l

,Ii'NITED STATES DISTRICT COUJ:{.~ FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

-~-------------------~--~-----------------x

LASHAWN A. by her next friend, Evelyn

Moore (1618B Beekman Place NW, Washing-

ton, DC 20009); DEMERICK B. by his next

friend Dr. Owen Rennert, (10300 Bells

Mill Terrace, Potomac, Maryland 20854);

GARY AND LEO C. by their next friends,

Crystal and Wesley Brown, (6101 16th

·· Street NW, Washington, DC 20011); ROBERT
D. by his next friend, Daryl Anette Chamblee (1856 Plymouth Street NW, Wash-

ington, DC 20012) '; KEVIN E. by his next

friend, Elizabeth Velez (3240 McKinley

Street NW, Washington, DC 20015); TYRONE

F. by his next friends, Eva Nash (307 18th street, NE, . Washington, DC 20018)

·.. '

-·. and Anatasia Holmes (1630 Underwood st.
NW, Washington, DC 20012), on their own

behalf and. on behalf of all o'thers

similarly situated,

J IFH [,.~~n'Lq:,•r•t•~,l'd9 .•
§:1cwI7S+
JIm{ 2 0 l~q

Plaintiffs, v.
MARION BARRY, JR., as Mayor of the District of Columbia (District Building,

· · · · ·

suite 520, 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,

Washington, DC 20004); PETER G. PARHAM,

as Director of the District of Columbia

Department of Human Services (Suite 700,

801 North Capitol Street NE,' Washington,

·· DC 20002); BARBARA BURKE-TATUM, as
Commissioner.of the Commission on Social Services of the District of Columbia

Department of Human Services (609 H Street NE, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20002); JEAN R. HUNTER, as Acting Admin-

· · ·

strator of the Family Services Adminis-

tration of the District of Columbia
Department of Human Services (Randall
Building, Room 213, 1st & Eye Street SW,

·
·

· Washington, DC 20024); and EVELYN P.
ANDREWS, as Acting Chief of the Child and :

Family Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (609 H Street NE, 4th Floor East, Washington, DC 20002),

· · ·

Defendants.

:

-----------------~--------------, ----------x

COMPIAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION
1. This is a civil rights action brought on behalf of children who have been placed in foster care under the supervision of the District of Columbia's Department of Human Services and on behalf of children have been abused or neglected and who are or should be known to the Department by virtue of that abuse or neglect. The Department has systematically denied the plaintiff children their rights under federal law, the united states Constitution, and the law of the District of Columbia.
2. Constitutional principles, federal statutes and the law of the District of Columbia all mandate that the Department promptly investigate complaints of neglect and abuse, that it make reasonable efforts to keep families together whenever possible by offering services, that it provide appropriate care to children it has taken into foster care, and that it provide permanent homes for children either by returning them to their own families or by finding them adoptive homes. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services is complying with none of these mandates.
3. The child-welfare system in Washington is in an ongoing state of crisis as severe as that experienced by many of the homes from which the system is removing children. Worker caseloads are many times larger than that permitted by professional standards, abuse reports go uninvestigated, ninety-day "emergency care" lasts for years, workers and foster parents are unt"rained, foster homes are overcrowded and unsupervised, planning for children is
1

nonexistent, children are "controlled" by inappropriate use of medication, specialized placements are virtually nonexistent and thus children with special needs often are shipped out to institutions in distant states, and no services are provided to families to enable children to be returned home safely nor are efforts made to find new permanent homes for children. One tragic result of this systemic chaos is that children who enter foster care in the District of Columbia remain there an average of nearly five years, more than three times the national average.
4. The District of Columbia child-welfare system operates in violation of federal statutes, constitutional provisions, and the law of the District of Columbia. These violations result directly from the defendants' actions and inactions and are irreparably injuring children for whom the Department of Human Services is responsible.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This is an action pursuant to section 1983 of title 42 of the united states Code alleging violations of federal statutes as well as of the united States Constitution. In addition the action alleges violations of statutes of the District of Columbia. The district court has jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to sections 1331 and 1343(a) (3) of title 28 of the united states Code, and it has pendent jurisdiction over the claims alleging violations of the statutes of the District of Columbia.
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6. Venue in this district is proper pursuant to section 1391(b) of title 28 of the united States Code because the claims arise in the district.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

7.

This action is properly maintained as a class action

pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of civil

Procedure.

8.

The plaintiff class encompasses the approximately 2,500

children who, as the result of an allegation of abuse or neglect

or as the result of suspected abuse or neglect, are in the legal

and/or physical custody of the District of Columbia Department of

Human Services as well as the thousands of children who are not

in the Department's legal or physical custody but have been the

victims of neglect or abuse of which the Department knows or

should know or are at risk of neglect or abuse of which the

Department knows or should know.

9.

The named plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the

proposed class. The violations of law alleged by the named

plaintiff children are typical and representative of violations

that pervade the District's foster-care system and thus that

pertain to the class members. Further, the harms suffered by the

named plaintiffS are representative of the harms suffered by the

class members.

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10. The questions of law and fact common to the proposed class include the following: (1) whether the defendants' actions and inactions violate the rights conferred upon the plaintiff children by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980; (2) whether the defendants' actions and inactions violate the rights conferred upon the plaintiff children by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution; (3) whether the defendants' actions and inactions violate the rights conferred upon the plaintiff children by the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977; (4) whether the defendants' actions and inactions violate the rights conferred upon the plaintiff children by the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act; and (5) whether the defendants' actions and inactions violate the rights conferred upon the plaintiff children by the District of Columbia youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986.
11. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The named plaintiffs are represented by, among others, attorneys employed by the Children's Rights Project of the American civil Liberties Union, a privately funded national organization with extensive experience in complex classaction, child-welfare litigation. Counsel have the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. Plaintiffs appear by next friends who are responsible and respected citizens working or living in the District of Columbia. Counsel for the plaintiffs know of no conflicts among members of the class.
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NAMED PLAINTIFFS
12. Plaintiff LASHAWN A. is a four-year-old girl who came into the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about September 15, 1986. She currently resides in a foster home located in the District of Columbia.
13. Plaintiff LASHAWN A. appears in this action by her next friend, Evelyn Moore. Ms. Moore is Executive Director of the National Black Child Development Institute in the District of Columbia.
14. Plaintiff DEMERICK B. is a three-year-old boy who came into the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about July 15, 1986. He currently resides in st. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home in Hyattsville, Maryland.
15. Plaintiff DEMERICK B. appears in this. action by his next friend, Dr. Owen Rennert. Dr. Rennert is a professor and chairman of the Department of Pediatrics at Georgetown University Hospital.
16. Plaintiff GARY C. is a six-year-old boy who originally came into the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about November 16, 1982. He currently resides in a foster home located in Maryland.
17. Plaintiff LEO C., the brother of plaintiff GARY C., is a five-year-old boy who originally came into the custody of the
5

District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about June 28, 1984. He currently resides in a foster home located in Maryland.
18. Plaintiffs GARY and LEO C. appear in this action by their next friends, Crystal and Wesley Brown. Ms. Brown is an educator and Mr. Brown is an engineer who is retired from his position at Howard University.
19. Plaintiff ROBERT D. is an eleven-year-old boy who came into the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about July 24, 1985. He currently resides in a foster home in the District of Columbia.
20. Plaintiff ROBERT D. appears in this action by his next friend, Daryl Anette Chamblee. Ms. Chamblee is a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Steptoe and Johnson.
21. Plaintiff KEVIN E. is a nine-year-old boy who came into the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about August 20, 1979. He currently resides at Villa Maria, a residential-care facility in Timonium, Maryland.
22. Plaintiff KEVIN E. appears in this action by his next friend, Elizabeth Velez. Ms. Velez teaches in the English Department at Georgetown University.
6

23. Plaintiff TYRONE F. is an eight-year-old boy who came into the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about February 24, 1987. He currently resides in Friendship House, a residential-care facility in Scranton, Pennsylvania.

24. Plaintiff TYRONE F. appears in this action by his next friends, Eva L.W. Nash and Anastasia M. Holmes. Ms. Nash, a social worker, is a retired division director at the United states Department of Health and Human Services, and Ms. Holmes is a teacher and librarian.
DEFENDANTS

25.

MARION BARRY, JR., is sued in his official capacity as the

Mayor of the District of Columbia. As Mayor, Mr. Barry is

responsible for the policies, practices, and operation of the

Child and Family Services Division of the District of Columbia

Department of Human Services.

26.

PETER G. PARHAM is sued in his official capacity as the

Director of the District of Columbia Department of Human

Services. As Director, Mr. Parham is responsible for the

policies, practices, and operation of the Child and Family

Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human

Services.

27.

BARBARA BURKE-TATUM is sued in her official capacity as

the commissioner of the Commission on Social Services of the

District of Columbia Department of Human Services. As

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commissioner, Ms. Burke-Tatum is responsible for the policies, practices, and operation'of the Child and Family Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services.
28. JEAN R. HUNTER'is sued in her official capacity as the Acting Administrator of the Family Services Administration of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services. As Acting Administrator, Ms. Hunter is responsible for the policies, practices, and operation of the Child and Family Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services.
29. EVELYN P. ANDREWS is sued in her official capacity as the Acting Chief of the Child and Family Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services. As Acting Chief, Ms. Andrews is responsible for the policies, practices, and operation of the Child and Family Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
30. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services is an umbrella social-services agency that has overall responsibility for the planning, implementation, and administration of health and social-service programs in the District of Columbia. Defendant Peter G. Parham is the Director of the Department, and he was appointed to that position by defendant Marion Barry, Jr. on or about October 21, 1988.
8

31. The Department of Human Services is comprised of three Commissions, one of which is the Commission on social Services. Defendant Barbara Burke-Tatum is the Commissioner of the Commission on social Services, and she was appointed to that position by defendant Marion Barry, Jr. on or about September 30, 1988.

32. The Commission of Social Services is comprised of five Administrations, one of which is the Family Services Administration. Defendant Jean R. Hunter is the Acting Administrator of the Family Services Administration.

33. The Family Services Administration is comprised of three Divisions, one of which is the Child and Family Services Division. This Division operates the District's foster-care system; defendant Evelyn P. Andrews is the Acting Chief of the Child and Family Services Division.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

34.

In addition to alleging that the defendants are violating

their constitutional rights, the plaintiff children allege that

the defendants are violating statutory rights conferred upon the

plaintiffs by four substantive statutes: (1) the federal

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627); (2)

the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect

Act of 1977 (codified as amended at D.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-1351 to

9

2-1357; D.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-2101 to 6-2107; D.C. Code Ann. §§ 62111 to 6-2119; D.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-2121 to 6-2127; and D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-2351 to 16-2365); (3) the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 51015106); and (4) the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986 (codified at D.C. Code Ann. § 3801 to 3-808).

35.

The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of

1980 and the District of Columbia plan for compliance with the

Act submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Health and

Human Services in order for the District of Columbia to obtain

funding pursuant to the Act, confers various rights upon children

who are in the foster-care custody or are at risk of entering the

foster-care custody of government agencies that receive funding

pursuant to the Act.

36. The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 requires that reasonable efforts be made to provide services to enable children to remain with their families or to be returned to their families whenever possible; that all children in foster care have written case plans developed and reviewed within specified time periods; that these plans contain specified elements; that appropriate services be provided to children, their parents, and their foster parents to address each child's needs and to assure each child's permanent placement; that each child receive proper care; that the homes or institutions in which children are placed conform with national standards and
10

that foster care payments are appropriate; that children be placed in the least restrictive, most familylike setting; that children receive periodic judicial or administrative reviews, and that children receive dispositional reviews to determine their future status no later than 18 months after placement.
37. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services receives SUbstantial funds pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.
38. The District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977 also confers a panoply of rights upon the plaintiff children. The Act requires that the Department attempt to obviate the need for removal of a child from his or her home by first offering services to the family, where appropriate; that the Department prepare for each child about whom a report of abuse or neglect is verified a plan to provide services to the child and the family so as to address the abuse or neglect; that the Department "maintain a program of treatment and services for families of neglected and abused children"; that the Department, in those cases in which it has removed a child from his or her home, "offer rehabilitative services to the child's family" that will allow for reunification of the child and the family; and that the Department, in those instances in which it has removed a child from his or her home and in which reunification is not appropriate, "prepare a permanent plan for the child." In addition, the District Act mandates, among other things, that the District initiate within no more than 24 hours investigations
11

into reports of abuse or neglect; that it take specific steps to assure that children who cannot return to their biological families be adopted promptly; and that the Department employ sufficient staff and supervisory personnel to meet its obligations under the Act.
39. The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act confers various rights upon children who, by virtue of abuse or neglect complaints, are or should be known to government agencies that receive funds pursuant to the Act.
40. The federal Act requires the District to initiate prompt investigations into reports of abuse and neglect and to take appropriate steps to protect the children who are subjects of such reports. Further, the Act mandates that the District have in place procedures, personnel, and facilities adequate to "deal effectively with child abuse and neglect cases."
41. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services receives funds pursuant to the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. In addition, the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act requires compliance with the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.
42. The District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986 requires that all facilities in which foster children are placed be licensed in accord with regulations to be promulgated by defendant Marion Barry and that those
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facilities be periodically inspected. The Act also mandates the Department to develop for all children in residential institutions or group facilities individual treatment plans and further that it provide periodic reviews for those children. Finally, the Act requires the Department to develop, for each child bein9 returned home from a residential institution or a group facility, "a comprehensive aftercare plan."
THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS
43. Plaintiff LASHAWN A. is a four-year-old girl. She entered the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about September 9, 1986, when her mother placed her in the Department's "emergency care" program because the mother was homeless. Currently, LaShawn resides in a foster home located in Washington, D.C.
44. Despite the fact that District law mandates that "emergency care" custody is to last no more than ninety days, LaShawn remained in emergency care for two and one-half years until March 27, 1989, when the Department filed a neglect petition against her mother.
45. During the two and one-half years that she has been in the Department's custody, LaShawn has never had a case plan that complies with federal and District law or that meets minimum professional standards. In the first six months that LaShawn was in custody there is no evidence that the Department developed any written case plan for her. Since then the Department has
13

completed forms that purport to be case plans, but they lack the elements required by federal and District law or by minimal professional standards. For instance, forms completed in september 1987, identified the Department's planning goal for LaShawn as being to return her to her mother, but the only steps identified for attaining that goal were "set up a regular visitation schedule with [the mother]" and "assess [the mother's] ability to care for LaShawn."
46. Since the Department assumed responsibility for LaShawn in September 1986, the Department's planning goal for LaShawn has been to return her to her mother. During this period, however, the Department has not provided or offered to LaShawn's mother any services to address the neglect that initially justified LaShawn's custody nor has it done anything else that might make possible the return of LaShawn to her mother. Indeed, the Department had no contact, other than to attempt to arrange visits, with the mother for over 27 months between September 1986 and February 1989. In addition to its failure to determine whether or not LaShawn can ever be returned to her mother, the Department has failed to determine whether an alternative plan of adoption would be appropriate for her.
47. During the two-and-one-half years that she has been in custody, LaShawn never has had an administrative or judicial review, nor has she had a dispositional hearing.
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48. In June 1987 a psychiatrist who examined LaShawn discovered potential serious psychiatric or psychological problems as well as potential developmental problems and recommended in a written report that LaShawn receive complete psychiatric and psychological assessments. Yet, it was not until a year and onehalf later in November 1988 that the Department arranged for these assessments.
49. The Department has violated LaShawn's federal and District of Columbia statutory rights and her federal constitutional rights by keeping her in emergency care for more than ninety days, by failing to develop for her written case plans within required time periods and case plans that contain the required elements and that are likely to assure her permanent placement, by failing to provide services or to make other efforts to implement the Department's plan to return her home to her mother or to consider and implement an alternative permanent plan, by failing to provide her with proper care and adequate services, by failing to provide her with periodic judicial and administrative reviews, and by failing to provide her with a dispositional hearing.
50. As a result of these violations of her rights, LaShawn has been deprived of the opportunity for healthy development and a normal childhood and has been and continues to be irreparably harmed.
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51. Plaintiff DEMERICK B. is a three-year-old boy. He entered the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about July 15, 1986, when he was eleven months old, after his mother signed him into emergency care. Currently, he resides in st. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home in Hyattsville, Maryland.
52. When Demerick entered the District's custody in July 1986, the Department placed him at st. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home, a short-term, emergency care facility. Four months later he was still at st. Ann's, and the facility warned the Department that he should be moved to a foster home. Since then st. Ann's frequently has requested that the Department move Demerick to an appropriate placement, and on December 13, 1988, st. Ann's wrote to the District that "Demerick is suffering emotionally and developmentally because of his prolonged institutionalization. He needs to be moved to a home setting as soon as possible to prevent further emotional damage." Despite these repeated warnings, Demerick is still at st. Ann's.
53. In the nearly three years that Demerick has been at st. Ann's, the Department worker responsible for his case has never visited him.
54. After she signed him into emergency care in July 1986, Demerick's mother never visited Demerick at st. Ann's. In November 1987 the Superior Court found her to have abandoned him, and since at least August 1987 the Department's planning goal for
16

Demerick has been to have him adopted. Yet, despite repeated requests from st. Ann's beginning as early as August 24, 1987, Demerick was not referred to the Department's adoption unit until late in 1988.
55. In the nearly two years since the Department decided that adoption would be appropriate for Demerick, it has done virtually nothing to achieve this goal other than to list him on various adoption exchanges.
56. The Department has violated Demerick's federal and District of Columbia statutory rights and his federal constitutional rights by keeping him in an overly restrictive and otherwise inappropriate congregate-care setting for nearly three years, by failing to develop and review written case plans that contain the required elements and by failing to take appropriate action to implement his plan, by failing to place him in the least restrictive, most familylike setting, by not providing him with proper care while he has been in the Department's custody, and by failing to take appropriate steps to assure his permanent placement in an adoptive home.
57. As a result of these violations of his rights, Demerick has been deprived of the opportunity for healthy development and a normal childhood and has been and continues to be irreparably harmed.
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58. LEO and GARY C. are brothers who are six and five years old, respectively. Leo originally entered the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human ,Services on or about November 16, 1982, when his mother signed him into emergency care; Gary originally entered the custody of the Department on or about June 28, 1984, when his mother signed him into emergency care. Currently, they reside in a foster home located in Maryland.
59. Between November 16, 1982, and March 6, 1987, the Department repeatedly accepted Gary and Leo into emergency care and then returned them to their mother. Leo was signed into care four times and was returned three times (accepted on or about November 16, 1982, and returned on or about May 31, 1983; accepted on or about June 28, 1984, and returned on or about March 7, 1985; accepted on or about June 19, 1985, and returned on or about October 4, 1985; accepted on or about March 6, 1987), and Gary was signed into emergency care three times and was returned twice (accepted on or about June 28, 1984, and returned on or about March 7, 1985; accepted on or about June 19, 1985, and returned on or about October 4, 1985; accepted on or about March 6, 1987). Throughout this period Gary and Leo's mother was experiencing ongoing serious problems, yet the Department continued to return the children to her even though it knew or should have known that she was unable to care for them properly. The Department also failed to make reasonable efforts to provide services'to these children's mother to avoid the need for Gary's and Leo's repeated reentries into foster care.
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60. Despite the fact that District law mandates that emergency care custody is to last no more than ninety days, after Leo and Gary were signed into emergency care on or about March 6, 1987, they remained in that status for over twenty months, until November 15, 1988, when a neglect petition was filed against their mother.
61. Since their reentry into the Department's custody in March 1987, neither Gary nor Leo has ever had a written case plan.
62. Since their reentry into the Department's custody in March 1987, Gary and Leo have not received periodic administrative or judicial reviews nor have they received dispositional hearings.
63. Since it assumed responsibility for Gary and Leo in March 1987, the Department planning goal has been to return them to their mother. During this two-year period, however, the Department has not provided or offered any services to the mother that would allow her to reassume responsibility for the children; indeed, it has done nothing more than refer the mother to three sources of possible services. In addition, the Department has done nothing to determine whether this mother will ever be able to resume responsibility for her children or to determine whether an alternative plan of adoption would be appropriate for these children.
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64. On or about March 6, 1987, the Department placed Gary and Leo in st. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home, a congregate-care facility. On August 11, 1987, a psychiatrist who examined the children recommended that they promptly be placed in a setting in which they would get individual attention from a single caretaker. On November 19, 1987, a psychologist who examined the children again recommended that the children be moved out of st. Ann's and into an individual foster home. Despite these reports and despite the fact that st. Ann's is a short-term, emergency care facility, the Department kept Gary and Leo at st. Ann's for over twenty months, until November 30, 1988.
65. During the twenty months that Gary and Leo remained at st. Ann's, the Department worker responsible for their case never visited them.
66. During the prolonged period during which he was left at st. Ann's, Leo developed serious behavioral problems. When he entered the facility in 1987 Leo was a normal child with no unusual behavioral problems. NOw, however, he has such serious behavioral problems that he is on the verge of being expelled from the elementary school he attends. And according to an October 1988 psychological evaluation, he is "harboring a great deal of anger, unfulfilled need for nurturing and fears of abandonment." The evaluation reports that Leo will require "ongoing counseling" and warns that without effective therapy "his aggressive behavior will escalate and continue as he gets. older."
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67. Since they left st. 'Ann's on November 30, 1988, Leo and Gary have resided with a single foster parent. Notwithstanding the october 1988 medical evaluation stating that Leo needs ongoing therapeutic services and despite repeated requests from the foster parent that he receive these services, the Department provided no such assistance to Leo for nearly three months after he left st. Ann's until the end of February, when he was enrolled in a once-a-week therapeutic nursery program. Due to his behavioral problems, however, he was expelled from the program within a month, and another month passed before the Department arranged for SUbstitute therapeutic services. Currently, the only service being provided to Leo is weekly therapy.
68. The Department has violated Gary and Leo's federal and District of Columbia statutory rights and their federal constitutional rights by failing to make reasonable efforts to offer services that could have prevented the need for their placement in foster care, by keeping them in emergency care longer than ninety days, by failing to place them in the least restrictive, most familylike setting for nearly twenty months, by failing to develop for them written case plans that contain the required elements or that are reasonably likely to assure their permanent placement, by not offering services that could allow them to return home, by failing to consider and to make efforts to implem~nt an appropriate alternative permanent plan, by not providing them with proper care while in the Department's
21

custody, and by not providing them with periodic administrative or judicial reviews.
69. As a result of these violations of their rights, Gary and Leo have been deprived of an opportunity for healthy development and normal childhoods and have been and continue to be irreparably harmed.
70. ROBERT D. is an eleven-year-old boy. He originally entered the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about January 25, 1980, after his mother reportedly had abandoned him. Currently, he resides in a foster home located in the District of Columbia.
71. On or about July 25, 1985, Robert's mother signed an emergency care agreement, giving the Department temporary legal custody of Robert. Robert remained in emergency care for three years and two months from July 1985 until September 1988, when a neglect petition was filed against his mother.
72. Since his entry into care in July 1985, the Department planning goal for Robert has been to return him to his mother. Yet, in a report submitted to the Family Division of the Superior Court in september 1988, Robert's case worker stated that "it is believed that [Robert's mother] will never be a resource for her children," and the report indicates that the Department believed this to be the case as e~rly as 1982.
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73. Despite the fact that the Department's planning goal is to return Robert to his mother, no social worker from the Department has visited Robert's mother in the last two years to assess her living situation, to assess her fitness to reassume responsibility for Robert, or to do any casework with her. Since Robert's entry into Department custody in July 1985, the Department has provided no services or other assistance to Robert's mother that would allow her to reassume responsibility for him. She specifically has requested homemaker services and mental health services.
74. In addition to its failure to determine whether or not Robert can ever be returned to his mother, the Department has failed to determine whether an alternative plan of adoption would be appropriate for him.
75. The Department has violated Robert's federal and District of Columbia statutory rights and his federal constitutional rights by keeping him in emergency care longer than ninety days, by failing to take reasonable steps to assure his permanent placement, by failing to develop for him written case plans that contain the required elements or that are reasonably likely to assure his permanent placement, by failing to provide services necessary and appropriate to make possible the Department's goal to return him home, and by failing to consider and to make efforts to implement an alternative permanent plan.
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76. As a result of these violations of his rights, Robert has been deprived of an opportunity for healthy development and a normal childhood and has been and continues to be irreparably harmed.
77. KEVIN E. is a nine-year-old boy. He originally entered the custody of the Department of Human Services on or about August 20, 1979, when he was ten days old, after his teenaged mother signed him into emergency care. He currently resides at Villa Maria, a residential-care facility in Timonium, Maryland.
78. Since his entry into Department custody, Kevin has been in at least eleven different placements, including st. Ann's Maternity and Infant Home for over a year, at least five foster homes, one group home, st. Elizabeth's Hospital (twice), Children's Hospital, and Villa Maria, his present placement. During this period Kevin has been assigned at least seventeen different workers.
79. On August 25, 1982, Kevin was placed with his mother, who at the time also was in the Department's custody, at a group home. His mother abused him, however, punishing him excessively by forcing him to sit on the toilet and in the bathtub for long periods of time, striking him, and forbidding him from playing with other children in the home. As a result of this abuse, Kevin was .separated from his mother on September 17, 1982.
24

80. In March 1984 the judicial order committing Kevin to the Department's custody lapsed as a result of the Department's carelessness. Rather than obtaining renewed legal custody of Kevin, the Department removed Kevin from the foster home he was in at the time and returned him to his mother even though it had no reason to believe that she would not abuse Kevin further or could care for him properly. within a month of receiving Kevin from the Department, Kevin's mother signed him back into emergency care, and it was reported that during the period he was with his mother Kevin was neglected and possibly abused.
81. On or about August 11, 1988, the Department placed Kevin at Villa Maria, a residential-care facility in Timonium, Maryland. However, the Department failed to develop within thirty days of the decision to place him at villa Maria the treatment plan required by District law; indeed, the Department has not developed any such plan.
82. The Department planning goal since at least January 15, 1986, has been to have Kevin adopted. Yet, Kevin has not even been referred to the adoption unit. The Department has made no effort to make him available for adoption or to have him adopted.
83. As early as November 1983 the Department worker responsible for Kevin's case noted that he exhibited "active behaviors and short attention span [that] interfere with his ability to learn and to use what he has learned." According to the worker's
25

report, "Disruptions and uncertainty in his life are a contributing factor," and she recommended "consistent structure and a stable environment." Since that report Kevin has been in seven different placements and has had numerous different workers. He now is diagnosed as sUffering from several psychiatric disorders, including oppositional Defiant Disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder, and Dsythmic Disorder. According to a February 1989 report "Kevin continues to have severe temper tantrums, low self esteem and poor peer relationships." His behavior has become so extreme that he has been institutionalized, and it is likely that this ten year~old child will experience serious behavioral problems for the remainder of his life.

84.

Since at least December 16, 1985 -- when he was six years

old Kevin has received powerful psychotropic medications that

are being used to control his behavior. The Department has

responded to this child's behavioral problems by subjecting him

to inappropriate medication instead of providing him with

appropriate treatment and placement.

85. The Department has violated Kevin's federal and District of Columbia statutory rights and his federal constitutional rights by returning him to his mother when they knew or should have known that she could not care for him, by failing to make reasonable efforts to offer services that could have prevented the need for foster care, by failing to provide him with proper care, by failing to develop for him writ~en case plans that contain the required elements or that are reasonably likely to
26

assure him permanent placement, and by failing during the ten years he has been in Department custody to make efforts to implement the Department's plan of adoption.
86. As a result of these violations of his rights, Kevin has been deprived of the opportunity for healthy development and a normal childhood and has been and continues to be irreparably harmed.
87. TYRONE F. is an eight-year-old boy. He entered the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services on or about February 24, 1987, as the result of an allegation that his mother had burned his hands. Currently he resides in Friendship House, a residential-care facility in Scranton, Pennsylvania.
88. Since coming into the Department's custody, Tyrone has suffered from serious psychological problems of which the Department has known. Despite this, the Department placed Tyrone in three different foster homes in which the parents had neither the qualifications nor the training that would have enabled them to care for a child experiencing the psychological problems Tyrone has been experiencing nor were these foster parents offered necessary services to address this child's needs. As a result of these inappropriate placements, Tyrone was removed from two of these foster home at the parents' request shortly after his placement.
27

89. On or about July 20, 1987, the Department attempted to place Tyrone in st. Eliz3beth's Hospital -- the District's psychiatric hospital -- despite the fact that he did not require hospitalization. Only because of efforts by his guardian was Tyrone not placed at st. Elizabeth's.
90. After its unsuccessful effort to place Tyrone at st. Elizabeth's, the Department placed Tyrone in another foster home. within two days of this placement, however, the Department removed him simply because of paperwork problems relating to his placement.
91. On or about July 22, 1987, the Department placed Tyrone at st. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home, a restrictive, residentialcare facility that offers emergency, short-term placements for infants and a longer term program for teenage, pregnant mothers. At the time of his placement at st. Ann's, Tyrone was seven years old. He remained there for six and one-half months until January 29, 1988.
92. On or about February 5, 1988, the Department placed Tyrone at Friendship House, a restrictive, residential-care facility in Scranton, Pennsylvania. On November 10, 1988, Friendship House reported that Tyrone did not need to be in a restrictive facility like Friendship House and stated further that continued placement there would be detrimental to him. Tyrone is still residing at Friendship House.
28

93. Since Tyrone entered custody in February 1987, the Department planning goal 'for him has been to return him to his mother. During this two-year period, however, the Department has provided no services or other assistance to Tyrone's mother and has no reasonable basis to believe that she will not abuse Tyrone again or that she will be able to reassume responsibility for him.
94. In addition to its failure to determine whether or not Tyrone can ever be returned safely to his mother, the Department has also failed to determine whether an alternative permanent plan would be appropriate for him.
95. The Department has violated Tyrone's federal and District of Columbia statutory rights and his federal constitutional rights by repeatedly placing and keeping him in inappropriate and overly restrictive placements, by failing to develop and make efforts to implement written case plans that contain the required elements and that are reasonably likely to assure him permanent placement, by failing to provide services or to make other efforts to make possible the Department's planning goal of returning him to his mother, and by failing to prepare an aftercare plan to assist his mother in reassuming responsibility of him if he is returned to her.
96. As a result of these violations of his rights, Tyrone has been and continues to be irreparably harmed.
29

97. The problems presented by the named plaintiffs are typical of the problems experienced by the children who, as the result of an allegation of abuse or neglect or as the result of suspected abuse or neglect, are in the physical and/or legal custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services or by the thousands of other children not in the Department's custody but who have been the victims of neglect or abuse of which the Department knows or should know or are at risk of neglect or abuse of which the Department knows or should know.
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Failure to Protect Children 98. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services is required by District and federal law to initiate within no more than 24 hours investigations in response to each report of neglect or abuse. The Department does not comply with this requirement, however. As of October 1988 the Department's Intake Branch, which is responsible for investigating reports, had a substantial backlog of reports that were awaiting investigation, and Department officials publicly acknowledged then that it took as long as five days to initiate many investigations. The backlog continues to increase, with one worker alone having a backlog of approximately 50 reports. One of the four supervisors in the Branch is carrying a full caseload and at least one of the other supervisors is carrying a partial caseload. The entire branch has available to it only three cars, and some or all of them often are not working. As a result of the Department's failure to initiate investigations into reports
30

of abuse or neglect promptly, children in the District of Columbia are unnecessari!y injured and are at continuing risk of unnecessary injury or death.
99. For years Department officials have been fully aware of the problem of uninvestigated reports of neglect or abuse but have willfully refused to hire the workers needed to remedy the problem. As early as February 1985 the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor reported to defendant Marion Barry and to former Department Director David Rivers that the "foster care program was seriously out of compliance with D.C. Law 2-22, the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, which requires neglect reports to be investigated with 24 hours of receipt." The Auditor revealed that each month as many as 400 reports of neglect were not being investigated in a timely manner. As the Auditor observed, "Sadly, each uninvestigated report represents a child or children whose health and welfare may be at risk."
100. When Department employees do respond to reports of neglect or abuse, they regularly fail to offer to the families any services that might enable children to remain safely at home and thus to avoid the need for foster care placement. Services to troubled families in their own homes are virtually nonexistent in the District of Columbia, despite the requirement of federal law that the District make reasonable efforts to avoid the need for foster care placement for all children it takes into foster care.
31

Misuse of "Emergency Care" 101. District of Columbia law permits parents to relinquish custody of their children temporarily to the Department of Human Services in situations in which the parents are experiencing problems that endanger the welfare of their children. Pursuant to this law the Department routinely accepts children into its "emergency care" program, but, in violation of federal and District law, it fails to make any effort to assist parents so as to enable them to reassume responsibility for their children. Further, the Department then willfully fails either to return the children to their parents or to seek legal custody from the Superior Court within the ninety days mandated by District law. Instead, it simply keeps children in "emergency care" unlawfully, sometimes for years.
102. Children whom the Department takes into "emergency care" often disappear into the District's foster-care system for years, deprived of the protections of federal law and of any opportunity of being returned to their parents or of being made available for adoption.
103. Unlike those children for whom the Department has lawful custody, children in "emergency care" do not receive either independent periodic reviews or appointed counsel, to which all children for whom the Department seeks legal custody are entitled.
32

104. As of January 1988 there were 118 children who had been in the Department's emergency care custody for more than 90 days, and 37 of those children had been in emergency care for more than one year.
105. Many of the children who are detained unlawfully in "emergency care" are returned to their families after months or years in custody, not because either the Department or a court has decided that it is safe or appropriate to return these children, but simply because legal custody has lapsed. Many of these children later return to foster care, after having suffered additional psychological damage and sometimes physical harm.
106. The unlawful detention of children in "emergency care" is causing the District to forego hundreds of thousands of dollars available under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. To qualify for these funds for any particular child, however, the District must have initiated, within six months of assuming physical custody of the child, proceedings to obtain legal custody of the child. According to a preliminary report issued by the federal government in February 1989, $763,209 of the federal payments to the District in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 were invalid and may have to be returned because the Department failed to comply with this requirement.
33

Inappropriate Placements 107. Newborn babies who have been abandoned by their parents at area hospitals are routinely left at the hospitals by the Department well beyond the time when they are ready for discharge. As of May 23, 1989, the Department was aware of and had failed to obtain placements for twenty-one "boarder babies" at one area hospital alone, three of whom have been there approximately six months. Such long-term hospitalization of medically healthy babies irreparably harms them.
108. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services routinely places infants and very young children in institutional placements for inappropriately long periods of time. Most of these children are placed at st. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home, a congregate-care facility in Hyattsville, Maryland that, as of May 18, 1989, was caring for forty-one children who were in the Department's custody. According to the united Way, in 1987 the average length of stay of children at st. Ann's -- virtually all of whom are children in the Department's custody -- was 56.8 days; in 1988 that figure jumped over 50% to 88 days. Such longterm institutionalization of very young children irreparably harms them.
109. The Department of Human Services routinely places more children in foster homes than is safe and appropriate and than is permitted ~y law. District of Columbia regulations limit foster homes to no more than four children, but virtually every foster home used by the Department has more children than the
34

regulations permit. As of April 12, 1989, approximately fifty percent of the Department's 365 foster homes had one child too many, another thirty percent had two children too many, and the remaining twenty percent had three or more children too many.
110. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services does not maintain adequate placement resources for children with special needs who are in the Department's custody. Despite the fact that the Department estimates that fifty percent of the 'children in its custody have special emotional, developmental, or physical needs, the Department does not operate a single specialized or therapeutic foster home nor does it provide the services or support to regular foster homes that would allow them to care for these children appropriately. Consequently, the Department places children with special needs either in regular foster homes in which the parents are unable to care properly for the children or in overly restrictive, out-of-state, residentialcare facilities.
111. The Department has placed hundreds of children in out-ofstate, residential-care institutions that are far more restrictive than is appropriate. Further, the Department is not adequately supervising the care of the children placed in these facilities and thus has no way of knowing whether these children are being treated properly or are receiving appropriate care and services. Finally, because these facilities -- some of which are located in Texas, Georgia, and Florida -- are located far away
35

from the children's families, children placed in these facilities are being denied appropriate visitation with their families.
112. District law mandates that defendant Marion Barry establish a "youth residential monitoring committee" to monitor the condition of foster children placed in residential institutions or group facilities. The committee is to receive quarterly reports of each child's progress and is to conduct an annual "onsite assessment" of each child's placement so as to assess its appropriateness. Defendant Barry has never established this committee, and thus foster children who are in the Department's custody and who are placed in residential institutions or group facilities are not receiving the monitoring and assessments to which they are entitled.
113. The District of Columbia has failed to place children in its custody in foster homes, group facilities, or institutions that meet standards that are reasonably in accord with current recommended standards for such institutions or homes. Defendant Marion Barry was required by District law to have promulgated by August 12, 1987, regulations governing all facilities -including foster homes -- into which the Department was placing foster children. However, no such regulations have been promulgated, and thus children in the Department's foster-care custody were in facilities for which regulations were, according to a Department report, "severely out-dated."
36

Absence of Plans 114. The Department of Human Services has failed to develop legally mandated case plans for thousands of the children in its custody. For many children in the Department's custody, no written case plans exist at all, thereby virtually assuring that handling of their cases is haphazard and impromptu and making much more likely that they will remain in foster care far longer than necessary. For those children for whom case planning documents do exist, these "plans" fall far short of legal requirements and minimal professional standards; often they are so vague and incomplete as to be meaningless.
115. The District of Columbia Department of Human services has failed to provide services or to make other reasonable efforts to assure the return of children to families in situations in which the Department's planning goal is to reunite the child with his or her family and the provision of services will facilitate that reunification. Instead, the Department routinely adopts a plan of return home for children and then fails to provide to the child or the family the services that are necessary to make possible the child's return. Further, the Department often will return children to their parents even though no services have been provided to the parents and no basis exists for believing the problems that necessitated the original removal have been resolved.
116. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services has failed to make reasonable efforts to facilitate the prompt
37

adoption of children for whom the Department has determined that adoption is appropriate. When the Department assigns a plan of adoption to a child it usually does nothing to effect that plan. Hundreds of children who have a plan of adoption have not been referred to the Department's adoption unit for adoption matching.
117. For those few children who are referred to the adoption unit, the Department makes little effort to assure they are adopted. The Department does not employ anyone whose sole duty is to recruit adoptive homes, and it employs just one person on a full-time basis and one person on a part-time basis to recruit both adoptive homes and foster homes.
118. Once children enter the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services, they are likely to spend most of their childhood in government custody. The average length of time for children in the District's foster-care system is slightly over 57 months. According to the most recently available figures, the median time in care nationally is 17 months, and no other jurisdiction for which data are available has a median time in care greater than 42 months.
Lack of Periodic Review 119. Federal and District law mandate that a court or independent administrative board periodically review the case of each child in the Department's custody. Among other things, these reviews are to determine the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the child's placement, the Department's
38

compliance with the written case plan, the progress made towards alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the child's removal from his or her home, and the projected date for the child's return to home or placement in an adoptive home. The District of Columbia has failed to assure that children in its custody receive these mandated reviews. For many children those in "emergency care," for instance these reviews never take place. For others, reviews are held, but the Department's failure to provide to the court or administrative reviewer and to the children's representative necessary and legally mandated information in a timely manner renders the reviews meaningless.
120. Federal law also requires the District to provide each child in its custody with a "dispositional hearing" within eighteen months of the child's entering custody and periodically thereafter. Among other things, these dispositional hearings are td determine the appropriate planning goal for the child (e.g. reunification with family, adoption, long-term foster care). The District of Columbia Department of Human Services has failed to assure that children in its custody receive these required dispositional hearings.
Insufficient and Untrained Staff 121. The Department of Human Services has failed to maintain adequate staff to discharge its legal responsibilities. Approximately one third of the full-time social worker positions within the Department's Child and Family Services Division are vacanti' this ratio of vacancies has existed since at least May 5, 1988.
39

122. As a result of the Department's chronic understaffing of its social work force, the social workers whom the Department does employ have dangerously high caseloads that far exceed minimally accepted professional standards. As of the spring of 1988 protective services workers carried average caseloads of twenty-five families and sixty seven children, intensive services workers carried average caseloads of forty five families and ninety two children, continuing services workers carried caseloads of fifty-six families and one hundred twenty-five children, and adoptions workers carried caseloads of sixty seven families. Currently, Department social workers are carrying caseloads at least as large as these; as of March 1, 1989, one unit of four workers in the Continuing services Branch was assigned 440 families consisting of over 900 children.
123. High-level Department and District officials long have been aware of the Division's vacancy and related caseload problems but willfully have refused to remedy them. In July 1988 the Chair of the Mayor's Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect wrote to defendant Marion Barry warning him of the "urgency" of the problems and reporting that "the Division has been plagued by an excessive shortage of staff. The problem has continued to deteriorate, creating a situation that is detrimental to the safety and well-being of children and the preservation of families. It has affected all levels of every program and service area, which adversely impacts upon the Division's ability to comply with Federal and District laws •••• " In a series of
40

memoranda (one of which was signed by 116 Child and Family Service Division employees) issued between March and September 1988, Department supervisors and workers pleaded with high-level Department officials, including defendant Peter Parham, to fill staff vacancies so as to reduce the caseloads carried by Department workers on the job.
124. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services does not provide adequate training to its social workers. Newly hired workers receive no formal or systematic training before assuming their responsibilities, and ongoing workers receive little or no continuing training.
125. The Department of Human Services does not provide adequate supervision of caseworkers. Supervisor-worker ratios exceed minimal professional standards, a problem seriously compounded by the fact that many supervisors themselves carry caseloads. According to an October 1988 statement signed by more than onehalf of the Department's supervisors, "We as supervisors have been unable to carry out our designated function, inasmuch as we have been forced to carry caseloads, respond to crises, make home visits, repeatedly go to court and place children. Thus, we are unable to adequately supervise our staff, provide sound caseload management and be available for consultation in complex situations."
41

Primitive Information System 126. The District of Columbia Department of Human Services does not have operating the information system required by federal law or minimal professional standards. For instance, most information about children in the Department's custody is kept on index cards maintained by various branches within the Department. This card "system" often is inaccurate or incomplete, and thus children frequently get "lost." Workers receive no computer or other reports that enable them to manage their caseloads, and supervisors do not receive adequate information for them to supervise their staffs. The haphazardness of the Department's record keeping was revealed by a federal report issued in February 1989 that indicated that the Department had in its custody as many as 100 children "whose program eligibility and even their very existence -- could not be supported by DHS case records." The report warned of an "alarming lack of control over case files."
127. All of the above violations of law are the result of actions or inactions taken by the defendants acting under color or law.
CAUSES OF ACTION
128. As a result of the actions and inactions of the defendants, the plaintiff children are being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the local plan adopted and approved as a necessary condition of federal funding under the Act. The rights
42

violated by the defendants include but are not limited to the plaintiff children's right to reasonable efforts to prevent removal from their homes or to enable them to return home; their right to written case plans that contain mandated elements and to the implementation and review of those plans; their right to placement in foster homes or facilities that conform to nationally recommended standards; their right to appropriate services; their right to placement in the least restrictive, most familylike setting; their right to proper care while in custody; their right to a plan and to services that will assure their permanent placement; their right to regular judicial or administrative reviews; their right to dispositional hearings within eighteen months of entering custody and periodically thereafter; and their right to receive services in a child welfare system with an adequate information system.
129. As a result of the actions and inactions of the defendants, the plaintiff children are being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977. The rights violated by the defendants include but are not limited to the plaintiff children's right to timely and reasonable investigations of complaints of neglect or abuse; their right to services to prevent removal from their homes when such is appropriate; their right not to be detained in emergency care for more than ninety days; their right to a plan that will assure the provision of services that will facilitate their prompt permanent placement; their right to prompt adoptive'
43

placement when appropriate; and their right to sufficient staff and staff supervision to "effect the Act's requirements.
130. As a result of the actions and inactions of the defendants, the plaintiff children are being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states Constitution. The constitutional rights violated by the defendants include but are not limited to the plaintiffs childrenis right not to be harmed -- physically, emotionally, developmentally or otherwise -- while in state custody; their right to placement in the least restrictive, appropriate placement; their right to care that is consistent with competent professional judgment; and their right not to be deprived of state or federally created liberty or property rights without due process.
131. As a result of the actions and inactions of the defendants, the plaintiff children are being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. The rights violated by the defendants include but are not limited to the plaintiff children's right to prompt investigation of reports of abuse or neglect; their right to protection from those who endanger their health and welfare; and their right to such administrative procedures, trained and qualified personnel, programs, and facilities that are necessary to deal effectively with chil~ abuse and neglect in the District of Columbia.
44

132. As a result of the actions and inactions of the defendants, the plaintiff children arc being deprived of the rights conferred upon them by the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986. The rights violated by the defendants include but are not limited to the plaintiff children's right to placement in properly licensed, inspected, and monitored facilities; their right to individualized treatment plans; and their right to comprehensive aftercare plans.
REQUESTED RELIEF The plaintiffs respectfully request that the court grant the following relief:
133. Certify this class as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of civil Procedure.
134. Enter declaratory and injunctive relief necessary and appropriate to remedy the defendants' violations of the plaintiff children's rights under the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.
135. Enter declaratory and injunctive relief necessary and appropriate to remedy the defendants' violations of the plaintiff children's rights under the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977.
136. Enter declaratory and injunctive relief necessary and
45

appropriate to remedy the defendants' violations of the plaintiff children's rights under the united states constitution.
137. Enter declaratory and injunctive relief necessary and appropriate to remedy the defendants' violations of the plaintiff children's rights under the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.
138. Enter declaratory and injunctive relief necessary and appropriate to remedy the defendants' violations of the plaintiff children's rights under the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986.
139. Award to the plaintiffs the reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the prosecution of this action, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988 of title 42 of the united states Code.
140. Retain jurisdiction of this matter.
141. Award to the plaintiffs any other relief the court deems just and proper.
46

.. ~

("

