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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARSHA CASPAR, GLENNA DEJONG, CLINT McCORMACK, BRYAN REAMER, FRANK COLASONTI, JR., JAMES BARCLAY RYDER, SAMANTHA WOLF, MARTHA RUTLEDGE, JAMES ANTEAU, JARED HADDOCK, KELLY CALLISON, ANNE CALLISON, BIANCA RACINE, CARRIE MILLER, MARTIN CONTRERAS, and KEITH ORR,

Case No. Hon.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

RICK SNYDER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, MAURA CORRIGAN, in her official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services, PHIL STODDARD, in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Office of Retirement Services, and JAMES HAVEMAN, in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Community Health,

Defendants. /

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. Plaintiffs Marsha Caspar and Glenna DeJong, Clint McCormack and Bryan Reamer, Frank Colasonti, Jr. and James Barclay Ryder, Samantha Wolf and Martha Rutledge, James Anteau and Jared Haddock, Kelly Callison and Anne Callison, Bianca Racine and Carrie Miller, and Martin Contreras and Keith Orr are eight same-sex couples who were legally married in Michigan on March 22, 2014, but are now being denied, along with their families, the dignity, recognition, privileges, and benefits that all legally married couples and their families deserve and are entitled to under the law. 2. Plaintiffs were married in Michigan after this Court, in DeBoer v. Snyder, permanently enjoined state officials from enforcing Michigan’s constitutional and statutory bans on marriage for same-sex couples, and before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stayed this Court’s judgment in DeBoer pending appeal. When Plaintiffs became married on March 22, 2014 in accordance with Michigan law, they immediately obtained vested rights in the validity and recognition of their marriages under Michigan law. Their marriages, and the protections and responsibilities that flow to them and their families from their married status, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and must be recognized by state officials regardless of the ultimate outcome of the DeBoer litigation.
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3. In violation of constitutional protections due to all legally married couples and their families, the Governor of Michigan has publicly announced that, as a result of the Sixth Circuit’s stay of this Court’s judgment in DeBoer, the legal benefits and rights associated with Plaintiffs’ marriages are being “suspended,” and the State of Michigan will not recognize the validity of Plaintiffs’ marriages because they are same-sex couples.
4. By retroactively stripping Plaintiffs’ marriages of legal recognition, the Governor has placed Plaintiffs and their families in an intolerable state of legal limbo that threatens their wellbeing, health, financial security, and family integrity, and denies their dignity as free and equal citizens. Absent relief from this Court, Plaintiffs will be unable to access critical protections and benefits for themselves and their families that are enjoyed as of right by all other couples who were legally married in Michigan.
5. By this action, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that their legally valid marriages be given immediate and ongoing recognition by the State of Michigan as required by the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this is a civil action arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, namely 42
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U.S.C. § 1983 and the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
7. Jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 because this is a civil action to redress the deprivation under color of state law of equal rights and civil rights secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because this is a judicial district in which a defendant resides and all defendants are residents of the State of Michigan.
9. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because this is a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred, are occurring, or will occur.
PARTIES 10. Plaintiffs Marsha Caspar and Glenna DeJong are adult female residents of Ingham County. They were married to one another in Ingham County on March 22, 2014. 11. Plaintiffs Clint McCormack and Bryan Reamer are adult male residents of Oakland County. They were married to one another in Oakland County on March 22, 2014.
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12. Plaintiffs Frank Colasonti, Jr. and James Barclay Ryder are adult male residents of Oakland County. They were married to one another in Oakland County on March 22, 2014.
13. Plaintiffs Samantha Wolf and Martha Rutledge are adult female residents of Ingham County. They were married to one another in Ingham County on March 22, 2014.
14. Plaintiffs James Anteau and Jared Haddock are adult male residents of Oakland County. They were married to one another in Oakland County on March 22, 2014.
15. Plaintiffs Kelly Callison and Anne Callison are adult female residents of Washtenaw County. They were married to one another in Washtenaw County on March 22, 2014.
16. Plaintiffs Bianca Racine and Carrie Miller are adult female residents of Oakland County. They were married to one another in Oakland County on March 22, 2014.
17. Plaintiffs Martin Contreras and Keith Orr are adult male residents of Washtenaw County. They were married to one another in Washtenaw County on March 22, 2014.
18. Defendant Rick Snyder is Governor of the State of Michigan. He is being sued in his official capacity by all Plaintiffs.
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19. Defendant Maura Corrigan is Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services. She is being sued in her official capacity by Plaintiffs Clint McCormack and Bryan Reamer.
20. Defendant Phil Stoddard is Director of the Michigan Office of Retirement Services. He is being sued in his official capacity by Plaintiffs Frank Colasonti, Jr. and James Barclay Ryder.
21. Defendant James Haveman is Director of the Michigan Department of Community Health. He is being sued in his official capacity by Plaintiffs Samantha Wolf and Martha Rutledge.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS Michigan’s Ban on Marriage for Same-Sex Couples
22. Prior to March 21, 2014, same-sex couples were not permitted to marry in Michigan.
23. Michigan prohibited same-sex couples from marrying by the so-called “Marriage Amendment” to the state constitution, Mich. Const. art. I § 25, which provides:
To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.
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24. Several implementing or associated statutes mirror the state’s constitutional ban on marriage for same-sex couples. M.C.L. § 551.1 states:
Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state. 25. Similarly, MCL § 551.3 provides, in part, that a man shall not marry another man, and MCL § 551.4 provides, in part, that a woman shall not marry another woman.
Michigan’s Ban on Marriage for Same-Sex Couples Is Enjoined 26. In October 2012, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, individually and on
behalf of their children, filed an amended complaint in DeBoer v. Snyder, Case No. 12-cv-10285-BAF (E.D. Mich.), challenging as unconstitutional Michigan’s ban on marriage for same-sex couples.
27. On March 21, 2014, following a bench trial in the DeBoer case, this Court declared the Michigan Marriage Amendment and its implementing statutes unconstitutional and permanently enjoined state officials from enforcing them.
28. This Court did not stay its judgment in DeBoer.
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Approximately 300 Same-Sex Couples Are Legally Married in Michigan 29. The following day, county clerks in four Michigan counties (Ingham,
Muskegon, Oakland, and Washtenaw) opened their offices and began issuing marriage licenses and certificates to same-sex couples.
30. Approximately 300 same-sex couples, including Plaintiffs, were married on March 22, 2014.
The Injunction Is Stayed Pending Appeal 31. Late in the afternoon of March 22, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit entered an order temporarily staying this Court’s judgment in DeBoer until March 26, 2014.
32. The Sixth Circuit’s stay order was entered after Plaintiffs and approximately 300 other same-sex couples got married.
33. Once the Sixth Circuit’s stay order was entered, county clerks in Michigan stopped issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
34. On March 25, 2014, the Sixth Circuit extended its stay of the DeBoer judgment pending final disposition of the state’s appeal.
35. Neither of the Sixth Circuit’s stay orders addressed the legal status of the marriages that same-sex couples entered into in Michigan on March 22, 2014.
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Governor Snyder Withdraws State Recognition of the Marriages
36. On March 26, 2014 Governor Snyder’s office issued the following
written statement:
After comprehensive legal review of state law and all recent court rulings, we have concluded that same-sex couples were legally married at county clerk offices in the time period between U.S. District Judge Friedman’s ruling and the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals temporary stay of that ruling.
In accordance with the law, the U.S. Circuit Court’s stay has the effect of suspending the benefits of marriage until further court rulings are issued on this matter. The couples with certificates of marriage from Michigan courthouses last Saturday were legally married and the marriage was valid when entered into. Because the stay brings Michigan law on this issue back into effect, the rights tied to these marriages are suspended until the stay is lifted or Judge Friedman’s decision is upheld on appeal.
37. On March 26, 2014, Governor Snyder also appeared personally at a
press conference. He made the following statement:
Good afternoon. I thought it appropriate to spend a minute or two making some comments with respect to the same-sex marriage case because obviously there’s been lots of questions. Let me set the stage appropriately. You go back to 2004 is when Michigan passed a constitutional amendment saying that marriage was between a man and a woman. It was implemented through statute also and it basically said that same-sex marriages would not be recognized in Michigan.
Last Friday, that changed. A federal judge, Judge Friedman, issued an opinion saying that the Michigan
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Constitution was going to be struck down given the federal Constitution. The next thing that happened then on-- was on Saturday, that there were a number of marriages across the state of Michigan, through a number of county clerks, and there was approximately 300 couples, and that took place. The next thing that happened on that Saturday night, the Court of Appeals issued a stay, and said that the judge’s opinion would be stayed until there was further judicial action.
Now this has created a lot of confusion and concern on a number of people. In particular, you have a lot of issues with the 300 couples that went through the process of going to the county clerks and going through the marriage. I wanted to bring some clarity because we’ve, again, really taken the position, we want to make sure we’re in compliance with the appropriate laws. So we’ve done quite a bit of legal research on this issue and what I’d say on this matter is, first of all -- and I would ask that you let me complete the entire statement because there are two elements to this -- is first of all, in respect to the marriages themselves, the 300 marriages on that Saturday, we believe those are legal marriages and valid marriages. The opinion had come down. There had not been a stay in place. So with respect to the marriage events on that day, those were done in a legal process and were legally done.
The stay being issued that next night really makes it more complicated and that’s why I asked you to bear with me-is, although the marriages were legal, what the stay does is reinstate Michigan law, and under Michigan law, it says the State of Michigan will not recognize the fact that they’re married because they’re of the same sex. So what we have is a situation here where the legal marriages took place on Saturday but, because of the stay that the operation of law is such that we won’t recognize the benefits of that marriage until there’s a removal of the stay or there’s an upholding of the judge’s opinion by the Court of Appeals or a higher court.
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I just want to bring some clarity because, again, this is a difficult situation where people have lots of concerns and issues. And again, that’s why I ask your forbearance to make sure we set the stage right and go through both steps of this process.
38. As a result of Governor Snyder’s decision, the marriages of
approximately 300 couples who got married on March 22, 2014 in accordance with
Michigan law have effectively been invalidated and repealed.
39. Upon information and belief, prior to Governor Snyder’s statement on
March 26, 2014, Michigan had never retroactively imposed a marriage requirement
to invalidate or “suspend” recognition of an existing marriage that was legally
performed in Michigan.
The U.S. Attorney General Grants Federal Recognition to the Marriages
40. On March 28, 2014, United States Attorney General Eric Holder
issued the following written statement:
I have determined that the same-sex marriages performed last Saturday in Michigan will be recognized by the federal government. These families will be eligible for all relevant federal benefits on the same terms as other same-sex marriages. The Governor of Michigan has made clear that the marriages that took place on Saturday were lawful and valid when entered into, although Michigan will not extend state rights and benefits tied to these marriages pending further legal proceedings. For purposes of federal law, as I announced in January with respect to similarly situated same-sex couples in Utah, these Michigan couples will not be asked to wait for
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further resolution in the courts before they may seek federal benefits to which they are entitled. Last June’s decision by the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor was a victory for equal protection under the law and a historic step toward equality for all American families. The Department of Justice continues to work with its federal partners to implement this decision across the government. And we will remain steadfast in our commitment to realizing our country’s founding ideals of equality, opportunity, and justice for all. Plaintiffs Marsha Caspar and Glenna DeJong 41. Plaintiffs Marsha Caspar and Glenna DeJong have been in a committed relationship for 27 years. Both lifelong residents of Michigan, they met through mutual friends at Michigan State University, where they were enrolled as graduate students. Marsha works at Consumers Energy as a financial manager, and Glenna runs her own independent consulting business that develops instructional trainings for various businesses and professional settings. 42. Marsha and Glenna have long wanted to marry as a way to publicly express their love and devotion to one another. At times they considered moving to another state that allows marriage for same-sex couples, but they decided instead to remain in Michigan, waiting patiently and hopeful for the day they could wed. They even kept a filled-out application for a marriage license in their home in order to be prepared and ready for that day.
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43. When the DeBoer decision was issued on March 21, 2014, Marsha heard the news at work. She was ecstatic at the knowledge that she and Glenna could finally wed. Glenna was at home when she heard the news and burst into tears of joy.
44. The next morning Glenna woke at 6:30 a.m. and saw on her iPad that Ingham County Clerk’s office would be open that morning to issue marriage licenses. She and Marsha were the first couple to arrive at the Ingham County Clerk’s office, and when the doors opened at 8:00 a.m. they became the first samesex couple to get married in Michigan.
45. Once their marriage had taken place, Marsha and Glenna were overwhelmed with joy by the fact that, after almost three decades, they were legally married. When Governor Snyder announced several days later that the state would not recognize the 300 legal marriages that had taken place on March 22, 2014, Glenna and Marsha were both hurt and dumbfounded. They could not understand how their marriage could be legal, yet they could not be afforded any rights or recognition. As the couple publicly stated at the time, “It’s akin to saying ‘Rick Snyder, you were elected governor, but we’re not giving you an office or letting you serve.’ There is no in-between. We are not a ‘skim milk marriage’ as Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has so poignantly identified.”
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46. Governor Snyder’s statement, in addition to denying the couple the same dignity and respect afforded to other legally married couples, has created uncertainty and anxiety for the couple as to how their marriage will be regarded in practical terms. Marsha suffers from a serious auto-immune disease that causes inflammation and restricts blood flow to various organs, which has affected both her mobility and kidney functioning. She has been hospitalized in the past due to the disease and was very close to kidney failure several years ago. Marsha and Glenna know of other same-sex couples who have been treated as legal strangers in hospitals, and they worry that this could happen to them should one of them be hospitalized in a facility that does not recognize their marriage.
47. Additionally, Marsha has asked her employer to add Glenna to her health insurance plan, but no decision has been made because the status of their marriage is in legal limbo. Glenna continues to pay the premiums for her own individual policy with Blue Cross Blue Shield, which is not as comprehensive as the coverage offered through Marsha's employer. If the state were to recognize Glenna and Marsha’s marriage, Glenna could get spousal coverage on Marsha’s health insurance policy, a benefit that all other couples who were legally married in Michigan receive.
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Plaintiffs Clint McCormack and Bryan Reamer 48. Plaintiffs Clint McCormack and Bryan Reamer have been in a
committed relationship for 22 years. They first met when Bryan was attending college at Michigan Tech in the Upper Peninsula, where Clint and his family lived. Clint is an insurance specialist for a psychology group and Bryan is a financial analyst at Ford Motor Company.
49. Within minutes of learning of the DeBoer decision on March 21, 2014, Clint and Bryan made plans to obtain their marriage license and solemnize their marriage at the Oakland County Courthouse the following morning. For over two decades years, they had been part of a relationship that their state had deemed second-class, and they were thrilled that the state was finally going to sanction their union and give them and their family the same recognition, privileges, benefits and protections that other married couples are provided. When they got married on March 22, 2014, they felt that an enormous emotional weight was lifted. Unfortunately, Governor Snyder’s announcement that their marriage will not be recognized by the state has created new anxieties and problems for Clint, Bryan, and their children.
50. Clint was raised in a very large family and always wanted to raise a large family with a life partner. Clint and Bryan are currently charged with the care of 13 children. Of the 13 children, six were jointly adopted by Clint and
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Bryan out of the foster care system in New Jersey, where unmarried couples are permitted to jointly adopt children; four were adopted by Bryan alone in states that do not permit joint adoptions by unmarried couples; and three were placed in Clint and Bryan’s care as foster children by the Michigan Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
51. The three children Clint and Bryan are raising as foster parents are sisters between the ages of one and three. These children suffer from a number of health problems such as sickle cell anemia and fetal alcohol syndrome. They were removed from the custody of their biological parents, whose legal rights to the children are likely to be terminated. As soon as that process is complete, Clint and Bryan wish to legally adopt the three girls.
52. It is important to Clint and Bryan that they jointly adopt these children so they will both be recognized as their legal parents. That way, if something happens to one parent, the other parent will not be a legal stranger to his child. Additionally, their children will not suffer the stigma, humiliation, and emotional confusion of having only one legally recognized parent in a two-parent family. One of the children who was legally adopted only by Bryan is a fifteen-year-old boy who was emotionally devastated when he learned that his other father, Clint, is not recognized by law as his parent.
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53. Under state law, DHS must give final approval to adoptions that arise out of the foster care system. But DHS has indicated on its Michigan Adoption Resource Exchange website that only married couples may jointly adopt foster children. Because Governor Snyder has stated that Clint and Bryan’s marriage on March 22, 2014 will not be recognized, they cannot jointly adopt their three foster children (or those girls’ two brothers), thus denying them the legal protection of both parents.
54. Clint would also like to adopt Bryan’s four children so that these children have the legal protection of both their parents. However, because the State of Michigan is not recognizing the validity of their marriage, Clint and Bryan fear that Clint will not be able to adopt Bryan’s children. And they fear that if something should happen to Bryan, Clint will become a legal stranger to the children he has been raising for many years.
Plaintiffs Frank Colasonti, Jr. and James Barclay Ryder 55. Plaintiffs Frank Colasonti, Jr. and James Barclay Ryder have been in a
committed relationship for 26 years, after they first met at the Metropolitan Community Church. Frank is retired from Birmingham Public Schools, where he was a high school guidance counselor, and James works for Beaumont Health System.
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56. Frank and James attended the DeBoer trial in person and the couple was ecstatic to hear about the DeBoer decision on March 21, 2014. They quickly made plans to obtain a marriage license and have their marriage solemnized at the Oakland County Courthouse on March 22, 2014. They brought friends as witnesses to the event that would ensure that their committed relationship would finally be accorded the respect and recognition that Michigan law provides to all couples who were legally married in this state.
57. Frank, age 61, is twelve years older than James. Because there is a reasonable likelihood that he could die before James, he wants to make sure that his husband is provided for financially and will receive comprehensive health benefits.
