Case 3:16-cv-00600-SCW Document 1 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 69 Page ID #1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HENRY DAVIS, DOUGLAS COLEMAN, )

AARON FILLMORE, JEROME JONES, )

DESHAWN GARDNER, and PERCELL )

DANSBERRY on behalf of themselves and all )

others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

JOHN BALDWIN, Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,

) ) )

Defendant.

Case No. 3:16-cv-600 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

NATURE OF THIS ACTION

1. Plaintiffs are residents of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who

seek to represent a class consisting of persons who are currently subjected to “extreme isolation”

(as defined below) or who have been subjected to extreme isolation and are in immediate danger

of being subjected to extreme isolation by the IDOC.

2. “Extreme isolation” is the consensus term used by correctional experts, including

corrections administrators, to describe segregation from the mainstream prisoner population in

attached housing units or free-standing facilities where prisoners are involuntarily confined to

their cells for upwards of 22 to 24 hours a day, given only extremely limited or no opportunities

for direct and normal social contact with other persons (i.e., contact that is not mediated by bars,

restraints, security glass or screens, and the like), and afforded extremely limited if any access to

meaningful programming of any kind. Haney, The Social Psychology of Isolation: Why Solitary

Confinement is Psychologically Harmful, Prison Service Journal, 12 at n.1 (Jan. 2009); see also

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Stephen Handelman, Changing the Rules for Solitary, The Crime Report (Jan. 15, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-justice/2016-01-changing-the-rulesfor-solitary. Extreme isolation includes, but is not limited to, double-celling inmates for updates of 23 hours a day or more in cells designed to hold only one person. Id. Double celling leads to inmates being “forced to interact with a cellmate under extremely close quarters that afford little or no privacy or respite.” Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 Wash. U. J. of L. & Pol. 265, 273 (2006). Further, these inmates experience “constant and unavoidable violations of personal space, in an environment of forced closeness that affords them no respite from one another or opportunities to release the interpersonal tensions that inevitably result.” Id. at 11; see also Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (prisoners held in extreme isolation “are severely deprived of normal human contact regardless of whether they are single or double celled”); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’v 325, 357–58 (2006) (“Confined groups comprising just two individuals may be the most pathogenic of all.”).
3. The practice of punishing incarcerated individuals by transferring them from the general prison population to extreme isolation has long been shown to cause a severe risk of grave physical and psychological harm. For example, IDOC data shows that prisoners housed in segregation in Illinois prisons are nine times more likely to commit suicide than those in the general population. That is an 800% increase in suicides per person in segregation versus suicides per person in the general population. Regardless of its label—solitary confinement, Disciplinary Segregation, Investigative Status, or Administrative Detention—extensive research shows that the practice of subjecting individuals to extreme isolation causes pain, suffering,
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psychological and emotional trauma, physical injury, and, in extreme cases, death. Moreover, the practice of punishing incarcerated individuals by subjecting them to extended periods of extreme isolation has long been viewed by courts, prison authorities, bar associations, and United Nations commissions on torture as a practice to be avoided in all but the most limited cases where the individual presents a credible and continuing serious threat to others or himself. See, e.g., Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 66th Sess., UN Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) (concluding that “prolonged solitary confinement” can produce harmful psychological effects and recommending that it be prohibited).
4. The IDOC, however, does not restrict the use of extreme isolation to limited cases where the individual presents a credible and continuing serious threat to others or himself. Instead, the Illinois Department of Corrections, as a matter of custom and practice, arbitrarily, capriciously, and routinely uses extreme isolation as means of punishing even the most minor prison infractions. Shockingly, as of June 30, 2013, approximately 2,300 residents of the IDOC were serving extreme isolation sentences. See Exhibit A, Segregation Housing Utilization and Population Dissemination, and Institution Population Chart, dated June 30, 2013. Of these 2,300 individuals, 680 individuals were serving extreme isolation sentences of more than a year, and 218 individuals were serving sentences of more than ten years. See Exhibit B, Segregation Sentence Imposed Compared to the Actual Length of Stay in Segregation, dated June 30, 2013. At Illinois’ maximum security prisons, approximately 1,400 individuals, constituting approximately 15% of Illinois’ maximum security prison population, were held in extreme isolation as of June 30, 2013. See Exhibit A. Of these 1,400 individuals, 654 individuals were
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serving extreme isolation sentences of more than a year, and 208 individuals were serving sentences of more than ten years. See Exhibit B.
5. The IDOC has subjected individuals such as Plaintiffs to extreme isolation in tiny, often windowless cages that are often smaller than even the already small general population cells. In fact, the tiny cells holding these individuals for 23 or more hours each day are significantly smaller than the 50 square feet the Illinois legislature now requires for all new, remodeled, and newly designed cells. See 730 ILCS 5/3-7-3. Led in shackles to these tiny, filthy, cold, and barren cages, these individuals are held in isolation for 23 hours or more a day, with virtually around-the-clock surveillance, and are deprived of meaningful social interaction and any ability to engage in any meaningful or productive physical or mental activity, including educational programs. Moreover, correctional officers under the supervision and control of the IDOC often impose additional punishment by depriving individuals in extreme isolation of what little remains—access to nourishment and edible food, exercise, showers, bedding, and personal effects (including their clothing) may all be arbitrarily denied and/or taken away.
6. The IDOC’s extreme isolation practices and policies are cruel, inhumane, offensive to basic human decency, and violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, Plaintiffs (who themselves are currently held by IDOC in extreme isolation or have been recently held in extreme isolation and are at risk of being returned to extreme isolation) bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons. In this action, Plaintiffs challenge the State of Illinois’ policies and customs, which place every individual incarcerated in Illinois at risk of being subjected to extraordinarily long and severely harmful extreme isolation. Plaintiffs
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seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the unconstitutional use of extreme isolation punishment. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. Plaintiffs and this class bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
8. This Court has jurisdiction over claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
9. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because some Plaintiffs reside at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”), which are both located in this district, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims bought by Plaintiffs and the class have occurred in this District. PARTIES
10. Named Plaintiffs Henry Davis, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Jerome Jones, DeShawn Gardner, and Percell Dansberry are individuals who are currently incarcerated at facilities under IDOC’s custody and control.
11. Plaintiff Henry Davis is a 42-year-old African-American man currently incarcerated and in extreme isolation at Lawrence. Mr. Davis was sentenced to six months in Disciplinary Segregation after receiving a ticket for alleged gang leadership. The IDOC expunged the ticket on April 11, 2014, yet Mr. Davis was not removed from Disciplinary Segregation until May 13, 2014, and instead of removing him back to general population, he was immediately placed in Administrative Detention, where he spent approximately six more months. Mere months after being released from Administrative Detention, Mr. Davis was
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recently placed back in Disciplinary Segregation, where he has been sentenced for six months, yet again for charges of gang leadership. Mr. Davis, who is not a current member of any alleged gang, suffers gravely from lack of inmate privileges and complete confinement to his cell for nearly 24 hours a day. Mr. Davis’ earliest release date is 2048.
12. Plaintiff Douglas Coleman is a 56-year-old African-American man currently incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). Before Stateville, Coleman was incarcerated at Menard from 2000 to 2008 and spent at least six months in Disciplinary Segregation. In 2008, Coleman was transferred to Stateville. During his time at Stateville, he was sentenced to six months in Disciplinary Segregation, but ultimately spent eight months in Disciplinary Segregation after receiving 60 extra days because of two disciplinary tickets, discussed below, from 2013 to 2014. He was housed in F House, cells 135 and 139. During Mr. Coleman’s time in Disciplinary Segregation, he suffered from unbearable living conditions and physical and psychological injuries which were exacerbated because authorities failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. Mr. Coleman’s earliest release date is 2059.
13. Plaintiff Aaron Fillmore is a 41-year-old Caucasian man currently incarcerated and in extreme isolation at Lawrence,. Mr. Fillmore has spent the last 17 years in extreme isolation. During that time, Mr. Fillmore has continuously been in Disciplinary Segregation, Administrative Detention, or Investigate Status, all of which constitute extreme isolation. Mr. Fillmore has not been provided with a meaningful opportunity to defend himself against the charges which have consistently kept him in extreme isolation, and during much of this time, he has not even been given meaningful notice of what he did wrong to warrant such extreme and extended isolation. While in extreme isolation, Mr. Fillmore has had little to no physical contact with other people. He has had no access to IDOC programming and limited opportunities to
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exercise. Mr. Fillmore has suffered mentally as a result. Mr. Fillmore’s earliest release date is 2035.
14. Plaintiff Jerome Jones is a 39-year-old African-American man of Moorish nationality. He is currently incarcerated at Menard. He spent a little over two years in Phase III Administrative Detention at Lawrence—meaning he did not violate any rules for many months. Mr. Jones was removed from the general population of Stateville for reasons unknown to him on July 25, 2013, and was then transferred to Lawrence on August 30, 2013. Despite not receiving a disciplinary ticket since 2001, Mr. Jones has never been able to successfully challenge the false accusation of his alleged gang association he later learned had put him in Administrative Detention in 2013 at Stateville. Mr. Jones, not a current member of any alleged gang, suffered from an extreme lack of inmate privileges and complete confinement to his cell for nearly 24 hours each day. Mr. Jones’ earliest release date is 2038.
15. Plaintiff DeShawn Gardner is a 44-year-old African-American man currently incarcerated and in extreme isolation at Lawrence. Mr. Gardener has been in Administrative Detention since November 2013. He was placed into Investigative Status while at Stateville. He was later transferred to Lawrence and placed in Administrative Detention. Mr. Gardener did not receive an opportunity to challenge his placement in Administrative Detention. In fact, the first review of his Administrative Detention status occurred nearly six months after his initial placement. He has suffered both mentally and physically in Administrative Detention by being cut off from the physical contact of loved ones and from IDOC’s rehabilitative programs. Mr. Gardner’s earliest release date is 2040.
16. Plaintiff Percell Dansberry is a 48-year-old African-American man currently incarcerated at Menard. Mr. Dansberry was sentenced to three months of Disciplinary
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Segregation at Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) after receiving a disciplinary ticket for alleged gang membership. After serving his three-month sentence and without notice, Mr. Dansberry was immediately transferred to Menard and placed in Administrative Detention. Despite not knowing the reason for his placement, Mr. Dansberry remained in Administrative Detention for almost two years. During that time, Mr. Dansberry suffered deplorable living conditions that included little to no physical human contact or mental stimulation for almost 24 hours a day. Mr. Dansberry’s earliest release date is 2037.
17. Defendant John Baldwin is the Acting Director of IDOC. Acting Director Baldwin has final policy-making authority within IDOC, and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining the unconstitutional policies and customs challenged by Plaintiffs. Acting Director Baldwin is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief. FACTS
Prisoners Housed In Extreme Isolation Suffer Both Present Harm and a Severe Increased Risk of Future Harm
18. IDOC’s practice of punishing incarcerated individuals by transferring them from the general prison population to extreme isolation has long been shown to cause grave physical and psychological harm, and to dramatically increase the risk of future harm. Documented physical and physiological harms caused by forced extreme isolation include, at the most basic level, social isolation, sensory deprivation, deprivation of meaningful social contact and social interaction, and denial of basic human dignity, all of which are among the basic necessities of life.
19. IDOC’s practice of punishing incarcerated individuals by transferring them from the general prison population to extreme isolation also dramatically increases the risk of physical harm, including suicide, self-harm, cardiovascular and genito-urinary complications,
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tremulousness, gastro-intestinal impairment, heart palpitations, insomnia, migraines, loss of appetite, weight loss, deteriorated vision, sudden excessive perspiration, back and joint ailments, hypersensitivity to external stimuli, and lethargy. As previously alleged, IDOC data shows almost a tenfold increase in the incidence of suicide for prisoners in extreme isolation versus prisoners in the general population.
20. IDOC’s practice of punishing incarcerated individuals by transferring them from the general prison population to extreme isolation also dramatically increases the risk of psychological harms, including post-traumatic stress disorder, hallucinations, severe and chronic depression, depersonalization, social withdrawal, confusion, apathy, anxiety, heightened nervousness, night terrors, panic attacks, irrational anger, rage, loss of impulse control, paranoia, claustrophobia, concentration and memory deficiencies, and perceptual distortions. As Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy stated, while speaking before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and Federal Government, “[s]olitary confinement literally drives men mad.” Lydia O’Connor, Justice Anthony Kennedy: Solitary Confinement ‘Literally Drives Men Mad,’ Huffington Post (Mar. 24, 2015, 5:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/24/anthony-kennedy-solitary-confinement_n_6934550. html?ir=Chicago&; see also Haney Expert Report at 12-14 (“[D]irect studies of prison isolation have documented an extremely broad range of harmful psychological reactions . . . includ[ing] increases in . . . negative attitudes and affect, anxiety, withdrawal, hypersensitivity, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, irritability, aggression, and rage, paranoia, hopelessness, a sense of impending emotional breakdown, self-mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behavior.”).
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21. The practice of double celling inmates does not mitigate the physical and psychological harms caused by extreme isolation. Inmates housed in double cells are subject to forced interactions with a cellmate under extremely close quarters that afford little or no privacy or respite. Double celling results in an environment of forced closeness that affords cellmates no respite from one another or opportunities to release the interpersonal tensions that inevitably result. In fact, the presence of a cellmate does not significantly mitigate, and actually may aggravate, the stresses of extreme isolation. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 325, 257–58 (2006).
22. For healthy individuals, the combined physical and psychological effects caused by forced isolation can result in grave harm even after short periods of segregated confinement. When the duration of confinement extends beyond days and into weeks, months, or years, however, the consequences can be devastating, permanent, and even deadly. The greatly enhanced risk of suicide and other self-harming behavior for people housed in extreme isolation is well documented. This is particularly the case when individuals with preexisting physical and mental health conditions are subjected to extended periods of isolation.
Many States (But Not Illinois) Recognize the Severe Harm Caused by Extreme Isolation and Have Adopted Policies and Standards to Protect Against Such Harm
23. Precisely because extreme isolation engenders such a significant risk of severe physical and psychological harm and stands as an affront to the basic notions of human dignity, many state authorities explicitly prohibit its imposition as punishment for a criminal offense. Moreover, many states and bar associations have adopted policies to protect against the unnecessary physical and psychological harms caused by extreme isolation. For example, after spending a night in a segregation cell, Colorado’s Director of Corrections embarked on a
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program to dramatically reduce the use of extreme isolation in Colorado’s prisons. As a result, Colorado now virtually bans the use of extreme isolation for all prisoners with a serious mental illness, and prohibits placement of women and youthful prisoners in extreme isolation. Rick Raemisch & Kellie Wasko, Open the Door—Segregation Reforms in Colorado, Colorado Dep’t Corrections (2015), http://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdoc/news/open-door-segregationreforms-colorado. As a result of these reforms, Colorado has reduced the percentage of its prison population in extreme isolation from over 7% of its prison population to 1.1%. The Arthur Liman Public Interest Program & Association of State Correctional Administrators, Time-InCell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 National Survey of Administrative Segregation in Prison (2015), at 7.
24. In Maine, a government study determined that tighter controls were necessary to protect against the overuse of segregation. Accordingly, the State enacted reforms that cut its segregation population in half and expanded access to social stimulation for prisoners placed in segregation.
25. Correctional leaders in Michigan have also implemented programs to reduce the duration of extreme isolation sentences and the number of prisoners subject to extreme isolation.
26. The State of New York agreed to severely limit both the reasons prisoners can be held in extreme isolation, and the length of time they can be kept in extreme isolation. See Settlement Agreement in Peoples v. Rischer, 11-CV-2694 (S.D.N.Y.), filed Dec. 16, 2015, available at www.nyclu.org/files/releases/20151216_settlementagreement_filed.pdf.
27. Also, the New York State Bar Association, noting the serious risk of physical and psychological harm caused by extreme isolation, has adopted a resolution advocating that, if segregated confinement is to be used at all, it should only be imposed for a number of days—not
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years, months, or even weeks. New York State Bar Association Urges Reform of Solitary

Confinement,

NYSBA

(May

5,

2014),

http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/SecondaryStandard.aspx?id=48899. The New York

State Bar Association further found that long-term segregated confinement is a

counterproductive, unnecessary infliction of pain. Id.; see also Stop Solitary – Standards and

Resolutions, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/stop-solitary-standards-and-resolutions (last visited

May 25, 2016). National and International Authorities Have Also Adopted Standards and
Policies to Protect Against the Harm Caused By Extreme Isolation

28. The American Bar Association has promulgated standards to ensure that prisoners

are not unnecessarily subjected to the severe physical and psychological harm caused by extreme

isolation. As a threshold matter, the ABA standards require that prisoners be separated from the

general population only after a finding that (1) the individual committed a severe disciplinary

infraction in which safety or security was seriously threatened, or (2) the individual presents a

credible and continuing serious threat to others or himself. In order to protect against the

unnecessary and unjustified harm caused by forced isolation, the ABA standards abolish extreme

isolation under any circumstances, requiring that any isolation imposed on a prisoner be for the

briefest term and under the least restrictive conditions possible.

29. Human rights organizations and authorities have also found that adequate

minimum safeguards are absolutely necessary to protect against the severe harms caused by

extreme isolation. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, for example, has

concluded that the use of solitary confinement for punitive purposes can never be justified, given

the disproportionate magnitude of suffering it imposes. Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur

has held that more than 15 days in solitary confinement amounts to torturous, cruel, and unusual

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punishment. For this reason, the UN Special Rapporteur recommends that such sentences be

abolished in all cases, even where isolation is determined to be absolutely necessary for

protecting the safety of prisoners and staff. Similarly, the UN General Assembly has called for

an “absolute abolition” of the use of extreme isolation as punishment, and the European

Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

has recommended that, due to its potentially hazardous effects, extreme isolation only be used as

punishment in exceptional cases and for the shortest period of time possible.

30. Near the end of 2015, the U.N. General Assembly approved the first major

revision of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (“SMRs”) since the

guidelines were originally drafted in 1955. Renamed the “Mandela Rules,” the revised rules

state that, “[s]olitary confinement shall be used only in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as

short a time as possible and subject to independent review.” The Mandela Rules forbid

indefinite or prolonged use of solitary confinement (defined as anything more than 15

consecutive days) and restrict its use for people with mental or physical disabilities. Econ. &

Soc.

Council

Res.

2015/20,

at

19

(Sept.

29,

2015),

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.3/70/L.3.

31. As reflected by these various authorities and organizations, the national consensus

standard is that if isolation is to be used at all, sufficient minimum protocols and safeguards are

necessary to ensure that it is only used as a last resort and, even then, that it is only used for a

short amount of time and under strict controls.
Illinois Is A Rogue Governmental Entity When It Comes To The Use of Extreme Isolation As A Means of Punishment

32. In derogation of national and international standards, Illinois uses extreme

isolation as a disciplinary tool of the first resort with astonishing frequency and length for the

