that arose or could have arisen at any time during the Liability Period, as defined in Paragraph 2.16, infra.
2.15. “Eligible Claimant” and/or “Eligible Class Member” means any Class Member who timely and properly submits to the Settlement Administrator a Claim Form and is entitled to a monetary award from the Class Claims Portions of the

2007 WL 2590363
Settlement Fund under the terms of a Distribution Formula approved by the Court. “Eligible Claimant” and/or “Eligible Class Member” specifically excludes any Class Member who previously executed a valid and enforceable release of all of his or her Eligible Claims, unless such release specifically provides for recovery under this Consent Decree.
2.16. “Final Approval” means the entry of the Court’s order granting final approval of this Consent Decree, which reflects that the Court concludes that the terms of this Consent Decree are fair, reasonable and adequate to the Class as a whole.
2.17. “Liability Period” means the period from December 17, 1999 to the Date of Preliminary Approval of the Consent Decree.
2.18. The “Litigation” and/or This “Case” means all proceedings relating to or arising from Smith, et al, v. Nike Retail Services, Inc., 03 C 9110 (N.D. Ill.), including any outstanding charges filed by any Named Plaintiffs with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or Illinois Department of Human Rights.
2.19. “Named Plaintiffs” means the individual plaintiffs who brought suit: Keith Smith, Ria McDougal, John Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers, Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbee, Marquisha Hudson, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey and DaJauna Young.
2.20. “Nike” means Nike Retail Services, Inc., and each and all of its past and present (as of the Effective Date) predecessors, affiliates, and successors.
2.21. “Niketown Chicago” or “NTC” means the Niketown Chicago store, located at 669 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
2.22. “Parties” means Nike, the Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members.
2.23. “Preliminary Approval” means the entry of the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval of this Consent Decree, which reflects that the Court concludes that the terms of this Consent Decree appear sufficiently fair, reasonable and adequate to the Class as a whole to warrant notice to the Class, an opportunity for Class Members to object or opt out, and a fairness hearing to consider final approval of the Consent Decree.
2.24. “Settlement” means the settlement terms embodied in this Consent Decree.
2.25. “Settlement Class Member” means any Class Member who does not opt out of the claims process of the Settlement.
2.26. “Settlement Administrator” means the person or entity selected by Class Counsel to conduct certain administrative tasks as described in Paragraph 13.1 infra.
2.27. “Service” means delivery of notice and/or papers, and shall be defined as service is specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. FINDINGS
The Court, having carefully examined the terms and provisions of this Consent Decree, and based on the pleadings and the record in this case, finds as follows:
A. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the Parties solely for purposes of entering and enforcing this Consent Decree;
B. The terms of this Consent Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable and just; and
C. This Consent Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not in derogation of the rights or privileges of any person, any Party, or the Class. The final approval of this Consent Decree will be in the best interests of the

2007 WL 2590363
Parties and the Class.
IV. GOALS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CONSENT DECREE
4.1. Goals Of The Consent Decree and Settlement Agreement. The Parties enter into this Consent Decree and Settlement Agreement to achieve the following goals: (a) to resolve all claims asserted in the Litigation; (b) to ensure that Settlement Class Members are fairly compensated for release of their claims; and (c) to ensure that effective mechanisms are in place to prevent race-based discrimination or race-based harassment at NTC.
4.2. Release.
4.2.1. Except with respect to any persons who have effectively exercised a right to opt out of this Decree, in consideration of the promises contained in, and the benefits provided or to be provided hereunder, upon the Effective Date this Consent Decree shall resolve, extinguish, and finally and forever bar any and all claims in law or in equity which any of the Named Plaintiffs, or their respective representatives, agents, heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns have, may have, may have had, or in the future may have against Nike arising from or related to events that occurred during the Liability Period. Nothing herein, however, shall serve to waive or otherwise limit Named Plaintiffs’ vested rights in any employment benefits protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) which were not included in the claims of the Benefits Class in this Litigation.
4.2.2. Except with respect to any persons who have effectively exercised a right to opt out of this Decree, in consideration of the promises contained in, and the benefits, processes and procedures provided or to be provided to the Settlement Class Members hereunder, upon the Effective Date this Consent Decree shall resolve, extinguish, and finally and forever bar any and all Claims in law or in equity for monetary relief or for equitable relief for alleged race-based discrimination or race-based harassment which any of the Settlement Class Members, or their representatives, agents, heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns have, may have, may have had, or in the future may have against Nike arising from or related to events that occurred during the Liability Period which are in alleged violation of Section 1981 and/or Title VII. As used in this Section, the phrase “claims for monetary relief” shall include all claims for economic or non-economic monetary damages of any kind which allegedly arose because of race-based harassment or race-based discrimination as alleged in this Litigation, including, without limitation, claims for back pay, employment benefits (including, without limitation, retirement, life insurance, and 401 (k) savings plan benefits, and the monetary equivalent of various forms of leave), and/or interest (including both pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest), compensatory damages and punitive damages. Nothing herein, however, shall serve to waive or otherwise limit Settlement Class Members’ vested rights in any employment benefits protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) which were not included in the claims of the Benefits Class in this Litigation.
4.2.3. Upon the Effective Date, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel shall bind all Settlement Class Members with respect to all claims identified above. This Consent Decree may be pled as a full and complete defense to any subsequent action or other proceeding involving any Settlement Class Member which arises out of the claims released and discharged by this Consent Decree.
4.3. Covenant Not to Sue. In consideration of the promises contained in this Consent Decree and the benefits, processes and procedures provided or to be provided hereunder, the Settlement Class Members also agree never to sue Defendant in any forum for any of the claims or theories covered by the Release language in Paragraph 4.2 above. They additionally agree that any such claim, if filed by any one or more of them, shall be dismissed with prejudice. Excluded from this covenant not to sue are any claims that cannot be waived by law.
4.4. No Admission Of Liability. This Consent Decree does not and is not intended to constitute and shall not be deemed to constitute an admission by Nike as to the merits, validity, or accuracy of any of the allegations, claims, or defenses in the Litigation, nor shall it be used as a means to require the continuation of any program or action beyond the term of this Consent Decree, except as may be necessary to enforce the terms of this Consent Decree. By entering into this Consent Decree, Nike does not admit or concede, expressly or impliedly, but instead denies, that it has in any way violated Title VII, the common law of any jurisdiction, any federal, state, or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or executive order, or any obligation or duty at law or in equity.

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4.5. No Court Findings As To Liability. In agreeing to the terms of this Consent Decree, the Parties acknowledge that neither this Court nor any other court has made any findings or expressed any opinion concerning the merits, validity, or accuracy of any of the allegations, claims, or defenses in the Litigation.
4.6. Not Admissible In Any Other Proceeding. Nothing in this Consent Decree, nor any action taken in implementation thereof, nor any statements, discussions, or communications, nor any materials prepared, exchanged, issued, or used during the course of the Litigation or in negotiations leading to this Consent Decree, are intended by the Parties to, nor shall any of the foregoing constitute, be introduced, be used, or be admissible in any way in the Litigation, or in any other judicial, arbitral, administrative, investigative, or other proceeding of whatsoever kind or nature as evidence of race-based discrimination or race-based harassment, or as evidence of any violation of Title VII; the common law of any jurisdiction; any federal, state, or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or executive order; or any obligation or duty at law or in equity. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Consent Decree may be used by the Plaintiff Class or Nike in any proceeding in this Court to enforce or implement the Consent Decree or any orders or judgments of this Court entered into in connection herewith.
4.7. Failure to Obtain Final Approval Of Consent Decree. In the event this Consent Decree does not become final or effective in its current form (for whatever reason), this entire Consent Decree shall become null and void and of no force or effect at the sole option of Nike. The Parties further agree that the Litigation shall be reinstated if Nike exercises its option to void the Consent Decree pursuant to any of the conditions enumerated in Section XV below.
V. JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over the Parties and the subject matter of the Litigation. The Litigation asserts claims under Section 1981 and Title VII that, if proven, would authorize the Court to grant the monetary and equitable relief set forth in this Consent Decree. Venue is proper in this District. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of the Litigation during the duration of this Consent Decree for the purpose of entering all orders, judgments and decrees that may be necessary to implement and enforce the relief provided herein. The procedures described below are not intended to diminish this Court’s inherent power to enforce any provision of this Consent Decree. All class and individual race-based discrimination and race-based harassment claims in the Litigation shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Effective Date of this Consent Decree, provided that the Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Consent Decree as described in this Section. A copy of the Proposed Preliminary Approval Order to be entered is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
VI. EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF THE CONSENT DECREE
6.1. Effect Of Consent Decree. Upon its entry by the Court following Final Approval, the Consent Decree shall constitute an order of the Court and all of its provisions will become enforceable by the Parties in the manner set forth in this Consent Decree. The Parties agree that they shall not appeal from the Consent Decree or the Court’s Order.
6.2. Joint Request For A Court Order. The Parties agree that they will seek entry of an Order in the form attached hereto and fully incorporated herein as Exhibit E, which dismisses all class and individual race-based discrimination and race-based harassment claims in the Litigation against Nike, with prejudice, and without costs to any Party except as expressly provided herein, and which incorporates a Release of all claims as specified herein on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class as set forth in Paragraph 4.2.
6.3. Effective Date. The Effective Date shall be the date on which the time for filing an appeal from the Court’s Final Approval of this Consent Decree has either expired without an appeal being filed, or if later, after any appeal has been fully resolved upholding the Consent Decree (including requests for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and petitions for certiorari), at which time the Parties become bound to perform the obligations set forth in this Consent Decree, and the terms of this Decree become binding on Nike, NTC, the Settlement Class, and anyone else who has undertaken an obligation under this Decree.
6.4. Expiration Date. This Consent Decree and any order of the Court shall expire and shall be without any force or effect two (2) years from the Effective Date, unless extended by written agreement of the Parties.

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VII. SCOPE OF THE CONSENT DECREE
7.1. Scope Of The Consent Decree. This Consent Decree resolves all class and individual claims of race-based discrimination and race-based harassment of the Named Plaintiffs and the Class that were or could have been brought in the Litigation.
7.2. Persons Covered. If this Consent Decree is approved by the Court, then all persons within the Class, as defined by Paragraph 2.4, supra, are bound by its terms, except those Class Members who effectively exercise a right to opt out of the Class and the Settlement. Class Members who elect to opt out must do so in writing, in the manner and by the date specified in the Preliminary Notice attached hereto as Exhibit B.
7.3. On-Going Best Efforts To Ensure The Effectuation Of The Settlement. The Parties agree to make and undertake their best efforts on an on-going basis to effectuate, as well as to seek entry of this Consent Decree, or if applicable, to defend, this Consent Decree from any legal challenge by appeal, collateral attack, objection, or otherwise.
VIII. RECOGNITION OF RETAINED MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
8.1. Overall Management Discretion Over The Workplace And Workforce. Subject to the terms of this Consent Decree, Nike shall at all times retain managerial discretion, inter alia, to select, hire, assign, transfer, train, promote, compensate, discipline, or terminate any of its employees, including but not limited to any Class Member, in accordance with applicable law.
8.2. Managerial Discretion Over Human Resource Functions. Subject to the terms of this Consent Decree, Nike shall at all times retain the unilateral right to modify its existing human resource functions, terms and conditions of employment, programs, procedures, practices, or policies or otherwise adopting any new human resource functions, terms and conditions of employment, programs, procedures, practices, or policies as Nike may deem appropriate in accordance with applicable law.
8.3. No Requirement To Violate Any Law. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall require Nike to violate any applicable law, ordinance, or regulation.
IX. EQUITABLE RELIEF
9.1. No Automatic Injunction. This Consent Decree shall not operate as an automatic injunction. Nike agrees to abide by applicable federal and state employment laws including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Furthermore, in lieu of an injunction, Nike will agree that the District Court shall retain jurisdiction for two years after the Effective Date for purposes of enforcing this Consent Decree.
9.2. Compliance Officer at World Headquarters and Ombudsperson at Niketown Chicago. Nike will designate its existing corporate Retail Human Resources Director, (who reports to the Vice President of Human Resources -- United States) as the Compliance Officer to perform certain duties under the Consent Decree that relate to Niketown Chicago. Nike shall also designate a local Ombudsperson at Niketown Chicago who shall report directly to the Compliance Officer.
9.3. Duties of Compliance Officer. The Compliance Officer shall ensure Niketown Chicago’s implementation and compliance with the injunctive relief provisions of the Consent Decree. The Compliance Officer’s duties shall include: a. Implementing and monitoring changes to human resources and loss prevention policies at Niketown Chicago, to the extent necessary to comply with this Consent Decree;
b. Overseeing the development and/or implementation of training and education programs to be provided under the Consent Decree;

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c. Submitting progress reports and other monitoring and reporting material provided for in the Consent Decree to the outside Court-appointed Diversity Consultant on a regular basis; comprehensive written reports shall be provided at least on an semi-annual basis.
d. Overseeing the investigation, collection, tracking, and appropriate resolution of complaints of unlawful race discrimination submitted under Nike’s internal complaint procedure at Niketown Chicago.
9.4. Duties of Ombudsperson. The Niketown Chicago Ombudsperson shall be responsible for assisting the Compliance Officer in the day-to-day implementation of the injunctive relief contained in this Settlement Consent Decree at Niketown Chicago. In addition, the Ombudsperson shall be responsible for handling complaints of race discrimination, retaliation, and/or harassment of African-American employees at Niketown Chicago by (1) ensuring that each report or complaint is timely and appropriately investigated; (2) monitoring the investigation of such complaints, and (3) reporting the result to the appropriate management officials, including the Compliance Officer and the Diversity Consultant. The Ombudsperson shall make semi-annual status reports to the Compliance Officer and Diversity Consultant.
9.5. EEO and Diversity Training. Nike shall provide training regarding equal employment opportunity to all supervisors and managers at Niketown Chicago on an annual basis during the term of the Consent Decree. Such training must include the following topics: (1) compliance with the Consent Decree; (2) equal opportunity employment; (3) federal, state, and Company prohibitions of unlawful race discrimination and retaliation; (4) diversity issues; and (5) other topics that will encourage equal opportunity in recruiting, hiring, assigning, promotion, and retention of employees, including its African American employees. Nike agrees that no less than two hours shall be devoted to training on these topics for each participant and that the first training session will be provided within four months following the Effective Date of the Consent Decree. With respect to those persons who are hired, transferred or promoted into any manager or supervisor position at Niketown Chicago after the first training session referenced above, Nike agrees that they will receive orientation training on these topics and no less than two hours of training on these topics within six months of the hire, transfer or promotion.
9.6. Court-Appointed Diversity Consultant. The parties shall try to agree on an independent Diversity Consultant to be appointed by the Court to monitor Nike’s compliance with the injunctive relief provisions in the Consent Decree. All fees and expenses of the Diversity Consultant shall be paid by Nike. In the event the parties cannot reach agreement on the independent Diversity Consultant, a list of four candidates shall be jointly submitted by the parties to the Court before the scheduled Fairness Hearing. The Court shall select and appoint the independent Diversity Consultant from this list. Each side shall furnish the names of two candidates for inclusion in this list. The list shall not identify which candidates were proposed by which side.
The Diversity Consultant will review all existing Niketown Chicago employment policies and practices related to promotions, terminations, discipline, hiring, and benefits for compliance with Title VII and this Consent Decree, and will review the Compliance Officer’s development and/or implementation of procedures, practices, and methodologies to achieve the programmatic relief objectives of this Consent Decree.
The scope of the Diversity Consultant’s responsibilities will include oversight of Nike’s compliance with the Consent Decree and shall include authority to review, oversee and monitor Nike’s applicable human resources and loss prevention practices at Niketown Chicago to ensure that Nike’s reforms carry out the goals contained in the terms of this Consent Decree. Nike is not precluded from developing and implementing such additional programs as it may find appropriate.
After conferring with the Diversity Consultant, Nike’s Compliance Officer will recommend a timetable for the implementation and completion of any revisions and additions to current Niketown Chicago employment policies and practices, subject to the terms of this Consent Decree. Such deadline(s) may be changed for good cause shown. The Compliance Officer shall review and report on Nike’s progress in implementing the terms of this Consent Decree against this timetable. Subject to its obligations under this Consent Decree, Nike shall retain full operational and managerial authority over all of its operations.
9.7. Access to Information. The Diversity Consultant will have reasonable access to all non-privileged relevant books, data, documents, and other sources of information, in whatever form they are maintained in the ordinary course of business, to the extent that such access is necessary and appropriate to the exercise of his or her responsibilities. Given the potential need for

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the Diversity Consultant to review confidential business information of Nike, the Diversity Consultant will sign a mutually agreeable Confidentiality Agreement, which will be subject to judicial enforcement. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois will retain jurisdiction to enforce this Confidentiality Agreement.
To the extent necessary to carry out his/her duties, the Diversity Consultant shall be allowed to communicate directly with any Niketown Chicago employees or former employees, with prior notice to Nike. In the event that the Diversity Consultant needs to communicate directly with Nike Retail Human Resources or Employee Relations employees with responsibility for Niketown Chicago, he/she shall notify the Compliance Officer of his/her intent. Nothing herein shall require that the Diversity Consultant obtain prior approval from Nike before communicating with any current or former employees authorized in this paragraph.
9.8. Reporting and Monitoring Function. Within six months after the Effective Date of the Consent Decree, the Diversity Consultant will complete an initial report, based on data compiled by the Compliance Officer, and submit it to the Compliance Officer, Nike, and Class Counsel for review. The Compliance Officer, Nike and Class Counsel shall have an opportunity to review and comment on the report, including the right to correct any perceived problems before the report is submitted to the Court. Within forty-five days after submission of the initial report to the Compliance Officer, Nike and Class Counsel, the Diversity Consultant shall make any appropriate changes and file such report with the Court.
The initial report will include a review and evaluation of Niketown Chicago’s Human Resources and Loss Prevention policies and practices as they relate to promotions, terminations, discipline, hiring, and benefits, including addressing any perceived deficiencies in Niketown Chicago’s current practices, any reforms implemented since the Effective Date of the Consent Decree, any recommendations made by the Compliance Officer or Diversity Consultant, and Nike’s compliance with the Consent Decree. The initial report also will identify what the Compliance Officer and/or Diversity Consultant believe remains to be done by Nike (if anything), why it needs to be done, and a recommended timetable for accomplishing it. Thereafter, for the duration of the appointment of the Compliance Officer and Diversity Consultant, they will be responsible for continuing their review of the employment and loss prevention policies and practices of Niketown Chicago as they relate to promotions, terminations, discipline, hiring, and benefits. After submission of the initial report, the Diversity Consultant shall submit three additional reports to the Court in six month intervals, subject to the review, comment and revision process described above. The final report shall be submitted at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the Consent Decree.
9.9. Specific Programmatic Relief. During the first full year after the Effective Date of the Consent Decree, Nike’s Compliance Officer, with the oversight of the Court-appointed Diversity Consultant, will implement the specific programmatic relief described in the following sections (a) through (g) below:
a. EEO Objectives
Niketown Chicago shall establish and/or maintain appropriate and measurable store-wide EEO objectives focused on providing equal employment opportunities for all employees in non-managerial sales positions without regard to race. These EEO Objectives shall encompass measurable goals for: ensuring prompt, thorough and appropriate resolution of race discrimination and retaliation complaints; and measuring success in reforming and/or maintaining applicable human resources and loss prevention practices to eliminate any disparate treatment of African-American employees. Nothing contained herein shall require that a quota or certain number of African-American employees be hired or promoted into any position or job classification, as such decisions remain solely within Nike’s managerial discretion and in accordance with applicable law.
b. Discipline
All discipline of Niketown Chicago non-managerial employees will be administered on the basis of criteria that are equally and consistently applied to all non-managerial employees regardless of race at Niketown Chicago. To that end, • all written discipline issued to non-managerial store-level employees will be administered on the basis of criteria that is equally and consistently applied to all such employees regardless of race;
• Orientation for managers will include training and managers will receive regular refresher training on fair and objective

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discipline practices, with particular coverage of EEO diversity issues;
• written disciplinary actions will be provided to the individuals disciplined to review, keep a copy, and sign to indicate review and receipt, but not necessarily agreement; and
• written discipline will include a comment opportunity if the discipline is believed to be unfair and/or inaccurate.
c. Staffing Nike, through its Compliance Officer and Ombudsperson, shall evaluate and revise, to the extent necessary to achieve the goals of this Consent Decree, Niketown Chicago’s promotion and employee development process for non-managerial employees to ensure that all internal potential job candidates have equal access to notice of available positions and equal access to application procedures regardless of race, including by making available to all employees promotability criteria and reviewing and revising, to the extent necessary, current job posting procedures. Niketown Chicago shall also establish and/or maintain practices and procedures to (1) require managers to make promotion and transfer decisions for open non-managerial sales positions at Niketown Chicago without regard to the race of the job candidate, and (2) ensure that all interested and qualified candidates have a fair opportunity to be considered for advancement to higher level non-managerial positions at Niketown Chicago. Nothing contained herein shall require that a quota or certain number of African-American employees be hired or promoted into any position or job classification, as such decisions remain solely within Nike’s managerial discretion and in accordance with applicable law.
Niketown Chicago shall also evaluate and revise, to the extent necessary, its methods for determining the appropriate job competencies, including job-related knowledge, skills, and abilities (“KSA’s”) needed to perform its respective non-managerial job positions. The Court-appointed Diversity Consultant will review these methods.
Niketown Chicago shall also ensure that all Niketown Chicago non-managerial employee training and similar special career advancement programs present equal career development opportunities for African-American employees. Nothing in this section or this Agreement shall limit Nike’s right to select the best qualified candidate available for each job.
d. Reporting on Promotions, Hiring, Terminations and Benefits As part of his/her annual report to the Diversity Consultant, the Compliance Officer will provide an executive summary of data relating to promotions, hiring, termination and benefits at Niketown Chicago during the reporting period, including (1) the number and race of all applicants and successful candidates for open non-managerial sales positions during the reporting period, (2) the number and race of all terminated employees during the reporting period and, (3) the number and race of any benefits-eligible employees in non-managerial positions who are not receiving benefits for which they are eligible.
e. Centralized Managerial Oversight The Compliance Officer will monitor the relevant employment and loss prevention practices at Niketown Chicago to ensure there is no unlawful disparate treatment against African-Americans. Nike also will agree to continue its appeal procedures for Niketown Chicago managerial determinations regarding promotion, discipline, termination, benefits, and loss-prevention related decisions.
f. Mentoring and Professional Development Niketown Chicago shall establish or continue a formal mentoring and professional development program for its non-managerial Niketown Chicago African-American employees that shall include individual development planning, career

