E ~t

. :I: I"~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT K
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

'06 JUN 26 All :54

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF

)

RACINE, INC., d/b/a INERNATIONAL )

HOUSE OF PANCAKES, and

)

SALAUDDIN JANMOHAMMED,

)

)

Defendants.

)

) ~, ~
·Civ.il Action No.
06-C-0715
COMPLAINT
Jury Trial Demand

NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and retaliation, and to provide appropriate reHefto Katrina Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees of defendant Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., d/b/a International House of Pancakes ("IHOP") who were adversely affected by such practices. Ms. Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees were adversely affected by such practices when an assistant manager at defendant's IHOP restaurant in Racine, Wisconsin subjected them to a sexually hostile working environment based on their gender. In addition, defendant discharged Ms. Shaw because of her refusal to submit to the harassment and her opposition to such unlawful employment practices.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451,1331,1337, 1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VIlli) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. The unlawful employment practices alleged were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
PARTIES 3. The plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with administering, interpreting, and enforcing Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, the defendant, Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. ("MHR"), was an Illinois corporation doing business in the City of Racine, Wisconsin, and had continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, MHR had continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 70 I(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), and (h). 6. At all relevant times, Salauddin Janmohammed was the President of MHR, and caused its dissolution on or about October 19,2005. On information and belief, Janmohammed received assets, either actually or constructively, as a result of that dissolution. He is therefore potentially liable for any relief that may be awarded plaintiff pursuant to 805 ILCS 5/12.80, Wis.

Stats. § 180.1408, and other applicable law, and is properly joined in this action as a relief defendant.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Katrina Shaw, a fonner MHR employee, filed charges with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by MHR. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. During Shaw's employment, MHR engaged in unlawful employment practices at its IHOP restaurant at 5800 Durand Ave., Racine, WI 53406 in violation of Sections 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3. Among other things, its assistant manager subjected Shaw to sexual harassment (including, but not limited to, unwelcome physical touching, propositions for sex, and sexual comments), which further created a sexually hostile and offensive work environment. MHR, despite actual or constructive notice of the situation, failed and refused to take prompt and appropriate action to correct the harassment and the resulting hostile environment. This situation continued until the assistant manager discharged Shaw, for her refusal to submit to the harassment and her opposition to such discriminatory practices. 9. Other similarly situated female employees ofMHR were also subjected to sexual harassment and a sexually hostile and offensive work environment while working at MHR's IHOP restaurant at 5800 Durand Ave., Racine WI 53406, including among other things, unwelcome physical touching, propositions for sex, and sexual comments from the assistant manager. MHR, despite actual or constructive notice of the situation, failed and refused to take prompt and appropriate action to correct the harassment and the resulting hostile environment.
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10. The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraphs 8 and 9 above has been to deprive Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees of equal employment opportunities, and to otherwise adversely affect their status as employees, because of sex; and in Shaw's case, in retaliation for her opposition to discriminatory practices.
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraphs 8 and 9 above were intentional.
12. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraphs 8 and 9 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, EEOC respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining MHR and its officers, successors, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in sexual harassment, any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex, and retaliation for opposition to such practices. B. Order MHR to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for women, and which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices. C. Order MHR and lanmohammed to make Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees whole by providing appropriate backpay and benefits, with pre-judgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including frontpay.
4

D. Order MRH and Janmohammed to make Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees whole by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in Paragraphs 8 and 9 above, including (but not limited to) emotional pain, suffering, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order MRH and Janmohammed to pay Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees punitive damages for MHR's malicious and reckless conduct described in Paragraphs 8 and 9 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
G. Award EEOC its costs of this action. mRY TRIAL DEMAND
EEOC requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

Date: June 26, 2006.

Dated: (,~(, {

,2006

James L. Lee Deputy General Counsel
Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
1801 "L" Street, N.W. a ington, D.C. 20507

5

t a t Dated: I

,2006

N:complaint.l.06-23-06

rian C. Tyndall Senior Trial Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Milwaukee District Office 310 West Wisconsin Avenue - Suite 800 Milwaukee, WI 53203-2292 Phone (414) 297-1130 Fax (414) 297-3146 TDD (414) 297-1115

6

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF

)

RACINE, INC., d/b/a INERNATIONAL )

HOUSE OF PANCAKES,

)

FLIPMEASTACK, INC., and

)

SALAUDDIN JANMOHAMMED,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No.
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Jury Trial Demand

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a to

correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and retaliation, and to provide

appropriate relief to Katrina Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees of

defendant Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., d/b/a International House of Pancakes

(“IHOP”) and defendant Flipmeastack, Inc. (“Flip”) who were adversely affected by such

practices. Ms. Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees were adversely affected

by such practices when an assistant manager at defendants’ IHOP restaurant in Racine,

Wisconsin subjected them to a sexually hostile working environment based on their gender. In

addition, Ms. Shaw was discharged because of her refusal to submit to the harassment and her

opposition to such unlawful employment practices.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. The unlawful employment practices alleged were committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
PARTIES 3. The plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), is the agency of the United States of America charged with administering, interpreting, and enforcing Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times, the defendant, Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. (“IHOP”), was an Illinois corporation doing business in the City of Racine, Wisconsin, and had continuously had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times, IHOP had continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), and (h). 6. At all relevant times, the defendant, Flipmeastack, Inc. (“Flip”), was an Illinois corporation doing business in Illinois and Wisconsin.

7. At all relevant times, IHOP and Flip have been a single employer continuously engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), and (h).
8. At all relevant times, IHOP and Flip employed Katrina Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees as a single employer.
9. At all relevant times, Salauddin Janmohammed was the President of IHOP, and caused its dissolution on or about October 19, 2005. On information and belief, Janmohammed received assets, either actually or constructively, as a result of that dissolution. He is therefore potentially liable for any relief that may be awarded plaintiff pursuant to 805 ILCS 5/12.80, Wis. Stats. § 180.1408, and other applicable law, and is properly joined in this action as a relief defendant.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 10. More than 30 days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Shaw, a former IHOP employee, filed charges with the EEOC alleging violations of Title VII by IHOP. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 11. During Shaw’s employment, defendants IHOP and Flip engaged in unlawful employment practices at the IHOP restaurant at 5800 Durand Ave., Racine, WI 53406 in violation of Sections 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3. Among other things, an assistant manager subjected Shaw to sexual harassment (including, but not limited to, unwelcome physical touching, propositions for sex, and sexual comments), which further created a sexually hostile and offensive work environment. IHOP and Flip, despite actual or constructive notice of the situation, failed and refused to take prompt and appropriate action to
3

correct the harassment and the resulting hostile environment. This situation continued until the assistant manager discharged Shaw, for her refusal to submit to the harassment and her opposition to such discriminatory practices.
12. Other similarly situated female employees of IHOP and Flip were also subjected to sexual harassment and a sexually hostile and offensive work environment while working at the IHOP restaurant at 5800 Durand Ave., Racine WI 53406, including among other things, unwelcome physical touching, propositions for sex, and sexual comments from the assistant manager. IHOP and Flip, despite actual or constructive notice of the situation, failed and refused to take prompt and appropriate action to correct the harassment and the resulting hostile environment.
13. The effect of the practices complained of in Paragraphs 11 and 12 above has been to deprive Shaw and a class of similarly situated female employees of equal employment opportunities, and to otherwise adversely affect their status as employees, because of sex; and in Shaw’s case, in retaliation for her opposition to discriminatory practices.
14. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraphs 11 and 12 above were intentional.
15. The unlawful employment practices complained of in Paragraphs 11 and 12 above were done with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, EEOC respectfully requests that this Court:
4

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining IHOP and Flip and their officers, successors, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in sexual harassment, any other employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex, and retaliation for opposition to such practices.
B. Order IHOP and Flip to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for women, and which eradicate the effects of their past and present unlawful employment practices.
C. Order IHOP, Flip, and Janmohammed to make Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees whole by providing appropriate backpay and benefits, with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of their unlawful employment practices, including frontpay.
D. Order IHOP, Flip, and Janmohammed to make Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees whole by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in Paragraphs 11 and 12 above, including (but not limited to) emotional pain, suffering, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order IHOP, Flip, and Janmohammed to pay Shaw and the class of similarly situated female employees punitive damages for IHOP and Flip’s malicious and reckless conduct described in Paragraphs 11 and 12 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
G. Award EEOC its costs of this action.
5

JURY TRIAL DEMAND EEOC requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.

Date: July 2, 2007. Deputy
EQUAL 1801 Washington, Dated: _______________, 2007

James L. Lee General Counsel
Gwendolyn Young Reams Associate General Counsel
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION “L” Street, N.W.
D.C. 20507
s/John Hendrickson John Hendrickson Regional Attorney

Dated: _______________, 2007
Milwaukee, Phone Fax TDD N:complaint-amended.2.07-02-07

s/Brian C. Tyndall Brian C. Tyndall Senior Trial Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Milwaukee District Office 310 West Wisconsin Avenue - Suite 800
WI 53203-2292 (414) 297-1130 (414) 297-3146 (414) 297-1115

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Marie Chartier, hereby certify that on July 2, 2007, I caused the foregoing document to be served by email and first class mail upon:
Robert M. Mihelich Law Offices of Robert M. Mihelich 2665 S. Moorland Road, Ste. 200 New Berlin, WI 53151

Paraleg

s/Marie Chartier Marie Chartier
al Specialist

7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Plaintiff,
v.
MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF RACINE, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 06-C-0715

DECISION AND ORDER The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought this action on behalf of two servers, Katrina Shisler and Michelle Powell, who were employed at an IHOP franchise in Racine, Wisconsin (the “Racine IHOP”), alleging that the servers were sexually harassed in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.1 A jury found that Shisler and Powell’s work environment was hostile or abusive and that defendants are liable for this harassment. Before me now are the parties’ post-verdict motions.
I. BACKGROUND At trial, Shisler and Powell testified that, between February and May of 2005, they were sexually harassed by one of the assistant managers at the Racine IHOP, Rosalio “Junior” Gutierrez. Shisler and Powell testified about numerous instances in which Gutierrez made sexually charged comments and engaged in sexual touching. Shisler and

1Initially, the EEOC filed this suit on behalf of three servers, but one of the servers, Rachel Schreier, failed to appear at trial, and so the claims filed on her behalf will be dismissed.

Powell testified that they complained about the harassment to both the general manager of the Racine IHOP, Michelle Dahl, and the other assistant manager, Nadia Del Rio, but that no action was taken on their complaints. Shortly after Shisler complained about Gutierrez’s behavior, she was terminated for violating the restaurant’s policy against possession of coupons while on duty.2
Shisler then consulted a lawyer, and this lawyer hired an investigator who began interviewing servers at the Racine IHOP. Del Rio informed the district manager for the Racine IHOP, Steve Smith, about the investigation, and this prompted Smith to conduct his own investigation. By this time, Gutierrez had already quit his job at the restaurant, and so Smith could not take any corrective action against him. However, Smith determined that Shisler and Powell had complained to Dahl and that Dahl should have acted on their complaints. He concluded that Dahl had violated defendants’ sexual harassment policy by not investigating the complaints and terminated her on the spot.
The jury instructions and verdict asked the jury to determine whether Shisler and Powell had been subjected to a hostile work environment and whether their employer was liable for failing to prevent or correct the sexual harassment. The jury was also asked to determine whether Shisler was terminated in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment. The jury found in favor of Shisler and Powell on the sexual harassment claims and in favor of defendants on the retaliation claim. The jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages to Shisler and $4,000 in compensatory damages to Powell. The
2Defendants argued that they prohibited servers from possessing coupons while on duty to prevent servers from handing them out to customers who were otherwise willing to pay full price.
2

jury also determined that defendants had acted in willful or reckless disregard of Powell’s rights and awarded her $100,000 in punitive damages. The jury determined that defendants had not acted in willful or reckless disregard of Shisler’s rights and therefore did not award her punitive damages.
There are three defendants in this case. The first is Salauddin Janmohammed, the franchisee of the Racine IHOP and approximately twenty other IHOPs located in the Midwest. Janmohammed was the president and sole shareholder of the second defendant, Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. (“MHR”), an Illinois corporation that Janmohammed formed in connection with the Racine franchise. After the events giving rise to this suit occurred, Janmohammed sold the Racine franchise to a third party and dissolved MHR. MHR is nonetheless a proper defendant because, under Illinois law, a dissolved corporation can be sued in its own name within five years after dissolution. 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12.80. The third defendant is Flipmeastack, Inc., an Illinois corporation owned by Janmohammed’s wife, Victoria Janmohammed. As explained in more detail below, Salauddin Janmohammed contracted with Flipmeastack to staff and operate all of his IHOP franchises, including the Racine IHOP. The jury instructions and verdict referred to the three defendants collectively and did not ask the jury to apportion liability among them.
The EEOC raises two issues in its post-verdict motions. First, it contends that all three defendants are jointly and severally liable for the claimants’ damages. Second, it contends that injunctive relief should be awarded against Flipmeastack and that such relief should extend to all of the IHOP restaurants it manages.
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Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), arguing that no reasonable jury could have found that Shisler and Powell experienced severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Defendants further argue that even if the jury could have found that the claimants’ harassment was severe or pervasive, the jury could not have reasonably concluded that defendants had failed to establish their affirmative defense under Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) – i.e., that defendants exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct harassing conduct in the workplace and that the claimants unreasonably failed to take advantage of opportunities and directives provided by defendants to prevent or correct harassment. Defendants also argue that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that defendants’ conduct caused Powell $4,000 in compensatory damages, and that the jury should not have awarded Powell punitive damages because defendants engaged in good-faith efforts to implement an antidiscrimination policy. Alternatively, defendants argue that Powell’s employer was MHR, and that because MHR had fewer than 100 employees Powell’s damages must be reduced to $50,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Defendants also move in the alternative for a new trial under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 59 based on two alleged errors: (1) failing to include a specific question on the verdict regarding defendants’ Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, and (2) admitting evidence regarding harassment claims made by employees other than Shisler and Powell at trial. Finally, defendants move for judgment on the EEOC’s unsuccessful claims and to strike certain materials attached to an affidavit filed by the EEOC in support of its post-verdict motion. I consider these issues below.
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II. DISCUSSION A. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), I must decide whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. See, e.g., Wallace v. McGlothan, 606 F.3d 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2010).
1. Whether jury permissibly concluded that claimants experienced severe or pervasive sexual harassment.
Defendants first argue that no reasonable jury could have concluded that Gutierrez subjected Shisler and Powell to severe or pervasive harassment. “To rise to the level of a hostile work environment, conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment such that it creates an abusive working environment.” Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2009). Further, a claim for a hostile work environment must be tested both objectively and subjectively. Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). That is, “the plaintiff must subjectively believe that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the working environment, and the harassment must also be sufficiently severe or pervasive, from the standpoint of a reasonable person, to create a hostile work environment.” Id. Factors that may be considered when making these determinations include “the severity of the allegedly discriminatory conduct, its frequency, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Scruggs, 587 F.3d at 840. Offhand comments and simple teasing do not
5

rise to the level of conduct that alters the terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 84041. However, to be actionable, harassing conduct does not need to be both severe and pervasive; one instance of conduct that is sufficiently severe may be enough. Jackson v. County of Racine, 474 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2007); Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2005).
In the present case, Shisler testified that Gutierrez engaged in sexually harassing behavior “all the time” during the three weeks that she worked for him. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, at 51.) At that time, Shisler was eighteen years old and Gutierrez was in his late twenties or early thirties. Shisler testified that, on several occasions, Gutierrez told her he wanted to take her into the dry storage area of the restaurant and “fuck [her] on the pancake batter.” (Id.) Gutierrez said this in the presence of other employees, as well as in private. Shisler asked Gutierrez to stop making these comments, but he persisted. Shisler also testified that Gutierrez stared at her in a sexual manner at least once per shift, and that his staring made her uncomfortable. She testified that “[h]e’d look me up and down. He’d look up and down my body. He always stared at my butt. He’d stare at my breasts. He would just stare at me like I was a piece of meat.” (Id. at 55.) Shisler testified that Gutierrez also engaged in sexual touching. One night, Shisler was bending over to clean a spill when she heard Gutierrez “talking about [her] butt” to another server. (Id. at 56.) Gutierrez then walked up to her and “slap groped” her buttocks, which Shisler described as a slap that turned into a grope. (Id.) Shisler told Gutierrez to “get the fuck off of [her].” (Id. at 156.) On another occasion, Gutierrez approached Shisler from behind and began massaging her, and Shisler could feel him breathing on her head and neck. She told him to “get the fuck away from [her]” and to leave her alone, but he refused. (Id. at 56.) Gutierrez also
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remarked to Shisler that his girlfriend would not mind him trying to pick Shisler up because his girlfriend was bisexual and they frequently picked up girls together. On another occasion, Gutierrez told Shisler that he thought she was “kinky” and that she “liked to do it rough.” (Id. at 61.)
A reasonable jury could have concluded from the above testimony that Gutierrez’s harassment was objectively severe or pervasive. Much of the behavior – including Gutierrez’s repeated requests to take Shisler into the dry storage area and fuck her on the pancake batter – was extremely severe. Although the harassing behavior need not be both severe and pervasive, a reasonable jury could have found that the harassment was pervasive in addition to severe. Shisler testified that the harassment occurred on every shift on which Gutierrez was her assistant manager. Defendants point out that, on cross examination, Shisler could tie only three instances of sexual harassment to specific shifts, and they argue that therefore the jury could not have found that Gutierrez harassed Shisler more than three times. As noted, however, on direct examination Shisler identified more than three instances of harassment, and on cross examination she insisted that harassment occurred on every shift. Although she could not remember the exact dates on which the other instances occurred, the jury was entitled to believe that the other instances did, in fact, occur. In any event, the three instances that Shisler could tie to specific shifts – propositioning her for sex on the pancake batter, telling her that she was kinky and liked it rough, and “slap groping” her buttocks – were extremely severe, and given that they occurred within a ten-day time period, could also reasonably be viewed as pervasive.
As for the subjective component, defendants argue that Shisler was not offended by Gutierrez’s behavior because she testified that at first she was “flattered” by Gutierrez’s
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attention. However, Shisler did not testify that any of the above conduct flattered her; rather, she testified that she was flattered when Gutierrez made a comment about liking her tie and her haircut. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, at 203.) Although defendants argued to the jury that Shisler was flattered by some of Gutierrez’s harassing behavior, the jury was entitled to believe that Shisler was only flattered by the comments about her tie and haircut, which occurred before the harassing behavior commenced. Defendants also contend that because Shisler had posted some off-color, sexual jokes on the online community “Myspace” (www.myspace.com) she could not have been offended by Gutierrez’s harassment. However, sharing jokes with friends in an online community is vastly different than being propositioned for sex by a supervisor at work. Thus, the jury reasonably concluded that Shisler subjectively believed that the harassment was severe or pervasive.
The evidence at trial also allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that Powell had experienced severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Powell, who was nineteen at the time, worked with Gutierrez during certain shifts between February and May of 2005. Powell testified that when Gutierrez first became her assistant manager, she did not have any problems with him, but that as Gutierrez began to engage in harassing behavior, she “became less and less comfortable with him,” to the point where she “tried to avoid him at all costs.” (Trial Tr., Vol. II, at 218.) Gutierrez’s harassment began when he told Powell in the presence of customers and other servers that her “ass looked good in them pants.” (Id.) Powell testified that this comment made her feel awkward but that she laughed it off, thinking it was a joke. However, as Gutierrez’s harassment became more severe, she realized it was not a joke. Gutierrez began to pull Powell’s hair whenever he could and told her that she “liked it rough” and “would get freaky with sex.” (Id. at 219.) On another
8

occasion, he whispered in her ear that he wanted to “eat [her] out,” which was a proposition for oral sex. (Id. at 219, 224.) He once left her a voicemail in which he asked if she wanted to “hook up.” (Id. at 219.) On one occasion when both Powell and Gutierrez were in the kitchen, Gutierrez told the cooks in Spanish that he wanted to fuck Powell but she would not let him. Gutierrez then translated his statement for Powell and the cooks nodded in agreement. Powell stated that when this happened she felt dirty. Gutierrez also approached Powell when she was in the dry storage area and pressed his pelvis against hers and told her he wanted to “do [her] from behind.” (Id. at 221.) On other occasions, Gutierrez walked past Powell and brushed up against her breasts and buttocks. Powell testified that she repeatedly told Gutierrez that his behavior was inappropriate and that he should “knock it off.” (Id. at 222.) When Gutierrez continued his harassing behavior, Powell attempted to avoid him, going so far to redirect her walking path if she noticed that Gutierrez was nearby. Based on this testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that an objective person would have found Powell’s work environment to be hostile or abusive and that Powell subjectively considered her work environment to be hostile or abusive.
2. Whether jury permissibly concluded that defendants had not established their Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.
Under Faragher and Ellerth, “[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. However, when no tangible employment action is taken (as in the present case) “a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
9

damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. “The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
In the present case, the jury was instructed to find in favor of defendants on the sexual harassment claims if defendants carried their burden of proof on their affirmative defense. However, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the EEOC, thus finding that defendants had not established their affirmative defense. Defendants argue that no reasonable jury could have failed to find that they had established their affirmative defense. I address each element of the defense in turn.
The first issue is whether the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. At trial, defendants attempted to show that they exercised reasonable care by pointing out that they had adopted a policy against sexual harassment and trained their employees about sexual harassment. The training consisted of showing all employees a “sexual harassment video tape” upon the commencement of their employment. (This tape was not shown to the jury or otherwise offered as evidence.) After viewing the video tape, both Shisler and Powell signed a copy of Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy. The policy instructed employees to “report any instances of improper behavior to [their] manager or company representative.” (Defs.’ Ex. 1026.) Shisler and Powell testified at trial that they knew they could report sexual harassment to their general manager (Michelle
10