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violation of any one of approximately 50 internal prison regulations, the majority of which can be classified as relatively minor offenses. As of June 30, 2013, IDOC maintains over 3,000 segregation beds, which are used to separate individuals from the general prison population and subject them to punishing forms of extreme isolation and deprivation. See Exhibit A. Approximately 2,300 of these segregation beds were occupied by individuals as of June 30, 2013. Id. Of these 2,300 individuals, 680 individuals were serving segregation sentences of more than one year and 218 individuals were serving segregation sentences of more than ten years. See Exhibit B. In fact, despite the closing of IDOC’s Tamms Correctional Center, which eliminated 168 individuals from segregation, IDOC’s overall segregation population increased by 257 individuals from June 30, 2012, to June 30, 2013. See Exhibit A.
33. The frequency with which IDOC uses extreme isolation as punishment is a direct consequence of the system-wide policies and customs governing the conduct and punishment of all individuals incarcerated throughout the Illinois prison system. In contrast to the clearly defined standards and criteria discussed above, Illinois permits the use of extreme isolation as punishment for conduct that poses no threat to the safety of its prisoners or the security of its correctional facilities. Illinois also imposes segregation sentences for extraordinary and disproportionate lengths of time that have no connection to any legitimate penological rationale or even to the seriousness of the offense committed. Defendant Acting Director Baldwin was and is personally involved in authorizing and continuing the unconstitutional policies and customs described below.
34. IDOC has promulgated numerous internal regulations governing every aspect of the behavior of individuals incarcerated in Illinois state prisons. Disciplinary offenses are defined in Appendix A to Section 504.20 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code. See 20
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Ill. Admin. Code § 504.20 (West 2015). These offenses cover a wide range of conduct from assault or possession of dangerous weapons to “disregarding basic hygiene” and include violations of facility rules. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504, App. A (West 2015).
35. If one of IDOC’s employees believes that an individual has violated any of these rules, he or she must prepare a “disciplinary report” or an “investigative report.” These reports document the alleged behavior and list any witnesses. He or she may orally reprimand the individual if the offense is one of those listed in the 400 series of Appendix A. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.30 (West 2015).
36. Both before and after a disciplinary report or an investigative report is prepared, the shift supervisor can decide whether to place the individual in “temporary confinement” pending the issuance of a report or a disciplinary hearing. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.40 (West 2015).
37. As a matter of practice, there is widespread disparity in the length of time that a prisoner spends in temporary confinement before an initial hearing across Illinois prisons. For example, the median number of days between placement in temporary confinement and the initial hearing varies from one to ten. The maximum number of days for each facility ranges from four to 194 days. This widespread disparity in terms of the initial hearing is indicative of the arbitrary and capricious nature of IDOC policies and practices pertaining to extreme isolation and the widespread deprivations of liberty and proper due process considerations afforded to every prisoner under the Fourteenth Amendment.
38. A “reviewing officer” is then assigned to (1) review the placement of an individual in temporary confinement, (2) interview those individuals receiving an investigative report, and (3) review an individual’s disciplinary report. When reviewing a disciplinary report,
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a reviewing officer must determine whether the offense committed is “major or minor in nature.” See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.50 (West 2015). All those offenses listed in the 100, 200, or 500 series of Appendix A are considered major offenses. Those offenses listed in the 300 or 400 series may be designated as either minor or major offenses. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.50(d)(3) (West 2015).
39. All major offenses are assigned to the “adjustment committee” for a hearing while all minor offenses are assigned to the “program unit” for a hearing. Those reports or offenses classified as major offenses are eligible for placement in segregation if found guilty. A vast number of these “major” offenses involve nonviolent and non-disruptive behavior or actions that pose little to no threat to the safety of the prisoners or the security of the facilities. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.80(k)(4)(H).
40. IDOC’s policies and regulations offer minimal guidance to a reviewing officer’s review of investigative and disciplinary reports as well as a prisoner’s placement in temporary confinement. IDOC’s policies and regulations fail to provide incarcerated individuals with an explanation of the types of conduct that may result in more or less severe classification. These same policies and regulations fail to provide notice to incarcerated individuals of the potential segregation sentencing ranges if found guilty of a violation of IDOC’s rules, including facility rules.
41. Individuals charged with major offenses are afforded an extremely limited “hearing,” with minimal process, to adjudicate their guilt. IDOC employees with many other work responsibilities often act as adjustment committee members. With respect to adjudicating guilt, adjustment committee members are permitted to credit the testimony of correctional staff over that of a prisoner. The prisoner can be denied the opportunity to present his own evidence.
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The prisoner is routinely denied the right to question or confront adverse witnesses. The prisoner can even be denied the ability to know the identity of the witnesses. Prisoners can be, and frequently are, convicted of offenses based only on the disputed word of a single correctional officer following a “hearing” in the hallway outside the prisoner’s cell.
42. Extreme isolation is also imposed on individuals without a hearing and even without notice, as a form of “nondisciplinary status of confinement.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.660 (West 2015). This status is referred to as “Administrative Detention.” Id.
43. Individuals are placed in Administrative Detention at the discretion of the Chief Administrative Officer (commonly known as “Warden”) with almost no review or opportunity for the individual to contest the allegations. 20 Ill. Adm. Code §§ 504.660(a), (b), and (c).
44. Review of the individual’s placement in Administrative Detention need only be conducted every 90 days and individuals may remain in that status indefinitely. 20 Ill. Adm. Code §§ 504.660(a) and (c).
45. IDOC’s policies permit and encourage extreme isolation sentences for behavior that demonstrates no risk of harm to the general prisoner population or to IDOC’s employees. A substantial number of extreme isolation sentences are for this type of behavior. For example, from January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2008, only 15% of sentences to extreme isolation involved offenses that implicated violent conduct or possession of dangerous contraband. See Exhibit C, Quantitative Findings on Use and Outcomes of Segregation in IL DOC, dated September 28, 2011. Furthermore, IDOC employees punitively imposed extreme isolation for the following behaviors:
a. Over 500 segregation sentences involving “damage or misuse of property”; b. Approximately 300 segregation sentences involving “intimidations or threats”;
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c. Approximately 150 segregation sentences involving possession of “drugs or drug paraphernalia”;
d. Over 1,500 segregation sentences for “unauthorized movement”; e. Over 1,300 segregation sentences involving “insolence”; f. Over 800 segregation sentences for “non-dangerous contraband”; g. Over 1,600 segregation sentences for “violation of rules”; h. Over 1,500 segregation sentences for “disobeying a direct order”; and i. Approximately 500 segregation sentences for “failure to report.” Id. 46. IDOC’s policies and customs regarding sentencing are a key factor in the arbitrary and inconsistent punishments that occur within IDOC’s facilities. IDOC’s policies and regulations are plainly inadequate and fail to provide guidance in order to ensure consistent and proportionate disciplinary outcomes. 47. With respect to sentence length, IDOC’s policies provide no mandatory sentence ranges. Instead, IDOC’s policies provide for maximum penalties for each offense. The maximum penalties, however, permit disproportionate and arbitrary sentencing to extreme isolation. An individual in possession of a package of cigarettes, for example, could be sentenced to up to three months of extreme isolation. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504. Tbl. A (West 2015). Furthermore, IDOC’s policies fail to place any upper limit on the number of consecutive segregation sentences that an individual may be forced to serve. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.110(b) (West 2015). Thus, individual extreme isolation sentences of 30 days for nonviolent behavior may have the practical effect of ensuring that the prisoner spends months or even years confined in extreme isolation. In addition, indeterminate periods of extreme isolation are frequently allowed and enforced. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.115 (West 2015).
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48. IDOC’s policies provide vague and generic guidance or criteria for when extreme isolation should be imposed as a disciplinary action. There is no articulation of the rationale for imposing such extreme isolation or for the length of time of each sentence. Instead, extreme isolation sentences are often routinely authorized and imposed without adequate explanations as a matter of policy and custom. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.20(b) and 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.80(k)(4)(H) (West 2015).
49. Moreover, IDOC’s policies permit employees to impose extreme isolation as punishment without taking into account factors that might make such extreme isolation particularly disproportionate, painful, and harmful. IDOC employees are permitted to impose extreme isolation sentences on the most vulnerable individuals, e.g., individuals with a history of mental illness, individuals with daily medical needs, and the elderly.
50. Once an individual begins serving his or her sentence, IDOC’s policies allow lengthy confinements without any subsequent individualized reviews to determine whether it is still necessary to keep that individual in extreme isolation. Nor do IDOC’s policies require that officials periodically evaluate whether the extreme isolation may be causing the individual increasingly severe and grave harm. Even indeterminate segregation sentences are only required to be reviewed once during the first year and once every 180 days thereafter. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.115 (West 2015).
51. IDOC’s policies and customs governing post-sentencing review of disciplinary actions fail to ensure any consistent or meaningful relief from grossly disproportionate extreme isolation. New proceedings are only granted if the original proceeding was found to be “defective” on four bases. No further guidance is offered by IDOC’s policies in making this determination of defectiveness. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.90 (West 2015). Furthermore,
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requests to reduce an individual’s time in extreme isolation can be unilaterally denied without any explanation. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.120 (West 2015).
52. All of the above policies work in conjunction with customs that have the force of formal policy throughout the IDOC system, tolerating and encouraging needlessly and purposefully harmful extreme isolation sentences for all forms of behavior, no matter how minor or nonthreatening. Lacking any adequate policies and procedures, IDOC’s employees impose unjustified and arbitrary punishments that are customarily authorized, ratified, and enforced system-wide.
53. In combination, IDOC’s policies and customs result in unjustified, inconsistent, and harmful extreme isolation sentences. Individuals receive lengthy sentences that are grossly disproportionate as compared to the underlying misbehavior. Similarly situated prisoners receive inconsistent, often vastly different sentences for similar misconduct. African-American prisoners are more likely to receive extreme isolation sentences, and to receive longer sentences, as compared to individuals of other racial or ethnic groups.
54. Acting Director Baldwin has final policy-making and supervisory authority within IDOC. As director, and pursuant to Illinois law, he is aware of and has ultimate authority with regard to all of IDOC’s internal rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and customs. According to the IDOC’s website, Acting Director Baldwin and his staff are “committed to operating a safe and secure prison system as well as enhancing prison-based treatment, prevention programs and the successful reentry of inmates into society, which will lead to lowering recidivism rates.”
55. Defendant Acting Director Baldwin was and is personally involved in authorizing and maintaining the disciplinary policies, procedures, and customs detailed in this complaint, and
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their consequences and effects. He has the responsibility to review and evaluate IDOC’s disciplinary policies and the authority to adopt, amend, or revise them.
56. Defendant Baldwin is aware of the harm caused by IDOC’s existing disciplinary policies and customs. Defendant Baldwin is aware that extreme isolation causes pain, suffering, mental deterioration, and physical injury. IDOC had statistical evidence and data that demonstrate the arbitrary, inconsistent, and grossly disproportionate extreme isolation sentences caused by its inadequate policies and customs. See Exhibits A, B, and C; see also Exhibit D, Various Segregation Charts, dated from September 30, 2009, to December 31, 2012. Defendant is also aware that extreme isolation sentences are often imposed for offenses that pose no threat to prison safety or security, and for lengths of time that far exceed any legitimate punitive goal and do little more than inflict unnecessary pain and an unjustified risk of harm. Id.
57. Defendant is aware of the consequences of IDOC’s policies and customs as the result of numerous communications to them from outside organizations and entities, including the study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice (“Vera Institute”) on or around September 2011. See Exhibit E, Memorandum of Understanding Between the IDOC and The Vera Institute of Justice, dated May 2010, and Exhibit F, Reducing Prisoner Isolation: An Innovative Approach to Classification and Management of Segregation, Control Units, and Supermax, undated.
58. Specifically, the Vera Institute, an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit center for justice policy and practice, found, among other things, that (1) “[t]he conduct exhibited by prisoners admitted to [Disciplinary Segregation] and [Administrative Detention] warrants sanctions, but it is not clear that the types of placement and lengths of stay are proportionate to prior and current negative behavior;” (2) “[t]he conditions of confinement in [Disciplinary Segregation] are not acceptable with respect to recreation, showers, mental health treatment, or
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contacts with clinical-services staff, and are not in line with best or standard practices in other systems;” (3) [t]here is a need to standardize key policies and program attributes for [Disciplinary Segregation] and [Administrative Detention] across the system; (4) “[t]he proportion of women in [Disciplinary Segregation] is almost twice that of men;” and (5) “[a] signification portion of the [Disciplinary Segregation] population has segregation time that exceeds their time left to serve.” Exhibit G, IDOC Segregation Study Major Findings, undated (emphasis added).
59. Defendant is also aware of a pattern of deficiencies through complaints that they have received through prisoner grievances and civil litigation.
60. Defendant has long been aware that IDOC’s disciplinary procedures fail to provide many of the minimum safeguards recommended by correctional, legal, mental health, and human rights experts. The certainty that these policies and customs have and will continue to lead to unjustified and harmful extreme isolation sentences is plain from the lack of adequate guidance contained in IDOC’s written policies themselves, and the fact that IDOC’s employees customarily impose extreme isolation sentences far exceeding even the minimal guidance that is provided.
IDOC’s Use of Extreme Isolation Serves No Legitimate Penological Purpose 61. The extraordinary length of extreme isolation sentences imposed by IDOC— approximately half of the sentences imposed on those in segregation as of June 30, 2013, were for more than three months, some five to ten times longer than the maximum allowable time recommended by mental health, legal, and human rights experts—serves no legitimate penological justification. In fact, the overwhelming evidence from other state corrections systems, as well as the Vera Institute study, is that the use of punitive extreme isolation
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exacerbates physical violence and psychological harms for both incarcerated individuals and correctional staff, and that it is counterproductive to legitimate penological goals such as prison safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See Exhibits A-G.
62. Implementing procedural safeguards, such as adopting adequate criteria designed to ensure proportionality and curtail the length of extreme isolation sentences, to avoid the risk of harm for vulnerable prisoners, and to provide notice to prisoners and staff of the length of extreme isolation that may be imposed as punishment for particular behaviors, would significantly protect against the risk of erroneous deprivations of the most fundamental constitutional rights, and would not unduly interfere with Defendant’s legitimate interests.
63. Despite all of the above, Defendant personally authorized these policies and customs although he has the authority, ability, and ultimate responsibility to ensure that IDOC’s policies and customs do not inflict unnecessary and avoidable harm on individuals incarcerated in Illinois prisons. By continuing these policies and practices, Defendant is responsible for the systemic and ongoing violations of the constitutional rights of individuals incarcerated in Illinois prisons, including the harms suffered by each of the Plaintiffs, as described below.
Henry Davis 64. Mr. Davis is 42 years old and currently incarcerated at Lawrence. He was incarcerated in 2005 and is currently serving a 45-year sentence for murder. 65. Mr. Davis previously spent over two years in extreme isolation, which included time spent in Investigative Status, Disciplinary Segregation, and Administrative Detention. He was recently placed back in Disciplinary Segregation. 66. Mr. Davis was first placed in Investigative Status on or about July 29, 2011, and continued through about September 2011. Thereafter, he was again placed in Investigative
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Status on November 7, 2013, for allegedly engaging in security threat group (“STG”) activity. On December 5, 2013, IDOC issued a disciplinary report charging Mr. Davis with allegedly holding a leadership position in an STG. A hearing was held on December 9, 2013, at which Mr. Davis was unable to call witnesses to refute the charge against him and IDOC refused to reveal or call their informant, preventing Mr. Davis from being able to question his accuser. Mr. Davis was sentenced to six months in segregation. He filed a grievance challenging the decision and on April 11, 2014, the ARB expunged the disciplinary report and ordered that Mr. Davis be released from segregation and restored to his previous grade. Despite this clear mandate from the ARB, Mr. Davis continued to be held in segregation for an additional 31 days, after which he was immediately placed in Administrative Detention instead of being returned to general population. On May 13, 2014, Mr. Davis received a memorandum, dated May 12, 2014, from Steve Duncan, the Warden at Lawrence, stating that he was being placed in Administrative Detention based on a review conducted on the same date. No other information was provided to Mr. Davis.
67. Mr. Davis remained in Administrative Detention until November 18, 2015. On May 29, 2014, while in Administrative Detention, Mr. Davis filed a grievance regarding the extra 31 days that he was held in Disciplinary Segregation after the disciplinary report was expunged and he was supposed to be moved back to general population, as well as the decision to move him to Administrative Detention instead of general population. On June 16, 2014, the Counselor responded that Mr. Davis’ placement in Administrative Detention had nothing to do with the expunged disciplinary report. The Counselor’s response did not address the additional time that Mr. Davis was held in segregation after the expungement. On February 3, 2015, the
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grievance officer, Elizabeth Bare, recommended that the grievance be denied. On July 13, 2015, the ARB denied Mr. Davis’ grievance.
68. On March 11, 2016, Mr. Davis received disciplinary report alleging the same offense that was expunged on April 11, 2014—leadership in a STG. Again, IDOC refused to reveal its source and Mr. Davis was unable to call any witnesses to refute the charge against him. He was sentenced to another six months in Disciplinary Segregation. On April 6, 2016, Mr. Davis filed a grievance challenging the March 11, 2016 disciplinary report.
69. Mr. Davis has three children and two small grandchildren. While in extreme isolation, Mr. Davis rarely, if ever, receives visits from his family because his visits are “no contact,” held behind a glass wall, and limited to one hour. While in general population, he would receive five visits each month. He currently is not permitted any phone calls (other than to legal counsel), and this causes him to feel extremely isolated, particularly from his family. His mail is extremely delayed, such that if he does receive a letter from family, it often arrives over a month after it was sent.
70. Prior to his time in extreme isolation, Mr. Davis had started to work toward obtaining his General Educational Development (G.E.D.). Unfortunately, he has been unable to finish his G.E.D. preparation program because the classes are not allowed in extreme isolation. Mr. Davis is a practicing Christian and, while in general population, he would regularly participate in Bible study courses, as well as other Christian classes and services. He has not been permitted to attend any of those religious classes or services while in extreme isolation. He is also very limited in his ability to attend to his legal work in extreme isolation because the law library in extreme isolation contains torn and tattered books and has no staff or inmate helpers.
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This is in stark contrast to the general population law libraries that have staff, inmate helpers, and both a better quality and greater quantity of books.
71. Mr. Davis’ food portions in extreme isolation are very small, and he is not allowed to supplement his diet with any food from the commissary. The cells are bug-ridden and often freezing cold in the winter.
72. Mr. Davis spends 23 to 24 hours a day confined to his cell. He has been singlecelled (without a cellmate) for most of his time in extreme isolation. The extreme isolation cell doors are covered in a plexiglass, making communication with individuals outside the cell extremely difficult. This is different from general population, where the doors contain bars but not a plexiglass wall. Further, the guards in extreme isolation at times turn on an air-blowing machine that adds to the noise, making it even more difficult to meaningfully communicate with anyone and also making it colder in the winter, seemingly a form of additional, informal punishment. Mr. Davis is only allowed outside in the yard approximately two hours each week, usually combined on the same day. This extreme isolation from his family and others within Lawrence, including the inability to meaningfully communicate or to go outside for more than two hours a week, causes Mr. Davis severe emotional distress and desperation to the point of wanting to run his head into the wall.
Douglas Coleman 73. Mr. Coleman is 56 years old and is currently incarcerated at Stateville. He is currently serving a 135-year sentence for murder and armed robbery. 74. Mr. Coleman is currently housed in X house at Stateville. 75. Mr. Coleman has endured at least three extreme isolation sentences during his incarceration (two times for having alcohol in his cell, and one from a positive drug test).
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76. Mr. Coleman entered the IDOC system in 1992. From 2000 to 2008, Mr. Coleman was incarcerated at Menard. During his time at Menard, Mr. Coleman was sentenced to Disciplinary Segregation for a positive drug test in or around 2001.
77. Mr. Coleman experienced deplorable living conditions in Disciplinary Segregation. The cells were filthy and had little air circulation. His food portions were greatly diminished. He was also denied timely access to his heart medicine.
78. While in Disciplinary Segregation, Mr. Coleman was only permitted yard privileges once a week. This caused him great anguish because he could not leave the cramped, dirty conditions of his cell, especially when disputes or frustrations with his cellmate arose.
79. Towards the end of his time in Disciplinary Segregation, Mr. Coleman felt really sick. Mr. Coleman suffered a stroke at Menard after leaving Disciplinary Segregation in September 2001.
80. In 2008, Mr. Coleman was transferred to Stateville because a correctional officer was harassing and discriminating against him because of his stroke. He was placed in the Health Care Unit upon his arrival at Stateville.
81. The first time that he was placed in Disciplinary Segregation at Stateville was around 2011. He spent six months in extreme isolation served in a cell within the Health Care Unit. The second time Mr. Coleman spent eight months in extreme isolation from 2013 through early 2014. His original 2013 sentence was for six months due to alcohol found in his cell, but Mr. Coleman ultimately spent a total of eight months in extreme isolation after receiving 60 extra
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days because of two additional disciplinary tickets. Mr. Coleman endured his second extreme isolation sentence in F-House, cells 135 and 139. 1
82. Mr. Coleman suffered extreme isolation in F-House, where the conditions included constant roaches, mice, and birds flying inside the unit. The roaches were seen constantly and everywhere in F-House, including wherever there was a surface, such as the sink, walls, counter, toilet, and in the bed where they would crawl on him. There were more roaches in F-House than the Health Care Unit. There were even insects and mice in the food. Mr. Coleman did not see any mice in general population cells. He had to “sleep with one eye open” because of the mice. There were also more cockroaches in F-House than in general population. Birds would frequently fly around F-House, including over the trays of food, whereas Mr. Coleman did not see birds in general population. Even when the food was not tainted by insects and rodents, it was of low quality and the inmates were given very small portions. In winter, the cells were unbearably cold, which was made worse by broken/missing window panes letting frigid air spill directly into his cell. It was so cold that, for one period of time, there was ice on the inside of Mr. Coleman’s F-House cell wall. He could not even keep himself warm against the frigid temperatures in his cell because he was not allowed to cover the broken/missing panes with a blanket to prevent cold air from coming into the cell; doing so would risk getting a disciplinary ticket.
83. Although Mr. Coleman was housed with a cellmate in F-House, he had no meaningful ability to communicate with the inmates in the cells on either side of his. He would have had to scream to get anyone’s attention outside of his cell, and even that often did not work. Mr. Coleman felt that he was on a deserted island because it was so hard to get attention when he 1 Mr. Coleman spent approximately one week in Health Care Unit segregation (out of the total of eight months) due to an injury that occurred while he was in F-House segregation.
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needed help. For part of his sentence, he was placed with an inmate known to be mentally disturbed. Mr. Coleman feared the inmate and requested a single cell because he felt that he was in danger, but no action was taken. Being confined for 24 hours a day with another person in such a tiny cell exaggerated the dire conditions of extreme isolation because there was constant tension with and fear of his cellmate. In general population, social workers could be used to help resolve problems.
84. While in F-House segregation for eight months, Mr. Coleman was confined to his cell approximately 24 hours a day. He was forced to eat all of his meals in his cockroachinfested cell. Mr. Coleman’s F-House cells were extremely small, making it very difficult to take a single step in the small space between the wall and the bed. The toilet was right against the bunk bed and toilets ran on timers every ten minutes or more. Solid plexiglass covered the bars on the cell, making it extremely difficult to speak and be heard outside of the cell, as well as exaggerating the smell the toilet caused inside the cell. This is very different than general population, where conversations are easy because there is no plexiglass. Mr. Coleman was given one soiled or torn sheet in F-House segregation or a blanket, but not always both, whereas he was given two sheets and a blanket in general population.
85. Confined to a wheelchair due to a stroke that occurred before he was placed in segregation, Mr. Coleman suffers from limited mobility, weakness in his legs, and balance issues, among other things. Mr. Coleman also has a stoma and colostomy bag. Yet, while in extreme isolation in F-House, Mr. Coleman was routinely denied use of a wheelchair, which was the only way he could often physically get to the shower. Once there, the officers forced Mr. Coleman to clean the showers before and after using them. This was difficult and dangerous because of Mr. Coleman’s physical condition and led to painful falls.
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86. Mr. Coleman’s access to many of the basic things he ordinarily would have had in general population was extremely limited or nonexistent while in F-House segregation. For example, Mr. Coleman was not allowed phone calls. Yard time was also reduced from three days a week in general population to one day a week in segregation. Even with that, Mr. Coleman was unable to access the yard, in part because he was denied a wheelchair and in part because in general population, other inmates would help him walk to the yard but in extreme isolation he was alone, without any help. Unlike in general population, Mr. Coleman had little or no access to religious programs, gymnasium, or his psychologist or social worker. While in FHouse segregation, he was only able to see his social worker approximately two times because the trip required access to his wheelchair, which he was often denied. Mr. Coleman’s visitations in extreme isolation were significantly decreased as compared to general population. His arms would be chained to his waist, with a chain connected to his back to lead him like an animal, and he would be chained to the floor. Visitations in extreme isolation were through a thick glass wall, making communication extremely difficult, if not impossible. No physical contact with visitors was permitted or possible, unlike in general population. In general population, Mr. Coleman could sit in the same room as the visitor, without any glass dividers, and Mr. Coleman and the visitor would be able to briefly touch, such as a short hug before leaving.
87. On one occasion, after Mr. Coleman had gone weeks without showering due to being denied use of a wheelchair, Mr. Coleman finally became so physically uncomfortable with the acid around his stoma that he got himself to the shower where he ultimately fell in the shower and hit his head and back. He laid on the floor in pain for approximately an hour and a half while the officers and health care workers joked and laughed at him. The officers eventually dragged Mr. Coleman out of the shower and took him to the medical unit, where a nurse at first
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refused to treat him. Eventually, Mr. Coleman returned to his cell in terrible pain, and after his cellmate called for help, he was finally given pain relievers. To date, Mr. Coleman has not received adequate medical attention despite still suffering from pain from the fall.
88. As mentioned above, Mr. Coleman received two disciplinary tickets while in FHouse, which extended his original six-month segregation sentence to eight months. One of the tickets occurred after Mr. Coleman’s slip and fall in the shower when he was taken to the HCU. There, he was writhing in pain and having muscle spasms when a nurse handed him a pitcher that he was not able to hold. He told the nurse that he could not hold the pitcher, but the nurse refused to help him. As he was on his way out of the room, Mr. Coleman’s back had a spasm and he dropped the pitcher in the opposite direction of the nurse. However, the nurse claimed that Mr. Coleman threw the pitcher at him and Mr. Coleman received a disciplinary ticket sentencing him to an additional month in segregation. Mr. Coleman received a “hearing” in his HCU cell, where he was placed after the injury. At that time he was found guilty, even though he pleaded not guilty and provided an explanation. He was not able to question the nurse involved in the incident.
89. The second disciplinary ticket, for health and sanitation, occurred when Mr. Coleman attempted to dispose of his colostomy bag during the period of time when he was not able to make it to the shower after being denied use of a wheelchair. He placed the bag outside of his cell where the porter indicated that he would pick it up. Unfortunately, the porter did not do so before an officer returned and gave Mr. Coleman a disciplinary ticket resulting in an additional month in segregation. Mr. Coleman had a brief “hearing” at his F-House cell. Mr. Coleman pled not guilty but was found guilty anyway.
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90. Mr. Coleman has filed at least 15 grievances since 2012 complaining of the conditions in extreme isolation and the poor treatment he received from the officers in segregation. For all 15 of the grievances, Mr. Coleman possesses documentation of denials by the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), demonstrating that Mr. Coleman exhausted his remedies by appealing the denials as far as he could. Nearly all decisions by the ARB stated that the issues were resolved or could not be resolved by the ARB. Each decision was issued many months after the initial grievance and one decision came over 16 months after Mr. Coleman had filed the grievance.
91. On August 1, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance stating that on that same day he had been told by an officer that he could not take a shower unless he cleaned the shower himself. The officer also told him that he was not to have a wheelchair. Although Mr. Coleman explained to the officer that he had a medical permit for the wheelchair to go to the shower, the officer denied him its use. It also stated that Mr. Coleman needed to clean his stoma, but was afraid to do so for fear of angering his cellmate. Mr. Coleman, therefore, requested a single cell. Finally, Mr. Coleman requested that the officers be held accountable for their actions.
92. The grievance was denied on October 3, 2013, by the grievance counselor, who stated simply that Mr. Coleman did not have a permit for the wheelchair and that “[t]he showers are cleaned daily.” Mr. Coleman appealed this decision, and on December 18, 2014 (more than 16 months after Mr. Coleman filed the grievance), the ARB responded. The ARB found that Mr. Coleman’s grievance had been appropriately addressed by the grievance counselor. Neither decision addressed the behavior by the officers.
93. On August 21, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that on August 14, 2013, while he was trying to clean the shower in “F House” segregation, he slipped, hitting his
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head and injuring his back. Mr. Coleman had been told by the officers that if he did not clean the showers, he would not be allowed to take one. Mr. Coleman had gone two weeks without taking a shower, but finally needed to clean his stoma and was forced to use the shower. Lt. Bell, one of the officers in charge of the segregation unit, accused him of falling to get out of cleaning the shower. Nurses made snide remarks and laughed and joked about Mr. Coleman’s misfortune. Mr. Coleman lay on the shower floor for what felt like an hour before the officers finally took him to the emergency room. When they did so, the officers slammed Mr. Coleman to a gurney and roughly handcuffed him to it. Mr. Coleman requested simply that a full investigation into the incident be done, that the officers responsible (including Lt. Bell) be punished, that he be compensated for his injuries, and that he be free from reprisals. This grievance does not appear to have even been addressed by the counselor.
94. The next day, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that on July 25, 2013, he had asked an F-House officer to allow him the use of his wheelchair so that he could make it to the shower. The officer’s response was “you can walk!” Mr. Coleman requested merely to know who had made the decision that he was not to have a wheelchair. The grievance counselor denied this grievance, stating that per the Health Care Unit (“HCU”), Mr. Coleman was not to have a wheelchair and that “[o]ffender is able to walk.” The same day, Mr. Coleman filed an additional grievance alleging disrespectful and threatening behavior by a nurse and requested a verbal apology. This grievance does not appear to have even been addressed by the counselor or the ARB.
95. On August 23, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that he stopped two officers and asked about getting a wheelchair. One officer said that he was still looking for a wheelchair. Mr. Coleman asked that they simply call HCU and ask for one, and the officers
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responded rudely and walked away. Mr. Coleman requested that the officers be trained in dealing with patients in line with the Americans with Disabilities Act. The grievance counselor found that Mr. Coleman should not be issued a wheelchair.
96. On August 30, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance stating that the day before, he had informed an officer that he wanted his medical shower and would like a wheelchair to make it to the shower. The officer informed Mr. Coleman that he could walk. Mr. Coleman detailed in the grievance that he was in pain and suffered from headaches, dizziness, and weakness in his legs such that he was unable to stand for more than a couple of minutes. Mr. Coleman simply requested that a wheelchair be provided to allow him to make it to the shower. The grievance counselor responded that Mr. Coleman was not assigned to a wheelchair.
97. On December 18, 2014 (again about 16 months after the grievances were filed), the ARB issued a response to Mr. Coleman’s appeals of the denials of his grievances from: August 22, 2013 (it is unclear whether this denial also addresses Mr. Coleman’s August 21 grievance, which was filed together with the August 22 grievance); August 23, 2013; August 30, 2013; and September 27, 2013. The response denied all four of Mr. Coleman’s grievances, simply stating that Mr. Coleman’s “grievance was appropriately addressed by HCU staff.”
98. On August 27, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that the segregation nurse had denied him the use of his quad cane, advising him that he could use a crutch instead. Mr. Coleman responded that he would be unable to use the crutch and advised the nurse that he had been prescribed the quad cane and issued a permit to use it. The grievance counselor’s response is dated October 8, 2013. The counselor stated that this was a duplicate grievance and that the HCU had not authorized Mr. Coleman to have the quad cane. On the side of the grievance, a note is written in what does not appear to be Mr. Coleman’s handwriting. The note
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says “ST RECEIVED 03-01-14” (likely “FIRST RECEIVED 03-01-14” if not for a copying error). On August 21, 2014, the ARB denied Mr. Coleman’s appeal, stating that the grievance was “[n]ot submitted in the timeframe outlined in Department Rule 504; therefore, this issue will not be addressed further.” The response also stated that the ARB had previously addressed the issue. This response was unfair to Mr. Coleman, considering that he filed the grievance the same day as the incident, and that the ARB appears to have received his grievance many months after it was filed, through no fault of Mr. Coleman.
99. On September 27, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance stating that the officers ignored his medical pass to see the doctor. Mr. Coleman also requested and was denied the use of a wheelchair to get to the shower. At one time, Mr. Coleman had been able to hobble to the shower by clutching the railing, but was no longer able to do that since his fall when he was forced to clean the shower. Mr. Coleman requested that he be provided access to the doctor when he had a pass, as well as use of a wheelchair to get to the shower. The grievance counselor responded that “[n]o Stateville employee, security or non-security, can simply choose to cancel or ignore a medical pass.” The counselor also noted that the wheelchair request was a duplicated grievance and that Mr. Coleman did not have a permit for a wheelchair. On December 14, 2014, the ARB responded to the grievance, saying that it was denied “in accordance with AD05.03.103A (Monetary Compensation for Inmate Assignments),” which is curious because Mr. Coleman did not request the relief of monetary compensation. The response also noted that it “was verified offender was seen by Dr. Obaisi on 11/13/13 moot issue.” To sum up, the prison’s response to officers denying Mr. Coleman access to medical treatment for which he had a pass was to inform him that Stateville employees cannot choose to ignore the pass and to declare the issue moot because he was able to see a doctor more than 45 days later.
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100. On October 26, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that he had asked an officer for a medical shower and had not received one. The officers told him that he was being denied showers because he threw feces all over the shower. Mr. Coleman suffers from a medical disorder necessitating the use of a colostomy bag. His options for cleaning the bag (necessary to prevent infection) were to clean it in the shower or in his cell. Doing so in his cell would anger his cellmate and result in unsanitary living conditions for both parties. Yet the officers refused Mr. Coleman the use of the shower because he cleaned his bag there. The grievance counselor responded to this grievance by stating that this was a “re-occuring (sic) theme in each grievance” and that a “copy is being sent to the HCU (again) for review and response.” The counselor stated that Mr. Coleman would get a response when the HCU responded. On September 18, 2014, the grievance was denied by the ARB because it was “appropriately addressed by the grievance officer.” It is unclear what, if anything, the grievance officer did to address the grievance, as Mr. Coleman continued to have problems with access to the showers during his time in segregation.
101. On December 18, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that he had requested a medical shower and did not receive it. Mr. Coleman stated that he normally would have reminded Lt. Sullivan, but the last time he had done so, Lt. Sullivan had told him that he did not need to ask and that he would get his showers. Mr. Coleman was afraid to ask again due to fear of reprisal. For relief, Mr. Coleman requested that he be transferred to the HCU. The grievance officer responded that every effort is made to ensure that offenders with special permits get their needs met but that “offender should remind staff early of scheduled movement.” The response did not address the fact that Mr. Coleman feared reprisal from the officers for doing what the counselor suggested to remedy the situation. On December 18, 2014, the ARB
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found that the grievance was properly addressed by the counselor and that cell assignment in the HCU is at the discretion of medical staff.
102. On December 12, 2013, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that there was no heat in his segregation cell, causing it to be freezing cold. The cold was such that ice accumulated on the cell windows. The toilet seat froze; it was too cold to wash. Mr. Coleman stated that this had been an issue since October. When Mr. Coleman and his cellmate complained, they were told that the heat was on a timer. On January 10, 2014, nearly a month later, the grievance counselor responded that a work order was submitted on the issue.
103. On May 15, 2014, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that his personal property had been stolen while he was in segregation, including money from his commissary fund. Mr. Coleman attached grievances from July 2013, while he was in segregation, requesting to be assured that his personal property was not taken because the proper procedures had not been filed in logging his property. The grievance counselor responded that inmates receive copies of receipts of their commissary fund purchases and that the other property issues raised were untimely. On September 30, 2014, the ARB filed a response denying the appeals of the grievances because they were not submitted within the proper timeframe. This decision seems to have been directed at the July 2013 grievances that Mr. Coleman submitted as exhibits to his May grievance, and does not address the stolen or misplaced property.
104. On June 8, 2014, Mr. Coleman filed a grievance alleging that he had underwent the colectomy in 2009 because prison doctor Dr. Singer had told him that it would be reversed after three to six months. It had been over five years, and the doctors had refused to reverse the procedure and remove the colostomy bag. Mr. Coleman requested that the prison doctors reverse the procedure due to the mental and physical pain he was suffering because of it. Mr. Coleman
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attached the August 21 grievance detailing the fall he had experienced in the shower that came about as a result of the officers’ treatment of him because of the colostomy bag. The grievance counselor did not appear to respond to this grievance. On September 23, 2014, the ARB denied the grievance as untimely. The denial seemed to stem from the fact that Mr. Coleman had attached the earlier grievance, which had been meant merely as an exhibit to further explain his complaint. The ARB decision did not address Mr. Coleman’s medical issues.
105. Mr. Coleman has stated that his time in segregation made his anger problems worse. Actions by the officers such as refusing to bring his wheelchair so that he can get to the shower have psychologically scarred and frightened Mr. Coleman. He cannot trust the staff to keep him safe. Mr. Coleman felt that he was doing better emotionally and psychologically before he suffered through segregation, but that things have since been much worse. As a result of Mr. Coleman’s time in extreme isolation, his depression has deepened. Mr. Coleman now meets with a psychologist to deal with anger issues which have been exacerbated by his time in segregation.
Aaron Fillmore 106. Mr. Fillmore is 41 years old and is currently incarcerated at Lawrence. He was initially incarcerated in June 1994 and is currently serving an 80-year sentence for murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and armed violence. 107. During the past 17 years of his incarceration, Mr. Fillmore has continuously been either in Disciplinary Segregation, Administrative Detention, or Investigative Status, all of which are ultimately extreme isolation.
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108. In extreme isolation, Mr. Fillmore has had little to no physical contact with other human beings. He is locked in a cell by himself at least 23 hours each day and has suffered both mentally and physically as a result.
109. Mr. Fillmore was originally placed in extreme isolation 17 years ago when he was transferred from Stateville Correctional Center to Tamms Correctional Center (“Tamms”) after an incident in which he and another prisoner were alleged to have non-fatally injured a guard. Although Mr. Fillmore pled guilty and received an additional sentence as a result, he also received indeterminate Disciplinary Segregation at that time. After spending approximately five years in Disciplinary Segregation, Mr. Fillmore was immediately transferred to Administrative Detention.
110. Despite an almost spotless disciplinary record since that alleged incident 17 years ago for which Mr. Fillmore has already been punished, he has continuously remained in extreme isolation with no hope of being placed back in the general population.
111. Mr. Fillmore was eventually transferred to Lawrence after Tamms was closed. Notwithstanding this closure, Mr. Fillmore describes the conditions in extreme isolation at Lawrence as worse than those at Tamms.
112. In extreme isolation at Lawrence, Mr. Fillmore is locked in a tiny, dirty cell for almost 24 hours a day. No larger than two or three steps long and one and a half to two steps wide, Mr. Fillmore’s cell barely gives him enough room to pace back and forth. His toilet, sink, and bed are all located within inches of one another. There is little to no access to natural light. A metal box covers the one and only window to his cell. A large amount of bird feces prevents Mr. Fillmore from opening his window and allowing for air circulation. The front of his cell is a solid steel door with a “chuck hole,” which is locked closed except when unlocked by
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correctional staff to serve food, and a small perforated slot made of Plexiglas approximately three inches wide and one foot long through which Mr. Fillmore can speak to correctional staff only when they come to his cell-front. The constant noise in his wing requires him to scream whenever he desires to communicate with his neighboring inmates.
113. Mr. Fillmore is currently housed on C-wing at Lawrence. C-wing also houses mentally ill inmates who are in “crisis cells” and under 10-, 15-, or 30-minute suicide watch. These inmates often throw feces, urine, and spoiled food or milk, causing the entire wing to have a putrid smell. As a result, Mr. Fillmore suffers from severe headaches, loss of appetite, and dizziness. The mentally ill inmates on the C-wing also constantly yell, scream, and bang on their cell doors. Often times, Mr. Fillmore is unable to sleep because of the relentless noise. He suffers from loss of sleep and concentration.
114. Mr. Fillmore leaves his cell on rare occasions: for meetings with his attorneys, an annual tuberculosis vaccination, and a weekly ten-minute shower. His shower is on a timer and he is not allowed to control the temperature of the water. When he is taken out of his cell, his hands are handcuffed and shackled to his waist. His feet are also shackled.
115. Unlike general population, Mr. Fillmore eats his daily meals in his cramped cell. His food is delivered to him through the “chuck hole” in the solid steel door at the front of his cell.
116. Mr. Fillmore’s visits and phone calls are also drastically curtailed as compared to general population. In Disciplinary Segregation, he is only allowed two “no contact” visits per month, which requires him to be handcuffed and shackled to the floor. He cannot physically touch his visitors and must converse with them behind a glass partition. While in Disciplinary Segregation, he is not allowed to make any phone calls. While in Administrative Detention, he
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is only allowed a maximum of one phone call per week for a maximum of thirty (30) minutes. This is in stark contrast to the unlimited phone calls for unlimited periods of time allowed in general population.
117. Mr. Fillmore is frequently denied the minimum five hours of exercise afforded to inmates in general population and typically is only allowed an hour or two of yard time each week. Whether in Disciplinary Segregation or Administrative Detention, Mr. Fillmore’s “yard” is drastically different than that of general population. It is a barren, single “dog cage” with a concrete floor, no exercise equipment, and no games or activities of any kind. It measures approximately four steps wide and 15 steps long. It is an empty space where Mr. Fillmore and the other inmates are forced to pace the short length of the single cage.
118. During his many years in extreme isolation, Mr. Fillmore has had absolutely no access to any of IDOC’s programming, including educational programs. In fact, Mr. Fillmore has been denied books, catalogs, newspapers, and other materials from the library. He has even been denied access to the law library. In addition, Mr. Fillmore has been denied his other personal property, including legal materials and gloves in winter, even while in Administrative Detention. His mail is frequently and consistently delayed by many weeks.
119. Mr. Fillmore experiences depression, anxiety, fatigue, and nausea as a result of his many years of extreme isolation. Despite his repeated requests, both oral and written, for mental health exams, screenings, and treatment, Mr. Fillmore has been denied access to mental health programs and services. IDOC staff has informed Mr. Fillmore that there are no mental health treatment protocols for inmates in long-term Disciplinary Segregation or Administrative Detention. Mr. Fillmore even witnessed an incident of another inmate in extreme isolation committing suicide.
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120. Furthermore, inmates in extreme isolation are routinely double-celled, often with mentally ill inmates. While at Lawrence, Mr. Fillmore was forced to have a cellmate for approximately three months. Having a cellmate caused Mr. Fillmore increased anxiety, panic attacks, and stress, essentially adding to and aggravating his mental health issues. He recently reported in a grievance that the double-celling of inmates in Administrative Detention threatens his mental health because he has spent so much time in extreme isolation and lacks the necessary social skills to be in a confined space with someone for long periods of time. Mr. Fillmore further reported that double-celling would cause irreparable harm to his mental state. Mr. Fillmore stated that “due to long-term isolation, I suffer from serious mental health issues which are not being treated due to prison officials’ deliberate indifference to my mental state.” IDOC did not conduct any screening or evaluation before Mr. Fillmore’s double-celling assignment and it was done without regard to each inmate’s physical and mental health.
121. There are no religious programs in extreme isolation and the chaplain does not visit inmates in extreme isolation. Mr. Fillmore has only seen the chaplain once at Lawrence in order to receive a copy of his kosher diet contract. Mr. Fillmore has requested religious materials from the chaplain, but did not receive them.
122. Mr. Fillmore has also suffered physically as a result of many years in extreme isolation. His concentration and memory have been affected. He also has suffered great weight loss, a loss of appetite, and a decrease in muscle mass. He states that “there’s nothing to do … [i]t’s just hopelessness in an empty cell, 24 hours a day.”
123. Mr. Fillmore has filed at least 25 grievances since he was placed in segregation. Many of those grievances seek relief from his continuous placement in extreme isolation, as well as the deplorable conditions of extreme isolation and lack of due process afforded to him. At
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least five of the grievances have been denied by the ARB, demonstrating that Mr. Fillmore exhausted his remedies by appealing the denials as far as he could. At least ten of Mr. Fillmore’s grievances that were properly and timely submitted never received a response from the ARB. Mr. Fillmore wrote a letter to the ARB on January 11, 2015, about the grievances that have not been answered. The ARB’s lack of response to those grievances has denied Mr. Fillmore the ability to exhaust them. Mr. Fillmore did all he could to appeal those grievances as far as he could despite the lack of response from the ARB.
124. Mr. Fillmore describes the process afforded to him throughout his incarceration as “sham hearings” and “useless.” He is not allowed to present evidence or call his own witnesses. He is not told why he is being held in extreme isolation, what allegations were made against him or how he can rejoin general population.
125. On July 27, 2007, Mr. Fillmore filed a grievance stating that the disciplinary report accusing him of having contraband was fabricated, that at the hearing his evidence was denied admittance, that the grievance officer did not review any evidence, and that his witnesses were not called—thus he was denied due process. On November 11, 2007, he received a response from the ARB that his grievance would be addressed without a hearing. The ARB confirmed the offenses and denied the grievance.
126. On June 12, 2013, Mr. Fillmore filed a grievance requesting that a disciplinary report, which resulted in more time in extreme isolation, be expunged, reheard by the committee, and exonerating evidence be reviewed. On June 10, 2014, Mr. Fillmore received a response from the ARB denying his grievance, finding no violation of due process and stating it was reasonably satisfied that Mr. Fillmore committed the offense in the report.
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127. On July 7, 2013, Mr. Fillmore filed a grievance about his transfer from Tamms to Pontiac on Administrative Detention status and without any review of his Administrative Detention and with no opportunity to defend against his continuous stay in Administrative Detention. On June 25, 2014, Mr. Fillmore received a response from the ARB denying his grievance and stating that the issue was addressed by the facility.
128. On November 12, 2013, Mr. Fillmore filed a grievance because he was transferred from Pontiac to Lawrence in Administrative Detention status. He received no information as to why he was being transferred and did not receive a hearing. Mr. Fillmore’s Administrative Detention status was also not being reviewed. His grievance requested that IDOC provide him with an Administrative Detention hearing and review of his Administrative Detention status, that he be provided a reason for transfer, a rule book, and that he be transferred out of Lawrence and released from Administrative Detention status, or at the very least given all Administrative Detention rights and privileges. On June 5, 2014, Mr. Fillmore’s counselor responded that the IDOC can assign offenders to any institution it wants and all privileges and amenities with its decision are an administrative decisions. Further, the counselor reported that Mr. Fillmore’s Administrative Detention status was reviewed, but he does not have a right to be present during that review. Mr. Fillmore received a response to this grievance from the ARB on December 8, 2014, denying his grievance and stating that his grievance was appropriately addressed by the facility.
129. In 2014, Mr. Fillmore was sentenced to yet another 365 days in extreme isolation, despite an almost spotless disciplinary record in recent years. The reason was for alleged gang activity based on a series of telephone calls he allegedly made and from letters he allegedly wrote. The IDOC claimed these messages and calls contained coded gang instructions. Despite
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Mr. Fillmore’s requests for the IDOC to review his phone records to show that he did not make the calls on the dates alleged, the IDOC has refused to produce that information. The IDOC has likewise refused to produce the letters allegedly containing coded gang messages. Mr. Fillmore pled not guilty to the charge of gang activity and without being afforded an opportunity to review any phone records or alleged letters, the IDOC sentenced him to one year in Disciplinary Segregation.
130. On November 3, 2015, Mr. Fillmore was notified that he would be placed back in Administrative Detention after the completion of his Disciplinary Segregation sentence. On December 1, 2015, IDOC claimed to conduct a “review” of Mr. Fillmore’s placement in Administrative Detention. Mr. Fillmore was not allowed to attend that review. He was not allowed to present any evidence or defend against his continued placement in extreme isolation. On December 7, 2015, Mr. Fillmore received a memorandum informing him that he would be placed in Phase I Administrative Detention indefinitely.
131. Mr. Fillmore remains in extreme isolation, with no idea or hope as to what he can do to be released or as to when he will be released back into the general population. As a result of this never-ending extreme isolation, Mr. Fillmore continues to suffer great mental and physical anguish.
Jerome Jones 132. Mr. Jones is 39 years old and is currently incarcerated at Menard. He was originally incarcerated in 1993 and is currently serving a 70-plus-year sentence for armed robbery, murder, home invasion, felon in possession of a weapon, and aggravated battery. Notably, Mr. Jones has had no disciplinary tickets since 2001 and has had committed no violations involving violence since 1996.
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133. On July 25, 2013, Mr. Jones was removed from general population at Stateville for reasons unknown to him at the time, and placed in Administrative Detention. Mr. Jones was subsequently transferred to Lawrence from Stateville in August 2013.
134. On August 1, 2013, Mr. Jones filed a grievance after being removed from general population at Stateville. In his grievance, Mr. Jones noted that he was not informed as to why he was placed in Administrative Detention and removed from general population. Rather, Mr. Jones was simply told by a gallery officer that he was going to Administrative Detention and to pack his property. He asked multiple IDOC staff why he was being placed in Administrative Detention, but they all responded that they didn’t know. The warden at Stateville even refused to notify Mr. Jones of the reason for his transfer. Instead, he responded to Mr. Jones’s inquiries, “You know why.”
135. On February 13, 2014, nearly seven months after his transfer, Marc Hodge, the Warden at Lawrence, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Jones that he was being moved to a lower phase of Administrative Detention based on a review of February 5, 2014. No further details were provided and Mr. Jones still didn’t know the reason for his initial placement in Administrative Detention. It was not until a couple of months later that Mr. Jones was informed during a face-to-face review that he was put in Administrative Detention due to his active involvement in a gang or STG. Specifically, Mr. Jones was accused of being a member of Gangster Disciples.
136. Mr. Jones denied any association with a gang during his time at Stateville or during his time in Lawrence, but has never been given a meaningful opportunity to review the evidence against him or present any evidence in his defense. Mr. Jones is currently not a member of any gangs or organizations which promote violence. He was previously a member of
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Gangster Disciples but formally “retired” in 2009, almost four years before he was removed from general population. Around this time, IDOC allowed Mr. Jones to hold a job position in the kitchen. He was also on the waiting list for other positions including working in the commissary, the clothing room, and the industries.
137. The August 1, 2013 grievance was finally addressed without a formal hearing by the Administrative Review Board on March 3, 2014. Without addressing why he was placed in extreme isolation or his decreased access to inmate privileges in extreme isolation, the Administrative Review Board merely ruled that he was permitted personal property “as approved by the CAO while in administrative detention.”
138. Despite being told that his placement in Administrative Detention was “nondisciplinary,” Mr. Jones has had almost all of the rights and privileges afforded to inmates in general population taken away. He was confined to a small, dark cell almost 24 hours per day. The toilet in his cell was on a timer and could only be flushed in 15-minute intervals. The window to his cell was covered by a steel shield. Further, Mr. Jones was completely isolated from general population and was only allowed to eat meals in his cell. Mr. Jones received his three daily meals at 3:00 a.m., 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. respectively. The portion sizes of these meals were much smaller than those served in general population.
139. Mr. Jones was only permitted “no contact,” pre-approved two-hour visits “as security measures allow” in Administrative Detention. During these visits, Mr. Jones was required to be shackled and chained to the floor. He could not physically touch his visitors and had to speak to them through a glass partition. Mr. Jones often told his family not to visit because he didn’t want to visit them under those degrading conditions. In contrast, general
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population is generally allowed around six visits per month. They can hug, touch, eat, and play games with their visitors. General population visits are unlimited in time.
140. Mr. Jones’s phone privileges were also greatly decreased. In Phase I Administrative Detention, Mr. Jones was only allowed one 30-minute phone call per month. In Phase III, Mr. Jones was allowed one 30-minute phone call per week. In contrast, general population is allowed unlimited phone calls for unlimited periods of time.
141. While in Administrative Detention, Mr. Jones did not receive his full six hours of exercise per week. He was allowed out in the “yard” approximately three times a week. Unlike general population, however, the “yard” in Administrative Detention is a fenced-in concrete slab. There was no access to a phone, basketball, or weights. There was also no track on which to run.
142. In 2014, Mr. Jones was forced to be double-celled. Mr. Jones initially refused to be placed in a cell with another inmate because he feared for his safety. After receiving a disciplinary ticket for his refusal, Mr. Jones complied with the double-cell assignment. As a result, his disciplinary ticket was expunged. He shared a tiny cell with another inmate for nearly a year. During that time, Mr. Jones experienced increased stress and feelings of anger. Mr. Jones did not consider his cellmate to be his peer and their conversations were not meaningful to him. The toilet being on a timer often created issues between Mr. Jones and his cellmate.
143. While Mr. Jones is Muslim and is an active member of the Moorish Science Temple of Americas, he was not allowed to attend religious services while in Administrative Detention. He was also denied religious materials. In general population, Mr. Jones attended religious services every Friday for two hours. He also promoted a peaceful, nonviolent culture in prison. He talked to other inmates about staying away from gangs and encouraged them to seek
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more positive outlets. Since he was isolated from the general population, Mr. Jones was unable to continue these efforts while in Administrative Detention.
144. Mr. Jones was denied access to both the general and law libraries during his time in Administrative Detention. For a period of time, his only access to the law library was to submit formal requests for the exact materials that he was looking for. In addition, Mr. Jones was occasionally denied access to his personal property, including his clothing, Walkman, and television.
145. Mr. Jones suffered from depression during his time in Administrative Detention due to his isolation from general population and lack of meaningful social contact, including participation in IDOC’s various programming and classes. Mr. Jones also suffered physically as a result of his isolation, increased stress, and lack of physical activity. He has lost weight and has developed allergies.
146. On October 20, 2015, Mr. Jones was informed that “[b]ased on an accelerated review conducted on 10/15/15, [he] will be released from Administrative Detention status.” No further explanation of IDOC’s decision to release him from over two years of extreme isolation was given.
147. On February 3, 2016, nearly four months after receiving an “accelerated review,” Mr. Jones was released from Administrative Detention and transferred to general population at Menard.
148. Despite an almost spotless disciplinary record for almost 20 years, Mr. Jones fears that he will again be arbitrarily placed in extreme isolation.
DeShawn Gardner 149. Mr. Gardner is 44 years old and is currently incarcerated and in extreme isolation
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at Lawrence. He is currently serving an 85-year sentence for murder. 150. Upon information and belief, Mr. Gardner is currently housed in Phase III
Administrative Detention at Lawrence. 151. From on or around January 27, 2006, to January 12, 2012, Mr. Gardner was
housed at the Tamms. He filed a grievance stating that his placement in Tamms was unjust and without cause. He appealed the final decision of the Chief of Operations approving his placement at Tamms.
152. Joseph Rose, Acting Chief Legal Counsel and designee for the Director, wrote to Mr. Gardner regarding his appeal on December 23, 2011. He concluded that Mr. Gardner should be placed outside of Tamms. From Tamms, he was eventually transferred to Menard.
153. On or around May 8, 2013, Mr. Gardner got into a fist fight with another inmate at Menard. He was sentenced to three months of Disciplinary Segregation, which he served at Pontiac.
154. On or around September 13, 2013, Mr. Gardner was transferred to Stateville. The facility was on level-1 lockdown when he arrived. The lockdown lasted until on or around October 2013.
155. On or around November 19, 2013, Mr. Gardner was placed in extreme isolation pending an investigation at Stateville. He did not receive a disciplinary ticket at that time. The investigative report only states “nature” as a reason for being placed in Investigative Status.
156. Mr. Gardner never received an interview regarding his placement in Investigative Status, which is required within 14 days of placement.
157. Mr. Gardner did not receive a meaningful opportunity to refute the “nature” charges made against him in the report. In fact, Mr. Gardner never learned the reasons for his
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placement in Investigative Status. 158. On or around December 17, 2013, Mr. Gardner was told by a correctional officer
that he was being transferred to Lawrence, 26 days after he received the investigative report. 159. That same day, Mr. Gardner was transferred to Lawrence and placed in
Administrative Detention without explanation. He has been in Administrative Detention ever since his transfer to Lawrence.
160. Mr. Gardner has progressed from Phase I to Phase III Administrative Detention twice while at Lawrence. Phases I and II have significantly less privileges, access to yard, and visitations than Phase III, which is described in further detail below.
161. Mr. Gardner was moved from Phase III Administrative Detention to Disciplinary Segregation for 30 days on or around September 28, 2014, for refusing to be double celled.
162. Mr. Gardner did not want to have a cellmate in the cramped and miserable conditions of Administrative Detention because it would only make conditions worse.
163. After being released from Disciplinary Segregation on or around October 28, 2014, Mr. Gardner was placed back in Phase I Administrative Detention .
164. While in Phase III Administrative Detention, Mr. Gardner has had no access to IDOC’s rehabilitative programs and has very little time outside of his cell. He has had no access to educational programs, the law library, or religious services. He feels extremely isolated in these conditions.
165. When Mr. Gardner leaves his cell, his hands must be handcuffed behind his back or to a chain on his waist with shackles on his feet. In general population, Mr. Gardner was able to move his limbs freely.
166. In general population, Mr. Gardner was permitted to freely use the phone, but
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now he is restricted to only three to four phone calls a month. 167. Mr. Gardner’s mail access is also restricted. While in general population, he was
able to obtain his mail without any delay or hassle from the correctional officers. 168. In his small, cramped cell, Mr. Gardner’s toilet flushes at 15-minute intervals,
meaning he is unable to dispose of feces in a timely manner. In general population, he had no restrictions on toilet flushing.
169. The cells in the Administrative Detention wing are nearby or across from cells housing mentally ill inmates. The mentally ill inmates constantly holler and scream and throw feces on the walls. The smell is nauseating and the feces attract more bugs.
170. Mr. Gardner misses having meaningful conversations and interactions with other inmates, which he enjoyed from the programming that was available to him in general population in other correctional facilities.
171. He is Hebrew Israelite and is unable to practice his religion with others. 172. While Mr. Gardner is permitted recreation time outside for two hours, three times a week it is in a cage with no activities. The cage reeks of urine and spit. 173. Mr. Gardner suffers great mental and emotional anguish because of his lack of access to rehabilitative programs and physical contact with his family members. He wants to make himself a better person, but is denied these programs and feels extremely isolated. 174. Mr. Gardner is only permitted to take meals in his cell. His meal portions are smaller than the portions in general population, which makes him feel less nourished and more isolated. 175. He is allowed four visitations a month, but they are behind glass and his hands are in chains. He is no longer able to hold his six grandchildren and misses hugging his family
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members. He feels cut off from loved ones. 176. Mr. Gardner’s cell is in deplorable condition. There is a constant stream of bugs
in his cell. He has to constantly monitor his cells for bugs in order to keep them from biting him or running into his food.
177. He does not want to be double-celled while in Administrative Detention because it would cause extreme mental suffering to be in such a small cell with another inmate without an opportunity to leave the cell. It would also cause more fights because they do not have an opportunity to cool down if a conflict arises.
178. On or around January 15, 2014, while at Lawrence, Mr. Gardner filed a grievance relating to his initial and continued placement in Administrative Detention at Stateville. Mr. Gardner specifically requested to be transferred back to general population.
179. On June 2, 2014, six to seven months after his initial placement in Administrative Detention, Mr. Gardner received a hearing. At the hearing, IDOC stated that he was placed in detention because of his role within the Black Disciples Security Threat Group. There was no opportunity to be present. Mr. Gardner has never been a part of the Black Disciples Security Threat Group.
180. The Administrative Review Board denied Mr. Gardner’s grievance relating to his placement in Administrative Detention on or around July 31, 2014. The denial states that he was “placed in Administration Detention . . . privileges/pp limited transfer to Law.”
181. While Mr. Gardner has been provided with follow-up reviews, the IDOC continues to keep him in Administrative Detention and has added unrelated new charges. The latest review from April 2016 states that he is active in the Black Disciples Security Threat Group within IDOC and has received disciplinary reports in the past, for which he has already
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served time in Disciplinary Segregation. These additional reasons were not listed on his first reviews in 2013.
Percell Dansberry 182. Mr. Dansberry is 48 years old and is currently incarcerated at Menard. He is currently serving a 65-year sentence for murder and armed robbery. 183. In or around August 2013, Mr. Dansberry was sentenced to three months of Disciplinary Segregation at Pontiac for his alleged membership in an STG. Specifically, he was accused of being a member of the Maniac Latin Disciples after IDOC allegedly spoke with a confidential informant who identified Mr. Dansberry as a member. Mr. Dansberry sent a grievance to the ARB contesting his alleged STG membership and IDOC’s failure to verify the reliability of the informant but the grievance disappeared. Of note, Mr. Dansberry has not been a member of the gang since on or around 2004. Mr. Dansberry served three months in Disciplinary Segregation without incident. 184. On December 4, 2013, Mr. Dansberry was transferred to Menard. Mr. Dansberry believed that he would be returning to general population. Immediately upon his arrival, however, he was taken to the segregation unit and placed in Phase I Administrative Detention. Mr. Dansberry remained in Administrative Detention, eventually progressing to Phase III, for almost two years, until November 2015. 185. Mr. Dansberry did not receive any notice prior to his placement in Administrative Detention. He was not given notice of the charges made against him or the factual basis giving rise to his placement. In fact, despite repeated requests, IDOC never provided Mr. Dansberry with a detailed reason for his continued placement in Administrative Detention.
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186. He also never received a meaningful opportunity to refute the charges against him. Even when an informal hearing was granted in April 2014, almost 5 months after his initial placement, it was inadequate because IDOC continued to withhold the reason(s) for his continued placement in Administrative Detention. After the hearing, Mr. Dansberry received a memorandum from IDOC merely stating that it was keeping him in Administrative Detention. It did not contain any further details or reasons for his continued placement.
187. While in Phase I, Mr. Dansberry was treated the same as if he were still in Disciplinary Segregation. He even wore the same jumpsuit. He was only allowed out of his cell to visit a small, barren “yard” once per week for five hours. The “yard” consisted of a fenced in cage with a concrete ground. During his time in Phases II and III, Mr. Dansberry was only allowed yard twice a week for two-and-a-half hours.
188. Mr. Dansberry’s cell was dark, cramped, and unsanitary. He was housed behind a solid steel door with only a chuck hole for food and a small window so the guards could count him during rounds. Most of the cells in the segregation unit had metal boxes covering the windows. Mr. Dansberry’s window faced the side of the prison and he could only see the brick of the prison wall.
189. While in Administrative Detention, Mr. Dansberry was only provided one small cup of watered-down disinfectant to clean his cell. He was not given any other cleaning supplies. He often saw bugs, cockroaches, and mice in his cell. The mice were so bad that many of the inmates in Administrative Detention, including Mr. Dansberry, were forced to plug the bottom of their cell doors in an attempt to block the mice from coming into the cells.
190. The worn-down state of the window in his cell forced Mr. Dansberry to stuff tissue in the cracks in an effort to prevent drafts from coming into his cell during winter. In the
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summer, his cell was very hot and there was very little air circulation. At one point, his cell became so hot that IDOC was forced to open up the chuck hole to try to circulate the air. Mr. Dansberry described his cell as a “hot air coffin.”
191. Additionally, the heat in his cell didn’t work properly. In the winter, it was so cold in his cell that he frequently had to wear his coat in order to stay warm. At one point, IDOC even passed out plastic to cover the windows. Other times it was so cold that ice accumulated around the inside of his window. At times, there was no hot water in his cell.
192. The food portions given to Mr. Dansberry during his time in Administrative Detention were miniscule. Mr. Dansberry described them as “portions for babies.” He was given potatoes for almost every meal. The food had no seasoning and was flavorless. The vegetables that he received were often overcooked and the rice undercooked.
193. His visits in Administrative Detention were extremely limited in amount, duration, and quality. He was allowed only two 1-hour visits per month in Phase I, three 2-hour visits per month in Phase II, and five 2-hour visits per month in Phase III. All of his visits were “no contact.” In contrast, inmates in general population at Menard are allowed contact visits for unlimited amounts of time. During these visits, general population inmates can use the vending machines and eat with their visitors.
194. Mr. Dansberry was only permitted one 30-minute phone call per week. This is in comparison to the unlimited number of calls permitted in general population.
195. In addition, during Phase I, Mr. Dansberry lost his audio-visual privileges. He had to wait 60 days before his television and Walkman were returned to him.
196. While in Disciplinary Segregation and Administrative Detention, Mr. Dansberry could not participate in any educational opportunities, including the G.E.D. program. He also
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was not allowed to participate in any of IDOC’s programming, including anger management programs, parenting classes, and communal church services. Access to his legal box was also restricted to once per month. His mail was regularly delayed or lost.
197. A few weeks after his placement in Administrative Detention Mr. Dansberry was assigned a cellmate. At first he refused this assignment because he didn’t want to be isolated in a cage with someone else for almost 24 hours a day. He eventually accepted a cellmate due to the correctional officers’ scare tactics. Being double-celled caused Mr. Dansberry a great amount of stress. He even got into a few altercations with his cellmate, but he did not make a record of it for fear of further disciplinary retaliation.
198. Overall, Mr. Dansberry has spent over ten years in extreme isolation while at Tamms, Pontiac, and Menard. He has suffered both mentally and physically as a result of his time in extreme isolation. Specifically, Mr. Dansberry continues to suffer from memory loss, anger, rage, paranoia and anxiety. He feels as though he has been “scarred” from his experience in extreme isolation. In fact, the conditions that he was forced to endure were so dire that Mr. Dansberry participated in two hunger strikes.
199. During the hunger strikes, IDOC ransacked Mr. Dansberry’s cell and shook him down several times. IDOC also wrote him a ticket for unauthorized group activity. He didn’t get any yard time and IDOC took his personal property including his personal food, coffee, and other items.
200. On January 15, 2014, and April 14, 2014, Mr. Dansberry submitted grievances complaining of his lack of due process and the deplorable conditions that he suffered during Administrative Detention including, but not limited to, the lack of notice provided to inmates placed in Administrative Detention, the lack of reasonable periodic review of continued
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placement in Administrative Detention, the lack of audio-visual privileges, the lack of educational and work programs, unsanitary cell conditions, small food portions, the lack of hot water, and double-celling.
201. On September 9, 2014, the Administrative Review Board denied both of Mr. Dansberry’s grievances. In its response, it stated that “policies and procedures are in place in accordance to [sic] IDOC Administrative Directives.”
Risk of Ongoing Harm to Named Plaintiffs and the Class 202. The Plaintiffs and class members are incarcerated in Illinois prison facilities governed by uniform disciplinary policies and customs. Incarcerated 24 hours a day, Plaintiffs and class members are in nonstop contact with correctional officers charged with broad discretion to enforce a list of approximately 50 vague internal prison disciplinary regulations, the majority of which can be classified as relatively minor offenses. Plaintiffs and class members may be charged with an infraction, convicted, and sentenced to extreme isolation for any reason, or for no legitimate reason at all. 203. As a matter of policy and custom, extraordinarily long and severely disproportionate extreme isolation sentences are often imposed on mere misunderstandings between prisoners and correctional officers or for good-faith mistakes in complying with one of IDOC’s numerous regulations. Moreover, prisoners can be, and are, sentenced to extreme isolation for mere hesitation in immediately complying with a correctional officer’s order—a risk particularly significant for prisoners with mental health diagnoses, which make it more difficult to comply with correctional officers’ demands instantaneously. Since IDOC’s policies and customs permit the contested testimony of a single correctional officer to be sufficient evidence of a disciplinary conviction, prisoners are often at risk of long-term segregated confinement for doing nothing culpable at all. Once a prisoner is accused by a correctional officer of committing
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a disciplinary infraction, it is a near certainty that the prisoner will be convicted, and it is more likely than not that extreme isolation will be imposed as punishment.
204. Moreover, IDOC’s policies and customs advocate the imposition of extreme isolation sanctions when the prisoner’s disciplinary hearing includes prior misbehavior reports and extreme isolation sentences. Thus, prisoners who have previously spent time in extreme isolation—which constitutes an astounding percentage—are at particular risk of being subjected to further extreme isolation sentences, which are often entirely disproportionate to the underlying misbehavior.
205. Finally, every person in an IDOC prison is at risk of being placed in long-term extreme isolation without being charged with any misconduct at all under either Investigative Status or Administrative Detention status, neither of which require a formal charge or a meaningful hearing.
206. Extreme isolation causes many prisoners to experience serious psychological and neurological harms which result in, among other things, loss of impulse control, depersonalization, and rage. These adverse effects may cause the prisoner to engage in atypical acts that IDOC staff will respond to with additional extreme isolation sanctions. Extreme isolation also causes severe depression and lethargy in many prisoners—effects which may subject prisoners to additional extreme isolation sanctions for failing to promptly obey orders.
207. The substantial and real risk of future extreme isolation sentences for all incarcerated individuals as a result of IDOC’s policies and customs is exemplified by the unending and continuous extreme isolation of Mr. Fillmore with no apparent end or meaningful review of his status. Further, Mr. Fillmore may face additional time in extreme isolation that he
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may be forced to withstand at an officer’s discretion for any future misbehavior, no matter how minor.
208. The IDOC policies and customs outlined in this complaint are uniformly applicable to Plaintiffs and the class, cause ongoing and systemic violations of clearly established rights afforded under the United States Constitution, and put all current and future prisoners at risk of future unjustified extreme isolation and constitutional rights violations.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 209. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of all current and future prisoners under the jurisdiction of IDOC to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief. All class members face a substantial risk of receiving arbitrary, disproportionate, harmful, and unjustified extreme isolation sentences as a result of IDOC’s policies and customs in violation of the United States Constitution. 210. All four of Rule 23(a)’s requirements are satisfied:
a. Numerosity: Joinder of all class members is impracticable because of the size of the class. There are approximately 9,700 individuals held in IDOC maximum security facilities—with approximately 1,300 confined in extreme isolation at any given time—and all face a substantial risk of being subject to unconstitutional extreme isolation as a result of Defendant’s system-wide policies and customs. There are almost 40,000 other prisoners housed in minimum and medium security prisons, any one of which could be charged with a disciplinary infraction at any time, or could be placed in Temporary Confinement, Investigative Status, or Administrative Detention at any time with no charge at all.
b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to all class members, including, but not limited to, whether Defendant’s policies and procedures have
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resulted in and continue to result in the use of extreme isolation in violation of the class members’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
c. Typicality: The claims of the class representatives are typical of those of the class members. All Plaintiffs—class representatives and class members—are individuals who have been or are currently transferred from general prison population into extreme isolation. All face substantial risk of being placed in extreme isolation in violation of their constitutional rights as a result of the challenged policies and procedures.
d. Adequacy of Representation: The class representatives and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. The named Plaintiffs are committed to obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief, which will benefit themselves and the class by abating the risk of constitutional harm caused by Defendant’s current policies and customs, and their interests in this matter are not antagonistic to those of other class members. Class counsel has many years of experience with class action and civil rights litigation.
211. A class seeking class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief is properly certified under Federal Rule of Procedure 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted, and refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Injunctive Relief for the Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members Against Defendant Acting Director Baldwin for Violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 212. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. As a result of the foregoing policies and customs authorized and maintained by Defendant Baldwin, the named Plaintiffs and class members have suffered and continue to suffer extreme isolation sentences imposed in violation
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of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ protection against cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, the extremely cramped, ancient, airless, filthy cells in which prisoners in extreme isolation are housed deprive Plaintiffs and the class of basic human needs, and inflict needless mental and physical injuries. Defendant has violated prisoners’ basic human dignity and their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Deprivation of Basic Human Needs 213. Specifically, Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs and the class of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. The cumulative effects of extreme isolation in tiny cages, without meaningful access to human contact and physical activity, constitute a serious deprivation of basic human needs. Extreme prolonged deprivation of these basic needs is currently imposing and will continue to impose serious psychological and physical pain and suffering and permanent psychological and physical injury on Plaintiffs and on the class they represent. Defendant has been deliberately indifferent to this pain and suffering caused by extreme isolation that they inflict on Plaintiffs and the class. Plaintiffs and members of the putative class therefore seek declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic constitutional violations. Disproportionate Punishment 214. Moreover, as a result of the foregoing policies and customs authorized and maintained by the Defendant, the named Plaintiffs and class members have suffered punishment disproportionate to any infraction that they may have committed. No legitimate security or other penological interest justifies punishment of extreme isolation for lengthy or indefinite periods of time that have no reasonable relationship to the infraction committed. Such disproportionate
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sentencing violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs and members of the putative class therefore seek declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic constitutional violations.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members Against Defendant Acting Director Baldwin for Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 215. As a result of the foregoing policies and customs authorized and maintained by Defendant Baldwin, the named Plaintiffs and class members have suffered extreme isolation, a significant and atypical hardship, without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class therefore seek declaratory and injunctive relief remedying these ongoing and systemic constitutional violations. 216. The ordinary incidents of prison life include multiple opportunities for meaningful social interactions with other people, multiple sensory inputs from a wide variety of sources, a large number of social interactions with prisoners and staff, and the chance to pursue life goals. Specifically, the ordinary incidents of prison life include access to educational programs, vocational training, and religious services; regular opportunities for recreation, including both indoor and outdoor facilities, with large groups of prisoners, recreation equipment such as weights, basketballs, handball courts, etc.; several hours a day of congregate activities including access to a dayroom for recreation, and to the dining hall for meals; access to telephones most days; and an opportunity for contact visits with friends and family. 217. Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs and class members of a liberty interest without due process of law by denying them meaningful notice of the potential sentencing ranges and what types of offenses may result in more or less severe classifications and punishments.
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Plaintiffs are also being denied adequate and meaningful hearings to adjudicate and determine
their guilt as well as subsequent reviews of their long-term and often indefinite extreme isolation.
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: a. Declare that Defendant’s acts and omissions violated Plaintiffs’ and the class
members’ rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and that these acts and omissions continue to cause ongoing violations of these rights;
b. Award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
c. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and other appropriate relief,
requiring Defendant Acting Director Baldwin, as well as his officers, agents, servants,
employees, and any other person who acted in concert or who participated in the imposition and
enforcement of extreme isolation at IDOC facilities, to end the ongoing constitutional violations
described above by implementing and conforming with the below standards, the language of
which is modeled after the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (Third Edition), Treatment of
Prisoners (2010):
Standard 23-2.6 Rationales for Segregated Housing: a) Correctional authorities shall not place prisoners in segregated housing except for reasons relating to: discipline, security, ongoing investigation of misconduct or crime, protection from harm, medical care, or mental health care. Segregated housing shall be for the briefest term and under the least restrictive conditions practicable and consistent with the rationale for placement and with the progress achieved by the prisoner. Segregation for health care needs shall be in a location separate from disciplinary and long-term segregated housing. Policies relating to segregation for whatever reason shall take account of the special developmental needs of prisoners under the age of eighteen. b) If necessary for an investigation or the reasonable needs of law enforcement or prosecuting authorities, correctional authorities shall be permitted to confine a prisoner under investigation for possible criminal violations in segregated housing for a period no more than 30 days. Standard 23-2.7 Rationales for Long-term Segregated Housing:
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a) Correctional authorities shall use long-term segregated housing