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counseling and mentoring.
g. Loss Prevention. Nike shall maintain, or develop to the extent necessary, standardized practices, procedures, and guidelines to be followed by Loss Prevention personnel regarding the monitoring of Niketown Chicago employees and customers. These guidelines shall prohibit Loss Prevention personnel from considering race or color, in any fashion or to any degree, in deciding whether to surveil, stop, detain, or interrogate any customer or employee of Niketown Chicago. Nike shall continue to provide training to all Loss Prevention personnel concerning these procedures, as well as regular diversity/EEO training. Nike shall also maintain, or develop to the extent necessary, a complaint procedure to provide for the filing, investigation, and, if appropriate, remedying complaints by Niketown Chicago employees that they are being subjected to different treatment by Loss Prevention personnel during check-out procedures due to race. Nike shall maintain, or develop to the extent necessary, reporting procedures to be followed by Loss Prevention personnel when they are monitoring Niketown Chicago employees and customers. These reporting procedures shall require Loss Prevention personnel to document the race of every employee and customer where a written report is generated. This information shall be provided to the Compliance officer and the Court appointed Diversity Consultant on an annual basis. 9.10. Additional Affirmative Relief.
a. Toll Free Hotline Niketown Chicago shall maintain the toll-free number for its employees that is designed, in part, to receive complaints of race discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation.
b. Internal Complaint Process Niketown Chicago shall maintain, or adopt to the extent necessary, an internal complaint process that shall be effectively and regularly publicized to all Niketown Chicago employees. The revised internal complaint process shall provide: (1) written notification to employees describing how investigations will be conducted; (2) prompt and thorough investigation of complaints by an individual specially trained to conduct such investigations who is not connected with the complaint; (3) written notification to employees that investigations will include interviews of all relevant witnesses, including the complainant, and reviews of any relevant documents; (4) maintenance of a written record of all investigatory steps, including interview notes, findings, conclusions, and actions taken; (5) prompt resolution of complaints; (6) confidentiality of the complaint and investigation, to the extent possible; (7) communication of the resolution of any complaint shall be timely provided to the complainant; (8) any complainant shall have the right to request a review of such resolution by the Compliance Officer (9) multiple avenues for lodging such complaints, including submission of an oral or written complaint to any level of

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supervisor or manager; and a toll-free telephone number to receive such complaints; (10) written notification that all supervisors and managers must immediately report any complaint of race discrimination or harassment, whether written or oral, to the Compliance Officer, for investigation by a designated individual; (11) written notification that any retaliation against any employee for use of the internal complaint process or for otherwise assisting the process will not be tolerated; and (12) written notification to all employees that if an allegation of discrimination or retaliation is substantiated, such conduct will result in appropriate discipline, up to and including discharge. 9.11. Community Outreach. Niketown Chicago shall continue its level of commitment to the African-American community in the Chicago area. By way of example only, recent efforts by Nike have included:
a. Chicago Public Schools: • Investment of over $1.2 million to implement the NikeGO PE Program in 87 CPS elementary schools. Each school received training, curricula, and equipment kits valued at $10,000 each. Over 400 CPS teachers fully-trained to implement a physical activity lesson plan in a traditional classroom setting. Over 5,000 CPS elementary school students involved in the program and getting physically active on a consistent basis. • Donated over 3,000 pairs of footwear with a retail value of over $240,000. • Adopted Irvin C. Mollison Elementary School. • Created a strategic partnership with Little Village High School.
b. Chicago Park District • Investment of $250,000 to build 2 soccer pitches at Bessemer and Kilbourn Parks • Investment of $240,000 to build 8 basketball courts in 4 CPD parks • Commitment to invest $100,000 to build a running track at a CPD park • Donated to CPD over 10,000 pairs of footwear with a retail value of over $800,000 • Sponsorship of the NeighborSports summer program
c. Chatham Neighborhood • Opened Chatham Nike Factory Store • $5,000 donated to 10 community organizations respectively • $5,000 donated to Jane A. Neil Elementary School and the school adopted by the Chatham Nike Factory Store • Utilizing minority owned local bank.

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X. MONETARY RELIEF
10.1. Settlement Fund. Within seventy-two (72) hours following Final Approval of this Decree, Nike shall pay by wire transfer to the Seaway National Bank of Chicago (pursuant to transfer instructions to be provided by Class Counsel after execution of this Decree by all Parties) with the understanding that Nike, including any of its agents, do not have any interest in Seaway the sum of Seven Million Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($7,600,000.00). This payment is made in order to satisfy the race discrimination and race-based harassment claims of all Settlement Class Members and Named Plaintiffs as well as for other purposes identified in this paragraph. The Class Claim Portion of the payment, as defined below, is payment is for alleged compensatory damages and/or punitive damages sought on behalf of the Class and shall not constitute backpay wages for any Settling Class Member except to the extent required by law. The monies so transferred, together with interest subsequently earned thereon, shall constitute the Settlement Fund. The above described $7.6 million Settlement Fund shall constitute all the funds or monies to be paid by Nike in connection with: (1) the resolution of the race discrimination and race-based harassment claims asserted in this matter; (2) this Decree (and attachments); and (3) the dismissal of the Complaint filed in this Action. This sum is inclusive of payment for: (1) all awards to and on behalf of the Settlement Class Members and Named Plaintiffs; (2) attorneys’ fees and expenses of the Classes and Named Plaintiffs; (3) all costs of notice and settlement administration; (4) all taxes imposed on the Settlement Fund subsequent to the date of its creation by Nike’s transfer of the Settlement Fund to the Seaway National Bank of Chicago and all expenses related to those taxes; and, (5) all taxes required to be withheld and paid over to the appropriate taxing authorities with respect to payments made by the Fund. Nothing in the foregoing sentence, however, shall release Nike from expenses required to fulfill its obligations under this Decree. All fees and expenses associated with the Diversity Consultant shall be paid by Nike and shall not be paid from the Settlement Fund. Further, all fees, costs, and any expenses associated with the Equitable Relief described in Section IX shall be paid by Nike and shall not be paid from the Settlement Fund.
10.2. Creation and Administration of Settlement Fund.
10.2.1. Creation.
(a) The Settlement Fund shall be an irrevocable trust under Illinois law and a Qualified Settlement Fund under Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code and shall be administered by the Administrators under the Court’s supervision. The Settlement Fund will consist of three portions: one Class Claims Portion in the amount of $5,000,000 (to be divided as follows: $2,500,000 for the Hostile Environment Class; $730,000 for the Job Segregation Class; $400,000 for the Promotion Class; $600,000 for the Discipline Class; $300,000 for the Benefits Class, and $470,000 for the Named Plaintiffs Incentive Awards Portion to be divided among the 18 Named Plaintiffs; one Legal Fees and Costs Portion in the amount of $2,600,000; and one Interest Earnings Portion to be used for any taxes imposed on the Settlement Fund subsequent to the date of its creation by Nike’s transfer of the Settlement Fund to the Seaway National Bank of Chicago and for administrative expenses related to the distribution of the Settlement Fund to Settlement Class Members. Applicants for awards for the Class Claims Portion shall together be referred to as “Claimants,” and recipients of awards from the Class Claims Portion shall together be referred to as the “Eligible Claimants.”
(b) From the Settlement Fund and any income earned thereon, Eligible Claimants may receive payments, and Class Counsel shall be paid all fees and reimbursed for all expenses incurred. An appeal fund may be created out of the Settlement Fund and set aside before allocating the Settlement Fund among Eligible Claimants.
10.3. Claims Filing Procedures for Settlement of Claims of Class Members and Named Plaintiffs. Within ten (10) business days after Final Approval of the Consent Decree, the Settlement Administrator shall mail Claim Forms to all Class Members who did not opt out. Class Members shall be entitled to submit their claims to the Settlement Administrator, under penalty of perjury, in accordance with the procedures set forth on the Claim Form. Any Class Member who obtained a final judicial determination concerning claims which would otherwise be covered by this Decree is not eligible to receive an award from the Class Claims Portions. In order to receive an award from the Class Claims Portions, a Class Member’s Claim Form must be received by the Settlement Administrator on or before December 3, 2007. Claim Forms received after that date shall not be eligible, unless the Court determines that the reason for a late submission constitutes excusable neglect. The Settlement Administrator shall promptly forward all Claim Forms to the Claim Reviewer. The Claim Reviewer shall then review and evaluate all Claim Forms and recommend monetary awards from the Class Claims Portion of the Settlement Fund to the Court under seal, no later than January 31, 2008. Upon approval of the award amounts by the Court, the Settlement Administrator shall notify each Class Member of their eligibility and the amount of their award. In the event that any Class Member believes that his/her award is in error, then such Class Member must petition the Court for a correction of the award

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within ten (10) business days after notification. After resolution of any petition for a correction, the Court shall authorize distribution of the settlement funds.
10.4. Distribution Formula.
10.4.1. Pursuant to a point formula recommended by Class Counsel and ordered by the Court, and in an effort to promote both fairness and efficiency, each Claim Form will be awarded points after review and after any necessary verification. The Claim Reviewer may in his/her discretion verify certain information provided on the Claim Form with information provided by Nike through the Preliminary Approval date. The details of the point system to be applied are subject to Court approval on recommendation by Class Counsel. All monetary awards shall be subject to the review and approval of the Court before disbursement. All Class Members receiving awards will be required to keep the amount of the awards confidential from everyone except Class Counsel, or any attorney, tax or financial adviser representing them or their spouse, life partner or members of their immediate family. If any Class Member who receives an award hereunder breaches the confidentiality provisions of this paragraph, Nike will retain all rights to pursue its enforcement remedies pursuant to Section XVI.
10.4.2. The point system shall be applied uniformly, will not be discretionary after Court approval and may be amended only by Court Order. The distribution formula will take into account several factors, including: length of service; dates of service; job classification; job assignment; complaints made by the Claimant to Nike regarding discrimination; whether Claimant received benefits; whether Claimant was subject to discipline; the Claimant’s promotional opportunities; the Claimant’s contributions to case prosecution; the Claimant’s anecdotal evidence of race discrimination or race-based harassment, and the overall strength of claim. Nike shall have no duty or obligation to produce additional documents, data or other information except as otherwise required by this Decree.
10.4.3. The total points awarded to all Claimants will be aggregated, and each Claimant’s proportionate share of the total points will be determined. The Claimants shall then be allocated a commensurate proportion of the applicable Class Claims Portion(s).
10.5. Tax Treatment.
10.5.1. Qualified Tax Status and Tax Responsibilities. The Settlement Fund shall be a Qualified Settlement Fund within the meaning of Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”) and any Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder. The parties shall cooperate to ensure such treatment and shall not take a position in any filing or before any tax authority inconsistent with such treatment.
10.5.2. Payment of Federal, State and Local Taxes by the Settlement Fund. The Class Claim Portion of the monetary relief paid by Nike into the Settlement Fund is for alleged compensatory damages and/or punitive damages sought on behalf of the Class and shall not constitute backpay wages for any Settling Class Member except to the extent required by law. The Settlement Fund shall (1) pay to the appropriate taxing authorities any applicable federal, state and local taxes that may be imposed on the Settlement Fund; and shall (2) withhold and pay over to the appropriate taxing authorities any applicable federal, state, and local taxes required to be withheld and paid over pursuant to this Decree, or any applicable law. The Settlement Administrator shall arrange for the preparation and filing of all tax reports and tax returns required to be filed by the Settlement Fund and for the payment from the Settlement Fund of any taxes owed by the Settlement Fund and/or required to be withheld and/or deducted from distributions to Class Members and Named Plaintiffs. The Settlement Administrator also shall arrange for the preparation, filing and issuance of any required IRS Forms 1099, W-2 or other tax related forms (including forms required by any state and local tax authorities) related to payments made to Settlement Class Members, Class Counsel, the Settlement Administrator and the Claim Reviewer from the Settlement Fund.
10.6. Indemnification by Settlement Class Members and Named Plaintiffs. For purposes of this indemnification, each Settlement Class Member and Named Plaintiff who receives a payment from the Settlement Fund shall be fully and ultimately responsible for payment of any and all federal, state or local taxes (excluding the employer share of employment taxes, if any, and unemployment taxes and excluding amounts properly withheld from the payment, if any) resulting from or attributable to the payment received by such Settlement Class Member or Named Plaintiff. Each Settlement Class Member and Named Plaintiff shall indemnify and hold harmless Nike, Class Counsel, the Depository Bank, and the Settlement Administrator from any tax liability, including penalties and interest and costs of any proceedings, related in any way to any acts or omissions on the part of the Settlement Class Member or Named Plaintiff. In all cases in which the tax liability that arises is not attributable to any acts or omissions on the part of a Settlement Class Member or Named Plaintiff, the Settlement

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Class Member or Named Plaintiff shall indemnify and hold harmless Nike, Class Counsel, the Depository Bank, and the Settlement Administrator from any tax liability, but not penalties and interest, or the costs of any proceedings related to such tax liability.
10.7. Nike Has No Tax Obligation, Liability or Responsibility. Nike shall have no withholding, reporting or any other tax reporting or payment responsibilities with regard to the Settlement Fund or its distribution to Class Members and Named Plaintiffs. Moreover, Nike shall have no liability, obligation, or responsibility for the administration of the Settlement Fund, the determination of any formulas for disbursement, or the disbursement of any monies from the Settlement Fund except for (1) its obligation to pay the settlement amount no later than seventy-two (72) hours after Final Approval of this Decree; and (2) its agreement to cooperate in providing information which is necessary for settlement administration set forth herein.
XI. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
11.1. Attorneys’ Fees And Costs. Class Counsel shall submit a fee application to the Court sufficiently in advance of the Fairness Hearing so that the issue may be addressed at the Fairness Hearing. Nike agrees not to contest any fee application submitted by Class Counsel up to $2,600,000. The Court shall determine the attorneys’ fees, as well as costs and expenses of Litigation, to be paid to Class Counsel out of the Settlement Fund at the time of final approval of this Consent Decree. Such fees, costs and expenses shall include time to be spent in the future defending the Consent Decree, conferring with Class Members, reviewing Nike’s reports, conferring with Nike’s counsel, or any other legal work to be performed by Class Counsel related to monitoring, administration, and/or implementation of this Consent Decree.
11.2. Release of Any Claims for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Nike shall have no obligation under this Consent Decree to pay any money for attorneys’ fees and costs to Class Counsel, except as expressly set forth herein. Except as otherwise provided herein, Nike shall not be liable for any of the Named Plaintiffs’ costs or attorneys’ fees, statutory or otherwise, incurred in the Litigation or during the term of the Consent Decree.
11.3. Cost of Employment Practices. The costs and expenses of administering the Equitable Relief in Section IX of the Consent Decree shall be paid by Nike.
11.4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs of Enforcing the Consent Decree. In the event that any Party is found by the Court to be in material breach of its obligations under the Consent Decree, the prevailing Party shall be permitted to petition the Court for its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of any enforcement action required to be taken in order to cure such breach.
XII. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING
12.1. Subject to approval by the Court, the Parties hereby agree to the following procedures and schedule for Preliminary Notice to Class Members and submission of this Consent Decree for final approval pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
12.2. The Court shall conduct a Preliminary Approval Hearing on July 30, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. to hear evidence and argument regarding whether the Court should approve the compromise of the Litigation in the manner set forth herein.
12.3. The Parties agree that they shall jointly file this Consent Decree with the Court seeking entry of a Preliminary Approval Order in the form attached hereto and fully incorporated herein at Exhibit A.
12.4. At the Preliminary Approval Hearing, the Parties agree to opine to the Court that the Consent Decree is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Class as a whole, within the meaning of that phrase as contemplated by Rule 23 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel of Record shall request prompt judicial approval of this Consent Decree as written. The Parties agree further to use their best efforts on a joint basis to obtain prompt entry of the Order. The Parties, through their respective counsel, also agree to recommend to the Court on a joint basis that, in their respective professional opinions, the Consent Decree is reasonable and appropriate, in the best interests of justice, that the Parties have bargained for the terms in the Consent Decree, and that no section or subsection of this Consent Decree should be modified or stricken. If the Court does

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not execute the Preliminary Approval Order in the form attached and fully incorporated herein at Exhibit A in any material part, the Parties agree that this Consent Decree shall be null and void. If this Consent Decree is terminated or fails to become effective for any reason, the Court’s establishment of a provisional settlement process shall be void, and the respective rights of the Parties in this case or in any other case shall not be prejudiced in any way by the proposed Consent Decree or the Court’s refusal to enter an Order approving the Consent Decree.
XIII. PRELIMINARY NOTICE, OBJECTIONS, AND OPT-OUTS 13.1. On or before August 10, 2007, Class counsel shall select and retain an independent Settlement Administrator to: (a) distribute Preliminary Notice to Class Members attached as Exhibit B;
(b) receive and forward to the Court and Counsel of Record any Requests for Opt-Out Statements; and
(c) distribute Notice of Final Approval of Consent Decree and Claim Forms.
13.2. The Settlement Administrator shall be a person, an organization, or an entity experienced and qualified in the administration of class action monetary settlement distribution and/or claims proceedings.
13.3. On or before August 10, 2007, Nike shall provide to Class Counsel the names and last known addresses of Class Members and an updated “Job Actions Database,” of the type produced during discovery, covering the entire Liability Period. On or before August 15, 2007, Class Counsel, through its Settlement Administrator shall issue Preliminary Notice and Request for Opt-out Statement (Exhibits B and C) to the last known address of each Class Member by first-class mail postage prepaid.
13.4. Any Class Member may request exclusion from the Class for purposes of recovering monetary relief as described in Section X. Any Class Member who wishes to opt-out of the Consent Decree for purposes of recovering monetary relief must submit a written and signed Request for Opt-out Statement to the Settlement Administrator (Exhibit C). Request for Opt-out Statements must be received by the Settlement Administrator by September 17, 2007. Any risk of non-receipt by September 17, 2007 is on the Class Member.
13.5. No Class Member may opt out of the programmatic relief provisions in Section IX of this Consent Decree.
XIV. FAIRNESS HEARING AND FINAL NOTICE 14.1. Class Counsel shall file the date-stamped originals for any opt-out statement with the Court by September 24, 2007.
14.2. Class Members who have timely and properly requested exclusion from the Class may not participate at the Fairness Hearing.
14.3. Settlement Class Members who wish to object to this Consent Decree or any part of it may be heard at the Fairness Hearing only: (a) if they file with this Court and serve on Counsel of Record a written statement of their objections;
(b) where such statement is received by the Court and Counsel of Record on or before September 24, 2007;
(c) where such statement indicates whether they intend to appear at the Fairness Hearing; and,
(d) if they contemporaneously notify the Court and Counsel of Record of their intention to appear at the Fairness Hearing.
Any risk of non-receipt by this day is on the Class Member. Such objectors may appear at the Fairness Hearing either in person or by counsel. Failure to perform any of these requirements shall be deemed a waiver of any objections. The Parties

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may, but need not, respond in writing to objections by filing a response with the Court.
14.4. If the Court approves the Consent Decree at the Fairness Hearing, the Settlement Administrator shall mail the Notice of Final Approval of Consent Decree within ten (10) business days of the conclusion of the Fairness Hearing to each Class Member who did not opt out of the class.
XV. EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF OPT-OUTS
Nike shall have the unilateral right to revoke the Consent Decree prior to the Final Approval Date in the event that ten percent (10%) or more of Class Members opt-out of the Consent Decree.
XVI. ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE
16.1. Resolution Of Parties’ Disputes. In the event that Class Counsel, the Diversity Consultant, or any Party to this Consent Decree believes that a Party has failed to comply with any material provision of this Consent Decree, he, she, or it shall first attempt to resolve the issue by good faith negotiations. To that end, he, she, or it shall immediately, and no later than three (3) business days after becoming aware of the issue, notify the other party in writing via e-mail and first class mail of the particulars of the dispute, the term or terms of the Consent Decree that are involved, and a suggested resolution of the problem. The recipient of the written communication must respond in writing to the sender within ten (10) business days with an explanation of its response to the proposed solution. If such correspondence does not resolve the dispute between the Parties, then the Parties shall meet on at least one (1) occasion within the next ten (10) business days and attempt to resolve the dispute in good faith.
16.2. Court Intervention. After complying with Paragraph 16.1 above, if the Parties are unable to resolve their dispute, then the Parties may seek Court intervention. The moving papers shall explain the facts and circumstances that allegedly necessitate immediate action by the Court. If any such matter is brought before the Court requesting immediate Court action, the opposing party shall be provided with appropriate actual notice, and an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the motion, pursuant to the Local Rules of the Court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court in its discretion may set such procedures for emergency consideration as are appropriate to the particular facts and circumstances, but no such matter may be conducted on an ex parte basis.
16.3. No Third-Party Rights. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be deemed to create any rights on the part of any third party beneficiaries to enforce this Consent Decree. The right to seek enforcement of this Consent Decree is vested exclusively in the Parties. In the event that a third-party challenges this Consent Decree or brings a lawsuit or files an administrative charge with a governmental agency, such as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a similar state or local agency, against Nike for liability resulting from any actions required by this Consent Decree, Class Counsel agrees that it will send a letter to and/or file a motion with the agency with which the charge was filed and/or judge assigned to the lawsuit which was filed, stating that Class Counsel believe the Consent Decree is valid, that the Consent Decree should be given full force and effect, that any actions taken by Nike as required by the Consent Decree are in compliance with all applicable laws, and that Nike should be absolved from liability for any actions required by this Consent Decree. Class Counsel will provide a copy of its letter and/or motion to Nike at the time of its mailing to and/or filing with the applicable court or governmental agency.
16.4. Status of Allegedly Injured Individuals. For purposes of interpreting this Consent Decree, allegedly injured individuals who are not Class Members shall not be deemed to be third-party beneficiaries of this Consent Decree and shall have no right to enforce its terms.
16.5. No Individual or Independent Right to Seek Enforcement. Nothing in this Consent Decree is intended to confer upon any person or entity other than the Plaintiff Class as a whole and by Class Counsel, and Nike the right to seek enforcement of its terms.

