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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ( , FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO c·' ' •. ~ EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,
v.
AMERITECH SERVICES, INC., and

CIVIL ACTION NO.

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COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL NOS. 165, 188, 336, 383 AND 399

Defendants

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The Commission alleges that Ameritech Services, Inc. discriminated on the basis of sex when it instituted a Pension Plan Enhancement Program on or about March 25, 1994, which denied immediate pension benefits to certain female employees for periods of time such employees spent on maternity leave prior to April 29, 1979 but did not deny such benefits to persons who took leave for other temporary disabilities. The Commission's action also seeks to restrain the unlawful payment of wages to employees of one sex

(

at rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex, and to provide appropriate relief to employees harmed as a result of such unlawful practices.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f) (1) and (3)and 707(a), (b) and (c) of Title VII of the civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e-5(f) (1) and (3) and 2000e6(a), (b) and (c) ("Title VII") and pursuant to Sections 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sections 216 (c) and 217, to enforce the requirements of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, codified as Section 6(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 206(d). 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(the "Commission"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 16(c) and 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sections 216(c) and 217, as amended by Section 1 of Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705; and by Sections 706(f) (1) and (3)and 707(a), (b) and (c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e-5(f) (1) and (3)and 2000e (a), (b) and (c).
4. At all relevant times, Defendant, Ameritech Services, Inc. (the "Employer") , has continuously been a Delaware corporation, doing business in the State of Ohio and the City of Cleveland and has continuously had at least 15 employees.
5. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
6. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and has continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
7. At all relevant times, Defendant Employer has

continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3 (b), (I) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203 (b), (I) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r) and (s), in that said enterprise has continuously been an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $362,500.
RULE 19(a) (2) DEFENDANTS 8. The Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("CWA") is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with Defendant Employer and is named as a Defendant pursuant to Rule 19(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that it has an interest in the outcome of this action. 9. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 165, ("Local 165"), Local No. 188 ("Local 188"), Local No. 336, ("Local 336"), Local No. 383 ("Local 383"), and Local No. 399 ("Local 399") are parties to collective bargaining agreements with Defendant Employer and are named as Defendants pursuant to Rule 19(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that they have an interest in the outcome of this action.

STATEMENT OF TITLE VII CLAIMS 10. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Diana Crowley, and other similarly situated women, filed charges with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant Employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 11. Since at least January 1, 1994, Defendant Employer has engaged in an unlawful pattern of employment practices at its Cleveland, Ohio facility, as well as other facilities in Ohio and other states, in violation of Sections 703(a) (1) and 707(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) and 2000e-6 (a). The unlawful pattern of employment practices includes instituting a Pension Plan Enhancement Program which denied immediate pension benefits to certain female employees by denying them service credit for periods of time such employees spent on maternity leave prior to April 29, 1979 but did not deny such benefits to persons who took leave for other temporary disabilities. 12. The effect of the pattern of employment practice (s) complained of in paragraph 11, above, has been to deprive Diana Crowley, and other similarly situated women, of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect their status because of their sex.

13. The unlawful pattern of employment practices complained of in paragraph 11, above, was and is intentional.
14. The unlawful pattern of employment practices complained of in paragraph 11, above, was and is now being committed with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Diana Crowley and other similarly situated women.
15. Since at least January 1, 1994, Defendant Employer has violated Sections 6 (d) (1) and 15 (a) (2) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d) (1) and 215(a) (2), by instituting a Pension Plan Enhancement Program which differentiated in benefits on the basis of sex in that the Pension Enhancement Program denied immediate pension benefits to certain female employees by denying them service credit for periods of time such employees spent on maternity leave prior to April 29, 1979 but did not deny such benefits to persons who took leave for other temporary disabilities.
16. As a result of the acts complained of above, Defendant Employer unlawfully has withheld and is continuing to withhold the payment of fringe benefits to Diana Crowley and a class of other similarly situated women generally defined as all present and former female employees of Defendant Employer who took any maternity-related leave of absence which commenced on or after July

2, 1965 and before April 29, 1979 and who are now or were within the scope of the offer made by the March 25, 1994 Pension Plan Enhancement Program of Defendant Employer. On information and belief, the size of the class is in excess of 7,000 present and former employees of Defendant Employer, some of whom are named on Exhibit A, attached hereto.
17. The unlawful practices complained of in paragraphs 15 and 16, above, were and are willful.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in the institution, maintenance and/or management of the March 1994 Pension Plan Enhancement Program, or any other similar plan, which discriminates on the basis of sex. B. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from discriminating within any of its establishments between employees on the basis of sex, by instituting, maintaining and/or managing the March 1994 Pension Plan Enhancement Program, or any other similar plan, which

differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex. C. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies,
practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for women , and which eradicate the effects of its past and present pattern of unlawful employment practices.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Diana Crowley, and other similarly situated women, by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be proved at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful pattern of employment practices, including but not limited to immediately modifying the March 1994 Pension plan Enhancement Program to give immediate pension benefits to female employees for periods of time such employees spent on maternity leave prior to April 29, 1979.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Diana Crowley by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful pattern of employment practices described in paragraph 11, above, including past and future out of pocket costs suffered by aggrieved individuals as the result of Defendant's sex differentiated Pension Plan Enhancement Program, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Diana Crowley, and

other similarly situated women, by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the pattern of unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 11, above, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Order Defendant Employer to pay Diana Crowley, and other similarly situated women, punitive damages for its malicious and/or reckless conduct described in paragraph 11, above, in an amount to be determined at trial.
H. Grant a judgment requiring Defendant Employer to pay appropriate back wages in amounts to be determined at trial, an equal sum as liquidated damages, or prejudgment interest in lieu thereof, to employees whose wages are being unlawfullY withheld as a result of the acts complained of above, including but not limited to Diana Crowley and those employees named on Exhibit A, attached hereto. The Commission is seeking monetary relief for a class of female employees who have been adversely affected by Defendant's March 1994 Pension Plan Enhancement Program because of said Plan's differentiation of benefits based on sex.
I. Grant such further relief as this Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.

J. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact
raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted C. GREGROY STEWART GENERAL COUNSEL
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
1801 L STREET, N.W. washington, D.C. 20507
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Regional Attorney(#0031443)
D. Sarge Supervisory Trial Attorney
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Solvita A. McMillan(#0040011) Trial Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Cleveland District Office 1660 W. 2d St. Ste 850 Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1454 (216) 522-7453

Linda Apling Janet Appleton Elaine Baer Kathie Bair Dorothy Baptista Phyllis Barnes Roberta Barrick Joyce Benjamin Bernadette Bernabei Catherine Berry Linda Bilbrey Betty Bober Deborah Briner Sherri Brooks Pam Brumfield Joyce Burns Barbara Burris Carol Burton Harriett Campbell Carol Chovanec Harriet Christian Jackie Clay Nancy Clemens Linda Cochran Karen Cousino Kathleen Cox Nancy Craig Diana Crowley Cheryl Cuprys Barbara Dale-Collins Susan Dattilo Paula Davidson Renee Eiland Linda Engel Mary Ann Enright Evelyn Evans Kathy Ewing Vicki Fauth Joan Fetters Joyce Fogle Arlene Foulk

EXHIBIT A

Lenore Friedman Phyllis Gaulden Susan Gehlers Mary Gonyer Mirta Gonzalez Marlene Gorka Carla Grubb Janice Hagemeyer Judieth Hale Betty Hardin Janice Harding Jane Harris Janet Harris Ravella Hartman Rose Harvey Carol Hays· Joyce Hicks Victoria Higginbotham Sandra Hughes Angel Humphrey Joan Hunnell Saundra Holland Madeline Honeycutt Delois Johnson Margaret Johnson Sharon Johnson Shirley Jones Frances Kajfasz Jackie Kendall Pamela Kopena Sharon Krajicek Carol LaCourse Lunceray Lamb Patricia Lanzy Jean Lefevre Sandra Lentz Mary Livingston Linda Massengale Patricia Mays Marcia Matney Mary McBride Georgianna McKeever Margaret McKinley

Mary Minnear Sandra Moon Susan Morel Anita Moses Sandra Mulhall Pamela Murphy Virginia Myszenski Melba Nix Nancy Nuding Sharon Oehlers Diane Parker Bettie Peck Ruth Pettit Gilda pitts Betty Pope Barbara Raglin Carolyn Ray Connie Ray C. Retherford Linda Rettig Louise Richardson Teresa Riddlebarger Phyllis Riffle Maryann Roberts Brenda Rouchion Margaret Ruminski Janet Sagert Ann Schmidt Jean Schulte Carol Sears Karen Shearer Betty Sherman Sherry Sidner Frances Smith Janice Smith Sandra Smith Brenda Smitherman-Muir Susan Spangler Latricia Sparks Harriet Spencer Kathryn Strauss Marsha Struckel Wilma Teems

,
Ruth Tellings Connie Thacker Joanna Thurston Barbara Tofstad Rosalind Toyer Karen Thompson Janice Tudor Leslie Turner Sharon Tynan Janet Vogelpohl Elsie Whitfield Marie Whitson Francie Wingo Joyce Wiczynski Belinda Williams Glenna Witt Rita Wray Karen Zawodny

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

-vs-

)

)

AMERITECH SERVICES, INC., et al. )

)

Defendants

)

JUDGE PAUL R. MATIA
CASE NO. 1:97CV2106
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER RE: GRANTING AMERITECH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") brought this action against Ameritech Services, Inc. ("Ameritech") alleging various discrimination claims. These claims are now before the Court upon cross-motions for summary judgment (ECF Docs. 60 and 76). The Court has reviewed Ameritech's memorandum in support (ECF Doc. 60), the EEOC's memorandum in support and memorandum in opposition (ECF Doc. 76), Ameritech's memorandum in opposition and reply memorandum in support (ECF Doc. 77), and the EEOC's reply memorandum in support (ECF Doc. 80). For the reasons that follow, Ameritech's motion

1The within matter came on for a telephonic conference on February 21, 2001, at which time the parties and lead counsel of record agreed that the case could be resolved by a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. See Order (ECF Doc. 51) at 1, No. 1; see also ECF Doc. 60 at 10 ("The EEOC and Ameritech agree that there is no genuine issue of material fact.").

for summary judgment will be granted and the EEOC's motion for summary judgment will be denied.

I. FACTS

The EEOC brought this action against Ameritech in

August 1997.2 Ameritech had previously sought a declaratory

judgment in the Northern District of Illinois (the "Foster-Hall"

litigation). Ameritech asked the Illinois district court to issue

an order stating that Ameritech's treatment of leaves of absence

prior to the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act

("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), did not violate Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Equal

Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.,

or other state laws. The defendant class of employees in that

action brought counterclaims under Title VII, the EPA, ERISA, and

the state laws. See Ameritech Ben. Plan v. Foster-Hall,

2International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Nos. 165, 188, 336, 383, and 399, known since September 1, 1998 as Local No. 21 ("IBEW") and Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("CWA") are named as defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). IBEW and CWA are the bargaining representatives for certain groups of employees of Ameritech. CWA was permitted to realign from party-defendant to party-plaintiff. See Order (ECF Doc. 33).
2

Nos. 97 C 1441 and 97 C 2209.3 Ameritech previously moved the Court in the case at bar for an order transferring venue to the Northern District of Illinois (ECF Doc. 6), thereby consolidating the Commission's claims with those of the Ameritech employees. The EEOC resisted Ameritech's effort to have the cases consolidated and the motion was subsequently denied. See ECF Doc. 41. The Illinois litigation has concluded with a decision favorable to Ameritech, see Ameritech Ben. Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers of America, 220 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1127 (2001), and the EEOC now asserts similar claims against Ameritech in this Court.
The following facts are undisputed. See Agreed
Joint Stipulations of Fact ("Stip.") (ECF Doc. 74). Ameritech Corporation was formed in 1984 when AT&T was ordered to divest itself of the operating company subsidiaries that provided local telephone service. (Stip. ¶¶23-25, 33). The Bell Companies, formerly AT&T subsidiaries, became subsidiaries of Ameritech Corporation and Ameritech Services became operational as a subsidiary of the Bell Companies. (Stip. ¶¶2, 23-25). For purposes of this decision, the difference of corporate identity is
3District Judge Suzanne B. Conlon granted Ameritech's motion for summary judgment. Ameritech Ben. Plan Comm. v. Foster-Hall, Nos. 97 C 1441 and 97 C 2209, 1998 WL 419483 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 1998).
3

irrelevant to the outcome. Therefore, Ameritech and its predecessors will be referred to collectively as Ameritech, even though the Court recognizes that Ameritech Services did not come into existence until 1984.
In 1994, Ameritech amended its pension plan, subject to agreement with the Unions. (Stip. ¶¶39, 82-83). This amendment, known as the Ameritech Pension Plan Enhancement Program, provided that eligible employees who terminated employment between February 22, 1994 and September 30, 1995 would have three years of service credit added to their net credited service and three years of age added to their actual ages for purposes of determining retirement benefits and calculating pension benefits. (Stip. ¶¶39-41). With the addition of three years to both service and age, some employees became eligible for immediate service pension and other ancillary benefits otherwise not available. (Stip. ¶41).
This action arises because Ameritech used a record-keeping system it calls Net Credited Service ("NCS") for purposes of determining an employee's entitlement to pension and other employment benefits under the 1994 benefit enhancement program. (Stip. ¶¶34, 35, 39-42). The NCS system produces a number that is assigned to each employee and is used to calculate
4

seniority. (Stip. ¶¶66, 67). This NCS number reflects continuous employment less deductible absences. (Stip. ¶¶59-65, 70-71).
Before the enactment of the PDA, Ameritech employees who took pregnancy and maternity-related leave were given less seniority credit than employees who took leaves of absence for temporary disabilities. (Stip. ¶34). Furthermore, at certain points prior to August 7, 1977, pregnant Ameritech employees were required to take maternity leave. (Stip. ¶52). As a result, many Ameritech employees who became pregnant prior to 1979 lost substantial amounts of NCS.
On April 29, 1979 (the effective date of the PDA amendments to Title VII), Ameritech amended its maternity leave policy to comply with the new law. (Stip. ¶¶38, 74). Under the amended policy, Ameritech began giving employees full NCS credit for their pregnancy and maternity-related leaves. (Stip. ¶¶38, 74). It did not, however, adjust the NCS periods of employees who had taken pregnancy or maternity-related leaves before the effective date of the PDA amendments. (Stip. ¶40). Despite its refusal to credit affected employees, Ameritech continued to use NCS to determine eligibility for various benefits, including the 1994 benefit enhancement program. (Stip. ¶¶40, 69-71). As a result, an estimated 7,000 Ameritech employees were not eligible for the newly offered benefits. (Stip. ¶10).
5