sparingly and shall not place or retain prisoners in such housing except for

reasons relating to:

i.

discipline after a finding that the prisoner has committed a very

severe disciplinary infraction, in which safety or security was seriously

threatened;

ii.

a credible continuing and serious threat to the security of others or

to the prisoner’s own safety; or

iii.

prevention of airborne contagion.

b) Correctional authorities shall not place a prisoner in long-term

segregated housing based on the security risk the prisoner poses to others unless

less restrictive alternatives are unsuitable in light of a continuing and serious

threat to the security of the facility, staff, other prisoners, or the public as a result

of the prisoner’s:

i.

history of serious violent behavior in correctional facilities;

ii.

acts such as escapes or attempted escapes from secure

correctional settings;

iii.

acts or threats of violence likely to destabilize the institutional

environment to such a degree that the order and security of the facility is

threatened;

iv.

membership in a security threat group accompanied by a finding

based on specific and reliable information that the prisoner either has engaged in

dangerous or threatening behavior directed by the group or directs the dangerous

or threatening behavior of others; or

v.

incitement or threats to incite group disturbances in a correctional

facility.

Standard 23-2.8 Segregated Housing and Mental Health:

a) No prisoner diagnosed with serious mental illness shall be placed

in long-term segregated housing.

b) No prisoner shall be placed in segregated housing for more than 1

day without a mental health screening, conducted in person by a qualified mental

health professional, and a prompt comprehensive mental health assessment if

clinically indicated. If the assessment indicates the presence of a serious mental

illness, or a history of serious mental illness and depression in segregated

settings, the prisoner shall be placed in an environment where appropriate

treatment can occur. Any prisoner in segregated housing who develops serious

mental illness shall be placed in an environment where appropriate treatment can

occur.

c) The mental health of prisoners in long-term segregated housing

shall be monitored as follows:

i.

Daily, correctional staff shall maintain a log documenting

prisoners’ behavior.

ii.

Several times each week, a qualified mental health

professional shall observe each segregated housing unit, speaking to unit staff,

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reviewing the prisoner log, and observing and talking with prisoners who are

receiving mental health treatment.

iii.

Weekly, a qualified mental health professional shall

observe and seek to talk with each prisoner.

iv.

Monthly, and more frequently if clinically indicated, a

qualified mental health professional shall see and treat each prisoner who is

receiving mental health treatment. Absent an individualized finding that security

would be compromised, such treatment shall take place out of cell, in a setting in

which security staff cannot overhear the conversation.

v.

At least every 90 days, a qualified mental health

professional shall perform a comprehensive mental health assessment of each

prisoner in segregated housing unless a qualified mental health professional

deems such assessment unnecessary in light of observations made pursuant to

subdivisions (ii)-(iv).

