Case: 1:10-cv-02477 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/22/10 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

P AME LA J . H ARRIS, E LLE N BRONF E LD, )

CAROLE GULO, MICH E LLE H ARRIS, )

WE NDY P ARTRIDGE , TH E RE SA RIF F E Y, )

GORDON P . STIE F E L, SUSAN WATTS, )

P ATRICIA WITH E RS, STE P H ANIE

)

YE NCE R-P RICE , a n d a cla ss of sim ila r ly )

sit u a t ed,

)

P la in t iffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

GOVE RNOR P AT QUINN, in H is Officia l )

Ca pa cit y a s Gover n or of t h e St a t e of Illin ois, )

SE IU H E ALTH CARE ILLINOIS &

)

INDIANA, SE IU LOCAL 73, a n d AF SCME )

COUNCIL 31,

)

Defen da n t s.

)

CASE NO. COMP LAINT–CLASS ACTION

William L. Messenger Na t ion a l Righ t t o Wor k Lega l Defen se
F ou n da t ion 8001 Bra ddock Roa d, Su it e 600 Spr in gfield, Vir gin ia 22160 (703) 321-8510 (703) 321-9319 (fa x) wlm @n r t w.or g
Cou n sel for Plain tiffs

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P RELIMINARY STATEMENT P la in t iffs a r e in dividu a ls wh o pr ovide h om e ca r e t o disa bled in dividu a ls en r olled in Illin ois Medica id-wa iver pr ogr a m s. Th ey a r e n ot em ployed by t h e St a t e of Illin ois, bu t by t h e in dividu a ls wh o t h ey ser ve. Never t h eless, u n der for m er Illin ois Gover n or Bla gojevich , t h e St a t e design a t ed a u n ion t o be t h e r epr esen t a t ive of on e gr ou p of h om e ca r e pr ovider s vis-a -vis t h e St a t e, a n d is com pellin g t h ese pr ovider s t o fin a n cia lly su ppor t t h a t u n ion a s t h eir st a t e-a ppoin t ed r epr esen t a t ive. Cu r r en t Illin ois Gover n or Qu in n is a t t em pt in g t o im pose a sim ila r sch em e of com pu lsor y polit ica l r epr esen t a t ion on a secon d gr ou p of h om e ca r e pr ovider s. Com pellin g h om e ca r e pr ovider s t o su ppor t a n en t it y for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o a n d pet it ion in g t h e st a t e in fr in ges on t h e fu n da m en t a l r igh t s of pr ovider s t o fr ee a ssocia t ion , fr ee speech , a n d t o pet it ion t h e gover n m en t for a r edr ess of gr ieva n ces u n der t h e F ir st Am en dm en t t o t h e Un it ed St a t es Con st it u t ion . Th is su it by h om e ca r e pr ovider s seeks decla r a t or y, in ju n ct ive, a n d m on et a r y r elief u n der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 t o r em edy t h is viola t ion of t h eir Con st it u t ion a l righ t s.
J URISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Th is Cou r t h a s ju r isdict ion t o a dju dica t e t h is ca se pu r su a n t t o bot h 28 U.S.C. § 1331, beca u se it a r ises u n der t h e Un it ed St a t es Con st it u t ion , a n d 28 U.S.C. § 1343, beca u se P la in t iffs seek r elief u n der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Th is Cou r t a lso h a s t h e a u t h or it y u n der 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 a n d 2202 t o gr a n t decla r a t or y r elief a n d ot h er r elief ba sed t h er eon .
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2. Ven u e is pr oper in t h is Cou r t pu r su a n t t o 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 a n d 1392 beca u se Defen da n t s m a in t a in offices a n d do bu sin ess wit h in t h is ju dicia l dist r ict a n d even t s givin g r ise t o t h is a ct ion t ook pla ce in t h is ju dicia l dist r ict .
P ARTIES 3. P la in t iffs a r e in dividu a ls wh o pr ovide h om e ca r e ser vices t o disa bled in dividu a ls en r olled in on e of t wo st a t e Medica id pr ogr a m s: (1) t h e H om e Ser vices P r ogr a m a dm in ist er ed by t h e Division of Reh a bilit a t ion Ser vices of t h e Illin ois Depa r t m en t of H u m a n Ser vices, (“ Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m ” ); or (2) t h e H om e Ba sed Su ppor t Ser vices P r ogr a m for Men t a lly Disa bled Adu lt s a dm in ist er ed by t h e Division of Developm en t a l Disa bilit ies of t h e Illin ois Depa r t m en t of Hu m a n Ser vices (“ Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m ” ). Mor e specifica lly:
3a . P la in t iff P a m ela J . H a r r is pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er son J osh u a , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m . J osh u a r equ ir es con st a n t ca r e a n d su per vision du e t o Ru bin st ein -Ta ybi syn dr om e, a r a r e gen et ic syn dr om e t h a t a dver sely a ffect s h is cogn it ive a bilit ies, m u scu la r a n d skelet a l syst em s, a n d ca u ses sever e in t ellect u a l a n d developm en t a l disa bilit ies.
3b. P la in t iff Mich elle H a r r is pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er br ot h er J osh u a , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m a n d wh ose con dit ion is descr ibed in pa r a gr a ph 3a .
3c. P la in t iff E llen Br on feld pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er son Noa h , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m . Noa h r equ ir es con st a n t ca r e a n d
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su per vision for h is sa fet y a n d t o m a xim ize h is qu a lit y of life du e t o sever e a u t ism . 3d. P la in t iff Ca r ole Gu lo pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er son J on a t h on ,
wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m . J on a t h on r equ ir es con st a n t ca r e a n d su per vision du e t o Ba t t en disea se (Neu r on a l Cer oid Lipofu scin oses), a t er m in a l n eu r ologica l disor der t h a t ca u ses seizu r es a n d declin in g cogn it ive, visu a l, a n d m ot or skill fu n ct ion s.
3e. P la in t iff Wen dy P a r t r idge pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er son , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m .
3f. P la in t iff Th er esa Riffey pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er sist er , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m du e t o qu a dr iplegia .
3g. P la in t iff Gor don P . St iefel pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h is da u gh t er P a m ela , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m . P a m ela r equ ir es con st a n t ca r e a n d su per vision du e t o Ret t syn dr om e, a n eu r odevelopm en t a l disor der t h a t r esu lt s in pr ofou n d cogn it ive a n d m ot or developm en t a l disa bilit ies.
3h . P la in t iff Su sa n Wa t t s pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er da u gh t er E liza bet h , wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m . E liza bet h r equ ir es con st a n t ca r e a n d su per vision du e t o qu a dr iplegic cer ebr a l pa lsy, a st r oke, a n d n u m er ou s su r ger ies.
3i. P la in t iff P a t r icia Wit h er s pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o h er son Der ek, wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m . Der ek r equ ir es con st a n t ca r e a n d su per vision du e t o Asper ger syn dr om e a n d ot h er disor der s t h a t sever ely im pa ir h is
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ju dgm en t a n d or ga n iza t ion a l skills. 3j. P la in t iff St eph a n ie Yen cer -P r ice pr ovides h om e ca r e ser vices t o a n
in dividu a l wh o pa r t icipa t es in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m . 4. Defen da n t Gover n or P a t Qu in n is su ed in h is officia l ca pa cit y a s t h e Gover n or a n d ch ief execu t ive officer of t h e St a t e of Illin ois. 5. Defen da n t s SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a n d SE IU Loca l 73 (collect ively “ SE IU” ) a r e a ffilia t ed la bor u n ion s t h a t t r a n sa ct bu sin ess a n d m a in t a in t h eir m a in offices in t h is ju dicia l dist r ict . 6. Defen da n t Am er ica n F eder a t ion of St a t e, Cou n t y, a n d Mu n icipa l E m ployees Cou n cil 31 (“ AF SCME ” ) is a la bor u n ion t h a t t r a n sa ct s bu sin ess a n d h a s on e of it s t wo m a in offices in t h is ju dicia l dist r ict .
F ACTS I. Home Care Programs
A. The Rehabilitation P rogram 7. Th e H om e Ser vices P r ogr a m is a st a t e Medica id wa iver pr ogr a m a dm in ist er ed by t h e Division of Reh a bilit a t ion Ser vices of t h e Illin ois Depa r t m en t of H u m a n Ser vices (“ Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m ” ). S ee 20 ILCS 2405 et seq.; 89 Ill. Adm in . Code §§ 676 et seq. Th e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m su bsidizes t h e cost s of h om e-ba sed ser vices for in dividu a ls wit h sever e disa bilit ies t o pr even t t h eir u n n ecessa r y in st it u t ion a liza t ion .
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8. Th e m a xim u m m on t h ly su bsidy t o wh ich a pa r t icipa n t in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m is en t it led t o pu r ch a se h om e-ba sed ser vices, or “ ser vice cost m a xim u m ,” is det er m in ed by a for m u la delin ea t ed a t 89 Ill. Adm in . Code § 679.50. 9. P a r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m m a y u se som e or a ll of t h eir su bsidy t o em ploy per son a l a ssist a n t s or per son a l ca r e a t t en da n t s (collect ively “ P er son a l Assist a n t s” ), wh o h elp wit h h ou seh old t a sks, per son a l ca r e, a n d cer t a in r ou t in e h ea lt h ca r e pr ocedu r es. 10. P er son a l Assist a n t s a r e em ployed by pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m , wh o a r e t h eir em ployer s. P r ogr a m pa r t icipa n t s m a y select a n d h ir e a n y in dividu a l wh o m eet s cer t a in m in im a l r equ ir em en t s t o ser ve a s t h eir P er son a l Assist a n t . P r ogr a m pa r t icipa n t s su per vise, disciplin e, a n d ot h er wise con t r ol t h e t er m s a n d con dit ion s of em ploym en t of t h eir P er son a l Assist a n t s, su bject t o st a t e m in im u m wa ge a n d qu a lifica t ion r equ ir em en t s. 11. P er son a l a ssist a n t s a r e n ot em ployed by t h e St a t e of Illin ois. Th e St a t e does n ot con t r ol or h a ve in pu t in t h e em ploym en t r ela t ion sh ip bet ween pr ogr a m pa r t icipa n t s a n d t h eir P er son a l Assist a n t s, ot h er t h a n t o r equ ir e a m in im u m wa ge r a t e. Th e St a t e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m m er ely su bsidizes a pr ogr a m pa r t icipa n t ’ s cost s of h ir in g a P er son a l Assist a n t by m a kin g sem i-m on t h ly pa ym en t s t o P er son a l Assist a n t s ba sed on t h e m in im u m wa ge r a t e. 12. Appr oxim a t ely 20,000 P er son a l Assist a n t s a r e em ployed by pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m a t a n y given t im e.
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B. The Disabilities Program 13. Th e H om e Ba sed Su ppor t Ser vices P r ogr a m for Men t a lly Disa bled Adu lt s (“ Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m ” ) is a st a t e Medica id-wa iver pr ogr a m a dm in ist er ed by t h e Division of Developm en t a l Disa bilit ies of t h e Illin ois Depa r t m en t of H u m a n Ser vices. S ee 405 ILCS 80/20-1 et seq.; 59 Ill. Adm in . Code §§ 117 et seq. Th e pr ogr a m su bsidizes t h e cost of h om e-ba sed ser vices for a du lt s wit h sever e m en t a l disa bilit ies t o pr even t u n n ecessa r y in st it u t ion a liza t ion . 14. Th e m a xim u m su bsidy t h a t a pa r t icipa n t in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m ca n r eceive is set by st a t u t e a s a per cen t a ge of a pa r t icipa n t ’ s socia l secu r it y pa ym en t s. S ee 405 ILCS 80/2-6. 15. P a r t icipa n t s in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m m a y u se som e or a ll of t h eir su bsidy t o h ir e in dividu a ls t o pr ovide per son a l ca r e a n d cer t a in h ea lt h ser vices t o t h em in t h eir h om e (h er ein a ft er “ P r ovider s” ). 16. P r ovider s a r e em ployed by pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m , wh o a r e t h eir em ployer s. P r ogr a m pa r t icipa n t s select , h ir e, fir e, su per vise, disciplin e, a n d ot h er wise con t r ol t h e t er m s a n d con dit ion s of em ploym en t of t h eir P r ovider s. P r ogr a m pa r t icipa n t s gen er a lly exer cise t h ese fu n ct ion s t h r ou gh a lega l gu a r dia n . 17. P r ovider s a r e n ot em ployed by t h e St a t e of Illin ois. Th e St a t e does n ot con t r ol t h e em ploym en t r ela t ion sh ip bet ween pr ogr a m pa r t icipa n t s a n d t h eir P r ovider s. Th e St a t e m er ely su bsidizes a pa r t icipa n t ’ s cost s of h ir in g a P r ovider . 18. Appr oxim a t ely 4,500 P r ovider s ser ve pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m .
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II. P ersonal Assistants in the Rehabilitation P rogram Are Compelled to S u p p o rt th e S EIU a s Th e ir S t a te -Ap p o in te d Re p re s e n ta tiv e A. The State Designates the SEIU as the P olitical Representative o f P e rs o n a l As s is ta n ts Vis -a -Vis th e S t a te w ith Re s p e c t to a Limited Aspect of the Rehabilitation P rogram
19. In 2003, for m er Illin ois Gover n or Bla gojevich in it ia t ed a t wo-st ep sch em e t o for ce P er son a l Assist a n t s in t o t h e SE IU in exch a n ge for t h e u n ion ’ s polit ica l su ppor t a n d ca m pa ign con t r ibu t ion s. Gover n or Bla gojevich fir st design a t ed t h e SE IU a s t h e r epr esen t a t ive of P er son a l Assist a n t s vis-a -vis h is a dm in ist r a t ion , a n d t h en for ced P er son a l Assist a n t s t o pa y t h e SE IU for t h e com pu lsor y polit ica l r epr esen t a t ion im posed u pon t h em . 20. On 7 Ma r ch 2003, Gover n or Bla gojevich issu ed E xecu t ive Or der 2003-08 (“ E O 2003-08” ). E O 2003-08 r ecogn ized t h a t P er son a l Assist a n t s a r e n ot st a t e em ployees, a n d t h a t pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m con t r ol t h eir h ir in g, in -h om e su per vision, a n d t er m in a t ion. Never t h eless, E O 2003-08 pr ovided t h a t :
Th e St a t e sh a ll r ecogn ize a r epr esen t a t ive design a t ed by a m a jor it y of t h e per son a l a ssist a n t s a s t h e exclu sive r epr esen t a t ive of a ll per son a l a ssist a n t s, a ccord sa id r epr esen t a t ive a ll t h e r igh t s a n d du t ies gr a n t ed su ch r epr esen t a t ives by t h e Illin ois P u blic La bor Rela t ion s Act , 5 ILCS 315/1 et seq., a n d en ga ge in collect ive ba r ga in in g wit h sa id r epr esen t a t ive con cer n in g a ll t er m s a n d con dit ion s of em ploym en t of per son a l a ssist a n t s wor kin g u n der t h e H om es Ser vices P r ogr a m t h a t a r e wit h in t h e St a t e’ s con t r ol. 21. On 16 J u ly 2003, Gover n or Bla gojevich codified E O 2003-08 by sign in g P u blic Act 93-0204, wh ich a m en ded Sect ion 3 of t h e Disa bled P er son s Reh a bilit a t ion Act t o pr ovide a s follows:
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Solely for t h e pu r poses of cover a ge u n der t h e Illin ois P u blic La bor Rela t ion s Act (5 ILCS 315), per son a l ca r e a t t en da n t s a n d per son a l a ssist a n t s pr ovidin g ser vices u n der t h e Depa r t m en t ’ s H om e Ser vices P r ogr a m sh a ll be con sider ed t o be pu blic em ployees a n d t h e St a t e of Illin ois sh a ll be con sider ed t o be t h eir em ployer a s of t h e effect ive da t e of t h is a m en da t or y Act of t h e 93r d Gen er a l Assem bly, bu t n ot befor e. Th e St a t e sh a ll en ga ge in collect ive ba r ga in in g wit h a n exclu sive r epr esen t a t ive of per son a l ca r e a t t en da n t s a n d per son a l a ssist a n t s wor kin g u n der t h e H om e Ser vices P r ogr a m con cer n in g t h eir t er m s a n d con dit ion s of em ploym en t t h a t a r e wit h in t h e St a t e’ s con t rol. Not h in g in t h is pa r a gr a ph sh a ll be u n der st ood t o lim it t h e r igh t of t h e per son s r eceivin g ser vices defin ed in t h is Sect ion t o h ir e a n d fir e per son a l ca r e a t t en da n t s a n d per son a l a ssist a n t s or su per vise t h em wit h in t h e lim it a t ion s set by t h e H om e Ser vices P r ogr a m . Th e St a t e sh a ll n ot be con sider ed t o be t h e em ployer of per son a l ca r e a t t en da n t s a n d per son a l a ssist a n t s for a n y pu r poses n ot specifica lly pr ovided in t h is a m en da t or y Act of t h e 93r d Gen er a l Assem bly, in clu din g bu t n ot lim it ed t o, pu r poses of vica r iou s lia bilit y in t or t a n d pu r poses of st a t u t or y r et ir em en t or h ea lt h in su r a n ce ben efit s. P er son a l ca r e a t t en da n t s a n d per son a l a ssist a n t s sh a ll n ot be cover ed by t h e St a t e E m ployees Gr ou p In su r a n ce Act of 1971 (5 ILCS 375/).
20 ILCS 2405/3(f). P u blic Act 93-0204 a lso m a de con for m in g a m en dm en t s t o t h e
Illin ois P u blic La bor Rela t ion s Act , 5 ILCS 315/1, et seq.
22. On or a r ou n d 26 J u ly 2003, t h e St a t e design a t ed SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois &
In dia n a a s t h e exclu sive r epr esen t a t ive of P er son a l Assist a n t s wit h r espect t o t er m s
a n d con dit ion s of t h eir em ploym en t wit h in t h e St a t e’ s con t r ol u n der t h e
Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m . Th ese t er m s a n d con dit ion s a r e lim it ed pr in cipa lly t o t h e
m in im u m com pen sa t ion pa id t o P er son a l Assist a n t s, a s P er son a l Assist a n t s a r e
em ployed a n d su per vised by pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m .
23. In t h is m a n n er , t h e St a t e design a t ed SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a s t h e
com pu lsor y r epr esen t a t ive of P er son a l Assist a n t s for t h e pu r pose of spea kin g t o,
pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed
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a spect s of t h e St a t e’ s Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m .
B. Th e State Compels P erson al Assistan ts to Fin an cially Su pport th e S EIU As Th e ir S t a te -D e s ig n a te d Re p re s e n ta tiv e
24. Th e Illin ois Depa r t m en t of H u m a n Ser vices a n d Cen t r a l Ma n a gem en t Ser vices
a r e pa r t ies t o a n “ Agr eem en t ” wit h SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illinois & In dia n a effect ive
fr om 1 J a n u a r y 2008 t h r ou gh 30 J u n e 2012. Th is Agr eem en t is t h e su ccessor t o a n
earlier agreement between the entities.
25. Th e Agr eem en t r equ ir es t h a t P er son a l Assist a n t s em ployed by pa r t icipa n t s in
t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m pa y a com pu lsor y fee t o SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois &
In dia n a . Specifica lly, Sect ion 6 of Ar t icle X of t h e Agr eem en t st a t es:
E ffect ive on t h e pa y per iod begin n in g Novem ber 1, 2003, a ll P er son a l Assist a n t s wh o a r e n ot m em ber s of t h e Un ion sh a ll be r equ ir ed t o pa y t h eir pr opor t ion a t e sh a r e of t h e cost s of t h e collect ive ba r ga in in g pr ocess, con t r a ct a dm in ist r a t ion a n d pu r su in g m a t t er s a ffect in g wa ges, h ou r s a n d ot h er con dit ion s of em ploym en t , bu t n ot t o exceed t h e a m ou n t of du es u n ifor m ly r equ ir ed of m em ber s. Th e Un ion sh a ll cer t ify t h e P er son a l Assist a n t s’ m on t h ly pr opor t ion a t e sh a r e t o t h e St a t e a n d t h e St a t e sh a ll dedu ct sa id a m ou n t fr om t h e wa ges of t h e P er son a l Assist a n t s a n d r em it it t o t h e Un ion . Th e Un ion sh a ll in dem n ify, defen d, a n d h old t h e St a t e h a r m less a ga in st a n y cla im , dem a n d, su it or lia bilit y a r isin g fr om a n y a ct ion t a ken by t h e St a t e in com plyin g wit h t h is sect ion .
26. At a ll t im es r eleva n t t o t h is Com pla in t , t h e St a t e h a s dedu ct ed com pu lsor y
u n ion fees fr om m on ies owed t o P er son a l Assist a n t s for ca r in g for pa r t icipa n t s in
t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m a n d r em it t ed t h ose m on ies t o SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois
& In dia n a . Th ese a n d sim ila r dedu ct ion s will con t in u e u n t il en join ed.
27. SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a is a ct in g u n der color of st a t e la w by ca u sin g,
pa r t icipa t in g in , a n d a ccept in g t h e com pu lsor y dedu ct ion of u n ion fees fr om m on ies
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owed t o P er son a l Assist a n t s. 28. SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a n d it s a ffilia t es t a ke a t lea st $3,600,000 in fees fr om P er son a l Assist a n t s ea ch yea r by m ea n s of t h ese dedu ct ion s, wit h t h e a ct u a l yea r ly win dfa ll likely m or e t h a n dou ble t h is a m ou n t . 29. In t h e m a n n er descr ibed a bove, Defen da n t s a r e com pellin g P er son a l Assist a n t s t o fin a n cia lly su ppor t SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a n d it s a ffilia t es a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed a spect s of t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m . No com pellin g or ot h er wise su fficien t gover n m en t in t er est ju st ifies t h e com pu lsor y polit ica l r epr esen t a t ion im posed u pon P er son a l Assist a n t s. III. Governor Quinn’ s Campaign to Designate The SEIU As The
Political Representative of Providers in the Disabilities Program 30. In J u n e 2009, Illin ois Gover n or Qu in n in it ia t ed a sch em e t o for ce P r ovider s in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m in t o t h e SE IU in exch a n ge for t h e SE IU’ s polit ica l su ppor t a n d ca m pa ign con t r ibu t ion s. 31. On 29 J u n e 2009, Gover n or Qu in n issu ed E xecu t ive Or der 2009-15. Th e or der is sim ila r t o for m er Gover n or Bla gojevich ’ s E O 2003-08, a n d pr ovides in r eleva n t part that:
Th e St a t e sh a ll r ecogn ize a r epr esen t a t ive design a t ed by a m a jor it y of t h e in dividu a l pr ovider s in t h e H om e-Ba sed Su ppor t Ser vices P r ogr a m a s t h e exclu sive r epr esen t a t ive of a ll per son a l a ssist a n t s, a ccor d sa id r epr esen t a t ive a ll t h e r igh t s a n d du t ies gr a n t ed su ch r epr esen t a t ives by t h e Illin ois P u blic La bor Rela t ion s Act , 5 ILCS 315/1 et seq., a n d en ga ge in collect ive ba r ga in in g wit h sa id r epr esen t a t ive con cer n in g a ll t er m s a n d con dit ion s of t h e pr ovision of ser vices wit h in t h e St a t e’ s con t r ol, in clu din g t h e set t in g of m in im u m r a t es
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of pa ym en t t o in dividu a l pr ovider s. 32. SE IU Loca l 73 pet ition ed for a n elect ion t o becom e t h e exclu sive r epr esen t a t ive of P r ovider s pu r su a n t t o E O 2009-15. AF SCME in t er ven ed in t h is elect ion . A m a il ba llot elect ion wa s sch edu led for 1 Oct ober 2009 t o 19 Oct ober 2009. 33. Gover n or Qu in n su ppor t ed SE IU Loca l 73’ s ca m pa ign a ga in st P r ovider s, in clu din g by illega lly a t t em pt in g t o ga g pr iva t e pa r t ies fr om spea kin g a ga in st SE IU Loca l 73. Specifica lly, t h e Illin ois Depa r t m en t of H u m a n Ser vices sen t let t er s t o ser vice fa cilit a t or s—pr iva t e per son s a n d en t it ies t h a t a ssist pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m —t h a t t h r ea t en ed t h eir con t r a ct u a l st a t u s wit h t h e St a t e if t h ey spoke a bou t or a ga in st u n ion iza t ion . 34. If u n ion ized u n der E O 2009-15, P r ovider s will be for ced, a s a con dit ion of ser vin g in dividu a ls in t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m , t o fin a n cia lly su ppor t t h e SE IU or AF SCME a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed a spect s of t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m , a s t h is is t h e pr in cipa l pu r pose of t h e sch em e. 35. P la in t iffs P a m ela H a r r is, Gor don St eifel, a n d E llen Br on feld devot ed t im e a n d m on ey t o ca m pa ign a ga in st SE IU Loca l 73 a n d AF SCME in t h e m a il ba llot elect ion . F or exa m ple, P la in t iff H a r r is a lon e spen t $1,342.02 for t h is pu r pose. 36. SE IU Loca l 73 a n d AF SCME lost t h e m a il ba llot elect ion t h a t con clu ded on 19 Oct ober 2009. H owever , u n der E O 2009-15, t h e SE IU a n d AF SCME ca n r equ est a n ot h er elect ion , or becom e t h e st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive of P r ovider s wit h ou t
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a n elect ion a ft er t h ey collect a su fficien t n u m ber of ca r ds fr om P r ovider s. On in for m a t ion a n d belief, t h e SE IU a n d AF SCME a r e con t in u in g t h eir effor t s t o im pose t h em selves on P r ovider s u n der E O 2009-15. 37. P la in t iffs P a m ela H a r r is, E llen Br on feld, Ca r ole Gu lo, Mich elle H a r r is, Wen dy P a r t r idge, Gor don P . St iefel, a n d P a t r icia Wit h er s a r e su bject t o a n a ct u a l a n d on goin g t h r ea t of bein g com pelled bot h t o su ppor t t h e SE IU a n d AF SCME a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls, a n d t o h a vin g t o expen d t im e a n d m on ey t o pr even t t h is in fr in gem en t on t h eir Con st it u t ion a l r igh t s.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 38. Th is is a cla ss a ct ion br ou gh t by n a m ed P la in t iffs Th er esa Riffey, Su sa n Wa t t s, a n d St eph a n ie Yen cer -P r ice for t h em selves a n d a ll ot h er s sim ila r ly sit u a t ed, pu r su a n t t o F eder a l Ru le of Civil P r ocedu r e 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), a n d/or 23(b)(3). Th e cla ss con sist s of a ll in dividu a ls wh o: (1) a r e P er son a l Assist a n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m ; a n d, (2) h a ve h a d a n y u n ion du es or fees dedu ct ed fr om t h e m on ies pa id t o t h em for ca r in g for pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m a n d r em it t ed t o SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a n d it s a ffilia t es. Th e cla ss in clu des ever yon e wh o com es wit h in t h e cla ss defin it ion a t a n y t im e fr om t wo yea r s pr ior t o t h e com m en cem en t of t h is a ct ion u n t il t h e con clu sion of t h is a ct ion . 39. Th e n u m ber of per son s in t h e cla ss exceeds 20,000. Th eir n u m ber m a kes join der of t h e en t ir e cla ss im pr a ct ica l.
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40. Th er e a r e qu est ion s of fa ct a n d la w com m on t o a ll cla ss m em ber s. F a ct u a lly, a ll cla ss m em ber s a r e bein g com pelled t o su ppor t SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed a spect s of t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m . Th e qu est ion of la w is t h e sa m e for a ll cla ss m em ber s: does t h is viola t e t h eir r igh t s u n der t h e Un it ed St a t es Con st it u t ion ? 41. Th e cla im s of P la in t iffs’ Th er esa Riffey, Su sa n Wa t t s, a n d St eph a n ie Yen cer P r ice a r e t ypica l of ot h er m em ber s of t h e cla ss, in t h a t t h eir Con st it u t ion a l r igh t s a r e a ll bein g in fr in ged u pon in a sim ila r m a n n er by bein g com pelled t o su ppor t SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed a spect s of t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m . 42. P la in t iffs’ Th er esa Riffey, Su sa n Wa t t s, a n d St eph a n ie Yen cer -P r ice ca n a dequ a t ely r epr esen t t h e in t er est s of t h e cla ss. Th ey h a ve n o in t er est s a n t a gon ist ic t o t h e cla ss, a ll of wh om h a ve a cogn iza ble in t er est in n ot bein g com pelled t o su ppor t a st a t e-design a t ed lobbyist in viola t ion of t h eir Con st it u t ion a l righ t s. P la in t iffs’ a t t or n eys a r e pr ovided pro bon o by a well-est a blish ed lega l-a id or ga n iza t ion a n d a r e exper ien ced in r epr esen t in g in dividu a ls wh ose con st it u t ion a l r igh t s a r e in fr in ged u pon wh en com pelled t o su ppor t a u n ion . 43. A cla ss a ct ion ca n be m a in t a in ed u n der Ru le 23(b)(1)(A), beca u se sepa r a t e a ct ion s by cla ss m em ber s will cr ea t e a r isk of in con sist en t a dju dica t ion s t h a t wou ld
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est a blish in com pa t ible st a n da r ds of con du ct for t h e Defen da n t s wit h r espect t o wh et h er it is la wfu l t o com pel P er son a l Assist a n t s t o su ppor t SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a . 44. A cla ss a ct ion ca n be m a in t a in ed u n der Ru le 23(b)(1)(B) beca u se a n a dju dica t ion t h a t det er m in es wh et h er it is con st it u t ion a l t o com pel a cla ss m em ber t o su ppor t t h e SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a will, a s a pr a ct ica l m a t t er , be disposit ive of t h e in t er est s of ot h er cla ss m em ber s. 45. A cla ss a ct ion ca n be m a in t a in ed u n der Ru le 23(b)(3), beca u se t h e com m on qu est ion s of la w a n d fa ct iden t ified in pa r a gr a ph 40 of t h e Com pla in t pr edom in a t e over a n y qu est ion s a ffect in g on ly in dividu a l cla ss m em ber s. A cla ss a ct ion is su per ior t o ot h er a va ila ble m et h ods for t h e fa ir a n d efficien t a dju dica t ion of t h e con t r over sy beca u se, a m on g ot h er t h in gs, a ll cla ss m em ber s a r e su ffer in g t h e sa m e viola t ion of t h eir Con st it u t ion a l r igh t s, bu t t h e a m ou n t of m on ey in volved in ea ch in dividu a l’ s cla im wou ld m a ke it bu r den som e for cla ss m em ber s t o m a in t a in sepa r a t e a ct ion s.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
(Violation of R igh ts of Person al Assistan ts u n d er 42 U.S .C. § 1983 an d th e Un ited S tates Con stitu tion )
P la in t iffs r ea sser t t h e for egoin g a n d fu r t h er a llege: 46. By com pellin g P er son a l Assist a n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m , specifica lly P la in t iffs Th er esa Riffey, Su sa n Wa t t s, St eph a n ie Yen cer -P r ice, a n d m em ber s of t h e
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P la in t iff cla ss, t o su ppor t SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a n d it s a ffilia t es a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed a spect s of t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m , Defen da n t s (ot h er t h a n AF SCME ) a r e a br idgin g a n d viola t in g t h e r igh t s of P er son a l Assist a n t s t o fr eedom of a ssocia t ion , fr eedom of speech , a n d t o pet it ion t h e gover n m en t for r edr ess of gr ieva n ces u n der t h e F ir st Am en dm en t t o t h e Un it ed St a t es Con st it u t ion , in viola t ion of t h e F ou r t een t h Am en dm en t a n d 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 47. Un less en join ed by t h is Cou r t , P la in t iffs Th er esa Riffey, Su sa n Wa t t s, St eph a n ie Yen cer -P r ice, a n d m em ber s of t h e P la in t iff cla ss will con t in u e t o su ffer ir r epa r a ble h a r m , da m a ge, a n d in ju r y for wh ich t h er e is n o a dequ a t e r em edy a t la w.
COUNT II (T h reaten ed Violation of R igh ts of Provid ers u n d er 42 U.S .C. § 1983
an d th e Un ited S tates Con stitu tion ) P la in t iffs r ea sser t t h e for egoin g a n d fu r t h er a llege: 48. By t h r ea t en in g t o com pel P la in t iffs P a m ela H a r r is, E llen Br on feld, Ca r ole Gu lo, Mich elle H a r r is, Wen dy P a r t r idge, Gor don St iefel, a n d P a t r icia Wit h er s t o su ppor t t h e SE IU or AF SCME a s t h eir st a t e-design a t ed r epr esen t a t ive for t h e pu r poses of spea kin g t o, pet it ion in g, a n d ot h er wise lobbyin g t h e St a t e a n d it s officia ls wit h r espect t o lim it ed a spect s of t h e Disa bilit ies P r ogr a m , Defen da n t s a r e t h r ea t en in g t o a br idge a n d viola t e t h eir r igh t s t o fr eedom of a ssocia t ion , fr eedom of speech , a n d t o pet it ion t h e gover n m en t for r edr ess of gr ieva n ces u n der t h e F ir st Am en dm en t t o t h e
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Un it ed St a t es Con st it u t ion , in viola t ion of t h e F ou r t eent h Am en dm en t a n d 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 49. P la in t iffs P a m ela J . H a r r is, E llen Br on feld, Ca r ole Gu lo, Mich elle H a r r is, Wen dy P a r t r idge, Gor don P . St iefel, a n d P a t r icia Wit h er s a r e su bject t o a n a ct u a l a n d on goin g t h r ea t of ir r epa r a ble h a r m a n d in ju r y, for wh ich t h er e is n o a dequ a t e r em edy a t la w, t h a t is in h er en t in a viola t ion of t h eir Con st it u t ion a l righ t s.
P RAYER F OR RELIEF Wh er efor e, P la in t iffs r equ est t h a t t h is Cou r t do t h e followin g: A. Issu e a per m a n en t in ju n ct ion t h a t :
(1) en join s Defen da n t s fr om com pellin g or ot h er wise ca u sin g P er son a l Assist a n t s a n d P r oviders t o su ppor t t h e SE IU, AF SCME , or a n y ot h er representative designated by the State;
(2) en join s en for cem en t of P u blic Act 93-0204, E O 2003-08, a n d E O 2009-15 for t h e pu r pose of com pellin g or ca u sin g P er son a l Assist a n t s or P r ovider s t o su ppor t t h e SE IU, AF SCME , or a ny ot h er r epr esen t a t ive design a t ed by t h e St a t e;
(3) voids a n d r escin ds Sect ion 6 of Ar t icle X of t h e Agr eem en t r efer en ced in pa r a gr a ph 25 of t h e Com pla in t ; B. Issu e decla r a t or y ju dgm en t s t h a t :
(1) it is u n con st it u t ion a l t o com pel P er son a l Assist a n t s a n d P r ovider s t o su ppor t t h e SE IU, AF SCME , or a n y ot h er r epr esen t a t ive design a t ed by t h e St a t e;
(2) P u blic Act 93-0204, E O 2003-08, a n d E O 2009-15 a r e u n con st it u t ion a l t o
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t h e ext en t t h a t t h ey a u t h or ize or per m it t h e St a t e of Illin ois, a n d a n y en t it y a ct in g in con ju n ct ion wit h t h e St a t e, t o com pel or ca u se P er son a l Assist a n t s a n d P r ovider s t o su ppor t t h e SE IU, AF SCME , or a n y ot h er r epr esen t a t ive design a t ed by t h e St a t e. C. Awa r d m on et a r y da m a ges t o:
(1) P la in t iffs Th er esa Riffey, Su sa n Wa t t s, St eph a n ie Yen cer -P r ice a n d ea ch m em ber of t h e P la in t iff Cla ss in a n a m ou n t equ a l t o t h e u n ion fees t a ken fr om t h e m on ies owed t o t h em for ca r in g for pa r t icipa n t s in t h e Reh a bilit a t ion P r ogr a m a n d r em it t ed t o SE IU H ea lt h ca r e Illin ois & In dia n a a n d of it s a ffilia t es, wit h in t er est , a n d h old t h e SE IU lia ble for sa id da m a ges;
(2) P la in t iffs P a m ela H a r r is, E llen Br on feld, Ca r ole Gu lo, Mich elle H a r r is, Wen dy P a r t r idge, Gor don St iefel, a n d P a t r icia Wit h er s for a n y m on ies t h a t t h ey spen t , or spen d in t h e fu t u r e, t o pr even t t h e im posit ion of t h e SE IU or AF SCME a s t h eir r epr esen t a t ive u n der E O 2009-15 or sim ila r pr ovision s, wit h in t er est , a n d h old t h e SE IU a n d AF SCME join t ly a n d sever a lly lia ble for sa id da m a ges. D. Awa r d n om in a l da m a ges t o ea ch P la in t iff a n d m em ber of t h e P la in t iff Cla ss. E . Awa r d P la in t iffs t h eir cost s a n d r ea son a ble a t t or n eys’ fees, pu r su a n t t o t h e Civil Righ t s At t or n eys’ F ees Awa r d Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. F . Gr a n t su ch ot h er a n d a ddit ion a l r elief a s t h e Cou r t m a y deem ju st a n d pr oper .
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Da t ed t h is 22n d da y of Apr il 2010.
/s/ Willia m L. Messen ger William L. Messenger Na t ion a l Righ t t o Wor k Lega l Defen se
F ou n da t ion 8001 Br a ddock Roa d, Su it e 600 Spr in gfield, Vir gin ia 22160 (703) 321-8510 (703) 321-9319 (fa x) wlm @n r t w.or g Attorn ey for Plain tiffs Mich a el H a u gh Vever ka Rosen & H a u gh 180 N. Mich iga n Ave 900 Ch ica go, Illin ois 312.372.3665 ver oh a la w@pr odigy.n et L ocal Cou n sel for S ervice Pu rsu an t to L ocal R u le 83.15
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 Case: 1:10-cv-02477 Document #: 56 Filed: 11/12/10 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:493

