Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 1 of 66

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------------X

SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLEAN FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPS ON, JULIUS DIXON, JOSEPH SARPONG, JEREMY THAME S, SEAN PETTIGREW, LEANDER GRIFFI N, BRIAN MORRIS, MICA ANCRUM, RICARDO JONES, VICTOR BRELAND, LINDSEY RIDDICK and MICHAEL RIDDICK, on Behalf of The mselves and Other Sim ilarly Situated,

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 10 CV 4228
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs,

ECF CASE

-against-

THE CITY OF NE W YORK, RAYMOND W. KELLY, Commissioner of the New York City Police Departm ent, Individually and in his O fficial Capacity, and P.O.s “JOHN DOE” #1-50, Individually and in their Official Capacities, (the nam e John Do e being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown),

Defendants.

-------------------------------------------------------------------X

Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson, Mariam Farnum, Charlean Finely, Ryburn Walkes, Jamel Towe, Christian Dudley, Joceley Ferdinand, Gary Sh aw, Michael Bennett, Chanel Meausa, David Thomson, Julius Dixon, Joseph Sarpong, Jeremy Th ames, Sean Pettigrew, Leander Griffin, Brian Morris, Mica Ancrum , Ricardo Jones, Vi ctor Breland, Lindsey Riddick and Michael Riddick, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, by their attorneys, Jon Norinsberg and Cohen & Fitch LLP, complaining of the defendants, respectfully alleges as follows:

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated seeking class certification compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for violati ons of theirs and othe rs similarly situated civil rights, as said righ ts are secured by said statute s and the Constitutions of the State of New York and the United States.
2. Under a pattern and practice set and enforced by city officials, the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), and New York City Police Officers stop, search, seize, arrest and issue summonses to individuals without probable cause in response to a requirem ent and constant pressure to meet a summons quota, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
3. Further, officers are being explicitly inst ructed to issue summonses regardless of whether any crim e or violation has occurred but instead in order to m eet a m inimum quota (“ACTIVITY”) requirement set forth by the NYPD.
4. To encourage and drive this unlawful pattern and practice, the NYPD consistently punishes officers who issue fewer summ onses, and rewards police officers who issue m ore summonses, regardless of whether or not there is probable cause to issue such summonses. Proof of the Existence of The NYPD’s Unlawful Quota Policy
5. Proof of the existence of the NYPD’s illegal quota policy comes not from a single source, but rather, from multiple and varying sources. Specifically, the existence of such a policy may be inferred from , inter alia, the f ollowing evidence: (1) tape recordings of commanding officers at the 41 st Precinct; (2) tape recordings of commanding officers at the 81 st Precinct; (3) an arbitrator’s ruling, dated January 14, 2006, which expressly found that the NYPD had an illegal quota policy which violated Labor Law § 215- a; (4) statistical evidence

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from the New York State Office of Court Adm inistration (:”OCA”), de monstrating that an overwhelming percentage of the summ onses filed in Court by the N YPD – over 50% – are ultimately dismissed; and (5) empirical evidence from a study conducted by John Eterno, PhD., a retired captain from the NYPD a nd Chairperson of Graduate Studie s in Crim inal Justice a t Molloy College and Eli Silverm an, PhD., a Profe ssor Emeritus at John Jay College of Cri minal Justice and the Graduate Center of CUNY, which confirm the NYPD’s relentless obsession with crime “numbers” exerts enorm ous pressure on commanding officers and has resulted in t he unethical manipulation of crime statistics by su ch officers, and in furth erance of th at manipulation, officers constantly issue summonses to individuals in the absence of probable cause in order to artificially create the statistical appearance of increased “activity.” Direct Evidence of a n Illegal Quota: The Ta pe Recordings of P.O. Polan co and P.O. Schoolcraft
6. Over the past two year s, several p olice officers have atte mpted to inf orm the public at lar ge, as well policy -making officials within the NYPD, of this unlawf ul and illega l practice of constantly and relent lessly pressuring officers to m aintain a summons quota that has resulted in numerous and continuing constitutional violations of the residents of New York City.
7. At least two (2) police officers, P.O. Adrian Schoolcraft and P.O. Adhyl Polanco, publicly came forward to provide evidence of the aforementioned incentives and pressures to increase the number of summonses issued by NYPD officers.
8. P.O. Schoolcraft and P.O. Polanco have provided evidence of their own experiences, as well as tape-recordings of supe rvising officers from the 81st and 41 st Precincts continuously instructing and pressuring officers to meet quotas in order to secure their jobs and avoid punishment.

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9. These tape recordings m ade by P.O. Polanco and P.O. Adrian Schoolcraft provide clear and overwhelming proof of the existence of the NYPD’s illegal quota policy. Evidence of The NYPD’s Quota Policy From Tape Recordings At The 41st Precinct
10. The tape recordings m ade by P.O. Pola nco explicitly refer to the NYPD’s quota requirements. For example, in one such recordi ng, a superior officer states as follows: “I SPOKE TO THE [C OMMANDING OFFICER] FOR ABOUT AN HOUR AND HALF. THE ACTIVITY [IS] 20 AND 1. .....THEY WANT 20 [SUMMONSES] AND 1 [ARREST]. HOW? I DON’T KNOW..... ALRIGHT, SO IT’S 20 AND 1.”
11. Similarly, another superior officer at the 41 st Precinct was recorded as s tating as follows: “NEXT WEEK YOU COULD BE AT 25 (SUMMONSES) AND 1 (ARREST), YOU COULD BE AT 35 (SUMMONSES) AND 1 (ARREST) AND GUESS W HAT? UNTIL YOU DECIDE TO QUIT THIS JOB AND BEC OME A PIZZA HUT DE LIVERY MAN, THIS IS WHAT YOU’RE GOING TO BE DOING UNTIL THEN.”
12. Further, another supervisor was heard threatening: “THINGS ARE NOT GOING TO GET ANY BE TTER, ITS GOING T O GET A LOT WOR SE. IF YOU THINK 1 (ARREST) AND 20 (SUMMONSES) IS BREAKING YOUR BALLS, GUESS WHAT? YOU ARE GOING TO BE DOING? YOU’RE GOING TO B E DOING A LOT MORE , A LOT MORE THAN WHAT YOU THINK.”
13. In fact, officers at the 41 st Precinct were explicitly told that these quotas are “NON-NEGOTIABLE,” and it is not a sufficient excu se that an officer sim ply did not observe sufficient summonsable and/or criminal activity to fulfill said quota.
14. Specifically, DONALD MCHUGH, the Commanding Officer of the 41st Precinct, stated about the quotas: “IT’S REALLY NON-NEGOTIABLE, ’CAUSE IF YOU DON’T DO

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IT NOW, I’M GONNA HAVE YOU WOR K WITH THE BOSS TO MAKE SURE IT HAPPENS.” Evidence of the NYPD’s Quota Policy from Tape Recordings at the 81st Precinct
15. Similar recordings were m ade by P.O. Adrian Schoolcraft at the 81 st Precinct. These recordings further confirm the existence of the NYPD’s unlawful quota policy.
16. For example, a supervising officer at the 81 st Precinct was recorded as stating the exact number – and specific type – of summonses that each officers is expected to delivery every month: “HE WANTS AT LEAST 3 SEAT BELTS (SUMMONSES), 1 CELL PHONE SUMMONS) AND 11 OTHERS (SUMMONSES)” per officer each month.
17. On December 8, 2008, Deputy Inspector Mauriello, Commanding Officer of the 81st Precinct, berated his officers for not writing enough summonses pe r month: “I S EE EIGHT FUCKING SUMMONSES FOR A 20 DAY P ERIOD OR A MONT H. IF YOU MESS UP, HOW THE HELL DO YOU WANT ME TO DO THE RIGHT THING BY YOU?”
18. Another Supervising Officer issued the following warning, “I TOLD YOU LAST MONTH, THEY’RE LOOKING AT THE NUMBERS . AIN’ T ABOUT LOSING YOUR JOB, [BUT] THEY CAN MAKE YOUR JOB REAL UNCOMFORTABLE.”
19. Additionally, Chief of Transportation MICHAEL SCAGNELLI, a three star Chief in charge of TRAFFICSTAT, was quoted as saying: “HOW MANY SUPERSTARS AND HOW MANY LOSERS DO WE HAVE ? HOW MANY SUMMONSES DOES THE SQUA D WRITE? WE NEED MORE ACTIVITY. IF YOUR PR ODUCTIVITY FALLS BELOW PAR, EITHER YOU OR THE C.O. IS GOING TO HAVE TO ANSWER.”

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20. Similarly, another superior officer stat ed as fo llows: “WE NEED 250’S, WE NEED ARRESTS, QUALITY OF LIFE EN FORCEMENT (C-SUMMONSES), COMMUNITY VISITS, WE NEED, GET 2 OF THEM IN A CAR, 3 ON FOOT.”
21. In fact, defendants were so obsessed w ith making their “num bers” that they literally instructed officers to issue summonses and make arrests when there was no evidence of any criminal activity whatsoever.
22. Specifically, one supervisor instruct ed: “GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS AND GET YOUR NUMBE RS ANYWAY. DON’T BE THE ONE C AUGHT OUT THER E. MARINO’S YELLING AT EVERYONE ABOUT THE POINTS.”
23. Additionally, on October 31, 2008, Mauriell o ordered his officers to arrest virtually everybody they ca me in contact with at 120 Chauncey Street in Brooklyn, with or without probable cause: “EVERYBODY GOES. I DON’T CARE. YOU’RE ON 120 CHAUNCEY AND T HEY’RE POPPING CHAMPAGNE? YOKE EM. P UT THEM THROUGH THE SYSTEM. THEY GOT BANDANNAS ON, ARREST THEM. EVERYBODY GOES TONIGHT. THEY’RE UNDERAGE? FUCK IT.”
24. Similar orders were given by a Sergeant on November 23, 2008. “IF THEY’RE ON A CORNER, MAKE ‘EM MOVE. IF THEY DON’T WANT TO MOVE, LOCK ‘EM UP. DONE DEAL. YOU CAN ALWAYS ARTICULATE [A CHARGE] LATER.”
25. Thus, in effectuating th e NYPD’s illegal quota policy, police officers throughout the City were being instructed to arrest and summons fully innocent people for crimes that never occurred – for nothing more than standing on a st reet corner in their neighborhoods – and then “articulate” or create a charge later.

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Further Proof of the NYPD’s Illegal Quota Policy: Written Directives by Chief Marino

26. In a 2005 a rbitration hearing, P.O. David Velez – who had been punished for failing to reach his m onthly quota – presented evidence that the 75 th Precinct had instituted and

was enforcing a policy that officers m ust meet “a quota of 10 (ten) summons per month” and

“that the police officers in squad A-1 received lower marks on their evaluations if the officers did

not meet ‘this minimum requirement.’” In the Matter of P.B.A. and City of New York, Case # A-

10699-04, at 9 (Jan. 14, 2006)(emphasis added).

27. Additionally, then Comm anding Officer Michael Marino actually reduced this directive to writing and distributed it to all of the supervisors in the 75th Precinct. (Id.)

28. The aforementioned written directive orde red that supervising officers were

required to evaluate officers based on their a dherence to the m inimum quota of summonses and

arrests. Id.

29. Specifically, in a writing dated Januar y 2004, C.O. Marino wr ote the following

directive to his supervisors fo r their use in evaluating the pe rformance of police officers:

(1) 35 or below = 2.5 - unless you can show improvement in last quarter.

significant

(2) Less than 11 collars = low or less in Perform ance Area #2 (Apprehension/Intervention).

(3) Less than 33 movers = low or less in perform ance Area #5 (Vehicular Offenses/Accidents).

(4) Less than 33 QOL [quality of life ] = low or less in Handling Specific Offenses (Performance Area #6).

(5) Any two above = low or less in B ehavioral Dimension #25 (Drive/Initiative) and/or Beha vioral Dimension #18 (Proble m Recognition).

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30. As a result of CHIEF MARINO’s explicit directives, Sgt. Lurch issued a memo to all officers in th e 75th Precinct “rem ind[ing] [officers] that a FAILU RE TO WRITE THE
REQUIRED AMOUNT OF S UMMONSES AND FAILURE T O MAKE THE REQUIRED
NUMBER OF ARREST FOR EACH RATING PERIOD WILL RESULT IN SUBSTANDARD
PERFORMANCE RATINGS.” (Id at 10) (emphasis supplied).
The NYPD’s Quota Policy Is Struck Down As Illegal in January 2006
31. While the NYPD denied the existence of any quota policy, the arbitrator
emphatically rejected defendants’ claims
The Arbitrator finds that C.O. Marino’s writing and Sergeant Lurch’s memo could not have been clearer : “failure to write the required am ount of summ onses ... will result in substandard performance ratings ...” Further, the asterisk in the goal co lumn makes it clear that [these] “goals” are monthly, quarterly and year ly. The Arbitrator is completely persuaded that th e “goals” co lumn on this m emo meets the definition in Labor Law Secti on 215-a for “quota” ... [Thus], the New York Police Departm ent violated New York State Labor Law Section 215-a by es tablishing and maintaining a summons quota...
In the Ma tter of P.B.A. and City of New York , Case # A10699-04, at 11, 27 (Jan. 14, 2006)(emphasis added).
32. Thus, notwithstanding defendants’ claims to the contrary, the NYPD was found
to have a quota policy that was not only unconstitutional and illegal, but also, violated New
York State Labor Law Section 215-a.
Notwithstanding The Arbitrator’s Decision, The NYPD’s Unlawful Quota Policy Continues To This Day.
33. Notwithstanding the Arbitrator’s January 14, 2006 decision, to this day,
34. Police officers throughout the City are c onstantly pressured to m eet the required
minimum quota of summonses on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis.
35. The NYPD’s unlawful quota policy is not limited to the 41st, 81st and 75th

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36. Precincts. Rather, it exists in every precinct throughout the City of New York, and has continued in full force even after the arbitrator’s decision of January 14, 2006.
37. In fact, after filing the related action of Schoolcraft v. City of New York , 10 CV 06005 (RWS), plaintiffs’ counsel have been contacted by a la rge number of additional police officers, who upon hearing of P.O. Schoolcraf t’s allegations, have also com e forward and informed plaintiff’s counsel that this quota po licy is also vehemently enforced in the 42nd, 52nd, 75th , 90th, 23rd, 43rd, 105th, 79th, 103rd, 115th, 6th Precincts, Housing Borough IRT, PSA 8, Transit Bureau Bronx and Transit District 23, where officers are being pres sured to m eet these illega l quotas or receive adverse employment action when they refuse or fail to do so.
38. Specifically, the aforem entioned officers have provided plaintiffs’ counsel with evidence of a ram pant illegal policy of issuing summonses pursu ant to a quota regardless of probable cause, the existence of a crime, the number of summonses actually filed or the num ber of summonses that are successfully prosecuted.
39. As a result of the NYPD’s continuation of this unlaw ful policy with the knowledge of its illegality, final and permanent injunctive and compensatory relief is appropriate for the putative class. The NYPD’s Code Word for Quotas: “Activity”
40. While the NYPD continues to publicly deny the ex istence of any quotas – claiming that these are m ere “productivity goals” – there can be no doubt that the comm ands and pressures from supervising officers for subo rdinate officers to increase their “ACTIVITY” specifically refers to producing a predeterm ined minimum number of summonses, arrests and 250’s.
41. This is apparent from the title of th e memo that was the subject of the 2006 arbitration decision, which was entitled “Squad Activity Expectations.”

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42. The use of the word “activity” in th at memo unequivocally refers to the requisite number of summonses needed to m eet the quot a, providing irrefutable evidence that any directives to increase “activity” correlate to a predetermined summons quota.
43. Further, P.O. Schoolcraft’s own low pe rformance evaluation was based on his failure to adhere to NYPD’s “activity” requ irements, and upon every inquiry as to the NYPD’s definition of “activity,” he was repeatedly informed that a ctivity was evaluated based on the number of summonses, arrests and UF 250 reports credited to an officer in a given month.
44. For example, P.O. Schoolcraft specif ically asked, “SO HOW CAN A POLIC E OFFICER BRING UP HIS POIN TS?,” to which his sergeant responded “BY DOING ACTIVITY…SUMMONSES, COLLARS [ARRESTS].”
45. Additionally, at on e of the ro ll calls in the 81st Precinct, a supervising officer stated, “I WANT ACTIVITY. LISTEN. I WANT 250’S AND C SUMMONSES.”
46. Further another supervising officer issued the following order, “ANYBODY OVER THERE SE LLING. HANGING OU T OVER THERE I DON’T C ARE WHAT THEY’RE SELLING, THEY’RE GETTING SOMETHING. I GOTTA GET A FE W SUMMONSES OVER THERE BECAUSE QUALITY OF LIFE W ENT OVER THERE AND TOOK SOME PICTURES OF SOME GUY SELLING, SELLING STUFF OVER THERE. I HAVE TO HAVE SOME ACTIVITY THAT WE HANDLED.” Further Proof of the NYPD’s Unlawful Quota Policy: Statistical Evidence from The OCA
47. The fact that the NYPD has an unlawfu l quota policy is f urther confirmed by statistical data from the New York State Office of Court Administration (“OCA”). As a result of the constant pressure to m eet monthly quotas – which is causally connected to NYPD’s obsession with COMPSTAT statistics (see §§ 115-131, 147-152, infra.) – officers are driven to stop, seize, arrest and summons individuals in the absence of probable cause in order to meet the

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minimum quota, resulting in an m arked increase in the total numbers of summonses issued by the NYPD.
48. In fact, since 1994 – which was the incep tion of COMPSTAT – there has been a five hundred percent (500%) increase in the number of summonses issued.
49. Further, according to the objective evidence contained in OCA’s own records, the majority of summonses filed by the NYPD were issued without probable cause or any legitim ate basis.
50. In fact, of all th e summonses adjud icated in the Criminal Court sys tem – more than half of them, or 50.5% – were dismissed in the year 2005.
51. This result is remarkably similar to the results from other years. For example, in 2006, 51% of all filed summonses were dismissed. In 2007, 50.7% of all filed sum monses were dismissed. In 2008, 50.5 % of all summonses filed were dismissed.
52. The utterly baseless nature of these su mmonses is further confirmed by the large number of summonses which are dismissed before they are even docketed.
53. Specifically, according to the 2007 Annual Rep ort from the Criminal Court, City of New York, there were approxim ately six hundred one thousand four hundred and fifty seve n (601,457) summonses filed within New York City.
54. Of the aforem entioned summonses issued in 2007, thirty five thousand three hundred and four (35,304) of the summonses were dismissed before even being docketed.
55. In addition, of the remaining summonses that were docketed in 2007, ninety three thousand one hundred and fifty nine (93,159) were dismissed as insufficient as a matter of law before arraignment.

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56. Additionally, according to the 2008 Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of New York, there were approximately five hundred sixty three thousand one hundred and fifty seven (563,157) summonses filed within New York City.
57. Of the afor ementioned summonses issued in 2008, thirty seven thousand five hundred and one (37,501) of the summonses were dismissed before even being docketed.
58. In addition, of the remaining summonses that were docketed in 2008, ninety nine thousand three hundred and seventeen (99,317) were dismissed as insufficient as a m atter of law before arraignment. The “Disappearing” Summonses: Counted By The NYPD But Not By OCA.
59. Upon information and belief, the afore mentioned number of summonses filed in 2007 and 2008 does not account for summonses recorded in COMPSTAT that are actually issued by the NYPD, but that are never filed in any criminal court in New York City.
60. Additionally, COMPSTAT statistic s would in fact contain the total number of summonses issued by a given precinct – whether or not the y were ev er filed with the cour t – which means that officers are s till credited with the statistic, despite the fact that the summons was returned to the officer as defective before ever being sent to the court.
61. As such, officers are m otivated by this quota to stop, seize, arrest and summ ons individuals in the absence of pr obable cause knowing that they can meet their quota by issuing a summons for a non-existent crim e or violation, which also corrobor ates the existence of “ghost summonses” (see §§ 101-108, infra).
62. Further upon inform ation and belief a com parison between COMPSTAT and OCA statistics will rev eal that th e actual number of sum monses issued is far g reater than is reflected in OCA statistics.

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63. Additionally, upon inform ation and belie f, the aforementioned num ber of summonses in 2007 and 2008 that were never docketed and or were dism issed prior to arraignment does not account for th e number of summonses that we re dismissed at arraignment as being insufficient.
64. Such incredibly high dismissal rates prior to any court appearance is presum ptive evidence that those sum monses were either: i) issu ed in order to m eet a quota for offenses that never occurred; or ii) that the NYPD has shown an utterly deliberate indifference to the proper training regarding the requisite level of probable cau se required to stop, arrest and summons individuals.
65. At a m inimum, according to the d ata actually known regarding th e amount of summonses filed and dismissed in 2007 and 2008, approximately twenty three percent (23%) of the total number of summonses filed were dismissed as legally insufficient.
66. The Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of New York in 2009 has not been published as of the date of this com plaint; however, given the nearly identical statistics from the preceding two years, it is presumed that 2009 will produce similar statistics. Implementation of the Quota: Relentless Pressure from Superior Officers
67. In order to enforce the quota system outlined above, it is a routine and widespread practice that officers are constantly reminded of these quotas during roll call and receive explicit threats of tour transfers, undesirable assignm ents, poor perform ance evaluations and other adverse consequences for failure to meet their monthly arrest and summons quotas.
68. For example, one such admonishment from a commanding officer was: “IF YOU MESS UP, HOW THE HELL [DO] YOU WANT ME TO DO TH E RIGHT THING BY YOU? YOU COME IN, 5 PARKER S, 3 A’S (SU MMONSES), NO C’S (S UMMONSES) AND T HE ONLY 250 YOU DO IS W HEN I FORCE YOU TO DO OVERTIME. I MEAN IT’S A T WO

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WAY STREET HERE. I’M OLD SCHOOL. I GOT 19, ALMO ST 20 YEARS. IF I

SCREWED UP, I HAD TO GIVE OUT 25 (S UMMONSES), IF I SCRE WED UP I’D HAVE

TO GIVE OUT DOUBLE NUMBERS.”

69. Further, evidence of the pressure facing officers to meet the required amount of

summonses – which in turn results in r epeated constitutional violations of New York City

residents (see §§ 99-106; 107-114, infra) – is apparent in another supervisor’s statement: “I’M

KEEPING CHIEF [MARINO] AT BAY. W HEN HE P ULLS ACTIVITY REPORTS GOES

BACK A WHOLE YEAR, SAYS THIS GUY, THIS GIRL IS NO GOOD. BOUNC

E

THEM…WHEN I TELL YOU TO GET YOUR ACTIVITY UP, IT’S FOR A REASON

BECAUSE THEY ARE LOOKING TO MOVE PEOPLE AND HE’S SERIOUS.”

The Consequences for Officers Who Fail or Refuse to Meet Their Quota

70. If an officer does not meet the aforementioned quota for issuing summonses, he or

she could receive punishm ent in the form of poor performance evaluations, loss of overtime,

shift changes or denial of sick and/or vacation days.

71. Additionally, if an officer fails to meet the quota requirement, he or she would be

personally “supervised” by their platoon comm ander during their tour, and would be told when,

where, to whom and for what a summonses

72. Moreover, it is made abundantly clear that performance evaluations, which lead to

raises, promotions and desirable assignm ents, are entirely based on adhe rence to these quotas,

thereby driving officers to issue unconstitutional summonses to meet the quota rather than suffer

adverse employment consequences.

