Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 1 Filed 04/13/15 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRISTAN BROUSSARD,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.:

v.

Section:

FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC d/b/a TOWER LOAN OF LAKE CHARLES,

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

Defendant.

COMPLAINT OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Plaintiff Tristan Broussard (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Broussard”), by and through his undersigned counsel, files this Complaint and Jury Demand against Defendant First Tower Loan, LLC d/b/a Tower Loan of Lake Charles (“Defendant” or “Tower Loan”).
INTRODUCTION 1. This suit arises from Tower Loan’s decision to terminate Plaintiff Tristan Broussard because of his sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). 2. In February 2013, Tower Loan extended a job offer to Mr. Broussard to work as a Manager Trainee in its Lake Charles, Louisiana branch. At the time that Tower Loan made that job offer, Mr. Broussard’s gender, gender identity, and gender expression were male. 3. Shortly after Mr. Broussard began working for Tower Loan in March 2013, Mr. Broussard’s supervisor at the Lake Charles branch Leah Sparks reviewed his employment paperwork and noticed that his driver’s license listed his sex as female. Ms. Sparks asked Mr. Broussard to explain why his driver’s license listed his sex as female, and Mr. Broussard truthfully responded that he is a transgender man.

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4. Less than a week after Tower Loan learned of the sex listed on Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license and that Mr. Broussard is a transgender man, Tower Loan Vice President David Morgan traveled to Lake Charles to meet with Mr. Broussard and his supervisor. Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Broussard that he could continue working at Tower Loan only if Mr. Broussard signed a written statement agreeing to act and be treated as female rather than as male while working for Tower Loan, including by dressing as female. Because Mr. Broussard is a transgender man and could not so agree, he was terminated from his position at Tower Loan.
5. Tower Loan’s decision to terminate Mr. Broussard because he is a transgender man, and because of his inability to conform to Tower Loan’s stereotypical expectations of gender and its requirements that he should agree to be treated as female, including by dressing and conducting himself as female, violates Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination because of sex. Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against their employees or applicants for employment because of their sex, which includes discrimination based on a person’s gender identity or transgender status; because a person has undergone, is undergoing, or intends to undergo a gender transition; or because a person fails to conform to gender- or gender-based stereotypes. In terminating Mr. Broussard for these reasons, Tower Loan violated Title VII.
PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Tristan Broussard is a 21-year-old resident of Lake Charles, Louisiana. Mr. Broussard is and was well qualified to serve as a Manager Trainee at Tower Loan. 7. Defendant Tower Loan is a limited liability company that maintains its principal Louisiana business establishment in Hammond, Louisiana. At all relevant times, Tower Loan
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has employed at least 15 employees, has done business within this District, and has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 28 U.S.C. §1343. 9. Venue is proper in this District because the unlawful acts of employment discrimination described herein occurred within Louisiana, and Tower Loan is found and maintains its primary Louisiana business establishment within this District. 42 U.S.C. §2000e5(f)(3).
FACTS 10. Tower Loan is a privately owned finance company that operates more than 180 branches in five States, including Louisiana. It employs more than 700 individuals and serves more than 200,000 customers. Its primary business is consumer installment lending. 11. In February 2013, Tower Loan sought applicants for a Manager Trainee position within its Lake Charles, Louisiana branch. Manager Trainees are generally responsible for lending, collecting, assisting with branch management, reviewing contracts, providing customer service, and assisting with hiring, training, and staff development. 12. Mr. Broussard applied for the Lake Charles Manager Trainee position in early February 2013. Mr. Broussard was well qualified for the position due to his previous sales experience dealing directly with clients and customers. Mr. Broussard was excited about the possibility of working for Tower Loan because of the increased salary he would receive if hired, the potential for growth and advancement within the company, and the possibility that he would be relocated from Lake Charles following completion of the training period.
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13. Leah Sparks, the manager of Tower Loan’s Lake Charles branch, interviewed Mr. Broussard for the Manager Trainee position on or about February 25, 2013. During the interview, Ms. Sparks told Mr. Broussard that she was impressed with his qualifications and disposition, and stated that Mr. Broussard was a top candidate for the Manager Trainee position.
14. Later that same day, Ms. Sparks called Mr. Broussard to offer him the Manager Trainee position. Mr. Broussard accepted the position.
15. During all of these interactions, Ms. Sparks interacted with and treated Mr. Broussard as male.
16. Mr. Broussard began working for Tower Loan on March 4, 2013. Mr. Broussard excelled in performing all of the duties of a Manager Trainee during his first week of employment at Tower Loan. Ms. Sparks, his immediate supervisor, had many positive things to say about Mr. Broussard. To Mr. Broussard’s knowledge, there were never any complaints or negative comments from customers about his work at Tower Loan.
17. Throughout this time period, Ms. Sparks and other Town Loan employees and clients interacted with and treated Mr. Broussard as male.
18. Mr. Broussard is a transgender man; his gender identity is male, and his clothing and appearance are male.
19. For transgender people such as Mr. Broussard, their birth sex and their gender identity are different. Gender identity is a person’s identification as male or female. Everyone has a gender identity and in most cases, a person’s gender identity aligns with his or her birth sex. As every major medical and mental health association recognizes, however, some people have a gender identity that does not match their birth sex.
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20. Transgender people experience varying levels of psychological distress as a result of the disconnect between their gender identity and birth sex. This distress, often referred to as Gender Dysphoria, is a serious medical condition and there are both nationally and internationally recognized standards of care for the treatment of Gender Dysphoria.
21. To alleviate the distress associated with Gender Dysphoria, many transgender people undergo gender transition to live in a manner consistent with their gender identity. The process can include both social and medical components. Medical treatments may include hormone-replacement therapy and a variety of surgeries, which may or may not include genital reconstructive surgery.
22. Mr. Broussard has known that he is male for as long as he can remember. He came out to his friends and family as transgender in August 2011 and has been living his life as a man, consistent with his male gender identity, since his transition in September 2011. He has been on testosterone therapy since May 2012, which has profoundly altered his body, causing him to acquire male secondary sex characteristics and to be easily recognized as male by others.
23. While Mr. Broussard was completing the paperwork for new employees on March 4, 2013, Tower Loan required Mr. Broussard to provide a valid form of identification. Mr. Broussard provided his driver’s license.
24. Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license lists his sex as female. 25. When Ms. Sparks noticed that Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license listed his sex as female, she asked Mr. Broussard about the listed sex. Mr. Broussard explained that he is a transgender man. 26. On information and belief, Ms. Sparks notified Tower Loan Vice President David Morgan of the sex listed on Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license. Mr. Morgan, together with Tower
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Loan’s Director of Human Resources Lynne Card and possibly other employees, determined that, despite Mr. Broussard’s identity as a transgender man, Tower Loan would require him to be treated as female, including requiring him to dress and conduct himself as female.
27. On March 11, 2013, Mr. Morgan traveled to Tower Loan’s Lake Charles office. When Mr. Broussard learned that Mr. Morgan would be visiting the Lake Charles branch, he assumed that Mr. Morgan was conducting a routine assessment of office operations, and did not know the actual reason for the visit. Mr. Broussard was excited to meet Mr. Morgan, because Mr. Morgan was a member of Tower Loan’s upper management.
28. After arriving, Mr. Morgan asked Mr. Broussard and Ms. Sparks to meet with him in a back conference room, where he handed Mr. Broussard a copy of the company’s dress code. Mr. Broussard did not understand why he had been given the company dress code. There had been no complaints about his dress, and no one had expressed any concern regarding his compliance with the company dress code. Mr. Broussard had complied with the company dress code at all times while working at Tower Loan.
29. Mr. Morgan explained that he was providing Mr. Broussard with the dress code for female employees, and stated that Mr. Broussard was not complying with the dress code provisions specifically governing how female employees must dress.
30. Mr. Broussard told Mr. Morgan that he lives and identifies as male. Mr. Morgan stated that the company nonetheless would require him to dress as female.
31. When Mr. Broussard realized that Mr. Morgan was going to penalize or fire him because of his transgender status, Mr. Broussard was shocked and became extremely distraught and concerned.
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32. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Morgan presented Mr. Broussard with a written statement and told Mr. Broussard that he had to sign the statement if he wanted to continue working at Tower Loan. The statement said:
I understand that my preference to act and dress as male, despite having been born a female, is not something that will be in compliance with Tower Loan’s personnel policies. I have been advised as to the proper dress for females and also have been provided a copy of the female dress code. I also understand that when meetings occur that require out of town travel and an overnight room is required, I will be in [sic] assigned to a room with a female. A true and correct copy of the written agreement presented to Mr. Broussard is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 33. After providing Mr. Broussard with the written agreement, Mr. Morgan made it clear to Mr. Broussard that he would be fired if he did not accept and sign the agreement. 34. Mr. Broussard refused to sign the agreement, and repeatedly explained that he could not agree to be treated as female, including having to dress and conduct himself as female, because he is male—specifically, a transgender male. 35. Mr. Morgan then stated that if Mr. Broussard “had some surgeries and we can see some results,” then Tower Loan may consider hiring him again. 36. Because Mr. Broussard would not sign Tower Loan’s written agreement, Tower Loan terminated Mr. Broussard’s employment. 37. Ms. Sparks called Mr. Broussard the following day to apologize for what had occurred and to tell Mr. Broussard that she did not know that he was going to be terminated. She told him that she thought he was a good employee. 38. Tower Loan had no business reason for requiring Mr. Broussard, a transgender man, to be treated as female and to dress and conduct himself as female as a condition of keeping
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his job, nor would it even have been possible for him to do so, as his physical appearance and gender identity are male.
39. A reasonable person who was directed by his employer to agree to be treated as female, including agreeing to dress and conduct himself as female, even though his gender identity is male would resign his employment rather than attempt to abide by the employer’s demands, and being asked to agree to such a demand is equivalent to being fired.
EEOC PROCEEDINGS 40. On August 27, 2013, Mr. Broussard’s counsel at the National Center for Lesbian Rights and Delaney & Robb Attorneys at Law LLC filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) on Mr. Broussard’s behalf. The Charge alleged that Mr. Broussard’s termination from Tower Loan constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of his sex, change of sex, sex stereotypes, and gender identity, in violation of Title VII and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. A true and correct copy of the EEOC charge is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 41. On December 2, 2014, the EEOC issued its determination regarding the merits of Mr. Broussard’s charge. The Commission concluded that “the evidence supports a reasonable cause finding that [Mr. Broussard] was subjected to discrimination based on sex, transgender male, in that [Mr. Broussard] was required by [Tower Loan’s] company policy to be treated as belonging to a gender with which [Mr. Broussard] does not identify, despite [Mr. Broussard] placing [Tower Loan] on notice of [his] desire to be treated as a member of the gender with which [he] identifies.” The Commission found that Tower Loan had “failed to meet its burden to show that the policies in question constituted a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of its particular business enterprise,” and that Mr. Broussard
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“was discharged or constructively discharged by [Tower Loan].” A true and correct copy of the EEOC’s Determination is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
42. On January 5, 2015, Mr. Broussard requested that the EEOC issue a Notice of Right To Sue. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right To Sue on January 20, 2015. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Right To Sue is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
COUNT ONE Sex Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 43. Mr. Broussard realleges and incorporates herein by reference the foregoing paragraphs. 44. Tower Loan engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Lake Charles, Louisiana branch, in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1), by terminating or constructively terminating Mr. Broussard because of sex. 45. Tower Loan’s decision to terminate Mr. Broussard was based on sex. Tower Loan fired Mr. Broussard because he is a transgender man, because he is undergoing or has undergone a gender transition, and/or because he did not conform to Tower Loan’s gender-based preferences, expectations, or stereotypes that a transgender man should be treated as female and should dress and conduct himself as female. 46. The effect of Tower Loan’s unlawful employment practices was to deprive Mr. Broussard of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of his sex. 47. Tower Loan’s unlawful employment practices were intentional and done with malice or with reckless indifference to Mr. Broussard’s rights under Title VII.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Tristan Broussard prays for the following relief:

a.

A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful and

violate Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.;

b.

A permanent injunction against Tower Loan and its officers, agents, successors,

employees, representatives, and any and all persons acting in concert with Tower Loan,

prohibiting them from engaging in unlawful sex discrimination against employees or applicants

for employment, including on the basis of gender identity;

c. Back pay and reinstatement or front pay (including interest and benefits), and

other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of Tower Loan’s unlawful employment

practices;

d. Compensatory and punitive damages;

e. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and all expenses and costs of this action;

f. Pre-judgment interest; and

g. Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary,

just, and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Mr. Broussard demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable in this action.

April 13, 2015

/s/ Ryan P. Delaney Ryan P. Delaney

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Ryan P. Delaney Delaney and Robb Attorneys at Law, LLC 2800 Veterans Boulevard, Suite 213 Metairie, LA 70005 Telephone: (504) 267-9700 Email: ryan@delaneyandrobb.com
James M. Finberg (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) (Trial Attorney) Barbara J. Chisholm (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) P. Casey Pitts (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) Altshuler Berzon LLP 177 Post Street, Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 Telephone: (415) 421-7151 Facsimile: (415) 362-8064 Email: jfinberg@altber.com
bchisholm@altber.com cpitts@altber.com
Shannon P. Minter (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) Amy Whelan (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) Asaf Orr (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) National Center for Lesbian Rights 870 Market Street, Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 392-6257 Email: sminter@nclrights.org
awhelan@nclrights.org aorr@nclrights.org
David Dinielli (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) Samuel Wolfe (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) A. Chinyere Ezie (admission pro hac vice forthcoming) Southern Poverty Law Center 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Telephone: (334) 956-8200 Facsimile: (334) 856-8481 Email: david.dinielli@splcenter.org
sam.wolfe@splcenter.org chinyere.ezie@splcenter.org
Counsel for Plaintiff Tristan Broussard
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRISTAN BROUSSARD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-1161 c/w 15-2500

FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC

SECTION: “J”(1)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint

Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 85) filed by

Defendant, First Tower Loan, LLC (“Tower”); an opposition thereto

(Rec. Doc. 99) filed by Intervenor, the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); an opposition (Rec.

Doc. 102) filed by Plaintiff, Tristan Broussard (“Broussard”); and

Defendant’s reply (Rec. Doc. 107). Also before the Court is

Defendant’s Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration (Rec.

Doc. 96), the EEOC’s opposition (Rec. Doc. 100), Plaintiff’s

opposition (Rec. Doc. 103), and Defendant’s reply (Rec. Doc. 110).

Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and

the applicable law, the Court finds that the motions should be

GRANTED for the reasons set forth more fully below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation derives from Broussard’s employment with

Tower and subsequent termination. Broussard is a twenty-one-year-

old resident of Lake Charles, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2.) Tower

is a consumer loan company, headquartered in Mississippi, with
branches in five states, including Louisiana. Id. at 3. Broussard
is a transgender man, meaning he outwardly appears to be male and
his gender identity is male. Id. at 4. However, his birth sex is
female. Id.
In early February 2013, Broussard applied for a job as a
Manager Trainee in Tower’s Lake Charles office. Id. at 1. Leah
Sparks, the manager of Tower’s Lake Charles office, interviewed
Broussard for the position on February 25, 2013. Id. at 4. Later
that same day, Sparks called Broussard to offer him the position.
Id. Broussard accepted the position and began working for Tower on
March 4, 2013. Id.
When Broussard arrived for his first day of work, Sparks
presented him with the paperwork required to be completed by new
employees. These materials included Tower’s Employment Agreement,
which contains the following arbitration provision: “Except for
the injunctive relief authorized by the foregoing paragraph,1 all
other disputes, legal or otherwise, relating to the employment
relationship shall be submitted to binding arbitration by the
1 Paragraph 4 of the Employment Agreement permits Tower to seek injunctive relief in the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi: “Upon actual or threatened breach of this Agreement, Tower shall be entitled to a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction restraining and prohibiting any conduct prohibited by this Agreement. . . . The parties agree that the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi, shall have personal jurisdiction over the parties for enforcement of this agreement . . . . The parties further agree that the venue for purposes of obtaining an injunction is Rankin County Chancery Court, such venue is mandatory, and to the exclusion of all other venues in Mississippi or elsewhere.” (Rec. Doc. 85-2, at 4.)
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parties.” (Rec. Doc. 85-2, at 4) (emphasis added). The Employment Agreement also states, “Signature by the employee on this contract constitutes an offer of employment by the employer, which offer is not accepted, and neither an employment relationship nor contract is formed or consummated until Tower signs this contract at its corporate headquarters in Rankin County, Mississippi.” Id. Broussard signed the Employment Agreement in Sparks’s presence on March 4, 2013. Id.
In addition, the paperwork included a separate document extending an offer of employment to Broussard “(Acceptance Form”), which Sparks signed on behalf of Tower. Id. at 3. The Acceptance Form states, “We are pleased to make you an offer of employment. . . . Please indicate your acceptance of our offer by signing your name at the bottom of this page.” Id. Further, it provides that “[t]he terms of your employment offer are governed by the terms outlined in the employment agreement you will sign.” Id. Broussard signed the Acceptance Form in Sparks’s presence on March 4, 2013. Id. Sparks then forwarded Broussard’s paperwork to Tower’s headquarters in Mississippi. Id. at 2. Tower received Broussard’s Employment Agreement and other new-hire materials at its headquarters on March 7, 2013, and stamped them as “received” with that date. (Rec. Doc. 85-3, at 2.)
Tower also required Broussard to provide a valid form of identification. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 5.) Broussard provided his
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driver’s license. Id. As Broussard completed the paperwork for his employment with Tower, Sparks noticed that his driver’s license listed his sex as female. Id. at 5. When Sparks asked Broussard about the listed sex, he explained that he is a transgender man. Id.
On March 11, 2013, Tower Loan Vice President David Morgan visited the Lake Charles office. Id. at 6. Morgan gave Broussard a copy of the company’s dress code for female employees and informed Broussard that the company would require him to dress as female. Id. Morgan also presented Broussard with a written statement and told him that he must sign the statement in order to continue working at Tower. Id. at 7. The statement expressed that Broussard’s “preference to act and dress as male” was not “in compliance with Tower Loan’s personnel policies.” Id. Further, the statement indicated that when an overnight room is required for out-of-town meetings, Broussard would be assigned to a room with a female. Id. Broussard refused to sign the statement, and his employment terminated.2 Id.
After Broussard’s new-hire paperwork arrived at Tower’s headquarters on March 7, 2013, it was processed in the regular course of business. (Rec. Doc. 85-3, at 2.) The Employment
2 The parties dispute whether Tower affirmatively terminated Broussard’s employment or Broussard resigned. However, this dispute is immaterial. Whether Broussard was fired, quit, or was constructively discharged has no bearing on the motions presently before the Court.
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Agreement and other forms were reviewed by administrative staff
for completeness and were thereafter presented to J. Lynne Card,
Tower’s Vice President and Director of Human Resources, for her
signature on behalf of Tower. Id. Card reviewed Broussard’s file and signed the Employment Agreement no later than March 26, 2013.3
Broussard filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on
August 27, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 8.) The EEOC determined that
Broussard’s claim was meritorious and issued a Notice of Right to
Sue on January 20, 2015. Id. at 8-9. Broussard filed the instant
action on April 13, 2015, asserting claims against Tower for
discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 9.) In response, on April 23, 2015, Tower
filed suit against Broussard in the Chancery Court of Rankin
County, Mississippi, seeking to compel Broussard to arbitrate the
claims asserted in his action against Tower. (No. 15-2500, Rec.
Doc. 1.) On May 26, 2015, Broussard removed Tower’s suit to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
3 Card determined that she signed the Employment Agreement no later than March 26 based on the data reflected in Tower’s electronic business record. (Rec. Doc. 85-3, at 3.) Specifically, Tower’s payroll data system reflects that Broussard’s employment was entered as “Approved,” and a date notation for this data filed indicates that the form was last updated on March 26, 2013. Id. However, based on the regular flow of new-hire paperwork in the office, and given that March 26 was a Tuesday, Card believes that she signed Broussard’s Employment Agreement on either Monday, March 25, or Friday, March 22. Id. The exact date that Card signed the agreement is immaterial. Whether Card signed agreement on March 22, March 25, or March 26 has no bearing on the motions presently before the Court.
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Mississippi. Id. Upon Broussard’s motion, on July 7, 2015, the Southern District of Mississippi transferred Tower’s suit to this Court, where it was consolidated with Broussard’s case. (No. 152500, Rec. Doc. 18.) Thereafter, on September 8, 2015, the EEOC filed a motion to intervene, which the Court granted. (Rec. Doc. 70.)
Tower filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 85) on November 5, 2015, and Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration (Rec. Doc. 96) on November 16, 2015. The EEOC and Broussard filed their oppositions on November 24, 2015. With leave granted from the Court, Tower filed a reply in support of its motion to compel arbitration on December 2, 2015, and a reply in support of its motion to stay on December 3, 2015. The motions are before the Court on the briefs, without oral argument.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS A. Motion to Compel Arbitration
Tower contends that all of the Title VII claims asserted in Broussard’s complaint are subject to and within the scope of a mandatory arbitration agreement between Broussard and Tower. First, Tower argues that a valid arbitration agreement exists within the Employment Agreement signed by both parties. (Rec. Doc. 85-1, at 5-6.) As Tower points out, the Agreement makes clear that Broussard’s signature on the document constituted an “offer of
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employment by the employee.” Id. at 7. Because the Agreement did not contain an expiration date, Tower claims it was a revocable offer. Id. at 8. Tower maintains that it accepted the offer in a reasonable amount of time, and therefore the agreement to arbitrate became effective when Card signed the Agreement on its behalf. Id.
Next, Tower argues that Broussard’s termination does not constitute a revocation or rejection of the offer. Id. at 8-9. According to Tower, termination of employment merely signifies an end to the employment relationship that is governed by the terms of the Employment Agreement. Id. at 8. Moreover, Tower claims that termination of Broussard’s employment is irrelevant. Id. at 10. Because the Agreement plainly covers disputes regarding allegation of wrongful discharge, which cannot be alleged where an employee is still employed, Tower insists that the Agreement clearly contemplates that the arbitration provision will survive potential termination. Id. at 11.
Tower further submits that Broussard would be bound to the arbitration provision even if Tower had never signed the Agreement. Id. at 9. Tower claims that “under Louisiana law, where one party drafts and presents a contract and the other party signs it, the contract is valid and binding upon the signing party, even where the other party fails to sign the contract.” Id. Additionally, Tower argues that because Broussard accepted the benefits of the
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Agreement, the ability to begin employment with Tower, he is bound by all of the terms of the Agreement. Id.
In addition, Tower contends that the Acceptance Form, by which Tower offered and Broussard accepted Tower’s offer of employment, constitutes a valid agreement to arbitrate, irrespective of the timing of when Tower eventually signed the Employment Agreement. Id. at 10. Tower asserts that the Acceptance Form incorporated the terms of the Employment Agreement by reference, including the arbitration provision. Id. For this reason, Tower argues Broussard independently agreed to arbitrate all employment disputes based on his signature on the Acceptance Form. Id.
Next, Tower asserts that Broussard’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration provision, which requires that any employment-related disputes be subject to arbitration. Id. at 16. According to Tower, the “any dispute” language in an arbitration clause is permissible and, as is the case here, can encompass Title VII claims in the context of an employment dispute. Id. at 17. Moreover, because the arbitration clause is broad, Tower argues that any dispute regarding whether Broussard’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause should be resolved by the arbitrator. Id.
Lastly, because Tower’s efforts to reach agreement with Broussard’s counsel on an arbitrator have been unsuccessful, Tower requests that the Court appoint the American Arbitration
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Association (“AAA”) to conduct the arbitration pursuant to its protocol for resolution of employment disputes. Tower explains that the AAA has a process by which the parties can select a wellqualified employment law arbitrator from among a panel randomly proposed by the AAA. Id. at 20.
Broussard presents several arguments in opposition to Tower’s motion. (Rec. Doc. 102.) First, Broussard argues that Tower rejected his “offer of employment” on March 11, 2013, when it fired him. Id. at 1. Broussard maintains that Tower could not later revive that offer by signing the Employment Agreement. Id. at 2. Second, because Tower fired him, Broussard claims no consideration to create a binding agreement existed when Tower signed the Employment Agreement. Id. Third, Broussard argues that the express terms of the Agreement, which provide that no “employment relationship” existed unless and until Tower signed the Agreement, preclude arbitration of any events that occurred prior to March 22, 2013. Id. Fourth, Broussard asserts that Tower’s insistence that he agree to present himself as a female at work constituted a counteroffer to the Employment Agreement, which he promptly rejected. Id. Fifth, Broussard contends that Tower waived any present right to force arbitration because of its “aggressive litigation” of this case. Id. In addition, Broussard insists that the Acceptance Form does not create a binding contract to arbitrate. Id. at 16. If the Acceptance Form incorporates the terms
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of the Employment Agreement, Broussard argues it would necessarily incorporate the term specifying that the proposed employment agreement constituted an offer of employment by Broussard that was not accepted until signed by Tower’s representative at its corporate headquarters. Id. at 16-17.
Similar to Broussard, the EEOC presents several arguments in opposition to Tower’s motion. (Rec. Doc. 99.) As an initial matter, the EEOC claims that the Court must treat Tower’s motion to compel as a motion for summary judgment, thereby construing all ambiguities in the facts in the light most favorable to Broussard and the EEOC. Id. at 2 nn.3-4. Many of the EEOC’s arguments concerning the formation of an arbitration agreement are analogous to Broussard’s arguments discussed above; however, the EEOC raises two additional arguments. First, the EEOC contends that even if there had been a contract, Tower has not established that Broussard knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a trial by jury. Id. at 11-16. Although the Fifth Circuit has never expressly decided the issue, the EEOC argues that Tower bears the burden of showing that a voluntary and knowing waiver occurred. Id. at 13 & n.11. Second, the EEOC argues that the arbitration provision at issue violates section 707 of Title VII because it purports to foreclose the filing of an EEOC charge. Id. at 16-18. For this reason, the EEOC claims the contract would be unenforceable as against public policy. Id. at 18.
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In response, Tower claims that Broussard’s arguments have no merit for several reasons. (Rec. Doc. 107.) First, Tower argues that the EEOC’s claim that the motion before the Court is a type of motion for summary judgment is incorrect. Id. at 2 n.2. According to Tower, disputes of fact here are not automatically resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, but instead are to be resolved by the Court based on the evidence. Id. Second, Tower claims that Broussard offers no evidence that it rejected the Employment Agreement. Id. at 3. To contrary, Tower repeats that it is undisputed that it signed the Employment Agreement. Id. Furthermore, Tower maintains that termination of Broussard’s employment is not inconsistent with and does not constitute a rejection of the Employment Agreement as to that period of employment that had already taken place as of the date it was signed by Tower. Id. Similarly, Tower claims that there is no evidence that Broussard withdrew his offer before it was accepted by Tower and nothing in the Agreement imposed a deadline for Tower to sign it. Id.
Further, Tower contests the argument that the memorandum presented to Broussard concerning the dress code and lodging issues was a counteroffer. Id. at 4. According to Tower, the memorandum “did not seek to start a new employment relationship, but instead clarified the terms and conditions of continued at-will employment which Broussard declined.” Id. Next, Tower explains that Louisiana
11