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment is appropriately granted when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Meade v. Pension Appeals and Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 192-93 (6th Cir. 1992).
The moving party is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party must "show that the non-moving party has failed to establish an essential element of his case upon which he would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial." Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). In reviewing the motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party when deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); White v. Turfway Park Racing Assn., Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1990).
6

The Supreme Court, in deciding Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), stated that in order for a motion for summary judgment to be granted, there must be no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 248. A fact is "material" only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. In determining whether a factual issue is "genuine" the Court must decide whether the evidence is such that reasonable jurors could find that the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict. Id. The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position ordinarily will not be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252.
III. THE EEOC IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT As an initial matter, it must be decided whether
the EEOC is properly before this Court. Ameritech argues that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ameritech Ben. Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers of America, 220 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2000), precludes the EEOC from maintaining this action. Given the facts of the Foster-Hall litigation and the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the EEOC's role in bringing employment discrimination claims, the Court finds that the EEOC may seek a decision in this case.
7

IV. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL Ameritech next contends that the EEOC is barred
from maintaining this action based on res judicata and collateral estoppel principles. Under federal res judicata, or claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); see also EEOC v. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d 448, 462 (6th Cir. 1999). While the EEOC appeared before the Seventh Circuit as amicus curiae, that court noted that "[its] ruling . . . will not formally preclude the EEOC in its Ohio action, since the Commission is . . . not a party before this court." Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 821. This Court agrees that the EEOC was not a party in the Foster-Hall litigation. Ameritech, however, makes the argument that the EEOC was in privity with the Foster-Hall defendants. Based on the wider scope of the instant action and the role of the EEOC, this Court disagrees.
Prior proceedings may bind a non-party as a privy where the relationship between the non-party and the party legally entitles the party to stand in judgment for the non-party, or where the non-party's interests were adequately represented by a party with the same interests. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940); Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 462-63. The
8

Foster-Hall defendants were not legally entitled to stand in judgment for the EEOC. Furthermore, the interests of the EEOC were not adequately represented in the Foster-Hall litigation. The EEOC "does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties." Id. at 458 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977)). In fact, "whenever the EEOC sues in its own name, it sues both for the benefit of specific individuals and the public interest." Id. This broad public interest, vested in the EEOC, was not adequately represented by the Foster-Hall defendants. Therefore, the Court finds that the EEOC is not in privity with the Foster-Hall defendants and, as such, claim preclusion does not bar the EEOC from maintaining this action.4
Ameritech also argues that issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, is an additional barrier to the EEOC bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit has stated that "issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, dictates that once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
4The Court also rejects Ameritech's argument that the Seventh Circuit did not properly decertify the defendant class in the Foster-Hall litigation, thereby binding all similarly situated Ameritech employees. The Seventh Circuit noted that the defendant class was never properly certified and, therefore, concluded that it would decide the case only on behalf of the parties properly before it. Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 820-21.
9

that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving any party to the prior litigation." Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 1994). Again, the EEOC was not a party to the Foster-Hall litigation and was not in privity with the Foster-Hall defendants. Thus, collateral estoppel also does not bar the EEOC from bringing this action.
Ameritech would additionally have the Court find that the EEOC waived its claims when it chose not to intervene in the Foster-Hall litigation. Ameritech points out that the EEOC's failure to intervene violated the Commission's internal standards. ECF Doc. 60 at 13. The Sixth Circuit recognized, however, that "the EEOC alone possesses the discretion as to how and when it shall carry out its administrative duties." Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 458. Such discretion entitles the EEOC to deviate from its own intervention standards. Therefore, the EEOC is not bound by the Foster-Hall litigation.
Another question before this Court is whether the EEOC may seek relief on behalf of the 943 claimants who were named defendants and intervenors in the Foster-Hall litigation. The Sixth Circuit in Frank's Nursery, supra, allowed the EEOC to seek monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of an employee whose claims were slated for arbitration. The Sixth Circuit noted that
10

the EEOC has broad powers "to obtain monetary remedies for violations of Title VII." Id. at 459. This Court need not decide whether those powers are broad enough to seek recovery for parties whose claims have been decided on the merits. See generally EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding prior judgment in employee's ADEA action precluded individual relief for him in subsequent EEOC action, but did not preclude injunctive relief against further violation); EEOC v. U.S. Steel Co., 921 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that individuals who had fully litigated their own claims under ADEA were precluded from obtaining individual relief in subsequent EEOC action based on same claims). Instead, the EEOC may rely on the claims of the approximately 7,000 similarly situated individuals to seek a decision in this case.
V. CLAIMS ARISING UNDER TITLE VII The main issue before the Court is whether the
EEOC's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. A Title VII charge must be filed within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," unless the plaintiff initially filed with an appropriate State or local agency, in which case the charge must be filed within 300 days. 42 U.S.C.
11

§ 2000e-5(e)(1). The EEOC depends on the filing of charges for notification of possible discrimination. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984); Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456. Therefore, this action hinges on whether such notification was timely. Ameritech argues that the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred when it revised its seniority system in 1979 to comply with the newly enacted PDA. The EEOC, on the other hand, argues that any accumulation of credit in the NCS was discriminatory and that the Commission was timely notified that NCS was used to determine early retirement benefits.
The EEOC is correct in pointing out that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ameritech, supra, is not binding on this Court. ECF Doc. 76 at 15 n.13. That decision, however, has a "powerful stare decisis effect" on the claims now before this Court. Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 821. The Seventh Circuit held, and this Court agrees, that "[this] case involves computation of time in service-–seniority by another name-–followed by a neutral application of a benefit package to all employees with the same amount of time." Id. at 823. It must be determined, therefore, if and when this seniority system (the NCS) violated Title VII.
Seniority of Ameritech's employees is determined under the NCS system. (Stip. ¶¶66-70). Through the NCS, employees are given credit for continuous employment with time for leaves of
12