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PAMELA J. HARRIS, ELLEN BRONFELD, CAROLE GULO, MICHELLE HARRIS, WENDY PARTRIDGE, THERESA RIFFEY, GORDON P. STIEFEL, SUSAN WATTS, PATRICIA WITHERS, STEPHANIE YENCER-PRICE, and a class of similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GOVERNOR PAT QUINN, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU HEALTHCARE ILLINOIS & INDIANA, SEIU LOCAL 73, and AFSCME COUNCIL 31,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 10-cv-02477 ) ) Hon. Sharon Johnson Coleman ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this proposed class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs are individuals who provide in-home care to disabled participants in one of two Illinois Medicaid-waiver programs: (1) the Home Services Program administered by the Division of Rehabilitation Services of the Illinois Department of Human Services (“Rehabilitation Program”); or (2) the Home Based Support Services Program for Mentally Disabled Adults administered by the Division of Developmental Disabilities of the Illinois Department of Human Services (“Disabilities Program”). Plaintiffs Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, and Stephanie Yencer-Price (“Rehabilitation Plaintiffs”) provide services to disabled participants in the Rehabilitation Program and allege that Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana (“SEIU HII”) violated the constitutional rights of these Plaintiffs by compelling them to pay SEIU HII compulsory union fees. Plaintiffs Pamela J. Harris, Ellen

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Bronfeld, Michelle Harris, Carole Gulo, Wendy Partridge, and Patricia Withers (“Disabilities Plaintiffs”)1 provide services to disabled participants in the Disabilities Program. The Disabilities Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Governor Pat Quinn (“Governor Quinn”), SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31 (“AFSCME”) violated the constitutional rights of the Disabilities Plaintiffs by threatening to compel them to financially support either SEIU Local 73 or AFSCME. The Rehabilitation Plaintiffs and the Disabilities Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment that certain conduct, portions of two Illinois Executive Orders, and an Illinois Public Act are unconstitutional. In a consolidated motion, all Defendants moved for dismissal of Counts I and II pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) respectively. (Dkt. No. 30.) Defendants SEIU Local 73 and AFSCME moved for dismissal on the additional basis that the claims against them fail to establish state action. Governor Quinn moved for dismissal of any claim seeking monetary damages against him on the additional basis of the immunity protections provided by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court conducted a hearing on the pending motion on November 5, 2010. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss. I. Factual Background
The Plaintiffs are providers of home care service to disabled individuals enrolled in either the Disabilities Program or the Rehabilitation Program.2 (Dkt. No. p. 2.) Both programs are
1Plaintiffs have filed notice with the Court of the voluntary dismissal of Gordon P. Stiefel. (Dkt. No. 49.)
2Providers in the Rehabilitation Program are generally referred to as “personal assistants” while providers in the Disabilities Program are generally referred to as “individual providers.”
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Medicaid-waiver programs administered by the Illinois Department of Human Services, which subsidize the costs of providing home-based services to individuals with severe disabilities. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 13.) The Plaintiffs provide personal care and certain health care services to program participants to allow the participants to remain in their homes and prevent their unnecessary institutionalization. (Id.) The program participants may select and hire any provider who meets certain minimum requirements as set by the State of Illinois (“State”). (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 16.) The participants supervise, discipline, and control certain terms and conditions of the providers they hire. (Id.) The State subsidizes a participant’s cost of hiring a provider, ensures that providers meet certain minimum requirements, and controls the economic terms of the providers’ employment. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, 17.)
A. Providers in The Rehabilitation Program In March 2003, former Illinois Governor Blagojevich issued “Executive Order on Collective Bargaining By Personal Assistants” (“EO 2003-08”), which recognized that the State was not the “sole employer” of the personal assistants who provide home services under the Rehabilitation Program. (Dkt. No. 32-1.) EO 2003-08 also recognized the importance of preserving the participants’ “control over the hiring, in-home supervision, and termination of the personal assistants” while at the same time preserving the “State’s ability to ensure efficient and effective delivery of personal care services and [to] control the economic terms of the personal assistants’ employment.” (Id.) In recognition of these twin objectives, EO 2003-08 provided that the State shall recognize a representative designated by the majority of the personal assistants as the exclusive representative of all personal assistants for the purposes of engaging
(Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 9, 31.) 3