Dahl), any assistant manager (Gutierrez and Nadia Del Rio), or the district manager (Steve Smith). Defendants also claim that they posted a sign in the employee break room that displayed the district manager’s telephone number, but there was conflicting testimony as to whether this sign was actually posted during the time period when Shisler and Powell were being harassed. Finally, defendants point out that once Steve Smith learned that a private investigator was asking questions about sexual harassment at the Racine IHOP, he commenced his own investigation and terminated Michelle Dahl for failing to investigate Shisler and Powell’s complaints about sexual harassment.
The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants satisfied their duty to exercise reasonable care by adopting the sexual harassment policy and complaint mechanism and terminating Michelle Dahl for failing to investigate Shisler and Powell’s complaints about sexual harassment. However, I cannot say that the jury was compelled to reach this conclusion. The mere adoption of some sexual harassment policy and complaint mechanism does not establish reasonable care as a matter of law; rather, the policy and complaint mechanism must be reasonably effective. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F.3d 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2007); Loughman v. Malnati Org., Inc., 395 F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, it is not enough for the employer to show that it had adopted a policy that looks good on paper; the employer must show that its policy and complaint mechanism were reasonably effective in practice – that is, that they were implemented properly. Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2005) (cited with approval in V&J Foods, 507 F.3d at 579).
In the present case, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants’ policy and complaint mechanism were not reasonably effective. First, the jury heard
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evidence indicating that all managerial employees at the Racine IHOP failed to carry out
their duties under the policy, and thus the jury could have concluded that Flipmeastack had
not properly trained its managers about preventing and correcting sexual harassment. See
Loughman, 395 F.3d at 407 (finding that “the consistent stream of harassment” at an
employer’s restaurant suggests that employer’s anti-harassment policy was “actually not
very effective at all”). Gutierrez violated the policy by engaging in sexual harassment. The
other assistant manager at the Racine IHOP, Nadia Del Rio, failed to investigate or report
Gutierrez’s harassment after Shisler and Powell complained to her. Indeed, Del Rio
testified that after Powell complained to her, she determined for herself that the alleged
harassment was not serious enough to warrant reporting because Shisler and Powell did not appear to be “afraid” of Gutierrez.3 Likewise, the general manager, Michelle Dahl,
failed to investigate and report Gutierrez’s harassment after Shisler and Powell complained
to her. Further, the jury heard evidence that Smith had failed to act on a prior complaint
3Del Rio testified as follows:
Q. You knew that this was a sexual harassment complaint, and sexual harassment complaints are very serious, aren’t they?
A. Yes. Q. And you must immediately report sexual harassment complaints,
shouldn’t you? A. Yes. Q. But you didn’t? A. But to me it was not sexual harassment, because they were always
talking and laughing. And they never look like they were afraid of [Gutierrez]. They never look like they were afraid of [Gutierrez]. They were always talking, laughing, sitting by him. Anywhere he would go, they were all behind him. So to me it was not sexual. To me it was not like they were scared of him.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, at 449.)
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by Shisler about the sexual harassment of another server, “Kristin,” by the Racine IHOP’s former general manager, Charles Hecker. The jury also heard evidence that Smith had himself sexually harassed Michele Dahl by rubbing his fingers on the cleavage area of a picture of Dahl’s teenage daughter. Gutierrez testified that he witnessed this incident but failed to report it. In light of all this testimony, the jury could have concluded that no one at the Racine IHOP took the sexual harassment policy seriously, and that the supervisors charged with enforcing the policy were poorly trained. See Clark, 400 F.3d at 350 (“The effectiveness of an employer’s sexual harassment policy depends upon the effectiveness of those who are designated to implement it.”).
Second, the jury could have concluded that defendants’ complaint mechanism was ineffective not just in practice, but on paper as well. The most serious defect was that Flipmeastack included language that could be reasonably understood as discouraging employees from making harassment complaints. After the written policy informs employees that they may complain about harassment to their manager or company representative, the policy states: “I also understand the severity of knowingly making false accusations of discrimination or harassment. Sexual harassment and/or Discrimination are a serious charge and should be taken seriously.” (Defs.’ Ex. 1026.) Victoria Janmohammed testified that she decided to add this language to the policy after her husband was sued for sexual harassment by a server at one of his other IHOPs. She denied that the language was added as a result of the lawsuit, but because the language was added after the lawsuit was filed the jury could have disbelieved her. In any case, the important point is that employees who read this statement might have been discouraged from making harassment complaints. An employee might have thought that he or she
13

would be disciplined if Flipmeastack investigated the complaint and determined that it was false. The jury could have concluded that an employer who discourages complaints about harassment in this manner has not exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment.
Finally, although this fact is not itself dispositive, I note that Flipmeastack did not establish any kind of hotline or formal complaint mechanism for reporting harassment claims. Where a large organization such as Flipmeastack employs a substantial number of teenagers, it is not unreasonable to expect the organization to “create a clear path for complaints of harassment and other forms of illegal discrimination.” V&J Foods, 507 F.3d at 579. Such a clear path might consist of a hotline posted in the employee break room that can be used to report harassment and discrimination. Id. In the present case, the complaint mechanism was somewhat informal, in that the sexual harassment policy told employees to report claims to their manager or company representative without specifying any particular point person or manner of lodging a complaint. Although defendants claim that they displayed a poster with instructions for reporting harassment claims in the employee break room, there was conflicting testimony as to whether this poster was actually displayed during the time when Shisler and Powell were harassed. In any event, even assuming that the poster was displayed, the jury was entitled to conclude that the poster did not adequately explain the complaint mechanism. The poster is entitled “IHOP Crisis Management Guidelines” and contains instructions for managing natural disasters, fires, and other events such as outbreaks of food-borne illness and armed robbery. (Defs.’ Ex. 1050.) The poster instructs employees to proceed in six steps: (1) remain calm, (2) assess the situation, (3) notify authorities, (4) notify the company, (5) proceed as directed
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and (6) refrain from commenting to the media. Oddly, the poster also lists “discrimination claims” as one of the nineteen events for which this six-step process should be used, even though most of the six steps have nothing to do with reporting harassment or discrimination claims. The jury could have concluded that complaints about sexual harassment and discrimination are significantly different than natural disasters and other similar events, and that, in burying information about the mechanism for reporting discrimination claims on a poster designed for dealing with other crises, defendants did not create a clear path for reporting harassment claims.4
Based on the above evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. For this reason, I need not consider whether the jury reasonably concluded that defendants failed to establish the second element of their affirmative defense – that Shisler and Powell unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by defendants or to avoid harm otherwise. Nonetheless, as I explain below, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Shisler and Powell did not act unreasonably.
Defendants argument at trial was that Shisler and Powell acted unreasonably in not reporting Gutierrez’s behavior to Steve Smith, the district manager. Defendants argued
4Defendants argue that, even if their poster was unclear, Shisler and Powell testified that they understood how to report harassment claims. Such testimony is evidence in defendants’ favor. However, whether defendants exercised reasonable care is a question that must be answered objectively. Just as a jury may find that a an employer exercised reasonable care even though it did not succeed in preventing sexual harassment, see Caridad v. Metro-Noth Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999), a jury may find that an employer failed to exercise reasonable care even though some of its employees understood its complaint mechanism.
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that had Shisler and Powell gone to Smith, he would have conducted an immediate investigation, as evidenced by the investigation he conducted upon learning that a private investigator was asking questions about harassment at the Racine IHOP. However, the jury could have concluded that Shisler and Powell acted reasonably even though they did not complain to Smith. Both Shisler and Powell activated the sexual harassment complaint mechanism by complaining to their “manager or company representative.” Besides asking Gutierrez to stop his harassing behavior, Shisler and Powell each reported Gutierrez’s harassment to Nadia Del Rio and Michelle Dahl – each of whom were “managers or company representatives” within the meaning of the sexual harassment policy. Shisler first reported Gutierrez’s behavior to Del Rio on March 18, 2005, which was only one day after Gutierrez first propositioned Shisler for sex on the pancake batter, and three days after he told her that she was kinky and liked it rough in bed. After Del Rio failed to take action and the harassment continued, Shisler reported Gutierrez’s behavior to the general manager, Michelle Dahl, on March 27, 2005. Only a few days later, on April 3, 2005, Dahl terminated Shisler’s employment. From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that Shisler acted reasonably and that she was not required to go directly to Smith.
Powell reported Gutierrez’s behavior to Dahl during the first week of April 2005. This was about a month after the harassment commenced. Dahl told Powell that the situation “would be taken care of.” (Trial Tr., Vol. II, at 225.) The following week, Del Rio approached Powell and asked her if Gutierrez had been harassing her. Powell said that he had been and told Del Rio that she had already complained to Dahl. Finally, in the last week of April, Powell repeated her complaint to Dahl, and Dahl responded by telling her that she knew what Powell was going to say and that she did not need to say it. Despite
16

these complaints, Gutierrez’s harassment continued until he quit his job on May 22, 2005. From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that Powell acted reasonably. Although there was some delay between the time the harassment commenced and the date on which Powell first reported it, the jury was entitled to conclude that the delay was not unreasonable, especially since Powell testified that the harassment became more severe over time. Once Powell reported the harassment to both Dahl and Del Rio and they told her they would take care of it, she had discharged her obligations under the sexual harassment policy. Although Powell might also have complained to Smith once she realized that Dahl and Del Rio had not corrected the problem, only a few weeks had elapsed between the time that Powell complained to Dahl and the date on which Gutierrez left the restaurant. The jury was permitted to conclude that Powell did not act unreasonably in failing to contact Smith during this time period. See Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 328 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that it is for jury to decide whether employee’s delay in using employer’s complaint mechanism was unreasonable, and that delays of six weeks and three months were not unreasonable as a matter of law).
Accordingly, I conclude that the jury was not required to find that defendants had established their affirmative defense under Faragher and Ellerth.
3. Whether defendants are entitled to a new trial because verdict did not contain question on Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial because I did not include a question on the verdict asking specifically whether defendants had established their Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. They argue that they were prejudiced by this omission and cite cases dealing with a district judge’s failure to include a material issue on
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a special verdict. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pressed Steel Tank Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1988). However, insofar as the verdict pertained to the hostile work environment claims, it was a general rather than special verdict, in that it did not ask the jury to answer interrogatories about each element of the claims and defenses but simply asked the jury whether it found in favor of plaintiffs or defendants.5 Thus, cases pertaining to the omission of a material issue from a special verdict are not relevant.
In any event, the verdict and jury instructions were not in any way misleading or prejudicial to defendants. The jury instructions, which tracked the Seventh Circuit’s pattern instructions, explained all of the elements that the EEOC needed to prove in connection with Shisler and Powell’s hostile work environment claims. The instructions told the jury to return a verdict in favor of defendants if it determined that the EEOC had not established all of these elements. The instructions then stated that if the EEOC had established these elements, the jury was to consider whether defendants had established their affirmative defense. The instructions told the jury to return a verdict in favor of defendants if it determined that defendants had established both elements of the defense. Consistently with the instructions, the verdict simply asked the jury whether it found in favor of plaintiff or defendants on each claim.
5The verdict was a special verdict to the extent that it included interrogatories asking the jury whether claimants were entitled to punitive damages and to separate the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded, if any.
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4. Whether defendants are entitled to a new trial because of admission of evidence regarding sexual harassment of employees other than claimants.
Defendants next argue that they are entitled to a new trial because I admitted evidence regarding the sexual harassment of employees other than Shisler and Powell. Defendants argue that this evidence was irrelevant because it had nothing to do with whether Shisler and Powell experienced sexual harassment. However, as explained above, evidence of other instances of sexual harassment was relevant to defendants’ Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense because it suggested that Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy was not reasonably effective. See Loughman, 395 F.3d at 407 (evidence of “consistent stream of sexual harassment” suggests that employer’s antiharassment policy was not effective). Thus, this evidence was relevant.
5. Whether jury’s award of compensatory damages to Powell was proper. Defendants argue that the jury’s award of $4,000 in compensatory damages to Powell was improper. Defendants contend that, in awarding this amount, the jury must have awarded damages for emotional distress caused by third parties, including Powell’s boyfriend and her father. At trial, Powell testified that when she told her boyfriend about Gutierrez’s harassment he became angry and physically assaulted her. Powell also testified that when her father learned about the harassment he became upset over the fact that she would not quit her job. This led to an extended period during which Powell and her father did not speak to one another. Powell’s father died in a skydiving accident shortly thereafter. Defendants argue that Gutierrez’s harassment cannot be deemed the cause of the emotional distress associated with these two events.
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To begin with, it is important to point out that Powell’s injuries were not limited to the emotional distress associated with her relationships with her boyfriend and father. Rather, Powell also suffered harm in the form of the humiliation and distress caused by Gutierrez’s harassment, such as when he propositioned her for sex, pressed his pelvis against her, pulled her hair, and brushed against her breasts and buttocks. Much of this harassment was severe and occurred in front of other customers and employees, and thus the jury could have reasonably awarded her $4,000 as compensation for humiliation and degradation. Cf. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that “[t]he more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant’s action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that action”).
However, even if the jury considered Powell’s relationships with her boyfriend and father when computing her damages, the award would be proper. While it is true that defendants cannot be held liable for any emotional distress caused by Powell’s boyfriend’s assault or her father’s untimely death, the jury could properly consider the strain that Gutierrez’s harassment placed on Powell’s personal relationships. Considering both the humiliation that Powell suffered as a result of Gutierrez’s actions along with the strain it placed on her relationships, $4,000 is not excessive. Further, the jury was not required to precisely determine how much of Powell’s distress was due to Gutierrez’s harassment and how much was due to her father’s death and the actions of her boyfriend. Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that jury need not quantify how much psychological distress was caused by defendant’s actions rather than other events).
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6. Whether jury permissibly awarded punitive damages. Defendants next challenge the jury’s award of $100,000 in punitive damages to Powell. A Title VII plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages if the defendant engages in discriminatory practices “with malice or with reckless indifference to [her] federally protected rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). This requires proof that the defendant acted “in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1999). In the present case, defendants do not dispute that the jury reasonably concluded that Gutierrez acted in the face of a perceived risk that his actions violated federal law. However, Gutierrez’s state of mind is not automatically imputable to defendants, and defendants can avoid liability for punitive damages if they establish that they made goodfaith efforts to comply with Title VII. Id. at 545-46. Here, defendants contend that they made good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII by adopting an anti-harassment policy and complaint mechanism, and that therefore they are immune from liability for punitive damages as a matter of law. However, the existence of an anti-harassment policy “is not sufficient in and of itself to insulate an employer from a punitive damages award.” Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2001). Otherwise, “employers would have an incentive to adopt formal policies in order to escape liability for punitive damages, but they would have no incentive to enforce those policies.” Id.; accord Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2003); Hertzberg v. SRAM Corp., 261 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2001). Further, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants’ policy did
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not constitute a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII. As discussed above, Flipmeastack’s anti-harassment policy included language warning employees about the “severity” of making false charges of discrimination or harassment. Victoria Janmohammed, the president of Flipmeastack and the person with ultimate authority for defendants’ policy, testified that she added this language to the policy after her husband was sued for sexual harassment by an employee at one of his other IHOPs. Although Janmohammed denied that she added this language to the policy as a result of the lawsuit brought against her husband, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Janmohammed was upset by this charge and that she wanted to discourage other such claims. Further, the jury could have concluded that the language about making false claims deterred employees from complaining about harassment out of fear that their complaint would be deemed false and that they would be disciplined for making a false claim.
Moreover, the evidence allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that defendants’ efforts to educate their managerial employees about sexual harassment were inadequate. As discussed, although Gutierrez, Del Rio and Dahl all testified that they received sexual harassment training, none of them did what the policy required. Gutierrez engaged in harassment himself and failed to report Smith’s harassment of Dahl. Del Rio decided that she did not need to take Powell’s complaints about Gutierrez’s harassment seriously because Powell did not seem to be afraid of him. Dahl ignored numerous complaints about Gutierrez’s harassment. The jury could have concluded that this consistent failure of management to fulfill their duties evinced a lack of effort on the part of Flipmeastack to ensure that its managerial employees actually understood what sexual harassment was and what their responsibilities were under the policy.
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Finally, the jury could have inferred from defendants’ “crisis management” poster that Flipmeastack had made only a half-hearted attempt to comply with Title VII. As noted, defendants held this poster out as their way of ensuring that all employees knew how to report sexual harassment. Yet, the poster is clearly designed to deal with events such as crime, fires and natural disasters rather than complaints of discrimination or harassment. Although the poster does list “discrimination claims” as one of the nineteen events to which it applies, it lists such claims as part of a list of three “other emergencies” – the other two being fires and “labor union intrusion.” The jury could have concluded that defendants added “discrimination claims” to this list as an afterthought rather than as part of a goodfaith effort to comply with Title VII.
Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants’ efforts to comply with Title VII fell short of the good-faith effort required to avoid liability for punitive damages.
7. Whether Powell’s damages must be reduced pursuant to statutory cap. Finally, defendants argue that no defendant employed more than 100 employees and that therefore Powell’s compensatory and punitive damages must be reduced to $50,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). However, as explained below, Powell, along with every other employee under the management of Flipmeastack, was “employed” by Flipmeastack. Because Flipmeastack managed at least 201 employees, the statutory cap is no lower than $200,000. Thus, Powell’s compensatory and punitive damages are within the applicable statutory cap and need not be reduced.6
6Defendants have not challenged the jury’s award as excessive as a matter of due process, and therefore I do not consider whether the $100,000 award must be reduced for
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B. Plaintiff’s Motion as to Scope of Remedies 1. Liability for damages The EEOC argues that all three defendants – MHR, Flipmeastack, and Salauddin
Janmohammed – are jointly and severally liable for the $105,000 verdict. Defendants argue that MHR is the entity that employed Shisler and Powell and that therefore MHR is the only party liable for the verdict. However, as explained below, Flipmeastack also employed Shisler and Powell, and therefore it is also liable for the verdict. Further, as the recipient of MHR’s assets upon dissolution, Salauddin Janmohammed is personally liable for the verdict in the amount of $15,000.
a. Liability of Flipmeastack As noted above, at the time of the events that give rise to this suit, Salauddin Janmohammed owned approximately twenty IHOP restaurants, either personally or through various business entities. He was the franchisee of the IHOP where Shisler and Powell worked. Although the franchise agreement between Janmohammed and IHOP listed Janmohammed, individually, as the franchisee of the Racine IHOP, Janmohammed incorporated MHR in connection with the franchise and became its president and sole shareholder. Janmohammed did not formally assign the franchise to MHR, but it was apparently Janmohammed’s intent that MHR be the de facto franchisee. However, MHR did not actually operate the franchise. Janmohammed delegated that function to Flipmeastack. According to Victoria Janmohammed, Flipmeastack’s business consists of providing “management consulting” services to all of the IHOPs
reasons other than the statutory cap. 24