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XVII. CONSTRUCTION
17.1. Governing Law. This Consent Decree shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of Illinois.
17.2. Entire Agreement. This Consent Decree, including Exhibits, comprises the full and exclusive agreement and understanding of the Parties with respect to this Settlement, and supersedes all prior written or oral agreements (including, without limitation, any and all term sheets previously agreed to by the Parties). No representations or inducements to compromise this action have been made, other than those recited in this Decree. This Decree does not impose any obligations on the parties beyond the terms and conditions stated herein. Accordingly, this Decree shall not prevent or preclude Nike from revising its employment practices and policies or taking other personnel actions during the term of the Decree that do not violate the requirements of the Decree.
17.3. Severability. Subject to and independent from Paragraph 4.6 herein, if any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Consent Decree or the application of it to any person or circumstances, is, for any reason, judged by the Court to be totally or partially unenforceable or contrary to law or if the enactment or amendment of any federal or state statute, order, ordinance, regulation renders any provision of this Consent Decree totally or partially unenforceable or contrary to law, such ruling, judgment, enactment, or amendment shall not effect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of this Consent Decree, except as otherwise provided herein.
17.4. Joint Document Of The Parties. The terms of this Consent Decree are the product of joint negotiation and are not to be construed as having been authored by one Party or another.
17.5. Agreed Modifications. Should either Named Plaintiffs or Nike determine that modifications, additions, or deletions to this Consent Decree are necessary, the counsel for the Parties shall meet in good faith and on reasonable notice to discuss any such changes. No modification, deletion, or addition to this Consent Decree shall be adopted unless it is agreed upon in writing, signed by the Parties, and so ordered by the Court.
17.6. Headings. The headings in this Consent Decree are for the convenience of the Parties only and shall not limit, expand, modify, amplify, or aid in the interpretation or construction of this Consent Decree.
17.7. Non-Waiver. The waiver in any one instance by any Party hereto of any term, condition, or covenant in this Consent Decree or of the breach of any term, condition, covenant, or representation herein shall not operate as or be deemed to be a waiver of the right to enforce any other term, condition, or representation, nor shall any failure by any Party at any time to enforce or require performance of any provision hereof operate as a waiver of or affect in any manner such Party’s right at a later time to enforce or require performance of such provisions or of any other provision hereof.
17.8. Calculation Of Time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this Consent Decree, unless otherwise stated, such computation or calculation shall be made consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
17.9. Notice To The Parties. All notices and other communications required under this Consent Decree shall be in writing and delivered either personally or by depositing the same, postage prepaid, in the United States Mail, addressed to the party hereto to whom the same is directed at the following addresses:

To Plaintiffs:

To Nike:

Ines Monte

Brenda H. Feis

BRENNAN & MONTE LTD.

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP

20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1530

131 S. Dearborn Street, Suite 2400

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Chicago, IL (312) 422-0001 (312) 422-0008 (facsimile)

Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 460-5000 (312) 460-7000 (facsimile)

The Parties or their counsel may from time to time change their addresses or representatives for purposes of this Section by providing written notice, return receipt requested, of such changes to the other Party.
17.10. Counterparts. This Consent Decree may be executed in one or more counterparts and each executed copy shall be deemed an original, which shall be binding upon all Parties hereto.
XVIII. PUBLICITY
18.1. General. The Parties and their counsel have entered into this Consent Decree with the hope and expectation that Nike, NTC and its current and future African-American employees will enjoy, for many years to come, a strong and mutually beneficial relationship.
18.2. Publicity. The Named Plaintiffs, Class Counsel and Nike shall agree to a media statement (“Public Statement”), attached hereto as Exhibit F, to be issued jointly upon the filing of the motion to approve the settlement and on the day after the Court’s preliminary approval of the settlement. Furthermore, the Named Plaintiffs, Class Counsel (on behalf of the Class) and Nike agree that all communications with the media and any other non-parties to the litigation regarding the case will be limited to the Public Statement. Nike, Class Counsel (on behalf of the Class) and the Named Plaintiffs agree that each will not engage in any unauthorized publicity regarding the case, and that neither Nike, Class Counsel nor Named Plaintiffs, nor any of their agents, will take any steps to encourage any Class Members or any other third parties from engaging in unauthorized publicity regarding the case. To the extent that any unauthorized publicity occurs that is not approved by Nike, Class Counsel and the Named Plaintiffs, each will retain the right to respond. The Parties further agree that Nike, Class Counsel (on behalf of the Class) and the Named Plaintiffs shall refrain from disparaging each other, and that neither Nike, Class Counsel nor Named Plaintiffs, nor any of their agents, will take any steps to encourage any Class Members or other third parties to engage in disparaging remarks or comments about Class Counsel, the Named Plaintiffs, Nike or NTC. Class Counsel and the Named Plaintiffs further agree to inform any inquiring Class Member that the terms of the Settlement include provisions that prohibit the Settlement Class Members from disparaging Nike or NTC and from discussing publicly the case beyond the parameters of the Public Statement. Nothing in this agreement shall restrict Nike’s right to communicate about the terms of this consent decree with its employees and community stakeholders for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the consent decree.
Class Counsel agrees that, within two (2) business days of the Court’s Preliminary Approval of the Consent Decree, they will modify any web site and/or any other publicly-available postings to add only documents and instructions related to the Consent Decree and the Exhibits attached thereto.
18.3. Breach of Publicity Promise. The Parties acknowledge that their mutual commitment to limit communications and publicity regarding this case is an essential condition to this agreement. Accordingly, if any Settlement Class Member, Named Plaintiffs, Class Counsel, or Nike engages in any communications with the media or any other non-parties to the litigation regarding the case, other than through the Public Statement authorized herein, Settlement Class Member, Named Plaintiffs, Class Counsel or Nike will retain all rights to pursue its enforcement remedies pursuant to Section XVI.
XIX. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

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The Parties agree that the Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice upon the Court’s Final Approval and entry of this Consent Decree.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, this ____ day of ________________, 2007. __________
Milton I. Shadur
United States District Court Judge

Agreed to in form: Dated: ______________________________

Agreed to in form: Dated: ______________________________

 
 2006 WL 1755339
2006 WL 1755339 (N.D.Ill.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Keith SMITH, Ria Mcdougal, John Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers, Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson Billy Brown, Crystal Barbee,
Marquisha Hudson, Dajuana Young Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey on behalf of themselves and a class of Similarly situated African-American employees, Plaintiffs, v. NIKE RETAIL SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
No. 03 C 09110. May 12, 2006.
Third Amended Complaint
Ines Monte, Noelle Brennan, Brennan & Monte, Ltd., 321 S. Plymouth Ct., Suite 1515, Chicago, Illinois 60604, (312) 431-1801, (312) 341-1808 (fax), Randall D. Schmidt, The University of Chicago Law School, Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, 6020 S. University Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637, (773) 702-9611, (773) 702-2063 (fax)
Ines Monte, One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Judge Milton I. Shadur. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”), Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race and to provide appropriate relief to Keith Smith, Ria McDougal, John Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers, Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbee, and Marquisha Hudson, DaJauna Young, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey and a class of similarly situated African-American former and current Nike Retail Services employees (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that Nike Retail Services (hereinafter “Nike” or “Defendant”) has engaged in an ongoing pattern or practice of race discrimination against its African-American employees, which includes the following discriminatory treatment: (1) segregating its African-American employees into the lowest paying jobs; (2) failing to provide African-American employees with equal promotional opportunities; (3) disciplining and terminating African-American employees pursuant to rules that were not enforced the same way against Caucasian employees; (4) treating its African-American employees less favorably in terms of benefits and classification; and (5) maintaining a hostile work environment for all its African-American employees based on this disparate treatment, coupled with a workplace filled with racial slurs by managers and employees, unfounded accusations of theft and abuse of discount and commission policies overwhelmingly directed at African-American employees, and unwarranted and excessive monitoring of African-American employees and customers.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1337 and § 1343. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended), Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

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2. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because the unlawful conduct alleged herein was committed and continues to occur within the boundaries of the Northern District of Illinois.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Keith Smith is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 4. Plaintiff Ria McDougal is an adult African-American female and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 5. Plaintiff John Lewis is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 6. Plaintiff Vernetta Duckworth is an adult African-American female and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 7. Plaintiff Janise Page is an adult African-American female and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 8. Plaintiff Jacques Walker is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 9. Plaintiff Shu-Ra Rogers is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 10. Plaintiff Todd Lindberg is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 11. Plaintiff Anthony Brown is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 12. Plaintiff Jason Readus is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 13. Plaintiff Dwight Brown is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 14. Plaintiff Robert Jackson is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 15. Plaintiff Billy Brown is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 16. Plaintiff Crystal Barbee is an adult African-American female and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 17. Plaintiff Marquisha Hudson is an adult African-American female and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 18. Plaintiff DaJauna Young is an adult African-American female and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 19. Plaintiff Anthony Barlow is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 20. Plaintiff Larry Posey an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 21. Defendant Nike employs approximately 23,000 persons worldwide and has its World Headquarters in Oregon and is incorporated under the laws of that state. 22. Nike owns facilities in Oregon, Tennessee, North Carolina and the Netherlands, and operates facilities for 15 Niketown stores, over 80 Nike Factory Stores, two NikeGoddess boutiques and over 100 sales and administrative offices. 23. In the fiscal year 2003, Nike’s United States revenues were $4.7 billion dollars. 24. At all times pertinent to this action Defendant Nike has been doing business in Illinois by operating a Niketown Store located at 669 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, 60611. At all relevant times herein, Nike Retail Services, Inc. employed over five hundred individuals.

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25. On October 4, 2002, Plaintiff Keith Smith filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging race discrimination against Nike Retail Services.
26. In particular, Smith alleged that Nike discriminated against him and a class of African- American employees, by failing to promote or transfer Smith and other African-American employees because of race, by denying Smith and other African-American employees benefits because of race, by disciplining and discharging Smith and other African-American employees because of race and by subjecting Smith and other African-American employees to unequal terms and conditions of employment because of race.
27. Smith also alleged that he was retaliated against for complaining about racially motivated comments and actions. Smith alleged that after he reported the Store Manager, Lori Wigod, for stating that she was “sick of those people,” in reference to African-American employees, he was terminated.
28. The Charge filed by Smith included the following class wide allegations: Nike enforced the attendance/tardiness and progressive discipline policies in a racially biased way in that they enforced such policies more harshly against African-American employees. African-American employees, including myself, were disciplined and discharged for alleged attendance/tardiness issues. Non-African-American employees with comparable or worse incidents of attendance/tardiness were not disciplined or discharged.
African-American employees, including myself, applied for and were denied positions in sales. Mostly non-African-American employees were promoted or transferred to those positions. Nike regularly failed to post sales positions and filled them with non-African-American employees.
African-American employees, including myself were regularly denied benefits even though we worked over 20 or 30 hours a weeks because Nike classified us as non-eligible for benefits. Non-African-American employees working over 20 or 30 hours a week received benefits because they were classified as eligible for such benefits.
29. On May 13, 2003, Plaintiff Ria McDougal filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging race and sex discrimination against Nike Retail Services. Plaintiff McDougal alleged that Nike discriminated against her and a class of African-American employees in promotions and transfers. Plaintiff McDougal further alleged that Nike discriminated against her and a class of African-American employees in enforcing its attendance/tardiness and progressive discipline policies in a racially biased manner. McDougal also alleged that Nike discriminated against her and a class of African-American employees by subjecting them to unequal terms and conditions of employment with respect to duties assigned and manner of supervision.
30. McDougal further alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for her opposition to discrimination. McDougal also alleged that she was discriminated based on her sex in that she was the only female in the stockroom and was terminated for pretextual reasons.
31. The Charge filed by McDougal included the following class wide allegations: I also believe that a class of similarly situated African-American employees working for Nike have been discriminated against based on their race.
Nike enforces its attendance/tardiness and progressive discipline policies in a racially biased way.
African-American employees are denied promotion or transfers to positions in sales.
African-American employees were subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment.
32. On September 19, 2003 the EEOC mailed a Notice of Right to Sue to Keith Smith and Ria McDougal.
33. Within 90 days after receiving the Notice of Right to sue, on December 17, 2003, Plaintiffs Smith and McDougal filed the original complaint in this matter, alleging that they and a class of similarly situated African-American employees had been discriminated based on race.

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CLASS ALLEGATIONS DEFINITION OF THE CLASS
34. The representative Plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated African-American employees and former employees of Defendant employed during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present. This general Hostile Work Environment Class consists of all current and former African-American employees employed by Niketown Chicago at any time between December 17, 1999 and the present. Plaintiffs allege these individuals have been subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of the law.
35. Further, based on the claims in this action, the representative Plaintiffs propose the following four subclasses under Title VII and § 1981:1
(a) A “Job Segregation/Wage Disparity” Subclass comprising of all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who were assigned to lower paid positions in the stockroom or as cashiers because of their race. This Subclass is represented by Plaintiffs Smith, McDougal, Walker, D. Brown, Hudson, Young and Jackson; (b) A “Promotion” Subclass consisting of all current and former African-American non- managerial employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who were denied promotions or deprived of the ability to pursue promotions because of their race. Plaintiffs Smith, McDougal, Lewis, Duckworth, Walker, Readus, A. Brown, D. Brown, B. Brown, Jackson, Hudson, Young, and Posey are the proposed representatives for this Subclass;
(c) A “Discipline” Subclass consisting of all current and former African-American non- managerial employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 to the present who suffered from racially-biased application of workplace rules and regulations, including but not limited to, time and attendance, employee discount, employee checkouts, suspensions, and terminations. All named Plaintiffs, except Barlow, represent the Discipline Subclass.
(d) A “Benefits Subclass” consisting of all current and former African-American part- time employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who applied for, requested, and/or were entitled to benefits but were denied those benefits because of their race. The proposed representatives of this Subclass are Plaintiffs Smith, Duckworth, A. Brown, Readus, Jackson, B. Brown, Barbee, Hudson, and Young.
JOB SEGREGATION
36. Defendant Nike engaged in systemic racial discrimination with respect to assignments and placement of its employees. Specifically, it hired African-American employees into stockroom and cashier positions, which were the lowest paid and dirtiest jobs. Those positions started at an hourly salary less than $8.00 per hour, while Commissioned Sales employees made three or four times that amount.
37. Between December of 1999 and August of 2004, Defendant Nike employed a total of one hundred twenty-nine employees in its stockrooms. Of those, only ten were Caucasian. However, seventy-nine were African-American. A closer look at the Caucasian employees shows that six of the ten worked in the stockroom for less than three months. Moreover, only three of the Caucasian employees hired were hired as “regular” employees.
38. During the period between January of 2001 and May of 2003, Nike employed thirty-three Commissioned Sales Specialists, the highest paid employees. Of those thirty-three employees, eight were African-American and twenty-three were Caucasian. Thus, in the lowest paid positions, approximately seventy-five percent of employees were AfricanAmerican, while less than five percent were Caucasian. During the same time period, in the highest paid positions, less than twenty-five percent were African-American, while almost seventy-five percent were Caucasian.
FAILURE TO PROMOTE

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39. Defendant Nike systematically and routinely failed to promote or transfer African-American employees. For example: Nike routinely failed to promoted or transfer those working in the stockroom or cashier positions into the more highly paid positions of Sales Associates or Commissioned Sales Specialists (“Sales Positions”); Nike routinely failed to promote or transfer African-American Sales Associates to more highly paid Sales Specialist positions; Nike routinely failed to post any Sales Position openings, thus denying the opportunity for internal candidates to apply. Although African-American employees frequently applied for, inquired about or otherwise sought such promotions, they were routinely denied the same. Defendant Nike would instead hire less qualified Caucasian individuals who were often less senior or experienced than the qualified African-American employees.
40. Upon information and belief, Nike actively recruited applicants for Sales Positions at predominantly Caucasian suburban high schools and hired employees with no sales experience, rather than promoting internal qualified African-American candidates.
FAILURE TO PROVIDE BENEFITS
41. Nike discriminated against its African-American employees by refusing to offer them full- time employment. African-American employees were routinely denied full-time status as compared to their non-African-American counterparts. For example, between January 2001 and May of 2003, Nike hired no full-time African-Americans for any Sales Positions.
42. Defendant Nike also discriminated against its African-American employees through its practice of hiring African-American employees as part-time employees and denying them benefits, though they worked hours that should have entitled them to these benefits. Between December of 1999 and August of 2004, Defendant Nike hired one hundred thirty-eight African-Americans into “part-time” slots, while only forty Caucasians were hired as “part-time.” Many employees who worked full-time hours but were classified as “part- time” requested benefits but Defendant Nike denied those requests.
43. Nike also refused to provide African-American employees benefits for which they were eligible. Nike purposefully categorized African-American employees as less than full-time, although many of these employees worked full-time hours. Nike’s policy indicates that if an employees hours change for 90 consecutive days, so should that employee’s status. Notwithstanding this policy, Nike failed to provide full-time status and benefits to those African-American employees who worked more than 29 or 30 hours a week. Nike also failed to provide benefits to those African-American employees who worked between 20 and 30 hours, although Nike’s own policy provided that such benefits were available and those benefits were provided to similarly situated Caucasian employees.
44. The benefits denied to African-American employees include Paid Time Off (Vacation Benefits), Health Benefits, Dental Benefits, Vision Benefits, access to Healthcare Reimbursement Accounts, Life Insurance, and Short and Long Term Disability.
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT/RACIAL HARASSMENT
45. African-American employees were subjected to a racially hostile working environment by, among other things, repeated accusations of theft; interrogations by Loss Prevention personnel and Management employees intended to coerce unfounded “confessions” of theft or misuse of company discounts; repeated use and tolerance of racial slurs and epithets in the workplace; excessive in-store monitoring of African-American employees, but not Caucasian employees; subjecting African-American employees, but not Caucasian employees, to “pat downs” and extensive searches of their belongings upon leaving of the store; and following African-American employees outside of the store in efforts to support unfounded allegations of “theft.”
46. African-American employees were also subjected to a racially hostile working environment by Nike’s excessive monitoring of African-American customers, but not Caucasian customers. Nike employees would be instructed to closely scrutinize African-American customers by following them around the store, calling their banks and/or credit card companies to get a “physical description” of African-American customers; refusing to allow African-American customers to make exchanges and/or refunds. Similarly situated Caucasian customers were not treated in this fashion.

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47. For example, on one occasion an African-American player for the Green Bay Packers was suspected of stealing solely because of his race. On another occasion, an African-American coach for the Milwaukee Bucks was unfairly scrutinized because of his race. The Store Manager, Lori Wigod, would state in response to young African-American males entering the store- “here comes trouble.”
48. Despite repeated complaints of harassment and a hostile working environment to numerous management officials, Defendant Nike failed to adequately address or respond to these complaints or to otherwise remedy or prevent the discrimination.
CLASS REQUIREMENTS MET
49. The individuals in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs estimate that there are approximately 230 to 250 members of the Class. Further, with respect to the identified subclasses, Plaintiffs estimate that the Segregation/Wage subclass would include more than 100 members. Plaintiffs estimate that it is conceivable that the Promotion subclass has approximately 250 members. Plaintiffs estimate that the Discipline subclass would include at least 72 African-American employees who were terminated during the relevant period for alleged attendance violations or violations of company policy; Plaintiffs estimate that this Discipline class could conceivably include all African-American employees employed during the identified timeframe, as many of these employees were also subjected to some level of discipline short of termination. Plaintiffs estimate that the Benefits subclass has approximately 138 members.
50. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individuals. Among these common questions are: (a) Whether Nike’s actions violated federal civil rights laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (“Title VII”), Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
(b) Whether Nike illegally segregates its workforce and relegates its African-American employees to the lowest paid positions of stockroom and cashier over more desirable positions and then limiting their advancement by failing to post openings;
(c) Whether there are statistically significant disparities between the hiring, placement, and compensation awarded to African-American employees and the hiring, placement and compensation awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, sufficient to permit an inference of intentional discrimination;
(d) Whether Nike maintains written and unwritten policies and/or practices for determining promotions and/or transfers that discriminate against the Class on the basis of race;
(e) Whether there are statistically significant disparities between the promotions awarded to African-American employees and promotions awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, sufficient to permit an inference of intentional discrimination;
(f) Whether Nike fails to provide full-time employment to its African-American employees because of their race;
(g) Whether there are statistically significant disparities between full-time employment awarded to African-American employees and full-time employment awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, sufficient to permit an inference of intentional discrimination;
(h) Whether Nike fails to provide benefits to its African-American employees eligible for said benefits because of their race.
(i) Whether there are statistically significant disparities between benefits awarded to African-American employees and benefits awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, sufficient to permit an inference of intentional discrimination;
(j) Whether Nike engaged in a practice of discriminatory discipline based on race pursuant to a corporate policy that left

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hiring decisions to the unfettered discretion of “local level” managers, and allowed for a lack of general subjectivity built into Nike’s disciplinary system;
(k) Whether Nike maintains and fails to remedy or prevent a hostile working environment for its African-American employees;
(1) Whether Defendant had a practice of failing to address complaints of racial harassment and discrimination;
(m) If discrimination is found, whether injunctive relief, including changes to company-wide written and unwritten policies and practices is needed to adequately remedy past and present discrimination against the Class and prevent future discrimination against the Class;
(n) Whether Nike’s conduct constitutes a pattern or practice of discrimination against the Class justifying an award of lost wages, benefits or other similar relief to individual members of the Class; and
(o) Whether Nike’s conduct constitutes a pattern or practice of discrimination against the Class justifying an award of compensatory and punitive damages to individual members of the Class.
51. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class.
52. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. The Court has appointed skilled and experienced counsel to represent the Class in this litigation.
53. Defendant Nike has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making final injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate.
54. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
55. Issues common to the class predominate over individual issues.
INDIVIDUAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS Keith Smith’s Individual Claims 56. Plaintiff Smith was hired by Defendant in May of 2000 into a position in the stockroom. He was terminated in July of 2002.
57. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies regarding benefits and compensation;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying sales positions;
(c) being unjustly disciplined and discharged, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined and/or discharged;
(d) being denied benefits even though he worked over 20 or 30 hours a weeks because Nike classified him as non-eligible for benefits, although non-African-American employees working over 20 or 30 hours a week received benefits because they were classified as eligible for such benefits;
(e) beng retaliated against after complaining to Human Resources of Store Manager Lori Wigod’s discriminatory statements by being terminated; and

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(f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
58. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 59. Nike was aware of Smith’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination. 60. Plaintiff Smith seeks reinstatement to a sales position at Niketown Chicago.
Ria McDougal’s Individual Claims 61. Plaintiff McDougal was hired by Defendant in November of 2000 into a stockroom position. She was terminated in July of 2002. 62. During her employment with Nike, she was subjected to discrimination due to her race and sex. Examples of this discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies regarding benefits and compensation; (b) receiving unwarranted negative performance evaluations due to her race; (c) being denied promotions and/or being denied the opportunity to pursue promotions to better-paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying positions; (d) being discharged for unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct, because of her race; (e) being subjected to retaliatory treatment for complaining about the unfair treatment of African-Americans by Nike; (f) being subject to sex discrimination in work assignments and positions available; and (h) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
63. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 64. Nike was aware of McDougal’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination. 65. At this time, Plaintiff McDougal is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
John Lewis’ Individual Claims 66. Plaintiff Lewis was hired by Defendant in June of 1993 into a position in the stockroom. After several years, he was promoted to Sales Associate and subsequently became a Sales Specialist. After complaining of race discrimination, he was stripped of his Sales Specialist position. He left Defendant’s employment in October of 2002. 67. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy, short-term disability policy and policies related to benefits and compensation

2006 WL 1755339
opportunities;
(b) being denied a promotion into the better-paying Sales Positions until after he complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
(c) upon receiving a Sales Position, Lewis was segregated with other African-American Sales employees into the Basketball Room;
(d) being retaliated against for bringing complaints of race discrimination to Nike’s headquarters department;
(e) being stripped of his Sales Specialist benefits and positions after complaining of race discrimination;
(f) having his African-American customers treated with hostility by Nike management because of those customers’ race;
(g) being subjected to heightened scrutiny and unfounded accusations of commission fraud; and
(h) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48 including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
68. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 69. Nike was aware of Lewis’ complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
70. At this time, Plaintiff Lewis is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Vernetta Duckworth’s Individual Claims 71. Plaintiff Vernetta Duckworth is a former employee of Nike, where she worked from approximately December of 2000 until March of 2004. Duckworth held different positions with Nike, including a position in the maintenance department and later, a sales position.
72. During her employment with Nike, she was subjected to discrimination due to her race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies regarding benefits and compensation;
(b) receiving unwarranted negative performance evaluations due to her race;
(c) being denied promotions and/or being denied the opportunity to pursue promotions to better-paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying positions;
(d) being followed from the store and falsely accused of conduct that impugned her honesty and her moral character;
(e) being subjected to unwarranted interrogation tactics and offensive treatment by Nike’s Loss Prevention department, including being interrogated for over two hours, being advised that her meeting with Loss Prevention had been tape recorded without her consent, being pressured into reporting other employees’ alleged misconduct that was unrelated to the accusations made against her;
(f) being discharged for unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct, because of her race;
(g) being subjected to retaliatory treatment for complaining about the unfair treatment of African-Americans by Nike; and

2006 WL 1755339
(h) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
73. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 74. Nike was aware of Duckworth’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination. 75. At this time, Plaintiff Duckworth is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Janise Page’s Individual Claims 76. Plaintiff Janise Page is a current employee of Nike, where she has worked for approximately fourteen years as a cashier, since June of 1992. 77. During her employment with Nike, she has been subjected to discrimination due to her race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, dress policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy; (b) receiving unwarranted negative performance evaluations due to her race; (c) being subjected to retaliatory treatment for complaining about the unfair treatment of African-Americans by Nike; and (h) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
78. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 79. Nike was aware of Page’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
Jacques Walker’s Individual Claims 80. Plaintiff Jacques Walker is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from approximately July of 2001 until July of 2002. Walker was employed in a stockroom position. 81. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies regarding benefits and compensation; (b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying sales positions; (c) being unjustly disciplined and discharged, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined and/or discharged; and (d) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.

