IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON,

)

and LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of )

themselves and a class of oZhers )

similarly situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

Defendant.

)

JUDGE GEI]°LE AN
04C
DOCKETE
TRIAL D~A~DEDOCT ~ ~ 2004

COMPLAINT

NOW COME Plaintiffs THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON,

and LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, through their attorneys Loevy & Loevy, and

for their complaint against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, state as

follows:

Introduction

Io This is a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section

1983 challenging the Chicago Police Department’s ("CPD" or

"Department") inhumane and unlawful system for detaining persons under the Department’s control.

2.

As is explained in detail below, the CPD has

engaged, for decades, in a repeated pattern of detaining citizens incommunicado within its police departments, holding them for

unconstitutional lengths of time and subjecting them to torture

in order to accomplish unjust ends. Plaintiffs bring this case

in order to finally put an end to this institutionalized system of police torture in Chicago.

3. The CPD’s detention system routinely violates

several fundamental constitutional protections guaranteed to all Americans. One such protection is the right to prompt judicial

review of the Department’s justification for detaining a citizen

in the first place. This requirement serves to ensure that citizens are not arrested unless the police have a proper

justification for interfering in their liberties and to prevent overreaching while the citizen is detained behind closed station

house doors. 4. As explained below, however, the Department

routinely flouts this requirement for prompt judicial review by keeping citizens seGreted inside its police departments while it attempts to develop grounds that would "justify~ detaining them after the fact.

5.

Another stunning example concerns the failure to

provide counsel for those being interrogated during these

detentions. It is a bedrock principal of American criminal

procedure that police may not interrogate a suspect in their

custody if that suspect requests to have an attorney present, unless and until an attorney has been provided. Although this

constitutional mandate is absolutely clear, the CPD literally

maintains no policy or directive for obtaining a lawyer if a

2

detainee requests one, leaving its officers no choice but to ignore the requests.

6.

This monumental failure by Department policymakers

results in consistent violations of the Fifth Amendment during

custodial interrogations of CPD detainees and communicates to CPD

officers that they may violate the constitution in order to

obtain a confession. The result is that numerous confessions obtained by the CPD in the course of such detentions have been

subsequently proven to be false. In the meantime, the damage is

done to those who have been coerced to confess and the true

criminals have been left at large to strike again.

7.

Further, detentions under the CPD’s system often

last many days during which the detainees’ basic human needs for food, sleep and access to sanitation and hygiene are ignored.

Indeed, the s~stem exploits these needs in a manner consistent with tactics of "’soft torture" used to extract involuntary confessions in other parts of the world.

8.

Charles Gruber, a former president of the

International Association of the Chiefs of Police who consults

with the United States Department of Justice in its

investigations of police forces, evaluated the unlawful detentions and the conditions of confinement complained of herein

and concluded in an expert opinion as follows:

In my 35 years of policing and visiting police departments around the country, I have not seen a more blatant failure to promptly process and humanely care for arrested individuals .... So outrageous is the

conduct on the part of the Chicago Police Department in constructing unlawful, unconstitutional, and inhumane policies and practices for extended detentions that it manifests deliberate indifference.
9. Supervisors and policymakers at the highest level have known of these inhumane conditions and illegal detentions for many years but they shrink from changing this system because it is an entrenched means of doing business in the CPD.
Jurisdiction and Venue i0. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ~ 1331. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) . Defendant, City of Chicago, is a municipality physically situated in this judicial district, and the evenZs giving rise to the claims in this case all occurred here.
Interrogation Room Detentions: The Use of ’~Soft" Torture In Chicaqo’s Detective Divisions
ii. Many persons who are detained by the CPD for extended periods are held in Detective Division interrogation rooms -- small, bare rooms, approximately ten feet in length and eight feet in widZh.
12. The rooms contain only a four foot by ten inch metal bench. There is no place to sleep or to relieve oneself and no access to running water. Because the rooms are wholly inadequate to meet the detainee’s basic needs, it is inhumane and cruel to hold a detainee in these rooms for extended periods of time. Illinois law recognizes this fact by placing an eight hour cap on detentions in such rooms.

13. The CPD, however, maintains no policies regarding the length of time a detainee may be held in these rooms. It is not uncommon for a detainee to be kept in such rooms for several days while CPD detectives interrogate them and attempt to extract a confession.
14. Exacerbating the torturous conditions, CPD policies and procedures require that all suspects held in an interrogation room be shackled -- arm to a ring on the wall or to a bar on the bench, for the entire time they are detained in the room.
15. During these detentions, the very officers who are charged with building a case against the detainees and attempting to obtain a confession from them have absolute control over their access to food, water, and a restroom. The investigating detectives control all circumstances of the detainees’ detention, even whether the light in the room is turned off at night allowing ~hem to attempt to rest.
16. If a suspect needs food or water, he/she can only get it if the detectives bring some. There is no scheduled food service for persons detained in these rooms. If a person needs to use the bathroom, they are at the whim of the detectives to unshackle them, let them out of the room and escort them to a resrroom. It is not uncommon for persons detained in the

interrogations rooms for extended periods to urinate or defecate

on themselves or on the floor.

17. These interrogation room detentions are not only

physically torturous, they are psychologically disorienting in a

manner that can lead to increased suggestibility for the suspect

being interrogated and, ultimately, to false confessions. These

very conditions are recognized world-wide as a means of

psychological torture to overcome a human being’s reason and

will.

Excessive Detentions Under The CPD’S System

18. The CPD detention practices challenged herein

directly contravene additional, well-established rights and

safeguards inherent in the United States Constitution.

19.

First, CPD policy and practice allows its

officers to hold citizens in its police stations (both

interrogation rooms and lock-up cells) without the benefit of

judicial review for unconstitutional periods of time.

20. This practice directly contravenes the Fourth

Amendment which requires either an arrest warrant or prompt

review by a judge of the CPD’s supposed justification for

depriving an arrestee of his/her liberty. However, the CPD does

not honor this right to judicial review.

21. Rather, the CPD allows its officers to hold

arrestees for extended periods of time in order to forestall this

very judicial scrutiny while they attempt to develop grounds to justify the arrest. CPD officers can and routinely do rely on the extended detentions as a tool which allows them to make arrests for unconstitutional reasons, such as mere hunches or even animus, and then justify them after the fact by developing sufficient supposed evidence during the period of illegal detention. All too often the "justifications" CPD officers develop during these illegal detentions consist of fabricated evidence and coerced confessions.
22. This very practice was documented forty-five years ago in a publication by the American Civil Liberties Union, entitled Secret Detention by the Chicaqo Police. That report, as well as multitudinous criminal and civil cases over the years and more recent media attention have all put the policymakers of the City of Chicago on notice of these routine violations. However, the policymakers have not remedied the system.
Other Inhumane Conditions Inflicted By The CPD’s System 23. In addition to the above, the CPD’s system fails
to accommodate for the basic human needs of those who are being detained.
24. The Department has an obligation to ensure, at a minimum, that detainees’ basic needs for sustenance, hygiene and sleep are met while they are in the Department’s charge. However, many of the hundreds o£ thousands of citizens arrested

in the City of Chicago each year are systematically deprived of

these basic needs. As a general and widespread practice and policy:

a. The CPD holds detainees in oppressive

conditions;

b.

The CPD furnishes no mattress or other

bedding for overnight detentions. Despite the fact that

overnight detentions are foreseeable and multi-day detentions are commonplace, the CPD maintains no bedding in its facilities and has no policies requiring that its employees furnish appropriate

means of sleep to those who are subjected to extended detentions;

c.

The CPD provides wholly inadequate access to

restrooms and means of personal hygiene; and

d.

The CPD furnishes detainees little if any

food or drink during extended detentions. Even when the CPD does

furnish food to those in its custody, it is always limited to a

pork bologna sandwich, which, as the final policymakers of the CPD well know, violates the religious beliefs of many of its

detainees, and is inedible to them. 25. These failures violate well-established

constitutional and state law requirements to provide for the basic human needs of those in custody. Indeed, the CPD has been

cited by the Illinois Department Of Corrections for its

widespread failure to provide proper bedding, nutrition and

8

access to sanitation for those in its custody. However, the final policymakers of the CPD consistently treat these serious problems with callous indifference.
26. Although there is absolutely no legitimate law enforcement purpose for the foregoing policies and practices, the CPD has refused, and continues to refuse, to change.
Facts Concerning The Named Plaintiffs 27. At approximately noon on February 24, 2004, Named Plaintiff Leonard Kimble came to the CPD police station after being told that police wanted to learn if he had information about an unspecified crime. 28. Immediately upon arrival, Mr. Kimble was stripped of his shoestrings, searched, and imprisoned in an interrogation room. His wrist was shackled to a ring on the wall. 29. Chicago police detectives began questioning him about a murder that had occurred in March 2003. Mr. Kimble had no knowledge of the victim or the circumstances of his death and communicated this fact to the officers. 30. Nevertheless, the detectives continued to question Mr. Kimble about the crime. 31. The detectives detained Mr. Kimble’s in the interrogation room for approximately 65 hours, from noon on February 24 to the early morning of February 27. The only times Mr. Kimble was allowed out of the interrogation room was to take
9

a lie detector test on the first day of his detention, to appear in a line-up on the third day, and one time to use the bathroom.
32. At no time during this entire period did Mr. Kimble receive any judicial determination of probable cause or bail. He was not allowed to use the telephone. He was not given any food to eat. The only liquids he received were from the faucet on the s±nk during his lone trip to the bathroom. He could not sleep properly as he was sitting upright on the small metal bench with his wrist chained to the wall.
33. On October 20, 2000, at approximately 9 a.m., Named Plaintiff Denny Robinson was ar work as a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. While he was sorting mail in an area closed to the public, Mr. Robinson was approached by a Chicago Police Officer, Detective Downs.
34. Detective Downs told him that he had an arrest warrant out for him, but Downs never showed him a warrant or indicated on his arrest report that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. On information and belief there was no such warrant.
35. Downs handcuffed Mr. Robinson but did not tell Mr. Robinson why he was being arrested. Thereafter, Mr. Robinson was transported to the police station, placed in a small interrogation room, and chained to a ring on the wall.
I0

36. Mr. Robinson was held in the room for three days and two nights and was interrogated during this time. The room contained only a small metal bench.
37. Mr. Robinson could not sleep properly due to his arm being suspended above him and Ghained to the wall. He was furnished no mattress, blanket nor pillow. In addition, the bare lightbulb illuminating the room remained on all night and Plaintiff could not switch it off.
38. On the third day of his captivity, Mr. Robinson was taken from the interrogation room, booked, and plaGed in a lock-up ce~l where he was held until the following day. The holding cell was slightly bigger than the interrogation room, but also ~ontained no accommodations for sleeping.
39. During his entire four-day detention, the only food provided to Mr. Robinson was three baloney sandwiches, one on each of the first three days of his confinement. He was often thirsty while locked in the interrogation room. When he asked for something to drink, detectives told him to "be patient," or words to that effect, rather than bring him water. Mr. Robinson was not able to sleep properly during the three nights he spent in police custody.
40. At no time during this four day ordeal did Mr. Robinson receive a judicial hearing to determine whether there
Ii

was probable cause to detain him or to set a bail for his release.
41. Mr. Robinson was finally transferred to the Cook County Jail on October 23, 2000, and was ultimately acquitted of all charges pending against him.
42. On July 29, 2003, Named Plaintiff Thomas Dunn was arrested by CPD officers for a crime he did not commit.
43. The officers placed Mr. Dunn in a CPD holding cell where he spent the next three nights.
44. During his detention, Mr. Dunn was not provided with any sheets, blankets, or pillows and was not able to obtain adequate sleep during this detention.
45. The only food Mr. Dunn received were pork bologna sandwiches. The only fluids he had to drink were from the tap of the sink in his cell.
46. On the morning following his third night in the cell, Mr. Dunn was finally transferred to court for a probable cause and bail hearing.
47. Each of the foregoing actions and failures to act by CPD employees affecting the Named Plaintiffs were taken pursuant to policies, customs and longstanding widespread practices of the CPD of which the Department’s policy makers were aware.
12

Class Allegations

48. The Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims both

for them3elves and for a class of others similarly situated.

Named Plaintiffs believe that the class should be organized into

three subclasses as follows.

49. Named Plaintiffs Kimbie and Robinson seek to

represent Class I. Class I consists of:

All persons detained in a CPD interrogation room for more than eight hours in a 24 hour period at any time form March 15, 1999 to the date of the order granting certification in this case.

50. The individuals in the Class I are so numerous

that joinder of all members is impractical. Named Plaintiffs

Kimble and Robinson e3timate that Class I numbers in at least the

thousands.

a.

On information and belief, at least 200,000

persons have been arrested by the CPD each year since 1999;

b.

The CPD maintains no policy, directive or

procedure limiting the amount of time that an arrestee may be

kept in an interrogat±on room. Indeed, Chicago police personnel,

Zestifying as representatives of the Chicago Police Department

and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that there is no

policy or practice of the CPD which limits the length of time an

arrestee can be held in an interview room, making it likely that

this unconstitutional condition of detention occurs again and

again; and

]3

c.

Chicago police personnel, testifying as

representatives of the Chicago Police Department and the CITY OF

CHICAGO, have stated under oath that it is not uncommon for

arrestees to be held in interrogation rooms for up to 72 hours or

more.

51. There are questions of law and fact common to the

claims of Class I. Among these common questions are:

a.

Whether it is unconstitutional to hold detainees

in an interrogation for extended periods of time;

b.

Whether it is unconstitutional to shackle persons

to a wall in an ±nterrogation room for extended periods of time;

c.

Whether the conditions of confinement in the

interrogation rooms deprive deZainees of acceptable means of

sleep in an unconstitutional manner;

d.

Whether CPD policy allows the misuse of

interrogations rooms for extended detentions in the manner

alleged herein;

e.

Whether there is a custom or practice within the

CPD of misusing interrogation rooms in the manner alleged herein;

f.

Whether CPD final policymakers have condoned or

been deliberately indifferent to the misuse of interrogations

rooms for extended detentions in the manner alleged herein; and

g.

Whether extended detentions in the interrogation

rooms violate detainees’ rights under state law.

14

52. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of Class I. Both Mr. Kimble and Mr. Robinson were detained in CPD interrogation rooms in excess of eight hours in a twenty-four hour period, each of them was shackled to the wall in the interrogation room, each of them was deprived of meaningful sleep, and each of them seeks to prove that the deprivations he suffered were inflicted as a result of CPD policy, custom, practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD policy makers.
53. Plaintiffs Kimble and Robinson will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class Io Plaintiffs have retained skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class.
54. The questions of law and fact common to the Class I, as described in paragraph 43 above, predominate over any individual issues.
55. Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Kimble, and Robinson seek to represent Class II. Class II consists of:
All persons detained in a CPD lock-up or detective division facility between the hours of i0 p.m. and 6 a.m. at any time form March 15, 1999 to the date of the order granting certification in this case.
56. The individuals in the Class II are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Kimble and Robinson estimate that Class II numbers in at least the thousands.
15

a.

On information and belief, at least 200,000

persons have been arrested by the CPD each year since 1999. A

sizeable percentage of these persons are detained between the

hours of i0 p.m. and 6 a.m. as persons arrested by the CPD in the afternoon are rarely if ever taken to court until the following

morning;

b.

The CPD maintains no poliGy, directive or

procedure requiring the provision of minimally appropriate

sleeping accommodations to those in its custody, inGluding the provision of a mattress, blanket or pillow. The CPD in fact

maintains no such bedding;

c.

CPD employees testifying as official

representatives of the City of Chicago testified that the CPD has never maintained any such policies or facilities to the best of

their knowledge. One of these representatives testified that detainees are expected to sleep on the floor or on the four foot

by ten inch metal benGh, and that this expectation applies even to those who are detained by the CPD for several days; and

d.

The CPD has been cited multiple times by Illinois

state officials for failing to maintain any bedding for detainees.

57. There are questions of law and fact common to the

claims of Class II. Among these common questions are:

16

a.

Whether it is unconstitutional to hold detainees

overnight without furnishing them sleeping facilities such as a

mattress, blanket or pillow;

b.

Whether it is a violation of state law to hold

detainees overnight without furnishing them sleeping facilities

such as a mattress, blanket or pillow;

c.

Whether CPD policy allows and/or encourages the

alleged constitutional deprivations;

d.

Whether there is a custom or practice within the

CPD that allows and/or encourages the alleged constitutional

deprivations;

e.

Whether CPD final policymakers have condoned or

been deliberately indifferent to the alleged constitutional

deprivations; and

f.

Whether CPD final policymakers have been

deliberately indifferent in failing to maintain minimally

adequate sleeping accommodations for overnight detainees.

58. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of

Class II. Mr. Dunn was detained over several nights in a CPD

lock-up cell. During that entire time he received no

accommodations for sleeping, no mattress, blanket or pillow.

Messrs. Kimble and Robinson were each detained in CPD

interrogation rooms over several nights and neither received any

accommodations for sleeping, nor any mattress, blanket or pillow.

17

Each of the Named Plaintiffs seeks to prove that the deprivations

he suffered were inflicted as a result of CPD policy, custom,

practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD polity makers.

59. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately

represent the interests of Class II. Plaintiffs have retained

skilled counsel with experienGe in constitutional and class

action litigation to represent the Class.

60. The questions of law and fact common ro Class II

predominate over any individual issues.

61. Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Kimble, and Robinson seek

to represent Class III. Class III consists of:

All persons arrested without an arrest warrant and detained by the CPD in excess of 48 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause at anytime from March 15, 1999 until the date of the order granting certification in this Gase.

62. The individuals in Class IIl are so numerous that

joinder of all members is impractical. Named Plaintiffs Dunn,

Kimble and Robinson estimate that Class III numbers in at least

the thousands.

a.

On information and belief, at least 200,000

persons have been arrested by the CPD eaGh year since 1999. A

sizeable percentage of these persons were detained in excess of

48 hours without any judicial determination of probable cause;

b.

The CPD maintains or maintained a policy, custom

and/or widespread praGtice permitting officers to detain suspects

18

in excess of 48 hours without obtaining a judicial determination

of probable cause and for reasons which do not amounZ to exigent circumstances;

c.

The CPD has a long history of detaining persons in

excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause determination. Most or a substantial portion of CPD officers

believe that they may detain a suspect for 72 hours or longer

without obtaining judicial approval;

d.

Numerous individual and class action civil rights

cases as well as criminal cases dating back to 1986 and before have challenged that the CPD fails to obtain probable cause

determinations within 48 hours of arrest;

e. The CPD did not adopt a policy even purporting to ban detentions in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval until August of 2003. Moreover, on information and belief, based

on the fact that detentions in excess of 48 hours are an

ingrained and long standing CPD practice, and based on the fact that Mr. Dunn was detained for 56 hours without a judicial

determination of probable cause in 2004, the new policy has not

been properly implemented;

f.

CPD employees testifying as representatives of the

City of Chicago testified that during the class period ir was not

uncommon for arrestees to be held for 72 hours or more without a

judicial determination of probable cause; and

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g.

An analysis of data obtained from the Cook County

States Attorneys Office and the Cook County Circuit Court indicates that at least approximately 1400 people were detained

in excess of 48 hours by the CPD without a judicial determination

of probable cause from March 15, 1999 through May of 2004. 63. There are questions of law and fact common to the
claims of Class II. Among these common questions are:

a.

Whether it violates the constitution to detain

warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining

judicial approval of probable cause for the detention;

b.

Whether it violates state law to detain

warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining

judicial approval of probable cause for the detention;

c.

Whether the CPD maintained a policy, custom

and/or widespread practice allowing the detention of warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining a judicial

determination of probable cause for the detention;

d.

Whether the CPD maintains a custom and/or

widespread practice allowing the detention of warrantless

arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining a judicial

determination of probable cause for the detention; and

e.

WhetheE CPD officials have been deliberately

indifferent to the need for training, enforcement, discipline~ and/or policy changes regarding the length of detention of

2O

arrestees in the absence of a judicial determination of probable

cause.

64. Plaintiffs" claims are typical of the claims of

Class III. Each of the Named Plaintiffs was detained by the CPD

in excess of 48 hours without receiving a judicial determination

of probable cause. Each of the Named Plaintiffs seeks to prove that the deprivations he suffered were inflicted as a result of

CPD policy, custom, practice and/or the deliberate indifference

of CPD policy makers. 65. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately
represent the interests of Class iII. Plaintiffs have retained

skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class.

The Robinson and Lopez Cases

66. The CPD’s policy of permitting extended detentions

of arrestees in the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause has been challenged in at least two class actions.
67. In the case of Robinson v. Chicaqo, 638 F.Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1986), rev’d 868 F.2d 959 (7~ Cir. 1989), the trial court determined that the practice of holding detainees for

excessive periods without obtaining judicial approval violated

the Fourth Amendment, and the court awarded an injunction against

the practice. In appealing that decision, Defendant City of Chicago essentially conceded the Fourth Amendment violation but

21

represented to the Seventh Circuit that it had abolished the policy allowing such detentions. The Seventh Circuit reversed the award of the injunction on standing grounds.
68. However, the CPD completely failed to enact any policies forbidding the challenged detentions or to take other appropriate steps to cease the detentions.
69. As a result, extended detentions without judicial approval remained the widespread norm in the CPD for the next ]5 years. CPD final policymakers were deliberately indifferent to these detentions.
70. In June of 2002, representatives testifying on behalf of the City of Chicago admitted under oath that the CPD continues to allow detentions in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval of probable cause. On the basis of <hese admissions another class action was pursued against the CPD, styled Lopez v. City of Chicago.
71. L__gpez was brought by a named plaintiff who was detained for five days in an interrogation room under the circumstances identified above. Like Robinson, L_p_pez challenged CPD polices and procedures allowing the detention of arrestees in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause review. Lopez also gave the City of Chicago notice that a large class of people were being subjected to unconstitutional conditions while detained in CPD police departments including being detained in
22

torturous interrogation room conditions, deprived of accommodations for sleeping, adequate nutrition and adequate access to sanitation.
72. In direct response to the challenge in Lo__Q/~_~, the CPD modified its directive for processing arrestees to forbid detentions in excess of 48 hours in the absence of judicial approval or extraordinary circumstances.
73. The modification was enacted by the CPD’s final policymaker or makers. The modification became effective in August of 2003.
74. The final policymakers of the CPD remain deliberaZely indifferent despite their having adopted the modification. Ignoring the allegations in Lo__oj~9~ of torturous conditions of confinement during CPD detentions, the final policymakers enacted no directive or modiffcation to limit the amount of time a detainee may be held in an interrogation room other than the 48 hour general limitation on all detentions. Neither was a directive modified or adopted to require adequa<e accommodations for sleeping or adequate provision of nutrition or sanitation.
75. The modification was adopted solely as a litigation response to the pressure of the L_~pez suit.
76. The modification was not implemented in a genuine manner that would actually change the CPD’s widespread practice
23

of unlawful detentions. The modification has not been subject of adequate dissemination, training and/or enforcement, and violations of the 48 hour requirement have not been adequately investigated and disciplined.
77. Rather, the final policymakers of the City of Chicago have been and remain deliberately indifferent to the widespread practice of detaining arrestees in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval. As a result, such detentions remain widespread prac<ice in the CPD.
78. The court in ~ approved a class limitations period beginning on March 15, 1999 based on the fact that the suit, filed as an individual action on March 15, 2001, provided notice of the widespread violations contained of herein.
79. The class representative in L__qpez withdrew his request for class certification on March 20, 2004. All claims asserted herein were tolled at least until that time by virtue of the L_~ez case. Additional tolling is provided under Illinois’s single re-filing rule.
80. Based on the CPD’s representations in Robinson that the policy allowing extended detention without judicial approval had been revoked and the fact that the CPD thereafter allowed the detentions through a widespread practice with which private citizens had no reason to be familiar, the Named Plaintiffs did not learn and could not have learned through
24

reasonable diligence that the CPD maintained a policy, custom and/or widespread practice allowfng detentions in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval until they learned of this through the ~ case.
81. Mr. Robinson learned of this fact in or about August of 2003. Messrs. Dunn and Kimble learned of this fact in or about June of 2004.
82. As private citizens, Named Plaintiffs have no reason to be familiar with the policies, failures of policy, widespread practices and/or customs of the CPD with regard to detentions in interrogation rooms. Named Plaintiffs did not learn and could not have learned through the exercise of reasonable diligence that the CPD permits unconstitutionally extended detentions in interrogation rooms as a matter of custom, widespread practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD final policymakers.
83. Mr. Robinson learned of this fact in or about August of 2003. Messrs. Dunn and Kimble learned of this fact in or about June of 2004.
84. As private citizens, Named Plaintiffs have no reason to be familiar with the policies, failures of policy, widespread practices and/or customs of the CPD with regard to providing constitutionally adequate sleeping accommodations to overnight detainees. Named Plaintiffs did not learn and could
25

not have learned through the exercise of reasonable diligence

that the CPD permits unconstitutional conditions of confinement

regarding sleep as a matter of custom, widespread practice and/or

the deliberate indifference of CPD final policymakers.

85. Mr. Robinson learned of this fact in or about

August of 2003. Messrs. Dunn and Kimble learned of this fact in

or about June of 2004.

COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Unlawful Interrogation Room Detentions

86. Plaintiffs realiege each of the forgoing

paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

87. As described more fully above, Named Plaintiffs

Kimble and Robinson and the members of the Class I have been

detained in CPD interrogation rooms for unconstitutional lengths

of time and have been damaged as a direct and proximate result.

88. The City of ChiGago caused this deprivation of

rights and is liable for Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’

damages, inter alia, because the City of Chicago maintains

unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that

caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to

adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner khat

causes such violations. Further, the City of Chicago has been

deliberately indifferent to the need for different policies,

training and discipline.

Also, the City of Chicago has failed

to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the

26

preceding paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same,

thereby causing the types of ±n~u~ies alleged here.

COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim For Deprivation of Adequate Accommodations For Sleep

89. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

90. As described more fully above, Named Plaintiffs

Dunn, Kimble and Robinson and the members of the Class II have

been detained in CPD facilities overnight and have not been furnished minimally adequate accommodations for sleeping all in a

manner that violated the constitution. 91. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of

rights and is liable for Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ damages, inter alia, because the City of Chicago maintains

unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that

caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to

adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that

causes such violations. Further, the City of Chicago has been deliberately indifferent to the need for different policies,

training and discipline.

Also, the City of Chicago has failed

to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same,

thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.

27

COUNT III- 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 Claim For Excessive Detention 92. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing
paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 93. As described more fully above, Named Plaintiffs
Dunn, Kimble and Robinson and the members of the Class III have been detained in CPD facilities for over 48 hours following arrest without a judicial determination of probable cause.
94. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ damages, inter alia, because the City of Chicago maintains unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that causes such violations. Further, the City of Chicago has been deliberately indifferent to the need for different policies, training and discipline. Also, the City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
28

COUNT IV - Respondeat Superior 95. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein 96. By all of the above employees of the City of Chicago subjected Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Kimble and Robinson and the members of the Classes I-Ill to excessive detentions and unlawful conditions of confinement in a manner which violates Illinois law. 97. These employee’s actions and omissions were taken within the scope of their employment for the CPD. 98. Named Plaintiffs and the members of Classes I-III have suffered damages as a result.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS DUNN, ROBINSON and KIMBLE, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, demand judgment against the CITY OF CHICAGO awarding their actual damages, costs and a reasonable attorneys fee, together with any other relief that may be just; and further demand that a common fund be established to compensate them and their attorneys and to reimburse all expenses in connection with obtaining this relief.
29

JURY DEMAND Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class, hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Jon Loevy Russell Ainsworth LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May St. Suite i00 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

Attorneys for/~la~ntlffs

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Civil Cover Sheet

@OCKffED
0cr 2004

This automate(

conlbrtns generally to the manual JS-44 approved by the Judicial Conli:rcncc of the United States in Seplclnbcr

1974. The data is required for the use of the Clerk of Court lbr the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. The information contained

herein neither replaces nor supplements the filing aad service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. rhis form is anthorized for

use only in the Northern District of lllinois.

Plaintiff(s): Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, and Leonard Kimble, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated

County of Residence: Cook

Plaintiff’s Arty:

Loevy & Loevy 312 N. May St., Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (,312) 243-5900

Defendant(s):City of Chicago

County Of Residence: Defendant’s Arty:

JUDGE

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[I. Basis of Jurisdiction:

(/~3.,3,3~ederal Question (u.s. not a party)

III. Citizenship of Principal Parties
(Diversity Cases Only)
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MAGISTPATE SIDNEY I. ~.,--,.a~K ER ~,,,,_,...L. _

iV. Origin ’

1. Original Proceeding

V. Nature of Suit: VI.Cause of Actiou:

(’~ther Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

VI1. Requested in Comp[a{nt Class
Dollar Deman .d’r----Jury Demand: Yes

VIII. This case IS NOT a refiling of a previously dismissed case.

Date:

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10/21/2004

In the Matter of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

OCT ~ ~ 2004

Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, and Leonard Kimble, on behalf of themselves and a class of" others similarly situated
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City of Chicago

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 Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 1 of 107

IN'THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON, and LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendant.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NOTICE OF FILING TO:

Mike Dolesh Sara Ellis Caroline Sheerin City of Chicago Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Room 900 Chicago, Illinois 60602
Please take notice that on August 8, 2005, I filed the attached Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification with the Clerk of the United States District Court
fOe £he ""<£he<o Die£<ic£ of illiO"ie.~ ~

LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Russell Ainsworth, an attorney, certify that on

August 5, 2005, I sent by Facsimile and U.S. Mail a copy of the

attached Motion and Memorandum to the above-named counsel of

record.

{)i1!J=

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 2 of 107

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

'g"' ;: FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON and

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LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of themselves and )

04-C-6804

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a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

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Judge Gettleman

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CITY OF CHICAGO,

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Defendant.

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PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz JonLoevy Russell Ainsworth 312 N. May St. Suite 100 Chicago, II 60607 (312) 243-5900

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 3 of 107
INTRODUCTION Chicago concedes that Class II, which brings relatively palatable claims about denial of bedding, is properly certified, but it challenges certification of the classes that accuse it of a pattern of torture and incognito detentions. Each of these classes should be certified because each is a cohesive grouping of claimants who were harmed as a result of precisely the same policies and practices. Chicago attempts to confuse the issue by focusing on purported variations in the effects of these practices, ignoring the reality that wherever the claims of a group of people are joined together in a class there will always be some variations. Under the law, however, that consideration simply does not undercut the substantial judicial economy of resolution by class action and the preference to resolve claims rather than leave them umemedied. Class treatment here will serve a very desirable purpose not only by compensating those who have been victimized by Chicago's entrenched practices but of finally bringing about much needed change.
ARGUMENT I. The Claims Presented by Each Member of Class I Are Appropriate for Certification
Class I presents a cohesive and common claim brought by persons who were kept in the CPD's detective division interrogation rooms for far longer than was reasonable or appropriate. Each class member alleges that slhe was kept in the room for over 16 hours - which is twice the allowable maximum - and should have been taken to a lock-up cell to rest. As a result, each class member was deprived of a bunk to sleep on, ready access to a toilet and washbasin in each cell, and regularly scheduled food service from disinterested jailers. Instead, each class member undisputedly had to sleep on the floor of the interrogation room (or just not sleep) and had to rely on their interrogators to meet their basic human needs. This combination of conditions violates well-accepted law enforcement standards for the treatment of prisoners and the prevention of coercion as well as clear administrative rules of the State of Illinois. In other words, there was no legitimate police purpose for treating the class members this way. The class accordingly claims that the interrogation room detentions were umeasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.
Many of the class members suffered additional deprivations when the detectives starved or shackled them during the detention (indeed, Chicago advances this fact as if it were favorable to its defense of this Motion). However, the fact that some class members were tortured more
1

''': t

!'-z-)

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 4 of 107

severely than others during these detentions does not prevent class certification. These differences go only to the issue of damages, and do not undermine the fact that each class member shares a core of common injuries and indignities that give rise to a right to relief.
A. Commonality Chicago lumps its attack on commonality in with its challenge to typicality and predominance, and it never explains its reasoning why Plaintiffs supposedly have not satisfied the commonality prong. Nevertheless, by raising the argument, Chicago necessarily asserts that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate even one question of law or fact which the class members share in common. See Portis v. City of Chicago, 2003 WL 22078279, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("Commonality generally requires the presence of a question of law or fact common to the class"); Rahim v. Sheahan, 2001 WL 1263493, *12 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("A plaintiff may ordinarily satisfy the commonality requirement by showing that 'there is at least one question of law or fact common to the class"'); Nat'l Org. for Women. Inc. v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351, 360 (N.D.IlI.1997) (same). However, there are multiple such questions that Chicago alternatively mischaracterizes or Ignores. First, each class member suffered a cognizable constitutional violation by being kept in the interrogation room past the point when any person would be expected to need rest (16 hours out of a 24-hour day) despite the fact that there was no place to sleep but the brick floor. It is undisputed that there is no sleeping area in the interrogation rooms, because they are intended for only relatively brief stints of interrogation, while the lock-up has a bunk and is intended for detainees to be able to rest. This is a common fact for each member of Class I, I and it raises a genuine common question as to whether the deprivation violated their constitutional rights. See Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (pretrial detainee stated claim for violation of Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that he was needlessly forced to sleep on a floor for two nights without a mattress); Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1986) (same, plaintiffs were forced to sleep on a floor without a mattress for one night).

I Not surprisingly, none of the declarants report being able to obtain meaningful sleep under these conditions. See Declarations, Group Exhibits 0, and Depositions, Group Exhibit W, Bryant Dep. 56:22-58:5; Lofton Dep. 25:14-16, 45:10-12, 35:18-24; J. Perez Dep. 26:4-7; M Perez Dep. 109:21-24; Robinson Dep. 61:13-20; Solomon Dep. 37:2-7, 50:14-22, 75:8-16.
2

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 5 of 107
Chicago essentially acknowledges in footnote 1 of its brief that this is a common question for Class I, but it argues, without examination, that the question devolves into an issue of bedding which it calls redundant of Class II's claims. That position is incorrect. There are clear dignitary and physical differences between being forced to sleep on a floor and being provided a bunk with or without bedding. ld.; see also People v. McKinney, 661 N.E.2d 408 (1 Dist. 1996) (level of intrusion associated with forcing witness to sleep on the floor of the interrogation room turned purportedly voluntary encounter into a Fourth Amendment seizure). The constitution protects both of these interests, meaning that Class I's claims for being needlessly forced to sleep on the floor are different than, and additional to, Class II's claims for a lack of bedding. ld., see also Schmerber v. Californi~ 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal ... dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State").
Second, and relatedly, there is an additional set of indignities which are undisputedly common to each class member. Because they were forced to remain in a room that is clearly not designed to meet their human needs, they had to rely on their interrogators to provide food and toilet access for their entire detention. That is substantively different and more discomforting than the situation in the lock-up where each cell contains its own toilet and washbasin and there is food regular service provided by disinterested jailers. Chicago's chart summarizing how often each class member ate or used the bathroom tries to whitewash these differences. For example, the chart's recitation that Mr. Robinson was taken to the bathroom twice on his first day in custody seriously under plays his testimony, sanitizing a very humiliating picture:
Q: Did he let you go to the washroom by yourself? A: What do you mean? Q: Did he go into the washroom with you? A: Yes. Q: Were you handcuffed? A: My left arm.
• • *
Q: When you needed to use the washroom, how did you let the detective know?
A: I had to yell or stretch across the room and kick the door.
3

,, ,

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 6 of 107

Q: When you did that, did someone respond? A: Occasionally. Q: When you say occasionally, what do you mean? A: Sometimes they did; sometimes they didn't. Robinson Dep. at 58, D's Exhibit 9. See also Declarations, Group Exhibits 0, and Depositions, Group Exhibit W, Bryant Dep. 52:21-53:4; Lofton Dep. 32:12-20, 61:6-16, 63:16-21; JPerez Dep. 24:23-25:6; M Perez Sep. 53:13-54:8; Solomon Dep. 52:5-15 (each describing having to scream and bang on the interrogation room door to obtain bathroom access).' Recognizing the impropriety of inflicting such indignities, national policing standards and Illinois law prohibit keeping arrestees interrogations rooms for more than eight hours. See Gruber Report at 8 (national practices require that arrestees may be held in an interrogation room for no more than eight hours and then must be taken to the lock-up for eight hours of rest before interrogation may resume), Ps' Exhibit J; see also 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 720.50 (for detentions of eight hours or less arrestee must be provided a bench and access to a washbasin and toilet as needed, but after eight hours an arrestee must be placed in a cell containing its own bunk, wash basin and a toilet). That is because there is no legitimate police purpose for such detentions and they can serve only the improper purposes of adding a coercive element to the interrogation. Thus, even assuming that the detectives actually did supply food and bathroom access to the detainees (which they often did not), there is nonetheless a common question as to whether it was unreasonable to keep the detainees out of the more humane environs of the lock-up. Third, there is a common question offact on whether the policies and/or widespread practices of the City of Chicago caused the class members to be detained for so long in an interrogation room instead of being taken to the lock-up. This is a common question because each class member must demonstrate a basis for municipal liability in order to recover. As Plaintiffs explained in their opening brief, questions of policy or practice are a well-accepted

, The chart also omits Declarant Tim Finwall who tried to get the detectives to take him to the restroom but eventually had to urinate on the floor. See Chicago's Chart at 4 (skipping from Karvis Carter to Leonard Lofton); Declaration of Tim Finwall, Ps' Exhibit 0 ~7 ("1 was not allowed to leave the room to use the bathroom and was forced to urinate in the corner"). See also Report of former Assistant Cook County State's Attorney Peter Faraci at 3 (noting that the rooms often smelled of urine), Ps' Exhibit Q.
4

" .

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 7 of 107

basis for a finding of commonality. See P's Brief at II; see also Portis, 2003 WL 22078279 at *2; Thompson v. City of Chicago, 2002 WL 1303138, *4 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("[A] suit challenging the constitutionality of a police department's standard policy satisfies the prerequisite of commonality, even if there exists individual issues regarding the application of that policy.").
B. Typicality As with the commonality prong, Chicago never articulates why it asserts that Plaintiff Robinson's claims are not typical of the class claims. As Chicago's own chart reveals, Mr. Robinson was detained in the interrogation room for three days. See Chicago's Exh. 1.3 This fact alone is enough to satisfY the typicality requirement because it shows that Mr. Robinson was, at a minimum, deprived of a bunk and subjected to the other indignities identified above just like every other class member. See Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589,595 (7th Cir.1998) ("Typicality is satisfied when the plaintiffs claim arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and the plaintiff s claim is based on the same legal theory") (citations and internal quotations omitted). Moreover, Mr. Robinson seeks recovery under the same Fourth Amendment legal theory as the rest of the class. Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir.1983) ("Similarity oflegal theory is more important than factual similarity, so the presence offactual differences between the claims of the members of the proposed class is not fatal to a finding of typicality"):

3 Moreover, Mr. Robinson experienced other deprivations that many of the class members suffered, including being shackled throughout each of these three days; receiving only a single bologna sandwich as his food for days two and three (he faired better on day one only because he happened to have his lunch with him when he was arrested); and, having sporadic and unreliable access to the bathroom. Id.
4 Chicago correctly states in footnote 6 of its Brief that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard governs the conditions for warrantless arrestees while the Fourteenth Amendment governs for those arrested pursuant to a warrant. As applied, however, there is no substantive difference in how the CPD can treat the two types of arrestees because there was no legitimate purpose for keeping the class members from the lock-up. Compare United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) ("The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by 'balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion oflegitimate governmental interests"') with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)("[I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal ... a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees"). Nevertheless, at this juncture, Plaintiffs ask that the Court define Class I to include only warrantless arrestees, without prejudice to adding a named plaintiff and moving to certify a warrant subclass at that time.
5

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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 8 of 107

C. Adequacy Chicago argues that Mr. Robinson is an inadequate representative, supposedly because his claims for the prolonged interrogation room detention are time-barred.' Given that Judge Darrah clearly ruled that all of the claims in the Lopez class action related back to the initial filing of the case, see Lopez v. City of Chicago, 2002 WL 31415767, *3 (N.D. Ill. 2002), Chicago attempts to support its argument by asserting that the interrogation room detention claims were not part of the Lopez class action suit. The statement is simply wrong, and Chicago has omitted from its Exhibit 3 the portions of the complaint that show it. Attached as Exhibit T' hereto is a complete copy of the Lopez complaint, showing the following allegations about this claim: • Class members are held for days in interrogation rooms which are not designed for housing arrestees,'\117;
• Mr. Lopez was held in an interrogation room for five days and shackled to a wall; '\140
• Class Count II: "As described more fully above, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been subjected to torturous conditions of confinement while being held in the custody of the CPO," '\161;
• Class Count II: "The City of Chicago ... maintains [no] policies regarding the maximum duration for which an arrestee may be kept in an interview room. The failure to maintain such policies is [so] likely to result in the unconstitutional use of such rooms to house arrestees that it manifests deliberate indifference," '\162.b. Because the interrogation room detention claims were a part of the Lopez case, Mr. Robinson's claims are timely. See Crown. Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) (limitations on class members' claims are tolled during the pendency of a class action). D. Predominancerrhe Heck Exclusion Plaintiffs argued in their opening brief that the common questions going to Chicago's municipal liability for the interrogation room detentions predominate over any individual issues
, Chicago also claims that Mr. Dunn is inadequate because he spent only a few hours in the interrogation room. That is true, but Chicago seems to have missed the fact that Mr. Dunn never alleged
that he was a member of Class I and has not moved to be its representative. See Complaint 'if 49 (Dunn
not listed as a Class I); P's Brief at 3 ("Mr. Robinson seeks to be the class representative for this class").
, For ease of reference, the exhibits attached to this Reply begin at the point in the letter series where Plaintiffs' opening briefs exhibits left off.
6

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• ,

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 9 of 107

on these claims, which are, primarily, issues of damages. See Ps' Briefat 14; see also See Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County. 2004 WL 1125922, *4 (ND. Ill. 2004) ('''[W]hen the class is challenging a uniform policy, the validity of that policy predominates over individual issues and class certification is appropriate"') citing Blihovde v. St. Croix County. Wis., 219 F.R.D. 607, 620 (W.D.Wis. 2003). Chicago does not address this point directly (or even mention it), but, instead raises three arguments claiming that individualized inquiries will be needed on each class members' claims, presumably defeating predominance.
First, Chicago makes an undeveloped argument that "whether certain conditions of confinement violate a constitutional standard can only be determined on an individual, case-bycase basis." City's Brief at 4. There are two fatal flaws. First and foremost Chicago misapplies the relevant legal rule. While the legality of a condition of confinement must be determined on a "case-by-case" basis (i. e. a specific condition like sleeping on the floor without a mattress must be analyzed against constitutional standards) that does not mean that an individual determination is required for each class member. Chicago is arguing that a jury could find a condition unconstitutional when suffered by class member but constitutional as to another. That is not the law, as is demonstrated by the fact that class actions are routinely brought over conditions of confmement. .E,g, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1985); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.1988) (class challenge to conditions of confinement); Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085 (7'h Cir. 1986) (same); Rahim, 2001 WL 1263493 (class challenge to shackling policy); Lewis v. Washington, 197 F.R.D. 611 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (class challenge to prison conditions including lack of hot food). The second problem is that the argument relies on a punishment analysis under the EighthIFourteenth Amendments, which is not a showing Class I needs to make. They need only prove unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Chicago next argues that the Court must conduct individualized inquiries because some class members experienced more torturous conditions in the rooms than others. See Ds' Brief at 3-7. Chicago is half right. Some class members clearly had a worse time in the interrogation room than others and not all of them experienced every type of deprivation Plaintiffs have identified nor to the same degree. However, that is not unusual in a large class and it does not cause individual issues to predominate, among other reasons, because such differences go only to

7

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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 10 of 107

the issue of damages, not to the right to recover.' As explained in Section I.A., above, each member of Class I establishes a right to relief by showing that they were subjected to a prolonged interrogation room detention rather than being taken to the more humane lock-up. In the course of those detentions, each class member undisputedly had no option but to sleep on the floor and had to endure the other needless indignities which the lock-up conditions are designed to prevent.
Because these facts alone establish the unreasonableness of each class members' detention, differences in the additional deprivations like shackling and feeding do not prevent common questions from predominating. Rather, there is a diversity of ways for the Court to address these differences while preserving the benefits of a common liability determination. See Carnegie v. Household Intern.. Inc., 376 F.3d 656,661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Rule 23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems created by the presence in a class action litigation of individual damages issues. Those solutions include '(I) bifurcating liability and damage trials with the same or different juries; (2) appointing a magistrate judge or special master to preside over individual damages proceedings; (3) decertifying the class after the liability trial and providing notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to prove damages; (4) creating subclasses; or (5) altering or amending the class."'). See also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (using special master and sampling method to determine class' members' damages from being subjected to various types oftorture in a human rights class action under the Alien Tort Claims Act); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir.1977) (upholding certification of a class seeking damages, inter alia, for unlawful conditions of confinement following arrest).
Although the foregoing is dispositive of Chicago's argument, and the Court thus need not perform individual shackling and/or feeding inquiries, Plaintiffs do wish to note for the record that Chicago is exaggerating the differences in the class members' experiences of these deprivations in its argument. As its own chart reveals, not a single person who was detained in
'See Portis. 2003 WL 22078279 at *4 ("the possibility of individualized damage inquiries does not defeat class certification even if individual hearings ultimately may be required") (citations omitted); Rahim, 2001 WL 1263493 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Schenkier, J.) (same); Gary v. Sheehan, 1999 WL 281347 *2 (N.D. III. 1999) (Coar, J.) ("[I]t is common for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to involve different levels of injury and damages for different class members; however, that does not mean that certifying a class under Rule 23(bX3) is incorrect").
8

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 11 of 107 "
the interrogation room reports being fed more than once a day, while some report being fed even
less frequently; and, only one of them, Mr. Lofton, reports not being shackled.' See D's Exhibit
1. See also Declarations, Ps' Group Exhibit 0; Depositions, Group Exhibit W, Bryant Dep.
29:17-19,48:7-9, 54:20-23, 62:7-11; Lofton Dep. at 44:3-15; J. Perez 19:14-19,49:19-22, M
Perez 41 :20-22; Robinson Dep. 38:9-23, 41 :19-24, 56:5-10, 68:24-69:5.; Solomon Dep. 35: 14-
19,50:24-51:3,76:6-8,79:22-80:13.
Finally, Chicago argues that the Class I exclusion of persons who may arguably be
subject to a defense under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), also requires an
individualized determination which causes individualized issues to predominate. To be clear,
Chicago does not appear to take issue with the sufficiency of the definition to exclude all Class I
claims that are arguably subject to Heck;' rather, its concern is that factual determinations are
necessary to decide if a class member fits within the exclusion. That concern is easily addressed.
All of the questions needed to make this determination can be answered with a few
keystrokes using electronic data which is readily available from the Cook County Circuit Court
and the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC").1O Moreover, even if the determination had
, Chicago tries to back away from its shackling policy by claiming that it is enforced only on a discretionary basis. The claim is dubious given that so many class members report being shackled and the policy clearly is worded in absolute terms: applying categorically to every detainee. Moreover, it instructs supervisors that the policy is to be "strictly enforced" and that they should administer discipline "when the provisions of this directive are violated in any manner." See Shackling Policy, Ps' Exhibit Q, § III.C.l,3.
, Chicago does ask in footnote 17 why the exclusion applies only to Class I and not Class III. The answer is that the Fifth Amendment provides a potential suppression remedy for the types oftorture alleged by Class I. However, there is no suppression remedy for violations of the 48 hour rule. See People v. Willis, 215 N.E. 2d 517 (Ill. 2005) (collecting cases and holding that there is no suppression remedy for violations of the 48-hour rule). Because there is no suppression remedy for a 48-hour rule violation, the claims of Class III do not imply the invalidity of any conviction.
10 At most, the information needed to determine if the exclusion applies to any given class member is as follows: (1) was the class member convicted?; (2) was the conviction based on a trial, or on a guilty plea?; (3) did the class member move to suppress a confession pretrial?; (4) if so was it granted or denied?; (5) has the sentence been discharged?; (6) has the conviction been overturned on appeal?; (7) has the conviction been invalidated in a habeas action? Questions 1-6 are all contained in the electronic docket sheets maintained by the Cook County Circuit Court. An example printout from the Court's computer is attached hereto as Group Exhibit U and highlighted to show the relevant fields. Similarly,
the example moc inmate status sheet shows that Question 7 can be answered by reference IDOC data
showing if a convicted person is still in custody and can be cross referenced to the Cook County Circuit Court database using the Cook County case number. See Id.
9