73. Specific evidence of this fact can be found in the following supervisor’s

statement: “YOU’RE JUST EXPECTED TO GO OUT, YOU DON’ T HAVE TO ANSWER

JOBS, YOU JUST HAVE TO WRITE C’ S (SUMMONSES). YOU DON’T WRITE ANY

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THAT NIGHT THEN YOU’LL B E BACK ON FOOT…THEY EXPECT AT LEAST TWO (2)

FROM EACH, EACH OF YOU I N A C AR, TOTAL OF FOUR (4). IF YOU DO M ORE

EVEN BETTER…IF YOU ARE ON QUALITY OF LIFE AUTO, YOUR ASSIGNMENT FOR

THE DAY IS QUALIT Y OF LIFE SUMMONSES, AND 250’S ALSO. LAST MONTH’ S

ACTIVITY REPORTS WERE GOOD BUT S OME, I STI LL HAVE TO C HASE SOME OF

YOU AROUND FOR 250’S AND C’S SO W ERE GOING TO HAVE A LITTL E

RESTRUCTURING IN JANUARY…ITS NOT HING PERSONAL ITS JUST THAT YOU R

EVALUATIONS ARE BASED ON YOUR AC TIVITY, SO I CAN’T GIVE YOU A 4 OR 4.5

IF YOU DON’T HAVE ANY ACTIVITY.”

74. All of this constant and relentless pressu re to adhere to th is quota policy drives

officers to stop, arrest, seize an d issue summonses to individuals in the absence of probable

cause for offenses never committed, which is a pparent from the unconstitu tional acts v isited

upon plaintiff’s herein and others similarly situated.

75. Aside from explicit threats of punishm ent, officers who do not m eet their quota

suffer severe adverse consequences, which in som e instances even ris e to the leve l of placing

their personal safety in jeopardy.

76. For instance, P.O. Edwin Valasquez had his tour reassigned when he did not meet

his summons quota despite the fact that the officer s who replaced him in his tour of duty had far

less experience and seniority on the job. 77. Additionally, another officer in the 41

st Precinct was punished when he

documented in his m emobook the fact that he was commanded by his lieutenant to suborn

perjury and issue a summons for activity that he did not observe.

78. When the lieuten ant discovered what he had docum ented, the officer was

informed that if the offi cer wanted the lieutenan t to “forget about it” in lieu of disciplinary or

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other adverse action, the officer would be required him to write twenty five (25) summonses

during his next tour of duty.

79. Upon information and belief, the aforementioned officer did in fact write twenty-

five (25) su mmonses on his next tour, whic h undoubtedly resulted in several co nstitutional

violations. 80.

Further, another officer in the 42nd Precinct suffered harassment when he reported

that Lieutenant Seda had comma nded him to suborn perjury and write traffic and other

summonses for offenses that he had not witnessed.

81. Upon reporting the illegal directive, he found a m ousetrap with his nam e on it

and was transferred for his safety as Seda had di sclosed his confidential complaint to the rest of

the command and had classified him as a “fucking rat.”

82. Further, Adhyl Polanco met a similar fate when he made it known to the Internal

Affairs Bureau that he had evidence of the NYPD’s illegal enforcement of summons and arrest

quotas.

83. P.O. Polanco’s gun and badge were rem oved when he attempted to accom pany

his sick partner to the hospital and refused to return to writing summonses at the behest of his

sergeant.

84. Further, his sergeant threatened to treat him as an EDP (“em otionally disturbed

person”) if he did not voluntarily surrender hi s gun and badge and was thereafter summarily

suspended. 85.

Moreover, an officer from the 115 th Precinct in Queens was actually fired for his

refusal to issue summonses pursuant to an unconstitutional quota.

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Officers Who Fail To Meet Expected Quotas Are Placed Into “Perfo rmance Monitoring”, Where They Face Severe Adverse Consequences.
86. In addition to punishing officers for failing to meet quotas, as detailed ab ove, the NYPD routinely places officers who cannot meet their quotas into “performance monitoring.”
87. For example, an unidentified officer who joined the NYPD in 1998 at the 75 th Precinct had always received a bove average perform ance evaluations until 2003, when Chief Marino was assigned as the Commanding Officer at the 75th Precinct.
88. Following Marino’s assignm ent, the officer began to receive poor perfor mance evaluations when he was unabl e to m eet the m inimum monthly summons requirem ent, which was four (4) A summonses, three (3) B summonses and three (3) C summonses.
89. Additionally, he was placed on “performance monitoring,” for his failure to meet the required number of summonses.
90. Performance monitoring has the following three levels of severity: 1) “Level One” is in-house monitoring (Precinct level only); 2) “Level Two” involves monitoring at Police Headquarters, and carries m any adverse consequences, such as loss of “paid detail” 1 eligibility and home visits every tim e an officer takes sick leave; and, 3) “Level Three” p erformance monitoring is the m ost severe, and an officer can be fired if he or she receives three command disciplines within a six (6) month period.
91. The subject officer was placed on “Level Two” m onitoring. Eventually, th is officer sought promotion to sergeant and was required to appear before the Career Advancement Review Board (“CARB”), which is typically only required for officers who have serious disciplinary issues, which he did not.
1 Paid details are private work assignments through the NYPD

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92. Notwithstanding this officer’s exemplary record – he had no disciplinary issues in his entire time with NYPD - his application for promotion was denied due to his low “activity.”
93. Moreover Chief Gianelli actually advised the officer that CARB will only review their decision if he increas es his “activity.” However, the of ficer refused to issue illeg al summonses merely to increase activity.
94. As such Employee Managem ent Division has since refused to review CARB’s decision and he has been denied promotion for nineteen (19) m onths – despite having scored in the top 10% on the Serg eant’s exam - all due to his failure to issue sum monses pursuant to an illegal and unconstitutional quota.
95. Instead, another officer who had identical qualifications but “high activity” was promoted to Sergeant first despite the fact that he had a crim inal conviction for Drunk Driving during his career with NYPD. P.O. Schoolcraft’s Harrowing Experience: Further Proof of The NYPD’s Unlawful Policies
96. All of the aforementioned incidents notwithstanding, perhaps the most disturbing consequence for refusing to adhere to the NYPD’s unconstitutional quota policy is the harrowing experience endured by P.O. Schoolcraft when he appealed his adverse perform ance evaluation, which was based entirely on his refusal to perpetuate this illegal quota policy.
97. In response to his appeal, P.O. Schoolcraft was summoned to a meeting with nine commanding officers from his precinct, all of whom discouraged him from challenging his evaluation and adm onished him that he could avoid all of this si mply by bringing up his “activity.”
98. When P.O. Schoolcraft responded that he ac ts on every criminal or summonsable offense he observes, his superior officers suggested that he should ride with som eone who has a

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record of issuing the required number of summonses, so that said officer could “point out” tim es

where summonses were to be issued.

99. Additionally, at that meeting P.O. Schoolcraft repeatedly asked the reason for his

poor evaluation and the response was repeatedly referring to the low number of summonses he

had issued in a given month.

100. Finally on October 31, 2009, in retaliation fo r the evidence that P.O. Schoolcraft

had gathered over the course of the year rega rding enforcement and encouragement of meeting

summons and arrest quotas, several police o fficers and high-ranking NYPD officials invaded

P.O. Schoolcraft’s apartment and had him involuntarily committed to Jamaica Hospital in an

attempt to silence P.O. Schoolcr aft from disclosing the evidence he had obtained regarding

illegal quotas and corruption within the NYPD.

The Result of Relentless Quota Pressure: “Ghost Summonses” And Falsified Police Reports

101. As the above incidents m ake clear, the simple threat of such extrem e

consequences for failing or refusing to adhere to this illegal quota policy drives officers to

simply conform to the policy, thereby resulting in hundreds of thousands of c

onstitutional

violations of New York City residents.

102. Specifically, this blanket quota enforced on all officers is driving officers to issue

summonses without probable cause for violations that never occurred, which is evidenced by

information provided by both P.O. Polanco and P.O. Schoolcraft that it is widespread practice for

officers to actually write “ghost summonses.”

103. The term “ghost summons” is NYPD slang for summonses issued without

probable cause for crimes that did not occur, wh ich are intentionally written defectively knowing

that the individual will suffer “only” the inco nvenience of being unlawfully seized during the

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issuance of the summ ons, but will never suffer the threat of prosecution; however, the officer will nonetheless still be able to meet the quota.
104. Moreover, while on duty, P.O. Schoolcraft, in a recorded conve rsation with Sgt. Devino, informed her of the existence of “ghost summonses”: “ITS COMMON PRACTICE HERE, FAKE 250’S, FAKE SUMMONSES BE ING HANDED IN BECAUSE THEY CAN’T KEEP UP WITH THE NUMBERS.”
105. Additionally, in that conversation he in formed her that these “fake” summonses were condoned and that the pres sure applied by supervising offi cers encouraged officers to engage in this illega l practice: “[THEY] WANT NUM BERS AND THERE ARE COPS GIVING THEM FAKE NUMBERS.”
106. Illustrative of the ex istence of the aforementioned NYPD practice of writing “ghost summonses” in response to the constant pr essure to m eet quotas was the scenario that unfolded for plaintiff VICTOR BRELAND when he was issued a summ ons for disorderly conduct in front of his mother’s bu ilding, when he had in fact comm itted absolutely no crime or violation of law.
107. In that situation, plaintiff VICTOR BR ELAND – who was merely trying to visit his sick mother – asked for a reason why he was being issued the summons, to which the officer responded, in sum and substance: “DON’T WORRY, I AM NOT GOING TO USE YOUR REAL INFORMATION. ITS JUST THAT IT’S THE END OF THE MONTH AND I NEED TO REACH MY QUOTA.”
108. Further, both P.O. Polanco, P.O. Sc hoolcraft and other unidentified officers have provided information that on num erous occasions they had witnessed to NYPD officers being commanded and ordered by sergeants, lieutenan ts and captains to issue su mmonses to

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individuals for offenses that they did not pers onally observe nor did they have any probable cause to believe had ever been committed. The NYPD’s Unlaw ful Quota P olicy: Selectively And Disproportionate ly Enforced In Minority Communities
109. All of the aforem entioned evidence pr ovided by P.O. Polanco and P.O. Schoolcraft – as well as the scores of other police officers who have come forward and contacted plaintiffs’ counsel – also leads to the undeniable conclusion that this policy, pattern and practice is selectively and intentiona lly enforced in neighborhoods and areas which have a high composition of m inority residents, which dispar ately impacts said individuals based on an impermissible classification under the Constitution of the United States.
110. Additionally, upon inform ation and belief, a partial basis being the racial composition of the nam ed plaintiffs in this m atter thus far, this policy, pattern and practice is purposely enforced in neighborhoo ds and areas which have a high composition of m inority residents, which disparately im pacts said indi viduals based on an im permissible classification under the Constitution of the United States.
111. Further, officers are fully aware that th ey can effectively meet these quotas by issuing these unconstitutional summonses in neighborhoods comprised of predom inantly minority residents because, as one unide ntified officer noted: “T HESE PEOPLE ARE HELPLESS AND HAVE NO RESOURCES OR THE IMPETUS TO FIGHT THIS.”
112. Additional evidence of the fact that these practices are carried out in a way that has a disparate impact on minority, African-American and Hispanic residents of New York City are statements in a m eeting instructing offi cers that in Bedford St uyvesant, practically “EVERYBODY HAS A W ARRANT”, and therefore, as to the m anner of enforcing this quota policy: “TREAT EVERYBO DY WITH RESPECT. BUT ‘THEY,’ AT 120, MALCOLM X

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AND BAINBRIDGE, NO…I WOULDN’T GIVE TOO MUCH [RESPECT]. THE MORE WE GIVE SUMMONSES, 250, COLL AR THEM IN THEIR BUILDING, YOU’RE PUTTING A WRENCH IN.”
113. In addition, according to NYPD’s own reports, since 200 7, one m illion seven hundred twenty four thousand nine hundred and forty eight (1,724,948) indi viduals have been stopped by the NYPD and of those individu als, one million four hundred thirty n ine thousand eight hundred and ninety six (1,439,896) were either African American or Hispanic.
114. According to those statistics of the to tal number of individuals stopped by the NYPD since 2007, approxim ately eighty three pe rcent (83%) were Af rican American or Hispanic.
115. Upon information and belief as well as data com piled by the NYACL U, a significant percentage of the total number of individuals stopped were issued a summons.
116. This unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be inferred from all of the evidence provid ed by NYPD officers as well as the racial composition of all the named plaintiffs in this action (i.e. African American). COMPSTAT: The Driving Force Behind the NYPD’s Unlawful Quota Policy
117. The origin of the N YPD’s quota policy may be traced di rectly back to COMPSTAT, which was first implemented in 1994.
118. While COMPSTAT was originally a useful law enforcement tool – helping police identify spikes of crime throughout the City – it has led the NYPD to develop an alm ost maniacal obsession with “numbers” that dominates their entire law enforcement philosophy.
119. The NYPD’s obsession with “numbers” begins at the precinct level. E very time a summons is issued, the issuing officers drop s a copy of the summons in “the box” in the

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Precinct, after which it is rev iewed by crim e analysis in o rder to ex amine the summons f or defects and/or the sufficiency of the allegations.
120. Thereafter, the summonses that pas s inspection are then sent to the court and the ones that are rejected are returned to the officers.
121. All of the summ onses issued by the officer s, whether defective or sufficient, are recorded in their m onthly performance reports and daily recap sheets, which are then submitted on a weekly and/or m onthly basis to their serg eants and lieutenants, who thereafter submit them to the commanding officers of the Precinct.
122. Additionally, records of those summonses ar e thereafter entered into the “bible,” which is kept by the Commanding Officer of the Precinct.
123. This “bible” kept by the comm anding officers of every Precinct in N ew York City is a record of ev ery officer’s “activit y,” including but not lim ited to, th e amount of summonses issued, whether defective or not.
124. In addition to the “bib le,” the same stat istics are reco rded electronically in a computer database known as COGNOS, which is accessible to all Precincts in New York City and contains the “activity” (i.e. arrests, summ onses, UF-250’s) of each and every m ember of the NYPD.
125. Further, the statistics that are recorded manually in the “bible” and electronically recorded in “COGNOS” are also electron ically recorded in the NYPD COMPSTAT database, which is a s tatistical record of, among other things, all arrests, summonses, stop and frisks and reported “major” crim e (i.e. m urder, rape, robber y, burglary, felony assau lt, grand larceny and grand larceny auto) city wide and broken down Precinct by Precinct.
126. Additionally, there is a similar database that records s tatistics regarding traffic tickets issued called TRAFFICSTAT, which is inextricably interwoven with the summons and

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arrest quotas, which can also result in adverse cons equences if the quota of traffic tickets are not met. COMPSTAT Meetings: Commanding Officers A re Berated And Disparaged, And Denied Extra Funding, Leading To Further Pressure For Summons “Activity”
127. Additionally, there are w eekly and m onthly COMPSTAT m eetings, which are recorded on video and transcribed, and which ar e designed to sta tistically monitor arrests, summonses, 250’s and reported m ajor crime throughout the five boroughs and Precinct by Precinct.
128. These meetings are organized, attende d and directed by top ranking NYPD officials throughout the five boroughs at the behest and comm and of defendant RAYM OND KELLY.
129. During these m eetings commanding offi cers throughout the NYPD a re berated and denied extra funding, resources and overtim e if their Precinct’s “ac tivity” (i.e. summonses, arrests, 250’s) is no t in acco rdance with the level of “activity” required by defendant RAYMOND KELLY.
130. Additionally, these com manding and superv ising are re lentlessly pressured to adhere to the required quota of C summonses (quality of life summonses) in accordance with the pre-ordained quota for each individual Precinct throughout the five boroughs.
131. In response to this policy, comm ands within the five boroughs routinely set “special summons details” in o rder to artificially increase the num ber of summonses issued, resulting in the issuance of hundreds of thousands of unconstitutional summonses.
132. Commanding officers who attend these m eetings know in advance that they will get “ripped apart” by NYPD brass if there is a spike in crime in their precincts.

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133. Commanding Officers who attend thes e COMPSTAT m eetings – which are viewed by other commanding officers on the N YPD’s Intranet – are well aware and understand that the NYPD’s allo cation of addition al funding, resources, benefits and overtime are completely dictated by the s tatistics that appear in COMPSTAT which are u ltimately reviewed by RAYMOND KELLY and the policy making officials at One Police Plaza. The NYPD’s Response to COMPSTAT P ressure: Blatant Manipulation of Crime Statistics Resulting in an Unconstitutional Summons Quota.
134. Based on the above, it is in the Commanding Officer’s best interest – career-wise and as far as their own Precinct’s funding is c oncerned – to m ake two very specific things appear in C OMPSTAT statistics: 1) a decrease in reported “m ajor” crime (i.e. m urder, rape, robbery, burglary, felony assault, grand la rceny, grand larceny auto), and 2) an increase in “activity” (i.e. arrests, summonses, 250’s), in order to perpetuate an erroneous belief that the two categories are casually related, w hich has di ctated the NYPD’s allocation of funding and resources since the re-appointment of defendant KELLY in 2002.
135. Additionally, it is equally in Defendant CITY OF NEW YORK’s best interest to perpetuate the belief that statistics justify and prove the n eed to have an increa sed police force and increased amount of public funding for same.
136. In furtherance of these policies and interests, the CITY has ef fectively created a situation where Precincts, if they are to be allocated additional resources and funding, need to artificially create the appearance of a causal relationship between theses statistical categories.
137. In doing so, this policy has created inte nse pressure on offi cers and has driven them to meet a quota of high summ ons activity every month and as such has caused officers to consistently violate the constitutional right of hundreds of thousands of New York City residents

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by arresting, detaining, seizing and issuing summonses to them in the absence of probable cause,

when in fact no violation has ever occurred.

138. Further P.O. Schoolcraft, P.O. Polanco a nd scores of other unidentified officers

who have com e forward, have provided eviden ce that in order to artificially create the

appearance of the statis tical correlation that, as a result of high “activ ity,” “major” crime is

therefore reduced, comm anding and supervising officers routinely direct officers to discourage

citizens from making reports of major crimes, refuse to take reports from citizens who desire to

make them and/or dow ngrade major crime reports to reflect only petit or m inor offenses (i.e.

robbery report is manipulated to reflect only “lost property”).

139. Evidence of this can be seen in the follo wing statement: “IF THE C V

(COMPLAINING VICTIM) WANTS TO M AKE A REPORT OF A ROBBERY, BUT THEY

DON’T WANT T O HELP US OUT, LOOK THROUGH PHOTOS, YOU DON’T NEE D TO

TAKE THAT REPORT.”

140. Additionally, in one instance in Marc h of 2009, Deputy Inspector Mauriello

refused to take a grand larceny automobile repo rt, which would otherw ise classify as a “m ajor”

crime for COMPSTAT, from an individual due to his prior criminal record, stating,

Mauriello:
Victim:
Mauriello: Victim:
Mauriello:

“WHAT DO YOU MEAN YOUR CAR WAS MISSING.” “I PARKED IT THERE, WOKE UP TODAY, GONE.” “EVER BEEN ARRESTED BEFORE?” “YEAH DID 6-8 YEARS FOR FE LONY DRUGS AND A GUN.” “SO MAYBE YOU THINK KARMA WOKE UP THIS AM AND TOOK YOUR CAR.”

141. Further proof that the NYPD is consum ed and utterly driven by numbers and

statistics, much of whic h is false, is apparent from statements of supervising officers, such as,

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“YOU CAN BE THE B EST COP IN THE WORLD, YOU DON’T WR ITE IT DOWN ON A PIECE OF PAPER, YOU DIDN’T DO IT. OP POSITE, YOU COULD BE THE WORST COP IN THE WORLD; YOU’RE A W RITER, BEST COP IN T HE WORLD. IT’S ALL PAPERWORK.”
142. In fact all of NYPD’s funding and incentives are base d entirely on statistics, creating a driving force to m anufacture or create statistics for offenses that never happened, as one supervisor stated: “JUST KEEP THE HOUNDS OFF. A PAR KER [PARKING VIOLATION]. A 250 [STOP A ND FRISK]. SOMEONE WALK ING DOWN THE STREET. YOU KNOW WHAT, I STOPPED AN ASSHOLE, I DID A 250, LET HIM GO. HE DIDN’ T HAVE ANY INFORM ATION. WHO CARES? IT’S STILL A 250. YOU KNOW WHAT, THAT KEEPS A SMILE ON THE [SUPERVISOR’S] FACE.”
143. Further evidence can be found in statem ents like the one a Sergeant m ade in October 18, 2009: “AGAIN, IT’S ALL ABOUT THE NUMBERS.”
144. Additionally, impact overtime, which is supplementary overtime allotted to certain Precincts, is only given to officers wi th the requirement that they issue a minimum number of summonses and/or arrests during said overtime shift.
145. Moreover, any officers who failed to meet the overtim e summons/arrest quota during their overtime shifts would not be given overtime in the future.
146. Further evidence of this deliberate manipulation and creation of artificial statistics, which leads to repeated constitution al violations, can be gleaned from the fact that officers are instructed to increase their activity in furtherance of this policy in response to major crimes being reported to again create the artifi cial appearance of a cau sal relationship between high activity and low reported major crime.

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147. An example of this can been seen in this statem ent: “A SHOOTING [AT]

MIDNIGHT ON CHAUNCE Y, SO DO SOME 250’S

COMMUNITY VISITS, C

SUMMONSES…THE USUAL BULLSHIT.”

148. As such, the NYPD’s policy of distributing resources based on this false statistical

correlation with COMPSTAT data has been th e driving force behind offi cers manufacturing or

creating “activity” that does not ex ist resulting in the issu ance of hun dreds of thousands of

unconstitutional summonses in the absence of probable cause.

Further Proof of the NYPD’s Manipulation of Crime Statistics: a Survey of Retired HighRanking NYPD Officials

149. The NYPD’s obsession with “num bers” – a nd their consequent m anipulation of

crime statistics – is further confirmed by a recent survey conducted by John A Eterno, PhD

(“Eterno”), a re tired captain from the NYPD and chairperson of graduate studies in crim inal

justice at Molloy College, and Eli Silve rman, PhD (“Silverman”), a Professor Emeritus at John

Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate Center of CUNY.

150. In this survey, Eterno an d Silverman interviewed nearly 500 for mer high-ranking

police officials to determine if the pressures created by Compstat might result in unethical crime

reporting by the NYPD.

151. The results of this surv ey were pu blished in the International Journal of Police

Science and Managem ent, Volume 12 Num ber 3 (April 6, 2010), in an article entitled “The

NYPD’s Compstat: Compare Statistics or Compose Statistics.”

152. 150. According to Eterno and Silverm an, “a large subset of respondents who

were active in the Co mpstat era reported being aware of crim e reports bei ng changed in an

unethical way.” (Id. at 13) (emphasis supplied).

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153. As the authors explained, “the pressure to downgrade index crim e is a key variable explaining [the] unethical distortion of crim e reports – as pressure increases, unethical changing of reports also increases ... ” (Id. at 15).
154. 152. Based on the survey results, Eter no and Silverm an concluded that, as a result of Compstat pressure, [c]learly, the evid ence thus far suggests that m embers of the NYPD have, at times, unethically altered complaint reports.” (Id. at 13) (emphasis supplied). The Necessity of This Class Action: Putting an End to The NYPD’s Unlawful Quota Policy.
155. From the afore mentioned evidence, it is apparent that the NYPD’s myopic obsession with “numbers” has resulted in an unlawful and unconstitutional quota policy, which has resulted in summonses that ar e issued regardless of probable cause, legal merit or whether a successful prosecution can be had.
156. The statistical data in co nnection with the documented evidence of high-ranking officials within the N YPD explicitly instructing officers to adhere to these quotas, is representative of an explic it and/or tacit policy, pattern and practi ce of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or an y legitimate legal basis for their issuance in order to adhere to summons quotas set out by the NYPD.
157. The statistical data in co nnection with the documented evidence of high-ranking officials within the N YPD explicitly instructing officers to adhere to these quotas, is representative that the aforem entioned practices are no t confined to is olated Precincts but are instead part of a city-w ide policy pattern and practice of forcing officers to m eet a summons quota thereby resulting in the constitutional violations of hundreds of thousands of New York City residents.