Standard 23-2.9 Procedures for Placement and Retention in Long-term Segregated Housing:

a) A prisoner shall be placed or retained in long-term segregated

housing only after an individualized determination, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the substantive prerequisites set out in Standards 23-2.7 and 23-5.5

for such placement are met. In addition, if long-term segregation is being

considered either because the prisoner poses a credible continuing and serious

threat to the security of others or to the prisoner’s own safety, the prisoner shall

be afforded, at a minimum, the following procedural protections:

i.

timely, written, and effective notice that such a placement

is being considered, the facts upon which consideration is based, and the

prisoner’s rights under this Standard;

ii.

decision-making by a specialized classification committee

that includes a qualified mental health care professional;

iii.

a hearing at which the prisoner may be heard in person

and, absent an individualized determination of good cause, has a reasonable

opportunity to present available witnesses and information;

iv.

absent an individualized determination of good cause,

opportunity for the prisoner to confront and cross-examine any witnesses or, if

good cause to limit such confrontation is found, to propound questions to be

relayed to the witnesses;

v.

an interpreter, if necessary for the prisoner to understand

or participate in the proceedings;

vi.

if the classification committee determines that a prisoner is

unable to prepare and present evidence and arguments effectively on his or his

own behalf, counsel or some other appropriate advocate for the prisoner;

vii.

an independent determination by the classification

committee of the reliability and credibility of confidential informants if material

allowing such determination is available to the correctional agency;

viii.

a written statement setting forth the evidence relied on and

the reasons for placement; and

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ix.

prompt review of the classification committee’s decision

by correctional administrators.

b) Within 30 days of a prisoner’s placement in long-term segregated

housing based on a finding that the prisoner presents a continuing and serious

threat to the security of others, correctional authorities shall develop an

individualized plan for the prisoner. The plan shall include an assessment of the

prisoner’s needs, a strategy for correctional authorities to assist the prisoner in

meeting those needs, and a statement of the expectations for the prisoner to

progress toward fewer restrictions and lower levels of custody based on the

prisoner’s behavior. Correctional authorities shall provide the plan or a summary

of it to the prisoner, and explain it, so that the prisoner can understand such

expectations.

c) At intervals not to exceed 30 days, correctional authorities shall

conduct and document an evaluation of each prisoner’s progress under the

individualized plan required by subdivision (b) of this Standard. The evaluation

shall also consider the state of the prisoner’s mental health; address the extent to

which the individual’s behavior, measured against the plan, justifies the need to

maintain, increase, or decrease the level of controls and restrictions in place at

the time of the evaluation; and recommend a full classification review as

described in subdivision (d) of this Standard when appropriate.

d) At intervals not to exceed 90 days, a full classification review

involving a meeting of the prisoner and the specialized classification committee

shall occur to determine whether the prisoner’s progress toward compliance with

the individual plan required by subdivision (b) of this Standard or other

circumstances warrant a reduction of restrictions, increased programming, or a

return to a lower level of custody. If a prisoner has met the terms of the

individual plan, there shall be a presumption in favor of releasing the prisoner

from segregated housing. A decision to retain a prisoner in segregated housing

following consideration by the classification review committee shall be reviewed

by a correctional administrator, and approved, rejected, or modified as

appropriate.

e) Consistent with such confidentiality as is required to prevent a

significant risk of harm to other persons, a prisoner being evaluated for

placement in long-term segregated housing for any reason shall be permitted

reasonable access to materials considered at both the initial and the periodic

reviews, and shall be allowed to meet with and submit written statements to

persons reviewing the prisoner’s classification.

f) Correctional officials shall implement a system to facilitate the

return to lower levels of custody of prisoners housed in long-term segregated

housing. Except in compelling circumstances, a prisoner serving a sentence who

would otherwise be released directly to the community from long-term

segregated housing shall be placed in a less restrictive setting for the final

months of confinement.

Standard 23-3.8 Segregated Housing:

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a) Correctional authorities shall be permitted to physically separate prisoners

in segregated housing from other prisoners but shall not deprive them of those

items or services necessary for the maintenance of psychological and physical

wellbeing.

b) Conditions of extreme isolation shall not be allowed regardless of the

reasons for a prisoner’s separation from the general population. Conditions of

extreme isolation generally include a combination of sensory deprivation, lack of

contact with other persons, enforced idleness, minimal out-of-cell time, and lack

of outdoor recreation.

c) All prisoners placed in segregated housing shall be provided with

meaningful forms of mental, physical, and social stimulation. Depending upon

individual assessments of risks, needs, and the reasons for placement in the

segregated setting, those forms of stimulation shall include:

i.

in-cell programming, which shall be developed for prisoners who

are not permitted to leave their cells;

ii.

additional out-of-cell time, taking into account the size of the

prisoner’s cell and the length of time the prisoner has been housed in this

setting;

iii.

opportunities to exercise in the presence of other prisoners,

although, if necessary, separated by security barriers;

iv.

daily face-to-face interaction with both uniformed and civilian

staff; and

v.

access to radio or television for programming or mental

stimulation, although such access shall not substitute for human contact

described in subdivisions (i) to (iv).

d) Prisoners placed in segregated housing for reasons other than discipline

shall be allowed as much out-of-cell time and programming participation as

practicable, consistent with security.

e) No cell used to house prisoners in segregated housing shall be smaller than

80 square feet, and cells shall be designed to permit prisoners assigned to them to

converse with and be observed by staff. Physical features that facilitate suicide

attempts shall be eliminated in all segregation cells. Except if required for security

or safety reasons for a particular prisoner, segregation cells shall be equipped in

compliance with Standard 23-3.3(b).

f) Correctional staff shall monitor and assess any health or safety concerns

related to the refusal of a prisoner in segregated housing to eat or drink, or to

participate in programming, recreation, or out-of-cell activity.

DATED: June 2, 2016

By: /s/ Kimball R. Anderson

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Counsel for Plaintiffs Kimball R. Anderson Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601 312-558-5600 (tel) 312-558-5700 (fax) kanderson@winston.com Alan S. Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Road Chicago, IL 60640 773-769-1411 (tel) 773-769-2224 (fax) alan@uplcchicago.org OF COUNSEL: Alyssa E. Ramirez Joanna F. Cornwell Winston & Strawn LLP 35 W. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601 312-558-5600 (tel) 312-558-5700 (fax) aramirez@winston.com jcornwell@winston.com
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 Case 3:16-cv-00600-SCW Document 71 Filed 03/10/17 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #336

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HENRY DAVIS, DOUGLAS COLEMAN,

AARON FILLMORE, JEROME JONES, )

DESHAWN GARDNER, and PERCELL )

DANSBERRY,

)

) Case No. 16-cv-600-SCW

Plaintiff,

)

)

vs.

)

)

JOHN BALDWIN,

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge: INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2016, Plaintiffs Henry Davis, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Jerome Jones, Deshawn Gardner, and Percell Dansberry filed a class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement resulting from what they characterize as “extreme isolation” during their times in extended segregation and for due process violations associated with their placement in segregation. This matter is before the Court on Defendant John Baldwin’s motion to dismiss (Docs. 22 and 23). Plaintiffs have filed a response (Doc. 31) in opposition to the motion. Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 36). Based on the following, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Case 3:16-cv-00600-SCW Document 71 Filed 03/10/17 Page 2 of 18 Page ID #337
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed their purported class action complaint on June 2, 2016 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for conditions of confinement, including deprivation of basic human needs and disproportionate punishment by placement in “extreme isolation” sentences in segregation. Plaintiffs also allege that their placement in segregation violated the due process clause. The five individual purported class representatives are all currently serving time in IDOC prisons. Some of the five are currently in segregation while the others were previously in segregation and, as Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges, are at risk of being placed back in segregation given their backgrounds and reasons for being placed in segregation initially. Plaintiff Henry Davis is currently serving time in segregation at Lawrence Correctional Center (Doc. 1, p. 5). Davis was previously sentenced to six months disciplinary segregation for alleged gang leadership (that sentence was later expunged) and, at the time of the filing of the complaint, was serving an additional six month sentence for gang leadership (Id. at p. 5-6). Defendant notes in his motion that Davis’ segregation term was set to end on September 11, 2016. Davis alleges that he has been in some form of “extreme isolation” on various occasions since 2011 (Id. at p. 23-25) and during his time in disciplinary segregation he was subject to limited, no contact visits and had limitations placed on his phone calls, delays with his mail, interruption of his GED program, was unable to participate in religious activities and courses, and was only provided access to a law library that contained torn and tattered books and no inmate
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helpers (Id. at p. 25). While in disciplinary segregation he was subjected to smaller food portions, cells with bugs and freezing cold temperatures, and an inability to visit the commissary (Id. at p. 26). He spends 23 to 24 hours a day in his cell and for the majority of the time he has been single celled. He is unable to communicate with individuals outside of the cell and the addition of an air-blowing machine makes any communication difficult (Id.). He is only allowed access to a yard for two hours each week, usually on the same day (Id.).
Plaintiff Douglas Coleman is currently housed in “X house” in Stateville Correctional Center and has been subject to approximately fourteen months of disciplinary segregation (Doc. 1, p. 26-27). While in various disciplinary segregations, his cells were filthy, sometimes infected with bugs and rodents, he had little air circulation, and his food portions were smaller (Id. at p. 27-28). He was only permitted yard privileges once a week (Id. at p. 27). In the winter months, the cells were extremely cold and his cell in F-House segregation at Stateville had a broken window pane, allowing additional cold air into his cell (Id. at p. 28). Coleman had little communication with other inmates, was confined for twenty-four hours a day, and at one point was housed with a mentally ill inmate (Id. at p. 28-29). While in F-House, Plaintiff, who suffered from a stroke and is confined to a wheelchair, was denied use of his wheelchair (Id. at p. 29). Plaintiff had limited yard privileges and was unable to access the yard many times due to being denied a wheelchair, was not allowed phone calls, and had little access to programs including religious and psychological services (Id.
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Case 3:16-cv-00600-SCW Document 71 Filed 03/10/17 Page 4 of 18 Page ID #339
at p. 30). He was subject to no contact visits (Id.). Plaintiff Aaron Fillmore is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center
and has been in various forms of segregation for the past seventeen years (Doc. 1, p. 38). Plaintiff Fillmore originally spent approximately five years in disciplinary segregation at Tamms Correctional Center (Id. at p. 39). When Tamms closed, Plaintiff was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center, where he remains in isolation almost twenty-four hours a day (Id.). Plaintiff has no access to natural light, his one window is covered by a metal box, and a large amount of bird feces is directly outside the window preventing him from opening the window to allow air circulation (Id.). The constant noise outside the cell makes it difficult to communicate with any other inmates on the wing (Id. at p. 40). Plaintiff rarely leaves his cell, only for meetings with his attorneys, an annual tuberculosis vaccination, and a weekly ten-minute shower (Id.). Plaintiff only is allowed two no contact visits a month and in disciplinary segregation he is not allowed to make phone calls (Id.). In administrative segregation he is only allowed one, thirty-minute phone call per week (Id. at p. 40-41). Fillmore alleges that he is only allowed one or two hours of yard each week and the yard consists of a barren concrete floor with no equipment, games, or activities (Id. at p. 41). He has no access to programs at the prison, including education programs, and he has been denied access to reading materials from the library as well as access to his personal property (Id.). Fillmore alleges that he is not allowed to present evidence or call witnesses when he is charged with disciplinary actions which cause him to be placed in segregation and that
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he is subject to “sham hearings” (Id. at p. 43). Plaintiff Jerome Jones is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center.
While at Stateville and Lawrence Correctional Centers in 2013 through 2015, Plaintiff was placed in administrative detention for having involvement in a gang or STG (Doc. 1, p. 46). Although he was told the segregation was for “non-disciplinary” purposes, he had many rights and privileges that are afforded general population inmates taken away from him (Id. at p. 47). He was confined to a dark cell for almost 24 hours a day, his toilet was on a timer, and he was completely isolated from general population, including being served meals in his cell (Id.). The portion size of his meals was smaller than those served in general population (Id.). Jones only was permitted no contact two-hours visits while in administrative detention and his phone privileges were limited (Id. at p. 47-48). Plaintiff received access to the yard only three times a week and “yard” consisted of a concrete slab with no access to weights, phone, or other materials and activities (Id. at p. 48). He shared his small cell with a second inmate for almost a year (Id.). He was not allowed to attend religious services, was denied religious materials, denied access to the general and law libraries, and denied access to his personal property (Id. at p. 48-49). Jones was released from administrative detention on February 3, 2016 but fears being arbitrarily placed back in isolation (Id. at p. 49).
Plaintiff DeShawn Gardner is currently housed in administration detention at Lawrence Correctional Center (Doc. 1, p. 49-50). He was initially housed at Tamms Correctional Center from 2006 to 2012 and was transferred to Menard Correctional
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Case 3:16-cv-00600-SCW Document 71 Filed 03/10/17 Page 6 of 18 Page ID #341
Center in 2012 (Id. at p. 50). Plaintiff, while at Stateville Correctional Center, was placed in investigative status on November 19, 2013 and did not receive a disciplinary ticket or told the reason for his placement in investigation (Id.). He was transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center twenty-six days later and placed in administrative detention (Id. at p. 51). Plaintiff remains in administrative detention, although he has progressed from Phase I to Phase III allowing him additional privileges than what are allowed in Phases I and II (Id. at p. 51). In Phase III Plaintiff has no access to rehabilitative programs, educational programs, the law library, or religious services (Id.). He has restricted phone privileges and his mail access is delayed (Id. at p. 51-52). He is housed in a small cell, with toilets that are on a timer, and housed near the mentally ill wing where inmates scream and throw feces (Id. at p. 52). He has limited communications with inmates outside of his cell (Id.). He is limited to yard privileges which consist of two hour, three times a week access to a cage that contains no activities (Id.). His meal portions are smaller than general population and he is only allowed four no contact visits a month (Id.).
Plaintiff Percell Dansberry is currently housed at Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 1, p. 54). In August 2013, Dansberry was sentenced to three months in disciplinary segregation while at Pontiac Correctional Center for membership in an STG. He was transferred to Menard Correctional Center on December 4, 2013 and placed in administrative detention where he remained for two years until November 2015 (Id.). Dansberry alleges that he did not receive notice prior to his placement in administrative
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Case 3:16-cv-00600-SCW Document 71 Filed 03/10/17 Page 7 of 18 Page ID #342
detention or notice of any charges against him (Id.). He alleges that he has never been provided a reason for his placement in administrative detention during the two years he was housed there (Id.). He was granted an informal hearing in April 2014 but was never given a reason for his continued placement; he was only told he was being kept in administrative detention (Id. at p. 54-55). While in administrative segregation, he was treated the same as disciplinary segregation inmates (Id. at p. 55). He was only given access to a barren yard once per week for five hours (Id.). In Phase II and III he was only allowed access to the yard twice a week (Id.). Most of the cells had metal boxes covering the windows and the doors were solid steel with only a chuck hole and small window (Id.). He was only given one small cup of watered-down disinfectant to clean his cell and the cell was infested with bugs and rodents (Id.). The cell was drafty in winter and in the summer was very hot and had little air circulation (Id. at p. 55-56). The food portions were smaller than general population (Id. at p. 56). His visits were limited; he was only allowed two 1-hour visits per month in Phase I, three 2-hour visits in Phase II, and five 2-hour visits in Phase III, all of which were no contact visits (Id.). He was permitted only one 30-minute phone call per week (Id.). In Phase I, Plaintiff also lost his audio-visual privileges and he could not participate in any educational and religious opportunities or other IDOC programming during his entire stay in administrative detention (Id. at p. 56-57).
Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant initially argued that
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the claims filed by Coleman, Fillmore, and Jones were barred by the doctrine of res judicata but has since withdrawn that argument (See Doc. 36). Defendant, however, continues to argue that Plaintiffs have failed to statement a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and due process. Defendant also argues that the claims of Coleman, Jones, and Dansberry are moot as they are not currently in disciplinary segregation or administrative detention and that the there is no jurisdiction to award injunctive relief as they are not currently confined to any type of segregation or detention. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs Davis, Fillmore, and Gardener possess no liberty interest in avoiding placement in administrative detention. In the alternative, Defendant seeks to sever the Plaintiffs’ claims.
LEGAL STANDARDS Defendant brings his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint, not the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In assessing a complaint or count under Rule 12(b)(6), the District Court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PriceWaterhouseCooper, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2007); Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006); Corcoran v. Chicago Park Dist., 875 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1989). Courts must determine whether the factual allegations in a complaint plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)).
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Dismissal is warranted “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.” Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2004)). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations of a pro se complaint, which this case was originally filed as, are to be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1994).
ANALYSIS A. Conditions of Confinement
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege that their placement in segregation or detention deprives them of basic human needs or that Baldwin was aware of the issues alleged by Plaintiffs.
The Eighth Amendment requires a minimum standard for treatment of prisoners including that prisoners are provided with humane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)). Inmates must be provided with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. (citations omitted). In order to succeed on a claim for inhumane conditions of confinement, an inmate must establish: (1) that he was housed under conditions that were “‘sufficiently serious’ so
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that ‘a [jail] official’s act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’”, and (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk. See Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). In order to prove deliberate indifferent, the plaintiff must show that the officials actually knew of the condition but refused to take reasonable steps to resolve it. Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773; Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 775.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged that being subject to “extreme isolation” deprived them of their basic needs and cites to Wilkinson v. Austin, 545. U.S. 209, 214, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) to support his position. Defendant notes that the Supreme Court in Wilkinson found that inmates in Ohio’s supermax prison were deprived of environmental and sensory stimuli and human contact, noting that the “cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a common eating area [and] [o]pportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through glass walls.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174. All true. However, Wilkinson did not deal with 8th Amendment claims and it therefore does not control this Court’s analysis. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 218, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174. Nevertheless, the allegations raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint are very similar to those Defendant points to in Wilkinson. Plaintiffs allege that they were housed in small
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cells behind a solid steel door with only a chuck hole and a small window, making communication with inmates outside the cell difficult. Windows to the outside were often covered with a metal box. The named Plaintiffs were provided with limited opportunities to have outside visitation and even then, they were only allowed no contact visits with family. They were provided with limited access to the yard, only once or twice a week or one to two hours a week and the “yard” was a barren concrete slab with no access to recreational activities. They also allege that they were provided with smaller meal portions, exposed to bugs, rodents and other vermin, and exposed to harsh temperatures. The Court finds that these allegations certainly establish the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773. See also Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2001)(deprivation of exercise); Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005-1006 (7th Cir. 2016) (cell infested with roaches and birds flying in through broken window).
The Court, additionally, finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged the requisite state of mind for Defendant Baldwin. As Plaintiffs point out, their complaint alleges that Plaintiffs filed numerous grievances which were reviewed by Baldwin. Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had studies and data in his possession showing that IDOC’s policies regarding segregation and detention caused “pain, suffering, mental deterioration, and physical injury.” (Doc. 1, p. 21). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately alleges deliberate indifference on Baldwin’s part. As such, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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B. Due Process In raising a procedural due process claim, an inmate must show that “(1) he has a
liberty or property interest that the state has interfered with; and (2) the procedures he was afforded upon that deprivation were constitutionally deficient.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir. 1994)). “An essential component of a procedural due process claim is a protected property or liberty interest.” Domka v. Portage Cnty, Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). It is well-established that a transfer from one prison to another with more adverse conditions of confinement generally does not affect a protected liberty interest. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). A protected liberty interest arises only if the transfer “imposes atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed. 2d 174 (2005) (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 116 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)). The Supreme Court has noted that the baseline for determining whether conditions of confinement are atypical or constitute a significant hardship are difficult because courts are inconsistent in applying a formula. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed. 2d 174. In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court noted that the conditions in Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), Ohio’s super max prison, met any plausible baseline for atypical and significant hardship due to the conditions that inmates were subjected to. Those conditions included limited human contact, no permitted conversations with other
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inmates, lights on in cells for twenty-four hours, and only one hour of exercise per day in a small, indoor gym. Id. at 223-24, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174. Further, the Court noted that placement in the OSP was indefinite and only reviewed on an annual basis. Id.
Prison disciplinary hearings satisfy procedural due process requirements where an inmate is provided: (1) written notice of the charge against the prisoner twenty-four (24) hours prior to the hearing; (2) the right to appear in person before an impartial body; (3) the right to call witnesses and to present physical/documentary evidence, but only when doing so will not unduly jeopardize the safety of the institution or correctional goals; and (4) a written statement of the reasons for the action taken against the prisoner. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–69 (1974); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988).
Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff Davis’ allegation that he was housed in segregation for six months, arguing that the six month term would not implicate a procedural due process right. Defendant also argues that neither Fillmore nor Gardner can allege a liberty interest in their placement in administrative segregation. But as Plaintiffs point out, there is no hard rule that a six month term of segregation does not implicate a liberty interest. Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]his need not imply that a rigid six-month period of inhuman confinement is a condition precedent to a deprivation of a prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty.”). The Seventh Circuit has noted that “considerably shorter period[s] of segregation may,
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depending on the conditions of confinement and on any additional punishments, establish a violation.” Kervin, 787 F.3d at 836 (collecting cases). And while Defendant relies on Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) for the proposition that there is no liberty interest in discretionary segregation, more recent Seventh Circuit cases have found that other forms of detention beyond disciplinary segregation can implicate a liberty interest, depending on the length of and conditions in detention. Compare Townsend, 522 F.3d at 722 (“established position that inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding placement in discretionary segregation”) with Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing from Townsend case noting that it involved a relatively short period of segregation); Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (although finding that inmate’s placement on suicide watch did not implicate a liberty interest, the Seventh Circuit noted that when an inmate is placed in more restrictive conditions, whether through protective custody or discretionary administrative segregation, “his liberty is affected only if the more restrictive conditions are particularly harsh compared to ordinary prison life or if he remains subject to those conditions for a significantly long time.”).
Instead, the Court must look at both the duration and the conditions presented while in segregation to determine whether a liberty interest arises. Marion, 559 F.3d at 697. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges significant periods of detention and segregation which the named Plaintiffs were subjected to. As Plaintiffs point out, they have alleged periods of time in isolation ranging from six months to seventeen years. And as
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previously stated, Plaintiffs have alleged that they were subject to extreme isolation with many privileges and basic life necessities allegedly denied to them during those time periods. Such conditions state a claim for an “atypical and significant hardship” at this stage of the case.
Further, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendant failed to provide them with their due process protections. Plaintiffs allege that they did not have advance notice or an opportunity to be heard before placement in detention, were not provided with an explanation for the detention while housed in isolation, and subjected to “sham” hearings. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ have adequately alleged a due process claim. Defendant’s motion as to this claim is also DENIED.
C. Mootness of Claims of Coleman, Jones, and Danberry Defendant also argues that the conditions of confinement and due process claims
brought by Coleman, Jones, and Danberry are moot because they are no longer being housed in any type of segregation or detention at their respective institutions. Defendant also argues that injunctive relief is improper for these three Plaintiffs under the Eleventh Amendment as there is no continuing violation since they are not currently housed in “extreme isolation”.
Courts can only hear live controversies which must exist at all stages of the litigation process. Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. School Corp., 442 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Jordan by & through Jones v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
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16 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1994)). When an action seeks only injunctive relief “this requirement ordinarily means that, once the threat of the act sought to enjoined dissipates, the suit must be dismissed as moot.” Id. (citing Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 744–45 (7th Cir.2005)). However, a plaintiff’s claims are not moot if he can show that the defendant’s actions were capable of repetition yet evading review. This doctrine “applies only in exceptional circumstances, and generally only when the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subject to the alleged illegality.” Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). If a prisoner is transferred from the facility where he seeks injunctive relief, the request for injunctive relief is usually moot “unless he can demonstrate [with something more than mere speculation] that he is likely to be retransferred.” Id. (citing Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1988)).
While Coleman, Jones, and Dansberry have been released from detention, either prior to the filing of this case or since the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs have alleged that there is a likelihood that they will be placed back in detention or segregation. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that each spent time in extreme isolation and are at particular risk of being placed back in or subject to extreme isolation sentences (Doc. 1, p. 59). Specifically, Coleman alleges that he received disciplinary tickets associated with effects of a stroke which he still suffers from, leaving him vulnerable to such tickets and a sentence in “extreme isolation” in the future (Id. at p. 31). Jones and Dansberry were
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both placed in administrative detention for gang affiliations, which they both allege they were not currently involved in at the time of their detention (Id. at p. 46-49, 54-55). Thus, as Plaintiffs point out, it is likely that they could be placed in detention again for their prior gang affiliations. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have alleged that although they are not currently housed in segregation or some other type of detention there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be subject to said detention again and the Court finds that those allegations go beyond mere suspicion. Further, Plaintiffs’ complaint challenges current policies or procedures and ongoing constitutional violations related to those policies; thus sovereign immunity does not apply. As such, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims against Coleman, Jones, and Dansberry as moot or barred by the Eleventh Amendment are DENIED.
D. Request to Sever Claims In the alternative, Defendant seeks to sever the claims of the Plaintiffs, arguing
that Plaintiffs have failed to provide a single, centralized claim and thus are improperly joined pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. The Court DENIES that request. The Court notes that the named Plaintiffs have all alleged that they were subject to similar conditions during their respective stints in “extreme isolation” in segregation or detention. While these episodes took place at different facilities, Plaintiffs have alleged similar experiences and conditions such that the Court finds that their rights rise out of the same “series of transactions or occurrences” for purposes of joinder. Further, the Court notes that Plaintiffs bring a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 23 and the determination as to whether such a class is appropriate in this case

is not yet ripe. As Plaintiffs point out, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims might vary,

the Court may later consider dividing the class into subclasses, if the Court finds that

class certification is proper at all. But at this time, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims

are properly joined.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March 10, 2017.

/s/ Stephen C. Williams STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS United States Magistrate Judge

Page 18 of 18

 
 Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 173 Filed 09/06/19 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #698

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HENRY DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROB JEFFREYS, Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 3:16-cv-600-MAB ) ) Judge Mark A. Beatty )

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 173 Filed 09/06/19 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #699

Plaintiffs Henry Davis, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Jerome Jones, DeShawn Gardner, and Percell Dansberry hereby move for an order certifying the following class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:
All prisoners who are now or will be incarcerated in adult correctional facilities by the Illinois Department of Corrections and thus who are at risk of being subjected to extreme isolation or who are currently subjected to extreme isolation. This motion is based on upon this Motion for Class Certification, the accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and all of its attached declarations and exhibits, the pleadings and papers on file in this action, oral argument, and any such other matters as the Court may consider in hearing this motion.

Dated: September 6, 2019

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Kimball R. Anderson
Kimball R. Anderson Matthew R. DalSanto Reid F. Smith ARDC No. 6308794 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60601-9703 Telephone: (312) 558-5600 Facsimile: (312) 558-5700 kanderso@winston.com mdalsanto@winston.com rfsmith@winston.com
Alan S. Mills Elizabeth Mazur Nicole Schult UPTOWN PEOPLE’S LAW CENTER 4413 North Sheridan Road Chicago, Illinois 60640 Telephone: (773) 769-1411 Facsimile: (773) 769-2224
1

Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 173 Filed 09/06/19 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #700 alan@uplcchicago.org liz@uplcchicago.org nicole@uplcchicago.org Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned counsel for Plaintiffs hereby certifies that on this 6th day of September, 2019, he caused a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION to be served by CM/ECF to all parties and counsel of record.

Dated: September 6, 2019

By: /s/ Kimball R. Anderson Attorney for Plaintiffs
Kimball R. Anderson WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60601-9703 Telephone: (312) 558-5600 Facsimile: (312) 558-5700 kanderso@winston.com

 
 Case 3:16-cv-00600-MAB Document 230 Filed 06/14/21 Page 1 of 59 Page ID #4850

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HENRY DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. JOHN BALDWIN,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) Case No. 3:16-CV-600-MAB ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification

(Doc. 173) and Defendant’s motions for leave to submit supplemental authority and/or

evidence (Docs. 225, 227).

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs are six inmates who have been housed in segregation at various facilities

throughout the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). They filed this two-count

putative class action alleging that the IDOC’s use of segregation, which they claim is

tantamount to “extreme isolation,”1 violates constitutional standards. Defendant is John

Baldwin, who was the acting director of the IDOC at the time this lawsuit was filed on

June 2, 2016.2 Plaintiffs allege in Count 1 that the conditions they are subjected to in