58. Under the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System (“MPSERS”), the State of Michigan’s Office of Retirement Services (“ORS”) allows newly married retirees to adjust their pension disbursements to a lower monthly amount received in order to preserve future pension payments and health benefits for a surviving spouse. This option is available only for legally married spouses, and it must be exercised within one year of marriage.
59. As a result of Governor Snyder’s announcement that Frank and James’s marriage would not be recognized or afforded the benefits that all other couples who were legally married in Michigan receive under state law, Frank is
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unable to adjust his pension plan to provide James with continued survivor’s benefits and health care in the event of Frank’s death. When Frank contacted ORS regarding his March 22, 2014 marriage and his desire to provide pension benefits to James, he was told by ORS staff that, pursuant to an internal memo, the ORS can recognize only marriages between a man and a woman, and that the MPSERS pension option for surviving spouses would therefore not be available to him while the DeBoer stay remained in place or unless Governor Snyder changed his position regarding the status of the March 22, 2014 marriages.
60. When Governor Snyder announced that the state would not recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples who got married in Michigan on March 22, 2014, Frank and James felt a tremendous sense of disappointment that their relationship had again been relegated to second-class status in their own state.
Plaintiffs Samantha Wolf and Martha Rutledge 61. Plaintiffs Samantha Wolf and Martha “Marnee” Rutledge have been
in a committed relationship for two and a half years. They met several years prior to that through mutual friends. Samantha works for the Michigan Department of Community Health (“MDCH”) as a manager of managed care data and systems support. Marnee is a substance abuse counselor and used to work for Michigan Rehabilitation Services as a contract employee.
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62. In 2008, while riding her motorcycle, Marnee was hit by a van. She suffered a closed head injury that has resulted in health complications, including neuro-fatigue. She also experienced severe trauma to her foot resulting in orthopedic complications, including severe pain and arthritis, which affect her mobility. Her doctors have told her that she will either need an ankle replacement or ankle fusion surgery. As a result of her accident, Marnee is currently on Social Security disability and receives Medicare.
63. Samantha and Marnee were thrilled when they heard about the DeBoer decision on March 21, 2014. When the Ingham County Clerk’s office announced that they would be open the next morning to issue marriage licenses, they quickly made plans to marry. Waiting in line on March 22, 2014, they were surrounded by other couples and friends, all there to celebrate the freedom for same-sex couples to finally marry.
64. Samantha wants Marnee to be covered under the health insurance policy that Samantha receives through her employment at MDCH. Such coverage is normally available to spouses of MDCH employees and is far more comprehensive than the benefits Marnee currently receives under Medicare. For example, Medicare does not provide vision or dental coverage and requires a $300 co-pay for emergency room visits.
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65. On the Monday morning following their marriage, Samantha requested health coverage for Marnee as her legal spouse. However, she was informed that MDCH cannot recognize her legal marriage or provide Marnee with spousal health insurance benefits because of Governor Snyder’s statement regarding the marriages of same-sex couples that took place on March 22, 2014.
66. Samantha and Marnee were very disappointed when they heard Governor Snyder’s announcement. In addition to being denied immediate spousal health coverage that is far more comprehensive than what Medicare covers, Samantha and Marnee are being denied the dignity and recognition accorded to other couples who have legally married in Michigan.
Plaintiffs James Anteau and Jared Haddock 67. Plaintiffs James Anteau and Jared Haddock have been in a
committed relationship for 16 years. They first met when they were neighbors in the same apartment building. James is a high school French and Spanish teacher with the Farmington Public Schools, and Jared is a bankruptcy and family law attorney in private practice.
68. James and Jared followed the DeBoer trial closely and were thrilled when Michigan’s prohibition on same-sex couples marrying was found unconstitutional on March 21, 2014. The couple had been wanting to be legally married for years because of their deep love for and commitment to one another.
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They also believed that by marrying they would enjoy the legal protections and benefits associated with marriage. The couple obtained a marriage license and had their marriage solemnized at the Oakland County Clerk’s office on March 22, 2014.
69. Prior to their marriage, James had Jared covered under his health insurance policy through the Farmington school system as an “other eligible adult.” Coverage under the “other eligible adult” status requires James to pay income taxes associated with the fair market value of Jared’s coverage.
70. After marrying Jared on March 22, 2014, James asked his employer to change Jared’s status from “other eligible adult” to legal spouse. As a spouse, the premiums paid for Jared’s insurance coverage would not be considered additional income to James for state income tax purposes. Although the Farmington schools’ human resources staff were sympathetic and supportive, they informed James they could not change Jared’s status to spouse because although their marriage was legal, it was not being recognized by the state for purposes of the benefits and rights tied to marriage.
71. The peace of mind James and Jared felt when they got married has been undermined by their knowledge that, solely because they are a same-sex couple, they continue to be treated differently from other couples who have legally married in Michigan. James’ straight co-workers who have married in Michigan
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enjoy health care benefits for their different-sex spouses that are being denied to James and Jared as a same-sex couple. James and Jared want their marriage to be recognized under state law on the same terms as other couples who have married in this state.
Plaintiffs Kelly Callison and Anne Callison 72. Plaintiffs Kelly Callison and Anne Callison have been in a committed
relationship for five years, having been introduced to each other by mutual friends. Anne is a public school teacher in Saline and Kelly is a stay-at-home mom.
73. The couple wanted to start a family early in their relationship and they were overjoyed when Anne became pregnant and gave birth to the couple’s son, now two years old. After their son’s birth, the couple met with an attorney to find out if Kelly could adopt him and thus provide their son with the legal protection of both parents. They were informed that a second-parent or step-parent adoption in Michigan was limited to married couples and since they could not marry, Kelly could not adopt their son. Consequently, Anne is their son’s sole legal parent. Despite the fact that Kelly has co-parented and raised her son since birth, in the eyes of Michigan law she is a stranger to her son. Should something happen to Anne, there is no guarantee that Kelly could continue to raise their son and make important decisions about his upbringing.
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74. After waiting several years for the right to marry, Kelly and Anne were thrilled when Michigan’s ban on marriage for same-sex couples was struck down, and they immediately made arrangements to be married the next day at the Washtenaw County Clerk’s office. Their family, friends, and their son were in attendance as they solemnized their marriage in the clerk’s office on March 22, 2014.
75. After they got married, Anne contacted her employer and asked whether Kelly could be covered under her health insurance policy as her spouse. Staff from the Saline school system’s human resources department responded that because Governor Snyder had stated that their marriage would not be recognized or receive any state benefits under state law, they could not provide health coverage to Kelly as Anne’s spouse.
76. Kelly currently pays for her own private health insurance policy, which costs $300 per month in premiums. The coverage she has under this policy is not nearly as comprehensive as the coverage she would receive through Anne’s employer as her spouse. Unlike the policy provided to Anne through the Saline school system, Kelly has no prescription, dental or vision coverage and has a $100 co-pay on emergency room visits.
77. Kelly and Anne both felt hurt and disheartened by Governor Snyder’s statement that although their marriage was legal, they are not entitled to the same
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recognition and protections afforded to different-sex couples who have married in Michigan. The Governor’s statement has put them back into a world of uncertainty—uncertainty as to whether their son will have the security of legallyrecognized relationships with both his moms, and uncertainty as to whether their Michigan marriage will ever carry any meaning under state law.
Plaintiffs Bianca Racine and Carrie Miller 78. Plaintiffs Bianca Racine and Carrie Miller have been in a committed
relationship for the past three and a half years. They first met at a bar in Detroit, where Carrie was doing her homework for school and Bianca struck up a conversation with her. Bianca has been in the National Guard for almost nine years and was deployed in Kosovo for two years as part of a NATO unit. She currently works at Chrysler as a contract employee data manager while studying environmental law with funds provided under the G.I. Bill. Carrie works as an office assistance for Oakland University and has been accepted into Wayne State University’s School of Library and Information Science.
79. Bianca is a politically active member of the LGBT community and remembers the joyous and momentous occasion when Massachusetts first began permitting same-sex couples to marry. She always hoped that she would meet someone with whom she could share a lifetime commitment in marriage, and she found that person in Carrie.
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80. The couple was thrilled when the DeBoer decision was announced on March 21, 2014, and they immediately made plans to obtain a marriage license and have their marriage solemnized at the Oakland County Clerk’s office the next day.
81. Although their families could not attend their wedding on such short notice because they live far away, Bianca and Carrie felt an incredible sense of solidarity and community with the other same-sex couples who lined up to marry at the Oakland County Clerk’s office on March 22, 2014. The joy of their marriage was tempered by Governor’s Snyder’s subsequent announcement that they would not be given the recognition or benefits that all other couples who are legally married in Michigan receive.
82. The state’s position regarding the March 22, 2014 marriages has created immediate practical problems for Bianca and Carrie that other couples who have married in Michigan have not experienced. For example, because both Bianca and Carrie will be full-time students this fall, they are concerned that they may encounter some financial hardships. Both the Michigan Veteran’s Trust Fund and Michigan National Guard Family Support Fund provide temporary assistance to wartime veterans and their families residing in Michigan who are experiencing financial hardship. Families are defined as spouses and financial dependents, and the ability for Bianca and Carrie to be recognized as a family for these programs is dependent upon whether their marriage is recognized in Michigan.
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83. Bianca recently contacted the Michigan office of the Army National Guard Judge Advocate General (“JAG”) regarding how her marriage affects the availability of financial aid programs for Carrie. The JAG office informed her that although all federal assistance programs would be available to the couple (pursuant to United States Attorney General Eric Holder’s statement that the federal government would recognize the Michigan marriages), any programs funded by the State of Michigan for the families of veterans and military personnel are not being offered to same-sex spouses as a result of Governor Snyder’s announcement regarding the March 22, 2014 marriages. The JAG office also told Bianca that, although there are both federal and state Veterans Affairs agencies, only the federal VA will recognize Carrie as Bianca’s spouse for the purpose of providing services that all military spouses are entitled to receive.
84. Bianca and Carrie were very upset to learn that despite Bianca’s service to her country and to the State of Michigan through the National Guard, in the eyes of Michigan law, her marriage to Carrie has no legal significance. Governor Snyder’s statement is also problematic for the couple in that they wish to start a family soon, but are concerned that both of them would not be legally recognized as the legal parents of their children.
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Plaintiffs Martin Contreras and Keith Orr 85. Plaintiffs Martin Contreras and Keith Orr have been in a committed
relationship for 28 years. The couple met in Ann Arbor one evening after Martin had finished his shift at the Mexican restaurant he owned and operated with this mother, and after Keith had finished playing a softball game in a local league. After becoming a couple, Keith joined Martin in operating the Mexican restaurant together in Ann Arbor. In 1995 they opened the Aut Bar, a popular bar and restaurant in Ann Arbor. Since then they have purchased several buildings in Ann Arbor that are now home to an LGBT community center and an LGBT bookstore.
86. Martin and Keith are prominent members of the Ann Arbor LGBT community, known not only for their business acumen, but also for their dedication and generosity to various charitable and political causes. The couple are dedicated to the well-being and welfare of both the City of Ann Arbor and the LGBT community.
87. When Martin and Keith learned that the DeBoer case might result in the freedom to marry for same-sex couples in Michigan, they decided that they would want to get married as soon as legally possible. They worked with local LGBT community advocates to ask that the Washtenaw County Clerk’s office make marriage licenses available as soon as the law allowed.
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88. On March 22, 2014, Martin and Keith were the fifth couple in line at the Washtenaw County Clerk’s office, obtaining their wedding license and having their marriage solemnized that day. Martin and Keith were thrilled to finally be able to have their relationship recognized under Michigan law. After getting married they returned to the Aut Bar, worked the lunch and dinner shifts until midnight (proudly announcing to customers that they were newlyweds), and then toasted each other with a glass of champagne.
89. Martin and Keith were disappointed and confused by Governor Snyder’s statement that although their marriages were legal, they would not be recognized by the state or accorded any benefits or protections that other marriages receive under state law. They worry how Governor Snyder’s statement will impact their ability to be recognized as legal spouses for purposes of state income taxes, as well as their health insurance. They believe that the Governor’s statement has created confusion, uncertainty, and a lack of clarity for a status they had finally achieved on March 22, 2014 after waiting almost three decades: legal marriage.
CAUSES OF ACTION 90. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state actors are liable at law or equity for their acts or omissions undertaken under color of law which deprive any person of the rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
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91. Defendants are state actors and, at all times relevant to this Complaint, were acting or failing to act, are acting or failing to act, or will act or fail to act under color of law.
COUNT ONE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 92. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State “shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 93. It has long been recognized that the Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process; it includes a substantive component that provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. 94. The Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. 95. The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right to marry, establish a home, bring up children, and make personal decisions relating to procreation, contraception, family relationships, life partnerships, and education. It includes protection from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the private realm of family life, the most intimate and personal choices persons make in their
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lifetime, and decisions central to personal dignity and autonomy. It prohibits laws that demean our private lives or deny our dignity as free persons. And it includes our rights generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free persons.
96. Substantive due process protects the sanctity of the family because the institution of family is deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. The relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is therefore an interest entitled to constitutional protection.
97. Once a constitutionally protected relationship is established, it acquires even more protection under the Due Process Clause. It has long been recognized at common law, and is deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition, that a legal marriage, once it is entered into, vests the married couple with benefits and rights that cannot be taken away by a legislative or executive act.
98. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the DeBoer litigation, the Due Process Clause protects Plaintiffs’ marriages, legal and valid under Michigan law when they were entered into, from being retroactively invalidated by the state. Defendants violate, have violated, and/or would violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights by refusing to recognize these marriages or by denying Plaintiffs and their families the dignity, privileges or benefits that all legally married couples and their families deserve and are entitled to under the law.
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COUNT TWO EQUAL PROTECTION 99. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution also provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 100. The Equal Protection Clause is a directive that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Under a rational-basis standard of review, unequal treatment is more likely to be struck down as unconstitutional when it inhibits or impairs personal relationships. A heightened level of scrutiny applies where the classification intrudes upon a fundamental right. Further, withdrawing from a disfavored group, but no other group, legal protections or benefits, or a designation that carries significant societal meaning or benefits, is more suspect than declining to extend those protections or benefits, or that designation, in the first place. 101. Marriage is a fundamental right, and married status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages. The Equal Protection Clause is violated where, as here, a state’s officials refuse to treat all married couples alike; identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal; deprive some couples who were legally married in that state, but not other couples who were legally married in that state, of the recognition, benefits, rights and privileges that are an essential part of married life; and tell
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those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of state recognition.
102. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the DeBoer litigation, the Equal Protection Clause protects Plaintiffs’ marriages, legal and valid under Michigan law when they were entered into, from being denied the same recognition, benefits, rights and privileges given to heterosexual couples who were legally married in Michigan. Defendants’ withdrawal or repeal of the recognition, benefits, rights and privileges of Plaintiffs’ marriages because Plaintiffs are same-sex couples, and Defendants’ refusal to provide Plaintiffs and their families with equal treatment and recognition, violates, has violated, and/or would violate Plaintiffs’ rights to the equal protection of the laws.
RELIEF REQUESTED Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request that this Court:
a. assert jurisdiction over this matter; b. enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants; c. provide declaratory relief as follows:
i. declare that article I, section 25 of the Michigan Constitution, otherwise known as the Michigan Marriage Amendment, and its implementing or associated statutes, are unconstitutional as applied to the marriages of couples, including Plaintiffs, who were legally married in Michigan and whose marriages were valid at the time they were entered into; and
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ii. declare that Defendants’ refusal to recognize the marriages of couples, including Plaintiffs, who were legally married in Michigan and whose marriages were valid at the time they were entered into, and refusal to afford those couples and their families, including Plaintiffs and their families, with all the benefits, rights and privileges given to other legally married couples and their families under Michigan law, on account of those couples being of the same sex, violates the rights of those couples and their families, including Plaintiffs and their families, to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
d. provide preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as follows:
i. enjoin Defendants from enforcing Article I, section 25 of the Michigan Constitution, otherwise known as the Michigan Marriage Amendment, and its implementing or associated statutes, against couples, including Plaintiffs, who were legally married in Michigan and whose marriages were valid at the time they were entered into; and
ii. enjoin Defendants from refusing to recognize the marriages of couples, including Plaintiffs, who were legally married in Michigan and whose marriages were valid at the time they were entered into, and from refusing to afford those couples and their families, including Plaintiffs and their families, with all the benefits, rights and privileges given to other legally married couples and their families under Michigan law, on account of those couples being of the same sex;
e. award Plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
f. provide any other relief deemed just and equitable.
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Respectfully submitted,