(

Respectfully submitted,

~Mj It- \... /.
CHRISTOPH R T. DUNN D.C. Bar No. 399181 Children's Rights Project American civil Liberties Union 132 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 (212) 944-9800

~~~~~~~ CIA ROBINSON LOWRY Children's Rights Project American Civil Liberties Union 132 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 (212) 944-9800

D.C. Bar No. 235960 American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of the National Capital Area 1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 457-0800

Of Counsel: ARTHUR B. SPITZER D.C. Bar No. 358931 American Civil Liberties Union Fund
of the National capital Area 1400 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 457-0800

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

Dated:

June 20, 1989

47

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 1 of 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

-------------------------------------------------------------x

LASHAWN A. by her next friend, Evelyn

:

Moore, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

:

District of Columbia, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

-------------------------------------------------------------x

89-CV-1754 (TFH)

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM FOR A FINDING OF CIVIL CONTEMPT

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 2 of 35

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

INTRODUCTION

1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

6

ARGUMENT

10

DEFENDANTS ARE OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAR

TERMS OF THE MFO AND AIP AND, THEREFORE, IN CONTEMPT

I. THE STANDARD APPLICABLE TO CIVIL CONTEMPT

10

II. DEFENDANTS ARE OPERATING THE DISTRICT’S CHILD

12

WELFARE SYSTEM NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAR

TERMS OF THE MFO AND THE AIP AND ARE FAILING TO

CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS OF REPORTED

ABUSE OR NEGLECT TO CHILDREN AT HOME OR IN

FOSTER CARE

A. Child Protective Services Investigations Are Not Being Timely

13

Initiated

B. Child Protective Services Investigations Are Not Being Timely

14

Completed

C. CPS Investigations of Alleged Abuse or Neglect in Foster Care

15

Are Not Being Timely Completed

D. Child Protective Services Caseworker Caseloads Are Out of

16

Compliance with MFO and AIP Mandates

E. Child Protective Services Investigations Are of Inadequate

16

Quality to Assure Safety

III. DEFENDANTS ARE OPERATING THE DISTRICT’S CHILD

18

WELFARE SYSTEM IN NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE

CLEAR TERMS OF THE MFO AND THE AIP AND ARE

FAILING TO ENSURE THE SOUND AND SAFE OPERATION

OF THE DISTRICT’S FOSTER CARE PROGRAM

A. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

19

ii

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 3 of 35

Relating to the Provision of Stable Placements for Children in Foster Care

B. The Lack of Placement Stability is Exacerbated by CFSA’s Failure

20

to Recruit an Adequate Placement Array to Meet Known Needs

C. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

21

Relating to the Provision of Medical and Dental Care to Children in

Foster Care

D. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

22

Relating to the Provision of Permanency Services for Children in

Foster Care

E. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

24

Relating to Essential Foster Care Visitation Practices

F. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

26

Relating to the Training of Workers and Supervisors

G. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

28

Relating to Quality Oversight of Child Welfare Service Delivery

and Outcomes

H. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP

28

Relating to Other Essential Child Welfare Services

CONCLUSION

29

iii

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 4 of 35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 744 (D.V.I. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 551-54 (D.D.C. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G.L. v. Zumwalt, No. 77-0242-CV-W-1, slip op. (W.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 1992) . Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) . . . . . . . . Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 154 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . McDonald’s Corp. v. Victory Invs., 727 F. 2d 82, 87 (3rd Cir. 1984) . . . . . . N.L.R.B. v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . . . S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10
11-12 10 10 11 11
11 10 10
6, 11 10 10 10 11 10

iv

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 5 of 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

-------------------------------------------------------------x

LASHAWN A. by her next friend, Evelyn

:

Moore, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

:

District of Columbia, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

-------------------------------------------------------------x

89-CV-1754 (TFH)

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM FOR A FINDING OF CIVIL CONTEMPT

Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Children’s Rights, Inc. and the American Civil

Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, respectfully move for a judicial finding of

civil contempt against Defendants for their failure to comply with the clear and

unambiguous provisions of the November 18, 1993, Modified Final Order (“MFO”)

(attached as Ex. A) and the February 2007 Amended Implementation Plan (“AIP”)

(attached as Ex. B) as approved and entered by this Court. In support of their motion,

Plaintiffs state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

The child welfare system in the District of Columbia is at a crossroads. After

years of planning, reorganization, investment of additional resources and capacity

building to improve the system, the District’s executive leadership has allowed the child

welfare system to return to a dysfunctional state. As a consequence, the reform effort in

the District has stagnated and begun to retreat. For the children who depend on the child

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welfare system for their basic protection and care, this return to the past means a future filled with uncertainty, instability and further harm. Once again, the Plaintiff Children find themselves lingering in foster care for long periods of time, moving between multiple foster homes too frequently, missing out on essential medical, dental and mental health services and reaching the age of majority without ever having known a stable family. And, most visibly, that part of the system responsible for responding to reports of abuse or neglect of children – whose lives may be in danger – has record-breaking backlogs in the number of such reports that are not being investigated on a timely basis. Just two weeks ago, a six-month-old child died while awaiting an overdue visit from a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) worker with a significantly excessive caseload.
Thus, the Plaintiff Children seek to enforce the very constitutional and statutory rights to adequate care and protection that are embodied in the prior remedial orders of this Court.
Since the entry of the MFO, Defendants have operated the District of Columbia’s child welfare system, now administered by and through the Child and Family Services Agency (“CFSA”), subject to a court-supervised and court-enforceable plan of reform.1 Entry of the MFO took place only after this Court had conducted a trial on the liability issues raised in Plaintiffs’ class action complaint and found Defendants to be in violation of the federal constitutional and federal and local District of Columbia statutory rights of the Plaintiff Class. This Court determined that the myriad systemic failings proven to
1 For a period of time from 1995 into 2001, the District’s child welfare program was overseen by a court-appointed receiver. As of its exit from receivership in 2001, the District has managed its child welfare system through its own city-employed management team.
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exist within the District’s child welfare system exposed children to an ongoing threat of harm requiring relief from the Court.
Though significant strides have been made to improve the quality of services and outcomes provided to the abused and neglected children in the District over the past 15 years, the District has never achieved compliance with the applicable court orders and now even these advances are at grave risk. The current reality, as fully described in interim monitoring reports submitted by the Court Monitor, is that CFSA’s performance in many areas of child welfare practice is substandard or declining or both. This erosion in CFSA performance directly flows from an unstable and deteriorating management situation within CFSA. Due to constant changes in leadership, the lack of continuity of purpose that accompanies such volatility at the top and the absence of executive branch oversight, child welfare performance has suffered and is now stumbling.
The downward trajectory of overall child welfare performance in the District has manifested itself in (1) untimely and poor quality CPS investigations for children both at home and already in foster care and (2) a foster care system that is too frequently unable to provide children with well-matched and adequately supported foster care providers, with essential medical, dental and mental health services and with timely and permanent placement with stable families.
The deficiencies in CPS practice within CFSA became a matter of great public attention earlier this year following the January discovery of four deceased children, ages 5, 6, 11 and 17, in the home of Benita Jacks (See Executive Office of the Mayor press release, January 11, 2008, attached as Ex. C). Ms. Jacks had been known to CPS investigators within CFSA for over a year before this gruesome discovery was made. (Id.
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at 3). More recently, the Washington Post reported that six-month-old Isiah Garcia had died of an undetermined cause on June 25, 2008, almost three months after becoming the subject of a report of child neglect to CFSA. (See July 8, 2008, Washington Post article, attached as Ex. D). The CPS investigator assigned to the Garcia referral by CFSA had never visited the infant or his home. (Id.). She reportedly was carrying 50 open investigative cases at the time of Isiah’s death and had not visited 17 of those 50 children. (Id.).
The Jacks and Garcia tragedies have brought public attention to CPS shortcomings already known to CFSA management for some time. In both its January 2006 “Assessment of the Quality of Child Protective Services Investigations in the District of Columbia” (“the January 2006 CPS Report”) (attached as Ex. E) and its November 2007 “Assessment of the Quality of Child Abuse and Neglect Investigative Practices in the District of Columbia” (“the November 2007 CPS Report”) (attached as Ex. F), the Court Monitor identified critical deficiencies in CPS practice that required correction. To date, CFSA still has not taken the action steps, as mandated in the MFO and AIP and as identified by the Court Monitor, to ensure timely, complete and safe CPS investigations.
Though perhaps less subject to recent media scrutiny, CFSA performance in the provision of basic foster care services has similarly stagnated or declined. From an insufficient mix and number of approved foster homes to a failure to deliver required medical and dental health services to children in foster care to the inadequate training of caseworker staff, CFSA is in noncompliance with the MFO and AIP in numerous essential respects. These areas of noncompliance continue to cause harm to Plaintiff
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Children who are too often experiencing multiple placement moves, unaddressed service needs and lengthy stays in foster care.
Just one week ago, on July 16, 2008, Mayor Adrian M. Fenty announced that he had accepted the resignation of Dr. Sharlynn E. Bobo as CFSA Director and that he had named Dr. Roque Gerald to serve as Interim CFSA Director. Though the Mayor’s announcement may evidence a recognition that child welfare reform in the District has stalled, if not gone into retreat, this latest change in agency leadership will not alone be adequate to rectify CFSA’s noncompliance with the MFO, the accompanying April 2003 Implementation Plan (“IP”) (attached as Ex. G) and the subsequent February 2007 AIP.
Indeed, a lack of stability and continuity of leadership has been a long-standing problem for the District’s child welfare system since it emerged from receivership in 2001, and Dr. Gerald’s recent appointment by the Mayor is only on an interim basis. Since April 2004, CFSA leadership has changed hands multiple times: from Olivia Golden to Brenda Donald to Uma Ahluwalia to Dr. Sharlynn Bobo and now to the new Interim Director, Dr. Roque Gerald. The important reform work necessary to protect children cannot succeed without stable and focused leadership dedicated to driving home and embedding improvements over the long run. Without a doubt, the District’s child welfare system experienced stress when public reaction to the discovery of the deceased Jacks children in January caused reports of abuse or neglect to rise. But the essence of competent management is its ability to manage both when things are going smoothly and when there are crises, such as occasionally occur in child welfare systems. The Jacks crisis hit a system already weakened by the absence of consistent leadership and the continued failure to accomplish necessary reforms.
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Absent a finding of contempt to once again make the protection of children a high priority for the executive leadership of the District and to make clear that this Court’s orders are to be respected, and if not, that they will be fully enforced, the Plaintiff Children will not benefit from the vital gains that have been made under this Court’s watch since 1991. Nor will they receive the full benefits promised by this Court’s remedial orders. Most importantly, children will continue to be exposed to a very real and ongoing threat of harm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 27, 1991, following a trial on the merits, this Court entered its Final Order which required Defendants to cure the constitutional and statutory failures found to exist in the District’s child welfare system. After subsequent litigation and noncompliance by Defendants, this Court approved and entered its MFO on January 27, 1994. The MFO specified exactly what Defendants must do in order to provide adequate services and protection to the children in its care. The MFO mandated that Defendants “fully comply with all provisions of this order.” (Ex. A at Section XX, Par. B(5)(b)). In order for Defendants to achieve compliance, the MFO required the parties and the Court Monitor to create an implementation plan that “shall be implemented, shall be fully binding on the defendants, and shall be enforceable by the court.” (Ex. A at Section XX, Par. B(5)(a) (emphasis added)). When Defendants failed to comply with their obligations, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to hold them in contempt and placed the District’s child welfare agency into receivership. See LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F.Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1995). From 1995 to 2003, the District engaged in significant reform efforts while under the federal court
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receivership and during a post-receivership probationary period. Although Defendants did not achieve compliance with the MFO during this period, the District’s treatment of children improved in many respects.
On May 16, 2003, this Court approved the IP, a post-receivership plan designed to bring the District into full compliance with requirements of the MFO. The IP required Defendants to fully comply with its provisions no later than December 31, 2006, with many requirements coming due for full compliance at earlier specified dates. Defendants made certain improvements while the IP was in effect – for instance, the backlog of abuse or neglect investigations not completed in 30 days was reduced from a high of 685 children to 89. (2007 Court Monitoring Report at 12, attached as Ex. H). However, the last report issued by the Court Monitor prior to the expiration of the IP on December 31, 2006, indicated that Defendants remained out of compliance with numerous IP requirements.
In spite of Defendants’ continued noncompliance as of December 31, 2006, Plaintiffs did not seek contempt because the District’s performance had improved in numerous respects and because Defendants vowed to achieve full compliance, if given more time. Consequently, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Court Monitor agreed to the AIP, which was approved by this Court on February 27, 2007. The AIP provided that it “shall be judicially enforceable and shall govern implementation of child welfare reform under the [MFO] through December 31, 2008.” (Ex. B at Preamble (emphasis added)).
The AIP required the development of an “Annual Strategy Plan with identified action steps designed to achieve safety, permanency and well-being for children and to reach and sustain the performance goals of the Amended LaShawn Implementation
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Plan.” (Ex. B at Section III). The parties and the Court Monitor agreed, and this Court ordered, that the action steps set forth in the Annual Strategy Plan “are enforceable by the Court but can be changed or deleted with the approval of the Court Monitor.” (Ex. B at Section III). The AIP also contemplated that Defendants, in consultation with the Court Monitor and Plaintiffs, would annually develop an updated Annual Strategy Plan during the effective period of the AIP. (Ex. B at Section III).
Defendants have failed to comply with the mandatory terms of the initial Annual Strategy Plan submitted to this Court on February 14, 2007 (Ex. B at Section III; March 21, 2008, Court Monitor Letter and Progress Memo to the Court and Court Monitor Status Report on Six-Month Stabilization Plan at 16-35, attached as Ex. I). Moreover, Defendants failed to formulate an updated Annual Strategy Plan satisfactory to Plaintiffs and the Court Monitor for implementation beginning on January 1, 2008. Therefore, the parties submitted a six-month Stabilization Plan to the Court on March 21, 2008 to cover the period January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008, and further agreed to extend the enddate of the AIP from January 1, 2009, to June 30, 2009. (Ex. I at 36). Defendants are currently in noncompliance with the terms of the six-month Stabilization Plan. (Ex. I at Table 2, Status of Action Steps).
The AIP requires the Court Monitor to furnish “interim performance report[s],” which include “findings regarding whether Defendants are making acceptable progress toward the final performance benchmarks.” (Ex. B at Preamble). Since the approval of the AIP, the Court Monitor has produced two interim performance reports (Ex. H and Ex. I) along with a separate report evaluating the District’s Child Protective Services, the November 2007 CPS Report (Ex. F). Not only do these reports find unacceptable
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progress, but they reveal that Defendants are instead backsliding and that prior progress is being undone.
The Court Monitor’s March 21, 2008, letter to this Court (in advance of an April 1, 2008 hearing) made clear that the District was moving in the wrong direction. (See Ex. I). Defendants were not in compliance with over 60% of the measurable AIP benchmarks and the CPS investigations backlog had ballooned to 885 cases. (Ex. I at 2, 16-35). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs agreed to extend the AIP through June 30, 2009, instead of immediately seeking contempt because Plaintiffs accepted Defendants’ claims that the District would act with urgency to stabilize the system and to make measurable and sustainable strides toward achieving full compliance. The Court then entered the sixmonth Stabilization Plan.
Defendants agreed to formulate by July 1, 2008, an acceptable 12-month strategy plan for reaching compliance with the AIP and the MFO. (Ex. I at 1). In the more than three months since the parties extended the AIP on April 1, 2008, Defendants have failed to come forward with an acceptable strategy plan that sets forth a clear path, including measurable benchmarks, for curing all areas of CFSA noncompliance. Moreover, CFSA performance has continued to deteriorate and the investigation backlog has skyrocketed to 1,690. (July 14, 2008, Testimony of Judith Meltzer to The Committee on Human Services of the Council of the District of Columbia at 3, attached as Exhibit J).
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ARGUMENT DEFENDANTS ARE OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAR TERMS
OF MFO AND AIP AND, THEREFORE, IN CONTEMPT I. THE STANDARD APPLICABLE TO CIVIL CONTEMPT
The Supreme Court has stated that civil contempt citations are an integral part of judicial power. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). Civil contempt is properly invoked to compensate for losses sustained due to a defendant’s noncompliance with a court order and, as here, to coerce future compliance with enforceable orders. McDonald’s Corp. v. Victory Invs., 727 F. 2d 82, 87 (3rd Cir. 1984); see Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 154 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding state and county in civil contempt for failing to comply with most provisions of consent decree concerning care and services for mentally retarded citizens).
A party moving for contempt bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the opposing party has violated a clear and unambiguous order of the court. Armstrong v. Executive Office of The President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The underlying court order is to be construed through its plain language and the circumstances surrounding its issuance; therefore, an order is less likely to be found ambiguous when it “was proposed and consented to by the contemnor.” Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 1999). In addition, the alleged violation need not be intentional in nature, and the contemnor’s state of mind is irrelevant in a civil contempt proceeding. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191; N.L.R.B. v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Once the moving party has come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
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noncompliance, the respondent then must carry the burden to establish a justification for the violation to avoid a contempt finding. Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1997); S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2000).
In LaShawn A., 887 F. Supp. 297, this Court previously found defendants in contempt of court by clear and convincing evidence, and imposed a full receivership over the District’s child welfare system. This receivership remained in place from 1995 through 2001. Prior to that order, in October 1994, this Court likewise had found Defendants in contempt and entered an order establishing a limited receivership. See October 4, 1994 Order of Judge Thomas F. Hogan (attached as Ex. K). Similarly, in G.L. v. Zumwalt, No. 77-0242-CV-W-1, slip op. (W.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 1992), a class action child welfare case, a federal district court found clear and convincing evidence of excessive and inaccurately counted caseloads, understaffing, inadequate training (including but not limited to failure to track who had been trained), insufficiently frequent visits of foster children by caseworkers and a lethargic adoption process (attached as Ex. L). Accordingly, the Court found defendants out of compliance with the consent decree and in contempt. Id. at 43. See also Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 551-54 (D.D.C. 1997) (citations omitted) (appointing a receiver over the District’s Commission of Mental Health Services because the District repeatedly failed to comply with the court’s orders and experienced multiple changes in leadership); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 744 (D.V.I. 1997) (holding governmental officials in contempt for failing to conform with most elements of settlement agreement requiring conditions at prison complex to be
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raised to constitutional minima and finding defendants noncompliant, despite improvements, because their efforts were isolated and superficial).
In the instant case, the Monitoring Reports and other evidence presented herein prove numerous violations of the MFO and AIP and consequent harm to children. II. DEFENDANTS ARE OPERATING THE DISTRICT’S CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM IN NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE MFO AND THE AIP AND ARE FAILING TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS OF REPORTED ABUSE OR NEGLECT TO CHILDREN AT HOME OR IN FOSTER CARE Among any child welfare system’s principal reasons for being is the obligation to protect children who are at risk of abuse or neglect – whether while living at home or in a foster home or institutional setting – by screening and then investigating complaints from concerned members of the public. Defendants’ core commitment to and responsibility for children’s safety is encapsulated in Section II of the MFO entitled “Protective Services.” (Ex. A at Section II). The provisions of Section II require Defendants, among other affirmative obligations, to develop and implement policies and procedures for receiving and responding to reports of abuse or neglect (Id. at Section II, Par. A), to develop policies and procedures for the proper screening of abuse and neglect reports (Id. at Section II, Par. D), to initiate all investigations of alleged abuse or neglect within 48 hours and to complete all such investigations within 30 days (Id. at Section II, Par. G), and to develop policies and procedures and to conduct risk assessments so that abuse or neglect investigations and removal decisions are based on a full and systematic analysis of all factors relating to existing or potential risks to the child (Id. at Section II, Par. H).
The requirements of Section II of the MFO are further reflected and made subject to court-enforceable action steps in the IP and the AIP. Thus, Section II of the IP
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required Defendants to initiate 90% of all abuse or neglect investigations within 48 hours by June 30, 2005, and to be in full compliance with this timeliness measure by December 31, 2005 (Ex. G at Section II, Par. 2), to complete 90% of all abuse or neglect investigations within 30 days by December 31, 2005, and to be in full compliance with this timeliness measure by June 30, 2006 (Id. at Section II, Par. 3), to complete 95% of all abuse or neglect investigations relating to children in foster care in conformance with all applicable investigation policies and within 30 days by December 31, 2005, and to be in full compliance with this measure by December 31, 2006 (Id. at Section II, Par. 5), and to routinely conduct quality investigations of abuse or neglect in 80% of cases by December 31, 2005, and to be in full compliance with this measure by December 31, 2006. (Id. At Section II, Par. 4).
Because Defendants failed to meet the above IP requirements by the established deadlines, these provisions of Section II were reincorporated into the AIP at Section I, Paragraph 1, Investigations and Section I, Paragraph 2, Acceptable Investigations. (Ex. B). Under the AIP, it remains the court-enforceable obligation of Defendants to assure the safety of all children made subject to allegations of abuse or neglect whether at home or in foster care settings. Defendants are failing to meet this primary obligation as reflected in the clear and unambiguous orders of this Court. (April 1, 2008, Court Monitor Performance Update at 1-2, attached as Ex. M).
A. Child Protective Services Investigations Are Not Being Timely Initiated The Court Monitor, has issued updated findings in relation to Defendants’
performance on the AIP, Section I, Pars.1 and 2 requirements as of April 2008. (Ex. M).
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These findings not only establish that Defendants are in clear violation of the MFO and AIP, but further reveal that Defendants’ performance is in decline.
Specifically, in relation to AIP Section I, Par. 1(a), the Court Monitor determined that only 56% of all abuse or neglect investigations relating to children residing in their family homes were being initiated within the mandatory 48 hour time period. (Ex. M at 1). This performance measure represents a sharp decline from the 71% rate of compliance reported by the Court Monitor in November 2007, though this latter performance measure also failed to meet the interim performance benchmark of 90%, which Defendants were to have achieved by June 30, 2005. (Ex. G at Section II, Par. 2; Ex. M at 1).

Percentage

Mandatory 48 Hour Initiation of Family Home Child Abuse and Neglect Investigations

Benchmark to be fulfilled by Jun-05 Nov-07 Apr-08

100%

90%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0% Benchmark to be fulfilled by Jun-05

71%
Nov-07 Time Pe riod

56% Apr-08

B. Child Protective Services Investigations Are Not Being Timely Completed Likewise, in relation to AIP Section I, Par. 1(b), the Court Monitor determined
that, as of April, 2008, only 17% of all abuse or neglect investigations relating to children residing in their family homes were being completed within the mandatory 30 day time
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period. (Ex. M at 1). This level of performance constitutes a retreat from the 55% rate of compliance reported by the Court Monitor in November 2007, though again this latter performance measure failed to meet the interim performance benchmark of 90%, which Defendants were to have achieved by December 31, 2005. (Ex. M at 1; Ex. G at Section II, Par. 3).

Percentag e

Mandatory 30 Day Completion of Family Home Child Abuse and Neglect Investigations

Benchmark to be fulfilled by Dec-05

Nov-07

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

90%
Benchmark to be fulfilled by Dec-05

55%
Nov-07 Time Pe riod

Apr-08
17% Apr-08

C. CPS Investigations of Alleged Abuse or Neglect in Foster Care Are Not Being Timely Completed
Similarly, in relation to AIP Section I, Par. 1(c), the Court Monitor determined that, as of April, 2008, only 20% of all abuse or neglect investigations relating to children residing in foster homes, group homes or institutions were being completed within the mandatory 30 or 60 day time period. (Ex. M at 1). This performance represents a dramatic decline from the 80% rate of compliance reported by the Court Monitor in November 2007. (Ex. M at 1). The interim performance benchmark of 85% was to be achieved by December 31, 2005. (Ex. G at Section II, Par. 4(d)).

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D. Child Protective Services Caseworker Caseloads Are Out of Compliance with MFO and AIP Mandates
The above areas of serious noncompliance are predictably connected with the increasing caseworker caseloads within CFSA. As of January 2007, the Court Monitor reported that only 4% (2 of 50 workers) of child protective services investigators within CFSA carried a caseload in excess of the maximum of 12 open cases per worker, as required under the MFO and AIP. (Progress on Key LaShawn Protective Services Requirements at 2, attached as Ex. N; Ex. B, Section I, Par. 28(a)). In stark contrast, as of June 30, 2008, fully 74% (63 of 85 workers) of CPS investigators carried over 12 cases. (Ex. M at 14). Nevertheless, Defendants have not taken the steps necessary to address this urgent resources need. Defendants further have not met their obligation under the February 14, 2007, Annual Strategy Plan to “continue ‘overstaffing’ in Child Protective Services (CPS) to maintain low investigator caseloads (not to exceed 1:12) …” (Ex. B, Section III, Par. A(1)(a)).

Percentage

Casew orkers w ithin CFSA w ith Caseloads in Excess of the Maxim um of 12 Open Cases/Worker
Percentage of Casew orkers w ith Caseloads Exceeding the Maximum

80%

60% 40%

20%

0%

4%

Nov-07

74% Apr-08

Tim e Period

E. Child Protective Services Investigations Are of Inadequate Quality to Assure Safety

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Not only are investigations of abuse or neglect taking place far too slowly to ensure basic child safety, but even when completed, they lack the requisite quality and depth. Thus, in the November 2007 CPS Report, the Court Monitor reported:
The Monitor remains concerned about the overall quality of investigative frontline practice. The intensive focus on timeliness of investigations has not been accompanied by an equal emphasis on the quality of decisionmaking and service linkage during the investigative process. The investigation record reviewers judged that only 20 of 40 investigations included the five core contacts required by policy and that 26 of the 40 investigations were of quality. (Ex. F at 23). This 2007 finding mirrored an earlier finding by the Court Monitor in its January 2006 CPS Report. There, the Monitor reported: Both the quantitative and qualitative evaluations reveal uneven quality in investigations practice. In addition to instances of not meeting standards related to making core contacts, closing investigations in a timely manner, conducting joint investigations with MPD and documenting the work, investigation workers are also not routinely connecting families to services and conducting thorough risk assessments. (Ex. E at 5). The Court Monitor’s November 2007 CPS Report and January 2006 CPS Report presaged the very kind of harms to children that now have befallen the Jacks children and Isiah Garcia. The past and continuing absence of overall quality in CPS investigations and practice cannot be rectified in an environment in which caseworker caseloads routinely exceed the maximum of 12 cases and in which a substantial backlog of overdue investigations burdens overworked caseworkers even further. Notwithstanding the nature and scope of the remedial measures required to cure this systemic failing, Defendants clearly are in noncompliance with AIP Section I, Par. 2 which requires “acceptable investigations” of abuse or neglect referrals, as defined in the clear terms of the AIP. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 2).
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III. DEFENDANTS ARE OPERATING THE DISTRICT’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAR TERMS OF THE MFO AND THE AIP AND ARE FAILING TO ENSURE THE SOUND AND SAFE OPERATION OF THE DISTRICT’S FOSTER CARE PROGRAM As determined by this Court at the liability trial in this case, Defendants’ legal
obligations to every child removed into CFSA custody extend well beyond the initial CPS investigation and removal decision to include the provision of a safe and stable placement, the delivery of basic medical and dental care and the provision of timely and effective permanency planning. None of these agency obligations can be reliably fulfilled absent a well-trained caseworker staff, regular contact and visitation between caseworkers and the children and families they serve, regular visitation between siblings and children and their parents, and a well-designed system of quality assurance and quality improvement. Defendants are in noncompliance with the clear provisions of the MFO and AIP that address these vital elements of the District’s foster care program. This noncompliance applies to the child welfare services being provided both directly by CFSA and through private child placing agencies under contract with CFSA. Indeed, CFSA is required by the MFO and AIP to develop and implement a performance based contracting system to assure the quality of private agency case management and service delivery. CFSA currently remains at square one in terms of instituting a proper performance based contracting system.
A. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to the Provision of Stable Placements for Children in Foster Care Defendants are in noncompliance with the MFO and AIP requirements relating to
the provision of stable placements for children who have been removed into foster care. As this Court previously determined, the provision of unstable and multiple placements
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to children in foster care causes them additional psychological harm and deprives them of the ability to attach with a trusted caretaker. The MFO and AIP provided for remedial action steps to address this reality.
Pursuant to the AIP, Defendants are obligated to ensure that 65% of children who are in out-of-home care for at least 12 months, but less than 24 months, have two or fewer total placements. (Ex. B, Section I, Par. 13(b)). As of April 2008, as reported by the Court Monitor, CFSA ensured the requisite two or fewer placements to only 56% of the children in this demographic. (Ex. M at 7).
Likewise, pursuant to the AIP, Defendants are obligated to ensure that 50% of children who are in out-of-home care for at least 24 months have two or fewer total placements. (Ex. B, Section I, Par. 13(c)). As of April 2008, as reported by the Court Monitor, CFSA ensured the requisite two or fewer placements to only 37% of the children in this demographic. (Ex. M at 7).
B. The Lack of Placement Stability is Exacerbated by CFSA’s Failure to Recruit an Adequate Placement Array to Meet Known Needs In its “2007 Needs Assessment Report (attached as Ex. O),” CFSA acknowledged
numerous areas of need in relation to the development of a foster care placement array designed to meet the characteristics of the current and anticipated foster care population in the District. CFSA found that its existing array of foster care settings was particularly inadequate to meet the needs of teens, teen parents and children presenting behavioral or medical issues that called for specialized foster care homes. (Ex. O at 45, 50-53). The absence of sufficient numbers of homes and accompanying child and foster parent supports in these placement categories is well-understood by CFSA management to contribute to unnecessary placement disruptions and to children going AWOL.
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Yet, as reported by the Court Monitor in its March 21, 2008 report to the Court, “CFSA continues to lack an appropriate array of placements for children. There is insufficient diversity in placement options in terms of skill, geographic location and treatment level to meet the needs of children in foster care.” (Ex. I at 10). The Court Monitor further observed that an increase in the number of children entering foster care in 2008 is threatening to stretch the existing placement array well beyond its limits and cautioned that “[q]uick action must be taken to avoid returning to a situation that the District has worked hard over many years to rectify – of over-placed foster homes, young children in congregate care and children waiting in office buildings for appropriate placements.” (Ex. I at 10).
According to the Court Monitor’s most recent data regarding CFSA performance, as of April 2008, twenty-six children under the age of 12 were placed in congregate care settings for more than 30 days, an exponential increase from the 5 children in this cohort as of November 2007, and a violation of the AIP and MFO. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 9(a); Ex. M at 6). Moreover, although the AIP requires that no more than 82 children be placed more than 100 miles from the District, as of April 2008, 126 children were in such placements. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 21; Ex. M at 11). The placement array in the District clearly is not meeting the need or the provisions of this Court’s orders, nor have Defendants taken adequate steps to address this long-documented problem.
In the unsuccessful negotiations over the past three months with Plaintiffs and the Monitor regarding a 12-month Annual Strategy Plan to become effective on July 1, 2008, Defendants came forth with no reasonable action plan to address the identified gaps in the CFSA placement array.
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C. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to the Provision of Medical and Dental Care to Children in Foster Care Defendants have also failed to provide children in CFSA custody with the
adequate mental and dental care that the children are entitled to under the AIP and MFO. The AIP requires that CFSA provide all children with a health screening prior to placement. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 24(a)). As of October 2007, only 59% of children received a health screening prior to placement. (Ex. M at 12). By comparison, the last interim benchmark on this measure in the IP was 90%, a benchmark to have been met by December 31, 2005. (Ex. G at Section VI, Par. 4)).
The AIP requires that children in foster care receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 24(b); Ex. M at 12). Defendants are not even able to provide reliable data as to whether these evaluations are taking place.
Similarly, the AIP requires CFSA to provide all caregivers with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of placement and to provide caregivers with Medicaid cards within 30 days of placements. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 24(c); Ex. M at 13). Sampling of documentation and medical cards provided to caregivers in January of 2008 revealed that 33% of foster parents received documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days, and less than 27% of foster parents received a Medicaid Card within 30 days. (Ex. M at 13).

TABLE 1—SUMMARY TABLE OF MEDICAL OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED-AIP Requirement 24

Last IP

Interim

CFSA

AIP

AIP Requirement

Benchmark Performance Compliance

CFSA provide all children with a health AIP Requirement 24(a) screening prior to placement.

FAILURE

90%

59% (as of Oct-07)

TO

21

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 26 of 35

Children in foster care must receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days AIP Requirement 24(b) of placement.
CFSA must provide all caregivers with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 AIP Requirement 24(c) days of placement.
CFSA must provide caregivers with Medicaid AIP Requirement 24(c) cards within 30 days of placement.

COMPLY

FAILURE

Defendants unable

TO

90%

to provide data

COMPLY

FAILURE

TO

95%

33%

COMPLY

FAILURE

TO

95%

Less than 27% COMPLY

D. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to the Provision of Permanency Services for Children in Foster Care Defendants are additionally in noncompliance with enforceable provisions of the
MFO and AIP in relation to achieving timely permanency for children who have been removed into foster care. As this Court determined at the liability trial in this case, a lack of permanency and stability in their adult relationships and homes causes harm to children.
The AIP requires Defendants to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that children placed in an approved adoptive home have their adoptions finalized within 12 months of placement in the approved adoptive home. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 16(c)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 85% performance on this measure by December 31, 2005), CFSA performance was only 10% as of April 2008. (Ex. G at Section VIII, Par. C; Ex M. at 9).
The AIP further requires that children with a goal of adoption should be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 16(a)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 85% performance on this measure by December 31, 2005), CFSA

22

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 27 of 35

performance was only 53% as of April 2008. (Ex. G at Section VIII, Par. 1(a); Ex. M at

8).

Similarly, the AIP requires that children with the permanency goal of adoption

shall have legal action commenced to free them for adoption within 45 days of their goal

becoming adoption. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 15). Though the AIP requires full

compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 75% performance on this

measure by June 30, 2004), CFSA performance was only 50% as of November 2007.

(Ex. G at Section VIII, Par. 1(b), Ex. M at 8).

TABLE 2—SUMMARY TABLE OF ADOPTION OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED

Last IP

Interim Defendants’

AIP

AIP Requirement

Benchmark Performance Compliance

Defendants must make all reasonable

efforts to ensure that children placed

in an approved adoptive home have

AIP

their adoptions finalized within 12

10%

FAILURE

Requirement months of placement in the approved

(as of April

TO

16(c)

adoptive home.

85%

2008)

COMPLY

Children with a goal of adoption

AIP

should be in an approved adoptive

Requirement placement within nine months of their

16(a)

goal becoming adoption.

85%

Children with the permanency goal of

adoption shall have legal action

AIP

commenced to free them for adoption

Requirement within 45 days of their permanency

15

goal becoming adoption.

75%

53% (as of April
2008)

FAILURE TO
COMPLY

50% (as of November 2007)

FAILURE TO
COMPLY

The noncompliance by CFSA with the above AIP permanency requirements has
caused a decline in the number of adoptions that are finalized each year in the District.
As reported by the Court Monitor on March 21, 2008:
[i]n 2007, 132 children exited foster care through adoption. This is a decrease from 2006 when 196 children were adopted and continues a trend of fewer adoptions over the past several years. Far too many children with

23

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 28 of 35
a goal of adoption -- over 500 children – are still waiting for a permanent family or for their adoptions to be finalized. (Ex. I at 8). E. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to Essential Foster Care Visitation Practices The AIP includes several provisions requiring that CFSA take steps to assure that necessary visitation occurs between caseworkers and children, siblings in separate foster homes and caseworkers and parents. Visitation is widely understood to be an essential element of good child welfare practice because it ensures that children are safe and allows caseworkers to determine whether their needs are being met, and promotes the continuity of family relationships and facilitates the exchange of critical information about unmet needs and potential safety issues. The AIP mandates that CFSA take action to ensure weekly social worker visits with children experiencing a new placement during the first month of the placement and twice monthly visits thereafter. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 6(a)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 90% performance on this measure by June 30, 2005), CFSA performance was only 65% as of April 2008. (Ex. G at Section IX, Par. 1(a); Ex. M at 5). The AIP also mandates that CFSA take action to ensure that sibling visitation occurs at least twice per month. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 20(b)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 75% performance on this measure by June 30, 2006), CFSA performance was only 59% as of April 2008. (Ex. G at Section VI, Par. 1(d); Ex. M at 11). Similarly, the AIP mandates that CFSA take action to ensure weekly visitation between children in foster care with a goal of reunification and their parents. (Ex. B at
24

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 29 of 35

Section I, Par. 11). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 85% performance on this measure by June 30, 2005), CFSA performance was only 33% as of April 2008. (Ex. G at Section VII, Par. 3; Ex. M at 6).
Finally, the AIP mandates that CFSA take action to ensure twice monthly visitation between caseworkers and the parents of children in foster care with a goal of reunification. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 10). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 80% performance on this measure by June 30, 2005), CFSA performance was only 50% as of April 2008. (Ex. G at 7-4, Ex. M at 6).

TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF VISITATION OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED

CFSA

Perfor

Last IP mance

Interim (as of

Bench April

AIP Requirement

mark 2008) AIP Compliance

CFSA must take action to

ensure weekly social worker

visits with children

experiencing a new

placement during the first

month of the placement and

twice monthly visits

AIP Requirement 6(a) thereafter.

80%

65% FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must take action to

ensure that sibling visitation

AIP Requirement

occurs at least twice per

20(b)

month.

75%

59% FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must take action to

ensure weekly visitation

between children in foster

care with a goal of

reunification and their

AIP Requirement 11 parents.

85%

33% FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must take action to

ensure twice monthly

visitation between

caseworkers and the parents

of children in foster care

AIP Requirement 10 with a goal of reunification. 80%

50% FAILURE TO COMPLY

25

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 30 of 35
F. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to the Training of Workers and Supervisors The decline in CFSA’s overall child welfare performance is connected in part to
Defendants’ failure to ensure that basic training is provided to frontline and supervisory staff as required in the MFO and AIP. This training is required for both CFSA employees and private agency staff responsible for the care of children in CFSA custody. It is axiomatic that an ill-prepared staff cannot reliably provide competent care and services to children in foster care. The IP and AIP explicitly require that proper mandatory training be furnished to both CFSA and private agency workers.
The AIP mandates that all caseworkers receive 80 hours of pre-service training before assuming responsibility for a case. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 30(a)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 90% performance on this measure by September 30, 2003), CFSA performance was only 52% as of November 2007. (Ex. G at Section XIV, Par (1); Ex. M at 17).
The AIP likewise mandates that 40 hours of pre-service training be completed by new supervisors within three months of assuming supervisory responsibility. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 30(b)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 90% performance on this measure by December 31, 2004), CFSA performance was only 27% as of November 2007. (Ex. G at XIV, Par. 6; Ex. M at 17).
The AIP also mandates that 30 hours of in-service training be competed annually by all previously hired frontline workers. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 31(a)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 85%
26

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 31 of 35

performance on this measure by June 30, 2006), CFSA performance was only 36% as of November 2007. (Ex. G at XIV, Par. 5; Ex. M at 17).
Finally, the AIP mandates that 24 hours of in-service training be completed by all previously hired supervisors. (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 31(b)). Though the AIP requires full compliance with this measure (and though the IP required 85% performance on this measure by June 30, 2005), CFSA performance was only 52% as of November 2007. (Ex. G at XIV, Par. 7; Ex. M at 17).
Training of CFSA agency staff and assuring training of private agency staff are matters that rest well within the control of CFSA management. Defendants’ noncompliance with the basic training requirements of the MFO and AIP manifest an unfortunate level of disregard and disrespect for the orders of this Court.

TABLE 4—SUMMARY TABLE OF TRAINING OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED

CFSA

Performance

Last IP

(as of

Interim

November

Requirement

Benchmark

2007)

AIP Compliance

CFSA must provide 80

hours of pre-service

AIP Requirement 30(a) training for new workers.

90%

52%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must provide 40

hours of pre-service

training for new

supervisors within three

months of assuming

AIP Requirement 30(b) supervisory responsibility.

95%

27%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must annually

provide 30 hours of in-

service training for

previously hired frontline

AIP Requirement 31(a) workers.

85%

36%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must annually

provide 24 hours of in-

service training to

previously hired

AIP Requirement 31(b) supervisors.

85%

52%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

27

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 32 of 35
G. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to Quality Oversight of Child Welfare Service Delivery and Outcomes The MFO and AIP require Defendants to establish and maintain certain structures
and systems by which the quality of services provided to children in foster care can be routinely and adequately monitored and any identified deficiencies addressed. The two basic structures to be established are (1) a quality assurance unit or function within CFSA to assure agency conformance with policies and procedures and continuous quality improvement (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 33) and (2) a performance based contracting system that couples private agency incentives to the achievement of acceptable outcomes for children placed under their supervision (Ex. B at Section I, Par. 35). As of April 2008, CFSA had not fully implemented these systems even though the IP required that a fully operational performance based contracting system be achieved by September 30, 2005 and that a fully operational quality assurance unit be functioning by December 31, 2004. (Ex. G at Section XVI, Par. 2, Section X, Par. 2). Indeed, the District has yet to even issue a request for proposal (“RFP”) on its performance based contracting model after a series of planning processes and false starts over the last several years. (Ex. I at 12). Defendants do not expect to issue the requisite RFP until later this year, some three years after performance based contracting was to be fully implemented under the IP.
H. Defendants Have Violated the Clear Terms of the MFO and AIP Relating to Other Essential Child Welfare Services In addition to the violations discussed above, Defendants are out of compliance
with many other AIP requirements. This noncompliance is particularly egregious with respect to the following requirements: a comprehensive and appropriate case planning
28

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 33 of 35

process, sibling placement together in foster care whenever reasonably possible and

supervisors shall not be responsible for day-to-day case management of any open cases.

TABLE 5—SUMMARY TABLE OF OTHER ESSENTIAL CHILD WELFARE SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED

CFSA

Last IP Performance

Interim (as of April

Requirement

Benchmark

2008)

AIP Compliance

Defendants to develop

AIP Requirement 17(a) case planning process

90%

71%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA to ensure sibling

placement together in

foster care whenever

AIP Requirement 20(a) reasonably possible.

80%

57%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

CFSA must ensure that no

supervisor is responsible

for day-to-day case

management of any open

AIP Requirement 29(b) cases.

100%

85%

FAILURE TO COMPLY

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs file this motion for a finding of contempt and further formal court action
with reluctance at this stage of this litigation. As this Court observed in making its
finding of contempt in 1995:
[The Court] has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to impose contempt sanctions and to interfere in the operations of local government by imposing broad receiverships or issuing flurries of micromanaging orders. The plaintiffs have also expressed their reluctance to seek a finding of contempt. However, as the Court has warned the defendants with increasing frequency, it cannot tolerate widespread noncompliance with its orders. (May 22, 1995, Memorandum Opinion Holding Defendants in Contempt at 48-49, attached as Ex. P).
More than fifteen years after the trial in this case, the parties and the Court ought
to be looking to successes that have been achieved rather than reviewing failures and the
need for further court orders. In fact, successes have been achieved; but they are not
sufficient, and they are not being sustained. The District’s child welfare system, for

29

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 34 of 35
whatever reasons, is still not providing the protections and benefits that this Court ordered following the liability trial in this case.
Given the current status of noncompliance and the deteriorating performance of the child welfare system, Plaintiffs can no longer rely on District government to act on its own, and again must turn to the Court for help.
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court make a judicial finding of contempt against Defendants for their noncompliance with the clear terms of the MFO and the AIP.
A proposed order is filed herewith, as required by local rules. Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Marcia Robinson Lowry ______________________________ Marcia Robinson Lowry Sara Michelle Bartosz Jeremiah Frei-Pearson Children’s Rights 330 7th Avenue, Suite 400 New York, New York 10001 Tel.: (212) 683-2210 FAX: (212) 683-4015 Arthur B. Spitzer (DC Bar No. 235960) American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area 1400 20th Street, N.W., Suite 119 Washington, DC 20036 Tel.: (202) 457-0800 Fax: (202) 452-1868 Counsel for Plaintiffs
30

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 891 Filed 07/24/2008 Page 35 of 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

-------------------------------------------------------------x

LASHAWN A. by her next friend, Evelyn

:

Moore, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

:

:

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

:

District of Columbia, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

-------------------------------------------------------------x

89-CV-1754 (TFH)

Order Holding Defendants in Contempt of Court Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order Holding Defendants in Contempt of Court, it is this ________ day of ________________, 2008, ORDERED that Defendants have been and are found in contempt of this court’s orders.

________________________ Thomas F. Hogan United States District Judge
Pursuant to Local Rule 7(k), this appendix to the Plaintiffs’ proposed order lists
the counsel for the parties whom are to be notified of the entry of this order:

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 898 Filed 10/06/2008 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

-------------------------------------------------------------x

LASHAWN A. by her next friend, Evelyn

:

Moore, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

v.

: 89-CV-1754 (TFH)

:

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

:

District of Columbia, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

-------------------------------------------------------------x

STIPULATED ORDER

This cause coming to be heard on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Finding of Civil Contempt and on the stipulation of the Parties, due notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Finding of Civil Contempt (the “Motion”) is temporarily adjourned and shall be held in abeyance by the Court subject to the terms set forth in Paragraphs 3 through 8 below. Plaintiffs reserve the right to seek a finding of civil contempt based on the matters asserted in the Motion and may seek judicial relief, including any and all available remedies flowing from the Motion, should Plaintiffs determine that acceptable progress is not being made in relation to the actions required in this Stipulated Order.

2. The Court will hold a status conference on this matter on October__, 2008 at_____.

3. By no later than October 15, 2008, Defendants shall execute a contract with Public Catalyst Group, a Program Support Consulting Team (the “Consultant”) that will provide the following:

(a) Upon execution of the contract, the Consultant will commence an assessment of the following to facilitate acceptable progress toward compliance with the Modified Final Order (“MFO”) and Amended Implementation Plan (“AIP”): (i) the existing CFSA management and organizational structure, (ii) the CPS management and organizational structure and staffing levels required to reduce/eliminate the backlog of investigations and to conduct high quality and timely investigations, and (iii) the actions needed to stabilize the workforce and recruit and hire social workers and supervisors to fill vacant positions;

(b) By no later than December 15, 2008, the Consultant, in consultation with the Monitor and the Parties, shall develop and issue recommendations setting forth strategies and

1

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 898 Filed 10/06/2008 Page 2 of 4
timetables for meeting the systemic needs identified in the assessment conducted under Paragraph 3(a);
(c) During the effective period of the contractual engagement, the Consultant will provide consultation, assistance and support for the implementation of the Consultant’s recommendations and shall regularly report to the Mayor of the District of Columbia and the City Administrator of the District of Columbia and apprise the Court Monitor on progress;
(d) The Interim Director of CFSA and the City Administrator (or designee) are the designated liaisons to work with the Consultant; and
(e) It is understood that the Consultant shall be contractually engaged by the District until at least January 15, 2009.
4. During the effective period of the Contract, in addition to the actions identified in Paragraph 3(a) through (c), the Consultant will assist the Mayor of the District of Columbia to recruit a permanent Director of CFSA and a qualified leadership and management team. It is understood that an acceptable permanent Director, once recruited, will be hired by the Mayor of the District of Columbia and will report to the Mayor of the District of Columbia. The Court Monitor and Plaintiffs will be included in the selection process for the permanent Director.
5. The Parties agree that the Consultant will report directly to the Mayor of the District of Columbia and the City Administrator during the effective period of the Contract.
6. The Parties further agree that Defendants shall implement the following reform strategies and meet the following identified benchmarks by the below dates. The Consultant shall provide guidance and consultation with respect to provisions (a) and (b) below:
(a) The number of investigations open longer than 30 days (as of October 1) (hereinafter called the “backlog”) will be reduced to 600 by November 15, 2008 and 100 by December 31, 2008. For all investigations open in December 2008 and continuing thereafter, there shall be no backlog, except for specific cases where there is documentation of good cause to exceed 30 days as verified by the Court Monitor.
(b) The vacancy rate for case carrying social workers will be reduced from 23 percent (September 2008) (58 vacancies in relation to currently budgeted Full Time Equivalents (“FTEs”)) to as low as 15 percent (35 vacancies in relation to currently budgeted FTEs) by December 31, 2008.
(c) The CPS hotline staff will be trained and the new telephone system for the CPS hotline will be fully operational by no later than December 31, 2008. The Court Monitor will assess the functionality of the system.
2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 898 Filed 10/06/2008 Page 3 of 4
(d) The first two units of in-home staff will colocate with the Collaboratives as soon as September 30, 2008 but no later than October 15, 2008. The remaining eight units of in-home staff will colocate with the Collaboratives as soon as October 30, 2008 but no later than November 15, 2008.
(e) Beginning November 15, 2008 and continuing thereafter CFSA and private agency staff shall conduct a family-involved meeting and secure the approval of the CFSA Director prior to recommending the goal of APPLA for any youth. The familyinvolved meeting shall assess all permanency options for the youth and seek commitment from the youth and the youth’s family team on the permanency recommendation.
(f) By December 31, 2008, a CFSA impact team will convene family-involved team meetings for 60 youth who have a goal of APPLA. These meetings will result in the review of legal permanency options (adoption, guardianship, and reunification), the identification of potential resources for permanent, legal relationships, and recommendations and action steps for at least 30 of the reviewed youth. By December 31, 2008, CFSA will develop a plan and schedule to complete reviews of all children with the APPLA goal for inclusion in the 2009 Strategy Plan.
(g) By December 31, 2008 CFSA will add 90 placements,1 in an appropriate mix to address placement needs.
(h) By October 30, 2008, CFSA will identify 40 children with a goal of adoption (including children who have no identified permanency resource and children who are placed in a pre-adoptive home, but have not achieved legal permanency). By no later than November 15, 2008, CFSA will identify and hire an external contractor to lead impact teams to review the status of these 40 children and identify and address barriers to achieving permanency. By no later than December 15, 2008, the impact teams will be in place and will work in collaboration with CFSA staff to achieve identified goals. There will be monthly monitoring of the progress of the impact teams in achieving permanency for these children.
(i) By November 15, 2008, CFSA will enter into a contract with a private agency with evidence of effectiveness in adoptions practice and acceptable to the monitor to provide adoption services for 25 children who have a permanency goal of adoption and no adoptive resource. The contract shall require that the provision of services begins by January 1, 2009.
(j) On November 1, 2008, December 1, 2008, and January 1, 2009, the Court Monitor will issue reports on Defendants’ efforts and compliance with the applicable terms of this Stipulated Order.
1This includes the following 40 placements CFSA contracted for in August 2008: two foster home beds for medically fragile children, 20 therapeutic foster home beds and 18 traditional foster home beds.
3

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 898 Filed 10/06/2008 Page 4 of 4

7. It is understood that the Consultant will work with the Interim Director of CFSA and the City Administrator during the effective period of the contractual engagement. If at any time the Consultant determines that the engagement is not productive, the Consultant shall so notify Defendants and shall have the option to unilaterally terminate its contract.
8. By January 15, 2009, the Defendants, in consultation with the Plaintiffs, shall complete a proposed annual strategy plan for the 2009 calendar year acceptable to the Court Monitor that contains specific action steps and benchmarks to move Defendants toward compliance with all MFO and AIP final requirements.
___________/S/_______________________________ PETER J. NICKLES Acting Attorney General for the District of Columbia
RICHARD S. LOVE [340-455] Senior Assistant Attorney General Office of the Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General-DC Counsel for Defendants 441 Fourth Street, NW, Sixth Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 724-6635 Counsel for Defendants
_________/S/___________________________________ Marcia Robinson Lowry Sarah Michelle Bartosz Jeremiah Frei-Pearson Children's Rights 330 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10001 (212) 683-2210
Arthur B. Spitzer (DC Bar No. 235960) American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area 1400 20th Street, N.W., Suite 119 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 457-0800 Counsel for Plaintiffs

So Ordered. October __, 2008

________________________________ Thomas F. Hogan United States District Judge

4

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 778 Filed 03/05/01 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,
Plaintiffs v.
ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,
Defendants

C.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)
ORDER

FILED
MAR 05 2001
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON. ClERK U.S. OIITRICT COURT

The Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding counsel for plaintiffs' claims

for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in monitoring compliance from March 3,2000 through December

31, 2000 with the orders entered in this civil action. Having reached an agreement regarding the amount

to be paid by defendants for such costs and expenses, the below-referenced counsel have jointly requested

that the Court enter this Consent Order, which reflects the agreement.

s=~ Upon consideration ofthe agreement ofthe parties, it is by the Court this

of

· . ·~·~ ;~01;

ORDERED: that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of one

hundred thirty-one thousand nine dollars and ninety-one cents ($131,009.91) in complete

settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from March 3, 2000 through December 3 1, 2000 with the orders entered in this civil action, with

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 778 Filed 03/05/01 Page 2 of 2
payment made consistent with paragraph 4.D of the parties November 20,2000 Agreement as to undisputed fees and costs.
cc: Richard S. Love Senior Counsel Equity and Receivership Division Office ofthe Corporation Counsel Counsel for Defendants 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001 Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Eric Thompson, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

LASHAWN A., by her next friend, Evelyn

)

Moore, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

Civ. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the District )

of Columbia, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court are the plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for a Finding of Civil Contempt [Dkt. No. 910], the defendants’ Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree (“Termination Motion”) [Dkt. No. 914], and the defendants’ Motion to Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring that the Court Monitor Approve, or Authorizing Her to Impose or Write, the District of Columbia’s Plans, Policies, or Strategies (“Monitor Motion”) [Dkt. No. 924]. After hearing oral arguments on these motions and considering the parties’ briefs and the relevant evidence in the voluminous record of this case, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs’ motion, deny the defendants’ Termination Motion, and grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs’ Monitor Motion for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND A. Events Leading to Liability and Consent Decree In 1989, the plaintiffs brought this class action against the mayor and other District of
Columbia officials on behalf of children who depend on the District’s child welfare system,

including its foster care system, alleging numerous violations of state and federal laws.1 After hearing two weeks of testimony, this Court “determined that, due to inept management and the indifference of the mayor’s administration, ‘the District had failed to comply with reasonable professional standards in almost every area of its child welfare system.’” LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 998 (D.D.C. 1991)). The Court found “widespread and systematic deficiencies” that caused emotional and physical harm to children in foster care as well as children who were not in the District’s custody but who were the subject of inadequately addressed reports of neglect. LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 983-86. It is not necessary to recite these troubling findings in greater detail here—suffice it to say that the Court concluded that the District’s child welfare system complied with neither “federal law, District law, nor, for those plaintiffs in the District’s foster care, the United States Constitution.” Id. at 960-61. Accordingly, the defendant officials were held liable for the District’s federal, local, and Fifth Amendment violations. Although the District reserved the right to appeal that ruling, the parties worked out a proposed consent decree2 to correct the myriad deficiencies in the District’s child welfare system. This proposal was approved and adopted by the Court as a Remedial Order on August 27, 1991 [Dkt. No. 145]. This Remedial Order, inter alia, appointed the Center for the Study of Social Policy as a Court Monitor. Since then, the Court Monitor has kept the Court apprised of the District’s progress and related developments. The Monitor has also has also assisted the parties with negotiations of proposed consent orders and implementation plans.
B. Appellate Findings and Instructions The District appealed, arguing that this Court overstepped its bounds by reaching the plaintiffs’ federal statutory and constitutional claims. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the
1 The defendant officials are currently responsible for the care of some 2,100 children in foster care and the supervision of over 600 children living at home. 2 The terms “consent decree,” “consent order,” and “consent judgment” are used interchangeably here.
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District of Columbia Circuit held that a private right of action existed under the District’s Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act, such that it “provided an independent basis for supporting the district court’s judgment.”3 LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“LaShawn I”). “Accordingly, rather than reach the difficult constitutional and federal statutory questions, the LaShawn I panel remanded the case ‘with instructions to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible.’” LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting LaShawn I, 990 F.2d at 1325). Consequently, this Court entered an 84-page Modified Final Order (“MFO”) based on local law, which was virtually identical to the original order. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1994). The District again appealed, arguing that the MFO unlawfully “imposes requirements beyond those of District law.” LaShawn A. v. Barry, No. 94-7044, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30536, 1996 WL 679301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 1996). Reasoning “that District law is not materially less demanding than federal law,” the D.C. Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment.4 Id. Soon thereafter, the Court adopted an implementation plan, developed by the Court Monitor and the parties, which provided steps toward compliance with the MFO.
C. Implementation of the Judgment: Receiverships While pursuing appeals, the District failed to comply with the Remedial Order. Therefore, in November 1994, this Court appointed three limited receivers to manage the child welfare system’s protective services, resource development, and corrective action functions. These receivers reported a “severe level of dysfunction” and concluded that the scope of their authority was insufficient to successfully implement the remedial order. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp.
3 The D.C. Circuit also reached the implicit conclusion that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was appropriate. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), see also LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing the en banc ruling). 4 In so ruling, the D.C. Circuit surmised that this Court had determined that the substitution of District law as the basis for the decree “did not materially undermine the District’s consent.” LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d at 850.
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297, 313 (D.D.C. 1995). Concurrently, the District was faced with a financial crisis. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Concerned that looming cost-cutting measures “would seriously undermine the receivers’ efforts to implement the consent decree,” the Court exempted certain staff members from such measures and adopted the receivers’ work plans. Id. (citation omitted).
In May 1995, after finding pervasive areas of noncompliance and missed deadlines, the Court held the defendants in contempt and placed the child welfare system into general receivership. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, concerned with the breadth of authority granted to the general receiver, remanded with instructions to “only authorize the Receiver to violate local law in those instances where, considering other alternatives, [the Court] specifically concludes an override is necessary to enforce the terms of the consent decree.” Id. at 854. And, if it so concludes, “identify the specific federal law ground it is using as justification for the Receiver’s authority to transcend local law.” Id. at 855. Such measures proved unnecessary, and, in October 2000, the parties agreed to a consent order setting forth requirements to end the receivership. Citing compliance with these requirements and the District’s overall improvement, the Court ended the receivership as of July 2001, subject to a probationary period.
D. Post-Receivership Implementation & Compliance The probationary period ended in 2003 with the entry of an implementation plan (“IP”) designed to bring the District into full compliance with the MFO. The defendants raised concerns with the outcome measures described in the IP. The IP was later amended, revised, and ultimately submitted for approval pursuant to a joint motion of the parties. This “Amended Implementation Plan” (“AIP”), which describes various outcomes to be achieved by the end of 2008, was adopted by the Court on February 27, 2007, shortly after Mayor Fenty took office. Progress was observed and maintained in many areas from 2003 to 2007, although the Court Monitor expressed concern that performance in several areas had “reached a plateau.” See Ct. Monitor Report, March 21, 2008
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4-5 [Dkt No. 990]. Then, things took a turn for the worse. On January 9, 2008, Banita Jacks’ four daughters, known to the District’s Child and Family
Services Agency (“CFSA”) by virtue of reports of suspected abuse or neglect in 2006 and 2007, were found dead in their home in the District’s Eighth Ward. See Office of the Inspector General, District of Columbia, OIG No. 09-I-0029, Report of Special Evaluation: Interaction Between an AtRisk Family, District Agencies, and Other Service Providers (2005-2008) (April 2009) [Dkt. No. 1010]. Due to media attention resulting from this horrific and demoralizing discovery, calls to the District’s child abuse and neglect hotline increased dramatically. Ct. Monitor Report, March 21, 2008. CFSA became overwhelmed, and the parties developed a six-month plan to stabilize the foundering agency. According to the Court Monitor, the parties also agreed to extend the compliance date for AIP outcomes to June 30, 2009. Id. Making matters worse, the agency’s Director resigned in July 2008. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a finding of civil contempt, alleging deteriorating performance and complaining of the defendants’ failure to develop an acceptable strategy. The parties reached a temporary resolution, and the Court entered a Stipulated Order, holding the motion in abeyance, enumerating several reform efforts and consultation requirements, and requiring the defendants to produce a “strategy plan” for the 2009 calendar year. Stipulated Order, Oct. 7, 2008 [Dkt. No. 899].
Citing the Court Monitor’s dissatisfaction with the defendants’ proposed plan, the plaintiffs renewed their contempt motion in January 2009, adding allegations of noncompliance with the Stipulated Order. The following month, the defendants filed a Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree, followed in March by a related Motion to Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring that the Court Monitor Approve, or Authorizing Her to Impose or Write, the District of Columbia’s Plans, Policies, or Strategies. The Court addresses each of these motions in turn.
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II. RENEWED MOTION FOR CONTEMPT In July 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt alleging the District failed to comply
with its obligations under the 1993 Modified Final Order (“MFO”) [Dkt. No. 891-2] and 2007 Revised Amended Implementation Plan (“AIP”) [Dkt. Nos. 861-1, 891-3]. That motion alleged some thirteen categories of violations based largely on data from April 2008. In October 2008, the parties reached agreement on the terms of a stipulation and proposed order [Dkt. No. 898], which was adopted as a Stipulated Order [Dkt. No. 899] holding the motion for contempt in abeyance, setting interim requirements, including the development of an annual “strategy plan.” The defendants submitted a proposed strategy plan on January 26, 2009, followed the next day by a motion for court approval of that proposal. [Dkt. Nos. 907, 908.] On January 30, 2009, the plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the defendants’ proposals, filed a renewed motion for contempt, now before the Court, wherein they incorporate their prior motion5 (supplemented with more recent data) and assert new grounds for a finding of contempt, based on alleged violations of the Stipulated Order. The first new ground is that the District has repudiated its obligations in developing a 2009 annual strategy plan as specified under Paragraph 8 of the Stipulated Order:
Instead of submitting to the Court a comprehensive plan, approved by the Monitor, completed in consultation with Plaintiffs, and containing specific action steps and benchmarks directed at achieving MFO and AIP compliance, Defendants have moved the Court to approve a temporary plan, not approved by the Monitor, completed without meaningful consultation with Plaintiffs, and containing virtually no specific action steps or benchmarks.
Renewed Mot. for Contempt 7 [Dkt. No. 910]. The plaintiffs further allege that the mayor appointed a new CFSA Director without consulting the plaintiffs as required by paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order. Pls.’ Reply Br. 2 [Dkt. No. 918].
5 The plaintiffs reserved the right to re-initiate contempt proceedings if they were unsatisfied with the District’s progress on its commitments under the Stipulated Order. Stipulated Order ¶ 1.
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A. Legal Standard The Court has inherent power “to enforce compliance with its orders through the remedy of civil contempt.” SEC v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Unlike criminal contempt, which has a punitive goal, civil contempt is “a remedial sanction designed to obtain compliance with a court order . . . .” Food Lion v. United Food Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Contempt is appropriate “only if the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous, and the violation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Broderick, 437 F.3d at 1234. In this context, clear and convincing evidence means “a quantum of proof adequate to demonstrate to a ‘reasonable certainty’ that a violation has occurred.” SEC v. Bilzerian, 613 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Levin v. Tiber Holding Corp., 277 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 2002)). “Furthermore, if the order contains any ambiguities, the Court must resolve those issues in favor of the party against whom contempt is sought.” Broderick v. Donaldson, 338 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C. 1997)). The order is to be interpreted using an objective test that considers the plain language of the order and the circumstances surrounding its issuance. Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing United States v. Young, 107 F.3d 903, 907 (D.C.Cir.1997)). “In analyzing the matter at hand, the court bears in mind that ambiguity is far less likely to be found when the order at issue was proposed and consented to by the contemnor.” Id. (citations omitted). Once the moving party has come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of noncompliance, the respondent carries the burden to establish a justification for the violation in order to avoid a contempt finding. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 16. A contemnor’s good faith alone is not a defense, but a party may raise good faith substantial compliance as a defense. See
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United States v. Shelton, 539 F. Supp. 2d 259, 263 (D.D.C. 2008); Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1017-18 (noting that “although a party’s good faith may be a factor in determining whether substantial compliance occurred, and may be considered in mitigation of damages, good faith alone is not sufficient to excuse contempt”); see also Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated in part, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “In order to prove good faith substantial compliance, a party must demonstrate that it took all reasonable steps within its power to comply with the court’s order.” Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1017 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Discussion 1. The Amended Implementation Plan
The plaintiffs allege numerous violations of the AIP, which is enforceable pursuant to the MFO. MFO § XX.B.5.a. They point to over a dozen categories of noncompliance with AIP benchmarks, based largely on data from November 2008 and March 2009. See Pls.’ Supp. Mem. [Dkt. No. 945]; see also Ct. Monitor Letter, March 21, 2008, Mot. For Contempt, Ex. I Appx. A [Dkt. No. 891-10] (explaining that the defendants were not in compliance with a majority of the quantitative AIP benchmarks). The defendants argue that a contempt sanction is not necessary to encourage progress because data indicate that CFSA is incrementally improving performance across the AIP outcomes. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Supp. Br. 3 [Dkt. No. 946]. They point largely to measures of performance as of March 31, 2009 as reported by CFSA Director Gerald. See generally Gerald Decl., Defs.’ Supp. Br. Ex. 1 [Dkt. No. 943-1] (discussing measures of performance cited by the plaintiffs as well as national statistics as reported in January 2007). They also contend that the deadline for compliance with the AIP outcome measures was extended from December 31, 2008 to June 30, 2009, such that this motion was prematurely filed. Defs.’ Supp. Opp’n Br. 3 [Dkt. No. 943]; see also Ct. Monitor Letter, March 21, 2008 2 [Dkt. No. 891-10]. The plaintiffs, however,
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argue that such an extension was contingent on the development, by July 1, 2008, of a one-year plan acceptable to the Monitor.
Although the Court never extended any AIP deadlines, in light of the District’s demonstrated efforts throughout 2008, the Court will decline to hold the defendants in contempt based on failures to meet AIP requirements that are illustrated solely by data gathered prior to June 30, 2009. See Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 2-3 (indicating that CFSA had largely stabilized and returned to 2007 levels of performance). Therefore, to the extent the plaintiffs’ motion is grounded in alleged noncompliance with the AIP, it will be denied without prejudice.6
2. Selection of a CFSA Director Paragraph 4 of the October 7, 2008 Stipulated Order [Dkt. No. 899] provides: “It is understood that an acceptable permanent Director, once recruited, will be hired by the Mayor of the District of Columbia and will report to the Mayor of the District of Columbia. The Court Monitor and Plaintiffs will be included in the selection process for the permanent Director.” On February 10, 2009, the defendants notified the Court that Roque R. Gerald, Psy. D., who served as the Interim Director of CFSA since July 2008, was selected and nominated by the mayor to be the agency’s permanent Director. [Dkt. No. 915.] The notice states that “[t]he Defendants consulted the Plaintiffs’ counsel and the Court Monitor prior to selecting Dr. Gerald.” Id. The plaintiffs dispute this claim, alleging that the defendants “undertook no legitimate or good faith consultation with Plaintiffs regarding the qualifications and attributes of an acceptable permanent director,” nor did they discuss the selection of Dr. Gerald or any other possible candidates. Pls.’ Reply Br. 2, 3. “Instead, shortly before Mayor Fenty’s February 10 announcement, Plaintiffs’ counsel received an altogether perfunctory telephone call from Attorney General Peter Nickles” informing them of the planned nomination. Id. The defendants’ description of their efforts to include the plaintiffs is revealing: 6 The District’s performance is discussed in terms of certain AIP benchmarks in Section III, infra.
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THE COURT . . . Am I to understand that . . . [the plaintiffs] have not been included in the selection?
MR. NICKELS: They will be included and given notice before we make a selection and have an opportunity to talk to the individual. If it’s Dr. Gerald they would have already met him and opposed him. They will know just as they knew last time they agreed and then rejected.
THE COURT: What [does] an acceptable permanent director mean to you?
MR. NICKELS: This means, to me, a candidate that’s acceptable to the mayor. It’s an executive function. The mayor was selected to run this agency. He has the right to name a director. Obviously, when he names a director he will receive advice from a lot of different people.
THE COURT: The court monitor and plaintiffs being included in the selection process means to you [that] after you select a person they’re allowed to talk to them?
MR. NICKELS: What it means, Your Honor, is that the mayor will make a selection and hear the comments of [the plaintiffs’ counsel] and the court monitor. We already know the views of the court monitor and the plaintiffs about our current director. Does that mean we can’t appoint the current director?
THE COURT: Your reading of this order does not comport with, I think, the commonsense reading of the order.
MR. NICKELS: Your Honor, there’s only so much consultation you can have. . . . Does the fact that the plaintiffs don’t like Dr. Roque Gerald mean that we can’t select him?
THE COURT: They are not saying that.
MR. NICKELS: They know his work --
THE COURT: The order requires, as I read it, consultation. And that, it seems to me, does not mean after the fact. Additionally, the order requires an acceptable (to the court monitor) proposed annual strategic plan that was not done. . . . If you want to not follow the court order you need to file some type of motion to get relief from the Court . . . .
Hr’g. Tr. 27:9-28:25, Feb. 6, 2009.
After the nomination, the mayor’s counsel, Ellen Efros of the District’s Office of the
Attorney General, had an opportunity to explain the selection process before the Court:
MS. EFROS: And we believe, Your Honor, that the plaintiffs were consulted. I don’t think the plaintiffs have any issue with whom we selected as the director of CFSA.
THE COURT: That is not the point. The point is whether or not the court order was obeyed that the court monitor and plaintiffs would be included in the selection process for the permanent director, obeyed in reality, not just superficially by notifying them of who you wanted to name.
MS. EFROS: I understand, Your Honor. We did try to communicate with the
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plaintiffs about the selection. Whether or not that communication or involvement rises to the level of what was contemplated by the order is questionable. But again it is not -- we don’t believe that in and of itself would be sufficient basis to hold the defendants in contempt here. Hr’g. Tr. 31:1-32:9, July 13, 2009.
Ms. Efros was mistaken. The defendants argue that they substantially complied in good
faith with the stipulated order. Yet they do not dispute the plaintiffs’ characterization of their
communications regarding the selection of a Director. A call informing the plaintiffs’ counsel of
the selection does not constitute inclusion in the selection process. Since the nomination was the
mayor’s responsibility, the Court finds that Mayor Fenty failed to comply with the clear terms of
paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order. And because the record reveals no justification for the
heedless effort to comply with this simple requirement, the Court cannot find that the mayor (or
other District officials) demonstrated good faith or substantial compliance with regard to paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order.7
3. The 2009 Annual Strategy Plan
Among the requirements of the Stipulated Order is the creation, in consultation with the
plaintiffs, of a 2009 annual strategy plan:
By January 15, 2009, the Defendants, in consultation with the Plaintiffs, shall complete a proposed annual strategy plan for the 2009 calendar year acceptable to the Court Monitor that contains specific action steps and benchmarks to move Defendants toward compliance with all MFO and AIP final requirements.
Stipulated Order ¶ 8 (October 7, 2008). Instead of submitting such a plan, the defendants submitted a six-month proposal8 [Dkt. No. 907], five pages in length, which was not approved by the Court
7 No criticism of Dr. Gerald is meant to be implied here. Indeed, the undersigned commends Dr. Gerald for his dedication to the District’s child welfare system. 8 The defendants did not formally seek relief from the Stipulated Order, but the Court informally granted leave for the defendants to file their plan by January 26, 2009. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Renewed Mot. for Contempt Ex. A [Dkt. No. 912-1].
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Monitor.9 The plaintiffs argue that the defendants violated the order because the six-month
proposal (1) is not an annual plan, (2) is not acceptable to the Monitor, and (3) lacks sufficient
action steps and benchmarks. The defendants are clearly in noncompliance with the requirement
that the proposed plan be an annual plan. The defendants contend, however, that the parties
informed the Court Monitor that they had agreed to postpone development of an annual plan, and
would meet to discuss a six-month “bridge period,” such that by doing so they substantially
complied with the order in good faith. Ct. Monitor Letter, January 5, 2009 11 [Dkt. No. 996]. It is
clear, moreover, that the Court Monitor was concerned with this proposal for good reason—its
dearth of benchmarks and specific action steps. See Ct. Monitor Mem.: Comments on 2009
Strategy Plan Proposal (March 4, 2009) [Dkt. No. 924-4]; Ct. Monitor Letter, January 26, 2009,
Renewed Contempt Mot. Ex. B [Dkt. Nos. 910-2, 997]. The Court cannot agree with Director
Gerald’s characterization of the proposal as “reasonable and ambitious.” Gerald Decl. 5. The
proposal amounts to little more than an outline, and the defendants have not provided a reasonable
justification for its lack of detail. The defendants’ lackadaisical approach to this requirement, and
their last-minute requests for adjustments, are additional grounds for concern.10 For these reasons,
the Court must again question whether the defendants genuinely intend to cooperate. Due to their
failure to provide an adequate annual proposal developed in consultation with the plaintiffs by the
9 This six-month proposal was superseded by the District’s proposal of a one year plan to exit court supervision, which was submitted to the Court Monitor on February 24, 2009. Monitor Mot. Ex. A [Dkt. No. 924-1]; Gerald Decl. 5. 10 The defendants also requested that the Court refrain from ruling on the contempt motions until addressing their termination motion. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Supp. Br. 1 [Dkt. No. 946]. The Court sees no reason to do so. See Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 438 (2004) (rejecting argument that federal court lacks power to enforce an order “unless the court first identifies, at the enforcement stage, a violation of federal law”); see also Maness v. Meyers, J., 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975) (“The orderly and expeditious administration of justice by the courts requires that ‘an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings’” (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947)); Cf. Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (it is a "well-established principle that a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees and settlement agreements"); United States v. Pearce, 792 F. 2d 397, 400 n3 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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deadline, the Court finds that the defendants have failed to comply, substantially or otherwise, with the unambiguous provisions of paragraph 8 of the Stipulated Order.
C. Conclusion The blatant disregard for paragraph 4 described above is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the defendants stipulated to the order’s terms, which required nothing more than genuine consultation. The contumacious posture of District officials has become a troubling theme here. See LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. at 299 (“[t]he remedial phase of this case has been marked by repeated cycles of noncompliance and sluggish progress”). Intransigence may be a nominal improvement from indifference, but it is still unacceptable in this context. The Court will hold the defendants in civil contempt for failing to comply with paragraph 8 of the October 7, 2008 Stipulated Order. The Court will further hold Mayor Fenty, as the official responsible for the appointment of the CFSA Director, in civil contempt for noncompliance with paragraph 4 of the order. The Court will not impose any fines at this time, and will instead take the measures outlined in the accompanying order.11 III. MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM COURT ORDERS When exercising their equitable authority, judges often face a tension between two maxims familiar to the field of medicine: primum succurrere (“first, hasten to help”) and primum non nocere (“first, do no harm”). One way to craft a judgment intended to address problems without causing new ones is to invite the parties to negotiate terms of a consent decree. Such judgments have a “hybrid character, having qualities of both contracts and court orders.” Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. at 431, 437 (2004) (“A consent decree embodies an agreement of the parties . . . [that they] expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree . . . .” (citation omitted). Should a problem
11 The defendants reserved the right to seek an evidentiary hearing as to the remedy. See Order (May 7, 2009) [Dkt. No. 941].
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with a prospectively applicable decree later arise, a party may move the Court to amend, vacate, or otherwise grant relief from it accordingly. FED. R. CIV. P. 60. Here, the defendants bring two motions to amend consent orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5).
A. Legal Standard Rule 60(b)(5) states, in pertinent part: “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [if] the judgment has been satisfied . . . or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable . . . .” The Rule is an avenue for demonstrating that significantly changed circumstances warrant reexamination and modification of an order. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (Cardozo, J.) (“A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need.”). “Modification of a consent decree may be warranted” when: (a) “changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,” (b) “when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,” or (c) “when enforcement would be detrimental to the public interest.” Rufo v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1992) (citations omitted). It is not, however, a vehicle for relitigating underlying violations or for challenging a ruling. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. at 2579, 2593 (2009); see also id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (the Court is not required to “retrace old legal ground, say, by remaking or rejustifying its original constitutional decision every time an effort is made to enforce or modify an order” (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390 (“[A] consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent that equity requires”). “[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393. The leading Supreme Court opinion discussing Rule 60(b)(5) in the institutional reform context is Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009). In Horne, the Court explained:
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[T]he Rule provides a means by which a party can ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if a significant change either in factual conditions or in law renders continued enforcement detrimental to the public interest. The party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief, but once a party carries this burden, a court abuses its discretion when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of such changes. Rule 60(b)(5) serves a particularly important function in what we have termed “institutional reform litigation.” For one thing, injunctions issued in such cases often remain in force for many years, and the passage of time frequently brings about changed circumstanceschanges in the nature of the underlying problem, changes in governing law or its interpretation by the courts, and new policy insights-that warrant reexamination of the original judgment.
129 S. Ct. at 2593 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court continued:
[I]n recognition of the features of institutional reform decrees, we have held that courts must take a “flexible approach” to Rule 60(b)(5) motions addressing such decrees. A flexible approach allows courts to ensure that responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials when the circumstances warrant. In applying this flexible approach, courts must remain attentive to the fact that federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate [federal law] or does not flow from such a violation. If [a federal consent decree is] not limited to reasonable and necessary implementations of federal law, it may improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers. For these reasons, a critical question in this Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether the objective of the . . . . declaratory judgment order . . . has been achieved. If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.
Id. at 2594-95 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “This inquiry . . . . takes the
original judgment as a given and asks only whether ‘a significant change in factual conditions or in
law’ renders continued enforcement of the judgment detrimental to the public interest.” Id. at 2596-
97 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384); see also id. at 2615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
B. The Consent Orders
As discussed above, the Modified Final Order (“MFO”) was negotiated by the parties and
entered as a consent decree in 1993. The decree implements various statutes in some detail,
reflecting a choice among various ways they could be implemented. Cf. Frew, 540 U.S. at 438.
The MFO is also a set of remedial and prophylactic measures intended to ensure that officials fulfill
their responsibilities to the District’s most vulnerable residents. It requires the Court Monitor to
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develop an implementation plan with the active participation of the parties. MFO § XX.B. An implementation plan must specify, among other things, “steps and tasks necessary to achieve compliance with the [MFO],” which must be updated every six months. MFO § XX.B.3.b. An implementation plan is binding on the parties as part of the MFO, which provides: “the [parties] waive any rights they may have to challenge any aspect of any such plan and agree to be bound by the plan.” MFO §§ XX.B.4, XX.B.5.a. The plaintiffs further agreed “not to seek judicial relief for technical, de minimus violations” of the MFO or the implementation plan. MFO § XX.F.3. Full compliance was expected by the end of 1995, MFO § XX.B.5.b, and the MFO accordingly envisions a procedure for ending court supervision: “The Monitor shall serve until the court determines, upon defendants’ application, that the Monitor is no longer necessary.” MFO § XX.A.3.
The implementation plan adopted in 2003 (the “IP”) established interim benchmarks to be achieved by December 2006. Despite the MFO’s waiver provision, the defendants sought to “reserve their right to raise objections to the outcome measures and to demonstrate, at an appropriate time, that they are in compliance with the MFO prior to achieving each of the threshold or ‘fully’ compliant levels set forth in the [IP].” Defs.’ Resp. to Proposed Implementation Plan 3, May 5, 2003 [Dkt. No. 804]. Compliance was not achieved in 2006, and the parties worked together in early 2007 to develop an amended implementation plan (the “AIP”). Consent Mot. to Enter Proposed Consent Order (Feb. 15, 2007) [Dkt. No. 861]. The Court adopted the AIP, which was intended to “govern implementation of child welfare reform under the [MFO] through December 31, 2008.” AIP preamble. In the AIP, the parties reserved “whatever rights and objections they have previously asserted in response to the [IP].” Id. In addition to specifying various outcomes, the AIP includes an annual “Strategy Plan” and various “action steps” that “are enforceable by the Court but can be changed or deleted with the approval of the Court Monitor.” AIP 17. It further provides that the Strategy Plan “will be updated annually in consultation with the
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Plaintiffs and the Court Monitor and is subject to approval by the Court Monitor.” Id. The Court Monitor did not approve of the defendants’ 2009 proposed plan, as required by the October 7, 2008 Stipulated Order. Ct. Monitor Mem., Feb. 12, 2009 (“Comments on Latest Versions of District’s Six Month Plan”); see also Ct. Monitor Mem., March 4, 2009 (“Comments on February 24, 2009 Strategy Plan Proposal”) [Dkt. No. 929-3]. On March 13, 2009, the defendants submitted a revised proposal to the Court along with their motion to modify the Court Monitor’s authority. Monitor Mot. Ex. A [Dkt. No. 924-2].
C. Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree In their Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree (“Termination Motion”) [Dkt. No. 914], the defendants request that the Court set forth a definitive timeline to end court supervision and terminate the consent decree within one year, and “adopt specific exit criteria narrowly designed to address any remaining District law violations [with a brief time period for monitoring exit criteria].”12 Termination Mot. 1, 31. “At the very least,” they add, “this Court should discharge all provisions of the consent decree except those designed to remedy an ongoing statutory violation, including any provision related to a violation that has now been cured.” Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Supp. Br. 1. Because the defendants fail to demonstrate that a significant change in circumstances warrants the relief requested, the Court will deny their motion. In support of their Termination Motion, the defendants argue that “the District is now in statutory compliance,” Mot. 3, and “[b]ecause the District is now in compliance . . . Horne v. Flores requires that the consent decree be dissolved.” Defs.’ Reply to Supp. Br. 2 [Dkt. No. 949]. Alternatively, even if “statutory compliance remains in [sic] issue, it is no longer equitable that the consent decree have prospective effect given significantly changed circumstances—namely, the complete transformation of the District’s child welfare system in the past decade.” Id. They add,
12 The motion also included a request to approve the District’s six-month plan, which was rendered moot by the defendants’ later submission of a proposed annual plan.
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“it is inappropriate for a federal court to continue to oversee the responsibilities of local officials based on non-systemic violations of local statutes.” Id. at 17; see also Monitor Mot. 23 (“. . . it is inequitable for the Court’s orders to remain in effect beyond this calendar year.”). Essentially, they contend that they have achieved substantial compliance, and that they can be reasonably expected to achieve full statutory compliance within one year, such that relief from the MFO is appropriate. Indeed, they claim that the Court’s supervision is now doing more harm than good. Termination Mot. 2.
1. Discussion In Horne, the plaintiffs sued the State of Arizona under the Equal Education Opportunities Act (“EEOA”) for failing take “appropriate action to overcome [students’] language barriers.” Id. at 2589-90. Finding the funding allocations for English-Language-Learner (“ELL”) instruction to be arbitrary, the district court held the defendants in violation of the EEOA. Id. The court entered a declaratory judgment, followed by several injunctions to ensure adequate funding. Id. Later, the state passed legislation that changed the ELL funding scheme, which, among other things, provided for structured English immersion, a different pedagogical approach to ELL instruction. Id. at 259091. Arguing that this new legislation constituted a significant change in circumstances, the state moved for relief under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court denied the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 2591. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the lower courts misapprehended the EEOA and misapplied the flexible standard for Rule 60(b)(5) motions set forth in Rufo v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) by failing to consider whether the state “is now fulfilling its statutory obligation by new means.” Id. at 2589. For their part, the plaintiffs contend that Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) is controlling. In Frew, parents of children eligible for certain Medicaid services alleged that Texas’ Medicaid program did not comply with federal law. The district court entered a consent decree, which the plaintiffs moved to enforce two years later, arguing that state officials failed to fully
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comply with its requirements. The district court agreed. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decree is a “federal court order that springs from a federal dispute” such that its enforcement lawfully “vindicates an agreement that the state officials reached to comply with federal law,” id. at 438-9, even if it requires the defendants to “take some steps that the statute does not specifically require.” Id. at 439.
Although this case differs from both Frew and Horne, each is instructive. Here, as in Frew, a consent decree is the subject of the motion. Notably, Horne did not involve a consent decree, and did not disturb the principle described in Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986), and observed in Frew, that a consent decree may “provide[] broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.” Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525; Frew, 540 U.S. at 439; see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391. Unlike Frew, however, the question here is whether the decree is prospectively equitable, not whether it is enforceable.
To answer this question, it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved. See Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2595; see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, 384; Bd. Of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-49 (1991). In Horne, the objective was compliance with the EEOA. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2595. So, the Court turned to the EEOA and found two particularly relevant statutes. One embodied the mandate upon which the judgment was based. See id. at 2597 (“Of course, any educational program, including the ‘appropriate action’ mandated by the EEOA, requires funding, but funding is simply a means, not the end.”). Another was the EEOA’s express limitation on court-ordered remedies. Id. at 2595 (stating that “. . . the EEOA itself limits courtordered remedies to those that ‘are essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1712). Notably, no similar statutory restriction is applicable here. Indeed, in stark contrast, CFSA’s enabling statute states that: “The provisions of this subchapter are intended to be consistent with all
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outstanding orders of the United States District Court in the LaShawn A, et al. v. Anthony Williams, et al., case.” D.C. Code § 4-1303.02a(f) (2009); see also D.C. Code § 4-1303.03a (2009).
The declaratory order and injunctions at issue in Horne also differ significantly from the consent decree and implementation plan at issue here. In Horne, the district court ordered the state to “prepare a cost study to establish the proper appropriation to effectively implement ELL programs,” set a deadline for the provision of funding, and ultimately imposed a schedule of fines that “escalated from $500,000 to $2 million per day” for each day the state failed to comply with the funding order. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2590 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the MFO leaves the District with a great deal of latitude in achieving its general requirements via “phased implementation plans” that are to be periodically updated. MFO § XX.B.
With respect to the nature and scope of the decree, this case is more like Rufo v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, wherein the Supreme Court announced the flexible approach applied in Horne. In Rufo, inmates of the Suffolk County Jail sued state and local officials, alleging that they were being held under unconstitutional conditions. The district court agreed and enjoined the defendants from housing an inmate awaiting trial with another inmate. Several years later, problems persisted to the point where the court of appeals ordered that the jail be closed unless a plan to create an adequate facility for pretrial detainees was adopted. Thereafter, the district court entered a consent decree, which included an architectural program for a new jail based on a projected population of 229 inmates. By the time construction began, the prisoner population had increased significantly, and the court modified the decree to provide for 453 cells. Shortly thereafter, the Sheriff moved to modify the decree to permit double-bunking in 197 cells, asserting that a recent Supreme Court decision clarified that such arrangements are constitutionally permissible. Despite these changed circumstances, the district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the defendant petitioners argued that the district court could not enforce the consent decree beyond those constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court rejected that argument,
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explaining:
To save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation, petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily does that), but also more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement. . . . To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation. The position urged by the petitioners would necessarily imply that the only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal constitutional prison standards . . . . Substantively, this would do violence to the obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the state were not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements.
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-90; see also Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (“a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree
merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial”);
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 354 n.6 (1992) (“parties may agree to provisions in a consent
decree which exceed the requirements of federal law”); Frew, 540 U.S., at 437 (“a federal consent
decree must spring from, and serve to resolve, a dispute within the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction; must come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings; and must
further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based”) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Here, the consent decree’s general purpose is to “ease the plight of children who depend on
[the District] for protection and for the opportunity to live and grow in a stable and nurturing
environment.” LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As recounted above, it
was crafted by the parties and ordered by the Court to address myriad deficiencies and conditions
that violated federal and local law,13 and was later upheld as a remedy for violations of local law.14
13 Specifically, the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977 (the “Abuse and Neglect Act”), D.C. Law 2-22 (Sept. 23, 1977), the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986, D.C. Law 6-139 (Aug. 13, 1986), and the CFSD Manual of Operations (Sept. 1985).
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LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.
Supp. 2d 959, 968-80 (D.D.C. 1991). Notably, the D.C. Circuit upheld the decree even assuming
that it “imposes requirements beyond those of District law.” Id.; see also Termination Mot. 27
(suggesting that “local officials in charge of institutional litigation” agreed to do “more than that which is minimally required by the [applicable law] . . . .” (citation omitted)).15 Keeping this in
mind, the Court will consider whether, as a result of changed circumstances demonstrated by the
defendants, the District is now in enduring compliance with the mandates underlying the consent
decree. Cf. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2598 (noting the importance of up-to-date factual findings).
2. Changed Circumstances and Unforeseen Obstacles
The defendants argue that significant changes—“namely, the complete transformation of the
District’s child welfare system” have occurred over the past decade that warrant modification of the
MFO and related orders. Defs.’ Reply to Supp. Br. 2 [Dkt. No. 949]. Modification is appropriate
“when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.
While such obstacles must be unexpected, they need not be entirely unforeseeable in order to justify
relief. Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Court here considers the
circumstances and events that the defendants claim warrant the requested modifications and prompt
dissolution of the MFO.
a. Structural Changes
The defendants list a panoply of “structural changes” in support of their argument that
14 The Court assumes that the same analysis is appropriate regardless of the nature of its subject matter jurisdiction. Naturally, Rule 60 does not apply to state or local courts, which may wield a different range of equitable powers than a federal court. 15 The parties have not discussed the extent that the defendants’ motion amounts to a challenge to the D.C. Circuit’s 1996 ruling. The District’s argument inescapably suggests that Horne has implicitly overruled that opinion, however, since a challenge to prior rulings in this case would not otherwise be cognizable under Rule 60(b)(5). See Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2593 (“Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests.”). This Court does not find the Circuit Court’s ruling to be abrogated nor does it find continued enforcement of the MFO to be improper.
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“changed circumstances” warrant relief. Termination Mot. 23-27. They describe several legislative and administrative developments, including the elevation of CFSA to a cabinet-level agency,16 id. at 24, the unification of the investigation system, id., the promulgation of new regulations for foster homes, id. at 26, and the creation of a Family Court for the District of Columbia, id. at 27. They point out that CFSA now has lower caseloads, an advanced case tracking system, and a 24-hour hotline that can record and retrieve calls. Id. at 25-6. They also note that CFSA conducts internal quality assurance monitoring and is subject to review by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as well as the D.C. Council. Id. at 26-7. Finally, the defendants highlight an increase in the number of attorneys dedicated to abuse and neglect cases. Id. at 27.
Similar arguments were raised in NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2000). There, an employer sought termination of a consent decree, arguing that such relief was warranted in light of personnel changes and an internal reorganization, among other things. Id. The court agreed that Harris Teeter had “promptly complied” with most, but not all, of the decree’s requirements. Id. at 35. The court reasoned, however, that:
compliance over an extended period of time is not in and of itself sufficient to warrant relief. . . [P]arties who have successfully sought modification have also established events or changed circumstances which "make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous," make the decree "unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles," or make "enforcement [of the decree] detrimental to the public interest. Id. The court explained that “[i]nternal compliance mechanisms instituted to effectuate the decree . . . . and hurdles inherent in a consent decree’s entry do not count as ‘obstacles’” under Rufo. Id. at 35-6. The Court denied the motion, emphasizing that the movants had not claimed that any circumstance or obstacle “makes the decree unworkable.” Id. at 36. The defendants here have similarly neglected to explain how any alleged changes make the decree “unworkable.” Such an explanation is required by Rufo, even in the institutional reform
16 CFSA was formerly the Child and Family Services Division of the Department of Human Services (“CFSD”).
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context, though the burden should be lighter than in Harris Teeter, which did not involve a government institution. See id. at 35. Moreover, some of the measures taken by the District (e.g., the 24-hour hotline, case tracking system, and reduced caseloads) are required by the MFO, and as such do not constitute unforeseen circumstances that warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(5). See id.; see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385. Furthermore, the defendants merely mention other “structural changes,” without discussing actual impacts, and without alleging any new policy insights. By contrast, the movants in Horne provided detailed descriptions of the state’s implementation of a “structured English immersion approach,” along with academic research papers supporting the new approach. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2586. For these reasons, the Court finds that the defendants have failed to demonstrate significantly changed circumstances justifying modification.
b. Economic Hardship The defendants further argue that the District’s projected revenue shortfall of $802 million for fiscal year 2010, or “some 15% of the District’s annual budget in local funds” is an unforeseen obstacle that warrants relief.17 Defs.’ Opp’n Br. 20 [Dkt. No. 922]. They note that CFSA allocated $615,550 for 2009 and that monitoring imposes other costs “by consuming the time and resources of government lawyers and officials.” Termination Mot. 29. Financial constraints are a legitimate concern. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 392-3; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990). The costs of monitoring, however, are not properly considered to be obstacles. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997) (holding that anticipated costs of compliance with an injunctive order are not changed circumstances under Rufo); see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385; Harris Teeter, 215 F.3d at 36. Moreover, the defendants have not shown projected costs to be unworkable or even
17 It bears noting that the District experienced severe financial hardship in 1995, well before the terms of the IP and AIP were negotiated. See generally LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d at 850-51.
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superfluous, nor have they provided a specific proposal for addressing the shortfall. Therefore, the
Court finds that they have failed to demonstrate that financial circumstances warrant modification.18
2. Statutory Compliance
The defendants contend that the District has achieved statutory compliance “in a full range
of areas” and “is making effective and appropriate efforts” in the “few remaining areas where legal
compliance can be improved.”19 Termination Mot. 3. They do not claim that the statutes the
consent decree is intended to effectuate have materially changed.20 Neither do they allege any
particular provision of the MFO to be inappropriate, unreasonable, or aimed at eliminating
conditions that are not unlawful or do not flow from a violation of law. Nor do they allege that any
of the AIP or MFO requirements are inconsistent with District policies or prospective policies.
Rather, they argue that they have substantially achieved the outcomes set forth in the AIP, and that
the AIP’s requirements inappropriately exceed statutory requirements, notwithstanding their
consent to its terms. The defendants make this claim even though they worked with the plaintiffs
and the Court Monitor to develop the AIP, and jointly submitted it for Court approval three years
18 The accompanying order invites discussion of budgetary or funding issues at the next status conference. 19 The defendants state that applicable local statutes provide “no [] precise standard or particular percentage that defines legal compliance. Nor would the district ever be able to show perfect compliance.” Defs.’ Supp. Br. 9. It is true that most of these statutes provide no specific criteria; but from this observation, the defendants take a startling leap: “Substantial compliance, not exact compliance, is the appropriate measure.” Id. (citing R.C. v. Walley, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1044 (M.D. Ala. 2005)); see also id. at 9-10 (“The proper focus here is on correction of systemic violations of law, not whether every problem has been corrected.” (citing R.C. v. Walley, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1144 (M.D. Ala. 2007))). This supposition, immediately familiar to anyone driving a bit over the speed limit, is based on a misreading of R.C. v. Walley. R.C. involved a consent decree that expressly provided “‘substantial compliance’ [as] the governing standard for termination.” Id. at 1043. The opinion does not suggest it as a standard for ascertaining statutory compliance. Additionally, on this point, the defendants’ position is at odds with Horne. See Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2589 (“The question at issue . . . is not whether Arizona must take ‘appropriate action’ [as required by the EEOA] . . . . Of course it must.”). 20 The Court invited and received supplemental briefs “addressing whether and how the District today remains in violation of the local statutes upon which the Court made its original findings of liability, and whether as a matter of law statutory compliance would nullify the consent decrees in this case.” Order, May 7, 2009 [Dkt. No. 941].
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ago, during Mayor Fenty’s administration. They point out that the District filed “objections” to the
IP and the AIP, arguing that many of the benchmarks “mandate performance at ninety percent or
higher which is an unrealistic level of compliance and is beyond any compliance level that can be mandated by law.”21 Termination Mot. 18 n.3, 19 n.4. Regardless, the AIP is intended to bring the
District into compliance with the MFO, which has been upheld based on local statutes whose terms
remain in force. Therefore, the defendant’s argument either assumes that the D.C. Circuit ruling
upholding the MFO was abrogated by Horne or that the AIP goes beyond the requirements of the
MFO such that they should not have consented to its terms. Because the AIP’s Strategy Plan
applied only through 2008 (or, as extended, June 30, 2009), the defendants claims regarding the AIP
are moot. However, in light of legislative changes other developments since the entry of the MFO,
the Court will take this opportunity to discuss the MFO, as implemented via the AIP, in context of
the current statutory framework. Cf. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (explaining that new legislation
may constitute a “potentially significant changed circumstance”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The defendants support their motion primarily by comparing the Court’s 1991 findings with
2008 or 2009 data, describing the comparison as “the most resounding demonstration possible that
the District is taking appropriate action to comply with its duties under applicable statutes.” Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Supp. Br. 10.22 To be sure, the plaintiffs similarly cherry-pick the data discussed in
21 Based on these objections, the defendants contend that they “have never consented to those benchmarks . . . .” (emphasis in original). Termination Mot. at 23-24. Notably, the parties waived such objections in the MFO, MFO § XX.B.4, and the defendants did not characterize their filing as an objection, although they did raise this concern regarding IP outcome measures, Defs’ Resp. to Proposed Implementation Plan 3, May 5, 2003 [Dkt. No. 804]. The defendants clearly consented to the AIP’s terms, but since the AIP acknowledges prior objections, these filings may be relevant to whether the decree’s continued operation is equitable. 22 The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs have conceded compliance in five areas because the plaintiffs failed to specifically address those areas in their supplemental brief. Defs.’ Supp. Reply Br. 9. (The plaintiffs provided four “illustrative examples.” Pls.’ Supp. Br. 18.) The Court finds no concession here, particularly in light of the fact that the defendants bear the burden of persuasion.
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their briefs, fighting overstatement with oversimplification. These analyses are not very revealing,
partly because they say very little about the sustainability of recent performance levels.
Fortunately, the record is supplemented by the Court Monitor’s data and commentary. The Court
need not address each category of activities or responsibilities enumerated in the consent orders to
resolve the pending motions, particularly with respect to areas where the parties’ analyses are
cursory (e.g., provision of continuing or preventive services,23 periodic reviews,24 and monitoring
foster homes25). Instead, the Court will herein focus on six areas addressed by the parties:
timeliness of investigations, case planning, voluntary placement, adoption, and system
infrastructure.
a. Timeliness of Abuse and Neglect Investigations
In 1991, the Court found that CFSD had “failed to initiate investigations into reports of
neglect or abuse within 24 hours and complete investigations within two weeks” in violation of
D.C. Code § 6-2102(b) (1981 ed.) and § 301.15 of the CFSD Manual of Operations. 762 F. Supp.
at 968-69. Similarly prompt initiation is required today: “[Investigations] shall commence (1)
Immediately upon receiving a report of suspected abuse or neglect indicating that the child’s safety
23 See D.C. Code § 4-1303.03(a)(3) (2009) (CFSA must “maintain a program of treatment and services for families of neglected and abused children including services designed to help children, where safe and appropriate, return to families from which they have been removed”). The AIP requires, among other things, medical and dental evaluations within 30 days of placement. AIP § 24(b). It further requires that CFSA provide documentation of Medicaid coverage within five days of placement, and Medicaid cards within 30 days of placement. AIP § 24(c). For children with a reunification goal, the AIP also sets visitation requirements. AIP §§ 10 (caseworker-parent visits); 20(b) (sibling visits); 11 (child-parent visits). The defendants do not allege these requirements to be inconsistent with CFSA policy. 24 In various circumstances where a child is placed outside of the home, their status must be periodically reviewed. D.C. Code. § 4-1301.09(d)(2); see also id. § 16-2323 (requiring permanency and review hearings in family court for children in foster care). In addition to projecting a date for return or permanent placement, such a review must assess the child’s safety, the appropriateness of the placement, and compliance with the case plan. Id. § 4-1301.09(e)(1). 25 Facilities providing foster care in the District (and any CFSA foster home, regardless of its location) must be periodically licensed and inspected. D.C. Code §§ 4-217.02, 7-2103, 7-2105. In 2001, the District promulgated regulations governing the licensing of foster homes for abused or neglected children. See generally CDCR §§ 29-6000 et. seq.
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or health is in immediate danger; and (2) As soon as possible, and at least within 24 hours, upon receiving any report not involving immediate danger to the child.” D.C. Code § 4-1301.04(b) (2009); see also id. § 4-1301.04(c) (delineating requirements for the initial phase of an investigation); CFSA Investigations Policy (Sept. 30, 2003) Ch. 1000 § 7.A.4.g (requiring face-toface contact with alleged child victim within 24 hours of receiving report). Investigations must be completed within 30 days, D.C. Code. § 4-1301.06(a) (2009), and CFSA employees have five days after the completion of an investigation to complete a final report. Id. at § 4-1301.06(c). The AIP is consistent with these statutes. See AIP §§ I.A.1.a (requiring initiation of investigation within 48 hours), I.A.1.b (requiring investigations to be completed within 30 days). The defendants claim that they have achieved compliance with these requirements. They also note, understandably, that timeliness must not be achieved at the expense of quality or safety. Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Supp. to Renewed Mot. for Contempt 4 (discussing length of investigations) [Dkt. No. 946].
Specifically, the defendants allege that, as of March 31, 2009, CFSA initiated or attempted to initiate 91% of investigations within 48 hours, which would meet the AIP benchmark. Gerald Decl. 6 [Dkt. No. 943-1]. The plaintiffs dispute this, alleging that only 72% of investigations were timely initiated as of March 2009 and only 74% were completed on time. Pls.’ Supp. Br. 18-19. The defendants contend that this discrepancy arises from cases where an investigator attempts but fails to locate the child, which are not counted as initiated until the child is actually contacted. Defs.’ Supp. Reply Br. 11-12; Gerald Decl. 6. The record does not reveal the methodology used to measure good faith attempts. Lacking such information, the Court cannot determine whether these attempts amount to initiation within the meaning of the AIP or the D.C. Code.26
26 In a review of forty investigations conducted in March 2007, the Court Monitor found that 31 were timely initiated, three included sufficient good faith efforts to meet the AIP initiation standard and six “did not meet the standard of being initiated within 48 hours.” Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 28 (citing Ct. Monitor Report: An Assessment of the Quality of Child Abuse and Neglect Investigative Practices in the District of Columbia (Nov. 14, 2007)). A similar qualitative review is forthcoming.
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The defendants also attribute other discrepancies between their data and the plaintiffs’ data to different measurement methodologies. For instance, they contend that the District does not consider an investigation completed until the report is written, and based on a 35-day time period, investigations are timely completed and closed investigations over ninety percent of the time. Hr’g Tr. 23:1-11 (July 20, 2009). The defendants also explain that “from January 1, 2009 to March 31, 2009, there were a total of 1,608 investigations, of which 462 cases had been open greater than 30 days, with a median of 33 days to closure.” Defs.’ Supp. Reply to Pls.’ Contempt Mot. 4. Finally, they emphasize that, despite amassing a backlog that rose to 1,759 cases in June 2008, CFSA reduced the backlog to 40 by April 2009. Id. (citing Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 29-30 [Dkt. No. 998]). The Monitor has applauded CFSA’s recovery from early 2008, when reports indicate that only 56% of investigations were timely initiated, and only 17% were timely completed. Indeed, it appears that, with regard to timeliness of investigations, CFSA has returned to or surpassed its 2007 levels of performance. This does not amount to compliance with the District’s unambiguous statutes, however. Even assuming that it did, in light of CFSA’s 2008 performance, the defendants have not shown that compliance is sufficiently likely to persist.27
b. Case Planning District law requires the prompt preparation of a case plan for each child for whom there is a substantiated report of abuse or neglect. D.C. Code § 4-1301.09(b) (the agency “shall, as soon as possible, prepare a plan for each child and family for whom services are required on more than an emergency basis and . . . take such steps to ensure the protection of the child and the preservation, rehabilitation and, when safe and appropriate, reunification of the family . . . .”). A case plan must be “consistent with the best interests and special needs of the child” and be designed to place him or 27 According to data validated by the Court Monitor, 71% of investigations were timely initiated as of November 2007. This figure fell to 56% as of April 2008, but rose to 75% as measured in January 2009. According to the Monitor, 55% of investigations were completed within 30 days as measured in November 2007. This figure plummeted to 17% in April 2008, but rose to 74% in January 2009.
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her in the “least restrictive and most appropriate setting available.” Id. § 4-1301.09(d)(1). Among other things, it must include a plan for the child’s safety and care, assuring the availability of services to improve conditions in the parents’ home, facilitating the child’s return home or permanent placement, and a description of the appropriate type of home or institution for placement. D.C. Code § 4-1301.02(3); see also id. § 1301.09a (requiring “reasonable efforts” to reunify families). If reunification is not possible, CFSA must ensure the child’s timely permanent placement, consistent with such a plan. D.C. Code § 4-1303.01a.
The AIP requires permanency goals to be consistent with District law as well as the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”), Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-675). Under the AFSA, a child may be assigned one of five goals at a permanency hearing. Among these is the category of Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (“APPLA”), which is the least preferred option and requires documentation of a “compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interests of the child to follow one of the four [other] options.” 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20. The MFO predates AFSA, but the defendants allege no inconsistency with the general permanency goals outlined in the MFO (APPLA falls within the MFO category of “continued foster care”).
In 1991, the Court found that the District “consistently failed to place children in the least restrictive placements consistent with their needs.” 762 F. Supp. at 972. This District also “consistently failed to prepare written case plans” and that the plans for children in its foster care often contained inappropriate goals. Id. at 973-74. CFSA now routinely develops case plans in a timely manner. Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 13 (95% timely in April 2008 and 97% in January 2009). CFSA’s case planning quality measures, however, show “inconsistent results.” Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 3, 13. The Monitor’s 2007 qualitative analysis of investigations revealed significant improvements in investigation standards together with persistent deficiencies in
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information gathering, training, and risk assessment that affect the quality of case planning.28 See

generally Ct. Monitor Report: An Assessment of the Quality of Child Abuse and Neglect

Investigative Practices in the District of Columbia (Nov. 14, 2007). Despite CFSA’s use of

permanency goals consistent with the ASFA, in the most recent Quality Service Review, reviewers

found 60% of case plans to contain acceptable strategies or reasoning, and acceptable

implementation in 50% of cases. Quality Service Review: Children and Families Served by the

District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency, CSSP (April 2009) 9-12. The Court

Monitor has repeatedly expressed concern about the “high number of children and youth with a goal

of [APPLA].” Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 67. Teenagers deemed unlikely to be adopted,

return home, or obtain guardianship are often assigned a goal of APPLA. Many grow up in foster

care and exit at the age of 18 or 21 without a stable home, a disposition associated with higher rates

of unemployment, homelessness, incarceration, and mental health problems. Id. CFSA has sought

to reduce the number of children with an APPLA goal, in part with the assistance of the Annie E.

Casey Foundation Strategic Consulting Group (“CSCG”). In November 2007, there were 833

children with an APPLA goal, amounting to 37% of all children in the District’s custody.

According to CSCG, this percentage dropped to 21% in early 2008, but remained above the national

average of 14%. Id. In 2008, under Dr. Gerald’s leadership, CFSA took action by disallowing the

automatic assignment of APPLA as a goal and increasing reviews for youth on track to “age out” of

the system. These measures are encouraging, but the extent to which the District is in compliance

with statutory case planning requirements remains unclear.

c. Foster Care: Voluntary and Emergency Placement

Within ninety days of removing a child from home, CFSA must either return the child home

or request the filing of a neglect petition. D.C. Code. § 4-1303.03(a)(2). Where CFSA takes

custody pursuant to the request of an agreement with a parent or guardian (a “voluntary

28 An updated analysis is forthcoming.

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placement”), the appropriate time period is even shorter. CFSA Investigations Policy (Sept. 30, 2003) Ch. 1000 § 7.L.1 (requiring a determination that the need for care shall not exceed 21 days). The defendants identify no inconsistencies with the MFO, which requires that such emergency care be limited to 21 days, unless an extension is duly approved. MFO § IV. In 1991, the Court found that children routinely languished in voluntary or emergency care, including the captioned plaintiff, LaShawn A., who was in voluntary care for two-and-one-half years. LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 971. The District now accepts voluntary placements only in rare circumstances. Indeed, as of December 2008, no children were in voluntary placements. Termination Mot. 11. The Court is satisfied that compliance with these statutes, as well as MFO § IV (“Emergency Care”) has been achieved. See Ct. Monitor Report, July 19, 2006 40; see also Birdsong Decl., Termination Mot. Ex. A 6.
d. Adoption In 1991, the Court emphasized CFSD’s noncompliance with its mandate to “prepare a permanent plan” for children that cannot be timely returned to their home, and its own policy requiring children with a goal of adoption to be referred within three days to the branch responsible for recruiting adoptive parents. 762 F. Supp. at 975. Where reunification is not feasible, CFSA must “take steps to implement a permanent plan of adoption or an alternative permanent plan for the child,” D.C. Code § 4-1303.03(b)(3), and ensure “timely permanent placement consistent with the . . . plan,” id. § 4-1303.01a(b)(11). Among these steps is a judicial procedure that involves filing a motion for termination of parental rights (“TPR”) so that a child can be legally adopted. The AIP requires the District to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that children with a permanency goal of adoption are in an approved adoptive home within nine months, and that placements in an approved adoptive home are finalized within one year. AIP § 16. TPR petitions and judicial proceedings more generally are merely part of the means here; the end is successful placement in a home. Recognizing this, the District has taken new initiatives on this front over the
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past two years, such as CFSA’s “Permanency Opportunity Project.”29 The Court is confident that
such efforts will facilitate the demonstrable achievement of the statutory goal of case plans that are
properly designed and executed. Unfortunately, the record does not yet indicate the extent to which
these efforts help identify and establish permanency resources. See, e.g. Defs.’ Status Report on
2009 Annual Plan 9.
The defendants aver that legal action is timely initiated by the District, and a majority of
children with a goal of adoption (499 in total as of October 31, 2009) are placed within nine
months. Data validated by the Court Monitor indicates that legal action is timely initiated in 84% of
adoption cases as of January 2009. Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 12. Yet the same data
indicate that only about half of children with a goal of adoption were in pre-adoptive placement
within nine months. Id.; Ct. Monitor Report, June 11, 2009 9 [Dkt. No. 1000].
Furthermore, of the thirty five children who had adoptions finalized in the last quarter of
2008, twenty six had waited in their approved adoptive home for over one year for the process to
conclude. Id. at 75. Overall, the Monitor has observed a decline in adoptions since 2005, despite an improvement in the timeliness of legal action.30 Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 72. In sum, the
record indicates that efforts to encourage more timely filings have succeeded, and that this
improvement has not resulted in more timely placements.
The defendants, on one hand, attribute some progress to the creation of the Family Court for the District of Columbia,31 stating that it has “vastly improved collaboration with the Court.”
29 CFSA has also established a new website with information for prospective foster parents or adoptive parents: http://adoptDCkids.org. 30 The defendants indicate that this trend has turned around, pointing to figures in a recent status report. Defs.’ Status Report on 2009 Annual Plan [Dkt. No. 1018-1] 9 (“128 adoptions were finalized in calendar year 2009, 26 more adoptions than were finalized in calendar year 2008 . . . .”). In their discussion of performance data generally, and these data in particular, the parties rarely point to helpful descriptive statistics. Raw numbers are valuable, but additional information (e.g., percentages), tends to help put them in context. 31 The Family Court Act of 2001 created the Family Court of the D.C. Superior Court and imposes a One-Family-One-Judge case management model.
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Termination Mot. at 27 (citation omitted). On the other hand, they explain that, after the District’s
Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) takes legal action to terminate parental rights (“TPR”), the
District “must rely on other actions in the child welfare system, such as the Family Court, to move
the adoption process forward.” Defs.’ Reply 10. According to the District, as of February 2009,
there were “364 TPR petitions pending before the Family Court. Of these petitions, 156 are
officially being held in abeyance by the Court, including 96 in which an adoption petition is
pending. The Family Court has currently scheduled less than a third of the pending TPR petitions
for a pretrial conference or a trial.” Id. (citations omitted). Andrew Reese, Deputy Attorney
General for the OAG Family Division, explains and describes a resulting “catch-22” scenario:
[t]he DC child welfare legal community and most family court judges are historically resistant to moving on the government’s motions to terminate parental rights until an adoptive home has been identified for a child. Concern is regularly expressed about creating ‘legal orphans.’ It is, however, significantly easier to recruit pre-adoptive homes for children who have been legally freed for adoption. This concern about creating ‘legal orphans’ can leave the child in limbo . . . .
Reese Decl. ¶ 13, Defs’ Reply Br. Ex. I.
The defendants note that their proposed Strategy Plan “offers additional strategies to
improve adoption outcomes.” Termination Mot. at 11. None of those strategies address this problem, however.32 See Monitor Mot., Ex. A 5-6, 12. The fact that CFSA cannot control the
Family Court offers no solace to children waiting for adoptive placement or to the honorable
citizens hoping to welcome a child into their family (or, for that matter, parents hoping that a child
has found safety and opportunity in a new home). This quandary in the Family Court may be an
impediment to placement, but the defendants must make reasonable efforts to ensure timely
placements nonetheless. Despite recent, encouraging steps to facilitate timely filing and review of 32 More recently, Chief Judge Lee F. Satterfield of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia has made efforts to ensure timely TPR processing. See Sup. Ct. A. Order 10-04: Timeline for Resolution of Motions to Review Magistrate Judges’ Decisions in Neglect, Guardianship, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights Matters (March 9, 2010), available at http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/docs/10-04.pdf.
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TPR petitions, the Court cannot conclude based on the relevant evidence in the record that the defendants have demonstrated compliance with the AIP or the statutes governing permanent placement.
e. System Infrastructure The defendants contend that the Court’s 1991 “system infrastructure findings . . . regarding case tracking, caseloads, supervision, and training . . . were not based on a specific statutory requirement and thus cannot be bases for continuation of the consent decree.” Mot. at 16 (citing 762 F. Supp. 976-9). This contention is simply incorrect. The Court’s 1991 findings in this regard were based not only upon the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1990 and the defendants’ stipulations, but upon local law. LaShawn A. 762 F. Supp. at 976-9 (“Federal and District law contain requirements pertaining to case tracking, caseloads, supervision, and training”) (emphasis added). As the Court explained, District law requires the maintenance of a Child Protection Register to index cases of abused and neglected children and assist in the treatment of those children. D.C. Code. Ann. § 6-2111. District law also requires CFSD to have “sufficient staff, supervisory personnel, and resources to accomplish the purposes of the Abuse and Neglect Act, including the capacity to provide emergency and continuing service resources to abused and neglected children and their families.” Id. at § 6-2122(c).
Id. at 964 (brackets omitted). These mandates persist today. D.C. Code §§ 4-1302.01 et. seq. (Child Protection Register); 4-1303.02a(d) (recodifying former § 6-2122(c)); 4-1303.02a(e) (“[s]taff qualifications, caseload levels, and supervision requirements of [CFSA] in the public and private delivery of services shall be guided by nationally accepted standards of best practice . . . .”).
Finally, with regard to training, the plaintiffs have alleged several areas of noncompliance with AIP requirements. The defendants explain that much of CFSA’s staff “were pulled to support reducing the investigations backlog” such that “most did not have an opportunity to complete the required in-service training hours.” Defs.’ Resp. to Pls. Supp. Br. 8; Gerald Decl. 6-7. The 2009 Strategy Plan proposal includes a goal of integrating their investigations practice model with the
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California Social Work Education Center Curriculum. Defs.’ Strategy Plan 11. The Court Monitor has not confirmed the implementation of this measure, and has expressed concern over CFSA’s persistent failure “to reliably track and monitor the training experience of the entire child welfare workforce and the training of foster and adoptive parents.” Ct. Monitor Supp. Mem., Dec. 22, 2009; see also Ct. Monitor Mem.: Comments on 2009 Strategy Proposal, March 4, 2009 8-9. Adequate training is critical, as highlighted by the Inspector General’s conclusion that, in the Jacks case, “despite a clear allegation of child neglect, CFSA did not act upon any of the information provided by the . . . hotline caller.” OIG Report 14.
3. Good Faith Compliance for a Reasonable Period of Time The defendants contend that, since the end of receivership, they have demonstrated “good faith compliance with the Court’s orders for a reasonable period of time.” Defs.’ Supp. Br. 5 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247); Termination Mot. 17-22. The movants’ good faith efforts are an appropriate consideration. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249. The plaintiffs argue that this alone is not sufficient to warrant modification, particularly where the District has failed to meet the benchmarks outlined in the AIP, because many MFO and AIP provisions explicitly require “full compliance.” Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 21, 23 (citing MFO § XX.B(5)(b)); see also R.C. v. Walley, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“termination of a consent decree is not appropriate unless the decree’s purposes have been fully achieved”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Sheldon 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90050, *24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009) (denying the defendant’s motion to exit the consent decree because the objective of the decree had not been achieved despite “sweeping modifications and improvements to the community mental health system”). The defendants are correct that the Court may accept a level of compliance that falls short of these benchmarks as sufficient (especially in light of significantly changed circumstances), even over the plaintiffs’ objection. See United States v. Western Elec., 46 F.3d 1198, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also McDonald v. Carnahan, 109 F.3d 1319 (8th Cir. 1997). However, they have
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shown no reason why the Court should do so. Cf. NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Relieving a party from its obligations under a final judgment ‘is an extraordinary remedy, as would be any device which allows a party . . . to escape commitments voluntarily made and solemnized by a court decree’”) (citation omitted).
According to the defendants, “a review of the history of this case – post receivership – reflects a record of collaboration and cooperation by the District in seeking to meet the concerns presented by the plaintiffs, the Monitor and the Court.” Termination Mot. 6 n.2. Unfortunately, in light of the District’s refusal to abide by the simplest provisions of the Stipulated Order, the Court cannot find that a period of good faith has persisted. Nor has the District achieved, let alone established a period of consistent compliance with, many of the AIP goals. The District has achieved compliance with portions of the MFO, but, as explained in the next section, the Court declines to take a piecemeal approach to modification here.
4. The Proposed Modification The defendants ask the Court to “adopt specific exit criteria narrowly designed to address any remaining District law violations.” Termination Mot. 1, 31. Yet they have not proposed a modification tailored to the alleged changed circumstances. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383 (“[i]f the moving party meets [the changed circumstances] standard, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances”); see also Salazar v. District of Columbia, No. 93-452, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14418, *23 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2010). Indeed, they offer no specific proposals at all, beyond a year-end deadline. Alternatively, they request that the Court “discharge all provisions of the consent decree except those designed to remedy an ongoing statutory violation, including any provision related to a violation that has now been cured.” Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Supp. Br. 1. This request appears to be based on an exceedingly broad reading of Horne, where the district court’s order was designed to secure compliance with a single statute. Here, the MFO is designed to ensure compliance with multiple statutes, and the
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Court is neither obligated nor inclined to rewrite such an order each time the defendants fall into compliance with a part of it. Cf. Johnson v. Sheldon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90050, *24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009).33 The defendants have not demonstrated a basis for revision, but even if they had, the Court lacks an adequate proposal to consider. See Rufo 502 U.S. at 391 (“A proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor”); Frew v. Hawkins, 401 F. Supp. 2d 619, 634-35 (E.D. Tex. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Frazar v. Ladd, 457 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2006).
5. Sustainability The flexible standard set forth in Rufo, and reaffirmed by Horne, requires the moving party to show that a “durable remedy” has been implemented. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2595. This may be accomplished by showing that the objectives of the order or decree have been “attained,” Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, and that it is unlikely that the prohibited conditions or actions will recur, Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247-48 (requiring defendants to show that “it was unlikely that the school board would return to its former ways”). See Horne, 219 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (where the requested relief “amounts to having a ‘decree set aside entirely,’” the movant must show “that it is unlikely, in the absence of the decree, that the unlawful acts it prohibited will again occur”) (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 442)). To satisfy their burden of demonstrating the durability of implemented remedies, the defendants contend that, under the leadership of CFSA’s “new senior management,” the “structural reforms” discussed above “ensure that the agency’s improvement is durable and self-sustaining. Through quality assurance monitoring and its automated case-tracking system, the agency is now able to identify problems when they arise. As a cabinet-level agency, CFSA also has the resources
33 Although the District is in compliance with MFO § IV, the defendants have not indicated any problem with its continuing operation. (The Court Monitor ceased examining compliance with § IV several years ago.) Absent the plaintiffs’ consent or a concrete reason to strike it, the Court will decline to strike MFO § IV.
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and infrastructure to respond promptly and decisively to address any issues so identified.” Defs.’
Reply to Pls.’ Supp. Br. 19 [Dkt. No. 949]; see also Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Notice of Supp. Auth. 5
[Dkt. No. 1008]. These conclusory statements constitute almost the entirety of the defendant’s
discussion of sustainability.34
As the defendants emphasize, the District made significant strides between 2001 and 2007,
and the child welfare system has transformed since 1991. The events of 2008 revealed significant
weaknesses, however. The defendants nonetheless brought this motion just over a year removed
from the tragic discovery of the decomposing bodies of four girls who received no help from
CFSA.35 By all accounts, CFSA largely fell to pieces in the aftermath of that discovery. Yet the
defendants provide no discussion of lessons learned from 2008, training measures, or any other
indicia of sustainability in support of their motion.36 Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 91-93.
Undoubtedly, CFSA has taken measures to buttress reforms. But the defendants have not
illustrated any, at least not in a manner that inspires enough confidence to support a conclusion that
the agency’s progress is “durable and self-sustaining.” The Court Monitor, relying in part on data
from one of the very quality assurance initiatives the defendants refer to, has observed “multiple
examples of inconsistent performance over time, suggesting that long-term sustainability of
34 Curiously, the District has provided a more detailed discussion of the durability of remedies in similar briefs in other institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Evans v. Fenty, Case No. 76-293, Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate 14-51 (Oct. 7, 2009); Dixon v. Fenty, No. 74-285, Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss 10-32 (Sept. 4, 2009). 35 It bears noting that these children were four of at least nine children “known to CFSA” within their last four years who died in 2008 as a result of abuse at home. Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 11, 91-2. Those nine were among 65 children so known to CFSA who died in 2008. (The CFSA Child Fatality Committee reviews the circumstances of such tragedies and measures the “known to CFSA” category as the number children who were brought to the attention of or otherwise touched by CFSA within four years of their death.) This figure was 44 in 2007 and 55 in 2006. 36 In their subsequent motion, the defendants mention, in general terms, two 2009 training efforts, without further description. Monitor Mot. 15-16. They also indicate progress in terms of following the general strategies outlined in their 2009 Strategy Plan proposal, but their claims in this regard have not been validated by the Court Monitor. See Defs.’ Status Report (Sept. 2, 2009) [Dkt. No. 957-1]; Ct. Monitor Letter, Dec. 22, 2009.
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progress has not been achieved.” Ct. Monitor Report, April 30, 2009 3, 26-34 [Dkt. No. 998]; see
also id. at 5 (“CFSA is still unable to routinely track and/or provide reliable data on performance”
with regard to several responsibilities). Consistent with this view is the independent consultant’s
report,37 quoted here at length:
Last year was a particularly troubling one for CFSA with its crisis in investigations followed by significant turnover in leadership and throughout the agency, setting back even further its progress on well-being and permanency outcomes for children and youth. . . . Even before the 2008 investigations crisis, the fact that CFSA’s case practice needs sustained attention is well documented in the federal CFSR, the most recent Quality Service Review (QSR), the federal monitoring reports and the reports of many of the other experts and consultants deployed in DC over the past several years. Suffice it to say that there is consensus among these experts that DC needs to improve its safety outcomes, the quality of its investigations, its provision of health and mental health services to children in care, improve stability while children are in placement, and ensure many more of its children and youth achieve permanency and achieve it in a timely fashion. . . . Tackling challenges of this magnitude is an enormous undertaking, but this work is essential to any reasonable construction of a successful reform of child welfare. It goes to the heart of how a functional system operates to improve the lives of the children and families which it serves . . . .
Kevin Ryan, Public Catalyst Group Pres. Mem., April 15, 2009.
Due principally to the defendants’ failure to demonstrate durable statutory
compliance, the Court will deny their Termination Motion.
D. Motion to Modify the Court Monitor’s Authority
The defendants’ most recent motion seeks modification of the MFO, AIP, and Stipulated
Order provisions concerning the Court Monitor’s preparation of implementation plans (including
the “2009 annual strategy plan”). The motion includes a general request that MFO provisions that
“authorize the Monitor to impose requirements, write and/or plan for the District, or require her
approval of the District’s plans, policies, and strategies” be “modified to a consultative requirement
only.” Monitor Mot. 4, 24; Defs.’ Reply 10. The defendants also request the addition of the
following blanket provision in the AIP as well as the Stipulated Order:
37 Pursuant to the October 7, 2008 Stipulated Order, the District hired the Public Catalyst Group to provide an assessment and recommendations. The group engaged CFSA from October 15, 2008 to January 15, 2009.
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Any other provision of this Court’s orders which required or authorized the Court Monitor to approve, impose, or write the District of Columbia’s plans, polices, or strategies to reform, operate, or continue to improve its child welfare system shall be modified to require and/or authorize consultation only.
Monitor Mot. 5.
1. The Modified Final Order and the Amended Implementation Plan
The MFO requires the Monitor to develop implementation plans with the active
participation of the parties. MFO § XX.B. Section III of the AIP includes action steps “designed to
achieve safety, permanency, and well-being for children and to reach and sustain . . . performance
goals.” AIP 17. The defendants seek relief from the following AIP provision:
The action steps are enforceable by the Court but can be changed or deleted with the approval of the Court Monitor. The Strategy Plan will be updated annually in consultation with the Plaintiffs and the Court Monitor and is subject to approval by the Court Monitor.
Id. According to the defendants, the Monitor’s planning responsibility “usurps the legitimate
functions of the political branches” and provides the Monitor with “veto power over the executive’s
actions.” Monitor Mot. 9-10. They further allege, in a conclusory fashion, that the Monitor “slows
down the agency’s ability to plan its operations, delays its ability to make changes in response to
dynamic events or conditions, and adds a layer of procedural difficulties that may prevent timely
action.” Id. at 16. The defendants further argue that the MFO in general, and the Monitor’s
authority in particular, is “contrary to the public interest” because it “deprive[s] [the District’s]
citizens of a voice, through their elected officials, in the operation of their government.” Monitor Mot. 8 (citing Frew, 540 U.S. at 431).38
The Court finds the defendants’ complaints to be unfounded, and their arguments
unavailing, especially in light of the D.C. Council’s intent to harmonize CFSA’s authorities and
38 The defendants also claim that the Court Monitor’s authority “to impose, write or approve CFSA’s plans or policies is not narrowly tailored to cure a violation of law,” and that the Court Monitor “has acted in a manner that is inconsistent with her role as a quasi-judicial officer.” Monitor Mot. 3, 7. The Court finds these assertions to be unsubstantiated and without merit.
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directives with orders in this case. D.C. Code § 4-1303.02a(f) (statutes regarding prevention of child abuse and neglect are “intended to be consistent with all outstanding orders [in this case]”). Since the end of receivership, District officials have operated the child welfare system, including CFSA. Neither the MFO nor the AIP substitute for the District’s policies or regulations,39 nor do they permit the Court Monitor to override local law. In fact, the requirement for an annual strategy may be met chiefly via discussion of plans for implementing or administering District regulations or policies. Despite the defendants’ complaints, they do not provide a single example of a conflict, beyond the Court Monitor’s criticisms of the proposed 2009 Strategy Plan. Nor do they explain how the Monitor causes delays. If the defendants aim to pursue a strategy inconsistent with the MFO or AIP, they may request leave to do so. Recognizing the need for flexibility, the AIP provides for amendment or deletion of action steps with Court Monitor approval. AIP 17. The defendants do not allege that the Monitor has ever denied such a request. Although they bear the burden of persuasion, the defendants again rely on conclusory statements instead of demonstrating an actual problem. Rather than deny the motion entirely on that basis, however, the Court will take the actions outlined below.
2. The October 7, 2008 Stipulated Order As discussed above, Paragraph 8 of the Stipulated Order provides:
By January 15, 2009, the Defendants, in consultation with the Plaintiffs, shall complete a proposed annual strategy plan for the 2009 calendar year acceptable to the Court Monitor that contains specific action steps and benchmarks to move Defendants toward compliance with all MFO and AIP final requirements.
39 Indeed, the MFO required the creation of many of those policies and procedures, and several CFSA policies embrace the AIP. See, e.g., CFSA Investigations Policy (Sept. 30, 2003) Ch. 1000 § I, available at http://cfsa.dc.gov/cfsa/lib/cfsa/policymanualpdffiles/policies/program - investigation (final).pdf; CFSA Family Team Meetings Policy (Feb. 13, 2007) § I, available at http://cfsa.dc.gov/cfsa/lib/cfsa/policymanualpdffiles/policies/program - family team meetings (final).pdf. With regard to certain neighborhood-based services, the D.C. Code also specifically requires compliance with the AIP. See D.C. Code § 4-1303.03a.
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Since the Monitor refused to approve their proposed plan, the defendants seek relief from this provision. Essentially, they ask the Court to relieve them of the requirement that the plan be acceptable to the Monitor, and that the Court adopt or endorse their proposed plan.
The terms of the Stipulated Order were negotiated by the parties in October 2008, less than seven months before the defendants filed this motion. There has been no election since then. Mayor Fenty consented to these terms, even while Dr. Gerald served as the interim CFSA director. Therefore, the Stipulated Order does not raise the same dead hand control-like concerns as older institutional reform judgments might. Cf. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2594 (“Injunctions of this sort bind state and local officials to the policy preferences of their predecessors . . . .”). Moreover, it specifically references “compliance with all AIP final requirements.” The proposed annual plan, while an improvement over the six-month plan initially submitted by the defendants, consists largely of vague process goals and contains only a handful of specific action steps and benchmarks. See, e.g., Defs’ Strategy Plan Proposal, Monitor Mot., Ex. A 12 [Dkt. No. 924-2] (planning to improve placement stability only by setting “a reasonable percentage target for reducing placement changes”).
“Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when ‘it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application,’ not when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree.” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. Yet all that the defendants have shown here is that they are inconvenienced by their promises. Absent the plaintiffs’ consent, or some other, more compelling circumstances, the Court cannot not find prospective enforcement of this provision to be inequitable. Cf. NLRB v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, 215 F.3d 32, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Frew v. Hawkins, 401 F. Supp. 2d 619, 636 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“A Rule 60(b) motion is not a vehicle by which Defendants may disregard the voluntary obligations contained in the consent decree, allow time to pass, and then litigate the underlying claims in hopes of never actually complying with . . . its terms”); see also Johnson v.
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Sheldon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90050, *24 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009); cf. United States v. Jupiter Aluminum Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83807, *31 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2009) (noting that a movant “is not entitled to Rule 60(b)(5) [relief] just because it is disappointed with the consequences of the settlement”) (citing McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000)).
E. Conclusions of Law It bears repeating that neither the MFO, nor the AIP, nor the Stipulated Order was unilaterally imposed upon the defendants—the parties negotiated the terms of these documents and jointly submitted them for court approval. Unlike the AIP and Stipulated Order, however, the MFO was submitted almost two decades and several administrations ago. Although the defendants have not demonstrated any harm from the Court Monitor’s authority to enter plan updates, the Court is mindful of potential issues. Such authority is not necessary to facilitate entry of a new plan. It also raises potential federalism and separation of powers concerns, see Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2593, even if they are not fully applicable here, see D.C. Code § 4-1303.02a(f). Cf. Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535, 552 (D.D.C. 1997) (“where the local authority's failure to comply with court orders provides no factual basis for respecting the local authority, the court need not withhold use of its equitable powers based on the theoretical principles of federalism and comity” (citations omitted)). Therefore, the accompanying order relieves the Court Monitor of responsibility for submitting the next implementation plan.40 The order instead requires the parties to develop and submit a detailed proposal to the Court, which will provide a fresh opportunity for the defendants to suggest sensible “exit criteria.” For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the defendants have not demonstrated that any other modification of the MFO would be in the public interest. For the time being, the Court
40 The accompanying order accomplishes this by amending MFO § XX.B, which will amount, in practical terms, to a partial grant of the defendants’ motion.
- 44 -

Monitor will continue to provide valuable oversight and objective analyses. Due to the applicable timeframes and the Court’s resolution of other requests, the defendants’ requests for modification of the AIP and the Stipulated Order, as well as their implied request that the Court adopt their proposed annual strategy plan are moot. To the extent that their motion seeks to otherwise modify the Court Monitor’s role, it will be denied.
The Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that it must “exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is promptly returned to the State and its officials.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 442. Sadly, on this record, the Court cannot conclude that the objectives of the consent decree have been achieved. Nor can it find that the defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the decree’s prospective application is inequitable, even applying the flexible approach countenanced by the Supreme Court. Lacking a crystal ball, the Court cannot responsibly dictate the timeline that the defendants desire. Therefore, to the extent the defendants seek a “definitive timeline” or a date certain for the termination of court supervision, it must deny their Rule 60(b)(5) motion. Any other holding would represent an unwarranted triumph of hope over experience. IV. CONCLUSION
Extensive litigation on these motions has changed little. Although the District’s child welfare system has improved drastically from the dismal state it was once in, the defendants have yet to deliver a fully satisfactory child welfare system. This conclusion should not overshadow the diligent and thoughtful efforts the defendants, employees, foster parents, adoptive parents, and other participants in that system, which have accomplished a great deal over the past nine years. But the fragility of that progress and the persistence of several shortcomings were gravely illustrated two years ago. While the consent decree is not a permanent intervention, supervision must persist until the defendants demonstrate that the District reliably satisfies its responsibilities. The accompanying
- 45 -

order is intended to facilitate such a demonstration in the foreseeable future by setting the stage for a new implementation plan. Recent efforts within the child welfare system leave the Court optimistic; there are several reasons to believe that such a demonstration will be possible, perhaps even in the next eighteen months. Therefore, despite the aforementioned difficulties and tragedies, and the hurdles that lie ahead, the undersigned believes that this plan will constitute the first pages of the final chapter of this case.
For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Contempt will be granted in part and denied in part, the defendants’ Termination Motion will be denied, and the defendants’ Monitor Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
An order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

April 5, 2010

/s/

.

THOMAS F. HOGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

- 46 -

 
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!aaassseee     111: :888999-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000111777555444-­-­-TTTFFFHHH              DDDooocccuuummmeeennnt t     111000888222              FFFi il leeeddd     000222/ /222888/ /111111              PPPaaagggeee     222     ooof f     222

 
 !"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:&%%%2;<$=%-)>?(>&-%%%@"A$%&%5B%:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., by her next friend, Evelyn )

Moore, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Case No. 89-cv-1754 (TFH)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

)

District of Columbia, et. al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in its April 5, 2010 Memorandum Opinion, this Court held

Defendants in civil contempt for their failure to timely provide an adequate annual plan proposal

developed in consultation with Plaintiffs, as required by paragraph 8 of the October 7, 2008

Stipulated Order. Order (April 5, 201 0) [Dkt. No. 1025]. The Court further held Mayor Adrian

Fenty, as the official responsible for the appointment of a CFSA Director, in civil contempt for

noncompliance with paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order, requiring Plaintiffs' inclusion in the

selection process. Defendants reserved the right to seek an evidentiary hearing on remedies, and the

Court invited briefing on appropriate remedies and held a remedy hearing on July 23, 2010.

I

Plaintiffs suggest that older youth transitioning out of foster care, particularly those with an

"APPLA" designation, suffered from a deprivation of services due to the District's failure to take

their planning obligations seriously. Plaintiffs propose that the Court order the District to undertake

a competitive procurement process to engage, for two years, an organization that serves older youth

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:&%%%2;<$=%-)>?(>&-%%%@"A$%?%5B%:
transitioning out of foster care. 1 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs· proposal is excessive, contending that "[t]he passage of time and the actions already required by the Court are sufficient to address defendants' contempt." Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' proposed remedy is punitive, as opposed to compensatory or coercive, such that it would be an appropriate remedy only for criminal contempt, not civil contempt.
"[S]ome categories of sanctions-compensatory fines, coercive imprisonment, and per diem fines to coerce compliance with affirmative court orders-[are classified] as civil in nature." Salazar v. D.C., 602 F.3d 431,439 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Nat'! Org.for Women''· Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 659, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (approving as a civil sanction a per diem fine of $100 per day for failure to appear in court)). Yet, as Defendants point out, ''an unconditional fine imposed after a finding of contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance." Salazar, 602 F.3d at 440 (quoting Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But, for all practical purposes, there is often no bright line between civil and criminal contempt sanctions, as "[m]ost contempt sanctions, like most criminal punishments, to some extent punish a prior offense as well as coerce an offender's future obedience." Int'l Union, United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994); Salazar, 602 F.3d at 438.
1 Plaintiffs also propose that the Court order Defendants to implement a 2010-2011 "Strategy Plan" in the form proposed by the Court Monitor. While purportedly aimed at preventing the repetitive delays and lackadaisical approach that plagued the 2009 plan proposal, this proposed sanction is not specifically tied to any provision of the 2010-2011 proposals espoused by the Monitor but eschewed by Defendants. The Court accordingly rejects it. Additionally, while Plaintiffs set forth a persuasive argument that youth with an APPLA goal were most likely to have seen benefits from an adequate plan, relative to others in foster care, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that effects of the contemptuous conduct warrant, as a coercive or compensatory sanction, the specific injunction they propose.
-2-

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:&%%%2;<$=%-)>?(>&-%%%@"A$%C%5B%:
Upon consideration of the parties· arguments, the Court rejects Defendants' claim that a contempt sanction is unnecessary.2 Cf' Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 79
(D.D.C. 2003) ("It is appropriate to use the contempt power to identify wrongdoing and to prevent
the recurrence of contumacious behavior in the future."); In re Fannie Mae Sees. Litig. 552 F.3d
814, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("District judges must have authority to manage their dockets, especially
during massive litigation such as this, and we owe deference to their decisions whether and how to
enforce the deadlines they impose." (citation omitted)). The Court also rejects Defendants'
argument, based on Evans and National Labor Relations Board v. Blevins Popcorn, 659 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1981 ), that a "three-stage process" is required for civil sanctions concerning a failure to meet a clear, court-ordered deadline.3 Here, after seeking additional time to comply with AlP
requirements, Defendants failed to comply with the agreed-upon deadline of paragraph 8, such that
members of the plaintiff class were unable to realize the intended benefit of the parties' bargain.
The sanction imposed below is therefore tailored to be compensatory, not punitive, in nature. See
Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2004).
2 Notwithstanding Defendants' improved proposals, the Court is particularly skeptical of the argument that the "passage of time" warrants the leniency they seek here. The Court cannot countenance a tactic that amounts to running-out-the-clock, particularly in light of the longstanding pattern of obstinate conduct observed here. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (U.S. 1991) ("when a party shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order," civil sanctions in the form of attorney's fees may be imposed to police the judicial process).
3 Under Defendants' interpretation, this Court may not order civil sanctions for a party's failure to comply with a deadline, other than a discovery deadline, unless the Court has already set forth an applicable schedule of fines or other penalties. According to Defendants, this is so even where the conduct may be enforceable via criminal contempt sanctions. In practical terms, this would mean that initial deadlines or filing deadlines need not be taken very seriously (at least not by a party insufficiently motivated by the prospect of paying attorneys' fees) since the Court will afford a recalcitrant party an opportunity to purge itself of contempt by complying with specified conditions, presumably including a new deadline.
-3 -

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:&%%%2;<$=%-)>?(>&-%%%@"A$%0%5B%:
With respect to the sanctions for Defendants' violation of paragraph 8 set forth below, the Court notes that: (1) the Stipulated Order contained no schedule offines for noncompliance,4 (2) Stipulated Order~ 8 imposed a deadline of January 15, 2009, which was informally extended to January 26, 2009, (3) although the District provided a brief, six-month proposal on that date, the District did not deliver a proposed annual plan until February 24, 2009, (4) a principle reason for the Court Monitor's dissatisfaction with Defendants' proposal was its lack of specific action steps and benchmarks concerning APPLA youth; (5) the District facilitates the transition of "emancipating" youth in part via a contractual arrangement with the Healthy Families/Thriving Communities Collaborative Council, which provides services (e.g., housing assistance) to youth in the system as well as those who aged-out of the system within the last two years, and (6) Defendants are already obligated to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs, including those associated with the contempt motions and remedy briefings sub judice (as confirmed by Defendants' counsel during the July 23, 2010 Remedy Hearing).
II Mayor Fenty's failure to comply with the simple requirements of paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order are also difficult to remedy, as the result was Dr. Gerald's appointment, which may have occurred whether or not he included Plaintiffs in the selection process as required by the Order. While the Court may vacate Dr. Gerald's appointment or order a criminal contempt hearing to determine whether Mayor Fenty's contemptuous conduct was wil{fid, it sees no reason to do so. Plaintiffs sensibly propose that the Court essentially replace the ignored consultation requirement with a new one, recurring every six months. The Court will not go quite so far as that, but it is
4 Nor does the MFO limit the scope of remedies Plaintiffs' may seek. MFO § XX.F.3.
- 4-

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:&%%%2;<$=%-)>?(>&-%%%@"A$%/%5B%:
appropriate to compensate Plaintiffs for their missed opportunity to engage the Mayor by granting a new one, as stated below.
III
For the reasons set forth above and during the July 23, 2010 hearing, the Court hereby
ORDERS Defendants to set aside a sum equal to the amount Plaintiffs incurred in
attorneys' fees and costs in litigating their Renewed Motion for Contempt, including for hearings,
remedy briefing, and expenses associated with calculating or reporting fees and costs; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Plaintiffs to provide, within thirty days, an estimate of attorneys'
fees and costs associated with their Renewed Motion for Contempt, as described above; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Defendants to set aside $40,000, or $100 per day per child who
aged out of foster care without achieving permanency during the forty days where Defendants' plan proposal was late (January 15 to February 24); 5 the Court
FURTHER ORDERS, as a compensatory and coercive sanction, the funds set aside
pursuant to this Order shall be promptly spent to enhance the District's initiative to facilitate the
healthy and stable transition of older youth dependent upon child welfare system through its
arrangement with the Healthy Families/Thriving Communities Collaborative Council (or via
another program or contractual arrangement aimed at this objective, as so certified to the Court by
5 The Court would forgive the nine days covered by its informal deadline extension if Defendants produced an adequate proposal on January 24, 2009, but elects not to do so in light of the vacuous proposal filed on that date. According to the CFSA annual report and CFSA FACES data, 176 children were emancipated (i.e., aged out) without achieving their permanency goal in 2009. Of these, 170 had an APPLA goal or no goal at all. More specifically, thirteen such children were emancipated in January 2009, followed by fifteen more in February 2009. Based on these data, the Court estimates that twenty children aged out of the system during the forty days the plaintiffs and the Court awaited Defendants' proposal, nineteen of whom had an APPLA goal. This figure is conservative in light of the fact that the population who may have benefitted from Defendants' plans but for their failure to timely commit to and implement them includes other youth as well. Its calculation assumes one child aged out on day one and a twentieth child aged out on day forty, with a constant rate of attrition.

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:&%%%2;<$=%-)>?(>&-%%%@"A$%:%5B%:
the CFSA Director)6 in addition to (i.e., separate and apart from) any amount allocated for that purpose for FY20 11; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Mayor Fenty, or his designee, to meet with Plaintiffs' counsel (or another agent of Plaintiffs') to discuss CFSA management and its implementation of the LaShawn A. reforms (i.e., the MFO) no later than November 22, 2010; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Defendants to consult with Plaintiffs regarding the selection of a new CFSA Director should a new appointment be made during the pendency of this litigation.
SO ORDERED.
September 2 7, 201 0
6 The CFSA Director might reasonably determine that the funds, in part, could be most effectively used to expand or bolster another initiative that helps older youth. For example, according to CFSA's 2009 Annual Report on the Grandparent Caregivers Program, 54% of the children served by that program in 2009 were aged thirteen or older, and seventy children remained on its waiting list at the end of the year.

 
 !aaassseee     111: :888999-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000111777555444-­-­-TTTFFFHHH              DDDooocccuuummmeeennnt t     111000222555              FFFi il leeeddd     000444/ /000555/ /111000              PPPaaagggeee     111     ooof f     333

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., by her next friend, Evelyn )

Moore, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Case No. 89-cv-1754 (TFH)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

)

District of Columbia, et. al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for a Finding of Civil Contempt

[Dkt. No. 910], Defendants’ Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the

Consent Decree (“Termination Motion”) [Dkt. No. 914], and Defendants’ Motion to Modify Court

Order Provisions Requiring that the Court Monitor Approve, or Authorizing Her to Impose or

Write, the District of Columbia’s Plans, Policies, or Strategies [Dkt. No. 924]. Upon careful

consideration of the entire record of this case, and in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion

issued this day, the Court hereby ORDERS:

1. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for a Finding of Civil Contempt is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants are held in civil contempt of Court for their noncompliance with ¶ 8 of the October 7, 2008 Stipulated Order [Dkt. No. 899]. Mayor Adrian M. Fenty is further held in civil contempt for noncompliance with ¶ 4 of the same Stipulated Order.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree is DENIED.

3. Defendants’ Motion to Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring that the Court Monitor Approve, or Authorizing Her to Impose or Write, the District of Columbia’s Plans, Policies, or Strategies is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

!aaassseee     111: :888999-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000111777555444-­-­-TTTFFFHHH              DDDooocccuuummmeeennnt t     111000222555              FFFi il leeeddd     000444/ /000555/ /111000              PPPaaagggeee     222     ooof f     333
4. Section XX.B.4 of this Court’s Order, dated Nov. 18, 1993 (the “Modified Final Order” or “MFO”) is modified to read as follows:
The Court Monitor shall provide a proposed Implementation Plan (or related updates, amendments, or recommendations) to the Court and to the Parties. The parties may submit comments or objections to the Monitors’ proposal(s) within ten days thereafter. The Court may adopt, modify, or reject the Court Monitor’s proposal(s) in whole or in part.
The MFO will otherwise remain in force.
5. The Parties shall contact each other and the Court to schedule a status conference and a remedy/sanctions hearing.
6. By April 30, 2010, the Parties shall meet and confer with each other and with the Court Monitor in an effort to develop a new consent order proposal.
7. By May 14, 2010, the Parties shall submit a proposed consent order to the Court with:
a. A proposed implementation plan, consistent with MFO § XX.B (and intended to replace the AIP) covering the period through FY 2011 (September 30, 2011). This plan or “Compliance Strategy” must address in detail the period through the end of this calendar year by
i. including specific action steps and targets;1 and
ii. briefly discussing, where appropriate, personnel and budget allocations.
b. A proposed methodology2 for evaluating compliance with the MFO including
i. Indicators, benchmarks, or other criteria for evaluating compliance, and
ii. reporting requirements or other means of measurement.
8. Proposals submitted pursuant to ¶ 7 shall (to the extent practicable):
a. Be categorically organized around the same subsections as the AIP, or else clearly denote and describe deviations from that format, to ensure clarity in reporting;
1 This requirement is intended to facilitate understanding of the District’s plans going forward. Absent a substantial or unjustifiable disparity, the Court will not find deviations from adopted provisions of jointly proposed action steps to constitute noncompliance. 2 In crafting these proposals, the Parties are encouraged to review the U.S. Department of Justice Toolkit for Court Performance Measures in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases (available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/publications/courttoolkit.html).
-­ 2 -­

!aaassseee     111: :888999-­-­-cccvvv-­-­-000111777555444-­-­-TTTFFFHHH              DDDooocccuuummmeeennnt t     111000222555              FFFi il leeeddd     000444/ /000555/ /111000              PPPaaagggeee     333     ooof f     333
b. Include references to statutes, regulations, the MFO, and internal policies; and
c. Be provided to the Court in an editable electronic format (preferably a format using one of the following file extensions: *.rtf, *.doc, or *.wpd).
9. To the extent the Parties are unable to agree on terms of a proposed consent order, they shall submit separate proposals, otherwise consistent with this Order, to the Court and to the Court Monitor. Consistent with ¶ 4 of this Order, the Court Monitor shall thereafter provide a proposed Implementation Plan to the Court.
10. By May 31, 2010, the Court Monitor shall submit comments regarding the Parties’ proposals (and any related filings, including recommendations completed pursuant to ¶ 9) to the Court.
11. Defendants shall continue to provide reports and data to the Court Monitor, in accordance with the MFO and AIP § 1.D.34.
12. The Parties are invited to discuss monitoring costs at the next status conference.
13. Defendants’ Motion for a Ruling on Its Termination Motion [Dkt. No. 1024] is resolved by this Order and is therefore dismissed as moot.
SO ORDERED.

April 5, 2010

/s/ Thomas F. Hogan

.

THOMAS F. HOGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-­ 3 -­

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 762 Filed 04/06/00 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

, FILED

LASHAWN A., by her next friend

)

Evelyn Moore, et aI.,

)

j APR 6 - 2000

Plaintiffs,

)

NANCY MAVER-WHITrINGTON, CLER',

)

I J S 0I3TPlICT COURT

)

v.

) Civ. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

)

ANTHONY WILLIAMS, as Mayor

)

of the District of Columbia, et aI.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses, Plaintiffs have requested that the Court award them $2,052,976.23 in fees and costs for work performed from August 28, 1991 through March 2,2000, Defendants assert that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees, and that their request is unreasonable. Based upon this Court's review of the pleadings and the supporting documentation, the Court will grant plaintiffs' motion and award them fees and expenses in the amount requested.
I. DISCUSSION] Defendants object to plaintiffs' second request for fees and expenses on three specific grounds. First, defendants argue that plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of fees based on the holdings of Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). Second, defendants argue that plaintiffs are not entitled to prevailing rates in the New York City

(,1)
AO 72A (Rev 8/82)

The procedural history of this case is recounted in this Court's Memorandum Opinion addressing plaintiffs' first motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses, and will not be repeated here. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, Slip. Op., February 18, 1998, at 1-4.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 762 Filed 04/06/00 Page 2 of 4
legal market or for travel time between New York and Washington, D.C. Finally, defendants contend that plaintiffs' hours should be reduced because ofredundancy, overstaffing and failure to keep adequate time records. These objections are addressed in tum.
In respect to the Suter and Robinson cases, the Court has already ruled that those decisions do not affect plaintiffs' entitlement to fees and expenses in this case. See LaShawn A v. Barry, Slip. Op., February 18, 1998, at 4-8. That ruling is law of the case and will not be disturbed. See LaShawn A v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389,1393 (D.C. Cif. 1996)(en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (under "the law of the case doctrine[,] the same issue presented in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result. "). The only new wrinkle in defendants' argument is based on the D.C. Circuit's subsequent opinion in LaShawn A. v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847 (D.C. Cif. 1998), which was handed down one month after this Court's first Memorandum Opinion on fees. That opinion questioned this Court's authority to empower the Receiver to disregard District of Columbia law. Id. at 853. Contrary to defendants' argument, nothing in that opinion suggested that plaintiffs were without substantial unresolved federal claims that would justify the awarding of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Cf. Maher v. Grange, 448 U.S. 122, 132 n.15 (1980) ("Congress intended fees to be awarded where a pendant constitutional claim is involved, even if the statutory claim on which the plaintiff prevailed is one for which fees cannot be awarded under [§ 1988]"). Defendants' reliance on that decision is therefore misplaced.
Defendants' second argument is that plaintiffs are not entitled to New York rates or compensation for their travel time between New York City and Washington, D.C. This Court's Memorandum Opinion on fees explicitly found that "plaintiffs properly selected the Children's Rights Project [now Children Rights, Inc.], and that counsel should be paid New York rates." LaShawn A, Slip Op. at 14. The Court "reduce[d] the recovery for travel time by 25%, to
2
A072A (Rev 8/82)

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 762 Filed 04/06/00 Page 3 of 4
compensate for the loss of productivity involved in frequent travel between New York and Washington, D.C.," but awarded complete reimbursement for related expenses such as taxi and air transportation. Id. at 11, 18-19. Plainti ffs' current fee and expense request is consistent with these holdings, which are also law of the case.
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs' billable hours should be reduced because of redundancy, overstaffing and failure to keep adequate time records. In its prior Opinion, the Court set forth a number of billing parameters drawn from both United States Supreme Court and District of Columbia Circuit caselaw. See LaShawn A., Slip Op. at 10-11 (plaintiffs may recover for 75% of travel time), 17-18 (plaintiffs may not recover for time spent by "paralegal case readers"). Plaintiffs' current request is consistent with those parameters. In addition, plaintiffs have documented their request with declarations and detailed time record summaries based on "contemporaneous, complete, and standardized time records which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney." National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Those records detail the work performed to the minute and are accompanied by explanatory summaries. Plaintiffs' claimed expenses are likewise detailed individually. The Court has carefully reviewed these voluminous billing records, and finds that the amounts claimed are reasonable and consistent with sound billing judgment.
3
AO 72A (Rev 8/82)

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 762 Filed 04/06/00 Page 4 of 4
II. CONCLUSION For the above-stated reasons, the Court will grant plaintiffs' second motion for fees and expenses, and award plaintiffs attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $2,052,976.23. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
...-
-~~
April ~, 2000 Thomas F. Hogan
United States District Ju
4
A072A (Rev 8182)

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 778 Filed 03/05/01 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,
Plaintiffs v.
ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,
Defendants

C.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)
ORDER

FILED
MAR 05 2001
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON. ClERK U.S. OIITRICT COURT

The Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding counsel for plaintiffs' claims

for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in monitoring compliance from March 3,2000 through December

31, 2000 with the orders entered in this civil action. Having reached an agreement regarding the amount

to be paid by defendants for such costs and expenses, the below-referenced counsel have jointly requested

that the Court enter this Consent Order, which reflects the agreement.

s=~ Upon consideration ofthe agreement ofthe parties, it is by the Court this

of

· . ·~·~ ;~01;

ORDERED: that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of one

hundred thirty-one thousand nine dollars and ninety-one cents ($131,009.91) in complete

settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from March 3, 2000 through December 3 1, 2000 with the orders entered in this civil action, with

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 778 Filed 03/05/01 Page 2 of 2
payment made consistent with paragraph 4.D of the parties November 20,2000 Agreement as to undisputed fees and costs.
cc: Richard S. Love Senior Counsel Equity and Receivership Division Office ofthe Corporation Counsel Counsel for Defendants 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001 Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Eric Thompson, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 764 Filed 04/06/00 Page 1 of 2
Civil Judgment

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ,

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

/FllED

VAPR 6 - 2000

LASHAWN A., by her next friend, Evelyn Moore, et aI.
Plaintiff(s)

\/MljCY MAYER-WHll TiN(; fO~, CtERI\ U S m~TfIIlCTCOURT

Civil Action No. CA 89-1754 (TFH) v.

ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al.
Defendant( s)

PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 6, 200, and it is this 6th day of July, 2000, hereby
ORDERED THAT partial final judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs, LASHAWN A., BY HER NEXT FRIEND, EVELYN MOORE, OEM ERICK B., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, DR. OWNE RENNERT, GARY C., BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS, CRYSTAL AND WESLEY BROWN, LEO C., BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS, CRYSTAL AND WESLEY BROWN, ROBERT D., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, DARYL ANETTE CHAMBLEE, KEVIN E. BY HIS NEXT FRIEND ELIZABETH VELEZ, AND TYRONE F., BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS, EVA NASH AND ANATASIA HOLMES, ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED against the defendants, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, AS MAYOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PETER G.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 764 Filed 04/06/00 Page 2 of 2
-2-
PARHAM, DIRECTOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, BARBARA BURKE TATUM, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE COMMISSION OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, JEAN R. HUNTER AS ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FAMILY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, AND EVELYN P. ANDREWS, AS ACTING CHIEF OF THE CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in the sum of TWO MILLION FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIX DOLLARS AND TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($2,052,976.23) for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this case, including work on the merits of this case performed from August 29, 1991 through March 2, 2000, and also including work on recovering fees and costs.
NANCY MAYER-WHITTINGTON, Clerk
By:--------------------------
Deputy Clerk

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 784 Filed 08/01/01 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,

Plaintiffs

v. ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,

C.A. No. 89-1754
(TFH)

Defendants

CONSENT ORDER

FILED
AUG 0 1 2001
~ANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT'

The parties have advised the Court that the licensing standards for group homes

that are being promulgated, as required by the Court's Order of May 22, 2001, do not

include standards for independent living facilities. Defendants intend to complete the

process of drafting, publishing, revising and finalizing these licensing standards by

February 28, 2002. Upon consideration of the parties joint request to enter this Consent
Order and the entire record herein, it is by the Court, this ~ day o~~, 2001

ORDERED: That defendants shall promulgate licensing standards for

independent living facilities on or before February 28, 2002.

copies to:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT DtiDGE
o e-

Grace M. Lopes Special Counsel to the Mayor 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 11th Floor So. Washington, D.C. 20001

Richard S. Love Office of the Corporation Counsel Senior Counsel

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 784 Filed 08/01/01 Page 2 of 2
Equity and Receivership Division 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor So. Washington, D.C. 20001
Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Eric Thompson, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016
Judith Meltzer Center for the Study of Social Policy 1575 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20006

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 781 Filed 05/22/01 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,

Plaintiffs

v. ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,

C.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

Defendants

CONSENT ORDER

FILED
MAY 2 2 2001
NANCY MAYER WHlTTIHCiTQ8. CI.R
U.s. DISTRICT COURT

Upon consideration of the Consent Motion to Enter Proposed Order Terminating

the Receivership, the memorandum of points and authorities filed in support thereof and
the entire record herein, it is by the Court, this ;;2...- day of -4-,2001

ORDERED: That on June 15,2001 the Receivership established pursuant to the

August 24, 1995 General Receivership Order shall be terminated and that Order, as well

as the November 16,2000 Order appointing an Interim General Receiver, shall be

vacated. Thereafter, the probationary period established by this Court's Order of October

23, 2000 shall commence. It is,

FURTHER ORDERED: That during a transition period ending on June 15,2001,

the Interim General Receiver shall consult with the Mayor's designated Director of the

Child and Family Services Agency ("CFSA"), Olivia A. Golden, Ph.D., on all significant

management decisions including personnel, procurement and fiscal decisions and issues.

Upon the tennination of the Receivership on June 15, 2001, Dr. Golden shall assume full

control of CFSA as the agency director; and it is,

FURTHER ORDERED: That the licensing standards for group homes for

neglected and/or abused children shall be promulgated on or before September 30, 2001.

r l'?: \

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 781 Filed 05/22/01 Page 2 of 3
The licensing standards for foster homes shall be promulgated by June 30, 2001, unless republication is required, in which case they shall be promulgated by August 15, 2001. The failure to promulgate these licensing standards by the dates referenced above will constitute prima facie evidence of contempt of this Consent Order, and the probationary period referenced in the Consent Order of October 23, 2000 will not terminate unless the foster and group home licensing standards have been promulgated. It is,
FURTHER ORDERED: That the probationary period referenced in the Consent Order of October 23, 2000 will not terminate if the transfer to CFSA of responsibility and authority for child abuse cases that is currently vested in the Director of Superior Court Social Services is not completed, unless defendants demonstrate that they have undertaken all reasonable efforts to accomplish the transfer. It is,
FURTHER ORDERED: That paragraphs 9.a. and 9.b. of Appendix A to the October 23, 2000 Consent Order is modified as follows:
9. a. Twenty percent increase above the baseline in the number of finalized adoptions from the same six-month period in 2000. 1
9.b. Ten percent increase above the baseline in the number of adoptive parents recruited and approved as compared to the same six-month period in 2000.
UNITED STATES DISTRI copies to: Grace M. Lopes Special Counsel to the Mayor 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 11th Floor So. Washington, D.C. 20001
I The Court's failure to finalize adoption petitions, despite defendants' good faith efforts to have done so, will be considered by the Monitor before making her conclusion in the six-month evaluation.
2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 781 Filed 05/22/01 Page 3 of 3
Richard S. Love Office of the Corporation Counsel Senior Counsel Equity and Receivership Division 441 Fourth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Eric Thompson, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016 Judith Meltzer Center for the Study of Social Policy 1575 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20006
3

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 788 Filed 01/14/02 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al.,

Plaintiffs v. ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants

C.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

FILED
JAN 14 2002
NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON. ClERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CONSENT ORDER

The Consent Order of October 23, 2000 established a probationary period upon

termination of the Receivership during which defendants were required to meet 75 percent of the

performance standards referenced in Appendix A to the Consent Order. The Consent Order

further required the Monitor to evaluate whether the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA)

met the performance standards six months after the Receivership was terminated. The Consent

Order set forth procedures for establishing a baseline against which the performance standards

were to be measured, including a process by which the Monitor could adjust the performance

standards.

The time to establish a reliable baseline took longer than originally contemplated and the

Monitor has recently made adjustments to the Appendix A performance standards.

The parties, in collaboration with the Monitor, have agreed that the CFSA's performance

should be measured against the May 31, 2001 baseline as of May 31, 2002. The parties further

agreed that Appendix A to the October 23,2000 Consent Order must be modified to reflect the

adjustments to the performance standards made by the Monitor. Further, the parties have agreed, in

collaboration with the Monitor, to enlarge the number of substantive experts on the independent

expert advisory panel referenced in paragraph 11 of the October 23,2000 Consent Order. Upon

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 788 Filed 01/14/02 Page 2 of 4
consideration of the parties' joint request to enter this Consent Order and the entire record herein, 02,
//
ORDERED: That the adjtt'sted performanc Is ndards attached hereto as Modified Appendix A be and hereby is substituted for the performance standards referenced in Appendix A to the October 23,2000 Consent Order in order to reflect the adjustments made by the Monitor. It is
FURTHER ORDERED: That paragraph 18 of the October 23,2000 Consent Order is modified to read as follows: Commencing on or about June 30, 2002, the Monitor shall evaluate whether the CFSA has met the adjusted performance standards by using the same methods specified in paragraph 17 to determine the baseline standards ("Six Month Evaluation"). It is
FUTHER ORDERED: That the first sentence of paragraph 11 of the October 23,2000 Consent Order is modified to read as follows: The new Director, in consultation with the Court Monitor and others the Director deems appropriate, shall establish an independent expert advisory panel of up to ten substantive experts. It is
FURTHER ORDERED: That all other provisions of the October 23,2000 Consent Order remain in full force and effect.

copies to:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUD (' ....""-~ ....

Grace M. Lopes Acting General Counsel to the Mayor 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 327 Washington, D.C. 20001

Richard S. Love

-2-

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 788 Filed 01/14/02 Page 3 of 4
Office ofthe Corporation Counsel Senior Counsel, Equity Division 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor So. Washington, D.C. 20001 Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Eric Thompson, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016 Judith Meltzer Center for the Study of Social Policy 1575 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005
-3-

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 788 Filed 01/14/02 Page 4 of 4
Modified Appendix A: Adjusted Performance Standards for Probationary Period
1. No more than 300 abuse and/or neglect investigations incomplete after 30 days; no more than 100 investigations incomplete after 60 days.
2. Forty-five percent of foster care cases have current case plans. 3. Twenty-five percent of kinship care cases have current case plans. 4. Eighty hours of staggered pre-service training for all staff hired between December 2001
through February 2002; in-service training for staff, pre and in-service training for foster parents, and opportunities for foster parent in-service training remain at baseline. 5. Thirty-five percent of cases in which children have a goal of return to the home have parental visits at least every two weeks. 6. Twenty-five percent of children in foster care have weekly visits with social worker in the first eight weeks; thirty-five percent of children in foster care have at least monthly visits with social worker. 7. Fifty percent of cases in compliance with administrative review requirements. 8. Fifty-seven percent of cases have a judicially approved decision on permanency within 14 months of a child entering foster care.
Corrective Action Categories:
9. Category 1: No child in emergency care more than 90 days. 10. Category 3b: Seventy-five percent of children are placed in foster homes with valid
licenses. 11. Category 4: No more than 10 percent of children in foster care have a permanency goal of
return home for more than 18 months. 12. Category 5: Seventy-two percent of children with a permanency goal of adoption for
more than 30 days have legal activity to free them for adoption. 13. Category 7: No more than twenty percent of children with a permanency goal of adoption
for more than 9 months are not in an approved adoptive home. 14. Category 8: No child under the age of 12 has a permanency goal of independent living. 15. Category 9: No more than 83 children in facilities more than 100 miles from the District
of Columbia.
16. Three hundred and twenty-eight children adopted between June 1,2001 and May 31, 2002.
17. Two hundred and eight adoptive parents recruited and fifty-six adoptive parents approved between June 1,2001 and May 31, 2002.
18. Sixty-percent of children placed with one or more of their siblings. 19. Twenty-five percent of children in foster care as of May 31, 2002 have had 3 or more
placements. 20. No more than 50 children under age 6 in group institutional placements.
-4-

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 791 Filed 04/19/02 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., by her next friend,

)

Evelyn Moore, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Civ. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

)

ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, as Mayor of

)

the District of Columbia, et aI.,

)

FILED

Defendants.

)

APR 1 92002

)

NANCYMAYERWHITTINGTON.CI.EII( MEMORIALIZING ORDER U.S. DISTRICT COUftT

For the reasons stated at the hearing held in open court on April 19,2002, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' "Emergency Motion for Joinder of Necessary Party and

Temporary Restraining Order" is DENIED at this time. It is further

ORDERED that, if they still wish to do so, Plaintiffs shall properly file and serve,

including service by facsimile and Federal Express, their motion for preliminary injunction upon

Defendants and the State of Maryland by no later than Friday, April 26, 2002. It is further

ORDERED that the State of Maryland shall file its opposition by no later than Friday,

May 3, 2002. Finally, it is further

ORDERED that a hearing to address Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, if

filed, shall be held on Wednesday, May 8, 2002 at 10:00 a.m.

, II'SO ORDERED.
April I Y-: 2002

. .~t~,,_ ,//.49ft1/--Thomas F. Hog~ ! ,/ Chief Judge "--

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 799 Filed 01/06/03 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,

Plaintiffs

v. ANTHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,

c.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

Defendants

CONSENT ORDER

FILED
JAN 06 2003
NANCY MAYER WHlTIINGTON. CLERK
U.S DISTRICT COURT

Upon consideration of the Consent Motion to Enter Proposed Order Tenninating

the Probationary Period and Approving the Interim Implementation Plan, the

memorandum of points and autho~ in support thereof and the entire record

herein,

it

is

by

the

Court,

this

/111 __,, _ day

of--ll~~~~~_ _ '

20c8,

ed by the Consent Order of

October 23,2000, be and hereby is tenninated. It is,

FURTHER ORDERED: That the Interim Implementation Plan, a copy of which is

attached hereto, be and hereby is approved.

copies to:
Grace M. Lopes General Counsel to the Mayor 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 327 Washington, D.C. 20004
Richard S. Love Office of the Corporation Counsel

'199

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 799 Filed 01/06/03 Page 2 of 2
Senior Counsel, Equity Division 441 Fourth Street, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20001
Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Eric Thompson, Esquire Children's Rights 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016
Judith Meltzer Center for the Study of Social Policy 1575 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005
Arthur Spitzer, Esquire ACLU of the National Capital Area 1400 20th Street, NW, Suite 119 Washington, D.C. 20036

 
 .. J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 825 Filed 05/16/05 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,

Plailltiffs

v.
ANIHONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,

C.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

Defendants

CONSENT ORDER

The Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding counsel for

plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in monitoring compliance from

September 1, 2004 through February 28, 2005 with the orders entered in this civil action.

Having reached an agreement regarding the amount to be paid by defendants for such costs

and expenses, the below-referenced counsel have jointly requested that the Court enter this

Consent Order, which reflects the agreement.
Upon consideration of the agreement ofthe parties, it is by the Court this <1 day
of ~'2005;
ORDERED: that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the

sum of thirty-seven thousand dollars ($37,000) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim

for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from September 1,

2004 through February 28, 2005 with the orders entered in this civil action.

c UNITED STATES DIS

cc:

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 825 Filed 05/16/05 Page 2 of 2
Richard S. Love Chief, Equity I Office ofthe Attorney General
for the District of Columbia Counsel for Defendants 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001
Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Erik Pitcha1, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 837 Filed 11/01/05 Page 1 of 2 C~se 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 833 Filed 10/21/2005 Page 1of2

LASfIAWN A., et a!., Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED
OCT 262005
CLERK; u.s. DISTRiCT CCiJRT
mS1;Rlcr OF COLUMBIA

v. i
~ONY WILLIAMS, et a!.,
i Defendants
!

C.A. No, 89-1754 (TFH)

CONSENT ORDER
II The Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding cow/sel for
plainliffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in monitoring compliance from, March
1,20 5 through August 31,2005 with the orders.entered in this civil action. Having ~eached

an a eement regarding the amount to be paid by defendants for such costs and expenses,

the b low-referenced counsel jointly request that the Court enter this Consent Order! which
i

refie(]:ts the agreement.

I I

Upon consideration ofthe agreement ofthe parties, it is by the Court this ~ ~y day

of I~ ,2005;

,

~e I' ORDERED: that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc.

I

'

sum t'ffifty-five thousand four hundred and forty-five dollars and fifty cents

:

cost~ ($55445.50) in complete settlement ofplaintiffi;' c1alin for attorneys' fees and

assadiated with monitoring compliance from March 1, 2005 through August 31,2005

- rhO ocd~ ~""" m""' d.rroc<i= .

._

I

~i~~ -{'. ~Arc, f

I

~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT

'.

I

,." CIad'se 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 837 Filed 11/01/05 Page 2 of 2

II "Case

1':89-cv-01754-TFHD~cJmenf833"iFned10/21/2005

Page 2 of'2

cc:
Richard S. Love Chief, Equity I Office ofthe Attorney General
for the District of Columbia Counsel for Defendants 441 Fourth Street,N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C; 20001
Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Erik Pitchal, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 860 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et aI.,

Plaintiffs

v.
ANTIIONY WILLIAMS, et aI.,

C.A. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

Defendants

CONSENT ORDER

The Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding counsel for

plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in monitoring compliance from

September 1, 2005 through August 1, 2006 with the orders entered in this civil action.

Having reached an agreement regarding the amount to be paid by defendants for such costs

and expenses, the below-referenced counsel jointly requests that the Court enter this

Consent Order, which reflects the agreement.

Upon consideration ofthe agreement ofthe parties, it is by the Court this ~~ day

1J' of a

,2007;

c7

ORDERED: that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the

sum of fifty-six thousand ($56,000) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for

attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from September 1, 2005

through August 1,2006 with the orders entered in this civil action.

C?~••- ~ ~~"---

UNITED STATES DIS

JUDGE

cc:

\

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 860 Filed 01/17/07 Page 2 of 2
( I
Richard S. Love Senior Assistant Attorney General Office ofthe Solicitor Genera! Office ofthe Attorney General
for the District ofColumbia 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001
Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Sarah Bartosz, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue 'South NewYork,N.Y.10016

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1027 Filed 04/05/10 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ADRIAN M. FENTY, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Civil Action No. 89-1754 (TFH)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that all defendants in the above-named case appeal to the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from the April 5, 2010 order of the

District Court denying Defendants’ Motion to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of

the Consent Decree, its partial grant of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for a Finding of Civil

Contempt and its partial denial of Defendants’ Motion to Modify Court Order Provisions

Requiring that the Court Monitor Approve, or Authorizing Her to Impose or Write, the District

of Columbia’s Plans, Policies, or Strategies, [Document 1025], and any and all orders merged

therein.

Dated: April 5, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney

PETER J. NICKLES General for the District of Columbia

Deputy Civil

GEORGE C. VALENTINE Attorney General
Litigation Division

Chief

/s/ ELLEN EFROS [#250746]
, Equity I Section

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1027 Filed 04/05/10 Page 2 of 2
/s/ RICHARD S. LOVE [#340455] Senior Assistant Attorney General Office of the Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General, D.C. /s/ LUCY PITTMAN [#483416] Assistant Attorney General 441 4th Street, N.W. 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 442-9891 (telephone) (202) 730-1436 (fax) lucy.pittman@dc.gov
2

 
 o o Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 1 of 30

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FEB 272007

LASHAWN A., et aI.,

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT DISTRICI' OF COLUMBIA
)

)

Plaintiffs,

) Civ. No. No. 89-1754 (TFH)

)

--v.--

)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

)

District of Columbia, et aI., 1

)

)

Defendants.

ORDER

Pursuant to the Court's Order of January 6, 2003, the parties have workeq together to

develop an Amended Implementation Plan for the Court's approval. Upon consi~eration ofthat

I
Amended Implementation Plan as provided to the Court on February 15,2007, tJie hearing held

~ on ..:l#7 7, and the record herein, it is hereby

I

ORDERED that the Amended Implementation Plan, a copy of which is a~ached hereto,

be and hereby is approved.

SO ORDERED.

February.z7, 2007

Thomas F. Hogan Chief Judge

1 As a result of the change in administration, the parties have here substituted as a ;Defendant Mayor Adrian M. Fenty for former Mayor Anthony A. Williams.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 2 of 30

• • •

• • • • •

February 2007

Center for the Study of Social Policy 1575 Eye Street, NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20005

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 3 of 30

LaShawnA. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREAMBLE

SECTION I: OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED BY DECEMBER 31,2008 TO ENSURE CHILD SAFETY PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY

A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY .....................................................................,................1 B. GOAL: PERMANENCY......................................................................j................3 C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING ........................................................... j................6 D. GOAL: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY..................................................~................8

SECTIONll: OUTCOMES TO BEMAINTAINED

A. PROTECTIVE SERVICES ....................................................................,................ 12

B. EMERGENCY CARE AND

I

GENERAL ASSISTANCE.....................................................................~ ...............13

C. PERMANENCY PLANNING AND

PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN .............................................................~............... 13

D. CASE REVIEW SYSTEM .............................................................,.......~ ...............14

E. CASELOADS, STAFFING, AND

WORKER QUALIFICATION ...............................................................;...............15

F. TRAINING ............................................................................................. ~ ............... 15

G. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................. 15

H. CONTRACT REVIEW ..........................................................................;...............16

SECTION Ill: 2007 STRATEGY PLAN TO ACHIEVE CRITICAL SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING OUTCOMES

A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY .......................................................................~.............. 18 B. GOAL: PERMANENCE ....................................................................................... 19 C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING ............................................................. 23 r.............. D. GOAL: SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................... ~..............26

------------------_.-------------~----.---

- - - - - - , - - - - - - - -..-~~-
Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 4 of 30

LaShawnA. v. Fentv Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007
PREAMBLE

The parties previously having submitted and the Court having entered for judicial enforcement the April 2003 Implementation Plan ("IP") as developed by the Court Appointed Monitor in consultation with the parties pursuant to Section XX.B'ofthe Modified Final Order ("MFO") in LaShawn v. Williams, C.A. No. 89-1754;

The IP having set forth certain interim performance benchmarks together with interim compliance dates and further having set final performance benchmarks to be met by Defendants with respect to the enforceable requirements ofthe MFO and IP no later than December 31,2006; and Defendants having not met all ofthose benchmarks by that date;

1 The parties hereby submit this Amended Implementation Plan ("AlP"), which includes

Outcomes to be Achieved, Outcomes to be Maintained and a Strategy Plan wi'th Action

1Steps to Achieve Critical Safety, Permanence and Well-Being Outcomes, as developed by the Court Appointed Monitor in consultation with the parties pursuant to Section
XX.B ofthe MFO. Upon approval by the Court of this AlP, it shall be judicially enforceable and shall govern implementation of child welfare reform under th~ Court's Modified Final Order through December 31,2008. The final performance be~chmarks as

set forth in the IP are reincorporated in the AIP. The Monitor shall prepare and submit to
1 fthe Court every 180 days an interim performance report setting forth (1) aggrdgate I LPerformance ~ns in relation to the Outcomes to be Achieved and dutcomes to

be Maintained and (2) findings regarding whether Defendants are making acceptable

progress'toward the final performance benchmarks. In executing and agreeing to this

1 1

Amended Implementation Plan, objections they have previously

aDsesfeernteddanintsreasnpdoPnlsaeintotiftfhserMesearyv2e0w03haItemvpleer mr~ignhttastiaonnd

L Plan.

..-.. - - - - - -~-~---

---~----~---

,

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

_

------ .

~---'

--------------_#'----"----------
Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 5 of 30

SECTION I:
OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED BY DECEMBER 31,2008 TO ENSURE CHILD SAFETY PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY

A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY

1. Investigations

a. Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be initiated within 48

[

hours. Initiation of an investigation includes seeing the child and talking with the

child outside the presence ofthe caretaker. When children are not immediately

located, documented good faith efforts to see the child within the first i48 hours

shall include visiting the child's home, school and day care in an atteQlPt to locate

the child as well as contacting the reporter, ifknown, to elicit addition~l

information about the child's location; contacts with the police shall b~ made for

all allegations that involve moderate and high risk cases.

b. Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be completed within 30 ( days.

c. Reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated; investigations in foster homes shall be ~ompleted within 30 days and investigations involving group homes, day care setj:ings or other congregate care settings shall be completed within 60 days.

2. Acceptable Investigations

CFSA shall routinely conduct investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect. Evidence of acceptable investigations shall include:

a. Use ofCFSA's screening tool in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations, and use of risk assessment protocol in making decisions resulting from an investigation;

b. A full and systematic analysis ofa family's situation and the factors placing a child at risk;

c. Appropriate interviews with needed collateral contacts and with all children in the household outside the presence ofthe caretaker, parents or caregivers, or shall include documentation, by the worker, of good-faith efforts to see the c)1ild and that the worker has been unable to locate the child; and

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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 6 of 30
d. Medical and mental health evaluations of the children or parents when the worker determines that such evaluations are needed to complete the investigation.
3. Services to Families and Children
Appropriate services, including all services identified in a child or family~s case plan, shall be offered and children/families shall be assisted to use services, to support child safety, permanence and well-being.
4. Social Worker Visits to Families with In-Home Services
A CFSA worker or a qualified worker from a service provider authorized py CFSA
shall make twice-monthly visits to families in which there has been subst(l'ntiated abuse or neglect, with a determination that each child can be maintained safely in the home with services. At least one visit per month shall be in the home, bu~ the second can be at the child's school, day care or elsewhere. Workers are responsiijle for assessing the safety of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly~outside of the presence of the caretaker.
5. Social Worker Visits to Children in Out-ol-Home Care
a. CFSA or contract social workers with case management responsibility: shall make twice-monthly visits to each child in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.). At ileast one visit per month shall be in the home, but the second can be at the childfs school, day care or elsewhere.
b. Workers are responsible for assessing the safety of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside ofthe presence of the caretaker.
6. Social Worker Visits to Children Experiencing a New Placement or a Pl~cement Change
a. CFSA or contract agency social workers with case responsibility shaillnake weekly visits during the first four weeks of placement and twice montHly visits thereafter to each child newly placed in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) or mpved to a new placement.
b. Workers are responsible for assessing the safety of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside ofthe presence ofthe caretaker.
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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 7 of 30

B. GOAL: PERMANENCY

7. Relative Resources
CFSA shall investigate relative resources in all cases requiring removal of children from their homes.
8. Placement ofChildren in Most Family-like Setting
a. Children in out-of~home placement shall be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate to his or her needs.

b. No child shall stay overnight in the CFSA Intake Center or office building

c. No child shall remain in an emergency, short-term, or shelter facility qr foster home for more than 30 days.

9. Placement of Young Children

,
a. Children under 12 shall not be placed in congregate care settings for Il10re than 30 days unless the child has special treatment needs that cannot be met in:a homelike setting and unless the setting has a program to treat the child's spdcific needs.
'I

b. CFSA shall place no child under six years of age in a group care non-foster horne
setting, except for those children with exceptional needs that cannot b~ met in any

other type ofcare.

I

10. Visits Between Parents and Workers or Providers

For children with a permanency goal of reunification, in accordance with t~e case

plan, the assigned worker or designated family services provider should m~et with the

parent(s) no less frequently than twice a month in the first three months po~t­ placement unless there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavaila~le or

refuses to cooperate with the Agency.

'

11. Visits Between Parents and Children

There shall be weekly visits between parents and children with a goal of re~nification unless clinically inappropriate and approved by the Family Court. In cases iin which visitation does not occur, the Agency shall demonstrate and there shall be : documentation in the case record that visitation was not in the child's best i,nterest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to fapilitate it.

I ,

i

3

LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementarion Plan

Febr1ary 2007

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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 8 of 30

-~- !

,-Fr'

12. Appropriate Permanency Goals

Children shall have permanency planning goals consistent with the PederC;ll Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASPA) and District law and policy guidelines.

13. Reduction ofMultiple Placementsfor Children in Care

I
a. Of all children served in foster care during the fiscal year (2007 and slltbsequent
years), and who were in care at least 8 days and less than 12 months, ~8 percent
shall have two or fewer placements.

b. Of all children served in foster care during the fiscal year (2007 and s~bsequent years), and who were in care for at least 12 months but less than 24 m~nths, 65%
shall have had two or fewer placement settings.

,

c. Of all children served in foster care during the fiscal year (2007 and subsequent
years), and who were in care for at least 24 months, 50% shall have h~d two or

fewer placement settings since October 1,2004 or entry into care (if e1i1try was

I

after October 1,2004).

.

14. Timely Approval ofFoster/Adoptive Parents

a. CFSA shall have in place a process for recruiting, studying and appro~ing

families interested in becoming foster or adoptive parents that results ip the

necessary training, home studies, and decisions on approval being completed

within 120 days of beginning training.

'

b. CFSA should ensure training opportunities are available so that interested families

may begin training within 30 days of inquiry.

I

15. Legal Action to Free Children for Adoption

Children with a permanency goal of adoption shall have legal action initiatrd to free them for adoption within 45 days of their permanency goal becoming adoption.
I
16. Timely Adoption

a. Children with a permanency goal of adoption should be in an approvedl adoptive

placement within nine months oftheir goal becoming adoption.

.

b. Within 95 days ofa child's permanency goal becoming adoption, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning team to develop a child-specific recruitment plan which may include contracting with a private adoption agency for thos~ children without an adoptive resource.
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February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 9 of 30
; ,

c. CFSA shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that children placed in an approved adoptive home have their adoptions finalized within twelve (12) months of placement in the approved adoptive home.

17. Case Planning Process

a. CFSA shall, with the family, develop timely, comprehensive and apprppriate case plans in compliance with District law requirements and permanency timeframes, which reflect family and children's needs, are updated as family circuwstances or needs change, and CFSA shall deliver services reflected in the currentI: case plan.
I
b. Case plans shall be developed within 30 days ofthe child entering car¢ and shall be reviewed and modified as necessary at least every six months there~fter, and
shall show evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan pr~gress. ,

c. Every reasonable effort shall be made to locate family members and t~ develop

case plans in partnership with youth and families, the families' inform~'l support networks, and other formal resources working with or needed by the y~uth and/or

family.

.

d. Case plans shall identifY specific services, supports and timetables for providing services needed by children and families to achieve identified goals.

18. Placement Licensing

Children shall be placed in foster homes and other placements that meet li4ensing and other MFO placement standards and have a current and valid license.

5
I
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Februpry 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 10 of 30

C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING

19. Community-based Service Referralsfor Low & Moderate Risk Families

Families who have been the subject of a report of abuse and/or neglect thl:'1-t is
determined to be low or moderate risk and needing additional supports shilll be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for service~and
supports.

20. Sibling Placement and Visits

a. Children in out-of-home placement should be placed with some or all bftheir siblings.

b. Children placed apart from their siblings should have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings.

21. Placement within 100 Miles ofthe District

I
No more than 82 children shall be placed more than 100 miles from the District of
Columbia. (Children placed in kinship or pre-adoptive family-based setti~gs under

the ICPC shall be exempt from this requirement.)

!

22. Assessmentsfor Children Experiencing a Placement Disruption

CFSA shall ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are

provided with a comprehensive and appropriate assessment and follow-up jaction

plans to determine their service and re-placement needs no later than withip 30 days

of re-placement.

.

23. SerVices to Promote Stability

CFSA shall provide for or arrange for services required by the MFO through operational commitments from District public agencies and/or contracts w~th private providers. Services shall include (a) services to enable children who have qeen the subject of an abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely ~n their
own homes; (b) services to enable children who have been returned from f9ster care
to parents or relatives to remain with those families and avoid replacement!into foster care; (c) services to avoid disruption of an adoptive placement that has not ~een
finalized and avoid the need for replacement; and (d) services to prevent thf
disruption of a beneficial foster care placement and avoid the need for replfcement.

LaShawn

A.

v.

Fenty

Amended Implementa~I ion

6 Plan

Febr~ary 2007

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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 11 of 30
24. Health and Dental Care a. Children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to placement. b. Children in foster care shall receive a full medical and dental evaluati\>n within 30 days of placement. c. CFSA shall provide caregivers with documentation of Medicaid covel1age within 5 days of every placement and Medicaid cards within 30 days. d. Medicaid coverage shall remain active for the entire time a child is in foster care.
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February 2007
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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 12 of 30

D. GOAL: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY
25. Financial Support for Community-Based Services
The District shall provide evidence of financial support for community- aJ!ld neighborhood-based services to protect children and support families. '
26. Resource Development Plan
The District shall implement the CFSA Resource Development Plan, whiqh is to be developed by June 30 each year. The Resource Development Plan shall inplude all of the components listed in Item I5b of the Outcomes to be Maintained'secti~n of this document.
27. Post-Adoption Services
CFSA shall make available post-adoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a child committed to CFSA.
28. Caseloads
a. The caseload ofeach worker! conducting investigations of reports of apuse andlor neglect shall not exceed the MFO standard, which is 1: 12 investigatioqs.
b. The caseload of each worker providing services to children and families in which the child or children in the family are living in their home shall not exdeed 1:15 families.
c. The caseload of each worker providing services to children in placemetIt, including children in Emergency Care and children in any other form df CFSA physical custody, shall not exceed 1:15 children for children in foster c~re.
d. The caseload of each Permanency Specialist shall not exceed 30 childr¢n with the goal of adoption/guardianship. An implementation assessment shall be Icompleted to determine effectiveness.
e. The caseload of each worker having responsibility for conducting hom~ studies shall not exceed 30 cases.

1 All requirements apply to both CFSA workers and private agency workers. All CFSA contr~cts with

private agencies providing foster care services shall include performance expectations for visit~tion of

children in foster care in compliance with MFO visitation requirements.

I

8

LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Imple;:~~j~o;; ';~~;

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 13 of 30

f. There shall be no cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days, in which case, the supervisor shall provide coverage but not for more than five business days.

29. Supervisory Responsibilities

a. Supervisors who are responsible for supervising social workers who carry

caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aides,

or five caseworkers.

.

b. No supervisor shall be responsible for the on-going case management lof any case.

30. Training/or New Workers and Supervisors

a. New workers shall receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training through a combination of classroom and on-the-job training in assigned training !~nits.

b. New supervisors shall receive a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service tljaining on supervision of child welfare workers within three months of assuming isupervisory responsibility .

31. Training/or Previously Hired Workers, Supervisors and Administrators!

a. Previously hired workers shall receive annually a minimum of 5 full trfining days (or a minimum of30 hours) of structured in-service training geared tmfard professional development and specific core and advanced competencit1is.

b. Supervisors and administrators shall receive annually a minimum of24 hours of structured in-service training.

32. Trainingfor Foster Parents

a. CFSA and contract agency foster parents shall receive a minimum of 15 hour~ of pre-

servi•ce tram• m• g.

I

b. CFSA and contract agency foster parents shall receive annually a minirpum of 15 hours of in-service training

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33. Quality Assurance
CFSA shall have a Quality Assurance system with sufficient staff and resources to assess case practice, analyze outcomes and provide feedback to managers and stakeholders. The Quality Assurance system must annually review a sufficient number ofcases to assess compliance with the provisions ofthe MFO and good social work practice, to identify systemic issues, and to produce results allowing the identification of specific skills and additional training needed by workers and supervisors.
34. Special Corrective Action
a. CFSA shall produce accurate monthly reports, shared with the Monitor, which identify children in the following categories: i. All cases in which there have been four or more reports of neglect or abuse for a single child or family with the fourth report occurring in the last 12 months; ii. All cases in which a child has been placed in four or more different placements, with the fourth or additional placement occurring in the last 12 months and the placement is not a permanent placement; iii. All cases in which a child has had a permanency goal of adoption for more than one year and has not been placed in an adoptive home; iv. All children who have been returned home and have reentered care more than twice and have a plan ofretum home at the time of the report; v. Children with a permanency goal ofreunification for more than 18 months; vi. Children placed in emergency facilities for more than 90 days; vii. Children placed in foster homes or facilities that exceed their licensed capacities or placed in facilities without a valid license viii. Children under 14 with a permanency goal of APPLA; and ix. Children in facilities more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia.
b. CFSA shall conduct a child-specific case review by the Director or Director's designee for each child identified and implement a child-specific corrective action plan, as appropriate.
35. Performance Based Contracting
CFSA shall have in place a functioning performance based contracting system that (a) develops procurements for identified resource needs, including placement and service needs; (b) issues contracts in a timely manner to qualified service providers in accordance with District Iaws.and regulations; and (c) monitors contract performance on a routine basis.
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February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 15 of 30

36. ICPC

CFSA shall continue to maintain responsibility for managing and complying with the ICPC for children in its care.

37. Licensing Regulations

CFSA shall have necessary resources to enforce regulations effectively for original and renewal licensing of foster homes, group homes, and independent liviing facilities.

38. Provider Payments

CFSA shall ensure payment to providers in compliance with DC's Quick -Payment Act for all services rendered.

39. Budget and Staffing Adequacy

The District shall provide evidence that the Agency's annual budget complies with Paragraph 7 ofthe October 23, 2000 Order providing customary adjustmerts to the FY 2001 baseline budget and adjustments to reflect increases in foster parent payments and additional staff required to meet caseload standards, unless ! demonstrated compliance with the MFO can be achieved with fewer resources.

The District shall provide evidence ofpompliance with Paragraph 4 oftheiOctober

23, 2000 Order that CFSA staff shall be exempt from any District-wide fuHoughs and
from any District-wide agency budget land/or personnel reductions that ma~ be

otherwise imposed.

.

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February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 16 of 30
SECTION II: OUTCOMES TO BE MAINTAINED
A. PROTECTIVE SERVICES
1. Entering Reports into Computerized System CFSA shall immediately enter all reports of abuse or neglect into its computerized infonnation systems and shall use the system to determine whether there have been prior reports of abuse or neglect in that family or to that child.
2. Maintaining 24 Hour Response System CFSA shall staff and maintain a 24-hour system for receiving and responding to reports ofchild abuse and neglect, which conforms to reasonable professional standards.
3. Checking for Prior Reports Child abuse and/or neglect reports shall show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of abuse and/or neglect.
4. Reviewing Child Fatalities The District ofColumbia, through the City-wide Child Fatality Committee, and an Internal CFSA Committee, shall conform to the requirements ofthe MFO regarding the ongoing independent review of child fatalities of members of the plaintiff class, with procedures for (1) reviewing child deaths; (2) making recommendations concerning appropriate corrective action to avert future fatalities; (3) issuing an annual public report; and (4) considering and implementing recommendations as appropriate.
12 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007

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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 17 of 30
\
- - - - .-~------~'
B. EMERGENCY CARE AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE
5. Policiesfor General Assistance Payments
CFSA shall have in place policies and procedures for appropriate use of general assistance payments for the care ofchildren by unrelated adults, including provision ofany applicable oversight and supervision.
6. Use of General Assistance Payments
CFSA shall demonstrate that District General Assistance payment grants are not used as a substitute for financial supports for foster care or kinship care for District children who have been subject to child abuse or neglect.
C. PERMANENCY PLANNING AND PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN
7. Licensing and Placement Standards
a. Children shall be placed in foster homes and other placements that meet licensing and other MFO placement standards.
b. Children in foster home placements shall be in homes that (a) have no more than three foster children or (b) have six total children including the family's natural children; (c) have no more than two children under two years of age or (d) have more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement ofa sibling group, with no other children in the home, shall exceed these limits.
c. No child shall be placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of eight (8) children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child's needs can only be met in that specific facility, including a description ofthe services available in the facility to address the individual child's needs.
d. Children shall not be placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, shall exceed the limits.
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February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 18 of 30
8. Appropriate Permanency Goals
No child under the age of 12 shall have a permanency goal oflegal custody with permanent caretakers unless he or she is placed with a relative who is willing to assume long-term responsibility for the child and who has legitimate reasons for not adopting the child and it is in the child's best interest to remain in the home ofthe relative rather than be considered for adoption by another person. No child under the age of 12 shall have a permanency goal of continued foster care unless CFSA has made every reasonable effort, documented in the record, to return the child home, to place the child with an appropriate family member, and to place the child for adoption, and CFSA has considered and rejected the possibility of the child's foster parents assuming legal custody as permanent caretakers of the child.
9. Post-Adoption Services Notification
Adoptive families shall receive notification at the time that the adoption becomes final of the availability of post-adoption services.
D. CASE REVIEW SYSTEM
10. Administrative Reviews
a. By September 30, 2005, CFSA shall have implemented an Administrative Case Review process, as defined in Section X.B.l(a-c) ofthe MFO, with sufficient staff resources to review foster care cases within 180 days ofa child's entry into foster care and every 180 days thereafter.
b. Foster care cases shall have had an Administrative Case Review within 180 days ofthe child entering care and every 180 days thereafter. The Administrative Case Review process shall:
l. Be staffed by qualified social workers ii. Provide advance notification to social workers, parents, foster parents, youth,
Guardians ad litem, and involved service providers as appropriate iii. Be efficiently and conveniently scheduled to ensure maximum participation
of involved parties, especially parents, as appropriate IV. Provide for a comprehensive review of case progress, the appropriateness of
permanency goals and placement, and adequacy of services to meet permanency goals and to promote the safety, permanence and well-being of the child; and v. Be structured to provide feedback to CFSA management on compliance with agency policies and procedures, District of Columbia law and the MFO
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February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 19 of 30
11. Permanency Hearings CFSA shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that children in foster care have a permanency hearing in Family Court no later than 14 months after their initial placement.
E. CASELOADS, STAFFING, AND WORKER QUALIFICATION
12. Use ofMSWs and BSWs Unless otherwise agreed, all social worker hires at CFSA shall have an MSW or BSW before being employed as trainees.
13. Social Work Licensure All social work staff shall meet District of Columbia licensing requirements to carry cases independently oftraining units.
F. TRAINING
14. Training for Adoptive Parents Adoptive parents shall receive a minimumof3Q. hours of training, excluding the orientation process.
G. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
15. Needs Assessment and Resource Development Plan a. CFSA shall complete a needs assessment every two years, which shall include an assessment of placement support services, to determine what services are available and the number and categories of additional services and resources, if any, that are necessary to ensure compliance with the MFO. The needs assessment shall be a written report. The needs assessment, including the report, shall be repeated every two years. CFSA shall provide evidence of adequate Resource Development capacity within the Agency, with sufficient staffand other resources to carry out MFO resource development functions.
15
LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 20 of 30
b. The District shall develop a Resource Development Plan, which shall be updated annually by June 30th of each year. The Resource Development Plan shall: (a) project the number of emergency placements, foster homes, group homes, therapeutic foster homes and institutional placements that shall be required by children in CFSA custody during the upcoming year; (b) identifY strategies to assure that CFSA has available, either directly or through contract, a sufficient number of appropriate placements for all children in its physical or legal custody; (c) project the need for community-based services to prevent unnecessary placement, replacement, adoption and foster home disruption; (d) identifY how the Agency is moving to ensure decentralized neighborhood and community-based services; and (e) include an assessment of the need for adoptive families and strategies for recruitment, training and retention of adoptive families based on the annual assessment. The Plan shall specifY the quantity of each category of resources and services, the time period within which they shall be developed, and the specific steps that shall be taken to ensure that they are developed. CFSA shall then take necessary steps to implement this plan.
16. Foster Parent Licensure
CFSA shall license relatives as foster parents in accordance with District law, District licensing regulations and ASFA requirements.
H. CONTRACT REVIEW
17. Maintaining Computerized System
a. CFSA shall develop and maintain a unitary computerized information system and shall take all reasonable and necessary steps to achieve and maintain accuracy.
b. CFSA shall provide evidence ofthe capacity ofFACES Management Information System to produce appropriate, timely, and accurate workerlsupervisorreports and other management reports that shall assist the Agency in meeting goals of safety, permanence and well-being and the requirements ofthe MFO.
18. Contracts to Require the Acceptance ofChildren Referred
CFSA contracts for services shall include a provision that requires the provider to accept all clients referred pursuant to the terms of the contract, except for a lack of vacancy.
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February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 21 of 30
19. Federal Revenue Maximization CFSA shall demonstrate compliance with Sections A and B of Chapter XVIII ofthe Modified Final Order concerning federal revenue maximization and financial development.
20. Foster Parent Board Rates There shall be an annual adjustment at the beginning of each fiscal year of board rates for all foster and adoptive homes to equal the USDA annual adjustment to maintain rates consistent with USDA standards for costs of raising a child in the urban south.
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February 2007

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SECTION III:
2007 STRATEGY PLAN TO ACHIEVE CRITICAL SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING OUTCOMES
CFSA will implement the following Annual Strategy Plan with identified action steps designed to achieve safety, permanency and well-being for children and to reach and sustain the performance goals ofthe Amended LaShawn Implementation Plan (AlP). The strategies and actions steps in this plan are in critical areas related to outcomes, including placements, investigations, visitation, case planning, and health and mental health services.
The Parties agree that the Defendant's Strategy Plan and actions steps are a means to achieving compliance with the required outcomes. The action steps are enforceable by the Court but can be changed or deleted with the approval of the Court Monitor. The Strategy Plan will be updated annually in consultation with the Plaintiffs and the Court Monitor and is subject to approval by the Court Monitor.
A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY
1. Action Steps to Improve Child Protective Services
a. Caseloads. CFSA will continue "overstaffing" in Child Protective Services (CPS) to maintain low investigator caseloads (not to exceed 1: 12) and/or support creation of an assessment unit. Supervisors will assign new investigations to investigators according to a rotational schedule that includes two consecutive offrotation days. Ongoing.
b. Management. CFSA will maintain twice-daily screening panels to ensure those cases appropriate for investigation are accepted and that the Assessment Unit will evaluate allegations that may involve issues other than abuse or neglect. Ongoing.
c. Hotline. The Hotline Supervisor and Program Manager will review regularly the Hotline recording system tapes to assess individual Hotline worker performance as well as overall Hotline functioning, and will implement improvements as needed. Ongoing.
d. Quality of Investigations. CFSA workers will use Structured Decision Making (SDM~ to assess child safety and family risk levels during investigations and throughout the life of a case. All families at low or moderate risk of abusing or neglecting their children will be referred to the Healthy FamilieslThriving Communities Collaboratives for intervention and support designed to prevent entries into foster care. CFSA will review FACES reports to monitor workers' 18 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 23 of 30
contacts with collateral contacts during an investigation. See also section below on quality assurance. Ongoing.
e. CPS training - CFSA will develop training curricula and provide training to address supervisory training needs as well as line worker training needs. Training will include forensic interviewing skill development for workers in the. special abuse and institutional abuse units and documentation and critical thinking in child welfare assessment for all CPS workers. Complete by December, 2007.
B. GOAL: PERMANENCE
1. Action Steps to Enhance Placement Capacity
a. Create appropriate placement capacity:
i. MTFC. CFSA will contract for family-based Multidisciplinary Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) for 20 youths with serious to severe emotional and behavior problems. Services available by May, 2007.
ii. Teen transitional services. CFSA will create 16 teen bridge services placements for older youths not yet ready to live independently but too old for traditional group homes. Services available by June 30, 2007.
I iii. Placements for special-needs children. CFSA will award contracts to I provide placement and supportive services to 40 children with serious
medical and/or developmental disabilities. One contract will be for twenty new foster home beds; the second will be for 20 congregate care beds that are already available but are covered by a sole source contract, so the net gain will be 20 special needs placements. July, 2007.
iv. Placements for teens and large sibling groups: CFSA will develop and implement a plan with timelines to develop strategies regarding placement ofteens who repeatedly experience disrupted placements and placement of large sibling groups. Plan with time frames for implementation developed by April 30, 2007.
v. STAR emergency beds: Create 4 additional emergency foster home beds in D.C. Maintain a total capacity of 10 STAR placements by March, 2007.
b. Media campaign to create new foster and adoptive resources. CFSA will continue efforts to increase community awareness of the need for foster parents and to increase calls to the recruitment line. CFSA will launch a recruitment campaign to address sibling groups of all ages. CFSA will work with True Insight 19 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 24 of 30

Marketing through the Annie E. Casey Foundation to help address recruitment and retention and will implement the Adoptive and Foster home recruitment plan previously developed and submitted to the Court Monitor. Ongoing.

c. Family Team Meetings. CFSA will conduct a Family Team Meeting (FTM)

whenever a child is at risk of removal, has been removed from home, is removed

from hislher current placement, or is at risk of placement disruption. CFSA will

develop and implement FTM plan that includes how FTM will be used to inform

the case planning process and shall develop a system to assure the implementation

of case planning steps and the delivery of service needs identified in the FTM.

Placement FTMs will be conducted within three days in cases of removals and

Replacement FTMs before the placement disrupts. Where a placement has

already disrupted or a child returns from abscondence, an FTM will be held

within 7 days. Ongoing with a date for full implementation by December 31,

2007.

.

2. Action Steps to Reduce Multiple Placements and Improve Stability

a. Improve interagency coordination. District leadership will convene a summit on increasing permanency and placement stability for youth in multiple systems that includes representatives from CFSA, DMH, DHS, DOH, Family Court, City Council, Court Monitor, placement providers, foster parents, Citizen Review Panel, the Collaboratives, youth, Casey Programs and others. CFSA and its partners will develop and execute agreements based upon strategies developed during summit. September 2007.
b. Seek technical assistance from AECF, Casey Family Programs and/or national resource centers. CFSA will obtain technical assistance and develop work plan that restructures service system for youth, and creates a strong placement and service continuum that meets the needs of youth and strengthens permanency. February, 2007 and ongoing. Work plan developed by April 30, 2007.
c. Family Finding/ Youth Connections. CFSA will implement Youth COl).nections to identify people who will remain permanent connections for youth and augment it with Family Finding, to identify extended family members with who¢ committed youth may have not had contact since they entered care but who may be interested in establishing permanent relationships. Training and pildt phase to begin by March, 2007, plan developed by April 30, 2007 with implem~ntation by December, 2007.

d. Enhance and target foster parent training and retraining and support. CIfSA shall obtain technical assistance for skill building relating to recruiting the right mix of foster parents and in general recruiting, developing and supporting resource families. Assistance will be obtained in designing an effective campaign to meet CFSA recruitment and support needs. CFSA will continue pilot test of
20 LaShawn A. v. FentyAmended Implementation Plan
February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 25 of 30
Mockingbird Model for some CFSA homes and evaluate the results. A full time social worker will be assigned to support STAR homes. February 2007 and ongoing.
e. Implement Levels of Care approach to foster parent reimbursement rates. Implement the Child NeedslProvider Interventions assessment instrument, a tool which social workers and foster parents complete together to identify a child's needs and the interventions/services they require and then which is rated by an independent reviewer who will match it with a pre-established actuarial scale of reimbursement rates based on identified needs. Implement in summer 2007 for CFSA case-managed children with beginning implementation in private child placement agencies by October, 2008. 2007 accomplishments will include development ofthe weighted rating scale and schedule of rates, development of training materials for foster parents and social workers, and the necessary FACES build.
f. Expand placement with kin. CFSA will identify and reduce barriers to temporary licensing with kin in the District and continue work with Maryland concerning kin placements. CFSA will create specific kinship support resources to include: targeted in service training, dedicated kin foster parent support workers, access to respite services and to in home support services. CFSA shall publish an emergency amendment to foster home rules that will allow the Director, upon written application and for good cause, to waive foster home rules that do not adversely affect child safety. April, 2007 and ongoing.
g. Acquire more specific data on the issue of multiple placements. CFSA will develop capacity to produce reliable cohort data in FACES; complete study ofthe experiences of girls 15-17 years old and develop and begin implementation of strategies that address the results of Fall 2006 QSRs that focused on t~ens. The teen and sibling placement work plan will include action steps to address multiple placements. Complete by December, 2007.
3. Action Steps to Enhance Case Practice
a. Maintain caseloads at the following levels:
i. The caseload of each worker2 conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed the MFO standard, which is 1:12 investigations.
2 All requirements apply to both CFSA workers and private agencyiworkers. All CFSA contracts with private agencies providing foster care services shall include performance expectations for visitation of children in foster care in compliance with MFO visitation requirements.
21 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007
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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 26 of 30

ii. The caseload of each worker providing services to children and families in which the child or children in the family are living in their home shall not exceed 1: 15 families.
iii. The caseload of each worker providing services to children in placement, including children in Emergency Care and children in any other form of CFSA physical custody, shall not exceed 1:15 children for children in foster care.
iv. The caseload of each Permanency Specialist shall notexceed 30 children with the goal of adoption/guardianship. An implementation assessment shall be completed to determine effectiveness.
v. The caseload of each worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases.
vi. There shall be no cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days, in which case, the supervisor shall provide coverage but not for more than five business days.
b. Improve in-home practice. CFSA will develop and implement an in-home case practice model that reflects Agency practice model and that articulates specific expectations and protocols for serving children and families within their homes, and strengthens capacity of birth families to keep their children safe at home and provide adequately for their needs. June, 2007.
c. Use Data to Track Worker visits and case plans. Supervisors will use worker specific data to monitor visits and case plans. Ongoing.
d. Case planning. Using outside consultants, CFSA will train staff on the teaming process with families for development and implementation of case plans. September 30, 2007.
e. Creation of Permanency Specialists. CFSA will implement a model of permanency specialists who work with out-of-home care social workers to support concurrent permanency planning from the time a child enters foster care through reunification, guardianship, adoption, or living independently. Implementation of a pilot is underway and an evaluation ofthe redesign will run concurrent to the pilot. Ongoing.