owned by Salauddin Janmohammed. However, “management consulting” is not an apt description of what Flipmeastack does. Usually, management consultants make recommendations to firms for improving their business, and the firms decide whether to implement the consultants’ recommendations. Flipmeastack does not make recommendations to Salauddin Janmohammed about the operation of his IHOPs; rather, it operates them outright. That is, when Janmohammed decides to open a new IHOP, he hires Flipmeastack to staff the restaurants and supervise their day-to-day operations without any input from him whatsoever. Flipmeastack does this through its district managers, each of whom is responsible for several of Janmohammed’s restaurants. When Janmohammed opens a new restaurant, Flipmeastack assigns one of its district managers to that restaurant. The district manager hires and supervises the restaurant’s general manager, and the general manager then hires and supervises the assistant managers and remaining employees at each store. All restaurant-level employees receive their paychecks from the corporation associated with their restaurant (e.g., MHR), while all district managers and higher employees receive their paychecks from Flipmeastack. Although Flipmeastack does not usually hire the assistant managers and servers, it exercises control over them indirectly through general managers, and also directly, in that district managers will often participate in the management of individual restaurants. At trial, the district manager for the Racine IHOP, Steve Smith, testified that he considered himself the servers’ “boss” (Trial Tr., Vol. III, at 539), and stated that he was authorized to hire and fire servers on the spot (id. at 617).
All policies concerning the day-to-day operation of Janmohammed’s restaurants – such as employee training, what vendors to use when purchasing food, and store
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promotions – are formulated and monitored by Flipmeastack. As explained above, Flipmeastack is also in charge of the sexual harassment policy and complaint mechanism at all of Janmohammed’s IHOPs.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “multiple entities may be considered an employee's ‘employer’ for the purposes of Title VII liability.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1088 (7th Cir. 2008). In the present case, the parties agree that MHR was one of Shisler and Powell’s employers. Whether Flipmeastack was also their employer depends on general principles of agency law. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-55. Although a number of factors are normally considered when determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, under Title VII the pertinent question is whether “the defendant so far controlled the plaintiff's employment relationship that it [is] appropriate to regard the defendant as the de facto or indirect employer of the plaintiff.” EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1995). This approach is sensible, because Title VII is concerned with preventing discrimination in the workplace, and the entity with the greatest ability to prevent and correct such discrimination – i.e., the entity exercising control over the workplace – should be charged with liability for doing so. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (stating that employer should be held vicariously liable for acts of harassing supervisor because employer has the greatest opportunity to screen supervisors, train them, and monitor their performance); Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 920 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that in Title VII context agency principles should be construed in light of practical reason for imposing vicarious liability on employers – to give employers incentive to control their employees).
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In the present case, Flipmeastack exercised total control over the employees of the Racine IHOP. As described above, Salauddin Janmohammed, MHR’s president, did not in any way participate in the operation of the restaurant. Instead, he hired Flipmeastack to do so, which then hired all of the restaurant’s employees and supervised their day-to-day activities. MHR essentially subcontracted responsibility for the Racine IHOP’s operations to Flipmeastack, and Flipmeastack then hired employees who were directly answerable to it, even though they received their paychecks from MHR. Indeed, although paychecks were issued by MHR, it was Flipmeastack that determined how much each employee would be paid, and whether the employee would receive a raise. Further, Flipmeastack was responsible for administering the sexual harassment and diversity policy at the Racine IHOP, along with all other policies regarding the operation of the restaurant. Thus, Flipmeastack was an “employer” of Shisler and Powell, even though it did not sign their paychecks. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Ill., 243 F.3d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “the source of funds need not coincide with the identity of the employer,” and that an entity can be an individual’s “employer” even if it does not supply the funds that are used to pay him or her). Accordingly, Flipmeastack is jointly and severally liable for the verdict.
Before moving on, I note that the parties had framed the issue of Flipmeastack’s liability in terms of Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999), a case in which the Seventh Circuit was asked to disregard the separate corporate existence of several affiliated companies. The court held that although each separate entity within a set of affiliated companies was entitled to be treated as such, the separate existence of each entity could be disregarded if it would be appropriate to “pierce the corporate veil” or
27

if the enterprise split itself into separate entities for the purpose of avoided coverage under the antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 940-42. The court also recognized that it would be appropriate to hold a parent company liable for the act of its subsidiary if the parent company “directed the discriminatory act, practice, or policy of which the employee of its subsidiary was complaining.” Id. at 941.
Although Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc. has some relevance to the present case, I find that it is not entirely on point. As discussed, the dispositive issue is whether Flipmeastack was one of Shisler and Powell’s employers, an issue not addressed in Papa. However, Papa has some relevance, in that it serves as a reminder that a company with a distinct corporate existence can be held liable for its own acts. Id. Thus, although Flipmeastack is a distinct legal entity, it can be held liable for employing Shisler, Powell and Gutierrez and failing to prevent and correct promptly Gutierrez’s sexually harassing behavior.
Flipmeastack argues that it did not “direct” Gutierrez to harass Shisler and Powell, and that therefore the “third situation” from Papa does not apply in this case. However, in the context of vicarious liability for sexual harassment that does not result in a tangible employment action, an employer’s liability does not arise from the employer’s affirmative act but from the employer’s failure to act – that is, its failure to prevent or correct the discrimination. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. In the present case, Flipmeastack’s liability does not stem from any corporate affiliation between Flipmeastack, MHR and the Janmohammeds, but from the fact that Flipmeastack had an independent duty to protect its own employees from sexual harassment. Thus, Flipmeastack’s liability is based on its own act, even though it did not direct Gutierrez’s behavior.
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b. Liability of Salauddin Janmohammed The EEOC next argues that I may pierce MHR’s corporate veil and hold Salauddin Janmohammed personally liable for the verdict. However, this issue is somewhat moot due to the fact that MHR sold its assets and has been dissolved. Under Illinois law, shareholders of a dissolved corporation become liable for its debts, to the extent of any distributions they received. 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12.80; Matos v. Richard A. Nellis, Inc., 101 F.3d 1193, 1195 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, Janmohammed must personally satisfy any judgment against MHR to the extent of the distributions he received from MHR. The parties dispute the amount that Janmohammed received when he dissolved MHR. The EEOC contends that Janmohammed received $210,000, the amount that the buyers paid for MHR’s assets. Janmohammed contends that he is only liable up to $15,000, since that is the extent of the cash he received from the asset sale. The EEOC seems to concede that Janmohammed did not receive more than $15,000 in cash. However, the EEOC contends that, as part of the sale, the buyers of MHR’s assets agreed to assume $195,000 worth of Janmohammed’s personal liability to the IHOP corporation. There is some confusion in the record as to whether the assumed liability was the corporation’s liability or Janmohammed’s personal liability. There is also some confusion over exactly what MHR’s assets consisted of. The primary asset was the franchise itself, but the franchise was in Janmohammed’s name, not MHR’s. On this record, it is impossible to conclude whether Janmohammed received more than $15,000 from the sale of MHR’s assets. Because the EEOC has the burden of proof and has not demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that Janmohammed received more than $15,000
29

in distributions from MHR, I determine that the EEOC can collect no more than $15,000 from Janmohammed.7
2. Injunctive Relief Title VII allows a court to award injunctive relief when it finds that the defendant “intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). The court may enjoin the unlawful employment practice and also “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.” Id. The decision of whether to invoke injunctive relief is within the district court’s discretion, as is the scope of any equitable relief awarded. Bruso, 239 F.3d at 863; EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1990). In deciding whether to award equitable relief, I am bound by the jury’s factual findings on plaintiff’s legal claims but may make additional findings of fact as needed. Lebow v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1996); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995). In the present case, the jury found that defendants intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, and so injunctive relief is authorized. EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1578 (7th Cir. 1997). However, the claimants no longer work for defendants and do not intend to seek future employment at any of their restaurants. Nonetheless, the EEOC requests injunctive relief against Flipmeastack in order to ensure that current and future employees of the restaurants under Flipmeastack’s control do not become victims of sexual harassment. In this regard, the EEOC requests an order (1) enjoining Flipmeastack from allowing or failing to promptly prevent and correct
7I also note that the EEOC did not request an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 30

sexual harassment of its employees; (2) requiring Flipmeastack to create a new sexual harassment training program for all employees that emphasizes management’s responsibility to prevent and correct sexual harassment; (3) requiring Flipmeastack to post a toll-free number for making sexual harassment complaints at all of the restaurants under its control; (4) requiring Flipmeastack to report any complaint of sexual harassment to the EEOC within thirty days and provide a description of the complaint, the investigation that was conducted, and the result of the complaint; (5) requiring Flipmeastack to post a notice regarding this case at all restaurants under its control; and (6) requiring Flipmeastack to maintain records of its compliance with the injunction and to allow the EEOC access to these records on forty-eight hours’ notice.
Even though the claimants no longer work for defendants, I conclude that injunctive relief is appropriate because the problems that led to the present suit could possibly persist in the future. See Ilona of Hungary, 108 F.3d at 1578-79 (injunctive relief is warranted when “discriminatory conduct could possibly persist in the future”). As discussed above, in finding defendants liable for the claimants’ hostile work environment and awarding Powell punitive damages, the jury implicitly found that defendants’ anti-harassment policy, training and complaint mechanism were deficient. Insofar as the jury’s findings are not comprehensive, I also find that defendants’ efforts to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior are deficient. As noted, the policy itself, in warning employees about the severity and seriousness of sexual harassment allegations, seems to discourage harassment complaints and gives the impression that an employee will be disciplined if his or her complaint is not sustained. Further, the “crisis management” poster does not clearly explain Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment complaint mechanism. Finally, based on the
31

testimony at trial, I find that Flipmeastack’s managerial employees do not understand their duties under the sexual harassment policy. The EEOC’s requested injunction is intended to address these deficiencies, and therefore I conclude that the injunction is warranted. See Gurnee Inn, 914 F.2d at 817 (affirming entry of injunction intended to address deficiencies in employer’s anti-harassment policy and grievance procedure).
Defendants argue that injunctive relief cannot extend to the other IHOPs owned by Salauddin Janmohammed and managed by Flipmeastack because they are separate entities and not parties to this case. However, the EEOC asks that the injunction be directed to Flipmeastack, and as explained above, Flipmeastack exercises functional control over all of the restaurants owned by Janmohammed. It is Flipmeastack that supervises all employees at Janmohammed’s restaurants and administers the antiharassment policy and complaint mechanism. Thus, it is Flipmeastack’s employment practices that need to be corrected, and so the injunction is appropriately addressed to it.
Defendants contend that Flipmeastack has no authority to, among other things, post notices about the present lawsuit in Janmohammed’s restaurants. This would be true if Janmohammed’s restaurants terminated their contracts with Flipmeastack and no longer relied on it for management services. However, so long as those restaurants contract with Flipmeastack and delegate control over the workplace to it, Flipmeastack has authority to post the notices required by this injunction, just as it had authority to post the “crisis management” guidelines at the Racine IHOP.
32

C. Miscellaneous Motions Two remaining motions filed by defendants require brief discussion. First,
defendants move for judgment on Shisler’s retaliation claim, which the jury rejected, and on the claims of Rachel Schreier, the claimant who did not appear at trial. To the extent that defendants request an order recognizing that Shisler’s retaliation claim was unsuccessful and that Schreier’s claims have been dismissed, the motion is granted. However, to the extent that the motion requests entry of a separate judgment on those claims, the motion is denied because the general rule is that when an action presents multiple claims for relief all such claims should be resolved in one final judgment, see, e.g., Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2004), and there is no reason to enter a separate judgment in this case. Further, to the extent that the motion requests costs in connection with the unsuccessful claims, the motion is denied because defendants are not “prevailing parties” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). Prevailing party status is not awarded on a claim-by-claim basis. Slane v. Mariah Boats, Inc., 164 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1999). Rather, the prevailing party is the party who obtains substantial relief, even if that party did not win on every claim. In the present case the prevailing party is clearly the EEOC.
Second, defendants move to strike certain materials that the EEOC included in its affidavit in support of its post-verdict motion. These materials were not offered as evidence at trial, and defendants contend that for this reason I may not consider them in connection with the present motions. However, the EEOC submitted these materials to support its equitable claims – claims for which I am the finder of fact. Of course, defendants are
33

entitled to contest the facts and to insist that I resolve any factual disputes at an evidentiary hearing. But I did not find it necessary to consult the disputed materials, and so no evidentiary hearing was required. Defendants’ motion to strike will therefore be denied as moot.
III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that the EEOC’s post-trial motion is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court enter judgment in favor of the EEOC and against defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $105,000, provided that the EEOC shall recover no more than $15,000 from Salauddin Janmohammed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court enter the injunction attached to this order as Attachment A. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and alternative motion for a new trial is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for entry of judgment and costs regarding the EEOC’s unsuccessful claims is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as explained above. FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 31 day of August, 2010.
/s_______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
34

ATTACHMENT A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Plaintiff,
v.
MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF RACINE, INC., d/b/a INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES, FLIPMEASTACK, INC., and SALAUDDIN JANMOHAMMED,
Defendants.

Case No. 06-C-0715

INJUNCTION AGAINST FLIPMEASTACK, INC. Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the court imposes the following injunctive provisions against Flipmeastack, Inc. (“Flipmeastack”) for four years from the date hereof: 1. Flipmeastack is enjoined from allowing a sexually hostile work environment to exist at any restaurant under its management. 2. Flipmeastack is ordered to create a new sexual harassment training program for all employees under its direct or indirect supervision that emphasizes the responsibility of supervisors to prevent and correct promptly and sexually harassing behavior. Further, Flipmeastack is ordered to post, at all restaurants that it manages, a toll-free number for harassment and discrimination complaints by employees and a written anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policy.

35

3. Within thirty (30) days after entry of this order, Flipmeastack shall provide counsel for the EEOC with a proposal for complying with Paragraph 2, above. The EEOC shall advise the company within thirty (30) days of receipt whether the proposal is acceptable. If the EEOC finds the proposal acceptable, Flipmeastack shall implement it within thirty (30) days of the EEOC’s approval. If the EEOC find the proposal unacceptable, it shall identify any deficiencies and make recommendations for correcting them. Flipmeastack will then have ten (10) days to accept or reject the EEOC’s recommendations. If Flipmeastack rejects the recommendations and the parties cannot settle their differences within ten (10) days after Flipmeastack communicates its rejection, either party may make a motion to the court for a decision on the proposal.
4. Flipmeastack shall post the attached Notice informing employees of this order in a conspicuous location where such Notice can be easily seen by all employees.
5. Flipmeastack shall report to the EEOC within thirty (30) days of any complaint of sexual harassment at any restaurant subject to its management and provide the EEOC with a description of the complaint, the investigation that was conducted, and the result of the complaint.
6. Flipmeastack shall maintain records of its compliance with the foregoing and shall allow the EEOC access thereto on forty eight (48) hours’ notice to Flipmeastack.
36

Date

Jon W. Sanfilippo Clerk

(By) Deputy Clerk
Approved as to form this __ day of August, 2010.
_______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge

37

Notice to all employees of IHOP restaurants operated by Flipmeastack, Inc.

Flipmeastack, Inc., an operator of IHOP restaurants owned by Salauddin

Janmohammed, in a lawsuit brought by the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), has been found by a federal jury to have violated

Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 by allowing a sexually hostile

work environment. The jury awarded a total of $5,000 in compensatory damages to

two victims and $100,000 in punitive damages to one of them.

As a result of this lawsuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Wisconsin has placed Flipmeastack, Inc., under an injunction for four

years requiring that it not allow a sexually hostile work environment at its IHOP

restaurants.

This notice is a reminder that employees have a right to be protected from

sexual harassment in the workplace, and may complain of such unlawful

discrimination both internally and to the EEOC.

The EEOC enforces the federal laws against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age or disability. If you believe you have been discriminated against, you may contact the EEOC at (312) 353-8195. The EEOC charges no fees and has a TTD number.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE

This Notice must remain posted for four years from the date below and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions about this Notice or compliance with its terms may be directed to: EEOC, 500 West Madison Street, Suite 2800, Chicago, IL 60661.

Dated: _______________________

____________________________

38

Lynn Adelman United States District Court Judge
39

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF

)

RACINE, INC., d/b/a INERNATIONAL

)

HOUSE OF PANCAKES,

)

FLIPMEASTACK, INC., and

)

SALAUDDIN JANMOHAMMED,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

Civil Action No. 06C0715

CONSENT DECREE AND ORDER

This action was filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“Commission” or “EEOC”) against defendants Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., d/b/a

International House of Pancakes (“Management Hospitality”), Flipmeastack, Inc.