law does not require “consideration,” but instead looks to whether there is a lawful “cause” to support the existence of the contract. Id. at 5. Tower maintains that proceeding with an employment relationship was indisputably a lawful cause sufficient to support a valid employment-related agreement. Id. Further, Tower notes that Broussard did in fact commence employment with the company as contemplated, such that this cause was not illusory. Id.
Tower also contends that Broussard fails to avoid the binding effects of the Acceptance Form, a separate agreement that was executed by the parties prior to the start of Broussard’s employment with the company. Id. at 5. Moreover, Tower responds that Broussard’s argument that incorporation of the arbitration provision by reference into the Acceptance Form included the requirement that the Employment Agreement be signed by Tower ignores the fact that the Agreement was in fact signed by Tower. Id.
Next, Tower asserts that the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected the EEOC’s argument that requiring a plaintiff to submit claims to arbitration violates the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. Id. at 9. According to Tower, Broussard voluntarily agreed to submit claims against Tower to arbitration by signing the Employment Agreement containing the valid arbitration provision and, by doing so, he relinquished his right to demand that his claims be heard by a jury. Id. In response to
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the EEOC’s argument that the Agreement is void under Title VII because it did not expressly reserve Broussard’s right to file an EEOC charge, Tower argues that the EEOC fails to cite any authority for this assertion. Id. at 10. Moreover, Tower insists that it never attempted such a waiver in the Employment Agreement, Acceptance Form, or otherwise. Id. To the contrary, Tower points out it is undisputed that an EEOC charge was filed on Broussard’s behalf and fully processed by the EEOC. Id.
Lastly, Tower rejects Broussard’s argument that it waived the right to compel arbitration. Id. at 6. According to Tower, there is a presumption against waiver of arbitration and Broussard bears the heavy burden of proving that Tower waiver its right. Id. Furthermore, Tower claims it asserted its right to arbitration in its Answer to the Complaint and has at all times expressed to counsel for Broussard and the EEOC that it considered Broussard’s claims to be subject to arbitration. Id. at 7. Additionally, Tower points out that the purpose of the state court action in Mississippi was solely to compel Broussard to arbitrate the claims he seeks to assert in this action. Id. B. Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration
In its second motion, Tower moves the Court to stay the claims asserted by the EEOC in this case pending the final outcome of the anticipated arbitration of Broussard’s claims. (Rec. Doc. 96-1, at 1-2.) First, Tower contends that section 3 of the Federal
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Arbitration Act mandates a stay of the EEOC’s action in the present case. Id. at 6. Although the EEOC is not a signatory to an arbitration agreement with Tower, Tower argues that “exceptional circumstances” exist to support a mandatory stay. Id. at 7. According to Tower, the claims asserted by the EEOC are identical to the claims subject to arbitration asserted by Broussard. Id. Because the issues to be litigated by the EEOC are identical to the issues that will likely be arbitrated in Broussard’s case, Tower claims “allowing the litigation to proceed would harm the parties’ rights to arbitrate.” Id.
Further, Tower identifies three factors present in the instant case that warrant a stay of the EEOC’s claims. Id. First, Tower maintains that the EEOC’s claims and the underlying facts supporting their claims are identical to Broussard’s claims. Id. at 7-8. Second, Tower argues that Broussard’s claims are inherently inseparable from the claims of the EEOC. Id. at 8. Third, Tower asserts that litigation of the EEOC’s claims will have a “critical impact” on the anticipated arbitration. Id. For these reasons, Tower insists that a stay of the litigation is required in this case.
Finally, Tower contends that, even if a stay is not mandatory under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court has the discretion to stay proceedings between Tower and the EEOC pending the outcome of arbitration of Broussard’s claims. Id. In deciding whether to
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exercise its discretion to stay the case, Tower claims that the Court should consider whether there is an overlap of facts and claims of the litigation and the arbitration and the likely impact of the litigation on arbitration. Id. According to Tower, Broussard’s anticipated arbitration necessarily overlaps with the litigation of the EEOC’s claims because the EEOC seeks to recovery identical, victim-specific relief on behalf of Broussard. Id. at 9. As a result, Tower claims the discovery that may take place in the arbitration is likely to be the same or similar discovery that will take place in the litigation of the EEOC’s claims. Id. Moreover, Tower contends that the resolution of Broussard’s victim-specific claims by an arbitrator will serve as res judicata barring the EEOC from seeking the same individual, victim specific relief in a subsequent proceeding. Id. at 10. Consequently, Tower argues that the only claims left for the EEOC to pursue would be claims for general injunctive relief, which can only be decided by the Court rather than a jury. Id. at 11. In sum, Tower maintains that the Court should exercise its discretion and grant a stay as a mean of controlling and managing its docket.
The EEOC opposes Tower’s motion for three reasons.4 (Rec. Doc. 100, at 2-3.) First, the EEOC claims that a stay would thwart its authority to enforce Title VII in the public’s interest. Id.
4 Broussard presents arguments in opposition to Tower’s motion to stay that are substantially similar to the EEOC’s and do not warrant separate discussion. (See Rec. Doc. 103.)
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Although the EEOC seeks to enforce Title VII by intervening rather than by bringing a direct action, it insists that it acts “to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.” Id. The EEOC maintains that staying the litigation of its claims would severely hamper its public interest role in this litigation. Id. at 10. Second, the EEOC contends that the Federal Arbitration Act provides no authority to stay its claims because it is not a party to the purported arbitration agreement. Id. at 3. Third, the EEOC argues that the Court’s discretionary power to control and manage its docket is better served by moving forward with litigation of the EEOC’s claims because the Court can directly manage the litigation. Id. Furthermore, contrary to Tower’s argument, the EEOC contends that an arbitrator’s decision will not have any preclusive effect on the EEOC; therefore, the EEOC argues it would be free to pursue its claims regardless of the outcome of arbitration. Id. at 16.
In reply to the EEOC’s and Broussard’s opposition, Tower maintains that if the Court compels Broussard to arbitrate his claims and does not stay the EEOC’s claims pending such arbitration, then Tower “will simultaneously be defending two separate proceedings in two separate forums involving identical allegations. It is very likely that the same discovery, depositions, and motions will take place in both forums, increasing case expenses, disruptions and inconvenience, and the likelihood
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of inconsistent rulings.” (Rec. Doc. 110, at 7.) Further, Tower clarifies that it does not claim that the EEOC’s public interests claims will be barred by res judicata; rather, it argues that the EEOC’s ability to seek individual relief for Broussard will be barred by the anticipated arbitration. Id. Otherwise, Tower insists that Broussard would get “two bites at the apple—one before the arbitrator and another by the EEOC on his behalf in this litigation.” Id. at 8.
LEGAL STANDARD The Fifth Circuit has observed that “[i]n enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress declared a national policy in favor of arbitration.” Snap-on Tools Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)). Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., provides, in relevant part, “A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Congress has therefore mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Considered to be “the primary substantive provision of the Act,” Section 2 reflects “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone
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Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). In
effect, Section 2 creates “a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability.” Id. “[C]ongress’ clear intent, in the Arbitration
Act, [was] to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of
court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”
Snap-on Tools Corp., 18 F.3d at 1263 (alterations in original)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22). Thus, there is
a strong presumption in favor of arbitration.
The FAA requires district courts to “compel arbitration of
otherwise arbitrable claims, when a motion to compel arbitration
is made.” Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil
Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1147 n.20 (5th Cir. 1985). Section 3 of the
FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under the agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3. This provision is mandatory and demands a stay of
the proceedings, at the request of a party, if the dispute is
arbitrable and referred to arbitration. Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463
F.3d 410, 417 n.6 (5th Cir. 2006).
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Courts employ a two-step analysis to determine whether a party may be compelled to arbitrate. Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 2009); Wash. Mut. Fin. Grp. v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2004); Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court first inquires whether the party has agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue. Jones, 583 F.3d at 233-34. This question itself is further subdivided into two considerations: “(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement.” Webb, 89 F.3d at 257-58. To determine whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate, the Court applies ordinary principles of state contract law. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2003); Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 2000). “[T]he federal policy favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties.” Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 321 F.3d at 538. In analyzing arbitrability, courts apply federal substantive law. Grigson, 210 F.3d at 531. Thus, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. If
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the Court finds that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties and that the dispute in question falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the second step is to determine whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable. Wash. Mut. Fin. Grp., 364 F.3d at 263.
DISCUSSION A. Motion to Compel Arbitration
The Court must first apply ordinary principles of state contract law to determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between Broussard and Tower. Under Louisiana law,5 “[a] contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.” La. Civ. Code art. 1906. Four elements are required for a valid contract: (1) capacity to contract; (2) mutual consent; (3) a lawful cause; (4) and an object that is lawful, possible, and determined or determinable. Granger v. Christus Health Cent. La., 144 So. 3d 736, 760-61 (La. 2013); see also La. Civ. Code arts. 1918, 1927, 1966 1971. The party claiming the existence of a contract has the burden of proving that the contract was perfected. La. Civ. Code art. 1831.
5 The Employment Agreement at issue contains a choice-of-law provision that provides, in pertinent part, “The interpretation and application of this contract (as well as choice of law principles) . . . is governed by Mississippi law.” (Rec. Doc. 85-2, at 4.) Yet, none of the parties briefed the Court on the choice-of-law issue, and the parties’ memoranda apply Louisiana law. Consequently, the Court applies Louisiana law to determine whether Broussard and Tower formed a valid agreement to arbitrate. However, the Court’s conclusion would be the same under Mississippi law.
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The element critical to the issue before the Court is the element of mutual consent. Article 1927 of the Louisiana Civil Code explains that “[a] contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance.” Id. art. 1927. Unless the law requires a certain formality for a type of contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that clearly indicates consent. Id. However, in the absence of a legal requirement, when the parties have contemplated a certain form, it is presumed that they do not intend to be bound until the contract is executed in that form. Id. art. 1947. In addition, an acceptance not in accordance with the terms of the offer is not an acceptance at all, but rather a counteroffer which must be accepted in order to become a binding contract. Id. art. 1943. Thus, to constitute a contract, an offer must be accepted as made.
An offer to make a contract is good, generally speaking, until revoked by the offeror or rejected by the offeree. An offer that neither specifies a period of time for acceptance nor manifests an intent to give the offeree a delay within which to accept is a revocable offer, which may be revoked before it is accepted. Id. arts. 1928, 1930. Furthermore, a revocable offer expires if not accepted within a reasonable time. Id. art 1931. A purported acceptance made after the expiration of the initial offer
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constitutes a new counteroffer, which must be accepted in order to form a binding contract.
In the instant case, Tower argues that both the Employment Agreement and the Acceptance Form, which incorporates the terms of the Employment Agreement, constitute valid contracts to arbitrate employment-related disputes. The Court first considers whether the Acceptance Form constitutes a binding contract with a valid arbitration agreement.
The Acceptance Form is a written contract between Broussard and Tower. The Acceptance Form clearly states that it is an “offer of employment” from Tower for Broussard to accept. (Rec. Doc. 852, at 3.) Before beginning work at Tower, Broussard signed the Acceptance Form below the statement, “I accept this offer of employment.” Id. The Acceptance Form provides that the terms of the offer “are governed by the terms outlined in the employment agreement you will sign.” Id. “As a general rule of contract law, separate documents may be incorporated into a contract by attachment or reference thereto.” Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Babcock, 703 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2012); AWC, Inc. v. CSF Const., Inc., 931 So. 2d 382, 386 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2006). Further, the Louisiana Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal have held: “The incorporation of an arbitration clause by reference to another written contract is a suitable method of evidencing the parties’ intent to arbitrate as long as the
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arbitration clause in the contract that is referred to has ‘a reasonably clear and ascertainable meaning.’” Aeneas Williams Imports, L.L.C. v. Carter, 131 So. 3d 894, 896 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2012); accord Woodson Const. Co. v. R.L. Abshire Const. Co., 459 So. 2d 566, 569 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1984); Regions Bank v. Weber, 53 So. 3d 1284, 1290 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010); Russellville Steel Co. v. A & R Excavating, Inc., 624 So. 2d 11, 13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1993). Therefore, it is accepted practice to incorporate by reference an arbitration provision not shown on the face of the document.
It is undisputed that the Employment Agreement contained an arbitration provision. Moreover, the arbitration clause in the Employment Agreement is clear. As mentioned above, the arbitration provision provides that “all . . . disputes, legal or otherwise, relating to the employment relationship shall be submitted to binding arbitration by the parties.” (Rec. Doc. 85-2, at 4.) Further, the arbitration provision contains a nonexhaustive list of arbitrable issues, including wrongful discharge. Id. Broussard’s argument that the Acceptance Form necessarily incorporates the provision of the Agreement stating that the Broussard’s signature on the Agreement is an offer of employment which must be accepted by Tower is untenable. To reach that conclusion, the Court would be required to disregard the express language in the Acceptance Form, which clarifies that Broussard
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may accept Tower’s offer of employment. While the Acceptance Form mentions the Employment Agreement and contemplates Broussard signing it, the Acceptance Form indicates that Broussard may accept the offer and form an employment relationship immediately: “The terms of your employment offer are governed by the terms outlined in the employment agreement you will sign. However, if you are ready to be a member of the Tower Loan team . . ., just sign below indicating . . . your acceptance of our offer.” Id. (emphasis added). Broussard signed both the Employment Agreement and the Acceptance Form. Id. at 3-4. Thus, there is a valid arbitration agreement.
Broussard’s argument that the agreement lacks consideration is misplaced. As an initial matter, the common law concept of consideration is not relevant to a contractual analysis in Louisiana. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 cmt. (c) (“Under this Article, ‘cause’ is not ‘consideration.’”); Unkel v. Unkel, 699 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1997) (“Consideration, in the common-law sense, is not a prerequisite for a valid contract in Louisiana, and is distinguished from cause.”). Instead of consideration, under Louisiana law, a contract requires a lawful cause and object. Cause is the reason a party obligates himself, not the terms of the obligation. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967. The objects of a contract are the specific actions the parties must undertake to comply with the contract. See id. art. 1971. Here,
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Broussard signed the Acceptance Form as a condition of employment. “Employment [is a] valid cause of [a] contract.” Cellular One, Inc. v. Boyd, 653 So. 2d 30, 34 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1995). Moreover, such an agreement is supported by valid consideration. See Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding offer of at-will employment was adequate consideration to support arbitration agreement and was not illusory “because any eventual arbitration will, of necessity, relate to conduct that occurred during the term of employment”); New S. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (“Under Mississippi law, any mutual promises, such as mutual promises to arbitrate certain claims, constitute consideration.”). Accordingly, the Acceptance Form signed by Broussard contains a consensual agreement to arbitrate which is binding and valid under Louisiana law and therefore Broussard is bound to that agreement and the dictates of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Having determined that Broussard and Tower formed a valid arbitration agreement, the Court must now consider whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of the arbitration provision. When determining whether a dispute is covered by the scope of an arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court has held that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 2425. The Fifth Circuit has likewise stated that doubts concerning
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the scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Safer v. Nelson Fin. Grp., Inc., 422 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Thus, “arbitration should not be denied ‘unless it can be said with positive assurance that [the] arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys. Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 297 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2002)).
In addition, the Fifth Circuit distinguishes between broad and narrow arbitration clauses. “If the clause is broad, the action should be stayed and the arbitrators permitted to decide whether the dispute falls within the clause.” Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1993). On the other hand, if the clause is narrow, the matter should not be referred to arbitration or the action stayed, unless the court determines that the dispute falls within the clause. Id. at 755. Arbitration clauses containing the “all dispute” language, such as the one presently before the Court, are of the broad type. See id.
Here, the dispute at issue falls squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The arbitration provision applies to all disputes “relating to the employment relationship,” and includes claims based on “sexual” matters and claims for “wrongful termination.” Further, the arbitration clause is broad. The
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arbitration clause makes it clear that the “scope of arbitration” is to be decided by the arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court is required to grant a stay under 9 U.S.C. § 3 and permit the arbitrator to decide whether Broussard’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause.
Having found that there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and that the dispute in question falls within the scope of the arbitration provision, the second step is to determine whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable. Although the EEOC’s opposition does not mention the Acceptance Form, it argues that a contract compelling arbitration would be unenforceable in this case. First, the EEOC argues that Tower has not established a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a trial by jury. However, the valid agreement to arbitrate is itself a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “The Seventh Amendment does not confer the right to a trial, but only the right to have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation should proceed before a court. If the claims are properly before an arbitral forum pursuant to an arbitration agreement, the jury trial right vanishes.” Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). In short, “[t]he Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury is limited by a
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valid arbitration provision that waives the right to resolve a dispute through litigation in a judicial forum.” Id.; see also Garza Nunez v. Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 06-3777, 2007 WL 496855, at *7 n.14 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2007) (“If he indeed entered into an arbitration agreement, the Plaintiff would be deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial.”).
The EEOC also argues that the arbitration provision at issue is unenforceable under Title VII because it purports to foreclose the filing of an EEOC charge. “A waiver of the right to file a charge is void as against public policy.” EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987). However, an unenforceable provision of an arbitration clause will not render the entire arbitration provision void. See Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2003) (severing unenforceable provision in arbitration clause barring any award of punitive damages and upholding remainder of arbitration clause that authorized arbitration of any and all disputes arising out of employment relationship); Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d at 1091 (“[C]ourt may enforce remainder of agreement unenforceable in part as against public policy when ‘performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential part of the agreed exchange.’”). Here, there is no evidence that Tower attempted to prohibit Broussard from filing an EEOC charge in the Acceptance Form, Employment Agreement, or otherwise. In fact, it is undisputed
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that an EEOC charge was filed on Broussard’s behalf and fully processed by the EEOC. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 8-9.) Accordingly, the Court rejects the EEOC’s arguments.
Lastly, Broussard argues that Tower waived its right to compel arbitration because of its “aggressive litigation” in this matter. The right to arbitration, like any contractual right, may be waived. Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986). The party seeking to prove a waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden: “Waiver of arbitration is not a favored finding, and there is a presumption against it.” Miller Brewing Co. v. Fort Worth Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1986). “A party waives its right to arbitration only when participation in the litigation has been so substantial that compelling arbitration would prejudice the other party.” Cargill Ferrous Int'l v. SEA PHOENIX MV, 325 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2003). For example, in Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the court held that the party moving for arbitration had waived that right because it had “initiated extensive discovery, answered twice, filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, filed and obtained two extensions of pre-trial deadlines, all without demanding arbitration.” 791 F.2d at 1159-62. On the other hand, where the party seeking arbitration asserts the right to demand arbitration in answer to a complaint, “the burden of proving waiver falls even more heavily on the shoulders of the party seeking to prove
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waiver.” Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int'l, AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1985).
In the instant case, Broussard fails to meet the heavy burden of proving waiver. Broussard claims that Tower substantially invoked the judicial process by filing its own countersuit in Mississippi; however, Broussard fails to mention that Tower filed suit in Mississippi solely to compel arbitration. Tower filed its lawsuit according to the specific provision in the Employment Agreement that authorizes Tower to file suit seeking injunctive relief in the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi. Tower filed its suit to compel arbitration within ten days of Broussard filing suit in this Court. For this reason, Tower’s filing of its lawsuit against Broussard in Mississippi strongly supports the conclusion that Tower did not waive its rights to compel arbitration. Moreover, Tower has repeatedly expressed that it considers Broussard’s claims to be subject to binding arbitration. For example, as its first defense in its Answer, Tower stated that Broussard’s claims are subject to arbitration and should be dismissed or stayed. (Rec. Doc. 46, at 1.) Therefore, Broussard had notice that Tower planned to compel arbitration and has not shown that compelling arbitration would prejudice him.
Tower further requests that the Court appoint the AAA to conduct the arbitration in accordance with its protocol for resolution of employment disputes. Under the FAA, courts may
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intervene into the arbitral process to select an arbitrator upon application of a party, if the arbitration agreement does not provide a method for selecting arbitrators. BP Expl. Libya Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Libya Ltd., 689 F.3d 481, 490-91 (5th Cir. 2012). Section 5 dictates that when an agreement to arbitrate does not provide a method for appointment of an arbitrator, “upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein.” 9 U.S.C. § 5 (emphasis added). Neither Broussard nor the EEOC have objected to the Court appointing the AAA to conduct the arbitration. Accordingly, unless Broussard and Tower reach an agreement on an arbitrator,6 the Court directs that the arbitration proceed before the AAA, with the parties to select an arbitrator pursuant to the provisions of the AAA’s Employment Dispute Resolution Rules.
6 Tower notes, “During earlier discussions between Tower Loan’s Mississippi counsel and certain of Plaintiff’s attorneys the parties reached what appeared to be a tentative agreement for submitting Broussard’s claims to arbitration before one of two Mississippi employment attorneys, J. William Manuel (Bradley Arrant) or Peyton S. Irby, Jr. (Kullman Firm) (both located in Jackson Mississippi).” (Rec. Doc. 85-1, at 19 n.19.) However, Broussard’s counsel have since declined to take a position regarding whether these attorneys are agreeable arbitrators. Id. Tower states that it would be agreeable to conducting the arbitration before either of these attorneys pursuant to the AAA protocols for resolution of employment disputes. Id.
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B. Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration Under section 3 of the FAA, a district court must stay a
lawsuit when a party demonstrates that any issue involved in the lawsuit is “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. This provision is mandatory and demands a stay of legal proceedings “whenever the issues in a case are within the reach of an arbitration agreement.” Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d at 754. When these circumstances are present, a district court “has no discretion under section 3 to deny the stay.” Id.
The first issue the Court must address in determining whether the mandatory stay provision applies is whether Tower, the defendant in this matter and a signatory to the arbitration agreement, may invoke the provision against the EEOC, the intervenor, who is a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement.
Historically, invocation of the mandatory stay provision was limited to signatories of the arbitration agreement and was not effective against any nonsignatory parties present in the lawsuit. Adams v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 237 F.3d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Generally, this section applies only to parties to the arbitration agreement.”). However, in recent years, courts have expanded the applicability of the mandatory stay provision. For example, in Adams v. Georgia Gulf Corp., the Fifth Circuit summarized two cases where the court “applied the stay provision
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to non-parties because the issues presented in the nonparty-party litigation if litigated would have rendered the arbitration redundant and thwarted the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Id. at 540-41 (citing Harvey v. Joyce, 199 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.2000); Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324 (5th Cir.1999)). Because the court was confronted with “exceptional circumstances,” it diverged from the general rule requiring party status for the mandatory stay provision to apply. Id. at 541. Similarly, in Waste Management, Inc. v. Residuous Industriales Multiquim, S.A. de C.V., the Fifth Circuit held that a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement could invoke the mandatory stay provision. 372 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 2004). The court found that the signatory’s claims in the litigation were so closely related to the arbitration and would have such an impact on the arbitration as to make a stay mandatory under section 3. Id. at 345.
In Waste Management, the Fifth Circuit articulated three factors that courts must consider in determining whether the mandatory stay provision applies: “1) the arbitrated and litigated disputes must involve the same operative facts; 2) the claims asserted in the arbitration and litigation must be ‘inherently inseparable’; and 3) the litigation must have a ‘critical impact’ on the arbitration.” Id. at 343. “The question is not ultimately one of weighing potential harm to the interests of the nonsignatory, but of determining whether proceeding with litigation
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will destroy the signatories’ right to a meaningful arbitration.” Id. (citing Adams, 237 F.3d at 541).
When a mandatory stay under section 3 is not warranted, the court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to stay the litigation pending the outcome of the arbitration, even as to claims between nonarbitrating parties, simply as a means of controlling its docket. Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d at 755 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 20 n.23; Matter of Talbott Big Foot, Inc., 887 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1989)). The court’s discretionary authority to issue a stay is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); accord Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 243 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 761 F.2d 198, 204 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985)). Determining whether to issue a discretionary stay “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain and even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.
Considering the three Waste Management factors, the Court finds that a discretionary, if not a mandatory, stay is warranted. First, the EEOC’s claims and Broussard’s claims undoubtedly involve the same operative facts. Notably, in its Notice of Intent to Intervene, the EEOC stated, “The nexus of factual circumstances
34