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158. These unconstitutional and illegal acts deg rade, humiliate, and cause harm to their victims. Individuals who are arrested and issued summonses suffer unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. In many cases they are subjecte d to the degradation of searches and seizures in plain view of the genera l public, and, in m any cases, handc uffing and prolonged detention within NYPD Precincts before being released. They are detained, sometimes for hours or days at a time, in filthy, ov ercrowded conditions. Then, in most instances are forced to tak e time from their jobs, families and lives in order to appear in court before the summonses are dismissed.
159. Despite the patently unconstitutional and illegal nature of this conduct and its detrimental effects on the New York City residents whom the laws are supposed to protect, city officials have refused to reform their practices and in fact, as has been documented, continue to instruct NYPD officers to increase this practice. The time has come to rein in this abuse of power and stop these unconstitutional and illegal acts.
160. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
161. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) and 1367. VENUE
162. Venue is properly laid in the Southern District of New York under U.S.C. § 1391(b), in that this is the District in which a su bstantial part of the events or om issions giving rise to the claim occurred.
JURY DEMAND 163. Plaintiffs respectfully demand a trial by jury of all issues in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).

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164. Plaintiff SHARIF STINSON is an African American male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
165. Plaintiff MARIAM FARNUM is an African American female and at all relevan t times a resident of the City and State of New York.
166. Plaintiff CHARLEAN FINLEY is an African American female and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
167. Plaintiff RYBURN WALKES is an African Am erican male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
168. Plaintiff JAMEL TOWE is an African Am erican male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
169. Plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY is an African Am erican male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
170. Plaintiff JOCELEY FERDINAND is an African American male and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
171. Plaintiff GARY SHAW is an African American male and at all relevant tim es a resident of the City and State of New York.
172. Plaintiff MICHAEL BENNETT is an African Am erican male and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
173. Plaintiff CHANEL MEAUSA is an African Am erican female and at a ll relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
174. Plaintiff DAVID THOM PSON is an African American male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
175. Plaintiff JULIUS DIXON is an African Am erican male and at all relevant tim es a resident of the City and State of New York.

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176. Plaintiff JOSEPH SARPONG is an African American male and a t all re levant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
177. Plaintiff JEREMY THAMES is an African American male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
178. Plaintiff SEAN PETTIGREW is an African American male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
179. Plaintiff LEANDER GRIFFIN is an African American male and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
180. Plaintiff BRIAN MORRIS is an African Am erican male and at all r elevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
181. Plaintiff MICA ANCRUM is an African Am erican male and at all re levant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
182. Plaintiff RICARDO JONES is an African American male and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
183. Plaintiff VICTOR BRE LAND is an African Am erican male and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
184. Plaintiff LINDSEY RIDDICK is an African American male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
185. Plaintiff MICHAEL RIDDICK is an African American male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York.
186. Defendant CITY OF NEW YORK was and is a m unicipal corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.
187. Defendant CITY OF NE W YORK maintains the New York City Police Department, a duly authorized pub lic authority and/or police department, authorized to perform

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all functions of a police depart ment as per the applicab le sections of the New York Stat e Criminal Procedure Law, acting under the direction and supervision of the aforem entioned municipal corporation, City of New York, who was responsible for the policy, practice, supervision, implementation and conduct of a ll NYPD matters and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision, and conduct of all NYPD personnel, including the defendants referenced herein. In additi on, at all relevant tim es, Defendant City was responsible for enforcing the rules of the NYPD, and for ensu ring that NYPD personnel obey the laws of the United States and of the State of New York.
188. That at all tim es hereinafter mentioned P.O.s JOHN DOE #1-50 were personnel within the NYPD who im plemented, enforced, perpetuated and/or allo wed the unconscionable and unconstitutional quota system for summonses that is the subject of this action, acting in the capacity of agents, serv ants and employees of defendant City and within the scope of their employment as such. Plaintiffs are unable to determine the names of these NYPD defendants at this time and thus sue them under a fictitious designation.
189. At all relevant tim es defendant RAYMOND KELL Y was the Police Commissioner of the City of New York and, as such, was a “policym aker” who m ade and enforced the policies of the NYPD, and who act ed in his capacity as agent, servant, and employee of defendant City, within the scope of his e mployment as such, and under color of state law.
190. That at a ll times hereinafter mentioned the defendants, either personally or through their em ployees, were acting under color of state law and/or in com pliance with the official rules, regulations, laws, statutes, custom s, usages and/or practices of the State or City of New York and/or New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond Counties.

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191. During all tim es mentioned in this com plaint, the defendants and each of them separately and in concert, engaged in acts and/or om issions which constitu ted deprivations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, equal protections and th e privileges and imm unities of the plaintiffs, and while these acts were carried out under color of law, they had no justification or excuse, and were instead illegal, im proper, and unrelated to any a ctivity in which law enforcement officers m ay appropriately and legally engage in the course of protecting persons and/or ensuring civil order.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 192. Plaintiffs SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLEAN FINLE Y, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL T OWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JULIUS DIXON, JOSEPH S ARPONG, JEREMY THAME S, SEAN P ETTIGREW, LEANDER GRIFFIN, BRIAN MORRIS, MICA ANCRUM, RICARDO, VICTOR BRELAND, LINDSEY RIDDICK and MICHAEL RIDDICK bring this ac tion as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) for violations of their con stitutional rights. The R ule (b)(2) Class is com prised of all persons who were or will be wro ngfully issued summonses pursuan t to a policy pattern and practice of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or any legal/legitimate basis in order to meet quotas established by the New York City Police Departm ent in violation of their constitutional rights, an d accordingly, who are thr eatened with future u nlawful enforcement of this unconstitutional policy. The class is comprised of all persons issued summonses pursuant to this policy who had committed no crim e or violation of law and thereaf ter had their summ ons dismissed during the fullest period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations.

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193. Defendants have acted, or fa iled to act, on grounds gene rally applicable to th e Rule (b)(2) Class, thereby m aking appropriate final injunctive re lief with respe ct to the Rule (b)(2) Class as a whole.
194. On information and belief, the Rule (b)(2) class includes hundreds of thousands of members. They are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable.
195. Plaintiffs SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLEAN FINLE Y, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL T OWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JULI US DIXON, JOSEPH S ARPONG, JEREMY THAME S, SEAN P ETTIGREW, LEANDER GRIFFIN, BRIAN M ORRIS, MICA ANCRUM, RICARDO J ONES, VICTOR BREL AND, LINDSEY RIDDICK and MICHAEL RIDDICK bring this action as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) for violations of their constitutional rights.
196. The Rule (b)(3) Class is com prised of all persons on who ha ve been wrongfully issued summonses pursuant to a policy pattern and practice of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or any legal/legitimate basis in order to meet quotas established by the New York City Police Department in violation of their constitutional rights. The class is comprised of all persons issued summonses pursuant to this policy who had c ommitted no crime or violation of law and th ereafter had their summons dism issed during the f ullest period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations.
197. All members of the Rule (b)(3 ) class we re injured as a result of de fendants conduct.
198. Upon information and belief, the Rule (b) (3) class includes hundreds of thousands of individuals and is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.

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199. The questions of law and fact presen ted by plaintiffs SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLEAN FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JULIUS DIXON, JOSEPH SARPONG, JEREMY THAMES, SEAN PET TIGREW, LEANDER GRIFFIN, BRIAN MORRIS, MICA ANCRUM, RICARDO JONES, VICTOR BRELAND, LINDSEY RIDDICK and MICHAEL RIDDICK a re common to other members of the class. Among others, the questions of law and fact comm on to the class are: (i) th at the NYPD had a policy, pattern and practice, explic it and/or tacit, of rewarding officers for issuing m ore summonses; (ii) that the NYPD ha d a policy, pattern and practice, explicit and/or tacit, of punishing officers for issuing fewer summonses; (iii) tha t the NYPD had a policy, pattern and practic e, explicit or tacit of establ ishing quotas for the issuance of summonses; (iv) that the NYPD has sho wn deliberate indifference to the training and supervision of officers regarding the requisite le vel of probable cause requi red to se ize, detain and issue an individual a summons; (v) that this policy resulted in the issuance of summonse s regardless of probable cause in vi olation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; (vi) that enforcement of this po licy knowingly created a disparate impact on minorities in v iolation of their constitutional rights; and (vii) that the approp riate injunctive and compensatory remedies that will be needed to ensure (a) th at this unconstitutional quota system for issuance of summonses, regardless of probable cause, is term inated in each and ev ery respect, and (b) th at its harm ful effects are nullified.
200. Common issues of law and fact such as those set forth above (and m any others) predominate over any individual issues.
201. This unconstitutional policy, pattern and practice has resu lted in the wrongful detention, charging, handcuffing, confine ment, deprivation of liberty, prosecution,

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psychological, physical and e motional injury of citizen s who have committed no crim e or violation of law. The claim s and practices alleged in this complaint are common to all members of the class.
202. The violations suffered by plaintiffs SHARIF S TINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLEAN FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLE Y, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JULIUS DIXON, KEITH MURPHY, BICELL BRIDGES, JOSEPH SARPONG, JEREMY THAMES, TYESHA WILLIAMS, MARLON FRANCIS, SE AN PETTIGREW, LEANDER GRIFFI N, BRIAN MORRIS, MICA ANRUM, RICARDO JONES, VICTOR BRELAND, LINDSEY RI DDICK and MICHAEL RIDDI CK are typical of those suffered by the class. The entire class will benefit from the remedial and monetary relief sought.
203. Plaintiffs SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLEAN FINLE Y, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL T OWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JULIUS DIXON, KEITH MUR PHY, BICELL BRIDGES, JOSEPH SARPONG, JEREM Y THAMES, TYESHA WILLIAMS, MARLON FRANCIS, SEAN PE TTIGREW, LEANDER GRIFFIN, BRIAN MORRIS, MICA ANCR UM, RICARDO JONE S, VICTOR BRELAND, LINDSE Y RIDDICK and MICHAEL RIDDICK have no conflict of interest with any class m embers, and will fairly and adequately pro tect the interests of the clas s. Counsel that is competent and experienced in federal clas s action and federal ci vil rights litigation has been retained to represent the class. Jon Norinsberg, Esq. is a la w firm with an office in New York City alm ost twenty (20) years of civil litigation experien ce. Further, Mr. Norinsberg has extensive experience in civil rights litiga tion against state and local governm ents, and the NYPD, and also has experience in class action lawsuits. Cohen & Fitch LLP is a law f irm with offices in New

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York City with extens ive experience in civil ri ghts litigation against the City of New York and the NYPD. Further Cohen & Fitch LLP is also experienced in police, prosecutorial and court practices in the crim inal courts throughout New York City give n the fact that the partners of Cohen & F itch LLP w ere both form er prosecutors and have also main tained a significant criminal defense practice. Additionally, the partners of Cohen & Fitch LLP have spent hundreds of hours in the Summons Parts within the Crim inal Courts throughout the City of New York and are personally familiar with th e large volume of summonses prosecuted on any given day, as well as the large volume that are dismissed for lack of filing or for insufficiency. Collectively, the two firms have litigated thousands of civil rights claims against the City of New York and the NYPD and have an intim ate knowledge of the crim inal process from arrest through prosecution, as well as the issuance and the prosecution of summonses.
204. This action is superior to any other method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this legal dispute, as joinder of all members is not only impracticable, but impossible given the volume and continuing nature of the violations as well as the transient nature of the members of the class. The damages suffered by certain members of the Class, although substantial, are small in relation to the extrao rdinary expense and burden of individual litigation and therefore it is highly impractical for such Class members to attempt redress for damages incurred due to their wrongful issuance of summons and subsequent prosecution.
205. There will be no extraordinary difficulty in the management of the Class action. FACTS
206. Plaintiff SHARIF STINSON is a nineteen (19) year old man. 207. Plaintiff MARIAM FARNUM is a twenty-seven (27) year old woman. 208. Plaintiff CHARLEAN FINLEY is a forty (40) year old woman. 209. Plaintiff RYBURN WALKES is a thirty-nine (39) year old man.

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210. Plaintiff JAMEL TOWE is a nineteen (19) year old man. 211. Plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY is a nineteen (19) year old man. 212. Plaintiff JOCELEY FERDINAND is a twenty-six (26) year old man. 213. Plaintiff GARY SHAW is a thirty-three (33) year old man. 214. Plaintiff MICHAEL BENNETT is a thirty-three (33) year old man. 215. Plaintiff CHANEL MEAUSA is an eighteen (18) year old female. 216. Plaintiff DAVID THOMPSON is thirty-one (31) year old male. 217. Plaintiff JULIUS DIXON is a thirty (30) year old male. 218. Plaintiff JOSEPH SARPONG is a twenty-nine (29) year old male. 219. Plaintiff JEREMY THAMES is a twenty-three (23) year old male. 220. Plaintiff SEAN PETTIGREW is a forty-four (44) year old male. 221. Plaintiff LEANDER GRIFFIN is a thirty-one (31) year old male. 222. Plaintiff BRIAN MORRIS is a thirty-three (33) year old male. 223. Plaintiff MICA ANCRUM is a thirty-six (36) year old male. 224. Plaintiff RICARDO JONES is a thirty three (33) year old male. 225. Plaintiff VICTOR BRELAND is a thirty-two (32) year old male. 226. Plaintiff LINDSEY RIDDICK is a thirty six (36) year old male. 227. Plaintiff MICHAEL RIDDICK is a thirty three (33) year old male. The Constitutional Violations against Sharif Stinson 228. On December 31, 2009, plaintiff SHARIF STINSON was walking out of his aunt’s apartment building located at 994 East 179 Street, New York, New York when several members of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause. 229. At the aforesaid tim e and place defendant officers approached plaintiff, ordered him against the wall and began to search him.

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230. Plaintiff was then tran sported to th e Precinct where he was held in a cell f or approximately four (4) hours, where plaintiff was not free to leave until the officers released him.
231. Thereafter the m embers of the NYPD i ssued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and released plaintiff.
232. Mr. Stinson was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
233. On March 3, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff SHARIF STINSON wa s dismissed.
234. On March 26, 2010, plaintiff SHARIF STIN SON was walking out of his aunt’s apartment building located at inside of 994 Eas t 179 Street, Bronx, New York going into the building where his aunt lived when several m embers of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause.
235. At the aforesaid tim e and place, def endant officers approached plaintiff, ordered him against the wall and began to search plaintiff.
236. Plaintiff was then trans ported to th e Precinct where he was detain ed for several hours where plaintiff knew he was not free to leave until the officers released him.
237. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued summonses for Di sorderly Conduct and for Trespass without probable cause.
238. Mr. Stinson was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
239. On May 24, 2010, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Mariam Farnum 240. On November 10, 2009, plaintiff MARIAM FARNUM was lawfully traveling
inside of her vehicle in the vicinity of Bedf ord and Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, New York whe n she was pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause.
241. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff was handcuffed, searched and detained for several hours at the police Prec inct where she knew that she was not free to leav e until the officers released her.
242. Thereafter, plaintiff wa s issued two (2) summonses for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
243. Ms. Farnum was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although she had committed no crime or violation of law.
244. On February 19, 2010, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Charlean Finley
245. On October 22, 2009, plain tiff CHARLEAN FINLEY wa s lawfully traveling inside of her vehicle in the vicinity of 1285 W ashington Avenue, Bronx, New York, which is a four lane thoroughfare waiting for a parkin g space when several m embers of the NYPD approached plaintiff’s vehicle without probable cause.
246. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff was detained without probable cause and was not free to leave while until the officers allowed her to leave.
247. Thereafter, the defendant officers wrot e plaintiff a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and allowed her to drive away.
248. Ms. Finley was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although she had committed no crime or violation of law.
249. On December 18, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Ryburn Walkes 250. On February 13, 2010, plaintiff RY BURN WALKES was walking on the
sidewalk in the vicinity of Ryer and Burnside Avenue, Bronx, New York when several m embers of the NYPD stopped, detained, handcuffed and strip searched plaintiff without probable cause.
251. Plaintiff was detained for several hours at the P recinct where he knew he was not free to leave until being released by the officers.
252. Thereafter, defendant officers issued pl aintiff with a summons f or Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and released him.
253. Mr. Walkes was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
254. On April 14, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Jamel Towe
255. On April 10, 2010, plaintiff JAMEL TOW E was walking out of his friend’s apartment building located at 965 T inton Avenue, Bronx, New York when several m embers of the NYPD detained, searched without probable cause.
256. Following his search defendant offi cers began to write plaintiff a summons, at which time plaintiff knew he was not free to leave until the officer finished writing the summons and allowed plaintiff to leave.
257. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued a summons for Disorderly Conduct and allowed to leave.
258. Mr. Towe was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
259. On June 9, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violations Against Christian Dudley 260. On January 3, 2010, plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY was lawfully present on a
public sidewalk in the vicinity of 1611 Saint Nicholas Avenue, New York, New York waiting for his friend when several members of the NYPD st opped and detained plai ntiff without probable cause.
261. Defendant officers commanded plaintiff to provide his identification and told him to wait there, to which plaintiff complied.
262. Plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave on hi s own until the defendant officers returned his identification and allowed him to leave.
263. Thereafter, the police officers returned plaintiff’s identification and issued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
264. Mr. Dudley was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
265. On March 29, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. 266. On April 19, 2010, plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY was lawfully present on a public sidewalk in the vicinity of 1630 Saint Nicholas Avenue, New York, New York waiting for his friend when several members of the NYPD st opped and detained plai ntiff without probable cause. 267. At the aforesaid time and place defendant officers commanded plaintiff to provide his identification and told him to wait there, to which plaintiff complied. 268. Plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave on hi s own until the defendant officers returned his identification and allowed him to leave. 269. Thereafter, the police officers issued plaintiff two (2) summonses for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.

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270. Mr. Dudley was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
271. On June 17, 2010, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Joceley Ferdinand
272. On May 14, 2010, plaintiff JOCELEY FERDINAND was lawfully present standing at a crosswalk in the vicinity of Ho ward and Pitkin Avenue, Brooklyn, New York when he was approached by several m embers of the NYPD and stopped, sear ched, and handcuffed without probable cause.
273. Thereafter the plaintiff was transported to the Precinct where he knew that he was not free to leave until being released by the officers.
274. At that time plaintiff wa s issued a summons for Di sorderly Conduct without probable cause.
275. Mr. Ferdinand was verbally and mentally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
276. On July 15, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violations Against Gary Shaw
277. On February 23, 2009, plaintiff GARY SHAW was lawfully parked in front of his building located at 730 East 223 Street, Bronx, New York unloa ding groceries w hen several members of the NYPD stopped and detained.
278. During his detention plaintiff understood he was not free to leave until the officers allowed him to do so.
279. Thereafter, defendant officers issued plaintiff a summons for leaving his vehicle unattended without probable cause as he was standing right in front of the vehicle.

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280. Mr. Shaw was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
281. On April 24, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. 282. On May 4, 2009, plaintiff GARY SHAW was la wfully traveling in his vehicle in the vicinity of Barnes Avenue and 233 rd Street, Bronx, New York when he was pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause. 283. Plaintiff understood he was not free to leave during the course of the stop until defendant officers returned his license and registration and allowed him to leave. 284. Thereafter the members of the NYPD informed plaintiff that he was being issued a summons for tinted windows when his windows were not tinted, but thereaf ter issued plaintiff with a summons instead for Open Container w ithout probable cause as there was no such open container. 285. Plaintiff understood he was not fr ee to leave until the o fficers issued him a summons and allowed him to leave. 286. Mr. Shaw was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 287. On June 23, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Michael Bennett 288. On January 6, 2010, plaintiff MICHAEL BENNETT was lawfully traveling inside of his vehicle in the vicinity of Gun Hill and White Plains Road, Bronx, New York when he wa s pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause. 289. Immediately thereafter plaintiff’s vehicle was searched without probable cause, at which time plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave until the officers finished the search of his vehicle and returned his license and registration.

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290. Thereafter, plaintiff wa s issued a su mmons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
291. Mr. Bennett was verbally and m entally abused by the offic ers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
292. On June 10, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Jamel Towe
293. On April 10, 2010, plaintiff JAMEL TOW E was walking out of his friend’s apartment building located at 965 T inton Avenue, Bronx, New York when several m embers of the NYPD detained, searched without probable cause.
294. Following his search defendant offi cers began to write plaintiff a summons, at which time plaintiff knew he was not free to leave until the officer finished writing the summons and allowed plaintiff to leave.
295. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued a summons for Disorderly Conduct and allowed to leave.
296. Mr. Towe was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
297. On June 9, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Chanel Meausa
298. On May 27, 2010, plaintiff CHANEL MEAUSA left her m other’s apartment, located at 1420 East 95 th Street, Brooklyn, New York, to take a walk when several m embers of the NYPD stopped, handcuffed and detained plaintiff without probable cause.
299. At the aforesaid tim e and place, defenda nt officers approached pla intiff and commanded her to provide identification; however, since plaintiff did not have any identification with her, she offered to go get it from her home.

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300. Plaintiff was then handcuffed with her ar ms behind her back and transported to the Precinct where she was held in a cell for approximately three (3) hours at which time plaintiff knew she was not free to leave until the officers released her.
301. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued a summons for Trespassing and allowed to leave. 302. Ms. Meausa was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although she had committed no crime or violation of law. 303. On July 27, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against David Thompson 304. On June 8, 2008, plaintiff DAVID THOMPSON was l awfully present on the corner of Creston Avenue and East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York, when several members of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause. 305. At the aforesaid tim e and place, defenda nt officers commanded plaintiff to provide his identification, to wh ich he com plied, and then handcuffed plaintiff wi th his arm s behind his back and aggressively placed him in a police vehicle. 306. Plaintiff was placed in a cel l, at w hich point plaintiff knew he was not free to leave until the officers returned his identification and released him. 307. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued two sepa rate summonses for Disorderly Conduct, alleging a violation of the same subsection of the statute. 308. Mr. Thompson was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 309. On August 6, 2008, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Julius Dixon 310. On December 18, 2009, plaintiff JULIUS DI XON was lawfully traveling inside
of his vehicle in the vicinity of 219 th Street and White Plains Ro ad, Bronx, New York when he was pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause.
311. Soon thereafter plaintiff and his vehicle we re searched without probable cause, at which time plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave until the officers finished the searches.
312. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued a summons for unreasonable noise in an automobile without probable cause.
313. Mr. Dixon was verbally and m entally abused by the officer s although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
314. On May 26, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Joseph Sarpong
315. On April 27, 2010, plaintiff JOSEPH SA RPONG was lawfully present in the vicinity of 247 W est 42nd Street, New York, Ne w York, when several m embers of the NYP D stopped, handcuffed and detained plaintiff without probable cause.
316. At the aforesaid tim e and place, defendant officers handcuffed plaintiff with his arms behind his back and transported him to the Precinct where he was held in a ce ll, at which time plaintiff knew he was not free to leave until the officers released him.
317. Plaintiff was issued a Disorderly Conduct summons for failure to disperse without probable cause.
318. Mr. Sarpong was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
319. On June 18, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Jeremy Thames 320. On March 5, 2009, plaintiff JEREMY THAM ES was lawfully present across the
street from his apartm ent, located at 1010 East 178 th Street, Bronx, New Yo rk, when several members of the NYPD stopped, detained, handcuffe d and searched plaintiff without probable cause.
321. At the aforesaid tim e and place, defenda nt officers commanded plaintiff to provide his identification, to wh ich plaintiff com plied, and then proceeded to search inside plaintiff’s underwear.
322. Thereafter, defendant was handcuffed with his arm s behind his back and transported to the Precin ct where he was he was he ld in a cell, at which tim e plaintiff knew he was not free to leave until the officers released him.
323. Plaintiff was issued a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 324. Mr. Thames was verbally and m entally abused by the offic ers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 325. On April 28, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violations Against Sean Pettigrew 326. On November 3, 2009, plaintiff SEAN PETTI GREW was lawfully present in the vicinity of 89 Christopher Avenue, Brooklyn, Ne w York and walking hom e from voting when several members of the NYPD stopped and detained plaintiff without probable cause. 327. Defendant officers comm anded plaintiff to provide his identification, to which plaintiff complied. 328. Plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave on his own until defendant officers returned his identification and allowed him to leave.