f. Child specific recruitment staffings. CFSA will use contract agencies (i.e. Spalding) for child specific recruitment when initial recruitment efforts are not successful. Grant funds will be used to hire a specific recruiter that will use nontraditional recruitment methods for hard-to-place children. Ongoing; Childspecific recruiter to be hired by April 15, 2007. 22 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan February 2007

_.- - - - - - - - ·__ ~-----___ 'V ._ . n·_~_'

_ ·"'l~' _ _ _ _ _. - - - - - -

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 27 of 30
g. Development of post-permanence services. CFSA will create an array of postpermanency services including mental health services for children and youth and support services. Ongoing.
C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING
1. Action Steps to Meet Children's Health and Dental Needs
a. DC Kids Contract. CFSA will execute a new contract with DC Kids to include a community-based DC KIDS clinic for pre-placement medical and behavioral screenings and a comprehensive Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) examination within 30 days of entering care, care coordination and appointment scheduling and technology enhancements to ensure data transfer between CFSA and DC KIDS to capture fully the services children receive. Contract effective May 1, 2007; Implementation ongoing.
b. Access to child's prior medical history. District of Columbia will implement new legislation that requires health professionals and others to provide access to medical records immediately upon request. Ongoing.
c. Improved information exchange with MAA. CFSA will collaborate with MAA and the MCOs to develop a tracking and monitoring process that will provide the MCOs with alerts that youths under their care are receiving services from CFSA. CFSA will collaborate with MAA to determine the feasibility ofCFSA's access to MAA's EPSDT registry, to learn from MAA whether a child receiving services from CFSA is current in the EPSDT examination. CFSA will ensure OCP staff have access to and are trained on the SPIS system. Ongoing; Feasibility assessment completed by August 31, 2007. SPIS training completed by Aprill, 2007.
d. Closing gaps in dental services. CFSA will finalize arrangements for services with "Small Smiles", a dental clinic in DC that serves Medicaid children ages 3 to 20 and includes Bilingual staff of dentists, hygienists and dental assistants. Assess capacity and develop and implement a referral process by March 31, 2007. Implementation by March 31, 2007.

23 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007

, '~-------.---

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---~-.--

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 28 of 30

2. Action Steps to Enhance Capacity ofMental Health Providers, Expand the Service Array and Improve Children's Mental Health Services Infrastructure at the Department ofMental Health
a. Complete needs assessment ofCFSA-involved children and youth's mental and behavioral health needs by March 31, 2007 and utilize the results to identifY any additional specific service needs and enhancement strategies. Analysis will include whether Medicaid dollars can be used to fund identified services within the DMH MHRS structure and the amount of local dollars that are required to support the needed, non Medicaid-eligible services. Needs assessment by March 31, 2007; Plan to implement the Needs Assessment to be developed by May 15, 2007.
b. Issue a Request for Information (RFI) for a dedicated network of 3-5 mental health providers to provide court ordered mental health assessments and meet service needs as identified in the needs assessment of CFSA clients/parents in the District of Columbia and Maryland. Providers will serve children in CFSA's custody and their parents and will be funded through MHRS dollars. Children and parents served by CFSA but not in its custody will be served by Medicaid managed care organizations (MCOs); with MAA, we will ensure the MCOs are prepared to serve children and families 24 hoursl7 days per week. August 31, 2007.
c. Amend DMH clinical criteria for prior authorization to provide that every child discharged from a psychiatric hospitalization or who experienced more than two placements in one twelve month period will qualifY for community and homebased interventions through DMH's community-based intervention services. March 1,2007.
d. Ensure access to Automated Client Eligibility Determination System (ACEDS) by CFSA Behavioral Services to determine the name of the assigned MCO for the parent or the child upon entry into care to begin to access existing linkages early. March 1, 2007.
e. Develop and implement community alternative wrap around services for District youth at risk for an out of home Residential Treatment Center (RTC) placement and for CFSA youth that have experienced multiple placements and/or hospitalizations. Medicaid State Plan Amendment will be submitted to CMS by September 30,2007 and implementation will follow CMS approval.
24 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 29 of 30

- - - - - - - - - ~---~--~--.-------------- -~----~- ---~---

----

f. Develop crisis intervention services to support and stabilize a child's placement (in-home or in foster home) as follows: 1) by May, 2007, make available to foster and birth parents 1: 1 support services by behavioral specialists and provide up to 3 days respite care; 2) by July 1,2007, develop statement of work, budget and propose funding source and implementation steps for crisis intervention services program to be operational for FY 2008.
g. Establish additional staffing at DMH to support enhanced children's mental health services to include a) systems coordinator/program manager for Medicaid eligible and non-Medicaid eligible services; b) a program analyst to analyze data and program effectiveness; c) CBI coordinator; d) A staff to coordinate all referrals from CFSA within the public mental health system in collaboration with the CFSA Behavioral Services Unit; and e) 1 psychologist and 1 clinical social worker to be assigned to CFSA's child protection unit under the direct supervision of CFSA' s Behavioral Services Unit. DMH will review its staffing alIpcation to determine its current resource capacity and determine amount of addit~onal funding, if any, needed for these positions. Plan completed by March 31, 2007 with staff to be hired no later than July 1,2007.
h. Issue RFP for Hurt Home for residential services for children ages 6-l2 and for other specialized day programming. February 5, 2007 with expectation of contract for services by June 1,2007.
i. CFSA to determine the amount of funding needed to be maintained in CFSA budget for FY08 to purchase mental health services needed for CFSA-involved children and families and not available through DMH provided or contracted resources. Prior to FY 08 budget development.

25 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007

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Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 864 Filed 02/27/07 Page 30 of 30
D. GOAL: SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY
1. Continue Administrative Reviews, internal Fatality Reviews, and special studies of internal service delivery (sometimes done collaboratively with the Center for the Study of Social Policy). CFSA will implement monthly QSRs throughout the agency at the unit level in spring, 2007, share results and recommendations agency wide across the agency, and conduct agency-wide QSR annually. Ongoing.
2. Establish a Continuous Quality Improvement (CQn system that engages both staff and external stakeholders in reviewing and improving practice. CFSA will update the Quality Assurance Plan completed in 2004 to incorporate specific outcomes and indicators for measuring them, building on practice standards in the Amended Implementation Plan. CFSA will develop a work plan and timetable that incorporate concrete strategies for embedding a CQI approach into the culture of the agency; an assessment of resources needed and a strategy to identify and provide those resources; engage external partners and stakeholders in CQI; include training for all participants; use existing and new quantitative and qualitative data for review and analysis; and systematically use results to improve policy, practice, and programs.· CFSA will share reports and other results of these efforts with the public via our website. Revised QA Plan by April 30, 2007. Implementation ongoing.
3. Complete training on the flexible fund policy by March 1,2007 and utilize requests made during the last six months of2006 to project amount of2008 fund. March, 2007 and ongoing.
4. Performance monitoring of private agencies CFSA will continue the use of Scorecards to monitor performance in the private agencies. Contracts with private agencies will include financial incentives and disincentives tied to performance, and CFSA will take all steps necessary to enforce the terms of private agency contracts, including the use of financial incentives and disincentives tied to performance. On-going.

26 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan
February 2007

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 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 889 Filed 06/19/08 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A. et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, et aI.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

-------------------------)

Civil Action No.: 89-1754 (TFH)

CONSENT ORDER

The Court has been apprised that the parties have conferred regarding plaintiffs' claim for

attorneys' fees and costs incurred in monitoring compliance from May 1 through October 31,

2007, with the orders entered in this civil action. Having reached an agreement regarding the

amount to be paid by defendants for such fees and costs, the below-referenced counsel jointly

request that the Court enter this Consent Order, which reflects the agreement.

4 - Upon consideration of the agreement of the parties, it is by the Court this

day of

~. _,2008;

ORDERED: that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of

fifty-three thousand ($53,000) in complete settlement of plaintiffs, claim for attorneys' fees and

costs associated with monitoring compliance from May 1 through October 31, 2007, with the

orders entered in this civil action.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDG
(

I.
Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 889 Filed 06/19/08 Page 2 of 2
cc: Richard S. Love Lucy Pittman Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia 441 Fourth Street, N.W., 6th Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001 Marcia Robinson Lowry, Esquire Sarah Bartosz, Esquire Children's Rights Inc. 330 7th Avenue, 4th Floor New York, N.Y. 10001
2

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 1 of 72
LASHAWN A.V. WILLIAMS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Submitted to: The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Developed by: Center for the Study of Social Policy with the Office of the Mayor and the Child and Family Services Agency of the District of Columbia and Children’s Rights, Inc.
April 2003

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 2 of 72
LASHAWN A.V. WILLIAMS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Table of Contents
I. NAMED PLAINTIFFS .................................................................................1
II. PROTECTIVE SERVICES ...........................................................................1 Outcomes .......................................................................................................1 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................7
III. SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES............................................10 Outcomes .......................................................................................................10 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................14
IV. EMERGENCY CARE...................................................................................17 Outcomes .......................................................................................................17 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................17
V. GENERAL ASSISTANCE ...........................................................................17 Outcomes .......................................................................................................17 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................17
VI. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN ....................................................................18 Outcomes .......................................................................................................18 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................27
VII. PLANNING...................................................................................................30 Outcomes .......................................................................................................30 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................35
VIII. ADOPTION AND POST ADOPTION .........................................................37 Outcomes .......................................................................................................37 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................40
IX. SUPERVISION OF PLACEMENT ..............................................................42 Outcomes .......................................................................................................42 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................43

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 3 of 72

X. CASE REVIEW SYSTEM............................................................................45 Outcomes .......................................................................................................45 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................47

XI. CASELOADS, XII. STAFFING, AND XIII. WORKER QUALIFICATION......................................................................49 Outcomes .......................................................................................................49 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................52

XIV.

TRAINING ....................................................................................................54 Outcomes .......................................................................................................54 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................57

XV. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT....................................................................59 Outcomes .......................................................................................................59 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................60

XVI.

CONTRACT REVIEW .................................................................................63 Outcomes .......................................................................................................63 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................63

XVII.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS ........................................................................65 Outcomes .......................................................................................................65 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................65

XVIII.

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................66 Outcomes .......................................................................................................66 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................66

XIX.

SPECIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION.............................................................67 Outcomes .......................................................................................................67 Key Implementation Strategies......................................................................67

XX. OTHER ..........................................................................................................69 Outcomes .......................................................................................................69

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 4 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

I. NAMED PLAINTIFFS
Not applicable; there are no remaining Named Plaintiffs.
II. PROTECTIVE SERVICES
Outcomes 1. CFSA will staff and maintain a 24-hour system for receiving and responding to
reports of child abuse and neglect, which conforms to reasonable professional standards.
2. Investigations will be initiated1 within 48 hours.
Current status: As of December 31, 2002, 43% of investigations were initiated within 24 hours.
 By June 30, 2003, 60% of investigations will be initiated within 48 hours.
 By December 31, 2003, 75% of investigations will be initiated within 48 hours.
 By June 30, 2004, 80% of investigations will be initiated within 48 hours.
 By December 31, 2004, 85% of investigations will be initiated within 48 hours.
 By June 30, 2005, 90% of investigations will be initiated within 48 hours.
 By December 31, 2005, there will be full compliance with this outcome.

1 CPS investigations are “initiated” as defined in Section II.G. of the LaShawn Modified Final Order (MFO). 1

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 5 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

3. Investigations will be completed within 30 days.
Current status: As of December 31, 2002, 57% of investigations were complete within 30 days.
 By June 30, 2003, 60% of investigations will be completed within 30 days.
 By December 31, 2003, 65% of investigations will be completed within 30 days.
 By June 30, 2004, 70% of investigations will be completed within 30 days.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of investigations will be completed within 30 days.
 By June 30, 2005, 80% of investigations will be completed within 30 days.
 By December 31, 2005, 90% of investigations will be completed within 30 days.
 By June 30, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
4. CFSA will routinely conduct quality investigations. Evidence of acceptable investigations will include:
a. Child abuse and neglect reports will include evidence of the use of CFSA’s risk assessment protocol(s) in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations, and decisions resulting from an investigation;
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of child abuse and neglect reports will include evidence of the use of CFSA’s risk assessment protocol(s) in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations, and decisions resulting from an investigation.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of child abuse and neglect reports will include evidence of the use of CFSA’s risk assessment protocol(s) in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations, and decisions resulting from an investigation.

2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 6 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

 By December 31, 2005, 80% of child abuse and neglect reports will include evidence of the use of CFSA’s risk assessment protocol(s) in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations, and decisions resulting from an investigation.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. Report findings will be based on a full and systematic analysis of a family’s situation and the factors placing a child at risk;
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of report findings will be based on a full and systematic analysis of a family’s situation and the factors placing a child at risk.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of report findings will be based on a full and systematic analysis of a family’s situation and the factors placing a child at risk.
 By December 31, 2005, 80% of report findings will be based on a full and systematic analysis of a family’s situation and the factors placing a child at risk.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
c. Investigations will include appropriate interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, and needed collateral contacts or will include documentation, by the worker, of good faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of investigations will include appropriate interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, and needed collateral contacts or will include documentation, by the worker, of good faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child.
 By December 31, 2004, 70% of investigations will include appropriate interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, and needed collateral contacts or will include documentation, by the worker, of

3

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 7 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

good faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child.
 By December 31, 2005, 80% of investigations will include appropriate interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, and needed collateral contacts or will include documentation, by the worker, of good faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
d. Investigations will show evidence of overall quality.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of investigations will show evidence of overall quality.
 By December 31, 2004, 60% of investigations will show evidence of overall quality.
 By December 31, 2005, 80% of investigations will show evidence of overall quality.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. Reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated in accordance with investigation timeframes and policies.
 By December 31, 2003, 75% of reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated in accordance with investigation timeframes and policies.
 By December 31, 2004, 85% of reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated in accordance with investigation timeframes and policies.
 By December 31, 2005, 95% of reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated in accordance with investigation timeframes and policies.

4

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 8 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
6. CFSA will immediately enter all reports of abuse or neglect into its computerized information systems and shall use the system to determine whether there have been prior reports of abuse or neglect in that family or to that child.
(Effective March 31, 2003, and ongoing thereafter)
7. Child abuse and/or neglect reports will show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of abuse and/or neglect.
 By June 30, 2003, 75% of child abuse and/or neglect reports will show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of abuse and/or neglect.
 By December 31, 2003, 80% of child abuse and/or neglect reports will show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of abuse and/or neglect.
 By December 31, 2004, 90% of child abuse and/or neglect reports will show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of abuse and/or neglect.
 By December 31, 2005, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
8. CFSA shall provide appropriate medical, psychological or psychiatric evaluations of children, as outlined in the MFO, as part of the investigation of abuse or neglect in cases where it is determined that such evaluations are necessary.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 By December 31, 2004, CFSA shall provide appropriate medical, psychological or psychiatric evaluations of children, as outlined in the MFO, as part of the investigation of abuse or neglect in cases where it is determined that such evaluations are necessary in 60% of cases.
 By December 31, 2005, CFSA shall provide appropriate medical, psychological or psychiatric evaluations of children, as outlined in the MFO, as part of the investigation of abuse or neglect in cases

5

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 9 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

where it is determined that such evaluations are necessary in 80% of cases.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
9. CFSA will ensure that children with substantiated abuse or neglect reports who have not had a physical examination during the investigation and have not had a recent exam in the time period recommended by the EPSDT schedule, receive a physical examination within 48 hours of substantiation of cases.
 By December 31, 2004, CFSA will ensure that children with substantiated abuse or neglect reports who have not had a physical examination during the investigation and have not had a recent exam in the time period recommended by the EPSDT schedule, receive a physical examination within 48 hours of substantiation of cases in 50% of cases.
 By December 31, 2005, CFSA will ensure that children with substantiated abuse or neglect reports who have not had a physical examination during the investigation and have not had a recent exam in the time period recommended by the EPSDT schedule, receive a physical examination within 48 hours of substantiation of cases in 75% of cases.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
10. By March 31, 2004, CFSA will develop or provide access, including notification of availability, to a specialized resource pool of medical, psychological and psychiatric resources that will be made available to workers and/or children and families as needed during an investigation of abuse or neglect.
11. The District of Columbia, through the City-wide Child Fatality Committee, and an Internal CFSA Committee, will conform to the requirements of the MFO for the provision of ongoing independent review of child fatalities of members of the plaintiff class, with procedures for (1) review of child deaths; (2) making recommendations concerning appropriate corrective action to avert future fatalities; and (3) issuing an annual public report and (4) considering and implementing recommendations, as appropriate.

6

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 10 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will develop and promulgate comprehensive written policy for
investigations, including:
(a) coordinated investigations with the Metropolitan Police Department;
(b) development and implementation of a policy for consistent screening of Hotline calls;
(c) policy for prioritization of response and response times;
(d) final determination policy;
(e) policy for determining whether children are endangered and must be removed from their home; and
(f) policy for the use of a standardized form to record all abuse/neglect final determinations.
(Policy developed by June 30, 2003; policy promulgated and fully implemented by September 30, 2003, except for additional implementation/training time for new risk assessment, as indicated below)
2. a. CFSA will assess the need for, and, if needed, develop/revise and implement a comprehensive risk assessment tool/process for use in all child abuse/neglect investigations.
(Risk assessment modified/revised by September 30, 2003; Revised risk assessment fully implemented by March 31, 2004)
b. Relevant staff will be trained on any new or revised risk assessment tool that may be developed.
(By March 31, 2004)
3. CFSA will revise and modify its after hours program to improve the efficiency and quality of after hours investigations.
(Revisions completed by April 30, 2003; Implementation by September 30, 2003)

7

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 11 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

4. CFSA will develop and implement policies and procedures for appropriately providing medical, psychological and psychiatric evaluations as part of an investigation of abuse and neglect. The policies shall provide that all children for whom such evaluations are necessary during the investigation period, as defined in this policy, shall receive the required evaluations during the investigation process and prior to the time the investigation is completed.
(Policy developed by December 31, 2003; Implementation by March 31, 2004)
5. CFSA will develop and implement policies and procedures so that all children for whom a report of neglect or abuse has been supported, who have not otherwise received a medical examination during the investigation, shall receive a complete medical examination no later than 48 hours after the report has been supported, except in those instances in which it is documented in the case record that the child has recently received a comprehensive medical examination within the time period recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics guidelines for children of the child’s particular age.
(Policies/procedures developed by March 31, 2004; Implementation between June 30, 2004 and December 31, 2004)
6. a. The District of Columbia Child Fatality Review Committee1 shall continue to (1) operate in accordance with District law; (2) be adequately staffed to review cases and prepare an annual report; (3) publicly issue an annual report with recommendations; and (4) provide evidence that recommendations were considered and implemented as appropriate.
(By December 31, 2003, and ongoing)
b. All child fatalities involving a child known to CFSA for four years will be comprehensively reviewed by an Internal CFSA Committee, with a representative of the Court Monitor. The Internal Committee will issue recommendations to the CFSA Director for systemic and case specific change.
(Effective March 31, 2003, and ongoing)

1 Pursuant to the MFO, the District of Columbia Child Fatality Review Committee shall include a member selected by plaintiffs.
8

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 974 Filed 12/09/09 Page 12 of 72

LaShawn Implementation Plan April 9, 2003

II. Protective Services

c. The CFSA Director will consider the recommendations of the Internal CFSA Committee and the City-wide Child Fatality Review Committee and implement, as appropriate.
(Effective March 31, 2003, and ongoing)
7. CFSA, in consultation with the Monitor, will review the functioning of the Hotline to assess appropriateness and consistency of decisions about accepting calls for investigation and develop strategies for improvement, if indicated.
(By December 31, 2003)

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III. Services to Children and Families

III. SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
Outcomes 1. By September 30, 2005, CFSA will secure commitments from District agencies
to partner with CFSA for the provision of services, or otherwise provide or arrange for services required by the MFO, including a) services to enable children who have been the subject of an abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes; (b) services to enable children who have been returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those families and avoid replacement in foster care; (c) services to avoid disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized and avoid the need for replacement; and (d) services to prevent the disruption of a beneficial foster care placement and avoid the need for replacement.
2. There will be evidence that families routinely are offered and assisted to use MFO required services to meet the goals of safety, permanency and well-being for children.
a. Appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services, when applicable, for the purpose of enabling children who have been the subject of a substantiated abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes.
 By June 30, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 50% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been the subject of a substantiated abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes.
 By December 31, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 70% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been the subject of a substantiated abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes.
 By December 31, 2004, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 75% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been the subject of a
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III. Services to Children and Families

substantiated abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes.
 By December 31, 2005, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 80% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been the subject of a substantiated abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. Appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services, when applicable, for the purpose of enabling children who have been returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those family members and avoid replacement in foster care;
 By June 30, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 50% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those family members and avoid replacement in foster care.
 By December 31, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 70% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those family members and avoid replacement in foster care.
 By December 31, 2004, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 75% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those family members and avoid replacement in foster care.
 By December 31, 2005, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 80% of applicable cases, for the purpose of enabling children who have been returned from foster

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III. Services to Children and Families

care to parents or relatives to remain with those family members and avoid replacement in foster car.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
c. Appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services, when applicable, for the purpose of avoiding the disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized.
 By June 30, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 50% of applicable cases, for the purpose of avoiding the disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized.
 By December 31, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 70% of applicable cases, for the purpose of avoiding the disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized.
 By December 31, 2004, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 75% of applicable cases, for the purpose of avoiding the disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized.
 By December 31, 2005, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be offered and children/families will be assisted to use services in 80% of applicable cases, for the purpose of avoiding the disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
d. Appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be provided for the purpose of preventing the disruption of a foster home placement, under those circumstances in which the placement is a long-term placement and the placement is beneficial to the child..

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III. Services to Children and Families

 By June 30, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be provided for the purpose of preventing the disruption of a foster home placement in 50% of applicable cases, under those circumstances in which the placement is a long-term placement and the placement is beneficial to the child.
 By December 31, 2003, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be provided for the purpose of preventing the disruption of a foster home placement in 70% of applicable cases, under those circumstances in which the placement is a long-term placement and the placement is beneficial to the child.
 By December 31, 2004, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be provided for the purpose of preventing the disruption of a foster home placement in 75% of applicable cases, under those circumstances in which the placement is a long-term placement and the placement is beneficial to the child.
 By December 31, 2005, appropriate services, including all services identified in the case plan, will be provided for the purpose of preventing the disruption of a foster home placement in 80% of applicable cases, under those circumstances in which the placement is a long-term placement and the placement is beneficial to the child.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with the outcome.
3. A CFSA worker or a qualified worker from a service provider authorized by CFSA will visit families in which there has been substantiated abuse or neglect, with a determination that children can be maintained safely in the home with services.
 By June 30, 2003, there will be visitation at least monthly in 50% of cases.
 By September 30, 2003, there will be visitation at least monthly in 70% of cases.
 By June 30, 2004, there will be visitation at least monthly in 80% of cases and twice monthly in 25% of cases.

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III. Services to Children and Families

 By June 30, 2005, there will be visitation at least monthly in 90% of cases and twice monthly in 40% of cases.
 By June 30, 2006, there will be visitation at least monthly in 95% of cases and twice monthly in 50% of cases.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
4. Families who have been the subject of a report of neglect/abuse that has not been founded, will be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency when appropriate.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 By December 31, 2004, 50% of families who have been the subject of a report of neglect/abuse that has not been founded, will be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency when appropriate.
 By December 31, 2005, 70% of families who have been the subject of a report of neglect/abuse that has not been founded, will be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency when appropriate.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. CFSA will provide evidence of financial support to community and neighborhood-based services to protect children and support families.
(Documentation of financial support to be provided at least annually in budget and expenditure reports or related reports.)
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will strengthen policies, procedures and practices regarding the provision
of services to families and children, to include:
a. Improving the documentation of services provided to stabilize families.
b. Implementation of case practice strategies to improve service delivery through:
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III. Services to Children and Families

i. Regular use of case planning conferences ii. Routine use of disruption conferences iii. Transfer case staffings when cases are transferred between
units or to new workers iv. Adoption case staffings
(Strategy Development complete by June 2003; Implementation between September 30, 2003 and December 31, 2003)
2. CFSA will make services available to children and families through issuance of community-based RFPs and/or through coordinating with other District agencies to increase services available to families. Services will include:
a. Respite Services b. Parent education/counseling c. Mental health services (including day treatment) d. Substance abuse programs e. Housing assistance f. Day care g. Intensive Home-based Services
In providing community-based intensive home-based services, CFSA will provide the equivalent of, but not less than, the service capacity required in Section III (D) of the MFO, unless the bi-annual needs assessment finds a lesser need for community-based intensive home-based services for children and families.
h. Intensive 14-day assessments i. Emergency cash assistance j. Access to other public benefits, and k. Less intensive family services.
(Progressive Implementation with progress demonstrated between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2004 with full implementation by December 31, 2005.)
3. CFSA will implement policies and procedures which will enable workers to timely provide, purchase, or arrange for individualized services identified in a child and/or family case plan to meet the needs of a child and/or family.
(By June 30, 2004)

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III. Services to Children and Families

4. CFSA will develop an on-call program of social workers to support families and foster parents.
(Program developed and implemented by September 30, 2003, with revisions implemented, if needed, by June 30, 2004)
5. CFSA will clarify the role of the SSA, clerical assistant, SSR, social worker and supervisor in case planning and the provision of services to children and families through written functional duties, and in CFSA policies and procedures.
(Functional Duties/Policy/Procedure changes complete by April 30, 2003; Full implementation of changes by September 30, 2003)

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IV. Emergency Care and V. General Assistance

IV. EMERGENCY CARE
Outcomes 1. CFSA will maintain compliance with standards set forth in the Modified Final
Order.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. No new strategies required.
V. GENERAL ASSISTANCE
Outcomes 1. By September 30, 2004, CFSA and DHS will have in place policies and
procedures for appropriate use of general assistance payments for the care of children with unrelated adults, including provision for any applicable oversight and supervision.
2. By September 30, 2004, CFSA and DHS will demonstrate that District General Assistance payments grants are not used as a substitute for financial supports for foster care or kinship care for District children who have been subject to child abuse or neglect.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA and DHS will review current procedures and strengthen and modify
them, if needed, and will implement all necessary changes to assure that general assistance payments grants are not used as a substitute for financial supports for foster or kinship care for District children who have been subject to child abuse or neglect.
(By March 31, 2004)
2. CFSA and DHS will assess current procedures and strengthen and modify them, if needed, for (a) identification by IM of children where there are child protection concerns, and (b) CFSA response to requests for intervention from IM.
(By March 31, 2004)
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VI. Placement of Children

VI. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN
Outcomes 1. Children will be placed in appropriate placements.
a. Children in out-of-home placement will be placed with some or all of their siblings.
Current status: As of December 31, 2002, 64% of children in foster care and kinship care placements placed with one or more siblings.
 By June 30, 2003, 65% of children in out-of-home placement will be placed with some or all of their siblings.
 By June 30, 2004, 70% of children in out-of-home placement will be placed with some or all of their siblings.
 By June 30, 2005, 75% of children in out-of-home placement will be placed with some or all of their siblings.
 By June 30, 2006, 80% of children in out-of-home placement will be placed with some or all of their siblings.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. Children placed in out-of-home placement will be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate to their needs.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of children placed in out-of-home placement will be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate to their needs.
 By December 31, 2004, 70% of children placed in out-of-home placement will be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate to their needs.
 By December 31, 2005, 80% of children placed in out-of-home placement will be placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate to their needs.

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 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
c. Children under 12 will not be routinely placed in congregate care settings.
Current status: As of December 31, 2002, 68 children under age 13 were in congregate care settings.
 By June 30, 2003, no more than 65 children under 12 will be placed in congregate care settings.
 By December 31, 2003, no more than 50 children under 12 will be placed in congregate care settings.
 By June 30, 2004, no more than 35 children under 12 will be placed in congregate care settings.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, no more than 20 children under 12 will be placed in congregate care settings.
d. Children placed apart from their siblings will have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings.
 By June 30, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 By June 30, 2004, 50% of children placed apart from their siblings will have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings.
 By June 30, 2005, 70% of children placed apart from their siblings will have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings.
 By June 30, 2006, 75% of children placed apart from their siblings will have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.

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VI. Placement of Children

e. CFSA will have no children stay overnight in its in-house Intake Center.
 By June 30, 2003, and thereafter, CFSA will have no child under age 12 stay overnight in its in-house Intake Center.
f. CFSA will not place children more than 100 miles outside the District of Columbia.
Current status: As of December 31, 2002, CFSA reported 58 children placed more than 100 miles outside the District of Columbia.
 By June 30, 2003, CFSA will not place more than 60 children more than 100 miles outside the District.
 By June 30, 2004, CFSA will not place more than 50 children more than 100 miles outside the District.
 By June 30, 2005, CFSA will not place more than 35 children more than 100 miles outside the District.
 By June 30, 2006, CFSA will not place more than 25 children more than 100 miles outside the District.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
g. CFSA will investigate relative resources in cases requiring removal of children from their homes.
 By June 30, 2003, CFSA will investigate relative resources in 50% of cases requiring removal of children from their homes.
 By June 30, 2004, CFSA will investigate relative resources in 65% of cases requiring removal of children from their homes.
 By June 30, 2005, CFSA will investigate relative resources in 75% of cases requiring removal of children from their homes.
 By June 30, 2006, CFSA will investigate relative resources in 85% of cases requiring removal of children from their homes.

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VI. Placement of Children

 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
h. CFSA will ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a thorough, professional evaluation to determine their service and re-placement needs within 30 days of replacements.
 By December 31, 2003, CFSA will ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a thorough, professional evaluation to determine their service and replacement needs within 30 days of re-placements in 50% of replacements.
 By June 30, 2004, CFSA will ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a thorough, professional evaluation to determine their service and re-placement needs within 30 days of re-placements in 60% of re-placements.
 By December 31, 2004, CFSA will ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a thorough, professional evaluation to determine their service and replacement needs within 30 days of re-placements in 70% of replacements.
 By December 31, 2005, CFSA will ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a thorough, professional evaluation to determine their service and replacement needs within 30 days of re-placements in 85% of replacements.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
2. CFSA will work to reduce multiple placements of children in foster care:
a. There will be a reduction in the percentage of children who enter foster care after January 1, 2003 who have had three or more placements.
 By September 30, 2003, CFSA and the Court Monitor will establish methodology for measuring multiple placements and the Court Monitor will set benchmarks for progress as of December 31, 2003, and annually thereafter.

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 By September 30, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. There will be a reduction in the percentage of children in foster care who will have had three or more placements in a twelve-month period.
Current status: As of May 31, 2002, 8% of children had three or more placements in the 12month period of May 31, 2001 to May 31, 2002.
 By June 30, 2003, no more than 10% of children in foster care will have had three or more placements in the previous 12 months.
 By June 30, 2004, no more than 8% of children in foster care will have had three or more placements in the previous 12 months.
 By June 30, 2005, no more than 5% of children in foster care will have had three or more placements in the previous 12 months.
 By June 30, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
3. Children will be placed in foster homes and other placements that meet licensing and other MFO placement standards.
a. Foster homes, group homes, and independent living facilities will have a current and valid license.
 By June 30, 2003, 80% of foster homes, group homes, and independent living facilities will have a current and valid license.
 By December 31, 2003, 90% of foster homes, group homes, and independent living facilities will have a current and valid license.
 By June 30, 2004, 95% of foster homes, group homes, and independent living facilities will have a current and valid license.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. Children in foster home placements will be in homes that (1) have no more than three foster children or (2) have six total children including the family’s natural children; (3) no more than two children under two years of age or more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a

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sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed these limits.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 June 30, 2004, no more than 15% of children in foster home placements will be in homes that (1) have more than three foster children or (2) have six total children including the family’s natural children; (3) no more than two children under two years of age or more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed these limits.
 By June 30, 2005, no more than 10% of children in foster home placements will be in homes that (1) have more than three foster children or (2) have six total children including the family’s natural children; (3) no more than two children under two years of age or more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed these limits.
 By December 31, 2005, no more than 8% of children in foster home placements will be in homes that (1) have more than three foster children or (2) have six total children including the family’s natural children; (3) no more than two children under two years of age or more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed these limits.
 By June 30, 2005, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
c. CFSA will place no child under six years of age in a group care nonfoster home setting, except for those children with exceptional needs, which cannot be met in any other type of care.
Current status: As of December 31, 2002, there were 25 children under six years of age in congregate care facilities.
 By December 31, 2003, there will be no more than 15 children under six years of age in a group care non-foster home setting, except for those children with exceptional needs, which cannot be met in any other type of care.

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VI. Placement of Children

 By June 30, 2004, there will be no more than 10 children under six years of age in a group care non-foster home setting, except for those children with exceptional needs, which cannot be met in any other type of care.
 By December 31, 2004, there will be no more than 5 children under six years of age in a group care non-foster home setting, except for those children with exceptional needs, which cannot be met in any other type of care.
 By June 30, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
d. No child will remain in emergency, short-term, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline performance will be established.
 By December 31, 2004, there will be a 50% reduction from the baseline in the number of children who remain in emergency, shortterm, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
 By December 31, 2005, there will be a 50% reduction from December 31, 2004, performance levels in the number of children who remain in emergency, short-term, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
 By June 30, 2006, no more than 25 children will remain in emergency, short-term, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
e. No child will be placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of 8 children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child’s needs can be met only in that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual child’s needs.
 By June 30, 2003, the baseline performance will be established.

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VI. Placement of Children

 By December 31, 2003, there will be a 20% reduction from the baseline of the number of children placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of 8 children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child’s needs can be met only in that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual child’s needs.
 By June 30, 2004, there will be a 50% reduction from December 31, 2003 performance levels in the number of children placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of 8 children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child’s needs can be met only in that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual child’s needs.
 By June 30, 2005, there will be a 50% reduction from the June 30, 2004 performance level in the number of children placed in a groupcare setting with a capacity in excess of 8 children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child’s needs can be met only in that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual child’s needs.
 By December 31, 2005, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
f. No child under 12 shall be placed in a congregate setting for more than 30 days, absent special treatment needs that can be met only in that setting.
 By June 30, 2003, the baseline performance will be established.
 By December 31, 2003, there shall be a 50% reduction in the number of children placed in a congregate setting for more than 30 days, absent special treatment needs that can be met only in that setting.
 By December 31, 2004, there shall be a 50% reduction from December 31, 2004 performance levels in the number of children under 12 placed in a congregate setting for more than 30 days, absent special treatment needs that can be met only in that setting.

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 By December 31, 2005, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
g. Children will not be placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placements of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed the limits.
 By June 30, 2003, the baseline will be established. No new placements after June 30, 2003 shall be in foster homes or facilities in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placements of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed the limits.
 By June 30, 2004, there will be a 50% reduction from the June 30, 2003 baseline in the number of children placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placements of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed the limits.
 By June 30, 2005, there will be a 50% reduction from the June 30, 2004 performance levels in the number of children placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placements of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed the limits.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with the requirement that children will not be placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placements of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, will exceed the limits.
4. Children in foster care will have a health screening prior to placement.
 By June 30, 2003, 50% of children in foster care will have a health screening prior to placement.
 By December 31, 2003, 60% of children in foster care will have a health screening prior to placement.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of children in foster care will have a health screening prior to placement.

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VI. Placement of Children

 By December 31, 2005, 90% of children in foster care will have a health screening prior to placement.
 By December 31, 2006, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. Children in foster care will receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
 By June 30, 2003, 50% of children in foster care will receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
 By December 31, 2003, 60% of children in foster care will receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of children in foster care will receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
 By December 31, 2005, 90% of children in foster care will receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
 By June 30, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
6. CFSA will continue to maintain responsibility for managing and complying with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for children in its care.
(Ongoing)
Key Implementation Strategies
1. CFSA will obtain a comprehensive independent assessment of the placement process and Family Resource Units by expert consultants. This review will consider (a) structure of the placement process; (b) policies and procedures involved in making decisions about placement; (c) the appropriate placement for children; and (d) providing appropriate supports to promote reunification and to ensure stability and well-being for children in placement. Upon completion of this review, CFSA, in consultation with the Monitor and Plaintiffs, will develop and finalize action steps to address structure of the placement process, placement policies and procedures, the effectiveness and efficiency of placement supports and the placement decision making process with timelines for implementing agreed upon strategies, for inclusion in the Implementation Plan.
(Consultant review completed by March 31, 2003; Action Steps developed by June 30, 2003)

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2. Beginning March 31, 2005, and every two years thereafter, CFSA will complete a bi-annual assessment of the effectiveness and sufficiency of its placement support service programs. Consistent with the findings of this assessment, CFSA will modify its placement support service programs, if needed, to ensure that placements for children are appropriate and stable. Within 90 days of the completion of the assessment, in consultation with the Monitor, CFSA will develop strategies to implement the recommendations from the bi-annual report. CFSA will propose to the Monitor and plaintiffs action steps for inclusion in the Implementation Plan to implement recommendations to assure appropriateness and stability of placements.
(Assessment by March 31, 2005 and bi-annually thereafter; proposed strategies by June 30, 2005)
3. CFSA will develop a comprehensive foster care policy that includes the following components:
a. Children will be placed with families first; b. Procedures to involve family, including extended family, in decisions
about appropriate placement; c. Supports available to foster parents; d. Appropriate use of emergency and kinship placements; e. Requirements and procedures for sharing information with foster
families, service providers and all who are involved in the case; and f. Expectations of the social worker, supervisor, case aide and foster
parent(s). g. Children will be placed with siblings in the least restrictive, most
family-like setting to meet individual needs and placed in close proximity to their homes and communities.
(Policy developed by September 30, 2003; Implemented by March 31, 2004)
4. CFSA will develop a formalized way to provide foster parents with all appropriate and available information about a child prior to or at the time of placement.
(By December 31, 2003)
5. CFSA will develop an after hours capacity to service foster parents/families in crisis situations. CFSA will develop a plan delineating how the after hours support will be made available with timeframes for implementation.
(By September 30, 2003)

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VI. Placement of Children

6. CFSA will conduct an assessment of the capacity to provide health screening and physical and behavioral health evaluations for children in foster care, taking into account the DC Kids evaluation produced by the Court Monitor. From this assessment, CFSA will develop a plan of action and will propose provisions to the plaintiffs and the Court Monitor for incorporation into the Implementation Plan to assure that all children (1) receive a medical screening within 24 hours of entering the Department’s custody; (2) a full medical and dental examination within 30 days of entering physical custody; and (3) a thorough professional evaluation of his or her needs within 30 days of re-placement.
(By December 31, 2003)

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VII. Planning

VII. PLANNING
Outcomes 1. All open cases will have current case plans, as defined in a, b and c below:
a. Initial case plans will be created within the first 30 days of a child’s removal from home.
b. Case plans will be updated to reflect changing needs.
c. Case plans will be updated minimally every six months.
Current status: As of May 31, 2002, approximately 40% of foster home and kinship care cases have current case plans.
 By June 30, 2003, 60% of case plans will be current.
 By December 31, 2003, 70% of case plans will be current.
 By June 30, 2004, 85% of case plans will be current.
 By December 31, 2004, 95% of case plans will be current.
 By June 30, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
2. CFSA will develop timely, comprehensive, and appropriate case plans that are developed with the family and reflect current conditions and needs.
a. Case plans will be reflective of a timely assessment of the individual needs of the child in placement, and the needs of both parents and children as they relate to a child’s permanency goal.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of case plans will be reflective of a timely assessment of the individual needs of the child in placement, and the needs of both parents and children as they relate to a child’s permanency goal.
 By December 31, 2005, 90% of case plans will be reflective of a timely assessment of the individual needs of the child in placement,

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VII. Planning

and the needs of both parents and children as they relate to a child’s permanency goal.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. Every reasonable effort will be made to locate family and to develop case plans in partnership with families, their informal support network, and other formal resources working with or needed by the family.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 By December 31, 2004, in 75% of case plans, every reasonable effort will be made to locate family and to develop case plans in partnership with families, their informal support network, and other formal resources working with or needed by the family.
 By December 31, 2005, in 90% of case plans, every reasonable effort will be made to locate family and to develop case plans in partnership with families, their informal support network, and other formal resources working with or needed by the family.
 By December 31, 2006, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
c. Case plans will identify permanency-planning goals for children that are appropriate for the child and family and are compliant with District law requirements and timeframes for permanency.
 By December 31, 2003, 75% of case plans will identify permanency-planning goals for children that are appropriate for the child and family and are compliant with District law requirements and timeframes for permanency.
 By June 30, 2004, 80% of case plans will identify permanencyplanning goals for children that are appropriate for the child and family and are compliant with District law requirements and timeframes for permanency.
 By December 31, 2004, 90% of case plans will identify permanency-planning goals for children that are appropriate for the child and family and are compliant with District law requirements and timeframes for permanency.

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 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
d. Case plans will identify specific services and supports and timetables for providing services needed by families to achieve identified goals.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of case plans will identify specific services and supports and timetables for providing services needed by families to achieve identified goals.
 By December 31, 2004, 60% of case plans will identify specific services and supports and timetables for providing services needed by families to achieve identified goals.
 By December 31, 2005, 85% of case plans will identify specific services and supports and timetables for providing services needed by families to achieve identified goals.
 By December 31, 2006, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
e. Cases will show evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan progress.
 By December 31, 2003, 55% of cases will show evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan progress.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of cases will show evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan progress.
 By December 31, 2005, 85% of cases will show evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan progress.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.

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3. For children with a goal of reunification, CFSA will facilitate weekly visits between children and their parents.
 By December 31, 2003, in 40% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, CFSA will facilitate weekly visits between children and their parents.
 By June 30, 2004, in 60% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, CFSA will facilitate weekly visits between children and their parents.
 By December 31, 2004, in 80% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, CFSA will facilitate weekly visits between children and their parents.
 By June 30, 2005, in 85% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, CFSA will facilitate weekly visits between children and their parents.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
4. For children with a goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the assigned worker or designated family services provider shall meet with the parent(s) no less frequently than twice a month in the first three months postplacement unless there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.
 By June 30, 2003, in 50% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the assigned worker or designated family service provider shall meet with the parent(s) no less frequently than twice a month in the first three months post-placement unless there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.
 By June 30, 2004, in 60% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the assigned worker or designated family service provider shall meet with the parent(s) no less frequently than twice a month in the first three months post-placement unless there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.

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 By June 30, 2005, in 80% of cases of children with a goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the assigned worker or designated family service provider shall meet with the parent(s) no less frequently than twice a month in the first three months post-placement unless there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.
 By June 30, 2006, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. Permanency goals for children in foster care will be appropriate to their needs and family situation and compliant with requirements for permanency in District law, absent a court order requiring a different goal. Goals would be inappropriate if:
a. A child under the age of 12 has a permanency goal of legal custody with permanent caretakers unless he or she is placed with a relative who is willing to assume long-term responsibility for the child and who has legitimate reasons for not adopting the child and it is in the child’s best interest to remain in the home of the relative rather than be considered for adoption by another person.
b. A child under the age of 12 has a permanency goal of continued foster care unless CFSA has made every reasonable effort, documented in the record, to return the child home, to place the child with an appropriate family member, or to place the child for adoption, and CFSA has considered and rejected the possibility of the child’s foster parents assuming legal custody as permanent caretakers of the child.
c. A child under the age of 16 has a permanency goal of independent living.
d. A child has a goal of return home if (a) both parents have relinquished custody or are deceased; (b) the parents cannot be located after a diligent search, not to exceed three months from the child’s entering placement or a child’s parents have been found guilty of repeated serious abuse of or neglect of the child or the siblings such that termination of parental rights is appropriate.
 By December 31, 2003, in 75% of cases, a child’s permanency goal will be appropriate.
 By December 31, 2004, in 90% of cases, a child’s permanency goal will be appropriate.

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 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will revise policies and procedures on case planning to incorporate MFO
requirements, permanency timeframes in District Law and the participation of youth, parents, families, informal supports, foster parents where applicable, and other service providers.
(By September 30 2003)
2. CFSA will revise and implement policies and procedures that clarify case planning responsibilities when contract agencies are involved.
(Revised policies by June 30, 2003; Implementation by September 30, 2003)
3. CFSA will develop and begin utilizing on a regular basis a quality assurance protocol to facilitate case plans that are timely, comprehensive, individualized, needs based, and current.
(Protocol developed by September 30, 2003; Implementation beginning September 30, 2003 and complete by March 31, 2004)
4. CFSA will develop a process for meeting with the family as soon as possible but no later than within seven (7) days to initiate planning whenever a child is removed from the home. This could include mediation, Team Decision Making, or other family meeting format that accomplishes the same objectives.
(Process developed by September 30, 2003; Implementation between September 30, 2003, and complete by September 30, 2004)
5. CFSA will develop and implement policies and procedures identifying those situations in which clinical expertise will be made available in the case planning process as needed to protect a child’s safety, permanency, and wellbeing.
(Policies to be developed by September 30, 2003; Implementation by March 31, 2004)
6. CFSA will incorporate into new contracts the requirement that contractors will have capacity for community sites for parental visitation.
(By September 30, 2003)

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7. CFSA will develop community sites to facilitate supervised and unsupervised parent and child visitation.
(Implementation begun by September 30, 2003; complete by March 31, 2004)

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VIII. Adoption and Post Adoption

VIII. ADOPTION AND POST ADOPTION
Outcomes 1. CFSA will have a timely process for moving children to adoption. Evidence of
compliance will include:
a. Children with a permanency goal of adoption will be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of children with a permanency goal of adoption will be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.
 By December 31, 2004, 75% of children with a permanency goal of adoption will be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.
 By December 31, 2005, 85% of children with a permanency goal of adoption will be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. Children with a permanency goal of adoption will have legal action initiated to free them for adoption within 30 days of their permanency goal becoming adoption.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of children with a permanency goal of adoption will have legal action initiated to free them for adoption within 30 days of their permanency goal becoming adoption.
 By June 30, 2004, 75% of children with a permanency goal of adoption will have legal action initiated to free them for adoption within 30 days of their permanency goal becoming adoption.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.

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c. CFSA will make all reasonable efforts to ensure children with a permanency goal of adoption will have their adoptions finalized within 12 months of placement in an approved adoptive home.
 By December 31, 2003, in 50% of cases, CFSA will make all reasonable efforts to ensure children with a permanency goal of adoption will have their adoptions finalized within 12 months of placement in an approved adoptive home.
 By June 30, 2005, in 65% of cases, CFSA will make all reasonable efforts to ensure children with a permanency goal of adoption will have their adoptions finalized within 12 months of placement in an approved adoptive home.
 By December 31, 2005, in 85% of cases, CFSA will make all reasonable efforts to ensure children with a permanency goal of adoption will have their adoptions finalized within 12 months of placement in an approved adoptive home.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
2. Within 95 days of a child’s permanency goal becoming adoption, CFSA will convene a permanency planning team which will develop a child-specific recruitment plan, if needed, which may include contracting with a private adoption agency.
 By December 31, 2003, permanency plan meetings will be held and child-specific recruitment plans developed, as needed, for 75% of children with a goal of adoption.
 By June 30, 2004, permanency plan meetings will be held and childspecific recruitment plans developed, as needed, for 90% of children with a goal of adoption.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
3. CFSA will have in place a process for recruiting, studying and approving families interested in becoming foster or adoptive parents that results in the necessary training, home studies and decisions on approval being completed within 120 days of application.

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VIII. Adoption and Post Adoption

 By June 30, 2003, decisions will be made in 120 days for 50% of foster and adoptive applicants.
 By June 30, 2004, decisions will be made in 120 days for 60% foster and adoptive applicants.
 By June 30, 2005, decisions will be made in 120 days for 75% of foster and adoptive applicants.
 By June 30, 2006, decisions will be made in 120 days for 85% of foster and adoptive applicants.
 By December 31, 2006, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
4. CFSA will make available post-adoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a child from CFSA or from a contract agency providing adoption services to children committed to CFSA.
 By June 30, 2003, the baseline will be established.
 By June 30, 2004, in 25% of cases, CFSA will make available postadoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a child from CFSA or from a contract agency providing adoption services to children committed to CFSA.
 By June 30, 2005, in 60% of cases, CFSA will make available postadoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a child from CFSA or from a contract agency providing adoption services to children committed to CFSA.
 By June 30, 2006, in 80% of cases, CFSA will make available postadoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a child from CFSA or from a contract agency providing adoption services to children committed to CFSA.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. Adoptive families will receive notification at the time that the adoption becomes final of the availability of post-adoption services.
 By June 30, 2004, and thereafter, 90% of adoptive families will receive notification at the time that the adoption becomes final of the availability of post-adoption services.

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VIII. Adoption and Post Adoption

Key Implementation Strategies 1. CSFA will develop and implement intensive action to facilitate adoption for
children currently in foster care placement with a goal of adoption.
a. CFSA will clarify in policy the expectations for adoption planning of children in placement consistent with MFO requirements and will provide training to all staff regarding these expectations.
(By September 30, 2003)
b. CFSA will complete the identification of all children with a goal of adoption for whom there is no currently identified adoptive resource.
(By March 31, 2003, and ongoing)
c. Beginning June 30, 2003, CFSA will convene a permanency planning team meeting to provide for review of children with a goal of adoption and the development of a child-specific recruitment plan, if needed, for any child who has no adoptive resource identified within 95 days of the establishment of the adoption goal.
d. CFSA will review progress for each child without an adoptive resource after 35 days of the goal becoming adoption, every 30 days and develop strategies, including contracting with private adoption agencies, where appropriate, to identify an approved adoptive family.
(By March 31, 2004)
e. For those children with an adoptive resource but no finalization, CFSA will develop a child specific plan and take all reasonable steps to move the adoption to finalization and review progress on children every 60 days.
(By September 30, 2003)
2. CFSA will provide resources, as needed, both staffing and financial, to its adoption recruitment and support efforts. Before September 30, 2003, CFSA will identify the staff and other resources to be allocated to adoptive home recruitment and support in FY’s 2004 and 2005.
3. CFSA will complete the contracting process for the Adoption Resource Center by April 30, 2003.

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4. CFSA will utilize the National Adoption Resource Registry, beginning September 30, 2003, and will identify ways to maximize this resource.
5. CFSA will make all reasonable efforts to coordinate adoption activities with DC Superior Court and identify and implement strategies to streamline the adoption process.
(By March 31, 2004)
6. Taking into account existing supports, CFSA, in consultation with the Monitor, will design and implement necessary strategies, including specification of resources for providing post-adoption services necessary to preserve families as outlined in Section VIII, G.2 and 3 of the MFO, especially developing access to and use of mental health and intensive family services to prevent disruption.
(Design complete by March 31, 2004; Implementation between January 2004 and March 31, 2005).

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IX. Supervision of Placement

IX. SUPERVISION OF PLACEMENT
Outcomes 1. CFSA will increase visitation1:
a. CFSA or contract agencies with any level of case responsibility shall make weekly visits during the first eight weeks of placement to children newly placed in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) or moved to a new placement.
 By June 30, 2003, in 30% of applicable cases, there will be weekly visits.
 By December 31, 2003, in 45% of applicable cases, there will be weekly visits.
 By June 30, 2004, in 60% of applicable cases, there will be weekly visits.
 By December 31, 2004, in 75% of applicable cases, there will be weekly visits.
 By June 30, 2005, in 90% of applicable cases, there will be weekly visits.
 By June 30, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
b. CFSA or contract social workers with case management responsibility shall make monthly visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.).
 By June 30, 2003, CFSA or contract social workers with case management responsibility shall make monthly visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) in 70% of cases.

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

1 Pursuant to Section IX.A of the MFO, each visit shall include a visit with the child outside the presence of the foster parent, except when the child is a very young infant.
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IX. Supervision of Placement

 By June 30, 2004, CFSA or contract social workers with case management responsibility shall make monthly visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) in 90% of cases.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
c. CFSA and contract social workers shall make bi-weekly (twice monthly) visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.).
 By December 31, 2003, CFSA and contract social workers shall make bi-weekly (twice monthly) visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) in 50% of cases.
 By December 31, 2004, CFSA and contract social workers shall make bi-weekly (twice monthly) visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) in 60% of cases.
 By June 30, 2005, CFSA and contract social workers shall make biweekly (twice monthly) visits to children in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.) in 80% of cases.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
2. By September 30, 2003, and thereafter, all CFSA contracts with private agencies providing foster care services shall include performance expectations for visitation of children in foster care in compliance with MFO visitation requirements.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will clarify in policy the expectations for social work visitation of
children in placement consistent with MFO requirements and provide training to all staff regarding these expectations.
(Policy clarification by September 30, 2003; Training complete by December 31, 2003)

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

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2. CFSA will develop and regularly disseminate management reports on social work compliance with the visitation requirements. Compliance data will be aggregated by worker, supervisor, CFSA manager, and individual contract agency to be used as an internal monitoring, assessment and evaluation strategy for managers, supervisors and workers.
(Beginning September 30, 2003, and thereafter)
3. CFSA will develop and promulgate performance-based contracts whereby contract agencies are required to supervise placements at MFO standards. Performance-based contracts to include strategies to leverage performance when contract agencies are not meeting visitation standards.
(Timeframes provided in Chapter XVI, Contract Review)
4. a. CFSA will design and implement strategies to monitor contractor adherence with supervision of placement requirements.
(Implementation beginning September 30, 2003, and ongoing thereafter)
b. CFSA will have sufficient monitoring staff to provide for a CFSA monitor to annually visit every private agency foster care placement in which a child is placed and the private agency has both child and family case responsibility.
(Monitoring procedures and staff capacity developed by December 31, 2003; full implementation by December 31, 2004).

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X. Case Review System

X. CASE REVIEW SYSTEM
Outcomes 1. By September 30, 2005, CFSA will have implemented an Administrative Case
Review process, as defined in Section X.B.1 (a-c) of the MFO, with sufficient staff resources to review foster care cases within 180 days of a child’s entry into foster care and every 180 days thereafter.
2. The Administrative Case Review process shall:
a. Be staffed by qualified social workers;
b. Provide advance notification to social workers, parents, foster parents, youth, Guardian ad litems, and involved service providers, as appropriate;
c. Be efficiently and conveniently scheduled to ensure maximum participation of involved parties, especially parents, as appropriate;
d. Provide for a comprehensive review of case progress, the appropriateness of permanency goals and placement, and adequacy of services to meet permanency goals and to promote the safety, permanence and well-being of the child.
e. Be structured to provide feedback to CFSA management on compliance with agency policies and procedures, District of Columbia law and the MFO.
3. Foster care cases will have had an Administrative Case Review within 180 days of entering care and every 180 days thereafter.
Current status: Sixty-five percent (65%) of cases are in compliance as of December 31, 2002.
 By June 30, 2003, 70% of foster care cases will have had an Administrative Case Review within 180 days of entering care and every 180 days thereafter.
 By December 31, 2004, 85% of foster care cases will have had an Administrative Case Review within 180 days of entering care and every 180 days thereafter.

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X. Case Review System

 By June 30, 2004, 95% of foster care cases will have had an Administrative Case Review within 180 days of entering care and every 180 days thereafter.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
4. CFSA shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that children in foster care have a permanency hearing in Family Court no later than 14 months after their initial placement.
 By December 31, 2003, in 75% of cases, CFSA shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that children in foster care have a permanency hearing in Family Court no later than 14 months after their initial placement.
 By June 30, 2004, in 90% of cases, CFSA shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that children in foster care have a permanency hearing in Family Court no later than 14 months after their initial placement.
 By June 30, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. By September 30, 2005, CFSA will have fully implemented a Quality Assurance system with sufficient staff and resources to assess case practice, analyze outcomes and provide feedback to managers. The Quality Assurance system must annually review cases from each supervisory unit in numbers sufficient to assess compliance with provisions of the MFO and good social work practice and to identify systemic issues and to produce results allowing the identification of specific skills and additional training needed by workers and supervisors.
6. CFSA will conduct appropriate case specific reviews as specified in Section X, D.1 of the Modified Final Order according to the timetable for phased implementation approved by the Court Monitor by September 30, 2003. CFSA will notify the Director or the Director’s designee and the Court Monitor on a monthly basis of the cases requiring special case review and the status and outcome of each review.
 By December 31, 2003, CFSA will conduct required case-specific reviews in 75% of appropriate cases as identified in phased implementation timetable.

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X. Case Review System

 By June 30, 2004, CFSA will conduct required case-specific reviews as specified in 75% of appropriate cases as identified in phased implementation timetable.
 By December 31, 2004, CFSA will conduct required case-specific reviews as specified in 75% of appropriate cases as identified in phased implementation timetable.
 By June 30, 2005, and thereafter, CFSA will conduct all case-specific reviews as specified in Section X.D.1 of the Modified Final Order.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will redesign the Administrative Review process to improve, among
other things, notification and attendance of relevant parties and to provide for a comprehensive review of case progress, permanency goals and adequacy of services. CFSA’s redesign will include a strategy to phase-in implementation of the new administrative review process. This redesign will include:
a. Development of new policies and procedures.
b. Development of capacity to convene early case planning conferences for children entering foster care.
c. Development of a new assessment tool that allows for comprehensive case reviews prior to holding an Administrative Case Review.
d. Adequate staff and supervision to conduct Administrative Case Reviews.
e. Restructuring of the notification and scheduling procedure to provide timely notification and maximize family and foster parent participation.
f. Procedures to ensure that review recommendations are reflected in case plans.
g. Processes to provide timely feedback to workers and supervisors.
h. Accountability mechanisms, which:
1) Require and enforce social worker participation in the review process.
2) Require the Information System to “flag” cases overdue for administrative reviews.

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(By September 30, 2003, interim benchmarks for phase-in will be established by CFSA in consultation with the Monitor and incorporated into the Implementation Plan. By September 30, 2004, the redesigned administrative review process will be fully implemented.)
2. CFSA will develop and implement a comprehensive Quality Assurance plan to carry out the full range of quality assurance functions required by the Agency and with the ability to assess the quality of case practice at CFSA and with contract agencies. The plan should identify:
a. Organizational unit(s) within CFSA responsible for quality assurance functions.
b. The scope of quality assurance functions including capacity for analyzing management and outcome data, administrative reviews, and special case reviews.
c. The staffing and resources within those units to carry out identified functions and the timeframes for filling positions, if any, and providing needed resources, if any.
d. The policies and procedures to identify areas, consistent with the MFO and management needs, requiring that quality assurance reviews should be undertaken.
e. The mechanisms to assure that the results of quality assurance reviews are available to workers, supervisors and program managers and provided to executive management to inform policy and procedure, resource development and training.
(System designed by December 31, 2003; Implementation between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2004)
3. By September 30, 2003, CFSA will develop procedures to provide for the phased implementation of the special reviews set forth in the MFO. Plans for phased implementation are subject to the approval of the Court Monitor.
4. Beginning December 31, 2003, and every six months thereafter, the Quality Assurance Director will submit to the Director and to the Court Monitor a report summarizing quality assurance activities, the results of the quality assurance process and the steps that have been taken or need to be taken to remedy problems or noncompliance with the Modified Final Order. The report shall contain no individually identifiable information and shall be public information.

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XI. Caseloads, XII. Staffing, and XIII. Worker Qualification

XI. CASELOADS, XII. STAFFING , AND XIII. WORKER QUALIFICATION
Outcomes 1. The caseload of each worker conducting investigations of reports of abuse
and/or neglect shall not exceed a maximum of 12 investigations at any one time.
 By June 30, 2003, the caseload of each worker conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed a maximum of 16 investigations at any one time.
 By December 31, 2003, the caseload of each worker conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed a maximum of 14 investigations at any one time.
 By June 30, 2004, and thereafter, the caseload of each worker conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed a maximum of 12 investigations at any one time.
2. The caseload of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children and families in which the child or children in the family are living in their home shall not exceed 17 families.
3. The caseload of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children in placement, including children in Emergency Care and children in any other form of CFSA physical custody, shall not exceed 12 for children with special needs and shall not exceed 20 for all other children.
 By March 31, 2003, baseline caseload levels of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children, whether in their home or in placement, will be established.
 By September 30, 2003, the caseload of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children, whether in their home or in placement, and families shall not exceed 27 cases.
 By December 31, 2003, the caseload of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children, whether in their home or in placement, shall not exceed 23 cases.

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 By June 30, 2004, the caseload of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children, whether in their home or in placement, and families shall not exceed 20 cases.
 By September 30, 2004, the caseload of each CFSA worker and private agency worker providing services to children, whether in their home or in placement, and families shall not exceed 17 cases.
 By December 31, 2004, there will be full compliance with MFO caseload standards.
4. The caseload of each CFSA worker having responsibility for any child in the Adoption Unit shall not exceed 12 children, or 15 children involving cases of independent adoption.
 By March 31, 2003, the baseline caseload level of each CFSA worker having responsibility for any child in the Adoption Unit shall be established.
 By September 30, 2003, the caseload of each CFSA worker having responsibility for any child in the Adoption Unit shall not exceed 27 children.
 By December 31, 2003, the caseload of each CFSA worker having responsibility for any child in the Adoption Unit shall not exceed 23 children.
 By June 30, 2004, the caseload of each CFSA worker having responsibility for any child in the Adoption Unit shall not exceed 20 children.
 By September 30, 2004, the caseload of each CFSA worker having responsibility for any child in the Adoption Unit shall not exceed 17 children.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
5. The caseload of each CFSA and private agency worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases.
 By December 31, 2003, the baseline caseload of each CFSA and private agency worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall be established.

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 By June 30, 2004, the caseload of each CFSA and private agency worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 35 cases.
 By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, the caseload of each CFSA and private agency worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases.
6. Supervisors who are responsible for supervising CFSA and private agency social workers who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aides, or five case workers.
 By June 30, 2003, 50% of supervisors who are responsible for supervising CFSA and private agency social workers who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aides, or five case workers.
 By December 31, 2003, 80% of supervisors who are responsible for supervising CFSA and private agency social workers who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aides, or five case workers.
 By December 31, 2004, 90% of supervisors who are responsible for supervising CFSA and private agency social workers who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aides, or five case workers.
 By December 31, 2005, 95% of supervisors who are responsible for supervising CFSA and private agency social workers who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aides, or five case workers.
 By December 31, 2006, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
7. No CFSA or private agency supervisor will be responsible for the management of any cases except in those situations in which the assigned worker leaves without providing notice, and in such circumstances, only for a five-day period.
 By December 31, 2003, 80% of supervisors will not be responsible for the management of any cases except in those situations in which the assigned worker leaves without providing notice, and in such circumstances, only for a five-day period.
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 By June 30, 2004, 90% of supervisors will not be responsible for the management of any cases except in those situations in which the assigned worker leaves without providing notice, and in such circumstances, only for a five-day period.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
8. Beginning September 30, 2003 and thereafter, there will be no unassigned cases.
9. Unless otherwise agreed, all social worker hires at CFSA must have a MSW or BSW before being employed as trainees.
10. All social work staff must meet District of Columbia licensing requirements to carry cases independently of training units.
11. By September 30, 2005, and continuously thereafter, CFSA will have sufficient staff to meet the caseload requirements of the MFO, or any subsequent modifications thereto, that are approved by the Court unless defendants can otherwise demonstrate substantial compliance with the MFO.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will complete a workload study by March 31, 2004, which shall
consider, among other things, the use of a weighing formula and the adequacy of MFO caseload standards and propose modification, if indicated, for consideration by the parties.
2. CFSA, in consultation with national experts, will implement strategies to recruit and retain qualified social workers.
(By September 30, 2003 and thereafter)
3. By June 30, 2003, and annually thereafter, CFSA will develop and implement a written recruitment and retention plan that identifies CFSA strategies, timeframes and recruitment resources allocated to ensure there are sufficient professional and paraprofessional staff to achieve compliance with the caseload ratios specified in the MFO.
4. By June 30, 2003, CFSA will review and compare total projected caseloads against MFO caseload standards to project the number of licensed social workers and supervisory social workers, case aides and support staff needed to
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meet the caseload ratios established in the MFO. The Staffing projection will also identify the staffing levels of other key functional areas including a) Training, b) Resource Development (including Licensing and Monitoring), c) Contracting, d) Quality Assurance, and e) OCC legal staff needed to carry out legal representation functions for the Agency. Based on these projections, CFSA, in consultation with the Monitor, will develop annual hiring targets with six month benchmarks.
a. For FY 2003, CFSA will increase the number of social work staff to 300 by September 30, 2003, and increase supervisory staff for these workers to 60 by September 30, 2003.
b. For FY 2004, CFSA will increase the number of social workers to 350 and supervisory staff to 70 by September 30, 2004, unless all caseload bench-marks for September 30, 2004 are met with fewer staff. This target will be reviewed quarterly with the Court Monitor and readjusted if caseload levels drop and fewer staff are needed.
5. The Mayor of the District of Columbia shall exercise, as necessary, the full extent of his authority under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”) in order to facilitate the hiring and retention of staff to meet the caseload standards required by the MFO.
6. CFSA will routinely conduct exit interviews for social work staff leaving the agency and analyze the information provided to inform recruitment and retention practices.
(Beginning March 31, 2003, and ongoing)
7. CFSA will evaluate the effectiveness of the B.S.W. plan developed and approved pursuant to the October 23, 2000 Court Order and submit recommendations for modification, if appropriate, with the consent of plaintiffs, to the Court Monitor for approval by September 30, 2004.

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XIV. Training

XIV. TRAINING
Outcomes1 1. New workers will receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training through
a combination of classroom and on-the-job training in assigned training units.
 By June 30, 2003, 90% of new workers will receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training through a combination of classroom and on-the-job training in assigned training units.
 By December 31, 2003, and thereafter, all new workers will receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training through a combination of classroom and on-the-job training in assigned training units.
2. Foster parents will receive a minimum of 15 hours of pre-service training.
 By December 31, 2003, 95% of foster parents will receive a minimum of 15 hours of pre-service training.
 By June 30, 2004, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
3. Adoptive parents will receive a minimum of 30 hours of training, excluding the orientation process.
 By December 31, 2003, and thereafter, 95% of adoptive parents will receive a minimum of 30 hours of training, excluding the orientation process.
 By June 30, 2004, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
4. Beginning September 30, 2003, CFSA will offer regularly scheduled judicial training.
5. Previously hired workers will receive annually a minimum of 40 hours of inservice training geared toward professional development and specific core and advanced competencies.
 By December 31, 2003, baseline information on number of previously hired workers annually receiving a minimum of 40 hours of in-service
1 All training outcomes and requirements, unless explicitly stated otherwise, apply to both CFSA and private agency workers.

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training geared toward professional development and specific core and advanced competencies will be established.
 By June 30 2004, 70% of previously hired workers will receive annually a minimum of 40 hours of in-service training geared toward professional development and specific core and advanced competencies.
 By June 30, 2005, 80% of previously hired workers will receive annually a minimum of 40 hours of in-service training geared toward professional development and specific core and advanced competencies.
 By June 30, 2006, 85% of previously hired workers will receive annually a minimum of 40 hours of in-service training geared toward professional development and specific core and advanced competencies.
 By December 31, 2006, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
6. New supervisors will receive a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers within three months of assuming supervisory responsibility.
 By June 30, 2003, 50% of new supervisors will receive a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers. This training will begin within three months of a person assuming supervisory responsibility and is completed over a 5-month period.
 By December 31, 2003, 70% of new supervisors will receive a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers. This training will begin within three months of a person assuming supervisory responsibility and is completed over a 5month period.
 By June 30, 2004, 80% of new supervisors will receive a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers. This training will begin within three months of a person assuming supervisory responsibility and is completed over a 5-month period.
 By December 31, 2004, 90% of new supervisors will receive a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers. This training will begin within three months of a person assuming supervisory responsibility and is completed over a 5month period.

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 By June 30, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
7. Supervisors will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of ongoing training.
 By December 31, 2003, 50% of supervisors will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of ongoing training.
 By June 30, 2004, 75% of supervisors will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of ongoing training.
 By June 30, 2005, 85% of supervisors will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of ongoing training.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
8. CFSA and contract agency foster parents will receive annually a minimum of 15 hours of in-service training.
 By December 31, 2003, 70% of foster parents will receive annually a minimum of 15 hours of in-service training.
 By December 31, 2004, 90% of foster parents will receive annually a minimum of 15 hours of in-service training.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
9. Social workers and supervisors at contract private agencies will receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training and ongoing training, as required for CFSA social workers.
 By December 31, 2003, 70% of social workers and supervisors at contract private agencies will receive the required 80 hours of preservice training and 40 hours of ongoing training, as required for CFSA social workers.
 By December 31, 2004, 90% of social workers and supervisors at contract private agencies will receive the required 80 hours of preservice training and 40 hours of ongoing training, as required for CFSA social workers.

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 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
10. CFSA administrators will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of training.
 By December 31, 2003, 70% of CFSA administrators will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of training.
 By December 31, 2004, 85% of CFSA administrators will receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of training.
 By December 31, 2005, and thereafter, there will be full compliance with this outcome.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. By September 30, 2003, CFSA will develop a training advisory committee or
alternative formal assessment process to provide on-going guidance and feedback regarding training design and activities.
2. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will adequately staff the Training Division and provide the needed resources to meet the MFO training requirements.
3. CFSA will redesign their training academy to provide or arrange for a system of training and professional development activities that are competency based for each level of staff.
a. CFSA will develop an annual training plan by September 30, 2003, and annually thereafter, that identifies the training to be provided to social workers, supervisors, managers, private providers, foster and adoptive parents, and attorneys as well as the training that will be offered for the judicial system.
b. Training at CFSA shall include, among other things, substantive MFO training requirements such as training:
i. for workers in utilizing new or revised risk assessment tool(s), ii. to improve documentation of supports and services provided to
families; iii. to assist workers in crafting services and plans to meet
individualized family needs, iv. for workers and foster parents on revised foster care policies, v. regarding the expectations for the visitation of children in
placement,

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vi. for workers and their supervisors on the case planning process, and
vii. for workers on the expectations for adoption planning for children in placement consistent with MFO requirements.
c. CFSA will implement a process to assess knowledge acquisition of newly hired staff following the completion of pre-service training, as well as assess the competency of staff during the on-the-job training in a training unit.
(By September 30, 2004)
d. CFSA will implement a process to assess knowledge acquisition of newly hired or newly promoted supervisors following the completion of supervisory training as well as assess the competency of supervisors during their probationary period.
(By September 30, 2004)
4. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will have in place a system to track all staff participation in required training.
5. Beginning September 30, 2003, CFSA will have written training curricula, available for review by the Court Monitor that focuses on practice model competencies and on continuous professional development for staff and for foster/adoptive parents.
6. CFSA will maintain training units as a mechanism for orienting and integrating new staff into the Agency.
(Beginning December 30, 2003, and thereafter)

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XV. Resource Development

XV. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
Outcomes 1. By September 30, 2004, CFSA will provide evidence of adequate Resource
Development capacity within the Agency, with sufficient staff, and other resources to carry out MFO resource development functions. Critical resource development functions include:
a. Development of out-of-home care resources including greater availability of foster home resources;
b. Development of in-home and community service resources;
c. Continued development of the neighborhood-based service system; and
d. Linkages with other public and private agencies, including negotiated agreements for service provision by other District agencies (e.g., mental health, substance abuse housing, daycare and child development).
CFSA will make incremental annual progress on these resource development obligations. By September 30 of each year, CFSA will provide the Monitor with documentation of resource development activities and progress in creating adequate resource development capacity.
2. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will complete a needs assessment, which will include an assessment of placement support services, to determine what services are available and the number and categories of additional services and resources, if any, that are necessary to ensure compliance with the MFO. The needs assessment shall be a written report. The needs assessment, including the report, shall be repeated every two years.
3. Within three months of the completion of the needs assessment by March 31, 2004, CFSA will produce a written Resource Development Plan identifying the services required and how they will be funded/developed. The Plan shall specify the quantity of each category of resources and services, the time period within which they will be developed, and the specific steps that will be taken to ensure that they are developed. CFSA will then take necessary steps to implement this plan.
a. The plan shall project the number of emergency placements, foster homes, group homes, therapeutic foster homes, and institutional

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placements that will be required by children in CFSA custody during the upcoming fiscal year.
b. Consistent with these projections, the plan will identify strategies to assure that CFSA has available, either directly or through contract, a sufficient number of appropriate placements for all children in its physical or legal custody.
c. The plan shall project the needs for community-based services to prevent unnecessary placement, replacement, adoption and foster home disruption.
d. The plan shall identify how the Agency is moving to ensure decentralized neighborhood- and community-based services.
e. The plan shall include an assessment of the need for adoptive families and strategies for the recruitment, training, and retention of adoptive families based on the annual assessment.
f. The Resource Development Plan will be updated annually by March 31st of each year.
4. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will have in place necessary resources to permit the Licensing & Monitoring Unit to enforce effectively regulations for original and renewal licensing of foster homes, group homes and independent living facilities.
5. Beginning September 30, 2003, and thereafter, CFSA shall license relatives as foster parents in accordance with District law, District licensing regulations and ASFA requirements.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA will adequately staff and support the Resource Development functions of
the Agency.
(Initial implementation by March 31, 2004; complete by September 30, 2004)
2. Resources to implement the Resource Development Plan will be identified through operational interagency agreements and/or the budgets of CFSA and/or other District agencies.
a. CFSA will secure commitments from District agencies to partner with CFSA for the provision of services to children and families, as appropriate.

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b. Working with appropriate District of Columbia agencies, CFSA will develop additional treatment resources, in the Washington, DC Metropolitan area, for children with special health and behavioral needs, if identified as a need in the Resource Development needs assessment, in order to serve children now residing in residential treatment outside of DC.
(Plan developed by March 31, 2004; implementation in accordance with the Plan between March 31, 2004 and March 31, 2006)
3. By June 30, 2004, CFSA will increase the number of licensed foster family homes (including traditional, proctor and therapeutic homes) by 20%, unless the needs assessment provides evidence of a lesser need.
4. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will timely license foster homes, group homes and independent living facilities and by March 31, 2004, CFSA will demonstrate the capacity to effectively monitor the homes and enforce the licensing regulations:
a. CFSA will identify the responsibilities and functions, including the management and supervisory structure needed to carry out the implementation and enforcement of licensing and monitoring standards for foster family homes, group homes and independent living facilities.
(By June 30, 2003)
b. CFSA will review the qualifications and competencies required for licensing/monitoring staff. Modification of job descriptions, qualifications and training of existing staff will be completed as appropriate.
(By September 30, 2003)
c. CFSA will provide sufficient Licensing & Monitoring staff and make best efforts to hire the 20 new positions by September 30, 2003 (unless CFSA can demonstrate that this function can be fulfilled with fewer staff); subsequent staffing, including additional staff if necessary, shall be included in the annual staffing projections identified in Section XII, Strategy 4.

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d. CFSA will implement strategies for orderly transition and replacement of children from facilities that do not meet licensing standards.
(By March 31, 2004)
5. CFSA will develop and implement policies on the licensure of kinship foster homes.
(By September 30, 2003)
6. The District will make all reasonable efforts to provide timely access to criminal records and FBI clearance information necessary for approval of emergency placements for children with relatives and approval of foster and adoptive families.
(By September 30, 2003)

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XVI. Contract Review

XVI. CONTRACT REVIEW
Outcomes 1. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will have in place a functioning contracting
system that (a) develops procurements for identified placement and service needs; (2) issues contracts in a timely manner to qualified service providers in accordance with District laws and regulations, and (c) monitors contract performance on a routine basis.
2. By September 30, 2005, CFSA will fully implement a performance-based contracting system with capacity to monitor performance on outcomes and make decisions based on achievement of outcomes.
a. By September 30, 2003, Contracts for family and group care will include performance measures, which will assist in placement stability, will focus on strengthening capacity to support children in family settings and will be clear with respect to CFSA expectations regarding contractor responsibilities to children and families.
b. By September 30, 2004, CFSA will routinely consider provider performance on established standards and expectations as a part of its contracting decisions.
c. By September 30, 2005, CFSA will provide evidence of a fully functioning performance-based contracting system.
3. Beginning September 30, 2003, and thereafter, CFSA contracts for services will include a provision, which requires the provider to accept all clients referred pursuant to the terms of the contract, except for a lack of a vacancy.
4. Beginning September 30, 2003, and thereafter, CFSA contracts with private agencies providing foster care services shall include performance standards for visitation of children in foster care and other practice standards in compliance with Implementation Plan and MFO requirements.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. By June 30, 2003, based on the review of the CFSA’s contract operations and
internal expertise, CFSA will complete restructuring of its Contracts Office and review and modify relevant job descriptions.

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2. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will hire or obtain through contract, a Contracting Officer, Contract Manager, 5 contract specialists, and a cost price analyst, unless it can establish that it can comply with the MFO with fewer staff.
3. By December 31, 2003, CFSA will ensure all Contracts office staff participate in training, including specific training relating to performance based contracting and methods of contracting in compliance with District law and regulations.
4. By March 31, 2004, CFSA will obtain an independent review of its Contracts Operations to include an assessment of a) contracting policies and procedures, b) job descriptions and qualifications of contracting staff, and c) the ability to meet contracting outcomes including timely solicitation and awarding of contracts and effective contract monitoring. Based on the review and recommendations, CFSA, in consultation with the Monitor, will propose additional action steps to improve the contracting system to the Monitor and the Plaintiffs for inclusion in the Implementation Plan.
(Independent review complete by June 30, 2004; Plan to improve contracts operations developed by September 30, 2004; for full implementation by September 30, 2005)
5. CFSA will revise its policies and procedures for specific contract performance to include performance-based outcomes.
(By September 30, 2004)
6. CFSA will issue new RFPs and award contracts for:
a. Congregate care (First round of awards by September 30, 2003)
b. Family care (First round of awards by September 30, 2003)
c. Community based care/preventative services (First round of awards by September 30, 2003)

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XVII. Information Systems

XVII. INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Outcomes 1. CFSA shall develop and maintain a unitary computerized information system
and will take all reasonable and necessary steps to achieve and maintain accuracy.
2. By December 31, 2004, and thereafter, CFSA will provide evidence of the capacity of FACES Management Information System to produce appropriate, timely and accurate worker/supervisor reports and other management reports which will assist the Agency in meeting goals of safety, permanence and wellbeing and the requirements of the MFO.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA, with the approval of the Court Monitor, will identify the reports to be
produced in FACES and the frequency of reports which will assist the agency in meeting goals of safety, permanence, well-being and monitoring compliance with the MFO and implementation plan.
(By September 30, 2003)
2. CFSA will assess the capacity of FACES to reliably produce the data elements and supervisory reports needed by management and supervisory personnel as well as by the Court Monitor. This will include required monthly child-specific noncompliance reports as identified in Section XVII, E, 1, a.-j. of the MFO. Based on the assessment, CFSA, in consultation with the Court Monitor, will develop a timeframe for production of required data elements/reports.
(FACES assessment and agreement with the Court Monitor on a schedule to phase in the development of reports will be complete by December 31, 2003. Reports will be phased in between September 30, 2003 and September 30, 2004.)
3. For those data elements that the assessment determines to be currently unreliable, CFSA will develop and implement strategies to improve the accuracy and reliability of the data.
(A timetable for developing and implementing strategies to improve the accuracy and reliability of data will be developed by December 31, 2003, for approval by the Monitor, leading to full implementation of all strategies by December 31, 2004).
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XVIII. Financial Development

XVIII. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Outcomes 1. CFSA will demonstrate compliance with Sections A and B of Chapter XVIII of
the Modified Final Order concerning federal revenue maximization and financial development.
2. The District shall provide evidence that the Agency’s annual budget complies with Paragraph 7 of the October 23, 2000 Order providing customary adjustments to the FY 2001 baseline budget and adjustments to reflect increase in foster parent payments and additional staff required to meet caseload standards, unless demonstrated compliance with the MFO can be achieved with fewer resources.
3. The District shall provide evidence of compliance with Paragraph 4 of the October 23, 2000 Order that CFSA staff shall be exempt from any District-wide furloughs and from any District-wide agency budget and/or personnel reductions that may be otherwise imposed.
Key Implementation Strategies 1. CFSA and the Court Monitor will annually review revenue maximization
activities and outcomes to assess effectiveness of revenue maximization policies, procedures and results.
(By December 31, 2003, and annually thereafter)
2. Foster parent board rates shall be adjusted annually at the start of each fiscal (or calendar) year to assure that they meet the USDA standard for raising a child in the urban south.
(By September 30, 2003, and annually thereafter)

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XIX. Special Corrective Action

XIX. SPECIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION
Outcomes 1. By September 30, 2003, and thereafter, CFSA will produce accurate monthly
reports identifying children in each of the nine Corrective Action Categories.
2. Beginning January 1, 2004, and thereafter, CFSA will conduct a specific case review by the Director or Director’s designee and reach agreement with the Monitor on a child-specific corrective plan that will be implemented for any child identified in a corrective action category for more than 90 days. Compliance dates for this outcome will be phased in by category between January 1, 2004 and September 30, 2005.
Key Implementation Strategies Additional implementation strategies to reduce the number of children in Corrective Action can be found in Sections III, VI, VII, X and XV of the Implementation Plan.
1. Implementation of Administrative Case Review procedures.
(See Chapter X for interim benchmarks on implementation of administrative case review system beginning June 30, 2003; full implementation by September 30, 2004)
2. Quality Assurance staff will have the capacity to identify children remaining in Corrective Action Categories, review information monthly on the children in Corrective Action categories, and monitor implementation of remedial action by CFSA or contract agency staff.
(By December 31, 2003)
3. Policies and procedures will be developed to provide a supervisory review of a child’s case and a plan for remedial action, within 30 days of a child being identified in a Corrective Action Category.
(By December 31, 2003)
4. Policies and procedures will be developed to provide a child specific case review by for children who remain in a Corrective Action category for 90 days or more.

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a. CFSA will develop a time-table for phasing in child-specific case reviews by corrective action category, for approval by the Monitor.
(Timetable developed by September 30, 2003 for beginning implementation January 1, 2004 and full implementation by September 30, 2005)
b. The Court Monitor will be informed in writing of children who remain in Corrective Action categories for 90 days or more and provide with a monthly schedule of case-specific reviews of these children’s cases. The Monitor will participate in the review of these cases and the identification and monitoring of remedial actions.
(Beginning January 1, 2004, according to approved timetable)

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XX. Other

XX. OTHER
Outcomes 1. CFSA will maintain an independent advisory group of experts, selected in
consultation with the Monitor and others, so long as private funds can be raised to support this.

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 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1061 Filed 09/28/10 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., by her next friend, Evelyn )

Moore, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Case No. 89-cv-17S4 (TFH)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

)

District of Columbia, et. al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in its April 5, 2010 Memorandum Opinion, this Court held

Defendants in civil contempt for their failure to timely provide an adequate annual plan proposal

developed in consultation with Plaintiffs, as required by paragraph 8 of the October 7,2008

Stipulated Order. Order (April 5,2010) [Dkt. No. 1025]. The Court further held Mayor Adrian

Fenty, as the official responsible for the appointment of a CFSA Director, in civil contempt for

noncompliance with paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order, requiring Plaintiffs' inclusion in the

selection process. Defendants reserved the right to seek an evidentiary hearing on remedies, and the

Court invited briefing on appropriate remedies and held a remedy hearing on July 23, 2010.

I

Plaintiffs suggest that older youth transitioning out of foster care, particularly those with an

"APPLA" designation, suffered from a deprivation of services due to the District's failure to take

their planning obligations seriously. Plaintiffs propose that the Court order the District to undertake

a competitive procurement process to engage, for two years, an organization that serves older youth

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1061 Filed 09/28/10 Page 2 of 6
transitioning out of foster care. I Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' proposal is excessive, contending that "[t]he passage of time and the actions already required by the Court are sufficient to address defendants' contempt." Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' proposed remedy is punitive, as opposed to compensatory or coercive, such that it would be an appropriate remedy only for criminal contempt, not civil contempt.
"[SJome categories of sanctions-compensatory fines, coercive imprisonment, and per diem fines to coerce compliance with affirmative court orders-[are classified] as civil in nature." Salazar v. D.C, 602 F.3d 431,439 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Nat'/ Org.for Women \'. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 659, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (approving as a civil sanction a per diem fine of $100 per day for failure to appear in court». Yet, as Defendants point out, "an unconditional fine imposed after a finding of contempt is criminal if the contemnor has no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance." Salazar, 602 F.3d at 440 (quoting Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2000). But, for all practical purposes, there is often no bright line between civil and criminal contempt sanctions, as "[m]ost contempt sanctions, like most criminal punishments, to some extent punish a prior offense as well as coerce an offender's future obedience." Int'! Union, United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994); Salazar, 602 F.3d at 438.
I Plaintiffs also propose that the Court order Defendants to implement a 2010-2011 "Strategy Plan" in the form proposed by the Court Monitor. While purportedly aimed at preventing the repetitive delays and lackadaisical approach that plagued the 2009 plan proposal, this proposed sanction is not specifically tied to any provision of the 2010-2011 proposals espoused by the Monitor but eschewed by Defendants. The Court accordingly rejects it. Additionally, while Plaintiffs set forth a persuasive argument that youth with an APPLA goal were most likely to have seen benefits from an adequate plan, relative to others in foster care, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that effects of the contemptuous conduct warrant, as a coercive or compensatory sanction, the specific injunction they propose.
- 2-

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1061 Filed 09/28/10 Page 3 of 6
Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, the Court rejects Defendants' claim that a contempt sanction is unnecessary.2 C!, Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 79
(D.D.C. 2003) ("It is appropriate to use the contempt power to identify wrongdoing and to prevent
the recurrence of contumacious behavior in the future."); In re Fannie Mae Sees. Litig. 552 F.3d
814,822 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("District judges must have authority to manage their dockets, especially
during massive litigation such as this, and we owe deference to their decisions whether and how to
enforce the deadlines they impose." (citation omitted». The Court also rejects Defendants'
argument, based on Evans and National Labor Relations Board v. Blevins Popcorn, 659 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1981), that a "three-stage process" is required for civil sanctions concerning a failure to meet a clear, court-ordered deadline.3 Here, after seeking additional time to comply with AlP
requirements, Defendants failed to comply with the agreed-upon deadline of paragraph 8, such that
members of the plaintiff class were unable to realize the intended benefit of the parties' bargain.
The sanction imposed below is therefore tailored to be compensatory, not punitive, in nature. See
Pigford v. Veneman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2004).
2 Notwithstanding Defendants' improved proposals, the Court is particularly skeptical of the argument that the "passage of time" warrants the leniency they seek here. The Court cannot countenance a tactic that amounts to running-out-the-clock, particularly in light of the longstanding pattern of obstinate conduct observed here. See Chambers v. NASCa. Inc., 501 U.S. 32,46 (U.S. 1991) ("when a party shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order," civil sanctions in the form of attorney's fees may be imposed to police the judicial process).
3 Under Defendants' interpretation, this Court may not order civil sanctions for a party's failure to comply with a deadline, other than a discovery deadline, unless the Court has already set forth an applicable schedule of fines or other penalties. According to Defendants, this is so even where the conduct may be enforceable via criminal contempt sanctions. In practical terms, this would mean that initial deadlines or filing deadlines need not be taken very seriously (at least not by a party insufficiently motivated by the prospect of paying attorneys' fees) since the Court will afford a recalcitrant party an opportunity to purge itself of contempt by complying with specified conditions, presumably including a new deadline.
-3 -

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1061 Filed 09/28/10 Page 4 of 6
With respect to the sanctions for Defendants' violation of paragraph 8 set forth below, the Court notes that: (1) the Stipulated Order contained no schedule offines for noncompliance,4 (2) Stipulated Order ~ 8 imposed a deadline of January 15,2009, which was informally extended to January 26,2009, (3) although the District provided a brief, six-month proposal on that date, the District did not deliver a proposed annual plan until February 24,2009, (4) a principle reason for the Court Monitor's dissatisfaction with Defendants' proposal was its lack of specific action steps and benchmarks concerning APPLA youth; (5) the District facilitates the transition of "emancipating" youth in part via a contractual arrangement with the Healthy Families/Thriving Communities Collaborative Council, which provides services (e.g., housing assistance) to youth in the system as well as those who aged-out of the system within the last two years, and (6) Defendants are already obligated to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs, including those associated with the contempt motions and remedy briefings sub judice (as confirmed by Defendants' counsel during the July 23,2010 Remedy Hearing).
II Mayor Fenty's failure to comply with the simple requirements of paragraph 4 of the Stipulated Order are also difficult to remedy, as the result was Dr. Gerald's appointment, which may have occurred whether or not he included Plaintiffs in the selection process as required by the Order. While the Court may vacate Dr. Gerald's appointment or order a criminal contempt hearing to determine whether Mayor Fenty's contemptuous conduct was wil!fid, it sees no reason to do so. Plaintiffs sensibly propose that the Court essentially replace the ignored consultation requirement with a new one, recurring every six months. The Court will not go quite so far as that, but it is
4 Nor does the MFO limit the scope of remedies Plaintiffs' may seek. MFO § XX.F.3.
-4 -

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1061 Filed 09/28/10 Page 5 of 6
appropriate to compensate Plaintiffs for their missed opportunity to engage the Mayor by granting a new one, as stated below.
III
For the reasons set forth above and during the July 23,2010 hearing, the Court hereby
ORDERS Defendants to set aside a sum equal to the amount Plaintiffs incurred in
attorneys' fees and costs in litigating their Renewed Motion for Contempt, including for hearings,
remedy briefing, and expenses associated with calculating or reporting fees and costs; the Court FURTHER ORDERS Plaintiffs to provide, within thirty days, an estimate of attorneys'
fees and costs associated with their Renewed Motion for Contempt, as described above; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Defendants to set aside $40,000, or $100 per day per child who
aged out of foster care without achieving permanency during the forty days where Defendants' plan
proposal was late (January 15 to February 24);5 the Court FURTHER ORDERS, as a compensatory and coercive sanction, the funds set aside
pursuant to this Order shall be promptly spent to enhance the District's initiative to facilitate the
healthy and stable transition of older youth dependent upon child welfare system through its
arrangement with the Healthy Families/Thriving Communities Collaborative Council (or via another program or contractual arrangement aimed at this objective, as so certified to the Court by
5 The Court would forgive the nine days covered by its informal deadline extension if Defendants produced an adequate proposal on January 24,2009, but elects not to do so in light of the vacuous proposal filed on that date. According to the CFSA annual report and CFSA FACES data, 176 children were emancipated (i.e., aged out) without achieving their permanency goal in 2009. Of these, 170 had an APPLA goal or no goal at all. More specifically, thirteen such children were emancipated in January 2009, followed by fifteen more in February 2009. Based on these data, the Court estimates that twenty children aged out of the system during the forty days the plaintiffs and the Court awaited Defendants' proposal, nineteen of whom had an APPLA goal. This figure is conservative in light ofthe fact that the population who may have benefitted from Defendants' plans but for their failure to timely commit to and implement them includes other youth as well. Its calculation assumes one child aged out on day one and a twentieth child aged out on day forty, with a constant rate of attrition.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1061 Filed 09/28/10 Page 6 of 6
the CFSA Director)6 in addition to (i.e., separate and apart from) any amount allocated for that purpose for FY20 11; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Mayor Fenty, or his designee, to meet with Plaintiffs' counsel (or another agent of Plaintiffs') to discuss CFSA management and its implementation of the LaShawn A. reforms (i.e., the MFO) no later than November 22,2010; the Court
FURTHER ORDERS Defendants to consult with Plaintiffs regarding the selection of a new CFSA Director should a new appointment be made during the pendency of this litigation.
SO ORDERED.
September 2 7, 2010
6 The CFSA Director might reasonably determine that the funds, in part, could be most effectively used to expand or bolster another initiative that helps older youth. For example, according to CFSA's 2009 Annual Report on the Grandparent Caregivers Program, 54% of the children served by that program in 2009 were aged thirteen or older, and seventy children remained on its waiting list at the end of the year.

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 1 of 49

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., by her next friend, Evelyn )

Moore, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) Case No. 89-cv-1754 (TFH)

)

ADRIAN M. FENTY, as Mayor of the

)

District of Columbia, et. al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the parties’ proposals for a new Implementation and Exit Plan,

submitted consistent with the Court’s April 5, 2010 Memorandum Opinion and contemporaneously

issued Order. Pursuant to Modified Final Order (“MFO”) § XX.B, the Court hereby enters the

Implementation and Exit Plan accompanying this Order as a Phased Implementation Plan covering

the remainder of 2010 and 2011. This plan replaces the LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended

Implementation Plan dated February 2007 and its provisions shall be enforceable via fines or

injunctive relief unless modified with the approval of the monitor or by the Court if the parties are

not in agreement as to such modifications.

The Court does not here set forth a specific schedule of fines, but will encourage compliance

with the plan by applying sanctions as appropriate, after consideration of factors such as the

persistence and extent of noncompliance.

SO ORDERED.

December 17, 2010

/s/ Thomas F. Hogan

.

THOMAS F. HOGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 2 of 49
LaShawn A. v. Fenty Implementation and Exit Plan
December 17, 2010

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 3 of 49
PREAMBLE This LaShawn A. v. Fenty Implementation and Exit Plan includes: Outcomes to be Achieved (Section I); Outcomes to be Maintained (those requirements where the District of Columbia’s current performance meets proposed exit requirements) (Section II); Sustainability and Exit (Section III); and the 2010-2011 Strategy Plan (action steps to achieve the outcomes) (Section IV). Citations from Federal law, District of Columbia law and regulations, the Modified Final Order (MFO), and CFSA policy are included.1 This plan supersedes and replaces the LaShawn A. v. Fenty Amended Implementation Plan dated February 2007.2 The 2010-2011 Strategy Plan is intended to facilitate the parties’ and the Court’s understanding of the actions to be taken by Defendants to achieve compliance with the exit criteria. The action steps and standards included in the Strategy Plan are a means to achieving the outcomes, and absent a substantial or unjustifiable disparity, the Court will not find deviations from the action steps in the Strategy Plan to constitute noncompliance (See Order April 5, 2010 at 2 n.1). The Monitor shall prepare and submit to the Court within 90 days of this Order and every 180 days thereafter an interim performance report setting forth (1) aggregate performance determinations in relation to the Outcomes to be Achieved and the Outcomes to be Maintained, (2) reporting regarding whether Defendants are making acceptable progress toward the outcomes and exit standards and (3) reporting regarding Defendants’ progress in carrying out the associated action steps set forth in the 2010-2011 Strategy Plan. Within 90 days of this order and every six months thereafter the Court Monitor shall provide the parties and the Court with an update summarizing the most recent data and events.
1 As required by the Court’s April 5, 2010 Order [Dkt. No. 1025], the outcomes reference a local statute or regulation where it relates in some manner to the subject matter of the outcome. By agreeing to this plan, the District of Columbia does not admit that any outcome to be achieved or maintained is required by statute or regulation, even where a statute or regulation is referenced in regard to such outcome; nor does the District of Columbia admit that any target percentage contained herein is a measure of statutory or regulatory compliance. Moreover, Defendants’ agreement to this plan, which is submitted pursuant to the Court’s April 5, 2010 Order, is without prejudice to the issues raised in its pending appeal of that Order. 2 This plan is enforceable as a “Phased Implementation plan” under Modified Final Order § XX.B. Its provisions, most notably those of sections I and II, are enforceable by civil fines.
2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 4 of 49
SECTION I: OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED TO ENSURE CHILD SAFETY, PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY
A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY
1. INVESTIGATIONS3
a. Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be initiated or documented good faith efforts shall be made to initiate investigations within 48 hours after receipt of a report to the hotline of child maltreatment.4
Exit Standard: 95% of all investigations will be initiated within 48 hours or there will be documented good faith efforts to initiate investigations whenever the alleged victim child(ren) cannot be immediately located.
b. Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be completed within 30 days after receipt of a report to the hotline of child maltreatment and the final report of findings for each investigation shall be completed within 5 days of the completion of the investigation.5
Exit Standard: 90% of investigations will be completed and a final report of findings shall be entered in FACES within 35 days.
c. For families who are subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months, CFSA will conduct a
3 MFO II(G), X(D)(1)(a); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04(b), 4‐1301.04(c)(3)(A), 4‐1301.06(a) & (c)(1); CFSA Hotline Policy, Child Protective Services (revised 12/09/09); CFSA Investigations Policy, Intake and Investigative Services (revised 9/30/03). 4 The 48 hour time period is consistent with local law (D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04(a), (b) & (c)). Initiation of an investigation includes seeing all alleged victim child(ren) and talking with the child(ren) outside the presence of the caretaker. When the alleged victim child(ren) is not immediately located, documented good faith efforts to see the child within the first 48 hours shall satisfy this requirement if they include: 1) visiting the child’s home at different times of the day; 2) visiting the child’s school and/or day care in an attempt to locate the child if known; 3) contacting the reporter, if known, to elicit additional information about the child’s location; 4) reviewing the CFSA information system and other information systems (e.g., ACEDS, STARS) for additional information about the child and family; and 5) contacting the police for all allegations that a child(ren)’s safety or health is in immediate danger. 5 The Court Monitor shall measure compliance with this requirement by validating FACES data regarding the percentage of all final reports of findings from investigations that were completed within 35 days after receipt of a report of child maltreatment.
3

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 5 of 49
comprehensive review of the case history and the current circumstances that bring the family to CFSA’s attention.
Exit Standard: 90% of the case records for families subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months will have documentation of a comprehensive review. 2. ACCEPTABLE INVESTIGATIONS6
CFSA shall routinely conduct investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect. Evidence of acceptable investigations includes:
a. Use of CFSA’s screening tool in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations;
b. Interviews with and information obtained from the five core contacts – the victim child(ren), the maltreater, the reporting source (when known), medical resources, and educational resources (for school-aged children);
c. Interviews with collateral contacts that are likely to provide information about the child’s safety and well-being;
d. Interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, or documentation, by the worker, of good-faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child;
e. Medical and mental health evaluations of the children or parents when the worker determines that such evaluations are needed to complete the investigation, except where a parent refuses to consent to such evaluations. When a parent refuses to consent to such an evaluation, the investigative social worker and supervisor shall consult with the Assistant Attorney General to determine whether court intervention is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the child(ren);
f. Use of risk assessment protocol in making decisions resulting from an investigation; and
g. Initiation of services during the investigation to prevent unnecessary removal of children from their homes.
Exit Standard: 80% of investigations will be of acceptable quality as measured by the QSR indicators and verified by the Monitor.
6 See generally MFO II(H) and (J‐K); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04, 4‐1301.06 (b)(3)(B‐D), 4‐1303.01a(3A); CFSA Investigations Policy, Intake and Investigative Services (revised 9/30/03).
4

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3. SERVICES TO FAMILIES AND CHILDREN TO PROMOTE SAFETY, PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING7 Appropriate services, including all services identified in a child or family’s safety plan or case plan, shall be offered and children/families shall be assisted to use services to support child safety, permanence and well-being. CFSA shall provide for or arrange for services through operational commitments from District of Columbia public agencies and/or contracts with private providers. Services shall include: a. Services to enable children who have been the subject of an abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes; b. Services to enable children who have or will be returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those families and avoid replacement into foster care; c. Services to avoid disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized and avoid the need for replacement; and d. Services to prevent the disruption of a beneficial foster care placement and avoid the need for replacement. Exit Standard: In 80% of cases, appropriate services, including all services identified in a child’s or family’s safety plan or case plan, shall be offered along with an offer of instruction or assistance to children/families regarding the use of those services.8
7 See generally MFO III(B); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.09(b), 4‐1303.01a(b)(7, 9, 10), 4‐1303.03(a)(3, 7, 13, 14), 4‐ 1303.03(b)(1‐4), (9) & (9A); CFSA Investigations Policy, Intake and Investigative Services (revised 9/30/03); Family Team Meetings Policy (January 29, 2007) and the Out‐of‐Home Practice Model (July 2009). 8 The Monitor will determine performance based on the QSR implementation and pathway to safe closure indicators for which 80% of cases will be rated acceptable on both indicators, as applicable (a score of 4 or higher on the 6 point QSR indicator scale).
5

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 7 of 49
4. WORKER VISITATION TO FAMILIES WITH IN-HOME SERVICES9
a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker shall make at least one visit monthly to families in their home in which there has been a determination that child(ren) can be maintained safely in their home with services.
b. A CFSA social worker, family support worker, private agency social worker or a Collaborative family support worker shall make a second monthly visit at the home, school or elsewhere.
Exit Standard: 95% of families will be visited monthly by a CFSA social worker or private agency social worker and 85% of families will be visited a second time monthly by a CFSA social worker, family support worker, private agency social worker or a Collaborative family support worker.10
c. Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence of the caretaker.
Exit Standard: 90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was visited and seen outside the presence of the caretaker and that safety was assessed during each visit.
5. WORKER VISITATION TO CHILDREN IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE11
a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case management responsibility shall make monthly visits to each child in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.).
b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse care manager shall make a second monthly visit to each child in out-ofhome care (foster family homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living programs, etc.).
c. At least one of the above visits each month shall be in the child’s home.
Exit Standard: 95% of children should be visited at least monthly and 90% of children shall have twice-monthly visits.
9 See generally MFO III(B)(1); no related District of Columbia law or regulation; CFSA Visitation Policy (revised April 2010); CFSA In‐Home Practice Model, Quality Home Visitation (December 2007). 10 Within 120 days of the Court’s approval of this plan, defendants and the Monitor will develop a method of measuring this standard. 11 MFO IX(A‐B); D.C. Code § 4‐1405(b); 29 DCMR § 6003.2(b); CFSA Visitation Policy (April 2010); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Visitation (July 2009).
6

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 8 of 49
d. Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child at every visit and each child over two years old must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence of the caretaker.
Exit Standard: 90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was seen outside the presence of the caretaker by a worker and that safety was assessed during each visit.
6. VISITATION FOR CHILDREN EXPERIENCING A NEW PLACEMENT OR A PLACEMENT CHANGE12
a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case management responsibility shall make at least two visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.
b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse care manager shall make two additional visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.
c. At least one of the above visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall be in the child’s home.
d. At least one of the visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall include a conversation between the social worker and the resource parent to assess assistance needed by the resource parent from the agency.
Exit Standard: 90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described above.
e. Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence of the caretaker.
Exit Standard: 90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was seen outside the presence of the caretaker by a social worker and that safety was assessed during each visit.
12 See generally MFO IX(A‐B); D.C. Code § 4‐1405(b); 29 DCMR § 6003.2(b); CFSA Visitation Policy (April 2010); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Visitation (July 2009).
7

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B. GOAL: PERMANENCY
7. RELATIVE RESOURCES13
CFSA shall identify and investigate relative resources in all cases requiring removal of children from their homes.
Exit Standard:
a. CFSA will take necessary steps to offer and facilitate pre-removal Family Team Meetings in 70% of applicable cases requiring child removal from home.14
b. In 90% of cases where a child(ren) has been removed from his/her home, CFSA will make reasonable efforts to identify, locate and invite known relatives to the Family Team Meeting (FTM).15
8. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MOST FAMILY-LIKE SETTING16
a. Children in out-of-home care shall be placed in the least restrictive, most familylike setting appropriate to his or her needs.
Exit Standard: 90% of children will be in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate to his or her needs.
b. No child shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
Exit Standard: No child shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.17
13 See generally MFO VI(A)(6); D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(4)(B); 29 DCMR § 1642.1; CFSA Temporary Licensing of Foster Home for Kin Policy, (VII) (revised October 26, 2005); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009); Family Team Meeting Policy (January 29, 2007); Notice of Removal to Adult Relatives of Children and Youth Entering Foster Care administrative issuance (December 2, 2009). 14 FTMs are to be held when a child is at imminent risk of removal and are not held in cases where criminal charges are pending, the Children’s Advocacy Center is involved or the family refuses to participate. Monitoring and reporting on this measure may require a review of a random sample of cases as FACES is unable to track performance on this outcome. 15 To measure this, the District will provide the Monitor with data on families whose child(ren) have been removed during a specified time frame and the number of families that have had an FTM and have had a relative(s) invited to the FTM. Where a FTM would be inconsistent with CFSA policy, the District will record and report that determination along with the other relevant data. 16 MFO VI(A)(1, 5); D.C. Code § 4‐1301.09(d)(1); 29 DCMR § 6256.4; CFSA Policy; CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009); Family Team Meeting Policy (January 29, 2007); Notice of Removal to Adult Relatives of Children and Youth Entering Foster Care administrative issuance (December 2, 2009).
8

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9. PLACEMENT OF YOUNG CHILDREN18
a. Children under age 12 shall not be placed in congregate care settings for more than 30 days unless the child has special needs that cannot be met in a home-like setting and unless the setting has a program to meet the child’s specific needs.
Exit Standard: No child under 12 will be placed in congregate care settings for more than 30 days without appropriate justification that the child has special treatment needs that cannot be met in a home-like setting and the setting has a program to meet the child’s specific needs.
b. CFSA shall place no child under six years of age in a group care non-foster home setting, except for those children with exceptional needs that cannot be met in any other type of care.19
Exit Standard: No child under 6 years of age will be placed in a group care nonfoster home setting without appropriate justification that the child has exceptional needs that cannot be met in any other type of care. 10. VISITS BETWEEN PARENTS AND WORKERS20
a. For children with a permanency goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with casemanagement responsibility shall visit with the parent(s) at least one time per month in the first three months post-placement.21
b. A CFSA social worker, nurse care manager or family support worker shall make a second visit during each month for the first three months post-placement.22
17 Based on individual review, the Monitor’s assessment will exclude, on a case‐by‐case basis, children placed in an emergency, short‐term, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days where moving them would not be in their best interests. 18 MFO VI(A)(8); 29 DCMR §§ 6256.1, 6256.2. 19 The Monitor will evaluate and report on the placement and needs of any children placed in a group care non‐ foster home setting where the District has determined the child to have exceptional needs that cannot be met in any other type of care. Within 120 days of approval of this plan, the Monitor and defendants will develop a working definition of exceptional needs. 20 MFO VII(B)(6); Visitation Policy (April 2010); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Visitation (July 2009); Engaging Incarcerated Parents Policy (December 1, 2009); Elements of Good Documentation Tip‐Sheet (November, 2009). 21 This exit standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency. 22 This exit standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.
9

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Exit Standard: 80% of parents will have twice monthly visitation with workers in the first three months post-placement as defined above.23
11. VISITS BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN24
There shall be weekly visits between parents and children with a goal of reunification unless clinically inappropriate and approved by the Family Court. In cases in which visitation does not occur, the Agency shall demonstrate and there shall be documentation in the case record that visitation was not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it.
Exit Standard: 85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought.25
12. APPROPRIATE PERMANENCY GOALS26
Children shall have permanency planning goals consistent with the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) and District law and policy guidelines.
Exit Standard:
a. 95% of children shall have permanency planning goals consistent with ASFA and District law and policy guidelines.
b. Beginning July 1, 2010, children shall not be given a goal of APPLA without convening a Family Team Meeting (FTM) or Listening to Youth and Families as Experts (LYFE) meeting with participation by the youth and approval by the CFSA Director, or a court order directing the permanency goal of APPLA.
c. 90% of youth ages 18 and older will have a plan to prepare them for adulthood that is developed with their consultation. No later than 180 days prior to the date on which the youth will turn 21 years old (or on which the youth will emancipate), an individualized transition plan will be created that includes as appropriate connections to specific options on housing, health insurance, and education and linkages to continuing adult support services agencies (e.g.,
23 This exit standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency. 24 MFO VII(B)(7); D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(5); Visitation Policy (April 28, 2010); Engaging Incarcerated Parents Policy (December 1, 2009); Elements of Good Documentation Tip‐Sheet (November, 2009); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Visitation (July 2009). 25 This exit standard is also satisfied in cases where it is documented that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it. 26 MFO VII(C‐D); D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a)(6) & (15); CFSA Establishing the goal of Alternative Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA) Policy (revised June 25, 2009); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Permanence (July 2009).
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Rehabilitation Services Administration, the Department on Disability Services, the Department of Mental Health, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid), work force supports, employment services, and local opportunities for mentors. This exit standard is satisfied if CFSA makes and documents good faith efforts to develop a transition plan but the youth refuses to participate in transition planning.27
13. REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE PLACEMENTS FOR CHILDREN IN CARE28
Exit Standard:
a. Of all children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care at least 8 days and less than 12 months, 83% shall have had two or fewer placements.
b. Of all children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12 months but less than 24 months, 60% shall have had two or fewer placements.
c. Of all children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 24 months, 75% shall have had two or fewer placements in that 12 month period.
14. TIMELY APPROVAL OF FOSTER/ADOPTIVE PARENTS29
CFSA shall have in place a process for recruiting, studying and approving families, including relative caregivers, interested in becoming foster or adoptive parents that results in the necessary training, home studies and decisions on approval being completed within 150 days of beginning training.
Exit Standard: 70% of homes licensed beginning November 1, 2010, will have been approved, and interested parties will have been notified within 150 days.30
27 The requirement to develop a Transition Plan for youth exiting the foster care system arises from The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110‐351, 122 Stat. 3949 (2008). 28 See generally MFO VI(A) and VI(B); CFSA Family Team Meetings (FTM) Policy (revised January 29, 2007); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009). 29 See generally MFO XV(E); no timeframes specified in D.C. Code, see generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(4)(C); 29 DCMR §§ 6028.4 & 6028.5. 30 The exit standard is satisfied where there is documentation that establishes that failure to meet the 150 day timeline is due to delays that are beyond the control of the District of Columbia.
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15. LEGAL ACTION TO FREE CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION31
Children with a permanency goal of adoption shall have legal action initiated to free them for adoption and Office of the Attorney General, on behalf of CFSA, shall facilitate the Court’s timely hearing and resolution of legal action to terminate parental rights.
Exit Standard:
a. For 90% of children with a permanency goal of adoption, where freeing the child for adoption is necessary and appropriate to move the child more timely to permanency, OAG, on behalf of CFSA shall file a motion to terminate parental rights or confirm that appropriate legal action has been taken within 45 days of their permanency goal becoming adoption.32
b. For 90% of children for whom a petition to terminate parental rights has been filed in order to achieve permanency, CFSA shall take and document appropriate actions by the assigned social worker and the assistant attorney general to facilitate the court’s timely hearing and resolution of legal action to terminate parental rights.
16. TIMELY ADOPTION33
a. Children with a permanency goal of adoption shall be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.34
Exit Standard:
i. For children whose permanency goal changed to adoption July 1, 2010 or thereafter, 80% will be placed in an approved adoptive placement by the end of the ninth month from when their goal changed to adoption.35
ii. For children whose permanency goal changed to adoption prior to July 1, 2010 who are not currently in an approved adoptive placement, 40% will be placed in an approved adoptive placement by December 31, 2010 and an additional 20% will be placed in an approved adoptive placement by June 30, 2011.
31 MFO VIII(C)(3); Implementation Plan (“IP”) (VIII)(1)(b). 32 This exit standard is satisfied when other actions or circumstances have occurred to free a child for adoption, such as relinquishment, an adoption petition, the child is 18 years old or older or death of child’s parents. 33 MFO VIII(D)(1) and (D)(2)(d); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.01(a), 4‐1303.01a(b)(11). 34 The Monitor will consider a placement an approved adoptive placement based on documentation of an intent to adopt or filing of an adoption petition or indication in the FACES service line of an adoptive placement. 35 This will be measured by looking at children who have had the goal of adoption for 10 months to ensure the full nine months have passed.
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b. CFSA shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that children placed in an approved adoptive home have their adoptions finalized within 12 months of the placement in the approved adoptive home.36
Exit Standard:
i. By September 30, 2010, 40% of the 203 children in pre-adoptive homes as of October 1, 2009 will achieve permanence.
ii. By June 30, 2011, 45% of the children in pre-adoptive homes as of July 1, 2010 will achieve permanence.
iii. 90% of children in pre-adoptive homes will have their adoption finalized within 12 months or have documented reasonable efforts to achieve permanence within 12 months of the placement in the approved adoptive home.
c. Timely permanency through reunification adoption or legal guardianship
Exit Standard:
i. Of all children who entered foster care for the first time in FY2010 and who remain in foster care for 8 days or longer, 45% will achieve permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2011.
ii. Of all children who are in foster care for more than 12 but less than 25 months on September 30, 2010, 45% will be discharged from foster care to permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or nonrelative guardianship) by September 30, 2011.
iii. Of all children who are in foster care for 25 months or longer on September 30, 2010, 40% will be discharged through reunification, adoption, legal guardianship prior to their 21st birthday or by September 30, 2011, whichever is earlier.
iv. The above standards (i, ii, and iii) will continue for each year for as long as this agreement is in effect.
36 Reasonable efforts include: 1) ensuring the home is licensed as a pre‐adoptive home (if not dually licensed); 2) requesting an adoption home study if needed; 3) responding to the Order of Reference; 4) preparing the child and biological parents for the adoption; 5) referring adoptive families to Family Intervention Services to assist/support families in their new role; 6) assessing post permanency needs and families’ readiness for adoption; 7) referring and acquainting families with the Post Permanency Family Center; 8) preparing for TPR trial if child is not legally free; 9) preparing an ICPC package if needed; and 10) preparing the adoption final report. See D.C. Code § 4‐ 1303.01a(b)(11).
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17. CASE PLANNING PROCESS37 a. CFSA, with the family, shall develop timely, comprehensive and appropriate case plans in compliance with District law requirements and permanency timeframes, which reflect family and children’s needs, are updated as family circumstances or needs change, and CFSA shall deliver services reflected in the current case plan. b. Every reasonable effort shall be made to locate family members and to develop case plans in partnership with youth and families, the families’ informal support networks, and other formal resources working with or needed by the youth and/or family. c. Case plans shall identify specific services, supports and timetables for providing services needed by children and families to achieve identified goals. Exit Standard: 80% of cases reviewed through the Quality Service Reviews (QSR) will be rated as acceptable.38
18. PLACEMENT LICENSING39 Children shall be placed in foster homes and other placements that meet licensing and other MFO placement standards and have a current and valid license. Exit Standard: 95% of foster homes and group homes with children placed will have a current and valid license.
37 MFO VII; D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.02(3), 4‐1301.09(b); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Case Planning (revised July 2009); CFSA Diligent Search Policy (revised December 1, 2009). 38 The Monitor will determine performance based on the QSR case planning process and pathway to safe case closure indicators, for which 80% of cases will be rated acceptable on both indicators, as applicable, a score of 4 or higher on the 6 point QSR indicator scale). 39 MFO XV(E); D.C. Code §§ 4‐217.02, 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(10), 4‐1402, 7‐217.02, 7‐2103, 7‐2105; 29 DCMR §§ 1638.2, 6206.1‐.5.
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C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING
19. COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE REFERRALS FOR LOW & MODERATE RISK FAMILIES40
Exit Standard: 90% of families who have been the subject of a report of abuse and/or neglect, whose circumstances are deemed to place a child in their care at low or moderate risk of abuse and neglect and who are in need of and agree to additional supports shall be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for follow-up.41
20. SIBLING PLACEMENT AND VISITS42
a. Children in out-of-home placement who enter foster care with their siblings should be placed with some or all of their siblings, unless documented that the placement is not appropriate based on safety, best interest needs of child(ren) or a court order requiring separation.
Exit Standard: 80% of children who enter foster care with their siblings or within 30 days of their siblings will be placed with some of their siblings.43
b. Children placed apart from their siblings should have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings unless documented that the visitation is not in the best interest of the child(ren).
Exit Standard: 80% of children shall have monthly visits with their separated siblings and 75% of children shall have twice monthly visits with their separated siblings.44
21. ASSESSMENTS FOR CHILDREN EXPERIENCING A PLACEMENT DISRUPTION45
CFSA shall ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a comprehensive and appropriate assessment and follow-up action plans to determine their service and re-placement needs no later than within 30 days of replacement. A comprehensive assessment is a review, including as applicable the child, his/her family, kin, current and former caregiver and the GAL, to assess the child’s
40 See generally MFO XV(A)(2); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(3), (3A)(A), 1303.03a(a). 41 Low and moderate risk cases for which CFSA decides to open an ongoing CFSA case are excluded from this requirement. 42 See generally MFO VI(A)(5); D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(5); 29 DCMR § 1642.8; CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009). 43 This standard excludes children where it is documented that such placement is not appropriate. 44 This standard excludes children where it is documented that visits are not in the best interest of the children. 45 MFO III(B)(3‐4), VI(C)(3).
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current medical, social, behavioral, educational and dental needs to determine the additional evaluations/services/supports that are required to prevent future placement disruptions.
Exit Standard: 90% of children experiencing a placement disruption will have a comprehensive assessment as described above and an action plan to promote stability developed. 22. HEALTH AND DENTAL CARE46
a. Children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to placement.
Exit Standard: 95% of children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to an initial placement or re-entry into care. 90% of children in foster care who experience a placement change shall have a replacement health screening.
b. Children in foster care shall receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
Exit Standard:
i. 85% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement. 95% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement.
ii. 25% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement. 50% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of placement. 85% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement.
c. Children in foster care shall have timely access to health care services to meet identified needs.
Exit Standard: 80% of cases reviewed through Quality Service Reviews (QSR) will be rated as acceptable.47
d. CFSA shall ensure the prompt completion and submission of appropriate health insurance paperwork, and shall keep records of, e.g., Medicaid application dates, HMO severance dates, and enrollment dates. CFSA shall provide caregivers with
46 MFO VI(C)(1); see generally D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.03(a)(3), 4‐1303.03(d); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009); Investigations Policy (September 30, 2003). 47 The Monitor will determine performance based on the QSR child status health/physical well‐being indicator, for which 80% of cases will be rated acceptable (a score of 4 or higher on the 6 point QSR indicator scale).
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documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of every placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.
Exit Standard: 90% of children’s caregivers shall be provided with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.
D. GOAL: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY
23. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN48
The District shall implement the CFSA Resource Development Plan, which is to be developed by June 30 each year. The Resource Development Plan shall include all of the components listed in item 21b of the Outcomes to be Maintained section of this document.
Exit Standard: The District shall implement the CFSA Resource Development Plan, which is to be developed by June 30 each year. The Resource Development Plan shall include all of the components listed in Item 21b of the “Outcomes to be Maintained” section of this document. 24. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES49
The District shall provide evidence of financial support for community- and neighborhood-based services to protect children and support families.
Exit Standard: The District shall provide evidence each year of financial support for community- and neighborhood-based services to protect children and support families. 25. CASELOADS50
a. The caseload of each worker51 conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed the MFO standard, which is 1:12 investigations.
b. The caseload of each worker providing services to children and families in which the child or children in the family are living in their home shall not exceed 1:15 families.
48 MFO XV(B). 49 MFO XV(C); Amended Implementation Plan (“AIP”) (25). See generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03a(a). 50 MFO XI(A, F); the D.C. Code does not mandate a staff ratio, see generally D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.02a(d), 4‐ 1303.02a(e). 51 All requirements apply to both CFSA workers and private agency workers. All CFSA contracts with private agencies providing foster care services shall include performance expectations for visitation of children in foster care in compliance with MFO visitation requirements.
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c. The caseload of each worker providing services to children in placement, including children in Emergency Care and children in any other form of CFSA physical custody, shall not exceed 1:15 children for children in foster care.
d. The caseload of each worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases.
e. There shall be no cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days, in which case, the supervisor shall provide coverage but not for more than five business days.
Exit Standard: 90% of investigators and social workers will have caseloads that meet the above caseload requirements. No individual investigator shall have a caseload greater than 15 cases. No individual social worker shall have a caseload greater than 18 cases. No individual worker conducting home studies shall have a caseload greater than 35 cases.
26. SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES52
a. Supervisors who are responsible for supervising social workers who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aids or family support workers, or five caseworkers.
b. No supervisor shall be responsible for the on-going case management of any case.53
Exit Standard:
i. 90% of supervisors shall be responsible for no more than five social workers and a case aide or family support worker.
ii. 95% of cases are assigned to social workers.
27. TRAINING FOR NEW SOCIAL WORKERS AND SUPERVISORS54
a. New direct service staff55 shall receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training through a combination of classroom, web-based and/or on-the-job training.
52 MFO XI(C); see generally D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.02a(d), 4‐1303.02a(e). 53 Within 120 days of approval of this plan, the Monitor and defendants will propose a new method for monitoring this outcome. 54 MFO XIV(D); see generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.02a(e); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Training (July 2009). 55 Direct service staff includes social workers, nurse care managers, and family supports workers who provide direct services to children, youth and families.
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Exit Standard: 90% of newly hired CFSA and private agency direct service staff shall receive 80 hours of pre-service training.
b. New supervisors shall complete a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility.
Exit Standard: 90% of newly hired CFSA and private agency supervisors shall complete 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare worker within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility.
28. TRAINING FOR PREVIOUSLY HIRED SOCIAL WORKERS, SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS56
a. Previously hired direct service staff57 shall receive annually a minimum of 5 full training days (or a minimum of 30 hours) of structured in-service training geared toward professional development and specific core and advanced competencies.
Exit Standard58: 80% of CFSA and private agency direct service staff shall receive the required annual in-service training.
b. Supervisors and administrators shall receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of structured in-service training.
Exit Standard59: 80% of CFSA and private agency supervisors and administrators who have casework responsibility shall receive annual in-service training.
29. TRAINING FOR FOSTER PARENTS60
a. CFSA and contract agency foster parents shall receive a minimum of 15 hours of pre-service training.
Exit Standard: 95% of CFSA and contract agency foster parents shall receive a minimum of 15 hours of pre-service training.
b. CFSA and contract agency foster parents shall receive 30 hours of in-service training every two years.
56 MFO XIV(D); see generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.02a(e); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Training (July 2009). 57 Twelve of the 30 hours required for the nurse care managers may be met with continuing education requirements of the licensing board. 58 These requirements will be measured for the twelve month period between July 1, 2010 and June 30, 2011 and annually thereafter. 59 These requirements will be measured for the twelve month period between July 1, 2010 and June 30, 2011 and annually thereafter. 60 MFO XIV(F); 29 DCMR § 6026.
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Exit Standard: 95% of foster parents whose licenses are renewed shall receive 30 hours of in-service training.
30. SPECIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION61
a. CFSA shall produce accurate monthly reports, shared with the Monitor, which identify children in the following categories: i. All cases in which a child has been placed in four or more different placements, with the fourth or additional placement occurring in the last 12 months and the placement is not a permanent placement; ii. All cases in which a child has had a permanency goal of adoption for more than one year and has not been placed in an adoptive home; iii. All children who have been returned home and have reentered care more than twice and have a plan of return home at the time of the report; iv. Children with a permanency goal of reunification for more than 18 months; v. Children placed in emergency facilities for more than 90 days; vi. Children placed in foster homes or facilities that exceed their licensed capacities or placed in facilities without a valid license vii. Children under 14 with a permanency goal of APPLA; and viii. Children in facilities more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia.
b. CFSA shall conduct a child-specific case review by the Director or Director’s designee(s) for each child identified and implement a child-specific corrective action plan, as appropriate.
Exit Standard: For 90% of children identified in corrective action categories, required reviews will occur and corrective action plans will be developed and implemented as appropriate.
31. PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTRACTING62
CFSA shall have in place a functioning performance-based contracting system that (a) develops procurements for identified resource needs, including placement and service needs; (b) issues contracts in a timely manner to qualified service providers in accordance with District laws and regulations; and (c) monitors contract performance on a routine basis.
Exit Standard: Evidence of functionality and ongoing compliance. Evidence of capacity to monitor contract performance on a routine basis.63
61 MFO XIX. 62 MFO XVI(B)(1).
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32. INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (ICPC)64
CFSA shall continue to maintain responsibility for managing and complying with the ICPC for children in its care.
Exit Standard: Elimination of the backlog of cases without ICPC compliance.
33. LICENSING REGULATIONS65
CFSA shall have necessary resources to enforce regulations effectively for original and renewal licensing of foster homes, group homes, and independent living facilities.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
34. BUDGET AND STAFFING ADEQUACY66
The District shall provide evidence that the Agency’s annual budget complies with Paragraph 7 of the October 23, 2000 Order providing customary adjustments to the FY 2001 baseline budget and adjustments to reflect increases in foster parent payments and additional staff required to meet caseload standards, unless demonstrated compliance with the MFO can be achieved with fewer resources.
The District shall provide evidence of compliance with Paragraph 4 of the October 23, 2000 Order that CFSA staff shall be exempt from any District-wide furloughs and from any District-wide agency budget and/or personnel reductions that may be otherwise imposed.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
35. FEDERAL REVENUE MAXIMIZATION67
CFSA shall demonstrate compliance with Sections A and B of Chapter XVIII of the Modified Final Order concerning federal revenue maximization and financial development.
Exit Standard: Evidence of consistent and appropriate claiming of all appropriate and available federal revenue.
63 Functionality will be assessed by looking at the timely execution and renewal, if applicable, of contracts/Human Care Agreements in accordance with Performance Based Contracting standards for all placement and service agreements; the timely and effective monitoring of contracts/Human Care Agreements in accordance with CSA policy and monitoring protocols and evidence of decisions and actions to procure placements and services from providers that meet specified performance outcomes. 64 D.C. Code §§ 4‐1422, 4‐1423, 4‐1303.02a(c); CFSA ICPC Policy (October 2, 2009). 65 MFO XV(E). 66 IP XVIII. 67 MFO XVIII(A‐B).
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SECTION II: OUTCOMES TO BE MAINTAINED The following outcomes are in the Outcomes to be Maintained Section because CFSA has demonstrated sustained performance that meets required exit standards.68
A. PROTECTIVE SERVICES 1. ENTERING REPORTS INTO COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM69
CFSA shall immediately enter all reports of abuse or neglect into its computerized information systems and shall use the system to determine whether there have been prior reports of abuse or neglect in that family or to that child. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance 2. MAINTAINING 24 HOUR RESPONSE SYSTEM70 CFSA shall staff and maintain a 24-hour system for receiving and responding to reports of child abuse and neglect, which conforms to reasonable professional standards. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance 3. CHECKING FOR PRIOR REPORTS71 Child abuse and/or neglect reports shall show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of abuse and/or neglect. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
68 The Monitor will continue to receive data and review Outcomes to be Maintained. Insubstantial and temporary deviation from performance on an Outcome to be Maintained will not result in re‐designation of an Outcome previously designated as an Outcome to be Achieved. 69 MFO II(C); IP II(6); CFSA Hotline Policy, Child Protective Services (revised December 9, 2009). 70 MFO II(A); CFSA Hotline Policy, Child Protective Services (revised December 9, 2009). 71 MFO II(C); CFSA Investigations Policy (VII)(C)(7)(b) (September 30, 2003); CFSA Hotline Policy, Child Protective Services (revised December 9, 2009).
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4. REVIEWING CHILD FATALITIES72
The District of Columbia, through the City-wide Child Fatality Committee, and an Internal CFSA Committee, shall conform to the requirements of the MFO regarding the ongoing independent review of child fatalities of members of the plaintiff class, with procedures for (1) reviewing child deaths; (2) making recommendations concerning appropriate corrective action to avert future fatalities; (3) issuing an annual public report; and (4) considering and implementing recommendations as appropriate.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
5. INVESTIGATIONS OR ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN FOSTER HOMES AND INSTITUTIONS73
Reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated; investigations in foster homes shall be completed within 35 days and investigations involving group homes, day care settings or other congregate care settings shall be completed within 60 days.
Exit Standard: 90% of reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes shall be completed within 35 days and within 60 days for investigations involving group homes, day care settings or other congregate settings.
B. EMEGENCY CARE AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE 6. POLICIES FOR GENERAL ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS74
CFSA shall have in place policies and procedures for appropriate use of general assistance payments for the care of children by unrelated adults, including provision of any applicable oversight and supervision.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance 7. USE OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS75
CFSA shall demonstrate that District General Assistance payment grants are not used as a substitute for financial supports for foster care or kinship care for District children who have been subject to child abuse or neglect.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
72 MFO II(N); D.C. Code § 4‐1371.03; CFSA Child Fatality Review Policy (March 18, 2009). 73 CFSA Investigations Policy (VII)(C)(7)(b) (September 30, 2003). 74 MFO V. 75 MFO V.
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8. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MOST FAMILY LIKE SETTING76
No child shall stay overnight in the CFSA Intake Center or office building.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
9. TIMELY APPROVAL OF FOSTER/ADOPTIVE PARENTS77
CFSA should ensure training opportunities are available so that interested families may begin training within 30 days of inquiry.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
10. PLACEMENT WITHIN 100 MILES OF THE DISTRICT78
No more than 82 children shall be placed more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia. (Children placed in college, vocational programs, correctional facilities, or kinship or pre-adoptive family-based settings under the ICPC shall be exempt from this requirement.)
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
11. LICENSING AND PLACEMENT STANDARDS79
a. Children shall be placed in foster homes and other placements that meet licensing and other MFO placement standards.
b. Children in foster home placements shall be in homes that (a) have no more than three foster children or (b) have six total children including the family’s natural children; (c) have no more than two children under two years of age or (d) have more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, shall exceed these limits.
c. No child shall be placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of eight (8) children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child’s needs can only be met in that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual child’s needs.
d. Children shall not be placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, shall exceed the limits.
76 Family Team Meeting Policy (January 29, 2007). 77 MFO XIV(F), (G); MFO XV(E); AIP(I)(14)(b); IP VI(3); 29 DCMR § 6028.4‐5. 78 MFO XV(D)(1),(5), XIX(A)(9); IP VI(1)(f). 79 MFO XV(E), VI(A)(7), (10); D.C. Code § 4‐1402; 29 DCMR §§ 1638.2, 6206.1‐4.
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Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance for 95% of children
12. CASE PLANNING PROCESS80
Case plans shall be developed within 30 days of the child entering care and shall be reviewed and modified as necessary at least every six months thereafter, and shall show evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan progress.
Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance; 90% of case plans shall be developed within 30 days of the child entering care and shall be reviewed and modified as necessary at least every six months thereafter.
13. APPROPRIATE PERMANENCY GOALS81
No child under the age of 12 shall have a permanency goal of legal custody with permanent caretakers unless he or she is placed with a relative who is willing to assume long-term responsibility for the child and who has legitimate reasons for not adopting the child and it is in the child’s best interest to remain in the home of the relative rather than be considered for adoption by another person. No child under the age of 12 shall have a permanency goal of continued foster care unless CFSA has made every reasonable effort, documented in the record, to return the child home, to place the child with an appropriate family member, and to place the child for adoption, and CFSA has considered and rejected the possibility of the child’s foster parents assuming legal custody as permanent caretakers of the child.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
14. TIMELY ADOPTION82
Within 95 days of a child’s permanency goal becoming adoption, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning team to develop a child-specific recruitment plan which may include contracting with a private adoption agency for those children without an adoptive resource.
Exit Standard: For 90% of children whose permanency goal becomes adoption, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning team to develop a child-specific recruitment plan which may include contracting with a private adoption agency for those children without an adoptive resource.
80 MFO VII(A‐B, D); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.02(3), 4‐1301.09(b); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Case Planning (revised July 2009); CFSA Diligent Search Policy (VII) (revised December 1, 2009); CFSA Family Team Meetings Policy (January 29, 2007). 81 MFO XIX(A)(8), VII(C)(4); AIP II(8); CFSA Establishing the Goal of Alternative Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA) Policy (June 25, 2004) 82 MFO VIII(D)(1), (2)(d); IP VIII(1‐2).
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15. POST-ADOPTION SERVICES NOTIFICATION83 Adoptive families shall receive notification at the time that the adoption becomes final of the availability of post-adoption services. Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance for 90% of cases. D. CASE REVIEW SYSTEM
16. FAMILY COURT REVIEWS84 A case review hearing will be conducted in Family Court at least every six months for every child as long as the child remains in out-of-home placement, unless the child has received a permanency hearing within the past six months. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance for 90% of cases.
17. PERMANENCY HEARINGS85 CFSA shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that children in foster care have a permanency hearing in Family Court no later than 14 months after their initial placement. Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance for 90% of cases. E. CASELOADS, STAFFING, AND WORKER QUALIFICATION
18. USE OF MSWs AND BSWs86 Unless otherwise agreed, all social worker hires at CFSA shall have an MSW or BSW before being employed as trainees. Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance for all social work hires.
19. SOCIAL WORK LICENSURE87 All social work staff shall meet District of Columbia licensing requirements to carry cases independently of training units. Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance for all social workers.
83 MFO VIII(G)(2); IP VIII(5). 84 MFO X(B)(1)(c); D.C. Code § 16‐2323; CFSA Administrative Review Policy (July 12, 2006). 85 MFO X(B)(2); D.C. Code § 16‐2323. 86 MFO XIII(A). 87 IP XI‐XIII(10).
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F. TRAINING
20. TRAINING FOR ADOPTIVE PARENTS88
Adoptive parents shall receive a minimum of 30 hours of training, excluding the orientation process.
Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance for 90% of adoptive parents.
G. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
21. NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN89
a. CFSA shall complete a needs assessment every two years, which shall include an assessment of placement support services, to determine what services are available and the number and categories of additional services and resources, if any, that are necessary to ensure compliance with the MFO. The needs assessment shall be a written report. The needs assessment, including the report, shall be repeated every two years. CFSA shall provide evidence of adequate Resource Development capacity within the Agency, with sufficient staff and other resources to carry out MFO resource development functions.
b. The District shall develop a Resource Development Plan, which shall be updated annually by June 30th of each year. The Resource Development Plan shall: (a) project the number of emergency placements, foster homes, group homes, therapeutic foster homes and institutional placements that shall be required by children in CFSA custody during the upcoming year; (b) identify strategies to assure that CFSA has available, either directly or through contract, a sufficient number of appropriate placements for all children in its physical or legal custody; (c) project the need for community-based services to prevent unnecessary placement, replacement, adoption and foster home disruption; (d) identify how the Agency is moving to ensure decentralized neighborhood and community-based services; and (e) include an assessment of the need for adoptive families and strategies for recruitment, training and retention of adoptive families based on the annual assessment. The Plan shall specify the quantity of each category of resources and services, the time period within which they shall be developed, and the specific steps that shall be taken to ensure that they are developed. CFSA shall then take necessary steps to implement this plan.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
88 MFO XIV(G). 89 MFO XV(B); D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(b)(10)(D–F).
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22. FOSTER PARENT LICENSURE90 CFSA shall license relatives as foster parents in accordance with District law, District licensing regulations and ASFA requirements.
Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance 23. QUALITY ASSURANCE91
CFSA shall have a Quality Assurance system with sufficient staff and resources to assess case practice, analyze outcomes and provide feedback to managers and stakeholders. The Quality Assurance system must annually review a sufficient number of cases to assess compliance with the provisions of the MFO and good social work practice, to identify systemic issues, and to produce results allowing the identification of specific skills and additional training needed by workers and supervisors. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
H. CONTRACT REVIEW AND PROVIDER PAYMENTS 24. MAINTAINING COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM92
a. CFSA shall develop and maintain a unitary computerized information system and shall take all reasonable and necessary steps to achieve and maintain accuracy.
b. CFSA shall provide evidence of the capacity of FACES Management Information System to produce appropriate, timely, and accurate worker/supervisor reports and other management reports that shall assist the Agency in meeting goals of safety, permanence and well-being and the requirements of the MFO and Courtordered Implementation and Exit Plan. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
25. CONTRACTS TO REQUIRE THE ACCEPTANCE OF CHILDREN REFERRED93 CFSA contracts for services shall include a provision that requires the provider to accept all clients referred pursuant to the terms of the contract, except for a lack of vacancy.
90 MFO XV(F); CFSA Temporary Licensing of Foster Home for Kin Policy (revised October 26, 2005). 91 MFO X(C). 92 MFO XVII(A–D). 93 MFO XVI(C).
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26. PROVIDER PAYMENTS94 CFSA shall ensure payment to providers in compliance with DC’s Quick Payment Act for all services rendered. Exit Standard: 90% of payments to providers shall be made in compliance with DC’s Quick Payment Act for all services rendered.
27. FOSTER PARENT BOARD RATES95 There shall be an annual adjustment at the beginning of each fiscal year of board rates for all foster and adoptive homes to equal the USDA annual adjustment to maintain rates consistent with USDA standards for costs of raising a child in the urban south. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
28. POST-ADOPTION SERVICES96 CFSA shall make available post-adoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a child committed to CFSA. Exit Standard: Ongoing compliance
94 AIP (38). 95 MFO XV(D)(6)(a). 96 MFO VIII(G); see generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(b)(9); 29 DCMR § 1622.6; CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Permanence (July 2009).
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SECTION III: SUSTAINABILITY AND EXIT
1. Defendants shall continue to provide to the Court Monitor, until this matter is dismissed, all information necessary to assess performance on Outcomes to be Achieved, and Outcomes to be Maintained and Strategy Plan implementation. The Court Monitor shall review and validate monthly data and report to the Court, providing a full report at least every six months on the status of Defendants’ performance on each of the outcomes and exit standards in the Implementation and Exit Plan and Defendant’s progress in carrying out the Strategy Plan.
2. As determined by the Court Monitor based on performance during a six-month period, the Monitor shall designate an outcome as an “Outcome to be Achieved” if performance data falls below the designated outcome and exit standard(s). When the Monitor determines Defendants’ performance satisfies the exit standard(s) for any Outcome to be Achieved, that outcome shall be moved to the “Outcomes to be Maintained” section of this Implementation and Exit Plan, unless the Court orders to the contrary.
3. Once an outcome has been designated as an “Outcome to be Maintained”, the Monitor will not reinstate it as an “Outcome to be Achieved” if performance deviation from the exit standard(s) is either insubstantial or temporary. If the Monitor seeks to reinstate an outcome as an “Outcome to be Achieved,” Defendants may object and provide information to demonstrate that the performance change is either temporary, insubstantial, or based on reasonable justification.
4. Defendants may seek to exit court supervision when (a) the Court Monitor reports that Defendants have achieved all of the outcomes and exit standards and maintained each of the “Outcomes to be Maintained” for at least two consecutive six-month reporting periods; (b) Defendants petition the Court for an Order of Dismissal and demonstrate, based on the Court Monitor’s reports, substantial compliance with the outcomes and exit standards and the Court finds, after hearing the views of the Court Monitor and the Plaintiffs, that the case should be dismissed in the interests of justice; or (c) as the Court may otherwise direct. In assessing compliance with this Implementation and Exit Plan, the Court will consider sustainability in light of how closely Defendants meet the exit standards as well as how consistently the exit standards are met over time. A “miss” by 5% or less on certain measures will not necessarily foreclose a demonstration of durable compliance, but neither shall a superior performance on one measure necessarily provide a basis for forgiving a shortfall on another. A substantial compliance argument must be assessed on the totality of the circumstances.
5. If Defendants seek to petition the Court for an Order of Dismissal on the grounds of substantial compliance, Defendants shall first inform the Court Monitor and Plaintiffs and engage in good faith efforts to determine whether there is any opposition to the relief sought and, if necessary, to engage in dispute resolution for a period not to exceed 45 business days in an attempt to resolve disagreements.
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SECTION IV: 2010-2011 STRATEGY PLAN
Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Court’s April 5, 2010 Order, the 2010-2011 Strategy Plan identifies specific action steps and targets to achieve safety, permanency and well-being for children and to reach and sustain the performance standards of the LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan. The strategies and specific action steps in this plan relate to outcomes including investigations, safe and stable reunification, licensing, training, adoption, services for youth aging out, placement stability, case planning, visitation and health and mental health services.
The Strategy Plan is a means to achieve compliance with the outcomes and exit standards of the LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan. Absent a substantial or unjustifiable disparity, the Court will not find deviations from action steps in the Strategy Plan to constitute noncompliance. The District’s Strategy Plan, including applicable due dates, can be modified with timely consultation with the Monitor. In the event that the District has not met the outcomes and exit standards of the LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan by September 30, 2011, the District, after consultation with the Monitor and Plaintiffs, will review, modify as appropriate and submit to the Court an updated Strategy Plan. The Court shall assume that all strategies with due dates preceding the filing of this order will be completed as planned, unless modified in consultation with and with the approval of the Monitor.
A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY
1. INVESTIGATIONS (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcomes 1 and 2)
a. Policy i. CFSA will review and modify, if necessary, its investigations policy to ensure clarity on the definition of quality investigations consistent with DC statute (including reasonable efforts to prevent removal and investigation of relative resources) and the definition included in the 2010-2011 Implementation and Exit Plan. ii. By September 2010, CFSA will complete a CPS investigations practice guide consistent with CFSA policy.
iii. CFSA in collaboration with the Child Advocacy Center (CAC) and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) will review the current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and existing policy to modify policy as necessary to increase appropriate utilization of the CAC. Practices to implement the policy and MOU on the use of the CAC will be reflected in the CPS investigations practice guide.
iv. In consultation with the Children’s Research Center (CRC), CFSA will recalibrate the risk assessment tool to address reliability of risk assessment process, pending available budgetary resources.
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b. Practice i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will develop the capacity (in-house or contracted) to ensure that Family Team Meetings (FTMs) occur prior to a child’s removal unless the child is at imminent risk of harm or prior to filing a petition for removal with Superior Court.97 ii. CFSA will identify any additional action steps necessary to implement the investigative practice recommendations from the Monitor’s report98 and implement such action steps or provide rationale as to why the Agency is choosing not to implement the recommendations.
iii. CFSA will develop and define the process for comprehensive reviews of families with four or more reports of abuse and neglect which may include the investigations program manager, the current investigative worker, the Office of Clinical Practice, Collaborative workers and others who have prior familiarity with the family.
iv. By November 1, 2010, CFSA will implement the comprehensive reviews of families with four or more reports of abuse and neglect which may include the investigations program manager, the current investigative worker, the Office of Clinical Practice, Collaborative workers and others who have prior familiarity with the family.
v. Investigators will seek the assistance of the CPS-assigned nurses and the Office of Clinical Practice professionals when needed for all investigations that present medical or mental health needs for the child(ren) and/or caregivers.
c. Services During an Investigation i. CFSA will identify and address current barriers to referrals for supportive services during an investigation in order to increase utilization of such services by families. ii. CFSA will develop a working group to determine an accurate baseline of potential referrals to the Collaboratives from CPS.
iii. CFSA will conduct a case review of children who are removed from their home for short periods of time to determine alternative strategies for keeping children safely in their homes.
d. Supervision of Practice i. CFSA will ensure supervisory consultation in advance of the investigative worker going into the field to guide the social worker prior to initiating the investigation. ii. CFSA will ensure that program managers and supervisors review open investigations at the 18th day to discuss and resolve barriers to timely and safe closure, and document those efforts in the investigation file.
97 See notes 14 and 15, supra, for exclusions to the FTM exit standard. 98 Center for the Study of Social Policy, An Assessment of the Quality of Child Abuse and Neglect Investigative Practices in the District of Columbia (May 24, 2010).
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iii. CFSA will ensure that investigations that exceed the 30-day time frame for completion have just cause, approved by a supervisor, reflected in FACES.NET beginning in June 2010.
iv. CFSA will ensure that investigations that exceed the 30-day time frame for completion are reviewed weekly by supervisors and program managers to ensure safe closure as soon as possible.
e. Training i. By November 2010, the Child Protection Services (CPS) pre-service training curriculum will be completed and will reflect any changes to policy as well as the CPS practice guide. ii. Beginning December 2010 and on-going, the CPS pre-service training curriculum will be used for any new staff or supervisors assigned to investigations.
iii. By December 31, 2010, all investigators and supervisors will be trained on the CPS investigations practice guide.
f. Quality Assurance i. CFSA will ensure the effective, continuing use of CPS quality assurance measures: ChildStat (at least one investigation every six months), Grand Rounds (two open investigations reviewed per month) and the validation of five hotline call reviews per month. ii. Beginning in July 2010, Quality Assurance (QA) staff will complete 10 reviews of randomly selected investigations each quarter for 12 months using a shortened version of the tool used by the Court Monitor. The sample will consist of investigations that have been closed within 15 days of the review date. The QA staff will work with the Court Monitor to validate these findings.
iii. CFSA will ensure that through weekly case reviews, program managers and supervisors will identify barriers and practice concerns related to the timeliness and quality of the investigations. This will include reviewing documented efforts to obtain information from collateral contacts and documentation of case staffings held with ongoing social workers, when applicable, to inform the investigation regarding the immediate safety of all children and the risk factors present for the child and family and to address safety issues identified by the investigator.
2. SERVICES TO FAMILIES AND CHILDREN TO PROMOTE SAFETY, PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING (Strategies to Achieve Outcome 3)
a. Practice i. Beginning July 1, 2010, CFSA will ensure that a team comprised of the assigned social worker, family support worker, and nurse care manager (for children in foster care) will in each case: a. assess and properly and timely identify service needs, b. make referrals for identified community-based services, and c. take any follow-up action to confirm access to and provision of identified services.
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ii. Beginning July 1, 2010, CFSA will ensure that team meetings are held with the family and other team members within the first 30 days of case opening to identify service needs and to plan for service provision.
iii. Beginning October 1, 2010, CFSA will ensure that team meetings are held with the family and other team members at critical decision points throughout the life of the case (i.e. placement changes, significant life changes; permanency decision-making).
b. Supervision i. By July 1, 2010, CFSA will conduct verification of the identification of service needs and service provision through weekly supervision and through monthly continuous quality improvement case reviews completed by supervisors and program managers. Program managers will complete three reviews a month per program area and supervisors will complete two reviews a month per unit.
c. Community-Based Services i. By September 30, 2010, CFSA will develop targets of the number of families to be served in FY2011. ii. CFSA, based on the targets developed, will ensure that resources and protocols are in place to meet the targets.
iii. CFSA will convene the joint Implementation Committee and develop a plan and begin to implement, pending available budgetary resources, the findings of the recently completed Partnership for Community Based Services (PCBS) First Year Evaluation Report to enhance and sustain the functioning of the PCBS.
d. Service Array i. CFSA will maintain the Rapid Housing program for families at risk of entering foster care or in need housing assistance for reunification. ii. The District will seek possible federal grants available to support housing assistance/housing choice vouchers to support family reunification.
3. VISITATION (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcomes 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11)
a. Policy i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will develop policy regarding the responsibilities of social workers and other team members charged with visiting families and children to assess the safety of children at every visit involving families receiving in home services and children in out of home care. ii. CFSA will develop visitation schedule template(s) to be used in worker and team member visits to families with children in out-of-home placement, visits to parents and parent-child visits.
iii. CFSA will re-examine the current rules governing the use of supervised parentchild visitation to determine if a broader array of staff, contractors, relatives and foster parents could provide supervision and make revisions as needed. Based on
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that review, CFSA will, develop a policy on criteria guiding the appropriate use of supervised and unsupervised visitation.
b. Worker Visits to Families Receiving In-Home Services i. Beginning October 1, 2010, for all new in-home cases, the CFSA social worker will discuss the purpose and frequency of visits with the family, will schedule one of the two monthly visits with the family and will review the visitation schedule with their supervisor. The scheduled visit does not preclude the ability of social workers to make unannounced visits.
c. Worker Visits to Children in Out-of-Home Placement i. Beginning October 1, 2010, for all initial placements and re-entries into foster care, social workers will engage parents and foster parents in the development of written visitation schedules outlining when and where caseworker-child visits will occur and the purpose of the visits. Social workers will document the discussion and the refusal or inability of parents or foster parents to participate in this conversation.
d. Parent-Child Visitation i. Beginning October 1, 2010, for all initial placements and re-entries into foster care, social works will engage parents in the development of written visitation schedules outlining when and where parent-child visits will occur and the purpose of the visits. Social workers will document the discussion and the refusal or inability of parents to participate in this conversation. ii. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will explore the feasibility, make recommendations and develop strategies to increase visitation between children and their parents. These strategies may include, but are not limited to, permitting visitation to occur in the parent’s home, expansion of community-based visitation centers, utilization of foster parents and/or relatives to supervise visitation, and utilization of contracted service providers to supervise visitation.
e. Visits to Parents i. Beginning October 1, 2010, for all initial placements and re-entries into foster care, social workers will engage parents in the development of written visitation schedules outlining when and where caseworker-parent visits will occur during the first three months post-placement and the purpose of the visits. Social workers will document the discussion and the refusal or inability of parents to participate in this conversation. ii. Beginning July 2010, CFSA will use a case review process to analyze data and contact information regarding the parent and social worker visits to ensure that the visitation is supportive of the permanency goal and issues identified in the visits are addressed and documented in the case plan. Program managers will conduct monthly three (3) case reviews and supervisors will conduct two (2) case reviews on a random selection of cases. Programs managers and supervisors will meet on a weekly basis or more frequently as necessary with workers to address quality and non-compliance issues.
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iii. Beginning July 2010, the social worker, Nurse Care Manager, and/or Family Support Workers will update notes in FACES.NET providing a status of the visit or state why the visit did not occur. At every visit, workers will discuss permanency goals, visitation requirements, and required action steps in the case plan during each parent/worker visitation and reflect the progress in the case notes.
f. Supervision i. CFSA will ensure that through weekly supervision or review of contact notes, supervisors are ensuring that workers are assessing for safety at every visit and documenting their findings. ii. CFSA will ensure that supervisors and program managers will complete monthly continuous quality activities to ensure documentation of the assessment of safety at each visit. Program managers will complete three reviews a month per program area and supervisors will complete two reviews a month per unit.
iii. CFSA will ensure supervisory review of every child with a goal of reunification to ensure there is a written visitation plan and clear understanding among the family’s team as to the visitation plan.
g. Training i. As part of training on the implementation of CFSA’s practice model, social workers and supervisors will be trained on the use of the protocol for assessing a child’s safety at every visit; the use of the visitation templates; and the purpose of visits and how to connect each visit to the overall case and permanency plans.
h. Quality Assurance i. CFSA will assure that by July 2010, private agencies develop and implement internal quality assurance systems for monitoring and evaluating their program performance on all visitation requirements and regularly develop and implement improvement strategies where necessary.
B. GOAL: PERMANENCY
4. RELATIVE RESOURCES (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 7)
a. Policy i. By October 31, 2010, CFSA will implement the requirements of the Fostering Connections Act relating to the engagement of relatives as part of the routine Agency response to allegations of abuse or neglect in the family home. ii. By November 30, 2010, CFSA will develop policy (1) defining, consistent with federal law, which foster care licensing standards are “non-safety” in nature and, therefore, eligible for the exercise of waiver authority in relation to licensing kinship placements; (2) permitting temporary kinship licensing to be utilized in circumstances in which relative placement is determined to be in the best interest
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of the child and safety can be maintained; (3) age appropriate policy and age appropriate licensing standards for ensuring kinship placements for 18 to 20 year olds under Family Court jurisdiction who wish to live with identified and qualified kin. In developing these policies, CFSA shall reassess 29 D.C.M.R § 6000.5 and whether its assignment of waiver authority to the Director remains appropriate. iii. CFSA will develop and promulgate policy regarding full implementation of the temporary kin licensing agreement with Maryland.
b. Practice i. CFSA will immediately and on an ongoing basis ensure that social workers take reasonable action to identify and assess relative resources, including, but not limited to: a. coordinating the initial FTM for families experiencing a removal, identifying relatives and inviting them to attend the FTM; and b. submitting a referral to the Diligent Search Unit when further assistance is needed, to expand the search to locate additional family members.
5. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcomes 8 and 9)
a. Policy i. Consistent with CFSA policy on placement of children and youth in the least restrictive, most family-like setting, placement of a child in a congregate care facility will require documentation of the absence of an available family placement and CFSA will develop a transition plan for all children placed in congregate care.
b. Placement Array i. A quarterly utilization review of available placement beds will be developed and implemented by the end of 2010, categorized by provider, type of placement, and access patterns. Commensurate modifications will then be made to contracts to ensure consistent access to placements appropriate to each child’s needs. ii. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will reduce traditional congregate care placements by 30% as compared with the number of placements in January 1, 2010.
c. Quality Assurance i. Beginning July 1, 2010, CFSA will prepare a monthly report of all children under the age of twelve in congregate settings reflecting the needs of each child and whether they meet the established criteria for this placement. For those that do not meet the criteria, corrective actions will be taken to immediately place the child in a more appropriate setting.
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6. APPROPRIATE PERMANENCY GOALS (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 12)
a. Policy i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will develop policies and protocols/MOUs for linking transitioning youth, as appropriate, to adult services (e.g., Rehabilitation Services Administration, the Department on Disability Services, the Department of Mental Health, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid), and work force supports and employment services, and local opportunities for mentors.
b. Practice i. Beginning June 1, 2010, CFSA independent living specialists will provide consultation to social workers managing cases of youth ages 16 – 17 to complete the Ansell-Casey Life Skills Assessment. ii. By June 30, 2010, the Office of Youth Empowerment in partnership with CFSA and private agency social workers will begin facilitating Youth Transition conferences to plan for transition to adulthood and to explore other appropriate permanency goals for youth ages 18 to 20 that currently have an APPLA goal and no permanent or potential connection to an adult.
iii. Beginning September 30, 2010, CFSA will examine permanency options for youth ages 14 – 20 with an APPLA goal using best practices, e.g., permanency roundtables.
iv. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will issue an RFQ for services not currently available to provide for the comprehensive, effective child-specific transitional services and support for youth with an APPLA goal. Contract(s) to provide these services will be in place by March 31, 2011.99
c. Quality Assurance i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will track and monitor the educational, employment, health and housing outcomes for youth with an APPLA goal. ii. Beginning June 1, 2010, CFSA, in partnership with Family Court through the Child Welfare Leadership Team, will monitor the number of youth given the goal of APPLA and will work with the Family Court to change the permanency goal for youth when guardianship and/or adoption opportunities are identified.
7. REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE PLACEMENTS FOR CHILDREN IN CARE (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 13)
a. Policy i. By December 1, 2010, CFSA will centralize all placement decisions within the CFSA Placement Administration eliminating all moves between and within private agencies without CFSA approval.
99 The action step 6.b.4 does not prohibit the current practice of providing services (through CFSA, other District agencies, contracts with the Collaboratives, placement providers, or community based programs) to youth as identified during their six month review or in any prior review. The action step is designed to create an expanded array of services that will provide a more efficient method of providing such services if needed.
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ii. CFSA will review and modify as appropriate, existing policy on placement to reflect all changes from the LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan and current practice, and describing how children are to be initially assessed and placed.
b. Licensure i. CFSA will dually license foster homes to serve as both traditional and therapeutic placements.
c. Training i. CFSA will explore the feasibility of using foster parents as co-trainers in the preservice training for workers. ii. CFSA, in collaboration with DMH and the Resource Parent Training Coalition, will develop and implement a skill-based curriculum for training all foster parents to provide therapeutic placements.
iii. CFSA, in collaboration with DMH and the Resource Parent Training Coalition, will develop therapeutic foster parent competencies and ensure all training activities build these competencies.
8. TIMELY APPROVAL OF FOSTER PARENTS (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 14) a. Policy i. CFSA will review and seek to modify applicable regulations to better facilitate timely licensure, and to eliminate or waive the fire inspection fee. b. Licensure i. By September 30, 2010, CFSA will modify and update administrative processes to facilitate a more timely licensing process. These include: a. beginning the home studies process earlier during pre-service training; b. beginning 30/60/90 day reviews of each applicant completed by the licensing supervisor and worker; and c. streamlining the required documents.
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9. LEGAL ACTION TO FREE CHILDREN (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 15)
Beginning with petitions to Terminate Parental Rights (“TPRs”) filed in January, 2010, OAG will review all pending TPRs regularly and quarterly will provide data to the CFSA Director for use in collaboration with the Court on cases that have not been resolved. For any TPR pending more than six months without appropriate court action scheduled to move the matter forward, OAG will take appropriate action to attempt to move the case to disposition.
10. TIMELY ADOPTION (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 16)
a. Policy i. By December 1, 2010, CFSA will formulate and publish official agency policy describing how permanency planning is to be undertaken and how permanency goals are to be facilitated and achieved including clarifying the roles of permanency specialists, social workers with case-management responsibility, private agency social workers and adoptions workers.
b. Practice i. CFSA will immediately and on an ongoing basis assure the effective and routine use of the Permanency Opportunities Project model to achieve timely permanency for children. ii. For children not in an approved adoptive placement, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning team meeting to develop a child-specific recruitment plan, which may include contracting with a private adoption agency for those children without an adoptive resource.
iii. CFSA social workers will provide the referral package to the matching unit to determine if a waiting family is a good match for the child; CFSA will ensure the matching unit sends the referral package to the recruitment unit if no available match for child specific recruitment.
iv. Beginning June 1, 2011, CFSA recruitment staff will use web-based technology (e.g., social network sites) to locate potential adoption resources.
v. Beginning in October 2010, CFSA recruitment staff will conduct case mining and Family Finding activities to locate family members.
c. Service Array i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will assess the current array of post-adoptive services. In making this assessment, CFSA will review internal performance and program data and will consult with the Foster and Adoptive Parent Advocacy Center (FAPAC), Adoptions Together, the Post-Permanency Center and others, as appropriate, to identify priority needs and develop plans to meet them.
d. Supervision i. The CFSA Out of Home and Permanency Administrators will conduct individual meetings with social workers and permanency specialists as needed to assess barriers and identify strategies to remove barriers that prevent permanence for
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those children with a goal of adoption and with an identified resource. Permanency specialists will track and follow-up on actions steps from the permanency barrier staffing every 30 days. ii. CFSA recruitment supervisors will review a daily management information system report to track children newly assigned the goal of adoption and working with social workers to complete the referral package if no adoptive resource is identified.
e. Training i. By June 2011, CFSA recruitment staff will be trained in case mining and family engagement to enhance capacity for identifying and engaging potential permanency resources.
f. Quality Assurance i. CFSA will track reasonable efforts to ensure children placed in an approved adoptive home have their adoption finalized within 12 months of the placement in the approved adoptive home. ii. CFSA will review the status of any child with the goal of adoption without a current pre-adoptive placement to create or revise and implement a child specific recruitment plan. Follow-up meetings will occur every 60 days until a permanent resource is identified.
11. CASE PLANNING (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 17)
a. Quality Assurance i. CFSA will immediately and on an ongoing basis ensure that existing case review processes (e.g., QSRs, Structured Progress Reviews, CQI Case Reviews, etc.) are utilized for children in foster care to ensure social work practice is directed toward the timely achievement of permanency (i.e. parent/child visitation, sibling visitation, access to services required to remediate the risk to children in the home).
12. PLACEMENT LICENSING (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 18)
a. Foster Home Licensing i. By June 30, 2010, implement an annual licensing and re-licensing calendar and protocol to ensure that all foster homes are licensed and re-licensed timely and accurately reflected in FACES that includes: a. a supervisory review of assigned foster homes due for licensure and re-licensure; b. the due dates and expiration dates for all foster home; and c. postcard reminders to all foster parents. ii. By September 30, 2010, create and implement a manual documentation protocol that serves as back-up tracking of foster parent compliance with required training.
41

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 43 of 49
b. Congregate Care Licensing i. By June 30, 2010, implement an annual licensing and re-licensing calendar and protocol to ensure that all congregate care facilities are licensed and relicensed timely and accurately reflected in FACES that includes: a. a supervisory review of assigned congregate care facilities due for re-licensure; b. the expiration dates for all group home and ILP licenses and the schedule of licensing activities and deadlines associated with each re-licensure; and c. memorandum reminders to the CEOs of congregate care facilities up for re-licensure. ii. By June 30, 2010, implement notification process to CFSA’s Placement Office, Contracts Office and the Congregate Care Contract Management Division in order to alert these offices of any concerns that may adversely affect a contractor’s license or the ability to place youth in a congregate care facility.
c. Monitoring i. By June 30, 2010, implement performance based monitoring of each private placement agency on a monthly basis, to include a full review of compliance with licensing and all placement standards followed with immediate corrective actions where indicated. ii. By September 30, 2010 as a process of monitoring congregate care provider agency compliance with title 29 DCMR chapters 62 and 63, CMPIA will notify the Office of Facility License to report any evidence of noncompliance with the licensing requirements, and ensure agencies develop and implement corrective actions.
C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING
13. SIBLING PLACEMENTS AND VISITS (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 20)
a. Policy i. Beginning October 1, 2010, for all initial placements and re-entries into foster care, social workers will engage parents, foster parents and kinship caregivers in the development of written visitation schedules outlining when and where sibling visits will occur. ii. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will explore the feasibility of and begin to implement strategies to increase visitation between siblings placed apart. These strategies may include, but are not limited to, permitting visitation to occur in the parent’s home, expansion of community-based visitation centers, utilization of foster parents to supervise visitation, and utilization of contracted service providers to supervise visitation. CFSA shall prepare and provide a brief report of its research and findings.
42

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 44 of 49
b. Practice i. Social workers and/or family support workers will follow-up weekly with caregivers to document sibling visitation that occurs outside of CFSA supervision (i.e. contacts children have in the school or community).
c. Supervision i. CFSA will ensure supervisory review of every child in foster care with siblings to ensure there is a written visitation plan and clear understanding among the family team as to the visitation plan.
d. Quality Assurance i. By September 30, 2010, CFSA will complete an evaluation of sibling groups to understand the barriers to placement and to determine how best to address these barriers.
14. ASSESSMENTS FOR CHILDREN EXPERIENCING PLACEMENT DISRUPTIONS (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 21)
a. Policy i. By November 1, 2010, CFSA will complete an Administrative Issuance that sets forth the actions to be taken when a placement disruption occurs, including the elements of a required replacement child assessment. The Administrative Issuance will include, but not be limited to, the following: a. Prior to replacement, children will receive a pre-placement health screening. b. Beginning July 2010, the social worker and the Nurse Care Manager, and the family support worker will be provided a record of the medical and behavioral health screening and any other information emanating from the replacement screening. c. Beginning July 2010, the social worker and/or family support worker will schedule a case consultation with the nurse care manager and placement services to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the child within 30 days of the disrupted placement to provide information on the social, behavioral, medical, dental and educational needs of the child. d. The social worker with the support of the nurse care manager and family support worker will identify appropriate services to address any outstanding medical, social, behavioral, dental or educational services required by the child and inform placement services. e. As part of the assessment, the social worker or other designated CFSA staff will consult with the former caregiver to assess reasons for placement disruption and the extent to which support services could have prevented the disruption.
43

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 45 of 49
f. The social worker with the support of the nurse care manager family support workers and placement services will complete a follow-up action plan in the case notes.
ii. By April 30, 2011, the Administrative Issuance will be used to develop CFSA policy on assessments for children experiencing placement disruptions.
b. Quality Assurance i. CFSA will ensure that through monthly, random continuous quality improvement case record reviews, program managers and supervisors will determine if the assessments and plans are occurring and are addressing the child's needs. This is to be in addition to weekly supervision.
15. HEALTH AND DENTAL CARE (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 22)
a. Policy i. By October 31, 2010, CFSA will develop and promulgate administrative issuances regarding the Healthy Horizons Assessment Center and Nurse Care Management Model. This administrative issuance, among other things, will define the roles of the assigned social worker, nurse care manager and case aide in ensuring the provision of timely and appropriate medical, dental and mental health care for children in foster care. ii. By September 30, 2011, CFSA will develop and promulgate policy based on the administrative issuance and their practice experience.
b. Healthy Horizons Clinic i. By September 30, 2010, the Healthy Horizons clinic will be staffed and operational. CFSA will operate an on-site screening center with licensed nurse practitioners for the completion of pre-placement screenings and comprehensive medical evaluations. The full array of responsibilities to be implemented are: a. Provision of medical and behavioral health screening services; b. Engagement of families to complete comprehensive medical, mental, and developmental biological family history; c. Comprehensive mental health screenings completed by co-located mental health professionals, except for those under age 1 and only with the involvement of the biological parent for those under age 8; d. Provision of medical, mental health and developmental information to social workers, family support workers, and co-located mental health professionals to provide a baseline history for providers; e. Serving as a medical information resource within the first month of placement; and f. Medical assistants and/or nurse case managers will work with or follow-up with foster parents and social workers to make dental evaluation appointments.
44

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 46 of 49
c. Nurse Care Managers i. Beginning July 2010, nurse care managers and/or medical assistants will followup with foster parents and social workers to document the completion of the dental evaluations and to advocate for the dental healthcare of children. ii. By July 1, 2010, nurse care managers will be assigned to children in foster care at a ratio of 1:100. Nurse care managers are required to facilitate the provision of appropriate services to meet healthcare needs. In collaboration with the assigned social worker, the Nurse Care Manager will be responsible for: a. Coordinating and monitoring health care services over the life of the case; b. Ensuring active Medicaid coverage for the entire time the child is in foster care or otherwise facilitating needed health care; c. Teaming with foster parents and social workers to ensure compliance with required and necessary health care services; d. Engaging in systematic communication, education and coordination of care among health care providers, child welfare professionals and family supports; and e. Ensuring medical plans are integrated into permanency case plans.
d. Needs Assessment and Implementation i. CFSA, with DMH, will review the availability of mental health services as identified in the 2007 Children’s Mental Health needs Assessment and determine, based on current needs and current capacity, the additional services that are required. Based on that review, by February 2011, CFSA, with DMH, will release a solicitation to provide the services identified. Services to be in place by August 2011.
D. GOAL: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY
16. TRAINING (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcomes 27 and 28)
a. Pre-Service Training i. By September 1, 2010, CFSA will review and revise the pre-service curriculum to ensure it builds the skills that CFSA believes are needed to implement the case practice model and protocol. ii. Beginning September 30, 2010, CFSA will institute a quarterly quality assurance and reconciliation process of CFSA and private agency staff pre-service training data to ensure that staff pre-service training hours are being accurately tracked and monitored.
b. In-Service Training i. By September 30, 2010, CFSA will review and revise in-service training to ensure it builds the skills that CFSA believes are needed to implement the case practice model and protocol.
45

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 47 of 49
ii. Beginning September 30, 2010, CFSA will institute a quarterly quality assurance and reconciliation process of CFSA and private agency staff in-service training data to ensure that staff in-service training hours are being accurately tracked and monitored.
c. Supervisory Training i. By September 30, 2010, CFSA will modify its existing training tracking and monitoring system to better ensure: a. all newly hired CFSA supervisors complete the required training on child welfare supervision within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility; and b. training hours are accurately tracked and monitored. ii. By September 30, 2010, CFSA, in collaboration with the private agencies, will strengthen and standardize the existing notification, tracking and monitoring system to ensure: a. timely notification of new private agency supervisor hires or internal promotions; b. timely enrollment of private agency supervisory staff in pre-service training; c. completion of supervisory pre-service training within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibilities; and d. accurate tracking and monitoring of training hours.
d. Practice Model i. By August 1, 2010, CFSA will complete a revised Training Academy Plan with an enhanced focus on the practice model and incorporate additional training on teaming and improving the quality of visitation.
17. TRAINING FOR FOSTER PARENTS (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 29)
a. Policy i. By March 31, 2011, CFSA will propose changes to 29 DCMR § 6026 to align the training requirements to the licensing period.
b. Training Curriculum i. CFSA will develop a specialized training curriculum to ensure all foster parents are offered training necessary to accept children with therapeutic needs per the action step to permit dual licensure for all foster placements.
c. Quality Assurance i. Beginning December 31, 2010, CFSA will institute a quarterly quality assurance and reconciliation process of foster parent training data to ensure that pre-service and in-service training hours for CFSA and private agency foster parents are being accurately tracked and monitored.
46

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 48 of 49
18. SPECIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 30)
a. Quality Assurance i. By October 15, 2010, CFSA will develop and implement a plan to review all children and families in special corrective action categories. The plan will include a timeframe for when these reviews will commence.
19. PERFORMANCE BASED CONTRACTING (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 31)
a. Congregate Care Contracts i. By August 1, 2010, CFSA will award Congregate Care Human Care Agreements/Tasks Orders that include performance indicators and outcomes. ii. By December 1, 2010, CFSA will conduct monthly site visits including: a. record reviews; b. physical plant inspections; c. surveys and interviews with staff and child/youth; and d. semi-annual evaluations of performance based contracts/human care agreements for congregate care services.
b. Foster Care Contracts i. By August 1, 2010, CFSA will conduct a technical review of the business plan submissions for case management and family-based foster care services. ii. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will award Case Management and Family-based Foster Care Human Care Agreements/Task Orders that include performance indicators and outcomes.
iii. By April 1, 2011, CFSA will conduct monthly site visits including: a. record reviews; b. home safety inspections; c. surveys and interviews with staff, foster parents and child/youth; and d. semi-annual evaluations of performance based contracts for case management and family based foster care services.
iv. By September 30, 2010, CFSA will take all necessary action, including any necessary hiring and training, to assure that adequate contract monitoring capacity exists to oversee private contractor performance.
c. Quality Assurance i. CFSA will require private agencies to develop internal quality assurance systems for monitoring and evaluating their program performance and to regularly develop and implement improvement strategies. CFSA will ensure that such private agencies implement these measures by December 31, 2010. On or before June 1, 2011, CFSA will provide a brief report on these quality assurance measures. ii. Beginning January 2011, CFSA will ensure that, as part of its semiannual assessment, the Contract Monitoring and Program Improvement Administration (CMPIA) provides feedback, technical assistance, and next step recommendations to private agencies to ensure continuous quality improvements are obtained and/or sustained.
47

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1073 Filed 12/17/10 Page 49 of 49
20. INTERSTATE COMPACT FOR THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 32)
a. Policy i. By September 1, 2010, CFSA will seek written agreement with the Maryland Department of Human Resources designed to hold providers serving children in both jurisdictions accountable to complying with ICPC requirements.
b. Placement i. By December 2010, centralize all placement moves within the CFSA Placement Administration.
c. Contracts i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will execute performance based contracts and monitoring for Case Management and Family Based Foster Care Services, which include the expectation of timely licensing of foster homes and submission of documents for ICPC approval.
d. Quality Assurance i. By December 31, 2010, CFSA will ensure all documentation is submitted for approval of CFSA children currently placed in Maryland.
21. DATA AND TECHNOLOGY (Strategy Plan to Achieve All Outcomes)
a. Data Capacity i. Within 180 days of the Court’s Order approving the LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan, CFSA, in consultation with the Monitor, will develop the capacity to produce accurate data on commitments made in the 2010-2011 LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan.
b. Data Sharing i. Beginning December 31, 2010, CFSA will publish on its website an expanded array of data relating to commitments in the LaShawn A. Implementation and Exit Plan.
22. FEDERAL REVENUE CLAIMING (Strategy Plan to Achieve Outcome 35)
a. By September 30, 2010, CFSA, with assistance from the federal revenue consultant, will submit a revised cost allocation plan to federal officials.
b. By December 31, 2010, CFSA in consultation with DHCF will assess the feasibility and desirability of submitting a revised Medicaid state plan amendment to federal officials to permit additional appropriate Medicaid plans in placement settings and make formal recommendations to the City Administrator.
48

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1075 Filed 12/17/10 Page 1 of 1

~niten ~ta:tes ([ourt of J\ppea:ls
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 10·7139
LaShawn A., By her next friend, Evelyn Moore, et aI.,
Appellees
v.
Adrian Fenty, as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et aI.,
Appellants

September Term 2010
1 :89-cv-01754-TFH Filed On: December 17, 2010 [1283585]

ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants' unopposed motion to hold case in abeyance, it is
ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby held in abeyance pending further order of the court.
The parties are directed to file motions to govern future proceedings in this case within 30 days of the completion of the district court proceedings on the pending sanctions matters.
The Clerk is directed to transmit a copy of this order to the district court. The district court is requested to notify this court promptly upon the conclusion of its proceedings.
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: lsi Mark A. Butler Deputy Clerk

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1084 Filed 05/24/11 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al.,

Plaintiffs, ) v.

VINCENT C. GRAY, et al.,

D

efendants.

) ) )
) ) ) ) ) )

Civil Action No.: 89-1754 (TFH)

CONSENT MOTION FOR ADOPTION OF ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

The parties agree to the attached proposed Consent Order that addresses plaintiffs'

claim for attorneys' f ees and costs for work associated with litigating various motions and

monitoring compliance from January 1, 2009 through Mar ch 31, 2010, related to the above -

referenced civil action. T his agreement is w ithout prejudice to the cl aims raised relative to

plaintiffs’ civil contempt remedy submission and the responses th ereto. Pur suant to the Court’s

Order of Nove mber 2, 2004, t he strict application of Rule 23( h) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure does not require approval of noti ce, publication, and a hear ing on the request for

attorneys’ fees and expenses in this matter.

Defendants, with the authorization of plai ntiffs' counsel, respectfully submit the proposed

Consent Order for the Court's consideration and move for its adoption by the Court.1

Respectfully submitted,

IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia

1 The District of Columbia also wishes to inform the Court that Attorney General Nathan has decided not to pursue the District’s appeal of the Implementation and Exit Plan ordered on December 17, 2010 and has moved to dismiss that appeal.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1084 Filed 05/24/11 Page 2 of 3

GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General Civil Litigation Division

___________/S/________________

RICHARD S. LOVE [# 340455]

Senior

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General, D.C.

441

Fourth Street, NW

Sixth Floor South

Washington,

D.C. 20001

(202)

724-6635

2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1084 Filed 05/24/11 Page 3 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al.,

Plaintiffs, ) v.

VINCENT C. GRAY, et al.,

D

efendants.

) ) )
) ) ) ) ) )

Civil Action No.: 89-1754 (TFH)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSENT MOTION FOR ADOPTION OF ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

1. Inherent Power of the Court.

2. Consent of the parties.

3. The record herein.

Respectfully submitted,

IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia

GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General Civil Litigation Division

___________/S/________________

RICHARD S. LOVE [# 340455]

Senior

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General, D.C.

441

Fourth Street, NW

Sixth Floor South

Washington,

D.C. 20001

(202) 724-6635

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1089 Filed 06/03/11 Page 1 of 1
USCA Case #11-7002 Document #1309881 Filed: OS/25/2011 Page 1 of 1
Jblnitcb ~tah~s ([ourt of J\ppcals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 11-7002
LaShawn A., By her next friend, Evelyn Moore, et aI.,
Appellees
v.
Vincent C. Gray, as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et aI.,
Appellants

September Term 2010
1:89-cv-01754-TFH Filed On: May 25,2011 [1309881]

ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants' motion for voluntary dismissal, and the response thereto, it is

ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby dismissed.
The Clerk is directed to transmit forthwith to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia a certified copy of this order in lieu of formal mandate.
FOR THE COURT: Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /s/
Mark A. Butler Deputy Clerk

 
 887 F.Supp. 297 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
LaSHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Sharon Pratt KELLY, et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 89–1754 (TFH). | May 22, 1995.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*297 Marcia Robinson Levy, Christopher Dunn, Craig Levine, American Civ. Liberties Union Foundation, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Anna Blackburne, Asst. Corporate Counsel, Office of Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS F. HOGAN, District Judge.
Four years ago, this Court heard more than two weeks of testimony and accepted more than 1000 admissions in a trial which exposed the desperate condition of the District of Columbia child welfare system. The Court then issued a 102–page opinion reaching “[t]he inescapable conclusion” that the system was operated in violation of federal law, District law, and the United States Constitution.1
Once the Court entered this finding of liability, the parties and court-appointed *298 Monitor worked before a backdrop of further legal proceedings to plan and implement reforms which would alleviate the violations. Four years and two mayoral administrations later, however, many if not most of the problems remain. Children are routinely denied the protections and services that local and federal law require. Because all reasonable alternative measures of change have been exhausted, the Court today grants the plaintiffs’ motion for contempt and imposition of a full receivership.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began with the filing of a class action on behalf of abused and neglected children in the District of Columbia, including both children within the District’s custody and those who remained in private custody but were known to the District’s Department of Human Services (DHS). Several District of Columbia officials, including the mayor, were named in their official capacities.2 After a bench trial in February 1991, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on April 18, 1991.
The opinion detailed widespread problems within the District of Columbia child welfare system and held that the defendants operated the system in a manner that violated the federal and local statutory rights of all the children in the plaintiff class. The Court also held that the defendants violated the Fifth Amendment rights of those plaintiff children in the foster care custody of the District of Columbia.
After the finding of liability, the parties worked together to plan a course of remedial action. After a few months, the plaintiffs and defendants reached agreement on the specifics of needed reform. On August 27, 1991, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for entry into judgment of a Remedial Order incorporating this agreement. The Court then adopted the Monitor’s Implementation Plan which laid out the steps necessary to comply with the Remedial Order. The defendants, in accordance with the terms of the Remedial Order, then appealed the judgment of liability, arguing alternatively that the Court erred in finding federal statutory and constitutional liability and that the Court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims were more appropriately addressed by the District of Columbia courts.
On October 1, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a remand, concluding that
Because the district court’s judgment is independently supportable by District of Columbia law, we affirm the court’s decision in favor of the children in this case. It appears that each provision of the remedial order reflects the requirements of District of Columbia statutes and regulations, as well as of federal statutes. Nevertheless, because the order was drafted to conform with federal as well as with District law, there are scattered references in the order to federal law that are inappropriate in light of our confirmation of the decision entirely on the basis of local law. We therefore remand to the district court, with instructions to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible. If there are any portions of the consent decree that depend entirely on a federal statute, the district court should consider the impact of Suter v. Artist M. on those provisions before it includes them in the revised consent decree.3
After reviewing the parties’ briefs and hearing arguments on necessary modifications, the Court issued a second Remedial Order on January 27, 1994, which incorporated the minor changes requested by the Court of Appeals. The Monitor thereafter developed a Revised Implementation Plan, which the *299 Court ordered incorporated into the new Remedial Order.
Throughout this period of legal proceedings, the parties, Monitor, and Court continued with remedial efforts. As will be described below, on several occasions the plaintiffs and Court became discouraged with the progress of the defendants’ compliance, and the plaintiffs twice moved for contempt. On October 4, 1994, when the defendants were utterly out of compliance with the Remedial Order and Revised Implementation Plan in the areas of Resource Development and Corrective Action, the Court entered an order imposing limited receiverships in those areas.4 The October 4 order also adopted the parties’ consent agreement for short timelines to meet other reform requirements in areas outside of those covered by the limited receiverships. Most of the elements of the consent agreement had been set forth in the Revised Implementation Plan, but the defendants had missed the deadlines and the plaintiffs agreed to extend them for selected tasks in an effort to avoid requesting further receiverships. The Court appointed the Receivers on November 23, 1994 and adopted their workplans on March 29, 1995.
Since the entry of the initial Remedial Order, the Center for the Study of Social Policy has acted as a court-appointed Monitor. The Monitor proposed detailed implementation plans for both remedial orders and regularly reports to the Court on the status of compliance with the Court’s orders. The Monitor also assists the parties with negotiations when consent agreements are developed for the Court’s consideration.
On April 4, 1995, the plaintiffs filed their third motion for contempt and also requested the imposition of a full receivership to cover all areas of the District’s child welfare system. The Court now considers this motion.
II. REMEDIAL HISTORY
The remedial phase of this case has been marked by repeated cycles of noncompliance and sluggish progress, frustration and requests for court intervention, promises to improve, and further noncompliance after a flurry of attempts to make short-term changes. This pattern has convinced the Court that the defendants either cannot or will not make the fundamental changes necessary to improve the plight of abused and neglected children.
The framework of the entire post-trial effort was the Remedial Order. This was not a set of restrictions that the Court unilaterally imposed upon the defendants. The parties developed its terms by consent and the then-mayor of the District of Columbia expressed her personal commitment to carrying out the plan. The Court entered the consent agreement as the Remedial Order.
On December 22, 1992, the plaintiffs filed their first contempt motion when the defendants were tardy in complying with a provision of the Remedial Order requiring that the District conduct a case review of all individuals in the child welfare system. However, once the motion was filed, the parties were able to agree that the defendants would immediately focus on five key areas—“building blocks”—which were necessary precursors to further reform. On April 30, 1993, the plaintiffs withdrew the contempt motion and stated that they were “gratified with the progress and the hard work” that the defendants had devoted to the building block areas. April 30, 1993 Tr. at 4. This was perhaps the high point in the District’s compliance history.
On March 22, 1994, the plaintiffs filed their second contempt motion and supplemented it with a memorandum filed on July 21, 1994. The plaintiffs alleged noncompliance with nearly every section of the Remedial Order. This time, the plaintiffs requested that the Court appoint a receiver to solve all of the compliance problems. However, by the time they appeared before the Court on September 16, 1994, the parties had drafted a “consent agreement” stretching out the deadlines in many areas and the plaintiffs had agreed to hold in abeyance the request for a full receiver. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs maintained *300 that receiverships for Resource Development and Corrective Action were necessary, and repeated their request for a finding of contempt. September 16, 1994 Tr. at 1–12. The Court, not eager to engender resentment among the defendants and their employees, declined to grant the plaintiff’s motion for a finding of contempt and held it in abeyance, even though “contempt may well [have been] justified.” September 16, 1994 Tr. at 30. The Court therefore entered an order imposing the two limited receiverships and adopting the consent agreement on October 4, 1994.

By November 23, 1994, it was clear to the Court that the defendants would be unable to meet the consent agreement’s deadlines with respect to Protective Services. Therefore, the Court imposed a third limited receivership in that area.
At this point, faced with increasing resistance on the part of the defendants, the Court was forced to begin issuing a series of piecemeal orders directing compliance with extant orders when it became apparent that the defendants had no plans to comply. See November 23, 1994 Order (requiring defendants to provide Monitor with copy of federal revenue maximization consultant’s contract and establishing deadline for minor amendment of contract); November 23, 1994 Order (requiring defendants to formally adopt policies and procedures); February 16, 1995 Order (establishing deadline for defendants to issue management information system Request For Proposals).
By February 10, 1995, the newly appointed Receivers had informed the court that extremely basic resources were absent or in short supply, thus making it almost impossible for various sectors of the child welfare system to function. The Court therefore entered an order adopting the Receivers’ Emergency Resource Plan to address these pressing needs. The plan required the provision of such essentials as diapers, copy paper, printed intake forms, automobile maintenance, telephones, and food vouchers.
Finally, on April 4, 1995, after learning that the Receivers were encountering resistance and hostility to their court-ordered efforts, and after compiling a 32–page list of over 130 areas in which they alleged the defendants had missed deadlines or were in noncompliance, the plaintiffs filed a third motion for contempt and again requested that the Court impose a full receivership. The motion has been fully briefed and was argued on May 15, 1995.
III. PRESENT VIOLATIONS: FINDINGS OF FACT
Various recent submissions from the parties, Monitor, and Receivers show that the defendants remain in noncompliance with many court-ordered requirements. It is important to note that most of these requirements, including those set forth in the Remedial Order and October 4, 1994 consent agreement, have been voluntarily proposed by the defendants. Instances of noncompliance are set forth below.
A. Adoption Activity in this area has nearly ground to a halt, even though adoption provides welcome stability for children and an end to foster care expenses for the defendants. The Monitor reports that
[a]doptions activity has now declined to levels that existed before the implementation of the ... Remedial Order. During [the first quarter of 1995] ... no children’s adoptive placements were finalized by the Court.... A total of 151 children have been awaiting adoptive placement for more than 9 months, with 92 of these children expected to be adopted by their foster care parents. As of the end of the quarter, there were 104 adoptive homes studies that were incomplete after 150 days. These data are a cause for serious concern.... The Adoptions Branch has been operating without a permanent Chief since October, 1994 and there is a critical need to restore forceful leadership to this area.5
The plaintiffs express equally strong warnings about the state of adoptions activity. Because the defendants were totally inactive in pursuing an adoption for one of the named *301 plaintiffs, the plaintiffs’ counsel themselves performed many of the defendants’ responsibilities in an attempt to move the process forward. Counsel had to exert “an enormous amount of pressure” on the defendants just to get the child’s picture taken for the adoption search. When the defendants did not proceed, counsel, who are not experts in the adoption field, compiled a list of adoption agencies that could help with the search. Even after the defendants received the list, they said they were unable to reach the agencies. Plaintiffs’ counsel then attempted to contact the agencies and succeeded. Finally, after this massive intervention by counsel into the defendants’ professional sphere, the defendants signed a contract with an agency to assist with the search, but the plaintiffs remain unconvinced that the matter will proceed. April 7, 1995 Tr. at 8–9. It is therefore not surprising to learn that the defendants are out of compliance with many requirements in the adoptions area.
1. Policies and Procedures. The defendants were to have provided the necessary resources and implemented revised adoption policies and procedures by March 31, 1993. The deadline was then extended to September 30, 1993.6 It was not until the Court ordered the defendants to adopt the policies and procedures on November 23, 1994 that this requirement was even halfway met. The defendants claim that they are in compliance with the revised policies and procedures,7 but the Monitor disagrees.8 It is impossible to conclude that the policies and procedures are being followed at the same time that adoptions activity has nearly halted and the plaintiffs are forced to provide their own suggestions for next steps.
2. Adoptions Branch Staffing. The Court required the defendants to fully staff the Adoptions Branch by June 30, 1992, and then extended the deadline to September 30, 1993.9 The Monitor and defendants agree that as of April 16, 1995, nearly three years after the original deadline, the Branch still suffers from severe staffing shortages from top to bottom. The Adoptions Branch Chief position is not filled with a permanent employee, and at least five social workers, two clerks, and two social services assistants need to be hired.10
3. TPR Staffing. Corporation Counsel was to have committed the necessary personnel to assure timely termination of parental rights (TPR) by September 30, 1993.11 Until this judicial procedure is completed, a child cannot be legally adopted. The defendants claim that they have completed this task because they hired a TPR Coordinator on March 9, 1995.12 However, the Monitor notes that the defendants must still hire a legal assistant and full-time attorney.13 Therefore, this task is not complete.
4. Prompt Home Studies. The Court ordered that all home studies conducted in preparation for adoption be completed within 150 days. The original deadline for this item was December 31, 1992, but it was extended to March 31, 1993.14 More than two years after the extended deadline, the defendants admit that they are not in compliance.15 The Monitor states that compliance is “not even close”—104 home studies were beyond the timeline as of March 31, 1995.16
5. Monitoring and Improvement. The Court ordered the defendants to monitor the progress of adoption activity, identify barriers, and develop the necessary corrective *302 action plans on a quarterly basis.17 Because adoptions activity is proceeding so poorly, it is clear that compliance in this area is far from complete, and the Monitor so concludes.18
B. Staffing 1. Total Number of Social Workers. The Court ordered the defendants to ensure the employment of 316 social workers by December 31, 1994.19 The defendants report that only 290 social workers were in place as of April 18, 1995.20 As the Monitor points out, the figures showing noncompliance here understate the actual shortage, since the present requirement was calculated based on the total number of children in the child welfare system in December 1993. In the meantime, the number of children in the system has increased and the total number of necessary social workers will rise accordingly.21
Serious problems can occur when staffing shortages lead to high caseloads. In its April 1991 opinion, the Court found that the extra responsibility made the social workers unable to
initiate timely investigations, provide needed services, ensure appropriate placements, prepare case plans, visit with foster children and parents, recruit foster and adoptive families, monitor foster homes and institutions, and claim all federal funding to which the CFSD should be entitled.22
Though the defendants argue that they are close to the goal and therefore have achieved substantial compliance, several factors counterbalance this rosy interpretation. First, the deadline for full compliance is five months past. To be below the goal at this late stage does not inspire any confidence in future improvements. Second, the Monitor reports that for every two new social workers hired during the remedial phase of this case, one social worker has resigned.23 This reveals the full measure of the challenge the defendants face in increasing their workforce. Third, the lag in compliance also suggests that the defendants will be unable to step up their efforts once the Monitor adjusts the goal to reflect the increased number of children in the system. Fourth, the Receivers report that social workers and other FSA staff were reported to be “leaving in droves” as a result of recent pay cuts, furloughs, and general disregard for worker concerns.24 The defendants do not seem prepared for this potentially accelerating attrition, especially when considered in light of the extant retention problems.
2. Administrative Supports. The Monitor and defendants agree that the defendants are not in compliance with the courtordered requirement that they develop and implement a plan to provide the required administrative supports to staff.25 This requirement is reiterated in the Emergency Resources Plan adopted by the Court on February 10, 1995. The Monitor reports that even though many of the requirements of the Emergency Resources Plan were initially met,
the Receivers and workers continue to report ongoing problems related to the availability of administrative supports (e.g., difficulty accessing supplies, forms, and vouchers for client services, lack of attention to basic office cleanliness and maintenance, lack of working word processors, phones that were once operable ceasing to work, and the ever-present problem of too few working automobiles). The response *303 to the February 10 Court Order addressed the immediate crises and some systems were put in place to avert future crises of the same nature. However, the Receivers report that maintenance of equipment and lack of basic staff resources is an ongoing problem.26 The Receivers concur, and note that “[e]ach box of xerox paper secured for staff and each time a fax machine receives toner is a major victory,” but that the cost of pursuing these basic resources is “high both in time and in steadily accumulating frustration.”27 This level of noncompliance is dismal. Without administrative supports that most professionals take for granted, the social workers cannot be expected to fulfill their most basic responsibilities, let alone take the extra steps needed

to reform the present system.
3. Other Staffing Requirements. The defendants have failed to comply with numerous other staffing requirements. They were required to conduct an occupational study of social worker positions by June 30, 1992.28 The deadline was extended to June 30, 1993, but as of April 18, 1995, the defendants could only state that a draft study had been completed and that a meeting had been scheduled for the next day to review the draft.29 The Monitor reports also that “final plans for implementation of the new standard are proceeding at an extremely slow pace.”30 The defendants also state that they are in noncompliance with court-ordered requirements that they review and revise promotions policy, review employee performance every 6 months, and develop a caseload weighing formula.31
Furthermore, the defendants admit that they are not in compliance with requirements that all social workers have a current and valid license.32 More importantly, they admit that over half of their supervisory units do not meet the required supervisor-to-staff ratio.33 The Court required that this important standard be met by December 31, 1993.34 When supervisors’ caseloads are high, problems of overwork arise just as they do for line social workers. In its April 1991 opinion, the Court noted that “[b]y carrying heavy caseloads, the[ ] supervisors have been unable to train staff and to monitor cases to ensure the safety and well-being of the children for whom their staff is responsible.”35 As of March 31, 1995, over half of the 44 supervisory units had more than the required maximum of 5 social workers.36 This is not even close to compliance.
C. Training The Monitor notes37 and the defendants admit38 that the defendants are in noncompliance with the court-ordered requirement that they develop and implement training for contract agencies focused on the needs of child-care and group home providers.39 Though the original deadline of March 31, 1993 was extended to June 30, 1993, as of March 31, 1995, the defendants were only able to report that “planning meetings have *304 occurred” and that they expected compliance by July 1995, more than two years late.40
D. Management Information System Federal law requires any child welfare agency receiving federal funds to maintain an information system from which the status, location, and goals for the placement of all foster care children may be readily determined. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A). In 1991, the Court observed that
such a system is also mandated by reasonable professional standards and, this Court believes, by basic common sense. Defendants have admitted that [its current information system] is not adequate. [The system] cannot provide accurate information on the number of children in emergency care, how long they have been in that status, and when they are reaching the 90–day deadline for remaining in that status. [The system] is also unable to accurately identify the physical location of all of the children in foster care. Additionally, it does not contain accurate information concerning vacancies in foster homes, nor does it contain accurate information regarding which social workers are assigned to which children.
* * * * * * Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that [the information system] is clearly inadequate for keeping track of the children in the District’s foster care. The Court can only wonder how an agency that cannot track the location of the children in its custody can possibly comply with the remaining requirements of federal and District law, much less with reasonable professional standards.41
Unfortunately, this situation remains largely unremedied. Though incremental improvements in the present information system have been effected, the defendants have not moved promptly to replace the system with one that would be truly adequate. They were to have developed and implemented a new or fully revised management information system (MIS) to meet court-ordered requirements by December 31, 1994, but then the deadline was extended to December 31, 1995.42 Upon discovering that the defendants did not appear to be on track to meet the December 1995 deadline, the Court adopted the Emergency Resource Plan on February 10, 1995, which required the District to release the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the MIS by February 28, 1995, and for a contract to be awarded by June 1, 1995. The Monitor notes, and the defendants do not disagree, that the defendants have “no chance of complying with the Court’s June 1 date for signing a contract.”43 The Monitor bases this unfortunate conclusion on three facts: (1) the defendants changed the deadline for submitting responses to the RFP from April 17, 1995 to June 1, 1995, thereby making a contract award by June 1 impossible;44 (2) the defendants submitted to the D.C. Department of Administrative Services 91 responses to vendors’ inquiries about the RFP, but as of April 20, 1995, the Department of Administrative Services had not released these responses to the vendors, thereby making prompt bids unlikely;45 and (3) the Monitor does not believe that the RFP conforms to the requirements of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) requirement that the contract have a two-year implementation timeframe. If the RFP does not comply with HHS requirements, the defendants risk losing the 75% federal reimbursement which the defendants require in order to be able to afford the new system.46