central to the EEOC’s claims will be those at issue in Mr. Broussard’s suit against First Tower Loan, LLC.” (Rec. Doc. 51, at 1.) Moreover, the EEOC’s complaint and Broussard’s complaint allege the same operative facts. (Compare Rec. Doc. 1, at 3-7, with Rec. Doc. 71, at 4-8.) “The close relationship between the facts involved in the federal court claims and the arbitration claims counsels in favor of staying this litigation.” Suzlon Infrastructure, Ltd. v. Pulk, No. H-09-2206, 2010 WL 3540951, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2010).
Second, although the subject matter of the EEOC’s claims and Broussard’s claims are similar, they are not “inherently inseparable.” When the EEOC chooses to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, or chooses to intervene in an aggrieved employee’s action as it did here, “the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002). Here, some of the EEOC’s claims are brought to vindicate a public interest and, therefore, are not inherently inseparable from Broussard’s personal claims. However, the facts and claims “significantly overlap.” Suzlon, 2010 WL 3540951, at *8. Indeed, litigating the EEOC’s claims will involve much of the same evidence developed in the arbitration.
Finally, the litigation would likely have a “critical impact” on the arbitration. Several of the EEOC’s claims seek victim-
35

specific relief “to make Mr. Broussard whole,” such as backpay, reinstatement, and damages. Broussard seeks the same relief. Consequently, resolving these claims of the EEOC would resolve issues that the arbitrator will decide. Given the binding effect of a federal judgment, as well as the factual similarities in the EEOC’s claims, the arbitrator would necessarily be strongly influenced to follow the Court's determination. See Waste Mgmt., 372 F.3d at 345. Thus, “[a]llowing the instant litigation to proceed would risk inconsistent results, and ‘substantially impact’ the arbitration.” Id.
A discretionary stay of this litigation will also enable the Court and the parties to benefit from the outcome of the arbitration. For example, Tower argues that if Broussard’s claims for victim-specific relief are resolved by the arbitrator, then the only claims left for the EEOC to pursue would be claims for general injunctive relief, which must be decided by the Court rather than a jury. The EEOC vigorously opposes this argument, relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). In Waffle House, the Supreme Court held that an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief, such as backpay, reinstatement, and damages, in an enforcement action. Id. at 287-88. However, in Waffle House, the EEOC filed an enforcement action and the employee
36

was not a party to the case. Id. at 283. Moreover, the employee had not sought arbitration of his claim. Id. at 297. Therefore, the Court did not consider what effect, if any, arbitration of the employee’s claim would have on the EEOC’s claims. Id. In this regard, the Court stated:
It is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgment would affect the validity of the EEOC's claim or the character of relief the EEOC may seek. The only issue before this Court is whether the fact that [the employee] has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement limits the remedies available to the EEOC. Id. Further, the Court noted that it “goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual” and “ordinary principles of res judicata, mootness, or mitigation may apply to EEOC claims.” Id. at 297-98. In the instant case, Tower does not dispute that the EEOC may seek victim-specific relief in an enforcement action, even if a valid arbitration agreement exists between the employer and employee. Thus, the EEOC’s reliance on Waffle House is misplaced. Instead, Tower asserts that the principles of res judicata may apply to the EEOC’s claims and, therefore, an arbitration judgment could affect the validity of the EEOC’s claims or the character of relief the EEOC may seek. The Fifth Circuit supports Tower’s assertion. In EEOC v. Jefferson Dental Clinics, PA, the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC was barred from seeking make-whole relief for employees who had already litigated their claims in
37

state court. 478 F.3d 690, 699 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Texas
law).7 The court’s holding was based on the res judicata effect of
the prior state court judgment in the employees’ case. Id. The
court reasoned that “[i]n the context of make-whole relief, . . .
the interests of the EEOC stack up poorly against the principles
of res judicata.” Similarly, the court explained that “[t]he EEOC’s
public interest does not justify giving the plaintiffs two chances
to receive make-whole relief.” Id. (citing Waffle House, 534 U.S.
at 296-97.) However, “given the divergence of interests between
the charging parties and the EEOC when it seeks injunctive relief,”
the court allowed the EEOC’s injunctive relief claims to proceed.
Id. at 698. Thus, in this case, the EEOC’s ability to seek make-
whole relief on behalf of Broussard may be limited by the
arbitration.
Lastly, the EEOC relies on Harris v. Amoco Production Co.,
768 F.2d 669 (1985), to support its argument that a stay would
thwart its authority to enforce Title VII in the public’s interest.
7 The EEOC argues that Tower’s reliance on EEOC v. Jefferson Dental Clinics, PA is improper because it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), and because it applied Texas law rather than federal law. However, the EEOC does not point to any inconsistencies between Jefferson Dental and Taylor, and courts have cited Jefferson Dental with approval since Taylor. See Jackson v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 583 F. App'x 417, 418 (5th Cir. 2014). Further, although Jefferson Dental applied Texas law rather than federal law, there is nothing to indicate that federal law would require a different conclusion. Compare Jefferson Dental, 478 F.3d at 695-99 (analyzing the representation-of-interests inquiry under Texas law), with Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894-900 (discussing the representation-of-interests inquiry under federal law). Nevertheless, the issue of res judicata is not presently before the Court and the Court need not decide whether any of the EEOC’s claims would be barred by res judicata at this time.
38

In Harris, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the EEOC’s claims when the original plaintiffs settled. Id. at 682. Reasoning “from the premise that the EEOC exists to represent the public interest in equal employment opportunity,” the court held that the EEOC, which had intervened in the case, had the authority to continue litigating after the main plaintiffs had settled out of the lawsuit. Id. Here, although Tower opposed the EEOC’s initial motion to intervene, Tower does not dispute that Title VII grants the EEOC the statutory right to intervene under certain circumstances. Nor does Tower seek to dismiss the EEOC’s claims at this time. Rather, Tower seeks a stay of the EEOC’s claims pending the final outcome of the arbitration between Broussard and Tower. Accordingly, the EEOC’s reliance on Harris is misplaced.
Considering the factors set out in Waste Management, the Court concludes that a stay in this matter is warranted. The operative facts are identical, the claims significantly overlap, and allowing the litigation to proceed would risk inconsistent results and substantially impact the arbitration. Moreover, the Court and the parties may benefit from the outcome of the arbitration. In sum, even if these factors do not require a mandatory stay under section 3, those factors, on the present record, support a discretionary stay.
39

CONCLUSION Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 85) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court appoints the American Arbitration Association as the arbitral forum to administer arbitration of the dispute between Broussard and Tower.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration (Rec. Doc. 96) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all proceedings in this matter shall be STAYED pending the outcome of the arbitration between Broussard and Tower. The Clerk of Court shall mark this action closed for statistical purposes.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court shall retain jurisdiction and that the case shall be restored to the trial docket upon motion of a party if circumstances change, so that it may proceed to final disposition. This order shall not prejudice the rights of the parties to this litigation.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of December, 2015.
CARL J. BARBIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
40

 
 Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRISTAN BROUSSARD, Plaintiff,
And

Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS c/w 2:15-cv-02500-CJB-SS "J" (1)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,

v.

FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC d/b/a TOWER LOAN OF LAKE CHARLES,
Defendant.

______________________________________________________________________________

CONSENT DECREE This action was instituted by Plaintiff-Intervenor, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”), against First Tower Loan, LLC (“Defendant”). The Commission alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). The complaint alleged that Defendant terminated the employment of Tristan Broussard (“Broussard”), who is transgender, because of sex, based on perceived nonconformity with gender stereotypes and/or his gender identity. Defendant has not admitted and specifically denies that it engaged in any unlawful employment practices. The EEOC and Defendant now wish to settle all claims or controversies encompassed by or which could have been brought in this action, without the burden, expense, or delay of further litigation, pursuant to the terms delineated in this Decree. The terms of this Decree were reached

1

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 2 of 8
by a process of negotiation and compromise. The EEOC and Defendant agree that the terms of this Decree represent the result of good faith negotiations by both parties.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements between the Parties, as set forth herein, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties request and the Court agrees to ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:
1. The Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the claims and causes of action asserted by the EEOC against Defendant, venue is proper, and all administrative prerequisites to the EEOC’s filing have been met.
2. The Court stayed the EEOC’s action against Defendant on December 10, 2015 based on an arbitration agreement Charging Party Broussard had signed with Defendant. On November 23, 2016, Charging Party was awarded $43,162 in economic damages and $10,000 in emotional distress damages in arbitration. The Court lifted its stay on July 14, 2017.
3. The Parties agree that this Decree resolves all claims brought or which could have been brought by the EEOC arising out of EEOC Charge Number 550-2013-01392 and/or the instant civil action. The EEOC waives further litigation of the claims raised in this civil action concerning Broussard. The EEOC expressly reserves its right, however, to process and litigate any other charges which may currently be pending or in the future may be filed against Defendant.
4. Neither the negotiations leading to, the execution of or the entry of the Decree shall constitute an acknowledgement or admission of any kind by Defendant that its officers, agents, or employees have violated or have not been in compliance with Title VII or any other applicable law, regulation, or order.
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Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 3 of 8
5. During the term of this Decree, Defendant, its officers, successors, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it/them will not engage in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of gender identity, transgender status, or sex stereotyping.
6. Within sixty (60) days of the entry of this Decree, Defendant shall review and
revise its existing EEO policies and practices and confirm that such policies and practices
conform to the law. The written EEO policies must include at a minimum:
a. A commitment to preventing unlawful sex discrimination, including, but not limited to, prohibiting discrimination based on sex-stereotyping, gender identity, and transgender status;
b. A commitment to preventing unlawful harassment including, but not limited to, harassment based on sex, sex-stereotyping, gender identity, and transgender status;
c. An explanation that prohibited behavior will not be tolerated from its employees, customers, agents, contractors, sub-contractors, clients, and any other persons present at any of the Defendant’s locations;
d. An encouragement of persons who believe they have been discriminated to report such concerns;
e. An explanation that employee concerns about discrimination may be raised with any manager, any HR representative, any Defendant executive, or through an employee hotline;
f. An explanation that employees will not be required to complain of discrimination directly to the individual that is engaged in the discriminatory behavior;
g. An explanation of the steps an employee must take to report discrimination, which must include the options of either an oral or written complaint;
h. An assurance that Defendant will investigate allegations of any activity that might be construed as unlawful discrimination and that such investigation will be prompt, fair, and reasonable;
i. An assurance that appropriate corrective action will be taken by Defendant to eradicate any unlawful conduct within its workforce;
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Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 4 of 8
j. A description of the consequences, up to and including termination, that will be imposed upon violators of Defendant’s anti-discrimination policies; and k. A requirement that supervisors and managers report any complaints about harassment or discrimination to Defendant’s Human Resources office. 7. All of Defendant’s employees, including Branch Managers, Manager-Trainees, and Human Resources personnel, in attendance at the next scheduled Branch Manager and Manager-Trainee meetings, shall participate in EEO training — conducted by a qualified employment law attorney or Human Resources professional with at least five years of experience in employment discrimination and/or EEO issues — of not less than one hour. During the term of this Decree, Defendant will ensure that each employee is trained annually at a minimum with the first training to be held within six (6) months after the entry of the Decree. The training shall include: (a) the types of sex-based employment decisions; (b) the Defendant’s policy and procedures for reporting alleged discrimination; (c) understanding the kind of conduct which may constitute unlawful sex discrimination, including discrimination based on sex-stereotyping and/or gender nonconformity (as gender nonconformity is described and defined in E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013)); and (d) the penalties of engaging in discriminatory behavior. Within twenty (20) days after the training has been completed, Defendant shall provide to the EEOC certification that the training has been completed, identifying each individual who attended the training, who conducted the training, and the date. 8. Within ten (10) days from the entry of this Decree, Defendant shall post a copy of the Notice attached as Exhibit “A” to this Decree at Defendant’s Lake Charles, Louisiana branch, in a conspicuous location easily accessible to and commonly frequented by employees. The
4

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 5 of 8
Notice shall remain posted for the 18 months duration of this decree. Defendants shall ensure that the postings are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
9. During the term of this Decree, the EEOC may take reasonable measures to ensure compliance with the terms of this Decree.
10. With the exception of paragraphs 1-3 and 9-15 of this Decree, Defendant shall bear the costs associated with administering and implementing the provisions of this Decree.
11. Should any provision of this Decree be declared invalid or be determined by any Court to be illegal or invalid, the validity of the remaining parts, terms, or provisions shall not be affected thereby and said illegal or invalid part, term, or provision shall be deemed not to be a part of this Decree.
12. This Decree sets forth the entire agreement between the EEOC and Defendant as to the captioned lawsuit and fully supersedes any and all prior agreements or understandings between the EEOC and Defendant pertaining to the subject matter herein.
13. The terms of this Decree shall be binding upon the EEOC, Defendant, and their respective agents, officers, employees, servants, successors, and assigns as to the issues resolved in this civil action. Unless otherwise noted, the terms of this Decree apply to all of Defendant’s facilities or offices and to any additional facilities or offices which Defendant opens during the duration of this Decree.
14. The duration of this Decree (“compliance period”) shall be 18 months from the date of its entry by the Court. In the event that the Parties believe that the other Party has failed to comply with any provision(s) of the Decree, the complaining party shall notify the other Party of the alleged non-compliance and shall afford the alleged non-complying party twenty (20) business days to remedy the alleged non-compliance or to satisfy the complaining Party that the alleged non-
5