1 The meaning of the term “extreme isolation” is discussed below in the “Factual Background” section.
2 Plaintiffs sued John Baldwin in his official capacity as Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (Doc. 1, p. 8). In June 2019, Baldwin was replaced by Rob Jeffreys, who is the current Acting Director of IDOC. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Rob Jeffreys is automatically substituted as a party to this action.
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extreme isolation deprive them of basic human needs and inflict disproportionate
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1, pp. 61–63). In Count 2,
Plaintiffs allege they have a protected liberty interest in avoiding extreme isolation and
the IDOC’s hearing and review procedures for prisoners sentenced to extreme isolation
are devoid of the due process protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (Id.
at pp. 63–64).
Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification on September 6, 2019 (Docs. 173,
174, 175, 176, 177, 222).3 They seek to certify the following class: All prisoners who are now or will be incarcerated in adult correctional facilities by the Illinois Department of Corrections and thus who are at risk of being subjected to extreme isolation or who are currently subjected to extreme isolation.
(Doc. 173).
Defendant filed his response in opposition on December 20, 2019 (Docs. 190, 191,
192, 193, 194). Plaintiffs filed their reply on February 14, 2020 (Doc. 197, 198, 224). The
undersigned was not able to hear oral arguments until July 16, 2020 due to interruptions
in court proceedings caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Following oral argument, the
motion for class certification was taken under advisement, (Docs. 219, 220), and the
parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Since then, Defendant
3 Plaintiffs initially submitted both an unsealed, redacted version of their supporting memorandum and exhibits (Doc. 174, Doc. 175) and a sealed, unredacted version (Doc. 176, Doc. 177). After the Court expressed reservations as to whether all of the redacted information and sealed exhibits truly warranted confidentiality (Doc. 219, Doc. 220; see also Doc. 221), the parties conferred and agreed that many of the redactions were unnecessary and a number of exhibits could also be unsealed (see Doc. 221). Following additional rulings and instructions from the Court, Plaintiffs filed a new public, redacted version of their supporting memorandum, exhibits, exhibit list, and reply brief (Docs. 222, 223, 224). The Court cites to the newer versions of these documents throughout this Order.
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John Baldwin has filed two motions for leave to supplement his response brief (Docs. 225, 227). Plaintiffs oppose both motions (Docs. 226, 229).
MISCELLANEOUS HOUSEKEEPING MATTERS Plaintiffs’ complaint references seven exhibits (A through G), including several documents pertaining to the Vera Institute’s work with the IDOC regarding its segregation policies and recommendations for reform (see Doc. 1). A subsequent Stipulation and Order signed by the parties regarding the Vera Institute’s work also refers back and cites to some of the complaint’s exhibits (see Doc. 115). However, none of those exhibits were actually filed with the complaint. The Court assumes this was simply the result of an unintentional oversight (see Doc. 1). In order to correct the omission, Plaintiffs should file the exhibits as a new entry on the docket, and the Court will link it back to the complaint on the docket. Similarly, Eldon Vail’s expert report indicates that there is an Appendix A and an Appendix B attached to the report, however, neither of the Appendices were included with any version of the filed report (see Doc. 174-4; Doc. 176-4; Doc. 222-4). In order to correct the omission, Plaintiffs should submit a new public, redacted version of the report (including the Appendices) directly to the Court at MABpd@ilsd.uscourts.gov. The Court will then replace the existing report at Doc. 222-4 with the new report. If there is information in the Appendices that must be kept confidential, Plaintiffs should also submit an unredacted version of the report (including the unredacted Appendices), which the Court will use to replace the existing sealed version at Doc. 176-4.
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Finally, per the Court’s previous instructions, the initial versions of Plaintiffs’ unsealed, redacted memorandum, their exhibit list, and their reply brief will be stricken from the docket with a note that updated versions were subsequently filed (see Doc. 221).
If the parties have any questions regarding these instructions, they may jointly contact chambers.
MOTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT (Docs. 225, 227) Defendant seeks to provide the Court with additional authority. First, Defendant wants to submit the opinions issued by the Seventh Circuit in McFields v. Dart, 982 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2020) and Howard v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 989 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2021) as supplemental authority (Doc. 225, Doc. 227). But these opinions are not new authority that changes the law governing Plaintiffs’ class action. See SDIL-LR 7.1. They are simply the latest opinions from the Seventh Circuit about a class action in the prison context. Although Plaintiffs object to Defendant’s attempts to submit these new opinions as supplemental authority (Docs. 226, 229), the Court notes they also previously submitted supplemental authority (Doc. 209). Plaintiffs, however, filed it as a “notice,” rather than as a motion (Id.). In other words, they simply submitted their supplemental authority without first asking the Court’s permission to do so, like Defendant has here. Defendant filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ “notice,” and asked the Court to strike it (Doc. 211), however, the Court opted not to take any action. Ultimately here, what is good for the goose is good for the gander, and therefore the Court will allow Defendant to supplement the record with their additional authority. The Court will review the McFields and Howard decisions but does not need any further briefing from the parties.
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Defendant also seeks to provide the Court with additional evidence concerning the IDOC’s continued efforts to review and revise its restrictive housing policies, which he says bears on his argument that there is no basis for class-wide relief under Rule 23(b)(2) (Doc. 225). Specifically, Defendant wants to submit the new Administrative Directive pertaining to restrictive housing (AD 05.15.100) that was enacted in October 2020 (Id.; see Doc. 225-3). Defendant contends “has contributed to a sharp decrease in the numbers of segregation prisoners”4 (Doc. 225). Defendant also wants to submit updated data from December 31, 2020 showing the year-end segregation numbers (Doc. 225; see Doc. 225-4).
This request is denied. Defendant did not provide any explanation as to how the new policy actually led to a consequent reduction in the number of prisoners held in restrictive housing (see Doc. 225). The Court is not going to scrutinize the 17-page policy to try to draw its own conclusions about the cause-effect relationship between the policy and the reduced population in restrictive housing. Furthermore, the simple fact that the IDOC is housing fewer prisoners in restrictive housing does not somehow defeat class certification. It simply means that a smaller, although still substantial, number of prisoners are currently being subjected to the purported unconstitutional procedures and conditions of confinement regarding restrictive housing.
4 This is the only reason Defendant provided for his desire to supplement the record with the new Administrative Directive (see Doc. 225). Defendant did not mention any other aspect of the Administrative Directive, such as any changes to the process by which prisoners are sent to restrictive housing or the conditions of confinement in restrictive housing (see Doc. 225). Consequently, the Court has not reviewed the Administrative Directive for those type of facts and they do not factor into the Court’s decision as to whether Defendant should be allowed to supplement the record with the Administrative Directive.
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For these reasons, Defendant’s first motion to supplement is granted in part and denied in part, and the second motion to supplement is granted.
MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Doc. 173) The parties submitted extensive briefing and evidence in this matter. There were almost 100 exhibits, totaling approximately 2100 pages.5 The exhibits included internal documents and records from the IDOC; depositions of at least six current or former IDOC officials, the six named Plaintiffs, and one other putative class member; and expert reports and follow-up depositions from Plaintiffs’ retained expert witnesses: Dr. Craig Haney and Mr. Eldon Vail. Dr. Craig Haney holds a PhD in psychology and a juris doctor from Stanford University, and he has been a professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz for over 40 years (Doc. 222-3, pp. 118–119; Doc. 190-13). Dr. Haney has spent decades studying the psychological effects of various prison conditions, including the nature and consequences of solitary confinement. He was retained by Plaintiffs to provide a summary of what is known about the negative psychological consequences of restrictive housing for both non-mentally ill and mentally ill prisoners. He was also asked to provide an opinion regarding the extent to which IDOC prisoners in restrictive housing are
5 Given the volume of evidence, citing to all relevant documents has proven cumbersome and timeconsuming. Therefore, throughout this Order, the Court cites to specific exhibits and page numbers (the ones imprinted by CM/ECF at the top of the page) when able, but at other times for the sake of ease and efficiency, the Court cites only to the parties’ briefs, which in turn contain citations to the relevant exhibits. The Court wishes to note that counsel for both parties were extremely diligent in cataloging all of the relevant exhibits that support each and every fact stated throughout their briefs. Moreover, both parties were accurate and honest in their representations of the evidence without embellishments or mischaracterizations. The Court greatly appreciates this and commends both parties’ efforts and candor.
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subjected to conditions of confinement that place them at a serious risk of psychological harm.
Eldon Vail is former correctional administrator with 35 years of experience working in and administering adult and juvenile correctional institutions in the State of Washington (Doc. 222-4, Doc. 191-14). He was retained by Plaintiffs, in short, to evaluate the IDOC’s restrictive housing policies and practices, opine on the deficiencies, and suggest reforms.
The IDOC operates 25 correctional facilities throughout the state (Doc. 190, p. 7; Doc. 222, p. 196). Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail both toured and inspected six of the facilities: Stateville, Pontiac, Dixon, Menard, Lawrence, and Logan Correctional Centers (Doc. 2223, p. 8; Doc. 222-4, p. 4). They both had brief conversations with random prisoners they encountered while touring the facilities; these were often “cell-front” conversations but some were also with prisoners out on the yard (Doc. 222-3, pp. 10, 50–51; Doc. 222-4, p. 4). They both also conducted private, individual interviews with several dozen prisoners (Id.).
Notably, Defendant does not have any rebuttal experts, and Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail’s reports are uncontested at this time. The testimony from the inmates who were deposed is also essentially uncontested by Defendant (see Doc. 190). Defendant tried to pick apart the inmates’ testimony by highlighting minor internal discrepancies (see Doc.
6 It appears from the evidence that there are restrictive housing units at all 25 facilities (see Doc. 192-5).
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190, pp. 13–26), but Defendant did not offer any of his own evidence demonstrating that life in IDOC prisons was anything other than how the inmates described it.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. “EXTREME ISOLATION”
As previously mentioned, Plaintiffs brought this action to challenge the IDOC’s use of “extreme isolation.” According to Plaintiffs, “‘[e]xtreme isolation’ is the consensus term used by correctional experts . . . to describe segregation from the mainstream prisoner population . . . where prisoners are involuntarily confined to their cells for upwards of 22 to 24 hours a day, given only extremely limited or no opportunities for direct and normal social contact with other persons (i.e., contact that is not mediated by bars, restraints, security glass or screens, and the like), and afforded extremely limited if any access to meaningful programming of any kind.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 2; see also Doc. 222, p. 9, n.1).
The IDOC does not use the term “extreme isolation,” but rather uses the term “restrictive housing” to refer to inmates confined in segregation outside of the normal general population (Doc. 190, p. 10). However, various IDOC officials admitted that extreme isolation as defined by Plaintiffs is generally what is occurring in restrictive housing throughout Illinois prisons (Doc. 191-12, pp. 24–25 (Randy Pfister); Doc. 222-19, pp. 5–6 (John Baldwin); Doc. 222-34, p. 6 (Kimberly Butler)).
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Craig Haney, said “restrictive housing,” particularly as it is practiced in the IDOC, clearly constitutes “solitary confinement” (Doc. 222-3, pp. 11, 15). The term “solitary confinement” as it is used in scientific, legal, and
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human rights literature, as well as, in common correctional parlance, refers to conditions of “severe (but not total) isolation from others” (Id. at p. 15).7 For the purposes of this Order, the Court uses the terms “restrictive housing,” “segregation,” and “extreme isolation” interchangeably and synonymously. B. RESEARCH ON EXTREME ISOLATION
Dr. Haney explained that psychologists have long known that social contact is fundamental to establishing and maintaining emotional health and well-being—the human brain is literally “wired to connect” to others (Doc. 222-3, pp. 7, 17–18). It is wellestablished based on extensive research and data that “meaningful social contact is a fundamental human need” and the need for “caring human touch” is likewise “fundamental” (Id. at pp. 16, 24).
Dr. Haney reported that numerous studies have shown that social deprivation, isolation, and exclusion in contexts outside of prison are potentially very harmful and known to produce a host of serious adverse cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and physical impairments, which can even cause permanent and irreparable damage to a person’s overall psychological and physical functioning (Id. at pp. 10–11, 16–25). For example, social isolation is a significant risk factor for anxiety and depression. It is related to paranoia, delusional or psychotic beliefs, and suicidal behavior. It can lead to decreased cognitive functions and difficulties with thinking, concentration, memory, and self-regulation (Id.). It can cause lethargy, reduced empathy, emotional numbing, an
7 According to Dr. Haney, “[f]or perhaps obvious reasons, total and absolute solitary confinement—literally complete isolation from any form of human contact—does not exist in prison and never has.” (Doc. 222-3, p. 15).
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absence of meaningful thought, and aggressive or even violent behavior. Social isolation is also known to adversely impact the functioning of the human immune system and undermines health outcomes in general (Id.). In fact, social isolation has been shown to literally lower the age at which people die (Id.).
Again, this is what happens to socially isolated individuals outside of prison. According to Dr. Haney, “there is every reason to believe” that the harm caused to prisoners in solitary confinement is even worse (Doc. 222-3 pp. 15–16, 25–26). Prisoners in solitary confinement experience not only “sheer deprivation of meaningful social contact” but also commonly experience high levels of repressive control, enforced idleness due to a dearth or complete absence of meaningful mental activity and programming, nonexistent or greatly reduced physical activity, a lack of positive environmental stimulation, and severe restrictions on property, all of which cause additional psychological distress (Id. at pp. 25, 36–37). Consequently, the social isolation in solitary confinement is “far more stressful, harmful, and dangerous than in the larger society where these deleterious effects have been elaborately documented” (Id. at p. 25).
Extensive research has shown that prisoners in segregation display a range of predictable and problematic symptoms of psychological stress (Doc. 222-3, pp. 26–34). These symptoms include: irritability, anxiety, paranoia, irrational anger, aggression, rage, hopelessness, and appetite and sleep disturbances (Id.). Research has also demonstrated a broad range of psychological reactions to extreme isolation, such as: hypersensitivity to external stimuli; difficulties with thinking, concentration, and memory; ruminations and intrusive thoughts; and panic and loss of control. Some prisoners even report
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hallucinations, perceptual distortions, self-mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behavior (Id.). Correlational studies have also demonstrated that suicide rates and self-mutilation are more prevalent in extreme isolation or restrictive housing (Id.). Additionally, research suggests that other violent acts, such as stabbings, attacks on staff, property destruction, and collective violence, are also more prevalent in restrictive housing (Id.).
But these symptoms and psychopathological reactions to social isolation do not paint the full picture of the harm that may occur in segregation (Doc. 222-3, pp. 35–36). Prisoners in solitary confinement are forced to develop their own socially pathological adaptations in order to function and survive—over time, their patterns of thinking, acting, and feeling are changed. For example, some prisoners cope with the void of normal social contact by withdrawing even further and receding even more deeply into themselves (Id.). For others, social interaction becomes uncomfortable, disorienting, and even frightening (Id.). One inmate who Dr. Haney encountered said, “It’s more normal to be alone. Even in the yard, I walk away from people. I can get a little hug from [my] family but I’m uncomfortable with the touch. It feels unnatural, even with my dad.” (Id. at p. 89). While these adaptations are functional and even necessary in solitary confinement, they can become especially painful and disabling if taken to extremes, or if and when they are internalized so deeply that they persist long after time in isolation has ended (Id. at p. 36). Additionally, the prolonged and profound mental and physical inactivity in extreme isolation is a form of sensory deprivation that can destroy important perceptual, cognitive, and physical skills and capacities (Id. at p. 37). The extreme social deprivation prisoners face in solitary confinement can “undermine an individual’s social
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identity, destabilize [their] sense of self, and ultimately destroy [their] ability to function normally in free society.” (Id. at p. 35).
As Mr. Vail put it, there is broad consensus in the corrections field and in the scientific and academic literature that the placement of prisoners in segregation creates a significant risk of harm, for all prisoners who are subjected to it, even prisoners without a preexisting mental illness (Doc. 222-4, pp. 43, 84; see also Doc. 222-3, pp. 27–28). However, mentally ill prisoners are especially vulnerable to the psychological pain and pressure in solitary confinement and therefore particularly at risk (Doc. 222-3, pp. 38–43). C. THE IDOC’S RESTRICTIVE HOUSING NUMBERS
Publicly available data shows that in 2018 the total population of the IDOC at the end of each month was, on average, around 39,000 inmates.8 That same data shows in 2019, it was a little over 38,000 inmates,9 and in 2020, it dropped to around 32,500.
8 See ILLINOIS DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, Operation and Management Reports, June 2018 through December 2018, available at https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Pages/Operation-andManagement-reports.aspx. 9 However, Defendant submitted excerpts of the IDOC’s Weekly Segregation Tracking Spreadsheet showing the average total population of the IDOC in 2019 was 40,145 (Doc. 192-1). This same number was reflected in the Selection of 2020 Weekly Segregation Tracking dated July 9, 2020, which was provided by Defendant to the Court and Plaintiffs’ counsel via email prior to the hearing on the motion for class certification.
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Data submitted by the parties shows that in 2018, approximately 9,100 inmates were assigned to restrictive housing for one or more days (Doc. 177, p. 6),10 with somewhere around 1,600 in restrictive housing on any given day.11
Of the inmates held in restrictive housing over a period of four years ending on December 31, 2018, there were 19,966 inmates (or approximately 64% of the inmates who were held in restrictive housing during that time period) who spent at least 30 days in restrictive housing (see Doc. 177, ¶4). There were 11, 891 inmates (or 38%) who spent at least 60 days in restrictive housing (Id.). There were 9,123 inmates (or 29%) who spent at least 90 days in restrictive housing (Id.). There were 5,059 inmates (or 16%) who spent at least half the year there (Id.). And there were 2,446 inmates (or 8%) who spent at least the whole year in restrictive housing (Id.).
Additionally, there are hundreds of prisoners who have spent more than one year in restrictive housing. Data shows that at the end of 2018, there were 1,619 prisoners in restrictive housing and 709 of them (or 44%) had been there for two or more years, 387 (24%) had been there for five or more years, 256 (16%) had been there for seven or more years; and 78 (5%) had been there for at least ten years (Doc. 177, ¶9). There were even
10 This was the last year for which complete data was available at the time Plaintiffs filed their class certification brief. In 2017, there were approximately 12,200 inmates assigned to restrictive housing for one or more days; in 2016, there were approximately 13,200 inmates; and in 2015, there were approximately 15,300 inmates (Doc. 177). 11 For example, on an unspecified date in June 2018, there were 1,612 prisoners in restrictive housing, and on December 31, 2018, there were 1,619 (Doc. 177, pp. 6, 7). In 2019, there was an average daily population of 1,499 inmates in restrictive housing (Doc. 192-1, p. 8; Selection of 2020 Weekly Segregation Tracking dated July 9, 2020).
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eleven documented prisoners who had been in restrictive housing for twenty years or more (Id.). D. RESTRICTIVE HOUSING POLICIES, CRITICISMS, AND COMPLAINTS
There are four main types of restrictive housing in the IDOC: investigative status, temporary confinement, disciplinary segregation, and administrative detention (Doc. 190, p. 10). See generally 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.40, 504.610, 504.630, 504.690 (2017).12
1. Investigative Status and Temporary Confinement Investigative status is when an inmate is placed in segregation “while an incident or matter is being investigated.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.12 (2017); see also id. at §§ 504.40, 504.610. Temporary confinement is when an inmate is placed in segregation “until a determination is made as to whether a disciplinary report or investigative report [should] be issued” or while waiting for a hearing to be held on a disciplinary report. Id. at § 504.12; see also id. at §§ 504.40, 504.610. The supervisor decides whether to place an inmate in investigative status or temporary confinement, and the decision must be subsequently reviewed by a “reviewing officer.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.40, 504.50(b), (c) (2017). For temporary confinement, the review must be within three calendar days, whenever possible. Id. at § 504.50(b). For investigative status, the review must be within ten calendar days, whenever possible, and consists of the “reviewing officer” interviewing the inmate to obtain the inmate’s views on the placement and then making
12 The IDOC’s policies regarding restrictive housing are laid out in the Illinois Administrative Code, title 20, subchapter E, part 504. It is commonly referred to as “Department Rule 504” or “DR 504” (Doc. 190, p. 10).
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a recommendation to the warden on whether to continue the placement. Id. at § 504.50(c). Placement in investigative status typically lasts no more than 30 days. Id.
2. Disciplinary Segregation If prison officials opt to proceed on a disciplinary report against an inmate, the report is assigned to the Adjustment Committee for hearing.13 Illinois regulations provide that the inmate must receive written notice of the facts and the charges being presented against him or her at least 24 hours prior to the hearing. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.80(b) (2017). The inmate may request that witnesses be interviewed prior to the hearing. Id. at § 504.80(f). And at the hearing, the inmate may make any relevant statement or produce any relevant documents in his or her defense. Id. If the Adjustment Committee decides that the inmate committed the offense charged, it recommends a disciplinary action. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.80 (2017). The recommendation must be reviewed and approved by either the warden or the Director of the IDOC. Id. An inmate may appeal the disciplinary action through the grievance procedures. Id. As of 2017, when the regulations were most recently amended, segregation is a potential punishment for 28 of 46 listed offenses. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.20, § 504
13 The regulations provide that “major offenses” (as defined by the regulations) are assigned to the “adjustment committee” for hearing and “minor offenses” (as defined by the regulations) are assigned to the “program unit” for hearing. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.50(d)(3) (2017). However, neither party addresses the particulars of a “program unit” hearing (see Docs. 190, 222, 224). In fact, Defendant never even mentions the phrase “program unit” in his response brief or in his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (see Doc. 190). Rather, Defendant only speaks of Adjustment Committee hearings (see Doc. 190). The Court thus presumes for the purposes of this Order that the IDOC simply opts to have all disciplinary reports heard by the Adjustment Committee and the discussion regarding disciplinary hearings is limited to proceedings in front of the Adjustment Committee.
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Table A (2017).14 The maximum term of segregation varies by offense and ranges from one month, to three months, to six months, to one year; and two offenses can even be punished with an “indeterminate” term of segregation. See id. Additionally, the IDOC permits segregation terms to be “stacked” for back-to-back punishments (Doc. 222-3, p. 48; Doc. 222-4, p. 50).15 In other words, prisoners in disciplinary segregation can and often do receive additional tickets for new infractions committed while they are in segregation that are then punished with additional segregation time, which is served consecutive to the term they are already serving. The “stacking” of segregation time can result in prisoners spending years, or even decades, in disciplinary segregation (Doc. 222-3, p. 50; Doc. 222-4, p. 51, 52–55, 56; Doc. 191-12, pp. 64–65). There is no limit on the amount of time a prisoner can be assigned to disciplinary segregation (Doc. 222-19, p. 9).
3. Complaints and Criticisms re: Disciplinary Segregation Placement In 2009, the IDOC retained the Vera Institute of Justice, an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit center for justice policy and practice, to study its segregation policies and to make recommendations for reform (Doc. 115, p. 1; Doc. 222-18, p. 4). The Vera Institute, in turn, retained Dr. James Austin, a renowned authority on correctional planning and research, to conduct the study (see id. at p. 3). After studying the IDOC’s policies, visiting a number of facilities, and speaking with IDOC staff, Dr. Austin and the
14 Other potential punishments include loss or restriction of privileges, demotion to B or C grade status, change in housing assignment or transfer to another facility, revocation of good time credit, and restitution. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.80 (2017). 15 See also Doc. 222-220, p. 6 (IDOC official Mike Atchison testifying at his deposition that stacking segregation terms “was the norm”).
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Vera Institute presented the IDOC with a number of findings and sixteen recommendations for overhauling its segregation policies, which appears to have largely fallen on deaf ears (Doc. 115, pp. 2–4; Doc. 115-1; Doc. 222-18, pp. 5, 11–114). Only one of the recommendations was outright accepted and implemented by the IDOC (see Doc. 1151; Doc. 222-18, pp. 14–15).16 Years later, the issues identified by the Vera Institute remain largely unchanged (see Doc. 222-3; Doc. 222-4).
Like the Vera Institute, Plaintiffs’ expert, Eldon Vail, criticized the frequency with which disciplinary segregation is imposed in the IDOC (Doc. 222-4, p. 49; see also Doc. 115; Doc. 222-18). In the IDOC, disciplinary segregation is the most commonly used designation for prisoners in restrictive housing, and administrative detention is second,17 which is “the reverse of how it works in most states,” according to Mr. Vail (Doc. 222-4, p. 49). He characterized the IDOC as “an outlier” and “far out of step” with other jurisdictions in this respect (Id.).
The Vera Institute and Mr. Vail also both criticized the IDOC for using segregation to punish offenses that did not require it (Doc. 222-4, pp. 57; see also Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1; Doc. 222-18). Mr. Vail agreed with prisoners who consistently complained that they were given segregation for minor offenses (Doc. 222-3; see also Doc. 222-4). Specifically, he
16 Specifically, the IDOC adopted and implemented the recommendation to “[r]equire the Regional Deputy Director and the Chief of Operations to approve all transfers to and from Pontiac and Tamms.” (Doc. 1151; Doc. 222-18, pp. 14–15). Tamms has since been shut down (Doc. 190, p. 15, n.2). Pontiac remains open, however. 17 According to June 2018 data, there were 1,612 prisoners in restrictive housing and 1,390—or 86%— were assigned to disciplinary segregation (Doc. 222-3, p. 12).
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opined that the IDOC frequently uses segregation to punish offenses that do not pose any serious threat to the safety of any person or institutional security (Doc. 222-4, p. 57).18 He cited examples of prisoners who were punished with segregation for getting a tattoo, for covering the light in their cell with paper, for throwing trash or paper onto the gallery, for kicking a toilet, and because a blade was missing from the prisoner’s fan (Id. at pp. 58–60). Other examples include prisoners who were punished with segregation for disrupting group sessions by tearing up papers (Doc. 222-5), refusing to cuff up (Doc. 222-6), and misusing toilet paper to cover his cell window (Doc. 222-7).
The Vera Institute and Mr. Vail also criticized the IDOC for imposing segregation sentences that are far too long (Doc. 222-4, pp. 49, 90; see also Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1; Doc. 222-18). Mr. Vail explained that “most states” cap the maximum time spent in disciplinary segregation at 30, 60, or 90 days (Doc. 222-4, p. 50). In contrast, the IDOC permits segregation sentences of six months and one year for numerous offenses, and two offenses are even punishable with open-ended, indeterminate sentences, which Mr. Vail opined was “far outside the norm” (Id.). He explained that the maximum penalties are “excessive and not rationally related to improving prisoner behavior” because research has shown that “[d]isciplinary sanctions of up to a year, or longer, have no relationship to effective modification of behavior” and “are not an effective deterrent” (Id. at pp. 49, 56). In fact, the IDOC has had knowledge for at least a decade that more
18 See also Doc. 222-34, pp. 104–105 (IDOC official Kimberly Butler stating she had no reason to dispute a finding that 85% of prisoners in long-term segregation were in for minor, not major, offenses).
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time in segregation does not improve inmate behavior, because the Vera Institute presented this same finding to the IDOC (Id. at p. 88).
Furthermore, evidence submitted to the Court indicates that prisoners across the facilities consistently complained that the IDOC’s disciplinary hearings are “bogus,” “a joke,” and “not fair” (Doc. 222-4, pp. 61–72). Specifically, prisoners are often charged with and found guilty of offenses based solely on confidential information that they were not allowed to see and had no opportunity to refute or challenge (Doc. 222-3, p. 57; Doc. 2224, pp. 63–64; see also Doc. 222, pp. 20–21, n.14–16). Hearing officials often refuse to call or interview the witnesses that the inmates request. Hearing officials routinely refuse to conduct any investigation or look at available evidence of an incident, such as video recordings and photographs. The hearings are sometimes conducted in the hallway outside the prisoner’s cell, in which case the proceedings are obviously not confidential and communicating through the cell door is difficult (for reasons that are explained further below in the section regarding conditions of confinement). The hearings are not recorded. And inmates are often not provided with an explanation of why they were found guilty or why a specific sentence of extreme isolation was imposed.
Mr. Vail reported that prisoners’ perception of the disciplinary hearing process is “universally quite poor” and the hearings were a common subject of the prisoners’ complaints (Doc. 222-4, pp. 61–72). Mr. Vail opined that “the depth of the collective angst about the hearing process by nearly every prisoner I interviewed [was] striking” (Id. at p. 66). As he explained, “institutional security is reliant on the perception by the inmate population that the profound authority corrections officials have over prisoners is
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exercised in a legitimate manner, which is judged by prisoners as whether or not the staff are capable and demonstrate through their actions that they are fair” (Id.). It is dangerous “when entire systems are perceived to be unfair” (Id.).
Mr. Vail also confirmed that many of the prisoners’ complaints are well-founded. He opined that the IDOC’s overreliance on confidential information and failure to call witnesses are indeed problematic (Doc. 222-4, pp. 67–71). It is also concerning that IDOC policy does not require the Adjustment Committee to review any video footage, photographs, or other records of the relevant incident because this information is often clear evidence of whether the offense that is charged actually occurred (Id.). Mr. Vail opined that as a result of these flaws, prisoners are deprived of necessary opportunities to contest the facts of the incidents or other bases for placing them in restrictive housing (Id.). Mr. Vail also criticized the IDOC’s policy for not mandating that disciplinary hearings be recorded (Id. at pp. 68–70). According to Mr. Vail, recording hearings is a common practice in most jurisdictions so there is a record that can be examined when needed to resolve grievances about whether or not the discipline policy was actually followed (Id. at p. 66).
4. Administrative Detention Placement in administrative detention (“AD”) is governed by 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690, which was amended in 2017. The IDOC also has a related internal policy called Administrative Directive 05.12.101, which was recently amended effective November 1, 2019 (Doc. 192-5). The regulations describe AD as “nondisciplinary” segregation “based on an administrative judgment that a prisoner requires separation from the main prison
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population” because they are thought to pose a risk to the facility or other individuals. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690 (2017). For example, IDOC official Randy Pfister testified that an inmate can be sent to AD for “safety and security of the facility, consistent negative behavior, significant authority within a security threat group [meaning they were a gang leader], serious violent assaults or murders” (Doc. 191-12, pp. 75–76).
A facility’s warden has the discretion to place an inmate in administrative detention for up to 90 days, with the approval of the Director or Deputy Director of the IDOC. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690 (2017). The regulations do not require a review of the initial placement decision. See id. The internal directive, however, does (Doc. 192-5). Specifically, a committee appointed by the warden at each facility must review an inmate’s initial placement in AD within 30 days, and the committee then has another 30 days to notify the inmate of the review decision (Doc. 192-5). The warden is also required to conduct a follow-up review every 90 days to determine whether the inmate’s placement in AD should be extended. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690 (2017). The regulations do not require the inmate to be interviewed as part of the continued placement reviews. Id. But the internal directive provides that inmates can provide a written statement in advance of the review and an oral statement if they are allowed to appear in-person at the review (Doc. 192-5). Prison officials only have to give the inmate the opportunity to appear in-person “at six-month intervals,” meaning at every other 90day review (Id.).
The internal directive provides that there are three phases of AD with Phase I being the most restrictive and Phase III being the least restrictive (Doc. 192-5). Offenders
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are placed in Phase I upon initial placement (Id.). They can move to less restrictive phases based on the recommendation of the review committee and approval by the warden (Id.). Such recommendations and decisions must be “supported by evidence that an offender’s actions or conduct deem him or her as a non-threat to the safety and security of the Department and that no credible intelligence exists to the contrary” (Id. at p. 2).
5. Complaints and Criticisms re: Administrative Detention Placement Both of Plaintiffs’ experts were critical of the AD placement criteria, describing it as extremely vague and reliant on “catch-all” phrases like the “safety and security of the facility,” “institutional order,” and “[o]ther legitimate penological interests.” (Doc. 222-4, p. 73; Doc. 222-3, p. 50). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690 (2017). Additionally, as previously noted, the regulations do not provide inmates with any opportunity to contest their placement in AD. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690 (2017). While the internal directive does require review of the initial placement decision, (see Doc. 192-5), Mr. Vail was highly critical that it gives prison officials 30 days to conduct the review and yet another 30 days to notify the prisoner of the result (Doc. 222-4, p. 75). He called the IDOC’s policy “egregious” and “far beyond the policy and practice in other jurisdictions” (Id.). For example, the American Correctional Association calls for an “official review” within 24 hours (Id.). Mr. Vail remarked that as a result of these lengthy timelines, prisoners may not know for over four weeks why they have been moved to AD, if they are told at all (Id.). Inmates consistently complained they are being held in AD for reasons that were never fully articulated to them because their placement was based on “confidential
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information” (Doc. 222-4, p. 72). Inmates also complained that they do not know what they need to do to get out of AD (Doc. 222-4, pp. 72, 77–79; Doc. 222-3, p. 63). They called the review hearings “meaningless” and a “hollow formality” (Doc. 222-4, p. 78).
Based on the records he reviewed and the frustrations expressed to him by prisoners, Mr. Vail agreed that the review hearings were “perfunctory” (Doc. 222-4, p. 76). He explained that the hearings did not “meaningfully engage the prisoner to explain why they are in AD and what they have to do in order to return to general population” (Id.). In fact, it was “universal” amongst the prisoners Mr. Vail spoke to that they could not articulate what they needed to do to get out of restrictive housing placement (Id. at p. 72). Not only is there a lack of clear direction to the prisoner, the rules also provide no guidance to the prison staff (Id. at p. 79). Neither the regulations nor the internal directive clearly define a way to either move through the phases of AD or out of AD status entirely, despite the Vera Institute’s critique about this very issue years prior (Id. at pp. 73, 76–80; Doc. 115, Doc. 115-1, Doc. 192-5, Doc. 222-18). See also 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.690 (2017). Consequently, the decision as to whether an inmate is “ready” to be released from AD is “apparently . . . [left] up to the subjective judgment of staff . . . with no standards to guide this decision.” (Doc. 222-4, pp. 79–80). Mr. Vail opined that the system was “arbitrary” (Id.). He stressed that there must be a structured way to get out of AD and it must be transparent and reasonable in terms of the amount of time it takes (Id.). He said it was “irresponsible and detrimental to good prison safety and security to place prisoners in segregation and leave them in the dark as to what they need to do to earn their way back to general population.” (Id.).
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Mr. Vail also criticized the 90-day follow-up reviews, opining that the infrequency of these reviews is problematic (Doc. 222-4, pp. 9, 75–76). He suggested that more frequent reviews were needed to not only determine whether continued placement was necessary but also to evaluate how the prisoner is handling the stress of living in a segregation cell (Id. at 76). For example, the American Correctional Association recommends a review every seven days for the first sixty days and at least every 30 days thereafter (Doc. 222-4, p. 75). Furthermore, Mr. Vail opined that the prisoner should always be allowed to attend every review hearing and should be able to explain why they think they should be released from AD (Id. at p. 76).
Mr. Vail indicated that inmates “repeatedly mocked” the characterization of AD as “nondisciplinary” (Doc. 222-4, p. 73). He agreed, stating that AD is “clearly an experience of being punished” (Id.). It is also “perceived as a dead end” and prisoners are left with little to no hope about their futures (Id. at pp. 72, 79). E. CONDITIONS IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING
It is undisputed that prisoners in restrictive housing are all held in the same areas and cells, regardless of the specific form of restrictive housing they are in (i.e., investigative status, temporary confinement, disciplinary segregation, or administrative detention) (Doc. 222-1, pp. 21–22; Doc. 222-2, p. 88). See also 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.610 (2017).
Plaintiffs’ experts indicated that all of the IDOC facilities vary in age, appearance, and level of function/disrepair (see Doc. 222-3, Doc. 222-4). For example, the six facilities visited by Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail range in age from nearly 150 years old to around 20
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years old. Some cells have badly chipped paint on nearly every surface, while others have intact paint jobs. Some cells have windows, others don’t. Some cells have nothing but a bed, toilet, and sink, while others might also have a desk and a stool/chair. Some showers are “filthy” with extensive rust and visible grime, while others are properly maintained and cleaned. Some showers lack any privacy measures. Some facilities have rodent and insect issues. Cell temperatures were a concern at every facility, with most being far too hot in the summer and freezing cold in the winter. There were also complaints of broken sinks, contaminated-looking water, broken toilets, broken lights, and long wait times to get things fixed. Plaintiffs’ experts observed cells with no ladders to the top bunk, “shredded” and stained mattresses, and bunk beds with rusted legs (see Doc. 222-3; Doc. 222-4). Prisoners complained of low-quality food and reduced portions at some facilities (see citations at Doc. 222, p. 24 n.31). But despite these variations, Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail agreed that all of the restrictive housing units operate on the same core policies and procedures and subject prisoners to the same degraded conditions of confinement, extreme social isolation, and other severe forms of restrictions and deprivations (Doc. 222-3, pp. 11–13, 45, 95–96; Doc. 222-4, p. 10).
To begin with, the restrictive housing cells at the six facilities Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail toured, while varied in exact dimensions, were all “extremely small,” according to Dr. Haney (Doc. 222-3, p. 46). In fact, Illinois law only requires cells in new and remodeled facilities to be at least 50 square feet, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-7-3, however, existing cells do not have to comply with the statute and many of them do not (see Doc. 222-3, p. 46; Doc. 222-4, pp. 24–26). It can be inferred from Mr. Vail’s report that none of the cells he
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observed meet the standard set by the American Correctional Association, which requires all restrictive housing cells to provide a minimum of 80 square feet, including 35 square feet of unencumbered space for the first occupant and an additional 25 square feet of unencumbered space if there is a second occupant (Doc. 222-4, pp. 26–27). The small size of the cells means that prisoners have “little or no ability to move about their cell,” which is especially problematic given that they are confined nearly around-the-clock in their cells (Doc. 222-3, p. 46). It also means that inmates cannot physically separate their normal daily routines—in other words, they eat, sleep, and defecate in the same space (Id.).
Dr. Haney reported that “many” of the restrictive housing cells “are inadequate for even a single prisoner to be confined for such extended periods of time” (Doc. 222-3, p. 45). Nevertheless, many of them are double-celled (Id. at p. 46). Double-celling is the practice of assigning two prisoners to one cell, which state regulations permit in restrictive housing (Id.). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.620(a) (2017). Dr. Haney opined that:
double-celling does not mitigate, and indeed may significantly exacerbate, the psychological impact of isolated confinement. The kind of forced and strained “interactions” that take place between prisoners who are confined nearly around-the-clock in a small cell does not constitute meaningful social contact. In fact, under these harsh and deprived conditions, the forced presence of another person may become an additional stressor and source of tension (and even precipitate physical conflict); it can worsen the negative psychological effects of the other deprivations to which prisoners in restrictive housing are subjected. In fact, in my experience, double-celling in restrictive housing units increases the risk of assaults and sometimes lethal violence. (Doc. 222-3, pp. 46–47). Mr. Vail likewise called double-celling inmates in restrictive housing a “bad” and “risky” practice that should be ended (Doc. 222-4, pp. 27–28).
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Additionally, Dr. Haney reported that “[a]ll of the restrictive housing cells at every facility [he] toured” impeded a prisoner’s ability to communicate with people outside of their cells, such as other prisoners and staff (Doc. 222-3, p. 46). Some cells have solid steel doors with only a small window (see id. at pp. 44–45, 47, 53, 59, 60, 62, 65, 85, 91, 180, 196, 213–14, 219–20, 224–27, 235–39, 243, 249, 251, 253–54, 261–64, 277–78, 291–92, 296–97, 299, 305–311). Others are barred cell doors that have been covered with plexiglass or metal screens (see id.). Consequently, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for inmates in restrictive housing to meaningfully communicate with anyone outside their cells (Doc. 222-3, pp. 46, 47; see also Doc. 222-27, p. 6).
Prisoners’ social contacts are also limited in other ways. In temporary confinement, investigative status, and disciplinary segregation, prisoners cannot make phone calls (e.g., Doc. 222-23, pp. 54–56, 137–141).19 The number of visits they can have per month is reduced (e.g., Doc. 222-3, p. 47; Doc. 222-23, pp. 54–56). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.620(i), 504.130, 525.20. Generally, the policy is that they get two visits a month, lasting only one hour (Doc. 222-3, p. 50). Those visits are non-contact, through a window, and often via a phone (Doc. 222-3, p. 49). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.130, 525.20. Additionally, disciplinary segregation prisoners are kept in leg and hand restraints throughout the visits, despite being in secure areas (Doc. 222-3, pp. 49–50). Dr. Haney
19 Prisoners in temporary confinement and disciplinary segregation are automatically demoted to “C” grade status. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.620(i), 504.610. (2017). Offenders in investigative confinement are provided with the same conditions as those in temporary confinement and disciplinary segregation. Id. at § 504.630. And in “C” grade, inmates cannot make phone calls Id. at §§ 504.620(i), 504.130, 525.150.
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pointed out that by only allowing non-contact visits, the IDOC takes away the inmates’ only real opportunity to experience caring human touch (Id. at p. 47).
In administrative detention, phone and visitation privileges vary by phase. In phase I, inmates get two, one-hour non-contact visits and one 15-minute phone call per month (Doc. 193-4). In phase II, inmates get three 90-minute non-contact visits and two 15-minute phone calls per month (Id.). In phase III, inmates get four two-hour “meet and greet” visits per month and two 15-minute phone calls per week (Id.).
Prisoners in restrictive housing do not attend chow; they eat their meals alone in their cells (Doc. 222, p. 38, n.62). They are not allowed to supplement their diet with items from the commissary (Doc. 222-3, p. 54; Doc. 193-4). See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.130(a)(3) (2017). They are not allowed to spend time in congregate spaces, such as day rooms, and they are not allowed to hold jobs in the prison (Doc. 222, p. 38; see also Doc. 222-3, Doc. 222-4).20