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in collective bargaining with the representative concerning the terms and conditions of employment “that are within the State’s control.” (Id.; Compl. ¶ 20.)
In July 2003, the Illinois General Assembly codified EO 2003-08 by enacting Public Act 0903-204, An Act Concerning Disabled Persons (“the 2003 Act”), which amended Section 3 of the Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Act. (Compl. ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 32-10.) Section 3(f) of the 2003 Act provided:
[P]ersonal assistants providing services under the Department’s Home Services Program shall be considered to be public employees and the State of Illinois shall be considered their employer. (Dkt. No. 32-10.) The 2003 Act also provided for a “Fair share agreement” which required all employees in a collective bargaining unit to pay “their proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract administration, and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.” (Id. at Sect. 3(g).) The fair share agreement specifically excluded payment of “any fees for contributions related to the election or support of any candidate for political office.” (Id.) Shortly after the 2003 Act was enacted, the majority of personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program designated SEIU HII as the exclusive representative for all personal assistants and the State and SEIU HII subsequently entered into a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) effective August 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-24.) In 2008, the State and SEIU HII entered into a new CBA effective January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 32-3 p. 2.) The CBA allows the State, upon the written authorization of the personal assistant, to deduct union dues and initiation fees from the personal
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assistant’s wages and remit such fees to SEIU HII. (Dkt. No. 32-3 p. 8.) The CBA also contains a fair share provision in Section 6 of Article X, which tracks the language in the 2003 Act and requires that all personal assistants who are not SEIU HII members pay “their proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.” (Compl. ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 32-4 p. 7.)
The Rehabilitation Plaintiffs are personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program who have either paid union dues or fair share fees through payroll deductions that were ultimately remitted to SEIU HII. (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Rehabilitation Plaintiffs allege that they, and other similarly situated personal assistants, are compelled to financially support SEIU HII for purposes of speaking to, petitioning, and otherwise lobbying the State with respect to the Rehabilitation Program and that the compelled association abridges their right to freedom of association, freedom of speech, and to petition the government for redress of grievances under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶ 46.)
B. Providers in the Disabilities Program On June 29, 2009, Governor Quinn issued Executive Order 2009-15 (“EO 2009-15” or “the Order”) titled “Collective Bargaining By Individual Providers of Home-Based Support Services.” (Compl. ¶ 31; Dkt. No 32-2.) EO 2009-15 recognized that the individual providers of home-based services under the Disabilities Program are not State employees but that the “State controls the economic terms of their provision of services.” (Dkt. No. 32-2 p. 2.) The Order also recognized the fact that the State had productively dealt with an exclusive
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representative of personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program for many years. (Id.) EO 2009-15 authorized the State to recognize a representative designated by the majority of the individual providers in the Home-Based Support Services Program as the exclusive representative for collective bargaining purposes. (Compl ¶ 31.)
In October 2009, Defendants SEIU Local 73 and AFSCME unsuccessfully attempted to become the exclusive representative of the individual providers in the Disabilities Program. (Id.. ¶ 32.) As a result, the individual providers in the Disabilities program are not represented by any union. (Id. at 33.) The Disabilities Plaintiffs allege that they devoted time, and in some cases money, to campaign against union representation. (Id. at 35.) These Plaintiffs also allege that SEIU Local 73 and AFSCME are continuing their efforts to become the exclusive representative pursuant to EO 2009-15 and that these ongoing efforts threaten to violate the constitutional rights of the Disabilities Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.) II. Standard of Review
A. Motion To Dismiss for Failure To State a Claim A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to the federal notice pleading standard, a complaint need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief and sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The Supreme Court has described the bar that a complaint must clear for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) as
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follows: “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). For a claim to have facial plausibility, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. As such, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be decided solely on the face of the complaint and any attachments that accompanied its filing. Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2010). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), a district court cannot consider material outside of the complaint and its attachments without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d) (“[i]f on motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12©), matters outside of the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment”). A court may, however, consider judicially noticed documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998). Judicial notice of historical documents, documents contained in the public record, and reports of administrative bodies is proper. Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201.
B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir.
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1999). The district court is not, however, bound to accept as true the allegations of the complaint which tend to establish jurisdiction where an opposing party properly raises a factual question concerning the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed with the action. Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1979). The district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists. Long, 182 F.3d at 554.
C. Request for Judicial Notice Documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they
are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims. Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998). Defendants requested that the Court take judicial notice of ten documents in support of their motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 32.) Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ request for judicial notice and indeed the Complaint relies upon several of the documents presented by the Defendants in their request for judicial notice. (See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 20, 21, 24, 31.) The Court therefore takes judicial notice of the following documents because they are matters of public record and because they are central to Plaintiffs’ claims: (1) Executive Order No. 2003-8 (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A); (2) Executive Order No. 2009-15 (id. at Ex. B); (3) Collective Bargaining Agreement between SEIU HII and the State of Illinois effective January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2012 (id. at Ex. C); (4) Collective Bargaining Agreement between SEIU HII and the State of Illinois effective August 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007) (id. at Ex. D); and (5) Illinois Public Act 93-0204 (2003) (id. at Ex. J). The Court also takes judicial notice of the August 30, 2002 Order in West v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 434B in the United States District Court for the Central Division of California,
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Western Division, (id. at Ex. F). See, e.g., Opoka v. INS, 94 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 1996) (“it is a well-settled principle that the decision of another court or agency...is a proper subject of judicial notice”). The Court declines to take judicial notice of the April 11, 2009 Arbitration Decision (RJN, Ex. E), the December 18, 1985 decision of the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (id. at Ex. G), the April 23, 2007 decision of the Illinois Labor Board (id. at Ex. H), and the March 18, 2002 decision of the State of Illinois Industrial Commission (id. at Ex. I) because Defendants have not established that these documents are necessary for resolution of their motion. III. Analysis
A. Count I - Rehabilitation Plaintiffs Count I, asserted on behalf of the Rehabilitation Plaintiffs, alleges the system of exclusive representation established by the State that allows Defendant SEIU HII to impose and collect fair share fees violates the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Defendants move for dismissal of Count I alleging that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that collective bargaining arrangements permitting fair share fees are consistent with the First Amendment. (Dkt. No. 31 p. 13.) Defendants claim that a long and unbroken line of Supreme Court cases about collective bargaining have held that such arrangements are justified by the state’s legitimate interest in establishing a harmonious system for labor relations. (Id.) Defendants also argue fair share fees have been found to fairly distribute the costs associated with collective bargaining among all who benefit to avoid the risk of “free riders.” (Id.) Defendants rely upon Hanson and its progeny for the proposition that exclusive representation arrangements, while imposing some burden on an individual’s First Amendment rights, are justified by the employer’s interest in
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“labor peace.” Railway Employees’ Dep’t. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1961) (holding “the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work” does not violate the First Amendment); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (holding fair share fees used to finance expenditures germane to collective bargaining serve an important government interest in labor relations and are constitutionally justified); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991) (holding that a union could constitutionally charge dissenting employees for their share of union activities appurtenant to collective bargaining and contract implementation). Defendants find additional support in a recent decision dismissing a similar action on nearly identical facts. (Order Granting SEIU Local 434B’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Four, West v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 434B, No. 01-cv-10862-CAS-FMO (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2002), submitted as RJN, Ex. F.)
As noted by the Defendants, the Supreme Court has held that employees can be required to contribute fair share fees to compensate unions for their representational activities. See, e.g., Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519. A line is drawn for First Amendment purposes between fair share fees, which pay for representational or collective-bargaining activities, and full union dues that often support nonrepresentational activities. Unions cannot force employees to pay for “the support of ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining agent.” See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36; Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294, 89 L. Ed. 2d 232, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986). In a recent decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that fair share fees are permitted under the First Amendment because this forced speech promotes peaceful labor relations and serves legitimate government purposes for the benefit of both union members and non-members. Kingstad v. State Bar of Wisc., No. 09-4080 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (slip opinion
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pp. 10-11). Without a showing that fair share fees are used to fund ideological conformity or imposed for reasons unrelated to collective bargaining, these fees do not violate the First Amendment. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 235-38.
Plaintiffs do not deny that fair share fees in the collective bargaining context have been found constitutional. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the exclusive representation arrangement here is “nothing short of compulsory political representation” that violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by compelling them to support a state-designated entity for purposes of lobbying the State for additional benefits from a government program. (Dkt. No. 33 at pp. 9-10.) Plaintiffs also allege that fair share fees imposed under this arrangement are not justified by a vital government interest.
The Plaintiffs’ claim that they are compelled by the State to support a state-designated representative to speak on their behalf for the purpose of getting more benefits from a government program is unsound. First, the State did not designate any entity to serve as the Plaintiffs’ exclusive representative. Instead, as set forth in the Complaint, the State “recognize[d] a representative designated by a majority of the personal assistants as the exclusive representative of all personal assistants.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 20.) Second, the Complaint alleges that the disabled individuals, not the Plaintiffs, are the recipients of a government program that subsidizes the cost of their in-home care. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 2-3, 7, 13.) Third, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation that the Plaintiffs are prevented from independently lobbying the State for any purpose. Finally, the authorities that Plaintiffs cite to support their claim found compelled support of beliefs or ideology unconstitutional; this is not the case that
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Plaintiffs find themselves in.3 See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1990) (holding any personnel decisions based upon support of political party violate First Amendment); Abood, 431 U.S. at 233-34 (holding union fees that support ideological activities violate First Amendment); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976) (holding policy that conditions employment on support of a political party violates First Amendment).
Defendants contend the State’s legitimate interest in establishing effective collective bargaining justifies a system of exclusive representation and fair share fees. (Dkt. No. 31. p. 17.) Plaintiffs counter that such arrangements are only constitutional when justified by a vital government interest and that none exists here. (Dkt. No. 33. p. 11.) Plaintiffs once again rely upon Elrod and Rutan, both of which considered infringements on First Amendment rights outside of the collective bargaining environment.
Plaintiffs also claim Lehnert provides support for their claim. Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Lehnert, however, is puzzling. The Lehnert plaintiffs were employees of a state college who challenged compelled union fees that were used for purposes other than collective bargaining. 500 U.S. at 513. In addressing plaintiffs’ challenge, the Court first emphasized that its previous decisions recognized that the compelled financial support of a union’s collective bargaining
3Plaintiffs filed a Citation to Supplemental Authorities in Support of Their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 39) after the close of briefing on the instant motion and without seeking leave of the Court. The filing consisted of a July 14, 2010 Order in Schlaud v. Granholm, Case No. 10-cv-147 (Dkt. No. 32) pending in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, along with excerpts from a July 13, 2010 hearing in the same matter. No reasoning was included in the July 14, 2010 Order. During the November 5, 2010 hearing in the case sub judice, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that he speculated as to the district court’s reasoning in Schlaud. The Court declines to speculate about the court’s reasoning in Schlaud and thus the Court will not consider this supplemental filing in ruling on Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.
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activities was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 516. The Court then articulated a three prong test for determining the range of fees that a union could constitutionally charge non-members consistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 519. Plaintiffs quote from a portion of this test when arguing that the State must demonstrate that a vital interest, rather than a legitimate interest as Defendants assert, justifies the fair share fees at issue here. (Dkt. No. 33 p. 11.) The full test set forth in Lehnert provides:
[A]lthough the Court’s decisions in this area prescribe a case-by-case analysis in determining which activities a union may constitutionally charge to dissenting employees, they also set forth several guidelines to be followed in making such determinations...chargeable activities must (1) be “germane” to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding “free riders”; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519. Read in full context, Lehnert explains that the government’s interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders is a vital government interest. While Defendants may have characterized the State’s interest in establishing a harmonious system for labor relations as a legitimate interest, this interest is considered vital in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. Plaintiffs’ claim that no vital interest exists here lacks merit. Throughout the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly referred to the collective bargaining activities before the Court as “lobbying.” Counsel argued that collective bargaining absent an employer-employee relationship is lobbying and that since no employment relationship exists between the State and the personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program, that the fair share fees here support compulsory lobbying. This argument is flawed as the Complaint alleges
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that: (1) the State pays the providers (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 26); (2) the State controls certain terms and conditions of the providers’ employment (id. at ¶¶ 10-11, 22, 26); and (3) the 20,000 providers are considered State employees solely for the purpose of collective bargaining (id. at ¶¶ 12, 21).
Although Plaintiff's counsel provided no authority to support this argument, Lehnert provides guidance on the sometimes “hazy line” between lobbying and collective bargaining in the public sector. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 518-520. The Court explained that in public sector employment, unions must necessarily concern themselves not only with negotiations at the bargaining table but also with those activities necessary to ensure the agreement’s implementation. Id. at 520. These additional activities include efforts to secure ratification and acquire appropriations from the proper state body. Id. These post-negotiating activities are “pertinent to the duties of the union as a bargaining representative” and are an “indispensable prerequisite” to ensuring contract implementation. Id. at 519-520. The Court recognized that the question of whether these additional activities are lobbying is “a close one.” Id. at 520. The Court held, however, that employees may be constitutionally compelled to subsidize legislative lobbying within the context of contract ratification or implementation. Id. at 522. Thus, characterizing the fair share fees here as “compulsory lobbying” does not, without more, implicate any First Amendment concerns. Id. at 517.
Plaintiffs’ also claim that the labor peace justification does not apply here because the personal assistants are not State employees. Yet, the personal assistants have been designated as public employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19.) There can be no doubt that the State has a vital interest in establishing peaceful labor relations with the 20,000
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personal assistants paid with State subsidized funds. Plaintiffs next argue that First Amendment values should predominate over the State’s interest because a contrary approach would inflict harm by causing individuals to support views and beliefs against their will thereby harming the democratic process that the First Amendment protects. (Dkt. No. 33 p. 36.) Plaintiffs’ argument fails because they have not alleged either in the Complaint or in their Opposition Motion that Plaintiffs have been forced to support any ideology or viewpoint with which they disagree.
In their briefs, both Plaintiffs and Defendants refer to the order entered by the district court in West v. SEIU Local 434B. Defendants argue that West supports their claim that the system of collective bargaining established by the State of Illinois comports with the First Amendment while the Plaintiffs argue that West rests on faulty reasoning. (Dkt. No. 31 p. 26; Dkt. No. 33. p. 34.) While certainly not binding on this Court, we find the reasoning in West persuasive. The West plaintiffs provided in-home support services to low income elderly and disabled persons, who received benefits to fund these services through a statewide public entitlement program. (RJN, Ex. F at p. 4.) By statute, the plaintiff providers were designated as state employees and were thereby subject to an exclusive bargaining agreement, which permitted the defendant union to collect agency fees. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) The plaintiffs asserted a constitutional challenge to the statute alleging that it violated the First Amendment rights of the providers and impinged upon their right to free association. (Id. at 2.) The union sought dismissal arguing that the statutory framework was enacted to clarify that the public body was the employer of the providers for collective bargaining purposes only and that the program recipients were the employers of the providers for all other purposes. (Id. at 15.) The union also argued that under Hanson and Abood, the union could constitutionally collect agency fees to
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support the costs of collective bargaining. (Id. at 16-17.) The plaintiffs argued that the challenged statutory provisions constituted illegal content and viewpoint based regulations subject to strict scrutiny to be constitutional. (Id. at 18.) The plaintiffs further contended that no public employer-employee relationship existed to justify an exclusive bargaining arrangement and that any such justification must be the least restrictive means available. (Id. at 20.)
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs were incorrect about the standard of scrutiny that applies to collective bargaining agreements. The court explained that “[i]t has long been settled that such interference with First Amendment rights is justified by the governmental interest in industrial peace.” (Id. at 21.) The court found that the statutory framework classifying the providers as public employees subject to exclusive bargaining agreements was in accordance with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. (Id. at 22.) The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and noted that the plaintiffs failed to articulate any impermissible way in which the statutory scheme impinged upon their First Amendment rights. (Id. at 22-23.)
Similarly, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the exclusive representation system here has imposed any burden on Plaintiffs beyond supporting the collective bargaining arrangement from which they benefit. There are no allegations that the fair share fees here are used to support any political or ideological activities. The Complaint alleges only that the Rehabilitation Plaintiffs pay a compulsory fee to SEIU HII for “their proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 25.) These costs are constitutional under
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Lehnert and other longstanding Supreme Court precedent. The Complaint fails to state a plausible claim that the fair-share fee arrangement violates the First Amendment and thus the Court dismisses Count I with prejudice.
B. Count II - Disabilities Plaintiffs Count II, asserted on behalf of the Disabilities Plaintiffs, alleges that Defendants Governor Quinn, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME have threatened to violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by attempting to unionize the individual providers in the Disabilities Program. (Dkt. No. 1 pp. 16-17.) Defendants seek dismissal of Count II arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the claim is not ripe and the Plaintiffs lack standing. (Dkt. No. 31 p. 33.) Plaintiffs counter that because the threat to their First Amendment rights is imminent, they have standing to enjoin enforcement of the statutory framework which would subject them to exclusive representation and fair share fees. (Dkt. No. 33 pp. 40-41.) Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the authority of the federal courts to “cases or controversies.” From that requirement flow two closely related concepts: ripeness and standing. Rock Energy Coop. v. Village of Rockton, 614 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2010). Both of these doctrines bar a plaintiff from asserting an injury that depends on so many future events that a judicial opinion would be advice about remote contingencies. Id. To determine whether an actual controversy exists, a court must look at whether the facts alleged show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant relief. Rock Energy, 614 F.3d at 748.
1. Ripeness Defendants argue that Count II is not ripe because there are several contingencies that
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must occur, that are not certain to occur, before the individual providers in the Disabilities Program would be subject to a fair share arrangement. The Complaint alleges that the majority of individual providers in the Disabilities Program elected not to designate any union as their exclusive representative in October 2009. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 32, 36.) Plaintiffs have not alleged that another election has been scheduled or that either Defendant SEIU Local 73 or Defendant AFSCME has petitioned to hold such an election. Further, as the Defendants asserted, the Disabilities providers could once again choose not to be represented by a labor organization. Even allowing for an election designating some union as the exclusive representative, a collective bargaining agreement that included a fair share fee provision would then need to be negotiated. Furthermore, Defendants SEIU Local 73 and AFSCME may choose not to participate in an election if one were to be held. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ argument that an election is likely, there are simply too many “future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all” to find that the threatened alleged violation is imminent, and thus ripe for adjudication. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2008). Count II is dismissed because the claim is not ripe.
2. Standing Defendants argue that no plaintiff has standing to assert Count II for the same reason that the claim is not ripe. Plaintiffs counter that they have standing because they can show a “reasonable probability” of suffering tangible harm and that they have expended time and money to prevent “Defendants’ attempts to impose a compulsory representative upon them in violation of their constitutional rights.” (Dkt. No. 33. p. 42.) The required elements of Article III standing are: (1) an injury-in-fact, which is an
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invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and, thus, actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relation between the injury and the challenged conduct, such that the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2004).
To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, the Disabilities Plaintiffs must establish that they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury. Id.; Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2001). This the Plaintiffs cannot do. Plaintiffs have couched their claim as involving an injury that the Defendants are “threatening.” (Dkt. No. 1 p. 16.) Thus, the alleged injury is not actual and, as discussed above, it is not imminent given the multiple contingencies that may or may not occur. The fact that the Disabilities Plaintiffs voluntarily spent money to prevent what they perceive as a threatened violation of their First Amendment rights does not establish an injury-in-fact. See, e.g. Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006) (granting summary judgment where plaintiffs’ “expenditure of time and money was not the result of any present injury, but rather the anticipation of future injury that has not materialized.”). Having failed to establish an injury-in-fact, Plaintiffs cannot meet the remaining requirements necessary to establish standing.
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count II because the claim is not ripe and Plaintiffs lack standing. As a result, the Court dismisses Count II against all Defendants
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with prejudice.4 C. Claims for Damages Against Governor Quinn Defendants also move for dismissal of all claims against Defendant Governor Quinn that
seek monetary relief on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims. (Dkt. No. 31 p. 38.) Plaintiffs did not address this argument in their Opposition Motion. Since the Court has concluded that Counts I and II must be dismissed with prejudice, the Court need not reach the issue of sovereign immunity. IV. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated November 12, 2010

Hon. Sharon Johnson Coleman United States District Court

4To the extent that Defendants argue that Count II should be dismissed against SEIU Local 73 and AFSCME for lack of state action, the Court’s ruling dismissing all Defendants from Count II renders this argument moot.
20

 
 Case: 1:10-cv-02477 Document #: 66 Filed: 09/23/11 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:571 Case: 10-3835 Document: 00711617274 Filed: 09/23/2011 Pages: 20

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3835 PAMELA J. HARRIS, et al.,
v.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

GOVERNOR PAT QUINN, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Illinois, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10 CV 02477—Sharon Johnson-Coleman, Judge.

ARGUED JUNE 9, 2011—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 1, 2011

Before MANION, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this appeal provide in-home care for people with varying levels of disabilities and other health needs. They present a narrow question: Does a collective bargaining agreement that requires Medicaid home-care personal assistants to pay a fee to a union representative violate

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the First Amendment, regardless of the amount of those fees or how the union uses them? We hold that it does not. Because the personal assistants are employees of the State of Illinois, at least in those respects relevant to collective bargaining, the union’s collection and use of fair share fees is permitted by the Supreme Court’s mandatory union fee jurisprudence in Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1961), and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider the claims of plaintiffs who have opted not to be in the union. Because they are not presently subject to mandatory fair share fees, their claims are not ripe.

I.
The plaintiffs in this case all provide in-home care to disabled individuals through Medicaid-waiver programs run by the Illinois Department of Human Services. Some are part of the Home Services Program administered by the Division of Rehabilitation Services. The others are part of the Home Based Support Services Program administered by the Division of Developmental Disabilities. We will call these groups the Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs and Disabilities Program plaintiffs respectively.

A. Home-Based Medicaid Waiver Program Features
These programs subsidize the costs of home-based services for disabled patients who might otherwise

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face institutionalization. The programs offer flexibility and self-direction for services that are tailored to patients’ individual needs. In the Rehabilitation Program, each patient works with a counselor to develop an individual service plan, which specifies “the type of service(s) to be provided to the patient, the specific tasks involved, the frequency with which the specific tasks are to be provided, the number of hours each task is to be provided per month, [and] the rate of payment for the service(s).” 89 Ill. Admin. Code 684.50. The service plan must be certified by the patient’s physician and approved by the State. Id. § 684.10.
Once a counselor identifies the type of personal assistant the patient needs for the service plan, the patient is free to select almost any personal assistant who meets the qualifications set by the State. Id. §§ 684.20, 684.30 The State, in turn, requires personal assistants to comply with age and work-hour limitations, provide written or oral recommendations from past employers, have related work experience or training, and satisfy the patient and counselor that they can communicate and follow directions. Id. § 686.10. Personal assistants sign employment agreements directly with patients, although the terms of the agreement are set by the State. Id. The State sets wages and pays personal assistants directly, withholding Social Security as well as federal and state taxes. Id. §§ 686.10, 686.40.
The Disabilities Program functions similarly. Each patient works with a State “service facilitator” to develop

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a “service/treatment plan.” 59 Ill. Admin. Code 117.120, 117.225(a). The State then pays for services provided under the plan, including personal care services. Id. at 117.215. The record is much less developed on the exact relationship between the State and the Disabilities Program personal assistants. And for good reason: the district court dismissed the claims on jurisdictional grounds, so no court has yet considered the merits of those claims.1

B. Rehabilitation Program Unionization
In the mid-1980s, personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program sought to unionize and, under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, collectively bargain with the State. The State Labor Relations Board, however, found that the personal assistants were in a unique employment relationship and that it lacked jurisdiction over that relationship because the State was not their sole

1 The details of the relationship between the State and the Disabilities Program personal assistants are unimportant for this appeal. As elaborated infra, we agree with the district court that the Disabilities Program claims are not yet ripe. But even if the claims were ripe, we would not consider the merits at this stage because the defendants have not crossappealed seeking an expanded judgment on the merits. See Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008) (“Under that unwritten but longstanding rule, an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party. . . . [without] a cross-appeal.”).

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employer. The personal assistants thus could not unionize until 2003, when the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was amended to designate “personal care attendants and personal assistants working under the Home Services Program” as State employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2405/3. ThenGovernor Blagojevich issued an executive order directing the State to recognize an exclusive representative for Rehabilitation Program personal assistants if they designated one by majority vote and to engage in collective bargaining concerning all employment terms within the State’s control. According to the Governor, this was important because each patient employed only one or two personal assistants. Thus, only the State could control the economic terms of employment and the widely dispersed personal assistants could not “effectively voice their concerns” about the program or their employment terms without representation.
Later that year, a majority of the approximately 20,000 Rehabilitation Program personal assistants voted to designate SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative with the State. The Union and the State negotiated a collective bargaining agreement which sets the pay rates, creates a health benefits fund for personal assistants, and establishes a joint Union-State committee to develop training programs. The agreement also contains other typical collective bargaining agreement provisions, including the union security clause that has given rise to this lawsuit and appeal. This “fair share” provision requires “all Personal

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Assistants who are not members of the Union . . . to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment.”

C. Disabilities Program Attempted Unionization
In 2009, Governor Pat Quinn issued an executive order directing the State to recognize an exclusive representative for the Disabilities Program personal assistants, if a majority so chose. See Ill. Exec. Order 2009-15. SEIU Local 713 petitioned for an election to become that representative, and AFSCME Council 31 intervened in the election as a rival candidate. In a mail ballot election, however, a majority of the approximately 4,500 Disabilities Program personal assistants rejected representation by either union. But that victory is not permanent: the unions can request new elections in the future, and, under Illinois labor law, may bypass an election altogether if they collect a sufficient number of union cards from the personal assistants. See id.; 80 Ill. Admin. Code 1210.100(b).2

2 While the plaintiffs allege that the unions have used coercive tactics to get them and others to join, and to lobby state officials, the constitutional claim in this appeal is confined to the payment or potential payment of the fair share requirement.

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D. Current Litigation
The following year, the personal assistants from both groups filed a two-count complaint against the Governor and the three unions involved. The Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs claimed that the fair share fees they were required to pay violated the First Amendment by compelling their association with, and speech through, the Union. The Disabilities Program plaintiffs argued that although they did not yet pay fees, they are harmed by the mere threat of an agreement requiring fair share fees. The district court dismissed the Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It dismissed the Disabilities Program plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they lacked standing and their claims were not ripe. The plaintiffs appeal both dismissals.

II.
The two sets of plaintiffs in this case stand in very different positions. The Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs are currently subject to a collective bargaining agreement that requires them to pay fair share fees to their union representative. The Disabilities Program plaintiffs have successfully rejected unionization and are not subject to fair share fees, but fear that may change at any time. This difference has important consequences: we have jurisdiction to consider the Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs’ claims, which we discuss in the first part of the analysis. But we must dismiss the

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Disabilities Program plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction because they are not ripe for adjudication. We explain these holdings in order.

A. Rehabilitation Program Claims
The Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs mount a facial challenge to the fair share fees. That is, they do not allege that the actual fees collected are too high or that the fees are being used for purposes other than collective bargaining.3 Their only argument is that they may not be forced to financially support collective bargaining with the State under any circumstances. They present a two-step argument. First, they argue that this case does not fall under the line of Supreme Court cases permitting mandatory fees to support collective bargaining representation because personal assistants are employed by individual Medicaid patients, not the State. Second, they argue that no compelling state interests justify extending these collective bargaining cases to reach personal assistants.
We first set out the controlling precedent. The Supreme Court has long approved collective bargaining agreements that compel even dissenting, non-union

3 The plaintiffs do argue that in the Medicaid context, collective bargaining with the State amounts to political advocacy. The Supreme Court has rejected this argument in the employment context, so it falls with our conclusion that personal assistants are State employees. See generally, Abood, 431 U.S. 209.

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members to financially support the costs of collective bargaining representation, as well as other closely related costs, as long as they are not used to support political candidates or views, or other ideological causes. First in Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, the Court refused to enjoin a “union shop” agreement between a railroad company and a union that required all employees of the railroad to become nominal, dues-paying members of the union as a condition of employment.4 351 U.S. at 227. Although a “right to work” provision in the Nebraska Constitution outlawed such agreements, the Court held that the federal Railway Labor Act permitted union shop agreements and thus superseded state law to the contrary. Along the way, it held that this provision of the Act was justified by Congress’s interest in supporting “industrial peace and stabilized labor-management” and in distributing the costs of collective bargaining to all those who benefit from it. Id. at 234, 238. It declined to consider hypothetical First

4 In a “union shop,” an “employer may hire nonunion employees on the condition that they join a union within a specified time”; in an “agency shop,” discussed below, “a union acts as an agent for the employees, regardless of the union membership.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1504 (9th ed. 2009). The Supreme Court has treated union and agency shops as “practical equivalent[s].” See Abood, 431 U.S. at 219 n.10. In an open shop, union membership is permitted but is not a condition of securing or maintaining employment. Under a state right-towork law, “employees are not to be required to join a union as a condition of receiving or retaining a job.” Black’s at 1504.