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329. Thereafter, the police officers returned plaintiff’s identification and issued plaintiff two (2) summonses for Disorderly Conduct and for Littering without probable cause.
330. Mr. Pettigrew was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
331. On January 6, 2010, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed. The Constitutional Violations Against Leander Griffin
332. On August 5, 2009, plaintiff LEANDER GRI FFIN was lawfully present in front of 1055 Rosedale Avenue, Bronx, New York, when several members of the NYPD s topped and detained plaintiff without probable cause.
333. Defendant officers pushed plaintif f up against a wall and commanded him to provide his identification, to which plaintiff complied.
334. Plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave on his own until defendant officers returned his identification and allowed him to leave.
335. Thereafter, the police officers returned plaintiff’s identification and issued plaintiff a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
336. Mr. Griffin was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
337. On September 23, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violations Against Brian Morris
338. On November 20, 2009, plaintiff BRIAN MO RRIS was lawfully present in the vicinity of 1055 Rosedale Av enue, Bronx, New York, when several m embers of the NYPD stopped and detained plaintiff without probable cause.
339. Defendant officers comm anded plaintiff to provide his identification, to which plaintiff complied.

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340. Plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave on his own until defendant officers returned his identification and allowed him to leave.
341. Thereafter, the police officers returned plaintiff’s identification and issued plaintiff a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
342. Mr. Morris was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
343. On January 15, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violations Against Mica Ancrum
344. On April 12, 2009, plaintiff MICA ANC RUM was standing in front of his building, located at 1055 Rosedale Avenue, Br onx, New York, after his nephew’s funeral when several members of the NYPD stopped and detained plaintiff without probable cause.
345. Defendant officers comm anded plaintiff to provide his identification, to which plaintiff complied.
346. Plaintiff understood that he was not free to leave on his own until defendant officers returned his identification and allowed him to leave.
347. Thereafter, the police officers returned plaintiff’s identification and issued plaintiff two (2) summonses for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
348. Mr. Ancrum was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
349. On June 2, 2009, and June 5, 2009, the su mmonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violations Against Victor Breland 350. On May 10, 2009, plaintiff VICTOR BRELAND was lawfully present on a public
sidewalk in the vicinity of 267 Osborn, Brookl yn, New York when several m embers of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause.
351. At the aforesaid tim e and place defendant o fficers approached plaintiff, told him not to move and asked for plaintiff’s identification, which plaintiff provided.
352. Plaintiff was then held in that location for several minutes at which time plaintiff knew he was not free to leave while the officers wrote plaintiff a summons.
353. Thereafter the m embers of the NYPD i ssued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and released plaintiff.
354. On July 13, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. 355. On April 15, 2010, plaintiff VICTOR BRELAND was lawfully present on a public sidewalk on the corner of Sheffield and Sutter Avenue, Brooklyn, New York when several members of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause. 356. At the aforesaid tim e and place, d efendant officers approached plaintiff, told h im not to move and asked for plaintiff’s identification, which plaintiff provided. 357. Plaintiff was then held in that location for several minutes at which time plaintiff knew he was not free to leave while the officers wrote plaintiff a summons. 358. Thereafter the m embers of the NYPD i ssued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and released plaintiff. 359. On June 15, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. 360. On or about May 2010, plaintiff VI CTOR BRELAND was lawfully present in front of his mother’s residence at 1069 Nost rand Avenue, Brooklyn, New York when several members of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause.

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361. At the aforesaid tim e and place defendant officers approached plaintiff, told him not to move and asked for plaintiff’s identification, which plaintiff provided.
362. Plaintiff was then held in that location for several minutes at which time plaintiff knew he was not free to leave while the officers wrote plaintiff a summons.
363. Thereafter plaintiff requested the reas on he was being issued a sum mons, to which the officer responded that the end of the month was approaching and the officer needed to meet his quota.
364. Thereafter the m embers of the NYPD i ssued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and released plaintiff.
365. When he appeared in co urt for the summ ons he was infor med by the court that they had no record of any summons. The Constitutional Violation Against Ricardo Jones
366. On January 15, 2010, plaintiff RICARDO JO NES was lawfully seated in the passenger seat of his friend’s vehicle parked in fr ont of his mothers’ apartment located at 225-02 133rd Avenue, Queens, New York when they were approached by several members of the NYPD without probable cause.
367. Immediately thereafter plaintiff and his friend were asked to provide identification without any reasonable suspicion to do so.
368. Thereafter both plaintiff and his friend requested the reason they were being asked to provide identification and if they had done something wrong.
369. In response to their inqu iry the officer sprayed mace into the vehicle an d ordered plaintiff out of the vehicle, to which plainti ff complied and at which tim e he was immediately handcuffed on the ground and was not free to leave.

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370. Plaintiff’s mother, hearing the commotion exited the house and inform ed the officer that plaintiff was her son and lived there.
371. Thereafter, plaintiff was issued summonses for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause and released from handcuffs.
372. Plaintiff was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although she had committed no crime or violation of law.
373. On March 16, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violations Against Lindsey Riddick and Michael Riddick
374. On August 18, 2010, plaintiff LINDSEY RIDDICK was lawfully standing outside of his apartment building at 325 E ast 21st Street, Brooklyn, New York, and conversing with his brother MICHAEL RI DDICK, when a m ember of the NYPD stopped and detained plaintiffs without probable cause.
375. At the aforesaid time and place, defendant officer commanded plaintiff to provide his identification, to which plaintiff complied.
376. The defendant officer then comma nded plaintiff to show the officer where he lived, to which plaintiff complied.
377. The defendant officer then comm anded plaintiff to show proof that he actually lived in this apartm ent building by using hi s key and opening the door , to which plaintiff complied.
378. Notwithstanding plaintiff’s full compliance with each and every (un lawful) order of the defendant officer, plaintiff Li ndsey Riddick was still issued several summonses when he refused to “go inside”, as ordered by the officer.
379. When plaintiff protested that he lived at this building, and had a right to stand outside, the defendant officer responded by saying, in su m and substance, “YOU DON”T OWN

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 55 of 66
THE STREET. YOU DON’T OWN THE SIDEWALK. YOU DON’T OWN THE BUILDING. YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO STAND HERE.”
380. Thereafter, the def endant officer issued multiple summonses to both Lindsey Riddick and Michael Riddick, without any legal basis whatsoever for doing so.
381. While these summonses were be ing issued, both Lindsey and Michael Riddick fully knew and unders tood that they were not free to leav e on their o wn until the defendant officer finished writing the summonses and allowed them to leave.
382. While the aforesaid summonses have not yet been adjudicated, plaintiffs fully expect that each and every one of these utterly baseless summonses will eventually be dism issed in court. The Unconstitutional Custom, Policy and Practice of the NYPD
383. At all relevant tim es, the City, acting through the NYPD, m aintained an express and de facto policy, custom and practice of issuing su mmonses without probable cause in order to meet quotas requiring a certain volume of summonses be issued throughout New York City.
384. Upon information and belief a high percen tage of those summ onses issued were not based upon probable cause or any legitim ate basis under the law, but were pursuant to the NYPD’s policy pattern and practice of having subordi nate officers issue summonses in order to meet quotas established by the City of New York, the N YPD, RAYMOND KE LLY and the NYPD defendants.
385. Upon information and belief this pattern and practice has a knowingly disparate impact on plaintiffs and members of the class, specifically other African American and Hispanic individuals, in vio lation of their Constitutional rights as secured by the Four th and Fif th Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 56 of 66
386. Upon information and belief, the issuance of summ onses regardless of probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law in order to meet quotas and goals given to the officers is well known and in fact encouraged th roughout the NYPD. Ne vertheless, the NYPD Defendants, including RAYM OND KELLY continue to allow poli ce officers to continue the practice, tolerate and encourage these unconstitutional practices.
387. The conduct of the NYPD’s policy-m aking defendants, including RAYMOND KELLY, has been a substantial fact or in the continuance of the issuance of these su mmonses in the absence of probable cause or any legi timate basis under the law only to m eet quota requirements set forth by the NYPD has been a subs tantial factor in the continuance of such arrests and summonses and a proxim ate cause of the constitutional violat ions alleged in this complaint. NYPD’s Deliberate Indifference to Training and Supervision of Officers
388. In light of the hundreds of thousands of summonses that are dism issed in a calendar year that are actually docu mented as being dismissed - in addition to the summ onses that were never filed or were dism issed at or after arraignment - is representative of the fact that defendants either knew or s hould have known, that many po lice officers and supervisory personnel were engaging in the lawless and unc onstitutional practice of issuing individual s summonses regardless of probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law; yet defendant have repeatedly failed to take an y action to end this conduct, and in fact expressly and/or tacitly encourage the lawless and unconstitutional actions.
389. The NYPD’s f ailure to tra in, discipline or supervise officers regarding their obligation not to issue summonses unless b ased upon probable cause or som e legitimate basis under the law, exhibited gross and wanton deliberate ind ifference to the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 57 of 66
390. Defendants’ persistent failure to take m easures to curb this unconstitutional practice constitutes acquiescence in the known unlawful behavior of their subo rdinates. The prevalence and general knowledge of these summonses and the rate of their dismissal, and the failure of supervisory defendants to take remedial action, constitute deliberate indifference to the rights of plaintiffs and the Class.
391. Because the pattern and practice of arre sting individuals and issuing summonses absent probable cause in furt herance of m eeting quotas and requirem ents, as set forth by RAYMOND KELLY and im plemented by the NYPD, has existed for many years, the aforementioned defendants knew and encouraged this unconstitutional behavior and repeatedly failed to take action to end this conduct by subordinate officers.
392. Because this explicit and/ or tacit pattern and practice existed of arres ting individuals and issuing summonses absent probable cause in furtherance of the quota policy, defendants knew or should have k nown that p olice officers assign ed to Precinc ts within New York City required training, superv ision, and discipline regarding their obligations not to issue summonses absent probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law.
393. The NYPD and the City of New York, through its agents and em ployees has failed or refused to hold accountable hi gh-ranking supervisors, commanding officers and subordinate officers, notwithstanding the exis tence of wide spread misconduct over a period of many years. This failure is the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiffs and those of other Class members.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR DEPRIVATION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS NDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
394. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and reallege each an d every allegation con tained in paragraphs “1” through “393 with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 58 of 66
395. All of the afore mentioned acts of defe ndants, their agents, servants and employees, were carried out under the color of state law.
396. All of the aforementioned acts deprived plaintiffs and the members of the Class of the rights, equal protections, privileges and im munities guaranteed to citizens of the United States by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Four teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
397. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants in their cap acities as police officers, with all of the actual and/or apparent authority attendant thereto.
398. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants in their cap acities as p olice officers, pursuant to the custo ms, usages, practices, procedures, and the rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police Department, all under the supervision of ranking officers of said department.
399. Defendants, collectively and individually, while acting und er color of state law, engaged in conduct that constituted a custom , usage, practice, procedure or rule of the respective municipality/authority, which is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FALSE ARREST UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 400. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered “1" through “399" with the sam e force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 401. As a result of defendants’ aforem entioned conduct, plaintiffs and other m embers of the Class were subjected to an illegal, im proper and false arrest in th e form of detention and the issuance of summonses by the defendants a nd prosecuted by the defendants in crim inal

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 59 of 66
proceedings, without an y probable cause, priv ilege, consent or any legitim ate basis under the law.
402. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and abuse of authority detailed above, plaintiffs sustained the damages hereinbefore alleges.
403. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiffs’ and members of the Class’ liberty was restricted for an extend ed period o f time, and they were put in fear for their s afety, were humiliated and subjected to handcuffing, and other physical restraints, without probable cause.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
404. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1" through “403” with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
405. The actions taken by defendants violated plaintiff’s first amendment right to peaceably assemble.
406. Defendants’ unlawful and constitutional conduct constituted a r estraint on plaintiffs’ ability to peaceably assemble in their own neighborhoods, public sidewalks and in areas open and freely accessible to the general public.
407. Defendants’ policy is intentionally enforced to prohibit the peaceable gathering of minority residents of New York City in their own neighborhoods.
408. Defendants’ policy is designed and to keep said residents inside of their hom es thereby preventing them from exercising their rights to peaceably assemble on public streets and areas in violation of their rights as secured by the First Amendment.
409. Evidence of this inten t to deprive plaint iffs of their rights to peaceab ly assemble in public areas is apparent from the following directives from supervising officers in the NYPD: “LISTEN I WANT 250 ’S AND C SUMMONSES. IF I GET CALL FROM A PI ZZERIA, 20

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 60 of 66
GUYS OUT THE RE, IF HE’S C ALLING ME THAT MEANS SOMETHING’S GOING ON OVER THERE, NO ONE HANGS OUT THERE. NOBODY, I WANT A GHOST TOWN. I WANT TO HEAR THE ECHO FROM ONE END OF THE STREET TO THE OTHER.”
410. “SHAKE EVERYBODY UP. ANYBO DY MOVING, ANYBODY CLIMBING IN THAT BUILDING, 250…C SUMMO NS, C SUMMONS YEAH…EVERYBODY WALKING AROUND, SHAKE THEM UP, STOP THEM, 250 THEM, NOT MATTER WHAT THE EXPLANATION…IF THEY’RE WALKING, IT DOESN’T MATTER.”
411. “YOU WANT TO BE AN ASSHOLE OR WHATEVER YOU CALL IT, MAKE EM’ MOVE. IF THE Y WON’T MOVE, C ALL ME OVER AND L OCK EM’ UP, DISC ON, NO BIG DEAL…IF YOU STOP THEM, 250 THEM. HOW HARD IS A 250? I’M NOT SAYING MAKE IT UP BUT YOU C AN ALWAYS ARTICULATE – ROB BERY BURGLARY, WHATEVER THE CASE MAY BE…THOSE KIDS ON THE S TEP. YOU GONNA KEEP WALKING?”
412. “GETTING BACK TO THE 250’S AND C’S, IF YOU ST OP SOMEONE FOR A C AND YOU DISC ON THEM, CHANCES ARE THEY ARE JUST HANGING AROUND, MOPING AROUND.”
413. “BE A LOTTA KIDS OUT THERE. YOU KNOW MY DEAL, I’M GOING TO CUFF EM’ UP AND BRING EM IN. WAIT TIL 7, LET THEM GO AT 7:30 W HEN EVERYBODY COMES IN. THEY HANG OUT IN THE PARK, I’LL TELL EM ONCE, I F THEY DON’T MOVE THEY’RE COMING.”
414. “AND SUMMONSES. SHAME ON YOU, YOU DRIVE BY AND THEY’RE PLAYING DICE, YOU DON’T GIVE A SUMMONS.”

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 61 of 66
415. All of the afore mentioned statements make it abundantly clear that this summonses quotas has been im planted and execu ted in a m anner that essentially prevents minority residents in low-incom e neighborhoods from exercising thei r rights to assem ble whatsoever in their own neighborhoods in areas that are and should be accessible to the public at large in violation of their rights under the First Amendment.
416. Additionally, plaintiff LINDSEY RIDDICK was standing in front of the building where he lived when he was issued a summ ons without probable cause and then the officer informed him, a thirty six (36) year old man , that he could not stand outside his own building, threatening to arrest him unless he went inside of his apartment and remained there.
417. As such, defendants conduct in having an implementing said policy is in direct violation of plaintiff’s right to freedom of assem bly as s ecured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
418. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff’s liberty was restricted for an extended period of time, and he was put in f ear for his safety, was hum iliated and s ubjected to handcuffing, and other physical restraints.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITYUNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 419. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and reallege each an d every allegation con tained in paragraphs “1" through “418" as if the same were more fully set forth at length herein. 420. Defendants caused plaintiffs and members of the Class to be issued summonses in the absence of any evidence of crim inal wrongdoing, notwithstanding their knowledge that said summonses were not based on probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law in violation of the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 62 of 66
421. Defendants caused plaintiffs and members of the Class to be issued summonses in the absence of any evidence of crim inal wrongdoing, notwithstanding their knowledge that said summonses were not based on probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law and knowing that plaintiffs and members of the class would b e required to appear in court to be prosecuted under the aforementioned unconstitutionally issued summonses in violation of the constitu tional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
422. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants and subordinate officers of the NYPD in their capacities as police officers and officials, with all the actual and/or apparent authority attendant thereto.
423. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants and subordinate NYPD officers in thei r capacities as police officers and officials pursuant to the cu stoms, policies, usages, practices, procedures, and rule s of the C ity of New York and the New York City Police Departme nt, all under the supervision of RAYMOND KELLY and other ranking officers of said department.
424. The pattern of unconstitu tional issuance of summonses pursuant to quotas established by policy-making officials within the NYPD and the City of New York, the failure to train staff regarding the requisite level of probable cause required for the issuance, and the failure to supervise and/or d iscipline staff responsible for the un constitutional issuance of summonses are so institutionalized as to represent a policy or custom of unconstitutional summonses under a quota system that caused the deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights and those of other Class members.
425. The aforementioned customs, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Po lice Department include, but are not limited to, the following unconstitutional practices:

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 63 of 66
i. Creating a quotas system for NYPD subordinate officer s requiring the officers to issue a certain num ber of summonses per month and year regardless of probable cause;
ii. Creating a policy of awarding in centives to officers who m eet or exceed the required number of summonses to be issued according to NYPD’s quota;
iii. Creating a policy of punishing offi cers who fail to meet the required number of summonses established by NYPD’s quota;
iv. Allocating NYPD funding and resources entirely based on a m anufactured correlation between low reported crime and high summons and arrest activity for quality of life offenses causing offi cers to “create” activ ity and do wngrade reported major crime;
v. Issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or any legal basis in order to meet the requirements of the quota established by the NYPD;
vi. Disproportionately issuing summonses to black and Hi spanic individuals in violation their rights unde r the Equal Protection Clau se pursuant to the quota established by the NYPD;
vii. Having a p olicy of vio lating minority residents right to peaceably ass embly in areas open to the public in violation of their rights under the First Amendment;
viii. Showing deliberate indifference to whether the summonses issued pursuant to that quota established by the NYPD were issued based on probable cause or any legal basis;
ix. Showing deliberate indifference to the training of subordinate officers to not issue summonses unless they are issued upon probable cause or a basis under the law;
x. Showing deliberate indifference to the s upervision of subordi nate officers in enforcing the quotas system established by the NYPD for the issuance of summonses in determining whether they were legitimately issued;
426. The existence of the aforesaid un constitutional customs and policies m ay be
inferred from repeated occurrences of si milar wrongful conduct as is the case with the twenty-
two (22) plaintiffs in this m atter as well as th e Annual Reports from the Criminal Courts of the
City of New York, NYPD’s own statistics and statistics and reports maintained by the NYACLU
and other City Agencies.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 64 of 66
427. The foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police Department constituted a deliberate indifference to the safety, well-be ing and constitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
428. The foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of Ne w York and the New York City Poli ce Department were the direct and proxim ate cause of the constitutional violations suffered by plaintiffs and members of the Clas s as alleged herein.
429. The foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Polic e Department were the moving force behind the constitutional violations suffered by plaintiffs and the members of the Class as alleged herein.
430. As a result of the foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police D epartment, plaintiffs and members of the Class were issued summ onses without probable cause or any legal basis and in many instances were subjected to detention, search, restrain ts, handcuffing and verbal and mental abuse in violation of their constitutional rights.
431. As a result of the foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police D epartment, plaintiffs and members of the Class were caused to appear in court to be prosecuted on these unconstitutionally issued summonses and in m any instances causing them to lose tim e from work or school in violation of their constitutional rights.
432. As a result of the foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police D epartment, plaintiffs and members of the Class were targeted, stopped and issued unconstitutional summonses based on an

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 65 of 66
impermissible classification under the Equal Prot ection Clause of the Fo urteenth Amendment, their race.
433. Defendants, collectively and individually, while acting und er color of state law, were directly and activ ely involved in violat ing the con stitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
434. Defendants, collectively and individually, while acting und er color of state law, acquiesced in and encouraged a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by subordinate police officers, and were directly respon sible for the violation of the constitutio nal rights of plaintiffs and members of the class.
435. All of the foregoing acts by defendants de prived plaintiffs and m embers of the Class of federally protected rights, including, but not limited to, the right:
ii. Not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law; iii. To be free from search, seizure and arrest not based upon probable cause; and, iv. To receive equal protection under the law; v. To peaceably assemble and express free speech. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs and members of the Class request the following relief jointly and severally as against all of the defendants:
1. A judgment declaring that defendants hav e committed the violations of law alleged in this action;
2. An order prelim inarily and perm anently enjoining and dir ecting defendants to cease en forcement of this quo ta system for th e issuance of summonses;
3. Directing that immediate remedial training on the proper and legal grounds for the issuance of summ onses be provided to all current members of the NYPD (in the Precincts and the police academy);
4. Directing defendants to put in pl ace a system for m onitoring the summonses issued and the legal ba sis for their issuance so that

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 8 Filed 08/31/10 Page 66 of 66

baseless summonses that have be en issued can be imm ediately dismissed;

5. Compensatory damages against all defendants in an am ount to be proven at trial;

6. Punitive damages against all def endants, except the City , in an amount to be proven at trial;

7. An order awarding disbursem ents, costs, and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

8. Such other further relief that the court may deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York August 31, 2010

225 (212)

BY: ________/S____________ JON L. NORINSBERG (JN-2133) Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, N.Y. 10007 791-5396 norinsberg@aol.com

BY:________/S____________ COHEN & FITCH LLP JOSHUA P. FITCH (JF-2813) GERALD M. COHEN (GC-0414) 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, N.Y. 10007 (212) 374-9115 jfitch@cohenfitch.com gcohen@cohenfitch.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

~"~-'-"-""'-"-'--."

--x

SHARIF STINSON, et al.,

against ­

Plaintiffs,

10 Civ. 4228 (RWS) OPINION

CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Defendants.
- -x

A P PEA RAN C E S:

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

COHEN & FITCH LLP 
 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 
 New York, NY 10007 
 By: Joshua P. Fitch, Esq. 

Gerald M. Cohen, Esq.

THE LAW OFFICES OF JON L. NORINSBERG, 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 
 New York, NY 10007 
 By: Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq. 


ESQ. 


At

for the Defendants

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO 
 CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
 100 Church Street 
 New York, NY 10007 
 By: Qiana C. Smith Williams, Esq. 


Sweet, D.J.
Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson, Mariam Farnum, Charlean Finley, Ryburn Walkes, Jamel Towe, Christian Dudley, Joceley Ferdinand, Gary Shaw, Michael Bennett, Chane1 Meausa, David Thompson, Julius Dixon, Joseph Sarpong, Jeremy Thames, Sean Pettigrew, Leander Griffin, Brian Morris, Mica Ancrum, Ricardo Jones, Victor Breland, Lindsey Riddick and Michael Riddick (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), bring this putative class action against the City of New York, Raymond Kelly, the Commissioner of the New York Police Department ("NYPD"), and unnamed New York City Police Officers (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants have implemented and sanctioned a policy, practice and custom of issuing unconstitutional summonses, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiffs allege that the NYPD is engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of issuing summonses to individuals without probable cause and that NYPD officers are explicitly instructed to issue summonses regardless of whether any crime or violation has occurred in order to meet a minimum quota requirement set forth by the NYPD. Plaintiffs contend that the NYPD consistently punishes officers who issue fewer
1

summonses and rewards police officers who issue more summonses, irrespective of whether probable cause existed for the summonses' issuance.