Cells in restrictive housing are barren for the most part (see Doc. 222-3, pp. 174– 315). They have a bed, a mattress, bedding, a toilet, and a sink (see id.). As noted above, sometimes a desk and a stool (see id.). Personal property is limited—prisoners have no radios or televisions (e.g., id. at pp. 48–49, 54, 58, 92; Doc. 222-29, p. 26).
Access to religious or educational programming for inmates in restrictive housing is non-existent, or significantly diminished (Doc. 222-3, pp. 47–48, n.8; Doc. 222-29, pp. 16–17; see Doc. 190, pp. 19, 22; Doc. 193-4). Dr. Haney explained that such programming
20 There was one exception to this out of the six facilities that Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail visited: segregation prisoners at Logan are at times allowed in the dayroom for indoor “recreation” time, however, they are chained to a table (Doc. 222-4, p. 45).
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is “essential to prisoner well-being” (Doc. 222-3, p. 47). “Programming not only allows prisoners to engage in productive forms of self-improvement or rehabilitation but also provides them with mental and physical activities in which to engage that, in turn, can help prevent debilitation and atrophy.” (Id. at pp. 47–48). Dr. Haney reported that “virtually all” of the prisoners in restrictive housing that he spoke with “complained about the severe levels of idleness to which they were subjected.” (Id. at p. 51). As one prisoner put it, “all I do all day is look at the walls and think about my fuck ups and feel hopeless and it makes me want to die. . . . this is torture.” (Id. at p. 87).
Inmates in restrictive housing are allowed out of their cells to shower. IDOC policy requires showers to be offered at least three times per week. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.620(g)(1). Showers last about 10-15 minutes (e.g., Doc. 222-28, p. 8; Doc. 193-4). Inmates in restrictive housing are also allowed out of their cells for recreation time. Mr. Vail reported this time is essential to prisoners’ wellbeing as it is one of the primary ways to relieve the stress caused by the social isolation and physical limitations that come with living in restrictive housing (Doc. 222-4, p.33). Generally speaking, the regulations require that prisoners in restrictive housing receive at least eight hours of recreation per week, to be distributed over the course of at least two days. 20 ILL. ADM. CODE § 504.670(a).21 Each facility is allowed to determine how the hours are distributed. Id.
Prisoners at the various facilities most commonly reported they are allowed to go to yard two or three days per week, for between two and three hours each time (e.g., Doc.
21 Per the Rasho settlement agreement, mentally ill prisoners in segregation for longer than sixty days are supposed to receive slightly more yard time: ten hours instead of eight (Doc. 222-4, p. 49).
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222-4, pp. 34–46).22 None of the prisoners Mr. Vail talked to reported receiving the full eight hours every week (Doc. 222-4, p. 34; see also Doc. 222, p. 39, n.66 (stating that all prisoners who were deposed indicated that they routinely receive less than eight hours per week)). Mr. Vail noted that the IDOC’s policy for recreation time fails to meet national and international standards (Doc. 222-4, p. 33). For example, the American Correctional Association requires a minimum of one hour, five days per week (Id.). And the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners—known as the Nelson Mandela Rules—requires at least one hour every day (Id at p. 34). Mr. Vail opined that offering recreation only two or three days a week “defeats the objective of getting segregated prisoners out of their cells as much as possible” in order to reduce the stress of living in restrictive housing (Id. at p. 46). Dr. Haney noted that allowing prisoners out to yard only two or three days a week means they can be confined in their cells continuously for several days at a time (Doc. 222-3, p. 49). In fact, prisoners reported not leaving their segregation cells for astounding lengths of time, including one prisoner who told Dr. Haney he had been in his cell around-the-clock for six months (Id. at p. 87).
The yard conditions at the different facilities are not identical, however, both Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail portray the conditions in all of the yards they toured as bleak and barren (see Doc. 222-3, Doc. 222-4). Dr. Haney said they are “‘yard’ in name only” (Doc. 222-3, p. 45). Some of the recreation areas are traditional congregate yards (Doc. 222-3 pp. 189, 222–23, 238, 282–89, 304; Doc. 222-4, pp. 33–46). They are surrounded by high fences,
22 Dixon is an exception; recreation is offered two hours a day, five days a week, exceeding the ACA standard and IDOC’s own policy (Doc. 222-4, p. 37).
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and topped with razor wire or barbed wire. Most of them have concrete floors. Some have no equipment whatsoever, and the ones that do have nothing more than a basketball hoop. Some of them have a picnic table or chair; others have no place to sit at all. Other recreation areas are one-man metal cages with concrete floors, that one of the named Plaintiffs described as “dog cages” (see Doc. 222-3 pp. 222, 287, 289; Doc. 222-4, pp. 33–46; Doc. 222-25, p. 19). The metal cages are completely barren with absolutely no exercise equipment and nowhere to sit. Mr. Vail testified that they are so small they “don’t leave much room for recreation or exercise” (Doc. 191-14, pp. 36–37).
Hardly any of the yards have toilets, even though prisoners are usually on the yard for well over an hour at a time (Doc. 222-4, p. 35). Mr. Vail was told that inmates “go” anyway, and some then throw their urine and feces (Id. at pp. 35, 38).
The congregate yards are supervised by a guard in a tower (Doc. 222-4, pp. 34–35, 37, 38, 40–41, 44, 45).23 Consequently, there are no guards in close proximity to supervise the inmates, to diffuse tense situations, or to break up fights (see id. at pp. 34–46; Doc. 19114, p. 35). Many reported being attacked or witnessing fights on the yard (Doc. 222-4, pp. 37, 38). Prisoners repeatedly told Mr. Vail that they felt yard was unsafe, and they declined to go, or rarely went, when it was offered (Id. at pp. 34–46; Doc. 191-14, pp. 35– 36).
In addition to recreation time, mentally ill inmates are also supposed to receive ten hours of “structured” time out of their cell, for example, in group therapy (Doc. 222-3, p.
23 Menard was the only facility that had a guard shack on the ground (Doc. 222-4, pp. 40–41). But prisoners reported there wasn’t always a guard in there (Id.).
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49). However, Dr. Haney received consistent reports that they were not receiving the requisite amount of structured out-of-cell time (Id. at pp. 49, 52). When it did occur, it was typically unrelated to any discernable therapeutic purpose or goal (Id. at p. 49). For example, during group therapy sessions, inmates watched “generic movies (that lacked psychological content),” including shows on the Hallmark channel, and talked about “world events,” sports, or “whatever you want” (Id. at pp. 60, 65, 74, 83, 90). And the inmates normally spent group sessions chained to benches or sitting in cages (Id. at pp. 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 75, 79–80).
Finally, prisoners consistently reported physical and verbal abuse by officers (Doc. 222-4, pp. 82–83).24 This information was completely unsolicited and instead “simply emerged” as Mr. Vail and Dr. Haney talked to prisoners (Id.). Mr. Vail called the volume of the reports “astounding” and “of great concern” (Id.). Two-thirds of all the prisoners he spoke with reported being the victim of physical abuse or witnessing such an incident, including 100% of the inmates he spoke with at Menard, 77% of the inmates at Pontiac, 73% of the inmates at Dixon, 40% of the inmates at Stateville, 33% at Logan, and 20% at Lawrence (Id.). The prisoners primarily reported physical beatings, almost always out of range of security cameras. They also complained of insufficient decontamination after chemical sprays were used. African American prisoners also reported that guards routinely use racial epithets and slurs (Id.). Mr. Vail commented that in the last six years,
24 Dr. Haney also indicated he received numerous reports about abuse from correctional officers. One inmate told him that guards “use shields, hit us, then walk out and act like it never happened.” (Doc. 2223, pp. 73). He also told Dr. Haney that one time when he attempted to hang himself, officers maced him when they came into his cell to cut him down (Id.). Another prisoner told Dr. Haney that guards sprayed mace in a bag and put it over his face (Id. at p. 67).
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he has interviewed hundreds of prisoners in dozens of prisons and jails in twelve different states, and there’s only been one other time that he’s encountered such a volume of reports of physical and verbal abuse in one prison system (Id.). F. EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE IDOC
It is important to reiterate that Dr. Haney’s and Mr. Vail’s reports, at this stage, are uncontested and unrebutted. Defendant did not offer any experts of his own. Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail’s reports paint a disturbing, and quite frankly distressing, picture. Mr. Vail characterized the conditions of the restrictive housing units he observed as “generally deplorable,” “stark and horrific,” “far below the standards of other state prison systems,” and “unnecessary to achieve the relevant penological objectives.” (Doc. 222-4, p. 10). Dr. Haney likewise said the conditions in the restrictive housing units he observed were “extremely harsh,” “draconian,” and “precisely the kind that create a significant risk of serious harm for all the prisoners who are subjected to them” (Doc. 222-3, pp. 12, 96, 97, 114, 116). In fact, he said they were “outright dangerous to prisoners’ mental health and well-being” and represented “nothing short of a system-wide crisis” (Id. at p. 12). He further opined that “shockingly high number of [mentally ill] prisoners” housed in the IDOC’s restrictive housing units was “frankly unconscionable” (Id. at p. 96.)
Unsurprisingly, “virtually all” of the prisoners that Dr. Haney spoke with reported or acknowledged various forms of suffering, decompensation, and deterioration that they are experiencing a result of the conditions in restrictive housing and the way they are treated (Doc. 222-3, p. 96). Dr. Haney indicated that the symptoms the prisoners acknowledged are indicative of the type of psychological trauma associated with severe
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forms of isolated confinement (Id.). Prisoners frequently reported depression, nearconstant anxiety, difficulty concentrating, ruminations, irritability, bouts of anger, and feelings of an impending breakdown (Id. at pp. 60–103). Some prisoners described visual hallucinations and auditory hallucinations (Id.). More than one prisoner even reported playing with and/or eating their own feces (Id.). And in many instances, prisoners showed Dr. Haney cuts, bite-marks, and scars from self-mutilation and described attempts to commit suicide (Id.).
Dr. Haney’s report was full of instances where inmates who self-mutilated or attempted suicide but were nevertheless kept in segregation (see Doc. 222-3, pp. 60–103). As one inmate at Menard told Dr. Haney, “I keep trying to kill myself and they keep putting me back in my same seg cell” (Id. at p. 82). Dr. Haney described another prisoner at Logan whose records showed her placement in segregation was continued, and even extended, despite “an extraordinary number of documented suicide attempts” and repeated pleas to be sent to the state mental hospital because she was certain that Logan “could not fix her brain” (Id. at p. 99).
Dr. Haney himself observed a multitude of prisoners that were “in obvious distress, sitting on the bunks in their disheveled cells, staring vacantly” (Id. at p. 59), and others that he described as “nearly incoherent” (Id. at p. 61), “extremely unstable” (Id. at p. 64), “very disturbed” and “especially fragile” (Id. at p. 70). And he remarked that at two facilities, he was “struck” by how many of the restrictive housing prisoners he interviewed appeared to be “profoundly mentally ill” (Id. at pp. 65, 72). Many of the prisoners Dr. Haney encountered expressed deep concerns about their own well-being
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and whether their impaired and deteriorated mental health would ever improve (Id. at pp. 81, 88, 96).
Dr. Haney opined that all of the IDOC restrictive housing units he toured “appear capable of having truly harmful—even devastating and fatal—impacts on the prisoners housed in them” (Doc. 222-3, p. 96). He stated unequivocally that the “harsh, severe conditions of confinement” in IDOC restrictive housing units “are precisely the kind that create a significant risk of serious harm for all the prisoners who are subjected to them” (Id. at p. 114). And, in fact, most of the inmates Dr. Haney encountered in the restrictive housing units could point to harm that they had already experienced (Id. at pp. 93, 114).
DISCUSSION A plaintiff seeking to certify a class must satisfy the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the proposed class qualifies under at least one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Id. Where, as here, certification is sought under Rule 23(b)(2), the plaintiff must show that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their proposed class satisfies each of the requirements of Rule 23. Howard v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Off., 989 F.3d 587, 597 (7th Cir. 2021)
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“Rule 23 is more than ‘a mere pleading standard[.]’” Howard, 989 F.3d at 597 (citation omitted). “[A] court may not simply assume the truth of the matters as asserted by the plaintiff[,]” on issues affecting class certification. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. Rather, the plaintiff must “actually prove” that the relevant requirements have been met. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 275 (2014) (emphasis in original).
“A class may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites for class certification have been met.” Lacy v. Cook Cty., Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 863 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 800 F.3d 360, 373 (7th Cir. 2015)). “Failure to meet any of the Rule’s requirements precludes class certification.” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008). A. DOES RASHO V. WALKER PRECLUDE CLASS CERTIFICATION?
Before addressing the requirements of Rule 23, the Court will first analyze Defendant’s argument that the class should not be certified because the claims in this case are “subsumed” by another class action in the Central District of Illinois: Rasho v. Walker, CDIL case no. 07-cv-1298-MMM (Doc. 190, pp. 31–39).25
Rasho is a class action that was initiated in 2007, challenging the adequacy of mental health services provided to mentally ill prisoners in the IDOC. Rasho Doc. 260. In August 2015, a class consisting of all current and future inmates within the IDOC’s custody who were or should have been identified as requiring mental health treatment
25 References to the docket in the instant case are cited as (Doc. ___), while references to the district court’s docket in Rasho are cited as “Rasho Doc. ___.”
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was certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). Rasho Doc. 252.26 Later that year, the parties reached a comprehensive settlement agreement regarding all aspects of mental health care in the IDOC, including, for example, screenings and evaluations, treatment plans, medication, staffing numbers, staff training, treatment spaces, and housing assignments. Rasho Docs. 710, 711-1. There were also provisions regarding segregation and discipline for mentally ill inmates. Rasho Doc. 711-1, pp. 16–20, 24–25. The settlement agreement was approved by the court in May 2016. Rasho Docs. 710, 711-1; Minute Entry dated 5/13/2016. A year and a half later, in October 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that Defendants were not complying with the agreement in various areas, including segregation. Rasho Doc. 1559. The court ultimately agreed and entered a permanent injunction in April 2019. Rasho Docs. 2460, 2516, 2579, 2633.27 Defendants appealed the Court’s order on March 1, 2019, Rasho Doc. 2583, and the appeal remains pending.
Defendant notes in his brief that the Rasho court found around 80% of IDOC inmates in segregation are mentally ill (Doc. 190, p. 31) (citing Rasho v. Walker, no. 07-cv1298-MMM (USDC-CDIL), 376 F. Supp. 3d 888, 908 (C.D. Ill. 2019)).28 Consequently, a
26 The exact class definition is: “Persons now or in the future in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) [who] are identified or should have been identified by the IDOC's mental health professionals as in need of mental health treatment as defined in the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association. A diagnosis of alcoholism or drug addiction, developmental disorder, or any form of sexual disorder shall not, by itself, render an individual mentally ill for the purpose of this class definition.” Rasho Doc. 252; also available at Rasho v. Walker, 376 F. Supp. 3d 888, 891 (C.D. Ill. 2019). 27 The permanent injunction order is also available at: Rasho v. Walker, 376 F. Supp. 3d 888 (C.D. Ill. 2019). 28 Plaintiffs indicated they are “skeptical” of this figure, arguing that it is unclear how it was calculated or what data was used (Doc. 198, p. 15). However, Plaintiffs’ counsel authored an affidavit, citing to data
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chunk of the proposed class members in the instant case are also members of the Rasho class. Defendant suggests the instant case is thus duplicative of Rasho and cites to cases involving the rule against duplicative litigation (Doc. 190, pp. 31–39; Doc. 220). That rule provides that a federal suit may be stayed or dismissed for reasons of wise judicial administration whenever the suit is duplicative of a parallel action already pending in another federal court. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 888 (7th Cir. 2012); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Paramount Liquor Co., 203 F.3d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs contend that Rasho is not still pending and therefore the rule against duplicative litigation does not apply (Doc. 224, pp. 11–12; see also Doc. 220). They further contend that the proper doctrine, if anything, would be res judicata (or claim preclusion) but they assert that doctrine is also inapplicable here (Doc. 224, pp. 18–19; see also Doc. 220).
When this issue was discussed at the hearing on the motion for class certification, defense counsel clarified that she does not believe either the rule against duplicative litigation or res judicata actually apply (see Doc. 220, pp. 40, 47–51). Specifically, counsel stated that Defendant is “not asking the Court to abstain from making determinations in
showing that, in 2018, 79% of the prisoners designated as seriously mentally ill at Dixon, Pontiac, and Menard were assigned to one or more days of segregation (Doc. 177, p. 7). Additionally, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Craig Haney, relied on Defendant’s figure of 80% (Doc. 222-3, pp. 14, 39). Dr. Haney also stated more generally that “an extraordinarily high percentage of persons housed in IDOC restrictive housing units are mentally ill” and the restrictive housing units he toured were “filled with mentally ill prisoners” (Doc. 2223, pp. 114, 115; see also id. at pp. 39, 72, 75, 106). So, while Defendant’s 80% figure may not be precise, the number of inmates in restrictive housing who are mentally ill is undoubtedly high.
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this case because of Rasho” and not arguing “that this case is precluded by Rasho.” (Id. at pp. 47, 48). Rather, defense counsel was making more of general argument, not based on any specific legal doctrine, that there is significant overlap between the instant case and Rasho and so it does not make sense to proceed with the class here (Id. at pp. 39–44, 47– 50). Counsel offered a number of reasons to support Defendant’s position. First, defense counsel contended that that if the instant class proceeds, there is a risk of inconsistent and conflicting findings and directives between this case and Rasho, and seemed to suggest there was no way to work around this potential risk (see id. at pp. 39–40, 47–48). Next, counsel argued that “any of the relief that [mentally ill inmates are] seeking pertaining to segregation can still be litigated and adjudicated in the Rasho action” (Id. at p. 41). Put differently, counsel’s position seemed to be that mentally ill inmates can and should use Rasho to litigate any and all of their issues and they cannot bring any new claims or be part of any new class (see id. at pp. 41, 43) (arguing that while the Rasho case is “mostly about mental health care . . . it’s spilled over into all aspects of the Department of Corrections”). Defense counsel also argued that Rasho already provides for some of the relief that Plaintiffs seek in the instant matter and so it does not make sense to move forward with this second class (Id. at pp. 50, 57). Finally, defense counsel suggested that eliminating the Rasho class members from the class here was not a viable alternative because “carving out 80 percent of a class doesn't make sense” and we would not be left with anything workable (Id. at pp. 47–48).
The Court is unconvinced by any of Defendant’s arguments. First, neither the rule against duplicative litigation nor res judicata apply. Both doctrines require the same or
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substantially similar claims and parties in two different lawsuits.29 But the proposed class here and the Rasho class are clearly different. The Rasho class is all current and future inmates who are or will be on (or should be on) the IDOC’s mental health caseload. Rasho Doc. 252. Whereas, the proposed class in this case is “[a]ll prisoners who are now or will be incarcerated” in adult correctional facilities in the IDOC. (Doc. 173) (emphasis added). In other words, the Rasho class consists of mentally ill inmates, while the class here is, quite simply, all prisoners now and in the future. In short, the class in this case is significantly broader than that of Rasho. While mentally ill inmates certainly comprise a portion of it, there is, without question, a huge number of current and future inmates who are not mentally ill that are also part of the class proposed here.
Additionally, the claims in the instant case are not the same as the claims in Rasho. Broadly speaking, Rasho is about inadequate mental health treatment. The plaintiffs alleged, for example, that the IDOC chronically fails to diagnose mental illness in inmates, provides grossly substandard care to those who are diagnosed, fails to train its employees as to how to properly respond to and interact with mentally ill inmates, and disciplines inmates for conduct caused by their mental illness without taking that illness into account when meting out punishment. Rasho Doc. 260. In contrast, the instant case is about the
29 McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 889 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A suit is duplicative if the claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 124 (1894) (“When the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat another, the case must be the same. There must be the same parties, or, at least, such as represent the same interests; there must be the same rights asserted and the same relief prayed for; the relief must be founded upon the same facts, and the title, or essential basis, of the relief sought must be the same.”); United States ex rel. Conner v. Mahajan, 877 F.3d 264, 270, 271, 272 (7th Cir. 2017) (federal claim preclusion law bars claims which were, or could have been, decided in a prior suit if there is an identity of the parties or their privies, an identity of the causes of action, and a final judgment on the merits) (citations omitted).
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use of restrictive housing. Plaintiffs allege, for example, that inmates are often sent to restrictive housing for minor infractions and/or for extended periods of time, conditions of confinement in restrictive housing are inhumane, and the hearing and review procedures for prisoners sent to restrictive housing are devoid of due process protections (Doc. 1).
To be sure, there is some degree of overlap between the two cases, which Plaintiffs admit (Doc. 224, p.15, n.4; Doc. 220, pp. 17, 19). Mentally ill inmates who are in segregation are members of both classes. And that number, although imprecise, is no doubt significant. See supra n.28. Rasho also touches on disciplinary proceedings and conditions in segregation for mentally ill inmates.30 However, Rasho did not ask, litigate, or resolve whether the IDOC’s policies, and/or the purported systemic failure to adhere to those policies, creates inhumane conditions of confinement in restrictive housing for inmates. Nor did Rasho ask, litigate, or resolve whether the process that inmates are provided before and after placement in restrictive housing is constitutionally insufficient. Furthermore, Rasho did not adjudicate anything regarding the rights of inmates in segregation who are not mentally ill, and none of the relief agreed to/ordered in Rasho applies to them.
For these reasons, neither the rule against duplicative litigation nor claim preclusion bar certification in this case. To the extent Defendant is arguing that common sense or reasons of equity and economy counsel against certification, that argument is
30 For example, the Rasho settlement agreement requires security staff to consult with a mentally ill inmate’s treatment team before double-celling the inmate in segregation and it dictates the amount of out-of-cell time mentally ill inmates in segregation must receive. Rasho Doc. 711-1, pp. 16–21, 24.
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likewise rejected. To begin with, this argument comes much too late in the proceedings. Arguments regarding duplicative or overlapping litigation are routinely made during the pleadings phase for the obvious reason that one of the parties is trying to put the case on ice as soon as possible, before any significant time or money has been expended. Here, Defendant could have made his argument from the outset. By the time this case was filed in June 2016, the class had been certified in Rasho and the settlement had been reached and approved by the Court. Any overlap this case has with Rasho should have been immediately apparent. But Defendant did not raise his argument at the beginning of the case (see Docs. 22, 36, 76). Instead, he waited until after Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification. By that point, the Court and the parties had already dedicated a truly massive amount of work to this case. As Defendant pointed out in its brief, the parties have spent years on discovery related to class certification (Doc. 190, p. 60). Hundreds of thousands of pages of documents have been produced, close to 20 depositions have been taken, (Id.), and there have been almost three dozen hearings in this matter (see Docs. 1– 229). It is simply too late to argue that class certification should not be considered, particularly because the argument is based on circumstances that have existed the entire time this case has been pending.
The timing and imprecision of Defendant’s argument suggests it is more likely a last-ditch effort to avoid class certification than it is a serious contention about conserving resources and promoting efficiency. Additionally, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the claims in Rasho cannot be amended to encompass the issues raised in this case. A settlement agreement has been reached, a permanent injunction order has been entered,
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and the case is on appeal. This case is not “largely duplicative” of Rasho, as Defendant asserts. Any overlap is minimal, and Defendant has not given the Court any reason to believe it should preclude class certification. Rather, the overlap would only come to bear on any relief ultimately agreed to or provided in this case, which can be addressed later as necessary by the parties and the Court. B. RULE 23 REQUIREMENTS
Having decided that Rasho does not preclude class certification, the Court now considers whether Plaintiffs have met all of the requirement of Rule 23.
1. Numerosity The first requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the proposed class “be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). A “class can be certified without determination of its size, so long as it's reasonable to believe it large enough to make joinder impracticable and thus justify a class action suit.” Arnold Chapman & Paldo Sign & Display Co. v. Wagener Equities Inc., 747 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2014). “While there is no magic number that applies to every case, a forty–member class is often regarded as sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850 F.3d 849, 859 (7th Cir. 2017). The putative class is, essentially, all current and future inmates in the IDOC. Data shows that in the last several years there have been between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners in the IDOC. Somewhere around 10,000 prisoners are held in extreme isolation for some period of time each year, with approximately 1,600 confined in extreme isolation on any given day. But it is possible for all prisoners in the IDOC to end up in segregation—any
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one of them could be charged with a disciplinary infraction that leads to placement in segregation and any one of them could be placed in administrative detention with no charge at all. Of course, there are also the future inmates who can and will be subjected to restrictive housing. Given the significant size of both the current and future prisoner populations, there is no question that numerosity is satisfied.
None of Defendant’s arguments contesting numerosity are persuasive. First, Defendant argues that the Rasho class members must be excluded (Doc. 190, pp. 39–42). But as explained above, an inmate’s status as a Rasho class member does not prevent the inmate from also being a class member in this action. Even if Defendant was correct and the Rasho class members were excluded, that would still leave all of the current and future non-mentally ill inmates for the instant class. This is undoubtedly a significant number— thousands, if not tens of thousands, of inmates.
Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs simply assume that every inmate who is currently serving time in restrictive housing or will in the future is a class member, but Defendant contends not every inmate has or will have a “legitimate” claim (Doc. 190, pp. 39–42; see also Doc. 220). (Doc. 190, p.p. 39–42). For example, according to Defendant, prisoners who served less than 30 days have no legitimate claim because such placements “have already been established to be constitutional” (Id. at p. 42). And maybe there are inmates who received a disciplinary hearing that was by the book or received sufficient out of cell time to prevent any harm (Id. at pp. 39–42). Defendant argues there is just no way to know which inmates have a claim and are thus class members without individual factual determinations (Id.).
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But Defendant’s argument incorrectly frames the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ claims are not based on the process provided to individual inmates on a specific occasion. Nor do Plaintiffs’ claims hinge on conditions of confinement that individual inmates experienced on a specific occasion. That is, Plaintiffs are not contending that a collection of individual constitutional violations that already occurred (each of which hinge on particular facts and circumstances) amount to a systemic constitutional violation. Rather, Plaintiffs are alleging the IDOC’s policies governing restrictive housing, which apply statewide at every facility to every inmate, and its systemic practices establish baseline conditions of confinement in segregation that are so inadequate they expose any and every inmate who is presently in restrictive housing or who will be in the future to a substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiffs also claim the baseline conditions of confinement in segregation constitute an atypical and a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, such that they have a protected liberty interest in avoiding segregation, but the IDOC’s statewide policies and systemic practices fail to provide inmates with adequate due process. Membership in the class is based on whether putative class members are or will be in IDOC custody and therefore subject to the formal policies and systemic practices at issue. It is not based on the specific application and effect of those policies on each individual class member.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the requirement of numerosity is met. 2. Commonality re: Conditions of Confinement Claim
The second requirement of Rule 23(a) is that there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). A single common question will do. Howard
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v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Off., 989 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011)); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 497 (7th Cir. 2012). But it “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution,” meaning that “determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’” Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 550, 553 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350). Accord Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (“What matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” (citation omitted); Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497 (“[T]he plaintiffs must show that they share some question of law or fact that can be answered all at once and that the single answer to that question will resolve a central issue in all class members' claims.”) (emphasis in original). “The critical point is ‘the need for conduct common to members of the class.’” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 553 (quoting Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756).
“[W]hen inmates provide sufficient evidence of systemic and centralized policies or practices in a prison system that allegedly expose all inmates in that system to a substantial risk of serious future harm,” commonality is satisfied. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 684 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Phillips, 828 F.3d at 557 (“If plaintiffs can present classwide evidence that a prison is engaging in a policy or practice which rises to the level of a systemic indifference, then we can identify ‘conduct common to members of the class’ which advances the litigation.” (quoting Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted))); Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498 (“[A]n illegal policy might
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provide the ‘glue’ necessary to litigate otherwise highly individualized claims as a class.” (emphasis omitted)). Numerous courts within the Seventh Circuit and beyond have concluded as much. See id. at 681 (collecting cases); Lippert v Baldwin, 10 C 4603, 2017 WL 1545672, at *2 (N.D. Ill. April 28, 2017); Rasho v. Walker, 07-1298-MMM, 2016 WL 11514940, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2016); Holmes et al. v. Godinez, 311 F.R.D. 177, 217 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Jackson et al. v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., No. 06 C 0493, 2006 WL 3718041, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2006); Westefer et al. v. Snyder et al., Nos. 00-162-GPM, 00-708-GPM, 2006 WL 2639972, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006).
The commonality analysis requires “a precise understanding of the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims.” Phillips, 828 F.3d at 552. Therefore, to begin, the Court will set forth the legal standard for a conditions of confinement claim. See id. at 554.
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Conditions of confinement that deprive inmates of “basic human needs” or “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Thus, in order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a prisoner must show: (1) a deprivation that is, from an objective standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, and (2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Defendant argues that commonality does not exist because questions regarding conditions of confinement are too individualized to resolve at once (Doc. 190, pp. 46–47). Defendant contends that conditions of confinement vary across the IDOC facilities, and that conditions even vary within the same facility, and cites to inmate testimony regarding cell size, cleaning supplies, cell temperature and ventilation (Id.). Conditions such as these do indeed vary, which Plaintiffs readily admit (see Docs. 222, 224). However, Plaintiffs’ claims do not rely on the types of conditions that differ between the facilities. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on the baseline conditions in restrictive housing that emanate from the IDOC’s formal policies and systemic practices and thus exist at every facility. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that inmates in restrictive housing at every facility, regardless of their designation (i.e., investigative status, temporary confinement, disciplinary segregation, or administrative detention), are kept in their cells for 22 to 24 hours per day without any meaningful human contact; denied basic privileges, out-ofcell-time, and programming; and subjected to double-celling and the threat of persistent, excessive physical and verbal abuse from correctional officers (Doc. 1; Doc. 222, pp. 27– 43; Doc. 224, p. 25; see also Doc. 220). They further allege these common conditions expose all inmates, and particularly mentally ill inmates, to a substantial risk of serious physical and mental harm to which Defendant is deliberately indifferent (Doc. 1; Doc. 222, pp. 27– 43; Doc. 224, p. 25; see also Doc. 220).
Plaintiffs support their claim with references to the Illinois regulations, admissions by IDOC officials, testimony from inmates, and expert reports from Dr. Haney and Mr. Vail. That evidence shows that cell doors regularly limit inmates’ ability to communicate
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with other inmates and staff from their cell. Access to phone calls, visits, religious and educational services, the chow hall, the day room, employment opportunities, and personal property is either nonexistent or significantly curtailed. Out-of-cell time is limited. Inmates routinely are not offered the full amount of yard time required by IDOC policy. Even when they are, they often refuse to go because the yards are unstimulating, unsanitary, and/or unsafe. Cells are extremely small but nevertheless frequently occupied by two inmates. Guards regularly use force against prisoners, chemical spray on prisoners, and use racial epithets and slurs when speaking. While variations undoubtedly exist between facilities as to other conditions, such as cleanliness, cell fixtures, and rodent and insect control, these dissimilarities do not bear on or somehow negate the broader, baseline conditions the facilities all have in common.31 It is those common baseline conditions in restrictive housing that Plaintiffs contend subject inmates to extreme social deprivation, profound levels of physical and mental idleness and inactivity, and rampant mistreatment by staff. And it is those common baseline conditions that Plaintiffs’ experts contend create a significant risk of serious harm for all
31 Some of alleged common conditions, such as restrictions on phone calls and visits, are set by the IDOC’s formal policies. Other conditions are not derived from the formal policies. For example, there is no written policy that directs officials to not provide inmates with the full eight hours of yard time each week or to subject them to physical abuse. Plaintiffs instead contend these are systemic practices that exist at every facility. However, Plaintiffs did not provide evidence as to all 25 of the IDOC’s facilities. Their experts visited six facilities, and, by the Court’s count, the named Plaintiffs testified about their experiences in restrictive housing at four of those same facilities (see Doc. 222, pp. 49–59; Doc. 190, pp. 13–26). But Defendant made no argument and provided no evidence that this sampling of facilities was not representative of all facilities (see Doc. 190). The Court finds that the nature and volume of Plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient as a representative sample of all IDOC facilities. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011) (explaining that anecdotal testimony from 1 in every 8 class members was “significant” while anecdotal testimony from 1 in every 12,500 class members was not).
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the prisoners who are subjected to them and, in fact, have already caused tremendous harm to scores of inmates.
Plaintiffs have thus met their burden by showing significant proof that common questions exist with respect to their conditions of confinement claim, namely, whether the conditions that exist as a result of the IDOC’s formal policies and systemic practices deprive class members of their basic human needs and expose them to a substantial risk of serious harm; and whether IDOC is deliberately indifferent to that harm.
To be clear, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ evidence and arguments at this stage are sufficient to establish that common questions exist as to all putative class members and the Court is not expressing any opinion as to whether Plaintiffs will ultimately succeed on the merits of their claim. The same holds true for the analysis in all sections that follow.
3. Commonality re: Due Process Claim To succeed on a due process claim, the prisoner must show they were deprived of a protected liberty interest and the procedures they were afforded were constitutionally deficient. Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 720 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Avoiding segregation can constitute a protected liberty interest,” but only when the more restrictive conditions in segregation impose “‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Lisle, 933 F.3d at 720– 21 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). In assessing whether segregation implicates a protected liberty interest, the court looks to “the combined import of the
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duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Here, Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing proof that common questions exist with respect to whether segregation in the IDOC gives rise to a protected liberty interest. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged and offered significant proof that a number of harsh conditions exist in restrictive housing units across all IDOC facilities, for all restrictive housing designations. Plaintiffs have also alleged and offered significant proof that inmates are regularly placed in restrictive housing for extended periods of time. Whether the conditions implicate a protected liberty interest is a question that can be answered in a single stroke as to all class members.
There are also additional common questions related to the second part of the due process analysis, which considers whether the procedures afforded to the inmate were constitutionally deficient. Looking first to investigative status and temporary confinement, Defendant contends that inmates subjected to these types of segregation are not entitled to any process (Doc. 190, p. 44). While there are Seventh Circuit cases that say as much, e.g., Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d at 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]nmates have no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative, protective, or investigative purposes.”), more recent cases question that conclusion. See, e.g., Earl v. Racine Cty. Jail, 718 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2013); Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2011). These newer cases suggest that non-punitive, discretionary segregation, which is typically imposed for only a short
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duration, can nevertheless implicate a liberty interest if the conditions are particularly harsh and restrictive compared to ordinary prison life. Earl, 718 F.3d at 691; Miller, 634 F.3d at 415. Whether the conditions IDOC inmates face in segregation are bad enough that inmates in investigative status and temporary confinement are entitled to some kind of procedural protections is a question common to the entire class.
Turning next to disciplinary segregation, the Supreme Court requires that an inmate facing disciplinary segregation be given:
1. a hearing with 24 hours’ advance written notice of the charges against them;
2. an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in their own defense, unless doing so would jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals;
3. the aid of a staff member or inmate in presenting a defense, if the inmate is illiterate or the issues complex;
4. an impartial tribunal; and 5. a written statement of reasons relied on by the tribunal. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–572 (1974). Here, Plaintiffs have shown proof that common questions exist with respect to the procedural protections afforded to inmates facing disciplinary segregation. Plaintiffs allege that, as a matter of systemic practice, the Adjustment Committee hearings used to impose a term of disciplinary segregation are perfunctory. Plaintiffs also claim that IDOC policy permits disciplinary segregation for minor infractions and permits lengthy sentences that are excessive and disproportionate. They support their claims with documentary evidence and deposition testimony, as well as the expert report of Eldon Vail. Mr. Vail reviewed well over one hundred inmate files and the IDOC’s hearing procedures, sentencing guidelines, and sentencing practices. He concluded the IDOC
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regularly conducts disciplinary hearings that are anything but meaningful due to deficiencies in the written policy and bad systemic practices. He further opined that policy permits and the IDOC regularly imposes segregation for offenses that do not warrant such a sentence because the offense did not pose a serious threat to institutional security. He also concluded the IDOC imposes lengthy segregation sentences that far exceed the norm for the field of corrections nationally. Mr. Vail also noted that these lengthy segregation sentences have been shown to increase the risk of harm to prisoners and do little, if anything, to modify behavior or provide deterrence.
Plaintiffs have thus met their burden by showing proof that common questions exist with respect to their due process claim regarding disciplinary segregation, including whether the IDOC’s disciplinary hearing policies and procedures fail to afford inmates adequate process to address the allegations brought against them; whether inmates in the IDOC are, as a matter of policy or practice, subjected to disproportionately unfair extreme isolation sentences; and whether the length of disciplinary segregation sentences, as a matter of policy or practice, is arbitrary and subject to abuse.
Finally, when it comes to administrative detention (or “AD” as it has been referred to previously in this Order), the required procedural protections are slightly different than those required for inmates facing disciplinary segregation. The Supreme Court requires that an inmate sent to AD must receive an “informal, nonadversary” review of the initial placement decision within a “reasonable time.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474 (1983); Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2017); Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684–86 (7th Cir. 2012). That means the inmate must be given “some notice of the
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reasons for [his] placement,” “an opportunity to present his views” to the prison official who decided to place him in AD, and “enough time to prepare adequately for the administrative review.” Proctor, 846 F.3d at 609 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476); Westefer, 682 F.3d at 684 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14 (1979)). The inmate must also receive “some sort of periodic review” of their placement in administrative detention to verify that they “[remain] a security risk.” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477, n.9; Westefer, 682 F.3d 679. The periodic reviews can also be “informal and nonadversary” but they “must still be meaningful and non-pretextual.” Westefer, 682 F.3d at 686; Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 527 (7th Cir. 2017).
Here, Plaintiffs have shown proof that common questions exist with respect to the procedural protections afforded to inmates sent to administrative detention. Plaintiffs claim the IDOC’s policy provides very vague criteria for placing an inmate in AD and the IDOC routinely places prisoners in AD without telling them why, for how long they will be confined, or what they need to do to get out. Plaintiffs allege that, as a matter of systemic practice, the periodic reviews are perfunctory. Again here, Plaintiffs offered documentary evidence and deposition testimony to support their claims, as well as, the expert report of Eldon Vail. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have provided evidence demonstrating commonality among the class when it comes to administrative detention: whether the IDOC’s administrative detention review policies and practices fail to afford prisoners adequate process.
To conclude, commonality has been satisfied as to both of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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4. Typicality The third requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement is meant to ensure that there is “enough congruence between the named representative’s claim and that of the unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the group.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011). In other words, the named representative’s claims must have “the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)). It is well-established that typicality is satisfied if the named representative’s claim “arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and . . . [the] claims are based on the same legal theory.” Oshana, 472 F.3d at (citing Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992)); De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232. The standard for typicality does not require the facts underlying every claim to be identical. De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232 (“The typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members.”) (citations omitted); 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:17 (11th ed. 2014) (“[M]inor factual differences between the claim of the putative representative and class members ordinarily will not defeat a finding of typicality, as the requirement does not require perfect overlap of circumstances.”).
55