2006 WL 1755339
82. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
83. Nike was aware of Walker’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
84. At this time, Plaintiff Walker is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Shu-Ra Roger’s Individual Claims 85. Plaintiff Shu-Ra Rogers is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from approximately October of 1996 through February of 2005. He has been employed in Nike’s stockroom and in sales.
86. During his employment with Nike, he has been subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, dress policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities, including being unfairly denied a bonus and being unfairly reprimanded, while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not denied bonuses and were not reprimanded;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying sales positions;
(c) being subjected to retaliatory treatment for complaining about the unfair treatment of African-Americans by Nike;
(d) being subjected to heightened scrutiny;
(e) being forced to quit his employment at Nike as a result of discrimination; and
(f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
87. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
88. Nike was aware of Rogers’ complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
89. At this time, Plaintiff Rogers is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Todd Lindberg’s Individual Claims 90. Plaintiff Todd Lindberg is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from October of 1996 through September of 1998, then again from April of 2000 through December of 2002. He was employed in a sales position on the second floor.
91. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, dress policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities;

2006 WL 1755339
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying sales positions;
(c) being unjustly disciplined and discharged, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined and/or discharged;
(d) being subjected to heightened scrutiny; and
(e) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
92. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
93. Nike was aware of Lindberg’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
94. At this time, Plaintiff Lindberg is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Anthony Brown’s Individual Claims 95. Plaintiff Anthony Brown is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from September of 1999 through December of 2002. He was employed as a cashier and later in a part-time position in sales on the second floor.
96. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy, short-term disability policy and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying full-time sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying full-time sales positions;
(c) being unjustly disciplined, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined;
(d) being subjected to heightened scrutiny; and
(e) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
97. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
98. Nike was aware of Anthony Brown’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
99. At this time, Plaintiff Anthony Brown is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.

2006 WL 1755339
Jason Readus’ Individual Claims
100. Plaintiff Jason Readus is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from October of 2000 through November of 2001. He was employed in a stock position in the basement.
101. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, dress policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying sales positions;
(c) being falsely accused of theft and subjected to unwarranted interrogation tactics and offensive treatment by Nike’s Loss Prevention department, including being ordered to write down “everything he had stolen” and being falsely told that Nike had video tapes that showed him stealing merchandise;
(d) being discharged for unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct, because of his race;
(e) being instructed that he was never to set foot in a Nike store again, without any justification for this prohibition; and
(f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
102. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
103. Nike was aware of Readus’ complaints about his mistreatment, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
104. At this time, Plaintiff Readus is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Dwight Brown’s Individual Claims
105. Plaintiff Dwight Brown is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from November of 2000 through May of 2001. He was employed in a stockroom position on the fourth floor.
106. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy, short-term disability policy and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying full-time sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying full-time sales positions;
(c) being unjustly disciplined, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined;
(d) being subjected to retaliatory treatment for complaining about the unfair treatment of African-Americans by Nike; and

2006 WL 1755339
(e) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
107. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
108. Nike was aware of Dwight Brown’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
109. At this time, Plaintiff Dwight Brown is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Robert Jackson’s Individual Claims 110. Plaintiff Robert Jackson is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from April of 2001 through July of 2001. He was employed in apparel, but was transferred to a stockroom position. His position in apparel was given to a Caucasian individual.
111. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy, dress policy, and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying full-time sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying full-time sales positions;
(c) being unjustly disciplined and discharged, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined and/or discharged; and
(d) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
112. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
113. Nike was aware of Jackson’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
114. At this time, Plaintiff Jackson is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Billy Brown’s Individual Claims 115. Plaintiff Billy Brown is a former employee of Nike, where he worked from October of 1992 until July of 2004. For his first seven years of employment, he worked in the maintenance department and in the stockroom. After repeated requests and applications for Sales Positions, he was eventually promoted to Sales Associate. In July 2004 he was terminated for allegedly misusing the company discount.
116. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy, and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities;

2006 WL 1755339
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better- paying full-time sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying full-time sales positions; (c) being unjustly disciplined, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined; (d) receiving unwarranted negative performance evaluations due to his race, which resulted in less compensation; (e) being falsely accused of theft and subjected to unwarranted interrogation tactics and offensive treatment by Nike’s Loss Prevention department, including being ordered to write down “everything he had stolen” and being required to sign a blank “Nike Loss” statement; (f) being instructed to monitor and watch African-American customers, but not similar Caucasian customers; and d) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
117. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 118. Nike was aware of Billy Brown’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination. 119. Plaintiff Billy Brown seeks reinstatement to a position at Niketown Chicago.
Crystal Barbee’s Individual Claims 120. Plaintiff Crystal Barbee is a former employee of Nike, where she worked as a cashier and customer service employee from July of 2003 through 2005. 121. During her employment with Nike, she has been subjected to discrimination due to her race. Examples of this race discrimination include: a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy, and policies related to benefits and compensation opportunities; b) being denied raises that were provided to similarly situated non-African-American employees in the same position; c) being instructed to provide less favorable treatment to African-American customers with respect to customer service, returns, and refunds (d) being instructed to monitor and watch African-American customers, but not similar Caucasian customers; (e) having complaints made about customer discrimination that were made directly to the Store Manager and to Nike’s Human Resources Department at the Corporate headquarters repeatedly ignored; and (f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
122. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race. 123. Nike was aware of Barbee’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.

2006 WL 1755339
124. At this time, Plaintiff Barbee is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Marquisha Hudson’s Individual Claims
125. Plaintiff Hudson is a former employee of Nike, where she worked from approximately May of 2003 until May of 2004. Hudson was employed as a cashier on the first floor, though she applied for Sales Positions.
126. During her employment with Nike, she was subjected to discrimination due to her race. Examples of this race discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as the attendance policy, sick leave policy, employee discount policy and policies regarding eligibility for full-time benefits and compensation;
(b) being denied promotions and/or being denied the opportunity to pursue promotions to better-paying sales positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily hired into those better-paying positions;
(d) being followed from the store by Loss Prevention and being subjected to heightened scrutiny by Loss Prevention when she shopped in the store with family members, while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such treatment; and
(e) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48. Hudson observed African-American customers being treated suspiciously, while similarly situated Caucasian customers were not. For example, Nike contacted the bank of an African-American customer to verify his identity because of purchases he was making with his corporate credit card, while not treating similarly situated Caucasian customers in the same humiliating manner. Nike directed African-American employees to watch African-American customers and not Caucasian customers. Nike subjected African-American employees to humiliating pat downs and searches, while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to this mistreatment.
127. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
128. Nike was aware of Hudson’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
129. At this time, Plaintiff Hudson is willing to seek reinstatement to a full-time position with full benefits only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Adjourn Young’s Individual Claims
130. Plaintiff DaJauna Young is a former employee of Nike, where she worked from May of 2002 until November of 2005. Young was hired by Defendant into a position in the stockroom. Subsequently, she obtained a position as cashier.
131. During her employment with Nike, she was subjected to discrimination due to her race. Examples of this discrimination include: (a) applying for sales positions at Nike on a number of occasions, including in the Spring of 2002, October of 2003, early 2004 and in the summer of 2004 and never being offered a position in sales, although less qualified white employees have been given sales positions. She also applied for a customer service position in the summer of 2004 and that position was instead given to a recently hired white woman;
(b) being subjected to a hostile environment based on race, by employees and supervisors using the word “nigger,” by inappropriate references to her skin tone, and through belittling and demeaning treatment by managers;

2006 WL 1755339
(c) being subjected to a hostile environment by Nike’s targeting African-American customers for discriminatory treatment in return and exchange policies and targeting of African-American customers for suspicion of theft, although not targeting similarly situated Caucasian customers;
(d) being subjected to retaliation after complaining about inappropriate comments made by a coworker, whereas the coworker who she had complained about was promoted; and
(e) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African-American customers by Nike.
(f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
132. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
133. Nike was aware of Young’s complaints, but failed to take any corrective action to remedy or prevent the discrimination.
134. At this time, Plaintiff Young is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.
Anthony Barlow’s Individual Claims 135. Plaintiff Barlow is a former employee of Niketown Chicago. Barlow was hired by Defendant in May of 1992. In 1996 he became manager of shipping and receiving for Defendant. In 1998 Barlow became a business manager and in 1999, Barlow became the Assistant Store Manager. Barlow left Niketown Chicago in January of 2002.
136. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include: (a) working in a segregated work environment and observing Nike employees being segregated by race;
(b) being allowed to “act” as Store Manager, but being denied the promotion to same;
(c) being denied promotion to Store Manager position, while a less qualified and less tenured Caucasian employee was promoted into Store Manager position;
(d) observing Nike’s refusal to promote qualified African-American employees into sales positions, while simultaneously hiring unqualified white employees into sales positions;
(e) being subjected to retaliation for objecting to Defendant’s racial profiling of customers and employees with respect to suspected theft; and
(f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African American customers by Nike.
(g) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
137. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
138. At this time, Plaintiff Barlow is willing to seek reinstatement only if steps are taken by Defendant Nike to eliminate racial discrimination and racial harassment.

2006 WL 1755339
Larry Posey’s Individual Claims
139. Plaintiff Posey is a current Niketown Chicago employee, hired by Defendant in November of 2000 into a position on the sales floor. During his employment with Nike, he was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include: (a) being subjected to disparate treatment in the application of work rules and policies, such as attendance policy, scheduling policy, employee discount policy and policies regarding benefits and compensation;
(b) being denied promotions and/or the opportunity to even pursue promotions to better visual merchandising positions, while Caucasians who were less qualified and who had less tenure with Nike were readily encouraged to apply and hired into those better-paying visual merchandising positions;
(c) being subjected to retaliation for making complaints of race discrimination;
(d) being falsely accused of theft and subjected to unwarranted interrogation tactics and offensive treatment by Nike’s Loss Prevention department;
(e) being unjustly disciplined and suspended, while similarly situated Caucasians were not disciplined and/or suspended; and
(f) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, including observing Caucasian customers being treated preferentially over African American customers by Nike.
(g) being subjected to a hostile work environment, as alleged with regard to the entire class, inter alia, in Paragraphs 45-48.
140. Despite numerous and repeated complaints to Nike’s Human Resources department and to his managers, the discriminatory treatment continued.
141. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Nike, due to their race.
COUNT ONE: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 1981
142. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.
143. Defendant has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of Section 1981 by engaging in a pattern and practice of 1) segregating its employees by race; 2) failing to promote African-American employees into higher paying Sales Positions; 3) failing to provide benefits and/or full-time employment to eligible African-American employees; 4) applying workplace rules and regulations in a racially biased manner, including the terminating African-American employees in a racially biased manner; and 5) maintaining a hostile and abusive environment for African-American employees by, among other things, falsely accusing African-American employees of theft, instructing Loss Prevention employees to follow African-American employees inside and outside of the store, strictly monitoring the African-American customers, but not the Caucasian customers, and applying stricter standards for accepting returns or exchanges from African-American customers.
COUNT TWO: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
144. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation above as if set forth herein in full.
145. Defendant has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of Title VII by engaging in a pattern and practice of 1) segregating its employees by race; 2) failing to promote African-American employees into higher paying Sales Positions; 3) failing to provide benefits and/or full-time employment to eligible African-American employees; 4) applying workplace rules and regulations in a racially biased manner, including the terminating African-American employees in a racially biased manner; and 5) maintaining a hostile and abusive environment for African-American employees by,

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among other things, falsely accusing African-American employees of theft, instructing Loss Prevention employees to follow African-American employees inside and outside of the store, strictly monitoring the African-American customers, but not the Caucasian customers, and applying stricter standards for accepting returns or exchanges from African-American customers.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Class respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief: a. Certification of the Class and Subclasses;
b. Enter a judgment that Defendant’s acts and practices as set forth herein are in violation of the laws of the United States;
c. Enter preliminary and permanent relief enjoining the discriminatory conduct and requiring Defendant to take steps to end its discriminatory practices and prevent current and future harm to Plaintiffs and the Class, including, but not limited to:
• Revised procedures which would require that Defendant Nike’s managers use fair and objective criteria for assigning newly hired employees to open positions, without regard to race;
• Revised procedures policies and practices related to Defendant Nike’s Loss Prevention program which would reduce the subjective targeting of African-American employees and customers;
• Establishment of effective EEO complaints and investigation procedures;
• Revised discipline procedures to reduce subjectivity;
• Implementation of a meaningful system of oversight to ensure that Defendant Nike’s managers are using objective criteria in personnel matters, without regard to race, including the establishment and monitoring of measures to assure equity in job assignments, hiring and promotions, discipline, and benefits;
• Revised procedures for evaluating internal and external job applicants which would reduce the subjectivity in the current system and would require Defendant Nike’s managers to use fair and objective criteria for hiring and promotion decisions; and
• Diversity/EEO training for all hiring managers, supervisors, Loss Prevention employees and retail employees;
d. Award Plaintiffs and the Class lost wages, including back pay, front pay and lost benefits, and including, without limitation, any lost benefits that would otherwise have been available to the Plaintiffs and Class without the discrimination;
e. Award Plaintiffs and the Class compensatory and punitive damages;
f. Award reinstatement to the following named Plaintiffs: Keith Smith, Ria McDougal, John Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers, Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbee, Marquisha Hudson, DaJauna Young, and Anthony Barlow.
g. Award reinstatement to class members who were discharged because of race discrimination.
h. Award reinstatement to class members who resigned due to race
i. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees; and
j. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court finds necessary and proper.

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JURY DEMAND Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues of facts and damages in this action. Dated: May 11, 2006 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

 
 2005 WL 6077505

2005 WL 6077505 (N.D.Ill.) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) United States District Court, N.D. Illinois. Eastern Division
Keith SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
NIKE RETAIL SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
No. 1:03CV09110. December 23, 2005.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class Certification

One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys, Noelle Brennan, Ines Monte, Brennan & Monte, Ltd., 321 S. Plymouth Ct., Suite 1515, Chicago, Illinois 60604, (312) 431-1801, (312) 341-1808 (fax).

Randall D. Schmidt, Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, 6020 S. University Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637, (773) 702-9611, (773) 702-2063 (fax).

Honorable Milton I. Shadur.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................

1

II. FACTS .....................................................................................................................................................................................

2

A. Niketown Chicago (“NTC”) .............................................................................................................................................

2

B. Hostile Work Environment ...............................................................................................................................................

4

C. Disparate Treatment of African-American Employees ...........................................................................................

12

1. Segregation Into Lower Paying Jobs ..............................................................................................................................

12

2. Discrimination in Promotion Opportunities .................................................................................................................

15

3. Discrimination in Discipline and Terminations ..........................................................................................................

17

4. Discrimination in Benefits .................................................................................................................................................

22

III. PROPOSED CLASSES ...................................................................................................................................................

24

IV. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................................................................

25

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Appropriate for Class Treatment .........................................................................................

.25

B. Legal Standard Applicable Under Rule 23 ..................................................................................................................

27

C. Plaintiffs Satisfy Requirements Under Rule 23(a) ....................................................................................................

29

1. Numerosity Requirement Met ..........................................................................................................................................

29

2. Commonality Requirement Met .......................................................................................................................................

31

2005 WL 6077505

3. Typicality Requirement Met .............................................................................................................................................

34

4. Adequate Representatives Requirement Met ..............................................................................................................

.36

D. Plaintiffs Satisfy Requirements Under Rule 23(b) ...................................................................................................

38

1. Rule 23(b)(2) Requirements Met. ....................................................................................................................................

.38

2. Hybrid Approach Proper Under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) .......................................................................

39

3. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements Met .....................................................................................................................................

40

V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................................

42

I. INTRODUCTION
In this lawsuit, eighteen current and former African-American employees of Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc. (“Defendant”) allege that Defendant has engaged in an on-going practice of race discrimination against its African-American employees. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that during their employment at Niketown Chicago (“NTC”), Defendant violated their rights by: (1) segregating its African-American employees into the lowest paying jobs; (2) failing to provide African-American employees with equal promotional opportunities; (3) disciplining and terminating African-American employees pursuant to rules that were not enforced the same way against Caucasian employees; (4) treating its African-American employees less favorably in terms of benefits and classification; and (5) maintaining a hostile work environment for all its African-American employees based on this disparate treatment, coupled with a workplace filled with racial slurs by managers and employees, unfounded accusations of theft and abuse of discount and commission policies overwhelmingly directed at African- American employees, and unwarranted and excessive monitoring of African-American employees and customers. See Ex. 1, Pis.’ Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 32-42, 118, 120.1
Based on the pervasive nature of NTC’s discriminatory conduct towards its employees and customers and the corresponding common issues of fact and law involved in these claims, Plaintiffs seek to prosecute this action as a class suit and seek to represent the entire class of employees who were subjected to NTC’s race discrimination between December 17, 1999 and the present date. Id. at ¶ 31. In support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs submit this Memorandum of Law along with the attached Appendix of Deposition Excerpts, Declarations, and Exhibits.2 As detailed below, the Court should grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification in its entirety.

II. FACTS
Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc. is a global sports company that produces and sells a massive range of sporting goods throughout the world, including through fifteen “Niketown” retail stores. PSAC at ¶¶ 18-19. Chicago is home to the Niketown flagship store (“NTC”), located at 669 N. Michigan Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Id. at ¶ 21, Berry Decl. at ¶ 6. The named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit and the putative class they seek to represent worked at NTC at some point between December 17, 1999 and the present. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 52, 56, 60, 64, 68, 72, 76, 80, 84, 88, 92, 96, 100, 104, 108, 111, 114.
A. Niketown Chicago (“NTC”)
NTC opened its doors in 1992 and since then, has occupied five floors and a basement at its location on Michigan Avenue. Berry Decl. at ¶ 5. As a flagship store, NTC draws large numbers of customers, including tourists from all over the world. Id.

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at ¶ 6. To serve those customers, NTC employs hundreds of individuals in different positions, including sales people, stockroom employees, cashiers, “Loss Prevention” employees, customer service employees, maintenance employees, managers, and administrative support employees. Id. at ¶ 6.
Despite an abundant interest on the part of African-American job applicants for sales positions within NTC, NTC’s workforce is largely segregated. In fact, as Plaintiffs in this case allege, NTC’s entire culture is characterized by animus and distrust of African-American employees and customers. The result is a work environment where African-American employees and customers are routinely scrutinized and harassed, African-American job applicants and employees are segregated into low paying jobs in the stockrooms and as cashiers, African-American employees are singled out for discipline and termination under rules that are rarely enforced against others, African-American employees are thwarted in their efforts to obtain better jobs within NTC, and African-American employees are not even afforded the benefits they are entitled to for their work.
NTC has gotten away with this pattern of discrimination, despite the existence of corporate centralized written policies and rules that are supposed to apply equally across all locations. Alphonse Dep. at 59. These rules address discrimination and harassment in the workplace, disciplinary policies, time and attendance, employee discounts, commissions, and a myriad of other issues. See Ex. 2, Excerpts from Defendant’s Corporate Policies. Defendant also maintains centralized policies regarding its “Loss Prevention” department which is charged with deterring and responding to theft and other losses at Defendant’s stores. Id.
Nevertheless, as NTC’s own corporate representatives testified, the implementation and enforcement of these corporate policies is left to the discretion of the managers at the local store. Alphonse Dep. at 60. In fact, there is no corporate vigilance over the implementation and enforcement of these policies and rules at the local store level. Id. at 106-107. Without corporate oversight to ensure that policies are being enforced in an objective and non-discriminatory fashion at the store level, NTC’s managers have exercised unfettered discretion to discriminate against African-American employees in the application of policies and enforcement of rules.
B. Hostile Work Environment3
Plaintiffs allege that all African-American employees working at NTC between December 17, 1999 and the present have been unlawfully subjected to a hostile work environment due to their race. This claim is premised on evidence that NTC routinely subjected its African-American employees to disparate treatment along with evidence that the workplace was permeated with racial slurs, unfounded accusations of theft and abuse of discount and commission policies, and unwarranted monitoring of African-American employees and customers.
Racial epithets, such as “nigger” “jigaboo” “uneducated project people” “reggin” (“nigger” backwards) “monkey” “nizza” “nig” and “suction lips” were repeatedly used to refer to African-American employees and customers at NTC by managers, including the Loss Prevention Manager, Dan Cruz, several stockroom managers, and other managers, as well as by non-African-American employees. See Steele Decl. at ¶ 3; Young Dep. at 119-124; Reed Decl. at ¶ 6; J. Brown Decl. at ¶ 10; Smith Dep. at 129-130.
Additional racial and offensive comments made by managers at NTC include: • “I heard a Black man can jump and run real fast, so hurry up and get them shoes.”
• “You’re lucky to be light-skinned.”
• “You have a big nose, I can tell you’re Black.”
• “Black people are so stupid.”
• “Mexicans will get the sales [positions] then Blacks.”
R. Jackson Dep. at 224-225; Young Dep. at 93-97; Rogers Dep. at 91.