Andrew Nickelhoff (P37990) Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan Sachs Waldman PC 2211 E. Jefferson Ave., Ste. 200 Detroit, MI 48207 (313) 496-9429 anickelhoff@sachswaldman.com
Julian Davis Mortenson (E.D. Mich. admission pending)
Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan University of Michigan Law School* 625 S. State St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (734) 763-5695 jdmorten@umich.edu
* Institution included for identification purposes only

/s/ Jay D. Kaplan Jay D. Kaplan (P38197) Daniel S. Korobkin (P72842) Brooke A. Merriweather-Tucker Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Kary L. Moss (P49759) American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6812 kaplan@aclumich.org dkorobkin@aclumich.org msteinberg@aclumich.org
John A. Knight American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation 180 N. Michigan Ave., Ste. 2300 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 201-9740 jaknight@aclu.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Dated: April 14, 2014

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARSHA CASPAR, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case v. HON. RICHARD SNYDER, et al.,

No. 14-CV-11499 MARK A. GOLDSMITH

Defendants. _________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (Dkt. 17), AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR A STAY (Dkt. 20), TO
DISMISS (Dkt. 21), AND TO CONSOLIDATE CASES (Dkt. 27)

I. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental question in this case is whet her officials of the St ate of Michigan are

violating the United States Consti tution by refusing to recognize th e marital status of same-sex

couples whose m arriages were solem nized pursu ant to Michigan m arriage licenses issued in

accordance with Mich igan law in ef fect at the tim e of the marriages. T his Court concludes that

the con tinued lega l va lidity of an indiv idual’s m arital s tatus in suc h cir cumstances is a

fundamental right com prehended within the libe rty protected under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Am endment. Even though the cour t decision that required Michigan to allow

same-sex couples to m arry has now been revers ed on appeal, the sam e-sex couples who m arried

in Michigan during the brief peri od when such m arriages were autho rized acquired a statu s that

state officials may not ignore absen t some compelling interest — a constitutional hurd le that the

defense does not even attem pt to surm ount. In these circum stances, what the state has joined

together, it may not put asunder.

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For the reasons discussed fully below, the Court grants a preliminary injunction requiring
the recognition of such m arriages and rejects the defense efforts to dismiss, stay, or consolidate
this case.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are eight same-sex couples who were married during a brief window of tim e —
lasting only a few hours on March 22, 2014 — one day after the decision of another judge of this
District ho lding tha t M ichigan’s r efusal to authorize sam e-sex m arriage was unc onstitutional.
See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (Friedman, J.). That district court
decision followed a nine-day bench trial addr essing whether Michigan’s ban on sam e-sex
marriage violated the due-proce ss and equal-protection guara ntees of the United States
Constitution. The ban is em bodied in a state constitutional am endment adopted by a voter referendum in 2004, as well as in earlie r-adopted state statutory provisions. 1 Applying rational-
basis review, the district cour t concluded that the ban denied sam e-sex couples the equal
protection of the laws, because the ban did not advance any conceivable legitimate state interest.
Id. at 768. The district court did not address th e DeBoer d efendants’ conditional request for a
1 See Mich. Const. art. 1, § 25 (“To secure and pr eserve the benefits of m arriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a m arriage or similar union for any purpose.”); Mich. Com p. Laws § 551.1 (“Marriage is inhe rently a unique relationship be tween a man and a wom an. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique relationship in orde r to prom ote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A m arriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.”); Mich. Comp. Laws § 551.2 (“So far as its validity in law is concerned, marriage is a civil contract between a m an a nd a wom an, to which the consent of parties capab le in law of contracting is essential. Cons ent alone is not enough to effectua te a legal m arriage on and after January 1, 1957.”). Although these enactm ents ar e of a more recen t vintage, Michig an’s definition of marriage, as a rela tionship between a m an and a wom an, goes back to Michigan’s territorial days. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 1 Laws of the Territory of Michigan 646, 646 (1871)).
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stay pending appeal in the event of an adverse ruling, which was orally m ade at the close of the trial.
That late Friday-afternoon decision prom pted four local county clerks to open their offices the next day, waive the traditional th ree-day waiting period, and i mmediately issue marriage licenses. Plaintiffs were among some 300 same-sex couples who received licenses and solemnized their m arriages that Saturday. The window during which sam e-sex marriage was lawful in Michigan closed ab ruptly on Saturday af ternoon, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a tem porary stay (later converted to a full stay pending appeal) of the district court’s decision. See DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341, 3/22/14 Order at 1 (Dkt. 11-2) (“To allow a m ore reasoned considerat ion of the m otion to stay, it is [ ordered] that the district court’s judgm ent [be] temporarily stayed until We dnesday, March 26, 2014.”); id., 3/25/14 Order at 3 (Dkt. 22-1) (gra nting the defendants’ “motion to stay the district court’s order pending final disposition of [the defendants’] appeal by this court”).
Following issuance of the full stay, Michigan Governor Richard Snyder, a defendant in both DeBoer and this action, announ ced a policy of refusing to re cognize the m arriages for any purpose under the law, while conc eding th at th e m arriages had be en lawf ully entered into in accordance with Michigan law in effect at the time of the marriages:
After comprehensive legal review of state law a nd all recen t court rulings, we have concluded that same-sex couples were legally married at county clerk offices in the tim e period between U.S. District Judge Friedm an’s ruling and the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals temporary stay of that ruling. In accordan ce with the law, the U. S. Circuit Court’s s tay has the effect of suspending th e benef its o f m arriage until f urther court rulings are issued on this m atter. The couples with certificates of marriage from Michigan courthouses last Saturday were legally married and the m arriage was valid when entered into. Because the stay brings Michig an law on this issue ba ck into ef fect, the
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rights tied to these m arriages are suspended until the s tay is lifted or Judge Friedman’s decision is upheld on appeal.

Compl. ¶ 36 (3/26/14 Written Statement of Governor’s Office) (Dkt. 1). The Governor reiterated

the policy at a press conference shortly after his written statement was issued:

[F]irst of all, in respect to the m arriages them selves, the 300 marriages on that Saturday, we believe those are legal m arriages and valid marriages. The opinion had com e down. There had not been a stay in place. So with respect to the marriage events on that day, those were done in a legal process and were legally done.

The stay being issued that next night really m

akes it m ore

complicated and that’s why I as ked you to bear with m e-- is,

although the m arriages were legal, what the stay does is reinstate

Michigan law, and under Michigan law, it says the S tate of

Michigan will not r ecognize the f act that they’ re married because

they’re of the same sex. So what we have is a situation here where

the legal marriages took place on Saturday but, b ecause of the stay

that th e operation of law is such that we won’t re cognize the

benefits of that m arriage until ther e’s a rem oval of the stay or

there’s an upholding of the judg e’s opinion by the C ourt of

Appeals or a higher court.

Compl. ¶ 37.

Plaintiffs then filed this action alleging due-process and equal-pr otection violations

against four state officials in their official capacities: the Governor and the heads of three

executive departments with responsibilities over benefits that Plaintiffs claim will be impaired by

the non-recognition policy. Plain tiffs allege inta ngible harms, such as loss of dignity, id. ¶ 98 ,

feelings of “uncertain ty and anxiety,” id. ¶ 46 , “disappo intment,” id. ¶ 60, loss o f “peace of

mind,” id. ¶ 71, as well as “hurt” and “dishearte n[ment],” id. ¶ 77. They also allege m ore

tangible harm s. Several Plainti ffs applied for health -insurance benefits based on their marital

status, only to be told by their em ployers that the applicants could not be recognized as m arried

under their insurance p lans because of the state’ s non-recognition policy. Id. ¶¶ 65 , 75. Other

Plaintiffs allege impairment of their efforts to adopt children together, because Michigan will not

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allow two single persons to adopt jointly the same child. Id. ¶¶ 54, 73. Still others allege loss of spousal-pension benefits, id. ¶ 59, state income-tax benefits, id. ¶ 70, and financial-aid benefits, id. ¶ 83.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 17), seeking an order requiring Defendants to recognize their m arriages and the m arriages of the other sa me-sex couples who were married before the issuance of the Sixth Circuit stay. Defendants opposed the motion (Dkt. 22), claim ing principally that the S ixth Circuit st ay rein stituted Mich igan’s ban o n sam e-sex marriage, and that the continue d validity of Plaintiffs’ m arriages was tied to the ultim ate appellate disposition of DeBoer. Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) (Dkt. 21), raisi ng several other defenses, including Eleventh Amendment immunity, standing, ripeness, failure to state a claim , and the absence of sufficient grounds for declarato ry relief. In addition, Defe ndants filed a m otion for a stay of this action until resolution of the a ppeal in De Boer (Dkt. 20) , as well as a m otion to consolidate th is case with a separate case pending before another ju dge of this D istrict, Bl ankenship v. Snyder, No. 14-12221 (Dkt. 27).
The Sixth Circuit has now spoken in DeBoer . DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). It reversed the district court’s decisi on and upheld Michigan’s ban on same-sex marriage (as well as the bans in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio). It concluded that the Supreme Court has already held that sam e-sex c ouples have no constitutional ri ght to m arry, by virtue of the Supreme Court’s one-line orde r in B aker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), which dism issed the appeal of a lawsuit challenging a Minnesota sam e-sex marriage ban because it did not raise “a substantial federal question.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 400 (quotation marks omitted). Rejecting the theory that United States v. W indsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) overturned Baker when the
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Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Ma rriage Act of 1996 for the act’s refusal to recognize sam e-sex m arriages allowed in som e states, the Sixth C ircuit exam ined num erous grounds urged in support of sam e-sex marriage and found all lacking. Notably, for purposes of our case, the Sixth Circuit did not address the question presented here: whether same-sex couples who were m arried pursuant to Mi chigan marriage lic enses issu ed und er M ichigan law — as it stood at the tim e their m arriages were solemnized — m ay, consistent with th e Constitution, be stripped by the s tate of their m arital status. The plaintiffs in DeBoer have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Suprem e Court, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F .3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, No. 14-571 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2014), which remains pending at this time.
The prelim inary injunction m otion and the motion to dismiss are discussed below in tandem, as they both require inquiry into the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants’ motions to stay and to consolidate are discussed thereafter.
III. ANALYSIS A. Motions for a Preliminary Injunction and to Dismiss
1. Standards of Decision The standard for a prelim inary injuncti on is well known: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Typically, no one factor is dispositive; rather they are to be considered as an integrative whole. Liberty Coins, L.L. C. v. Goodm an, 748 F.3d 682, 690 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Each of these factors should be balanced ag ainst one another and s hould not be considered prerequisites to the grant of a preliminary in junction.” (quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
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However, where a plain tiff dem onstrates a likelihood of su ccess on a claim ed con stitutional violation, a preliminary injunction is nearly always appropriate. Oba ma for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) (“When a party seek s a prelim inary injunction on the basis of a potential co nstitutional violation, th e likelihood of success on the m erits often w ill be the determinative factor.” (quotation marks omitted)). As the discussion b elow demonstrates, all of the factors point decidedly in favor of granting an injunction in this case.
In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-m atter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff has the bur den of proving jurisdiction.” Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6 th Cir. 1990). Challe nges to subject-matter jurisdiction f all into two genera l ca tegories: “f acial attacks” — which argue that th e plead ing allegations are insufficient — and “factual attacks” — which challenge the factual veracity of the allegations. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). On a motion raising a facial attack, “the court must take the material allegations of the petition as true and construed in the light m ost f avorable to th e nonmoving party.” Id. In reviewing a motion raising a factual attack, “the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id.
In evaluating a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 12(b)(6), “[c]ourts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accept all well-p led factual allegations as true, a nd d etermine whether the complaint states a p lausible claim for relief.” Albrecht v. Treon , 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation m arks, brackets, and citations o mitted). T o surviv e a motion to dismiss, a complaint must ple ad spe cific f actual allegations, and not just legal conclu sions, in support of each claim . Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S.
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662, 678–679 (2009). A complaint will be dism issed unless, when all well-pled factual allegations are accepted as true, the complaint states a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679.
With these standards in m ind, the Court begins by exa mining the four factors for a preliminary injunction.
2. Likelihood of Success on the Merits a. Due Process
The Due Process Claus e of the Fo urteenth Amendment, which provides that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty or property without due process of law,” protects more than fair process. C ollins v. City of Harker Heights, T ex., 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992). T he doctrine of substantive due process safeguards individual liberty against “certain government actions regardless of the f airness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Determ ining which spheres of human endeavor deserve protection under the Due Process Clause from which types of government encroachm ent is a query that has occupied the judicial m ind since the late 19th century. See McD onald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010).
Because an overly exp ansive v iew of substa ntive due pro cess heightens the risk that judges may impose their own legislative preferences in the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause, courts m ust exercise “cau tion and restra int.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). Restraint, however, “does not counsel abandonment.” Id.
The adm onishment of restra int is illustra ted by the Court’s gene ral disinc lination to afford heightened jud icial scrutiny under the Due Process Clause to routine legislation touching on economic and social affairs. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 879 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Ever since the deviant econom ic due process cases were re pudiated, our doctrine has steered away fro m
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laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions . . . .” (quotation marks,
brackets, an d citations om itted)). Rather, heig htened jud icial scrutiny under the Due Proces s
Clause is afforded to those claimed infringe ments that pertain to “‘funda mental’ liberty
interests.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993).
To qualify for such heightened scrutiny, the rights claim ed to be fundam ental must be
profoundly tethered to the histor y and traditions of our Nation. W ashington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997) (“[W]e have regularly obser ved that the Due P rocess Clause specially
protects those fundam ental rights and liberties which are, objec tively, deeply r ooted in this
Nation’s his tory and tra dition and implicit in the concept of ordered liber ty, such tha t ne ither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacr ificed.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Justice John Harlan I I f amously articulated the balance tha t courts m ust strike in d etermining
whether rights are fundamental:
Due process has not been reduced to any for mula; its content cannot be determ ined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, bu ilt upon postulates of respect f or the libe rty o f the individual, has s truck betwee n that liberty and the dem ands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitu tional c oncept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it develop ed as well as the trad itions f rom which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Suprem e Court has long recognized that governm ent actions im pinging on
significant dimensions of family life — and especially marriage — implicate fundamental rights.
See, e.g., C leveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (in invalidating
mandatory m aternity leave, stating that “[t]hi s Court has long recognized that freedom of 9