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 6 of 8
complying Party has complied. If the alleged non-complying Party has not remedied the alleged non-compliance or otherwise satisfied the complaining Party that it has complied within twenty (20) business days, the complaining Party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief. The Parties agree that the Court shall retain jurisdiction of this case during the term of this Decree to enforce compliance and to take any action necessary and/or appropriate for its interpretation, execution, modification, and/or adjudication of disputes. The EEOC shall have until two months after the expiration of the compliance period of this decree to seek relief with this Court in regard to any alleged violation of the Decree.
15. The parties to this Decree shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees incurred in this action.
16. When this Decree requires the submission by Defendant of documents or other materials to the EEOC, such documents or other materials shall be mailed or emailed to Eduardo Juarez, Supervisory Trial Attorney, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, San Antonio Field Office, 5410 Fredericksburg Rd., Suite 200, San Antonio, TX 78229-3555, EDUARDO.JUAREZ@EEOC.GOV.
SO ORDERED AND ENTERED this _____ day of _____O__c__to__b_e_r_____ , 2017.
____________________________________ HONORABLE CARL BARBIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 7 of 8
EXHIBIT A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
This NOTICE is being posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered in Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, Civil Action No.: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS c/w 2:15-cv-02500-CJB-SS. This NOTICE will be conspicuously posted for a period of 18 months at the Lake Charles, Louisiana branch. It must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
1. Federal law, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate based upon sex including treating differently or harassing an employee because of stereotypes about how a person of his or her sex should look or act. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) position, in accordance with some federal courts, is that this prohibition includes treating differently or harassing an employee because of his or her gender identity or transgender status.
First Tower Loan, LLC strongly supports and will comply with such Federal law in all aspects and it will not take any action against employees because they have exercised their rights under the law by filing charges with the EEOC. Sex discrimination occurs when an employment decision is made based on a person’s sex including pregnancy and/or sex/gender stereotyping rather than on legitimate factors. The EEOC’s position, in accordance with some federal courts, is that sex discrimination may also occur when an employment decision is made based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity rather than on legitimate factors.
Some examples of conduct that the EEOC views as unlawful sex discrimination include:
• Denying an employee, a promotion because the employee is a transgender male or is a transgender female.
• Firing an employee because the employee is planning gender transition.
• Failing to hire an applicant because the applicant is a transgender woman or a transgender male.
• Discriminating in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, such as providing a lower salary, towards an employee because of sexual orientation.
• Harassing an employee because of his or her sexual orientation or transgender status, for example, by derogatory terms, sexually oriented comments, disparaging remarks for associating with a person of the same or opposite sex, or intentional misuse of gender pronouns when referring to transgender employees.
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Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM Document 152 Filed 10/05/17 Page 8 of 8
• Harassing an employee because of a gender transition, such as by intentionally and persistently failing to use the name and gender pronoun that correspond to the gender identity with which the employee identifies, and which the employee has communicated to management and employees.
• Discriminating against or harassing an employee because of his or her sexual orientation, or gender identity, in combination with another unlawful reason, for example, on the basis of race or disability.
This list is in no means exhaustive. There are other forms of sex discrimination. 2. If you believe you are being discriminated against in any term, condition or privilege of
your employment because of your race, religion, color, national origin, sex, including pregnancy and/or sexual orientation, and/or gender identity or that you are being retaliated against for having engaged in Title VII-protected activity, you are encouraged to seek assistance or to report the alleged act as soon as possible to your immediate supervisor. Supervisors who are informed of an alleged incident of discrimination and/or retaliation have been instructed to immediately notify the Human Resource Department. In addition to reporting a complaint of discrimination and/or retaliation to company officials, a person may also contact the EEOC. Information about the EEOC procedures dealing with how to file a charge is available on the Internet at www.eeoc.gov. 3. No retaliatory action may be taken against you for seeking assistance, filing a charge, or communicating with the EEOC. 4. EEOC enforces Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Equal Pay Act; sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in the private sector and state and local governments.
8

 
 Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 540 (2015)

135 F.Supp.3d 540 United States District Court,
E.D. Louisiana.
Tristan BROUSSARD v.
FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC.
Civil Action No. 15–1161. |
Signed Oct. 1, 2015. |
Filed Oct. 2, 2015.
Synopsis Background: Former employee who was transgender, outwardly appearing and self-identifying as being of male gender while having birth-sex of female, brought Title VII discrimination action against former employer after he was terminated for refusing to comply with company’s female dress code. Employer brought state court action against employee, employee removed the action, and the cases were consolidated. Upon removal, employer moved to transfer venue.
Holdings: The District Court, Carl J. Barbier, J., held that:
employee’s choice of venue was proper;
prospective transferee district was proper venue; but
transfer was not warranted, abrogating EEOC v. Noble Drilling, 2004 WL 2700289.
Motion denied.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*542 Amy Whelan, San Francisco, CA, Ryan P. Delaney, Delaney & Robb, Attorneys at Law, LLC, Metairie, LA, Samuel Eugene Wolfe, Montgomery, AL, for Tristan Broussard.
David M. Whitaker, Zoe Wilde Vermeulen, Kean Miller LLP, New Orleans, LA, for First Tower Loan, LLC.
1

ORDER AND REASONS
CARL J. BARBIER, District Judge.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue (Rec.Doc. 52) filed by Defendant, First Tower Loan, LLC (“Tower”) and two oppositions thereto (Rec.Doc. 67; Rec.Doc. 74) filed by Plaintiff, Tristan Broussard (“Broussard”), and Intervenor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation derives from Broussard’s employment with Tower and subsequent termination. Broussard is twentyone years old and a resident of Lake Charles, Louisiana. (Rec.Doc. 1 at 2.) In February *543 2013, Tower offered Broussard a job as a Manager Trainee in its Lake Charles office. Id. at 1. Broussard is a transgender man, meaning that he outwardly appears to be male and his gender identity is male. Id. at 4. However, his birth sex is female. Id. at 4. As Broussard completed paperwork for his employment with Tower, his supervisor, Leah Sparks, noticed that his driver’s license listed his sex as female. Id. at 5.
On March 11, 2013, Tower Loan Vice President David Morgan visited the Lake Charles office. Id. at 6. Morgan gave Broussard a copy of the company’s female dress code and informed Broussard that he must dress as a female because he was born female. Id. Morgan also presented Broussard with a written statement and told him that he must sign the statement or lose his job. Id. at 7. The statement said that Broussard’s “preference to act and dress as male” was not “in compliance with Tower Loan’s personnel policies.” Id. Broussard refused to sign the agreement, and Tower subsequently terminated his employment. Id.

Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 540 (2015)

Broussard filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC on August 27, 2013. Id. at 8. The EEOC determined that Broussard’s claim was meritorious and issued a Notice of Right to Sue on January 20, 2015. Id. at 8–9. Broussard filed the instant action on April 13, 2015. Meanwhile, Tower filed suit against Broussard in Mississippi state court. Broussard removed Tower’s suit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Upon Broussard’s motion, the federal court transferred Tower’s suit to this Court, which consolidated it with Broussard’s case. (Rec.Doc. 36.)
The EEOC filed a Notice of Intent to Intervene on September 1, 2015. (Rec.Doc. 51.) The next day, Tower Loan filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or Alternatively, to Transfer Venue. (Rec.Doc. 52.) Broussard filed opposition to this motion on September 15. (Rec.Doc. 67.) This Court granted the EEOC’s Motion to Intervene on September 16, and the EEOC filed opposition to Tower’s motion on September 29. (Rec.Docs. 70, 79). Subsequently, Tower filed a Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. (Rec.Doc. 75.)
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Tower challenges venue in this Court on two bases. First, Tower argues that Title VII’s venue provisions require the claimant to bring suit in the district where the unlawful employment action occurred. Second, even if venue is proper in the Eastern District under Title VII, Tower argues that this Court should transfer the case to the Western District of Louisiana, which encompasses Lake Charles, because it is a more appropriate venue.
Broussard first argues that the statutory language of Title VII clearly provides that a claimant can bring suit in any district in the state where the unlawful employment action occurred. Second, he argues that Tower failed to demonstrate that transfer is warranted and that the multifactor test articulated by the Fifth Circuit supports the maintenance of his suit in this Court.
In its opposition, the EEOC joins and adopts Broussard’s opposition. Further, it argues that the plain language of Title VII provides for venue in the Eastern District in this case. The EEOC also asserts that Tower has not met its burden of demonstrating that a transfer is warranted. As part of this argument, the EEOC emphasizes the importance of the plaintiff’s venue selection in Title VII cases. Like Broussard, the EEOC also asserts that the
2

multi-factor test does not support transfer to the Western District.
*544 LEGAL STANDARD
Congress has adopted special venue provisions for Title VII cases. In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir.2003) (“Horseshoe II ”). Specifically,
[A Title VII action] may be brought [1] in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but [4] if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) (bracketed numbers added). When venue is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the chosen venue was proper. Smith v. Fortenberry, 903 F.Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D.La.1995).
Even when the plaintiff files suit in a proper venue, the district court may transfer a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The movant has the burden of showing that an alternative forum is more appropriate for the action. See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir.2008) ( “Volkswagen II ”). “The plaintiff’s privilege to choose, or not to be ousted from, his chosen forum is highly esteemed.” Carpenter v. Parker Drilling Offshore USA, Inc., No. 05–265, 2005 WL 1432373, at *1 (E.D.La. June 16, 2005). Therefore, to overcome the plaintiff’s choice of venue, the movant must show “good cause” for the transfer. Volkswagen II, 545

Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 540 (2015)

F.3d at 315. Good cause for the transfer exists when the transferee venue is clearly more convenient than the plaintiff’s chosen venue. Id. In such a case, the court should grant the motion to transfer. Id.
When deciding a motion to transfer, the Fifth Circuit considers private and public interest factors first articulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). Id. The private interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir.2004) (“Volkswagen I ”)). The public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id. (brackets in original). None of the factors are entitled to dispositive weight. Id.
DISCUSSION
A. Whether Plaintiff Filed Suit in a Proper Venue This Court finds that the Eastern District of Louisiana is a proper venue for Broussard’s action based on three considerations: (1) the plain language of Title VII’s venue provision, (2) congressional intent, and (3) precedent from other district courts in the Fifth Circuit.
First, Title VII clearly states that venue is proper in any district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment actions occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). *545 When interpreting a statute, courts will primarily consider the plain meaning of the words used. Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). When the words are unambiguous, the court must apply the statute as written. Id. at 255, 112 S.Ct. 1146. Courts should give words their ordinary, plain meaning and should not construe a statute to render any clause, sentence, or word superfluous, void, or insignificant. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303,
3

314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009).
Here, Title VII unambiguously provides for venue in any district court in Louisiana. The alleged discrimination based on sex took place in Tower’s Lake Charles office. (Rec.Doc. 1 at 6–7.) Thus, by the plain language of the statute, venue is proper in any district court in Louisiana, including this Court. To decide otherwise would be to read out the words “any” and “in the State” from the statute.
Second, legislative history sheds light on Congress’s intent to allow venue anywhere in the state where the unlawful acts occurred. The original version of the bill introduced in the House provided for venue in “the judicial district in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed” or “in the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2511 (1964). The Senate altered this language to provide for venue in “any district in the State where the practice occurred.” 110 Cong. Rec. 12,723 (1964). This change reflects a deliberate choice by the Senate to expand the plaintiff’s venue options.
Third, the majority of the district courts in the Fifth Circuit have held that venue is proper in any district in the state where the unlawful employment actions occurred. See, e.g., Wallace v. Bd. of Supervisors for the Univ. of La. Sys., No. 14657, 2015 WL 1970514, at *2 (M.D.La. Apr. 30, 2015); Coleman v. Trican Well Serv., L.P., 89 F.Supp.3d 876, 880 (W.D.Tex.2015); Davidson v. Weyerhaeuser Corp., No. 11–0636, 2011 WL 5402362, at *2–3 (W.D.La. Oct. 4, 2011); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Parish Water Work’s Co., 415 F.Supp. 124, 125 (E.D.La.1976).
The Fifth Circuit has yet to decide the scope of Title VII’s venue provision. See Horseshoe II, 337 F.3d at 430 (withdrawing previous decision, which held that venue in Title VII cases was proper only in the district where the employment practices occurred, not anywhere in the state). However, the Eleventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit have supported a more expansive reading of the statute, in line with the district court cases cited above. Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 504 (9th Cir.2000); Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 654 n. 11 (11th Cir.1993); Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Ed., 935 F.2d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir.1991). In lieu of binding Fifth Circuit precedent, this Court finds the decisions of these Circuit Courts persuasive.
Thus, the Eastern District of Louisiana is a proper venue for Broussard’s suit. Tower’s arguments for dismissal are

Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 540 (2015)

unavailing.1
B. Whether the Court Should Transfer to a More Appropriate Venue Even when the plaintiff files suit in a proper venue, the court may exercise its discretion to transfer the case to another district or division where the action might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest *546 of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Norman v. H & E Equip. Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 1281989, at *5 (M.D.La. Mar. 20, 2015). As mentioned above, the movant has the burden of demonstrating that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. In determining whether to transfer the case, the court will consider a number of private and public interest factors.
A. District Where the Action Might Have Been Brought As a threshold question, the Court must determine whether the Western District of Louisiana is a district “where the action might have been brought.” Title VII clearly provides for venue in the Western District because (1) it is a judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practices are alleged to have been committed and (2) it is a judicial district in which Broussard would have worked but for the unlawful practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Because Broussard could have originally filed suit in the Western District, the preliminary inquiry is satisfied.
B. Private Interest Factors As mentioned above, the private interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. Each will be discussed in turn.
4

(1) Access to Proof When analyzing the first factor, courts consider the distance between the current location of the evidence and the trial venue. MGT Gaming, Inc. v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 978 F.Supp.2d 647, 668 (S.D.Miss.2013). This analysis turns on “which party will most probably have the greater volume of documents relevant to the litigation and their presumed location in relation to the transferee and transferor venues.” Id. Typically, documents concerning corporate parties are located at the corporation’s headquarters. Id. at 669 (citing In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed.Cir.2010)).
In this case, the relevant documents are in Tower’s possession. In its motion, Tower mentioned Broussard’s employment file as a piece of relevant documentary evidence. (Rec.Doc. 52–1 at 6.) The file is located at Tower’s headquarters in Flowood, Mississippi. (Rec.Doc. 52–3.) According to Google Maps, the Flowood headquarters is 189 miles from the Eastern District, while it is 278 miles from the Western District. (Rec.Docs. 67– 3, 67–4.) Tower failed to show the existence of any documentary evidence located in Lake Charles. Thus, it cannot show that venue in the Western District would facilitate the access to proof. This factor supports maintaining suit in the Eastern District.
(2) Compulsory Process The second factor favors a transfer when the transferee venue would have “absolute subpoena power,” or subpoena power for both depositions and trial. MGT Gaming, 978 F.Supp.2d at 671. However, subpoena power is not an important consideration when the only witnesses are party witnesses. Tegrity Contractors, Inc. v. Spectra Grp., Inc., No. 12–2555, 2013 WL 654924, at *5 (E.D.La. Feb. 21, 2013). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a subpoena may command a person to attend a trial or deposition within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(1)(A). A party or a party’s officer can be compelled *547 to attend a trial or deposition anywhere in the state where he resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(1)(B)(i). Thus, a corporate party’s employees can be compelled to testify at a trial or deposition anywhere in the state. Tegrity Contractors, 2013 WL 654924, at *5.

Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 540 (2015)

Here, Tower has not identified any nonparty witnesses. Its motion mentions as potential witnesses Broussard’s supervisor, Leah Sparks, and Broussard’s co-workers, all of whom are Tower employees who work at the Lake Charles office. This Court has absolute subpoena power over these employees because they are party officers who are employed within the state of Louisiana. The motion generally states that most witnesses are located in Lake Charles, but it does not identify any witnesses who are not employees of a party. Thus, the availability of compulsory process is not an important factor in the transfer of venue analysis.
(3) Cost of Attendance The cost of attendance for willing witnesses is an important factor in determining whether to transfer venue. Modern Am. Recycling Servs., Inc. v. Dunavant, No. 10– 3153; 2011 WL 1303136, *6 (E.D.La. March 31, 2011). While the cost of attendance for party witnesses can be considered, the cost of attendance for nonparty witnesses is entitled to greater weight. MGT Gaming, 978 F.Supp.2d at 671; Remmers v. United States, No. 09–345, 2009 WL 3617597, at *5 (E.D.Tex. Oct. 28, 2009); Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Trans Globe Imports, Inc., No. 02–2538, 2003 WL 21251684, *2 (N.D.Tex. May 23, 2003). When the distance between the existing venue and proposed transferee venue is more than 100 miles, the inconvenience to the witnesses increases in direct proportion to the additional distance to be traveled. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317.
The moving party must “specifically identify the key witnesses and outline the substance of their testimony.” Tegrity Contractors, 2013 WL 654924, at *4; Modern Am. Recycling, 2011 WL 1303136, *6; Cypress Drilling, Inc. v. Griffin, No. 06–0556, 2006 WL 2177992, at *2 (W.D.La. July 31, 2006); Caraljo Music, Inc. v. Malaco, Inc., No. 87–3599, 1988 WL 32943, at *2 (E.D.La. Apr. 5, 1988); Southern Inv’rs II v. Commuter Aircraft Corp., 520 F.Supp. 212, 218 (M.D.La.1981); see also 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper § 3851, at 425. When the movant fails to make this showing, the court should deny the motion to transfer. Caraljo Music, Inc., 1988 WL 32943, at *2 (“Witnesses have not been identified; their location is unknown; and the areas of testimony are not provided. Thus, [the movant] has failed to carry its burden.”); 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper § 3851, at 425.
As discussed above, Tower failed to identify any nonparty witnesses who would be inconvenienced by trial in the Eastern District. In addition, Tower failed to list the key
5

witnesses and the substance of their testimony. Instead, it stated generally that “[t]he costs for willing witnesses from Lake Charles to attend proceedings in Lake Charles would be minimal, but costs for their travel 205 miles to New Orleans would be significant.” (Rec.Doc. 52–1 at 6.) This allegation is not sufficient to meet the movant’s burden. Thus, this factor supports maintaining venue in the Eastern District.
(4) Practical Problems In this case, the fourth factor is not important. The case is still “still in its infancy stage.” See Tegrity Contractors, 2013 WL 654924, at *6. The parties have not begun conducting discovery, and the pre-trial conference and trial dates have not been set. Thus, neither party would *548 be prejudiced by a transfer to the Western District. Broussard alleges generally that transfer would delay adjudication of his claim but does not offer any proof. Tower Loan has the burden of showing that transfer would result in a more efficient trial, but it failed to allege that transfer would affect the litigation at all. Thus, this factor is neutral.
C. Public Interest Factors The public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315 (brackets in original). In this case, the parties have not raised issues of conflict of laws or familiarity of the courts with the relevant law. Thus, the only relevant factors are congestion and local interest.
(1) Congestion As part of the transfer analysis, courts will consider the time between the filing of a suit and trial. In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2009). However, this factor is not entitled to much weight because it is the most speculative, and this factor alone should not outweigh other factors. Id.; Versata Software,

Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 540 (2015)

Inc. v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 08–313, 2009 WL 3161370 at *4 (E.D.Tex. Sept. 30, 2009).
Tower did not allege that the Western District would provide a faster route to trial. However, Broussard cited statistics from the federal district courts showing that the Western District may be more congested than the Eastern District. (Rec.Doc. 67, at 14.) For example, cases in the Western District take a median of twenty-seven months to reach trial, while cases in the Eastern District take a median of fifteen months. Id. Tower Loan did not carry its burden of showing that venue in the Western District would result in a faster adjudication. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of maintaining venue in the Eastern District.

determined that this case raises issues of “general public importance.” (Rec.Doc. 59–2.) This designation suggests that the issues raised in this case are important to the public at large, not only the residents of Lake Charles. Thus, Tower failed to show that this case involves an interest localized to Lake Charles. For that reason, this factor supports maintaining venue in the Eastern District.
Tower failed to show that the private and public interest factors weigh in favor of a transfer to the Western District. Thus, the case will remain in the Eastern District.

(2) Local Interest Tower alleges that venue is more appropriate in the Western District because Lake Charles has a local interest in deciding the case. (Rec.Doc. 52–1 at 6.) However, it does not explain how this case is of interest only to Lake Charles. See id. Instead, it suggests that Lake Charles has a local interest simply because the events alleged in the complaint occurred there. See id.

Accordingly,

CONCLUSION

*549 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue (Rec.Doc. 52) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum (Rec.Doc. 75) is DENIED as moot.

Tower’s argument ignores the fact that multiple districts can have a local interest in a case. See Wallace, 2015 WL 1970514, at *7. Particularized local interests are entitled to more weight than local interests that “could apply virtually to any judicial district or division in the United States.” See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318. The EEOC

All Citations 135 F.Supp.3d 540

Footnotes

1

To the extent that the Court’s decision is inconsistent with EEOC v. Noble Drilling, No. 04–1683, 2004 WL 2700289 (E.D.La. Nov.

19, 2004), that case is disavowed.

End of Document

\

6

 
 Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 138-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 6
REPLACEMENT EXHIBIT for
Plaintiff's Notice of Arbitration Decision

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 138-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 6

TRISTAN BROUSSARD, Claimant,
VERSUS

ARBITRATOR: J. WILLIAM MANUEL

Respondent.

AWARD AND OPINION OF ARBITRATOR

I, the undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in accordance with the Arbitration

Agreement entered into by the above-named parties; having been duly sworn; having heard the

proofs; and considered the allegations of the parties, hereby issue this Reasoned Opinion and

Award.

After considering the testimony of all the witnesses, and where appropriate, having

considered their relative credibility, and having carefully reviewed the exhibits introduced into

evidence and the post-hearing briefing, all in light of the applicable law governing these issues, I

find as follows:

This is an action brought by Claimant Tristan Broussard ("Broussard" or "Claimant")

against

('

" or "Respondent") alleging that

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e by engaging in sex

discrimination. On December 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Louisiana granted -

's Motion to Compel Arbitration. The arbitration hearing was

conducted over a period of two and a half days, September 7 - 9, 2016.

In early spring of 2013, Broussard applied for and was hired by-

for the position

of Manager Trainee in -

·s Lake Charles, Louisiana office. During the hiring process,

Broussard presented as a male with patchy facial hair and a coat and tie. At some point early in

his time with

, Broussard was required to submit a drivers' license. That license

represented that Broussard was female. Numerous discussions within 1

soon ensued

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 138-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 3 of 6

and culminated with a March 11, 2013, meeting between Broussard,

(the Lake

Charles branch manager), and

(Senior Area Supervisor) during which, Broussard

was presented with a memo including the following language:

I understand that my preference to act and dress as a male, despite having been

born a female, is not something that will be in compliance with -

's

personnel policies.

I have been advised as to the proper dress for females and also have been provided a copy of the female dress code. I also understand that when meetings occur that require out of town travel and an overnight room is required, I will be assigned to a room with a female.

s Director of Human Resources and Executive Vice President, -

testified that she was involved in the drafting of this memo along with input from corporate

counsel. Broussard was told that he needed to follow the instructions within the memo and sign

it. Broussard stated that he could not comply with the policy, but was told in the meeting to take

the day off and think about it. Broussard left the building, but did not return to -

the

next day. In a telephone conversation with -

, Broussard stated that he could not comply

with the policy presented to him and therefore he would not be returning to work.

SEPARATION OF EMPLOYMENT WITH

It is undisputed that Broussard never returned to -

after leaving the office on

March 11, 2013. The Claimant alleges that he was involuntarily tenninated during the March 11,

2013. In the alternative, the Claimant argues that he suffered a constructive discharge as a result

of the policies imposed upon him by the corporate office. The Respondent argues that Broussard

voluntarily abandoned his employment and that the circumstances cannot be construed to meet the

standard of a constructive discharge.

Based upon the testimony, I find that Broussard was not involuntarily terminated in the

March 11, 2013 meeting. However, I do believe that the testimony and documents presented at

2

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 138-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 4 of 6

the hearing show that Broussard meets the standard of a constructive discharge. The briefing on

this issue was very well-done on both sides, but in the end, I believe that the facts show that

Broussard involuntarily resigned in order to escape an intolerable and illegal employment

requirement imposed by the corporate office-that he act and dress only as a female pursuant to

-

·s personnel policies. With regard to the argwnent that Broussard did not properly use

a grievance procedure, I find that his discussions with his branch manager and senior area

supervisor are sufficient to meet that factor, should a cou1t deem that it apply.

"BECAUSE OF" SEX

In order to support a claim for sex discrimination, Broussard must prove that he suffered

an adverse employment action because of his sex. As noted in my Order on the cross-motions for

summary judgment and defendant's motion to strike, the Fifth Circuit has not yet ruled that

discrimination based solely on an employee's status of being transgender or going through

transgender transition is a per se violation of Title VII. And although there was ample testimony

about the condition of gender dysphoria, Broussard's complaint does not make a claim that he was

discriminated against for suffering from that condition. Instead, we must look to see if-
llll's actions and statements support a claim for sex discrimination under the current statutory

interpretation of Title VII by the Fifth Circuit.

In doing so, it is my opinion that the United States Supreme Comt's decision in Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) provides proper guidance. In Price Waterhouse, the

Cou1t held that Congress "intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men

and women resulting from sex stereotypes." Id. at 251. Fu1ther, the Court noted that as a country,

we are "beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that

they matched the stereotype associated with their group." Id. In a later case, addressing an

argument that Congress did not contemplate a certain type of sex discrimination theory when 3

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 138-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 5 of 6

passing Title VII, the Supreme Comt noted that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the

pri ncipal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws

rather than the principal concerns of ow· legislators by which we are governed." Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Services. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).

The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed that gender-stereotyping can be the basi.s for a claim

under Title VII. In EEOC v. Bob Bros. Const. Co., LLC, 73 1 F.3d 444, 454 (2013), the Cou1t

talked about the Price Waterhouse decision and went on to state that "numerous courts, including

[the Fifth Circuit], have recognized that a plaintiff can satisfy Title VII's because-of-sex

requirement with evidence of a plaintiffs perceived fai lure to conform to traditional gender

stereotypes." Therefore, we must look to see if the proof showed that

acted on a

perception that Broussard fai led to conform to traditional gender stereotypes.

The testimony, memo and emails presented at the hearing clearly show that, after learning

that Broussard's driver's license stated female,-

began to act in a manner showing that

it perceived Broussard did not comply with the traditional gender stereotypes of a female. The

memo, drafted by -

with advice from counsel and presented to Broussard on March 11,

2013, states that by acting and dressing in a manner other than like a female, Broussard would be

in violation of

's personnel policies. Therefore,

s corporate office

insisted that he match the stereotype associated with female. That is a violation of Title VII, under

both Price Waterhouse and Boh Bros. Broussard has met the "because of sex" standard to support

his claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.

DAMAGES Economic Damages

Broussard claims that he is entitled to over $100,000 in back pay. The testimony and

documentation, however, show some major issues with Broussard 's mitigation of damages. The

4

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 138-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 6 of 6

most troubling testimony was that Broussard left a subsequent job at Mark Dodge where he made

over $26,000 in eleven months to take a position at Blaze Smoke Shop for $8 per hour. There was

no testimony that he was asked to leave Mark Dodge and no credible reason as to why he would

leave a position that put him almost at the same position as a Manager Trainee at -

. In

addition, Broussard'sjob search attempts have been hindered by his own fai lure to maintain a valid

driver's license. These issues also affect the analysis for front pay damages. In addition, his brief

sojourn at -

affects the amount of future pay, if it were to be awarded. As such, I adopt

the arguments ofthe Respondent on those issues and hereby award Broussard $43, 162 in economic

damages.

Emotional Distress Damages

Broussard also seeks $125,000 in emotional distress and mental anguish damages. This

figure is allegedly based upon his testimony that his constructive discharge from -

caused him to be upset. There was also testimony, from Broussard and his former girlfriend, that

he suffered from mental anguish and emotional distress prior to ever having worked at -

. .. Recognizing that he did suffer some mental anguish from his brief time with -

,

I am awarding $10,000 in emotional distress damages and no proof regarding that issue was

presented at the hearing.

This Award and Opinion is in full settlement and determination of all claims of liability

and damages submitted to this Arbitration.

The Claimant's post-hearing brief did not~

5

 
 Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 1 of 18
2000E,CLOSED,MASTER
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:15−cv−01161−CJB−JVM

Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC Assigned to: Judge Carl Barbier Referred to: Magistrate Judge Janis van Meerveld Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/13/2015 Date Terminated: 10/05/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Tristan Broussard

represented by Ryan P. Delaney Delaney & Robb, Attorneys at Law, LLC 2800 Veterans Blvd. Suite 213 Metairie, LA 70002 504−267−9700 Email: ryan@delaneyandrobb.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amy Whelan National Center for Lesbian Rights 870 Market St. Suite 370 San Francisco, CA 94102 415−392−6257 Email: awhelan@nclrights.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barbara J. Chisholm Altshuler Berzon LLP 177 Post Street Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 415−421−7151 Email: bchisholm@altber.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James M. Finberg Altshuler Berzon LLP 177 Post Street Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 415−421−7151 Email: jfinberg@altber.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

P. Casey Pitts Altshuler Berzon LLP 177 Post Street Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 415−421−7151 Email: cpitts@altber.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Samuel Eugene Wolfe

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 2 of 18
Southern Poverty Law Center (Montgomery) 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Email: sam.wolfe@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 03/30/2016 PRO HAC VICE
Scott D. McCoy Southern Poverty Law Center (Montgomery) 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Email: scott.mccoy@splcenter.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Consol Plaintiff
First Tower Loan, LLC 15−2500

represented by David M. Whitaker Kean Miller LLP (New Orleans) First Bank & Trust Tower 909 Poydras Street Suite 3600 New Orleans, LA 70112 504−585−3050 Email: David.Whitaker@KeanMiller.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael O'Mara Gwin Watkins & Eager P.O. Box 650 Jackson, MS 39205 601−948−6470 Email: mgwin@watkinseager.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Lutkewitte Kilgore Kean Miller (Baton Rouge) II City Plaza 400 Convention St. Suite 700 Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225−389−3712 Email: erin.kilgore@keanmiller.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kenneth E. Milam WATKINS & EAGER P. O. Box 650 Jackson, MS 39205−0650 601−965−1900 Email: kemilam@watkinseager.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Deloss Huffstetler Kean Miller (Baton Rouge) II City Plaza 400 Convention St.

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 3 of 18

Suite 700 Baton Rouge, LA 70802 225−387−0999 Email: scott.huffstetler@keanmiller.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zoe Wilde Vermeulen Kean Miller LLP (New Orleans) First Bank & Trust Tower 909 Poydras Street Suite 3600 New Orleans, LA 70112 504−620−3367 Email: zoe.vermeulen@keanmiller.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Consol Plaintiff
Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC 15−2500

represented by David M. Whitaker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael O'Mara Gwin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kenneth E. Milam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Zoe Wilde Vermeulen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Intervenor
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Edward Juarez U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 5410 Fredericksburg Road Suite 200 San Antonio, TX 78229 210−281−7613 Email: eduardo.juarez@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra V Navarre Davis U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (New Orleans) 500 Poydras Street Suite 809 New Orleans, LA 70130 504−595−2914 Fax: 504−544−6056 Email: alexandra.navarre−davis@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory T. Juge U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (New Orleans)

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 4 of 18
500 Poydras Street Suite 809 New Orleans, LA 70130 504−676−8239 Email: gregory.juge@eeoc.gov TERMINATED: 03/02/2017
James Philip Sacher U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1919 Smith St. 7th Floor Houston, TX 77002 713−209−3398 Email: james.sacher@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle T. Butler U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (New Orleans) 500 Poydras Street Suite 809 New Orleans, LA 70130 (504) 595−2872 Fax: (504) 595−2886 Email: michelle.butler@eeoc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Consol Intervenor
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 15−2500

represented by Edward Juarez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory T. Juge (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra V Navarre Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Philip Sacher (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle T. Butler (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
First Tower Loan, LLC doing business as Tower Loan of Lake Charles

represented by David M. Whitaker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Erin Lutkewitte Kilgore

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 5 of 18
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott Deloss Huffstetler (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Zoe Wilde Vermeulen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Consol Defendant
Tristan Broussard 15−2500

represented by Jody E. Owens , II SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − Jackson 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 280 Jackson, MS 39201 601/948−8882 Fax: 601/948−8885 Email: jody.owens@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amy Whelan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Andrea Chinyere Ezie − PHV SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − Montgomery P. O. Box 2087 400 Washington Avenue (36104) Montgomery, AL 36102 334/956−8311 Fax: 334/956−8481 Email: chinyere.ezie@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 10/12/2016 PRO HAC VICE
Barbara J. Chisholm (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Corrie Wynette Cockrell SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − Jackson 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 280 Jackson, MS 39201 601/948−8882 Fax: 601/948−8885 Email: corrie.cockrell@splcenter.org
Elissa F. Johnson SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER − Jackson 111 East Capitol Street, Suite 280 Jackson, MS 39201 601/948−8882 Email: elissa.johnson@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 10/06/2015