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to be made by reference to paper documents rather than electronically, it is still not one which requires a determination by the trier of fact. Rather, it is a purely ministerial issue which can be determined pretrial from reliable court records. Such determinations do not predominate even if they are individualized. See Wells v. McDonough, 188 F.R.D. 277, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (Marovich, J.) (ministerial question which determined whether each class member had viable claim could be resolved outside of trial and did not predominate); Avila v. Van Ru Credit Com., 1995 WL 22866, *7 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ("The existence of individual questions that are ministerial in nature or otherwise easy to resolve does not defeat a certification petition"); see also Christakos v. Intercounty Title Co., 196 F.R.D. 496, 501 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (individualized issue does not predominate where issue is "not complicated, or one which will require much time or resources so as to detract from the class"). II. Class III is Appropriately Certified
A. Chicago's Periodic Changes In Its Written Detention Policies Do Not Defeat Certification Nor Restrict the Class Period
Chicago posits that Class III is not sufficiently cohesive because Chicago has changed its written policies with regard to detention over time, in fact, twice during the class period. It is true that Chicago did make these changes and that the changes have some bearing on its municipal liability for post-August 2003 detentions. 11 However, Chicago's written policies are hardly the sum total of Plaintiffs' proof on their Monell claims. Rather, Plaintiffs chiefly rely on the existence of an entrenched and widespread practice within the CPD of using illegally-long
mr detentions as a matter of routine practice that has persisted for decades. See Complaint 2-4
(citing a decades long practice of illegal detentions), ~~ 66-85 (recounting the persistence of the detention practice over the course of 20 years from the filing of Robinson v. Chicago, through Lopez v. Chicago, to the case before your honor).
Indeed, much of Plaintiffs' evidence centers on the fact that the widespread practice remains despite the fact that Chicago implemented policy changes in the past, a persistence that Plaintiffs attribute to the policymakers' unwillingness to investigate and discipline violations of
mr the rule. rd. 67,76. For example, Mr. Robinson was detained for over three days in the
11 The August 15,2003 amendment to 02-03 is the first time that Chicago implemented a written policy stating that the felony review process cannot be permitted to cause detentions in excess of 48 hours.
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"
October 2000, while 92-05 was in effect, id. ~~ 33-36, Mr. Dunn was held for approximately the same period of time in July 2003, under the first version of 02-03, id. ~~ 42-43; and Mr. Kimble, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Ford were each held for approximately 60 hours in 2004 and 2005, well after the most recent version of 02-03 was put in place). Id. ~~ 27-32, Hicks and Ford Complaint ~~ 310, Exhibit V, hereto. Poignantly, Chicago relies on Deputy Chief Kobel's testimony that he has not heard of any detentions past 48 hours since the policy change in August 2003, City's Briefat 8, which shows he did not even know about Mr. Kimble's allegations in the very action he was testifying in about nor what had happened to Mr. Hicks and Mr. Ford just two weeks before his deposition. Id. Thus, while it is undisputed that Chicago has made changes in its written policies during the class period, there is also evidence that those policy changes have been ineffectual at ending the actual, entrenched practice.
Chicago'S theory is that the policy changes render Mr. Dunn's and Robinson's claims not typical of Class III's claims and that Plaintiffs therefore need to add a named representative for the period August 15, 2003 to the present. See Chicago's Brief at 8.12 However, the facts proving the named representatives' claims need not be exactly the same as the claims of each member of the class to satisfy typicality. Some factual variation is unavoidable. Rather, the real issue is whether there is sufficient similarity to give the representative an incentive to prove the absent class members' claims. Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 59697 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he typicality requirement primarily directs the district court to focus on whether the named representatives' claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large"); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir.1983) ("The typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members. Thus, similarity of legal theory may control even in the face of differences of fact").
It is certainly possible to have a fine written policy but be deliberately indifferent to its violation. Thus, by alleging that decades-long practice persists because the policymakers are not willing to investigate and discipline violations and do the hard work of implementing genuine
12 Mr. Robinson was detained during 92-05 and Mr. Dunn was detained during the preamendment 02-03, so the only potential gap is for detentions after August 15, 2003 when 02-03 was amended.
II

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change, Plaintiffs Dunn and Robinson plainly present the same, viable legal theory as each of the class member. Also, at this stage, the evidence demonstrates that the practice remained despite numerous policy changes since 1986, which demonstrates that simply writing new policies does not remedy this problem. If the course of discovery shows that the policymakers have substantively changed their efforts for tackling the problem (other than by enacting serial ineffective policies), then it may be necessary to add a post-August 2003 class representative and subclass the 48 hour claims by written policy period. But, the present state of the evidence does not show such a need. Therefore, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Dunn can represent the entire class. B. The 48-Hour Rule Exception for Bona Fide EmergencieslExtraordinary
Circumstances Does Not Prevent Certification Of This Class Chicago argues that the 48-hour rule exception for bona fide emergencies or extraordinary circumstances prevents class certification supposedly because each detention would have to be examined for the presence of such circumstances which supposedly would make the trial unmanageable. However, it is not uncommon for individualized questions to be present in a (b)(3) class action, what is required is that such questions not predominate over common ones. See f,g. Redd v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 2004 WL 1117844, *5 (N.D.IlI. 2004) (common issues arising out of defendants' uniform use of deceptive solicitation letter predominated despite a necessary individual question of reliance for each member of the class); Portis v. City of Chicago, 2004 WL 1284010, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ("Individual affirmative defenses do not preclude class treatment"); Ringswald v. County of DuPage, 196 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (potentially available defenses of Younger abstention, collateral estoppel, and lack of standing did not predominate over common questions); Pinkett v. Moolah Loan Coro.,1999 WL 1080596, *4 (N.D.Ill 1999) ("[Ilt is well established that individual counterclaims or defenses do not render a case unsuitable for class certification."). The facts here show that the potential defense as to some of the detentions does not predominate and will not render the trial of Class Ill's claims unmanageable. First, the defense should arise seldomly if at all because, by definition, the circumstances which justifY detaining someone without judicial review for more than 48 hours are well outside the ordinary. Further, the legitimate circumstances for delaying such review are particularly rare in Cook County because the court system provides for holding probable cause hearings ex parte in the event "a detained person is alleged to be incapable of appearing in court due to ... exigent
12

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"
circumstances." See Cook County Circuit Court First Municipal District General Order 86-1, Ps' Exhibit 1. It is hard to imagine any extraordinary circumstance that would prevent a probable cause determination within 48 hours under that procedure, and Chicago does not offer the Court even one example in its Response. Whatever rare bird might prevent an ex parte probable cause determination within 48 hours of arrest (perhaps a snow storm closing the courts) would hardly cause individual issues to predominate over common questions affecting the entire class.
Relatedly, Chicago's reasons for detaining arrestees without judicial approval are documented on the Hold Form checklist, Ps' Exhibit D, as well as on a CPD document called a Detention Report, see D.S.O. 79-40, attached as Exhibit X hereto ("The Detention Report provides ... a written explanation of why an arrestee was detained past the morning court call"). This documentation affords a ministerial method to determine prior to trial if a detention really presents any extraordinary circumstances issue. If discovery shows that there are a significant number of such detentions then it may be necessary to create a subclass and bifurcate resolution ofthe claim and the defense for manageability purposes. Otherwise, it is perfectly manageable for Chicago to try a relatively small number of extraordinary circumstances defenses in connection with the liability or damages phase of class members' claims.
Third, putting aside circumstances like hospitalization of an arrestee, which can be readily ascertained from the documents, the evidence shows that the bulk of the detentions here were due to Chicago's CI procedure which allows the detentions to continue without a judicial hearing until the State's Attorney approves charges. Whether delays due to felony review qualifY as an emergency or extraordinary circumstance is a common question, but of course, one which must be resolved against Chicago. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991); see also Kyle v. Patterson, 957 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (waiting for a prosecutor to approve charges is not an emergency or extraordinary circumstance as a matter of law), affirmed 196 F.3d 695 (7'" Cir.1999); People v. Willis, 215 Ill.2d 517, --- N.E.2d ----, 2005
WL 1340002, *II (Ill. 2005) (same).
Further, Chicago's reliance on Robinson v. Gillespie, 219 F.R.D. 179 (D. Kan 2003) is misplaced, and it clearly miscites the holding when it asserts that that court held 48-hour claims must be decided on an individual-by-individual basis. In fact, the court was dealing with a class which included both pre- and post-48 hour detentions and which was defined by reference to
13

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whelher the detention was "prompt." Id. at 183. The court held that the use of the term "prompt" rendered the class definition untenable
because "[t]he decision whether a probable cause determination is or is not 'prompt,' within the meaning of that term as used in the relevant cases . . . is not an objective one which can be measured solely by reference to hours and minutes." Id. That is not a problem for Class Ill's definition because it does use an objective measure of 48 hours. Moreover, the Gillespie court took issue with the movants' failure to adequately address a host of other class certification issues before it. But the court certainly never said that a properly supported 48-hour class could not qualifY for certification, and it never analyzed any of the points Plaintiffs raise (and support) here.
Finally, Plaintiffs wish to address Chicago's footnote citation to the recent opinion in Lopez v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 711986, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2005), where the district court took Mr. Lopez' claim away from the jury by holding that the provision of false alibis justified his five-day detention without judicial approval. Chicago is wise to keep that cite in the small print of its brief because it is a highly flawed decision which is currently on appeal. By way of background, this Court should understand that the Lopez court resolved factual disputes on the supposed false alibi; the detectives claimed Mr. Lopez gave false alibis but Mr. Lopez testified unequivocally that he had been truthful, and the witnesses the detectives relied upon came to trials and backed Mr. Lopez' account. Id. This Court should also be aware that the Lopez court took the case away from the jury based on the astonishing conclusion that an undisputedly false murder confession, which Mr. Lopez testified was coerced from him after two sleepless days and nights of constant shackling and starvation in the interrogation room,!3 justified holding him an additional three days without consulting a judge. Id. ("Lopez made statements admitting that he was the shooter, but his statements turned out to be false, and he subsequently recanted. [His] actions ... in admitting to being the killer and providing false information relating to such admission, and in subsequently recanting his latest lie required the allocation of police resources, and the continuation of the investigation of this murder. It is unclear what Lopez's motives were
13 Relatedly, plaintiff testified that he was shackled for five days in the interrogation room and fed only once. The district court took these claim away from the jury by ruling that the police were at most negligent in how they treated Mr. Lopez and by ruling that the police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for such conduct. Id. at *4.
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. . . . [but ilt appears that Lopez was trying to 'outsmart' the police officers and trying to 'play games."').
But, what is relevant for present purposes, is that the Court got the law wrong when it held that the need to supposedly investigate false alibis is an extraordinary circumstance for delaying judicial review of an arrest past 48 hours. In reaching that conclusion, the district court misconstrued McLaughlin's language about the need for "a substantial degree of flexibility" in evaluating a delay, ignoring the fact that the Court was there discussing delays of under 48-hours and went on in the very next paragraph to differentiate that situation from a delay past 48 hours. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-57 ("Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes"). Accordingly, the result the district court reached in the Lopez trial should hold no sway over this Court's certification decision. III. The Class Period for Classes I-III is Proper
Chicago makes several arguments for paring the class period down from the March 15, 1999 date alleged in the Complaint and approved by Judge Darrah in Lopez. First, as to Class I, Chicago argues that it is not entitled to extend back more than two years from the filing of this case because Class I's claims supposedly were not asserted in Lopez. However, as was demonstrated in Section I.C., above, this contention is flatly wrong. The case included a count for the interrogation room detentions. Thus, Class I is subject to the exact same class period as Classes II and III, which Chicago admits relate back. See Chicago's Brief at 15, n. 25.
Second, Chicago argues that the class period should extend no further than two years before the filing of the Lopez class action complaint rather than relating back to the initial complaint. Chicago claims prejudice supposedly because Mr. Lopez withdrew the class claims (five months before this case was filed) but it identifies no actual prejudice from that fact, and, moreover, its position makes no sense. Even if there were prejudice from the withdrawal of the motion, it is a complete mystery why that prejudice would be alleviated if this class nevertheless related back to the filing of the Lopez class action complaint but not the initial complaint.
Finally, Chicago argues that the Court should at least lop offthe five months between the withdrawal of the Lopez class certification and the filing of this case. The argument overlooks Illinois' savings statute, 735 ILCS 5113-217, which tolls limitations for one year following a voluntary dismissal. Pettiford v. Sheahan, 2004 WL 626151, *13 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Pursuant to
15

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<.
that statute, even those class members whose claim might otherwise have expired in the intervening five months had a year to file their claims. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650,661 (1983) ("After class certification is denied, [the federal tolling interest espoused in American Pipe] is vindicated as long as each unnamed plaintiff is given as much time to intervene or file a separate action as he would have under a state savings statute applicable to a party whose action has been dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits"). Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the class period of March IS, 1999 to the present is proper.
CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification should be granted in its entirety with the modification that Class I should be limited to persons arrested without a warrant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
~ I~· fJt '3j One of Counsel for Plaintiffs
Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Jon Loevy Russell Ainsworth 312 N. May St., Suite 100 Chicago, II 60607 (312) 243-5900
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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 19 of 107

F I L E D a IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVI~I J 2002 I'

JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself

)

and a class of others similarly

)

situated,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, DETECTIVE JAMES

)

DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, )

DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE )

GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and

)

OFFICER ROBERT MYERS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

CI.EMRllC. UHA.'.&DWI.T. RDfaCITIlCNOSURT

Judge Darrah 'uC~f\t\)

01 C l823!J

.,nrr)

lW~ 13~

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SBCOND AMENDED COMPLA];H'l'
NOW COMES Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself

and a class of others similarly situated (the putative "Class"),

by counsel, and complaining of Defendants DETECTIVE JAMES

DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA,

OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS, OFFICER ROBERT MYERS

(collectively, "Defendant Police Officers") and CITY OF CHICAGO,

states as follows:

Introcmction

1. This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section

1983 and Fed. R. eiv. P. 23(b) (3). Plaintiff brings this action

on behalf of himself and the Class to reform an unconstitutional

police procedure known as the "holct past court call" procedure.

This procedure allows police to continue investigating and interrogating recent arrestees without taking them before a judicial official for a determination of probable cause.

EXHIBIT
L

Plaintiff and the members of the Class are all persons who

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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 20 of 107

been detained at CPO police stations in excess of 48 hours under this procedure while the CPD continued its investigation of the crime for which they were arrested.
2. In addition to causing unlawful detentions in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the "hold" procedure as implemented by the CPD also violates arrestees' Fourteenth Amendment rights to minimally appropriate conditions of confinement. During the "hold" period, arrestees are forced to (attempt to) sleep on the floor of small interrogation rooms where they are held or on the standard four foot by ten inch metal benches within.
3. The CPO furnishes them no sleeping facility during this time (not even a mattress, blanket or pillow). The CPO maintains no such facilities to offer them because the investigatory hold, itself, is an exception to the standard CPO practice of releasing arrestees to the Cook County Department of Corrections, which entity takes them to the probable cause hearing and houses them in its jail facility.
4. As a result, arrestees detained under the hold past court call procedure are kept from disinterested judicial officials and are isolated for days in interrogation rooms and deprived of necessary sleep while police continue to interrogate them and build evidence against them; all raising the specter of torture, false confessions, and unlawful convictions.
2
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5. Plaintiff and the Class seek a judgment which will remedy their injuries and reform this unconstitutional procedure.
Relevant CPO Procedure. 6. In felony arrests, CPO practice and procedure prohibits the arrestee from being taken to court for a probable cause hearing until the State's Attorney's Office ("SAO") approves the charges being sought by the CPO. The CPO refers to this as the "felony review process". 7. In cases where the evidence known to the CPD at the time of the arrest is insufficient in the SAO's opinion to decide whether charges should be approved or denied, the arrestee is neither taken to court nor released. Rather, CPO officers are permitted to continue their investigation to develop more evidence to support the charges. 8. Normal CPD procedure is that recent arrestees are automatically transferred out of the various CPD police station "lock-ups" (bare cells with no accommodations for extended detentions) to the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections ("Cook County") either immediately prior to or at the time of the arrestee's probable cause hearing. 9. Thus, in the normal course, Cook County would either transport the arrestee directly from CPD custody to the scheduled court call or would receive the arrestee from the CPO at that hearing. If probable cause is found, Cook County then takes the prisoner for housing at its jail facility.
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10. To prevent this series of events from automatically taking place, when a police officer or detective is unable to obtain felony approval from the SAO, the officer can place a written "hold" on the arrestee. This is known as the hold past court call procedure. The hold procedure prevents the arrestee from being taken to court or transferred to the custody of Cook County.
11. The hold is required by CPO policy that the arrestee may not be taken for a probable cause hearing until felony charges are approved. During the period of the hold, the officers or detectives continue gathering evidence to support the charges sought, as by interrogating the arrestee, interviewing witnesses and conducting line-ups.
12. The hold is continued until the investigating officers or detectives have developed sufficient evidence to obtain approval of charges from the SAO or until the SAO exercises its discretion to refuse to charge. In most cases, when the SAO finally states that charges are being denied, the Assistant Deputy Superintendent may override and approve charges. Otherwise, the arrestee must be released. In homicide cases, no override may be exercised.
13. Only after felony approval is obtained will an arrestee held under the procedure finally be taken to court for a probable cause hearing, where evidence developed during the hold

4

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period is presented. Such investigatory holds routinely last in excess of 48 hours.
14. The hold past court call procedure violates Fourth Amendment requirements for a prompt post-arrest judicial determination of whether there is probable cause to detain the arrestee. The Supreme Court has held that police may not unreasonably delay presenting an arrestee for a probable cause hearing following a warrantless arrest, that it is unreasonable to del~y for purposes of continuing to develop evidence after the arrest, and that a delay which exceeds 48 hours is presumptively unreasonable regardless of the purpose for the delay.
15. This very CPO procedure has already been declared unconstitutional as violating the Fourth Amendment in the case of Robinson v. Chicago, 638 F.Supp. 186 (N.D.III. 1986), rev'd Qll other grounds, 868 F.2d 959 (7 th Cir. 1989). In appealing, that decision, the CPO represented to the Seventh Circuit that it had abolished the hold past court call procedure. However, the procedure is alive and well and still in use throughout the CPD.
16. As implemented by the CPO, the hold past court Call procedure also violates arrestees' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free of torture. The CPD does not maintain any facilities deSigned to house arrestees in its custody and in particular it does not provide them even minimally appropriate facilities for sleeping.
5
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17. Rather, during the duration of the investigatory "hold," usually amounting to more than 4B hours and often days longer, the arrestee is kept in a small interrogation room (an "interview room" in CPD parlance) which is not designed for housing prisoners and which fUrnishes them no facility for sleeping.
18. The CPD maintains no sleeping facilities because, absent a "hold," arrestees are routinely transferred to the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections which maintains a jail for housing prisoners, including bunks for sleeping.
19. By contrast, the interrogation rooms contain no amenities. The sole furnishing is a small metal bench four feet in length and ten inches in width. No mattresses, no blankets and no pillows are furnished by the CPD to those in its custody. Arrestees may also be kept in a pOlice station lock-up during part of the "hold" period, however, the lock-up has no sleeping facili ty either.
20. As a result, arrestees detained under the hold past court call procedure are routinely deprived of meaningful sleep in a manner which has long been recognized as torturous and unconstitutional.
21. In totality, the procedure allows CPD officers and detectives to deprive arrestees, Who have not even received a judicial determination of probable cause, of necessary sleep
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while continuing to interrogate them, all in a manner that raises the specter of false confessions due to coercion and exhaustion.
Jurisdiction and VeDue 22. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). On information and belief, all parties reside in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein all occurred within district.
C1.88 Action A11eqation8
23. Each of the foregoing Paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.
24. The named Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez, brings this action on his own behalf, and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a) and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
25. The named Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of the following individuals:
All persons arrested by the Chicago Police Department without an arrest warrant and who were detained in excess of 48 hours pending approval of felony charges by the State's Attorney at any time from March 15, 1999 to the present day (the "Class Period").
26. The individuals in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The named Plaintiff estimates that the Class numbers in at least the thousands.
a. On information and belief, approximately 200,000 persons have been arrested by the CPO in each year of the Class
7

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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 26 of 107

•

Period. In the year 1999 alone, the Chicago Police Department arrested over 268,000 persons. Many of these were held over awaiting trial; and
b. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the CPO and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that most CPO felony arrests take in excess of 4·8 hours to obtain SAO approval of the charges and that all those arrestees would be detained in the manner described above during that time;
c. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the CPO and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that the hold past court call procedure is invoked routinely and often and that the CPO maintains computerized forms for this procedure; and
d. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the Chicago Police Department and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that there is no policy or practice of the CPO which limits the length of time an arrestee can be held in an interview room, making it likely that this unconstitutional condition of detention occurs again and again.
27. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether the hold past court call procedure violates arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights in a manner which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
8

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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 27 of 107

b. Whether the CPD's practice of housing arrestees in excess of 24 hours without furnishing them any sleeping facilities violates the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
c. Whether the City of Chicago maintains policies and/or practices that are the moving force behind the challenged conduct.
28. Named Plaintiff Lopez' unlawful detention and torture claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Mr. Lopez alleges, inter alia, that he was detained in excess of 48 hours based on CPO policy which prevents felony arrestees from receiving a probable cause hearing until the SAO approves charges and the hold past court call procedure and for purposes of continuing the investigation against him; that he was denied any facility for sl,eeping during that time; and that he has suffered damages as result.
29. Named Plaintiff Lopez will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. Mr. Lopez has retained skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class in this litigation.
30. The questions of law and fact common to the Class, as described in paragraph 27 above, predominate over individual issues.

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Plaintiff Lopez' Xndividual Alleqationa
31. On or about July 19, 2000, in the Humbolt Park neighborhood on the West side of Chicago, 27-year-old Miguel Figueroa stood in the sunroof of a moving Pontiac Bonneville and fired shots from a .38-caliber weapon at rival gang members,
32. A stray bullet struck a nearby l2-year old boy, killing him.
33. Within a week, Miguel Figueroa confessed to the murder on videotape. He presently faces the death penalty for his crime.
34. At the time of the shooting Plaintiff, Joseph Lopez, was an l8-year-old resident of the Humbolt Park neighborhood.
35. The day following the shooting. Plaintiff was talking to a friend on the street when the two of them were approached by several Chicago police officers.
36. One of the officers was Officer Gomez, an officer known in Plaintiff's neighborhood as a dangerous and violent man.
37. Without any probable cause to believe Plaintiff had committed any wrongdoing, the officers handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in their squad car.
39. The officers drove Plaintiff to a nearby alley. Following a brief interrogation, Officer Gomez punched Plaintiff in the face.
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39. The officers told Plaintiff they believed he was a witness to the shooting. Plaintiff was then taken to the police station.
40. Upon his arrival at the police station, Defendants took Plaintiff to the "Area 5" detective division where he was placed in a small "interview room" and shackled to the wall with handcuffs.
41. Plaintiff Lopez was kept in this room for the approximately five days. The room contained no facility for sleeping. The room contained only a small metal bench of four feet in length and ten inches in width. At no time was Plaintiff furnished a mattress, blanket or pillow.
42. At no time during this approximately five day period was Plaintiff taken to court for a probable cause hearing. Rather, Plaintiff was kept from court pursuant to CPD policy which prevents felony arrestees from receiving a probable cause hearing or being transferred to the Cook County jail facility until the SAO approves charges against them. During this period of time several "hold forms" were issued to prevent Mr. Lopez from being transferred to the custody of Cook County or from receiving a probable cause hearing.
43. During virtually this entire period, Plaintiff remained in a small room/cell with his wrist handcuffed to a ring on the wall. The only human contact permitted Plaintiff was when
11
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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 30 of 107
he was interrogated by various Defendant Police Officers who attempted to coerce him into confessing to the murder.
44. Under these conditions of confinement, Plaintiff was unable to obtain proper sleep.
45. During this approximately five day period, the Defendant officers and the CPD continued to investigate and develop evidence purportedly linking Mr. Lopez with the shooting.
46. During this time, Defendants also denied Plaintiff access to an attorney despite his requests to speak with an attorney.
47. Plaintiff's faculties were overcome by sleep deprivation and the unconstitutional and torturous tactics being used on him. Plaintiff at one point made an inculpatory statement indicating that he shot the boy. However, the facts of the statement conflicted with the true facts of the shooting. Upon being told that his facts were incorrect, Plaintiff recanted his statement.
48. After five days, the SAO approved the charge of capital murder against Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez, then only 18 years old, was informed that the death penalty would be sought against him. The CPD also announced to the public media that Plaintiff was the murderer.
49. Approximately one hour after prosecutors stated they were seeking the death penalty against Plaintiff, police
12
------------------ - -------------------------

,,'

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 31 of 107

arrested Miguel Figueroa for the crime Plaintiff allegedly committed.
50. Thereafter, Figueroa (then age 28) gave a videotaped confession to the Chicago Police regarding the shooting.
51. Thereafter, Plaintiff was released and the wrongful charges against .him were dismissed.
52. Notwithstanding the decision to initiate and pursue Plaintiff's prosecution, the Defendant Police Officers had actual knowledge that Plaintiff was not the killer.
53. Some of the eye-witnesses to the shooting told the Defendant Police Officers that Lopez was not the man who shot DeLaRosa. The shooter had a different complexion than Plaintiff and longer hair. Plaintiff's head was shaved at the time.
54. The Defendant Police Officers intentionally and without justification ignored these eyewitnesses who attested to Plaintiff's innocence, and instead claimed to have relied upon the purported identification of Plaintiff by several gang members hostile to Plaintiff.
55. This line-up conducted by the Defendant Police Officers, supposedly resulting in the positive identification of Plaintiff who was bald and ten years younger than the longerhaired shooter, was deeply flawed. The Defendant Police Officers intentionally chose to ignore the eyewitnesses who Claimed Plaintiff was innocent and instead only attempted line-up identifications from gang members hostile to Plaintiff.
13

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 32 of 107

56. The Defendant Police Officers' actions referenced

above were all taken intentionally to frame Plaintiff for a

murder he did not commit.
COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. S 1983:
UDlawful Detention Cla~ Of Plaintiff &ad The Cla•• Aqa.illat DafandaDt City of Chicaqo

57. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing

paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

59. As described more fully above, Plaintiff and the

. members of the Class have been detained without being afforded a

prompt post-arrest probable cause hearings, all in a manner which

violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

This deprivation of Plaintiff and the Class members'

constitutional rights was effected under color of law, and

Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been damages as a

result.

59. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of

rights and is liable for Plaintiff's and the Class Members'

damages, inter alia, because:

a. The City of Chicago maintains an unjustified

and unconstitutional policy preventing arrestees from obtaining a

probable cause hearing until the SAO has completed a felony

review process. The policy makes no exception for instances when

the SAO does not complete its review within 48 hours. Indeed,

the City Of Chicago maintains the hold past court call procedure

14
- _._----------------

",

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 33 of 107

which is designed to prevent an arrestee from obtaining a probable cause hearing while CPD gather additional evidence;
b. The City of Chicago fails to adequately train its officers on the constitutional requirements for affording prompt probable cause hearings, and fails to supervise and control its officers' activities in this area, and is thereby the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue here, and its failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference;
c. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to adequatelY punish and discipline prior instances of similar misconduct, thereby leading Chicago Police Officers to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encourag.ing future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff and the members of the Class; and
d. The City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding sub-paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
WHEREFORE, the named Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated, respectfully requests that the Court certify the Class defined herein and enter judgment against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, awarding appropriate compensatory damages, establish a common fund with
15

, ..

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 34 of 107

all of these monies to award Plaintiff a portion thereof for his attorneys fees, award statutory attorneys' fees, and award any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COUNT xx - 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Fourteenth AmeI1c:1raent Claim Of Pla.int.i.ff and ne Class Against Defendant City of ChicalJO
60. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
61. As described more fully above, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have been subjected to torturous conditions of confinement while being held in the custody of the CPO including being deprived of even minimally proper facilities for sleeping, all in a manner which violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The deprivation of Plaintiff and the Class members' constitutional rights was under color of law, and plaintiff and the members of the Class have been damages as a result.
62. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiff's and the Class Members' damages, inter alia, because:
a. The City of Chicago maintains an unjustified and unconstitutional policy discussed above which prevents arrestees from being transferred to the Cook County jail for extended periods of time in order to prevent them from being transported to court for a probable cause hearing. This policy causes arrestees to remain in CPD custody for extended periods of
16

.. ' t

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 35 of 107

time, but yet the City of Chicago fails to provide any facility designed for housing arrestees for such duration and in particular for affording them minimally appropriate facilities for sleeping. The need for appropriate sleeping facilities while being detained for extended periods by the CPD is so obvious that the failure to provide them while continuing to maintain this policy manifests deliberate indifference;
b. The City of Chicago maintains no policies regarding furnishing proper sleeping facilities to arrestees, nor does it maintain any policies regarding the maximum duration for which an arrestee may be kept in an interview room. The failure to maintain such policies is likely to result in the unconstitutional use of such rooms to house arrestees that it manifests deliberate indifference;
c. The City of Chicago fails to adequately train its officers on the constitutional requirements for affording proper care for persons detained in its custody for extended periods, and fails to supervise and control its officers activities regarding care for arrestees needs during such detentions, and is thereby the moving force behind, the very type of misconduct at issue here, and its failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference;
d. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of deprivation at issue here by failing to adequately punish and
17

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 36 of 107

discipline officers involved in prior instances of similar deprivations, thereby leading Chicago Police Officers to believe their actions will never be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encourages abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff and the members of the Class; and
e. The City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of deprivation described in the preceding sub-paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
WHEREFORE, the named Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly situated, respectfully requests that the Court certify the Class defined herein and enter jUdgment against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, awarding appropriate compensatory damages, establish a common fund with all of these monies to award Plaintiff a portion thereof for his attorneys fees, award statutory attorneys' fees, and award any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.
COOHT III - 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Individual Exce.sive Foree Claim Of Th. Plaintiff
63. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
64. As a result of Officer Gomez's unjustified and excessive use of force, Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as well as emotional distress.
65. As a result of the failure of Officer Myers, Officer Gomez's partner, to intervene to prevent Officer Gomez's
18

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 37 of 107

excessive use of force, Plaintiff suffered pain and injury, as well as emotional distress. Officer Myers had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm had he been so inclined, but failed to do so.
66. The misconduct described in this Count was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken intentionally with willful indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
67. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
68. The misconduct described in this count was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department in that:
a. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Chicago Police Department directly encourages, and is thereby the moving force behind, the very type of excessive force at issue here by failing to adequately train, supervise and control its officers, such that its failure to do so manifests deliberate indifference;
b. As a matter of both policy and practice, the Chicago Police Department facilitates the very type of excessive force at issue here by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of misconduct, thereby leading Chicago Police Officers to believe their actions will never be
19

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 38 of 107

scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses such as those affecting Plaintiff;
c. Generally, as a matter of widespread practice so prevalent as to comprise municipal policy, officers of the Chicago Police Department use excessive force against citizens in a manner similar to that alleged by Plaintiff in this Count on a frequent basis, yet the Chicago Police Department makes findings of wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases;
d. Municipal policy-makers are aware of (and condone and facilitate by their inaction) a "code of silence" in the Chicago Police Department, by which officers fail to report misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at issue in this case; and
e. The City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of abuse describe in the preceding sub-paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendants, CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS, awarding compensatory damages and attorneys' fees, along with punitive damages against Defendants OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS in their individual capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just.

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 39 of 107

COUNT rv - state Law C~aim,
P~aintiff' s Indi.vidual. Cl.&:im For Assault and Battery 69. Plaintiff rea1leges each of the forgoing
paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 70. As described more fully in the preceding
paragraphs, Plaintiff was attacked by Defendant Officer Gomez without justification or provocation.
71. The actions of Defendant Officer Gomez constituted an offensive physical contact, undertaken willfully and wantonly, proximately causing P1aintiff's injuries.
72. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness. and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
73. ,As a result of the offensive touching, Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries, including but not limited to a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
COONT V - State Law C~aim: P~aintiff's Indi.vidua~ Claim For Intentional Infliction of Bmotiona~ Distress
74. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
21

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 40 of 107

75. As described more fully in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendant Police Officers engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with respect to Plaintiff, to wit, the Defendants used violence, torture and unlawful methods to attempt to coerce Plaintiff into confessing to a murder he did not commit.
76. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with intent, knowledge or callous disregard for the fact that there was a high probability that the conduct would inflict severe emotional distress on Plaintiff.
77. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
7B. As a proximate result of this misconduct, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and anguish.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against the DETECTIVE JAMES, DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.

22

,,~

"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 41 of 107

Count vr - 42 u.s.c. § 1983:
Individual Claim for Unlawful Detention By The Defendant Officers 79. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing
paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 80. As described more fully above, Defendants held
Plaintiff without affording him a probable cause hearing in a manner which violated the Fourth Amendment.
81. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
82. As a result of this misconduct, Plaintiff sustained damages.
83. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department in the manner described more fully above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages against DETECTIVE JAMES, DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS in their individual capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.

23

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 42 of 107
Count VZI - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Individual Cla~ For Police Torture By Defendant Officers
84. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
85. In attempting unlawfully to coerce Plaintiff to confess to a murder he did not commit, the Defendants employed such inhuman methods as shackling Plaintiff's wrist to the wall for excessive amounts of hours and intentionally depriving Plaintiff of sleep.
86. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights of others.
87. As a result of this misconduct, Plaintiff sustained physical and emotional injuries.
88. The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department in the manner described more fully above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter jUdgment in his favor and against the Defendants, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages against the DETECTIVE JAMES, DELAFONT, DETECTIVE JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA, OfFICER JOSE GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and OFfICER ROBERT MYERS in their individual capacities, and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
24

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 43 of 107
count ViII - State Law Claim: Individual Claim For Respondeat Superior 89. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 90. In committing the acts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, the Defendant Police Officers were members of, and agents of, the Chicago Police Department acting at all relevant times within the scope of their employment. 91. Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agent. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against Defendant, CITY OF CHICAGO, in an amount equal to any award against the Defendant Police Officers, as well as any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.
COtJNT IX - State Law Clai.lll: Individual Clai.lll Based On Indemnification Statute
92. Plaintiff realleges each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
93. Illinois law, 735 ILCS 10/9-102, provides that public entities are directed to pay any tort judgment for compensatory damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities.
25

••

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 44 of 107

•
I

94. The Defendant Police Officers are or were

employees of the City of Chicago who acted within the scope of

their employment in committing the misconduct described herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, respectfully

requests that the Court enter judgment in his favor and against

Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO in the amounts awarded to Plaintiffs

against Defendant Police Officers as compensatory damages,

attorneys' fees, punitive damages, and any other relief this

Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances.

JURy DEMaND

Plaintiff, JOSEPH LOPEZ, hereby demands a trial by jury

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) on all issues

so triable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz
Jon Loevy Jon Rosenblatt LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May St. Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

. ,
~

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 45 of 107

~~ IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

Page 001

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

VS

NUMBER 97CRl147402

ERIC

KITTLER

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the electronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

The States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION with the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

Charging the above named defendant with:

720-5/9-1 (A) (1) 720-5/9-1 (A) (2) 720-5/9-1 (A) (3) 720-5/9-1 (A) (3) 720-5/9-1 (A) (3) 720-5/9-1 (A) (1) 720-5/1B-2 (A) 720-5/24-1.2 (A) (2) 720-5/1B-2(A) 720-5/24-1 (A) (10) 1 720-5/24-3.1 (A) (1) 1 .The following disposition(s)

was/were

F

MURDER/INTENT TO KILL/INJ

F

MURDER/STRONG PROB KILL/I

F

MURDER/OTHER FORCIBLE FEL

F

MURDER/OTHER FORCIBLE FEL

F

MURDER/OTHER FORCIBLE FEL

F (ATT)MURDER/INTENT TO KILL/INJ

F

ARMED ROBBERY

F

AGG DISCHARGE FIREARM/OCC

F (ATT)ARMED ROBBERY

F

CARRY/POSSES FIREARM IN P

F

UNLAWFUL POSSESS HNDGUN<l

rendered before the Honorable Judge(s):

04/17/97 IND/INFO-CLK OFFICE-PRES JUDGE 97CRl147402 ID# CR100330274
05/01/97 CASE ASSIGNED FLTZGERALD, THOMAS R.
05/01/97 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 APPEARANCE FILED KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 DEFENDANT ARRAIGNED KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 MOTION FOR DISCOVERY KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 ADMONISH AS TO TRIAL IN ABSENT KELLEY, DANIEL J
05/01/97 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/01/97 1701 05/01/97 1720

F

1

06/04/97

EXHIBIT
L4

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 46 of 107

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ,<,EOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Page 008

ERIC

VS KITTLER

NUMBER 97CRl147402

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the electronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

The States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION 01/22/99 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR

KELLEY, DANIEL J

01/22/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT KELLEY, DANIEL J

02/26/99

02/26/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

02/26/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

KELLEY, DANIEL J

02/26/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT KELLEY, DANIEL J

03/24/99

03/24/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

MORRISSEY, JOHN E.

03/24/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

MORRISSEY, JOHN E.

03/24/99 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR

MORRISSEY, JOHN E.

03/24/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT MORRISSEY, JOHN E.

04/05/99

04/05/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

MOORE, COLLEEN MCSWEENEY

04/05/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

MOORE, COLLEEN MCSWEENEY

04/05/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT MOORE, COLLEEN MCSWEENEY

04/06/99

04/06/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

04/06/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

KELLEY, DANIEL J

04/06/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT KELLEY, DANIEL J

04/09/99

04/09/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

04/09/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

KELLEY, DANIEL J

04/09/99 MOTION TO SUPPRESS KELLEY, DANIEL J

D

2

J4/09/99 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR

KELLEY, DANIEL J

,

, . Case 1:04-cv-06804 ;,-
,'............',.'-,:q'--....,.;'''' ... ..-..~,.:~''''';':'-,~.::>-!''~ -...!.,i.-..~. ~,..~~.:,...:r'
, '

Document 42

Filed 08/08/2005

Page 47 of 107

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

t:'EOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

VS

NUMBER 97CRl147402

ERIC

KITTLER

Page 009

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, ~nd keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the ~lectronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

rhe States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION

)4/09/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/03/99

)4/28/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

)4/28/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

KELLEY, DANIEL J

14/28/99 CASE ADVANCED

05/03/99

KELLEY, DANIEL J

4/28/99 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR

KELLEY, DANIEL J

4/28/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT

05/03/99

KELLEY, DANIEL J

5/03/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

5/03/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

KELLEY, DANIEL J

5/03/99 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

5/03/99 SPECIAL ORDER

JURY-SELECTED

KELLEY, DANIEL J

,/03/99 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR

KELLEY, DANIEL J

;/03/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/05/99

;/05/99 TRIAL COMENCED AND CONTINUED KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/06/99

;/06/99 TRIAL COMENCED AND CONTINUED

05/07/99

KELLEY, DANIEL J

;/07/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

/07/99 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

KELLEY, DANIEL J

/07/99 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY

CALL

KELLEY, DANIEL J

/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

COOl

KELLEY, DANIEL J

,. Case 1:04-cv-06804 ·~,;~."",..•,~••·,,,,:,,o,".;,,,,-~:;.:,,,,·~_.........(.~~~:;,....,,,,..~~~~..r "

Document 42

Filed 08/08/2005

Page 48 of 107

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

Page 010

.. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

VS

NUMBER 97CRl147402

ERIC

KITTLER

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the electronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

The States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION

05/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

C002

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

C003

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

C004

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

C005

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

C007

, KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 FINDING OF GUILTY

C008

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 PRE-SENT INVEST. ORD, CONTD TO

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 M/S TO REVOKE BOND

S

001

KELLEY, DANIEL J

05/07/99 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT

06/17/99

KELLEY, DANIEL J

06/17/99 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

KELLEY, DANIEL J

06/17/99 MOTION DEFENDANT - NEW TRIAL

D

2

KELLEY, DANIEL J

36/17/99 JGMT ON FINDING/VERDICT/PLEA

F

KELLEY, DANIEL J

)6/17/99 DEF SENTENCED ILLINOIS DOC

C002

COUNTS 1, 3, AND 4 MERGES WITH COUNT 2.

35 YRS

KELLEY, DANIEL J

)6/17/99 DEF SENTENCED ILLINOIS DOC

C007

TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH COUNT 2.

30 YRS

KELLEY, DANIEL J

)6/17/99 DEF SENTENCED ILLINOIS DOC

C008

TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH COUNT 2.

15 YRS

KELLEY, DANIEL J

16/17/99 CREDIT DEFENDANT FOR TIME SERV

812 DYS

KELLEY, DANIEL J

. ,,, '~"'~"'''':'''';,<,.'''':';'''''~''~'''';''''''l;.~\!;;:~~.(,.:\O.....~.:.C~~..ia.~.s~ e 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 49 of 107

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

Page 012

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

VS

NUMBER 97CR1147402

ERIC

KITTLER

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the electronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

The States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION

05/17/00 SUPPL REPORT OF PRCD PREPARED

00/00/00

OS/25/00 SUPPL REC RECD BY APPL COUNSEL

00/00/00

STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER

01/26/01 SUPPL REPORT OF PRCD PREPARED

00/00/00

01/26/01 SUPPL REC RECD BY APPL COUNSEL

00/00/00

STATES ATTORNEY

11/14/01 MANDATE FILED

11/28/01 1701

11/28/01 REVIEW COURT REVERSAL-RMD DRTN

12/12/01 1717

BIEBEL, PAUL JR.

12/12/01 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

12/12/01 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

12/12/01 DEF REM CUST CC SHERIF

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

12/12/01 NO BAIL

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

12/12/01 DEF DEMAND FOR TRIAL

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

12/12/01 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS WADAS, KENNETH J.

12/26/01

12/26/01 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

00/00/00

WOOD, WILLIAM S.

12/26/01 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

00/00/00

WOOD; WILLIAM S.

12/26/01 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS

01/09/02

WOOD, WILLIAM S.

12/26/01 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

00/00/00

WOOD, WILLIAM S.

01/09/02 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

01/09/02 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

01/09/02 DEF DEMAND FOR TRIAL

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

01/09/02 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

. Case ~..............c.';;":"-"~;"""",-.~H'-':"~"'~~"'*";"!o~~""'­ 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 50 of 107

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Page 013

ERIC

VS KITTLER

NUMBER 97CRl147402

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the electronic ~ecords of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

The States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION

01/09/02 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD WADAS, KENNETH J.

01/30/02

01/30/02 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY WADAS, KENNETH J.

00/00/00

01/30/02 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE WADAS, KENNETH J.

00/00/00

01/30/02 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT WADAS, KENNETH J.

02/13/02

32/13/02 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE WADAS, KENNETH J.

00/00/00

)2/13/02 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT . WADAS, KENNETH J.

02/22/02

)2/22/02 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY WADAS, KENNETH J.

00/00/00

)2/22/02 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE WADAS, KENNETH J.

00/00/00

12/22/02 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT WADAS, KENNETH J.
2/27/02 ~PECIAL ORDER DISCLOSURE TO STATE.

03/21/02. 00/00/00

3/21/02'PLEA OF NOT GUILTY WADAS, KENNETH J.

CALL 00/00/00

3/21/02 JURY WAIVED WADAS, KENNETH J.

00/00/00

3/21/02 FINDING OF NOT GUILTY

CALL 00/00/00

-~

WADAS, KENNETH J.

3/21/02 SPECIAL ORDER DEFTDISCHARGED

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

1/07/04 SPECIAL ORDER

00/00/00

NOTIFICATION OF MOTION 1/07/04 SPECIAL ORDER

TO

AUTHORIZE

VIEWING OF IMPOUNDING 00/00/00

PEOPLES

EXHIBIT

!'
j ..

BY ERIC KITTLER'S ATTORNEYS, LOERY & LOERY FILED

l/07/04 HEARING DATE ASSIGNED

04/12/04 1701

,/12/04 DEFENDANT ON BOND

00/00/00

WADAS, KENNETH J.

rI . . ..

/12/04 SPECIAL ORDER

00/00/00

DEF ALLOWED TO VIEW PEOPLE EXH #24 WHICH IMPOUNDED BY CLERK OF CIRCUIT CO WADAS, KENNETH J.

!, I
,~ \ '

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 51 of 107

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Page 015

ERIC

VS KITTLER

NUMBER 97CRl147402

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION

I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the electronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:

The States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION

," I1~nois DepCaratmseen1t:o04f C-covr-r0e6ct8io0n4s - InDmoactuemSeenartc4h2 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 52 of 107Page 1 of2

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STOCKDALE, JESSE
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04-11-1981 217lbs. Black Male 6 ft. 02 in. Black Brown

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SENTENCING INFORMATION

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1

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ARMED ROBBERY

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04/18/1997

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,. I1Hr:ois DepaCratmseen1t:o0f4C-covr-r0ec6t8io0n4s - InDmoactuemSeeanrtc4h2 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 53 of 107Page 20f2

Copyright © 2002 JDOe

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ARMED ROBBERY 04/16/1997 19 YEARS 0 MONTHS 0 DAYS COOK NO

All complaints regarding the accuracy of information contained in these documents should be submitted, In writing, to the Illinois Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 19277, Springfleld,lL 62794-9722.

looe Privacy Information I IIIir)Qis Prj,vacv_JnformatiQ..Il I Kids Priy-Cl.9'. I WeJL~~~~sibility I lODe
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1.._.11................ :...1 ....... ............... :1 , ..... J...... 1.. .............: ..... _ .... I ............. _ ........ ,: __ .... ........ -

, .

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 54 of 107

R£CfIVED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY HICKS and REGINALD FORD, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

JUL 062005
"'I"". CLi£'o'''.,.-nul.siE. I0.IIsII.r.F0iolcarsClNOso
NO:' MAGISTRATE JUDGE Fir GERALDINE SOAT BROWN

CITY OF CHICAGO, DETECTIVE F!N!U )

JUDGE KENNELLY

HALL, and PRESENTLY UNIDENTIFIED )

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS,

)

)

Defendants.

)

05C 3932
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT
NOW COME Plaintiffs ANTHONY HICKS, and REGINALD FORD, through their attorneys Loevy & Loevy, and for their complaint against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO and PRESENTLY UNIDENTIFIED CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS, state as follows:
Introduction 1. This actions arises out of the arrest, detention and mistreatment of Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford by members of the Chicago Police Department in connection with a crime of which both were innocent. Plaintiffs seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state law.
Jurisdiction and Venue 2. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendant, City of Chicago, is a municipality physically situated in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims in this case all occurred here.