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Amendment issues that might arise if the union engaged in partisan or ideological speech. Id. at 238.
Then, in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., the Court extended the scope of its holding in Hanson to include public employees and attempted to set out limits on the use of fees collected from dissenting employees. 431 U.S. 209. It held that an “agency shop” clause in an agreement between the Detroit Board of Education and its teachers’ union could require teachers who were not union members to financially support the union’s collective bargaining, contract administration, grievance-adjustment procedures, and other activities “germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.” Id. at 232, 235. Since Abood, the Court has continued to refine its approach to the appropriate use of fees from nonunion members in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (outlining appropriate procedures to protect non-member fees), and Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assoc., 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (elaborating specific charges that can and cannot be funded with union donations). But it has not wavered from its position that, as a general matter, employees may be compelled to support legitimate, non-ideological, union activities germane to collective-bargaining representation.
Against this backdrop, we next consider whether the personal assistants are, as the defendants contend, State employees. If so, this case is controlled by Abood and the plaintiffs’ claims fail. As an initial matter, we note that we pay no particular heed to the State legislature’s designation of personal assistants as State employees

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solely for purposes of collective bargaining under Illinois law. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2405/3(f). The label affixed by a state, whether in statute, regulation, or order, is not sufficient to designate the relationship “employment.” Whether someone is an employee of the state has a host of implications—under both state and federal law—beyond whether mandatory union fees are permitted. Because of this, the Illinois legislature may have designated personal assistants as employees or not for reasons entirely unrelated to compelled speech under the First Amendment. Rather than accept either party’s characterization of the relationship, we must consider the relationship itself and decide whether the State is an employer for purposes of compelling support for collective bargaining.
Two sources inform our analysis. First, neither Hanson nor Abood discusses the definition of employer, so we will assume the Court meant to give the word its ordinary meaning: “A person who controls and directs a worker under an express or implied contract of hire and who pays the worker’s salary or wages.” Black’s at 604. Second, we draw from labor relations law the notion that more than one person or company may be an individual’s employer. Cf. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (discussing joint employment determination by NLRB); DiMucci Const. Co. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 1994) (listing factors courts consider in reviewing an NLRB determination of joint employment). We are aware of no cases specifically discussing Abood in a joint-employ-

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ment situation. But it is not an uncommon situation for a single individual to find himself with more than one employer for the same job. This undermines the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish between the typical employer-employee relationship, on one hand, and every other imaginable labor relationship, on the other. Thus, both the home-care patient and the State may be employers if they each exercise significant control over the personal assistants.
And in the Rehabilitation Program, the State does have significant control over virtually every aspect of a personal assistant’s job. While the home-care regulations leave the actual hiring selection up to the homecare patient, the State sets the qualifications and evaluates the patient’s choice. 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 686.10. And while only the patient may technically be able to fire a personal assistant, the State may effectively do so by refusing payment for services provided by personal assistants who do not meet the State’s standards. Id. § 677.40. When it comes to controlling the day-to-day work of a personal assistant, the State exercises its control by approving a mandatory service plan that lays out a personal assistant’s job responsibilities and work conditions and annually reviews each personal assistant’s performance. Id. §§ 686.10, 686.30. Finally, the State controls all of the economic aspects of employment: it sets salaries and work hours, pays for training, and pays all wages—twice a month, directly to the personal assistant after withholding federal and state taxes. Id.

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In light of this extensive control, we have no difficulty concluding that the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of Abood.
The plaintiffs raise two objections. First, they claim that the patient, not the State, employs them. But as we have explained, even if the patient is properly considered an employer, that would not prevent the State from being a joint employer. Second, they argue that, however we characterize the State’s relationship with personal assistants, the interests in collective bargaining that Abood identified does not apply here. They claim that the differences between the personal assistants here and the typical employment situation at issue in Abood undermine the State’s claimed interest in labor peace. Specifically, the plaintiffs characterize Abood’s labor peace interest thus: “that disruptions caused by diverse employee expressive association within a workplace could be solved by giving a union a monopoly over employee speech vis-à-vis their employer.” Pl. brief at 20. Thus, they assert that because the personal assistants are “outside the workplace” and they cannot be compelled to speak to the State with a single voice, the labor peace interest does not apply.5

5 The plaintiffs further argue that outside the workplace, the government has no lawful interest in quelling diverse, even disruptive, speech or association. But we do not understand the complaint to allege that the State has quelled any of the plaintiffs’ speech, merely that they have been forced to finan-
(continued...)

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We do not accept the plaintiffs’ narrow characterization of the labor peace interest. In Hanson, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labor-management relations are numerous and complex” and a question of policy outside of the judiciary’s concern. 351 U.S. at 234. The Court thus envisioned labor peace to include “stabilized labormanagement relations,” which are at issue in any employer-employee relationship, regardless of whether employees share the same workplace. The Court expanded its description of labor peace in Abood:
The designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment. It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension with the work force and eliminating the advantages of employee collectivization. It also frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations.

5 (...continued) cially support a single bargaining representative. Employee speech jurisprudence is entirely distinct from that of compelled association, as are the interests that justify (or not) each respective intrusion into employees’ freedom of speech.

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431 U.S. at 224. Given our conclusion that the State employs the personal assistants, with extensive control over the terms and conditions of employment, and has chosen (wisely or not) to establish some of those terms and conditions through negotiation rather than regulation, the interests identified by the Court in Abood are identical to those advanced by the State in this case. The plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish Abood are unavailing.
Thus, because of the significant control the state exercises over all aspects of the personal assistants’ jobs, we conclude that personal assistants are employees of the State and reject the plaintiffs’ arguments that the State’s interests in collective bargaining do not apply to the unique circumstances of personal assistants. As such, the fair share fees in this case withstand First Amendment scrutiny—at least against a facial challenge to the imposition of the fees itself.
We once again stress the narrowness of our decision today. We hold that personal assistants in the Illinois home-care Medicaid waiver program are State employees solely for purposes of applying Abood. We thus have no reason to consider whether the State’s interests in labor relations justify mandatory fees outside the employment context. We do not consider whether Abood would still control if the personal assistants were properly labeled independent contractors rather than employees. And we certainly do not consider whether and how a state might force union representation for other health care providers who are not state employees, as the plaintiffs fear. We hold

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simply that the State may compel the personal assistants, as employees—not contractors, health care providers, or citizens—to financially support a single representative’s exclusive collective bargaining representation.

B. Disabilities Program Claims
While the underlying legal issues raised by the Disabilities Program plaintiffs are similar to those we considered above, the district court dismissed their claims on ripeness and standing grounds. This is because the Disabilities Program plaintiffs are in a fundamentally different position. As we have noted, the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants have chosen to be represented by a union. Illinois is not a “right to work” state where paying dues for union membership is optional for each worker, and thus under state law the minority of caregivers opposed to the union may be required to pay their fair share of the dues used to bargain for pay, working conditions, and other universal benefits. The Disabilities Program personal assistants, on the other hand, have opted not to have union representation. By exercising that option, they have prevented collective bargaining and are not required to pay any fair share requirement. But because they are not subject to an agreement mandating fair share payments, we agree with the district court that the Disabilities Program plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe, and we lack jurisdiction to consider the complaint.
A claim is not ripe if it “rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed

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may not occur at all.” Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998)). The Disabilities Program plaintiffs complain of the same conduct as the Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs: that one of the unions and the State will enter into an agreement that will require all personal assistants to pay a fair share fee to support that union’s collective bargaining activity. But unlike the Rehabilitation Program, the Disabilities Program personal assistants have rejected union representation, and there is no certainty that the Disabilities Program personal assistants will ever unionize. Hence, the State has no representative to recognize and cannot agree to compel the plaintiffs to pay fair share fees at all. The plaintiffs’ claims are contingent on events that may never occur and thus are not ripe.
The plaintiffs argue that the very existence of the executive order committing the State to recognizing an exclusive union representative makes it significantly more likely that the plaintiffs will be forced to financially support that union’s speech. Thus, there is a reasonable probability of future harm to the plaintiffs’ constitutional interests, which the plaintiffs feel they should not have to spend resources to defeat. And they argue the courts can redress this harm by declaring that the plaintiffs may not be compelled to support a union, and by enjoining the State from enforcing its laws and executive orders in such a way that compels the plaintiffs to support a union.
But the plaintiffs do not allege that the mere existence of the executive order violates their rights, only that it

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makes such a violation more likely. Their argument thus confuses this increased likelihood of a future violation of their constitutional rights with the probabilistic future harm which is sufficient to meet the minimal injury-in-fact requirements of standing. The cases on which the plaintiffs rely stand only for the rule that a constitutional violation now may merely increase the likelihood of injury later. That would be a question of constitutional standing and inapplicable to the issue of ripeness we have before us. E.g., Southworth v. Board of Regents, 307 F.3d 566, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2002) (students had standing to challenge a facially unconstitutional system for allocating student fees); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2003) (candidates had standing to challenge unconstitutional regulation of political ads despite lack of enforcement); Mulhall v. UNITE Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2010) (employee had standing to challenge unlawful agreement to facilitate unionization despite possibility that it would never occur). This case is different because the only violations alleged by the plaintiffs may never occur.
The plaintiffs feel burdened fighting to prevent what they view as an unconstitutional collective bargaining agreement. But many individuals and organizations spend considerable resources fighting to prevent Congress or the state legislatures from adopting legislation that might violate the Constitution. The courts cannot judge a hypothetical future violation in this case any more than they can judge the validity of a not-yetenacted law, no matter how likely its passage. To do so would be to render an advisory opinion, which is

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precisely what the doctrine of ripeness helps to prevent. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[R]ipeness, when it implicates the possibility of this Court issuing an advisory opinion, is a question of subject matter jurisdiction under the case-or-controversy requirement.”).
The district court did err in one respect however. After holding that the Disabilities Program plaintiffs’ claims were not yet ripe, it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Generally, when a complaint is dismissed because it is not ripe (or because the plaintiffs lack standing, for that matter) it is dismissed without prejudice unless it appears beyond a doubt that there is no way the plaintiffs’ grievance could ever mature into justiciable claims. Chattanoga Mfg., Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 301 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that district court erred in dismissing counterclaims with prejudice because “[i]f a dispute ripens between the parties, [the counterclaimant] should have the opportunity to litigate its claims.”). If the Disabilities Program personal assistants ever do vote to unionize and enter an agreement with the State mandating fair share fees, the plaintiffs will have a ripe claim. Given our holding above, it may be that such a claim will not last long, but we will not prejudge the issue in this case. Therefore, we will remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the claims of the Disabilities Program plaintiffs without prejudice.

III.
For these reasons, we reject the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. The Disabilities Program plaintiffs do not

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allege that a constitutional violation has yet occurred. Thus, their claim is not ripe and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. But because the claim is unripe, it should be dismissed without prejudice, so we remand with instructions for the district court to correct the order of dismissal. The Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs do allege a justiciable claim, but we reject it on the narrow grounds that Supreme Court precedent permits the State, as a joint employer, to compel fair share fees in the interest of stable labor relations. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part with instructions.

9-1-11

 
 (Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2013

1

Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus
HARRIS ET AL. v. QUINN, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11–681. Argued January 21, 2014—Decided June 30, 2014
Illinois’ Home Services Program (Rehabilitation Program) allows Medicaid recipients who would normally need institutional care to hire a “personal assistant” (PA) to provide homecare services. Under State law, the homecare recipients (designated “customers”) and the State both play some role in the employment relationship with the PAs. Customers control most aspects of the employment relationship, including the hiring, firing, training, supervising, and disciplining of PAs; they also define the PA’s duties by proposing a “Service Plan.” Other than compensating PAs, the State’s involvement in employment matters is minimal. Its employer status was created by executive order, and later codified by the legislature, solely to permit PAs to join a labor union and engage in collective bargaining under Illinois’ Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA). Pursuant to this scheme, respondent SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana (SEIU–HII) was designated the exclusive union representative for Rehabilitation Program employees. The union entered into collective-bargaining agreements with the State that contained an agency-fee provision, which requires all bargaining unit members who do not wish to join the union to pay the union a fee for the cost of certain activities, including those tied to the collective-bargaining process. A group of Rehabilitation Program PAs brought a class action against SEIU–HII and other respondents in Federal District Court, claiming that the PLRA violated the First Amendment insofar as it authorized the agency-fee provision. The District Court dismissed their claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in relevant part, concluding that the PAs were state employees within the meaning of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209.

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Syllabus
Held: The First Amendment prohibits the collection of an agency fee from Rehabilitation Program PAs who do not want to join or support the union. Pp. 8–40. (a) In upholding the Illinois law’s constitutionality, the Seventh Circuit relied on Abood, which, in turn, relied on Railway Employes v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, and Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740. Unlike Abood, those cases involved private-sector collectivebargaining agreements. The Abood Court treated the First Amendment issue as largely settled by Hanson and Street and understood those cases to have upheld agency fees based on the desirability of “labor peace” and the problem of “ ‘free riders[hip].’ ” 431 U. S., 220– 222, 224. However, “preventing nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts” is a rationale “generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections,” Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. ___, ___, and in this respect, Abood is “something of an anomaly,” 567 U. S., at ___. The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several grounds. The First Amendment analysis in Hanson was thin, and Street was not a constitutional decision. And the Court fundamentally misunderstood Hanson’s narrow holding, which upheld the authorization, not imposition, of an agency fee. The Abood Court also failed to appreciate the distinction between core union speech in the public sector and core union speech in the private sector, as well as the conceptual difficulty in public-sector cases of distinguishing union expenditures for collective bargaining from those designed for political purposes. Nor does the Abood Court seem to have anticipated the administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify union expenditures as either chargeable or nonchargeable, see, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, or the practical problems that would arise from the heavy burden facing objecting nonmembers wishing to challenge the union’s actions. Finally, the Abood Court’s critical “labor peace” analysis rests on the unsupported empirical assumption that exclusive representation in the public sector depends on the right to collect an agency fee from nonmembers. Pp. 8–20. (b) Because of Abood’s questionable foundations, and because Illinois’ PAs are quite different from full-fledged public employees, this Court refuses to extend Abood to the situation here. Pp. 20–29. (1) PAs are much different from public employees. Unlike fullfledged public employees, PAs are almost entirely answerable to the customers and not to the State, do not enjoy most of the rights and benefits that inure to state employees, and are not indemnified by the State for claims against them arising from actions taken during the course of their employment. Even the scope of collective bargaining

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on their behalf is sharply limited. Pp. 20–25. (2) Abood’s rationale is based on the assumption that the union
possesses the full scope of powers and duties generally available under American labor law. Even the best argument for Abood’s anomalous approach is a poor fit here. What justifies the agency fee in the Abood context is the fact that the State compels the union to promote and protect the interests of nonmembers in “negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in settling disputes and processing grievances.” Lehnert, supra, at 556. That rationale has little application here, where Illinois law requires that all PAs receive the same rate of pay and the union has no authority with respect to a PA’s grievances against a customer. Pp. 25–27.
(3) Extending Abood’s boundaries to encompass partial public employees would invite problems. State regulations and benefits affecting such employees exist along a continuum, and it is unclear at what point, short of full-fledged public employment, Abood should apply. Under respondents’ view, a host of workers who currently receive payments from a government entity for some sort of service would become candidates for inclusion within Abood’s reach, and it would be hard to see where to draw the line. Pp. 27–29.
(c) Because Abood does not control here, generally applicable First Amendment standards apply. Thus, the agency-fee provision here must serve a “ ‘compelling state interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’ ” Knox, supra, at ___. None of the interests that respondents contend are furthered by the agency-fee provision is sufficient. Pp. 29–34.
(1) Their claim that the agency-fee provision promotes “labor peace” misses the point. Petitioners do not contend that they have a First Amendment right to form a rival union or that SEIU–HII has no authority to serve as the exclusive bargaining representative. This, along with examples from some federal agencies and many state laws, demonstrates that a union’s status as exclusive bargaining agent and the right to collect an agency fee from nonmembers are not inextricably linked. Features of the Illinois scheme—e.g., PAs do not work together in a common state facility and the union’s role is very restricted—further undermine the “labor peace” argument. Pp. 31–32.
(2) Respondents also argue that the agency-fee provision promotes the welfare of PAs, thereby contributing to the Rehabilitation Program’s success. Even assuming that SEIU–HII has been an effective advocate, the agency-fee provision cannot be sustained unless the union could not adequately advocate without the receipt of non-

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member agency fees. No such showing has been made. Pp. 32–34. (d) Respondents’ additional arguments for sustaining the Illinois
scheme are unconvincing. First, they urge the application of a balancing test derived from Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563. This Court has never viewed Abood and its progeny as based on Pickering balancing. And even assuming that Pickering applies, that case’s balancing test clearly tips in favor of the objecting employees’ First Amendment interests. Second, respondents err in contending that a refusal to extend Abood here will call into question this Court’s decisions in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, and Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, for those decisions fit comfortably within the framework applied here. Pp. 34–40. 656 F. 3d 692, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­ ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 11–681
_________________
PAMELA HARRIS, ET AL, PETITIONERS v. PAT QUINN, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 30, 2014]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the First Amendment permits a State to compel personal care providers to subsidize speech on matters of public concern by a union that they do not wish to join or support. We hold that it does not, and we therefore reverse the judg­ ment of the Court of Appeals.
I
A
Millions of Americans, due to age, illness, or injury, are unable to live in their own homes without assistance and are unable to afford the expense of in-home care. In order to prevent these individuals from having to enter a nurs­ ing home or other facility, the federal Medicaid program funds state-run programs that provide in-home services to individuals whose conditions would otherwise require institutionalization. See 42 U. S. C. §1396n(c)(1). A State that adopts such a program receives federal funds to compensate persons who attend to the daily needs of individuals needing in-home care. Ibid.; see also 42 CFR §§440.180, 441.300–441.310 (2013). Almost every State has established such a program. See Dept. of Health and

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Human Services, Understanding Medicaid Home and Community Services: A Primer (2010).
One of those States is Illinois, which has created the Illinois Department of Human Services Home Services Program, known colloquially as the state “Rehabilitation Program.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f ) (West 2012); 89 Ill. Admin. Code §676.10 (2007). “[D]esigned to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals who may instead be satisfactorily maintained at home at a lesser cost to the State,” §676.10(a), the Rehabilitation Program allows participants to hire a “personal assistant” who provides homecare services tailored to the individual’s needs. Many of these personal assistants are relatives of the person receiving care, and some of them provide care in their own homes. See App. 16–18.
Illinois law establishes an employer-employee relation­ ship between the person receiving the care and the person providing it. The law states explicitly that the person receiving home care—the “customer”—“shall be the em­ ployer of the [personal assistant].” 89 Ill. Admin. Code §676.30(b) (emphasis added). A “personal assistant” is defined as “an individual employed by the customer to provide . . . varied services that have been approved by the customer’s physician,” §676.30(p) (emphasis added), and the law makes clear that Illinois “shall not have control or input in the employment relationship between the cus­ tomer and the personal assistants.” §676.10(c).
Other provisions of the law emphasize the customer’s employer status. The customer “is responsible for control­ ling all aspects of the employment relationship between the customer and the [personal assistant (or PA)], includ­ ing, without limitation, locating and hiring the PA, train­ ing the PA, directing, evaluating and otherwise supervis­ ing the work performed by the personal assistant, imposing . . . disciplinary action against the PA, and ter­ minating the employment relationship between the cus­

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tomer and the PA.” §676.30(b).1 In general, the customer “has complete discretion in which Personal Assistant he/she wishes to hire.” §684.20(b).
A customer also controls the contents of the document, the Service Plan, that lists the services that the customer will receive. §684.10(a). No Service Plan may take effect without the approval of both the customer and the cus­ tomer’s physician. See §684.10, 684.40, 684.50, 684.75. Service Plans are highly individualized. The Illinois State Labor Relations Board noted in 1985 that “[t]here is no typical employment arrangement here, public or other­ wise; rather, there simply exists an arrangement whereby the state of Illinois pays individuals . . . to work under the direction and control of private third parties.” Illinois Dept. of Central Management Serv., No. S–RC–115, 2 PERI ¶2007, p. VIII–30, (1985), superseded, 2003 Ill. Laws p. 1929.
While customers exercise predominant control over their employment relationship with personal assistants, the State, subsidized by the federal Medicaid program, pays the personal assistants’ salaries. The amount paid varies depending on the services provided, but as a general mat­ ter, it “corresponds to the amount the State would expect to pay for the nursing care component of institutionaliza­ tion if the individual chose institutionalization.” 89 Ill. Admin. Code §679.50(a).
——————
1 Although this regulation states clearly that a customer has complete discretion with respect to hiring and firing a personal assistant, the dissent contends that the State also has the authority to end the employment of a personal assistant whose performance is not satisfac­ tory. Nothing in the regulations supports this view. Under 89 Ill. Admin. Code §677.40(d), the State may stop paying a personal assistant if it is found that the assistant does not meet “the standards estab­ lished by DHS as found at 89 Ill. Adm. Code 686.” These standards are the basic hiring requirements set out in §686.10, see n. 2, infra. Provid­ ing adequate performance after hiring is nowhere mentioned in §686.10.

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Other than providing compensation, the State’s role is comparatively small. The State sets some basic threshold qualifications for employment. See §§686.10(h)(1)–(10).2 (For example, a personal assistant must have a Social Security number, must possess basic communication skills, and must complete an employment agreement with the customer. §§686.10, 686.20, 686.40.) The State man­ dates an annual performance review by the customer, helps the customer conduct that review, and mediates disagreements between customers and their personal assistants. §686.30. The State suggests certain duties that personal assistants should assume, such as perform­ ing “household tasks,” “shopping,” providing “personal care,” performing “incidental health care tasks,” and “monitoring to ensure the health and safety of the cus­ tomer.” §686.20. In addition, a state employee must “identify the appropriate level of service provider” “based on the customer’s approval of the initial Service Plan,” §684.20(a) (emphasis added), and must sign each customer’s Service Plan. §684.10.
B Section 6 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) authorizes state employees to join labor unions and to bargain collectively on the terms and conditions of
——————
2 It is true, as the dissent notes, post, at 4, that a personal assistant must provide two written or oral references, see §686.10(c), but judging the adequacy of these references is the sole prerogative of the customer. See §676.30(b). And while the regulations say that an applicant must have either previous experience or training, see §686.10(f ), they also provide that a customer has complete discretion to judge the adequacy of training and prior experience. See §684.20(b) (the customer has complete discretion with respect to hiring and training a personal assistant). See also §686.10(b) (the customer may hire a minor—even under some circumstances, a person as young as 14); §686.10(f ) (the customer may hire a personal assistant who was never previously employed so long as the assistant has adequate training); §684.20(b) (criminal record check not required).

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employment. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, §315/6(a). This law applies to “[e]mployees of the State and any political sub­ division of the State,” subject to certain exceptions, and it provides for a union to be recognized if it is “designated by the [Public Labor Relations] Board as the representative of the majority of public employees in an appropriate unit . . . .” §§315/6(a), (c).
The PLRA contains an agency-fee provision, i.e., a provi­ sion under which members of a bargaining unit who do not wish to join the union are nevertheless required to pay a fee to the union. See Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U. S. 407, 409, n. 1 (1976). Labeled a “fair share” provision, this section of the PLRA provides: “When a collective bargain­ ing agreement is entered into with an exclusive repre­ sentative, it may include in the agreement a provision requiring employees covered by the agreement who are not members of the organization to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the collective-bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment.” §315/6(e). This payment is “deducted by the employer from the earn­ ings of the nonmember employees and paid to the employee organization.” Ibid.
In the 1980’s, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) petitioned the Illinois Labor Relations Board for permission to represent personal assistants employed by customers in the Rehabilitation Program, but the board rebuffed this effort. Illinois Dept. of Central Management Servs., supra, at VIII–30. The board con­ cluded that “it is clear . . . that [Illinois] does not exercise the type of control over the petitioned-for employees nec­ essary to be considered, in the collective bargaining con­ text envisioned by the [PLRA], their ‘employer’ or, at least, their sole employer.” Ibid.
In March 2003, however, Illinois’ newly elected Gover­ nor, Rod Blagojevich, circumvented this decision by issu­

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ing Executive Order 2003–08. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a–47a. The order noted the Illinois Labor Relations Board decision but nevertheless called for state recogni­ tion of a union as the personal assistants’ exclusive repre­ sentative for the purpose of collective bargaining with the State. This was necessary, Gov. Blagojevich declared, so that the State could “receive feedback from the personal assistants in order to effectively and efficiently deliver home services.” Id., at 46a. Without such representation, the Governor proclaimed, personal assistants “cannot effectively voice their concerns about the organization of the Home Services program, their role in the program, or the terms and conditions of their employment under the Program.” Ibid.
Several months later, the Illinois Legislature codified that executive order by amending the PLRA. Pub. Act no. 93–204, §5, 2003 Ill. Laws p. 1930. While acknowledging “the right of the persons receiving services . . . to hire and fire personal assistants or supervise them,” the Act de­ clared personal assistants to be “public employees” of the State of Illinois—but “[s]olely for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f ). The statute emphasized that personal assistants are not state employees for any other purpose, “including but not limited to, purposes of vicari­ ous liability in tort and purposes of statutory retirement or health insurance benefits.” Ibid.
Following a vote, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana (SEIU–HII) was designated as the personal assistants’ exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargain­ ing. See App. 23. The union and the State subsequently entered into collective-bargaining agreements that require all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a “fair share” of the union dues. Id., at 24–25. These payments are deducted directly from the personal assis­ tants’ Medicaid payments. Ibid. The record in this case

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shows that each year, personal assistants in Illinois pay SEIU–HII more than $3.6 million in fees. Id., at 25.
C
Three of the petitioners in the case now before us— Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, and Stephanie Yencer­ Price—are personal assistants under the Rehabilitation Program. They all provide in-home services to family members or other individuals suffering from disabilities.3 Susan Watts, for example, serves as personal assistant for her daughter, who requires constant care due to quadri­ plegic cerebral palsy and other conditions. See App. 18.
In 2010, these petitioners filed a putative class action on behalf of all Rehabilitation Program personal assistants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See 656 F. 3d 692, 696 (CA7 2011). Their complaint, which named the Governor and the union as defendants, sought an injunction against enforcement of the fair-share provision and a declaration that the Illinois PLRA violates the First Amendment insofar as it requires personal assistants to pay a fee to a union that they do not wish to support. Ibid.
The District Court dismissed their claims with preju­ dice, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in relevant part, concluding that the case was controlled by this Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. 431 U. S. 209 (1977). 656 F. 3d, at 698. The Seventh Circuit held that Illinois and the customers who receive in-home care are “joint employers” of the personal assistants, and the court stated that it had “no difficulty concluding that the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of Abood.” Ibid.
Petitioners sought certiorari. Their petition pointed out
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3 The other five petitioners are personal assistants under a similar Illinois program called the “Disabilities Program.” See, infra, at 39–40, and n. 30.