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personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the F ourteenth Amendment”); Loving v. Virginia, 38 8 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (in striking down anti-m iscegenation law, stating that “[t]he freedom t o m arry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights esse ntial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (in striking do wn contraceptive ban, stating that the right of marital privacy is “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (in striking down statute crim inalizing the teach ing of a fo reign language to young children, stating that th e liberty guaranteed by the Fourteen th Am endment in cludes “the right . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children”); Skinner v. Ok lahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (in striking down a statute allowing sterilization of crim inals, st ating that the “legislatio n [] involves one of the basic civil rights of m an[;] [m]arriage and procrea tion are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”).
The present case im plicates a fundam ental ri ght associated with m arriage, as a liberty interest protectable under the Due Process Clause . More specifically, this case implicates the right to m aintain one’s m arital status once it has been lawfully acquire d under the laws of the state seeking to defeat it. Importantly, this case does not concern the right to acquire the status of being married, which was the issue addressed by the Sixth Circuit in DeBoer.
Although no Suprem e Court case has squarely addressed the question of m aintaining one’s m arital status, th e com pelling inference to be drawn from the cases address ing m arriage and family is that the lib erty interest being protected is the on-going relationship that the parties expect — or at leas t, fervently hope — will endure so long as they both live. In other words , what is “fundam ental” is not si mply the snapshot m oment when vows are spoken, but the
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lifetime of comm itted intimacy that couples exp ect will follow. As the Court taugh t in Leh r v.

Robertson,

[t]he im portance of the f amilial re lationship, to the ind ividuals involved and to the society, stem s from the e motional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association . . . .

463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Sm ith v. Org. of Foster Fa milies for Equal. & Refor m, 431

U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting W isconsin v. Yode r, 406 U.S. 205, 231- 233 (1972))) (quotation

marks omitted); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (recognizing that m arital “status is a far-

reaching legal acknowledgement of the intim ate relationship between two pe ople”); Bd. of Dirs.

of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (“The Court has recognized

that the f reedom to enter into an d car ry on cer tain in timate or p rivate re lationships is a

fundamental element of liberty p rotected by the B ill of Rights. . . . The intim ate relationships to

which we have acco rded constitutiona l pro tection inc lude m arriage.” (cita tions om itted));

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.

S. 609, 619-620 (1984) (recognizing that

“[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and comm itments to the

necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special co mmunity of

thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distin ctively personal aspects of one’s life[,]” and

“relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to

an understanding of fr eedom of association as an intrinsic elem ent of personal liberty”); Pi

Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ . of P ittsburgh, 229 F. 3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 200 0) (“Family

relationships are the paradigm atic form of protected intimate associations.”). Thus, it is th e on-

going union — not simply the initi al joinde r — tha t is “essentia l to the orderly pursuit of

happiness.” Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.