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 55 of 107
Facts 3. On information and belief, on or around May 8, 2005, an individual or individuals, who were possibly armed and who are unknown to Plaintiffs, robbed the Autozone store at 3577 W. Grand Avenue in Chicago, Illinois of money. The robbery was captured on videotape. 4. Several days later Plaintiffs came to the store to return for a refund approximately $40.00 worth of automobile parts that Mr. Ford had previously purchased. 5. After Mr. Ford submitted the receipt and merchandise to an employee of the store, Plaintiffs were asked to wait. Shortly, several unknown Chicago Police Officers arrived and ordered Plaintiffs to lie on the floor. 6. Mr. Hicks explained that he had an artificial knee _cap and could not comply without assistance. Rather than assist the officers forced Mr. Hicks to the ground in a needlessly brutal fashion causing him great pain and suffering. 7. Both Plaintiffs were then placed in the back of a police car outside of the store. While they waited there, they overheard a conversation between the officers and personnel from a beauty supply shop which was next door to the Autozone, in which the officers were informed that Plaintiffs were not the persons who committed the robbery.
2

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 56 of 107 •
8. Thereafter, Plaintiffs were taken to the Chicago Police Department facility at Kedzie and Harrison where they were turned over to the custody of Hall and others.
9. On information and belief, Hall and others watched the videotape from the crime. On information and belief the perpetrator or perpetrators depicted on the tape did not resemble the Plaintiffs.
10. Plaintiffs were held at the station for approximately 62 hours. There was no probable cause for the arrest nor for this detention.
11. There was no arrest warrant nor any post-arrest judicial approval of probable cause for this detention and no emergency or extraordinary circumstances necessitating it.
12. During this detention, both Plaintiffs were placed in numerous line-ups having nothing to do with the Autozone robbery, in Defendants' attempts to see if they could develop evidence to tie plaintiffs to other crimes. On information and belief, much of the length of their detention was due to the Defendants' attempts to pin unrelated crimes on Plaintiffs with these line-ups. Plaintiffs were not identified by anyone in any of the line-ups.
13. Both Plaintiffs were shackled for long stretches of time during their detentions. Hall and others interrogated Plaintiffs for long periods to try to get them to confess to the crime and/or implicate one another.
3

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 57 of 107
14. Hall and other Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers also starved Plaintiffs, inter alia, to try to force them to give an incriminating statement. Mr. Ford was provided food only one time during the detention and Mr. Hicks was fed only twice during the detention. Defendant Hall also physically assaulted each of the Plaintiffs as part of the interrogation.
15. Plaintiffs were also wrongfully deprived of sleep by shackling and otherwise. At no time during the entire detention did they receive a mattress, blanket or pillow. This is because Chicago has failed to provide proper facilities for arrestees being held overnight.
16. After approximately 62 hours, Plaintiffs were released without being charged with any crime.
17. The City of Chicago maintains an arrest/detention system which is the moving force behind the injuries that Plaintiffs suffered. As a matter of policy and widespread practice, Chicago Police Officers are indulged in arresting citizens without probable cause in order to try to develop probable cause after arrest. Moreover, Chicago does not enforce the 48-hour rule for post-arrest probable cause hearings. Despite ample notice that its officers routinely detain warrantless arrestees without a probable cause hearing in excess of 48 hours and that they delay probable cause hearings for impermissible purposes, Chicago takes no steps to review its
4

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 58 of 107
officers' actions, to investigate reported violations and/or to discipline its officers for violations of these requirements.
18. Similarly Chicago places no requirements on its officers to ensure that arrestees are provided proper means of sleep, no requirement that they be fed when held outside of a lock-up, and its policies and widespread practices allow shackling for excessive periods of time. As a matter of widespread practice, arrestees are often starved or provided with insufficient sustenance while in custody.
19. Despite the availability of ample evidence that mistreatment of the types that Plaintiffs suffered occur routinely in its police departments, Chicago has not undertaken to properly apprise itself of the existence of mistreatment, to investigate or discipline officers who inflict such mistreatment or to provide policies and/or training which would discourage . officers from inflicting such mistreatment.
20. Rather, Chicago's policymakers condone such violations out of the misguided belief that arrests/detentions without probable cause and mistreatment during interrogations are effective law enforcement tools and that officers should not actually be restricted by requirements for probable cause, prompt probable cause hearings, or proper treatment.
5

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 59 of 107
21. The actions and omissions on the part of the City of Chicago were the moving force behind the violations Plaintiffs suffered.
COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Cla~ for Unlawful Arrest
22. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
23. By all of the above, the Defendants City of Chicago and Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers caused Plaintiffs to be arrested without probable in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and Plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against City of Chicago and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who are responsible for these actions awarding actual damages as well as the costs, fees and attorneys fees incurred in connection with this action. Plaintiffs further demand that punitive damages be awarded against the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who are responsible for these actions.
COUNT II - Unlawful Arrest under State Law 24. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 25. By all of the above, the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers caused Plaintiffs to be arrested without
6

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 60 of 107

probable in violation of state law and Plaintiffs have been

damaged as a direct and proximate result. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand

that judgment be entered against the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers awarding actual and punitive damages as well as the costs and fees incurred in connection with this

action.

COUNT III - 42 u.s.c. § 1983 Claim for
Excessive Force

26. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing

paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 27. By all of the above, the Defendants City of
Chicago, and Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who

effected the arrests unreasonably caused Plaintiff Hicks to experience unnecessary pain and suffering during the arrest in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 28. By all of the above, the Defendants City of
Chicago and Hall unreasonably caused Plaintiff Hicks and Ford to

experience unnecessary pain and suffering by assaulting and battering them and causing this to happen, in violation of their

Fourth Amendment rights. 29. By all of the above, the Defendants City of

Chicago, Hall, and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police

Officers responsible for Plaintiffs' care during the detention

unreasonably caused Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford to experience

7

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 61 of 107
unnecessary pain and suffering by shackling them excessively, depriving them of food, depriving them of sleeping accommodations, and otherwise mistreating them.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against Defendants City of Chicago, Hall, and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who were responsible for their care while in custody actions awarding actual damages as well as the costs, fees and attorneys fees incurred in connection with this action against all of them and punitive damages against the individual defendants.
COUNT IV - Assault and Battery Under State Law 30. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 31. By all of the above, the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who effected the arrest unreasonably caused Plaintiff Hicks to experience unnecessary pain and suffering during the arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 32. By all of the above, Defendant Hall unreasonably caused Plaintiff Hicks and Ford to experience unnecessary pain and suffering by assaulting and battering them, in violation of state law. 33. By all of the above, Defendants Hall and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers responsible for
8

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 62 of 107
their care during the detention unreasonably caused Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford to experience unnecessary pain and suffering by shackling them excessively, depriving them of food, depriving them of sleeping accommodations, and otherwise mistreating them.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against Defendants Hall, and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who were responsible for their care while in custody awarding actual and punitive damages as well as the costs and fees incurred in connection with this action.
COUNT V - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 C1a~ for Unlawful Detention 34. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing
paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 35. By all of the above, the Defendants City of
-Chicago, Hall and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers responsible for the detention caused Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford to be detained unreasonably in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against Defendants City of Chicago, Hall, and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who were responsible for their detention awarding actual damages as well as the costs, fees and attorneys fees incurred in connection
9

..

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 63 of 107

with this action against all of them and punitive damages against the individual defendants.
COUNT VI - Un~awfu~ Detention Under state Law 36. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 37. By all of the above, the Defendants City of Chicago, Hall and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers responsible for the detention caused Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford to be detained unreasonably in violation of state law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against Defendants Hall, and the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police Officers who were responsible for their detention awarding actual and punitive damages as well as the costs and fees incurred in connection with ·this action. COUNT VII - Re~ondeat Superior Under State Law 38. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein 39. By all of the above employees of the City of Chicago subjected Plaintiffs Ford and Hicks to the violations set our in Counts II, IV and VI all in a manner which violates Illinois law.

10

: ..~.-

"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 64 of 107

40. These employee's actions and omissions were taken within the scope of their employment with Defendant City of Chicago.
41. Plaintiffs have suffered damages as a result. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against City of Chicago awarding actual damages as well as the costs and fees incurred in connection with this action.
COUNT VIII - Indemnity Under State Law 42. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein 43. Under Illinois law, Defendant City of Chicago is required to indemnify any judgment entered against Defendants Hall and/or the Presently Unidentified Chicago Police officers. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Hicks and Ford respectfully demand that judgment be entered against City of Chicago awarding actual damages as well as the costs and fees incurred in connection with this action.

11

..

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 65 of 107

JURy DEMAND Plaintiffs Ford and Hicks demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Russell Ainsworth LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May St., -Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

Suite 100

12

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 66 of 107
1

)
.~

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

2

EASTERN DIVISION

3

4

JOSEPH LOPEZ,

5

Plaintiff,

6

vs.

7 CITY OF CHICAGO, DETECTIVE JAMES DELAFONT, DETECTIVE

8

JENNIFER DeLUCIA, DETECTIVE

HECTOR VERGARA, OFFICER JOSE

9

GOMEZ, OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS

and OFFICER ROBERT MYERS,

10 Defendants.

11

) ) ) )
) 01 C 1823
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

12

Deposition of JULIAN BRYANT taken before

13 CAROL CONNOLLY, CSR, CRR, and Notary Public, pursuant to

14

the Federal Rules of civil Procedure for the United

15 States District Courts pertaining to the taking of

16 depositions, at 77 West Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois,

17

commencing at 2:45 p.m. on the 26th day of November,

18 A.D., 2003.

19

20

21

22

23

24

LegaLink - Chicago (312) 263-3524

EXHIBIT
"VJ

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 67 of 107 56

1

Q When on the first day did you bang on the wall

2

to get water?

3

A I don't know what time it was. It was sometime

4

the first day though.

5

Q How much water did she bring you?

6

A She brought me little Styrofoam cup full of

7

water.

8

Q Did you have anything to drink on the second

9 day?

10

A No,

11

Q Did you ever ask anyone for anything to drink

12

on the second day?

13

A No. I was tired of being in there and asking

14

for nothing. I asked the judge to have something to

15 eat.

16

Q

Did you use the restroom on the second day?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Did you need to use the restroom?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Did you stay in that room for a second night?

21

A

I stayed in there for three nights.

22

Q

During the day on the second day, did you sleep

23

at all?

'--"~"
24
... ~/

A

No .

LegaLink - Chicago (312) 263-3524

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 68 of 107 57

1

Q Did you try to sleep?

2

A

No.

3

Q Did you want to sleep?

4

A

Yes. I couldn't sleep.

5

Q How come?

6

A

Because I was tired of being in there and they

7 ain't giving me nothing to eat. They keep asking me the

8 same questions over and over trying to get me to change

9 my story.

10

Q On the second night did you sleep?

11 12
· ,, 13 14

A

No.

Q Was the light on in the room the second night?

A

All the nights the light was on.

Q Did you try to sleep on the second night?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q How come you couldn't?

17

A

I couldn't sleep. I slept eventually I guess.

18

Q Eventually you slept?

19

A

I ain't never sleep. I stay awoke.

20

Q Did you lay down on the bench?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q Did you try to sleep?

23

A

No.

24

Q Did you want to sleep?

LegaLink - Chicago (312) 263-3524

,"

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 69 of 107

58

1 ,
/
)
. ,-,-",,'

1

A Yes,

2

Q During the second night did anyone come to

3 speak with you?

4

A They kept coming in every few hours, second day

5

all the way to the third night.

6

Q On the third day when did the detectives come

7 to speak with you?

8

A They came in all day. They came early in the

9 morning probably about 7:00 something because court was

10

just starting. You could hear all the clerks running

11

past with the little buggies and stuff like that.

12

Q You speak with the detectives?

13

A I didn't say nothing to them. I told them I

14

want to talk to the lawyer, and that's when they brought

15

in the State's Attorney probably about right on that

16

day. Sometime they came in ask me the same thing, I

17

told them the same thing.

18

Q On that third morning was that the first time

19 that you had asked to speak with a lawyer?

20

A Yes because I was tired of talking to them.

21

They weren't treating me right.

22

Q What time during that day did the State's

23 Attorney come in?

24

A I don't know the time it was. It was later on

LegaLink - Chicago . (312) 263-3524

· .

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 70 of 107

Page 2

I

1

2

The deposition of LEONARD LOFTON

2

1N D E X

3 called for examination by the Defendants pursuant to 3

4 notice and pursuant to the provisions oithe Federal

WITNESS:

PAGE

5 Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States Court, 4

6 pertaining to the taking of depositions, taken

LEONARD LOFTON

7 before Arnold N. Goldstine, a Certified Shorthand

5 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION

8 Reporter within and fur the County of Cook and Stat, 7

BY MS. SKlERMONT 6

9 of Illinois, at 312 North May Street, in the City of

8 CROSS EXAMINAnON

10 Chicago, County of Cook and State of Illinois, on

9

BY MR. KENDALL

55

11 the November 23, 2003, commencing at the hour of 10

BY MR. KANOVITS 59,64

12 1:30 o'clock p.m.

11 REDIRECT EXAMINAnON

13

12

BY MS. SKIERMONT 62

14

13

15

14

16

15

17

16

EXHIBITS

18

17

19

18 LOFTON DEPOSITION NOS.

19 No.1

15

20

20

21

21

:22

22

23

23

24

24

Page 4

Page 3'

Page 5

I

APPEARANCES:

2

3

Mr. Michael Kanovits, Esq.

4 Mr. Russell Ainsworth, Esq.

Loevy &. Loevy
5 - 312 Nonh May Street

Chicago, Illinois 60607

6 appeared on behalf ofthe

7

Plaintiff;

8

9
10 Ms. Korey V. Skiennont. Esq.

Jones Day

II

77 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601·1692
12

appeared on behalf of

13

Defendant City ofChicagD;

14
15 Mr. Perry M. Kendall, Esq.

Ancel, Glink. Diamond, Bush. DiCianni & Rolek, P.e.

16 140 South Dearborn Street

6300 Sears Tower

17 Chicago, Illinois 60603

18

appeared on behaJfofthe

IndividuaJ Defendants.
19

20

21

22

23 24

1

(The oath was administered)

2

LEONARD LOFTON

3

having been first duly sworn,

4

was examined and testified as follows:

5

DIRECT EXAMINAnON

6 BY MS. SKIERMONT:

7

Q Mr. Lofton, my name is Karey Skiermont.

8 You can call me Karey, I represent the City of

9 Chicago. 1am going to be asking you a bunch of

10 questions today. It is not a police interview.

11 Obviously, this is just a chance to tell your side

12 ofthe story. And J just want you and I to go

13 through what happened.

14

So, first [ have a couple of routine

15 questions.

J6

Could you please stale your name and

J7 address for the record?

18 A Leonard Lofton. I stay at J916 South

19 Hardin now.

20 Q Okay.

21

During this deposition, I'm going to

22 ask you questions. And my questions and your

23 answers are going to be rec;.orded by the gentleman at

24 the end ofthe table.

2 (Pages 2 to 5) 312.222.1644

Arnold Goldstine & Associates, Ltd. - Chicago, IL 60611 agaltd@ameritech.net

Fax 312.222.1645

,,~<--.
t
C'

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 71 of 107

Page 22

Page 24

I

A Yeah. I could turn the light on and off.

I

2

Q You say the room was filthy?

2

3

A It was filthy.

3

4

Q Could you give me some more details abou 4

5 that?

5

6

A That was dirt all over the floor. You

6

7 could see where people who was in there before ha 7

8 spit all over and it smelled like urine.

8

9 Q Were there any rats or roaches?

9

l O A 1 didn~ see no rats or roaches.

10

11 Q 1 have to ask.

II

12

Was there anything in the room

12

13 besides the bench?

I3

14 A There was a chair in there, but they took 14

15 the chair out.

15

16 Q So you were left in the room with only the 16

17 bench?

17

18 A Yes.

18

19 Q But you were not handcuffed to anything in 19

20 the room?

20

21 A No.

21

22 Q Okay.

22

23

Let me go back a little bit.

23

24

You say you were handcuffed in the

24

A No. Q Okay.
So you were arrested. Was it a Sunday on the day that you were arrested?
A Yes. Q And it was at ten-thirty in the morning? A Yes. Q What had you been doing on that day before you were arrested? A Well, before I got arrested, I remember walking the dog and taking out the garbage. Then I went in my room to watch a video, DVD. And that was it. Q Okay.
Had you had any meals that day before your arrest?
A Yeah, I eat. A bowl of cereal. Q Had you had anything to drink that day, water, soda? A Well the milk with the cereal. Q Okay.
Had you used the restroom before you had gone, before you had been arrested?
A That was the first thing I do, I get up in

Page 23

Page2S

I room for about an hour?

I

2 A Yeah. 1was sitting behind, my back on

2

3 the bench.

3

4 Q Okay.

4

5

Your hands were cuffed behind your

5

6 back on the bench for about an hour, then someone 6

7 carne in and removed the handcuffs?

7

8 A Yes.

8

9 Q Who carne into the room?

9

lOA One ofthe detectives, 1think he was the

10

II detective that was handling the case.

II

12 Q Okay.

12

13

Was it just one person?

13

14 A He came and his partner stood at the door. 14 15 Q Was the partner inside the room or outside 15

16 the room?

16

17 A He was standing like in between the door. 17

18 Q Okay.

18

19

Did they talk to you at that time?

19

20

A No. They didn~ talk to me. They

20

21 searched me, took my belt. My shoe strings. 1

21

22 asked them why they was doing that. They say well 22

23 we don't want you to commit suicide.

23

24 Q Did you have a watch on at this time?

24

the morning, shower and wash everything. Q Okay. Had you had a good night's sleep the
night before? A Yes.
Q Okay.
Now, the incident that took place in April of200 1. The actual fight that you had with
Mr. Moore. Were you arrested after that fight,
were you arrested in April? A 1 never was arrested.
Q Okay.
Now. in the room upstairs with the bench, what was the temperature, was it cold or hot.
A It was cold.
Q Okay.
A It was hot outside. They had air
conditioning.
Q Okay.
So you were in there for an hour and they came in and removed your handcuffs, but they did not talk to you at that time?
A No.

312.222.1644

Arnold Goldstine & Associates, Ltd. - Chicago, IL 60611 agaltd@ameritech.net

7 (Pages 22 to 25) Fax 312.222.1645

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 72 of 107

Page 34

Page 36

I State's Attorney came in and told you why you were 1 Q But you tried?

2 there, how many more times did people come in to 2 A I tried. I was worried, I was depressed,

3 question you about the case?

3 I was frustrated. And I couldn't sleep.

4 A 1 can't say.

4 Q So at some point the Assistant State's

5 Q Were they in and out kind of a lot?

5 Attorney asked you to write down a statement?

6 A They was in and out, not a lot, often.

6 A And I refused.

7 Q Often you would say?

7 Q Okay.

8 A Yeah.

8

Did he then write down a statement

9 Q Okay.

9 for you?

10

Was it always the same detective?

10 A He wrote a statemenf down.

11 A It was the ones who was handling my case. 11 Q And then he read it out loud to you?

12 Q Did the Assistant State's Attorney come in 12 A Yes.

13 again?

13 Q Okay.

14 A He came in and tried to get me to make a 14

And did you sign the statement?

15 statement, but I wouldn't make a statement.

15 A I signed the statement. Yeah.

16 Q How did they try to make you give a

16 Q Did it accurately reflect what you felt

17 statement?

17 had happened?

18 A They was telling me that they got

18 A To the fight. Yeah.

19 witnesses. They got people here that's going to

19 Q What all did the statement say?

20 pick me out in the line-up. And I should, you know 20 A I can't remember what it said

21 be truthful, confess.

21 word-for-word.

22 Q But did you refuse?

22 Q Did it describe the fight that you had had

23 A I refused to give a statement.

23 with Mr. Moore, kind of the way that you describe

24 Q Okay.

24 it to me earlier?

Page 35

,

I

Was that all that you told them, no,

2 I wontt?

I

A Little bit.

2 Q Okay.

,

Page 37

3 A I told them I ain't going to sign nothing

3

Was there anything different?

4 because I ain't got no lawyer here.
5 - Q How long would you say that you were in

4 A Other than me saying ['killed him.

5

Q Did the statement say that you had kille

6 the room with the bench total?

6 him?

7 A From Sunday to like Wednesday in the

7 A It say I beat him to death with a blunt

8 morning in the wee hours of the morning I was down 8 object, caused his death.

9 there.

9 Q Did the statement say you admitted to

10 Q But how long were you in the room

10 doing that?

11 upstairs?

II A Yeah. That's what the statement was

12 A From Sunday to the wee hours ofthe

12 about.

13 morning on Wednesday.

13 Q But you do admit that you had the fight

14 Q Okay.

14 with him?

15

They didn't take you downstairs at .

15 A I did have a fight with him.

16 any time?

16 Q Okay.

17 A No.

17

Did the Assistant State's Attorney

18 Q Were you able to sleep while you were in

18 come in with a videotape· recorder?

19 the room?

19 A I was in the video room.

cO A No. I tried to sleep On the bench, it was

2D Q Okay.

21 too small. I had to take my shirt off and sleep on 21

Did they take you from the room

22 the filthy floor.

22 where --

23 Q But you were able to sleep on the floor?

23 A They took me out of this room right nex

24 A No, I wasn't able to sleep.

24 door to another conference room.

10 (Pages 34 to 37) 312.222.1644

Amold Goldstine & AsSOCiates, Ltd. - Chicago, IL 60611 agaltd@ameritech.net

Fax 312.222.1645

(.
( .

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 73 of 107

Page 42

Page 44

I

Q Okay.

I that.

2

Do you remember what time of day it 2 Q Okay.

3 was or what day it was when you were taken

3

So how many times did you get to eat

4 downstairs?

4 while you were in the room upstairs?

5

A I couldn't tell.

5 A Maybe two or three.

6

Q Okay.

6 Q What did you get to eat?

7

And what did they do when they took 7 A They mostly brought Burger Kings and I

8 you downstairs?

8 don't eat meat, so I just eat fries. I left the

9 A When they take you downstairs, they

9 meat there.

10 fingerprint you and book you in. They put you in aO Q You're a vegetarian?

II cell, wait to go to court.

II A Yes.

12 Q Okay.

12 Q Did they provide vegetarian food for you.

13

At any time were you taken to be part 13 A No.

14 of a line-up?

14 Q The French fries?

IS A I did a line-up.

15 A That was it.

16 Q Okay.

16 Q Okay.

17

When did that happen?

17

So they also brought you some pop?

18 A I couldn't say.

18 A The pop come with the little Value Meal,

19 Q Was it before you were taken downstairs? 19 whatever it is.

20 A When they did the line-up, yeah, before 20 Q Okay.

21 you go downstairs you did the line-up.

21

Did they let you smoke any

22 Q Okay.

22 cigarettes?

23

Was it at the same time you were

23 A I had my own cigarettes.

24 taken downstairs?

24 Q Okay.

Page 43

Page 45
(

I

MR. KANOVITS: Objection to the questio~ I

So you smoked cigarettes while you

2

You can answer the question.

2 were in the room?

3 A No.

3 A I smoke them, yes.

4 BY MS. SKIERMONT:
5 - Q Okay.

4 Q You had a lighter with you and everything.
5 A I had matches.

6

So at some point while you were in

6 Q Matches.

7 the room upstairs, did someone come in to take yo 7

So you were able to smoke while you

8 to the line-up?

8 were in the room?

9 A When I was arrested they took me - I was 9 A Yeah.

10 in that room, right the next day or so, thai's when 10 Q Were you in any physical pain while you

II I did the line-up.

II were being held in the room?

12 Q Okay.

12 A Cold. You couldn't sleep.

13

Then after the line-up did they take

13 Q Right.

14 you back to the room?

14

Other than that?

15 A That's where I stayed at all the time, I

IS A My back was aching because I got the

16 was in that room.

16 bullets in me.

17 Q Then they took you downstairs and put you 17 Q But you were not handcuffed?

18 in the lock-up?

18 A No.

19 A After everything was over. Thafs when I 19 Q So what happened once they took you to

20 went downstairs.

20 court?

21 Q Okay.

21 A I went to court, I was given a bond, the

22

How long were you in the lock-up

22 bond was $275,000. And I went through and I w,"

23 before you were taken to court?

23 booked.

24 A Maybe five to six hours, something like 24 Q Where did you get taken?

12 (Pages 42 to 45) 312.222.1644

Arnold Goldstine & Associates, Ltd. - Chicago, IL 60611 agaltd@ameritech.net

Fax 312.222.1645

, '
..,: ~.

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 74 of 107

1

.1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

3

EASTERN DIVISION

4

5 JOSEPH LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

6

Judge Darrah

-vs-

No, 01C 1823

7

CITY OF CHICAGO, DETECTIVE)

8 JAMES DELAFONT, DETECTIVE

JENNIFER DeLUCIA,

9 DETECTIVE HECTOR VERGARA,

OFFICER JOSE GOMEZ,

10 OFFICER DANIEL JACOBS and

OFFICER ROBERT MYERS,

11

Defendants.

12

Deposition of JESUS PEREZ, taken before NICOLE

13 MARIE DeBARTOLO, C.S.R., R.P.R., and Notary Public,

14 pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

15 the United States Courts pertaining to the taking of

16 depositions for the purpose of discovery, at

17 Suite 100, 312 North May, Chicago, Illinois,

18 commencing at 6:10 p.m., on the 20th day of November,

19 2003.

20

21

22

23

24

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 75 of 107

18:32:42 1 18:32:42 2 18:32:45 3 18:32:46 4 18:32:51 5 18:32:55 6 18:32:57 7 18:32:58 8 18:33:01 9 18:33:01 10 18:33:05.11 18:33:07 12 18:33:08 13 18:33:09 14 18:33:12 15 18:33:14 16 18:33:1617 18:33:17 18 18:33:18 19 18:33:21 20 18:33:2621 18:33:3222 18:33:3723 18:33:4224

26 police officers came in?
A Day and a half I was there and then another day aDd a half down.tain.
Q Okay. So when you were in the room with the
bench, you - did you sleep at all? A ~obably for about half an hour, 45 minutes
the most.
Q So were you trying to sleep or did you nod
offl A I just Dodded oU4 like too exhausted.
Q But you were able to sleep?
A No.
Q But you did fall asleep?
A 1 did faD asleep eventually, but it was hurting, so, YOD know_
Q Did you have any dreams while you were
sleeping? A Nightmares.
Q What were your nighbnares about?
A My whole life in jaB. YOlllmow, DOt being abJe to see my daughter being born aDd whatnot.
Q So you nodded off" you woke up, police
officers came in, and you were taken clown and - and booked. What did they do at that point? Did they

28

18:34:37 1 middle.

18:34:37 2 Q Was there - so you say there was a toilet

18:34:40 3 and two benches?

18:34:41 4 A Uh-Ilum.

18:34:41 5 Q One aD each side?

18:34:43 6 18:34:43 7 18:34:45 8 18:34:46 9

_1A Yes, ma1am.
Q Would you say that they were kind of bunks?
A No. Q J....

18:34:4710 A Steel benches.

18:34:4811 Q Okay. How wide were they?

18:34:51 12 A I would say about six fed w~e.

18:34:5813 Q Would you have been able to lie down 00 one

18:35:0114 ofthcm.?

18:35:0115 A Yeah.

18:35:0116· Q Did you lie down on oncoftbem?

18:35:0317 A 1 did lie doWll beause my -

18:35:0618 Q Did you sleep at aU?

18:35:07 19 A No, IcouJdnlt sleep. I wanted to faD 18:35:0920 asleep, but I wu just thinking. Every time I would

18:35:13 21 hear someone opening the door, I would get up bopmg

18:35:1722 it wu my tuna to get out.

18:35:1823 Q Yau said also there was a toilet in your

18:35:2024 oelI?

18:33:44 1 18:33:48 2 18:33:51 3 18:33:51 4 18:33:53 5 18:33:54 6 18:33:56 7 18:34:01 8 18:34:04 9 18:34:07 10 18:34:16 II 18:34:18 12 18:34:1913 18:34:21 14 18:34:21 15 18:34:23 16 18:34:25 17 18:34:27 18 18:34:28 19 18:34:2920 18:34:3021 18:34:3222 18:34:3223 18:34:3324

27
~yourfingapriDm?
A Everything, fiogerprints, picture.
Q Nothing else?
A That's it, notbing else.
Q And then what happened?
A I was ask.iDg if I could make my pbone call, and eventually they did, and all I was calling my girlfriend, tbe guard wouldn't let me talk to my girlfriend and let her know where 1 was at, what was goiag on, so he hurried me up. Luckily enough I got the infonD.lion to my girl and she got the lawyers to
get me out.
Q So when were you allowed to make tbe phone
call? A Wben tbey booked us and everything.
Q Was it right after you were booked?
A Not right after. 1 had to walt for at least .. hour or so.
Q Where did you wait?
A In the ceO.
Q They put you in a ceIl?
A Yeah.
Q What did the cell look like?
A Bars, benches on tbe side, toilet in the

18:35:20 I 18:35:23 2 18:35:24 3 18:35:26 4 18:35:27 5 18:35:30 6 18:35:31 7 18:35:32 8 18:35:34 9 18:35:34 10 18:35:37 11 18:35:39 12 18:35:40 \3 18:35:45 14 18:35:46 15 18:35:49 16 18:35:5417 18:35:57 18 18:36:02 19 18:36:0220 18:36:0521 18:36:0622 18:36:0623 18:36:0924

29 A Ub~bum. A little fOUDtaiD for water,
dri:akiag founmiD.
Q So you had a wilet and you had water?
A Uh·ham.
Q And you were in the cell for an hour and they
let you mBke a phone caU, right? .
A Uh.·h.am..
Q And you caJh,d your girlfriend and told her
wbere you were? A UIo-hum.
Q Could you answer with a yes?
A Yes.
Q 1lumk you. ADd your girlfriend caned a
lawyer for you? A She caBed my sister because I c:ouldD't get
across to my sister, ••d after that I dem't know if she got the lawyer or m~ sister got the lawyer, but they gGtme out eventually. Not that sa.me day, bu
you know_.
Q So after you made your phone call, did you go
back to your cell?
A Yeah.
Q And was there a police officer with you the
whole time that you made your phone can and went

8 (Pages 26 to 29)

LEGALINK- CmCAGO (312) 163-3514

rr ".,:_;~
,.;,

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 76 of 107

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

2

EASTERN DIVISION

3 JOSEPH LOPEZ,

4 Plaintiff,

5 -vs-

No. 01 C 1823

6

CITY OF CHICAGO,

7

)

Defendant.

8

9

Deposition of MARIO PEREZ taken before

10 TIMI M. HANNON, C.S.R., R.P.R., and Notary Public,

11 pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the

12 United States District Courts pertaining to the taking

13 of depositions, at Suite 100, 312 North May Street, in

14 the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois at 1:43

15 o'clock p.m. on the 22nd day of November, A.D. 2003.

16 17 18

19 20 21

22

23 24

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 77 of 107

28 (Pages 106 to 109)

106

108

I Q I'm just asking you if there -was a settlement

I people may have experienced would be wrong, also?

2 for an amount ofmoney?

2 A Yes.

3 A Yes.

3 Q Okay. Why?

4 Q Okay. Have you filed any other lawsuits? 5 A No.

4 A They shouldn't bappeD to anybody. 5 Q Do you feel that you wen: mistreated while you

6 Q Do you feel that you were harmed by your

6 were detained?

7 experience in the police lockup in March of2001? 8 A Yes.

7 A Yes. 8 Q Okay. Whal: sorts of things were dODe to you

9 Q How do you feel that you were harmed?

9 thai you consider to be mistreatment?

10 A I Ceel I was barmed because recently I bad 11 gotten beaten up by tbe police. And then now I was 12 going to jail Cor something I didn't do.

10 A Well, my rigbts taken away from me. II Q All right. Do you fuel like you were properly 12 fed while you were in the custody of the Chicago Police

13 Q Do you feel that you were harmed by the

13 Department?

14 questioning that was done by the officers? 15 A Yes.

14 A No. 15 Q Do you feel that your needs, your buman needs as

16 Q How do you feel thai you were harmed?

16 a person were being met?

17 A They were just telling me bad, bad things, and 17

18 what's goiag to bappeo to me.

18

A Yes. Q Do you feel that your needs for sleep were being

19 Q What do you feel your harm was?

19 met?

20 A I was going to jail Cor a loog time. 21 Q Do you fccl that you were harmed because you

20 A Yes. 21 Q You do? Were being met or denied?

22 were wrongfully acoused?

22 A WeD, wbat do you mean by met?

23 A Yes.

23 Q Well, is it your habit to sleep evel)l day?

24 Q Did you feel harm in any other way from your

24 A Ob,DO.

1 time in March 200 I at the police statino?
2 A No. 3 Q As a result ofthe harm that you felt during

107

109

I Q No, you dOD~ sleep every day?

2 A. Yes, I sleep, but I couldn't sleep at the time

3 whenlwas-

4 th3t time, have you seen a th""",lst?

4 Q In custody?

5 A No. 6 Q Hive you seeo a doctor?

5
.
6

A Yes• Q So do you feel like - Do you normally need

7 A No. 8 Q Have you done anything as a result ofthat harm?

9 A No. \0 MS. HAWLEY: I don~ have anymore questions.

II MS. BENWAY: Idon't.

12 MR. KANovnz: I have a couple.

13

EXAMINATION

14

BY MR. KANOvrrZ:

7 sleep every day? 8 A Y...
9 Q Do you feel like your need for ,Ieep was met
10 while you were at the police department? II A Y... 12 Q How was it met?
13 A Couldn't really sleep.
14 Q Okay. Do you know what I mean by having a need

15 Q Mr. perez, at the beginning of your deposition,

15 met?

16 you were talking about the reasons why you feel that 17 what happened to you was wrong and what would have

16 A No. 17 Q Okay. Like iC you need food - This would be an

18 happened to the other people in the class was wrong. Do 18 example. Your need for food would be met by having

19 you reeall testif'ying to that? 20 A Yes.
21 Q Okay. Do you feel that the detention that you 22 experienced at the Chicago Police Department was wrong?

19 somebody give you fuod. Let me tI)I asking. different

20 way. and I apologize fur being confusing about this.

21

Were you able to get the sleep that you

22 normally need while you were in the custody of the

23 A Y...
24 Q Do you feel that similar detentions that other

23 Chicago Polioe Department? 24 A I didn't, no.

LEGALINK- CHICAGO
(312) 263-3524

(~
f\.:'.~.'

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 78 of 107
.

1 ·..---.
~ 'n·••

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

2

EASTERN DIVISION

3

JOSEPH LOPEZ,

4 Plaintiff,

5 -vs-

No.. 01 C 1823

6

CITY OF CHICAGO,

7 Defendant.

8

9

Deposition of DENNY ROBINSON taken before

10 TIMI M. HANNON, C.S.R., R.P.R., and Notary Public,

11 pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil procedure for the

12 United States District Courts pertaining to the taking

13 of depositions, at Suite 100, 312 North May Street, in

14 the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois at 11:25

15 o'clock a.m. on the 22nd day of November, A.D. 2003.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

..

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 79 of 107

16 (pages 58 to 61)

.

58

60

1 A Yes. 2 Q Did he let you use the washroom by yourself!

1 Q Were you ever thirsty on that first day? 2 A Yes.

(
\.

3 A What do you mean?

3 Q Did you ever ask for any water?

4 Q Did he go into the washroom with you?

4 A I had drank some water when I weDt to the

5 A Yes. 6 Q Were you handcuffed?

5 restroom. 6 Q Did you drink water at any other time?

7 A My leflarm.

7 A No.

8 Q Did you use the washroom again that day?

8 Q Did you ever ask for water any other time?

9 A I don't remember.

9 A No.

10 Q When you oeeded to use the washroom. how did you 10 Q Did anyone ever ask you if you wanted something

II let the detective koow?

11 to drink?

12 A I had to yell or stretch across the room and 13 kick the door. 14 Q When you did that, did someone respond? 15 A Occasionally.

12 A No. 13 Q Did anyone ever ask yOll ifyOll wanted something 14 to eat other than the lunch that you had and the bologna 15 sandwich you had in the evening?

16 Q When you say occasionally. what do you mean? 17 A Sometimes they did; s~metimes they didn't.

16 A No. 17 Q Did you ever ask anyone for something to eat?

18 Q About how many times dn you think you yelled to 19 use the washroom?

18 A Yes. 19 Q When was that?

20 A About three.

20 A That day arouDd 5:00.

21 Q About how many times did someone respond to your 21 Q Who did you ask?

22 yelling to use the washroom?

22 A ODe of the officers. I don't know his name.

23 A J think tw~e. One time they just - So.mebody . 23 Q What did he .ay when you asked?

24 raised the paper, loo~ed iD, aDd theD kept going.

24 A You'll eat when everybody else eat.

59

61

I Q And the other two times, someone did respond?

I Q Did he indicate when that might be?

2 A No. One time. J said they - Two time! they

2 A No, he didn't.

3 responded. Once they - I went to tbe washroom. Once 3 Q Did you ask him?

4 they raised the paper, looked in aDd kept going.

4 A Yes, I did.

5 Q About how many tim", did you reach over and kick 5 Q What did he respond?

6 the door to get attention?

6 A He didn't.

7 A Twice. 8 Q Did someone respond both ofthose times?

7 Q After you had the bologna sandwich that night, 8 what happened after that?

9 A Yes. 10 Q Did you use the washroom those two times?
II A One of those times.

9 A NothiDg. 10 Q When is the next time that. you saw a police II officer?

12 Q Why did you not use the washroom the other time? 12 A The followiDg Bloming.

13 A Because the officu ~ust looked.. Raised the

13 Q That night, did you sleep in the room?

14 paper, looked in, and jUlt kept gOiDg.

14 A I I'e5Ited my eyes, yes.

15 Q So on this first day, do you think you used the

15 Q Did you actually fall asleep?

16 washroom twice?

16 A Not-No.

17 A Yes.

17 Q Why i.that?

18 Q And both oftbose times, was it Detective Downs

18 A Because I was very uncomfortable.

19 that look you?

19 Q Why were you uncomfortable?

20 A No. Once was Detective Downs.

20 A Because my arm was suspended ill the air.

21 Q Who took you the other time?

21 Q Did you try to lie down?

22 A I don't know. 23 Q Were you handcuffed? 24 A My left arm.

22 A I tried to. 23 Q How much of the time do you ihink you were lying 24 down?

.

LEGALINK- CHICAGO (312) 263-35:4

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 80 of 107

1
2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 - 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24

Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH LOPEZ,

)

pl ai nti ff,

)

vs.

) NO. 01 C 1823

CITY OF CHICAGO, DETECTIVE)

JAMES DELAFONT, et al.,

)

Defendants.)

----------------------)

DEPOSITION OF RYAN SOLOMON
November 20, 2003

312.222.1644

Amold Goldstine & Associates, Ltd. - Chicago, IL 60611 agaltd@amentech.net

Fax 312 )'n :645

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 81 of 107

P~ge 34

Page 36

I Put your hands up. Get in the car. Put the I you were sitting?

2 handcuffs on me.

2

A. Like this, about like this

3

Q. Did they say, "You're under arrest"? 3 (indicating).

(

4

A. No.

4

Q. Would you say -- the witness is

5

Q. When you arrived at the police

5 gesturing, and it looks like you're saying -- it

6 station, who took you into the police station? 6 looks like you have your ann at waist height.

7

A. The police.

7

A. Right.

8

Q. The police who were in the car with 8

Q. Could you put your anns on the bene

9 you?

9 if you were handcuffed to the ring?

10

A. Yeah.

10

A. Probably not this hand that's

II

Q. Okay. Where did they take you in th II handcuffed. But there's like a little pole

12 police station?

12 here, too. I can hold it sitting on the pole or

13

A. To a little room.

13 whatever. And then my other hand is free.

14

Q. Where was the little room in the

14

Q. Were you handcuffed to the ring?

15 police station?

15

A. Just one hand was handcuffed to the

16

A. Like, first get in -- when you first 16 nng.

17 walk in, on this side or something (indicating .17

Q. And what was the bench like?

18

Q. The witness was indicating on the -- 18

A. Steel.

19 on which side as you walk in?

19

Q. H'ow wide was it?

20

A. On the left.

20

A. About the size ofthis table, a nice

21

Q. Did you go up any stairs?

21 little size.

22

A. No.

22

Q. I'm sorry?

23

Q. Tell me about the room that they too~ 23

A. A nice little size.

24 you into. What was it like?

24

Q. A nice little size?

Page 35

Page 37

I

A. It was like a little room with a

1

A. Yeah.

2 door - I mean with a little window with a white 2

Q. Was it wide enough to sit on?

3 piece of paper covering it.

3

A. Yeah, it was wide enough to sit on.

4 - Q. Was the window in the door?

5

A. Yeah, it was in the door.

4 Wide enough to sit on but not sleep on.

5

Q. Was it long enough to lie down on?

6

Q. Was it covered with white paper on

6

A. Yeah. It was long enough to lie on,

7 the inside or the outside of the door?

7 but uncomfortable.

8

A. Outside.

8

Q. How talI are you?

9

Q. Did they take you into the room?

9

A. About, like, -- I don't know.

10

A. Yeah.

10

Q. Was the bench longer than you or wen

II

Q. Where did you go when you got into II you longer than the bench if you were lying

12 the room?

12 down?

13

A. Where did I go? On the little bench. 13

A. Probably longer than the bench if!

14

Q. SO, what was inside the room in terms 14 was lying down.

15 offumishings?

15

Q. Did you lie down on the bench?

16

A. A bench, this little ring thing that

16

A. Yeah, I lied on the bench.

17 they handcuffed me to.

17

Q. Where was your arm that was

18

Q. Where was the little ring thing?

18 handcuffed when you were lying down on the

19

A. On the wall.

19 bench?

20

Q. Was it behind the bench?

20

A. On the pole, sitting on the pole..

21

A. Yeah. It was, like, the bench right

21 Just sitting like this (indicating).

22 here, and the ring right there on the wall

22

Q. So; you could lie down on the bench

23 screwed in (indicating).

23 and rest your handcuffed ann on a pole, is that

24

Q. How high was the ring in terms of how 24 correct?

10 (Pages 34 to 37) 312.222.1644

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Fax 312.222.164~

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 82 of 107

Pag.50

Pag.52

1 left after you were hit, did anyone return to

1 to the bathroom?

2 the room that you were in?

2

A. Kept me handcuffed behind my back.

J

A. No.

3 Brought me to the washroom, a little ,oom lik

4

Q. Did anyone else come to the room that 4 . this. I go in and use the washroom, whatever.

5 you Were in?

5

Q. When you first realized you had to go

6

A. No.

6 to the bathroom, were you sitting on the metal

7

Q. What happened then in that room after 7 bench?

8 they left?

8

A. Yeah.

9

A. I was just in the room. And I guess

9

Q. Was there anyone in the room with you

10 it was, like, in the morning, nighttime. I

10 at the time?

11 think it was dark outside. And they had took m 11

A. No.

12 to Western and 51 st, the other station or

12

Q. Did you yell?

13 whatever.

13

A. Yeah.

14 . Q. Did you spend a night in the little

14

Q. Did someone come?

15 room with the metal bench at 61 st before you 15

A. Yeah.

16 went to 51st and Wentworth?

16

Q. Who came?

17

A. Yes, yeah.

17

A. A man. I don't think he was a police

18

Q. Did you sleep that night?

18 or whatever. He was just someone that worked

19

A. No, I didn't sleep. 1 probably dozed 19 there or whatever. Took me to the washroom.

20 off and woke up. But not the full sleep that I 20

Q. Did they keep you handcuffed while

21 would get if! was at home in bed.

21 you went to the washroom?

22

Q. Did you lie down?

22

A. Yeah.

23

A. [laid.

23

Q. Did they allow you to go into the

24

Q. From the time that you were brought 24 washroom by yourself?

Page 51

Page 53

I to 61 st and Racine until the time you left did 1

A. Yeah.

2 you have anylhing to eat?

2

Q. Were you able to go to the bathroom

3

A. No.

3 by yourself?

4 - Q. Did you ask for anylhing to eat?

5

A. No.

4

A. Yes.

5

Q. Then did you return to the metal room

6

Q. Why didn't you ask for anything to

6 after you went to the bathroom?

7 eat?

8

A. Because I didn't really have an

7

A. Yeah.

8

Q. Were you escorted to the metal room?

9 appetite to eat.

10

Q. Were you thirsty?

II

A. No.

9

A. Yeah.

10

Q. Were you handcuffed on your way back

II to the metal room? I'm sorry. I keep saying,

12

Q. Did you ask for anylhing to drink? 12 "the metal room." The room with the metal bene

13

A. (Shaking head).

13 is what I mean when [ say, "the metal room."

14

Q. Did anyone bring you anything to

14 I'm sorry.

[5 drink?

15

A. Yeah.

16

A. No.

16

Q. Were you placed back on the metal

17

Q. Did you have anylhing to drink?

17 bench when you returned to the room?

18

A. No.

18

A. Yes.

19

Q. Did you have to go to the bathroom? 19

Q. Were you handcuffed when you were

20

A. Yeah.

20 returned to the metal room?

21

Q. Did you get to go to the bathroom? 21

A. Yes.

22

A. Yeah, they let me go to the washroom 22

Q. How many times did you go to the

23 once.

23 bathroom when you were at 61st and Racine?

24

Q. What happened when you needed to g 24

A. Once.

14 (Pages 50 to 53) 312.222.1644

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Fax 312.222.164E

•(r . •

. .

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 83 of 107

Page 74

Page 76

1

A, Right, yeah, they left. They left

I at 61 st and Racine?

2 Ollt the room then.

2

A. Yeah.

J

Q. Were you teft alone in the room?

3

Q. While you were at 51st and Wentworth

4

A. Yeah.

4 in the room with the metal bench or at any

5

MR. KANOVITZ: I don't want to

5 time - strike that.

6 interrupt your flow, but when you reach a good 6

While you were at 51st and Wentworth,

7 stopping point, I'd like to take a break.

7 were you given anything to eat?

8

MR. DUNLOP: Sure. Why don't we take 8

A. No.

9 a five-minute break now?

9

Q. Did you ask for anything to eat?

10

(Whereupon a recess was had.)

\0

A. No.

11

MR. DUNLOP: Would you read back, 11

Q. 1 believe you said earlier that when

12 please, Miss Court Reporter, the last couple of 12 you went to 51st and Wentworth you were hungry

13 lines?

13

A. Yeah.

14

(Whereupon the record was read

14

Q. Did you tell anyone you were hungry?

15

by the reporter as reqljested.)

15

A. No.

16 BY MR. DUNLOP:

16

Q. Why didn't you tell anyone you were

17

Q. What happened after you were left

17 hungry?

18 alone in the room at 51st and Wentworth?

18

A. 1 was scared.

19

A. I sat there by myself.

19

Q. Did you continue to be scared while

20

Q. How long did you sit there?

20 you were at 51st and Wentworth?

21

A. Like 30 minutes, something like that. 21

A. Yeah.

22

Q. What happened after 30 minutes?

22 . Q. And were you so scared that you

23

A. Nothing.

23 didn't want to ask anyone for something to eat?

24

Q. Did you spend a night in that room?

24

A. Yeah.

Page 75

Page 77

1

A. Yeah.

1

Q. Did you continue to be hungry?

2

Q. Did anything happen between the time -2

A. Yeah.

3 the officers who asked you about your

3

Q. Were you thirsty?

4 I!andwriting and your spending the night in the 4

A. Yeah. Not really. 1 wasn't really

5 room -- did anything happen between the time th 5 thirsty.