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In the same vein, Lori Wigod (Caucasian), a high-ranking NTC manager repeatedly referred to African-Americans as “those people” when speaking to Caucasian employees, or “you people” when speaking directly to African-American employees. A. Brown Dep. at 275; Smith Dep. at 394-395; Lewis Dep. 213-214; Sanders Decl. at ¶ 5.
Significantly, Wigod first served as NTC’s Human Resources Manager from July 5, 2000 until October 25, 2001. See Ex. 3, DEF085151 through DEF085246 (spreadsheet of all employees of NTC between 12/1/1999 - 8/31/2004). She then became NTC’s Store Manager from October 26, 2001, until she was terminated by Defendant in 2005, well-after this suit was brought. Id. No Human Resources Manager was hired to replace Wigod once she became Store Manager and she essentially continued to serve as HR Manager, as well. Lewis Dep. at 325.
When African-American males entered the store, Wigod would state “here comes trouble.” Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 119; Posey Dep. at 312. On one occasion, while Wigod lectured a subordinate about cleanliness, she stated “this is how the master’s house is supposed to look.” Sanders Decl. at ¶ 6.
Not surprisingly, despite numerous complaints by various African-American employees to Wigod, when she was HR Manager and Store Manager, no action was taken to rectify the harassment. Young Dep. at 125-128; Lindberg Dep. at 263; Lewis Dep. at 224. For example, when John Lewis complained to Wigod that a Caucasian sales associate referred to an African-American cashier as a “nigger” no corrective action was taken by Wigod. Id. at 224.
Apart from being regularly subjected to racial epithets, African-American employees were routinely treated as thieves or potential thieves. They were regularly falsely accused of theft; subjected to excessive “pat downs” and searches by Nike employees; subjected to surveillance inside and outside of the store; and interrogated by Nike managers to coerce “confessions” of wrongdoing.
Virtually every African-American employee testified extensively about the offensive “check out” procedures that NTC employed with its African-American employees, but not with similarly-situated Caucasian employees. Unlike Caucasian employees, African-American employees were routinely subjected to thorough searches, frisks, and pat downs, every time they exited the store. They were regularly required to lift their shirts, shake their pants, show their shoes, empty their bags, and remove their jackets. See Smith Dep. at 254 ; McDougal Dep. at 226-229; Barbee Dep. at 68-72; A. Brown Dep. at 242, 263; B. Brown Dep. at 267, 271-274; D. Brown Dep. at 86, 94, 109- 113, 121-122; Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 109-115; Hudson Dep. at 115, 135-136; Jackson Dep. at 147-149; Lewis Dep. at 165-170; Lindberg Dep. at 209-214; Page Dep. VII. at 12-17; Posey Dep. at 307-308; Readus Dep. at 166-168; Rogers Dep. at 259, 268-269; Walker Dep. at 127-128; 141-145 ; Young Dep. at 478; Williams Decl. at ¶ 3; Walls Decl. at ¶ 9.
In fact, though African-American employees could not leave the store until they had undergone such check-out, by contrast, Caucasian employees could exit the store just by waving up at the security camera stationed at the door or at a manager looking down from the veranda. Lewis Dep. at 146-147; Bourn Decl. at ¶ 10; Lieteau Decl. at ¶ 12; Sanders Decl. at ¶ 10.
Nike’s Loss Prevention department also targeted African-American employees for theft both inside and outside of the store. Cruz, the Loss Prevention Manager who referred to African-Americans as “jigaboos,” specifically instructed his staff to scrutinize African-American employees more closely. See Steele Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 5; Crisp Decl. at ¶ 4. Numerous employees testified about being subjected to this heightened surveillance, as well as being followed inside and sometimes outside of the store by Loss Prevention. A. Brown Dep. at 134; B. Brown Dep. at 269-270, 275; D. Brown Dep. at 150-151; Hudson Dep. at 113; Lindberg Dep. at 247; Posey Dep. at 268-269; Young Dep. at 472- 473; Reed Decl. at ¶ 8.
NTC managers and Loss Prevention staff also manufactured accusations of theft against African-American employees and conducted “interrogations” intended to coerce confessions of some wrongdoing. Plaintiff Vernetta Duckworth testified that she was subjected to an interrogation by LP which resulted in her termination. Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 38-39. At first, the questions focused on whether other sales associates engaged in commission fraud. When Duckworth denied knowledge of commission fraud by others and denied engaging in fraud herself, the LP agent said “oh, so [you’re] just Miss Goody Two Shoes.” Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 32-33. As Duckworth testified, when she continued to deny engaging in any fraudulent behavior, LP tried to intimidate Duckworth, putting a folder on the table and stating “I have every purchase that you ever made.” Id. at 35. Duckworth explained: He kept getting up and leaving. He got on the phone, he got up and sat down, kept getting up and leaving. ... And then he started going into -- start asking me other different questions, calling me -- Basically, he was loud, screaming at me, hollering... I guess I wasn’t telling him what he wanted to hear, and he just started screaming, hitting stuff all on the table,

2005 WL 6077505
going back and forth, in and out .... I didn’t understand. I didn’t know what I had done, so I didn’t understand why he was treating me like that.
He told me I had to write out a statement, and during that statement what I was writing down wasn’t what he wanted to hear or wanted me to write down, so I had to scratch off and start all over again, scratch off, start over again. And every time I didn’t write down what he want[ed], he hit the table, bam, or he’ll leave out, get on his phone. I was up there two-and-a-half hours, so I was going through all this. Whenever I didn’t write down what he wanted, I say what he wanted in the words he wanted -- not say the words, but what he wanted to hear, he would get mad and frustrated and he’ll leave out and then he’ll come back. So he’ll repeat what I said -- “Now, you -- He’ll tell me this and tell me that, and -- tell him, no, that’s not what happened. “Well, that’s what -- and he’ll hit the table with something and he’ll go back out. This was going on for almost two-and-a-half hours. So at that particular time I’m tired, exhausted. I’m like, okay, whatever I have to do to save my job, that’s what I will do.”
Duckworth Dep. at 38, 47-48.
Eventually, after several hours of these abusive tactics, Duckworth wrote out a statement falsely confessing to abusing her employee discount. Id. at 49-50. Others experienced similar harassment and coercion. See Readus Dep. at 114-120, 125; B. Brown Dep. at 228-229, 173-174; D. Brown Dep. at 140-142; Posey Dep. at 132-133.
Finally, NTC created a hostile environment for its African-American employees through its demeaning and offensive treatment of African-American customers.4 As testified to by numerous individuals, NTC would routinely ask African-American employees to “keep an eye” on African-American customers, but never asked them to do this with Caucasian customers. See Chapple Decl. at ¶ 3; McCullough Decl. at ¶ 11; Johnson- Wakama Decl. at ¶ 6; Lindberg Dep. at 250.
Plaintiffs also observed that NTC’s Loss Prevention team closely monitored African-American customers, but not Caucasian customers. One manager testified that whenever an African-American male customer entered the store, Loss Prevention alerted LP employees, store managers and other employees with radios, by referring to these customers as “98’s.” Barlow Dep. at 325, 331, 333. They would then communicate the location of the “98” so that the individual could be monitored. Id. at 336, 342. Loss Prevention did not have any code or other signal to alert others when any Caucasian customers entered the store. Id. at 325-328.
A cashier on the first floor, who has worked for NTC since its opening to the present date, testified that every time an African-American male entered the store, the Loss Prevention employee stationed at the door would announce the arrival with instructions to monitor the customer. This cashier repeatedly confronted the Loss Prevention associate about the impropriety of his conduct, but he responded that he was simply “doing what he was told.” Page Dep. Vol. II at 109-110.
Essentially every employee who worked outside of the stockrooms testified to observing the monitoring of African-American customers for suspicion of theft. See B. Brown Dep. at 189, 193-195; Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 105-106; Lindberg Dep. at 240- 242, 251, 254; Readus Dep. at 177-180; Young Dep. at 385-387; Posey Dep. at 295, 310- 311; Parte Decl. at ¶ 3; Chapple Decl. at ¶ 3. Indeed, African-American NTC employees were themselves followed when shopping with their family members or friends. See Hudson Dep. at 99-100; Barlow Dep. 179; Reed. Decl at ¶ 8.
After receiving repeated complaints from African-American employees about Nike’s offensive profiling of African-American customers, an African-American manager showed a documentary to staff employees that addressed racial profiling for theft and the faulty premise behind such profiling in an effort to discourage such profiling by NTC. Barlow Dep. at 176-180, 387-393. That manager was subsequently reprimanded by a senior manager. Id. at 180.
By contrast, Caucasian customers were hardly monitored at all. Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 164-165. Indeed, Loss Prevention was so intent on watching the African-American customers that Caucasian shoplifters were observed simply walking out of NTC without paying for merchandise. Barbee Dep. at 216-218; Page Dep. Vol. II at 113; Posey Dep. at 298-299.
African-American customers were also held to stricter standards when making returns or exchanges as compared to Caucasian customers who returned or exchanged merchandise. Barbee Dep. at 129-130, 136. In addition, NTC would give cash back to white customers making returns while denying cash to similarly situated African-American customers. Barbee

2005 WL 6077505
Dep. at 182. NTC also gave discounts to Caucasian customers that it refused to give to African-American customers. Barbee Dep. at 164- 165.
On one occasion in 2002, Wigod allowed a Caucasian customer to return a three year-old pair of shoes, while refusing to permit an African-American customer to return shoes purchased two weeks earlier. A. Brown Dep. at 149-153. “It didn’t matter to [Wigod] because he was black. He could not return that shoe.” Id. at 152. One class member summarized NTC’s policy as follows:
the majority of the white customers were able to return just about any and everything with or without a receipt. The black customers, you know, they would come in sometimes with a receipt and still [only] get a store credit.
A. Brown Dep. at 156. See also, Lindberg Dep. at 254-255; Page at 34, 36-38, 40-41; Posey Dep. at 301; Barbee Dep. at 182; Young Dep. at 388-394; Bourn Decl. at ¶ 9; Hayes Decl. at ¶ 9; Pinkston Decl. at ¶ 4.
NTC cashiers also testified to being phoned by Loss Prevention as an African-American customer approached the cash register and were instructed to ask for identification to ensure the names and signatures matched. Barbee Dep. at 375-378; Page Dep. Vol. II at 144-146; Hudson Dep. at 132-133. One cashier testified that when African-American customers attempted to make large purchases on credit cards, Cruz would instruct her to “fake swipe” the credit card (prompting a decline) and call the bank issuing the card to ask for a “physical description.” Young Dep. at 371-377. See also, Barbee Dep. at 191-192; B. Brown Dep. at 277-280; Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 163-164.
Even African-American professional athletes were subjected to NTC’s racially motivated scrutiny. In 2002, Wigod permitted Kansas City Royal player Mike Sweeny (Caucasian) to “comp” Michael Jordan “Limited Edition” shoes within days of her decision refusing to allow White Sox player Willie Harris (African-American) to do the same. A. Brown, Dep. at 142-145. Similarly, in 2002 several Green Bay Packers players, including Aman Green, Gilbert Brown and Antonio Freeman (all of whom receive merchandise from NTC in the form of “comps”) were followed by Loss Prevention because they allegedly looked “suspicious.” A. Brown Dep. at 154-155. On another occasion in 2002, Cleveland Cavaliers coach John Lucas was shopping at Nike with his son and an African-American Cleveland player. A. Brown Dep. at 157-158. Despite the fact that Lucas was a well known coach and a regular customer at NTC, Wigod refused to allow him to return some t-shirts and a shirt he purchased for his wife. A. Brown Dep. at 158-161. One witness to this incident described it as follows:
Lori just talked to him as if he was nobody. I mean, she just totally told him, you know, I don’t believe that you bought that with your own money. I believe you got it with the comp, so therefore, you can’t return it, bottom line.
A. Brown Dep. at 158. Similarly, when Chicago Bulls player Tyson Chandler came into NTC to buy some shoes, Loss Prevention Manager Daniel Cruz followed him around to ensure he was not trying to steal from NTC. Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 99-105. See also, Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 98-99 (LP following African-American baseball player); Barbee Dep. at 251-252 (two African-American athletes denied “comp” benefits by Lori Wigod)
C. Disparate Treatment of African-American Employees
1. Segregation Into Lower-Paying Jobs
Documents produced by Defendant show the undeniable racial segregation in NTC’s workforce, particularly for positions in the stockrooms and as cashier. See Ex. 4, Table of African-American and Caucasian Employees in Stockroom Positions, and Ex. 5, Table of African-American and Caucasian Employees in Cashier Positions, as excerpted from Ex. 3. Several named Plaintiffs and other African-American employees testified that they were segregated into the lowest paying jobs at Niketown, though better paying positions they were qualified to perform were available. See Young Dep. at 20-23, 29-38; R. Jackson Dep. at 48; Lieteau Decl. at ¶ 3.
A direct assistant to a General Manager at Niketown Chicago testified that it was Niketown Chicago’s regular practice to tell

2005 WL 6077505
African-American candidates for employment that they had to start in the stockroom to get their “foot in the door” and “work their way up.” Pinkston Decl. at ¶ 8. Oftentimes these African-Americans were better qualified than the non-African-Americans who were assigned the more desirable, better-paying positions outside of the stockroom. Id.
Between December of 1999 and August of 2004, NTC employed a total of 129 employees in its stockrooms. See Ex. 3. Of those, only 10 were Caucasian. See Ex. 4, Table of African-American and Caucasian Employees in Stockroom Positions as excerpted from Ex. 3, DEF085151 through DEF085246 (spreadsheet of all employees of NTC between 12/1/1999 8/31/2004). However, seventy-nine were African-American. Id. A closer look at the Caucasian employees shows that 6 of the 10 worked in the stockroom for less than 3 months. Id. Moreover, only 3 of the Caucasian employees hired were hired as “regular” employees. Id.
The working conditions in the stockroom were undeniably poor. These positions were universally referred to as “back of the house” positions, including by Defendant’s corporate representatives. Alphonse Dep. at 124, 126, 127-128. Employees were confined in windowless work areas. Plaintiffs complained that the stockrooms were dark, dirty and had poor ventilation. Plaintiff Ria McDougal described it this way:
[We] had to stay in the stockroom all day, no air, no windows to see outside, no general public. It was like being incarcerated, in jail, prison. It was just a different environment compared to what the salespeople were experiencing. We were literally locked in a box. ... Because that’s what it felt like, I was in jail. I’ve never been locked up before outside of working in the Nike stockroom, but I can imagine what it feels like to be incarcerated.
McDougal Dep. at 186-87. See also, Sanders Decl. at ¶ 3.
Additionally, the stockroom, maintenance and cashier positions were among the lowest paid at NTC. In general, these positions paid $8.00 per hour. PSAC at ¶ 32. In comparison, sales positions were commission jobs that usually paid substantially more. PSAC at ¶ 32.5
There is overwhelming anecdotal evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ contention that NTC managers intentionally engaged in racial discrimination with respect to job assignments during the relevant time period. For example, a number of named Plaintiffs who applied to work at NTC were automatically assigned to work in the stockroom. These Plaintiffs include D. Brown (PSAC at ¶ 68), Jackson (Id. at ¶ 92), McDougal (Id. at ¶ 52), Smith (Id. at ¶ 48), Walker (Id. at ¶ 68), and Young (Id. at ¶ 108 ). Several employees testified to the fact that though they were not specifically applying for a stockroom position, NTC hired and assigned them to the stockroom. D. Brown Dep. at 40; Jackson Dep. at 47-48; McDougal Dep. at 37-38, 41; Smith Dep. at 83, 96-97; Walker Dep. at 31, 40-41; and Young Dep. at 20-23, 31-33.
NTC’ s treatment of Plaintiff DaJauna Young is typical of its treatment of this group of Plaintiffs. In March 2002, Young filled out an employment application and indicated that she was interested in a cashier position. Young. Dep. at 20-23. Young then met with a manager, and, at his suggestion, filled out a second application indicating that she was interested in either a cashier or sales position. Id. at 22-24. When Young called Jenkins to find out about the status of her application, Jenkins told Young that there were no open positions in either sales or cashier but that there were positions available in the stockroom. Young was then interviewed and offered a position in the stockroom. Id. at 31-33.
Young accepted the position in the stockroom. When Young attended her training class, she learned that four of the ten individuals in her training class had been hired as sales associates. Id. at 33. At least two new Caucasian sales associates had been interviewed after Young. Id. at 33.
Even when African-American employees were actually hired into sales positions, they were discriminated against in job assignments and often relegated to the lower- paying, part-time, non-specialist sales positions, that were not located on the first floor, where the majority of business occurred. McCullough Decl. at ¶ 9; Berry Decl. at ¶ 7.
Until recently NTC’s “Sales Associates” worked as commissioned sales people, earning up to 8 percent commission on all sales they made. Berry Decl. at ¶ 7.6 The earning potential for Sales Associates was significantly higher in certain departments such as Men’s Running, and significantly lower in others, such as Girls Clothing. Id. A select group of Sales Associates were designated by NTC as “Sports Specialists.” Id. These sales people were trained in and assigned by NTC

2005 WL 6077505
management to work exclusively in certain sport departments of the store where sales figures were high. Id. By contrast, regular Sales Associates were rotated by their managers in and out of various departments on their assigned floor. Id. These “Sports Specialists” positions were highly coveted. During the period between January of 2001 and May of 2003, less than twenty-five percent of employees holding the Sports Specialist position were African-American. Of those African-Americans that were awarded Specialist status, most of them were placed in the Basketball room. PSAC at ¶ 33; Berry Decl. at ¶ 7.
2. Discrimination in Promotion Opportunities
NTC systematically and routinely failed to provide African-American employees equal promotional opportunities. Plaintiffs Barlow, A. Brown, B. Brown, D. Brown, Duckworth, Hudson, Jackson, Lewis, McDougal, Posey, Readus Smith, Walker, and Young each sought promotions to better positions. They were all either discouraged from applying for the position or were rejected after they applied for position. See Barlow Dep. at 150, 185, 112-115; A. Brown Dep. at 116-19; B. Brown Dep. at 24-26, 125-133; D. Brown Dep. at 57-64; Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 8-10, 84-85; Hudson Dep. at 70-78, 108-11; Jackson Dep. at 66-67; Lewis Dep. at 267-268, McDougal Dep. at 48- 58; Posey Dep. at 67-69, 221-23; Readus Dep. at 54-59; Smith Dep. at 285-87, 299-303; Walker Dep. at 66-74; and Young Dep. at 205, 207, 210-211, 221-224, 238, 246-49.
Many Plaintiffs testified that some open positions were not posted within NTC. See, e.g., A. Brown Dep. at 118; Hudson Dep. at 110-11; Jackson Dep. at 133; McDougal Dep. at 50-51, 53; Smith Dep. at 263, 285-86, 432; and Young Dep. at 455. Instead, NTC recruited applicants for these positions at predominately Caucasian suburban high schools. See A. Brown Dep. at 118, 120-23; Walker Dep. at 67; Lewis Dep. at 93-94, 33.
NTC delegated promotion and transfer decisions to the managers at NTC. According to Jovita Alphonse, a Senior Human Resources official at Defendant’s corporate headquarters, it was in the discretion of the managers at the store level to decide how to communicate job openings and whether to even consider internal applicants. Alphonse Dep. at 134-137. In fact, there was no requirement that existing employees be advised of new openings or promotional opportunities at all. Id.
There is ample additional evidence of NTC’ s systematic failure to provide African-American employees equal opportunities to obtain better positions. Reginald Reed began his employment at NTC in the stockroom, like so many other African-American employees. Reed Decl. at ¶ 2. He soon sought a promotion to sales. Every time he expressed his desire for such a position to various managers, “they gave some excuse, like I was not familiar with the product or they would say that no positions were available. Instead of considering me for the position, Niketown hired outside people who were not Black and who did not have knowledge of the product for sales positions during this time.” Reed Decl. at ¶ 5. Another employee who sought a position in payroll was rejected in favor of a less qualified Caucasian external applicant. McCullough Decl. at 5.
3. Discrimination in Discipline and Terminations
Every one of the named Plaintiffs in this case testified to incidents showing that Defendant routinely applied its workplace rules and practices in a racially-biased manner. For example, the employee discount policies at NTC have been routinely differentially enforced based on race. Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 180, 188, 213, 190. NTC managers would regularly let non-African-Americans go over their pre-set employee discount limit, while adhering to the discount limit when ringing up African-American employees. Johnson-Wakama Decl. at ¶ 7; Newsome Decl. at ¶ 7; Posey Dep. at 276, 279; Reed Decl. at ¶ 9; Lieteau Decl. at ¶ 11; Granger Decl. at ¶ 5. Non-African-American employees at NTC, including a current Caucasian sales associate, used their employee discounts for individuals who were not on their approved discount list without repercussion, while many African-American employees have been terminated for this same behavior. Chapple Decl. at ¶ 5. A Loss Prevention employee testified that Caucasian managers even allowed Chicago Police officers to use their employee discount in violation of the policy. One of these managers was Dan Cruz, the Loss Prevention manager at NTC. Crisp Decl. at ¶ 5.
Plaintiff John Lewis discovered he had his employee discount shopping privileges suspended in the summer of 2002, when he came to make a purchase and was refused by Wigod. Lewis Dep. at 456-457. Wigod had Lewis’ discount privileges suspended because a Caucasian employee had offered to use her discount on his behalf when Lewis had reached the allotted limit on his own discount privileges.7 As Lewis testified, “throughout the time I worked at Nike we were given a limit to how much we could purchase on our discounts. When that limit was done ... then ... other people ... .would use their limit to help