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Opinion of the Court
that other States were following Illinois’ lead by enacting laws or issuing executive orders that deem personal assis­ tants to be state employees for the purpose of unionization and the assessment of fair-share fees. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Petitioners also noted that Illinois has enacted a law that deems “individual maintenance home health workers”—a category that includes registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and certain therapists who work in private homes—to be “public employees” for similar purposes. Ill. Pub. Act no. 97–1158, 2012 Ill. Laws p. 7823.
In light of the important First Amendment questions these laws raise, we granted certiorari. 570 U. S. ___ (2013).
II
In upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit relied on this Court’s decision in Abood supra, which held that state employees who choose not to join a public-sector union may nevertheless be compelled to pay an agency fee to support union work that is related to the collective-bargaining process. Id., at 235–236. Two Terms ago, in Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. ___ (2012), we pointed out that Abood is “something of an anomaly.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). “ ‘The primary purpose’ of permitting unions to collect fees from non­ members,” we noted, “is ‘to prevent nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing the employment benefits obtained by the union’s collective bargaining without sharing the costs incurred.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (quoting Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, 181 (2007)). But “[s]uch free-rider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First Amend­ ment objections.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10–11).
For this reason, Abood stands out, but the State of Illinois now asks us to sanction what amounts to a very

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Opinion of the Court
significant expansion of Abood—so that it applies, not just to full-fledged public employees, but also to others who are deemed to be public employees solely for the purpose of unionization and the collection of an agency fee. Faced with this argument, we begin by examining the path that led to this Court’s decision in Abood.
A
The starting point was Railway Employes v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956), a case in which the First Amend­ ment was barely mentioned. The dispute in Hanson re­ sulted from an amendment to the Railway Labor Act (RLA). Id., at 229, 232. As originally enacted in 1926, the Act did not permit a collective-bargaining agreement to require employees to join or make any payments to a union. See Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 750 (1961). At that time and for many years thereafter, there was “a strong and long-standing tradition of voluntary unionism on the part of the standard rail unions.” Ibid.
Eventually, however, the view of the unions changed. See id., at 760–761. The RLA’s framework for resolving labor disputes “is more complex than that of any other industry,” id., at 755, and amendments enacted in 1934 increased the financial burden on unions by creating the 36-member National Railroad Adjustment Board, one-half of whose members were appointed and paid by the unions. Id., at 759–760. In seeking authorization to enter into union-shop agreements, i.e., agreements requiring all employees to join a union and thus pay union dues, see Oil Workers, 426 U. S., at 409, n. 1, the unions’ principal argument “was based on their role in this regulatory framework.” Street, 367 U. S., at 761. A union spokesman argued that the financial burdens resulting from the Act’s unique and complex scheme justified union-shop provi­ sions in order to provide the unions with needed dues. Ibid.

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These arguments were successful, and the Act was amended in 1951 to permit a railroad and a union to enter into an agreement containing a union-shop provision. This amendment brought the Act into conflict with the laws of States that guaranteed the “right to work” and thereby outlawed the union shop. Nebraska, the setting of Hanson, was one such State. 351 U. S., at 228.
In Hanson, the Union Pacific Railroad Company and its unionized workers entered into a collective-bargaining agreement that contained a provision requiring employ­ ees, “as a condition of their continued employment,” to join and remain members of the union. Id., at 227. Employees who did not want to join the union brought suit in state court, contending that the union-shop provision violated a provision of the Nebraska Constitution banning adverse employment actions “ ‘because of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization.’ ” Id., at 228 (quoting Neb. Const., Art. XV, §13). The employer countered that the RLA trumped the Nebraska provision, but the Nebraska courts agreed with the employees and struck down the union-shop agreement.
When the case reached this Court, the primary issue was whether the provision of the RLA that authorized union-shop agreements was “germane to the exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.” 351 U. S., at 234– 235. In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that this provision represented a permissible regulation of commerce. The Court reasoned that the challenged provi­ sion “ ‘stabilized labor-management relations’ ” and thus furthered “ ‘industrial peace.’ ” Id., at 233–234.
The employees also raised what amounted to a facial constitutional challenge to the same provision of the RLA. The employees claimed that a “union shop agreement forces men into ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought protected by the Bill

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Opinion of the Court
of Rights.” Id., at 236. But because the lawsuit had been filed shortly after the collective-bargaining agreement was approved, the record contained no evidence that the union had actually engaged in political or ideological activities.4
The Hanson Court dismissed the objecting employees’ First Amendment argument with a single sentence. The Court wrote: “On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar.” Id., at 238.
This explanation was remarkable for two reasons. First, the Court had never previously held that compulsory membership in and the payment of dues to an integrated bar was constitutional, and the constitutionality of such a requirement was hardly a foregone conclusion. Indeed, that issue did not reach the Court until five years later, and it produced a plurality opinion and four separate writings. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 (1961) (plurality opinion).5
Second, in his Lathrop dissent, Justice Douglas, the author of Hanson, came to the conclusion that the First Amendment did not permit compulsory membership in an integrated bar. See 367 U. S., at 878–880. The analogy drawn in Hanson, he wrote, fails. “Once we approve this measure,” he warned, “we sanction a device where men and women in almost any profession or calling can be at

——————
4 The employees’ First Amendment claim necessarily raised the ques­ tion of governmental action, since the First Amendment does not restrict private conduct, and the Hanson Court, in a brief passage, concluded that governmental action was present. This was so, the Court reasoned, because the union-shop provision of the RLA took away a right that employees had previously enjoyed under state law. 351 U. S., at 232–233.
5 A related question arose in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990), which we discuss infra, at 37–38.

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least partially regimented behind causes which they op­ pose.” 367 U. S., at 884. He continued:
“I look on the Hanson case as a narrow exception to be closely confined. Unless we so treat it, we practically give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional people into goose-stepping brigades. Those brigades are not compatible with the First Amendment.” Id., at 884–885 (footnote omitted).
The First Amendment analysis in Hanson was thin, and the Court’s resulting First Amendment holding was nar­ row. As the Court later noted, “all that was held in Han­ son was that [the RLA] was constitutional in its bare authorization of union-shop contracts requiring workers to give ‘financial support’ to unions legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents.” Street, 367 U. S., at 749 (emphasis added). The Court did not suggest that “industrial peace” could justify a law that “forces men into ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought,” or a law that forces a person to “con­ form to [a union’s] ideology.” Hanson, supra, at 236–237. The RLA did not compel such results, and the record in Hanson did not show that this had occurred.
B
Five years later, in Street, supra, the Court considered another case in which workers objected to a union shop. Employees of the Southern Railway System raised a First Amendment challenge, contending that a substantial part of the money that they were required to pay to the union was used to support political candidates and causes with which they disagreed. A Georgia court enjoined the en­ forcement of the union-shop provision and entered judg­ ment for the dissenting employees in the amount of the payments that they had been forced to make to the union.

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The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Id., at 742–745. Reviewing the State Supreme Court’s decision, this
Court recognized that the case presented constitutional questions “of the utmost gravity,” id., at 749, but the Court found it unnecessary to reach those questions. Instead, the Court construed the RLA “as not vesting the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted money.” Id., at 768. Specifically, the Court held, the Act “is to be construed to deny the unions, over an employee’s objec­ tion, the power to use his exacted funds to support politi­ cal causes which he opposes.” Id., at 768–769.
Having construed the RLA to contain this restriction, the Street Court then went on to discuss the remedies available for employees who objected to the use of union funds for political causes. The Court suggested two: The dissenting employees could be given a refund of the por­ tion of their dues spent by the union for political or ideo­ logical purposes, or they could be given a refund of the portion spent on those political purposes that they had advised the union they disapproved.6 Id., at 774–775.
Justice Black, writing in dissent, objected to the Court’s suggested remedies, and he accurately predicted that the Court’s approach would lead to serious practical problems. Id., at 796–797. That approach, he wrote, while “very lucrative to special masters, accountants and lawyers,” would do little for “the individual workers whose First Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated.” Id., at 796. He concluded:
“Unions composed of a voluntary membership, like all other voluntary groups, should be free in this country to fight in the public forum to advance their own
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6 Only four Justices fully agreed with this approach, but a fifth, Jus­ tice Douglas, went along due to “the practical problem of mustering five Justices for a judgment in this case.” Id., at 778–779 (concurring opinion).

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causes, to promote their choice of candidates and par­ ties and to work for the doctrines or the laws they fa­ vor. But to the extent that Government steps in to force people to help espouse the particular causes of a group, that group—whether composed of railroad workers or lawyers—loses its status as a voluntary group.” Ibid.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, also dissented, arguing that the Court’s remedy was conceptu­ ally flawed because a union may further the objectives of members by political means. See id., at 813–815. He noted, for example, that reports from the AFL–CIO Execu­ tive Council “emphasize that labor’s participation in urg­ ing legislation and candidacies is a major one.” Id., at 813. In light of “the detailed list of national and international problems on which the AFL–CIO speaks,” he opined, “it seems rather naive” to believe “that economic and political concerns are separable.” Id., at 814.
C
This brings us to Abood, which, unlike Hanson and Street, involved a public-sector collective-bargaining agreement. The Detroit Federation of Teachers served “as the exclusive representative of teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education.” 431 U. S., at 211–212. The collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the board contained an agency-shop clause requiring every teacher to “pay the Union a service charge equal to the regular dues required of Union members.” Id., at 212. A putative class of teachers sued to invalidate this clause. Asserting that “they opposed collective bargaining in the public sector,” the plaintiffs argued that “ ‘a substantial part’ ” of their dues would be used to fund union “ ‘activi­ ties and programs which are economic, political, profes­ sional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no voice.’ ”

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Id., at 212–213. This Court treated the First Amendment issue as largely
settled by Hanson and Street. 431 U. S., at 217, 223. The Court acknowledged that Street was resolved as a matter of statutory construction without reaching any constitutional issues, 431 U. S., at 220, and the Court recognized that forced membership and forced contribu­ tions impinge on free speech and associational rights, id., at 223. But the Court dismissed the objecting teachers’ constitutional arguments with this observation: “[T]he judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.” Id., at 222.
The Abood Court understood Hanson and Street to have upheld union-shop agreements in the private sector based on two primary considerations: the desirability of “labor peace” and the problem of “ ‘free riders[hip].’ ” 431 U. S., at 220–222, 224.
The Court thought that agency-shop provisions promote labor peace because the Court saw a close link between such provisions and the “principle of exclusive union rep­ resentation.” Id., at 220. This principle, the Court ex­ plained, “prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization.” Id., at 220–221. In addition, the Court noted, the “designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment.” Id., at 220. And the Court pointed out that exclusive representation “frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single union to reach agree­ ments and settlements that are not subject to attack from

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rival labor organizations.” Id., at 221. Turning to the problem of free ridership, Abood noted
that a union must “ ‘fairly and equitably . . . represent all employees’ ” regardless of union membership, and the Court wrote as follows: The “union-shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’ to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation.” Id., at 221–222.
The plaintiffs in Abood argued that Hanson and Street should not be given much weight because they did not arise in the public sector, and the Court acknowledged that public-sector bargaining is different from private­ sector bargaining in some notable respects. 431 U. S., at 227–228. For example, although public and private em­ ployers both desire to keep costs down, the Court recog­ nized that a public employer “lacks an important disci­ pline against agreeing to increases in labor costs that in a market system would require price increases.” Id., at 228. The Court also noted that “decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process” undertaken by people “ultimately responsible to the electorate.” Ibid. Thus, whether a public employer accedes to a union’s demands, the Court wrote, “will depend upon a blend of political ingredients,” thereby giving public employees “more influence in the decisionmaking process that is possessed by employees similarly organized in the private sector.” Ibid. But despite these acknowledged differences between private- and public-sector bargaining, the Court treated Hanson and Street as essentially controlling.
Instead of drawing a line between the private and public sectors, the Abood Court drew a line between, on the one hand, a union’s expenditures for “collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment pur­ poses,” 431 U. S., at 232, and, on the other, expenditures

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for political or ideological purposes. Id., at 236.
D
The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several grounds. Some of these were noted or apparent at or before the time of the decision, but several have become more evident and troubling in the years since then.
The Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and Street as having all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-sector union. As we have explained, Street was not a constitutional decision at all, and Hanson disposed of the critical question in a single, unsupported sentence that its author essentially aban­ doned a few years later. Surely a First Amendment issue of this importance deserved better treatment.
The Abood Court fundamentally misunderstood the holding in Hanson, which was really quite narrow. As the Court made clear in Street, “all that was held in Hanson was that [the RLA] was constitutional in its bare authori­ zation of union-shop contracts requiring workers to give ‘financial support’ to unions legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents.” 367 U. S., at 749 (emphasis added). In Abood, on the other hand, the State of Michigan did more than simply authorize the imposition of an agency fee. A state instrumentality, the Detroit Board of Education, actually imposed that fee. This pre­ sented a very different question.
Abood failed to appreciate the difference between the core union speech involuntarily subsidized by dissenting public-sector employees and the core union speech invol­ untarily funded by their counterparts in the private sec­ tor. In the public sector, core issues such as wages, pen­ sions, and benefits are important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private sector. In the years since Abood, as state and local expenditures on employee wages and benefits have mushroomed, the importance of the

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difference between bargaining in the public and private sectors has been driven home.7
Abood failed to appreciate the conceptual difficulty of distinguishing in public-sector cases between union ex­ penditures that are made for collective-bargaining pur­ poses and those that are made to achieve political ends. In the private sector, the line is easier to see. Collective bargaining concerns the union’s dealings with the employer; political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government. But in the public sector, both collective­ bargaining and political advocacy and lobbying are di­ rected at the government.
Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify public-sector union expenditures as either “chargeable” (in Abood’s terms, expenditures for “collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes,” id., at 232) or nonchargeable (i.e., expenditures for political or ideological purposes, id., at 236). In the years since Abood, the Court has strug­ gled repeatedly with this issue. See Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435 (1984); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U. S. 292 (1986); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991); Locke v. Karass, 555 U. S. 207 (2009). In Lehnert, the Court held that “chargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allow­ ance of an agency or union shop.” 500 U. S., at 519. But as noted in JUSTICE SCALIA’s dissent in that case, “each
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7 Recent experience has borne out this concern. See DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, National Affairs No. 5, p. 15 (2010) (“In Illinois, for example, public-sector unions have helped create a situation in which the state’s pension funds report a liability of more than $100 billion, at least 50% of it unfunded”).

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one of the three ‘prongs’ of the test involves a substantial judgment call (What is ‘germane’? What is ‘justified’? What is a ‘significant’ additional burden).” Id., at 551 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Abood likewise did not foresee the practical problems that would face objecting nonmembers. Employees who suspect that a union has improperly put certain expenses in the “germane” category must bear a heavy burden if they wish to challenge the union’s actions. “[T]he onus is on the employees to come up with the resources to mount the legal challenge in a timely fashion,” Knox, 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19) (citing Lehnert, supra, at 513), and litigating such cases is expensive. Because of the open­ ended nature of the Lehnert test, classifying particular categories of expenses may not be straightforward. See Jibson v. Michigan Ed. Assn.–NEA, 30 F. 3d 723, 730 (CA6 1994)). And although Hudson required that a un­ ion’s books be audited, auditors do not themselves review the correctness of a union’s categorization. See Knox, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 18–19) (citing Andrews v. Educa­ tion Assn. of Cheshire, 829 F. 2d 335, 340 (CA2 1987)). See also American Federation of Television and Recording Artists, Portland Local, 327 N. L. R. B. 474, 477 (1999) (“It is settled that determinations concerning whether particu­ lar expenditures are chargeable are legal determinations which are outside the expertise of the auditor. Thus, as we have stated, the function of the auditor is to verify that the expenditures that the union claims it made were in fact made for the purposes claimed, not to pass on the correctness of the union’s allocation of expenditures to the chargeable and nonchargeable categories”); California Saw and Knife Works, 320 N. L. R. B. 224, 241 (1995) (“We first agree [that the company at issue] did not violate its duty of fair representation by failing to use an independ­ ent auditor to determine the allocation of chargeable and

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nonchargeable expenditures”); Price v. International Un­ ion, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 927 F. 2d 88, 93–94 (CA2 1991) (“Hudson requires only that the usual function of an auditor be performed, i.e., to determine that the expenses claimed were in fact made. That function does not require that the auditor make a legal decision as to the appropriateness of the allocation of expenses to the chargeable and non­ chargeable categories”).
Finally, a critical pillar of the Abood Court’s analysis rests on an unsupported empirical assumption, namely, that the principle of exclusive representation in the public sector is dependent on a union or agency shop. As we will explain, see infra, at 31–34, this assumption is unwar­ ranted.
III A
Despite all this, the State of Illinois now asks us to approve a very substantial expansion of Abood’s reach. Abood involved full-fledged public employees, but in this case, the status of the personal assistants is much differ­ ent. The Illinois Legislature has taken pains to specify that personal assistants are public employees for one purpose only: collective bargaining. For all other pur­ poses, Illinois regards the personal assistants as private­ sector employees. This approach has important practical consequences.
For one thing, the State’s authority with respect to these two groups is vastly different. In the case of full-fledged public employees, the State establishes all of the duties imposed on each employee, as well as all of the qualifica­ tions needed for each position. The State vets applicants and chooses the employees to be hired. The State provides or arranges for whatever training is needed, and it super­ vises and evaluates the employees’ job performance and

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imposes corrective measures if appropriate. If a state employee’s performance is deficient, the State may dis­ charge the employee in accordance with whatever proce­ dures are required by law.
With respect to the personal assistants involved in this case, the picture is entirely changed. The job duties of personal assistants are specified in their individualized Service Plans, which must be approved by the customer and the customer’s physician. 89 Ill. Admin. Code §684.10. Customers have complete discretion to hire any personal assistant who meets the meager basic qualifica­ tions that the State prescribes in §686.10. See §676.30(b) (the customer “is responsible for controlling all aspects of the employment relationship between the customer and the [personal assistant], including, without limitation, locating and hiring the [personal assistant]” (emphasis added)); §684.20(b) (“complete discretion in which Personal Assistant [the customer] wishes to hire” subject to baseline eligibility requirements).
Customers supervise their personal assistants on a daily basis, and no provision of the Illinois statute or imple­ menting regulations gives the State the right to enter the home in which the personal assistant is employed for the purpose of checking on the personal assistant’s job per­ formance. Cf. §676.20(b) (customer controls “without limitation . . . supervising the work performed by the [personal assistant], imposing . . . disciplinary action against the [personal assistant]”). And while state law mandates an annual review of each personal assistant’s work, that evaluation is also controlled by the customer. §§686.10(k), 686.30. A state counselor is assigned to assist the customer in performing the review but has no power to override the customer’s evaluation. See ibid. Nor do the regulations empower the State to discharge a personal assistant for substandard performance. See n. 1, supra. Discharge, like hiring, is entirely in the hands of the cus­

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tomer. See §676.30. Consistent with this scheme, under which personal
assistants are almost entirely answerable to the customers and not to the State, Illinois withholds from personal assistants most of the rights and benefits enjoyed by full­ fledged state employees. As we have noted already, state law explicitly excludes personal assistants from statutory retirement and health insurance benefits. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f ). It also excludes personal assistants from group life insurance and certain other employee benefits provided under the State Employees Group In­ surance Act of 1971. Ibid. (“Personal assistants shall not be covered by the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971”). And the State “does not provide paid vacation, holiday, or sick leave” to personal assistants. 89 Ill. Ad­ min. Code §686.10(h)(7).
Personal assistants also appear to be ineligible for a host of benefits under a variety of other state laws, includ­ ing the State Employee Vacation Time Act (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, §360/1); the State Employee Health Savings Account Law (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, §377/10–1); the State Employee Job Sharing Act (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, §380/0.01); the State Employee Indemnification Act (see Ill. Stat., ch. 5, §350/2); and the Sick Leave Bank Act. See Ill. Stat., ch. 5, §400/1. Personal assistants are apparently not entitled to the protection that the Illinois Whistleblower Act provides for full-fledged state employees. See Ill. Stat., ch. 740, §174/1. And it likewise appears that personal assistants are shut out of many other state employee programs and benefits. The Illinois Department of Central Management Services lists many such programs and benefits, including a de­ ferred compensation program, full worker’s compensation privileges,8 behavioral health programs, a program that
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8 Under §686.10(h)(9), a personal assistant “may apply for Workers' Compensation benefits through [the State] . . . however, . . . the cus­

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allows state employees to retain health insurance for a time after leaving state employment, a commuter savings program, dental and vision programs, and a flexible spending program.9 All of these programs and benefits appear to fall within the provision of the Rehabilitation Program declaring that personal assistants are not state employees for “any purposes” other than collective bar­ gaining. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f ).
Just as the State denies personal assistants most of the rights and benefits enjoyed by full-fledged state workers, the State does not assume responsibility for actions taken by personal assistants during the course of their employ­ ment. The governing statute explicitly disclaims “vicari­ ous liability in tort.” Ibid. So if a personal assistant steals from a customer, neglects a customer, or abuses a customer, the State washes its hands.
Illinois deems personal assistants to be state employees for one purpose only, collective bargaining,10 but the scope of bargaining that may be conducted on their behalf is sharply limited. Under the governing Illinois statute, collective bargaining can occur only for “terms and condi­ tions of employment that are within the State’s control.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f ). That is not very much.
As an illustration, consider the subjects of mandatory bargaining under federal and state labor law that are out

——————
tomer, not DHS, is the employer for these purposes.” 9 See www2.illinois.gov/cms/Employees/benefits/StateEmployee/Pages/
default. 10 What is significant is not the label that the State assigns to the
personal assistants but the substance of their relationship to the customers and the State. Our decision rests in no way on state-law labels. Cf. post, at 10. Indeed, it is because the First Amendment’s meaning does not turn on state-law labels that we refuse to allow the state to make a nonemployee a full-fledged employee “[s]olely for purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act,” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f), through the use of a statutory label.

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of bounds when it comes to personal assistants. Under federal law, mandatory subjects include the days of the week and the hours of the day during which an employee must work,11 lunch breaks,12 holidays,13 vacations,14 ter­ mination of employment,15 and changes in job duties.16 Illinois law similarly makes subject to mandatory collective­ bargaining decisions concerning the “hours and terms and conditions of employment.” Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 181 Ill. 2d 191, 201, 692 N. E. 2d 295, 301 (1998); see also, e.g., Aurora Sergeants Assn., 24 PERI ¶25 (2008) (holding that days of the week worked by police officers is subject to mandatory collective bargaining). But under the Rehabilitation Program, all these topics are governed by the Service Plan, with respect to which the union has no role. See §676.30(b) (the customer “is re­ sponsible for controlling all aspects of the employment relationship between the customer and the PA, including, without limitation, locating and hiring the PA, training the PA, directing, evaluating, and otherwise supervising the work performed by the PA, imposing . . . disciplinary action against the PA, and terminating the employment relationship between the customer and the PA”); §684.50 (the Service Plan must specify “the frequency with which the specific tasks are to be provided” and “the number of hours each task is to be provided per month”).
B 1
The unusual status of personal assistants has important

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11 See Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676 (1965). 12 See In re National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N. L. R. B. 905 (1948). 13 See In re Singer Manufacturing Co., 24 N. L. R. B. 444 (1940). 14 See Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F. 2d 180 (CA4 1942). 15 See N. K. Parker Transport, Inc., 332 N. L. R. B. 547, 551 (2000). 16 See St. John’s Hospital, 281 N. L. R. B. 1163, 1168 (1986).