(“Flipmeastack”), and Salauddin Janmohammed (“defendants”), pursuant to Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of

sex and retaliation, and to provide appropriate relief to Katrina Shaw Shisler (“Shisler”) and a

class of similarly situated female employees of defendants Management Hospitality and

Flipmeastack who were adversely affected by such practices. EEOC alleged that Shisler and a

class of similarly situated female employees were adversely affected by such practices when an

assistant manager at defendants’ IHOP restaurant in Racine, Wisconsin subjected them to a

sexually hostile working environment based on their gender. In addition, EEOC alleged that

Shisler was discharged in retaliation for her refusal to submit to the harassment and her 1

Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 1 of 9 Document 236

opposition to such unlawful employment practices. Defendants denied the EEOC’s allegations. The Commission and defendants tried the case to a jury in the District Court in
November 2009, resulting in a verdict in favor of EEOC in regard to the sexual harassment of Shisler and Michelle Powell (“Powell”), and in favor of defendants in regard to retaliation. The jury awarded a total of $5,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The Court entered judgment on the verdict against all defendants and ordered injunctive relief against defendant Flipmeastack on August 31, 2010. Defendants appealed to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing in part that Flipmeastack did not exercise sufficient control over the employees of its client restaurants to make it liable as an employer under Title VII. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict but reversed the judgment against Flipmeastack and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the issue of whether Flipmeastack had sufficient control over the employees of its client restaurants to make it liable.
After the Court of Appeals’ remand to the District Court and a settlement conference with the Court, the Commission and defendants Flipmeastack, Inc., Management Hospitality, and Salauddin Janmohammed have agreed to resolve this matter pursuant to this Consent Decree and Order, without continuing to a trial or other determination on the issue of Flipmeastack’s liability under Title VII.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having carefully examined the terms and provisions of this Consent Decree, and based on the pleadings, record and stipulations of the parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT: 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the parties for
purposes of entering and enforcing this Decree. 2
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 2 of 9 Document 236

2. The terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable and just. 3. This Decree conforms with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is not in derogation
of the rights or privileges of any person. The entry of this Decree will further the objectives of Title VII, and will be in the best interests of the parties, those for whom EEOC seeks relief, and the public. 4. This Decree resolves all claims the EEOC brought or could have brought arising out of the Charge of Discrimination filed by Shisler against Management Hospitality, EEOC Charge No. 260-2005-06821C, including EEOC’s claims herein on behalf of Shisler and Powell. The parties further agree that this Decree does not resolve any other claims. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Defendant Flipmeastack agrees to comply with the following substantive provisions of affirmative relief, as adapted from the injunction that was issued by the Court on August 31, 2010 and supplemented by the Court on May 31, 2011: 1. Flipmeastack shall not allow a sexually hostile work environment to exist at any restaurant at which it provides restaurant management consulting services. For the purposes of this Consent Decree, the term “restaurant management consulting services” is specifically defined and limited to sexual harassment, diversity and discrimination training, prevention, compliance, and investigation services. Restaurants which currently receive such services are listed on attached Exhibit B, and Flipmeastack shall advise EEOC in writing if any restaurants are added or deleted from that list during the term of this Consent Decree. 2. Flipmeastack shall continue to conduct sexual harassment training for all employees at any restaurant at which it provides restaurant management consulting
3
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 3 of 9 Document 236

services that emphasizes the responsibility of supervisors to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. Further, Flipmeastack will post, at all restaurants where it provides management consulting services , a toll-free number for harassment and discrimination complaints by the restaurants’ employees and a written anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policy.
* * * 4. Flipmeastack shall post the attached Notice informing employees of all restaurants where it provides management consulting services of this Consent Decree and Order in a conspicuous location where such Notice can be easily seen by all employees, pursuant to paragraph 7 below. 5. Flipmeastack shall report to the EEOC within thirty (30) days of any complaint of sexual harassment at any restaurant where it provides management consulting services and will provide the EEOC with a written description of the complaint, the investigation that was conducted, and the result of the complaint. All documents and electronic information regarding such complaint and investigation shall be made available for inspection and copying by the EEOC pursuant to paragraph 6 below. 6. Flipmeastack shall maintain records of its compliance with the foregoing and shall allow the EEOC access thereto on forty eight (48) hours’ written notice to Flipmeastack. 7. A copy of the notice described in paragraph 4 shall be posted in a conspicuous location at each of the restaurants serviced by Flipmeastack. For purposes of monitoring compliance, Flipmeastack shall provide the EEOC with a list identifying the name,
4
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 4 of 9 Document 236

address and phone number of each of the restaurants serviced by Flipmeastack, and shall also provide the EEOC with sworn certifications stating that the notices are posted at all restaurants, and it shall attach to each certification dated digital photos depicting the notices and their locations at each restaurant. The first certification is due on August 15, 2012, and subsequent certifications are due by the 15th of each third month thereafter in which the injunction is in effect. Finally, the EEOC shall be allowed to conduct random inspections of the restaurants during business hours to ensure that the notices have been posted in accordance with the injunction and this order. Flipmeastack is responsible for making sure that the managers at each restaurant are aware of the EEOC’s right to conduct these inspections, and the EEOC shall ensure that its representatives carry appropriate identification. 8. The training described in paragraph 2 shall be provided to all new employees at the restaurants serviced by Flipmeastack as part of the hiring process and to all employees once per year in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Flipmeastack shall annually provide the EEOC’s Milwaukee District Office with a list of those trained and the date and description of the training provided. MONETARY RELIEF Defendants agree, within 15 days of entry of this Consent Decree and Order, to pay: $11,000 as damages to Ms. Katrina Shisler; and $4,000 as damages to Ms. Michelle Powell. Payment of the $15,000 by the defendants shall relieve Salauddin Janmohammed, in his individual capacity only, from any and all past and future liability or obligations under the monetary terms of this consent decree, subject to the default provisions set forth herein.
5
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 5 of 9 Document 236

Defendants further agree, on or before March 1, 2013, to pay $50,000 as damages to Ms. Michelle Powell. Defendants shall mail the payments to the above persons at the addresses provided by the Commission, and shall simultaneously provide copies of the payment checks to the undersigned counsel for the Commission. In the event of any default of the foregoing monetary relief provisions, this Consent Decree shall be null and void, and the case shall be placed on the Court calendar for further proceedings in accordance with the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals’ Final Judgment dated January 9, 2012. TERM AND CONTINUING JURISDICTION
This Consent Decree and Order shall continue in effect through August 31, 2014. The Court shall maintain jurisdiction over this Consent Decree and Order and in the event of any dispute or non-compliance with its terms shall conduct such further proceedings as are necessary to its enforcement, pursuant to the record herein. SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this _____day of ___________, 2012.
____________________________ Lynn Adelman United States District Court Judge EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 131 M Street, NE Washington, DC 20507 P. DAVID LOPEZ General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
6
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 6 of 9 Document 236

Milwaukee Area Office 310 W. Wisconsin Ave., Suite 800 Milwaukee, WI 53203-2292 Phone (414) 297-1130

s/John C. Hendrickson JOHN C. HENDRICKSON Regional Attorney

Date: 8/14/12

s/Jean P. Kamp JEAN P. KAMP Associate Regional Attorney

Date: 8/14/12

s/Brian C. Tyndall BRIAN C. TYNDALL Senior Trial Attorney

Date: 8/14/12

MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF RACINE, INC.

By:_s:/Salauddin Janmohammed President
FLIPMEASTACK, INC.

Date__8/6/2012_

By:_s:/Victoria Janmohammed_ President
SALAUDDIN JANMOHAMMED

Date___8/6/2012

s:/Salauddin Janmohammed______ Salauddin Janmohammed

Date____8/6/2012_

7
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 7 of 9 Document 236

Notice to all employees of IHOP restaurants whereFlipmeastack, Inc. provides management consulting services
Flipmeastack, Inc. (“Flipmeastack”), a company that provides restaurant management consulting services to IHOP restaurants, in a lawsuit brought by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Flipmeastack, Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., and Salauddin Janmohammed, has agreed to post this Notice pursuant to a Consent Decree and Order. In the lawsuit, one of the restaurants where Flipmeastack provided management consulting services was found by a federal jury to have violated Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 by allowing a sexually hostile work environment. The jury awarded compensatory damages to two victims and punitive damages to one of them. Also in the lawsuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin had placed Flipmeastack under an injunction for four years, requiring that it not allow a sexually hostile work environment at its clients’ restaurants. On appeal to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgement against Flipmeastack was reversed, the injunction against Flipmeastack was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The parties then resolved the case pursuant to the Consent Decree and Order, without a determination on the issue of Flipmeastack’s liability.
This notice is a reminder that employees have a right to be protected from sexual harassment in the workplace, and may complain of such unlawful discrimination both internally and to the EEOC. The EEOC enforces the federal laws against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age or disability. If you believe you have been
8
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 8 of 9 Document 236

discriminated against, you may contact the EEOC at (312) 353-8195. The EEOC charges no fees and has a TDD number. THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE This Notice must remain posted until August 31, 2014 and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions about this Notice, compliance with its terms, or the Consent Decree and Order (a copy of which is available on request to the EEOC) may be directed to: EEOC, 500 West Madison Street, Suite 2800, Chicago, IL 60661. Dated: _______________________ ____________________________ Lynn Adelman United States District Court Judge
9
Case 2:06-cv-00715-LA Filed 08/14/12 Page 9 of 9 Document 236

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

666 F.3d 422 United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff–Appellee, v.
MANAGEMENT HOSPITALITY OF RACINE, INC. d/b/a International House of Pancakes, Flipmeastack, Inc. and Salauddin Janmohammed,
Defendants–Appellants.
No. 10–3247. |
Argued April 5, 2011. |
Decided Jan. 9, 2012.
Synopsis Background: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed action against restaurant franchise and affiliated corporations under Title VII alleging sexual harassment and retaliation against employees. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Lynn S. Adelman, J., 780 F.Supp.2d 802, denied various post-verdict motions following entry of jury verdict in favor of employees. Defendants appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Young, District Judge, sitting by designation, held that:
rational jury could have concluded that assistant manager’s verbal and physical sexual harassment directed at teenage employee during every shift was both severe and pervasive and created objectively hostile and abusive work environment;
rational jury could have found that employer did not discharge its duty to effectively prevent and correct promptly sexual harassment in the workplace;
rational jury could have found that employees reasonably took advantage of preventative or corrective measures;
1

rational jury could have concluded that sexual harassment policy was not sufficient to insulate employer from punitive damages award;
district court’s decision to not include question addressing employer’s affirmative defense on liability portion of verdict form was not abuse of discretion;
employee’s testimony regarding harassment by former general manager was relevant to employer’s Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense;
any prejudice caused by admission of general manager’s testimony that district manager had sexually harassed her was cured; and
district court’s ruling with respect to liability of corporate affiliate could not be sustained.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*427 Paula R. Bruner (argued), Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Robert M. Mihelich (argued), Attorney, Law Offices of Robert M. Mihelich, New Berlin, WI, for Defendants–Appellants. Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, BAUER, Circuit Judge, and YOUNG, District Judge.*
Opinion
YOUNG, District Judge.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought this action on behalf of two servers, Katrina Shisler and Michelle Powell, who were employed at an International House of Pancakes franchise in Racine, Wisconsin (the “Racine IHOP”), alleging that the servers were sexually harassed in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. A jury found in favor of Shisler and Powell on the hostile

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

work environment claim, and against the Defendants, Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. (“MHR”) d/b/a International House of Pancakes, Flipmeastack, Inc., and Salauddin Janmohammed. The jury awarded compensatory damages to Shisler and Powell, and awarded punitive damages to Powell.
Following the jury verdict, the EEOC filed a document entitled EEOC’s Post–Trial Motions that addressed two motions: a motion for judgment against Defendants Flipmeastack and Salauddin Janmohammed and a motion for an order of injunctive relief. The Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or Alternatively for a New Trial or Remittitur. By Decision and Order dated August 31, 2010, the district court denied the Defendants’ motions, granted the EEOC’s motions, and entered judgment in favor of the EEOC, and an injunction against Flipmeastack, Inc. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part, and affirm in part.
I. Background
The recitation of the relevant facts that follow are presented in the light most favorable to the EEOC, as they relate to the Defendants’ Rule 50 motion and the jury’s verdict. Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2000). All other facts necessary for resolution of this appeal, including the facts relevant to the district court’s conclusion that Flipmeastack was an “employer” of Shisler and Powell, will be addressed in the Discussion Section.
A. The Defendants Janmohammed was the principal owner and franchisee of twenty-one IHOPs, including *428 the Racine IHOP. He operated the Racine IHOP under the franchise name of MHR1, and was its president and sole shareholder. MHR contracted with Flipmeastack, a company solely owned by Janmohammed’s wife, Victoria Janmohammed, to provide management consulting services for his IHOPs. These services included accounting and payroll, corporate
2

IHOP franchise reporting and compliance, and human resources assistance. In addition, Flipmeastack hired the district managers, who, in turn, hired the general managers of each restaurant in the district, and oversaw the day-to-day operations of those particular restaurants. In 2005, Steve Smith was the district manager of the Racine IHOP, Michelle Dahl was the general manager, and Nadia Del Rio and Rosalio “Junior” Gutierrez were the assistant managers. The employees of each restaurant, including the general manager, assistant managers, and servers, were employees of MHR.
B. The Sexual Harassment Policy In 2005, Flipmeastack formulated and updated the Sexual Harassment and Diversity Policy for managers and employees of MHR. The policy indicated that “any form of unlawful harassment of co-workers or members of the public is absolutely forbidden, regardless of whether it is verbal, physical, or visual harassment.” It also stated that employees “will report any instances of improper behavior to my manager or company representative.” Victoria Janmohammed confirmed that Gutierrez, Del Rio, and Dahl were managers or “company representatives” within the meaning of the policy, and that a complaint to any one of those three would be effective. As the general manager, Dahl was responsible for maintaining a workplace free of sexual harassment and for reporting instances of sexual harassment to upper management, and Del Rio was responsible for training all new hires. This training consisted of showing all new hires a sexual harassment videotape, handing them a copy of the sexual harassment policy, and asking them to read and sign it. Both Shisler and Powell viewed the videotape and signed Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy. Shisler’s and Powell’s signed copies of the sexual harassment policy, like all copies signed by IHOP servers, were locked in a file cabinet. The complaint procedure was not available in print.
In 2005, corporate IHOP directed that a crisis management guidelines poster be displayed in every IHOP restaurant. The poster provided a list of telephone numbers in case of an emergency, such as an armed robbery, flood, earthquake, or “other emergency,” such as a “discrimination claim.” The poster included the telephone number of Flipmeastack, the corporate number of IHOP, and the cell phone number of Smith. Neither

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

Shisler nor Powell had any recollection of seeing the poster in the Racine IHOP.
C. The Claimants Shisler, a teenager, worked at the Racine IHOP on two different occasions. During her first term of employment in January 2004, Shisler testified that the general manager of the Racine IHOP, Charles Hecker, was sexually harassing a female server named Christine. Shisler gave Smith a written letter informing him of that fact, and complaining that she and her boyfriend were receiving unfair work assignments. According to Shisler, Smith’s response was “passive” and he *429 never “really sa[id] whether or not he was going to take care of it.” Shisler never heard from Smith regarding those issues; however, she testified that Hecker started to treat her differently, and “stated things that he only could have either been told, or read himself in the letter.” After things worsened with Hecker, Shisler “called the Corporation” and was told she “had to go to [Smith] about it.” In light of Hecker’s treatment of her, she did not complain again to Smith. Ultimately, Hecker fired Shisler.
Her second term of employment began on March 3, 2005. By this time, Dahl served as the general manager of the Racine IHOP. Gutierrez, who was approximately 10 years older than Shisler, was relatively new to the position and worked as the night manager (5:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.), while Shisler worked the second shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.); consequently, their schedules overlapped. Shisler testified that whenever she worked with Gutierrez, he made sexually charged comments to her, including, “I want to take you in the back and fuck you over the pancake batter,” “I bet you’re kinky,” and “you like it rough.” Gutierrez even propositioned her for three-way sex with his (allegedly) bisexual girlfriend. Gutierrez stared at her body, breasts and buttocks, like she was “a piece of meat,” rubbed her shoulders and pressed his body up against hers, and made her feel very “uncomfortable.” Shisler “told him to get the fuck away from [her].” She felt “bullied” by him and felt “dirty” after he told the cooks in Spanish that he wanted to have sex with her. On March 18, 2005, Shisler, along with two other servers, reported Gutierrez’s behavior to Del Rio. Shisler told Del Rio that she would have to be “blind” if she did not “see it going on.” Del Rio “blew [them] off,” shook her head, and called them “silly girls.”
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At some point after Shisler reported Gutierrez’s behavior to Del Rio, Gutierrez “slap groped” her buttocks as she was bending over to pick up hot sauce from the floor. Shisler told Gutierrez to “get the fuck off [her].” On March 27, 2005, Shisler reported Gutierrez’s behavior to Dahl, who said that this was “none of [her] concern” and then said “we’re done here.” After her complaints fell on deaf ears, Shisler “gave up” and kept working “because [she] needed the money.” On April 3, 2005, Dahl terminated Shisler for violating the Racine IHOP’s coupon policy, which barred servers from possessing coupons and giving them to customers.
Powell, also a teenager, worked at the Racine IHOP from October or December 2004 until June 2006. Powell generally worked the first shift (6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.), so she worked with Gutierrez when their schedules overlapped—approximately once a week. Powell testified that in late February 2005, Gutierrez began to make offensive comments to Powell such as her “ass looked good in them pants.” Initially, Powell thought Gutierrez’s comments were “inappropriate,” but “laughed it off, thinking it was a joke[.]” Powell’s thoughts changed when “his harassment continued and became more severe,” to the point where “she tried to avoid him at all costs.”
Gutierrez pulled her ponytail whenever he could and told her that she “liked it because [she] would like [sex] rough.” Gutierrez also whispered in her ear that he would like to “eat [her] out” and left a voicemail on Powell’s cell phone asking Powell “to hook up” with him. On one occasion while Powell and Gutierrez were in the kitchen, Gutierrez told the cooks in Spanish “how badly he wanted to fuck [Powell] and [she] wouldn’t let him” and then translated what he said to her. He also told her “he thought [she] would get freaky with sex.” On another occasion, *430 Gutierrez took Powell into the dry storage area and pressed himself up against her while telling her that he “would like to do [her] from behind.” Powell also recalled that when Gutierrez walked past her, he would frequently brush up against her breasts and buttocks. Powell repeatedly objected to Gutierrez’s behavior, and asked him to “knock it off.” In response, Gutierrez “seemed to yell at [her] more” or gave her “harder things to do.”
Powell testified that during the first week of April 2005, she complained to Dahl that Gutierrez was “sexually and