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Defendants do not expressly reject this p rinciple. Nor do Defendants dispute that their refusal to accord legal recognition to Plaintif fs’ m arital status am ounts to a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ m arital status. Nor could Defendant s so argue, given that the denial of legal recognition to a m arital status ev iscerates that status. To st ate the obvious: two people whose marriage was validly solemnized, but who are not permitted to enjoy any of the benefits or rights of married people, are unquestionably the functional equivalent of unmarried people.2
There is also no question that Defendants’ refusal to re cognize the marital status of persons lawfully married pursuant to Michigan marriage licenses issued under Michigan law — as that law stood at the tim e the marriages were solemnized — is entirely unprecedented. In the nine briefs s ubmitted by them to date in this action, Defenda nts have failed to provid e a single court decision approving a state’s e ffort to vitiate the m arital status of a couple lawfully m arried under that state’s law. By cont rast, there is a long history of court decisions and legislative enactments, under a variety of theo ries, reflecting a nati onal consensus rejecti ng the view that a person’s m arital status m ay be invalidated by a state after it was lawfully acquired under that state’s law.
One m anifestation of this consensus is the plethora of court deci sions that in terpret statutes modifying marriage-eligibility requirements so as to exem pt pre-existing m arriages that would otherwise be invalidated under the change in law. For exam ple, in Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005), the court addressed a change in Arizona law that declared void out-of-state marriages between first cousins — unions that had been previously recognized under
2 Def endants do argue that ther e is no constitu tional righ t to som e of the benef its Plaintif fs cannot obtain as a result of th e non-recognition policy, such as pe nsion and insurance benefits or the right to adopt jointly as a couple. De fs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 13 (Dkt. 22). But Pl aintiffs are not asserting that the loss of thos e rights am ounts to a violation of due process. Rather, they claim — rightly — that the loss of recognized m arital status produces tangible harm in the for m of those lost benefits.
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Arizona law. Although the “plain” language of th e statute converted the litigants’ pre-existing marriage from valid to v oid, the cou rt interpreted the statutory am endment as prospective only, because, otherwise, the litigants’ “vested” right in their marriage would be destroyed. Id. at 864865, 866.
To the same effect is Cavanaugh v. Vale ntine, 41 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (Sup. Ct. 1943), where the court interpreted a statute abolishing common-law marriages as applying prospectively only, because, otherwise, the pre-existing union would be nullified, amounting to the impairment of a contract, in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.
Similarly, in Hatfield v. United States, 127 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1942), the court interpreted an amendment to New York’s dom estic relations law as o perating prospectively only, based on the doctrine of non-retroactivity, which presumes that legislative enactments apply prospectively. Id. at 577-578. The a mendment made a second or subsequent m arriage void, where the spouse from a prior m arriage had disappeared for five or more years, unless a divorce decree had been secured prior to the remarriage; the original statute had only m ade the rem arriage voidable, and only as of the date it was invalidated by court decree. Id. The Second Circuit relied on an earlier New York decision, Atkinson v. Atkinson, 203 N.Y.S. 49 (App. Di v. 1924), which had concluded: “It cannot be held that the Legislature intended that a m arriage perform ed in accordance with the law existing at the tim e of performance can be declared void because of a subsequent change in the statute.” 203 N.Y.S. at 52.3
3 See also Succession of Yoist, 61 So. 384, 385 (La. 1913) (s tating that a “sta tute prohibited marriages between white persons and persons of color, b ut had no r etroactive e ffect as to marriages of that kind which ha d been previously consummated” ); In re Ragan’s Estate, 62 N.W.2d 121, 121-122 (Neb. 1954) (“The statute [pr oviding that common-law m arriages are not recognized in Nebraska] had no re troactive aspects and com mon-law marriages entered into and consummated prior to the adoption of the act ar e valid.”); Weisberg v. Weisberg, 98 N.Y.S. 260, 261-262 (App. Div. 1906) (holding that a statute making m arriages between uncle and niece
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In the sam e contex t as the present case, cou rts have r ejected sta te ef forts to nullif y a same-sex couple’s marital status once it was legally acquired under that state’s law. In Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009), the California Supreme Court addressed whether a voteradopted state constitutional amendment prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages should be applied to the estim ated 18,000 sam e-sex couples who had m arried after the issuance of an earlier court decision recognizing their right to marry. The court refused to give the am endment retroactive application, to avoid a due-pro cess violation under the California Constitutio n premised on the deprivation of vested rights. Id. at 121-122.
Following the California Suprem e Court’s lead, the district court in Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Utah 2014), rejected state efforts to deny recognition to sam e-sex marriages solemnized in the period between the issuance of a court order recognizing their right to m arry and the d ate the United States Su preme Court st ayed the effect of the order pending appeal. Invoking the doctrine of vested rights, the Evan s court concluded that the sam e due-process concerns voiced in Strauss were present: “The State’s decision to retroactively apply its marriage bans and p lace Plain tiffs’ m arriages ‘on hold’ infringes upon fundam ental constitu tional
incestuous could not be applied retroactively; otherwise it w ould be unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts); Gilels v. Gilels, 287 N. Y.S. 5, 9 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (declining to apply retroactiv ely marriage am endment allowing annulm ent based on insanity); Stackhouse v. Stackhouse, 862 A.2d 102, 107 (P a. Super. Ct. 2004) (in “grandfathering” as valid common-law m arriages established before abo lishment by court decision, stating that the Pennsylvania “Supreme Court has long recognized a principle of general jurisprudence that a law can be repealed by the law giver; but the right s which have been acquired under it, while it was in force do not thereby cease [becau se] . . . [i]t woul d be an absolute injustice to abo lish with the law all of the effects it had produced” (quotation marks and brackets omitted)); PNC Bank Corp. v. W .C.A.B. (Stam os), 831 A.2d 1269, 1279-1283 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (applying the abolition of common-law m arriage prospectiv ely); Tufts v. Tufts, 30 P. 309, 309-310 (Utah 1892) (amended statute providing for a lesser degree of cruelty as a cause for divorce should not be applied retroactively).
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protections for the m arriage rela tionship,” found in the Fourteen th Am endment. Id. at 12071210.4
Legislative action also conf irms the consen sus again st inv alidating m arriages that were valid prior to the adoption of statutory am endments that would have voided those m arriages. This is evidenced by numerous statutes carving out exemptions for existing marriages. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.05.311 (1963); Fla. Stat. § 741.211 (1967); Ga. Code A nn. § 19-3-1.1 (1996); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/214 (1905); Ind. Code § 31-11-8-5 (1958); Mich. Com p. Laws § 551.2 (1957); Minn. Stat. § 517.01 (1941); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-15(2) (1956); 2 The Revised Codes of Montana of 1921 15 (1921) (citing Mont. Rev. Code 1935, §§ 5700-5703); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.12(B)(2) (1991); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1103 (2004); S.D. Codi fied Laws § 25-1-29 (1959).
Like other states, Michigan also has a firm policy against the retroa ctive application of legislation generally. See Frank W. Lynch & Co. v. Flex Techs., Inc., 624 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Mich. 2001) (prospective app lication utilized “if re troactive application of a statute woul d impair vested rights, create a new obligation an d impose a new duty, or attach a disability with respect to past transactions,” unless legislativ e intent clearly indicate s otherwise); Hughes v. Judges’ Ret. Bd., 282 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich. 1979) (“A statute is construed to have prospective effect only unless the Legislature expressly, or im pliedly, indica tes its in tention to g ive it
4 Defendants attempt to distinguish Evans to no avail, by claiming that the decision turned on the “exercise [of] rights attendant to a marriage.” Defs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 23. In fact, the Evans court made clear that the m arriages in that case were valid at the moment of solemnization, and that “[n]o separate step can or m ust be taken after solemnization for the rights of a m arriage to vest.” Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1206. It was irreleva nt in Evans, as it is in this case, whether the couples exercised any rights attendant to a m arriage. Like Utah law discussed in Evans, Michigan law requires n o act beyond obtaining a marriage license and solemnization to create a valid marriage. See discussion infra in connection with Defendants’ “ab-initio” theory.
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retrospective effect.”). This is in harmony with the federal rule against retroactive application of
legislation:
[T]he presumption against retroactiv e leg islation is deep ly rooted in our jurisprudence, and em bodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elem entary c onsiderations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to k now what th e law is and to confor m their conduct a ccordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. Fo r that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that ex isted when the c onduct took place has tim eless and universal appeal. In a free, dyna mic society, creativity in both commercial and ar tistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-266 (1994) (quotation marks, footnotes, and
citations omitted).
These authorities — and the absence of any to the contrary — illustrate a consensus that
the right to the continue d validity of a m arriage is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s tradition,” so
long as, at the time it was solemnized, the marriage was authorized under the law of the state that
seeks to defeat or diminish the marriage. Whether prompted by the notions of vested rights or an
aversion to retro active application of the law, courts have been unwaver ing in their disapproval
of any attempt to deprive people of their m arital statu s when that state ’s law a uthorized th e
marriage when solemnized. This uncontroverted history establishes that this right is fundamental
and comprehended within the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
Viewed in this light, it is irr elevant whet her Plaintiffs had a c onstitutional righ t to
solemnize a same-sex marriage in the first instance — just as it would be i rrelevant whether first
cousins had a constitutional right to m arry in the firs t ins tance, o r whether an u ncle had a
constitutional right to marry his niece, or whether a couple had a constitutional right to engage in
common-law marriage. In all such instances, once a marriage has been solemnized pursuant to a
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validly issu ed m arriage license, th e authorizin g state can not withdraw the statu s that it has awarded, even if the couples had no right to demand to be married in the first place.
To rule otherwise would be to create a pern icious pre cedent th at could catas trophically undermine the stability that marriage seeks to create. If a state could with draw the marital status it had gran ted, children would suddenly face th e stigma that their fam ily was no longer legally recognized. Estate plans would leave unaddressed taxable events or incidents w ith costly tax consequences. Carefully crafted pension ar rangements would become inoperative, plunging survivors into potentially ruinous financial ha rdship. In term s of the personal ordering and orderliness of one’s m ost fundam ental affairs, nothing would be m ore de structive of “ordered liberty.” A nd such disarray would com e abou t not because of action voluntarily taken by the couple after they married, but rather due solely to a change in the solemnizing state’s law.
In light of the fundamental nature of the right to maintain the marital status granted by the state seeking to defeat it, only a “narrowly tailored” and “co mpelling” state interest could defeat or diminish it. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2008) (sam e). Defendants m ake no ar gument that any state in terest served by the non-recognition policy is com pelling. And in light of the discuss ion below, this Court sees no interest that meets this “usually unforgiving” standard. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410.
Defendants do, nonetheless, raise a num ber of a rguments why Plaintiffs will not lik ely succeed on the m erits — argum ents that also f orm the basis of Defendants’ m otion to dism iss. As to each argum ent, Defendants are m istaken. Plaintiffs, therefore, have s tated a plausib le claim that the non-reco gnition po licy violates the Due Process Claus e, and they h ave shown a likelihood of succeeding on that claim.
b. Ab-Initio Theory
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Defendants’ princ ipal a rgument is that Pla intiffs’ righ t to m aintain the ir m arriages can survive only so long as the ini tial decis ion th at in itially a uthorized th eir m arriages is uph eld. According to Defendants, if the district court’s decision in DeBoer is not ultim ately vindicated, Plaintiffs’ m arriages were void ab initio. Fo r this sam e reason, Defe ndants suggest the Court refrain from deciding Plaintiffs’ motion — and from hearing this case in its entirety — until after a final decision in the DeBoer case.
However, there is no authority supporting this “ void ab in itio” theory in the con text of marriages. Defendants’ notion th at Plaintiffs’ m arriages were somehow “conditionally valid,” Defs. Supp. Br. at 2 (D kt. 43), is m ade out of whole cloth. Ther e is nothing in the record to indicate that the marriage licenses that Michigan county clerks issu ed to Plaintiffs contained any language that was condition al. Nor does Michigan law recognize any concept of a condition al marriage. Indeed, Michigan law sets forth only two requirem ents for a lawful m arriage: (i) a validly issued marriage license from a county clerk, and (ii) a solem n declaration, made before a person authorized to solem nize the union and befo re two witnesses, that the pe rsons m arrying take each other as spouses. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 551.2, 551.7, 551.9. Defenda nts concede these requ irements wer e m et. Thus, Michig an law was fully satisfied and im posed no conditionality on Plaintiffs’ marriages.
Defendants seek support for their notion of conditionality based on the fact that the licenses were issued as a result of a decision by a single district judge. Defs. Supp. Br. at 2-3. But Michigan law contains no provision for conditional marriages based on what legal event may have prom pted county clerks to is sue m arriage licenses. And cer tainly nothing in federal law makes condition al a m arriage prom pted by a d istrict court ruling that was unquestionab ly in effect when the marriage licenses were issued. To be sure, it is not an everyday occurrence that a
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state’s law on m arriage eligibility changes back and forth within a 24-hour period. But that is simply a function of our legal system , which pr ovides that an unstayed final judgm ent of a district court is effective immediately. See, e.g., In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “j udgment of a district court becomes effective and enforceable as soon as it is entered; there is no suspended eff ect pending appeal unless a stay is entered”); Evans, 21 F . Supp. 3d at 1207 (sam e); see also Hovey v. McDona ld, 109 U.S. 150, 161-162 (1883) (holding that, while granting a stay “would have been em inently proper[,] . . . where the power is not exercised by the court, nor by the judge who allows the appeal, the decree retains its intrinsic force and effect”).
Defendants must, therefore, go beyond the m arriage context and rely on their argum ent that, as a general m atter, a judgm ent that is re versed on appeal has no effect. Such a bald characterization of the law, however, is an oversimplified misstatement.
In fact, a reversed judgm ent may still have legal ef fects, m any of which are extraordinarily consequ ential. For exam ple, th e f ailure to obey an injunc tion that is la ter reversed may lead to crim inal culpability for contempt. United States v. United Mine W orkers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947) (“Vi olations of an order are punish able as crim inal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal or though the ba sic action has becom e moot.” (citation and footnote omitted)). And while Defendants are correct that a reversal o f a judgment will nullify the judgm ent as to th e parties to the appeal in that litigation, “[a] reversal does not ordinarily control the interests of parties who did not join . . . the appeal,” 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 739, much less non-parties, such as Plaintiffs.5
5 Defendants cite num erous cases for the p roposition that parties act at their peril if they act in accordance with a decree that is later reversed. See Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Stay at 11; Defs. Reply in Support of Mot. to Stay at 4 (Dkt . 33). But such cases address the consequences
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In fact, there is a long- established principle that the reve rsal of a judgment on appeal will not affect the rights of non-pa rties who acted in good-faith relia nce on the judgm ent. See, e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 927 (6th Cir. 1983) (reversing cons ent decree addressin g racial discrimination in police hiring, but leaving undisturbed the rights of police officers already hired or promoted in reliance on the decree). In the bankruptcy context, the Bankruptcy Code adopts this principle by mandating that a good-faith purchaser under an unstayed bankruptcy sale order may not have his or her right s affected by a reversal of the order on appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (“The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or leas e of property does not affect the va lidity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the app eal, unless such authoriza tion and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.”).
Moreover, the doctrine of m ootness recogn izes th at third pa rties m ay have so significantly relied on a judgm ent that an appellate court has discretion to dism iss the appeal of that judgment, where relief could n ot properly be granted b ecause of the inequitable im pact on third pa rties — a doctrine tha t is inconsis tent with Defendants’ notion that an erroneous judgment is, in general, a legal nullity. See, e .g., Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers), 526 F.3d 942, 952 ( 6th Ci r. 2008) (dism issing creditors’ appeal as moot, where reversal of reorgani zation plan would adversely im pact third parties not before the court); Kessler v. Surface Transp. Bd., 637 F.3d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing appeal, where disputed property was sold to third part y); Oakville Dev. Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 986 F.2d 611,
for partie s in the litig ation in w hich the ju dgment is reversed; they do not address the consequences to non-parties, such as Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.
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615 (1st Cir. 1993) (dism issing appeal as m oot, where property was sold to third party in a foreclosure sale).
These authorities confirm that Defendants’ ab-initio argum ent is without foundation. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, a revers ed judgment does not ordinarily nullify the rights that a third party m ay have acquired in reliance on the judgm ent when that judgm ent was still operative. The law pro vides far greater flexibility — and f airness — than Def endants concede. As shown above, that flexibility and fairness ar e illustrated by the pro tection the law accords to third-party rights in a variety of relatively mundane contexts, includ ing routine m atters of commerce. It would be a strange jurisprudence that would lend pr otection to such third par ties, but not to those who entered into a highly personal — and for many, a sacred — contract for life. The law must, at a minimum, afford the same protection to married couples, by recognizing their fundamental liberty intere st to m aintain the validity of a la wful m arital status acquired as a consequence of a non-stayed court order.
Defendants’ efforts to breathe life into their ab-initio argument now that the Sixth Circuit has spoken in DeBoer also fails. Defendants argue th at the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of the district court h as resurrected M ichigan’s ban on sam e-sex m arriages, ther eby invalidating Plaintiffs’ marriages. Defs. Supp. Br. at 2-3. But nothing in the DeBoer opinion addresses the right to retain one’s m arital s tatus in th e face of the so lemnizing state’s effort to invalidate it. That question was never argued in DeBoer or decided.
Another argument premised on DeBoer also misses the mark. Defe ndants argue that the Sixth Circuit validated sam e-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee, which were challenged by out-of-state litigants whose sam e-sex m arriages were lawful in th e states from which they migrated. Defendants cl aim that the Sixth Circuit’s hold ing in DeBoer that a state is
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free to refu se recognition of out-o f-state m arriages that d o not m eet its own d efinition of marriage should be applicable to our case, as well. Howe ver, that issue is not the issue in our case; we deal only with efforts by Michigan officials to abroga te a m arital sta tus that was lawfully acquired under Michigan law. This issue does not im plicate the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that “a State does not behave irrationally by insisti ng upon its own definition of m arriage rather than deferring to the definition adopted by another State.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 419.
This is so, because our case does not involve the potential erosion of the state’s power to define marriage by forcing the state to accep t the definition of marriage adopted in sister states. In our case, Plaintiffs acquire d a marital status that Michig an bestowed upon them , and which Defendants — Michigan officials — them selves acknowledge was lawfully acquired at the tim e, pursuant to valid ly iss ued Mich igan m arriage licenses. Nor does o ur case rais e a potential conflict with the line of cases decided under the F ull Faith and Credit Clause, under which states have long had the right to refuse recognition of out-of-state marriages that violate a state’s public policy. The Sixth Circuit in DeBoer saw this c onflict as supportiv e of its holding that a state could legitim ately refuse recognition of out -of-state m arriages not encom passed under the refusing state’s definition of m arriage. But no sister -state’s definition of marriage is implicated here. Thus, nothing in the DeBoer decision supports Defendants’ position in our case.6
c. Stay Order
6 Because no ne of the iss ues decided in DeBoer bear on our case, Defen dants’ argument as to whether DeBoer should be applied retroactively, see Defs. Reply in Support of Mot. to Stay at 3 (Dkt. 33), is irrelevant.
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Defendants also purport to find refuge in the Sixth Circu it’s full stay o rder.7 They read the order as reinstating the validity of Michig an’s sam e-sex m arriage ban for all m arriages, whenever solemnized. That read ing is only partia lly correct. While the stay order did resurrect the ban with respect to sam e-sex couples seeking to marry after entry of the stay order, the order says nothing about sam e-sex couples m arried before the stay cam e into effect. Neither the language of the order, nor the pa rties’ briefing in the Sixth Circ uit on the stay m otion, raised the issue of how same-sex couples married before the stay order was entered should be treated. Had the panel m ajority meant the s tay order to suspe nd or alter the m arital status of those who had married on the strength of the district court order, the stay order would have so specified. In the absence of any clear ex pression that the ord er was meant to be read in that f ashion, this Cour t will not regard it as such.
d. Eleventh Amendment Defendants also invoke the Elev enth Amendment, which bars “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of t he Un ited States.” U.S. Const. am end. XI. Defendants acknowledge that, under the doctri ne of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), federal courts may, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, entertain suits seeking prospective equitable or declaratory relief for violations of federal law against a state officer sue d in his o r her official capacity. See Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (Dkt. 21 ) (citing W ill v. Mich. Dep’t of State P olice, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989)). But Defendants argue that two impediments to Plaintiffs’ case exist here: (i) th e unavailability of prosp ective relief, and (ii)
7 The operative language of the full stay order stat es that the Sixth Circui t “[grants] Michigan’s motion to stay the dis trict cou rt’s o rder pend ing f inal d isposition of Mic higan’s app eal by th is court.” DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341, 3/25/14 Order at 3.
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Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to plead a causal conne ction between the alleged deprivation of rights and Defendants’ actions. Both arguments are flawed.
The argument based on the unavailability of pr ospective relief is prem ised on th e notion that the Sixth Circuit stay orde r mandates non-recognition of Plaint iffs’ marriages. In essence, the argument is that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action seeking prospective injunctive relief where the plaintiff has no right, on the m erits, to such relief. Defendants offer no c ase for this novel proposition, and the Court’s own research reveals none. This is not surprising , given that Defendants’ theory would raise an E leventh Amendment issue — and its attendant jurisdictional implications — every tim e a plaintiff lost on the m erits in an ac tion seeking prospectiv e injunctive relief. Conflating the Eleventh Amendment with the m erits is simply not how the Ex parte Young doctrine operates. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of M d., 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002) (holding that “the inquiry in to whether suit lie s under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim”); Dubuc v. M ich. Bd. of Law Exa m’rs, 342 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Importantly, determining whether the Ex parte Young doctrine applies does not involve an analysis of the merits of a plaintiff’s claims.”).
Regarding causal connection, Defendants misstate the law. The Ex parte Young doctrine does not require a causal connect ion between the depr ivation and som e spec ific a ction tha t a defendant took. Rather, “[a] plain tiff must allege facts showing how a state official is connected to, or has responsibility for, the alleged consti tutional violations.” Top Flight Entm ’t, Ltd. v. Schuette, 729 F.3d 623, 634 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). In ot her words, this requirem ent is s atisfied where a state of ficial ha s “som e connection” to the uncons titutional le gislation or other challenged action. Allied Artists Pict ure Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982) (“[Ex parte Young] requires that the state of ficer sued have ‘some connection’ with the
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enforcement of the alleg edly unconstitutional Act.”); Floyd v. Cnty. of Kent, 454 F. App’x 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The state official sued [] must have, by virtue of the office, som e connection with th e alleged unc onstitutional act or c onduct of which the plaintiff com plains.” (emphasis added)).
Here, the nam ed Defendants are alleged to have more than m ere “[g]eneral au thority to enforce the laws of the state.” Children’s H ealthcare is a L egal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1416 (6th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). Each has had either some direct, personal involvement in the deprivation, or has responsib ility to enforce the pol icy of not recognizing Plaintiffs’ marriages — matters for which Plaintiffs have plausibly set forth facts.
Plaintiffs have alleged facts showing how Governor Snyder “is connected to, or has responsibility for,” not recognizing Plaintiffs’ marriages. Top Flight Entm ’t, Ltd., 729 F.3d at 634. As Governor, he has broad supervisory re sponsibilities over the ex ecutive departments of the state. See Mich. Const. art. V, § 8 (“Each principal department shall be under the supervision of the governor unless otherwise provided by th is constitution.”). Mo re specifically, however, Governor Snyder was the key decision-m aker for adopting the policy of not recognizing Plaintiffs’ marriages in light of the disagreement with the district court’s decision.
Plaintiffs Clint McCorm ack and Bry an Reamer are suing Maura Corrigan in her official capacity as director of the Michig an Departm ent of Hum an Services (“DHS”). Com pl. ¶ 19. These Plaintiffs wish to jointly adop t each other’s children, as well as th ree girls who have been removed from the custody of their biological pare nt, whose legal rights to the children are likely to be terminated. Id. ¶¶ 51, 52. Plaintiffs have alleged that, under state law, DHS must give final approval to adoptions that arise ou t of the foster care system . I d. ¶ 53. Plaintiffs contend that “DHS has indicated on its Mich igan Adoption Resource Exchange” website that o nly m arried
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couples m ay jointly adopt foster children. Id. Thus Director Corrigan, as the head of her

department, is integrally connected to the policy of non-recognition.

Plaintiffs Frank Colasonti, Jr. and Jam es Ryder are suing Phil Stoddard in his official

capacity as directo r of the Mich igan Office of Retire ment Services (“ORS”). Id. ¶ 2 0.

According to Plaintiffs, under the Michigan Public School Employees Retirem ent Syste m

(“MPSERS”), ORS “allows newly m arried retirees to adjust their pension disbursem ents to a

lower monthly amount received in order to p reserve future pension payments and health benefits

for a surviving spouse.” Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiffs contend that when Col asonti “contacted ORS

regarding his March 22, 2014 m arriage and his desire to provide pe nsion benefits to [Ryder], he

was told by ORS staff that, pursu ant to an internal memo, the ORS can recognize only marriages

between a man and a wom an, and that the MPSERS pension option for surviving spouses would

therefore not be available to him while the DeBo er stay remained in p lace or unless Governor

Synder changed his position regarding the stat us of the March 22, 2014 m arriages.” Id. ¶ 59.

Director Stoddard, as the head of hi s departm ent, has direct responsibility for carrying out the

non-recognition policy.