absence subtracted. (Stip. ¶¶67-68). Prior to 1979, leaves of absence for pregnant employees were credited differently than leaves of absence for temporarily disabled employees. (Stip. ¶34). All parties agree that if this system were in effect today there would be a clear violation of Title VII. (Stip. ¶¶38, 74); see also Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 821 ("Ameritech freely admits that it could not today calculate its NCS numbers to favor persons who had not taken pregnancy or maternity leave . . ." (emphasis in original)). Ameritech amended this policy on April 29, 1979, to comply with the PDA amendments to Title VII which became effective that same day. (Stip. ¶¶38, 74). It did not, however, adjust NCS periods of employees who had taken pregnancy or maternity leaves before the effective date of the PDA, nor did it discontinue its use of NCS to calculate various benefits. (Stip. ¶40). Therefore, it must be determined whether Ameritech's use of NCS to calculate early retirement benefits is a new discriminatory act or merely the present effects of pre-PDA discrimination.
When dealing with the aftermath of discriminatory acts which occurred before such acts clearly became illegal, the Supreme Court draws a slight distinction between continuing violations and past violations with present effects. Compare Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) with United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). This distinction becomes important in
13

the instant case because if the continuing violation doctrine

applies, the EEOC's claims are timely. On the other hand, if

limited eligibility for Ameritech's early retirement benefit offer

is the present effect of its pre-1979 maternity leave policy,

Ameritech is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Supreme Court considered the present effects of

past discrimination in Evans, supra. The defendant airline

rehired the plaintiff after its policy of terminating flight

attendants upon marriage was found to violate Title VII. The

Court held that no present violation existed when the airline

refused to credit plaintiff with seniority lost as a result of her

termination. Id. at 557-58. The Court further stated that

plaintiff's claim challenging her termination, as opposed to her

claim challenging the airline's refusal to grant seniority credit,

was not timely. Therefore, the discriminatory termination was to

be treated as an act occurring before Title VII was enacted.

Id. at 558.

In Bazemore, supra, the Supreme Court recognized

the existence of a continuing violation, which gave rise to a timely Title VII action. The continuing violation occurred when the defendant employer calculated base salary using a discriminatory salary structure. Id. at 395-396. The Court held that the use of the discriminatory salary structure violated Title

14

VII even though this structure was established prior to Title

VII's effective date. Id. The Court recognized that each paycheck

that "delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white

is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that

this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII."

Id. Thus, the Bazemore plaintiffs were able to file a claim up to

180 days after receiving a paycheck, rather than 180 days after

the salary structure was enacted. The EEOC similarly argues that

the aggrieved Ameritech employees could file their claims up to

180 days after they were denied eligibility for the newly offered

benefits.

Interestingly enough, the Bazemore Court discussed

and distinguished its Evans holding. In footnote six, the Court stated that "[o]ur holding [in Bazemore] in no sense gives legal effect to the pre-1972 actions, but, consistent with Evans and Hazelwood [School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977)], focuses on the present salary structure, which is illegal if it is a mere continuance of the pre-1965 discriminatory pay structure." Id. at 396 n.6. The critical question is whether any present violation exists, and "[b]ecause the employer was not engaged in discriminatory practices at the time the respondent in Evans brought suit, there simply was no violation of Title VII." Id. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that the continuing violation
15

doctrine is a narrow exception to the 180-day statute of limitations. Cox v. City of Memphis, 230 F.3d 199 (6th Cir. 2000).

When bringing a Title VII claim "the limitations period begins to run in response to discriminatory acts themselves, rather than in response to the continuing effects of past discriminatory acts." Id. at 202. In the instant action, therefore, the focus is on

whether Ameritech is engaged in any present discriminatory

practices.

In 1994, Ameritech decided to offer early

retirement and various cash benefits to employees who had high enough NCS numbers to retire between February 22, 1994 and September 30, 1995. The EEOC argues that because use of NCS to calculate benefits favors those who were not pregnant before 1979, Ameritech is engaged in a present discriminatory practice. ECF Doc. 76 at 31-32. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Ameritech's present NCS structure does not violate Title VII. (See

Stip. ¶74). If Ameritech had merely continued its pre-PDA maternity leave structure, a continued violation would have occurred pursuant to Bazemore, supra. Instead, Ameritech amended

its policies to fully comply with the PDA amendments. Furthermore, while the EEOC makes the point that

unlike the seniority system in Evans, Ameritech's "seniority

system differentiates between similarly situated males and females

16

on the basis of sex," Evans, 431 U.S. at 558, this argument comes too late. The proper time for this claim was, at the latest, 300 days after Ameritech's predecessors amended the maternity leave policies to comply with the PDA amendments and subsequently refused to credit those who took maternity leave prior to 1979. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
The EEOC is well aware of the statute of limitations and, therefore, takes a different route. It argues that the newly offered benefits are facially discriminatory because many employees are not eligible due to pre-1979 maternity leave. Ameritech, however, was entitled to rely on NCS in deciding who was eligible for the newly offered benefits for the reasons previously stated. First, the NCS system is presently in full compliance with Title VII; secondly, the NCS system had not been timely challenged. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit recognized that a rule allowing employees to sit on their rights would contradict important policy considerations. Cox, 230 F.3d at 205. In Cox, the Court held that the City of Memphis was entitled to rely on a tainted promotion list that was not timely challenged. Id. at 204-06. To allow city employees to challenge the promotion list the entire time it was used would have created an open-ended period of liability for the employer. Id. at 205 (citing Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1986)).
17

The proper time to challenge the tainted list, the Court reasoned, was when the list was promulgated. Id. at 204.
The same policy considerations weigh in favor of allowing Ameritech to rely on NCS in determining benefits. As the Seventh Circuit recognized in the prior litigation, "[i]t is no secret to any employee that seniority rolls like Ameritech's NCS make a difference for a host of employee benefits, some present, and some future." Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 823. In addition, the affected Ameritech employees knew their NCS had not been credited soon after Ameritech amended its plan in response to the enactment of the PDA. "The time for bringing a complaint was therefore long ago." Id.
The Court recognizes that the Ninth Circuit in Pallas v. Pacific Bell, 940 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1050 (1992), reached a different conclusion under similar facts. In the prior litigation, the Illinois district court declined to follow Pallas. It stated that "[t]o the extent Pallas concludes that reliance on net credited service dates without re-calculating pre-1979 net credited service based on post-1979 law is a facially discriminatory policy, this court finds Pallas unpersuasive and respectfully declines to follow it." Foster-Hall, 1998 WL 419483, at *5. In addition to recognizing the stare decisis effect of the Illinois litigation, this Court
18

similarly finds Pallas unpersuasive and, therefore, declines to
follow it. Contra EEOC v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 1999 WL 386725, *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999). The EEOC makes a final argument that 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(2) provides a window through which to bring the
instant case. Section 2000e-5(e)(2) states in full: For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the system. (Emphasis added.)
If the EEOC is able to show intentional discrimination, the action
challenging NCS accrues at the time Ameritech employees are
injured by the seniority system, i.e., when those not eligible as
a result of pre-1979 maternity leave were denied the newly offered
benefits. Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 823. Like the employees in the
Foster-Hall litigation, the EEOC is unable to prove intentional
discrimination.
19