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 6 of 18
James M. Finberg (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
P. Casey Pitts (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ryan P. Delaney (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Samuel Eugene Wolfe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/30/2016
Scott D. McCoy (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/13/2015
04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/17/2015
04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT with jury demand against First Tower Loan, LLC (Fee previously paid) filed by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Attachment to Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D) Attorney Ryan P. Delaney added to party Tristan Broussard(pty:pla).(Delaney, Ryan) (Attachment 1 replaced on 4/17/2015) (gec). (Attachment 3 replaced on 4/17/2015) (gec). Modified on 4/17/2015 (gec).(NEF:KWR,cml) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
Filing fee received from Tristan Broussard: $ 400 (receipt no. 053L−4815879) (mmv) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
2 Initial Case Assignment to Judge Carl Barbier and Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby. (mmv) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
3 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 1 Complaint. Filing attorney did not properly format the pdf of the civil cover sheet. The pdf should not have the pink/green header nor the 3 red buttons at the bottom. When using a FORM, fill in the applicable fields then click the red PRINT button at the bottom to print the document to pdf format. Also, attachments have duplicate descriptions. For attachments, do not duplicate category in the description box since this results in duplicate docket text. In addition, Exhibit A was 17 x 22.67 inches. Pursuant to LR10.1, all documents filed in this court must be 8.5 x 11 inches. Clerk took corrective action. No further action is necessary. (gec) (Entered: 04/17/2015)
4 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #9** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4828971) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/22/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
5 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #10** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829004) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/22/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
6 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #11** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829022) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/22/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
7 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #12** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli (Filing fee $

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 7 of 18

04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015

100 receipt number 053L−4829045) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order ECF Registration)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/22/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
8 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #20** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sam Wolfe (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829102) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Certificate of Good Standing, # 2 Proposed Order Declaration, # 3 Proposed Order ECF Registration)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
9 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #13** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Declaration, CGS, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
10 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #14** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Declaration, CGS, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
11 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #15** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Declaration, CGS, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
12 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #19** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement declaration, # 2 Supplement CGS, # 3 Supplement ecf registration, # 4 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
13 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration, Certificate of Good Standing, ECF Registration Form)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
14 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, Certificate of Good Standing, ECF Registration Form, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
15 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, Certificate of Good Standing, ECF Registration Form, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
16 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Barbara J. Chisholm (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829314) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, Certificate of Good Standing, ECF Registration Form, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
17 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice James M. Finberg (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829331) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
18 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice P. Casey Pitts (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829336) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 8 of 18

04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/22/2015 04/23/2015 04/23/2015
04/29/2015 05/21/2015 05/22/2015 05/25/2015
05/25/2015

Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration, Certificate of Good Standing, ECF Registration Form)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
19 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 ECF Registration Form)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
20 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Samuel Wolfe (Fee previously paid) by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Certificate of Good Standing, # 4 ECF Registration Form)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 4/23/2015 (gec). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
21 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 5 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan, 4 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr, 6 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter, 7 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli. Documents were filed in error. Attorney has refiled. (gec) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
22 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 10 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan, 12 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli, 8 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Sam Wolfe, 11 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter, 9 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr. Documents were filed in error. Attorney has refiled. (gec) (Entered: 04/23/2015)
23 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 13 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr, 14 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan, 15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter, 16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Barbara J. Chisholm, 17 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice James M. Finberg, 18 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice P. Casey Pitts, 19 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli, 20 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Samuel Wolfe. The title of the attached proposed orders should not include the word 'Proposed' but only reflect 'Order' on the actual document. (gec) (Entered: 04/23/2015)
24 ORDER Setting Oral Argument Hearing on 13 − 20 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Motions set with ORAL ARGUMENT for 5/20/2015 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby.(cml) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
25 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby: Motion Hearing held on 5/21/2015 re 13 − 20 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice. The Court shall issue an order. (Court Reporter Rebecca Gonzalez.) (cml) (Entered: 05/21/2015)
28 ORDERED that 13 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice., 15 − 19 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice are DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED that 14 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice, and 20 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice are GRANTED and that Amy Whelan and Samuel Wolfe shall be enrolled pro hac vice in the above captioned matter. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby on 5/22/2015. (cml) (Entered: 05/26/2015)
26 **DEFICIENT** Supplemental Memorandum filed by Tristan Broussard, in In Support of 16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Barbara J. Chisholm (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829314), 18 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice P. Casey Pitts (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829336), 19 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli (Fee previously paid), 15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter (Fee previously paid), 17 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice James M. Finberg (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829331), 20 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Samuel Wolfe (Fee previously paid), 14 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan (Fee previously paid), 13 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr (Fee previously paid) . (Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 5/26/2015 (gec). (Entered: 05/25/2015)
27 **ERROR: FILED AS A SEPARATE DOCUMENT** AFFIDAVIT in Support by Affiant Tristan Broussard re 16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Barbara J. Chisholm (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829314), 18 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice P. Casey Pitts (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829336), 19

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 9 of 18

05/26/2015 05/27/2015 05/28/2015 05/29/2015 06/11/2015 06/15/2015 06/17/2015 07/13/2015 07/14/2015
07/14/2015
07/16/2015

MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice David Dinielli (Fee previously paid), 15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Shannon P. Minter (Fee previously paid), 17 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice James M. Finberg (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−4829331), 20 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Samuel Wolfe (Fee previously paid), 14 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Amy Whelan (Fee previously paid), 13 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Asaf Orr (Fee previously paid) . (Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 5/26/2015 (gec). (Entered: 05/25/2015)
29 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed; waiver sent to First Tower Loan, LLC on 4/14/2015, answer due 6/15/2015. (Delaney, Ryan) (Entered: 05/26/2015)
30 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 29 Waiver of Service Executed. Document does not contain Section and Magistrate Judge. All future pleadings must reflect Section "J" and Magistrate (4). (gec) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
31 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT First MOTION for APPEAL/REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court re 25 Motion Hearing, 24 Order Setting/Resetting Hearing on Motion, 28 Order on Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Submission, # 2 Supplement, # 3 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 5/29/2015 (gec). (Entered: 05/28/2015)
32 MOTION for APPEAL/REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court re 28 Order on Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Tristan Broussard. Motion set for 6/17/2015 09:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Supplement, # 3 Notice of Submission, # 4 Proposed Order)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 6/1/2015 (gec). (Entered: 05/29/2015)
33 ORDERED that Plaintiff's 32 MOTION for APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court is DENIED. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (gec) (Entered: 06/11/2015)
34 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint, by First Tower Loan, LLC. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)Attorney David M. Whitaker added to party First Tower Loan, LLC(pty:dft).(Whitaker, David) (Entered: 06/15/2015)
35 ORDER granting 34 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint, as to First Tower Loan, LLC answer due 7/15/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby on 6/17/2015. (caa) (Entered: 06/17/2015)
36 ORDERED that CA 15−2500 is consolidated with Master case 15−1161; All entries shall be made on the master docket sheet only, with a notation listing the cases to which the document applies as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/13/15. (NEF: Mag. Judge Roby, C.Lee)(sek) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
37 ORDER: A Supplemental Memorandum 26 and Affidavit in Support 27 were filed by plaintiff, which the court deemed deficient. Counsel was notified of the deficiency, and given seven days to correct the pleadings. This is to advise counsel that as of July 14, 2015, these documents have not been corrected, and, therefore, have been stricken from the record, and will not be considered by the court. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/14/15.(Reference: 15−1161)(sek) (Entered: 07/14/2015)
38 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint, by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−1161; 15−2500)Attorney David M. Whitaker added to party First Tower Loan, LLC(pty:conpla), Attorney David M. Whitaker added to party Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC(pty:conpla).(Whitaker, David) Modified on 7/15/2015 (gec). (Entered: 07/14/2015)
39 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−2500)Attorney David M. Whitaker added to party First Tower Loan, LLC(pty:conpla), Attorney David M. Whitaker added to party Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC(pty:conpla).(Whitaker, David) (Entered: 07/16/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 10 of 18

07/17/2015
07/21/2015 07/21/2015 07/21/2015
07/22/2015 07/30/2015
08/06/2015 08/07/2015 08/21/2015 08/27/2015 09/01/2015 09/01/2015 09/02/2015
09/03/2015

40 EXPARTE/CONSENT First MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Reference: 01161)Attorney Ryan P. Delaney added to party Tristan Broussard(pty:condft).(Delaney, Ryan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 7/20/2015: # 1 Proposed Order) (caa). Modified on 7/20/2015 (caa). (Entered: 07/17/2015)
41 ORDER granting 39 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney David M. Whitaker,Zoe Wilde Vermeulen for First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby. (Reference: 15−2500)(cml) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
42 ORDER granting 40 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Amy Whelan,Samuel Eugene Wolfe for Tristan Broussard. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby. (Reference: 15−2500)(cml) (Entered: 07/21/2015)
43 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint, by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC, Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Karen Wells Roby. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: ALL CASES)(Whitaker, David) Modified on 7/22/2015 (gec). (Entered: 07/21/2015)
44 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 43 MOTION for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint. Filing attorney did not enter additional filer(s) in the blank text box on the docket text screen. Clerk added filer(s). (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 07/22/2015)
45 ORDERED that 43 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer re 1 Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED as to Broussard's request for an extension of time to file an answer, and it is DENIED as to First Tower Loan's request for an extension of time to file an answer. FURTHER ORDERED that Broussard shall have until August 21, 2015 to file an answer to First Tower Loans complaint, and First Tower Loan shall have seven (7) days after the issuance of this order to file an answer to Broussard's complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby. (Reference: All Cases)(cml) (Entered: 07/30/2015)
46 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by First Tower Loan, LLC.(Reference: 15−1161)(Whitaker, David) Modified on 8/7/2015 (gec). (Entered: 08/06/2015)
47 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 46 Answer to Complaint. Filing attorney should have changed 'Y' to 'N' at the question 'Does this include a jury demand?'. Document does not reflect a jury demand. (Reference: 15−1161)(gec) (Entered: 08/07/2015)
48 Defendant Broussard's ANSWER to Complaint of Tower Loan by Tristan Broussard.(Reference: 2:15−cv−02500)(Wolfe, Samuel) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
49 ORDER: Scheduling Conference set for 9/8/2015 01:30 PM before Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby on 8/26/2015.(Reference: ALL CASES)(caa) (Entered: 08/27/2015)
50 NOTICE by Tristan Broussard of Lack of Unanimous Consent to Proceed Before Magistrate Judge. (Reference: 2:15−1161, 2:15−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) (Entered: 09/01/2015)
51 NOTICE by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Intent to Intervene. (Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 9/2/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/01/2015)
52 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC. Motion(s) will be submitted on 9/23/2015. Motion set before Judge Carl J. Barbier. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2)(Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(Vermeulen, Zoe) Modified on 9/3/2015 (gec). Modified Judge on 9/9/2015 (sek). (Entered: 09/02/2015)
53 NOTICE OF NON CONSENT ORDER : The undersigned Magistrate Judge has been notified that all parties have not consented to proceed to trial before a Magistrate Judge. Therefore, ORDERED that the 49 Scheduling Conference is CANCELLED.

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 11 of 18

09/03/2015 09/03/2015 09/08/2015
09/08/2015 09/08/2015 09/08/2015 09/09/2015 09/09/2015 09/09/2015
09/09/2015 09/09/2015 09/10/2015

Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby.(Reference: All Cases) (NEF:BARBIER)(cml) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
54 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby recused. Case reassigned to Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan for all further proceedings Motion(s) referred to Sally Shushan.Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby.(Reference: All Cases)(cml) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
55 MOTION to Stay Proceedings by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC. Motion(s) will be submitted on 9/23/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Reference: ALL CASES)(Vermeulen, Zoe) Modified on 9/3/2015 (gec). Modified on 9/4/2015 to remove referral (lag). (Entered: 09/03/2015)
56 **ERROR: ATTORNEY REFILED, SEE RECORD DOC #58** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Continue , MOTION to Expedite , MOTION for Hearing re 52 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161)(Navarre Davis, Alexandra) Modified on 9/9/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/08/2015)
57 Order Vacating Case Referral to Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 9/8/15. (cc: Judge Shushan, G. Chauvin) (Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
58 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Continue , MOTION to Expedite , MOTION for Hearing by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Notice of Submission)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161)(Navarre Davis, Alexandra) Modified on 9/9/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/08/2015)
59 MOTION to Intervene by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion(s) referred to Sally Shushan. Motion(s) will be submitted on 9/23/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Memorandum in Support, # 4 Proposed Order, # 5 Notice of Submission)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161)(Navarre Davis, Alexandra) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
60 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 56 MOTION to Continue MOTION to Expedite MOTION for Hearing re 52 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue. This document was filed in error. Attorney has refiled, see record doc #58. (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
61 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 52 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue is submitted before Judge Carl J. Barbier on 9/23/15 per order # 57 . (Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
62 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Expedite Motion to Continue by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Motion to Continue, # 4 Proposed Memorandum in Support of Motion to Continue, # 5 Proposed Order granting Motion to Continue)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 9/10/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/09/2015)
63 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC re 64 MOTION to Continue. (Reference: ALL CASES)(Whitaker, David) Modified link on 9/10/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/09/2015)
64 MOTION to Continue Defendant's Venue Motion by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion(s) will be submitted on 10/7/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
65 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 62 MOTION to Expedite Proposed Motion to Continue. Filing attorney incorrectly attached the Motion to Continue to this motion instead of filing it as a separate entry. Clerk took corrective action by separating the motion to continue and docketing it as a separate entry (Rec. Doc. 64). (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 09/10/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 12 of 18

09/15/2015 09/15/2015
09/15/2015 09/15/2015 09/16/2015
09/16/2015 09/22/2015 09/23/2015 09/29/2015 09/29/2015 09/30/2015 10/02/2015 10/05/2015

66 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC re 59 MOTION to Intervene. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Reference: ALL CASES)(Whitaker, David) Modified on 9/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/15/2015)
67 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tristan Broussard re 52 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Samuel Wolfe, # 2 Exhibit Wolfe Decl. Ex. A − Branch Locations, # 3 Exhibit Wolfe Decl. Ex. B − Map from Tower to E.D. La., # 4 Exhibit Wolfe Decl. Ex. C − Map from Tower to W.D. La., # 5 Exhibit Wolfe Decl. Ex. D − Map from Tower's Counsel to E.D. La., # 6 Exhibit Wolfe Decl. Ex. E − Map from Tower's Counsel to W.D. La., # 7 Exhibit Wolfe Decl. Ex. F − Caseload Profiles)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161; 2:15−cv−02500)(Wolfe, Samuel) Modified on 9/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/15/2015)
68 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tristan Broussard re 55 MOTION to Stay Proceedings. (Reference: 2:15−cv−01161; 2:15−cv−02500)(Wolfe, Samuel) Modified on 9/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/15/2015)
69 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by Tristan Broussard re 59 MOTION to Intervene. (Reference: 2:15−cv−01161; 2:15−cv−02500)(Wolfe, Samuel) Modified on 9/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/15/2015)
70 ORDERED that the EEOC's Motion to Intervene is GRANTED. The EEOC's Motion for Expedited Hearing is DENIED as moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that First Tower's Motion to Stay is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the EEOC's Motion to Continue is GRANTED. First Tower's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue (Rec. Doc. 52), currently set for submission on September 23, 2015, is RESET for submission on October 7, 2015. The EEOC shall file a response to Defendant's motion no later than September 29, 2015, in accordance with LR 7.5. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 9/16/15.(Reference: all cases)(sek) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
71 Intervenor COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Reference: all cases)(sek) (Entered: 09/16/2015)
72 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record , Edward Juarez, by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Statement Under Oath of Edward Juarez, # 4 ECF Attorney Registration Form)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) (Entered: 09/22/2015)
73 ORDER granting 72 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Edward Juarez for U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 09/23/2015)
74 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 52 MOTION to Dismiss for Improper Venue or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, EEOC Amicus Brief in Horseshoe Appeal)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
75 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Transfer by First Tower Loan, LLC, Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Reference: ALL CASES)(Vermeulen, Zoe) Modified on 9/30/2015 (gec). (Entered: 09/29/2015)
76 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 75 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Transfer. Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the district judge. Clerk took corrective action. (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
77 ORDER & REASONS: denying 52 Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue; denying as moot 75 Motion for Leave to File Reply Memorandum. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/1/15. (Reference: all cases)(sek) (Entered: 10/02/2015)
78 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Elissa Johnson as Attorney by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161;

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 13 of 18

10/05/2015 10/06/2015 10/07/2015 10/08/2015 10/08/2015 11/04/2015 11/05/2015 11/06/2015 11/06/2015
11/06/2015 11/06/2015
11/06/2015 11/13/2015