6 officers left and you went to sleep?

6

Q. Why weren't you thirsty?

7

A. No.

7

A. I don't know. 1 wasn't, though.

8

Q. Did you go to sleep?

8

Q. Did you have some water?

9

A. I was up. I say I might have went to

9

A. Probably my little juice that I

10 sleep and woke back up, or whatever, but I

10 bought from the store. That was about it.

11 wouldn't call it sleep. Probably dozing off and 11

Q. Do you mean that you had -- I'm

12 waking up.

12 sorry. When did you have the juice from the

13

Q. Did you have trouble sleeping?

13 store?

14

A. Yeah.

14

A. 1 was telling you I had went to the

15

Q. Why did you have trouble sleeping?

15 store and 1 was coming through the alley or

16

A. That steel bench or whatever.

16 whatever and they had grabbed me and put me in

17

Q. Was there anything on your mind that 17 the car and took me to 61 st Street and Racine.

18 was keeping you up?

18

Q. Did you have any water to drink after

19

A. Yeah. I'm injai1 or whatever for

19 that?

20 something 1 didn't do.

20

A. No.

21

Q. Was that on your mind when you spent 21

Q. You didn't have any water to drink at

22 the night at 61 st and Racine?

22 61 st and Racine?

23

A. Yes.

23

A. No.

24

Q. And did it keep you up when you were 24

Q. 1thought you said earlier that you

20 (Pages 74 to 77) 312.222.1644

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Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 84 of 107

D.S.O. 79-40

Chicago Police Department

TITLE:

DETENTION REPORT

ISSUE DATE:

20 December 1979

EFFECTIVE DATE:

21 December 1979

DISTRIBUTION: RESCINDS:

A Department Special Order 74-41

I. PURPOSE

This order: A. states Department policy relating to detention of adult arrestees.

B. describes procedures for using the Detention Report (CPD-11.516).

II. POLICY
It is Department policy to process an arrested person without unnecessary or unreasonable delay. It is recognized, however, that the time required to complete these processes will vary. It is the responsibility of each Department member to ensure that the reason for detaining any arrestee is valid.
III. PURPOSE OF THE DETENTION REPORT
A. The Detention Report provides district watch commanders, Central Detention watch sergeants and the Identification Section with a written account of persons who were arrested prior to 2400 hours the previous day and who have not been released or sent to court that morning.
B. The Detention Report provides district commanders and the Commanding Officer of the Central Detention Section with a written explanation of why an arrestee was detained past the morning court call.
IV. PROCEDURES
A. Initiation by Lockup Personnel

D.S.O. 79·40 ISSUE DATE:

DETENTION REPORT 20 December. 1979

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 85 of 107

1. Each day, at the beginning of the 2nd watch, lockup keepers assigned to the Central Detention Section and Districts 2 through 21, 23 and 24 will determine if any persons arrested prior to 2400 hours the previous day, male or female, have not been released or sent to court.
a. If all arrestees have been released or sent to court, the lockup keeper will prepare the Detention Report, entering the following statement, "NO OUTSTANDING C.B. NOS: He will then submit the report to the 2nd watch commander for review.
b. After reviewing the Detention Report, the 2nd watch commander will initial it in the lower left-hand comer and forward the report to the district commander for his approval and signature.
c. Central Detention Section watch commanders will follow the same procedures as outlined and forward the report to the Commandi.ng Officer of the Central Detention Section for his approval and signature.
2. If for any reason an arrestee has not been released or sent to court (confined to hospital, awaiting line-up, etc.), the lockup keeper will prepare two copies of the Detention Report and submit them to the 2nd watch commander for review. The report will contain the following information: arrestee's name, CB number, reason for arrest, date and time of arrest, date and time charged, and a written explanation of why the arrestee has not been released or sent to court.
a. After reviewing the Detention Report, the 2nd watch commander will indicate his approval by initialing the report in the lower left-hand corner. If, in the opinion of the 2nd watch commander. continued detention of the arrestee is unwarranted, he will take appropriate action in accordance with the General Order entitled "Processing Persons Under Department Control."
b. After initialing the report he will:
(1) forward the original to the district commander for his approval and signature.

D.S.O. 79-40 ISSUE DATE:

DETENTION REPORT 20 December 1979

Page 2

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 86 of 107

(2) forward the duplicate copy to the Identification Section, via Department Mail, before 0900 hours.

B. Review by district commander/Commanding Officer of Central Detention Section
1. Upon receipt of the Detention Report from the 2nd watch commander, district commanders/Commanding Officer of the Central Detention Section will review the report to determine the justification for the extended detention of any arrestee. If it is determined that the reason is not valid and follow-up action is taken, a description of the action will be documented on the reverse side of the report.

2. After the Detention Report has been approved, the district commander/Commanding Officer of the Central Detention Section will sign it. The report will then be:

a. filed by date.
b. Maintained in a location within the unit where it will be available for inspection on a 24 hour basis.
c. RETENTION OF THE DETENTION REPORT CPO -11.516IS CHANGED TO 3 YEARS.
(Item IV-B-2-c amended, 31 Mar 89, Facsimile Message 89-02036).
.3. In the brief absence of the district commander/Commanding Officer of the Central Detention Section (Saturday, Sunday, holiday, etc.), the second watch commander's approval will suffice for that particular absence only.

C. Review by the Identification Section
Upon receipt of the duplicate copies of the Detention Report from the districts and Central Detention Section, Identification Section personnel will:

1. refer to the Arrest Control Set (CPD-31.200) which contains those CB numbers that have not been matched with the blue copy of the Arrest Report bearing the same CB number. (The blue copy of the Arrest Report is sent to the Identification Section when the arrestee is either released or sent to court.)
2. match Arrest Control Sets with the duplicate copy of the Detention

0.5.0. 79-40
ISSUE DATE:

DETENTION REPORT 20 December 1979

Page 3

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 87 of 107

Report (received from the districts or Central Detention Section) if the blue copy of the Arrest Report has not been received. This matched set will then be placed in a suspense file until the blue copy of the Arrest Report is received.
a. Upon receipt of the blue copy of the Arrest Report, destroy the duplicate copy of the Detention Report. If more than one arrestee is listed on a Detention Report, the Detention Report will be retained until the blue copy of the Arrest Report for each arrestee has been matched which the Arrest Control Set.
b. If neither a Detention Report nor the blue copy of an Arrest Report is received by 1300 hours, the Identification Section will contact the concerned unit by PAX and inform the desk sergeanUCentral Detention Section watch commander of the deficiency. The desk sergeanUCentral Detention Section watch commander will be responsible for correcting the deficiency.
Authenticated by:
Joseph DiLeonardi Acting Superintendent of Police
18-79 WGE (JHP)
FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Issue Date:

22 March 1989

Message Number:

89-01844

To:

All Department Members

From:

Joseph P. Beazley Commander Research & Development

Message:

DEPARTMENT SPECIAL ORDER 79-40 ENTITLED "DETENTION REPORT" is amended as follows:

0.5.0. 79-40 ISSUE DATE:

DETENTION REPORT 20 December 1979

Page 4

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 88 of 107

ITEM IV-B-2-c IS AMENDED TO READ:
c - RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING RECORDS RETENTION REQUIREMENTS DEPARTMENT MEMBERS WILL ANNOTATE THEIR COpy OF THE ABOVE CITED DIRECTIVE TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE
TO BE READ AT ROLL CALL FOR THREE DAYS

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Issue Date:

31 March 1989

Message Number:

89-02036

To:
From:

All Department Members
Joseph P. Beazley Commander Research and Development

Message: RETENTION OF THE DETENTION REPORT CPD -11.516 IS CHANGED TO 3 YEARS

DEPARTMENT MEMBERS WILL ANNOTATE THEIR COpy OF THE RETENTION SCHEDULE PAGE 4 TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE

0.5.0. 79-40 ISSUE DATE:

DETENTION REPORT 20 December 1979

PageS

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 89 of 107
1

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

2

EASTERN DIVISION

3 4 JOSEPH LOPEZ,

Docket No. 01 C 1823

5

Plaintiff,

6

vs.

7 CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Chicago, Illinois March 14, 2005 1:15 o'clock p.m.

8

Defendants.

9

10

VOLUME 1A

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Trial

11

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, and a jury

12 APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff:
13
14
15
16 For the Defendants:
17
18
19
20

LOEVY & LOEVY BY: MR. ARTHUR R. LOEVY
MR. MICHAEL I. KANOVITZ MR. RUSSELL R. AINSWORTH
312 North May Street
Suite 100 Chicago, Illinois 60607

ANCEL, GLINK, DIAMOND, BUSH,
& ROLEK, P.C. BY: MR. THOMAS G. DiCIANNI
MR. ALLEN DUARTE MS. DARCY L. PROCTOR
140 South Dearborn Street
6th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60603

DiCIANNI

21

22 LAURA LACIEN, CSR, RMR

23

Official Court Reporter

219 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1714

24

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 408-5032

25

EXHIBIT
Y

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 90 of 107

Lopez - Direct

63

(

1 wall on the ring.

2 Q. And can you show the jury where your hand would be when

3 you were sitting in that room?

4 A. It would be like maybe this high from my body because

5 the ring on the wall so I'll be sitting like this.

6 Q. And were you handcuffed from the first moment you were

7 put into that room?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Okay. Can you describe the room for the jury? How big

10 was it?

11 A. It was maybe like between seven to nine feet both ways.

12 It had one door and a window like this long and this wide.

13 Q. Could you see out the window?

14 A. No, sir.

15 Q. Why not?

16 A. It had typing paper from top to bottom.

17 Q. What did you think when you saw the typing paper?

18 A. That they were holding me back from something and I had

19 no clue what it was but it didn't seem right to me.

20 Q. Was there a bench in the room?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. How big was it roughly?

23 A. Probably like maybe three to four feet long and nine to

24 11 inches width.

25 Q. Okay. What was the bench made out of?

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 91 of 107

Lopez - Direct

91

1 Q. Did you try to sleep while you were in the room?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Did you try to lay down and sleep while you were in the

4 room? 5 A. Yes, sir, but it wasn't -- it wasn't good for me.

6 Q. Can you explain to the jury in your own words how it is

7 that you tried to lay down to sleep in the room?

8 A. Well, it being that my hand was handcuffed to the ring on

9 the wall, I had to extend my arm over the bench and at the

10 same time hold myself with the pressure of me pulling myself

11 to the ring and lay like this on the floor and try to at

12 least get a nap in.

13

MR. KANOVITZ: Your Honor, could he step down and

14 demonstrate how he had to situate his body?

15

THE COURT: Yes. He can. Assume the door knob is

16 the ring. Counsels may approach.

17

(Witness steps down.)

18

THE WITNESS: I was laying like this --

19

THE COURT: The jury, you could stand up and watch

20 him.

21

THE WITNESS: I was laying on the floor like this

22 and my head over the bench and my arm extended to the ring

23 but at the same time my body weight was pulling my arm down

24 so I would have to try to hold myself up and hold myself

25 right here with my hand.

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 92 of 107

Lopez - Direct

92

1

THE COURT: Thank you.

2

(Witness resumes stand.)

3

THE COURT: Let the record reflect that the witness

4 demonstrated how he was handcuffed and how he laid down in

5 his opinion.

6 BY MR. KANOVITZ: 7 Q. Was the floor that you had to lay on clean?

8 A. No, sir. 9 Q. Were you able to fall asleep in that position?

10 A. Yes. I did, sir.

11 Q. Okay. How long did you fall asleep for?

12 A. I don't know how long I fell asleep but I woke up in

13 pain.

14 Q. Can you explain? 15 A. I woke up to feeling my hand like if it was hot, burning

16 and cold at the same time. And for me holding my arm up like

17 this, it got kind of stuck in the position it was. It was

18 turning like a purplish blue and it was like sending little

19 shock waves down my arm.

20

And plus, I had

when I got up, I had a little red

21 line from me trying to prop myself on the bench. And my

22 side, my shoulder was hurting, my hip was hurting and my

23 knees were hurting from my body weight was trying to like

24 I don't know. I was trying to like hold my body up at the

25 same time, relax myself. So as my body laid up there, I

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 93 of 107

Lopez - Direct

93

1 guess from me sleeping, my arm kind of lost all circulation 2 in it and then my shoulder started hurting, my hip and my 3 knees. 4 Q. What did you do when you woke up and felt that pain? 5 A. Well, I woke up and I sat back on the bench and I leveled 6 my arm with the ring and I started to go like this to try to 7 get circulation back to my arm. But every time I wave and 8 try to open my hand, it would hurt. 9 Q. How long did that last? 10 A. I don't know, sir. 11 Q. Did you ever, during the time that you were in that room, 12 try to lay down like that again? 13 A. No, sir. 14 Q. Did you try to sleep again while you were in that room? 15 A. Yes, sir. 16 Q. Can you tell the jury how you tried to sleep after 17 that? 18 A. I will sit straight up and have my hand, of course, on 19 the ring and I will try to lean and go to sleep. And every 20 time I would notice I was sleeping is because I was hitting 21 my head on the wall. 22 Q. Do you know how long you were able to fall asleep at a 23 time like that? 24 A. No, sir; and I know it wasn't that long. 25 Q. Was that sleep restful for you?

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 94 of 107

Lopez - Direct

94

1 A. No, sir.

2 Q. Was it restorative in any way?

3

MR. DiCIANNI: Objection.

4

THE COORT: Basis of objection?

5

MR. DiCIANNI: Restorative, it's vague and

6 speculative.

7

THE COORT: I'll sustain the objection.

8 BY MR. KANOVITZ: 9 Q. Did you feel rested when you woke up from sleeping in

10 that way?

11 A. No, sir. 12 Q. Did you recall at one point while you were in the room

13 hearing Sophie's voice outside of the room?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. What do you recall about that? 16 A. I can remember her -- I don't know what she was saying

17 but I know I recognized her voice.

18 Q. Was she trying to talk to you as far as you could tell?

19 A. I believe she was like talking as she was walking past

20 the door, like talking to one of the detectives or something

21 like that. 22 Q. Do you know how long you had been in custody when you

23 heard her voice?

24 A. No, sir. 25 Q. Do you know how long it had been since you had slept when

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 95 of 107 99 Lopez - Direct

1 at that time?

2 A. No, sir. 3 Q. Did you know that your grandmother was not in the room? 4 A. I knew she wasn't there but I don't know why I was still

5 talking to her. Q. Did you retain the ability to control your own thoughts
6

7 at that point?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. Can you explain what you mean?

A. I couldn't -- I couldn't even put my ideas in place. I 10

couldn't even think straight. And every time I would, like, 11

12 say something, I would tell myself man, you know, I didn't

shoot that little boy and then a voice will click in and say

,-

13

I

14 yeah, you did shoot him.

15 Q. Can you describe this voice? A. It was __ I know it wasn't no girl voice or nothing like
16 that. It was just some voice that was coming from the back
17 of my head just kept telling me yeah, you did shoot him. So
18 19 after awhile me fighting against that voice, it just came
true. I was like you know what, I started to believe that I 20

21 did shoot her. Q. Okay. Was this a voice that was inside of your head or
22

23 did you hear it coming from outside?

24 A. Inside my head, sir. 25 Q. Okay. Had you ever heard a voice like that before?

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 96 of 107

Lopez - Direct

100

1 A. Never in my life, sir.

2 Q. Was it frightening when you heard that voice?

3 A. Frightening, yes. And at the same time, I was like whoa

4 because this ain't ever, ever happened to me in my life.

5 Q. What did you think that voice was?

6 A. I don't know.

7 Q. Did you -- was it in -- when you heard that voice, did it

8 sound like your own thoughts or did it sound like something

9 else? 10

MR. DiCIANNI: I'll object to lack of foundation for

11 that.

12

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. Your own

13 thoughts

I mean, he testified he heard something deep

14 inside him.

15 BY MR. KANOVITZ:

16 Q. The voice you heard, was that the same voice that you

17 hear when you hear yourself talking or was it someone else's

18 voice?

19 A. I know

20

MR. DiCIANNI: Same objection.

21

THE COURT: Okay. One second.

22

MR. DiCIANNI: Same objection.

23

THE COURT: I'll allow you to ask the question if

24 the voice was his own voice.

25

MR. KANOVITZ: Okay.

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 97 of 107

•

Lopez - Direct

101

1 BY MR. KANOVITZ: 2 Q. Was the voice your own voice? 3 A. No, sir.
4 Q. Okay. Do you know how long it had been since you slept 5 at this point? 6 A. No, sir. At that point in time, I was actually losing my
7 marbles and I believe I was going crazy, sir. 8 Q. Had you had anything to eat at this point, sir? 9 A. No, sir. 10 Q. Did you ever experience visual hallucinations while you 11 were in the room? 12 A. Yes, sir. 13 Q. Can you explain? 14 A. I was sitting there for a while and after me crying so 15 much and trying to put thoughts all together, which wasn't 16 even going together, I was sitting looking at the wall and I 17 would feel like the wall was like coming in closer. And as I 18 would feel it, it looked like it was coming in closer to 19 me. 20 Q. Do you know how long that went on for? 21 A. I don't know, sir. 22 Q. Do you know how many times you saw that happening? 23 A. I think it was happening every time I looked at the 24 wall. 25 Q. How long had you been in custody at that point?

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 98 of 107

Lopez· Direct

102

1 A. I have no clue, sir, how long I was there. 2 Q. Do you remember the night that you confessed to the 3 murder of the little boy? 4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. Describe how you were feeling physically at that point. 6 A. I know my body was aching because, like I said, my arm 7 was already hurting. My back was hurting. My stomach was 8 hurting. My eyes were hurting. They were kind of swollen 9 already. I had a hoarse throat from screaming, yelling, 10 talking to myself and I just felt exhausted. 11 Q. How was your mind working at that point? 12 A. It wasn't working at all. 13 Q. Do you feel that you retained the ability to think 14 rationally at that point? 15 A. No, sir. 16 Q. Did you eventually have a conversation in that state 17 where a detective asked you if you were ready to confess? 18 A. What you mean, in the conversation with one of the 19 detectives? 20 Q. Yes. 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 Q. Okay. And did you offer to confess or were you asked if 23 you were ready to confess? 24 A. I don't remember if I offered or if I was asked. 25 Q. Okay. What detective did you have that conversation

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 99 of 107

Lopez - Direct

103

1 with? 2 A. Detective Jacobs, sir. 3 Q. What did you tell him? 4 A. Well, I didn't tell him nothing. He kept telling me to 5 just confess and to just get it over with. And after, like I 6 was saying, so long of me fighting myself telling me I didn't 7 do it, the voice was like overpowering me and kept telling me 8 I did do it so I honestly believe I did it so that's -- and I 9 told him I will confess. 10 Q. At the time that you told him that you were ready to 11 confess, you in fact believed that you had done the murder? 12 A. Yes, sir. 13 Q. Did you tell him anything else at that time? 14 A. Well, right before I told him I will confess, I was like 15 I'll talk to you if you can get a picture for -- no, a letter 16 or if I could talk to Sophie and that he insists that he can 17 get a letter for me. 18 Q. What did you say to that? 19 A. I said okay. 20 Q. Did he eventually bring you a letter? 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 Q. And did he bring you a picture? 23 A. Yes, sir. 24 Q. What was the picture of? 25 A. It was a picture of Sophia and her niece.

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 100 of 107

Lopez· Direct

104

/"

1 Q. Okay. And had you ever seen that picture before?

2 A. No, sir. 3 Q. And he brought you a letter?

4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. Did he leave you alone in the room with the letter?

6 A. Yes, sir. 7 Q. Did he tell you anything when he handed you the letter?

8 A. No, sir. 9 Q. Okay. What did the letter say? 10 A. She wrote on the letter that she loves me, she misses me

11 and she was going to be there until I get out and she was

12 pregnant. 13 Q. Okay. Did you know that she was pregnant at that

14 point?

15 A. I had an idea but I wasn't sure.

16 Q. Okay. Did she tell you if she had gotten a test and

17 found out that she was pregnant?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Do you know how long you had been in police custody at

20 that point when you read that letter?

21 A. No, sir.

22 Q. Do you know how long it had been since you had slept last

23 when you read that letter?

24 A. No, sir. I didn't know nothing. At that time, like I

25 said, my mind was nowhere near my head. My head wasn't even

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 101 of 107

Lopez· Direct

105

1 on my body, I think. 2 Q. Do you know if it was day or night? 3 A. No, sir. 4 Q. How long did it take you to read the letter? 5 A. Not long. 6 Q. Okay. What did you do with the letter after you read 7 it? 8 A. I p~t it in my pocket, sir. 9 Q. What did you do with the picture? 10 A. I broke the picture and I took one of them because there 11 was two pictures in there. It was a key chain. There was 12 two pictures in there. I broke the plastic casing. I put 13 the other picture in my pocket. 14 Q. Why did you do that? 15 A. Because there was two pictures in there and they said 16 they were going to take it back from me because I couldn't 17 keep the pictures with me so I broke it. I took one and put 18 it in my pocket. 19 Q. Okay. What happened next? 20 A. I believe Detective Jacobs came in and it was Delafont 21 with a state's attorney, sir. 22 Q. And can you describe the state's attorney? 23 A. She was a lady and she was pregnant. 24 Q. And what happened next? 25 A. I confessed, sir.

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 102 of 107

Lopez - Direct

106

1 Q. Did you respond to specific questions? 2 A. I don't remember if they were asking me any questions. 3 Q. Okay. How did you know it was time to confess? 4 A. Because she had came in with a notebook paper, a yellow 5 notebook pad and a pen so I figured it's time for me to 6 confess. And plus, they already told me when they come back 7 that it was going to be time for me to confess. 8 Q. Do you know how long it took you to confess? 9 A. No, sir. 10 Q. Do you remember what you told the state's attorney? 11 A. I can't remember everything, sir, but I remember a little 12 bit. 13 Q. Okay. Did you know at the time that you were giving that 14 confession whether you were the murderer or not? 15 A. Excuse me? 16 Q. Did you believe that you had committed the murder at the 17 time that you gave that confession? 18 A. I didn't believe it. But like I said, that voice was 19 telling me that I did shoot him so in a way I was like, man, 20 I had "ifs" that I did shoot him. 21 Q. Do you know why you decided to give the state's attorney 22 that confession? 23 A. No. I don't, sir. 24 Q. Did any of the people in the room react while you were 25 giving that confession?

· ."

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 103 of 107

Lopez· Direct

107

1 A. No, sir. 2 Q. Did anybody in the room say anything while you were

3 giving that confession? 4 A. I don't remember if they were saying anything but I know

5 there was no reaction. 6 Q. Okay. What happened after -- what happened after you

7 finished giving your confession to the state's attorney?

8 A. Well, all three of them left out of the room and it was

9 kind of harder on me because I seen that the lady was 10 pregnant and I had just found out that my girl was actually

11 pregnant so it kind of made it worse. It was like throwing

12 another 200 pounds on my back.

13

MR. DiCIANNI: I'm sorry. I didn't hear that last

14 comment.

15

THE COURT: It kind of felt like 200 pounds on his

16 back.

17 BY MR. KANOVITZ: 18 Q. Where did you get the details of the story that you gave

19 to the state's attorney? 20 A. From Detective Jacobs corning in and asking me are you

21 sure you weren't in this place at this time. 22 Q. Okay. Were you playing games with the police when you

23 gave that confession?

24 A. No, sir. 25 Q. Were you trying to cover up for somebody when you gave

•

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 104 of 107

Lopez· Direct

108

1 that confession? 2 A. No, sir, because I didn't know nobody or anything. I 3 didn't have no clue about nothing. All I knew is what they 4 told me. 5 Q. Did you have any idea who had committed this murder at 6 the time that you gave that confession? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Did you think that when you gave that confession that 9 you'd be allowed to leave the room? 10 A. I wasn't sure what was going to happen afterwards. All I 11 figured out is that maybe they were going to take me down to 12 lockup already and send me to the county. 13 Q. Okay. Do you know what time of day it was when you 14 finished giving the confession? 15 A. No, sir. 16 Q. Had you had anything to eat when you gave that 17 confession? 18 A. No, sir. 19 Q. Were you handcuffed to the hook when you gave that 20 confession? 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 Q. Where were you sitting when you gave that confession? 23 A. On the bench, sir. 24 Q. Where did the where did Jacobs, Delafont and the 25 state's attorney sit while you were giving that confession?

.lI_ "

~

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 105 of 107

Lopez" Direct

109

1 A. Right in front of me. 2 Q. Did they bring chairs into the room? 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 Q. Did they leave the chairs in the room after they left? 5 A. No, sir. 6 Q. Were those chairs padded? 7 A. I don't remember if those chairs were padded or not. 8 Q. How long were you alone in the room after you 9 confessed? 10 A. I'm not sure how long I was there. 11 Q. What happened next? 12 A. I remember Detective Jacobs corning back in. He was kind 13 of mad at me saying that I was a liar and everything I told 14 him was a lie. So he took the letter and the picture away 15 from me saying that I don't deserve to be a father and that 16 Sophie should have an abortion. 17 Q. What did you say to him? 18 A. I told him that I don't think she's going to have an 19 abortion and I didn't shoot nobody, that's why obviously my 20 story didn't match. 21 Q. Did he tell you what it was about your story that didn't 22 match? 23 A. No, sir. 24 Q. Did he tell you that your story, in fact, did not 25 match?

·" '" .. ..

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 106 of 107

Lopez· Direct

110

1 A. Yes, sir. 2 Q. Did anyone bring you food after you gave that

3 confession? 4 A. I'm not sure what detective it was but I know they brang

5 me a bologna sandwich. 6 Q. Did they bring you anything to drink?

7 A. Yeah. A little juice. 8 Q. Do you know how long it was between the time that you 9 gave the confession to the state's attorney and the time that

10 they brought you food?

11 A. No, sir. 12 Q. Did you ever see the pregnant state's attorney again?

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. Did she ever tell you her name?

15 A. I don't remember if she even

I don't remember if she

16 even talked to me or anything.

17 Q. After you finished giving her the confession, did she ask

18 you to sign anything?

19 A. No, sir. 20 Q. Do you know how much longer you stayed in that room after

21 you gave the confession? 22 A. No, sir. I had no recollection of no time or any date of 23 any time. 24 Q. After you gave that confession, did a detective ever come

25 and tell you that someone had signed a statement against

.. .......

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 42 Filed 08/08/2005 Page 107 of 107

Lopez - Direct

111

-. ,.c-

1 you?

\

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Okay. Do you remember how long it was after you

4 confessed?

5 A. No, sir.

6 Q. Do you know how long it had been since you had slept at

7 that point?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. Do you know if it was night or day at that point?

10 A. No, sir. I didn't even know if I was still in the same

11 day or where I was at.

12 Q. Okay. What did they tell you about the signed

13 statement?

14 A. They said

15

MR. DiCIANNI: Objection. Can I have a foundation

16 as to when or who he was talking to?

17

THE COURT: Okay. "When," he's testified

18 consistently that he didn't know when anything happened.

19

MR. DiCIANNI: But who is he.

20

THE COURT: But who is he, I'll allow that.

21 BY MR. KANOVITZ: 22 Q. Who was it that told you that there had been a statement

23 signed against you?

24

MR. DiCIANNI: And who is present.

25

THE COURT: One second. Let counsel ask the

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:548

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON,

)

and LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of

)

themselves and a class of others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 04 C 6804 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn ("Dunn") and Denny Robinson ("Robinson"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a four-count putative class action against defendant City of Chicago ("City") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 on October 21,2004. Plaintiffs allege that while in the custody of the Chicago Police Department ("CPO") as post-arrest detainees, they were subjected to unlawful inten·ogation room detentions (Count I), deprived of adequate accommodations for sleep (Count II), and detained more than 48 hours before receiving a judicial

hearing (Count III). Count IV asserts a respondeat superior claim. Plaintiffs' have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for certification of three classes

defined as:
I. All persons held in a CPO interrogation or "interview" room for more than sixteen hours in a 24-hour period at any time from March 15, 1999, to the date of the order granting certification in this case.

'The complaint alleges that Leonard Kimble ("Kimble") was held in an interrogation room for approximately 65 hours under unlawful conditions and without a probable cause hearing, and he is included in the class allegations for all three classes. The motion for class certification, however, docs not seek to certify him as a class representative for any class.

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 2 of 21 PageID #:549
II. All persons held in a CPO lock-up or detective division facility between the hours of I0 p.m. and 6 a.m. at any time from March 15, 1999, to the date oft he order granting certification in this case. Ill. All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPO in excess of48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing at any time from March 15, 1999, to the date of the order granting certification in this case. Class I is further defined to "exclude all persons who gave an inculpatory statement while in
CPO custody if: (I) the person was convicted after a trial on the merits at which the statement was admitted, that conviction has not been invalidated, and the resulting sentence has not been discharged, provided that the person also brought a motion to suppress that statement before or during trial; or (2) the criminal case remains pending and the statement has not been suppressed in a pretrial motion or has been suppressed but the suppression order was not appealed by the state within 30 days.
Robinson seeks to represent Class I, and Robinson and Dunn seck to represent Class II and Class
III. Defendant opposes certification of Class I and Class Ill, arguing that: (I) plaintiffs cannot
satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); and (2) the classes arc not maintainable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Defendant does not challenge certification of Class II. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion is granted as to Class Ill and denied as to Class 1.2
2The court notes that both parties have filed briefs in excess of 15 pages (with extensive footnotes) without leave of court and without a table of contents and authorities, in violation of Local Rule 7.1.
2

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 3 of 21 PageID #:550
FACTS Plaintiffs' three proposed classes correspond to three separate categories of claims regarding the treatment of post-arrest detainees held by the CPO. Class I alleges that detainees were held in interrogation or interview rooms, rather than in lock-up facilities, for more than 16 hours, and that they were subjected to inhumane conditions in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' Interrogation rooms arc small, approximately ten feet long eight feet wide, and bare except for a metal bench, which is approximately four feet long and ten inches wide, and a shackling hook on the wall. Under the CPD's Special Order No. 99-02, dated December 3, 1999, detectives and officers are required to "secure all adult prisoners to a restraining device when placing the prisoner in an interview room." There is no toilet in the interrogation rooms. Detainees do not receive regular meal service while in the interrogation rooms, and arc "at the whim" of CPO officers and detectives for food, water, and access to bathroom facilities. Detainees become sleep-deprived because the metal bench is not long enough for an adult to lie down on, and "it is not uncommon for detainees to go without food or access to sanitary facilities for much of their detention." Many detainees urinate or defecate on themselves or on the noor. Unlike the interrogation rooms, lock-up cells contain bunks and toilet facilities, and lockup detainees receive regular meal service. There are CPO rules and regulations regarding treatment of lock-up detainees. In contrast, the CPO maintains no rule or practice limiting the amount of time that an individual can be kept in an interrogation room, or specifying the care and
1Piaintiffs clarify in their reply that Class I is limited to warrantless arrestees, and thus the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard governs the conditions of confinement.
3

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 4 of 21 PageID #:551

treatment of arrcstces detained in interrogation rooms. According to plaintiffs, no legitimate police purpose is served by holding post-arrest detainees in interrogation rooms rather than lockup faci lilies where their conditions of confinement would he improved and regulated. Plaintiffs' basic human needs for food, sleep, hygiene, and access to a restroom were ignored. Plaintiffs allege that the conditions in the interrogation rooms amount to physical and psychological "soft torture," which lead to increased suggestibility for the person being interrogated, and to false
confessions. Class II, which defendant does not challenge, alleges that persons held in lock-up cells
overnight were not provided with a mattress or other bedding for the bunks. Class IIJ alleges that persons arrested without a warrant on suspicion of a felony were
held in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Under the CPD's "hold past court call" procedure, the CPO extends an arrestee's detention until the Cook County State's Attorney decides whether to approve charges. Plaintiffs allege that this procedure existed for decades and was widespread. and was applied to class members even though it was held unconstitutional in Robinson v. City of Chicago, 638 F. Supp. 186 (N.D.Ill. I986)'. In August 2003, the CPO adopted a policy prohibiting detentions in excess of 48 hours, but according to plaintiffs the new policy has not been properly implemented. For example, Dunn alleges that in 2004 he was detained for 56 hours without a judicial hearing.

4 ln Robinson, the trial court determined that the practice of holding detainees for

excessive periods without judicial approval violated the Fourth Amendment, and enjoined the

"hold past court call" procedure. The Seventh Circuit reversed the injunction on standing

grounds, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were moot because their damage claims were settled

prior to the district court's ruling.

Robinson

v.

City

of Chicago,

868

F.2d

959

(7

11 '

Cir.

!98')).

4

------------- -~--
Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 5 of 21 PageID #:552
DISCUSSION Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, which governs class actions, requires a two-step analysis to detern1inc if class certification is appropriate. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a): (I) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697,703 (7th Cir. 1993). These clements are a prerequisite to certification, and failure to meet any one of them precludes certification of a class. Second, the action must also satisfy one of the conditions of Rule 23(b). Joncek v. Local714 International Teamster Health and Welfare Fund, 19')9 WL 755051, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 19')9) (and cases cited therein). Relevant to the instant case, Rule 23(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that: "(I) common questions must predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and (2) class resolution must be superior to other methods for the fair and effective adjudication of the controversy." Portis v. City of Chicago, 2003 WL 22078279, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003) (quoting.loncek, 1999 WL 755051, at *7). Plaintiffs have the burden of showing compliance with Rule 23. Cwiak v. Flint Ink Com., 186 F.R.D. 494,496 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Defendant challenges certification of Class I and Class III on several grounds, but focuses its Rule 23(a) arguments on typicality and commonality. Defendant also argues that plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) because class claims do not predominate, and class resolution is not superior.
5

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:553

I.

Rule 23(a): Commonality and Typicality

Defendant objects to certification of Classes I and Ill on the basis that the proposed

classes l~1il to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). "A common

nucleus of operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule

23(a)." Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d I013, I018 (7'" Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. I051

(I 'J'J3). The presence of some factual variation among class members' experiences will not

dcfcat class certi lication. & at I017. A plaintiff need only show that there is at least one

question of f~1ct common to the class to satisfy the commonality requirement. Portis v. City of

Chicago, 2003 WL 22078279, at *2 (N.D.III. Sept. 8, 2003); In re VMS Sec. Litig, 136 F.R.D.

466, 473 (N.D. II I. 1991 ). Typicality is satisfied if a plaintiffs claim arises from the same event,

practice, or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members, and the

claims arc based on the same legal theory. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 595 (7'" Cir. I ')98);

Kort v. Diversified Collections Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1617213, at *3 (N.D.lll. Dec. 17, 2001 ).
Commonality and typicality arc closely related, and finding one often results in find the other. &

For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that Class I and Class III satisfy the requirements

of Rule 23(a).

A. Class I

Plaintiffs argue that there are several questions of fact and law common to Class I. Class

I alleges that defendant is liable under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 ( 1978),

for violations of the Fourth Amendment based on: (1) the maintenance of an unconstitutional,

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 7 of 21 PageID #:554
written policy requiring shackling of detainees held in interrogation rooms'; (2) the failure to enact policies limiting the amount of time a detainee may be held in an interrogation room; (3) the failure to establish policies for food services and other humane treatment for persons held in the rooms; (4) the failure to provide proper sleeping facilities for persons held in the rooms, including bedding; and (5) the deliberately indifferent failure to correct a repeated pattern of neglect of the human needs of persons held in interrogation rooms.
Defendant argues that Class I lacks commonality because plaintiffs were not subjected to standardized conduct or conditions. See Allen v. CityofChicago, 828 F. Supp. 543,551 (N.D. Ill. I')')3) (commonality requirement met when there is "standardized conduct by defendants toward members of the putative class"). Defendant asserts that the deposition testimony of plaintiffs, other class members, and defendant's witnesses demonstrate differences in CPO practices and the experiences of detainees. Indeed, some class members testified that they were offered food and water by some CPO officers while being held in the interrogation room, and that they were permitted to usc the restroom facilities when they asked. Some class members also testified that they were not handcuffed, or not always handcuffed, in the interrogation room. According to defendant, these variations necessitate individualized inquiry and preclude class treatment.
The variations identified by defendant in the actual treatment of certain detainees, however, do not eliminate the common nucleus of fact alleged in Class 1: all of the detainees were held for an unlawful period of time (greater than I(, hours) in interrogation rooms that lacked the most basic amenities. See Portis v. City of Chicago, 2003 WL 22078279, at *2
'The policy is contained in Special Order No. 99-02 dated December 3, 1999, which requires detectives and interrogators to "secure all adult prisoners to a restraining device when placing the prisoner in an interview room."
7

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 8 of 21 PageID #:555
(N.D.l\1. Sept. 8, 2003) ("A class action will not be defeated solely because of some factual diiTerenccs among the class members' grievances.") (quoting Heastie v. Community Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 675 (N.D.III. 1989). Indeed, defendant concedes that the lack of a place to sleep is common to all class members.'' Even if the lack of a place to sleep did not provide sufficient commonality, plaintiffs were subject to the Special Order requiring that all detainees remain in restraints while held in an interrogation room. Plaintiffs also allege that they were all at the mercy of"thcir interrogators" for food and water, and for access to the restroom.
Defendant's arguments against class cettification based on factual differences arc unpersuasivc. The fact that certain detainees were treated marginally better on an ad hoc basis than others does not alter plaintiffs' allegations that they were subject to the standard practice of prolonged detention in interrogation rooms rather than the lock-up without a legitimate police purpose, and that the interrogation rooms are inherently unfit for human occupancy for more than a few hours. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.Jd 849, 868 (')'" Cir. 200 I) ("[C]ommonality is satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members."). Defendant objects that the variations in treatment may atlcct damage calculations, but, as discussed below, individual damage calculations do not preclude class certification. Defendant docs not dispute that all Class !members assert a common legal claim under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful conditions of confinement. Plaintitls' Class I claims therefore satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).
''Delcndant argues that this claim in Class I is redundant of the Class II claim that no bedding is provided to detainees held in lock-up cells overnight. The Class I and Class II claims, however, arc patently eli ffcrcnt because they refer to different holding facili tics, and the lack of a place to sleep is not analogous to the lack of bedding for the bunk provided.
8

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 9 of 21 PageID #:556
Defendant does not clearly articulate how Class I fails to satisfy the typicality claim. Plaintiff Robinson, who is the proposed representative of Class I, testified that he was held in an interrogation room, and he brings his claim under the same Fourth Amendment legal theory as the rest of Class ! 7 Robinson thus satisfies the typicality prong. Sec Keele, I49 F.3d at 595 (typicality is satisfied when the plaintiff's claim arises fi·mn the same practice or course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the putative class members, and has the same essential characteristics of the class at large); De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp. Inc., 713 F.2d 225,232 (7'" Cir. I983) ("Similarity oflegal theory is more important than factual similarity.").
Defendant is correct, however, that Robinson's Class 1claims arc time-barred. The parties agree that a two-year statute of limitations applies to~ 1983 claims. See Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 597 (7'" Cir. 2001 ). Plaintiffs argue that all of their claims relate back to the original complaint filed in Lopez v. City of Chicago, case no. 01 C 1823, on March 15, 200 I. The first complaint in Lopez asserted individual ~ I983 and state law claims against the City and several detectives and police officers. On October 24, 2002, Judge Darrah granted the plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint adding class allegations regarding the "hold past court call" policy and the practice of the CPD that is raised by Class lii in the instant case. Lopez, 2002 WL 31415767, at *3 (N.D.IIl. Oct. 25, 2002). The plaintiff in Lopez sought to certify one putative class only, which he defined as:
All persons arrested by the [CPD] without an arrest warrant and who were detained in excess of 48 hours pending approval of felony charges by the State's Attorney at any time from March 15, I999, to the present day.
'Defendant argues that Dunn cannot serve as Class I representative because he testified that he was held in an interrogation room for a few hours only. Dunn, however, seeks to represent Class ll and Class Ill only, not Class I.

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 10 of 21 PageID #:557
Judge Darrah held that the class claims related back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. I 5(c), and thus the actionable class period extended hack to March I 5, I999, which was two years prior to the tiling of the original complaint. The proposed Lopez class was never certified. After Lopez was transferred to the calendar of Judge Der-Yeghiayan, the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, which was fully briefed by the parties. On May 20, 2004, Judge Dcr- Ycghiayan granted the plainti ITs motion to withdraw his motion for class certification and proceed to trial on his individual claims.
The liling of a class action suit tolls the statute of limitations for all the members of the putative class. Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3cl 908, 914 (7'" Cir. 2002); sec also Crown Cork & Seal Co .. Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (I 983) (limitations on class members' claims arc tolled during the pendency of a class action). The question, then, is whether the class allegations in Lopez tolled the class allegations in the instant case. Plaintiffs correctly assert that Lopez "included a count for interrogation room detentions" because Count II of the second amended complaint in Lopez alleged that plaintiff and the class members "have been subjected to torturous conditions of confinement while being held in the custody of the CPD," including many of the deprivations alleged in the instant complaint. The definition of the putative class in Lopez. however, rcl'crenccd the 48 hour rule only.
Although neither party expressly addresses this issue, it is the proposed definition of the class, not the content of the class allegations, that is relevant to the tolling question. That is, only the claims of plaintiffs who would have been included in a putative class are tolled. The Supreme Court emphasized class membership in Crown Cork & Seal, holding that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to "all asserted
10

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 11 of 21 PageID #:558
members of the class that would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." 4(>2 U.S. at 353. Lower courts have also focused on the identity of class members, not the class allegations. Sec, e.g., Spann v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia, 2004 WL (>'Jl785, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2004) (plaintiff must be included in putative class to toll statute of limitations); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.. 19')8 WL 474146, at *8 (N.D.lll. Aug. 6, 19'J8) (tolling doctrine is designed to benefit a "group the class and its putative members.").
In the instant case, plaintiffs' class allegations were tolled by the filing of Lopez only to the extent that the class definitions here match the class definition proposed in Lopez. Lopez did not define any class regarding conditions of confinement in the interrogation rooms. The definition of Class l therefore assct1s a new class; consequently, the Class I claims were not tolled by Lopez.' Plaintiffs filed their class complaint in the instant action on October 12, 2004, and Class I may therefore include persons detained after October 12, 2002. Accordingly, Robinson, who was arrested and held in October 2000, is barred by the statute of limitations fi·om representing or being a member of Class I.
Because Robinson is the only plaintiff seeking to represent Class I and his claims arc time-barred, the court cannot certify Class I at this time.'' The court will consider granting
'Similarly, Class II, comprised of detainees housed in the lock-up facilities without a mattress or bedding, was not tolled by Lopez because the Lopez class definition did not include these claims.
''The court notes that Robinson's Class II claims are time-barred as well, but that Dunn also seeks to represent Class II and his claims arc within the actionable period.
II

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 12 of 21 PageID #:559
plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint naming a qualified class representative for Class I. B. Class Ill
Class Ill assets a claim under the Supreme Court's holdings in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. I03 ( 1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 ( 1991 ). Class lJI alleges that defendant unreasonably delayed obtaining judicial approval before detaining Robinson, Dunn, and the other class members for more than 48 hours after a warrantless arrest. Plaintiffs argue that defendant is liable under Monell based on: (I) the il1ilure to enact a policy requiring adherence to the 48-hour rule; (2) the failure to provide proper training on the 48-hour rule and to discipline violations of the rule; and (3) deliberate indifference to the widespread use of the "hold past call procedure" and to the volume of detentions lasting more than 48 hours without judicial approval.
Gerstein holds that the Fourth Amendment requires a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer "promptly" after a warrantless arrest. McLaughlin holds that detenninations of probable cause that occur within 48 hours of anest are generally "prompt" and thus comply with the dictates of Gerstein. The are exceptions, however, to the 48 hour rule. Relevant to the Class Ill claims, probable cause hearings provided beyond the 48 hour window may be found constitutional, but the defendant bears the burden ofproof"to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57.
Defendant fails to clearly distinguish its Rule 23(a) arguments and its Rule 23(b)(3) objections to Class Ill. Defendant points out that during the proposed class period from 1999 to the present, the CPO followed different policies and practices with respect to detention. In particular, efTectivc August 15, 2003, the CPO amended General Order No. 02-03, to prohibit
12

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 13 of 21 PageID #:560
detaining anyone over 48 hours lor any reason. According to defendant, after August 15, 2003, "there can be no municipal liability for the 'random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees' if a detective violates that order." Defendant also argues that plaintiffs "need to make separate proofs regarding the three time periods and they need three separate class rcprcsentati ves to represent the class members lor each period."
Plaintiffs respond that although defendant's written policies, including the amendment to General Order 02-03, have some bearing on municipal liability, the gravamen of plaintiffs' Class Ill claims focus on an well-established and widespread practice within the CPD of using unlawfully long detentions. Indeed, plaintiffs' claims rely on evidence that the illegal practice endured despite the policy changes implemented in August 2003. The practice, not the written policies, is the focus of plaintiffs' claims, and changes in the policies of the CPD over time thus do not preclude class certification. De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225,232 (7'" Cir. I'!83) ("The typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there arc !'actual distinctions between the claims orthe named plaintiffs and those ol' other class members. Thus, similarity of legal theory may control even in the face of differences of fact."). Similarly, it is not necessary for a class representative to have been detained during each of the three periods. Sec Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596-97 (7'" Cir. 1993) ("[T]he typicality requirement primarily directs the district court to focus on whether the named representatives' claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.").
Defendant also argues that the case law establishes valid exceptions to the 48 hour rule, and thus it may have other defenses to some class members' claims. Under Mclaughlin, the government may prove that a detention longer than 48 hours was not unreasonable by
13

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 14 of 21 PageID #:561
demonstrating "the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance" to justify that detention. 500 U.S. at 57. As plaintiffs point out, such an exception is inherently unusual, and thus would apply to no more than a handful of identi liable class members. 10 In other words, the common predominant issues cannot be ignored in favor of the existence of a handful of extraordinary circumstances.
In addition, the Cook County court system permits probable cause hearings to be held ex parte if the detainee is prevented from appearing in court due to "exigent circumstances," which makes it even less likely there would be a legitimate excuse for failing to provide a probable cause determination within 48 hours. Moreover, the existence of individualized defenses does not preclude class certification. See. e.g., Portis, 2003 WL 22078279 at *3 ("Individual affirmative defenses do not preclude class treatment."); Pinkett v. Moolah Loan Corp., 1999 WL I 080596, at *4 (N.D.lll 1999) ("[I]t is well established that individual counterclaims or defenses do not render a case unsuitable for class certification."). Indeed, McLaughlin was a class action.
Defendant cites Robinson v. Gillespie, 21 '! F.R.D. 179 (D.Kan. 2003), which denied class ccrti fication of McLaughlin detention claims, but Robinson is readily distinguishable. The proposed class in Robinson included any person who did not receive a "prompt" probable cause determination. The Robinson court held that the failure to specify a number of hours would require the court to "examine the specifics of[cach] case" to determine whether a person falls
111 ln a footnote, defendant cites Lopez v. City of Chicago, 2005 WL 71 1986, at *2 (N.D.lll. March 23, 2005), in which Judge Der-Yeghiayan granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the plaintiffs McLaughlin claim. Judge Der- Yeghiayan held that the plaintiffs provision of false alibis and a recanted confession constituted extraordinary circumstances that justified detaining him for five days without judicial approval. The court is neither persuaded nor bound by Judge Der- Yeghiayan's reasoning in Lopez, which is currently on appeal.
14