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implications for present purposes. Abood’s rationale, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, is based on the assumption that the union possesses the full scope of powers and duties generally available under American labor law. Under the Illinois scheme now before us, how­ ever, the union’s powers and duties are sharply circum­ scribed, and as a result, even the best argument for the “extraordinary power” that Abood allows a union to wield, see Davenport, 551 U. S., at 184, is a poor fit.
In our post-Abood cases involving public-sector agency­ fee issues, Abood has been a given, and our task has been to attempt to understand its rationale and to apply it in a way that is consistent with that rationale. In that vein, Abood’s reasoning has been described as follows. The mere fact that nonunion members benefit from union speech is not enough to justify an agency fee because “private speech often furthers the interests of nonspeak­ ers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for.” Lehnert, 500 U. S., at 556 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). What justifies the agency fee, the argument goes, is the fact that the State compels the union to promote and protect the interests of nonmembers. Ibid. Specifically, the union must not discriminate be­ tween members and nonmembers in “negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in settling dis­ putes and processing grievances.” Ibid. This means that the union “cannot, for example, negotiate particularly high wage increases for its members in exchange for accepting no increases for others.” Ibid. And it has the duty to provide equal and effective representation for nonmem­ bers in grievance proceedings, see Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 5, §§315/6, 315/8, an undertaking that can be very involved. See, e.g., SEIU: Member Resources, available at www.seiu.or /a/members /disputes-and-grievances-rights­ procedures-and-best-practices.php (detailing the steps

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involved in adjusting grievances). This argument has little force in the situation now
before us. Illinois law specifies that personal assistants “shall be paid at the hourly rate set by law,” see 89 Ill. Admin. Code §686.40(a), and therefore the union cannot be in the position of having to sacrifice higher pay for its members in order to protect the nonmembers whom it is obligated to represent. And as for the adjustment of grievances, the union’s authority and responsibilities are narrow, as we have seen. The union has no authority with respect to any grievances that a personal assistant may have with a customer, and the customer has virtually complete control over a personal assistant’s work.
The union’s limited authority in this area has important practical implications. Suppose, for example that a cus­ tomer fires a personal assistant because the customer wrongly believes that the assistant stole a fork. Or sup­ pose that a personal assistant is discharged because the assistant shows no interest in the customer’s favorite daytime soaps. Can the union file a grievance on behalf of the assistant? The answer is no.
It is true that Illinois law requires a collective­ bargaining agreement to “contain a grievance resolution procedure which shall apply to all employees in the bar­ gaining unit,” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, §315/8, but in the situation here, this procedure appears to relate solely to any grievance that a personal assistant may have with the State,17 not with the customer for whom the personal
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17 Under the current collective-bargaining agreement, a “grievance” is “a dispute regarding the meaning or implementation of a specific provision brought by the Union or a Personal Assistant.” App. 51; see also id., at 51–54. “Neither the Union nor the Personal Assistant can grieve the hiring or termination of the Personal Assistant, reduction in the number of hours worked by the Personal Assistant or assigned to the Customer, and/or any action taken by the Customer.” Id., at 51. That apparently limits the union’s role in grievance adjustments to the

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Opinion of the Court
assistant works.18
2
Because of Abood’s questionable foundations, and be­ cause the personal assistants are quite different from full­ fledged public employees, we refuse to extend Abood to the new situation now before us.19 Abood itself has clear boundaries; it applies to public employees. Extending those boundaries to encompass partial-public employees, quasi-public employees, or simply private employees
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State’s failure to perform its duties under the collective-bargaining agreement, e.g., if the State were to issue an incorrect paycheck, the union could bring a grievance. See id., at 48
18 Contrary to the dissent’s argument, post, at 10–11, the scope of the union’s bargaining authority has an important bearing on the question whether Abood should be extended to the situation now before us. As we have explained, the best argument that can be mounted in support of Abood is based on the fact that a union, in serving as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a bargaining unit, is required by law to engage in certain activities that benefit nonmembers and that the union would not undertake if it did not have a legal obligation to do so. But where the law withholds from the union the authority to engage in most of those activities, the argument for Abood is weakened. Here, the dissent does not claim that the union’s approach to negotia­ tions on wages or benefits would be any different if it were not required to negotiate on behalf of the nonmembers as well as members. And there is no dispute that the law does not require the union to undertake the burden of representing personal assistants with respect to their grievances with customers; on the contrary, the law entirely excludes the union from that process. The most that the dissent can identify is the union’s obligation to represent nonmembers regarding grievances with the State, but since most aspects of the personal assistants’ work is controlled entirely by the customers, this obligation is relatively slight. It bears little resemblance to the obligation imposed on the union in Abood.
19 It is therefore unnecessary for us to reach petitioners’ argument that Abood should be overruled, and the dissent’s extended discussion of stare decisis is beside the point. Cf. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148, 164–166 (2008) (declining to extend the “implied” right of action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act “beyond its present boundaries”).

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would invite problems. Consider a continuum, ranging, on the one hand, from full-fledged state employees to, on the other hand, individuals who follow a common calling and benefit from advocacy or lobbying conducted by a group to which they do not belong and pay no dues. A State may not force every person who benefits from this group’s efforts to make payments to the group. See Lehnert, 500 U. S., at 556 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). But what if regula­ tion of this group is increased? What if the Federal Gov­ ernment or a State begins to provide or increases subsidies in this area? At what point, short of the point at which the individuals in question become full-fledged state em­ ployees, should Abood apply?
If respondents’ and the dissent’s views were adopted, a host of workers who receive payments from a governmen­ tal entity for some sort of service would be candidates for inclusion within Abood’s reach. Medicare-funded home health employees may be one such group. See Brief for Petitioners 51; 42 U. S. C. §1395x(m); 42 CFR §424.22(a). The same goes for adult foster care providers in Oregon (Ore. Rev. Stat. §443.733 (2013)) and Washington (Wash. Rev. Code §41.56.029 (2012)) and certain workers under the federal Child Care and Development Fund programs (45 CFR §98.2).
If we allowed Abood to be extended to those who are not full-fledged public employees, it would be hard to see just where to draw the line,20 and we therefore confine Abood’s
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20 The dissent suggests that the concept of joint employment already supplies a clear line of demarcation, see post, at 8–9, but absent a clear statutory definition, employer status is generally determined based on a variety of factors that often do not provide a clear answer. See generally 22 Illinois Jurisprudence: Labor and Employment §1:02 (2012); American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employ­ ees, Council 31 v. State Labor Relations Bd., 216 Ill. 2d 567, 578–582, 839 N. E. 2d 479, 486–487 (2005); Manahan v. Daily News-Tribune, 50 Ill. App. 3d 9, 12–16, 365 N. E. 2d 1045, 1048–1050 (1977). More important, the joint-employer standard was developed for use in other

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Opinion of the Court
reach to full-fledged state employees.21
IV A
Because Abood is not controlling, we must analyze the constitutionality of the payments compelled by Illinois law under generally applicable First Amendment standards. As we explained in Knox, “[t]he government may not prohibit the dissemination of ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op. at 8–9); see also, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382 (1992); Riley v. National Federa­ tion of Blind of N.C., 487 U. S. 781, 797 (1988) West Vir­ ginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 713–715 (1977). And “com­ pelled funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups” presents the same dangers as compelled speech. Knox, supra, at ___ (slip op. at 9). As a result, we ex­ plained in Knox that an agency-fee provision imposes “a ‘significant impingement on First Amendment rights,’ ” and this cannot be tolerated unless it passes “exacting First Amendment scrutiny.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op. at 9–10).
In Knox, we considered specific features of an agency­ shop agreement—allowing a union to impose upon non­ members a special assessment or dues increase without providing notice and without obtaining the nonmembers’
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contexts. What matters here is whether the relationship between the State and the personal assistants is sufficient to bring this case within Abood’s reach.
21 The dissent claims that our refusal to extend Abood to the Rehabili­ tation Program personal assistants produces a “perverse result” by penalizing the State for giving customers extensive control over the care they receive. Post, at 12. But it is not at all perverse to recognize that a State may exercise more control over its full-fledged employees than it may over those who are not full-fledged state employees or are privately employed.

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affirmative agreement—and we held that these features could not even satisfy the standard employed in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U. S. 405, 415 (2001), where we struck down a provision that compelled the subsidization of commercial speech. We did not suggest, however, that the compelled speech in Knox was like the commercial speech in United Foods. On the contrary, we observed that “[t]he subject of the speech at issue [in United Foods]—promoting the sale of mushrooms—was not one that is likely to stir the passions of many, but the mundane commercial nature of that speech only high­ lights the importance of our analysis and our holding.” Knox, supra, at ___ (slip op. at 9).
While the features of the agency-fee provision in Knox could not meet even the commercial-speech standard employed in United Foods, it is apparent that the speech compelled in this case is not commercial speech. Our precedents define commercial speech as “speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction,” United Foods, supra, at 409 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 761–762 (1976)), and the union speech in question in this case does much more than that. As a consequence, it is arguable that the United Foods standard is too permissive.
B
For present purposes, however, no fine parsing of levels of First Amendment scrutiny is needed because the agency­ fee provision here cannot satisfy even the test used in Knox. Specifically, this provision does not serve a “ ‘com­ pelling state interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational free­ doms.’ ” Knox, supra, at ___ (slip op. at 10) (quoting Rob­ erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623 (1984)). Respondents contend that the agency-fee provision in this

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case furthers several important interests, but none is sufficient.
1
Focusing on the benefits of the union’s status as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in the unit, respondents argue that the agency-fee provision promotes “labor peace,” but their argument largely misses the point. Petitioners do not contend that they have a First Amend­ ment right to form a rival union. Nor do they challenge the authority of the SEIU–HII to serve as the exclusive representative of all the personal assistants in bargaining with the State. All they seek is the right not to be forced to contribute to the union, with which they broadly disagree.
A union’s status as exclusive bargaining agent and the right to collect an agency fee from non-members are not inextricably linked. For example, employees in some federal agencies may choose a union to serve as the exclu­ sive bargaining agent for the unit, but no employee is required to join the union or to pay any union fee. Under federal law, in agencies in which unionization is permit­ ted, “[e]ach employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right.” 5 U. S. C. §7102 (emphasis added).22
Moreover, even if the agency fee provision at issue here were tied to the union’s status as exclusive bargaining agents, features of the Illinois scheme would still under­ mine the argument that the agency fee plays an important role in maintaining labor peace. For one thing, any threat to labor peace is diminished because the personal assis­

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22 A similar statute adopts the same rule specifically as to the U. S. Postal Service. See 39 U. S. C. §1209(c).

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tants do not work together in a common state facility but instead spend all their time in private homes, either the customers’ or their own. Cf. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 51 (1983) (“[E]xclusion of the rival union may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor-peace within the schools”). Federal labor law reflects the fact that the organization of household workers like the personal assistants does not further the interest of labor peace. “[A]ny individual employed . . . in the domestic service of any family or person at his home” is excluded from coverage under the National Labor Rela­ tions Act. See 29 U. S. C. §152(3).
The union’s very restricted role under the Illinois law is also significant. Since the union is largely limited to petitioning the State for greater pay and benefits, the specter of conflicting demands by personal assistants is lessened. And of course, State officials must deal on a daily basis with conflicting pleas for funding in many contexts.
2
Respondents also maintain that the agency-fee provision promotes the welfare of personal assistants and thus contributes to the success of the Rehabilitation Program. As a result of unionization, they claim, the wages and benefits of personal assistants have been substantially improved;23 orientation and training programs, back­ ground checks, and a program to deal with lost and erro­ neous paychecks have been instituted;24 and a procedure was established to resolve grievances arising under the collective-bargaining agreement (but apparently not
——————
23 Wages rose from $7 per hour in 2003 to $13 per hour in 2014. Brief for Respondent Quinn 7. Current wages, according to respondents, are $11.65 per hour. Brief for Respondent SEIU–HII 6.
24 See generally Brief for Respondent Quinn 6–8; Brief for Respondent SEIU–HII 6.

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grievances relating to a Service Plan or actions taken by a customer).25
The thrust of these arguments is that the union has been an effective advocate for personal assistants in the State of Illinois, and we will assume that this is correct. But in order to pass exacting scrutiny, more must be shown. The agency-fee provision cannot be sustained unless the cited benefits for personal assistants could not have been achieved if the union had been required to depend for funding on the dues paid by those personal assistants who chose to join. No such showing has been made.
In claiming that the agency fee was needed to bring about the cited improvements, the State is in a curious position. The State is not like the closed-fisted employer that is bent on minimizing employee wages and benefits and that yields only grudgingly under intense union pres­ sure. As Governor Blagojevich put it in the executive order that first created the Illinois program, the State took the initiative because it was eager for “feedback” regard­ ing the needs and views of the personal assistants. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 46. Thereafter, a majority of the personal assistants voted to unionize. When they did so, they must have realized that this would require the pay­ ment of union dues, and therefore it may be presumed that a high percentage of these personal assistants became union members and are willingly paying union dues. Why are these dues insufficient to enable the union to provide “feedback” to a State that is highly receptive to sugges­ tions for increased wages and other improvements? A host of organizations advocate on behalf of the interests of persons falling within an occupational group, and many of these groups are quite successful even though they are dependent on voluntary contributions. Respondents’
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25 See Brief for Respondent Quinn 7.

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showing falls far short of what the First Amendment demands.
V
Respondents and their supporting amici make two additional arguments that must be addressed.
A
First, respondents and the Solicitor General urge us to apply a balancing test derived from Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968). See Brief for Respondent Quinn 25–26; Brief for SEIU–HII 35–36; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. And they claim that under the Picker­ ing analysis, the Illinois scheme must be sustained. This argument represents an effort to find a new justification for the decision in Abood, because neither in that case nor in any subsequent related case have we seen Abood as based on Pickering balancing.26
In any event, this effort to recast Abood falls short. To begin, the Pickering test is inapplicable because with respect to the personal assistants, the State is not acting in a traditional employer role.27 But even if it were, appli­
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26 The Abood majority cited Pickering once, in a footnote, for the prop­ osition that “there may be limits on the extent to which an employee in a sensitive or policymaking position may freely criticize his superiors and the policies they espouse.” 431 U. S., at 230, n. 27. And it was cited once in Justice Powell’s concurrence, for the uncontroversial proposition that “ ‘the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it pos­ sesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.’ ” Id., at 259 (opinion concurring in judgment) (quoting Picker­ ing, 391 U. S., at 568). United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U. S. 405 (2001), cited Pickering only once—in dissent. 533 U. S., at 425 (opinion of BREYER, J.). Neither Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984), nor Knox cited Pickering a single time.
27 Nor is the State acting as a “proprietor in managing its internal operations” with respect to personal assistants. See NASA v. Nelson,

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Opinion of the Court
cation of Pickering would not sustain the agency-fee provision.
Pickering and later cases in the same line concern the constitutionality of restrictions on speech by public em­ ployees. Under those cases, employee speech is unprotected if it is not on a matter of public concern (or is pursuant to an employee’s job duties), but speech on matters of public concern may be restricted only if “the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees” out­ weighs “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.” 391 U. S., at 568. See also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U. S. ___ (2011); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 (2006); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion); Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983).
Attempting to fit Abood into the Pickering framework, the United States contends that union speech that is germane to collective bargaining does not address matters of public concern and, as a result, is not protected. Taking up this argument, the dissent insists that the speech at issue here is not a matter of public concern. According to the dissent, this is “the prosaic stuff of collective bargain­ ing.” Post, at 9. Does it have any effect on the public? The dissent’s answer is: “not terribly much.” Post, at 20. As the dissent sees it, speech about such funding is not qualitatively different from the complaints of a small-town police chief regarding such matters as the denial of $338 in overtime pay or directives concerning the use of police vehicles and smoking in the police station. See post, at 20; Borough of Duryea, supra, at ___ (slip op. at 3).28
——————
562 U. S. ___ (2011) (slip op. at 1–2, 14). 28 The dissent misunderstands or mischaracterizes our cases in this
line. We have never held that the wages paid to a public-sector bar­ gaining unit are not a matter of public concern. The $338 payment at issue in Guarnieri had a negligible impact on public coffers, but pay­

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This argument flies in the face of reality. In this case, for example, the category of union speech that is germane to collective bargaining unquestionably includes speech in favor of increased wages and benefits for personal assis­ tants. Increased wages and benefits for personal assis­ tants would almost certainly mean increased expenditures under the Medicaid program, and it is impossible to argue that the level of Medicaid funding (or, for that matter, state spending for employee benefits in general) is not a matter of great public concern.
In recent years, Medicaid expenditures have represented nearly a quarter of all state expenditures. See National Association of State Budget Officers, Summary: Fall 2013 Fiscal Survey of States (Dec. 10, 2013), online at http:// www.nasbo.org. “Medicaid has steadily eaten up a grow­ ing share of state budgets.”29 In fiscal year 2014, “[t]hirty­ five states increased spending for Medicaid for a net in­ crease of $6.8 billion.” Ibid. Accordingly, speech by a powerful union that relates to the subject of Medicaid funding cannot be equated with the sort of speech that our cases have treated as concerning matters of only private concern. See, e.g., San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77 (2004) (per curiam); Connick, supra, at 148 (speech that “re­ flect[ed] one employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause célèbre” (emphasis added)).
For this reason, if Pickering were to be applied, it would

——————
ments made to public-sector bargaining units may have massive implications for government spending. See supra, at 18, and n. 7. That is why the dissent’s “analogy,” post, at 20–21, is not illustrative at all. We do not doubt that a single public employee’s pay is usually not a matter of public concern. But when the issue is pay for an entire collective-bargaining unit involving millions of dollars, that matter affects statewide budgeting decisions.
29 See Cooper, Bigger Share of State Cash for Medicaid, N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2011.

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Opinion of the Court
be necessary to proceed to the next step of the analysis prescribed in that case, and this would require an assess­ ment of both the degree to which the agency-fee provision promotes the efficiency of the Rehabilitation Program and the degree to which that provision interferes with the First Amendment interests of those personal assistants who do not wish to support the union.
We need not discuss this analysis at length because it is covered by what we have already said. Agency-fee provi­ sions unquestionably impose a heavy burden on the First Amendment interests of objecting employees. See Knox, 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op. at 19) (citing Lehnert, 500 U. S., at 513; Jibson v. Michigan Ed. Assn., 30 F. 3d 723, 730 (CA6 1994). And on the other side of the balance, the arguments on which the United States relies—relating to the promotion of labor peace and the problem of free rid­ ers—have already been discussed. Thus, even if the per­ missibility of the agency-shop provision in the collective­ bargaining agreement now at issue were analyzed under Pickering, that provision could not be upheld.
B
Respondents contend, finally, that a refusal to extend Abood to cover the situation presented in this case will call into question our decisions in Keller v. State Bar of Cal. 496 U. S. 1 (1990), and Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217 (2000). Respondents are mistaken.
In Keller, we considered the constitutionality of a rule applicable to all members of an “integrated” bar, i.e., “an association of attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law.” 496 U. S., at 5. We held that members of this bar could not be re­ quired to pay the portion of bar dues used for political or ideological purposes but that they could be required to pay the portion of the dues used for activities connected with

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Opinion of the Court
proposing ethical codes and disciplining bar members. Id., at 14.
This decision fits comfortably within the framework applied in the present case. Licensed attorneys are sub­ ject to detailed ethics rules, and the bar rule requiring the payment of dues was part of this regulatory scheme. The portion of the rule that we upheld served the “State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.” Ibid. States also have a strong interest in allocating to the members of the bar, rather than the general public, the expense of ensuring that attorneys adhere to ethical practices. Thus, our decision in this case is wholly consistent with our holding in Keller.
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the same is true with respect to Southworth, supra. In that case, we up­ held the constitutionality of a university-imposed manda­ tory student activities fee that was used in part to support a wide array of student groups that engaged in expressive activity. The mandatory fee was challenged by students who objected to some of the expression that the fee was used to subsidize, but we rejected that challenge, and our holding is entirely consistent with our decision in this case.
Public universities have a compelling interest in pro­ moting student expression in a manner that is viewpoint neutral. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995). This may be done by providing funding for a broad array of student groups. If the groups funded are truly diverse, many students are likely to disagree with things that are said by some groups. And if every student were entitled to a partial exemption from the fee requirement so that no portion of the student’s fee went to support a group that the student did not wish to support, the administrative problems would likely be insuperable. Our decision today thus does not undermine

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Opinion of the Court
Southworth.
* * *
For all these reasons, we refuse to extend Abood in the manner that Illinois seeks. If we accepted Illinois’ argu­ ment, we would approve an unprecedented violation of the bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support. The First Amendment prohibits the collection of an agency fee from personal assistants in the Rehabilitation Program who do not want to join or support the union.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part,30 and the case is remanded for fur­ ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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30 The Court of Appeals held—and we agree—that the First Amend­ ment claims of the petitioners who work, not in the Rehabilitation Program, but in a different but related program, the “Disabilities Program,” are not ripe. This latter program is similar in its basic structure to the Rehabilitation Program, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a, but the Disabilities Program personal assistants have not yet union­ ized. The Disabilities Program petitioners claim that under Illinois Executive Order No. 2009–15, they face imminent unionization and, along with it, compulsory dues payments. Executive Order No. 2009– 15, they note, is “almost identical to EO 2003–08, except that it targets providers in the Disabilities Program.” Brief for Petitioners 10.
In a 2009 mail-ballot election, the Disabilities Program personal assistants voted down efforts by SEIU Local 73 and American Federa­ tion State, County and Municipal Employees Council 31 to become their representatives. See App. 27. The record before us does not suggest that there are any further elections currently scheduled. Nor does the record show that any union is currently trying to obtain certification through a card check program. Under these circumstances, we agree with the holding of the Court of Appeals.