Plaintiffs Samantha Wolf and Martha Rutledge are suing Jam es Haveman in his official

capacity as director of the Michigan Department of Community Health (“DCH”). Id. ¶ 21. Wolf

wants Rutledge “to be covered under the health insurance policy that [Wolf] receives through her

employment at [DCH].” Id. ¶ 64. According

to Plaintiffs, “[s ]uch coverage is norm ally

available to spouses of [DCH] e mployees[,] and is far more com prehensive than the benefits

[Rutledge] currently receives under Medicare.” I d. Plaintiffs contend that W olf “requested

health coverage for [Rut ledge] as her legal spou se” the Mon day following their m arriage. Id. ¶

65. However, Wolf claims that she was informed by DCH that it would not “recognize her legal

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marriage or provide [Rutledge] with spousal h ealth insurance benefits because of Governor Snyder’s statem ent regarding the marriages of sam e-sex couples that took place o n March 22, 2014.” Id. Director Have man, as the head of his departm ent, has responsibilities directly connected to the non-recognition policy.
All Defendants have “some connection” to the unconstitutional policy sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar to this action.
e. Standing and Ripeness A plaintiff must satisfy three requirem ents for Article II I standing. F irst, th e plaintif f must have suffered an “ injury in fact,” defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “con crete and particularized, ” i.e., “actu al or imm inent,” as oppos ed to “co njectural or hypothetical.” United States v. W indsor, 1 33 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (quotation m arks omitted). Second, a causal connection m ust exist between the injury and the conduct of which a plaintiff complains. Id . That is to say, “the in jury has to be fairly tr aceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of th e independent action of som e third party not before the court.” Id. (quotatio n m arks, brackets, and ellipsis om itted). Third, it m ust be “likely,” r ather than “ merely speculative, tha t the inju ry will be r edressed by a f avorable decision.” Id. (quotation m arks omitted); accord Lujan v. Defende rs of W ildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). Ripeness is a related doctrine, requiring a court “to evaluate bot h the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hard ship to the parties of withholdi ng court consideration.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 814 (2003) (Ste vens, J., concurring)
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(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967)). The Sixth Circuit has delineated three factors for courts to evaluate:
(1) the likelihood that the harm alleged by th e plaintiffs will ever come to pass; (2 ) whether th e factual reco rd is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adju dication of the m erits of the parties’ resp ective cla ims; and (3) the hardship to the par ties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings. Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 532 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Defendants’ standing argum ent — pertaining to only some of the Plaintiffs — is that these Plaintiffs’ injuries are “conjectural or h ypothetical.” Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 22. Defendants point to the f ollowing allegations as insuf ficient: (i) Marsha Caspar wants to add Glenna DeJong to her insurance plan; (ii) Clint McCorm ack and Bryan Ream er want to adopt children, but have not begun the pr ocess; (iii) Bianca Racine and Carrie Miller allege potential financial difficulties in starting a family; and (iv) Martin Contreras and Keith Orr allege emotional concerns about the status of their marriage. Id. at 22-23. Regarding causation, Defendants reprise thei r argum ent that no specific conduct by Defendants Corrigan, Stoddard, or Havem an has re sulted in any of th e alleged injuries. Regarding redressability, Defe ndants argue that som e of the alleged tangible harm s — for example, pertaining to adoption and financial aid — are dependent on issues beyond m arital status, making it unlikely that a decision f avorable to Plain tiffs will redress the ir injuries. For their ripeness argument, Defendants reprise their arguments of non-particularized injuries and the absence of a record dem onstrating that the lack of recognized m arital status alone wi ll result in harm. Defendants’ arguments all lack merit. Their standing and ripeness arguments are myopic in that they fail to recognize the central harm that the non-recognition of Plaintiffs’ m arriages is
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alleged to have produced: the severe em otional harm through the assault on Plaintiffs’ dignity. That may fairly be described as “concrete and pa rticularized,” just as any emotional harm would be if it stemmed from a legally protected interest. Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (S.D. Ind. 2 014) (standing satisfied based in part on intangible harm to “dignity” resulting from non-recognition of same-sex marriage); Stahlman v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (D. Md. 2014) (em otional harm is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirem ent if “the alleged harm stems from the infringem ent of a ‘legally protected interest’”). Because Defen dants have announced and m aintained a polic y of non-recognition that viol ates Plaintiffs’ due-process rights, there can be no question that the claim of e motional harm is neither conjectural nor hypothetical; it is palpable, present, and persistent.
Defendants overlook, as we ll, certain tangible harm s. Ca spar alleges that she asked her employer to add DeJong to her insurance plan but canno t receive a decis ion because of th e uncertain legal status of their marriage. Compl. ¶ 47. Racine, a m ember of the National Guard for nine years, was told that financial-aid programs funded by th e State of Michigan would not be available for her sam e-sex spouse. Id. ¶ 83. There is nothing “conjectural” or “hypothetical” about these harms.
And Defendants’ actions in announcing, m aintaining, and enforcing the non-recognition policy m ake the harm fairly traceable to thei r conduct. Further, a decision of this Court favorable to Plaintiffs would unquestionably stop at least some of these harms, thereby satisfying the redressability factor. For ex ample, the denial of health insu rance and pension benefits — as well as loss of dignity — woul d be reversed if the non-recogn ition policy wer e revers ed. Because there is standin g for at leas t some of the claimed harms, it is irrelev ant whether other
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harms, standing alone, would not support standing. See Sch. Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of

the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2009).

The ripeness factors are also satisfied. The alleged harm of impaired human dignity and

denial of at least som e tangible benefits have already come about, there by establishing that the

factual reco rd is sufficiently d eveloped, such that th ere is no need to await futu re events for

adjudication of the issues in this action. And de laying judicial resolution of these issues would

serve no useful purpose. To the contrary, such delay would compound the harms these Plaintiffs

suffer each day that their marital status remains unrecognized.

f. Declaratory Judgment

Defendants also claim that th e Court should decline jurisd iction over this case under the

Declaratory Judgm ent Act. Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Dism iss at 14. That act provides

that, “[i]n a case of actu al controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the U nited States,

upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, m ay declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28

U.S.C. § 2201. The exe rcise of jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action is consigned to the

court’s discretion. W ilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). In exercis ing that

discretion, courts consider five factors:

(1) Whether the declaratory controversy;

action would settle th e

(2) Whether th e declarato ry act ion would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue;

(3) Whether the declaratory rem edy is being used m erely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for res judicata;”

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(4) Whether th e use of a declarato ry action would increas e friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and
(5) Whether there is an alternative rem edy which is better or more effective.
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Grand Trunk W . R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Co., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Defendants’ arguments against the exercise of jurisdiction all lack mer it. As to f actors 1 and 2, Defendants argue that the u ltimate appellate decision in DeBoer will control the outcom e of this case, m aking this case irrelevant. As prev iously stated, this view is m isguided. Even if the ultimate outcome of the DeBoer case is that sam e-sex couples have no constitu tional right to marry, Plaintiffs in this action nonetheless have a fundamental right to m aintain the validity of their marriages — which Michigan law authorized — against the refusal by Michigan officials to recognize them. This case will settle that issue.
Factor 3 is not pertin ent, because courts h ave utilized it in a vastly d ifferent context — where there was a race to the courthouse by the declaratory-judg ment plaintiff and its opponent, who may have sought or was about to seek an al ternative judicial forum. See AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 788 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts take a dim view of declaratory plaintiffs who file their suits mere days or weeks before the coercive suits filed by a ‘nat ural plaintiff’ and who seem to have done so for the purpose of acquiring a favorable forum . Allowing declaratory actions in these situa tions can d eter s ettlement negotiations and encourage races to the courthouse, as potential plaint iffs m ust file before approaching def endants for settlem ent negotiations, under pain of a declar atory suit.”). Here, there was no race to the co urthouse. In
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fact, Plaintiffs are both the declaratory-judgm ent pl aintiffs a nd the “natural” plaintiffs, as they are not conceivable defendants; Plaintiffs are the only parties seeking relief.8
Nor is there any possible friction between fede ral and s tate courts that this litiga tion might generate. There is no related action pe nding in a state court — the circu mstance that factor 4 was designed to address. Scotts dale Ins. Co., 513 F.3d at 559-560. And whil e Defendants argue that a decision here would “creat[e] friction between this Court and the State’s broad authority and significant interests in regulating the subject matter of this action,” Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Dis miss at 16, federal courts routinely review state enactm ents. Defendants present no case suggesting that th is creates un acceptable f riction between federal courts and states. Further, this factor is concerned principally with friction arising from federal courts addressing issues of state law. Scottsda le Ins. Co., 513 F.3d at 559 (“The Suprem e Court has cautioned that where another suit involving th e same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the sam e state la w issues is pending in state cour t, a district court m ight be indulging in gratu itous interferen ce, if it perm itted the federal declaratory action to proceed. ” (quotation m arks and brackets omitted) (emphasis added)). This case raises federal constitutional issues — not issues under state law.
Nor should a decision by this Court create any unacceptable friction with the S ixth Circuit, as Defendants argue. Defs . Br. in Support of Mot. to Dism iss at 16. If the Sixth Circuit disagrees with how this Court ha s interpreted its stay order, th e DeBoer decision, or any other
8 Defendants’ “procedural fencing” arguments lack merit. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs seek a declaration so as to secure benefits before th e district court ruling in DeBoer is called into question by an appellate decision. Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Dism iss at 15. They also claim that the declaratory judgm ent action is a colla teral attack on the Sixth Circuit stay order. Id. Neither of these m otives involves a race to the cour thouse, the chief concer n of this factor. Nor is this suit a co llateral attack on the stay order, as that order do es not address persons married before the stay order went into effect.
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issue of law, it will take appropr iate appellate action — hardly an eventuality that should deter a district court from entertaining a declaratory-judgment action.
As for a more effective remedy than declaratory relief, Defendants offer no candidates. Not only do the five tradition al factors counsel rejecting Defendants’ argum ent; so does another factor, under which courts examine whether dismissal of the declaratory count would not lead to any efficiencies because counts seeking related relief, such as injunctive relief, are closely intertwined with the request for declaratory relief:
When a plaintiff seeks relief in a ddition to a declaratory judgm ent, such as dam ages or injunctive relief, both of which a court m ust address, then the entire benef it derived from exercising discretion not to grant declarato ry relief is frustrated, and a stay or dism issal would not save any judici al resources. The claims in this case for which declaratory relief is requested and those for which injunctive relief is req uested are s o closely intertwined that judicial economy counsels against dism issing the cl aims for declaratory judgm ent relief while adjudicating the claims for injunctive relief. Adrian Energy Assoc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 481 F.3d 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). Here, injunctive relief and declaratory relief do appear to be intertwined, furnishing yet another reason for refusing dismissal of the request for declaratory relief. For all of these reaso ns, Plain tiffs’ clai ms seeking de claratory r elief will not b e dismissed.
g. Improper Injunction Defendants also argue that the type of pre liminary injunction sought by Plaintiffs is one that courts “particularly disfavor,” and thus triggers greater judicial scrutiny, because it: (i) alters the status quo, (ii) requires Defe ndants to take affirm ative action, rather than merely desist from certain cond uct, and (iii) af fords Plaintif fs all the relief they could rec over af ter a trial. Def s. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 8 (Dkt. 22).
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The premise that there are “disfavored” injunc tions finds no support in S ixth Circuit law.
Notably, the authorities cited by Defendants were district court cases that relied on Tenth Circuit
authority for the proposition that certain types of injunctions are disfavored. See Cox v. Jackson,
579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 855 n.8 (E.D. Mich. 2008); MK Cha mbers Co. v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., No. 13-11379, 2013 WL 5182435, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013). The S ixth
Circuit, however, has rejected Tenth Circuit au thority requiring m ore exacting judicial scrutiny
of injunctions that alter the status quo, are m andatory in nature, or grant substantially all of the
relief to which a plaintiff may ultimately be entitled after trial:
Recognizing that preservation of the court’s ability to exercise meaningful review m ay require a ffirmative relief in or der to prevent some future irre parable injury, several comm entators have criticized judicial hesitancy to disturb the status quo where the conditions favoring injunctive relie f are satisfied . . . . We therefore see little cons equential importance to the concept of the status quo, and conclude that th e distinction between m andatory and prohibitory injunctive relief is not m eaningful. Accordingly, we reject the Tenth Circuit’s “heavy and compelling” standard and hold that the tradition al prelim inary injun ctive standard —the balancing of equities —applies to m otions f or m andatory preliminary injunc tive relief as we ll a s m otions f or proh ibitory preliminary injunctive relief.
United Food & Comm ercial Workers Union, Lo cal 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163
F.3d 341, 348 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Nor is there anything to disf avor ab out an in junction that m ay grant an applic ant f ull
relief before a trial, in a case where a trial is no t likely to resolve any s ignificant factual issue.
Indeed, no evidentiary hearing is required for a preliminary injunction when factual matters are
not in material dispute. See Hunter v. Ha milton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 246 (6th
Cir. 2011) (a hearing is not requi red “when the issues are prim arily questions of law” (quotation
marks omitted)); Certified Restoration Dry Cl eaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d
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535, 553 (6th Cir. 2007) (a district court is not re quired to hold an evidentiary hearing before
granting a prelim inary injunction “where m aterial facts are not in dis pute, or where facts in
dispute are not m aterial to th e p reliminary injunction” (quotation marks om itted)). Here,
Defendants did not request an evidentiary heari ng in connection with th e injunction motion; nor
do they identify any factual issue that a trial would have to resolve. As currently postured by the
parties, this case involves pure questions of law without any disputed factual predicates.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not seek an “improper” injunction.9
In sum, Plaintiffs have dem onstrated a lik elihood of success on the m erits on their due-
process claim, and Defendants have failed to raise any viable basis for dismissing this action.10
9 Defendants raise a number of other arguments that are, similarly, without merit.
 Defendants appear to s uggest that Plainti ffs unnecessarily delayed th e filing of their motion seeking prelim inary injunctive relief. Defs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 15, 19. While laches is a potential equita ble defense, Defendants have not expressly invoked it. Nor have they alleged or substantiated any pr ejudice — a n ecessary elem ent for laches. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (“Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.”).
 Defendants contend that the Court lacks jurisd iction because of the one-sentence order in Baker sta ting that a sa me-sex-marriage cha llenge f ailed to raise a su bstantial f ederal question. Defs. Reply in Support of Mot. to Di smiss at 4-6 (Dkt. 31). As stated earlier, this case does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry.
 Defendants claim that any harm to Plaintiffs flows from the stay order, not their actions, Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Dism iss at 18 (Dkt. 21), and that the stay is som e kind of “superseding” event, Defs. Reply in Support of Mot. to Di smiss at 3. As earlier stated, the stay order, by its term s, did not purport to apply to those m arried before it came into effect.
10 Courts generally avoid unnece ssary adjudication of constitutional questions. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 43 9, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial r estraint r equires tha t cou rts avo id re aching cons titutional qu estions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”). Because the preliminary injunction may be granted on due-process grounds, there is no need to discuss Plaintiffs’ equal-protection claim. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 497 n. 5 (1 972) (not addre ssing th e equal-protection claim because th e
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3. The Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors “When a pa rty seeks a prelim inary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, ‘the likelihoo d of succes s on the merits often will be the determ inative factor.’” Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009)). Nonetheless, considerat ion of the other prelim inary injunction factors is appropriate. Id. All factors decisively counsel granting Plaintiffs’ motion.
a. Irreparable Harm Irreparable injury may be presumed when ther e is a constitu tional violation. Id. (“When constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed.”). Further, the hallm ark o f irrepa rable inju ry is the unavailability of m oney dam ages to redress the injury. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d at 550. Where damages are difficult to calculate, the injury may also be deemed irreparable. Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n injury is not fully com pensable by money damages if the natu re of the plaintiff’s loss would make damages difficult to calculat e.”); E.E.O.C. v. Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54, 70 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (in an age discrim ination case, finding “that the psychological and physiological distress suffered by the claim ants” constituted irreparable ha rm for purposes of a preliminary injunction), aff’d, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “claim s of emotional and physical harm m ay in som e circum stances ju stify prelim inary injunc tive relief”); United States v. Matusoff Rent al Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 740, 756 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (concluding that irreparable harm had been established where vi ctims of discrim inatory practices “suffered
case was resolved on due-process grounds). That portion of Defenda nts’ m otion to dism iss is denied without prejudice. Shoul d future developments make clear that the Court should rule on the viability of the equ al-protection cla im, Defendants will be gr anted leave to re new the ir motion at that time.
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emotional distress” and “the rem edies available at law are inadequate to com pensate for such

injuries” b ecause emotional dist ress is “difficult, if not im possible, to calculate with

mathematical precision”); Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 829 F. Supp 584, 598 (S.D.N.Y.

1993) (rejecting the contention “that non-econom ic claims such as emotional or psychological

damage can never, as a m atter of law, dem onstrate irr eparable harm suf ficient to justif y a

preliminary injunction”).

Here, the ha rms Plaintif fs allege in clude inta ngible matters, such as loss of dignity and

other emotional injury, which are not susceptible to quantitative calculation. In similar contexts,

courts have found such harm to be irreparable. For example, in Majors v. Jeanes, - F. Supp. 3d -,

2014 WL 4541173, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2014), th e court granted a prelim inary injunction

requiring a county clerk in Arizona to issue a d eath certificate showing the plaintiff’s sam e-sex

spouse, whom he had married lawfu lly out-of-state, as “m arried.” The court held that the “loss

of dignity and status,” as well as the “depri

vation of a constitutional right,” constituted

irreparable injury. Id. at *5. To the sam e effect is Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028

(S.D. Ind. 2014) (awarding pre liminary injunction requiring sa me-sex spouse to be listed on

death certificate, find ing irreparable injury from deprivati on of constitutional right and loss of

“dignity that official marriage status confers”).