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within the class. l.Q_, at 183. Plaintiffs in the instant case, by contrast, provide an objective definition of Class Ill in terms of a quantifiable number of hours, and thus the concerns of the Robinson court arc inapplicable here. Contrary to dcl'cndant's characterization, the Robinson
court did not hold, or even suggest, that a properly defined McLaughlin class could not be
certi lied. Accordingly, Class Ill satisfies the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule
23(a). Unlike Class I and Class II, the class definition in Lopez included the same putative class
members as Class Ill in the instant case. Thus, Lopez tolled the statute of limitations for Class Ill. Defendant argues that it was prejudiced because the Lopez class allegations were withdrawn in May 2004, and that the class period should therefore extend no further than two years before the filing of the Lopez class action. The court is unpersuadcd, however, because defendant fails to point to any actual prejudice and docs not explain why refusing to relate the instant case back to the filing of the initial Lopez complaint on March 15,2001, would alleviate any such prejudice. Moreover, defendant did not object to the plaintiffs' motion to withdraw the class allegations in Lopez.
Defendant argues, alternatively, that Class Ill can extend "at the very most back to August 1999" because the statute of limitations was running on all claims during the five months between the voluntary dismissal of the class allegations in Lopez and the filing of the instant action. Sec Culverv. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908,914 (7'" Cir. 2002) (statute tolled while class action claims arc pending begins to run again when the class claims are dismissed). Plaintiffs argue that the statute remained tolled under the Illinois' savings statute, 735 ILCS 5/13-
15

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 16 of 21 PageID #:563
217, which tolls limitations for one year following voluntary dismissal. The Seventh Circuit has held that the savings statute cannot rescue federal claims. Beck v. Caterpillar Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 407 (7'" Cir. I995) ('The law is clear. When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a lawsuit which was brought in federal court, asserts a purely federal claim, and is subject to a federal statute of limitations, stale savings statues do not apply."). Five months passed un-to lied after the class allegations in Lopez were dismissed, and must be subtracted fi·om the Class Ill time period.
Accordingly, the actionable time period for Class III begins August 15, I')')9. II. Rule23(b)(3)
Defendant asserts that both Class I and Class 111 fail to meet the requirements of23(b)(3). Certification under this rule requires that: (I) common questions must predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and (2) class resolution must be superior to other methods for the fair and effective adjudication of the controversy. Portis, 2003 WL 22078279, at *3.
Defendant first argues that many of the putative class members' claims are barred by the the Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 ( 19')4), that a person cannot bring a ~ I983 action challenging "actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid." Under Heck, to recover damages for harms "caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a~ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ habeas corpus." 512 U.S. at 586-87. In the instant case, in order to eliminate class members whose claims may be precluded by Heck,
16

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 17 of 21 PageID #:564
plaintiffs exclude from Class I persons who made an inculpatory statement while in CPO custody and meet certain other conditions relevant to Heck considerations.
Defendant docs not contest that plaintiffs' proposed class excludes members that would implicate Heck, but argues that the factual determinations necessary to decide if a class member fits within the exclusions arc difficult and individualized. Plaintiffs respond convincingly that all of the information necessary to make this detem1ination can be easily obtained using "electronic data readily obtained from the Cook County Circuit Court and the Illinois Department of Concctions." In addition, the application of the exclusion proposed in Class I is a purely ministerial issue that can be determined prior to trial and will not predominate. See Wells v.
McDonough, 188 F.R.D. 277,279 (N.D.Ill. 1999); Avila v. Van Ru Credit Com., 1995 WL
228(,(,, at *7 (N.D.111. I 995). Heck therefore poses no bar to the certification of Class 1. 11 Repeating many of its Rule 23(a) arguments, defendant asserts that common questions do
not predominate Class 1because detainees were treated differently while held in the interrogation rooms, and analysis of the constitutionality of the conditions of con fin em en t requires individualized inquiry. Defendant cites several cases, such as Ruffv. Godinez, 1993 WL 239045, at *3 (N. 0.111. June 28, 1993 ), holding that whether certain conditions of confinement violate a constitutional standard can be determined only on an individual, case by case basis. Defendant, how<:ver, takes these holdings out of context and misconstrues plaintitTs' claims in the instant case. First, Ruff was not a class action. Second, the general principle that there is no
11 Defendant asks in a footnote why the Class I exclusion does not apply to Class 111, but docs not expressly object to the certification of Class 111 based on Heck. The court notes that the Class 111 claims do not implicate Heck conccms because the presumption that a delay in excess of 48 hours is unlawful is rebuttable. Sec McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57. Finding 48 hour rule violations by defendant, therefore, would not implicate class members' convictions.
17

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 46 Filed: 10/05/05 Page 18 of 21 PageID #:565
static definition of an unlawful condition of confinement, sec Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 34h-47 (I 981 ), docs not prevent class treatment of allegations that certain conditions common to all interrogation rooms arc unlawful. Courts routinely address conditions of confinement claims in class actions. See, e.g. Rhodes; Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d I310 (7'" Cir. I988); Rahim v. Sheahan, 2001 WL 1263493 (N.D.III. Oct. 19, 2001); Lewis v. Washington, 197 F.R.O. (,]I (N.D.IIJ. 2000).
Defendant cites Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 820-821 (6'" Cir. 2003), and McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which affirmed the denial of class ccrti fication. Both cases, however, are distinguishable. For example, in Alkire, the district court f(lllnd that individual issues predominated in an unlawful detention and debt collection case because there were "varying reasons for the arrests, varying lengths of stay in jai I, varying financial situations, [and] varying reasons for contempt adjudications" among proposed class members. The factual variations in the instant case arc much Jess significant to the legal questions at hand, and do not outweigh the common facts, as discussed above.
As plaintiffs correctly observe, while the legality of each condition of confinement must be determined on a case by case basis, each class plaintifrs experience docs not require individual analysis. That is, if it is unlawful to hold detainees for prolonged periods in interrogation rooms without a toilet, bed, or regular meal service, it is unlawfi.II as to each class member regardless of factual variations in their actual experiences while in custody. That some detainees may have been more or less deprived, or "tortured" in plaintiffs' conception, docs not impede the court's ability to adjudicate whether the shared deprivations suffered by all members of Class I violated the Constitution. See Gary v. Sheehan, 1999 WL 281347, at *2 (N.D.III. Mar.
18

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31, 19')')) ("[l]t is common for Rule 23(h)(3) class actions to involve different levels of injury and damages for different class members; however, that does not mean that certifying a class under Rule 23(h)(3) is incorrect."). Similarly, whether defendant is liable for failing to have a policy against detentions in excess of 48 hours prior to August 15,2003, and for failing to implement that policy properly clearly does not require individual analysis. Any possible defenses to violations of the 48 hour rule based on "extraordinary" circumstances, as discussed above, do not predominate.
Plaintiffs concede that the assessment of damages "is the only issue which presents any serious questions of individualized proof," hut this docs not preclude class treatment. See Williams v. Rizza Chevrolet-Gco. Inc., 2000 WL 26373 I, at *3 (N.D.lll. Mar. 6, 2000) ("[T]hc possibility of individualized damage inquires docs not defeat class certification even if individual hearings ultimately may be required." Indeed, if necessary, a court can divide class plaintiffs into sub-classes for damage purposes. In Portis, for example, this court certified a class and noted that damage sub-classes could he created if the plaintiffs succeed in establishing the class's right to damages. 2002 WL 22078279, at *4; see also Rahim, 2001 WL 1263493, at* 14 (Schenkicr, M..!. ) (recommending certification of class and noting individual damages issues "can be addressed through the creation of subclasses"). A similar procedure could be followed in the instant case if necessary.
The second requirement under Rule 23(h)(3) is that class resolution must be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Because common issues predominate and the named plaintiffs arc typical and adequate class representatives, as discussed above, the instant case meets this requirement. Requiring each class
19

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member to bring a separate action would be a waste of time and money. Sec Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 224 (N.D. II!. 1997). In addition, it is likely that many individual members would forfeit their claims if they could not pursue them as a class because of the expense and complexity of litigating a Monell claim against a municipality. See Portis, 2003 WL 22078279, at *2.
Accordingly, Class I and Class Ill satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(h)(3).
20

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CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court grants plaintiffs' motion for class certification with respect to Class III and ccrti fies a class defined as: All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPO in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing at any time from August 15, I999, to the date of this order. The court certifies Class II by agreement, defined as: All persons held in a CPO lock-up or detective division facility between the hours of I 0 p.m. and 6 a.m. at any time from October 12, 2002, to the date of this order. The court denies plaintiffs' motion as to Class I. This matter is set for a status hearing on October 18, 2005, at 9:30a.m. at which time: (a) plaintiffs' counsel shall infonn the cou1i whether they wish to file an amended complaint naming a qualified representative for Class I; and (b) the parties shall discuss notifying the members of Classes II and Ill of the pendency of this action.

ENTER: October 5, 2005

c-~~) (!Ji!JL~.(/~
Robe~t W. Gettleman
United States District .Judge

21

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 343 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:3810

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON, )

and VERONICA IMPERIAL, on behalf of )

themselves and a class of others similarly )

situated, and LEONARD KIMBALL,

)

individually,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

)
CITY OF CHICAGO, )

Case No. 04-CV-6804 Judge Gettlcman Magistrate Judge Schenkicr

)
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND DIRECTING NOTICE TO SETTLEMENT CLASSES Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, and Denny Robinson (collectively, the "Named Plaintiffs"), individually and as representatives of the Settlement Classes defined in Paragraph I below (collectively, "PiaintHfs"), and Defendant City of Chicago ("Defendant") (collectively, the "Parties") have entered into a Class Action Release and Settlement Agreement dated May 14, 2010, including the documents and exhibits incorporated therein (the "Settlement Agreement"), to settle the above-captioned lawsuit ("Action"). The Named Plaintitls have filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement (the "Motion for Preliminary Approval"). TI1e Settlement Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions for a proposed settlement and dismissal with prejudice of the Action. All terms and phrases used in this Order shall have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement.

Having reviewed the Settlement Agreement, the Motion for Preliminary Approval, and the pleadings and other papers on file in this action, and having also considered tl1e statements of

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 343 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:3811
counsel, the Court finds that the Motion for Preliminary Approval should be granted and that this Order should be entered. The Court hereby gives its preliminary approval to the settlement, orders that notice be sent to the Settlement Classes, and schedules a Final Approval Hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
This preliminary approval is subject to approval of the settlement by the City Council of the City of Chicago. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved by the City Council of the City of Chicago by the time of the Mailed Notice Date (June! I, 2010), the settlement, the Settlement Agreement, and this preliminary approval shall have no force or effect, and the Parties will be returned to the status quo ante with respect to this Action as if the Settlement Agreement had never been entered into, as further set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: I. In this Action, the Court previously certified three litigation classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court now finds that Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing for purposes of preliminary approval that the requirements tor certifying the Settlement Classes under Rule 23(b)(3) have been satisfied. The Court finds that the settlement and Settlement Agreement arc sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to allow dissemination of notice of the proposed settlement to the members of the Settlement Classes, and to hold a Final Approval hearing. The preliminary certification of the Settlement Classes, appointment of the class representatives and Class Counsel, and all other actions associated with preliminary approval are undertaken on the condition that the certillcation and other actions shall be automatically vacated if the Settlement Agreement is not approved by the City Council of the City of Chicago by June!!, 2010; if the Settleinent Agreement is terminated or disapproved in whole or in part by the Court, any appellate court, and/or any other court of review; or if any of the Parties invokes the right to revoke the settlement according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
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i '
2. For purposes of the Settlement Agreement and for settlement only, the Court

preliminarily certifies the following Settlement Classes pursuant Rule 23(b)(3):

(a)

Settlement Class 1:

All persons held in a Chicago Police Department ("CPO") interrogation or "interview" room for more than 16 hours in a 24-hour period at any time from October 21, 2002 to the date of preliminary approval.

(b)

Settlement Class II:

All persons detained in a CPO lock-up or detective facility from I0:00 p.m. (or earlier) on a given day and not released until6:00 a.m. (or later) of the toll owing day, at any time from October 21, 2002 to the date of preliminary approval.

(c)

Settlement Class Ill:

All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPO and were not released and did not receive a judicial probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest, at any time from March 15, 1999 to February 10,2008.

(d)

Excluded from these Settlement Classes are the following persons:

(i) Members of the Northern District of lllinois federal judiciary and their immediate families; and

(ii) All persons who have timely elected to opt out of or exclude themselves from the Settlement Classes in accordance with the Court's Orders. 3. The Court finds, for purposes of preliminary approval, that (a) members of each proposed Settlement Class are so numerous as to make joinder of all members impracticable; (b) there arc questions oflaw or fact common to each ofthe proposed Settlement Classes; (c) the claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of tl1c claims of the proposed Settlement Classes they seek to represent; (d) the Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel will titirly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the proposed Settlement Classes they seek to represent; (c) questions of law or fact common to the members of each of the proposed Settlement Classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and (t) a class action is

Page 3

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superior to other available methods tor the fair and efficient adjudication of the Action.

4. The Court appoints the following Named Plaintiffs as class representatives of the

following Settlement Classes:

•

Named Plaintiff Veronica Imperial 1s the class representative for

Settlement Class I.

•

Named Plaintiff Thomas Dunn is the class representative for Settlement

Class II.

•

Named Plaintitls Thomas Dunn and Denny Robinson are the class

representative for Settlement Class III.

5. The Court appoints the following to act as Class Counsel for the Settlement Classes:

Michael Kanovitz, Esq. and the law firm of Locvy & Locvy, 312 North May Street, Suite 100,

Chicago, 111inois 60607.

6. The Court appoints Rust Consulting, Inc. as Claims Administrator, which shall

administer the Notice Plan and the settlement, in accordance with the terms and conditions of

this Order and the Settlement Agreement.

7. The Court further finds that neither the certification of these Settlement Classes, nor

the settlement of this Action, shall be deemed to be a concession by Defendant to the propriety of

the certification of any of the litigation classes previously certified by this Court in this Action,

or to the propriety of certification of any litigation class, and Defendant retains all rights to assert

that class certification tor purposes other than scttlcmcnt is not appropriate. Furthermore, the

Settlement Agreement shall not be deemed to be an admission ofliability, or of unconstitutional

or illegal conduct by or on the part of Defendant and/or the City of Chicago's future, current, or

former officers, agents, and employees, and shall not serve as evidence of any wrongdoing by or

on the part of Defendant and/or the City of Chicago's future, current, or former officers, agents, and employees.

8. The Court approves the mailed notice (the "Mailed Notice") without material

Page4

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 343 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 5 of 10 PageID #:3814
alteration from Exhibit 8 of the Settlement Agre~ment. The Court directs the Parties to deliv~ to the Claims Administrator a list of what the Parties beli~ve in good faith to be a complete listing of the names and last-known addresses of all persons entitled to receive the Mailed Notice, as this information is reasonably available to Defendant based on Chicago Police Department records, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. The Court further directs the Claims Administrator to mail to all such persons the Mailed Notice, by first class U.S. mail, on or before June!!, 2010, unless extended by Order of this Court. The Court further directs the
Settlement Administrator to promptly remail any notices returned by the Postal Service with
f(Jrwarding addresses that are received. The Court further directs the Settlement Administrator to follow the procedures set out in the Settlement Agreement.
9. The Court approves the published notice ("Published Notice") that is without material alteration from Exhibit C ofthe Settlement Agreement.
I0. The Court approves th~ notice plan ("Notice Plan") that is without material alteration from Exhibit 0 of the Settlement Agreement.
11. The Court directs the Claims Administrator to maintain a toll-free VRU telephone system containing recorded answers to frequently asked questions, along with an option permitting potential Settlement Class members to speak to live operators or to leave messages in a voicemail box. The Court further directs the Claims Administrator to maintain an Internet website, as described in the Settlement Agreement, which shall include, at a minimum, copies of the Settlement Agreement (including exhibits), the Mailed Notice, the Claim Form, and this Order; which may be amended as appropriate during the course of the settlement as agreed to by th~ Parties; and which shall be maintained f(Jf at least 180 days after the expiration of the period for the submission of Claim Forms, us set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
12. The Court linds that the Notice Plan, including th~ Mailed Notice and Published Notice, as set forth herein and in the Settlement Agreement meets all requirements of due
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process and federal law. The Court further finds that this notice (i) is the best practicable notice; (ii) is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise potential members of the Settlement Classes of the pendency of the Action and of the proposed settlement, and of their right to object or to exclude themselves from the proposed settlement; (iii) is reasonable and constitutes due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice; and (iv) meets all applicable requirements of due process and federal law.
13. The Court approves the claim form ("Claim Fonn") that is without material alteration from Exhibit E of the Settlement Agreement. The Court directs that the Claim Fom1 be distributed with tl1e Mailed Notice. To be considered tbr possible payment, Claim Forms must be postmarked by no later than October 25, 20 I0. Any Claim Form postmarked after this date shall be untimely and invalid. Claim Forms must be signed and notarized by the Settlement Class Member, except that Claim Forms may be submitted on behalf of a Settlement Class Member by (1) the executor or administrator of a deceased Settlement Class Member's estate, (2) the legal guardian of a Settlement Class Member who has been declared incompetent, or (3) a person with a valid Power of Attorney from the Settlement Class Member.
14. Spanish-language versions of the Mailed Notice and Claim Form shall be made available upon request of a Claimant, and shall also be posted on the settlement website.
15. Any member of the Settlement Classes who wishes to be excluded from the Settlement Classes must comply with the tenns set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Mailed Notice and mail to the Claims Administrator an appropriate and timely request for exclusion postmarked no later than September 9, 2010. Any Settlement Class member who timely requests exclusion from the Settlement Classes in accordance with the Mailed Notice shall not be bound by any orders or judgments entered in this Action and shall not be entitled to receive any benefits provided hy the settlement in the event it is finally approved by the Court. Requests for exclusion must be exercised individually by a Settlement Class member, not as or
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on behalf of a group, class, or subclass, except that such requests may be submitted on behalf of an individual Settlement Class Member by the executor or administrator of a deceased Settlement Class Member's estate, or the legal guardian of a Settlement Class Member who has been declared incompetent.
16. The Court orders the Claims Administrator, at or before the Final Approval Hearing, to file proof of mailing of the Mailed Notice, as well as a list of all persons who timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Classes (along with an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of that list (the "Opt-Out List")).
17. Any member of the Settlement Class who does not timely request exclusion as set forth in the Mailed Notice shall be bound by all proceedings, orders, and judgments in the Action, even if such member of the Settlement Class has previously initiated or subsequently initiates individual litigation or other proceedings encompassed by the Released Claims, as defined in the Settlement Agreement, and even if he or she never received actual notice of the Action or the settlement, as described in further detail in the Settlement Agreen1ent.
18. Unless and until they have timely excluded themselves from the Settlement Classes as set t()rth in the Notice, members of the Settlement Classes are also preliminarily enjoined (i) from filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in, or pa1ticipating as plaintiff, claimant, or class member in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding in any jurisdiction based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circwnstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or the Released Claims; (ii) from filing, commencing, or prosecuting a lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding as a class action on behalf of any members of the Settlement Class who have not timely excluded themselves (including by seeking to amend a pending complaint to include class allegations or seeking class certification in a pending action), based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circwnstanccs relating thereto, in the Action
Pagc7

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 343 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 8 of 10 PageID #:3817
and/or the Released Claims; and (iii) from attempting to effect an opt-out of a class of individuals in any lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or the Released Claims.
19. Any member of the Settlement Class who does not timely request exclusion as set forth in the Mailed Notice, and who wishes to object to the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy ofthe proposed settlement, or to the Attorneys' Fee Award and Incentive Awards, or to any other aspect of the settlement, must submit an objection no later than August 10, 2010, that complies with the requirements for objections as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Mailed Notice. The objection must be mailed to the Claims Administrator (postmarked on or before August I0, 20 10) and filed with the Court on or before that same date. In filing objections in this Court, objectors must comply with all applicable federal rules and laws. Failure to adhere to these requirements will bar the objection.
20. Any member of the Settlement Class who timely serves a written objection may appear at the Final Approval Hearing, either in person or through an attorney, if a Notice of Intention to Appear is timely filed with the Court, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Mailed Notice. Settlement Class members who do not adhere to these requirements will not be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.
21. The right to object to the proposed settlement must be exercised individually by a Settlement Class member or his or her attorney, not as a member of a group, class, or subclass, and, except in the case of a deceased or incapacitated Settlement Class member, not by the act of another person acting or purporting to act in any other representative capacity. The objection must contain (1) a heading that refers to the Action by case name (Dunn v. City of Chicago) and case number (No. 04-CV-6804); (2) a statement whether the objector intends to appear at the Final Approval hearing, either in person or through counsel and, if through counsel, a statement
Page 8

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 343 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 9 of 10 PageID #:3818
identifying that counsel by name, bar number, address, and telephone number; (3) a statement of the specitic legal and factual basis for each obje~,iion; and (4) a description of any and all evidence the objector may offer at the Final Approval Hearing, including photocopies of any and all exhibits the objector may introduce at the Final Approval Hearing.
22. The Claims Administrator shall maintain a post office box to be used tor receiving requests for exclusion, objections, notices of intention to appear, and any other communications. Only the Claims Administrator, Class Counsel, the Defendant, the Court, the Clerk of the Court, and their designated agents shall have access to this post ofiice box, except as otherwise provided in the Settlement Agreement. Disclosure of any privileged communications to the Class Administrator, the Court, Defendant, or counsel for Defendant shall not constitute a waiver of the privilege.
23. The Claims Administrator shall promptly furnish Class Counsel, counsel for Defendant, and any counsel of record for members of the Settlement Classes with copies of any and all written objections, requests for exclusion, notices of intention to appear, or other communications that come into its possession, except as otherwise provided in the Settlement Agreement.
24. Any petition for award of attorneys' fees, or reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses, or the Named Plaintiffs' Incentive Awards, shall be filed prior to the Final Approval Hearing.
25. A Final Approval hearing shall be held on October 6, 2010, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2525, Federal Dirksen Building, 219 South Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois 60604, before the w1dersigned for the purpose of determining (a) whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be Hnally approved by the Court; (b) whether to issue a final judgment without material alteration from Exhibit F of the Settlement Agreement; and
(c) whether to approve the Attorneys' Fee Award and the Incentive Awards, as set forth in the
Page 9

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 343 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 10 of 10 PageID #:3819

Settlement Agreement.

26. The Court reserves the right to adjourn or continue the Final Approval Hearing, or

any further adjournment or continuance thereof, without further notice other than announcement

at the Final Approval Hearing or at any adjournment or continuance thereof: and to approve the

settlement with modifications, if any, consented to by Class Counsel and Defendant without

further notice.

27. All pretrial proceedings in the Action arc stayed and suspended until further order of

this Court.
Dated: _:\~ / ~I d._ 0 ( J

/~~
Judge Robert W. Gettleman

Page 10

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:4266

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN lliSTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON,

)

and VERONICA IMPERIAL, on behalf of )

themselves and a class of others similarly

)

situated, and LEONARD KIMBALL,

)

individually,

)

)

)

Plnintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

) CITY OF CHICAGO,
)

Case No. 04-CV-6804 Judge Gettleman Mngistrate Judge Schenkier

)
Defendnnt.
)

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND l<'INAL JUDGMENT On May 14, 2010, the Court entered its Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Se(l]ement and Directing Notice to Settlement Classes. After notice was sent to the Sett.lement Classes, 1 this Court held a Final Approval Heuring on October 6, 201 0, !'or the purpose ol' determining (I) whether the proposed settlement, on the terms set forth in the Parties'
Settkmenl Agreement, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be linl•lly approved by this
Court; (2) whdher, pursuant to the terms of the proposed settlement, a judgment should be entered dismissing Defendant City of Chicago (md releasing Dekndant and the other Releases from all Released Claims; and (3) whdher to award attorneys' fees and expenses to Class Counsel and Incentive Awards to the Named PlainliiTs.
The Court, having reviewed the Settlement Agreement and all papers submitted in ~onn~ction with the proposed settlement and having consicltJred e~ll arguments ol' crnm~el e~nd

1 All t~rms ;md pbras~s used in this Order shall have the same meaning as in Parties' Class Action Release and Settlement Agreement dated May 14, 2010, including the exhibits (the "Sdtlement Agreement"), which is incorporated into this Order.

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:4267
objectors; finds that the Parties have evidenced full compliance with the Preliminary Approval Order, and that there are substantial and sufficient grounds for entering this Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement and Final Judgment (''Final Order and Judgment"). Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(h) and 54(d), the Court will determin<" the amount of th<" Attorneys' Fcc Award and will enter u separate Final Order and Judgment Regarding Attorneys' Fcc Award. Class Counsel shall file by October 29, 2010, supplemental materials in support of their Petition for Award of Attorneys' Fees. The Court schedules a hearing regarding the Attorneys' Fee Award lor November 3, 2010, at 10:30 a.m.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows: I. The Court has .lederal subject mutter jurisdiction of this Action and jurisdiction to approve the settlement.
2. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Named Plainlills lmd all members or the Settlement Classes.
3. Pursuant to federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court finds that (a) members of each Settlement Class are ~o numerous as to make joinder of all members impracticable; (b) there arc questions oriaw or fact common to each of the Settlement Classes; (c) the claims of the Named Plaintitl's are typical of the claims of the Settlement Classes they represent; (d) the Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel fairly and adequately protected and will continue to protect the interests of the members ol' the Settlement Classes; (e) questions of law or fact common to the members of each of the Settlement Classes predominate over any questions allecting only individual members; and (f) <l class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and ellicient adjudication of the Action.

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:4268

4.

The Court th~retore finds that the requirem~nts fbr certifying a settlement class

have been met and are appropriate under the circumstances of this case pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The Court certifies for settlement purposes only the li>llowing

Settlement Classes, with the Named Plaintiffs representing each Settlement Class as follows:

(a) Settlement Class I (Class Repr~s~ntative: Victoria Imperial)
All persons held in a Chicago Police Department ("'CPO") interrogation or "interview" room for more than 16 hollfs in a 24-hour period at any time from Odober 21, 2002 to the date of preliminary approval.
(b) Settlement Class II (Class Representative: Thomas Dunn)
All persons detained in a CPO Jock-up or detective facility from I0:00p.m. (or earlier) on a given day and not released until6:00 a.m. (or later) of the f<>llowing day, at any time from October 21,2002 to the date ofpreliminary approval.
(c) Settlement Class III (Class Rcprcsenl<ltives: Thomas Dunn and Denny Robinson):
All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony with(l\ll an mrest warrant and who were dotain~d by the CPD and were not released and did not receive a iudicbl probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest, at any time from March 15, 1999 to February 10, 2008.
(d) Excluded from these Settlement Classes arc the following p~rsons:
(i) Members of the Northern District of Illinois federal judiciary and their immediate families; and

(ii) All persons who have timely elected to opt out ol' or exclude themselves from the Settlement Classes in accordance with the Court's Orders.
5. The Court gives final approval to the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate
to the Named Plaintiff~ and to each member of the Settlement Classes, and in their best interests,
und in full compli,mce with all requirements of due process and federal law.

6. Neither the certification of these Settlement Classes, nor the settlement of this
or Action, shall be deemed to be a concession by Defendant to the propriety of the certification or any the litigation classes previously certified by this Court during this Action, or to the
3

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:4269
propridy of certitlcation of any litigation class, and Defendant retains all rights to assert that class certification for purposes other than settlement is not appropriate. Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement shall not be deemed to be an admission or liability, or or unconsti!ution<tl or illegal conduct by or on the part of Dekndant and/or the City of Chicago's future, current, or ltmner ol'licers, agents, and employees, and shall not serve as evidence of any wrongdoing by or on the pmt of Defendant and/or the City of Chicago's future, current, or former ol'lkers, agents, and employees. However, reference may be made to the settlement and the Settlement Agreement as may be necessary to etTectuate the provisions of the Settlement Agreement.
7. The Court finds that the Mailed Notice, Published Notice, and Notice Plan implemented pursuant to this Agreement (i) constitulec.l the best practicable notice; (ii) constituted notice that is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise members of the Settlement Classes of the pendency of the Action, their right to object or exclude themselves from the proposed settlement and to appe<tr at the Final Approval Hearing, anc.J their right to sock monetary relief; (iii) were reasonable and constituted due, adequate, and suftlcient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice: and (iv) met (Ill <lpplicablc requirements of due process and federal Iav.·.
8. The Court linc.Js that Class Counsel and the Named Plaintiffs adequately represented the Settlement Classes for the purpose of' entering into and implementing the Settlement Agreement The Court further finds that Rust Consulting, Inc., the Court-appointed Claims Administrator, has met all requirements of the Court as set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order and Settlemtlnl Agreement.
9. The Court has considered all objections, including those that may not technically qualify as objections and those that were 11led (d\er th<" objection c.Jeac.Jline. After consic.Jering the objections, and all hriellng an c.! oral argument ofJered in support of or in opposition to same, and
4

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:4270
fbr the n;u~ons stated in open court at the Final Approval H<!aring, the Court finds that the objections arc without m<!rit. Accordingly, all objections are hereby overn.ded.
10. The Court further holds that the Efl'ective Date of this settlement with respect to all terms other than the Attorneys' Fee Award is the date upon which this Final Order and Judgment becomes Final;' provided, however, that lher<' shall be no disbursement of claims payments to eligible claimants before the Effective Date of the Attorneys' Fcc Award. The Effective Date of the Attorneys' Fee Award shall be the date upon which the Final Order and Judgment Reg<trding Attorneys' Fee Award becomes Final.
ll_ The Court hereby dismisses the Action (including all individual and class claims against Defendant) with prejudice and without fees or costs except as expressly provided in this Final Order ~nd Judgment and the Final Order and Judgment Reg~ding Attorneys' Fee Award; except that, by consent of th<! Pmties, the Court shall retain jurisdiction solely for the purpo~~ of enforcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement and entering the Final Order and Judgment Regarding Attorneys' Fee Award through October 3, 2011. Except as set lorth ~xpressly in this P~agraph, the case is dismissed with prejudice upon entry of this Final Order and Judgment.
12. Th~ Court finds that the Named Plaintiffs and each memher of the Settlement Class~s have conclusively compromised, settled, disch~rged, dismissed, and released all Released Claims against Defendant and the other Releasees, as follows:
Named Plaintiffs' Release: As consideration fbr this Agreement, and upon the Effective Date, the Nan1ed Plaintiffs, including each and every one of their
' "Final" as used in this paragraph moans that (a) the judgment is a tlnal, appealable j udgm~nt; m1d (b) either (I) no appeal has been taken from the judgment as of the date on which all times to appeal have expired, or (ii) an app~al or other review proceeding of the judgment having been commenced, SllCh appeal or other review is finally concluded and no longer is subject to review by any court, whether by <tppe~l. petitions for rehearing or reargument, petitions for rehearing en bane, petitions for writ of' certiorari, or otherwise, and such appeal or other review has been 11nally resolved in such manner that ~ffirms the judgment in all material respects.
5

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:4271
respective agents, representatives, altomeys, heirs, a~signs, or any other p<'rson acting on their behalf or for their benefit, hereby generally release and discharge Releasees from any and all claims, demands, rights, causes oC action, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, costs, debts, or liabilities which they now have, or had at any time prior to and through the date of this release.
Settlement Class Release: As consideration for this Agreement, and upon the Effective Date, all members of the SeUiemenl Classes who have not properly and timely excluded themst'IV<'S fi·om the Settlement Classes, including each and every one of' their respective agents, representatives, attorneys, heirs, assigns, or any other person acting on their behalf or for their bene1it, hereby release and discharge Releasees fi'om any and all claims, demands, rights, causes of action, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, costs, debts, or liabilities whid1 all members of the Settlement Classes in the Action now have, or had at any time prior to and through the date of this release arising out of or in any way related to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.
13. Accordingly, upon the Effective Date, the Named Plaintiffs and all members of the Settlement Classes who h<we not been excluded from the Settlement Class, whether or not they return a Claim Form within the Lime and in the manner provided for, arc barred from asserting any Released Claims against Defendant and the other Releasees, and any such members of the Settlement Classes are deemed to have released any and all Released Claims as against Defendant and the other Releasees. The settlement and this Final Order and Judgment arc binding on, and shall have res judicata and prt'clu~ive effect in, any pending and future
6

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:4272

lawsuits or other proceedings t"ncompa~~ed by the Released Claims maintained by or on behalf of the Named Plaintil'fs and all other members of the Settlement Classes.

14. follows:

The Court approves the payment or the Nl•med Plaintii'i's' Incentive Awards <t~

Named Plaintiff Thomas Dunn: $25,000

Named Plaintiff Denny Robinson: $ 25,000

Nmned Plaintiff Veronica Imperial: $ 25,000

The Incentive Awards shall be distributed in accordance with the tem1s of the Settlement Agreement.

15.

Additional distributions 1\·om tht" Sdtlemt"nt Fund, including the return to

Defendant of any remaining fund~ all<"r th<" conclusion of the settlement administration, shall be

made in accordanc<" with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

16. The Court hereby bars md enjoins all members of the Settlement Classes who have not been excluded from the Settlement Classt"s li'om (i) tiling, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in, or participating (as class members or otherwise) in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or oth~r proceeding in any jurisdiction based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstmces relating thereto, in this Action and/or the Released Claims and (ii) organizing members of the Settlement Classes who have not been ~xcluded from the Settlement Classes into a separate class for purposes of pursuing as a purported class action any lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or otht"r proceeding (including by seeking to amend a pending complaint to indude dass allegations, or seeking class ccrtit1cation in a pending action) based on, relating to, or

7

••

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:4273

arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or the Released Claims.
17. The Court approws the Opt-Out List (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) and determines that !he Opt-Out list is a complete list of all potential Settlement Class members who have properly and timely requested exclusion li-om the Settkment Chtsses and, accordingly, shall neither share in nor be bound by this Final Order and Judgment. Exhibit 1 will be updated alter October 25, 2010, to incorporate any additional opt-outs from the mailing of Notice. Persons who are also members of the certified class in Voduk v. Cily ofChh:ago, No. 03 cv 2463, and did not opt out of that Vodak class, have until October 25, 2010, to opt out from the Settlement. ln m:~:ordance with Paragraph 15 of the Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Directing Notice to Settlement Classes, any such opt outs must be submilted individually by a Vodak class member, and not as or on behalf of a group, class, or subclass, except that a request for e!<clu~ion may be submitted on behalf of an individual Vodak class member by th~ ~"eccllor or administrator of a deceased Vodak class member's estate, or the kg<li guardian of a Vodak class member who has been declared incompetent. If a Vvdak class member who has submitted, or will submit, a Claim Form also submits a timely reque~t for exclusion pursuant to this Paragraph, the claim shall be deemed to be withdrawn, the Vodak class member shall not be eligible for payment under the settlement, and the Claims Administrator shall send u letter to that Vvdak class member so inf(Jrnling him or her of the effect of the exclusion request.
18. In the event this settlement does not become eflective in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, then the Settlement Agreement, this Final Order and Judgment, the Final Order and Judgment Regarding Attorneys' Fee Award, and all order~ entered into regarding this settlement shall be null and void <md V<IC<lled, in accordmwe with the

8

• •

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:4274

Settlement Agreement Further, in such case, the Settlement Fund, less notice and settlement administration expenses that have been properly dishurst'd, or prup<'rly incurred but not yet disbursed, shall be returned to Defend<lllt pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
19. The Court hereby authorizes the Parties, without ±ttrther approval from the Court, to <1gree to <1nd adopt such amendments, modification, and expansions of the Settlement Agreement as (a) arc consistent in all material respects with this Final Order and Judgment and (b) do not limit the rights of the Settkment Class members under the terms of the Settlement Agreement

Dated: Octobt'r 6, 20 I 0

~ ·--~"""'-.ti.,0.~~.__
The Honorable Robert W. Gcttlcman

9

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 10 of 12 PageID #:4275
EXHIBIT 1
r;:'·'

. - Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 11 of 12 PageID #:4276

Exclusion Report
PROJECT: Chicago Arrest " Database: char
Report Criteria: None

10/05/2010 09:38AM Page 1 of 2
Report ID :EXCl500:3

EXCC ID FUL.c NAME

1

JAMES MIKHEL

2

RALPH CASTILLO

J

ANDREW PEARSON

4

TIFFANY FRAZIER

5

ERICKA JOHNSON

6

ADAM N HELANDER

7

~OBERT FI<iHEL

8

DANY LANZA

9

MARSHALL INGRAM

10

ERIC RANKS

ll

AaGAIL CIHAK

12

RUTH BULINSK!

13

RASHAD SWANIGAN

14

GEORGE HORTON lR

15

SCOTT G!LBERT

16

PEWAYNE HOWARD

17

RICHARD BAKER

18

LADINA TIMMONS

19

GEORGE GALLAGHER

20

RODNEY PATTON

21

ALAN WHITE

22

ANNeTTe SPIGHT

:l~

DONALD WELLS

24

CHARLEo DONELSON

25

TOMMY THOMAS

2~

KENDAL!; J. BRINoON

27

ROBERT PAYNE

28

B!SHARA THOMAS

..,.·'

29

OSCAR r.LORES

30

RICHARD DIMATTEO

31

AN'rHONY LEWIS

32

JOHNNY BROWN

33

LAVEl HUNTER

34

FRo PRICK STAPLETON

35

TANEYSHA BASS

16

GRZEGORZ zAWADOWICZ

'7

KeiTH HARDIMAN

38

KElTH BRYANT

39

DEON SAILS

40

1\ENPR!CK JACKSON

4I

RYAN VALENCIA

42

cORRAINE WATSON

43

SHERRY CREMONA VAN PER "LST

PRIV!I...I=GED INFORMATION/CONFIDENTTAI-fl'Y NOl'IC6- Th~ lnform!!tlon conh'llnecl on thl:s roport 1~ confltH:ntl~llnformatlon thllt Is. lntende~ to re~nljln
confldttlltl;;~l, Jt Is lri~ended for ttlc 1.1'e of Ru~t Consulting, Int.

... .•._ "'

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 356 Filed: 10/06/10 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:4277

Exclusion Report
PROJECT: Chic" go Arrest " Database: char
RP.port Criteria: None

EXCLID FULL NAME

44

I<EVIN CRONlN

45

JAMES GORDON

46

ct~A~LE$ J(AM

47

RUnt ANN COOK

48

I'MILY LONIGRO

·~

JODI GRON60RG

50

MISTY DEMARS

51

KAREN CRArG

s:z

I<ATERI CHAPMAN· KRAMER

53

CAROLYN CAPORUSSO

54

BRUCE BEAL

55

JENNIFER WESTFAl.l

56

COReY ALLBRITT~N

57

MATTHEW ADAMS

58

DERRICK ROBERSON

~9

GREGORY PANKO

60

MARKUS CRAWFORD

61

ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ

62

MARCUS MCNEAL

63

JENNIFER BRISTER

64

COREY KELSEY

68

MATTHEW HUTCHINS

oo

FAHHM FOOTE·EL

67

WILLIAM TERRELl

68

MWENDO MURITHI

69

JOSEPH MARTINeZ

70

STEVEN BECK

7l

cARRY BANKS

,,. ,..,

n

JEFFREY SHAW

73

lAMES PINI<lN

74

TAMARA WOODS

75

BRTAN MCCLENDON

76

LINNEL BLOUNT

77

JEFFREY CAMPBELL

78

~11RISTOPHER NEAL

?n

JASON MULERO

80

JAMES WORTIICM

61

JUAN MENESES

82

CARLOS MUNIZ

83

DEBORAH GL!\:KMAN

TOTAL NUMBER Of EXCLUSIONS: B>

10/05/2010 09:38AM
Poge 2 of 2
Report lD :EXC15003

PRIVILE:GI:O !NF"ORMA1ICN/CONFIDI=:NTii\LliY NOTICE~ Tho 1nform11tlon cont~lned on thl~ report Is confldanti;:~J iritormatlon tMt I:;; lntenOed to r<:~rnllhl confidential. It Is Jntanded for tha usa gf Rus~ Consulting, Inc.

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 436 Filed: 04/19/13 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:4665

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON, and LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant.

)

)

)

)

04 C 6804

)

)

JUDGE GETTLEMAN

)

)

)

)

)

)

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORDER This cause having come before the Court for a status hearing on April 18, 2013, and after having been advised by the parties, it is hereby ordered that the Settlem ent Fund has been fully exhausted through payments to Class Members and any remainder returned to the City pursuant to Paragraph 34 of the Settlement Agreement.
Dated: April 19, 2103
The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman

1

 
 Dunn v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

2005 WL 3299391 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Thomas DUNN, Denny Robinson, and Leonard Kimble, on behalf of themselves and a class of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant.
No. 04 C 6804. | Nov. 30, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Arthur R. Loevy, Jonathan I. Loevy, Michael I. Kanovitz, Russell R. Ainsworth, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Catherine M. Kelly, J. Ernest Mincy, III, Mara Stacy Georges, Sara L. Ellis, Stephen Paul Baker, City of Chicago, Department of Law, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GETTLEMAN, J.
*1 On October 5, 2005, this court issued a memorandum opinion and order (“the Order,” reported at 231 F.R.D. 367 (2005)) granting plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class (Class III asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint)1 defined as “all persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPD [Chicago Police Department] in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing at any time from August 15, 1999, to the date of this order.” In the Order, the court declined to apply the Illinois “savings statute,” 735 ILCS 5/13-217, because it erroneously held that the savings statute did not apply to federal claims subject to a federal statute of limitation. Plaintiff thereafter moved to reconsider, citing Beck v. Caterpillar, Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir.1995), for the proposition that federal courts borrow both the state’s tolling and savings provisions to measure limitations periods for § 1983 actions. The court agrees and grants that motion.
In addition, plaintiffs moved the court to amend the Order to extend Class III back to March 15, 1999, the beginning of the putative class period in Lopez, rather than August 15, 1999. In the Order, this court held that the two year Illinois statute of limitation remained tolled during the

pendency of Lopez v. City of Chicago, No. 01 C 1823, in which the plaintiff had asserted a similar class but had voluntarily withdrawn the class allegations on May 20, 2004. Because the court erroneously declined to apply the Illinois savings statute, the court subtracted the five months that passed un-tolled between the time the class allegations in Lopez were dismissed and the filing of instant case on October 21, 2004. The issue presented by plaintiffs’ further motion to reconsider, therefore, depends on whether the state savings statute, which allows a plaintiff whose case was dismissed voluntarily or for certain other reasons unrelated to the merits, a year to refile his or her claims, applies to the withdrawal of class allegations.
In Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 103 S.Ct. 2611, 77 L.Ed.2d 74 (1983), the Supreme Court applied a Puerto Rican statute, that provided that the limitations period begins to run anew when tolling ceases, to the denial of a class certification motion in a § 1983 action. In his opinion, Justice Stevens noted that under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), unnamed plaintiffs (including putative class members) “should be treated as though they had been named plaintiffs during the pendency of a class action” to avoid the incentive for those people to file separate, duplicative actions. Id. at 659. Noting that a state law was not at issue in American Pipe, the Chardon court stated (Id. at 661): In a § 1983 action, however, Congress has specifically directed the courts, in the absence of controlling federal law, to apply state statutes of limitations and state tolling rules unless they are “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). American Pipe does not answer the question whether, in a § 1983 case in which the filing of a class action has tolled the statute of limitations until class certification is denied, the tolling effect is suspension rather than renewal or extension of the period. American Pipe simply asserts a federal interest in assuring the efficiency and economy of the class action procedure. After class certification is denied, that federal interest is vindicated as long as each unnamed plaintiff is given as much time to intervene or file a separate action as he would have under a state savings statute applicable to a party whose action has been dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits, or, in the absence of a statute, the time provided under the most closely analogous state tolling statute. (Emphasis added).2
*2 The holding in Chardon is as applicable to the voluntary dismissal of class claims as it is to the denial of a motion for class certification. In both instances, the unnamed class members are afforded the same protection “as if they had filed actions in their own names which were subsequently dismissed ...” Id. at 661. As defendant
1

Dunn v. City of Chicago, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2005)

conceded at oral argument on November 28, 2005, had plaintiffs Dunn and Robinson been named plaintiffs in the Lopez case and voluntarily withdrew from that case, they would be entitled to the protection of the one year Illinois savings statute. Under Chardon, Dunn and Robinson are in no different position in the instant case because they “should be treated as though they had been named plaintiffs during the pendency” of the Lopez class action.
Defendant objects to the application of the one year Illinois savings statute because, it claims, the withdrawal (or even denial) of class action status does not fit one of the four enumerated situations in which that statute has been held to apply.3 Defendant cites Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 536 (7 th Cir.1994), as holding that the Illinois savings statute must be interpreted narrowly to apply only to those four situations. This argument, while facially appealing, ignores the holding in Chardon that “[a]fter class certification is denied, that federal interest [of protecting the integrity of federal class action procedure under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23] is vindicated as long as each

unnamed plaintiff is given as much time to intervene or file a separate action as he would have under a state savings statute applicable to a party whose action has been dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits.” (Emphasis added). Chardon at 661. Thus, plaintiffs in the instant case should be put in the same position as plaintiffs whose actions were voluntarily dismissed, one of the four enumerated situations mentioned in Mares. Application of the one year savings statute is therefore a narrow interpretation of that statute.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider is granted, and Class III is redefined as: All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPD in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing at any time from March 15, 1999, to the date of this order.
	  

Footnotes

1

The court also denied certification of Class I and granted certification of Class II by agreement. The issues addressed in this

opinion do not affect those two classes.

2

The Court had previously noted that the “tolling effect” at issue could possibly “establish a fixed period such as six months or [as

in the cases of the Illinois statute] one year during which the plaintiff may file suit, without regard to the length of the original

limitations period or the amount of time left when tolling began.” Id. at 652, n. 1.

3

Those situations are: (1) if judgment is entered for the plaintiff, but reversed on appeal, or (2) if there is a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff and, upon motion and arrest of judgment, the judgment is entered against the plaintiff, or (3) the action is voluntarily

dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is dismissed for want of prosecution, or (4) if the action is dismissed by a United States

District Court for lack of jurisdiction.

	  

2

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 339-2 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 1 of 42 PageID #:3716

U ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ORTHER DISTRICT OF ILLI OIS
EASTER DIVISIO

THOMAS DU , DE Y ROBI SO , )

and VERO ICA IMPERIAL, on behalf of )

themselves and a class of others similarly )

situated, and LEO ARD KIMBALL,

)

individually,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

)

v.

)

)

) CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

Case o. 04-CV-6804 Judge Gettleman Magistrate Judge Schenkier

) Defendant.
)

CLASS ACTIO RELEASE A D SETTLEME T AGREEME T

This Class Action Release and Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) is made between

and among (1) Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, and Denny Robinson (collectively, the

“Named Plaintiffs”), individually and as representatives of the Settlement Classes defined in

Paragraph 10 below (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), and counsel for the Named Plaintiffs and the

Settlement Classes, Michael Kanovitz, Esq., and the law firm of Loevy & Loevy, on the one

hand; and (2) the City of Chicago (“Defendant”), on the other hand (collectively, the “Parties”).

1.

This Agreement is entered into to effect a full and final settlement

and dismissal with prejudice of all claims against Defendant in the above-captioned lawsuit (the

“Action”) on the terms set forth below, subject to the approval of the Court. The Parties

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acknowledge that this Settlement Agreement is contingent upon the City Council of the City of

Chicago giving its approval to the settlement, and that if the settlement is not so approved by the

time of the Mailed Notice Date (as defined below), the settlement, the Settlement Agreement,

and any preliminary approval of the settlement shall have no force or effect, and the Parties will be returned to the status quo ante with respect to this Action as if this Agreement had never been

entered into, as further set forth in Paragraphs 44 and 45.

RECITALS

2.