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1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 11–681
_________________
PAMELA HARRIS, ET AL, PETITIONERS v. PAT QUINN, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 30, 2014]

JUSTICE KAGAN,
JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.

with and

whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join,

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), an-
swers the question presented in this case. Abood held that a government entity may, consistently with the First
Amendment, require public employees to pay a fair share of the cost that a union incurs negotiating on their behalf
for better terms of employment. That is exactly what Illinois did in entering into collective bargaining agreements with the Service Employees International Union
Healthcare (SEIU) which included fair-share provisions. Contrary to the Court’s decision, those agreements fall
squarely within Abood’s holding. Here, Illinois employs, jointly with individuals suffering from disabilities, the inhome care providers whom the SEIU represents. Illinois
establishes, following negotiations with the union, the most important terms of their employment, including
wages, benefits, and basic qualifications. And Illinois’s interests in imposing fair-share fees apply no less to those caregivers than to other state workers. The petitioners’
challenge should therefore fail. And that result would fully comport with our decisions
applying the First Amendment to public employment. Abood is not, as the majority at one point describes it,

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
“something of an anomaly,” allowing uncommon interference with individuals’ expressive activities. Ante, at 8. Rather, the lines it draws and the balance it strikes reflect the way courts generally evaluate claims that a condition of public employment violates the First Amendment. Our decisions have long afforded government entities broad latitude to manage their workforces, even when that affects speech they could not regulate in other contexts. Abood is of a piece with all those decisions: While protecting an employee’s most significant expression, that decision also enables the government to advance its interests in operating effectively—by bargaining, if it so chooses, with a single employee representative and preventing free riding on that union’s efforts.
For that reason, one aspect of today’s opinion is cause for satisfaction, though hardly applause. As this case came to us, the principal question it presented was whether to overrule Abood: The petitioners devoted the lion’s share of their briefing and argument to urging us to overturn that nearly 40-year-old precedent (and the respondents and amici countered in the same vein). Today’s majority cannot resist taking potshots at Abood, see ante, at 17–20, but it ignores the petitioners’ invitation to depart from principles of stare decisis. And the essential work in the majority’s opinion comes from its extended (though mistaken) distinction of Abood, see ante, at 20–28, not from its gratuitous dicta critiquing Abood’s foundations. That is to the good—or at least better than it might be. The Abood rule is deeply entrenched, and is the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but thousands of contracts between unions and governments across the Nation. Our precedent about precedent, fairly understood and applied, makes it impossible for this Court to reverse that decision.
I
I begin where this case should also end—with this

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
Court’s decision in Abood. There, some public school teachers in Detroit challenged a clause in their collective bargaining agreement compelling non-union members to pay the union a service charge equivalent to regular dues. The Court upheld the requirement so long as the union was using the money for “collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,” rather than for political or ideological activities. 431 U. S., at 225–226. In so doing, the Court acknowledged that such a fair-share provision “has an impact upon [public employees’] First Amendment interests”; employees, after all, might object to policies adopted or “activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative.” Id., at 222. Still, the Court thought, the government’s own interests “constitutionally justified” the interference. Ibid. Detroit had decided, the Court explained, that bargaining with a single employee representative would promote “labor stability” and peaceful labor relations—by ensuring, for example, that different groups of employees did not present “conflicting demands.” Id., at 221, 229. And because such an exclusive bargaining agent has a legal duty to represent all employees, rather than just its own members, a compulsory surcharge fairly distributes “the cost of [bargaining] among those who benefit” and “counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders.’ ” Id., at 222.
This case thus raises a straightforward question: Does Abood apply equally to Illinois’s care providers as to Detroit’s teachers? No one thinks that the fair-share provisions in the two cases differ in any relevant respect. Nor do the petitioners allege that the SEIU is crossing the line Abood drew by using their payments for political or ideological activities. The only point in dispute is whether it matters that the personal assistants here are employees not only of the State but also of the disabled persons for whom they care. Just as the Court of Appeals held, that

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
fact should make no difference to the analysis. See 656 F. 3d 692, 698 (CA7 2011).
To see how easily Abood resolves this case, consider how Illinois structured the petitioners’ employment, and also why it did so. The petitioners work in Illinois’s Medicaidfunded Rehabilitation Program, which provides in-home services to persons with disabilities who otherwise would face institutionalization. Under the program, each disabled person (the State calls them “customers”) receives care from a personal assistant; the total workforce exceeds 20,000. The State could have asserted comprehensive control over all the caregivers’ activities. But because of the personalized nature of the services provided, Illinois instead chose (as other States have as well) to share authority with the customers themselves. The result is that each caregiver has joint employers—the State and the customer—with each controlling significant aspects of the assistant’s work.1
For its part, Illinois sets all the workforce-wide terms of employment. Most notably, the State determines and pays the employees’ wages and benefits, including health insurance (while also withholding taxes). See 89 Ill. Admin. Code §§686.10(h)(10), 686.40(a)–(b) (2007); App. 44– 46. By regulation, Illinois establishes the job’s basic qualifications: for example, the assistant must provide references or recommendations and have adequate experience and training for the services given. See §§686.10(c), (f). So too, the State describes the services any personal assis-
——————
1 The majority describes the petitioners as “partial” or “quasi” public employees, a label of its own devising. Ante, at 28. But employment law has a real name—joint employees—for workers subject at once to the authority of two or more employers (a not uncommon phenomenon). See, e.g., 29 CFR §791.2 (2013); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 475 (1964). And the Department of Labor recently explained that in-home care programs, if structured like Illinois’s, establish joint employment relationships. See 78 Fed. Reg. 60483–60484 (2013).

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tant may provide, and prescribes the terms of standard employment contracts entered into between personal assistants and customers. See §§686.10(h), 686.20.
Illinois as well structures the individual relationship between the customer and his assistant (in ways the majority barely acknowledges). Along with both the customer and his physician, a state-employed counselor develops a service plan laying out the assistant’s specific job responsibilities, hours, and working conditions. See §§684.10, 684.50. That counselor also assists the customer in conducting a state-mandated annual performance review, based on state-established criteria, and mediates any resulting disagreements. See §686.30.
Within the structure designed by the State, the customer of course has crucial responsibilities. He exercises day-to-day supervisory control over the personal assistant. See §676.30(b). And he gets both to hire a particular caregiver (from among the pool of applicants Illinois has deemed qualified) and to impose any needed discipline, up to and including discharge. See ibid.; §677.40(d). But even as to those matters, the State plays a role. Before a customer may hire an assistant, the counselor must sign off on the employee’s ability to follow the customer’s directions and communicate with him. See §§686.10(d)–(e) (requiring that the employee demonstrate these capabilities “to the satisfaction of” the counselor). And although only a customer can actually fire an assistant, the State can effectively do so by refusing to pay one who fails to “meet [state] standards.” §677.40(d). The majority reads that language narrowly, see ante, at 3, n. 1, 22, but the State does not: It has made clear not just in its litigation papers, but also in its collective bargaining agreements and customer guidance that it will withhold payment from an assistant (or altogether disqualify her from the program) based on credible allegations of customer abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation. See App. 55; Brief for

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
Respondent Quinn 3, 50; Ill. Dept. of Human Servs., Customer Guidance for Managing Providers 8, online at http://www.dhs.state.il.us/OneNetLibrary/27897/documents/ Brochures/4365.pdf (as visited June 27, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).2
Given that set of arrangements, Abood should control. Although a customer can manage his own relationship with a caregiver, Illinois has sole authority over every workforce-wide term and condition of the assistants’ employment—in other words, the issues most likely to be the subject of collective bargaining. In particular, if an assistant wants an increase in pay, she must ask the State, not the individual customer. So too if she wants better benefits. (Although the majority notes that caregivers do not receive statutory retirement and health insurance benefits, see ante, at 22, that is irrelevant: Collective bargaining between the State and SEIU has focused on benefits from the beginning, and has produced state-funded health insurance for personal assistants.) And because it is Illinois that would sit down at a bargaining table to address those subjects—the ones that matter most to employees and so most affect workforce stability—the State’s stake in a fair-share provision is the same as in Abood. Here too, the State has an interest in promoting effective operations by negotiating with an equitably and adequately funded exclusive bargaining agent over terms and conditions of employment. That Illinois has delegated to program customers various individualized employment issues makes no difference to those state interests. If anything, as the State has contended, the dispersion of employees across numerous workplaces and the absence of
——————
2 Indeed, pursuant to the grievance procedure in the present collective bargaining agreement, the SEIU obtained an arbitration award reversing the State’s decision to disqualify an assistant from the program for such reasons. See Brief for Respondent SEIU 7 (citing Doc. No. 32–5 in Case No. 10–cv–02477 (ND Ill.)).

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day-to-day state supervision provides an additional reason for Illinois to want to “address concerns common to all personal assistants” by negotiating with a single representative: Only in that way, the State explains, can the employees effectively convey their concerns about employment under the Rehabilitation Program. App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a (Exec. Order No. 2003–8).
Indeed, the history of that program forcefully demonstrates Illinois’s interest in bargaining with an adequately funded exclusive bargaining agent—that is, the interest Abood recognized and protected. Workforce shortages and high turnover have long plagued in-home care programs, principally because of low wages and benefits. That labor instability lessens the quality of care, which in turn, forces disabled persons into institutions and (massively) increases costs to the State. See Brief for Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute as Amicus Curiae 16–26; Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 4–5. The individual customers are powerless to address those systemic issues; rather, the State—because of its control over workforce-wide terms of employment—is the single employer that can do so. And here Illinois determined (as have nine other States, see Brief for Respondent SEIU 51, n. 14) that negotiations with an exclusive representative offered the best chance to set the Rehabilitation Program on firmer footing. Because of that bargaining, as the majority acknowledges, home-care assistants have nearly doubled their wages in less than 10 years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefited from better training and workplace safety measures. See ante, at 32–33; Brief for Respondent Quinn 7; App. 44–48. The State, in return, has obtained guarantees against strikes or other work stoppages, see id., at 55—and most important, believes it has gotten a more stable workforce providing higher quality care, thereby avoiding the costs associated with institutionalization. Illinois’s experience thus might serve as a

8

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
veritable poster child for Abood—not, as the majority would have it, some strange extension of that decision.
It is not altogether easy to understand why the majority thinks what it thinks: Today’s opinion takes the tack of throwing everything against the wall in the hope that something might stick. A vain hope, as it turns out. Even once disentangled, the various strands of the majority’s reasoning do not distinguish this case from Abood.
Parts of the majority’s analysis appear to rest on the simple presence of another employer, possessing significant responsibilities, in addition to the State. See ante, at 20–22, 24. But this Court’s cases provide no warrant for holding that joint public employees are not real ones. To the contrary, the Court has made clear that the government’s wide latitude to manage its workforce extends to such employees, even as against their First Amendment claims. The government’s prerogative as employer, we recently explained, turns not on the “formal status” of an employee, but on the nature of the public “interests at stake”; we therefore rejected the view that “the Government’s broad authority in managing its affairs should apply with diminished force” to contract employees whose “direct employment relationship” is with another party. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 14– 15). And indeed, we reached the same result (in language that might have been written for this case) when such employees “d[id] not work at the government’s workplace[,] d[id] not interact daily with government officers and employees,” and were not subject to the government’s “day-to-day control” over “the details of how work is done.” Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 676–677 (1996).3 Here, as I have explained, Illinois’s

——————
3 The majority claims that the Court developed this law “for use in other contexts,” ante, at 28–29, n. 20, but that is true only in the narrowest sense. The decisions I cite dealt with First Amendment

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
interests as an employer and program administrator are substantial, see supra, at 4–6; and accordingly, the State’s sharing of employment responsibilities with another party should not matter.4
Next, the majority emphasizes that the Illinois Legislature deemed personal assistants “public employees” solely “for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act” and not for other purposes, like granting statutory benefits and incurring vicarious liability in tort. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f) (West 2012); see ante, at 6, 22–23; but cf. Martin v. Illinois, 2005 WL 2267733, *5–*8 (Ill. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, July 26, 2005) (treating caregivers as public employees for purposes of workers’ compensation).5 But once again, it is hard to see why that fact is relevant. The majority must agree (this Court has made the point often enough) that
——————
claims that joint or contract employees made against the government. The only difference is that those suits challenged different restrictions on the employees’ expressive activities.
4 In a related argument, the majority frets that if Abood extends to the joint employees here, a “host of workers who receive payments from a governmental entity for some sort of service would be candidates for inclusion within Abood’s reach.” Ante, at 28. But as I have just shown, this Court has not allowed such worries about line-drawing to limit the government’s authority over joint and contract employees in the past. And rightly so, because whatever close cases may arise at the margin (there always are some), the essential distinction between such employees and mere recipients of government funding is not hard to maintain. Consider again the combination of things Illinois does here: set wages, provide benefits, administer payroll, withhold taxes, set minimum qualifications, specify terms of standard contracts, develop individualized service plans, fund orientation and training, facilitate annual reviews, and resolve certain grievances. That combination of functions places the petitioners so securely on one side of the boundary between public employees and mere recipients of public funding as to justify deferral of line-drawing angst to another case.
5 As the opinion’s quadruple repetition of the words “appear” and “apparently” suggests, ante, at 22–23, the majority is mostly guessing as to in-home caregivers’ eligibility for various state programs.

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KAGAN, J., dissenting
“state law labels,” adopted for a whole host of reasons, do not determine whether the State is acting as an employer for purposes of the First Amendment. E.g., Umbehr, 518 U. S., at 679. The true issue is whether Illinois has a sufficient stake in, and control over, the petitioners’ terms and conditions of employment to implicate Abood’s rationales and trigger its application. And once more, that question has a clear answer: As I have shown, Illinois negotiates all workforce-wide terms of the caregivers’ employment as part of its effort to promote labor stability and effectively administer its Rehabilitation Program. See supra, at 6–8. As contrasted to that all-important fact, whether Illinois incurs vicarious liability for caregivers’ torts, see ante, at 23, or grants them certain statutory benefits like health insurance, see ante, at 22, is beside the point. And still more so because the State and SEIU can bargain over most such matters; for example, as I have noted, the two have reached agreement on providing statefunded health coverage, see supra, at 7.
Further, the majority claims, “the scope of bargaining” that the SEIU may conduct for caregivers is “circumscribed” because the customer has authority over individualized employment matters like hiring and firing. Ante, at 23–25. But (at the risk of sounding like a broken record) so what? Most States limit the scope of permissible bargaining in the public sector—often ruling out of bounds similar, individualized decisions. See R. Kearney & P. Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 75–77 (5th ed. 2014) (“The great majority of state statutes” exclude “certain matters from the scope of negotiations,” including, for example, personnel decisions respecting “hiring, promotion, and dismissal”); Note, Developments in the Law—Public Employment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1611, 1684 (1984) (Many state statutes “explicitly limit[ ] the scope of bargaining, typically by excluding decisions on personnel management”). Here, the scope of collective

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bargaining—over wages and benefits, as well as basic duties and qualifications—more than suffices to implicate the state interests justifying Abood. Those are the matters, after all, most likely to concern employees generally and thus most likely to affect the nature and quality of the State’s workforce. The idea that Abood applies only if a union can bargain with the State over every issue comes from nowhere and relates to nothing in that decision—and would revolutionize public labor law.
Finally, the majority places weight on an idiosyncrasy of Illinois law: that a regulation requires uniform wages for all personal assistants. See ante, at 25. According to the majority, that means Abood’s free-rider rationale “has little force in the situation now before us”: Even absent the duty of fair representation (requiring the union to work on behalf of all employees, members and non-members alike, see infra, at 22–23), the union could not bargain one employee’s wages against another’s. Ante, at 26.6 But that idea is doubly wrong. First, the Illinois regulation applies only to wages. It does not cover, for example, the significant health benefits that the SEIU has obtained for inhome caregivers, or any other benefits for which it may bargain in the future. Nor does the regulation prevent preferential participation in the grievance process, which governs all disputes between Illinois and caregivers arising from the terms of their agreement. See n. 2, supra. And second, even if the regulation covered everything subject to collective bargaining, the majority’s reasoning is a non-sequitur. All the regulation would do then is serve as suspenders to the duty of fair representation’s belt: That Illinois has two ways to ensure that the results of
——————
6 The majority also suggests in this part of its opinion that even if the union had latitude to demand higher wages only for its own supporters, it would not do so. See ante, at 27, n. 18. But why not? A rational union, in the absence of any legal obligation to the contrary, would almost surely take that approach to bargaining.

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collective bargaining redound to the benefit of all employees serves to compound, rather than mitigate, the union’s free-rider problem.
As far as I can tell, that covers the majority’s reasons for distinguishing this case from Abood. And even when considered in combination, as the majority does, they do not succeed. What makes matters still worse is the perverse result of the majority’s decision: It penalizes the State for giving disabled persons some control over their own care. If Illinois had structured the program, as it could have, to centralize every aspect of the employment relationship, no question could possibly have arisen about Abood’s application. Nothing should change because the State chose to respect the dignity and independence of program beneficiaries by allowing them to select and discharge, as well as supervise day-to-day, their own caregivers. A joint employer remains an employer, and here, as I have noted, Illinois kept authority over all workforce-wide terms of employment—the very issues most likely to be the subject of collective bargaining. The State thus should also retain the prerogative—as part of its effort to “ensure efficient and effective delivery of personal care services”—to require all employees to contribute fairly to their bargaining agent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a (Exec. Order No. 2003–8).
II
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of plausibly distinguishing this case from Abood, the petitioners raised a more fundamental question: the continued viability of Abood as to all public employees, even what the majority calls “full-fledged” ones. Ante, at 9. That issue occupied the brunt of the briefing and argument in this Court. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 16–24; Brief for Respondent SEIU 15–44; Brief for Respondent Quinn 15–29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14–28; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5–

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21, 32–39, 42–47, 50–60. The majority declines the petitioners’ request to overturn precedent—and rightly so: This Court does not have anything close to the special justification necessary to overturn Abood. Still, the majority cannot restrain itself from providing a critique of that decision, suggesting that it might have resolved the case differently in the first instance. That dicta is off-base: Abood corresponds precisely to this Court’s overall framework for assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims. To accept that framework, while holding Abood at arms-length, is to wish for a sui generis rule, lacking in justification, applying exclusively to union fees.
A
This Court’s view of stare decisis makes plain why the majority cannot—and did not—overturn Abood. That doctrine, we have stated, is a “foundation stone of the rule of law.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 15). It “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles [and] fosters reliance on judicial decisions.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991). As important, it “contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,” ibid., by ensuring that decisions are “founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986). For all those reasons, this Court has always held that “any departure” from precedent “demands special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984).
And Abood is not just any precedent: It is entrenched in a way not many decisions are. Over nearly four decades, we have cited Abood favorably numerous times, and we have repeatedly affirmed and applied its core distinction between the costs of collective bargaining (which the government can demand its employees share) and those of

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political activities (which it cannot). See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U. S. 207, 213–214 (2009); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, 519 (1991); Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U. S. 292, 301–302 (1986); Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 455–457 (1984). Reviewing those decisions, this Court recently—and unanimously—called the Abood rule “a general First Amendment principle.” Locke, 555 U. S., 213–215. And indeed, the Court has relied on that rule in deciding cases involving compulsory fees outside the labor context—which today’s majority reaffirms as good law, see ante, at 37–39. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, 9–17 (1990) (state bar fees); Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 230–232 (2000) (public university student fees); Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457, 471–473 (1997) (commercial advertising assessments). Not until two years ago, in Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. ___ (2012), did the Court so much as whisper (there without the benefit of briefing or argument, see id., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1–6)) that it had any misgivings about Abood.
Perhaps still more important, Abood has created enormous reliance interests. More than 20 States have enacted statutes authorizing fair-share provisions, and on that basis public entities of all stripes have entered into multiyear contracts with unions containing such clauses. “Stare decisis has added force,” we have held, when overturning a precedent would require “States to reexamine [and amend] their statutes.” Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202–203 (1991). And on top of that, “[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. Here, governments and unions across the country have entered into thousands of contracts involving millions of employees in reliance on

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Abood. Reliance interests do not come any stronger. The majority’s criticisms of Abood do not remotely de-
feat those powerful reasons for adhering to the decision. The special justifications needed to reverse an opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point of stare decisis. And the majority’s critique extends no further. It is mostly just a catalog of errors Abood supposedly committed— reproaches that could have been leveled as easily 40 years ago as today. Only the idea that Abood did not “anticipate” or “foresee” the difficulties of distinguishing between collective bargaining and political activities, see ante, at 18–19, might be thought different. But in fact, Abood predicted precisely those issues. See 431 U. S., at 236 (“There will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining . . . and ideological activities”). It simply disagreed with today’s majority about whether in this context, as in many others, lines that are less than pristine are still worth using. And in any event, the majority much overstates the difficulties of classifying union expenditures. The Court’s most recent decision on the subject unanimously resolved the single issue that had divided lower courts. See Locke, 555 U. S., at 217–221. So it is not surprising that the majority fails to offer any concrete examples of thorny classification problems. If the kind of hand-wringing about blurry lines that the majority offers were enough to justify breaking with precedent, we might have to discard whole volumes of the U. S. Reports.
And the majority says nothing to the contrary: It does not pretend to have the requisite justifications to overrule Abood. Readers of today’s decision will know that Abood does not rank on the majority’s top-ten list of favorite precedents—and that the majority could not restrain itself from saying (and saying and saying) so. Yet they will also know that the majority could not, even after receiving full-

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dress briefing and argument, come up with reasons anywhere near sufficient to reverse the decision. Much has gone wrong in today’s ruling, but this has not: Save for an unfortunate hiving off of ostensibly “partial-public” employees, ante, at 28, Abood remains the law.
B
And even apart from stare decisis, that result is as it should be; indeed, it is the only outcome that makes sense in the context of our caselaw. In numerous cases decided over many decades, this Court has addressed the government’s authority to adopt measures limiting expression in the capacity not of sovereign but of employer. Abood fits— fits hand-in-glove—with all those cases, in both reasoning and result. Were that rule not in place, our law respecting public employees’ speech rights would contain a serious anomaly—a different legal standard (and not a good one) applying exclusively to union fees.
This Court has long acknowledged that the government has wider constitutional latitude when it is acting as employer than as sovereign. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. 591, 598 (2008) (“[T]here is a crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising the power to regulate . . . and the government acting . . . to manage [its] internal operation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Time and again our cases have recognized that the Government has a much freer hand” in dealing with its employees than with other citizens. NASA, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). We have explained that “[t]he government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated” in the public workplace—that the government must have the ability to decide how to manage its employees in order to best provide services to the public. Engquist, 553 U. S., at 598. In effect, we have tried to place the government-qua-employer in a similar (though

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not identical) position to the private employer, recognizing that both face comparable challenges in maintaining a productive workforce. The result is that a public employee “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006). “[A]lthough government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context.” Engquist, 553 U. S., at 600.
Further, this Court has developed and applied those principles in numerous cases involving First Amendment claims. “Government employers, like private employers,” we have explained, “need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words” in order to “efficient[ly] provi[de] public services.” Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 418. Accordingly, we have devised methods for distinguishing between speech restrictions reflecting the kind of concerns private employers often hold (which are constitutional) and those exploiting the employment relationship to restrict employees’ speech as private citizens (which are not). Most notably, the Court uses a two-step test originating in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968). First, if the expression at issue does not relate to “a matter of public concern,” the employee “has no First Amendment cause of action.” Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 418. Second, even if the speech addresses a matter of public concern, a court is to determine whether the government “had an adequate justification” for its action, ibid., by balancing “the interests of the [employee] as a citizen . . . and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees,” Pickering, 391 U. S., at 568.
Abood is of a piece with all those decisions; and indeed, its core analysis mirrors Pickering’s. The Abood Court recognized that fair-share provisions function as prerequi-

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sites to employment, assessed to cover the costs of representing employees in collective bargaining. Private employers, Abood noted, often established such employment conditions, to ensure adequate funding of an exclusive bargaining agent, and thus to promote labor stability. Abood acknowledged (contrary to the majority’s statement, see ante, at 17) certain “differences in the nature of collective bargaining in the public and private sectors.” 431 U. S., at 227; see id., at 227–229. But the Court concluded that the government, acting as employer, should have the same prerogative as a private business in deciding how best to negotiate with its employees over such matters as wages and benefits. See id., at 229 (“[T]here can be no principled basis for” distinguishing between a public and private employer’s view that a fair-share clause will promote “labor stability”). At the same time, the Court recognized the need for some mechanism to ensure that the government could not leverage its power as employer to impinge on speech its employees undertook as citizens on matters of public import. See id., at 234–236.
The Court struck the appropriate balance by drawing a line, corresponding to Pickering’s, between fees for collective bargaining and those for political activities. On the one side, Abood decided, speech within the employment relationship about pay and working conditions pertains mostly to private concerns and implicates the government’s interests as employer; thus, the government could compel fair-share fees for collective bargaining. On the other side, speech in political campaigns relates to matters of public concern and has no bearing on the government’s interest in structuring its workforce; thus, compelled fees for those activities are forbidden. In that way, the law surrounding fair-share provisions coheres with the law relating to public employees’ speech generally. Or, said otherwise, an anomaly in the government’s regulation of its workforce would arise in Abood’s absence: Public em-