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

physically abusing [her] and other female workers” and “grabbing us and saying dirty things to us.” Although Dahl said she “would take care of it,” Dahl did nothing to address her complaints. Powell also testified that Del Rio, prompted by the complaints from other servers, asked Powell if Gutierrez was treating her in an inappropriate way. Although Powell responded “yes,” Del Rio did not report these complaints to upper management. When Gutierrez continued with his harassing behavior, Powell reported his inappropriate conduct to Dahl again, but Dahl cut her off by saying that “[she] didn’t need to hear it.” Eventually, like Shisler, Powell “learned not to say anything.”
D. The Investigation Shisler’s attorney hired Lilly Brown, a private investigator, to obtain information about Shisler’s termination and to determine whether sexual harassment was occurring at the restaurant. Between May 10, 2005, and May 25, 2005, Brown interviewed servers of the Racine IHOP, including Powell. On May 21, 2005, in the midst of the investigation, Gutierrez quit his position as assistant manager.
On May 23, 2005, Del Rio informed Smith that a private investigator was asking about Gutierrez’s harassment of servers. This prompted Smith to conduct his own investigation. Because Gutierrez had already quit his position, Smith could not take any corrective action against him. Smith, however, determined that Shisler and Powell had complained to Dahl and that Dahl should have acted on their complaints. Smith determined that Dahl violated the sexual harassment policy by not investigating their complaints and terminated her.
E. Dahl’s Lawsuit Following her termination, Dahl filed a lawsuit against MHR alleging that Smith sexually harassed her. Her case was based, in part, on the allegation that Smith rubbed his finger over the cleavage area of Dahl’s daughter’s picture. Gutierrez testified that he witnessed the event, and heard Smith comment, “if only she was 18.” Gutierrez testified that Smith’s comment made him uncomfortable, but he
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did not report this incident because he was fearful he would lose his job. Dahl confronted Smith about this incident, but Smith told her that if she reported him, he would “deny everything.” At any rate, at the trial of this matter, Smith testified that the case was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment in December 2008.
F. Jury Trial The jury trial commenced on November 16, 2009. The jury heard the accounts noted above from Shisler, Powell, Smith, Dahl, Del Rio, and Gutierrez, among others. The jury was asked to determine whether Shisler and Powell had been subjected to a hostile work environment. The Defendants’ Faragher/ Ellerth affirmative defense was included in the jury instructions, but the verdict form did not include a specific interrogatory with respect to the defense. The jury was also asked to consider whether Shisler was terminated in retaliation *431 for complaining of sexual harassment. The jury instructions and verdict form referred to the three Defendants collectively, because the district court reserved ruling on the corporate liability of Flipmeastack post trial.
On November 19, 2009, the jury returned a special verdict form in favor of Shisler and Powell on the sexual harassment claims, and in favor of the Defendants on Shisler’s retaliation claim. The jury awarded Shisler $1,000 in compensatory damages, and awarded Powell $4,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.
G. Post–Trial Motions and Rulings Following the jury verdict, the Defendants moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law or for New Trial under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, the Defendants argued that no rational jury could have found Shisler and Powell experienced a hostile work environment, and that, in any event, they had established their Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The Defendants also argued that the jury’s award of $100,000 in punitive damages must be stricken as against the great weight of the evidence. In support of their Motion for

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

New Trial, the Defendants argued that the district court committed prejudicial error by failing to include a specific question regarding the Defendants’ affirmative defense on the verdict form, and by admitting “other acts” evidence, over their objection. The Defendants also argued, in the alternative, that the punitive damages award should be reduced pursuant to the statutory cap of $50,000.
The EEOC raised two issues in its Post–Trial Motions. First, it contended that all three Defendants were jointly and severally liable for the amounts set forth in the jury’s verdict. Second, it contended that injunctive relief should be awarded against Flipmeastack and that such other relief should extend to all of the IHOP restaurants it manages.
In its Decision and Order, the district court denied the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for New Trial or Remittitur. In addition, the district court granted the EEOC’s Post–Trial Motions, finding that Flipmeastack was an employer of Shisler and Powell, and thus, liable for the $105,000 jury verdict and enjoined Flipmeastack from, inter alia, “allowing a sexually hostile work environment to exist in any restaurant under its management.”
II. Analysis
A. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law We review de novo the district court’s denial of the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Erickson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 469 F.3d 600, 601 (7th Cir.2006). “ ‘Our inquiry is limited to the question whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed.’ ” Wallace v. McGlothan, 606 F.3d 410, 418 (7th Cir.2010) (quoting Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 536 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.2008)). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are within
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the province of the jury.” Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We must reverse only if, “on the basis of the admissible evidence, no rational jury could have found for the prevailing party.” Id. (citing Walker v. Bd. of Regents of the *432 Univ. of Wis. Sys., 410 F.3d 387, 393 (7th Cir.2005)); see also Emmel v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir.1996) (“ ‘[W]e are particularly careful in employment discrimination cases to avoid supplanting our view of the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of both the jury (in its verdict) and in the judge (in not interfering with that verdict.’ ”) (quoting Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir.1990))).
1. Sexual Harassment Claims A sexually hostile or abusive work environment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). For sexual harassment to be actionable, a plaintiff must prove conduct that is so severe or pervasive as “ ‘to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Id. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982)). In determining whether the harassment rises to this level, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the “ ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ ” Gentry v. Export Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 842, 850 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). In evaluating the severity of harassment, we are guided by prior case precedent:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures. On the other side lies the

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.
Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430–31 (7th Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted). We also assess the impact of the harassment on the plaintiff’s work environment from both a subjective and objective viewpoint; “ ‘one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.’ ” Gentry, 238 F.3d at 850 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)).
We find that a rational jury could have found that Shisler was subjected to harassment that was both severe and pervasive. At the trial of this matter, Shisler testified that Gutierrez engaged in sexually harassing conduct during every shift that Gutierrez was her assistant manager. His comments to Shisler were highly offensive and easily surpassed what could reasonably be described as vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo. He told her he wanted to “fuck her,” propositioned her for three-way sex with his girlfriend, told her she was “kinky” and liked “rough” sex, and stared at the intimate parts of her body “like a piece of meat.” Gutierrez engaged in physical touching by “slap groping” her buttocks. Shisler testified that she felt “bullied” by him and that his comments made her feel “dirty.” Given the age difference between Shisler and Gutierrez and Gutierrez’s position of authority over her, a rational jury could have concluded that Gutierrez’s verbal and physical harassment directed at Shisler created an objectively hostile and abusive work environment.
The Defendants attack Shisler’s credibility by arguing that on cross-examination, she could only identify three specific instances *433 of sexually harassing comments and conduct by Gutierrez over the four-week period that she worked at the Racine IHOP. As noted, however, Shisler testified to more than three specific instances of conduct, and she testified that some form of verbal harassment occurred on every shift that she worked with Gutierrez. Although Shisler could not remember the exact dates that specific instances of sexual harassment occurred, the jury was entitled to believe Shisler’s version of events.
In any event, to prevail, Shisler need not show that the conduct complained of was both severe and pervasive;
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“even one act of harassment will suffice if it is egregious.” Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). A jury could infer that the three instances that Shisler did testify to—telling her that he thought she was “kinky” and liked it “rough,” propositioning her for sex on the pancake batter, and “slap groping” her buttocks—were sufficiently severe to support a jury verdict. See Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431 (noting that even if a plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment are on the line between the merely unpleasant and the sexually harassing, “the jury’s verdict, whether for or against the defendant, cannot be set aside in the absence of trial error”).
The Defendants also suggest that Shisler was not subjectively offended by Gutierrez’s crude comments because her MySpace page contained a sexually graphic video of young males masturbating in the presence of young females, and contains the comment, “funny as hell.” The jury was entitled to disregard this video as evidence that Shisler did not find Gutierrez’s comments to be offensive. As the district court observed, “sharing jokes with friends in an online community is vastly different than being propositioned for sex by a supervisor at work.”
Further, there is sufficient evidence in the record showing that Shisler was subjectively offended by Gutierrez’s comments and conduct because she repeatedly informed Gutierrez that his conduct was unwelcome and complained to IHOP managers Del Rio and Dahl. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a rational jury could find that Shisler was the victim of sexual harassment while an employee at the Racine IHOP, in violation of Title VII.
We also find a rational jury could have found that Powell was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment. Powell testified that Gutierrez made inappropriate comments to her like “your ass looks good in them pants,” pulled her ponytail and told her she “would like it rough” and “would get freaky with sex.” He propositioned her for oral sex, told her he would like to “do her from behind” as he pressed his pelvis into her body, told the cooks he wanted to “fuck” her, and left a voicemail message on her phone asking her to “hook up” with him. Gutierrez touched her breasts and buttocks whenever he could by brushing up against her as he walked past her. Powell testified Gutierrez’s comments made her feel “dirty,” and that she felt worried if she had

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

to work on the same shift as Gutierrez. Powell also testified that when she objected to Gutierrez’s treatment of her, he gave her harder work assignments or “yelled at her more,” “[s]o she learned just not to say anything.” Like Shisler, Powell was a teenager at the time. The age disparity between Powell and Gutierrez, coupled with Gutierrez’s position of authority over her, could have led a rational jury to conclude that Gutierrez’s verbal and physical harassment directed at Powell created an objectively hostile and abusive work environment, and that Powell reasonably perceived it as such.
*434 2. The Faragher/Ellerth Affirmative Defense An employer can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment of a subordinate. Generally, an employer may avoid liability if it can prove the two elements of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275.
a. Defendants’ Preventative Measures
The Defendants contend that they took sexual harassment seriously, and instituted an effective sexual harassment policy to prevent and promptly correct any instances of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace. Victoria Janmohammed testified that the policy was a “zero tolerance” policy, meaning “we do not tolerate any sexual harassment, any discrimination. We don’t even tolerate somebody not investigating.” To this end, the Defendants required all of their new employees, including Shisler and Powell, to watch a video educating them on sexual harassment in the workplace, and to read and sign their sexual harassment policy. The Sexual Harassment and Diversity Policy that Shisler and Powell signed stated the following:
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I have watched the Sexual Harassment and Diversity videos. I am fully aware of our companies [sic] policies regarding both—zero tolerance for any type of unlawful discrimination and/or harassment. Our company is committed to providing a work environment that is free of unlawful behavior in any form. I will lead by example.
* * *
Any form of unlawful harassment of co-workers or members of the public is absolutely forbidden, regardless of whether it is verbal, physical, or visual harassment. You must be sensitive to the feelings of others and must not act in a way that might be considered offensive to someone else. I will report any instances of improper behavior to my manager or company representative. The company will take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate all reports of improper behavior.
I also understand the severity of knowingly making false accusations of discrimination or harassment. Sexual Harassment and/or Discrimination are a serious charge and should be taken seriously.
In addition, the Defendants also note the presence of the Crisis Management Guidelines Poster in the employee break room that displayed, in part, Smith’s cell phone number. Lastly, Defendants point out that as soon as Del Rio informed Smith that a private investigator was asking questions about sexual harassment at the Racine IHOP, he immediately conducted an investigation, took witness statements, determined that the policy had been violated, and took corrective action by firing Dahl for her failure to investigate the servers’ allegations.
We find that a rational jury could have concluded that the Defendants exercised reasonable care by instituting a sexual harassment policy with a reasonable complaint mechanism, and by engaging in prompt and corrective action by investigating Shisler’s and Powell’s complaints of harassment and terminating Dahl. Like the district court, however, we find that *435 the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find otherwise. Although the presence of a sexual harassment policy is encouraged by Title VII, “the mere creation of a sexual harassment policy will not shield a company from its responsibility to actively prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.” Gentry, 238 F.3d at 847. The policy must provide “a meaningful process whereby an employee can express his

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

or her concerns regarding an individual within a working environment.” Id. Case law also requires that the policy’s complaint mechanism be reasonable, “and what is reasonable depends on the employment circumstances, and therefore, among other things, on the capabilities of the class of employees in question.” EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, the policy must not only be reasonably effective on paper, but also reasonably effective in practice. Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 350 (6th Cir.2005).
Despite the fact that the Defendants had a sexual harassment policy in place, a rational jury could have found that the policy and complaint mechanism were not reasonably effective in practice. At trial, the jury heard evidence indicating that all managerial employees at the Racine IHOP failed to carry out their duties under the policy. See Loughman v. Malnati Org., Inc., 395 F.3d 404, 407 (7th Cir.2005) (finding that “the consistent stream of harassment at the restaurant suggests that Malnati’s policy was actually not very effective at all”). For example, Gutierrez violated the policy by engaging in sexual harassment. The other assistant manager of the Racine IHOP, Del Rio, and the general manager of the Racine IHOP, Dahl, both failed to report Gutierrez’s harassment after Shisler and Powell complained to them. Moreover, the jury heard evidence that Smith failed to investigate Shisler’s prior complaint of harassment of another female server by the former general manager of the Racine IHOP, Hecker. The jury also heard evidence that Smith engaged in inappropriate conduct that could be described under the policy as sexual harassment, by rubbing his finger over the cleavage area of a picture of Dahl’s teenage daughter and stating, “if only she was 18.” Gutierrez testified that he witnessed this incident, but did not report it. A rational jury, faced with this evidence, could have found that none of the managers of the Racine IHOP took action under the policy that could be termed “corrective” or “effective.” See Clark, 400 F.3d at 350 (“The effectiveness of an employer’s sexual harassment policy depends upon the effectiveness of those who are designated to implement it.”).
Second, although management was required to take sexual harassment training, the evidence at trial suggested that the training was inadequate. Del Rio testified that she did not receive sexual harassment training when she became an assistant manager, even though she, as the assistant manager, was responsible for the orientation and

training of new employees. Moreover, even though the policy stated that “any form of unlawful harassment of co-workers or members of the public is absolutely forbidden,” Del Rio “blew off” Shisler’s and Powell’s complaints. Del Rio knew that she had an absolute duty to report sexual harassment allegations to upper management, yet she did not report Powell’s complaints because, in her opinion, Powell did not seem to be “afraid” of Gutierrez. Similarly, Dahl knew that she had an absolute duty to report such allegations to upper management. Yet, in the face of Powell’s allegations that Gutierrez was “sexually and physically abusing [her] and other female servers,” she failed to report Powell’s complaints. On these *436 facts, a rational jury could have concluded that, not only was the policy and the management training ineffective, but the protections offered by them were illusory. Gentry, 238 F.3d at 847–50 (upholding jury’s determination that employer failed to take preventative or corrective action regarding sexual harassment where evidence revealed deficiencies in harassment policy and a failure to respond to complaints).
Third, “[o]ur cases recognize prompt investigation of the alleged misconduct as a hallmark of reasonable corrective action.” Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Here, a rational jury could have concluded that Smith’s investigation of Gutierrez’s sexual harassment was not “prompt.” Shisler complained to management of Gutierrez’s harassment twice in March 2005, and Powell complained to management three times in April 2005. Smith did not commence his investigation until May 23, 2005. This is not the type of response “ ‘reasonably likely to prevent the harassment from recurring.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir.2004)). In addition, a rational jury could have believed that an investigation ensued only because Shisler’s private investigator started making inquiries of other female servers at the Racine IHOP.
Further, a rational jury could have concluded that the policy was not reasonably effective on paper. As the district court observed, an employer’s complaint mechanism must provide a clear path for reporting harassment, particularly where, as here, a number of the servers were teenagers. See V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 578 (noting that because it was part of V & J’s business plan to employ teenagers, “the company was obligated to suit its procedures to the understanding of the average

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E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

teenager”). Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy did not provide a point person to air complaints to. In fact, it provided no names or contact information at all. To the extent the Crisis Management Guidelines Poster was meant to supplement the sexual harassment policy in this regard, a rational jury could have concluded that it did not fulfill this role. First, neither Shisler nor Powell could recall whether the poster was actually displayed in the employee break room during the time that they were harassed. Second, the poster contains instructions on how to deal with natural disasters, fires, and other events such as food-borne illness. It also contains the phone numbers of local authorities, and Flipmeastack’s corporate numbers, including Smith’s cell phone number. The word “discrimination” is contained on the poster under the heading “other emergencies”; however, the poster does not inform an employee which company number to call in the event he or she believes that the sexual harassment policy has been violated. In addition, the poster did not describe employees’ rights under Title VII or provide phone numbers for the EEOC or a local civil rights office, and thus, did not provide a means for the employee to make an external complaint of discrimination. These facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from them, could have led a rational jury to conclude that the complaint mechanism provided by Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy did not provide a clear path for reporting harassment. For all of these reasons, we find that the jury’s determination that the Defendants did not discharge their duty to effectively prevent and correct promptly sexual harassment in the workplace, was not unreasonable.
b. Shisler’s and Powell’s Preventative or Corrective Action
We now turn to the second element of the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative *437 defense—i.e., whether Shisler and Powell unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective measures. The Defendants’ primary argument on appeal is that neither Shisler nor Powell ever complained to Smith, and there is “no doubt” that had they done so, “[Smith] would have taken prompt action to correct sexual harassment.” The Defendants’ argument ignores the terms of the sexual harassment policy itself, which provided that an employee was to
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“report any instances of improper behavior to [the employee’s] manager or company representative.” As the creator of the policy, Victoria Janmohammed affirmed this fact at trial. Shisler and Powell utilized the complaint mechanism by first asking Gutierrez, an assistant manager, to stop his harassing behavior. When Gutierrez refused to stop his harassment, both Shisler and Powell reported Gutierrez’s harassment to Del Rio and Dahl—each of whom were managers or company representatives within the meaning of the policy.
During the month that Shisler worked at the Racine IHOP (March 2005), she first reported Gutierrez’s harassment to Del Rio on March 18, 2005. After Del Rio failed to take action, Shisler reported the harassment to Dahl on March 27, 2005. On cross-examination, Shisler testified that, after she last complained to Dahl, and Dahl “blew her off,” she could have complained to Smith; however, Smith did not work that day, and would not be at the restaurant “until the very next Sunday, possibly.” Shisler was terminated on April 3, 2005. Given this evidence, a rational jury could have believed that Shisler did not act unreasonably by failing to report Gutierrez’s conduct directly to Smith.
In addition, a rational jury could have believed that Shisler did not feel comfortable reporting Gutierrez’s harassment to Smith. Shisler testified that Smith failed to respond to her prior complaint of harassment by Hecker toward another server in 2004. Shisler also testified that after she complained to Smith, Hecker began to treat her more harshly. In light of this prior experience, a rational jury could have concluded that her decision not to contact Smith in 2005 was therefore justified.
Powell first complained to Dahl of Gutierrez’s harassment during the first week of April 2005. Dahl responded that she “would take care of it.” The following week, Del Rio asked Powell if Gutierrez had been treating her inappropriately, and Powell responded in the affirmative. Still, no action was taken. Powell last aired a complaint to Dahl during the last week of April, but Dahl told her that she “didn’t need to hear it.” While it is true, as the district court observed, that Powell might have complained to Smith after it became evident that neither Dahl nor Del Rio had corrected the problem, only about three to four weeks elapsed between the time that Powell last complained to Dahl and the date that Gutierrez resigned. A rational jury could have concluded that Powell did not act unreasonably in failing to contact Smith during this

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

time period. See Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 328 F.3d 361, 365–66 (7th Cir.2003) (stating that it is for the jury to determine whether employee unreasonably failed to avail herself of her employer’s complaint procedures, and employee’s delay of six weeks to report supervisor’s misconduct after trying to deal with supervisor directly was not unreasonable as a matter of law). For all of these reasons, we find that the jury’s determination that Shisler and Powell took prompt and appropriate action under the policy was not unreasonable.
3. Punitive Damages Punitive damages are available under Title VII when a plaintiff demonstrates *438 that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination “with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Whether an award of punitive damages is proper is subject to a three-part inquiry. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). The first two elements require the plaintiff to show that: (1) the employer acted with the requisite mental state—i.e., that it acted “in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate the federal law”; and (2) the employer’s managerial agent recklessly disregarded the plaintiff’s federally protected rights while acting within the scope of employment. Id. at 535–36, 543, 119 S.Ct. 2118. Third, an employer may avoid vicarious liability for a managerial employee’s discriminatory conduct if the employer can show that it engaged in good faith efforts to implement an anti-discrimination policy. Id. at 545, 119 S.Ct. 2118. The Defendants challenge only the third element, claiming that this case presents a “textbook example of responsible employers implementing and following clear and effective sexual harassment policies.”
While the Defendants’ sexual harassment policy is relevant to evaluating whether an employer engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII, “it is not sufficient in and of itself to insulate an employer from a punitive damages award. Otherwise, employers would have an incentive to adopt formal policies in order to escape liability for punitive damages, but they would have no incentive to enforce those policies.” Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 858–59 (7th Cir.2001) (footnote collecting cases and citation omitted).