E. Administrative Review and Quality Assurance 1. Administrative Review. As noted in the Court’s original liability opinion, federal *305 and District law both require that periodic reviews be conducted to determine the continued appropriateness of each child’s placement.47 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (B); D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2323(a). Obviously, this requirement prevents children from languishing in inappropriate situations as their circumstances change. The Court ordered the defendants to provide an administrative review for all children in care within 180 days of their entering the Department’s physical and legal custody and every 180 days thereafter. The defendants were originally supposed to meet this standard by September 30, 1992, but the deadline was extended to June 30, 1993. Furthermore, by September 30, 1993, the defendants were to have eliminated the backlog of noncomplying cases.48 The Monitor notes,49 and the defendants agree,50 that as of March 31, 1995, 180 cases were out of compliance with the requirements.
The defendants argue that they are in substantial compliance because they have achieved significant increases in the compliance percentage and in review timeliness since 1992.51 However, the Monitor points out that the cancellation rate— the percentage of scheduled administrative reviews which were not performed—increased from 13 percent to 28 percent from the last quarter of 1994 to the first quarter of 1995.52 The Monitor explains that this “sharp increase in cancellations” is attributable to the lack of case plans for children—in itself a problem—and staff furloughs.53 The defendants themselves admit that of the 1432 administrative reviews scheduled for the first quarter of 1995, only 1038 were performed.54
Though the defendants have shown some improvement over the long term in this area, they remain drastically behind the September 30, 1993 and June 30, 1993 deadlines. Furthermore, the recent increase in cancellations suggests that progress may be slowing. Therefore, the Court cannot agree that the defendants are in substantial compliance.
2. Quality Assurance. The Monitor notes that the defendants responded to staff shortages by detailing Quality Assurance employees to administrative review functions. As a result, “[a]ll Quality Assurance activity has been curtailed since the last quarter of 1994” and “there has been virtually no progress in attaining the Quality Assurance goals outlined in the ... Implementation Plan.”55 This lack of progress is evident in the defendants’ noncompliance in six separate areas outlined below.
The Court required the defendants to develop and implement a quality review process that will sample 20 percent of the cases in each supervisory unit every 12 months.56 Though the defendants did develop a plan whose implementation began approximately eight months late, they have not proceeded with this review in any meaningful way in 1995.57
The Court also required the defendants to follow up on the above-described quality reviews by providing feedback to supervisory units and then developing corrective action plans for any problems.58 The defendants state that they have provided feedback but have not yet completed any corrective action plans.59 The Monitor points out that since *306 the defendants have not proceeded with quality reviews in 1995, feedback and corrective action will not proceed either.60
The Court also required the defendants to assess the resources assigned to the Office of Administrative Review and develop a plan for increasing the review capacity of the office.61 The defendants and the Monitor disagree over whether the defendants have achieved compliance in the area.62 However, the Corrective Action Receiver agreed with the Monitor and found that further assessment and improvement was necessary.63
The defendants were also required to revise their staffing and resource plan for conducting administrative reviews. This revision was to be completed by September 30, 1992, but the deadline was extended to September 30, 1993.64 Though the defendants again argue that they are in substantial compliance with this requirement,65 the Court agrees with the Monitor66 that the Corrective Action Receiver is correct to conclude that further work is needed in this area.
The Court also required the defendants to provide a response to workers within five days when administrative review unearths a policy issue requiring resolution. The defendants were to be in full compliance by June 30, 1992, but the deadline was extended for a year.67 The Monitor concludes that the defendants are not in compliance and states that “feedback on

policy issues is not occurring in a timely way.”68 The defendants agree that they are not in compliance with this standard.69
Finally, the Court required the defendants to implement changes to their recordkeeping practices when previous reviews reveal a need for adjustments. The defendants were to have completed this task by September 30, 1993, but the deadline was extended until December 31, 1993.70 The defendants argue that they are in substantial compliance with this requirement because they have identified recordkeeping changes and implemented them. However, the defendants’ own review of their recordkeeping practices yielded average scores between 2.58 and 3.86 on a five-point scale for various information fields.71 The Monitor concludes that the identified changes in practice have not yet been implemented.72
F. Licensing, Monitoring, and Contract Review The defendants are in noncompliance with at least five court-ordered requirements in this area. First, the Court required the defendants to develop policies and procedures to enable prompt decisionmaking on the issuance of licenses for foster care facilities.73 This move would enable the District to expand their foster care resources in an efficient yet careful manner in order to cope with the growing influx of children into the system. The policies and procedures were to have been developed by June 30, 1993, but the deadline was extended by a year. The Monitor and defendants agree that policies have been drafted, but still await the review of other District of Columbia offices, including the DHS General Counsel’s Office, the Office of Corporation Counsel, and the Office *307 of Regulatory and Legislative Affairs.74 Obviously, the defendants are not on the verge of fulfilling this requirement even a year after the extended deadline.
Second, the Court required the defendants to implement changes to foster care licensing and program monitoring.75 The defendants report compliance as incomplete76 and the Monitor notes that while an interim Memorandum of Understanding is in place “no plan has been developed to assure that sufficient resources are available to make implementation of the agreement a reality.”77
Third, the Court required the defendants to collect and compile information from program monitoring reviews. This compilation was to have been completed by December 31, 1992, but the deadline was extended fifteen months to March 31, 1994.78 One year after the extended deadline, the Monitor reports noncompliance79 and the defendants report that several steps remain before the task is completed.80
Fourth and fifth, the Court required the defendants to develop a plan for revision of contracting policies and procedures and to implement that plan so that the revisions were made. Revisions were to have been completed by December 31, 1992, but the deadline was extended until June 30, 1993.81 The defendants admit that they have not yet formulated a plan for revision, let alone made the changes. However, they point out that LaShawn contracts are given expedited processing.82 The Monitor states that the contracting process “remains cumbersome and it remains difficult to procure services in a timely fashion.”83 Based upon the defendants’ noncompliance in many other areas requiring various contracting measures, it is clear that the process is still a major hindrance.
G. Legal Representation and Court Relationships Because many of the children in the plaintiff class are involved in proceedings before the District of Columbia courts, the defendants must coordinate closely with various elements of the judicial system. Effective cooperation is especially important to complete the judicial termination of parental rights that is a prerequisite to adoption. With that in mind, the Court ordered the defendants to implement changes suggested by a formal assessment of legal services provided by the Office of Corporation Counsel, which is responsible for many of the family court matters, and the working relationships between DHS staff and Corporation Counsel staff. Full implementation was required by December 31, 1993.84 However, the Monitor notes85 and the defendants agree86 that almost eighteen months after the deadline, the defendants have hired some new individuals but have not yet implemented the changes suggested by the assessment.
The Court also required the defendants to incorporate the training needs of the District of Columbia Superior Court into the defendants’ Annual Training Plan. The defendants report some interactions between their agencies and the Superior Court, but do not state that they are in full compliance with *308 this requirement.87 The Monitor merely notes that compliance is incomplete.88 Without more information, the Court cannot determine how soon the defendants will be in full compliance, but the September 30, 1993 deadline is already long past.
H. Revenue Maximization Revenue maximization is essential to many of the other court-ordered requirements: if the defendants do not receive their full share of federal funds for various child welfare operations, they will be unable to effect the sweeping changes required to lift the child welfare system out of its wretched state. It is incredible that the defendants have not pursued this avenue more aggressively, since it could provide them with an infusion of much-needed cash.
In the October 4, 1994 consent agreement, the defendants agreed to hire a full time employee to assure implementation of the revenue maximization plan embodied in the agreement and to comply with various provisions of the Remedial Order. The Monitor reports that “as an interim step,” the defendants have designated two employees to work half-time on revenue maximization in cooperation with an outside consultant, but that “DHS has not taken steps to hire a full time employee.... [F]ailure to identify or hire a capable senior staff member could seriously delay work on revenue maximization.”89
The Monitor’s dire predictions have ample foundation. The defendants have been continually out of compliance with various elements of the revenue maximization plan as set forth in court orders. The defendants’ reluctance to proceed was so great that on November 23, 1994, the Court had to issue an order requiring the defendants to take certain specific small steps toward the final approval of a contract for an outside consultant. Furthermore, the Monitor notes that the defendants have been uncooperative in working with the Monitor employee designated to assist the defendants with revenue maximization.90
I. Services to Families and Children 1. Interagency Access to Services. By December 31, 1993, the defendants were to have developed specific plans that would improve interagency access to services. This deadline was extended from September 20, 1992.91 Such cooperation is necessary in order to ensure that children in the plaintiff class have access to day care, health care, and other services provided by other parts of the District government. The defendants admit that compliance is incomplete in this area, even though they have developed protocols with some other District agencies.92 The Monitor notes that “[f]iscal constraints in the District continue to make real access to services ... from other agencies of District government extremely problematic.” For example, though the CSS signed a protocol with the Ambulatory Health Care Administration of the Commission on Public Health to provide priority clinic health care to FSA clients, the Commission on Public Health subsequently shut down several health care clinics, making the protocol much less useful.93
Not all of these problems have fiscal roots. The defendants appear incapable of managing the administrative tasks associated with providing available services. The documents before the Court reveal at least two examples of how these resources are wasted.
The first example concerns the use of day care services. When he received contradictory reports from social workers and FSA officials about whether day care was available, *309 the Resource Development Receiver “was verbally assured that the cutback [in day care services] was an error which would be rescinded.” However, when the Receiver requested confirmation that all staff were assured that day care was available, he did not receive an adequate response. On April 27, the Monitor (and not the Receiver) was provided with a copy of a memorandum dated April 3 from the FSA Administrator to all staff explaining that day care was available. The Receiver, notified by the Monitor, then contacted twenty supervisory units and found that “with few exceptions, the memorandum was not known to supervisors or made available to line staff.”94 The problem with this lack of communication is critical: if the social workers are not aware of the availability of day care, they will not be able to place children in foster homes requiring day care assistance, thereby exacerbating the shortage of placement resources.
The second example concerns the defendants’ failure to use funded substance abuse treatment slots for which they had priority access. The plaintiffs supplied the Court with a memorandum from the District’s Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services Administration to the Acting Administrator of FSA warning the recipient that CSS was in danger of losing its access to the slots because it had referred no individuals to the treatment program as of January 31, 1995.95 This failure to act is inexcusable given that substance abuse is a major cause of child abuse and neglect, particularly when the defendants would have incurred no expense in utilizing the treatment.
2. Family Service Fund. The Court required the defendants to establish a family service fund upon which workers can draw to purchase goods or services required by a family that cannot be obtained in a reasonable time period from another source.96 Though the fund was to have been established by December 31, 1993, it still does not exist. The defendants admit that compliance is incomplete but state that they have arranged purchase orders with various organizations that provide the same goods and services sought to be paid for by the fund.97 However, the Monitor notes that access to the resources “is spotty to nonexistent and/or services are very uneven. Staff have reported that while the Department continues to assure the presence of these resources, they can rarely find them to provide to clients.”98 The Receivers will work to address this problem through enforcement of the Emergency Resource Plan, but the defendants are presently far from compliance.

3. Prompt Transfer of Cases to Service Workers. The Court required the defendants to ensure the transfer of cases to service workers within five days, in order to expedite assistance to abused and neglected children.99 Though this procedure was to have been in place by December 31, 1993 (and originally a year earlier), the defendants admit,100 and the Monitor concurs, 101 that they have not yet implemented the plan they have developed for effecting this prompt transfer.
J. Out-of-Home Care The defendants are not in compliance with at least ten requirements in this area. First, and most essentially, the Court required the defendants to centralize placement activity in one placement office.102 This was due to be completed by September 30, 1992, but the deadline was extended to August 30, 1993. The Monitor reports that placement is not centralized in the new office that the defendants have staffed. The Monitor explains that “placement workers still rely on personal *310 knowledge and relationships in making placements,” and that the centralized office does not receive reliable listings of available placements. The Monitor also notes that
[t]he lack of appropriate placements has reached crisis proportions with approximately 20 children for whom no placements are now available. The Placement Office staff are under extreme stress and are often forced to move children multiple times to a series of inappropriate placements.103 Second, the Monitor reports that the defendants are not in compliance with the Court’s order to develop procedures and resources available to serve as a placement transition fund.104 In fact, the Monitor states that the defendants have provided “[n]o new information” suggesting that any progress has been made.105
Third, the defendants are out of compliance with the Court’s requirement that they hire a full-time employee to develop and coordinate supports for foster parents.106 The Monitor points out that the DHS opposed adding this requirement to the Revised Implementation Plan.107 The defendants note they have developed a required Foster Parent Handbook and convened a meeting of foster parents.108 Though these steps are necessary and probably helpful to foster parents, they are too limited a substitute for the services of a full-time employee.
Fourth, the defendants have not achieved full compliance with licensing standards for the number of children in foster care homes, though they were required to do so by June 30, 1993 (the original deadline was three months earlier).109 The Monitor and defendants do not report the same number of unlicensed homes, but this may be attributable to the difference in reporting dates.110 Furthermore, the Monitor maintains that the existing data on the number of unlicensed homes is unreliable and the Corrective Action Receiver will verify the figures.111 In any case, at least eleven homes with sixteen children are unlicensed even though the deadline passed almost two years ago.
Fifth, the Court required the defendants to increase foster parent payment rates to 100% of the 1992 USDA standards by April 1, 1994.112 The defendants have not done so and have not provided any information to the Monitor on progress in this area.113
Sixth, the defendants have failed to implement a wide variety of support services for foster parents, even though the Court has imposed deadlines of March 31, 1993 and then September 30, 1993.114 The defendants note that they have conducted a survey of foster parent needs and are currently providing some services, but that many plans are still in draft and compliance is incomplete.115 The Monitor reports that existing support services have “been severely curtailed in recent months” that the present “widely dispersed efforts” would be more effective if a full-time employee were available to concentrate on the task. 116
Seventh, the Monitor states that the defendants are not in compliance with certain sections *311 of the Remedial Order regarding the case planning process and supervision of placements. The Court at first required this to be completed by March 31, 1994, but the date was extended to June 30, 1994.117 Though the defendants point to some improvements in compliance, the Monitor “has not seen this change reflected in regular case reviews and administrative reviews ... nor in surveys of records reviewed in the course of fatality reviews.”118
Eighth, the Court required the defendants to establish and fill a full-time position to coordinate kinship care. This was required to be completed by April 30, 1994.119 The defendants and Monitor agree that a candidate has been selected but not yet hired.120
Ninth, the Court required the defendants to develop and implement policies and procedures for regarding the placement of children with kinship providers. Policies were to have been developed by March 31, 1994 and implemented by June 30, 1994.121 Because the Court specifically ordered the defendants to adopt a full set of draft policies and procedures on November 23, 1994, the first part of this task is now complete. The Monitor reports that the policies were to be implemented beginning with staff training on April 24, 1995, almost one year late.
Tenth, the Court required the defendants to develop and implement a licensure process for kinship homes. This was required to be completed by December 31, 1992, but the deadline was extended by two years.122 These policies were finalized by the Court order described above, but the Monitor reports that implementation is just beginning.123
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF VIOLATIONS: FINDINGS OF FACT
Though the above review of the defendants’ noncompliance mentions the practical effects of these problems, further illustration is in order. Three documents recently submitted to the Court show that the defendants’ noncompliance can have devastating outcomes.
A. Child Fatality On February 4, 1995, a three-year old child was beaten and choked to death by a relative who was caring for the child. Because the deceased was known to the District’s child welfare system, the Monitor reviewed the circumstances surrounding the fatality and prepared a Memorandum on April 4, 1995 which was forwarded to the parties and the Court.
The Monitor concluded that the death “could have been prevented” and that “no one adequately discharged a protective function” on behalf of the deceased or other children in the household. Though the defendants had received a report of neglect as early as October 1992, they missed “numerous clues, indications, and opportunities” to avoid this tragedy. April 4, 1995 Memo at 3.
The Monitor found that the defendants erred in several ways, including by not adequately assessing the child’s risk at an early stage; not dealing appropriately with the child’s mother; not performing regular visits; allowing the case to remain unassigned to any social worker for several periods of time; not providing adequate supervision and training for workers involved with the case; and not coordinating services provided by other parts of the District government. April 4, 1995 Memo at 3–5.
Furthermore, the Monitor concluded that the defendants’ internal review of the fatality was “unsatisfactory on all accounts.” The defendants failed to convene a timely review *312 panel; failed to involve the required high-level management in the review; failed to produce a report with sufficiently documented and detailed information; failed to produce the report promptly; and failed to address problems raised by the review. April 4, 1995 Memo at 6–7.
The widespread problems and inadequate internal response to this terrible event provide stark evidence that the defendants are unable or unwilling to comply with the Court’s orders and alleviate the problems raised at trial. The Court cannot expect the defendants to respond to the more mundane but pressing matters involved in some of the remedial provisions (such as increasing staffing and making policy statements available) if they do not respond adequately to this clearly identifiable, highly publicized tragedy.
B. Emergency Overnight Placements Over the past several weeks, the Receivers have grown increasingly aware that children are being placed in a large number of successive temporary placements over short periods of time. The Resource Development Receiver investigated this issue and completed a report on May 18, 1995.
The report found that in April 1995, twenty-four children had multiple placements “driven by a drastic shortage of placement resources.” One child experienced six different placements in two weeks. Other examples include a child moved three times in three days and another moved four times in four days. Report at 3–4. When children are shuttled around in this manner, many suffer. The children are traumatized and social workers are overburdened.
The Receiver identified several causes for this practice. In addition to the general shortage of placement resources, which must be addressed by systematic resource development, other problems worsen the situation:
—The computerized daily list of placement options is not accurate and makes placement difficult.

—Social workers are unsure whether day care is available when there is a chance to place a child in a home where day care is required.
—Foster parents and licensed vendors who can provide care are becoming reluctant to participate because they are not being paid and services have not been provided.
—Placement is not centralized and lacks “even basic computer support.” Social workers must routinely make 25 phone calls to secure a placement.
—Few new foster care families have been approved in the last several months even though there have been numerous applicants.
Report at 3–7. The Receiver has identified short-term solutions for some of these problems and will proceed with the Resource Development Workplan in order to achieve long-term progress. However, the report buttresses the above evidence of systemic difficulty and shows how these problems can have harmful effects on children.
C. Receivers’ Report On May 18, 1995, the Receivers submitted a joint report detailing the operation of the limited receiverships over the past few months. Though there are signs of progress, the Receivers also tell of epidemic inaction, resistance, frustration, and poor attitudes.
For example, the Protective Services Receiver states that children often remain overnight at the defendants’ offices at 625 H Street N.E. The report tells of at least four children who slept at the facility in the month of May alone. The Receiver believes that “agency leadership does not demand the best from its staff,” and that placements are not so difficult to find that children must remain in the offices. Report at 4–5. Foster parents also leave their children with the building’s security guards during the day and this practice “is allowed and even condoned by some foster care workers who are desperate to keep homes, no matter how inadequate the foster parent may be.” Report at 5. The Receiver concludes that
[o]ne of the goals of this Receiver was to point out problems which could provide the basis for moving to solutions. The District has refused most efforts to help and in some instances has actively worked against the Receivership. For this, I have no *313 choice but to support the concept of a General Receivership.
Report at 7–8.
The Corrective Action Receiver concurs and maintains “that there is such an atmosphere of passivity and even detachment within the FSA that it is difficult to see how client and service problems can be effectively addressed.” Report at 8. The Receiver notes that it is difficult to retain workers because they are frustrated with pay cuts, furloughs, lack of basic administrative supports, and unclear pronouncements on the permanency of contract jobs. Report at 9–12. One social worker responded to a January 13, 1995 survey distributed by the Receivers thus: “I need ‘an experienced capable supervisor. I have been here eight months. I am now the senior member of the unit. Since that time, three social workers, ones with the most experience, have left the unit. Please help. This is dangerous.’ ” Report at 16. A May 12, 1995 letter from a supervisor to the Receiver painted an equally pathetic picture:
We sincerely appreciate your cooperation in helping us to expeditiously obtain toner for our printer. However, as I mentioned in our conversation, we ask that you continue in your endeavor to assist us in acquiring other much needed supplies and materials, i.e.: Telephone lines, space, supplies, standardized forms, typewriter, summer camp activities for children and training for parents.
Report at 16–17. Though the Receivers have graciously and valiantly risen to address the “severe level of dysfunction in the agency” that surprised even them, the Court did not appoint these three professionals with the idea that they would spend their time tracking down office supplies. It is apparent that the defendants will not act of their own accord to assist the limited receivers with reform.
The Resource Development Receiver, in addition to detailing the problems with successive emergency placements, notes that a “critically needed” respite care center donated by a third party remains unused because CFSD has not staffed it. After detailing various other problems reviewed above, the Receiver concludes from personal experience that “the environment is as dismal now as it was in the very beginnings of judicial intervention.” Report at 13.
V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
As the above recital of woes demonstrates, the defendants are radically out of compliance with the Court’s orders. The Court agrees with the Monitor’s assessment of compliance in the areas discussed above and adopts each of the findings of facts proposed in Exhibit E to the plaintiffs’ motion. The Court further finds that the problems in the District of Columbia’s child welfare system are so widespread and persistent that the limited receiverships will not suffice to accomplish reform.
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Contempt [1] Civil contempt does not have a punitive goal. It is “a remedial sanction designed to obtain compliance with a court order or to compensate for damage sustained as a result of noncompliance.” NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C.Cir.1981). Contempt is appropriate if clear and convincing evidence shows noncompliance, regardless of the intent of the contemnor. Id. at 1183 (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949)).
[2] 1. Good Faith. The defendants argue that good faith and substantial compliance are defenses to contempt allegations. However, the cases they cite from this circuit precede Blevins Popcorn and thus do not control. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 531 F.2d 617 (D.C.Cir.1976); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Co., 380 F.2d 570 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 327, 88 S.Ct. 437, 19 L.Ed.2d 560 (1967).
In any case, the defendant’s good faith is arguable at best. The remedial history outlined above demonstrates that the defendants have repeatedly attempted last-minute adjustments *314 or compromises in an attempt to avoid sanctions. Because this pattern has persistently recurred since 1991, the Court must question whether the defendants truly intend to cooperate in the remedial efforts. Additionally, the defendants’ recent actions cast an extremely bad light on their alleged good intentions. On March 30, 1995, the Mayor transmitted a bill to the District of Columbia City Council that sought to abolish private rights of action to enforce local statutory responsibilities to care for and protect abused and neglected children. A copy of the transmittal memorandum and draft legislation have been docketed with the Clerk of the Court.
This legislative tactic damages the defendants’ claims of good faith in two ways, regardless of whether they have a right to take such action. First of all, the proposal shows that the defendants seek to make child welfare “subordinate to the priorities which the Mayor, [Council, and Congress] establish through the appropriations process.” Draft Legislation at 3. By abolishing the private right of action, the defendants intend to completely remove the Court from efforts taken on behalf of the children. With no means of outside enforcement,124 and in the climate of the District’s fiscal difficulties, there is absolutely no guarantee that the defendants will do anything at all to aid or protect their young residents. All legal accountability evaporates. The bill would allow the District to continue with impunity to ignore their legal as well as moral duty to care for these helpless children. The intended result of this legislation therefore casts doubt upon the defendants’ present willingness to comply with either the letter or the spirit of the Court’s orders, since there is no indication that the defendants consider child welfare important.
Second, the proposal suggests that the defendants have not been forthright with the Court about their desires to reach a negotiated solution with the plaintiffs. On April 7, 1995, the defendants told the Court that they had proposed an agency restructuring that “was undertaken with a great deal of thoughtfulness and care” and was “a worthwhile effort to address the very concerns that are foremost in the plaintiff and [M]onitors’ mind, that is, infrastructure and leadership.” April 7, 1995 Tr. at 17. This representation came just eight days after the defendants submitted the proposed legislation. It is quite hard to believe that the defendants could be diligently pursuing a negotiated solution at the same time that they were seeking to end the entire litigation of this case.
2. Substantial Compliance. Whether or not substantial compliance is a defense to contempt is irrelevant, for the defendants have not substantially complied with the Court’s orders. As the detailed analysis above shows, the defendants are far from achieving reform in many key areas. The virtual stoppage of adoption activity, the critical staffing shortages, the dearth of basic administrative supports, the severely delayed installation of the MIS, and the inaction on revenue maximization highlight the degree of noncompliance. Illustrative situations such as the February 1995 fatality and the use of successive emergency placements reveal from another perspective how broad the failures are. Furthermore, the reports from the Receivers and the Monitor about the defendants’ indifference counsel the Court to place no confidence in future efforts. The Resource Development Receiver’s conclusion sums it up best: though the details of noncompliance and difficulty may be somewhat different from those brought forth at trial, the overall situation is just as “dismal” as it was in 1991, and abused and neglected children continue to suffer under these conditions.
Therefore, the Court holds that the defendants are in civil contempt of court for failing to comply with numerous provisions of the Court’s orders. At this time, the Court will not impose any fines upon the defendants, and instead will take the measures outlined below.

B. Full Receivership The plaintiffs point out that the court’s authority to order remedial injunctive relief *315 is broad. Swann v. Charlotte– Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275–76, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). In addition to the venerable cases generated by the school desegregation movement, the plaintiffs cite other recent examples of receiverships imposed to remedy a variety of ills. See, e.g. Shaw v. Allen, 771 F.Supp. 760 (S.D.W.Va.1990) (prisons); Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Detroit, 476 F.Supp. 512 (E.D.Mich.1979) (water-treatment plant); and Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980) (public housing).
[3] The defendants make several arguments opposing the imposition of a full receivership. First, they state that the facts do not support the need for a full receivership because they have made and are continuing to make substantial progress. While it is true that the defendants have made some progress in various areas, the above factual findings show the urgent need for a new, more fundamental approach to change. Otherwise, each report of incremental progress will be mitigated by regression in another area or future inaction on that first step forward. Much of the progress originally made is now slipping back into the same tired way of doing business that brought these parties before the Court.
[4] The defendants also assert that there is no legal basis for the receivership, since the second Remedial Order was entered on the basis of local law alone. The defendants attempt to argue that “there are no ... violations [of federal law] in this case,” and that therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to intervene in local government matters. Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion at 15. This characterization is at best disingenuous and could even be called patently untrue. The Court’s April 1991 opinion found violations of both federal and local law. The Court of Appeals then directed that the Court reenter the remedial order on local law grounds if possible. The Court of Appeals did not require that the Court avoid relying on federal law where necessary.125 The Court of Appeals also did not reach the merits of the Court’s federal liability holding. To the extent that the defendants wish to argue that the Court must have a federal liability basis for its imposition of a full receivership, the Court will refer the defendants to its 1991 opinion.
The defendants also maintain that full receivership is inappropriate in light of Congress’ recent creation of a control board to oversee the District’s finances.126 There is no reason to suppose that the control board and a full receivership in this case are mutually exclusive. The House of Representatives prepared a report on the legislation which contains several references to the various court-ordered obligations faced by the District127 and even refers specifically to this case.128 In fact, the legislation seems to anticipate coordination between court-ordered activities and the control board’s oversight: the law gives the board power to make recommendations relating to the effects of court orders upon the operations of the District government. In some instances the board may take action upon its own recommendations, including “structural reforms, personnel actions, and the enactment of local ordinances.”129 As the defendants are well aware, the plaintiffs urge that a full receiver be empowered to take exactly these steps.
*316 The defendants also argue that the present Receivers be given more time to work before a full receivership is imposed. Because the Receivers themselves endorse the idea of a full receivership and because noncompliance is rampant in areas outside of the present Receivers’ purview, this argument is unavailing. In fact, recent successes within the areas of receivership provide hope that change could occur elsewhere were a full receivership to be in place. For example, the diligent work and sometimes round-the-clock presence of the Protective Services Receiver has increased the promptness with which abuse and neglect investigations are initiated. In January 1995, only 69% of all investigations began within the required 48 hours. By the end of March, the figure had climbed to 81.4%.130 Additionally, the quick development of the Emergency Resources Plan has provided some relief, although the Receivers must struggle with other District agencies in order to maintain compliance. Furthermore, the detailed and thoughtful workplans submitted by all three Receivers are a great improvement over the usual tardy and underdeveloped plans offered by the defendants at various stages of the remedial effort.
Finally, the defendants argue that they have proposed a viable restructuring plan that would improve the state of the child welfare system and obviate the need for a receivership. The Court has heard discussion of this plan at recent status calls, but remains unconvinced that the plan provides enough detail and enough overhaul to alleviate the problems set forth here. The plaintiffs, moreover, have engaged in extensive negotiations with the defendants in an attempt to agree upon a proposed restructuring, but brought this contempt motion when they left the discussions unsatisfied. While the Court is reluctant to dismiss any effort by the defendants to initiate real change, the substance of the plan, the plaintiff’s reaction to it, and this case’s history of last-minute attempted fixes leave the Court skeptical. Four years ago the Court was told that the defendants had a “plan” to rebuild the agency. Now, facing contempt and full receivership, the defendants again put forth a proposed solution. There is no reason to believe this plan has more chance of success than the one the defendants presented at trial and quickly abandoned.
Therefore, the Court today imposes a full receivership over the child welfare system for the District of Columbia. As the accompanying order illustrates, the parties and Monitor shall attempt to agree upon the terms of a proposed order setting forth the steps necessary to effectuate this receivership. The parties have fully briefed the issue of the appropriate extent of the Receiver’s powers, but the Court will defer resolution of this matter until after receipt of the proposed order. Obviously, the Receiver will have to be granted broad powers to effectuate the fundamental changes needed.

VII. OTHER MATTERS
Also pending before the Court is the defendants’ motion to reconsider the Court’s adoption of the Resource Development Workplan submitted by the Receiver. The defendants argue that the workplan inappropriately requires them to prevent certain essential workers from receiving pay cuts or furloughs and requires the maintenance of funding for various items at certain levels.
For many of the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny the motion for reconsideration. In the various reports reviewed above, the Monitor and Receivers explain that pay cuts and furloughs have had severe effects on staff morale and retention, which have caused other areas of noncompliance to bloom. These problems are urgent and cannot await the uncertain future of further political action by the District. Neither the defendants’ recent proposals nor past events in this case’s remedial history suggest that there is any alternative solution to these staffing problems. It was therefore appropriate for the Court to exercise its broad remedial injunctive power and adopt the workplan. The Court will incorporate the above analysis and deny the motion for reconsideration. The motion to stay implementation of the workplan is denied as moot.

*317 VIII. CONCLUSION
Today is a sad day for the District of Columbia and an even sadder day for the children of the District of Columbia. The defendants should be extremely uncomfortable with their present level of compliance and are undoubtedly disappointed to learn of the imposition of the receivership. The Court does not take these steps lightly. It has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to impose contempt sanctions131 and to interfere in the operations of local government by imposing broad receiverships or issuing flurries of micromanaging orders.132 The plaintiffs have also expressed their reluctance to seek a finding of contempt.133 However, as the Court has warned the defendants with increasing frequency, it cannot tolerate widespread noncompliance with its orders. Notwithstanding the Court’s warnings, outright hostility has replaced grudging acceptance. The pattern of delay and inaction that has characterized this case for the last few years must end now.
Abused and neglected children in the District of Columbia are not receiving the services and protection which are their desert and legal entitlement. The young child who was killed in February did not receive life-saving intervention. Boys and girls who must sleep in the defendants’ office building do not receive the attention or resources necessary to provide them with a home for the night. Children who are shuttled from one emergency placement to another do not receive the continuity that their young psyches require. Perhaps most sadly of all, children awaiting adoption do not receive the expeditious help of the defendants in beginning a safer, more stable, and maybe even happier life.
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy noted that the Chinese character for crisis is a composite of two other characters meaning “danger” and “opportunity.” The crisis now before the Court has just those elements. It is all too evident that the plaintiff children face great danger in the present system, and the Court intends for its ruling to provide the children and the defendants with the opportunity to begin again. Let us hope that the defendants respond to this opportunity.

Footnotes

1

LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 960–61 (D.D.C.1991).

2

The heads of each of the agencies in the chain of supervision for the child welfare system were named. The Child and Family

Services Division (CFSD) is primarily responsible for the child welfare system. The CFSD is a subunit of the Family

Services Administration (FSA), which falls beneath the Commission on Social Services (CSS). The CSS is one of three

commissions within the DHS.

3

LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.

2d 659 (1994) (citation omitted).

4

On November 23, 1994, the Court revised the order to include a limited receivership in the area of Protective Services.

5

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 8.

6

Revised Implementation Plan at 74.

7

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 38.

8

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 86.

9

Revised Implementation Plan at 76.

10

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 38–39; March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 86.

11

Revised Implementation Plan at 76.

12

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 40.

Footnotes

1

LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 960–61 (D.D.C.1991).

2

The heads of each of the agencies in the chain of supervision for the child welfare system were named. The Child and Family

Services Division (CFSD) is primarily responsible for the child welfare system. The CFSD is a subunit of the Family

Services Administration (FSA), which falls beneath the Commission on Social Services (CSS). The CSS is one of three

commissions within the DHS.

3

LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.

2d 659 (1994) (citation omitted).

4

On November 23, 1994, the Court revised the order to include a limited receivership in the area of Protective Services.

5

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 8.

6

Revised Implementation Plan at 74.

7

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 38.

8

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 86.

9

Revised Implementation Plan at 76.

10

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 38–39; March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 86.

11

Revised Implementation Plan at 76.

12

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 40.

13

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 86.

14

Remedial Order § VIII.F.1, Revised Implementation Plan at 77.

15

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 39–40.

16

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 85.

17

Revised Implementation Plan at 76.

18

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 87.

19

Remedial Order § XXII.B; Revised Implementation Plan at 93–95; October 4, 1994 Consent Agreement.

20

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 50.

21

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 16.

22

762 F.Supp. at 977.

23

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 13.

24

Receivers’ May 18, 1995 Report at 10. This “general disregard” includes the lack of basic administrative supports for the

workers, as outlined below.

25

Revised Implementation Plan at 104–05; Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 49, March 31, 1995

Quarterly Report at 23–24.

26

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 23–24.

27

May 18, 1995 Receivers’ Report at 2, 13.

28

Revised Implementation Plan at 103.

29

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 48.

30

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 19.

31

Remedial Order §§ XII.B, XI.B; Revised Implementation Plan at 103, 106, 109; Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt

Motion, Exhibit I at 48–50.

32

Revised Implementation Plan at 107. The defendants argue that they have achieved substantial compliance because 90% of

the social workers do have a license. Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 48.

33

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 49–50.

34

Remedial Order § XI.C; Revised Implementation Plan at 108.

35

762 F.Supp. at 968.

36

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 24.

37

Id. at 27.

38

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 54.

39

Revised Implementation Plan at 123.

40

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 27.

41

762 F.Supp. at 976–77.

42

Revised Implementation Plan at 138–39.

43

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 29.

44

Id. The defendants confirm that they made this change. Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 63.

45

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 29.

46

Id.

47

762 F.Supp. at 974.

48

Revised Remedial Order at § X.B.1.c; Revised Implementation Plan at 145.

49

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 34.

50

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 64 (lower table).

51

Id. at 63.

52

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 33.

53

Id.

54

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 64 (upper table).

55

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 31.

56

Remedial Order § X.C.3.a; Revised Implementation Plan at 150.

57

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 71; March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 31.

58

Remedial Order § X.C.6; Revised Implementation Plan at 150.

59

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 67.

60

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 32.

61

Revised Implementation Plan at 145.

62

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 68–69; March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 34.

63

Corrective Action Receivers’ Workplan at 18–19, 28 (adopted by Court on March 29, 1995).

64

Revised Implementation Plan at 145.

65

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 68–69.

66

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 35.

67

Revised Implementation Plan at 145.

68

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 35.

69

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 72.

70

Revised Implementation Plan at 154.

71

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 70–71.

72

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 35.

73

Remedial Order § XV.E.2.

74

March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 46; Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 73.

75

Revised Implementation Plan at 159–60.

76

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 75.

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103
104 105 106 107 108 109 110
111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124
125
126
127 128 129 130 131
132

Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 68–69; March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 34.
Corrective Action Receivers’ Workplan at 18–19, 28 (adopted by Court on March 29, 1995).
Revised Implementation Plan at 145.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 68–69.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 35.
Revised Implementation Plan at 145.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 35.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 72.
Revised Implementation Plan at 154.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 70–71.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 35.
Remedial Order § XV.E.2.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 46; Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 73.
Revised Implementation Plan at 159–60.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 75.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 45.
Revised Implementation Plan at 163–64.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 44.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 75.
Remedial Order § XVI.B; Revised Implementation Plan at 165–66.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 74–75.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 45.
Revised Implementation Plan at 170.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 46–47.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 58–59.
Id. at 58.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 47.
Id. at 56. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt and Full Receivership (April 4, 1995), Exhibit C (letter from Monitor employee to defendants outlining barriers to progress in revenue maximization). Revised Implementation Plan at 33.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 13–14.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 68–69.
Id. at 9–10.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt and Full Receivership, Exhibit B.
Revised Implementation Plan at 29.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 14–15.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 70.
Remedial Order § VII.B.I and Revised Implementation Plan at 27 and 30.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 15–16.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 71.
Revised Implementation Plan at 44. March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 74. See also May 18, 1995 Receivers’ Report, Attachment A (report detailing problems with successive emergency overnight placements). Revised Implementation Plan at 47, 49.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 76.
Revised Implementation Plan at 52, 54; March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 76.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 76.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 33.
Revised Implementation Plan at 46–47. See March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 77 (38 unlicensed homes as of March 31, 1995); Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 26–27 (11 unlicensed homes as of April 11, 1995). March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 77.
Revised Implementation Plan at 55.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 77.
Revised Implementation Plan at 53, 55.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 29–32.
March 31, 1995 Quarterly Report at 77–78.
Remedial Order §§ VII, IX; Revised Implementation Plan at 60.
Quarterly Report of March 31, 1995 at 78.
Revised Implementation Plan at 64.
Quarterly Report of March 31, 1995 at 80; Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 33–34.
Revised Implementation Plan at 66.
Remedial Order § XV.F.1; Revised Implementation Plan at 64.
Quarterly Report of March 31, 1995 at 81. The transmittal memo presumes that no federal cause of action presently exists. This assumption is analyzed below, but is accepted arguendo here. In fact, the Court of Appeals gave the Court particular instructions to consider the effect of Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) upon any finding of federal liability. Since the Court of Appeals’ remand, however, the Supreme Court’s decision has been at least partially overturned by congressional action. See Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1281–1285 (E.D.Wisc.1995) (holding that recent statutory amendment reversed most effects of Suter and that federal cause of action existed to enforce many sections of Adoption Assistance Act.) The defendants have not suggested that in spite of these developments, a federal cause of action no longer exists. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104–8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995). H.R.Rep. No. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) at 5, 10, 12, 31.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 44.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 1–2. See, e.g., October 29, 1992 Tr. at 30 (“[The Court is] reluctant to move into a contempt mode or enforcement mode”) and March 3, 1994 Tr. at 15 (“[Contempt can] be a distraction and a concern”). See, e.g., February 26, 1991 Tr. at 68–69 (“It has traditionally not been the Courts’ role in our society ... to impose themselves upon the Executive Branch”); July 30, 1992 Tr. at 26 (“I do not want to see this degenerate to a process of using the Court mechanisms of enforcement to compel the District to do certain things beyond what we’ve already found and agreed upon”); Id. at 32 (“I’m very loathe again to get into orders to compel the District and its various agencies to do specific things beyond the order we have”); August 5, 1992 Tr. at 25 (“I ... do not want either side running to me every time there’s a disagreement and asking for the Court to intervene”); October 29, 1992 Tr. at 25 (“The Court does not want to get into micro-management of the agency.... That is not the Court’s desire, and the proper role of a court is not to manage other branches of government, whether legislative or executive”); Id. at 30 (“[The Court is] reluctant to move into a contempt mode or enforcement mode”); January 28, 1994 Tr. at 10 (“I did not want to interfere with ... Executive operations”); August 12, 1994 Tr. at 45 (“[T]he court does not believe a court should be in running executive agencies. That’s not the proper function of a court”); September 16, 1994 Tr. at 34–35 (“[The Court] does not ... believe that the Court should be appointing people to run agencies and to do their work”); November 18, 1994 Tr. at 40 (“I am leery of seeing the Court bit by bit eat away at the autonomy of the agency by expanding the receivers’ authority”); and February 3, 1995 Tr. at 37 (“I think we’re very close to doing something I have been reluctant to do.... I still fundamentally believe the courts should only be a last

126 127 128 129 130 131 132
133

112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) upon any finding of federal liability. Since the Court of Appeals’ remand, however, the Supreme Court’s decision has been at least partially overturned by congressional action. See Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1281–1285 (E.D.Wisc.1995) (holding that recent statutory amendment reversed most effects of Suter and that federal cause of action existed to enforce many sections of Adoption Assistance Act.) The defendants have not suggested that in spite of these developments, a federal cause of action no longer exists.
District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104–8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995).
H.R.Rep. No. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) at 5, 10, 12, 31.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 44.
Defendants’ Opposition to Contempt Motion, Exhibit I at 1–2.
See, e.g., October 29, 1992 Tr. at 30 (“[The Court is] reluctant to move into a contempt mode or enforcement mode”) and March 3, 1994 Tr. at 15 (“[Contempt can] be a distraction and a concern”).
See, e.g., February 26, 1991 Tr. at 68–69 (“It has traditionally not been the Courts’ role in our society ... to impose themselves upon the Executive Branch”); July 30, 1992 Tr. at 26 (“I do not want to see this degenerate to a process of using the Court mechanisms of enforcement to compel the District to do certain things beyond what we’ve already found and agreed upon”); Id. at 32 (“I’m very loathe again to get into orders to compel the District and its various agencies to do specific things beyond the order we have”); August 5, 1992 Tr. at 25 (“I ... do not want either side running to me every time there’s a disagreement and asking for the Court to intervene”); October 29, 1992 Tr. at 25 (“The Court does not want to get into micro-management of the agency.... That is not the Court’s desire, and the proper role of a court is not to manage other branches of government, whether legislative or executive”); Id. at 30 (“[The Court is] reluctant to move into a contempt mode or enforcement mode”); January 28, 1994 Tr. at 10 (“I did not want to interfere with ... Executive operations”); August 12, 1994 Tr. at 45 (“[T]he court does not believe a court should be in running executive agencies. That’s not the proper function of a court”); September 16, 1994 Tr. at 34–35 (“[The Court] does not ... believe that the Court should be appointing people to run agencies and to do their work”); November 18, 1994 Tr. at 40 (“I am leery of seeing the Court bit by bit eat away at the autonomy of the agency by expanding the receivers’ authority”); and February 3, 1995 Tr. at 37 (“I think we’re very close to doing something I have been reluctant to do.... I still fundamentally believe the courts should only be a last resort and should not interfere with the normal executive functions”).
See, e.g., January 29, 1993 Tr. at 9 (“[I]t is not our preference to litigate this case through contempt”); April 30, 1993 Tr. at 5 (“we’re glad we’re not talking contempt today”); and November 18, 1994 Tr. at 11 (“[W]hat we are proposing is a sanction that we are reluctant to propose”).

 
 Opinion

1995 WL 520763 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, District of Columbia.
LaSHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Marion BARRY, et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 89–1754 (TFH). | Aug. 24, 1995.

GENERAL RECEIVERSHIP ORDER
THOMAS F. HOGAN, District Judge.
*1 The purpose of this order is to ensure full compliance with the Remedial Order and the Implementation Plan in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. As the provisions below explain, the Receiver is granted all necessary authority to carry out its responsibilities, including but not limited to any and all authority previously vested in the Office of the Mayor or any other executive branch of the government of the District of Columbia. The Receiver will make reasonable efforts to exercise its authority in cooperation with District of Columbia officials and in a manner consistent with local law whenever possible. However, to the degree that local law governing lines of authority, budgeting, governmental structure and organization, procurement and personnel unreasonably interfere with the Receiver’s discharge of its responsibilities, local law is superseded by the Receiver’s authority. The defendants and their successors, assigns, subordinates, employees and agents shall fully support and cooperate with the Receiver’s efforts to implement the Remedial Order and Implementation Plan. Failure to do so will result in severe sanctions. Copies of this Order shall be circulated to all division heads in the affected agencies, see # I(A).

I. Structure of the Receivership A. All tasks and activities relating to the implementation of the Remedial Order and the Implementation Plan shall be under the direct authority of the Receiver, regardless of whether they are now located in the Child and Family Services Division, the Family Services Administration, the Commission on Social Services, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Administrative Services, the Office of Corporation Counsel, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs or the District of Columbia Office of Personnel.
B. The Receiver shall have direct control and line supervisory authority over all activities and tasks relating to members of the LaShawn class, including but not limited to:
1. family preservation services;
2. investigations of alleged abuse or neglect;
3. intake;
4. placement;
5. ongoing services;
6. adoption;
7. activities of the residential placement unit;
8. licensing and certification of foster and adoptive homes, group care facilities, and licensed child placement agencies;
9. supervision of private vendors under contract to serve members of the LaShawn class;
10. training;
11. resource development;
12. creation and management of an independent personnel function with responsibility for hiring, retention, and other personnel actions;
13. creation and operation of an independent contracting and procurement function;
14. creation, management, and oversight of a child welfare management information system, including full authority to participate in the ongoing procurement process for a management information system;
15. creation of an independent budget function with responsibility for budget and fiscal management for services relating to members of the LaShawn class;
16. supplies and administrative services necessary to support services to the LaShawn class; and
17. submitting claims for federal reimbursement.
*2 These tasks are assigned to the Receiver, who may assign or delegate any tasks as deemed necessary.

II. Receiver’s Authority The Receiver shall have full authority to take all necessary steps to ensure timely implementation of the LaShawn Remedial Order and Implementation Plan; including but not limited to:

A. The authority to reorganize the provision of services, including the authority to establish a new organizational entity;
B. The authority to ensure the implementation of a neighborhood-based model of service delivery;
C. The authority to initiate privatization of any portion of the District of Columbia child welfare system; and
D. The authority to designate and assign all necessary administrative, direct service, and support staff, including hiring personnel directly and all other personnel actions deemed necessary by the Receiver to carry out the Court’s orders.
E. The authority to enter into contracts and procure all goods and services necessary to carry out the Child Welfare Receivership.
III. Budget A. In developing and implementing the Receivership, the Receiver shall make every effort to work cooperatively and in coordination with the recently-established District of Columbia Fiscal Control Board to ensure the cost-effective operation of the Receivership.
B. Within 90 days, the Receiver shall develop and submit to the Court and the District of Columbia Fiscal Control Board a projected annual budget, the total amount of which shall be a sum sufficient to run the District’s child welfare system, implement the Child Welfare Information System, implement the Resource Development Plan and comply with all aspects of the Remedial Order and Implementation Plan. The budget shall include necessary administrative overhead attached to child welfare functions in relevant agencies of the District of Columbia government including, but not limited to, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Administrative Services, the District of Columbia Office of Personnel, and the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. The Receiver shall have authority to submit proposed modifications to this budget if additional information, experience, and federal revenues received make changes appropriate.
C. Within 120 days, the Receiver will submit recommendations to the Court on an independent fiduciary mechanism for receipt and disbursement of funds to operate the child welfare system in conformity with the Court’s orders.
D. Any and all funds obtained through present and new federal maximization efforts for services relating to LaShawn class members shall be added fully and directly to the Receiver’s budget and shall be used for program enhancement in accordance with federal law. Any such funds received shall have no effect on the level of funds required to be placed in the Receiver’s budget by the District of Columbia under any of the provisions of this order.
E. The Receiver shall prepare subsequent budgets on an annual basis and submit them to the District of Columbia Fiscal Control Board and the Court.
*3 F. The District of Columbia shall make the funds available to carry out the Child Welfare Receivership in accordance with the approved annual budget.
G. The Receiver shall submit to an independent audit of financial records at reasonable intervals.
IV. Initial Operating Fund A. In order to begin operations in advance of the establishment of the budge and fiscal and personnel procedures, the District shall establish an initial operating fund with the Court in the amount of $500,000. The Receiver shall authorize payments from the fund for the salary and expenses of the Receiver, the limited Receivers and additional staff, consultants, and expenses necessary to implement the Child Welfare Receivership.
B. The Receiver shall submit monthly requests for payment from this fund to the Court.
C. The District shall replenish the fund on a monthly basis to keep it at the established level.
D. Until the full budget and fiscal mechanism of the Receivership is established, the District shall continue to meet all current and established payroll, administrative costs, foster care payments, contractual and vendor obligations related to the LaShawn class.
E. The Receiver shall also work with the District of Columbia to establish a working fund within the District of Columbia’s fiscal structure which the Receiver can use during the initial period of Receivership to cover expenses not included in the Initial Operating Fund. This working fund shall be designed to give the Receiver effective payment and reimbursement authority for goods and services in the event that normal District of Columbia payment procedures should falter, and impede the Receiver in carrying out his responsibilities.
V. Operation of the Limited Receiverships A. The orders creating the Limited Receiverships and adopting the Limited Receivers’ work plans shall remain in full force and effect until the Receiver assumes his position.
B. All of the authority vested in the Limited Receivers by the Court’s orders shall be incorporated within the authority of the Receiver. In its decisions concerning the operation of services for members of the LaShawn class, the Receiver shall have the authority to determine whether to keep the Limited Receivers in place, subject to the full authority and administrative control of the Receiver, or whether to incorporate their functions directly into the Receivership.
V. Role of the Monitor The Monitor shall develop and submit a plan to the Court detailing the Monitor’s withdrawal from its present responsibilities as established by the Court’s orders. The plan shall be designed to terminate the Monitor’s present role no later than December 31, 1995.
VI. Compensation The Receiver’s salary shall be $130,000 per year. The District of Columbia shall indemnify the Receiver in the same manner

and to the same extent as it indemnifies other District of Columbia agency heads. The Court shall retain the authority to remove the Receiver for good cause.
VII. Length of the Receivership *4 The Court anticipates that the Receivership shall terminate within three years. The Receivership shall remain in full force and effect until such time as all elements of the Remedial Order and Implementation Plan have been fully implemented and the Receivership is no longer necessary to assure the ongoing operation of the District of Columbia’s child welfare system in accordance with all applicable legal requirements.
Once the Court has determined that the Receivership is no longer necessary, the Court shall establish a reasonable time period to allow for smooth transition of the child welfare system from the Receivership back to the District of Columbia government. The Receiver shall develop a plan to facilitate such transition.
SO ORDERED.

 
 1998 WL 35243112 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
LaSHAWN A., by her next friend Evelyn Moore, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Marion BARRY, as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
Civ. No. 89–1754 (TFH). | Feb. 18, 1998.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, DC, Erik S. Pitchal, Jeremiah Frei–Pearson, Marcia Robinson Lowry, Michael Sara Bartosz, Children’s Rights, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Natalie Frazier Allen, Office of Corporation Counsel, D.C., Richard S. Love, Office of Corporation Counsel, Office of the Solicitor General, Robert C. Utiger, DC Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS F. HOGAN, United States District Judge.
*1 Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion for interim attorneys fees.1 Plaintiffs have requested that the Court award them $2,419,373.17 in fees and costs. Defendants oppose the award of any fees; they further assert that plaintiffs’ request is unreasonable. The Court will grant plaintiffs’ motion and will award them fees, but it will reduce the award from the amount requested.
I Procedural History
The Court’s April 18, 1991 opinion found defendants liable on slightly different grounds for two portions of the plaintiff class. As to plaintiff children in defendants’ custody, the Court found that defendants violated their federal and local statutory rights and also their constitutional rights. As to plaintiff children not in the defendants’ custody, the Court found only that defendants violated their federal and local statutory rights. A few months after the finding of liability, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for entry into judgment of a remedial order.
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action to redress “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law.” A violation of federal statute amounts to an actionable harm under § 1983 when Congress has not specifically foreclosed such suits, and when the statute in question unambiguously creates definite obligations that are not “ ‘too vague and amorphous’ to be ‘beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.’ “ Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs argued inter alia that defendants had violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628, 670–679a (“Adoption Assistance Act”). Relying on precedent from several circuits and Supreme Court guidance regarding § 1983, this Court held that the Adoption Assistance Act imposed obligations specific enough to create rights enforceable under § 1983.
After the Court released its opinion, the Supreme Court examined the Adoption Assistance Act in light of § 1983. Suter v. Artist M ., 503 U.S. 347 (1992). It focused upon 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), which requires that each recipient of certain federal funds must ensure that its “state plan” provides that “reasonable efforts” will be made to prevent the removal of children to foster homes and that “reasonable efforts” will also be made to enable children who are removed to return home. The Supreme Court held that this provision of the Adoption Assistance Act was unenforceable through § 1983 because the statute only required funding recipients to adopt a plan, and not to ensure that the specific element of the plan requiring “reasonable efforts” was actually performed. Congress later overturned much of this decision.2
After the Sutter opinion was released, this case reached the Court of Appeals. Defendants urged the court to rely upon Suter and reverse the federal statutory liability finding, but the Court of Appeals took another approach. It held that
*2 [b]ecause the district court’s judgment is independently supportable by District of Columbia law, we affirm the court’s decision in favor of the children in this case. It appears that each provision of the remedial order reflects the requirements of District of Columbia statutes and regulations, as well as of federal statutes. Nevertheless, because the order was drafted to conform with federal as well as with District law, there are scattered references in the order to federal law that are inappropriate in light of our confirmation of the decision entirely on the basis of local law.
We therefore remand to the district court, with instructions to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible. If there are any portions of the consent decree that depend entirely on a federal statute, the district court should consider [the Suter decision] ... before it includes them in the revised consent decree.
LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1993). On remand, the Court issued a second remedial order which incorporated the changes directed by the Court of Appeals.
The Circuit then considered defendants’ appeal of the second remedial order. The original panel issued an opinion that remanded the order back to this Court for reconsideration of the exercise of pendant jurisdiction. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F. 3d 556 (D.C.Cir.1995). However, an opinion of the Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated that opinion and effectively affirmed the Court’s remedial order. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C.Cir.1996). Therefore, all appellate challenge of the Court’s remedial order in this case is complete; there is no question that plaintiffs have prevailed in this litigation.
II Entitlement to Award

The Court has discretion to award attorney’s fees to a party that prevails under § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Interim fee awards are appropriate once a plaintiff becomes a prevailing party, even if the entire course of litigation has not terminated. Texas Association v. Garland, 489 U.S. 782, 790–91 (1989). Therefore, if the Court finds that plaintiffs have prevailed pursuant to § 1983, it may award fees, even though substantial issues may remain in the underlying case.
There is no dispute that plaintiffs are the prevailing party; there are no appealable issues remaining in this litigation. It is also irrelevant that plaintiffs prevailed through a consent judgment, and not after a full trial and judgment on the merits. The Supreme Court has stated that “for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.” Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
Not all of the claims brought by the plaintiffs are fee-shifting claims. Because local statutes are not enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the fee-shifting provisions of § 1988 do not apply directly to those claims. Therefore, the Court cannot award fees solely because plaintiffs have prevailed on local grounds not covered under § 1983. However, the Supreme Court noted that “Congress intended fees to be awarded where a pendent constitutional claim is involved, even if the statutory claim on which the plaintiff prevailed is one for which fees cannot be awarded under [§ 1988].” Maher, 448 U.S. at 132 n. 15. Thus, it is not dispositive that the Court eventually premised its second remedial order on local law alone, in order to comply with the Court of Appeals’ desire to avoid reaching the federal issues.
*3 Courts have applied this theory to award fees when only local law claims are reached and federal constitutional or statutory claims remain unresolved, so long as the federal claims are substantial and the federal and local claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1572–73 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1073 (1992) (state constitutional claim resolved); Plott v. Griffiths, 938 F .2d 164, 167–68 (10th Cir.1991) (state statutory claim resolved); Wisconsin Hospital Ass’n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 865 (7th Cir.1987) (claim of violation of consent decree resolved); Seaway Drive–In v. Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 449–51 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986) (state statutory claim resolved); Exeter–West Greenwich Regional School District v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1986) (state statutory claim resolved by certification to state supreme court); New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 718 F.2d 22, 23, 25 n. 3 (2d Cir.1983) (en banc) (state statutory claim resolved); Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983) (state tort claim resolved); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activity Ass’n, 574 F.2d 423, 426–27 (8th Cir.1978) (“nonfederal,” “nonconstitutional” claim resolved at preliminary injunction stage). Therefore, the Court may award plaintiffs with fees if they have substantial federal claims, and if those claims are sufficiently related to the state grounds on which they prevailed.
Defendants ask the Court to revisit its original finding of liability, and to determine that the plaintiffs should not prevail on their federal claims, thereby rendering § 1988 inapplicable. The Court declines to do so. Not only would a fresh merits determination expand this litigation beyond its already convoluted state, but the Court is satisfied that, even if plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims do not survive Suter,3 plaintiffs have substantial constitutional claims on which they would prevail. LaShawn v. Dixon. 762 F.Supp. at 990–994 (Rejecting arguments that constitutional claims lacked merit). Even if there is a defect in the finding of statutory liability, neither Suter nor its congressional override disturbs this court’s holding on the constitutional claims of the custodial portion of the plaintiff class. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs have substantial constitutional claims, on which they would have prevailed, had the Court reached those issues in its opinion.
Defendants argue, first, that plaintiffs’ success on the local law claims somehow preempts recovery on federal constitutional claims, thereby foreclosing the application of § 1988. Defendants rely on the Supreme Court case of Smith v. Robinson. 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which denied fees to a party that recovered under a non-fee generating, federal statute.4 The Smith Court held that parties seeking fees under § 1988 had to establish both that they had substantial federal claims, and that Congress intended § 1983 to extend to those claims. Smith. 468 U.S. at 1007.
*4 Plaintiffs in the present case easily meet the Smith standard. The Smith plaintiffs were barred from recovery of fees because they had achieved their full relief through a federal statute—the Education of the Handicapped Act—in which Congress had specifically decided not to permit fee shifting. In that case, the Court found that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 claims, in favor of claims under the EHA. For this reason, the Court refused to permit the plaintiffs to execute an end run around the Congressional intent embodied in the statute. In the present case, by contrast, plaintiffs have not recovered under any comprehensive federal statute, such as the EHA. Instead, plaintiffs have viable, at least partially parallel claims under the Constitution and under local law. There is no indication that Congress intended to make an exception, or to foreclose recovery on a constitutional basis, as it clearly did with the EHA. Thus, plaintiffs’ recovery of fees is not barred under the Smith doctrine.
Defendants further argue that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are not related to the local grounds on which they obtained relief. This argument must also fail. It is clear from the Court’s remedial order and opinion that the constitutional claims arise from the same set of facts as the local claims, since both involve defendants’ operation of their child welfare system.5 Thus, plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are not only substantial, but are intertwined with the local law claims on which relief was predicated. Thus, recovery of fees is proper under § 1988, as interpreted by Maher v.. Gagne and the Courts of Appeals.
Finally, defendants argue that the constitutional grounds extend only to the plaintiffs who were in custodial care, and that plaintiffs should not recover fees for litigating the claims of non-custodial plaintiffs. The Court is not persuaded by this argument to reduce the award. Because the facts involving the care of the custodial children and the non-custodial children are so intertwined, a proportionate reduction is neither appropriate, nor possible. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 440 (1983) (requiring proportionate reduction when claims are “distinct in all respects” but allowing full fees when claims are “related”).
The Court finds that plaintiffs are a prevailing party, and that they have federal claims that are substantial and related to the local claims upon which the Court fashioned its second remedial order. Therefore, the Court holds that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
III Extent of Award
Plaintiffs’ most recent fee request—their “Revised Request for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (through October 30, 1997)”6—asks the Court to award $2,419,373.17 in fees and expenses. In addition to objecting to the award of fees in general, defendants object to the amount of plaintiffs’ request. Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiffs request payment for, .. hours not reasonably expended, request for payment at an unreasonable hourly rate, and request payment for unreasonable expenses.
*5 The Court will address these issues, and will impose certain caps and reductions on the award. The Court will also ask plaintiffs to recalculate their counsel’s hourly rates; the Court will wait for those figures before entering a final fee award.

A. Attorneys’ Fees The initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, or “lodestar.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U .S. 886, 888 (1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D.C.Cir.1995). This figure can then be modified by a multiplier, if necessary. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. Generally, the applicants bear the burden of establishing the appropriate hours and the reasonableness of the rate. Id.
Therefore, in order to evaluate whether plaintiffs have submitted a reasonable request, the Court will first examine plaintiffs’ hours to determine whether they were reasonably expended. Then, the Court will determine what hourly rate is reasonable.
1. Appropriate Number of Hours In order to justify a fee request, a plaintiff must document hours worked through contemporaneous time records, or risk a reduction in the award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; In Re North, 12 F.3d 252, 257 (D.C.Cir.1994). In the present case, plaintiffs have presented fairly detailed time records. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs have properly documented their request.
However, defendant objects to three aspects of plaintiffs request—time expended in travel between New York and Washington, D.C, redundant time in which more than one attorney attended the same hearing, deposition, or meeting, and time spent preparing to file the complaint. The Court agrees in part with defendants, and will order a reduction in the overall award. Defendants also ask the Court to define what hours are recoverable for litigating this fee issue, which the Court will do.
a. Travel Time Plaintiffs’ counsel is based in New York; therefore, counsel has spent substantial time in transit, to attend meetings, depositions, and hearings in Washington, D.C, where the case and the Court are located. Defendants concede that plaintiffs can recover time for travel within the Washington area—because even local counsel would engage in such travel—but they argue that plaintiffs should not recover for travel between the cities.
Plaintiffs argue that all travel time was productively spent discussing and preparing the case. Courts are divided on how much compensation attorneys are due for travel time. See e.g., Gay, Lesbian, and BiSexual Alliance v. Sessions, 930 F.Supp. 1492 (M.D.Ala.1996) (granting full recovery for travel time by out of town counsel). But see Wilder v. Bernstein, 975 F.Supp. 276, 283–84 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (reducing award for travel time to compensate for its unproductive nature). The Court finds that plaintiffs do not establish that all transit time, which accounts for a substantial portion of the award,7 was spent productively. Therefore, the Court will reduce the recovery for travel time by 25%, to compensate for the loss of productivity involved in frequent travel between New York and Washington, D.C.
b. Hours Spent Preparing Complaint *6 Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for approximately 602 hours that they spent developing the case, prior to filing the complaint. Time spent preparing the complaint is normally recoverable under § 1988, but time spent on optional, prelitigation tasks is not. Webb v. Board of Education. 471 U.S. 234, 241–44 (1985). Defendants concede that plaintiffs should recover some of this time, but they assert that 602 hours is an excessive time to prepare to file a case. The Court agrees with defendants, and will therefore reduce plaintiffs’ recovery for pre-complaint time by 25%.
c. Billing Judgment Time expended is not always synonymous with time reasonably expended, and billing judgment is as important in the setting of fee recovery as it is in the setting of private billing of clients. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc ). A substantial portion of counsel’s time was spent in discussions among attorneys, and plaintiffs frequently sent multiple attorneys to the same event.8 Furthermore, defendants argue that plaintiffs have not documented their counsel’s time sufficiently, and that some reduction is necessary to compensate not only for redundancy in billing, but also for uncertainty in record keeping.
The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs may have requested recovery for some redundancy in effort. The Court also agrees that plaintiffs’ record keeping prevents a thorough consideration of hours worked. The Court will not apply the reduction urged by defendants, but it will compensate for plaintiffs’ billing judgment by reducing the total award by 5%.
d. Fee Litigation Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to recover fees for hours spent litigating the present motion. However, the Court does not wish to reward protracted litigation by providing an extensive award for both the merits and the fee stages of this case. Therefore, the Court will cap plaintiffs recovery for time spent litigating this motion at 15% of the recovery for litigation of the merits. See e .g., Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir.1986) (Imposing similar cap on recovery for attorneys’ fees litigation).
e. Summary The Court will therefore grant plaintiffs recovery for their time spent in litigation, as summarized in their “Revised Request for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (through October 30, 1997),” and as documented their other exhibits to their motion. However, the Court will subtract 25% of the recovery for travel time and 25% of the recovery for pre-litigation time. Furthermore, the Court will cap the recovery for time spent litigating this motion at 15% of the recovery for time spent litigating the merits. Finally, the Court will assess a 5% reduction on the total recovery, to adjust for billing judgment.
2. Reasonable Hourly Rate Having determined the number of hours that plaintiffs’ counsel reasonably expended, the Court must determine a reasonable hourly rate, or lodestar, to apply to that time. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). Plaintiffs have suggested hourly rates, based New York rates and the experience of each attorney.
*7 Defendants present five objections to plaintiffs’ requested rates. First, defendants argue that counsel should be paid D.C. rates. Second, defendants assert that the Laffey index is not properly applied to this case. Third, defendants argue that plaintiffs should not be paid current rates. Fourth, defendants assert that plaintiffs have improperly calculated their counsel’s

experience levels. Finally, defendants object to payment of volunteer lawyers and paralegals.
a. Relevant Geographical Market Normally, § 1988 awards are calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether counsel is private or public-interest. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. However, an extra-forum rate may be appropriate where no sufficient local lawyers are available. Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983) (Out-of-town rates for Voting Rights cases). Most Circuits have held that the issue depends on the reasonableness of hiring an out of town specialist. See, e.g., Public Interest Group v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1186 (3d Cir.1995): Maciera v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir.1983).
In the present case, the relevant community is Washington, D.C, where plaintiffs and defendants are located, and where court proceedings occurred. However, plaintiffs present affidavits that they attempted to find appropriate counsel in the Washington, D.C, area, and that they were unable to do so. They state that other advocacy groups lacked either the time or the resources to take on such a huge case, and that a local law firm may possibly have had the time but would have lacked the expertise necessary to conduct such specialized litigation. Plaintiffs assert that their search identified the Childrens’ Rights Project as the only viable group which had the time, resources, and expertise to take on this complex case.9
The Court is satisfied that plaintiffs properly selected the Childrens’ Rights Project, and that counsel should be paid New York rates, pursuant to Donnell. Furthermore, the Court finds that plaintiffs have properly justified their suggested rates as reasonable within the New York legal community.10
b. Use of Laffey Index Plaintiffs have calculated their rates based on an index, created in the case of Laffey v. Northwest Airlines. 572 F.Supp. 354 (D .D.C.1983), that sets hourly rates, based on years of litigation experience. The index is kept and updated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C. as a guide to D.C. rates; plaintiffs have used it as a guide for setting New York rates as well. Defendants argue that the index is unreliable, and that plaintiffs should be paid according to a civil rights law index, not a complex litigation one.
Defendants’ first argument fails. The index has been relied upon favorably by the Court of Appeals and by-judges on this Court, See, e.g., Save our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C.Cir.1988); Park v. Howard University, 881 F .Supp. 653, 661 (D.D.C.1995) (Gasch, J.); Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Companies, 862 F.Supp. at 509 (D.D.C.1995) (Lamberth, J.). The Court of Appeals has consistently affirmed its reliability, stating that the Laffey index is a “useful starting point,” which plaintiffs may supplement (as they have done in this case). Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109 (D .C.Cir.1995).
*8 The Circuit has also rejected defendants’ second argument, and has stated that the relevant market for § 1988 awards is that of complex litigation. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1112. Furthermore, this litigation has been extremely complex, and the application of a complex litigation index, such as the Laffey, table, is entirely appropriate. Finally, plaintiffs have provided ample evidence that their table of rates is reasonable in light of the rates charged by firms that handle these types of cases. Therefore, the Court will calculate its award from plaintiffs’ index of rates.
c. Current rates Plaintiffs ask the Court to award fees at 1997 hourly rates, rather than the prevailing rates in 1989–91, when counsel performed most of this work. They assert that current rates will compensate for the 6–8 year delay in payment. Defendants argue that plaintiffs will receive a windfall, but the Court does not agree. The application of current rates is fair compensation for the wait that plaintiffs and their counsel have endured.
d. Experience Under plaintiffs’ rate index, different attorneys’ hours are billed at different rates, according to their litigation experience. The primary error in plaintiffs’ calculations is that they compensate according to their attorney’s 1997 experience levels, even though most work was performed in 1989–91, when these attorneys were less experienced. This liberal calculation has substantial effects on the fees paid, and nearly all, if not all, of plaintiffs’ counsel would be billed at lower rates, if their true experience levels are used.11
Plaintiffs argue that they must use 1997 experience levels to compensates for the lapse of time between their work and the payment of fees by defendant. However, the Court’s award already compensates plaintiffs for this delay, by calculating billing at 1997 hourly rates, adjusted for 1997 values, instead of at older rates. The use of 1997 experience levels, in addition to the 1997 prevailing rates, would give plaintiffs a substantial windfall—increasing their recovery by almost 40% for certain lawyers.
The Court agrees with defendants, and calculate the fee award at rates set according to the experience possessed by each attorney at the time he or she performed the work. Plaintiffs will therefore need to revise their fee request, to show hours worked and experience attained by each attorney, by year.
e. Volunteer Attorneys and Clerks Finally, plaintiffs seek to recover fees for work performed by volunteers in this case. These persons include attorney Marilyn Mazur and law clerk/paralegal Tara Sher. Defendants argue that, since they were volunteers, the “prevailing rate” for these persons is $0. However, fees are measured by market value of services rendered, not by the value that was actually charged. Jordan v. United States Department of Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 523–24 (D.C.Cir.1982) (granting fees for student legal services). Based on the Circuit’s decision in Jordan, the Court will permit recovery for these two volunteer workers.
*9 Plaintiffs have already agreed to apply a 25% reduction in Ms. Mazur’s hourly rate, to compensate for some non-litigation experience she has had. Plaintiffs should continue to apply this reduction when they recalculate Ms. Mazur’s rate based on her experience at the time she performed her work, as described, supra .
B. Other Expenses Plaintiffs have also requested payment for expenses beyond the work of attorneys on the case. Specifically, plaintiffs request payment for the work of four paralegals, for the work of a number of “case readers,” and for miscellaneous expenses.

1. Paralegals Plaintiffs request payment for time spent by three paralegals12 on the merits litigation, and for one paralegal13 on the fee litigation. Plaintiffs may recover for expenses that are traditionally part of an attorney’s bill, including for paralegal help. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). Thus, plaintiffs may recover a reasonable fee for these persons, even if they worked as volunteers. Furthermore, plaintiffs have established that $85 per hour is a reasonable billing rate, and that their paralegals spent 584 hours on the merits and 88.5 hours on the fee litigation. Therefore, the Court will award plaintiffs fees for this work, at $85 per hour.14
2. Case readers Plaintiffs also seek compensation for approximately 9775 hours spent by nineteen “paralegal case readers.” These individuals reviewed the records of several hundred children in the plaintiff class and completed a questionnaire, which outlined the history of defendants’ treatment of each child. The resulting data was used by plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Theodore Stein, “and formed the basis for the central evidence in the case.” Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 27.
Defendants argue that this expense is not compensable under § 1988. The Supreme Court has held that § 1988 does not entitle prevailing parties to recover expert witness fees. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86– 87 (1991). Instead, the statute permits recovery only of costs, as described at 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and of expenses that have traditionally been included in the attorney’s fee, such as the services of secretaries and paralegals. Id. Thus, there is no dispute that plaintiffs cannot recover Dr. Stein’s fees or time.
Plaintiffs assert that they used data derived from case reader effort in their own presentation of the case, in addition to using it as expert work product. This may be true, but the Court finds that the case readers’ primary task was to aid Dr. Stein in preparation of his expert testimony; the additional benefit to plaintiffs’ counsel was secondary. As a component of the expert witness fee, the labor of these case readers is therefore unrecoverable under § 1988. WVUH, 499 U.S. at 86–87. For this reason, the Court will not award plaintiffs compensation for the 9775 hours expended by the nineteen case readers.
3. Other expenses *10 Plaintiffs also request $73,583.17 in expenses.15 They seek reimbursement for such items as deposition transcripts, taxi and air transportation for attorneys, meals for attorneys while traveling, long-distance telephone calls, photocopying, and express postage and courier services.
Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for those items set forth in the costs statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and for those items traditionally billed to clients as part of the attorney’s fee. WVUH, 499 U.S. at 86–87, 99; Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989). Defendants read WVUH to suggest that the plaintiffs can only recover those expenses listed in the costs statute, but their reading of the precedents is incorrect. This Circuit has approved reimbursement of expenditures such as those sought by plaintiffs. Laffley, 746 F.2d at 30. Therefore, the Court will approve the award of these expenses.

IV Conclusion
The Court has determined that plaintiffs, as prevailing parties to this litigation, are entitled to attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In addition, the Court has approved plaintiffs’ time records as a base off which to calculate the award. Furthermore, the Court will set plaintiffs’ award based on prevailing 1997 hourly rates, to compensate for the time that plaintiffs have spent waiting for payment of these fees and expenses.
The Court finds, however, that plaintiffs have improperly calculated their counsel’s hourly rates, because they bill each attorney as if he or she performed all work at a 1997 experience level. The Court also finds that there are other grounds for reduction of awards for travel time, prelitigation time, and for time spent litigating this fee issue. Finally, the Court finds that a 5% reduction should apply to the entire award, to account for some duplicative and unproductive efforts.
The Court cannot, at this time, calculate a final figure for its award of fees, because it does not have a breakdown of hours worked by plaintiffs’ attorneys, and because it does not have the proper hourly rates for those attorneys. Plaintiffs’ current fee request gives only a single, “lump sum” figure of hours worked for each attorney, and does not break hours down by year. Furthermore, the current request calculates each attorney’s hourly rate at his or her 1997 level of experience. The Court will require plaintiffs to revise their request, and to submit a more detailed breakdown of each attorney’s billing. This new breakdown should include hours worked by year for each attorney. The revised request should also distinguish time spent each year in transit between New York and Washington from time spent on other tasks.
In addition, the revised request should include each attorney’s hourly rate for each year that he or she performed work. That hourly rate may be set from the index that plaintiffs are currently using, which uses prevailing 1997 rates. However, plaintiffs must calculate the applicable rate for the attorneys according to each attorney’s experience level at the time he or she performed the work, not according to a 1997 experience level.
*11 Once plaintiffs have submitted this revised fee request, the Court will apply reductions as stated in the opinion, will calculate the appropriate fees, and will enter its award of fees and expenses.
An order will accompany this opinion.

ORDER
For the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for interim attorneys’ fees is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs shall submit to the Court a revised fee request, as described in the Memorandum Opinion. The revised request shall include an individual breakdown of hours worked by each attorney in each year, with a further breakdown of hours spent by each attorney in travel and in pre-litigation efforts. The revised request shall include hourly rates calculated at appropriate yearly experience levels.

Footnotes

1

In the present motion, plaintiffs seek recovery only for fees and expenses up to an including the entry of the Consent

Judgment in 1991. It also covers fees and expenses for preparing and litigating this fee request. It does not cover fees or

expenses for any other task performed after 1991.

2

Congress amended the Social Security Act (of which the Adoption Assistance Act is a part) to state that in all pending and

future actions brought to enforce a provision of [the Social Security Act], such a provision is not to be deemed

unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of [the Act] requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a

State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to

enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M., ... but not applied

Footnotes

1

In the present motion, plaintiffs seek recovery only for fees and expenses up to an including the entry of the Consent

Judgment in 1991. It also covers fees and expenses for preparing and litigating this fee request. It does not cover fees or

expenses for any other task performed after 1991.

2

Congress amended the Social Security Act (of which the Adoption Assistance Act is a part) to state that in all pending and

future actions brought to enforce a provision of [the Social Security Act], such a provision is not to be deemed

unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of [the Act] requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a

State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to

enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M., ... but not applied

in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; provided, however, that this section is not intended to

alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(15) of the Act is not enforceable in a private right of action. 42

U.S.C. § 1320a–2 (amended October 20, 1994).

3

Indeed, it is possible that plaintiffs could prevail on their federal statutory claims, after the congressional overturn of Suter

and subsequent case law. Two courts have examined the congressional amendment in light of § 1983 suits and found that

the reach of Suter is limited to § 671(a)(15) only. Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v.Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1281–84

(E.D.Wis.1995); Harris v. James, 883 F.Supp. 1511, 1519 (M.D.Ala.1995). These decisions suggest that even if the Court

were to revisit the federal claims, it would rule in favor of the plaintiffs, except with respect to § 671(a)(15). That provision

covers only a small part of the defendants’ violations. In its original liability opinion, the Court held that [i]n almost every

area of the federal law, the District’s child welfare system is deficient. It fails to investigate reports of abuse and neglect in a

timely manner; it fails to provide services to children and families; it fails to make appropriate foster care placements; it

fails to develop case plans; and it fails to assure a permanent home for the children in its care, among other things. LaShawn

A. ex rel. Moore v. Barry, 762 F.Supp. 959, 989 (D.D.C.1991). This conclusion implicates other provisions of the Adoption

Assistance Act. 762 F.Supp. at 962–64, 989–90.

4

Defendants presented this argument for the first time only one week before the scheduled hearing on this motion. It is

unclear why defendants did not make this major argument, which is based on a case that was issued nearly fourteen years

ago, at an earlier stage of this four year fee litigation.

5

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ constitutional claims could not support all of the relief ultimately granted. However,

the extent of relief was decided in a consent agreement between the parties; therefore, plaintiffs should not be punished,

merely because defendants agreed to give them more relief than the Constitution demanded.

6

This request is found at Exhibit G to Plaintiffs’ Fifth Supplemental Memorandum in support of their motion.

7

For example, defendants calculate that plaintiffs’ lead attorney spent 20.5 percent of his billed time in travel.

8

Again, defendants calculate that plaintiffs’ lead attorney spent 11 percent of his time in conference with other attorneys, and

multiple attorneys would attend even the most routine status calls.

9

Among other considerations, plaintiffs had to find counsel that possessed the resources to “front” substantial funds and

hours without the prospect of prompt compensation. Indeed, few other firms or organizations would devote such substantial

human and economic resources to a case, and wait nearly nine years for payment of their fees.

10

Plaintiffs do not request New York rates for their three D.C. lawyers-Elizabeth Symonds, Arthur Spitzer, and Alvin Bronstein.

These attorneys should be billed at D.C. rates, which plaintiffs concede.

11

For example, plaintiffs request that one attorney, Christopher Dunn, be billed at his 1997 experience level of 12 years.

However, when he performed work in 1988–1991, he had only 2–6 years of experience. Calculating his billing at this lower

experience level reduces his hourly rate from $310 per hour to less than $200 per hour. Of course, Mr. Dunn is entitled to

bill at a higher rate for his work after 1990, when he had more experience.

12

Lise Hamlin, Tara Sher, and Katherine Cheung.

13

Sarah Whitsett

14

The Court will, however, apply its 10% billing judgment reduction to paralegal time as well as to attorney time.

15

This amount is comprised of $71,104.02 in expenses for the merits litigation and $2,479.15 in expenses for the fee

litigation. Defendants have already paid over $22,000 in expenses; the current figure incorporates that payment.

 
 762 F.Supp. 959 United States District Court,
District of Columbia.
LaSHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Sharon Pratt DIXON, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 89–1754. | April 18, 1991.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*960 Christopher Dunn, Marcia Lowry, Children’s Rights Project, ACLU, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Eugene Adams, D.C. Office of Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THOMAS F. HOGAN, District Judge.
This is a class action brought on behalf of children who are in foster care under the supervision of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS)1 and children who, although not yet in the care of the DHS, are known to the department because of reported abuse or neglect.2 It is a case about thousands of children who, due to family financial problems, psychological problems, and substance abuse problems, among other things, rely on the District to provide them with food, shelter, and day-to-day care. It is about beleaguered city employees trying their best to provide these necessities while plagued with excessive caseloads, staff shortages, and budgetary constraints. It is about the failures of an ineptly managed child welfare system, the indifference of the administration of the former mayor of the District of Columbia, Marion Barry, and the resultant tragedies for District children relegated to entire childhoods spent in foster care drift. Unfortunately, it is about a lost generation of children whose tragic plight is being repeated every day.
The complaint in this case alleges both statutory and constitutional violations in the administration of the District’s foster care system. These allegations include the failure of the DHS to initiate timely investigations into reports of abuse or neglect, the failure to provide services to families to prevent the placement of children in foster care, the failure to place those who may not safely remain at home in appropriate foster homes and institutions, the failure to develop case plans for children in foster care, and the failure to move children into a situation of permanency, whether by returning them to their homes or freeing them for adoption.
In over two weeks of trial, this Court heard testimony about the system’s deficiencies from a vast array of witnesses, including experts in child welfare and child psychiatry, social workers and managers at the DHS, foster and adoptive parents, and the parent of two children who spent several years in the District’s custody. The Court has before it over a thousand District admissions confirming many of the plaintiff class’ allegations. The inescapable conclusion is that the foster care system *961 operated by the DHS does not comply with federal law, District law, or, for those plaintiffs in the District’s foster care, the United States Constitution. Defense counsel has argued that public institutions cannot solve the problems brought about by poverty, neglect, and abuse until society addresses their causes. Plaintiffs have not asked for a “perfect world,” however, they merely request compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements and they ask not to be harmed while in the District’s custody. Mindful of the uncomfortable position in which the Court is placed by entertaining such a challenge to local government action, it is nevertheless compelled by the evidence to enter a judgment of liability against the defendant officials.3 The Court shall defer ordering specific injunctive relief until after further briefing and argument by the parties.
I.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the District’s practices in administering the city’s foster care system violate numerous provisions of federal and District statutes. The federal statutes allegedly violated are the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96–272, 94 Stat. 516 (June 17, 1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–627 and §§ 670–679) (Adoption Assistance Act) and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub.L. No. 93–247, 88 Stat. 4 (January 31, 1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5106) (Abuse Prevention Act). The District statutes allegedly violated are the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Law 2–22 (Sept. 23, 1977) (codified as amended at D.C.Code Ann. §§ 2–1351 to –1357, §§ 6–2101 to –2107, §§ 6–2121 to –2127, and §§ 16–2351 to –2365) (Abuse and Neglect Act) and the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986, D.C.Law 6–139 (Aug. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at D.C.Code Ann. §§ 3–801 to –808) (Licensure Act). Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges violations of the Child and Family Services Division (CFSD) Manual of Operations (September 1985) and reasonable professional child welfare standards.
A. Abuse and Neglect The federal Abuse Prevention Act and the District’s Abuse and Neglect Act both deal with the investigation of reports of abuse and neglect and the provision of services to families for whom reports are substantiated. The District law establishes a 24–hour intake unit within the CFSD, the function of which is to receive reports of abuse and neglect and respond with investigations and emergency services. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2122(e). The federal law requires “prompt” investigations, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2), whereas the District law requires investigations “within 24 hours of the receipt of the report.” D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2102(b). The purpose of the investigations, according to District law, is to determine the nature and extent of the abuse or neglect, the person responsible for the abuse or neglect, the conditions in the home, and whether the health or safety of the children in the home are in jeopardy. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2104. Both federal and District law require the DHS to take whatever steps are necessary to protect the health and welfare of a child for whom a report has been made. These steps may include providing emergency services so that the child may remain in the home, or removing the child and placing him or her in temporary care if the provision of services could not adequately protect the child. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (2) & (b)(3); D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2105 & § 6–2124. Federal law requires “reasonable efforts” to prevent the removal of a child from the home or to return the child to the home if removal is necessary. Adoption Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15). District law similarly requires the CFSD to develop a plan for *962 providing services to prevent the child’s removal from the home or facilitate the child’s return to the home if removal is unavoidable. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2107. Finally, District law requires that if the child is removed from the home as a result of the investigation, within 90 days of removal the DHS shall either return the child to the home or request the filing of a neglect petition in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2123.
B. Continuing Services

The federal Adoption Assistance Act and the District’s Abuse and Neglect Act include provisions on placing children in foster care, preparing case plans, providing continuing services to children and their natural and foster parents, periodically reviewing the necessity and appropriateness of placements, recruiting adoptive families, and maintaining a system that comports with professional standards.
1. Placements There are five ways a child may come into the custody of the DHS. The first is through voluntary placement, by which the child’s parent or guardian voluntarily requests a temporary placement not to exceed 90 days. Before a child is taken into placement, a variety of in-home services directed at maintaining the child in the home must be offered or considered. CFSD Manual of Operations at § 601.1. Other methods of bringing a child into the custody of the DHS are through voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, see id. at § 601.2, temporary shelter care while a court action is pending, see id. at § 601.3, protective custody when a child has been left alone or with inadequate supervision, see id. at § 601.4, and police hold when a law enforcement officer has reason to believe the child is in immediate danger and removal is necessary. See id. § 601.5.
With respect to voluntary placements, also referred to as “emergency care” by the DHS officials, District law requires the CFSD to return the child to the home or request the filing of a neglect petition in the Family Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court within 90 days of placement. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2123(a)(2). Federal law requires return to the home within 180 days unless there has been a judicial determination that placement is in the best interests of the child. 42 U.S.C. § 672(e).
Federal law requires that children for whom placement is necessary be placed in “the least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child.” 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A). See also CFSD Manual of Operations at § 602.5(a). Additionally, federal law requires that all foster homes and institutions receiving federal funds meet standards “reasonably in accord with recommended standards of national organizations concerned with standards for such institutions or homes, including standards related to admission policies, safety, sanitation, and protection of civil rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10).
2. Case Plans Federal regulations require social workers to prepare written case plans within 60 days of the assumption of responsibility for a child. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(2). Similarly, District law provides that case plans be prepared “as soon as possible” for children for whom there has been a substantiated report of abuse or neglect. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2107(b). This requirement is expanded upon in the CFSD Manual of Operations, which mandates a case plan within 45 days of the child’s entry into care or within 30 days if the child has been voluntarily placed in care. CFSD Manual of Operations at § 401.2(a). To be in compliance with federal law, a case plan must contain a description of the home or institution in which the child is to be placed and a discussion of the appropriateness of such a placement. Additionally, the plan must set forth the agency’s intentions for carrying out the voluntary placement agreement or judicial determination that resulted in the *963 child’s placement in foster care.4 The plan must also include a program for providing services to the child and his or her natural and foster parents, with the goal of either returning the child to the home or permanently placing the child. The plan must further detail the services necessary to address the child’s needs while in foster care and must discuss the appropriateness of the services that have been provided. Finally, the plan must include the health and educational records of the child, to the extent those records are available and accessible. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1).
The District’s Abuse and Neglect Act requires similar information to be included in case plans and requires specific arrangements for the management of each case for which protective services are required. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2107(b). The CFSD Manual of Operations is more specific, requiring case plans to include the reasons for placement, the goal for the child and the date it is to be achieved, the reasons for the choice of the goal, and the changes necessary to achieve the goal. CFSD Manual of Operations at § 401.2(h). Case plans must also include a visitation schedule specifying who will visit, how frequently visits will take place, where the visits will occur, and whether any conditions of supervision will apply. Id.5
3. Providing Services The Adoption Assistance Act requires agencies to provide “proper care” to children in their custody and to provide services intended to facilitate the return of the child to the home or to place the child in a permanent family. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) and § 627(a)(2)(C). The District’s Abuse and Neglect Act contains similar requirements. See D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2107(b), § 6– 2123(a)(3), and § 6–2124. The services that the CFSD is authorized to provide include emergency financial aid, temporary third-party placement with neighbors or relatives, emergency caretaker services, homemaker services, day care, counseling, medical services, and other appropriate services available in the community. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2124.
4. Periodic Reviews Both federal and District law require periodic judicial or administrative reviews of the status of children in foster care. Federal law requires reviews at least every six months by either a court or administrative panel. The purpose of the reviews is to “determine the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to project a likely date by which the child may be returned to the home or placed for adoption or legal guardianship.” 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B).6 District law similarly provides that, once a child has been adjudicated as neglected, the Family Division of the Superior Court shall hold a review hearing every six months unless the child is over the age of six and has been in custody for longer than two years. D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2323(a).
5. Adoption Federal law contemplates adoption for those children who cannot be returned *964 home after services have been provided. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(B) & § 675(5)(B). District law is more specific, requiring the CFSD to “prepare a permanent plan for the child” when rehabilitative services fail to result in reuniting the child with his family within a reasonable time. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2123(b)(2). District law also provides that when parental rights are terminated and a child is freed for adoption, the CFSD shall seek prompt adoptive placement. If no placement is made within three months, the CFSD shall list the child on all appropriate adoption exchanges. If no placement is made within six months, the CFSD shall report to the Court on its efforts to secure an adoptive placement. D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2360(b).
The CFSD’s policy manual contains further requirements for recruiting adoptive families. The manual provides that, even when a child is not legally freed for adoption, his or her case must be referred to the Adoption and Placement Resources Branch of the CFSD within three days of the selection of adoption as a goal for the child. CFSD Manual of Operations at § 703.3.
6. System Infrastructure With respect to the general infrastructure of the child welfare system in the District, both federal and local law have certain requirements: Federal law requires the District to maintain an information system from which the status, location, and goals for the placement of all foster care children may be readily determined. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A). District law requires the maintenance of a Child Protection Register to index cases of abused and neglected children and assist in the treatment of those children. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2111. District law also requires the CFSD to have “sufficient staff, supervisory personnel, and resources to accomplish the purposes of [the Abuse and Neglect Act], including the capacity to provide emergency and continuing service resources to abused and neglected children and their families.” Id. at § 6–2122(c). Moreover, District law requires the staff qualifications, caseload levels, and supervision requirements of the CFSD to be guided by the standards set out by the Child Welfare League of America or other child welfare organizations. Id. at § 6–2122

(d).
C. Licensure of Foster Homes and Institutions The District’s Licensure Act requires every facility providing foster care in the District to be licensed and inspected annually. D.C.Code Ann. § 3–802 and § 3–805(a)(1). Facilities caring for District children outside the District must be inspected at least once a year. Id. at § 3–805(a)(2).
II.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND THE COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court was presented with various types of evidence during the lengthy trial of this case. First, the Court had before it over a thousand stipulated facts. Second, the Court was presented with several reports and case studies prepared by experts in the areas of child welfare policy and practice, social service methodology and research, the types and uses of automated information in public services programs, and the financing, administration, and delivery of human services. Third, the Court heard testimony from child psychiatrists, foster, adoptive, and natural parents, and employees of the DHS ranging from front-line social workers to upper-level management. After explaining more fully the nature of the expert evidence presented, the Court will make its findings of fact.
A. The Nature of the Expert Evidence
1. Walker Case Review The complaint in this case names seven children as plaintiffs on behalf of the class. Their stories, according to plaintiffs, are representative of the stories of countless other children who have spent time in the District’s foster care system. Introduced as evidence in this case is a report prepared by Clarice Dribble Walker, an expert in the field of child welfare policies and practices and an associate professor of social work *965 at Howard University in Washington, D.C.7 For purposes of this litigation, Professor Walker prepared a “Case Review” of the case records of each of the named plaintiffs and the extent to which those records are in compliance with federal and District law and national professional standards (the Walker Report). Professor Walker based the report on her examination of the case records maintained by the DHS, as well as on deposition transcripts, reports by other experts in the field, and DHS documents, including the CFSD Manual of Operations. Professor Walker reviewed the cases in the context of her knowledge of the federal Adoption Assistance Act and Abuse Prevention Act and the District’s Abuse and Neglect Act. The Walker Report details the experiences of each of the named plaintiffs in the District’s foster care system, the social work and legal issues related to each, and the systemic problems identified in providing services to each of the children. The report concludes that the DHS has not complied with “the legal and social work mandate for permanency planning for children in the child welfare system,” Walker Report at 5, because it has failed to make appropriate placements, set appropriate goals for children in placement, provide services toward the achievement of those goals, and move children through the system quickly so that they may obtain permanency by either returning home or being adopted.
2. Stein Case Reading Serving as the basis for many of plaintiffs’ allegations about the widespread and systemic deficiencies in the District’s foster care system is a Case Reading prepared by Theodore J. Stein, Ph.D., an expert in the fields of child welfare policy and practices and social science methodology and research (the Stein Report). Dr. Stein is a professor of social welfare at the State University of New York at Albany, where he has taught courses including “Child Welfare: Policy and Practice,” “Research and Quantitative Methods,” and “Law and Social Work.” He has conducted six “case readings” since the passage of the federal Adoption Assistance Act and is currently working on another.8
Dr. Stein’s case reading consisted of a review of a random sample of 675 case records for children in custody or formerly in the custody of the DHS and children who had been the subject of an investigation into a report of abuse or neglect.9 This random sampling represents approximately 25 percent of the cases of children in foster care in the District, a figure that Dr. Stein testified is compatible with accepted scientific methodology.10 The cases for review were selected using a table of random numbers.
*966 The case review was intended to assess the District’s compliance with the requirements of the federal and local statutes, the CFSD Manual of Operations, and relevant professional standards such as those of the Child Welfare League of America. To accomplish this end, Dr. Stein developed a case reading instrument broken down into 11 sections: four dealing with case plans; two with investigations of abuse and neglect; two with case reviews; one for demographic information; one for medical, psychological/psychiatric, and educational history; and one covering the monitoring of foster care and institutional facilities by the CFSD. The case reading instrument consisted of 99 pages and 178 multi-part questions. Two full-time supervisors and 18 full-time case readers assisted Dr. Stein with the case review. The case readers spent three days in training on how to use the case reading instrument and the case reading guidelines. Dr. Stein conducted two reliability tests throughout the course of the case reading, the first yielding 94 percent reliability and the second yielding 95 percent reliability. Data from the case reading instruments was entered into computers by six staff members hired for the project. Data entry was also tested for reliability, which was determined to be 99 percent.
Once the data from the case reading instruments was entered, Dr. Stein analyzed the data. His findings are broken down into eight areas making up Volume I of the case reading. These areas are: demographic information about the sample; information regarding abuse and neglect investigations; information describing case planning and service provision for children in foster care with plans of either return home, adoption, independent living, or continued foster care; information regarding medical, dental, psychiatric/psychological services, and educational progress; information on administrative and judicial reviews; and information on the monitoring of foster homes and institutions. Volume II of the case reading includes detailed case examples illustrating the findings reported in Volume I. Based on these findings and examples, Dr. Stein concluded in his report and in testimony before this Court that, at the time of the case reading in early 1990, the District’s foster care system was operating in much the same way as other jurisdictions had operated prior to the passage of the federal Adoption Assistance Act in 1980: as a holding system for children. Very few District children receive services to prevent their placement in foster care. Thirty-seven percent of children in the District’s foster care system have been in care for four or more years and 62 percent do not have written case plans. Stein Report at 195. As a wrap-up to Dr. Stein’s direct testimony at trial, he emphasized his conclusions by stating that he had not seen a system in the last eight to ten years that had made so little progress since the passage of the federal Adoption Assistance Act.
3. Center for the Study of Social Policy Report In addition to the Walker and Stein Reports, plaintiffs introduced into evidence a report prepared by the Center for the Study of Social Policy (the Center), entitled Children and Family Services in the District of Columbia (September 1990) (Center Report), and consisting of an analysis of the District’s child welfare system and recommendations for its improvement.11 The Center is a nonprofit organization, based in Washington, D.C., that conducts policy research and analysis and provides technical assistance to state and local governments in various areas of human services, including child welfare. In the area of child welfare, the Center has directed comprehensive child welfare reform initiatives in three states and has provided direct technical assistance to over 20 states with respect to the financing, administration, and design of children’s policies and *967 programs. The Center staff consists of numerous professionals in the human services field and many specialists in child welfare policy. Testifying as experts during the trial of this case were three Center staff members who contributed to the report: Frank Farrow, Director of Children’s Services Policy at the Center and former Executive Director of the Social

Services Administration of the Maryland Department of Human Resources; Carol Wilson Williams, Ph.D., a senior research analyst at the Center and former professor of social work at the University of North Carolina and the University of California at Los Angeles; and Judith Meltzer, a senior research associate at the Center who specializes in federal entitlements funding under the Adoption Assistance Act and has offered technical assistance to a number of states regarding maximizing their federal reimbursements under the Act.12
The Center’s report was prepared with two goals: to independently analyze the alleged deficiencies in the District’s child welfare system and to propose concrete, feasible remedies for the future. The report analyzes the system in relation to the requirements of federal and District law, DHS and CFSD policies, and generally accepted professional child welfare practice. To conduct its analysis, the Center staff extensively reviewed DHS documents including all pertinent legal and policy documents produced by defendants. Center staff interviewed DHS employees, including case workers and supervisors within the CFSD, administrators in the Family Services Administration, and the Director of Income Maintenance at the DHS. Additionally, Center staff observed several depositions, including those of all four branch chiefs within the CFSD. The Center Report concludes that the District has consistently failed to meet the requirements of federal and District law and its own policy. These failures, according to the report, have resulted in a system that does not adequately protect at-risk children and families. See Center Report at i. For each area of the District’s alleged failures, the report offers several specific recommendations for improvement, both short-term and long-term. In addition, the report sets forth a proposed “Sequenced Implementation Plan,” including target dates, for putting the Center’s recommendations into action. See Center Report at 75–80.
4. Psychiatrists’ Testimony Testifying at trial were four child psychiatrists who had reviewed the case records of and conducted personal interviews with four of the named plaintiffs. Each gave their expert opinion on the psychological and emotional harm that the named plaintiffs have suffered as a result of the failures of the defendants to provide for their needs. In addition, Dr. Harold Eist gave his opinion about the psychological and emotional harm to all of the children in the plaintiff class, resulting from the systemwide deficiencies in the delivery of services to foster children and children who have been the subjects of reported abuse or neglect.
B. Findings of Fact Based on all of the evidence presented, including the stipulations entered into by defendants, the Court issues the following findings of fact. To assist the reader in understanding the significance of these facts, the Court will first present some general findings and will then present the bulk of the remaining findings in categories that relate to the statutory framework detailed in Part I, supra. The Court will conclude with those findings involving harm to the plaintiff class.
1. General Findings As the Court has previously explained, the DHS is the District’s umbrella social services agency. To illustrate the hierarchy *968 of the agency as it relates to this case:
—————
The CFSD, which has primary responsibility for the implementation and administration of the child welfare system, is comprised of five branches:
The Intake and Crisis Services Branch (ICSB) is responsible for receiving and investigating reports of neglect filed with the CFSD. The branch maintains a 24–hour hotline specifically for this purpose. The branch also makes initial assessments of need and provides emergency and crisis intervention services. Two Intensive Services Branches (ISBs) are responsible for those cases for which an initial investigation indicates that the placement of a child is probable or that family breakdown is imminent or very likely without the provision of intensive services to the family. The branches were planned so that each social worker would handle a maximum of 20 cases and would work intensively with the assigned families in a short period of time. The Continuing Services Branch (CSB) is responsible for those cases for which the initial investigation indicates problems resulting from chronic conditions that require the continuing provision of services but are not likely to lead to total family breakdown. The branch also provides continuing services to children in foster care and their families. The Adoption and Placement Resources Branch (APRB) is responsible for recruiting foster and adoptive families, conducting home studies, and training foster and adoptive parents. Finally, the Monitoring Unit, which is not a “branch” but a separate unit reporting directly to the division chief, is responsible for monitoring all foster homes and group homes in which children in the custody of the CFSD are placed and which are located within a 50–mile radius of the District of Columbia. The unit monitors these facilities to ensure compliance with all federal and local statutes and regulations. See CFSD Policy Manual at Chapter 100.
According to stipulations entered into by the parties, as of September 30, 1988, 2,166 children were in foster care in the District of Columbia. As of June 1989, the average stay for children in the District’s foster care system was 4.8 years. This compares to a national average of just over two years. See Center Report at ii. According to the Stein Report, as of December 1989, 27 percent of the children in the District’s custody had been in that status for more than five years and 60 percent had been in custody for more than two years. Approximately 95 percent of the children in the District’s foster care are black.
2. Abuse and Neglect Investigations and Preventive Services
a. Timeliness of Investigations
Both federal and District law require prompt investigations into reports of abuse or neglect. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2); D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2102(b). District law and CFSD policy specify 24 hours for initiating *969 investigations and two weeks for completing investigations. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2102(b) and CFSD Manual of Operations at § 301.15. Despite these stringent requirements, the stipulations entered into by the parties indicate that for several months during 1988, 1989, and 1990, the department consistently failed to initiate timely investigations into reports of neglect13 and consistently failed to complete investigations within two weeks. In August 1988, for example, the ICSB failed to initiate investigations into five reports of neglect it received that month, involving seven children. As the backlog began to worsen, the then-acting-chief of the CFSD, Evelyn Andrews, notified the administrator of the FSA in her November 1988 monthly report that:
Staff shortages in the critical area of protecting children has [sic] required supervisors to take uncovered caseloads, staff to cover for co-workers who are in the field or on leave (there has been a significant increase in staff absenteeism), staff to attempt to fulfill the demands made through court orders, and make every effort to comply with mandated timeframes. It is virtually impossible to protect children in such an environment and under the current conditions. Children are at risk. Stipulation 137. One month later, in December 1988, the branch failed to initiate investigations into 30 reports it received that month, involving 84 children. At that time, the branch also had a backlog of 584 reports, involving 828 children, for which investigations had not been completed. Despite the dire situation within the CFSD in December 1988, the backlogs continued to worsen throughout 1989 and 1990. In June 1989, the ICSB failed to initiate investigations into 50 reports it received that month, involving 75 children. It also ended the month with a backlog of 716 reports, involving 1,285 children, for which it had not completed investigations. A study conducted in fiscal year 1989 by the chief of the ICSB revealed that the average length of time between the receipt of a

report of neglect and the branch’s initiation of an investigation was ten days.
Although the ICSB chief’s report revealed serious and continuing failures to comply with District and federal law, the backlogs continued to grow. In January 1990, the ICSB failed to initiate investigations into 91 reports received during the month, involving 171 children. Additionally, it had a backlog of 1,112 reports, involving 1,853 children, for which investigations had not been completed. At the end of January 1990, the ICSB had only 12 social workers assigned to it to conduct investigations. Defendants have stipulated that as of February 1, 1990, staffing shortages within the CFSD prevented workers from initiating investigations within the statutory time period.
The number of backlogged investigations dipped slightly in early 1990, so that by April 1990, a new study conducted by the chief of the ICSB revealed that the average length of time between the receipt of a report and the initiation of an investigation had dropped to four days. Nevertheless, for nearly 50 percent of the reports received during April 1990, the ICSB failed to initiate an investigation within 24 hours. Moreover, the branch ended each month between July 1989 and May 1990 with an average backlog of approximately 1,200 reports for which it had not completed investigations. The backlogs were reported by the then-chief of the ICSB, Carolyn Smith, to the chief of the CFSD, Evelyn Andrews, in June 1990. Ms. Smith also reported that the branch lacked a sufficient number of automobiles to investigate neglect reports within 24 hours. Ms. Andrews reported the situation to the then-administrator of the FSA, Jean Hunter,14 in her June monthly report.
During the summer of 1990, the ICSB borrowed workers from other branches and *970 tried to alleviate the backlog by working significant overtime hours. Nevertheless, by the end of August 1990, the ICSB had failed to initiate investigations into 41 reports it received that month, involving 93 children. It had also failed to complete investigations for 445 reports, involving 750 children. As of October 1990, it was taking the ICSB up to five days to initiate investigations into reports of neglect. According to the testimony of Carolyn Smith, as of December 1990, for the three units within the ICSB on the day shift, there were four vacancies out of a possible full staffing level of 15 social workers. On the evening shift, there were four vacancies out of five social worker positions. The midnight shift, primarily responsible for receiving reports and staffed in part with paraprofessionals, was fully staffed.
Based on the foregoing facts, almost all of which have been stipulated, this Court finds that the CFSD has, since at least the beginning of 1988, continuously failed to initiate investigations into reports of neglect or abuse within 24 hours and complete investigations within two weeks. These failures have been largely due to staff shortages and the lack of access to resources, such as automobiles, necessary to conduct investigations. The Court also finds, based on the testimony of Dr. Williams, an expert in the field of child welfare policy, as well as Ms. Smith, the former chief of the ICSB, that the failure to initiate timely investigations can be partially attributed to the inability to screen out inappropriate reports. Although many jurisdictions use screening instruments to lessen the number of reports requiring investigations, District law currently requires the investigation of all reports of neglect or abuse.
b. Provision of Preventive Services
Both federal and District law require the provision of services to enable a child for whom a report has been made to remain in the home or, if removal is necessary, to enable the child to return home as quickly as possible. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) & (b)(3); D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2105 & § 6–2124. The CFSD is authorized to provide services including emergency financial aid, shelter, emergency caretaker services, homemaker services, day care, counseling, medical services, and other appropriate services. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2124. Based on the testimony of Dr. Stein and Professor Walker, the Court finds that the CFSD has consistently failed to provide the services required to enable children to remain with their families or reunite with them if temporary placement is required.
According to Professor Walker’s testimony and report, none of the case records of the named plaintiffs indicates that any services were provided to prevent placement. Similarly, according to the case reading conducted by Dr. Stein, none of the case records studied contained a judicial determination that “reasonable efforts” had been made to prevent placement, in accordance with federal law. Although defense counsel elicited through cross examination that the absence of a record of services in the children’s case records does not necessarily mean that no services were provided, the Court finds little or no reason to believe that services were indeed provided. Testimony of social workers and of the former chief of the ICSB revealed that services frequently are not provided because they are not available. Defendants have admitted that although a number of parents have substance abuse and mental health problems, the CFSD has no drug treatment services or counseling services that it can provide directly to families in need. Similarly, although a substantial number of parents have housing and unemployment problems, the CFSD does not have the capability to directly provide housing or job services. Because the CFSD is unable to provide many direct services and does not have any priority access agreements with other agencies or organizations, defendants have candidly admitted that the CFSD has insufficient service resources to meet the “reasonable efforts” requirement of federal law. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that defendants have consistently failed to provide services or otherwise use “reasonable efforts” to prevent placement. The result has been an increased risk of *971 arbitrary or inappropriate placements as well as an increased cost to the District.
3. Continuing Services
a. Placement
Once a child has come into foster care, either through voluntary placement or emergency placement resulting from a substantiated abuse or neglect investigation, both federal and District law place limits on the time a child may remain in care without a judicial determination that placement is in the child’s best interests. Federal law mandates that a child return home within 180 days unless such a determination has been made, 42 U.S.C. § 672(e); District law mandates return home within 90 days unless the CFSD has requested the filing of a neglect petition in Superior Court. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2123(a)(2).
By defendants’ own admissions, since at least 1987, children have consistently remained in voluntary care for more than 90 days without the filing of a neglect petition. Between October 1, 1987 and September 30, 1988, nearly 75 percent of the children in voluntary placement had been in that status for longer than 90 days.15 As of April 1988, there were children in voluntary care who had been in that status for as long as two years without any neglect petition having been filed. One of the named plaintiffs, LaShawn A., was in voluntary care for two-and-a-half years. Several of the other named plaintiffs were also in voluntary care well beyond the 90–day time limit imposed by District law. As of April 1988, defendants have admitted that there was no accurate listing of the number of children in voluntary care and that the DHS lacked a system for tracking voluntary care cases and for monitoring services to the families of children in voluntary care. These facts were presented to the administrator of the FSA in a memo submitted by Evelyn Andrews in July 1988. Ms. Andrews continued to submit similar memos to the administrator of the FSA throughout 1989 and 1990 as the problem continued to persist.
Based on defendants’ admissions and the uncontroverted testimony of the experts in the case, the Court finds that the CFSD has consistently failed to comply with the statutory time limits regarding voluntary and emergency care. The result has been a state of limbo for these children who, while in “emergency care,” do not have any case plans prepared on their behalf. The misuse of voluntary and emergency care in the District is one of the reasons why foster care drift has occurred for so many children in the District foster care system.
The evidence presented in this case has revealed that not only are children remaining in voluntary or emergency care beyond the statutory time limits, they are also spending much of their foster care experience in inappropriate placements. Federal law and CFSD policy require the placement of children in the least restrictive setting and in close proximity to their families. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A); CFSD Manual of Operations at § 602.5(a). According to Professor Walker’s testimony and report, all of the named plaintiffs were placed inappropriately: LaShawn A., who came into the CFSD’s care when she was two years old and was a “special needs” child,16 was placed in the home of an elderly foster mother who had no intention of adopting her. Demerick B. came into care at 11 months of age and was placed in a congregate facility for three years rather than in a family foster home where he could have developed a continuous and affectionate relationship with a single adult. Gary C. and Leo C. came into emergency care when their mother was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. They were

placed in a congregate facility where they remained *972 for nearly two years without a consistent, nurturing care giver. Robert D. came into care when he was a year-and-a-half old and was abandoned by his mother. He has been in six different family foster homes and one group home, experiencing no continuity of care and severe foster care drift. Tyrone E. was seven years old when he was removed from his home due to reports of abuse. Although he is a special needs child with severe emotional problems, he was inappropriately placed in multiple foster homes in which the foster parents had received no special training. He was also placed in over-restrictive out-of-state facilities that were hundreds of miles from his family. Kevin E. was placed in foster care when he was 20 days old and has spent all but 43 days of his life in foster care. He is a special needs child who has suffered additional trauma from the prolonged placement in congregate care as an infant and the experiences of at least three abrupt separations from foster families who had indicated plans to adopt him. He was inappropriately returned to his mother, who was an unfit parent, on several occasions. These inappropriate placements, along with others, have been partially the result of social worker vacancies that preclude sufficient training sessions and home studies to ensure appropriate placements.
Defendants have admitted that the demand for foster homes has outpaced the supply and that since at least January 1989, the CFSD has frequently been unable to place all of the children for whom it has received requests for placement. Since at least 1988, there has been an increase in the number of children entering foster care with special needs. Although these children cannot adequately be cared for in traditional foster homes, the DHS does not directly operate any therapeutic foster homes.17 The only such homes available to the CFSD are those operated by the Consortium on Child Welfare. As of November 1990, the department was making no efforts to develop therapeutic foster homes.
Similarly, although the CFSD needs foster homes designed to provide short-term or emergency care for children, it has no foster homes designated for this purpose. It also has an insufficient number of foster homes in which to place babies who have tested HIV-positive. Perhaps as egregious a fact as any is the defendants’ own admission that the CFSD placement office has no automated information system to enable it to identify vacancies in foster homes, group homes, and institutions. The placement coordinator must telephone individual foster homes to determine if space is available. When the placement coordinator is unable to identify a placement vacancy, the task falls on the child’s social worker and supervisor. The testimony of a frontline social worker within the CFSD, Chainie Scott, revealed that children often end up spending entire days in social workers’ offices while the workers attempt to locate placements. In light of all of the foregoing facts, most of which have been stipulated, the Court finds that defendants have consistently failed to place children in the least restrictive placements consistent with their needs.
b. Case Planning
Federal and District law, as well as the CFSD’s own policy, require the timely preparation of case plans for all children in foster care. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d); D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2107(b); CFSD Manual of Operations at § 401.2. According to the uncontroverted testimony provided by plaintiffs’ experts at trial, reasonable professional standards require case plans to articulate specific goals with realistic strategies and timelines for accomplishing them. Case plans are necessary to ensure that children receive proper care, are placed in appropriate settings, and remain in foster care no longer than necessary. To assure these things, a good permanent placement system for children should ensure that children who cannot remain with or be returned to their biological parents be freed for adoption and placed in adoptive homes. When adoption *973 is the goal, the responsible agency should aggressively recruit potential adoptive families and should implement all relevant procedures to allow children to become legally available for adoption in a timely manner. Long-term foster care should be used only rarely, and only when appropriate.
CFSD policy provides for five possible case plan goals: return home, placement with a relative or other person, adoption, independence, or continued foster care. Independence is only appropriate as a goal if the child is over the age of 16 and all other permanent options have been ruled out. Continued foster care is not to be the goal unless the child is at least 13 years old and all other permanency options have been ruled out because of the child’s rejection of adoption due to an attachment to the foster parents or to the natural parents. CFSD Manual of Operations at § 401.4. Goals are to be set for one-year timelines and should not exceed 18 months, except for the goals of independence and long-term foster care.
Despite these policy guidelines, the evidence presented in this case establishes that children are often given totally inappropriate goals. According to the Stein Report, approximately 8 percent of the children in the District’s foster care have a planning goal of independent living. Of those with such a plan as of December 1989, 35 percent had been assigned that goal before they were four years old and 49 percent had been assigned that goal before they were 16 years old. Approximately 10 percent of the children in the District’s foster care have a planning goal of continued foster care. Of those with such a plan as of December 1989, 29 percent had been assigned that goal before they were one year old, 48 percent had been assigned that goal before they were four years old, and 54 percent had been assigned that goal before they were 10 years old. In 47 percent of these cases, there was no evidence of efforts to return the child to his or her family, and in 56 percent of these cases, there was no evidence that the CFSD had considered adoption.
Dr. Stein’s report revealed the following, among other things, with respect to the existence of case plans: Of the children in the District’s custody with a planning goal of return home as of December 1989, 62 percent did not have a written case plan. Of the 38 percent who did have written case plans, none contained all of the information required by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) and the discussion at Part I(B)(2), supra. These plans routinely failed to include information on goals, strategies for achieving those goals, and timeframes. Also absent from the files of many of the children with goals of return home were visiting schedules mandated by the CFSD policy. See CFSD Manual of Operations at § 401.2(h). Seventy percent of these children had no parent-child visiting schedules in their records, 91 percent had no worker-child visiting schedules, and 94 percent had no worker-parent visiting schedules.
Professor Walker’s report was also quite revealing: in none of the named plaintiffs’ case records did she find a written case plan that contained all of the information required by federal and District law and reasonable professional standards.
The defendants’ admissions strongly support the observations of both Dr. Stein and Professor Walker. The defendants have admitted that as of July 1990, the caseloads in the Intensive Services Branches and the Continuing Services Branch were so high that workers were unable to closely monitor families or develop case plans in a timely manner. With respect to implementing the goals set for children in foster care, the evidence speaks for itself: for those with goals of return home as of December 1989, 52 percent had had that goal for 18 months or more, 41 percent for two or more years, and 23 percent for three or more years. Even more revealing is the fact that the average stay for children in the District’s foster care system is just under five years—a third of their childhoods.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the CFSD frequently assigns inappropriate goals to the children in its foster care and consistently fails to prepare written case plans to enable the children to *974 realize their goals. Although defense counsel repeatedly elicited trial testimony that the need to respond to frequent “crises” often precludes the preparation of case plans, the Court finds, based on the uncontroverted expert testimony, that the results of not having a case plan may be just as devastating as the results of most crises. Without a case plan that sets forth a goal and a means of achieving it, children are relegated to spending significant chunks of their childhoods, if not their entire childhoods, in foster care, constantly bouncing from crisis to crisis.
c. Services
Just as the CFSD has often failed to provide any services to prevent the removal of children from their homes, the Court finds based on the evidence before it that the CFSD has consistently failed to provide services once children are removed from their homes and placed in foster care. The Stein Report indicates that, based on case records, of the children in foster care as of December 1989 whose goal was return home and who had entered into care through voluntary placement, the CFSD had failed to provide services in 77 percent of their cases. The failure to provide services designed to facilitate a child’s return home is frequently due to the unavailability of those services.
The evidence reveals that the CFSD is failing to provide other necessary services as well—those that would constitute

“proper care” under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1). Although CFSD policy mandates that all children entering care undergo a complete medical evaluation prior to placement, see CFSD Manual of Operations at § 602.8(a), reports submitted by Evelyn Andrews to the administrator of the FSA between May 1988 and May 1990 indicate that the CFSD did not have adequate medical screening facilities for children coming into care. Once in care, Dr. Stein’s report indicates that as of December 1989, 44 percent had not had a medical examination since their entry into care. Seventy-nine percent had not had a dental examination.
Although CFSD policy requires that a social worker have “face-to-face contact” with each child in foster care at least once a month, see CFSD Manual of Operations at § 603.2(a)(1), Dr. Stein’s report reveals that in the cases of 64 percent of the children in the District’s foster-care custody with a planning goal of return home as of December 1989, there was no evidence that the children had ever been visited by their social workers. Of the children with a planning goal of adoption as of December 1989, there was no evidence of visits in 52 percent of the cases. According to defendants’ own admission, as of October 1990, 149 children in the District’s foster care had no social worker assigned to them.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the CFSD has consistently failed to provide appropriate services and proper care to children in its custody.
d. Periodic Reviews
Both federal and District law require periodic judicial or administrative reviews for the purpose of determining the continued need for and appropriateness of placement. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B); D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2323(a). According to the Stein Report, of the children in foster care as of December 1989 who were eligible for a six-month review, only 13 percent had received a timely review. Defendants have admitted that as of August 1, 1990, children were not receiving timely administrative reviews. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the CFSD has consistently failed to comply with federal and District requirements regarding judicial and administrative reviews.
e. Adoption
District law requires that the CFSD “prepare a permanent plan” for a child when he or she cannot be returned to the home within a reasonable length of time. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2123. According to the unrebutted testimony of plaintiffs’ experts in this case, such permanency planning is also required under all reasonable professional standards for child welfare. To achieve permanency for children who cannot return home, it is crucial that parental rights be terminated and that children be legally “freed” for adoption. Defendants have admitted that children who are not legally *975 freed for adoption are less likely to be considered for adoption by prospective adoptive parents than those who have been freed. Nevertheless, of the children in the District’s foster care with a planning goal of adoption as of December 1989, 66 percent had not been legally freed for adoption. As of July 30, 1990, the majority of children that the CFSD’s adoption coordinator was trying to place were not legally freed. This results in “at-risk adoptions” in which a potential adoptive parent takes a child into custody with the risk that parental rights will not be terminated and the parent will never be able to legally adopt the child.
According to the Stein Report, for those children who, as of December 1989, had a planning goal of adoption but were not yet legally freed for adoption, in only 26 percent of the cases had information concerning terminating parental rights been submitted to an attorney. For half of these children, the CFSD staff had failed to discuss the possibility of relinquishment of parental rights with their mothers. Testimony on behalf of the defendants revealed that the blame for failing to terminate parental rights lies jointly with the District’s Office of Corporation Counsel. Even when the CFSD provides the necessary information to an attorney in the Corporation Counsel’s office, according to the testimony of Evelyn Andrews, the attorney often refuses to seek termination of parental rights until an adoptive family is found. This presents a Catch–22 because the Adoption and Placement Resources Branch (APRB) often is unable to recruit adoptive parents until parental rights have been terminated. Additionally, defendants have admitted that although in the spring of 1990 an attorney was hired specifically to file and prosecute termination petitions, by August 1990, the Office of Corporation Counsel had not formally authorized the attorney to file such petitions. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the CFSD has consistently failed to expedite the progression of the children in its custody toward permanent placement through adoption.
Part of the CFSD’s failures can no doubt be attributed to its noncompliance with its own policy that children with a goal of adoption be referred to the APRB within three days of setting that goal. See CFSD Manual of Operations at § 703.3. Nor has the CFSD complied with District law requiring certain recruitment efforts such as listing children on appropriate adoption exchanges. Defendants have stipulated that in the case of the named plaintiff Demerick B., for whom it was recognized early on that return home would be impossible, no referral to the APRB was made for a year-and-a-half after his last parental visit and two months after he was adjudicated as a neglected child. After the referral, which occurred in January 1988, Demerick’s picture was never even displayed to a potential adoptive parent for another year. He was referred to only one adoption exchange. There was no case plan in Demerick’s record until June 1989. In August 1989, when Demerick entered into an at-risk adoption placement, no motion had been filed to terminate parental rights. As of May 23, 1990, Demerick continued to be in foster care and was not yet legally adopted.
Dr. Stein’s report reveals that the delays in Demerick’s case also occur in the cases of numerous other children. For those in foster care as of December 1989 with a goal of adoption, the cases of only 29 percent had been referred to the APRB within the required three days. In 14 percent of the cases, notification was sent to the APRB more than a year after adoption was chosen as a goal. Moreover, of the children who were freed for adoption as of December 1989 but who had not been placed in pre-adoptive homes, 24 percent had never been referred to the APRB for placement. Defendants have stipulated that the high caseloads of the social workers within the CFSD prevent them from making adoption referrals in a timely manner.
The evidence presented on both sides of this case reveals that once a child has been referred to the APRB for placement, the wait for an adoptive home may be lengthy indeed. Defendants have stipulated that as of August 1990, only one-and-a-half employees *976 were responsible for recruiting all adoptive and foster parents. Since that time, according to the testimony of Geneva Ware, who was appointed supervisor of a newly created Recruitment Unit in August 1990, there have been three employees actively recruiting potential adoptive and foster parents. Nevertheless, as Ms. Ware admitted at trial, the unit’s efforts to recruit have not kept up with the demand. The Court is somewhat encouraged by defendants’ belated recognition of the need to enhance recruiting efforts, but notes that even as Ms. Ware was testifying about the inability to keep up with demand, another witness in this case testified that she had been waiting for over a year to adopt a foster child.
f. System Infrastructure
Federal and District law contain requirements pertaining to case tracking, caseloads, supervision, and training. The facts related to these “infrastructure” elements will be discussed in turn.
i. Case Tracking
Federal law requires any child welfare agency receiving federal funds to maintain an information system from which the status, location, and goals for the placement of all foster care children may be readily determined. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A). Such a system is also mandated by reasonable professional standards and, this Court believes, by basic common sense. Defendants have admitted that although its current information system, the WARD Tracking System (WTS), was designed to collect and process information regarding case management, client tracking, and vendor payments, the system is not adequate. According to the unrebutted testimony of Charlotte Haberaecker, an expert in the types and uses of automated information systems for human services agencies, the WTS cannot provide accurate information on the number of children in emergency care, how long they have been in that status, and when they are reaching the 90–day deadline for remaining in that

status. The WTS also is unable to accurately identify the physical location of all of the children in foster care. Additionally, it does not contain accurate information concerning vacancies in foster homes, nor does it contain accurate information regarding which social workers are assigned to which children.
Ms. Haberaecker’s testimony is supported by numerous of defendants’ admissions. Defendants have admitted that the CFSD lacks sufficient staff to operate and maintain the WTS. An April 1988 memorandum to the former administrator of the FSA warned that children were not being entered into the system in a timely manner, if at all. Defendants acknowledge that because much of the information in the system is missing or out-of-date, the system cannot generate accurate and meaningful reports about placement vacancies, overplacements, administrative reviews, court activity, family visits, or caseworker assignments. Although the system requires substantial upgrading, no budget money has been made available for the work. Instead, CFSD social workers track information on thousands of three-by-five-inch index cards. Over the last several years, the deficiencies in the system were repeatedly made known to high-level officials within the administration of the former mayor of the District of Columbia, Marion Barry, as well as to the mayor himself. In June 1989, the former administrator of the FSA met with then-mayor Barry to inform him that the system’s deficiencies precluded the CFSD from performing its assigned tasks.
The Court’s concluding findings in this area are plucked from nearly 100 of defendants’ stipulations regarding information tracking. In the words that defendants stipulated to:
As of August 1, 1990, the District of Columbia had no information system that identified all children in the District’s foster-care custody.
Stipulation 1549.
The CFSD placement office has no automated information system so as to enable it to track the location of children placed in foster homes, group homes, or any other type of placement.
Stipulation 1563.
In a memorandum dated March 27, 1990, the DHS employee responsible for the *977 operation of the Ward Tracking System (WTS) notified the office of defendant Barbara Burke–Tatum [the commissioner of the Commission on Social Services] that it was necessary to confer upon the WTS office official status within DHS so DHS could qualify for federal reimbursement for WTS operations.
Stipulation 1567.
In a March 30, 1990, memorandum, defendant Barbara Burke–Tatum was notified that, because the DHS office that operates the Ward Tracking System had no official status within DHS, the Department was unable to apply for federal funds that would otherwise cover 90% of the office’s costs. According to the memorandum, “In a time of tight budgeting for direct services it is unconscionable not to maximize resources. It would be a relatively simple matter to place this office either in OIS or FSA where reimbursements would be forthcoming and adequate staffing could be provided.”
Stipulation 1568.
Because the DHS office that operates the Ward Tracking System had no official status within DHS, the Department was unable to apply for federal funds that would otherwise cover 90% of the office’s costs.
Stipulation 1569. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the WTS is clearly inadequate for keeping track of the children in the District’s foster care. The Court can only wonder how an agency that cannot track the location of the children in its custody can possibly comply with the remaining requirements of federal and District law, much less with reasonable professional standards.
ii. Caseloads
The Court need not look beyond defendants’ own admissions to issue its findings in the area of social worker caseloads.18 Defendants have admitted that the ICSB must be fully staffed in order to initiate investigations within 24 hours of receipt, that the ISB social workers should have maximum caseloads of 20 families so that they are able to provide needed casework services, and that CSB workers should have caseloads not to exceed 35 to 40 families per worker. These maximum caseloads have been greatly surpassed for at least the last several years, leading to the CFSD’s inability to initiate timely investigations, provide needed services, ensure appropriate placements, prepare case plans, visit with foster children and parents, recruit foster and adoptive families, monitor foster homes and institutions, and claim all federal funding to which the CFSD should be entitled. The excessive caseloads have been due in large part to the department’s admitted failure to fill social worker vacancies. This failure has been in part the result of the department’s former policy of hiring “term” employees rather than permanent employees and of the low salaries in comparison to neighboring jurisdictions.
Defendants’ admissions indicate numerous occasions over the past several years in which officials within the Barry Administration were made aware of the severe staff shortages within the CFSD. Scores of intradepartmental memos warn that the staff shortages may result in failure to comply with the District’s Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act and that staff must be hired to avoid serious injury or death to children in custody. As early as July 1988, the former mayor was notified by the chair of his Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect that the “severe staffing problem” in the CFSD was “creating a situation that is detrimental to the safety and well-being of children and the preservation of families. It has affected all levels of every program and service area, which adversely impacts upon the Division’s ability to comply with Federal and District laws and regulations and to provide comprehensive services to families and children.” Stipulation 1161. In August 1988, then-mayor Barry told CFSD workers that 32 new social workers would be hired by October 1, 1988. This promise was the upshot of several meetings and memorandums from front-line social workers to high-level department officials. These social *978 workers had complained that they were unable to adequately protect the safety of the children assigned to them because of the high caseloads and lack of resources such as automobiles. By October 1, 1988, only one new worker had been hired, seven had left, and the CFSD had not acquired new automobiles. As of October 10, 1988, only 10 new workers had been hired.
In June 1989, then-mayor Barry was again informed about the severe staff shortages. He was told that 41.3 percent of CFSD staff positions were vacant and that the “tremendous amount of stress that leads to worker burnout” contributes to the “rapid turnover” of social workers. Stipulation 1183. The former mayor was informed again in November 1989 and January 1990 that the CFSD was experiencing serious staff shortages. Nevertheless, on June 28, 1990, the District of Columbia instituted a hiring freeze that barred filling CFSD vacancies.
Recently, the DHS has undertaken new efforts to fill its empty social worker positions. As of November 1990, according to the testimony of the acting administrator of the FSA, Elizabeth Parker, the department began hiring on a permanent basis. It is also converting its term employees to permanent positions. Additionally, according to Ms. Parker’s testimony, the paperwork to increase social workers’ salaries to a competitive level was, at the time of trial, on the city administrator’s desk. The department has also run ongoing vacancy announcements and participated in job fairs and campus recruitments in an effort to recruit new workers.
Despite the evident attempts to attract workers, there is no indication yet that the past failures have been remedied. Instead, the fact remains that, at the time of trial in February 1991, 107 of a total of 239 social worker positions in the CFSD remained vacant. Chainie Scott, a social worker in the CSB, testified that as of January 1991, she was responsible for 69 families and 251 children. Although this was down from a high of 131 families and over 300 children, it was still well above the maximum caseloads that defendants have admitted must not be exceeded for social workers to do their jobs. Ms. Scott testified that even with her caseload down to 69 families, it is impossible for her to visit each child regularly. Instead, she sees the children only when a crisis arises or when a court hearing is approaching. The Court finds that, based on

defendants’ admissions, Ms. Scott’s testimony, and the unrebutted testimony of plaintiffs’ experts, the CFSD is unable to carry out its responsibilities under federal and District law while its social workers are operating at existing caseloads.
iii. Supervision
The uncontroverted expert testimony presented to the Court is that reasonable professional standards require supervisors to play a role in educating, supporting, and directing staff; in ensuring quality control; and in ensuring that the child welfare agency’s policies are carried out. By defendants’ own admissions, the extreme staff shortages have resulted in CFSD supervisors carrying caseloads normally assigned to social workers. By carrying heavy caseloads, these supervisors have been unable to train staff and monitor cases to ensure the safety and well-being of the children for whom their staff is responsible.
iv. Training
According to the uncontroverted testimony of plaintiffs’ experts, reasonable professional standards require specialized training for handling cases of child maltreatment and providing services. Ongoing training should be provided to case workers, managers, supervisors, social service representatives, foster parents, respite providers, parent aids, and homemakers. Although defendants agree that new social workers should receive formal training and existing social workers should receive ongoing training, until June 1990, no such training was available. In June 1990, the DHS hired James Oliver to set up a training program in the CFSD. At the time of trial, the CFSD had conducted two training sessions, involving approximately 70 social workers, in the areas of general information about the DHS, specific case planning *979 and case management skills, and the requirements of federal and District law. The training sessions consisted of between 30 and 40 hours each but included no field training. Mr. Oliver testified that more training sessions are planned for the future and will be directed toward existing social workers, management, and clerical staff, as well as to new social workers. Mr. Oliver testified that he hopes to have completed a session of training for everyone in the CFSD by the end of 1991, at which time he will take over the position of chief of one of the Intensive Services Branches. Mr. Oliver stated that he anticipates ongoing training after 1991.
The testimony of Mr. Oliver indicates that defendants have at last taken positive steps toward implementing a training program that may eventually comply with reasonable professional standards. The Court remains concerned, however, that Mr. Oliver’s plan for continued training sessions is not embodied in any kind of written document submitted to the Court, as remains true of other promised reforms the Court heard about from the District. With the fragile budget situation that faces the CFSD, the DHS, and the District as a whole, there is no guarantee that training will not be cut due to lack of funding. The Court is also concerned that there is still no orientation training provided to new social workers before they begin working on cases. Chainie Scott and Thomas Wells, both social workers in the Continuing Services Branch, testified at trial that such training would have been very valuable to them. In sum, although the Court finds that the training program just initiated by defendants is a good start, it does not yet rise to the level that professional standards deem adequate.
4. Monitoring Foster Homes and Institutions District law requires facilities providing foster care within the District to be licensed and inspected annually. Facilities caring for children outside of the District must also be inspected annually. D.C.Code Ann. § 3–802 & § 3–805. Similarly, the CFSD Manual of Operations requires regular evaluations of all foster homes and facilities to ensure their quality and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. CFSD Manual of Operations at § 902.2.19 The Monitoring Unit, within the CFSD, is responsible for this task. Unfortunately, as defendants have readily admitted, the same problems with staff shortages and high caseloads have negatively affected the Monitoring Unit’s ability to carry out its responsibilities.
In preparing his report for use in this case, Dr. Stein requested the records of 123 foster homes in which 210 children were located. The Monitoring Unit provided him with the records of 108 foster homes.20 All of these homes had been approved for the placement of children, but there was evidence of biannual reviews in only 57 percent of them.
The defendants’ own admissions corroborate Dr. Stein’s report. According to stipulations entered into by the parties, between December 1988 and July 1990, the Monitoring Unit failed to monitor any of the foster homes operated by the Consortium for Child Welfare in which District children were placed. In July 1990, the supervisor of the unit admitted that the unit had insufficient staff to monitor foster homes and group homes as required by the CFSD policy. The supervisor believed the unit needed two additional social workers to carry out its responsibilities. Based on the Stein Report and defendants’ own admissions, the Court finds that the CFSD has consistently failed to monitor foster homes and institutions in accordance with the requirements of District law and CFSD policy.
5. Missed Financing Opportunities Plaintiffs’ experts and defendants themselves agree that early intervention and the *980 provision of preventive services is more cost-effective than removing a child from the home. In a June 1988 Briefing Overview to then-mayor Marion Barry, the DHS reported that during fiscal year 1987, an average of $5,000 to $6,000 was spent per family per year for preventive services, while an average of $17,000 was spent on each child in specialized foster care and group homes and an average of $50,000 was spent on each child in residential treatment facilities. Virtually the same figures were presented to the mayor in the department’s June 1989 Briefing Overview.
According to the uncontroverted testimony of Judith Meltzer, an expert in the financing, administration, and delivery of human services including child welfare services, the DHS currently allocates and spends funds in the least cost-effective way possible by spending large sums on out-of-home care and little on preventive services. According to Ms. Meltzer, by establishing a program to provide intensive in-home services to prevent the need for placement in foster care, the department could save from $1 to $2 million per year by the second year, assuming only a 40 percent success rate. Approximately 20 families could be provided intensive in-home family services for the cost of placing one child in a residential facility. In the case of named plaintiff Demerick B., Ms. Meltzer estimates that the DHS could have saved roughly $12,000 per year by placing Demerick in a foster home with supportive services rather than in the expensive residential treatment facility where he spent three years.21 Had he been placed in an adoptive family, the department probably would have spent roughly $12,000 over the entire three-year period. In the case of named plaintiff Tyrone W., Ms. Meltzer estimates that placements in three foster homes, two hospitals, and two residential treatment facilities over a 28–month period cost the DHS approximately $100,000. Alternatively, had the DHS provided Tyrone and his family with intensive in-home services including mental health counseling, day care, and homemaker services, designed to prevent Tyrone’s removal from the home, the estimated cost would have been $46,000. Defendants have offered no expert testimony to rebut Ms. Meltzer’s estimates or her conclusions. Based on this, the Court finds that the DHS is not using its funds in a cost-effective manner, resulting in children being removed from their homes and placed in foster or institutional care without any reasonable efforts having been expended to permit them to remain at home.
In addition, Ms. Meltzer gave uncontroverted testimony that the District is currently losing millions of dollars in available federal funds because of its serious management and systemic deficiencies. Federal reimbursements under the Adoption Assistance Act are “open-ended.” That is, there is no cap on the amount of money a state agency may receive for certain eligible activities or services provided to eligible children. States and the District of Columbia are reimbursed according to an established “Federal Financial Participation” rate, which is 50 percent for most eligible activities and 75 percent for eligible training activities. To receive federal reimbursements under the Act, the claimant must establish not only the eligibility of the activity, but the eligibility of the child benefiting from that activity. Eligibility for reimbursements under the Act is tied to eligibility for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. At least 75 percent of children in the District’s foster care are AFDC eligible, yet the CFSD had established eligibility under the Adoption Assistance Act for only 24 percent in July 1987 and 22.6 percent in July 1988. This compares to eligibility rates of 72 percent in New York City, 64 percent in Pittsburgh, 56 percent in Philadelphia, and 50 percent in Montgomery County,

Maryland, an affluent suburb of the District of Columbia.
*981 In fiscal years 1985 and 1986, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) disallowed 76 percent of the District’s claim for $7.8 million in reimbursements under the Act. The HHS report attributed the high rate of disallowance to noncompliance with federal regulations and the department’s own policies and procedures. Some of the claims were disallowed due to the CFSD’s failure to obtain court-ordered custody of children who had been in the District’s care for more than 180 days. Some were disallowed because children were in homes that did not have current licenses or did not qualify as foster homes. Still others were disallowed because there were no case records for children on whose behalf payments were to be made.
Ms. Meltzer estimated that due to the DHS’s failure to properly establish eligibility under the Adoption Assistance Act for all children entering the system, its failure to properly document and claim all allowable training and administrative costs under the Act, and its failure to comply with all of the procedures that must accompany claims, the District is currently losing approximately $14 million a year in potential funding under the Adoption Assistance Act. In addition, it is losing another $7 million per year in Medicaid funding due to its failure to establish and maintain Medicaid eligibility for the children in its care, among other things. In total, Ms. Meltzer and the Center Report conservatively estimate that the District could obtain, at a minimum, an additional $21 million a year in federal reimbursements by ensuring that the proper procedures for making the claims are carried out.22 Other states have seen even greater increases. According to Ms. Meltzer’s testimony, the state of Ohio received $5.8 million in reimbursements in 1984, but after embarking on a concerted program to maximize its revenue assistance, received $52 million in reimbursements in 1990. Similarly, the state of Pennsylvania increased its reimbursements from $43 million in 1984 to $97 million in 1990.
The Court gives credit to the testimony of Elizabeth Parker, current acting administrator of the FSA, that after federal reviews in 1987, 1988, and 1989, the department was never notified that it was ineligible for federal funding. The Court nevertheless finds, based on Ms. Meltzer’s testimony, that the amount of federal funding could have been greatly increased had the department complied more fully with federal laws and regulations and CFSD policy. The Court has listened to defense counsel argue that the District is operating at a severe deficit and that all departments within the city are under stringent budgetary constraints. In essence, defense counsel has argued that compliance with federal and local laws is impossible. The experiences of other states, such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, show that it is not impossible. Moreover, the evidence shows that over a five-year period, by expending a minimal effort, the District could obtain over $100 million in federal funding. The Court finds it disingenuous for the District to blame its inadequacies on a lack of funding when it has failed to obtain the generous funding that is readily available to it.
6. The Proposed Realignment Throughout defendants’ case in chief, the Court was presented with much testimony about a proposed “realignment” that the CFSD is undergoing to better carry out its responsibilities. Evelyn Andrews, chief of the CFSD, testified that the division intends to realign itself in a way that provides for social workers to specialize in certain areas and thereby reduce their caseloads. Ms. Andrews testified that various committees were working on a plan for realignment. Despite the Court’s repeated requests for documentation of this alleged plan, the best that defendants were able to provide was a brief proposed organizational *982 chart for the realigned division. This chart indicates that under the division chief would be three deputy chiefs: one for “Prevention and Protection,” one for “Foster Care and Adoption,” and one for “Operations.” Under the deputy chief for Prevention and Protection would be the “Prevention, Intake and Crisis Services Branch” and the “Child Protective Services Branch.” Under the deputy chief for Foster Care and Adoption would be the “Foster Care Services Branch” and the “Adoption Resources Branch.” The deputy chief for Operations would be responsible for the Monitoring Unit, the WARD Tracking System, and other administrative functions. No document provided to the Court suggests any time frame for instituting the proposed realignment or any strategy for making it work to reduce caseloads and increase compliance with federal and District law. Nor did Ms. Andrews’ testimony provide the Court with any guidance in this regard. Ms. Andrews testified that the plan was not in final form, but that she was aware of some administrative level changes due to take place in the next few weeks. She did not apprise the Court of the details of these changes.
The Court is encouraged that defendants are finally attempting to alleviate some of the deficiencies in the current system. Nevertheless, the Court simply does not have enough evidence detailing the proposed realignment in order to make a finding that the realignment will remedy all of the system’s failures, which have been elaborately detailed above. No one has explained how specialization will reduce caseloads or when the specialization is to take place. The Court cannot ask plaintiffs to rely on defendants’ good faith but as yet unsubstantiated promises to improve.
It is not sheer coincidence that the proposed realignment has been suddenly undertaken in the past few months. Based on the testimony of several of defendants’ witnesses, it is clear that many of the District’s steps toward improvement were instituted after discovery was largely completed, plaintiffs’ experts had completed their reports, and the prospect of a full trial on the merits had become likely. It wasn’t until June of 1990, eight months before trial, that the DHS hired someone to set up a training program for social workers, managers, and support staff within the CFSD. It wasn’t until August of 1990, six months before trial, that the DHS established a Recruitment Unit within the CFSD, solely for the purpose of recruiting foster and adoptive homes. It wasn’t until November of 1990, three months before trial, that the DHS began hiring social workers on a permanent, rather than temporary, basis. At the time of trial, there was still no concrete evidence that existing social workers had been converted to permanent positions, although the evidence indicated that a conversion was planned. It wasn’t until January of this year, a month before trial, that the caseloads of social workers such as Chainie Scott were reduced.23 It wasn’t until the time of trial itself that the chief of the ICSB was asked to prepare a risk assessment tool for use during investigations of neglect reports. The person assigned this task admitted at trial that he was only “a little” familiar with the Child Welfare League standards concerning risk assessment. In short, the Court is concerned that the department’s efforts to improve may have been motivated only by this litigation and, without continued litigation or a court order, the motivation for continued restructuring and improvement will subside.24
7. Harm to the Children The Court has found that the DHS has, at least since 1987, consistently failed to comply with the requirements of the federal Adoption Assistance Act, the District’s Abuse and Neglect Act, the CFSD Manual of Operations, and reasonable professional *983 standards. Although common sense dictates that these widespread and systemic deficiencies have caused harm to the children in the District’s foster care, plaintiffs have nevertheless introduced substantial uncontroverted evidence regarding the nature and scope of that harm.
a. Harm to the Named Plaintiffs
Testifying on behalf of plaintiffs were four child psychiatrists. Each had examined one of the named plaintiffs, both personally and through a review of the child’s case records. Each had an opinion regarding the harm that had resulted from the child’s experience in foster care.
i. LaShawn A.
Dr. Harold Eist, a child psychiatrist who is on the faculty at Howard University and has treated over 5,000 inner city children, offered his opinion about the psychological and emotional stability of LaShawn A. LaShawn came into custody in September 1986, when she was two-and-a-half years old. She was placed in voluntary care by her mother, who was homeless and could not care for LaShawn because of emotional problems. No services were offered to enable her to remain at home. LaShawn was placed in the foster home of a woman in her sixties who had no interest in adopting LaShawn. She had no contact with her natural family for at least two years after she came into care. During this period, a psychiatrist who examined her discovered potential psychiatric problems and developmental delays. She was placed in a therapeutic nursery in

the summer of 1987. In November 1988, her mother visited her. In January and February 1989, LaShawn’s mother failed to show up for scheduled visits. A subsequent visit from her mother did not go well. In April, she was visited by her father, who had been incarcerated when she entered foster care. LaShawn remained in emergency care status until May 1989, twoand-a-half years after her entry into the District’s physical custody. A psychiatric evaluation conducted that month indicated she may have been experiencing an overuse of physical punishment and perhaps even sexual abuse in her foster home. At the time of trial, LaShawn remained in the same foster home.
Dr. Eist examined LaShawn in July 1990. He described her as an attractive, neatly groomed six-and-a-half-year-old who separated easily from the social worker who brought her to his office. He testified that LaShawn was frenetically hyperactive and lost concentration easily. Her developmental delays became evident when she could not play tic tac toe nor draw a straight line. When Dr. Eist asked her who loved her, LaShawn replied “no one.” When he asked her who hated her, she said her foster mother. Dr. Eist testified that LaShawn indicated that her foster mother beat her. Dr. Eist concluded that LaShawn suffered from “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder” (AD–HD), was severely emotionally delayed, and was overwhelmed by stimuli. He opined that her prognosis was grave and that she will likely experience four to six exacerbations of depression throughout her adulthood, lasting anywhere from one to four years each. Although Dr. Eist admitted that the cause of AD– HD is unknown and that there was evidence that LaShawn had psychological problems before entering foster care, he concluded that the mishandling of her case while in custody contributed to her disorders. He testified that LaShawn has benefited from the therapeutic nursery, but that she needs occupational training, additional support services, contact with her siblings, and a decision about her final placement. Dr. Eist opined that had LaShawn been in a caring family who lobbied for services to provide for her special needs, there is a strong likelihood that her AD–HD would not be as severe and her depression would be seriously ameliorated. The longer she remains with her current foster mother, according to Dr. Eist, the less she may be able to benefit from adoptive placement.
ii. Leo C.
Dr. Gordon Kirschner, a child psychiatrist with experience in psychoanalysis and the treatment of children, adolescents, and adults, reviewed the case records of Leo C. and examined him on July 18, 1990. Leo came into custody in 1982 when he was *984 two-and-a-half months old and his mother was admitted into a psychiatric facility. Although case workers almost immediately determined that Leo should be a candidate for adoption, the department returned Leo to his mother six months after he came into care. Leo’s mother then had another baby, her fifth, in the fall of 1983. In May 1984, Leo’s mother requested that he and his new brother, Gary, be placed in foster care while she sought psychiatric hospitalization. The children did not come into care, however, but were sent to stay with their maternal grandmother in June 1984. Later that month they were left with a neighbor who called the DHS to have them placed in emergency care. Leo and Gary remained in a foster home until February 1985, when their foster mother requested their removal. The children were returned to their mother. In June 1985, their mother placed them in voluntary care so she could be hospitalized for depression. After she left the hospital, the children were again returned to her. In 1987, the children again came into the District’s custody and have remained there ever since. They were in an institution until late 1988, after which they were placed in a foster home. Since May 1989, both children have been on psychoactive medications to control their behavior. Their case goals remain “return home” even though their mother has been uncooperative and has not visited regularly. According to the testimony of Dr. Kirschner, the foster mother caring for Gary and Leo “dropped out of the picture” while they were at camp in the summer of 1989. They have been with their step-grandmother ever since.
Dr. Kirschner described Leo as notably unemotional and unattached to his step-grandmother, even though he had spent the previous 18 months living with her. Dr. Kirschner described him as cooperative, but inclined to change the rules of the games they played in order to suit himself. He testified that Leo suffered from AD–HD and developmental disorders and that Leo had a poorly formed internal representation of other people, including his mother and strangers. Dr. Kirschner opined that Leo’s problems will continue into adulthood. He testified that he believed the frequent changes in Leo’s living situation and the inadequacies of Leo’s mother had caused many of Leo’s difficulties. Had Leo been adopted by the time he was three, Dr. Kirschner opined, he would not have experienced the same disorders. Nevertheless, Dr. Kirschner believes Leo could still benefit from adoption.
iii. Robert D.
Dr. Richard Gross, a child psychiatrist with extensive experience treating children in foster care, reviewed the records of and personally examined Robert D. This child came into care when he was 14 months old after his grandmother filed a report that he had been neglected. He was in foster care from January 25, 1980 until November 6, 1980, when he was returned to his mother. In January and February 1984, the department was notified by Robert’s sister’s school principal and by the Metropolitan Police Department’s Youth Division that the family was in need of assistance. Nothing in the record indicates any visits by the assigned social worker until Robert entered emergency care in July 1985. After his first foster mother beat him, he was placed in a different foster home. He lived in this home from the fall of 1985 until 1988. The goal listed on Robert’s April 1987 case plan was adoption. His mother signed an agreement relinquishing parental rights on June 1, 1987, but the agreement was never processed because it apparently was lost. Robert’s May 1988 case plan inexplicably listed a goal of family reunification. In December 1988, Robert moved to his fourth foster home, where he remained until September 1989. Robert’s April 1989 Disposition Report, written when he was 10 years old, states that his planning goal is long-term foster care. In late 1989, Robert was placed in a group home.
Dr. Gross described Robert as being concrete and literal in his thinking, exhibiting poor judgment and little enthusiasm. He testified that Robert had low self-esteem, felt no sense of belonging, and expressed an unusual fear and distrust of people. Robert refused to draw a picture of a person *985 or play with the doctor’s puppets that looked like people. Dr. Gross testified that Robert told him “you can’t trust people, they die in front of your face.” According to Dr. Gross, Robert suffers from depression, adjustment disorders, and learning disabilities that are likely to follow him into adulthood and prevent him from undertaking normal life activities such as holding down a steady job. Dr. Gross opined that Robert’s problems were caused by the early lack of a relationship with his mother and the continuing lack of a relationship with any single caregiving adult. Although Dr. Gross acknowledged that Robert’s problems were fairly characteristic of children in foster care, he believed that placement in one continuous and appropriate foster home could have provided Robert with a greater chance of success. Similarly, Dr. Gross testified that he believes that if Robert had been adopted earlier, he would be a more integrated and successful child.
iv. Kevin E.
Dr. William Clotworthy, Jr., a child psychiatrist who was the clinical director for the Christ Child Institute for Children for 15 years, reviewed the records of and personally examined Kevin E. With minor exceptions, Kevin has been in the District’s custody for his entire life. He came into custody following his release from the hospital 20 days after he was born. Kevin is now 11 years old. He has been in 11 different placements, including foster homes, group homes, residential treatment facilities, and hospitals. At one time he was in a foster home with his mother, who was also in the District’s custody. Kevin was not freed for adoption until he was eight years old. Kevin was hospitalized in 1988 after exhibiting behavior that included running away from home, head banging, suicidal thoughts, auditory hallucinations, and temper tantrums. He told hospital staff that he hated himself and he climbed into a trash can and asked to be thrown away. Kevin was placed in Villa Maria, a residential treatment facility in Baltimore, Maryland, in the fall of 1988. Reports from the institution in 1989 indicate that he might not be able to tolerate the intensity of a family setting due to his history of abandonment. Although adoption has been Kevin’s planning goal for much of his life, his case has never been referred to the Adoption and Placement Resources Branch.
Dr. Clotworthy examined Kevin on July 30, 1990. He described Kevin as engaging, articulate, and cooperative, but with a severe case of AD–HD. According to Dr. Clotworthy, Kevin was easily distracted and frustrated, had poor impulse control, and suffered from mild learning disabilities in the form of speech and language delays. Dr. Clotworthy testified that the record revealed Kevin’s low self-esteem and difficulty trusting people. Dr. Clotworthy opined that these conditions are likely

to be long-lasting and that Kevin’s tendency to react strongly to both hard and medium “bumps along his road” may affect his ability to hold a job. Dr. Clotworthy testified that he believed that the frequent changes in placements were each interpreted by Kevin as being his fault and signifying that something was wrong with him. Each was an enormous blow. Dr. Clotworthy opined that if social workers had been attuned to his special needs earlier, the outcome for Kevin could have been quite different. In Dr. Clotworthy’s opinion, Kevin was moved at inappropriate times, was returned to his mother inappropriately, was not prescribed medication early enough (to control his depression and hyperactivity), and was generally not provided with the help he needed to be a success in school or at other endeavors. Dr. Clotworthy testified that any trained social worker should have realized his needs much earlier and realized that there was no chance of returning him to his mother. Dr. Clotworthy expects Kevin to experience regression and an increase in symptoms when he is forced to leave Villa Maria.
b. Harm to the Plaintiff Class
The uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Eist, Professor Walker, Dr. Williams, and other of plaintiffs’ experts leads the Court to find that regular, constant, reliable relationships with adults are critical to the development of children. For children in foster care, regular visits with their social *986 workers, parents, and siblings are crucial if there is to be any chance of reunification. Without such visitation, children are unable to develop a sense of safety, confidence, and trust. If the parents are uncooperative or unwilling to visit regularly and accept parental responsibility, social workers should expeditiously move toward adoption by gathering the necessary materials for terminating parental rights. Prolonged stays in foster care and frequent changes in placements lead to the disorders suffered by the named plaintiffs all too frequently. As Dr. Gross testified, Robert’s problems are fairly characteristic of other children in the foster care population. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the children in the District’s foster care have been and continue to be irreparably harmed— psychologically, emotionally, and sometimes physically—by the inappropriate treatment they have received while in that care.
Those who are not in the District’s custody but who have been the subject of reports of neglect have also been harmed. Dr. Stein’s case reading contains examples of 11 cases for which reports were substantiated but no services provided. In the most extreme case, a child died after his mother failed to keep him on a heart monitor made necessary by his medical problems. Prior to releasing the child to his mother, the CFSD had been made aware of the mother’s lack of contact with the child while he was hospitalized. The homicide detective’s report, made after the child’s death, noted that the mother’s apartment was dirty, without running water, and was littered with drug paraphernalia. The child showed signs of having been choked. In less extreme cases, children are forced to live in filthy, rodent-infested homes that lack electricity or running water. They are often in the presence of drug use and are not fed regular meals. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that those plaintiffs who have been the subject of a report of neglect but remain in the home have been and continue to be harmed by the District’s failure to provide preventive services.
C. Summary of Findings
To summarize, in the foregoing discussion, the Court found the following:
1. The average stay for children in the District’s foster care system is 4.8 years, over twice the national average.
2. The CFSD has, since at least the beginning of 1988, continuously failed to initiate investigations into reports of neglect or abuse within 24 hours and complete investigations within two weeks.
3. The CFSD has consistently failed to use “reasonable efforts” to prevent the removal of children from their homes or to provide the services necessary to reunite them with their families when removal cannot be avoided.
4. Children in the CFSD’s physical custody have consistently remained in voluntary or emergency care beyond 90 days without the filing of a neglect petition and beyond 180 days without a judicial determination that placement is in their best interests.
5. The CFSD has consistently failed to place children in the least restrictive placements in close proximity to their families and consistent with their needs.
6. The CFSD has frequently assigned children in its custody inappropriate case goals and has consistently failed to prepare written case plans to enable the children to realize their goals.
7. The CFSD has consistently failed to provide services once children are removed from the home and placed in foster care.
8. The CFSD has consistently failed to expedite the progression of children in its custody toward permanent placement through adoption and has failed to timely refer children whose goal is adoption to the Adoption and Placement Resources Branch.
9. The CFSD has consistently failed to ensure that the children in its custody receive timely judicial and administrative reviews regarding the continued necessity and appropriateness of placement.
10. The CFSD’s automated information system, the WARD Tracking System, is wholly inadequate for keeping track of the *987 number and location of children in the District’s custody and their needs.
11. The caseloads handled by CFSD social workers have consistently exceeded reasonable professional standards and prevented the CFSD from carrying out its responsibilities under federal and District law.
12. Extreme staff shortages have consistently resulted in CFSD supervisors carrying caseloads rather than training and monitoring their employees.
13. The CFSD’s Monitoring Unit has consistently failed to monitor and inspect foster homes and institutions on a yearly basis.
14. The DHS has consistently failed to use its funding in the most cost-effective manner and has consistently failed to maximize its federal funding by failing to make the administrative changes necessary to qualify for such funding.
15. Each of the named plaintiffs, as well as the rest of the members of the plaintiff class, have been and continue to be psychologically, emotionally, and physically harmed by the actions and inactions of defendants.
16. Management personnel at all levels of the DHS, as well as the former mayor, have repeatedly been advised about the department’s deficiencies and inability to comply with federal and local law.
17. The DHS’s proposed realignment, although a positive step toward improvement, is still too tentative to moot this case or make injunctive relief unnecessary.
III.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs bring their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District operates its child welfare system in violation of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, as well as the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Plaintiffs also allege that the District is violating its own statutes: the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977 and the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief only.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. Standard for § 1983 Liability [1] The seminal case establishing that municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 is Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).25 In that case, the Supreme Court held that although “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents,” it may be held liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037–38. Defendants argue that the District cannot be held liable unless the alleged unconstitutional action “ ‘implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers.’ ” Defendants’ Trial Brief at 9 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036). Defendants ignore the next sentence of the Monell decision, however, which makes it clear that “local governments, like every other § 1983 ‘person,’ *988 by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” 436 U.S. at 690–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. What matters is that the policy or custom is “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2038.
[2] This circuit has elaborated on the Monell inquiry, holding that to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “a persistent, pervasive practice, attributable to a course deliberately pursued by official policymakers, one that caused the deprivation of constitutional rights plaintiff experienced.” Carter v. District of Columbia, et al., 795 F.2d 116, 125–26 (D.C.Cir.1986). The Court will use this legal standard to review the alleged statutory and constitutional violations in this case.
B. Alleged Statutory Violations 1. Applicability of § 1983 [3] [4] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that § 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of federal statutory rights as well as constitutional rights. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, ––––, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). The test for determining whether § 1983 provides a remedy for any particular statutory violation is two-part: first, “the plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right,” see Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at ––––, 110 S.Ct. at 448, and second, Congress must not have specifically foreclosed the § 1983 remedy. Id. See also Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 19, 100 S.Ct. at 2512. Whether a federal right has been violated depends upon whether the statute in question creates “obligations binding on the governmental unit” that are not “ ‘too vague and amorphous’ to be ‘beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce’ ” and that are “ ‘inten[ded] to benefit’ the putative plaintiff.” Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at ––––, 110 S.Ct. at 448 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431–32, 430, 107 S.Ct. 766, 774, 773, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)).
[5] Defendants have argued that the federal statutes relied upon by plaintiffs merely establish state grant programs and do not create actionable rights under § 1983. This argument is contrary to existing law. In Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983), the First Circuit applied the two-part test to alleged violations of the same statute at issue in this case, the federal Adoption Assistance Act. The court held that the Act confers enforceable rights upon children in the custody of states receiving federal funding under the Act. In so holding, the First Circuit relied on numerous Supreme Court decisions since 1968 that “implicitly and explicitly” have held that the rights under various provisions of the Social Security Act are privately enforceable under § 1983. 719 F.2d at 510 (citing cases). Having determined that the Adoption Assistance Act conferred an enforceable right, the First Circuit went on to determine that Congress had not foreclosed the § 1983 remedy by authorizing the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to withhold or reduce federal funding under the Act when a state does not comply with its requirements. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that a cutoff in funding was the sole remedy under the Act. Instead, the First Circuit held that the issue was governed by Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), in which the Supreme Court held that:
We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal court is without power to review state welfare provisions or prohibit the use of federal funds by the States in view of the fact that Congress has lodged in the Department of HEW the power to cut off federal funds for noncompliance with statutory requirements. We are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals *989 most directly affected by the administration of its program.
397 U.S. at 420, 90 S.Ct. at 1222.
More recently, the Fourth Circuit upheld the enforceability of the Adoption Assistance Act through § 1983 in L.J. By and Through Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 805 (1989). The Fourth Circuit held that the provisions of the Act:
spell out a standard of conduct, and as a corollary rights in plaintiffs, which plaintiffs have alleged have been denied. It is true that the statutes are largely statutes relating to appropriations, but, defendants’ argument to the contrary notwithstanding, they are privately enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
838 F.2d at 123. The court went on to uphold the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to “submit a plan for review of foster homes about which a report of maltreatment has been made, to monitor child placements in foster homes at least monthly and in some instances weekly, to expand its medical services to foster children including the keeping of medical records, and to provide prompt written reports of maltreatment of foster children to their attorneys and the juvenile court....” Id. at 120. See also Lesher v. Lavrich, 784 F.2d 193, 197 (6th Cir.1986) (holding plaintiffs not entitled to damages for alleged violations of Adoption Assistance Act but agreeing with Lynch that “[i]t may be reasonable to read the [Act] to permit parents and children affected by the programs it funds to sue to force those programs to comply with the federal funding requirements”).
This Court finds the reasoning of the First and Fourth Circuits persuasive. It would strain logic to hold that plaintiffs, as the intended beneficiaries of the Adoption Assistance Act, nevertheless are precluded from enforcing their rights under the Act. Moreover, the provisions of the Act itself persuade the Court that the Act creates enforceable rights. These provisions are extraordinarily specific, spelling out exactly what a state must do for children in its care in order to receive funding under the Act. Based on this, the Court holds that the Adoption Assistance Act, by its terms, “creates obligations ‘sufficiently specific and definite’ to be within ‘the competence of the judiciary to enforce,’ ... is intended to benefit the putative plaintiffs, and is not foreclosed ‘by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself.’ ” Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at ––––, 110 S.Ct. at 449 (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 432, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 774, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)).

2. Defendants’ Violations [6] Having determined that § 1983 is available to enforce rights conferred by the Adoption Assistance Act, this Court must determine whether the District, by virtue of an official policy or custom, has deprived plaintiffs of those rights. The Court has recited countless facts which undeniably establish that plaintiffs are being deprived of rights conferred upon them by the federal statute. In almost every area of the federal law, the District’s child welfare system is deficient. It fails to investigate reports of abuse and neglect in a timely manner; it fails to provide services to children and families; it fails to make appropriate foster care placements; it fails to develop case plans; and it fails to assure a permanent home for the children in its care, among other things. The Court has already found that these failures have terrible consequences for the children in the District’s custody as well as for those who are known to the District because of reports of neglect or abuse. In one tragic case, these failures resulted in an infant’s death. The Court has also found that the upper management of the DHS, as well as the former mayor, have been repeatedly made aware of most, if not all, of the system’s failures. At one point, having been repeatedly advised that children were at risk due to severe staff shortages and excessive caseloads, the mayor promised to hire more social workers so that the CFSD could carry out its responsibilities. This promise never materialized.
Defendants have pointed out that the District’s official policy is embodied in its *990 statutes, which largely follow the mandates of the Adoption Assistance Act. Although the Court agrees that the District’s statutes may be its “official policy,” it does not represent the actual practice in the District. The court in Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir.1983), addressed and rejected a similar argument. In that case, defendants argued that review was precluded because the Massachusetts statute and regulations were consistent with federal law. The court held that § 1983 applies to state “custom or usage” just as it does to state statutes. Therefore, the court held, “[i]f Massachusetts’s practice is to deprive foster children of federal statutory rights, even though the state’s law on the books requires otherwise, section 1983 is available as a remedy.” 719 F.2d at 511. The situation is the same in this case. Based on the overwhelming evidence, the Court can conclude nothing less than that the District’s failures amount to a “persistent, pervasive practice, attributable to a course deliberately pursued by official policy-makers.” Carter v. District of Columbia, et al., 795 F.2d 116, 125–26 (D.C.Cir.1986). Accordingly, the Court holds that the District has been and continues to be depriving plaintiffs of federal statutory rights in violation of § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
C. Alleged Constitutional Violations
1. The Need to Reach the Constitutional Claims Although the Court is mindful of the longstanding admonishment to refrain from reaching constitutional issues unnecessarily, the nature of the relief sought in this case makes a resolution of the constitutional claims of the children in the District’s foster care unavoidable. By holding that the District has violated only these children’s statutory rights, the Court is limited to granting only conditional relief. If the District decides to simply forego federal funding under the Adoption Assistance Act, the Court would have no basis for enforcing any injunction it might order. This limitation was noted by the district court in Lynch v. King, 550 F.Supp. 325 (D.Mass.1982), aff’d, Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir.1983). In that case, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the state to provide written case plans, ordering a cap on the number of cases a social worker can have at any time, and ordering other specific relief. The district court noted, however, that the relief was limited to “an order compelling state officials to give up some of those resources—funds appropriated by Congress—if federal requirements are not met.” 550 F.Supp. at 327.26 See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1221, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970) (holding that plaintiffs who challenged the state’s plan for making payments pursuant to the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program were entitled to declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction against the payment of federal monies if the state did not develop a plan that conformed with the statute in a reasonable *991 amount of time, but noting that the state is free to use only state funds according to whatever plan it chooses, providing it does not violate the Constitution).
If this Court orders relief for the District’s statutory violations only, the District could simply give up its federal payments in order to relieve itself of a burdensome court order. Plaintiffs would then be left with no effective relief. Because the Court may grant only conditional relief for defendants’ statutory violations, the Court will proceed to reach plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
2. The Legal Standard [7] Plaintiffs allege that they are being deprived of their due process rights under the fifth amendment, including: (1) the right not to be harmed while in state custody, (2) the right to placement in the least restrictive, most appropriate placement, (3) the right to care that is consistent with competent professional judgment, and (4) the right not to be deprived of state or federally created liberty or property rights without due process. Complaint at ¶ 130. As the Court has previously articulated, to establish a constitutional violation under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove that the alleged unconstitutional action amounts to an official policy or custom and that a causal link exists between the policy or custom and the alleged harm. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1987); Carter v. District of Columbia, et al., 795 F.2d 116, 125–26 (D.C.Cir.1986).
Before the Court can apply this standard to the facts of this case, it must determine whether defendants’ actions or nonactions are indeed unconstitutional. This issue has never been conclusively determined by any of the district courts or circuits that have entertained similar child welfare suits.
The biggest obstacle to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims is the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Social Services, et al., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The case involved a young boy who was not in the state’s custody but had been brought to the state’s attention through reports of abuse. After the state social services agency became aware of the boy and established a “Child Protection Team” to recommend measures for his protection, the boy’s father beat him so severely that he will require institutionalization for the rest of his life. The boy’s mother sued under § 1983 on his behalf, arguing that the state had acquired a duty to protect her son because it knew of the danger of abuse to him and had undertaken efforts to provide for his protection. Having entered this “special relationship” with the boy, the mother argued that the state had a duty to protect him competently.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, holding that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” 489 U.S. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 1003. The Court reiterated its prior holdings that the due process clause does not confer an affirmative right to governmental aid. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2688–89, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972).
DeShaney is distinguishable from the case at bar for two reasons. First, the Court in DeShaney acknowledged that “when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” 489 U.S. at 199–200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005. The Court continued by noting that “[h]ad the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.” Id. at 201 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 n. 9. Clearly this is the situation for the plaintiffs in this case *992 who have entered into the District of Columbia’s custody.
The second distinguishing factor is that the plaintiffs in this case argue that the District’s statutes and policies create constitutionally protected liberty and property interests. The District’s violation of these statutes and policies, so their argument goes, violates the due process rights of the children in foster care. This argument was not considered by the Supreme Court in DeShaney because it had not been pleaded in the courts below. See 489 U.S. at 195 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1003 n. 2 (noting that the entitlement argument was made for the first time in petitioners’ Supreme Court brief and thus declining to consider it). Whether either of these distinguishing factors opens the door to holding the District liable for constitutional violations depends upon the scope of plaintiffs’ liberty interests and the scope of the defendants’ duty to prevent the deprivation of those interests.

a. Scope of Plaintiffs’ Liberty Interests
Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are brought pursuant to the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which is applicable to the District of Columbia in the same way as the fourteenth amendment is applicable to the states. The fifth amendment protects persons from being deprived of liberty interests without due process of law. Plaintiffs have asserted that they have liberty interests in freedom from harm while in state custody, placement in the least restrictive, most appropriate foster care placements, and receiving care that is consistent with competent professional judgment.
[8] It is indisputable that plaintiffs have a liberty interest in safe conditions while in state custody. Even convicted criminals subject to state or federal punishment have an interest in their physical security. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Although the scope of plaintiffs’ liberty interest is not entirely clear, the Supreme Court has indicated that it is broader for those in the civil custody of the state than for those in the state’s criminal custody.
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), plaintiff, an involuntarily committed mentally retarded adult, complained that he had suffered repeated injuries and had been subjected to physical restraints while in the state’s custody. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had liberty interests in reasonably safe conditions and freedom from bodily restraint. Id. at 315–16, 102 S.Ct. at 2457–58. The Supreme Court then turned to plaintiff’s claim that he had a right to minimal training in the development of necessary skills. The Court noted that although a state has no general constitutional duty to provide substantive services to its citizens, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977), a duty may arise when a person is in the state’s custody and is dependent upon the state for care. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317, 102 S.Ct. at 2458. The Supreme Court then held that the plaintiff’s liberty interests “require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.” Id. at 319, 102 S.Ct. at 2460. The Court did not need to resolve “the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom.” Id. at 318, 102 S.Ct. at 2459 (footnote omitted).
The Court finds the rights of children in foster care to be analogous to the rights of the involuntarily committed. That is, they have a right to reasonably safe placements in which they will not be harmed.27 This *993 right is not limited to safety from physical harm, although there are certainly instances in which the plaintiffs in this case have been physically harmed. This right extends to safety from psychological and emotional harm. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (mental and emotional distress is a cognizable injury under § 1983). See also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198, 109 S.Ct. at 1005 (once in custody, state has constitutional “duty to assume some responsibility for [a child’s] safety and general well-being”). Whether plaintiffs have a liberty interest in any specific services is a more difficult question, analogous to the question of training addressed by the Supreme Court in Youngberg. In addressing this question, it is important to keep in mind that plaintiffs did not come into the District’s care by choice. They are wards of the District who rely wholly on the District to provide them with all of life’s necessities. They are children and rely on the District to protect them from harm and ensure their well-being. To the extent that certain services, such as appropriate placements and case planning, are essential to preventing harm to the children in the District’s custody, this Court holds that the children have a constitutional liberty interest in those services. This delimitation of the scope of plaintiffs’ liberty interest is consistent with the decision in Youngberg, wherein the Supreme Court limited the plaintiff’s liberty interest in training to just that training necessary to ensure his safety and freedom from bodily restraint.
Plaintiffs’ interests also derive from the District’s own statutes and regulations, which provide precise directives to the DHS for the operation of its child welfare system. To the extent these statutes and regulations confer benefits upon the plaintiffs in the District’s foster care, the deprivation of those benefits takes on constitutional dimensions. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the requirements of procedural due process apply to deprivations of liberty and property interests. According to the Court, property interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit relied in part on Roth to reverse a district court’s dismissal of a foster child’s § 1983 complaint in Taylor By and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc ), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). In that case, the appellate court determined that the Georgia statutes regarding foster care and placement conferred benefits upon children in the care of the state. Specifically, the court held that
[T]he Georgia scheme mandates that officials follow guidelines and take affirmative actions to ensure the well being and promote the welfare of children in foster care. These children can state a claim based upon deprivation of a liberty interest in personal safety when the officials fail to follow this mandate....
It is no moment that the state officials are not charged in this case with affirmatively acting to harm this child. What the child is entitled to is the state’s protection from harm. She is entitled to be protected in the manner provided by statute. It would be anomalous if the state, *994 in allegedly acting to protect the child, could itself cause harm to the child by failing to assume the child’s minimal safety. Failing to act may, under certain circumstances, be more detrimental than acting.
818 F.2d at 799–800. The Georgia statutes at issue in Taylor provided a comprehensive scheme governing the state’s foster care system. The District’s statutes are also comprehensive, requiring the following, among other things: investigations of neglect within 24 hours, D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2102(b); preparation of a plan for each child and family for whom there is a substantiated report of neglect, id. at § 6–2107; limited 90–day stays in emergency placement, id. at § 6–2123; placements in the “least restrictive” settings, “consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child,” CFSD Manual of Operations at § 602.5(a); and the licensure and yearly inspection of youth residential facilities, including foster homes, D.C.Code Ann. at §§ 3–802 and 3–805. See also Part I, supra (outlining mandates of federal and District statutes).
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Taylor provides compelling support for this Court’s definition of the scope of the liberty interests of the plaintiffs who are in the District’s foster care custody. The Court is reluctant, however, to rely wholly on the District’s statutes as the source of constitutional liberty interests for those plaintiffs who are not in the District’s custody.28 The Court recognizes that this issue was explicitly left open by the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, et al., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), which made it clear that the state does not have a general constitutional duty to protect the liberty interests of children who are not in its custody. Without further guidance, the Court is unwilling to hold that the District has acquired such a duty solely by virtue of its own statutes and regulations. Nevertheless, it is without question that the District has neglected its statutory duties, under both federal and local law, to all of the children in the plaintiff class, including those who are not in the District’s foster care custody.
b. Scope of Defendants’ Constitutional Duty
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), the Supreme Court held that determining whether the plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated requires balancing the plaintiff’s liberty interests against any relevant state interests, including fiscal constraints and administrative burdens. Id. at 321, 102 S.Ct. at 2461. The standard for conducting this balancing is not whether the state’s interest is “compelling” or “substantial,” but whether the state exercised professional judgment in choosing what action to undertake. It is not for the court to “ ‘specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.’ ” Id. at 321, 102 S.Ct. at 2461 (quoting the Third Circuit’s opinion in the same case, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir.1980)). Rather, “liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462. Under this standard, the *995 Constitution places a duty upon state agencies to exercise professional judgment when carrying out their responsibilities. The Supreme Court acknowledged in a footnote that expert testimony may be relevant for determining

whether an agency’s decisions substantially depart from the requisite professional judgment. Id. at 323 n. 31, 102 S.Ct. at 2462 n. 31.
The Youngberg case began its journey to the Supreme Court when the district court instructed the jury that they could hold defendants liable only if they found defendants to be “deliberately indifferent” to the serious medical and psychological needs of the plaintiff. This “deliberate indifference” standard was adopted by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), a case involving prisoners’ rights to be free from “cruel and unusual” punishment under the eighth amendment. After the jury found defendants liable, the case was appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed and remanded, holding that the eighth amendment standard was inapplicable. The Third Circuit, however, could not agree on the appropriate standard for review. Recognizing the importance of this question, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court then adopted the “professional judgment” standard set forth above, holding that the district court had erroneously instructed the jury on the eighth amendment deliberate indifference standard.
Since Youngberg, two circuits have had the occasion to consider the two standards in the context of cases involving children in state custody. In Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983), the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a J.N.O.V. after a jury returned a verdict in favor of a plaintiff who had been physically and sexually abused by her foster father. The Second Circuit held that government officials could be held liable under § 1983 for inaction, as well as for affirmative action, in violation of law. In its first decision, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Youngberg, the Second Circuit held that deliberate indifference was a prerequisite to § 1983 liability. 649 F.2d at 141. In its second decision, after remand and after Youngberg, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had articulated a different standard for institutionalized plaintiffs. Because the appeal had been brought by the defendants, however, the court did not have to determine which standard to apply. The court instead noted that “[e]ven if the [Youngberg ] standard of liability is applicable outside of an institutional setting, it is not more favorable to the [defendants] than the deliberate indifference test that was applied.... Consequently, we reject the [defendants’] assertion that the [Youngberg ] decision has effected a change in the controlling law so as to make our prior decision clear error....” 709 F. 2d at 790. Because the Second Circuit was not presented with an opportunity to decide whether Youngberg applies to children in foster care, this Court does not find its decision controlling.
In Taylor By and Through Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc ), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989), decided well after Youngberg, the Eleventh Circuit again applied the deliberate indifference standard to a § 1983 case involving a child in foster care. The court, in reversing in part the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint, held that a child in foster care may prevail under § 1983 “only where it is alleged and the proof shows that the state officials were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the child.” 818 F.2d at 797. At the same time, the Court acknowledged the similarities between the liberty interests of a child in foster care and the liberty interests of the plaintiff in Youngberg. The court specifically declined to address the merits of the child’s claim, stating that “[w]hether the child’s claim constitutes a liberty interest protected by the due process clause when weighed against the demands of society will be determined at later stages in these proceedings.” *996 818 F.2d at 795. This Court finds the Taylor opinion to be ambiguous. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not explain the relationship between the Youngberg standard and the “deliberate indifference” standard, the Court finds little guidance in its decision.
[9] Faced with no clear precedent, it is for this Court to determine whether the Youngberg professional judgment standard applies to children in the state’s foster care custody. The Court finds plaintiffs in this case to be in a much closer position to the plaintiff in Youngberg than to an incarcerated prisoner. As the Youngberg decision recognizes, the rights of a person in the civil custody of the state are greater than the rights of a person in the state’s criminal custody. The foster children that make up the plaintiff class in this case have done society no wrong and they deserve no punishment. It would be inappropriate to force them to endure constitutional deprivations absent a showing of “deliberate indifference” by their caretakers. At the same time, it would be inappropriate to hold caretakers liable for constitutional deprivations when those caretakers had exercised their professional judgment in determining the best course of conduct. Thus, this Court will judge the defendants’ liability based on whether they have exercised competent professional judgment in the administration of the District’s child welfare system.29
3. Defendants’ Violations [10] The Court has held that the plaintiffs in the District’s foster care have liberty interests in personal safety and freedom from harm. The facts of this case establish beyond any doubt that defendants have failed to protect these plaintiffs from harm —whether physical, psychological, or emotional—by failing to place plaintiffs appropriately, failing to prepare case plans, failing to monitor placements, and failing to ensure permanent homes, among other things. Plaintiffs have established these failures in the same way they established defendants’ statutory violations: through the experts’ reports and testimony, the histories of the named plaintiffs, various DHS documents and reports, the testimony of high-level DHS officials, and the defendants’ own admissions.
The defendants have admitted that, for certain periods of time, up to 75 percent of the children in voluntary or emergency care had been in that status for longer than 90 days without the filing of a neglect petition. This status is a form of legal limbo, in which children are suspended with no efforts made to reunite them with their families or to place them in permanent adoptive homes. The defendants have admitted that the CFSD’s social workers are unable to closely monitor families or make regular visits to the children for whom they are responsible. This widespread deficiency contributes to the CFSD’s perpetual state of crisis. The defendants have admitted that the CFSD does not have adequate medical screening facilities for children coming into its care. The risk of harm to these children, as well as to those they may be placed with, is unacceptable. The defendants have admitted that the CFSD often fails to refer children for adoption even when all hope for family reunification is gone. In at least one case, the CFSD lost a relinquishment agreement, signed by a neglected child’s natural mother, that would have freed the child for adoption and paved the way for a permanent family. That child remains in the District’s custody. The defendants have admitted that the CFSD has no reliable automated means of tracking the location of children in its care. When a child is referred for placement, a social worker must start calling foster homes to determine whether they have a vacancy. The defendants have admitted *997 that the CFSD does not regularly inspect the foster homes and institutions in which its wards are placed. This failure has no doubt contributed to the instances of physical abuse that the evidence has shown to occur within some of these facilities.
In the Court’s view, the defendants’ own admissions have established their liability. That the system’s outrageous deficiencies may be the result of staff shortages and excessive caseloads is no help to defendants, whose knowledge of these problems and refusal to take action confirm that the problems are not isolated incidents, but amount to “a persistent, pervasive practice.” The behavior of the defendants also confirms that the decisions made by officials within the DHS have not been the result of the exercise of professional judgment. Plaintiffs’ experts, whose testimony was uncontroverted, established that the District has failed to comply with reasonable professional standards in almost every area of its child welfare system. The testimony of defendants’ own witnesses, several of which are named as defendants, often did little more than support this conclusion. Their candidness in admitting the system’s failures makes it all the more clear that these failures are not the result of choosing among several professionally acceptable alternatives. These failures are the result of making no choices at all.30
Under Youngberg, if defendants have exercised professional judgment in carrying out their constitutional duties, the Court is to balance plaintiffs’ liberty interests against any relevant state interests. In this case, however, the Court has determined that defendants have failed to exercise professional judgment almost as egregiously as they have failed to carry out their constitutional duties. Because of this, defendants’ arguments about fiscal constraints are unavailing. The Court is well aware of the District’s financial plight, but this cannot relieve the District of liability for depriving the children in its foster care of their constitutionally protected liberty interests.
The Court also concludes that plaintiffs have established the causal link between defendants’ constitutional violations and the injuries suffered by the District’s foster care children. The testimony and reports of Dr. Stein and plaintiffs’ other experts demonstrate that most of the children in foster care will acquire or exacerbate permanent psychological disorders such as the “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder” exhibited by each of the named plaintiffs who was examined. The case histories of the named plaintiffs reveal the emotional harm these children have suffered, to the point of attempting suicide, by virtue of the failure of the system to either reunite them with their families or find them adoptive families who will care for them. The

case histories also reveal the physical abuse these children have endured by virtue of the system’s failure to provide for *998 their safety. This is not a case of attempting to protect plaintiffs’ interests and failing; this is a case where all too often no attempt is ever made.
The Court views the evidence in this case as nothing less than outrageous. The District’s dereliction of its responsibilities to the children in its custody is a travesty. Although these children have committed no wrong, they in effect have been punished as though they had. Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that defendants have deprived the children in the District’s foster care of their constitutionally protected liberty interests in violation of § 1983.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the evidence before it and has carefully examined the law. Whatever the limits of the District’s ability to provide for the children in its custody, it is clear that the District is statutorily and constitutionally compelled to do more than it is doing now. For these reasons and all of the reasons in the preceding discussion, the Court holds that defendants have violated § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code by depriving plaintiffs of their statutorily and constitutionally conferred rights.

ORDER
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion issued herewith and for the reasons set forth therein, it is this 18th day of April, 1991,
ORDERED that the defendants are hereby adjudged liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the federal and local statutory rights of all of the children in the plaintiff class and for violating the constitutional rights of those plaintiffs in the District of Columbia’s foster care custody; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that there shall be a status conference on May 10, 1991, at 9:15 a.m., in Courtroom 9, for the purpose of discussing the relief phase of this case. Prior to the status conference, the parties shall make a good faith effort to prepare a joint proposed schedule for resolving the final phase of this case.

Parallel Citations 59 USLW 2651

Footnotes

1

The DHS is the District’s umbrella social services agency. Within it are three commissions, including the Commission on

Social Services (CSS). Within the CSS are five administrations, including the Family Services Administration (FSA). Within

the FSA are three divisions, including the Child and Family Services Division (CFSD), which has the primary responsibility

for the implementation and administration of the child welfare system within the District, including the foster care system.

2

Because several of the original defendants, including former mayor Marion Barry, no longer hold office in the District of

Columbia government, the Court is sua sponte substituting the current officials, including Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon, as

defendants.

3

The defendants in this action, all of whom are sued in their official capacities, are Sharon Pratt Dixon, mayor of the District

of Columbia; Vincent Gray, director of the Department of Human Services; Barbara Burke–Tatum, commissioner of the

Commission on Social Services; Elizabeth Parker, acting administrator of the Family Services Administration; and Evelyn

Andrews, chief of the Child and Family Services Division.

4

Under the Adoption Assistance Act, states receiving federal monies under the Act must make foster care maintenance

payments on behalf of children who are removed from the home as a result of either a voluntary placement agreement entered

into by the child’s parent or legal guardian or a judicial determination that remaining in the home would be contrary to the

child’s welfare and reasonable efforts to prevent placement have been made. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1).

5

The District’s laws governing proceedings in the Family Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court parallel the

case plan requirements. These laws require a report to the court including a plan for providing protective services, the

estimated time in which the goals of intervention may be achieved, and, if the child is in placement, the reasons why the

child cannot be protected in the home and the plans for maximizing contact between the parent and child while the child is

in placement. D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2319(c).

6

Federal law also requires a dispositional hearing no later than 18 months after the original placement, to determine the

future status of the child. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).

7

Professor Walker also serves as chairperson for the direct services clinic at Howard University’s School of Social Work. By

virtue of this position, she is familiar with the policies and practices of the CFSD. Additionally, Professor Walker has served

for 20 years as the senior consultant on child welfare issues for the National Black Child Development Institute. In 1989 she

authored a study funded by the Skillman Foundation on the interventions and outcomes for black children entering foster

care in 1986 in five cities across the country. Currently, Professor Walker serves on the Foster Care Commission of the

Child Welfare League of America.

8

Dr. Stein’s professional accomplishments also include having published 24 articles and six books in the area of child

welfare and presented numerous papers at professional conferences throughout the country. Dr. Stein has conducted

numerous multi-state studies of various aspects of child welfare, many of which have been funded through federal grants.

Dr. Stein has served as a consultant on child welfare policy for the American Bar Association, the United Kingdom, the state

of New Mexico, the city of Philadelphia, and the state of Illinois, among others. His work for the state of New Mexico

included developing a plan for the implementation of a federal court order regarding the state’s child welfare system.

9

Eighty percent of the sample records were for children in foster care or who had been in foster care in the year prior to the

case reading. Nineteen percent were for children who had been the subject of an investigation. One percent was for children

who had never actually been removed from their homes, although the DHS had reported them as being in foster care.

10

Dr. Stein did not review a set percentage of cases of children who had been the subject of an abuse or neglect investigation,

but reviewed a set number—127—of such cases.

11

Plaintiffs originally moved to have members of the Center’s staff appointed as independent experts under rule 706 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. When this motion was denied, plaintiffs engaged the Center staff to prepare the report that was

ultimately entered into evidence.

12

Charlotte Haberaecker, although not a staff member of the Center, also contributed to the Center report and testified at trial.

Ms. Haberaecker is a senior manager of Management Consulting Services in the Office of Government Services at the

accounting firm of Price Waterhouse. She testified as an expert in the types and uses of automated information in public

services programs.

13

The CFSD is responsible for investigating only reports of neglect. The District’s police department is responsible for

investigating reports of abuse. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2104.

14

Ms. Hunter was originally named as a defendant in this action. She retired prior to the trial and defendant Elizabeth Parker is

currently the acting director for the FSA.

15

Between September 1987 and March 1988, the CFSD established a special unit known as the Emergency Care Unit within the

Intensive Services Branch. During the six months the unit operated, it successfully reunited, within the mandatory 90–day

time period, 27 of 68 children referred to it. As a result of budgetary constraints, however, the CFSD disbanded the

Emergency Care Unit in March 1988.

16

According to the testimony of CFSD employees, a “special needs” child is one who is over five years of age, is part of a

sibling group, or has physical or emotional problems.

10

Dr. Stein did not review a set percentage of cases of children who had been the subject of an abuse or neglect investigation,

but reviewed a set number—127—of such cases.

11

Plaintiffs originally moved to have members of the Center’s staff appointed as independent experts under rule 706 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. When this motion was denied, plaintiffs engaged the Center staff to prepare the report that was

ultimately entered into evidence.

12

Charlotte Haberaecker, although not a staff member of the Center, also contributed to the Center report and testified at trial.

Ms. Haberaecker is a senior manager of Management Consulting Services in the Office of Government Services at the

accounting firm of Price Waterhouse. She testified as an expert in the types and uses of automated information in public

services programs.

13

The CFSD is responsible for investigating only reports of neglect. The District’s police department is responsible for

investigating reports of abuse. D.C.Code Ann. § 6–2104.

14

Ms. Hunter was originally named as a defendant in this action. She retired prior to the trial and defendant Elizabeth Parker is

currently the acting director for the FSA.

15

Between September 1987 and March 1988, the CFSD established a special unit known as the Emergency Care Unit within the

Intensive Services Branch. During the six months the unit operated, it successfully reunited, within the mandatory 90–day

time period, 27 of 68 children referred to it. As a result of budgetary constraints, however, the CFSD disbanded the

Emergency Care Unit in March 1988.

16

According to the testimony of CFSD employees, a “special needs” child is one who is over five years of age, is part of a

sibling group, or has physical or emotional problems.

17

Therapeutic foster homes are those in which the foster parents have been specially trained and receive special services to

help them handle special needs children.

18

Defendants stipulated to over 200 facts in this area.

19

The CFSD manual requires biannual reviews rather than annual reviews as required by District law. No explanation has been

provided for this discrepancy; however, Evelyn Andrews testified at trial that the Monitoring Unit is responsible for yearly

visits to traditional foster homes and group homes.

20

The other 15 could not be located.

21

Ms. Meltzer estimates $17,000 per year per child for placement in a foster home with supportive services and $29,000 per

year for placement in St. Ann’s Maternity and Infant Home, where Demerick was placed. The cost for placement in St. Ann’s

is based on the monthly cost as of the summer of 1990.

22

Although defendants did not offer any expert to rebut Ms. Meltzer’s estimates, the Center Report indicates that the Director

of Income Maintenance within the department has previously estimated that the District could realize an additional $10 to

12 million in Adoption Assistance Act funds per year by making a number of administrative changes. This estimate is not

far from Ms. Meltzer’s $14 million estimate.

23

As the Court has previously found, even after the reduction, the caseloads of the CFSD’s social workers far exceed any

reasonable professional standards and make it impossible for the social workers to effectively carry out their functions.

24

The Court’s concerns are fueled by the fact that no written documentation on the goals, objectives, and methodology of the

proposed realignment was supplied to the Court.

25

It should be noted that, although the District of Columbia is not a named defendant in this action, the mayor is named in her

official capacity. Because the mayor is, in essence, the individual embodiment of the District, the Court does not find that

the failure to name the District as a defendant affects its analysis of the applicability of § 1983.

26

Despite the limit of this relief, the court in Lynch chose not to address plaintiff’s constitutional claims at that time. It held,

however, that “[i]f defendants choose not to participate in the program for supplemental funds ..., or fail to submit a revised

plan demonstrating their compliance with the requirements of [the Act], they will be restrained from spending supplemental

funds allotted under [the Act]. In addition, plaintiffs may apply to the court for a hearing on their constitutional claims.”

550 F.Supp. at 354. Unlike this case, which has proceeded through a full trial on the merits, the decision in Lynch was made

at the preliminary injunction stage, after which the parties entered into a settlement.

In the more recent decision in L.J. By and Through Darr v. Massina, No. 84–4409 (July 27, 1987) (reprinted as Addendum

B to L.J. By and Through Darr v. Massina, 699 F.Supp. 508 (1988)), aff’d, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 805 (1989), the Maryland district court was not so reluctant to address the

constitutional issues at the preliminary injunction stage. That court first established that defendants, including the

Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS), had a constitutional duty to protect the children in the city’s

foster care custody. The court then held that due to the “systemic nature of the BCDSS failure to perform that duty,” the

plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims. 699 F.Supp. at 539–40.

27

This holding is supported by the decisions of the District Court of Maryland and the Fourth Circuit. In L.J. By and Through

Darr v. Massina, No. 84–4409 (July 27, 1987) (reprinted as Addendum B to L.J. By and Through Darr v. Massina, 699

F.Supp. 508 (1988)), aff’d, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 805 (1989),

the district court held that the defendants, including the Baltimore City Department of Social Services, had entered into a

“special relationship” with the children in the city’s foster care custody. By virtue of this special relationship, defendants

had acquired an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff foster children. The court went on to hold that the systemic nature of

defendants’ failure to carry out its duty warranted preliminary injunctive relief.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held it unnecessary to reach the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims but it noted that

“[d]efendants do not seriously contend with respect to prospective relief that if plaintiffs prove their allegations, which

they have already demonstrated have an arguably solid foundation, plaintiffs will have proven a violation under the

Fourteenth Amendment.” 838 F.2d at 122. Plaintiffs in L.J., like the plaintiffs in this case, had alleged that systemic

deficiencies in the city’s foster care system violated the Adoption Assistance Act and the Constitution and resulted in

irreparable harm to the city’s foster children.

28

Although many of the plaintiffs in this case are in the District’s custody, others remain in the home or in the care of friends

or relatives after having been the subject of a report of abuse and neglect. The plaintiff class is defined as:

All children who, as the result of alleged or suspected abuse or neglect, are in the legal and/or physical custody of the

District of Columbia Department of Human Services; and the presently-identifiable children who are not in the

Department’s legal or physical custody but who have been the victims, or are at risk, of neglect or abuse of which the

Department knows or should know as a result of notice to or filings with the Department; not including, however, any

member of the class certified in Bobby D. v. Barry, Civil Action Misc. No. 16–77 (D.C.Super.Ct. July 7, 1980), who

remains in the foster-care custody of the Department of Human Services, with respect to those issues addressed by the

judgment entered in that action.

LaShawn A., et al. v. Barry, et al., No. 89–1754, Order Granting Class Certification (January 22, 1990).

29

The Court is also persuaded to reach this conclusion based on the nature of this case. This is not a case like Doe or Taylor in

which the plaintiff seeks money damages. In such cases, a deliberate indifference standard may be warranted due to the

chilling effect that an unfavorable judgment may have on municipal policymakers. Plaintiffs in this case seek injunctive

relief only. In seeking such specific relief, it is particularly appropriate to consider whether the treatment plaintiffs are

currently receiving is the result of competent, professional decisionmaking.

30

The Court notes that although it has applied the professional judgment standard to this case, the result would have been the

same had it used the deliberate indifference standard. The evidence clearly establishes that the Barry Administration was

aware since at least 1987 of the serious deficiencies in the child welfare system. Despite this knowledge, the administration

did virtually nothing to improve the dire situation within the CFSD. The former mayor was warned that children were at risk

due to the lack of social workers and the excessive caseloads those workers handled. At the time of trial, the CFSD was still

barely over half-staffed and social workers still carried caseloads well in excess of professional standards and the division’s

own policy. The former mayor was warned that the CFSD lacked an information system capable of tracking the number and

location of children in its care. At the time of trial, the CFSD had no new system capable of tracking this essential

information. The former mayor was informed that the District was losing millions in federal financing due to administrative

and procedural shortcomings. At the time of trial, the CFSD had not instituted any program for maximizing federal revenues

and continued to forgo millions in federal reimbursements. The list could go on and on, with each of the District’s

shortcomings representing another failure in its duty to protect the children in its care. The lack of action by the Barry

Administration to remedy the system’s defects and properly provide for the plaintiff children represents no less than

deliberate indifference toward the constitutional rights of these children. That the new mayor and her administration may

have the intent to institute reforms cannot alter this conclusion unless that intent is transformed into concrete action or, at

the very least, a concrete plan for action.

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 1 of 7
June 25, 2014
Via Electronic Mail
The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia E. Barrett Prettyman U.S. Courthouse 333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 4012 Washington, DC 20001 thomas_f._hogan@dcd.uscourts.gov
Re: LaShawn A. v. Gray, Civil Action No. 89-1754 (TFH) Supplemental Report on Performance on Select Exit Standards during January – March 2014
Dear Judge Hogan:
At the January 24, 2014 status hearing, the District requested and the Monitor agreed to provide two reports in advance of the July 17, 2014 hearing. The first, which has already been provided, is the full monitoring report for the period July 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. This second supplemental report provides additional data on select Exit Standards from the LaShawn A. v. Gray Implementation and Exit Plan (IEP) for the months of January through March 2014. The Exit Standards selected for this supplemental report were requested by CFSA as some of the areas that remain to be achieved and for which the Monitor would be able to relatively quickly verify the performance data provided by CFSA.
Attached is a summary table of the performance data on the selected standards reprinted from the last full monitoring report (July through December 31, 2013) and in the subsequent first three months of 2014. For each of the 13 Exit Standards assessed, we have also indicated the direction of performance change in the first quarter of 2014. It is important to note that there are 88 standards in the IEP of which 23 remain to be achieved. Thirteen of the 23 are discussed in this report; the additional 10 standards that remain to be achieved and are not discussed in this supplemental report will be reviewed in the next full monitoring report, due to be provided to the Court in November 2014.
1575 Eye Street, NW  Suite 500  Washington, DC  20005  p202.371.1565 50 Broadway  Suite 1504  New York, NY  10004  p212.979.2369 www.cssp.org

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 2 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JANUARY – MARCH 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS June 25, 2014 2|Page
The Exit Standards addressed in the supplemental report include:
1. Timely Initiation of Investigations – 95% of all investigations will be initiated within 48 hours or there will be documented good faith efforts to initiate investigations whenever the alleged victim child(ren) cannot be located (IEP citation I.A.1.a.).
2. Timely Completion of Investigations – 90% of investigations will be completed and a final report of findings shall be entered in FACES.NET within 35 days (IEP citation I.A.1.b.).
3. Comprehensive Review on New Investigations with Four or More Reports – 90% of the case records for families subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth of greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months will have documentation of a comprehensive review (IEP citation I.A.1.c.).
4. Social Worker Visitation for Children Experiencing a New Placement or Placement Change – 90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described (IEP citation I.A.6.a.-c.).
5. Visitation between Parents and Workers – 80% of parents will have twice monthly visitation with workers in the first three months post-placement or there will be documentation that the parents are unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency (IEP citation I.B.10.).
6. Visitation between Parents and Children – 85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought or there will be documentation that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite the Agency’s efforts (IEP citation I.B.11.).
7. Reduction of Multiple Placements for Children in Care – Children served in foster care shall have two or fewer placements; different performance levels are required based upon the length of time children are in care (IEP citation I.B.13.).

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 3 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JANUARY – MARCH 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS June 25, 2014 3|Page
8. Timely Approval of Foster/Adoptive Parents – 70% of homes licensed beginning November 1, 2010, will have been approved, and interested parties will be notified within 150 days or there is documentation that the delay (beyond 150 days) is due to something beyond the Agency’s control (IEP citation I.B.14.).
9. Community-based Service Referrals for Low & Moderate Risk Families – 90% of families who have been the subject to a report of abuse and/or neglect, whose circumstances are deemed to place a child in their care at low or moderate risk of abuse and neglect and who are in need of and agree to additional supports shall be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for follow-up (IEP citation I.C.19.).
10. Health Screenings for Children in Foster Care prior to Placement – 95% of children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to an initial placement or re-entry into care and 90% of children in foster care who experience a placement change shall have a replacement health screening (IEP citation I.C.22.a.).
11. Full Medical Evaluations for Children in Foster Care – 85% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement and 95% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement (IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.).
12. Full Dental Evaluations for Children in Foster Care – 25% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement; 50% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of placement; and 85% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement (IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.).
13. Receipt of Medicaid Numbers and Cards – 90% of children’s caregivers shall be provided with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement (IEP citation I.C.22.d.).
Below the Monitor summarizes the supplemental findings by substantive area of the LaShawn IEP. Overall, the data point to continued progress as there were improvements in seven of the 13 Exit Standards reviewed for this three month period.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 4 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JANUARY – MARCH 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS June 25, 2014 4|Page
Summary of Findings:
Investigative Practice and Referrals for Community-based Services:
Four LaShawn Exit Standards related to investigations are included in this report. Two of the standards showed continued improvement and performance data for two of the three months met the IEP Exit Standard (IEP citation I.A.1.c. – completion of comprehensive reviews of the case history and current circumstances for families who are subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months and IEP citation I.C.19. – community-based service referrals for low and moderate risk families).1
Performance on initiating investigations with 48 hours (IEP citation I.A.1.a.) remained unchanged with between 88 and 91 percent of investigations initiated within 48 hours between January and March 2014. This is slightly below the required Exit Standard of 95 percent performance.