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you out. And that was a regular thing at Niketown ... [T]here were several times when a Caucasian manager ... actually made purchases for [him]” with her discount without any negative repercussions. Id. at 452. Others were subjected to the same discriminatory enforcement of the employee discount policy and employee return policy. A. Brown Dep. at 105; Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 62-70.
Even when Caucasian employees, including managers, openly used their employee discounts on behalf of wholly unauthorized individuals, they would suffer no consequences. Lewis Dep. at 441-442. This was the case for several management and non-management individuals who exchanged the use of their employee discount with individuals who worked as valets at parking garages near NTC’s Michigan Avenue location. Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 179-180. These valets would regularly come in to the store and offer $5 parking in exchange for the use of an individual’s employee discount. Lewis Dep. at 441. Numerous Caucasian employees and managers accepted their offer, though it was strictly against NTC policy, without any repercussions. Id. As one Plaintiff testified, NTC selected not to enforce its employee discount in these cases, as the Caucasian managers themselves would ring up these sales for Caucasian employees. Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 179-181. Similarly, the Caucasian NTC employees would “trade” the use of their employee discounts with Caucasian retail employees of other retailers, like Gap, Burberry and others. Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 181-183. Managers overlooked these violations. Id. at 182.
On one occasion, Lori Wigod placed limits on African-American employees’ purchase of “Air Force Ones,” a popular gym shoe, stating “all you people are going to do is just extend it your friends.” Young Dep. at 484-485. Notably, Lori Wigod openly violated company policy by returning a jacket for full value at NTC, though the item had been purchased for less than half its price at Nike’s Outlet store. Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 178. Rules regarding “commission violations” and making “bulk sales” by sales associates have similarly been regularly used to discipline African-American employees, but not similarly-situated Caucasian employees. See Posey Dep. at 81-82, 89-92; 106, 118, 121-123; A. Brown Dep. at 128.
When Plaintiff John Lewis complained to an African-American manager about NTC’s selective discipline regarding employee discounts, she responded by saying, “John, you know you can’t do anything outside of the box.” Lewis Dep. at 452.
Additionally, NTC managers selectively enforced time and attendance rules to the detriment of African-American employees. Several Plaintiffs testified that African- American employees were regularly disciplined for calling in sick, or other attendance and tardiness infractions, while Caucasian employees who engaged in the same conduct were not. See Lindberg Dep. at 44, 47, 63, 108-109, 118, 123, 188; Posey Dep. at 260- 261, 273-275, 292; Hudson Dep. at 63-69; Duckworth Dep. Vol. I at 185-186; Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 78-82; D. Brown Dep. at 77-79; Barbee Dep. at 75-76; Young Dep. at 70-84, 101-106; McDougal Dep. at 74-76, 159; A. Brown Dep. at 100-101; Reed Decl. at ¶ 11; Williams Decl. at ¶ 7; Lewis Dep. at 310-315.
As Plaintiff John Lewis testified, NTC’s unequal application of the attendance rules on the basis of race was on-going throughout his entire employment with NTC. Lewis Dep. at 378. Lewis complained to several managers about this harassment. Id. at 325, 327-328, 378-385. Notably, numerous written reprimands Lewis received lacked validity, since, often times, all the employees on the opening shift would punch in late because management’s “morning huddle” or “morning announcements” with the employees went over in length. Id at 305-306. Lewis noticed that he was being called into the office for these alleged “tardiness” issues on a regular basis, while Caucasian employees who had punched in late alongside him were not. Id. Though several Caucasian employees had similar patterns of late punches as Lewis did, they were not similarly disciplined. Id. at 314-315, 318-319.
In March of 2002, Lewis received another written reprimand for time and attendance issues. As Lewis testified, he spoke to his manager Loya’l Lowe, who is African-American, about this particular write-up. Lewis Dep. at 324. During this discussion, Lowe, told him “he [wa]s sorry ... but he was told by Lori [Wigod] to check all of my punches and to make sure that ... [Lewis] was documented for it properly. And that’s why he had to do it.” Id. at 325. Lewis then told Lowe:
this is ridiculous. ... I feel that Lori ... is prejudiced against me because of my color ... And I told him that I need someone who I can talk to, you know, who can actually do something about the problem, you know. I mean, because we didn’t have anyone in human relations. We didn’t have an HR manager there, because the HR manager was Lori. And the store manager was Lori. And Lori was the individual who was, you know, prejudiced. Therefore, I mean, I had no one to talk to. ... If Lori tells him to document the punches to say I’m late, you know, regardless of whether they are valid or not, and regardless of whether the Caucasians in the store were doing them or not, then he had to do that and he had to confront me with

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it. ... [I]t just wasn’t fair what was going on ... I just felt, you know, discriminated against. And I tell you, it was a horrible feeling.” Lewis Dep. at 325, 327-328.
Though Lewis complained to Defendant’s corporate office about the racial discrimination, nothing was done to remedy the problem. Id. at 329.
The statistical evidence in this case also demonstrates that African-American employees have also been terminated at a significantly higher rate than Caucasian employees at NTC. Based on personnel information provided by Defendant, NTC employed approximately 234 African-American employees between December of 1999 and August of 2004. See Ex. 3. NTC terminated at least 72 of these African-American employees for violation of company rules, including attendance rules and employee discount rules. See Ex. 6, Termination Table as excerpted from Ex. 3. During the same time frame, Defendant employed approximately 117 Caucasian employees. See Ex. 3. However, Defendant only terminated 9 of these employees for violation of company rules. See Ex. 6. Less than 8% of the Caucasian employees working at NTC between December 1999 and August 2004 were terminated for attendance or violation of company rules. But more than 33% of all African-American employees working during this time period were terminated for attendance or violation of rules. See Exs. 3, 6.8
Several former NTC African-American employees testified about their pretextual terminations for violations of policies that were not enforced against Caucasian employees. See PSAC at ¶¶ 48, 49(c), ¶ 69(c), ¶ 85(d); McDougal Dep. at 126-130, 163; Lindberg Dep. at 146, 152; Duckworth Dep. Vol. II at 32-38, 47-54; B. Brown Dep. at 148-149, 158; Reed Decl. at ¶ 8; Lieteau Decl. at ¶ 14; McCullough Decl. at ¶ 12; Granger Decl. at ¶ 6.
4. Discrimination in Benefits
NTC also discriminated against its African-American employees through its practice of hiring African-American employees as part-time employees and denying them benefits, though they worked hours that should have entitled them to these benefits. Between December of 1999 and August of 2004, NTC hired 138 African-Americans into “part-time” slots, while only 40 Caucasians were hired as “part-time.” See Ex. 7, Part- Time Status Employees as excerpted from Ex. 3. Plaintiffs Barbee, A. Brown, B. Brown, Duckworth, Hudson, Jackson, Readus, Smith, and Young all testified in their depositions that they were hired as part-time employees without benefits. These Plaintiffs stated that they requested benefits but NTC denied those requests. A. Brown Dep. at 60-61; D. Brown Dep. at 52-55; Hudson Dep. at 106-107; Jackson Dep. at 64, 119; Lewis Dep. at 446-448, Readus Dep. at 32-34; Smith Dep. at 286-287; Young Dep. at 259. See also, Newsome Decl. at ¶¶ 3-5; Johnson-Wakama Decl. at ¶ 3; Lieteau Decl. at ¶ 3; Reed Decl. at¶ 3-4.
According to Defendant’s corporate benefits policy, retail employees are categorized four ways: Full-time regular working 30-40 hours per week; Part-time regular working 20-29 hours per week; Part-time regular working under 20 hours per week; and Seasonal. See Ex. 2, DEF 098968-098669. This employment status determines the benefits to which the employee is entitled. Full-time employees are eligible to receive a full array of benefits including paid time off, health benefits, dental benefits, vision benefits, access to healthcare reimbursement accounts, life insurance, and short and long term disability. See Ex. 8, DEF 097643. Part-time employees working 20-29 hours per week are also entitled to some of these benefits during the first open enrollment period after the employee has worked for NTC for 12 months. Id. While medical, dental and vision benefits are offered to these part-time employees, Defendant does not pay any portion of the cost of the benefit. Id.
Defendant’s policy also provides that an employee’s status should change if his or her normal hours of work change for an indefinite period of time. As a rule of thumb, Nike’s policy indicates that if an employees hours change for 90 consecutive days, so should that employee’s status. Notwithstanding this policy, several Plaintiffs worked more than 29 or 30 hours a week, yet were denied full-time status and benefits. See A. Brown Dep. at 78-79, D. Brown Dep. at 55; Duckworth Dep., Vol. I at 141-47, Vol. II at 73; Jackson Dep. at 53, 119; Readus Dep. at 31-32; Smith Dep. at 61. Other Plaintiffs worked between 20 and 30 hours but did not receive benefits. D. Brown Dep. at 55. For example, Jason Readus worked in the stockroom an average of over 25 hours per week. However, during his entire tenure at NTC, he was classified as a part-time employee. Readus repeatedly asked managers why he was not receiving benefits. Though he was told by managers that they “would look into it,” nothing was ever done. Readus Dep. at 45-47.

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Enforcement of Nike’s full-time/part-time policy is left to the discretion of the local store. Thus, the local store is allowed to decide whether to classify an employee as full-time or part-time. Alphonse Dep. at 103-105. The managers in the local stores are also allowed to decide whether to change the status of an employee based on the number of hours that employee works. As a consequence, African-American employees were regularly excluded from “full-time” status on the basis of their race.
III. PROPOSED CLASSES
As detailed above, there is ample evidence that NTC subjected its African-American employees to a hostile work environment in violation of § 1981. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to have the Court certify one general class of all African-American employees who were employed at Niketown Chicago anytime between December 17, 1999 and the present date as a “Hostile Work Environment Class”.9 All eighteen named Plaintiffs in this action represent the proposed Hostile Work Environment Class.
Further, based on the claims in this action, Plaintiffs propose that the Court also certify the following four subclasses under Title VII and § 1981:10
(1) A “Job Segregation/Wage Disparity Subclass” consisting of all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who were assigned to lower paid positions in the stockroom or as cashiers because of their race. This Subclass is represented by Plaintiffs Smith, McDougal, Walker, D. Brown, Hudson, Young and Jackson; (2) A “Promotion Subclass” consisting of all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who were denied promotions or deprived of the ability to pursue promotions because of their race. Plaintiffs Smith, McDougal, Lewis, Duckworth, Walker, Readus, A. Brown, D. Brown, B. Brown, Jackson, Hudson, Young, Barlow, and Posey are the proposed representatives for this Subclass;
(3) A “Discipline Subclass” consisting of all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 to the present who suffered from racially-biased application of workplace rules and regulations, including but not limited to, time and attendance, employee discount, employee checkouts, suspensions, and terminations. All eighteen named Plaintiffs represent the Discipline Subclass.
(4) A “Benefits Subclass” consisting of all current and former African-American part-time employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who applied for, requested, and/or were entitled to benefits but were denied those benefits because of their race. The proposed representatives of this Subclass are Plaintiffs Smith, Duckworth, A. Brown, Readus, Jackson, B. Brown, Barbee, Hudson, and Young.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Appropriate for Class Treatment
As recognized by the Supreme Court, “suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving class wrongs” where “common questions of law or fact are typically present.” East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). The Seventh Circuit has recently reaffirmed that allegations of a hostile environment, which collectively “constitute[] one unlawful employment practice,” are appropriate for class treatment. Allen v. International Truck and Engine Corp., 358 F.2d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002)) (directing district court to certify race hostile work environment/harassment class). See also, Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged harassment and hostile work environment); Warnell v. Ford Motor Company, 189 F.R.D. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged harassment and hostile work environment).
Similarly, courts routinely certify class actions alleging wide-spread discrimination in promotions. Palmer v. Combined Insurance Company of America, 217 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged pattern of

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discrimination in promotions); Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2001) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged pattern of discrimination in promotions); Meiresonne v. Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same).
The same is true for denial of benefits and segregation/wage claims. Valdez v. Local 25, SEIU, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7660 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1990) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged discriminatory distribution of benefits); Helms v. Local 705 International Brotherhood of Teamster, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5382 (N.D. Ill. April 15, 1998) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged improper denial of benefits); Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged discrimination in wages); Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 170 F.R.D. 448 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged discrimination in wages); Bennett v. Central Tel. Co., 97 F.R.D. 518 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged exclusion and segregation based on gender).
Finally, courts have properly granted class certification in cases where the plaintiffs have alleged discriminatory treatment in discipline and terminations. Toney. v. Rosewood Care Center of Joliet, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4744 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1999) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged pattern of discriminatory discipline and termination); Battle v. White Cap, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4658 (N.D.Ill. March 30,1999) (class action certified where plaintiffs alleged pattern of discrimination in application of disciplinary rules); Binion v. Metropolital Pier & Exposition Auth., 163 F.R.D. 517 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
Recently a federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted class certification in litigation almost identical to the instant case. Toney, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4744. In Toney, the plaintiffs alleged that they and other African-American employees were subjected to systematic discrimination, including the maintenance of a hostile work environment, the disparate enforcement of work rules, the disparate treatment of African-American employees regarding vacation time and job duties, and the pretextual termination of African-American employees on account of race. The putative class members worked in different positions, on different shifts, and under different managers. Id. at * 28-29. The Toney plaintiffs provided anecdotal evidence of the disparities in treatment, along with statistical evidence of disparate rates of termination between African-American and other employees. Id. at * 21. As in the present case, the plaintiffs in Toney alleged that the defendant’s actions intentionally discriminated against African-Americans. Id. at 17.
The Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding it was appropriate to certify: (1) a general class of all African-American employees; (2) a subclass of all African-American employees who were terminated for pretextual reasons or who were constructively discharged; (3) a subclass of all African-American employees who were subjected to adverse employment decisions, including disparate discipline, due to race; and (4) a subclass of all current and former African-American employees who were subjected to a hostile work environment. Toney, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4744 at 3132. In accordance with this and other cases cited above, Plaintiffs’ proposed classes should be certified.
B. Legal Standard Applicable Under Rule 23
Plaintiffs have the burden to demonstrate to the Court that they have satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) for each class they seek to have certified. This requires showing: (1) that the class is too numerous to make joinder practicable; (2) that there are common questions of fact and law; (3) that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, (1982). In addition, Plaintiffs must also meet one of the requirements listed under Rule 23(b).
Although it is Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that the case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, they need not demonstrate that they will prevail on the merits in order to satisfy Rule 23. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). In this regard, the Court should not resolve any factual disputes and should not conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the suit. Id.; Orlowski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 370, 373-74 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Rather the Court should accept as true all of Plaintiffs’ allegations and supporting evidence. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177; Owner- Operator Independent Drivers Assoc. v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 04 C 3207, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23350, *3, n.4, *23, Appendix (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2005); Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480, 482. (N.D. Ill. 1992), Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D.60, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The Court’s role is to determine whether the Plaintiffs are asserting a claim which, assuming its merits, would satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. See H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 24.13 at 60 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter

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“Newberg”); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
Plaintiffs’ claims in this action are precisely the type of “class wide wrongs” the Supreme Court has suggested are appropriate for class action treatment. As detailed below, Plaintiffs meet all the requirements for class certification for each of the proposed classes. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification should be granted.
C. Plaintiffs Satisfy Requirements Under Rule 23(a)
1. Numerosity Requirement Met
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1). To determine whether joinder is impracticable courts must consider the circumstances unique to each case. Swanson v. Am. Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969). These circumstances include whether class members are able to bring individual suits and whether it is judicially efficient for the court to try such individual suits. Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 56 (N.D. Ill. 1996). As noted by the Seventh Circuit, “to require a multiplicity of suits by similarly situated small claimants would run counter to one of the prime purposes of a class action.” Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969).
Additionally, the plaintiffs must provide some evidence or reasonable estimate of the number of class members, however, if the plaintiffs are unable to provide exact numbers, a good faith effort is sufficient to establish the number of class members. Long v. Thornton Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 82 F.R.D. 186, 189 (N.D. Ill. 1979). “[W]hile there is no threshold number requiring or barring a finding of numerosity, a class of more than 40 members is generally believed to be sufficiently numerous for Rule 23 purposes.” Toney, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4744 at * 6. See also Chandler v. Southwest Jeep-Eagle Inc., 162 F.R.D. 302, 307 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (permissive joinder deemed inappropriate when class members number 40 or more); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 164 F.R.D. 667, 671 (C.D. 111.1996) (joinder considered impracticable where class consists of 38 members). Here, common sense dictates that the numerosity requirement is met for each class.
The Hostile Work Environment Class, defined as “all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present who were subjected to a hostile environment,” meets Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement. Based on personnel information provided by the Defendant, this class would include at least 234 individuals. See Ex. 3, DEF085151 through DEF085246 (spreadsheet of all employees of NTC between 12/1/1999 8/31/2004).
Plaintiffs’ proposed Segregation/Wage Subclass is defined as “all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present that applied for jobs at Niketown and were segregated into the stockroom and cashier positions on the basis of their race.” This class would include more than 100 members. See Exs. 3, 4, 5. Accordingly, this class meets the numerosity requirement.
The Promotion Subclass also meets the numerosity requirement. This subclass is defined as “all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present that were denied promotions or deprived of the ability to pursue promotions because of their race.” It is conceivable that this subclass has 234 members based on the extensive testimony cited above reflecting NTC’s failure to post positions, discouragement of African-Americans from submitting applications, and managers’ failure to forward applications to the appropriate parties. Additionally, numerous individuals testified that they were rejected for promotions due to their race.
The Discipline Subclass also meets the numerosity requirement. This subclass is defined as “all current and former African-American employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 to the present who were subjected to discriminatory discipline and/or termination because of their race.” First, at least 72 African-American employees were terminated during this period for alleged attendance violations or violations of company policy. See Ex. 6. As described above, these rules were enforced against African-Americans but not against other employees. Moreover, Plaintiffs estimate that the subclass of individuals subjected to some level of discipline short of termination will consist of all 234 African-American employees employed during the identified timeframe. Id.
Finally, the Benefits Subclass also meets the numerosity requirement. This subclass is defined as “all current and former

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African-American part-time employees of Niketown Chicago during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present that applied for, requested, and/or were entitled to benefits but were denied those benefits because of their race.” The Benefits Subclass has approximately 138 members. See Ex. 8, (Table of African-American Part-Time Employees).
2. Commonality Requirement Met
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the class. Commonality is satisfied where the named plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination are based on policies, patterns or practices of defendant that affect not only them, but also which similarly victimize the putative class members. “[T] he cases have not been overly restrictive in setting out the requirements for commonality, with the existence of a common nucleus of operative fact usually being enough to qualify .... Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assoc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23350 at *3, citing Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). In order to satisfy this requirement, there needs to be just one common question of law or fact. Arenson v. Whitehall Convalescent and Nursing Home, 164 F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Moreover, factual variations among the experiences of class members do not preclude meeting the commonality requirement for class certification. Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1017-18.
In this case, the common nucleus of operative fact center on NTC’s pattern of discrimination against its African-American employees. NTC’s discrimination against African-Americans occurred in the following ways: the segregation of the workforce, the denial of promotions, the use of disparate discipline and terminations, and the denial of benefits. The fact that the defendant engaged in standardized conduct by subjecting its African-American employees to disparate treatment in discipline, benefits, and promotions supports a finding of a common nucleus of operative fact. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir, 1998). See also, National Organization of Women v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351, 357 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Alliance to End Repression, 565 F.2d at 978.
NTC’s pattern of discrimination, along with the repeated use and tolerance of racial slurs and epithets in the workplace and the demeaning treatment of African- American employees and customers as thieves, also serves as the common nucleus of operative fact related to Plaintiffs’ claim that NTC created a hostile work environment for all of NTC’s African-American employees. Class treatment in this case is wholly appropriate. Edmonson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 380 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“Where an across-the-board or permeating policy of discrimination is alleged in a class action, the requirement of [commonality] is satisfied.”)
Even though individuals may have experienced the hostile environment differently, that will not defeat commonality. Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding that sexual harassment claims could be addressed on a class-wide basis and that the common question of law in such cases is whether a reasonable woman would find the work environment hostile); Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“inquiry into each class member’s subjective perception and response will of course be relevant to damages. But individual differences in that respect do not detract from the satisfaction of the commonality standard.”)
Moreover, in the present case, Defendant’s corporate headquarters delegated authority for the implementation and enforcement of its corporate practices and policies regarding harassment, job assignments, promotions, discipline/termination, and benefits to NTC’s local management team. This unchecked delegation of authority was used in a racially biased manner against African-American employees, as demonstrated by the statistical and anecdotal evidence detailed above, and is sufficient to establish Rule 23(a)’s requirement of commonality. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999) (delegation to supervisors of discretionary authority to make employment decisions without sufficient oversight gave rise to common questions sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598 (2d Cir. 1986) (system in which promotion decisions are made by one central group satisfies Rule 23(a)); Binion v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Auth., 163 F.R.D. 517, 523-26 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (commonality existed when plaintiff provided testimony and evidence showing the operation and effect of an identifiable discriminatory discipline policy); Orlowski, 172 F.R.D. at 373-74.
A finding of commonality is further supported because two key individuals were directly and consistently implicated in the claims of discrimination reflected in each of the proposed class and subclasses, Store Manager Lori Wigod and Loss Prevention Manager Dan Cruz. These two managers were directly involved in the subjective decision-making process for employment issues at NTC. Wigod was the Human Resources Manager for NTC beginning in July of 2000. She was

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subsequently promoted to Store Manager in October of 2001. See Ex. 2. In her role as both Human Resources and Store Manager, she was intimately involved in implementing and enforcing work place policies regarding the hiring, promotion, discipline, termination, benefits, and harassment of NTC employees.
Similarly, Cruz was hired as a member of Loss Prevention in November of 1999. He was promoted to Loss Prevention Manager in June of 2001. Id. Cruz was responsible for implementing the Loss Prevention policies and practices that are at issue in this case, including directing the surveillance of NTC’s African-American employees and African-American customers, implementing investigation and interrogation practices, and applying employee check-out procedures, among others. Thus, the Court should find that the Hostile Environment Class and the four Subclasses meet the commonality requirement under Rule 23.
3. Typicality Requirement Met
The issue of typicality is closely related to that of commonality. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). To satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23 (a)(3), the named Plaintiffs must have the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156. The named representatives’ claims should have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class. De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). A plaintiff’s claims are typical if (1) they arise from the same event, practice, or course of conduct as the claims of the other class members, and (2) the claims are based on the same legal theory. Id. There can be factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs’ claims and the class members’ claims: similarity of legal theory is sufficient. Id. In fact, Rule 23(a)(3) “requires neither complete co-extensivity nor even substantial identity of claims.” Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assoc., 2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 23350 at *6. “Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) should be determined with reference to the company’s actions, not with respect to particularized defenses it might have against certain class members.” Wagner v. Nutrasweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996).
As recently explained in a Northern District of Illinois class certification decision, “[w]hether the [employer’ s] management decisions originated from a common decision maker or individual department heads is of little consequence, ‘since the named plaintiffs have allegedly suffered various forms of employment discrimination, they share common factual and legal issues with other black employees who were or are subject to these alleged policies of discrimination.” Daniels v. FRB, 194 F.R.D. 609, 615 (N.D. Ill. 2000), quoting Lawson v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 102 F.R.D. 783, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Here, Defendant’s standard conduct toward the African-American Plaintiffs, supports a finding that the discriminatory conduct caused a common injury typical of the classes’ claims as required by Rule 23(a)(3). Moreover, the claims of Plaintiffs and the class members are based on the same legal theory. Namely, that Nike violated § 1981 by engaging is a pattern of disparate treatment that was so severe that it created a racially hostile work environment for all African-American employees in Niketown Chicago. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the four subclasses are all based on violations of Title VII and Section 1981, the members of which were subjected to the same discriminatory treatment, including segregation, denial of promotions, discriminatory discipline and/or promotions, and denial of benefits. Thus, Plaintiffs meet the typicality component for the main class and the four subclasses.
4. Adequate Representatives Requirement Met
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that named class representatives “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This requires the demonstration of three elements:
(1) the chosen class representative cannot have antagonistic or conflicting claims with other members of the class ...; (2) the named representative must have a sufficient interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous advocacy ...; and (3) counsel for the named plaintiff must be competent, experienced, qualified, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation vigorously.
Gammon v. G.C. Services Limited Partnership, 162 F.R.D. 313, 317 (N.D. Ill.1995) (citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he burden of demonstrating adequacy under this standard, nevertheless, is not a heavy one.” Nielsen v. Greenwood, 1996 WL 563539, (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 366 (1966)).