This is an alleged class action, in which Plaintiffs claim that

Defendant violated the United States Constitution in connection with policies and procedures

adopted by the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) regarding the processing and handling of

certain persons who are members of one or more alleged classes. Defendant has denied and

continues to deny these claims, and further denies that it has engaged in any wrongdoing

whatsoever. No dispositive rulings as to the merits of these claims have yet been made by the

Court herein. The Court has, however, previously certified three litigation classes herein. The

Parties recognize the risk and expense associated with a trial of Plaintiffs’ claims and any

appeals that may follow, as well as the uncertainty inherent in complex litigation, and have

concluded that the settlement as set forth in this Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in

the best interests of all Parties. The Parties have reached this Agreement at arms’ length, after

consultation with their independent advisors and attorneys, in order to resolve these disputes

conclusively without the uncertainty, expense, and delay of further litigation, pursuant to the

terms set forth herein.

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SETTLEME T TERMS

Preliminary Certification of Settlement Classes

3.

This Settlement Agreement shall fully and finally settle all individual

and class action claims against Defendant that were or could have been asserted in the Action, as

further provided in Paragraphs 40 and 41 of this Agreement.

4.

The parties to this Agreement are sometimes referred to as “the

Parties” and include:

(a) The Named Plaintiffs, Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, and

Denny Robinson, individually, and on behalf of the Settlement Classes, as defined

in Paragraph 10 (a) – (c); and

(b) The Defendant, the City of Chicago.

5.

The “Releasees” consist of the aforementioned Defendant, the City

of Chicago, and all of its future, current, and former officers, agents, and employees.

6.

Counsel for the Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Classes are

Michael Kanovitz and the law firm of Loevy & Loevy. They are referred to as “Class Counsel.”

7.

The “Claims Administrator” refers to Rust Consulting, Inc.

8.

The “Settlement Fund” means the sum total of settlement

administration and notice costs, attorneys’ fees and costs, Named Plaintiff Incentive Awards, and

claims payments, which, sum total, in no event shall exceed $16.5 million, as further set forth in

Paragraph 30.

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9.

“Claimant” means a potential member of one or more of the

Settlement Classes who submits a claim for settlement payment pursuant to the terms of this

Agreement.

10.

The Parties stipulate to certification, for settlement purposes only, of

the three Settlement Classes (collectively “Settlement Classes,” and individually, “Settlement

Class I,” “Settlement Class II,” or “Settlement Class III”) defined as follows:

(a)

Settlement Class I is defined as:

All persons held in a Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) interrogation or “interview” room for more than 16 hours in a 24-hour period at any time from October 21, 2002 to the date of preliminary approval.

(b)

Settlement Class II is defined as:

All persons detained in a CPD lock-up or detective facility from 10:00 p.m. (or earlier) on a given day and not released until 6:00 a.m. (or later) of the following day, at any time from October 21, 2002 to the date of preliminary approval.

(c)

Settlement Class III is defined as:

All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPD and were not released and did not receive a judicial probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest, at any time from March 15, 1999 to February 10, 2008.

(d) Named Plaintiff Veronica Imperial is the class representative for

Settlement Class I. Named Plaintiff Thomas Dunn is the class representative for

Settlement Class II. Named Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn and Denny Robinson are the

class representatives for Settlement Class III.

(e)

Excluded from these Settlement Classes are the following persons:

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(i) Members of the Northern District of Illinois federal judiciary and their immediate families; and

(ii) All persons who have timely elected to opt out of or exclude themselves from the Settlement Classes in accordance with the Court’s Orders.

11.

Solely for purposes of implementing this Agreement and

effectuating the settlement, Defendant stipulates that the Court may enter an Order preliminarily

certifying the Settlement Classes, appointing Named Plaintiffs as representatives of the

Settlement Classes (as set forth in Paragraph 10(d)), and appointing the following as Class

Counsel for the Settlement Classes:

Michael Kanovitz Loevy & Loevy 312 North May Street, Suite 100 Chicago, Illinois 60607 Telephone: (312) 243-5900 Facsimile: (312) 243-5902 Email: mike@loevy.com

12.

Solely for the purpose of implementing this Agreement and

effectuating the settlement, the Parties stipulate that the following shall be appointed as Claims

Administrator:

Rust Consulting, Inc.

13.

Solely for the purpose of implementing this Agreement and

effectuating the settlement, Defendant stipulates that the Named Plaintiffs are adequate

representatives of the Settlement Classes, as set forth in Paragraph 10(d).

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14.

After execution of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly move

the Court to enter an order (the “Preliminary Approval Order”) that is without material alteration

from Exhibit A hereto, and that, among other things:

(a) preliminarily approves this Agreement;

(b) preliminarily certifies the Settlement Classes defined herein, with

the Named Plaintiffs approved as class representatives of the Settlement Classes

as set forth in Paragraph 10(d), and Loevy & Loevy appointed as Class Counsel

for the Settlement Classes;

(c) schedules a fairness hearing on final approval of this Agreement

(the “Final Approval Hearing”) to consider the fairness, reasonableness, and

adequacy of the proposed settlement and whether it should be finally approved by

the Court;

(d) finds the settlement to be sufficiently fair to warrant providing

notice to the Settlement Classes;

(e) appoints Rust Consulting, Inc. as Claims Administrator;

(f) approves the mailed notice (the “Mailed Notice”), the content of

which is without material alteration from Exhibit B hereto, and directs its mailing

to potential members of the Settlement Classes by first class U.S. mail to the last-

known address for each such person, in accordance with the procedures set forth

in Paragraph 18, and, for Mailed Notices returned, directs the Claims

Administrator to follow the procedures set forth in Paragraph 18;

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(g) approves the published notice (the “Published Notice”), the content of which is without material alteration from Exhibit C hereto, and directs that it be published in accordance with the Notice Plan, as set forth in Paragraph 14(h);
(h) approves the notice plan (the “Notice Plan”), the content of which is without material alteration from Exhibit D hereto, including the Mailed Notice and the Published Notice, and finds that it satisfies the requirements of due process and federal law;
(i) approves the settlement website as described in Paragraph 21, which may be amended during the course of the settlement as appropriate and agreed to by the Parties, and which shall be maintained for at least 180 days after the expiration of the period for submission of Claim Forms, as set forth in Paragraph 28;
(j) directs the Claims Administrator to maintain a toll-free VRU telephone system containing recorded answers to frequently asked questions, along with an option permitting potential Settlement Class members to speak to live operators or to leave messages in a voicemail box;
(k) approves the claim form (the “Claim Form”), the content of which is without material alteration from Exhibit E hereto, for distribution to potential members of the Settlement Classes, and sets a date after which Claims Forms shall be deemed untimely (as further provided in Paragraph 28 below);
(l) determines that the Notice Plan, including the Mailed Notice and Published Notice, (i) is the best practicable notice; (ii) is reasonably calculated,
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under the circumstances, to apprise potential members of the Settlement Classes of the pendency of the Action and of their right to object or to exclude themselves from the proposed settlement; (iii) is reasonable and constitutes due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice; and (iv) meets all applicable requirements of due process and federal law;
(m) requires the Claims Administrator, at or before the Final Approval Hearing, to file proof of mailing of the Mailed Notice, as well as a list of all persons who timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Classes (along with an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of that list (the “Opt-Out List”));
(n) requires each potential member of the Settlement Classes who wishes to exclude himself or herself from the Settlement Classes to submit an appropriate, timely request for exclusion, postmarked no later than ninety (90) days after the mailing is initially completed (the “Mailed Notice Date”), to the Claims Administrator at the address in the Mailed Notice, and further requires that any requests for exclusion be exercised individually by a Settlement Class member, not as or on behalf of a group, class, or subclass, except that such requests may be submitted on behalf of an individual Settlement Class Member by the executor or administrator of a deceased Settlement Class Member’s estate, or the legal guardian of a Settlement Class Member who has been declared incompetent;
(o) preliminarily enjoins all potential members of the Settlement Classes, unless and until they have properly and timely excluded themselves from
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the Settlement Classes, (i) from filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in, or participating as plaintiff, claimant, or class member in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding in any jurisdiction based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or the Released Claims (as defined in Paragraphs 40 and 41); (ii) from filing, commencing, or prosecuting a lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding as a class action on behalf of any members of the Settlement Classes who have not properly and timely excluded themselves (including by seeking to amend a pending complaint to include class allegations or seeking class certification in a pending action), based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or the Released Claims; and (iii) from attempting to effect an opt-out of a class of individuals in any lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or Released Claims;
(p) rules that any potential member of the Settlement Classes who does not submit a timely, written request for exclusion from the Settlement Classes will be bound by all proceedings, orders, and judgments in the Action, even if such person has previously initiated or subsequently initiates individual litigation or other proceedings encompassed by the Released Claims (as set forth in Paragraphs 40 and 41);
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(q) requires each member of the Settlement Classes who has not submitted a timely request for exclusion from the Settlement Classes and who wishes to object to the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of this Agreement or the proposed settlement, or the Attorneys’ Fee Award, or Incentive Awards (as provided in Paragraph 30), to mail to the Claims Administrator (who shall promptly forward it to Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendant), and to file with the Court no later than sixty (60) days after the Mailed Notice Date, a statement of the objection, as well as the specific legal and factual reasons, if any, for each objection, including any support the member of the Settlement Classes wishes to bring to the Court’s attention and all evidence the member of the Settlement Classes wishes to introduce in support of his or her objection, or be forever barred from objection, as follows: the objection must contain (1) a heading that refers to the Action by case name (Dunn v. City of Chicago) and case number (04-CV6804); (2) a statement whether the objector intends to appear at the Final Approval Hearing, either in person or through counsel and, if through counsel, a statement identifying that counsel by name, bar number, address, and telephone number; (3) a statement of the specific legal and factual basis for each objection; and (4) a description of any and all evidence the objector may offer at the Final Approval Hearing;
(r) provides that the right to object to the proposed settlement must be exercised individually by a Settlement Class member or his or her attorney, not as a member of a group, class, or subclass, and, except in the case of a deceased or
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incapacitated Settlement Class member, not by the act of another person acting or purporting to act in any other representative capacity;
(s) requires any attorney hired by a member of the Settlement Classes at the Settlement Class member’s expense for the purpose of objecting to this Agreement or to the proposed settlement, or to the Attorneys’ Fee Award or Incentive Award, to mail to the Claims Administrator (who shall promptly forward it to Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendant) and to file with the Clerk of the Court a notice of appearance no later than sixty (60) days after the Mailed Notice Date, or as the Court may otherwise direct;
(t) directs the Claims Administrator to rent a post office box to be used for receiving requests for exclusion, objections, notices of intention to appear, and any other non-privileged communications, and providing that only the Claims Administrator, Class Counsel, Defendant, the Court, the Clerk of the Court, and their designated agents shall have access to this post office box, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement; and finds that if any privileged communications are disclosed to the Class Administrator, the Court, Defendant, or Counsel for Defendant, the privilege has not been waived by such disclosure;
(u) directs the Claims Administrator and/or Class Counsel promptly to furnish Class Counsel, Counsel for Defendant, and any counsel of record for members of the Settlement Classes with copies of any and all objections, written
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requests for exclusion, notices of intention to appear, or other communications

that come into its possession (except as expressly provided in this Agreement);

(v) contains any additional provisions agreeable to the Parties that

might be necessary to implement the terms of this Agreement and the proposed

settlement; and

(w) finds that preliminary approval of the settlement is contingent upon

City Council of the City of Chicago giving its approval to the settlement, and that

if the Settlement Agreement is not so approved by the Mailed Notice Date, the

settlement, the Settlement Agreement, and the Court’s preliminary approval of the

settlement shall have no further force or effect, and the Parties will be returned to

the status quo ante with respect to this Action as if this Agreement had never been

entered into, or the settlement preliminarily approved, as further set forth in

Paragraphs 44 and 45.

15.

The Parties and their respective attorneys acknowledge that

settlement of this Action is not an admission of liability, or of unconstitutional or illegal conduct

by or on the part of Defendant and/or the City of Chicago’s future, current or former officers,

agents and employees, and shall not serve as evidence of any wrongdoing by or on the part of

Defendant and/or the City of Chicago’s future, current or former officers, agents, and employees.

The Parties and their respective attorneys further acknowledge that settlement is made to avoid

the uncertainty of the outcome of litigation and the expense in time and money of further

litigation and for the purpose of judicial economy.

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16.

The Parties and their respective attorneys acknowledge that

settlement of this Action is not a concession by Defendant to the certification of any of the

litigation classes previously certified by this Court during this litigation.

17.

The Named Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, and Class Counsel agree not to use

the fact of this settlement or Defendant’s stipulation to the certification of the Settlement Classes

against Defendant in this or any other proceeding.

Class otice and Opt-Out Procedures

18.

Within twenty-nine (29) days of the entry of the Preliminary

Approval Order, the Claims Administrator shall cause the Mailed Notice, along with the Claim

Form, to be mailed by first class U.S. mail to the last-known address of each potential member of

the Settlement Classes whose names and last-known addresses are reasonably ascertainable from

CPD arrest records, as agreed to by the Parties. Prior to the mailing, the Claims Administrator

shall use an address updating service such as Lexis SmartLinx and/or the National Change of

Address Database to verify the accuracy of the addresses of all potential Settlement Classes

members, the costs of which are included in the administration costs described in Paragraph

30(a). If, as a result of the mailing, a forwarding address is provided by the Postal Service, but

the Mailed Notice is not forwarded by the Postal Service, the Claims Administrator will re-mail

the Mailed Notice to the forwarding address. In the event that any Mailed Notice is returned as

undeliverable a second time, no further mailing shall be required.

19.

The Claims Administrator shall effectuate the Published Notice, as

set forth in further detail in Exhibits C and D.

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20.

The Claims Administrator shall maintain a toll-free VRU telephone

system containing recorded answers to frequently asked questions, along with an option

permitting potential Settlement Class members to speak to live operators or to leave messages in

a voicemail box.

21.

The Claims Administrator shall maintain a website for this

settlement for at least 180 days after the expiration of the period for the submission of Claim

Forms, as set forth in Paragraph 28. The website shall include, at a minimum, copies of the

Settlement Agreement (including exhibits), the Mailed Notice, the Claim Form, and the

Preliminary Approval Order, and may be amended as appropriate during the course of the

settlement as agreed to by the Parties. The Mailed Notice and Claim Form shall also be made

available in Spanish upon the request of a Claimant, and posted on the website.

22.

The Parties will notify each other of the receipt of any request for

exclusion or objection to this Agreement received from a member of the Settlement Classes

within two (2) business days of receipt.

23.

All potential members of the Settlement Classes shall have ninety

(90) days from the Mailed Notice Date to submit requests for exclusion from the Settlement

Classes prepared and directed in the manner set forth in the Mailed Notice.

24.

The Named Plaintiffs agree that they shall not elect or seek to opt out

or exclude themselves from the Settlement Classes.

25.

All potential members of the Settlement Classes who do not timely

and properly exclude themselves from the Settlement Classes shall be bound by this Agreement,

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and all their claims shall be dismissed with prejudice and released, even if they never received

actual notice of the Action or this settlement.

26.

If more than thirty-five (35) members of Settlement Class I or more

than thirty-five (35) members of Settlement Class III exclude themselves, Defendant will have

the option, which it may exercise in its sole discretion, to void this Agreement by providing

written notice to Class Counsel no later than fifteen (15) days after the deadline for opting out

has passed. In such circumstance, the Parties shall revert to the same position as they were prior

to the execution of this Agreement, and no Party shall be bound by any settlement terms outlined

in this Agreement, as set forth in further detail in Paragraphs 44 and 45. In the event that

Defendant exercises its option to void this Agreement, the Class Administrator will provide

notice that the settlement has been voided via U.S. mail solely to Claimants who have already

submitted claims by this date, and Defendant will bear the cost of this notice.

Claim Forms and Certain Settlement Administration Procedures

27.

The Claim Form shall be without material alteration from Exhibit E.

28.

To be eligible for any monetary relief set forth in Paragraph 30(d), a

Settlement Classes Member must (a) truthfully, accurately to the best of his or her ability, and

completely fill out the Claim Form; (b) sign the Claim Form under penalty of perjury; (c) have

the Claim Form notarized; and (d) mail the Claim Form, with first class postage prepaid, to the

Claims Administrator postmarked on or before one hundred thirty five (135) days after the

Mailed Notice Date. Claim Forms must be signed and notarized by the Settlement Class

Member, except that Claim Forms may be submitted on behalf of a Settlement Class Member by

(1) the executor or administrator of a deceased Settlement Class Member’s estate, (2) the legal

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guardian of a Settlement Class Member who has been declared incompetent, or (3) a person with

a valid Power of Attorney from the Settlement Class Member.

29.

Class Counsel may conduct confirmatory discovery of Defendant,

which may assert all appropriate objections to any such discovery, which objections will be

resolved by the Court. Any such discovery obtained by Class Counsel shall be subject to the

Agreed Protective Orders previously entered by this Court during the litigation (Dkt. 36 and 136)

and the Parties agree that the documents and information provided to Class Counsel are for use

in this litigation only, and that information regarding potential Settlement Class members will be

treated confidentially.

Settlement Class Recovery, Costs of otice, amed Plaintiffs’ Incentive Awards, and Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses

30.

Defendant shall be responsible for the funding of a settlement fund

(the “Settlement Fund”) in the maximum potential amount of $16,500,000. In no event shall the

Defendant be required to fund, or be liable under this settlement for, any amount in excess of

$16,500,000. If the potential payments to Settlement Class members, as calculated in Paragraph

30(d) below, exceed the amount available in the Settlement Fund after payment of other amounts

provided for herein, such recovery shall be reduced by pro rata distributions as provided below.

Funding shall be made on the following terms:

(a)

otice and Settlement Costs. All costs of sending the Mailed Notice and

Claim Form and administering the Settlement Fund will be paid out of the

Settlement Fund. The Claims Administrator will perform all work

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necessary to send the Mailed Notice and Claim Form to the Settlement Classes and administer the settlement and the Settlement Fund. The Parties will provide to the Claims Administrator a list of potential members of the Settlement Classes based upon CPD arrest records, as set forth in Paragraph 30(d). All such information shall be treated confidentially and returned to Defendant at the conclusion of the settlement administration. (b) amed Plaintiffs’ Incentive Awards. The Named Plaintiffs’ incentive awards (“Incentive Awards”) will be paid out of the Settlement Fund. Subject to Court approval, Thomas Dunn is eligible to receive an Incentive Award not to exceed $25,000, Veronica Imperial is eligible to receive an Incentive Award not to exceed $25,000, and Denny Robinson is eligible to receive an Incentive Award not to exceed $25,000. If such amounts are awarded, the Named Plaintiffs will not be permitted to make any further claims on the Settlement Fund. (c) Attorneys’ Fee Award. Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses will be paid out of the Settlement Fund. Class Counsel agree not to seek from the Court an award of attorneys’ fees in excess of $5,000,000.00, and costs and expenses in excess of $70,000.00 (the “Attorneys’ Fee Award”). The final determination of the Attorneys’ Fee Award will be decided by the Court, as further described in Paragraph 37.
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The Attorneys’ Fee Award will be disbursed to Class Counsel at such time as provided in Paragraph 36 below. (d) Payments to Eligible Settlement Class Members. Payments to eligible Settlement Classes Members who submit timely and valid Claim Forms shall be calculated in the manner provided for below in Subparagraphs 30(d)(i) - (iii). In the event that the payment amounts required by this Subparagraph 30(d) exceed the funds remaining in the Settlement Fund (after payment of other amounts provided for herein), payments shall be made to eligible Settlement Class Members on a pro rata basis in order to ensure that under no circumstances will Defendant’s total payment under this settlement exceed the $16,500,000 funding obligation. Claimants who have had more than one detention during the class periods and meet the criteria for one or more of the Settlement Classes criteria are eligible to receive payments for each separate detention, as provided below in Subparagraphs 30(d)(i) - (iii). (i) Members of Settlement Class I are eligible to receive a payment of up to $2,000, conditioned on their ability to satisfy the following criteria:
(1) To be eligible to receive an award up to $2,000, a Class I Claimant must satisfy the following criteria:
a) The Claimant must submit a notarized Claim Form signed by the Claimant, stating under penalty of perjury that the Claimant meets the criteria for membership in Class I;
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b) 19

AND
One of the following is satisfied:
i) The CPD Automated Arrest Database, Paper Database, or other CPD records demonstrate that the time between when the Claimant checked out of lockup and returned to lockup was greater than 16 hours, and these records do not demonstrate that the Claimant was held somewhere other than in an interview room during this period of time during the Settlement Class period;
or
ii) CPD and/or Cook County Clerk’s Office (“CCC”) records demonstrate that the Claimant was charged with homicide, sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm, or more than one robbery, and the time between arrest (using presumptions applicable to Settlement Classes II and III in the event of missing data) and the time received in lockup or the final approval of probable cause (whichever is greater) is greater than 16 hours during the Settlement Class period;
or
iii) CPD and/or CCC records demonstrate that the Claimant was charged with

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homicide, sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm, or more than one robbery and the time between arrest (using presumptions applicable to Settlement Classes II and III in the event of missing data) and CPD records demonstrate that the Claimant was held for at least 16 hours in an interview room during the Settlement Class period.

(ii) Members of Settlement Class II are eligible to receive a payment

of up to $90, conditioned on their ability to satisfy the following criteria:

(1) To receive an award up to $90, a Class II Claimant

must satisfy the following criteria:

a) b)
20

Submit a notarized Claim Form signed by the Claimant, stating under penalty of perjury that the Claimant meets the criteria for membership in Settlement Class II;
AND
The time of arrest and the time of release reflected in the CPD Automated Arrest or Paper Databases demonstrate that the Claimant was detained overnight during the Settlement Class period.
i) Where the time of release is missing from the Automated Arrest or Paper Databases, the initial court date or bond date (whichever is earlier) with a noon bond time assumption shall take the

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place of the time of release. If the initial court date is missing as well as the time of release, then the Cook County Criminal Records Database shall be used to determine the earlier of the initial court date or bond date (if any) and a noon release shall be assumed on the earlier of those two days. If there is no initial court date, no bond date, and no record in the Cook County Criminal Records Database, it will be assumed that the Claimant was released without charging, and the time indicated that the Claimant was released without charging will take the place of the time of release.
ii) Where the arrest time is missing from the Automated Arrest or Paper Databases, the earliest of the following proxies will substitute for the time of arrest: transport time, initial approval of probable cause, or time received in lockup. For these proxies, it will be assumed that the time of arrest preceded the proxy time by 10 minutes for transport time, 2 hours for initial approval of probable cause, and 2.5 hours for time received in lockup.
iii) Where CPD records do not indicate that the Claimant was arrested during the class period (or where none of the
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proxies in Paragraph

30(d)(ii)(1)(b)(ii)

are

available) but the Claimant

appears in CCC records then

the arrest date reflected in

that database shall be used.

If the arrest date is before the

bond hearing date, assume

the Claimant is in Settlement

Class II.

(iii) Members of Settlement Class III are eligible to receive a payment

of up to $3,000, conditioned on their ability to satisfy the following

criteria:

(1) To receive an award up to $3,000, a Class III

Claimant must satisfy the following criteria:

a) Submit a notarized Claim Form signed by the Claimant, stating under penalty of perjury that the Claimant meets the criteria for membership in Settlement Class III;

AND

b) The Automated Arrest Database or Paper Database demonstrate that the Claimant was arrested during the Settlement Class period;

AND
c) The Automated Arrest Database or Paper Database does not show that the Claimant was released or given a judicial hearing of probable cause within 48 hours;

AND

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d) 23

The Automated Arrest or Paper Databases demonstrate that more than 48 hours passed between arrest and the earlier of time of release or time of probable cause hearing;
i) For Automated Arrest data: Where the data shows that the Claimant received a bond and does not reflect an earlier release from lock-up time, the bond time shall be used as the end time of the 48-hour calculation. Where the data does not reflect that the Claimant received a bond, or where bond is after release from lockup, assume detainee appeared for a probable cause hearing on the date of the release from lock-up at a time three hours after release from lock-up and that time shall be used as the end time of the 48-hour calculation. For Paper Arrest data: the initial court date or bond date (whichever is earlier) with a noon bond/hearing time assumption shall take the place of the time of release. If the initial court date or bond date (if any) is missing as well as the time of release, then the Cook County Criminal Records Database shall be used to determine the earlier of the initial court date or bond date, and a noon bond/court time shall be assumed in place of the time of release. If there is no initial court date, no bond date, and no record in the

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Cook County Criminal Records Database, it will be assumed that the Claimant was released without charging and the time indicated that the Claimant was released without charging will take the place of the time of release;

ii) Where the arrest time is missing from the Automated Arrest or Paper Databases, the earliest of the following proxies will substitute for the time of arrest: transport time, initial approval of probable cause, or time received in lockup. For these proxies, it will be assumed that the time of arrest preceded the proxy time by 10 minutes for transport time, 2 hours for initial approval of probable cause, and 2.5 hours for time received in lockup;

iii) Where CPD records do not

indicate that the Claimant

was arrested during the class

period (or where none of the

proxies in Paragraph

30(d)(iii)(1)(b)(ii)

are

available), but the Claimant

appears in Cook County

criminal court records which

show that Claimant’s first

appearance included a bond

hearing then use the arrest

date reflected in that database

and presume a noon arrest

time on that date of arrest and

a noon hearing time on the

date of the first appearance.

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AND
e) One of the following is satisfied:
i) The Automated Arrest Database or Paper Database shows that the Claimant was arrested for a felony offense, and do not indicate that the arrest was pursuant to a warrant;
or
ii) Other CPD or Cook County criminal court records demonstrate that the Claimant was arrested for a felony, do not indicate that the arrest was pursuant to a warrant, and was detained longer than 48 hours without being released or being given a judicial determination of probable cause to detain.
(iv) Settlement Class members who are members of another Settlement
Class may receive payment for all Settlement Classes of which they are
members and have provided proof of such membership, as described in
Paragraph 30(d)(i)-(iii).

ADDITIO AL CLAIMS ADMI ISTRATIO PROCEDURES

31.

Settlement claims shall be denied if the Claim Form does not

demonstrate that the Claimant is a member of the Settlement Class or Classes or the Claimant

does not otherwise satisfy the eligibility requirements stated in Paragraph 30(d)(i)-(iii). In

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addition, a claim may be denied if information in the Claim Form does not conform to

Defendant’s records, or the information in Defendant’s records does not match the identifying

information supplied by the Claimant. For purposes of calculating the claim payments, the

information in Defendant’s records shall control and may not be challenged by Claimants except

as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement. Where a Claim Form is not completely

filled out by the Claimant or is otherwise defective, the Claims Administrator will notify the

Claimant of the defect and provide the Claimant with twenty-one (21) days to cure the defect.

32.

The Claims Administrator shall provide copies of all Claim Forms

(including any related documents and nonprivileged communications from claimants) to Class

Counsel and Defendant’s counsel on a weekly basis, and in any event by no later than seven (7)

days after the deadline for submitting claims. Within fifty-two (52) days of the final date of

submission of Claim Forms, as set forth in Paragraph 28, the Claims Administrator shall provide

to Class Counsel and Defendant’s counsel a list of the Settlement Class members who submitted

Claim Forms, along with (1) the Claims Administrator’s initial proposal for which Claim Forms

are valid and timely, and (2) the proposed payments for each of the Claimants. Class Counsel

and Defendants’ counsel shall have twenty-one (21) days thereafter in which to confer regarding

(1) which Claim Forms are valid and timely and (2) the appropriate payments (if any) for each

claim. If Class Counsel and counsel for Defendant cannot agree on whether any particular claim

is entitled to payment under the settlement, they shall submit the issue to the Court. The Court’s

decision shall be final, binding, and nonappealable.

33.

By hundred and five (105) days from the Effective Date, the Claims

Administrator shall mail to all Settlement Class Members who submitted Claim Forms (i) a

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notice informing the Settlement Class Member of the determination as to whether, and how

much money (if any), the Settlement Class Member is entitled to receive under the settlement,

and (ii) enclosing a check for payment under the terms of the settlement. The letter shall also

advise the Claimant that he or she may object to the amount of the payment, or to the denial of

payment, by mailing to the Claims Administrator, within thirty (30) days after the date that the

Claims Administrator mails the determination, a written and signed statement setting forth the

basis for that objection. Any objection that is not postmarked within that thirty (30) day period

shall be waived. The only valid basis for an objection is that the criteria set forth in Paragraph

30(d) were not properly applied to the claim. The Claims Administrator shall forward any

objections to Class Counsel and counsel for Defendant within five (5) days of receipt. The

Parties shall seasonably report to the Court any objections that have been submitted and seek the

Court’s resolution of these objections. The Parties shall also report to the Court regarding their

joint or respective recommendation for resolution of each of the objections. The Court’s

decision regarding each objection shall be final, binding, and nonappealable.

34.

Defendants will pay the claims administration and Settlement Class

Members’ validated claims portion of the Settlement Fund to the Claims Administrator within

one hundred and five (102) days after the Effective Date, which amount the Claims

Administrator shall hold in trust and distribute in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

If funds remain after payment of the amounts set forth in Paragraphs 30(a)-(d), the Claims

Administrator shall disburse these funds to Defendant within thirty (30) days after the Claims

Administrator mails the letters and checks to Settlement Class Members, as set forth in

Paragraph 33.

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35.

The City will submit funds to be used for notice and publication

costs to the Claims Administrator no later than sixteen (16) days after the City Council gives its

approval to the settlement. The Claims Administrator shall distribute payments to Settlement

Class Members, by first class mail, within one hundred and five (105) days of the Effective Date

to each Settlement Class member who submitted a valid, timely Claim Form as provided in the

Notice. All checks issued to the Settlement Class member claimants in accordance with this

Paragraph shall indicate on their face that they are void after one hundred and eighty (180) days

from the date issued.

36.

Defendant agrees to fund half of the Attorneys’ Fee Award and all

Incentive Awards no later than seven (7) days of the Effective Date and the final half of the

Attorneys’ Fee Award concurrently with the final payment from the Settlement Fund to members

of the Settlement Classes, as described in Paragraph 35.

ATTOR EYS’ FEE AWARD

37.

Class Counsel will petition the Court for an order awarding

attorneys’ fees in an amount no greater than $5,000,000 and costs in an amount no greater than $70,000. The terms of this Agreement are not conditioned upon any minimum or maximum

Attorneys’ Fees Award, or upon the payment of any Incentive Award or claims payment to any

Named Plaintiff. Defendant, the Named Plaintiffs, and Class Counsel agreed to all substantive

terms of the settlement with respect to members of the Settlement Classes prior to reaching an

agreement concerning attorneys’ fees and costs. The Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel do not

condition their willingness to enter into, or perform under, this Settlement Agreement on any

agreement or accord regarding the attorneys’ fees or costs of Class Counsel, or the Named

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Plaintiffs’ Incentive Awards. Class Counsel agrees that what the Court determines to be the

Attorneys’ Fee Award are the full fees and costs for this litigation and will not seek any further

amount from Class Members. Class Counsel shall receive from the Settlement Fund the amount

of attorneys’ fees and costs approved by the Court, but in no event more than $5,070,000, by the

due dates provided herein. Such fees and costs are inclusive of all efforts heretofore and

hereinafter expended by Class Counsel and any other attorneys acting on behalf of the Named

Plaintiffs and Settlement Classes, up to and including the execution of this Settlement

Agreement, and further include all services to be performed by Class Counsel in effectuating this

Settlement Agreement.

Final Approval, Dismissal of Claims, and Releases

38.

If after conducting the Final Approval Hearing, the Court grants final

approval of this Agreement (including any modifications thereto made by the Parties as provided

for herein), the Parties will request that the Court enter a final order (the “Final Order and

Judgment”) in the form attached as Exhibit F that, among other things:

(a) certifies the Settlement Classes for settlement purposes only, and

finds that the Court has personal jurisdiction over all members of

the Settlement Classes and that the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction to approve this Agreement and all exhibits thereto;

(b) gives final approval to the settlement set forth in this Agreement as

fair, reasonable, and adequate as to the Named Plaintiffs and the

Settlement Classes, and in their best interests, and in compliance

with all requirements of due process and federal law, and directs

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the Parties and their counsel to implement and consummate this Agreement and direct the administration of the settlement in accordance with its terms and provisions; (c) declares this Agreement and the Final Order and Judgment to be binding on, and have res judicata and preclusive effect in, all pending and future lawsuits or other proceedings encompassed by the Release (as set forth in Paragraphs 40 and 41) maintained by or on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs and all other members of the Settlement Classes, as well as their heirs, executors and administrators, successors, and assigns; (d) finds that the Mailed Notice, Published Notice, and Notice Plan implemented pursuant to this Agreement (i) constituted the best practicable notice; (ii) constituted notice that is reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise members of the Settlement Classes of the pendency of the Action, their right to object or exclude themselves from the proposed settlement and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing, and their right to seek monetary and other relief; (iii) were reasonable and constituted due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice; and (iv) met all applicable requirements of due process and federal law;
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(e) finds that Class Counsel and the Named Plaintiffs adequately represented the Settlement Classes for the purpose of entering into and implementing the Agreement, and further finds that the Claims Administrator has met all the requirements of the Court as set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order and this Agreement;
(f) dismisses the Action (including all individual and class claims presented thereby) on the merits as to Defendant and with prejudice and without fees or costs except as expressly provided herein; further provides that, by consent of the Parties, the Court shall retain jurisdiction solely for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement through October 3, 2011; and further provides that except as set forth expressly in this Subparagraph, the case is dismissed with prejudice upon entry of the Final Order and Judgment;
(g) adjudges that the Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement Classes have conclusively compromised, settled, discharged, dismissed, and released any and all Released Claims against Defendant and the other Releasees;
(h) approves the payment of the Attorneys’ Fee Award to Class Counsel as set forth in Paragraph 30(c), and the payment of Incentive Awards to the Named Plaintiffs as set forth in Paragraph 30(b); 31

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(i) provides that, upon the Effective Date, the Named Plaintiffs and all members of the Settlement Classes who have not been excluded from the Settlement Class, whether or not they return a Claim Form within the time and in the manner provided for, shall be barred from asserting any Released Claims against Defendant and the other Releasees, and any such members of the Settlement Classes shall have released any and all Released Claims as against Defendant and the other Releasees;
(j) determines that the Agreement and the settlement provided for herein, and any proceedings taken pursuant thereto, are not, and should not in any event be offered or received as evidence of, a presumption, concession, or an admission of liability or of any misrepresentation or omission in any statement or written document approved or made by Defendant; provided, however, that reference may be made to this Agreement and the settlement provided for herein in such proceedings as may be necessary to effectuate the provisions of this Agreement;
(k) bars and enjoins all members of the Settlement Classes who have not been excluded from the Settlement Classes from (i) filing, commencing, prosecuting, intervening in, or participating (as class members or otherwise) in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding in any jurisdiction 32

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based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in this Action and/or the Released Claims and (ii) organizing members of the Settlement Classes who have not been excluded from the Settlement Classes into a separate class for purposes of pursuing as a purported class action any lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or other proceeding (including by seeking to amend a pending complaint to include class allegations, or seeking class certification in a pending action) based on, relating to, or arising out of the claims and causes of action, or the facts and circumstances relating thereto, in the Action and/or the Released Claims; (l) approves the Opt-Out List and determines that the Opt-Out List is a complete list of all Settlement Classes members who have properly and timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Classes and, accordingly, shall neither share in nor be bound by the Final Order and Judgment; and (m) authorizes the Parties, without further approval from the Court, to agree to and adopt such amendments, modifications, and expansions of this Agreement and all exhibits hereto as (i) shall be consistent in all material respects with the Final Order and
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Judgment and (ii) do not limit the rights of members of the

Settlement Classes.

39.

The claims released by the Named Plaintiffs and the Settlement

Classes members as set forth in Paragraphs 40 and 41 are the “Released Claims.”

40.

amed Plaintiffs’ Release: As consideration for this Agreement,

and upon the Effective Date, the Named Plaintiffs, including each and every one of their

respective agents, representatives, attorneys, heirs, assigns, or any other person acting on their

behalf or for their benefit, hereby generally release and discharge Releasees from any and all

claims, demands, rights, causes of action, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees,

costs, debts, or liabilities which they now have, or had at any time prior to and through the date

of this release.

41.

Settlement Class Release: As consideration for this Agreement,

and upon the Effective Date, all members of the Settlement Classes who have not properly and

timely excluded themselves from the Settlement Classes, including each and every one of their

respective agents, representatives, attorneys, heirs, assigns, or any other person acting on their

behalf or for their benefit, hereby releases and discharges Releasees from any and all claims,

demands, rights, causes of action, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs,

debts, or liabilities which all members of the Settlement Classes in the Action now have, or had

at any time prior to and through the date of this release arising out of or in any way related to the

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.

42.

Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude any action to enforce the

terms of the Agreement, including participation in any of the processes detailed therein.

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Withdrawal from Settlement

43.

Within fifteen (15) days of the occurrence of any of the following

events, and upon written notice to counsel for all Parties, any Party shall have the right to

withdraw from the settlement:

(a) if the Court fails to approve the Agreement or if on appeal the Court’s

approval is reversed or modified; or

(b) if the Court materially alters any of the terms of the Agreement; or

(c) if the Preliminary Approval Order, as described in Paragraph 14, or the

Final Approval Order, as described in Paragraph 38, is not entered by the Court,

or is reversed or modified on appeal, or otherwise fails for any reason; or

(d) if more than 35 class members of Settlement Class I or more than 35 class

members of Settlement Class III choose to exclude themselves and Defendant

opts to void this Agreement, pursuant to the provisions in Paragraph 26 of this

Agreement.

44.

If this Agreement is not approved by the Court or the settlement is

not given approval by the City Council of the City of Chicago, or otherwise fails to become

effective, the orders, judgment, and dismissal to be entered pursuant to this Agreement shall be

vacated; this Agreement shall have no further force and effect, and the Parties will be returned to

the status quo ante with respect to the Action as if this Agreement had never been entered into.

45.

If this Agreement fails to be approved or otherwise fails to be

consummated in accordance with its terms:

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(a) The Named Plaintiffs shall be entitled to continue this Action on behalf of the classes in accordance with the rulings, circumstances and procedural posture that existed in this Action on the date of preliminary approval; and

(b) Defendant shall retain all rights to continue its defense to this Action and to assert claims in accordance with the rulings, circumstances and procedural posture that existed in this Action on the date of preliminary approval.

Effective Date

46.

The Effective Date of this Agreement shall be the date when each

and all of the following conditions have occurred:

(a) This Agreement has been fully executed by all the Parties and their

counsel;

(b) The City Council of the City of Chicago has given its approval to

the settlement;

(c) Orders have been entered by the Court granting preliminary

approval of this Agreement, and approving a form of notice and Claim Form, all

as provided in this Agreement;

(d) The Court-approved notice has been duly promulgated as ordered

by the Court;

(e) The Court has entered a Final Order and Judgment finally

approving this Agreement, as provided in this Agreement; and

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(f) The judgment has become Final as defined in Paragraph 47.

47.

“Final,” when referring to a judgment order means that (a) the

judgment is a final, appealable judgment; and (b) either (i) no appeal has been taken from the

judgment as of the date on which all times to appeal therefrom have expired, or (ii) an appeal or

other review proceeding of the judgment having been commenced, such appeal or other review is

finally concluded and no longer is subject to review by any court, whether by appeal, petitions for rehearing or reargument, petitions for rehearing en banc, petitions for writ of certiorari, or

otherwise, and such appeal or other review has been finally resolved in such manner that affirms

the Final Order and Judgment in all material respects.

Additional Provisions

48.

The headings and captions contained in this Agreement are for

reference purposes only and in no way define, extend, limit, describe, or affect the scope, intent,

meaning, or interpretation of this Agreement.

49.

The Exhibits to this Agreement are an integral part of the settlement

and are hereby incorporated and made part of this Agreement.

50.

The Parties hereto shall execute all documents and perform all acts

necessary and proper to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. The executing of documents

must take place prior to the date scheduled for the Final Approval Hearing

51.

Neither this Agreement nor any negotiations shall be construed,

offered, received as, or deemed to be, evidence of an admission on the part of the Named

Plaintiffs or the Settlement Classes of lack of merit, or on the part of Defendant of any liability

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or wrongdoing whatsoever, whether as alleged in the Second Amended Class Action Complaint

or otherwise.

52.

The Parties may destroy documents generated related to the notice

and administration of the Agreement eighteen (18) months after the Effective Date.

53.

Class Counsel agrees to return all documents and data provided by

Defendant during the course of this Action within sixty (60) days after mailing of the

letters/checks regarding payment to the Settlement Classes.

54.

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent Defendant

from communicating orally, electronically, or in writing with Settlement Classes members in the

ordinary course of business.

55.

All documents, papers and notices required to be given by this

Agreement to Plaintiffs, the Settlement Classes, or Class Counsel shall be given to:

Michael Kanovitz LOEVY & LOEVY 312 N. May Street, Suite 100 Chicago, Illinois 60607

All documents, papers and notices required to be given under this Agreement to Defendant shall

be given to:

Mara S. Georges Corporation Counsel c/o Matthew Hurd 30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1720 Chicago, Illinois 60602

With a copy to:

Matthew C. Crowl Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive
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Suite 6600 Chicago, Illinois 60606

56.

The Parties to this Agreement agree to cooperate in the submission

of this Agreement to the Court and will recommend acceptance of the Agreement by all

necessary parties. The Parties shall cooperate in taking any such other steps as may be requested

by the Court to implement this Agreement and the settlement provided for herein.

57.

In consideration of this Agreement, Class Counsel agrees that what

the Court determines to be the Attorneys’ Fee Award and costs are the full fees and costs for this

litigation and will not seek any further amount from Class Members. Class Counsel further

represent and certify that they will pay any amounts due for attorneys’ fees pursuant to any

agreement with them, and hold Defendant harmless from any such claim.

58.

This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance

with the laws of the State of Illinois.

59.

The Parties to this Agreement warrant that they are executing this

Agreement freely and voluntarily, after independently determining that its provisions are of a

material benefit to them, and that the duties and obligations imposed by it are fair and

reasonable.

60.

The Parties to this Agreement have read and fully understand the

stated terms and conditions, have had time to reflect on and consider the benefits and

consequences of entering into this Settlement Agreement, and have had the opportunity to review

the terms of this Agreement with their respective attorneys. The Parties also warrant that they

have not entered into this Agreement in reliance upon any warranty or representation, express or

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implied, of any nature or kind by any other Party, other than the warranties and representations

expressly made in this Agreement.

61.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement, this

Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between and among the Parties with respect to the

settlement of the Action, and it supersedes all prior and contemporaneous written and/or oral

agreements between the parties. All negotiations, discussions, prior understandings and

agreements between the Parties with regard to the subject matter of this Agreement are merged

into this Agreement, which fully, completely, and accurately states and expresses the Parties’

entire understandings and agreements, and may not be modified or amended except upon a

writing signed by the Parties and their respective counsel.

62.

This Agreement shall not be construed more strictly against one

Party than another merely because of the fact that it may have been prepared by counsel for one

of the Parties, it being recognized that, because of the arms’-length negotiations resulting in the

Agreement, all Parties hereto have contributed substantially and materially to the preparation of

the Agreement.

63.

In the event that there are any developments in the effectuation and

administration of this Agreement that are not dealt with by the terms of this Agreement, then

such matters shall be dealt with as agreed upon by the Parties, and, failing agreement, as shall be

ordered by the Court.

64.

Except as expressly provided herein, the Parties to this Settlement

Agreement are responsible for payment and negotiation of their own attorneys’ fees and costs.

40

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 339-2 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 41 of 42 PageID #:3756

65.

In the event any date or deadline set forth in this Agreement falls on

a weekend or legal holiday, such date or deadline shall be on the first business day thereafter.

Unless otherwise noted, all references to “days” in this Agreement shall be to calendar days.

66.

This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts,

each of which together shall be deemed one and the same instrument. Facsimile and PDF

signature copies are acceptable.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto, acting by and through their respective counsel of record have so agreed, on ____________, 2010.

For amed Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class:
______________________________ Thomas Dunn
______________________________ Veronica Imperial
______________________________ Denny Robinson

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Case: 1:04-cv-06804 Document #: 339-2 Filed: 05/14/10 Page 42 of 42 PageID #:3757
For Class Counsel with respect to release of attorneys’ lien and approval as to form:
____________________ Michael Kanovitz LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May, Suite 100 Chicago, Illinois 60607 Tel: (312) 243-5900 Fax: (312) 243-5902 Attorney for amed Plaintiffs and Settlement Class For Defendants:
CITY OF CHICAGO A Municipal Corporation MARA S. GEORGES Corporation Counsel
By: _________________________ Matthew Hurd Deputy Corporation Counsel 30 N. LaSalle Suite 1710 Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 742-0234
Attorneys for the City of Chicago
Approved as to form: __________________________ Matthew C. Crowl, Esq. Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 FAX: (312) 258-5609
42

 
 Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 102 Filed 06/02/2006 Page 1 of 1

IN NORTHERN

TDHIESTRUNICITTEDOFSTILALTEINS ODISIS, TREAICSTTERCNOURDTIVISION

THOMAS LEONARD

DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON, KIMBLE, VERONICA IMPERIAL,

on behalf of themselves and a

class of others similarly situated,)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

)

Defendant.

)

04 c 6804
JUDGE GETTLEMAN
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORDER

This Motion for Class Certification on Class I having been brought by Plaintiff Veronica Imperial, and the City of Chicago not opposing that Motion, and the Court being otherwise

sufficiently advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

I.

The Court certifies the following class pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3): All persons held in a CPO interrogation or ''interview''
room for more than sixteen hours in a 24-hour period at any time
from March 15, 1999, to the date of this Order. II. The Court appoints Plaintiff Veronica Imperial as

class representative for this class.

III. The Court appoints Loevy & Loevy as class counsel

for the class.

r Entered:

 
 FILED Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 1 of 33
APRIL 3, 2007
MICHAEL W. DOBBINS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON,

)

and VERONICA IMPERIAL, on behalf )

themselves and a class of others )

similarly situated, and LEONARD )

KIMBALL, individually,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF CHICAGO,

)

)

Defendant.