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ployers could then pursue all policies, except this single one, reasonably designed to manage personnel and enhance the effectiveness of their programs.
The majority’s critique of Abood principally goes astray by deeming all this irrelevant. This Court, the majority insists, has never “seen Abood as based on Pickering balancing.” Ante, at 34. But to rely on Abood’s failure to cite Pickering more often, as the majority does, see ante, at 34, n. 26, is to miss the essential point. Although stemming from different historic antecedents, the two decisions addressed variants of the same issue: the extent of the government’s power to adopt employment conditions affecting expression. And as just discussed, the two gave strikingly parallel answers, providing a coherent framework to adjudicate the constitutionality of those regulations.
To the extent the majority engages with that framework, its analysis founders at the first step, in assessing the First Amendment value of the speech at issue here. A running motif of the majority opinion is that collective bargaining in the public sector raises significant questions about the level of government spending. Ante, at 17–18 and n. 7, 36 and nn. 28–29. By financing the SEIU’s collective bargaining over wages and benefits, the majority suggests, in-home caregivers—whether they wish to or not—take one side in a debate about those issues.
But that view of the First Amendment interests at stake blinks decades’ worth of this Court’s precedent. Our decisions (tracing from Pickering as well as Abood) teach that internal workplace speech about public employees’ wages, benefits, and such—that is, the prosaic stuff of collective bargaining—does not become speech of “public concern” just because those employment terms may have broader consequence. To the contrary, we have made clear that except in narrow circumstances we will not allow an employee to make a “federal constitutional issue” out of basic

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“employment matters, including working conditions, pay, discipline, promotions, leave, vacations, and terminations.” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 10); see Umbehr, 518 U. S., at 675 (public employees’ “speech on merely private employment matters is unprotected”). Indeed, even Abood’s original detractors conceded that an employee’s interest in expressing views, within the workplace context, about “narrowly defined economic issues [like] salaries and pension benefits” is “relatively insignificant” and “weak.” 431 U. S., at 263, n. 16 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). (Those Justices saved their fire for teachers’ speech relating to education policy. See ibid.) And nowhere has the Court ever suggested, as the majority does today, see ante, at 35–36 and n. 28, that if a certain dollar amount is at stake (but how much, exactly?), the constitutional treatment of an employee’s expression becomes any different.
Consider an analogy, not involving union fees: Suppose an employee violates a government employer’s work rules by demanding, at various inopportune times and places, higher wages for both himself and his co-workers (which, of course, will drive up public spending). The government employer disciplines the employee, and he brings a First Amendment claim. Would the Court consider his speech a matter of public concern under Pickering? I cannot believe it would, and indeed the petitioners’ own counsel joins me in that view. He maintained at oral argument that such speech would concern merely an “internal proprietary matter,” thus allowing the employer to take disciplinary action. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 10. If the majority thinks otherwise, government entities across the country should prepare themselves for unprecedented limitations on their ability to regulate their workforces. But again, I doubt they need to worry, because this Court has never come close to holding that any matter of public employment affecting public spending (which is to say most such mat-

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ters) becomes for that reason alone an issue of public concern. (And on the off-chance that both the petitioners and I are wrong on that score, I am doubly confident that the government would prevail under Pickering’s balancing test.)
I can see no reason to treat the expressive interests of workers objecting to payment of union fees, like the petitioners here, as worthy of greater consideration. The subject matter of the speech is the same: wages and benefits for public employees. Or to put the point more fully: In both cases (mine and the real one), the employer is sanctioning employees for choosing either to say or not to say something respecting their terms and conditions of employment. Of course, in my hypothetical, the employer is stopping the employee from speaking, whereas in this or any other case involving union fees, the employer is forcing the employee to support such expression. But I am sure the majority would agree that that difference does not make a difference—in other words, that the “difference between compelled speech and compelled silence” is “without constitutional significance.” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 796 (1988). Hence, in analyzing the kind of expression involved in this case, Abood corresponds to Pickering (and vice versa)— with each permitting a government to regulate such activity in aid of managing its workforce to provide public services.
Perhaps, though, the majority’s skepticism about Abood comes from a different source: its failure to fully grasp the government’s interest in bargaining with an adequately funded exclusive bargaining representative. One of the majority’s criticisms of Abood, stated still more prominently in Knox, 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10–11), goes something as follows. Abood (so the majority says) wrongly saw a government’s interest in bargaining with an exclusive representative as “inextricably linked” with a fair-share

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agreement. Ante, at 31; see ante, at 20. A State, the majority (a bit grudgingly) acknowledges, may well have reasons to bargain with a single agent for all employees; and without a fair-share agreement, that union’s activities will benefit employees who do not pay dues. Yet “[s]uch free-rider arguments,” the majority avers, “are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.” Ante, at 8–9 (quoting Knox, 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10–11)). In the majority’s words: “A host of organizations advocate on behalf of the interests of persons falling within an occupational group, and many of these groups are quite successful even though they are dependent on voluntary contributions.” Ante, at 33–34.
But Abood and a host of our other opinions have explained and relied on an essential distinction between unions and special-interest organizations generally. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U. S., at 221–222 and n. 15; Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735, 750 (1988); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 762 (1961). The law compels unions to represent—and represent fairly—every worker in a bargaining unit, regardless whether they join or contribute to the union. That creates a collective action problem of far greater magnitude than in the typical interest group, because the union cannot give any special advantages to its own backers. In such a circumstance, not just those who oppose but those who favor a union have an economic incentive to withhold dues; only altruism or loyalty—as against financial self-interest—can explain their support. Hence arises the legal rule countenancing fair-share agreements: It ensures that a union will receive adequate funding, notwithstanding its legally imposed disability—and so that a government wishing to bargain with an exclusive representative will have a viable counterpart.
As is often the case, JUSTICE SCALIA put the point best:

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“Where the state imposes upon the union a duty to deliver services, it may permit the union to demand reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the other end, where the state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement from the union, it may compel them to pay the cost. The ‘compelling state interest’ that justifies this constitutional rule is not simply elimination of the inequity arising from the fact that some union activity redounds to the benefit of ‘free-riding’ nonmembers; private speech often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for. What is distinctive, however, about the ‘free riders’ [in unions] . . . is that . . . the law requires the union to carry [them]—indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to benefit [them], even at the expense of its other interests. . . . [T]he free ridership (if it were left to be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by circumstances but mandated by government decree.” Lehnert, 500 U. S., at 556 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
And in other parts of its opinion, the majority itself mimics the point, thus recognizing the core rationale of Abood: What justifies the agency fee, the majority notes, is “the fact that the State compels the union to promote and protect the interests of nonmembers.” Ante, at 25; see ante, at 27, n. 18. Exactly right; indeed, that is as clear a one-sentence account of Abood’s free-rider rationale as appears in this Court’s decisions.
Still, the majority too quickly says, it has no worries in this case: Given that Illinois’s caregivers voted to unionize, “it may be presumed that a high percentage of [them] became union members and are willingly paying union dues.” Ante, at 33. But in fact nothing of the sort may be so presumed, given that union supporters (no less than

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union detractors) have an economic incentive to free ride. See supra, at 22–23. The federal workforce, on which the majority relies, see ante, at 31, provides a case in point. There many fewer employees pay dues than have voted for a union to represent them.7 And why, after all, should that endemic free-riding be surprising? Does the majority think that public employees are immune from basic principles of economics? If not, the majority can have no basis for thinking that absent a fair-share clause, a union can attract sufficient dues to adequately support its functions.
This case in fact offers a prime illustration of how a fairshare agreement may serve important government interests. Recall that Illinois decided that collective bargaining with an exclusive representative of in-home caregivers would enable it to provide improved services through its Rehabilitation Program. See supra, at 7–8. The State thought such bargaining would enable it to attract a better and more stable workforce to serve disabled patients, preventing their institutionalization and thereby decreasing total state expenditures. The majority does not deny the State’s legitimate interest in choosing to negotiate with an exclusive bargaining agent, in service of administering an effective program. See ante, at 32–33. But the majority does deny Illinois the means it reasonably deemed appropriate to effectuate that policy—a fair-share provision ensuring that the union has the funds necessary to carry out its responsibilities on behalf of in-home care-

——————
7 See, e.g., R. Kearney & P. Mareschal, Labor Relations in the Public Sector 26 (5th ed. 2014) (“[T]he largest federal union, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), represented approximately 650,000 bargaining unit members in 2012, but less than half of them were dues-paying members. All told, out of the approximately 1.9 million full-time federal wage system (blue-collar) and General Schedule (white-collar) employees who are represented by a collective bargaining contract, only one-third actually belong to the union and pay dues”).

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givers. The majority does so against the weight of all precedent, and based on “empirical assumption[s],” ante, at 20, lacking any foundation. Abood got this matter right; the majority gets it wrong: Illinois has a more than sufficient interest, in managing its workforce and administering the Rehabilitation Program, to require employees to pay a fair share of a union’s costs of collective bargaining.
III
For many decades, Americans have debated the pros and cons of right-to-work laws and fair-share requirements. All across the country and continuing to the present day, citizens have engaged in passionate argument about the issue and have made disparate policy choices. The petitioners in this case asked this Court to end that discussion for the entire public sector, by overruling Abood and thus imposing a right-to-work regime for all government employees. The good news out of this case is clear: The majority declined that radical request. The Court did not, as the petitioners wanted, deprive every state and local government, in the management of their employees and programs, of the tool that many have thought necessary and appropriate to make collective bargaining work.
The bad news is just as simple: The majority robbed Illinois of that choice in administering its in-home care program. For some 40 years, Abood has struck a stable balance—consistent with this Court’s general framework for assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims— between those employees’ rights and government entities’ interests in managing their workforces. The majority today misapplies Abood, which properly should control this case. Nothing separates, for purposes of that decision, Illinois’s personal assistants from any other public employees. The balance Abood struck thus should have defeated the petitioners’ demand to invalidate Illinois’s fair-share agreement. I respectfully dissent.

 
 Case: 1:10-cv-02477 As of: 07/01/2014 02:06 PM CDT 1 of 8
MASON,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:10−cv−02477

Harris et al v. Quinn et al Assigned to: Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman Demand: $9,999,000 Case in other court: 10−03835 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/22/2010 Date Terminated: 11/12/2010 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Pamela J Harris

represented by William L Messenger National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation 8001 Braddock Road Suite 600 Springfield, VA 22160 (703) 321−8510 Email: wlm@nrtw.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh Veverka, Rosen &Haugh 180 North Michigan Avenue Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 372−3665 Email: michael@verohalaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Ellen Bronfeld

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carole Gulo

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michelle Harris

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wendy Partridge

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh

Case: 1:10-cv-02477 As of: 07/01/2014 02:06 PM CDT 2 of 8

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Theresa Riffey

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Gordon P Stiefel

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Susan Watts

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Patricia Withers

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Stephanie Yencer−Price and a class of similarly situated

represented by William L Messenger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael Austin Haugh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Pat Quinn Governor; in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Illinois

represented by David Michael Friebus Illinois Attorney General's Office (100 W) 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−4355

Case: 1:10-cv-02477 As of: 07/01/2014 02:06 PM CDT 3 of 8

Email: dfriebus@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana

represented by Robert E. Bloch Dowd, Bloch &Bennett 8 South Michigan Avenue 19th Floor Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−1361 Email: efile@dbb−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ronald M. Willis Dowd, Bloch &Bennett 8 South Michigan Avenue 19th Floor Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 372−1361 Email: efile@dbb−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott A Kronland Altshuler Berzon Llp 177 Post Street Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 421−7151 Email: skronland@altshulerberzon.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant SEIU Local 73

represented by Joel Abbott D'Alba Asher, Gittler, Greenfield, Cohen &D'Alba 200 West Jackson Boulevard Suite 1900 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 263−1500 Email: jad@ulaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Ann Angelucci Asher, Gittler, Greenfield, Cohen &D'Alba 200 West Jackson Boulevard Suite 1900 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 263−1500 Email: maa@ulaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant AFSCME Council 31

represented by Melissa J. Auerbach Cornfield &Feldman 25 East Washington Street Suite 1400 Chicago, IL 60602−1708 (312) 236−7800 Email: mauerbach@cornfieldandfeldman.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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John M West Bredhoff &Kaiser P.L.L.C. 805 Fifteenth Street N.W. Suite l000 Washington, DC 20005 202−842−2600 Email: jwest@bredhoff.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/22/2010
04/22/2010 04/22/2010 04/22/2010
04/23/2010 04/26/2010
04/26/2010
05/06/2010 05/06/2010 05/06/2010 05/11/2010 05/11/2010 05/11/2010 05/11/2010 05/13/2010 05/13/2010

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Pamela J Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Wendy Patridge, Stephanie Yencer−Price, Patricia Withers, Theresa Riffey, Carole Gulo, Susan Watts, Michelle Harris, Gordon P Stiefel; Filing fee $ 350, receipt number 0752−4738954.(Messenger, William) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Messenger, William) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Michael T. Mason. (nsf, ) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Patridge, Theresa Riffey, Gordon P Stiefel, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price by William L Messenger (Messenger, William) (Entered: 04/22/2010)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants AFSCME Council 31, Pat Quinn, SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana, SEIU Local 73 (emd, ) (Entered: 04/23/2010)
4 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: The Court orders the parties to appear for an initial status hearing. All parties shall refer to and comply with Judge Guzman's requirements for the initial appearance as outlined in Judge Guzman's case management procedures, which can be found at: www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Status hearing set for 6/23/2010 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (cjg, ) (Entered: 04/26/2010)
5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Gordon P Stiefel, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price by Michael Austin Haugh. (jmp, ) (Entered: 04/27/2010)
6 NOTICE by SEIU Local 73 Notice of Filing, Certificate of Service (Angelucci, Margaret) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant SEIU Local 73 by Margaret Ann Angelucci (Angelucci, Margaret) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant SEIU Local 73 by Joel Abbott D'Alba (D'Alba, Joel) (Entered: 05/06/2010)
9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Pat Quinn by David Michael Friebus (Friebus, David) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana by Ronald M. Willis (Willis, Ronald) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana by Robert E. Bloch (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Bloch, Robert) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
12 NOTICE by SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana re attorney appearance 11 (Bloch, Robert) (Entered: 05/11/2010)
13 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant AFSCME Council 31 by Melissa J. Auerbach (Auerbach, Melissa) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
14 MOTION by Defendant AFSCME Council 31 for extension of time to file answer regarding complaint, 1 Agreed (Auerbach, Melissa) (Entered: 05/13/2010)

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05/13/2010 05/13/2010 05/13/2010 05/14/2010 05/14/2010 05/14/2010 05/14/2010 05/17/2010
05/18/2010 05/25/2010 05/26/2010 06/07/2010 06/07/2010 06/08/2010
06/09/2010
06/15/2010

15 NOTICE of Motion by Melissa J. Auerbach for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 14 before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 5/18/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Auerbach, Melissa) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
16 MOTION by Defendant Pat Quinn for extension of time to file answer (Friebus, David) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
17 NOTICE of Motion by David Michael Friebus for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 16 before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 5/18/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Friebus, David) (Entered: 05/13/2010)
18 MOTION by Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana for extension of time to Answer or Otherwise Plead (Bloch, Robert) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
19 NOTICE of Motion by Robert E. Bloch for presentment of extension of time 18 before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 5/18/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Bloch, Robert) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
20 MOTION by Defendant SEIU Local 73 for extension of time to file answer regarding complaint, 1 (Angelucci, Margaret) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
21 NOTICE of Motion by Margaret Ann Angelucci for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 20 before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 5/18/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Angelucci, Margaret) (Entered: 05/14/2010)
22 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: Motion by Defendant AFSCME Council 31 for extension of time to file answer regarding complaint 14 is granted. Motion by Defendant Pat Quinn for extension of time to file answer 16 is granted. Motion by Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana for extension of time to Answer or Otherwise Plead 18 is granted. Motion by Defendant SEIU Local 73 for extension of time to file answer regarding complaint 20 is granted. All answers are due by 6/18/10, as requested in the motions. The motion hearing date of 5/18/10 is stricken, parties do not need to appear in court. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/17/2010)
23 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−4828319. (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 05/18/2010)
24 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: Application for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−4828319. (Kronland, Scott) 23 is granted. Mailed notice (cjg, ) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
25 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana by Scott A Kronland (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 05/26/2010)
26 MOTION by Defendant Pat Quinn to set a briefing schedule , expand page limits, and vacate the initial status hearing (Friebus, David) (Entered: 06/07/2010)
27 NOTICE of Motion by David Michael Friebus for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 26 before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 6/10/2010 at 09:30 AM. (Friebus, David) (Entered: 06/07/2010)
28 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Susan Watts, Pamela J Harris, Carole Gulo, Gordon P Stiefel, Ellen Bronfeld, Michelle Harris, Patricia Withers, Theresa Riffey, Wendy Partridge, Stephanie Yencer−Price as to AFSCME Council 31 on 4/29/2010, answer due 5/20/2010; Pat Quinn on 4/29/2010, answer due 5/20/2010; SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana on 4/28/2010, answer due 5/20/2010; SEIU Local 73 on 4/28/2010, answer due 5/20/2010. (Messenger, William) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
29 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: Notice of motion set for 6/10/10 is stricken. Motion by Defendant Pat Quinn to set a briefing schedule, expand page limits, and vacate the initial status hearing 26 is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants shall jointly file consolidated motion to dismiss up to and including 50 pages on or before 6/15/10. Plaintiffs' consolidated response up to and including 50 pages due 7/6/10. Defendants' consolidated reply up to and including 25 pages due 7/20/10. Ruling to be by mail. Status hearing reset to 7/28/2010 at 09:00 AM. Discovery shall not be stayed pending ruling on motion to dismiss. Mailed notice (cjg, ) (Entered: 06/09/2010)
30 MOTION by Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana to dismiss −− DEFENDANTS CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS TO DISMISS (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2010)

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06/15/2010 06/15/2010 07/02/2010
07/20/2010 07/22/2010 07/23/2010 07/28/2010 08/11/2010 08/11/2010 08/12/2010
08/16/2010
09/07/2010
09/08/2010 09/10/2010

31 MEMORANDUM by SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana in support of motion to dismiss 30 −− Defendants Memorandum in Support of Consolidated Motions to Dismiss (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
32 Request for Judicial Notice by SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana −− Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Consolidated Motions to Dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2010)
33 RESPONSE by Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Gordon P Stiefel, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Pricein Opposition to MOTION by Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana to dismiss −− DEFENDANTS CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS TO DISMISS 30 (Messenger, William) (Entered: 07/02/2010)
34 REPLY by Defendants AFSCME Council 31, Pat Quinn, SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana, SEIU Local 73 to response in opposition to motion, 33 Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Consolidated Motions to Dismiss (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 07/20/2010)
35 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting (Messenger, William) (Entered: 07/22/2010)
36 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: Status hearing reset to 7/28/2010 at 09:30 AM. NOTE TIME CHANGE ONLY. Mailed notice (cjg, ) (Entered: 07/23/2010)
37 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: Status hearing held on 7/28/2010. Status hearing set for 8/16/2010 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (cjg, ) (Entered: 07/28/2010)
38 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting (Messenger, William) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
39 SUPPLEMENT to response in opposition to motion, 33 Citation of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − 14 July 2010 Order in Schlaud, # 2 Exhibit B − Transcript Excerpts)(Messenger, William) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
40 RESPONSE by Pat Quinn, SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana in Support of MOTION by Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana to dismiss −− DEFENDANTS CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS TO DISMISS 30 SEIU HCII's &Governor Pat Quinn's Response To Pls' Citation of Supplemental Authority (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 08/12/2010)
41 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman:Status hearing held and continued to 2/9/2011 at 09:30 AM. Court adopts the parties discovery plan. Plaintiffs shall file their motion for class certification with supporting memoranda by 12/1/2010. The parties shall comply with FRCP(26)(a)(2) by 1/4/11. Rebuttal expert reports shall comply with FRCP(26)(a)(2) by 2/4/11. All discovery, including experts, shall be completed by 3/15/2011. Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda shall be filed by 4/15/2011. Advised in open court (jms, ) (Entered: 08/16/2010)
43 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that, pursuant to the Executive Committee Order entered on August 23, 2010, the civil cases on the attached list have been selected for reassignment to form the initial calendar of the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman, therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the attached list of 264 cases be reassigned to the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall become effective on Wednesday, September 8, 2010. Mailed notices.(ef, ) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
42 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−5193833. (West, John) (Entered: 09/08/2010)
44 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman:This case has been reassigned to the calendar of Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman. The parties are directed to meet and discuss the status of the case. The parties are to file a joint status report by 9/24/2010 in the form described in the courts webpage at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/_assets/_documents/webdocs/coleman/InitialStatus.pdf. All pending status or hearing dates before the previously assigned district judge are vacated. All other dates to stand pending further order.Mailed notice (keg, ) (Entered: 09/10/2010)

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09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/13/2010 09/14/2010 09/15/2010 09/15/2010 09/16/2010
09/24/2010 11/05/2010 11/12/2010 11/12/2010 11/12/2010 12/10/2010
12/10/2010 12/10/2010 12/10/2010 12/10/2010 12/20/2010 12/29/2010 09/23/2011

45 MOTION by Defendant SEIU Healthcare Illinois &Indiana to stay −− Defs' Jt. Motion to Stay Discovery &Vacate Scheduling Order Pending Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
46 DECLARATION of Scott A. Kronland regarding motion to stay 45 (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
47 NOTICE of Motion by Scott A Kronland for presentment of motion to stay 45 before Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 9/16/2010 at 08:45 AM. (Kronland, Scott) (Entered: 09/13/2010)
48 MINUTE entry before Honorable Ronald A. Guzman: Status hearing set for 2/9/11 is stricken. Mailed notice (cjg, ) (Entered: 09/14/2010)
49 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Gordon P Stiefel Solely With Respect to Action of Plaintiff Gordon Stiefel (Messenger, William) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
50 MEMORANDUM by Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price in Opposition to motion to stay 45 (Messenger, William) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
51 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman:Motion by John West for Leave to Appear pro hac vice 42 is granted. Defendants' Motion to stay discovery 45 heard on 09/16/2010 and the motion is granted. Hearing on the pending motion to dismiss set for 11/5/2010 at 10:30 AM.Mailed notice (keg, ) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
52 STATUS Report Jointly Filed on Behalf of All Parties by Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price (Messenger, William) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
53 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman:In court hearing on the motion to dismiss 30 held on 11/5/2010. The Court will take arguments and case law under advisement and issue ruling. Mailed notice (keg, ) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
54 MINUTE entry before Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman:Defendants' motion to dismiss 30 is granted and the case is dismissed. See Memorandum and Order for details. Mailed notice (keg, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
55 ENTERED JUDGMENT Signed by the Courtroom Deputy on 11/12/2010:Mailed notice(keg, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
56 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 11/12/2010:Mailed notice(keg, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
57 NOTICE of appeal by Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price regarding orders 56 , 54 , 55 Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 0752−5506907. (Messenger, William) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
58 DOCKETING Statement by Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price regarding notice of appeal, 57 (Messenger, William) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
59 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
60 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal, 57 . Notified counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 12/10/2010)
61 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal, 57 ; USCA Case No. 10−3835. (td, ) (Entered: 12/13/2010)
62 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Pamela J Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Susan Watts, Patricia Withers, Stephanie Yencer−Price (Messenger, William) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
63 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 57 (USCA no. 10−3835) (dj, ) (Entered: 12/29/2010)
64 MANDATE of USCA dated 9/23/2011 regarding notice of appeal, 57 ; USCA No. 10−3835. Herewith is the mandate of this court in this appeal, along with the Bill of Costs, if

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09/23/2011
09/23/2011 11/14/2013 11/14/2013

any. A certified copy of the opinion/order of the court and judgment, if any, and any direction as to costs shall constitute the mandate. (jmp, ) (Entered: 09/26/2011)
65 CERTIFIED copy of order dated 9/23/2011 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal, 57 ; Appellate case no. : 10−3835 The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED in part and the case is REMANDED in part with instructions. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. Each party to bear its own costs. (jmp, ) (Entered: 09/26/2011)
66 OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Argued 6/92011; Decided 9/1/2011 in USCA case no. 10−3835. (jmp, ) (Entered: 09/26/2011)
67 LETTER from Supreme Court of the United States dated 11/13/2013 forward by the USCA 7th Circuit. (kj, ) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
68 RECORD FOR CERTIORARI TRANSMITTAL FORM dated 11/14/2013 from the USCA 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal, 57 ; Appellate case no. : 10−3835 ; Pursuant to a request from the Supreme Court of the United States dated November 13, 2013, Supreme Court Case Number: 11−681, I, GINO J. AGNELLO, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, do hereby certify that the foregoing contains a true copy of the appellate record. The following documents, as reflected on this court's public docket sheet, are electronically available through PACER: See document nos. 8, 17, 24, 25, 27, 34 &35. (kj, ) Modified on 11/15/2013 . (Entered: 11/15/2013)