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In this case, Plaintiffs satisfy the elements of this requirement. Plaintiffs do not have antagonistic or conflicting claims with other members of the class. Plaintiffs and the class members are African-Americans who at some point during the period between December 17, 1999 and the present were employed at Niketown Chicago. The fact that some Plaintiffs may have had differing levels of success obtaining limited promotions and/or benefits does not render them unsuitable as class representatives. “[T]he real question ... is not whether [these plaintiffs] have been ‘successful,’ but whether progress toward even greater success in [their] professional career has been impeded by reason of [discrimination].” Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In addition, the fact that one named Plaintiff held a management level position, and therefore may be deemed an “agent” of Nike for some limited purposes, does not prevent him from being an adequate class representative. In addressing this precise issue, the Court in Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 22718 (S.D. Ill. December 27, 2001) explained the following: “only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party’s claims of representative status.” Id. at * 25 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the proposed representatives of the main class and each of the subclasses have the same interests as the class and subclass members: to demonstrate and remedy the occurrence of discriminatory practices by Nike in Niketown Chicago.
Plaintiffs also satisfy the second part of this prerequisite to class certification. Plaintiffs have a sufficient interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous advocacy. The burden of establishing this element is not difficult. A class representative need only possess general knowledge of the case and participate in discovery. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10627 at *18 (N.D. 111. June 11, 2002); Sebo v. Rubenstein, 188 F.R.D. 310, 316 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
In this case, the named Plaintiffs certainly have “a sufficient interest” in the outcome of the case. All of the Plaintiffs have a general understanding of the foundation of the case and each has responded to written discovery and been deposed by Nike’s attorneys. This qualifies them as “conscientious representative plaintiffs” and satisfies this element. Robles v. Corporate Receivables, Inc. 220 F.R.D. 306, 314 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
Finally, Defendant has conceded that Plaintiffs’ attorneys are qualified and able to conduct the proposed litigation vigorously.
D. Plaintiffs Satisfy Requirements Under Rule 23(b)
As noted above, in addition to the requirements of Rule 23(a), a party seeking class certification must also satisfy at least one of the three additional requirements specified in Rule 23(b). In this case, Plaintiffs have brought suit alleging that Nike engaged in a practice of racial discrimination affecting a large number of employees. Plaintiffs seek both equitable relief, including back pay and injunctive relief, along with monetary damages, including compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiffs thus seek to have the class and subclasses certified for the purpose of equitable relief under Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs seek to have the damages claims under a hybrid Rule 23(b)(2) and (b) 3 approach or, alternatively, under Rule 23(b)(3). See Allen, 358 F.3d at 472.
1. Rule 23(b)(2) Requirements Met
Under Rule 23(b)(2), an action is suitable for certification whenever “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Plaintiffs satisfy this test. As detailed above, the heart of Plaintiffs’ allegations is that NTC engaged in a pattern of discriminatory behavior directed at African-American employees which affected every African-American employee in that store. Further, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief sufficient to end Nike’s pattern of discrimination and prevent future harm to Plaintiffs and the class.
As discussed in the Amended Complaint and the fact section above, Nike has “acted ... on grounds generally applicable to the class.” Moreover, Plaintiffs seek systemic injunctive relief. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Allen, because systemic injunctive relief is sought in class actions alleging wide-spread discrimination, such relief will affect all African-American employees and not only the named plaintiffs. Thus, the equitable aspects of the case are inherently class-wide. Allen, 358 F3d. at 471. The Court reasoned that class certification is preferable because “class certification obliges counsel (and representative plaintiffs) to proceed as fiduciaries for all [minority] employees, rather than try to maximize the outcome for these [named plaintiffs] at the potential expense of the other [minority employees] .... Id. “A Rule 23(b)(2) class is especially appropriate [when] ... the gravamen of the ... Amended Complaint is the elimination of discriminatory employment practices.” Lawson, 102 F.R.D. at 793.

2005 WL 6077505
2. Hybrid Approach Proper Under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3)
Plaintiffs’ damages claims are appropriate for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) (as explained below). As the Seventh Circuit has stated, “for many years Rule 23(b)(2) was the normal basis of certification in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases.” Jefferson v. Ingersoll International, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999). Prior to 1991, Title VII class actions were traditionally certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because Title VII plaintiffs were allowed only equitable relief. In addition to declaratory or injunctive relief, equitable relief also includes back pay. Id. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed Title VII plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
The Seventh Circuit has stated that an employment discrimination case that seeks both equitable relief and damages may be inappropriate for certification solely under 23(b)(2) because it may not meet the requirement that damages be incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought. Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 139, AFL-CIO, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000). In determining whether certification solely under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate, courts must be mindful of the constitutional due process rights of the class members. Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 897.
Notably, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that a “hybrid” approach may be used to reach the efficiency gains of 23(b)(2) and the due process concerns of 23(b)(3). Id. at 899 (“bifurcate the proceedings - certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class for equitable relief and a Rule 23(b)(3) class for damages”). See also Lemon, 216 F.3d at 581-82; Allen v. International Truck and Engine Corporation, 358 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2004).
Thus the class and the subclasses in the instant case should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) for the declaratory and equitable relief and Rule 23(b)(3) for compensatory and punitive damages.
3. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements Met
Alternatively, the class should be certified entirely under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) allows an action to be maintained as a class if the court finds that “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and that “a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In determining “superiority” the court should look to non-exhaustive factors: the interest of class members in individually controlling separate actions, any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced, the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation, and the manageability of the class action. Id. The Seventh Circuit has concluded that classes seeking substantial damages may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 139, AFL-CIO, 216 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 899).
The common questions of law and fact in this case predominate over any individual issues. The dominant legal issues are whether and to what Nike engaged in a pattern of discrimination against its African-American employees. A decision on this issue will determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate and whether individual employees are entitled to damages. Only the extent of the damages will be an individual question. “The necessity of answering individual questions after answering common questions will not prevent a class action.” Heastie v. Community Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See also Carnegie v. Household International, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining the possibilities for a court to handle the individual damages in a class action).
The predominance requirement is also generally satisfied where a “common nucleus of operative fact”, for which the law provides a remedy, exists among all class members. Chandler v. Southwest Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 302, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (citing Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, 69 F.R.D. 331, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1974). In this case, there is a common nucleus of operative fact that concerns the store-wide treatment of African-American employees. It would be inefficient to hold separate trials at which each plaintiff would be allowed to present evidence of the store-wide environment.
Further, a class action is superior to other available methods for resolving this case. In particular, a class action will allow the consolidation of what otherwise would be hundreds of individual trials on the issues of liability, damages and injunctive relief. The core questions in this case, whether Nike engaged in a store-wide pattern of discrimination and to what extent, will rely on the same proof. Thus, a class action is far more desirable than individual trials. Also, the size of the class in this case,

2005 WL 6077505
approximately 250 people, poses no unusual manageability concerns.
The addition to the predominance and superiority requirements, the Rule 23 Advisory Committed Notes explain that courts should certify a class when certification “would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote ... uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural fairness.” Anchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (citing Adv. Comm. Notes, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 697). Certifying this class under Rule 23(b)(3) will allow the Court to efficiently address the similar claims of discrimination while preserving procedural fairness through notice and an opportunity to opt-out. See Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898. Therefore, this Court should find that plaintiff’s evidence satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) and certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3).
V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs ask this Court to certify the general class and four subclasses set forth in Plaintiffs Motion For Class Certification and allow the named Plaintiffs to represent the classes. Plaintiffs further request that the Court appoint Noelle Brennan, Ines Monte and Randall D. Schmidt to represent the class and subclasses.

 
 CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

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DENLOW, PROTO, TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:03-cv-09110

Smith, et al v. Nike Retail Svc Inc Assigned to: Honorable Milton I. Shadur Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

Date Filed: 12/19/2003 Date Terminated: 10/02/2007 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
Ria McDougal on behalf of themselves and a class of similiarly situated African American employees

represented by Noelle Christine Brennan Brennan & Monte, Ltd. 20 South Clark Street Suite 1530 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 422-0001 Email: nbrennan@brennan-monte.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Randall D. Schmidt Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 6020 South University Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 (312) 702-9611 Email: r-schmidt@uchicago.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keith Smith

Ines M. Monte Brennan & Monte, Ltd. 20 South Clark Street Suite 1530 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 422-0001 Email: imonte@brennan-monte.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address)

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LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff John - Lewis

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Vernetta Duckworth

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Janise Page

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte

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(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacques Walker

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Shu-Ra Rogers

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Todd Lindberg

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address)

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Plaintiff
Anthony Brown TERMINATED: 11/17/2004

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jason Readus TERMINATED: 11/17/2004

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/17/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Dwight - Brown TERMINATED: 11/17/2004

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/17/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Robert Jackson TERMINATED: 11/17/2004

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/17/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Billy Brown

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/17/2004 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Crystal Barbie

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Markesha Hudson On behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated African American employees

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Dajuana Young

Noelle Christine Brennan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff Anthony Barlow
Plaintiff Larry Posey
Plaintiff Class Representatives

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ines M. Monte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Beth A Davis Brennan & Monte, Ltd. 20 South Clark Street #1530 Chicago, IL 60603 (312)422-0001 Email: bdavis@brennan-monte.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc

represented by James L. Singleton Greene & Letts 111 W. Washington Suite 1650 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 346-1100 Email: jsingleton@greeneandletts.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathryn M Woodward Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon LLP

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225 West Wacker Drive Suite 2800 Chicago, IL 60606-1229 (312) 201-2000 Email: woodward@wildmanharrold.com TERMINATED: 08/15/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Martin Peter Greene Greene & Letts 111 West Washington Suite 1650 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 346-1100 Email: mpgreene@greeneandletts.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brenda H. Feis Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603-5577 (312) 460-5000 Fax: (312) 460-7000 Email: bfeis@seyfarth.com
Brenda H. Feis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carl K. Turpin Greene & Letts 111 West Washington Suite 1650 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 346-1100 Email: ckturpin@greeneandletts.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David S. Baffa Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603-5577 (312) 460-5000

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Fax: (312) 460-7000 Email: dbaffa@seyfarth.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Elaine Tinglin Greene & Letts 111 West Washington Suite 1650 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 346-1100
Kevin Thomas Lee Greene & Letts 111 West Washington Suite 1650 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 346-1100 Fax: 312 346-4571 Email: ktlee@greeneandletts.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip Stephens Holloway Gonzalez, Saggio and Harlan, L.L.C. 35 East Wacker Drive # 500 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 236-0475 Email: hollop@gshllp.com TERMINATED: 08/19/2005
Sheldon Leigh Jeter Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. 20 North Wacker Drive Suite 2100 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 460-5000 Fax: (312) 460-7000 Email: ljeter@seyfarth.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed
12/17/2003 12/17/2003

#

Docket Text

1 RECEIVED complaint with 4 copies. (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003) 2 CIVIL cover sheet. (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)

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12/17/2003 12/17/2003 12/17/2003 12/17/2003 12/17/2003 12/18/2003 12/18/2003 12/19/2003
12/19/2003 12/23/2003 01/05/2004 01/12/2004 01/16/2004
01/20/2004 02/02/2004

3 APPLICATION by plaintiff Keith T Smith to proceed in forma pauperis (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
4 APPLICATION by plaintiff Ria McDougal to proceed in forma pauperis (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
5 MOTION by plaintiff Keith T Smith for appointment of counsel (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
6 MOTION by plaintiff Ria McDougal for appointment of counsel (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
7 PRO SE APPEARANCE by plaintiff Keith T Smith (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
FORWARDED complete case file to Judge Shadur (ntf) (Entered: 12/18/2003)
8 PRO SE APPEARANCE by plaintiff Ria McDougal. (ntf) (Entered: 12/19/2003)
9 MINUTE ORDER of 12/19/03 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing set for 2/4/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' applications to proceed in forma pauperis [31], [4-1] are granted. The decision on the motion for appointment of counsel will have to await supplemental submissions by plaintiffs that provide more detail. Pretrial schedule on reverse of minute order. (Entered Memorandum Order). (See reverse of minute order.) Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf) (Entered: 12/23/2003)
COMPLAINT (ntf) (Entered: 12/23/2003)
SUMMONS issued by U.S. Marshals as to defendant Nike Retail Svc Inc with two certified copies of order dated 12/19/03 with complaint. (ntf) (Entered: 12/23/2003)
10 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant by Martin Peter Greene, Kevin Thomas Lee, Carl K. Turpin, Philip Stephens Holloway, Karen Elaine Tinglin; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/06/2004)
11 MOTION by defendant for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/20/2004)
12 MINUTE ORDER of 1/16/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Defendant's motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to complaint is granted [11-1]. Defendant has to and including 02/02/04 in which to answer or otherwise plead. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/20/2004)
13 RETURN OF SERVICE by U.S. Marshals executed as to defendant Nike Retail Svc Inc on 01/13/04 (ntf) (Entered: 01/22/2004)
14 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant Nike Retail Svc to plaintiffs' complaint of employment discrimination [0-1]; Notice. (ntf) (Entered: 02/04/2004)

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02/03/2004
02/04/2004 02/19/2004 02/19/2004 02/24/2004 02/25/2004
03/04/2004 03/18/2004
04/08/2004 04/08/2004 06/10/2004 08/05/2004

15 MINUTE ORDER of 2/3/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Answer 3 is stricken, and Nike is deemed to have admitted the allegations in complaint 3. AD 1 is accordingly stricken. AD 4 is both hypothetical and premature, and it too is stricken. (Entered Memorandum Order). Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf) (Entered: 02/04/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 2/4/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 9:00 3/4/04 . In court notice (srn) (Entered: 02/04/2004)
16 MOTION by plaintiff Keith Smith for appointment of counsel (ntf) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
17 MOTION by plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis (Attachments) (ntf) Modified on 02/25/2004 (Entered: 02/25/2004)
18 NOTICE by plaintiff Ria McDougal of change of address (ntf) (Entered: 02/25/2004)
19 MINUTE ORDER of 2/25/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of counsel [16-1], [6-1], [5-1] is denied at the present, but obviously without prejudice to its potential renewal if it were to turn out that all of their effors have gone for naught. Entered Memorandum Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 02/26/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 3/4/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 9:00 3/18/04 . In court notice (srn) (Entered: 03/04/2004)
20 MINUTE ORDER of 3/18/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held and continued to 4/8/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motions for appointment of counsel are granted. (5-1,6-1,16-1). This Court hereby appoints Noelle Brennan of Brennan & Monte, 321 S. Plymouth Court, Ste. 1515, Chichago, IL 60604, 312-431-1800 to represent the plaintiffs. Mailed notice (gcy) (Entered: 03/19/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 4/8/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 9:00 6/10/04 . in court notice (srn) (Entered: 04/08/2004)
21 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Noelle Christine Brennan, Ines M. Monte (ntf) (Entered: 04/09/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 6/10/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 9:00 8/5/04 . In court notice (srn) (Entered: 06/10/2004)
22 MINUTE ORDER of 8/5/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Status hearing held and continued to 9/22/04 at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended complaint on or before 08/19/04. Defendant's responsive pleading is due 21 days after the date of delivery of the amended complaint. Mailed

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08/19/2004 08/23/2004
08/25/2004 09/13/2004 09/17/2004
10/01/2004 10/12/2004 10/13/2004
10/22/2004 10/27/2004 10/28/2004 11/02/2004 11/16/2004

notice (jmm) (Entered: 08/09/2004)
23 MOTION by plaintiffs for extension of time to file amended complaint ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 08/20/2004)
24 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [0-1] by plaintiffs; jury demand; adding plaintiffs John Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers, Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbie, Markesha Hudson (ntf) (Entered: 08/24/2004)
25 MINUTE ORDER of 8/25/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Plaintiff's motion for extension of time to file amended complaint is granted [23-1]. No notice (ntf) (Entered: 08/26/2004)
26 MOTION by defendant for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to the amended complaint ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
27 MINUTE ORDER of 9/17/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Defendant's motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to amended complaint is granted [26-1]. Defendant has to and including 10/28/04 in which to respond to plaintiff's amended complaint. The September 22 status date is vacated and reset to 11/17/04 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 09/20/2004)
29 MOTION by plaintiffs for a protective order (Attachments); Notice (ntf) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
28 RESPONSE by defendant to plaintiffs' motion for a protective order (Attachments); Notice. (ntf) (Entered: 10/14/2004)
30 MINUTE ORDER of 10/13/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted [29-1]. Counsel is to submit an agreed draft order for signature. A status hearing set for 10/22/04 at 8:45 a.m. No notice (ntf) (Entered: 10/15/2004)
SCHEDULE set on 10/22/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held. Status hearing continued to 9:00 11/17/04 . In court notice (srn) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
31 MINUTE ORDER of 10/27/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: (Entered Protective Order). Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
32 MOTION by defendant to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ; Memorandum in support; (Attachments); Notice (ntf) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
33 MINUTE ORDER of 11/2/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Plaintiff's response to defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) [32-1] is to be filed on or before 11/15/04. No notice (ntf) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
34 LETTER to Judge Shadur from attorney Noelle Brennan dated 11/16/04 for plaintiffs. (hp) Modified on 11/19/2004 (Entered: 11/19/2004)

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11/16/2004 11/17/2004
12/02/2004 12/09/2004
12/22/2004 12/27/2004 12/29/2004
01/04/2005 01/05/2005 01/06/2005 01/06/2005

35 LETTER to Judge Shadur from attorney Kevin T. Lee dated 11/16/04 for defendant. (hp) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
36 MINUTE ORDER of 11/17/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held and continued to 01/13/05 at 9:00 a.m. Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part in accordance with this Court's oral ruling. (32-1) Plaintiffs Anthony Brown, Dwight Brown, Jason Readus, and Robert Jackson are dismissed from this action. The motin is granted as to the Title VII claims relating to conduct more than 300 days before the Keith Smith filing of charges with the EEOC. The motion based on the single filing doctrine is denied. All Title VII (both individual and class) claims based on hostile work environment are dismissed. Mailed notice (hp) (Entered: 11/19/2004)
37 AGREED MOTION by defendant Nike Retail Svc Inc for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs amended complaint ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 12/10/2004)
38 MINUTE ORDER of 12/9/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Defendant's agreed motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead to plaintiffs amended complaint is granted [37-1]. Defendant has to and including 12/17/04 in which to answer or otherwise plead. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 12/10/2004)
39 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant to first amended complaint [24-1] (Attachment); Notice (ntf) (Entered: 12/23/2004)
40 MOTION by defendant for an extension of time to respond or object to plaintiffs' requests for production pursuant to Rule 34(b) ; Notice (ntf) (Entered: 12/30/2004)
41 MINUTE ORDER of 12/29/04 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Defendant's motion for an extension of time to respond or object to requests for production pursuant to Rule 34(b) is granted [40-1]. Defendant has to and including 01/10/05 in which to respond or object to plaintiffs' request for production. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 12/30/2004)
43 MOTION by plaintiffs to quash subpoenas , and for protective order (Attachments); Notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
44 RESPONSE by defendant to plaintiffs' motion to quash subpoenas [43-1], and motion for protective order [43-2]; Notice. (ntf) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
42 REFERRAL ORDER: Case referred to Hon. Morton Denlow for discovery supervision Mailed notice. (srn) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
SCHEDULE set on 1/6/05 by Hon. Morton Denlow : Status hearing set to 10:00 2/15/05 before Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow in Courtroom 1350. Parties shall deliver a copy of an initial status report to chambers, Room 1356, 3 business days before the initial status hearing. If the parties have recently prepared and filed an initial status report, the submission of the

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

01/06/2005
01/13/2005 01/13/2005 01/19/2005
02/11/2005 02/11/2005 02/16/2005 02/16/2005 02/17/2005
02/22/2005 02/22/2005 02/22/2005

previously filed initial status report is sufficient. Mailed notice (dmk) (Entered: 01/06/2005)
45 MINUTE ORDER of 1/6/05 by Hon. Milton I. Shadur: Plaintiffs' motion to quash subpoenas [43-1], and for protective order [43-2] is granted in accordance with this Court's oral ruling. This action is referred to Magistrate Judge Denlow for discovery supervision. The 01/13/05 status date is vacated and reset to 03/08/05 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ntf) (Entered: 01/07/2005)
46 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for leave to file additional appearances; Exhibits. (ntf, ) Modified on 4/3/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 01/21/2005)
47 NOTICE by Nike Retail Services, Inc of motion for leave to file additional appearances. (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/21/2005)
48 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Defendant's motion for leave to file additional appearances 46 is granted. Kathryn Woodward is granted leave to substitute her appearance for that of Karen E. Tinglin, Michael A. Warner, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. Sari M. Alamuddin and S. Leigh Jeter of the law firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP are granted leave to file their appearances as additional counsel on behalf of Nike. (ntf, ) (Entered: 01/21/2005)
49 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing reset for 2/17/2005 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 2/15/05 is stricken. (dmk, ) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
50 INITIAL STATUS Report by parties; Notice; Exhibits.(ntf, ) Modified on 2/2/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/14/2005)
51 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to clarify the court's 10/27/04 protective order; Exhibits. (rbf, ) Modified on 2/28/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/17/2005)
52 NOTICE of Motion by all defendants for presentment of motion by plaintiff to clarify the court's 10/27/04 protective order 51 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 2/24/2005 at 09:15 AM. (rbf, ) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
53 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing held on 2/17/2005. Status hearing set for 3/8/2005 at 10:00 AM. The language of the rider with respect to pre-termination employers is as stated in open Court. The language of the rider with respect to post-termination employers is denied without prejudice as stated in open Court. Judicial staff mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
55 MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to file plaintiffs' second amended complaint. (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
56 NOTICE by plaintiffs of motion for leave to file plaintiffs' second amended complaint 55 (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
58 SECOND AMENDED complaint by plaintiffs.(ntf, ) Modified on 5/17/2006