A rational jury could have concluded that the Defendants’ policy was not sufficient to insulate it from a punitive damages award, because it was ineffective in advancing the education and protection of the employees’ rights under Title VII. A rational jury could have concluded that certain policy language—i.e., noting the “severity of knowingly making a false accusation of discrimination or harassment”—was inserted to discourage complaints of sexual harassment. Indeed, Victoria Janmohammed testified that the language was inserted after her husband was sued for sexual harassment by a server at one of his IHOP restaurants. Although she denied that the language was inserted into the sexual harassment policy in reaction to the lawsuit, the jury was entitled to disbelieve her. In addition, Smith testified that, once the servers viewed the sexual harassment video and signed the sexual harassment and diversity policy, the policy was locked in a file cabinet, not accessible to the servers without managerial approval. If the managerial approval had to come from a manager who happened to be the alleged harasser, this could present a significant hurdle for relief. See V & J Foods, 507 F.3d at 579 (“A policy against harassment that includes no assurance that a harassing supervisor can be bypassed in the complaint process is unreasonable as a matter of law.”). Moreover, the complaint mechanism was mentioned in the video, but was not available in written form. To the extent the crisis management poster was meant to address this issue by providing the name and cell phone number of Smith, the poster was insufficient to fill the gap in information for the reasons previously stated regarding the Defendants’ affirmative defense.
Further, a rational jury could have concluded that the Defendants did not engage in good faith efforts to educate their managerial staff about sexual harassment in the workplace. Del Rio testified that, although *439 she received training on sexual harassment when she was a server, she did not receive additional training after she was promoted to assistant manager. As Del Rio was in charge of training all new employees on the Defendants’ sexual harassment policy, her lack of training is troublesome. Moreover, Del Rio received numerous complaints of Gutierrez’s sexual harassment from Shisler and Powell (among others), but failed to report their complaints, in part, because she did not think Powell was serious. Gutierrez and Dahl received training on sexual harassment as managerial staff; however, neither complied with the policy by reporting the harassment to upper management. Gutierrez engaged in sexual harassment, and failed to report Smith when he made

10

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

inappropriate comments while admiring a picture of Dahl’s daughter. Dahl received complaints regarding Gutierrez’s sexual harassment of servers on numerous occasions, but, like Del Rio, failed to report those claims to Smith or to upper management at Flipmeastack. Thus, as the district court found, a rational jury could have concluded that the Defendants’ consistent failure to comply with the sexual harassment policy evinced a lack of understanding of what constituted sexual harassment under Flipmeastack’s policy and what their responsibilities were as managerial staff under the policy. Accordingly, we find that there was a reasonable basis in the record to permit a jury to find that the Defendants did not engage in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. The jury’s punitive damages award stands against MHR2 and Janmohammed; however, for the reasons advanced in Section II.C. of this opinion, the punitive damages award against Flipmeastack is remanded to the district court.
We now turn to the district court’s ruling denying the Defendants’ motion for new trial.
B. Defendants’ Motion for New Trial Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) Defendants challenge the district court’s denial of their motion for new trial on two grounds. First, they contend that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense on the special verdict form. Second, they contend that the district court admitted “other acts” evidence that prejudiced the jury against them. We review a district court’s rulings on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d 870, 877 (7th Cir.2011).
1. Special Verdict Form Whether to “submit special interrogatories (either on all issues or on a subset of issues like damages) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 591 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Bularz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir.1996)). The verdict form asked the jury to decide whether the Defendants were liable for sexual harassment, but failed to include an additional interrogatory asking whether the Defendants were entitled to their Faragher/ Ellerth
11

affirmative defense. The Defendants assert that the district court’s failure to include on the special verdict form any interrogatories related to their affirmative defense impermissibly took the issue away from the jury, *440 and constitutes an abuse of discretion. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Pressed Steel Tank Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 313, 318 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a district court to submit all material issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence in a special verdict form).
The verdict form in this case was entitled “Special Verdict Form.” Yet, as the district court described it, the verdict form was a general verdict form as it pertained to the Defendants’ liability for sexual harassment, and a special verdict form as it pertained to damages. We are not aware of any rule that precludes this type of hybrid verdict form; Rule 49 does not. Our case law requires only that the verdict form not be confusing or misleading to the jury. Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir.2010). In evaluating whether a verdict form is confusing or misleading, we consider the verdict form in light of the instructions given to determine “whether [the jury] had [an] understanding of the issues and its duty to determine those issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Defendants do not challenge the district court’s instructions to the jury, including the instructions on the elements of a claim for sexual harassment and the Defendants’ Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The instructions informed the jury that in evaluating whether the Defendants were liable for Gutierrez’s sexual harassment of Shisler and/or Powell, they were to consider whether the Defendants had proven their affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. We find that the verdict form, read in light of the jury instructions, informed the jury that in finding the Defendants’ liable, they were implicitly rejecting their affirmative defense. Therefore, the district court’s decision not to include a question addressing the Defendants’ affirmative defense on the liability portion of the verdict form was not an abuse of discretion.
2. “Other Acts” Evidence We review claims of improperly admitted evidence for an abuse of discretion. Farfaras v. Citizens Bank and

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

Trust of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir.2006). Where the alleged error of admission occurred during trial, “we will grant a new trial only if the error had a substantial influence over the jury, and the result reached was inconsistent with substantial justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Evidentiary errors satisfy this standard only when a significant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 144 F.3d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir.1998) (citations omitted).
The Defendants object to two pieces of evidence admitted at trial: (1) Shisler’s testimony that Hecker, the general manager of the Racine IHOP prior to Dahl, sexually harassed another female server named Christine, and (2) Dahl’s testimony that Smith sexually harassed her. Defendants contend this evidence was “irrelevant and highly inflammatory” and it “wrongly prejudiced the jury against defendants.”
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED.R.EVID. 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....” FED.R.EVID. 403.
*441 Shisler testified that Smith’s response to her report of Hecker’s harassment was “passive.” She also testified that, following her report to Smith, Hecker began to assign her the worst restaurant sections. When she contacted corporate IHOP, she was informed she had to complain to Smith. Given her recent experience with Smith, Shisler decided not to pursue the matter. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Shisler’s testimony regarding Hecker’s harassment was relevant to the Defendants’ Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense because, as the district court reasoned, it suggested that Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy was not reasonably effective.
Dahl testified that she was sexually harassed by Smith. The district court found that her testimony was also relevant to the Defendants’ Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. The Defendants contend that they were prejudiced by the admission of Dahl’s testimony, because her lawsuit against MHR, alleging that Smith sexually harassed her, was dismissed by the district court on summary judgment eleven months before the trial of this
12

matter commenced.
The subject of Dahl’s lawsuit was addressed during Smith’s testimony. He testified that Dahl’s lawsuit was “dismissed” because “there was no merit to it.” Thus, any prejudice caused by the admission of Dahl’s testimony was cured by Smith’s testimony. Accordingly, we find the admission of Shisler’s and Dahl’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion.
C. EEOC’s Post–Trial Motions The EEOC’s Post–Trial Motions include a motion to find the Defendants jointly and severally liable, and a motion for injunctive relief against Flipmeastack. We first address the district court’s order holding Flipmeastack liable for the sexual harassment of the claimants. We review the district court’s conclusion of law de novo. Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 758–59 (7th Cir.2010).
1. Corporate Liability Prior to trial, the EEOC filed a motion in limine regarding corporate liability. The motion asked the district court to rule, as a matter of law, that Flipmeastack, as an affiliate corporation of MHR, should be held liable for Gutierrez’s harassment of Shisler and Powell under two of the three theories advanced in Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940–41 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that an affiliate’s corporate existence may be disregarded, and the affiliate held to be an employer under Title VII, in “three situations”; the traditional conditions are present to pierce the corporate veil, the affiliate splits itself into tiny corporations for the express purpose of avoiding liability under Title VII, and the parent corporation directed the discriminatory act of which the plaintiff is complaining). The EEOC argued under the “first situation” of Papa that MHR’s corporate liability should be pierced and that Flipmeastack should be held the real employer of Gutierrez at the Racine IHOP. It also argued under the “third situation” of Papa that Flipmeastack should be held liable for directing the discriminatory act, because it “was the entity responsible for the inadequate HR policies and practices that allowed the harassment to occur and

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

continue....” After the motion was fully briefed, the district court held a pre-trial conference, the minutes of which state, “Court to resolve motions in limine on 3 corporate law issues after trial, if necessary. EEOC may file objection to this procedure.” Following oral argument, we requested a transcript of the pre-trial conference from the district court. Although there was no transcript, the district court explained, in a *442 written memorandum, that it chose to rule on the issue of Flipmeastack’s corporate liability because it believed that if “the facts relating to corporate structure and the relationship between the three defendants had been addressed during trial, the trial would have been much longer and more complicated than it was.” Neither the Defendants nor the EEOC objected to this procedure.
In its post-trial motion, the EEOC submitted the issue of Flipmeastack’s corporate liability to the district court on the same grounds asserted in its motion in limine. In the district court’s Decision and Order, it found that the control theory advanced in EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 169 (7th Cir.1995) applied, and that Papa “was not entirely on point.” Moreover, the district court rejected the grounds upon which the EEOC based its claim of Flipmeastack’s corporate liability. It found that “Flipmeastack is a distinct legal entity,” and that “Flipmeastack did not direct Gutierrez’s behavior.”
We agree with the Defendants that the control theory of liability was injected into the case too late. In support of our ruling, we find Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir.1992) directly on point. In Miller, we overturned a RICO conviction based on an enterprise theory raised not by the parties, but by the district court when it entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law post trial. The complaint alleged that Miller and his accounting firm were an enterprise that engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of misleading statements and omissions that violated federal securities laws. Id. at 1379. The plaintiff maintained her enterprise theory throughout the trial. Id. at 1380. In the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, it found the accounting firm had not been involved in the alleged illegal activity, so there was no enterprise consisting of Miller and his accounting firm. Id. at 1379. Instead, the district court found Miller and three of his associates in the fraud constituted a RICO enterprise, even though, during the trial, there was “no mention of an enterprise consisting of the four conspirators themselves.” Id. at 1380. We concluded that although there was extensive

evidence concerning Miller’s connection with his three associates, the parties did not consent, within the meaning of Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to define the enterprise as consisting of Miller and his three associates during the trial. Id. Indeed, we noted that “Miller had no warning that evidence manifestly admissible because relevant to the conspiracy charge would also be used to establish the existence of an enterprise to which no one in the course of this litigation had alluded.” Id. Accordingly, we held that the district court committed prejudicial error by changing the theory of the case after the close of the evidence, because it ran counter to the spirit of the adversary system and deprived the defendant of the opportunity to rebut the new enterprise theory. Id.
In the EEOC’s pre-trial and post-trial motions, it relied solely on the “first” and “third situation” raised in Papa. After completion of post-trial briefing, the district court, sua sponte, injected an entirely new theory of liability based upon a case never cited by either party, EEOC v. Illinois, supra. The district court reframed the issue as “whether the defendant so far controlled the plaintiff’s employment relationship that it [is] appropriate to regard [Flipmeastack] as the de facto or indirect employer of the plaintiff.” In so ruling, the district court deprived the Defendants of presenting contrary evidence. This error is not harmless. It is evident from the district court’s post-trial Decision and Order that had it decided Flipmeastack’s corporate liability strictly from the parties’ *443 written submissions, it would have found Flipmeastack not liable for Shisler’s and Powell’s sexual harassment.
There is one other issue to address. At oral argument, we raised concerns regarding the district court’s decision to remove the corporate liability issue from the province of the jury. The EEOC submits that the Defendants waived their right to a jury by failing to object. The record reflects that the Defendants did not raise an objection to the district court’s decision to rule on the corporate liability issue before trial for two reasons. First, the Defendants understood that the EEOC was seeking to pierce the corporate existence of MHR and find that Flipmeastack was an employer of Gutierrez. Second, the Defendants did not believe that Papa applied to the facts of the case. Accordingly, we find that the Defendants did not waive their right to a jury with respect to the control theory of liability.

13

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

Because the district court injected a new theory of the case after the time the Defendants could present rebuttal evidence, and because the district court reserved ruling on an issue ultimately found to be a question for the jury, the district court’s ruling with respect to the corporate liability of Flipmeastack is reversed and remanded for trial.

punitive damages “in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year [is] $200,000”). Because this appeal leaves the liability of Flipmeastack unresolved, we are unable to address the propriety of the district court’s ruling. We therefore remand this issue for the district court to address if, and when, Flipmeastack is found liable for the judgment.

2. Injunction Against Flipmeastack The Defendants also object to the district court’s order enjoining Flipmeastack from “allowing a sexually hostile work environment to exist in any restaurant under its management,” and ordering Flipmeastack to create a new sexual harassment training program, a new written anti-harassment and anti-discrimination policy, and to post a Notice in its restaurants informing employees of the court’s Order for a period of four years. Because we reverse the district court’s finding of liability with respect to Flipmeastack, we need not address the Defendants’ specific objections. The injunction against Flipmeastack must be dissolved.
D. Motion for Remittitur Lastly, we address the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to remit Powell’s punitive damages award from $100,000 to $50,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). In denying the motion, the district court found that Powell was an employee of Flipmeastack, and because Flipmeastack managed at least 201 employees, Powell’s compensatory and punitive damages award was within the statutory cap. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(C) (providing that the statutory cap for compensatory and

III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s denial of the Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial with respect to Defendants, MHR and Salauddin Janmohammed. We reverse the district court’s grant of the EEOC’s Post–Trial Motions; the judgment against Flipmeastack is reversed and remanded, and the injunction dissolved. Because Flipmeastack’s liability for Powell’s punitive damages award hinges on the degree of control Flipmeastack had over the employees of MHR, the punitive damages award against Flipmeastack, and the need, if any, *444 to remit that award pursuant to the statutory cap, are also remanded. The district court is ordered to conduct proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All Citations
666 F.3d 422, 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380

Footnotes

*

The Honorable Richard L. Young, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, sitting by

designation.

1

MHR dissolved, and its assets were sold, after the events giving rise to this case occurred.

2

Because MHR is a dissolved corporation, the district court held that Janmohammed had to personally satisfy any judgment

against MHR to the extent of the distributions he received as a result of the dissolution of MHR. The district court found that he

received $15,000 from the sale of MHR’s assets; thus, he was liable for that amount of the judgment against MHR. That issue is

14

E.E.O.C. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422 (2012) 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 145, 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,380
not the subject of this appeal.
15

 
 United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin (Milwaukee) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:06−cv−00715−LA

CLOSED

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Management Hospitality of Racine Inc et al Assigned to: Judge Lynn Adelman Case in other court: 10−3247
USCA: Flipmeastack; 09/24/10, 10−3247
10−3555
USCA; EEOC; 11/01/10, 10−3555 Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/26/2006 Date Terminated: 10/23/2012 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Brian C Tyndall United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Milwaukee District Office 310 W Wisconsin Ave − Ste 500 Milwaukee, WI 53203−2292 414−297−1130 Fax: 414−297−3146 Email: brian.tyndall@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jean P Kamp United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Chicago District Office 500 W Madison St − Ste 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 312−353−7719 Fax: 312−353−8555 Email: jean.kamp@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Camille A Monahan United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Milwaukee District Office 310 W Wisconsin Ave − Ste 800 Milwaukee, WI 53203−2292 414−297−3548 Fax: 414−297−3146 Email: camille.monahan@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gwendolyn Young Reams United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Office of Legal Counsel 1801 L St NW − Rm 6040 Washington, DC 20507 202−663−4669 TERMINATED: 02/27/2007

John C Hendrickson United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 1 of 16

Chicago District Office 500 W Madison St − Ste 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 312−886−5972 TERMINATED: 02/27/2007
Nicholas J Pladson United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 330 2nd Ave S − Ste 720 Minneapolis, MN 55401−2214 612−355−4047 Fax: 312−335−4044 Email: nicholas.pladson@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Management Hospitality of Racine Inc doing business as International House of Pancakes
Defendant Salauddin Janmohammed
Defendant Flipmeastack Inc

represented by Robert M Mihelich Law Offices of Robert M Mihelich 2665 S Moorland Rd − Ste 200 New Berlin, WI 53151 262−789−9300 Fax: 262−785−1729 Email: attyrmm@bizwi.rr.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert M Mihelich (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert M Mihelich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/26/2006
07/17/2006 07/27/2006 07/27/2006 08/24/2006 08/24/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT − Consent Forms Distributed for Magistrate Judge Aaron E Goodstein. E−File Notification & Judge Adelman's Standing Order Distributed. Jury Demand. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet# 2 Judge Adelman's Standing Order)(djd) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
2 REFUSAL of Consent to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (djd)
3 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc waiver sent on 6/26/2006, answer due 8/25/2006. (Tyndall, Brian)
4 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Salauddin Janmohammed waiver sent on 6/26/2006, answer due 8/25/2006. (Tyndall, Brian)
5 Defendants' ANSWER to Complaint and Affirmative Defenses by all defendants.(Mihelich, Robert)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert M Mihelich on behalf of all defendants. Attorney(s) appearing: Robert M. Mihelich (Mihelich, Robert)

Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 2 of 16

08/24/2006 7 CERTIFICATE of Interest by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)

08/24/2006 8 Refusal to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge by all defendants (Mihelich, Robert)

08/24/2006 9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by all defendants (Mihelich, Robert)

09/06/2006

NOTICE by the Court. Parties are reminded to provide chambers with paper copies of all documents electronically filed pursuant to Judge Adelman's standing order. (Wesolek, Marie)

09/13/2006

10 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/13/06. Telephone Conference set for 10/26/2006 01:30 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)

09/28/2006 11 MOTION to Amend/Correct Unopposed Motion to Change Date for Scheduling Conference by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/04/2006 12 Joint REPORT of Rule 26(f) Plan by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2006

13 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 10/5/06. Telephone Conference rescheduled from 10/26/06 to 11/1/2006 01:30 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)