Performance on the fourth measure of investigative practice included in this supplemental report – timely completion of investigations (IEP citation I.A.1.b.) – has declined since the July through December 2013 monitoring period. Compliance has steadily decreased between January and March 2014, and in March 2014, 48 percent of investigations were completed within 35 days and as of the last day of the month, 105 investigations were in backlog status, having been open for longer than 35 days. The Monitor thinks and CFSA agrees that this decrease in performance is related to caseload pressure in CPS investigative units. Although we have not yet validated the caseload data for this period, CFSA data for February and March 2014 shows a significant increase in the percentage of workers whose caseloads are above the required standard of no more than 12 investigations per worker.2 CFSA noted the caseload decline in its reporting to the Monitor and immediately initiated steps to address the decline by hiring additional workers and
1 The Exit Standard for comprehensive reviews has been at compliance levels for five of the past six months reviewed (October 2013 through March 2014). 2 In February 2014, CFSA reports that 77 percent of investigative workers had caseloads of 12 or fewer and two workers were responsible for more than 15 investigations. In March 2014, CFSA reports that 64 percent of investigative workers had caseloads of 12 or fewer and 10 were responsible for more than 15 investigations.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 5 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JANUARY – MARCH 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS June 25, 2014 5|Page
is currently reviewing the investigations open longer than 35 days to determine barriers as well as service needs for the families.
Visits:
Three LaShawn Exit Standards related to visits (IEP citation I.A.6.a.- c. – visitation between social workers and children when they are newly placed or replaced; IEP citation I.B.10. – visitation between social workers and parents; and IEP citation I.B.11. – visitation between parents and children) are included in this supplemental report. Performance data for the first quarter of 2014 show that visitation between parents and children with a goal of reunification has improved since the July through December 2013 monitoring period, increasing from a monthly range of 64 to 66 percent to a monthly range between January and March 2014 of 73 to 75 percent. Data show that worker visits to children during the first four weeks of placement and worker visits to parents with a goal of reunification continued at approximately the same level achieved during the previous monitoring period.
Placement and Placement Support:
Data for two LaShawn Exit Standards related to placement and placement support are included in the supplemental report (IEP citation I.B.13. – reduction of multiple placements and IEP citation I.B.14. – timely licensure of foster parents). The Exit Standard related to placement stability has three subparts, reflecting differing levels of expected performance for children in care for different periods of time (12 months or less, between 12 and 24 months and greater than two years). CFSA’s performance on the sub-part related to children in care for two or more years has been at or above compliance levels as since January 2011 and was maintained in this three month period. Additionally, during the first quarter of 2014, CFSA data show improvements to compliance levels in the second sub-part of this Exit Standard which requires that children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12 months but less than 24 months have two or fewer placements. These improvements in the reduction of multiple placements for children in CFSA care for two years or less are the result of changes to the placement process which allow for better matching caregivers and placement settings to children’s needs and improvements in the availability of supports for caregivers which promote stability of placement.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 6 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JANUARY – MARCH 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS June 25, 2014 6|Page
CFSA also continues to demonstrate improvement and has performed at required levels in the first three months of 2014 in timely approval of foster parents, reaching 74 percent of homes licensed within the required 150 day timeframe. This is a considerable improvement from the data for the last half of 2013 which showed 59 percent of homes achieving timely licensure.
Well-Being:
January through March 2014 performance data for four health and dental care LaShawn Exit Standards are included in the supplemental report (IEP citation I.C.22.a. – health screening prior to placement, re-entry or replacement; IEP citation I.C.22.b.i. – full medical evaluation after placement; IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii. – full dental evaluation after placement; and IEP citation I.C.22.d. – caregiver receipt of Medicaid number and card).
CFSA has made some improvement in the monthly range of performance toward completion of initial, re-entry and replacement health screenings and timely comprehensive medical evaluations. Completion of full dental evaluations within 90 days of placement has declined slightly to the lower level of monthly performance found in the July through December 2013 monitoring period with a monthly range between January and March 2014 of 78 to 80 percent; this sub-part of the full dental evaluation Exit Standard requires 85 percent. There was no change in performance on receipt of Medicaid number or cards, although CFSA reports that they have recently developed a new process with the Department of Human Services to issues Medicaid cards timely.
Amendments to May 2014 Progress Report:
Subsequent to our providing the Court with the progress report for the July through December 2013 monitoring period, CFSA provided supplemental data for two Exit Standards. These corrected performance data will be included in subsequent reporting and are detailed below for notification to the Court:

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123 Filed 07/11/14 Page 7 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JANUARY – MARCH 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS June 25, 2014 7|Page
• IEP citation I.C.22.d. – Receipt of documentation of Medicaid coverage The monitoring report indicated that in August 2013, no applicable foster parents received the child’s Medicaid number within five days of placement. Based upon supplemental data provided, compliance in August 2013 is 81 percent.3
• IEP citation I.B.11. – Visitation between parents and children The monitoring report provided that in December 2013, 66 percent of applicable children had weekly visits with their parents. Based upon the supplemental data provided, compliance in December 2013 is 65 percent.4
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Judith Meltzer Deputy Director Court-appointed Monitor, LaShawn A. v. Gray cc: Marcia Lowry, CRI
Adam Dembrow, CRI Kate Wood, CRI Brenda Donald, Director, CFSA Beatriz Otero, Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services Richard Love, OAG Lucy Pittman, Deputy General Counsel Mary Williams, CFSA Thea Cohen, Clerk, US District Court
3 The IEP requires a performance level of 90 percent. 4 The IEP requires a performance level of 85 percent.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 1 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

SUMMARY TABLE OF SELECT LaSHAWN A. v. GRAY IMPLEMENTATION AND EXIT PLAN STANDARD PERFORMANCE between January and March 2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

February 2014 Performance

March 2014 Performance

Direction
of Change2

1. Investigations: Investigations of

95% of all investigations will

alleged child abuse and neglect shall be be initiated within 48 hours or

initiated or documented good faith efforts shall be made to initiate investigations within 48 hours after receipt of a report to

there will be documented good faith efforts to initiate investigations whenever the

Monthly range of 83 – 90%

91%

89%

88%

↔

the hotline of child maltreatment.

alleged victim child(ren)

(IEP citation I.A.1.a.)

cannot be immediately located.

2. Investigations: Investigations of

90% of investigations will be

alleged child abuse and neglect shall be completed and a final report of

completed within 30 days after receipt of findings shall be entered in

a report to the hotline of child maltreatment and the final report of

FACES.NET within 35 days. Monthly range

62%

of 58 – 74%

61%

48%

↓

findings for each investigation shall be

completed within five days of the

completion of the investigation.

(IEP citation I.A.1.b.)

1 Data from July – December 2013 are reprinted from the May 14, 2014 monitoring report. 2 For direction of change, “” indicates that, in the Monitor’s judgment based on data and an understanding of case practice, performance is trending upwards generally by at least three percentage points; “” indicates performance is trending downward generally by at least three percentage points; “↔” indicates that, in the Monitor’s judgment, there has been no change in performance.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 2 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

February 2014 Performance

March 2014 Performance

Direction
of Change2

3. Investigations: For families who are 90% of the case records for

subject to a new investigation for whom families subject to a new

the current report of child maltreatment is investigation for whom the

the fourth or greater report of child

current report of child

maltreatment, with the most recent report maltreatment is the fourth or Monthly range

occurring within the last 12 months,

greater report of child

of 76 – 94%

96%

87%

93%

↑

CFSA will conduct a comprehensive

maltreatment, with the most

review of the case history and the current recent report occurring within

circumstances that bring the family to

the last 12 months will have

CFSA’s attention.

documentation of a

(IEP citation I.A.1.c.) comprehensive review.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 3 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement
10. Visitation for Children Experiencing a New Placement or a Placement Change:
a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case management responsibility shall make at least two visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.
b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse care manager shall make two additional visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.
c. At least one of the above visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall be in the child’s home. (IEP citation I.A.6.a-c.)3

Exit Standard
90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described.

July – December
2013 Performance1
a.-c. Monthly range of 75 – 87% of applicable children had four visits in first four weeks of new placement or placement change.

January 2014 Performance
a.-c. 82%4

February 2014 Performance
a.-c. 87%5

March 2014 Performance
a.-c. 85%6

Direction of
Change2
↔

3 Subsection d. of this standard was not newly assessed for this supplemental report and therefore is not included in the Table. 4 In January 2014, there were 105 children applicable to this measure and 85 had been in the new placement for four weeks; 78 (92%) of these children had at least three visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change. 5 In February 2014, there were 106 children applicable to this measure and 85 had been in the new placement for four weeks; 81 (95%) of these children had at least three visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change. 6 In March 2014, there were 116 children applicable to this measure and 91 had been in the new placement for four weeks; 88 (97%) of these children received at least three visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 4 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

February 2014 Performance

March 2014 Performance

Direction
of Change2

18. Visits between Parents and Workers:
a. For children with a permanency goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case-management responsibility shall visit with the parent(s) at least one time per month in the first three months postplacement.
b. A CFSA social worker, nurse care manager or family support worker shall make a second visit during each month for the first three months postplacement.
(IEP citation I.B.10.)

80% of parents will have twice monthly visitation with workers in the first three months post-placement. 7

Between October – December 2013, monthly range of 48 – 72%

73%8

59%9

62%10

↔

7 This Exit Standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency. 8 Of the 45 applicable parents, 32 had twice monthly visits with a worker and for one additional parent, there was documentation in the record that the parent was unavailable or
refuses to cooperate with the Agency despite efforts by the Agency. 9 Of the 32 applicable parents, 19 had twice monthly visits with a worker. 10 Of the 45 applicable parents, 27 had twice monthly visits with a worker and for one additional parent, there was documentation in the record that the parent was unavailable or
refuses to cooperate with the Agency despite efforts by the Agency.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 5 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement
19. Visits between Parents and Children: There shall be weekly visits between parents and children with a goal of reunification unless clinically inappropriate and approved by the Family Court. In cases in which visitation does not occur, the Agency shall demonstrate and there shall be documentation in the case record that visitation was not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it.
(IEP citation I.B.11.)

Exit Standard
85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought. 11

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

Between October – December 2013, monthly range of 64 – 66%

73%12

February 2014 Performance
75%13

March 2014 Performance
74%14

Direction of
Change2
↑

23. Reduction of Multiple Placements for a. Of all children served in

Children in Care:

(IEP citation I.B.13.)

foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care at least 8 days

Monthly range of 79 – 82%

81%

81%

82%

↑

and less than 12 months,

83% shall have had two or

fewer placements.

11 This Exit Standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it. 12 Of the 302 applicable children, 213 had weekly visits with their parents and for an additional eight children, there was documentation in the record that visits could not occur despite efforts by the Agency. 13 Of the 304 applicable children, 223 had weekly visits with their parents and for an additional six children, there was documentation in the record that visits could not occur despite efforts by the Agency. 14 Of the 315 applicable children, 224 had weekly visits with their parents and for an additional 10 children, there was documentation in the record that visits could not occur despite efforts by the Agency.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 6 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

b. Of all children served in

foster care during the

previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12 months but less than 24

Monthly range of 47 – 56%

months, 60% shall have

had two or fewer

placements.

c. Of all children served in

foster care during the

previous 12 months who were in care for at least 24 months, 75% shall have

Monthly range of 74 – 78%

had two or fewer

placements in that 12

month period.

January 2014 Performance
60%
76%

February 2014 Performance
60%
77%

March 2014 Performance
63%
76%

Direction
of Change2

24. Timely Approval of Foster/Adoptive 70% of homes licensed

59% of foster

Parents: CFSA shall have in place a

beginning November 1, 2010, homes

process for recruiting, studying and

will have been approved, and licensed

approving families, including relative

interested parties will have

caregivers, interested in becoming foster been notified within 150

between July – December

74% (42/57) of foster homes licensed between January and March 2014 received their license

↑

or adoptive parents that results in the

days. 15

2013 received

within 150 days.

necessary training, home studies and

their license

decisions on approval being completed

within 150

within 150 days of beginning training.

days.

(IEP citation I.B.14.)

15 The Exit Standard is satisfied where there is documentation that establishes that failure to meet the 150 day timeline is due to delays that are beyond the control of the District of Columbia.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 7 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

February 2014 Performance

March 2014 Performance

Direction
of Change2

35. Community-based Service Referrals for Low & Moderate Risk Families:
(IEP citation I.C.19.)

90% of families who have been the subject of a report of abuse and/or neglect, whose circumstances are deemed to place a child in their care at low or moderate risk of abuse and neglect and who are in need of and agree to additional supports shall be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for followup. Low and moderate risk cases for which CFSA decides to open an ongoing CFSA case are excluded from this requirement.

Monthly range of 43 – 89% of applicable closed investigations were referred to a Collaborative or community agency.

86%16

89%17

95%18

↑

39. Health and Dental Care: Children in 95% of children in foster care Initial and re-

foster care shall have a health screening shall have a health screening

prior to placement.

prior to an initial placement or

(IEP citation I.C.22.a.) re-entry into care.

entries: monthly range of 87 – 100%

Initial and reentries: 94%

Initial and reentries: 100%

Initial and reentries: 92%

90% of children in foster care who experience a placement

Replacements: monthly range

Replacements: Replacements:

87%

89%

Replacements: 86%

↑

change shall have a

of 83 – 87%

replacement health screening.

16 In January 2014, 18 of the 21 applicable families with investigations closed that month were referred to a Collaborative or community agency. 17 In February 2014, 25 of the 28 applicable families with investigations closed that month were referred to a Collaborative or community agency. 18 In March 2014, 37 of the 39 applicable families with investigations closed that month were referred to a Collaborative or community agency.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 8 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

February 2014 Performance

March 2014 Performance

Direction
of Change2

40. Health and Dental Care: Children in 85% of children in foster care Within 30

foster care shall receive a full medical

shall receive a full medical

days: monthly

evaluation within 30 days of placement. evaluation within 30 days of range of 74 – Within 30

Within 30 days: Within 30

(IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.) placement.

83%

days: 77%

88%

days: 78%

95% of children in foster care Within 60

Within 60

Within 60

Within 60

↑

shall receive a full medical

days: monthly days19: 97% days20: 97%

days21: 96%

evaluation within 60 days of range of 86 –

placement.

97%

41. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.)

25% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
50% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of placement.
85% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement.

Within 30 days: monthly range of 51 – 79%
Within 60 days: monthly range of 75 – 90%
Within 90 days: monthly range of 79 – 92%

Within 30 days: 37%
Within 60 days: 76%
Within 90 days: 80%

Within 30 days: Within 30

42%

days: 51%

Within 60 days: Within 60

69%

days: 73%

Within 90 days: Within 90

78%

days: 80%

↔

19 All of the children who received a comprehensive medical evaluation between 31 – 60 days after placement received this evaluation within 45 days of placement. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1123-1 Filed 07/11/14 Page 9 of 9
Attachment to June 25, 2014 Letter to The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

July – December
2013 Performance1

January 2014 Performance

February 2014 Performance

March 2014 Performance

Direction
of Change2

43. Health and Dental Care: CFSA shall ensure the prompt completion and submission of appropriate health insurance paperwork, and shall keep records of, e.g., Medicaid application dates, HMO severance dates, and enrollment dates. CFSA shall provide caregivers with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of every placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.d.)

90% of children’s caregivers shall be provided with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.

Monthly range of 0 – 92% of foster parents received the Medicaid number within five days of the child’s placement.
Monthly range of 0 – 35% of foster parents received the Medicaid card within 45 days of the child’s placement.

Medicaid number: 84%
Medicaid card: 0%

Medicaid number: 83%
Medicaid card: 17%

Medicaid number: 85%
Medicaid card: 4%

↔

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 1 of 7
December 22, 2014
Via Electronic Mail
The Honorable Thomas F. Hogan U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia E. Barrett Prettyman U.S. Courthouse 333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 4012 Washington, DC 20001 thomas_f._hogan@dcd.uscourts.gov
Re: LaShawn A. v. Gray, Civil Action No. 89-1754 (TFH) Supplemental Report on Performance on Select Exit Standards during July – October 2014
Dear Judge Hogan:
On November 17, 2014, the Monitor provided the Court with the LaShawn A. v. Gray Progress Report for the Period January 1 – June 30, 2014 which is scheduled to be discussed during the January 7, 2015 status hearing. At the request of District officials, the Monitor has agreed to provide the Court and parties with performance data for select Exit Standards where more recent performance data were available and could be verified prior to the January 2015 status hearing. Attached is a summary table with these additional data on select Exit Standards from the LaShawn A. v. Gray Implementation and Exit Plan (IEP) for the months of July through October 2014. The Exit Standards selected for this supplemental report are some of the areas in the IEP that remain to be achieved and for which the Monitor was able to verify the performance data provided by CFSA in an expedited timeframe.
Of the 88 Exit Standards in the IEP, there are 17 (19%) standards that remain to be achieved as of June 30, 2014; this supplemental report provides additional performance data for nine of those Exit Standards and for investigative caseloads is a subpart of a previously achieved Exit Standard that is now designated as an Outcome to be Maintained.1 The attached summary table of the performance data on the selected standards includes data reprinted from the last full monitoring
1 For IEP citation I.A.6. (visits for children experiencing a new placement or placement change), only a subpart of the Exit Standard is included. Subpart d. of the Exit Standard was not newly assessed and is not included in the supplemental report.
1575 Eye Street, NW  Suite 500  Washington, DC  20005  p202.371.1565 50 Broadway  Suite 1504  New York, NY  10004  p212.979.2369 www.cssp.org

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 2 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JULY – OCTOBER 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS December 22, 2014 2|Page
report (January 1 – June 30, 2014) and adds performance data for the subsequent four months of 20142. For each Exit Standards assessed, we have also indicated the direction of recent performance change. Complete performance for July through December 2014 for all Exit Standards will be included in the next full monitoring report, due to be provided to the Court in May 2015.
Below is a listing of the Exit Standards for which additional data has been provided and the summary finding from the analysis of that data:
1. Timely Initiation of Investigations (IEP citation I.A.1.a.) Exit Standard: 95% of all investigations will be initiated within 48 hours or there will be documented good faith efforts to initiate investigations whenever the alleged victim child(ren) cannot be located.
Data for July – October 2014: CFSA’s performance on timely initiation of investigations showed improvement between July and October 2014. In October 2014, with 92 percent of investigations were initiated within 48 hours or there was documentation that good faith efforts were made. Monthly performance between January and June 2014 ranged from 84 to 91 percent.
2. Timely Completion of Investigations (IEP citation I.A.1.b.)
Exit Standard: 90% of investigations will be completed and a final report of findings shall be entered in FACES.NET within 35 days.
Data for July – October 2014: – Performance for the timely completion of investigations remains unchanged since the January through June 2014 monitoring period. Compliance ranged from 36 to 62 percent between January and June 2014 and ranged from 36 to 56 percent between July and October 2014. Improvements over the previous period have been noted in the number of investigations in backlog status (those having been open for longer than 35 days) – from 229 in June 2014 down to 107 in October 2014.
2 For those Exit Standards where data is not yet available for October 2014, it is noted as such in the summary table.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 3 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JULY – OCTOBER 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS December 22, 2014 3|Page
3. Investigative Worker Caseloads (IEP citation I.D.25.a.) Exit Standard: 90% of investigators will have caseloads that do not exceed 1:12 investigations. No individual investigator shall have a caseload greater than 15 cases.
Data for July – October 2014: During the previous monitoring period, the percentage of CPS investigators who met the required standard declined from 100 percent in January to 48 percent in June 2014. CFSA has worked intensively to hire and train addition workers and caseloads did begin to improve between July and October 2014. In this four month period, investigation caseload compliance ranged from 77 to 88 percent.
4. Social Worker Visitation for Children Experiencing a New Placement or Placement Change (IEP citation I.A.6.a.-c.)
Exit Standard: 90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described.
Data for July – September 2014: Performance remains unchanged since the previous period. Monthly performance for January through June 2014 ranged from 77 to 87 percent and July through September 2014 performance ranged from 81 to 85 percent. Performance is thus close to but not yet meeting the IEP Exit standard.
5. Visitation between Parents and Workers (IEP citation I.B.10.)
Exit Standard: 80% of parents will have twice monthly visitation with workers in the first three months post-placement or there will be documentation that the parents are unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.
Data for July – September 2014: Performance data for the third quarter of 2014 show that visitation between parents and workers improved since the January through June 2014 monitoring period, increasing from a monthly range of 59 to 73 percent to 76 to 81 percent between July and September 2014. For the first time, CFSA met the required level of performance during the months of August and September 2014.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 4 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JULY – OCTOBER 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS December 22, 2014 4|Page
6. Visitation between Parents and Children (IEP citation I.B.11.)
Exit Standard: 85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought or there will be documentation that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite the Agency’s efforts.
Data for July – September 2014: Performance remains unchanged from the previous monitoring period. January through June 2014 performance ranged from 69 to 82 percent and performance between July and September ranged from 75 to 78 percent.
7. Timely Permanency through Reunification, Adoption or Legal Guardianship (IEP citation I.B.16.c.)
Exit Standard: Required performance is based on the fiscal year and timely permanency as of September 30, 2014 for three cohorts of children in foster care – those who entered care for first time in FY2013 and remained in care for 8 days or longer (45% will achieve permanency), those children in foster care for more than 12 months but less than 25 months (45% will achieve permanency) and those children in foster care for 25 months or more (40% will achieve permanency).
Data as of September 30, 2014: Compared to performance in FY2013, CFSA performance declined for the first cohort, slightly improved for the second cohort and improved for the third cohort of children/youth. For those in care for more than 8 days but less than 12 months, 36 percent achieved permanency in FY2014 compared to 48 percent in FY2013. For those in care for more than 12 months but less than 25 months, 40 percent achieved permanency in FY2014 compared to 38 percent in FY2013 and for those in care for more than 25 months, 28 percent achieved permanency in FY2014 compared to 20 percent in FY2013. Performance on permanency exits for none of the three cohorts of children have met the IEP Exit Standards.
8. Health Screenings for Children in Foster Care prior to Placement (IEP citation I.C.22.a.)
Exit Standard: 95% of children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to an initial placement or re-entry into care and 90% of children in foster care who experience a placement change shall have a replacement health screening.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 5 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JULY – OCTOBER 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS December 22, 2014 5|Page
Data for July – October 2014: Performance toward completion of health screenings prior to an initial placement or re-entry into care showed improvement over the previous period (January – June 2014 performance monthly range of 78 – 100% and July – October 2014 performance monthly range of 93 – 100%). Completion of replacement health screenings for children experiencing a placement change remained the same (January – June 2014 performance monthly range of 77 – 89% and July – October 2014 performance monthly range of 77 – 88%).
9. Full Medical Evaluations for Children in Foster Care (IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.)
Exit Standard: 85% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement and 95% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement.
Data for July – October 2014: There are two subparts to this Exit Standard and improvements over the previous period were seen for completion of full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement (January – June 2014 performance monthly range of 77 – 88% and July – October 2014 performance monthly range of 82 – 92%). For the second part of the Exit Standard – full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement – performance remains the same as the previous period (January – June 2014 performance monthly range of 94 – 97% and July – October 2014 performance monthly range of 90 – 98%). Notably, in September and October 2014, CFSA met the required level of performance for both subparts of this Exit Standard.
10. Full Dental Evaluations for Children in Foster Care (IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.)
Exit Standard: 25% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement; 50% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of placement; and 85% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement.
Data for July – October 2014: There are three subparts to this Exit Standard, and overall, CFSA demonstrated improvement in all subparts and met the required level of performance for all subparts in August, September and October 2014. Completion of full dental evaluations within 30 days of placement increased from a monthly range of 37 to 54 percent between January and June 2014 to a monthly range of 47 to 69 percent between July and October 2014. Completion of

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 6 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JULY – OCTOBER 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS December 22, 2014 6|Page
full dental evaluations within 60 days of placement increased from a monthly range of 64 to 82 percent between January and June 2014 to a monthly range of 74 to 88 percent between July and October 2014. And, for the final subpart of the Exit Standard related to completion of full dental evaluations within 90 days of placement, the monthly range of performance increased from 64 to 88 percent between January and June 2014 to a monthly range of 81 to 91 percent between July and October 2014.
Leadership Transition
Since we have filed the monitoring report with the Court, we have been informed a major leadership transition that will occur in 2015. Director Brenda Donald who has spearheaded the improvements at CFSA over the last three and half years has accepted the appointment as the new Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services under Mayor Muriel Bowser’s administration. Director Donald will transition to her new position on January 2, 2015, where she will support the Mayor in coordinating comprehensive services across multiple agencies including CFSA, Department of Behavioral Health, Department on Disability Services, Department of Health, Department of Health Care Finance, Department of Human Services, Department of Parks and Recreation, Department of Youth Rehabilitative Services, Office of Disability Rights and Office on Aging. Director Donald has named Raymond Davidson, Deputy Director of Administration, as the interim Director of CFSA while the District conducts a search for her permanent replacement. Director Donald is scheduled to discuss the transition with counsel for Plaintiffs on December 22, 2014.
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Judith Meltzer Deputy Director Court-appointed Monitor, LaShawn A. v. Gray
cc: Marcia Lowry, A Better Childhood, Inc. Sara Glasser, A Better Childhood, Inc.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1135 Filed 12/30/14 Page 7 of 7
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR JULY – OCTOBER 2014 PERFORMANCE ON SELECT EXIT STANDARDS December 22, 2014 7|Page
Brenda Donald, Director, CFSA Beatriz Otero, Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services Richard Love, OAG Lucy Pittman, Deputy General Counsel Mary Williams, CFSA Cameron Currie, Clerk, US District Court

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 1 of 183
LASHAWN A. V. BOWSER PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1 – DECEMBER 31, 2014
May 15, 2015

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 2 of 183

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 3 of 183
LaShawn A. v. Bowser Progress Report for the Period July 1 – December 31, 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 A. Methodology ..........................................................................................................1 B. Report Structure .......................................................................................................4
II. SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE ..............................................................................5 III. SUMMARY TABLES OF LASHAWN A. v. BOWSER
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXIT PLAN PERFORMANCE ................................... 10 Table 1: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes
to be Achieved Between July 1 and December 31, 2014 ..............................10 Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes
to be Maintained Between July 1 and December 31, 2014...........................23 IV. DISCUSSION OF LASHAWN A. v. BOWSER
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXIT PLAN OUTCOMES ...........................................59 A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY ......................................................................................59
1. Hotline…..........................................................................................................60 2. Investigations ..................................................................................................62 3. Family Assessments ........................................................................................73 4. Services to Families and Children to Promote Safety,
Permanency and Well-Being ..........................................................................78 5. Visitation ........................................................................................................84
i

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B. GOAL: PERMANENCY ......................................................................................99 1. Relative Resources ...........................................................................................99 2. Placement of Children .....................................................................................99 3. Reduction of Multiple Placements for Children in Care ..............................103 4. Timely Approval of Foster Parents................................................................109 5. Appropriate Permanency Goals .....................................................................111 6. Timely Adoption and Permanency ................................................................113 7. Case Planning Process ...................................................................................120
C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING .........................................................................127 1. Sibling Placements and Visits .......................................................................127 2. Assessments for Children Experiencing a Placement Disruption..................127 3. Health and Dental Care .................................................................................128
D. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY ........................................................................141 1. Caseloads .......................................................................................................141 2. Staff Training .................................................................................................145 3. Training for Foster and Adoptive Parents .....................................................146 4. Special Corrective Action ..............................................................................147 5. Reviewing Child Fatalities ............................................................................149 6. Quality Assurance ..........................................................................................151 7. Financing........................................................................................................153
APPENDICES A. Glossary of Acronyms B. 2014 LaShawn Strategy Plan C. 2015 LaShawn Strategy Plan
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
1. Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Achieved Between July 1 and December 31, 2014..........................................................10
2. Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained Between July 1 and December 31, 2014 .......................................................23
3. Number of Calls to Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline by DR Pathway (July – December 2014) ...................................................................................................61
4. Service Referrals to Collaborative or Community-based Agency for Family Assessments (July – December 2014) .................................................................77
5. Acceptable Performance on QSR Indicators Used to Assess Services to Children and Families to Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being ....................83
6. Demographics of Children in Out-of-Home Placement as of December 31, 2014 ................................................................................................101
7. Children and Youth Exiting to Permanency by Cohort as of December 31, 2014 ................................................................................................117
8. Acceptable Performance on QSR Indicators Used to Assess Case Planning Process ....................................................................................................125
9. Investigative Social Worker Caseloads (July – December 2014) .................................................................................................144
10. Family Assessment (FA) Social Workers Caseloads (July – December 2014) .................................................................................................145
11. Number of Children in Special Corrective Action Categories by Month (July – December 2014).................................................................................148
12. Actual and Budgeted Gross Title IV-E Federal Funds Operating Budget (FY2009 – FY2015) .......................................................................................................154
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1. Timely Initiation of Investigations (December 2012 – December 2014) ........................63 2. Timely Initiation of Investigations (July – December 2014) ...........................................64 3. Timely Completion of Investigations (June 2011 – December 2014) .............................65 4. Timely Completion of Investigations (July – December 2014) .......................................66
5. Completion of Reviews for Families Subject to a New Investigation for Whom the Current Report is the Fourth or Greater Report Within the Last 12 Months (December 2012 – December 2014) ....................................68
6. Completion of Reviews for Families Subject to a New Investigation for Whom the Current Report is the Fourth or Greater Report Within the Last 12 Months (July – December 2014) .......................................................69
7. Investigations Determined to be of Acceptable Quality (June 2011 – December 2014)..........................................................................................70
8. Community-based Services Referrals for Low and Moderate Risk Families (October 2012 – December 2014).............................................72
9. Community-based Services Referrals for Low and Moderate Risk Families (July – December 2014)............................................................73
10. Initiation of FA within 3 and 5 Days (July – December 2014) ........................................75 11. Closure of FA within 45 Days of Referral to Hotline (July – December 2014) ..............76 12. QSR Implementing Supports and Services Indicator Parameters to
Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance .............................79 13. QSR Pathway to Case Closure Indicator Parameters to Consider
and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance ............................................80 14. QSR Findings on Services to Families and Children to
Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being (CY2010 – CY2014) ..............................81 15. QSR Findings on Services to Children and Families to Promote
Safety, Permanency and Well-Being (July – December 2014)........................................82
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16. Children Receiving In-Home Services: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits (June 2012 – December 2014) .....................................................85
17. Children Receiving In-Home Services: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits (July – December 2014)...............................................................86
18. Children in Out-of-Home Care: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits (June 2012 – December 2014)..........................................................................................87
19. Children in Out-of-Home Care: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits (July – December 2014) ...................................................................................................88
20. Required Number of Visits to Children in New Placements (June 2011 – December 2014)..........................................................................................89
21. Required Number of Worker Visits to Children in New Placements (July – December 2014) ...................................................................................................90
22. Children Experiencing a Placement Change: Safety Fully Assessed during All Required Visits in the Month (June 2013 – December 2014) ........................91
23. Children Experiencing a Placement Change: Safety Fully Assessed during All Required Visits in the Month (July – December 2014) ..................................92
24. Percentage of Households with Twice Monthly Visits between Workers and Parents with Goal of Reunification (December 2011 – December 2014) .................93
25. Percentage of Households with Twice Monthly Visits between Workers and Parents with Goal of Reunification (July – December 2014) ..........................................94
26. Percentage of Children with Goal of Reunification who Visit Weekly with the Parent with whom Reunification is Sought (December 2011 – December 2014) ................................................................................95
27. Percentage of Children with Goal of Reunification who Visit Weekly with the Parent with whom Reunification is Sought (July – December 2014) ........................96
28. Number of Children in Out-of-Home Placements by Year (CY2005 – CY2014) ......................................................................................................100
29. Placement Service Type for Children in Out-of-Home Care as of December 31, 2014 ................................................................................................102
30. Children in Foster Care at Least 8 Days and Less than 12 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements (June 2011 – December 2014) ..........................................104
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31. Children in Foster Care at Least 8 Days and Less than 12 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements (July – December 2014)....................................................105
32. Children in Foster Care at Least 12 Months but Less than 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements (June 2011 – December 2014)........................106
33. Children in Foster Care at Least 12 Months but Less Than 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements (July – December 2014) .................................107
34. Children in Foster Care at Least 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements During a 12-Month Period (June 2011 – December 2014) .........................107
35. Children in Foster Care at Least 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements During a 12-Month Period (July – December 2014) ..................................108
36. Approval of Foster Parents within 150 Days of Beginning Training (July 2012 – December 2014) ........................................................................................109
37. Youth Ages 18 and Older with a Youth Transition Plan (January 2012 – December 2014) ..................................................................................111
38. Children Placed in Pre-Adoptive Home Within 9 Months of Goal Change to Adoption (January 2012 – December 2014) ....................................113
39. Timely Permanency for Children (September 2011 – September 2014) .......................115 i. Timely Permanency for Children in Care for 8 days or longer ii. Timely Permanency for Children in Care between 12 and 25 months
iii. Timely Permanency for Children in Care for 25 months or longer
40. QSR Planning Interventions Indicator Parameters to Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance ...........................................121
41. QSR Pathway to Case Closure Indicator Parameters to Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance ...........................................122
42. QSR Findings on Case Planning Process (CY2010 – CY2014) ....................................123
43. QSR Findings on Case Planning Process (July – December 2014) ...............................124
44. Percentage of Children who Received a Health Screening Prior to Placement (Initial or Re-Entries) (June 2011 – December 2014) .....................129
45. Percentage of Placement Activities where Children Received a Health Screening Prior to Re-Placement (for Children with Multiple Placements) (June 2011 – December 2014)........................................................................................130
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46. Percentage of Children who Received a Health Screening Prior to Placement (Initial and Re-Entries) and Re-Placement (July – December 2014) .................................................................................................131
47. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Medical Evaluation Within 30 Days of Placement (December 2010 – December 2014) ..............................132
48. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Medical Evaluation Within 60 Days of Placement (December 2010 – December 2014) ..............................133
49. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Medical Evaluation Within 30 and 60 Days of Placement (July – December 2014) .....................................134
50. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation Within 30 Days of Placement (December 2010 – December 2014) ..............................135
51. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation Within 60 Days of Placement (December 2010 – December 2014) ..............................136
52. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation Within 90 Days of Placement (December 2010 – December 2014) ..............................136
53. Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation (July – December 2014) .................................................................................................137
54. Medicaid Number and Medicaid Card Distribution to Foster Parents (June 2013 – December 2014)........................................................................................138
55. Percentage of Foster Parents who Received Child’s Medicaid Number within Five Days of the Child’s Placement (July – December 2014) ............................139
56. Percentage of Foster Parents who Received Child’s Medicaid Number within 45 Days of the Child’s Placement (July – December 2014) ...............................140
57. Caseloads for Permanency and In-home Social Workers (July – December 2014) .................................................................................................142
58. Percentage of Investigative Workers who Met Exit Standard Requirements for Caseloads (December 2011 – December 2014) .............................................................143
59. Percentage of Foster/Adoptive Parents with 30 Hours of In-Service Training (June 2012 – December 2014)........................................................................................147
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LaShawn A. v. Bowser Progress Report for the Period July 1 – December 31, 2014
I. INTRODUCTION
This report on performance of the District of Columbia’s child welfare system for the period of July 1 through December 31, 2014 is prepared by the LaShawn A. v. Bowser court-appointed Monitor, the Center for the Study of Social Policy (CSSP). As monitor, CSSP is responsible to the Honorable Thomas F. Hogan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and is required to independently assess the District of Columbia’s performance in meeting the outcomes and Exit Standards set by the LaShawn Implementation and Exit Plan (IEP)1 in accordance with the LaShawn Modified Final Order (MFO)2.
The IEP establishes the Court’s expectations regarding the outcomes and performance levels to be achieved and sustained in order to fulfill the requirements of the LaShawn MFO. The IEP includes: Section I: Outcomes to be Achieved; Section II: Outcomes to be Maintained; Section III: Sustainability and Exit; and Section IV: Strategy Plan, which is updated annually.3 For each of the outcomes, an Exit Standard(s) has been identified and is the benchmark against which outcome achievement and sustained performance is measured.
The Monitor’s last report on LaShawn implementation was released on November 17, 2014, with a supplemental report provided to the court on December 22, 2014. With few exceptions, this current report is based on data on performance from July 1 through December 31, 2014 to determine progress in meeting the IEP Exit Standards and the objectives of the 2014 Strategy Plan.
A. Methodology
The primary sources of information about performance are data provided by the District’s Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) and verified by the Monitor. The Monitor reviews extensive aggregate and back-up data and has access to staff and electronic case records on FACES.NET4 to verify performance.

1 Implementation and Exit Plan (Dkt. No. 1073), December 17, 2010. 2 Modified Final Order (Dkt. No. 222 (order adopting MFO); Dkt. No. 222-2 (MFO)), January 27, 1994. 3 The District filed the 2014 Strategy Plan with the Court on February 18, 2014 after consultation with the Monitor and Plaintiffs’
counsel (Dkt. No. 1121-1). See Appendix B. 4 FACES.NET is CFSA’s automated child welfare information system.

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The Monitor conducted the following supplementary verification and data collection activities during this period:

 Review of Young Children Placed in Congregate Care Settings

The Monitor and CFSA staff reviewed records of all children under the age of 12 who were placed in a congregate care setting for more than 30 days, including those children under the age of six who were placed in congregate care settings for any length of time, during the review period to determine if these placements were appropriate and met an agreed upon placement exception.

 Review of Children Who were Adopted over 12 Months from Placements in PreAdoptive Home

The Monitor and CFSA staff reviewed adoption cases that were finalized between July and December 2014 and took longer than 12 months from placement in pre-adoptive home to determine if reasonable efforts had been made to finalize the adoption despite the delays.

 Validation of Timely Licensure of Foster and Adoptive Parents

The Monitor conducted additional validation of licensure data for those foster and adoptive parents whose licensure took more than 150 days to determine if the delay was due to circumstances outside the District’s control.

 Validation of Training Data

The Monitor conducted additional validation of pre-service training data for foster parents, social workers and supervisors and in-service training data for foster parents.

 Validation of Caseload Data

The Monitor conducted an independent validation of caseload data for CFSA and private agency social workers for the period between July and December 2014. The Monitor validated caseload size and assignment of cases to social workers for ongoing permanency cases, in-home cases, investigations and family assessments5. The Monitor also validated data to determine if

5 CFSA has stated its view that family assessments (FA), which are now part of the District’s response to allegations of child abuse and neglect, are not covered by the provisions of the LaShawn MFO and IEP. CFSA has argued that since FAs are not “investigations,” they are not subject to IEP standards and should be reported on differently by the Monitor than other IEP Exit Standards. The Monitor does not agree with this position; the District implemented the FA pathway as part of a new approach to responding to allegations of child abuse and neglect. While it is true that the practice of differential response and the FA pathway were not contemplated or used by CFSA at the time the IEP was established, it is part of the District’s child protective services (CPS) response which is covered by the LaShawn MFO and IEP. With the inclusion of FA as an appropriate CPS response, many

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individual supervisors were assigned to supervise no more than five case carrying social workers and one case aide.
 Validation of Quality of Investigations
During this monitoring period, CFSA provided the Monitor with data on its findings from a review of the quality of 132 child protective services investigations completed between July and December 2014. The Monitor conducted a secondary review of the case records and contact notes for 51 (39%) of these investigations.
 Quality Service Reviews (QSR)
Most of the LaShawn Exit Standards are assessed using administrative data from FACES.NET, which are reviewed and in many areas, independently validated by the Monitor. CFSA also provides supplementary manual data, both from internal case record reviews and Quality Service Reviews (QSR), for assessing performance for selected Exit Standards. The QSR is a case-based qualitative review process that requires interviews with all of the key persons who are working with and are familiar with the child and/or family whose case is under review. Using a structured protocol, trained QSR reviewers synthesize the information gathered and rate how well the child is functioning and how the system is performing to support the child and family. Reviewers provide direct feedback to social workers and supervisors as well as a written summary of findings to expand and justify QSR ratings. As part of LaShawn monitoring, the Monitor conducts some of the QSRs, participates in oral case presentations6 and also verifies data from QSRs conducted by CFSA staff. Monitor staff work collaboratively with CFSA and typically are lead reviewers for at least two reviews each month.7
Between July and December 2014, a total of 125 QSRs were completed to assess case planning and service delivery outcomes. Twenty-four of the 125 QSRs were conducted on children receiving in-home services and the remaining 101 QSRs were focused on children placed in outof-home care. In designing the QSR sample for 2014, there was an intentional increase in the number of in-home cases included to more closely examine in-home case practice through this methodology and collect data on strengths and areas of challenge in case practice and policy for in-home services.

of the referrals that were previously addressed using the CPS investigation pathway are now directed to the FA pathway. CFSA staff report that family assessment workers follow the same protocols as investigators with respect to safety assessments. The Monitor has taken the position that the caseload standard for FA workers is the same as for investigative workers as the nature of the work with the family and children is comparable. The Monitor has also taken the position that it is within the purview of the LaShawn MFO and IEP that the Monitor fully assess and evaluate FA as an integral part of the District’s CPS response. 6 Each case is presented to a panel consisting of CFSA representatives from the QSR unit, Monitor staff and the Department of Behavioral Health, as appropriate. The case presentation is used to ensure inter-rate reliability on ratings across reviews. 7 CSSP provided lead reviewers for 23 QSRs in CY2014 and CSSP staff participated in almost all oral case presentations during this period.

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 Other Monitoring Activities
The Monitor attends numerous CFSA meetings including management team meetings, policy workgroup meetings and the CFSA Internal Child Fatality Review Committee, as well as the City-wide Child Fatality Review Committee. The Monitor also meets frequently with senior leadership and managers throughout the Agency. During this monitoring period, Monitor staff observed several Trauma Systems Therapy (TST) implementation meetings, RED (review, evaluate and direct) Team implementation meetings and several different types of RED Team meetings8. Additionally, the Monitor interviewed and collected information from external stakeholders of the District of Columbia’s child welfare system, including contracted service providers and advocacy organizations.
B. Report Structure
The monitoring report assesses the District of Columbia child welfare system’s performance in meeting the IEP Exit Standards, as defined in the December 17, 2010 Court Order, during July through December 2014. Section II provides a summary of the District’s progress in improving outcomes during this six month period. In Section III, the summary tables provide the Court with a consolidated update of the District’s performance as of December 2014 on the IEP Outcomes remaining to be achieved and the Outcomes previously achieved that need to be maintained.9 Section IV provides further discussion of the data, an assessment of whether the District has met the required Exit Standard(s) for IEP Outcomes to be Achieved and for some measures, maintained required performance for IEP Outcomes to be Maintained. Section IV also includes information on CFSA’s implementation of specific strategies included in the 2014 LaShawn Strategy Plan.

8 The RED Team framework provides multiple consultation and information sharing opportunities at certain decision points within a case for child welfare workers, and in some cases families, to review relevant information about a family and the risk of child maltreatment, evaluate that information and direct a decision. 9 In some instances where December 2014 performance data are not available, the most recent performance data are cited with applicable timeframes.

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II. SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE
The District’s Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) has been engaged for the past few years in a transformational process to improve its approaches, services and results for the District’s children and families. A strategic framework was developed in 2012 which structures the child welfare system’s s work into four pillars:
 safe reduction of entries of children and youth into foster care,  use of foster care as a temporary safe haven for abused or neglected children,  improved well-being outcomes for children served by the system and  timely achievement of permanency for children and youth temporarily or permanently
separated from their families.
In implementing its strategic framework, the CFSA has incorporated several child welfare best practice innovations – investing in new strategies that have been implemented or are now in process of being fully implemented. As is documented in our most recent monitoring reports, CFSA has also made progress on meeting LaShawn IEP Exit Standards that were not previously achieved and has successfully maintained required performance on most of the standards that were already achieved.
Several of the most important initiatives have required multiple actions over several years including planning and development; creating and adopting new protocols; modifying data systems to allow for the collection and analysis of data for tracking and assessment; training many staff and external partners; and investing in and contracting for new service interventions. As an example, to improve decision making throughout the Agency with the goal of achieving positive child and family outcomes, CFSA adopted a new consultation and information sharing framework which was first introduced to CFSA staff as the RED Team (Review, Evaluate, Direct) process. This framework requires workers and supervisors to more systematically review family and case history, family strengths and needs and to consult with multiple members of CFSA staff and partner/provider agencies when making decisions about how and when to intervene in a child and family’s life. The RED team process and decision making framework is now being spread throughout the Agency’s key decision points. The goal is to use a consistent framework and process when making decisions at the hotline; during an investigation or family assessment; when deciding to open and close an in-home child protection case; in deciding whether a child needs to enter foster care; and in planning for and taking actions to achieve permanency and/or to assist older youth to successfully transition from care. When fully implemented, the framework is intended to guide critical thinking and supervision in ways that CFSA believes will improve case practice and outcomes on all levels.

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Another transformational initiative has been the system’s adoption of Trauma Systems Therapy (TST) as a tool for both understanding trauma and its behavioral manifestations in children who have been subject to abuse and/or neglect and as a therapeutic approach to assessment and treatment. Through its TST work, CFSA is in the process of revising its protocols and tools for the assessments of children and families; training staff, providers and foster parents; and introducing new treatment interventions. This effort, like the RED team framework, is a multiyear work in progress and is supported by a federal demonstration grant.
A third major initiative has been the systems’ adoption of a differential response framework which directs that not every call to the hotline requires an investigation of child abuse or neglect. With proper consideration of safety issues and safeguards, many families are now serviced through a family assessment pathway which does not require a finding of child abuse or neglect but rather seeks to engage families in services and supports to improve family functioning and better meet family needs.
These and other efforts – underway for the past several years – have produced results as evidenced by the significant reduction in the number of children and youth in foster care and CFSA’s improved performance on many additional LaShawn Exit Standards. At the same time, as we have identified in prior monitoring reports, the application of these reforms across the system remains inconsistent and case level data point to several core areas of Agency practice around permanency, well-being and case planning where additional improvement and outcome achievement is still needed. Further, even though the number of children and youth in foster care was dramatically reduced, the system needs a wider array of supportive treatment resources with providers skilled at helping children and youth heal and thrive. Overall the District’s child welfare system has set an ambitious and appropriate path, taking advantage of the most current research and incorporating advances in technology and practice, but it is also a system that continues to struggle with consistent quality in some areas.
With the transition to a new Mayor in January 2015, there have been leadership changes at CFSA. In January 2015, Brenda Donald, who had ably served as CFSA’s Director since January 2012 and who created a team to lead the transformational efforts described above, was appointed by Mayor Muriel Bowser as the new Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services. Raymond Davidson who had served as CFSA’s Deputy Director of Administration was appointed as Director on May 8, 2015. CFSA also had two new Deputy Directors selected in January 2015 – Michele Rosenberg, previously CFSA’s chief of staff, was named Deputy Director for Program Operations and Marie Morilus-Black, previously Child and Youth Services Director with the DC Department of Behavioral Health, was named CFSA’s Deputy Director for Well-Being. All three of these leaders bring a commitment to continue to implement CFSA’s strategic directions and improvement strategies.

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Progress on IEP Exit Standards
As of the end of this monitoring period, of the 88 Exit Standards included in the LaShawn IEP, the District has now met 74 (84%), including two newly achieved this monitoring period. Performance for the majority of Exit Standards previously designated as Outcomes to be Maintained remained at compliance levels this period; the Monitor has determined that those few Exit Standards where performance fell below the required level represent either temporary or insubstantial deviations in performance. 10 Fourteen Exit Standards remain to be achieved. These include Exit Standards related to investigative practice; services to families and children to promote safety, permanency and well-being; assessing and documenting safety during worker visits; frequency of visits to children newly placed or replaced in the month; frequency of visits between parents and workers; frequency of visits between children and parents with whom reunification is sought; timely permanency; case planning process; and timely distribution of Medicaid numbers and cards to placement providers.
The two newly met standards are both health outcomes – full medical evaluations for children in foster care (IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.) and full dental evaluations for children in foster care (IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.). The achievement of these Exit Standards demonstrates CFSA’s attention and focus on well-being outcomes and how CFSA’s overall health system for children has developed. CFSA now has in place a placement screening and a health appointment system that allows for flexible and timely scheduling with workers and caregivers for children’s preplacement screenings and comprehensive medical evaluations; a cadre of nurse care managers who are assigned in cases where children require more intensive oversight and coordination of their medical care and who consult with investigators and in-home workers to provide advice and guidance; and functional internal tracking mechanisms to ensure that children receive timely health care. QSR ratings on the health status for children and youth continue to be high, with 92 percent of cases reviewed acceptable.11
Similar to the improvements discussed in CFSA’s health delivery and management system, there are other significant areas of strength within the child welfare system that are described in more

10 The Exit Standards designated as Outcomes to be Maintained that fell below the required level and the Monitor has determined are either temporary or insubstantial deviations include: comprehensive review of case history or families subject to a new investigation for whom the current report is the fourth or greater (IEP citation I.A.1.c.); timely approval of foster/adoptive parents (IEP citation I.B.14.); legal action to free children for adoption (IEP citation I.B.15.a.); placement of children in approved adoptive home within 9 months of goal change to adoption (IEP citation I.B.16.a.i.); children in pre-adoptive homes will have their adoption finalized, or documentation of reasonable efforts to finalize, within 12 months of placement (IEP citation I.B.16.b.iii.); in-service training for foster parents (IEP citation I.D.29.b.); licensing and placement standards (IEP citation II.B.11.); and foster parent board rates (IEP citation II.H.27). The following Outcomes to be Maintained were partially maintained this period: worker visitation to families with in-home services (IEP citation I.A.4.a.-b.); caseloads (IEP citation I.D.25.); supervisory responsibilities (IEP citation I.D.26.a.&b.); special corrective action plans (IEP citation I.D.30.); and timely completion of investigations of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions (IEP citation II.A.5.). 11 As discussed later in this report, the remaining health indicators to be achieved include distribution of Medicaid numbers and Medicaid cards to placement providers in a timely manner. New strategies are being considered as part of the 2015 LaShawn Strategy Plan to resolve this issue.

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detail in this report that have contributed to the District’s ability to have achieved 84 percent of required IEP Exit Standards.
Children are routinely placed in family-based settings and there is recognition that placement with kin should be the first inquiry with initial placements and throughout the life of a case. As of December 31, 2014, 83 percent of children were placed in family-based settings, including 23 percent in kinship homes. CFSA has achieved and continues to meet the standards related to the appropriate placement of young children in the least restrictive setting and in reducing multiple placements for children in care. Appropriate placement for older youth continues to be a challenge.
The capabilities of CFSA’s data information system and continuous quality improvement processes continue to evolve. The data system allows for real time tracking of outcomes and is increasingly able to provide supervisors and managers with the information needed to support the workforce with training, clinical guidance and time management.
Continuing Challenges and Concerns
As much as has been accomplished, there remain important LaShawn standards and outcomes that have not yet been achieved and some measures around the quality of case planning and service delivery where performance has declined. One of these areas where CFSA continues to struggle is with regards to several components of child abuse and neglect investigative practice. Caseloads for investigative workers continue to be above the standard required by the IEP and, as a result, the timely closure of investigations and quality of investigations are not yet at the Exit Standard target.
Several measures used to assess the quality of case practice have shown decline this period and are of particular concern to the Monitor. QSR data are used to assess performance on the appropriate provision of services to children and families and the quality of the case planning process. For both measures, performance has not reached compliance levels and there was a significant decline between CY2013 and CY2014; services to families and children performance declined from 51 percent to 35 percent of cases rated as acceptable and case planning process performance declined from 61 percent to 46 percent of cases rated as acceptable. Additionally, performance on social workers assessment and documentation of safety during visits to children at home with their families or in out-of-home placement remains far below the required target.
In the Monitor’s assessment, despite having put critically important building blocks in place, there remains a disconnect between the policy and program directions and the consistent implementation of new services and supports for families and workers, including communitybased services and RED Teams, and the integration of these services and supports into practice

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with families. At the core of effective interventions with families who come to the attention of the child welfare system and central to CFSA’s case practice model is effective engagement with children and families and appropriate assessment of presenting and underlying needs of children, birth parents and substitute caregivers. CFSA needs to and is now appropriately focusing on the consistent application of its strategies with its own staff and with private providers. In order to see steady improvements in performance on the quality case practice measures, it is essential that CFSA continue to focus attention on engagement and assessment strategies to ensure that planning and appropriate supports and services are put in place in ways that can support families to move forward to safe case closure.
Performance data for practices and outcomes with in-home child protective services cases are lower than for cases involving children in out-of-home placement and have not shown improvement in this recent monitoring period. CFSA only partially maintained the Exit Standard for frequency of social worker visits to families and children receiving in-home services; QSR data for case planning and service delivery is lower for in-home service cases than out-of-home cases; and assessment and documentation of safety for in-home service cases declined from an already low performance level.
Finally, CFSA’s performance on permanency measures for children in out-of-home care continue to remain a challenge. While current data show improvement in moving children who have been in care more than 12 months toward permanency, CFSA has not met the required level of performance for any of the cohorts within the permanency measure remaining to be achieved.
With these remaining challenges in mind, the 2015 LaShawn Strategy Plan was developed through consultation with the Monitor and Plaintiffs’ counsel to focus attention on the specific Exit Standards that have not been achieved but within the context of the Agency’s overall strategic direction. The Plan includes strategies to address the challenges discussed in this section, including: timely closure of investigations, investigative worker caseloads, quality of investigations, services to families and children, case planning process, distribution of Medicaid cards, assessing and documenting safety during visits and timely permanency. The Strategy Plan was filed with the Court on March 26, 2015 and is attached as Appendix C.

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III. SUMMARY TABLES OF LaSHAWN A. v. BOWSER IMPLEMENTATION AND EXIT PLAN PERFORMANCE

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

1. Investigations: Investigations of alleged child

95% of all investigations will be initiated Monthly range Monthly range

abuse and neglect shall be initiated or documented good faith efforts shall be made to initiate

within 48 hours or there will be

84 – 91%

documented good faith efforts to initiate

of 83 – 95%16

Partially17

↑

investigations within 48 hours after receipt of a

investigations whenever the alleged

report to the hotline of child maltreatment.

victim child(ren) cannot be immediately

(IEP citation I.A.1.a.) located.

12 In most instances, performance data in this column reflects January through June 2014 performance data as reported in the November 2014 monitoring report. CY2013 QSR data and FY2013 permanency cohort data are included in this column for applicable Exit Standards for comparison purposes. 13 In some instances where December 2014 performance data are not available, the most recent performance data are cited with applicable timeframes. For some Exit Standards, the Monitor provides a range of data over the monitoring period to better illustrate performance. More detailed information on CFSA’s performance toward specific Exit Standards
is provided in subsequent sections of this report. 14 “Yes” indicates that, in the Monitor’s judgment based on presently available information, CFSA’s performance satisfies the Exit Standard requirement. “Yes” may be used for Outcomes to be Maintained in Table 2 of this report if performance deviation from the Exit Standard requirement is determined by the Monitor to be insubstantial or temporary. “Partially” is used when CFSA has come very close but has not fully met an Exit Standard requirement or in instances where Exit Standards have more than one part and CFSA has fulfilled some but not all parts of the Exit Standard requirement. “No” indicates that, in the Monitor’s judgment, CFSA’s performance is below the designated Exit Standard
requirement. 15 Where applicable, “” indicates that, in the Monitor’s judgment based on data and an understanding of case practice, performance is trending upwards generally by at least 3 percent; “” indicates performance is trending downward generally by at least 3 percent; “↔” indicates that, in the Monitor’s judgment, there has been no change in performance; and “N/A” indicates a judgment regarding direction of change is not applicable to the Exit Standard during the monitoring period. 16 Monthly performance data for timely initiation of investigations are as follows: July, 83%; August, 86%; September, 90%; October, 92%; November, 95%; December, 94%. 17 CFSA’s performance continued to improve this period and met the required level of performance in November and was within 3 percent in October and December.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

2. Investigations: Investigations of alleged child

90% of investigations will be completed Monthly range Monthly range

abuse and neglect shall be completed within 30 days and a final report of findings shall be

after receipt of a report to the hotline of child

entered in FACES.NET within 35 days.

of 36 – 62%

of 36 – 56%18, 19

No

maltreatment and the final report of findings for each

↓

investigation shall be completed within five days of

the completion of the investigation.

(IEP citation I.A.1.b.)

4. Acceptable Investigations: CFSA shall routinely conduct investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect.20
(IEP citation I.A.2.)

80% of investigations will be of acceptable quality.

67% of

69% of

investigations investigations of

No

of acceptable acceptable

quality.

quality.21

↔

18 Monthly performance data for timely completion of investigations are as follows: July, 36%; August, 42%; September, 44%; October, 56%; November, 39%; December, 43%. 19 During this monitoring period, CFSA reports the following backlog: July, 190 investigations; August, 140 investigations; September, 88 investigations; October, 107 investigations; November, 145 investigations; December, 131 investigations. 20 Evidence of acceptable investigations includes: (a) Use of CFSA’s screening tool in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations; (b) Interviews with and information obtained from the five core contacts – the victim child(ren), the maltreater, the reporting source (when known), medical resources, and educational resources (for school-aged children); (c) Interviews with collateral contacts that are likely to provide information about the child’s safety and well-being; (d) Interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, or documentation, by the worker, of good-faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child; (e) Medical and mental health evaluations of the children or parents when the worker determines that such evaluations are needed to complete the investigation, except where a parent refuses to consent to such evaluations. When a parent refuses to consent to such an evaluation, the investigative social worker and supervisor shall consult with the Assistant Attorney General to determine whether court intervention is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the child(ren); (f) Use of risk assessment protocol in making decisions resulting from an investigation; and (g) Initiation of services during the investigation to prevent unnecessary removal of children from their homes. 21 Performance data were collected through a review of 132 investigations closed between July and December 2014. Investigations were reviewed by CFSA and the Monitor conducted a secondary review of 39% of these investigations for validation purposes.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

5. Services to Families and Children to Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being: Appropriate services, including all services identified in a child or family’s safety plan or case plan shall be offered and children/families shall be assisted to use services to support child safety, permanence and well-being.

In 80% of cases, appropriate services, including all services identified in a child’s or family’s safety plan or case plan shall be offered along with an offer of instruction or assistance to children/families regarding the use of

51% of cases were acceptable based on CY2013 QSR data.

35% of cases were acceptable based on CY2014 QSR data.22

No

↓

CFSA shall provide for or arrange for services through operational commitments from District of Columbia public agencies and/or contracts with private providers. Services shall include:

those services. The Monitor will determine performance-based on the QSR Implementation and Pathway to Safe Closure indicators.

a. Services to enable children who have been the

subject of an abuse/neglect report to avoid

placement and to remain safely in their own

homes;

b. Services to enable children who have or will be returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those families and avoid replacement into foster care;

c. Services to avoid disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized and avoid the need for replacement; and

d. Services to prevent the disruption of a beneficial foster care placement and avoid the need for replacement.
(IEP citation I.A.3.)

22 Data collected during QSRs conducted in CY2014 determined that 54% of cases (67 of 125) were acceptable on the Implementation of Supports and Services indicator, 54% of cases (67 of 125) were acceptable on Pathway to Case Closure indicator and 35% (44 of 125) were acceptable on both indicators.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

7. Worker Visitation to Families with In-Home

90% of cases will have documentation

Monthly range Monthly range

Services: Workers are responsible for assessing and verifying each child was visited and seen of 42 – 58%

of 30 – 51%23, 24

documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and outside the presence of the caretaker and

No

↓

environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that safety was assessed during each visit.

that brought this family to the attention of the

Agency) of each child at every visit and each child

must be separately interviewed at least monthly

outside of the presence of the caretaker.

(IEP citation I.A.4.c.)

9. Worker Visitation to Children in Out-of-Home Care: Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns

90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was seen outside the presence of the caretaker by a worker and that safety was assessed during each visit.

Monthly range of 40 – 59%

Monthly range of 44 – 72%25, 26

No

↑

that brought this family to the attention of the

Agency) of each child at every visit and each child

over two years old must be separately interviewed at

least monthly outside of the presence of the

caretaker.

(IEP citation I.A.5.d.)

23 Monthly performance for assessing and documenting safety during visits for in-home cases are as follows: July, 30%; August, 30%; September, 47%; October, 51%; November, 38%; December, 38%. 24 Performance data are based upon a non-statistically significant sample of children applicable to this Exit Standard during the monitoring period. The Monitor has not validated the manual data provided by CFSA given CFSA’s current performance on this Exit Standard is not near compliance levels. 25 Monthly performance for assessing and documenting safety during visits for out-of-home cases are as follows: July, 44%; August, 52%; September, 72%; October, 60%; November, 72%; December, 60%. 26 Performance data are based upon a non-statistically significant sample of children applicable to this Exit Standard during the monitoring period. The Monitor has not validated the manual data provided by CFSA given CFSA’s current performance on this Exit Standard is not near compliance levels.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

10. Visitation for Children Experiencing a New Placement or a Placement Change: a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social
worker with case management responsibility shall make at least two visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.

90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described.

a.-c. Monthly range of 77 – 87% of applicable children had four visits in first four weeks of new

a.-c. Monthly range of 66 – 85% of applicable children had four visits in first four weeks of new

No

b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse care manager shall make two additional visits to each

placement or placement change.

placement or
placement change.27

child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.

d. Between

d. Monthly

March – May range of 52 –

c. At least one of the above visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall be in the child’s home.

2014, a conversation regarding assistance

82% 28

d. At least one of the visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall include a conversation between the social worker and the resource parent to assess assistance needed by the resource parent from the Agency. (IEP citation I.A.6.a-d.)

needed by the resource parent occurred with the resource parent in 60% of new placements or

placement

changes.

↔

27 Monthly performance data are as follows: July, 81%; August, 85%; September, 81%; October, 79%; November, 77%; December, 66%. Data indicate that the number of children who had been in the new placement for 4 weeks and received at least 3 or more visits during the first 4 weeks of a new placement or placement change are as follows: July, 91%; August, 93%; September, 94%; October, 92%; November, 93%; December, 77%. 28 Performance data are based upon a record review of a non-statistically significant sample of children applicable to this Exit Standard.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

11. Visitation for Children Experiencing a New

90% of cases will have documentation

Monthly range Monthly range

Placement or a Placement Change: Workers are

verifying each child was seen outside the of 10 – 40%

of 28 – 58% 29,

responsible for assessing and documenting the safety presence of the caretaker by a social (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors worker and that safety was assessed

30

No

↑

and the initial safety concerns that brought this

during each visit.

family to the attention of the Agency) of each child

at every visit and each child must be separately

interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence

of the caretaker.

(IEP citation I.A.6.e.)

29 Monthly performance for assessing and documenting safety during visits to children experiencing a placement change are as follows: July, 28%; August, 58%; September, 50%; October, 56%; November, 52%; December, 44%. 30 Performance data are based upon a non-statistically significant sample of children applicable to this Exit Standard during the monitoring period. The Monitor has not validated the manual data provided by CFSA given CFSA’s current performance on this Exit Standard is not near compliance levels.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

18. Visits between Parents and Workers:

80% of parents will have twice monthly Monthly range Monthly range

a. For children with a permanency goal of

visitation with workers in the first three

reunification, in accordance with the case plan, months post-placement.31

of 59 – 73%

of 74 – 81%32

Partially33

↑

the CFSA social worker or private agency social

worker with case-management responsibility

shall visit with the parent(s) at least one time per

month in the first three months post-placement.

b. A CFSA social worker, nurse care manager or family support worker shall make a second visit during each month for the first three months post-placement.
(IEP citation I.B.10.)

31 This Exit Standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency. 32 Reported performance includes instances where there was documentation in the record that the parent was unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency despite efforts by the Agency. Monthly performance are as follows: July, 76%; August, 81%; September, 80%; October, 76%; November, 77%; December, 74%. 33 CFSA met the required level of performance during 2 months this period and was within 3 percent during one additional month. The Monitor considers this Exit Standard to be
partially achieved.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

19. Visits between Parents and Children: There shall be weekly visits between parents and children with a goal of reunification unless clinically inappropriate and approved by the Family Court. In cases in which visitation does not occur, the Agency shall

85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought.34

Monthly range Monthly range

of 69 – 82%

of 73 – 78%35

No

↔

demonstrate and there shall be documentation in the

case record that visitation was not in the child’s best

interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur

despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it.

(IEP citation I.B.11.)

34 This Exit Standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it. 35 Reported performance includes instances where there was documentation in the record that visits did not occur because it was not in the child’s best interest, was clinically inappropriate or could not occur despite efforts by the Agency. Monthly performance are as follows: July, 78%; August, 76%; September, 75%; October, 76%; November, 73%; December, 76%.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

32. Timely Adoption: Timely permanency through reunification, adoption or legal guardianship.

i. Of all children who entered foster care for the first time in FY2012 and who remain in foster care for 8 days or

As of September 30, 2013, 48% of

As of September 30, 2014, 36% of children in

(IEP citation I.B.16.c.)

longer, 45% will achieve permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship,

the children in this cohort

this cohort

achieved

adoption or non-relative guardianship) achieved

permanency.

No

by September 30, 2013.

permanency.

↔

ii. Of all children who are in foster care for more than 12 but less than 25 months on September 30, 2011, 45% will be discharged from foster care to permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2013.

As of September 30, 2013, 38% of the children in this cohort achieved permanency.

As of September 30, 2014, 40% of children in this cohort achieved permanency.

iii. Of all children who are in foster care for 25 months or longer on September 30, 2011, 40% will be discharged through reunification, adoption, legal guardianship prior to their 21st birthday or by September 30, 2013, whichever is earlier.

As of September 30, 2013, 20% of the children in this cohort achieved permanency.

As of September 30, 2014, 28% of children in this cohort achieved permanency.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

33. Case Planning Process:

80% of cases reviewed through the

61% of cases 46% of cases

a. CFSA, with the family, shall develop timely,

Quality Service Reviews (QSR) will be were

were acceptable

comprehensive and appropriate case plans in compliance with District law requirements and permanency timeframes, which reflect family

rated as acceptable.

acceptable

based on

based on

CY2014 QSR

No

CY2013 QSR data.36

↓

and children’s needs, are updated as family

data.

circumstances or needs change, and CFSA shall

deliver services reflected in the current case

plan.

b. Every reasonable effort shall be made to locate family members and to develop case plans in partnership with youth and families, the families’ informal support networks, and other formal resources working with or needed by the youth and/or family.

c. Case plans shall identify specific services, supports and timetables for providing services needed by children and families to achieve identified goals.
(IEP citation I.B.17.)

36 Data collected during QSRs conducted in CY2014 determined that 68% (85 of 125) of the cases were acceptable on the Planning Interventions indicator, 54% (67 of 125) were acceptable on the Pathway to Case Closure indicator and 46% (58 of 125) were acceptable on both indicators.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

39. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.a.)

95% of children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to an initial placement or re-entry into care.
90% of children in foster care who experience a placement change shall have a replacement health screening.

Initial and reentries: monthly range of 78 – 100%
Replacements: monthly range of 77 – 89%

Initial and reentries: monthly range of 92 – 100%
Replacements: monthly range of 77 – 88%

Partially

↔

40. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care 85% of children in foster care shall

Within 30 days: Within 30 days:

shall receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days receive a full medical evaluation within monthly range monthly range

of placement.

30 days of placement. (IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.)

of 77 – 88%

of 82 – 93%

Yes37

↑

95% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement.

Within 60 days: Within 60 days:

monthly range monthly range

of 94 – 97%

of 90 – 98%

37 CFSA met the sub-part of this Exit Standard which requires 85% of children in care receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement during the last 5 months of the monitoring period and the sub-part of this Exit Standard which requires 95% of children in care receive a full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement during the last 4 months of the monitoring period.

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

41. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care 25% of children shall receive a full dental Within 30 days: Within 30 days:

shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days evaluation within 30 days of placement. monthly range monthly range

of placement.

of 37 – 54%

of 47 – 73%

Yes

(IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.) 50% of children shall receive a full dental Within 60 days: Within 60 days:

↑

evaluation within 60 days of placement. monthly range monthly range

of 64 – 82%

of 74 – 92%

85% of children shall receive a full dental Within 90 days: Within 90 days:

evaluation within 90 days of placement. monthly range monthly range

of 64 – 88%

of 77 – 92%

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Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Table 1: Outcomes to be Achieved

Exit Standard

January –
June 2014 Performance12

July –
December 2014 Performance13

Exit
Standard Achieved14

Direction
of Change15

43. Health and Dental Care: CFSA shall ensure the 90% of children’s caregivers shall be

Monthly range Monthly range

prompt completion and submission of appropriate provided with documentation of Medicaid of 57 – 85% of of 67 – 87% of

health insurance paperwork, and shall keep records coverage within 5 days of placement and foster parents

of, e.g., Medicaid application dates, HMO severance Medicaid cards within 45 days of

received the

foster parents received the

No

dates, and enrollment dates. CFSA shall provide

placement.

Medicaid

Medicaid

caregivers with documentation of Medicaid coverage

number within number within

within 5 days of every placement and Medicaid cards

five days of the five days of the

within 45 days of placement.

child’s

child’s

(IEP citation I.C.22.d.)

placement.

placement.38

Monthly range of 0 – 41% of foster parents received the Medicaid card within 45 days of the child’s placement.

Monthly range of 0 – 39% of foster parents received the Medicaid card within 45 days of the child’s placement.39,40

↔

38 Monthly performance data for receipt of the Medicaid number within 5 days of placement are as follows: July, 74%; August, 73%; September, 72%; October, 87%; November, 86%; December, 67%. 39 Monthly performance data for receipt of the Medicaid card within 45 days of placement are as follows: July, 39%; August, 12%; September, 14%; October, 35%; November, 14%; December, 0%. 40 These data report performance on Medicaid card distribution to foster parents when the child initially enters foster care. CFSA reports that Medicaid cards for children who experience a placement change are transferred through the placement passport packet and there is not currently a tracking method to confirm this transfer to the new foster parent.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

3. Investigations: For families who are subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months, CFSA will conduct a comprehensive review of the case history and the current circumstances that bring the family to CFSA’s attention.
(IEP citation I.A.1.c.)

90% of the case records for families subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months will have documentation of a comprehensive review.

Monthly range of 80 – 96%

Monthly range of 87 – 97%41

Yes42

6. Worker Visitation to Families with In-Home Services: a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker shall
make at least one visit monthly to families in their home in which there has been a determination that child(ren) can be maintained safely in their home with services.
b. A CFSA social worker, family support worker, private agency social worker or a Collaborative family support worker shall make a second monthly visit at the home, school or elsewhere.
(IEP citation I.A.4.a-b.)

95% of families will be visited monthly by a CFSA social worker or private agency social worker and 85% of families will be visited a second time monthly by a CFSA social worker, family support worker, private agency social worker or a Collaborative family support worker.

a. Monthly range of 93 – 95% of families were visited monthly
b. Monthly range of 91 – 93% of families were visited twice during the month

a. Monthly range of 90 – 94% of families were visited monthly
b. Monthly range of 87 – 91% of families were visited twice during the month

Partially43

41 Monthly performance data for comprehensive review of families with four or more reports are as follows: July, 96%; August, 97%; September, 96%; October, 92%; November, 87%; December, 94%. 42 CFSA fell below the required level of performance for 1 month this period. The Monitor considers this a temporary deviation and compliance with this Exit Standard maintained. 43 CFSA maintained the required level of performance for one sub-part of this Exit Standard (twice monthly visits to families receiving in-home services) but did not maintain the required level of performance for the other sub-part (monthly visits with families) for any month this monitoring period. The Monitor considers this Exit Standard to be partially maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

8. Worker Visitation to Children in Out-of-Home Care:

95% of children should be

a. Monthly range a. Monthly range

a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case visited at least monthly and

of 96 – 98%

of 94 – 98%

management responsibility shall make monthly visits to each

90% of children shall have

had monthly

had monthly

Yes

child in out-of-home care (foster family homes, group homes, twice-monthly visits.

visits

visits

congregate care, independent living programs, etc.).

b. Monthly

b. Monthly range

b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family

range of 94 –

of 92 – 97%

support worker or nurse care manager shall make a second

96% had twice had twice

monthly visit to each child in out-of-home care (foster family

monthly visits monthly visits

homes, group homes, congregate care, independent living

programs, etc.).

c. At least one of the above visits each month shall be in the child’s home. (IEP citation I.A.5.a-c.)

12. Relative Resources: CFSA shall identify and investigate relative CFSA will take necessary steps Between January Between July –

resources by taking necessary steps to offer and facilitate pre-

to offer and facilitate pre-

– June 2014,

December 2014,

Yes

removal Family Team Meetings (FTM) in all cases requiring

removal FTMs in 70% of

CFSA took

CFSA took

removal of children from their homes.

applicable cases requiring child necessary steps necessary steps

(IEP citation I.B.7.a.) removal from home.

to offer/facilitate to offer/facilitate

pre-removal

pre-removal

FTMs in 90% of FTMs in 92% of

applicable cases. applicable cases.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

13. Relative Resources: In cases where a child(ren) has been

In 90% of cases where a

Of the 117

Of the 99

removed from his/her home, CFSA shall make reasonable efforts to child(ren) has been removed

families who had families who had

identify, locate and invite known relatives to the FTM.

from his/her home, CFSA will children

children removed

Yes

make reasonable efforts to

removed during during this

(IEP citation I.B.7.b.) identify, locate and invite

this monitoring monitoring

known relatives to the FTM. period, CFSA period, CFSA

made reasonable made reasonable

efforts to

efforts to

identify, locate identify, locate

and invite

and invite known

known relatives relatives to the

to the FTM in FTM in 97% of

97% of cases. cases.

14. Placement of Children in Most Family-Like Setting: Children in 90% of children will be in the Not newly

Not newly

out-of-home care shall be placed in the least restrictive, most family- least restrictive, most family- assessed

assessed44

Yes

like setting appropriate to his or her needs.

like setting appropriate to his or

(IEP citation I.B.8.a.) her needs.

15. Placement of Children in Most Family-like Setting: No child

No child shall remain in an

Between January Between July –

shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or foster emergency, short-term or

– June 2014,

December 2014,

home for more than 30 days.

shelter facility or foster home three children one child was

Yes

(IEP citation I.B.8.b.) for more than 30 days.

were placed in placed in

emergency, short emergency, short

term foster

term foster home

homes for more for more than 30

than 30 days.

days.45

44 The method of determining performance on this Exit Standard requires a case record review; performance data for March 2012 and March 2013 indicate that CFSA exceeded the required level of performance. The Monitor may periodically verify performance on this Exit Standard in the future. 45 This placement was for 34 days in a short-term foster home. CFSA has provided the Monitor with information regarding the circumstances of this placement and the Monitor has determined that moving the child would not have been in their best interest. The Monitor will continue to assess these placements as they occur.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

16. Placement of Young Children: Children under age 12 shall not be placed in congregate care settings for more than 30 days unless the child has special needs that cannot be met in a home-like setting and unless the setting has a program to meet the child’s specific needs.
(IEP citation I.B.9.a.)

No child under 12 will be placed in congregate care settings for more than 30 days without appropriate justification that the child has special treatment needs that cannot be met in a home-like setting and the setting has a program to meet the child’s

Between January – June 2014, a total of 4 children under 12 were applicable to this standard and all met an agreed upon exception.

Between July – December 2014, a total of 4 children under 12 were applicable to this standard and all met an agreed upon exception.

Yes

specific needs.

17. Placement of Young Children: CFSA shall place no child under No child under 6 years of age Between January Between July –

six years of age in a group care non-foster home setting, except for will be placed in a group care – June 2014, 2 December 2014,

those children with exceptional needs that cannot be met in any other non-foster home setting without children under 6 2 children under

Yes

type of care.

appropriate justification that the years of age

6 years of age

(IEP citation I.B.9.b.) child has exceptional needs that were placed in a were placed in a

cannot be met in any other type group care non- group care non-

of care.

foster home

foster home

setting. One of setting and both

the children met children met an

an agreed upon agreed upon

exception.

exception.

20. Appropriate Permanency Goals: Children shall have

95% of children shall have

Performance

Performance

permanency planning goals consistent with the Federal Adoption

permanency planning goals

ranged between ranged between

Yes

and Safe Families Act (ASFA) and District law and policy

consistent with ASFA and

95 – 97%

95 – 96%

guidelines.

District law and policy

(IEP citation I.B.12.a.) guidelines.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

21. Appropriate Permanency Goals: Children shall have

Beginning July 1, 2010,

There were 17 There were 29

permanency planning goals consistent with the Federal Adoption

children shall not be given a

youth whose

youth whose goal

and Safe Families Act (ASFA) and District law and policy

goal of APPLA without

goal changed to changed to

guidelines.

convening a Family Team

APPLA between APPLA between

Yes

(IEP citation I.B.12.b.) Meeting (FTM) or Listening to January – June July – December

Youth and Families as Experts 2014. Seven of 2014. Five of the

(LYFE) meeting with

the 17 (41%)

29 (17%) had

participation by the youth and had LYFE/FTM LYFE/FTM

approval by the CFSA Director, conference. The conference. The

or a court order directing the Agency

Agency

permanency goal of APPLA. supported the

supported the

goal change in 6 goal change in 2

cases (4 are

cases (18 are

youth who are youth who are

unaccompanied unaccompanied

minors).

minors)46.

46 Unaccompanied refugee minors who enter foster care in the District proceed to a dispositional hearing very early in their case and are routinely given APPLA goals as other permanency options are rarely available. Permanency hearings continue to occur throughout their time in care, and if determined appropriate, their goal can later be changed from APPLA to another permanency option.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

22. Appropriate Permanency Goals: Youth ages 18 and older will have a plan to prepare them for adulthood that is developed with their consultation and includes, as appropriate, connections to housing, health insurance, education, continuing adult support services agencies (e.g., Rehabilitation Services Administration, the Department on Disability Services, the Department of Mental Health, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid), work force supports, employment services and local opportunities for mentors.
(IEP citation I.B.12.c.)

90% of youth ages 18 and older will have a plan to prepare them for adulthood that is developed with their consultation. No later than 180 days prior to the date on which the youth will turn 21 years old (or on which the youth will emancipate), an individualized transition plan will be created that includes as appropriate connections to specific options on housing, health insurance, and education and linkages to continuing adult support services agencies (e.g., Rehabilitation Services Administration, the Department on Disability Services, the Department of Mental Health, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid), work force supports, employment services, and local opportunities for mentors.

Between January – June 2014, 95% of youth ages 18 and older had a timely YTP.

Between July – December 2014, 96% of youth ages 18 and older had a timely YTP.47

Exit Standard Maintained
Yes

47 252 out of 264 older youth were eligible for YTPs; 12 youth were excluded due to abscondence, developmental disability or the youth refused an YTP. 241 youth (96%) had an YTP developed during the monitoring period. CFSA continued to assess YTP plans for all youth who transitioned out of CFSA care to determine that these youth had been provided appropriate connections to specific options of housing, health insurance, education, etc. The Monitor verified these data.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

23. Reduction of Multiple Placements for Children in Care:

a. Of all children served in foster care during the

Monthly range of Monthly range of

81 – 87%

82 – 88%

(IEP citation I.B.13.)

previous 12 months who were in care at least 8 days

and less than 12 months,

Yes

83% shall have had two or

fewer placements.

b. Of all children served in

foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12

Monthly range of Monthly range of

60 – 65%

63 – 65%

months but less than 24

months, 60% shall have

had two or fewer

placements.

c. Of all children served in

foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 24

Monthly range of Monthly range of

76 – 79%

74 – 78%

months, 75% shall have

had two or fewer

placements in that 12

month period.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

24. Timely Approval of Foster/Adoptive Parents: CFSA shall have in place a process for recruiting, studying and approving families, including relative caregivers, interested in becoming foster or adoptive parents that results in the necessary training, home studies and decisions on approval being completed within 150 days of beginning training.
(IEP citation I.B.14.)

70% of homes licensed beginning November 1, 2010, will have been approved, and interested parties will have been notified within 150 days.

74% of foster homes licensed between January – June 2014 received their license within 150 days.

65% of foster homes licensed between July – December 2014 received their license within 150 days.

Yes48

25. Legal Action to Free Children for Adoption: Children with a

For 90% of children with a

93%

permanency goal of adoption shall have legal action initiated to free permanency goal of adoption,

them for adoption and Office of the Attorney General, on behalf of where freeing the child for

CFSA, shall facilitate the Court’s timely hearing and resolution of adoption is necessary and

legal action to terminate parental rights.

appropriate to move the child

(IEP citation I.B.15.a.) more timely to permanency,

OAG, on behalf of CFSA shall

file a motion to terminate

parental rights or confirm that

appropriate legal action has

been taken within 45 days of

their permanency goal

becoming adoption.

88%49

Yes50

48 CFSA newly met this Exit Standard during the previous monitoring period. The Monitor considers current performance to be an insubstantial deviation due to the small number of applicable cases and is not recommending redesignation at this time, however, will continue to closely monitor future performance. 49 There were a total of 91 applicable children who had a permanency goal of adoption and required legal action to free them for adoption; 80 had legal action to free them for adoption within 45 days. 50 Although this performance is a slight decline from the previous monitoring period, the number of children who are represented in this cohort is small and this variation is small, thus in the Monitor’s judgement this performance is insubstantial and the requirement continues to be maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

26. Legal Action to Free Children for Adoption: Children with a

For 90% of children for whom

100%

100%

permanency goal of adoption shall have legal action initiated to free a petition to terminate parental

them for adoption and Office of the Attorney General, on behalf of rights has been filed in order to

Yes

CFSA, shall facilitate the Court’s timely hearing and resolution of achieve permanency, CFSA

legal action to terminate parental rights.

shall take and document

(IEP citation I.B.15.b.) appropriate actions by the

assigned social worker and the

assistant attorney general to

facilitate the court’s timely

hearing and resolution of legal

action to terminate parental

rights.

27. Timely Adoption: Children with a permanency goal of adoption For children whose permanency

80%

shall be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of goal changed to adoption July

their goal becoming adoption.

1, 2010 or thereafter, 80% will

(IEP citation I.B.16.a.i.) be placed in an approved

adoptive placement by the end

of the ninth month from when

their goal changed to adoption.

78%51

Yes52

51 During this monitoring period, 41 children had their permanency goal changed to adoption, 32 of whom were placed in an approved adoptive placement by the end of the ninth month from the goal change to adoption. 52 Although this performance is a slight decline from the previous monitoring period, the number of children who are represented in this cohort is small and this variation is small, thus in the Monitor’s judgement this performance is insubstantial and the requirement continues to be maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

28. Timely Adoption: Children with a permanency goal of adoption For children whose permanency Review period Review period

shall be in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of goal changed to adoption prior has expired;

has expired;

their goal becoming adoption.

to July 1, 2010 who are not

Monitor is no Monitor is no

N/A

(IEP citation I.B.16.a.ii.) currently in an approved

longer tracking longer tracking

adoptive placement, 40% will performance.

performance.

be placed in an approved

adoptive placement by

December 31, 2010 and an

additional 20% will be placed

in an approved adoptive

placement by June 30, 2011.

29. Timely Adoption: CFSA shall make all reasonable efforts to

By September 30, 2010, 40% of Review period Review period has

ensure that children placed in an approved adoptive home have their the 203 children in pre-adoptive has expired;

expired; Monitor

N/A

adoptions finalized within 12 months of the placement in the

homes as of October 1, 2009

Monitor is no

is no longer

approved adoptive home.

will achieve permanence.

longer tracking tracking

(IEP citation I.B.16.b.i.)

performance.

performance.

30. Timely Adoption: CFSA shall make all reasonable efforts to

By June 30, 2011, 45% of the Review period Review period

ensure that children placed in an approved adoptive home have their children in pre-adoptive homes has expired;

has expired;

N/A

adoptions finalized within 12 months of the placement in the

as of July 1, 2010 will achieve Monitor is no

Monitor is no

approved adoptive home.

permanence.

longer tracking longer tracking

(IEP citation I.B.16.b.ii.)

performance.

performance.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

31. Timely Adoption: CFSA shall make all reasonable efforts to

90% of children in pre-adoptive From January – From July –

ensure that children placed in an approved adoptive home have their homes will have their adoption June 2014, 97% December 2014,

adoptions finalized within 12 months of the placement in the

finalized within 12 months or of adoptions

76% of adoptions

No54

approved adoptive home.

have documented reasonable were completed were completed

(IEP citation I.B.16.b.iii.) efforts to achieve permanence or reasonable

or reasonable

within 12 months of the

efforts were

efforts were

placement in the approved

made to

made to complete

adoptive home.

complete

adoptions within

adoptions within 12 months of

12 months of

child being

child being

placed in a pre-

placed in a pre- adoptive home.53

adoptive home.

34. Placement Licensing: Children shall be placed in foster homes 95% of foster homes and group Monthly range Monthly range of

and other placements that meet licensing and other MFO placement homes with children placed will of 95 – 96%

94 – 96%55

Yes

standards and have a current and valid license.

have a current and valid

(IEP citation I.B.18.) license.

53 CFSA reports that 38 adoptions were finalized during this monitoring period. Of those 38, 17 were finalized within 12 months and reasonable efforts were made to finalize
adoptions within 12 months for an additional 12 children. 54 The Monitor considers current performance to be an insubstantial deviation due to the small number of applicable cases and is not recommending redesignation at this time,
however, will continue to closely monitor future performance. 55 Reported performance includes combined compliance for both foster and group homes.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

35. Community-based Service Referrals for Low & Moderate Risk 90% of families who have been Monthly range Monthly range of

Families:

the subject of a report of abuse of 82 – 100% of 95 – 100% of

(IEP citation I.C.19.) and/or neglect, whose

applicable

applicable closed

Yes

circumstances are deemed to

closed

investigations

place a child in their care at low investigations

were referred to a

or moderate risk of abuse and were referred to Collaborative or

neglect and who are in need of a Collaborative community

and agree to additional supports or community agency.56

shall be referred to an

agency.

appropriate Collaborative or

community agency for follow-

up. Low and moderate risk

cases for which CFSA decides

to open an ongoing CFSA case

are excluded from this

requirement.

36. Sibling Placement and Visits: Children in out-of-home placement who enter foster care with their siblings should be placed with some or all of their siblings, unless documented that the placement is not appropriate based on safety, best interest needs of child(ren) or a court order requiring separation.
(IEP citation I.C.20.a.)

80% of children who enter foster care with their siblings or within 30 days of their siblings will be placed with some of their siblings.

93% of children placed between January – June 2014 with their siblings or within 30 days of their siblings

84% of children placed between July – December 2014 with their siblings of within 30 days of their siblings were

Yes

were placed with placed with some

some of their

of their

siblings.

siblings.57

56 Monthly performance for community-based referrals for low and moderate risk families are as follows: July, 100%; August, 95%; September, 100%; October, 100%; November, 100%; December, 100%. 57 CFSA also provided data for all children in care at a point in time (not limited to those who entered care between July and December 2014) for this Exit Standard. As of December 31, 2014, 76% of children currently in foster care who entered care with their siblings or within 30 days of their siblings were placed with 1 or more sibling.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

37. Sibling Placement and Visits: Children placed apart from their siblings should have at least twice monthly visitation with some or all of their siblings unless documented that the visitation is not in the best interest of the child(ren).
(IEP citation I.C.20.b.)

80% of children shall have monthly visits with their separated siblings and 75% of children shall have twice monthly visits with their separated siblings.

Monthly range of 80 – 86% with at least monthly visits
Monthly range of 69 – 77% with at least twice monthly visits

Monthly range of 83 – 87% with at least monthly visits58
Monthly range of 74 – 82% with at least twice monthly visits59

38. Assessments for Children Experiencing a Placement Disruption: CFSA shall ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a comprehensive and appropriate assessment and follow-up action plans to determine their service and re-placement needs no later than within 30 days of re-placement. A comprehensive assessment is a review, including as applicable the child, his/her family, kin, current and former caregiver and the GAL, to assess the child’s current medical, social, behavioral, educational and dental needs to determine the additional evaluations/services/ supports that are required to prevent future placement disruptions.
(IEP citation I.C.21.)

90% of children experiencing a placement disruption will have a comprehensive assessment and an action plan to promote stability developed.

Monthly range of 83 – 100%

Monthly range of 82 – 100%60

Yes Yes61

58 Monthly performance data are as follows for at least monthly sibling visits: July, 85%; August, 87%; September, 85%; October, 87%; November 84%; December, 83%. 59 Monthly performance data are as follows for twice monthly sibling visits: July, 77%; August, 82%; September, 75%; October, 77%; November, 74%; December, 74%. 60 Monthly performance data are as follows for assessments for children experiencing a placement disruption: July, 92%; August, 100%; September, 100%; October, 100%;
November, 82%; December, 100%. 61 Performance below the required standard only occurred during one month this monitoring period. The Monitor considers this insubstantial and the Exit Standard is maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

42. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care shall have

80% of cases reviewed through 91% of cases

92% of cases were

timely access to health care services to meet identified needs

Quality Service Reviews (QSR) were acceptable acceptable based

Yes

will be rated as acceptable.

based on CY2013 on CY2014 QSR

(IEP citation I.C.22.c.)

QSR data.

data.62

44. Resource Development Plan: The District shall implement the The District shall implement Resource

CFSA reports

CFSA Resource Development Plan, which is to be developed by

the CFSA Resource

Development

continued work

June 30 each year. The Resource Development Plan shall include all Development Plan, which is to Plan was

to strengthen

Yes

of the components listed in item 21b of the Outcomes to be

be developed by June 30 each submitted to the differential

Maintained section of the IEP.

year. The Resource

Monitor on June response, expand

(IEP citation I.D.23.) Development Plan shall include 27, 2014.

continuum of

all of the components listed in

services to

Item 21b of “Outcomes to be

support timely

Maintained” Needs Assessment

reunification and

and Resource Development

reduce foster care

Plan.

placements and

support

assessment and

services for

individuals with

co-occurring

mental health

disorders,

substance abuse

disorders and

domestic

violence.

62 Of the 101 cases reviewed through QSR in CY2014 where the child or youth was placed in foster care at the time of the review, 93 (92%) were rated as acceptable on the Health Status indicator.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

45. Financial Support for Community-Based Services: The District The District shall provide

CFSA reports No modifications

shall provide evidence of financial support for community- and

evidence each year of financial that in addition to FY2015

neighborhood-based services to protect children and support

support for community- and

to the base

spending.

Yes

families.

neighborhood-based services to funding for the

(IEP citation I.D.24.) protect children and support

Collaboratives,

families.

the

Collaboratives

received an

additional

$170,000 to

upgrade the

Efforts to

Outcomes

(ETO) system.

In FY2015, CFSA allocated funding to each Collaborative to implement and maintain the Title IV-E waiver services. The Collaboratives will also receive $200,000 to fund community capacity building grants.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

46. Caseloads: a. The caseload of each worker conducting investigations of
reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed the MFO standard, which is 1:12 investigations.
b. The caseload of each worker providing services to children and families in which the child or children in the family are living in their home shall not exceed 1:15 families.
c. The caseload of each worker providing services to children in placement, including children in Emergency Care and children in any other form of CFSA physical custody, shall not exceed 1:15 children for children in foster care.

90% of investigators and social workers will have caseloads that meet the above caseload requirements. No individual investigator shall have a caseload greater than 15 cases. No individual social worker shall have a caseload greater than 18 cases. No individual worker conducting home studies shall have a caseload greater than 35 cases.

d. The caseload of each worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases.

e. There shall be no cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days, in which case, the supervisor shall provide coverage but not for more than five business days.

(IEP citation I.D.25.)

a. Monthly range of 48 – 100% of investigators met the caseload requirements. Monthly range of 0 – 15 investigators had a caseload of more than 15.
b. & c. Monthly range of 96 – 99% of ongoing workers met the caseload requirements. Monthly range of 0 – 1 social workers had a caseload of 18 or more.
d.100% of workers conducting home studies met required performance

a. Monthly range of 72 – 88% of investigators met the caseload requirements.63 Monthly range of 0 – 6 investigators had a caseload of more than 15.64
b. & c. Monthly range of 95 – 99% of ongoing workers met the caseload requirements. No social workers had a caseload of 18 or more.
d.100% of workers conducting home studies met required performance of

Partially

63 Monthly performance data for caseload requirements are as follows: July, 77%; August, 87%; September, 88%; October, 78%; November 72%; December, 81%. 64 Monthly performance data for investigators with caseloads of more than 15 are as follows: July, 6 workers; August, 2 workers; September, 0 workers; October, 3 workers; November, 4 workers; December, 6 workers.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

of no greater

than 30 cases.

July – December 2014
Performance no greater than 30 cases.

Exit Standard Maintained

e. Monthly range of 26 – 70 (1 – 4% of total open cases) cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days.

e. Monthly range of 29 – 91 (1 – 5% of total open cases) cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days.65

47. Supervisory Responsibilities:

90% of supervisors shall be

Monthly range Monthly range of

a. Supervisors who are responsible for supervising social workers responsible for no more than of 96 – 98% of 95 – 98% of

who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six five social workers and a case supervisors met supervisors met

Yes

workers, including case aids or family support workers, or five aide or family support worker. the required

the required

caseworkers.

standard.

standard.

b. No supervisor shall be responsible for the on-going case management of any case. i. Supervisors shall be responsible for no more than five social workers and a case aide or family support worker.

(IEP citation I.D.26.a.&b.i.)

65 Between July and December, in addition to the cases cited above, a monthly range of between 37 and 67 ongoing cases were assigned to investigative social workers. CFSA indicates that these investigations have closed and are awaiting transfer to an ongoing unit. The Monitor continues to have concerns regarding delays in transferring cases after completion of an investigation.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

48. Supervisory Responsibilities: a. Supervisors who are responsible for supervising social workers
who carry caseloads shall be responsible for no more than six workers, including case aids or family support workers, or five caseworkers.

95% of cases are assigned to social workers.

Monthly range of 89 – 94% cases assigned to social workers.

Monthly range of 86 – 94% cases assigned to social workers.66

Partially67

b. No supervisor shall be responsible for the on-going case management of any case. ii. Cases shall be assigned to social workers.
(IEP citation I.D.26.a.&b.ii.)

49. Training for New Social Workers: New direct service staff68 shall 90% of newly hired CFSA and

100%

100%

receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training through a

private agency direct service

Yes

combination of classroom, web-based and/or on-the-job training.

staff shall receive 80 hours of

pre-service training.

(IEP citation I.D.27.a.)

50. Training for New Supervisors: New supervisors shall complete a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility.
(IEP citation I.D.27.b.)

90% of newly hired CFSA and private agency supervisors shall complete 40 hours of preservice training on supervision of child welfare worker within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility.

100%

100%

Yes69

66 Monthly performance data for cases assigned to social workers are as follows: July, 92%; August, 94%; September, 92%; October, 94%; November 94%; December, 86%. 67 CFSA met sub-part a. of this Exit Standard which requires that supervisors are responsible for no more than six workers. This is the second monitoring period that CFSA has fallen below the performance level for sub-part b. of this standard which requires 95 percent of cases are assigned to social workers. The Monitor will continue to assess performance on this standard to determine if the deviation is temporary prior to recommending redesignation. 68 Direct service staff includes social workers, nurse care managers and family supports workers who provide direct services to children, youth and families. 69 This Exit Standard applied to 4 supervisors during the period who had received their supervisory clearance 8 months prior to the monitoring period (between October 2013 and May 2014).

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

51. Training for Previously Hired Social Workers: Previously hired 80% of CFSA and private

97%

direct service staff70 shall receive annually a minimum of 5 full

agency direct service staff shall

training days (or a minimum of 30 hours) of structured in-service

receive the required annual in-

training geared toward professional development and specific core service training.

and advanced competencies.

(IEP citation I.D.28.a.)

July – December 2014
Performance
Not yet due71

Exit Standard Maintained
N/A

52. Training for Previously Hired Supervisors and Administrators: Supervisors and administrators shall receive annually a minimum of 24 hours of structured in-service training.
(IEP citation I.D.28.b.)

80% of CFSA and private agency supervisors and administrators who have casework responsibility shall receive annual in-service training.

98%

Not yet due72

N/A

53. Training for Foster Parents: CFSA and contract agency foster 95% of CFSA and contract

94%

parents shall receive a minimum of 15 hours of pre-service training. agency foster parents shall

(IEP citation I.D.29.a.)

receive a minimum of 15 hours of pre-service training.

54. Training for Foster Parents: CFSA and contract agency foster 95% of foster parents whose

98%

parents shall receive 30 hours of in-service training every two years. licenses are renewed shall

(IEP citation I.D.29.b.)

receive 30 hours of in-service training.

98% Yes

92%

Yes73

70 12 of the 30 hours required for the nurse care managers may be met with continuing education requirements of the licensing board. 71 Data is collected annually based on a training schedule that begins July 1st and ends June 30th each year. 72 Ibid. 73 The Monitor considers this an insubstantial deviation from the performance level required and compliance with this Exit Standard maintained.
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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

55. Special Corrective Action:
a. CFSA shall produce accurate monthly reports, shared with the Monitor, which identify children in the following categories: i. All cases in which a child has been placed in four or more different placements, with the fourth or additional placement occurring in the last 12 months and the placement is not a permanent placement; ii. All cases in which a child has had a permanency goal of adoption for more than one year and has not been placed in an adoptive home;
iii. All children who have been returned home and have reentered care more than twice and have a plan of return home at the time of the report;
iv. Children with a permanency goal of reunification for more than 18 months;
v. Children placed in emergency facilities for more than 90 days; vi. Children placed in foster homes or facilities that exceed their
licensed capacities or placed in facilities without a valid license; vii. Children under 14 with a permanency goal of APPLA; and viii. Children in facilities more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia.

For 90% of children identified in corrective action categories, required reviews will occur and corrective action plans will be developed and implemented as appropriate.

b. CFSA shall conduct a child-specific case review by the Director or Director’s designee(s) for each child identified and implement a child-specific corrective action plan, as appropriate.
(IEP citation I.D.30.)

a. CFSA produces a monthly report that identifies the cases of these children/famili es that have been flagged for discussion during applicable reviews.
b. 100% of children requiring a special corrective action plan(s) for one or more special corrective action category had a plan developed.

a. CFSA produces a monthly report that identifies the cases of these children/famili es that have been flagged for discussion during applicable reviews.
b. 85% of required special corrective action plan(s) were developed.

Partially74

74 CFSA indicates that the 33 plans that were not developed were due to a transition process with at least 1 private agency and that a new process has been developed which will be closely monitored to ensure that all future required special corrective action plans are developed. CFSA maintained the required level of performance for one sub-part of this Exit Standard and fell below the required level for completion of plans when required; the Monitor considers this Exit Standard to be partially maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

56. Performance-Based Contracting: CFSA shall have in place a

Evidence of functionality and Infrastructure for Infrastructure for

functioning performance-based contracting system that (a) develops ongoing compliance. Evidence performance

performance

procurements for identified resource needs, including placement and of capacity to monitor contract based

based contracting

Yes

service needs; (b) issues contracts in a timely manner to qualified

performance on a routine basis. contracting

remains in place

service providers in accordance with District laws and regulations;

remains in place and CFSA uses

and (c) monitors contract performance on a routine basis.

and CFSA uses data to make

(IEP citation I.D.31.)

data to make

decisions about

decisions about placement and

placement and future contracts.

future contracts. CFSA utilizes

Performance

Improvement

Plans (PIP) with

agencies to

address areas

where

performance is

below

expectations,

which may

include timely

permanence,

family

connections,

visitation, etc.

During the

monitoring

period, 6 private

agencies were

placed on PIPs

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance and based on utilization and performance, two agency contracts were not renewed. 4 PIPs remain pending.

Exit Standard Maintained

57. Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC): CFSA Elimination of the backlog of

shall continue to maintain responsibility for managing and

cases without ICPC

complying with the ICPC for children in its care.

compliance.

CFSA has eliminated the backlog. There are no children

CFSA has eliminated the backlog. There are no children

Yes

(IEP citation I.D.32.)

placed without placed without ICPC approval. ICPC approval.

CFSA is a pilot site for a national project (The National Electronic Interstate Compact Enterprise) to increase efficiency, improve service delivery for children and reduce barriers to interstate placement. Preliminary results show a reduction in ICPC delays.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

58. Licensing Regulations: CFSA shall have necessary resources to CFSA shall have necessary

As of June 2014, As of December

enforce regulations effectively for original and renewal licensing of resources to enforce regulations 22 of 22 FTE

2014, 21 of 22

foster homes, group homes, and independent living facilities.

effectively for original and

positions for

FTE positions for

Yes

renewal licensing of foster

Family-Based Family-Based

(IEP citation I.D.33.) homes, group homes, and

Contracts

Contracts

independent living facilities. Monitoring were Monitoring were

filled.

filled.75

25 of 27 FTE positions were filled for Family Licensing Division.

23 of 23 FTE positions were filled for Family Licensing Division.

59. Budget and Staffing Adequacy:

The District shall provide

The actual

The approved

The District shall provide evidence that the Agency’s annual budget evidence that the Agency’s

FY2014 budget FY2015 budget

complies with Paragraph 7 of the October 23, 2000 Order providing annual budget complies with was $223.2

is $246.3 million

Yes

customary adjustments to the FY 2001 baseline budget and

Paragraph 7 of the October 23, million and

and provides

adjustments to reflect increases in foster parent payments and

2000 Order providing

provides

adequate funding

additional staff required to meet caseload standards, unless

customary adjustments to the adequate

for required

demonstrated compliance with the MFO can be achieved with fewer FY 2001 baseline budget and funding for

staffing, services

resources.

adjustments to reflect increases required staffing, and supports.

in foster parent payments and services and

The District shall provide evidence of compliance with Paragraph 4 additional staff required to meet supports.

The proposed

of the October 23, 2000 Order that CFSA staff shall be exempt from caseload standards, unless

FY2016 budget

any District-wide furloughs and from any District-wide Agency

demonstrated compliance with

is $244.99

budget and/or personnel reductions that may be otherwise imposed. the MFO can be achieved with

million and

fewer resources.

provides

(IEP citation I.D.34.)

adequate funding

for required

staffing, services

and supports.

75 Congregate care contracts management is reported within the family-based contract management division.
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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

60. Federal Revenue Maximization: CFSA shall demonstrate compliance with Sections A and B of Chapter XVIII of the Modified Final Order concerning federal revenue maximization and financial development.
(IEP citation I.D.35.)

Evidence of consistent and appropriate claiming of all appropriate and available federal revenue.

CFSA now has a Title IV-E Waiver approved. CFSA will be claiming this federal

CFSA is implementing its Title IV-E Waiver and has received IV-E capped payments

Yes

revenue on a

in the 3rd and 4th

quarterly basis. quarter of

Additionally,

FY2014 which

CFSA increased enable the

claiming

Agency to

Supplemental maintain

Security Income consistent levels

or Social

of federal

Security

revenue. CFSA

Disability

has worked with

Income for

the

eligible children. Collaboratives to

ensure the

necessary

infrastructure is

in place to

support proper

documentation of

Waiver

programs. CFSA

had a 100%

claiming rate on

the Department

of Health Care

Finance’s most

recent audit.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

61. Entering Reports Into Computerized System: CFSA shall

Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

immediately enter all reports of abuse or neglect into its

compliance

Compliance

Yes

computerized information systems and shall use the system to

determine whether there have been prior reports of abuse or neglect

in that family or to that child.

(IEP citation II.A.1.)

62. Maintaining 24 Hour Response System: CFSA shall staff and

Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

maintain a 24-hour system for receiving and responding to reports of

compliance

compliance

Yes

child abuse and neglect, which conforms to reasonable professional

standards.

(IEP citation II.A.2.)

63. Checking for Prior Reports: Child abuse and/or neglect reports Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

shall show evidence that the investigator checked for prior reports of

compliance

compliance

Yes

abuse and/or neglect.

(IEP citation II.A.3.)

64. Reviewing Child Fatalities: The District of Columbia, through the City-wide Child Fatality Committee, and an Internal CFSA Committee, shall conform to the requirements of the MFO regarding

Ongoing Compliance

Internal: Ongoing Compliance

Internal: Ongoing Compliance

Yes

the ongoing independent review of child fatalities of members of the plaintiff class, with procedures for (1) reviewing child deaths; (2) making recommendations concerning appropriate corrective action to avert future fatalities; (3) issuing an annual public report; and (4)

City-wide: Ongoing Compliance

City-wide: Ongoing Compliance

considering and implementing recommendations as appropriate.

(IEP citation II.A.4.)

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

65. Investigations of Abuse and Neglect in Foster Homes and Institutions: Reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes and institutions shall be comprehensively investigated; investigations in foster homes shall be completed within 35 days and investigations involving group homes, day care settings or other congregate care settings shall be completed within 60 days.
(IEP citation II.A.5.)

90% of reports of abuse and neglect in foster homes shall be completed within 35 days and within 60 days for investigations involving group homes, day care settings or other congregate settings.

Monthly range of 60 – 100%

Monthly range of 50 – 100%76

Partially77

66. Policies for General Assistance Payments: CFSA shall have in Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

place policies and procedures for appropriate use of general

compliance

compliance

assistance payments for the care of children by unrelated adults,

Yes

including provision of any applicable oversight and supervision.

(IEP citation II.B.6.)

67. Use of General Assistance Payments: CFSA shall demonstrate Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

that District General Assistance payment grants are not used as a

compliance

compliance

substitute for financial supports for foster care or kinship care for

Yes

District children who have been subject to child abuse or neglect.

(IEP citation II.B.7.)

76 Reported performance includes combined compliance for both foster homes and congregate care settings. Monthly performance on timely completion of investigations of reported abuse and neglect in foster homes and in institutions are as follows: July, 69%; August, 79%; September, 62%; October, 100%; November, 78%; December, 50%. 77 Due to the small number of institutional abuse investigations, performance on this Exit Standard has varied considerably. In December 2014, there were only 14 applicable investigations and 7 were closed timely. The Monitor considers monthly performance below the required standard to be insubstantial and will not recommend redesignation.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

68. Placement of Children in Most Family-Like Setting: No child shall stay overnight in the CFSA Intake Center or office building.

Ongoing Compliance

(IEP citation II.B.8.)

In April 2014, CFSA reports

four children

that between July

stayed at CFSA – December

Yes

overnight. CFSA 2014, no child

reports that this stayed overnight

placement was at CFSA.

in error and in

response,

guidance would

be provided to

staff on roles

among different

administrations

(CPS, in-home,

placement,

kinship) when

families are

involved with an

in-home case

that results in a

removal.

69. Timely Approval of Foster/Adoptive Parents: CFSA should ensure training opportunities are available so that interested families may begin training within 30 days of inquiry.

Ongoing Compliance

(IEP citation II.B.9.)

Training was

Training was

offered during offered during

Yes

the current

the current

monitoring

monitoring

period.

period.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

70. Placement within 100 Miles of the District: No more than 82

Ongoing Compliance for no

Monthly range Monthly range of

children shall be placed more than 100 miles from the District of

more than 82 children.

of 21 – 24

13 – 23 children

Columbia. (Children placed in college, vocational programs,

children

Yes

correctional facilities, or kinship or pre-adoptive family-based

settings under the ICPC shall be exempt from this requirement.)

(IEP citation II.B.10.)

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

71. Licensing and Placement Standards: a. Children shall be placed in foster homes and other placements
that meet licensing and other MFO placement standards.

Ongoing compliance for 95% of children.

b. Children in foster home placements shall be in homes that (a) have no more than three foster children or (b) have six total children including the family’s natural children; (c) have no more than two children under two years of age or (d) have more than three children under six years of age. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, shall exceed these limits.

c. No child shall be placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of eight (8) children without express written approval by the Director or designee based on written documentation that the child’s needs can only be met in that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual child’s needs.

d. Children shall not be placed in a foster care home or facility in excess of its licensed capacity. The sole exception shall be those instances in which the placement of a sibling group, with no other children in the home, shall exceed the limits.

(IEP citation II.B.11.)

a. Monthly range of foster and group homes: 95 – 96%

a. Monthly range of foster and group homes: 94 – 96%78

b. Monthly range b. Monthly range of children over of children over placed in foster placed in foster homes: 1 – 3% homes: 2 – 3%

c. Children in group care settings with capacity in excess of eight children – 0%

c. Monthly range of children in group care settings with capacity in excess of 8 children: 0 – 22%79

d. No exceptions were provided for the children placed in excess of licensing capacity during this monitoring period.

d. No exceptions were provided for the children placed in excess of licensing capacity during this monitoring period.

Yes80

78 Reported performance includes combined compliance for both foster and group homes. 79 In the month of September, 22% (9 of 41) of children placed in a group home were in a home that exceed a capacity of 8. This corresponds with 1 group home that was out of
compliance. In all other months of the monitoring period, no children were in a group home that exceeded a capacity of 8. 80 The Monitor considers performance in September 2014 for sub-part c. of this Exit Standard to be a temporary deviation in performance and this Exit Standard to be maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

72. Case Planning Process: Case plans shall be developed within 30 90% of case plans shall be

Monthly range Monthly range of

days of the child entering care and shall be reviewed and modified as developed within 30 days of the of 92 – 96%

90 – 92%

necessary at least every six months thereafter, and shall show

child entering care and shall be

Yes

evidence of appropriate supervisory review of case plan progress. reviewed and modified as

necessary at least every six

(IEP citation II.B.12.) months thereafter.

73. Appropriate Permanency Goals: No child under the age of 12 Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

shall have a permanency goal of legal custody with permanent

Compliance

Compliance81

caretakers unless he or she is placed with a relative who is willing to

Yes

assume long-term responsibility for the child and who has legitimate

reasons for not adopting the child and it is in the child’s best interest

to remain in the home of the relative rather than be considered for

adoption by another person. No child under the age of 12 shall have

a permanency goal of continued foster care unless CFSA has made

every reasonable effort, documented in the record, to return the child

home, to place the child with an appropriate family member, and to

place the child for adoption, and CFSA has considered and rejected

the possibility of the child’s foster parents assuming legal custody as

permanent caretakers of the child.

(IEP citation II.B.13.)

81 As of December 31, 2014, CFSA reports that no child under the age of 12 had a non-court ordered goal of legal custody and 1 child under the age of 12 had a goal of APPLA. This is the same child that was identified in previous monitoring periods.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

74. Timely Adoption: Within 95 days of a child’s permanency goal For 90% of children whose

100%

95%82

becoming adoption, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning

permanency goal becomes

team to develop a child-specific recruitment plan which may include adoption, CFSA shall convene

Yes

contracting with a private adoption agency for those children without a permanency planning team to

an adoptive resource.

develop a child-specific

(IEP citation II.B.14.) recruitment plan which may

include contracting with a

private adoption agency for

those children without an

adoptive resource.

75. Post-Adoption Services Notification: Adoptive families shall

Ongoing compliance for 90% CFSA continues CFSA continues

receive notification at the time that the adoption becomes final of the of cases.

to report all

to report all

availability of post-adoption services.

adoptive

adoptive families

Yes

(IEP citation II.B.15.)

families receive receive

notification in a notification in a

variety of ways. variety of ways.

76. Family Court Reviews: A case review hearing will be conducted Ongoing Compliance for 90% As of June 30, As of December

in Family Court at least every six months for every child as long as of cases.

2014, 95% of 31, 2014, 96% of

the child remains in out-of-home placement, unless the child has

applicable

applicable

Yes

received a permanency hearing within the past six months.

children had

children had

required review. required review.

(IEP citation II.D.16.)

77. Permanency Hearings: CFSA shall make every reasonable effort Ongoing compliance for 90% Monthly range Monthly range of

to ensure that children in foster care have a permanency hearing in of cases.

of 96 – 98%

95 – 99%

Yes

Family Court no later than 14 months after their initial placement.

(IEP citation II.D.17.)

82 Of 22 children whose goal changed to adoption between October 1 and December 31, 2014, 1 child did not have a staffing within 95 days.
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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

78. Use of MSWs and BSWs: Unless otherwise agreed, all social

Ongoing compliance for all

Ongoing

Ongoing

worker hires at CFSA shall have an MSW or BSW before being

social work hires.

compliance

compliance

Yes

employed as trainees.

(IEP citation II.E.18.)

79. Social Work Licensure: All social work staff shall meet District Ongoing compliance for all

Ongoing

Ongoing

of Columbia licensing requirements to carry cases independently of social workers.

compliance

compliance

Yes

training units.

(IEP citation II.E.19.)

80. Training for Adoptive Parents: Adoptive parents shall receive a Ongoing compliance for 90%

94%

98%

minimum of 30 hours of training, excluding the orientation process. of adoptive parents.

Yes

(IEP citation II.F.20.)

81. Needs Assessment and Resource Development Plan: a. CFSA shall complete a needs assessment every two years,
which shall include an assessment of placement support services, to determine what services are available and the number and categories of additional services and resources, if any, that are necessary to ensure compliance with the MFO. The needs assessment shall be a written report. The needs assessment, including the report, shall be repeated every two years. CFSA shall provide evidence of adequate Resource Development capacity within the Agency, with sufficient staff and other resources to carry out MFO resource development functions.

Ongoing Compliance

a. Needs

a. Needs

Assessment

Assessment

completed

completed

Yes

December 2013 December 2013

b. Resource Development Plan updates completed June 27, 2014

b. Updates to Monitor were provided in March 2015. CFSA reports continued to work to strengthen differential response, expand

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

b. The District shall develop a Resource Development Plan, which

shall be updated annually by June 30th of each year. The

Resource Development Plan shall: (a) project the number of

emergency placements, foster homes, group homes, therapeutic

foster homes and institutional placements that shall be required

by children in CFSA custody during the upcoming year; (b)

identify strategies to assure that CFSA has available, either

directly or through contract, a sufficient number of appropriate

placements for all children in its physical or legal custody; (c)

project the need for community-based services to prevent

unnecessary placement, replacement, adoption and foster home

disruption; (d) identify how the Agency is moving to ensure

decentralized neighborhood and community-based services; and

(e) include an assessment of the need for adoptive families and

strategies for recruitment, training and retention of adoptive

families based on the annual assessment. The Plan shall specify

the quantity of each category of resources and services, the time

period within which they shall be developed, and the specific

steps that shall be taken to ensure that they are developed.

CFSA shall then take necessary steps to implement this plan.

July – December 2014
Performance continuum of services to support timely reunification and reduce foster care placements and support assessment and services for individuals with cooccurring mental health disorders, substance abuse disorders and domestic violence.

Exit Standard Maintained

(IEP citation II.G.21.)

82. Foster Parent Licensure: CFSA shall license relatives as foster Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

parents in accordance with District law, District licensing regulations

compliance

compliance

Yes

and ASFA requirements.

(IEP citation II.G.22.)

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

83. Quality Assurance: CFSA shall have a Quality Assurance system with sufficient staff and resources to assess case practice, analyze outcomes and provide feedback to managers and stakeholders. The Quality Assurance system must annually review a sufficient number of cases to assess compliance with the provisions of the MFO and good social work practice, to identify systemic issues, and to produce results allowing the identification of specific skills and additional training needed by workers and supervisors.

Ongoing Compliance

(IEP citation II.G.23.)

Ongoing

Ongoing

Compliance

Compliance

Yes

The QA unit is The QA unit is

fully staffed with fully staffed with

4 full-time QSR 4 full-time QSR

reviewers, 6

reviewers, 6

FTEs assigned to FTEs assigned to

QA/Child

QA/Child

Fatality and 2 Fatality and 2

supervisory case supervisory case

specialists.

specialists.

84. Maintaining Computerized System:

Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

a. CFSA shall develop and maintain a unitary computerized

compliance

compliance

information system and shall take all reasonable and necessary

Yes

steps to achieve and maintain accuracy.

b. CFSA shall provide evidence of the capacity of FACES.NET Management Information System to produce appropriate, timely, and accurate worker/supervisor reports and other management reports that shall assist the Agency in meeting goals of safety, permanence and well-being and the requirements of the MFO and Court-ordered Implementation and Exit Plan.
(IEP citation II.H.24.)

85. Contracts to Require the Acceptance of Children Referred:

Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

Ongoing

CFSA contracts for services shall include a provision that requires

compliance

compliance

Yes

the provider to accept all clients referred pursuant to the terms of the

contract, except for a lack of vacancy.

(IEP citation II.H.25.)

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

86. Provider Payments: CFSA shall ensure payment to providers in 90% of payments to providers Ongoing

Ongoing

compliance with DC’s Quick Payment Act for all services rendered. shall be made in compliance

compliance

compliance

Yes

with DC’s Quick Payment Act

(IEP citation II.H.26.) for all services rendered.

Monthly range Monthly range of

of 93 – 97% of 93 – 97% of

providers were providers were

paid timely

paid timely

87. Foster Parent Board Rates: There shall be an annual adjustment Ongoing Compliance

Ongoing

at the beginning of each fiscal year of board rates for all foster and

compliance

– – 83

Yes

adoptive homes to equal the USDA annual adjustment to maintain

rates consistent with USDA standards for costs of raising a child in

the urban south.

(IEP citation II.H.27.)

83 The FY2014 board rates are set based on USDA standards using 2012 estimated expenditure data. The Monitor reviewed the board rates paid by CFSA and private providers and determined that the traditional foster parent rate paid by some private providers did not meet the required standard. When this was brought to the attention of Agency leadership, it was corrected immediately. The Monitor considers this a temporary deviation from the performance level required and compliance with this Exit Standard maintained.

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Table 2: Outcomes to be Maintained

January – June

2014

Implementation and Exit Plan Requirement

Exit Standard

Performance

July – December 2014
Performance

Exit Standard Maintained

88. Post-Adoption Services: CFSA shall make available post-

Ongoing Compliance

Funding for

Ongoing

adoption services necessary to preserve families who have adopted a

FY14 remains Compliance

Yes

child committed to CFSA.

unchanged.

(IEP citation II.H.28.)

The proposed

FY2015 budget

includes

$866,650 for the

Post-

Permanency

Family Center

and $32,236,106

for the Adoption

and

Guardianship

Subsidy

Program.

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IV. DISCUSSION OF LaSHAWN A. v. BOWSER IMPLEMENTATION AND EXIT PLAN OUTCOMES
A. GOAL: CHILD SAFETY
CFSA maintains a 24-hour, seven day a week hotline to accept reports of alleged child abuse and neglect in the District of Columbia. CFSA utilizes a Differential Response (DR) system to determine the appropriate system response to referrals which include one of the following pathways: 1) screened out because the referral does not include an allegation of abuse or neglect or is out of jurisdiction, 2) initiate a child protective services (CPS) investigation, 3) initiate a Family Assessment (FA)84 or 4) Information and Referral (I&R).85 These determinations are made by hotline staff at the time of referral with the use of the Hotline SDM tool and after consultation in the Hotline RED Team. The Hotline RED Team is a multi-disciplinary team that meets three times each day to review referrals received by the hotline and determine which DR pathway is appropriate. CFSA also has an educational neglect triage unit that screens referrals of educational neglect for children between the ages of five and 17 years old from public and charter schools. These referrals are sent utilizing a form developed by CFSA which captures the number of days missed, the student’s current grades and information regarding any interventions attempted by the school prior to submitting the referral.
In this section of the report, the Monitor examines CFSA’s performance in hotline, investigations and family assessment86, all critical areas of practice for a child welfare system.

84 Family Assessment response is utilized consistent with District law (DC Code Section 4-1301.04) and is designed for families for whom a hotline report has been made but with no identified safety concerns. For these families, instead of a child protective services investigation, CFSA uses a strength-based, family-centered assessment process to support families in identifying needs and accessing services. Investigations are required for reports involving child fatality, suspected sex abuse or allegations that a child is in imminent risk of or has experienced abuse or neglect that is severe. 85 Information and Referral is the pathway for requests from other jurisdictions and information or reports outside the parameters of CFSA involvement. Some examples include requests for courtesy interviews, notice of child or youth abscondence, notice of child or youth return from abscondence, non-CPS assaults or child or youth curfew violations. 86 CFSA has stated its view that family assessments (FA), which are now part of the District’s response to allegations of child abuse and neglect, are not covered by the provisions of the LaShawn MFO and IEP. CFSA has argued that since FAs are not “investigations,” they are not subject to IEP standards and should be reported on differently by the Monitor than other IEP Exit Standards. The Monitor does not agree with this position; the District implemented the FA pathway as part of a new approach to responding to allegations of child abuse and neglect. While it is true that the practice of differential response and the FA pathway were not contemplated or used by CFSA at the time the IEP was established, it is part of the District’s CPS response which is covered by the LaShawn MFO and IEP. With the inclusion of FA as an appropriate CPS response, many of the referrals that were previously addressed using the CPS investigation pathway are now directed to the FA pathway. CFSA staff report that FA workers follow the same protocols as investigators with respect to safety assessments. The Monitor has taken the position that the caseload standard for FA workers is the same as for investigative workers as the nature of the work with the family and children is comparable. The Monitor has also taken the position that it is within the purview of the LaShawn MFO and IEP that the Monitor fully assess and evaluate FA as an integral part of the District’s CPS response.

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1. Hotline
Table 3 below shows the number of calls the hotline received between July and December 2014 and specifies the DR pathway selected for each referral. The volume of calls to the hotline this monitoring period ranged between 849 and 1,249 a month. The total calls this period represents a 28 percent decrease over the previous monitoring period (last monitoring period there was a total of 9,217 calls compared to 6,645 calls this period). However, the number of calls are similar to the amount of calls received during this same period in 2013; seasonal fluctuations in call volume are common for child welfare agencies to experience.
An average of 28 percent of hotline calls received each month of this monitoring period were accepted for a CPS investigation or linked to a current investigation and an average of 18 percent of hotline calls each month were accepted for a FA or linked to a current FA. As indicated in Table 3 below, a monthly range of eight to 18 percent of calls were accepted as I&R and a monthly range of 36 to 48 percent of calls were screened out. The percentage of screen outs has increased since the previous monitoring period and continued to rise between July and December 2014. CFSA attributes the increase to the utilization of the Hotline SDM tool which guides consistent decision-making among staff. CFSA also reports that as of December 2014, all educational neglect referrals that are submitted by schools through the automated forms process online are captured as “reports.” These reports are either screened out by the educational neglect triage unit or assigned for CPS investigation or FA based on the facts and circumstances of the educational neglect report.

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Table 3: Number of Calls to Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline by DR Pathway
July – December 2014

Information and Referral
(I&R)

Month Total

July 201487
Aug 201488
Sept 201489
Oct 201490
Nov 201491
Dec 201492

1,045 849 1,175 1,249 1,130 1,197

Accepted 189 (18%)
78 (9%) 102 (9%) 94 (8%) 102 (9%) 90 (8%)

Investigation

Accepted 274 (26%)

Linked* 40 (4%)

236 (28%) 33 (4%)

327 (28%) 34 (3%)

286 (23%) 49 (4%)

282 (25%) 28 (2%)

267 (22%) 31 (3%)

Family Assessment (FA)

Accepted 156 (15%)

Linked* 10 (1%)

Screened Out by Hotline or Hotline RED Team**
376 (36%)

130 (15%) 7 (1%) 365 (43%)

198 (17%) 6 (<1%) 508 (43%)

211 (17%) 5 (<1%) 604 (48%)

201 (18%) 5 (<1%) 512 (45%)

236 (20%) 9 (1%) 564 (47%)

Total 6,645 655 (10%) 1,672 (25%) 215 (3%) 1,132 (17%) 42 (1%) 2,929 (44%)

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INT003 Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding. * Linked indicates that the Agency already had an open investigation or FA and the new referral was linked to the previously open referral. ** A referral may be screened out when the information provided by the reporter does not indicate allegations of abuse or neglect in the District of Columbia.

87 At the time the data were run for July 2014, 11 hotline calls were awaiting approval (6 I&R). These calls are not included in
the total denominator. 88 At the time the data were run for August 2014, 12 hotline calls were awaiting approval (8 I&R). These calls are not included in the total denominator. 89 At the time the data were run for September 2014, 9 hotline calls were awaiting approval (7 I&R). These calls are not included in the total denominator. 90 At the time the data were run for October 2014, 17 hotline calls were awaiting approval (14 I&R). These calls are not included in the total denominator. 91 At the time the data were run for November 2014, 23 hotline calls were awaiting approval (21 I&R). These calls are not included in the total denominator. 92 At the time the data were run for December 2014, 7 hotline calls were awaiting approval (6 I&R). These calls are not included in the total denominator.

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2. Investigations
Referrals which allege serious safety concerns for children, including severe neglect, physical and sexual abuse, require CPS investigations. The IEP requires CFSA to:
 initiate an investigation within 48 hours of the referral to the hotline or document good faith efforts to initiate the investigation when the alleged victim child(ren) cannot be immediately located;
 complete the investigation and enter the final report of findings into FACES.NET within 35 days of the referral to the hotline;
 comprehensively review families who are subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months;
 conduct investigations of acceptable quality; and  refer families whose circumstances are deemed to place a child in their care at low or
moderate risk of abuse and who are in need of and agree to additional supports to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for follow up.
Investigative caseloads improved this monitoring period (between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 72 to 88% of investigators had no more than 12 investigations, up from June 2014 performance of 48%). CFSA partially met the Exit Standard for timely initiation of investigations (within 48 hours of referral to the hotline), performance remained below the required level for timely closure of investigations (within 35 days of referral to the hotline). Additionally, quality of investigations continues to be an area where improvement is needed.
CFSA maintained required performance for the investigations Exit Standards previously designated as Outcomes to be Maintained, including comprehensive review of families subject to a new investigation for whom the current report is the fourth or greater with the most recent occurring within the last 12 months and referring families with low or moderate risk of abuse who are in need of and agree to additional supports to an appropriate Collaborative or community-based agency for follow up.

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Initiating Investigations

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

1. Investigations: Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be initiated or documented good faith efforts shall be made to initiate investigations within 48 hours after receipt of a report to the hotline of child maltreatment.
(IEP citation I.A.1.a.)
95% of all investigations will be initiated within 48 hours or there will be documented good faith efforts to initiate investigations whenever the alleged victim child(ren) cannot be immediately located.93

100% 90% 80% 70% 74% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Dec-12

Figure 1: Timely Initiation of Investigations December 2012 – December 2014

89%

90%

94% 85%

IEP Exit Standard 95%

Jun-13

Dec-13

Jun-14

Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INT052

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: Initiation of an investigation includes seeing all alleged victim children and talking with them outside the presence of the caretaker, or making all applicable good faith efforts to locate all alleged victim children within the 48-hour time frame.94 In December 2014, 329 investigations were completed; in 251 (76%) investigations, a social worker saw all alleged victim children within 48 hours of the report to the hotline and in an additional 59 (18%) investigations, there

93 Documented good faith efforts to see alleged victim children within the first 48 hours shall satisfy this requirement if they include: 1) visiting the child’s home at different times of the day; 2) visiting the child’s school and/or day care in an attempt to locate the child if known; 3) contacting the reporter, if known, to elicit additional information about the child’s location; 4) reviewing the CFSA information system and other information systems (e.g. ACEDS, STARS) for additional information about the child and family; and 5) contacting the police for all allegations that a child(ren)’s safety or health is in immediate danger. 94 For younger and non-verbal children, observation is acceptable.

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was documentation that good faith efforts were made to initiate the investigation, for a total of 94 percent of investigations initiated timely. Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 83 to 95 percent of investigations were initiated timely, either by the social worker seeing and interviewing all alleged victim children outside the presence of the caretaker within 48 hours of the report to the hotline or by documenting completion of all applicable good faith efforts (see Figure 2). Based upon performance during this period, the Monitor considers CFSA to have partially met the required level of performance for this Exit Standard.
Figure 2: Timely Initiation of Investigations July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

83% Jul-14

86% Aug-14

90% Sep-14

92% Oct-14

95%

94%

Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 95%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INT052

Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to increase performance on timely initiation of investigations:
 To ensure investigations are initiated timely (inclusive of good faith efforts), effective December 2013, CFSA increased the frequency of the Hotline RED Teams using the group decision‐making process framework. Previously, CFSA held two Hotline RED Teams per weekday. Beginning December 2013, the teams were increased to three per weekday to manage the volume of the referrals, assign the referrals to the appropriate pathway, track assignment and response time, and ensure that multidisciplinary membership is a part of the decision‐making process (2014 Strategy Plan, #1).

CFSA reports continued implementation of this strategy, with three Hotline RED Teams

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occurring daily at 8am, 1pm and 5pm. The weekend schedule may vary depending upon the number of referrals received and availability of staff to provide a multidisciplinary team of decision makers. Monitor staff periodically attend Hotline RED Team meetings to observe the process.
Timely Completion of Investigations

IEP Requirement

2. Investigations: Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be completed within 30 days after receipt of a report to the hotline of child maltreatment and the final report of findings for each investigation shall be completed within five days of the completion of the investigation.
(IEP citation I.A.1.b.)

Exit Standard

90% of investigations will be completed and a final report of findings shall be entered in FACES.NET within 35 days.

Figure 3: Timely Completion of Investigations June 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 90% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-11

87% Dec-11

80% Jun-12

60% Dec-12

50% Jun-13

74%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

36%

43%

Dec-13 Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV004

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: In December 2014, there were 316 non-institutional abuse investigations completed; 137 (43%) were completed and had findings entered in FACES.NET within 35 days after receipt of the report.95 As indicated in Figure 4 below, performance started to improve at the beginning of the monitoring period but declined again after October 2014. A monthly range of 36 to 56 percent of investigations were completed timely. Performance does not meet the required level.

95 During this monitoring period, CFSA reports the following backlog: July, 190; August, 140; September, 88; October, 107; November, 145; December, 131.

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Figure 4: Timely Completion of Investigations July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

36% Jul-14

42%

44%

Aug-14 Sep-14

56% Oct-14

43% 39% Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV004
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategies to increase performance on timely completion of investigations:
 CFSA will continue the 10‐Day RED Teams, which will address barriers to timely and effective completion of investigations. In addition, the Big RED Team reviews will be scheduled with supervisors to address investigations open for 35 days or more. The next steps developed in the RED Teams will be documented and shared with social workers and supervisors for follow up. The next steps will be reviewed during supervision (2014 Strategy Plan, #2).

CFSA reports that 10/15 Day RED Teams have continued during this monitoring period for select investigations. As previously reported, Big RED Team reviews have not been held as intended due to the significant backlog in investigations that are open longer than 35 days. Although the backlog was decreasing between July and September 2014, it started to rise again in October and as of December 2014, 131 investigations were in backlog.

 To effectively complete investigations, CPS management will continue to equalize the caseloads, remove investigative workers out of rotation as appropriate, and quickly fill social worker vacancies as needed (2014 Strategy Plan, #3).

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Performance on all of the IEP investigation measures have been negatively impacted by caseload issues. CFSA has employed several strategies to reduce investigative worker caseloads with much of the emphasis this period on filling vacancies and mobilizing additional staff. Between July and December 2014, CFSA hired seven new CPS investigators and as of December 2014, there were no investigative worker vacancies.96 It is anticipated that all new hires will be trained by March 2015. Additionally, CFSA has hired a recruiter to implement a comprehensive recruiting strategy and has utilized a contract with a private agency to hire five contract social workers to assist with investigations. By April 2015, CFSA anticipates having a floater unit in place which will be comprised of a team of experienced social workers who will be temporarily deployed within the Agency to fill gaps that may be caused by employees who are on leave or where there are vacancies.

96 By the end of April 2015, two of the new hires resigned and their positions are now vacant.
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Reviews of Repeat Reports

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

3. Investigations: For families who are subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months, CFSA will conduct a comprehensive review of the case history and the current circumstances that bring the family to CFSA’s attention.
(IEP citation I.A.1.c.)
90% of the case records for families subject to a new investigation for whom the current report of child maltreatment is the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment, with the most recent report occurring within the last 12 months will have documentation of a comprehensive review.

Figure 5: Completion of Reviews for Families Subject to a New Investigation for Whom the Current Report is the Fourth or Greater Report Within the Last 12 Months
December 2012 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 45% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Dec-12

92% Jun-13

94% Dec-13

IEP Exit

93%

94%

Standard 90%

Jun-14

Dec-14

Source: CFSA Manual Data
Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: The purpose of this requirement is to ensure a more intensive upfront review of a family’s history and current case circumstances when a family has had multiple reports alleging abuse or neglect. In December 2014, there were 78 families eligible for a review as the current report of child maltreatment was the fourth or greater report of child maltreatment with the most recent

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report occurring within the last 12 months; 73 (94%) of these investigations had documentation in FACES.NET indicating that a comprehensive review of the case history and current circumstances that brought the family to CFSA’s attention had occurred. Between July and December 2014, monthly performance for this Exit Standard ranged from 87 to 97 percent (see Figure 6). This Exit Standard continues to be maintained.

Figure 6: Completion of Reviews for Families Subject to a New Investigation for Whom the Current Report is the Fourth or Greater Report Within the Last 12 Months
July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

96% Jul-14

97% Aug-14

96% Sep-14

92% Oct-14

87% Nov-14

94% Dec-14

Source: CFSA Manual Data

IEP Exit Standard 90%

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Quality of Investigations

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

4. Acceptable Investigations: CFSA shall routinely conduct investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect.97
(IEP citation I.A.2.)
80% of investigations will be of acceptable quality.

Figure 7: Investigations Determined to be of Acceptable Quality June 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 50% 53% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-11 Dec-11

70% Jun-12

62% Dec-12

70% Jun-13

65% Dec-13

67% 69%

IEP Exit Standard 80%

Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: Data for December 2012 were collected during a case record review of a statistically significant sample of investigations closed in October 2012. Data presented for June 2011, December 2011, June 2012, June 2013 and December 2013 are based upon a review of 20 investigations closed between January and June 2014. Data for June 2014 are based upon a review of 131 investigations closed during that monitoring period and data for December 2014 are based upon a review of 132 investigations closed between June and December 2014.

97 Evidence of acceptable investigations includes: (a) Use of CFSA’s screening tool in prioritizing response times for initiating investigations; (b) Interviews with and information obtained from the five core contacts – the victim child(ren), the maltreater, the reporting source (when known), medical resources and educational resources (for school-aged children); (c) Interviews with collateral contacts that are likely to provide information about the child’s safety and well-being; (d) Interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, or documentation, by the worker, of good-faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child; (e) Medical and mental health evaluations of the children or parents when the worker determines that such evaluations are needed to complete the investigation, except where a parent refuses to consent to such evaluations. When a parent refuses to consent to such an evaluation, the investigative social worker and supervisor shall consult with the Assistant Attorney General to determine whether court intervention is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the child(ren); (f) Use of risk assessment protocol in making decisions resulting from an investigation; and (g) Initiation of services during the investigation to prevent unnecessary removal of children from their homes.

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: Data for this Exit Standard were provided by CFSA through implementation of a continuing quality improvement practice that is outlined in the 2014 LaShawn Strategy Plan. CFSA staff reviewed 132 investigations completed between July and December 2014 using a structured review instrument developed by CFSA and the Monitor that was used in previous case record reviews to determine if an investigation is of acceptable quality. The Monitor then independently reviewed 51 (39%) of these investigations for validity. Of the 132 investigations reviewed, 91 (69%) were assessed to be of acceptable quality. Data were collected on a quarterly basis and data for the third quarter98 determined that 40 (62%) of the 65 investigations reviewed were of acceptable quality and in the fourth quarter99 51 (76%) of the 67 investigations reviewed were acceptable, showing an upward trend in performance over the six month period. Performance does not yet meet the level required by the IEP.
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to improve the quality of investigations:
 As a continuing quality improvement practice, the process for completing, reviewing, and reporting on acceptable investigations will continue in 2014 with the assistance of the Office of Agency Performance. The revised process, which began in February 2014, includes peer reviews within CPS management, an increased sample size and frequency of the reviews and reporting out. Each supervisor will conduct a review on two closed investigations per month for review by the program manager. The results will be shared monthly and will include detailed information to allow for targeted training and coaching by supervisor (2014 Strategy Plan, #4).
As discussed above and in the previous monitoring report, CFSA staff have reviewed completed investigations throughout the year to assess for acceptable quality. CFSA reports that findings from these reviews are shared in CPS all-staff meetings, during leadership huddles and are incorporated into an Entry Services scorecard that is used for internal management purposes.

98 Between July – September 2014 99 Between October – December 2014
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Community-based Service Referrals for Low & Moderate Risk Families

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

35. Community-based Service Referrals for Low & Moderate Risk Families:
(IEP citation I.C.19.)
90% of families who have been the subject of a report of abuse and/or neglect, whose circumstances are deemed to place a child in their care at low or moderate risk of abuse and neglect and who are in need of and agree to additional supports shall be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for follow-up. Low and moderate risk cases for which CFSA decides to open an ongoing CFSA case are excluded from this requirement.

Figure 8: Community-based Services Referrals for Low and Moderate Risk Families October 2012 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 66% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Oct-12

45% Jun-13

100%

100%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

79%

Dec-13

Jun-14

Dec-14

Source: October 2012 performance data collected during case record review of a statistically significant sample of investigations closed in October 2012. Sampling represents a ± 5% margin of error with 95% confidence in the results. Data presented for June 2013, December 2013, June 2014 and December 2014 from FACES.NET report INV089.

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: During December 2014, 316 investigations were completed of which 138 investigations had a risk rating of low or moderate. Of these 138 investigations, four were connected to an open case, three were opened as an ongoing case for services, four were already receiving needed services, six did not require a referral for additional supports or services and in 84 investigations, the family demonstrated service needs but declined a referral. Of the remaining 37 investigations, all 37 (100%) families received a referral to a Collaborative or community agency for follow-up. Between July and December 2014, monthly performance for this Exit Standard ranged between 95 and 100 percent (see Figure 9). CFSA newly met this Exit Standard during the previous

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monitoring period and continued to meet the required level of performance during the current monitoring period.

Figure 9: Community-based Services Referrals for Low and Moderate Risk Families July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

100% Jul-14

95% Aug-14

100% Sep-14

100% Oct-14

100%

100%

Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV089
3. Family Assessment
The Family Assessment (FA) pathway is designed for families for whom a hotline report has been made but there are no identified immediate safety concerns. For these families, instead of a CPS investigation, CFSA uses a strength-based, family-centered assessment process to support families in identifying needs and accessing services. CFSA has been using the FA pathway as part of its Differential Response (DR) system since September 2011.
CFSA is working with IAR Associates to evaluate the FA response pathway within CFSA’s DR system. There are two phases to this evaluation. The first phase was a preliminary safety analysis of children whose families were served through the FA pathway to assess whether there was any evidence that children in families who received a FA were any less safe than they would have been had their families received a CPS investigation. During this phase, the evaluation examined 599 families who received a FA following a report to the hotline between September 1, 2011 and June 30, 2013 and used a retrospective matching to select a comparison group of families with similar allegations who received a CPS investigation. Using several indicators of child safety – including subsequent child maltreatment reports, quantity of new reports, allegations in later reports and child removals and placement – the evaluation determined that children in the

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families who received a FA were no less safe than they would have been had their families received a CPS investigation response. The second phase of the evaluation is scheduled to occur between January and December 2015 and will more fully examine child and family outcomes as part of the assessment of the District’s DR model and its implementation.
Initiation of FA
CFSA policy sets different response times for initiation of FA depending upon the information contained in the hotline referral – either within three or five days from the hotline referral. Regular monthly reports for this practice became available in March 2014. In October 2014, CFSA added the capacity within FACES.NET that allows workers to indicate whether reasonable efforts had been made to initiate the FA if the child(ren) had not been seen within the designated timeframes. This is similar to how data are collected for timely initiation of investigations.
Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 26 to 46 percent of families whose FA case closed that month had all alleged child victims contacted within 72 hours of the receipt of referral; an additional 13 to 27 percent each month were contacted within five days. In total and inclusive of those FAs where reasonable efforts were made (for October through December 2014 only), a monthly range of 45 to 87 percent of families had their FA case initiated within five days (see Figure 10).

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Figure 10: Initiation of FA within 3 and 5 Days July – December 2014100

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

55% 27%
28%
Jul-14

45% 18%
26%

55% 13%
42%

79% 16% 18%
45%

86% 24%
23%
39%

Aug-14

Sep-14

Oct-14

Nov-14

3 Days 5 Days Reasonable Efforts

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INT055 Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Completion of FA

87% 18% 23% 46%
Dec-14

CFSA’s policy and practice guidance provides that FA should remain open for 45 days. The goal during that period is to fully assess child and family strengths and needs and link families with appropriate community services. In every FA, a safety assessment as part of the initial response. Following the safety assessment, unless there is an identified safety concern which warrants converting the referral to an investigation, a family’s participation in FA services is voluntary and families must agree to participate.

Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 33 to 58 percent of FAs were closed within 45 days of referral to the hotline. Specifically, as of December 31, 2014, 229 FAs were closed and 127 (55%) were closed within 45 days. Of the FAs that were open longer than 45 days, 54 (24%) were closed within 46 to 59 days; 39 (17%) were closed within 60 to 89 days; and the remaining nine (4%) were closed in 90 days or longer.

Data are collected for reason for FA closure – the top cited reasons in December 2014 for all FAs completed that month are family declined participation (99 families/43%); no further action needed (48 families/21%); family referred to a Collaborative or other community-based agency

100 Documentation of reasonable efforts became available in October 2014.
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(32 families/14%); open CPS referral (19 families/8%); and family out of jurisdiction (19 families/8%).

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Figure 11: Closure of FA within 45 Days of Referral to Hotline July – December 2014

58%

52%

55%

45%

41%

33%

Jul-14

Aug-14

Sep-14

Oct-14

Nov-14

Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV140
Community-based Service Referrals
Referrals to community-based agencies that can work with families to address needs identified through the assessment process is a key element of CFSA’s FA model. Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of six to 14 percent of families with a closed FA were referred to a Collaborative or other community agency.101 Table 4 below details the Collaboratives to which families were referred. CFSA has indicated that while the FA approach encourages the use of community resources to help families, the model also supports the families’ right to choose whether or not to engage in services and families may choose not to engage because they plan to utilize their own natural supports, the family may already be connected to services in the community or the family prefers to explore other options without CFSA involvement. Phase II of the DR evaluation report is expected to provide additional insight into these engagement and service utilization issues.

101 The monthly percentage of closed FAs referred to a Collaborative or community-based agency are as follows: July, 8%; August, 6%; September, 10%; October, 10%; November, 10%; December, 14%.

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Table 4: Service Referrals to Collaborative or

Community-based Agency for Family Assessments

July – December 2014

Collaborative or Community-Based Agency

Total Referrals

Columbia Heights/Shaw Collaborative

8

East River Collaborative

33

Edgewood/Brookland Collaborative

16

Far Southeast Collaborative

32

Georgia Avenue Collaborative

8

Other Community-Based Agency

13

Total

110

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV140

Repeat Maltreatment

As part of its assessment of the effectiveness of the FA intervention, CFSA collects data on the number of families with closed FAs who have a subsequent investigation which was substantiated for child abuse or neglect within six months of FA case closure. There were 1,137 children with a closed FA during the monitoring period between January 1 and June 30, 2014; 39 children (3%) had a substantiated investigation within six months of FA closure. Additionally, there were 462 children with a closed FA between July 1 and December 31, 2013; 37 (8%) had a substantiated investigation within 12 months of FA closure. These data are part of what will be more fully analyzed in the previously referenced evaluation of DR and FA practice.

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4. Services to Families and Children to Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

5. Services to Families and Children to Promote Safety, Permanency and WellBeing: Appropriate services, including all services identified in a child or family’s safety plan or case plan shall be offered and children/families shall be assisted to use services to support child safety, permanence and well-being.
CFSA shall provide for or arrange for services through operational commitments from District of Columbia public agencies and/or contracts with private providers. Services shall include:
a. Services to enable children who have been the subject of an abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes;
b. Services to enable children who have or will be returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those families and avoid replacement into foster care;
c. Services to avoid disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized and avoid the need for replacement; and
d. Services to prevent the disruption of a beneficial foster care placement and avoid the need for replacement.
(IEP citation I.A.3.)
In 80% of cases, appropriate services, including all services identified in a child’s or family’s safety plan or case plan shall be offered along with an offer of instruction or assistance to children/families regarding the use of those services. The Monitor will determine performance-based on the QSR Implementing Supports and Services and Pathway to Case Closure indicators.

As required by the IEP, two indicators from the QSR protocol are used to measure CFSA’s performance on the Exit Standard pertaining to appropriate service provision to families and children to promote safety, permanency and well-being. These indicators, Implementing Supports and Services and Pathway to Case Closure, are described in further detail in Figures 12 and 13, which include the parameters reviewers consider in rating performance in the selected areas, as well as descriptions of minimally acceptable performance and unacceptable performance as contained within the QSR protocol.

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Figure 12: QSR Implementing Supports and Services Indicator Parameters to Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance102
Implementing Supports and Services Indicator
 Parameters Reviewers Consider: Degree to which: (1) strategies, formal and informal supports, and services planned for the child, parent or caregiver, and family are available and provided on a timely and adequate basis. (2) The combination of supports and services fit the child and family situation so as to maximize potential results and benefits while minimizing conflicting strategies and inconveniences. (3) Delivery of planned interventions is sufficient and effective to help the child and family make adequate progress toward attaining the life outcomes and maintaining those outcomes beyond case closure.
 Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance:
Minimally Acceptable Implementation means that a fair array of supports and services somewhat matches the intervention strategies identified in the case plan and is minimally to fairly helping the child and family meet near-term needs and make progress toward planned outcomes. A minimally adequate to fair set of supports and services is usually available, used, and seen as somewhat satisfactory by the family. The array provides few options, limiting professional judgment and family choice in the selection of providers. The team is considering taking steps to mobilize additional resources to give the family choice and/or provide resources to meet the particular family needs but has not yet taken any steps.
Unacceptable Implementation means that supports and services identified in the case plan are at least somewhat limited or may not be readily accessible or available to the family. A limited set of supports and services may be inconsistently available and used but may be seen as partially unsatisfactory by the family. The service/support array provides few options, substantially limiting use of professional judgment and family choice in the selection of providers. The team has not yet considered taking steps to mobilize additional resources to give the family greater choice and/or provide resources to meet particular family needs.

102 Quality Service Review Protocol for a Child and Family: Reusable Protocol for Examination of Child Welfare and Mental Health Services for a Child and Family, Shared Practice Protocol. Human Services and Outcomes, November 2013, p. 66-67.

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Figure 13: QSR Pathway to Case Closure Indicator Parameters to Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance103
Pathway to Case Closure Indicator
 Parameters Reviewers Consider: To what degree: (1) Is there a clear, achievable case goal including concurrent and alternative plans? (2) Does everyone involved, including family members, know and agree on what specific steps need to be achieved in order to achieve the case goal and close the case safely? (3) Is the child/family making progress on these steps and informed of consequences of not meeting the necessary requirements within the required timelines? (4) Are team members planning for the youth’s transition from care in APPLA cases? (5) Are reasonable efforts being made to achieve safe case closure for all case goals?
 Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance:
Minimally Acceptable Pathway to Case Closure means some people involved in the case understand the case goal, including any plan alternatives. Minimally adequate to fair efforts are being made to achieve the permanency goal and to remove any barriers to permanency. Some people have agreed upon the steps that must be accomplished and requirements that must be met for safe case closure. Some team members are aware of timelines and consequences for not meeting requirements and the team is making some progress towards closure, though not in a timely manner - or - the team has established a good plan but has not made sufficient progress on it.
Unacceptable Pathway to Case Closure means few people involved in the case understand or agree with the case goal, including any plan alternatives. Marginal or inconsistent efforts are being made to achieve the permanency goal and to remove any barriers to permanency. Few steps that must be accomplished or requirements that must be met for safe case closure, timelines, and consequences for not meeting requirements have been defined and/or agreed upon by family members and providers. The case is not making sufficient progress towards closure - or - the team has established a fair plan but has not made progress on it.

103 Quality Service Review Protocol for a Child and Family: Reusable Protocol for Examination of Child Welfare and Mental Health Services for a Child and Family, Shared Practice Protocol. Human Services and Outcomes, November 2013, p. 58-59.

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Figure 14: QSR Findings on Services to Families and Children to Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being CY2010 – CY2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40%
42% 30% 20% 10% 0%
CY2010

64% CY2011

42% CY2012

51%

IEP Exit Standard 80%
35%

CY2013

CY2014

Source: QSR Data

Performance for calendar year 2014: A total of 125 cases were reviewed using the QSR methodology from January to December 2014. Of these cases, 24 of the cases involved a child receiving in-home services and 101 cases were of children placed in out-of-home care.

As Figure 15 indicates, approximately one-third of the cases reviewed (35%; 44 of 125) were rated as acceptable on both the Implementing Supports and Services and Pathway to Case Closure indicators. Slightly more than half (54%; 67 of 125) of the cases reviewed were rated acceptable on the Implementing Supports and Services indicator and 54 percent of the cases (67 of 125) were rated acceptable on the Pathway to Case Closure indicator. During the current monitoring period, CFSA’s performance decreased and is far below the 80 percent required for this Exit Standard for services to families and children to promote safety, permanency and wellbeing.

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The data indicate a gap in matching supports and services with pathway to case closure as significantly fewer cases (23) were rated acceptable on both indicators as compared to cases that rated acceptable on just one of these select indicators. One key element of the pathway to case closure indicator is ensuring that all team members, including family members, are on the same page and understand the direction the case is moving and what is required to move the case to closure. One key theme from the QSR case narratives and additional analyses is that the formation, functioning and coordination of the team is critical to acceptable performance on the Pathway to Case Closure and Implementing Supports and Service indicators.104 While CFSA’s use of RED Teams has provided additional opportunities for increased teaming and critical thinking, it is important that this information sharing and consultation framework be used in all teaming opportunities with the birth family, foster family and professionals across agencies working with the family. Additionally, the engagement and assessment of key team members – including the child, mother, father and substitute caregiver, as applicable – impact the team’s ability to properly plan and implement the necessary supports and services to move the case to safe case closure. A second theme from the QSR case narratives and regression analyses highlight significant impact of some key elements in the service delivery process – specifically, engagement with the child; assessment of the child; and assessment of the mother.105

100%

Figure 15: QSR Findings on Services to Children and Families to Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being CY2014 N=125

80%

60% 35%
40%

20%

0% Acceptable Performance on Both Indicators

Source: QSR Data, January – June 2014

IEP Exit Standard 80%

104 Regression analyses were run to determine the significance of engagement, assessment and teaming indicators on pathway to case closure and implementing supports and services while controlling for placement type, agency and age of youth. Findings from these analyses indicate that team formation and functioning are significant predictors of acceptable pathway to case closure (p<.05) and team coordination is a significant predictor of acceptable implementation of supports and services (p<.05). 105 Regression analyses indicate these findings are significant at p<.05. Findings also indicate the significant impact of the engagement of the father on pathway to case closure (p<.10) and of the assessment of the child and caregiver on acceptable implementation of supports and services (p<.10).

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Critical to CFSA’s performance on this Exit Standard is its success in providing appropriate inhome services and supports for families. Of the cases reviewed where the focus child was receiving in-home services, 25 percent (6 of 24) were rated acceptable on Implementing Supports and Services compared to 60 percent (61 of 101) of cases rated acceptable where the focus child was placed in out-of-home care (see Table 5). Additionally, only 46 percent (11 of 24) of in-home cases were rated acceptable on Pathway to Case Closure compared to 55 percent (56 of 101) of out-of-home cases. The difference in the percentage of acceptable in-home cases compared to out-of-home cases is significant106 and suggest the need for additional emphasis on effective case practice and services within in-home cases.

Table 5: Acceptable Performance on QSR Indicators Used to Assess

Services to Children and Families to

Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being

In-Home Cases

Out-of-Home Cases

N=24

N=101

Implementing Supports and Services

25% (6)

60% (61)

Pathway to Case Closure

46% (11)

55% (56)

Both Indicators

17% (4)

40% (40)

Source: QSR Data, CY2014

Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to increase performance on the services provided to children and families to promote safety, permanency and well-being:

 By April 1, 2014, CFSA will test the Functional Family Assessment tool for inhome and out-of-home. Full implementation of the tool is expected by July 31, 2014 (2014 Strategy Plan, #5).107

CFSA has delayed the implementation of the Caregivers Strength and Needs Assessment, as integration into FACES.NET has taken longer than anticipated due to the complex changes being made to link this and other assessments to the case planning screen and document. CFSA now expects full integration into FACES.NET and a roll-out of the tool by July 2015.

106 Analyses indicate this difference is significant at a level of p<.05. 107 This strategy was modified in June 2014 and changed the full implementation date from May 1, 2014 to July 31, 2014 as additional time was needed to complete testing and training on the tool.

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5. Visitation
The visits for children with their caseworkers, parents and siblings can ensure children’s safety, maintain and strengthen family connections and increase opportunities to achieve permanency. Social worker visits with children in out-of-home placement and with their families promote placement stability and increase the likelihood that reunification will occur. They also allow social workers to assess safety, progress on case plans and link children and families to needed services as appropriate.
During this monitoring period, CFSA continued to maintain required performance on frequency of worker visits to children in out-of-home care108 and partially met the Exit Standard for visits between workers and parents in the first three months after a child’s placement in care. Improvements were also noted in the assessment and documentation of safety for children in outof-home care and for children newly placed or replaced during the month. Performance declined in both frequency of visits to children receiving in-home services109, which is only partially maintained this period as an Outcome to be Maintained, and assessing and documenting safety during worker visits in in-home services cases.

108 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP citation I.A.5.a.-c. during this monitoring period. 109 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP citation I.A.4.a.-b. during this monitoring period.

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Social Workers Assessment of Safety during Visits – Families with In-Home Services

IEP Requirement

7. Worker Visitation to Families with In-Home Services: Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence of the caretaker.
(IEP citation I.A.4.c.)

Exit Standard

90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was visited and seen outside the presence of the caretaker and that safety was assessed during each visit.

Figure 16: Children Receiving In-Home Services: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits June 2012 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 28% 10% 0%
Jun-12

25% Jun-13

58% Jun-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%
38%
Dec-14

Source: Case Record Review Data (June 2012 and June 2013) and CFSA Manual Data (June and December 2014)

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: During the current monitoring period, CFSA reviewed the documentation of 45 to 50 children each month who were receiving in-home services.110 In December 2014, of the 50 cases reviewed, 19 (38%) cases had documentation that safety was fully assessed at two or more visits during the month. Between July and December 2014, reviewers determined that documentation indicated that safety was fully assessed at two or more visits in 30 to 51 percent of the cases reviewed each month (see Figure 17). CFSA continues to fall far below the required level of 90 percent for this Exit Standard.
Figure 17: Children Receiving In-Home Services: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

30% Jul-14

47% 30%
Aug-14 Sep-14

51% Oct-14

38%

38%

Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Source: CFSA Manual Data

110 In September and October 2014, documentation for 45 children were reviewed and for the remaining months, documentation for 50 children were reviewed.

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Social Workers Assessment of Safety during Visits – Children in Out-of-Home Care

IEP Requirement

9. Worker Visitation to Children in Out-of-Home Care: Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child at every visit and each child over two years old must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence of the caretaker.
(IEP citation I.A.5.d.)

Exit Standard

90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was seen outside the presence of the caretaker by a worker and that safety was assessed during each visit.

Figure 18: Children in Out-Of-Home Care: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits
June 2012 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 24% 10% 0%
Jun-12

32% Jun-13

40% Jun-14

60%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Dec-14

Source: Case Record Review Data (June 2012 and June 2013) and CFSA Manual Data (June and December 2014)

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: CFSA reviewed the documentation of 25 children each month who were placed in out-of-home care during this monitoring period. Of the 25 cases reviewed in December 2014, in 15 (60%) cases it was determined that safety was fully assessed at two or more visits during the month. Reviewers determined that documentation indicated that safety was fully assessed at two or more visits in 44 to 72 percent of the cases reviewed each month this period (see Figure 19). CFSA’s performance on this Exit Standard continues to improve but does not yet meet the required level of 90 percent.

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Figure 19: Children in Out-of-Home Care: Safety Fully Assessed at Two or More Visits
July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

44% Jul-14

52% Aug-14

Source: CFSA Manual Data

72% Sep-14

60% Oct-14

72% 60%
Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

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Social Worker Visits – Children Experiencing a New Placement or a Placement Change

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

10. Visitation for Children Experiencing a New Placement or a Placement Change:
a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case management responsibility shall make at least two visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.
b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse care manager shall make two additional visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change.
c. At least one of the above visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall be in the child’s home.
d. At least one of the visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall include a conversation between the social worker and the resource parent to assess assistance needed by the resource parent from the Agency. (IEP citation I.A.6.a-d.)
90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described.

Figure 20: Required Number of Visits to Children in New Placements June 2011 – December 2014

100%

90%

80%

70%

60% 63%

69%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Jun-11 Dec-11

83% Jun-12

79% Dec-12

89% Jun-13

87% Dec-13

83% 66%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT014

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: During the month of December 2014, there were 113 individual child placements applicable to this measure; 75 (66%) had the required number of visits by a CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse care manager with at least one visit occurring in the child’s home.111 Between July and December 2014, monthly performance ranged between 66 and 85 percent of children who were newly placed or experienced a placement change had the required number of visits (see Figure 21).

As seen in Figure 21 below, CFSA’s performance declined in the final months of the monitoring period and does not yet meet the required performance level of 90 percent.

Figure 21: Required Number of Worker Visits to Children in New Placements July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

81% Jul-14

85% Aug-14

81% Sep-14

79% Oct-14

77% 66%
Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT014

The Exit Standard also requires that at least one of the visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change include a conversation between the social worker and the resource parent to determine what, if any assistance is needed from the Agency. CFSA collected data for this sub-part of the standard when reviewing case records to determine if safety was assessed during visits. Between July and December, 52 to 82 percent of new placements or

111 Additional data were provided which indicate that of all children who had been in a new placement for 4 weeks, a monthly range of 77 to 94% of children received at least 3 or more worker visits this monitoring period. The number of children who had been in the new placement for 4 weeks and received at least 3 or more visits during the first 4 weeks of a new placement or placement change are as follows: July, 91%; August, 93%; September, 94%; October, 92%; November, 93%; December, 77%.

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placement changes each month included a conversation between the social worker and resource parent to determine what assistance was needed from the Agency.

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

11. Visitation for Children Experiencing a New Placement or a Placement Change: Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child at every visit and each child must be separately interviewed at least monthly outside of the presence of the caretaker.
(IEP citation I.A.6.e.)
90% of cases will have documentation verifying each child was seen outside the presence of the caretaker by a social worker and that safety was assessed during each visit.

Figure 22: Children Experiencing a Placement Change: Safety Fully Assessed during All Required Visits in the Month
June 2013 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

20% Jun-13

40% May-14

44%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Dec-14

Source: Case Record Review Data (June 2013) and CFSA Manual Data (May and December 2014)

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: CFSA reviewed the documentation of 24 to 25 children who experienced a new placement or placement change each month between July through December 2014. In December 2014, reviewers determined that safety was fully assessed during all visits that month in 11 of the 25 (44%) cases reviewed.112 Between July and December 2014, reviewers determined that documentation indicated that safety was fully assessed at all visits during the month in 28 to 58 percent of the cases reviewed each month. CFSA’s performance is showing some improvement but continues to fall far below the level of performance required by the IEP.

Figure 23: Children Experiencing a Placement Change: Safety Fully Assessed during All Required Visits in the Month
July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

28% Jul-14

58% Aug-14

Source: CFSA Manual Data

50% Sep-14

56% Oct-14

52% Nov-14

44% Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

112 All visits refers to at least 4 visits as required by the IEP citation I.A.6.a-d. which outlines the frequency of visitation required to children experiencing a new placement of placement change.

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Visits between Parents and Workers

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

18. Visits between Parents and Workers:
a. For children with a permanency goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case-management responsibility shall visit with the parent(s) at least one time per month in the first three months post-placement.113
b. A CFSA social worker, nurse care manager or family support worker shall make a second visit during each month for the first three months postplacement.
(IEP citation I.B.10.)
80% of parents will have twice monthly visitation with workers in the first three months post-placement.

Figure 24: Percentage of Households with Twice Monthly Visits between Workers and Parents with Goal of Reunification December 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 35% 20% 10% 0%
Dec-11

53% Jun-12

57%

62%

Dec-12 Jun-13

65% Dec-13

74% 65%
Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 80%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT267; performance data from June and December 2014 include instances where there was documentation in the record that the parent was unavailable or refused to cooperate despite Agency efforts.

113 This Exit Standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: In December 2014, there were 50 households of children with a goal of reunification applicable to this measure; parents in 34 households received two worker visits and for an additional three parents, there was documentation in the record that the parent was unavailable or refused to cooperate with the Agency despite efforts made by the Agency, for a total of 74 percent in compliance with this Exit Standard. Between July and December 2014, monthly performance on this measure ranged between 74 and 81 percent (see Figure 25). Performance has improved since the previous period and met the required level of performance during two months this period and was within three percent during one additional month. The Monitor considers this Exit Standard to be partially achieved.

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Figure 25: Percentage of Households with Twice Monthly Visits between Workers and Parents with Goal of Reunification July – December 2014

76%

81%

80%

76%

77%

74%

Jul-14 Aug-14 Sep-14 Oct-14 Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 80%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT267 and findings from internal audit of missed visits efforts

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Visits between Parents and Children

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

19. Visits between Parents and Children: There shall be weekly visits between parents and children with a goal of reunification unless clinically inappropriate and approved by the Family Court. In cases in which visitation does not occur, the Agency shall demonstrate and there shall be documentation in the case record that visitation was not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it.
(IEP citation I.B.11.)
85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought.114

Figure 26: Percentage of Children with Goal of Reunification who Visit Weekly with the Parent with whom Reunification is Sought
December 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 67% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Dec-11

72% Jun-12

71% Dec-12

67% Jun-13

66% Dec-13

76% 71%

IEP Exit Standard 85%

Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT012; performance data from June and December 2014 include instances where there was documentation in the record that visits could not occur despite Agency efforts.

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: In December 2014, 327 children were applicable to this measure; 243 had weekly visits with the parent with whom reunification is sought and for an additional five children, there was documentation in the record that visits could not occur because the visit was not in the child’s best interest, was clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts made by the Agency,

114 This Exit Standard is also satisfied in cases where it is documented that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it.

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for a total of 76 percent in compliance with this Exit Standard during the month.115 Between July and December 2014, monthly performance on this measure ranged between 73 and 78 percent (see Figure 27). This performance is below the level required by the IEP.

Figure 27: Percentage of Children with Goal of Reunification who Visit Weekly with the Parent with whom Reunification is Sought
July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

78% Jul-14

76% Aug-14

75% Sep-14

76% Oct-14

73%

76%

Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 85%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT012 and findings from internal audit of missed visits efforts
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategies to increase performance on visitation:
 By March 1, 2014, CFSA will implement Icebreaker meetings following the initial FTM. The Icebreaker meetings will include the attendance of birth parents and foster parents to begin building a relationship. This engagement strategy will assist parents in connecting quicker with the foster parents and begin to develop a line of communication to better support the children. The process will also allow social workers to schedule and coordinate visits with parents and children from the beginning of the case (2014 Strategy Plan, #11).
CFSA partnered with the Foster and Adoptive Parent Advocacy Center (FAPAC) to implement Family Icebreakers in 2014 and between January and June 2014, six Icebreaker meetings were

115 Of the total children who may have been included in this measure, 10 were excluded due to suspended visits by court order; 13 were excluded due to being classified as in abscondence for the whole month; and 21 were excluded due to “other suspended visits,” which includes when a parent or child is incarcerated more than 100 miles away or when a child is placed outside of DC, Maryland, Virginia or placed in a residential treatment facility greater than 100 miles away.

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held.116 Beginning in the fall of 2014, CFSA’s Kinship and Placement Resource Development Specialists took on responsibility for coordinating and facilitating the Icebreakers. There was some increase in Icebreakers during the current period, with 15 Icebreaker meetings being completed between July and December 2014.117 CFSA reports that data are not available measuring the impact of Icebreakers on family visitation and engagement.
Beginning in April 2015, CFSA plans to offer Icebreaker meetings not only to parents at the time of removal but also to parents and resource parents of children who have a goal of reunification and experience a placement change.
 CFSA has revised its placement policy effective March 1, 2014, which identifies that temporary situations such as respite and planned extended visits with relatives and/or parents are not counted as placement moves. By March 1, 2014, CFSA will operationalize the policy into FACES.NET. This system update will have a direct impact on the performance on weekly visits during a child’s first four weeks of a new placement because these temporary situations will no longer be incorrectly identified as placement changes that require weekly visits (2014 Strategy Plan, #12).
CFSA reports that the revised policy was implemented and operationalized into FACES.NET in 2014. Data for 2014 do not indicate much change in performance on the Exit Standard related to worker visits to children within the first four weeks of initial placement or a placement change.
 Effective September 2013, CFSA constructed and fully implemented a case transfer process that occurs no later than the initial Family Team Meeting (FTM) following the removal of a child from the home. This parental engagement process requires the assigned on‐going social worker (CFSA and private agency) to attend a Removal RED Team meeting (prior to the initial FTM), the initial FTM, and the initial court hearing. This requirement is designed to allow the social worker to complete the initial worker/parent visits and engage the parent(s) in scheduling the visitation with the child(ren) and ongoing visits with the worker (2014 Strategy Plan, #13).
CFSA reports that Removal RED Teams, which are required as part of the transfer of a case from the investigator to the ongoing worker, are occurring 100 percent of the time and allow for better coordination among workers. No additional updates since the previous monitoring period were provided regarding this strategy.
 Beginning February 2014, CFSA will conduct a monthly data analysis for the

116 Data from FACES.NET indicate that 170 children were initially placed in foster care during this same time period. 117 Data from FACES.NET indicate that 163 children were initially placed in foster care during this same time period.

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required parent‐child and parent‐worker visits to determine barriers to meeting the standards. Findings from the analysis will be shared with CFSA and private agencies monthly (2014 Strategy Plan, #14).
CFSA regularly conducts further analysis of data available in FACES.NET regarding performance on visits between parents and workers and visits between parents and children. Although these reports have been amended to allow a worker to specify when the parent is unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency, or when there is documentation to indicate that a visit is not in the child’s best interest or clinically inappropriate, CFSA has found that some workers struggle to accurately enter the necessary information into FACES.NET. CFSA has provided workers and supervisors with a tip sheet which specifies the efforts a worker should make to facilitate visitation and where this information should be captured in FACES.NET. CFSA reports that in addition to documentation issues, some workers have difficulty engaging uncooperative or unavailable parents and that this effects visitation performance.
To increase performance on these Exit Standards, workers and supervisors are encouraged to plan visits in advance and identify when support is needed.
 Beginning February 20, 2014, and continuing on a quarterly basis, the Deputy Directors for Community Partnerships and Program Operations will institute and formalize a quality assurance process for assessing safety during visits for in‐ home and out‐of‐home cases. CFSA supervisors and contract monitoring staff will conduct 20 case reviews to determine whether safety was assessed and documented during visits. Findings from these reviews will be shared with workers, supervisors and management and will be used to inform ongoing worker training and coaching (2014 Strategy Plan, #25).
As indicated by the data discussed earlier in this section, during this monitoring period CFSA continued to implement the quality assurance process to review workers’ assessment and documentation of safety during visits with children. CFSA reports that findings are periodically shared with permanency supervisors during supervisor management meetings and with in-home staff during staff meetings or during group supervision. Current data indicate performance has improved for children in out-of-home placement, however, performance declined on this measure for in-home cases. CFSA has engaged the University of Iowa and the National Resource Center for In-Home Services to provide training to workers on a framework for the completion of quality visits. Trainings were held on March 23 and 24, 2015 and completion of quality visits is a part of staff performance benchmarks.

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B. GOAL: PERMANENCY
1. Relative Resources
CFSA continues to implement strategies to support kin as placement and family support resources through early identification, temporary licensure support and striving to make a kinship home the first placement for children upon entering care. CFSA’s Kinship Support unit is responsible for many of these strategies as well as coordinating Family Team Meetings (FTMs) as soon as CFSA is involved with a family where a child is at risk of out-of-home placement. As a matter of policy, CFSA requires a referral to the Diligent Search unit to locate parents, grandparents and other relatives at the same time a FTM referral is made. It is CFSA’s practice, and a requirement of the IEP, to identify family members who may be able to join in the FTM planning process in order to provide information and support to children and parents and also be considered as placement options.118 CFSA continues to provide the Monitor quarterly data regarding the use of FTMs with sufficient back up data to demonstrate efforts to identify and invite family members to FTMs.
CFSA has previously met both Exit Standards applicable to identification and use of relative resources and performance was maintained during this monitoring period.119 Specifically, of the 104 families at-risk of having their children removed between July and December 2014, CFSA took necessary steps to offer/facilitate pre-removal FTMs in 96 cases (92%). Additionally, of the 99 families who had children removed during this monitoring period, CFSA made reasonable efforts to identify, locate and invite known relatives to the FTM in 96 cases (97%).
2. Placement of Children
Children enter foster care when they cannot be kept safely in their own homes. The LaShawn IEP has multiple requirements regarding the placement of children in out-of-home care to ensure their safety, permanency and well-being.
Figure 28 below shows the number of children in out-of-home placement in the District of Columbia between December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2014. The number of children in foster care continues to decline, with a 12 percent reduction since the same time in 2013.

118 The Kinship Family Licensing Unit and Diligent Search Unit work in tandem to assess the homes of potential kinship resources and complete necessary background checks. Additionally, staff is available to conduct fingerprinting on-site, which increases the speed and ease of licensing kinship resources. 119 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP citation I.B.7.a.-b. during this monitoring period.

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3000 2500 2000 1500 1000

Figure 28: Number of Children in Out-of-Home Placements by Year CY2005 – CY2014

2588

2286

2193

2264

2103

2007

1744

1430

1215

1068

Number of Children

500

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Year

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC156 CY2005 through CY2014 data are point in time data taken on the last day of the calendar year.

Demographics of Children in Out-of-Home Care

Table 6 below shows the number of children in out-of-home placement as of December 31, 2014 with basic demographic information. There were 1,068 children between the ages of birth and 21 years in out-of-home placement. Similar to other periods, the majority of children are African American (95%) and are either under the age of six (25%) or age 15 or older (45%) (see Table 6).

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Table 6: Demographics of Children in Out-of-Home Placement as of December 31, 2014 N=1,068

Gender
Male Female

Total

Number
554 514
1,068

Percent*
52% 48%
100%

Race
Black or African American White Asian Unable to Determine/Unknown No Race Data Reported
Total

Number
1,018 37 4 1 8
1,068

Percent
95% 3% <1% <1% <1%
100%

Ethnicity
Hispanic Non-Hispanic Unable to Determine Unknown

Number
101 957
3 7

Percent
9% 90% <1% <1%

Total

1,068

100%

Age
1 year or less 2-5 years 6-8 years 9-11 years 12-14 years 15-17 years 18-20 years

Number
91 176 115 93 116 208 269

Percent
9% 16% 11% 9% 11% 20% 25%

Total

1,068

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC156 Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding.

100%

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Placement of Children in Most Family-Like Setting

Research evidence is clear that children do best when they are living with families. Of the 1,068 children in out-of-home care on December 31, 2014, 883 (83%) were placed in family-based settings, including 243 (23%) in kinship homes. Figure 29 below displays the placement types for children in out-of-home care as of December 31, 2014.

Figure 29: Placement Service Type for Children in Out-of-Home Care as of December 31, 2014
N=1,068

Correctional Facility (23),
2% Abscondance (35),
3%

Residential Treatment (14), 1%

Specialized (14), 1% Other (16), 2%

Group Homes (44), 4%
Pre-Adoptive (50), 5%
Independent Living (53), 5%

Traditional (352), 33%

Therapeutic (224), 21%

Kinship (243), 23%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT232 and CMT389 Other includes college/vocational, hospitals and not in legal placement.
CFSA has previously achieved both Exit Standards related to placement of children in the most family-like setting120 and maintained required performance during the current period.121

Placement of Young Children

The IEP specifically limits the use of congregate care placements for young children unless there is appropriate justification that the child has special treatment or exceptional needs that cannot be

120 IEP citations I.B.8.a&b. 121 IEP citation I.B.8.b. requires that no child shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days. During the current monitoring period, 1 child was placed for 34 days in a short-term foster home. CFSA has provided the Monitor with information regarding the circumstances of this placement and the Monitor has determined that moving the child would not have been in their best interest. The Monitor will continue to assess these placements as they occur.

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met in a home-like setting.122 These Exit Standards are Outcomes to be Maintained and, as discussed below, CFSA continued to meet the required performance during the current monitoring period.
IEP citation I.B.9.a. requires that no child under the age of 12 shall be placed in a congregate care setting for more than 30 days without appropriate justification. Between July and December 2014, four children under the age of 12 were placed in congregate care settings for more than 30 days. CFSA and Monitor staff reviewed these placements and all were determined to have specialized needs that required placement within those settings.
IEP citation I.B.9.b. requires that no child under the age of six be placed in group care, nonfoster home settings without appropriate justification. During the current monitoring, two children under the age of six were placed in hospital settings and, after review by CFSA and Monitor staff, both were determined to have specialized needs that required placement in that setting. Also during this monitoring period, three of the six children discussed above were discharged into family-like placements that are able to meet their needs and potentially provide permanency for each child.
3. Reduction of Multiple Placements for Children in Care
The Exit Standard on placement stability has different required performance levels based on the length of time children are in care, due to the different placement trajectories for children who have been in care for shorter versus longer periods of time. The overall goal is to minimize placement moves for all children to the greatest extent possible recognizing the importance of placement stability to a child’s well-being and the substantial evidence that now exists that demonstrates how children are harmed by multiple placements.
During the previous monitoring period, CFSA met the required level of performance for all three sub-parts of this Exit Standard (IEP citation I.B.13.a.-c.), which was redesignated as an Outcome to be Maintained, and continued to meet these performance levels during the current monitoring period (see Figures 30 – 35).

122 Placement exceptions were agreed upon in July 2011 and include: 1) medically fragile needs where there is evidence in the child’s record and documentation from the child’s physician that the child’s needs can only be met in a hospital or skilled nursing facility or another highly specialized treatment facility; 2) developmentally delayed or specialized cognitive needs where there is evidence that the child’s condition places the child in danger to himself or others and that ensuring the child’s safety or the safety of other requires placement in a congregate treatment program which can meet the child’s needs; or 3) court order where the Court has ordered that the child remain in the group care setting.

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Children in Care at Least 8 Days and Less than 12 Months
This sub-part of the Exit Standard requires that 83 percent of children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care at least eight days and less than 12 months have two or fewer placements.
Figure 30: Children in Foster Care at Least 8 Days and Less than 12 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements June 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80%
81% 81% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-11 Dec-11

81% Jun-12

79% Dec-12

80% Jun-13

80% Dec-13

87% 90% Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 83%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC234

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: As of December 31, 2014, there were 328 children in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care at least eight days and less than 12 months; 296 (90%) had two or fewer placements (see Figure 31). As illustrated in Figure 31 below, between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 88 to 92 percent of children in foster care for eight days to less than 12 months had two or fewer placements, exceeding the required level of 83 percent every month.

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Figure 31: Children in Foster Care at Least 8 Days and Less than 12 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements July – December 2014

100%

90% 88%

88%

90%

90%

92%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Jul-14 Aug-14 Sep-14 Oct-14
Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC234

Nov-14

90% Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 83%

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Children in Care at Least 12 Months but Less than 24 Months

This sub-part of the Exit Standard requires that 60 percent of children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12 months but less than 24 months have two or fewer placements.
Figure 32: Children in Foster Care at Least 12 Months but Less than 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements June 2011 – December 2014

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

59% 50%

57%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Jun-11 Dec-11

53% Jun-12

57% Dec-12

57% Jun-13

53% Dec-13

64% 63%

IEP Exit Standard 60%

Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC234
Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: As of December 31, 2014, there were 264 children in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12 months, but less than 24 months; 165 (63%) had two or fewer placements (see Figure 33). Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 63 to 65 percent of children in foster care for 12 to 24 months had two or fewer placements (see Figure 33). Performance for this sub-part of the Exit Standard continued to meet the required level each month.

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Figure 33: Children in Foster Care at Least 12 Months but Less than 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

64% Jul-14

65% Aug-14

65% Sep-14

64% Oct-14

63% Nov-14

63% Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC234

IEP Exit Standard 60%

Children in Care at Least 24 Months during a 12 Month Period

For children in care 24 months or greater, the measure is purposely focused on the child’s placement experiences in the past 12 months, since many of these children have histories with multiple past placements. The analysis is focused on whether these children have achieved stability in the most recent 12 month period and the Exit Standard requires that 75 percent have two or fewer placements in that 12 month period.

Figure 34: Children in Foster Care at Least 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements During a 12 Month Period
June 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 76% 76% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-11 Dec-11

79% Jun-12

76% Dec-12

76% Jun-13

75% Dec-13

78% 75% Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 75%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC234

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: As of December 31, 2014, there were 600 children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 24 months; 449 (75%) had two or fewer placements during the previous 12 months (see Figure 35). Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 74 to 78 percent of children in care for at least 24 months had two or fewer placements within the past 12 months (see Figure 35).123 CFSA’s performance continues to meet this sub-part of the Exit Standard requirement.

Figure 35: Children in Foster Care at Least 24 Months with 2 or Fewer Placements During a 12-Month Period
July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

77% Jul-14

78% Aug-14

78% Sep-14

74% Oct-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PLC234

74% Nov-14

75% Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 75%

Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to increase performance on reduction of multiple placements:

 CFSA will continue to utilize a behavioral crisis stabilization support service for foster parents and kinship foster parents. CFSA will continue to utilize a management process that reinforces the integrated teaming approach to identify, coordinate, and link appropriate supports/services to meet the needs of children currently in, or at risk of, a restrictive level of care (2014 Strategy Plan, #15).

123 In October and November 2014, performance for this sub-part was 74%, which is 1% below the required level. The Monitor considers this an insubstantial deviation and compliance with this Exit Standard maintained.

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Behavioral crisis stabilization services have been available to CFSA foster parents since November 2013 and to private agency foster parents since January 2014. CFSA reports that in FY2014, there were 151 referrals for mobile crisis stabilization services and 72 percent of the children involved in these referrals remained stable in their placement. As of the first quarter in FY2015, 35 referrals have been made for mobile crisis stabilization services and 91 percent of the children involved in these referrals remained stable in their placement.
The data discussed in this section suggest that the crisis stabilization services have contributed to CFSA’s ability to meet and maintain required performance for this Exit Standard in 2014.

4. Timely Approval of Foster Parents

CFSA is responsible for licensing and monitoring foster homes and placement facilities in the District of Columbia and contracts with private child placing agencies in the states of Maryland and Virginia to license homes and facilities in those states. CFSA has been focusing its recruitment efforts to increase the number of licensed homes in the District and reports a continued trend of a higher percentage of initial placements occurring in the District. This Exit Standard (IEP citation I.B.14.), which was newly achieved during the previous monitoring period, requires that 70 percent of homes licensed will have been approved within 150 days of beginning training.

Figure 36: Approval of Foster Parents within 150 Days of Beginning Training July 2012 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 36% 20% 10% 0% Jul - Dec 2012

47% Jan - Jun 2013

58% Jul - Dec 2013

74% Jan - Jun 2014

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report PRD202

65%

IEP Exit Standard 70%

Jul - Dec 2014

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 30, 2014: Between July and December 2014, CFSA and private agencies licensed 119 family foster homes; 77 (65%) of these homes were licensed with the required number of pre-service training hours and within the 150 day timeframe.124 Performance on this Exit Standard declined during this monitoring period; the Monitor currently considers the decline to be a temporary deviation and is not recommending redesignation at this time, however, will continue to closely monitor future performance.
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to increase performance on timely approval of foster parents:
 By September 30 2014, four CFSA staff members will receive Approved Training (Master Trainer) status. CFSA currently utilizes the PS-MAPP training curriculum. The Approved Trainers will have the flexibility to offer the PS-MAPP training to foster parents more frequently and with flexibility of location, to include foster parents’ homes (2014 Strategy Plan, #21).
As reported in the monitoring report for the January through June 2014 monitoring period, all licensing staff were trained in Trauma Informed Partnering for Permanence and Safety: Model Approach to Partnerships in Parenting (PS-MAPP) and five staff are trained as Approved Trainers to ensure PS-MAPP is consistently administered to all foster parents. This training is co-facilitated with existing foster parents, which enables new foster parents to learn from firsthand experience what to expect when working with children in care, and better understand their role prior to deciding whether or not to follow through with licensing requirements.
 CFSA will continue to utilize the services of the KVC consultant to implement solutions to timely licensing of foster homes, including challenges around kin, worker delays, data entry issues, family delays with scheduling, rescheduling fire inspections (2014 Strategy Plan, #22).
CFSA’s contract with a KVC consultant concluded during the current monitoring period after CFSA licensing staff received key tools and support to provide technical assistance to private agencies to address barriers to timely licensure. CFSA reports that the consultation and technical assistance provided by the consultant improved CFSA’s capacity and ability to license foster and adoptive homes in a timely manner.

124 Of the 77 homes that were licensed in the current monitoring period, 10 homes whose licensure took longer than 150 days were considered compliant due to circumstances that were beyond the District’s control.

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5. Appropriate Permanency Goals

The IEP requires that children have permanency planning goals consistent with the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) and District law and policy guidelines. There are a number of Exit Standards associated with this outcome that focus specifically on older youth in foster care and those children and youth with a permanency goal of Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA). CFSA has previously met and continues to maintain these IEP Exit Standards.125

Discussion in this section also includes CFSA’s current performance on the Exit Standard (achieved during the last monitoring period) that requires youth transitioning out of care to have a transition plan developed that summarizes work to date and provides guidance on next steps required to support the youth in transitioning from foster care (IEP citation I.B.12.c.). These plans must be individualized and developed with the youth and his/her identified, supportive team. Further, plans should provide the youth with appropriate connections to specific options on housing, health insurance, education and linkages to continuing adult support services agencies.

Figure 37: Youth Ages 18 and Older with a Youth Transition Plan January 2012 – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 61% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jan - Jun 2012

96% 57%

Jul - Dec 2012

Jan - Jun 2013

92%
Jul - Dec 2013

95%
Jan - Jun 2014

96%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Jul - Dec 2014

Source: CFSA Manual Data and FACES.NET report CMT391

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: CFSA has worked to enhance practice with adolescents to support earlier and ongoing engagement and planning with youth around their transition from foster care. CFSA reports that of the 264 youth ages 18 and older under CFSA care between July and December 2014, 12 youth were in abscondence, developmentally disabled or refused to participate in the development of a
125 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP citation I.B.12.a.-c. during this monitoring period.

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YTP and were excluded from analysis. Thus, out of 252 applicable youth, 241 (96%) had a YTP plan.
The Monitor considers performance on this Exit Standard to be maintained.
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has used the following the strategy to ensure quality youth transition planning occurs for older youth:
 Beginning February 2014, CFSA will monitor and validate the creation and implementation of youth transition plans using the Foster Care Club toolkit. Each month CFSA will review a 20 percent sample of YTPs completed during the performance period to determine if youth was involved in the plan development. CFSA will also review the YTPs for all youth who age out during each month to ensure that the plans include the appropriate connections (2014 Strategy Plan, #20).
For youth ages 20.5 and older, CFSA continued to utilize a tool to review the quality of transition planning for each youth. Monitor staff previously participated in these reviews and is satisfied with the validity of the tool and that transition planning is occurring for nearly all older youth exiting foster care.
CFSA reports that the Foster Care Club toolkit, the new version of the YTP, became available online as of October 2014. A team of Office of Youth Empowerment (OYE) social workers and supervisors tested this online toolkit through December to ensure its quality and ease of use prior to making the toolkit available online to all workers and youth. CFSA reports that the online version of the toolkit is again delayed and will be available to all workers beginning at the end of October 2015. An electronic (pdf) version of the tool is being used by workers and youth until it is available online.

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6. Timely Adoption and Permanency

There are a number of IEP outcomes that track processes that are designed to facilitate timely achievement of permanency goals for children. These include:

 Placing children in approved adoptive homes within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.
 Making reasonable efforts to finalize adoptions within 12 months of placement in the approved adoptive home.
 Achieving permanency within established timeframes through adoption, guardianship and reunification.

Approved Adoptive Placement

The IEP requires that children with a goal of adoption be placed in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of their goal becoming adoption.126 There are two Exit Standards to measure this outcome (IEP citation I.B.16.a.i.&ii.) and both are designated as Outcomes to be Maintained.127 The discussion below focuses on the Exit Standard which requires that 80 percent of children whose goal changed to adoption on July 1, 2010 or thereafter be placed in an approved adoptive placement within nine months of the goal change.

100% 90% 80% 70% 71% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-12

Figure 38: Children Placed in Pre-Adoptive Home Within 9 Months of Goal Change to Adoption January 2012 –December 2014

84%

80%

76%

80%

78%

IEP Exit Standard 80%

Dec-12

Jun-13

Dec-13

Jun-14

Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report ADP070
126 Pursuant to the IEP, the Monitor considers a placement an approved adoptive placement based on documentation of an intent to adopt, filing of an adoption petition or indication in the FACES.NET services line of an approved adoptive placement. 127 CFSA sufficiently achieved performance on the Exit Standard for children whose permanency goal changed to adoption prior to July 1, 2010 and because the review period for this IEP Exit Standard has expired and CFSA ultimately achieved compliance, the Monitor is no longer tracking performance for this measure.

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: This Exit Standard requires that 80 percent of the children whose goal changed to adoption on July 1, 2010 or thereafter be placed in an approved adoptive placement by the end of the ninth month from when their goal changed to adoption. From July through December 2014, 32 (78%) of 41 eligible children were placed in an approved adoptive placement by the end of the ninth month from the goal change. Although this performance is a slight decline from the previous monitoring period, the number of children who are represented in this cohort is small and this variation is so small that in the Monitor’s judgement, this performance is insubstantial and the requirement continues to be maintained.
Reasonable Efforts to Finalize Adoptions
CFSA is required to ensure that 90 percent of children are adopted, or reasonable efforts are made to have them adopted, within 12 months of being placed in a pre-adoptive home (IEP citation I.B.16.b.iii.). This Exit Standard is currently designated as an Outcome to be Maintained.
From July through December 2014, 76 percent of adoptions were completed, or reasonable efforts were made to complete adoptions, within 12 months of the child being placed in a preadoptive home. Specifically, CFSA reports that 38 adoptions were finalized during this monitoring period. Of those 38, 17 cases were finalized within 12 months and reasonable efforts were made to finalize adoptions within 12 months for an additional 12 children. Monitor staff participated in the review of the children’s cases that took longer than 12 months to finalize and agreed that reasonable efforts had been made despite the delays. CFSA’s performance is below the required level; however, due to the small number of applicable cases, the Monitor considers this an insubstantial deviation and will not recommend redesignation.

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Permanency Exits through Adoption, Guardianship and Reunification

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

32. Timely Adoption: Timely permanency through reunification, adoption or legal guardianship.
(IEP citation I.B.16.c.)
i. Of all children who entered foster care for the first time in FY2013 and who remain in foster care for 8 days or longer, 45% will achieve permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2014.
ii. Of all children who are in foster care for more than 12 but less than 25 months on September 30, 2013, 45% will be discharged from foster care to permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2014.
iii. Of all children who are in foster care for 25 months or longer on September 30, 2013, 40% will be discharged through reunification, adoption, legal guardianship prior to their 21st birthday or by September 30, 2014, whichever is earlier.

Figures 39i-iii: Timely Permanency for Children September 2011 – September 2014

i. Timely Permanency for Children in Care for 8 days or longer
50%

40% 47% 45% 30%

48% 36%

IEP Exit Standard 45%

20% Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14

ii. Timely Permanency for Children in Care between 12 and 25 months
50%

40%

30% 34%
20% Sep-11

28% Sep-12

38% 40% Sep-13 Sep-14

IEP Exit Standard 45%

iii. Timely Permanency for Children in

50%

Care for 25 months or longer

40%

30%
20% 18%
10% Sep-11

19% Sep-12

20% Sep-13

28% Sep-14

IEP Exit Standard 40%

Sources: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT384 and CMT385

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Performance for the period September 30, 2013 through September 30, 2014:128 The IEP requires CFSA to achieve an agreed upon percentage of timely permanent exits for children to a permanent family through adoption, guardianship or reunification. This Exit Standard has three sub-parts that must be met before compliance can be reached for the entire Exit Standard, with different compliance percentages for entry cohorts of children based on their length of stay in foster care. The sub-parts are measured annually as of the end of the fiscal year, so performance on this Exit Standard is measured as of September 30, 2014 and reported as of that month.
The first part of the Exit Standard requires that of all children who entered foster care for the first time in FY2013 and who remain in foster care for eight days or longer, 45 percent will achieve permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2014. Of the 289 children who entered foster care in FY2013 and remained in foster care for eight days or more, 103 (36%) exited to positive permanency by September 30, 2014, representing a decline in performance. Last year at this time, 48 percent of the FY2012 cohort had exited care.
The second part of the Exit Standard requires that of all children who are in foster care for more than 12 but less than 25 months on September 30, 2013, 45 percent will be discharged from foster care to permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2014. Of the 233 children who were in care more than 12 months and less than 25 months on September 30, 2013, 92 (40%) achieved positive permanency by September 30, 2014. Performance improved over last monitoring period, but does not reach the Exit Standard.
The third and last part of the Exit Standard requires that of all children who are in foster care for 25 months or longer on September 30, 2013, 40 percent will be discharged through reunification, adoption, legal guardianship prior to their 21st birthday or by September 30, 2014, whichever is earlier. For the 730 children who had been in care 25 or more months on September 30, 2013, 201 (28%) achieved permanency by September 30, 2014. Performance has improved since this same time last year but remains far below the Exit Standard requirement.

128 This timeframe differs from other sections as performance on this Exit Standard is measured through the fiscal year.

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Table 7:

Children and Youth Exiting to Permanency by Cohort as of September 30, 2014

Length of time in out
of home care during
FY2013

Total number of children/ youth in
cohort

Exit to Reunification

Exit to Guardianship
– Kin

Exit to Guardianship
– NonKin

Adoption

Total exits to
permanency by
September 30, 2014

8 days – 12

289

months

92 (32%)

2 (<1%)

0 (0%)

9 (3%) 103 (36%)

12 – 24 months

233

25 (11%)

19 (8%)

15 (6%) 33 (14%) 92 (40%)

25 months

730

or more

29 (4%)

52 (7%)

61 (8%)

59 (8%) 201 (28%)

Sources: FACES.NET reports CMT384 and CMT385 The number of children in cohorts for 12-24 months and 25 months or more changed since the last monitoring report due to “backdated data entries”; i.e., data clean up by CFSA. Percentages have been rounded.

Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has worked with the National Resource Center for Permanency and Family Connection (NRCPFC) on a number of strategies to increase performance on timely permanency for children and youth. In addition, CFSA has used the RED Team consultation and information sharing framework to ensure that workers make deliberate efforts to help children achieve timely permanency. CFSA’s implementation of these strategies are described below:

 Throughout 2014, CFSA will work with the National Resource Center for Permanency and Family Connections (NRCPFC) and the CRC to develop alerts for concurrent planning discussions during the RED Team meetings (2014 Strategy Plan, #16).

Historically, all CFSA cases were supposed to involve concurrent planning with a “Plan A” to support reunification and a “Plan B”, to be simultaneously implemented in the event reunification failed. This past year, the NRCPFC worked with CFSA to define concurrent planning – a social work permanency practice – as “the process of achieving permanency by simultaneously working two plans to timely move children and youth to a safe and permanent family.” The NRCPFC and Children’s Research Center (CRC) consultants worked with CFSA RED Team facilitators to identify criteria of cases to be considered for concurrent planning based on an analysis of cases that re-entered the child welfare system and cases that led to adoption and

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guardianship. The criteria for cases in which concurrent planning is appropriate and required are children under eight years old entering care with any of the following concerns:
 In-home services have been provided prior to placement  Re-entry into foster care  Siblings currently in care  Trauma history of parent and child/youth (attention focused on pattern and history of
drug use, unexplained injuries, serious and persistent trauma, inability to self-regulate, impulsivity, mood swings, PTSD)  Child/youth’s parents currently or formerly in foster care
CFSA reports that permanency workers were required to attend a concurrent planning training in September 2014 and, as of January 2015, concurrent planning practice is occurring on all eligible cases. Further, in January a complementary course focused on “full disclosure”—talking with parents at the beginning of the case about concurrent planning and the consequences of having their parental rights terminated if they cannot be safely reunified with their child(ren).
 Throughout 2014 the NRCPFC and National Center on Data and Technology will work with CFSA to further analyze and examine reunification prognosis indicators and re-entry data based on the concurrent planning framework (2014 Strategy Plan, #17).
CFSA reports no further update on this strategy. Last monitoring period, CFSA provided information from a report examining poor prognoses for reunification that analyzed cases involving children who initially entered care and those who re-entered between January and August 2013. CFSA examined data elements such as placement type, allegation type and permanency goals. In November 2013, CFSA and the NRCPFC shifted the focus of the analysis to children who had reunified in FY2011 or later and had re-entered care in FY2013 or later. CFSA reported a similar study was being conducted on re-entries into care for children who had been in legal guardianships.129
 By August 1, 2014, CFSA, working with the National Resource Center for Adoptions, will develop a scope of work for redesigning guardianship practices with a goal of promoting more timely permanency (2014 Strategy Plan, #18).
As previously reported, NRCPFC consultants worked with CFSA staff and attorneys to revisit how to best use guardianship as a permanency option. One goal of this work was to improve collaboration between CFSA and the D.C. Superior Court to minimize re-entry of guardianship

129 There were 5 children who exited to legal guardianship and re-entered care who were examined in this study. The length of time between exiting and re-entering care ranged from 7 to 33 months. Of these children, 2 were removed due to physical abuse, 2 were removed due to neglect and one child had a removal reason of child’s behavior problem.

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cases into foster care. A D.C. Superior Court Judge involved staff from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) in a Rules Committee working group to revisit guardianship rules. Additionally, representatives from CFSA and OAG participated in the Family Court Abuse and Neglect Subcommittee which was working to amend the guardianship administrative order which governs guardianship process and protocols.
CFSA reports that work with these partners has ended and that the number of children exiting to permanency through guardianship continues to increase – in FY2012, 111 children exited to guardianship; in FY2013, 139 children exited to guardianship; in FY2014, 163 children exited to guardianship; and through May 7, 2015 of FY2015, 22 children have exited to guardianship so far.
 Throughout 2014, CFSA will continue to utilize the RED teams at various phases of the permanency process and will use RED teams to facilitate decisions and timely action about case transfer, placement matching, guardianship, and adoption (2014 Strategy Plan, #19).
CFSA reports, and the monitoring team has observed, continued use of RED Teams to provide collaborative consultation and decision making at multiple points during the life of a case. In addition, CFSA reports that the consultation and information sharing framework should be used on an ongoing basis by workers and supervisors to analyze the complexity of cases and ensure that children and families get the support they need so that children can remain at home, return home or be in another permanent home in a safe and timely manner.

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7. Case Planning Process
The case planning process Exit Standard requires CFSA to work with families: (1) to develop timely, comprehensive and appropriate case plans in compliance with District law requirements and permanency timeframes which reflect the family’s and child(ren)’s needs and are updated as family circumstances or needs change and (2) to deliver services reflected in the current case plan. Every effort should be made to locate family members and develop case plans in partnership with children and families, the families’ informal support networks and other formal resources working with or needed by the child and/or family. Case plans should identify specific services, supports and timetables for providing services needed by children and families to achieve identified goals. CFSA continues to maintain compliance on timelines for court ordered case plans130; the remaining IEP requirement is related to the quality of the case planning process. The Monitor measures performance on the quality of the case planning process requirement through ratings from the QSR.

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

33. Case Planning Process: a. CFSA, with the family, shall develop timely, comprehensive and
appropriate case plans in compliance with District law requirements and permanency timeframes, which reflect family and children’s needs, are updated as family circumstances or needs change, and CFSA shall deliver services reflected in the current case plan. b. Every reasonable effort shall be made to locate family members and to develop case plans in partnership with youth and families, the families’ informal support networks, and other formal resources working with or needed by the youth and/or family. c. Case plans shall identify specific services, supports and timetables for providing services needed by children and families to achieve identified goals.
(IEP citation I.B.17.)
80% of cases reviewed through the Quality Service Reviews (QSR) will be rated as acceptable on both the Pathway to Case Closure and Plan Implementation indicators.

As required by the IEP, two indicators from the QSR protocol are used to measure CFSA’s performance on the Exit Standard pertaining to appropriate case planning. These indicators, Planning Interventions and Pathway to Case Closure, are described in further detail in Figures 40 and 41, which summarize the parameters reviewers consider in rating performance for Planning Interventions and Pathway to Case Closure, as well as descriptions of minimally acceptable performance and unacceptable performance as contained within the QSR protocol.

130 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP citation II.B.12. during this monitoring period.

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Figure 40: QSR Planning Interventions Indicator Parameters to Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance131
Planning Interventions
 Indicator Focus: the planning interventions are a set of strategies and actions, based on assessed needs, which result in changes for the child, youth and family. Intervention planning is an ongoing process throughout the life of the case and the interventions should be consistent with the long-term view for the child, youth and family.
 Parameters Reviewers Consider: to what degree meaningful, measurable, and achievable life outcomes (e.g. safety, permanency, well-being, family functioning in fulfilling life roles, transition and life adjustment) for the child and family are supported by well-reasoned, agreed-upon goals, intervention strategies and actions for attainment.
 Indicator sub-parts:  Safety and Protection  Permanency  Well-Being  Daily Functioning and Life Role Fulfillment  Transition and Life Adjustment  Other Planned Outcomes and Interventions
 Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance:
Minimally Acceptable Planning means a minimally reasoned, periodic planning process is used to match intervention strategies to stated goals that are somewhat consistent with the long-term view. Choices are at least minimally supported by the child and family and by a slim team consensus. The strategies selected reflect a minimally adequate to fair assessment and are loosely linked to the planned goals and outcomes to meet the needs of the child and family and to help them be successful in daily living after exiting the service system. Plans include a minimally described set of steps to which key participants are somewhat committed. Strategies and actions across providers and funding sources are somewhat aligned and minimally integrated.
Unacceptable Planning is evident from a somewhat or substantially inadequately reasoned, occasional planning process. Intervention strategies may not have clear goals and may be somewhat inconsistent with the long-term view. Choices may be marginally supported by the child and family. A vague or shifting consensus may exist around some goals and strategies. Interventions described may reflect an authorized services category rather than a clear strategy for change. The intervention may be related to an inferred area of need by my lack clear goals or strategies. Plans may include some general activities for which some participants are authorized to provide services. Planning across providers and funding sources is somewhat misaligned or inconsistently integrated.

131 Quality Service Review Protocol for a Child and Family: Reusable Protocol for Examination of Child Welfare and Mental Health Services for a Child and Family, Shared Practice Protocol. Human Services and Outcomes, November 2013. p. 62-65.

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Figure 41: QSR Pathway to Case Closure Indicator Parameters to Consider and Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance132
Pathway to Case Closure
 Parameters Reviewers Consider: To what degree: (1) Is there a clear, achievable case goal including concurrent and alternative plans? (2) Does everyone involved, including family members, know and agree on what specific steps need to be achieved in order to achieve the case goal and close the case safely? (3) Is the child/family making progress on these steps and informed of consequences of not meeting the necessary requirements within the required timelines? (4) Are team members planning for the youth’s transition from care in APPLA cases? (5) Are reasonable efforts being made to achieve safe case closure for all case goals?
 Description of Acceptable/Unacceptable Performance:
Minimally Acceptable Pathway to Case Closure means some people involved in the case understand the case goal, including any plan alternatives. Minimally adequate to fair efforts are being made to achieve the permanency goal and to remove any barriers to permanency. Some people have agreed upon the steps that must be accomplished and requirements that must be met for safe case closure. Some team members are aware of timelines and consequences for not meeting requirements and the team is making some progress towards closure, though not in a timely manner - or - the team has established a good plan but has not made sufficient progress on it.
Unacceptable Pathway to Case Closure means few people involved in the case understand or agree with the case goal, including any plan alternatives. Marginal or inconsistent efforts are being made to achieve the permanency goal and to remove any barriers to permanency. Few steps that must be accomplished or requirements that must be met for safe case closure, timelines, and consequences for not meeting requirements have been defined and/or agreed upon by family members and providers. The case is not making sufficient progress towards closure - or - the team has established a fair plan but has not made progress on it.

132 Quality Service Review Protocol for a Child and Family: Reusable Protocol for Examination of Child Welfare and Mental Health Services for a Child and Family, Shared Practice Protocol. Human Services and Outcomes, November 2013. p. 58-59.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 64% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
CY2010

Figure 42: QSR Findings on Case Planning Process CY2010 – CY2014

IEP Exit Standard 80%

64%

61%

50%

46%

CY2011

CY2012

CY2013

CY2014

Source: QSR Data

Performance for calendar year 2014: During CY2014, 125 cases were reviewed using the QSR methodology; in 101 cases the focus youth was living in out-of-home placement and in 24 cases the focus youth was receiving services through an in-home case. As Figure 43 indicates, 46 percent (58 of 125) of cases reviewed were rated as acceptable on both the overall Planning Interventions and Pathway to Case Closure indicators. In some cases, reviewers rated practice on one indicator as acceptable, while their assessment of practice in the other area was unacceptable. Specifically, 68 percent of cases (85 of 125) were rated acceptable overall on the Planning Interventions indicator and 54 percent of cases (67 of 125) were rated acceptable on the Pathway to Case Closure indicator. CFSA’s performance of 46 percent does not meet the Exit Standard requirement of 80 percent.

Despite multiple interventions that are aimed at improving case planning and decision making, CFSA’s performance on case planning in calendar year 2014 declined from calendar year 2013. Furthermore, this is CFSA’s lowest performance on this Exit Standard over the past five years, which makes the decline in performance particularly concerning. Over the past five years, CFSA has reduced the number of children in out-of-home care and now serves more children, youth and families through in-home cases. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those investigations that do lead to a child’s removal are more complex and the pathway to case closure may also be more difficult. While CFSA’s assessments of family needs and knowledge of the impact of trauma have become more nuanced and informative, it appears that there remains a gap in the consistent quality of planning to address the needs and well-being of the children, youth and families served by the Agency.

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As discussed previously in this report, one key theme from the QSR case narratives and additional analyses is that performance on the QSR indicators which assess team formation and functioning, engagement of the child, assessment of the child and assessment of the mother are all critical to acceptable performance on the Pathway to Case Closure indicator.133 A second theme from the QSR case narratives and regression analyses of the data highlight the significant impact of engagement with the child and assessment of the child on overall acceptable Planning Interventions.134

100% 80% 60% 40%

Figure 43: QSR Findings on Case Planning Process CY2014 N=125
46%

IEP Exit Standard 80%

20%

0% Acceptable Performance on Both Indicators
Source: QSR Data CY2014

Similar to CFSA’s performance on Services to Children and Families to Promote Safety, Permanency and Well-Being, performance on this Exit Standard was lower in cases reviewed where the focus child was receiving in-home services compared to those receiving out-of-home services. In those cases where the focus child was receiving in-home services, 50 percent (12 of 24) were rated acceptable on Planning Interventions compared to 72 percent (73 of 101) of cases where the focus child was placed in out-of-home care. Additionally, 46 percent (11 of 24) of inhome cases were rated acceptable on Pathway to Case Closure compared to 55 percent (56 of 101) of out-of-home cases. These differences in the percentage that are acceptable for in-home compared to out-of-home is significant135 and suggest the disparate outcomes for these two

133 Regression analyses were run to determine the significance of engagement, assessment and teaming indicators or Pathway to Case Closure and Planning Interventions while controlling for placement type, agency and age of youth. Findings from these analyses indicate that team formation and functioning, child engagement, assessment of the child and assessment of the mother are significant predictors of acceptable Pathway to Case Closure (p<.05). 134 Regression analyses indicate these findings are significant at p<.05. Findings also indicate the significant impact of the team coordination on acceptable Planning Interventions (p<.10). 135 Analyses indicate this difference is significant at a level of p<.05.

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groups of children receiving services and indicate the need for continued focus on improving case practice for in-home cases.

Table 8: Acceptable Performance on QSR Indicators Used to Assess

Case Planning Process

In-Home Cases

Out-of-Home Cases

N=24

N=101

Planning Interventions

50% (12)

72% (73)

Pathway to Case Closure

46% (11)

55% (56)

Both Indicators

25% (6)

51% (52)

Source: QSR Data CY2014

Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategies to increase performance on the services provided to children and families to improve the case planning process:

 Based on QSR findings, Agency Performance is conducting an analysis on case plans and services. The analysis will include a review of ten percent of the inhome and a review of five percent of the foster care cases. The findings will be completed and shared with management in March and April 2014 and will be used to modify practice, policy, and trainings, as needed (2014 Strategy Plan, #6).136

As a result of the findings from the case plan review, supervisors from both Community Partnerships and Program Operations developed action teams to identify additional strategies regarding case planning and team formation. These strategies include increased participation of in-home staff at 10/15 day RED Teams held during an investigation or FA, holding regular CPS to In-Home Case Transfer RED Teams and integrating the information consultation and sharing framework into group supervision and ongoing practice.

 CFSA will continue to provide immediate feedback on the QSR findings and practice examples about the case to the supervisor and social worker and discuss next steps. The QSR team will follow up with the supervisor and social worker within 30 days. A permanency Big RED Team will be scheduled 60 days following the QSR to review the findings and follow up. The case practice specialist will

136 This strategy was modified in June 2014 to change the percentage of foster care cases for review from 10 to 5% as CFSA determined that a review of 5% was sufficient to document themes. Additionally, the date of completion was changed to include April 2014 to provide additional time to complete the analysis.

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track the steps identified through the QSR and permanency Big RED and will report to the permanency Big RED Team if the steps are not occurring (2014 Strategy Plan, #7).

CFSA continues to identify substance abuse, mental health and housing issues as on-going challenges families are facing and having difficulty resolving. To address challenges related to substance abuse, CFSA has contracted with a provider for mobile assessments for older youth and adults who are struggling with substance abuse in order to engage youth and adults, obtain needed assessments and link those in need to ongoing services in a more timely manner.

To improve planning and support in cases where the youth and/or adult is struggling with mental health, CFSA is planning to repurpose the DBH co-located staff in a more clinical role. The DBH co-located staff will now be available to consult on cases on an as-needed basis and will be conducting training on mental health services available in the community for all units within CFSA. Additionally, mental health screenings will now be conducted by staff at Healthy Horizons for youth in out-of-home placement in order to initially identify the need for mental health services that may be able to support the youth.

One of CFSA’s principle tools to assist families and older youth with housing challenges is the Districts’ Rapid Housing program. In February 2015, the Rapid Housing Application became available online in order to expedite referrals to the program. CFSA staff also continue to work with partners at the Collaboratives to refer families and older youth as appropriate to identify and assist with exploring housing options. The limited availability of affordable housing in the District remains a huge barrier.

 Within six months of receiving approval from the Children’s Bureau, CFSA will integrate the Child and Adolescent Functional Assessment Scale (CAFAS) into FACES.NET. Thereafter, staff will be trained and begin using the tool (2014 Strategy Plan, #8).

In July 2014, CFSA received the necessary approvals to build the CAFAS137, the tool that will be used to assess a youth’s daily functioning across key domains and changes in functioning over time, into FACES.NET. As was previously discussed regarding the integration of the Caregivers Strengths and Barriers Assessment, full integration of the tools into FACES.NET continues to be delayed and is now expected to be completed by July 2015.

 Beginning February 1, 2014, the Choice Providers will participate in case transfer RED Team at the point of removal and the initial Family Team Meeting (FTM) to enhance family engagement and improve the identification of and timely

137 Child and Adolescent Functional Assessment Scale.
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referral to services needed for children and families (2014 Strategy Plan, #9).

The goal of this strategy is to connect families more quickly to appropriate mental health providers. CFSA data indicate that attendance of Choice Providers138 at Removal RED Teams for children entering care remains consistent and that partners are available to attend other teaming meetings including Family Team Meetings.
C. GOAL: CHILD WELL-BEING

1. Sibling Placements and Visits

By placing siblings together, CFSA is able to mitigate some of the trauma children experience when they must enter out-of-home care and can help children sustain their critically important lifelong connections and supports. As discussed in the paragraph below, CFSA continues to meet both Exit Standards related to sibling placement and visitation between siblings if they are placed apart (IEP citations I.C.20.a.&b.).

As of December 31, 2014, 84 percent of children who entered care with their siblings or within 30 days of their siblings between July and December 2014 were placed with some or all of their siblings. Current performance exceeds the required performance of 80 percent. Regarding sibling visitation, during this monitoring period a monthly range of 83 to 87 percent of siblings had at least monthly visits and 74 to 82 percent of siblings had at least twice monthly visits with their brothers and/or sisters.139

2. Assessments for Children Experiencing a Placement Disruption

In an effort to increase children’s placement stability, the IEP requires CFSA to ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a comprehensive and appropriate assessment to determine their service and re-placement needs with a follow-up action plan developed no later than within 30 days of a child’s re-placement (IEP citation I.C.21.). CFSA uses the Child Needs Assessment (CNA) tool for this purpose for all children who enter care or require a placement change. The CNA collects information on the child’s needs in numerous domains, including mental and behavior health, medical and physical characteristics, personal care, education and cultural and linguistic. Based upon the child’s needs, a rating is determined which recommends the type of placement most appropriate for the child – ranging from a traditional/kinship foster home to residential treatment facility. A CFSA Resource

138 The Choice Providers include Community Connections, Family Matters, First Home Care, Hillcrest Children and Family Center, Maryland Family Resources, Universal Healthcare Management Services and Parent Infant Early Childhood Enhancement Program. 139 The IEP Exit Standard requires 75% of children have twice monthly visits with their separated sibling groups. In November and December 2014, performance was at 74%. The Monitor considers this to be an insubstantial deviation and compliance with this Exit Standard to be maintained.

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Development Specialist completes this tool which assists staff within the Placement Services Administration identify appropriate placements.
During the current monitoring period, between nine and 21 placement disruptions occurred each month and between 82 and 100 percent of children experiencing a disruption had a CNA completed within 30 days of notification of the need for a placement change. In November 2014, performance was 83 percent, below the required level of 90 percent. There were 11 applicable placement disruptions that month and a sibling group of two had their assessments completed within 35 days of placement change, just slightly over the 30 day requirement. The Monitor considers this an insubstantial deviation in performance and this Exit Standard continues to be maintained.
3. Health and Dental Care
Health Screening Prior to Placement
The IEP requires children in foster care to have a health screening prior to an initial placement, re-entry into care or change in placement. The purpose of the health screening prior to placement is to identify health conditions that require prompt medical attention such as acute illnesses, chronic diseases, signs of abuse or neglect, signs of infection or communicable diseases, hygiene or nutritional problems and developmental or mental health concerns. Additionally, the screening gathers information about the child’s health care needs to be shared with the child’s foster parent or caregiver, social worker and other service providers. During this monitoring period, CFSA met the performance level required by the IEP for medical evaluations and dental evaluations for the first time. CFSA continues to partially meet the performance level required by the IEP for medical screenings and continues to struggle with providing foster parents with documentation of Medicaid coverage, both number and card, in a timely manner.

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IEP Requirement Exit Standard

39. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.a.)
95% of children in foster care shall have a health screening prior to an initial placement or re-entry into care.
90% of children in foster care who experience a placement change shall have a replacement health screening.

Figure 44: Percentage of Children who Received a Health Screening Prior to Placement (Initial or Re-Entries)
June 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 97% 100% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-11 Dec-11

91% Jun-12

90% Dec-12

92% Jun-13

100% Dec-13

97% 92%
Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 95%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH004

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Figure 45: Percentage of Placement Activities where Children Received a Health Screening Prior to Replacement (for Children with Multiple Placements) June 2011 – December 2014

100% 90%
79% 80% 70% 60% 66% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-11 Dec-11

75% Jun-12

70% Dec-12

74% Jun-13

83% Dec-13

87% 80%
Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90% Webinar: Children’s Corps: A Dynamic Approach to Child Welfare Worker Recruitme nt, Screening and Selection

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH004

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: In December 2014, of the 13 children who were initially placed or re-entered foster care, 12 (92%) received a health screening prior to being placed (see Figure 46). Between July and December 2014, performance on this measure ranged between 92 and 100 percent monthly, meeting or exceeding this sub-part of the Exit Standard requirement for three of the six months of the monitoring period.
During the month of December 2014, there were 97 child placement change activities that required the child be medically screened prior to placement. In 78 (80%) of the 97 placement changes, the child received a health screening prior to the change in placement. Performance for this sub-part of the Exit Standard ranged between 77 and 88 percent monthly from July through December 2014 (see Figure 46).
Based on these data, while CFSA fully met or fell just short of the performance required by the IEP on initial health screenings prior to placement, CFSA did not meet the required performance for health screenings prior to a placement change in any month. The Monitor considers this Exit Standard partially met.

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100%

Figure 46: Percentage of Children who Received a

Health Screening Prior to Placement (Initial and Re-Entries) and Replacement

July – December 2014

IEP Exit

Standard -

95%

90% 80% 70%

100% 88%

98% 77%

93% 87%

94% 85%

93% 81%

92% 80%

IEP Exit Standard 90%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Jul-14 Aug-14 Sep-14 Oct-14 Nov-14 Dec-14

Received a Health Screening Prior to Placement (Initial and Re-Entries) Received a Health Screening Prior to Replacement
Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH004

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Full Medical Evaluation within 30 and 60 Days of Placement

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

40. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.) 85% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement.
95% of children in foster care shall receive a full medical evaluation within 60 days of placement.

Figure 47: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Medical Evaluation Within 30 Days of Placement
December 2010 – December 2014

100%

90%

80%

70%

73%

60%

67%

50% 52% 40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Dec-10 Jun-11 Dec-11

66% Jun-12

56% Dec-12

87% 90%

IEP Exit

Standard -

85%
76% 79%

Jun-13 Dec-13 Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

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Figure 48: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Medical Evaluation Within 60 Days of Placement
December 2010 – December 2014

100%

90%

80%

88% 84%

70%

60% 64%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Dec-10 Jun-11 Dec-11

94% Jun-12

70% Dec-12

92% 96% Jun-13 Dec-13

97% 97% Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 95%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: In December 2014, there were 89 children applicable to this measure; 80 (90%) had a medical evaluation within 30 days of placement and an additional six (7%) had a medical evaluation within 60 days of placement. Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 82 to 93 percent of children in foster care received a full medical evaluation within 30 days of placement and by 60 days post-placement, 90 to 98 percent of children per month had received the required evaluation (see Figure 49).

CFSA performance on both sub-parts of this Exit Standard, requiring that 85 percent of children entering foster care receive a full medical evaluation within 30 days of their placement in care and requiring that 95 percent of children entering foster care receive a full medical evaluation before 60 days, increased during the monitoring period. CFSA met the 85 percent standard in the final five months of the monitoring period and met the 95 percent requirement in the final four months of the monitoring period. Therefore, this Exit Standard is considered achieved.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%

Figure 49: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Medical Evaluation

Within 30 and 60 Days of Placement

July – December 2014

IEP Exit

Standard

(within 60

90%

92%

98%

97% 92%

98% 93%

97% 90%

days) 95%

85%

88%

82%

IEP Exit Standard

(within 30

days) -

85%

Jul-14

Aug-14 Sep-14 Within 30 Days

Oct-14 Nov-14 Within 60 Days

Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

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Full Dental Evaluation within 30, 60 and 90 Days of Placement

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

41. Health and Dental Care: Children in foster care shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.)
25% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
50% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of placement.
85% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement.

Figure 50: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation Within 30 Days of Placement
December 2010 – December 2014

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

57%

40% 30% 35%

20%

10%

0% Dec-10 Jun-11

49% Dec-11

54% Jun-12

12% Dec-12

53% 42%
Jun-13 Dec-13

54% 55% Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 25%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

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Figure 51: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation Within 60 Days of Placement140
December 2010 – December 2014

100%

90%

80%

78%

70%

66%

60%

50%

40% 39% 30%

20%

10%

0% Dec-10 Jun-11 Dec-11

67%

72%

28% Jun-12 Dec-12 Jun-13

76%

77%

67%

Dec-13 Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 50%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

Figure 52: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation Within 90 Days of Placement141 December 2010 – December 2014

100% 90% 80%
82% 70%
70% 60% 50% 40% 39% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Dec-10 Jun-11 Dec-11

69% Jun-12

28% Dec-12

80% 82% Jun-13 Dec-13

77% 72% Jun-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 85%

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

140 Data include children who received full dental evaluation within 30 days. 141 Data include children who received full dental evaluation within 30 and 60 days.
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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: In December 2014, this Exit Standard applied to 62 children; 34 (55%) had a dental evaluation within 30 days of placement and an additional 14 (22%) had a dental evaluation within 60 days of placement. The remaining 14 children did not receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement.

From July through December 2014, between 47 and 73 percent of children per month received a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement (see Figure 53). A total of between 74 and 92 percent of children per month received a full dental evaluation within 60 days and between 77 and 92 percent of children per month received a full dental within 90 days.

CFSA continues to meet the performance level required by the IEP for the sub-part requiring 25 percent of children to receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement and the subpart requiring 50 percent of children to receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of placement. CFSA met the performance level required by the IEP for the sub-part requiring that 85 percent of children receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement during four months of the current monitoring period, therefore, this Exit Standard is considered achieved.

Figure 53: Percentage of Children who Received a Full Dental Evaluation July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70%

81% 74%

85% 80%

91% 92%92% 82%87% 88%
73% 69%

77% 77%

60%

54%

57%

55%

50% 47%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Jul-14

Aug-14

Sep-14

Oct-14

Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard (within 90 days) 85%
IEP Exit Standard (within 60 days) 50%
IEP Exit Standard (within 30 days) 25%

Within 30 Days Within 60 Days Within 90 days

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report HTH005

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Medicaid Coverage

IEP Requirement Exit Standard

43. Health and Dental Care: CFSA shall ensure the prompt completion and submission of appropriate health insurance paperwork, and shall keep records of, e.g., Medicaid application dates, HMO severance dates, and enrollment dates. CFSA shall provide caregivers with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of every placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.
(IEP citation I.C.22.d.)
90% of children’s caregivers shall be provided with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.

Figure 54: Medicaid Number and Medicaid Card Distribution to Foster Parents

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 46%

June 2013 – December 2014
84% 57%

67%

IEP Exit Standard 90%
IEP Exit Standard 90%

30%

20%

10% 0%

6%

0%

15% 0%

Jun-13

Dec-13

Jun-14

Dec-14

Medicaid Number

Medicaid Card

Source: CFSA Manual Data

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: CFSA continues to track the distribution of Medicaid numbers and cards to foster parents when a child is placed regardless of whether or not it is the child’s first placement in foster care or a placement change. In December 2014, 15 children experienced a placement activity and remained in that placement for at least five days. Of these 15 children, CFSA was able to verify that 10 foster parents (67%) received the child’s Medicaid number within five days of their placement. Between July and December 2014, performance ranged from 67 to 87 percent per month (see Figure 55).142

Between July and December 2014, CFSA was able to verify that between zero and 39 percent of foster parents each month received the child’s Medicaid card within 45 days of the child’s placement (Figure 56). CFSA’s performance on this Exit Standard continues to fall below the performance level of 90 percent required by the IEP. CFSA has since instituted a new strategy to centralize the management of Medicaid number and card distribution through the Business Services Administration in order to successfully ensure foster parents are provided with both the Medicaid number and Medicaid card in a consistent and timely manner.

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Figure 55: Percentage of Foster Parents who Received Child’s Medicaid Number within Five Days of the Child’s Placement
July – December 2014

87%

86%

74%

73%

72%

67%

Jul-14 Aug-14 Sep-14 Oct-14 Nov-14 Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard – 90%

Source: CFSA Manual Data

142 These data report performance on Medicaid card distribution to foster parents when the child initially enters foster care. CFSA reports that Medicaid cards for children who experience a placement change are transferred through the placement passport packet and there is not currently a tracking method to confirm this transfer to the new foster parent.

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Figure 56: Percentage of Foster Parents who Received Child’s Medicaid Card within 45 Days of the Child’s Placement July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

39% Jul-14

12%

14%

Aug-14 Sep-14

35% Oct-14

14% Nov-14

0% Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 90%

Source: CFSA Manual Data
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to increase performance on the receipt of Medicaid numbers and cards by foster parents:

 CFSA, in conjunction with the Office of the Deputy Mayor, will continue to work with the Department of Health Care Finance to streamline the process for sending Medicaid cards to foster parents. By June 30, 2014, the group will provide CSSP with a written business process for distributing Medicaid cards to foster parents with an explanation of how the process has been streamlined (2014 Strategy Plan, #10).

CFSA has taken steps to streamline the process in order to provide foster parents with Medicaid information for children and youth in their care in a timely manner. The Business Services Administration within CFSA, which was and continues to be responsible for determining each child’s Title IV-E eligibility, is now also responsible for submitting all necessary documentation to the Department of Human Services (DHS). Further, CFSA and DHS continue to engage in discussions to enable CFSA to issue temporary Medicaid cards. One barrier identified through these conversation is CFSA’s lack of access to specific technology that would allow CFSA to issue the cards.

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D. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND SYSTEM ACCOUNTABILITY
1. Caseloads
Exit Standards pertaining to caseloads and supervisory responsibilities are currently designated as Outcomes to be Maintained (IEP citations I.D.25.&26.). Given the critical importance of caseload size, this section provides current information on worker and supervisory caseloads. Overall, CFSA’s caseloads meet LaShawn standards with the notable and important exception of caseloads for Investigations and Family Assessment workers, which remain too high. Stabilizing the workforce and reducing caseloads for these workers is a high priority for remedial action.
Caseloads for permanency social workers and workers conducting home studies The IEP requires that 90 percent of workers have caseloads that meet the requirements. For inhome and permanency workers, the standard is 15 cases per worker and no individual worker with a caseload greater than 18. For workers conducting home studies, the standard is 30 cases per worker and no individual worker with a caseload greater than 35.
CFSA maintained performance on the Exit Standards pertaining to caseloads for workers conducting home studies (100%) and in-home and permanency workers (95 – 99%) (see Figure 57).143 The number of in-home and permanency cases unassigned for more than five days ranged each month, from 29 and peaked at 91 in December 2014.144

143 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP
citation I.D.25. during this monitoring period. 144 Ibid.

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Figure 57: Caseloads for Permanency and In-home Social Workers July – December 2014

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

98% Jul-14

95% Aug-14

97% Sep-14

99% Oct-14

96% Nov-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report CMT328

99% Dec-14

IEP Exit Standard 95%

Supervisory responsibilities This Exit Standard requires that supervisors are responsible for no more than five case carrying social workers and one case aid or family support worker (IEP citation I.D.26.a.) and that 95 percent of cases are assigned to social workers (IEP citation I.D.26.b.). During the current monitoring period, a monthly range of 95 to 98 percent of supervisors were responsible for supervising no more than five case carrying social workers and a case aid, family support worker or non-case carrying social worker, meeting the requirements for this sub-part of the Exit Standard.

For the second part of the Exit Standard, the percentage of ongoing cases that were carried by social workers ranged from 86 to 94 percent monthly this period.145 In December 2014, when the number of unassigned cases for more than five days peaked at 91, CFSA performance on supervisory caseloads was also at its lowest with only 86 percent of the cases were assigned to a social worker in December 2014. The Monitor believes these data are directly related and highlight the importance of continuing to focus on appropriate staffing and ensuring the workforce, including supervisors, has the tools and time necessary to support families.

145 See Table 2: Performance on IEP Exit Standards for Outcomes to be Maintained, of this report for performance on IEP citation I.D.26.b. during this monitoring period.

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Based upon consideration of performance for both sub-parts of this Exit Standard, the Monitor considers this Exit Standard to be partially maintained.

Investigative Caseloads

IEP Requirement

46. Caseloads: a. The caseload of each worker conducting investigations of reports of abuse
and/or neglect shall not exceed the MFO standard, which is 1:12 investigations.
(IEP citation I.D.25.a.)

Exit Standard

90% of investigators and social workers will have caseloads that meet the above caseload requirements. No individual investigator shall have a caseload greater than 15 cases.

Figure 58: Percentage of Investigative Workers who Met Exit Standard Requirements for Caseloads December 2011 – December 2014

100% 90% 80%
82% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Dec-11

71% Jun-12

92% 70%
Dec-12 Jun-13

100%

IEP Exit

Standard -

81%

90%

48%

Dec-13 Jun-14 Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV068

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014: Between July and December 2014, a monthly range of 72 to 88 percent of investigative workers met the required caseload standard by not exceeding 12 investigations per month (see Table 9). Additionally, during this same time period, a monthly range of zero to six investigators had a caseload exceeding 15 investigations each month, which is above compliance levels. This represents a decrease from the previous monitoring period where the number of workers carrying over 15 investigations ranged from zero to 15 workers between January and June 2014. Due to the problematic performance on investigative caseloads, the Monitor considers the overall caseload Exit Standard to be partially maintained. Table 9 below illustrates investigative worker caseloads by month.

Table 9: Investigative Social Worker Caseloads

July – December 2014

Workers

Month

Carrying no more than 12 Investigations:
Met Exit Standard

Workers Carrying 13-15 Investigations

Workers Carrying More
than 15 Investigations

Total Workers Carrying More
than 12 Investigations

July (N=47)

36 (77%)

6 (13%)

5 (11%)

11 (23%)

August (N=47)

41 (87%)

4 (9%)

2 (4%)

6 (13%)

September (N=49)

43 (88%)

6 (12%)

0 (0%)

6 (12%)

October (N=45)

35 (78%)

6 (13%)

4 (9%)

10 (22%)

November (N=43)

31 (72%)

8 (19%)

4 (9%)

12 (28%)

December (N=42)

34 (81%)

2 (5%)

6 (14%)

8 (19%)

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report INV068

N does not include the FA workers, FA supervisors or investigative supervisors who held case responsibility for both investigations and FAs during the same month.146

Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding.

146 Between two and seven CPS supervisors, managers and administrators were collectively responsible for between two to 25 investigations each month. CFSA decreased the number of FA workers responsible for a split CPS and FA caseload and FA supervisors responsible for carrying CPS investigations from zero to two over the course of the monitoring period.

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Family Assessment Caseloads
Caseloads for FA workers improved from the previous monitoring period and the number of FA workers carrying no more than 12 FAs ranged from 88 to 100 percent between July and December 2014 (see Table 10).

Table 10: Family Assessment Social Workers Caseloads* July – December 2014

Month

Workers

Workers

Carrying no more Carrying 13-15

than 12 FAs

FAs

Workers Carrying More
than 15 FAs

Total Workers Carrying More
than 12 FAs

July (N=34)

30 (88%)

4 (12%)

0 (0%)

4 (12%)

August (N=35)

35 (100%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

September (N=34)

34 (100%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

October (N=34)

33 (97%)

1 (3%)

0 (0%)

1 (3%)

November (N=38)

36 (95%)

0 (0%)

2 (5%)

2 (5%)

December (N=35)

31 (89%)

4 (11%)

0 (0%)

4 (11%)

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET INV068 N does not include the FA supervisors or investigative workers who carried FAs.147

2. Staff Training

Training is a core function of any child welfare agency and is a primary mechanism to ensure that social workers, supervisors and managers have the competencies necessary to carry out their jobs effectively. The IEP requires that 90 percent of newly hired CFSA and private agency direct service staff receive 80 hours of pre-service training (IEP citation I.D.27.a.) and 90 percent of newly hired CFSA and private agency supervisors complete 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility (IEP citation I.D.27.b.).

Based on feedback from leadership, supervisors and other CFSA staff, CFSA’s Child Welfare Training Academy (CWTA) implemented a modified pre-service training curriculum in January 2015. Previously, pre-service training occurred over the course of 35.5 days, for a total of 235 classroom hours. The revised curriculum now occurs over 11.5 days, for a total of 80 classroom hours, at which point frontline staff participate in applied training in the field. CFSA reports that

147 Between 1 and 4 FA supervisors were collectively responsible for carrying between 1 and 20 FAs and between 0 and 3 investigators were also responsible for collectively carrying 0 to 3 FAs each month.

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the modification in pre-service curriculum continues to provide social workers with the necessary skills and development while also allowing newly hired staff to begin their positions in a timelier manner.
Phase 1 of the revised training curriculum includes a focus on the foundations of child welfare practice, child centered practice and Trauma Systems Therapy (TST) which takes one week to complete. After completion of the classroom training, staff receive job-specific training related to either entry services (hotline, investigations and FA) or ongoing case management (in-home and out-of-home) and training in FACES.NET. After completing these modules, staff are then eligible to begin the applied training portion of the curriculum in the field. The applied training portion of the curriculum allows new social workers to engage in real-time learning and takes six to seven weeks, with an extension in time as necessary. CFSA reports that trainee social workers are closely supervised and supported throughout this process, working on a reduced caseload and sharing all responsibilities with seasoned staff.
CFSA is planning to implement Phase 2 of the training curriculum in the near future, which will add a focus that allows workers to better understand the life of the case. It will also include CFSA’s new assessment tools and provide opportunities for practice using these tools with a training case. It is anticipated that the implementation of this piece of the overall training curriculum will add an additional 5.5 days to the classroom training portion of pre-service training.
During the current monitoring period, CFSA maintained required performance on pre-service training for social workers (100%)148 and pre-service training for supervisors (100%).149
3. Training for Foster and Adoptive Parents
The IEP requirements for pre-service (IEP citation I.D.29.a.) and in-service (IEP citation I.D.29.b.) training for foster parents were both previously designated as an Outcomes to be Maintained; current performance remains at compliance levels. Nearly all (98%) foster parents completed 15 hours of pre-service training prior to licensure and 92 percent (204 of 222) of foster parents completed the required number of in-service training hours.

148 Of the 50 direct service staff hired between July 1 and December 31, 2014, 40 completed the required training, 8 were in the process of completing training within the given timeframe and 2 are inactive. 149 This Exit Standard applied to 4 supervisors during the period who had received their supervisory clearance 8 months prior to the monitoring period (between October 2013 and May 2014).

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Figure 59: Percentage of Foster/Adoptive Parents with 30 hours of In-Service Training June 2012 - December 2014

100% 90% 80%
81% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Jun-12

83% Dec-12

96% 85%

Jun-13

Dec-13

98% 92%

IEP Exit Standard 95%

Jun-14

Dec-14

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report TRN009 Data represent performance for each 6 month monitoring period (January – June and July – December)

4. Special Corrective Action
CFSA has previously met the Exit Standard that requires production of monthly reports identifying children in special corrective action categories and completion of child-specific case reviews to develop corrective action plans as appropriate (IEP citation I.D.30.). CFSA partially maintained required compliance with this Exit Standard during the current period. The number of children within each category remained relatively unchanged each month this period with the exception of two placement categories where reductions are noted – children with four or more placements with placement change in the last 12 months and children in facilities more than 100 miles from DC. Data on the number of children in special corrective action categories between July and December 2014 are presented in Table 11 below.
Between July and December 2014, 275 children newly entered at least one special corrective action category and 316 special corrective action plans were considered.150 Of the 316 possible plans, CFSA reports that after review, 98 plans were not required151 and 185 plans (85%) were

150 Individual children may be in more than one category and require more than one plan to address the issues specific to each category. 151 Reasons for a plan not being required include the following: by the time the case was being reviewed, the child’s goal had been changed into compliance; the home was licensed; the child’s move was to the legal custody of DYRS or incarceration; the child was hospitalized; services were provided to stabilize the placement; or the move was to permanent placement or trial home visit.

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completed. CFSA indicates that the 33 plans that were not developed were due to a transition process with at least one private agency and that a new process has been developed which will be closely monitored to ensure that all future required special corrective action plans are developed.

July 2014 Au g 2014 Sept 2014 Oct 2014 No v 2014 De c 2014

Table 11: Number of Children in Special Corrective Action Categories by Month* July – December 2014
Special Corrective Action Category

Placement Categories

CFSA Children with 4 or More Placements with a Placement Change in the Last 12 Months and 306 293 293 282 273 268 the Placement is not a Permanent Placement

Children Placed in Emergency Facilities Over 90 Days

0

0

0

0

0

0

Children Placed in Foster Homes without Valid Permits/Licenses or Foster Homes that Exceed 50 66 45 55 52 53 their Licensed Capacity

Children in Facilities More than 100 Miles from DC

22

20

17

15

13

12

Permanency Categories

Children with the Goal of Adoption for More than 12 Months who are not in an Approved Adoptive Home

61 60 57 55 58 58

Children in Care who Returned Home twice and Still have the Goal of Reunification

3

2

2

2

2

2

Children under 14 with a Goal of APPLA

2

2

2

2

2

2

Children with the Goal of Reunification for More than 18 Months

42 38 39 35 39 37

Source: CFSA Administrative Data, FACES.NET report COR013 * Individual children may be included and counted in more than 1 category.

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5. Reviewing Child Fatalities
The District of Columbia’s City-wide Child Fatality Committee, a requirement of the LaShawn MFO and IEP, was created by Mayoral Order in October 1992 and in subsequent legislation.152 It is charged with reviewing the circumstances surrounding the deaths of children who are residents or wards of the District of Columbia including those children or families who were known to the child welfare system at any point during the four years prior to their death. The Committee is required to be composed of representatives from the Department of Human Services, Department of Health, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, CFSA, Metropolitan Police Department, Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, DC Public Schools, Department of Housing and Community Development, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Superior Court of DC, Office of the US Attorney, DC hospitals where children are born or treated, college or university schools of social work, Mayor’s Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect and eight community representatives.153 The Committee review examines past events and circumstances surrounding the child’s death through a review of documentation of public and private agencies responsible for serving children and families in order to determine systemic, legal or policy and practice deficits and to make recommendations for improvement. The Committee is located and staffed within the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME).
CFSA also has an Internal Child Fatality Committee which reviews the deaths of resident children who were known to the child welfare agency within four years prior to their death. The review assesses the quality of CFSA service delivery to the child and family, identifies patterns of risks and trends in cases involved with CFSA and determines any systemic issues that need further attention. The Committee is composed of a multidisciplinary team including representatives from Quality Assurance, Training, Health Services, Clinical Practice, Program Operations, General Counsel and other related departments. The Internal Committee reviews cases within 45 days of notification of the child’s death.
This Exit Standard was newly redesignated as an Outcome to be Maintained during the previous period and required performance was maintained during this period. Further discussion of Committee activities during the monitoring period are discussed below.

152 D.C. Code §4-1371 153 Since the initial creation of the Fatality Review Committees, consistent with the MFO, the Monitor has served as a member of both the City-wide and Internal Child Fatality Review Committees. In June 2014, the Monitor and staff were appointed by Mayoral Order to the City-wide Committee.

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Performance for the period July 1 through December 31, 2014:
City-wide Child Fatality Committee:
Membership of the City-wide Committee has previously been a struggle, however, there are currently 23 individuals appointed by the Mayor participating on the Committee. During the current monitoring period, there were four new appointees representing the Mayor’s Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect, the Department of Human Services, the Office of the Attorney General and the Department of Housing and Community Development. Also during this period, the Committee formally adopted operating rules and procedures. The Committee is scheduled to submit the 2014 Annual Report by September 30, 2015.
The City-wide Committee met every month this monitoring period and reviewed 41 cases involving infant and child fatalities. Seventy percent of the cases reviewed involved infants who died of natural causes. The City-wide Committee adopted 10 recommendations this period; nine of these recommendations address issues related to collaborative communication among District agencies, addressing risk factors associated with interfamily violence, gang intervention, nutrition counseling and family planning counseling for women of child bearing age.
Internal Child Fatality Committee:
CFSA’s Internal Child Fatality Committee met every month during the monitoring period except for October and December 2014. CFSA reports that at the end of the review period, one child fatality was in backlog and was reviewed internally on January 22, 2015.
During the Committee meetings this period, 11 child fatalities were reviewed. In August 2014 Committee meeting, three recommendations were made: 1) social workers explore the trauma history of families involved in the child welfare system; 2) CFSA continue to develop a policy regarding the appointment of medical guardians for special needs children and youth who have experienced medical emergencies; and 3) CPS examine the process for documenting discussions of physical discipline with caretakers and ensure that staff are trained to ask pertinent questions when there are discrepancies during interviews. CFSA reports that these recommendations are in process of being addressed.
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA has employed the following strategy to increase compliance toward reviewing child fatalities:
 By March 31, 2014, CFSA will work with the Office of the Deputy Mayor to meet with the newly appointed Chief Medical Examiner to review the status of the City‐

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wide Child Fatality Committee (CFRC) and its requirements and to identify actions/resources needed to bring the CFRC into compliance (2014 Strategy Plan, #26).
Representatives of the Deputy Mayor for Health and Human Services Office and CFSA’s director and other representatives met with the Chief Medical Examiner throughout 2014. In late 2014, the City-wide Child Fatality Committee was brought into compliance with the requirements of the LaShawn MFO and IEP and this Exit Standard was redesignated as an Outcome to be Maintained.
6. Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance
Continuous quality assurance is essential to CFSA’s practice improvement and system functioning. CFSA’s leaders have a strong interest in continuous quality improvement (CQI) and have developed and implemented numerous processes for data collection and analysis. CFSA has extended their internal CQI emphasis to include the private agencies with whom they work. The Monitor continues to work with CFSA as it takes actions to improve its overall CQI plan and CQI implementation.
Performance on Strategy Plan: CFSA implemented the following strategies to ensure growth and development of the quality of practice in accordance with its overall CQI plan:
 Throughout 2014, CFSA will continue the weekly Big RED process to address the barriers to timely case closure. Participants include program administrators, managers and supervisors. The RED Team framework includes concrete next steps to case closures (2014 Strategy Plan, #23).
CFSA continues to conduct Big RED Team meetings for children who are placed in out-of-home care. Big RED Teams are held to address any barriers to permanency and outline the next steps to achieve permanency; supervisors present cases to attendees which include upper-level management and administrators, attorneys and service providers. The key barriers to permanency identified during Big RED Team meetings include lack of mental health services, access to substance abuse services and limited options for stable housing. CFSA has implemented strategies to address these challenges including contracting for mobile substance abuse assessments for youth and adults, working closely with co-located DBH partners and launching an online application process for Rapid Housing. To further address and understand the mental health challenges and connection to appropriate services, the Office of Well-Being is planning to

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modify the role of the co-located DBH staff by increasing their availability to provide support and mental health consults to social workers on specific cases.
 Throughout 2014, CFSA Program Operations will continue to implement a quality assurance process to include a review of supervisors’ work in permanency on a regular basis through the Big RED, a coaching and mentoring model for supervisors, based on the length of time a child is in foster care (2014 Strategy Plan, #24).
As discussed in the previous strategy, the consultation and information sharing framework provides CFSA and the private agencies with a supportive infrastructure for CFSA’s Four Pillars154 strategic agenda and continues to be used throughout CFSA’s system within RED Team meetings, group supervision and individual case consultations. CFSA and the private agencies continue to hold Big RED Team meetings to identify barriers to permanency and develop concrete next steps to move the case toward safe case closure.
In the spring of 2015, the Office of Agency Performance will lead a multi-stakeholder workgroup to develop a performance-based outcome report for each RED Team, based on data captured in FACES.NET, which will provide data to drive decisions regarding continuous quality improvement.
Data and Technology
CFSA continue to use data for management purposes and to assess the quality of its practice. The Monitor has regular discussions with CFSA on ways to improve data collection methods and clarify and make more useful current data reports.
CFSA has added the RED Team information sharing and consultation template into FACES.NET so that information and next steps can be documented and readily available to social workers and supervisors. As discussed in earlier sections of this report, CFSA is continuing to update and include additional templates in FACES.NET, including its case plan document and other screening and assessment tools.
CFSA has also implemented a “data visualization system”, which is being first introduced to staff in Entry Services, that provides a daily picture of the overall status of investigations and FAs open in Entry Services. CFSA administrators and managers’ report that this tool provides information to better help them manage worker caseloads, provide direct supervision and understand on a daily basis the status of all investigations and FAs. Administrators, managers

154 CFSA’s strategic agenda is focused on practice in four key areas, also known as the Four Pillars: Front Door, Temporary Safe Haven, Well Being and Exit to Permanence.

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and supervisors have all been trained on the data visualization system and there is a plan to rollout the training to front-line staff in the coming months.
7. Financing
Federal Revenue
CFSA continues to demonstrate its ability to maximize Title IV-E revenue. CFSA submits quarterly claims for Title IV-E claiming as well as providing documentation to support claiming under the Title IV-E Waiver.155 CFSA reports efforts to support the Collaboratives in budgeting and expenditure reporting to ensure proper documentation of the Waiver programs. Further, CFSA reports accurately claiming Medicaid for the Healthy Horizon Assessment Clinic. Although revenue maximization work is a continuous activity, the Monitor previously determined that CFSA’s multi-year efforts to maximize federal revenue were sufficient to meet the IEP requirement and that CFSA now has the infrastructure and direction to continue this work. This Exit Standard is an Outcome to be Maintained, and CFSA has sustained performance on this standard.
Table 12 presents the actual, approved or proposed Title IV-E federal resources used to support services to children and families involved with CFSA. For July through December 2014, CFSA reports its Title IV-E penetration rate of 63 percent for foster care cases and 79 percent for adoption cases.

155 The District of Columbia’s federal Title IV-E Waiver plan was approved in September 2013 implementation began in 2014. CFSA has been able to reinvest Waiver funds to support family stabilization, preservation and reunification.

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Fiscal Year

Table 12: Actual and Budgeted Gross Title IV-E Federal Funds Operating Budget
FY2009 – FY2015

Total Title IV-E Federal Resources (in millions)

Overall Budget (in millions)

FY2009 (actual)

$49.7

$289.1

FY2010 (actual)

$58.1

$277.3

FY2011(actual)

$52.4

$249.4

FY2012 (actual)

$55.5

$238.5

FY2013 (actual)

$56.8

$227.3

FY2014 (actual)

$60.8

$223.2

FY2015 (proposed)

$61.9

$246.3

Source: CFSA FY2015 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan and District’s Financial System (SOAR)

Budget

CFSA’s approved FY2015 budget (which runs from October 1, 2014 through September 30. 2015) is $246,266,239 of which $169,578,000 (69%) is local funding and the remainder is primarily federal funding. For the past two years, as the population of children in foster care has decreased, CFSA’s budget has produced surpluses which the Mayor has in some cases repurposed for other activities. CFSA reports that even after repurposing some funds in this current year, the FY2015 budget is still expected to show a slight surplus due to reduced expenditures as a result of fewer children in foster care than were estimated in the budget process and an increase in management efficiencies.

Mayor Bowser’s proposed FY 2016 budget for CFSA is slightly decreased from the FY2015 budget (.5% net decrease) and is currently under deliberation by the District Council. CFSA leaders report that both the current budget and the FY2016 proposed budget provide sufficient funds to meet all staffing and service needs. The budget and expenditure patterns continue to reflect the decrease in foster care placements, a shift in funding for services from local funds to those that can now be covered through the federal Title IV-E waiver, management efficiencies and increased partnerships with other District agencies that allow some services that were previously paid for by CFSA (i.e. day care) to be paid for by other District agencies.

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The CFSA proposed FY2016 budget is $244,990,996 of which $165,349,000 (67%) is local funding.156 The FY2016 budget includes a 4.6 percent net increase ($3 million) in federal revenue including federal funds expected through the Title IV-E Waiver, which will allow CFSA to use federal funds for intensive foster care prevention and reunification services. Federal funding has also increased through CFSA’s enhanced Title IV-E claiming as a result of a negotiated agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services that now allow for reimbursement of case management services for youth placed in congregate care settings.
CFSA’s proposed FY2016 FTEs will increase to 825 positions with an assumed vacancy rate of 6.5 percent, representing an additional eight positions in staffing authorization since FY2014.

Reallocation of Local Funds
Over the past two years, the number of children and youth in out-of-home placement and congregate care settings have declined substantially producing a surplus of budgeted CFSA funds associated with placement and management costs. Some of these funds were reprogrammed to other District agencies to cover programmatic and administrative costs. During FY2014, $8,533,000 of local funds were reprogrammed from CFSA’s budget to other District agencies – specifically, $7,000,000 to the Children and Youth Investment Collaborative to support events and activities of the District’s One City Summer initiative including the Summer Youth Employment Program and $1,083,000 to the DHS to support the New Heights program, which works to prevent teen pregnancy and support teen parents attending school. CFSA reports that the reprogramming has not affected their ability to move forward to implement new services for children and families particularly in the areas of substance abuse, education and services for older youth.

Between July and December 2014, there were no additional reprogramming requests related to the FY2015 budget.

Implementation of Title IV-E Waiver Services

CFSA and the Healthy Families Thriving Communities Collaboratives continue to move forward to expand community-based services funded through the District’s Safe and Stable Families Initiative, which is their Title IV-E waiver effort. With an approved federal waiver, the District is able to use federal funds that were previously only available for placement and placement related costs to develop a broader evidenced-based service array to reduce placement and length of stays in foster care and improve permanency outcomes. The two principal service programs funded through the waiver are Homebuilders (an intensive family preservation model) and Project Connect (a service to support families with children transitioning home from foster care). The ramp up to service delivery has been slow. As of March 2015, contracts have been executed with

156 FY2016 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan, Child and Family Services Agency.

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providers to begin accepting referrals for both Homebuilders (based in Ward 7, East River Family Strengthening Collaborative) and Project Connect (based in Ward 8, Far Southeast Family Strengthening Collaborative) with plans to expand to two additional Collaboratives in the coming months. Services provision remains very low under these contracts as providers focus on testing program fidelity and building the referral process. Additional preventive services currently funded through the Title IV-E waiver include capacity grants issued to small, local organizations identified by the Collaboratives and pre-court legal services157 for families in areas that include housing and custody.
District Agency Partnerships
CFSA reports that through improved partnerships with other District agencies, social workers are now able to provide children and families with services and support more efficiently. For example, CFSA has partnered with the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) to provide day care vouchers for children placed in out-of-home care and the Department of Behavioral Health (DBH) to provide housing for transition aged youth receiving DBH services. Additionally, CFSA is working with the Department of Health Care Finance to enroll children and youth in Medicaid more efficiently in order to reduce ad hoc costs borne by the agency to pay for medical services that could be appropriately paid for through Medicaid.
Office of Well Being
The FY 2015 budget is supporting CFSA’s work to improve the educational success and stability of children and youth in care. CFSA has invested in providing transportation for youth entering foster care or changing placements to ensure school placement stability as well as $500,000 in tutoring and $500,000 in mentoring services.
Housing
Securing affordable housing for low income families remains a significant challenge for CFSA and the District as a whole. Many of the families CFSA serves struggle with stable, appropriate and affordable housing and sometimes the lack of housing is a barrier for children remaining and/or returning to live with their families. Housing is also a key need of older youth transitioning from foster care who often need significant help in order to avoid homelessness. CFSA is able to support families and older youth through Rapid Housing funds, vouchers through the federal Family Unification Program and a new program for teen parents supported through Title IV-E waiver funding. However, these resources are not sufficient to solve the extensive housing challenges faced by CFSA families and older youth. While the District

157 CFSA reports that through the first half of FY2015, there have been 78 referrals for pre-court legal services compared to 24 referrals in six months prior.

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attempts to work on a city-wide plan to address the gap in housing, it is essential for CFSA to continue to innovate and partner with DBH and the Department of Human services to support families and older youth find stable, affordable housing.

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APPENDIX A Glossary of Acronyms Used in Monitoring Report

ACEDS: Automated Client Eligibility Determination System APPLA: Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement ASFA: Adoption and Safe Families Act BSW: Bachelor of Social Work CAFAS: Child and Adolescent Functional Assessment Scale CFRC: Child Fatality Review Committee CFSA: Children and Family Services Agency CNA: Child Needs Assessment CPS: Child Protective Services CQI: Continuous Quality Improvement CRC: Children’s Research Center CSSP: Center for the Study of Social Policy CWTA: Child Welfare Training Academy CY: Calendar Year CYIC: Children and Youth Investment Collaborative DBH: Department of Behavioral Health DHS: Department of Human Services DR: Differential Response DYRS: Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services FA: Family Assessment FACES.NET: CFSA’s automated child welfare information system FAPAC: Foster and Adoptive Parent Advocacy Center FTE: Full Time Employment

FTM: Family Team Meeting FY: Fiscal Year HMO: Health Maintenance Organization ICPC: Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children IEP: Implementation and Exit Plan I&R: Information and Referral LYFE: Listening to Youth and Families as Experts MFO: Modified Final Order MSW: Master of Social Work NRCPFC: National Center for Permanency and Family Connections OAG: Office of the Attorney General OCME: Office of the Chief Medical Examiner OYE: Office of Youth Empowerment PECFAS: Preschool and Early Childhood Functional Assessment Scale PS-MAPP: Partnering for Permanence and Safety: Model Approach to Partnerships in Parenting PTSD: Posttraumatic stress disorder QA: Quality Assurance QSR: Quality Service Review RED: Review, Evaluate and Direct SDM: Structured Decision Making SSI: Supplemental Security Income STARS: Student Tracking and Reporting System TST: Trauma Systems Therapy USDA: United States Department of Agriculture YTP: Youth Transition Plan

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APPENDIX B 2014 LaShawn Strategy Plan

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LaShawn A. v. Gray Implementation and Exit Plan
Section IV: 2014 Strategy Plan Introduction Pursuant to the Implementation and Exit Plan entered December 17, 2010 (Exit Plan), the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), after consultation with the Court Monitor and Counsel for Plaintiffs, submits the following 2014 Strategy Plan. The strategies and action steps in the 2014 Plan relate to outcomes and exit standards in the Outcomes to be Achieved section (as modified) in the Exit Plan. The 2014 Plan is a means to achieve compliance with the exit standards. Absent a substantial or unjustifiable disparity, the Court will not find deviations to constitute noncompliance. Moreover, the 2014 Plan, including applicable due dates, can be modified with timely consultation with the Court Monitor. In the event that the District has not satisfied the exit standards remaining in the Exit Plan by December 31, 2014, the District, after consultation with the Monitor and Counsel for Plaintiffs, will review, modify as appropriate, and submit to the Court an updated Strategy Plan for 2015. As described in the 2012 and 2013 Plans, the 2014 Plan is presented in the context of CFSA’s overall strategic framework, which is comprised of four pillars.

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)
Front Door

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LaShawn A. v. Gray Implementation and Exit Plan
Section IV: 2014 Strategy Plan

LaShawn Requirements

LaShawn Strategies
CFSA is focused on improving performance in timely initiation of investigations; collecting sufficient information from core and collateral contacts; conducting adequate risk assessments; and monitoring initiation of services to prevent unnecessary removals. Throughout 2014, CFSA will adopt and incorporate the following:

Initiation of Investigations [Exit Standard 1(a)]
Timely Closure of Investigations
[Exit Standard 1 (b)]
Acceptable Investigations [Exit Standard 2]

1. To ensure investigations are initiated timely (inclusive of good faith efforts), effective December 2013, CFSA increased the frequency of the Hotline RED teams using the group decision‐making process framework. Previously, CFSA held two Hotline RED teams per weekday. Beginning December 2013, the teams were increased to three per weekday to manage the volume of the referrals, assign the referrals to the appropriate pathway, track assignment and response time, and ensure that multidisciplinary membership is a part of the decision‐making process.
2. CFSA will continue the 10‐Day RED Teams, which will address barriers to timely and effective completion of investigations. In addition, the Big RED Team reviews will be scheduled with supervisors to address investigations open for 35 days or more. The next steps developed in the RED Teams will be documented and shared with social workers and supervisors for follow up. The next steps will be reviewed during supervision.
3. To effectively complete investigations, CPS management will continue to equalize the caseloads, remove investigative workers out of rotation as appropriate, and quickly fill social worker vacancies as needed.

4. As a continuing quality improvement practice, the process for completing, reviewing, and reporting on acceptable investigations will continue in 2014 with the assistance of the Office of Agency Performance. The revised process, which began in February 2014, includes peer reviews within CPS management, an increased sample size and frequency of the reviews and reporting out. Each supervisor will conduct a review on two closed investigations per month for review by the program manager. The results will be shared monthly and will include detailed information to allow for targeted training and coaching

2

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Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)
Well Being

LaShawn Requirements

by supervisor.

LaShawn Strategies

The Functional Family Assessment tool is designed to identify the appropriate needs and services for parents and caregivers.

5. By April 1, 2014, CFSA will test the Functional Family Assessment tool for in‐home and out‐of‐home cases. Full implementation of the tool is expected by May 1, 2014.

During the grand review in November 2013, the Office of Policy, Planning and Program Support presented the QSR findings to CFSA management. The findings highlighted strengths and areas of improvement.

Services to families and children to
promote safety, permanency and well‐ being
[Exit Standard 3]
Case planning process [Exit Standard 17]

6. Based on the QSR findings, Agency Performance is conducting an analysis on case plans and services. The analysis will include a review of ten percent of the in‐home and foster care cases. The findings will be completed and shared with management in March 2014 and will be used to modify practice, policy, and trainings, as needed.
7. CFSA will continue to provide immediate feedback on the QSR findings and practice examples about the case to the supervisor and social worker and discuss next steps. The QSR team will follow up with the supervisor and social worker within 30 days. A permanency big RED team will be scheduled 60 days following the QSR to review the findings and follow up. The case practice specialist will track the steps identified through the QSR and permanency Big RED and will report to the permanency Big RED team if the steps are not occurring.

The Child and Adolescent Functioning Assessment Scale (CAFAS) is a tool used for assessing a youth’s day‐to‐day functioning across critical life subscales and for determining whether a youth’s functioning improves over time. CFSA has requested approval from the Children’s Bureau (submitted October 31, 2013) to use this tool as part of its work under the federal grant on trauma‐informed practice.

8. Within six months of receiving approval from the Children’s Bureau, CFSA will integrate

3

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 173 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)

LaShawn Requirements

LaShawn Strategies the CAFAS into FACES.NET. Thereafter, staff will be trained and begin using the tool.

The Department of Behavioral Health maintains a network of Choice Providers within the District for the timely and coordinated access to all clinically necessary behavioral health services and supports.

9. Beginning February 1, 2014, the Choice Providers will participate in the case transfer RED team at the point of removal and the initial family team meeting (FTM) to enhance family engagement and improve the identification of and timely referral to services needed for children and families.

Health and Dental Care (distribution of Medicaid
cards) [Exit Standard 22(d)]

10. CFSA, in conjunction with the Office of the Deputy Mayor, will continue to work with the Department of Health Care Finance to streamline the process for sending Medicaid cards to foster parents. By June 30, 2014, the group will provide CSSP with a written business process for distributing Medicaid cards to foster parents with an explanation of how the process has been streamlined.

Temporary Safe Haven

The goal of Icebreaker meetings is to build a relationship between the birth and foster parents to support a child who has just entered out‐of‐home care. While other meetings may focus on making decisions, Icebreaker meetings focus on initiating a relationship between a child’s parents and the person serving as his or her out‐of‐home caregiver.

Visitation [Exit Standards 4(c), 5(d), 6,
10, and 11]

11. By March 1, 2014, CFSA will implement Icebreaker meetings following the initial FTM. The Icebreaker meetings will include the attendance of birth parents and foster parents to begin building a relationship. This engagement strategy will assist parents in connecting quicker with the foster parents and begin to develop a line of communication to better support the children. The process will also allow social workers to schedule and coordinate visits with parents and children from the beginning of the case.

12. CFSA has revised its placement policy effective March 1, 2014, which identifies that temporary situations such as respite and planned extended visits with relatives and/or parents are not counted as placement moves. By March 1, 2014, CFSA will operationalize

4

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 174 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)
Exit to Permanence

LaShawn Requirements

LaShawn Strategies
the policy into FACES.NET. This system update will have a direct impact on the performance on weekly visits during a child’s first four weeks of a new placement because these temporary situations will no longer be incorrectly identified as placement changes that require weekly visits.

13. Effective September 2013, CFSA constructed and fully implemented a case transfer process that occurs no later than the initial Family Team Meeting (FTM) following the removal of a child from the home. This parental engagement process requires the assigned on‐going social worker (CFSA and private agency) to attend a Removal RED team meeting (prior to the initial FTM), the initial FTM, and the initial court hearing. This requirement is designed to allow the social worker to complete the initial worker/parent visits and engage the parent(s) in scheduling the visitation with the child(ren) and ongoing visits with the worker.

14. Beginning February 2014, CFSA will conduct a monthly data analysis for the required parent‐child and parent‐worker visits to determine barriers to meeting the standards. Findings from the analysis will be shared with CFSA and private agencies monthly.

Reduction of Multiple Placements for Children in
Care [Exit Standards 13(a) and
13(b)]
Timely adoption (Timely Permanence to include reunification, adoption and
guardianship) [Exit Standard 16]

15. CFSA will continue to utilize a behavioral crisis stabilization support service for foster parents and kinship foster parents. CFSA will continue to utilize a management process that reinforces the integrated teaming approach to identify, coordinate, and link appropriate supports/services to meet the needs of children currently in, or at risk of, a restrictive level of care.
CFSA is modifying the approach to concurrent planning by incorporating the resources and framework provided by the National Resource Center on Permanency and Family Connections (NRCPFC).
16. Throughout 2014 CFSA will work with the National Resource Center (NRCPRC) and the CRC to develop alerts for concurrent planning discussions during the RED team meetings.

Appropriate Permanency

17. Throughout 2014 the NRCPRC and National Center on Data and Technology will work with

5

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 175 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)
Organizational Capacity Organizational Capacity

LaShawn
Requirements Goals (Youth Transition
Plans) [Exit Standard 12(c)]

LaShawn Strategies
CFSA to further analyze and examine reunification prognosis indicators and re‐entry data based on the concurrent planning framework.
18. By August 1, 2014, CFSA, working with the National Resource Center for Adoptions, will develop a scope of work for redesigning guardianship practices with a goal of promoting more timely permanency.

19. Throughout 2014, CFSA will continue to utilize the RED teams at various phases of the permanency process and will use RED teams to facilitate decisions and timely action about case transfer, placement matching, guardianship, and adoption.

20. Beginning February 2014, CFSA will monitor and validate the creation and implementation of youth transition plans using the Foster Care Club toolkit. Each month CFSA will review a 20 percent sample of YTPs completed during the performance period to determine if the youth was involved in the plan development. CFSA will also review the YTPs for all youth who age out during each month to ensure that the plans include the appropriate connections.

Timely Approval of Foster/ Adoptive Parents
[Exit Standard 14]

21. By September 30, 2014, four CFSA staff members will receive Approved Trainer (Master Trainer) status. CFSA currently utilizes the PS MAPP foster parent training curriculum. The Approve Trainers will have the flexibility to offer the PS MAPP training to foster parents more frequently and with flexibility of location, to include foster parents’ homes.
22. CFSA will continue to utilize the services of the KVC consultant to implement solutions to timely licensing of foster homes, including challenges around kin, worker delays, data entry issues, family delays with scheduling, and rescheduling fire inspections.

Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI)

In accordance with the guidance received from the Administration of Children and Families, CFSA will continue to measure the quality of services and outcomes for children and families through the following Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI ) processes:

6

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 176 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)

LaShawn Requirements

City‐Wide Child Fatality Review Committee [Exit Standard II(4)]

LaShawn Strategies
23. Throughout 2014, CFSA will continue the weekly “Big RED” process to address the barriers to timely case closure. Participants include program administrators, managers and supervisors. The RED team framework includes concrete next steps to case closures.
24. Throughout 2014, CFSA Program Operations will continue to implement a quality assurance process to include a review of supervisors’ work in permanency on a regular basis (“BIG RED,” a coaching and mentoring model for supervisors) based on the length of time a child is in foster care.
25. Beginning February 20, 2014, and continuing on a quarterly basis, the Deputy Directors for Community Partnerships and Program Operations will institute and formalize a quality assurance process for assessing safety during visits for in‐home and out‐of‐ home cases. CFSA supervisors and contract monitoring staff will conduct 20 case reviews to determine whether safety was assessed and documented during visits. Findings from these reviews will be shared with workers, supervisors and management and will be used to inform ongoing worker training and coaching.
26. By March 31, 2014, CFSA will work with the Office of the Deputy Mayor to meet with the newly appointed Chief Medical Examiner to review the status of the City‐wide Child Fatality Committee (CFRC) and its requirements and to identify actions/resources needed to bring the CFRC into compliance.

7

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 177 of 183

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 178 of 183
APPENDIX C 2015 LaShawn Strategy Plan

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 179 of 183
LaShawn A. v. Bowser
Implementation and Exit Plan Section IV:
2015 Strategy Plan
Introduction Pursuant to the Implementation and Exit Plan entered December 17, 2010 (Exit Plan), the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), after consultation with the Court Monitor and Counsel for Plaintiffs, submits the following 2015 Strategy Plan. The strategies and action steps in the 2015 Plan relate to outcomes and exit standards in the Outcomes to be Achieved section (as modified) in the Exit Plan. The 2015 Plan is a means to achieve compliance with the exit standards. Absent a substantial or unjustifiable disparity, the Court will not find deviations to constitute noncompliance. Moreover, the 2015 Plan, including applicable due dates, can be modified with timely consultation with the Court Monitor. In the event that the District has not satisfied the exit standards remaining in the Exit Plan by December 31, 2015, the District, after consultation with the Monitor and Counsel for Plaintiffs, will review, modify as appropriate, and submit to the Court an updated Strategy Plan for 2016.
As described in the 2012‐2014 Plans, the 2015 Plan is presented in the context of CFSA’s overall strategic framework, which is comprised of four pillars.

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 180 of 183

LaShawn Requirements

LaShawn A. v. Bowser Implementation and Exit Plan
Section IV: 2015 Strategy Plan
LaShawn Strategies
Overall performance measures and management by data is a continuing goal of the Child Protective Services Administration (CPS). A data management system was developed in 2014 which allows for real time review of various measures that can be reviewed by division, unit, and worker.

1. In 2015, CPS managers will continue to utilize data (e.g., data visualization system, management reports, score cards) to conduct monthly reviews of worker performance for conformance with CPS standards. Based on the performance levels, CPS managers will identify and address needs for coaching or corrective action, as needed.

Front Door

Initiation of Investigations [Exit Standard 1(a)]
Timely Closure of Investigations
[Exit Standard 1(b)]
Acceptable Investigations [Exit Standard 2]
Caseloads [Exit Standard 25(a)]

2. CPS supervisors will use the Consultation and Information Sharing Framework as a guide in reviewing investigations during supervision. In addition, CPS will continue to utilize the 10/15 Day RED teams, held each day (Monday through Thursday) to review the status of referrals and progress toward completion of investigations. Each RED Team will review five investigations or family assessments selected because of complicating factors or otherwise needing group consultation.
3. The acceptable investigation (CQI) tool will continue to be used to review investigation practice. Consistent with 2014, CFSA supervisors, managers, and agency performance staff will review 66 investigations per quarter and will ensure that each worker will have at least one of his or her investigations reviewed per quarter. The results will be shared with the worker and supervisor to develop coaching or corrective action, as needed.

Caseloads:

4. CPS will continue to equalize the caseloads, remove investigative workers out of rotation as appropriate, and quickly fill social worker vacancies as needed.

5. The Human Resources Administration hired a full time recruiter and Human Resources will continue to focus on effective and timely recruitment of social workers.

2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 181 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)
Well Being

LaShawn Requirements
Services to families and children to
promote safety, permanency and well‐
being [Exit Standard 3] Case planning process [Exit Standard 17]

LaShawn Strategies
6. No later than April 2015, a floater unit of five full‐ time social workers will be available to provide for easy transfer of social workers to areas of the agency that need immediate staff support.
7. In January, CFSA streamlined pre‐service training for investigative social workers. The classroom training will be two weeks and the field training will be seven weeks.
The case planning process will be modified to include functional assessments and a well‐being pathway to identify and meet service needs. The improved case planning process, as outlined below, will be implemented in in June 2015, following training in May 2015:
8. Initiation of case planning will begin at the FTM to address acute needs.
9. Within the first 30 days of removal, children will be screened and/or assessed on the following areas: development, mental/behavioral health, and trauma. The parent’s functioning will be assessed using the Caregiver Strengths and Barriers Assessment and the child’s functioning will be assessed using the Child and Adolescent Functional Assessment Scale (CAFAS) or the Preschool and Early Childhood Functional Assessment Scale (PECFAS).
10. A 30‐day case planning RED Team will be held to review the screens and assessments, and the child ecology checklist will be completed. Based on these screens, assessments, and check list, the team will select from one or more categories of services that will fit the needs for the child and/or family and will develop a plan with the family to meet those needs. The parents will be invited to the case planning RED Team and encouraged to attend and participate.
11. Case plans are a living document and will be amended as assessments are completed at 90‐day intervals to determine change in functioning. As needed, services can be adjusted between the 90 day intervals with the case plan amended at the RED team meeting.
12. By September 30, 2015, CFSA will develop with a national expert method of monitoring fidelity to the RED team process.
3

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 182 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)

LaShawn Requirements

LaShawn Strategies

The exit standards are measured using indicators from the quality services reviews (QSRs). In 2015, CFSA will continue to conduct QSRs and provide guidance for staff based on the results:

13. The QSR reviewers will continue to provide feedback on the results and issues identified in the QSRs to social workers, supervisors, and managers, including at individual meetings with the social worker and supervisor following the QSR. In addition, feedback will be provided at quarterly management meetings to review aggregate information and identified trends.

14. CFSA will continue to have RED teams as a follow up to the QSR to review the status of the next steps identified during the QSR. Those RED teams will be scheduled within 60 days following the QSR.

15. Staff from the QSR and quality assurance units will engage in ongoing coaching of social workers and supervisors to identify and resolve barriers to permanency and to improve case practice.

CFSA developed a protocol for increasing the use of community papering, a process of petitioning the Family Court without removing children from the family home but allows for court oversight with in‐ home services to families.

16. CFSA introduced the community papering protocol in January and will continue to implement the protocol through training and supervision.

Health and Dental Care (distribution of Medicaid
cards) [Exit Standard 22(d)]

17. CFSA has implemented a streamlined process where the Business Services Administration submits the request to the Department of Human Services to transition a child to Fee‐for‐ Service Medicaid coverage.
18. The Placement Administration will follow up each week to ensure that the Medicaid number and card are provided to the foster parents.

19. CFSA is working with the Department of Human Services and the Department of Healthcare 4

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1142 Filed 05/21/15 Page 183 of 183

Strategic Framework (“Four Pillars”)

LaShawn Requirements

LaShawn Strategies
Finance to identify and resolve barriers to timely Medicaid card issuance and distribution. By December 2015, the District government will have developed and implemented a streamlined process to ensure timely distribution of proof of coverage.

Temporary Safe Haven

Visitation [Exit Standards 4(c), 5(d),
6(e)]

20. In an effort to emphasis the assessment and documentation of safety assessments, CFSA invited the National Resource Center for Family Practice, University of Iowa, to develop a visitation planning and documenting training for staff. The training focuses on: planning the visits in advance, setting forth goals/outcomes to be achieved at the visits, and assessing and documenting safety. Training for all in‐home workers will be completed in March 2015 and by April 30, 2015, for permanency workers.
21. Supervisors and social workers will plan visitations in advance and identify the need for support in conducting required visits from family support workers and other identified team members. Once a week, the supervisors will coordinate with the identified support team to fill the support needs.

Exit to Permanence

Timely adoption (Timely Permanence to include reunification, adoption and
guardianship) [Exit Standard 16]

In 2014, CFSA worked with the National Resource Center on Permanency and Family Connections (NRCPFC) to modify the Agency’s approach to concurrent planning. The work included identification of prognosis indicators and re‐entry data. The Agency also worked with its external partners, including the Family Court and guardians ad litem, to prepare and educate them on the Agency’s approach to concurrent planning.
22. In January 2015, the Agency implemented the new approach to concurrent planning. Cases with certain indicators will be worked with two goals, reunification and either adoption or guardianship.

23. CFSA and private provider agencies will continue to hold permanency RED Teams each Monday to identify and resolve barriers to permanency. RED Teams will be held for each child/case beginning with the case planning at 30 days and every 3 months thereafter until the child/youth achieves permanency.

5

 
 Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201 Filed 08/29/19 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. MURIEL BOWSER, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 89-1754 (TFH)

JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER APPROVING EXIT AND SUSTAINABILITY PLAN The Parties jointly request the entry of an order approving the attached Exit and Sustainability Plan (ESP), to replace the Implementation and Exit Plan (IEP) dated December 17, 2010. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) and LCvR 7(m). Since the June 11, 2019 hearing, the Court Monitor has assisted the Parties in mediation and extensive negotiations to reach an agreed approach to finally terminate this litigation. The ESP reflects the substantial progress the District of Columbia (the District) has made in the last decade, by removing from court monitoring certain Exit Standards imposed by the IEP that the District has achieved and maintained for several years. The ESP also provides a detailed strategy for—and commitment by—the District to focus on the remaining areas that require additional improvement, and to allow the District to achieve those important outcomes. The Parties will meet after the Court Monitor’s next monitoring report and determine what additional steps are necessary to ensure that the District continues to progress towards achieving compliance with the remaining Exit Standards.

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201 Filed 08/29/19 Page 2 of 4

A memorandum of points and authorities and a proposed order are attached.

Dated: August 29, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Marcia Lowry Marcia Lowry (#1187053) A Better Childhood, Inc. 355 Lexington Avenue, Floor 16 New York, NY 10017 (646) 795-4456 mlowry@abetterchildhood.org
/s/ Sarah Jaffe Sarah Jaffe (#5230313) A Better Childhood, Inc. 355 Lexington Avenue, Floor 16 New York, NY 10017 (646) 795-4456 sjaffe@abetterchildhood.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia
TONI MICHELLE JACKSON Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Division
/s/ Fernando Amarillas FERNANDO AMARILLAS (#974858) Chief, Equity Section
/s/ Andrew J. Saindon ANDREW J. SAINDON (#456987) Senior Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 600S Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 724-6643 Email: andy.saindon@dc.gov

Attorneys for Defendants

2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201 Filed 08/29/19 Page 3 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. MURIEL BOWSER, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 89-1754 (TFH)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER APPROVING EXIT AND SUSTAINABILITY PLAN
In support of the Parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Order Approving Exit and Sustainability
Plan, the Parties rely upon:
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A) and (7)(b);
2. LCvR 7(m);
3. The Implementation and Exit Plan (IEP) dated December 17, 2010 [1073]; and
4. The inherent equitable powers of the Court.

Dated: August 29, 2019.
/s/ Marcia Lowry Marcia Lowry (#1187053) A Better Childhood, Inc. 355 Lexington Avenue, Floor 16 New York, NY 10017 (646) 795-4456 mlowry@abetterchildhood.org
/s/ Sarah Jaffe Sarah Jaffe (#5230313) A Better Childhood, Inc.

Respectfully submitted,
KARL A. RACINE Attorney General for the District of Columbia
TONI MICHELLE JACKSON Deputy Attorney General Public Interest Division
/s/ Fernando Amarillas FERNANDO AMARILLAS (#974858) Chief, Equity Section

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201 Filed 08/29/19 Page 4 of 4

355 Lexington Avenue, Floor 16 New York, NY 10017 (646) 795-4456 sjaffe@abetterchildhood.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Andrew J. Saindon ANDREW J. SAINDON (#456987) Senior Assistant Attorney General 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Suite 600S Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 724-6643 Email: andy.saindon@dc.gov
Attorneys for Defendants

4

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-1 Filed 08/29/19 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LASHAWN A., et al., Plaintiffs,
v. MURIEL BOWSER, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 89-1754 (TFH)

ORDER Upon consideration of the Parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Order Approving Exit and Sustainability Plan, and the entire record, it is: ORDERED that the Joint Motion is GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the Parties’ joint request, the Court will enter a separate order approving the Exit and Sustainability Plan, which will replace the Implementation and Exit Plan dated December 17, 2010 [1073]. SO ORDERED.

Dated: _______________

_______________________________________________ THE HONORABLE THOMAS F. HOGAN Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Lashawn A., by her next friend, Evelyn )

Moore, et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

MURIEL BOWSER, as Mayor of the )

District of Columbia, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 89-cv-1754 (TFH)

ORDER Pending before the Court are the Parties’ proposal for an Exit and Sustainability Plan. Pursuant to Modified Final Order (“MFO”) § XX.B, the Court hereby enters the Exit and Sustainability Plan accompanying this Order. This plan replaces the LaShawn A. v. Fenty Implementation and Exit Plan dated December 17, 2010.

SO ORDERED. , 2019

THOMAS F. HOGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 2 of 19
LaShawn A. v. Bowser Exit and Sustainability Plan
August 29, 2019

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 3 of 19
PREAMBLE This LaShawn A. v. Bowser Exit and Sustainability Plan includes: Outcomes to be Maintained, a listing of Exit Standards from the 2010 Implementation and Exit Plan that the District’s performance met and maintained (Section I); Outcomes to be Achieved (Section II); SelfRegulation and Public Reporting Commitments (Section III); Placement Array Commitments (Section IV); and Sustainability and Exit (Section V). Citations from Federal law, District of Columbia law and regulations, the Modified Final Order (MFO), and CFSA policy are included. This plan supersedes and replaces the LaShawn A. v. Fenty Implementation and Exit Plan (IEP) dated December 17, 2010. The Court Monitor shall continue to prepare and submit to the Court bi-annual performance reports setting forth 1) compliance with the “Outcomes to be Achieved” Exit Standards; and 2) Defendants’ progress in carrying out the associated action steps set forth in the Placement Array Commitments and Self-Regulation and Public Reporting Commitments sections. At the end of the first quarter of the calendar year, the Parties will convene a meeting to engage in good faith discussions to reassess the remaining Exit Standards and plans to exit the LaShawn A. lawsuit.
2

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 4 of 19

SECTION I: OUTCOMES TO BE MAINTAINED

Defendants and the Court Monitor shall not be required to report to the Court on the “Outcomes to be Maintained” (Section I) Exit Standards unless there is a reason to believe that they have not been maintained. At the Court Monitor’s discretion, or at the Plaintiffs’ request, the Court Monitor may request data and information on specific “Outcomes to be Maintained” Exit Standard(s) from Defendants in order to assess the District’s performance.

If the Monitor seeks to reinstate an outcome designated as an “Outcome to be Maintained” to an “Outcome to be Achieved,” Defendants may object and provide information to demonstrate that the performance change is either temporary, insubstantial, or based on reasonable justification.

The following 56 Exit Standards1 are in the “Outcomes to be Maintained” Section because the District has demonstrated sustained performance and the parties agree that no future external monitoring is required.

1.

Investigations (IEP citation I.A.1.c.)

2.

Worker Visitation to Families with In-Home Services (IEP citation I.A.4.a.-b.)

3.

Worker Visitation to Children in Out-of-Home Care (IEP citation I.A.5.a.-c.)

4.

Relative Resources (at-risk) (IEP citation I.B.7.a.)

5.

Relative Resources (removal) (IEP citation I.B.7.b.)

6.

Placement of Children in Most Family-Like Setting (IEP citation I.B.8.a.)

7.

Placement of Young Children (under 12) (IEP citation I.B.9.a.)

8.

Placement of Young Children (under 6) (IEP citation I.B.9.b.)

9.

Appropriate Permanency Goals (ASFA) (IEP citation I.B.12.a.)

10.

Appropriate Permanency Goals (APPLA) (IEP citation I.B.12.b.)

11.

Appropriate Permanency Goals (YTP) (IEP citation I.B.12.c.)

12.

Legal Action to Free Children for Adoption (IEP citation I.B.15.a.-b.)

13.

Timely Adoption (in approved placement within 9 months) (IEP citation

I.B.16.a.i.)

14.

Timely Adoption (finalization in 12 months) (IEP citation I.B.16.b.iii.)

15.

Placement Licensing (IEP citation I.B.18.)

16.

Sibling Placement and Visits (placement) (IEP citation I.C.20.a.)

17.

Sibling Placement and Visits (visits monthly and bi-monthly) (IEP citation

I.C.20.b.)

18.

Health and Dental Care (preplacement and replacement screenings) (IEP citation

I.C.22.a.)

19.

Health and Dental Care (full medical evaluation) (IEP citation I.C.22.b.i.)

20.

Health and Dental Care (QSR) (IEP citation I.C.22.c.)

21.

Supervisory Responsibilities (IEP citation I.D.26.a. & b.i.-ii.)

22.

Training for New Social Workers (IEP citation I.D.27.a.)

23.

Training for Previously Hired Social Workers (IEP citation I.D.28.a.)

24.

Training for Previously Hired Supervisors and Administrators (IEP citation

1 LaShawn A. v. Fenty et al., Implementation and Exit Plan (“IEP”) dated December 17, 2010. 3

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 5 of 19

I.D.28.b.)

25.

Training for Foster Parents (pre-service) (IEP citation I.D.29.a.)

26.

Special Corrective Action (IEP citation I.D.30.)

27.

Performance-Based Contracting (IEP citation I.D.31.)

28.

Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) (IEP citation I.D.32.)

29.

Licensing Regulations (IEP citation I.D.33.)

30.

Budget and Staffing Adequacy (IEP citation I.D.34.)

31.

Federal Revenue Maximization (IEP citation I.D.35.)

32.

Entering Reports Into Computerized System (IEP citation II.A.1.)

33.

Maintaining 24 Hour Response System (IEP citation II.A.2.)

34.

Checking for Prior Reports (IEP citation II.A.3.)

35.

Reviewing Child Fatalities (IEP citation II.A.4.)

36.

Investigations of Abuse and Neglect in Foster Homes and Institutions (IEP

citation II.A.5.)

37.

Policies for General Assistance Payments (IEP citation II.B.6.)

38.

Use of General Assistance Payments (IEP citation II.B.7.)

39.

Timely Approval of Foster/Adoptive Parents (IEP citation II.B.9.)

40.

Placement within 100 Miles of the District (IEP citation II.B.10.)

41.

Licensing and Placement Standards (IEP citation II.B.11.)

42.

Case Planning Process (IEP citation II.B.12.)

43.

Appropriate Permanency Goals (IEP citation II.B.13.)

44.

Post-Adoption Services Notification (IEP citation II.B.15.)

45.

Family Court Reviews (IEP citation II.D.16.)

46.

Permanency Hearings (within 14 days) (IEP citation II.D.17.)

47.

Use of MSWs and BSWs (IEP citation II.E.18.)

48.

Social Work Licensure (IEP citation II.E.19.)

49.

Training for Adoptive Parents (IEP citation II.F.20.)

50.

Foster Parent Licensure (IEP citation II.G.22.)

51.

Quality Assurance (IEP citation II.G.23.)

52.

Maintaining Computerized System (IEP citation II.H.24.)

53.

Contracts to Require the Acceptance of Children Referred (IEP citation II.H.25.)

54.

Provider Payments (IEP citation II.H.26.)

55.

Foster Parent Board Rates (IEP citation II.H.27.)

56.

Post-Adoption Services (IEP citation II.H.28.)

4

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 6 of 19
SECTION II: OUTCOMES TO BE ACHIEVED
1. INVESTIGATIONS – TIMELY INITIATIONS2
Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be initiated or documented good faith efforts shall be made to initiate investigations within 48 hours after receipt of a report to the hotline of child maltreatment.3
Exit Standard: 95% of all investigations will be initiated within 48 hours or there will be documented good faith efforts to initiate investigations whenever the alleged victim child(ren) cannot be immediately located.
2. INVESTIGATIONS (TIMELY CLOSURES)4
Investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect shall be completed within 30 days after receipt of a report to the hotline of child maltreatment and the final report of findings for each investigation shall be completed within 5 days of the completion of the investigation.5
Exit Standard: 90% of investigations will be completed and a final report of findings shall be entered in FACES within 35 days.
3. ACCEPTABLE INVESTIGATIONS6
CFSA shall routinely conduct investigations of alleged child abuse and neglect. Evidence
2 IEP citation I.A.1.a.; MFO II(G), X(D)(1)(a); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04(b), 4‐1301.04(c)(3)(A), 4‐1301.06(a) & (c)(1); CFSA Hotline Policy, Child Protective Services (revised 08/29/12); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15). 3 The 48-hour time period is consistent with local law (D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04(a), (b) & (c)). Initiation of an investigation includes seeing all alleged victim child(ren) and talking with the child(ren) outside the presence of the caretaker. When the alleged victim child(ren) is not immediately located, documented good faith efforts to see the child within the first 48 hours shall satisfy this requirement if they include: 1) visiting the child’s home at different times of the day; 2) visiting the child’s school and/or day care in an attempt to locate the child if known; 3) contacting the reporter, if known, to elicit additional information about the child’s location; 4) reviewing the CFSA information system and other information systems (e.g., ACEDS, STARS) for additional information about the child and family; and 5) contacting the police for all allegations that a child(ren)’s safety or health is in immediate danger. 4 IEP citation I.A.1.b.; MFO II(G), X(D)(1)(a); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04(b), 4‐1301.04(c)(3)(A), 4‐1301.06(a) & (c)(1); CFSA Hotline Policy, Child Protective Services (revised 08/29/12); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15). 5 The Court Monitor shall measure compliance with this requirement by validating FACES data regarding the percentage of all final reports of findings from investigations that were completed within 35 days after receipt of a report of child maltreatment. 6 IEP citation I.A.2.; see generally MFO II(H) and (J‐K); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.04, 4‐1301.06 (b)(3)(B‐D), 41303.01a(3A); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15).
5

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 7 of 19
of acceptable investigations include: a. Use of CFSA’s screening tool in prioritizing response times for initiating
investigations; b. Interviews with and information obtained from the five core contacts – the victim
child(ren), the maltreater, the reporting source (when known), medical resources, and educational resources (for school-aged children); c. Interviews with collateral contacts that are likely to provide information about the child’s safety and well-being; d. Interviews with all children in the household outside the presence of the caretaker, parents or caregivers, or documentation, by the worker, of good-faith efforts to see the child and that the worker has been unable to locate the child; e. Medical and mental health evaluations of the children or parents when the worker determines that such evaluations are needed to complete the investigation, except where a parent refuses to consent to such evaluations. When a parent refuses to consent to such an evaluation, the investigative social worker and supervisor shall consult with the Assistant Attorney General to determine whether court intervention is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the child(ren); f. Use of risk assessment protocol in making decisions resulting from an investigation; and g. Initiation of services during the investigation to prevent unnecessary removal of children from their homes.
Exit Standard: 80% of investigations will be of acceptable quality as measured by a qualitative review and verified by the Monitor.
4. SERVICES TO FAMILIES AND CHILDREN TO PROMOTE SAFETY, PERMANENCY AND WELL-BEING7
Appropriate services, including all services identified in a child or family’s safety plan or case plan, shall be offered and children/families shall be assisted to use services to support child and safety, permanence and well-being.
CFSA shall provide for or arrange for services through operational commitments from District of Columbia public agencies and/or contracts with private providers. Services shall include:
a. Services to enable children who have been the subject of an abuse/neglect report to avoid placement and to remain safely in their own homes;
b. Services to enable children who have or will be returned from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those families and avoid replacement into foster care;
c. Services to avoid disruption of an adoptive placement that has not been finalized and avoid the need for replacement; and
7 IEP citation I.A.3.; see generally MFO III(B); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.09(b), 4‐1303.01a(b)(7, 9, 10), 4‐1303.03(a)(3, 7, 13, 14), 4‐1303.03(b)(1‐4), (9) & (9A); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15); Family Team Meetings Policy (revised 04/04/13) and the Out‐of‐Home Practice Model (July 2009).
6

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 8 of 19
d. Services to prevent the disruption of a beneficial foster care placement and avoid the need for replacement.
Exit Standard: 80% of cases in the QSR sample will have an acceptable rating on the Supports and Services Indicator.
5. ASSESSING SAFETY DURING WORKER VISITATION TO FAMILIES WITH INHOME SERVICES8
Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this family to the attention of the Agency) of each child.
Exit Standard: 80% of the in-home sample will have an acceptable rating on two QSR indicators: Child Safety9 and Planning Interventions: Safety & Protection.10
6. ASSESSING SAFETY DURING WORKER VISITATION TO CHILDREN IN OUTOF-HOME CARE11
Workers are responsible for assessing and documenting the safety (e.g., health, educational and environmental factors and the initial safety concerns that brought this child to the attention of the Agency) of each child.
Exit Standard: 80% of the out-of-home sample will have an acceptable rating on two QSR indicators: Child Safety12 the QSR Planning Interventions: Safety/Protection.13
7. VISITATION FOR CHILDREN EXPERIENCING A NEW PLACEMENT OR A PLACEMENT CHANGE14
a. A CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with case management responsibility shall make at least two visits to each child during the first four weeks
8 IEP citation I.A.4.c. 9 The Safety indicator is a Child and Family Status Indicator within the QSR protocol. Safety will be considered “acceptable” when all sub-parts: home, school, community, and other are considered to be acceptable. 10 The Planning Intervention sub-part Safety and Protection indicator is a Practice Performance Indicator within the QSR protocol. 11 IEP citation I.A.5.d. 12 The Safety indicator is a Child and Family Status Indicator within the QSR protocol. Safety will be considered “acceptable” when all sub-parts: home, school, community, and other are considered to be acceptable 13 The Planning Intervention sub-part Safety and Protection indicator is a Practice Performance Indicator within the QSR protocol. 14 IEP citation I.A.6.a-d.; see generally MFO IX(A‐B); D.C. Code § 4‐1405(b); 29 DCMR § 6003.2(b); CFSA Visitation Policy (revised 08/11/11); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Visitation (July 2009).
7

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 9 of 19
of a new placement or a placement change. b. A CFSA social worker, private agency social worker, family support worker or nurse
care manager shall make two additional visits to each child during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change. c. At least one of the above visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall be in the child’s home. d. At least one of the visits during the first four weeks of a new placement or a placement change shall include a conversation between the social worker and the resource parent to assess assistance needed by the resource parent from the agency.
Exit Standard: 90% of children newly placed in foster care or experiencing a placement change will have four visits in the first four weeks of a new placement or placement change as described above.
8. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MOST FAMILY-LIKE SETTING15
No child shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
Exit Standard: No child shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or temporary foster home for more than 30 days.16
9. VISITS BETWEEN PARENTS AND WORKERS17
a. For children with a permanency goal of reunification, in accordance with the case plan, the CFSA social worker or private agency social worker with casemanagement responsibility shall visit with the parent(s) at least one time per month in the first three months post-placement.18
b. A CFSA social worker, nurse care manager or family support worker shall make a second visit during each month for the first three months post-placement.19
15 IEP citation I.B.8.b.; MFO VI(A)(1, 5); D.C. Code § 4‐1301.09(d)(1); 29 DCMR § 6256.4; CFSA Policy; CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009); Family Team Meeting Policy (revised 04/04/13); Notice of Removal to Adult Relatives of Children and Youth Entering Foster Care administrative issuance (December 2, 2009); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15). 16 Based on individual review, the Monitor’s assessment will exclude, on a case‐by‐case basis, children placed in an emergency, short‐term, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days where moving them would not be in their best interests. 17 MFO VII(B)(6); Visitation Policy (revised 08/29/11); CFSA Out-of-Home Practice Model, Visitation (2009); Engaging Incarcerated Parents Policy (December 1, 2009); Elements of Good Documentation Tip-Sheet (November, 2009). 18 This exit standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency. 19 This exit standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency.
8

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 10 of 19
Exit Standard: 80% of parents will have twice monthly visitation with workers in the first three months post-placement as defined above.20
10. VISITS BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN21
There shall be weekly visits between parents and children with a goal of reunification unless clinically inappropriate and approved by the Family Court. In cases in which visitation does not occur, the Agency shall demonstrate and there shall be documentation in the case record that visitation was not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it.
Exit Standard: 85% of children with the goal of reunification will have weekly visitation with the parent with whom reunification is sought.22
11. REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE PLACEMENTS FOR CHILDREN IN CARE23
Exit Standard:
a. Of all children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care at least 8 days and less than 12 months, 83% shall have had two or fewer placements.
b. Of all children served in foster case during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 12 months but less than 24 months, 60% shall have had two or fewer placements.
c. Of all children served in foster care during the previous 12 months who were in care for at least 24 months, 75% shall have two or fewer placements in that 12-month period.
12. TIMELY APPROVAL OF FOSTER/ADOPTIVE PARENTS24
CFSA shall have in place a process for recruiting, studying and approving families, including relative caregivers, interested in becoming foster or adoptive parents that results in the necessary training, home studies and decisions on approval being completed within 150 days of beginning training.
20 This exit standard is also satisfied when there is documentation that the parent(s) is(are) unavailable or refuses to cooperate with the Agency. 21 IEP citation I.B.11.; MFO VII(B)(7); D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(5); Visitation Policy (revised 08/29/11); Engaging Incarcerated Parents Policy (12/01/09); Elements of Good Documentation Tip‐Sheet (November 2009); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Visitation (July 2009). 22 This exit standard is also satisfied in cases where it is documented that a visit is not in the child’s best interest, is clinically inappropriate or did not occur despite efforts by the Agency to facilitate it. 23 IEP citation I.B.13; See generally MFO VI(A) and VI(B); CFSA Family Team Meetings (FTM) Policy (revised 04/04/13); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009). 24 IEP citation I.B.14.; see generally MFO XV(E); no timeframes specified in D.C. Code, see generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(4)(C); 29 DCMR §§ 6028.4 & 6028.5.
9

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 11 of 19
Exit Standard: 70% of homes licensed beginning April 1, 2019, will have been approved, and interested parties will have been notified within 150 days.25
13. TIMELY ADOPTION26
Timely permanency through reunification adoption or legal guardianship
Exit Standard:
a. Of all children who entered foster care for the first time in FY 2018 and who remain in foster care for 8 days or longer, 45% will achieve permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non-relative guardianship) by September 30, 2019.
b. Of all children who are in foster care for more than 12 but less than 25 months on September 30, 2018, 45% will be discharged from foster care to permanency (reunification, kinship guardianship, adoption or non- relative guardianship) by September 30, 2019.
c. Of all children who are in foster care for 25 months or longer on September 30, 2018, 40% will be discharged through reunification, adoption, legal guardianship prior to their 21st birthday or by September 30, 2019, whichever is earlier.
d. The above standards (i, ii, and iii) will continue for each year for as long as this agreement is in effect.
14. CASE PLANNING PROCESS27
a. CFSA, with the family, shall develop timely, comprehensive and appropriate case plans in compliance with District law requirements and permanency timeframes, which reflect family and children’s needs, are updated as family circumstances or needs change, and CFSA shall deliver services reflected in the current case plan.
b. Every reasonable effort shall be made to locate family members and to develop case plans in partnership with youth and families, the families’ informal support networks, and other formal resources working with or needed by the youth and/or family
c. Case plans shall identify specific services, supports and timetables of providing services needed by children and families to achieve identified goals.
Exit Standard: 80% of cases will achieve an acceptable rating on the Quality Service
25 The exit standard is satisfied where there is documentation that establishes that failure to meet the 150 day timeline is due to delays that are beyond the control of the District of Columbia. 26 IEP citation I.B.16.c; MFO VIII(D)(1) and (D)(2)(d);), 4‐1303.01a(b)(11). 27 IEP citation I.B.17.; MFO VII; D.C. Code §§ 4‐1301.02(3), 4‐1301.09(b); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Case Planning (revised July 2009); CFSA Diligent Search Policy (revised 07/10/14).
10

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 12 of 19
Reviews (QSR) Planning Intervention Indicator.28
15. COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE REFERRALS FOR LOW & MODERATE RISK FAMILIES29
Exit Standard: 90% of families who have been the subject of a report of abuse and/or neglect, whose circumstances are deemed to place a child in their care at low or moderate risk of abuse and neglect and who are in need of and agree to additional supports shall be referred to an appropriate Collaborative or community agency for follow-up.30
16. ASSESSMENTS FOR CHILDREN EXPERIENCING A PLACEMENT DISRUPTION31
CFSA shall ensure that children in its custody whose placements are disrupted are provided with a comprehensive and appropriate assessment and follow-up action plans to determine their service and re-placement needs no later than within 30 days of replacement. A comprehensive assessment is a review, including as applicable the child, his/her family, kin, current and former caregiver and the GAL, to assess the child’s current medical, social, behavioral, educational and dental needs to determine the additional evaluations/services/supports that are required to prevent future placement disruptions.
Exit Standard: 90% of children experiencing a placement disruption will have a comprehensive assessment as described above and an action plan to promote stability developed.
17. HEALTH AND DENTAL CARE (FULL DENTAL EVALUATION)32
Children in foster care shall receive a full medical and dental evaluation within 30 days of placement.
Exit Standard: 25% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 30 days of placement. 50% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 60 days of
28 The Monitor will determine performance based on the QSR Planning Intervention Indicator. This composite indicator will be considered to be “acceptable” when the sub-part Safety & Protection is rated acceptable, the subpart Permanency is rated acceptable, and the majority of the sub-parts are rated acceptable. The District will conduct 140 QSRs annually to determine if practice is acceptable. 29 IEP citation I.C.19.; see generally MFO XV(A)(2); D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.03(a‐1)(3), (3A)(A), 4-1303.03a(a). 30 Low and moderate risk cases for which CFSA decides to open an ongoing CFSA case are excluded from this requirement. 31 IEP citation I.C.21.; MFO III(B)(3‐4), VI(C)(3). 32 IEP citation I.C.22.b.ii.; MFO VI(C)(1); see generally D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.03(a)(3), 4‐1303.03(d); CFSA Out‐ of‐Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15).
11

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 13 of 19
placement. 85% of children shall receive a full dental evaluation within 90 days of placement.
18. HEALTH AND DENTAL CARE (MEDICAID NUMBER AND CARD)33
CFSA shall ensure the prompt completion and submission of appropriate health insurance paperwork, and shall keep records of, e.g., Medicaid application dates, HMO severance dates, and enrollment dates. CFSA shall provide caregivers with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of every placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.
Exit Standard: 90% of children’s caregivers shall be provided with documentation of Medicaid coverage within 5 days of placement and Medicaid cards within 45 days of placement.
19. CASELOADS34
a. The caseload of each worker35 conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed the MFO standard, which is 1:12 investigations.
b. The caseload of each worker providing services to children and families in which the child or children in the family are living in their home shall not exceed 1:15 families.
c. The caseload of each worker providing services to children in placement, including children in Emergency Care and children in any other form of CFSA physical custody, shall not exceed 1:15 children for children in foster care.
d. The caseload of each worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases.
e. There shall be no cases unassigned to a social worker for more than five business days, in which case, the supervisor shall provide coverage but not for more than five business days.
f. The above standards (a-e) will continue to be monitored as long as this decree is in effect.
Exit Standard: 90% of investigators and social workers will have caseloads that meet the above caseload requirements. No individual investigator shall have a caseload greater than 15 cases. No individual social worker shall have a caseload greater than 18
33 IEP citation I.C.22.d.; MFO VI(C)(1); see generally D.C. Code §§ 4‐1303.03(a)(3), 4‐1303.03(d); CFSA Out‐of‐ Home Practice Model, Placement (July 2009); Investigations Policy (revised 01/16/15). 34 IEP citation I.D.25.; MFO XI(A, F); the D.C. Code does not mandate a staff ratio, see generally D.C. Code §§ 4‐ 1303.02a(d), 4‐1303.02a(e). 35 All requirements apply to both CFSA workers and private agency workers. All CFSA contracts with private agencies providing foster care services shall include performance expectations for visitation of children in foster care in compliance with MFO visitation requirements.
12

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 14 of 19
cases. No individual worker conducting home studies shall have a caseload greater than 35 cases. 20. TRAINING FOR NEW SOCIAL WORKERS AND SUPERVISORS36 a. New direct service staff37 shall receive the required 80 hours of pre-service training
through a combination of classroom, web-based and/or on-the-job training.
Exit Standard: 90% of newly hired CFSA and private agency direct service staff shall receive 80 hours of pre-service training.
b. New supervisors shall complete a minimum of 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare workers within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility.
Exit Standard: 90% of newly hired CFSA and private agency supervisors shall complete 40 hours of pre-service training on supervision of child welfare worker within eight months of assuming supervisory responsibility. 21. TRAINING FOR FOSTER PARENTS38 CFSA and contract agency foster parents shall receive 30 hours of in-service training every two years.
Exit Standard: 95% of foster parents whose licenses are renewed shall receive 30 hours of in-service training. 22. PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MOST FAMILY LIKE SETTING39 No child shall stay overnight in the CFSA Intake Center or office building. Exit Standard: Ongoing Compliance
36 IEP citation I.D.27.b.; MFO XIV(D); see generally D.C. Code § 4‐1303.02a(e); CFSA Out‐of‐Home Practice Model, Training (July 2009). 37 Direct service staff includes social workers, nurse care managers, and family supports workers who provide direct services to children, youth and families. 38 IEP citation I.D.29.b.; MFO XIV(F);29 DCMR 6026. 39 IEP citation II.B.8.; Family Team Meeting Policy (revised 04/04/13).
13

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 15 of 19 23. TIMELY ADOPTION40
Within 95 days of a child’s permanency goal becoming adoption, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning team to develop a child-specific recruitment plan which may include contracting with a private adoption agency for those children without an adoptive resource. Exit Standard: For 90% of children whose permanency goal becomes adoption, CFSA shall convene a permanency planning team to develop a child-specific recruitment plan which may include contracting with a private adoption agency for those children without an adoptive resource.
40 IEP citation II.B.14.; MFO VIII(D)(1), (2)(d); IP VIII(1‐2). 14

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 16 of 19
SECTION III: SELF-REGULATION AND PUBLIC REPORTING COMMITMENTS
I. Policy: CFSA will continue to create and update policies to reflect changes in practice. By December 31, 2019, CFSA will finalize the following new or updated policies:
x In-Home Services x Safety Planning x Investigations x Hotline x Family Team Meeting x Engaging Incarcerated Parents x Child Fatality Review x Placement and Matching x Permanency
a. Policy Development – CFSA Policy will continue to be developed through requests from the Director, program area deputy, new federal guidance or local legislation requiring a policy change, or when the agency determines that a policy requires an update following a biannual review or when a significant practice change requires staff guidance.
b. Policy Dissemination – Any new or updated policies will be available on the online policy manual accessible through the CFSA website and CFSA intranet within 30 days of the policy finalization. New and updated policies will be disseminated through the quarterly CFSA Policy Press E-newsletter and CFSA Policy Press ENewsletter Special Editions as needed. Other dissemination possibilities include internal management team meeting presentations, individual administration-wide presentations, inclusion in pre- service and in-service social worker and foster parent training, and at external committee meetings.
c. Policy Training – When CFSA determines training is required for a new or updated policy, the training will commence within 45 days of the policy finalization.
II. Continuous Quality Improvement: CFSA will continue to enhance and strengthen its continuous quality improvement (CQI) system and use the information to self- regulate, evaluate and adjust practice and policy decisions to meet performance outcomes. CFSA will use qualitative and quantitative data including stakeholder feedback and frequent monitoring of the volume of work, process and quality of care, and performance outcomes. CFSA will create a public reporting process by December 31, 2019, and post quarterly and annual reports on the CFSA website.
15

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 17 of 19 III. Public Reporting: The District will produce the following annual reports and will make the reports publicly available within 30 days of finalization:
a. Needs Assessment and Resource Development Plan 41 b. Financial Support for Community-Based Services42 IV. CFSA will continue to do QSR reviews for at least two years after it exits from court jurisdiction. It will make the results of those reviews available to the public within 60 days of finalization.
41 IEP citation II.G.21. 42 IEP citation I.D.24.
16

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 18 of 19
SECTION IV: PLACEMENT ARRAY COMMITMENTS
Defendants commit to improve and expand available placements. In addition to the commitments memorialized below, Defendants agree to continually reassess their array and ensure that it has sufficient placements to appropriately match all children in its care with appropriate, stable caretakers. No child shall remain in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or temporary foster home for more than 30 days. Defendants will continue to immediately report to the Monitor if a child spends the night in the CFSA office, and provide the Monitor with monthly data regarding the number of children who have spent more than 30 days in an emergency, short-term or shelter facility or temporary foster home. Defendants make the following commitments to improve and expand its Placement Array:
1. Recruit and license Stabilization Observation Assessment Respite (SOAR) Foster Parents for a total of four beds that will be available for placement by December 10, 2019.
2. Issue Request for Proposal (RFP) and contract for Intensive Foster Care beds by December 31, 2019 for 36 children. Placements will be available by January 31, 2020.
3. Secure six Congregate Care beds for children with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Placements will be available by December 10, 2019.
4. Secure six Behavioral/Therapeutic Congregate Care beds for children. Placements will be available by December 10, 2019.
5. Recruit and license 50 new family foster beds with necessary supportive services with a net increase of at least 25 family foster beds. Placements will be available by January 31, 2020.
17

Case 1:89-cv-01754-TFH Document 1201-2 Filed 08/29/19 Page 19 of 19
SECTION V: SUSTAINABILITY AND EXIT
Defendants shall continue to provide to the Court Monitor all information necessary to assess performance on the “Outcomes to be Achieved” (Section II) and the Placement Array Commitments (Section IV), until this matter is dismissed. The Court Monitor shall review and validate monthly data and report to the Court, providing a full report on the status of Defendants’ performance on each of the Outcomes to be Achieved Exit Standards in the Exit and Sustainability Plan. The Court Monitor shall continue to participate in internal Child Fatality Review Committee meetings and remain a member of the City-wide Child Fatality Review Committee for the duration of this Court Order. Notwithstanding the above, Defendants may seek to exit court supervision when (a) the Court Monitor reports that Defendants have achieved all of the “Outcomes to be Achieved” Exit Standards and maintained each of the “Outcomes to be Achieved” for at least two consecutive sixmonth reporting periods; (b) Defendants petition the Court for an Order of Dismissal and demonstrate, based on the Court Monitor’s reports, substantial compliance with the outcomes and Exit Standards and the Court finds, after hearing the views of the Court Monitor and the Plaintiffs, that the case should be dismissed in the interests of justice; or (c) as the Court may otherwise direct. In assessing compliance with this Exit and Sustainability Plan, the Court will consider sustainability in light of how closely Defendants met the Exit Standards as well as how consistently the Exit Standards are met over time. A “miss” by 5% or less on certain measures will not necessarily foreclose a demonstration of durable compliance, but neither shall a superior performance on one measure necessarily provide a basis for forgiving a shortfall on another. A substantial compliance argument must be assessed on the totality of the circumstances. If Defendants seek to petition the Court for an Order of Dismissal on the grounds of substantial compliance, Defendants shall first inform the Court Monitor and Plaintiffs and engage in good faith efforts to determine whether there is any opposition to the relief sought and, if necessary, to engage in dispute resolution for a period not to exceed 45 business days in an attempt to resolve disagreements.
18

 
 - 201 -

-.J..... 11 . c::oJ-

LASHAWN A v. DIXON
MODIFIED FINAL ORDER
November 18, 1993

- 202-
Table of Content.
I. Named Pla.lntlffl ......................................................... 1
II. Protectivi SW'YIcel ........•.........•.............•...................... 1 ~ 24 hour .ysatm
~ cooff1lnlltiofl with IMtropolltan Police o.pa!fJ'J»nt

~ priority ,.~. . .ystem ~ rl.t u ...ment ~••
~ In...stigation pt'O(*fu,.,
~ proof of sp«:iaJized ,.sourc. people
~ Po!;c. to IICCOtr/pany ...om"
~ FcaJlty RrMYi CommlttH
III. Service. to Children and Famillel ............................................. 6

~ Nrv/ces to pre,.,... family relafJonshlpl

~ reasonable dorts 10 avoid the
nHd for plac.ment

0 intens;"" family urvic.,

,.Mee, 0

to p,....nt di,ruption of adoptive

or foster family ~ment

"Mee' 0 ran~ of community

~.crlb«1

~ intens;"" horr»-Ou«J urvice units

IV. Emergency ea.. ........................................................... 11

o 21 day limlta:Jon
o limited emn'Jon permltr.d o reJatjon to court procHdlng' . V. General Assistance ....•........•.......................................... 12 o not a ,ubstitute for tomr cate
o in...nlOry and assessment tequired

- 203-
LaSh.....", A v. Diron Modified Fina! Q:dtr
VI. Placement of Children ...................................................... 14 0 ••st ,.S1ric:tJI4, most family-lib
Hfling. tWquitWd 0 ,.I.rionship with information
'ysMm
0 pla::ing siblIng. ~r
0 pla:»ment wtrh ,.,att-..9.
0 no mo,. than 3 fo,.r child,.n ".r hom. except sibling.
0 group case placements limited tIy
~ and duration 0 boarder babies policies and pf'OC«iure. 0 p~l4cement and placement evaluation.
0 med"lCaIlCfNnlng center 0 placeme"t .uppott ..Mee.
0 over-placements prohibited 0 licen.e. and permits
VII. Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
0 jnJtjai planning process
0 writt&n case plan
0 plWntalln..ol\4ment 0 visltrttion MtwNn worlrer and
parent and child and parent 0 permanency ~s 0 retum home ~ limited to
12 and 18 months 0 ~aI guatfflan.hlp and
limitation. 0 limited UN at corrtJnlJtld
foStlr carw
0 independent living 0 .ub'«luent planning procedU,..,
InchJding timeliness
II

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LaShlfwrl A v. Dixon Modified Fina' Order
VIII. Adoption ..................................................... '.' ...... 29
o proc.du," and titT»liM"
lor frMing • child for adoption
o Corpollltlon Counsel respons/tJillty o m.rraJ and tranmr II:) adoption
branch and ~ plllCe".,.nt
o Individual recruitment rnand~
IX. Supervillon of Placement ................................................... 37
o wor1cer visits with child
o privm ~ncy visitation
responsiOiIm.,
o reportS of child abuse or
n~~ In OlJk)f.hotT» plltCetT»nts
X. Cal. Review System ..................................................... 38
o admlnistnl!iYe ~
o dispositional hHring. o quality assu~ ,.~ws
XI. ClseJoadl ............................................................. 44
0 abuN/n.g1ect In...stigation, limn.d 10 12
0 family NMoN caHload• .., at 17
0 tomr c...... caseJoads maximum of 12 or 20
() adoption caseload maximum set
at 12 or 15
() SUpeM~ prohltJn.<i from carrying caseloltd
0 wor1cload study
iii

- 205-
LaShawn A v. Qiron Modified Fin.' Q:der

XII. Staffing .••.................•......................•••..•.•••......... 47

~ UN..",.nt and planning
XIII. Worittr Qualification. . .................................•..•.............. 47

~ .u;»rvitOl'l muat h6IIe MSW plu.
3~.xperienc.

XIV. Training ............................................... : ............... 48

o comprehensive child welfare training
program

omc. ~ training

,.quir.d

~ .upervisory training

~ fostlr parent training
o MiOpIive ;.ar.nt training o JudicW training
XV. Resource Development OffIce ........... : .................................. 53 o ne«f UHSSm.nt and resou~
dewlopment
o Resouree O'...lopment Pian
o commun~ HMeeS

~ fostlr fIorM tDt.

~ licenaing and moniforlng ~ foster ~ sr:andartfs
o relarM fostIr homes

- 206 -
La$hawrr A v. Diron Modified Fina' Qrder
XVI. Contract R.view ................................................ . . . . . . . . 63
XVII. Information System ..................................................... 64
o· unltaty computerl~ infof7Ntjon
~m requif'lld
o ..omr and .upervisory ,.ports o non<ompii~ ,.porta XVIII. Financial Development .................................................... 73
() maximi:. FFP (F«ieraJ FinlJllcW Participation) () main"n~ of effort
XIX. Special Correctlv, Action ................................................. 74 () emerpency c::ar. mo,. than 90
days and B other .peci.J cm.gor». o.iln..r.d
XX. Monitoring and Implementation ........................................... 75 XXI. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 XXII. Reservation of Defendant,' Appeal Rights ................................... 84
v

- 207-
LaShrNn A V. OillO" Modifi.cf Final Q:der
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
LaSH,6.WN A v. DIXON MODIFIED ANAL ORDER
I. NAMED PLAINTIFFS
A.. The Commissioner of the Commission on Social Services shall
monitor the work of the Child and Family Services Division
(CFSD) to assure that continual and steady progress toward permanency is maintained with regard to the named plaintiffs.
B. The Commissioner of the Commission on Social Services shall ensure that all plans are implemented and that all necessary services are provided.
C. Plaintiffs and defendants shall attempt to agree on necessary services and plans for the named plaintiffs. If the parties are unable to agree on necessary services and plans for the named plaintiffs. they shall select an independent expert to oversee the cases of the named plaintiffs. Such expert shall have decision-making authority with regard to necessary services and plans. Failure to implement the experts decisions shall be a violation of this Order.
D. The Commissioner of the Commission on Social Services shall ensure that plaintiffs' counsel receive quarterly reports concerning the childrens status. services that have been provided. and implementation of plans for the named plaintiffs. Complete copies' of all updated entries and new documents added to the childrens records shall be provided
to plaintiffs' counsel f!Nery 30 days.
E. The proviSions of this section of the Order shall go into effect immediately.
II. PROTECTIVE SERVICES
A. The Department of Human Services shall establish. staff and maintain a 24 hour system for receiving and responding to reports of child neglect and abuse which conforms with reasonable profeSSional standards.
1

- 208-
".Sh.""" Av. piltOn Modified Fina' Order
B. In conjunction with the Metropolitan Police Department. the Department shall develop and implement written policies and procedures for the cooperative screening and investigation of· complaints of alleged child abuse; these policies and procedures shall remain in effect for as long as. the
Metropolitan Police Department retains arT-J responsibility for
such complaints. M. a minimum. these pOlicies and procedures shall require the following:
1. The Department shall be notified of all reports of abuse received by the Metropolitan Police Depar:tment.
2. A Department social worker shall accompany the Metropolitan Police Department official or employee in the investigation of all abuse complaints.
3. All requirements of this Order concerning the provision of services and the use of the risk assessment policy
and form shall apply to arT'/ reports originating with the
Metropolitan Police Department as well as all other reports covered by this Order.
C. All reports of abuse/neglect shall be entered immediately into the Department's unitary computer information system and an investigating worker or supervisor reviewing the report shall use the information system to determine whether there have been prior reports of abuse/neglect in that family or to that child. This information shall immediately be available to the worker to whom the case has been assigned.
D. The Department shall develop poliCies and procedures to screen complaints of abuse and neglect to determine whether these complaints of abuse/neglect are within the definitions of abuse/neglect contained in District law. The Department shall also screen out all those reports that are not and make general referrals and provide information for those referrals not within the legal definition.
2

- 209-
LaShawn A v. DillO" Modifi&d Final Qrder
E. The Department shall develop policies and procedures for prioritizing response times to each report.
F. Time periods for initiating investigations of all reports of abuse or neglect shall range from immediately to within 48 hours.
G. All reports of abuse and/or neglect must be initiated within 48 hours and the investigation completed within 30 days:
1. A report shall not be deemed initiated unless the worker has seen the child and talked with the child out of the presence of caretakers alleged to have abused or neglected the child; or
2. The worker has made documented. good faith efforts to see the child but has been unable to locate the child.
H. The Department shall develop pOlicies and procedures to conduct risk assessment and to assure that child protective services investigations and decisions are based on a full and systematic analysis of a familys situation and the factors placing a child at risk and to guide decision- making concerning:
1. Whether abuse/neglect has occurred;
2. Whether the provision of services will enable the child and/or other children to remain safely in the home and, if so, what services should be provided. However, the lack of services necessary to enable the child to remain in the home shall be documented in writing, where such services are necessary but unavailable;
3. Whether the child and/or children are in danger and . must be removed from the home.
3

- 210 -

LASh,.." A v. Oim" !.4osfifi~ Final C):dtr

I.

In developing the risk assessment process, the Department

shall consult with other District departments for the purpose

of ensuring that, to the extent possible, the Departments risk

assessment is compatible with or complementary to the risk

assessment or famity and child assessment instruments used

by those departments. The intent is to minimize the duplica-

tive and contradictory assessments that might otherwise be

conducted when a child or family is served by more than one

department

J. The Department shall develop poliCies and procedures to
determine which children (who are the subject of abuse/neglect reports, or other children in the household) should receive a complete medical, psychological or psychiatric evaluation as part of the investigation:

1. All children for whom such evaluations are necessary. as defined in this policy, shall. receive the required evaluations during the investigation process and prior to the time the investigation is completed; and

2. All children for whom a report of neglect or abuse has been supported, who have not otherwise received a medical examination during the investigation. shall receive a complete medical evaluation no later than· 48 hours after the report has been supported. except in those instances in which it is documented in the case record that the child has recently received a comprehensive medical examination within the time period recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics guidelines for children of the childs particular age.

K The Department shall develop policies and procedures for the reporting. investigation. and determination of reports of neglect/abuse Oncluding specifications of what information must be included), in a final determination of whether abuse/neglect has occurred. All such determinations must be

4

- 211 -
LaSh".,.,." A v. 0;110" Modified Final Q:d~r
recorded on a standardized form.
L The Department shall establish and fund a pool of specialized resource people, including but not limited to, psychiatrists, psychologists, and physicians:
1. The resource pool shall be available by telephone and/or in person on an emergency basis to consult with workers and supervisors concerning the investigation and determination of complaints of child abuse or neglect;
2. The availability and use of this resource pool shall be made known in writing to workers and supervisors and included in the pre-service training; and
3. Where resources are provided within the Department, such pool should be governed by written agreements and their job descriptions shall include their functions as part of resource pool.
M. The Department shall develop policies and procedures, in conjunction with the Police Department, to ensure workers receive immediate ·access to pOlice protection in appropriate circumstances. The Metropolitan Police Department shall accompany Department workers on the investigation of all complaints for which the Department deems police protection to be necessary, subject to the jointly developed procedures
. described above.
N. The defendants shall establish and maintain a Fatality Review Committee:
1. The Fatality Review Committee (Committee) shall include, but not be limited to, the Administrator of the Family Services Administration; the Chief of the Child and Family Services Division; and four persons not employed by the District of Columbia, one of whom will
5

- 212 -
LaS"~ A v, DillOn Modihd Fln'a! Order
be selected tit the plaintiffs, one of whom will be
selected by the defendants, and the third and fourth of
whom will be selected by the first two. The committee
members shall select one of the members not
employed tit the Department to chair the committee;·
2. In arTf instance in which a child in the plaintiff class
dies under arrt circumstances, the Department shall
provide the Committee with complete access to all DHS records and workers relating to or invvfved with the child and his or her family;
3. The Committee shall have access to the Quality Assurance staff of this Order to assist in ar7i record revi~ if the Committee deems such access appropriate;
4: M the end of each District of Columbia Fiscal Year, the Committee shall issue a formal report reviewing all fatalities of members of the plaintiff class during the year and make recommendations concerning appropriate corrective action to be taken by the defendants to avert Mure fatalities;
5. The Department shall implement all such recommendations of the Committee; and
6. The annual Committee report shall be a public document and shall not contain any child or family identifiable information.
III. SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
A. The Department shall develop poliCies and procedures for determining and ensuring that families are referred to and receive the intensity and level of services necessary to preserve family relationships, to prevent additional abuse/neglect, to promote better parental care, and to assure
6

- 213 -
LAS/!fw!? .. v. 01110" Modified Final Order
good care for the child.
8. The Department shall provide services in the follO'Ning manner:
1.· To enable children who have been the subject of an
abuse/neglect report to remain safety in their own
homes;
a. For all families who have been the subject of a report of neglect/abuse that has not been founded, service needs, if any, shall be identified, the family shall be referred to an appropriate agency, and services shall be provided wherever possible.
b. For all families who have been the subject of a report of neglect/abuse that has been founded and the determination has been made that the child can' safely remain at home based on a child and family risk assessment, the family shall receive appropriate services based on their needs.
c. For all families who have been the subject of a report of neglect/abuse that has been founded and for whom the determination has been made that the child is likely to be placed in foster care:
(1) The worker must make and document reasonable efforts to avoid the need for placement t:J.f conSidering a range of services to keep the child safety at home and providing those services that would enable the child to remain at home;
(2) The worker must make a determination that it would not be possible to maintain
7

- 214-
LaShllWf! A V. OillO" Modified Fina' Order
the child safely at home with the provision of services; and
(3) The worker must consider intensive family services as part of this determination.
2. To enable children who have been retumed from foster care to parents or relatives to remain with those family members and avoid replacement in foster care:
a. As part of the process for discharging a child from foster care, the case plan shall be reviewed and revised to determine those services necessary to support the child and the family when the child is returned and to avoid the need for replacement in foster care; and
b.' All services identified in the case plan to avoid the need for replacement in foster care shall be provided.
3. To avoid the disruption of an adoptive placement:
a. In the event that an adoptive placement that has not been finalized is in danger of disrupting and the worker determines that the placement is beneficial to the child, the case plan shall be revi9'N9d and revised to determine those services necessary to support the child and the family and to avoid the need for replacement; and
b. All services necessary to avoid the need for replacement shall be provided.
4. To prevent the disruption of a foster home placement under those circumstances in which the placement is
8

- 215 -
LaSh6Wn A v. OillOfI Modified Fina' Q:der
a long-term placement and the placement is beneficial to the child:
a. In the event that the worker has determined that the placement is beneficial to the child, but is in danger of disrupting, the case plan shall be reviewed and revised to determine those services necessary to support the child and the foster family and to avoid the need for replacement; and
b. All those services necessary to avoid the need for replacement shall be provided.
c. The Department shall develop policies and procedures
specifying the criteria for the provision of family services and for the referral of families to any private agencies with which the Department contracts for such services:
1. The Department shall develop a range of community services available to families; and
2. Reasonable efforts to avoid the need for foster care placement shall be defined as services that cover a range of intensity relating to families' needs, including:
a. Intensive home-based crisis intervention services;
b. Homemaker services Oncluding 24 hour);
c. Parent education/counselling;
d. Mental health services Oncluding day treatment};
e. Substance abuse programs;
f. Housing assistance;
9

- 216 •

Q.!!i

yShltWr1 A v. Qira" Modifi&d Final Order

~

g. Respite care;
h. Day care;
i. Emergency cash assistance;
j. Access to other public benefits;
k. Less intensive family services.
D. Within 240 days of the entry of this Order, the Department shall establish five community based intensive home-based services units with five workers each, who shall have maximum caseloads of 2-4 families, with additional units to be established as determined by the Department and/or under contract by the process described in the section on Resource Development and Contract Review below.
1. The units shall be established according to the following schedule: within 90 days of the entry of this Order. the first unit shall be established; within 150 days the second unit shall be established; within 180 days the third unit shall be established; within 210 days the fourth unit shall be established; and within 240 days the fifth unit shall be established. A unit shall be deemed -established- once it is fully staffed and operational;
2. The Department shall develop policies and procedures for the referral of families to these units; and
3. An evaluation mechanism shall be developed to track, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of all services provided both by DHS and private agencies and the need for arT'f additional resources in avoiding placement and improving the outcome for children and families within twelve months after these services begin operating, and annually thereafter.

10

- 217 -
LaSh!.....,., A v. Di~n Modifi&d Final Order
E. The defendants shall assure that all services described in this section are available, either directly or under contract with private agencies, subject to the processes described in the Resources Development section and the Contract Review section, and subject to the timetables developed in the· Implementation Plan.
IV. EMERGENCY CARE
A. The Department shall develop policies and procedures for the use of Emergency Care, or voluntary placement, including a form for the parents that fully informs parents of the nature and scope of Emergency Care.
B. Emergency Care shall be used only under the following circumstances:
1. Ps soon as a parent requests Emergency Care, the Department shall conduct an assessment of the familys need for services and determine whether the provision of services will avoid the need for Emergency Care placement;
2. The Department shall provide family services to avoid the need for foster care placement, as described in the Services to Families section of this Order, rather than take a child into Emergency Care, wherever appropriate;
3. Emergency Care shall be used only when there is no· other "Im'/ to care for the child due to the short-term incapacity or unavailability of the parent, as more fully set forth in the policies and procedures to be developed pursuant to this Order;
4. A workers decision to accept a child into Emergency Care and to release a child from Emergency Care must be approved in writing by the Chief of CFSD;
11

- 218 -
US"""", A Vo OIltOn ModIfied Final Order
5. Emergency Care shall be limited to 21 days, except when circumstances, expressly documented in the case record, strongly suggest that a child can return home within 21 additional days. In those instances in which Emergency Care is extended to 42 days, the workers Branch Chief must approve the extension in writing. Such ° circumstances include the active involvement of the parent in a drug treatment program exceeding 21 days or other rehabilitative services which require the parent to be in residence. Where such programs permit children to co-reside with the parent, they shall do so.
6. Within 21 days of arTtJ child entering Emergency Care, or 42 days for those children for when Emergency Care has been so extended, the Department shall return the child to the parent or. if grounds exist, the Corporation Counsel shall file appropriate papers with the Superior Court seeking legal custody of the child.
C. ArTtJ parent who has consented to a child being placed in Emergency Care may revoke his or her consent at any time. In those instances in which a parent does revoke consent, the Department shall retum the child to the parent if such is appropriate. If returning the child to the parent is not appropriate, the Departmeont must immediately seek _legal custody of the child subject to the provisions of D.C. Code Section 16-2301, et seg. The decision to seek court custody of a child who has entered Department custody through Emergency Care does not have to be approved by the workers Branch Chief or by the Chief of CFSD.
V. GENERAL ASSISTANCE
A. The Department shall not use the General Assistance Program as a substitute for foster care. When a Department 'NOrker arranges a childs placement in response to a complaint of abuse/neglect, the childs placement may not be made under
12

- 219 -
LaSh!""" A v. Dixon Modifi~ Final Order
the General Assistance Program.
B. The Department shall develop procedures to determine those circumstances in which it is .appropriate for children to be placed with unrelated adults under the General Assistance Program instead of being placed in foster care custody:
1. The standard that shall be used in developing these procedures is that children placed CNrcrf from family members generally should be under the supervision of the Department and the courts and that the General Assistance Program should be used only under limited unusual circumstances;
C. The Department shall identify and determine the number of children living with unrelated adults in the General Assistance Program.
1. As part of this analysis, the Department shall conduct an assessment of the individual circumstances of those children, their need for services, and the appropriateness of their living situations;
2. For those children determined by this analysis to be in need of services, the Department shall ensure that those services are provided; and
3. The Department shall seek legal custody of those children in the General Assistance Program whose circumstances require it.
4. For all those children for whom it is determined that living arrangements under the General Assistance Program are appropriate, the Department shall develop policies and procedures to provide oversight and supervision concerning the childs situation.
VI. PlPCEMENT OF CHILDREN
13

- 220-
L!Shllwrl A v. Dire" Modified Final Ord.r
A. Placement of Children
1. 111e Department shall develop and implement pOlicies and procedures governing the process for placing children with the primary goal of ensuring that all children are placed in the least restrictive, most family-like setting that meets their individual needs and that they are placed in or in close proximity to the homes and communities in which they resided before entering the Departments custody. 111e Department shall adhere to all such policies and procedures. .
2. The Department· shall establish and maintain a Placement Office with sufficient staff and other resources so as to ensure that all children requiring placement are placed promptly and appropriately, and in accordance with their needs.
3. 111e Placement Office shall have continuous and complete access to information sufficient to assure a careful and appropriate match between a childs individual needs and a placement with the resources to meet those needs. This information shall be available from the unitary computerized information system mandated 'r:J.j Section XVII of this Order:
a. For each child who needs to be placed, Department placement personnel shall have available in a unified· format, the following information: the name of the child; the childs age; whether the child has arrt siblings in the Departments custody and, if so, the facility in which the sibling(s) is placed; the childs permanency goal, if one exists; the childs placement history; for those children with a permanency goal of returning home, the street address of the parent(s) or other caretaker(s) to whom retum home is sought; and arrt special
14

- 221 -
Wh.wn A v. OiltOn Modified Final Q:der
needs of the child based on assessments conducted by or on behalf of the Department; and
b. For each facility licensed to accept children, Department placement personnel shall have available from the unified computer information system in a unified format the following: whether the facility has arfo/ vacancies; the· ages and genders of children whom the facility is licensed to accept; the age and gender of all other children in the facility; the level of care that the facility can provide; specialized services available through the facility. or by the foster parent; the names of the foster parents if the facility is a foster home; the name of the supervisor or licensee if the facility is a group home or institution; and the total number of children who may reside in the facility at arfo/ one time pursuant to the facilitys license.
4. As soon as the Department has determined that a child is in need of a placement, it shall initiate the placement process. In all such instances, it shall be the responsibility of the Placement Office to locate an appropriate placement; under no circumstances may the office retum the request for a placement to the chiJd(ren)'s worker and leave the worker to locate a placement
5. All children shall be placed in accordance with their individual needs, taking into account the childs need to be placed as close to home and community as possible, the importance of plaCing siblings together, and the need to place children in the least restrictive, most home-like setting.
6. Wherever possible and appropriate, children shall be
15

- 222-
LaSh"""," A v. Diron Modified Final Order
placed with relatives whom the Department has certified for emergency placement pursuant to Section XV(F) of this Order.
7. No ch!ld shalt be placed in a foster home if that placement will result in more than three foster children in that foster home, or Cl total of six children, including
the foster familys natural children; more than two
children under tYt'O years of age; or more than three children under six years of age.
a. The sole exception to the limits established by Section VI (A) (7) of this Order shall be in those instances in which the placement of a sibling group in a foster home with no other children in the home would exceed the limits. In such instances, Section VI(A)(7) shall not preclude the placement of the sibling group together.
b. The defendants shall incorporate the limits . established by Section VI (A) (7) of this Order into all relevant District of Columbia licensing provisions.
8. No child under six years of age shall be placed in a group care non-foster home setting, except for children with exceptional needs which cannot be met in any· other type of care. No child under twelve shall be placed in a group care non-foster home setting for more than 30 days unless the child has special treatment needs that cannot be met in a home-like setting and unless the setting has a program to treat the childs specific needs.
9. No child shalt remain in an emergency, short-term, or shelter facility or foster home for more than 30 days.
16

- 223-
L!Shawn A. v. Dixon Modified Final Order
10. No child shall be placed in a group-care setting with a capacity in excess of 8 children without express written approval by the Chief of CFSD based on written documentation that the childs needs can be met only in
. that specific facility, including a description of the services available in the facility to address the individual childs needs.
B. "Boarder Babies·
1. The Department shall establish and implement pOlicies and procedures that will assure the prompt and appropriate placement - including return home, where appropriate - of infants who are residing in hospitals located in the District of Columbia but who are, or are soon to be, medically ready for discharge.
2. In conjunction with hospitals located in the District of Columbia, the Department shall establish a reporting mechanism or process by which the Department will be notified of all children in the hospitals who are likely to not be discharged to their parents and of their ongoing status.
3. Within three (3) working days of learning of any child in a hospital in the District of Columbia who is not likely to be discharged to his/her parents, the Department
shall make fNery reasonable effort to locate a parent or
other family member to whom the child can safely and appropriately be returned or placed once he or she is medically ready for discharge and to determine whether that parent or appropriate family member is in . need of services as described in the Services to Children and Families section to avoid the need for foster care placement.
4. Upon notification from a hospital that a child who cannot be discharged to his/her parents will be
17

- 224-
La$hawn A v. Dixon Modified Final Ord.r
medically ready for discharge within the following five days and that the child needs a placement, the Department shall locate an appropriate placement for the child within 72 hours. In all such instances, the Department fi~ shall consider whether it is appropriate to return the child to a parent or place the child with
another family member and, if necessary, provide
services as described in the Services to Children and
Families section of this Order. If the child cannot be returned home, the Department shall place the child in an appropriate placement within 24 hours of the child being medically ready for discharge.
C. Placement Evaluations
1. All children shall receive a medical screening within 24 hours of entering the Departments phySical custody
and a full medical and dental examination within two
weeks of entering physical custody.
2. The defendants shall contract with a well-staffed hospital that operates 24 hours a day - such as Howard University Hospital - to provide the medical" screening and examinations mandated in Section VI(C)(1) above.
3. In all instances in which the Department places a child in a substitute-care facility - whether from the childs home, from another substitute care faCility, or from arry other prior placement - the Department shall assure that the child receives a thorough, professional evaluation of his or her needs, before placement if pOSSible, or as soon thereafter as possible, but in no event later than 30 days after the child is phySically placed in the new placement. The resource pool
mandated in Section 'IN of this Order shall be available
to assist in the evaluation of the childs needs.
18

- 225-
L.!Sh~ A v. Dixon Modified Fina' Order
D. Placement Support Services
1. Wrthin 180 days of the entry of this Order. the Department shall complete an assessment of the support services to be provided to foster homes and facilities to assure that placements for children are appropriate and stable.
2. Consistent with the findings of the assessment
mandated by Section VI (D)(I). the Department shall establish, either directly or through contract, placement support services sufficient to assure that placements for children are appropriate and stable.
3. On a periodic basis. but no less frequently than once fN8ry 2 years, the Department shall formally assess the effectiveness and Sufficiency of its placement support
service programs. Consistent with the findings of
these assessments, the Department shall modify its placement-support service programs to assure that placements for children continue to be appropriate and stable.
E. No child shall be placed in a faCility, foster home, group home, institution. or other facility such that his or her placement in the facility would result in there being more children in the facility than is permitted by the facilitys license as specified in Section VI (A) (7) of this Order.
F. No child shall be placed in a facility - foster home, group home. institution. Consortium home. or other facility - that does not have a current permit or license.
G. In conjunction with the plaintiffs, the defendants shall promulgate regulations .governing all foster-care facilities in which it places children.
19

- 226-
La$hltW17 A v. Dixon Modifitd Final Qrd.r
VII. PLANNING
A. In consultation with the plaintiffs, the Department shall develop and implement pOlicies and procedures that will establish a planning process that (I) initially· will seek to work intensively with the child's parent(s) and other appropriate family members to allow the child to remain at home, if appropriate; (2) in those instances in which removal from the home is necessary, will work intensively with the child's parents and other appropriate family members in a collaborative process to return the child home under appropriate circumstances consistent with reasonable professional standards; and (3) if, after all reasonable efforts have been made under ·appropriate Circumstances, but have not succeeded in returning the child home, will assure the child an alternative, appropriate, permanent placement as quickly as possible.
8. Initial Planning Process
1. The Department shall establish, implement, and maintain policies and procedures for assuring that in all instances in which a report of abuse or neglect is supported, the case is transferred to a foster-care worker within t'NO (2) working days of the finding. When the case is transferred, the foster-care worker will be provided with all documents produced or obtained 'rJ.J the Department prior to the transfer.
2. In all cases in which a report of neglect or abuse is substantiated, the Department worker assigned to the child and family's case shall meet as soon as possible with the child's parent(s) to initiate the planning process:
a. This meeting shall take place as soon as
of possible, but in all instances must occur within
seven (7) calendar days the s\..Ibstantiation;
20

- 227-
L.$hewn A v. pilOn Modified Fina' Order
b. This meeting shall take place in the parent(s)'s home, unless extraordinary circumstances, documented in the record, make meeting in the home inappropriate;
c. The purposes of the meeting are to discuss the problems that necessitated the child's removal; to identify the changes by the parent(s) that may be necessary to allow the child to return home; to identify the services that need to be provided to the parent(s) to allow the child to retum home; to arrange a visitation schedule between the child and the parent(s); to assure that, where necessary, day-care and transportation resources exist to allow the visitation to take place; and to arrange for a schedule of contacts between the parent(s) and the worker. In the event that the parent{s) cannot be located or refuses to meet with the worker, the worker shall make and document alI efforts made to locate the parent and to ensure that the meeting take place; and
d. In all cases in which the parent(s) whereabouts are unknown to the Department as of the time the allegation of abuse or neglect is supported, the Department immediately shall institute a diligent search for the parent(s), which shall be documented in the child and family case records.
3. In all instances in which it is impossible to meet with the parents, the planning process shall begin as described abow with consideration by the worker of the factors in Section VII(B}(2}(c) of this Section, and with the initiation of the diligent search described in Section VII (B)(2)(d) of this Section, no later than 7 days after a report of neglect or abuse is supported.
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LaSh6Wn A v. Diron Modifi&d Final Order
4. Within 30 days of the child entering the Department's physical or legal custody, the worker assigned to the child's case shall develop, with the child's parent(s) if possible, a written case plan for the child and the family, taking into account all information from meetings with the child's parent(s) and all information obtained during the initial investigation and risk assessment process. The worker shall make every reasonable effort to involve fully the parents and other appropriate family members in the development of the plan. If. the worker is unable to invotve the parent(s), the reasons for such shall be clearly specified in the record.
5. There shall be a written case plan for each Child. The case plan shall be recorded on a standardized form or set of forms, shall be signed by the child's parent(s) if possible, shall be approved and signed by the worker's supervisor, and shall include at least the following:
a. the child's permanency goal;
b. the specific reasons necessitating the child's being in foster care;
c. the specific needs of the child's family as they relate the child's permanency goal;
d. the specifiC objectives that must be accomplished by the parent(s), worker, and other involved parties to effect the permanency goal;
e. the specific services that will be provided to the child and family, if the permanency goal is return home, to allow the child to return home;
f. an indMdualized and specific timetable for the
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provision of the services that will be provided to the family, if the permanency goal is return home, to allow the child to return home;
g. an identification of the responsibilities of the Department worker or, where appropriate, the worker(s) from a private agency in the provision of services that will be provided to the family, if the permanency goal is return home, to allow the child to retum home;
h. the speCific needs of the child while he or she is in the Department's custody;
i. the specific services that will be provided to meet the childs specifiC needs;
j. an individualized and specific timetable by which the specific services the child needs will be provided to the child;
k. an identification of who will be responsible for the provision of the specific services the child needs that will be provided to the child;
I. a discussion of the appropriateness of the childs placement to include a specific explanation as to how the child's placement meets his or her needs;
m. A specific schedule of visitation between the child and the child's parent(s) and other appropriate family members, including siblings; and
n. A specific schedule of service contacts between the child and" family's worker(s) and (1) the child; . (2) the child's parent(s) and other
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La$hhm A v. Dixon Modified Fina' Q-der
appropriate family members; and (3) the foster parents or other caretaker where the child is placed.
6. For all children with a permanency goal of retum home, the child's worker, in accord with the written case plan, shall visit and work with the child's parent(s) in the home as often as is necessary to 'facilitate the childs
retum home. In fNery case the worker must meet with
the child's parent(s) no less frequently than twice a month during the first 3 months after the permanency goal becomes return home.
7. The Department shall assure that all visitations between children and their parents and siblings take place in the parent's home unless there are reasons documented in the record that home visits would pose a danger to the child. In all instances, visits shall take place in the most family-like setting possible. The Department shall assure that all children with a permanency goal of return home are permitted to visit with their parent(s} at least once a week, unless the best interest of the child, specifically documented in the child's case record, requires less frequent visitation.
C. Permanency Goals - The Department shall assign children one of the following permanency goals: retum home, adoption, legal custody with permanent caretakers, continued foster care, or independent living.
1. All children who enter the Departments custody shall initially have a permanency goal of return home with the following exceptions:
a. Children for whom both parents have relinquished custody or are deceased;
b. Children whose parents cannot be located after a
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LaShawn .. v. OillO" Modified Final Qrd.r
diligent search,not to exceed three months initiated as soon as the child enters placement; and
c. Children whose parents have been found guilty of repeated serious abuse or neglect of the child or the childs siblings such that termination of parental rights is appropriate.
2. For arrt child who has a permanency goal of retum home for more than 12 months. the childs worker and supervisor must include in the record a written explanation justifying continuation of the goal. No child shall have a permanency goal of return home for more than 18 months. unless there are documented in the record and approved by the childs workers supervisor extraordinary circum- stances and reason to believe that the child can still be returned home within a specified and reasonable time period.
3. No child shall be assigned a permanency goal of legal custody with permanent caretakers unless (1) the child is at least 12 years old; (2) the Department has made every reasonable effort. documented in the record, to return the child home. to place the child with an appropriate family members. and to place the child for adoption; and (3) the person to whom the Department proposes to assign permanent caretaker status has demonstrated a commitment to assuming long-term responsibility for the child. This permanency goal may also be used for children whose parents do not have custody of their children solely because of permanent disability. for whom in-home services will not enable them to assume care of the child, but who have a significant and meaningful relationship with the child.
a. The Department may assign a permanency goal of legal custody with permanent caretakers to a child younger than 12 for whom it has not made adoption efforts tf:
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ySh6'Nr! A v. Dire" Modified Final Q:der
(1) the child is placed with a relative;
(2) the relative is willing to assume long-term responsibility for the child but has legitimate reasons for not adopting the child; and
(3) it is in the child's best interest to remain in the home of the relative rather than be considered for adoption by another person(s).
4. No child shall be assigned a permanency goal of continued foster care unless
a. the child is at least 12 years old;
b. the Department has made every reasonable effort,
documented in the record, to return the child home, to place the child with an appropriate family member, or to place the child for adoption; and
c. the Department has considered and rejected the possibility of the child's foster parents assuming legal custody as permanent caretakers of the child.
5. No child younger than 16 shall be assigned a permanency goal of independent living. The Department may,- however, provide services to children 14-years old or older in anticipation of their permanency goals being changed to inde-
pendent living once they become 16.
D. SubseQuent Planning Review
1. The child's worker and supervisor shall have an ongoing responsibility to assure that the child's permanency goal is appropriate or to change it if it is not, to assure that the child's services and placement are appropriate and are
26

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La$hrNrt A v. DillOn Modihd Final Order
meeting the childs specific needs; to assure that the parents and other appropriate family members are receiving the specific services mandated by the case .plan and that they are progressing towards the specific objectives identified in the plan; and to assure that, in those cases in which there are multiple service providers, the proviSion of services is coordinated so as to assure the delivery of the mandated services.
2. . Within 90 days of the childs entry into the Departments physical or legal custody, and fNery 90 days thereafter, the Department shall review in a supervisory conference the progress of the child and the childs family and shall review and update the child and familys written case plan:
a. M. a minimum the review must address the following: the appropriateness of the services being provided to the child, the childs parent(s), and the childS foster parent; in those cases in which retum home is the permanency goal, the progress the parent(s) have made towards accomplishing the specific objectives that must be met for the child to retum home, the progress that must still be made, and what barriers, if arTf, are hindering the parent(s)s progress; the appropriateness of timetables; whether additional or different services are necessary; and the appropriateness of continuing the childs permanency goal;
b. All subsequent reviews shall be attended by the Department worker(s) responsible for the case, the worker(s)s supervisor(s), and if the child is in placement with a private agency, with the worker at the private agency who is responsible for the child;
c. The Department shall make every reasonable effort to facilitate the participation of childS parent(s) and other appropriate family members in these reviews. M. the very least, the Department shall provide written notice
21

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LaSh,"", A v, Dixo" Modified Fin.1 O'qf(

of the review so that the parent(s) and other appropriate family members receive the notice at least seven calendar days before the review is scheduled and the Department shall make whatever arrangements are necessary - including providing transportation and day care services - to assure that those parents or other appropriate family members who wish to attend are able to do so;

d. The findings of these subsequent revi9'NS shall be recorded on a standardized form or set of forms, entered into the record, and provided to the childs parent(s) when their whereabouts are known;

e. The Department worker shall be responsible for assuring that all steps recommended in the subsequent reviews be implemented and the Department shall establish a mechanism for assuring this implementation; and

f.

The subsequent reviews required to take place six

months following placement and fNery six months

thereafter as long as the child continues in the

Departments custody shall be coordinated with the

concurrent six-month judicial or administrative reviews

mandated by Section X of this Order so as to eliminate

unnecessary duplication of effort 'cf.J the worker,

supervisor, parent(s), and other Department staff.

E. The pool of specialized resource people mandated 'cf.J Section
x:v of this Order shall be available by telephone and in person
to consult with workers and supervisors in the development and review of plans for services for families and for children.

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yShaW1! A V. 01110" Modified Final Order
VIII. ADOPTION
A. The process of freeing a child for adoption and seeking and securing an adoptive placement shall begin as soon as the childs permanency goal becomes adoption within the time periods set forth in this section.
B. The Department shall develop and implement policies and procedures goveming the process of freeing children for adoption and matching children with adoptive homes. Those procedures shall include the requirements in this section.
C. Freeing a child for adoption
1. N9 later than 15 Vt'Orking days after a childs plan has become adoption, the childs worker shall make every effort to obtain a relinquishment of parental rights from both of the childs parents.
2. No later than 15 days after a childs plan has become adoption, the childs worker shall renew or initiate a diligent search for arry parent whose whereabouts are unknown and shall begin, in conjunction with Corporation Counsel, the process of seeking to notify such a parent by publication.
3. For those children for whom the Department is unable to obtain a voluntary relinquishment from both parents:
a. Within 30 days of the childs permanency goal becoming adoption, the childs adoption worker shall confer with Corporation Counsel to determine the sufficiency of the grounds for terminating parental rights, to determine all necessary documentation that need be submitted to Corporation Counsel, and to seek to secure a waiver of confidentiality.
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LaS/lpz! A v. Dirpn Modified Final OrO.r
b. Within 60 days of the childs permanency goal becoming adoption the childs adoption worker shall submit all necessary documentation to the Corporation Counsel for the termination of parental rights.
c. Within 15 days of receiving the documentation from the childs adoption worker, Corporation Counsel shall file a petition .with the Family Division to terminate parental rights so long as Corporation Counsel believes that there are legal grounds to seek termination of parental rights. In those cases in which the plan is adoption but Corporation Counsel declines to file the termination petition within 15 days, there shall be a procedure established by the Department, involving the Division Chief and Senior Corporation Counsel, to resolve the dispute. This shall not preclude guardian ad litems or other attorneys from filing for termination of parental rights.
4. The adoption branch shall be notified by Corporation Counsel no later than three days after entry of a judgment terminating parental rights.
5. The Corporation Counsel shall designate a Coordinator or Uaison for the termination of parental rights, who shall have specific responsibility for monitoring all procedures and requirements concerning legal activity in the process of terminating parental rights:
a. The Coordinator shall work with CFSD to develop pOlicies and procedures to ensure that legal activities concerning termination of parental rights are occurring as required by this Order; and
30

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oim" LaSh8Wr! A v.

Modifi~ Final Order

b. The Coordinator shall identify arry problems concerning the process for terminating parental rights as required by this Order that exist between CFSD and the Corporation Counselor
with the Superior Court and make arrt
necessary recommendations concerning such problems to the Corporation Counsel and to the
Commissioner of the Commission on Social
Services, who shall take all necessary steps to implement such recommendations.

D. ReferralfTransfer to Adoption Branch and adoptive placement
1. The cases of all children with a permanency goal of adoption shall be referred to the Adoption Branch within five days of the childs permanency goal becoming adoption:
a. The foster care worker and the adoption worker shall jointly develop a written Transition Plan detailing the individualized procedures to prepare the child and to facilitate and expedite the childs placement;
b. The foster care and adoption workers shall both work as a team with the child during the period between the selection of adoption as the childs permanency goal and the childs placement in an adoptive home and for a period of time following placement. The foster care worker shall retain responsibility for routine supervision of the child in foster care, management of medical and psychological services, and handling the financial arrangements relating to the childs placement. The adoption worker shall be responsible for the preparation of the child, including the compiling of the child's
31

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La$hawrl A. v. oixon Modified Final Order
history and preparation of the life book; discussion of the adoption plan as well as relinquishment counseling with the childs parent(s). the preparation of termination rights packets. and the recruitment and selection of an appropriate adoptive family for the child. During this period the case will count as a case for each worker for purposes of the caseload limits in this Order.
c. The childs foster care worker shall be the case manager prior to placement; the adoption worker shall be the case manager following placement; and
d. The Transition Plan shall be submitted to an
adoption supervisor for revievv and approval and
shall include a full assessment of the appropriateness . of the foster family as a potential adoptive family pursuant to Section VIII(E). below.
e. In conjunction with the plaintiffs and the LaShawn A. Monitor; the Department shall formally assess the appropriateness of the allocation of case responsibilities mandated by Section VIII(D)(1)(b) after it has been in effect for one year. Should the assessment determine that a change in the allocation is appropriate, the Department shall implement the appropriate changes.
2. For all children referred to the Adoption Branch, the Department shall immediately begin the process of identifying and. if necessary, doing individual recruiting for an adoptive home, subject to the time periods set out below:
32

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l.!Shl1Wr1 A v. plxon Modified Final Order
a. The Department shall determine whether it has approved potential adoptive families for a child within 10 days after the childs case has been referred to the Adoption Branch;
b. For those children not placed within 30 days of being referred to the adoption branch, the child shall be presented to Homes for Black Children, or other appropriate private adoption agencies.
c. The Department shall register on all appropriate local, regional and national adoption exchanges any child who has not been matched with an adoptive family within 45 days after the child has been referred to the Adoption Branch;
d. The Department shall begin individual child specific adoptive home recruitment, consistent with the procedures and standards contained in the adoptive
xv. home recruitment plan described in Section for arTf
child for whom an adoptive home has not been identified within 90 days after the child has been referred to the Adoption Branch; and
e. Foster parent adoptions:
(1) The time periods in Section VIII(D)(2) above shall not apply to a child whose foster family has formally applied to become an adoptive parent for the child, as referred to in Sections VIII (E) (3) and (F) (2) below, within 30 days after being notified that the childs permanency plan is adoption;
(2) In the event that the childs foster family is not approved as an adoptive family within three months after the childs permanency goal has been changed to adoption. the time periods in
33

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Y$I'I,v.1'I A V. DiltOrt Modified Final Qrd.,

Section VIII (O)(2) (a-d) of this Section shall begin to run; and

f.

Legal Risk placements:

(1) The Department, in conjunction with Corporation Counsel, shall establish criteria and a procedure for designating children with a permanency goal of adoption for whom termination of parental rights seems likely as legal Risk adoptive placements;

(2) Children categorized as eligible for Legal Risk placements shall be placed in an adoptive home as soon as one has been identified, provided that the adoptive famify is fully informed of the nature and status of Legal Risk placement; and

(3) . Children not categorized as eligible for Legal Risk placements shall be placed in an adoptive home as soon after entry of a judgment terminating parental rights as possible, consistent with the judgment of the worker and supervisor responsible for the case.

E. Foster parent adoptions

1. Once a childs permanency goal has become adoption, the Department shall consider the appropriateness of the foster family applying to be an adoptive family for the child no later than 5 days after the permanency goal becomes adoption. The childs foster care worker shall assist the adoption branch worker in making the assessment of the foster famify.

2. The Department sh~1I notify in writing all foster families for children whose permanency goal has become adoption and such families shall receive written

34

- 241 -
LaShltWn A v. Dizon Modified Final Order
notification of the childs permanency goal, of the availability of adoption subsidy, that they have the right to seek to adopt the child, and of the applicable procedures to begin the formal adoptive home study process.
3. Foster parents who have had responsibility for the child for six months or more, who are interested in becoming adoptive parents for the child, and who are considered suitable parents by the childs worker shall immediately be referred for a home study. The child shall not be considered to be in an adoptive placement, however, for purposes of the required adoption recruitment activity contained in Section VIII (D)(2) above, unless the foster parents have initiated the homa study process and have been approved as adoptive parents.
F. Adoptive home studies
1. The process of screening and approving applicants for adoption shall not exceed three months from the date the application to be approved as an adoptive family is received. The screening process shall not exceed two months for famifies already providing foster care for a child and seeking to adopt that child.
2. Foster parents who have had responsibility for a child for six months or more, who apply to adopt the child, and who are considered suitable adoptive parents by the childs worker, shall have a preference with regard to adopting their foster child.
3. In the event that arrt child who is legally free for adoption has been awaiting an adoptive placement for more than six months from the date the child's permanency goal became adoption, the Department shall be required to contract with a nationally- recognized
35

- 242-
YSh.twn A v. Ol1tOIl Modihd Final Order
model adoptive home recruitment program to provide indMduai adoptive home recruitment for the child.
G. Post-adoptive placement services
1. All of the provisions of this Order concerning access to services, periodic revi~, and supervision of placement shall continue to apply to all children in adoptive placements until such time as the adoption becomes final, except that an adoptive placement shall be treated as a new placement. for purposes of the frequency of worker visiting. even in those instances in which a foster home is converted into an adoptive placement
2. All services necessary to preserve families, as described in Section JII, shall be available to adoptive families, both prior to and subsequent to the finalization of the adoption, and families shall receive notification at the time that the adoption becomes final of the avaiJability of family services.
3. Under appropriate circumstances to be determined by the worker and the supervisors, families in which an adoptive placement is in danger of disruption, either prior to or subsequent to the finalization of the adoption, shall receive intensive family services as described in Section III.
36

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L!ShltWrl A v. OIXO" ModIfied Final C!der

IX. SUPERVISION OF PLACEMENT

A During the first eight weeks after a child is placed in a DHS

foster home, the Department worker shall visit the child in the

foster home as frequently as is necessary to assure the

childs adjustment to the placement, but no less frequently

than once a week. Thereafter, the worker shall visit the child

in the foster home as frequently as is necessary, but no less

frequently than once every two weeks. Each visit shall include

a private visit with the child outside the presence of the foster

parents except in those cases where the child is a very young

infant.

.

B. During the first eight weeks after a child is placed in a privateagency foster home, the Department shall require that social services workers from the private agencies providing placement services shall visit each child placed in a foster home as frequently as is necessary to assure the childs adjustment in the placement. but no less frequently than once a week. Thereafter, the worker shall visit the child in the foster home as frequently as is necessary. but no less
frequently than once every two weeks. Each visit shall include
a private visit with the child outside the presence of the foster parents except in those cases where the child is a very young infant.
c. The childs foster care worker shall visit each child placed in
a foster family or facility operated by a private agency that provides placement services in the foster home or facility once a month. Each visit shall include a private visit with the child outside the presence of the foster parents or facility staff. The private agencys worker assigned to the case shall accompany the foster care worker.

37

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LaShrNn A v. Oiron Modifi&d Final Order
D. Arry reports of alleged abuse or neglect of a child in a foster home or other child-care facility shall be investigated by the Department in the same manner as those concerning children not in Departmental custody, as set forth in Section " of this Order, except that the !~vestigating worker shall notify and consult the Department worker With direct responsibility for the childs case and arT'/ private provider worker with direct responsibility for the childs case. if the child is placed through
such an agency.
x. CASE REVIE'N SYSTEM
A. The Department shall develop and implement a case-review system that assures (I) that all children in the Departments foster care custody receive timely and meaningful reviews of their individual cases; and (2) that assures that DHS management personnel are able to monitor the Departments compliance with CFSD policies and procedures, District of Columbia law, and the provisions of this Order. Moreover, the
Department shall make fNery reasonable effort to develop and
implement a coordinated case review system to minimize the
time required tit social workers to participate in the review
system.
B. Child-Specific ReviS'm .
1. Administrative Reviews
a. The Department shall develop and implement policies to ensure that a/l children receive administrative reviews as mandated by this Order.
b. The Department shall establish and maintain. directly or by contract, an office or unit with sufficient staff and other resources to assure
38

- 245-
L.&Shawn A v. QIro" Modlfltd Flna' Qrdtl'
that all children in Departmental custody receive
administrative revi~ as mandated by this Order. This office or unit shall have continuous
and ongoing access to the Departments unitary computerized information system.
c. Within 180 days of a childs entry into the Departments physical or legal custody and
fNSry 180 days thereafter, the Department shall
conduct an administrative review of the childs case, regardless of the timing or content of
review conducted by the Family Division of the
Superior Court:
(1) Administrative revi~ shall determine, but shall not be limited to, the following: the chiids legal status; whether the childs legal status is appropriate; the childs planning goal; whether the childs permanency goal is appropriate; whether the child has a written case plan, as required by District of Columbia law and this Order; whether the childs case plan
is appropriate and, if it is not, the steps
that need to be taken to make the plan appropriate; the services being provided to the child and, in those cases in which the childs planning goal is retum home, the services being provided to the childs parent{s); the adequacy of the services being provided to the child and the parent(s); the childs placement; and whether the childs placement is appropriate;
(2) M. a minimum, the childs worker and the childs workers supervisor shall attend the administrative review, which shall be
39

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USh....", A v. O/XOfl Modified Final Order

&..\,1.

conducted by an individual not employed by CFSD. For ant child whose case is being reviewed and for whom the planning goal is retum home. the :.... Department shall make 'Nary reasonable effort to assure that the childs parent(s) and foster parent(s) attend the administrative review; in such instances, the Department shall notify the parent(s) in writing at least 14 days in advance of the review;
(3) The information compiled in administrative reviews shall be recorded on a standardized form or group of forms, a copy of which shall be placed in the childs record; and
(4) Administrative reviews shall be coordinated with the subsequent planning reviews mandated by Section VII of this Order.
2. The defendants shall assure that every child in their physical or legal custody receives a hearing, in a family or Juvenile court or another court Oncluding a tribal court) of competent jurisdiction, or by an administrative body appointed or approved by the court, no later than eighteen months after the original placement (and periodically thereafter during the continuation of foster care). which hearing shall determine the Mure status of the child Oncluding, but not limited to, whether the child should be retumed to the parent, should be continued in foster care for a specified period, should be placed for adoption, or should (because of the childs special needs or circumstances) be continued in foster care on a permanent or long-term basis) and, in the case of a child who has attained age 16, the

40

- 247-
l.!ShrIt.f! A v, DIm" Modifi~ Final Order
services needed to assist the child to make the transition from foster care to independent living.
a. Within sixty (60) days of the entry of this Order,
the Mayor or her designee shall arrange with the Family Division of the Superior Court for the
implementation of a process by which the
Family Division shall conduct the h'earings as is required by section XeS) (2) of this Order. As
part of these efforts, the Mayor shall make atl reasonable efforts to implement a process by which the Family Division judges shall be informed of the significance of such hearings.
C. Quality Assurance Reviews
1. The Department shall establish and maintain a Quality Assurance Unit to conduct periodic reviews of case
records. The unit shall be directed by a person with a masters degree in social work and at least five years
experience in child welfare services. The unit shall be adequately staffed and shall receive special training to perform the duties described in this section.
2. The Department shall develop pOlicies and procedures by which the Quality Assurance Unit will conduct quality assurance reviews:
a. The purpose of the reviews is to provide necessary information to Department management personnel and to determine on an ongoing basis whether the Department is following the provisions of this Order; of CFSD policy, and of good social work practice; and
b. Policies and procedures shall be developed to ... , enable the Quality Assurance Unit to determine the adequacy of worker and supervisor activity
41

- 248-
LaShawn A v. 01N" Modified Fina' Order
and to identify structural. organizational or other problems interfering with the provision of services as required by ~this Order. They will include specific processes and procedures for identifying workers or supervisors who. as a resutt of the results of a Quality Assurance
review. are in. need of additional training.
3. Categories of review
a. M a minimum. the Quality Assurance Unit shall. once f!Nery twelve months. review a statistically significant number of cases from each supervisory unit within CFSD with responsibility for children in DHS custody.
b. If significant problems are identified within a particular caseload or supervisory unit. the policies and procedures developed in accordance with Section X(C)(2) above. shall provide for 100% review of cases in a particular workload or supervisory unit. Workers or supervisors for whom Quality Assurance review identifies problems in meeting the requirements of this Order shall receive appropriate additional training.
c. The Quality Assurance Unit shall conduct all specialized review3 of particular categories of children. as requested 'r:f.J the LaShavm A. Monitor to address specific issues.
4. M. a minimum. the Quality Assurance reviews shall examine the complete case records of the children whose cases are being reviewed.
5. The Department shall develop a standardized form or set of forms to be used in the quality assurance
42

- 249-
L4Sh~ A v. Dixon Modified Final Ord.r
process and shall then assure that this form or set of forms is used in the process.
6. Within 30 days of the completion of quality assurance
for arTf particular supervisory unit, completed quality assurance review forms along with a report
summarizing the contents of those forms shall be provided to the relevant supervisor and branch chief. Within 30 days of receipt of the completed forms and the report, the branch chief and supervisor, in consultation with an appropriate representative from the Quality Assurance Unit, shall develop a corrective action plan to remedy problems identified in the quality
assurance reviews. The branch chief and supervisor
shall then take all necessary steps to implement the corrective action plan.
7. On a periodic basis, but no less frequently than once e-tery six months, the Director of the Quality Assurance Unit shall submit to the Chief of CFSD and to the LaShawn A. Monitor a complete report summarizing the resutts of the quality assurance process and the steps that have been taken or need to be taken to remedy problems or noncompliance with this Order identified by Quality Assurance Unit. This report shall not contain indMdual1y identifiable information and shall be public information.
D. Special Reviews
1. M. a minimum, the follCrNing cases shall be reported to and reviewed by the Chief of CFSD and the LaShawn A. Monitor:
a. All cases in which there have been four or more reports of neglect or abuse concerning a single child, a single perpetrator, or a single family;
43

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UShlrwrI A v. QII'Of! Modified Final Qrd.r
b. All cases in which a child has been placed in four different placements, excluding a retum home;
c. All cases in which a child who has a plan of return home foi' more than 24 months and has
such a plan at the time of the report;
d. All cases in which a child has had a
permanency goal of adoption for more than one year and has not been placed in an adoptive home at the time of the report; and
e. All children who have been returned home and have reentered care more than twice and have a plan of retum home at the time of the report.
2. In the event that the Chief of CFSD does not take
appropriate action on the case within 30 days after the
report has been made, the LaShawn A. Monitor may, in the exercise of its discretion, recommend specific action to be taken on the case. If action is not taken, plaintiffs may seek an Order from the court directing that such action be taken.
XI. CASELOA..DS
A. For the purpose of this caseload limit, arrt case that is not closed or is not transferred to another worker is included in calculating the number of cases in a workers caseload. These maximums apply to each individual workers caseload:
1. The caseload of each worker conducting investigations of reports of abuse and/or neglect shall not exceed a maximum of 12 investigations at arTt one time. Each family shall count as a case, regardless of the number of children in the family on whom the neglect/abuse report has been received:
44

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LIShlwn A v. Dixon Modl1iesf Fin.1 Qrd.r

2. The caseload of each worker providing services to
families in which the child or children in the family are
living in their home shall not exceed 17 families. Each
family shall count as a case. This limit is a maximum
and shall not apply to those workers providing
intensive family services. as described in Section III;

3.
•

The caseload of each worker providing services to
children in placement. including children in Emergency
Care and children in arTf other form of Department physical custody. shall not exceed 12 fOr children with
special needs and shall not exceed 20 for all other
children. Each child shall count as a case, regardless
of whether arTf children in the caseload are siblings;

4. The Department shall ensure that these caseload
limitations are in effect and are followed by arTi private
agencies with which the Department contracts for either in-home famity services or for placement
services;

5. The caseload of each Department worker, having' responsibility for arT'/ child in placement with a private
agency and in those situations in which the private agency has responsibility for both the child and the family. shall not exceed 30 children.

6. The caseload of each Department worker having
responsibility for arrt child in the Adoption Branch shall
not exceed 12 children, or 15 children invoMng cases
of independent adoption; and

7. The caseload of each Department worker having responsibility for conducting home studies shall not exceed 30 cases. A case shall consist of an adoptive family.

B. The Department shall develop policies and procedures for a

45

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La$h6Wn A v. Qil/Ol! Modified Fina' Order
caseload weighing formula to ensure that ant workers who have caseloads that fall into more than one of the categories described in Section XI(A) have caseloads that conform with the equivalent of the maximum limits set forth above.
c. Supervisors who are responsible for supervising workers who
are carrying caseloads shall be responsible for no more than
six workers, including case aides, or five case workers.
D. The Department, in consultation with the plaintiffs, shall conduct or contract to have conducted a workload study:
1. This workload study shall be conducted within a time period set forth in the Final Implementation Plan and based upon the implementation of the new policies and practices required by this Order; and
2. The caseload limitations set out above shall be subject to adjustments based on the information gathered through the workload study.
E. Ant child who is in the Departments custody shall be
assigned to a worker within 3 hours of the Departments assuming custody of the child.
F. When a worker with responsibility for a case leaves the Department, the case shall be reassigned according to the following requirements:
1. If the worker leaves the Department after gMng notice, the cases in that workers caseload will be reassigned to other ~rkers no later than 5 working days after the ~rker gives notice;
2. If the worker leaves the Department without giving notice, the cases in that workers caseload will be reassigned to other workers not later than 5 working days after the worker has left; and
46

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l.!SMwn A v. OIltOn Modified Final Q-dt/'
3. Supervisors shall not carry cases, except during the 5 day period described in Section XI (F) (2) above.
XII. STAFFING
A. In consuttation with plaintiffs, the Department shall formally
identify and assess the following: 0) District of Columbia
practices and procedures that affect the recruitment and retention of social workers, including but not limited to worker salaries and other working conditions, career opportunities within CFSD, the availability of police protection for CFSD social workers, and the availability of support services such as cars and support staff; and (2) the role of paraprofessional workers in assisting CFSD social workers.
B. Consistent with the assessment required by Section XII (A), the Department shall develop and implement a written plan for assuring that it has sufficient staff at all times for recruiting and retaining social workers and other staff and for making the best use of professional and paraprofessional staff.·
XIII. WORKER QUAUFICATIONS
A. The Department may not change the current requirement that all persons hired as social workers have a Masters Degree in Social W:>rk without the consent of the plaintiffs. .
B. All persons hired or promoted as supervisors after the entry of this Order shall have a Masters Degree in Social WOrk and shall have a minimum of 3 years of social work experience in child wetfare.
47

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LaSh.twn Av. QiX(>" Modified Final O'd.,
XlV. TRAINING
A. TraininQ ProQram - The defendants shall develop policies and
procedures that assure a comprehensive child-welfare training
program that will assure that all persons charged with
responsibilities for children in the plaintiff class shall receive sufficient training that will permit them to comply with the
relevant mandates of CFSD policy, District of Columbia law,
and with all of the provisions of this Order.
B. TraininQ Unn - The Department shall establish a full-time training unit directed by a Chief of Training that will have sufficient staffing. budget funds, and other resources to assure that it can provide comprehensive child-welfare training that will assure that all persons charged with responsibilities for children in the plaintiff class shall receive sufficient training
that will permit them to comply with the relevant mandates of CFSD policy, District of Columbia law, and with all the
provisions of this Order. The person with operational responsibility for this training unit shall have a Master of Social Work and experience in providing child welfare training.
c. Training Study and Evaluation
1. Within 120 days of the entry of this Order, the
defendants in conjunction with the LaShawn A Monitor
shall complete a comprehensive formal assessment of the training needs of the Department relating to the operation of the child welfare program. M. a minimum, this assessment shall focus on needed training resources, programs, and curricula as they relate to both general and specialized training for DHS workers, supervisors, and administrative and managerial personnel; for foster parents and adoptive parents; and for employees or otherS under the supervision of entities with which the apartment contracts to provide services to children and families.

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LaShrwn A v. Q;%O" Mos1ifi!S1 Final Q:dfl'
2. Consistent with the assessment mandated by Section XIV(C}O) of this Order. the Department shall assure adequate training resources. programs. and curricula as they relate to both general and specialized training for DHS workers. supervisors. and administrative and managerial personnel; for foster parents and adoptive parents; and for employees or others under the supervision of entities with which the Department contracts to prc:Mde services to children and families.
3. For all training programs that it implements. the Department shall establish a formal process by which it will be able to assess on an ongoing basis the effectiveness of the training programs. In conducting these assessments. the Department shall take into account resufts from the administrative reviews mandated by this Order and the results from the quality assurance process.
D. Department Personnel Training
1. CESD Social \N;)dsers
a. Pre-service Training: Every newly hired CFSD
social worker shall receive a minimum of 80 hours of instructional training and a minimum of 80 hours of field training. Prior to the completion of the mandated training. no newly hired CFSD social worker may assume responsibility for any cases. except to the extent that the pre-service training program includes on-the-job training that includes closely supervised case duties.
b. In-service Training: During each calendar year. all CFSD social workers shall receive a minimum of 40 hours of ongoing training. V\t)rkers providing specialized services. including. but.
49

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LaSh".", A v. DIllOn Modified Final Ord.,

not limited to, investigations of child abuse/neglect, services to families, ongoing foster care supervision, adoption, and monitoring shall receive specialized training in these areas.
c. Previously Hired 'Abrkers: Arrf social worker
hired prior to the date of this Order shall receive pre-service training as specified in Section XJV(D)(1)(a) within 180 days of the entry of this Order unless a needs assessment specifically indicates there is no training deficit.

2. Other Social Work Training - All CFSO personnel, other

than those included in Section XIV (0)(1) who have arrt

casework responsibility shall receive a minimum of 24

hours of training to facilitate their ability to deliver

services to children and families.

.

3. Department Supervisor Training

a. Pre-service Training: Within three months of assuming supervisory responsibility, arrt newly hired or promoted CFSD supervisor shall receive.a minimum of 40 hours of training that is directed specifically at the supervision of child-welfare, social workers.

b. In-Service Training: During each calendar year, all CFSD supervisors shall receive a minimum of 24 hours of ongoing training.

c. Previously Hired Supervisors - ArTy supervisor who had been hired as of the date of this Order shall receive pre-service training as specified in Section XIV (0)(3)(a) within 90 days of the entry of this Order unless a needs assessment specifically indicates there is no training deficit.

50

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LaShewn A v. Dim" Modifi.cl Fina' ():d.r
4. Administrative Staff Training • During each calendar year, all CFSD Branch Chiefs and other administrative personnel shall receive at least 24 hours of training to build their capacity to manage CFSD, to plan and implement systems changes, and to advocate for needed resources.
E. private-PrcMder Training - The Department shall assure that all persons providing social work services under or pursuant to a contract with the Department shall have received training similar in substance and duration as that specified in Section XIV(D)(1).
F. Foster·parent Training
1. Arrt person who seeks to become a foster parent shall
receive a minimum of 15 hours of training prior to having a child placed in their home. Except for emergency relative placements, no child shall be placed in a persons home until the person has completed the entire training program and has demonstrated a satisfactory mastery of the training curriculum.
2. The Department shall assure that all foster parents receive a minimum of 15 hours of training each year.
3. M. a minimum, foster-parent training shall provide prospective foster parents with the information and training necessary to allow them to comply with the relevant mandates of CFSD policy, District of Columbia law, and with all the provisions of this Order; shall enable them to meet experienced foster parents; and shall provide, where appropriate, specialized training to permit prospective foster parents to care for children with special needs, be they medical, behavioral, developmental, or emotional.
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LfSI'I8wr! A v. piltOn Modified Final OrOer
G. Adoptive-Parent Training
1. Arrt person who seeks to become an adoptive parent
shall receive a minimum of 30 hours of training, excluding the orientation process. No child shall be placed in a prospective adoptive parents home until the prospective adoptive parent has completed the entire training program and has demonstrated a satisfactory mastery of the training curri~lum:
a. ArTy person who is seeking to become an adoptive-parent and who has participated in CFSD sponsored adoptive-parent training in the prior 18 months need receive only 15 hours of training; and
b. The Department shall develop a separate training program for such prospective adoptive parents.
2. No a minimum, adoptive parent training shall enable prospective adoptive parent(s) to meet adoptive parents and shall provide. where appropriate, specialized training to permit prospective foster parents to care for children with special needs, be they medical. behavioral. developmental. or emotional.
H. Judicial Training
1. In conjunction with Court Social Services and Counsel on Child Abuse and Neglect (CCAN), the Department shall establish and maintain a judicial training program for the judges of the Family Division of the Superior Court.
2. The Defendants shall make all reasonable efforts to assure that the judges of the Family Division of the
52 .

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LaShawr! A v. Dixon Modified Final Order
Superior Court participate in the Departments judicial training program.
I. Training Curriculum and Written Materials
1. In consultation with the LaShawn A. Monitor, the Department shall dewlop formal curricula to guide the
training programs mandated 'elf this Order. These
curricula shall be tailored to pr'CMde specialized training for Department workers who have specialized responsibilities such as protective services, foster care services, adoption, or monitoring.
2. The Department in conjunction with the laShawn A.
Monitor shall dewlop formal standardized, written materials to be used in conjunction with all training
programs mandated 'elf this Order. The Department
shall assure that all individuals participating in Departmental training receive a set of the relevant written materials that they may retain.
3. All persons, except judges, to whom the Department must provide training pursuant to this Order must demonstrate a satisfactory mastery of the relevant training curriculum. The Department shall not permit arT{ newly-hired or promoted social worker to become a permanent employee before and until that person has demonstrated a satisfactory mastery of the relevant training curriculum.
)0/. RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
A. Creation of Resource Development Office
1. The Department shall create and maintain a Resource Development Office headed by Chief of Resource Dewlopment, who shall have a minimum of five (5) years of child welfare experience. The Department
53

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uShawn A v. Dirort Modified Anal Q'der
shall assure that the office has sufficient staff, background, training and other resources to fuffill the requirements of this Section.
2. The Resource DeNelopment Office is responsible for needs assessment· and resource development as required by this Order and shall deNelop necessary resources to provide community-based placement prevention and out-of-home care and related supportive services for children.
B. Development of Resources
1. A needs assessment will be undertaken, in accordance with the proviSions of the Implementation Plan, beginning no later than 60 days after the entry of this Order to determine what services are available and the number and categories of additional services and resources that are necessary, including in-home and placement-related services, to ensure compliance with this Order.
2. The needs assessments described in Section XV(B)(1} above, and as more fully described in Section XV(C-D} below, shall be repeated fNery two years, in accordance with the provisions of the implementation plan, using the unitary computerized information system referred to in Section XVII insofar as possible, once that system is functioning.
3. Based on the needs assessment, a written Resource DfNelopment Plan shall be developed, in accordance with the provisions of the impiementation plan. The Plan shall specify the quantity of each category of resources and services, the time periods within which they will be developed, and the specific steps that will be taken to ensure that they are developed.
54

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LaSh.tW!'! A v. PiltOn Modlfi~ Final Ord.r
4. In developing these resources and services as required by this Order, the Department shall move tcmard a decentralized neighborhood and community-based system of service delivery.
5. In developing all such services, existing service delivery systems and existing agencies shall be utilized wherever possible, through the development of inter-agency agreements and contracts, subject to the provisions of Section XVI, Contract Review, of this Order.
6. The Resource Development Plan shall be implemented within the time period determined by the Implementation Plan.
C. Community-Based Services
1. The needs assessment and Resource Development Plan shall determine the need for an adequate number of community-based services to prevent unnecessary placement, replacement, adoption and foster home disruption, as described in the Services to Children and Families section, which are necessary to make reasonable efforts to prevent the placement or replacement of children in appropriate circumstances. These services shall include:
a. Intensive home-based crisis intervention services;
b. Homemaker services Oncluding 24 hour}
c. Parent education/counselling;
d. Mental health services Oncluding day treatment);
e. Substance abuse programs;
55

- 262-

Q!!1

LaSh......" A v. Olro" Modjfi~ Final Order

~

f. Housing assistance;
g. Respite care;

h. Day care;

i.

Emergency cash assistance;

j. Access to other public benefits;

k. Less intensive family services; and

I.

Medica/ services.

2. In developing decentralized community-based services,
the Department shall move toward ensuring the availability of needed resources in each ward of the District to assure that the needs of children and families
are met within th~r own neighborhoods. To the extent
possible. new resources should be located in agencies and organizations which are accessible to parents.

3. All services for which there is a need shall be developed, provided and/or made available within a time period and in locations to be determined by the Implementation Plan.

4. With regard to services for which there is a need only under extraordinary and rarely-occurring circumstances, a process shall be developed, including the use of specialized contracts, to ensure the availability of those services when necessary.

D. Placement Resources

1. The· Department shall take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that it has available to it at all times a sufficient number of foster homes, group

56

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LaShllwn A v. Dixon Modified Final Order
homes, therapeutic foster homes, residential treatment facilities, and other facilities to allow it to place children promptly in the least restrictive, most family-like setting in or within close proximity to their homes and communities.
2. A written report projecting the number of emergency placements, foster-homes, group homes, therapeutic foster homes, and institutional placements that will be required by children in the Departments custody during the next twelve (12) months shall be developed within 180 days of the entry of this Order in accordance with the provisions of the Implementation Plan.
3. Consistent with the Resource Development Plan, the Department shall develop in writing a plan to assure that it has available, either directly or through contract, a sufficient number of appropriate placements for all children in its phySical or legal custody. The Department shall then take all steps necessary to implement this plan.
4. By the beginning of each District of Columbia Fiscal Year. a written report shall be developed in accordance with the Implementation Plan projecting the number of emergency placements. foster homes. group homes. therapeutic foster homes. and institutional placements that will be required by children in the Departments custody during the upcoming Fiscal Year:
a. Consistent with these projections. the Department shall develop in writing a plan to assure that it has available. either directly or through contract. a sufficient number of appropriate placements for all children in its physical or legal custody; and
57

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l.!Shrwr? A v, piltOn Modifi!d Flna! Q:df(
b. The Department shall then take all steps necessary to implement this plan.
5. In conjunction with the plaintiffs and their experts, the Commission on Mental Health Services and the Commission' on Social Services, the defendants shall formally assess the possibility of developing additional residential treatment resources in the Metropolitan YJashington area. Consistent with this assessment, the Department shall make every reasonable effort to develop such resources.
6. Foster/adoptive homes:
a. The Department shall raise District board rates to a level consistent with the Department of Agriculture standards conceming the actual costs of raiSing children and utilizing specialized rates as necessary to assure an appropriate number and range of foster homes as required by this Order. /lJ. a minimum, the Board rates equal the USDA total costs of raising a child in the urban South in families with projected incomes between $29,600 to $47,800. There shall be an annual adjustment at the beginning of each fiscal year of board rates for all foster homes and the adjustment shall equal the USDA annual adjustment;
b. The Department shall comply with the substance and the timetable in the plan referred to in Section XV(D)(2), above;
c. The Department shall establish a budget dedicated solely to the recruitment of foster and adoptive parents and shall hire sufficient personnel to assure that the Department can recruit and train a sufficient number of foster
58

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LlShrMt A v. DIxon ModIfl.c1 Flna' OYer
homes and adoptive homes so as to assure appropriate and permanent placements for all children in the Department's physical or legal custody; and
d. The Department shall develop an annual specific Adoptive Home Recruitment Plan, including an annual assessment of the need for adoptive families and specific procedures and plans for the recruitment, training, and retention of potential adoptive families based on the annual assessment:
(1) The Department shall use nationallyrecognized model adoptive home recruitment programs in developing the Adoptive Home Recruitment Plan;
(2) The Adoptive Home Recruitment Plan shall also include specific procedures for adoptive home recruitment for individual children; and
(3) In the event that the number of children with a permanency goal of adoption awaiting an adoptive placement for more than 90 days from the date the child has been legally freed for adoption in arry calendar year exceeds a number
mutually agreed upon 'cf.J the plaintiffs
and the Department, the Department shall be required to contract with a nationally-recognized model adoptive home recruitment program with demonstrated effectiveness to provide adoptive home recruitment for all such children.
59

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LaShttWn A v. 0;1/0" Modified Final Q:d.r
E. Ucensing and Monitoring
1. The Department shall be responsible for approving and monitoring all placement facilities and foster homes in which children in the Departments physical and/or legal custody are placed. . .
2. In conjunction with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, the Defendants shall develop policies and procedures to assure that decisions conceming the issuance of a license for arT'f foster-care facility - including foster homes, group homes, residential treatment centers or other child-care facilities - in which a member of the plaintiff class may be placed are made promptly:
a. Within 45 days of a.rrt prospective foster
parent(s)s completion of foster-parent training, the defendants shall make and implement a final decision about the issuance of a license to the prospective foster parent(s); and
b. Within 90 days of the receipt of arrj application for a license to operate a group home, residential treatment or other non-foster-home child care facility, the defendants shall make and implement a final decision about the issuance of a license to the prospective foster parent(s).
3. The Department shall develop, review and, if necessary, revise the standards and the process for certifying and utilizing foster homes and group care facilities, including all facilities in which children are placed by the Department, to ensure that they conform with nationally-accepted standards and with good social work practice.
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LaSh8Yol'l'l A v. Q/tOfI Modified Final Order
4. The Department shall develop policies and procedures for monitoring all facilities and foster homes in which children in the Departments. physical and/or legal
custody are placed:
a. All such standards shall ensure that individuals ~ training and experience in child welfare are involved in the licensing and monitoring process;
b. All such standards shall er:!sure that foster
homes and group facilities are visited by the
monitoring unit at least once a year to issue a license renewal for the coming 12 month period and to ensure continued compliance with standards. In relicensing foster homes and facilitiese the monitoring unit shall take into consideration:
(1) Arrt reports and investigations of
neglect/abuse that have been filed conceming the foster home or facility;
(2) The foster families' participation in mandatory training and the facility worker's participation in planning staffings; and
(3) Reports obtained from case workers for children placed with the foster family or facility on the effectiveness of their work with children;
(4) No worker having full-time responsibility for monitoring foster homes shall be responsibility for monitoring more than 35 foster homes; and .
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LaSh8Wn A v. DillOn Modifi~ Fina' Order
(5) No worker having responsibility for monitoring group homes or institutions shall be responsible for monitoring more than 30 group homes or institutions. In no instance shall a worker responsible for monitoring group homes or institutions be responsible for monitoring more than 10 such facilities that are located more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia.
F. Relative foster homes
1. The Department shall develop pOlicies and procedures for licensing relatives as foster parents.
. 2. The standard3 for licensing relatives as foster parents shall provide:
a. An emergency certification procedure so that children can be placed immediately with relatives, where appropriate;
b. A formal certification of relatives as foster parents no later than 30 days after the children are placed under the emergency certification procedure; and
c. Standards that will ensure appropriate care for children, but will allow flexibility in licensing relatives whose living facilities may not conform with all speCifications for non-relative foster parents but which are nevertheless suitable for the care of the particular child.
G. Specialized Resource Pools - The Department shall ensure the availability of a pool of specialized resource people to workers and supervisors for consultation on issues relating to
62

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L.!Shawn A v. Oixo" Modihd Fina' Q:d.r
investigation, service provision and planning for individual children and families as referred to in this Order. These resource pools shall consist of specifically designated individuals who are regularly and continuously available to perform this task and who have expertise in the specific situations described in this Order as well as general skills in child welfare and child development and who are available to workers and supervisors by telephone or in person and on an emergency basis when necessary.
XVI. CONTRlCr REVIEW
A. All services within the scope of this Order for which the Department contracts with private providers or agencies shall be subject to a contract screening and review process within the Department.
B. The Department shall develop policies and procedures for specific contract performance and a contract performance
review process for each category of services:
1. No contract conceming arTf of the services referred to
in this Order shall be entered into by defendants that does not include specific contract performance standards;
2. No contract conceming arry of the services referred to in this Order shall be renewed prior to an evaluation
and review of services rendered under the previous
contract, a determination by the Administrator of the Family Services Administration that the services have been performed satisfactorily and that the contractor has fulfilled the contract performance standards;
c. All contracts entered into by the Department concerning arry
of the services referred to in this Order shall provide that the contracting agency shall accept for service all clients referred by the Department pursuant to the terms of the contract,
63

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LaShlIwn A v. Dillon Modlfi.cl Final Order
subject only to a lack of a vacancy; and
D. The FSA Administrator shall approve all initial contracts and all contract renewals subject to the provisions of this section.
XVII. INFORMATION SYSTEM
A. Unttary Computerized Information System - In accordance with the provisions of the Implementation Plan. the Department shall develop a unitary computerized information system that will record and report information sufficient to permit Department social workers and administrators to achieve compliance with relevant provisions of District of Columbia IaN and with all the provisions of this Order.
B. Mandated Data Elements - The Department unitary computerized information system shall record all data sufficient to permit Department social workers and administrators to achieve compliance with all the provisions of this Order as well as with all relevant provisions of relevant District of Columbia law.
1. M. a minimum. the Departments unitary computerized information system shall record the following data for all children about whom the Department has received a report of abuse or neglect and for all children in the Departments custody:
a. the full legal name of the child;
b. the childs date of birth;
c. the full legal name of the childs mother;
d. the childs mothers address;
e. the full legal name of the childs father;
64

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LaShawn A v. piron Modified Fina' Order
f. the childs fathers address;
g. the date the Department assumed physical custody of the child;
h. the date the Department assumed legal custody of the child;
i. all periods during which the Department had physical or legal custody of the child prior to the most recent period of custody;
j. the childs current legal status (e.g. committed to DHS. emergency care, etc.);
k. the date the childs current legal status was established;
I. the childs current permanency goal;
m. the date the childs current permanency goal
was established;
n. all prior permanency goals of the child and the dates that they were established;
o. the date the childs current, written case plan was established;
p. details about the current physical location of the child, including the type of facility in which the child is residing, the exact address of the facility in which the child is residing, and the name(s) of the person(s) who have direct caretaker responsibility for the child;
q. the names, employing organization, addresses, and phone numbers of all workers who have
65

- 272-
L!Shltwn A v. p/xon Modihd Fin.1 Order
responsibility of the child, whether they are Department or employees or employees of private organizations.
r. the name of the DHS supervisor(s) of the DHS workers who have responsibilitY fo"r the child;
s. the date that the DHS worker or supervisor assumed responsibility for the childs case;
t. the dates of all visits between the child and the childs worker(s); the dates of all visits between the child and the child's mother; the dates of all visits between the child and the child's father; and the dates of all visits between the child and the childs sibling(s);
u. for arTi child who has a sibling, hatf-sibling, parent, or child in the Department's custody, the name of· that person, that person's DCID number, and the name of that person's social worker(s)
v. the date of all physical examinations received by the child while in the Department's physical or legal custody;
w. the dates of all Judicial reviews received by a
child, specifying whether the review was a Judicial review or an administrative review; and
X. the date of the dispositional hearing required by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Wetfare Act of 1980.
2. For all facilities foster homes, group homes, institutions, Consortium or other contract homes, or arTf other facilities in which the Department places
66

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LaSh.!Wn A V. PiltOll Modified Fina' Ord.r
children:
a. the full name of the facility;
b. the type of facility, including aIlf special characteristics of the facility;
c. the exact street address of the facility (P.O. boxes not acceptable);
d. the phone number of the facility;
e. the full names of all individuals wrth caretaker responsibility at the facility;
f. in the cases of foster homes, the names and birthdates of all Ct'1i1dren in the facility;
g. whether the facility has a current and valid permit to operate as a foster-care facility;
h. the date the facility's current or most recent permit expires or expired;
i. the number of children for which the facility is licensed;
j. the date of the completion of the most recent monitoring of the facility; and
k. the name (s), employing organization(s), addresses, and phone numbers of the worker(s) with responsibility for monitoring the facility.
C. Mandated Worker/Supervisory Reports - In accordance with provisions of the Implementation Plan, the Department shall develop reports from the unitary computerized information system sufficient to assure that workers and supervisors have
67

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LaShltwn A v. OiltO" Modified Fin.I Order
adequate information to assure compliance with relevant provisions of District of Columbia law and with all the provisions of this decree.
1. No a minimum, the Departments unitary automated .- information system shall produce on a periodic basis but no less frequently than once a month, the following reports:
a. An alphabetized listing of all children in the Departments physical or legal custody, including the childs name, DCID number, legal status, birthdate, and the name and identification number of the childs DHS social worker. This listing shall be produced in sufficient quantity to assure its access to all DHS social workers;
b. For each DHS worker with direct responsibility
for arT'f children in the Departments physical or
legal custody, a listing of all children for whom that worker is responsible, including the childs name, DcrD number, regal status, planning goal, and physical location. This listing shall be distributed no less frequently than once a month to each worker with direct responsibility for arTj children in the Departments physical or legal custody;
c. For each DHSWorker with direct responsibility for arry children in the Departments physical or legal custody, a listing of all children for whom that worker is responsible for whom arTi of the following events either are late or are due in the sixty days following the report: expiration of allowed emergency care status, case plan
review, administrative review, judicial review, Or
dispositional hearing. This listing shall be
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L.&Sn.wn A v. oillOn Modifi~ Final Qrd.,
distributed no less frequently than once a month to each worker with direct responsibility for arrt children in the Departments physical or legal custody;
d. For each OHS supervisor who has principal responsibility for arTj child in the Departments physical or legal custody. a listing of aJl children for whom that supervisor is responsible and the childs OCID number. This listing shall be distributed to each Branch chief and to the CFSD Chief;
e. A listing of all children. by DHS unit. who have been in emergency care for more than 21 days. including the childs. name. DCID number. and the name and identification number of the childs DHS social worker. This listing shall be produced in sufficient quantity to assure its access to all DHS social workers;
f. A listing of all facilities - foster homes. group homes. institutions. Consortium or other contract homes, or arTo/ other facility for which
aITf vacancies exist. including the name of the
facility; the type of facility; and the number of vacancies. This listing shall be produced on a daily basis and provided daity to the DHS office responsible for placing children in the Departments custody;
g. A listing of all children. by OHS unit, who are placed in facilities foster homes, group homes, institutions. Consortium or other contract homes. or arrt other facility that do not have current valid permits or licenses. including the childs name. OCIO number, and the name and identification number of the childs DHS social
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WhllWf'l A v. 01110" Modified Final Order

worker. This listing shall be produced in sufficient quantity to assure its access to all OHS social workers;

h.· A listing of all children, by OHS unit, who are placed in facilities foster homes, group homes, institutions, Consortium or other contract
homes, or arTf other facility in which there are
more children than is permitted by the facilitys license or permit, including the childs name, OCIO number. and the name and identification number of the childs OHS social worker;

i.

A listing of each facility - foster home, group

home, institution, Consortium or other contract

home, or a.rTf other facility - in which there are

more children than is permitted by the facilitys

license or permit, including the names of all

children in the facility, and the name(s) and

identification number(s) of the OHS social

worker(s) responsible for children in the faCility.

This report shall be distributed to the Monitoring

Unit, to each worker with children on the report,

and to the CFSD Chief; and

j.

A listing of all DHS social workers, by DHS unit,

who have caseloads in excess of the caseload

limits established in Section XI of this Order,

including the name and identification of the

worker, the name of the workers supervisor,

and the size of the workers caseload.

O. Mandated Management Reports - The Departments unitary computerized information system shall produce reports sufficient to assure that Department management personnel can effectively manage the Department and can achieYe compliance with all the provisions of this decree as well as with all relevant provisions of relevant District case law.

70

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LaSh8Wn A V. 0110" Modified Final Rd.,
E. Mandated Child-Specific Noncompliance Reports - The Department shall assure that Department supervisory personnel and the LaShawn A. Monitorreceive on an ongoing basis, reports identifying all children for whom Department practice is out of compliance with the substantial provisions of this Order:
1. M.. a minimum, the following types of cases shall be reported:
a. All cases in which an investigation has not been initiated with 48 hours of the receipt of the report;
b. All cases in which an investigation has not been completed within 30 days of the receipt of the report of abuse or neglect;
c. All cases in which a child has been in emergency care for more than 42 days;
d. All cases in which a child does not have a written case plan within 30 days of having entered the departments custody;
e. All cases in which a child has not received an administrative review during the preceding nine months;
f. All cases in which a child has not received a dispositional hearing within 21 months of having entered the Departments custody;
g. All cases in which a child under the age of six (6) has been placed in a congregate-care facility;
71

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U$h8wn A v. plJ:On Modifi~ FInal Q:det'
h. All cases in which a child has had a plan of adoption and who has not been referred to APRB within 30 days of the establishment of the permanency goal;
i. All cases in which a child under the age of twelve (12) has been assigned a permanency goal of continued care;
j. All cases in which a child under the age of sixteen (16) has been assigned a permanency goal of independent living.
F. The Department shall assure that sufficient resources, including personnel, are dedicated to the development and operation of the unitary computerized information system to assure that all information in the system is accurate and current:
1. In 8rrf instance in which a child comes into the Departments physical and legal custody, the information specified in Section XVII(B)(1)(a-t) of this section shall be entered into the system within 24 hours of the Department assuming custody of the child; and
2. In arT'f instance in which a child in the Departments physical or legal custody is placed in .aIT>J facility by or
on behatf of the Department, the information pertaining to the childs location shall be entered into the system within 24 hours of the placement.
G. The Department shall obtain sufficient computer hardware to assure that arTf social worker responsible either for investigations of abuse or neglect or responsible for children in the Departments physical or legal custody has direct and ready access to the information contained the Departments unitary computerized information system.
72

·279 .
LaShawn A v. DIllOn Modified Final Ord.r
H. In conjunction with the LaShawn A. Monitor, the Department
shall formally assess the Departments record-keeping practices as they relate to the foster-care system. Pursuant to this assessment, the Department shall make whatever changes are necessary to assure that case records are well-organized, complete, and·'useful for social workers and other Department personnel.
XVIII. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
A. In accordance with provisions of the Implementation Plan, the Department shall develop and implement policies and procedures by which it can maximize funds available to it through Trtles IV-B and IV-E of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Medicaid Act, and SSI.
B. All funds remitted to the District of Columbia by the United States Department of Health and Human Services under Trtles IV-B and IV-E of the Adoption Assistance and Child Vlelfare Act of 1980, the Medicaid Act, and SSI shall be committed exclusively to the provision of services and support, including staff serving the children in the class covered by this Order.
C. The Department budget allocated to the provision of services and support including staff serving the children in the class covered by this Order, shall not be decreased to reflect arry additional funds remitted to the District as a result of the Districts development and implementation of. policies and
procedures by which it cart maximize funds available to it
through Trtles IV-B and IV-E. of the AdoiJtion Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Medicaid N:;t, and sst. The
Defendants shall establish a mechanism by which the plaintiffs
can confirm that these budgetary funds are not offset in arry
waf·
73

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LfSh8"M! A V. 0"1'0" Modifi.cl Fina' Q:der
XIX. SPECIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION
A Within 90 days after the entry of this Order, in conjunction with the plaintiffs, the Department shall develop a plan to
. immediately take all necessary action on the status of children in the following categories:
1. Children in emergency care for more than 90 days;
2. Children placed in emergency facilities for more than 90 days;
3. Children placed in foster homes or facilities that exceed their licensed capacities or placed in facilities without a valid license;
4. Children with a permanency goal of retum home that has remained in effect for more than 18 months;
5. Children with a permanency goal of adoption for more than 30 days for whom no legal activity has been initiated to free the children for adoption;
6. Children with a permanency goal of adoption for more than 90 days who have not been referred to the Adoption Branch;
7. Children with a permanency goal of adoption for more than 9 months who are not in an approved adoptive placement;
8. Children under 12 with a permanency goal of long-term foster care or independent living; and
9. Children in facilities more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia..
B. In addressing the problems of children in the above-listed
74

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LaSh,..,.." A v. Q/ron M2difi!d Final OY,r
categories. the LaShawn A. Monitor may recommend that the Department create and fund special short-term units to review these childrens cases, that special emergency resources be created and made available, including funds to recruit. license and train additional and specialized foster or adoptive parents. and that the Corporation Counselor the Department shall make available designated attomeys to take necessary legal action. If the Monitors recommendations are not followed. plaintiffs may seek appropriate orders from the court.
XX. MONITORING AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Appointment and Authority
1. The LaShawn A Monitor (Monitor) shall be the Center for the Study of Social Policy, in Washington. D.C.
a. Should Tom Joe cease to serve as the Director of the Center for the Study of Social Policy, the plaintiffs and the defendants shall
review the appropriateness of the Center
continuing to serve as the Monitor.'
2. The Monitor shall be responsible solely to the court but shall work actively with the parties to assure the effective and prompt implementation of this Order.
3. The Monitor shall serve until the court determines. upon defendants' application. that the Monitor is no longer necessary.
B. Phased Implementation Plans
1. The Monitor shall prepare and present to the parties and the court an Implementation Plan within 120 days of the entry of this Order.
75

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LaS".""" A v. Dixon Modifi~ Fina' Order
2. The Implementation Plan shall be developed with the active participation of the parties. The Monitor shall assure that the plaintiffs and defendants have a full opportunity to consult and be involved with the development of the Implementation Plan.
3. The Implementation Plan shall contain the following:
a. Implementation Dates:
(1) The plan shall contain final implementation dates by which each of
the proviSions of this Order that do not
contain specific implementation timetables will be fully implemented consistent with the timelines established by Section XX(8)(S)(b).
(2) The plan shall also include interim dates, prior to the final implementation date, by which the provisions shall be partially implemented, and shall specify the degree of implementation required by each of the interim implementation dates for each of the provisions of this Order.
(3) The plan shall include dates for the completion of the needs assessments referred to in Section XV(8)(1), and for the completion of the Resource Development Plan referred to in Section XV(8)(3) and Section XV(D)(3). No later than 30 days after those assessments and the Resource Development Plan are completed, final and interim implementation dates, as required by Section XX (8)(3)(a)(1) and
76

- 283-
L!$hfW!! A v. Dixon Modified Final Ord,r
Section XX(B)(3)(a)(2) above for the development of the services and
resources required by Section x:v and
identified by the needs assessments
and Resource Development Plan, shall
be added 'r1t the Monitor to the
Implementation Plan which shall be
deemed amended by those additions.
b. Implementation Steps, Processes, and Tasks
(1) The Implementation Plan shall specify the steps and tasks necessary to achieve compliance with the provisions of this Order and to meet the interim and final implementation dates set forth in Section XX(B)(3)(a). The Plan shall
designate timelines by which the steps
and tasks are' to be accomplished and shall designate appropriate staffing levels and personnel to assure timely implementation of the Plan. The Plan shall also identify who shall be responsible for the steps and tasks, including outside contractors.
(2) This portion of the Implementation Plan shall be updated fNSry six months, and the updates shall list tasks accomplished and additional steps and tasks that may have been identified as additionally necessary to achieve compliance with the provisions of this Order. The updates shall also contain timetables for additional steps and tasks that have been identified as necessary to achieve compliance with this Order and timetables and the
n

- 284-
L!Shrwn A v. Q11:O" Modlfl&d Final Q:der
designation of personnel for these additional steps and tasks.
4. Upon completing the Implementation Plan or a plan
updat~, the Monitor shall submit the plan to the parties, arid.it shall become binding upon the parties and a part of this courts order. The plaintiffs arid
the defendants waive arT{ rights they may have to
challenge arT'/ aspect of arrt such plan and agree to
be bound by the plan.
5. Enforcement
a. All provisions of the Implementation Plan shall
be implemented, shall be fully binding on the defendants, and shall be enforceable by the court.
b. The defendants shall fully comply with all provisions of this Order by June 30, 1995, with the exception of Section XVII, with which the defendants shall comply fully by December 31, 1995.
C. The timelines in Section XX(S) (5) (b) may be extended with the consent of the plaintiffs, the defendants, the Monitor, and with the approval of the court.
C. Monitor Staffing and Spending
1. The Monitor shall prepare a Staffing and Spending Plan to cover the first twelve months follcming the entry of this Order and shall thereafter prepare Staffing and Spending Plans for each subsequent twelve-month period. The plan shall include position descriptions and vitas of the Center staff who will be engaged in development of implementation plans or
78

- 285-

Fin.' LaShr.Nn A v. piltOn Modihd

Q:d.r

monitoring.
2. The Director shall review and approve the Monitors Staffing and Spending· Plan within 10 days following its receipt or, if the Director decides not to approve the Plan on the ground that the expenditures are not necessary to enable the Monitor to fulfill its responsibilities under this Order, the Director shall submit the matter to the court for resolution within 15 days following the receipt of the plan.
3. The parties and the Monitor shall make good faith efforts to resolve 8.n'J disputes concerning the expenditures in the Monitors Staffing and Spending Plan prior to the submission of arTf disputes concerning the plan to the court, as provided in Section XX(C)(2) above.
4. The Monitor shall submit monthly invoices for the Directors review, approval, and processing for payment.
5. With respect to the Monitors first Staffing and Spending Plan, the District shall not be obligated to expend more than $300,000.
D. Monitoring and Reporting
1. The Monitor shall have access to all information, records, personnel and reports and shall have the authority to require reports on the status of the implementation plan, the status of children, and compliance with this Order.
2. After the completion of the Implementation Plan mandated by Section XX(S), the Monitor shall issue a report e-lery 90 days concerning the status and progress made by the defendants toward compliance
79

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LaShltWf'l A v. O/!O!! l.4odifi~ Final Order
with the implementation plans and with the provisions of this Order.
a. The Monitors reports shall be provided to the parties and, if it so orders, to the court.
b. The parties and the Monitor Oncluding their successors, officers, agents, servants, employees, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them) shaJl not disclose af"'rj indMdual1y identifiable information concerning children, their parents, or their foster or adoptive parents.
E. Policies and Procedures
1. In developing the pOlicies and procedures required by this Order, the defendants shall consutt and work collaboratively with the plaintiffs and the Monitor.
2. All policies and procedures developed by the Department pursuant to Section XX(E)(1) shall be provided to the Monitor and plaintiffS 30 days before such pOlicies and procedures are due under the terms of this Order.
3. If upon submission of proposed policies and procedures, the plaintiffs object to af"'rj such policy or procedure, they shall submit to the defendants in writing within 15 days of receipt of the proposed pOlicies and procedures their objections and any proposed changes. The defendants shall then have 15 days to accept or to reject the plaintiffs' proposed changes.
4. After the Departments submission of the pOlicies and procedures as provided by Section XX(E)(2), in the event that the Monitor determines that the policies
80

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L&SMwn A v. DIN" Modifi~ Final O'der
and/or procedures are inconsistent with the ~isions of this Order, or with reasonable professional standards, the Monitor shall make recommendations to the Department to ensure that the policies and/or procedures are consistent with the provisions of this Order and are consistent with reasonable professional standards.
5. After the Department's submission or resubmission
of the policies and procedures as provided 'r:f.J
Section XX(E)(2), in the event that plaintiffs determine that such policies and or procedures are inconsistent with the terms of this Order, do not address the legal violations determined by this court's decision and order, or are inconsistent with reasonable professional standards, and defendants fail to make
necessary revisions, plaintiffs may bring this matter
to the attention of the court and seek further orders.
6. Those final policies and procedures mandated 'r:f.J
this Order shall be deemed incorporated into the final order and shall be enforceable by the court.
F. Miscellaneous
1. Plaintiffs shall have access to all information and reports and shall have the authority to require the defendants to provide all reports reasonably necessary to monitor the status of the Implementation Plan, the status of children, and compliance with this Order and applicable District of Columbia law.
2. All reports concerning compliance with the Implementation Plan, the status of children, and compliance with this Order that do not contain
81

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L!Sh~ A v. DillOn Modifi~ Final Order
indMdually identifiable information shall be public information.
3. Nothing in this Order shall limit the right of the plaintiffs to seek from the court appropriate relief. including the appointment of a Special Master, to
remedy ant violations of the courts Order or a.rT'/ violations of arrt provision of an Implementation Plan
or to seek arT'f other relief necessary to implement
the provisions of this Order or Implementation Plan or necessary to remedy the violations identified in the
courts opinion of April 18. 1991. The plaintiffs agree
not to seek Judicial relief for technical. de minimus violations of this Order or of the Implementation Plan.
G. All claims by plaintiffs for costs and attorneys fees are reserved.
H. Except as expressly provided herein. defendants do not waive arTf
rights available under applicable laws.
I. The court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter.
XXI. DEFINITIONS
Unless expressly defined otherwise in this Order. the follOWing
terms are defined as follows:
A. -Administration,· -Family Services Administration,- or ·FSA· is the Family Services Administration of the Commission on Social Services of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services, or its successor agency.
B. '!Adoption Branch- is the Adoption and Placement Resources Branch of the Child and Family Services
82

- 289-

~.

LfSMwr! A v. p/ll9!! Modl1ltd Flnal Q:d.,

~

Division of the Family Services Administration of the Commission on Social Services of the District of Columbia, Department of Human Services. or its successor entity.
C. ·Commission- or ·Commission on Social Services· is the Commission on Social Services of the District of Columbia, Department of Human Services. or its successor agency.
D. ·Custody" refers to the physical or legal custody of a child. whichever comes first in time.
E. ·Departmenr or ·Department of Human Services· is the District of Columbia Department of Human Services, or its successor agency.
F. ·Distria- is the District of Columbia.
G. ·Division.- ·Child and Family Services Oivision.- or ·CFSO- is
the Child and Family Services Division of the Family Services Administration of the Commission on Social Services of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services. or its successor agency.
H. ·Division Chier is the Chief of the Child and Family Services Division of the Family Services Administration of the Commission on Social Services of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services. or its successor agency.
I. ·Emergency Care- or -EC- is the custody authorized by D.C. Code Ann. Section 6-2124(c)(1).
J. ·Police- or ·Police Departmenf is the Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD).

83

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P'm l..I.Shrwn A v. Qi!O!! Modifitd Final
XXII. RESERVATION OF DEFENDANTS' APPEAL RIGHTS A. Nothing in thls Order shall PrEMnt the.. Defendants from appealing 8ff'/ portion of this Order or the Courts April 1B, 1991 Memorandum Opinion assessing liability against the Defendants.
B. The Defendants shall not seek a stat of this Order if
Defendants decide to appeal the Court~ April 18, 1991 Memorandum Opinion.
-
C. In the event that the courts Memorandum Opinion of April 18, 1991, Is vacated on appeal in its entirety, this Order and arT'/ subsequent implementation plan or plans shall be null and void. In the event that the courts Memorandum Opinion of April 1B, 1991, is vacated on appeal in part, the portions of this Order or' SIfoJ subsequent implementation plan or plans that are directly based on that part of the Memorandum Opinion that is vacated shall be null and void.
84

 
 APPEAL,CLOSED,MEDIATION,TYPE−E
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:89−cv−01754−TFH

LASHAWN A., et al v. BOWSER, et al Assigned to: Judge Thomas F. Hogan Demand: $0 Case: 1:10−cv−00461−JDB Case in other court: USCA, 10−07045
USCA, 10−07139 USCA, 11−07002 Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights Receiver DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHILD WELFARE
Plaintiff LASHAWN A. By her next friend, Evelyn Moore

Date Filed: 06/20/1989 Date Terminated: 10/19/1991 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Michael D. Jones KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 655 15th Street, NW Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 879−5000 Fax: (202) 879−5200 Email: michael.jones@kirkland.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser A Better Childhood, Inc., 355 Lexington Avenue Floor 16 New York, NY 10017 646−795−4456 Fax: (914)238−0365 Email: srglasser@abetterchildhood.org TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 330 Seventh Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 (212) 683−2210 Fax: (212) 683−4015 Email: adembrow@childrensrights.org TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 915 15th Street, NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 601−4266 Fax: (202) 457−0805 Email: artspitzer@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Dunn NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, INC. 404 Park Avenue South 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 (212) 683−2210 TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 404 Park Avenue South 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 (212) 683−2210 Fax: (212) 683−4015 Email: epitchal@childrensrights.org TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson MEISELMAN DENLEA PACKMAN CARTON & EBERZ PC 1311 Mamaroneck Ave. White Plains, NY 10605 (914) 517−5000 Fax: (914) 517−5055 Email: jfrei−pearson@mdpcelaw.com TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 330 Seventh Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 (212) 638−2210 Fax: (212) 683−4015 TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kathryn A. Wood CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 330 Seventh Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 (212) 683−2210 Fax: (212) 683−4015 Email: kwood@childrensrights.org TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Marcia Robinson Lowry A BETTER CHILDHOOD, INC. 1095 Hardscrabble Road Chappaqua, NY 10514 (646) 808−7344 Fax: (914) 238−0365 Email: mlowry@abetterchildhood.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
DEMERICK B. By his next friend Dr. Owne Rennert

Michael Sara Bartosz CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 330 7th Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 (212) 683−2210 Fax: (212) 683−4015 Email: sbartosz@childrensrights.org TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 330 Seventh Avenue 4th Floor New York, NY 10001 (212) 683−2210 Ext. 332 Fax: (212) 683−4015 TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe A BETTER CHILDHOOD, INC. 1095 Hardscrabble Road Chappaqua, NY 10514 (347) 687−2063 Fax: (914) 238−0365 TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address)
Christopher Thomas Dunn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow

Plaintiff
GARY C. By his next friends, Crystal and Wesley Brown

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kathryn A. Wood (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Marcia Robinson Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sara Bartosz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address)
Christopher Thomas Dunn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012

Plaintiff
LEO C. By his next friends, Crystal and Wesley Brown

PRO HAC VICE
Kathryn A. Wood (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Marcia Robinson Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sara Bartosz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address)
Christopher Thomas Dunn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff
ROBERT D. By his next friend, Daryl Anette Chamblee

Kathryn A. Wood (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Marcia Robinson Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sara Bartosz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address)
Christopher Thomas Dunn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kathryn A. Wood (See above for address)

Plaintiff
KEVIN E. By his next friend, Elizabeth Velez

TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Marcia Robinson Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sara Bartosz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address)
Christopher Thomas Dunn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kathryn A. Wood (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE

Plaintiff
TYRONE F. By his next friends, Eva Nash and Anatasia Holmes. On their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

Marcia Robinson Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sara Bartosz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Sara Robinson−Glasser (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Adam C. Dembrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Arthur B. Spitzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Dunn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/01/1995
Craig R. Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/05/1999
Erik S. Pitchal (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
Jeremiah Frei−Pearson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kara Morrow (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 PRO HAC VICE
Kathryn A. Wood (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014 PRO HAC VICE

V.
Defendant
MARION S. BARRY, JR. As Mayor of the District of Columbia TERMINATED: 05/22/2001

Marcia Robinson Lowry (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Sara Bartosz (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/12/2014
Patrick S. Almonrode (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/24/2014 PRO HAC VICE
Sarah Jaffe (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/23/2020 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anna Elizabeth Blackburne−Rigsby DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUPERIOR COURT 500 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 4450 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 879−0055 TERMINATED: 12/05/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arlene L. Robinson DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUPERIOR COURT 500 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 4450 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 879−1327 TERMINATED: 05/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Lynn Ziegler LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 1401 New York Avenue, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 662−8600 Email: cziegler@lawyerscomm.org TERMINATED: 05/14/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene A. Adams , III OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C. 441 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001−4600 (202) 724−6636 TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques P. Lerner D.C. Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Office of the General Counsel 1100 4th St. SW 5th Floor Washington, DC 20024 (202) 724−1342 Fax: (202) 741−5908 Email: jacques.lerner@dc.gov TERMINATED: 10/25/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria−Claudia T. Amato DC OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2000 14th Street, NW Suite 756 Washington, DC 20009 (202) 671−2037 Fax: (202) 671−2514 Email: maria.amato@dc.gov TERMINATED: 08/15/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natalie Frazier Allen OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, D.C. 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 6N79 Washington, DC 20001−4600 (202) 727−3500 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger DC OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−5168 Email: robert.utiger@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA School of Law 4200 Connecticut Avenue, NW Room 39/301Q Washington, DC 20008 (202) 274−5400 Fax: 202−274−5320 Email: ralexander@udc.edu TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter A. Smith , Jr. 700 Seventh Street, SW

Defendant
PETER G. PARHAM Director of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services TERMINATED: 01/19/2010

Apartment 815 Washington, DC 20024 (202) 488−9223 TERMINATED: 10/12/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beverly Jean Burke WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT COMPANY 101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20080 (202) 624−6177 Email: bburke@washgas.com TERMINATED: 11/04/1993
Michael Edward Zielinski SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of Hearings and Appeals 501 West Ocean Boulevard Suite 6420 Long Beach, CA 90802 (562) 980−4190 TERMINATED: 09/19/1997
Richard S. Love DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Office of the Solicitor General 441 Fourth Street, NW 6th Floor South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6635 Fax: (202) 727−0491 Email: richard.love@dc.gov TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
Victor E. Long REGAN ZAMBRI & LONG, PLLC 1919 M Street, NW Suite 350 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 822−1867 Fax: (202) 463−0776 Email: vlong@reganfirm.com TERMINATED: 11/02/1993 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anna Elizabeth Blackburne−Rigsby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arlene L. Robinson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Lynn Ziegler (See above for address)

Defendant
BARBARA BURKE−TATUM As Commissioner of the Commission on

TERMINATED: 09/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene A. Adams , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques P. Lerner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria−Claudia T. Amato (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natalie Frazier Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter A. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beverly Jean Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993
Michael Edward Zielinski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/19/1997
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
Victor E. Long (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/02/1993 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew J. Saindon OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL/DC

Social Services of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services

Public Interest Division/Civil Enforcement Section 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−6643 Fax: (202) 730−1470 Email: andy.saindon@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Elizabeth Blackburne−Rigsby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arlene L. Robinson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Lynn Ziegler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene A. Adams , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques P. Lerner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria−Claudia T. Amato (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natalie Frazier Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter A. Smith , Jr. (See above for address)

Defendant
JEAN R. HUNTER As Acting Administrator of the Family Services Administration of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services TERMINATED: 01/19/2010

TERMINATED: 10/12/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beverly Jean Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993
Michael Edward Zielinski (See above for address)
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