Plaintiffs seek equitable relief in

form of (1) a

declaration that Defendants' pol ies, practices and customs

violate the law and Constitution as leged, (2) a class -wide

injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing a quota system

the issuance

summonses, (3) an order directing that

immediate remedial training on the proper legal grounds for the

issuance of summonses be provided to all current members of the

NYPD (in the precincts and the police academy) and (4) an order

directing Defendants to put in place a system for monitoring the

summonses issued and the legal basis for their issuance such

that baseless summons can be dismissed. Additionally,

Plaintiffs

compensatory and punit

damages and, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, attorneys'

Plaintiffs now move

class certification, approval

class representatives and appointment of class counsel

pursuant to Rules 23 (a), 23 (b) (2), and 23 (b) (3) of the Federal

Rules

Civil Procedure.

2

Based on the

ts and conclusions set forth below,

aintiffs' motion is granted, a class is certified under both

Rules 23(b) (2) and 23(b) (3) and class representatives and class

counsel are appointed. The class is defined to include

individuals who were issued summonses that were later dismissed

upon a judicial finding of facial insuff iency and who were

ticketed without probable cause. Individuals who were issued

summonses that survived the New York City Citywide Summons

Operations' defect review but were dismissed during the second-

round review process upon a judicial finding of facial

insufficiency are presumptive members of the class, but

Defendants can challenge any presumptive class member on grounds

that the summons at issue was dismissed for reasons other than a

lack of probable cause. The class is ent led to seek

declaratory and injunct

relief, pursuant to its certification

under Rule 23(b) (2) ( as well as money damages, pursuant to its

certification under Rule 23(b) (3). Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson,

Ryburn Walkes, Gary Shaw, Michael Bennett, Chanel Meausa{ David

Thompson, Julius Dixon{ Jeremy Thames, Leander Griffin{ Ricardo Jones, Victor Breland and Lindsey Riddick1 will serve as class

1

Pursuant to the Joint Consent Order, endorsed by the Court

on June 24{ 2011, Plaintiffs Joceley Ferdinand, Jamel Towe,

Joseph Sarpong, Sean Pettigrew and Michael Riddick were removed

as class representatives. Additionally, pursuant to the Order{

any proposed class representative who failed to appear

3

representatives, and Cohen & Fitch LLP and Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq. shall serve as class counsel.
Prior Proceedings
This action was initiated on May 25, 2010. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 31, 2010 (the "Amended Class Action Complaint") . Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for class certification on February 4, 2011. Following the resolution of various motions regarding pre-certification discovery, the parties entered a stipulation as to the scope of depositions to be conducted prior to the briefing of the instant motion. Following that discovery period and further briefing, the class certification motion was marked fully submitted and heard on November 16, 2011.
The Facts
The following facts are drawn from the Amended Class Action Complaint and the declarations, exhibits and affidavits
deposition by July 15, 2011, would withdraw as a class representative. Accordingly, PI ntiffs Mariam Farnum, Charlean Finley, Christian Dudley, Brian Morris and Mica Ancrum are no longer proposed class representatives since they failed to timely appear for deposition.
4

submitted with respect to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. These facts are not in dispute except as noted below.

A. The Plaintiffs

According to the Amended Class Action Complaint,

Plaintiffs are twenty-two men and women between the ages of 18

and 44 years old. Each Plaintiff alleges that

or she has

been issued one or more summonses by police officers without

probable cause, in Manhattan, Queens, the Bronx or Brooklyn and

that such summonses were subsequently dismissed. Each aims to

have sustained inj es as a result of these encounters

including, but not limited to, fear of the possibility of

receiving summonses without probable cause in the future.

B. The Citywide Summons Operation

Accompanying their opposition to aintiffs' motion

for class certification, Defendants

submitted excerpts from

the Annual Reports of the Criminal Court of the ty of New York

for

years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. These

reports provide a description the tywide Summons Operation.

5 


According to the reports, summonses can be issued from

over forty certified agencies, including the NYPD, Metropolitan

Transportation Authority and the New York City Fire Department,

among others. These authorized agenc deliver summonses to

the Criminal Court's Central Receiving Unit. Once the summonses

are received, the Central Receiving Unit looks for"

ous

defects" that would prohibit the summons from being docketed.

Such serious defects include a missing signature or narrative or

an improper return date. Following this review, the summonses

are then scanned into the Criminal Court's Summons Automated

Management System. After data ent staff log the information

and create a docket, the summonses are then forwarded to the

appropriate county's summons office where the Associate Court

Cl

in charge coordinates with the Supervising Judge's office

to ensure that, in the words

the Annual Reports, "a timely

review for legal sufficiency takes place." In Bronx, Kings, New

York and Queens Counties, this review for "legal sufficiency"

takes place prior to the scheduled arraignment date. Summonses

that survive this judicial review are then endared for

arraignment. In Richmond County, summonses are reviewed for

legal sufficiency at

scheduled arraignment session. As

such, the Citywide Summons Operation involves two stages of

6 


review: an initial

t review performed by the Central

Receiving Unit, and then a review for "legal

ficiency"

performed by a judici

ficer.

The charts accompanying the statistics in the Annual

Reports describe the two rounds of review as "De t Review" and

"Facial Sufficiency Review," and the Annual Reports'

presentation of the data

es the "timely review for legal

ficiency" with "Facial

ficiency Review." See N.Y.C. Crim.

Ct. Annual Rept. 2009 at 33 35 (describing summons

ew

s and presenting data, noting "Dism. Insuff." term

"represents the number of summonses dismissed as part

the

pre-arraignment review" and

ing the number

summonses

fi

surviving defect review minus the numbered dismissed as

insufficient to represent those "Summonses Surviving Faci

Suffic

Review."); see also N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Annual

2008 at 37 39; N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Annual Rept. 2007 at 35-37;

N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Annual Rept. 2006 at 46-48. As such,

terms

"legal ficiency" as used in the Annual Reports and "facial

sufficiency" appear to be synonymous.

tywide Summons Operation can thus be described

7

as follows. 2 When an NYPD officer observes illegal conduct, he

issues a summons and, before the return date l files an

accusatory instrument with the New York City Criminal Court.

Once this accusatory instrument is filed and delivered to the

Court's Central Receiving Unit, it is screened for defects l such

as a missing signature or narrative, or improper return date.

Summonses that survive this defect review are then forwarded to

the appropriate county/s summons office, where the Associate

Court Clerk and Supervising Judge's office ensure

a timely

review

legal sufficiency takes place. Legal sufficiency is

synonymous with faci sufficiency, a term that is defined in

the New York Criminal Procedure Law.

C. Reports Generated by the Office of Court Administration

In addition to a description of New York City's Citywide Summons Operation, the parties have also submitted statistics obtained from the Office of Court Administration (OCA). These reports, entitl "Caseload Activi Report

2

The applicable New York State statutes empowering NYPD

officers to issue summonses, requiring NYPD officers to file an

accusatory instrument with the Criminal Court for the City of

New York subsequent to issuing a summons and outlining the

guidelines by which courts review summonses for facial

suff iency are described more fully in the section discussing

ascertainability.

8

Summons Cases,lI contain data for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 and provide detail by geographic area of the number of new summonses calendared, the total number of dispositions and the means by which the disposition was reached, i.e. dismissed, adjourned in contemplation dismissal, found guilty, pled guilty, acquitted or other disposition.

The OCA data reveals that, in total, over the period

from 2004 through 2009, there were 3,597,964 summonses filed.

Of those, 223,716 were dismissed during the first-round defect

review, and 620,149 were dismissed during the second round

facial sufficiency review. In percentage terms, between 2004

and 2009, 6.2% of summonses filed were dismissed prior to

arraignment as defective and 17.2% of summonses filed were

dismissed prior to arraignment as facial insufficient. The

percentages have remained fairly constant from 2004 through

2009. In 2004, 5.8% of summonses filed were dismissed as

defective, 16.7% of summonses filed were dismissed as

ially

insufficient. In 2005, it was 6.2% and 18.2%; in 2006 1 it was 6.0% and 19.4%; in 2007, it was 5.9% and 15.5%; in 2008 1 6.7% and 17.6%; and in 2009[ it was 6.8% and 16.0%.

Plaintiffs note that, between 2004 and 2009, 2[291[425 9 


summonses were adjudicated

the New York City Criminal Courts,

and 1,185,412 of those summonses (51.7% of the total

adjudicated) were dismissed. Plaintiffs also highlight that of

the number of summonses that are adjudicated annually, the

number that are dismissed prior to trial is consistently over

50%:

2004, it was 53.6%; in 2005, 53.5%; in 2006 1 51.3%; in

2007 1 50.7%; in 2008 1 50.5%; and in 2009 1 50.1%. According to

Plaintiffs, the fact that this percentage has consistently

remained above 50% demonstrates the existence of a pattern or

practice. Defendants dispute Plaintiffs l conclusions concerning

the OCA statistics.

Of the summonses that were dismissed l 1,945 (less than .1%) resulted in an acquittal, which Plaintiffs interpret as meaning these summonses were dismissed after trial. According to Plaintiffs, this reveals that over 99% (99.9%) of all dismissals l numbering some 1,183,467, occurred prior to trial as the result of a judicial finding that those summonses were legally insufficient to support the charges alleged. Again, Defendants dispute the conclusions Plaintiffs have reached concerning this data.

D. Tape Recordings of NYPD Roll Call Meetings 10

In addition to the OCA data, Plaintiffs have submitted

tape recordings obtained from NYPD Officers Adhyl Polanco

(nPolanco") and Adrian Schoolcraft (nSchoolcraft"), as well as

accompanying affidavits of authenticity. The recordings

provided have so been presented to the Honorable Shira A.

Scheindlin in the case of

of New York, 813 F.

Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), a case in which African-American

suspects brought a putative class action, under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, against the City of New York, the Police Commissioner, the

Mayor and police officers, alleging a pol

of stops and fri

by the NYPD on the basis of race or national origin, in

violation of Title VI and

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

According to his affidavit, Polanco has been a member

of the NYPD since 2005 and, from 2006 to December 2009, served

as a patrol officer in the 41st Precinct in the Bronx. Polanco

1S currently suspended. In September and October 2009,

anco

made audio recordings of precinct roll

I meetings during

which officers would receive oral instructions from trainings

sergeants, patrol squad supervisors and platoon commanders,

among others. Schoolcraft, according to his affidavit, is also

a suspended member of the NYPD. From September 2003 through

11 


October 2009, Schoolcraft worked as a patrol officer in the 81st

Precinct in Brooklyn, and, between April 2008 and October 2009,

he made audio recordings of roll

I meetings.

According to the excerpted portions cited in

Class

Action Amended Complaint, Polanco's tape recordings from the 41 st

Precinct include the following comments from Polanco's superior

officers: "I spoke to the [commanding officer] for about an hour

and half. The activi [is] 20 and 1.

. They want 20

[summonses] and 1 [arrest]. How? I don't know.

Alright/

so it's 20 and 1." "Next week you could be at 25 [summonses]

and 1 [arrest], you could be at 35 [summonses] and 1 [arrest]

and guess what? Until you cide to quit this job and become a

pizza hut delivery man, this is what you're going to be doing

until then." "Things are not going to get any better, it's

going to get a lot worse. If you think 1 [arrest] and 20

[summonses] is breaking your balls, guess what you are going to

be doing? You're going to be doing a lot more, a lot more than

what you think." "It's real non-negotiable, 'cause if you

don't do it now, I'm gonna have you work with

boss to make

sure it happens."

schoolcraft's recordings from the 81st Precinct reveal 12

the lowing comments from supervising officers: "He wants at

least 3 seatbelts [summonses] f 1 cell phone [summons] and 11

others [summonses] /I "I see 8 fucking summonses for a 20 day

period or a month. If you mess up, how the hell do you want me

to do the right thing by you?" "I told you last month, they're

looking at the numbers. Ain't about losing your job, [but] they

can make your job real uncomfortable." "How many superstars and

how many losers do we have? How many summonses does the squad

write? We need more act ty. If your productivity falls below

par, either you or the C.O. is going to have to answer." "We

need 250's [a type of summons], we need arrests, quality of li

enforcement [C-summonses] I community visits, we need, get 2 of

them in a car, 3 on foot." "Go through

motions and get your

numbers anyway. Donlt be the one caught out there. Marino/s

yelling at everyone about

points. II "If they're on a corner,

make 'em move. If they don't want to move, lock 'em up. Done

deal. You can always articulate [a charge] later."

E. January 14, 2006 Ruling Of Arbitrator Bonnie Siber 
 Weinstock 


In addition to the audio recordings, Plaintiffs have

submitted a January 14, 2006 decision from Arbitrator Bonnie

Siber Weinstock addressing the 75th Precinct's 13

leged

enforcement of a traffic summons quota. While the Arbitrator received evidence regarding quotas for a variety of leged quotas, including moving violations, parking tickets, quality of li summonses and arrests, the arbitrator addressed only the alleged quota for traffic violations. In the decision, the Arbitrator framed the issue in the proceeding to be: "Did the New York City Police Department violate New York State Labor Law Section 215 a by establishing and maintaining a summons quota for traffic violations in the 75th Precinct and by penalizing officers for failing to meet the stated number of traffic violations, including parking, standing and stopping? If so, what shall be the remedy?"
Citing testimony from NYPD officers and various documents describing how a police officer's failure to issue the required number of summonses would result in a substandard performance rating, the Arbitrator found that the 75 th Precinct had instituted and enforced a traffic summons quota in violation of New York State Labor Law Section 215-a:
The aim raised this proceeding is sustained in accordance with the Opinion herein. The New York City Police Department violated New York State Labor Law Section 215-a by establishing and maintaining a summons quota for traffic violations in the 75th Precinct and by penalizing officers for failing to meet the stated number of traff
14

violations, including parking, standing and stopping. The City shall cease and desist from maintaining a vehicular ticket quota. The City shall, upon request, revise the performance evaluation of any employee whose marks were reflective of a failure to meet the illegal ticket quota. Employees in the 75th Precinct shall have ninety calendar (90) days from the date of this Award within which to contact the Employer and express a desire to have their performance evaluation(s) reviewed and revised.
The Standard For Class Certification
Class certification is appropriate where the proposed class meets, by a preponderance of the evidence following a court's "rigorous analysis," the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the proposed class constitutes one of the types of classes enumerated in Rule 23 (b) See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551-52, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 478 (2d Cir. 2008); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 2006). "Frequently that 'rigorous analysis' will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim." Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551; accord Bombardier, 546 F.3d at 202. However, "in making such determinations, a district judge should not assess any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23
15

requirement. II In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41. The Court has

discretion on questions of ass certification because "the

district court is often in the best position to assess the

propriety the class and has the ability

. to alter or

modify the ass, create subclasses, and

ify the class

whenever warranted."

Rouse

., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).

------''---­

The four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are as follows:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or

common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of

representative parties are typical of the claims or

fenses of the class; and (4) the representative

ies

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class.

Fed. R. civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs must also show the ass

def tion is ascertainable. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 44 45. "An

identifiable class

sts if its members can be ascertained by

re

to object

criteria. II In re Fosamax Prods. abo

.,248 F.R.D. 389,395 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting In re
--'--""-­
Ether Prods. Liab. Lit ., 209 F.R.D. 323,

337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).

16

In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a),

the proposed class must constitute one of the types of classes

enumerated in Rule 23(b).

aintiffs have moved

class

certification under both Rule 23(b) (2) and Rule 23(b) (3). Rule

23 (b) (2) provides for class certification if

requirements of

Rule 23(a) are met and:

the party opposing the class has acted or refused to

act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so

that final

unctive

f or corresponding

declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class

as a whole [ . ]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2). Rule 23 (b) (3) provides for class

certification if the requirements

Rule 23(a) are met and:

the court finds that the questions of law or fact

common to class members predominate over any questions

affect only individual members, and that a class

action is superior to other available methods for

fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

matters pertinent to

se findings include: (A)

the class members' interests in individually

cont ling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation

concerning the controversy already begun by or against

class membersi (C) the desirability or undes

ility

of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the

particular forum; and (D)

likely difficulties in

managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) . 17 


The Second rcuit has described the standard of proof governing class certification as follows:

(1) a district judge may certify a class only after

making determinations that each of the Rule 23

requirements

been met; (2) such determinations can

be made only if the judge resolves factual disputes

relevant to

Rule 23 requirement and finds that

whatever underlying facts are relevant to a particular

Rule 23

rement have been establi

and is

persuaded to

, based on the relevant facts and the

applicable

standard, that the

rement is

met; (3)

obligation to make such determinations is

not les

by overlap between a

23 requirement

and a merits issue, even a merits issue that is

identical with a Rule 23 requirement; (4) in making

such determinations, a district judge should not

assess

aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23

requirement; and (5) a district judge has ample

discret to circumscribe both

extent of

discovery concerning Rule 23

rements and the

extent a hearing to determine whether such

requirements are met in order to assure that a class

certif

ion motion does not become a pretext for

part trial of the merits.

In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41. \\, [1'] standard of proof appli

to evi

proffered to meet'

requirements of Rule 23 [is]

a 'preponderance of the evidence. '" In re Flag Telecom

, 574 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 2009)
~--~~~--~------------~~
(quot Bombardier, 546 F.3d at 202) .

The Plaintiffs Have Satisfied The Rule 23(a) Requirements For 18

Class Certification

As noted above 1 a class may be certif

only if

satisf the following prerequisites: (1) the class is so

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there

are questions law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims

or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of

class; and (4) the representat

part will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class.

R. Civ. P. 23(a) i see also In re Pfizer Inc. Sec .

• 1
--""'-­

No.

04 Civ.

9866 (LTS) (HBP) 1

2012 WL 1059671 1

at

*2

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012). Courts have also found an implied

requirement of ascertainability to the express requirements set

forth in Rule 23(a). See In re Sadia S.A. Sec. Lit '1 269

F.R.D. 298 1 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing In re IP0 1 471 F.3d at

30). For the reasons set forth below 1 the class satisf

the

four requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the additional

requirement of ascertainability.

1. Numerosity

For class certification to be appropriate, the proposed class must be so numerous that joinder of all of its
19

individual members would be impracticable. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

23 (a) (1) i In re NYSE

ialists Sec. Lit '1 260 F.R.D. 55 1 69

70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). "The numerosity requirement in Rule

23 (a) (1) does not mandate that joinder of all parties be

impossible only that

difficulty or inconvenience of

joining all members of the class make use of the class action

appropriate. II Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas

th & WeI

Fund v. Merck-Medco Care LLC ~~----------~-----------~~------~----- I 504 F.3d 229 1 244-45 (2d

Cir. 2007) i see also In re

Market Makers Antitrust

--------~--~--~----- ............~--------~~~ 


Litig' l 169 F.R.D. 493 1 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "Numerosity is

presumed when a class consists of forty members or more. 1I NYSE

Specialists l 260 F.R.D. at 70 (citing Consolo Rail

v. Town

-of- - " ' - - - - - I 47 F.3d 473 1 483 (2d Cir. 1995)) i see also In re Sadia l 269 F.R.D. at 304 ("Sufficient numerosity can be presumed

at a

1 of forty members or more. II) •

Here l the proposed class like exceeds forty members. Given the figures included in the OCA datal the number individuals the proposed class could number in the hundreds of thousands. 3 AccordinglYI Plaintiffs have satisfied their

3

Because of the three year statute of limitations applicable

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 the applicable class period begins in May 2007. The Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Reports

establish that the number of summonses issued to putative

plaintiffs in the class l as the class is defined below l number 20

burden of establishing numerosity.

2. Commonality

"The commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs'

grievances share a common question of law or fact." Marisol A.

v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing In re

Prod. Liab. Lit 'f 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir.

1987)). However, "[c]ommonality does not mandate that all class

members make identical claims and arguments/ only that common

issues of fact or law affect all class members." Trief v. Dun &

Bradstreet

., 144 F. R. D. 193 / 198 (S . D. N. Y. 1 992 ) (c i ng

----------------~

Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assfn v. Port Auth./ 698 F.2d ISO,

153 54 (2d Cir. 1983)). "A court may find a common issue of law

even though there exists some factual variation among class

members' specific grievances." Dupler v. Costco Wholesale

Corp., 249 F.R.D. 29/ 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted)

some 99,317 in 2008 and 96,100 in 2009. Data

2010 is not

part of the evidentiary record before the Court/ and statistics

for 2007 include summonses from the January through May 2007

period that are out de the class period. However/ even when

only the 2008 and 2009 figures are considered, the number of

summonses at issue is at least 195/417. Although putative

plaintiffs may have received more than one summons/

large

quantity of summonses at issue in this litigation assures that

the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a) is satisfied.

21 


aintiffs have alleged that they were victims

of a pattern and practice set and enforced by city offic s,

the NYPD and New York City Police Officers to stop, search,

seize, arrest and issue summonses to individuals without

probable cause in response to a requirement and constant

pressure to meet a summons quota. The c

these Plaintiffs

seek to represent includes those who suffered similar injury

pursuant to the same pattern and pract

"The fact that the

claims of the proposed class stem from the same alleged

unconstitutional conduct of the defendants proves the

stence

of common questions of law or fact." Daniels v. ------~-----~~~----~~
York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

In addressing Rule 23(a) 's commonality requirement,

particular attention must be paid to the Supreme Court's recent

decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes. In the Dukes case,

named plaintiffs were three current and former female

employees of Wal Mart, each of whom alleged that she suffered

unlawful sexual discrimination in pay and promotion. In seeking

c

certification to bring Title VII claims on behalf of all

current and former female Wal-Mart employees, the named

plaintiffs did not lege an "express corporate policy against

the advancement of women," Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2548, or a

22 


"uniform employment practice" that violated the law, id. at

2554. Instead, the named plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart's

general corporate policy was to low local managers discretion

over their employees' pay and promotion and that this policy of

allowing discretion, coupled with a "corporate culture" of

sexual stereotyping caused women to be disfavored in the

workplace. Id. at 2548. The District Court for the Northern

District of California certified the class, basing its finding

commonality on three types of evidence: statistics showing

pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal

evidence from some 120 women and expert testimony from a

sociologist to the effect that Wal-Mart's corporate culture

rendered it vulnerable to discrimination in discretionary pay

and promotion decision making. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2549. The

Ninth Circuit affirmed certification, finding that the named

plaintiffs' evidence established commonality by raising the

issue "whether Wal Mart's female employees nationwide were

subjected to a single set

corporate poli es (not merely a

number of independent discriminatory acts) that may have worked

to unlawfully discriminate against them violation of tle

VII." Id. at 2549.

Reject

the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, the Supreme 23

Court summarized the commonality requirement as follows:

Commonality requires the pI

iff to demonstrate that the

class members "have suf

the same injury," (citation

omitted). This does not mean merely that they have all

suffered a violation of the same provision law. Title

VII,

example, can be violated in many ways-by

discrimination, or by hiring and promotion

criteria that result in disparate impact, and by the use of

these practices on the part of many different superiors in

a single company. Quite obviously, the mere claim by

empl

of the same company that they have suffered a

t VII injury, or even a disparate-impact tIe VII

ury, gives no cause to lieve that all t

can

productively be litigated at once. Their cl

must

depend on upon a common contention-for example, the

assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same

supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of

such a nature that it is capable of classwi resolution­

which means that determination of its truth or falsity will

an issue that is central to the

idity of each

one of the claims one stroke.

Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.