As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, Ameritech had no reason to consider its maternity leave policy discriminatory, especially after the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that Title VII did not prohibit distinctions based on pregnancy. Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 823. Moreover, in light of the fact that the PDA has not been treated as a retroactive statute, Ameritech had no reason to think it was required to issue seniority credit to those aggrieved by the pre-1979 maternity leave policy. Id.; see also Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216, 1218 n.4 (6th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that "[the PDA] amendment was intended to be prospective only in application"). As such, the EEOC cannot prove that Ameritech adopted the NCS with an intent to discriminate, which renders section 2000e-5(e)(2) inapplicable.
Ameritech offers an additional defense to the EEOC's Title VII claims. It argues that even if the policies at issue are discriminatory, such policies constitute a "bona fide seniority system" not actionable under Title VII. Section 2000e-2(h) specifically exempts discriminatory effects that flow from a bona fide seniority system from the definition of unlawful employment practices, as long as the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate. The EEOC counters this argument by pointing out that the PDA amendments to Title VII
20

prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy and the statute specifically states that "nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Whether this language eliminates the bona fide seniority system safe harbor provision in pregnancy discrimination actions is deftly debated by the parties.
The Court finds that Ameritech has established that the NCS is a bona fide seniority system. Since 1979, the NCS has been applied in a neutral manner. Moreover, any disparity represents the present effect of past discrimination. The question remains whether this bona fide seniority system is subject to scrutiny in pregnancy discrimination actions. The Court, however, decides this case on other grounds and declines to decide whether the language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) precludes the use of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) in pregnancy discrimination actions. Despite the possible elimination of this safe harbor provision in pregnancy discrimination actions, Ameritech's bona fide seniority system does become important when analyzing the claims brought under the Equal Pay Act.
VI. CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE EQUAL PAY ACT The EEOC argues that Ameritech's application of NCS
to determine eligibility for the 1994 early retirement benefits
21

violates the EPA. The EPA prohibits employers from discriminating "between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which [the employer] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Even assuming the EEOC could establish a prima facie case under the EPA, the statute provides Ameritech a complete defense. The EPA provides that there is no violation if the unequal pay was due to "any other factor other than sex," including "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; [or] (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production." Id. This is an affirmative defense for the employer. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974). Again, Ameritech has established that the NCS is a bona fide seniority system. While this may not provide a defense in pregnancy discrimination actions, the fact that NCS is a bona fide seniority system does provide a complete defense to claims brought under the EPA. See Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 824; EEOC v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (factors adopted by a company for legitimate business reasons bar claims brought under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
Furthermore, the EEOC's claims brought under the EPA are untimely. The EEOC argues that it does not challenge the pre-1979 denial of service credit as the discriminatory act in
22

this case, but, instead, asserts that the EPA violation occurred in 1994. ECF Doc. 80 at 29. However, given the fact that 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) precludes the EEOC from bringing an EPA claim against Ameritech for its 1994 reliance on NCS, the only actionable claim occurred more than two years ago. As the Seventh Circuit noted, "[c]laims arising under [the EPA] must be filed within two years of their accrual, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), and these claims were not presented until many years after the initial decision not to adjust the employees' time in service for pre-1979 pregnancy leaves." Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 824.
VII. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Ameritech's motion for
summary judgment (ECF Doc. 60) is GRANTED and the EEOC's motion for summary judgment (ECF Doc. 76) is DENIED upon the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Ameritech is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the complaint. Final judgment will be entered in favor of Ameritech.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ PAUL R. MATIA CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Opinion and Order was filed electronically this 18th day of February, 2004. Notice of this filing will be sent to C. Larry Watson, Regional Attorney, John D. Sargent, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Solvita A. McMillan, Trial Attorney, Joyce Goldstein, Esq., Brian P. O'Connor, Esq., and Cynthia C. Schafer, Esq., by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system. A copy of this Order has also been sent by regular mail this 18th day of February, 2004 to Mary K. O'Melveny, Esq., 501 3rd Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20001-2797; James D. Holzhauer, Esq., Robert A. Bloom, Esq., and Kim A. Leffert, Esq., Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, 190 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60603; and Gilbert A. Cornfield, Esq., Cornfield and Feldman, 25 East Washington Street, Suite 1400, Chicago, Illinois 60604-1803.
/s/ PAUL R. MATIA CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
24

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs

)

)

-vs-

)

)

AMERITECH SERVICES, INC., et al. )

)

Defendants

)

JUDGE PAUL R. MATIA CASE NO. 1:97CV2106
JUDGMENT ENTRY

This Court, having filed its Memorandum of Opinion and Order Re: Granting Ameritech's Motion for Summary Judgment, hereby enters judgment in favor of defendant, Ameritech Services, Inc., and against plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on the complaint. Final.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ PAUL R. MATIA CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A copy of the foregoing Judgment Entry was filed electronically this 18th day of February, 2004. Notice of this filing will be sent to C. Larry Watson, Regional Attorney, John D.

Sargent, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Solvita A. McMillan, Trial Attorney, Joyce Goldstein, Esq., Brian P. O'Connor, Esq., and Cynthia C. Schafer, Esq., by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system. A copy of this Order has also been sent by regular mail this 18th day of February, 2004 to Mary K. O'Melveny, Esq., 501 3rd Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20001-2797; James D. Holzhauer, Esq., Robert A. Bloom, Esq., and Kim A. Leffert, Esq., Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, 190 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60603; and Gilbert A. Cornfield, Esq., Cornfield and Feldman, 25 East Washington Street, Suite 1400, Chicago, Illinois 60604-1803.
/s/ PAUL R. MATIA CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2

 
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Cat03, Perelman, Standard, Termed
U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:97-cv-02106-PRM

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al v. Ameritech Services, Inc. et al Assigned to: Hon. Paul R. Matia Case in other court: 04-03496 Cause: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