Victor E. Long (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/22/1990 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anna Elizabeth Blackburne−Rigsby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arlene L. Robinson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Lynn Ziegler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/14/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene A. Adams , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques P. Lerner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria−Claudia T. Amato (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natalie Frazier Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger (See above for address)

Defendant
EVELYN P. ANDREWS As Acting Chief of the Child and Family Services Division of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services TERMINATED: 01/19/2010

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter A. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beverly Jean Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993
Michael Edward Zielinski (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/19/1997
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
Victor E. Long (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/22/1990 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew J. Saindon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anna Elizabeth Blackburne−Rigsby (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/05/1995 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Arlene L. Robinson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Cheryl Lynn Ziegler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/19/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene A. Adams , III (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacques P. Lerner (See above for address)

Defendant ANTHONY WILLIAMS Mayor, Washington, D.C. TERMINATED: 05/21/2007
Defendant ADRIAN M. FENTY as Mayor of the District of Columbia

TERMINATED: 10/25/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria−Claudia T. Amato (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/15/2000 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Natalie Frazier Allen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert C. Utiger (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robin C. Alexander (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter A. Smith , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/12/1999 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beverly Jean Burke (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/04/1993
Michael Edward Zielinski (See above for address)
Victor E. Long (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/22/1990 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Grace Michele Lopes OFFICE OF GRACE M. LOPES, ESQ 1220 19th Street, NW Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 232−8311 Fax: (202) 232−2052 Email: gmlopes@sparb.org TERMINATED: 05/08/2003 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
represented by Ellen A. Efros COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF

TERMINATED: 01/12/2011
Defendant CLARENCE H. CARTER Director of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services Defendant ROQUE GERALD Director of the Child and Family Services Agency of the District of Columbia
Defendant FRED SWAN Family Services Administrator of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services Defendant VINCENT C. GRAY as Mayor of the District of Columbia TERMINATED: 03/25/2015

COLUMBIA Office of the General Counsel 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 4 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 724−7820 Fax: (202) 724−8129 Email: eefros@dccouncil.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucy E. Pittman OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Office of the Solicitor General 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600S Washington, DC 20001 (202) 727−3881 Fax: (202) 741−5925 Email: lucy.pittman@dc.gov TERMINATED: 06/17/2016
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
represented by Andrew J. Saindon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew J. Saindon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
represented by Andrew J. Saindon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ellen A. Efros (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lucy E. Pittman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/17/2016
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016

Defendant MURIEL BOWSER as Mayor of the District of Columbia
V. Interested Party CHRISTIAN GREENE TERMINATED: 11/07/2019
Movant STATE OF MARYLAND

represented by Andrew J. Saindon (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ellen A. Efros (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Amanda J. Montee OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−5691 Fax: (202) 741−8934 Email: amanda.montee@dc.gov TERMINATED: 12/19/2018
Esther Yong McGraw D.C. Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Office of the General Counsel 1100 4th St. SW 5th Floor Washington, DC 20024 (202) 442−8409 Email: esther.mcgraw2@dc.gov TERMINATED: 07/17/2018
Lucy E. Pittman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/17/2016
Richard S. Love (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/01/2016
represented by F. Douglas Hartnett ELITOK & HARTNETT AT LAW, PLLC 1101 30th Street, NW Ste 500 Washington, DC 20007 (202) 965−0529 Email: dhartnett@elitokandhartnett.com TERMINATED: 11/07/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
represented by Carol A. Smith OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Assistant Attorney General Saratoga State Center 311 West Saratoga Street

Amicus NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON CHAPTER
Amicus AMERICAN FEDERATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, AFL−CIO
Amicus AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Room 1015 Baltimore, MD 21201 (410) 767−7726 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine M. Shultz OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Assistant Attorney General Saratoga State Center 311 West Saratoga Street Room 1015 Baltimore, MD 21201 (410) 767−7726 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lawrence Hillel Mirel WILEY REIN LLP 1776 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 719−7449 Fax: (202) 719−7049 TERMINATED: 11/02/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anton Hajjar MURPHY ANDERSON PLLC 1300 L Street, NW Suite 1210 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 223−2620 Fax: (202) 682−9276 Email: ahajjar@murphypllc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia G. Jones LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA G. JONES 1050 17th Street, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036−5517 (202) 785−4199 Fax: (202) 582−0533 Email: marciajoneslawoffice@yahoo.com TERMINATED: 11/02/1993 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kimberlee Keller AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE & COUNTY MUNICIPAL EMPLOY UNION 1101 17th Street, NW

Amicus DC KINCARE ALLIANCE
Amicus MARLA PAM SPINDEL Movant JEANNE ASHERMAN Guardian ad litem for unnamed class members Christopher M., Brian M., Kevin M., Katrina M., Lisa M., Tamara B., Takea B., and Jonathan B.
Movant BARBARA BATTLE
Movant WILLIE F. CALHOUN
Movant RICHARD P. DIGERONIMO

Suite 1210 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 775−5900
represented by Colin Ryle Kass PROSKAUER ROSE LLP 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 600 South Washington, DC 20004 (202) 416−6890 Fax: (202) 416−6899 Email: ckass@proskauer.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marla P. Spindel DC KINCARE ALLIANCE 1101 CONNECTICUT AVENUE SUITE 450 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 (202) 360−7106 Email: marla@dckincare.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter J. Nickles DC GOVERNMENT 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W Suite 300 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 727−1597 Fax: 202−778−5394 Email: peter.nickles@dc.gov TERMINATED: 01/13/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson 1200 G Street, NW Suite 370 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 628−1105 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Movant JESURENA R. GRIFFIN
Movant JOHN KUKLISH
Movant DIANE ROBINSON
Movant FRANK SAMUEL on behalf of supervisory social workers of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services Intervenor PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON
Intervenor LAUREL V. LEVITA

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Quentin Pearson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON 107 Seventh Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202) 547−8301 Fax: AREA CODE (202) PRO SE
represented by LAUREL V. LEVITA 4718 Tallahassee Avenue Rockville, MD 20853 (301) 929−0783 Fax: AREA CODE (301) PRO SE

Date Filed 06/20/1989 06/20/1989
06/20/1989 06/26/1989

# Docket Text
1 MOTION by plaintiff for leave to file complaint omitting last names of the infant plaintiffs , declaration (Under Seal in Room 1800) (yep) (bj, ). (Entered: 06/23/1989)
2 ORDER by Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson : granting motion for leave to file complaint omitting last names of the infant plaintiffs [1−1] by plaintiffs. Further, that the Declaration of Counsel shall be filed under seal. (N) (yep) (bj, ). (Entered: 06/23/1989)
3 COMPLAINT filed summons issued (5) (yep) (bj, ). (Entered: 06/23/1989)
4 AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of summons and complaint upon defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, the District of Columbia on 6/21/89 by process server (jda) (Entered: 06/27/1989)

07/10/1989
07/10/1989
07/12/1989
07/13/1989 07/14/1989 07/18/1989 07/18/1989 07/21/1989 07/24/1989 07/26/1989 07/28/1989
08/07/1989
08/10/1989
08/17/1989
08/28/1989 09/06/1989 09/06/1989 09/06/1989

5 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS by Robin C. Alexander−Smith (jda) (Entered: 07/11/1989)
6 MOTION by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS to extend time to answer to 7/18/89 (jda) (Entered: 07/11/1989)
9 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to answer to 7/18/89 [6−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. (N) (jda) (Entered: 07/18/1989)
7 MOTION by plaintiffs to certify class action ; Exhibits (2) (jda) (Entered: 07/14/1989)
8 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to extend time to answer to 7/18/89 [6−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. (jda) (Entered: 07/18/1989)
10 ANSWER for defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS , (jda) (bj, ). (Entered: 07/19/1989)
CALENDARED CD/N (jda) (Entered: 07/19/1989)
11 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : parties to file a joint proposed scheduleing plan on 8/15/89 ; referring discovery matters or other matters arising during the month of August to Magistrate Robinson (N) (mf) (Entered: 07/25/1989)
CASE REFERRED to Magistrate Deborah A. Robinson for discovery matters during the month of August (mbd) (Entered: 07/25/1989)
12 MOTION by defendants to extend time to 8/10/89 to respond to class certification (mf) (Entered: 07/27/1989)
13 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 8/10/89 to respond to class certification [12−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. response to motion due 8/10/89 (N) (mf) (Entered: 07/31/1989)
14 REQUEST by plaintiffs to defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS for production of documents (mf) (Entered: 08/08/1989)
15 MEMORANDUM by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS in opposition to motion to certify class action [7−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (2) (jda) (Entered: 08/11/1989)
16 REPLY by plaintiffs to memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for class certification, exhibit [15−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. (mf) (Entered: 08/17/1989)
17 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION by plaintiff of various personnel of DC Department of Human Services (mf) (Entered: 08/29/1989)
18 PROPOSED SCHEDULING PLAN by parties (fiat) HOGAN, J. (jda) (Entered: 09/08/1989)
19 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : for Marcia Robinson Lowry to appear pro hac vice (N) (jda) (Entered: 09/08/1989)
20 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : defendants' dispositive motions due 9/22/89 with the oppositions and replies due thereafter as provided in Local Rule 108; hearing set for 9:30 11/3/89; parties to proceed with discovery (N) (jda) (Entered: 09/08/1989)

09/22/1989 09/29/1989 10/06/1989
10/06/1989 10/10/1989 10/27/1989 10/30/1989 10/30/1989 11/03/1989 11/03/1989 11/07/1989
11/07/1989 11/07/1989 11/20/1989 11/22/1989
12/14/1989 12/14/1989 12/14/1989 12/14/1989 12/18/1989 12/18/1989 01/05/1990 01/15/1990

21 MOTION by defendants to dismiss (ajr) (Entered: 09/27/1989)
22 JOINT MOTION by parties for protective order (jda) (Entered: 10/02/1989)
23 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to dismiss [21−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR.; exhibits (8) (mf) (Entered: 10/10/1989)
24 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : stating terms of protective order (N) (mf) (Entered: 10/11/1989)
25 DEPOSITION of YVONNE ZABRISKIE taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 10/11/1989)
26 DEPOSITION of CAROLYN SMITH taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 10/30/1989)
27 MOTION by amicus NAT.ASSN. SOC.WKRS. to file amicus brief ; appendix (3) EXHIBIT (Brief) (mf) (Entered: 11/01/1989)
28 MOTION for AMER FED STATE, COUNTY & MUN EMP to file amicus brief ; EXHIBIT (Brief) (mf) (Entered: 11/01/1989)
29 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Victor E. Long (jda) (Entered: 11/06/1989)
30 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:30 11/20/89 ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/06/1989)
31 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to file amicus brief [27−1] by NAT.ASSN. SOC.WKRS., granting motion for AMER FED STATE, COUNTY & MUN EMP to file amicus brief [28−1] (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1989)
32 NOTICE OF FILING of brief by amicus AMER. FED. STATE CO.; attachment (mf) (Entered: 11/15/1989)
33 NOTICE OF FILING of brief by amicus NAT.ASSN. SOC.WKRS. (mf) (Entered: 11/15/1989)
34 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for AMER FED STATE, COUNTY & MUN EMP to file amicus brief [28−1] (N) (mf) (Entered: 11/22/1989)
35 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 1:30 1/22/90 ; discovery due 5/15/89 ; plaintiff's rule 26(b) 5/15/90 ; defendant's rule 26(b) due 8/15/90 dispositive motions due 10/1/89 ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/27/1989)
36 DEPOSITION of CECILLE C. HOLLINGSWORTH taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 12/14/1989)
37 DEPOSITION of CAROLYN SMITH taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 12/14/1989)
38 DEPOSITION of TONI M. HARVEY taken for plaintiffs; exhibits (mf) (Entered: 12/14/1989)
39 DEPOSITION of BARBARA BATTLE taken for plaintiffs; exhibits (mf) (Entered: 12/14/1989)
40 TRANSCRIPT filed o f hearing for dates of 11/3/89 reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 12/19/1989)
41 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for dates of 11/20/89 reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 12/19/1989)
42 REQUEST by plaintiffs to defendants for production of documents (mf) (Entered: 01/08/1990)
109 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 1/18/91 nunc pro tunc to file pretrail statement [108−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. defendant's pretrial statement due 1/18/91 (N) (mf) (Entered: 01/17/1991)

01/22/1990 01/23/1990 02/06/1990 02/06/1990 02/08/1990 03/15/1990 03/16/1990 03/22/1990 03/22/1990 03/23/1990 03/26/1990
03/28/1990 03/29/1990
04/05/1990 04/11/1990
04/13/1990
04/18/1990 04/19/1990 04/19/1990 04/27/1990

43 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 1:45 3/28/90 ; (N) (mf) (Entered: 01/26/1990)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 1:45 3/28/90 ; reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 01/26/1990)
44 MOTION to withdraw as attorney for defendants Robin C. Alexander−Smith (mf) (Entered: 02/07/1990)
45 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for dates of 1/22/90 reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 02/07/1990)
46 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw as attorney for defendants of Robin C. Alexander−Smith [44−1] (N) (mon) (Entered: 02/08/1990)
47 RESPONSE by defendants MARION S. BARRY JR.,PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, and EVELYN P. ANDREWS to request for production of documents (mf) (Entered: 03/15/1990)
48 MOTION by plaintiffs for appointment of experts pursuant to Rule 706 ; affidavit (1); attachments (mf) (Entered: 03/16/1990)
49 MOTION by defendants to extend time to 4/6/90 for appointment of experts (mf) (Entered: 03/22/1990)
50 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of withdrawal of counsel Victor E. Long (mf) (Entered: 03/22/1990)
53 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION by plaintiffs of the Department of Human Services (jda) (Entered: 04/02/1990)
51 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 4/6/90 for appointment of experts [49−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. response to motion for appointment of excpers due by 4/6/90 (N) (mf) (Entered: 03/28/1990)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
52 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 10:00 4/12/90 at whicb time newly designated counsel for defendants (Eugene Adams) shall be prepared to discuss his response to plaintiffs' pending motion to appoint experts; response to motion by defendants due 4/17/90 (N) (mf) (Entered: 03/30/1990)
CASE referral ended Magistrate Deborah A. Robinson (mbd) (Entered: 04/05/1990)
54 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS by Eugene A. Adams (mf) (Entered: 04/12/1990)
55 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : discovery due 7/16/90 ; status hearing set for 9:30 7/17/90 ; plaintiff's rule 26(b) 7/16/90 ; defendant's rule 26(b) due 10/15/90 dispositive motions due 11/16/90 ; defendants have until l0/15/90 to depose plaintiffs' experts, and plaintiffs have until ll/12/90 to depose defendants' experts. (N) (gew) (Entered: 04/14/1990)
56 MEMORANDUM by defendant in opposition to motion for appointment of experts pursuant to Rule 706 [48−1] by plaintiff (mf) (Entered: 04/18/1990)
57 TRANSCRIPT filed for dates of 3/28/90 reporter: A Thomson (jda) (Entered: 04/20/1990)
58 TRANSCRIPT filed for dates of 4/12/90 reporter: A Thomson (jda) (Entered: 04/20/1990)
59 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION by plaintiffs of various agency departments (mf) (Entered: 04/30/1990)

05/07/1990 05/10/1990
05/10/1990
05/14/1990
05/17/1990
05/18/1990 06/01/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/07/1990 06/08/1990 06/12/1990
06/18/1990
06/18/1990 06/20/1990

60 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : discovery due 7/30/90 ; status hearing set for 9:30 7/31/90 ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 05/08/1990)
61 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that defendants shall produce to the plaintiffs by Friday, 5/1//90 the following: (1) for each named plaintiffs child, all cae records including foster care records, family, foster=parent, consortium records and adoptin records, not already produced pursuant to plaintiffs request of 8/4/89; (2) for each named plaintiff's chiled, all documents added to the child's foster−care or family record since it was produced pursuant to the request of 8/4/89 (N) (mf) (Entered: 05/14/1990)
62 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that in conjunction with the case review being conducted by the plaintiffs, the defendants shall produce to the plaintiffs each working day the complete records of 20 children identified in the sample provided by the plaintiffs to the defendants. The defendants shall produce records at the rate every working day until the case review is completed (N) (mf) (Entered: 05/14/1990)
63 MOTION by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS to extend time to 5/18/90 to respond to Court order of 5/9/90 (mf) (Entered: 05/15/1990)
65 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 5/18/90 to respond to Court order of 5/9/90 [63−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. due by 5/18/90 (N) (mf) (Entered: 05/22/1990)
64 RESPONSE by defendants to request for production of documents (mf) (Entered: 05/21/1990)
66 MOTION by plaintiffs for order to make plaintiffs children available for medical examination (mf) (Entered: 06/04/1990)
67 DEPOSITION of Mary Urquhart taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
68 DEPOSITION of Barbara Battle taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
70 DEPOSITION of Shermain Bowden taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
71 DEPOSITION of Cheryl Stancell taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
72 DEPOSITION of Urcisia Cajilog taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
73 DEPOSITION of Geneva Ware taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
74 DEPOSITION of Lastenia Pretlow taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
75 DEPOSITION of Joseph C. Rae taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
69 DEPOSITION of Rania Bahnan taken for plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 06/08/1990)
76 MEMORANDUM by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS in opposition to motion for order to make plaintiffs children available for medical examination [66−1] by plaintiff (mf) (Entered: 06/14/1990)
77 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for order to make plaintiffs children available for medical examination [66−1] by plaintiff; affidavit (1) (mf) (Entered: 06/19/1990)
78 MOTION by plaintiff to expedite motion for order to make children available for medical examination (mf) (Entered: 06/19/1990)
79 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to expedite motion for order to make children available for medical examination [78−1] by plaintiff; setting a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for an order to make plaintiff children available for medical examination before Judge Hogan at 9:30 a.m. on 7/5/90. (N) (bm) (Entered: 06/20/1990)

06/25/1990 06/26/1990 06/26/1990 06/26/1990 06/26/1990 06/28/1990 07/05/1990
07/09/1990 07/13/1990
07/18/1990 07/31/1990
07/31/1990 08/03/1990
08/13/1990 08/14/1990 08/22/1990 09/17/1990 09/20/1990
09/21/1990 09/21/1990 09/28/1990
10/02/1990

80 INTERROGATORIES and request to produce documents filed by defendants to plaintiffs; Exhibit (jda) (Entered: 06/26/1990)
81 DEPOSITION of Edwina Davis taken for plaintiffs (ajr) (Entered: 06/27/1990)
82 DEPOSITION of Joseph Rae taken for plaintiffs (ajr) (Entered: 06/27/1990)
83 DEPOSITION of Gwendolyn Menefee taken for plaintiffs (ajr) (Entered: 06/27/1990)
84 DEPOSITION of Alberta Oliver taken for plaintiffs (ajr) (Entered: 06/27/1990)
85 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery responses from defendants , and for expedited consideration Exhibits (3) (ajr) (Entered: 06/28/1990)
87 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to compel discovery responses from defendants [85−1] by plaintiff, granting motion for order to make plaintiffs children available for medical examination [66−1] by plaintiff plaintiff's rule 26(b) 7/30/90 as to non−psychiatric experts ; as to psychiatric experts, by 087/17/90 (N) (gew) (Entered: 07/12/1990)
86 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for dates of 7/5/90 reporter: Anneliese J. Thomson (cjp) (Entered: 07/11/1990)
88 MOTION by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS to extend time to 7/19/90 to comply with the Court's 7/5/90 order requiring defendants to supplement their responses to plaintiffs' December 1989 requests for production of documents (cjp) (Entered: 07/13/1990)
89 JOINT MOTION by parties to modify scheduling order (jda) (Entered: 07/19/1990)
90 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting joint motion to modify scheduling order [89−1] by defendant, plaintiff non−expert discovery due 8/13/90 ; plaintiff's rule 26(b) 8/13/90 ; (N) (mf) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
91 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that experts may attend depositions of other witnesses to assist and advise counsel, provided that advance notice of the expert's attendance is provided to opposing counsel. (N) (gew) (Entered: 08/03/1990)
92 RULE 26(b)(4) STATEMENT filed by plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 08/13/1990)
93 TRANSCRIPT filed of status conference for dates of 7/31/90 reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 08/15/1990)
94 MOTION by plaintiff to modify scheduling order and for expedited trial (mf) (Entered: 08/23/1990)
95 MOTION by defendant for protective order (ks) (Entered: 09/20/1990)
96 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to modify scheduling order and for expedited trial [94−1] by plaintiff dispositive motions due 10/19/90 ; status hearing set for 9:15 10/17/90 ; plaintiff's rule 26(b) 10/12/90 ; defendant's rule 26(b) due 10/1/90 (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/21/1990)
97 MOTION by defendants to compel discovery (mf) (Entered: 09/24/1990)
98 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for protective order [95−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR.; attachments (mf) (Entered: 09/24/1990)
99 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by plaintiff to motion to compel discovery [97−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR.; exhibit (1) (mf) (Entered: 10/01/1990)
100 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion for protective order [95−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR.; directing defendants to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests by 10/15/90. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/03/1990)

10/05/1990 10/05/1990 10/10/1990 10/17/1990 10/18/1990
11/02/1990
11/14/1990 01/09/1991 01/14/1991
01/18/1991 01/24/1991 01/24/1991 01/25/1991
01/31/1991 02/04/1991 02/05/1991 02/05/1991
02/06/1991 02/06/1991 02/06/1991 02/07/1991

101 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel discovery , and to expedite consideration of motion to compel ; exhibits (5) (mf) (Entered: 10/10/1990)
102 MOTION by plaintiffs to compel defendants to file Rule 26(b)(4) , and to expedite (mf) (Entered: 10/10/1990)
103 MOTION nunc pro tunc by defendants to extend time to 11/16/90 to complete discovery pursuant to order of 9/19/90 (mf) (Entered: 10/11/1990)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 10/18/1990)
104 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to compel defendants to file Rule 26(b)(4) [102−1] by plaintiff, granting motion to compel discovery [101−1] by plaintiff status hearing set for 1:30 12/3/90 ;directing defendants to file a Rule 26(b)(4) statement by 10/26/90; the parties have until 11/16/90 to complete despositions of experts. have until (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/19/1990)
105 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by defendants MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, and EVELYN P. ANDREWS to request for admissions (mf) (Entered: 11/05/1990)
106 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for dates of 10/17/90 reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 11/15/1990)
107 PRETRIAL STATEMENT by plaintiffs; Exhibit (kk) (Entered: 01/10/1991)
108 MOTION by defendants MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, and EVELYN P. ANDREWS to extend time to 1/18/91 nunc pro tunc to file pretrail statement (mf) (Entered: 01/15/1991)
110 PRETRIAL STATEMENTS by defendants (mf) (Entered: 01/23/1991)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 01/25/1991)
111 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for dates of 1/24/91 reporter: A. Thomson (mf) (Entered: 01/28/1991)
112 AMENDED PRETRIAL STATEMENTS due by defendants by 01/31/91 at 4:30 pm; defendants are to serve plaintiffs' local counsel by hand and plaintiffs' New York counsel by overnight mail; directing the parties, by the commencement of trial on 02/06/91, file with the Court legal briefs addressing the claims and defenses involved in this action, etc. (gew) (Entered: 01/29/1991)
113 PRETRIAL STATEMENTS (addendum) by defendant (mf) (Entered: 02/01/1991)
114 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of amended exhibit to pretrial order; attachment (1) (mf) (Entered: 02/05/1991)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 10:00 2/6/91 ; reporter: A Thomson (mf) (Entered: 02/08/1991)
116 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the parties; before presenting their respective cases, file with the Court and serve upon opposing counsel a written notice of the witnesses expected to be called to testify and the order in which they will testify; the parties shall provied the Court and opposing counsel with 24 hour notice of any changes in the schedule of witnesses (N) (mf) (Entered: 02/08/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan begun and continued to 02/07/91 at 9:45 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/07/1991)
115 TRIAL BRIEFS by defendants (mf) (Entered: 02/07/1991)
117 PRE−TRIAL BRIEFS by plaintiffs (mf) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/08/91 at 9:45 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/08/1991)

02/08/1991 02/10/1991 02/11/1991 02/13/1991 02/19/1991 02/20/1991 02/21/1991 02/26/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 03/19/1991 04/18/1991 04/18/1991
05/04/1991

NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/11/91 at 9:30 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/11/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/21/91 at l0:00 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/21/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/12/91 at 9:45 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/13/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/19/91 at 9:30 as; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/15/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/20/91 at 10:00 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/20/1991)
118 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of proposed list of witnesses "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 02/26/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and continued to 02/26/91 at 10:00 am; reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/22/1991)
NON−JURY TRIAL before Judge Thomas F. Hogan resumed and concluded reporter: A. Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/27/1991)
119 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 2/6/91 reporter: A. Thomsonn; Volume I; pages 1−139 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
120 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/7/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume II; pages 1−185 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
121 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 2/8/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume III; pages 1−143 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
122 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/11/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume IV; pates 1−143 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
123 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/12/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume V; pages 1−140 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
124 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/13/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume VI; pages 1−135 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
125 TRANSCRIPT (portion) filed for dates of 3/11/91 reporter: A Thomson (FILED UNDER SEAL ROOM 1800) (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
126 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/19/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume VII; pages 10177 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
127 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/20/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume VIII; pages 1−56 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
128 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/21/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume IX; pages 1−23 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
129 TRANSCRIPT filed of trial for dates of 3/26/91 reporter: A Thomson; Volume X; pages 1−70 (mf) (Entered: 03/20/1991)
130 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (N) (gew) (bj, ). (Main Document 130 replaced on 2/20/2015) (bj, ). (Entered: 04/18/1991)
131 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:15 5/10/91; adjudging the defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the federal and local statutory rights of all of the children in the plaintiff case and for violating the constitutional rights of those plaintiffs in the District of Columbia's foster care custody; prior to the status conference, the parties shall make a good faith effort to prepare a joint proposed schedule for resolving the final phase of this case. (N) (gew) (bj, ). (Entered: 04/18/1991)
133 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:30 7/10/91 ; motion hearing set for 9:30 7/24/91 ; , parties proposed final orders due by 6/28/91 (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/05/1991)

05/10/1991 06/28/1991 07/01/1991 07/10/1991 07/11/1991 07/12/1991 07/17/1991 07/17/1991 08/07/1991 08/14/1991 08/14/1991 08/21/1991
08/23/1991 08/26/1991 08/27/1991 09/05/1991 09/25/1991 09/26/1991 10/28/1991 12/23/1991

132 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:30 5/24/91 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/16/1991)
134 JOINT MOTION by defendants to extend time to 7/3/91 to file proposed final orders (ks) (Entered: 07/01/1991)
135 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting joint motion to extend time to 7/3/91 to file proposed final orders [134−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR. (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/02/1991)
136 JOINT MOTION by plaintiffs, defendants for entry into judgment of Remedial Order ; Exhibits (ks) (Entered: 07/11/1991)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 07/12/1991)
137 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : fairness hearing on the proposed remedial Order set for 9:30 8/26/91 ; parties to submit a joint proposed notice to Class Members of the proposed Remedial Order by 7/17/91 (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/15/1991)
138 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing notice of proposed entry of class action Order; objections to this are to be received by 8/20/91 to Judge Hogan; hearing to be held on 8/26/91 9:30 , (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/18/1991)
139 LEGAL NOTICE of Proposed Approval of Order resolving class action by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/18/1991)
140 JOINT MOTION by defendant, plaintiff to substitute of corrected proposed remedial Order ; Exhibit (1); EXHIBIT (PROPOSED FINAL ORDER) (ks) (bj, ). (Entered: 08/16/1991)
141 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting joint motion to substitute of corrected proposed remedial Order [140−1] by TYRONE F., MARION S. BARRY JR. (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/16/1991)
142 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant, plaintiff of PROPOSED FINAL ORDER, filed pursuant to Order of 89−1754 (ks) (Entered: 08/16/1991)
143 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that the comments and/or objections to the proposed remedial Order shall be made a part of the public record and the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to file the attached documents; Attachments; Exhibits (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/21/1991)
144 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in response to submissions concerning joint proposed Order (ks) (Entered: 08/26/1991)
FAIRNESS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 08/27/1991)
145 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting joint motion for entry into judgment of Remedial Order [136−1] by LASHAWN A., MARION S. BARRY JR. (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/28/1991)
146 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 8/26/91 reporter: Anneliese J. Thomson, Fairness Hearing before Judge Hogan (lpp) (Entered: 09/06/1991)
147 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant from order [145−1] entered 8/28/91; no fee − Government; Copies mailed to Christopher T. Dunn, and Elizabeth Symonds (ks) (Entered: 09/26/1991)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [147−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR. to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 09/26/1991)
USCA # 91−7159 assigned for appeal [147−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR. (ks) (Entered: 12/18/1991)
148 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/31/92 in which the Monitor's proposed implementation plan will be deemed effective, or, in the alternative, will be considered by the Court for approval (ajr) (Entered: 12/24/1991)

12/23/1991 12/31/1991
01/07/1992
01/31/1992 02/07/1992 02/14/1992 02/21/1992 02/21/1992 03/19/1992 04/27/1992 04/27/1992
05/18/1992 06/15/1992 06/15/1992 07/16/1992 07/30/1992 07/30/1992 08/04/1992 08/05/1992 08/05/1992

149 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Beverly Jean Burke (ajr) (Entered: 12/24/1991)
150 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to motion to extend time to 1/31/92 in which the Monitor's proposed implementation plan will be deemed effective, or, in the alternative, will be considered by the Court for approval [148−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 01/02/1992)
151 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 1/31/92 in which the Monitor's proposed implementation plan will be deemed effective, or, in the alternative, will be considered by the Court for approval [148−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS due by 1/31/92 (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/08/1992)
152 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 2/14/92 to file comments on the Monitor's proposed implementation plan (ks) (Entered: 02/03/1992)
153 RESPONSE by plaintiff(s) in opposition to motion to extend time to 2/14/92 to file comments on the Monitor's proposed implementation plan [152−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 02/10/1992)
154 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of comments on the Monitor's revised proposed Implementation Plan (ks) (Entered: 02/18/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/24/1992)
155 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:15 4/27/92 in Courtroom 9 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/25/1992)
156 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 2/21/92 reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 03/20/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 10:00 6/15/92 ; , ddl reporter: A Thomson (lin) (Entered: 04/27/1992)
157 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 10:00 6/15/92 ;; and that the Corrective Action Plan, appended to the Quarterly Progress Report submitted to the Court on 3/31/92, is incorporated into and made a part of the Implementation Plan adopted by this Court as part of its Final Order entered 8/26/91 (N) (ks) (bj, ). (Entered: 04/28/1992)
158 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 4/27/92 reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 05/18/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 06/15/1992)
159 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:30 7/27/92 in Courtroom 9 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/16/1992)
160 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 6/15/92 reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 07/17/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 07/31/1992)
161 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:30 8/5/92 ; (N) (jjc) (Entered: 07/31/1992)
162 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 7/30/92 reporter: C. Gansle (ajr) (Entered: 08/05/1992)
163 LETTER from the D.C. Office of Corporation Counsel to J. Hogan. (fiat, HOGAN, J.) (ajr) (Entered: 08/05/1992)
164 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:15 10/20/92 in Courtroom #9; (N) (ajr) (Entered: 08/05/1992)

08/05/1992 08/13/1992
09/01/1992 10/29/1992 10/30/1992 10/30/1992
11/23/1992 11/23/1992 11/24/1992 12/02/1992 12/18/1992 12/18/1992 12/22/1992
12/24/1992 01/08/1993
01/22/1993
01/25/1993 01/29/1993 01/29/1993 02/26/1993 04/30/1993 05/03/1993

STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 08/06/1992)
165 NOTICE OF FILING by counsel Symonds for plaintiffs of change of address/phone to: Elizabeth Symonds; AMERICAN CIVILLIBERTIES UNION; Washington Office; 122 Maryland Ave. NE; Washington, DC 20002; (202) 544−1681 (effective 8/31/92) (ajr) (Entered: 08/14/1992)
166 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 8/5/92 reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 09/02/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 10/29/1992)
167 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that defendant's to file an updated report due by 11/19/92 , status hearing set for 9:15 11/23/92 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1992)
168 LETTER dated 10/27/92 to Judge Hogan from plaintiffs Marcia Robinson Lowry of views on the status of implementation "Let this be filed" (fiat) Judge Hogan (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1992)
169 TRANSCRIPT filed of Status Call for date(s) of 10/29/92 Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 11/23/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 11/25/1992)
170 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:30 12/18/92 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/24/1992)
171 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 11/23/92 Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 12/03/1992)
172 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 9:00 12/23/92 to address any pending motions (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/21/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Carey Gansle (gew) (Entered: 12/22/1992)
173 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt and why the Court should not enter appropriate relief (ajr) (Entered: 12/28/1992)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson/Carrie Gansle (gew) (Entered: 12/24/1992)
174 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt and why the Court should not enter appropriate relief [173−1] by plaintiffs; Affidavit (1) (ks) (Entered: 01/11/1993)
175 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt and why the Court should not enter appropriate relief [173−1] by plaintiffs (ks) (Entered: 01/25/1993)
176 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 12/23/92. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 01/26/1993)
177 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that a quarterly review session shall be held on 3:00 4/30/93 in Courtroom #9 (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/02/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/02/1993)
178 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for dates of 1/29/93. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 03/01/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 05/04/1993)
179 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 1:30 5/14/93 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/04/1993)

05/05/1993 05/14/1993 05/25/1993 06/07/1993 06/08/1993 06/09/1993
06/15/1993 06/22/1993
06/22/1993
06/29/1993
07/16/1993
07/26/1993 07/26/1993
08/03/1993 08/03/1993
10/01/1993 10/01/1993

180 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 4/30/93. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 05/06/1993)
181 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : defendants' appropriate formal petition for modification of the Final Remedial Order and Implementation Plan due by 5/25/93 (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/14/1993)
182 MOTION filed by defendants to modify the terms of the plaintiff's remedial order and implementation plan ; exhibits (2) (lin) (Entered: 05/26/1993)
183 MOTION (unopposed) filed by plaintiff to extend time to 6/15/93 to file their response to defendants' motion to modify the terms of the LaShawn A. Remedial Order and Implementation Plan (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1993)
184 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for dates of 7/11/91. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1993)
185 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 6/15/93 to file their response to defendants' motion to modify the terms of the LaShawn A. Remedial Order and Implementation Plan [183−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/10/1993)
186 MOTION filed by plaintiff LASHAWN A. to extend time to 6/22/93 to file their response to defendants' motion to modify the Terms of the LaShawn A. Remedial Order and Implementation Plan (ks) (Entered: 06/16/1993)
187 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 6/22/93 to file their response to defendants' motion to modify the Terms of the LaShawn A. Remedial Order and Implementation Plan [186−1] by LASHAWN A. (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/23/1993)
188 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to modify the terms of the plaintiff's remedial order and implementation plan [182−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 06/23/1993)
189 REPLY by defendants to response to motion to modify the terms of the plaintiff's remedial order and implementation plan [182−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 06/30/1993)
190 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that parties may respond to the Center for the Study of Cocial Policy's analysis of the defferences between the Remedial Order and the Court−approved Implementation Plan and the District's proposals, if they so desire, within 10 days of this Order (N) (ks) (Entered: 07/16/1993)
191 RESPONSE by plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., and LASHAWN A. to Monitor's analysis of defendants' proposed modifications; exhibit A. (bm) (Entered: 07/26/1993)
192 RESPONSE by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, and SHARON PRATT KELLY to Court order [190−1] dated 7/16/93; attachments (4). (bm) (Entered: 07/27/1993)
194 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : (N) (jjc) (Entered: 08/04/1993)
195 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : motion hearing set for 10:00 10/1/93 in Courtroom 9, to consider defendants' motion to modify and any recommendations; parties are reminded that the Remedial Order and Implementation Plan remain in full effect at this time SO ORDERED (N) (jjc) (Entered: 08/04/1993)
194 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed 4/16/93 in USCA affirming USDC and remanding with instructions; opinion, on appeal [147−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR. USCA# 91−7159 (pmh) (Entered: 10/01/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson/Santa Zizzo (gew) (Entered: 10/04/1993)

10/04/1993
10/20/1993 10/22/1993 10/25/1993 10/28/1993
10/29/1993 11/01/1993 11/02/1993 11/03/1993 11/03/1993 11/04/1993
11/10/1993 11/12/1993
12/03/1993 12/06/1993 12/07/1993 12/08/1993 12/09/1993 12/09/1993

195 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : defendants are directed to file by 10/20/93 a brief addressing whether there are any portions in the Remedial Order that are inapproppriate in light of the DC Circuit's confirmation of this Court's opinion entirely on the basis of local law; plaintiffs directed to to file a response by 11/1/93; hearing set for 10:00 11/10/93 ; (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/05/1993)
196 MEMORANDUM by defendants on remand (ks) (Entered: 10/21/1993)
197 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of supplement to their memorandum on remand; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 10/25/1993)
198 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to compel compliance with the Court's Order of 10/4/93 (ks) (Entered: 10/26/1993)
199 RESPONSE by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to motion to compel compliance with the Court's Order of 10/4/93 [198−1] by plaintiffs; attachment. (bm) (Entered: 10/29/1993)
200 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 10/01/93. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 10/29/1993)
201 MOTION (unopposed) filed by plaintiff(s) for extension of time to 11/3/93 to file response to defendants' memorandum on remand and suppelmental filings (gdf) (Entered: 11/02/1993)
202 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for extension of time to 11/3/93 to file response to defendants' memorandum on remand [201−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/02/1993)
203 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing defendants' supplemental memorandum on Remand due 11/3/93 ; (N) (jjc) (Entered: 11/03/1993)
204 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to memorandum on remand [196−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 11/04/1993)
205 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL for defendant, substituting Arlene L. Robinson for attorney Eugene A. Adams III for MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, (ks) (Entered: 11/04/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 11/12/1993)
206 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Hearing set for 2:00 12/6/93 ; regarding the proposed remedial order. Additionally, the Courta will consider arguments addressing plaintiffs' motion to modify on the basis of changed circumstances.(N) (gew) (Entered: 11/15/1993)
207 RESPONSE (Comments) by defendants on plaintiff's proposed modified Order (ks) (Entered: 12/06/1993)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 12/10/1993)
208 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date of 11/10/93. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1993)
209 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date of 12/6/93. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 12/08/1993)
210 MOTION by JEANNE ASHERMAN, Guardian ad litem filed for leave to file motion to intervene , and omitting last names of child petitioners and to file under seal ; EXHIBIT (MOTION) (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1993)
211 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for leave to file motion to intervene [210−1], granting motion omitting last names of child petitioners and to file under seal the declaration containing the full identities of the movants [210−2] (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1993)

12/09/1993 12/09/1993
12/13/1993 12/22/1993 12/23/1993 12/27/1993 01/05/1994 01/05/1994 01/06/1994
01/21/1994 01/27/1994 01/28/1994 02/28/1994 03/01/1994
03/03/1994 03/03/1994
03/16/1994 03/16/1994 03/18/1994

212 NOTICE OF FILING by movant interveners of Declaration of Identities of Child petitioners (FILED UNDER SEAL IN ROOM 1800) (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1993)
213 MOTION filed for JEANNE ASHERMAN to intervene ; Exhibits (6) (Counsel: Peter J. Nickles, COVINGTON & BURLING, 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., P.O. Box 7566, Washington, D.C. 20044, (202) 662−6000) (ks) Modified on 01/06/1994 (Entered: 12/10/1993)
214 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing plaintiffs to file, within 14 days of this order, comments on these particular areas of the proposed modified order (N) (jjc) (Entered: 12/14/1993)
215 RESPONSE by defendants to motion for JEANNE ASHERMAN to intervene [213−1] (lin) (Entered: 12/23/1993)
216 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for JEANNE ASHERMAN to intervene [213−1]; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 12/27/1993)
217 MEMORANDUM in RESPONSE by plaintiffs to Court's order [214−2] (ks) (Entered: 12/27/1993)
218 REPLY by movant JEANNE ASHERMAN to response to motion for JEANNE ASHERMAN to intervene [213−1] (ks) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
219 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/14/94 to review plaintiffs' memorandum in response to the Court's Order of 12/13/93, and for leave to file a responsive pleading (ks) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
220 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 1/14/94 to review plaintiffs' memorandum in response to the Court's Order of 12/13/93, and for leave to file a responsive pleading [219−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
221 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion for JEANNE ASHERMAN to intervene [213−1] (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/24/1994)
222 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : a quarterly review status hearing set for 9:00 3/3/94 ; the court adopts plaintiffs' modified final remedial order in full (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/29/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 02/02/1994)
223 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from order [222−2] , entered on: 1/29/94; no fees paid; copies mailed to Christopher T. Dunn (ks) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [223−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
224 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : motion hearing set for 2:00 5/6/94 ; , plaintiffs to file motion for a contempt Order and a motion for attorney's fees due by 3/21/94; defendants' responses due 4/11/94; replies due 4/22/94 (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/04/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : The Progress of Lashawn Implementation 10/01/93 to 12/31/94 filed by District of Columbia, fiated by Judge Hogan; Quarterly Progress Report as of 12/31/94 filed by Center for the Study of Social Policy, fiated by Judge Hogan. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
225 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date of 1/28/94. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 03/17/1994)
226 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date of 3/3/94. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 03/17/1994)
USCA # 94−7044 assigned for appeal [223−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P.

03/21/1994 03/22/1994 03/23/1994 03/24/1994 03/24/1994 04/08/1994 04/08/1994
04/08/1994
04/11/1994 04/20/1994 04/21/1994 04/21/1994
04/22/1994

ANDREWS (tth) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
227 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 3/22/94 to file their motion for a contempt order , and to extend time to 3/24/94 to file their motion for attorneys' fees (tth) (Entered: 03/22/1994)
228 MOTION filed by plaintiff for order holding defendants in contempt of Court ; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 03/23/1994)
229 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of corrected exhibit to their motion for an order hoding defendants in contempt of Court; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 03/24/1994)
230 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for interim attorneys' fees and expenses ; Exhibits (17) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/24/1994)
231 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 3/22/94 to file their motion for a contempt order [227−1] by plaintiff(s)ssssss (N) (fle) (Entered: 03/24/1994)
232 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. by Michael Edward Zielinski (tth) (Entered: 04/11/1994)
233 MOTION filed by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. to extend time to 5/31/94 to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses and to continue the hearing scheduled for May 6, 1994 as to fee issues only (tth) (Entered: 04/11/1994)
234 FIRST INTERROGATORIES and request to produce documents filed by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. to plaintiffs (tth) (Entered: 04/11/1994)
235 MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (20) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/12/1994)
236 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 4/27/94 to respond to defendant's proposed policies and procedures (ks) (Entered: 04/21/1994)
237 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 4/27/94 to respond to defendant's proposed policies and procedures [236−1] by plaintiff(s); response to motion(s) due by 4/27/94 ; (N) (lpp) (Entered: 04/22/1994)
238 MOTION filed by plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., and LASHAWN A. to extend time to 4/27/94 to reply to the defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt. (bm) (Entered: 04/22/1994)
ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend time to 4/27/94 to respond to defendant's proposed policies and procedures [236−1] set> ; reply to dispositive motions due by <date not set> ; status hearing reset for <date not set> ; pretrial conference reset for <date not set> ; trial reset for <date not set> ; cross motions due by <date not set> ; response to cross motions due by <date not set> ; reply to cross motions due by <date not set> ; motion for summary judgment due by <date not set> ; response to motion for summary judgment due <date not set> ; reply to motion for summary judgment due by <date not set> ; summary judgment hearing reset to <date not set> ; plaintiff's rule 26(b) due by <date not set> ; defendant's rule 26(b) due by <date not set> ; brief due by <date not set> ; response to brief due by <date not set> ; reply to brief due by <date not set> ; motion hearing set for <date not set> ; motion(s) due by <date not set> ; response to motion(s) due by <date not set> ; reply to motion(s) due by <date not set> ; witness list due by <date not set> ; counter−expert witness list due by <date not set> ; show cause hearing reset for <date not set> ; in−camera submission due by <date not set> ; settlement conference reset to <date not set> ; response to show cause due by <date not set> ; proposed findings of fact due by <date not set> ; (N) (jjc) (Entered: 04/22/1994)

04/25/1994 04/26/1994 04/28/1994 04/28/1994
04/28/1994 04/29/1994
05/06/1994 05/17/1994 05/26/1994 05/31/1994 06/02/1994
06/07/1994 06/08/1994
06/08/1994 06/20/1994 06/22/1994 07/07/1994

239 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for extension of page limitation to reply to defendants' response to plaintiff's contempt motion (tth) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
240 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 4/27/94 to reply to the defendants' response to plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt. [238−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 04/28/1994)
241 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in further support of motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (7) (ks) (Entered: 04/29/1994)
242 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to extend time to 5/31/94 to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses and to continue the hearing scheduled for May 6, 1994 as to fee issues only [233−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 04/29/1994)
243 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for extension of page limitation to reply to defendants' response to plaintiff's contempt motion [239−1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 04/29/1994)
244 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for extension of page limitation to reply to defendants' response to plaintiff's contempt motion [239−1] by plaintiffs; plaintiffs shall have leave to file a reply of no more that 50 pages in response to defendant's opposition to plaintiff's contempt motion (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1994)
CONTEMPT HEARING before JUDGE THOMAS F. HOGAN; heard and taken under advisement; Reporter−Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 05/09/1994)
245 TRANSCRIPT filed of Contempt hearing for date of 5/6/94. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
246 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of clarification of certain statements made by the Court at the 5/6/94 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for contempt; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 05/26/1994)
247 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 6/7/94 to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses (ks) (Entered: 06/01/1994)
248 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 6/7/94 to file a response to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [247−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/03/1994)
249 MOTION filed by defendants to file excess pages limitation ; (EXHIBIT−OPPOSITION) (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1994)
250 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to file excess pages limitation [249−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/08/1994)
255 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (5) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/20/1994)
251 UNOPPOSED MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 7/8/94 to file their reply to defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses (tth) (Entered: 06/21/1994)
252 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 7/8/94 to file their reply to defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [251−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 06/23/1994)
254 MOTION (Unopposed) filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 7/25/94 to file their reply to defendants' opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for interim fees and expenses. (tth) (Entered: 07/08/1994)

07/08/1994
07/21/1994 07/25/1994
07/28/1994
07/29/1994 07/29/1994 08/11/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/12/1994 08/25/1994 09/08/1994 09/08/1994
09/08/1994
09/09/1994 09/16/1994 09/20/1994 09/20/1994 09/26/1994 09/30/1994 10/04/1994

253 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 7/25/94 to file their reply to defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [251−1] by plaintiffs (N) (bm) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
256 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 07/21/1994)
257 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to file excess pages limitation ; EXHIBIT (REPLY TO MOTION FOR INTERIM ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES) (ks) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
258 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] by plaintiffs; Attachments (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
259 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to file excess pages limitation [257−1] by plaintiff(s) (N) (gew) (Entered: 08/03/1994)
319 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 12/28/1994)
261 LETTER dated 8/10/94 to Judge Hogan by Christopher Dunn "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
260 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs . (ks) (Entered: 08/15/1994)
262 LETTER dated 8/11/94 to Judge Hogan from Arlene L. Robinson; Attachment: Comments "Let this be filed" (fiat) Judge Hogan (ks) (Entered: 08/16/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 08/29/1994)
263 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs concerning authority and operation of proposed receivers; exhibits (5). (tth) (Entered: 08/26/1994)
264 RESPONSE by defendants to memorandum concerning authority and operation of proposed receivers [263−1] by plaintiffs; Attachments (7) (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1994)
265 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that the hearing set for 9/9/94 at 2:00 p.m. is hereby cancelled; and that the plaintiffs' attorneys shall recover from the defendant $22,480.55 for the plaintiffs' costs of action through 8/27/91 (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/09/1994)
266 SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL by defendants JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, and MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; attachment. (bm) (Entered: 09/09/1994)
267 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for dates of 8/12/94. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 09/12/1994)
CONTEMPT HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 09/23/1994)
268 TRANSCRIPT filed of contempt hearing for date of 9/16/94. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
269 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiffs of proposed Order on plaintiffs' contempt motion (ks) (Entered: 09/21/1994)
270 LETTER dated 9/15/94 from Christopher Dunn to Judge Hogan; Attachments "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 09/27/1994)
271 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to plaintiff's amended proposed order for Receivership (ks) (Entered: 10/03/1994)
272 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : in accordance with its bench ruling of the 9/16/94 hearing, the Court hereby orders the imposition of a limited receivership and a consent agreement; Attachments: Receivership and Consent Agreement (N) (ks)

10/04/1994 10/06/1994 10/07/1994 10/11/1994 10/17/1994 10/19/1994 10/19/1994 10/20/1994
10/21/1994 10/21/1994
10/25/1994 10/26/1994 10/26/1994 10/27/1994 10/27/1994

(Entered: 10/06/1994)
273 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that the Revised Implementation Plan dated 8/1/94, shall be and hereby is incorporated into the made a part of the Implementation Plan adopted by this Court as part of its Modified Final Order entered 11/18/93 (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/06/1994)
274 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Anna Elizabeth Blackburne (ks) (Entered: 10/07/1994)
275 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to supplement receivership Order , to hold defendants in contempt , and for expedited consideration ; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 10/11/1994)
276 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: granting motion to supplement receivership Order [275−1] to hold defendants in contempt [275−2] and for expedited consideration [275−3] by plaintiffs; defendants to file any response to motion due 10/17/94; hearing set for 9:30 10/28/94 (N) (bm) (Entered: 10/13/1994)
277 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion to supplement receivership Order and for order holding defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 10/18/1994)
278 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for order enforcing provision I.C. of the modified final Order , and for expedited consideration (ks) (Entered: 10/20/1994)
279 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : defendants to file any respond to plaintiff's motion for enforcement of a provision of the modified final Order and for expedited consideration due by 5:00 10/20/94 (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/20/1994)
280 RESPONSE by defendant in opposition to motion for order enforcing provision I.C. of the modified final Order [278−1] by plaintiffs; and request by defendants for a closed evidentiary hearing to determine the clinical and medical appropriateness of assigning Kevin T.'s case to an independent expert; Declaration (1) (ks) (Entered: 10/21/1994)
281 NOTICE OF FILING by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. of original signed Declaration and curriculm vitae of Dr. Janice Hutchinson, M.D., PhD for inclusion with the original motion (ks) (Entered: 10/24/1994)
282 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that the defendants file a written report with the Court due by 12:00 10/26/94; this report shall be authored by Horace Green, M.D., who is named as Kevin T.'s psychiatrist by the defendants; and that Dr. Green's report be filed under seal, and that the plaintiffs and Monitor be served with copies of the report; (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/26/1994)
283 JOINT MOTION by defendant for order waiving Doctor−patient privilege and confidentiality protections of the D.C. Mental Health Information Act (ks) (Entered: 10/27/1994)
284 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting joint motion for order waiving Doctor−patient privilege and confidentiality protections of the D.C. Mental Health Information Act [283−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR. (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/27/1994)
285 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants re: Judge's Order filed 10/21/94 requesting Dr. Horace Green to submit and file a evaluation under seal; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 10/27/1994)
286 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B. in further support of motion to supplelment receivership order and to hold defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] (blj) (Entered: 10/28/1994)
287 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of supplement to their opposition to plaintiffs' motion for an order enforcing provision I.C. of the modified final order and defendant's request for a closed evidentiary hearing to determine the clinical and medical appropriateness of assinging Kevin T.'s case to an independent expert; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 10/31/1994)

10/28/1994 10/28/1994 10/28/1994 11/02/1994
11/02/1994 11/03/1994
11/04/1994 11/15/1994 11/15/1994 11/16/1994 11/16/1994 11/16/1994 11/16/1994 11/18/1994
11/18/1994
11/18/1994
11/18/1994 11/21/1994 11/21/1994

288 LETTER dated 10/27/94 to Judge Hogan from Marcial R. Lowry and Elizabeth Symonds "Let this be filed" (fiat) (ks) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
289 LETTER dated 10/27/94 to Judge Hogan from Tom Joe, Director; re Progress Report on LaShawn A. v. Kelly Consent Agreement "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 10/31/1994)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan Reporter: Anneliese Thomson/Gloria Williams (gew) (Entered: 11/01/1994)
290 MOTION filed for movants BARBARA BATTLE, WILLIE F. CALHOUN, RICHARD P. DIGERONIMO, JESURENA R. GRIFFIN, JOHN KUKLISH, DIANE ROBINSON, FRANK SAMUEL to intervene as plaintiffs ; Attachments (3); EXHIBIT (COMPLAINT) (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1994)
291 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from order [273−1] , entered on: 10/6/94; Govt. − no fee; copies mailed to Christopher T. Dunn, and Marcia Robinson Lowry (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1994)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [291−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 11/03/1994)
292 STATUS REPORT by defendants concerning implementation of the Court's 10/4/94 Order; Exhibits (4) (ks) (Entered: 11/07/1994)
293 MOTION filed by plaintiff to resume consideration of plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses ; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 11/16/1994)
294 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 11/23/94 to file a response to the motion to intervene (ks) (Entered: 11/16/1994)
295 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 11/23/94 to file a response to the motion to intervene [294−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/16/1994)
296 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 11/23/94 to review and file a responsive pleading to the motion to intervene (ks) (Entered: 11/17/1994)
297 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of report entitled "Commission on Social Services Responses to the Report of a Review of Child Abuse and Neglect Investigation and Intake" (ks) (Entered: 11/17/1994)
311 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in further support of motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court [228−1] by plaintiffs (ks) (Entered: 11/30/1994)
299 RESPONSE (OPPOSITIONS) by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to plaintiffs' memorandum in further support of motion to hold defendants in contempt (blj) (Entered: 11/21/1994)
300 MOTION filed by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to extend time to 11/22/94 to comment on the proposed receivership team (blj) (Entered: 11/21/1994)
304 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : giving defendants until 11/23/94 to review the Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs filed on 11/02/94 on behalf of persons employed by defendants as supervisory social workers, and to file a responsive pleading, if appropriate. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/23/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 11/25/1994)
301 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date of 10/28/94. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
302 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of copies of pages to their pleadings; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 11/22/1994)

11/22/1994 11/22/1994 11/23/1994 11/23/1994 11/23/1994 11/23/1994
11/23/1994
11/28/1994 12/06/1994 12/09/1994
12/09/1994
12/09/1994 12/12/1994 12/12/1994

303 RESPONSE by defendants to Monitor's proposed limited Receivership Team and plaintiff's proposed Order appointing the limited receivers; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 11/23/1994)
USCA # 94−7227 assigned for appeal [291−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (blj) (Entered: 11/23/1994)
305 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to motion for movants BARBARA BATTLE, WILLIE F. CALHOUN, RICHARD P. DIGERONIMO, JESURENA R. GRIFFIN, JOHN KUKLISH, DIANE ROBINSON, FRANK SAMUEL to intervene as plaintiffs [290−1] (ks) (Entered: 11/25/1994)
306 MEMORANDUM by defendants in opposition to motion for movants BARBARA BATTLE, WILLIE F. CALHOUN, RICHARD P. DIGERONIMO, JESURENA R. GRIFFIN, JOHN KUKLISH, DIANE ROBINSON, FRANK SAMUEL to intervene as plaintiffs [290−1] (ks) (Entered: 11/25/1994)
308 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the defendants formally adopt this full set of policies and procedures immediately and without amendment; directing that the aforesaid policies and procedures are incorporated into the Remedial Order. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
309 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : the defendants shall supply the monitor with all materials that are a part of the contract executed w/D.M. Griffith by 12:00 11/28/94; directing by 12:00 noon on 11/30/94, defendants to amend the 11/21/94 contract w/ D.M. Griffith so as to include certain language; (See Order for Details) (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
310 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : naming a team of receivers to effectuate the receivership established by this Court's 10/01/94 order (filed 10/04/94); directing that Beatrice Moore, Audrey Sutton, and Ray Sirry are appointed to implement the receivership established by the Court pursuant to its order of 0/01/94. Paragraphs 1−21 of that order are hereby incorporated into this order. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
307 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion to resume consideration of plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [293−1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 11/29/1994)
312 MOTION filed by defendants for reconsideration of order structuring the compensation of the receivers and the payment of expenses incurred by the Receivership Team [310−1] (ks) (Entered: 12/07/1994)
313 REPLY by defendants to response to motion for reconsideration of order structuring the compensation of the receivers and the payment of expenses incurred by the Receivership Team [310−1] [312−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1994)
314 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion for reconsideration of order structuring the compensation of the receivers and the payment of expenses incurred by the Receivership Team [310−1] [312−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1994)
DEPOSIT of $75,000.00 into the Registry of the Court pursuant to Order filed 11/23/94 (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1994)
315 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing for date of 11/18/94. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1994)
316 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion for movants BARBARA BATTLE, WILLIE F. CALHOUN, RICHARD P. DIGERONIMO, JESURENA R. GRIFFIN, JOHN KUKLISH, DIANE ROBINSON, FRANK SAMUEL to intervene as plaintiffs [290−1] (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/13/1994)

12/12/1994
12/12/1994 12/21/1994 12/22/1994 12/29/1994 01/13/1995 01/25/1995 02/03/1995 02/06/1995 02/06/1995
02/06/1995 02/07/1995 02/10/1995 02/16/1995
03/07/1995
03/07/1995

317 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting in part, denying in part motion for reconsideration of order structuring the compensation of the receivers and the payment of expenses incurred by the Receivership Team [310−1] [312−1]; setting forth the modifications for paragraph IV of the Court's 11/23/94 order naming the receivership team. (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/13/1994)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 12/14/1994)
318 Text not available. (Entered: 12/22/1994)
Text not available. (Entered: 12/22/1994)
USCA # 94−7251 assigned for appeal [318−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 12/30/1994)
320 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for dates of 12/12/94. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 01/17/1995)
321 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $4,524.87 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for services rendered during 12/94; setting forth address. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/26/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) Modified on 05/12/2003 (Entered: 02/06/1995)
322 LETTER (gew) (Entered: 02/07/1995)
323 LETTER dated 01/31/95 from the LaShawn Receivership Team to Judge Hogan regarding the defendant's recent actions to restrict the Receivers from full and fee access to staff within the Family Services Administration and the dire need for some immedite resources to maintain an adequate level of service to families and children. (gew) (Entered: 02/07/1995)
324 LETTER dated 02/02/95 from defendants, in response to the Receivers' January 31, 1995 letter and the Plaintiffs' February 1, 1995 letter to Judge Hogan; Fiated and dated − Let This Be Filed. (gew) (Entered: 02/07/1995)
325 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date of 2/3/95. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 02/08/1995)
326 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that the defendants shall comply with the Emergency Resource plan, with scrupulous attention to its deadlines; and that the plan and the Receiver Team's cover letter shall be filed in the Court docket; Attachment (N) (ks) (Entered: 02/10/1995)
327 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing defendants to issue publicly the Request for Proposal for the computerized management information system by 02/28/95; the defendants to enter into a contract by 02/21/95; defendants to designate by 02/15/95, a senior staff member within the DDS Comptroller's Office acceptable to the Monitor who will work half−time on revenue maxiimization with David M. Griffiths; defendants are directed to develop by 02/21/95, a plan to fillthe position of Administrator of the Family Services Administration. (N) (gew) (Entered: 02/17/1995)
328 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days, the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $2,723.48 to Audrey Sutton for sevices rendered during December, 1994; the check shall be sent to 2901 Argentina Place, Mitchellville, Md 20716; funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
329 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days, the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $6,444.68 to the Center for the Study of Social Policy for these equipment purchases; the check shall be sent to 1250 Eye St., N>W>, Suite #503, Washington, DC 20005−3922. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the

03/07/1995 03/07/1995 03/08/1995 03/13/1995 03/21/1995 03/21/1995 03/21/1995 03/21/1995 03/29/1995 04/04/1995 04/04/1995

Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
331 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days, the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,609.27 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for services rendered during January, 1995. The Check shall be sent to 80 Mourning Dove Drive, Stafford, VA 22554. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
332 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,498.55, to Beatrice Moore for services rendered during January 1995. The check shall be sent to 13624 Turnmore Road, Silver Spring, MD 20906. Funds for this payment shall be draw from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
330 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days, Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $640.00 to Professional Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered during January, 1995. The check shll be sent to P.O. Box 15244, Washington, DC 2003−0244. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account establish by the Defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/09/1995)
333 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days, the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sumof $6752.69 to Audrey Sutton for services renderd during January, 1995. The Check shall be sent to 2901 Argentina Place, Mitchellville, MD 20716. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/14/1995)
334 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk shall pay the sum of $10,921.46 to Social Services Solutions, Inc for services rendered during February 1995. The check shall be sent to 80 Mourning Dove Drive, Stafford, VA 22554. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/22/1995)
335 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $2176.00 to Professional Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered during February 1995. The check shall be sent to P>O> Box 15244, Washington, DC 20003−0244. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/23/1995)
336 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8024.30 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered during February 1995. The check shall be sent to 13624 Turnmore Road, Silver pring, Maryland 20906. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/23/1995)
337 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum $8024.30 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered during February 1995. The check shall be sent to 13624 Turnmore Road, Silver Spring, MD. 20906. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/23/1995)
338 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : adopting the three workplans covering Resource Development, Corrective Acton, and Protective Services. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/29/1995)
339 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for order holding defendants in contempt of Court and/or for a General Receivership ; Exhibits (7) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/05/1995)
340 STATUS REPORT by defendants; Attachments (2) (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/05/1995)

04/06/1995 04/07/1995 04/07/1995 04/17/1995 04/18/1995
04/18/1995 04/24/1995 04/25/1995 04/27/1995 04/27/1995 04/28/1995
05/02/1995 05/02/1995 05/02/1995 05/02/1995 05/03/1995 05/03/1995 05/11/1995

341 MOTION filed by defendants for reconsideration of the order adopting the limited receiver's resource development work plan filed 3/28/95 [338−1] (ks) (Entered: 04/07/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
342 NOTICE OF FILING by plaintiff LASHAWN A. of LaSHAWN CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN "Let this be filed" (fiat) (bulky) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 04/10/1995)
343 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court and/or for a General Receivership [339−1] by plaintiffs; Attachments (bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/18/1995)
344 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for reconsideration of the order adopting the limited receiver's resource development work plan filed 3/28/95 [338−1] [341−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 04/19/1995)
345 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of a corrected copy of defendant's opposition to plaintiffs' motion for contempt and for a General Receiver; Attachments (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 04/19/1995)
346 MOTION filed by defendants to stay case pending the Court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration (ks) (Entered: 04/25/1995)
354 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to resume consideration of plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [293−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/03/1995)
347 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 4/7/95. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
348 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court and/or for a General Receivership [339−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits A thru E (EXHIBIT C FILED UNDER SEAL IN ROOM 1800) (ks) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
349 REPLY by defendants to response to motion for reconsideration of the order adopting the limited receiver's resource development work plan filed 3/28/95 [338−1] [341−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 05/01/1995)
350 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,348.00 to PMC Temporaries, Inc. for servcies rendered during January 1995 (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
351 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $10,674.31 to Social Services rendered during March 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
352 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $7,817.50 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered during March 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
353 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,456.07 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered during March 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/02/1995)
355 MOTION filed by defendants for reconsideration of order filed 4/25/95 [354−2] ; Appendix (ks) (Entered: 05/04/1995)
356 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendants in support of mtoion to govern further proceedings; Appendix (ks) (Entered: 05/04/1995)
357 SUPPLEMENTAL filing in support of motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court and/or for a General Receivership [339−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 05/15/1995)

05/15/1995 05/15/1995 05/15/1995 05/16/1995
05/18/1995 05/19/1995
05/19/1995
05/19/1995
05/19/1995
05/19/1995 05/22/1995 05/22/1995 05/22/1995
05/23/1995

STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 05/17/1995)
359 LETTER to Members of the Council, from Phyllis Jones, Secretary to the Council dated 03/30/95. Fiated by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (gew) (Entered: 05/18/1995)
360 QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT AS OF MARCH 31, 1995; FIATED by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (gew) (Entered: 05/18/1995)
358 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing defendants to submit to the Court by 05/18/95, copies of all documents in their possession relating to the formulation and transmittal to the D.C. Council on 03/30/95 of the cover letter and draft bill relating to proposed legislation entitled "Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Repeal, Reenactment, and Amendment Act of 1995. (N) (gew) (Entered: 05/18/1995)
361 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: granting oral motion for Craig R. Levine to appear pro hac vice as counsel for plaintiffs (N) (bm) (Entered: 05/19/1995)
362 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $7,007.37 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered during April 1995; funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/19/1995)
363 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $7,427.30 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered during April 1995; funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the court (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/19/1995)
364 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $6,800.00 to PMC Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered during April 1995; funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/19/1995)
365 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,135.12 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for services rendered during April 1995; funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court (N) (ks) (Entered: 05/19/1995)
DEPOSIT in the sum of $75,000.00 into the Registry of the Court by the D.C. Government (ks) (Entered: 05/22/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 05/23/1995)
366 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (N) (gew) (Entered: 05/23/1995)
367 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion to stay case pending the Court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration [346−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, denying motion for reconsideration of the order adopting the limited receiver's resource development work plan filed 3/28/95 [338−1] [341−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS; directing that the District of Columbia child welfare system be placed into receivership; also directing the parties and Monitor to attempt to agree upon a proposed order governing the selection, appointment, responsibilities, and powers of the child welfare receiver; the parties to submit a proposed order(or separate orders if they are unable to agree) to the Court by 05/31/95. (N) (gew) (Entered: 05/23/1995)
368 TRANSCRIPT filed of Bench Ruling for date(s) of 5/22/95. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 05/24/1995)

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05/26/1995 05/31/1995 06/05/1995 06/08/1995 06/09/1995 06/12/1995 06/12/1995 06/12/1995
06/13/1995 06/13/1995 06/13/1995 06/16/1995 06/20/1995
06/21/1995

369 REPORT to the Court, submitted by Receiverships, Beatrice Moore, Audrey Sutton, and D. Ray Sirry "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 05/24/1995)
370 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. from order [367−1], entered on: 5/23/95. No fee paid D.C. Government. Copies mailed to Christopher T. Dunn and Marcia Robinson Lowry. (dot) (Entered: 05/26/1995)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [370−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (dot) (Entered: 05/26/1995)
371 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of proposed Receivership Order and Comments to plaintiffs' proposed Order (ks) (Entered: 06/01/1995)
USCA # 95−7141 assigned for appeal [370−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 06/07/1995)
372 MOTION filed by defendants to pay vendors ; Attachments (2) (ks) (Entered: 06/09/1995)
373 SUPPLEMENTAL FILING concerning plaintiff's motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
374 MOTION filed by defendants to stay case pending appeal of portions of the May 22, 1995 Order ; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
375 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for immediate payment to vendors and for expedited consideration ; Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
376 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for immediate payment to vendors and for expedited consideration [375−1] by TYRONE F., granting motion to pay vendors [372−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS; directing the defendants to deliver by hand a check to Peterson Miles, Inc. in the amount of $113,659.79 by noon on 06/13/95; the defendants shall also deliver by hand a check to ASAP Temporaries in the amount of $467,163.63 by noon on 06/13/95; directing the defendants to pay the vendors listed on Attachment A of the Defendants' motion)(other than the two vendors addressed in the plaintiffs' motion) the specified amount listed by each company's name by 5 p.m. on June 19, 1995. (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan by plaintiffs motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] taken under advisement Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 06/15/1995)
377 TRANSCRIPT filed of motion hearing for date of 5/15/95. Reporter: A. Thomson (ks) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
378 MOTION filed by defendants to supplement motion for a stay pending appeal ; Attachment (ks) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
379 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for immediate action regarding the management information system and to hold certain individuals in contempt ; Exhibits (2) (ks) (Entered: 06/19/1995)
381 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for immediate action regarding the management information system and to hold certain individuals in contempt [379−1] by LASHAWN A.; defendants shall submit any response to the aforesaid motion by 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, June 21, 1995; motion hearing set for 4:00 6/26/95; reply to motion due 10:00 6/26/95 (N) (dot) (Entered: 06/22/1995)
380 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for immediate action regarding the management information system and to hold certain individuals in contempt [379−1] by LASHAWN A. . (ks) (Entered: 06/22/1995)

06/26/1995 06/26/1995 06/26/1995 06/26/1995
06/26/1995 06/27/1995 06/27/1995 06/27/1995 06/27/1995 07/07/1995 07/17/1995 07/17/1995 07/19/1995 07/28/1995 07/28/1995

382 REPLY by plaintiffto response to motion for order holding defendants in contempt of Court and/or for a General Receivership [339−1] by plaintiffs; Attachment (1) (ks) (Entered: 06/27/1995)
383 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to stay case pending appeal of portions of the May 22, 1995 Order [374−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS . (ks) (Entered: 06/27/1995)
384 TRANSCRIPT filed of hearing on attorneys' fees for date of 6/23/95. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 06/27/1995)
385 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : holding defendants in contempt of court for their ongoing failures regarding the procurement of a management information system (MIS); directing the defendants to issue a corrected Request for Proposals (RFP) regarding the management information system by 06/26/95; defendants shall close bidding for the MIS on 07/31/95; defendants shall ensure that the technical review panel has completed its work and that those offerings within the competitive range are identified by 08/11/95; defendants shall complete negotiations and solicitation of Best anf Final Offers from Offerors in the competitive range by 08/18/95; defendant shall require the receipt of Best and Final Offers by 08/25/95; defendants shall decide upon an offeror to be awarded the MIS contract by 08/28/95; defendants shall prepare the award package and submit the proposed contract to HHS for final approval by 08/31/95; defendants shall plan in advance with HHS in order to expedite HHS approval of the MIS contract within 5 days of HHS's receipt of the proposed contract; defendants shall sign the contract and issue a contract award within 24 hours of HHS approval; if these deadlines are not met, a hearing will be held on 9/12/95 at 9:00 am (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 07/06/1995)
386 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $18,582.00 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for services rendered and expenses incurred during May, 1995. (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
387 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $6800.00 to PMC Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered and expenses incurred during May, 1995. (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
388 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $8,543.72 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered and expenses incurred during May, 1995. (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
389 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan :directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $9,122.92 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered and expenses incurred during May, 1995.` (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/29/1995)
390 THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 07/10/1995)
391 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendants' third supplemental opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorney's fees (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
392 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from order [385−1] , entered on: 6/29/95; Government−no fee; Copies mailed to Christopher T. Dunn and Marcia Robinson Lowry (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [392−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 07/19/1995)
393 TRANSCRIPT filed for date of 6/26/95. Reporter: Anneliese J. Thomson (bm) (Entered: 07/28/1995)
USCA # 95−7180 assigned for appeal [392−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (bm) (Entered: 08/01/1995)

08/01/1995
08/01/1995
08/01/1995
08/01/1995
08/11/1995 08/24/1995
08/28/1995 08/29/1995 08/29/1995 09/01/1995 09/01/1995 09/01/1995 09/01/1995

394 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Gladys Kessler: that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,895.18 to Beatrice Moore for service rendered and expenses incurred during June 1995. The Check shall be sent to 13624 Turnmore Road, Silver Spring, MD 20906. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (dot) Modified on 08/01/1995 (Entered: 08/01/1995)
395 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Gladys Kessler : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $12,713,42 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for servies rendered and expenses incurred during June 1995. The check shall be sent to 80 Mourning Dove Drive, Stafford, VA 22554. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
396 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Gladys Kessler : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,501.25 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered and expenses incurred during June 1995. The check shall be sent to 2901 Argentina Place, Mitchelville, MD 20716. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
397 ORDER FOR COMPENSATION by Judge Gladys Kessler : that within fourteen days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8,245.50 to PMC Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered during June 1995. The check shall be sent to P.O. Box 7247−8341, Philadelphia, PA 19170−8341. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (dot) (Entered: 08/01/1995)
398 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : that Jerome G. Miller is appointed as the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver in accordance with the Court's opinion and order of 5/22/95; an Order outlining the Receiver's responsibilities and powers will follow (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/11/1995)
399 GENERAL RECEIVERSHIP ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : setting forth instructions to the Receivership; and the District shall establish an initial operating fund with the Court in the amount of $500,000.00; the receiver shall authorize payments from the fund for the salary and expenses of the Receiver, the limited Receivers and additional staff, consultants, and expenses necessary to implement the Child Welfare Receivership (See Order for details) (N) (ks) (Entered: 08/24/1995)
400 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant from order [399−1], order [398−1] , entered on: 8/24/95 and 8/11/95; Government − no fee; Copies mailed to Christopher T. Dunn and Marcia R. Lowry (ks) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [400−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 08/29/1995)
401 MOTION filed by defendants for reconsideration and modification of order filed 6/26/95 of time frames for issuance of the Child Welfare information system contract [385−1] ; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 08/30/1995)
402 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : that within fourteen (14) days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $6,004.00 to PMC Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered during June 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/01/1995)
403 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : that within fourteen (14) days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $7,830.48 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for services rendered and expenses incurred during July 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/01/1995)
404 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : tht within fourteen (14) days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $7,913.48 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered and expenses incurred during July 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/01/1995)
405 ORDER by Judge Paul L. Friedman : tht within fourteen days the Clerk of the court shall pay the sum of $6,748.04 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered and expenses incurred during July 1995 (N) (ks) (Entered: 09/01/1995)

09/06/1995
09/11/1995 09/26/1995 09/26/1995 09/26/1995 09/26/1995
09/26/1995 09/26/1995 09/26/1995 10/05/1995 10/11/1995 10/11/1995

406 COMPENSATION ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $7,500.00 to Managed Health Services for services rendered during July, 1995. The check shall be sent to 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N>W>, Suite 300, Washington, D. C. 20006; directing that no further payments shall be made to Managed Health Services for continuation of the work invoiced here without the review and approval of Jerome Miller, the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/07/1995)
USCA # 95−7215 assigned for appeal [400−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 09/11/1995)
407 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $9,540.76 to Beatrice Moore for services rendered and expenses incurred during August, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
408 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8535.32 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered and expenses incurred during August, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
409 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $8500.00 to PMC Temporaries, Inc. for services rendered during August 1995 and the first week of September 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
410 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $18,684.25 to Social Service Solutions, Inc. for the services of Social Work Analysis Techniques rendered during June, July and August, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
411 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $1768.00 to Jerome G. Miller for services rendered during August 1995 and on September 1, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
412 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $9,544.82 to Social Services Solutions, Inc. for services rendered and expenses incurred during August 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
413 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing within 14 days the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $3033.33 to Michael K. Gatling for services rendered during August 1995 and on 09−01−95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/27/1995)
DEPOSIT in the sum of $250,000.00 into the Registry of the Court (ks) (Entered: 10/06/1995)
DEPOSIT by defendant D.C. Government in the sum of $61,748.64 in the Registry of the Court (ks) (Entered: 10/12/1995)
414 ORDER by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina : that the Court's previous order for compensation to Social Work Analysis Techniques be vacated and no check shall issue as a result of that order; and that the Clerk of the court shall instead pay the sum of $8,266.50 to Social Work Analysis Techniques for services rendered in August 1995; funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court (N) (ks) (Entered: 10/12/1995)

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DEPOSIT in the sum of $500,000.00 by defendant pursuant to Court's Order of 8/24/95. (ks) (Entered: 10/17/1995)
415 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : amending the 10/11/95 order so that the Clerk will pay the sum of $8266.50 to Social Services Solutions, Inc.; Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/19/1995)
416 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court pay the sum of $5539.20 to William Cathcart for services rendered from September 13, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
417 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $886.40 to Maurice Chaite for services rendered from October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants wit the Clerk of The Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
418 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $9360.00 to Lionel Henderson for services rendered. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
419 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $609.28 to Maria Korman for services rendered from October 10, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
420 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3066.08 to Kimberly Kyburz for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 25, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
421 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $468.72 to Judie Macalino for services rendered from September 12, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
422 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $347.53 to Gilbert McKune for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 18, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
423 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum $1776.80 to Wendy Nichols for services rendered from October 2, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
424 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $343.20 to Charles Price, Sr. for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 27, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
425 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $622.98 to Ruby Price for services rendered and expenses incurred from August 23, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
426 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court shall pay the sum of $1164.34 to Lakeisha Ratliff for services rendered and expenses incurred from

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October 2, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the Lashawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
427 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3872.67 to Tim Roche for services rendered from September 18, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
428 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1600.00 to James Sprowls for services rendered. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
429 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $545.32 to Gayle Starkes for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 12, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
430 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $651.80 to Derek Stewart for services rendered and expenses incurred from October 9, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
431 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2769.28 to John Townes for services rendered from October 2, 1995 to October 13, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/26/1995)
432 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to withdraw Christopher Thomas Dunn as attorney for TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. (blj) (Entered: 10/31/1995)
433 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw Christopher Thomas Dunn as attorney for TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. [432−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 11/02/1995)
434 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court pay the sum of $9,706.52 to Andrew Gordon for services rendered and expenses incurred from August 21, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court.(N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
435 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court pay the sum of $1,523.04 to Kimberly W. Kyburz for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
436 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of Court pay the sum of #1,844.63 to Maria Korman for services rendered and expenses incurred from 10/16/95 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
437 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of Court pay the sum of $2,352.80 to Farouk Hosein for services rendered from September 18, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
438 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of Court to pay the sum of $14,500.00 to Lionel Henderson for services rendered from October 14, 1995 to

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October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
439 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $190.96 to Judie Macalino for services rendered from October 17, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
440 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $216.88 to Gilbert McKune for services rendered and expenses incurred from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
441 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $15,276.18 to Beatrice D. Moore for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 5, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
442 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $24,517.00 to Jerome G. Miller for services rendered and expenses incurred from August 15, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account extablished by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
443 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,766.80 to Wendy Nichols for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
444 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that the Clerk of the Court pay the sum of $142.56 to Charles Price, Jr. for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn frm the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
445 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that the Clerk of the Court pay the sum of $4,106.25 to Robert E. Nunnally, Jr. for services rendered from October 10, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
446 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $604.56 to Ruby Price for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receiver ship Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
447 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,158.05to Lakeisha Ratliff for services rendered and expenses incurred from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
448 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $6,923.20 to Tim Roche for services rendered from October 2, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
449 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $720.00 to D. Ray Sirry for services rendered from September 13, 1995 to September 27, l995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn

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Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
450 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3200.00 to James Sprowls for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
451 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of #235.80 to Gayle Starkes for services rendered and expenses incurred from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
452 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,277.95 to Derek Stewart for services rendered and expenses incurred from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
453 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $14,578.32 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 1, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
454 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $13,390.00 to Raymond J. Tallia for services rendered and expenses incurred from September 1, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account by the defendant with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
455 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,460.16 to John Townes for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
456 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that the Clerk of the Court pay the sum of $2,368.75 to Washington Professional Janitorial Services for services rendered from September 26, 1995 to September 29, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
457 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum $14,848.80 to PMC Temporaries for services rendered from September 3, 1995 to September 28, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account estalbished by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
458 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2308.00to William Cathcart for services rendered from October 16, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
459 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $14,538.72 to Michael K. Gatling for services rendered from September 4, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court.(N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
460 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $410.10 to John C. Croup for expenses incurred from September 7, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)

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461 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $886.40 Maurice Chaite for services rendered from October 16, 1995 to October 27, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/08/1995)
462 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for receiver DC CHILD WELFARE by Michael D. Jones (ks) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
463 MOTION filed by receiver DC CHILD WELFARE requesting the transfer of funds to the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver ; Affidavit (1) (ks) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
464 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,154.00 to Julie Breslow for services rendered from 11/06/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account estalbished by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
465 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,538.40 to Penelope Brooks for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
466 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,308.00 to William Cathcart for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
467 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $886.40 to Maurice Chaite for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
468 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,840.00 to Richard Flintrop for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
469 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $220.80 to Monica Furey for services rendered from 10/23/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
470 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,461.60 to Michacel K. Gatling for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
471 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $11,105.19 to Lionel Henderson for services rendered and expenses incurred from 10/30/95 to 11/09/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
472 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $756.00 to Farouk A. Hosein for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
473 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,617.11 to Maria Korman for services rendered and expenses incurred from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account estalbished by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N)

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(gew) (Entered: 11/28/1995)
474 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $761.52 to Kimberly W. Kyburz for services rendered from November 8, 1995 to November 10, 1995. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
475 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $162.56 to Betty Lee for services rendered from 11/01/95 to 11/02/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
476 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $190.96 to Judie Macalino for services rendered from 10/20/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
477 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,869.60 to Walter McCaster for services rendered from 10/23/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
478 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $124.16 to Gilbert McKune for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
479 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $6,040.00 to Jerome G. Miller for services rendered and expenses incurred from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
480 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,769.51 to Beatrice D. Moore for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
481 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,776.80 to Wendy Nichols for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
482 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,000.00 to Robert E. Nunnally, Jr. for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
483 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $617.28 to Jennifer Olexy for services rendered from 11/01/95 to 11/08/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
484 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $211.20 to Charles Price, Jr. for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
485 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $165.60 to Ruby Price for services redered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)

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486 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,191.49 to Lakeisha Ratliff for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
487 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,109.91 to Ridgwell's Caterers for services rendered on 11/21/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
488 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,461.60 to Tim Roche for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
489 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,880.00 to James Sprowls for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
490 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $225.70 to Gayle Starkes for services rendered and expenses incurred from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
491 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,269.60 to Derek Stewart for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
492 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,532.76 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
493 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum $2,740.00 to Raymond J. Tallia for services rendered from 10/20/95 to 11/09/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
494 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,125.44 to John Townes for services rendered and expenses incurred from 10/30/95 to 11/10/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account estalbished by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
495 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $10,959.22 to Washington Professional Janitorial Services for services rendered from 10/01/95 to 10/31/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
496 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,000.00 to Wasserman/Katz for services rendered on 11/03/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
497 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $61,753.00 to Tiger Direct for equipment provided pursuant to invoices dated from 09/28/95 to 10/30/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)

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498 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,100.75 to A−24 Hour Locksmith Service for services rendered from 09/30/95 to 10/26/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn form the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/30/1995)
500 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for receiver DC CHILD WELFARE by Michael D. Jones (ks) (Entered: 12/04/1995)
501 MOTION filed by receiver DC CHILD WELFARE requesting the transfer of funds to the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver ; Affidavit (1) (ks) (Entered: 12/04/1995)
499 MOTION filed by defendants to substitute appearance of Anna E. Blackburne for Natalie Frasier−Allen (ks) (Entered: 12/01/1995)
502 RESPONSE and RECOMMENDATION by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to motion requesting the transfer of funds to the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver [501−1] by DC CHILD WELFARE (ks) (Entered: 12/06/1995)
504 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to substitute appearance of Anna E. Blackburne for Natalie Frasier−Allen [499−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
506 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,707.30 to Audrey Sutton for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
507 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,240.00 to Raymond J. Tallia for services rendered from ll/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
508 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,461.60 to John Townes for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
509 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $27,141.17 to David M. Griffith and Associates, Ltd. for services rendered from 10/01/95 to 10/31/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
510 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $8,500.00 to Namadji Research Corp. for services rendered on 10/30/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
511 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,903.50 to American Business Machines for goods supplied as described in its 10/24/95 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
512 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $273.30 to City Group, Inc. for goods supplied as described in its 10/17/95 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
513 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : i directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $129.35 to Computer Associates for goods supplied as described in its 11/06/95 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn

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Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
514 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,110.15 to Consolidated Maintenance Supply, Inc. for goods supplied from 10/19/95 to 11/22/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
515 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $26,613.00 to Data General Corp. for services rendered from 10/01/95 to 12/31/95. Funds for this paylment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receiverhsip Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
516 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,059.95 to Egghead Software for goods supplied as described in its 11/26/95 consolidated statement. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
517 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $707.50 to Take Me Home for goods supplied as described in its 11/03/95 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
518 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,501.17 to Franklin Quest Co. for goods supplied as described in its invoices dated from 09/29/95 to 10/17/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
519 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $469.50 to Handi Ramp for goods supplied on 10/25/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
520 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,186.25 to Information Management Group for goods supplied on 11/01/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
521 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,789.31 to International Autocare, Inc. for services rendered on 11/01/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
522 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,395.00 to Manifest Auto Cleaning Center for services rendered as described in its 10/25/95 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court.(N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
523 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $5,740.91 to MPI Business Systems for goods supplied as described in its November 10, 1995 statement. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
524 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $653.79 to Neutron Industries, Inc. for services rendered on 10/21/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
525 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $371.00 to Resolute Solutions Corp. for goods supplied as described in its October 21, 1995 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N)

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(gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
526 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,085.00 to Thoroclean, Inc. for services rendered as described in its September 23, 1995 invoice. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
527 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,615.60 to Julie Breslow for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
528 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,538.40 to Penelope Brooks for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
529 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $4,444.34 to William Cathcart for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
530 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum $531.84 to Maurice Chaite for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawnfrom the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
531 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,600.00 to Richard Flintrop for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
532 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $130.88 to Monica Furey for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
533 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $4,367.91 to Michael K. Gatling for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
534 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $6,934.20 to Andrew Gordon for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/01/95 to 11/21/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
535 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $10,440.00 to Lionel Henderson for services rendered from 11/10/95 to 11/22/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants wit the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
536 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $756.00 to Farouk A. Hosein for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
537 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,085.28 to Maria Korman for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95.

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Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Accoutn established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
538 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,538.40 to Kimberly W. Kyburz for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
539 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $121.52 to Judie Macalino for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
540 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $747.84 to Walter McCaster for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
541 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $158.17 to Gilbert McKune for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
542 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $6,071.75 to Jerome G. Miller for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
543 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,808.35 to Beatrice D. Moore for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/22/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
544 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $977.29 to Wendy Nichols for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
545 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directng the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,700.00 to Robert E. Nunnally, Jr. for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
546 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $514.40 to Jennifer Olexy for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
547 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $211.20 to Charles Price, Jr. for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
548 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $165.60 to Ruby Price for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
549 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $692.16 to Lakeisha Ratliff for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds

12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995 12/07/1995
12/08/1995 12/11/1995 12/14/1995 12/18/1995 12/22/1995 12/22/1995

for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
550 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $3,124.88 to Tim Roche for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
551 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum $485.29 to Kwasi Seitu for services rendered from 11/13/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receiveship Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
552 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $600.76 to D. Ray Sirry for services rendered and expenses incurred from 09/28/95 to 10/10/95. Funds for this payment be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
553 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directng the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $2,400.00 to James Sprowls for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
554 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of #138.39 to Gayle Starkes for services rendered and expenses incurred from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
555 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $761.76 to Derek Stewart for services rendered from 11/11/95 to 11/24/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account established by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
556 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $1,001.94 to Esther D. Sumlar. This sum replaces the lost paycheck written to Sumlar by the District of Columbia on 09/29/95 for the pay period ending 09/15/95. Funds for this payment shall be drawn from the LaShawn Receivership Account estalbished by the defendants with the Clerk of the Court; directing that if Sumlar eventually receives a replacement check from the District of Columbia, that check shall be deposited into the LaShawn Receivership Account. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/13/1995)
505 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion requesting the transfer of funds to the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver [501−1] by DC CHILD WELFARE; directing that the Initial Operating Fund now deposited with the Court shall be transferred to the Receiver's bank account. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
503 MOTION filed by defendants for status hearing regarding the projected annual budge of the Lashawn General Receivership for Fiscal Year 1996 (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1995)
557 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $303,694.19, plus all accrued interest, to the LaShawn General Receivership. This total shall be taken from all accounts related to this case and represents the balance of those accounts. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/15/1995)
558 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: directing the defendants shall have until the close of business on 1/8/96 to submit comments on the Projected Annual Budget of the LaShawn General Receivership (N) (bm) (Entered: 12/18/1995)
DEPOSIT by defendants in the sum of $335.602.19 into the Registry of the Court pursuant to Orders filed 10/25/95, 11/6/95, and 11/27/95. (ks) (Entered: 12/28/1995)
559 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $335,602.19 plus any accrued interest to the LaShawn General Recceivership. This

01/02/1996 01/03/1996 01/03/1996
01/03/1996 01/04/1996 01/05/1996
01/17/1996
01/18/1996 01/22/1996
01/23/1996 01/23/1996 01/29/1996 01/31/1996 02/29/1996 02/29/1996 02/29/1996

sum represents the latest deposit by the defendants. (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/29/1995)
DEPOSIT in the sum of $59,606.48 pursuant to Orders, into the Registry of the Court; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
560 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants from order [505−1] , entered on: 12/12/95; Government − no fee; Copies mailed to Marcia R. Lowry (ks) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
561 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk of the Court to pay the sum of $59,606.48 plus any accrued interest to the LaShawn General Receivership once the check is deposited with the Court; The defendants are reminded that no further checks are to be prepared as payable to the Court in relation to this case. (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
563 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing plaintiffs to file a response to the defendants comments on the General Receiver's proposed budget by 01/18/96. (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/16/1996)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [560−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (ks) (Entered: 01/04/1996)
562 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. to extend time to 1/29/96 to submit comments to the revised projected annual budget of the Lashawn General receivership for fiscal year 1996 (blj) (Entered: 01/11/1996)
566 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 1/29/96 to submit comments to the revised projected annual budget of the Lashawn General receivership for fiscal year 1996 [562−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
564 MOTION filed by defendants to extend time to 1/26/96 to file their submit comments to the revised projected Annual Budget of the Lashawn General Receivership for Fiscal year 1996 (ks) (Entered: 01/19/1996)
565 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 1/29/96 to submit comments to the revised projected annual budget of the Lashawn General receivership for fiscal year 1996 [562−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/22/1996)
USCA # 96−7002 assigned for appeal [560−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 01/23/1996)
567 120−DAY PROGRESS REPORT FILED BY THE LASHAWN GENERAL RECEIVERSHIP (gew) (Entered: 01/25/1996)
568 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of consent praecipe regarding defendants' comments on the Budget of the Lashawn General Receivership for Fiscal Year 1996 (ks) (Entered: 01/31/1996)
569 CONSENT praecipe by defendants and the General Receiver (ks) (Entered: 02/01/1996)
570 TRANSCRIPT (Duplicate Copy) filed of status call for date of 4/27/92. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (Original Transcript filed 5/18/92 was lost from file) (ks) (Entered: 02/29/1996)
571 TRANSCRIPT (Duplicate Copy) filed of Fairness Hearing for date(s) of 8/26/91. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (Original Transcript filed 9/5/91 was lost from file) (ks) (Entered: 02/29/1996)
572 TRANSCRIPT (Duplicate Copy) filed of Status Call for date(s) of 2/21/92. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (Original Transcript filed 3/19/92 was lost from file) (ks)

03/20/1996 03/21/1996
05/03/1996 05/06/1996 05/07/1996 05/21/1996 05/21/1996 06/03/1996 06/14/1996 08/15/1996 08/30/1996
09/04/1996 09/11/1996 09/11/1996
09/13/1996 09/16/1996
10/04/1996

(Entered: 02/29/1996)
573 MOTION filed by plaintiff's counsel to withdraw Elizabeth Sarah Symonds as attorney for plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. (ks) (Entered: 03/21/1996)
574 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw Elizabeth Sarah Symonds as attorney for plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. [573−1] by plaintiffs (N) (ks) (Entered: 03/21/1996)
575 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Cheryl Lynn Ziegler (dot) (Entered: 05/06/1996)
577 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for plaintiffs by Craig R. Levine, and notice of change of address "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) Modified on 05/09/1996 (Entered: 05/09/1996)
576 MOTION (RENEWED) filed by defendants to stay case ; Appendix (1) (ks) (Entered: 05/08/1996)
579 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to renewed motion for a stay pending appeal [576−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS; affidavit (1) (blj) (Entered: 05/22/1996)
580 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to motion to stay case pending appeal [374−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS (blj) (Entered: 05/22/1996)
581 REPLY MEMORANDUM by defendants to response to renewed motion to stay case [576−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS; Declaration (1); Exhibit (1) (ks) (Entered: 06/04/1996)
582 SUR−REPLY by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to stay case [576−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS; Exhibits (3) (ks) (Entered: 06/17/1996)
583 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for enforcement of the Court's Order that the defendants fully cooperate with the Recevier, and for specific relef in accordance with the general Receivership Order ; Exhibits (5) (ks) (Entered: 08/16/1996)
584 RESPONSE by defendants in opposition to motion for enforcement of the Court's Order that the defendants fully cooperate with the Recevier, and for specific relef in accordance with the general Receivership Order [583−1] by TYRONE F.; Declarations (3); Attachments (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 09/03/1996)
585 MOTION filed by defendants to expunge record. (ks) (Entered: 09/05/1996)
586 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants of the orginial Declaration of Sandra R. Manning to their opposition to plaintiffs' motion for Enforcement of the Court's Order; Declaration (1) (ks) (Entered: 09/12/1996)
587 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: granting motion to expunge record [585−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS; striking the letter from Marcia Robinson Lowry to this Court, dated 8/6/96 from the record and/or personal files of the Court; directing plaintiffs shall fully comply with Rule 106(b) and not send any future correspondence to the Judge in this case except upon his request. (N) (bm) (Entered: 09/13/1996)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Teresa Sorenson (gew) (Entered: 09/16/1996)
588 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 1:30 12/10/96 ; the Receiver shall submit to the Court recommendatins on an independent Fiduciary mechanism for receipt and disbursement of funds by 12/6/96 ; plaintiffs shall file any updates or amendments to their Motion for Interim Attorneys' Fees by 10/04/96; motion hearing set for 1:30 11/22/96 ; defendants to file their opposition to plaintiffs' motion by 10/25/96 ; plaintiffs' to file their reply to defendants' opposition by 11/4/96 ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/18/1996)
589 SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs regarding plaintiff's motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses; Exhibits (6) (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 10/08/1996)

10/10/1996
10/11/1996
10/24/1996 10/25/1996 11/01/1996 11/12/1996 11/26/1996
11/27/1996 12/09/1996
12/09/1996 12/10/1996
12/10/1996 12/10/1996 12/12/1996 12/12/1996 12/16/1996
12/19/1996

590 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. from order; [588−1] , entered on: 9/18/96; no fee paid pursuant to Rule 4 (a) (4); copy mailed to Marcia R. Lowry (blj) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [590−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (blj) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
593 LETTER dated 10/24/96 by Jerome G. Miller, General Receiver of a corrected copy of the Progress Report dated 10/22/96; Attachments (ks) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
591 RESPONSE (Fourth Supplemental) by defendants in opposition to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs. (ks) (Entered: 10/28/1996)
592 REPLY by plaintiffs in support of their second supplemental memorandum regarding motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibit (1). (ks) (Entered: 11/04/1996)
USCA # 96−7234 assigned for appeal [590−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (ks) (Entered: 11/13/1996)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan granted motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs parties are to meet and try to work out fees amoung themselves or, consider mediation; parties to report to the court for a status hearing set for 1:30 1/9/97 ; Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (jwd) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
594 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; that the amounts of attorneys' fees to which plaintiffs are entitled shall be determined at a later date. (N) (dot) (Entered: 12/02/1996)
595 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for order adopting the monitoring agreement between the General receivership and the certer for study of Social Policy and requiring that the quarterly progress reports described therein be filed with the Court ; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
596 REPORT by receiver DC CHILD WELFARE, Jerome G. Miller to Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (ks) (Entered: 12/10/1996)
597 AMENDED motion for order adopting the monitoring agreement between the General receivership and the certer for study of Social Policy and requiring that the quarterly progress reports described therein be filed with the Court [595−1] by LASHAWN A.; Exhibits (2). (ks) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
598 MOTION filed by defendants requesting that the Court refrain from ruling on plaintiffs' motion for an order adopting the monitoring agreement until defendants have had time to file their opposition. (ks) (Entered: 12/11/1996)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : status hearing set for 1:30 1/9/96 ; Reporter: ANNELIESE (gew) (Entered: 12/16/1996)
599 TRANSCRIPT filed of motions hearing for date(s) of 11/26/96. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
600 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 12/10/96. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
601 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion requesting that the Court refrain from ruling on plaintiffs' motion for an order adopting the monitoring agreement until defendants have had time to file their opposition. [598−1] by EVELYN P. ANDREWS; that defendants shall have 11 days from the date of the service of plaintiff's motion to file and serve their opposition thereto. (N) (ks) (Entered: 12/17/1996)
602 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for Madeline H. deLone to appear pro hac vice ( CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, INC. 404 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, (212)

12/19/1996 12/23/1996
12/24/1996
01/03/1997 01/03/1997 01/07/1997
01/09/1997 01/10/1997 01/23/1997
01/23/1997
01/27/1997 02/04/1997 03/03/1997 03/04/1997 03/05/1997 03/06/1997 03/06/1997

638−2210) (blj) (Entered: 12/20/1996)
603 MOTION filed by plaintiffs for John E. Kirklin to appear pro hac vice ( CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, INC. 404 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, (212) 638−2210) ; Attachments (blj) (Entered: 12/20/1996)
604 RESPONSE by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. to motion for order adopting the monitoring agreement between the General receivership and the certer for study of Social Policy and requiring that the quarterly progress reports described therein be filed with the Court [595−1] by LASHAWN A. (blj) (Entered: 12/24/1996)
605 REPLY by plaintiffs to response to amended motion for an order adopting the monitoring agreement between the General Receivership and the Center for Study of Social Policy and requring that the quarterly progress reports described therein be filed with the Court. [597−1] (ks) (Entered: 12/26/1996)
606 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for John E. Kirklin to appear pro hac vice [603−1] by plaintiffs. (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/03/1997)
607 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for Madeline H. deLone to appear pro hac vice [602−1] by plaintiffs. (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/03/1997)
608 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting amended motion [597−1] for order adopting the monitoring agreement between the General receivership and the certer for study of Social Policy and requiring that the quarterly progress reports described therein be filed with the Court [595−1] by LASHAWN A. (See Order for details) (N) (ks) (Entered: 01/07/1997)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (gew) (Entered: 01/14/1997)
609 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed in USCA dated 10/30/96, on appeal [223−1], appeal [147−1] , affirming the judgment of USDC . USCA # 94−7044 (cjp) (Entered: 01/13/1997)
610 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: referring case for mediation; directing the Clerk of Court to furnish a copy of this Order to the Circuit Executive's Office for the purpose of assigning a mediator; counsel and persons with settlement authority attend mediation; Mediation to be concluded by 3/14/97. (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/24/1997)
611 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: setting forth the terms and schedule governing the resolution of plaintiffs' pending motion for interim attorney's fees abd expenses; plaintiffs' final brief due 3/21/97; defendants' final responsive brief due 4/4/97; plaintiffs' reply to brief due 4/11/97 (N) (bm) (Entered: 01/24/1997)
612 TRANSCRIPT filed of status hearing for date(s) of 1/9/97. Reporter: Anneliese Thomson (ks) (Entered: 01/28/1997)
613 REPORT dated 2/3/97 by General Receiver of Caring for Children: A plan to transform Child and Family Services "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 02/04/1997)
614 MOTION filed for PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, LAUREL V. LEVITA to intervene as a matter of right (No exhibit). (ks) (Entered: 03/05/1997)
625 LASHAWN REVISED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN by receiver DC CHILD WELFARE, submitted by Jerome G. Miller "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/19/1997)
615 COMMENTS by defendants on the Receiver's "Plan to transform Child and Family Services". (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
616 LETTER to Judge Hogan dated 3/5/97 by The Ad Hoc Committee "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
617 LETTER to Judge Hogan dated 3/3/97 by Sister Ann Patrick Conrad at the Catholic University of America. "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered:

03/06/1997 03/06/1997 03/06/1997 03/06/1997 03/06/1997 03/06/1997
03/06/1997
03/06/1997 03/13/1997 03/19/1997 03/20/1997
03/21/1997 04/03/1997
04/07/1997 04/07/1997
04/09/1997 04/15/1997

03/06/1997)
618 LETTER dated 3/3/97 to Dr. Miller from Sister Ann Patrick Conrad; cc Judge Thomas F. Hogan. "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
619 LETTER dated 2/28/97 from Elizabeth Siegel and Susan Zox−Smith to Judge Hogan. "Let this be Filed" (fiat) Judge Hogan. (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
620 STATEMENT filed of Critique of Caring for Children: A Plan to Transform Child and Family Services "Let this be Filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN. (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
621 LETTER dated 3/6/97 to Judge Hogan by Dr. Dianne Brown and Ms. Joyce Higashi; Attachment. "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
622 LETTER dated 3/3/97 by Jerome G. Miller to Judge Hogan "Let this be filed" (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : interveners to amend their pleadings by 3/20/97; parties to respond to final comments by 4/7/97; final respond by plaintiff and defendant due by 4/21/97; status hearing set for 10:00 5/6/97 ; Reporter: Patricia J. Yerkes (ks) (Entered: 03/06/1997)
623 NOTICE OF FILING by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, MARION S. BARRY JR. a letter from the Metro Washington Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers ; attachments (blj) (Entered: 03/07/1997)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: PATRICIA J. YERKES (gew) (Entered: 03/11/1997)
624 STIPULATED ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Parties have agreed to modify the schedule to govern the resolution of plaintiffs' pending motion for iterim attorney's fees and expense, see the order for details. (N) (lpp) (Entered: 03/13/1997)
626 MOTION filed by intervenor PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, intervenor LAUREL V. LEVITA to extend time for an additional two weeks to comply with the Court's Order of 3/6/97. (ks) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
627 ORDER by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay : granting motion to extend time for an additional two weeks to comply with the Court's Order of 3/6/97. [626−1] by LAUREL V. LEVITA, PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON (N) (lpp) Modified on 03/21/1997 (Entered: 03/21/1997)
628 TRANSCRIPT filed of status call for date(s) of 3/6/97. Reporter: Patricia Yerkes (ks) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
629 MEMORANDUM by intervenor PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, intervenor LAUREL V. LEVITA in support of motion for PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, LAUREL V. LEVITA to intervene as a matter of right [614−1]; Exhibits (9). (ks) (Entered: 04/04/1997)
630 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff, comments on the receiver's plans: "Lashawn A. Revised Implementation Plan" and "Caring for children: A Plan To Transform Child and Family Services" (lkn) (Entered: 04/09/1997)
631 MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., comments on the receiver's revised implementation plan (lkn) (Entered: 04/09/1997)
632 ERRATA by plaintiff, corrected comments on the receiver's plans "Lashawn Revised Implementation Plan" and "Caring for Children: A Plan to Transform Child and Family Services". (lkn) (Entered: 04/10/1997)
633 LETTER dated 04/08/97, from Cecilia Perry/AFSCME (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)

04/16/1997
04/16/1997
04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997
04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/16/1997 04/17/1997 04/18/1997
04/18/1997
04/21/1997
04/21/1997 04/21/1997
04/23/1997

634 LETTER dated 04/07/97, by Cynthia Booker/Louvenia Williams/Edgewood/Brookland Family Support Collaborative (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
635 LETTER dated 04/07/97 by Lloyd D. Smith, Jacquelyn Henry, Shirley Prophet/East River Family Strengthening Collaborative (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
636 LETTER dated 03/25/97 by Robert L. Woodson/Natl. Center for Neighborhood Enterprise (fiat) Judge Hogan. (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
637 LETTER dated 03/21/97, by Judith A. Hines/Council on Accreditation of Services for Families and Children, Inc., (fiat) Judge Hogan. (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
638 LETTER dated 04/03/97, by Vicki Young (fiat) Judge Hogan. (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
639 LETTER dated 04/07/97, by Marian Urquilla/Columbia Height/Shaw Family Support Collaborative (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
640 LETTER dated 04/04/97, by Fred Taylor/For Love of Children (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
641 LETTER dated 03/18/97, by Joseph J. O'Hara/Inst. for Health & Human Services, Inc. (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
642 LETTER dated 04/08/97, by Cecilia Perry/AFSCME (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
643 LETTER dated 03/07/97, to Dr. Jerome Miller, cc: Judge Hogan, by Barbara J. Collins/Foster and Adoptive Parents Association (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
644 LETTER dated 04/07/97, by Tom Joe/Center for the Study of Social Policy (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
645 LETTER received 04/07/97, by Bobbi Blok/Washington Child Development Council (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
646 LETTER dated 04/07/97, by Thomas Wells/Consortium for Child Welfare (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
647 LETTER dated 04/04/97, by Dolores L. Farr/Healthy Babies Project (fiat) Judge Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
648 MOTION filed by plaintiffs to extend time to 4/18/97 to respond to pending motion to intervene filed 4/3/97 (mlp) (Entered: 04/18/1997)
649 NOTICE by Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, regarding the LaShawn Revised Implementation Plan (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN. (lkn) (Entered: 04/21/1997)
650 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in opposition to motion for PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, LAUREL V. LEVITA to intervene as a matter of right [614−1] (lkn) (Entered: 04/21/1997)
651 MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., on comments submitted. (lkn) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
652 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff, regarding comments on receiver's plans. (lkn) (Entered: 04/22/1997)
654 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 4/18/97 to respond to pending motion to intervene filed 4/3/97 [648−1] by plaintiffssssss (N) (gew) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
653 LETTER, to Judge Thomas Hogan from Jerome G. Miller/Child & Family Services (fiat) JUDGE HOGAN. (lkn) (Entered: 04/24/1997)

04/24/1997 04/28/1997
04/30/1997 05/01/1997 05/05/1997 05/07/1997 05/12/1997 05/16/1997
05/21/1997
05/21/1997 06/02/1997 06/05/1997
06/06/1997 06/12/1997 07/03/1997

655 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of September 13, 1996. Reporter: Theresa M. Sorenson, CVR−CM (lkn) (Entered: 04/25/1997)
656 STIPULATED ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: setting forth supplemental briefing scheduled if case is not settled in mediation; plaintiff's final brief and evidentiary submissions due 5/2/97;defendants' final response to brief and evidentiary submissions due 5/16/97 ;plaintiffs' final reply to brief and reply submissions due 5/23/97 ; (N) (jeb) (Entered: 04/29/1997)
658 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion for PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, LAUREL V. LEVITA to intervene as a matter of right [614−1]; granting the motion of American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees to file a brief as amicus curiae (N) (JMF) (Entered: 05/01/1997)
657 ORDER by Judge Royce C. Lamberth for Judge Thomas F. Hogan : continuing hearing scheduled for May 06, 1997 (N) (JMF) Modified on 05/02/1997 (Entered: 05/01/1997)
659 (THIRD)SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (22). (lkn) (Entered: 05/05/1997)
661 STATEMENT filed, Progress Report as of March 31, 1997, prepared by the Center for the Study of Social Policy , (fiat) Judge Hogan. (lkn) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
660 LETTER to Judge Hogan from Elizabeth Siegel and Susan Zox Smith, DC Action for Children (lkn) (Entered: 05/14/1997)
662 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (FIFTH) by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to plaintiff's motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses (st) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
663 MOTION filed by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. for leave to substitute revised fifth supplemental opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses :EXHIBIT (Revised opposition). (lkn) (Entered: 05/22/1997)
664 SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. on the receiver's strategic and revised implementation plans. (lkn) (Entered: 05/22/1997)
665 REPLY by plaintiff to defendants' fifth supplemental opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses (Doc. No. 230); Exhibits. (lkn) (Entered: 06/04/1997)
666 MEMORANDUM (COMMENTS) by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., on the selection process for an interim receiver; Attachments.(FILED UNDER SEAL) (lkn) Modified on 06/06/1997 (Entered: 06/06/1997)
667 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : accepting the resignation of Jerome G. Miller as the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver; appointing, for a period not to exceed 90 days, Wilfred Hamm as acting Receiver and Linda Bayless as acting Deputy Receiver. (N) (gew) (Entered: 06/06/1997)
668 ERRATA by plaintiff, of corrected copy of Exhibit "C" to plaintiffs' reply to defendants' fifth supplemental opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses, filed (6/2/97). (lkn) (Entered: 06/13/1997)
669 (FOURTH)SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (8). (lkn) (Entered: 07/07/1997)

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09/02/1997 09/04/1997 09/05/1997
09/19/1997 09/25/1997 10/03/1997 10/10/1997 10/23/1997 10/23/1997

670 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of April 17, 1997. Reporter: Phylis Merana (lkn) (Entered: 07/07/1997)
671 NOTICE by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, of comments on the draft position announcement. (lkn) (Entered: 07/10/1997)
672 MOTION filed by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to change the composition of the screening committee for a new receiver (lkn) (Entered: 08/18/1997)
673 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. by Robert C. Utiger (lkn) (Entered: 08/19/1997)
674 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM by Robert C. Utiger (lkn) (Entered: 08/19/1997)
675 (SIXTH SUPPLEMENTAL)RESPONSE by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses. (lkn) (Entered: 08/19/1997)
676 MEMORANDUM by plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A. in opposition to motion to change the composition of the screening committee for a new receiver [672−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 08/27/1997)
677 RESPONSE by plaintiffs to defendants' sixth supplemental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses; Exhibit (3). (lkn) (Entered: 09/03/1997)
678 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : extending the appointments of Wilfred Hamm as acting Receiver and Linda Bayless as acting Deputy Receiver for a period of 30 days. (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/04/1997)
679 REPLY by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in support of their motion to change the composition of the screening committee for a new receiver [672−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 09/08/1997)
680 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of attorney Michael Edward Zielinski for MARION S. BARRY JR., for PETER G. PARHAM, for JEAN R. HUNTER, for BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, for EVELYN P. ANDREWS. (lkn) Modified on 09/25/1997 (Entered: 09/22/1997)
681 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion to change the composition of the screening committee for a new receiver [672−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (gew) (Entered: 09/26/1997)
682 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : extending the appointments of Wilfred Hamm as acting Receiver and Linda Bayless as acting Deputy Receiver for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. (lkn) (Entered: 10/03/1997)
683 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : appointing Linda Bayless as acting Receiver for a period not to exceed 30 days. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 10/10/1997)
684 GENERAL RECEIVERSHIP ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : ensuring full compliance with the Remedial Order and the Implementation Plan in an expeditious and cost−effective manner. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/24/1997)
685 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : appointing Ernestine Jones as the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receiver in accordance with Court's opinion and order of

10/29/1997
11/03/1997 11/17/1997 11/20/1997 12/19/1997 12/22/1997 01/05/1998 01/21/1998
01/26/1998 01/29/1998
02/03/1998 02/04/1998 02/04/1998 02/12/1998 02/18/1998 02/18/1998 03/09/1998 07/08/1998

May 22, 1995. The Receiver's responsibilities and powers remain as outlined in the Court's General Receivership Order of August 24, 1995. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/24/1997)
686 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that Ms. Jones annual salary will be $125,000 plus a 12% increment to cover health and retirement benefits; the total annual compensation package will be $140,00. Ms. Jones will be eligible for vacation benefits of four weeks per year. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/29/1997)
687 (FIFTH) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in support of motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiff; Exhibits (7). (lkn) (Entered: 11/04/1997)
689 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : motion hearing set for 1:30 1/26/98 ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/02/1997)
688 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : motion hearing set for 1:30 1/26/98 ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/20/1997)
690 MOTION filed by receiver DC CHILD WELFARE to withdraw the firm of Kirkland & Ellis as attorney (lkn) (Entered: 12/24/1997)
691 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw the firm of Kirkland & Ellis as attorney [690−1] by DC CHILD WELFARE (N) (gew) (Entered: 12/29/1997)
692 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw the firm of Kirkland & Ellis as attorney [690−1] by DC CHILD WELFARE (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/05/1998)
693 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to plaintiffs' fee petition; Appendices (2). (lkn) (Entered: 01/22/1998)
694 REPLY by plaintiff to defendants' supplemental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses (filed 1/21/98) (lkn) (Entered: 01/27/1998)
695 MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in support of supplemental memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' fee petition. (lkn) (Entered: 01/30/1998)
697 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : motion hearing on plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees set for 1:30 2/4/98 ; (N) (jeb) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
696 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Walter A. Smith Jr. (JMF) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
STATUS HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Reporter: Patricia J. Yerkes (gew) (Entered: 02/05/1998)
698 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (SIXTH)by plaintiff to motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiff (lkn) (Entered: 02/13/1998)
699 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (N) (gew) (Entered: 02/20/1998)
700 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses [230−1] by plaintiff (N) (gew) (Entered: 02/20/1998)
701 RESPONSE by plaintiff to order [700−1]; Exhibits (4). (lkn) (Entered: 03/10/1998)
703 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing that plaintiffs shall recover from defendants the sum of $1,248,467.13 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this case; directing the Clerk to enter partial final judgment for plaintiffs against defendants in the amount of $1,248,467.13, with interest to accrue thereon from the date of entry of this order, as provided by law. (N) (gew) (Entered: 07/09/1998)

07/09/1998
07/14/1998 07/27/1998 07/29/1998
07/31/1998
08/03/1998
08/11/1998 08/12/1998 08/14/1998 08/14/1998 08/17/1998 08/26/1998
09/02/1998 09/29/1998
11/06/1998 11/23/1998 12/30/1998

702 CERTIFIED COPY of judgment filed in USCA dated 6/2/98, on appeal [590−1], appeal [560−1], appeal [400−1], appeal [392−1], appeal [370−1], appeal [318−1], appeal [291−1] , remanding for further proceedings. , and dismissing remaining appeals as moot OPINION USCA # 94−7227, 94−7251, 95−7141, 95−7180, 95−7215, 96−7002 & 96−7234 (cjp) (Entered: 07/09/1998)
704 PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT by Judge Thomas F. Hogan; entering partial final judgment in favor of plaintiffs against defendants in the sum of $1,248,467.13. (gew) (Entered: 07/15/1998)
705 MOTION filed by plaintiff to withdraw Madeline H. deLONE as attorney for plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. (tw) (Entered: 07/28/1998)
706 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw Madeline H. deLONE as attorney for plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. [705−1] by plaintiff (N) (gew) (Entered: 07/29/1998)
707 NOTICE OF APPEAL by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. from order [703−1] , entered on: 07/09/98; Fee not paid, appeal by govt. Copies mailed to counsel. (lkn) (Entered: 08/03/1998)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [707−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS to U.S. Court of Appeals (lkn) (Entered: 08/03/1998)
708 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff from judgment order [704−1] entered on 07/14/89, order [703−1] entered on 07/09/98; fee not paid. Copies mailed to counsel. (lkn) (Entered: 08/12/1998)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [708−1] by plaintiff to U.S. Court of Appeals (lkn) (Entered: 08/12/1998)
USCA # 98−7147 assigned for appeal [708−1] by plaintiff (JMF) (Entered: 08/17/1998)
USCA # 98−7146 assigned for appeal [707−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (JMF) (Entered: 08/17/1998)
USDC appeal fee of $5.00 and USCA docketing fee of $100.00 received, for appeal [708−1] by plaintiff , by plaintiff . USCA notified. (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1998)
709 NOTICE by plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A. that plaintiffs will not be ordering additional transcripts. (tw) (Entered: 08/27/1998)
USCA # 98−7147 assigned for appeal [708−1] by plaintiff (st) (Entered: 09/03/1998)
710 OBJECTIONS by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. and comments on the receiver's final draft stategic plan, dated September 4, 1998. (tw) (Entered: 09/30/1998)
711 MEMORANDUM by defendants' (jf) (Entered: 11/09/1998)
712 MOTION filed by defendant to disapprove the final draft strategic plan, dated 09/04/98 (jf) (Entered: 11/24/1998)
713 MOTION filed by plaintiff to withdraw Craig R. Levine as attorney for TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. (lkn) (Entered: 01/04/1999)

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01/14/1999 01/20/1999 01/20/1999 02/08/1999 02/09/1999
02/12/1999
02/25/1999 03/03/1999 03/05/1999
03/15/1999
05/14/1999 05/24/1999 06/14/1999 06/25/1999 06/30/1999 07/09/1999

714 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw Craig R. Levine as attorney for TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. [713−1] by plaintiff attorney Craig R. Levine for LASHAWN A. (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/05/1999)
715 MOTION filed by plaintiff for leave to file opposition out of time :EXHIBIT (Opposition). (lkn) (Entered: 01/15/1999)
716 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for leave to file opposition out of time [715−1] by plaintiff (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/21/1999)
756 RESPONSE by plaintiff in opposition to defendants' motion to disapprove the receiver's final draft strategic plan. (lkn) (Entered: 12/14/1999)
717 MOTION (SECOND) filed by plaintiff for interim attorney fees and expenses ;Exhibits (25) (lkn) (Entered: 02/09/1999)
718 MOTION filed by plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A. for ERIC THOMPSON to appear pro hac vice ( no information given ) (bjsp) (Entered: 02/10/1999)
719 REPLY by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to response to motion to disapprove the final draft strategic plan, dated 09/04/98 [712−1] by PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (tw) (Entered: 02/16/1999)
720 CERTIFIED COPY of order filed in USCA dated 2/25/99, on appeal [708−1], appeal [707−1] , remanding for further proceedings. USCA # 98−7146 & 98−7147 (cjp) (Entered: 02/26/1999)
721 JOINT MOTION by defendant, plaintiff to vacate , and to modify partial final judgment regarding attorneys' fees ; Attachment. (lkn) (Entered: 03/04/1999)
722 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing the Clerk to enter a Revised Partial Final Judgment for plaintiffs against defendants in the amount of $960,000, in accordance with parties' Settlement Agreement and proposed judgment. (N) (gew) (Entered: 03/05/1999)
723 REVISED PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT by Judge Thomas F. Hogan in favor of plaintiffs TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B. against plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A. in the sum $960,000 accordance with the parties' Settlement Agreement and proposed judgment. (gew) (Entered: 03/15/1999)
724 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of attorney Cheryl Lynn Ziegler for MARION S. BARRY JR., and JEAN R. HUNTER. (adc) (Entered: 05/18/1999)
725 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for ERIC THOMPSON to appear pro hac vice ( no information given ) [718−1] by plaintiffssssss (N) (gew) (Entered: 05/26/1999)
726 MOTION filed by plaintiff for order awarding judgment on plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses as conceded ; attachments (1) (jf) (Entered: 06/16/1999)
727 MOTION filed by defendant to extend time to 6/30/99 to file response to plaintiff's Rule 108(b) motion for entry of order awarding judgment on plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses as conceded (tb) (Entered: 06/28/1999)
728 MOTION filed by defendant to extend time to 8/1/99 to respond to plaintiff's second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses (tb) (Entered: 07/01/1999)
729 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to extend time to 8/1/99 to respond to plaintiff's second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses [728−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM,

07/13/1999 07/14/1999
07/15/1999 07/21/1999 07/27/1999 07/29/1999

JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS . (lkn) (Entered: 07/13/1999)
730 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion to extend time to 8/1/99 to respond to plaintiff's second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses [728−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, granting motion for interim attorney fees and expenses [717−1] by plaintiffs; directing plaintiffs to recover from defendants the sum of $1,763,692 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this case, including work on recovering fees and costs; directing the Clerk to enter partial final judgment for plaintiffs against defendants in the amount of $1,763,692.63, with interest to accrue thereon from the date of entry of this order, as provided by law. (N) (gew) (Entered: 07/14/1999)
731 PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of plaintiffs, LASHAWN A. BY HER NEXT FRIEND, EVELYN MOORE, DEMERICK B., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, DR. OWNE RENNERT, GARY C., BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS, CRYSTAL AND WESLEY BROWN, LEO C., BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS CRYSTAL AND WESLEY BROWN, ROBERT D. BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, DARYL ANETTE CHAMBLEE, KEVIN E. BY HIS NEXT FIREND ELIZABETH VELEZ, AND TYRONE F., BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS, EVA NASH AND ANATASIA HOLMES, ON THEIR OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED against defendants ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, AS MAYOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PETER G. PARHAM, DIRECTOR OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMIBIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, BARBARA BURKE TATUM, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE COMMISSION OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, JEAN R. HUNTER AS ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FAMILY SERVICES ADMINISTRATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND EVELYN P. ANDREWS, AS ACTING CHIEF OF THE CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in the sum of $1,763,692.63 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this case, including work on recovering fees and costs, with interest to accrue thereon from the date of entry of this order as provided by law. (N) (jeb) (Entered: 07/15/1999)
732 REPLY by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to plaintiffs' opposition to motion to extend time to 6/30/99 to file response to plaintiff's Rule 108(b) motion for entry of order awarding judgment on plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses as conceded [727−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 07/16/1999)
733 CORRECTED ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying motion to extend time to 6/30/99 to file response to plaintiff's Rule 108(b) motion for entry of order awarding judgment on plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses as conceded [727−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS; granting motion of plaintiffs' to treat second motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses; directing that pltf. recover from defts. the sum of $1,763,692.23 for reasonable attorneys' fees; directing that pltfs. recover from defts. the sum of $104,263.62 for reasonable expenses (N) (jaw) Modified on 07/23/1999 (Entered: 07/23/1999)
734 MOTION filed by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. for reconsideration of order [730−1] , and to vacate the award of attorney's fees entered July 14, 1999 (lkn) (Entered: 07/28/1999)
735 RESPONSE by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses . (lkn) (Entered: 07/30/1999)

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08/12/1999 08/12/1999
08/12/1999 08/12/1999 08/12/1999 08/12/1999 08/12/1999 08/16/1999
08/16/1999 08/31/1999 09/23/1999 10/12/1999
10/15/1999

736 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in support of motion for reconsideration of order [730−1] [734−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, motion to vacate the award of attorney's fees entered July 14, 1999 [734−2] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
737 REPLY by plaintiffs to defendants' opposition to plailntiffs' second motion for interim attorheys' fees and expenses. (lkn) (Entered: 08/13/1999)
738 RESPONSE by plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A. in opposition to motion for reconsideration of order [730−1] [734−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, motion to vacate the award of attorney's fees entered July 14, 1999 [734−2] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS . (lkn) (Entered: 08/13/1999)
740 LETTER from Latin American Youth Center (fiat) J. Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
741 LETTER from Constorium for Child Welfare (fiat) J. Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
743 LETTER from Lutheran Social Services of the National Capital Area (fiat) J. Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
744 LETTER from Board of Child Care Foster Care Program (fiat) J. Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
745 LETTER from For Love of Children (fiat) J. Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
739 REPLY by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to plaintiff's opposition to motion for reconsideration of order [730−1] [734−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, motion to vacate the award of attorney's fees entered July 14, 1999 [734−2] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
742 LETTER from The Martin Pollak Project (fiat) J. Hogan (lkn) (Entered: 08/17/1999)
746 LETTER daated 08/12/99 to The Honorable A. Williams, Mayor from Patricia G. Shannon, President & CEO, Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Washington, with copy to Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (gew) (Entered: 09/10/1999)
747 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : holding case in abeyance motion of defts. for reconsideration ; and directing defts. to submit a memorandum as described in this order within 30 days of this order. (N) (jaw) (Entered: 09/24/1999)
748 SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL for defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., substituting Maria Claudia Amato for attorney Walter A. Smith Jr. for MARION S. BARRY JR., attorney Walter A. Smith Jr. for PETER G. PARHAM, attorney Walter A. Smith Jr. for BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, attorney Walter A. Smith Jr. for JEAN R. HUNTER, attorney Walter A. Smith Jr. for EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 10/13/1999)
749 MOTION filed by defendant for reconsideration of order dated 09/23/99 [747−1], [747−2] (jf) (Entered: 10/18/1999)

10/20/1999 10/22/1999 10/25/1999
10/26/1999 11/03/1999
12/10/1999
02/17/2000
03/06/2000 03/07/2000 03/13/2000
03/20/2000 04/06/2000 04/06/2000

750 RESPONSE by plaintiffs in opposition to motion for reconsideration of order dated 09/23/99 [747−1], [747−2] [749−1] by PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS . (lkn) (Entered: 10/21/1999)
752 MOTION filed by defendants' to extend time to 60 days to file a memorandum to Court's order dated 09/23/99 (jf) (Entered: 10/26/1999)
751 REPLY by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. to plaintiff's opposition to motion for reconsideration of order dated 09/23/99 [747−1], [749−1] by PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (lkn) (Entered: 10/26/1999)
753 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. by Jacques Philippe Lerner (lkn) (Entered: 10/27/1999)
754 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to extend time to 60 days to file a memorandum to Court's order dated 09/23/99 [752−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS; report due by 12/10/99 ;, granting motion for reconsideration of order dated 09/23/99 [747−1], [747−2] [749−1] by PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/05/1999)
755 MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR.; documenting violations of Federal and Local Rules and Court Orders pursuant to the court's Order dated 9/23/99 and 11/3/99; attachments (dam) (Entered: 12/13/1999)
757 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : , vacating this Court's July 21, 1999 Order awarding plaintiffs attorney's fees and expenses; plaintiffs have until 3/6/00 to supplement their fee motion, if they so choose ; defendants have until 3/13/00 to supplement their opposition brief, if they so choose. ; (N) (gew) (Entered: 02/23/2000)
758 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of motion for interim attorney fees and expenses [717−1] by plaintiffs; Exhibits (8). (Bulky) (ks) (Entered: 03/07/2000)
759 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs' second motion for interim attorney fees and expenses [717−1]; exhibits (3) (cjp) (Entered: 03/08/2000)
760 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM by defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. in opposition to motion (second) for interim attorney fees and expenses [717−1] by plaintiffs (cjp) (Entered: 03/14/2000)
761 REPLY MEMORANDUM by plaintiff in further support of plaintiffs' supplemented second motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses (bjsp) (Entered: 03/21/2000)
762 MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (N) (gew) (Entered: 04/06/2000)
763 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for interim attorney fees and expenses [717−1] by plaintiffs; directing to recover from defendants the sum of $2,052,976.00 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this case, including work on the merits of the case performed from August 29, 1991 through March 2, 2000, and also including work on recovering fees and costs; directing the Clerk to enter partial final judgment for plaintiffs against defendants in the amount of $2,052,976.23, with interest to accrue thereon from the date of entry of this order, as provided by law. (N) (gew) (Entered: 04/06/2000)

04/06/2000
05/02/2000 05/04/2000 05/09/2000 08/15/2000
10/23/2000 10/23/2000 10/23/2000 10/25/2000
11/15/2000 11/16/2000
12/04/2000 12/11/2000 01/05/2001 02/05/2001 02/14/2001 03/02/2001 03/05/2001

764 PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT by Judge Thomas F. Hogan; entering partial final judgment for plaintiffs against defendants in the total sum of $2,052,976.23 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in this case, including work on the merits of the case performed from August 29, 1991 through March 2, 2000, and also including work on recovering fees and costs. (gew) (Entered: 04/06/2000)
765 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiffs from judgment order [764−1], order [763−1] , entered on: 4/6/00. Copies sent to all parties. (bjsp) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
TRANSMITTED PRELIMINARY RECORD on appeal [765−1] by TYRONE F. to U.S. Court of Appeals (bjsp) (Entered: 05/04/2000)
USCA # 00 7122 assigned for appeal [765−1] by TYRONE F. (bjsp) (Entered: 05/10/2000)
766 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of attorney Maria Claudia Amato and Martin L. Grossman for MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, for EVELYN P. ANDREWS. (jf) (Entered: 08/16/2000)
767 CONSENT ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : regarding a process that would result in termination of the Receivership upon satisfaction of certain specified conditions. (N) (gew) (Entered: 10/24/2000)
768 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. for order to enter proposed consent order (cas) (Entered: 10/24/2000)
769 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for defendants by Richard Stuart Love (jf) (Entered: 10/25/2000)
770 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL of attorney Jacques Philippe Lerner for MARION S. BARRY JR., attorney Jacques Philippe Lerner for PETER G. PARHAM, attorney Jacques Philippe Lerner for BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, attorney Jacques Philippe Lerner for JEAN R. HUNTER, attorney Jacques Philippe Lerner for EVELYN P. ANDREWS. (jf) (Entered: 10/27/2000)
771 MOTION (CONSENT) filed by plaintiffs to enter proposed order (jdm) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
772 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : directing effective 11/20/00, Sondra Jackson is appointed Interim Receiver until the District of Columbia Child Welfare Receivership is terminated pursuant to the terms of the Court's Order of 10/23/00; directing that the Interim Receiver's responsibilities and powers reman as outlined in the Court's General Receiveship Order of 11/24/95. (N) (gew) (Entered: 11/16/2000)
774 CERTIFIED COPY of order filed in USCA dated 12/1/00, on appeal [765−1] , remanding for further proceedings. USCA # 00−7122 (cjp) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
773 JOINT MOTION by defendants, plaintiffs to vacate , and to modify partial final judgment regarding attorney' fees (jdm) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
775 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting joint motion to vacate [773−1] by plaintiffs, defendant, granting joint motion to modify partial final judgment regarding attorney' fees [773−2] by plaintiffs, defendant (N) (gew) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
776 MOTION (THIRD) filed by plaintiffs for attorney fees and expenses ; Declarations (2); Exhibits (6). (jdm) (Entered: 02/07/2001)
777 ERRATA by plaintiffs, correcting memorandum in support of plaintiffs' third motion for interim attorneys' fees and expenses; Declaration (1). (jdm) (Entered: 02/15/2001)
779 MOTION filed by defendants, plaintiffs for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys fees (jdm) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
778 ORDER by Judge Thomas F. Hogan: directing that the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of one hundred thirty−one thousand nine dollars and ninety−one cents ($131,009.91) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from March 3, 2000 through December 31, 2000 with the orders entered in this civil action, with payment made consistent with paragraph 4.D of the parties November 20, 2000 Agreement as

05/16/2001 05/22/2001 05/22/2001 05/22/2001 07/31/2001 08/01/2001 08/13/2001 09/10/2001
01/11/2002
01/14/2002

to undisputed fees and costs. (N) (jf) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
780 MOTION filed by defendant to enter proposed order terminating the receivership (tb) (Entered: 05/17/2001)
MOTION HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan granted motion to enter proposed order terminating the receivership [780−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS Reporter: Scott Wallace (jf) (Entered: 05/22/2001)
781 ORDER (CONSENT) by Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to enter proposed order terminating the receivership [780−1] by MARION S. BARRY JR., PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (jf) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
782 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Grace Michele Lopes representing defendant ANTHONY WILLIAMS . New address: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR 441 Fourth Street, NW 11th Floor, Washington, DC, 20001 (202) 727−1597. (tb) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
783 MOTION filed by defendants for consent order (aet) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
784 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for consent order [783−1] by ANTHONY WILLIAMS; directing defendants to promulgate licensing standards for independent living facilities by 02/28/02. (N) (jf) (Entered: 08/02/2001)
785 MOTION (BI−ANNUAL) filed by plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A. for attorney's fees and expenses ; Exhibit's (7) (cas) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
786 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : allowing motion for interim attorney's fees and expenses for the period of 01/01 through 06/30/01 [785−1] by plaintiffs; further ordered, that partial judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs, LASHAWN A., by her next friend, et al. against defendants, ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al. in the sum of $58,583.34. (N) (jf) (Entered: 09/13/2001)
787 MOTION filed by amicus AMER. FED. STATE CO., amicus AMER. FED. OF SCHOOL, amicus NAT.ASSN. SOC.WKRS., defendant EVELYN P. ANDREWS, defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR., plaintiff TYRONE F., plaintiff KEVIN E., plaintiff ROBERT D., plaintiff LEO C., plaintiff GARY C., plaintiff DEMERICK B., plaintiff LASHAWN A., movant JEANNE ASHERMAN, movant BARBARA BATTLE, movant WILLIE F. CALHOUN, movant RICHARD P. DIGERONIMO, movant JESURENA R. GRIFFIN, movant JOHN KUKLISH, movant DIANE ROBINSON, movant FRANK SAMUEL, receiver DC CHILD WELFARE, intervenor PABLO RUIZ−SALOMON, intervenor LAUREL V. LEVITA, defendant ANTHONY WILLIAMS to modify proposed consent order to adjust six months evaluation period to reflect the delay in establishing the baseline (cas) (Entered: 01/14/2002)
788 CONSENT ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to modify proposed consent order to adjust six months evaluation period to reflect the delay in establishing the baseline [787−1] by defendant, intervenor, receiver, plaintiff, defendant, amicus; further ordered, that paragraph 18 of the 10/23/00 consent order is modified to read as follows: Commencing on or about 06/30/02, the Monitor shall evaluate whether the CFSA has met the adjusted performance standards by using the same methods specified in paragraph 17 to determine the baseline standards ("Six Month Evaluation"); further ordered, that the the first sentence of paragraph 11 of the 10/23/00 Consent ORder is modified to read as follows: The new Director, in consulatation with the Court Monitor and others the Director deems appropriate, shall establish an independent expert advisory panel of up to ten substantive experts; further ordered, that all provisions of the 10/23/00 Consent Order remain in full force and effect. (N) (jf) (Entered: 01/15/2002)

03/14/2002 03/18/2002
04/19/2002 04/23/2002 04/25/2002 04/25/2002 06/13/2002 09/24/2002 10/04/2002 11/20/2002 01/06/2003 03/31/2003 04/01/2003
04/03/2003 04/07/2003

790 MOTION filed by defendant JEAN R. HUNTER, defendant BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, defendant PETER G. PARHAM, defendant MARION S. BARRY JR. for adoption of consent order regarding attorney's fees. (td) (Entered: 03/19/2002)
789 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan: directing District of Columbia to pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of thirty−eight thousand four hundred and seventy−five dollars ($38,475) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from July 01, 2001 through December 31, 2001 with orders entered in this civil action. (N) (jf) (Entered: 03/18/2002)
791 MEMORIALIZING ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : denying plaintiffs motion for joinder of necessary party and temporary restraining order; dispositive motions due 4/26/02 ; response to dispositive motions due 5/3/02 ; motion hearing set for 10:00 5/8/02 ; (N) (jf) (Entered: 04/21/2002)
792 Declaration of Emelda P. Johnson. (td) (Entered: 04/29/2002)
793 MOTION (emergency) filed by plaintiff for joinder of necessary party and temporary restraining order ; attachment (1); exhibits (5); (FIAT. Chief Judge Hogan) (td) (Entered: 04/29/2002)
794 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE for Non Party STATE OF MARYLAND by Catherine M. Shultz and Carol A. Smith. (td) Modified on 05/01/2002 (Entered: 05/01/2002)
795 TRANSCRIPT filed for date(s) of 4/19/02. Reporter: Scott L. Wallace (bcs) (Entered: 06/14/2002)
796 MOTION filed by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, ANTHONY WILLIAMS for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys fees (bcs) (Entered: 09/25/2002)
797 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys fees [796−1] by ANTHONY WILLIAMS, PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (jf) (Entered: 10/04/2002)
798 MOTION filed by defendants for enter proposed order terminating the probationary period and approving the interim implementation plan ; attachment (1) (mpt) (Entered: 11/22/2002)
799 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for enter proposed order terminating the probationary and approving the interim implementation plan [798−1] by ANTHONY WILLIAMS, PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (jf) (Entered: 01/07/2003)
800 MOTION filed by defendants JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees (bcs) (Entered: 04/01/2003)
801 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys' fees [800−1] by PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER; further orderd, directing District of Columbia to pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of sixty−two thousand dollars ($62,000) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from January 01, 2002 through June 30, 2002 with the orders entered in this civil action. (N) (jf) (Entered: 04/02/2003)
802 MOTION (REVISED) filed by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, ANTHONY WILLIAMS for adoption of consent order regarding attornys' fees (bcs) (Entered: 04/04/2003)
803 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan: directing the District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of sixty−two thousand dollars ($62,000) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from July 1, 2002 through December 31, 2002 with the orders entered in this civil action. (N) (jf) (Entered: 04/08/2003)

05/05/2003 05/06/2003 05/08/2003
05/08/2003 05/14/2003
05/14/2003
05/15/2003 05/15/2003 09/15/2003 09/17/2003
09/27/2004 10/28/2004 11/02/2004 12/09/2004 12/09/2004

804 RESPONSE by defendants ANTHONY WILLIAMS, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM to the proposed implementation plan by the court monitor on 4/22/03 (bcs) (Entered: 05/06/2003)
805 MOTION filed to withdraw Grace Michele Lopes as attorney for ANTHONY WILLIAMS (bcs) (Entered: 05/07/2003)
806 REPLY by plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. to response objection to the proposed implementation plan by the court monitor on 4/22/03 [804−1] by PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, ANTHONY WILLIAMS . (bcs) Modified on 05/14/2003 (Entered: 05/09/2003)
807 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion to withdraw Grace Michele Lopes as attorney for ANTHONY WILLIAMS [805−1] (N) (jf) (Entered: 05/12/2003)
810 RESPONSE by defendants EVELYN P. ANDREWS, JEAN R. HUNTER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, PETER G. PARHAM, ANTHONY WILLIAMS to response reply to response to the proposed implementation plan by the court monitor on 4/22/03 [806−1] by plaintiffs; (FIAT); "LET THIS BE FILED" by Chief Judge Hogan (bcs) (Entered: 05/16/2003)
811 MOTION filed by plaintiffs TYRONE F., KEVIN E., ROBERT D., LEO C., GARY C., DEMERICK B., LASHAWN A. for Erik S. Pitchal to appear pro hac vice ( Children's Rights 404 Park Avenue South, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10016, (212)683−2210) ; declaration (1); (COPY) (bcs) Modified on 05/16/2003 (Entered: 05/16/2003)
808 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion for Erik S. Pitchal to appear pro hac vice for plaintiffs' (N) (jf) (Entered: 05/15/2003)
809 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan: approving the implementation plan pursuant to Court's order of January 06, 2003; (BULKY) (N) (jf) (Entered: 05/16/2003)
812 MOTION filed by defendants for adoption of consent order regarding attorneys fees (bcs) (Entered: 09/16/2003)
813 ORDER by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : granting motion regarding attorneys fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from 1/1/03 through 6/30/03 [812−1] by ANTHONY WILLIAMS, PETER G. PARHAM, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS (N) (nmr) (Entered: 09/17/2003)
814 MOTION for Attorney Fees by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F.. (Attachments: # 1 Affirmation of Lowry# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B & C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F, G & H# 7 Agreed Order, Notice & Proposed Order)(lc, ) (Entered: 10/13/2004)
815 NOTIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(nmw, ) (Entered: 10/28/2004)
816 ORDER; Order granting the Motion for Approval of Plaintiff's Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11/2/04. (hs,) (Entered: 11/02/2004)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held, case continued for a further status hearing before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/18/05 at 2:00PM in courtroom #8. Status Conference held on 12/9/2004. (Court Reporter CATHRYN JONES.) (hs,) (Entered: 12/09/2004)
817 ORDER setting status conference for February 18, 2005 at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 9, 2004. (lctfh1, ) (Entered: 12/09/2004)

12/09/2004 12/09/2004 12/09/2004 01/18/2005 02/17/2005 02/18/2005
02/23/2005 05/02/2005 05/12/2005 05/16/2005 07/27/2005 08/04/2005
08/08/2005 08/09/2005 08/26/2005 09/09/2005 09/23/2005 10/07/2005

819 RESPONSE to 818 filed by BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, JEAN R. HUNTER, EVELYN P. ANDREWS, ANTHONY WILLIAMS, PETER G. PARHAM (fiat.."Let this be filed−Chief Judge Hogan"). (lc, ) (Entered: 01/27/2005)
820 Civil Statement from Judith W. Meltzer, Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Social Policy regarding Status Conference scheduled for December 9, 2004. (lc, ) (Entered: 02/09/2005)
821 Letter from Children's Rights (Fiat: "Let this be filed" Chief Judge Hogan). (lc, ) (Entered: 02/15/2005)
818 Civil Statement from Thomas Welts, Executive Director of Consortium For Child Welfare. (lc, ) (Entered: 01/19/2005)
822 STATUS REPORT Defendants' Response to the Court Monitor's Letter and Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/17/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 2/18/2005. A Status Conference is set to review the New plan on Foster Care Placements and relations with other agencies, on 5/2/05 at 11:00AM before Chief Judge Hogan in Courtroom #8. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
823 ORDER setting status conference for May 2, 2005 at 11:00 a.m. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on February 23, 2005. (lctfh1, ) (Entered: 02/23/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 5/2/2005. Next Status Conference set for 7/25/05 at 10:00 AM. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 05/02/2005)
824 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/12/2005)
825 ORDER; CONSENT ORDER . Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 5/13/05. (hs,) (Entered: 05/16/2005)
826 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Conference set for 8/4/2005 11:30 AM in Courtroom 8 before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan.. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on July 27, 2005. (lctfh1, ) (Entered: 07/27/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 8/4/2005. Bi−weekly reports from the Defendants ordered to be submitted to Chief Judge Hogan's Chambers. Next Status Conference set for 11/9/05 at 11:30AM before Chief Judge Hogan in Courtroom # 8. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 08/05/2005)
827 SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Report due by 8/26/2005. Status Conference set for 11/9/2005 11:30 AM in Courtroom 8 before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan.. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on August 8, 2005. (lctfh1, ) (Entered: 08/08/2005)
828 NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by all plaintiffs. Case related to Case No. 05−cv−1060. (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 08/09/2005)
829 NOTICE of Filing Regarding Provider Payments by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/26/2005)
830 NOTICE of Filing of Second Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/09/2005)
831 NOTICE of Filing of Third Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/23/2005)
832 NOTICE of Filing of Fourth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/07/2005)

10/21/2005 10/21/2005 11/01/2005 11/04/2005 11/09/2005
11/18/2005 12/02/2005 12/16/2005 12/19/2005
01/10/2006
01/13/2006 01/27/2006 02/10/2006 02/15/2006
02/22/2006 03/15/2006 03/15/2006
04/20/2006 05/15/2006 06/15/2006 07/17/2006

833 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees Order by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
834 NOTICE of Filing Fifth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
837 CONSENT ORDER, Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/24/05. (hs,). (Entered: 11/01/2005)
838 NOTICE of Filing Sixth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/04/2005)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 11/9/2005. The next Status Conference is set for 2/15/2006 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
839 NOTICE of Filing Seventh Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/18/2005)
840 NOTICE of Filing Eighth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/02/2005)
841 NOTICE of Filing Ninth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
842 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File the District's Next Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
MINUTE ORDER granting 842 Motion for Extension of Time. The next provider payment report shall be due January 13, 2006. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on January 10, 2006. (lctfh1, ) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
843 NOTICE Notice of Filing Tenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
844 NOTICE of Filing Eleventh Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/27/2006)
845 NOTICE of Filing Twelfth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 2/15/2006. Next Status Conference set for 6/20/2006 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
846 ORDER setting schedule. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on February 22, 2006. (lctfh1, ) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
847 NOTICE of Filing Thirteenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re Status Conference, (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/15/2006)
848 VACATED PURSUANT TO ORDER FILED ON 1/12/2011.....STIPULATION re Status Conference, that Provider Payment Reports Shall Be Filed Monthly by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Love, Richard) Modified on 1/13/2011 (dr). (Entered: 03/15/2006)
849 NOTICE of Filing Fourteenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
850 NOTICE of Filing Fifteenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Attachments: # 1)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/15/2006)
851 NOTICE of Filing Sixteenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 06/15/2006)
852 NOTICE of Filing Seventeenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Attachments: # 1)(Love, Richard) (Entered:

07/25/2006
08/15/2006 09/15/2006 10/16/2006 10/18/2006
11/20/2006 12/13/2006
12/15/2006 01/10/2007 01/16/2007 01/17/2007 02/15/2007 02/15/2007 02/15/2007 02/27/2007 02/27/2007 02/27/2007
03/15/2007 04/17/2007

07/17/2006)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 7/25/2006. Status Conference set for 10/27/2006 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne.) (hs,) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
853 NOTICE of Filing Eighteenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/15/2006)
854 NOTICE of Filing Nineteenth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
855 NOTICE of Filing Twentieth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
MINUTE ORDER The Status Conference previously set for 10/27/2006 will now be held on 12/21/2006 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/18/06. (lctfh1) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
856 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−First Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
MINUTE ORDER cancelling the status conference set for December 21, 2006, at 11:00 a.m. The parties shall notify the Court of a mutually acceptable date to reschedule the status conference. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 12/13/06. (lctfh1) (Entered: 12/13/2006)
857 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Second Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/15/2006)
858 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees Order by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
859 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Third Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/16/2007)
860 CONSENT ORDER; Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/16/07. (hs,) (Entered: 01/17/2007)
861 MOTION for Order by ANTHONY WILLIAMS. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Implementation Plan# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
ORDER: Status Conference set for February 27, 2007, at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/15/07. (lctfh1) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
862 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Fourth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
863 NOTICE of Filing Revised Amended Implementation Plan by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 861 MOTION for Order (Attachments: # 1 Amended Implementation Plan)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
864 ORDER; Approving the Amended Implementation Plan, Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/27/07. (hs,) Modified on 2/28/2007 (mlp) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 2/27/2007. Status Conference set for 6/7/2007 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
865 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Fifth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
866 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Sixth Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/17/2007)

05/15/2007 05/19/2007
05/19/2007
05/23/2007 05/23/2007 06/12/2007
06/15/2007 07/16/2007 07/31/2007 08/02/2007 08/15/2007 09/17/2007 10/15/2007 10/18/2007
11/15/2007 12/06/2007
12/17/2007 01/15/2008 02/11/2008

867 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Seventh Provider Payment Report by ANTHONY WILLIAMS re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
868 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Michael Sara Bartosz, :Firm− Childrens Rights, :Address− 330 Seventh Avenue, New York NY 10001. Phone No. − 212−683−2210. Fax No. − 212−683−4015 by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Michael Sara Bartosz# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 05/19/2007)
869 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Jeremiah Frei−Pearson, :Firm− Childrens Rights, :Address− 330 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10001. Phone No. − 212−683−2210. Fax No. − 212−683−4015 by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Jeremiah Frei−Pearson# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 05/19/2007)
870 ORDER; granting [#868] Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 5/22/07. (hs,) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
871 ORDER granting [#869] Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice, Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 5/23/07. (hs,) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan : Status Conference held on 6/12/2007.Status Conference set for 10/23/2007 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs,) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
872 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Eighth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
873 NOTICE of Filing Twenty−Ninth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
874 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
875 CONSENT ORDER, Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8/1/07. (hs,) (Entered: 08/02/2007)
876 NOTICE of Filing Thirtieth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/15/2007)
877 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−First Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/17/2007)
878 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Second Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/15/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference previously set for Tuesday, October 23, 2007, is rescheduled for Monday, November 19, 2007, at 2:00 pm in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/18/2007. (lctfh1) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
879 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Third Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/15/2007)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference previously set for February 22, 2008, is rescheduled for Thursday, February 28, 2008, at 2:00 pm in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 12/6/2007. (lctfh1) (Entered: 12/06/2007)
880 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Fourth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
881 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Fifth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference previously set for February 28, 2008, is reset for Tuesday, April 1, 2008, at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/11/08. (lctfh1) (Entered: 02/11/2008)

02/15/2008 03/17/2008 04/01/2008
04/09/2008 04/15/2008 05/14/2008 05/15/2008 06/09/2008
06/16/2008 06/19/2008 07/15/2008 07/24/2008
08/06/2008 08/06/2008 08/07/2008
08/15/2008 08/19/2008 09/05/2008

882 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Sixth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
883 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Seventh Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 4/1/2008. Status Conference set for 6/11/2008 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Scott Wallace.) (hs) (Entered: 04/01/2008)
884 NOTICE of Appearance by Lucy E. Pittman on behalf of ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/09/2008)
885 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Eighth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/15/2008)
886 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) Modified on 9/17/2008 (jeb, ). (Entered: 05/14/2008)
887 NOTICE of Filing Thirty−Ninth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference previously scheduled for June 11, 2008, is rescheduled for Wednesday, August 20, 2008, at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Status Conference set for 8/20/2008 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan.) Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 6/9/08. (lctfh1) (Entered: 06/09/2008)
888 NOTICE of Filing of Fortieth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
889 CONSENT ORDER; Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 6/11/08. (hs) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
890 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−First Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 07/15/2008)
891 MOTION to Enforce Court Orders by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 07/24/2008)
892 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion and for a Continuance of the August 20, 2008 Status Hearing by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
893 MOTION for Continuance of the August 20,2008 Status Hearing by ADRIAN M. FENTY (tr, )(See Docket Entry 892 to view document) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court GRANTS 892 the District of Columbia's Motion For Extension Of Time To Respond To Plaintiffs' Motion For A Finding Of Civil Contempt And For A Continuance Of The August 20, 2008 Status Hearing. Accordingly, the District of Columbia must file its response to Plaintiffs' motion by September 5, 2008, and the status hearing previously set for August 20, 2008, is continued to a date and time convenient to the parties and the Court. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8/7/08. (lctfh1) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
894 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Second Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER : The status conference previously scheduled for August 20, 2008, is rescheduled for Wednesday, September 17, 2008, at 2:30 pm. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8/19/08. (lctfh1) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
895 Memorandum in opposition to re 891 MOTION to Enforce Court Orders filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 09/05/2008)

09/10/2008 09/12/2008 09/15/2008 09/17/2008 09/18/2008
10/06/2008 10/07/2008 10/15/2008 10/24/2008 10/27/2008 11/06/2008
11/13/2008 11/17/2008 11/18/2008 11/20/2008 11/25/2008

MINUTE ORDER: A status conference will be held on Wednesday, September 17, 2008, at 2:30pm as previously scheduled, but the Court will not at that time hear arguments concerning Plaintiffs' pending contempt motion. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 09/10/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
896 REPLY to opposition to motion re 891 MOTION to Enforce Court Orders filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 09/12/2008)
897 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Third Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/15/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 9/17/2008, no further hearing set. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs) (Entered: 09/17/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties are instructed to file a status report by Friday, October 3, 2008, regarding the interim stipulation proposed at the status conference on Wednesday, September 17, 2008. If at that time the parties have reached agreement on a stipulation, the status report shall include the stipulation. Plaintiffs' contempt motion is held in abeyance pending the status report. (Status Report due by 10/3/2008). Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 09/18/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 09/18/2008)
898 STIPULATION re 891 MOTION to Enforce Court Orders by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
899 ORDER entering stipulation and setting status conference for November, 7, 2008, at 10:00 AM. (Status Conference set for 11/7/2008 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan.) Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/07/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 10/07/2008)
900 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Fourth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference that was set for Nov. 7, 2008, is rescheduled to Thursday, Nov. 13, 2008, at 10:00AM. (Status Conference set for 11/13/2008 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan.) Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/24/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 10/24/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference that was set for Nov. 13, 2008, is rescheduled to Thursday, Nov. 20, 2008, at 10:00AM. (Status Conference set for 11/20/2008 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan.) Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/27/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 10/27/2008)
901 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Kara Morrow, :Firm− Children's Rights, :Address− 330 Seventh Avenue, 4th floor, New York, NY 10001. Phone No. − 212−638−2210 ext. 335. Fax No. − 212−683−4015 by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kara Morrow, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The court grants 901 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11/13/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 11/13/2008)
902 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Fifth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
903 NOTICE of Report on Progress In Meeting the Terms of this Court's Stipulated Order by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 899 Order, Set Hearings (Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 11/20/2008. Status Conference set for 1/29/2009 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs) (Entered: 11/20/2008)
904 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 11/25/2008)

11/26/2008 12/15/2008 01/13/2009
01/15/2009 01/26/2009 01/27/2009 01/29/2009
01/30/2009
01/30/2009 02/03/2009
02/05/2009 02/06/2009
02/06/2009
02/06/2009 02/10/2009 02/10/2009
02/10/2009

MINUTE ORDER granting 904 Motion for Adoption of Consent Order Regarding Attorneys Fees. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11/26/08. (lctfh4) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
905 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Sixth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/15/2008)
MINUTE ORDER: The status conference that was set for Jan. 29, 2009, is rescheduled to Friday, Feb. 6, 2009, at 2:00PM. (Status Conference set for 2/6/2009 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan.) Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/13/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 01/13/2009)
906 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Seventh Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
907 NOTICE of Filing; Six−Month Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Six−Month Plan)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 01/26/2009)
908 MOTION for Order to Approve Six−Month Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 01/27/2009)
909 ENTERED IN ERROR.....SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 891 MOTION to Enforce Court Orders filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) Modified on 1/30/2009 (nmw, ). (Entered: 01/29/2009)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 909 Supplemental Memorandum; emailed to jfrei−pearson@childrensrights.org, cc'd 11 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Incorrect event used, 2. Please refile document, 3. Please refile as a Motion. (nmw, ) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
910 MOTION for Order by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 01/30/2009)
911 Memorandum in opposition to re 908 MOTION for Order to Approve Six−Month Plan filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) Modified on 2/4/2009 to correct Attached 1 name (tr). (Entered: 02/03/2009)
912 Memorandum in opposition to re 910 MOTION for Order filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/05/2009)
913 NOTICE of Filing Addendum to District's Six−Month Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 908 MOTION for Order to Approve Six−Month Plan, 907 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Addendum to Six−Month Plan)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
914 MOTION for Order to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 2/6/2009. (Court Reporter Cathryn Jones.) (hs) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
915 NOTICE by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Press Release)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
916 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Patrick S. Almonrode, :Firm− Childrens Rights, :Address− 330 Seventh Avenue, Suite 400, New York, NY 10001. Phone No. − 212−683−2210 x332. Fax No. − 212−683−4015 by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Patrick S. Almonrode, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 02/10/2009)
917 Letter from Peter J. Nickles. " Let this be filed" Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/9/2009. (tr) (Entered: 02/11/2009)

02/12/2009 02/17/2009 02/17/2009 02/17/2009
02/20/2009 02/27/2009 03/02/2009 03/12/2009 03/13/2009
03/16/2009 03/17/2009
03/18/2009
03/24/2009 03/24/2009
03/31/2009

918 REPLY to opposition to motion re 910 MOTION for Order filed by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 02/12/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 916 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/17/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 02/17/2009)
919 NOTICE of Filing Forty−Eighth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/17/2009)
920 Memorandum in opposition to re 914 MOTION for Order to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
921 NOTICE of Refiling of Exhibit E, Exhibit F, and Exhibit G by LASHAWN A. re 920 Memorandum in Opposition, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit E, # 2 Exhibit F, # 3 Exhibit G)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 02/20/2009)
922 REPLY to opposition to motion re 914 MOTION for Order to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit H, # 2 Exhibit I, # 3 Exhibit J)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
Motion Hearing set for 5/4/2009 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 3/2/2009. (lctfh4) (Entered: 03/02/2009)
923 NOTICE of Filing by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 922 Reply to opposition to Motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 03/12/2009)
924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
925 NOTICE of Filing of Forty−Ninth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/16/2009)
926 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 926 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies. Plaintiffs' response due by 3/31/2009. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 3/18/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 03/18/2009)
927 MOTION for Leave to Appear AS AMICUS CURIAE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT by AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Hajjar, Anton) (Entered: 03/24/2009)
928 ERRATA Attachment − Exhibit A Opinion and Award by J.C. Truesdale by AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 927 MOTION for Leave to Appear AS AMICUS CURIAE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed by AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. (Hajjar, Anton) (Entered: 03/24/2009)
929 Memorandum in opposition to re 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit

04/01/2009
04/03/2009 04/06/2009
04/07/2009
04/07/2009
04/07/2009 04/15/2009
04/15/2009 04/24/2009 04/24/2009 04/27/2009 04/28/2009 04/30/2009 04/30/2009 05/07/2009
05/07/2009

4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
The omnibus Motions Hearing that was previously set for May 4, 2009, is rescheduled to Thursday, May 7, 2009 at 9:30 A.M. in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4/1/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 04/01/2009)
930 Memorandum in opposition to re 927 MOTION for Leave to Appear AS AMICUS CURIAE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/03/2009)
931 MEMORANDUM re 927 MOTION for Leave to Appear AS AMICUS CURIAE AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT filed by AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 04/06/2009)
932 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 932 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies. The defendants' reply is due by 4/15/2009. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4/7/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
933 ORDER denying 927 Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4/7/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
934 REPLY to opposition to motion re 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/15/2009)
935 NOTICE of Filing of Fiftieth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/15/2009)
936 NOTICE of Appearance by Ellen A. Efros on behalf of ADRIAN M. FENTY (Efros, Ellen) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
937 MOTION for Order For An Evidentiary Hearing by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
938 Memorandum in opposition to re 937 MOTION for Order For An Evidentiary Hearing filed by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 04/27/2009)
939 REPLY to opposition to motion re 937 MOTION for Order For An Evidentiary Hearing filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/28/2009)
940 ORDER holding in abeyance 937 Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and modifying agenda for hearing on May 7, 2009. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4/30/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon the parties' representations, the Court finds as moot 908 Motion for Order to Approve Six−Month Plan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4/30/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Status Conference held on 5/7/2009. Motions Hearing set for 6/29/2009 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Susan Tyner) (hs) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
941 ORDER finding as moot 937 Motion for Order for an Evidentiary Hearing and setting supplemental briefing schedules and hearings on 891 , 910 , 914 , and 924 . Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 5/7/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 05/07/2009)

05/07/2009 05/15/2009 05/21/2009
06/15/2009 06/22/2009 06/25/2009 06/29/2009 07/01/2009 07/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/08/2009 07/14/2009 07/15/2009 07/17/2009 07/20/2009
07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/24/2009

Set Deadlines: Defendant's Supplemental Brief is due by 5/21/2009. Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in support of... due by 6/22/2009. Plaintiff's Supplemental Response due by 6/25/2009. (hs) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
942 NOTICE of Filing of the 51st Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
943 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 941 Order on Motion for Order in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for a Finding of Civil Contempt filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Declaration of Director Gerald)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
944 NOTICE of Filing Fifty−Second Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 06/15/2009)
945 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 891 MOTION to Enforce Court Orders filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 06/22/2009)
946 RESPONSE re 945 Supplemental Memorandum filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Motion Hearing held on 6/29/2009; Renewed Motion for Contempt heard and taken under advisement; (Court Reporter Susan Tyner.) (lin, ) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
947 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 941 Order on Motion for Order filed by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 07/01/2009)
948 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 948 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Defendants' reply to plaintiffs' supplemental brief due by 7/14/09. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7/8/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Response due by 7/14/2009 (zlin, ) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
949 SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM to re 941 Order on Motion for Order filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D, # 2 Exhibit J, # 3 Exhibit L, # 4 Exhibit M, # 5 Exhibit N, # 6 Exhibit O)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 07/14/2009)
950 NOTICE of Filing Fifty−Third Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 07/15/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Contempt Hearing set for 7/20/2009 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before JudgeJudge Thomas F. Hogan. (zlin, ) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Motion Hearing held on 7/20/2009 re 914 MOTION for Order to Establish a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY, 924 MOTION for Order To Modify Court Order Provisions Requiring That The Court Monitor Approve, Or Authorizing Her To Impose Or Write, The District Of Columbia's Plans, Policies, Or Strategies filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. Motions taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Catalina Kerr.) (zlin, ) (Entered: 07/20/2009)
951 12/8/08 Letter from Child and Family Services to the Editor and Chief of the Washington Post. "Let This Be Filed" per Judge Thomas Hogan. (lin, ) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
952 EXHIBITS by LASHAWN A. "Let This Be Filed" per Judge Thomas Hogan. (lin, ) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
953 EXHIBITS by Defendant. "Let This Be Filed" per Judge Thomas Hogan.(lin, ) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
954 NOTICE of Filing by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 07/24/2009)

08/17/2009
08/17/2009
08/19/2009 09/02/2009
09/09/2009 09/14/2009 09/15/2009 09/18/2009 10/15/2009 11/16/2009 11/23/2009 11/30/2009 12/07/2009 12/07/2009 12/09/2009
12/09/2009 12/09/2009
12/09/2009
12/09/2009
12/09/2009

955 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File the Monthly Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
MINUTE ORDER granting 955 Motion for Extension of Time to File Monthly Provider Payment Report until August 21, 2009. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8/17/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 08/17/2009)
956 NOTICE of Filing 54th Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 08/19/2009)
957 NOTICE Status Report on the District of Columbia's 2009 Annual Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Status Report, # 2 Exhibit)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
958 MOTION to Strike 957 Notice (Other) by LASHAWN A. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
959 Memorandum in opposition to re 958 MOTION to Strike 957 Notice (Other) filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 09/14/2009)
960 NOTICE of Filing Fifty−Fifth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
MINUTE ORDER: The Motion to Strike 958 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 9/18/09. (lctfh4) (Entered: 09/18/2009)
961 NOTICE of Filing Fifty−Sixth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/15/2009)
962 NOTICE of Filing Fifty−Seventh Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
963 STATUS REPORT by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 11/23/2009)
964 RESPONSE re 963 Status Report filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 11/30/2009)
965 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
966 NOTICE Response to Monitor's Report of November 30, 2009 by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 12/07/2009)
967 ORDER directing that the correspondence and reports in the summary table be incorporated into the record by fiat. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 12/4/09. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
968 CHRONOLOGY of Monitor Correpondence with the Court. (Filed per directive of Judge Thomas F. Hogan in Order filed 12/9/09) (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
969 REPORT of Court Monitor dated 12/4/09 regarding progress on termination of LaShawn Receviership and Baseline Report on Probationary Period Performance Standards. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
970 REPORT by Center for Study of Social Policy dated 4/2/02 regarding Assessment of Initial Implementation and Operation of the District of Columbia Kids Integrated Delivery System (KIDS) Medical Care Program. (jeb, ) Modified on 12/11/2009 (jeb, ). (Entered: 12/09/2009)
971 REPORT of Court Monitor dated 9/2/02 regarding Progress in Meeting Probationary Period Performance Standards for the District of Columbia Child and Family Sevices Agency. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
972 SPECIAL REPORT of Court Monitor dated 9/2/02 regarding Monitor's Special Case Review −A.B.,A Child in the Custody of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA). (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/09/2009)

12/09/2009
12/09/2009
12/09/2009
12/10/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009
12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009 12/11/2009

973 REPORT by Center for Study on Social Policy dated 8/7/03 regarding the Progress of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency Under the Interim Implementation Plan, 9/2/2002−03/2003. (jeb, ) Modified on 12/11/2009 (jeb, ). (Entered: 12/09/2009)
974 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN in LaShawn A. v. Williams as developed by Center for the Study of Social Policy with the Office of the Mayor and the Child and Family Services Agency of the District of Columbia andChildrens Rights, Inc. as submitted to Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/09/2009)
975 REPORT by Center for Study of Social Policy dated 1/20/04 regarding an Assessment of the Functioning of the Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency. (jeb, ) Modified on 12/11/2009 (jeb, ). (Entered: 12/09/2009)
976 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 12/10/2009)
977 REPORT of Center for Social Policy dated 1/20/04 regarding Qualitative Review: Process, Results, and Recommendations. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
978 REPORT of Center for Social Policy dated 2/09/04 regarding an Assessment of the District of Columbia's Progress as of September 30,2003 in Meeting the Implementation and Outcome Benchmarks for Child Welfare Reform. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
979 REPORT of Center for Social Policy dated 9/30/04 regarding LaShawn Monitoring Report submitted to the Court. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
980 REPORT of Center for Social Policy dated 5/16/05 regarding an Assessment of the District of Columbia's Progress as of September 30, 2004. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
981 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated 11/3/05 regarding an Assessment of the District of Columbia's Progress as of June 30,2005. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
982 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated 1/30/06 regarding Assessment of The District of Columbia's Child and Family Pre−Service Training for Social Workers. (jeb, ) Modified on 12/11/2009 (jeb, ). (Entered: 12/11/2009)
983 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated 2/7/06 regarding an Assessment of the Quality of Child Protective Services: Investigations in the District of Columbia. (jeb, ) Modified on 12/11/2009 (jeb, ). (Entered: 12/11/2009)
984 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated 2/13/06 regarding Progress Report on LaShawn A. vs. Williams. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
985 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated July 2006 regarding an Assessment of Multiple Placements for Children in Foster Care in the District of Columbia. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
986 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated 7/19/06 regarding an Assessment of the District of Columbia's Progress as of April 30, 2006 in Meeting the Implementation and Outcome Benchmarks for Child Welfare Reform. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
987 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated June 2007 regarding LaShawn vs. Fenty Progress Report. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
988 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated November 2007 regarding an Assessment of the Quality of Child Abuse and Neglect Investigative Practices in the District of Columbia. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
989 REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated 11/14/07 regarding Progress Report in Preparation for LaShawn A. vs. Fenty Status Hearing on November 19, 2007. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
990 LETTER AND AIP PERFORMANCE TABLE from Center for Study of Social Policy dated 3/21/08 regarding AIP Outcomes to be Achieved with November 2007 Data. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)

12/11/2009 991 LETTER and AIP PERFORMANCE TABLE from Center for Study of Social Policy Dated 9/15/08 regarding AIP Outcomes to be Achieved with April 2008 Data. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)

12/11/2009 992 LETTER from Center for Study of Social Policy dated 10/6/08 regarding Agreement reached on a Stipulated Order to temporarily adjourn Plaintiffs' Motion for Finding of Contempt. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)

12/11/2009 993 LETTER from Center for Study of Social Policy dated 10/31/08 regarding Stipulation Monitoring Report which provides update on District progress in meeting the requirements of the Stipulated Order dated 10/6/08. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)

12/15/2009 994 NOTICE of Filing Fifty−Eighth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/15/2009)

12/16/2009 995 LETTER by Center for Social Policy dated November 19, 2008 regarding Stipulation Monitoring Report and provides a further update on District progress in meeting the requirements of the Stipulated Order dated 10/6/08. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009

996 LETTER AND REPORT by Center for Social Policy dated January 5, 2009 regarding the Meeting requirements of the October 6, 2008 LaShawn A. v. Fenty Stipulated Order and provides final report on District's compliance with requirements of October 6,2008 Stipulated Order. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009

997 LETTER & AIP PERFORMANCE TABLE from Center for Study of Social Policy dated January 26, 2009 regarding AIP Outcomes to be Achieved with November 2008 Data, asks for guidance from Court regarding the lack of agreement on and approval of annual strategy plan(Letter), and provides updated data on District Performance (Data Table) (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009

998 LETTER & PERFORMANCE REPORT from Center for Study of Social Policy dated April 30, 2009 regarding an Assessment of District of Columbia's Child Welfare System as of January 31, 2009 and provides information on the progress achieved by the District of Columbia in meeting the requirements of LaShawn A. v. Fenty. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009

999 LETTER from Center for Study of Social Policy dated May 7, 2009 regarding Supplement to an Assessment of the District of Columbia's Child Welfare System as of January 31, 2009 and provides preformance data on medical and dental requirements; updates on lack of training data. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009 1000 LETTER & AIP Performance Table from Center for Study of Social Policy dated June 11, 2009 regarding AIP Outcomes to be Achieved with March 2009 Data and provides validated data pursuant to Court's 5/7/09 order (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009 1001 TABLE dated July 15, 2009 from J. Meltzer sent via email to Court and Parties regarding Examples of Other Consent Decree and Settlement Agreements Outcomes and Performance and provides outcome and performance data in other settlement agreement and consent decree cases (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009 1002 LETTER & ATTACHMENTS from Center for Study of Social Policy dated August 6, 2009 regarding LaShawn A. v. Fenty Strategy Plan and provides Monitor's rationale as to why the strategy plan is inadequate. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009 1003 LETTER from Center for Study of Social Policy dated September 3, 2009 which clarifies for the Court tha Monitor has not verified data in the September 2, 2009 filing by the District (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009 1004 LETTER from Center for Study of Social Policy dated November 24, 2009 that clarifies for the Court that the Monitor has neither verified data in the 11/23/09 filing by the District (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/16/2009 1005 LETTER & REPORT from Center for Study of Social Policy dated November 30, 2009 regarding an Assessment of the District of Columbia's Child Welfare System: Practice to Support Children Who Enter, Re−enter, or are Re−placed While in Foster Care. (jeb, ) (Entered: 12/16/2009)

12/21/2009 1006 NOTICE of Filing by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 967 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/21/2009)

12/21/2009 1007 RESPONSE re 976 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 12/21/2009)

12/30/2009 1008 REPLY re 976 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/30/2009)

01/15/2010 1009 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Fifty−Ninth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/15/2010)

01/19/2010

1010

Office of the Inspector General, District of Columbia, OIG No. 09−I−0029, Report of Special Evaluation: Interaction Between an At−Risk Family, District Agencies, and Other Service Providers (2005−2008) (April 2009),filed by fiat and in accordance with Section XX.F.2 of this Courts Order, dated Nov. 18, 1993 (Modified Final Order) (Entered: 01/19/2010)

01/19/2010 1011 Ct. Monitor Supp. Mem.: Training Requirements, dated Dec. 22, 2009, filed by fiat and in accordance with Section XX.F.2 of this Courts Order, dated Nov. 18, 1993 (Modified Final Order).(jeb, ) (Entered: 01/19/2010)

01/19/2010 1012 D.C. Dept. Mental Health FY2009 AIP Report,filed by fiat and in accordance with Section XX.F.2 of this Courts Order, dated Nov. 18, 1993 (Modified Final Order) (Entered: 01/19/2010)

01/19/2010 1013 U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services 2008 D.C. CFSR Report, filed by fiat and in accordance with Section XX.F.2 of this Courts Order, dated Nov. 18, 1993 (Modified Final Order). (jeb, ) (Entered: 01/19/2010)

01/19/2010 1014 2008 CFSA Annual Public Report, filed by fiat and in accordance with Section XX.F.2 of this Courts Order, dated Nov. 18, 1993 (Modified Final Order). (jeb, ) (Entered: 01/19/2010)

01/20/2010 1015 ORDER directing that certain named defendant officials be updated. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/14/10. (lin, ) (Entered: 01/20/2010)

01/28/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 965 Motion for Order: Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Adoption of a Consent Order Regarding Attorney's Fees [Dkt. No. 965] (addressing Plaintiffs' claim covering the period from July 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008) is GRANTED, and the proposed order [Dkt. No. 965−1] is hereby adopted. Accordingly, the District of Columbia shall pay $160,000 to Children's Rights, Inc. in complete settlement of Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs for work associated with monitoring compliance during that period. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1−28−2010.(lctfh3) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

01/29/2010

1016

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 07/20/09; Page Numbers: 1−66. Date of Issuance:01/29/10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Catalina Kerr, Telephone number 202.354.3258, Court Reporter Email Address : catykerr@msn.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 2/19/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/1/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/29/2010.(Kerr, Catalina) (Entered: 01/29/2010)

02/16/2010 1017 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixtieth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/16/2010)

02/17/2010 1018 STATUS REPORT by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Status Report, # 2 Exhibit Senate Testimony)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/17/2010)

02/18/2010 1019 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 02/18/2010)

02/19/2010

1020

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 07/20/09−CORRECTED; Page Numbers: 1−66. Date of Issuance:02/19/10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Catalina Kerr, Telephone number 202.354.3258, Court Reporter Email Address : catykerr@msn.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 3/12/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/22/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/20/2010.(Kerr, Catalina) (Entered: 02/19/2010)

02/22/2010 1021 NOTICE Response To Plaintiffs Notice Of Supplemental Authority by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 1019 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 02/22/2010)

02/24/2010 1022 RESPONSE re 1018 Status Report filed by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 02/24/2010)

03/15/2010 1023 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−First Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/15/2010)

03/29/2010 1024 MOTION for Order on the Motion for a Definitive Timeline for Termination of the Consent Decree by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 03/29/2010)

04/05/2010

1025

ORDER denying 891 Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce (Contempt I); granting in part and denying in part 910 Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Civil Contempt; denying 914 Defendants' Motion for a Definitive Termination Timeline; granting in part and denying in part 924 Defendants' Motion to Modify the Court Monitor's Authority; and finding as moot 1024 Defendants' Motion for Order. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 04−05−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 04/05/2010)

04/05/2010

1026

MEMORANDUM OPINION to accompany contemporaneously issued Order 1025 resolving 891 Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce (Contempt I); 910 Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Civil Contempt; 914 Defendants' Motion for a Definitive Termination Timeline; 924 Defendants' Motion to Modify the Court Monitor's Authority; and 1024 Defendants' Motion for Order. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 04−05−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 04/05/2010)

04/05/2010 1027 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 1025 Order on Motion to Enforce, Order on Motion for Order,,,,,,,, by ADRIAN M. FENTY. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/05/2010)

04/06/2010 1028 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Fee remains to be paid and another notice will be transmitted when the fee has been paid in the District Court re 1027 Notice of Appeal. (dr) (Entered: 04/06/2010)

04/15/2010 1029 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 04/15/2010)

04/15/2010 1030 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Second Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/15/2010)

04/16/2010

USCA Case Number 10−7045 for 1027 Notice of Appeal filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (rdj) (Entered: 04/16/2010)

04/19/2010 1031 Memorandum in opposition to re 1029 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Plan filed by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 04/19/2010)

04/20/2010 1032 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1029 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Plan filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/20/2010)

04/20/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendants' 1029 Motion for Extension of Time. The deadlines set forth in this Court's Order, dated April 5, 2010 1025 are rescheduled as follows: The proposal deadline (Paragraph 7) is noon on May 28, 2010, and the Court Monitor commentary deadline (Paragraph 10) is noon on June 14, 2010. The parties are directed to appear in Courtroom 25A for a status conference at 11:00 a.m. on May 26, 2010. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4−20−2010. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 04/20/2010)

04/20/2010

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 5/26/2010 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (hs) (Entered: 04/22/2010)

05/17/2010 1033 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' 63rd Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 05/17/2010)

05/26/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 5/26/2010. Parties to discuss the next return to court date and then notify Chambers. (Court Reporter Patty Gels.) (ldc, ) (Entered: 05/26/2010)

05/28/2010 1034 NOTICE of Filing of Plaintiffs' Proposed Second Amended Implementation Plan by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Proposed Second Amended Implementation Plan)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 05/28/2010)

05/28/2010 1035 NOTICE of Filing the District of Columbia's Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 1025 Order on Motion to Enforce, Order on Motion for Order,,,,,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 05/28/2010)

06/15/2010 1036 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Fourth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 06/15/2010)

06/18/2010

MINUTE ORDER: The parties shall appear on Friday, July 23, 2010 at 10:30 a.m. for a status conference and hearing in Courtroom 25A. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 6−18−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 06/18/2010)

06/18/2010

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/23/2010 10:30 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (lin, ) (Entered: 06/18/2010)

06/24/2010 1037 NOTICE of Filing Comments to the Monitor's Proposed Plan and the District's Revised Final Implementation Plan by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 1025 Order on Motion to Enforce, Order on Motion for Order,,,,,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 06/24/2010)

06/24/2010 1038 NOTICE of Filing Comments to the Monitor's Proposed Plan by LASHAWN A. re 1025 Order on Motion to Enforce, Order on Motion for Order,,,,,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 06/24/2010)

07/15/2010 1039 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Fifth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 07/15/2010)

07/19/2010 1040 Letter from Matthew Fraidin, UDC School of Law to Hogan, J. "Let This Be Filed" (lin, ) (Entered: 07/19/2010)

07/19/2010 1041 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Defendants' Proposed "Final Implementation Plan," Plaintiffs' Response, and Proposed Order by LASHAWN A. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 07/19/2010)

07/22/2010 1042 NOTICE of Filing Proposed Order by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 1037 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) (Love, Richard) (Entered: 07/22/2010)

07/23/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Hearing held on 7/23/2010. Matter taken under advisement. Plaintiff Attorneys: Marcia Lowery, Sara Bartosz, Art Spitzer; Defense Attorneys: Richard Love, Lucy Pittman, George Valentine: Witness: Dr. Roque Gerald, Director of Child and Family Services. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne.) (ldc, ) (Entered: 07/23/2010)

07/28/2010

NOTICE of Hearings: Remedy/Sanctions Hearing set for 8/26/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Chambers Conference set for 8/18/2010 02:00 PM in Chambers before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (lin, ) (Entered:

07/28/2010)

07/30/2010 1043 PREHEARING ORDER regarding the remedy/sanctions hearing scheduled for August 26, 2010. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7−30−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 07/30/2010)

08/03/2010 1044 MOTION for Discovery for Purpose of 8/26/2010 Sanctions Hearing by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Request for Production of Documents, # 2 Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, # 3 Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition, # 4 Notice of Deposition of Roque Gerald, # 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/03/2010 1045 MOTION to Modify the Briefing Schedule Set Forth in the July 30, 2010 Order re 1043 Order by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 08/03/2010)

08/05/2010

MINUTE ORDER re 1045 MOTION to Modify the Briefing Schedule Set Forth in the July 30, 2010 Order & 1044 MOTION for Discovery. Each party shall file their opposition, if any, to the opposing parties' pending motion no later than 4:00 p.m. TODAY, August 5, 2010. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8−5−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/05/2010 1046 Memorandum in opposition to re 1044 MOTION for Discovery for Purpose of 8/26/2010 Sanctions Hearing filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/05/2010)

08/06/2010 1047 REPLY to opposition to motion re 1044 MOTION for Discovery for Purpose of 8/26/2010 Sanctions Hearing filed by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 08/06/2010)

08/06/2010

MINUTE ORDER denying Plaintiffs' 1044 Motion for Discovery. Defendants are directed to have detailed information concerning the District's population of youth with an APPLA designation since January 2009 available for consideration at the remedy hearing. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8−6−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 08/06/2010)

08/06/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting in part Defendants' 1045 Motion to Modify the Briefing Schedule. Defendants' prehearing brief deadline, set forth in this Court's Order dated July 20, 2010 1043 , is extended to noon on Monday, August 23, 2010. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8−6−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 08/06/2010)

08/16/2010 1048 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Sixth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/16/2010)

08/20/2010

1049

TRIAL BRIEF August 26, 2010 Pre−Hearing Brief by LASHAWN A.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Witness List, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A−1, # 3 Exhibit Ex. A−2, # 4 Exhibit Ex. A−3, # 5 Exhibit Ex. A−4, # 6 Exhibit Ex. A−5, # 7 Exhibit Ex. A−6, # 8 Exhibit Ex. A−7, # 9 Exhibit Ex. A−8, # 10 Exhibit Ex. A−9, # 11 Exhibit Ex. B Exhibit List, # 12 Exhibit Ex. C 2010−2011 Composite Strategy Plan, # 13 Exhibit Ex. D, # 14 Exhibit Ex. E)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 08/20/2010)

08/23/2010 1050 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Defendants' Pre−Hearing Brief by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

08/23/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 1050 Consent Motion for Extension of Time. Defendants shall submit their brief no later than 11:00 p.m. today (August 23, 2010). Defendants shall submit their List of Exhibits no later than 2:00 p.m. tomorrow, August 24, 2010. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8−23−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

08/23/2010 1051 TRIAL BRIEF August 26, 2010 Pre−Hearing Brief by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

08/23/2010 1052 MOTION To Cancel 8/26/10 Hearing or Convert to a Status Hearing re 1051 Trial Brief by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

08/23/2010

Set/Reset Deadlines: Defendants' Brief due by 11:00 p.m. 8/23/2010. Defendants' Exhibit List due by 2:00 p.m. 8/24/2010. (zmm, ) (Entered: 08/24/2010)

08/24/2010 1053 NOTICE of Filing (Defendants' Exhibit List) by ADRIAN M. FENTY re Order on Motion for Extension of Time to, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List)(Pittman, Lucy)

(Entered: 08/24/2010)

08/24/2010 1054 REPLY August 26, 2010 Pre−Hearing Brief by LASHAWN A.. (Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) Modified on 8/25/2010 to edit event used (dr). (Entered: 08/24/2010)

08/25/2010 1055 Memorandum in opposition to motion re 1052 MOTION To Cancel 8/26/10 Hearing or Convert to a Status Hearing re 1051 Trial Brief filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Pittman, Lucy) Modified on 8/26/2010 to edit text (dr). (Entered: 08/25/2010)

08/25/2010

MINUTE ORDER denying 1052 Defendants' Motion to Cancel Hearing. The remedy hearing will proceed as scheduled. After reviewing the parties' briefs, lists of exhibits, and lists of witnesses, the Court anticipates no need to hear witness testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, the parties should provide oral argument with reference to evidence mentioned in their exhibit lists. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8−25−2010. (lctfh3) (Entered: 08/25/2010)

08/26/2010

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Remedy/Sanctions Hearing held on 8/26/2010. Matters to be taken under advisement. Order to be issued by the Court. Plaintiff Attorney: Marcia Lowry, Kara Morrow, Sara Bartosz; Defense Attoney: Richard Love, Lucy Pittman, George Valentine, Lionel Sims; Court Monitor: Judy Meltzer; also present: Dr. Roque Gerald, Director of Child and Family Services (CFSA) (Court Reporter Susan Tyner.) (ldc, ) (Entered: 08/26/2010)

08/26/2010 1056 NOTICE of Change of Address by Lucy E. Pittman (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 08/26/2010)

08/27/2010 1057 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Request by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Supplemental Request)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 08/27/2010)

09/03/2010 1058 Memorandum in opposition to re 1057 MOTION for Leave to File Supplemental Request filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Permanency Review Form)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/03/2010)

09/15/2010 1059 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Seventh Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 09/15/2010)

09/17/2010

1060

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 7/23/10; Page Numbers: 1 − 125. Date of Issuance:9/17/10. Court Reporter/Transcriber Bryan A. Wayne, Telephone number 202−354−3186, Court Reporter Email Address : bryanawayne@verizon.net.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 10/8/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/18/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/16/2010.(Wayne, Bryan) (Entered: 09/17/2010)

09/28/2010 1061 ORDER regarding civil contempt; See order for directives. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 9/27/10. (lin, ) (Entered: 09/28/2010)

10/18/2010 1062 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Eighth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/18/2010)

10/26/2010 1063 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 1061 Order by ADRIAN M. FENTY. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 10/26/2010)

10/27/2010 1064 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals docketing fee was not paid because the fee was an Appeal by the Government re 1063 Notice of Appeal. (dr) (Entered: 10/27/2010)

10/28/2010

1065

RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT re 1061 Order filed by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A Lowry Declaration, # 2 Attachment 1 Summary Chart, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B Settlement Agreement)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 10/28/2010)

10/29/2010

USCA Case Number 10−7139 for 1063 Notice of Appeal filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (dr) (Entered: 11/01/2010)

11/08/2010

MINUTE ORDER finding as moot 1057 Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Request Regarding Proposed Civil Contempt Compensatory Remedy for Aged−out Youth in light of 1061 the Court's 9/27/2010 Order regarding civil contempt. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11−8−2010. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 11/08/2010)

11/10/2010 1066 Letter dated 10/15/10 from Anniglo Boone, Ph.D of the Consortium For Child Welfare "Let This Be Filed". Hogan, J. (lin, ) (Entered: 11/10/2010)

11/15/2010 1067 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' Sixty−Ninth Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 11/15/2010)

11/15/2010 1068 RESPONSE re 1065 Response to Order of the Court, filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Pittman, Lucy) (Entered: 11/15/2010)

11/18/2010

1069

MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Defendants Opposition To Plaintiffs Civil Contempt Remedy Submission Pursuant To The Court's September 28, 2010 Order by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 11/18/2010)

11/22/2010

MINUTE ORDER granting 1069 Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Civil Contempt Remedy Submission until December 6, 2010. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11−22−2010. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 11/22/2010)

12/06/2010

1070

REPLY re 1068 Response to Document Plaintiffs' Contempt Remedy Submission filed by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A: Declaration of Kara Morrow, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B: Declaration of Sara Bartosz)(Frei−Pearson, Jeremiah) (Entered: 12/06/2010)

12/06/2010 1071 MOTION to Strike 1068 Response to Plaintiffs Civil Contempt Remedy Submission by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (See Docket Entry 1070 to view document) (dr) (Entered: 12/07/2010)

12/15/2010 1072 NOTICE of Filing Defendants' 70th Provider Payment Report by ADRIAN M. FENTY re 848 Stipulation (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/15/2010)

12/17/2010 1073 ORDER; Approving Implementation and Exit Plan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 12−17−2010. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 12/17/2010)

12/17/2010 1075 ORDER of USCA as to 1063 Notice of Appeal filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY ; ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby held in abeyance pending further order of the court. USCA Case Number 10−7139. (ls, ) (Entered: 12/21/2010)

12/20/2010

MINUTE ORDER finding as moot 1041 Motion for Leave to File Instanter a Response to Defendants' Proposed "Final Implementation Plan" with "Exit Targets" in light of proceedings before the Court on July 23, 2010 and the Court's Order of December 17, 2010. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 12−20−2010. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

12/20/2010 1074 Memorandum in opposition to re 1071 MOTION to Strike 1068 Response to Document filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/20/2010)

01/12/2011 1076 Consent MOTION to Vacate Requirement to File Monthly Provider Payment Reports by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/12/2011)

01/12/2011

MINUTE ORDER granting 1076 Consent Motion to Vacate the Requirement that Defendants File Monthly Provider Payment Reports with the Court. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1−12−2011. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 01/12/2011)

01/13/2011 1077 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to ADRIAN M. FENTY. Attorney Peter J. Nickles terminated. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

01/14/2011 1078 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 1073 Order by CLARENCE H. CARTER, ROQUE GERALD, FRED SWAN, ADRIAN M. FENTY. Fee Status: No Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Love, Richard) (Entered: 01/14/2011)

01/18/2011 1079 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Fee remains to be paid and another notice will be transmitted when the fee has been paid in the District Court re 1078 Notice of Appeal. (dr) (Entered: 01/18/2011)

01/19/2011

USCA Case Number 11−7002 for 1078 Notice of Appeal filed by FRED SWAN, ADRIAN M. FENTY, ROQUE GERALD, CLARENCE H. CARTER. (dr) (Entered: 01/20/2011)

02/02/2011 1080 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Limit the Required Exemption from District−Wide Furloughs re 767 Order by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/02/2011)

02/03/2011 1081 ORDER granting 1080 Motion For Leave to Limit the Required Exemption from District−Wide Furloughs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 2/3/11. (zlin, ) (Entered: 02/03/2011)

02/28/2011 1082 USCA MANDATE (certified copy) as to 1027 Notice of Appeal filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY. ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed. (smm) Modified on 4/8/2011 (smm). (Entered: 04/08/2011)

03/21/2011

ORDER extending deadline for the Court Monitor to submit a monitoring report under the Implementation and Exit Plan from March 21, 2011 until April 30, 2011. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 3/21/2011. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 03/21/2011)

05/02/2011 1083 MONITORING REPORTS submitted on behalf of the Court Monitor Judith W. Meltzer. (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter)(dr) (Entered: 05/18/2011)

05/24/2011 1084 Consent MOTION for Order regarding attorneys' fees and costs by ROQUE GERALD (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/24/2011)

05/25/2011 1085 ORDER regarding settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs.. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 5/24/11. (lin, ) (Entered: 05/25/2011)

05/27/2011 1086 Letter from Center for the Study of Social Policy to Hogan, J. dated 5/24/10 with attachments A, B, C (lin, ) (Entered: 05/27/2011)

05/27/2011 1087 Letter from Center for Study of Social Policy dated 6/14/10 to Hogan, J. with attachments (lin, ) (Entered: 05/27/2011)

05/27/2011 1088 Letter from Center for Study of Social Policy with attachment dated 9/20/10 to Hogan, J. (lin, ) (Entered: 05/27/2011)

06/03/2011 1089 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) as to 1078 Notice of Appeal filed by FRED SWAN, ADRIAN M. FENTY, ROQUE GERALD, CLARENCE H. CARTER ; USCA Case Number 11−7002. ORDERED that the motion for voluntary dismissal be granted and the case is hereby dismissed. (smm) (Entered: 06/03/2011)

07/14/2011 1090 ORDER denying as moot 1071 Motion to Strike (See Order for further details). Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7/14/11. (cp) (Entered: 07/14/2011)

08/26/2011 1091 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) as to 1063 Notice of Appeal filed by ADRIAN M. FENTY ; USCA Case Number 10−7139. ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby dismissed. (kb) Modified on 8/30/2011 (kb). (Main Document 1091 replaced on 8/30/2011) (kb, ). (Entered: 08/26/2011)

12/02/2011 1092 NOTICE of LaShawn A. v. Gray Progress Report for the Period of January 1−June 30, 2011 (dr) "Let This Be Filed," Signed by Judge Hogan on 12/2/2011. (Entered:

12/05/2011)

02/02/2012 1093 NOTICE of Change of Address by Arthur B. Spitzer (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 02/02/2012)

02/07/2012

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 3/30/2012 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (lctfh3) (Entered: 02/7/2012) (Entered: 02/07/2012)

02/23/2012 1094 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs by ADRIAN M. FENTY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/23/2012)

03/01/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 1094 Motion for Order: Consent Motion for Adoption of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs [Dkt. No. 1094] (addressing Plaintiffs' claim covering the period from April 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011). The proposed order [Dkt. No. 1094−1] is hereby adopted. Accordingly, the District of Columbia shall pay $465,000 to Children's Rights, Inc. in complete settlement of Plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with litigating various motions and monitoring compliance with the orders entered in this civil action during that period. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 3/1/2012.(lctfh3) (Entered: 03/01/2012).. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 3/1/12. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 03/01/2012)

03/27/2012 1095 NOTICE of Filing the 2012 Strategy Plan by VINCENT GRAY (Attachments: # 1 2012 Strategy Plan)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/27/2012)

03/30/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 3/30/2012. A further Status Conference is scheduled for 6/20/2012 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Susan Tyner) (tg, ) (Entered: 03/30/2012)

04/04/2012

1096

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Adam C. Dembrow, :Firm− Children's Rights, :Address− 330 Seventh Avenue, 4th floor, New York, NY 10001. Phone No. − 212−683−2210. Fax No. − 212−683−4015 by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Adam C. Dembrow, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 04/04/2012)

04/11/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 1096 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 4/11/12. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 04/11/2012)

05/29/2012 1097 Letter from Judith Meltzer. "Let this be Filed," Signed by Judge Hogan on 05/29/2012. (dr) (Entered: 05/30/2012)

05/29/2012 1098 PROGRESS REPORT for the period July 1 − December 31, 2011. "Let this be filed," Signed by Judge Hogan on 05/29/2012. (dr) (Entered: 05/30/2012)

06/19/2012

NOTICE OF COURTROOM CHANGE. Please take notice that the Status Conference scheduled for 6/20/2012 at 11:00 AM will be conducted in Courtroom 14, Fourth Floor, Main Courthouse, before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (tg, ) (Entered: 06/19/2012)

06/20/2012

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 6/20/2012. The Court accepts the modifications attached to the letter to the Court dated 6/18/12. A further Status Conference is scheduled for 12/17/2012 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Patricia Kaneshiro−Miller) (tg, ) (Entered: 06/20/2012)

06/26/2012 1099 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney John E. Kirklin, Eric Thompson, Erik S. Pitchal, Jeremiah Frei−Pearson, and Kara Morrow by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Dembrow, Adam) (Entered: 06/26/2012)

07/02/2012

MINUTE ORDER granting 1099 Motion to Withdraw John E. Kirklin, Eric Thompson, Erik S. Pitchal, Jeremiah Frei−Pearson, and Kara Morrow as Attorney for Plaintiffs. Attorney John E. Kirklin, Eric Thompson, Erik S. Pitchal; Jeremiah Frei−Pearson and Kara Morrow terminated. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7/2/12. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 07/02/2012)

07/02/2012 1100 Letter from Judith Meltzer. "Let this be Filed. 89−cv−1754", Signed by Judge Hogan on 06/20/2012. (rdj) (Entered: 07/02/2012)

07/09/2012 1101 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Charles Q. Pearson; Type of Document Returned: 7/2/2012 Minute Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 07/13/2012)

07/11/2012 1102 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Craig R. Levine; Type of Document Returned: 7/2/2012 Minute Order; No new address on file. (zmm, ) (Entered: 07/13/2012)

07/17/2012 1103 Letter from Judith Meltzer. "Let this be Filed," Signed by Judge Hogan on 07/17/2012. (dr) (Entered: 07/18/2012)

07/17/2012 1104 Letter from Judith Meltzer. "Let this be Filed," Signed by Judge Hogan on 07/17/2012. (dr) (Entered: 07/20/2012)

12/10/2012 1105 NOTICE of filing LaShawn A. v. Gray Progress Report for the Period of January 1 − June 30, 2012. "Let this be Filed," Signed by Judge Hogan on 12/10/2012. (dr) (Entered: 12/13/2012)

12/17/2012

Minute Entry for Status Conference regarding Six−Month Progress Report held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 12/17/12 : Status Conference to discuss Proposed Strategic Plan set for 2/25/13 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter : Kellie Humiston) (kk) (Entered: 12/17/2012)

01/30/2013

1106

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 12−17−12; Page Numbers: 1 − 22. Court Reporter/Transcriber Kellie Humiston, Telephone number 202−354−3187, Court Reporter Email Address : kmhcourtreporter@msn.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 2/20/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/2/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/30/2013.(Humiston, Kellie) (Entered: 01/30/2013)

02/05/2013 1107 Letter from Judith Meltzer, Deputy Director (ldc, ) (Entered: 02/05/2013)

02/14/2013

MINUTE ORDER canceling the status conference scheduled to take place on February 25, 2013. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on February 14, 2013. (lctfh2) (Entered: 02/14/2013)

02/20/2013 1108 NOTICE of Filing by VINCENT C. GRAY re 1073 Order (Attachments: # 1 2013 Strategy Plan)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/20/2013)

02/28/2013 1109 Mail Returned as undeliverable. Sent to Charles Quentin Pearson; Type of Document Returned: Minute Order to cancel Status Conference set for 02/25/13 entered on 02/14/13; Resent at new address: Unkonwn. (ldc, ) (Entered: 02/28/2013)

03/25/2013

1110

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 6−20−12; Page Numbers: 1−28. Date of Issuance:3−25−13. Court Reporter/Transcriber Patricia Kaneshiro−Miller, Telephone number 202−354−3243, Court Reporter Email Address : patfromhawaii@aol.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the

five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 4/15/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/25/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/23/2013.(Kaneshiro−Miller, Patricia) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

04/18/2013 1111 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees by VINCENT C. GRAY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/18/2013)

05/07/2013 1112 Consent ORDER granting 1111 Consent Motion for Order Regarding Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 05/07/13. (ldc, ) (Entered: 05/07/2013)

05/23/2013

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 7/15/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (lm) (Entered: 05/23/2013)

06/03/2013 1113 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the Period July 1 − December 31, 2012 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 3, 2013. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 06/03/2013)

06/14/2013

1114

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Kathryn A. Wood, :Firm− Childrens Rights, :Address− 330 7th Avenue, 4th floor, New York, NY 10001. Phone No. − 212−683−2210. Fax No. − 212−683−4015 by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Kathryn A. Wood, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 06/14/2013)

06/17/2013

ORDER granting 1114 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 17, 2013. (lctfh3, ) (Entered: 06/17/2013)

06/19/2013

Set/Reset Hearings : Status Conference set for 7/15/13 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (kk) (Entered: 06/19/2013)

07/11/2013 1115 Letter, dated 7/3/13, from Judith Meltzer. "Let This be Filed" by Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (kk) (Entered: 07/12/2013)

07/11/2013 1116 Letter from Judith Meltzer, dated 7/11/13. "Let This be Filed" by Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (kk) (Entered: 07/12/2013)

07/15/2013

Minute Entry for Status Conference held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7/15/13 : Interim Status Call set for 10/22/13 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter : Lisa Foradori) (kk) (Entered: 07/15/2013)

10/10/2013 1117 Letter from Court−appointed Monitor, Judith Meltzer, regarding status of case and request for continuance of status hearing until December, 2013. "Let this be done" by Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (kk) (Entered: 10/16/2013)

10/18/2013

MINUTE ORDER vacating the Interim Status Conference set for 10/22/13 at 10:00 AM before Judge Thomas F. Hogan at the request of the Court−appointed Monitor, Judith Meltzer; directing that the hearing be rescheduled for a date in December 2013; approved by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 10/18/13. (kk) (Entered: 10/18/2013)

10/22/2013

Set/Reset Hearings : Interim Status Conference reset for 12/13/13 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (kk) (Entered: 10/22/2013)

11/26/2013 1118 Consent MOTION to Postpone December 13, 2013 Status Conference by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Dembrow, Adam) (Entered: 11/26/2013)

11/27/2013

MINUTE ORDER granting 1118 Consent Motion to Postpone Status Conference. Accordingly, the Status Conference previously scheduled for December 13, 2013 will now be held on January 24, 2014 at 11:00 AM. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11/27/2013.(lctfh1) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

11/27/2013

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 1/24/2014 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (ldc, ) (Entered: 11/27/2013)

01/13/2014 1119 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Patrick S. Almonrode by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Dembrow, Adam) (Entered: 01/13/2014)

01/24/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/24/14 : Interim Status Conference held. Further Status Conference set for 6/25/14 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter : Lisa Foradori) (kk) (Entered: 01/24/2014)

01/24/2014 1120 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE OF PATRICK S. ALMONRODE : granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Attorney Patrick S. Almonrode as counsel for Plaintiffs 1119 ; signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/22/14. (kk) (Entered: 01/24/2014)

02/18/2014 1121 NOTICE of Filing 2014 Strategy Plan by VINCENT C. GRAY re 1073 Order (Attachments: # 1 2014 Strategy Plan)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 02/18/2014)