Supreme Court d that such a

"common connection" was lacking in Dukes because the basis for

liability was not merely sfavor in pay and promotion, but the

reason why each class member was disfavored.

five-justice

majority noted: "The only corporate policy that plaintiffs'

convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart's 'policyl of

allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment

matters. On its face,

course l that is just the opposite of a

uniform employment practice that would provide the commonali

for a class act

i it is a policy against having uniform 24

employment pract

II Id. at 2554.

plaintiffs had not

identified a corporate policy that led to the local managers'

discretion being exercised in a uniformly scriminatory way,

the Supreme Court held commonality to be lacking. See id. at

2556-57 ("Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a

companywide discriminatory pay and promotion

icy, we have

concluded that they

not established the

stence of any

common question. lI ) •

unlike in

where the plaintiffs alleged a

corporate policy

scretion to local managers and a corporate

culture hostile to the advancement of women, PIa iffs here

have alleged a specific

icy promulgated by Defendants,

namely, that Defendants

established a practice by which

NYPD officers issue summonses without probable cause

order to

meet a summons quota. As such, the Supreme Court's holding in

Dukes supports a finding

Rule 23{a)'s commonality element

s been established in this case.

3. Typicality

have

Rule 23(a) (3) requires that the class representatives

ims typical of those

by the class members. "To

25

establish typicality under Rule 23(a) (3), the party seeking

certi cation must show that 'each class member's claim arises

from the same course of events and each class member makes

similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability.'"

See In re Fl Telecom, 574 F.3d at 35 (quot

Robidoux v.

Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993). "Rule 23 (a) (3) is

satisfied when each class member's claim ses from the same

course of events, and each class member makes similar arguments

to prove the defendant's liability." In re Drexel, 960 F.2d at

291. When the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected

both the named plaintiffs and the prospective class, typicality

is usually met. See Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936-37i see also

Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 155 (2d

r. 2001) (the typicality requirement "is satisfied when each

class member's claim ses from the same course of events, and

each class member makes similar 1

arguments to prove the

defendant's liability.II). Typicality may be found to fail in

cases where the named plaintiff was not harmed by the conduct

alleged to have injured the class. Newman v. RCN Telecom Servs.,

Inc., 238 F.R.D. 57, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Here,

proposed class representatives are New

Yorkers who have all allegedly been issued at least one summons

26

without probable cause and suffered injury as a result of an

alleged unconstitutional NYPD

ice. The sole theory of

liability in s case is that Defendants have a pattern and

practice of issuing summonses without probable cause for

behavior that did not occur or that does not constitute a

summonsable offense. As such, the claims here" se[] from the

same course of events, and

class member makes similar legal

arguments to prove the defendant1s liability." Cent. States,

504 F.3d at 245 (quotation marks and citation omitted) .

4. Adequacy

The adequacy representation inquiry under Rule

23(a) considers "whe

1) plaintiff's

rests are

antagonistic to the interest of other members of the class and

2) pIa iff's attorneys are qualified,

enced and able to

conduct litigation." Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec.

'1 222 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2000) i see also NYSE
---'=-­

---------, 260 F.R.D. at 73. In

to defeat c

certification, there must be "a showing of a genuine conflict"

between the proposed class representative's interests and those

the other members of the class, In re Drexel, 960 F.2d at

291, and "only a

lict that goes to the very subject matter

27

of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative

status." Hirschfeld v. Stone, 193 F.R.D. 175, 183 (S.D.N.Y.

2000) .

fferences in the amount

recoverable damages

generally do not give rise to a conflict. See, e.g., In re

NASDAQ, 169 F.R.D. at 513.

In this case, Plaintiffs have demonstrated both the

first and second prongs of the test outlined in the Second

rcuit's Baffa decision to be fulfilled. Plaintiffs' interests

are identical to those of the putative class, as all plaintiffs

have been allegedly injured by the same unconstitutional actions

on the part of Defendants. See Darquea v. Jarden Corp., No. 06

Civ. 722 (CLB) , 2008 WL 622811 1 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2008)

("All claims alleged arise from the same wrongful conduct, and

thus, Plaintiff's interests l recouping money invested, are

simi

to those of the proposed class. As such, named

aintiffs will

rly and adequately protect the interests of

the class.").

With respect to the second prong of the Baffa test concerning adequacy, Plaintiffs have retained Jon L. Norisberg, Esq. and the law firm of Cohen & Fitch LLP. These attorneys are competent and experienced in federal class action and federal
28

civil rights litigation. Jon L. Norinsberg is a civil rights

attorney with nearly twenty years of civil litigation

experience l including civil rights litigation against state and

local governments. See, e.g.,

ia v. Ci of New York, No.

11 Civ. 2141 (JGK) , 2012 WL 906958 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012);

__________~~__ , No. 07-CV-4793 (CBA) (RML) , 2011 WL 4625996

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011); Stamile v.

of Nassau, No. CV

10-2632 (SJF) (AKT) , 2011 WL 1754125 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011);

=B=r=a:~n~d~o~n~v~.~C=i~L-0~f-=N=e=w-=Y=o=r~k=, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ; ~~~~-=~~___N_~e_w__Y_o~r_k, No. CV 07-4143 (RJD) (JO), 2008

WL 3884388 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2008); Richardson v.

of New

York, No. 02 CV 3651(JG), 2006 WL 2792768 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

2006). Similarly, Cohen & Fitch LLP has previously litigated

civil rights actions against the City of New York. See, e.g.,

~N=i=b=b=s.-=v=.-=C=i~-=o=f-=N=e=_w _Y=o=r-=k, 800 F. Supp. 2d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Plaintiffs' counsel claim that collective ,the two firms have

litigated thousands of civil rights claims against the City of

New York. Plaintiffs also represent that the partners of Cohen

& Fitch LLP maintain a significant criminal defense practice

and, in that capacity, have spent hundreds

hours

the New

York City Criminal Court's Summons Parts. As such, Jon L.

Norisberg, Esq. and Cohen & Fitch LLP are qualified to represent

the proposed class and, along with aintif ,will protect the

29

class members' interests. Accordingly, the adequacy requirement Rule 23 (a) (4) has been satisfied.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' depos ion

testimony reveals a lack of competence and is indicative of a

lack responsibility toward the absent class members. In

particular, Defendants highlight the testimony of Stinson, who

according to Defendants! testified that he was in a daze when he

met with his attorneys! was distracted by a Yankee game and at

the end of his deposition stated that he did not understand some

of

terms used in the deposition even when he was initi ly

instructed to inform opposing counsel if he did not fully

understand the questions. Defendants also contend that other

Plaintiffs demonstrated incompetency concerning basic issues

such as

number of ass representatives in the case! the

advantages of pursuing the putative plaintiffs! as a class!

Plaintiffs! duties as class representatives!

procedural

posture and goals of the litigation and the general facts of the

case. Notwithstanding Defendants! contentions! a review of

Plaintiffs! deposition testimony demonstrates that Plaintiffs

have a working knowledge

the litigation and the

30 


responsibilities of class representatives. 4

4

See, e.g., Bennett Dep. at 28:23 30:21 ("Q. What is your

understanding about your role in this lawsuit? A. It's to give

testimony on what has happened to me at the hands of the NYPD.

Q. What is the Fourth Amendment? A. It's

right that protects

me against illegal search and seizure for no probable cause. Q.

Do you understand you are a class represent at ? A. Yes. Q. As

you sit here today, what is your understanding of what it means

to be a ass representative? A. It means that I'm representing

all the people that this has happened to in the

of New

York. Q. Do you understand that as a class representative you

have duties and responsibilities to

class? A. Yes. Q. What

is your understanding of what those duties and responsibilities

are? A. It's to show up, to participate, to give testimony when

you need me, to

in court when I'm needed.

. Q. Are there

other class representatives. A. Yes. There are. Q. What is your

understanding about how many other class representatives there

are? A. Roughly 20."); Meausa Dep. at 29:20 30:23 ("Q. What is

your understanding of your claims in

complaint? A. You'll

understand one of my claims is basically I know what I've been

through and I want to let my story be heard. So I'm going to

tell my side of the story. Even though, you know, it's people

behind me that has their side of the story too, along with the

class act. Q. What is the story you're referring to? A. That the

cops, they feel that they could stop people, innocent people and

do whatever they want and treat them how they want and give them

summonses and walk away and it's okay.

. Q. What do you

bel

that the people are doing illegally? A. I believe the

people are stopped - - innocent people - - and is giving out

summonses for no apparent reason."); Shaw Dep. at 53:18-54:1

("Q. Do you understand the allegations in the complaint? A. Yes.

Q. Tell me what your understanding is? A. Well basically, the

complaint, we're complaining about officers who are pulling over

people in their cars, writing them tickets, taking away

ir

liberties, that's a violation of our civil rights.") i Dixon Dep.

at 38:10 25 ("Q. You said you understand the legal bases for the

claims. Can you explain to me

legal bases? A. I just

explained to you that my Fourth Amendment was being violated.

More than a hundred thousand people's Fourth Amendments are

being violated as far as illegal search and procedures, people

being pulled over or you just getting a BS summons. All right.

Here's a ticket for this. Go to court.

. Q. What rights does

the Fourth Amendment guarantee to you that you

I were

31 


Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs are inadequate as ass representatives because of their lack of understanding of the fee structure in the litigation. Courts have repeatedly held that the financial resources of the proposed class representatives are relevant in determining adequacy, and class certification may be denied where the named plaintiffs fail to assume the responsibility for costs of litigation. See Weber v. Goodman, 9 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Here, according to Defendants, aintiffs' deposition testimony displays their lack of knowledge concerning the fee arrangement with counsel, most Plaintiffs testified that class counsel were responsible for the costs of the litigation, and Plaintiffs were unaware that class counsel could later bill Plaintiffs for the cost of the suit. Defendants claim that none of the Plaintiffs appear to have the financial resources necessary to pay attorney fees and costs if Plaintiffs' claims are unsuccessful.

Defendants' argument concerning Plaintiffs' financial

ability to pay defendants I costs is unavailing l as it is "irrelevant that [the] named plaintiffs were unaware of

potential liability

defendants I fees and costs, particularly

violated? A. That I can/t just unlawfully be stopped and you just unlawfully search me. You have to have probable cause.")
32

as plaintiffs! counsel are likely paying the costs of this

action." Casale v. Kel

257 F.R.D. 396! 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

With respect to the contention that Plaintiffs! deposition

testimony suggested a lack of understanding concerning their

ultimate responsibility for fees! the deposition testimony! in

several instances! reveals Plaintiffs! understanding that they

are responsible for the fees associated with the litigation.

See! e.g.! Meausa Dep. 36:1 7 ("Q. Are you aware that you could

potentially be liable for costs if this case loses? A. Yes. Q.

What do you understand that to mean? A. If everybody in the

class act drops out! I!m the only one there! that I will be

responsible for the costs."); Thames Dep. 52:3 12 ("Q. Are you

aware of your potential liability if you lose this case? A. Yes.

Q. What is your liability if you

what is your potential

liability if you lose this case? A. I think I have to pay some

fees or something like that! if I!m not mistaken. Q. You!re

aware that if you do not win! you may be liable for attorneys I

fees and cost? A. Yes.").

Defendants also criticize the adequacy of the proposed class representatives! criti zing Plaintiffs! reliabilitYt competency and credibility. Defendants note that certain Plaintiffs! backgrounds contain criminal arrests and
33

convictions, a failure to pay taxes and examples of conduct

demonstrating a proclivity for untruthfulness. However, as this

Court has observed, "According to the leading commentator on

class actions, most courts have rejected challenges to adequacy

based on allegations that plaintiffs backgrounds were alleged to

include 'unrelated unsavory, unethical or even illegal conduct.'

As set forth above, a proposed class representative's interest

may only be said to be in conflict with those other class

members where the class representative is vulnerable to unique

defenses and sharp attacks relevant to the issues in the

litigation." German v. Federal Home Mortg. Corp., 168 F.R.D.

145,155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 1 H. Newberg & A. Conte,

on Class Actions, § 3.36 (2d ed. 1992)). Other courts

in this district have rejected similar attempts to use the named

plaintiffs' background or credibility as a basis for challenging

the adequacy of class representatives. See, e.g., Casale, 257

F.R.D. at 412 ("Frankly put, defendants' assault on named

plaintiffs' capability to represent the interests of similarly

situated individuals is disrespectful and blatantly self-

serving.") i Cromer Fin. Ltd.

, 205 F.R.D. 113, 125

(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to bar class representatives on the

grounds of credibility where it was not clear that plaintiffs

fabricated testimony) .

34

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established their burden of demonstrating the adequacy of both class counsel and the class representatives.

5. Ascertainability

Although not expressly stated in the Rule, courts have

found an implied requirement of ascertainability to the express

requirements set forth in Rule 23(a). See In re Sadia, 269

F.R.D. at 305 (citing In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 30). As noted

above, "[a]n identifiable class exists if its members can be

ascertained by reference to objective criteria." In re Fosamax,

248 F.R.D. at 395 (quoting In re MTBE t 209 F.R.D. 337). Put

another waYt the ascertainability requirement means that "the

class description is sufficiently definite so that it is

administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a

particular individual is a member.1f Casale t 257 F.R.D. at 406;

see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities

ion, 269

F.R.D. 366, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (" [T]he requirement that

there be a class will not be deemed satisfied unless the class

description is sufficient definite so that it is

administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a

35 


particular individual is a member. II) • The standard for ascertainability "is not demanding. 1I Gortat v. Capala Bros., Inc., No. 07 CV-3629 (ILG) , 2010 WL 1423018, at *2, (E.D.N.Y. Apr 9, 2010). "It is designed only to prevent the certification of a class whose membership is truly indeterminable. 1I rd.
In their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs seek to define the class "consisting of all persons who have been or will be issued a summons in the absence of probable cause for offenses that were never committed and whose summonses were ultimately dismissed prior to trial. 1I Plaintiffs, subsequent to limiting the applicable class period to all summonses dismissed from May 2007 to the present based on the three year statute of limitations, assert that "the class is readily ascertainable by the identi cation of those individuals who had their summonses dismissed prior to trial. 1I However, Plaintiffs' fort to demarcate cleanly the boundaries of the class fail, as Plaintiffs cannot ascertain which summonses were issued without probable cause merely by reference to the number of summonses dismissed.
Dismissal of a summons does not, by itself, indicate that the summons was issued without probable cause. As
36 


described above, the Citywide Summons Operation involves a twostep review process: first, the Central Receiving Unit conducts a defect review/ dismissing those summonses that include a serious defect such as a missing signature or narrative or improper return date; second, the Associate Court Clerk and Supervising Judge in each county coordinates a process where the summonses are reviewed for facial sufficiency.

A review of relevant New York statutes is necessary to

precisely describe what is meant by the term "facial

sufficiency." The first issue concerns the colloquial use of

the term "summons" to describe the notice served upon an

individual by a police officer who observes illegal activity.

The Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Reports

describe these notices as "summonses/" and many New York State

statutes so use that term. However, comparing the Criminal

Procedure Law's definition of "appearance ticket" and "summons"

reveals that the notices at issue in this present action are

more accurately described as "appearance tickets/If as that term

is defined

the CPL:

§ 150.10 Appearance ticket; definition, form and content
1. An appearance ticket is a written notice issued and subscribed by a police officer or other public servant
37 


authorized by state law or local law enacted pursuant to the provisions of the municipal home rule law to issue the same, directing a designated person to appear in a designated local criminal court at a designated future time in connection with his alleged commission of a designated offense. A notice conforming to such definition constitutes an appearance ticket regardless of whether it is referred to in some other provision of law as a summons or by any other name or title.
§ 130.10 Summonsi definition, function, form and content
1. A summons is a process issued by a local criminal court directing a defendant designated in an information, a prosecutor's information, a felony complaint or a misdemeanor complaint filed with such court, or by a superior court directing a defendant designated in an indictment filed with such court, to appear before it at a designated future time in connection with such accusatory instrument. The sole function of a summons is to achieve a defendant's court appearance a criminal action for the purpose of arraignment upon the accusatory instrument by which such action was commenced.
2. A summons must be subscribed by the issuing judge and must state or contain (a) the name of the issuing court, and (b) the name of the defendant to whom it is addressed, and (c) the name or title of an offense charged in the underlying accusatory instrument, and (d) the date of issuance of the summons, and (e) the date and time when it is returnable, and (f) a direction that the defendant appear before the issuing court at such time.
N.Y. C.P.L. §§ 150.10, 130.10. The "Practice Commentaries"
accompanying N.Y. C.P.L. § 150.10 assist in demarcating the
boundary between an appearance ticket and a summons:
Due to the fact that an appearance ticket may be referred to as a summons or a traffic ticket or, as the statute
38

says, "by any other name or title", this section defines

the appearance ticket in terms of a concept that embraces

all notices that 1 within

description, as

distinguished from defining a specific, designated

document. For example, an instrument designated by the

statute as a "summons" mayor may not an appearance

ticket. If the summons is issued pursuant to CPL Article

130, it obviously is not an appearance ti

,as quickly

can be determined by comparing

definition in CPL §

130.10 with the def

ion in the present sect

But

another type of summons may well be an appearance ticket ­

e.g., the traffic summons (see Vehicle & Traffic Law, §

207). Thus the question of whether an instrument 1 ed

"summons", for example, is for CPL purposes a summons or an

appearance ticket depends upon the statute that describes

it and authorizes its issuance.

Preiser, Practice Comment es, N.Y. C.P.L. § 150.10 (McKinney's

2012). Although an "appearance ticket" and a "summons" are both

methods of requiring a defendant's appearance in local criminal

court for arraignment, an appearance ticket is available when

"no criminal action against a person has been commenced in any

court," while a summons is available only "[a]fter a criminal

action has been commenced in a local criminal court by the

filing an accusatory instrument therewith./I N.Y. C.P.L. §

110.10. Because the notices served on Plaintiffs in this action

represent instances where a police officer has observed illegal

conduct, written a citation and served an individual, these

notices are more accurately described as "appearance ti

sft

39 


rather than "summonses. lls Police officers are authorized to

serve an appearance ticket, in lieu of making an arrest,

any

offense other than a Class A, B, C or D f ony or in violation

of certa sexual of

or offenses ated to escape or bail

jumping. See N.Y. C.P.L. § 150.20(1).

"At or prior to the court date, the officer or other public servant who issued the appearance ticket will file an accusatory instrument typically an information - in local criminal court.1I Preiser, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L. § 150.10. The police ficer issuing the appearance ticket files the accusatory instrument pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L. § 150.50:

§ 150.50 Appearance ticket; filing a local criminal court accusatory instrument; dismissal of insufficient instrument

1. A police ficer or other public servant who has issued

and served an appearance ticket must, at or fore the time

such appearance ticket is returnable, file or cause to be

filed with

local criminal court in which it is

returnable a local criminal court accusatory instrument

charging the person named in such appearance ticket with

the offense

fied there

Nothing

in contained

shall authorize the use of a simplified information when

not authorized by law.

2. If such accusatory instrument is not sufficient on its face, as prescribed in section 100.40, and if the court is

5

This distinction in terminology is relevant in terms of

describing how these notices are reviewed for ial

ficiency.

sewhere in this opinion, the colloquial term

"summons" is used.

40

satisfied that on the basis of the available facts or

evidence it would be impossible to draw and file an

accusatory instrument which is

ficient on its face,

must dismiss such accusatory instrument.

N.Y. C.P.L. § 150.50. Accordingly, once the NYPD officer or other authorized off ial issues the citation, the officer then files an accusatory instrument in the Criminal Court of the City of New York. This accusatory instrument must be suff ient on its face, as mandated in N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40, which itself refers to N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.15:

§ 100.40 Local criminal court accusatory instruments; sufficiency on face

1. An information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face when:

(a) It substant ly conforms to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15i and

(b) The allegations of the factual part of the information, together with those of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information; and

(c) Non-hearsay legations of

factual part the

information and/or of any supporting depositions

establish, if true, every element of the offense

charged and the defendant's commission thereof.

§ 100.15 Information, misdemeanor complaint and felony complaint; form and content
41 


1. An information, a misdemeanor complaint and a

felony compl

must each specify

name of the

court with which it is filed and the title of the

action, and must be subscribed and

fied by a

person known as the "complainant."

complainant

may be any person having knowledge, whether personal

or upon information and belief,

commission of

the offense or offenses charged.

instrument must

contain an accusatory part and a

1 part. The

complainant/s verification of the

rument is deemed

to apply only to the factual part thereof and not to

the accusatory part.

2.

accusatory part of each such instrument must

designate the offense or of

s charged. As in the

case of an indictment, and subject to the rules of

applicable to indictments, two or more

may be charged in

counts. Also as

case of an indictment, such instrument may

charge two or more defendants provided that all such

defendants are jointly charged with every offense

all

therein.

3.

factual part of such trument must contain a

statement of the complainant leging facts of an

iary character supporting or tending to support

charges. Where more than one offense is charged,

the factual part should consist of a single factual

account applicable to all

counts of the accusatory

The factual all

may be based either

upon personal knowledge

complainant or upon

information and belief. Nothing contained in this

section, however, limits or affects the requirement,

prescribed in subdivision one of section 100.40/ that

order for an informat or a count thereof to be

sufficient on its facet

element of the of

charged and the defendant/s commission thereof must be

supported by non-hearsay allegations of such

information and/or any supporting depositions.

N.Y. C.P.L. §§ 100.40/ 100.15.

42 


A review of these statutes reveals that the fac

suffic

ew conducted as part of the Citywide Summons

Operat

s a judicial determination of whether the

summons issued lacked probable cause. As noted above, N.Y.

C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b) requires the reviewing court to determine

whether

e cause" existed for the issuance of the

summons. The term "reasonable cause" is synonymous with

"probable cause." See Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d

Cir. 1985) ('" [R]

cause,' [is] the equivalent of

probable cause.") i Hahn v.

, 820 F. Supp. 54, 58

--------------~--------~~

(N.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Reasonable cause is defined substantially the

same as probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.").

Although other reasons

dismissal at the facial

sufficiency review stage are sible, it is unlikely that these

alternative rationales apply to

summonses at issue in this

litigation. As noted above, N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.15 requires

dismissal of a summons that ils to state the court in which it

is filed, the title of the action, the name of

subscribing

complainant, the offense charged or a suffi ently criptive

factual statement, and § 100.40(1) (c) requires non

ay

allegations to establish each element of the of

Under the

summons review process described above, the techni

errors

43

enumerated in N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.15 are addressed in the defect

review conducted prior to the judicial determination of facial

sufficiency. With respect to N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c), the

offenses for which the summonses in this case are being issued

establi lack

non-hearsay all

ions to be an improbable

reason for dismissal. According to the OCA statistics, the

offenses for which the most summonses were issued include

consumption of alcohol on the street, disorderly conduct,

violations of motor vehicle safety rules, bicycle on the

sidewalk, trespass, offensive matter in the street/public ace,

ilure to comply with s

/parking offenses, reckless driving,

littering, unlawfully being the park a er hours, unlawful

possession of marijuana, unreasonable noise, unlicensed

operation of a vehicle, unlicensed vending and operation of a

motor vehic with a suspended registration. Given the nature

of these offenses, and aintiffs' deposition testimony

describing how summonses were issued on the basis of NYPD

officers' personal observations, an overwhelming number of the

summonses found to be facially sufficient would not be dismissed

on hearsay grounds pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c).

Thus, the Citywide Summons Operation's two-step review process

and the nature of the offenses involved establish the vast

majority

those summonses

ling to survive judici review

44

for

ial sufficiency to have been dismissed for want of

probable cause.

If, as Plaintiffs propose, the class were def

to

include 1 summonses that were dismissed, this class would

include those summonses dismissed at the de ct review stage,

thereby including individuals who had their summonses dismissed

for reasons such as a missing signature or invalid return date.

It is not necessarily the case that these summonses that are

dismis

as defective were issued without probable cause. The

common theory binding together the putat plaintiffs' claims

is that the NYPD and other city off ials have engaged in a

pattern and practice of issuing summonses to individuals without

probable cause in response to a requirement and constant

pressure to meet a summons quota. Certifying a class that

includes individuals whose summonses were dismissed as

de ive, without any judgment rendered as to whether those

individuals' summonses were issued without probable cause, fails

to capture the group of putat plaintiffs who

been harmed

by the wrong aintiffs allege. Accordingly, Plaintiffs'

definition of the class is modified to capture only those

summonses dismissed for want of probable cause.