11/01/2006

14 Minute Entry for telephonic scheduling conference held 11/1/06 by Judge Lynn Adelman: Settlement Conference set for 1/18/2007 01:30 PM in Courtroom 390 before Judge Lynn Adelman. Initial written discovery to be exchanged by 1/1/07. (djd) (Entered: 11/02/2006)

01/18/2007 15 Minute Entry for settlement conference held on 1/18/07 before Judge Lynn Adelman: Parties not able to settle. Court will set a scheduling conference. (djd)

02/05/2007

16 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 2/5/07.Telephonic Scheduling Conference set for 3/16/2007 01:30 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)

02/26/2007 17 Second Joint REPORT of Rule 26(f) Plan by all parties. (Tyndall, Brian)

02/26/2007 18 LETTER from Brian C. Tyndall. (Tyndall, Brian)

02/27/2007

19 NOTICE of Appearance by Jean P Kamp on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in place of Attys John Hendrickson and Gwendolyn Young Reams. (djd) (Entered: 02/28/2007)

03/16/2007 20 Minute Entry for telephonic scheduling conference held 3/16/07 before Judge Lynn Adelman; Court will adopt parties' scheduling order. (djd) (Entered: 03/20/2007)

03/20/2007

21 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/19/07. Amended Pleadings due by 6/1/2007,Discovery due by 11/15/2007,Plaintiffs Expert Witness List due by 7/2/2007,Defendants Expert Witness List due by 9/3/2007,Motions due by 12/3/2007. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)

05/02/2007 22 MOTION to Compel Plaintiff EEOC's Rule 7.4 Expedited Non−Dispostive Motion to Compel Discovery by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)

05/02/2007 23 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall in Support of Rule 7.4 Motion to Compel Discovery. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5)(Tyndall, Brian)

05/03/2007 24 Docket Annotation − Email sent to Atty Tyndall re 23 describing attachments (djd)

05/07/2007 25 STIPULATION to Extend Briefing Schedule by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

05/07/2007 26 PROPOSED Order Extending Briefing Schedule filed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

05/08/2007 27 Docket Annotation − Email sent to Atty Mihelich re attaching Proposed Order to Stipulation when efiling 25 26 (djd)

05/10/2007

MARGIN ORDER to document #26 Approving Stipulation that defendants' response to motion to compel discovery is extended to 5/18/07 signed by Judge Lynn Adelman

Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 3 of 16

05/18/2007 05/18/2007 05/18/2007 05/25/2007 06/01/2007 06/04/2007 06/06/2007
06/21/2007 06/21/2007 06/25/2007 07/02/2007 07/20/2007 07/24/2007 07/24/2007 07/24/2007 07/30/2007 07/31/2007 08/07/2007
09/05/2007 09/21/2007

on 5/10/07. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)
28 BRIEF in Opposition filed by all defendants re 22 MOTION to Compel Plaintiff EEOC's Rule 7.4 Expedited Non−Dispostive Motion to Compel Discovery. (Mihelich, Robert)
29 AFFIDAVIT of Robert M. Mihelich in Support of Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Mihelich, Robert)
30 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by all defendants (Mihelich, Robert)
31 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/25/07. Telephonic Status Conference set for 6/6/2007 11:30 AM before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)
32 MOTION for Order Unopposed Motion to Change Scheduling Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
33 Docket Annotation − email sent to Atty Tyndall re 32 efiling/emailing proposed orders (djd)
36 Minute Order. Proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman : granting 22 Motion to Compel; granting 32 Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. Plaintiff may amend complaint without further motion through 7/2/07. Telephonic Status Conference held on 6/6/2007. (rz) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
34 LETTER from Brian C. Tyndall enclosing a copy of Unopposed Motion to Chagne Scheduling Order. (Tyndall, Brian)
35 MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order Unopposed Motion to Change Scheduling Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/25/07 granting 35 Motion to Amend/Correct. Plaintiff's experts due 7/31/07; defendant's experts due 9/30/07. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
37 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Salauddin Janmohammed filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. EEOC requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.(Tyndall, Brian)
38 Defendants' ANSWER to Amended Complaint by all defendants.(Mihelich, Robert)
39 MOTION for Order to Show Cause and For Other Relief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Tyndall, Brian)
40 PROPOSED ORDER MOTION for Order to Show Cause and for Other Relief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 7/25/2007 (Dimiceli, Diane).
41 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Other Relief. (Tyndall, Brian)
42 ORDER that witness Rosalio Gutierrez appear in court on 8/7/07 at 2 p.m. to show cause signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/29/07. (cc: Rosalio Gutierrez, all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)
43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission documents being served on deponent along with order from Judge Adelman (Tyndall, Brian)
44 Minute Entry for cause hearing held 8/7/07 before Judge Lynn Adelman: Gutierrez agreed to appear at a deposition set for 9/5/2007 10:00 AM in the Federal Courthouse. The Court threatened to hold Gutierrez in contempt if he does not appear at that time. (djd) (Entered: 08/08/2007)
45 LETTER from Brian C. Tyndall to Judge Adelman regarding witness Rosalio Gutierrez, Jr.. (Tyndall, Brian)
46 Judgment Offer by all defendants Pursuant to Rule 68. (Mihelich, Robert)

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10/15/2007
10/18/2007
12/04/2007
01/15/2008 01/23/2008 02/28/2008 03/03/2008
04/16/2008 04/16/2008 04/24/2008 04/24/2008
06/02/2008 06/05/2008 06/06/2008
06/30/2008 07/01/2008 07/08/2008 07/23/2008
07/23/2008
08/29/2008 08/29/2008 09/02/2008 09/02/2008

47 PROPOSED Unopposed Motion to Change Scheduling Order filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission w/ Proposed Order. (Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 10/17/2007 (Dimiceli, Diane).
ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 10/17/07 granting 47 motion to change scheduling order. Discovery to be completed by 12/21/07; dispositive motion deadline 1/21/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
48 Unopposed MOTION to Amend/Correct Unopposed Motion to Change Scheduling Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian) Text Modified on 12/5/2007 (Zvers, Rita).
49 MOTION to Amend/Correct Unopposed Motion to Amend Scheduling Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
50 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 1/23/08 granting 49 Motion to Amend/Correct. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
51 MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order Unopposed Motion to Change Scheduling Order by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
52 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/3/08 granting 51 Motion to Amend/Correct. Discovery due 4/16/08; dispositive motions due 5/16/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
53 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order by all parties. (Mihelich, Robert)
54 PROPOSED Order filed by all parties. (Mihelich, Robert)
55 Docket Annotation − Email sent to Atty Mihelich re emailing proposed order 54 (djd)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman granting 53 Motion to Amend/Correct. Discovery deadline 5/16/08; dispositive motion deadline 7/1/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
56 LETTER from Attorney Robert M. Mihelich. (Mihelich, Robert)
57 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/5/08 REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Aaron E Goodstein for mediation. (cc: all counsel)(djd)
58 ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS signed by Magistrate Judge Aaron E Goodstein on 6/6/2008. Settlement Conference set for 7/23/2008 at 9:30 AM in Courtroom 254 before Magistrate Judge Aaron E Goodstein. See Order for deadlines. (cc: all counsel)(Goodstein, A.)
59 MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/1/08 granting 59 Motion to Amend/Correct. Dispositive motions due 9/1/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
60 LETTER from Brian C. Tyndall regarding time of mediation to be changed from 9:30 to 10:30. (Tyndall, Brian)
62 ORDER RETURNING CASE signed by Magistrate Judge Aaron E Goodstein on 7/23/2008. The mediation did not result in the resolution of plaintiff's claims. Case no longer referred. (cc: all counsel)(Goodstein, A.)
63 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Aaron E Goodstein: Settlement Conference held on 7/23/2008; parties did not settle; case returned to Judge Adelman for continued processing (vkb) (Entered: 07/24/2008)
64 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)
65 PROPOSED filed by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/2/08 granting 64 Motion to Amend/Correct. Dispositive motions due 10/15/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motions due by 10/15/2008 (djd) (Entered: 09/03/2008)

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10/15/2008 10/16/2008 11/21/2008 11/26/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 01/16/2009 01/21/2009
01/30/2009
02/03/2009 02/17/2009 02/19/2009 02/23/2009
02/23/2009 02/23/2009
03/04/2009 03/09/2009

66 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order by all parties. (Mihelich, Robert)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 10/16/08 granting 66 Motion to Amend/Correct. Dispositive motions due 12/1/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
67 MOTION to Amend/Correct Scheduling Order by all parties. (Mihelich, Robert)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/26/08 granting 67 Motion to Amend/Correct. Dispositive motions due 12/22/08. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
68 AFFIDAVIT of Robert M Mihelich in Support of Defts' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (filed in bound paper format) (djd)
69 Docket Annotation − Email sent to Atty Mihelich re pdf requirement for 68 Affidavit (djd)
70 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)
71 Proposed Findings of Fact by all defendants (Mihelich, Robert)
72 DECLARATION of Victoria Janmohammed in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Mihelich, Robert)
73 DECLARATION of Steve Smith in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Mihelich, Robert)
74 BRIEF in Support filed by all defendants re 70 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. (Mihelich, Robert)
75 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 1/21/09 granting 75 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiff's response to motion for partial summary judgment due 2/4/09. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
76 MOTION to Amend/Correct Unopposed Motion to Amend Schedule for Response to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 2/3/09 granting 76 Motion to Amend/Correct. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
77 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time for Response to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 2/19/09 granting 77 Motion for Extension of Time. EEOC response due 2/23/09. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
78 BRIEF in Opposition filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 70 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment EEOC's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Tyndall, Brian)
79 Proposed Findings of Fact by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
80 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A to Declaration, # 2 Attachment B to Declaration, # 3 Attachment C to Declaration, # 4 Attachment D to Declaration, # 5 Attachment E to Declaration, # 6 Attachment F to Declaration, # 7 Attachment G to Declaration, # 8 Attachment H to Declaration, # 9 Attachment I to Declaration, # 10 Attachment J to Declaration)(Tyndall, Brian)
81 MOTION for Extension of Time to Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)
MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/9/09 granting 81 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants' reply to plaintiff's response to motion for partial summary judgment due 3/23/09. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)

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03/25/2009 82 MOTION for Extension of Time by all defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)

03/30/2009

MARGIN ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/27/09 granting 82 Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants' reply to plaintiff's response to motion for partial summary judgment due 3/30/09. (cc: all counsel)(dm)

03/30/2009 83 Reply to EEOC's Opposition − Proposed Findings of Fact by all defendants (Mihelich, Robert) Modified on 4/2/2009 (djd).

03/30/2009 84 Response to EEOC's Proposed Findings of Fact by all defendants (Mihelich, Robert) Modified on 4/2/2009 (djd).

03/30/2009

85 Supplemental AFFIDAVIT of Robert M. Mihelich in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Mihelich, Robert)

03/30/2009 86 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by all defendants re 70 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. (Mihelich, Robert)

05/27/2009

87 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/27/09 denying 70 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Telephone status conference set for 6/17/09 at 2:30 p.m. to schedule further proceedings. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)

05/29/2009

NOTICE by the Court. Telephonic status conference set for 6/17/09 HAS BEEN RESCHEDULED to 6/26/09 at 2:30 p.m. The court will initiate the call. (Wesolek, Marie)

06/26/2009

88 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/26/09. Final/Joint Pretrial Report due by 10/13/2009 Jury Trial set for 11/16/2009 10:00 AM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. Pretrial Conference set for 10/16/2009 10:30 AM in Room 364, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman.Motions in limine due 9/22/2009; response briefs due 9/29/2009. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)

06/26/2009

89 Minute Entry for telephonic status conference held 6/26/09 before Judge Lynn Adelman; motions in limine due 9/22/09; responses due 9/29/09. Final pretrial 10/16/09 10:30AM and jury trial 11/16/09 10:00AM. Trial could last one week or longer. Parties to inform Court if a court conducted settlement conference may be useful (djd) (Entered: 06/29/2009)

09/22/2009 90 MOTION in Limine Regarding Corporate Law and Liability Issues by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)

09/22/2009

91 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall in Support of EEOC's Motions in Limine. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit, # 9 Exhibit, # 10 Exhibit, # 11 Exhibit, # 12 Exhibit, # 13 Exhibit, # 14 Exhibit, # 15 Exhibit, # 16 Exhibit, # 17 Exhibit, # 18 Exhibit, # 19 Exhibit, # 20 Exhibit, # 21 Exhibit)(Tyndall, Brian)

09/22/2009 92 MOTION in Limine EEOC's Motion in Limine Regarding Tax Filings by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)

09/22/2009 93 DECLARATION of Camille A. Monahan in Support of EEOC's Motion in Limine. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Tyndall, Brian)

09/22/2009 94 MOTION in Limine to Exclude UI Decision (#1) by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009

95 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Prior Sexual Harassment Suit (#2) by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009

96 MOTION in Limine to Exclude References to Allegations of Sexual Harassment at Other IHOP Restaurants by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009

97 MOTION in Limine to Exclude References to Allegations of Sexual Harassment by Former General Manager by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 7 of 16

09/22/2009

98 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Allegations of Sexual Harassment by Non−Class Members by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009

99 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Post Employment Status by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009 100 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Claim for Damages Relative to Migraine Headaches by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009 101 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Psychiatric Counseling by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009 102 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Defendants' Wealth and Size by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit)(Mihelich, Robert)

09/22/2009 103 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Alleged Psychological Counseling by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Exhibit)(Mihelich, Robert)

09/28/2009 104 MOTION to Amend/Correct Unopposed Motion to Amend Schedule for Parties to File Briefs in Response to Motions in Limine by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/28/2009 105 PROPOSED Proposed Order filed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

09/29/2009

106 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/29/09 granting 104 Motion to Amend briefing schedule. The deadline for the parties to file briefs in opposition to Motions in Limine is changed from September 29, 2009 to October 5, 2009. (cc: all counsel) (Adelman, Lynn)(dm)

10/05/2009

107 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 94 MOTION in Limine to Exclude UI Decision (#1) EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#1): Evidence Regarding the Unemployment Insurance Division's Determination and Investigative File. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2009

108 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 95 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Prior Sexual Harassment Suit (#2) EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#2): Evidence Regarding Prior Sex Harassment/Retaliation Lawsuit. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2009

109 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 98 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Allegations of Sexual Harassment by Non−Class Members EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#3): Allegations of Sex Harassment by Hecker and Smith. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2009

110 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 97 MOTION in Limine to Exclude References to Allegations of Sexual Harassment by Former General Manager EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#4): Evidence Regarding Allegations of Sexual Harassment Made by Michelle Dahl. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2009

111 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 98 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Allegations of Sexual Harassment by Non−Class Members EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#5): Allegations of Sex Harassment by Non−Class Members. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2009

112 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 100 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Claim for Damages Relative to Migraine Headaches EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#7): Evidence of Headaches and Impact of Headaches. (Tyndall, Brian)

10/05/2009 113 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 103 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Alleged Psychological Counseling

Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 8 of 16

10/05/2009 10/05/2009
10/05/2009
10/05/2009 10/05/2009 10/06/2009 10/13/2009 10/13/2009 10/14/2009 10/15/2009 10/15/2009 10/16/2009
10/27/2009 10/27/2009 11/02/2009

EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#8): Evidence Regarding Michelle Powell's Psychologicial Counseling. (Tyndall, Brian)
114 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 102 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Defendants' Wealth and Size EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#9): Evidence of Defendants' Wealth and Size. (Tyndall, Brian)
115 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall Declaration of Brian C. Tyndall in Opposition to Defendants' Motions in Limine. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment H, # 2 Exhibit Attachment I, # 3 Exhibit Deposition Exhibit 45, # 4 Exhibit Deposition Exhibit 8, # 5 Exhibit Attachment J, # 6 Exhibit Attachment K, # 7 Exhibit Attachment L, # 8 Exhibit Attachment M)(Tyndall, Brian)
116 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 99 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Post Employment Status EEOC's Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine (#6): Evidence of Post−Employment Status of and Job References Provided to 'Former IHOP Managers Dahl and Guiterrez. (Tyndall, Brian)
117 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc re 90 MOTION in Limine Regarding Corporate Law and Liability Issues. (Mihelich, Robert)
118 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc re 92 MOTION in Limine EEOC's Motion in Limine Regarding Tax Filings. (Mihelich, Robert)
119 AFFIDAVIT of Robert M. Mihelich in Support of Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Reference to Tax Filings. (Mihelich, Robert)
120 PRETRIAL REPORT by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Mihelich, Robert)
121 PRETRIAL REPORT by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit)(Tyndall, Brian)
122 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 90 MOTION in Limine Regarding Corporate Law and Liability Issues. (Tyndall, Brian)
123 Supplemental MOTION to Supplement "Supplemental Declaration of Brian C. Tyndall in Support of EEOC's Motions in Limine Regarding Corporate Law and Liability Issues" by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 10/15/2009 (djd).
124 Docket Annotation − Email sent to Atty Tyndall re selecting correct efiling event 123 (djd)
125 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Final Pretrial Conference held on 10/16/2009, 100 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Claim for Damages Relative to Migraine Headaches filed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Flipmeastack Inc, is DENIED. 94 MOTION in Limine to Exclude UI Decision filed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Flipmeastack Inc is GRANTED. 101 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Reference to Psychiatric Counseling filed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Flipmeastack Inc was GRANTED. See hearing minutes for additional details. (Court Reporter Cheryl Stawski) (cms) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
126 OBJECTIONS by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc to Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits and Designation of Depositions to be Read into the Record. (Mihelich, Robert)
127 EEOC's Objections to IHOP's Pretrial Disclosures Exhibit List by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
128 Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Second Exhibit List by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)

Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 9 of 16

11/03/2009 11/03/2009
11/03/2009 11/04/2009 11/05/2009
11/05/2009
11/12/2009 11/13/2009
11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/13/2009 11/14/2009 11/16/2009 11/16/2009
11/17/2009 11/19/2009
11/19/2009 11/19/2009 11/19/2009 11/19/2009