Defendants offer no meaningful response. They argue that the harm could not be

“immediate,” because Plaintiffs waited 23 days to file suit and another 45 days before filing their

preliminary injunction motion. Defs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 15. Given both the significance and

the com plexity of the is sues tha t ne eded to be brief ed, as well as the number of parties who

needed to b e consulted, this hard ly suggests a lack of dilig ence on Plaintiffs’ part, or that the

claimed harms were not imminent. See, e.g., B P Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp.,

37

4:14-cv-11499-MAG-MKM Doc # 46 Filed 01/15/15 Pg 38 of 47 Pg ID 748
229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2000) (“To the extent that delay can justify denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction, a delay caused by a plaintiff’s good faith efforts to investigate an infringement or to determ ine how serious an infringement is does not preclude a finding of irreparable harm.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Defendants also argue that the injuries are “s peculative, entirely unrelated to the conduct of Defendants, and/or dependent on factors beyond mere marital status.” Defs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 15. The Court rejected this argument in its earlier discussi on on standing and ripeness, which need not be repeated here.
Defendants also claim that the in juries are a ll compensable with m oney damages. Id. at 16. But Defendants offer no explanation as to w ho these Plaintiffs should sue for compensation for loss of hum an dignity by virtue of the non -recognition policy. If Defendants suggest that they them selves would be po tential targe ts f or suit, there are clear im pediments, such as immunity, that would render uncertain any claim fo r monetary damages. Where the availability of a m oney dam age rem edy is significantly in doubt because of an immunity defense, m oney damages are not deemed an adequate rem edy, rende ring the harm irreparable. Feinerm an v. Bernardi, 558 F. Supp. 2d 36, 51 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Where…the plaintiff in question cannot recover damages from the defendant due to the defendant’s sovereign immunity[,]…any loss of income suffered by a plaintif f is irr eparable per se.” (citatio ns omitted)); United Sta tes v. New York, 708 F.2d 92, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirm ing th at injury could be irreparable because defendant would be immune from money damage recovery under the Eleventh Amendment).
38

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Because Plaintiffs alleg e that th ey have suffered both a constitution al violation and
significant emotional injury and ha rm to their dignity f rom the denia l of their m arital s tatus, irreparable injury is established.11
b. Public Interest
The public interest is served by an in junction here because it will p rotect Plaintiffs’ due-
process rights. Am . Fr eedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp.
(SMART), 698 F.3d 885, 896 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he public interest is prom oted by the robust
enforcement of constitutional rights.”).
c. Balance of Equities
Finally, the balance of the equi ties tips decidedly in favor of an injunction. Plaintiffs
present a com pelling case of lo ss of dignity and devastating emotional traum a. Sam e-sex
couples, like their opposite -sex-couple counterparts, have the sam e innately hum an im pulse to
maintain bonds of comm itted intimacy in a social ly and leg ally recognized m arriage. The non-
recognition policy frustrates that impulse and triggers a deeply felt sense of degradation from the
loss of marital status caused by the state that solemnized it in the first instance.
On the other side of the ledger, Defendants offer no convincing counter-argument. They
claim that Governor S nyder will have lost the benefit of the Si xth Circuit stay in DeBoer, and
11 Two other points made by Defendants regarding irreparable harm are irrelevant, given that the Court’s analysis of irreparable ha rm is limited to constitutional harm, emotional injury, and loss of dignity. First, Defendants ar gue that the more-tang ible harm s of loss of benefits are not irreparable because o ther (though more costly) be nefit arrangements can be m ade. Defs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 17. S econd, Defendants subm it that the harm of “ uncertainty” regarding Plaintiffs’ m arriages is a product of Plaintiffs’ own decision to m arry in the face of a public announcement that the DeBoer defendants would appe al the decision. Id. at 17-19. As these identified h arms are distinc t f rom loss of human dign ity, em otional injury, an d c onstitutional harm, these argum ents need not be addressed. In any case, as to De fendants’ self-inflictedwound theory, there is no authority offered by De fendants that would fault an applicant for injunctive relief based on his or her decision to take adv antage of le gal righ ts that the law authorized.
39

4:14-cv-11499-MAG-MKM Doc # 46 Filed 01/15/15 Pg 40 of 47 Pg ID 750
that there will be a “conf lict” between this Court and the Sixth Circuit. However, as previously stressed, the Sixth Circuit stay did not address th e status of those who m arried while the district court’s order was still in effect; thus the Govern or has lost no benefit secured by the stay. And, because recognizing th ose m arriages solem nized in accordance with Michig an law does not contradict the stay order, there is no foreseeable friction with the Sixth Circuit.
Defendants also claim that there will be “conf usion” regarding the status of the other same-sex couples who married on March 22 in Michigan, but who did not join in this action, and that there would be “disparate treatm ent” in making only the nam ed Plai ntiffs the injunc tion’s beneficiaries. Defs. Resp. to Inj. Mot. at 21-22. What the confusion might be is never explained. In any case, the injun ction will dra w no distinc tion between those who joined th is lawsuit a nd those who did not. All are victim s of the sam e constitutional violation and all have suffered the same types of harm. Making all couples beneficiaries of the injunction will prevent the disparate treatment feared by Defendants.
Defendants’ disparate-treatment argument is further flawed, because it is premised on the notion that a court is powerle ss to order relief beyond nam ed plai ntiffs of an action in the absence of class allegations. Id. Defendants’ argument misreads the law.
Courts have regularly held that a plainti ff may seek an injuncti on applicable to all similarly-situated individuals harm ed by the same unconstitutional practice, without the necessity of seeking class-action treatm ent. See, e.g., Craft v. Mem phis Light, Gas & W ater Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he dist rict court properly recognized that such [injunctive] relief to the extent gran ted [would] . . . accrue to the ben efit of others sim ilarly situated and, consequently, as the Eighth Circui t has recognized, [n]o useful purpose would be served by p ermitting this case to proceed as a cl ass ac tion because [t]he determ ination of the
40

4:14-cv-11499-MAG-MKM Doc # 46 Filed 01/15/15 Pg 41 of 47 Pg ID 751
constitutional question can be m ade by the Court and the rules and regulations determ ined to be constitutional or uncon stitutional r egardless of whether th is action is trea ted as a n individual action or as a class actio n.” (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Drum right v. Padzieski, 436 F. Supp. 310, 325 (E .D. Mich. 1977) (“[A]bsent som e unusual factors[,] suits for determination of the constitutionality of a federal statute or regulation should not be treated as a class action. Therefore, the Court concludes that this action should not proceed as a class ac tion. No significant in terest will be adv anced by allowing the action to b e maintained on behalf of a class. Any relief that plaintiff may be able to prove himself entitled to will inure to the benef it of all thos e on whose beha lf p laintiff asser ts an inte rest.” (quo tation marks and internal citation omitted)); Curry v. Dempsey, 520 F. Supp. 70, 75 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (“[T]here is at any rate no useful purpose to be served by class certification in th is case. The parties are s eeking a declaration of their legal rights and duties. Any declaratory or injunctive relief will a ccrue to the benefit of others s imilarly situated whether the re is a class or not, so a class action is unnecessary.”), rev’d on other grounds, 701 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1983).
These authorities within the S ixth Circuit are in harm ony with the prevalent rule outside the Sixth Circu it. See 7A Charles Alan W right, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1771 at 490- 491 (3d 2005) (“In m ost civil- rights cases plaintiff seeks injunctive o r declara tory relief that will ha lt a discriminatory em ployment pra ctice or tha t will strike down a statute, rule, or ordinance on th e ground th at it is con stitutionally offensive. Whether plaintiff proceeds as an i ndividual or on a class-suit basi s, the requested relief generally will benefit not only the claimant but all oth er persons subject to the p ractice or the rule und er attack.”); Sandford v. R L Colem an Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing “the settled rule [ ] that whether plaintiff proceeds as an individua l or o n a class su it basis, the
41

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requested in junctive r elief generally will b enefit not on ly the cla imant but a ll o ther pe rsons subject to the practice o r the rule un der attack” (quotation marks and br ackets omitted)); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. C ity of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[W]hether or not appellant s are entitled to cla ss action treatm ent, the decree to which they are en titled is the sam e . . . . [T]he very nature of the rights appe llants seek to vindic ate requires that the decree run to th e benefit not only of the named pl aintiffs but also for all persons similarly situated”); Ihrke v. N. States Powe r Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972) (sam e as Craft, 534 F.2d at 686), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
Defendants’ citation to Tesm er v. Granhol m, 333 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Kowa lski v. Tesm er, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) is not persuasive. In that action, the Sixth Circuit addressed a prelim inary injunction decl aring unconstitutional a Mich igan statute forbidding judges to appoint appe llate counsel for indigent crim inal defendants who had pled guilty. Id. at 686. In reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that the injunction improperly enjoined all of Michig an’s circuit judges, who were not parties to the action. Id. at 702 (“Our deepest concern with th e equitable relief fashioned by th e district court is that it enjoins non-party judicial officers.”). In our case, there is no such concern. The injunction would not operate against non-parties (except those who act in concert with Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)).12

12 Neither party cited Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F .3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003), which held that

“[w]hile district courts are not categorically prohibited from granting injunctive relief benefitting

an entire class in an individual suit, such broad r elief is ra rely justified because injunctive relief

should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide com plete relief to the

plaintiffs.” (em phasis in original). In Sharpe, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court for,

among other reasons, extending the injunction’s pr ohibition against political retaliation or

favoritism to firefighters who had not joined in

the lawsuit as plain tiffs. Id. at 274.

Nevertheless, Sharpe does not counsel restricting the injunction here only to the named Plaintiffs

for three reasons: First, the Sixth Circuit m ade clear that there is no categorical requ irement for

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Accordingly, all sam e-sex couples w ho m arried in Michigan on March 22, 2014, pursuant to Michigan marriage licenses issued prior to the issuance of the Sixth Circuit stay, will be the beneficiaries of the preliminary injunction. Thus, there will be no disparate treatment, as feared by Defendants.
In sum , all relev ant f actors coun sel gr anting Plaintif fs’ m otion f or a pre liminary injunction.
B. Motion for a Stay Defendants’ motion for a stay asks this Court to stay all proceedings in this case pen ding resolution of the appeal in DeBoer, “including a decision by the United S tates Supreme Court, if applicable.” Defs. Mot. to Stay at 7 (Dkt. 20). It appears that Defendants’ motion is still viable, notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’ s decision reversing the distri ct co urt in DeBoer, be cause Plaintiffs have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The decision to stay is consigned to a c ourt’s discretion. Ohio Envtl. Council v. United States Dist. Court, S. Dist. of Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977). The appropriate analysis “calls for the exercis e of judgm ent, which must weigh com peting interests.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-255 (1936). Where the stay m otion is prem ised on the alleged significance of another case’s im minent dispos ition, cou rts hav e co nsidered th e poten tial dispositive effect of the othe r case, judicial eco nomy achieve d by awaiting adjudication of the other case, the public w elfare, and the relative hardships to the partie s created by withholding judgment. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 3212597, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2013); Iljin U SA v. NTN Corp., N o. 06-10145, 2006 W L 568351, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
such a restriction. Id. at 273. Second, the non-part y beneficiaries in Sharpe were subject to an administrative grievance process, which prov ided a r emedy withou t the ne cessity of an injunction. Id. The sa me cannot be said of th e same-sex couples here. Third, Defendants m ake no argument that extending the injunction to non-parties would appreciably add to any burden.
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Mar. 7, 2006) (holding that, when considering a m otion to stay, “it is unassailable that issues of judicial econom y and balancing the interests of the parties and the Court are to be taken into account”).
Defendants premise their motion on the theory that the ultimate resolution of the DeBoer litigation will be dispositive of Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Ear lier in this op inion, the Cour t rejected the view that an affirmance of the Sixt h Circuit’s decision woul d affect the outcom e of this case. On the other hand, a Suprem e Court reversal of the Sixth Circu it would likely lead to vindication of Plaintiffs’ claim. That possibility, however, is not sufficient to justify placing this litigation on hold. It does not appear — and no argum ent has been m ade — that extensive discovery will be requir ed in this c ase, or tha t any factual issues need to be tried. U nder these circumstances, there do not appear to be any significant judicial econ omies to be reaped by staying this action.
Consideration of the public interest also counsels against a stay. As discussed earlier, the public interest is a lways served by robust protection of const itutional guarantees. See SMART , 698 F.3d at 896. That is particularly so in this case, where the denial of a fundam ental right so frontally assaults the hum an dignity of Plaintif fs and those sim ilarly situated. Michigan’s nonrecognition policy divests Plaintiffs of an essential hum an dimension in their lives — the legally recognized bond of committed intim acy in a m arriage th at was solemnized and recognized as valid by the challenging state — the loss of which unquestionably wounds them deeply.
Defendants’ hardships, on the other hand, are insubstantial when carefully considered. They claim that the democratic process m ust be protected. Defs. Reply in Support of Mot. to Stay at 6 (Dkt. 33). Of course, it m ust — so long as that process does not offend the
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Constitution. As Justice Frankfurter explai ned in Gom illion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960):
When a State exercises power who lly within the dom ain of state interest, it is insula ted f rom f ederal judic ial re view. But such insulation is not carried over when state pow er is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right. The cla sh h ere b etween the non -recognition policy and the Due Process Clause is n o dif ferent than the myriad cases in which state and fe deral governm ental actions have been rebuffed because they contradict constitu tional guarantees — judicial rebuke s that go all the way back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Defendants also c laim that m andating recogn ition will con tinue to c reate “ confusion, costs, and potential inequity.” Defs. Br. in Support of Mot. to Stay at 13-14. However, Defendants do not fully spell out wh at specific harm may result. They do claim that Mich igan might seek to recove r b enefits paid out to Plaintif fs, if this decision is ultim ately and f inally reversed, and that such calculations m ay be complicated. Id. at 14-15. But Defendants offer no authority that would allow Michig an to recov er su ch benefits, and the Cour t is aw are of none . Nor do Defendants sufficiently explain why such an unwinding would be im practicable, if permitted. Defendants’ concerns are essentially ephemeral. Weighing all the considerations, the motion is denied to the extent it seeks a stay pending resolution of the Supreme Court’s review in DeBoer. However, the Court is cognizant that an appe al m ay be taken in this case. Given the importance of the issues to all parties and the significant public dimensions of this decision, the prudent course is entry of a short-term stay of 21 days, to give the parties and the Sixth Circuit sufficient time to pursue an orderly appellate pro cess in this action. S ee Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1212 (D . Utah 2014) (denying the stat e’s m otion for a stay of the injunction
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pending appeal, but granting a 21-day stay for the state to pursue an em ergency stay with the Tenth Circu it, becaus e “the court finds som e be nefit in allowing the Tenth Circuit’s [sic] to review whether to stay the injunction prior to implementation”).
Accordingly, the Court will stay the effectiveness of its order for 21 days. C. Motion to Consolidate Defendants filed a m otion to consolidate (Dkt. 27), seeking to con solidate this case with Blankenship v. Snyder, No. 14-12221 (E.D. Mich.) (T arnow, J.). Consolid ation is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 where there are common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2) (“If actions before the cour t involve a common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions.”). “W hether cases in volving the same factual and legal questions sh ould be con solidated f or tr ial is a m atter within the d iscretion of the tria l cour t.” Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 1993). The central question in our case is whether a sam e-sex marriage solemnized pursuant to Michigan marriage licenses issued under Michigan law, as it stood at the tim e of solemnization, must be recognized in Michiga n. The central question in Bla nkenship is m arkedly different: whether Michigan m ust recognize a sa me-sex m arriage that was lawfully perform ed under the laws of another state — an issue similar, if not identical, to one of the issues decided by the Sixth Circuit in DeBoer. Because Blankenship raises a conceptually different question, the m otion to consolidate is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 17) is granted. Defendants are pre liminarily enjoined from refusing to re cognize the m arital status of Plaintiffs and all other sam e-sex couples who were lawfully married in Michigan afte r the district court’s
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ruling au thorizing such m arriages in DeBoer and before the issuance of the stay by the Sixth Circuit on March 22, 2014 in that case. Defendants shall affo rd all such couples all the protections and benefits as are m andated or au thorized by Michig an law for all co uples whose marriages are validly solem nized under Michigan law. This injunctive order shall bind Defendants, their agents, servants, em ployees, a nd attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any such persons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d)(2). The effectivenes s of this preliminary injunction is stayed for 21 da ys. The Court also denies Defendants’ m otions for a stay (Dkt. 20), to dismiss (Dkt. 21), and to consolidate cases (Dkt. 27).
SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2015 Detroit, Michigan United