45

In order to ensure that

ass is not overly-

inclusive, the class certified will be defined to include

individuals who were issued summonses that were later dismissed

upon a judici finding of fac

insufficiency and who were

ticketed without probable cause. This judicial finding of

facial insufficiency is understood to occur at the Citywide

Summons Operation's second st of review, a

the first

stage de

review has been conducted. Merely being issued a

ticket that was later dismi

is not, by itself, considered

tantamount to having been ticketed without probable cause.

Individuals who were issued summonses that survived the defect

review process but were dismissed upon a judicial finding of

facial

ficiency are presumptive members of the class, but

Defendants can challenge any of these presumptive class members

on grounds that their summonses were dismi than a lack of probable cause. 6

for reasons

6

Defendants, in their opposition br ,highlight various

aspects of Plaintiffs' deposition testimony suggesting that at

some of the summonses Plaintiffs received were issued with

probable cause and object to the Court "rubber-stamping a

proposed class to include anyone who has had a summons

di ssed." For this reason, the boundaries of the class have

been narrowed to include only those putative plaintiffs whose

summonses were dismissed during the second-step, facial

ficiency review process, where the applicable statutes

suggest the reason

dismissal to a lack of probable cause.

Additionally, af

Defendants the ability to challenge any

putative plaintiff's membership in

class will ensure that

the class is not

-inclusive.

46

Defendants contend that, without some evidence linking the rates of dismissal with a judicial determination concerning the probable cause for the underlying issuance of the summonses, the Court would be required to engage in tens of thousands of individualized inquiries on the merits of each putative plaintiff's case in order to determine who is in the class. However, an argument similar to that raised by Defendants in the present action was addressed by the Second Circuit in Brown v. Kelley, 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010) and by this Court in Casale v. Kelley, 257 F.R.D. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Although both Brown and Casale addressed the ascertainability of a class in the context of a Rule 23(b) (3) inquiry, the legal conclusions in these cases are equally applicable to class ascertainability in a Rule 23(a) context. See Brown, 609 F.3d at 483 n.17.
In Brown, an arrestee brought a putative class action against various city defendants, including Police Commissioner Kelly, alleging that these defendants engaged in the unlawful enforcement of a statute, which had been declared unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, prohibiting loitering with the purpose of begging. After the district court certified the class, the defendants appealed. Although the
47

Circuit rejected the district court's decision to certi a

statewide plaintiff ass, the district court's decision to

certify a citywide plaintiff class was affirmed. In reaching

its conclusion, the Second Circuit addressed the defendant's

argument that "certification is inappropriate because the claims

at issue in this case require individualized inquiries to

establish liability." Brown, 609 F.3d at 483. In rejecting

this argument, the Circuit held, first, that several common

questions of law and fact were shared by the plaintiffs,

including whether New York City had a policy of enforcing the

loitering statute, whether

City iled to train its officers

regarding the statute's unconstitutionality and whether

Commissioner Kelly had knowledge

the unlawful acts of his

subordinates, among other common issues. See id. at 483-84.

Second, the Circuit noted that the claims of the plaintiffs in

the citywide class all arose from the same core allegation,

namely that the defendants had continued to enforce the

loitering statute notwithstanding the Second Circuit's ruling

that doing so violated the rst Amendment. See id. at 484.

though the Circuit recognized that some of the claims in the

complaint, particularly those for false arrest, may require

individualized factual inquiries into the issue of whether

probable cause existed, "the fact that some defendants may have

48

a probable cause defense in some cases does not render certification inappropriate light of the common central issues in this action." Brown, 609 F.3d at 484.

Similarly, in Casale, the district court addressed an

argument raised by the defendants that certifying a class would

require a ftparade of mini-trials." The Court rejected this

contention, noting that "[t]he Second Circuit recently held in a

similar Fourth Amendment class action that, '[i]n light of the

pervasive character of the common liability issues and the

admitted de minimis nature of individualized liability issues,'

a dist ct court had abused its discretion by finding that

individual issues predominated. This Court will not repeat that

mistake." Casale, 257 F.R.D. at 414 (c ing In re Nassau

Strip Search~Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006)}. The

district court in Casale also rejected another argument that

Defendants, citing

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct.

----~~--------------

588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), raise, namely that mini-tri s

would be required because probable cause may have existed for

another crime at the time the summons was issued. See Casale,

257 F.R.D. at 411 ("[T]his does not demand the denial of class

certification. It is implausible that in more than a de minimis

number of cases did police officers have probable cause to

49 


arrest a plaintiff for another crime but chose solely to charge of an unconstitutional provision. Nor have
s presented evidence to that effect.") .

Defendants object to the applicability of Casale on

basis that membership in the class in that case was easily

ascertainable because the claim was limited solely to

teria of whether an individual was arrested or summonsed in

connection with the specific unconstitutional statutes at issue l

while in this case l membership in the c determined as Plaintiffs do not claim

is not so easily members of the

putative class were all summonsed for

a specific

unconstitutional statute nor that putat

pIa iffs were all

issued summonses at a specific event.

Court/s modification

of the proposed class definition to

lude only those putative

plaintiffs who were issued summonses without probable cause

serves to address Defendantsl concerns.

As described above I aintiffs in this action present

a common theory of liabili I namely that they were victims of a

pattern and pract

set and enforced by city officials, the

NYPD and New York City ice Officers to issue summonses to

individuals without probable cause in response to a requirement

50

and constant pressure to meet a summons quota. As Brown,

common questions are applicable to Plaintiffs' claims, and each

individual plaintiff's allegations are linked by a single

theory. Accordingly, Defendants' contention that mini trials

are required to ascertain which individuals belong in the class

is insufficient to feat class certification. To the extent

any individualized issues arise affecti the manageability of

class, it is within the Court's capability to address them.

See Brown, 609 F.3d at 486 ("The district court, of course,

possesses tools with which to manage the individualized

inquiries that

s action may require,

uding creat

subclasses, decertifying the class with respect to claims where

individualized inquiries become too burdensome, and holding

separate trials for plaintiffs subject to individual defenses

that remain after the common questions of law and fact are

resolved. We leave the management of these issues to the sound

discretion of the court. H ) •

The P1aintiffs Have Satisfied The Ru1e 23(b) Requirements For C1ass Certification

In addition to meeting the

rements Rule 23(a),

a proposed class must also constitute one

the types

classes enumerated in Rule 23(b).
51

aintiffs have moved for

class certification under both Rule 23(b) (2) and Rule 23(b) (3), and, for the reasons discussed below, aintiffs have carried their burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that class certification is appropriate under each of these Rules.

1. The Class Is Certified Pursuant To Rule 23(b) (2) For Purposes Of Adjudicating Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

To certify a class seeking prospective declaratory or

injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants "acted

or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,

thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a

whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2). "Rule 23 (b) (2) is designed

to assist and is most commonly relied upon by litigants seeking

institutional reform in the form of injunctive relief," Marisol

A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd,

126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997). Class certification under Rule

23(b) (2) is particularly appropriate in civil rights litigation.

See

I 135 F.R.D. 81 1 83

(S.D.N.Y. 1991) {"Without class certification, their case - as

its requested relief with respect to all similarly situated

52 


persons - could fail on technicality. Indeed, it is in part for

concerns such as these that civil rights actions are

paradigmatic 23 (b) (2) class suits. 1/) In this case, PI

iffs

seek declaratory and injunctive

J.n the form of a

declaration

Defendants' pol

f practices and customs

violate the law and Constitution as leged, a class wide

injunction oining Defendants from enforcing a quota system

for the issuance of summonses, an order directing that immediate

remedial training on the proper legal grounds for

issuance

of summonses be provided all current members of

NYPD and an

order directing Defendants to put in place a system for

monitoring the summonses issued and the legal basis for their

issuance such that baseless summons can be dismissed.

ass certification under Rule 23(b) (2) is appropriate

in this case, as the class includes those individuals who have

been issued summonses without probable cause pursuant to an

alleged unconstitutional

ice whereby NYPD officers are

instructed to issue summonses regardless of whether any

violation has occurred in order to meet a minimum quota

requirement. The Amended Class Action Complaint includes

instances where Plaintiffs have been repeat

issued

summonses, suggesting declaratory and injunctive relief in the

53

form requested by Plaintiffs to be appropriate. Plaintiffs have thus established that Defendants "acted . . on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2).

As was the case in evaluating the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a), addressing whether this class can be certified under Rule 23(b) (2) requires particular attention to be paid to the Supreme Court's Dukes decision. In Dukes, the Supreme Court's second holding concerned the effect claims for monetary relief on the dist ct court's decision to certify an injunction class pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2). In a unanimous holding, the Supreme Court noted:

Rule 23(b) (2) allows class treatment when" party

opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds

that apply generally to

class, so that final

unctive

ief or corresponding

aratory relief is appropriate

respecting the ass as a whole." One possible reading of

this provision is that it applies only to requests for such

injunct or declaratory relief and does not authorize the

ass certification of monetary claims at all. We need not

that broader question in this case, because we think

I at a minimum, claims

individualized relief (like

the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy

Rule.

key to

(b) (2) c

is "the indivisible nature of the

injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted-the notion that

the conduct is such that it can be oined or declared

unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none

of them." (citation omitted). In other words, Rule

54

23(b) (2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member
class. It does not authorize class certification when individual class member would be entitled to a injunction or declaratory judgment against Similarly, it does not authorize class
certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.

Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2557. The Supreme Court concluded that "the

combination of individualized and classwide relief in a (b) (2)

class" is inconsistent wi the history and structure of the

rule, and claims

monetary relief may not be certified under

Rule 23 (b) (2) where" monetary relief is not incidental to

the injunctive or decl

relief." Id. at 2557.

"[I]ncidental damage should not require additional hearings to

resolve the disparate

ts of each individual's case; it

should neither introduce new

antial legal or factual

issues, nor entail complex individualized determinations." Id.

at 2560 (citing A__I_I_i_s_o__n__v_.____~~______________~~., 151 F.3d 402,

415 (5th Cir. 1998)). In reaching

s holding, the Court

rejected precedent relied upon by

Court

Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit that permitted combinat

(b) (2) classes so long

as the individualized monetary reI

not "predominate"

over injunctive relief. See id. at 2557; see so Dukes v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th r. 2010).

55

Both

Second Circuit and this Court have followed

the "predominates" approach the Supreme Court rejected in Dukes.

Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164; MacNamara v. Ci of New York,

275 F.R.D. 125, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Plaintiffs, in seeking

certification pursuant to Rule 23 (b) (2), cite the Robinson

holding and the "predominates" approach as precedent supporting

their position. Relying on such precedent in the termath of

the Supreme Court's opinion would be inappropriate. On its

face, the holding in Dukes would appear to defeat Plaintiffs

efforts to certify a class under Rule 23(b) (2), as declaratory

and injunct

relief as well as money damages are both being

sought. However, it must be recognized that the ass be

the Supreme Court in the Dukes case was certified only under

Rule 23(b) (2). Recent precedent from this Court establishes

that when a di

ct court engages in

analysis required

under Rule 23(b) (2) and Rule 23(b) (3), a class can be certified

seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief as well as money

damages.

. In

Stores L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167

~= :.:~~~~~~~~,~~~~~~~~

(S.D.N.Y. 2011), the Honorable Colleen McMahon addressed

defendant Best Buy's motion for ass decertification, which the

defendant filed following the Dukes decision. The plaintiffs in

56 


were New York customers of defendant Best Buy who were
refused a "price match" at the defendant's store. Best Buy advertised that it would meet any competitors price on products it sells, subject to various conditions. In a ruling prior to the Dukes opinion, this Court certified as a class New York customers Best Buy who were denied valid price matches, under both Rule 23(b) (2) and Rule 23(b) (3). In certifying the class, Judge McMahon identified as a common question whether, as alleged by plaintiffs, Best Buy maintained and communicated to local branches a corporate policy of denying valid price matches. If Best Buy did engage in this conduct, then Best would be liable under New York's General Business Law misleading consumers.

In addressing Best Buy's contention that the Dukes decision mandated that the class be decertified, Judge McMahon noted:

Dukes, like Robinson, was concerned with Rule 23(b) (2)

classes that sought both injunctive and monet relief.

In this case, by contrast, I have certified a class both

under Rule 23(b) (2) and under Rule 23(b) (3), after finding

that the additional requirements

(b) (3)-"predominance"

of common questions over individualized questions and

"superiority" of class resolution-are satisfied here. In

this case, unlike Dukes, a (b) (2) class is not seeking

monetary reI f, but

an injunction against further

statutory violations. It is a separately certified (b) (3)

57

class that

money damages. Because violation of the

[New York General Business Law] entit

both classes to

relief, only one liability trial will need to be held to

determine the

stence vel non of

Anti Matching

Policy.

Jermyn, 276 F.R.D. at 173 74 (citations omitted). Judge

McMahon's reasoning in Jermyn applies equally to the present

action. Just as New York's General Bus

s Law afforded the

Jermyn plaintiffs both injunctive reI f and money damages, so

too does 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute under which Plaintiffs

seek relief

this action. So long as the Court here engages

in the analysis necessary under

23 (b) (2) and Rule 23 (b) (3),

just as Judge McMahon did in

, the Dukes decision

~~-=--

preclude certification of a class under Rule 23 (b) (2) for

s not

purposes

injunctive relief and under Rule 23(b) (3) for

purposes of money damages.

Defendants, in addition to opposing certif

ion

pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) on the basis of Dukes, contend that

Rule 23(b) (2) certification should be denied because Plaintiffs'

individualized compensatory damages, rather than injunctive

reI f, is the predominant form of relief sought. However,

Defendants' alleged unconstitutional practice of issuing

summonses without probable cause represents a threat to personal

58 


liberty, and the Amended Class Action Complaint includes allegations that some Plaintiffs have been subject to repeated harassment. Although the size of the class is large, the Amended Class Action Complaint reveals Plaintiffs to have each suffered a small amount of quantifiable damage, thereby suggesting that receipt of monetary damages is not the motivation behind this suit, but rather "incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief." Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2560; see also Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 256 F.R.D. 418, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Such damages are insufficient to incent a plaintiff to bring suit; they are exceeded by the filing fee. However, a reasonable plaintiff aggrieved by Best Buy's policy would want to prevent Best Buy from committing wrongful acts in the future. Accordingly, the class meets the requirements of Rule 23(b) (2) ."). Although the class does seek money damages, Defendants' contention that money damages are the predominant form of relief sought is unsupported.
Defendants also attack Plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive relief. "To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling."
59

Davis v. Fed.

tion Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 733, 128 S.Ct.

----~----~~~~--~~--~~~-

2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). Moreover,

[p]laintiffs seeking unctive relief must establish a

fourth element to

standing, namely a "real and

immediate threat of

injury" demonstrated by more

than "past exposure to ill I conduct." City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75

L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (quot O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.

488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). In

other words, plaintiffs assert an injunction claim must

allege the probability of a

encounter with the

defendant which is likely to

to a similar violation of

some protected right. See

, 461 U.S. at 105-06.

-"'---­

Roe v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 495, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y.

2001). In other words, it must be "Ii ly, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be

sed by a favorable

decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildli ,504 U.S. 555, 560,

112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted). In

support of their standing argument, De

s cite to this

Court's holding in MacNamara v. City of New York, in which

individuals arrested during the Republican National Convention

sought injunctive relief relating to alleged NYPD

ices of

protestors, but the Court held that

aintiffs'

future harm, namely that they faced potent arrest

class representatives "plan to at

demonstrates

New York in the future," was "too speculative and conjectural

60

to supply a predicate

prospective injunctive relief." 275

F.R.D. at 140 141. However, the fact that several Plaintiffs in

this case have received multiple summonses alleged to have been

issued without probable cause suggests the potential for future

harm to rise above the speculative level.

Finally, according to Defendants, certification pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) is also inappropriate because Plaintiffs have not established Defendants to have "acted on grounds generally applicable to the class," as Plaintiffs' allegation of a citywide practice of issuing summonses without probable cause cannot be reasonably inferred from tape recordings taken at two police precincts. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs have failed to identi an official policy or its equivalent. However, notwithstanding Defendants' contentions, the OCA data reveals that a large number of summonses are dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial insufficiency and that these dismissals occur throughout the
ty of New York.

Because Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a citywide policy that poses a legitimate, non-speCUlative threat to the putative plaintiffs' constitutionally protected
61

liberties r a ass seeking declaratory and injunctive relief is certified pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2).

2. The Class Is Certified Pursuant To Rule 23(b) (3) For Purposes Of Adjudicating Claims For Money Damages

In addition to certifying a Rule 23(b) (2) ass for purposes of adjudicating declaratory and injunctive relief r Plaintiffs have established the need to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3) for purposes of adjudicating claims for money damages. Rule 23(b) (3) provides that a class action may be maintained if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members r and that a class action is superior to other avail e methods for fairly and eff iently adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).

i. Predominance

"Class-wide issues predominate if resolution of some

of

legal or factual questions that qualify each class

memberrs case as a genuine controversy can be achieved through

generalized proof r and if these particular issues are more substantial than the issues subject only to individualized
62

proof. If Moore v. PainWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir.

2002). To determine whether aintiffs have met this burden,

the Court turns to the elements of the underlying causes of

action. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S.Ct.

2179! 2184-87, 180 L.Ed.2d 24 (2011) ("Considering whether

'questions law or fact common to class members predominate'

begins,

course, with the elements of the underlying cause of

action. lf ) Although predominance is a more stringent inquiry,

"satisfaction of

typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)

goes a long way toward satisfying the Rule 23(b) (3) requirement

of commonality." Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc.! 798 F.2d

590, 598 (2d Cir. 1986).

In the present case, common questions of fact and law

apply to the claims of each potential plaintiff, including

whether Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of issuing

summonses in the absence of probable cause, whether that

practice has been motivated by a quota, whether that practice

has been perpetuated by inadequate training and whether

potential plaintiffs' constitutional rights have been infringed

upon as a result

the NYPD's alleged summonsing practices.

See Brown, 609 F.3d at 483-84 (upholding certification of Rule

23(b) (3) citywide class because several common questions of law

63

and fact were shared by all pIa iffs including whether City

had a policy of enforcing an unconstitutional statute, whether

the City led to adequately train officers and whether

Commissioner

ly had knowledge of the unlawful acts of his

subordinates, among others) .

Defendants, in arguing that common issues of law and

fact do not predominate, attack Plaintiffs' interpretation of

OCA data and raise the possibility that individual mini-

trials will be required to ascerta whether probable cause was

lacking in each instance a summons was issued. However, as

described above in the discussion of ascertainability, these

contentions do not preclude certif

ion of the proposed class.

aintiffs in this action present a common theory of liability

involving an NYPD policy of issuing summonses to individuals

without probable cause in response to a quota requirement.

Because the potential plaintiffs' claims brought under this

theory involve sufficient common issues of law and fact subject

to generalized proof, the predominance requirement of Rule

23 (b) (3) is fulfilled.

ii. Superiority

64

The second prong of Rule 23(b) (3) requires that

Plaintiffs demonstrate that a class action is "superior to other

lable methods

fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). Rule 23(b) (3) provides

a list of factors that courts should consider when analyzing

superiority. These include: (1) "the class members I interests

in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of

separate actions;" (2) "the extent and nature of any ligation

concerning

controversy already begun by or against ass

members; II (3) "the desirability or undesirability of

concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular

forum;1I and (4) "the likely difficulties in managing a class

action.11 rd. "Class actions are the superior method for

resolving controversies when the main objectives of Rule 23 are

served l namely the efficient resolution

the claims or

liabilities of many individuals in a single action, as well as

elimination of repetitious litigation and possibly inconsistent adjudications. 1I Rodolico v. Unisys Corp. I 199

F.R.D. 468,479 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki I

442 U.S. 682, 700 01 1 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)).

Given the large number of potent

class members, a

class action represents a superior method for adjudicating this

65

dispute. Consolidat

a class involving so many potential

plaintiffs would promote judicial economy, and individual

lawsuits could lead to inconsistent results. Furthermore,

without class certification, it is likely that the

constitutional violations Plaintiffs allege would go

unadjudicated, as many of the potential class members do not

possess the knowledge or resources to prosecute a lawsuit, and

the relatively small amount of damages suffered by each

individual plaintiff decreases the possibility of individual

lawsuits being filed. See Rios v. Marshall, 100 F.R.D. 395, 409

(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[T]he relative small amount likely in any

individual recovery, the availability of treble damages

notwithstanding! renders certification of a plaintiff class in

this action particularly appropriate. H ). Plaintiffs' claims

allege a single unconstitutional practice! making class

certification especially appropriate. See Brown! 609 F.3d at

484 ("[W]here plaintiffs were allegedly aggrieved by a single

policy the defendants! and there is strong commonality of the

violation of the harm, this is precisely the type of situation

for which the class action device is suited.") (citations

omitted). As such, a class action represents a superior means

of adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims.

66

By establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the predominance of common legal and factual issues as well as the superiority of a class action approach, Plaintiffs have demonstrated certification of a ass under Rule 23(b) (3) to be appropriate.

Conclusion

For

reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' motion

for class certification is granted. The ass certified is

defined to include individuals who were issued summonses that

were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial

insufficiency and who were ticketed without probable cause.

Individuals who were issued summonses that survived the defect

review process but were dismissed upon a judicial finding of

facial insufficiency are presumptive members of the class, but

Defendants can challenge any presumptive class members on

grounds that the summons at issue was dismissed for reasons

other than a lack of probable cause. The applicable class

period is May 25, 2007 to the present, pursuant to the three

year statute of limitations governing actions brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The class is certified under both Rules

23 (b) (2) and 2 3 (b) (3), wi the Rule 23 (b) (2) class seeking

67

declaratory and injunctive relief and the Rule 23(b) (3) class seeking money damages. Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson, Ryburn Walkes, Gary Shaw, Michael Bennett, Chanel Meausa l David Thompson, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Victor Breland and Lindsey Riddick will serve as class representatives, and Jon Norinsbe I Esq. and Cohen & Fitch LLP will serve as class counsel.

It is so ordered.

New York I NY April ~3' 2012

U.S.D.J.

68 


 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 1 of 31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------------X

SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLENE FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW and MICHAEL BE NNETT, on Behalf of Themselves and Other Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
THE CITY OF NE W YORK, RAYMOND W. KELLY, Commissioner of the New York City Police Departm ent, Individually and in his Official Capacity, PAUL BROWN, Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, Individually and in his Official Capacity, and P.O.s “JOHN DOE” #1-50 (NYPD Supervisory, Training and Policy Personnel), Individually and in their Official Capacities, (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown),

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 10 CV 4228
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
ECF CASE

Defendants.

-------------------------------------------------------------------X

Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson, Mariam Farnum, Charlene Finely, Ryburn Walkes, Jamel Towe, Christian Dudley, Joceley Ferdinand, Gary Shaw and Michael Bennett on be half of themselves and others sim ilarly situated, by their attorn eys, Jon Norinsberg and Cohen & Fitch LLP, complaining of the defendant, respectfully alleges as follows:
INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated seeking class certification compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees pursuant to 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for violations of theirs and others similarly situated civil rights, as

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 2 of 31
said rights are secured by said statutes and the Constitu tions of the State of New York and the United States.
2. Under a pattern and practice set and enforced by city officials, the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), and New York City Police Officers stop, search, seize, arrest and issue summonses to individuals without probable cause in orde r to m eet summons quotas, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
3. To encourage this pattern and practice, th e NYPD rewards police officers with more summonses issued and punishes officers w ith fewer summonses issued, regardless of probable cause, the number of summonses actuall y filed or the num ber of summonses that are successfully prosecuted.
4. At least two (2) po lice officers, P.O. Adrian Schoolcraft and P.O. Adil Polanco, have provided evidence of the aforementioned incentives and pressures to increase the number of summonses issued by NYPD officers in the form of tape recordings of Supervising Officers from the 81st and 41st precincts instructing officers to meet quotas in order to secure their jobs and gain incentives.
5. Specifically, in an interview conducte d by Eyewitness News on March 2, 2010, P.O. Polanco provided evidence of the polic y of issuing summ onses pursuant to a quota regardless of probable cause, the num ber of summonses actually file d or the num ber of summonses that are successfully prosecuted.
6. In that inte rview, P.O. explicitly stated that of ficers were instruc ted to issue summonses regardless of whether any crim e or vi olation had occurred but instead in order to meet quotas (“numbers”) set forth by NYP D: “EVEN IF THE CRIME IS NOT COMMITTED, THE NUMBER IS STILL THERE.”