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

02/24/2005
02/24/2005
03/08/2005
03/08/2005 03/08/2005 03/10/2005 03/16/2005 03/16/2005
03/16/2005 03/16/2005
03/17/2005 03/17/2005

(ef, ). (Entered: 03/01/2005)
54 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to clarify 51 is denied,with a provision that is to be drafted for amodification of Paragraph 2 of the 10/27/04 protective order. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to clarify51 in court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
57 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file plaintiff's second amended complaint 55 is granted. Defendant's amendment to the existing answer is to be filed on or before 03/10/05. Mailed notice (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/01/2005)
59 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing held on 3/8/2005. All matters relating to the referral of this action having been resolved, the case is returned to the assigned judge. Judge Morton Denlow no longer referred to the case. Judicial staff mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
60 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 3/8/2005 Status hearing set for 3/22/2005 at 08:45 AM.In court notice. Modified on 4/27/2006 (smm, ). (Entered: 03/08/2005)
61 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before Judge Morton Denlow held on 02/17/05 (Volumes 1). (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
62 ANSWER and affirmative defenses by defendant to second amended complaint; Notice. (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/15/2005)
63 MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to file an additional appearance (gma, ) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
64 NOTICE of Motion by Noelle Christine Brennan for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to file an additional appearance 63 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/22/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/17/2005)
67 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for entry of agreed protective order (gma, ) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
68 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin Thomas Lee for presentment of UNOPPOSED MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for entry of agreed protective order 67 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/22/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
65 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to clarify plaintiffs' second amended complaint (gma, ) (Entered: 03/18/2005)
66 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin Thomas Lee for presentment of MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to clarify plaintiffs' second amended complaint 65 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 3/22/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/18/2005)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

03/17/2005
03/17/2005 03/17/2005 03/22/2005
04/12/2005 04/12/2005
04/12/2005 04/12/2005 04/13/2005

69 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Defendant's motion for entry of proposed protective order 67 is granted. Enter Protective Order. After the case is closed in the District Court, the parties may obtain the return of any previously-sealed documents by a motion filed within 60 days after the case is closed. Any documents that are not so withdrawn will become part of the public case file. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
70 AGREED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 3/17/2005: Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, ) (Entered: 03/21/2005)
113 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Attorney Randall D. Schmidt for Todd Lindberg and Billy Brown added. (srn, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
71 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for leave to file 63 is granted, Motion to clarify 65 is granted, Status hearing held on 3/22/2005, Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to clarify65, MOTION by Plaintiffs Todd Lindberg, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbie, Markesha Hudson, Ria McDougal, Keith Smith, John - Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Dajuana Young, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers for leave to file63 Status hearing set for 7/21/2005 at 08:45 AM. Any motion for class certification shall be filed on or before July 18, 2005. In Court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
72 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for an order: (1) directing plaintiffs' counsel to refrain from making speaking objections and engaging in other improper conduct during depositions: (2) enlarging the time for plaintiffs' depositions; and (3) compelling answers to deposition questions regarding prior convictions. (ntf, ) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
73 MEMORANDUM of law by Nike Retail Services, Inc in Support of its motion for an order: (1) directing plaintiffs' counsel to refrain from making speaking objections and engaging in other improper conduct during depositions: (2) enlarging the time for plaintiffs' depositions; and (3) compelling answers to deposition questions regarding prior convictions 72 (ntf, ) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
74 DECLARATION of S. Leigh Jeter (ntf, ) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
75 NOTICE by Nike Retail Services, Inc of emergency motion for an order: (1) directing plaintiffs' counsel to refrain from making speaking objections and engaging in other improper conduct during depositions: (2) enlarging the time for plaintiffs' depositions; and (3) compelling answers to deposition questions regarding prior convictions 72. (ntf, ) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
76 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : For the reasons stated orally. defendant's emergency motion is granted in that both sides counsel is to refrain from improper deposition conduct and the motion is denied as to the entry of a general order allowing more than seven hours to depose plaintiff's, subject to appropriate individual consideration at a later date. The motion to compel answer to questions regarding Keith Smith's prior convitions 72 is

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

04/19/2005 06/27/2005 06/27/2005
06/29/2005
07/22/2005 08/09/2005
08/09/2005
08/19/2005
09/16/2005 09/16/2005 09/20/2005

denied. Mailed notice (ntf, ) (Entered: 04/14/2005)
77 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc by Brenda H. Feis; Notice. (ntf, ) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
78 JOINT MOTION by Plaintiffs to extend date for filing motion for class certification (gma, ) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
79 NOTICE of Motion by Ines M. Monte for presentment of JOINT MOTION by Plaintiffs to extend date for filing motion for class certification 78 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/29/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
80 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for extension of timetime78 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is to be filed on or before October 3, 2005., Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiffs Keith Smith, Dajuana Young, Larry Posey, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers for extension of time78 Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 06/29/2005)
81 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing set for 10/11/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 07/22/2005)
82 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to substitute attorney, MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to withdraw as attorney (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Appearance of Riana N. Shipps# 2 Exhibit Affidavit of Philip S. Holloway)(Lee, Kevin) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
83 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin Thomas Lee for presentment of motion to substitute attorney, motion to withdraw as attorney,, 82 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 8/19/2005 at 09:15 AM. (Lee, Kevin) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
84 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Defendant's motion for leave to withdraw and substitute appearance 82 is granted. Phillip Holloway is granted leave to withdraw his appearance and Riana Shipps is granted leave to file her appearance on behalf of the defendant, Nike. Mailed notice (ntf, ) (Entered: 08/22/2005)
85 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Plaintiffs to extend date for filing motion for class certification. (ntf, ) (Entered: 09/21/2005)
86 NOTICE by plaintiffs of motion to extend date for filing motion for class certification 85 (ntf, ) (Entered: 09/21/2005)
87 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for extension of timetime85 is granted, Plaintiffs have to and including December 16, 2005 in which to file their motion for class certification. Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiffs Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight - Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbie, Markesha Hudson, Ria McDougal, Keith Smith, John - Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Dajuana Young, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey, Janis85 Status hearing set for

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

12/13/2005
12/13/2005 12/15/2005 12/23/2005 12/23/2005 12/23/2005 12/23/2005 01/03/2006 01/03/2006 01/03/2006
01/05/2006
01/19/2006 01/19/2006

12/22/2005 at 09:00 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 09/22/2005)
88 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Smith for extension of time and to file brief in excess of fifteen pages (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service Notice of Motion and Certificate of Service)(Caporusso, Catherine) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
89 NOTICE of Motion by Catherine A. Caporusso for presentment of motion for extension of time88 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 12/15/2005 at 09:15 AM. (Caporusso, Catherine) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
90 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for extension of timetime88 is granted Status hearing set for 1/5/2006 at 09:00 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/15/2005)
91 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Smith to certify class (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
92 MEMORANDUM by Keith Smith in Support of motion to certify class91 (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
93 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re memorandum in support of motion92, MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Smith to certify class91 (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
94 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Smith to certify class91 Filing by Paper of Appendix (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
95 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for leave to file Motion for Summary Judgment (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
96 NOTICE of Motion by Brenda H. Feis for presentment of motion for leave to file95 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 1/5/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
97 MEMORANDUM by Nike Retail Services, Inc in Support of motion for leave to file95 Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Table of Contents# 2 Appendix Exhibit 1# 3 Appendix Exhibits 2-5# 4 Appendix Exhibits 6-9# 5 Affidavit Exhibits 10-14# 6 Affidavit Exhibits 1519# 7 Affidavit Exhibits 20-23# 8 Appendix Exhibits 24-27# 9 Appendix Exhibits 28-33)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
98 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to certify class 91 is entered and continued, Motion for leave to file 95 is denied, Status hearing held on 1/5/2006, Responses due by 1/26/2006 to motion to certify class. Motion Hearing set for 1/31/2006 at 08:45 AM. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
99 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for leave to file excess pages (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
100 NOTICE of Motion by Brenda H. Feis for presentment of motion for leave to

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

01/19/2006 01/19/2006 01/19/2006 01/19/2006 01/23/2006
01/26/2006 01/26/2006 01/26/2006 01/26/2006
01/26/2006 01/26/2006
01/31/2006

file excess pages99 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 1/23/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
101 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc by David S. Baffa (Baffa, David) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
102 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc by Sheldon Leigh Jeter (Jeter, Sheldon) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
103 NOTICE of Motion by Brenda H. Feis for presentment of motion for leave to file excess pages99 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 1/23/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
104 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc by Brenda H. Feis (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/19/2006)
105 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an additional appearance is granted. (63) Randall Schmidt is granted leave to file an additional appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff. Defendant's motion for leave to file in excess is granted. (99-1) Mailed notice (jmm, ) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
106 MEMORANDUM by Nike Retail Services, Inc in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
107 APPENDIX by Nike Retail Services, Inc to Brief in Opposition to Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-D# 2 Exhibit E-G# 3 Exhibit HJ)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
108 APPENDIX appendix107, memorandum in opposition106 by Nike Retail Services, Inc to Brief in Opposition to Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K-M# 2 Exhibit N-R)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
109 APPENDIX appendix107, appendix108, memorandum in opposition106 by Nike Retail Services, Inc to Brief in Opposition to Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit S and EX1# 2 Exhibit S EX2(1of3)# 3 Exhibit S EX2(2of3)# 4 Exhibit S EX2(3of3)# 5 Exhibit S EX3# 6 Exhibit T-V)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
110 APPENDIX appendix107, appendix108, memorandum in opposition106, appendix, 109 by Nike Retail Services, Inc to Brief in Opposition to Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit W (1-5)# 2 Exhibit W (6-10)# 3 Exhibit X to BB# 4 Exhibit CC-DD)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
111 APPENDIX appendix107, appendix108, appendix, 110, memorandum in opposition106, appendix, 109 by Nike Retail Services, Inc to Brief in Opposition to Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit EE-OO# 2 Exhibit PP-WW# 3 Exhibit XX# 4 Exhibit YY-ZZ# 5 Certificate of Service)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
112 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 1/31/2006 in court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/01/2006)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

02/15/2006 02/27/2006 03/22/2006 03/22/2006
03/29/2006 04/06/2006 04/26/2006 04/27/2006 05/01/2006
05/11/2006
05/12/2006

114 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 2/15/2006. Plaintiff's submission is due on or before February 27, 2006. in court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
115 REPLY by Keith Smithin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Smith to certify class91 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Barlow Excerpts Part 1# 2 Exhibit Barlow Excerpts Part 2# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 9# 4 Exhibit Barbee Excerpts)(Brennan, Noelle) (Entered: 02/27/2006)
116 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 3/22/2006.(jmm, ) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
117 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur: Enter memorandum opinion and order. With modest limitations discussed earlier, Rule 23(a) has been satisfied as to the overall class and each subclass. That is true as well as to Rule 23(b)(3) and conditionally, as to Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiff's motion to certify class is granted. [91-1] A status hearing is set for March 29, 2006 at 8:45 a.m. to discuss the timetables for those open items and for the further proceedings in this action. Mailed notice (jmm, ) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
118 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing reset for 4/6/2006 at 09:15 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
119 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 4/6/2006 Status hearing set for 5/24/2006 at 09:00 AM. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an Amended Complaint. Defendant's responsive pleading is due 14 days after receipt of the Amended Complaint. (srn, ) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
121 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following date: 1/5/06; Before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur (mb, ) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
120 Plaintiffs' Supplemental STATEMENT by Crystal Barbie (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Excerpts Barbee Deposition)(Monte, Ines) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
122 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Class counsel have tendered a Supplemental Statement in support of the inclusion of Crystal Barbee ("Barbee") as a subclass representative. Unless defense counsel file a response objecting to such exclusion on or before 5/10/06, plaintiff's motion will be granted and Barbee will be authorized to act as such representative. (srn, ) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
123 SUPPLEMENT by Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbie, Markesha Hudson, Ria McDougal, Keith Smith, John - Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Dajuana Young, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers to Support Submission of Information Needed for Rule 23(b)(2) Certification (Attachments: # 1 Third Amended Complaint)(Monte, Ines) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
124 THIRD AMENDED complaint by Todd Lindberg, Anthony Brown, Jason Readus, Dwight - Brown, Robert Jackson, Billy Brown, Crystal Barbie,

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

05/18/2006 05/19/2006
05/19/2006 05/24/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/25/2006 05/30/2006 06/01/2006 06/01/2006

Markesha Hudson, Ria McDougal, Keith Smith, John - Lewis, Vernetta Duckworth, Dajuana Young, Anthony Barlow, Larry Posey, Janise Page, Jacques Walker, Shu-Ra Rogers against Nike Retail Services, Inc (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
126 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : WIth no response having been filed by defendant objecting to inclusion of Crystal Barbee, she is authorized to act as named representative of the benefits sub-class. (srn, ) (Entered: 05/18/2006)
127 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Enter Memorandum Order. This court grants leave to plaintiffs to file third amended complaint instanter and confirms the certification under Rule 23(b)(2) as to the overall class and the respective subclasses identified in the Opinion. Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
128 MEMORANDUM Order Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 5/19/2006:Mailed notice(hp, ) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
129 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 5/24/2006 Status hearing set for 8/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
130 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to strike amended complaint, 124 Paragraphs 65,84,89,94,99,104,109,114,129,138 (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
131 NOTICE of Motion by Brenda H. Feis for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief130 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 5/30/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
132 MEMORANDUM by Nike Retail Services, Inc in Support of motion to strike, motion for relief130 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
133 Defendant's ANSWER to amended complaint Third by Nike Retail Services, Inc(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
134 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to strike 130 is denied, Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to strike amended complaint, 124 Paragraphs 65,84,89,94,99,104,109,114,129,138130 (srn, ) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
135 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Enter Memorandum Order. Affirmative defenses 1,3,4,5,6,8,9,10 and 11 are stricken. (For further detail see separate order.) Notices mailed by Judicial staff Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
136 MEMORANDUM Order Signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 6/1/2006:(hp, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/15/2006
06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/15/2006 06/16/2006 06/16/2006 06/20/2006
06/22/2006
07/07/2006 07/07/2006 07/12/2006

137 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for leave to file leave to communicate with certain class members (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
138 NOTICE of Motion by Brenda H. Feis for presentment of motion for leave to file137 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/20/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
139 MEMORANDUM by Nike Retail Services, Inc in Support of motion for leave to file137 to Communicate with Certain Class Members (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit # 3 Exhibit # 4 Exhibit # 5 # 6 Exhibit)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
140 MOTION for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit Group 2)(Monte, Ines) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
141 NOTICE of Motion by Ines M. Monte for presentment of motion for protective order140 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/20/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
142 Corrected NOTICE of Motion by Ines M. Monte for presentment of motion for protective order140 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/20/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
143 MOTION for order Approving Class Notice and for Other Relief (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
144 NOTICE of Motion by Ines M. Monte for presentment of motion for order143 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/20/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
145 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for leave to file 137 is entered and continued, Motion for protective order 140 is entered and continued, Motion for order 143 is entered and continued to 6/22/2006 at 09:15 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
146 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for leave to file 137 is entered and continued to 7/12/06 at 9:15 a.m. Motion for protective order 140 is granted without prejudice to possible renewal efforst as discussed in open court. Motion for order 143 is entered and continued to 7/12/06 at 9:15 a.m. Responses due by 7/7/2006. (srn, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
147 RESPONSE by Class Representatives in Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for leave to file leave to communicate with certain class members137 (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
148 CERTIFICATE by Class Representatives of Service (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
149 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc for leave to file leave to communicate with certain class members is denied without prejudice. 137 (srn, ) (Entered: 07/12/2006)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

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08/09/2006 08/11/2006 08/11/2006 08/15/2006 08/16/2006 09/21/2006
10/05/2006 10/05/2006 10/10/2006 10/11/2006 10/19/2006
12/18/2006 12/18/2006 12/18/2006

150 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 8/9/2006 Status hearing set for 9/21/2006 at 09:00 AM. (srn, ) (Entered: 08/09/2006)
151 MOTION by Defendant Nike Retail Services, Inc to withdraw appearance and substitute counsel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Singleton, James) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
152 NOTICE of Motion by James L. Singleton for presentment of motion to withdraw151 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 8/16/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Singleton, James) (Entered: 08/11/2006)
153 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion to withdraw 151 is granted, Attorney James L. Singleton for Nike Retail Services, Inc added. Attorney Kathryn M Woodward terminated. (srn, ) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
154 NOTICE by Brenda H. Feis of Change of Address (Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
155 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing held on 9/21/2006 Status hearing set for 11/2/2006 at 09:00 AM. A proposed form of class notice is to be submitted to this Court on or before October 5, 2006. (srn, ) (Entered: 09/21/2006)
156 Plaintiffs' Proposed Class Notice by Class Representatives (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
157 NOTICE by Class Representatives of Filing of Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice of Class Action Lawsuit (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 10/05/2006)
158 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing set for 10/17/2006 at 08:45 AM. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/10/2006)
159 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Status hearing reset for 10/19/2006 at 09:15 AM. Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/11/2006)
160 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Motion for order 143 approving class notice is granted with the modifications as stated in open court. Status hearing held on 10/19/2006 Status hearing set for 1/17/2007 at 09:00 AM. The November 2 status date is vacated. In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/19/2006)
161 MOTION by Plaintiff Class Representatives to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E)(Davis, Beth) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
162 NOTICE of Motion by Beth A Davis for presentment of motion to compel161 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 12/21/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Davis, Beth) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
163 CERTIFICATE of Service by Beth A Davis on behalf of Class Representatives regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Class Representatives to

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

12/19/2006 12/19/2006 12/20/2006 12/21/2006
01/17/2007 02/06/2007 03/08/2007 03/13/2007 03/13/2007 05/16/2007 06/07/2007 06/27/2007 07/30/2007

compel161 (Davis, Beth) (Entered: 12/18/2006)
164 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Class Representatives CORRECTED EXHIBIT D regarding MOTION by Plaintiff Class Representatives to compel161 (Davis, Beth) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
165 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Class Representatives by Beth A Davis (Davis, Beth) (Entered: 12/19/2006)
166 RESPONSE by Nike Retail Services, Inc to MOTION by Plaintiff Class Representatives to compel161 Discovery Responses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-G)(Feis, Brenda) (Entered: 12/20/2006)
167 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Motion to compel 161 is granted on the limited terms and conditions in accordance with this Court's oral ruling. No fees are awarded to either side in connection with this motion. Motion hearing held on 12/21/2006 regarding motion to compel161 In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
168 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 1/17/2007,Status hearing set for 3/9/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/17/2007)
169 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 11/17/2004, 2/24/2005, 3/8/2005, 3/22/2005, 4/13/2005, 6/22/2006; Before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur (transcripts 1-6)(mb, ) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
170 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :At counsel's request the Status hearing is reset to 3/13/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
171 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 3/13/2007, Status hearing set for 5/16/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
172 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 6/10/2004, 10/13/2004; Before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur (172-1 through 172-2) (Documents not imaged) (rp, ) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
173 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 5/16/2007, Status hearing set for 6/21/2007 at 09:00 AM.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
174 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :At counsel's request theStatus hearing is reset for 6/29/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
175 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :At counsel's request the Status hearing is reset for 7/30/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
176 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

2/14/08 5:03 PM

07/30/2007 07/30/2007 07/30/2007 07/30/2007 09/26/2007 09/26/2007 10/01/2007 10/01/2007 10/01/2007 10/02/2007
10/02/2007 10/03/2007 11/06/2007

7/30/2007.In court notice (srn, ) (Entered: 07/30/2007)
177 MOTION by Plaintiff Class Representatives Parties' Joint Motion for Order Preliminarily Approving Consent Decree (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 07/30/2007)
178 SETTLEMENT Agreement by Class Representatives and Nike and CONSENT DECREE (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 07/30/2007)
179 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Enter Preliminary Approval Order. Plaintiff's joint moton for an order 177 is granted. (For further detail see order). (ar, ) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
180 PRELIMINARY Approval Order, signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 7/30/2007 179.(ar, ) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
181 Opt-Out Statement by Class Representatives (Davis, Beth) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
182 NOTICE by Class Representatives re other181 Filing of Opt-Out Statement and Certificate of Service (Davis, Beth) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
183 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Fairness hearing is set for 10/2/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
184 Class Counsel's Unopposed Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs by Class Representatives (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit A-1# 3 Exhibit A-2# 4 Exhibit A-3)(Monte, Ines) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
185 NOTICE by Class Representatives re other184 Filing of Class Counsel's Unopposed Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
186 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Fairness hearing held. Enter Order of Dismissal. Enter Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree. This case is dismissed, with prejudice and without costs to the parties, except as otherwise expressly provided for in this Order and the Consent decree, including, but not limited to, this Court's retention of jurisdiction to administer, effectuate, and enforce the provisions of the Consent Decree. (For further detail see separate orders). Civil case terminated. (ar, ) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
187 ORDER of Dismissl and Settlement Agreement and Consent Decree (Exhibits), both signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 10/2/2007 186. (ar, ) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
188 ENTERED JUDGMENT. (ar, ) (Entered: 10/05/2007)
189 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur : Enter Order on Disbursement of Funds. It is ordered that incentive payments may be distributed immediately. Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs, as approved by this Court on 10/02/07 may be distributed immediately. (For further detail see separate order). (ar, ) (Entered: 11/08/2007)

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CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 3.0 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois - Docket Report

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11/06/2007 12/27/2007 01/04/2008 01/10/2008 01/10/2008 01/14/2008 01/14/2008

190 ORDER of Distribution of Funds, signed by Judge Milton I. Shadur on 11/6/2007 189.(ar, ) (Entered: 11/08/2007)
191 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing set for 1/4/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 12/27/2007)
192 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Status hearing held on 1/4/2008. Plaintiff's memorandum regarding point formula is to be submitted promptly.Mailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
193 MOTION by Plaintiff Class Representativesfor Approval of Point System Allocating Class Claims Portion of Settlement Fund (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Monte, Ines) (Entered: 01/10/2008)
194 NOTICE of Motion by Ines M. Monte for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief193 before Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 1/15/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Monte, Ines) (Entered: 01/10/2008)
195 MINUTE entry before Judge Milton I. Shadur :Plaintiff's Motion for approval of point system allocating class claims portion of settlement fund 193 is grantedMailed notice (srn, ) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
196 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 07/12/06 before the Honorable Milton I. Shadur. (ar, ) (Entered: 01/15/2008)

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