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Defendant focuses on the alleged factual differences among the named Plaintiffs’ circumstances and insists that these differences defeat typicality (Doc. 190). But none of the named Plaintiffs are contesting the particulars of their own placement in restrictive housing. Rather, they are challenging as a general matter whether restrictive housing in the IDOC is cruel and unusual and whether it is imposed without due process. Their claims are based on conduct that is not unique to them. Both the named Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent are all subject to the same formal policies and systemic practices, which expose them to a substantial risk of serious harm and denial of due process. Furthermore, they all face the risk of the same constitutional deprivations caused by those policies and practices. Thus typicality is satisfied.
5. Adequacy of Representation The fourth and final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the named plaintiffs and proposed class counsel must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Defendant does not challenge the adequacy of class counsel (see Doc. 190; Doc. 220, p. 29), and the Court has no reason to believe they are not qualified. Therefore, the Court will only analyze whether the named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives. “A class representative must be part of the class and must ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the other class members.” Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011)). All six of the named Plaintiffs remain in custody—some are in restrictive housing and some have been returned to general population. Those who are currently in general
56

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population face a potential return to restrictive housing at anytime pursuant to the system-wide policies and practices at issue in this case and thus are at risk of being exposed to the purported due process violations and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Those who are currently in restrictive housing are actively exposed to the purported due process violations and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. While no inmate will have an experience identical to another, all inmates—including the named Plaintiffs—are subjected to the same system-wide policies and practices governing extreme isolation. Thus, the named Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with the putative class and adequacy is satisfied.
6. Rule 23(b)(2) Along with satisfying Rule 23(a), a party seeking class certification must also meet one of the requirements under Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs seek to certify a class for injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2); they are not seeking monetary damages. Under Rule 23(b)(2), class certification is allowed where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Defendant makes a number of arguments as to why certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate (Doc. 190, pp. 54–59), but they all relate to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, which are not at issue at the class certification stage. None of the arguments provide any reason that certification is inappropriate. Plaintiffs seek to cure purported systemic defects in how the IDOC as a whole administers placement in
57

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extreme isolation. “Providing a vehicle for redressing civil rights violations on a classwide basis through injunctive or declaratory relief is the fundamental purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) [and it] is routinely employed as a tool to vindicate the civil rights of prison inmates.” Westefer v. Snyder, No. CIV. 00-162-GPM, 2006 WL 2639972, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006) (citing cases); accord Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 686 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[F]ollowing Rule 23(b)(2)’s text and purpose, courts have repeatedly invoked it to certify classes of inmates seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged widespread Eighth Amendment violations in prison systems.”) The injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs would address the IDOC’s policies and practices regarding restrictive housing and prescribe a standard of conduct applicable to all class members.
Thus, the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are satisfied. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s first motion to supplement (Doc. 225) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is granted as to the new case law but denied as to the IDOC Administrative Directive and updated restrictive housing data. Defendant’s second motion to supplement (Doc. 227) is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Doc. 173) is GRANTED. The following class is CERTIFIED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2):
All prisoners who are now or will be incarcerated in adult correctional facilities by the Illinois Department of Corrections and thus who are at risk of being subjected to extreme isolation or who are currently subjected to extreme isolation.
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Winston & Strawn, LLP and the Uptown People’s Law Center are APPOINTED as counsel to the class.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SUBSTITUTE Rob Jeffreys, in his official capacity, for John Baldwin as the Defendant in this case.
The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to strike the memorandum in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Doc. 174), Plaintiffs’ exhibit list (Doc. 182), and their reply brief (Doc. 197) and include a note on the docket at Docs. 174, 182, and 197 that updated versions of these documents were subsequently filed on December 14, 2021 and can be found on the docket at Docs. 222, 223, and 224.
Plaintiffs shall file the exhibits to their Complaint as a new entry on the docket. Plaintiffs shall submit directly to the Court (MABpd@ilsd.uscourts.gov) a new public, redacted version of Eldon Vail’s expert report that includes his Appendices.

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 14, 2021

s/ Mark A. Beatty MARK A. BEATTY United States Magistrate Judge

59

 
 Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 1 of 27
BEB−MAG,CASREF,CJRA_A,KLH2
U.S. District Court Southern District of Illinois (East St. Louis) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:16−cv−00600−MAB

Davis et al v. Baldwin Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff Henry Davis

Date Filed: 06/02/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alan S. Mills Uptown People's Law Generally Admitted 4413 N. Sheridan Chicago, IL 60640 773−769−1411 Fax: 773−769−2224 Email: alan@uplcchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alyssa E. Ramirez Winston & Strawn LLP − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−3267 Email: alyssa−ramirez−3911@ecf.pacerpro.com TERMINATED: 03/06/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Cara Lawson Winston & Strawn LLP − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 734−478−1967 Email: clawson@winston.com TERMINATED: 08/16/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Elizabeth Mazur Uptown People's Law Center 4413 N. Sheridan Road Chicago, IL 60640 773−769−1411 Fax: 773−769−2224 Email: liz@uplcchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joanna Frances Cornwell Winston & Strawn − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−3187 Fax: 312−558−5700 Email: jcornwell@winston.com TERMINATED: 10/26/2017 PRO HAC VICE

Matthew R. DalSanto Winston & Strawn − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−6211

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 2 of 27

Fax: 312−558−5700 Email: mdalsanto@winston.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole Schult Uptown People's Law Center 4413 N. Sheridan Road Chicago, IL 60640 773−769−1411 Fax: 773−769−2224 Email: nicole@uplcchicago.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reid Smith Winston & Strawn − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−7241 Email: rfsmith@winston.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ross J. Corbett Winston & Strawn LLP − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−3760 Fax: 312−558−5700 Email: rcorbett@winston.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shawn J. Gebhardt Winston & Strawn LLP − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−3741 Fax: 312−558−5700 Email: shawn−gebhardt−5607@ecf.pacerpro.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimball R. Anderson Winston & Strawn − Chicago, IL 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601−9703 312−558−5858 Fax: 312−558−5700 Email: kanderson@winston.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Douglas Coleman

represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alyssa E. Ramirez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Cara Lawson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 3 of 27

Plaintiff Aaron Fillmore

Elizabeth Mazur (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joanna Frances Cornwell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2017 PRO HAC VICE
Matthew R. DalSanto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reid Smith (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ross J. Corbett (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shawn J. Gebhardt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimball R. Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alyssa E. Ramirez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Cara Lawson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Elizabeth Mazur (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joanna Frances Cornwell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2017 PRO HAC VICE
Matthew R. DalSanto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 4 of 27

Nicole Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reid Smith (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ross J. Corbett (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shawn J. Gebhardt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimball R. Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jerome Jones

represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alyssa E. Ramirez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Cara Lawson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Elizabeth Mazur (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joanna Frances Cornwell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2017 PRO HAC VICE

Matthew R. DalSanto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reid Smith (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ross J. Corbett (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 5 of 27

Shawn J. Gebhardt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimball R. Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Deshawn Gardner

represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alyssa E. Ramirez (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Cara Lawson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2019 PRO HAC VICE

Elizabeth Mazur (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joanna Frances Cornwell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2017 PRO HAC VICE

Matthew R. DalSanto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicole Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Reid Smith (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ross J. Corbett (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shawn J. Gebhardt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kimball R. Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Percell Dansberry

represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alyssa E. Ramirez

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 6 of 27
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Cara Lawson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/16/2019 PRO HAC VICE
Elizabeth Mazur (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joanna Frances Cornwell (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/26/2017 PRO HAC VICE
Matthew R. DalSanto (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nicole Schult (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reid Smith (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ross J. Corbett (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Shawn J. Gebhardt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimball R. Anderson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
John Baldwin Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections

represented by Laura K. Bautista Illinois Attorney General's Office − Springfield 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62706 217−557−0261 Fax: 217−524−5091 Email: lbautista@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam J. Poe Illinois Attorney General's Office − Springfield 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−5819

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 7 of 27
Fax: 217−524−5091 Email: KWerth@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 03/23/2017
Ayesha Patel Office of the Attorney General−Springfield 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−9014 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: CStarkweather@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 10/11/2019
Gary S. Caplan Illinois Attorney General's Office − Chicago 2 100 West Randolph Street 12th Floor Chicago, IL 60601−3175 312−814−5661 Fax: 312−814−3806 Email: gcaplan@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 10/11/2019
Lisa A. Cook Office of the Attorney General−Springfield 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−9014 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: lcook@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Jennings Office of the Attorney General−Springfield 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−785−4555 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: LCrouch@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 10/11/2019
Robert L. Fanning Office of the Attorney General−Springfield 500 South Second Street Springfield, IL 62701 217−782−2077 Fax: 217−782−8767 Email: ddesalle@atg.state.il.us TERMINATED: 10/11/2019

V.
Interested Party
Charles Donelson TERMINATED: 03/19/2019

represented by Charles Donelson R02279 STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER Route 53 PO Box 112 Joliet, IL 60434 PRO SE

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 8 of 27

Date Filed 06/02/2016 06/02/2016 06/03/2016 06/07/2016
06/07/2016 06/07/2016 06/16/2016 06/29/2016 06/29/2016 06/29/2016 06/29/2016 06/30/2016 07/01/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against John Baldwin ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0754−2954086.), filed by Percell Dansberry, Jerome Jones, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Douglas Coleman, Deshawn Gardner. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons)(Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Kimball R. Anderson on behalf of Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
3 Notice of Judge Assignment. Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan assigned. All future documents must bear case number 16−600−MJR. If the parties consent to Magistrate Judge assignment, the consent form with instruction is attached for your convenience. (slh) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
4 ORDER REFERRING CASE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE. Plaintiffs are prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Represented by counsel, they bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated inmates, and have prepaid the $400 filing fee. Each of the named Plaintiffs is or has been incarcerated at Lawrence or Menard Correctional Center under conditions they describe as "extreme isolation." They allege that the conditions of their confinement in administrative segregation violate their Eighth Amendment rights, and that they have suffered a deprivation of a liberty interest without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek class action certification, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the complaint. Accepting Plaintiffs' allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have articulated a colorable federal cause of action against Defendant for violations of their constitutional rights. Accordingly, pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre−trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral. Counsel for Plaintiffs may initiate service without further delay. Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 6/7/2016. (tjk)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 06/07/2016)
5 CONSENT/NON−CONSENT TO U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE − sealed pending receipt from all parties. (Anderson, Kimball) Unsealed on 7/12/2016 (slh). (Entered: 06/07/2016)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Alan S. Mills on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
7 Summons Issued as to John Baldwin. (slh) (Entered: 06/16/2016)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Robert L. Fanning on behalf of John Baldwin (Fanning, Robert) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Laura K. Bautista on behalf of John Baldwin (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Adam J. Poe on behalf of John Baldwin (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Ayesha Patel on behalf of John Baldwin (Patel, Ayesha) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
12 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Attorney Joanna Frances Cornwell $200 fee paid,receipt number 0754−2977668 by on behalf of Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Cornwell, Joanna) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
13 ORDER granting 12 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Attorney Joanna F. Cornwell on behalf of Plaintiffs. (slh)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT.

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 9 of 27

07/08/2016 07/11/2016 07/11/2016 07/12/2016 07/13/2016
08/02/2016
08/03/2016 08/04/2016 08/05/2016
08/22/2016 08/22/2016 08/31/2016 09/01/2016

NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/01/2016)
14 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by John Baldwin. (Fanning, Robert) (Entered: 07/08/2016)
15 ORDER granting 14 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Answer due August 8, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 7/11/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/11/2016)
16 FINAL CONSENT TO U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE (Fanning, Robert) Modified on 7/12/2016 (slh). (Entered: 07/11/2016)
17 NOTICE OF REFERRAL: Upon consent of parties case transferred to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for final disposition. (slh) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
18 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 8/5/2016 at 3:00 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/13/2016)
Reset Hearings: Due to the unavailability of the Court, the Status Conference is RESET for 8/5/2016 at 2:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (amv) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
19 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Admission by Attorney Alyssa E. Ramirez $200 fee paid,receipt number 0754−3003855 by on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Ramirez, Alyssa) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
20 ORDER Granting 19 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice Admission by Attorney Alyssa E. Ramirez. (mar)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 08/04/2016)
21 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Status Conference held on 8/5/2016. Joanna Cornwell, Alan Mills, and Alyssa Ramirez for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista for Defendant. Defendant shall have and additional 14 days, until 8/22/16, to file an answer or responsive pleading. Scheduling Conference set for 9/1/2016 at 2:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Parties to provide a proposed class action scheduling order. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 08/08/2016)
22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and, MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint by John Baldwin. Responses due by 9/26/2016 (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
23 MEMORANDUM in Support re 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint filed by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 08/22/2016)
24 STRICKEN−MOTION Plaintiffs' Proposed Report of the Parties and Proposed Scheduling and Discovery Order (Class Action) by All Plaintiffs. (Anderson, Kimball) Modified on 9/1/2016 (jlrr). (Entered: 08/31/2016)
25 NOTICE STRIKING ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS striking 24 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Henry Davis, Jerome Jones, Deshawn Gardner, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Percell Dansberry. This document is a proposed Scheduling and Discovery Order. Proposed documents are not to be efiled. Efiler is instructed to email this document to Judge Williams' proposed email inbox for review and approval.(jlrr)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/01/2016)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 10 of 27

09/01/2016 09/02/2016
09/07/2016 09/26/2016 10/03/2016
10/03/2016 10/20/2016 10/21/2016
10/24/2016 10/25/2016
10/27/2016 11/01/2016 11/02/2016

26 SUPPLEMENT by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. Supplement to 1 Complaint, (Exhibits A − G). (Ramirez, Alyssa) (Entered: 09/01/2016)
27 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Status Conference held on 9/2/2016. Joanna Cornwell, Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Adam Poe and Laura Bautista for Defendant. Court modifies defendant's proposed scheduling order. Status Conference set for 11/18/2016 at 10:45 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/02/2016)
28 SCHEDULING ORDER: Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 9/7/16. (Attachments: # 1 Joint Report of the Parties)(amv) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
29 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint (Unopposed) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Ramirez, Alyssa) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
30 ORDER granting 29 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint. Responses due by 10/4/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 10/3/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/03/2016)
31 RESPONSE in Opposition re 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint filed by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 10/03/2016)
32 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
33 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint. Replies due by 10/24/2016.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 10/21/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/21/2016)
34 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 10/24/2016)
35 ORDER granting 34 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint. Replies due by 10/27/2016.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 10/25/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/25/2016)
36 REPLY to Response to Motion re 22 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , or in the alternative, to Sever the Complaint filed by John Baldwin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Poe, Adam) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
37 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File ESI Protocol by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Cornwell, Joanna) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
38 NOTICE OF ERRORS AND/OR DEFICIENCIES re 37 Motion for Extension of Time. See attached document for specifics. (kdb) (Entered: 11/02/2016)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 11 of 27

11/02/2016 11/11/2016 11/14/2016 11/18/2016
12/01/2016 12/02/2016 12/05/2016 12/16/2016 12/19/2016 12/23/2016 12/27/2016 12/27/2016 01/06/2017

39 ORDER granting 37 Motion for Extension of Time. ESI protocol to be submitted by November 11, 2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 11/2/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/02/2016)
40 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File ESI Protocol by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Cornwell, Joanna) (Entered: 11/11/2016)
41 ORDER granting 40 Motion for Extension of Time. ESI protocol should be submitted to the Court by 11/18/2016. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 11/14/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/14/2016)
42 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Status Conference held on 11/18/2016. Joanna Cornwell, Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Adam Poe for Defendants. Parties SHALL meet and confer regarding ESI protocol no later than 12/16/16. The meet and confer shall include representative litigation counsel along with ESI experts designated to address search issues for CMS and, if necessary, IDOC. Designated ESI expert from Plaintiff's counsel's firm (which may also be litigation counsel possessing such expertise) shall also participate. The parties shall submit the ESI protocol no later than 1/6/17. Parties shall also submit proposed protective order and HIPAA order no later than 11/29/16. Status Conference set for 2/10/2017 at 11:00 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/21/2016)
43 HIPAA Qualified Protective ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 11/29/2016. (anj) Modified on 12/2/2016 (kek). (Entered: 12/01/2016)
44 NOTICE OF MODIFICATION OF DOCKET TEXT re 43 Order. Judge's signature date modified in the docket text to 11/29/2016. This notice is for information only. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/02/2016)
45 AGREED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER with modifications to paragraphs 7, 9(b), and 10. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/5/2016. (anj) (Entered: 12/05/2016)
46 MOTION for Extension of Time to Comply with Order regarding ESI Conference by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 12/16/2016)
47 ORDER granting 46 Motion for Extension of Time. The parties have until December 20, 2016 in which to meet and confer regarding the ESI protocol. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/19/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/19/2016)
48 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Responses by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 12/23/2016)
49 ORDER granting 48 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Discovery responses due January 6, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/27/2016. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/27/2016)
50 RESPONSE in Opposition re 48 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Responses filed by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 12/27/2016)
51 MOTION to Enter Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery Plan for Electronically Stored Information by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 01/06/2017)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 12 of 27

01/06/2017 01/06/2017 01/09/2017 01/09/2017 01/10/2017 01/13/2017 01/17/2017
01/20/2017 01/23/2017 01/24/2017
01/24/2017
01/25/2017

52 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
53 MOTION for Extension of Time to File in Compliance with the Court's 11/21/16 Order concerning Proposed ESI Protocol by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
54 ORDER granting 52 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Discovery responses due January 13, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 1/9/2017. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/09/2017)
55 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Attorney Reid Smith $200 fee paid,receipt number 0754−3129465 by on behalf of Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Smith, Reid) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
56 ORDER granting 55 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice filed by Attorney Reid Smith. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/10/2017)
57 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
58 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 51 MOTION to Enter Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery Plan for Electronically Stored Information , 53 MOTION for Extension of Time to File in Compliance with the Court's 11/21/16 Order concerning Proposed ESI Protocol, 57 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery : Motion Hearing set for 1/24/2017 at 01:30 PM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted, enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted again enter Security Code 9467.(anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/17/2017)
59 RESPONSE in Opposition re 51 MOTION to Enter Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery Plan for Electronically Stored Information filed by John Baldwin. (Poe, Adam) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
60 NOTICE of Appearance by Gary S. Caplan on behalf of All Defendants (Caplan, Gary) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
61 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Motion Hearing held on 1/24/2017 re 51 MOTION to Enter Plaintiffs' Proposed Discovery Plan for Electronically Stored Information filed by Henry Davis, Jerome Jones, Deshawn Gardner, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Percell Dansberry, 57 Third MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by John Baldwin, 53 MOTION for Extension of Time to File in Compliance with the Court's 11/21/16 Order concerning Proposed ESI Protocol filed by John Baldwin. Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez, Joanna Frances Cornwell and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Adam Poe, Laura Bautista and Gary Caplan for Defendant. This matter is set for discovery dispute conference on 2/10/17 at 10:45 am. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. Modified on 1/26/2017 (kek). (Entered: 01/24/2017)
62 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 2/10/2017 at 10:45 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (amv) THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. Modified on 1/26/2017 (kek). (Entered: 01/24/2017)
63 ORDER regarding January 24, 2017 hearing, finding as moot 51 Motion to enter Plaintiff's proposed ESI Order; finding as moot 53 Motion for Extension of Time to File; finding as moot 57 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 1/25/2017. (anj) (Entered: 01/25/2017)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 13 of 27

01/26/2017 02/10/2017
03/01/2017 03/01/2017 03/01/2017 03/09/2017 03/10/2017

64 NOTICE OF ERRORS re 61 Minute Entry re Motion Hearing and 62 Notice of Hearing − The docket text of said entries incorrectly lists the year in the date of hearing. The Discovery Dispute Conference is set for 2/10/2017 at 10:45 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Modifications have been made to entries 61 and 62 accordingly. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/26/2017)
65 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 2/10/2017. Joanna Cornwell, Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez, Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista, Adam Poe, and Gary Caplan for Defendants. Parties continue to meet and confer regarding multiple disputed issues. Parties are making progress on esi protocol. Parties continue to confer regarding sources of information, custodians, and search terms. Defendant's are continuing to produce responsive documents. Plaintiffs are concerned about production of Veran Institute Report documents. Parties have agreed on an extension until next week for Defendants' response to Rule 33 interrogatories. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 3/1/2017 at 3:00 PM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Barb Kniepmann.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 02/13/2017)
66 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 3/1/2017. Parties discuss discovery still in dispute. Parties are finalizing ESI protocol but have remaining disputes regarding custodians and responses to written discovery. Discovery Dispute Conference reset for 3/9/2017 at 02:30 PM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Call−in information remains the same. (Court Reporter Molly Clayton.) (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/01/2017)
67 STRICKEN BY ORDER OF COURT Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Pretrial Conference held on 3/1/2017. Alexa Newton for Plaintiff; Jeremy Tyrrell for IDOC Defendants; Tim Dugan for Wexford Defendants. The Court states on the record which Defendants remain in case. Status Conference set for 3/16/2017 at 10:15 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams to discuss setting a settlement conference. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Molly Clayton.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/01/2017)
68 NOTICE STRIKING ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS striking Minute Entry 67 Pretrial Conference as entry docketed in incorrect case. (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/01/2017)
69 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 3/9/2017. Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez, Joanna Cornwell and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs; Adam Poe, Laura Bautista and Gary Caplan for Defendants. Parties dispute as to whether documents should be redacted for safety and security concerns or produced in their entirety pursuant to a protective order. Defendant to submit a six page, single spaced brief as well as a sampling of documents for in−camera review by March 30, 2017. Plaintiffs have until April 6, 2017 to submit a responsive brief. Next discovery dispute conference set for April 13, 2017 at 2:30 p.m. (Court Reporter Barb Kniepmann.) (amv) THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/10/2017)
70 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 4/13/2017 at 2:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467.