06/11/2014

Set/Reset Hearings: The Status Conference set for Wednesday, June 25 2014 shall now be held on Wednesday, July 16 2014 at 02:30 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (lctfh1) (Entered: 06/11/2014)

07/11/2014 1122 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the Period July 1 − December 31, 2013 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7/11/2014.(Attachments: # 1Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer)(lctfh1) (Entered: 07/11/2014)

07/11/2014 1123 ORDER The attached SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRESS REPORT for the Period January − March 2014 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 7/11/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Summary Table) (lctfh1) (Entered: 07/11/2014)

07/16/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 7/16/2014. Further Status Conference set for 1/7/2015 at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Vicki Eastvold) (tcr) (Entered: 07/16/2014)

08/04/2014

1124

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 7−15−13; Page Numbers: 1−32. Date of Issuance:8−4−14. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa M. Foradori, Telephone number 202−354−3269, Court Reporter Email Address : L4dori@hotmail.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 8/25/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/4/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/2/2014.(Foradori, Lisa) (Entered: 08/04/2014)

08/04/2014

1125

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 1−24−14; Page Numbers: 1−26. Date of Issuance:8−4−14. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa M. Foradori, Telephone number 202−354−3269, Court Reporter Email Address : L4dori@hotmail.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at ww.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 8/25/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/4/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/2/2014.(Foradori, Lisa) (Entered: 08/04/2014)

08/08/2014 1126 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs by VINCENT C. GRAY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 08/08/2014)

08/25/2014

MINUTE ORDER granting 1126 Consent Motion for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees. The District of Columbia shall pay Children's Rights, Inc. the sum of one−hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in complete settlement of plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance from January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 8/21/2014.(lctfh1) (Entered: 08/25/2014)

09/03/2014 1127 NOTICE of Change of Address for Marcia Robinson Lowry by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 09/03/2014)

09/03/2014

1128

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Sara Robinson−Glasser, :Firm− A Better Childhood, Inc., :Address− 1095 Hardscrabble Road, Chappaqua, NY 10514. Phone No. − (541) 660−3763. Fax No. − (914) 238−0365 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−3827543. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Sara Robinson−Glasser, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 09/03/2014)

09/05/2014 1129 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Sara Michelle Bartosz, Adam C. Dembrow, and Kathryn A. Wood by LASHAWN A. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Dembrow, Adam) (Entered: 09/05/2014)

09/12/2014 1130 ORDER granting 1128 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 09/12/2014. (lctfh3) (Entered: 09/12/2014)

09/12/2014 1131 ORDER granting 1129 Motion to Withdraw Appearances of Sara Michelle Bartosz, Adam C. Dembrow, and Kathryn A. Wood.. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 09/12/2014. (lctfh3) (Entered: 09/12/2014)

10/31/2014 1132 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees & Costs by VINCENT C. GRAY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

10/31/2014 1133 ORDER granting 1132 Consent Motion for Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees & Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 31, 2014. (lctfh3) (Entered: 10/31/2014)

11/19/2014 1134 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period January 1 − June 30, 2014 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on November 19, 2014. (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer) (lctfh3) (Entered: 11/19/2014)

12/30/2014 1135 ORDER. The attached SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRESS REPORT for the period July − October 2014 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 30, 2014. (Attachments: # 1 Summary Table) (lctfh3) (Entered: 12/30/2014)

01/07/2015 1136 ORDER. The attached LETTER from Judith Meltzer regarding an update on the exit standard related to reviewing child fatalities is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on January 7, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 01/07/2015)

01/07/2015

Minute Entry for Status Conference held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/7/15 : Further Status Conference set for 6/15/15 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter : Lisa Foradori) (kk) (Entered: 01/08/2015)

01/22/2015 1137 ORDER. The attached letter from Judith Meltzer regarding re−designation of select exit standards is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on January 22, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 01/22/2015)

03/25/2015 1138 NOTICE of Filing−2015 Strategy Plan by VINCENT C. GRAY re 1073 Order (Attachments: # 1 2015 Strategy Plan)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 03/25/2015)

04/14/2015

1139

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 1−7−15; Page Numbers: 1−26. Date of Issuance:4−14−15. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa M. Foradori, Telephone number 202−354−3269, Court Reporter Email Address : L4dori18@gmail.com.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via

PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 5/5/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/15/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/13/2015.(Foradori, Lisa) (Entered: 04/14/2015)

05/01/2015 1140 Consent MOTION for Order regarding attorney's fees and costs by VINCENT C. GRAY (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/01/2015)

05/04/2015 1141 ORDER granting 1140 Consent Motion for Adoption of Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on May 4, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 05/04/2015)

05/21/2015 1142 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period July 1 − December 31, 2014 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on May 21, 2015. (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer) (lctfh3) (Entered: 05/21/2015)

06/15/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 6/15/15 : Status Conference held. Interim Status Conference set for 10/20/15 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter : Barbara DeVico) (kk) (Entered: 06/17/2015)

06/29/2015 1143 ORDER. The attached letter from Judith Meltzer regarding re−designation of select exit standards is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 29, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 06/29/2015)

07/14/2015

MINUTE ORDER. The status conference previously set for October 20, 2015 at 2:00 PM is rescheduled for October 21, 2015 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on July 14, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 07/14/2015)

07/14/2015

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference reset for 10/21/2015 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (ldc) (Entered: 07/14/2015)

10/08/2015

MINUTE ORDER. The status conference previously scheduled for October 21, 2015 at 2:00 PM is rescheduled for December 3, 2015 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 8, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 10/08/2015)

11/24/2015 1144 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period January 1 − June 30, 2015 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on November 24, 2015. (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer) (lctfh3) (Entered: 11/24/2015)

12/02/2015 1145 ORDER. The attached Supplemental Report on Performance on Select Exit Standards during July−October 2015 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 2, 2015. (Attachments: # 1 Summary Table for July−October 2015 Performance) (lctfh3) (Entered: 12/02/2015)

12/03/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 12/3/2015. Further Status Conference set for 6/15/2016 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Janice Dickman) (tth) (Entered: 12/03/2015)

12/17/2015 1146 Consent MOTION for Order regarding attorney's fees and costs by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 12/17/2015)

12/28/2015 1147 ORDER granting 1146 Consent Motion for Adoption of Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 21, 2015. (lctfh3) (Entered: 12/28/2015)

01/07/2016 1148 ORDER. The attached letter from Judith Meltzer regarding re−designation of select exit standards is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on January 7, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 01/07/2016)

04/08/2016 1149 NOTICE of Filing 2016 Strategy Plan by MURIEL E. BOWSER re 1073 Order (Attachments: # 1 2016 Strategy Plan)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 04/08/2016)

04/08/2016

MINUTE ORDER. The status conference previously scheduled for June 15, 2016 at 2:00 PM is rescheduled for June 21, 2016 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on April 8, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 04/08/2016)

05/02/2016 1150 Consent MOTION for Order regarding attorneys' fees and costs by MURIEL E. BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Love, Richard) (Entered: 05/02/2016)

05/03/2016 1151 ORDER granting 1150 Consent Motion for Adoption of Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on May 3, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 05/03/2016)

06/17/2016 1152 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Esther Yong on behalf of MURIEL E. BOWSER Substituting for attorney Lucy Pittman (Yong, Esther) (Entered: 06/17/2016)

06/17/2016 1153 NOTICE of Appearance by Amanda Montee on behalf of MURIEL E. BOWSER (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 06/17/2016)

06/20/2016 1154 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period July 1 − December 31, 2015 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 20, 2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer) (lctfh3) (Entered: 06/20/2016)

06/21/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 6/21/2016. Furher Status Conference set for 10/4/2016 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim) (tth) (Entered: 06/21/2016)

07/19/2016

MINUTE ORDER. The status conference previously scheduled for October 4, 2016 at 2:00 PM is rescheduled for September 9, 2016 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on July 19, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 07/19/2016)

07/19/2016

1155

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Sarah Jaffe, :Firm− A Better Childhood, Inc., :Address− 1095 Hardscrabble Road, Chappaqua, NY 10514. Phone No. − 347−687−2063. Fax No. − 914−238−0365 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−4610084. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Sarah Jaffe, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 07/19/2016)

07/20/2016 1156 ORDER. The attached letter from Judith Meltzer regarding re−designation of select exit standards is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on July 20, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 07/20/2016)

07/20/2016

MINUTE ORDER granting 1155 Motion for Admission, Pro Hac Vice, of Sarah Jaffe as Additional Counsel for Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on July 20, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 07/20/2016)

09/09/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 9/9/2016. Further Status Conference set for 12/15/2016 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Bryan Wayne.) (zsm) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

09/09/2016

1157

ORDER. The attached INTERIM STATUS REPORT is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on September 9, 2016. (Attachments: # 1 An Assessment of the District of Columbia's Child and Family Services Agency Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline and Intake Practices and Decision Making) (lctfh3) (Entered: 09/09/2016)

10/19/2016 1158 TRANSCRIPT OF 9/9/16 STATUS HEARING, before Judge Thomas F. Hogan, held on September 9, 2016. Page Numbers: 1−25. Date of Issuance: 10/19/16. Court Reporter: Bryan A. Wayne. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the tr anscript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 11/9/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/19/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/17/2017.(Wayne, Bryan) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
10/26/2016 1159 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 06/21/16; Page Numbers: 1−33. Date of Issuance:10/26/16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced abov e. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 11/16/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/26/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/24/2017.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 10/26/2016)

11/30/2016 1160 Consent MOTION for Order regarding attorney's fees and costs by MURIEL E. BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

11/30/2016 1161 ORDER granting 1160 Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on November 30, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

11/30/2016

1162

ORDER. The attached Assessment of the District of Columbia's Child and Family Services Agency Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline and Intake Practices and Decision Making (amended to include recommendations) is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on November 30, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

11/30/2016 1163 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period January 1 − June 30, 2016 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on November 30, 2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer) (lctfh3) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

12/01/2016 1164 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MURIEL E. BOWSER. Attorney Richard S. Love terminated. (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 12/01/2016)

12/15/2016 1165 ORDER. The attached Supplemental Report on Performance on Select Exit Standards during July − October 2016 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 15, 2016. (lctfh3) (Entered: 12/15/2016)

12/15/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 12/15/2016. Further Status Conference set for 3/23/2017 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Lisa Griffith) (tth) (Entered: 12/15/2016)

12/22/2016 1166 NOTICE by MURIEL E. BOWSER (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 12/22/2016)

03/23/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 3/23/2017. Further Status Conference set for 5/25/2017 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Lisa Foradori) (tth) (Entered: 03/23/2017)

04/03/2017 1167 NOTICE of Filing 2017 Strategy Plan by MURIEL E. BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 2017 Strategy Plan)(Yong, Esther) (Entered: 04/03/2017)

04/25/2017

MINUTE ORDER. The status conference previously set for May 25, 2017 is rescheduled to July 12, 2017 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on April 25, 2017. (lctfh3) (Entered: 04/25/2017)

05/12/2017 1168 Consent MOTION for Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Yong, Esther) (Entered: 05/12/2017)

05/23/2017 1169 ORDER granting 1168 Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on May 23, 2017. (lctfh3) (Entered: 05/23/2017)

05/25/2017 1170 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 3/3/17; Page Numbers: 20. Date of Issuance:5−25−17. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lisa M. Foradori, Telephone number 202−354−3269, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 6/15/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/25/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/23/2017.(Foradori, Lisa) Modified date of hearing on 5/26/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 05/25/2017)

06/12/2017 1171 ORDER. The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period of July 1 − December 31, 2016 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 12, 2017. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Transmittal Letter from Judith Meltzer) (lctfh3) (Entered: 06/12/2017)

07/12/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 7/12/2017. Further Status Conference set for 12/14/2017 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 25A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Patricia Kaneshiro−Miller) (tth) (Entered: 07/12/2017)

08/10/2017 1172 Letter to the Court from from Judith Meltzer, Deputy Director, Court−appointed Monitor, LaShawn A. v. Bowser. "Let this be filed," by Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (zrdj) Modified to correct typo on 8/11/2017 (znmw). (Entered: 08/10/2017)

10/05/2017

MINUTE ORDER. The status conference previously set for December 14, 2017 is rescheduled to December 5, 2017 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 5, 2017. (lctfh3) (Entered: 10/05/2017)

11/03/2017 1173 Consent MOTION for Attorney Fees by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 11/03/2017)

11/08/2017 1174 ORDER granting 1173 Defendant's Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 11/8/2017. (lctfh1) (Entered: 11/08/2017)

12/05/2017

MINUTE ORDER for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 12/5/2017. Further Status Conference set for 5/16/18 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 5, 2017. (lcesh1) (Entered: 12/05/2017)

12/05/2017 1175 MINUTE ORDER: The attached PROGRESS REPORT for the period of January 1 − June 30, 2017 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 5, 2017. (lcesh1) (Entered: 12/05/2017)

12/05/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 12/5/2017. Further Status Conference set for 5/16/2018 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Timothy Miller) (tth) (Entered: 12/05/2017)

12/20/2017

1176

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 12−5−2017; Page Numbers: 1−16. Date of Issuance:12−20−2017. Court Reporter/Transcriber Timothy R. Miller, Telephone number 202−354−3111, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href="http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/node/110">Transcript Order Form</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 1/10/2018. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/20/2018. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/20/2018.(Miller, Timothy) (Entered: 12/20/2017)

01/24/2018

MINUTE ORDER: The status conference previously set for May 16, 2018 at 2:00 PM is rescheduled to May 16, 2018 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on 1/24/18. (lctfh1) (Entered: 01/24/2018)

01/24/2018

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference reset for 5/16/2018 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (tth) (Entered: 01/24/2018)

04/06/2018 1177 NOTICE of Filing of 2018 Strategy Plan by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHILD WELFARE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 04/06/2018)

04/26/2018

MINUTE ORDER: The status conference previously set for May 16, 2018 at 10:00 AM is rescheduled to May 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on April 26, 2018. (lctfh3) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

04/26/2018

Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference reset for 5/16/2018 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (hs) (Entered: 04/26/2018)

05/04/2018 1178 Consent MOTION to Modify Implementation and Exit Plan by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 05/04/2018)

05/08/2018 1179 ORDER granting 1178 Defendants' Consent Motion to Modify the Implementation and Exit Plan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on May 8, 2018. (lctfh3) (Entered: 05/08/2018)

05/08/2018 1180 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by DC Kincare Alliance (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief of Amicus Curiae DC Kincare Alliance, # 2 Exhibit

[Proposed Order])(Kass, Colin) (Entered: 05/08/2018)

05/16/2018

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 5/16/2018. Another Status Conference is scheduled for 12/11/2018 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Pat Kaneshiro−Miller) (jth) (Entered: 05/16/2018)

05/21/2018 1181 Letter to the Court from Judith W. Meltzer re Progress Report on LaShawn A. v. Kelly (Attachments: # 1 Progress Report for the Period July − Dec 2017) "Let this be filed", by Judge Thomas F. Hogan (zrdj) (Entered: 05/21/2018)

06/12/2018 1182 Consent MOTION for Order by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 06/12/2018)

06/25/2018 1183 ORDER granting 1182 Defendants' Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 20, 2018. (lctfh3) (Entered: 06/25/2018)

07/17/2018 1184 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MURIEL BOWSER. Attorney Esther Yong terminated. (Yong, Esther) (Entered: 07/17/2018)

10/16/2018 1185 Consent MOTION for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney Fees and Costs by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Montee, Amanda) Modified on 10/17/2018 to correct docket text/event (jf). (Entered: 10/16/2018)

10/18/2018 1186 ORDER granting 1185 Defendant's Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 18, 2018. (lctfh3) (Entered: 10/18/2018)

12/10/2018 1187 RESPONSE to Monitor Letter of 11.30.18 filed by DC KINCARE ALLIANCE, Marla Pam Spindel, DC Kincare Alliance. (Spindel, Marla) (Entered: 12/10/2018)

12/11/2018

Minute Entry and Order; Proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 12/11/2018. Oral ruling; granting 1180 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by DC Kincare Alliance; The Monitor's Supplemental Report deadline is extended to March 2019. Status Conference set for 6/11/2019 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Crystal Pilgrim) (hs) (Entered: 12/11/2018)

12/11/2018 1190 Transmittal Letter dated November 20, 2018 and the attached Progress Report. "Let this be filed." Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 11, 2018(zrdj) (Additional attachment(s) added on 12/20/2018: # 1 Exhibit Progress Report for the Period Jan − Jun 2018) (zrdj). (Entered: 12/20/2018)

12/11/2018 1191 SUPPLEMENTAL Report on Performance on Select Exit Standards during July − September 2018. "Let this be filed." Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on December 11, 2018(zrdj) (Entered: 12/20/2018)

12/11/2018 1192 Letter dated November 30, 2018 re: Update on consultation between the Monitor, KinCare Alliance, and CFSA (zrdj) Modified on 12/20/2018 (zrdj). (Entered: 12/20/2018)

12/19/2018 1188 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew J. Saindon on behalf of All Defendants (Saindon, Andrew) (Entered: 12/19/2018)

12/19/2018 1189 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to MURIEL BOWSER. Attorney Amanda J. Montee terminated. (Montee, Amanda) (Entered: 12/19/2018)

01/10/2019 1193 Letter dated December 20, 2018 Letter re: Re−designation of Select Exit Standard. "Let this be Filed" by John Thomas F. Hogan on 1/10/2019. (jf) Modified to add text on 1/11/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 01/10/2019)

03/11/2019 1194 NOTICE of Filing of Strategy Plan for 2019 by MURIEL BOWSER (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2019 Strategy Plan)(Saindon, Andrew) (Entered: 03/11/2019)

04/03/2019 1195 Consent MOTION for Entry of Order re: Attorney's Fees and Costs by EVELYN P. ANDREWS, MURIEL BOWSER, CLARENCE H. CARTER, ROQUE GERALD, FRED SWAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Saindon, Andrew) Modified event on 4/4/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 04/03/2019)

04/03/2019 1196 ORDER granting 1195 Defendants Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on April 3, 2019. (lctfh3) (Entered: 04/03/2019)

06/09/2019 1197 ENTERED IN ERROR. . . . .First STATUS REPORT of DC KinCare Alliance by MARLA PAM SPINDEL. (Spindel, Marla) Modified on 6/10/2019 (ztd). (Entered: 06/09/2019)

06/10/2019

NOTICE OF ERROR re 1197 Status Report; emailed to marla@dckincare.org, cc'd 28 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Please refile document, 2. Please see LCvR 5.1(a) re: Correspondence and 5.1(d) re: Form of Documents. (ztd, ) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/10/2019 1198 RESPONSE to Status filed by Christian Greene. (Hartnett, F.) (Entered: 06/10/2019)

06/11/2019

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Status Conference held on 6/11/2019. Parties inform the court of the status of this action. Interim review of this case will be discussed at a status conference set for 12/10/2019 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Overall review of the status of this case will be discussed at a status conference now set for 5/5/2020 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter: Crystal Pilgrim. (tj) (Entered: 06/12/2019)

06/19/2019 1199 FIAT ORDER. The attached LaShawn A. v. Bowser Progress Report for the Period July 1, 2018−March 31, 2019 is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 19, 2019. (JK) Modified on 6/19/2019 (hs). Modified event title on 7/2/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 06/19/2019)

06/19/2019

1200

FIAT ORDER. The attached letter from the Court Monitor recommending to change the designation of the Exit Standard titled "Visits Between Parents and Children," IEP I.B.11, from the "Outcomes to be Achieved" status to the "Outcomes to be Maintained" status is hereby fiated into the record. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on June 19, 2019. (JK) Modified on 6/19/2019 (hs). Modified event title on 7/2/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 06/19/2019)

08/29/2019

1201

Joint MOTION for Order approving Exit and Sustainability Plan by MURIEL BOWSER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, CLARENCE H. CARTER, ROQUE GERALD, FRED SWAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Exit and Sustainability Plan)(Saindon, Andrew) Modified event on 8/30/2019 (znmw). (Entered: 08/29/2019)

09/10/2019 1202 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on 12/11/2018; Page Numbers: 1−29. Date of Issuance:09/10/2019. Court Reporter/Transcriber Crystal M. Pilgrim, Telephone number 202.354.3127, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 10/1/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/11/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/9/2019.(Pilgrim, Crystal) (Entered: 09/10/2019)
09/18/2019 1203 Consent MOTION for Entry of Order re: Attorney's Fees and Costs by MURIEL BOWSER, BARBARA BURKE−TATUM, CLARENCE H. CARTER, ROQUE GERALD, FRED SWAN (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Saindon, Andrew) (Entered: 09/18/2019)

09/19/2019

MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of 1203 Defendants' Consent Motion for Entry of Order Regarding Attorney's Fees and Costs, it is ORDERED that the District of Columbia shall pay A Better Childhood, Inc. the sum of forty thousand, two−hundred and seventy−six dollars, and thirty−nine cents ($40,276.39) in complete settlement of the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and costs incurred from March 1, 2019 through August 31, 2019, in monitoring compliance with the orders entered in this civil action. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on September 19, 2019. (JK) (Entered: 09/19/2019)

09/20/2019

MINUTE ORDER. The parties shall appear for a hearing regarding the pending 1201 Joint Motion for Entry of Order Approving Exit and Sustainability Plan on October 31, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 26A. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on September 20, 2019. (JK) (Entered: 09/20/2019)

09/23/2019

Set/Reset Hearings: Motion Hearing set for 10/31/2019 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (hs) (Entered: 09/23/2019)

10/18/2019

MINUTE ORDER. At the parties' request the status conference currently set to take place on December 10, 2019 is RESCHEDULED to take place on Monday, December 16, 2019 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 18, 2019. (JK) (Entered: 10/18/2019)

10/30/2019 1204 MEMORANDUM by Christian Greene. (Hartnett, F.) (Entered: 10/30/2019)

10/31/2019 1205 ORDER granting 1201 Joint Motion for Entry of Order Approving Exit and Sustainability Plan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 31, 2019. (CR) (Entered: 10/31/2019)

10/31/2019

AMENDED*****Minute Entry; for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Motion Hearing held on 10/31/2019. Joint MOTION 1201 for Order approving Exit and Sustainability Plan; heard and granted. Status Conference set for 12/16/2019 at 2:00PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Sara Wick) (hs) Modified on 10/31/2019 to reflect the date: 12/16/2019 and 2:00PM (hs). (Entered: 10/31/2019)

10/31/2019 1206 ORDER approving Exit and Sustainability Plan. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on October 31, 2019. (CR) (Entered: 10/31/2019)

11/07/2019

MINUTE ORDER. As stated in open court during the hearing held on October 31, 2019, it is not proper for Christian Greene to submit filings on the public docket in this case as an "Interested Party." Accordingly, the Clerk is hereby instructed to strike documents 1198 and 1204 from the record. No further filings from Ms. Greene shall be accepted in this case. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on November 7, 2019. (CR) (Entered: 11/07/2019)

11/08/2019 1207 TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING before Judge Thomas F. Hogan, held on 10/31/2019. Page Numbers: 1−10. Date of Issuance: 11/08/2019. Court Reporter: Sara Wick, telephone number 202−354−3284. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. Aft er 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

12/16/2019

Redaction Request due 11/29/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/9/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/6/2020.(Wick, Sara) (Entered: 11/08/2019)
Minute Entry; for proceedings held before Judge Thomas F. Hogan: Interim Status Conference held on 12/16/2019. Status Conference set for 5/5/2020 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (Court Reporter Janice Dickman)

(hs) (Entered: 12/16/2019)
12/17/2019 1208 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Thomas F. Hogan held on December 16, 2019; Page Numbers: 1−12. Date of Issuance:December 17, 2019. Court Reporter: Janice Dickmqan, Telephone number: 202−354−3267, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 1/7/2020. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/17/2020. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/16/2020.(Dickman, Janice) (Entered: 12/17/2019)

03/23/2020

1209

MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Valarie McLaughlin, Filing fee $ 100, receipt number ADCDC−6946925. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Valarie McLaughlin, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 03/23/2020)

03/23/2020 1210 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F.. Attorney Sara Robinson−Glasser terminated. (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 03/23/2020)

03/23/2020 1211 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to LASHAWN A., DEMERICK B., GARY C., LEO C., ROBERT D., KEVIN E., TYRONE F.. Attorney Sarah Jaffe terminated. (Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 03/23/2020)

03/24/2020

MINUTE ORDER granting 1209 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice of Valerie McLaughlin. Counsel should register for e−filing via PACER and file a notice of appearance pursuant to LCvR 83.6(a). Click for instructions. Signed by Judge Thomas F. Hogan on March 24, 2020. (CR) (Entered: 03/24/2020)

04/08/2020

Set/Reset Hearings: The Status Conference previously set for 5/5/2020 is now reset for 6/15/2020 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 26A before Judge Thomas F. Hogan. (hs) (Entered: 04/08/2020)

 
 !"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:/*;%%%2<=$>%&-?@(?&-%%%A"B$%&%5C%;

LASHAWN A. BY EVELYN MOORE, ET AL.,

v.
ANTHONY B. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

D.D.C. Civ. No. 89-1754 D.C. Cir. No. 00-7122

ATTORNEYS' FEES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The parties to this litigation, acting through their counsel who are duly authorized to make this agreement on their behalf, hereby agree as follows:
1. Within two working days of execution of this agreement, the parties will jointly move in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to remand appeal No. 00-7122 to the District Court for entry of a modified partial final judgment.
2. Within five working days of entry of the Court of Appeals remand order, the parties will jointly move in the District Court for a Modified Partial Final Judgment for $1,750,000 (one million seven-hundred-fifty thousand dollars) in place of the judgment entered in D.D.C. Civ. No. 89-1754 on April6, 2000.
3. The District of Columbia will pay plaintiffs $1,750,000 (one million seven-hundredfifty thousand dollars) in accordance with the Modified Partial Final Judgment within thirty days of execution of this agreement, such payment to be regarded as full and complete satisfaction of all attorneys' fees and costs accrued by plaintiffs in this litigation through and including March 2, 2000. If the District of Columbia does not make the payment within thirty days of execution of this agreement, interest at the statutory rate specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 will begin to run as of the thirtieth day, whether or not the District Court has entered the Modified Partial Final Judgment as of that date.
The parties recognize thafihe District of Columbia may be prevented from making timely payment of the sum due under this paragraph by the unavailability of appropriated funds due to circumstances beyond its control. Such unavailability shall not diminish the obligation of the District to make .such payment when funds are .available and to pay interest at the statutory rate for the period of delay. In any action brought by plaintiffs to make such payment, the District will acknowledge its obligation to make such payment when funds become available.
4. All attorneys' fees and costs in D.D.C. Civ. No. 89-1754 accruing after March 2, 2000, shall be governed by the following provisions:
A. Plaintiffs shall henceforth file and serve itemized applications for fees and costs approximately every six months. The application for the period from March 3, 2000, to and including September 30, 2000 (or any later date), shall be filed and served on trial counsel for the District of Columbia within seventy-five days of execution of this agreement.
B. Fees will be calculated using the Laffey matrix in effect at the time of service
of plaintiffs' fee application except (i) that the fees for Marcia Lowry will be paid

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:/*;%%%2<=$>%&-?@(?&-%%%A"B$%@%5C%;

-2 -

at a rate ten per cent higher than the applicable Laffey matrix rate and (ii) fees for time spent in travel shall be at 50% of the otherwise applicable rate.

C. The District of Columbia will have forty-five days without extension from the time of service of each fee application to file objections in the District Court that the hours spent are inaccurate, unreasonable, or redundant. In objecting to a particular fee application, the District of Columbia may argue to the District Court that, in determining whether the hours spent were "unreasonable," the court should consider the degree to which a request for relief was unsuccessful; plaintiffs may argue that this is not an appropriate consideration. No other grounds for objection may be raised. The District of Columbia is foreclosed from objecting that fees are not payable because (i) the Modified Final Order entered by the District Court in January 1994 is not based on federal law or the Constitution; (ii) that the work performed benefits members of the LaShawn class who are not in the custody of the District of Columbia; or (iii) that the work performed is for monitoring.

D. Regardless of whether the District of Columbia files timely objection to a fee application, it will nevertheless pay all undisputed fees and costs within seventyfive days of service of the application together with interest at the statutory rate specified by 28 U.S. C. § 1961, calculated from the forty-fifth day following service of the application.

E. The District of Columbia will pay all disputed fees and costs awarded by the District Court within thirty days of entry of an order awarding fees (or, if an appeal is filed, within thirty days of final disposition of the appeal), together with interest at the statutory rate specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, calculated from the day of the District Court judgment on fees.

F. If an appeal is filed, neither party will file dispositive motions, move for extensions of time, or otherwise act to delay disposition of the appeal.

5. This agreement shall be enforceable in the District Court, except that paragraph 4.F.

shall be enforceable in the United States Court of Appeals.

7

l.:~.fb;~

/

ERIC THOMPSON

ROBElyfR. GSB
Corpjrati Counsel CHARL L. REISCHEL Deputy Cmporation Counsel Appellate Division

LUTZ ALEXANDER PRAGER
Assistant Deputy Cmporation Counsel

!"#$%&'()*+,*-&./0*123%%%45+67$89%&-:/*;%%%2<=$>%&-?@(?&-%%%A"B$%;%5C%;

Children's Rights, Inc. 11th Floor 404 Park Avenue South New York, N.Y. 10016 Tel.: (212) 683-2210
Counsel for PlaintiffS
November ;2:Z,_2000

-3 -
Office of the Corporation Counsel One Judiciary Square 441 Fourth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001-2714 Tel.: (202) 727-6252 or 724-5667
Counsel for Defendants

 
 69 F.3d 556 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
LaSHAWN A., et al., Appellees v.
Marion S. BARRY, Jr., as Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al., Appellants.
No. 94-7044. | Argued April 19, 1995. | Decided Oct. 31, 1995. | Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1996.* | Rehearing In Banc Granted, Judgment Vacated, Jan. 30, 1996.
Class action was brought on behalf of children in foster care under supervision of District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS) and children who, although not yet in care of DHS, are known to DHS because of reported abuse or neglect. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Thomas F. Hogan, J., 762 F.Supp. 959, found that § 1983 provided federal remedy for violations of Federal Adoption Assistance Act. District of Columbia officials appealed. The Court of Appeals, Mikva, J., 990 F.2d 1319, held that District of Columbia law created private cause of action for both groups of children and remanded with instructions to fashion order based entirely on local law if possible. On remand, the District Court modified certain provisions of decree and rejected defendants’ contention that some provisions still violated local law. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Stephen F. Williams, Circuit Judge, held that remand was necessary to allow district court to reexamine whether, given power at outset in generalized sense to decide plaintiffs’ state law claims, exercise of pendent jurisdiction to continue to enforce massive institutional reform decree was warranted in light of intervening change in federal law due to Supreme Court’s Suter decision.
Remanded.
Randolph, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.
*558 **394 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 89cv01754).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Garland Pinkston, Acting Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel.
Christopher T. Dunn argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Marcia R. Lowry, Elizabeth Symonds and Arthur B. Spitzer.
Before: WILLIAMS, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
This case appears before us for the second time, with the defendants-the mayor and other officials of the District of Columbia-asking for relief from a consent decree pursuant to which the district court is exercising broad supervisory authority over the District’s child welfare system. Because the district court has not re-examined the validity of the federal claims underlying its jurisdiction since the Supreme Court issued a decision that seems to undermine the statutory support for federal jurisdiction (though not the constitutional basis of certain claims), we remand the case to the district court to perform that re-examination. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
* * *
Plaintiffs, a class of children who either are in foster care under the supervision of the D.C. Department of Human Services (“DHS”), or have been reported to be abused or neglected but are not yet in DHS care, sought injunctive relief based on alleged violations of federal statutory and constitutional law, as well as of local law.
The district court agreed for the most part with plaintiffs. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959 (D.D.C.1991). It found explicitly that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27 and §§ 670-79, afforded plaintiffs rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), and held implicitly that the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06, did so as well. See 762 F.Supp. at 988-89. It detailed widespread violations of those statutes. Id. at 968-87. The court proceeded to find that children in foster care under the supervision of the District enjoyed a liberty interest under the U.S. Constitution, id. at 991-92, with a concomitant right to such services as were “essential to preventing harm” to the children, id. at 993. Compliance with this norm was to be measured by the “professional judgment standard”, drawn from Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Under that standard, “liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462 (quoted at 762 F.Supp. at 994). Finally, the court held that various practices of the District violated that standard, as well as the two pertinent federal statutes and various provisions of local law. 762 F.Supp. at 996-98. It did not find a private right of action for the children under D.C. law, although its discussion of possible entitlements protected under the due process clause may have assumed such rights. Id. at 993-94.
In response to this merits determination, the parties negotiated a broad consent decree, which in its current form occupies 90 single-spaced pages and constitutes a rather comprehensive manual for the conduct of the *559 **395 District’s child welfare activities. The agreement reserved defendants’ right to appeal the district court’s liability ruling and addressed the possibility that the court’s merits opinion might be “vacated” in whole or in part. Section XXII(C) provides:
In the event that the court’s Memorandum Opinion of April 18, 1991, is vacated on appeal in its entirety, this Order and any subsequent implementation plan or plans shall be null and void. In the event that the court’s Memorandum Opinion of April 18, 1991, is vacated on appeal in part, the portions of this Order or any subsequent implementation plan or plans that are directly based on that part of the Memorandum Opinion that is vacated shall be null and void.
In their first appeal, defendants challenged the findings of constitutional violations. They also claimed that, in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), holding that §§ 671(a)(9) & (a)(15) of the Adoption Assistance Act are not enforceable in a § 1983 action, the federal statutes on which the district court had relied were not enforceable by private plaintiffs. This court found it unnecessary “to confront these constitutional and federal statutory issues, for the district court judgment is completely supportable on the grounds of local law”, which, we said, creates a private cause of action both “for children in foster care and for children reported to have been abused or neglected but not yet in the District’s custody.” LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1322, 1325 (D.C.Cir.1993). Because the consent decree had been drafted to conform to federal as well as local law, we remanded to the district court “with instructions to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible. If there are any portions of the consent decree that depend entirely on a federal statute, the district court should consider the impact of [Suter ] on those provisions before it includes them in the revised consent decree.” Id. at 1326.

On remand, the district court declared, despite our having explicitly sidestepped the issue of liability under federal law, that we had “clearly affirmed this Court’s Memorandum Opinion.” LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754, Order at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1993) (citing our decision, 990 F.2d at 1326 (“Because the district court’s judgment is independently supportable by District of Columbia law, we affirm the court’s decision in favor of the children in this case.”)). On that basis, it rejected defendants’ argument that § XXII(C) of the consent decree required modification of the decree. Id. at 2. It did not in any way address whether other circumstances-such as the Suter decision itself-might require modification of the decree or reexamination of the court’s jurisdiction under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. After modifying certain provisions of the consent decree to remove terms that the parties evidently agreed were in violation of District law, it rejected defendants’ contention that some provisions still violated local law. It acknowledged that the decree “exceeds the specific mandates of local law”, but found the excess “a necessary and appropriate use of [the court’s] equitable authority” in light of defendants’ “widespread local law violations”. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754, Order at 1 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1994). See also Order of Nov. 12, 1993 at 2 (“To the extent that portions of the remedial order exceed the terms of local law, the Court invokes its equitable authority in approving the consent decree.”).
* * *
Defendants now return to us, questioning whether the district court has jurisdiction to enforce a wide-ranging institutional reform order against the government of the District of Columbia based entirely on District of Columbia law. We regard the defendants’ claim as basically posing a question under step 2 of Gibbs, namely, whether, given power at the outset in a generalized sense to decide the plaintiffs’ state law claims, the district court should, despite Suter, exercise that power in the form of continuing to enforce a massive institutional reform decree of the sort it had originally adopted.
Law of the Case Considerations [1] [2] Plaintiffs respond that the jurisdictional question has already been decided, by the panel in the first appeal, so that defendants’ *560 **396 dants’ claim is barred by law-of-the-case doctrine. That doctrine embodies the general rule that
a court involved in later phases of a lawsuit should not re-open questions decided (i.e., established as the law of the case) by that court or a higher one in earlier phases. When there are multiple appeals taken in the course of a single piece of litigation, law-of-the-case doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal should not be revisited on later trips to the appellate court.
Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C.Cir.1995). The doctrine normally applies to issues decided explicitly or “by necessary implication”. Id.
These conventional requirements have certainly been fulfilled in this case. The prior panel’s decision necessarily implied that a remedial order supported entirely by local law could properly be entered. The court explicitly recognized that its affirmance rested “entirely on the basis of local law”, LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d at 1326, and implicitly held that an order devoid of federal support would present no jurisdictional problem. We said that our “authority to decide the case entirely on pendent state grounds is incontrovertible”, id., citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1136, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), for the proposition that a federal court presented with federal and local law claims may, “even though the federal ground be not established ... nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground”, id. (emphasis deleted). As to the second step required by Gibbs, the decision whether under the conditions prevailing the district court should exercise power over the pendent local-law claim by continuing enforcement of a 90-page child welfare code, the prior panel passed sub silentio. Its remand to the district court for entry of an order based entirely on local law necessarily implied that the answer to this question was “yes”.
[3] [4] Law of the case, however, is a prudential doctrine that “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912) (Holmes, J.) (citations omitted). “A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance”. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (emphasis added). The Court in Christianson noted, however, that “as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
In Christianson itself, the Court rejected defendant’s theory that the Seventh Circuit’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction bound the Federal Circuit to that view, on transfer from the Seventh. Once the Federal Circuit decided that the Seventh’s view was “ ‘clearly wrong’ it [the Federal Circuit] was obliged to decline jurisdiction,” id. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178, thus applying the conventional exception for clear error. In any event, law of the case in the lower courts could not constrain the Supreme Court’s own review. “Just as a district court’s adherence to law of the case cannot insulate an issue from appellate review, a court of appeals’ adherence to the law of the case cannot insulate an issue from this Court’s review.” Id. In a footnote dictum, however, the Court said,
There is no reason to apply law-of-the-case principles less rigorously to transfer decisions that implicate the transferee’s jurisdiction. Perpetual litigation of any issue-jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional-delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice. But cf. Potomac Passengers Assn. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., ... 520 F.2d 91, 95 n. 22 [ (D.C.Cir.1975) ].
486 U.S. at 816 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 n. 5.
As the “But cf.” cite suggests, our holding in Potomac Passengers directly contradicted the Christianson dictum. In Potomac Passengers this court found that it had erroneously decided a jurisdictional issue in a prior appeal and proceeded to correct the mistake. Though apologizing for the earlier mistake, the court insisted on the need for correctness as to issues of subject matter jurisdiction: **397 *561 “When an appellate court makes so fundamental an error as that of sustaining federal subject matter jurisdiction where none exists, we think the court must exercise its discretion to correct that mistake.” 520 F. 2d at 95 n. 22. Potomac Passengers has been widely cited for the proposition that jurisdictional questions are relatively unrestrained by law of the case.1
Courts have applied Christianson’s discussion of law of the case doctrine relating to jurisdictional questions only in cases involving the propriety of transfers.2 See, e.g., Ukiah Adventist Hospital v. FTC, 981 F.2d 543, 546 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“Review of a transfer order [including jurisdictional grounds] in a transferee court is exceedingly limited.”) (dictum citing Christianson); Wang Laboratories v. Applied Computer Sciences, 958 F.2d 355, 358 (Fed.Cir.1992) (accepting case transferred by First Circuit, the court reasoned that “if the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end”); Moses v. Business Card Express, 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir.1991) (upholding, under Christianson, district court’s decision to apply law-of-the-case principles to transfer decision made pursuant to forum selection clause; technically venue rather than jurisdictional issue). While courts have sometimes applied law of the case to jurisdictional questions, in doing so they have neither relied on the Christianson dictum nor even expressly considered whether jurisdictional issues called for special treatment. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351 (D.C.Cir.1995); In the Matter of Memorial Estates, 950 F.2d 1364, 1367 (7th Cir.1991); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1151 (2d Cir.1988); Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986) (pre-Christianson ). And two of the circuits that once applied law of the case to a jurisdictional issue without discussion, the Ninth and the Second, later refused to do so when they zeroed in on the special character of jurisdictional matters. In Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 724 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988), decided several months after Christianson, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court was not barred by law of the case from reconsidering its own non-final orders. The court cited Potomac Passengers for the proposition that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction, because of its intrinsic importance to the judicial power of the federal courts, is particularly suitable for reconsideration.” Id. And the Second Circuit applied the same principle in DiLaura v. Power Authority, 982 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1992), noting that “subject matter jurisdiction is particularly suited for reconsideration”, although, to be sure, as Judge Winter noted in a separate opinion, the issue was in fact moot because what might have been law of the case for the district court could not have prevented review by the court of appeals, see id. at 81. Wright & Miller have noted that “[q]uestions of subject matter jurisdiction are particularly apt to be

free of law of the case principles”, citing Potomac Passengers. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 at 799 n. 32 (1981) (under the heading “Suitable to Reconsider”). “In addition to the great importance that is generally attributed to jurisdictional limits, such questions may at times involve matters of discretion that inherently require reexamination as a case progresses”, id. (emphasis added), the latter phrase being apparently an allusion to step 2 of Gibbs. The 1995 Supplement to Wright & Miller does not modify that passage, 1995 Supplement at 739-40 n. 32, citing Christianson under the separate category of “Propriety of Transfer: Transferor reconsideration”, id. at 730 n. 26.
The dissent attempts to elevate law of the circuit doctrine (which supposedly has no *562 **398 exceptions) above law of the case doctrine (which concededly does). Dissent at 407-408. Plaintiffs, although they argued law-of-the-case vigorously, never suggested this distinction, perhaps because they thought there was none-that at the court of appeals level exceptions to law of the case were necessarily the same as exceptions to law of the circuit. Nor did our own precedent on the subject, Potomac Passengers, perceive such a distinction.
Among jurisdictional issues, the ones most strongly inviting a relaxed application of law of the case are those that the prior decision never explicitly confronted. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“Pennhurst II”), the Court certainly acted as if such an exception to ordinary law of the case doctrine existed. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (“Pennhurst I”), the Court itself cast doubt on the federal basis for a consent decree enforced against state officials, see id. at 18-27, 101 S.Ct. at 1540-45, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine the validity of the federal claims. The Court also remanded state law claims to determine “whether state law provides an independent and adequate ground which can support the court’s remedial order.” Id. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 1547. The remand order thus necessarily implied that a federal court would have jurisdiction to enter the order on state law grounds alone.
On remand, the Court of Appeals acted on the implied permission Pennhurst I had given and found that the Pennsylvania statute provided “adequate support for [the order] independent of federal law”. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 647, 656 (3d Cir.1982). Again the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment denies federal courts jurisdiction to order state officials to conform their conduct to state law. 465 U.S. at 117-21, 104 S.Ct. at 917-19. It brushed aside several earlier implicit rulings to the contrary in other cases, announcing that stare decisis principles did not bind its reconsideration of the jurisdictional issue. (“When questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.” Id. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 918.)
Pennhurst II is not, of course, identical to the current issue. First, the direct bar of the Eleventh Amendment is plainly of greater force than the discretionary jurisdictional limit of Gibbs step 2. Second, though the Court alluded to implicit holdings to the contrary in other cases, it did not acknowledge the necessary implication of Pennhurst I that there was federal jurisdiction for an injunction resting solely on state law, and thus an obvious ground for applying law-of-the-case. Especially given the merely “prudential” character of law-of-the-case restrictions, and the doctrine’s grounding in concerns of judicial economy, see, e.g., Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739-40, however, the Court’s action strongly suggests that law-of-the-case considerations give way more readily to jurisdictional concerns, at least where the initial decision has failed to address the issue explicitly.
[5] We thus turn to consider whether a Gibbs step 2 inquiry is jurisdictional. When a federal court is presented with a combination of federal and state claims, it must pursue the two-step analysis outlined in Gibbs. 383 U.S. at 725-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1138-40.3 The first step requires the court to evaluate the substantiality of the federal claim and whether the state and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”. Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. If these requirements are met, then “there is power in the federal courts to hear the whole”. In our first pass at this case, we got that far and stopped. Finding that there had been (prior to Suter ) a substantial federal claim, we asserted “incontrovertible” authority “to decide the case entirely on pendent state grounds”. 990 F.2d at 1326.
But Gibbs makes clear that that should not be the end of the inquiry. The Supreme Court has spoken of Gibbs step 2 in terms *563 **399 that mark it as a jurisdictional inquiry, in the sense that it requires continuous re-examination as the litigation and surrounding legal context develop. As Gibbs itself says:
That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist.... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.... The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has properly been assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation. Pretrial procedures or even the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account in this circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation, dismissal of the state claim might even then be merited.
383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (emphasis added). And more recently the Court stated in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988):
Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. Id. at 350, 108 S.Ct. at 619 (emphasis added).4
Lower federal courts of appeals, including this circuit, have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and treated the Gibbs step 2 inquiry as jurisdictional-and accordingly have raised the issue on their own. The Seventh Circuit raised a Gibbs step 2 issue sua sponte in Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1987). After dismissing plaintiff’s federal claim before trial, the district court had proceeded to review a pendent state law claim on the merits. Although defendant did not raise a Gibbs step 2 issue on appeal, the Seventh Circuit declared that “because the rule is jurisdictional, we are obligated to raise it ourselves.” Id. at 1218 n. 4 (emphasis added). The court then vacated the district court’s dismissal of the pendent claim on the merits. This court has likewise treated Gibbs step 2 analysis as jurisdictional and raised the issue sua sponte. In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C.Cir.1990), the district court had previously dismissed both federal statutory and state contract claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This court held that the district court had correctly dismissed the federal statutory claims, but had incorrectly dismissed the state contract claims on First Amendment grounds. Without prompting, the court proceeded to hold that because the district court had properly dismissed the federal claim before trial, under Gibbs step 2 it should also dismiss the pendent state law claim unless it found diversity of citizenship. Id.
The dissent dispatches Maguire and Minker by characterizing them as applications of a newly coined Gibbs step one-and-ahalf-cases where the federal claim survives step 1 but is dismissed before trial. Dissent at 411. Thus, in its view, the Seventh Circuit’s and our treatment of that situation as jurisdictional can’t possibly mean that Gibbs step 2 is jurisdictional. But until the dissent, no one has perceived this circumstance as *564 **400 involving a special kind of Gibbs step; it is simply an instance of Gibbs step 2 so clear that any continued assertion of jurisdiction by the district court would be an abuse of discretion. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.
[6] In sum, the key issue here-the application of Gibbs step 2-(1) is jurisdictional, and thus is subject to continuous reexamination throughout the enforcement of a consent decree (even without a party’s raising it) and (2) was never explicitly addressed in our prior decision. Our non-discussion of the finding of continued jurisdiction suggests that it consumed few or no judicial resources. Taking our cue from the Supreme Court in Pennhurst II, therefore, we conclude that the interest in limiting federal courts to the exercise of their proper jurisdiction outweighs the marginal contribution to stability and judicial economy that could be achieved by giving finality to our prior sub silentio treatment of the Gibbs step 2 issue.

Gibbs Step 2 Analysis [7] [8] As we said before, the first part of the Gibbs test is satisfied once a federal court is determined to have power over state claims because of a substantial related federal claim. That part is indeed satisfied here. Step 2 of the Gibbs test requires a weighing of factors to determine whether, although power exists, it should be exercised in favor of jurisdiction. These factors include judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, avoidance of needless decisions of state law (in order to promote comity and obtain a “surer-footed reading of applicable law”), the timing of the dismissal of the federal claims, the predominance of state versus federal issues, and the potential for jury confusion. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The initial decision lies in the discretion of the district court, subject to review for abuse of discretion in the court of appeals. Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (D.C.Cir.1995).
[9] Two circumstances weigh heavily against allowing pendent jurisdiction: federal claims have either dropped out or are greatly weakened, and the local claims lead to extensive entanglement in local government operations.
First, the elimination or weakening of federal claims obviously weighs against exercise of pendent jurisdiction.5 Gibbs itself said: “Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. Courts have held that pendent state claims should be dismissed if the federal claim drops out quite late, even after trial. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556, 564 (2d Cir.1991) (“The judicial economy factor should not be the controlling factor, and it may be appropriate for a court to relinquish jurisdiction over pendent claims even where the court has invested considerable time in their resolution.”); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1047 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that even after a trial on the merits, district court properly dismissed pendent state law claims after directing a verdict in favor of defendant on federal claim).
[10] Similarly, predominance of local law issues weighs against exercise of pendent jurisdiction. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court noted “if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state law claims may be dismissed without prejudice”. 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (emphasis added). As Gibbs suggests, considerations of comity weigh especially heavily in cases involving massive consent decrees controlling government bodies. Even before Pennhurst, federal courts *565 **401 were concerned about controlling state agencies through exercise of pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs step 2. In Evans v. Buchanan, 468 F.Supp. 944, 956 (D.Del.1979), for example, the court refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs to redesign a state school district tax, citing “the intricacies of the state-law issue” and “questions of comity raised by the remedies proposed.”6
[11] [12] Although injunctions against District of Columbia officials based on District law are not outright banned under the Eleventh Amendment, which applies only to states,7 Pennhurst II does suggest that, in general, injunctions against nonfederal officials based on nonfederal law should be disfavored. Indeed, we have consistently stressed the respect due the courts of the District of Columbia in applying District law. In applying jurisdictional aspects of exhaustion doctrine, for example, we have noted that “the federal courts owe to the District of Columbia the comity extended to a state”. Committee of Blind Vendors of the District of Columbia v. District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 134 (D.C.Cir.1994). Moreover, we have followed this principle in applying Gibbs step 2. In Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 772 (D.C.Cir.1982), we held that the district court had abused its discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction over novel and unsettled questions of D.C. law (fiduciary duty issues). And in Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164 (D.C.Cir.1984), we underlined the importance of avoiding unnecessary federal court invasions of local self-government. One part of an injunction had become moot and the other rested solely on a mistaken belief that local officials’ violation of local law ipso facto violated the federal Constitution. After explaining that local law violations were not automatically federal violations and that rights created by local law should normally be vindicated in local courts, we turned to the possibility of pendent jurisdiction and rejected it:
In general, “principles of comity and the desirability of a ‘surer-footed reading of applicable law’ support the determination of state claims in state court.” [Citing Gibbs and a D.C. Circuit case.]3. Determination by the state court is especially important where the case involves “novel and unsettled” issues of state law.... Here, the law in question is new, its meaning ambiguous and sharply disputed. Moreover, the district court should not retain jurisdiction because this case directly implicates the processes by which a locality governs itself. Appellees’ remedy, if any, lies in the courts of the District of Columbia.
Id. at 169 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Angela R. by Hesselbein v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.1993), while the court found the first step of Gibbs satisfied in a case under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and while it for unexpressed reasons did not regard the Pennhurst II bar as insurmountable, id. at 325, it cautioned the district court about devoting federal judicial resources to enforcement of a decree under a pendent state law claim-even where the state legislature had explicitly imposed the precise terms of the decree on the state welfare agency. Noting the “decidedly minor” interest of federal courts in remedying violations of state law, id. at 325-26, the court vacated the decree and remanded the case to the district court, with instructions to weigh the “constitutional, statutory, and institutional *566 **402 factors that bear upon the task of crafting a suitable equitable decree”. Id.8
[13] It is true that we have upheld an injunction against District officials based solely on pendent District law grounds. See District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C.Cir.1988). But there our application of Gibbs step 2 found only that the district court had not abused its discretion by ordering an injunction against the District of Columbia prohibiting it from spending public funds to oppose citizens’ initiatives. Such a limited, prohibitory injunction offends the principle of comity to a far lesser extent than the wide-ranging, positive institutional reform injunction here.
So far, we have considered the two factors of a vanishing federal claim and an intrusive remedy based on local law grounds separately. But the two factors are closely related. Gibbs sets out a multi-factor balancing test, and presumably a factor pointing in one direction could offset one pointing in the other, and a strong factor pointing in one direction would reinforce a weak factor pointing in the same direction. So, for instance, the greater the intrusion on local government, the more substantial the federal claim should be. It seems at least doubtful that an intrusion such as the consent decree here could be supported where the Supreme Court has found two of the federal statutory provisions inadequate to ground a § 1983 claimunless the remaining statutory clauses can be successfully distinguished.
Because the district court failed to consider the impact of Gibbs step 2 factors-particularly considerations of comity-on its exercise of jurisdiction, we remand the case with instructions on how to proceed. Cf. Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 309-10 (4th Cir.1973) (remanding case for Gibbs step 2 analysis where the district court failed to recognize that it had discretion under Gibbs to hear pendent claims and erroneously thought it was required to dismiss state claims for lack of jurisdiction).
Further Considerations on Remand Any specific provision of the consent decree that can be grounded in what the court concludes is a winning federal claim should of course be preserved.9 The parties here have *567 **403 not briefed the precise impact of Suter on each of the various sections of the federal statutes at issue. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court to make that inquiry in the first instance, in order to determine which, if any, federal grounds survive that could support an injunction. We note that at a minimum, the “reasonable efforts” clause of the Adoption Assistance Act, § 671(a)(15), relied on heavily by the district court, see 762 F.Supp. at 961, 970, 980, 986, and § 671(a)(9), related to its findings at id. at 986, are no longer enforceable under the express holding of Suter. See 503 U.S. at 359 n. 10, 364, 112 S.Ct. at 1368 n. 10, 1370.
Ancillary mandates may be appropriate under the court’s equitable jurisdiction, but only to the extent shown necessary to remedy violations that any decree properly addresses under the above standards. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2056, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995) (“[T]he remedial quality education program should be tailored to remedy the injuries suffered by the victims of prior de jure segregation.... On remand, the District Court must bear in mind that its end purpose is not only ‘to remedy the violation’ to the extent practicable, but also ‘to restore state and local authorities to the

control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution.’ ”) (citations omitted); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2757, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (“[T]he nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation.... [T]he federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution.”) (citations omitted). Specific provisions that cannot be supported on any of the above bases should be excised from the decree.
[14] Plaintiffs cite Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986), for the proposition that defendants may and should be held to the provisions of the consent decree, even though those provisions exceed what the law requires. But as we explain in more detail below, the District, like defendants in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992), consented to the provisions of the decree only to the extent that they were necessary to remedy legal violations and has consistently objected to being subjected to more demanding standards. In Local No. 93, by contrast, the defendant city voluntarily accepted and continued to embrace extra obligations, to which only third parties objected. Compare Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 762-63 (“Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been adjudicated.... [M]isunderstanding of the law could form a basis for modification. In this connection, we note again that the decree itself recited that it ‘sets forth a program which is both constitutionally adequate and constitutionally required.’ ”) (citations omitted).
* * *
The district court will confront a number of other issues on remand that the parties have adequately briefed and on which we offer the following guidance.
[15] First, plaintiffs suggest that § XXII(C) forecloses termination of the consent decree, because it calls for termination only on the occurrence of an event-vacation of the district court’s original merits opinion in its entirety-that has not taken place. There are a number of flaws in this contention. First, § XXII(C) clearly contemplates partial relief calibrated to partial failure of the grounds on which the district court acted. The consent decree thus does not represent a “compromise [on] genuine uncertainties”, Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 478-79 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), but rather a knuckling under to the district court’s legal conclusions, contingent on those conclusions being upheld on appeal. The decree specifies that “portions of this Order ... that are directly based on [any] part of the Memorandum Opinion that is vacated shall be null and void.” In a literal sense, of course, even the *568 **404 partial condition never had any serious possibility of being fulfilled, for appellate courts rarely vacate district court opinions as opposed to judgments. But the parties plainly did not bargain for so hypertechnical a reading. Rather, since the provisions of the consent decree were negotiated as responses to specific findings of violations, the parties clearly anticipated that any undermining of those findings would require that the District be freed of the affected provisions. In effect, § XXII(C) is congruent with the lessons of Pennhurst II-that major changes in federal law may have the effect of undermining the jurisdictional basis of a continuing decree that is based only on local law. Accordingly, § XXII(C) cannot be read to preclude a consideration of Suter’s impact on the decree’s legal foundation.
[16] Resting heavily on their contrary reading of § XXII(C), plaintiffs object that defendants failed to move below for modification of the consent decree. Although the defendants did not specifically invoke Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), authorizing relief when “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application”, they indisputably sought relief on the grounds that Suter had eroded the basis for the decree, see Defendants’ Memorandum on Remand at 4 & n. 1 (Oct. 20, 1993), and the district court’s orders recognize as much, see, e.g., Order of Nov. 12, 1993, at 1 (referring to defendants’ requests that it “vacate or substantially modify the remedial order”).10 Even apart from § XXII(C), modification of a consent decree under Rule 60(b)(5) would proceed under “a flexible modification standard in institutional reform litigation because such decrees ‘reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the public’s right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions.’ ” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, 112 S.Ct. at 759 (citations omitted). See also Evans, 10 F.3d at 480, 477 (finding that any continued enforcement of a consent decree entered into by the City of Chicago had become “ ‘inequitable’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5)” where the federal grounds had all been found wanting and continuing supervision would burden the district court and entangle it in the operations of “another sovereign”); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir.1994) (en banc) (similar).
Second, plaintiffs contend that insofar as Suter may draw in question the district court’s conclusion that the two federal statutes create rights enforceable under § 1983, Congress has reversed it. They point to the following 1994 enactment:
In an action brought to enforce a provision of the Social Security Act, such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of the Act requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M. [503 U.S. 347], 112 S.Ct. 1360 [118 L.Ed. 2d 1] (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; Provided, however, that this section is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section [671(a) (15) ] of the Act is not enforceable in a private right of action.
Social Security Act Amendments of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-432, § 211, 108 Stat. 4398, 4460 (Oct. 31, 1994) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2); see also Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-382, § 555, 108 Stat. 3518, 4057-58 (Oct. 20, 1994) (enacting the same language). Defendants respond that this instruction about “how to go about construing legislation enacted by other Congresses ... impermissibly intrudes on the judicial power.” Reply Br. at 22. We see no need to evaluate defendants’ constitutional argument, because we cannot see that the “instruction” bears on the interpretive issues before the district court.
[17] Contrary to the assumptions of plaintiffs’ (and the dissent’s) arguments, Suter *569 **405 did not find provisions of the Adoption Assistance Act unenforceable “because of ... inclusion in a section of [the Act] requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2. Rather, as we read Suter, its holding was based on the combination of (1) the Pennhurst I requirement of a clear statement for any conditions on state receipt of federal grants, see 503 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 1366, (2) the absence of “statutory guidance ... as to how ‘reasonable efforts’ are to be measured”, id. at 360, 112 S.Ct. at 1368, and (3) the establishment of an alternative enforcement mechanism, see id. at 360-61, 112 S.Ct. at 1368-69. The discussion of the section’s being embedded in the requirements for a state plan, id. at 358, 112 S.Ct. at 1367, seems largely a way station to the point that alternative means of enforcement are provided. The Suter Court’s principal concern was the Act’s vagueness. In discussing the “reasonable efforts” clause, § 671(a)(15) (state must make “reasonable efforts” to prevent need for removing child from his home and to return child to home after removal), the Court noted: “How the State was to comply with this directive, and with the other provisions of the Act, was, within broad limits, left up to the State.” 503 U.S. at 360, 112 S.Ct. at 1368 (emphasis added).
This interpretation of Suter corresponds with the ordinary inquiry as to whether to infer a private right of action from a statutory scheme, see, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), and has been endorsed by other circuits as well. See, e.g., Marshall v. Switzer, 10 F.3d 925, 929 (2d Cir.1993) (“[T]he significant point in Suter was not that the statute in question only required a state to submit a plan to the federal agency but that the statute provided no guidance for measuring ‘reasonable efforts.’ ”); Wood v. Tompkins, 33 F.3d 600, 605-06 n. 14 (6th Cir.1994) ( “[T]he [Suter ] Court noted that other sections of the Adoption Act, in contrast to § 671(a)(15), did indeed impose precise requirements on the states in addition to requiring the mere submission of a plan.... [T]he holding is simply that the one particular provision that was at issue is too amorphous to confer enforceable rights.”). Likewise, in Doe v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 93-0092, slip op. at 17, 1994 WL 71547 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1994), the court found that a provision that had originally been relied on in this case, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (a provision of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act), “invests only ‘generalized dut[ies]’ upon the states and does not ‘unambiguously confer’ an enforceable right to bring a private action against the government.” The court at no point relied on Congress’s having specified that the requirement should be embodied in a State plan.11 Of course neither the Social Security Act of 1994 nor the identical language of the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 did anything to supply more precise standards for the Adoption Assistance Act, or to alter the clear statement requirement or the Adoption Assistance Act’s non-judicial enforcement provisions; it thus changed none of the factors on which the Suter Court’s reasoning depended.
Congress may have been misled by the language of Suter’s footnote 10, which says, after setting forth the language of § 671 (a)(9), “As this subsection is merely another feature which the state plan must include to be approved by the Secretary, it

does not afford a cause of action to the respondents anymore than does the ‘reasonable efforts’ clause of § 671(a)(15).” 503 U.S. at 359 n. 10, 112 S.Ct. at 1368 n. 10. In conjunction with the opinion’s text, discussed above, we read the footnote to state essentially that the combination of factors noted above applies with equal force to § 671(a)(9).
The legislative history of the identical 1994 provisions suggests that Congress may also have been confused by Suter’s statement that “the Act does place a requirement on the States, but that requirement only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary which contains the 16 listed features.” *570 **406 503 U.S. at 358, 112 S.Ct. at 1367. See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 863 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1552 (quoting above sentence). The point of the sentence, however, is simply to distinguish what the statute specifically requires of states (adoption of a plan approved by the Secretary) from what-for the reasons given elsewhere in the opinion-it does not require. It certainly does not announce a general rule that mandatory inclusion in a plan demonstrates intent not to create an enforceable right.
The legislative history has another formulation of congressional purpose, but it is no more helpful than the reference to state plans. The Conference report stated that
The intent of this provision is to assure that individuals who have been injured by a State’s failure to comply with the Federal mandates of the State plan titles of the Social Security Act are able to seek redress in the federal courts to the extent that they were able to prior to the decision in Suter v. Artist M., while also making clear that there is no intent to overturn or reject the determination in Suter that the reasonable efforts clause to Title IV-E does not provide a basis for a private right of action.
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 761, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2901, 3257 (emphasis added). But the Court decided Suter by applying previously established judicial criteria to a specific instance (§ 671(a)(15)) of a general question (whether Congress intended to create an enforceable right). The dissent in Suter, cited by the dissent here, was not correct in claiming that the Suter majority had “changed the rules of the game.” 503 U.S. at 377, 112 S.Ct. at 1377 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Even if Congress could wipe Suter from the books, we think that lower courts addressing the same issue would have no basis for assuming that, if once again confronted with a Suter-like issue, the Supreme Court would not do just what it did in Suter. Thus, unless § 211 actually changed part of the test that led to the outcome in Suter (which, as we have said, it did not), courts should find equally vague provisions of similar acts equally unenforceable for the reasons that the Court found convincing in Suter.
Nor does the second sentence of the 1994 amendments assist plaintiffs. It reads: This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M. [503 U.S. 347], 112 S.Ct. 1360 [118 L.Ed.2d 1] (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; Provided, however, that this section is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section [671(a)(15) ] of [the Act] is not enforceable in a private right of action.
(Emphasis added.) But Congress identified no “grounds” applied in Suter that were “not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting ... enforceability.” Thus the sentence has no effect on the interpretive issues raised by the Adoption Assistance Act.
* * *
After what may seem a long journey, the core of our conclusion is no more than that we take seriously the Supreme Court’s statement in Gibbs that “the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has properly been assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation.” 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. When a Supreme Court decision such as Suter flatly removes some of the supports of pendent jurisdiction, and at a minimum enfeebles most of the others, the “open” issue must be reexamined. To that end, we remand the case to the district court.
So ordered.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
To paraphrase Edward R. Murrow, anyone who isn’t confused by the majority opinion doesn’t really understand it.
After six years of litigation, after a trial and a decision of this court sustaining the district court’s jurisdiction, after further proceedings on remand, after an order finding the District of Columbia in contempt and the appointment of a receiver, after all this-voilà-my two colleagues spot a “jurisdictional” flaw in the case, a flaw everyone else *571 **407 must have overlooked. Of course, they have discovered no such thing. The supposed defect identified in the majority opinion is not of the jurisdictional variety, and the issue the majority opinion addresses is hardly new-this court decided it two years ago when the District first appealed. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“LaShawn I”). The District sought rehearing from that decision. The court denied the petition. The District suggested rehearing en banc. It did not get the votes. Now my colleagues, forgetting that two judges do not an en banc court make, reverse the first panel’s ruling. That is, to say the least, an extraordinary result, and so are the reasons given for it. The majority opinion tosses aside settled law, turns its back on Supreme Court decisions, disregards the controlling precedents of this court, rewrites the holdings of other courts, and badly misreads a federal statute.1
I
Inconsistency is the antithesis of the rule of law. For judges, the most basic principle of jurisprudence is that “ ‘we must act alike in all cases of like nature.’ ”2 This is an old idea, and it has given rise to two time-honored doctrines of importance to this case. First, the same issue presented in a later case in the same court should lead to the same result. Second, the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result. For three-judge panels in the federal courts of appeals, the first proposition reflects a variant of stare decisis, which I shall call the law-of-the-circuit doctrine. The second embodies the law-of-the-case doctrine. The majority opinion violates both.
The law-of-the-circuit doctrine is derived from legislation and from the structure of the federal courts of appeals. Courts of appeals sit in panels, or divisions, of “not more than three judges” pursuant to the authority granted in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The “decision of a division” is “the decision of the court.” Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46 (citing Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249 (1941)); see Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C.Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, 113 S.Ct. 1579, 123 L.Ed.2d 147 (1993). Were matters otherwise, the finality of our appellate decisions would yield to constant conflicts within the circuit. 314 U.S. at 335, 62 S.Ct. at 277-78. One three-judge panel, therefore, does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court. E.g., United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1370 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). That power may be exercised only by the full court, either through an en banc decision, id., or pursuant to the more informal, and dubious, practice adopted in Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1981). While the law-of-the-case doctrine allows for certain exceptionsalthough not, to be sure, the one the majority invents today-the law-of-the-circuit doctrine does not. Thus, in circuits such as ours, where both doctrines are at work, the more exacting law-of-the-circuit doctrine supplants the law-of-the-case doctrine when panels hear multiple appeals from a single case. See, e.g., United States v. 162.20 Acres of Land, 733 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1984) (explaining that when a prior panel in the same circuit has decided an issue, law-of-the-circuit doctrine supplants law-of-the-case doctrine and precludes reconsideration of that decision in a subsequent appeal, even if the second panel believes the first was wrong), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 920 (1985); cf. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that both the law of the case and the law of the

circuit precluded a panel from reconsidering issues resolved in a prior appeal in the same case), cert. denied, *572 **408 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 951 (1985).
Until today, the law-of-the-circuit doctrine was completely settled, thoroughly understood and uniformly honored-by the two judges in the majority and the other judges of this court. See, e.g., Ayuda v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 153, 154 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (Henderson, J., concurring); Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 891, 930 (D.C.Cir.1988) (Williams, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc ), cert. dismissed, 501 U.S. 1283, 112 S.Ct. 38, 115 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1991). Likewise, the district judges in this circuit have rightly assumed that a decision of one panel of this court represents the law of the circuit. See, e.g., Feeling v. Kelly, 152 F.R.D. 670, 673 (D.D.C.1994) (relying upon LaShawn I to sustain the district court’s pendent jurisdiction).
Now things have changed. My two colleagues must admit-and do admit, although rather grudgingly-that they are today overruling the panel’s decision in LaShawn I. This is beyond dispute. The question the majority opinion addresses is a question LaShawn I answered and answered in a way directly contrary to the majority’s disposition. LaShawn I explained that the District of Columbia’s statutory and regulatory scheme was “appropriately before us under our pendent jurisdiction,” 990 F.2d at 1324; held that federal judicial authority to decide the case on pendent grounds was “incontrovertible,” id. at 1326; and affirmed the district court’s exercise of that authority by confirming its decision “entirely on the basis of local law,” id. To put the matter starkly, the first panel-consisting of then-Chief Judge Mikva, Judge Sentelle and myself-directed the district judge not to consider federal claims and to revise the decree accordingly; a majority of the second panelconsisting of Judge Williams and Judge Henderson-now directs the district judge to consider federal claims and modify the decree accordingly. This is more than mere inconsistency. It is flat contradiction, and-because we are one court-it is selfcontradiction.
II
Perhaps I should end on this note. But so much else is wrong with what the majority has written that I think it appropriate to say more. Apart from the law-of-the-circuit doctrine, the law of the case foreclosed reopening the question my colleagues address, and the clear dictates of the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Constitution should have steered them away from the conclusions they reach.
A
“When there are multiple appeals taken in the course of a single piece of litigation, law-of-the-case doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal should not be revisited on later trips to the appellate court.” Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 180, 133 L.Ed.2d 118 (1995); see also Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 471 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990). The Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to be “loathe” to reconsider issues already decided “in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). My colleagues identify no such “extraordinary circumstance” here. They can point to no intervening change in controlling legal authority. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C.Cir.1995). They do not claim that LaShawn I was “clearly erroneous” or that it “would work a manifest injustice.” See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178.
Instead, my colleagues invent for themselves an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine under which a subsequent panel is free to reexamine any “jurisdictional” question decided, but not extensively discussed, by an earlier panel in an earlier appeal of the same case. This invention is no doubt convenient as my colleagues struggle to reach the *573 **409 result they want here. Unfortunately, it also contradicts both the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. and our own very recent decision in Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.
First, those decisions make clear that it is of no moment that the three-judge panel in LaShawn I devoted little space to the topic that now grabs the attention of two of my other colleagues. As the Supreme Court held in Christianson, the law-ofthe-case doctrine turns “on whether a court previously decide[d] upon a rule of law ... not whether, or how well, it explained the decision.” 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739, we held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to questions decided “explicitly or by necessary implication.” The majority admits as much (maj. op. at 396), but then argues that the issues “most strongly inviting a relaxed application of law of the case are those that the prior decision never explicitly confronted” (maj. op. at 398). This is doubly wrong. It misstates LaShawn I and it misstates the law. While LaShawn I did not provide a detailed analysis of United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), doubtless because the District did not rest its appeal on any supposed lack of pendent jurisdiction, the law-of-the-case doctrine depends not on how extensively the earlier panel discussed the particular issue, but on whether it decided it, as LaShawn I assuredly did.
Second, the Supreme Court in Christianson specifically rejected the “jurisdictional question” exception the majority manufactures for this case. The Court there said that the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits a federal court from revisiting another federal court’s decision to transfer a case to it so long as the transferee court finds the transfer decision “plausible.” 486 U.S. at 819, 108 S.Ct. at 2179. The Court explained:
There is no reason to apply law-of-the-case principles less rigorously to transfer decisions that implicate the transferee’s jurisdiction. Perpetual litigation of any issue-jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional-delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice.
Id. at 816-17 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 n. 5. In reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected Potomac Passengers Ass’n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 520 F.2d 91, 95 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1975), in which this court first suggested that the law-of-thecase doctrine might not preclude reconsideration of jurisdictional questions. Id. The majority acknowledges the Supreme Court’s rejection of Potomac Passengers, but then inexplicably ignores it. It is true, as the majority states, that Potomac Passengers was “widely cited for the proposition that jurisdictional questions are relatively unrestrained by law of the case” (maj. op. at 396), but that was before Christianson. In the seven years since Christianson, only two federal courts have even mentioned Potomac Passengers, and then only to bolster the unremarkable conclusion that a district court is free to reconsider its own non-final jurisdictional decisions. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 724 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 518, 530 (D.Conn.1991).3 The majority cites no case since Christianson in which a federal appellate court has reversed a jurisdictional decision made by a prior merits panel. Today, of course, this court and other courts of appeals routinely apply law-of-the-case preclusion to questions of jurisdiction, see, e.g., McKesson Corp., 52 F.3d at 350; Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1151 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 200, 107 L.Ed.2d 154 (1989), and do so even when the first decision regarding jurisdiction is less than explicit. See, e.g., In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 950 F.2d 1364, 1367 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct. 2969, 119 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992).
So where does the majority derive the inspiration for its invention? Hunting far and wide for something, anything, to counteract the force of Christianson and Crocker, the majority comes up with a strange source *574 **410 of supportPennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“Pennhurst II”). No matter that Pennhurst II decided nothing about the law-of-the-case doctrine, in fact did not even mention it. It is enough for the majority that the Supreme Court said in Pennhurst II that it does not consider itself bound by decisions on questions of jurisdiction made sub silentio in previous cases “when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue” to the Court. 465 U.S. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 918 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But that plainly has nothing to do with this appeal. The cited portion of Pennhurst II dealt with the stare decisis effect of decisions in other cases, not the effect of earlier decisions by the same appellate court in the same case.

It would take a mighty leap to get from Pennhurst II to the majority’s newly-coined rule that an appellate court may freely revisit jurisdictional questions it decided in an earlier appeal of the same case. My colleagues make the attempt, but predictably fall well short. While acknowledging that the Supreme Court never addressed the law-of-the-case doctrine in Pennhurst II (maj. op. at 398), they declare-here comes the jump-that the Court “acted” as if the majority’s new law-of-thecase exception already existed (maj. op. at 398). The majority’s theory has two flaws, both fatal. First, the Supreme Court had no reason to “act” as if the majority’s new law-of-the-case exception already existed in Pennhurst II because there was no law-of-the-case issue there at all.4 Second, regardless of how the majority thinks the Supreme Court “acted” in Pennhurst II, the Court clearly rejected the majority’s “jurisdictional question” exception four years later in Christianson.
B
Even if my colleagues were free to create an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine for “jurisdictional questions,” they still would face a major problem here: the application of Gibbs step two is not, as they claim, “jurisdictional,” see (maj. op. at 399). It becomes “jurisdictional” in my colleagues’ eyes only because they must see it this way. Otherwise, there is no explaining why they ignore the law of the case and take it upon themselves to reexamine this court’s earlier holding in LaShawn I. And so they form a perfect circle: Gibbs step two is jurisdictional because it requires continuous reexamination (maj. op. at 398), and it requires continuous reexamination because it is jurisdictional (maj. op. at 400). There is, however, a rub-the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have uniformly recognized that the second step of the Gibbs analysis is decidedly not jurisdictional. The matter is discretionary. Here the discretion had already been exercised-in LaShawn I-in favor of resolving the case entirely on pendent local law grounds.
Obviously, the concept of pendent jurisdiction entails a jurisdictional element, but that is comprised in the first step of the Gibbs analysis. See Wal-Juice Bar, Inc. v. Elliott, 899 F.2d 1502, 1503 (6th Cir.1990); District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C.Cir.1988); Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 188 (D.C.Cir.1986); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 772 (D.C.Cir.1982). Step one of Gibbs deals with the court’s “power” to hear pendent local law claims-its jurisdiction-when the case raises a “substantial” federal issue and the federal and local law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and “are such that [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected *575 **411 to try them all in one proceeding.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. The federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, to the extent Congress authorizes it, is derived directly from Article III, Section 2, extending the judicial “Power” to “all Cases in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States....” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3231, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction rests on the idea that the court’s jurisdiction over the underlying federal claim brings the related pendent claims under the scope of Article III because they are part of the same “case” or “controversy.” See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821-23, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). Gibbs’ requirements of a substantial federal claim, a common nucleus of operative fact, and the expectation of one trial, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138, “serve[ ] as an operational definition of the ‘one constitutional “case” ’ language.” Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL.L.REV. 1399, 1416 (1983).
There can be not the slightest doubt here that the children’s claims under federal statutory law, the Constitution, and District of Columbia law all arise from a common set of facts. The district court’s jurisdiction-its power-to decide the local law claims thus turned on the substantiality of the underlying federal claims. Whether a court may decide pendent claims is determined on the face of the pleadings. Contrary to what the majority tells us, the ultimate disposition of the federal claim is “immaterial on the question of power.” 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, sFederal Practice and Procedure § 3567.1, AT 114-15 (1995).
Once a district court finds a substantial federal claim, it has jurisdiction over the entire case. The court then must engage in the second step of the Gibbs analysis and decide whether to exercise that jurisdiction over the local or state law claims. This aspect of Gibbs-the so-called “key issue” according to my colleagues-is not a jurisdictional determination. It is an entirely prudential one, which is why Gibbs held that “pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion....” 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.5 To reach a contrary conclusion, the majority must misconstrue a decision of the Seventh Circuit and then completely mischaracterize a decision of this circuit. In Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir.1987), the Seventh Circuit did not, as the majority claims, call the Gibbs step two analysis jurisdictional. See maj. op. at 399. It applied that label only to the Gibbs “rule” that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. The majority’s mischaracterization of this court’s decision in Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C.Cir.1990), is far worse. The majority insinuates that the Minker court called Gibbs step two a “jurisdictional question.” Maj. op. at 400. It did no such thing. In Minker, this court said, “Our holding raises a new jurisdictional question on remand.” 894 F.2d at 1361. The new question left “on remand” was not a Gibbs question-this court handled that one itself-but rather was whether the plaintiff had sufficiently pled diversity to provide an independent basis of jurisdiction over his state-law claim. 894 F.2d at 1361. That is a jurisdictional question all right, but it is not Gibbs step two.
*576 **412 Despite my colleagues’ best efforts, then, Gibbs step two remains not a “jurisdictional inquiry,”6 but a prudential determination left to the discretion of the court that makes it. There is no other way to explain Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School District, 457 U.S. 594, 595, 102 S.Ct. 2612, 2612, 73 L.Ed.2d 245 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that a federal court’s decision whether to resolve pendent local law claims was to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See also Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Williams, J.) (“Whether actually to decide [the local-law claims] is a matter left to the sound discretion of the district court.... We review for abuse of discretion.”).
The majority purports to apply that standard here, apparently concluding that the district court abused its discretion in “fail [ing] to consider the impact of Gibbs step 2 factors-particularly considerations of comity-on its exercise of jurisdiction....” Maj. op. at 402. What discretion? The district court did not address Gibbs step two on remand and for good reason: this court already had done so. See LaShawn I, 990 F.2d at 1326. The district court, in other words, had no discretion to abuse. It was bound by the holding in LaShawn I. See In re Ivan F. Boesky Securities Litigation, 957 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.1992) (explaining that the law-of-the-case doctrine leaves a district court “no discretion” in carrying out an appellate court’s directions on remand). If we suppose that the district court abused its discretion in complying with our ruling in LaShawn I, what, according to the majority, should the district court have done?
III
The majority’s handiwork thus far ought to be enough to leave the district judge thoroughly confused, but my colleagues are not finished yet. For the remand, they direct the district court to apply an entirely new set of pendent jurisdiction rules and then to ignore the clear direction of Congress in interpreting the federal statutory scheme at the center of this case.
A
On remand, the majority declares, the district court must “examine[ ] the validity of the federal claims” and determine whether “any federal grounds survive that could support an injunction.” Maj. op. at 394, 403.7 This direction happens to conflict directly with Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1214, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970), which is relegated to a footnote in the majority *577 **413 opinion. In Rosado v. Wyman, the Supreme Court roundly rejected the idea that “once a federal court loses power over the jurisdiction-conferring claim, it may not consider a pendent claim.” 397 U.S. at 404, 90 S.Ct. at 1213. Just as a federal court does not lose jurisdiction over a diversity action if one of the parties

moves while the appeal is pending, a federal court does not lose pendent jurisdiction over the local law claims if the federal claims are decided against the plaintiff or otherwise drop out of the case. Id. at 405 & n. 6, 90 S.Ct. at 1214 & n. 6. In the Supreme Court’s words, Rosado holds that there is no requirement that a federal court have “jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages of the litigation as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim,” id. at 405, 90 S.Ct. at 1214-a holding completely at odds with the majority’s proposition that even now, after an extensive trial and two appeals, the pendent jurisdiction already exercised must be undone unless the plaintiffs’ local law claims remain closely intertwined with “winning” federal claims. Under Rosado, even if the first panel had reversed the judgment to the extent the district court found the District in violation of federal law, pendent jurisdiction over the local law claims would still exist, and the extensive violations of local law would support the decree.
Having made a shambles of Gibbs step two and of Rosado v. Wyman, the majority lays waste to what remains of the law of pendent jurisdiction. Unlike plaintiffs in any other case ever decided by the federal courts, the plaintiffs here may retain their victory on their local law claims only if it turns out that they had “winning” federal claims. Maj. op. at 402. “Winning”? Where does this idea come from? Gibbs and the cases following it require only that the federal claim asserted in the complaint be “substantial,” that is, that it “have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court,” a principle derived from Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 549, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933). Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. According to Levering, “jurisdiction, as distinguished from merits, is wanting where the claim set forth in the pleading is plainly unsubstantial ... either because [it is] obviously without merit, or ‘because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of [the Supreme] court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’ ” 289 U.S. at 105-06, 53 S.Ct. at 550 (italics added) (quoting Hannis Distilling Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326, 327, 54 L.Ed. 482 (1910)). A federal question is therefore “substantial” for purposes of pendent jurisdiction if it is not “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” or “no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1379, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also District of Columbia Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 10; Town of W. Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 991 F.2d 1039, 1049 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S.Ct. 185, 126 L.Ed.2d 144 (1993); Matasar, supra, 71 CAL.L.REV. at 1419. The Court explained in Hagans: “The limiting words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance.... [T]hose words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial....” 415 U.S. at 537-38, 94 S.Ct. at 1379.
In requiring the district court to find a “winning” federal claim as a prerequisite to exercising jurisdiction over pendent local law claims, my colleagues have thus overruled the Supreme Court’s decisions in Levering, Hagans, and Gibbs-a tall order for two judges of an inferior federal court.
Given their treatment of Supreme Court precedents, it is little wonder that my colleagues also mow down two decisions of this court bearing directly on the issue they think needs deciding. In District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d at 10, we upheld solely on pendent local law grounds an injunction against the District of Columbia prohibiting it from spending public funds to oppose citizens’ initiatives. Far from determining whether a winning *578 **414 federal claim supported the injunction, we refused to decide the merits of the federal claim (much as did the panel in LaShawn I ) because it was not “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” and was therefore substantial enough to support the pendent claims. Id. (citation omitted). Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179 (D.C.Cir.1986), is to the same effect. We there reversed the district court’s ruling that a District of Columbia statute violated federal law. Although the federal claim was a loser, we considered it “substantial enough” to allow us to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent local law claim and to decide it, which we did. 792 F.2d at 188.8
The majority ignores Dimond but attempts to distinguish District of Columbia Common Cause on the ground that the injunction there was somehow inoffensive to the notion of “comity” the majority tries to fashion out of its favorite recurring non sequitur, Pennhurst II. Maj. op. at 401-402. Pennhurst II is an exceedingly odd, indeed astonishing, source for the majority’s views on the comity this court owes local District of Columbia courts. Odd because Pennhurst II dealt with something no one would have dreamed this case involved-the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. Exceedingly odd because the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity on the states from certain suits in federal court, and when last I checked, the District of Columbia was not a state. Astonishing because the majority nonetheless finds that Pennhurst II and the Eleventh Amendment somehow “suggest that, in general, injunctions against nonfederal officials based on nonfederal law should be disfavored.” Maj. op. at 400-401.
*579 **415 It is hard to take this seriously. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining “suit[s] in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI (italics added). That eliminates the District of Columbia. I would have thought that judges in this circuit needed no reminding that the District is not a sovereign state, separate from the federal government. It is the seat of our national government, and it is subject to Congress’ plenary authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.9 See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). Although inhabitants of the District today possess, to some degree, the power of self-government, District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), they hold that power at Congress’ forbearance, and it is far from absolute. Congress has “reserve[d] the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject ... including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District ... and any act passed by the [District] Council.” Id. § 601. The District government must submit any law it enacts to Congress, which can disapprove the law within 30 days. Id. § 602(c)(1). The District may make no expenditures, even of funds it raises through its own means of revenue collection, unless approved by an act of Congress. Id. § 446.
The District is thus a distinctly federal entity, “truly sui generis in our governmental structure.” District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432, 93 S.Ct. 602, 610, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973). A suit in federal court against a federal entity “is hardly the instrument of a distant, disconnected sovereign,” Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 394, 401, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994), and thus raises none of the concerns that underpin the Eleventh Amendment or the Supreme Court’s application of it in Pennhurst II. Accordingly, the cases the majority cites concerning the comity owed states-Angela R. ex rel. Hesselbein v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.1993), and Evans v. Buchanan, 468 F.Supp. 944 (D.Del.1979)-are irrelevant here.10
Stripped of their faulty Eleventh Amendment underpinnings, my colleagues’ views on the comity owed District of Columbia courts turn solely on their misunderstanding of the Gibbs step two analysis. The majority seems to think that the existence of local law claims automatically counsels against the exercise of jurisdiction over them. If that were true, pendent jurisdiction would never exist. But as this court has made clear, it is the extent to which a local law issue is “novel and unsettled”-and not its mere existence-that might counsel against the exercise of jurisdiction. Compare Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 775 (D.C.Cir.1982) (district court abused its discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction over “novel and unsettled” local law issues) and Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting pendent jurisdiction over “novel and unsettled” local law issues) with Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d at 189 (where local law issues were neither novel nor unsettled, uncertainty in local law could not weigh heavily against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction). The majority *580 **416 has identified no such “novel and unsettled” local law issues at stake here. To do so now, it would have to overrule yet another portion of LaShawn I, in which this court held that District of Columbia law clearly provides private causes of actions for all of the children in the plaintiff class. 990 F.2d at 1326.
B
This brings me to the majority’s treatment of Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), and the statute Congress passed in the wake of that decision.
Suter held that one of the provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627 and §§ 670-679 (“the Act”), upon which plaintiffs have relied, could not be enforced through a private cause of action. In light of the Court’s holding with respect to that provision-42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)-the majority suggests that the substantiality of the federal claims asserted by those plaintiff children who are not in custody may be undermined because, in view of Suter, they

may not be able to enforce any of the Act’s provisions.11 Maj. op. at 406. And so the majority instructs the district court, on remand, to consider the effect of Suter.
That instruction collides with 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, a 1994 statute severely limiting Suter. The statute provides: In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M. [503 U.S. 347], 112 S.Ct. 1360 [118 L.Ed. 2d 1] (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; provided, however, that this section is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(15) of this title is not enforceable in a private right of action.
Id. Theorizing that Congress may have been “misled” or “confused” by the language of Suter (maj. op. at 405-406), my colleagues essentially conclude that this statute has no effect at all. Maj. op. at 406. They claim that the first sentence of § 1320a-2 means nothing because Suter did not turn solely on the fact that the provision at issue was included in the state plan requirement. That point might be well taken, but what about the next sentence? There, Congress specifically directed the federal courts to use the same “grounds for determining the availability of private actions” they used before Suter and to disregard any new grounds the Supreme Court first applied in Suter. This direction may be understood only in light of the dissenting opinion in Suter, which claimed that the Suter majority had “changed the rules of the game” for finding private rights of action under § 1983. See 503 U.S. at 377, 112 S.Ct. at 1377 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rightly or wrongly, Congress credited the dissenters’ view. “The intent of this provision,” the Conferees stated, “is to assure that individuals who have been injured by a State’s failure to comply with the Federal mandates of the State plan titles of the Social Security Act are able to seek redress in the federal courts to the extent they were able to prior to the decision in Suter v. Artist M. ....” H.R.CONF.REP. No. 761, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1994) (italics added). Two district courts have considered § 1320a-2 and have so read the provision. See Harris v. James, 883 F.Supp. 1511, 1519 (M.D.Ala.1995) (explaining that in § 1320a-2, Congress “mandated that courts continue to apply a pre-Suter approach”); Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1283 (E.D.Wis.1995) (explaining that § 1320a-2 requires courts to “ ‘rewind the clock’ and look to cases prior to *581 **417 Suter to determine the enforceability of other provisions”).12
My colleagues see things differently. They say that because Congress did not identify the specific Suter “grounds” it wished to reject, it must not have meant to reject any grounds. Maj. op. at 406. Even if that argument made any sense, it still would directly contradict both the language of the Suter amendment, which overturns “any such grounds” applied in Suter but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, and the “hornbook law” presumption against “interpreting a statute in a way which renders it ineffective,” see Federal Trade Comm’n v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Branch Office, 515 F.2d 988 (D.C.Cir.1975).
In short, Congress has directed the federal courts not to consider Suter in deciding whether there may be private enforcement of the Act, while my colleagues have directed the district court to do just the opposite.
Congress’ command raises constitutional problems of its own. Congress may not prescribe rules of decision for cases pending in the federal courts. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-48, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). But cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 1457, 131 L.Ed. 2d 328 (1995). And it is far from certain whether Congress may, consistent with principles of separation of powers and the independence of the judicial branch, direct the lower federal courts to disregard the reasoning of an otherwise binding Supreme Court decision.
There is no reason why the district court, and ultimately this court, should have to ponder this serious question or the other constitutional issues the majority sends back to it, issues raised by the dictum in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), with respect to the in-custody children. Maj. op. at 402 n. 9. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has endorsed the practice of deciding cases on the basis of a pendent state-law claim in order to avoid constitutional questions. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193, 29 S.Ct. 451, 455, 53 L.Ed. 753 (1909); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 6 S.Ct. 1132, 30 L.Ed. 118 (1886). Pennhurst II itself stressed that nothing in its decision regarding the immunity of states under the Eleventh Amendment was “meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the principle [of avoiding constitutional questions] in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues.” 465 U.S. at 118-19 n. 28, 104 S.Ct. at 918 n. 28. And in a later case, the Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for a court of appeals to reach a federal constitutional question when it could have avoided doing so by deciding the case on pendent statelaw grounds. Schmidt v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 457 U.S. at 595, 102 S.Ct. at 2612.
The majority opinion turns the table upside down. Again ignoring higher authority, the majority orders the district court to abuse its discretion by deciding the constitutional issues.
IV
It is time to bring this opinion to a close. The majority’s opinion disregards the law of this court and of the Supreme Court. My colleagues do not like the idea of a federal district court issuing a decree to govern local institutions. Nor do I, nor, for that matter, *582 **418 does the district judge in this case. But we are sworn to uphold the law. I therefore dissent.
ADDENDUM
The case went to trial four years ago. Two weeks of testimony revealed the District of Columbia’s deficient, inept administration of its foster care system. This testimony, together with more than a thousand admissions of fact by the District, showed that District officials had consistently failed to carry out responsibilities imposed on them by federal and local laws. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 960, 986-87 (D.D.C.1991). These were far from minor infractions. The transgressions psychologically, emotionally and physically harmed those children in the District’s foster care system and those children who, although not yet in the District’s care, were known to the District because of reported abuse and neglect. Id. at 987.
The district court thus reached the “inescapable conclusion” that the District’s foster care system complied with neither “federal law, District law, [n]or, for those plaintiffs in the District’s foster care, the United States Constitution.” Id. at 960-61. The District’s administration of its foster care system violated numerous provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627 and §§ 670-679, and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106.13 The Adoption Assistance Act, the court held, conferred upon the plaintiffs rights that were privately enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the District had violated by depriving plaintiffs of those rights. 762 F.Supp. at 988-90.
The district court also found that the District’s operation of its foster care system violated numerous provisions of the District’s Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Law 2-22 (Sept. 23, 1977) (codified as amended at D.C.CODE ANN. §§ 2-1351 to -1357, §§ 6-2101 to -2107, §§ 6-2121 to -2127, and §§ 16-2351 to -2365); the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986, D.C.Law 6-139 (Aug. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at D.C.CODE ANN. §§ 3-801 to -808); and the Child and Family Services Division Manual of Operations (September 1985). The District’s obligations under its own laws parallel almost exactly the requirements of federal law. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“LaShawn I ”). Analogizing the rights of children in foster care to rights of those involuntarily committed, LaShawn, 762 F.Supp. at 992, the district court ruled that these laws conferred liberty and property interests, protected under the Fifth Amendment, on the children in the custody of the District’s foster care system,

id. at 994. The District had violated § 1983 by depriving the children in foster care of these constitutionally protected interests. 762 F.Supp. at 998.
The parties worked out a remedial order designed to correct deficiencies in the District’s administration of its foster care system, and the district court entered it.
*583 **419 The District appealed, contending that the district court erred in finding that the administration of the District’s foster care system violated the Fifth Amendment and that the intervening decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), precluded any private cause of action under § 1983 or federal child welfare statutes. LaShawn I, 990 F.2d at 1321-22. Recognizing that the appeal raised “complex constitutional and federal statutory issues,” we held that it was unnecessary to reach the District’s challenges. Id. at 1324. Under District law, children reported to have been abused or neglected had a private right of action under the District’s Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act. Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.1987). Because a government owes greater duties toward those in its custody, we concluded that the children in the District’s foster care system also had a private right of action under the Act. LaShawn I, 990 F.2d at 1325. In addition, we noted that the other District statute relied on by the children, the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act, explicitly provides these children with a private cause of action to sue under the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act. Id. at 1325-26. These statutes, we held, “provide[d] an independent basis for supporting the district court’s judgment.” Id. at 1326. This court’s authority to decide the case entirely on the pendent local claims, we stated, was “incontrovertible” under United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Parallel Citations 314 U.S.App.D.C. 392

Footnotes

*

Circuit Judge Randolph would grant the petition for rehearing.

1

See, e.g., Green v. Dept. of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 839 & n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1980); Amusement & Music Operators Ass’n v.

Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 636 F.2d 531, 532-33 & nn. 2-4 (D.C.Cir.1980); Acton Corp. v. Borden, 670 F.2d 377, 380 n. 2

(1st Cir.1982); Crane Co. v. American Standard, 603 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir.1979); EEOC v. Neches Butane Products Co.,

704 F.2d 144, 147 n. 2 (5th Cir.1983); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794 (6th Cir.1983); Christianson v. Colt

Industries Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir.1986).

2

The lone exception seems to be a case involving personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction. In the Matter of Oil Spill by the

Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1292 (7th Cir.1992).

3

Because this litigation was commenced before December 1, 1990, the new supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1367 (Supp. V 1993), does not apply.

4

Cf. Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc) (holding that mere consent of local officials, without

viable federal claim, could not justify continued enforcement of decree against city) (“the court must ensure that there is a

substantial federal claim, not only when the decree is entered but also when it is enforced, and that the obligations imposed

by the decree rest on this rule of federal law rather than the bare consent of the officeholder”) (emphasis added).

5

We do not hold that the disappearance of federal claims from a case automatically deprives a federal court of jurisdiction

over all types of pendent claims, which would be contrary to Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404-05, 90 S.Ct. 1207,

1213-14, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). The disappearance or weakening of federal claims are simply factors to be considered in

step 2 of a Gibbs analysis. We do not understand why the dissent flogs us with “conflict[ing] directly with Rosado.” Dissent

at 412-413.

6

See also Catalano v. Dept. of Hospitals, 299 F.Supp. 166, 175 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction

under Gibbs to determine whether income exemption regulation conformed to state law, since issue “presents a question of

state legislative intent and delegation of powers to an administrative body, which more appropriately lies within the ambit

of the state court’s expertise with respect to its own laws”).

7

We note that the First Circuit has interpreted the term “state”, as used in the Eleventh Amendment, to include more than just

the 50 obvious ones, ruling that Puerto Rico is covered by the Eleventh Amendment “in the same manner, and to the same

extent, as if [it] were a State.” See De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.1991). But

we decline to follow the First Circuit’s approach here.

3

Although the District of Columbia is constitutionally distinct from the states, it may nevertheless be treated as a state for

present purposes....

8

See also Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc). Although Evans involved a pure “municipal

corporation”, the city of Chicago, the court recognized the force of comity principles even as to political entities not

covered by the Eleventh Amendment. When making inquiries into jurisdictional support for a consent decree, “courts are

bound by principles of federalism (and by the fundamental differences between judicial and political branches of

government) to preserve the maximum leeway for democratic governance.” Id. at 479.

The dissent appears to suppose that we rely on the Eleventh Amendment. Dissent at 414-415. If for some reason the

paragraphs above leave any doubt on the subject, No, we do not; we rely primarily on circuit precedent affording a similar

(and doubtless weaker) comity to the District of Columbia, with support from other circuits recognizing the role of comity

where it was not (or was perceived as not) mandated by Pennhurst II.

9

We express no opinion as to the merits of the district court’s original finding that the post-custody children have valid

constitutional claims under the dictum of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 201 n. 9,

109 S.Ct. 998, 1006 n. 9, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (“Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua

from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to

incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”). If the district court does reach the issue

on remand and adheres to its ruling, it should consider the possibility of bifurcating the class, since in-custody plaintiffs

raise issues distinct from those who rely entirely on federal and local statutes.

We note in this connection that although courts ordinarily refrain from deciding constitutional questions when a case can

be resolved on the basis of state law, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936)

(Brandeis, J., concurring); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 29 S.Ct. 451, 454, 53 L.Ed. 753 (1909),

Pennhurst II “had the effect of overruling the entire history of Siler/Ashwander doctrine in cases where injunctive relief is

requested against the state.” Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 835 F.2d 1486, 1497 (1st Cir.1987) (citing Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 123,

104 S.Ct. at 920 (majority opinion); 465 U.S. at 159-63, 104 S.Ct. at 939-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The comity afforded

the District under Grano v. Barry in the application of Gibbs step 2, paralleling the rule of Pennhurst II, similarly implies

that the district court may not exercise jurisdiction over the pendent claims merely to avoid confronting the reverse-

DeShaney issue. Of course Ashwander would under no circumstances suggest any need to refrain from addressing the issues

of federal statutory law.

10

Even if the defendants had not sought relief on these grounds, we would still be required to investigate the basis of the

district court’s jurisdiction on our own initiative. See Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,

894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C.Cir.1990); Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1987).

11

We note that two district courts interpreting § 211 have deferred to the congressional view that inclusion in a plan was

central to Suter’s analysis-see Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1283 (E.D.Wis.1995); Harris v. James, 883

F.Supp. 1511, 1520 (M.D.Ala.1995)-but we disagree.

1

For those unacquainted with this class action, I offer a brief history in an addendum to this opinion.

2

Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A.) (quoting Lord Mansfield in John Wilkes’ case, Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng.Rep. 327,

335 (1770)). See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).

3

DiLaura v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 982 F.2d 73, 76-77 (2d Cir.1992), the only other post-Christianson

decision the majority cites in support of its law-of-the-case exception, also concerns only the authority of a district court to

alter its non-final decisions.

4

In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (“Pennhurst I”), the

Court eliminated one federal basis for a consent decree, then remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine if state

law or federal constitutional or statutory grounds could support the decree. Id. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 1547. Pennhurst I did not

decide whether the Eleventh Amendment would bar a federal court from granting relief against a state on pendent state-law

claims. Rather, in directing the court of appeals to consider whether state law could support the decree, the Court directed

the court of appeals to consider that question. Only after the court of appeals held on remand that state law alone was

sufficient to support the order, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.1982) (en banc ), did the Supreme Court squarely confront the Eleventh

DeShaney issue. Of course Ashwander would under no circumstances suggest any need to refrain from addressing the issues of federal statutory law.

10

Even if the defendants had not sought relief on these grounds, we would still be required to investigate the basis of the

district court’s jurisdiction on our own initiative. See Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,

894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C.Cir.1990); Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1987).

11

We note that two district courts interpreting § 211 have deferred to the congressional view that inclusion in a plan was

central to Suter’s analysis-see Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F.Supp. 1268, 1283 (E.D.Wis.1995); Harris v. James, 883

F.Supp. 1511, 1520 (M.D.Ala.1995)-but we disagree.

1

For those unacquainted with this class action, I offer a brief history in an addendum to this opinion.

2

Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A.) (quoting Lord Mansfield in John Wilkes’ case, Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng.Rep. 327,

335 (1770)). See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).

3

DiLaura v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 982 F.2d 73, 76-77 (2d Cir.1992), the only other post-Christianson

decision the majority cites in support of its law-of-the-case exception, also concerns only the authority of a district court to

alter its non-final decisions.

4

In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (“Pennhurst I”), the

Court eliminated one federal basis for a consent decree, then remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine if state

law or federal constitutional or statutory grounds could support the decree. Id. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 1547. Pennhurst I did not

decide whether the Eleventh Amendment would bar a federal court from granting relief against a state on pendent state-law

claims. Rather, in directing the court of appeals to consider whether state law could support the decree, the Court directed

the court of appeals to consider that question. Only after the court of appeals held on remand that state law alone was

sufficient to support the order, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.1982) (en banc ), did the Supreme Court squarely confront the Eleventh

Amendment question. Since the Court had not faced the question before Pennhurst II, it had not established any law of the

case to apply.

5

While it is true that the Supreme Court in Gibbs explained that the step two question remains open through “the litigation,”

the Court meant only that the question need not be decided forever on the pleadings, but could be reconsidered during

pretrial proceedings or even the trial itself. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. While it may be true that a district

court can relinquish its pendent jurisdiction even after trial, see (maj. op. at 399), the majority has identified no case in

which that question was revisited after a trial, an appeal, a remand, and another appeal.

6

Congress has also explicitly recognized the discretionary nature of the second step of the Gibbs inquiry. The Judicial

Improvement Act, enacted in 1990 and codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1367, states:

... in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (italics added). When the federal claim drops out, the district court has discretion to retain or dismiss

the pendent local law claims: “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim in

subsection (a)” for any of the reasons listed in § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (italics added).

The majority passes over § 1367 because this case began before the statute’s effective date (maj. op. at 398 n. 3). But in

attaching their jurisdictional label to Gibbs step two, my colleagues should have paused to consider that § 1367 “codified

the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction developed by the Supreme Court in the case of United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 [86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218] (1966), and its progeny.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th

Cir.1995); see also Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 (D.C.Cir.1995). (The

statute also did a good deal more by allowing the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over pendent parties, cf. Finley v.

United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989), as distinguished from pendent claims. See David D.

Siegel, Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL

COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, PART III, at 546-68 (Apr. 2, 1990 & July 1, 1990).)

7

It is a mystery to me why the majority assigns this task to the district court, rather than to itself. The questions posed are

questions of law, and this court is in as good a position to decide them as the district court. The majority’s assignment sets

the stage for yet another appeal, and the district judge must be as baffled as I am by this court’s conflicting commands.

8

The majority relies on Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct.

1831, 128 L.Ed.2d 460 (1994) (Evans III ), to support its conclusion that the second part of the Gibbs analysis is a

jurisdictional inquiry. Evans III is not on point. The Seventh Circuit reached the result it did because no substantial claim

whatsoever-federal or local-underlay the district court’s order. Evans III does not even discuss the question of pendent

jurisdiction, since the only local claims at issue there were part of the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process theory. 10 F.3d

at 476. A prior appellate panel, Evans v. City of Chicago, 873 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir.1989) (Evans II ), rejected both of the

plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the City of Chicago’s practice of paying some judgments earlier than others. That

panel explicitly held that the City had not violated the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, id. at 1015-18, and

according to Evans III, there was “little doubt that Evans II would have repulsed a due process argument had the plaintiffs

presented it for decision,” 10 F.3d at 480-81. Given the absence of a substantial federal claim, the Evans III court held that

the district court had no jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree. The “bare consent of the officeholder” was not a

sufficient basis for imposing obligations on the City. Id. at 479.

Here, it is not the “bare consent” of the District that supports the consent decree. As this court held, the decree rests on the

District’s flagrant and repeated violations of District of Columbia law. LaShawn I, 990 F.2d at 1325. For purposes of this

appeal, Evans III demonstrates, if anything, only that the first part of the Gibbs inquiry-the substantiality of the underlying

federal claim-is jurisdictional.

Nor does Angela R. ex rel. Hesselbein v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.1993), support the majority’s holding. In that case,

as here, the federal claims against the governor of Arkansas and the director of the state’s Department of Human Services

were based in the Constitution, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679, and

the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106a. 999 F.2d at 322. The court recognized the

uncertainty of the constitutional claims of those children not in foster care. Moreover, it noted that the analysis in Suter v.

Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), “might ultimately compel the conclusion that the ... federal

statutes upon which plaintiffs rely do not create an enforceable private right of action on their behalf.” 999 F.2d at 323, 324.

Nevertheless, because these questions went to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and did not “inescapably render the claims

frivolous,” it held the district court clearly had jurisdiction to enter a consent decree resolving the dispute. Id. at 324

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, as to the question whether the plaintiffs here have federal claims

substantial enough to support the district court’s exercising pendent jurisdiction over their local law claims, Angela R.

supports a conclusion directly contrary to the majority’s.

The problem in Angela R. was not jurisdictional, but centered on “future enforcement of [the] obligations” imposed by the

decree. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the consent decree did not resolve specifically enough how it was to be

enforced, and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in approving it. Id. at 325. Because Angela R. was a suit

against state officials, Eleventh Amendment concerns made it particularly important that the decree’s enforcement

provisions were consensual and plain. Id. at 325-26. Those concerns are not present here. See infra pp. 401-402.

9

For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress has indicated that the District of Columbia should be treated as a municipal

government. H.R.REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979). After noting that municipalities may be liable for § 1983

violations under Monell v. City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the House report stated:

“That decision leaves the District of Columbia government and its officers as the only persons in the United States or its

territories who are not subject to Section 1983 liability.” H.R.REP. No. 548, supra, at 2. By contrast, § 1983 does not

abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity accorded to States. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41, 99 S.Ct. 1139,

1144-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam).

10

Committee of Blind Vendors of the District of Columbia v. District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130 (D.C.Cir.1994), is likewise of

little value here because it concerned not the comity federal courts owe District of Columbia courts, but the respect owed the

District’s administrative agencies in a statutory scheme in which Congress specifically said that the District of Columbia

should be treated like a state. See 28 F.3d at 132 n. 1.

11

The district court found the District in violation of six provisions of the Act. See infranote 13.

12

Before Suter, federal courts had sustained private actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the Act’s provisions.

See, e.g., Timmy S. v. Stumbo, 916 F.2d 312, 316 (6th Cir.1990) (determining that the “reasonable promptness” provision of

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 805 (1989) (holding the substantive requirements listed in §

671(a)(9), (10) & (16) enforceable under § 1983); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 512 (1st Cir.1983) (concluding that the

case plan requirements of § 671(a)(16) and § 675(1) & (5)(B) are enforceable under § 1983).

13

Specifically, the court found the District in violation of the following requirements imposed upon recipients of federal

funding for child welfare programs: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (requiring prompt investigations into reports of abuse or

neglect and necessary action to protect welfare of abused or neglected children), 762 F.Supp. at 968-70; (2) 42 U.S.C. §

5106a(b)(3) (requiring demonstration of program to ensure effective treatment of child abuse and neglect cases), 762

F.Supp. at 970; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (requiring provision of services to enable a child for whom a report has been made

to remain in the home or, if removal is necessary, to enable the child to return home as quickly as possible), 762 F.Supp. at

970; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 672(e) (mandating that a child return home within 180 days unless a judicial determination has been

made that foster care placement is in the child’s best interests), 762 F.Supp. at 971; (5) 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (requiring

procedures to assure children are placed in least restrictive settings), 762 F.Supp. at 971; (6) 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (requiring

timely preparation of case plans containing specific information), 762 F.Supp. at 972-73; (7) 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B)

(requiring review of child’s status at least every six months), 762 F.Supp. at 974; and (8) 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A) (requiring

operation of information system from which status, location and goals for placement of all foster care children may be

readily determined), 762 F.Supp. at 976-77.

End of Document

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

 
 990 F.2d 1319 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
LaSHAWN A., by Her Next Friend, Evelyn MOORE, et al., Appellees, v.
Sharon Pratt KELLY, et al., Appellants.
No. 91–7159. | Argued Nov. 4, 1992. | Decided April 16, 1993. | Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 9, 1993.
*1320 **50 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 89–1754.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Beverly J. Burke, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, for appellants. John Payton, Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellants.
Marcia Robinson Lowry, New York City, with whom Christopher T. Dunn, Elizabeth Symonds, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellees.
Before MIKVA, Chief Judge, SENTELLE and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MIKVA, Chief Judge:
This is a review of a decision by the district court in favor of a group of unfortunate children who brought a class action suit for injunctive relief against various officials of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs brought the class action on behalf of children who are in foster care under the supervision of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (“DHS”), as well as children who are reported to be abused or neglected but are not yet in the care of the DHS.
The children attacked a child-welfare system which they alleged is characterized by ineptness and indifference, inordinate caseloads and insufficient funds. The district court found that, because of the appalling manner in which the system is managed, children remain subject to continuing abuse and neglect at the hands of heartless parents and guardians, even after the DHS has received reports of their predicaments. The court also found that youngsters who have been taken into the custody of the District’s foster-care system languish in inappropriate placements, with scarce hope *1321 **51 of returning to their families or being adopted. The court held that the District of Columbia’s treatment of the children violated the Constitution and federal and local statutes.
After trial, the parties negotiated a remedial order that seeks to ease the plight of children who depend on the DHS for protection and for the opportunity to live and grow in a stable and nurturing environment. In the remedial order, the District of Columbia expressly reserved the right to appeal the district court’s judgment assessing liability against it. The District’s appeal from this judgment raises some complex constitutional and federal statutory issues. Because District of Columbia law is an independent and sufficient basis to support the district court’s decision, however, we need not reach these issues in order to uphold the district court’s resolution of this case.
I. BACKGROUND
It is not necessary to recount at length the complex background of this case, nor to recapitulate the extensive list of allegations against the District officials that the district court found to be based in fact. For the details as to these matters, we refer to Judge Thomas F. Hogan’s clear and comprehensive discussion in the opinion below. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 961–87 (D.D.C.1991). Suffice it to say that the district court found that the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (“DHS”), the agency entrusted with the care of foster children and abused and neglected children, has consistently evaded numerous responsibilities placed on it by local and federal statutes. Among the agency’s transgressions are:
[T]he failure of the DHS to initiate timely investigations into reports of abuse or neglect, the failure to provide services to families to prevent the placement of children in foster care, the failure to place those who may not safely remain at home in appropriate foster homes and institutions, the failure to develop case plans for children in foster care, and the failure to move children into a situation of permanency, whether by returning them to their homes or freeing them for adoption.
LaShawn A., 762 F.Supp. at 960.
The district court held, as to the children already enmeshed in the foster-care system, that the practices of the DHS deprived them of their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court also found that the challenged actions and non-actions of the DHS violated two federal statutes: the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–627 and §§ 670–79, and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101– 5106. The court held the defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for both the constitutional and federal statutory violations.
The children also raised pendent claims that the defendants had violated the District of Columbia’s statutory and regulatory law, namely the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Code Ann. §§ 2–1351 to –1357, §§ 6–2101 to – 2107, §§ 6–2121 to –2127, and §§ 16–2351 to –2365 (“Abuse and Neglect Act”); the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986, D.C.Code Ann. §§ 3–801 to –808 (“Licensure Act”); and the Child and Family Services Division (“CFSD”) Manual of Operations (September 1985). The district court found that the defendants had violated these acts and regulations, but it did not hold that the children possessed an explicit or implied private cause of action under District law to enforce these statutes. Instead, it held that the District’s laws conferred constitutionally protected liberty and property interests on the children, the deprivation of which, without due process, was actionable under § 1983.
On appeal, the District officials assert that the district court erred in finding that the administration of the city’s child-welfare and foster-care system violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. They further contend that Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), which the Supreme Court decided after the district court decided the present case, forecloses any federal statutory *1322 **52 cause of action. As we will explain, it is not necessary for us to confront these constitutional and federal statutory issues, for the district court judgment is completely supportable on the grounds of local law.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Abstention [1] As an initial matter, we must address the District officials’ contention that under principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the district court should have abstained from deciding a large portion of this case. Appellants assert that Younger applies as to children within the foster-care system because these children are parties to ongoing proceedings in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia where their claims could have been resolved. (Appellees do not urge Younger abstention as to the claims of children who are reported to be abused or neglected but who are not yet in foster care, because these children are not yet parties to Family Division proceedings.) This Court has never decided whether the District of Columbia is a state for Younger abstention purposes. Instead, every time the question has arisen, we have assumed that the doctrine applies to the District and nonetheless determined, in light of the

facts of each particular case, that Younger abstention has not been appropriate. See, e.g., District Properties Assocs. v. Dist. of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 28 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1984); Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 701 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1984). In the present case, we again find it unnecessary to reach the issue, because Younger abstention would not be required here even if the doctrine applied to the District with full force.
In Younger and its progeny, the Supreme Court has established that federal courts may not interfere with pending state judicial or administrative proceedings. Although the Supreme Court has extended Younger abstention well beyond its original application to pending state criminal proceedings, the Court has never abandoned the core principle that the doctrine is applicable only “if the [federal] plaintiffs ‘had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings.’ ” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2378, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 1218, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (emphasis in original)). The notions of comity underlying Younger abstention do not compel federal courts to refrain from hearing federal statutory and constitutional claims when the pending state proceeding is an inadequate or inappropriate forum for pursuing these claims.
This Court has previously applied this principle in a case concerning the Family Division of the D.C. Superior Court. Family Div. Trial Lawyers of Superior Court–D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C.Cir.1984), involved the constitutional claims of three attorneys who regularly requested assignment of cases in the Family Division. In federal district court, the attorneys unsuccessfully challenged the practice by which the D.C. Superior Court appointed counsel to represent indigent parents in neglect proceedings without reimbursement. They appealed the adverse decision to this Court. Before this Court, the appellees argued that the district court should have abstained from deciding the merits of the appellants’ claims, because these claims could have been raised and adequately dealt with in the individual neglect cases in which the appellants were counsel.
This Court rejected the appellees’ abstention argument. It questioned “the need or wisdom of extending Younger to all constitutional claims that might be adjudicated in state as well as federal courts.” 725 F.2d 695, 702 (D.C.Cir.1984). Instead, the court focused on whether the federal plaintiffs were “parties to any pending suit in the local courts in which their constitutional challenges could naturally be resolved.” Id. at 702 (emphasis added). The panel observed that “the individual neglect cases in which the appellants are counsel are questionable vehicles at best for raising their constitutional claims.” Id. at 703. *1323 **53 Consequently, it concluded that Younger abstention was not applicable.
Proceedings in the Family Division are an equally questionable vehicle for adjudicating the claims raised in the present case. There are three types of Family Division proceedings that may be “pending” for a child entangled in the District of Columbia’s foster-care system: (1) a “neglect proceeding” adjudicating a neglect petition filed by the Corporation Counsel against the child’s parents, (2) periodic review hearings, and (3) proceedings adjudicating motions to terminate parental rights. None of these proceedings is an appropriate forum for this multi-faceted class-action challenge to the District of Columbia’s administration of its entire foster-care system.
Neglect proceedings are designed to focus on the special problems surrounding the neglect or abuse of a child by his or her parent, guardian, or custodian. The Family Division of the D.C. Superior Court has recognized that these proceedings are not suitable arenas in which to grapple with broad issues external to the parent-child relationship:
By their very nature neglect proceedings contemplate issues centering on the care of a child by his or her parent. If need be “related matters involving the same family or household” can be consolidated. [D.C. Superior Court Rules Governing Neglect Proceedings Rule 2 and 3(b).] Anything broader is inconsistent with the nature of the proceedings.
In the Matters of N.P. and L.W., Nos. 404–79, 418–79 (D.C.Super.Ct. June 14, 1982), slip. op. at 2–3, quoted in Family Div., 725 F.2d at 703.
The other two types of proceedings that are pending for some of the children—review hearings and termination proceedings —are even less suitable arenas in which to present the claims the children advance in this case. The Family Division is required to provide each child in the foster-care system with a review hearing either every six months or every year, depending on the child’s age and the amount of time he or she has been within the system. D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2323(a). The review hearing is no broader in scope than the neglect proceeding. It is clearly intended merely to reassess periodically the disposition of the child.
The Family Division has explicitly rejected the use of review hearings to adjudge claims requesting broad-based injunctive relief based on federal law. In In re Brim, No. 489–80 (D.C.Super.Ct. July 20, 1984), the Family Division denied a motion by two children for injunctive relief against the D.C. Department of Human Services for the Department’s alleged mishandling of Social Security disability payments it collected on the children’s behalf. The court noted:
This motion—with the full panoply of remedies requested (such as an accounting, declaratory relief requiring promulgation of rules and regulations, establishment of trust funds, and a permanent injunction)—is simply not appropriately heard within the context of a review, pursuant to 16 D.C.Code 2323, to monitor the post-dispositional welfare of a neglected child.... [T]hese issues are properly raised in federal district court.
Id., slip op. at 2.
The only other proceeding available to children in the foster-care system is the termination hearing. See D.C.Code Ann. §§ 16–2358 to 59. This proceeding, however, has an even more limited function than the neglect proceeding and review hearing. A termination hearing is held in response to a motion by a child (through counsel), or by the District of Columbia, to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents, guardians, or custodians. D.C.Code Ann. § 16–2354. The hearing is manifestly not intended to address subjects other than the cessation of parental rights, and the children’s claims in this case are well outside its scope.
In sum, there was no pending judicial proceeding in the District of Columbia which could have served as an adequate forum for the class of children in this case to present its multifaceted request for broad-based injunctive relief based on the Constitution and on federal and local statutory law. This holding squares with our *1324 **54 decision in District Properties Assocs. v. Dist. of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir.1984). In District Properties, local landlords brought a class action suit broadly challenging, on constitutional and federal statutory grounds, the practices and procedures of the District of Columbia agency responsible for administering the District’s rent control laws. They pursued their case in U.S. District Court, despite ongoing administrative and judicial proceedings in the District of Columbia. This Court reversed the district court’s use of Younger abstention to bar the action. In language strikingly relevant to the present case, we stated:
[T]he only possible ground for Younger dismissal in this case would be if [the ongoing District of Columbia proceeding] was the kind of local enforcement proceeding in which appellants could have had a full and fair opportunity to present their federal claims. But ... appellants’ claims are in a number of respects considerably broader than the claims they were able to assert in the proceedings in local courts or before the [Rental Accommodations Office]. And the relief they seek in this case is far broader than that which the local court could have granted in the administrative review proceeding.... There being no pending state enforcement proceedings that would have afforded appellants a full and fair opportunity to litigate their constitutional claims, the predicate for Younger abstention was simply absent in this case.
Id. at 28. For the same reasons, we refuse to hold that the district court should have abstained from deciding the present case. We proceed to the merits.
B. Challenges to the Child–Welfare and Foster–Care System The district court adjudged the defendants liable “under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the federal and local statutory rights of all of the children in the plaintiff class and for violating the constitutional rights of those plaintiffs in the District of Columbia’s foster care custody.” LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 998 (D.D.C.1991). Appellants attack the judgment so far as it rests on federal statutory rights. They argue that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), decided after the district court issued its ruling in LaShawn, renders the federal statutes at issue unenforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellants also challenge the constitutional basis of the district court opinion.
It is not necessary to reach the complex constitutional and federal statutory issues in this case. The District of Columbia’s statutes and regulations provide a scheme for the protection and care of foster children, and children reported to be abused or

neglected, that is equally as comprehensive as that provided by the federal statutes and is appropriately before us under our pendent jurisdiction.
As outlined by the district court, the obligations of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services under the Abuse and Neglect Act, the Licensure Act, and the CFSD Manual of Operations parallel almost precisely the requirements contained in the relevant federal laws. Every claim supported by federal law is also supported by District law. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. at 961–64. The DHS has violated District law as well as federal law by failing, for example, to initiate timely investigations into reports of abuse or neglect, to provide services to families in order to prevent the placement of children in foster care, to place those who may not safely remain at home in appropriate foster homes and institutions, to develop case plans for children in foster care, and to move children into a situation of permanency.
As the district court framed its decision, local law did not provide an entirely independent ground for the judgment, because the court did not find that the local statutes themselves provided the children with an explicit or implied private right of action. Instead, the district court apparently decided that the District of Columbia’s statutes and policies create constitutionally protected liberty and property interests for those children in the District’s foster-care custody. *1325 **55 “To the extent these statutes and regulations confer benefits upon the plaintiffs in the District’s foster care, the deprivation of those benefits takes on constitutional dimensions.” LaShawn, 762 F.Supp. at 993. The children thus had a cause of action under § 1983.
If, however, we determine that the district court’s judgment can be supported entirely by reference to the law of the District of Columbia, as appellees argue, we need not enter the § 1983 thicket at all. The fact that the district court itself did not rest its decision on this basis is of no concern, for “[t]he prevailing party may, of course, assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of his judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).
[2] We find that the District statutes create a private cause of action for children in foster care and for children reported to have been abused or neglected but not yet in the District’s custody. As for the latter group, this matter was conclusively settled by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.App.1987). In that case, a mother brought suit against the District of Columbia on behalf of her children for the city’s failure to remove the children from their abusive father’s home. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the Abuse and Neglect Act provides a private remedy against the District for the special class of abused and neglected children protected by the statute:
With respect to the District of Columbia ... we hold that when [the Child Protective Services Division] received a report that the two Roddy children, who were specifically and individually identified, were being abused by their father, [the Abuse and Neglect Act] created a special relationship between the District and the two children. From that moment on, the District had a duty to take certain steps prescribed by the Act for the protection of those children. The District’s breach of that duty is actionable under the special duty exception to the general rule [that the government’s general duty to the citizenry at large is not enforceable by a particular individual].
Id. at 675.
Turner establishes that the children in the present case who are reported to be abused or neglected but who are not yet in the District’s custody have a private right of action under the District’s Abuse and Neglect Act. It therefore seems self-evident that this Act (which regulates the District’s foster-care system as well as its child-abuse-response system) also creates privately enforceable rights for those children actually in the District’s custody. It is generally recognized that the state owes a greater duty toward people in its custody than toward people still in the care of private actors. Indeed, in assessing duties imposed on the state by the United States Constitution (as opposed to duties imposed by state statutes), the Supreme Court has held that the state has a constitutional duty to assume responsibility for the safety and well-being of a person only when the state takes that person into its custody. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199– 201, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005–1006, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989).
It would strain logic to conclude that the District, through the Abuse and Neglect Act, has assumed a duty on behalf of children still in the private sphere, but not on behalf of those youngsters who are in its custody. We therefore hold that the Abuse and Neglect Act creates a private right of action for children in the foster-care system.
[3] There is an additional basis in District law for the right of the children in foster care to sue to enforce the statutes at issue. The other District of Columbia statute relied on by appellees, the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act, explicitly provides these children with a private cause of action. This act regulates Youth Residential Facilities, which it defines to “include, but not necessarily be limited to, foster homes, youth shelters, runaway shelters, emergency care facilities, youth group homes, supervised apartments, and *1326 **56 residential treatment centers.” D.C.Code Ann. § 3–801(9)(B).
Unquestionably, every child entangled in the D.C. foster-care system is situated in a facility covered by this provision. The act goes on to grant every resident of one of these facilities a private right of action:
Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy, a resident, any person acting on or in behalf of a resident, or the licensee or administrator of a facility may bring an action in court for mandamus to order the Mayor, a District government agency, or the youth residential monitoring committee to comply with this chapter, a rule issued pursuant to this chapter, or any other District law relevant to the operation of the facility or the care of its residents.
D.C.Code Ann. § 3–808(d)(1) (emphasis added).
In other words, the Licensure Act permits children in foster care to sue to enforce not only the requirements of the Licensure Act itself, but also all of the provisions of the Abuse and Neglect Act related to “the care” of these children. This broad language encompasses all the provisions that the appellants are alleged to have violated.
In sum, under District of Columbia law, every member of the appellee class had a private right of action to enforce the obligations imposed on the DHS by local statutes and regulations. Moreover, these statutes provide an independent basis for supporting the district court’s judgment. We therefore affirm the district court without addressing the federal statutory and constitutional claims. Our authority to decide the case entirely on pendent state grounds is incontrovertible. The Supreme Court has held that “where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question ... the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the nonfederal ground.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1137, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (quoting Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246, 53 S.Ct. 586, 589, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933)).
No challenge has been raised to the district court’s certification of the class. In any event, such certification was proper in relation to the pendent claims, as well as the federal claims. The children could not have brought their District law claims as a class action in the Family Division. See Rules Governing Neglect Proceedings Rule 1(b) (excluding from list of rules applicable to neglect proceedings the rule providing for class actions). They clearly could, however, have brought these claims as a class action in the District of Columbia Superior Court. See D.C.SUPER.CT.R.CIV.P. 23. It thus is not necessary for us to consider the issue of whether the federal district court could have entertained the pendent claims as a class action if the procedure had in fact been unavailable to the children in the District of Columbia courts.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the district court’s judgment is independently supportable by District of Columbia law, we affirm the court’s decision in favor of the children in this case. It appears that each provision of the remedial order reflects the requirements of District of Columbia statutes and regulations, as well as of federal statutes. Nevertheless, because the order was drafted to conform with federal as well as with District law, there are scattered references in the order to federal law that are inappropriate in light of our confirmation of the decision entirely on the basis of local law.
We therefore remand to the district court, with instructions to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible. If there are any portions of the consent decree that depend entirely on a federal statute, the district court should consider the impact of Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), on those provisions before it includes them in the revised consent decree.

It is so ordered.
Parallel Citations 301 U.S.App.D.C. 49

 
 Unpublished Disposition 107 F.3d 923
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The Court’s decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal
Reporter. Use FI CTADC Rule 28 and FI CTADC Rule 36 for rules regarding the publication and citation of unpublished opinions.)
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
LaSHAWN A., et al., Appellees v.
Marion S. BARRY, Jr., et al., Appellants
No. 94-7044. | Oct. 30, 1996. | Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 89cv01754).
DDC, 887 F.Supp. 297 [On remand from 87 F.3d 1389].
AFFIRMED.
Before WILLIAMS, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.
*1 This appeal was considered on the record before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and on the briefs of counsel and oral argument before this court. The issues have been accorded full consideration by this court and occasion no need for a published opinion. See D.C.Cir.Rule 36(h). It is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this court that the judgment of the district court be affirmed. The District’s primary point is that the judgment under review imposes requirements beyond those of District law. Cf. LaShawn v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1993) (directing district court “to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible.”). That point is not disputed. The judgment is based, however, in part on the District’s earlier consent to substantially the same decree. That consent, to be sure, was conditioned on affirmance of the district court judgment on federal grounds. But it appears now largely undisputed-especially in reference to the aspects of the judgment that extend beyond the precise provisions of District law-that District law is not materially less demanding than federal law. Thus, the judgment under review does not extend beyond District law more than it extends beyond federal law. Accordingly, we infer that the district court reasoned that the substitution of District law alone as the basis of the decree, in place of reliance on federal plus District law, did not materially undermine the District’s consent.
The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. See D.C.Cir.Rule 41(a).
Parallel Citations
1996 WL 679301 (C.A.D.C.), 323 U.S.App.D.C. 290

 
 117 S.Ct. 2431 Supreme Court of the United States Marion S. BARRY, Jr., Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al., petitioners,
v. LaSHAWN A., By Her Next Friend, Evelyn MOORE, et al.
No. 96-1433. | June 9, 1997.
Case below, LaShawn A. v. Sharon Pratt Kelly, 887 F.Supp. 297; 990 F.2d 1319; 69 F.3d 556; 74 F.3d 303; 87 F.3d 1389; 107 F.3d 923.
Opinion *2432 Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied.
Parallel Citations 117 S.Ct. 2431 (Mem), 138 L.Ed.2d 193, 65 USLW 3811, 65 USLW 3814

 
 144 F.3d 847 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
LaSHAWN A., By her next friend, Evelyn MOORE, et al., Appellees, v.
Marion S. BARRY, Jr., Mayor, As Mayor of the District of Columbia, et al., Appellants.
Nos. 94-7227, 94-7251, 95-7141, 95-7180, 95-7215, 96-7002 and 96-7234. | Argued March 17, 1998. | Decided June 2, 1998.
*848 **205 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (89cv01754).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellants, with whom John M. Ferren, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the briefs.
Marcia Robinson Lowry argued the cause for appellees, with whom Craig R. Levine and Arthur B. Spitzer were on the brief.
Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:
The Mayor of the District of Columbia and other District government officials (collectively, the District), challenge seven orders *849 **206 issued by the district court related to its appointment of receivers to manage the District’s child welfare system. The focus of their challenge is an order which empowers the general receiver to disregard District law to the extent that it unreasonably interferes with the discharge of her responsibilities. Because that order is too broad, we remand it to the district court. The balance of the appeals are moot.
I.
Nine years ago, appellees filed this case on behalf of two groups of District children: (1) those in the District’s foster care system and (2) those known to the District to be in danger of abuse or neglect. Seeking injunctive relief, they alleged widespread violations of these children’s rights under the Constitution as well as various federal and District statutes. Following a lengthy trial, the district court, in 1991, concluded that the evidence presented in the case was “nothing less than outrageous” and that “[t]he District’s dereliction of its responsibilities to the children in its custody [was] a travesty.” LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 998 (D.D.C.1991). The court determined that, due to inept management and the indifference of the mayor’s administration, “the District had failed to comply with reasonable professional standards in almost every area of its child welfare system.” Id. at 997. With respect to children outside of the foster care system, the District failed to investigate reports of abuse or neglect in a timely manner or provide needed services. Id. at 989. And once children entered the foster care system, it did not place them appropriately, monitor their care, or adequately ensure permanent homes. As a result, the District failed to protect the children in its custody from physical, emotional, and psychological harm. Id. at 996.
The court held District officials liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) for both constitutional and federal statutory violations. It concluded that the District had deprived children in its foster care system of their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that the District had abridged both groups of children’s rights under two statutes: the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27 and §§ 670-79 (1988), and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1988). It further determined that the District had violated various local statutes and regulations that conferred constitutionally protected liberty interests1 whose deprivation, without due process, violated § 1983.
The parties agreed, after lengthy negotiations, to an 84-page remedial consent decree approved by the district court which regulated every aspect of the District’s child neglect and foster care system. The District, however, expressly reserved the right to appeal the district court’s judgment of liability; to the extent that any part of the district court’s opinion was vacated on appeal, the portions of the remedial order directly based on that part of the opinion would become “null and void.”
The District appealed, attacking the constitutional and federal statutory basis of the district court’s judgment. We noted, however, that the District of Columbia’s statutory scheme for “the protection and care of foster children, and children

reported to be abused or neglected [was] equally as comprehensive as that provided by the federal statutes....” LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“LaShawn I”). While the district court had concluded that the local statutes in question created liberty interests, the deprivation of which was actionable under § 1983, we held that District statutes themselves created “a private cause of action for children in foster care and for children reported to have been abused or neglected but not yet in the District’s custody.” Id. at 1325. As the district court’s judgment appeared to be independently supportable by local law, we circumvented the constitutional and federal statutory questions and directed the district court “to fashion an equally comprehensive *850 **207 order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible.” Id. at 1326. If the district court determined, on remand, that certain portions of the consent decree depended entirely on a federal statute, we instructed it to consider the impact of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)2 before it included such provisions in a revised remedial order.
The district court simply deleted all references to federal law and readopted the consent decree. As for the District’s concern that the remedy exceeded the mandates of local law, the court justified the decree as a “necessary and appropriate use of its equitable authority” to cure widespread violations of District law. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 1994) (order adopting modified remedial order). And the district court clarified, in accordance with LaShawn I, that federal law was “not the basis of the consent decree.” LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 12, 1993) (order directing plaintiffs to propose modified remedial order).
The District once again appealed, contending, inter alia, that the modified remedial order was not solely based on local law as required by LaShawn I and that the entire order should be declared “null and void” under the terms of the parties’ initial agreement. Again sidestepping, a divided panel remanded the case to the district court to reexamine the validity of the federal claims and its exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the local law claims under the second step of the test set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139-40, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F.3d 556 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“LaShawn II”). Sitting en banc, however, we held that the law-of-the-case and law-of-the-circuit doctrines prevented us from revisiting the LaShawn I panel’s implicit conclusion that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in this case was appropriate under Gibbs step two. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc). After remitting the case to the LaShawn II panel to consider the issues raised by the District in its appeal, we affirmed the district court, holding that the decree did not extend beyond District law any more than it extended beyond federal law and that “the substitution of District law alone as the basis of the decree, in place of reliance on federal plus District law, did not materially undermine the District’s consent.” LaShawn A. v. Barry, No. 94-7044, 1996 WL 679301 (D.C.Cir. Oct. 30, 1996).
In the meantime, plaintiffs and the district court became frustrated with the District’s recalcitrance in implementing the consent decree. On November 23, 1994, more than three years after the entry of the initial remedial order, the district court appointed three limited receivers to manage the areas of protective services, resource development, and corrective action. These receivers soon reported that their efforts to implement the remedial order were severely hampered by an array of obstacles, including the departure of staff due to budgetary constraints. They complained that the child welfare bureaucracy was suffering from a “severe level of dysfunction” and concluded that the scope of the limited receiverships was insufficient to implement the remedial order. At about the same time, the District government confronted a fiscal crisis. In early 1995, the D.C. Council mandated salary reductions and furloughs for District government employees in an effort to stem the flow of red ink. The district court, concerned that this attempt to cut costs would seriously undermine the receivers’ efforts to implement the consent decree, ordered the adoption of the limited receivers’ work plans which provided that “[a]ll Family Administrative staff required by *851 **208 the LaShawn Remedial Order shall be exempt from staff layoffs, furloughs, salary reductions or other similar measures which may be instituted to manage the overall District budget deficit.” See LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 29, 1995).
A couple of months later, on May 22, 1995, the district court found appellants in contempt and placed the child welfare system into general receivership. The district judge had become troubled by the limited receivers’ reports and discouraged by a 32-page list of more than 130 areas in which the District had missed deadlines or was in noncompliance with the remedial order, LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F.Supp. 297 (D.D.C.1995). In response to the District’s argument that a federal court should not institute a general receivership to remedy violations of local law, the district court referred back to its original 1991 opinion finding violations of federal law. To the extent that our LaShawn I opinion required it to address the impact of the Supreme Court’s Suter opinion before reviving the federal claims, the district court asserted, in a footnote, that Suter had been “at least partially overturned” by intervening legislation. LaShawn A., 887 F.Supp. at 315 n. 125. In the same opinion, the district court also denied appellants’ motion for reconsideration of its earlier order exempting child welfare staff from pay cuts and furloughs. Id. at 316.
On August 24, 1995, the district court outlined the general receiver’s (Receiver’s) responsibilities and powers, which incorporated all of the authority previously given to the limited receivers. In its most expansive grant of authority, the district court, over appellants’ vigorous objection, ordered that:
the Receiver will make reasonable efforts to exercise its authority in cooperation with District of Columbia officials and in a manner consistent with local law whenever possible. However, to the degree that local law governing lines of authority, budgeting, governmental structure and organization, procurement, and personnel unreasonably interfere with the Receiver’s discharge of its responsibilities, local law is superseded by the Receiver’s authority.
LaShawn A. v. Barry, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 24, 1995) (general receivership order) (emphasis added).3 The parties dispute whether the Receiver, in any instance, has transgressed local law, but no such violations appear in the district court record below.
Although appellants initially challenged seven district court orders, they concede that three of their appeals are now moot.4 A fourth, objecting to powers given the limited receivers, need not be evaluated separately as their general powers have been merged into the power of the Receiver. We, therefore, are left to consider three orders: the March 29, 1995 order exempting Family Services Administrative Staff from salary reductions and furloughs, the May 22, 1995 order denying appellants’

motion for reconsideration of the March order, and the August 24, 1995 order directing the Receiver to disregard District law when it “unreasonably interfere[s] with the Receiver’s discharge of [her] responsibilities.”
II.
[1] [2] Appellees argue that challenges to the March 29, 1995 and May 22, 1995 orders are also moot. Appellants admit that the furlough and salary reduction legislation adopted to deal with the District’s fiscal crisis has expired, therefore appellees contend that no live controversy exists with respect to the orders which permitted the Receiver to override these laws. The District responds that these orders fall within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness doctrine. For this exception to apply, the District must show: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or *852 **209 expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed. 2d 350 (1975). Assuming arguendo that the temporary nature of the salary reduction and furlough measures allows the District to meet its burden on the first prong, it cannot satisfy its obligation with respect to the second. Although the District claims that temporary pay cuts and furloughs may be instituted again in the event of future budget deficits, it offers no support for the proposition that the District again will run budget deficits during the lifetime of the receivership,5 let alone for its implicit claim that the congressionally created Control Board, despite the existence of the consent decree, would approve of pay cuts and furloughs so severe that the Receiver would find it necessary to exempt child welfare personnel from such measures. The District simply has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable expectation a similar controversy will recur, and we therefore agree that the appeals of these two orders are moot.6
[3] What remains is the gravamen of the District’s case: its complaint that the district court abused its discretion in its August 24, 1995 order by authorizing the Receiver to violate District law in several areas to the extent local law “unreasonably interfere[d] with the Receiver’s discharge of [her] responsibilities.” The District claims that because the district court is enforcing a decree based exclusively on local law, it is essentially in the same position as a local court. And like all other institutions of government, local courts are subject to valid restrictions imposed by local legislatures. The district court, therefore, may not remedy one violation of local law by permitting other violations of local law.
We are not persuaded by appellees’ suggestion that, since the District has not pointed to any specific instance in which the Receiver has transgressed local law, the district court’s order should be affirmed if we can imagine any set of circumstances in which the district court would be justified in authorizing the Receiver to override local law. We must review whether the broad scope of authority granted to the Receiver under the present circumstances is proper, not whether a more narrowly drawn authorization under a hypothetical set of future conditions might be within the district court’s discretion.
[4] In that regard, we admit that while avoiding the federal statutory and constitutional claims seemed prudent at the time, our prior dispositions have led us into a most unusual predicament. We have before us a federal district court order that purports to override local law in order to implement a consent decree based solely on local law. The case appears to be unique; we cannot find any other instance where we or one of our sister circuits have dealt with an analogous dispute. This is partially because the Eleventh Amendment denies federal courts jurisdiction to order state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117-21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 917-19, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).7 As support for the district court’s *853 **210 order, appellees point to several circuits which have held that federal courts possess the power to override local law to enforce consent decrees in instances where there have been no findings or admissions of federal liability. See, e.g., Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.1992); Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.1986); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir.1981). Once a local government consents to a remedial order in a case where violations of federal rights have been alleged, they argue, a federal court obtains the authority to override conflicting local law in order to enforce the decree, regardless of whether there are any formal findings or admissions of liability on federal grounds. As the Second Circuit has stated:
The respect due the federal judgment is not lessened because the judgment was entered by consent. The plaintiffs’ suit alleged a denial of their constitutional rights. When the defendants chose to consent to a judgment, rather than have the District Court adjudicate the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the result was a fully enforceable federal judgment that overrides any conflicting state law or state court order. Badgley, 800 F.2d at 38. There are crucial differences, however, between the cases cited by appellees and this one. Unlike those cases, it cannot be said that the District here implicitly conceded some basis for federal liability; the District expressly reserved its right to appeal its liability under federal law not withstanding its entry into the consent decree. And more important, in fashioning its consent decree, we directed the district court to base its remedial order only on local law, to the extent possible. In response, the district court deleted all references to federal law from the consent decree. [5] Absent any recognized or implicitly conceded federal basis to the decree, we simply do not see how the district court has the power to authorize the Receiver to disregard District law. While it is true that a consent decree involves an exercise of federal power, a federal court enforcing a state-created right becomes, “in effect, only another court of the State” and cannot employ a remedy that is not available in state court. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1469-70, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994). And although Guaranty Trust was a diversityjurisdiction case amplifying the principles of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), pendent jurisdiction jurisprudence is based on the same principles. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Allowing different remedies in state law cases heard in federal courts on pendent jurisdiction would undermine the “twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1142, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).
[6] The courts of a jurisdiction cannot authorize violations of that jurisdiction’s laws, unless pursuant to the command of a

higher law. It is a fundamental tenet of separation-of-powers doctrine that a court’s enforcement powers are restricted by the dictates of the legislature. As we have observed, a district court’s remedial powers “are necessarily limited by a clear and valid legislative command counseling against the contemplated judicial action.” Antone v. Block, 661 F.2d 230, 235 (D.C.Cir.1981). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this basic principle, noting that “ ‘[a] Court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a right but no remedy known to the law, create a remedy in violation of the law....’ ” INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 2216, 100 L.Ed.2d 882 (1988) (quoting Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S.(19 Wall.) 107, 122, 22 L.Ed. 72 (1873)); see also Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192, 14 S.Ct. 71, 74, 37 L.Ed. 1044 (1893) ( “[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law.”).
[7] The scope of the Receiver’s authority is quite extraordinary. Even were the consent decree explicitly based on federal law, we would be hesitant to affirm. To be sure, a federal court has broad equitable powers, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275-76, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), and may, in certain instances, override state or local law for the purpose of enforcing a decree designed to remedy violations of federal law. See, e.g., *854 **211 Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 52-53, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 1663-64, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 1286, 28 L.Ed.2d 586 (1971). But in this case, the district court has given the Receiver an open-ended authorization to disregard numerous important sections of District law. We think considerable tension exists between its order and the Supreme Court’s admonition that in employing their broad equitable powers, federal courts must “exercise ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed.’ ” Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280, 110 S.Ct. 625, 634, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.(6 Wheat.) 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)).
[8] Our review of a district court’s choice of equitable remedies is “highly contextual and fact dependent.” Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d at 861. But “the remedy should begin with what is absolutely necessary. If [those] measures later prove ineffective, more stringent ones should be considered.” Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145-46 (5th Cir.1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1982). We sympathize with the district court’s frustration with the pace of the District’s progress in complying with the remedial order and its desire to empower the Receiver to accomplish her goals as quickly as possible. Disregarding local law, however, is a grave step and should not be taken unless absolutely necessary. In Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit considered a case where a district court had authorized a local sheriff to override state laws by ordering the early release of certain inmates from an overcrowded jail. 968 F.2d at 850. While the court held open the possibility that such an authorization might be upheld under certain circumstances, it noted that “the district court did not make any findings that other alternatives were inadequate before it authorized the Sheriff to override applicable state laws.” Id. at 864. It therefore vacated the relevant part of the district court’s order.
The equitable remedy here is even more troubling than the one at issue in Stone. There, the district court authorized a local government official, the Sheriff, to override state law in only one narrow field. In this case, the Receiver, a court-appointed official, has been authorized to disregard District law in a whole host of areas. While it is true that the Receiver is required to conclude that relevant local laws “unreasonably interfere” with her ability to discharge her responsibilities, the district court has never concluded that compliance with District law, as a general matter, precludes the Receiver from enforcing the consent decree. And even were it to make such a finding, we believe that the district court needs to consider each contemplated violation of District law on a case-by-case basis. Should a situation arise in which it is alleged that desired action by the Receiver violates local law, the District should bring this to the attention of the district court and bear the burden of making the case that a conflict exists. If the district court concludes that there is indeed such a conflict, it should only authorize the Receiver to violate local law in those instances where, considering other alternatives, it specifically concludes an override is necessary to enforce the terms of the consent decree.
In such cases, the district court further must consider the status of the federal statutory claims. If the district court had wished, when revising the consent decree in light of LaShawn I, to retain any provision solely based on federal law, we instructed it to reexamine the relevant federal claim in light of the Supreme Court’s Suter opinion. Rather than perform such a reexamination, however, the district court explicitly disclaimed any federal basis for the consent decree. The district court’s 1995 attempt to revive the federal law claims in its opinion placing the child welfare system into receivership was inadequate. Noting the requirements of our LaShawn I mandate, the district court, speaking generally of the federal statutory violations, declared that the Supreme Court’s Suter decision “has been at least partially overturned by congressional action.” LaShawn A., 887 F.Supp. at 315 n. 125 (emphasis added). We think this treatment of the matter is insufficient; the district court must instead analyze the federal claims separately in light of the recent legislation8 and Supreme *855 **212 Court cases, including Suter and Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), in order to determine whether any survive. A mere observation that Suter may no longer be relevant due to congressional action does not comply with our LaShawn I mandate.
Should the district court determine, in accordance with the framework laid out in this opinion, that empowering the Receiver to violate District law in a specific instance is warranted, it must identify the specific federal law ground it is using as the justification for the Receiver’s authority to transcend local law. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Kasper v. Board of Election Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332, 342 (7th Cir.1987), “An alteration of the [state’s] statutory scheme ... depends on an exercise of federal power, which in turn depends on a violation of federal law.” (emphasis added). Since reintroducing federal claims into the case would constitute a modification of the basis of the consent decree, the District would, of course, be able to contest such a modification on appeal.
* * * *
As the district court’s August 24, 1995 order raises significant separation of powers concerns, we remand with instructions to consider those instances in which desired action by the Receiver conflicts with local law in accordance with the procedures spelled out in this opinion. We hold the District’s other appeals to be moot.

So ordered.

Parallel Citations 330 U.S.App.D.C. 204

Footnotes

1

The pertinent District laws were the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Code Ann. §§ 2-1351 to -1357,

§§ 6-2101 to -2107, §§ 6-2121 to -2127, and §§ 16-2351 to -2365 (1991); the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of

1986, D.C.Code §§ 3-801 to -808 (1991); and the Child and Family Services Division Manual of Operations (September

1985).

2

In Suter, the Court held that a single provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 671

(a)(15), requiring a state to have a plan providing that “reasonable efforts” will be made to prevent a child from being

removed from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his family, imposed only generalized duties on the

states and thus created neither a private right of action nor an enforceable right under § 1983. Suter, 503 U.S. at 363-64, 112

S.Ct. at 1370. Although the Court’s holding only reached that single provision of the Adoption Act, its analysis implicated

the provisions of both federal statutes at issue in this case, which parallel the structure of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). See Doe v.

District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 866 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting similarity between Adoption Act and Child Abuse

Prevention and Treatment Act).

3

In a partial modification of its order, the district court later directed the Receiver to “contract and procure goods and

services consistent with the District’s existing procurement law and procedures.” LaShawn A. v. Barry, Civ. No. 89-1754

(D.D.C. filed Dec. 8, 1995) (order transferring child welfare funds to Receiver’s bank account).

4

These involve challenges to: (1) a June 26, 1995 order setting deadlines to execute contracts for creation of a management

information system; (2) the December 8, 1995 order transferring the Initial Operating Fund to the general receiver; and (3) a

September 26, 1996 order denying the District’s motion to stay the May 1995 receivership order.

5

We note that the District’s own budget projections currently forecast budget surpluses in the range of $150 million to $200

million for the next five years. David A. Vise, D.C. Fiscal Future Glows; Rosy Outlook May Mean Tax Cuts, WASH. POSTT,

Mar. 8, 1998, at A1.

6

The District’s alternative claim, that it is entitled to reimbursement of the funds spent complying with the disputed orders,

does not save the controversy. By including this contention as a throwaway line in its reply brief, the District has not

satisfied our requirement that parties’ arguments be sufficiently developed lest waived. In any event, the District does not

suggest from whom this reimbursement would come or on what basis it would be made. The disputed money has already

been paid out in salary to District employees, and we do not see how the district court could order its return. We think it

remarkable to suggest that the Receiver, seeking to implement the terms of the consent decree, could, at this point, be

required to transfer millions of dollars from the child welfare budget to other parts of the District government.

7

The term “state” in the Eleventh Amendment also has been interpreted to include Puerto Rico, see De Leon Lopez v.

Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.1991), but not the District of Columbia. See LaShawn A. v.

Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1394 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1996) (en banc). Nevertheless, we continue to operate under the assumption that

District law under Gibbs should be treated as state law, rather than inferior federal law. Cf. id. at 1398 (Silberman, J.,

concurring).

8

The relevant statutory amendment reads:

In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because

of its inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan.

This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to

enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,

112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability:

Provided, however, That this section is not intended to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(5) of

this title is not enforceable in a private right of action.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (amended Oct. 20, 1994); id. at § 1320a-10 (amended Oct. 31, 1994) (identical provision).

 
 87 F.3d 1389 United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit. LaSHAWN A., et al., Appellees,
v. Marion S. BARRY, Jr., et al., Appellants. No. 94-7044. | Argued In Banc May 8, 1996. | Decided July 9, 1996.
Reversed and remitted to panel of Court of Appeals. Silberman, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion. Williams, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion in which Henderson, Circuit Judge, joined.
*1390 **381 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (89cv01754); Thomas F. Hogan, District Judge. Attorneys and Law Firms Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause, for appellants. With her on the briefs, were Charles F. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel. Garland Pinkston, Jr., Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel at the time the briefs were filed, and Vanessa Ruiz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered appearances. Marcia R. Lowry, New York City, argued the cause, for appellees. With her on the brief, were Craig R. Levine, New York City and Arthur B. Spitzer, Washington, DC. Christopher T. Dunn, Washington, DC, entered an appearance. *1391 **382 A. Duncan Whitaker, Washington, DC, and Suzan J. Aramaki, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Jerome G. Miller, as General Receiver. Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, GINSBURG, SENTELLE, HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, ROGERS, and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS, in which Circuit Judge HENDERSON joins.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge.
In this ongoing litigation over the District of Columbia’s foster care system, we granted rehearing in banc to decide whether one panel of this court may reconsider a prior panel’s decision directing the district court to exercise pendent jurisdiction in the case. The answer is no.
I In 1989, plaintiffs brought this class action on behalf of the abused and neglected children who rely on the District of Columbia’s foster care system. They alleged that the defendants-the mayor and other high-level District officials-were responsible for widespread violations of their rights under the United States Constitution, various federal statutes, and a long list of local laws. Two weeks of trial testimony revealed the District of Columbia’s deficient and inept administration of its foster care system. The testimony, and more than a thousand admissions of fact by the District, showed that District officials

had consistently failed to carry out responsibilities imposed on them by federal and local laws. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 960, 986-87 (D.D.C.1991).
The district court reached the “inescapable conclusion” that the District’s foster care system complied with neither “federal law, District law, [n]or, for those plaintiffs in the District’s foster care, the United States Constitution.” Id. at 960-61. The District’s administration of its foster care system violated numerous provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-627 and §§ 670-679, and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106.1 The Adoption Assistance Act, the court held, conferred upon the children rights that were privately enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the District had violated by depriving the children of those rights. 762 F.Supp. at 988-90. The district court also found that the District’s operation of its foster care system violated numerous provisions of the District’s own Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-22 (Sept. 23, 1977) (codified as amended at D.C.CODE ANN. §§ 2-1351 to -1357, §§ 6-2101 to -2107, §§ 6-2121 to -2127, and §§ 16-2351 to -2365); the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986, D.C. Law 6-139 (Aug. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at D.C.CODE ANN. §§ 3-801 to -808); and the Child and Family Services Division Manual of Operations (Sept.1985). The District’s obligations *1392 **383 under its own laws parallel the requirements of federal law; indeed the District law requirements are, in many respects, more stringent than those in the corresponding federal statutes. Analogizing the rights of children in foster care to rights of those involuntarily committed, LaShawn, 762 F.Supp. at 992, the district court ruled that the District’s laws conferred liberty and property interests, protected under the Fifth Amendment, on the children in the custody of the District’s foster care system, id. at 994, and that the District had violated § 1983 by depriving the children in foster care of these constitutionally protected interests. 762 F.Supp. at 998.
The parties worked out a remedial order to correct deficiencies in the District’s administration of its foster care system, and the district court entered it.
In the remedial order, the District specifically reserved the right to appeal the district court’s liability ruling. The District invoked that right almost immediately, contending before this court (1) that the district court erred in finding that the administration of the District’s foster care system violated the Fifth Amendment, and (2) that the intervening decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), precluded any private cause of action under § 1983 or federal child welfare statutes. A unanimous panel of this court held, however, that it was unnecessary to reach those “complex constitutional and federal statutory issues.” LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (“LaShawn I”), cert. denied, 510 U.S.1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 659 (1994). Under District law, children reported to have been abused or neglected had a private right of action to enforce the District’s Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act. Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.1987). Because a government owes greater duties toward those in its custody, the panel concluded that the children in the District’s foster care system also had a private right of action under the Act. LaShawn I, 990 F.2d at 1325. In addition, the panel noted that the other District statute relied on by the children, the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act, explicitly provides these children with a private cause of action to sue under the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act. Id. at 1325-26. These statutes, the panel held, “provide[d] an independent basis for supporting the district court’s judgment.” Id. at 1326.
Accordingly, rather than reach the difficult constitutional and federal statutory questions, the LaShawn I panel remanded the case to the district court “with instructions to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible.” Id. The panel explained that the District’s statutory and regulatory scheme was “appropriately before us under our pendent jurisdiction,” id. at 1324, and that federal judicial authority to decide the case on pendent grounds was “incontrovertible,” id. at 1326.
The District sought rehearing from that decision. The panel denied the petition. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, No.91-7159 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 9, 1993). The District suggested rehearing in banc. It did not get the votes. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, No. 91-7159 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 9, 1993). The District asked the Supreme Court to review the decision. Its petition for writ of certiorari was denied. Kelly v. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore, 510 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 659 (1994).
On remand, the district court sought to comply with the direction of LaShawn I by entering a modified remedial order based on local law. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1994). The District of Columbia appealed again, this time arguing that (1) under both the terms of the parties’ agreement and general principles of contract law, the original remedial order should have been vacated because LaShawn I had “not affirmed” the district court’s finding of liability under federal law, and (2) the modified remedial order was not “based on” local law as required by LaShawn I.
Rather than confront those issues, a divided panel of this court remanded the case to the district court to “re-examine” its exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the claims arising under local law. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F.3d 556, 570 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (“LaShawn II”), vacated and reh’g in banc granted, *1393 **384 74 F.3d 303 (D.C.Cir.1996). The LaShawn II majority acknowledged that LaShawn I explicitly decided that the district court had the “power” to exercise pendent jurisdiction under the first step of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). 69 F.3d at 560. The LaShawn II majority also acknowledged that the LaShawn I panel had decided-by necessary implicationthat an exercise of pendent jurisdiction was appropriate under Gibbs step two. Id. Nonetheless, the LaShawn II majority concluded that it was free to revisit LaShawn I ‘ s Gibbs step two decision because, it said, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude reconsideration of “jurisdictional” questions decided but “not explicitly addressed” in a prior appeal. Id. at 562.
Upon the plaintiffs’ suggestion, we granted rehearing in banc and vacated the judgment of the LaShawn II majority.

LaShawn A. v. Barry, 74 F.3d 303 (D.C.Cir.1996). We then directed the parties to brief the following question: Under either the law-of-the-case doctrine or law-of-the-circuit doctrine, did the decision in LaShawn I, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1993), preclude the panel in LaShawn II, 69 F.3d 556 (D.C.Cir.1995), from considering whether the district court could properly exercise its jurisdiction under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)?
LaShawn A. v. Barry, No. 94-7044 (D.C.Cir. Feb. 9, 1996). We now answer that question in the affirmative.
II
[1] [2] [3] Inconsistency is the antithesis of the rule of law. For judges, the most basic principle of jurisprudence is that “ ‘we must act alike in all cases of like nature.’ ”2 Two time-honored doctrines help put that principle into practice. The first is the law-of-the-case doctrine: the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result.3 The second is the law-of-the-circuit doctrine: the same issue presented in a later case in the same court should lead to the same result. Both doctrines play a role in this case.
[4] “When there are multiple appeals taken in the course of a single piece of litigation, law-of-the-case doctrine holds that decisions rendered on the first appeal should not be revisited on later trips to the appellate court.” Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865, 116 S.Ct. 180, 133 L.Ed.2d 118 (1995); see also Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 471 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990). The Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to be “loathe” to reconsider issues already decided “in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)).
The LaShawn II majority identified no such “extraordinary circumstance” to justify reconsideration of LaShawn I’s pendent jurisdiction decision, and we are aware of none. There had been no intervening change in controlling legal authority, see McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1045, 116 S.Ct. 704, 133 L.Ed.2d 660 (1996), and the LaShawn I decision was not “clearly erroneous.” See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178.4 Nonetheless, the *1394 **385 LaShawn II majority thought itself free to revisit LaShawn I’s Gibbs step two decision on the ground that the law-of-the-case doctrine contains an exception allowing a panel to reexamine any “jurisdictional” question decided, but not extensively discussed, by an earlier panel in an earlier appeal of the same case.
No such exception exists. In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.-a case involving one circuit’s attempt to revisit the transfer decision of another circuit-the Supreme Court specifically rejected any “jurisdictional question” exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine. The Court said:
There is no reason to apply law-of-the-case principles less rigorously to transfer decisions that implicate the transferee’s jurisdiction. Perpetual litigation of any issue-jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional-delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice.
Id. at 816-17 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 n. 5. In reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected Potomac Passengers Ass’n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 520 F.2d 91, 95 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1975), in which this court first suggested that the law-of-thecase doctrine might not preclude reconsideration of jurisdictional questions. Id. Before the Supreme Court decided Christianson, the lower federal courts frequently cited Potomac Passengers for the notion that jurisdictional questions are relatively unrestrained by law-of-the-case considerations. In the eight years since Christianson, however, references to Potomac Passengers have been few and far between. Only two federal courts have relied on Potomac Passengers, and then only to bolster the unremarkable conclusion that a district court is free to reconsider its own non-final jurisdictional decisions. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 724 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 518, 530 (D.Conn.1991).5
That the jurisdictional question exception of Potomac Passengers is no longer good law should come as no particular surprise. Today, this court and other courts of appeals routinely apply law-of-the-case preclusion to questions of jurisdiction, see, e.g., McKesson Corp., 52 F.3d at 350; Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1151 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 200, 107 L.Ed.2d 154 (1989), and do so even when the first decision regarding jurisdiction is less than explicit. See, e.g., In re Memorial Estates, Inc., 950 F.2d 1364, 1367 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct. 2969, 119 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992). The dissent complains that the LaShawn I panel did not explicitly discuss the Gibbs step two question, except to say that pendent jurisdiction was “incontrovertible.” 990 F.2d at 1326. But the Supreme Court’s holding in Christianson renders the dissent’s complaint irrelevant. The law-of-the-case doctrine, the Supreme Court said, turns “on whether a court previously decide[d] upon a rule of law ... not whether, or how well, it explained the decision.” 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 (internal quotation marks omitted). We said the same in

Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739: the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to questions decided “explicitly or by necessary implication.” As the dissent acknowledges, the LaShawn I panel decided the Gibbs step two question **386 *1395 “by necessary implication.” Dissent at 1399. Under Christianson, nothing more is required.6
[5] The procedural setting of this case calls for an even stronger than usual version of the law-of-the-case doctrine. While lawof-the-case doctrine is a prudential creation of the courts, the law-of-the-circuit doctrine is derived from legislation and from the structure of the federal courts of appeals. Courts of appeals sit in panels, or divisions, of “not more than three judges” pursuant to the authority granted in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The “decision of a division” is “the decision of the court.” Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46 (citing Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249 (1941)); see Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C.Cir.1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, 113 S.Ct. 1579, 123 L.Ed.2d 147 (1993). Were matters otherwise, the finality of our appellate decisions would yield to constant conflicts within the circuit. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 314 U.S. at 335, 62 S.Ct. at 278. One three-judge panel, therefore, does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court. E.g., United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1370 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). That power may be exercised only by the full court, either through an in banc decision, id., or pursuant to the more informal practice adopted in Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1981).
[6] Because the law-of-the-case doctrine alone precluded the LaShawn II panel from revisiting the Gibbs decision of LaShawn I, we need not delve deeply into the interplay between the law-of-the-case and the law-of-the-circuit doctrines.7 Suffice it to say that, when both doctrines are at work, the law-of-the-circuit doctrine should increase a panel’s reluctance to reconsider a decision made in an earlier appeal in the same case. See, e.g., United States v. 162.20 Acres of Land, 733 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1984) (explaining that when a prior panel in the same circuit has decided an issue, law-of-the-circuit doctrine supplants law-of-the-case doctrine and precludes reconsideration of that decision in a subsequent appeal, even if the second panel believes the first was wrong), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 920 (1985); cf. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that both the law of the case and the law of the circuit precluded a panel from reconsidering issues resolved in a prior appeal in the same case), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 951 (1985). While the law-of-the-case doctrine offers several exceptions-although not, as we have explained, a “jurisdictional question” one-the law-of-the-circuit doctrine is much more exacting. Whether the law-of-thecircuit doctrine allows reconsideration of a prior decision that was “ ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice,’ ” see Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1391 n. 8), is a question we can leave for another day: in revisiting LaShawn I, the LaShawn II majority did not identify any “clear error,” and, as we said in discussing the law-of-the-case doctrine, see *1396 **387 supra p. 384, we do not believe that the LaShawn I panel committed one.
Instead, the LaShawn II majority claimed that it was free to revisit LaShawn I under a “jurisdictional question” exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine. To repeat, no such exception exists. But even if it did, LaShawn I ‘s decision on Gibbs step two would not fall within it. As the Supreme Court explained in Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 627, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 1336, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974), the view of “pendent jurisdiction as something akin to subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised sua sponte at any stage and that is capable of aborting prior federal court proceedings is a misreading of the law.”
The concept of pendent jurisdiction entails a jurisdictional element, but that is comprised in the first step of the Gibbs analysis. See Wal-Juice Bar, Inc. v. Elliott, 899 F.2d 1502, 1503 (6th Cir.1990); District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C.Cir.1988); Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 188 (D.C.Cir.1986); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 772 (D.C.Cir.1982). Step one of Gibbs deals with the court’s “power” to hear pendent local law claims-its jurisdiction-when the case raises a “substantial” federal issue and the federal and local law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and “are such that [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one proceeding.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. The federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, to the extent Congress authorizes it, is derived directly from Article III, Section 2, extending the judicial “Power” to “all Cases in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States....” U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2; see also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3231-32, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208-09, 63 L.Ed. 2d 479 (1980). The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction rests on the idea that the court’s jurisdiction over the underlying federal claim brings the related pendent claims under the scope of Article III because they are part of the same “case” or “controversy.” See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821-23, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). Gibbs’s requirements of a substantial federal claim, a common nucleus of operative fact, and the expectation of one trial, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138, “serve[ ] as an operational definition of the ‘one constitutional “case” ’ language.” Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L.REV. 1399, 1416 (1983).
There can be not the slightest doubt here that the children’s claims under federal statutory law, the Constitution, and District of Columbia law all arise from a common set of facts. The district court’s jurisdiction-its power-to decide the local law claims thus turned on the substantiality of the underlying federal claims. Whether a court may decide pendent claims is determined on the face of the pleadings. The ultimate disposition of the federal claim is “immaterial on the question of power.” 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.1, at 114-15 (1995).

Once a district court finds a substantial federal claim, it has jurisdiction over the entire case. The court then must engage in the second step of the Gibbs analysis and decide whether to exercise that jurisdiction over the local or state law claims. This aspect of Gibbs is not a jurisdictional determination, which is why Gibbs held that “pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion....” 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.8 There is no other way to explain Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School District, 457 U.S. 594, 595, 102 S.Ct. 2612, 2612, 73 L.Ed.2d 245 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that a federal court’s decision whether to resolve *1397 **388 pendent local law claims was to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.9 Clearly, a question cannot be both discretionary and jurisdictional: the federal courts have no “discretion” to hear cases outside their jurisdiction. The Gibbs step two question is thus not “jurisdictional” and would not come under a “jurisdictional” question exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine if such an exception existed.10
Our analysis resolves the question we posed: the law-of-the-case and law-of-the-circuit doctrines precluded the panel in LaShawn II from revisiting the Gibbs step two decision reached in LaShawn I. It does not, however, resolve the issues the District raised in its appeal. See supra p. 383. Because the LaShawn II panel remanded the case to the district court to reexamine the pendent jurisdiction question, it did not address those arguments when the appeal was before it. We remit the appeal to the panel so it may do so now.
So ordered.
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the majority opinion; I do not think it was clear error for the original panel to have pretermitted the federal statutory and constitutional questions and directed the district judge “to fashion an equally comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia law, if possible.” The law of the case exception for clear error is only awkwardly applied to a decision of a roughly contemporaneous panel of the same appellate court, which is why the majority is quite right that in this sort of situation we have law of the case plus elements of law of the circuit. Whatever the boundary between clear error and error, however, it surely cannot be clear error for the panel to have not accepted an argument-based on an analogy to Pennhurst IIwhich the District did not make.
Still, I do believe the original panel’s disposition was dubious. I think that the implication of Gibbs ‘ observation that a federal court should not exercise pendent jurisdiction if the federal claims are dismissed, see 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, is that the federal claims should be considered first. Ordinarily, of course, federal courts seek to avoid deciding federal constitutional questions, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), but when the alternative is the unseemly prospect of taking over a state institution to force compliance with state law, the Ashwander doctrine should yield. By deciding Pennhurst II on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds, the Supreme Court put paid to the prospect of federal courts being used in that fashion against a state. But there still remains the District of Columbia, which, of course, is not a state and therefore not entitled *1398 **389 to Eleventh Amendment protection. The District is correct, however, in arguing that whether the panel erred or not depends on whether one is to regard the District as akin to a state under the Gibbs-Pennhurst II line. We have traditionally so treated the District, and I think the panel should have done so-at least by deciding the federal questions first so that if they were decided against the plaintiffs, the case could be dismissed.
To be sure, our tradition of treating the District jurisprudentially like a state may be outmoded: the District’s “home rule” itself might well be thought a sad failure. Surely those organizations who, as plaintiffs, seek federal judicial control of more and more of the District’s governmental functions feed that perception. If home rule is to be abolished, however, it should be done by Congress, not incrementally by federal judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, with whom HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:
A federal district judge-an exceptionally fine one, it so happens-has taken full command of a major chunk of District of Columbia government, the Child and Family Services Division of the Department of Human Services. Although the law in whose name he runs the department is local, not federal, no opinion of the district court or this court has ever performed the balancing required by United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139-40, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. The majority tells us that because of “law of the case,” this substitution of judges for elected government must continue into the indefinite future, without any court ever engaging in the balancing required by Gibbs. I think not. To me it appears that (1) law of the case does not bar one panel of the court from addressing a jurisdictional issue that a prior panel resolved only implicitly-without one word of discussion; and (2) the balancing required for pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs’s “second step” is in fact jurisdictional.
* * *
The majority’s statement of the history of the litigation prior to the now-vacated panel opinion, Maj. Op. at 382-384, is not inaccurate. But neither is it complete. First, the consent decree negotiated between the parties consists of a 90-page single-

spaced code of operations. Thus the degree of federal judicial control is remarkable in its sweep and detail. The District negotiated the decree after and under the pressure of a district court decision on the merits, LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959 (D.D.C.1991), but before the Supreme Court’s decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). As Suter rejected two of the holdings of the district court-that §§ 671(a)(9) & (a)(15) of the Adoption Assistance Act created rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-with implications for the rest of the court’s statutory analysis, the judicial reasoning that compelled the District to embrace the consent decree was obviously vulnerable. Indeed, on the two specific provisions addressed in Suter, it was plainly unsustainable. Thus the District had, under pressure that was at least in part ill-founded, agreed to the most detailed imaginable federal judicial supervision of a major portion of its governance.
Second, the majority does not convey-indeed, it is hard to convey-how absent from the first panel opinion, LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“LaShawn I”), is any reference to or hint of the balancing required for pendent jurisdiction under the second step of Gibbs. The following is its entire discussion of pendent jurisdiction: Our authority to decide the case entirely on pendent state grounds is incontrovertible. The Supreme Court has held that “where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question ... the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the nonfederal ground.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1137, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (quoting Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246, 53 S.Ct. 586, 589, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933)).
*1399 **390 990 F.2d at 1326. The only language quoted from Gibbs relates exclusively to the first step required by that case; that quotation frames the panel’s own language (i.e., the non-quoted part), referring to the court’s “authority” to decide the case, which echoes Gibbs’ s observation that there is “power” in the court to hear the case if the first test is met-the common nucleus of operative facts. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. Accordingly, we are not in any way here dealing with a question “not extensively discussed,” see Maj. Op. at 385, but, so far as the balancing required by Gibbs’s second step is concerned, a question not discussed at all.
* * *
The status of jurisdictional issues under law of the case. There is, of course, no dispute that law of the case traditionally bars reconsideration even of an issue merely decided “by necessary implication,” subject to equally traditional exceptions for decisions found clearly erroneous or working manifest injustice, or, at least in some cases, undermined by an intervening change in controlling authority. Nor can it be doubted that LaShawn I’s instruction to the district court to go full speed ahead on the basis of District law resolved the Gibbs second step “by necessary implication.” After all, as jurisdiction is a necessary predicate to judicial action, regardless of whether any party has attacked jurisdiction, see, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607-08, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (“federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction,” regardless of whether any party has raised the issue), any decision to reach the merits implicitly rejects any attacks on the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, despite the complete omission of any reference in the briefs in LaShawn I to Gibbs (or, so far as appears, to pendent jurisdiction at all), and the court’s complete non-discussion of Gibbs’s second step, by standard reasoning LaShawn I is properly said to have found, by necessary implication, that Gibbs’s second step was satisfied.
Jurisdictional issues are, of course, special in a number of regards. First, as already noted, a court is not only free but affirmatively obliged to raise the issue of its jurisdiction where it might be in question, even though the parties never dreamed of the issue. Second, judicial decisions implicitly rejecting attacks on a court’s jurisdiction (or that of a lower court), i.e., ones that proceed to the merits without discussion of jurisdiction, have no precedential force on the jurisdictional point. “When questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119, 104 S.Ct. 900, 918, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) ( “Pennhurst II”).
The first question before the court, then, is whether the special characteristics of jurisdictional issues require any special treatment for purposes of law of the case. This court once took a firm position that they did so-to the point of removing such questions from law-of-the-case analysis, Potomac Passengers Ass’n v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 520 F.2d 91, 95 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1975), and the case was widely cited for that proposition.1 As the majority rightly observes, however, the Supreme Court expressed at least a degree of disapproval in a dictum:
There is no reason to apply law-of-the-case principles less rigorously to transfer decisions that implicate the transferee’s jurisdiction. Perpetual litigation of any issue-jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional-delays, and therefore threatens to deny, justice. But cf. Potomac Passengers Assn. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., ... 520 F.2d 91, 95 n. 22 [ (D.C.Cir.1975) ]. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 n. 5, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988).
*1400 **391 Since Christianson, the cases have been more mixed,2 and are certainly consistent with the view, which I share, that Potomac Passengers overdid it. Christianson’s direct impact appears to have been slight, with courts applying its discussion of law-of-the-case doctrine relating to jurisdictional questions only in the precise context at issue there-application of a transferring court’s jurisdictional analysis in a coordinate court to which the case has been transferred.3 See, e.g., Ukiah

Adventist Hospital v. FTC, 981 F.2d 543, 546 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1992) ( “Review of a transfer order [including jurisdictional grounds] in a transferee court is exceedingly limited.”) (dictum citing Christianson); Wang Laboratories v. Applied Computer Sciences, 958 F.2d 355, 358 (Fed.Cir.1992) (accepting case transferred by First Circuit, the court reasoned that “if the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end”); Moses v. Business Card Express, 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir.1991) (upholding, under Christianson, district court’s decision to apply law-of-thecase principles to transfer decision made pursuant to forum selection clause; technically venue rather than jurisdictional issue). While post-Christianson decisions have sometimes applied law of the case to jurisdictional questions outside the transfer context, in doing so they have neither relied on the Christianson dictum nor even expressly considered whether jurisdictional issues called for special treatment. See McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 351 (D.C.Cir.1995); In the Matter of Memorial Estates, 950 F.2d 1364, 1367 (7th Cir.1991); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State of New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1151 (2d Cir.1988).
Moreover, at least one circuit that once applied law of the case to a jurisdictional issue without discussion later acknowledged the special character of such issues. In DiLaura v. Power Authority, 982 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1992), the court held that a district court was not barred by law of the case from reconsidering its own non-final orders, noting that “subject matter jurisdiction is particularly suited for reconsideration.” (As Judge Winter noted in a separate opinion, however, the issue was in fact moot because what might have been law of the case for the district court could not have prevented review by the court of appeals, see id. at 81.) See also Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 724 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988) (apparent dictum citing Potomac Passengers for the proposition that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction, because of its intrinsic importance to the judicial power of the federal courts, is particularly suitable for reconsideration”).
One post-Christianson case, Wilmer v. Board of County Comm’rs of Leavenworth County, 69 F.3d 406 (10th Cir.1995), confronted a problem closely akin to ours. In a prior pass at the case, the majority had disregarded a jurisdictional issue that the dissent had “tentatively” raised. Id. at 410. Did this bar the panel from considering it? The court noted that since any merits decision implicitly rejects all jurisdictional attacks, application of law of the case as conventionally articulated would bar all consideration of such issues at any time after an initial final judgment, thereby conflicting with the directive of Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide relief where the judgment is void, as well as the decisions that have applied that rule to overturn jurisdictionally defective final judgments. Id. at 409-10. Wilmer *1401 **392 concluded, therefore, that a jurisdictional issue could be examined where there had been no “actual determination” of the issue, id. at 409, and obviously did not regard the dissent’s raising the issue as satisfying that test, id. at 410, even though, under normal assumptions as to how courts work, that necessarily meant that the majority was fully aware of, and had rejected, the contention.
The line drawn in Wilmer seems to me sound. Indeed, I do not understand the majority to say that the “necessary implication” aspect of law of the case means that a court’s issuance of a final judgment, logically but not expressly based on a positive jurisdictional finding, precludes any later consideration of the issue. Its ruling, insofar as it proceeds under the assumption that Gibbs’s second step is jurisdictional (an assumption it ultimately rejects), must rest on the idea that LaShawn I “actually” decided that that step was satisfied. But this seems necessarily to rest on a very loose notion of “actual” decision, far looser than that applied by the court in Wilmer. The only evidence of actual decision of the issue in LaShawn I is what one might infer from its reference to Gibbs, coupled with our knowledge that Gibbs involves two steps, not one. But that amounts to no more than silent action, in the face of presumptive awareness of an issue, which Wilmer clearly regarded as being less than an “actual” determination.
Alternatively, perhaps the majority means that Gibbs is a unitary proposition. On this view, a citation to the case and a quote from one of the operative passages articulating step one ipso facto constitute an “actual” determination of step two. The theory seems to me a bit metaphysical. If Wilmer is right, i.e., more is required to trigger law of the case than action on the merits coupled with a sign of judicial awareness of the jurisdictional issue, it must be because some more serious evidence of a mental connection with the issues is necessary. If so, then the idea that the steps of Gibbs are unitary seems to be simply a fiction to avoid the requirement that there be evidence of such a mental connection.
The actions of the Supreme Court suggest that mere implicit resolution of a jurisdictional issue should not be binding under law of the case. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (“Pennhurst I”), the Court had cast doubt on the federal basis for a consent decree enforced against state officials, see id. at 18-27, 101 S.Ct. at 1540-45, and remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine the validity of the federal claims. The Court also remanded state law claims to determine “whether state law provides an independent and adequate ground which can support the court’s remedial order,” without significant discussion of the issue. Id. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 1547.
On remand, the court of appeals recognized that the remand order necessarily implied that it would have jurisdiction to enter the order on state law grounds alone. “Implicit in that direction is a holding that the plaintiffs’ federal law claims are of sufficient substance to support the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over that Pennsylvania law claim.” Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir.1982).4 The court of appeals then acted on the implied permission Pennhurst I had given and found that the Pennsylvania statute provided “adequate support for [the order] independent of federal law.” 673 F.2d at 656.
Again the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment denies federal courts jurisdiction to order state officials to conform their conduct to state law. 465 U.S. at 117-21, 104 S.Ct. at 917-19. It brushed aside several earlier implicit rulings to the contrary in other cases, explaining that stare decisis principles did not bar its reconsideration of the

jurisdictional issue. **393 *1402 Id. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 918. The decision thus overrode law of the case in the interest of getting the jurisdictional issue right. While the majority did not explicitly address the problem of law of the case, the dissenters did, saying that in reversing the Third Circuit on the second round, “the Court casts aside [the] well-respected doctrine ... of law of the case.” 465 U.S. at 165, 104 S.Ct. at 943 (Stevens, J., with whom Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., joined, dissenting).
Despite the obviousness of the law-of-the-case issue and the dissent’s explicit discussion, the majority disregarded it. It may thus seem inconsistent for me to attach any importance to the Court’s action, in view of what I have said, in agreement with Wilmer, on the application of law of the case to undiscussed jurisdictional issues. But law of the case is not a jurisdictional issue; it merely “expresses the practice of courts,” Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 (quotation omitted). Since implicit treatments of non-jurisdictional issues are precedents, see, e.g., Elcon Enterprises, Inc. v. WMATA, 977 F.2d 1472, 1484 (D.C.Cir.1992); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C.Cir.1987), it is appropriate to look to Pennhurst II as such. Given the merely “prudential” character of law-of-the-case restrictions, and the doctrine’s grounding in concerns of judicial economy, see, e.g., Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739-40 (D.C.Cir.1995), the Court’s action strongly suggests that law-of-the-case considerations, like those of stare decisis, give way to jurisdictional concerns where the initial decision has failed to address the issue explicitly.
The majority alludes briefly to law of the circuit, Maj. Op. at 386-387, but I think its role here is necessarily marginal. While for non-jurisdictional issues a court’s unspoken but necessary premise will often be taken as precedent, see Elcon Enterprises and King, supra, I do not read the majority as saying that should be true for jurisdictional decisions. Such a view would run squarely into Pennhurst II and kindred cases. Insofar as the majority is saying that the panel-to-circuit relationship calls for extra caution in re-examining once-resolved issues, I agree. It is more unseemly for one group of three members of a court to overturn another group of three than for a single judge, or group of judges, to reject his or their former position. The catch is in the phrase “once-resolved.” For the reasons already given, I do not believe that LaShawn I can be said ever to have resolved the issue of how Gibbs’s second step should apply to the present litigation.
Whether Gibbs’s second step is jurisdictional. When a federal court is presented with a combination of federal and state claims, it can adjudicate the state law claims only if that is consistent with the two-step analysis outlined in Gibbs. 383 U.S. at 725-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1138-40.5 The first step requires the court to evaluate the substantiality of the federal claim and whether the state and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. If these requirements are met, then “there is power in the federal courts to hear the whole.” Id. Then-and the analysis may vary at different stages of the litigation-the court is to balance several variables, such as the desirability of a “surer-footed reading of applicable law,” the possible predominance of the state-law issues, the degree to which they are tied to matters of federal policy, possible issues of federal preemption and chances of jury confusion. Id. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1139-40.
The majority concludes that if the first step is taken and there is “power” in the court, no jurisdictional issue remains. See Maj. Op. at 387-388. This of course encounters a non-trivial linguistic problem: Gibbs’s second step is expressly part of the determination of whether there is “pendent jurisdiction,” so one might think it followed, as a matter of ordinary language, that it was jurisdictional. It could, however, be a non-merits, non-jurisdictional inquiry, comparable to abstention and related doctrines. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 1098-1100, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943); *1403 **394 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-19, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246-47, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494-95, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 1175-76, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942).
A natural place to start is with the origin, the way the Court spoke of Gibbs step two in Gibbs itself: That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist.... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law....
The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has properly been assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation. Pretrial procedures or even the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account in this circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation, dismissal of the state claim might even then be merited.
383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (emphasis added). And more recently the Court stated in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988):
Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.

Id. at 350, 108 S.Ct. at 619 (emphasis added).6 Thus the Court has imputed to the Gibbs step two inquiry a characteristic normally possessed by jurisdictional issues and rarely if ever by non-jurisdictional ones-the quality of being open to examination throughout the litigation.
Federal courts of appeals, including this circuit, have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and imputed to the Gibbs step two inquiry another characteristic of jurisdictional issues-that the court is obliged to raise it sua sponte. In Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 & n. 4 (7th Cir.1987), the district court had dismissed plaintiff’s federal claim before trial and then proceeded to address a pendent state law claim on the merits. Although defendant did not raise a Gibbs step two issue on appeal, the Seventh Circuit declared that “because the rule is jurisdictional, we are obligated to raise it ourselves.” Id. at 1218 n. 4 (emphasis added). The court then vacated the district court’s dismissal of the pendent claim on the merits. This court has likewise treated Gibbs step two analysis as jurisdictional and raised the issue sua sponte. In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C.Cir.1990), the district court had previously dismissed both federal statutory and state contract claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This court held that the district court had correctly dismissed the federal statutory claims, but had incorrectly dismissed the state contract claims on First Amendment grounds. Without prompting, the court proceeded to hold that because the district court had properly dismissed the federal claim before trial, under Gibbs’s second step it should also dismiss the pendent state law claim unless it found diversity of citizenship. Id.
The majority dispatches Maguire and Minker by characterizing them as applications *1404 **395 of a newly coined Gibbs step one-and-a-half-cases where the federal claim survives step one but is dismissed before trial. Maj. op. at 383 n.10. Thus, in its view, the Seventh Circuit’s and our treatment of that situation as jurisdictional can’t possibly mean that Gibbs step two is jurisdictional. But until the majority opinion, no one has perceived this circumstance as involving a special kind of Gibbs step; it is simply an instance of Gibbs step two so clear that any continued assertion of jurisdiction by the district court would be an abuse of discretion. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.
The majority, if I read it correctly, says that Gibbs’s second step cannot be jurisdictional because it is “discretionary.” Maj. Op. at 387-388. The analysis would be correct if the set of things that are “jurisdictional” could, as a matter of logic, not intersect with the sets of things that are “discretionary.” But that’s not true. Characterization of a matter as discretionary, at least in the Gibbs context, appears to reflect two closely related points. First, the analysis is highly case-specific, turning on a balance of issues that are typically fact-intensive and as to which the answers range along a spectrum rather than taking a simple yes/no form (e.g., the predominance of the state-law questions posed and the likelihood of jury confusion). See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1139-40. Second, it follows that it will be difficult for appellate courts to articulate specific rules capable of guiding the trial courts, so that a deferential form of appellate review is suitable. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 932-34 (7th Cir.1989) (en banc); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2459, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (approving reasoning of Mars Steel Corp.). An issue with those characteristics can, without logical inconsistency, be jurisdictional as well. When an appellate court finds a district court has abused its discretion on Gibbs’s second step analysis, it can still-and I think should still-be understood as having resolved a jurisdictional issue. As I said before, what else could it be resolving?
Professor Shapiro, analyzing a very broad range of jurisdictional issues intertwined with discretionary choice (but not mentioning pendent jurisdiction), notes that in such cases there may be a question “whether the Court was construing the applicable statute as not conferring jurisdiction in the particular case, or was it relying on a discretion not to exercise jurisdiction that admittedly existed?” David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 543, 561 (1985). He thus divides the instances of jurisdiction-cum-discretion into two categories, the first jurisdictional (but with the decision recognized as having discretionary characteristics), the second a purely discretionary overlay on a choice of whether to exercise jurisdiction. He goes on to point out that the distinction may be important for purposes of practical matters such as “the ability of the court to raise a question sua sponte.” Id. at 562. Indeed. Here, the practical actions of courts-most specifically the Seventh Circuit in Maguire and ourselves (less explicitly) in Minker-mark Gibbs’s second step as jurisdictional.
Finally, the majority relies on language yanked out of context. It quotes Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974), for the proposition that the view of “pendent jurisdiction as something akin to subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised sua sponte at any stage and that is capable of aborting prior federal court proceedings is a misreading of the law.”
Id. at 627, 94 S.Ct. at 1336, quoted by Maj. Op. at 387. But there the majority was objecting to the dissent’s coming up with the idea of a remand to the district court for consideration of state law claims that the majority thought “were wholly tangential to the principal theme” of the lawsuit, id. at 624, 94 S.Ct. at 1335, and that had been dropped by plaintiffs at both stages of appellate review, id. Thus the Court was saying only that unlike issues of subject matter jurisdiction, state law claims that are susceptible of pendent jurisdiction are not on that account capable of being resurrected at any time, regardless of abandonment by the claimant.
*1405 **396 Accordingly, I believe the Gibbs step two balancing is properly regarded as jurisdictional and, for that reason, open to consideration in later phases of a lawsuit where it has not been mentioned before.

* * *
There remains the possibility that, if the above analysis is incorrect, LaShawn I’s silent resolution of the Gibbs step two issue was subject to the exception in law of the case for “clearly erroneous” prior decisions. As author of the panel opinion, I never suggested that LaShawn I’s resolution was clearly erroneous and would be most reluctant to impute any such error to my colleagues. Compare p. 385 above (noting the unseemly character of overturning the opinion of a prior panel). Indeed, as my opinion for the panel made clear, there are strong values on both sides of the matter-among them two doctrines of judicial self-abnegation in favor of democratic political processes: deferring resolution of constitutional issues where possible, on the one hand, and keeping life-appointed federal judges from taking over the interpretation and application of democratically chosen local law, on the other. In any event, as LaShawn I never detectably addressed Gibbs’s second step I have no idea what Gibbs step two analysis might be at issue, and thus am ill-positioned to find error, much less clear error, in that decision.
* * *
Because I believe that law of the case does not bar later panels of a court from considering jurisdictional issues that a prior panel has resolved implicitly but not expressly, and that the second step required for pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs is indeed jurisdictional for purposes of that principle, I dissent.

Parallel Citations 318 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 65 USLW 2049

Footnotes

1

Specifically, the court found the District in violation of the following requirements imposed upon recipients of federal

funding for child welfare programs: 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (requiring prompt investigations into reports of abuse or

neglect and necessary action to protect welfare of abused or neglected children), 762 F.Supp. at 968-70, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)

(3) (requiring demonstration of program to ensure effective treatment of child abuse and neglect cases), 762 F.Supp. at 970,

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (requiring provision of services to enable a child for whom a report has been made to remain in the home or, if removal is necessary, to enable the child to return home as quickly as possible), 762 F.Supp. at 970, 42 U.S.C. §

672(e) (mandating that a child return home within 180 days unless a judicial determination has been made that foster care

placement is in the child’s best interests), 762 F.Supp. at 971, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (requiring procedures to assure children

are placed in least restrictive settings), 762 F.Supp. at 971, 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (requiring timely preparation of case plans containing specific information), 762 F.Supp. at 972-73, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (requiring review of child’s status at least every six months), 762 F.Supp. at 974; and 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A) (requiring operation of information system from which

status, location and goals for placement of all foster care children may be readily determined), 762 F.Supp. at 976-77.

2

Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 294 (C.A.) (quoting Lord Mansfield in John Wilkes’ case, Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327,

335 (1770)). See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L. J. 747, 758 (1982).

3

Of course, the law-of-the-case doctrine reaches beyond the court that made the first decision. It applies just as strongly to

coordinate courts, see Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2177-78, 100 L.Ed.

2d 811 (1988), and an even more powerful version of the doctrine-sometimes called the “mandate rule”-requires a lower

court to honor the decisions of a superior court in the same judicial system. See Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)

488, 492, 9 L.Ed. 1167 (1838).

4

The District now argues that the LaShawn I decision was fundamentally flawed because it analyzed pendent jurisdiction

under Gibbs rather than Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984)

(“Pennhurst II”). But Pennhurst II dealt with the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits federal courts

from entertaining “suit[s] in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend.

XI (emphasis added). The District of Columbia is not a state. It is the seat of our national government, subject-as has become

increasingly clear of late-to the plenary authority of Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.

Thus, Pennhurst II has no application here. Perhaps that is why the District failed even to mention Pennhurst II in its

petition for rehearing, suggestion for rehearing in banc, and petition for certiorari from LaShawn I.

5

The Tenth Circuit recently cited Potomac Passengers as support for the argument that the “always-open character of

jurisdictional questions” should be “a consideration weighing against” the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine to

such questions. Wilmer v. Board of County Comm’rs, 69 F.3d 406, 410 n. 3 (10th Cir.1995). The Wilmer court did not adopt

that view, however; it held only that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude consideration of questions-

jurisdictional or otherwise-that were not decided in a prior appeal. Id. at 409-10. Because the LaShawn I panel in fact

necessarily decided the Gibbs step two question (dissent at 1399), the Wilmer holding has no application here.

6

As the dissent notes (dissent at 1399), the Supreme Court said in Pennhurst II that it does not consider itself bound by

decisions on questions of jurisdiction made sub silentio in previous cases “when a subsequent case finally brings the

jurisdictional issue” to the Court. 465 U.S. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 918 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But that

plainly has nothing to do with this appeal. The quoted portion of Pennhurst II dealt with the stare decisis effect of

decisions in other cases, not the effect of earlier decisions by the same appellate court in the same case.

7

There are situations in which the law-of-the-case doctrine but not the law-of-the-circuit doctrine applies. If a party fails to

raise a point he could have raised in the first appeal, the “waiver variant” of the law-of-the-case doctrine generally precludes

the court from considering the point in the next appeal of the same case. See Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739-40. The law-of-the-

circuit doctrine would not, however, bind another panel. Without a holding on the point, the first panel’s decision would

have no precedential effect. “Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor

ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507,

511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 149, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925).

such questions. Wilmer v. Board of County Comm’rs, 69 F.3d 406, 410 n. 3 (10th Cir.1995). The Wilmer court did not adopt that view, however; it held only that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude consideration of questionsjurisdictional or otherwise-that were not decided in a prior appeal. Id. at 409-10. Because the LaShawn I panel in fact necessarily decided the Gibbs step two question (dissent at 1399), the Wilmer holding has no application here.

6

As the dissent notes (dissent at 1399), the Supreme Court said in Pennhurst II that it does not consider itself bound by

decisions on questions of jurisdiction made sub silentio in previous cases “when a subsequent case finally brings the

jurisdictional issue” to the Court. 465 U.S. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 918 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But that

plainly has nothing to do with this appeal. The quoted portion of Pennhurst II dealt with the stare decisis effect of

decisions in other cases, not the effect of earlier decisions by the same appellate court in the same case.

7

There are situations in which the law-of-the-case doctrine but not the law-of-the-circuit doctrine applies. If a party fails to

raise a point he could have raised in the first appeal, the “waiver variant” of the law-of-the-case doctrine generally precludes

the court from considering the point in the next appeal of the same case. See Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739-40. The law-of-the-

circuit doctrine would not, however, bind another panel. Without a holding on the point, the first panel’s decision would

have no precedential effect. “Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor

ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507,

511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 149, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925).

8

While it is true that the Supreme Court in Gibbs explained that the step two question remains open through “the litigation,”

see dissent at 394, the Court meant only that the question need not be decided forever on the pleadings, but could be

reconsidered during pretrial proceedings or even the trial itself. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139-40.

9

Congress has also explicitly recognized the discretionary nature of the second step of the Gibbs inquiry. The Judicial

Improvements Act, enacted in 1990 and codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1367, states:

... in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (italics added). When the federal claim drops out, the district court has discretion to retain or dismiss

the pendent local law claims: “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim in

subsection (a)” for any of the reasons listed in § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (italics added).

Section 1367 does not apply in this particular case because the children’s complaint was filed before the statute’s effective

date. Still, § 1367’s language is instructive in that the provision, inter alia, “codified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction

developed by the Supreme Court in the case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218

(1966), and its progeny.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir.1995); see also Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban

Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1266 (D.C.Cir.1995).

10

The dissent suggests that Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C.Cir.

1990), and Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir.1987), imply that the Gibbs step two is jurisdictional.

Dissent at 394-395. They do not. Those cases treated as “jurisdictional” only the Gibbs “rule” that “if the federal claims are

dismissed before trial ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139; Minker,

894 F.2d at 1361; Maguire, 814 F.2d at 1218 n. 4.

* * *

1

See, e.g., Green v. Dept. of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 839 & n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1980); Amusement & Music Operators Ass’n v.

Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 636 F.2d 531, 532-33 & nn.2-4 (D.C.Cir.1980); Acton Corp. v. Borden, 670 F.2d 377, 379 n. 2

(1st Cir.1982); Crane Co. v. American Standard, 603 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir.1979); EEOC v. Neches Butane Products Co.,

704 F.2d 144, 147 n. 2 (5th Cir.1983); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794 (6th Cir.1983); Christianson v. Colt

Industries Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir.1986).

2

Commentators have apparently not seen Christianson as wiping the slate clean. Wright and Miller said in 1981 that “[q]

uestions of subject matter jurisdiction are particularly apt to be free of law of the case principles,” citing Potomac

Passengers. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 at 799 n.32 (1981) (under the heading “Suitable to

Reconsider”). “In addition to the great importance that is generally attributed to jurisdictional limits, such questions may at

times involve matters of discretion that inherently require reexamination as a case progresses,” id. (emphasis added), the

latter phrase being apparently an allusion to step two of Gibbs. The 1996 Supplement to Wright & Miller does not modify

that passage, 1996 Supplement at 704 n.32, and cites Christianson under the separate category of “Propriety of Transfer:

Transferor reconsideration,” id. at 694-95 n. 26.

3

The lone exception seems to be a case involving personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction. In the Matter of Oil Spill by the

Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1292 (7th Cir.1992).

4

When the majority in Pennhurst II overturned the Third Circuit’s adjudication of the state law claims, the dissenters made

the same point about Pennhurst I, saying that the majority was reversing “the Court of Appeals because it did precisely what

this Court ordered it to do”-reinstate its prior judgment if state law provided an adequate and independent ground to

support the remedial order. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 126, 104 S.Ct. at 921-22 (Stevens, J., with whom Brennan, Marshall, &

Blackmun, JJ., joined, dissenting).

5

Because this litigation was commenced before December 1, 1990, the new supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §

1367 (Supp. V 1993), does not apply.

6

Cf. Evans v. City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc) (holding that mere consent of local officials, without

a viable federal claim, could not justify continued enforcement of decree against city) (“[T]he court must ensure that there is

a substantial federal claim, not only when the decree is entered but also when it is enforced, and that the obligations

imposed by the decree rest on this rule of federal law rather than the bare consent of the officeholder.”) (emphasis added).