)

NO: 04-CV-6804 Judge Gettleman Magistrate Schenkier JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

AMENDED COMPLAINT NOW COME Plaintiffs THOMAS DUNN, DENNY ROBINSON, VERONICA IMPERIAL, and LEONARD KIMBLE, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, through their attorneys Loevy & Loevy, and for their complaint against Defendant CITY OF CHICAGO, state as follows:

Introduction 1. This is a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1983 challenging the Chicago Police Department’s (“CPD” or “Department”) inhumane and unlawful system for detaining persons under the Department’s control. 2. As is explained in detail below, the CPD has engaged, for decades, in a repeated pattern of detaining citizens incommunicado within its police departments, holding them for unconstitutional lengths of time and subjecting them to torture

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 2 of 33
in order to accomplish unjust ends. Plaintiffs bring this case in order to finally put an end to this institutionalized system of police torture in Chicago.
3. The CPD’s detention system routinely violates several fundamental constitutional protections guaranteed to all Americans. One such protection is the right to prompt judicial review of the Department’s justification for detaining a citizen in the first place. This requirement serves to ensure that citizens are not arrested unless the police have a proper justification for interfering in their liberties and to prevent overreaching while the citizen is detained behind closed station house doors.
4. As explained below, however, the Department routinely flouts this requirement for prompt judicial review by keeping citizens secreted inside its police departments while it attempts to develop grounds that would “justify” detaining them after the fact.
5. Another stunning example concerns the failure to provide counsel for those being interrogated during these detentions. It is a bedrock principal of American criminal procedure that police may not interrogate a suspect in their custody if that suspect requests to have an attorney present, unless and until an attorney has been provided. Although this constitutional mandate is absolutely clear, the CPD literally maintains no policy or directive for obtaining a lawyer if a
2

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detainee requests one, leaving its officers no choice but to ignore the requests.
6. This monumental failure by Department policymakers results in consistent violations of the Fifth Amendment during custodial interrogations of CPD detainees and communicates to CPD officers that they may violate the constitution in order to obtain a confession. The result is that numerous confessions obtained by the CPD in the course of such detentions have been subsequently proven to be false. In the meantime, the damage is done to those who have been coerced to confess and the true criminals have been left at large to strike again.
7. Further, detentions under the CPD’s system often last many days during which the detainees’ basic human needs for food, sleep and access to sanitation and hygiene are ignored. Indeed, the system exploits these needs in a manner consistent with tactics of “soft torture” used to extract involuntary confessions in other parts of the world.
8. Charles Gruber, a former president of the International Association of the Chiefs of Police who consults with the United States Department of Justice in its investigations of police forces, evaluated the unlawful detentions and the conditions of confinement complained of herein and concluded in an expert opinion as follows:
In my 35 years of policing and visiting police departments around the country, I have not seen a more blatant failure to promptly process and humanely care for arrested individuals. . . . So outrageous is the
3

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conduct on the part of the Chicago Police Department in constructing unlawful, unconstitutional, and inhumane policies and practices for extended detentions . . . that it manifests deliberate indifference.
9. Supervisors and policymakers at the highest level have known of these inhumane conditions and illegal detentions for many years but they shrink from changing this system because it is an entrenched means of doing business in the CPD.
Jurisdiction and Venue 10. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendant, City of Chicago, is a municipality physically situated in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims in this case all occurred here.
Interrogation Room Detentions: The Use of “Soft” Torture In Chicago’s Detective Divisions
11. Many persons who are detained by the CPD for extended periods are held in Detective Division interrogation rooms -- small, bare rooms, approximately ten feet in length and eight feet in width.
12. The rooms contain only a four foot by ten inch metal bench. There is no place to sleep or to relieve oneself and no access to running water. Because the rooms are wholly inadequate to meet the detainee’s basic needs, it is inhumane and cruel to hold a detainee in these rooms for extended periods of
4

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time. Illinois law recognizes this fact by placing an eight hour cap on detentions in such rooms.
13. The CPD, however, maintains no policies regarding the length of time a detainee may be held in these rooms. It is not uncommon for a detainee to be kept in such rooms for several days while CPD detectives interrogate them and attempt to extract a confession.
14. Exacerbating the torturous conditions, CPD policies and procedures require that all suspects held in an interrogation room be shackled -- arm to a ring on the wall or to a bar on the bench, for the entire time they are detained in the room.
15. During these detentions, the very officers who are charged with building a case against the detainees and attempting to obtain a confession from them have absolute control over their access to food, water, and a restroom. The investigating detectives control all circumstances of the detainees’ detention, even whether the light in the room is turned off at night allowing them to attempt to rest.
16. If a suspect needs food or water, he/she can only get it if the detectives bring some. There is no scheduled food service for persons detained in these rooms. If a person needs to use the bathroom, they are at the whim of the detectives to unshackle them, let them out of the room and escort them to a
5

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restroom. It is not uncommon for persons detained in the interrogations rooms for extended periods to urinate or defecate on themselves or on the floor.
17. These interrogation room detentions are not only physically torturous, they are psychologically disorienting in a manner that can lead to increased suggestibility for the suspect being interrogated and, ultimately, to false confessions. These very conditions are recognized world-wide as a means of psychological torture to overcome a human being’s reason and will.
Excessive Detentions Under The CPD’S System 18. The CPD detention practices challenged herein directly contravene additional, well-established rights and safeguards inherent in the United States Constitution. 19. First, CPD policy and practice allows its officers to hold citizens in its police stations (both interrogation rooms and lock-up cells) without the benefit of judicial review for unconstitutional periods of time. 20. This practice directly contravenes the Fourth Amendment which requires either an arrest warrant or prompt review by a judge of the CPD’s supposed justification for depriving an arrestee of his/her liberty. However, the CPD does not honor this right to judicial review.
6

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21. Rather, the CPD allows its officers to hold arrestees for extended periods of time in order to forestall this very judicial scrutiny while they attempt to develop grounds to justify the arrest. CPD officers can and routinely do rely on the extended detentions as a tool which allows them to make arrests for unconstitutional reasons, such as mere hunches or even animus, and then justify them after the fact by developing sufficient supposed evidence during the period of illegal detention. All too often the “justifications” CPD officers develop during these illegal detentions consist of fabricated evidence and coerced confessions.
22. This very practice was documented forty-five years ago in a publication by the American Civil Liberties Union, entitled Secret Detention by the Chicago Police. That report, as well as multitudinous criminal and civil cases over the years and more recent media attention have all put the policymakers of the City of Chicago on notice of these routine violations. However, the policymakers have not remedied the system.
Other Inhumane Conditions Inflicted By The CPD’s System 23. In addition to the above, the CPD’s system fails
to accommodate for the basic human needs of those who are being detained.
7

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24. The Department has an obligation to ensure, at a minimum, that detainees’ basic needs for sustenance, hygiene and sleep are met while they are in the Department’s charge. However, many of the hundreds of thousands of citizens arrested in the City of Chicago each year are systematically deprived of these basic needs. As a general and widespread practice and policy:
a. The CPD holds detainees in oppressive conditions;
b. The CPD furnishes no mattress or other bedding for overnight detentions. Despite the fact that overnight detentions are foreseeable and multi-day detentions are commonplace, the CPD maintains no bedding in its facilities and has no policies requiring that its employees furnish appropriate means of sleep to those who are subjected to extended detentions;
c. The CPD provides wholly inadequate access to restrooms and means of personal hygiene; and
d. The CPD furnishes detainees little if any food or drink during extended detentions. Even when the CPD does furnish food to those in its custody, it is always limited to a pork bologna sandwich, which, as the final policymakers of the CPD well know, violates the religious beliefs of many of its detainees, and is inedible to them.
8

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25. These failures violate well-established constitutional and state law requirements to provide for the basic human needs of those in custody. Indeed, the CPD has been cited by the Illinois Department Of Corrections for its widespread failure to provide proper bedding, nutrition and access to sanitation for those in its custody. However, the final policymakers of the CPD consistently treat these serious problems with callous indifference.
26. Although there is absolutely no legitimate law enforcement purpose for the foregoing policies and practices, the CPD has refused, and continues to refuse, to change.
Facts Concerning The Named Plaintiffs and Mr. Kimble 27. At approximately noon on February 24, 2004, Named
Plaintiff Leonard Kimble came to the CPD police station after being told that police wanted to learn if he had information about an unspecified crime.
28. Immediately upon arrival, Mr. Kimble was stripped of his shoestrings, searched, and imprisoned in an interrogation room. His wrist was shackled to a ring on the wall.
29. Chicago police detectives began questioning him about a murder that had occurred in March 2003. Mr. Kimble had no knowledge of the victim or the circumstances of his death and communicated this fact to the officers.
9

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30. Nevertheless, the detectives continued to question Mr. Kimble about the crime.
31. The detectives detained Mr. Kimble’s in the interrogation room for approximately 65 hours, from noon on February 24 to the early morning of February 27. The only times Mr. Kimble was allowed out of the interrogation room was to take a lie detector test on the first day of his detention, to appear in a line-up on the third day, and one time to use the bathroom.
32. At no time during this entire period did Mr. Kimble receive any judicial determination of probable cause or bail. He was not allowed to use the telephone. He was not given any food to eat. The only liquids he received were from the faucet on the sink during his lone trip to the bathroom. He could not sleep properly as he was sitting upright on the small metal bench with his wrist chained to the wall.
33. On October 20, 2000, at approximately 9 a.m., Named Plaintiff Denny Robinson was at work as a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. While he was sorting mail in an area closed to the public, Mr. Robinson was approached by a Chicago Police Officer, Detective Downs.
34. Detective Downs told him that he had an arrest warrant out for him, but Downs never showed him a warrant or indicated on his arrest report that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant. On information and belief there was no such warrant.
10

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35. Downs handcuffed Mr. Robinson but did not tell Mr. Robinson why he was being arrested. Thereafter, Mr. Robinson was transported to the police station, placed in a small interrogation room, and chained to a ring on the wall.
36. Mr. Robinson was held in the room for three days and two nights and was interrogated during this time. The room contained only a small metal bench.
37. Mr. Robinson could not sleep properly due to his arm being suspended above him and chained to the wall. He was furnished no mattress, blanket nor pillow. In addition, the bare lightbulb illuminating the room remained on all night and Plaintiff could not switch it off.
38. On the third day of his captivity, Mr. Robinson was taken from the interrogation room, booked, and placed in a lock-up cell where he was held until the following day. The holding cell was slightly bigger than the interrogation room, but also contained no accommodations for sleeping.
39. During his entire four-day detention, the only food provided to Mr. Robinson was three baloney sandwiches, one on each of the first three days of his confinement. He was often thirsty while locked in the interrogation room. When he asked for something to drink, detectives told him to “be patient,” or words to that effect, rather than bring him water. Mr. Robinson
11

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was not able to sleep properly during the three nights he spent in police custody.
40. At no time during this four day ordeal did Mr. Robinson receive a judicial hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to detain him or to set a bail for his release.
41. Mr. Robinson was finally transferred to the Cook County Jail on October 23, 2000, and was ultimately acquitted of all charges pending against him.
42. On July 29, 2003, Named Plaintiff Thomas Dunn was arrested by CPD officers for a crime he did not commit.
43. The officers placed Mr. Dunn in a CPD holding cell where he spent the next three nights.
44. During his detention, Mr. Dunn was not provided with any sheets, blankets, or pillows and was not able to obtain adequate sleep during this detention.
45. The only food Mr. Dunn received were pork bologna sandwiches. The only fluids he had to drink were from the tap of the sink in his cell.
46. On the morning following his third night in the cell, Mr. Dunn was finally transferred to court for a probable cause and bail hearing.
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47. On or about 9 a.m. on April 30, 2003, Plaintiff Veronica Imperial was arrested at her home without an arrest warrant and forced to accompany three detectives.
48. They took her to a detective division interview room and handcuffed her to a ring on the wall. The room contained only a small metal bench.
49. She was held in this room for approximately two days. During that time she was repeatedly questioned regarding an assault of which she was innocent. In response to the questioning she consistently told the detective questioning her that she did not wish to speak with police. Despite her refusal to speak, this same detective periodically came into the room to questioned over the entire period of her detention, telling her that witnesses were implicating her in an attempted murder and that se should speak with him to save herself.
50. During much of this interrogation, Ms. Imperial was shackled to the ring on the wall. This detective did not unshackle her until an attorney hired by her family came to the police station to try to intervene on her behalf.
51. Ms. Imperial was fed only once during the entire detention in that room. In order to relieve herself she had to bang on a door until someone came to escort her to the restroom. Often she would have to bang for long periods of time.
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52. There was no bed or bedding for Ms. Imperial to sleep in the room. She was forced to sleep on the floor to the extent that she could.
53 Ms. Imperial was charged in connection with the alleged assault and taken to a lock-up facility where she spent another night. There was no bed or bedding furnished to her in the lock-up facility either.
54. Ms. Imperial was acquitted of all charges in November 2003.
55. Each of the foregoing actions and failures to act by CPD employees affecting the Named Plaintiffs were taken pursuant to policies, customs and longstanding widespread practices of the CPD of which the Department’s policy makers were aware.
Class Allegations 56. The Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims both for themselves and for a class of others similarly situated. Named Plaintiffs believe that the class should be organized into three subclasses as follows. 57. Named Plaintiff Imperial seeks to represent Class I. Class I consists of: All persons detained in a CPD interrogation room for more than eight hours in a 24 hour period at any time form October 21, 2002 to the date of the order granting certification in this case.
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58. The individuals in the Class I are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The Named Plaintiffs estimate that Class I numbers in at least the thousands.
a. On information and belief, at least 200,000 persons have been arrested by the CPD each year since 1999;
b. The CPD maintains no policy, directive or procedure limiting the amount of time that an arrestee may be kept in an interrogation room. Indeed, Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the Chicago Police Department and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that there is no policy or practice of the CPD which limits the length of time an arrestee can be held in an interview room, making it likely that this unconstitutional condition of detention occurs again and again; and
c. Chicago police personnel, testifying as representatives of the Chicago Police Department and the CITY OF CHICAGO, have stated under oath that it is not uncommon for arrestees to be held in interrogation rooms for up to 72 hours or more.
59. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Class I. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether it is unconstitutional to hold detainees in an interrogation for extended periods of time;
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b. Whether it is unconstitutional to shackle persons to a wall in an interrogation room for extended periods of time;
c. Whether the conditions of confinement in the interrogation rooms deprive detainees of acceptable means of sleep in an unconstitutional manner;
d. Whether CPD policy allows the misuse of interrogations rooms for extended detentions in the manner alleged herein;
e. Whether there is a custom or practice within the CPD of misusing interrogation rooms in the manner alleged herein;
f. Whether CPD final policymakers have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to the misuse of interrogations rooms for extended detentions in the manner alleged herein; and
g. Whether extended detentions in the interrogation rooms violate detainees’ rights under state law.
60. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of Class I. Ms. Imperial was detained in a CPD interrogation room in excess of eight hours in a twenty-four hour period, she was shackled to the wall in the interrogation room for long periods of time, she was deprived of meaningful sleep as a result of the lack of a bed or bedding, she seeks to prove that the deprivations she suffered were inflicted as a result of CPD policy, custom, practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD policy makers.
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61. Plaintiff Imperial will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class I. Plaintiff has retained skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class.
62. The questions of law and fact common to the Class I, as described in paragraph 43 above, predominate over any individual issues.
63. Named Plaintiffs Dunn and Robinson seek to represent Class II. Class II consists of:
All persons detained in a CPD lock-up or detective division facility between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. at any time form October 21, 2002 to the date of the order granting certification in this case.
64. The individuals in the Class II are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Kimble and Robinson estimate that Class II numbers in at least the thousands.
a. On information and belief, at least 200,000 persons have been arrested by the CPD each year since 1999. A sizeable percentage of these persons are detained between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. as persons arrested by the CPD in the afternoon are rarely if ever taken to court until the following morning;
b. The CPD maintains no policy, directive or procedure requiring the provision of minimally appropriate sleeping accommodations to those in its custody, including the
17

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provision of a mattress, blanket or pillow. The CPD in fact maintains no such bedding;
c. CPD employees testifying as official representatives of the City of Chicago testified that the CPD has never maintained any such policies or facilities to the best of their knowledge. One of these representatives testified that detainees are expected to sleep on the floor or on the four foot by ten inch metal bench, and that this expectation applies even to those who are detained by the CPD for several days; and
d. The CPD has been cited multiple times by Illinois state officials for failing to maintain any bedding for detainees.
65. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Class II. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether it is unconstitutional to hold detainees overnight without furnishing them sleeping facilities such as a mattress, blanket or pillow;
b. Whether it is a violation of state law to hold detainees overnight without furnishing them sleeping facilities such as a mattress, blanket or pillow;
c. Whether CPD policy allows and/or encourages the alleged constitutional deprivations;
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d. Whether there is a custom or practice within the CPD that allows and/or encourages the alleged constitutional deprivations;
e. Whether CPD final policymakers have condoned or been deliberately indifferent to the alleged constitutional deprivations; and
f. Whether CPD final policymakers have been deliberately indifferent in failing to maintain minimally adequate sleeping accommodations for overnight detainees.
66. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of Class II. Mr. Dunn was detained over several nights in a CPD lock-up cell. During that entire time he received no accommodations for sleeping, no mattress, blanket or pillow. Messrs. Kimble and Robinson were each detained in CPD interrogation rooms over several nights and neither received any accommodations for sleeping, nor any mattress, blanket or pillow. Each of the Named Plaintiffs seeks to prove that the deprivations he suffered were inflicted as a result of CPD policy, custom, practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD policy makers.
67. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of Class II. Plaintiffs have retained skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class.
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68. The questions of law and fact common to Class II predominate over any individual issues.
69. Named Plaintiffs Dunn and Robinson seek to represent Class III. Class III consists of:
All persons arrested without an arrest warrant and detained by the CPD in excess of 48 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause at anytime from March 15, 1999 until the date of the order granting certification in this case.
70. The individuals in Class III are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Kimble and Robinson estimate that Class III numbers in at least the thousands.
a. On information and belief, at least 200,000 persons have been arrested by the CPD each year since 1999. A sizeable percentage of these persons were detained in excess of 48 hours without any judicial determination of probable cause;
b. The CPD maintains or maintained a policy, custom and/or widespread practice permitting officers to detain suspects in excess of 48 hours without obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause and for reasons which do not amount to exigent circumstances;
c. The CPD has a long history of detaining persons in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause determination. Most or a substantial portion of CPD officers
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believe that they may detain a suspect for 72 hours or longer without obtaining judicial approval;
d. Numerous individual and class action civil rights cases as well as criminal cases dating back to 1986 and before have challenged that the CPD fails to obtain probable cause determinations within 48 hours of arrest;
e. The CPD did not adopt a policy even purporting to ban detentions in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval until August of 2003. Moreover, on information and belief, based on the fact that detentions in excess of 48 hours are an ingrained and long standing CPD practice, and based on the fact that Mr. Dunn was detained for 56 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause in 2004, the new policy has not been properly implemented;
f. CPD employees testifying as representatives of the City of Chicago testified that during the class period it was not uncommon for arrestees to be held for 72 hours or more without a judicial determination of probable cause; and
g. An analysis of data obtained from the Cook County States Attorneys Office and the Cook County Circuit Court indicates that at least approximately 1400 people were detained in excess of 48 hours by the CPD without a judicial determination of probable cause from March 15, 1999 through May of 2004.
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71. There are questions of law and fact common to the claims of Class II. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether it violates the constitution to detain warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining judicial approval of probable cause for the detention;
b. Whether it violates state law to detain warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining judicial approval of probable cause for the detention;
c. Whether the CPD maintained a policy, custom and/or widespread practice allowing the detention of warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause for the detention;
d. Whether the CPD maintains a custom and/or widespread practice allowing the detention of warrantless arrestees in excess of 48 hours without obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause for the detention; and
e. Whether CPD officials have been deliberately indifferent to the need for training, enforcement, discipline, and/or policy changes regarding the length of detention of arrestees in the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause.
72. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of Class III. Each of the Named Plaintiffs was detained by the CPD in excess of 48 hours without receiving a judicial determination
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of probable cause. Each of the Named Plaintiffs seeks to prove that the deprivations he suffered were inflicted as a result of CPD policy, custom, practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD policy makers.
73. The Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of Class III. Plaintiffs have retained skilled counsel with experience in constitutional and class action litigation to represent the Class.
The Robinson and Lopez Cases 74. The CPD’s policy of permitting extended detentions of arrestees in the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause has been challenged in at least two class actions. 75. In the case of Robinson v. Chicago, 638 F.Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1986), rev'd 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989), the trial court determined that the practice of holding detainees for excessive periods without obtaining judicial approval violated the Fourth Amendment, and the court awarded an injunction against the practice. In appealing that decision, Defendant City of Chicago essentially conceded the Fourth Amendment violation but represented to the Seventh Circuit that it had abolished the policy allowing such detentions. The Seventh Circuit reversed the award of the injunction on standing grounds.
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76. However, the CPD completely failed to enact any policies forbidding the challenged detentions or to take other appropriate steps to cease the detentions.
77. As a result, extended detentions without judicial approval remained the widespread norm in the CPD for the next 15 years. CPD final policymakers were deliberately indifferent to these detentions.
78. In June of 2002, representatives testifying on behalf of the City of Chicago admitted under oath that the CPD continues to allow detentions in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval of probable cause. On the basis of these admissions another class action was pursued against the CPD, styled Lopez v. City of Chicago.
79. Lopez was brought by a named plaintiff who was detained for five days in an interrogation room under the circumstances identified above. Like Robinson, Lopez challenged CPD polices and procedures allowing the detention of arrestees in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause review. Lopez also gave the City of Chicago notice that a large class of people were being subjected to unconstitutional conditions while detained in CPD police departments including being detained in torturous interrogation room conditions, deprived of accommodations for sleeping, adequate nutrition and adequate access to sanitation.
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80. In direct response to the challenge in Lopez, the CPD modified its directive for processing arrestees to forbid detentions in excess of 48 hours in the absence of judicial approval or extraordinary circumstances.
81. The modification was enacted by the CPD’s final policymaker or makers. The modification became effective in August of 2003.
82. The final policymakers of the CPD remain deliberately indifferent despite their having adopted the modification. Ignoring the allegations in Lopez of torturous conditions of confinement during CPD detentions, the final policymakers enacted no directive or modification to limit the amount of time a detainee may be held in an interrogation room other than the 48 hour general limitation on all detentions. Neither was a directive modified or adopted to require adequate accommodations for sleeping or adequate provision of nutrition or sanitation.
83. The modification was adopted solely as a litigation response to the pressure of the Lopez suit.
84. The modification was not implemented in a genuine manner that would actually change the CPD’s widespread practice of unlawful detentions. The modification has not been subject of adequate dissemination, training and/or enforcement, and
25

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 26 of 33
violations of the 48 hour requirement have not been adequately investigated and disciplined.
85. Rather, the final policymakers of the City of Chicago have been and remain deliberately indifferent to the widespread practice of detaining arrestees in excess of 48 hours without judicial approval. As a result, such detentions remain widespread practice in the CPD.
86. The court in Lopez approved a class limitations period beginning on March 15, 1999 based on the fact that the suit, filed as an individual action on March 15, 2001, provided notice of the widespread violations contained of herein.
87. The class representative in Lopez withdrew his request for class certification on March 20, 2004. All claims asserted herein were tolled at least until that time by virtue of the Lopez case. Additional tolling is provided under Illinois’s single re-filing rule.
88. Based on the CPD’s representations in Robinson that the policy allowing extended detention without judicial approval had been revoked and the fact that the CPD thereafter allowed the detentions through a widespread practice with which private citizens had no reason to be familiar, the Named Plaintiffs did not learn and could not have learned through reasonable diligence that the CPD maintained a policy, custom and/or widespread practice allowing detentions in excess of 48
26

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 27 of 33
hours without judicial approval until they learned of this through the Lopez case.
89. Mr. Robinson learned of this fact in or about August of 2003. Messrs. Dunn and Kimble learned of this fact in or about June of 2004.
90. As private citizens, Named Plaintiffs have no reason to be familiar with the policies, failures of policy, widespread practices and/or customs of the CPD with regard to detentions in interrogation rooms. Named Plaintiffs did not learn and could not have learned through the exercise of reasonable diligence that the CPD permits unconstitutionally extended detentions in interrogation rooms as a matter of custom, widespread practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD final policymakers.
91. Mr. Robinson learned of this fact in or about August of 2003. Messrs. Dunn and Kimble learned of this fact in or about June of 2004. Ms. Imperial learned of this fact in November 2005.
92. As private citizens, Named Plaintiffs have no reason to be familiar with the policies, failures of policy, widespread practices and/or customs of the CPD with regard to providing constitutionally adequate sleeping accommodations to overnight detainees. Named Plaintiffs did not learn and could not have learned through the exercise of reasonable diligence
27

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 28 of 33
that the CPD permits unconstitutional conditions of confinement regarding sleep as a matter of custom, widespread practice and/or the deliberate indifference of CPD final policymakers.
93. Mr. Robinson learned of this fact in or about August of 2003. Messrs. Dunn and Kimble learned of this fact in or about June of 2004. Ms. Imperial learned of this fact in November 2005.
COUNT I - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Unlawful Interrogation Room Detentions 94. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 95. As described more fully above, Plaintiff Kimble, Named Plaintiff Imperial, and the other members of Class I were detained in CPD interrogation rooms for lengths of time which violate federal constitutional and state law. Among other violations, Defendant contravened the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement and the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement. Holding detainees in an interrogation room for long periods is unreasonable given the conditions in those rooms. Further, after eight hours of detention, the class members had an entitlement under 20 IL ADC 720.50 to a cell with a toilet, a bed, and running water (conditions absent from the interrogation rooms). Defendant deprived the class members of this entitlement without due process of law.
28

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 29 of 33
96. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for these Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members' damages, inter alia, because the City of Chicago maintains unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that causes such violations. Further, the City of Chicago has been deliberately indifferent to the need for different policies, training and discipline. Also, the City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
COUNT II - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim For Deprivation of Adequate Accommodations For Sleep
97. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
98. As described more fully above, Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Robinson, and Imperial, Plaintiff Kimble, and the other members of the Class II have been detained in CPD facilities overnight and have not been furnished minimally adequate accommodations for sleeping as required by federal constitutional and state law. Among other violations, Defendants contravened the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requirement. It is unreasonable
29

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 30 of 33
not to furnish bedding to these detainees. Further, the class members had an entitlement under 20 IL ADC 720.60 to bedding. Defendant deprived them of this entitlement without due process of law.
99. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members' damages, inter alia, because the City of Chicago maintains unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that causes such violations. Further, the City of Chicago has been deliberately indifferent to the need for different policies, training and discipline. Also, the City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
COUNT III - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim For Excessive Detention 100. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing
paragraphs as if fully stated herein. 101. As described more fully above, Named Plaintiffs
Dunn and Robinson, Plaintiff Kimble, and the members of the Class III have been detained in CPD facilities for over 48 hours
30

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 31 of 33
following arrest without a judicial determination of probable cause.
102. The City of Chicago caused this deprivation of rights and is liable for Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members' damages, inter alia, because the City of Chicago maintains unconstitutional policies, customs and widespread practices that caused these violations. Moreover, the City of Chicago fails to adequately train and discipline its officers in a manner that causes such violations. Further, the City of Chicago has been deliberately indifferent to the need for different policies, training and discipline. Also, the City of Chicago has failed to act to remedy the patterns of misconduct described in the preceding paragraphs, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the types of injuries alleged here.
COUNT IV - Respondeat Superior 103. Plaintiffs reallege each of the forgoing paragraphs as if fully stated herein 104. By all of the above employees of the City of Chicago subjected Named Plaintiffs Dunn, Robinson and Imperial, Plaintiff Kimble and the members of the Classes I-III to excessive detentions and unlawful conditions of confinement in a manner which violates Illinois law.
31

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 32 of 33
105. These employee’s actions and omissions were taken within the scope of their employment for the CPD.
106. Named Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Kimble, and the members of Classes I-III have suffered damages as a result.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF KIMBLE AND NAMED PLAINTIFFS DUNN, ROBINSON, and IMPERIAL, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, demand judgment against the CITY OF CHICAGO awarding their actual damages, costs and a reasonable attorneys fee, together with any other relief that may be just; and further demand that a common fund be established to compensate them and their attorneys and to reimburse all expenses in connection with obtaining this relief.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff Kimble and Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the classes, hereby demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
32

Case 1:04-cv-06804 Document 131 Filed 04/03/2007 Page 33 of 33

Arthur Loevy Michael Kanovitz Jon Loevy Russell Ainsworth LOEVY & LOEVY 312 North May St. Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312) 243-5900

s/Michael Kanovitz Attorneys for Plaintiffs

33

 
 Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 1 of 32
PROTO,SCHENKIER,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.1.1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−06804

Dunn, et al v. City of Chicago Assigned to: Honorable Robert W. Gettleman Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Thomas Dunn

Date Filed: 10/21/2004 Date Terminated: 10/06/2010 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Arthur R. Loevy Loevy &Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243−5900 Email: loevylaw@loevy.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Lewis Donnell Loevy &Loevy 321 North Mat Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 312 243 5900 Email: heather@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan I. Loevy Loevy &Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243−5900 Email: jon@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew T. Jenkins Deshur Law Firm 55 West Monroe Street Suite 3950 Chicago, IL 60603 312 243 5900 Email: mjenkins@loevy.com TERMINATED: 06/25/2008
Michael I Kanovitz Loevy &Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243−5900 Email: mike@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roshna Bala Keen Deshur Law Firm 55 West Monroe Street Suite 3950 Chicago, IL 60603

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 2 of 32

(312) 243−5900 Email: roshna@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell R Ainsworth Loevy &Loevy 312 North May Street Suite 100 Chicago, IL 60607 (312)243−5900 Email: russell@loevy.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Denny Robinson

represented by Arthur R. Loevy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Lewis Donnell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I. Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael I Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roshna Bala Keen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell R Ainsworth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Leonard Kimble on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated

represented by Arthur R. Loevy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Heather Lewis Donnell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jonathan I. Loevy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael I Kanovitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Roshna Bala Keen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Russell R Ainsworth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 3 of 32

Plaintiff Veronica Imperial

represented by Heather Lewis Donnell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Roshna Bala Keen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant City of Chicago

represented by June K. Ghezzi Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601−1692 (312) 782−3939 Fax: (312) 782−8585 Email: jkghezzi@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/24/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Matthew Charles Crowl Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: mcrowl@schiffhardin.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Dolesh City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−9010 Email: mdolesh@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 10/25/2005 LEAD ATTORNEY
Aphrodite Kokolis Schiff Hardin LLP 6600 Sears Tower Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: dkokolis@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Joseph Murray Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601−1692 (312)782−3939 Fax: (312)782−8585 Email: bjmurray@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/24/2005
Caroline K. Sheerin City of Chicago

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 4 of 32
Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street 1040 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−6437 Email: csheerin@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 10/25/2005
Catherine M. Kelly City of Chicago (30 N LS) 30 North LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60602 (312)744−8368 Fax: (312) 744−8373 Email: catherine.kelly@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 01/03/2008
Craig Alan Roeb Chapman, Glucksman, &Dean 11900 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90064 310 207 7722 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
J Ernest Mincy , III City of Chicago, Department of Law 30 North LaSalle Street Suite 1020 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 742−0094 Email: emincy@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jamal S. Muhammad Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: jmuhammad@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason G. Winchester Jones Day 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601−1692 (312)782−3939 Fax: (312)782−8585 Email: jgwinchester@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/24/2005
Jean H. Hurricane Schiff Hardin LLP One Market Spear Tower, 32nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 415 901 8700 Email: jhurricane@schiffhardin.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karey Vering Skiermont Jones Day

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 5 of 32
77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601−1692 (312)782−3939 Email: kskiermont@jonesday.com TERMINATED: 02/24/2005
Lisa M. Natter Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 312 258 5888 Email: lnatter@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mara Stacy Georges City of Chicago Department of law 30 North LaSalle Street Room 900 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 744−2002 Email: mgeorges@cityofchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew B Mock Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: mmock@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Brown Holmes Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5500 Email: pholmes@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara L. Ellis Schiff Hardin LLP 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 258−5834 Fax: (312) 258−5600 Email: sellis@schiffhardin.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Paul Baker City of Chicago (30 N LS) 30 North LaSalle Street Chicago, IL 60602 (312)744−8369 Fax: (312)744−8677 Email: stephen.baker@cityofchicago.org TERMINATED: 12/03/2007
Movant
Frank W. White

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Movant Jose Carrizales

Movant James D. Lewis

Movant Talmon Hegwood, Jr.

represented by Talmon Hegwood, Jr. N−81140 Dixon − DIX 2600 North Brinton Avenue Dixon, IL 61021 PRO SE

Movant Eric Durr

represented by Eric Durr N−82072 Lawrence − LAW 10930 Lawrence Road Sumner, IL 62466 PRO SE

V. Intervenor Tommy Dye

represented by Kenneth N Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C. 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 201 Chicago, IL 60604−6107 (312) 427−3200 Email: knf@kenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/21/2004
10/21/2004 10/28/2004 11/19/2004
11/19/2004 11/22/2004 11/29/2004

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT; Jury demand − Civil cover sheet − Appearance(s) of Russell R Ainsworth, Michael I Kanovitz, Arthur R. Loevy, Jon Loevy as attorney(s) for plaintiffs (One original and one copy summons(es) issued.) (Documents: 1−1 through 1−3) (lw) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
RECEIPT regarding payment of filing fee paid; on 10/21/04 in the amount of $150.00, receipt #10216898. (lw) (Entered: 10/22/2004)
2 RETURN OF SERVICE of summons and complaint executed as to defendant City of Chicago on 10/28/04. (hp) (Entered: 10/29/2004)
3 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant by June K. Ghezzi, Jason Graham Winchester, Brian Joseph Murray, Karey Vering Skiermont. (gma) (Entered: 11/22/2004)
4 AGREED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for extension of time to answer or otherwise plead ; Notice. (lc) (Entered: 11/30/2004)
MOTION by defendant City of Chicago for reassignment of cases as related (Attachments); Notice (Original in 01 cv 1823) (cdy) (Entered: 12/02/2004)
5 MINUTE ORDER of 11/29/04 by Hon. Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant's motion for extension of time to 01/04/05 to file its answer to plaintiff's complaint is granted [4−1] Telephoned notice (lc) (Entered: 11/30/2004)

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12/03/2004 01/04/2005 01/04/2005 01/10/2005 01/11/2005 01/11/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/03/2005 02/09/2005 02/09/2005
02/16/2005 02/23/2005 02/24/2005
03/04/2005 03/04/2005 03/15/2005

RESPONSE by plaintiffs to Chicago's motion for reassignment of cases as related [0−1] (Attachments); Notice (Original in 01 cv 1823) (cdy) (Entered: 12/06/2004)
6 MOTION by defendant for extension of time in which to answer or otherwise plead ; Notice. (emd) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
7 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant by Caroline K. Sheerin (emd) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
8 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to Chicago's second motion for extension of time in which to answer or otherwise plead [6−1] (Attachments); Notice. (ntf) (Entered: 01/10/2005)
SCHEDULE set on 1/11/05 by Hon. Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing set to 9:00 2/9/05 . Status report due 2/3/05. Open court notice (gds) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
9 MINUTE ORDER of 1/11/05 by Hon. Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant City of Chicago's motion for extension of time to 2/3/05 to answer or otherwise plead is granted [6−1]. Mailed notice (emd) (Entered: 01/11/2005)
10 JOINT INITIAL STATUS Report by parties; Notice.(mjc, ) Modified on 2/7/2005 (mjc, ). Modified on 1/10/2006 (mjc, ). (Entered: 02/07/2005)
11 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to withdraw and substitute counsel.(lxs, ) (Entered: 02/09/2005)
12 NOTICE of Motion by June K. Ghezzi for presentment of motion to substitute attorney, motion to withdraw as attorney 11 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/9/2005 at 09:15 AM. (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/09/2005)
13 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint; Exhibit.(lxs, ) Modified on 12/8/2005 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/09/2005)
14 NOTICE of Motion by June K. Ghezzi for presentment of motion to dismiss 13 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/9/2005 at 09:15 AM. (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/09/2005)
15 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Mara Stacy Georges, Sara L. Ellis, Michael J. Dolesh (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/11/2005)
16 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 2/9/2005, Set deadlines/hearing as to motion to dismiss 13 : Responses due by 2/16/2005 Replies due by 2/23/2005. Status hearing set for 3/16/2005 at 09:30 AM. No notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/22/2005)
17 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendant's motion to dismiss 13 ; Notice; Exhibits. (mjc, ) Modified on 2/28/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 02/22/2005)
19 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago in support of its motion to dismiss; Notice. (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/28/2005)
18 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant City of Chicago's motion to withdraw appearances of June Ghezzi, Jason Winchester, Brian Murray, and Karen Skiermont as its counsel and to substitute the appearances of Michael Dolesh and Sara Ellis as its counsel is granted. Open Court notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/25/2005)
20 MOTION by Plaintiffs to supplement the record of Chicago's motion to dismiss; Exhibits. (gma, ) Modified on 7/26/2006 (ym, ). (Entered: 03/08/2005)
21 NOTICE of Motion by Arthur R. Loevy for presentment of MOTION by Plaintiffs to supplement the record of Chicago's motion to dismiss 20 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/9/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 03/08/2005)
22 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Motion to supplement 20 the record on defendant's motion to dismiss is granted Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/15/2005)

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03/16/2005
03/24/2005
03/25/2005 03/28/2005 04/15/2005 04/20/2005 04/29/2005 05/02/2005 05/05/2005
06/13/2005 06/13/2005 06/21/2005 06/23/2005 06/23/2005 06/24/2005 07/18/2005 07/27/2005 07/27/2005
08/02/2005

23 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Motion to reassign case [] is moot, Motion to dismiss 13 is denied. Answer to complaint is due by 4/15/05. Status hearing set for 3/24/2005 at 09:00 AM. Open court notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/16/2005)
24 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held. Plaintiff's class certification motion is due by 5/13/2005. Defendant's response is due by 6/17/2005. Plaintiff's reply is due by 7/1/2005. Status hearing set for 8/25/2005 at 09:00 AM. Open court notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/25/2005)
26 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to magistrate judge Sidney I. Schenkierpursuant to Local Rule 72.1. Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 03/25/05. (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/29/2005)
25 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing set for 4/20/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
27 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by City of Chicago; Notice.(lxs, ) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
28 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 6/23/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/20/2005)
29 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to extend class certification briefing schedule; Notice. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/03/2005)
30 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendant City of Chicago to extend class certification briefing schedule; Notice. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/04/2005)
31 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Motion for extension of time 29 30 is granted. Plaintiff's motion for class certification is due by 6/13/2005. Responses due by 7/18/2005. Replies due by 8/1/2005. Status hearing before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman is reset to 9/29/2005 at 09:00 A.M. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/05/2005)
32 MOTION by plaintiffs for class certification; Notice.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/16/2005)
33 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in Support of their motion for class certification 32 . (lcw, ) (Document Not Scanned) Modified on 8/9/2007 (lcw, ). (Entered: 06/16/2005)
34 NOTICE of Motion by plaintiffs for presentment of MOTION to transfer as a related case before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/28/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 06/22/2005)
35 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 10/18/2005 at 09:00 AM. The status hearing date of 10/13/05 is stricken by the Court. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 06/23/2005)
36 AGREED, QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE Order Signed by Judge Sidney I. Schenkier on 6/23/2005.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
37 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier: Enter agreed qualified protective order. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/28/2005)
38 MEMORANDUM by defendant City of Chicago in Opposition to plaintiffs' motion for class certification 32 ; Notice. (Exhibits) (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/21/2005)
39 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Plaintiffs for a four−day extension to file their reply in support of class certification(gma, ) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
40 NOTICE of Motion by plaintiff for presentment of UNOPPOSED MOTION by Plaintiffs for a four−day extension to file their reply in support of class certification 39 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/2/2005 at 09:15 AM. (gma, ) (Entered: 07/28/2005)
41 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Plaintiff's motion for extension of time 39 to file reply is granted. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/02/2005)

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08/08/2005 09/21/2005 10/03/2005 10/05/2005
10/05/2005 10/14/2005 10/14/2005 10/18/2005 10/19/2005 10/25/2005 10/25/2005
10/25/2005 10/26/2005 11/02/2005 11/08/2005 11/08/2005 11/09/2005 11/10/2005 11/15/2005

42 REPLY by plaintiffs in Support of their motion class certification 32 ; Notice. (Exhibits) (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/10/2005)
43 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing reset to 10/3/2005 at 09:15 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/21/2005)
44 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing date of 10/3/2005 is stricken. The Court will rule by mail. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
45 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Memorandum opinion and order entered. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for class certification with respect to class III is granted. The court certifies class II by agreement. The court denied plaintiffs' motion as to class I. Status hearing set for 10/18/05 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
46 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 10/5/2005.(lcw, ) (Entered: 10/07/2005)
47 MOTION by Plaintiff Thomas Dunn for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 46 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 10/14/2005)
48 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief 47 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/18/2005 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 10/14/2005)
49 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing reset to 10/25/2005 at 09:30 AM. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is also reset to that day and time. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/18/2005)
50 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Pursuant to the parties request, the status hearing set for 10/18/05 is reset to 11/1/2005 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/19/2005)
51 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Stephen Paul Baker (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 10/25/2005)
54 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held. Leave is granted to Michael J. Dolesh and Caroline K. Sheerin to withdraw their appearance as counsel on behalf of defendant. Leave is granted to Steven Baker, J. Ernest Mincy and Catherine Kelly to file their appearances as substitute counsel for defendant. Response to plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is due by 11/8/05. Reply is due by 11/15/2005. Status hearing continued to 11/28/05, at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
Responses due by 11/8/2005 Replies due by 11/15/2005. (lcw, ) (Entered: 11/03/2005)
52 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by J Ernest Mincy, III (Mincy, J) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
53 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing set for 11/10/2005 at 09:00 AM. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/02/2005)
55 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago to motion for reconsideration, motion for relief 47 (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
56 NOTICE by City of Chicago re Response 55 to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 11/08/2005)
57 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Catherine M. Kelly (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
58 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 12/6/2005 at 09:00 AM. The defendant is to respond to the plaintiffs' settlement proposal by 11/28/05. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/14/2005)
59 REPLY by Thomas Dunnin Support of MOTION by Plaintiff Thomas Dunn for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 46 47 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 11/15/2005)

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11/15/2005 11/28/2005 11/30/2005 11/30/2005 12/07/2005 12/12/2005 12/12/2005 12/12/2005 12/12/2005 12/13/2005 12/13/2005 12/15/2005
12/15/2005 12/15/2005 12/15/2005 01/19/2006 01/26/2006 02/08/2006
02/09/2006

60 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re reply to response to motion 59 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 11/15/2005)
61 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 11/28/2005 Status hearing set for 12/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. Open court notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
62 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Memorandum opinion and order entered. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to reconsider 47 is granted and class III is redefined. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
63 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 11/30/2005.(lcw, ) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
64 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Pursuant to the defendants' request, the status hearing is reset to 12/15/05 at 9:00 a.m. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 12/07/2005)
65 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble for leave to file Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
66 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for leave to file 65 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
67 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble to certify class I (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
68 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to certify class 67 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/15/2005 at 09:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
69 Joint Proposed Class Action Notice by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, City of Chicago (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
70 NOTICE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble re other 69 Joint Proposed Notice of Class Action (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
71 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file amended complaint is granted. Motion to certify class I is continued to 1/26/06, at 9:30 a.m. Discovery ordered closed 11/16/06. Status hearing continued to 11/16/06, at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
Motion Hearing set for 1/26/2006 at 09:30 AM. (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
72 AMENDED complaint by Veronica Imperial, Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble against City of Chicago. (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
73 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 1/19/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
74 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 2/8/2006 at 09:00 AM. Any 30(b)(6) depositions are to be completed before 2/8/06. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 01/20/2006)
75 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 1/26/2006 Status hearing set for 2/9/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
76 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 3/1/2006 at 09:00 AM. By 2/28/06, another 30(b)(6) deposition shall take place concerning the computer information. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
77 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 2/9/2006. Status hearing set for 3/1/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/09/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 11 of 32

03/01/2006 03/01/2006
03/07/2006 03/07/2006 03/09/2006 03/09/2006
03/23/2006 03/23/2006 03/28/2006 03/28/2006
03/30/2006 04/12/2006 04/12/2006

78 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 3/1/2006 Status hearing set for 3/9/2006 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
79 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 3/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. Plaintiff's oral motion to set a deadline for defendant's responses to written discovery served on 01/17/06 is GRANTED; responses are due by 03/22/06. The parties are directed to meet and confer concerning any disputes concerning plaintiff's pending Rule 30(b)(6) notice, and to raise any unresolved disputes at the next status conference. At the next status conference, the Court will set deadlines for defendant to produce certain computerized arrest records. Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
80 STATUS Report regarding class notice by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
81 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re status report 80 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
82 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 3/9/2006. Conference on class notice is set for 5/12/2006 at 11:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
83 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : STATUS HEARING HELD. Defendant's shall begin production of information from its CRIS data base as soon as possible after 03/23/06. The production shall be on a rolling basis, and shall be completed by 04/13/06. Plaintiff shall serve Rule 36 requests to admit concerning the subjects of the pending Rule 30(b)(6) notices by 03/10/06. The Court shortens defendant's time to respond, with the answers to the requests to admit due by 03/24/06. Defendant shall supply plaintiff with a list of relevant CV numbers by 03/16/06. The Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices shall be held in abeyance pending the answers to the requests to admit. The matter is set for a status conference on 04/13/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/09/2006)
84 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time to answer plaintiffs' Second Set of Requests to Admit (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Plaintiffs' Second Set of Requests to Admit)(Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
85 NOTICE of Motion by Sara L. Ellis for presentment of motion for extension of time 84 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 3/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 03/23/2006)
86 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Defendant's motion for an extension of time to answer plaintiffs' second set of Request to Admit 84 is granted. Status hearing set for 3/30/2006 at 09:00 AM. The Court orders that Mr. Maris and his supervisor are to appear at the status hearing. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
87 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : This order corrects the previously entered order for 3/28/06 (docket entry 86). Defendant's motion for an extension of time to answer plaintiffs' second set of Requests to Admit 84 is granted. By 4/10/06, the defendant is to answer the Requests to Admit without objections. Status hearing set for 3/30/2006 at 09:00 AM. The Court orders that Mr. Maris and his supervisor are to appear at the status hearing. (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/29/2006)
88 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held on 3/30/2006. (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
89 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial for discovery Overruling objections and Deeming Request Admitted (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
90 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for discovery 89 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/18/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/12/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 12 of 32

04/13/2006 04/21/2006 04/21/2006 04/24/2006 04/24/2006 04/26/2006
05/12/2006 05/25/2006 06/02/2006 06/02/2006

91 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held. By 4/27/06, the defendant is to complete production of the requested CRIS data. By 6/8/06, the defendant is to produce the automated system information. Plaintiff's motion for discovery Overruling objections and Deeming Request Admitted is reset for hearing on 4/26/06 at 9:00 a.m. The 4/18/06 motion hearing date is stricken. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
92 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Veronica Imperial to compel and for Cautionary Instructions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/21/2006)
93 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to compel 92 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/26/2006 at 08:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/21/2006)
94 RESPONSE by City of Chicago in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial for discovery Overruling objections and Deeming Request Admitted 89 (Ellis, Sara) (Linked document does not show case number 04c6804) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
95 NOTICE by City of Chicago re response in opposition to motion 94 and Certificate of Service (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
96 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status/motion hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion to overrule objections and to deem requests admitted (doc. # 89) is granted in part and denied in part. The Court overrules all objections to the requests other than with respect to the objection to the definition of "City of Chicago," which shall be defined as personnel of the Chicago Police Department and any persons with policy−making authority over the Chicago Police Department. By 5/3/06, the defendant is to review its answers to Requests to Admit Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 13, 15 and to supplement its responses. The Court denies the motion insofar as it seeks to deem all requests admitted. The Court grants the motion to compel defendant to produce Rule 30(b)(6) witness(es) to testify with respect to requests nos. 7−11, 14, 15, and 19. The defendant is to identify the witnesses it will produce by 5/10/06 and all witnesses will give their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony by 5/24/06. Plaintiffs' motion to compel and for cautionary instructions (doc. # 92) is granted in part and denied in part. By 5/10/06, defendant is to supplement its answers to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3, and produce documents responsive to Document Requests Nos. 1 and 3, consistent with the Court's oral ruling in open court. To the extent that defendant's responses incorporate by reference documents from the Lopez litigation, defendant shall identify those documents by Bates numbers. By 5/10/06, all documents responsive to any outstanding document requests are to be produced. Plaintiff's motion for cautionary instructions is denied. The parties are to meet and confer to prepare a schedule of witnesses they will depose through mid−July 2006, which they shall present to the Court at the next status conference. A status hearing is set for 5/25/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/27/2006)
97 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Conference re: class notice held on 5/12/2006. Plaintiff's motion to certify class I and status hearing regarding identification of class members is set for 6/2/2006 at 08:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
98 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : STATUS CONFERENCE HELD. By the close of business on 06/02/06, defendant shall complete production of all responsive information from the CHRIS databse. By the close of business on 06/09/06, defendant shall respond to all outstanding interrogatories, shall complete paper document production, and shall answer the amended complaint. The matter is set for a status on 07/20/06 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 05/25/2006)
99 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 6/2/2006 Status hearing set for 8/14/2006 at 11:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/02/2006)
100 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier: The status conference set for 07/20/2006 is stricken. The Court will conduct a status conference on 08/14/2006