MARK

s/Mark A. Goldsmith A. GOLDSMITH States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing docum ent was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court' s ECF Syst em to their respective em ail or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 15, 2015.

s/Johnetta

M. Curry-Williams Case Manager

47

 
 4:14-cv-11499-MAG-MKM Doc # 50 Filed 02/24/15 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 766

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION – DETROIT

MARSHA CASPAR, GLENNA
DEJONG, CLINT MCCORMACK, BRYAN REAMER, FRANK
COLASONTI, JR., JAMES BARCLAY RYDER, SAMANTHA
WOLF, MARTHA RUTLEDGE, JAMES ANTEAU, JARED
HADDOCK, KELLY CALLISON, ANNE CALLISON, BIANCA
RACINE, CARRIE MILLER, MARTIN CONTRERAS, and KEITH
ORR,

Case No. 14-cv-11499 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

Plaintiffs, v

RICK SNYDER, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan; MAURA CORRIGAN, in
her official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Human
Services; PHIL STODDARD, in his official capacity as Director of the
Michigan Office of Retirement Services; and JAMES HAVEMAN,
in official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Community
Health;

Defendants. /

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

4:14-cv-11499-MAG-MKM Doc # 50 Filed 02/24/15 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 767
Having previously granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Michigan’s refusal to recognize their same-sex marriages and upon reviewing the parties’ joint memorandum dated February 20, 2015, it is hereby Ordered:
1. For the reasons set forth in this Court’s Opinion and Order dated January 15, 2015 (Doc #46), see Caspar v. Snyder, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015), a final DECLARATORY JUDGMENT is hereby entered for Plaintiffs against Defendants; and Defendants are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from refusing to recognize the marital status of Plaintiffs and all other same-sex couples who were lawfully married in Michigan after the district court’s ruling authorizing such marriages in DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), and before the issuance of the stay by the Sixth Circuit on March 22, 2014, in that case. Defendants shall afford all such couples all the protections and benefits as are mandated or authorized by Michigan law for all couples whose marriages are validly solemnized under Michigan law. This injunction shall bind Defendants, their agents,
2

4:14-cv-11499-MAG-MKM Doc # 50 Filed 02/24/15 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 768
servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any such persons. 2. Count II of Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed as moot, without prejudice to reinstatement should this judgment be vacated.

Dated: February 24, 2015 Approved as to form only.

Mark A. Goldsmith MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

/s/ Michael J. Steinberg (w/consent)
Michael J. Steinberg (P43085) Attorney for Plaintiffs
ACLU Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave.
Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6812

Date: February 20, 2015

/s/ Michael F. Murphy Michael F. Murphy (P29213)
Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 373-1162

Date: February 20, 2015

3

 
 Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 1 of 13
U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Flint) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:14−cv−11499−MAG−MKM

CLOSED

Caspar et al v. Snyder et al Assigned to: District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith Referred to: Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Date Terminated: 02/24/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Marsha Caspar

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff Sachs Waldman 2211 E. Jefferson Ave., Ste. 200 Detroit, MI 48207 313−496−9429 Email: anickelhoff@sachswaldman.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6823 Fax: 313−578−6811 Email: btucker@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578−6824 Fax: (313) 578−6811 Email: dkorobkin@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight American Civil Liberties Union Foundation LGBT & AIDS Project 180 N. Michigan Ave. Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601 312−201−9740 Fax: 312−288−5225 Email: jknight@aclu−il.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson Michigan Law School 625 South State Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109 734−763−5695 Fax: 734−764−5228 Email: jdmorten@umich.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg American Civil Liberties Union Fund of

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 2 of 13

Michigan 2966 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6814 Email: msteinberg@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 313−578−6812 Fax: 313−578−6811 Email: kaplan@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Glenna DeJong

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Clint McCormack

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 3 of 13

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bryan Reamer

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Frank Colasonti, Jr.

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 4 of 13

Plaintiff James Barclay Ryder
Plaintiff Samantha Wolf

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 5 of 13

Plaintiff Martha Rutledge

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Anteau

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jared Haddock

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 6 of 13

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kelly Callison

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anne Callison

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address)

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 7 of 13

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Bianca Racine

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carrie Miller

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 8 of 13

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Martin Contreras

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keith Orr

represented by Andrew A. Nickelhoff (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

John A. Knight (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julian Davis Mortenson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael J. Steinberg (See above for address)

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 9 of 13
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jay Kaplan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Rick Snyder in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan
Defendant Maura Corrigan in her official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services
Defendant Phil Stoddard in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Office of Retirement Services

represented by Christina M. Grossi Michigan Dept of Attorney General 525 West Ottawa P.O. Box 30736 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−6434 Fax: 517−373−2454 Email: grossic@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth State of Michigan Department of Attorney General P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−1162 Fax: 517−373−2060 Email: BoothJ2@Michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael F. Murphy MI Dept of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 517−373−1162 Email: murphym2@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christina M. Grossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael F. Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christina M. Grossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael F. Murphy (See above for address)

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 10 of 13

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
James Haveman in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Community Health

represented by Christina M. Grossi (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael F. Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Objector Erin Dawn Blankenship

represented by Alec S. Gibbs Law Offices of Gregory T. Gibbs 717 S. Grand Traverse Flint, MI 48502 810−239−9470 Fax: 810−235−2468 Email: gibbsale@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Objector Shayla Blankenship

represented by Alec S. Gibbs (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/14/2014
04/14/2014 04/14/2014 04/14/2014 04/15/2014 04/15/2014
04/16/2014 04/17/2014 04/30/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: 0645−4593819 − Fee: &#036 400. County of 1st Plaintiff: Ingham − County Where Action Arose: Multiple Counties − County of 1st Defendant: Washtenaw. [Previously dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): E.D. Mich., 12−cv−10285, Judge Friedman] (Kaplan, Jay) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
2 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel S. Korobkin on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
3 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael J. Steinberg on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Brooke A. Merriweather−Tucker on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Merriweather−Tucker, Brooke) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
5 SUMMONS Issued for * All Defendants * (DWor) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (DWor) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
6 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: John A. Knight appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Knight, John) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew A. Nickelhoff on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
8 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Phil Stoddard served on 4/24/2014, answer due 5/15/2014. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 04/30/2014)

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04/30/2014 04/30/2014 04/30/2014 05/01/2014 05/01/2014 05/06/2014 05/06/2014 05/29/2014
05/29/2014 05/30/2014 06/02/2014 06/05/2014
06/05/2014 06/19/2014 06/23/2014 06/30/2014 06/30/2014 06/30/2014 07/01/2014

9 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. James Haveman served on 4/24/2014, answer due 5/15/2014. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
10 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Maura Corrigan served on 4/24/2014, answer due 5/15/2014. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
11 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Rick Snyder served on 4/24/2014, answer due 5/15/2014. (Steinberg, Michael) (Entered: 04/30/2014)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael F. Murphy on behalf of All Defendants. (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Christina M. Grossi on behalf of All Defendants. (Grossi, Christina) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
15 ORDER Striking 13 Stipulation. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
16 STIPULATION AND ORDER to Extend Time to Answer 1 Complaint, (Response due by 6/5/2014). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A − Caspar Declaration, # 3 Exhibit B − DeJong Declaration, # 4 Exhibit C − Callison Declaration, # 5 Exhibit D − Wolf Declaration, # 6 Exhibit E − Rutledge Declaration, # 7 Exhibit F − Colasonti Declaration, # 8 Exhibit G − Ryder Declaration, # 9 Exhibit H − McCormack Declaration, # 10 Exhibit I − Reamer Declaration, # 11 Exhibit J − Kelly Callison, # 12 Exhibit K − Anteau Declaration, # 13 Exhibit L − Haddock Declaration, # 14 Exhibit M − Contreras Declaration, # 15 Exhibit N − Orr Declaration, # 16 Exhibit O − Miller Declaration, # 17 Exhibit P − Racine Declaration, # 18 Exhibit Q − DeBoer v. Snyder Judgment, # 19 Exhibit Strauss v. Horton Amicus Brief) (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
18 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
19 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua O. Booth on behalf of All Defendants. (Booth, Joshua) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Granting 18 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages. Issued by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
20 MOTION to Stay by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Document Continuation attached case, # 2 Document Continuation attached case, # 3 Document Continuation attached case, # 4 Index of Exhibits, # 5 Exhibit 1, # 6 Exhibit 2, # 7 Exhibit 3, # 8 Exhibit 4, # 9 Exhibit 5) (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
21 MOTION to Dismiss by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4) (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 06/05/2014)
22 RESPONSE to 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6) (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 06/19/2014)
23 STIPULATION AND ORDER for Extension of Time for Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' 20 MOTION to Stay , (Response due by 6/30/2014). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 06/23/2014)
24 RESPONSE to 20 MOTION to Stay Hold Case in Abeyance Pending Appeal in DeBoer filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
25 RESPONSE to 21 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
26 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Response to Motion to Dismiss by All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 06/30/2014)
27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Blankenship Complaint) (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2014)

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07/01/2014 07/01/2014
07/02/2014 07/07/2014 07/14/2014 07/14/2014 07/14/2014 07/14/2014 07/15/2014
07/15/2014 07/18/2014 07/24/2014 07/25/2014
07/25/2014 08/05/2014 08/15/2014 08/18/2014
08/19/2014

28 NOTICE by All Defendants re 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Granting 26 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Response to Motion to Dismiss filed by Clint McCormack, Frank Colasonti, Jr., Marsha Caspar, James Barclay Ryder, James Anteau, Bryan Reamer, Carrie Miller, Martin Contreras, Samantha Wolf, Anne Callison, Glenna DeJong, Martha Rutledge, Keith Orr, Kelly Callison, Bianca Racine, Jared Haddock. Issued by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 07/01/2014)
29 STIPULATION AND ORDER Extending Time for Defendants to File Reply to Response to 20 MOTION to Stay , (Response due by 7/14/2014). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 07/02/2014)
30 REPLY to Response re 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 07/07/2014)
31 REPLY to Response re 21 MOTION to Dismiss filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 case, # 2 case, # 3 case) (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
32 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Defendants. (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
33 REPLY to Response re 20 MOTION to Stay filed by All Defendants. (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
34 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by All Defendants. (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/14/2014)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER Granting 32 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Phil Stoddard, James Haveman, Rick Snyder, Maura Corrigan and 34 Ex Parte MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages filed by Phil Stoddard, James Haveman, Rick Snyder, Maura Corrigan. Issued by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
35 NOTICE TO APPEAR: Status Conference set for 7/24/2014 @ 3:00 PM **LOCATION: FLINT, MICHIGAN** before District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith (Goltz, D) (Entered: 07/15/2014)
36 RESPONSE to 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by All Plaintiffs. (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 07/18/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith: Status Conference held on 7/24/2014. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 07/24/2014)
37 NOTICE OF HEARING on 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases , 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 21 MOTION to Dismiss , 20 MOTION to Stay . Motion Hearing set for 8/21/2014 @ 9:30 AM **LOCATION: FLINT, MICHIGAN** before District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith (Goltz, D) (Entered: 07/25/2014)
38 REPLY to Response re 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by All Defendants. (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 07/25/2014)
39 NOTICE of Appearance by Julian Davis Mortenson on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Mortenson, Julian) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
40 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 20 MOTION to Stay filed by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases , 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 21 MOTION to Dismiss , 20 MOTION to Stay . Motion Hearing RESET for 8/21/2014 @ 9:30 AM **LOCATION ONLY** **THEORDORE LEVIN COURTHOUSE, 231 W. LAFAYETTE, DETROIT** **COURTROOM #225 − JUDGE COHN'S COURTROOM** before District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith (Goltz, D) (Entered: 08/18/2014)
TEXT−ONLY ORDER: At the forthcoming 8/21/2014 hearing on all pending motions, Plaintiffs' counsel will be allowed up to one hour for an opening argument and Defendants' counsel will be allowed up to one hour for an opening argument; each side will then be allowed up to 30 minutes for rebuttal. Due to the overlap of issues,

Case: 4:14-cv-11499 As of: 11/27/2018 11:12 AM EST 13 of 13

08/21/2014 08/21/2014
11/07/2014
11/14/2014 11/19/2014 11/19/2014 01/15/2015 02/09/2015 02/20/2015 02/24/2015 02/24/2015 05/20/2015

counsel may address the pending motions in any order they wish within their allotted time. Issued by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Goltz, D) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
41 NOTICE by Erin Dawn Blankenship, Shayla Blankenship re 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases , 28 Notice (Other) (Gibbs, Alec) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith: Motion Hearing held on 8/21/2014 re 20 MOTION to Stay filed by Phil Stoddard, James Haveman, Rick Snyder, Maura Corrigan; 21 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Phil Stoddard, James Haveman, Rick Snyder, Maura Corrigan; 27 MOTION to Consolidate Cases filed by Phil Stoddard, James Haveman, Rick Snyder, Maura Corrigan; 17 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Clint McCormack, Frank Colasonti, Jr., Marsha Caspar, James Barclay Ryder, James Anteau, Bryan Reamer, Carrie Miller, Martin Contreras, Samantha Wolf, Anne Callison, Glenna DeJong, Martha Rutledge, Keith Orr, Kelly Callison, Bianca Racine, Jared Haddock. Disposition: MOTIONS TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. (Court Reporter David Yarbrough) (JCur) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
42 ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING as to 27 Defendants' MOTION to Consolidate Cases; 17 Plaintiffs' MOTION for Preliminary Injunction; 21 Defendants' MOTION to Dismiss; 20 Defendants' MOTION to Stay: (Defendant's briefs due by 12/14/2014; Plaintiffs' briefs due by 12/21/2014). (Refer to image for additional details). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur) (Entered: 11/07/2014)
43 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 42 Order, Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings,, filed by Maura Corrigan, James Haveman, Rick Snyder, Phil Stoddard. (Booth, Joshua) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
44 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF re 42 Order, Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings,, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Snyder issues statement, # 3 Exhibit 2 − Evans v. Utah − Stipulated Dismissal Order) (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
45 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs of Factual Development (Nickelhoff, Andrew) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
46 OPINION and ORDER (1) Granting Plaintiffs' Motion For A Preliminary Injunction 17 , And (2) Denying Defendants' Motions For A Stay 20 , To Dismiss 21 , And To Consolidate Cases 27 . Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur) (Entered: 01/15/2015)
47 ORDER REGARDING SUBMISSION OF JOINT MEMORANDUM. Joint submissions due on or before 2/20/2015. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur) (Entered: 02/09/2015)
48 MEMORANDUM re 47 Order by All Defendants (Murphy, Michael) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
49 STIPULATION AND ORDER To Extend Time For Plaintiffs To Move For Attorney Fees And Costs. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
50 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur) (Entered: 02/24/2015)
51 STIPULATED ORDER Extending Time For Plaintiffs To Move For Attorneys' Fees And Costs by 6/23/2015. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (JCur) (Entered: 05/20/2015)