Date Filed: 08/15/1997 Date Terminated: 02/18/2004 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by C. Larry Watson U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - Cleveland 3001 AJC Federal Bldg. 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216-522-7455 Fax: 216-522-7430 Email: larry.watson@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John D. Sargent INVALID - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 850 Skylight Office Tower 1660 West Second Street Cleveland, OH 44113-1454 216-522-7438 Fax: 216-522-7430 Email: John.Sargent@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Solvita A. McMillan U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - Cleveland 3001 AJC Federal Bldg. 1240 East Ninth Street Cleveland, OH 44199 216-522-7453 Fax: 216-522-7430 Email: solvita.mcmillan@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO
V. Defendant Ameritech Services, Inc.
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represented by Bryan P. O'Connor Goldstein & O'Connor 1040 Leader Bldg. 526 Superior Avenue, E Cleveland, OH 44114 216-771-6633 Fax: 216-771-7559 Email: boconnor@unionlaw.cc ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joyce Goldstein Law Office of Joyce Goldstein 1040 Leader Bldg. 526 Superior Avenue, NE Cleveland, OH 44114 216-771-6633 Fax: 216-771-7559 Email: jgoldstein@unionlaw.cc ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mary K. O'Melveny 501 3rd Street, N.W., Suite 800 Washington, DC 20001-2797 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kim A. Leffert Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw - Chicago 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 312-782-0600 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristen W. Crosby Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw - Chicago 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 312-701-8435 Fax: 312-706-9159 Email: Kcrosby@mayerbrownrowe.com TERMINATED: 08/27/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eric S. Dreiband Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw - Chicago 71 South Wacker Drive
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Defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 165
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Chicago, IL 60606 312-701-8931 Fax: 312-706-8360 Email: edreiband@mayerbrown.com TERMINATED: 04/01/2002 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Janet R. Widmaier Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw - Chicago 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 TERMINATED: 04/01/2002 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeri A. Lindahl-Garcia Ameritech Corporation Ste. 25A 225 West Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60606 312-727-3506 TERMINATED: 08/27/2003 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cynthia C. Schafer Ameritech Legal Department Ste. 1400 45 Erieview Plaza Cleveland, OH 44114 216-822-3973 Fax: 216-822-0240 Email: cs2763@att.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James D. Holzhauer Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw - Chicago 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert A. Bloom Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw - Chicago 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gilbert A. Cornfield Cornfield & Feldman Ste. 1400
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Defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 188
Defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 336
Defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 383
Defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 399

25 East Washington Street Chicago, IL 60604-1803 312-236-7800 Fax: 312-236-6686 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gilbert A. Cornfield (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gilbert A. Cornfield (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gilbert A. Cornfield (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gilbert A. Cornfield (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/15/1997
08/15/1997 08/15/1997 08/20/1997 09/22/1997 09/22/1997

#

Docket Text

1 Complaint with Jury Demand (6 summons and Magistrate Consent Forms issued) against Ameritech Services, Inc., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Nos. 165, 188, 336, 383 and 399. filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Filing fee collected, receipt #NA. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
2 Random Assignment of Magistrate Judge Perelman.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
3 Case Information Statement filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
4 Case Management Conference Order scheduling case management conference on 10/20/97 at 4:15 p.m. (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
5 Case Information Statement filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
6 Motion to change/transfer venue to the Northern District of Illinois (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)

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09/22/1997 09/23/1997 09/23/1997 09/30/1997 09/30/1997
10/03/1997 10/14/1997 10/14/1997 10/14/1997 10/15/1997 10/15/1997 10/15/1997 10/16/1997 10/20/1997
10/20/1997

7 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of James D. Holzhauer & Jeri Lindahl-Garcia filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
8 Supplement to motion for admission of counsel pro hac vice (related document(s)7) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
9 Marginal Order Granting deft. Ameritech's motion for James D. Holzhauer & Jeri Lindahl-Garcia to appear pro hac vice. (Judge Matia) (Related Doc # 7) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
10 Waiver of Summons Returned executed upon IBEW Local 383 & IBEW Local 336 on 8/18/97 filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Nos. 165, 188, 336, 383 and 399.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
11 Waiver of Summons Returned executed upon Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, IBEW Local 165, Ameritech Services, Inc.. IBEW Local 399 & IBEW Local 188 on 8/18/97 filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Nos. 165, 188, 336, 383 and 399.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
12 Motion for order for an extension of time & expedited disposition filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
13 Attorney Appearance by Bryan P. O'Connor, Joyce Goldstein filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Nos. 165, 188, 336, 383 and 399.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
14 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of Mary K. O'Melveny filed by Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
15 Motion for extension of time to answer complaint filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
16 Motion for order for leave to file responsive pleading filed by Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
17 Marginal Order Granting until 10/24/97 pltf's motion for an extension of time & expedited disposition. (Judge Matia) (Related Doc # 12) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
18 Marginal Order Granting motion by Mary K. O'Melveny to appear pro hac vice for deft. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. (Judge Matia) (Related Doc # 14) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
19 Report of Parties Planning Meeting filed by all parties.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
20 Case Management Conference Plan/Order: Standard track assigned; discovery to be complete by 5/4/98; new parties to be joined & pleadings amended by 1/28/98; dispositive motions to be filed by 6/5/98; status hearing set for 1/28/98 at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
21 Marginal Order granting deft. Ameritech Services, Inc.'s motion for extension of time to answer complaint(Related Doc # 15) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)

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10/20/1997 10/24/1997 10/24/1997 10/24/1997 10/24/1997 11/03/1997
11/03/1997
11/05/1997 02/04/1998 02/04/1998 05/13/1998 05/13/1998

22 Marginal Order granting deft. Communications Workers of America's motion for leave to file responsive pleading. (Related Doc # 16) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
23 Response Memorandum in opposition to deft. Ameritech's motion to transfer venue filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1) (Related motion(s)6) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
24 Affidavit/Declaration of Daniel J. Cabot in support of pltf's memorandum in opposition to deft Ameritech's motion to transfer venue (related document(s)23, 6) filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
25 Affidavit/Declaration of Teresa Personen in support of pltf's memorandum in opposition to deft Ameritech's motion to transfer venue (related document(s)23, 6) filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
26 Affidavit/Declaration of Solvita A. McMillan in support of pltf's memorandum in opposition to deft Ameritech's motion to transfer venue (related document(s)23, 6) filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
27 Answer to Complaint (related document(s)1) Filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 165, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 188, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 336, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 383, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 399.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
28 Attorney Appearance by Gilbert A. Cornfield filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 165, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 188, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 336, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 383, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 399.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
29 Reply Memorandum in support of its' motion to transfer venue (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Related motion(s)6) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
30 Order continuing status hearing to 9:00 a.m. on 4/23/98; discovery extended to 7/29/98; dispositive motion deadline extended to 8/28/98. (Judge Matia)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
31 Order scheduling trial on 11/16/98 at 9:30 a.m. & a final pretrial conference on 10/22/98 at 1:30 p.m. (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
32 Notice /Stpulation regarding discovery filed by all parties.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
33 Order permitting CWA to realign from party-deft. to party-pltf. (Judge Matia)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)

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07/16/1998 07/29/1998 08/26/1998 08/26/1998 09/14/1998 09/16/1998 09/25/1998 09/29/1998 09/29/1998 09/29/1998 09/29/1998 10/09/1998 11/06/1998 11/25/1998
09/30/1999