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 13 of 32

06/02/2006 06/02/2006 06/09/2006 06/09/2006 07/17/2006 08/10/2006 08/14/2006 08/14/2006 09/21/2006
09/28/2006
10/27/2006 10/31/2006 11/22/2006

at 11:00 a.m. in conjunction with the status conference being held at that time by Judge Gettleman. Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
101 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : The Court certified the class. The Court appoints plaintiff Veronica Imperial as class representative for this class. The Court appoints Loevy &Loevy as class counsel for the class. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
102 ORDER Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2006.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/08/2006)
103 ANSWER to amended complaint by City of Chicago(Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
104 NOTICE by City of Chicago re answer to amended complaint 103 and certificate of service (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 06/09/2006)
105 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 3/16/05; Before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman (cdy, ) (Entered: 07/18/2006)
106 STATUS Report Regarding Identification Of The Class Members by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 08/10/2006)
107 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status conference held in chambers in conjunction with district judge. The matter is set for a pre−settlement conference with the magistrate judge on 09/21/06 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
108 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 8/14/2006 Status hearing set for 10/27/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/17/2006)
109 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Preliminary settlement conference held with the parties and continued to 11/21/06 at 9:30 a.m. During the conference, it came to the Court's attention that the City's production of a sampling of 3000 paper arrest records is long overdue. The Court, sua sponte, orders that the production of those records begin immediately, continue on a rolling bases, and be completed by 09/28/06. The Court sets the matter for a status conference on 09/28/06 at 1:00 p.m. The Court further orders that Mr. Bezarek personally attend that status conference. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
110 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 10/31/06 at 9:00 a.m. By 10/13/06, The City is to produce no less than half of the remaining 1800 arrest records at issue. The balance of the arrest records are to be produced by 10/30/06. The plaintiff's oral motion for the City to produce the dates for which the request for the 3000 paper arrest records was made is granted. The Court directs the City to produce the dates for when the arrest records were requested from the City Counsel's paralegal, when the paralegal made the request to the Office of Legal Affairs, and when the Office of Legal Affairs gave the request to the officers assigned to pull the documents. The City is to keep a log of who is assigned to pull any records, how long those assigned have been pulling the records, and how many individuals are pulling the records. Maile notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 10/04/2006)
112 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 10/27/2006. Brief status report is due by 11/22/2006. The close of discovery is continued generally. Status hearing set for 11/28/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
111 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held. The settlement conference set for 11/21/06 is reset to 11/28/2006 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
113 STATUS Report regarding class notice by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 11/22/2006)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 14 of 32

11/28/2006 11/28/2006 11/28/2006 12/04/2006 12/14/2006 01/09/2007 02/06/2007 02/26/2007 03/02/2007 03/09/2007 03/09/2007 03/20/2007
03/26/2007 03/28/2007 03/28/2007 03/28/2007 04/03/2007 04/03/2007 04/09/2007

114 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The Settlement conference set for 11/28/06 is reset to 12/14/2006 at 09:45 AM. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
115 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re status report 113 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 11/28/2006)
116 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 11/28/2006 Status hearing set for 12/4/2006 at 09:45 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/29/2006)
117 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Settlement conference held on 12/4/2006 Settlement Conference set for 2/23/2007 at 11:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 12/05/2006)
118 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held and continued to 2/2/2007 at 09:00 AM. Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
119 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The settlement conference set for 02/02/07 is Reset for 2/8/07 at 10:00 a.m Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
120 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The settlement conference set for 02/08/07 is reset to 3/2/2007 at 09:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
121 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Settlemenet pretrial conference date of 2/23/2007 is stricken.Status hearing set for 3/22/2007 at 09:00 AM.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/26/2007)
122 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held and continued to 03/20/07 at 9:30 a.m. The matter is set for a telephone status conference on 03/09/07 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
123 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing re−set to 5/18/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
124 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Telephone status conference held.Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
125 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held. By the close of business on 03/22/07, defense counsel shall inform chambers of which of the proposed dates for reconvening the settlement conference are acceptable. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/20/2007)
129 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement Conference continued to 4/25/2007 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
126 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial for leave to file Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Second Amended Complaint)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
127 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for leave to file 126 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/3/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
128 Corrected Attachment to Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/28/2007)
130 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Plaintiff's motion 126 for leave to file second amended complaint is granted. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/06/2007)
131 SECOND AMENDED Complaint by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial against City of Chicago.(lcw, ) (Entered: 04/06/2007)
132 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial, Defendant City of Chicago for hearing Concerning Protective

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 15 of 32

04/09/2007 04/12/2007
04/13/2007 04/13/2007 04/24/2007 04/24/2007 05/11/2007 05/11/2007 05/14/2007 05/14/2007 05/16/2007 05/16/2007 05/17/2007
06/04/2007 06/13/2007 06/22/2007

Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
133 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Paul Baker for presentment of motion for hearing 132 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/12/2007 at 08:30 AM. (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 04/09/2007)
134 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion for hearing concerning protective order 132 is granted. The parties are to revise the protective order as directed by the Court and submit the revised copy to the Court by the close of business on 4/12/07. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
135 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier :Enter protective order, as amended by the Court at paragraph 9.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/17/2007)
136 PROTECTIVE Order. Signed by Judge Sidney I. Schenkier on 4/13/2007.(lcw, ) (Entered: 04/17/2007)
137 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Telephone status conference held. As a result of a conflict with the Court's schedule, the continued settlement conference set for 4/25/07 is reset to 5/11/07 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
138 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier :The continued Settlement Conference reset for 5/11/2007 at 11:00 AM.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
139 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing is re−set to 6/13/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
140 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Continued settlement conference held. The matter is set for a status conference on 05/17/07 at 9:45 a.m. for status on discovery. (mmm, ) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
141 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time to Respond to Plaintiffs' March 21, 2007 Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
142 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Paul Baker for presentment of extension of time 141 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 5/17/2007 at 09:45 AM. (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
143 RESPONSE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperialin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time to Respond to Plaintiffs' March 21, 2007 Discovery 141 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
144 NOTICE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial re response in opposition to motion, 143 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
145 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion for an extension of time to respond to plaintiffs' 3/21/07 discovery request 141 is denied insofar that it seeks to argue that it is a proper objection to the Request to Admit, But the Court grants the motion as to its request amend the defendant's answers. The defendant is to answer the request to admit by 5/24/07. Any denials are to be given with a full factual disclosure for the denial, including any required documents.Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
146 MOTION by Isaac Briggs to intervene in the above captioned matter. (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/06/2007)
147 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 6/13/2007. Answer to the second amended complaint is due by 7/18/2007. Status hearing set for 7/19/2007 at 09:00 a.m.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
148 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial to enforce May 17, 2007 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 06/22/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 16 of 32

06/22/2007 06/26/2007 06/26/2007 06/27/2007 06/27/2007
06/28/2007 06/29/2007 07/12/2007 07/12/2007 07/16/2007 07/16/2007 07/18/2007 07/18/2007 07/19/2007
08/03/2007 08/06/2007

149 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to enforce 148 before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier on 6/27/2007 at 08:30 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
150 RESPONSE by City of Chicagoin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial to enforce May 17, 2007 Order 148 (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
151 NOTICE by City of Chicago re response in opposition to motion 150 and Certificate of Service (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
152 DOCUMENT entered in error. (Entered: 06/28/2007)
154 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier :Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to enforce the minute order of 5/17/07 148 is granted. Defendant is given leave to amend its answers to request to admit to state fully the basis for its denials, and to attach any documents in support of the denials. The amendment is due by 7/13/07. Plaintiff is given leave to depose any one knowlegeable about denials by 8/10/07. The costs and fees for any additional depositions the plaintiff needs are to borne by the defendant. In addition, defendant is given leave to supplement any prior interrogatory answers concerning the conditions of confinement and bedding claims. The supplementation is due by 6/29/07. Any further supplementation of these interrogatory answers by 6/29/07, or further amendment of the answers to the request to admit after 7/13/07, will be untimely and will not be permitted. The matter is set for a status hearing on 8/14/07 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (air, ) (Entered: 06/28/2007)
153 NOTICE of Correction regarding order on motion to enforce, motion hearing, text entry,,,,,,,,, 152 . (air, (Entered: 06/28/2007)
155 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing date of 7/19/2007 is reset to 8/16/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
156 OBJECTIONS by City of Chicago to motion hearing, text entry,,,,,, 154 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J)(Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
157 OBJECTION FILED IN DOCKET # 156 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Paul Baker for presentment of before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/19/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 07/12/2007)
158 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file Supplemental Exhibit in Support of Its Objection (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K)(Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
159 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Paul Baker for presentment of motion for leave to file 158 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/19/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
160 ANSWER to amended complaint Second by City of Chicago(Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
161 NOTICE by City of Chicago re answer to amended complaint 160 and Certificate of Service (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
162 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held. Defendant's motion for leave to file supplemental exhibit is granted. Response to defendant's objection to Magistrate Judges ruling is due by 8/3/2007. Reply is due by 8/17/2007. Status hearing is re−set to 9/11/2007, at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/26/2007)
163 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial to objections, 156 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
164 NOTICE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial re Response 163 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 08/06/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 17 of 32

08/13/2007 08/17/2007 08/17/2007 08/20/2007 08/24/2007 08/28/2007 09/04/2007 09/10/2007 09/10/2007
09/11/2007 09/14/2007
09/27/2007
09/27/2007
09/30/2007 09/30/2007 10/04/2007
10/17/2007

165 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing set for 8/14/07 is reset to 9/18/2007 at 09:00 AM. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
166 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago to objections, 156 in Support of (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 08/17/2007)
167 NOTICE by City of Chicago re reply 166 (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 08/17/2007)
168 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Judge Sidney I. Schenkier no longer referred to the case.The referral to Magistrate Judge Schenkier is terminated.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
169 MOTION by Meeka Aresaba to intervene. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
170 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing is re−set to 9/10/2007 at 10:30 a.m.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
171 ORDER Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 9/4/2007: Defendant's objections to the Magistrate Judge June 28 order is overruled.Mailed notice(gds, ) (Entered: 09/05/2007)
172 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 9/10/2007.Status hearing set for 9/27/2007 at 08:45 a.m.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
173 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: discovery supervision and settlement conference.(gds, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 09/10/2007)
174 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :The time of the 9/27/2007 status hearing is re−set to 08:30 a.m.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/11/2007)
175 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : The status conference set with the magistrate judge for 09/18/07 is STRICKEN. The status will be reset as needed after the 09/27/07 status conference with the presiding district judge. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
176 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status conference held in chambers with Judge Gettleman. The parties may pursue discovery by document subpoenas (and any follow−up resulting from the responses to the subpoenas), limited to the bedding issue, through 11/01/07. The matter is set for a status conference in court with the magistrate judge on 11/01/07 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/27/2007)
179 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 9/27/2007. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is due by 12/7/2007. Defendant's response and cross−motion are due by 1/11/2008. Plaintiffs' reply and response are due by 1/25/2008. Defendant's final reply is due by 2/8/2008. Status hearing set for 3/27/2008 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
177 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica ImperialUpdate Class Definitions (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 09/30/2007)
178 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 177 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/4/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 09/30/2007)
180 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Motion 177 is granted; Motion hearing held on 10/4/2007 regarding motion for miscellaneous relief 177 to update the class definitions, noting that defendant maintain the same objections that were previously filed.mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/09/2007)
181 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of City of Chicago by Craig Alan Roeb; Order entered granting leave by Judge Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $ 50.00 paid, receipt number 1115068. (lcw, ) (Entered: 10/18/2007)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 18 of 32

11/01/2007
11/27/2007 11/27/2007 11/27/2007 11/27/2007 12/03/2007 12/05/2007
12/12/2007 12/12/2007 12/19/2007
12/21/2007 12/21/2007 01/03/2008 01/07/2008 01/08/2008 01/08/2008

182 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Status hearing held and continued to 1/22/2008 at 10:00 a.m. in chambers. If the parties want the court to review some materials before the 1/22/08 hearing, the materials should be delivered to chambers by noon on 1/18/08. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
183 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial, Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time of Briefing Schedule for All Motions for Summary Judgment, Agreed (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
184 NOTICE of Motion by Catherine M. Kelly for presentment of extension of time 183 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
185 MOTION by counsel for Defendant City of Chicago to withdraw as attorney (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
186 NOTICE of Motion by Stephen Paul Baker for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 185 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Baker, Stephen) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
187 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant City of Chicago's motion 185 to withdraw attorney Stephen Baker is granted. Attorney Stephen Paul Baker terminated. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
188 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for extension of time 183 is granted. Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment are due by 1/11/2008. Defendant's response and cross−motion are due by 2/15/2008. Plaintiffs' reply and response are due by 2/29/2008. Defendant's final reply is due by 3/14/2008. Status hearing is re−set for 5/14/2008 at 09:00 a.m Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
189 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time of Briefing Schedule for All Motions for Summary Judgment, Second &Unopposed (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
190 Certificate of Service NOTICE of Motion by Catherine M. Kelly for presentment of extension of time 189 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/18/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
191 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant City's motion for extension of time 189 of briefing schedule for all motions for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff's motion is due by 2/15/2008. Defendant's response and cross−motion are due by 3/14/2008. Plaintiff's reply and response are due by 3/28/2008. Defendant's reply is due by 4/11/2008. This is the final extensionTelephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 12/19/2007)
192 MOTION by counsel for Defendant City of Chicago to withdraw as attorney (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
193 Certificate of Service NOTICE of Motion by Catherine M. Kelly for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 192 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/27/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Kelly, Catherine) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
197 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant City of Chicago's motion 192 to withdraw appearance of counsel Catherine M. Kelly is granted. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/08/2008)
194 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Patricia Brown Holmes (Holmes, Patricia) (Entered: 01/07/2008)
195 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Matthew Charles Crowl (Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 01/08/2008)
196 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Matthew B Mock (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 01/08/2008)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 19 of 32

01/11/2008 01/11/2008 01/17/2008 01/18/2008 01/22/2008 01/24/2008
02/15/2008 02/15/2008 02/15/2008 02/18/2008 02/19/2008 02/20/2008 02/20/2008 03/12/2008 03/17/2008 04/04/2008 04/04/2008 04/04/2008 04/04/2008

198 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for extension of time To Summary Judgment Briefing Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
199 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew B Mock for presentment of extension of time 198 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/22/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 01/11/2008)
200 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Thomas Dunn by matthew T. Jenkins (Jenkins, matthew) (Entered: 01/17/2008)
201 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Veronica Imperial to extension of time 198 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 01/18/2008)
202 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held and continued to 02/19/08 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) Modified on 1/22/2008 (mmm, ). (Entered: 01/22/2008)
203 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Motion hearing held on 1/22/2008. Defendant's motion for extension of time 198 is granted. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is due by 2/15/2008. Defendant City's response and cross motion are due by 4/4/2008. Plaintiff's reply and response is due by 4/18/2008. Defendant's final reply is due by 4/25/2008. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/24/2008)
204 MOTION by Plaintiff Thomas Dunn for summary judgment in favor of Class II (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
205 Undisputed Facts STATEMENT by Thomas Dunn (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−4# 2 Exhibit 6−10# 3 Exhibit 11−15# 4 Exhibit 16−20# 5 Exhibit 21−23# 6 Exhibit 24−25# 7 Exhibit 26−31)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
206 Corrected Undisputed Facts STATEMENT by Thomas Dunn (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
207 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re statement 206 , statement 205 of filing Exhibit 5 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 5 to Plaintiffs' LR 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Undisputed Facts)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 02/18/2008)
208 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier : Settlement conference held and continued to 03/12/08 at 10:00 a.m.Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 02/19/2008)
209 MOTION by Plaintiff Thomas Dunn for summary judgment (corrected copy) (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
210 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re MOTION by Plaintiff Thomas Dunn for summary judgment (corrected copy) 209 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
211 MINUTE entry before Judge Sidney I. Schenkier :Settlement conference held and continued to 4/9/2008 at 10:00 AM in chambers.Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 03/12/2008)
212 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: At the joint request of the parties, the continued settlement conference set for 04/09/08 is RESET to 04/25/08 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
213 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to strike the Declaration of Jeannie Johnson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, B and C, # 2 Exhibit D and E)(Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
214 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew B Mock for presentment of motion to strike 213 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/17/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
215 MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago in Opposition to motion for summary judgment 209 City of Chicago's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II (Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
216 RULE 56 Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) Statement by City of Chicago regarding motion for summary judgment 209 Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement in Opposition to

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 20 of 32

04/04/2008 04/04/2008 04/04/2008 04/04/2008
04/17/2008 04/19/2008 04/19/2008 04/19/2008
04/19/2008
04/19/2008 04/19/2008 04/19/2008 04/21/2008 04/23/2008 04/24/2008

Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Undisputed Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibit 1−9, # 3 Exhibit 10−20, # 4 Exhibit 21−28, # 5 Exhibit 29−35)(Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
217 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment City of Chicago's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and IV (Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
218 NOTICE by City of Chicago re MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment City of Chicago's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and IV 217 (Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
219 MEMORANDUM by City of Chicago in support of motion for summary judgment 217 City of Chicago's Brief in Support of Its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and IV (Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
220 RULE 56 Local Rule 56.1 Statement by City of Chicago regarding motion for summary judgment 217 City of Chicago's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibits 1−9, # 3 Exhibits 10−20, # 4 Exhibits 21−30, # 5 Exhibits 31−37, # 6 Exhibits 38−43)(Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/04/2008)
229 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 4/17/2008 regarding motion to strike 213 . The motion is taken under advisement. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/22/2008)
221 REPLY by Thomas Dunn to memorandum in support of motion 219 for Summary Judgment: Class II (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
222 RESPONSE by Veronica Imperialin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment City of Chicago's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and IV 217 Class I (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
223 RULE 56 Class II's Response to Defendant's Statement of Addtional Facts Statement by Thomas Dunn regarding motion for summary judgment 217 by Class II (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 31−32, # 2 Exhibit 33, # 3 Exhibit 34−37, # 4 Exhibit 38−40, # 5 Exhibit 41−43, # 6 Exhibit 44, # 7 Exhibit 45, # 8 Exhibit 46, # 9 Exhibit 47−48)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
224 RULE 56 Class I and II: Response to Defendant's Statement of Fact and Plaintiff's Statement of Addtional Facts Statement by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial regarding motion for summary judgment 217 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−2, # 2 Exhibit 3−5, # 3 Exhibit 6−11, # 4 Exhibit 12−15)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
225 RESPONSE by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperialin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to strike the Declaration of Jeannie Johnson 213 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−2)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
226 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial to strike Certain of Defendant's Summary Judgment Exhibits (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
227 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion to strike 226 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/24/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2008)
228 Plaintiff's CORRECTED Motion to Strike Certain of Chicago's Summary Judgment Exhibits by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/21/2008)
230 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Response to plaintiffs' corrected motion to strike is due by 5/9/2008. Reply is due by 5/16/2008. telephone notice (gds,) (Entered: 04/23/2008)
231 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: The settlement conference set for 04/25/08 is RESET to 05/02/08 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 04/24/2008)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 21 of 32

04/24/2008 04/24/2008
04/25/2008 04/25/2008 04/25/2008 04/25/2008 04/28/2008
05/02/2008 05/02/2008
05/02/2008 05/02/2008 05/08/2008
05/09/2008 05/09/2008 05/09/2008
05/12/2008 05/13/2008

232 REPLY by Thomas Dunn to reply to response to motion 221 Class II's Corrected Reply In Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2008)
233 RESPONSE by Veronica Imperialin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for summary judgment City of Chicago's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I, II and IV 217 Class I's Corrected Response in Opposition to City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/24/2008)
234 RESPONSE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to strike the Declaration of Jeannie Johnson 213 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/25/2008)
235 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago to motion to strike 213 the Declaration of Jeannie Johnson (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2008)
236 RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago City's Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Index, # 2 Exhibits 1−4, # 3 Exhibits 5−8)(Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2008)
237 REPLY by City of Chicago to response in opposition to motion, 233 City of Chicago's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Parital Summary Judgment on Counts I, II &IV (Crowl, Matthew) (Entered: 04/25/2008)
238 EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial Corrected (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Corrected Exhibit 10, # 2 Exhibit Corrected Exhibit 12.pdf, # 3 Exhibit Corrected exhibit 14)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 04/28/2008)
239 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Continued settlement conference held and continued to 06/30/08 at 4:00 p.m.Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
240 RESPONSE by City of Chicagoin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial to strike Certain of Defendant's Summary Judgment Exhibits 226 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−3)(Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
241 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago to strike Plaintiffs' Newspaper Articles (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
242 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew B Mock for presentment of motion to strike 241 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/15/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
246 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 7/19/07 and 9/10/07; Before the Honorable Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. (Documents 246−1 through 246−2) (Document Not Scanned) (lcw, ) Modified on 5/12/2008 (lcw, ). (Entered: 05/12/2008)
243 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for Status Hearing (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/09/2008)
244 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew B Mock for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 243 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/15/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/09/2008)
245 REPLY by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial to MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial to strike Certain of Defendant's Summary Judgment Exhibits 226 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 05/09/2008)
247 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Status hearing date of 5/14/2008 is stricken.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/12/2008)
248 RESPONSE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial to motion to strike 241 . (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 5/14/2008 (lcw, ). (Entered: 05/13/2008)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 22 of 32

05/14/2008 05/14/2008
05/15/2008 05/22/2008
05/22/2008 05/29/2008 05/30/2008 05/30/2008 05/30/2008 06/04/2008
06/05/2008 06/05/2008 06/09/2008 06/25/2008 06/30/2008 07/07/2008 07/07/2008 07/08/2008 07/09/2008

249 RESPONSE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperialin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for Status Hearing 243 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 05/14/2008)
251 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of City of Chicago by Jean H. Hurricane; Order entered granting leave by Judge Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $ 50.00 paid, receipt number 4624002849. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/16/2008)
250 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Lisa Michelle Natter (Natter, Lisa) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
252 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion 243 for a status hearing is granted; Motion hearing held on 5/22/2008. Status hearing set for 6/17/2008 at 09:00 a.m. Reply in support of defendant's motion 241 to strike plaintiffs' newspaper articles is due by 5/22/2008. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
253 REPLY by Defendant City of Chicago to motion to strike 241 Plaintiff's Newspaper Articles (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/22/2008)
255 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 05/17/07 and 06/27/07; Before the Honorable Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier. (Documents 255−1 through 255−2) (Documents Not Scanned) (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
254 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Jamal S. Muhammad (Muhammad, Jamal) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
256 MOTION by Defendant City of ChicagoFor Class Notice And Stay On Ruling on Cross−Motions For Summary Judgment (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
257 NOTICE of Motion by Matthew B Mock for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 256 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/4/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 05/30/2008)
260 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 6/4/2008 regarding motion 256 for class notice and stay on ruling. Status hearing is re−set to 7/9/2008 at 09:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/09/2008)
258 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiff Thomas Dunn to withdraw as attorney Matthew Jenkins (Loevy, Arthur) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
259 NOTICE of Motion by Arthur R. Loevy for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 258 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/25/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Loevy, Arthur) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
261 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The time of the 7/9/2008 status hearing is reset to 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/09/2008)
262 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 258 by plaintiffs counsel Matthew Jenkins for leave to withdraw is granted. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/26/2008)
263 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 08/05/08 at 5:00 p.m. (mmm, ) (Entered: 07/02/2008)
264 City of Chicago's Memorandum Regarding Notice of Classes I and II by City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
265 NOTICE by City of Chicago re other 264 Notice of Filing (Mock, Matthew) (Entered: 07/07/2008)
267 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs by Roshna Balasubramanian. (ca, ) (Entered: 07/11/2008)
266 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 7/9/2008. Status hearing, in chambers, is set for 7/31/2008 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 23 of 32

07/31/2008 08/05/2008 08/06/2008 08/06/2008 08/06/2008 08/08/2008 08/12/2008 08/19/2008
08/25/2008 08/27/2008 09/18/2008 09/19/2008 09/29/2008 10/07/2008

notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/10/2008)
268 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 7/31/2008. Status hearing set for 8/6/2008 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/01/2008)
272 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 08/08/08 at 12:30 p.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
269 MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file Supplemental Local Rule 56.1 Statements with Newly Available Evidence (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C Part 1, # 4 Exhibit C Part 2)(Hurricane, Jean) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
270 NOTICE of Motion by Jean H. Hurricane for presentment of motion for leave to file 269 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/27/2008 at 10:30 AM. (Hurricane, Jean) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
271 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 8/6/2008. Status hearing set for 8/12/2008 at 11:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
273 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 9/29/2008 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 08/08/2008)
274 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 8/12/2008. Settlement Conference set for 10/7/2008 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/12/2008)
275 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 07/09/08 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: JENNIFER COSTALES, CRR, RMR (312)427−5351 jennifer_costales@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 9/9/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/19/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/17/2008. (Costales, Jennifer) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
276 RESPONSE by Thomas Dunn, Denny Robinson, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperialin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago for leave to file Supplemental Local Rule 56.1 Statements with Newly Available Evidence 269 (Balasubramanian, Roshna) (Entered: 08/25/2008)
277 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion 269 for leave to supplement its LR 56.1 statements with newly available evidence is granted. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 09/05/2008)
279 MOTION by Isaac Briggs to Rule on Motion to intervene. Notice. (Exhibits). (ca, ) (Entered: 09/22/2008)
278 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement Conference set for 9/29/2008 at 9:00 a.m. is reset to 9/29/08 at 09:30 AM. Telephone notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/19/2008)
280 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 10/16/08 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
281 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 10/7/2008. Status hearing set for 10/31/2008 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, )

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 24 of 32

10/16/2008 10/28/2008 10/31/2008 12/01/2008 12/12/2008 01/08/2009 01/28/2009
03/03/2009 03/04/2009 03/11/2009 03/16/2009
04/06/2009 04/29/2009 05/01/2009

(Entered: 10/08/2008)
282 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 10/27/08 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
283 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held. (mmm, ) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
284 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 10/31/2008. Defendants' settlement proposal is due by 11/18/2008. Plaintiffs' response is due by 11/21/2008. Settlement pretrial conference is set for 12/1/2008 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds ) (Entered: 11/05/2008)
285 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held on 12/1/2008 and continued to 12/12/2008 at 1:00 PM.Mailed notice (tlp, ) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
286 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 01/08/09 at 1:30 p.m. By the close of business on 01/06/09, the parties shall deliver to chambers any supplemental settlement letters they have exchanged. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
287 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 01/28/09 at 10 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
288 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held. By 02/13/09, defendant shall provide plaintiffs with a written response to their last proposal; by 02/20/09, plaintiffs shall provide defendant with a written reply to that response. By noon n 02/27/09, defense counsel shall deliver to chambers all settlement letters exchanged since today's conference. The matter is set for a continued settlement conference on 03/04/09 at 5:00 p.m. in chambers. In addition, the parties are advised that the matter is set for final settlement conferences to determine whether final resolution can be reached: those conferences are set for 04/28/09 at 10:00 a.m. and 05/01/09 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
289 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: The Settlement conference set for 3/4/09 is RESET to 3/11/2009 at 2:00 PM. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
290 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:The Settlement Conference set for 3/11/09 at 2:00 p.m. is RESET to 3/11/09 at 3:00 PM. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 03/06/2009)
291 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 04/06/09 at 7:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mmm, ) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
292 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: By agreement of the parties, due to ongoing settlement negotiations with Judge Schenkier the motions for summary judgment 209 ; Motion to strike 213 ; motion for summary judgment 217 ; motion to strike 226 ; motion to strike 241 ; motion for class notice and to stay 256 ; and motion 279 to rule on motion to intervene are withdrawn without prejudice. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
293 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held on 4/6/2009. Continued settlement conference dates of 04/28/09 at 10:00 a.m. and 05/01/09 at 11:00 a.m. stand.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
294 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 05/01/09 at 11:00 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
295 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 05/08/09 at 3 p.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 05/04/2009)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 25 of 32

05/08/2009 05/22/2009 06/05/2009 07/06/2009 07/09/2009 08/21/2009 09/14/2009 09/25/2009 09/30/2009 10/02/2009 10/08/2009
10/22/2009
11/23/2009 12/11/2009 12/15/2009 12/21/2009 12/23/2009 01/04/2010

296 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 05/22/09 at 10:15 a.m. Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 05/11/2009)
297 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 6/5/09 at 3:00 p.m. Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 05/22/2009)
298 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 07/06/09 at 9:00 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
299 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 07/13/09 at 5:30 p.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
300 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:The continued settlement set for 07/13/09 is RESET to 08/21/09 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
301 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 09/14/09 at 2:00 p.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 08/21/2009)
302 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 09/30/09 at 2:00 p.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
303 MOTION to intervene by Jarmain Merritt (ca, ). (Entered: 09/29/2009)
304 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 10/20/09 at 7:30 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 09/30/2009)
305 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement Conference set for 10/20/09 is RESET 10/22/2009 at 7:30 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/06/2009)
306 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: On the court's own motion, Jarmain Merritt's Motion to Intervene is denied. Dunn v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6804, does not involve the Forest Park or Oak Park police departments. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
307 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Status hearing held in chambers regarding status of documenting settlement. The matter is set for a further status hearing in chambers on 11/23/09 at 7:30 a.m. Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 10/22/2009)
308 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Settlement conference held and continued to 12/11/2009 at 9:15 A.M. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,) (Entered: 11/23/2009)
309 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Status conference held and continued to 12/15/09 at 9:30 a.m. in chambers.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
310 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 12/21/09 at 10 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 12/15/2009)
311 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 12/23/09 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 12/21/2009)
312 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 01/05/10 at 10:00 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 12/23/2009)
313 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:At the joint request of the parties, the settlement conference set on 1/5/2010 is reset to 1/21/2010 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 01/05/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 26 of 32

01/11/2010 01/21/2010 02/03/2010 02/11/2010 02/19/2010 02/25/2010 02/26/2010 03/01/2010 03/05/2010 03/05/2010 03/05/2010 03/05/2010 03/05/2010 03/08/2010 03/08/2010
03/08/2010 03/08/2010 03/08/2010 03/08/2010 03/08/2010

314 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:The settlement conference set for 1/21/2010 at 10:00 a.m. is RESET to 1/21/2010 at 1:30 p.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
315 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 2/3/10 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 01/21/2010)
316 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 02/10/10 at 1:30 p.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 02/03/2010)
317 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 02/19/10 at 11:00 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 02/11/2010)
318 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Settlement conference held and continued to 02/25/10 at 10:00 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 02/19/2010)
319 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Continued settlement conference held. The matter is set for a telephone status hearing on 02/26/10 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 02/25/2010)
320 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Telephone status held.Mailed notice (wyh, ) (Entered: 02/26/2010)
321 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson by Heather Lewis Donnell (Donnell, Heather) (Entered: 03/01/2010)
322 Document entered in error. (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 3/8/2010 (kj, ). (Entered: 03/05/2010)
323 MEMORANDUM in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 3/8/2010 (kj, ). (Entered: 03/05/2010)
324 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/9/2010 at 10:00 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/05/2010)
325 Document entered in error. (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 3/8/2010 (kj, ). (Entered: 03/05/2010)
326 NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/9/2010 at 10:00 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/05/2010)
327 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny RobinsonFor Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
328 MEMORANDUM of Law by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement 327 (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 3/9/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 03/08/2010)
329 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny RobinsonFor Additional Published Notice to Class Via Chicago Transit Authority Buses (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
330 NOTICE of Correction regarding 322 . (kj, ) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
331 NOTICE of Correction regarding 329 . (kj, ) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
332 RESPONSE by City of Chicagoin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny RobinsonFor Additional Published Notice to Class Via Chicago Transit Authority Buses 329 (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 03/08/2010)
333 NOTICE by City of Chicago re response in opposition to motion 332 (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 03/08/2010)

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03/09/2010 03/09/2010
03/17/2010 04/05/2010 05/11/2010 05/14/2010
05/14/2010
05/14/2010 05/14/2010
05/14/2010 08/10/2010 08/10/2010 08/10/2010 09/29/2010 09/29/2010
09/29/2010

334 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant City of Chicago by Aphrodite Kokolis (Kokolis, Aphrodite) (Entered: 03/09/2010)
335 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 3/9/2010 regarding plaintiff's motion 329 for additional published notice, and motion 327 for preliminary approval. Those motions are continued to 4/1/2010 at 1:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/12/2010)
336 REPLY by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson to response in opposition to motion 332 for additional published notice (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Keen, Roshna) (Entered: 03/17/2010)
337 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 329 for additional published notice is withdrawn. Motion hearing held on 4/5/2010. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/05/2010)
338 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: discovery supervision and settlement. (gds, ) Mailed notice. (Entered: 05/11/2010)
339 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson for preliminary approval of class action settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F)(Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 5/17/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 05/14/2010)
340 MEMORANDUM of Law by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson in support of Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of proposed class action settlement, 339 (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 5/17/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 05/14/2010)
341 NOTICE by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson re MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson for settlement preliminary approval 339 (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
342 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiff's motion 339 for preliminary approval of class action settlement and directing notice to settlement classes is granted. A final approval hearing is set for 10/6/2010, at 10:00 a.m. in courtroom 2525. [For further detail see separate order] Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
343 ORDER Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Directing Notice to Settlement Classes Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/14/2010(ca, ). (Entered: 05/18/2010)
344 ATTORNEY Appearance for Objectors Kevin Vodak, Steven Hudosh, Cathy Gruber, Patrick Donnell, Robert Castillo, Sarah Bergstrand by John Ladell Stainthorp (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 08/10/2010)
345 OBJECTIONS to Proposed Settlement (Stainthorp, John) (Entered: 08/10/2010)
346 LETTER from William F. McCormick dated 8/10/2010; Notice. (lp, ) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
347 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson for leave to file Oversized Briefs Instanter (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
348 MEMORANDUM motion for leave to file 347 by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit A−1, # 3 Exhibit A−2, # 4 Exhibit A−3, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D part 1, # 8 Exhibit D part 2, # 9 Exhibit E, # 10 Exhibit F, # 11 Exhibit G, # 12 Exhibit H, # 13 Exhibit H−1)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
349 Joint MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit A−1, # 3 Exhibit A−2, # 4 Exhibit A−3, # 5 Exhibit A−4, # 6 Exhibit A−5, # 7 Exhibit A−6, # 8 Exhibit A−7, # 9 Exhibit A−8, # 10 Exhibit A−9, # 11 Exhibit A−10, # 12 Exhibit A−11, # 13 Exhibit C)(Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 9/30/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 09/29/2010)

Case: 1:04-cv-06804 As of: 04/25/2013 02:15 PM CDT 28 of 32

09/29/2010
09/30/2010 10/01/2010 10/05/2010 10/06/2010 10/06/2010
10/06/2010 10/21/2010
10/29/2010 10/29/2010 11/03/2010
11/23/2010 12/03/2010 12/03/2010
12/03/2010 12/07/2010
12/23/2010

350 MEMORANDUM of Law by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson in support of joint motion for final approval of class action settlement, 349 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 9/30/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 09/29/2010)
351 Corrected Exhibit 1 350 <(Declaration) (Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 10/1/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 09/30/2010)
352 CORRECTED Exhibit B 349 − Declaration of Ted Dabroski (Muhammad, Jamal) Modified on 10/4/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 10/01/2010)
353 SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT of Robin Niemiec regarding motion for settlement, 349 (Donnell, Heather) Modified on 10/6/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 10/05/2010)
354 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion to file oversized briefs instanter is granted. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/08/2010)
355 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Final approval hearing held. Motion 349 for final approval of class action settlement is granted. Vodak class members have until 10/25/10 within which to opt out. Status hearing is set for 10/22/10 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 10/14/2010)
356 ORDER Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Final Judgment Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/6/2010(ca, ). (Entered: 10/14/2010)
357 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs are to file a report on the number of total claims to date and provide a reasonable estimate of the final number and amount of claims by 10/29/2010. The status hearing set for 10/22/2010 is re−set to 11/3/2010 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds,) (Entered: 10/21/2010)
358 Plaintiffs' Report Regarding Class Member Claims by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 10/29/2010)
359 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re other 358 Plaintiffs' Report Regarding Class Member Claims (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 10/29/2010)
360 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held. Pursuant to this Court's oral ruling, plaintiffs' attorneys are awarded the sum of $3,300,000.00 plus costs in the amount of $70,000.00. Status hearing is continued to 1/28/2011, at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 11/04/2010)
361 MOTION for Rule to show cause by Wayne Willis (ca, ). (Entered: 11/29/2010)
362 RESPONSE by Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson to MOTION for order to show cause 361 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit A)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
363 JOINT MOTION by Defendant City of Chicago, Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson to Grant Mr. Isaac Briggs Belated Exclusion From Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit 1 to Exhibit A)(Kanovitz, Michael) Modified on 12/6/2010 (ca, ). (Entered: 12/03/2010)
364 Joint NOTICE of Motion by Michael I Kanovitz for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 363 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/7/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Kanovitz, Michael) (Entered: 12/03/2010)
365 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held. Motion 361 by Wayne Willis for rule to show cause is denied. Joint motion 363 to grant Isaac Briggs belated exclusion for the class action settlement is granted and Mr. Briggs is allowed to opt−out of the class. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/13/2010)
366 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: Telephone status hearing held. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 12/23/2010)

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01/28/2011 01/28/2011
02/01/2011
02/01/2011 02/16/2011
02/22/2011
03/01/2011
03/01/2011 03/18/2011 03/31/2011
04/15/2011
05/05/2011 05/16/2011 05/17/2011
05/19/2011 05/23/2011 05/24/2011 05/26/2011 05/26/2011 05/31/2011 06/15/2011

367 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier:Joint status hearing held with district judge. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 01/28/2011)
368 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 1/28/2011. Status hearing set for 2/22/2011 at 11:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/03/2011)
369 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Order the Court extends to 2/28/2011 the date for mailing notices of claim determinations and accompanying checks to Settlement Class Members who submitted a claim form. The Court approves payment to the Claim Administrator, Rust Consulting, Inc. for invoices of $76,745.10 to be paid out of the Settlement Fund.Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 02/04/2011)
370 ORDER Granting Miscellaneous Relif Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/1/2011(ca, ). (Entered: 02/04/2011)
371 MOTION to Object and to inforce order by Jason Negron (Exhibits) (Poor quality original − paper document on file) Modified on 3/8/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 02/17/2011)
372 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 2/22/2011. Counsel are to submit a proposed draft order. Status hearing is set for 9/15/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/24/2011)
373 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Enter order granting miscellaneous relief. [For further detail see minute order.] Mailed notice (lw, ) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
374 ORDER granting miscellaneous relief. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/1/2011. (lw, ) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
375 LETTER from Marcus D. Deloney dated 3/12/11 (ca, ). (Entered: 03/22/2011)
376 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Any new claim forms received by the Clerk are not to be docketed, but are to be forwarded to plaintiff's attorney Michael I. Kanovitz, at the firm of Loevy &Loevy, 312 North May St., suite 100, Chicago, IL. 60607. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 03/31/2011)
377 JOINT Settlement Status Report by City of Chicago, Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kanovitz, Michael) (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 4/18/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 04/15/2011)
378 LETTER from Frank W. White (ca, ). (Entered: 05/06/2011)
380 LETTER from Frank W. White (Exhibits) (ca, ). (Entered: 05/18/2011)
379 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Denny Robinson to letter 378 filed by Mr. Frank White (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Donnell, Heather) (Entered: 05/17/2011)
381 LETTER from Frank W. White (ca, ). (Entered: 05/20/2011)
382 MOTION to appointed counsel by Frank W. White (ca, ). (Entered: 05/25/2011)
383 MOTION for Reconsideration to file a late claim form since claimant never received a notice by Fredrick Dixon (ca, ). (Entered: 05/26/2011)
385 MOTION for Investigation to see if claimant is a class member by Guadalupe Chacon (ca, ). (Entered: 06/01/2011)
386 AFFIDAVIT Relief by Juan Rodriguez ; Notice (ca, ). (Entered: 06/01/2011)
384 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 382 of Frank W. White to appoint counsel is denied. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/01/2011)
387 SECOND Motion to Appointed Counsel by Frank W. White (ca, ). (Entered: 06/17/2011)

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06/17/2011 06/17/2011
06/22/2011 06/28/2011 06/29/2011 06/29/2011 06/29/2011 07/07/2011 07/07/2011
07/12/2011 07/19/2011 07/21/2011 07/27/2011
07/27/2011 08/29/2011
09/06/2011 09/12/2011 09/13/2011

388 NOTICE of Motion for presentment of motion to appoint counsel 387 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/30/2011 at 09:15 AM. (ca, ). (Entered: 06/17/2011)
389 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson to Miscellaneous Motions filed by Frederick Dixon, Guadalupe Chacon, Cornell Vinegar, and Frank White, motion to appoint counsel 387 , motion for reconsideration 383 , motion for miscellaneous relief 385 , affidavit 386 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Donnell, Heather) (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 6/20/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 06/17/2011)
390 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Second motion 384 of Frank W. White to appoint counsel is denied. Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 06/22/2011)
394 MOTION for Appointment of Counsel for a Class member who is incompetent by Carlos Aguilar(Exhibit) (ca, ). (Entered: 07/05/2011)
391 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing is set for 7/6/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Telephone notice (gds, ) (dl, ). (Entered: 06/29/2011)
392 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing is set for 7/7/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/29/2011)
393 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for appointment of counsel for class member Carlos Aguilar is denied. Mailed notice (ca, ). (Entered: 06/30/2011)
395 Letter to Court regarding class action settlement adminstration status report by Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson (Donnell, Heather) (Entered: 07/07/2011)
396 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 7/7/2011. Motion to enforce 371 is stricken. Motion for reconsideration 383 is stricken. Motion for investigation 385 is stricken. Status hearing date of 9/15/2011 is stricken. Status hearing is set for 9/27/2011 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
397 SETTLEMENT Update to the Court by Frank W. White (Exhibits) (ca, ). (Entered: 07/14/2011)
398 LETTER from Alvin Brown dated 7/14/11 (ca, ). (Entered: 07/22/2011)
399 MOTION for Investigation I did not receive claim forms by Isaias Marin ; Notice (ca, ). (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 7/26/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 07/26/2011)
400 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The Court approves categories of class members for payment of additional funds. Status hearing is re−set to 9/15/2011, at 9:30 a.m. [For further detail see separate order.] Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
401 ORDER Granting Miscellaneous Relief Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/27/2011(ca, ). (Entered: 07/29/2011)
402 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: All communications from class members and potential class members are to be forwarded to plaintiff's counsel Michael I. Kanovitz. This order is entered nunc pro tunc as of 3/31/2011. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/29/2011)
403 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 9/15/2011 is re−set to 9/27/2011 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/06/2011)
404 DUNN Settlement Up Date to the Court by Frank W. White (Exhibit) (ca, ). (Entered: 09/13/2011)
405 JOINT RESPONSE by Defendant City of Chicago, Plaintiffs Thomas Dunn, Veronica Imperial, Leonard Kimble, Denny Robinson to Letter filed by Mr. Frank White 404 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B)(Donnell,

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09/19/2011 09/27/2011
11/09/2011 11/09/2011 11/10/2011
11/10/2011
11/10/2011 11/18/2011 11/22/2011
11/22/2011 11/23/2011 11/28/2011
11/28/2011
12/05/2011 12/27/2011 02/01/2012
02/07/2012 02/14/2012 05/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/25/2012

Heather) (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 9/14/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 09/13/2011)
406 LETTER from Matthew Ristau dated 9/11/11 (ca, ). (Entered: 09/19/2011)
407 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/27/2011. Status report is due by 11/7/2011. Status hearing set for 11/10/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice ( gds, ) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
408 STATUS Report Joint and Final by City of Chicago (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Declaration of Charlene Young, # 2 Exhibit B)(Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
409 NOTICE by City of Chicago re status report 408 (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 11/09/2011)
410 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 11/10/2011. A brief written report is due by 2/7/2012. Status hearing set for 2/14/2012 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/16/2011)
411 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The Court approves categories of class members for payment of additional funds. Mailed notice. [For further detail see separate order.] (mr, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
412 ORDER Granting Miscellaneous Relief Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/10/2011.(mr, ) (Entered: 11/18/2011)
413 11/17/11 REQUEST to the Court for Attorney in Dunn Settlement by Frank W. White. (mr, ) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
414 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Enter revised order approving categories of class members for payment of additional funds. [For further detail see separate order] Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
415 REVISED ORDER Granting Miscellaneous Relief Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/22/2011.(mr, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
416 NOTICE by Frank W. White to the Court of Ligal Action in Dunn Settlement Case (Exhibits)(Poor quality Original−Document on File). (mr, ) (Entered: 11/29/2011)
417 NOTICE of Motion by Frank W. White for presentment of REQUEST to the Court for Attorney in Dunn Settlement 413 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/29/2011 at 09:15 AM. (mr, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
418 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Request 413 of movant Frank White to the court for attorney in Dunn settlement is denied. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
419 NOTICE by Frank W. White to the Court that Ligal Action Has Been Reconsider In Dunn Settlement Case (Exhibits). (mr, ) (Entered: 12/07/2011)
420 Document entered in error(mr, ). (Entered: 12/30/2011)
421 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier: All matters subject to the referral having been concluded, the referral is hereby terminated. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
422 STATUS Report Joint by City of Chicago (Ellis, Sara) (Entered: 02/07/2012)
423 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 2/14/2012. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
424 MOTION by Movant James D. Lewis to sanctions. (mr, ) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
425 MOTION by Intervenor Tommy Dye to intervene (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/25/2012)
426 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to intervene 425 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/28/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/25/2012)

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06/25/2012 06/25/2012 06/26/2012 06/29/2012 07/12/2012
09/20/2012 04/09/2013 04/09/2013 04/19/2013
04/19/2013

428 MOTION by Movant Talmon Hegwood, Jr for an order Directing Rust Consulting, Inc and/or Loevy &Loevy to Reacess Plaintiff's Claims. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment No. 1)(mr, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
429 LETTER from Talmon Hegwood, Jr. dated 6/19/2012. (mr, ) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
427 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to intervene 425 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/25/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
430 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Motion hearing held on 6/29/2012 regarding Tommy Dye's motion to intervene 425 which is continued to7/12/2012 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
431 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 424 of James D. Lewis for sanctions is denied. Petition 425 of Tommy Dye to intervene is withdrawn. Motion 428 of Talmon Hegwood, Jr. for an order directing Rust Consulting or Loevy &Loevy to re−access plaintiffs claims is denied. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 07/19/2012)
432 MOTION by Movant Eric Durr to intervene (Exhibits) (rp, ) (Poor Quality Original−Document on File) (mr, ). (Entered: 09/25/2012)
433 MOTION by Plaintiffs Denny Robinson, Thomas Dunn, Leonard Kimble, Veronica Imperial, Defendant City of Chicago to dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Donnell, Heather) (Entered: 04/09/2013)
434 NOTICE of Motion by Heather Lewis Donnell for presentment of motion to dismiss 433 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/18/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Donnell, Heather) (Entered: 04/09/2013)
435 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Parties' joint motion to dismiss 433 this case is granted. The Settlement Fund has been fully exhausted through payments to Class Members and any remainder returned to the City. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
436 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/19/2013: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/19/2013)