129 USM 285 form RETURN OF SERVICE of Subpoena; Lilly Brown served 11/2/09 (djd)
130 Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's October 30, 2009 Supplemental Exhibit List by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. (Mihelich, Robert)
131 EEOC's Objections to Defendant's Second Pretrial Disclosures Exhibit List by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
132 USM 285 form − RETURN OF SERVICE − Subpoena served upon Michelle Powell 11/3/09(djd)
133 NOTICE of Appearance by Nicholas J Pladson on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Attorney(s) appearing: Nicholas J. Pladson (Pladson, Nicholas). Correct Suite number should be #720. Modified on 11/5/2009 per filer(kmf).
134 NOTICE of Appearance by Camille A Monahan on behalf of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Attorney(s) appearing: Camille A. Monahan (Monahan, Camille)
135 OBJECTIONS by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc to the Plaintiff's Jury Instructions. (Mihelich, Robert)
136 RESPONSE filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "Plaintiff EEOC's Response to Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions" (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Monahan, Camille)
137 AFFIDAVIT of Process Server for Service on Union Grove Restaurant. (Mihelich, Robert)
138 AFFIDAVIT of Process Server for Service of Subpoena on Nadia DelRio. (Mihelich, Robert)
139 AFFIDAVIT of Process Server for Service of Subpoena on Michelle Dahl. (Mihelich, Robert)
140 AFFIDAVIT of Process Server for Service of Subpoena on Toys R Us. (Mihelich, Robert)
141 AFFIDAVIT of Process Server for Service of Subpoena on Rosalio Gutierrez. (Mihelich, Robert)
142 AFFIDAVIT of Process Server of Service of Subpoena on Union Grove Restaurant. (Mihelich, Robert)
143 USM 285 Form; unable to serve Rachel Schreier (djd)
144 Minute Entry for Jury Trial held 11/16/09 before Judge Lynn Adelman: Jury Trial begun; testimony taken; trial adjourned (Court Reporter Heidi Trapp) (djd) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
145 Minute Entry for day 2 of jury trial held 11/17/09 before Judge Lynn Adelman (Court Reporter Heidi Trapp) (djd) (Entered: 11/19/2009)
146 Minute Entry for jury trial held 11/18/09 and 11/19/09 before Judge Lynn Adelman: Jury Trial completed on 11/19/2009; Verdict in favor of plaintiff; Jury dismissed; Briefing schedule set; Telephonic status conference set for 11/30/09 10:30AM. (Court Reporter Heidi Trapp) (Attachments: # 1 Nov 19, 2009 trial minutes) (djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Telephonice status conference set for 11/30/2009 10:30 AM before Judge Lynn Adelman. (djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
147 Jury Instructions. (djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
148 JURY VERDICT for plaintiff and against defendants. (djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)
149 Jury Communications. (djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

Case: 2:06-cv-715 As of: 06/08/2017 04:33 PM CDT 10 of 16

11/19/2009 150 DEPOSITION of Katrina Shisler taken on 8/08/07 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 151 DEPOSITION of Rosalio Gutierrez taken on 9/13/07 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 152 DEPOSITION of Steven Smith taken on 10/17/07 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 153 DEPOSITION of Nadia Delrio taken on 01/04/08(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 154 DEPOSITION of Salauddin Janmohammed taken on 05/03/07 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 155 DEPOSITION of Salauddin Janmohammed taken on 04/11/08 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 156 DEPOSITION of Victoria Janmohammed taken on 05/04/07 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/19/2009 157 DEPOSITION of Victoria Janmohammed taken on 04/11/08 (paper format)(djd) (Entered: 11/20/2009)

11/30/2009 158 Minute Entry for telephonic status conference held 11/30/09 before Judge Lynn Adelman: Parties to explore settlement on their own; shall contact the court if they prefer mediation (djd) (Entered: 12/01/2009)

12/14/2009 159 SCHEDULING ORDER: signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 12/14/09. Telephonic Status Conference set for 12/16/2009 04:00 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)

12/16/2009

161 Minute Entry for telephonic status conference held 12/16/09 before Judge Lynn Adelman: Transcript of trial not available until 1/12/10; Court modifies briefing schedule on post−verdict motions: Plntf's brief due 2/12/10; Defts' brief due 3/15/10; Plntf's response/reply due 4/16/10; Defts' reply due 5/3/10. (djd) (Entered: 12/18/2009)

12/17/2009 160 Exhibit List. (Attachments: # 1 exhibit list)(bdr)

02/08/2010

162 TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial − Part 1 of 4 held on November 16, 2009 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber Heidi J. Trapp, Contact at 414−297−3074. Transcripts may be purchased through the court reporter using the Transcript Order Form found here or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 3/1/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/11/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2010. (Trapp, Heidi)

02/08/2010

163 TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial − Part 2 of 4 held on November 17, 2009 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber Heidi J. Trapp, Contact at 414−297−3074. Transcripts may be purchased through the court reporter using the Transcript Order Form found here or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 3/1/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/11/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2010. (Trapp, Heidi)

02/08/2010

164 TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial − Part 3 of 4 held on November 18, 2009 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber Heidi J. Trapp, Contact at 414−297−3074. Transcripts may be purchased through the court reporter using the Transcript Order Form found here or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 3/1/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/11/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2010.

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(Trapp, Heidi)

02/08/2010

165 TRANSCRIPT of Jury Trial − Part 4 of 4 held on November 19, 2009 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber Heidi J. Trapp, Contact at 414−297−3074. Transcripts may be purchased through the court reporter using the Transcript Order Form found here or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 3/1/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/11/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/10/2010. (Trapp, Heidi)

02/12/2010

166 To be refiled − MOTION "EEOC's Post−Trial Motions by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment G, # 2 Attachment K − Injunction Order Against Defendants Management Hospitality of Racine, In. and Flipmeastack, Inc.)(Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 2/17/2010 (djd).

02/12/2010

167 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall "Second Supplemental Declaration of Brian C. Tyndall in Support of EEOC's Post−Trial Motions and in Support of EEOC's Motions in Limine Regarding Corporate Law and Liability Issues". (Attachments: # 1 Attachment H, # 2 Attachment I, # 3 Attachment J)(Tyndall, Brian)

02/17/2010 168 Docket Annotation − Email sent to Atty Tyndall to refile 166 using multiple motion reliefs (djd)

02/17/2010 169 SEE DOCUMENT ENTRY 171 MOTION for Damages "EEOC's Post−Trial Motions" by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment G)(Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 2/18/2010 (djd).

02/17/2010 170 PROPOSED MOTION for Order "Injunction Order Against Defendants Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. and Flipmeastack, Inc." by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 2/18/2010 (djd).

02/18/2010 171 EEOC's POST−TRIAL MOTION for Damages, and MOTION for Order for Injunctive Relief (Attachments: # 1 G)(djd)

03/15/2010 172 MOTION for Judgment by All Defendants. (Mihelich, Robert). Added MOTION for New Trial on 3/16/2010 (djd).

03/15/2010 173 BRIEF in Support filed by All Defendants re 172 MOTION for Judgment. (Mihelich, Robert)

03/15/2010 174 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 171 MOTION for Damages MOTION for Order. (Mihelich, Robert)

03/15/2010 175 MOTION to Strike by All Defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)

03/15/2010 176 MOTION for Judgment by All Defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)

04/16/2010 177 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 171 MOTION for Damages MOTION for Order for Injunctive Relief. (Tyndall, Brian)

04/16/2010 178 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 172 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for New Trial. (Tyndall, Brian)

04/16/2010 179 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 176 MOTION for Judgment and Costs. (Tyndall, Brian)

04/16/2010 180 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 175 MOTION to Strike. (Tyndall, Brian)

05/03/2010 181 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Defendants re 172 MOTION for Judgment MOTION for New Trial. (Mihelich, Robert)

05/03/2010 182 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Defendants re 176 MOTION for Judgment. (Mihelich, Robert)

05/03/2010 183 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Defendants re 175 MOTION to Strike. (Mihelich, Robert)

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08/31/2010
08/31/2010
09/13/2010
09/14/2010 09/24/2010
09/24/2010
09/27/2010 09/27/2010 09/27/2010 09/28/2010 11/01/2010 11/02/2010 11/02/2010 11/02/2010 11/02/2010 11/09/2010
11/09/2010 11/19/2010 11/23/2010 01/10/2011 01/10/2011

184 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 8/31/10 granting 171 Motion for Damages; granting 171 Motion for Order; denying 172 Motion for Judgment; finding as moot 175 Motion to Strike ; granting in part and denying in part 176 Motion for Judgment; denying 172 Motion for New Trial. Clerk ordered to enter judgment and injunction. (cc: all counsel) (Wesolek, Marie)
185 JUDGMENT and INJUNCTION signed by Deputy Clerk in favor of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Flipmeastack Inc, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed and approved by Judge Lynn Adelman on 8/31/10. (cc: all counsel)(Wesolek, Marie)
186 BILL OF COSTS Proposed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemized listing of costs, # 2 Exhibit Invoices for bill of costs)(Tyndall, Brian)
187 BRIEFING LETTER Electronically Transmitted to Parties (cms)
188 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 185 Judgment, by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc. Filing Fee PAID $455, receipt number mk4689020496 (cc: all counsel) (dlm) (Corrected attachment(s) added on 9/27/2010: # 1 Notice of Appeal) (lmt). (Entered: 09/27/2010)
189 Docketing Statement by Flipmeastack Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, Management Hospitality of Racine Inc re 188 Notice of Appeal (cc: all counsel) (dlm) (Entered: 09/27/2010)
190 Attorney Cover Letter re: 188 Notice of Appeal (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet)(dlm)
191 7th Circuit Information Sheet re: 188 Notice of Appeal (dlm)
192 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 188 Notice of Appeal (dlm)
193 USCA Case Number 10−3247 re: 188 Notice of Appeal, filed by Management Hospitality of Racine Inc, Salauddin Janmohammed, and Flipmeastack Inc. (lmt)
194 NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian)
195 7th Circuit Information Sheet re: 194 Notice of Cross Appeal (lmt)
196 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 194 Notice of Cross Appeal (lmt)
197 Attorney Cover Letter re: 194 Notice of Cross Appeal (Attachments: # 1 Docket Sheet)(lmt)
198 USCA Case Number 10−3555 re: 194 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (lmt)
199 Entered in error. LETTER from the Court to Reginald Cole, Jr. requesting correct IFP form and 6 month trust account statement. (cc: All Counsel) (lmt) Modified on 11/9/2010 (lmt).
200 LETTER from Brian C. Tyndall request for scheduling order filed 06/26/2009 be made part of the appeal record. (Tyndall, Brian)
201 LETTER from Brian Tyndall, EEOC re: Bill of Costs. (Tyndall, Brian)
202 COSTS TAXED for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Chief Deputy Clerk in amount of $ 14,433.54 against defendants. (cc: all counsel) (cms)
203 MOTION for Order to Show Cause and For Other Relief by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Tyndall, Brian). Added MOTION on 1/11/2011 (kah).
204 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall in Support of Motion for Order To Show Cause and For Other Relief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Injunction Against Flipmeastack dated August 31, 2010, # 2 Exhibit B − Mihelich Letter dated 10/27/2010, # 3 Exhibit C − Tyndall letter dated 11/2/2010, # 4 Exhibit D − Mihelich letter dated 11/12/2010, # 5 Exhibit E −Tyndall letter dated 11/23/2010, # 6 Exhibit F − Mihelich letter dated

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01/11/2011
01/31/2011 01/31/2011 02/01/2011 02/07/2011
02/07/2011 02/10/2011
02/22/2011 02/22/2011
03/07/2011 03/07/2011 04/14/2011 04/15/2011 04/18/2011 04/18/2011 04/21/2011

12/9/2010)(Tyndall, Brian)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 203 MOTION for Order to Show Cause and For Other Relief filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ; When filing motions which contain multiple parts the filer should select all applicable parts from the motion event list; This does not need to be refiled. Please refer to the user manuals on electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (kah)
205 MOTION for Order Approving Supersedeas Bond by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mihelich, Robert)
206 LETTER from Attorney Robert M. Mihelich −Joint Request for an Extension. (Mihelich, Robert)
TEXT ONLY ORDER approving 206 Letter request for extension signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 2/1/11. Defendants' response due 2/7/11. (cc: all counsel)(Adelman, L.)(dm)
207 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 2/7/11 granting 205 Motion for Order Approving Supersedeas Bond of $138,000 conditioned on satisfaction of the judgment in full, together with costs and interest, if the appeal is finally dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed; or satisfaction in full of the judgment as modified, together with such costs and interest as the appellate court may adjudge and award. Further ordering that the copy of the bond attached at Exhibit A to the Motion is hereby deemed to be filed in this Court. (cc: all counsel) (Adelman, L.)(dm)
208 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 203 MOTION for Order to Show Cause and For Other Relief. (Mihelich, Robert)
209 USCA Mandate (certified copy) as to 194 Notice of Cross Appeal filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission USCA Number 10−3555. Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss case pursuant to FRAP 42(b), filed by Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on February 8, 2011, IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). (lmt)
210 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 203 MOTION for Order to Show Cause and For Other Relief. (Tyndall, Brian)
211 DECLARATION of Brian C. Tyndall (Supplementary) in Support of Motion for Order To Show Cause and For Other Relief. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Tyndall letter to Mihelich dated September 17, 2010, # 2 Exhibit Tyndall letter to Mihelich dated October 19, 2010, # 3 Exhibit Mihelich letter to Tyndall dated October 19, 2010, # 4 Exhibit Tyndall letter to Mihelich dated October 21, 2010)(Tyndall, Brian)
212 Appeal Record Request received from 7th Cir. Re: USCA Case Number 10−3247. (dlm)
213 Certified Record on Appeal 10−3247 Transmitted to US Court of Appeals consisting of 1 vol pleadings in PDF format on CD, 1 loose pleadings #68, 4 vol transcripts, 1 box exhibits, 8 depositions re 188 Notice of Appeal, (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet)(dlm)
214 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/14/11. Motion hearing set for 4/29/2011 01:30 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman in Room 390 of the Federal Courthouse, 517 E. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, Wisconsin. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
215 LETTER regarding scheduled hearing from Attorney Robert Mihelich. (Mihelich, Robert) Modified on 4/18/2011 (jcl).
NOTICE by the Court. Motion hearing set for 4/29/2011 01:30 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman is CANCELED. (dm)
216 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/18/11. Telephone Status Conference set for 4/26/2011 02:00 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman. The court will initiate the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
217 MEMORANDUM re: transcripts signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/21/11. (cc: all counsel, via USPS to Clerk, 7th Cir. Ct. Appeals)(dm)

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04/26/2011

218 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/26/11 granting 203 Motion for Order to Show Cause to the extent that Flipmeastack, Inc. is ordered to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of the injunction entered in this case at a hearing to be held on May 20, 2011, at 11:15 a.m., in Courtroom 390 of the United States Courthouse, 517 East Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Defendants motion for stay due 5/3/11; plaintiff's response due 5/10/11. (cc: all counsel) (dm)

04/26/2011

219 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Status Conference held on 4/26/2011;Defendants to show cause why they should not be found in contempt at hearing;Defendants plan to call Victoria Janmohammed as a witness;Plaintiff does not plan to call witnesses but will rely on proofs submitted with motion along with cross exam of V Janmohammed; Defendants intend to ask for stay of injunction pending appeal. Motion due 05/3/2011; Response from EEOC due 05/10/11 (jcl) (Entered: 04/27/2011)

05/03/2011 220 MOTION to Stay Injunction by All Defendants. (Mihelich, Robert)

05/10/2011 221 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 220 MOTION to Stay Injunction. (Tyndall, Brian)

05/17/2011 222 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/17/11 denying 220 Motion to Stay Injunction. (cc: all counsel) (dm)

05/17/2011 223 LETTER from Attorney Robert Mihelich requesting the court to reschedule the hearing. (Mihelich, Robert) Modified on 5/18/2011 (jcl).

05/19/2011 224 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/19/11 DENYING 223 Letter request for adjournment of hearing. (cc: all counsel)(dm)

05/20/2011 225 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/20/11. Show Cause Hearing set for 5/26/2011 03:00 PM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(dm)

05/20/2011

226 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Contempt Hearing Minutes held on 5/20/2011; Regarding alleged noncompliance with paragraph 3 of the injunction, Flipmeastack must formally tender its proposal for complying with paragraph 2 to the EEOC within 30 days of today. Parties shall follow the process outlined in paragraph 3 strictly. Substantial compliance is not sufficient;Flipmeastack shall establish an actual toll free numberthat leads directly to Flipmeastack; Noncompliance with paragraph 4, court hears testimony of Victoria Janmohammed and issues order to show cause to Salauddin Janmohammed. (Court Reporter Sheryl Stawski) (jcl) (Entered: 05/23/2011)

05/26/2011 227 Email offered by EEOC. (cc: all counsel)(dm) (Entered: 05/27/2011)

05/27/2011

228 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Show Cause Hearing held on 5/27/2011; Testimony of Salauddin Janmohammed take and arguments heard regarding compliance with paragraph 4 of injunction and contempt sanctions (Court Reporter John Schindehelm) (jcl)

05/31/2011

229 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/31/11. I FIND Flipmeastack and Salauddin Janmohammed guilty of civil contempt for violating and aiding and abetting the violation of Paragraph 4 of the injunction entered on 8/31/10. IT IS ORDERED a copy of the notice attached to the injunction be posted in a conspicuous location at each of the seventeen restaurants serviced by Flipmeastack by 6/2/11. For every day after 6/2/11 that the notices are not posted at all seventeen restaurants, Flipmeastack and Salauddin Janmohammed shall, jointly and severally, incur a fine of $1,000.Further ordering that by 6/2/11 Flipmeastack and Salauddin Janmohammed shall provide the EEOC with a list identifying the name, address and phone number of each of the seventeen restaurants serviced by Flipmeastack. Flipmeastack shall also provide the EEOC with sworn monthly certifications stating that the notices are posted at all seventeen restaurants, and it shall attach to each certification dated digital photos depicting the notices and their locations at each restaurant. The first certification is due on 6/15/11, and subsequent certifications are due by the 15th of each month in which the injunction is in effect. Finally, the EEOC shall be allowed to conduct random inspections of the seventeen restaurants during business hours to ensure that the notices have been posted in accordance with the injunction and this order. Flipmeastack and Salauddin Janmohammed are responsible

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06/02/2011
06/10/2011
03/02/2012 03/05/2012 03/14/2012 03/22/2012 04/18/2012 08/07/2012 08/14/2012 08/21/2012 09/12/2012

for making sure that the managers at each restaurant are aware of the EEOCs right to conduct these inspections, and the EEOC shall ensure that its representatives carry appropriate identification. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
230 TRANSCRIPT of Continuation of Contempt Hearing held on 5/26/2011 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, RMR, CRR, Contact at johns54@sbcglobal.net / 414.861.8777. Transcripts may be purchased through the court reporter using the Transcript Order Form found here or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 6/27/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/8/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/6/2011. (Schindhelm, John)
231 TRANSCRIPT of Contempt hearing held on May 20, 2011 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber Sheryl L. Stawski, Contact at 414/881−0922. Transcripts may be purchased through the court reporter using the Transcript Order Form found here or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 7/5/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/14/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/12/2011. (Stawski, Sheryl)
232 USCA Mandate (certified copy) USCA Number 10−3247 AFFIRMED the district court's denial of the motion for judgment and REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.The record on appeal will be returned at a later date.CASE REOPENED (dlm) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
Appeal Record Returned consisting of 1 loose pleading, 8 Depositions and 1 box of exhibits re 188 Notice of Appeal (lmt)
233 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/14/12. Status Conference set for 3/29/2012 11:30 AM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
NOTICE by the Court. Status Conference set for 3/29/2012 11:30 AM has been ADJOURNED to 4/18/2012 at 3:00 PM. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
234 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Status Conference held on 4/18/2012; Case settled; Terms placed on record; See transcript for precise details (Court Reporter Heidi Trapp) (jcl) (Entered: 04/19/2012)
235 NOTIFICATION of Exhibit Release sent to counsel of record. (cms)
236 PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Consent Decree by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B−List of IHOP Restaurants)(Tyndall, Brian) Modified on 8/21/2012 to add the word "proposed" to description. (kmm).
237 CONSENT DECREE AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 8/21/12. See document for details. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
EXHIBITS destroyed. No response to notification received. (cms)

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