34 Notice rescheduling final pretrial conference on 11/12/98 at 11:30 a.m. in room 112 before Judge Matia.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
35 Motion for extension of time to complete discovery and to file dispositive motions filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
36 Motion for extension of time to file dispositive motion filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
37 Motion to dismiss case (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
38 Motion for extension of time to file response/reply to deft's motion to dismiss filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
39 Response to deft. Ameritech Services, Inc.'s moiton to dismiss filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1) (Related motion(s)37) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
40 Motion for extension of time to file response/reply brief in support of its' motion to dismiss filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
41 Marginal Order denying moiton by Ameritech Services, Inc. to transfer venue (Related Doc # 6) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
42 Marginal Order granting the agreed motion of EEOC to extend discovery to 8/28/98 & dispositive motion deadlines to 9/30/98 (Related Doc # 35) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
43 Marginal Order granting motion of EEOC for extension of time until 9/16/98 to respond to deft's motion to dismiss (Related Doc # 38) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
44 Marginal Order granting motion by deft Ameritech for extension of time to file a reply brief in support of its' motion to dismiss (Related Doc # 40) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
45 Reply memorandum of law in support of its' motion to dismiss filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1) (Related motion(s)37) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
46 Motion for leave to file instanter sur reply to deft's reply memorandum of law in support of its' motion to dismiss filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
47 Order (Nunc Pro Tunc as of & for 11/12/98), pursuant to 11/12/98 telephonic status conference, parties will file cross-motions for summary judgment, if the Court denies Ameritech Services's motion to dismiss; the 11/16/98 trial is canceled. (Judge Matia)(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
48 Marginal Order granting pltf's motion to file instanter sur reply to deft's reply memorandum of law in support of its' motion to dismiss (Related Doc # 46) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)

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09/30/1999 02/21/2001 02/23/2001
03/02/2001 03/05/2001 03/12/2001 04/13/2001 04/13/2001 04/20/2001 04/20/2001 04/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001

49 Sur-Reply to deft's reply memorandum of law in support of deft's motion to dismiss filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Related motion(s)37) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
50 Marginal Order withdrawing motion by Ameritech Services, Inc. to dismiss case. (Related Doc # 37) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
51 Order that Ameritech Services to file motion for summary judgment by 4/23/01; EEOC to file motion for summary judgment by 6/4/01; Ameritech to file memorandum in opposition & reply by 7/5/01; EEOC to file reply memorandum by 8/6/01; Further Ordered directing parties to file stipulations as to all uncontested facts by 4/23/01 (Related Doc # 36) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
52 Returned Mail (2/21/01 Marginal Order) addressed to Gilbert A. Cornfield with Post Office notation: Forwarding Order Expired. (related document(s)50) .(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
53 Returned Mail (2/23/01 Order) addressed to Jeri A. Lindahl-Garcia with Post Office Notation: Return to Sender (related document(s)51) .(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
54 Returned Mail (2/23/01 Order) addressed to Gilbert A. Cornfield with Post Office notation: Forwarding Order Expired. (related document(s)51) .(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
55 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of Eric S. Dreiband filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
56 Motion for extension of time to file dispositive motion filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
57 Marginal Order granting motion of Eric A. Drieband to appear pro hac vice for Ameritech. (Judge Matia) (Related Doc # 55) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
58 Marginal Order granting the agreed motion by deft. Ameritech Services, Inc. for extension of time to file motions for summary judgment and related papers (Related Doc # 56) (Judge Matia) (M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
59 Answer to Complaint (Related Doc # 1) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
60 Motion for summary judgment filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
61 Exhibits 1 through 13 in support of its motion for summary judgment (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
62 Exhibit 14 in support of its motion for summary judgment (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
63 Exhibit 14 Volume 2 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)

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05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001
05/29/2001 07/10/2001
08/10/2001
08/10/2001

64 Exhibit 14 Volume 3 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
65 Exhibit 14 Volume 4 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
66 Exhibit 14 Volume 5 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
67 Exhibit 14 Volume 6 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
68 Exhibit 14 Volume 7 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
69 Exhibit 14 Volume 8 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
70 Exhibit 14 Volume 9 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
71 Exhibit 14 Volume 10 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
72 Exhibit 14 Volume 11 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
73 Exhibit 14 Volume 12 (Complete Document on File in Clerk's Office) (related document(s)60) filed by Ameritech Services, Inc..(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
74 Agreed Joint Stipulations of Fact (Complete Document (Exhibits 1 to 8) on File in Clerk's Office filed by Ameritech Services, Inc., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.(M, J A) Modified text on 5/30/2001 (M, J A). (Entered: 05/30/2001)
75 Notice of Placement of case in the CM/ECF Docketing System .(M, J A) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
76 Motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and memorandum in opposition to Ameritech Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment filed by Solvita A. McMillan on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 memorandum in support of SJ and memorandum in opposition to Ameritech's motion for SJ# 2 Local Rule 7.1(g) affidavit# 3 citations# 4 affidavit of Paula Davidson# 5 attachment A to Paula Davidson affidavit# 6 affidavit of Virginia Myszenski Jones# 7 attachments A, B and C to affidavit of Virginia Myszenski Jones)(Related document(s)60) (C, K A) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
77 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 76, 60) to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Ameritech's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14)(Dreiband, Eric) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
78 Opposition (Related Motion(s) 60) to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Ameritech Service's Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.. (Dreiband, Eric) (Entered: 08/10/2001)

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09/07/2001
09/19/2001
09/19/2001
09/25/2001 03/29/2002 03/29/2002 04/01/2002 08/11/2003 08/11/2003 08/11/2003 08/27/2003
08/27/2003 09/09/2003

79 Unopposed Motion for extension of time until 9/18/01 to file reply to response to motion for summary judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Related document(s)78, 77) (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text 9/10/2001 (C, K A). (Entered: 09/07/2001)
80 Reply (Related Motion(s) 76, 60) to Ameritech's memorandum in opposition to the Commission's motion for summary judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (McMillan, Solvita) Modified text 9/19/2001 (C, K A). Additional attachment (declaration of Teresa Personen in support of reply in support of motion for summary judgment, COMPLETE DOCUMENT ON FILE IN CLERK'S OFFICE) added and modified on 9/19/2001 (C, K A). (Entered: 09/19/2001)
81 Supplement to Reply to Ameritech's Memorandum in Opposition to the Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Related document(s)80) (McMillan, Solvita) (Entered: 09/19/2001)
82 Order entered on 9/25/2001 Granting Motion for extension of time until 9/19/01 (Related Doc # 79)chief Judge Paul R. Matia. (I, B) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
83 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of Kristen W. Crosby filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 affidavit of Kristen W. Crosby)(C, K A) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
84 Attorney Appearance of Kristen W. Crosby filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.. (C, K A) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
85 Order signed on 4/1/2002 Granting Motion to appear pro hac vice, attorney Kristen W Crosby for Ameritech Services, Inc. added to case. (Related Doc # 83) (I, B) (Entered: 04/01/2002)
86 Notice of change of firm name filed by Ameritech Services, Inc.(C, K A) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
87 Motion for appearance of Kim A. Leffert on behald of Ameritech Services, Inc. (C, K A) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
88 Motion for appearance pro hac vice of Kim A. Leffert filed by Ameritech Services, Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(C, K A) (Entered: 08/11/2003)
89 Marginal Order granting Defendant Ameritech Services, Inc.'s motion to enter appearance of attorney Kim A. Leffert (Related Doc # 87). Signed by Judge Paul R. Matia on 8/27/03.(R, J) Modified text on 8/27/2003 (R, J). (Entered: 08/27/2003)
90 Marginal Order granting Defendant Ameritech Services, Inc.'s motion for attorney Kim A. Leffert to appear pro hac vice (Related Doc # 88). Signed by Judge Paul R. Matia on 8/27/03. (R, J) (Entered: 08/27/2003)
91 Returned Mail (8/27/03 Marginal Entry Orders) addressed to Gilbert A. Cornfield with Post Office notation: Forwarding Order Expired. (Attachment: # 1 8/27/03 Marginal Entry Orders & Notices of Electronic Filing) (Related documents 89, 90) (M, J A) (Entered: 09/09/2003)