2:15−cv−2500)(Wolfe, Samuel) Modified on 10/6/2015 (gec). (Entered: 10/05/2015)
79 NOTICE: Scheduling Conference set for 11/3/2015 03:00 PM before case manager by telephone. By Clerk.(Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
80 ORDER granting 78 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Tristan Broussard. Attorney Elissa F. Johnson terminated. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/6/15. (Reference: all cases)(sek) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
81 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Designate Edward Juarez as Lead Trial Attorney by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−2500)(Juarez, Edward) Modified on 10/8/2015 (gec). (Entered: 10/07/2015)
82 ORDER granting 81 Motion to Designate Edward Juarez as lead Trial Attorney for Plaintiff−Intervenor U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/8/15. (Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
83 ANSWER to 71 Intervenor Complaint by First Tower Loan, LLC.(Reference: 15−1161)(Whitaker, David) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
84 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 10/6/2016 02:30 PM before Judge Carl Barbier. Jury Trial set for 10/31/2016 08:30 AM before Judge Carl Barbier. All discovery must be completed by 9/6/2016. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/4/15. (Attachments: # 1 Pretrial Notice Form)(Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 11/04/2015)
85 MOTION to Compel Arbitration Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings by First Tower Loan, LLC. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/2/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Notice of Submission)(Reference: 15−1611)(Whitaker, David) (Attachment 2 & Attachment 3 replaced on 11/9/2015 per doc #90) (sek). (Entered: 11/05/2015)
86 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Exhibits "1" and "2" to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings [Doc. 85] by First Tower Loan, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2)(Reference: 15−1161)(Whitaker, David) Modified on 11/6/2015 (gec). (Entered: 11/06/2015)
87 ERROR DUPLICATE FILING: SEE DOC #88 FOR CORRECT ENTRY −. EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Jody E. Evans to be substituted in place of James M. Finberg, Barbara J. Chisholm, P. Casey Pitts by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 11/6/2015 (sek). (Entered: 11/06/2015)
88 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney James M. Finberg, Barbara J. Chisholm, P. Casey Pitts to be substituted in place of Jody E. Owens by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 11/9/2015 (gec). (Entered: 11/06/2015)
89 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 86 MOTION to Substitute Exhibits. Filing attorney incorrectly changed 'N' to 'Y' at the question 'Is this motion to be decided by the Magistrate Judge Y/N?'. This motion will be decided by the district judge. Also, attachments have duplicate descriptions. For attachments, do not duplicate category in the description box since this results in duplicate docket text. Clerk took corrective action. (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
90 ORDER granting 86 Motion to Substitute Exhibit 1 and 2 to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings. Exhibits attached to Rec.Doc. 86 are deemed part of the record as to Doc. 85 Motion to to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/6/15. (Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 11/06/2015)
91 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of P. Casey Pitts (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5106531), MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney P. Casey Pitts to be substituted in place of Jody E. Owens II by Tristan Broussard.

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 14 of 18

11/13/2015
11/13/2015
11/16/2015 11/16/2015 11/16/2015 11/20/2015 11/20/2015
11/24/2015 11/24/2015 11/24/2015 11/24/2015

(Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Pitts, including (1) Certificate of Good Standing and (2) Statement Regarding Disciplinary Proceedings, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Proposed Orderr)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 11/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 11/13/2015)
92 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Barbara J. Chisholm (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5106537), MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Barbara J. Chisholm to be substituted in place of Jody E. Owens II by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Chisholm, including (1) Certificate of Good Standing and (2) Statement Regarding Disciplinary Proceedings, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Proposed Orderr)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 11/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 11/13/2015)
93 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice of James M. Finberg (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5106540), MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney James M. Finberg to be substituted in place of Jody E. Owens II by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Finberg, including (1) Certificate of Good Standing and (2) Statement Regarding Disciplinary Proceedings, # 2 Memorandum in Support, # 3 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 11/16/2015 (gec). (Entered: 11/13/2015)
94 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 91 , 92 , 93 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice, MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attachments have duplicate descriptions. For attachments, do not duplicate category in the description box since this results in duplicate docket text. Clerk took corrective action. (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
95 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by First Tower Loan, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 11cv1161)(Whitaker, David) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
96 MOTION to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration by First Tower Loan, LLC. Motion(s) will be submitted on 12/2/2015. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Reference: 15cv1161)(Whitaker, David) (Entered: 11/16/2015)
97 ORDER granting 95 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Scott Deloss Huffstetler,Erin Lutkewitte Kilgore for First Tower Loan, LLC. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/19/15. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
98 ORDER REFERRING MOTIONS: Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of P. Casey Pitts (Rec. Doc. 91), Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Barbara J. Chisholm (Rec. Doc. 92), and Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of James M. Fineberg (Rec. Doc. 93) are hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan for the Eastern District of Louisiana, for the purpose of hearing and determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A). Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/19/15. (NEF: Mag Judge Shushan, G. Chauvin)(Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
99 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 85 MOTION to Compel Arbitration Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings . (Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
100 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 96 MOTION to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juarez, Edward) Modified reference on 11/24/2015 (sek). (Entered: 11/24/2015)
101 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 100 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion; At the prompt 'Enter case numbers to which this document applies:' − Case(s) number should be entered − NOT a document number. Clerk took corrective action. (Reference: 15−1161)(sek) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
102 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tristan Broussard, Tristan Broussard re 85 MOTION to Compel Arbitration Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings . (Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Wolfe, Samuel) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 15 of 18

11/24/2015 11/27/2015 12/01/2015 12/02/2015 12/02/2015 12/02/2015 12/03/2015 12/03/2015 12/07/2015 12/08/2015 12/10/2015
01/07/2016 01/13/2016

103 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by Tristan Broussard, Tristan Broussard re 96 MOTION to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration . (Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Wolfe, Samuel) (Entered: 11/24/2015)
104 ORDER granting 91 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 92 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 93 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan on 11/25/2015. (Reference: Both Cases)(bwn) (Entered: 11/27/2015)
105 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator, and Stay Proceedings by First Tower Loan, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Reference: 15−1611)(Whitaker, David) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
106 ORDER granting 105 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 12/2/15. (Reference: 15−1161)(sek) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
107 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by First Tower Loan, LLC re 85 MOTION to Compel Arbitration Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings. (Reference: 15−1161)(sek) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
108 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Defendant's Reply In Support Of Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration by First Tower Loan, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Reference: 15cv1161)(Huffstetler, Scott) (Entered: 12/02/2015)
109 ORDER granting 108 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 12/3/15. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 12/03/2015)
110 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by First Tower Loan, LLC re 96 MOTION to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 12/03/2015)
111 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Clarification of Order by Tristan Broussard. Motion(s) referred to Sally Shushan. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Wolfe, Samuel) Modified on 12/8/2015 (gec). (Entered: 12/07/2015)
112 ORDERED that plaintiff's 111 Motion for Clarification is GRANTED. The November 27, 2017 order granting the motions to appear pro hac vice (Rec. doc. 104 ) is MODIFIED; and Andrea Ezie of the Southern Poverty Law Center remains admitted pro hac vice as counsel for Tristan Broussard. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan. (Reference: ALL CASES)(gec) (Entered: 12/08/2015)
113 ORDER AND REASONS: ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration, Appoint Arbitrator and to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 85) is GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED that the Court appoints the American Arbitration Association as the arbitral forum to administer arbitration of the dispute between Broussard and Tower. FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Stay EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration (Rec. Doc. 96) is GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED that all proceedings in this matter shall be STAYED pending the outcome of the arbitration between Broussard and Tower. The Clerk of Court shall mark this action closed for statistical purposes. FURTHER ORDERED that the Court shall retain jurisdiction and that the case shall be restored to the trial docket upon motion of a party if circumstances change, so that it may proceed to final disposition. This order shall not prejudice the rights of the parties to this litigation. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 12/9/15.(Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 12/10/2015)
114 MOTION for Reconsideration re 113 Order to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider Order Staying EEOC's Claims by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion(s) will be submitted on 1/27/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 1/8/2016 (gec). (Entered: 01/07/2016)
115 **DEFICIENT** NOTICE by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 114 MOTION for Reconsideration re 113 Order, Order Dismissing Case; to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider Order Staying EEOC's Claims, of Withdrawal of 1292(b) Request. (Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 1/14/2016 (gec). (Entered:

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 16 of 18

01/14/2016 01/19/2016 01/19/2016 01/22/2016 01/25/2016 01/26/2016 01/26/2016 03/08/2016
03/23/2016 03/24/2016
03/30/2016 05/31/2016

01/13/2016)
116 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to Withdraw 1292(b) Request by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 1/15/2016 (gec). (Entered: 01/14/2016)
117 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by First Tower Loan, LLC re 114 MOTION for Reconsideration re 113 Order to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider Order Staying EEOC's Claims . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Reference: 15−1161)(Huffstetler, Scott) Modified on 1/20/2016 (gec). (Entered: 01/19/2016)
118 ORDER granting 116 Motion for Leave to Withdraw 114 Motion to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 1/15/16. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
119 **DEFICIENT** REPLY to Response to Motion filed by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 114 MOTION for Reconsideration re 113 Order. (Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 1/25/2016 (gec). (Entered: 01/22/2016)
120 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider Order Staying EEOCS Claims by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 1/26/2016 (mmv). (Entered: 01/25/2016)
121 ORDER granting 120 Motion for Leave to File Reply. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 1/26/16. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 01/26/2016)
122 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Support filed by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 114 MOTION to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider Order Staying EEOC's Claims. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 01/26/2016)
123 ORDER & REASONS: ORDERED that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Motion to Alter, Amend, or Reconsider Order Staying EEOC's Claims (Rec. Doc. 114) is DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED that the discretionary stay of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's claims previously entered in this matter is MODIFIED as follows: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's claims are STAYED pending completion of the arbitration between Tristan Broussard and First Tower Loan, LLC within six (6) months from the date of this order, unless good cause be shown for an extension. The parties shall advise the Court in writing upon completion of the arbitration. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 3/7/16.(Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(sek) (Entered: 03/08/2016)
124 **DEFICIENT** EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Scott D. McCoy to be substituted in place of Samuel Wolfe by Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−01161−CJB−KWR)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 3/24/2016 (gec). (Entered: 03/23/2016)
125 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Scott D. McCoy to be substituted in place of Samuel Wolfe , Ex Parte MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Scott D. McCoy (Filing fee $ 100 receipt number 053L−5299536) by Tristan Broussard, Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Scott D. McCoy in Support of Pro Hac Vice Admission, # 2 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) (Entered: 03/24/2016)
126 ORDER granting 125 Motion to Substitute Attorney and Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Scott D. McCoy for Tristan Broussard, Attorney Samuel Eugene Wolfe terminated. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 3/25/16. (Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
127 MOTION TO LIFT THE STAY OF EEOC'S CLAIMS by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Motion(s) will be submitted on 6/15/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission, # 3 Exhibit 1)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) (Entered: 05/31/2016)

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 17 of 18

06/07/2016 06/08/2016 06/13/2016
06/16/2016 08/17/2016 09/06/2016 09/09/2016 10/10/2016 10/12/2016 12/01/2016
12/05/2016
12/07/2016 01/24/2017
02/22/2017

128 RESPONSE/MEMORANDUM in Opposition filed by First Tower Loan, LLC re 127 MOTION TO LIFT THE STAY OF EEOC'S CLAIMS . (Reference: 15−1161)(Kilgore, Erin) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
129 Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk re 128 Response/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. ** Document contains incorrect Magistrate Judge. All future pleadings must reflect Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan (Magistrate 1). (Reference: 15−1161)(clc) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
130 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION for Leave to File REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO LIFT STAY OF EEOC'S CLAIMS AND IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Proposed Pleading)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
131 ORDER denying 127 Motion to Lift Stay of EEOC's Claims. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 6/15/16. (Reference: 6/15/16)(sek) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
132 ORDERED that 130 Motion for Leave to File Reply is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (Reference: 15−1161)(gec) (Entered: 08/17/2016)
133 MOTION to Extend Stay of EEOC's Claims Pending Arbitration by First Tower Loan, LLC. Motion(s) will be submitted on 9/21/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Notice of Submission)(Reference: all cases)(Vermeulen, Zoe) Modified on 9/7/2016 (gec). (Entered: 09/06/2016)
134 ORDER granting 133 Motion to Extend Stay of EEOC Claims Pending Arbitration until the final arbitration award is made. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 9/8/16. (Reference: both cases)(sek) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
135 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw A. Chinyere Ezie as Attorney for Plaintiff by Tristan Broussard, Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(McCoy, Scott) (Entered: 10/10/2016)
136 ORDER granting 135 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Andrea Chinyere Ezie terminated. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(gec) (Entered: 10/13/2016)
137 NOTICE by Tristan Broussard, Tristan Broussard of Arbitration Decision. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Award and Opinion of Arbitrator)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161, 2:15−cv−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/8/2016: # 1 Exhibit A − Award and Opinion of Arbitrator) (gec). (Entered: 12/01/2016)
138 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Strike 137 Exhbit and Substitute Exhibit to Notice of Arbitration Decision by Tristan Broussard, Tristan Broussard. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit − Proposed Replacement Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Reference: 2:15−cv−1161; 2:15−cv−2500)(Delaney, Ryan) Modified on 12/5/2016 (sek). (Entered: 12/05/2016)
139 ORDER granting 138 Motion to Strike and Substitute Exhibit to 137 Notice. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500) (gec) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
140 TRANSCRIPT of Motion Hearing held on May 20, 2015 before Judge Karen Wells Roby. Court Reporter/Recorder Rebecca S. Gonzalez, Telephone number 504−589−7724. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Parties have 21 days from the filing of this transcript to file with the Court a Redaction Request. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/24/2017. (Reference: 15−1161)(rsg) (Entered: 01/24/2017)
141 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Withdraw Gregory T. Juge as Attorney by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−1161)(Juge, Gregory) Modified on 2/23/2017 (gec). (Entered: 02/22/2017)

Case: 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-JVM As of: 03/21/2019 03:34 PM CDT 18 of 18

03/02/2017 04/06/2017 05/05/2017 06/14/2017 06/23/2017 07/17/2017
09/13/2017 09/19/2017 10/03/2017 10/05/2017
10/05/2017

142 ORDER granting 141 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Gregory T. Juge terminated. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (Reference: 15−1161)(gec) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
143 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION to Enroll as Counsel of Record by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−01161) Attorney Michelle T. Butler added to party U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(pty:intv).(Butler, Michelle) Modified text on 4/7/2017 (mmm). (Entered: 04/06/2017)
144 ORDER granting 143 Motion to Enroll as Counsel of Record for Attorney Michelle T. Butler for U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (Reference: 15−1161)(gec) (Entered: 05/05/2017)
145 DEFICIENT NOTICE by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission re 134 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief To Lift Stay. (Reference: 134)(Butler, Michelle) Modified text on 6/16/2017 (ss). (Entered: 06/14/2017)
146 EXPARTE/CONSENT MOTION Lift Stay by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−cv−01161)(Butler, Michelle) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
147 ORDERED that the 146 MOTION Lift Stay is GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the discretionary stay imposed by the Court in the above−captioned case is hereby LIFTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall administratively reopen the above−captioned case. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 7/14/2017.(Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(gec) Modified text on 7/17/2017 (gec). (Entered: 07/17/2017)
148 NOTICE: Scheduling Conference set for 10/3/2017 02:00 PM before case manager by telephone. By Clerk. (Reference: 15−1161, 15−2500)(gec) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
149 EXPARTE/CONSENT Joint MOTION to Approve Consent Judgment by U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading Consent Decree, # 2 Proposed Order)(Reference: 15−cv−01161)(Butler, Michelle) Modified filers on 9/20/2017 (cg). (Entered: 09/19/2017)
150 ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference, currently set for Tuesday, October 3, 2017, is hereby CANCELLED. A Scheduling Conference will be rescheduled if the Court deems it necessary. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/2/2017. (Reference: All Cases)(gec) (Entered: 10/03/2017)
151 ORDER granting 149 Motion to Approve Consent Judgment. Further, the Court having approved and executed the Consent Decree, hereby instructs the Clerk of Court to enter the Decree into the record with Plaintiff−Intervenor and Defendant to each bear their own costs and attorneys' fees. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff−Intervenor's claims and this case are herebyDISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, subject to the terms of the Decree. Further, the Court retains jurisdiction to vacate this Order and to reopen this action upon cause shown that a provision of the Decree has not been completed and that a party wishes this Court to enforce the Decree specifically. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/5/2017. (Reference: All cases)(cg) (Entered: 10/05/2017)
152 Consent Decree. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 10/5/2017.(Reference: All cases)(cg) (Entered: 10/05/2017)