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 14 of 27

03/10/2017 03/22/2017 03/22/2017 03/22/2017 03/23/2017 03/24/2017 04/12/2017
04/19/2017
04/20/2017
04/21/2017 04/21/2017 04/21/2017
05/09/2017

(amv) THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/10/2017)
71 ORDER denying 22 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/10/2017. (anj) (Entered: 03/10/2017)
72 NOTICE of Appearance by Melissa A. Jennings on behalf of John Baldwin (Jennings, Melissa) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
73 NOTICE of Appearance by Lisa A. Cook on behalf of John Baldwin (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
74 MOTION to Substitute Attorney by John Baldwin. (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 03/22/2017)
75 ORDER granting 74 Motion to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Adam J. Poe terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/23/2017. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/23/2017)
76 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by John Baldwin.(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
Reset Hearings: Discovery Dispute Conference RESET for 4/19/2017 at 1:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (amv) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
79 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 4/19/2017. Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez, Joanna Cornwell, Reid Smith and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook, Melissa Jennings, Laura Bautista and Gary Caplan for Defendants. (Court Reporter Barb Kniepmann.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/21/2017)
77 STRICKEN BY ORDER OF COURT Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Status Conference held on 4/20/2017. Lucas Pendry for Plaintiff. Jason Winslow and Jeff Glass for Defendant. Status Conference set for 5/4/2017 at 8:45 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/21/2017)
78 NOTICE STRIKING ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS striking 77 Minutes of Status Conference. Entry docketed in incorrect case. (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/21/2017)
80 ORDER regarding 4/19/2017 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 4/21/2017. (anj) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
81 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 5/9/2017 at 9:00 AM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (amv) THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/21/2017)
82 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 5/9/2017. Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez, Joanna Cornwell, Reid Smith and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista, Gary Caplan, Lisa Cook and Melissa Jennings for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 6/21/2017 at 2:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 15 of 27

05/10/2017 05/12/2017 05/15/2017 05/17/2017 06/21/2017
06/22/2017 06/23/2017 07/05/2017
07/14/2017
07/14/2017

TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 05/10/2017)
83 ORDER regarding 5/9/2017 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 5/10/2017. (anj) (Entered: 05/10/2017)
84 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 5/12/2017. (anj) (Entered: 05/12/2017)
85 NOTICE of Appearance by Shawn J. Gebhardt on behalf of Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones (Gebhardt, Shawn) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
86 ORDER ADOPTING parties' ESI Plan with modification to paragraph B.1.a.(2). The Court will not file exhibits identifying custodians and search terms in the public record but the exhibits are to be maintained by the parties. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 5/17/2017. (anj) (Entered: 05/17/2017)
87 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 6/21/2017. Alan Mills, Alyssa Ramirez and Sean Shawn Gebhardt for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista, Lisa Cook and Melissa Jennings for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 7/14/2017 at 10:30 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Molly Clayton.) (drb)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 06/21/2017)
Set Hearings: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 7/14/2017 at 10:30 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. (kek) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
88 ORDER regarding 6/21/2017 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 6/23/2017. (anj) (Entered: 06/23/2017)
89 Transcript of DISCOVERY DISPUTE CONFERENCE held on 5/09/2017, before Judge Stephen C. Williams. Court Reporter/Transcriber Laura A. Esposito, Telephone number (618) 482−9481.
NOTICE: Attorneys and unrepresented parties have 7 calendar days to file a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript and 21 calendar days to file a Redaction Request. If redactions are not requested, the transcript will be made remotely available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days. See the full Transcript Policy on the website at http://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/forms/TransPolicy.pdf
Transcript may be viewed at the public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/26/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/7/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/3/2017. (lae) (Entered: 07/05/2017)
90 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 7/14/2017. Alyssa Ramirez, Reid Smith, Shawn Gebhardt for Plaintiffs. Melissa Jennings, Laura Bautista and Gary Caplan for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 8/15/2017 at 3:00 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/14/2017)
91 ORDER regarding 7/14/2017 discovery dispute conference. As stated in the record, the Court finds that the process the Defendant is using for identifying non−email ESI is reasonable, and being conducted in good faith. The Court notes that the deadline for ESI discovery is August 9, 2017. The next status conference is set for August 15, 2017 at 3:00 p.m. The parties are welcome to provide the Court with a joint submission on any discovery issues for that hearing by close of business on August 14, 2017. Signed

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 16 of 27

08/15/2017
09/14/2017
10/16/2017 10/26/2017 10/26/2017 10/30/2017 11/06/2017 11/06/2017

by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 7/14/2017. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/14/2017)
92 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 8/15/2017. Alyssa Ramirez, Reid Smith and Shawn Gebhardt appear for Plaintiffs. Gary Caplan, Lisa Cook, Laura Bautista and Melissa Jennings appear for Defendants. The Parties are to meet and confer regarding streamlining the ESI search parameters based on the results of Defendant's test searches. Meet and confer to take place by September 5, 2017. Defense is directed to make timely notification to Plaintiffs if subsequent test searches require additional meet and confer regarding modification of the search terms. ESI searches and production due by November 7, 2017. Next Discovery Dispute Conference set for 9/14/2017 at 11:00 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 08/15/2017)
93 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 9/14/2017. Alyssa Ramirez and Reid Smith for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook, Laura Bautista and Melissa Jennings for Defendants. Defendants to provide updated ESI search information to Plaintiffs by October 3, 2017. Parties to then meet and confer to further refine searches by October 11, 2017. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 10/18/2017 at 10:00 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/14/2017)
94 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference reset for 10/30/2017 at 02:00 PM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Call−in information remains the same. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/16/2017)
95 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Joanna Cornwell by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Smith, Reid) (Entered: 10/26/2017)
96 ORDER granting 95 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Joanna Frances Cornwell terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 10/26/2017. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/26/2017)
97 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference reset for 11/6/2017 at 11:00 AM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Call−in information remains the same. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/30/2017)
98 ORDER regarding November 6, 2017 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 11/6/2017. (anj) (Entered: 11/06/2017)
99 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 11/6/2017. Alyssa Ramirez and Kimball Anderson for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista, Lisa Cook and Melissa Jennings for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 11/15/2017 at 3:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Stephanie Rennegarbe.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/06/2017)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 17 of 27

11/07/2017 11/14/2017 11/15/2017
11/16/2017
12/01/2017 12/01/2017
12/13/2017 12/14/2017 12/14/2017 12/14/2017 12/14/2017
01/22/2018

100 ORDER. The parties are granted leave to conduct the depositions of incarcerated individuals Kilsey Shearrill (#B79268) and Cordell Sanders(#R41346) pursuant to FRCP 30(a)(2)(B). Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 11/7/2017. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/07/2017)
101 NOTICE OF STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE by John Baldwin (Jennings, Melissa) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
102 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 11/15/2017. Kimball Anderson and Reid Smith for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook, Melissa Jennings and Laura Bautista for Defendants. Case set for 12/1/17 at 2:30 pm for discovery dispute conference. (Court Reporter Molly Clayton.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/16/2017)
103 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 12/1/2017 at 2:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/16/2017)
104 ORDER regarding 12/1/2017 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/1/2017. (anj) (Entered: 12/01/2017)
105 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 12/1/2017. Kimball Anderson, Alyssa Ramirez and Reid Smith for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook, Melissa Jennings and Laura Bautista for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 12/14/2017 at 11:15 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. (Court Reporter Barb Kniepmann.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/01/2017)
106 MOTION to Clarify or Correct This Court's Order Concerning the Status of ESI Discovery by John Baldwin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 12/13/2017)
107 [STRICKEN PER DOC. 108]ORDER regarding December 14, 2017 discovery dispute conference, finding as moot 106 Motion to Clarify. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/14/2017. (anj) Modified on 12/14/2017 (anj). (Entered: 12/14/2017)
108 ORDER STRIKING 107 Order on Motion to Clarify as Order contains incorrect dates. Corrected Order to be entered. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/14/2017. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/14/2017)
109 ORDER regarding December 14, 2017 discovery dispute conference, FINDING AS MOOT 106 MOTION to Clarify. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 12/14/2017. (anj) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
110 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 12/14/2017. Alyssa Ramirex and Reid Smith for Plaintiffs. Melissa Jennings and Laura Bautista for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 1/22/2018 at 9:30 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Molly Clayton.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/14/2017)
111 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 1/22/2018. Discovery Dispute/Rule 16 Conference set for 1/29/2018 at 10:00 AM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Counsel shall appear in person. Status Conference set for 3/7/2018 at 1:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows:

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 18 of 27

01/22/2018 01/29/2018
01/29/2018 01/30/2018 02/02/2018 02/07/2018 02/26/2018 03/07/2018 03/08/2018
03/12/2018

Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Molly Clayton.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/22/2018)
112 ORDER regarding 1/22/2018 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 1/22/2018. (anj) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
113 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 1/29/2018. Alan Mills and Reid Smith appear for Plaintiffs in open court. Kimball Anderson and Alyssa Ramirez for Plaintiffs via telephone. Gary Kaplan, Melissa Jennings, and Lisa Cook for Defendants. Pursuant to Rule 16, the Court discusses two potential stipulations with the parties and agreement is reached regarding the content of the stipulation concerning Defendant's notice of the Vera Institute's report and findings. Final version of the stipulation and order is due with the Court no later than 2/2/18. No agreement could be reached concerning the second proposed stipulation relating to the Defendant's response/actions to/subsequent to the Vera study. The Court orders expedited filing and response to requests to admit. Plaintiffs shall file requests to admit on these topics no later than 2/5/18. Defendant shall file its response no later than 2/26/18. Plaintiff shall also submit revised search terms with proposed Boolean connectors no later than 2/5/18. Defendant shall run search and provide hit count no later than 2/19/18. Parties shall then further meet and confer. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 3/7/2018 at 1:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 888−684−8852; when prompted enter Access Code 6049846; and when prompted enter Security Code 9467. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv) (Entered: 01/29/2018)
114 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew R. DalSanto on behalf of All Plaintiffs (DalSanto, Matthew) (Entered: 01/29/2018)
Set Deadlines: Plaintiffs' Requests to Admit due by 2/5/2018. Defendant's Response due by 2/26/2018. (kek) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
115 ORDER regarding Joint Stipulation on Notice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 2/2/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(anj) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
116 Plaintiffs' First Set of REQUEST for Admissions to Defendant by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones.(Ramirez, Alyssa) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
117 RESPONSE/ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS by John Baldwin. Related document: 116 Request for Admissions filed by Henry Davis, Jerome Jones, Deshawn Gardner, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Percell Dansberry.(Jennings, Melissa) (Entered: 02/26/2018)
118 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 3/8/2018 at 09:00 AM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 1−877−873−8017; when prompted, enter Access Code 7937009.(anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/07/2018)
119 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 3/8/2018. Alyssa Ramirez, Kimball Anderson, Alan Mills and Reid Smith appear for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook, Laura Bautista and Gary Caplan appear for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 5/18/2018 at 2:00 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (Please note the numbers have changed) (Court Reporter Chris Dohack.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/08/2018)
120 ORDER regarding 3/8/2018 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/12/2018. (anj) (Entered: 03/12/2018)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 19 of 27

03/20/2018 04/05/2018 04/16/2018 04/25/2018 04/26/2018 04/27/2018 05/18/2018 05/18/2018 05/18/2018 06/05/2018
06/21/2018
06/21/2018

121 Amended Scheduling ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/20/2018. (anj) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
122 RESPONSE to 116 Request for Admissions Revised filed by John Baldwin. (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 04/05/2018)
123 NOTICE of Hearing:Discovery Dispute Conference set for 4/25/2018 at 04:00 PM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 1−877−336−1829; when prompted, enter Access Code 4442281.(anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/16/2018)
126 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 4/25/2018. Alyssa Ramirez, Kimball Anderson, and Reid Smith for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista, Gary Caplan and Lisa Cook for Defendants. (Court Reporter Liberty Recording.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/27/2018)
124 ORDER regarding 4/25/2018 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 4/25/2018. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. Modified on 4/27/2018 (kek). (Entered: 04/26/2018)
125 NOTICE OF MODIFICATION re 124 Order. Docket text modified to correct the Judge's signature date to 4/25/2018. This notice is sent for informational purposes only. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/27/2018)
127 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 5/18/2018. Kimball Anderson and Reid Smith for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook, Laura Bautista, and Gary Caplan for Defendants. Discovery Dispute Conference set 6/5/18 at 4:00 p.m.(Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 05/18/2018)
128 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 6/5/2018 at 4:00 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 05/18/2018)
129 ORDER regarding 5/18/2018 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 5/18/2018. (anj) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
130 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 6/5/2018. Kimball Anderson and Alyssa Ramirez for Plaintiffs. Laura Bautista and Lisa Cook for Defendant. The parties are working through document production. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 6/21/2018 at 3:30 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 06/05/2018)
131 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 6/21/2018, ( Discovery Dispute Conference set for 7/6/2018 at 3:00 PM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 06/21/2018)
132 Amended Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 6/21/2018. Final supplemental production due June 28, 2018. The remaining documents which are being withheld for

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06/27/2018 06/27/2018 07/06/2018 07/06/2018 07/06/2018
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07/16/2018
07/27/2018
09/18/2018 09/18/2018

security reasons should be logged on a privilege log and submitted to the Court for in−camera review by June 28 to the Courts proposed documents email. Next hearing set for July 6, 2018 at 3:00 p.m. Parties to submit proposed joint amended scheduling order prior to next hearing. Discovery Dispute Conference set 7/6/18 at 3:00 pm before Magistrate Judge Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 06/21/2018)
133 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Attorney Cara Lawson $200 fee paid,receipt number 0754−3601284 by on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Lawson, Cara) (Entered: 06/27/2018)
134 ORDER granting 133 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice filed by Attorney Cara Lawson. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 06/27/2018)
135 ORDER regarding 7/6/2018 discovery dispute conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 7/6/2018. (anj) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
136 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 7/6/2018. (anj) (Entered: 07/06/2018)
137 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 7/6/2018. Status Conference set for 10/25/2018 at 9:00 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/06/2018)
138 NOTICE of Appearance by Elizabeth Mazur on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Mazur, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
139 NOTICE of Hearing: Discovery Dispute Conference set for 7/16/2018 at 11:30 AM in Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 1−877−336−1829; when prompted, enter Access Code 4442281.(anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/12/2018)
140 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 7/16/2018. Defendant raises concerns over start time for Plaintiff's prison tours as Plaintiff seeks to start the tours during the time the prison takes its morning count. To avoid interfering with the prison's schedule, the parties are DIRECTED to start the tours one hour later, at 8:00 a.m. and thereby delay the proposed schedule by one hour, with the understanding that interviews of inmates may go later in the day and IDOC will have to work to accommodate those later interviews. Parties should also come up with a script to give to potential interviewees regarding representation. (Court Reporter Laura Esposito.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/17/2018)
141 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Discovery Dispute Conference held on 7/27/2018. Cara Lawson for Plaintiff. Lisa Cook for Defendant. The Court discusses problems regrading interview of inmate by Plaintiff's expert. (Court Reporter Liberty Recording.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/27/2018)
142 STRICKEN − NOTICE of Appearance by Nicole Schult on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Schult, Nicole) Modified on 9/19/2018 (kek). (Entered: 09/18/2018)
143 NOTICE of Appearance by Nicole Schult on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Schult, Nicole) (Entered: 09/18/2018)

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09/19/2018 10/15/2018 10/16/2018 10/25/2018 10/26/2018
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01/08/2019 01/25/2019 01/28/2019 01/29/2019

144 NOTICE STRIKING ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS striking 142 Notice of Appearance filed by All Plaintiffs. Document attached is a blank fillable form. A corrected Notice of Appearance has been filed at Document 143 and no further action is required by the filer. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/19/2018)
145 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Attorney Ross J. Corbett $200 fee paid,receipt number 0754−3696375 by on behalf of Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Corbett, Ross) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
146 ORDER granting 145 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice filed by Attorney Ross J. Corbett. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/16/2018)
147 AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 10/25/2018. (anj) (Entered: 10/25/2018)
148 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Status Conference held on 10/26/2018. Kimball Anderson, Reid Smith, Cara Lawson and Matthew DelSantos for Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook and Laura Bautista for Defendant. The Court adopts the proposed revised scheduling order. That parties have made substantial progress and are nearing the end of necessary fact discovery. The parties have a dispute regarding the production of policies/procedures relating to use of force, chemical agents, decontamination and drug testing. Discovery Dispute Conference set for 11/1/2018 at 11:45 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Case is also set for Status Conference on 11/29/2018at 11:00 AM via Telephone Conference before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281. (Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/26/2018)
149 NOTICE OF CANCELLATION of Hearing: Discovery dispute conference set for 11/1/2018 is cancelled per the request of the parties. (anj)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/01/2018)
150 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams: Status Conference held on 11/29/2018. Reid Smith and Cara Lawson for Plaintiff. Lisa Cook and Laura Bautista for Defendant. Defendant to provide list of inmates in restrictive housing for Plaintiff to review. Plaintiff to identify the individuals from which they want to obtain records on by December 18, 2018. The parties are directed to contact the the new assigned judge for any remaining issues. (Court Reporter n/a.) (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 11/29/2018)
151 Case Reassigned to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty. Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams no longer assigned to the case. (cds) (Entered: 01/08/2019)
152 MOTION For Entry of Parties Third Joint Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order (Class Action) re 147 Order (AGREED) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 01/25/2019)
153 NOTICE REGARDING FILING re 152 Motion For Entry of Parties Third Joint Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order (Class Action). When a document will contain multiple Attorney signatures, the non−filing Attorney should include "with consent" in her/her signature. This Notice is sent for informational purposes only. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/28/2019)
154 THIRD AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER. Plaintiff's motion for class certification due 5/14/19. See order for additional deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 1/29/2019. (arf) (Entered: 01/29/2019)

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01/29/2019 03/04/2019 03/06/2019 03/08/2019 03/19/2019
04/08/2019 04/08/2019
04/23/2019
04/23/2019 04/23/2019

155 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/23/2019 at 11:00 AM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281; followed by Security Code 4367.(arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 01/29/2019)
156 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Alyssa E. Ramirez by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 03/04/2019)
157 ORDER GRANTING 156 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Alyssa E. Ramirez terminated. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/6/2019. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/06/2019)
158 MOTION to Join Case by Charles Donelson. (jsm2) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
159 ORDER DENYING 158 Motion for Joinder. As best the Court can tell, Charles Donelson, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, is seeking to become a party to this case in some fashion. The only means of becoming a plaintiff in an already−existing action of which the Court is aware is joinder under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 or 20, intervention under Rule 24, or amendment of a complaint pursuant to Rule 15. Donelson has not demonstrated that the requirements for either joinder or intervention are satisfied in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 20, 24. Similarly, the existing Plaintiffs have not moved to amend their complaint to join Donelson as a party Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Therefore, Donelson's request to join this action is DENIED. However, Donelson may potentially become a member of this proposed class action at some point in the future provided the class is certified and Donelson falls within the class definition. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Charles Donelson at Stateville Correctional Center. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/19/2019. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/19/2019)
160 MOTION for Entry of Parties' Fourth Joint Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order (Class Action) (AGREED) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
161 NOTICE REGARDING FILING re 160 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Henry Davis, Jerome Jones, Deshawn Gardner, Douglas Coleman, Aaron Fillmore, Percell Dansberry. When pleadings contain multiple attorney signatures, the non−filing attorney must include the language with consent with his/her signature. See Section 2.1 of the CM/ECF Users Manual. This notice is for informational purposes and therefore no action is required.This Notice is sent for informational purposes only. (amv)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/08/2019)
162 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty: Telephonic Status Conference held on 4/23/2019. Attorneys Reid Smith and Cara Lawson appear on behalf of Plaintiffs. Attorneys Lisa Cook and Laura Bautista appear on behalf of Defendant. The Court will adopt the parties' Fourth Joint Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order as submitted. The parties may modify deadlines contained in the Joint Report as long as it does not impact the briefing deadlines for Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. A status conference will be set by further order of the Court. (Court Reporter: proceedings not recorded.) (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/23/2019)
163 FOURTH AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for class certification due 8/16/2019. See order for additional deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 4/23/2019. (arf) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
164 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference set for 7/10/2019 at 9:30 AM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when

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07/10/2019 07/10/2019 07/29/2019 08/07/2019 08/15/2019 08/16/2019 09/06/2019
09/06/2019
09/06/2019

prompted enter Access Code 4442281; followed by Security Code 5482. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/23/2019)
165 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty: Telephonic Status Conference held on 7/10/2019. Attorneys Reid Smith and Cara Lawson appear on behalf of Plaintiffs. Attorneys Lisa Cook and Laura Bautista appear on behalf of Defendant. Discovery is progressing. A status conference will be set by further order of the Court. (Court Reporter: proceedings not recorded.) (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/10/2019)
166 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference set for 10/10/2019 at 10:00 AM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty. Instructions for placing the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281; followed by Security Code 1119.(arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 07/10/2019)
167 MOTION for Entry of Parties' Fifth Joint Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order (Class Action) AGREED by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 07/29/2019)
168 FIFTH AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for class certification due 9/6/2019. (See order for additional deadlines.) Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 8/7/2019. (arf) (Entered: 08/07/2019)
169 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Cara A. Lawson by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 08/15/2019)
170 ORDER GRANTING 169 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Cara Lawson terminated as counsel of record for Plaintiffs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 8/16/2019. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 08/16/2019)
171 ORDER: Telephonic Status Conference set for 9/6/2019 at 1:00 PM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty to discuss why the parties believe it is necessary to extend the page limitation for the class certification briefing by another 20−pages. If 1:00 p.m. does not work for the parties, they must meet and confer to find a mutually agreeable time for the phone conference. The undersigned is only available until 2 p.m. today. The parties should then contact the undersigned's courtroom deputy, Alex Francis, with the agreed−upon time. Instructions for joining the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted enter Access Code 4442281; followed by Security Code 2233. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 9/6/2019. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/06/2019)
179 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/6/2019. Attorneys Matthew DalSanto, Reid Smith, and Elizabeth Mazur appear on behalf of Plaintiffs. Attorney Laura Bautista appears on behalf of Defendants. The parties' request for excess pages for class certification briefing is granted. Plaintiffs are allowed up to 60 pages for their motion for class certification and memorandum in support. Defendants are allowed up to 60 pages for their memorandum in opposition. Plaintiffs are allowed 30 pages for a reply brief, if needed. The parties are encouraged however, to make every effort not to utilize the entire page limit.The briefing should include a table of contents and table of authorities. Two courtesy copies of all class certification briefs shall be submitted to chambers, including exhibits. (Court Reporter: proceedings not recorded.) (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/06/2019)
172 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Class Certification Brief and Supporting Exhibits Under Seal (Agreed) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered:

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09/09/2019 09/10/2019 09/10/2019

09/06/2019)
173 MOTION to Certify Class by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. Responses due by 10/10/2019 (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
174 MEMORANDUM in Support re 173 MOTION to Certify Class (Public Redacted Version) filed by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41)(Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
175 AFFIDAVIT re 173 MOTION to Certify Class (Declaration of Matthew R. DalSanto in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification) (Public Redacted Version) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (DalSanto, Matthew) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
176 Sealed Memorandum in Support re 173 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41)(Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
177 Sealed Document (Sealed Declaration of Matthew R. DalSanto in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification) re 173 Motion to Certify Class by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (DalSanto, Matthew) (Entered: 09/06/2019)
178 ORDER: Plaintiffs' counsel shall file an exhibit list that corresponds with their motion for class certification. It should list each exhibit number, describe what the exhibit is, and indicate whether it is sealed/redacted or not. For example, "Exhibit 1: Deposition of Randy Scott Pfister (unsealed/unredacted)." Defense counsel shall do the same for the exhibits they include as part of their response to the motion for class certification. Counsel for both sides shall include a copy of their exhibit list with the courtesy copy of the brief and exhibits that they mail to the Court. The Court thanks counsel in advance for their cooperation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 9/9/2019. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. Modified on 9/9/2019 to add the words "redacted" and "unredacted." (klh2) (Entered: 09/09/2019)
180 NOTICE OF MODIFICATION re 179 Minute Entry. The minute entry docketed on 9/6/2019 was inadvertently entered without a document number assigned and has been assigned Document Number 179. This notice is for information only. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 09/09/2019)
181 Sealed Document Plaintiffs' Index of Exhibits re 176 Sealed Memorandum in Support,,, by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 09/10/2019)
182 Exhibit List (Public Redacted Version) re 174 Memorandum in Support,,, by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones.. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 09/10/2019)

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10/10/2019
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12/20/2019
12/20/2019 12/20/2019 02/14/2020 02/14/2020

183 NOTICE OF CANCELLATION of Hearing: The Telephonic Status Conference set 10/10/2019 is cancelled. If the parties determine a status conference would be beneficial, they are directed to notify the Court. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/10/2019)
184 MOTION to Terminate Counsel by John Baldwin. (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
185 ORDER GRANTING 184 Motion to Terminate Counsel. Attorneys Robert Fanning, Melissa Jennings, Gary Caplan, and Ayesha Patel are terminated as counsel of record for Defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 10/11/2019. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 10/11/2019)
186 MOTION For Entry of the Parties' Sixth Joint Amended Scheduling and Discovery Order (AGREED) by John Baldwin. (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 11/15/2019)
187 SIXTH AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER: 186 Motion is GRANTED and the parties' proposed modifications are adopted. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 11/27/2019. (klh2) (Entered: 11/27/2019)
188 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Opposition to Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion by John Baldwin. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 12/13/2019)
189 ORDER GRANTING 188 Motion for Extension of Time. The deadline for Defendants to file their Memorandum in Opposition to Class Certification is EXTENDED by one week to December 20, 2019. The deadline for Plaintiffs' reply memorandum and Plaintiffs' expert(s) replies is EXTENDED to February 14, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 12/17/2019. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 12/17/2019)
190 RESPONSE to Motion re 173 MOTION to Certify Class filed by John Baldwin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #1, # 2 Exhibit #2, # 3 Exhibit #3, # 4 Exhibit #4, # 5 Exhibit #5, # 6 Exhibit #6, # 7 Exhibit #7, # 8 Exhibit #8, # 9 Exhibit #10, # 10 Exhibit #11, # 11 Exhibit #12, # 12 Exhibit #13, # 13 Exhibit #14, # 14 Exhibit #15)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
191 EXHIBIT by John Baldwin. Exhibit to 190 Response to Motion, . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #17, # 2 Exhibit #18, # 3 Exhibit #19, # 4 Exhibit #20, # 5 Exhibit #21, # 6 Exhibit #22, # 7 Exhibit #23, # 8 Exhibit #24, # 9 Exhibit #25, # 10 Exhibit #26, # 11 Exhibit #27, # 12 Exhibit #28, # 13 Exhibit #29, # 14 Exhibit #30)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
192 EXHIBIT by John Baldwin. Exhibit to 190 Response to Motion, . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #32, # 2 Exhibit #33, # 3 Exhibit #34, # 4 Exhibit #35, # 5 Exhibit #36, # 6 Exhibit #37, # 7 Exhibit #38, # 8 Exhibit #39, # 9 Exhibit #40, # 10 Exhibit #41, # 11 Exhibit #42, # 12 Exhibit #43, # 13 Exhibit #44, # 14 Exhibit #45, # 15 Exhibit #46, # 16 Exhibit #47, # 17 Exhibit #48, # 18 Exhibit #49, # 19 Exhibit #50)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
193 EXHIBIT by John Baldwin. Exhibit to 190 Response to Motion, . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit #51, # 2 Exhibit #52, # 3 Exhibit #53, # 4 Exhibit #54)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
194 Sealed Document re 190 Response to Motion, by John Baldwin. (Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 12/20/2019)
195 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of It's Motion for Class Certification Under Seal (Agreed) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
196 WITHDRAWN (By Order at Doc 207) − MOTION to Strike Defendant's Undisclosed Exhibits in Response to Motion for Class Certification by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) Modified on 3/19/2020 (kek). (Entered: 02/14/2020)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 26 of 27

02/14/2020 02/14/2020 02/28/2020 03/02/2020 03/06/2020
03/06/2020 03/13/2020 03/16/2020 03/16/2020 03/17/2020 03/18/2020

197 REPLY to Response to Motion re 173 MOTION to Certify Class (Public Redacted Version) filed by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
198 SEALED REPLY to Response to Motion re 173 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 02/14/2020)
199 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 196 MOTION to Strike Defendant's Undisclosed Exhibits in Response to Motion for Class Certification by John Baldwin. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
200 ORDER GRANTING 199 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Response. Defendant's response to 196 MOTION to Strike is now due on or before March 13, 2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/2/20. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/02/2020)
201 ORDER: Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is now fully briefed and the Court intends to set this motion for oral argument. Before doing so, the Court would like to discuss a few matters with the parties regarding the oral argument. Such matters include the scheduling of the oral argument; the amount of time necessary for each party to present their respective argument; the format for the argument (whether each party will receive one block of time or whether it will be broken down into sub−parts based on the Rule 23(a) factors); and whether the parties are contemplating the use of visual aids, power point presentations, or anything of the like in conjunction with their argument. The Court would also entertain any other agenda items insofar as it relates to the oral argument that the parties wish to discuss (additional discussion topics should be submitted via a joint e−mail to the undersigned's courtroom deputy 24 hours prior to the status conference). Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/6/2020. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/06/2020)
202 NOTICE of Hearing: Telephonic Status Conference set for 4/15/2020 at 10:00 AM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty. Instructions for joining the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted, enter Access Code 4442281; followed by Security Code 2238. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/06/2020)
203 STRICKEN − MOTION to Withdraw 196 MOTION to Strike Defendant's Undisclosed Exhibits in Response to Motion for Class Certification (Agreed) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) Modified on 3/17/2020 (kek). (Entered: 03/13/2020)
204 NOTICE REGARDING FILING re 203 Motion to Withdraw. Document contains a proposed order. Proposed orders are not to be filed, rather should be submitted via email to the assigned Judge. Document should be submitted accordingly. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/16/2020)
205 MOTION to Withdraw 196 MOTION to Strike Defendant's Undisclosed Exhibits in Response to Motion for Class Certification (AGREED) by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones. (Anderson, Kimball) (Entered: 03/16/2020)
206 NOTICE STRIKING ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS striking 203 Motion to Withdraw. Motion has been re−filed at Document 205 and this filing is stricken as duplicative. No further action is required by the filer. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/17/2020)
207 ORDER GRANTING 205 Motion to Withdraw and WITHDRAWING 196 Motion to Strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 3/18/20. (klh2)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/18/2020)

Case: 3:16-cv-600 As of: 05/20/2020 01:26 PM CDT 27 of 27

03/19/2020 04/03/2020 04/06/2020 04/13/2020 04/14/2020 04/15/2020
04/16/2020
04/28/2020 05/04/2020

208 NOTICE of Hearing (changing time only): Per defendant's oral request, and with the consent of plaintiffs' counsel, the Telephonic Status Conference is RESET for 4/15/2020 at 3:00 PM in East St. Louis Courthouse before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty. Instructions for joining the conference call are as follows: Call toll free 877−336−1829; when prompted, enter Access Code 4442281; followed by Security Code 2238. (arf)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 03/19/2020)
209 MEMORANDUM In Support re 172 Motion to Certify Class by Douglas Coleman, Percell Dansberry, Henry Davis, Aaron Fillmore, Deshawn Gardner, Jerome Jones (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Anderson, Kimball) Modified on 4/6/2020 (kek). (Entered: 04/03/2020)
210 NOTICE OF MODIFICATION re 209 Notice (Other). In an effort to keep the docket clear, Document 209 has been modified as follows: MEMORANDUM In Support re 172 Motion to Certify Class. No further action is required by the filer in relation to this notification. (kek)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/06/2020)
211 RESPONSE to 209 Notice (Other) Memorandum in Support of Class Certification filed by John Baldwin. (Bautista, Laura) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
212 MOTION Judicial Notice by John Baldwin. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Cook, Lisa) (Entered: 04/14/2020)
213 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty: Status Conference held on 4/15/2020. Matthew DalSanto, Reid Smith, Kimball R. Anderson, Alan Mills, Nicole Schult, and Paul J. Sauerteig appear on behalf of Plaintiffs. Lisa Cook and Laura Bautista appear on behalf of Defendants. The Court discusses the scheduling of oral argument on the pending motion for class certification as well as the amount of time each party will need to present their oral argument. The Court will set the oral argument by separate notice and outline the parameters for the oral argument. Plaintiffs raise an issue regarding the recently filed motion for judicial notice 212 by Defendants. Plaintiffs will be given an opportunity to file a responsive brief, which is due on or before 4/28/2020. (Court Reporter Karen Waugh.) (lmt)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/16/2020)
214 ORDER: This case is set for oral argument on July 16, 2020 at 1:00 p.m. in the East St. Louis Courthouse before the undersigned. The following parameters are established for the oral argument. Each party will be allotted sixty minutes of time to present their argument. Plaintiffs may utilize all 60 minutes in their opening argument or they may reserve time for rebuttal. However, no more than 15 minutes may be reserved by Plaintiffs for rebuttal. As the Court noted during the status conference, at this time the Court hopes to conduct this oral argument at the Courthouse. However, given the fluid situation surrounding the COVID−19 pandemic, a video conference oral argument may be required. The Court will carefully monitor the situation and keep the parties apprised if changes become necessary. If oral argument proceeds in−person, it will be conducted in a large courtroom (given the number of counsel entered in the case) that will sufficiently allow for room to maintain social distance. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on 4/16/2020. (lmt)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED. (Entered: 04/16/2020)
215 RESPONSE in Opposition re 212 MOTION Judicial Notice filed by All Plaintiffs. (Schult, Nicole) (Entered: 04/28/2020)
216 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Mazur, Elizabeth) (Entered: 05/04/2020)