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09/26/2003
02/18/2004
02/18/2004
04/15/2004 04/29/2004 05/04/2004 05/06/2005 06/29/2005

92 Address Change Notice of Cornfield and Feldman filed by counsel for International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 165, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 188, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 336, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 383 and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 399. (C, K A) (Entered: 09/26/2003)
93 Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting Ameritech's motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 60) and denying EEOC's motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 76) upon the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Ameritech is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the complaint. Final judgment will be entered in favor of Ameritech. It Is So Ordered. Signed by Chief Judge Paul R. Matia on 2/18/2004.(S, B) (Entered: 02/18/2004)
94 Judgment Entry. This Court having filed its Memorandum of Opinion and Order re 93 Order on Motion for summary judgment, hereby enters judgment in favor of defendant, Ameritech Services, Inc., and against plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on the complaint. Signed by Chief Judge Paul R. Matia on 2/18/2004. (S, B) Modified text 2/19/04 (C, K A). (Entered: 02/18/2004)
95 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals from the 93 Memorandum of Opinion and Order of 2/18/04 and from the 94 Judgment Entry of 2/18/04, filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (McMillan, Solvita). Modified text on 4/16/2004 (H, S P). (Entered: 04/15/2004)
96 Transcript Request by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 95 Notice of Appeal. Transcript is unnecessary, there were no hearings. (H, S P) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
97 Acknowledgment from the USCA for Sixth Circuit of receipt of 95 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 04-3496). Date filed in USCA 4/19/04. (H, S P) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
98 Information copy of opinion from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit: Affirming the judgment of the District Court as to 95 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 04-3496). This is not a mandate order. Circuit Judges: Martin, Cook and Lay. Date issued by USCA 5/3/05 (H, S P) (Entered: 05/09/2005)
99 True copy of mandate from the USCA for the Sixth Circuit: Affirming the judgment of the District Court as to 95 Notice of Appeal (USCA# 04-3496). Date issued as mandate 6/27/05, No costs taxed (Related document 98) (H, S P) (Entered: 06/30/2005)

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 f I LEe

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MAY - 3 2005 LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

// 77Cf/JI06

Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERITECH SERVICES, INC.,

~tIf/?7 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Defendant-Appellee.

----------------------------------~/

Before:

MARTIN, COOK and LAY, Circuit Judges:

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

appeals the district court's award of summary judgment in favor ofAmeritech Services, Inc., in this

case alleging pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

Prior to April 29, 1979, the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(k), Ameritech's predecessors treated pregnancy leave as personal leave rather than as

disability leave for purposes of seniority accrual. Both parties agree that this policy would have

violated the Act if it were in place when the Act became effective, but on the effective date of the

*The Honorable Donald P. Lay, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

No. 04-3496 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm 'n v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. Page 2 Act, Ameritech's predecessors adopted a new pregnancy leave policy that complied with the new statute. It is undisputed that from April 29, 1979, to the present, employees have received full service credit for pregnancy-related leaves.
Ameritech and its predecessors have long utilized a seniority system based upon term of employment. Since the 1960s, this seniority system has been entitled Net Credited Service, which the parties refer to as "NCS." An employee's Net Credited Service date is her original hire date adjusted to reflect any leaves or other absences for which service credit was not earned. This date is used to determine retirement eligibility, pension benefits, bids on open positions, vacations, promotions, transfers, and other job-related benefits. Before and after enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, employees taking pregnancy leave were provided written notice of their Net Credited Service date when returning to work and periodically throughout their careers at the company.
In March 1994, Ameritech amended its retirement and pension plan through the Ameritech Pension Plan Enhancement Program, which provided that the retirement benefits of eligible employees who terminated employment between February 22, 1994, and September 30, 1995, would be calculated as if they had three additional years of service and three additional years of age. As a result, some employees became eligible for an immediate service pension and other benefits for which they otherwise would not have qualified. When it established the Enhancement Program, Ameritech did not alter employees' respective Net Credited Services dates, nor did it retroactively grant credit for pregnancy-related leaves occurring prior to enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. As a result, approximately 7,000 Ameritech employees who had taken such

No. 04-3496 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm 'n v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. Page 3 leave prior to April 1979 were not eligible for all of the newly offered benefits. Some of these individual employees filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued right-to-sue letters.
In December 1995, Ameritech employee Bernadette Bernabei filed suit against Ameritech in the Northern District of Ohio, alleging that Ameritech's failure to grant retroactive credit for prePregnancy Discrimination Act pregnancy leaves violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. In March 1997, Ameritech filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois against a proposed defendant class, seeking a declaration that it had engaged in no illegal activity. Bernabei's suit was transferred to the Northern District ofIllinois and consolidated with Ameritech's suit. The Northern District ofIllinois entered summary judgment in favor of Ameritech. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. See Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers ofAm., 220 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2000).
In August 1997, the Commission filed the instant suit against Ameritech in the Northern District of Ohio, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act and seeking relief on behalf of a class of "all present and former female employees of [Ameritech] who took any maternityrelated leave of absence which commenced on or after July 2, 1965 and before April 29, 1979 and who are now or were within the scope of the offer made by the March 25, 1994 Pension Plan Enhancement Program of [Ameritech]."
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor ofAmeritech. The district court held that the Commission's Title VII claim was time-barred because the claimants did not file charges with the Commission within three hundred days of any discriminatory conduct by Ameritech. According to the court, any discriminatory conduct in which Ameritech may have

No. 04-3496 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm 'n v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. Page 4 engaged took place no later than 1979 and the differentials in early retirement eligibility and benefits represented only "the present effect of[Ameritech's] pre-1979 maternity leave policy." With respect to the Commission's Equal Pay Act claim, the district court held that Ameritech was entitled to a complete defense because any unequal pay was due to a bona fide "seniority system." In making its ruling, the district court indicated that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ameritech Benefit Plan, while not preclusive, had a "powerful stare decisis effect" on this litigation.
After engaging in a thorough review of the record in the present case, we conclude that the district court was correct to grant summary judgment to Ameritech. The Seventh Circuit, in Ameritech Benefit Plan, 220 F.3d at 821-24, considered the very facts and legal issues presented in this case and concluded that Ameritech was entitled to summary judgment on both the Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims. We find the Seventh Circuit's analysis to be persuasive, and we thus adopt it in this case.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court's judgment.