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 3 of 31

7. P.O. Polanco further stated that if an officer does not m eet the aforementioned

quotas for issuing summonses, he or she could receive punishment in the form of losing

overtime, having their shifts changed or being denied days off.

8. Further, in that same interview, Eyewitness News provided additional evidence of

this policy in the f orm of tape reco rdings of commanding and supervising officers pressuring

officers to meet their summons quota.

9.

Specifically, one commanding officer at the 41 st precinct was recorded as stating

in sum and substance: “NEXT WEEK YOU COULD BE AT 25 (SUMMONS ES) AND 1

(ARREST), YOU COULD BE AT 35 (SU MMONSES) AND 1 ( ARREST) AND GUE SS

WHAT UNTIL YOU DECIDE T O QUIT T HIS JOB AND BEC OME A PI ZZA HUT

DELIVERY MAN, THIS IS WHAT YOU’RE GOING TO BE DOING UNTIL THEN.” 10. Additionally another supervising of ficer from the 41 st precinct was recorded as

stating in su m and substance: “THINGS ARE NOT GOI NG TO GET ANY BETTER, ITS

GOING TO GET A LOT WORSE. IF YOU THINK 1 (ARREST) AND 20 (SUMMONSES) IS

BREAKING YOUR BALLS GUESS WHAT YOU ARE GOING TO BE DOING, YOU’R E

GOING TO BE DOING A LOT MORE, A LOT MORE THAN WHAT YOU THINK.”

11. A separate story condu cted by the Village Voice on May 4, 2010 provided

additional evidence of this policy of issui ng summonses pursuant to a quota requirem ent

regardless of probable cause. 12. In that story, P.O. Schoolcraft provided tape recordings of the 81st Precinct where

supervising officers stated in sum and substance: “HOW MANY S UPERSTARS AND HOW

MANY LOSERS DO WE HAVE , HOW MANY SUMMONSES DOES THE SQUAD WRIT E.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 4 of 31
WE NEED MORE AC TIVITY, IF YOUR PR ODUCTIVITY FALLS BELOW PAR EITHER YOU OR THE C.O. IS GOING TO HAVE TO ANSWER.”
13. Another supervising officer at the 81 st Precinct was record ed as stating in sum and substance, “HE WANTS AT LEAST 3 SEATBELTS (SUMMONSES), 1 CELL PHONE SUMMONSES) AND 11 OTHE RS (SUMMONSES). ON THE AVER AGE WE HAVE ABOUT 9 SUMMONSES WHICH IS NOT B AD BUT HE’S GOT A DIFFERE NT NUMBER IN MIND.
14. Moreover, in an attem pt to conceal and/or justify this flagrantly unconstitutional practice, defendant PAUL BROWN has classifi ed this quota system as a “PRODUCTIVITY GOAL.”
15. Further evidence of th is pattern and practice of NY PD to issue summonses pursuant to a an established quota regardless of probable cause was provided in a follow up story conducted by Eyewitness News on May 24, 2010.
16. According to the statistics uncovered in that story, over fifty percent (50%) of all summonses issued in 2008 were dismissed as legally insufficient.
17. Further, according to NYPD Comstat da ta, in 1994, there were approxim ately thirty six thousand five hundred and eighty five (36,585) summonses dismissed.
18. According to their data, since that time there h as been a five hundred percent (500%) increase in the number of summonses issued.
19. Additionally, the evidence provided by th e aforementioned “whistleblowers” leads to th e conclusion that th is policy, pa ttern and p ractice is purposely enforced in neighborhoods and areas which have a high composition of minority residents, which disparately

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 5 of 31
impacts said individuals based on an im permissible classification under th e Constitution of the United States.
20. This unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be inferred from NYPD stop and frisk data as well as the racial composition of all the named plaintiffs in this action (i.e. African American).
21. From the aforem entioned evidence it is apparent that th ese summonses are no t issued pursuant to any legitim ate basis under th e law and instead are issued regardless of probable cause, legal merit or whether a successful prosecution can be had.
22. As a consequence, according to the 2007 Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of Ne w York, the re were approximately six hundred and one thousand four hundred and fifty seven (601,457) summonses filed within New York City.
23. Of the aforem entioned summonses issued in 2007, thirty five thousand three hundred and four (35,304) of the summonses were dismissed before even being docketed.
24. In addition, of the remaining summonses that were docketed in 2007, ninety three thousand one hundred and fifty nine (93,159) were dismissed as insufficient as a m atter of law before arraignment.
25. Additionally, according to the 2008 Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of New York, there were approximately five hundred sixty three thousand one hundred and fifty seven (563,157) summonses filed within New York City.
26. Of the afor ementioned summonses issued in 2008, thirty seven thousand five hundred and one (37,501) of the summonses were dismissed before even being docketed.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 6 of 31
27. In addition, of the remaining summonses that were docketed in 2008, ninety nine thousand three hundred and seventeen (99,317) were dismissed as insufficient as a m atter of law before arraignment.
28. Further, according to statistics provid ed by Eyewitness News, a total of 381,002 summonses, or fifty one percent (51%), of all summonses issued in 2008 were dismissed.
29. Upon information and belief, the afore mentioned number of summonses filed in 2007 and 2008 does not account for summonses actually issued by the NYPD that are never filed in any criminal court in New York City.
30. Upon information and belief, the afore mentioned number of summonses in 2007 and 2008 that were never docketed and or were dismissed prior to arraignment does not account for the number of summonses that were dismissed at arraignment as being insufficient.
31. At a m inimum, according to the d ata actually known regarding th e amount of summonses filed and dismissed in 2007 and 2008, approximately twenty three percent (23%) of the total number of summonses filed were dismissed as legally insufficient.
32. The Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of New York in 2009 has not been published as of the date of this com plaint; however, given the nearly identical statistics from the preceding two years, it is presumed that 2009 will produce similar statistics.
33. The statistical data in co nnection with the documented evidence of high-ranking officials within the N YPD explicitly instructing officers to adhere to these quotas, is representative of an explic it and/or tacit policy, pattern and practi ce of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or an y legitimate legal basis for their issuance in order to adhere to summons quotas set out by the NYPD.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 7 of 31
34. These unconstitutional and illegal acts deg rade, humiliate, and cause harm to their victims. Individuals who are arrested and issued summonses suffer unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. In many cases they are subjecte d to the degradation of searches and seizures in plain view of the genera l public, and, in m any cases, handc uffing and prolonged detention within NYPD precincts before being released. T hey are detained, sometimes for hours or days at a time, in filthy, ov ercrowded conditions. Then, in most instances are forced to tak e time from their jobs, families and lives in order to appear in court before the summonses are dismissed.
35. Despite the patently unconstitu tional and il legal nature of this conduct and its detrimental effects on the New York City residents whom the laws are supposed to protect, city officials have refused to reform their practices an d in fact, as has been documented, continue to instruct NYPD officers to increase this practice. The time has come to rein in this abuse of power and stop these unconstitutional and illegal acts.
JURISDICTION 36. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 37. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) and 1367.
VENUE 38. Venue is properly laid in the Southern District of New York under U.S.C. § 1391(b), in that this is the District in which a su bstantial part of the events or om issions giving rise to the claim occurred.
JURY DEMAND 39. Plaintiffs respectfully demand a trial by jury of all issues in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).

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PARTIES 40. Plaintiff SHARIF STINSON is an African American male, and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York. 41. Plaintiff MARIAM FARNUM is an African American female, and at all relevan t times a resident of the City and State of New York. 42. Plaintiff CHARLENE FINLEY is an African American female, and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York. 43. Plaintiff RYBURN WALKES is an African Am erican male, and at all relevan t times a resident of the City and State of New York. 44. Plaintiff JAMEL TOWE is an African Am erican male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York. 45. Plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY is an African Am erican male and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York. 46. Plaintiff JOCELEY FERDINAND is an African American male and at all relevant times a resident of the City and State of New York. 47. Plaintiff GARY SHAW is an African American male and at all relevant tim es a resident of the City and State of New York. 48. Plaintiff MICHAEL BENNETT is an African American male, and at all relev ant times a resident of the City and State of New York. 49. Defendant CITY OF NEW YORK was and is a m unicipal corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York. 50. Defendant CITY OF NE W YORK maintains the New York City Police Department, a duly authorized public authority and/or police departm ent, authorized to perform all functions of a police departm ent as per th e applicable sections of the New York State

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Criminal Procedure Law, acting under the d irection and supervision of the aforem entioned municipal corporation, City of New York, who was responsible for the policy, practice, supervision, implementation and conduct of all NYPD matters and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision, and c onduct of all NYPD personnel, including the defendants referenced herein. In addition, at all relevant tim es, defendant City was responsible for enforcing the rules of the NYPD, and for ensuring that NYPD personnel obey the laws of the United States and of the State of New York.
51. That at all tim es hereinafter mentioned P.O.s J OHN DOE #1-50 were training, supervisory and policy m aking personnel with in the NYPD who im plemented, enforced, perpetuated and/or allowed the unconsciona ble and unconstitutional quota system for summonses that is the subject of this action, acting in the capacity of agents, servants and employees of defendant City and within the scope of their employment as such. Plaintiffs are unable to determine the names of these NYPD Supe rvisory defendants at this tim e and thus sue them under a fictitious designation.
52. At all relevant tim es defendant RAYMOND KELL Y was the Police Commissioner of the City of New York and, as such, made enforced policy of the N YPD, and acted in his capacity as agent, servant, and employee of defendant City, within the scope of his employment as such, and under color of state law.
53. At all relevant tim es defendant PAUL BROWN was the Deputy Police Commissioner of the City of New York and, as such, made enforced policy of the N YPD, and acted in his capacity as agent, servant, and employee of defendant City, within the scope of his employment as such, and under color of state law.
54. That at a ll times hereinafter mentioned the defendants, either personally or through their em ployees, were ac ting under color of state law a nd/or in com pliance with the

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official rules, regulations, laws, statutes, custom s, usages and/or practices of the State or City of New York and/or New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond Counties.
55. During all tim es mentioned in this com plaint, the defendants and each of them separately and in conc ert, engaged in ac ts and/or omissions which con stituted depravations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, equal protections and the privileges and immunities of the plaintiffs, and while these acts were carried out under color of law, they had no justification or excuse, and were instead illegal, im proper, and unrelated to any a ctivity in which law enforcement officers may appropriately and legally engage in the course of protecting persons and/or ensuring civil order.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 56. Plaintiffs SHARIF STI NSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLENE FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRI STIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW and MICHAEL BENNETT bring this act ion as a class action under F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) for violations of their constitutional rights. The Rule (b)(2) Class is comprised of all persons who were o r will b e wrongfully issued summonses pursuant to a po licy pattern and practice of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or any legal/legitimate basis in order to meet quotas established by the New York C ity Police Departm ent in violation of their constitutional rights, and accordingly, who are thr eatened with future unlawful enforcement of this unconstitutional policy. The class is comprised of all persons issued summonses pursuant to this policy who had committed no crim e or violation of law and there after had their summons dismissed during the fullest period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations. 57. Defendants have acted, or failed to act, on grounds ge nerally applicable to the Rule (b)(2) Class, thereby m aking appropriate f inal injunctive relief with r espect to the Rule (b)(2) Class as a whole.

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58. On information and belief, the Rule (b)(2) class includes hundreds of thousands of members. They are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable.
59. Plaintiffs SHARIF STI NSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLENE FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRI STIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW and MICHAEL BENNETT bring this act ion as a class action under F ed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) for violations of their constitutional rights. The Rule (b)(3) Class is comprised of all persons on who have been wr ongfully issued summonses pursu ant to a policy pattern and practice of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or any legal/legitimate basis in order to meet quotas established by the New York C ity Police Departm ent in violation of their constitutional rights. T he class is comprised of all persons i ssued summonses pursuant to this policy who had committed no crim e or violati on of law and thereafter had their summ ons dismissed during the fullest period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations.
60. All members of the Rule (b)(3 ) class we re injured as a result of de fendants conduct.
61. Upon information and belief, the Rule (b)(3) class includes hundreds of thousands of individuals and is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.
62. The questions of law and fact presen ted by plaintiffs SHARIF STINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLENE FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAM EL TOWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW and MICHAEL BENNETT are common to other m embers of the class. Among others, the questions of law and fact common to the class are: (i) th at the NYPD had a policy, pattern and prac tice, explicit and/or tacit, of rewarding officers for issuing more summonses; (ii) that the NYPD had a policy, pattern and practice, explicit and/or ta cit, of punishing offi cers for issuing fewer summ onses; (iii) that the NYPD had a policy, pattern and practice, explicit or tacit of establishing quotas for the

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issuance of summonses; (iv) that this policy resulted in the issuance of summonses regardless of probable cause in violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights; (v) that enforcement of this policy knowingly created a disparate impact on minorities in violation of their constitutional rights; and (vi) that the appropriate injunctive and compensatory remedies that will be needed to ensure (a) that this unconstitutional quota system for issuance of summonses regard less of probable cause is terminated in each and every respect and (b) that its harmful effects are nullified.
63. Common issues of law and fact such as those set forth above (and m any others) predominate over any individual issues.
64. This unconstitutional policy, pattern and practice has resu lted in the wrongful detention, charging, handcuffing, confine ment, deprivation of liberty, prosecution, psychological, physical and em otional injury of citizens who have comm itted no crime or violation of law. The claims and practices alleged in this complaint are common to all members of the class.
65. The violations suffered by plaintiffs SHARIF S TINSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLENE FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRISTIAN DUDLE Y, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW and MICHAEL BENNETT are typ ical of those suffered by the class. The entire class will benefit from the remedial and monetary relief sought.
66. Plaintiffs SHARIF STI NSON, MARIAM FARNUM, CHARLENE FINLEY, RYBURN WALKES, JAMEL TOWE, CHRI STIAN DUDLEY, JOCELEY FERDINAND, GARY SHAW and MICHAEL BENNETT hav e no conflict of interest with any class m embers, and will fairly and adequa tely protect the in terests of the class. Couns el that is competent and experienced in f ederal class actio n and f ederal civil rights litigation has been retained to represent the class. Jon Norinsberg, Esq. is a law fir m with an office in New York City with extensive experience in civil rights litigation against state and local governments and the NYPD

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and has experience in class action lawsuits. Cohe n & Fitch LLP is a law f irm with offices in

New York City with extensive experience in civil rights litigation against the City of New York

and the NYPD. Further Cohen & Fitch LLP is al so experienced in police, prosecutorial and

court practices in the crim inal courts throughout New York City gi ven the fact that the partners

of Cohen & Fitch LLP were both form er prosecutors and have also m aintained a significant

criminal defense practice. Additionally, the partners of Cohen & Fitch LLP have spent hundreds

of hours in the Summons Parts within the Criminal Courts throughout the City of New York and

are personally familiar with the vo lume of summonses prosecuted on any given day as well a s

the volume that are dismissed for lack of filing or for insufficiency. Collectively, the two firms

have litigated thousands of civi l rights claims against the City of New York and the N YPD and

have an intimate knowledge of the crim inal process from arrest through prosecution as well as

the issuance and the prosecution of summonses.

67.

This action is superior to any other method for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this legal dispute, as joinde r of all m embers is not only im practicable, but

impossible given the volum e and continuing nature of the violations as well as the trans ient

nature of th e members of the class. The da mages suffered by certain m embers of the Class,

although substantial, are small in relation to th e extraordinary expense and burden of individual

litigation and therefore it is high ly impractical for such Cl ass members to attem pt redress for

damages incurred due to their wrongful issuance of summons and subsequent prosecution.

68. There will be no extraordinary difficulty in the management of the Class action.

FACTS

69. Plaintiff SHARIF STINSON is a nineteen (19) year old man.

70. Plaintiff MARIAM FARNUM is a twenty seven (27) year old woman.

71. Plaintiff CHARLENE FINLEY is a forty (40) year old woman.

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72. Plaintiff RYBURN WALKES is a thirty nine (39) year old man. 73. Plaintiff JAMEL TOWE is a nineteen (19) year old man. 74. Plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY is a nineteen (19) year old man. 75. Plaintiff JOCELEY FERDINAND is a twenty six (26) year old man. 76. Plaintiff GARY SHAW is a thirty three (33) year old man. 77. Plaintiff MICHAEL BENNETT is a thirty three (33) year old man.
The Constitutional Violations Against Sharif Stinson 78. On December 31, 2009 plaintiff S HARIF STINSON was walking out of his aunt’s apartment building located at 994 East 179 Street, New York, New York when several members of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause. 79. Thereafter the m embers of the N YPD issued plain tiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 80. Mr. Stinson was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 81. On March 3, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. 82. On March 26, 2010 plaintiff SHARI F STINSON was walking out of his aunt’s apartment building located at inside of 994 Eas t 179 Street, Bronx, New York going into the building where his aunt lived when several m embers of the NYPD stopped, detained and searched plaintiff without probable cause. 83. Thereafter the m embers of the N YPD issued plain tiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct and for Trespass without probable cause. 84. Mr. Stinson was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 85. On May 24, 2010, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Mariam Farnum 86. On November 10, 2009 plaintiff MARIAM FARNUM was lawfully traveling inside of her vehicle in the vicinity of Bedf ord and Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, New York whe n she was pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause. 87. Immediately thereafter p laintiff was deta ined for several hours, handcuf fed and searched by the NYPD officers without probab le cause and issued two summonses for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 88. Ms. Farnum was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although she had committed no crime or violation of law. 89. On February 19, 2010, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.
The Constitutional Violation Against Charlene Finely 90. On October 22, 2009 plaintiff CHARLENE FINLEY was lawfully traveling inside of her vehicle in the vicinity of 1285 W ashington Avenue, Bronx, New York, which is a four lane thoroughfare waiting for a parkin g space when several m embers of the NYPD approached plaintiff’s vehicle without probable cause. 91. Immediately thereafter plaintiff was de tained without probable cause, and NYPD officers and plaintiff a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 92. Ms. Finley was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although she had committed no crime or violation of law. 93. On December 18, 2009, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.
The Constitutional Violation Against Ryburn Walkes 94. On February 13, 2010 plaintiff RYBURN WALKES was walking on the sidewalk in the vicinity of Ryer and Burnside Avenue , Bronx, New York when several m embers of the NYPD stopped, detained, handcuffed and strip searched plaintiff without probable cause.

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95. Plaintiff was detained for several hours after which members of the NYPD issued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause.
96. Mr. Walkes was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
97. On April 14, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. The Constitutional Violation Against Jamel Towe
98. On April 10, 2010 plaintiff JAMEL TOW E was walking out of his friend’s apartment building located at 965 T inton Avenue, Bronx, New York when several m embers of the NYPD detain ed, searched with out probable cause and issued plaintiff with a summons for Disorderly Conduct.
99. Mr. Towe was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
The Constitutional Violation Against Christian Dudley 100. On January 3, 2010 plaintiff CHRISTIAN DUDLEY was lawfully present on a public sidewalk in the vicinity of 1611 Saint Nicholas Avenue, New York, New York waiting for his friend when several members of the NYPD st opped and detained plai ntiff without probable cause. 101. Thereafter, the police o fficers issued pl aintiff with a summons f or Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 102. Mr. Dudley was verbally and m entally abused by the officers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 103. On March 29, 2010, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Joceley Ferdinand 104. On May 14, 2010 plaintiff JOCELEY FE RDINAND was lawfully present standing at a crosswalk in the vicinity of Ho ward and Pitkin Avenue, Brooklyn, New York when he was approached by several m embers of the NYPD and stopped, sear ched, handcuffed and issued a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 105. Mr. Shaw was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
The Constitutional Violations Against Gary Shaw 106. On February 23, 2009 plaintiff GARY SHAW was lawfully parked in front of his building located at 730 East 223 Street, Bronx, New York unloa ding groceries w hen several members of the NYPD s topped, detained and issued plaintiff a summons for leaving his vehicle unattended without probable cause as he was standing right in front of the vehicle. 107. Mr. Shaw was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 108. On April 24, 2009, the summons issued to plaintiff was dismissed. 109. On May 4, 2009 plaintiff GARY SHAW was lawfully traveling in his vehicle in the vicinity of Barnes Avenue and 233 rd Street, Bronx, New York when he was pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause. 110. Thereafter the members of the NYPD informed plaintiff that he was being issued a summons for tinted windows when his windows we re not tinted, but instead issued plainti ff with a summons for Open Container without probable cause as there was no such open container. 111. Mr. Shaw was verbally and m entally abused by the offi cers although he had committed no crime or violation of law. 112. On June 23, 2009, the summonses issued to plaintiff were dismissed.

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The Constitutional Violation Against Michael Bennett 113. On January 6, 2010 plaintiff MICHAEL BE NNETT was lawfully traveling inside of his vehicle in the vicinity of Gun Hill and White Plains Road, Bronx, New York when he wa s pulled over by several members of the NYPD without probable cause. 114. Immediately thereafter plaintiff’s vehicl e was searched without probable cause and plaintiff was issued a summons for Disorderly Conduct without probable cause. 115. Mr. Bennett was verbally and m entally abused by the offic ers although he had committed no crime or violation of law.
Unconstitutional Policy and Practice in the NYPD 116. At all relevant tim es, the City, acting through the NYPD, m aintained an express and de facto policy, custom and practice of issuing su mmonses without probable cause in order to meet quotas requiring a certain volume of summonses be issued throughout New York City. 117. As a consequence, according to the 2007 Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of Ne w York, the re were approximately six hundred and one thousand four hundred and fifty seven (601,457) summonses filed within New York City. 118. Of the aforem entioned summonses issued in 2007, thirty five thousand three hundred and four (35,304) of the summonses were dismissed before even being docketed. 119. In addition, of the remaining summonses that were docketed in 2007, ninety three thousand one hundred and fifty nine (93,159) were dismissed as insufficient as a m atter of law before arraignment. 120. Additionally, according to the 2008 Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of New York, there were approximately five hundred sixty three thousand one hundred and fifty seven (563,157) summonses filed within New York City.

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121. Of the afor ementioned summonses issued in 2008, thirty seven thousand five hundred and one (37,501) of the summonses were dismissed before even being docketed.
122. In addition, of the remaining summonses that were docketed in 2008, ninety nine thousand three hundred and seventeen (99,317) were dismissed as insufficient as a m atter of law before arraignment.
123. Further, according to statistics provid ed by Eyewitness News, a total of 381,002 summonses, or fifty one percent (51%), of all summonses issued in 2008 were dismissed.
124. Upon information and belief the aforem entioned number of summonses filed in 2007 and 2008 does not account for summonses actually issued by the NYPD that are never filed in any cr iminal court in New York City and therefore do not appear in the aforem entioned statistics.
125. Upon information and belief the af orementioned number of summonses in 2007 and 2008 that were never docketed and or were dismissed prior to arraignment does not account for the number of summonses that were dismissed at arraignment as being insufficient.
126. At minimum, according to the data actually known regarding the amount of summonses issued and dism issed in 2007 and 2008, approximately twenty three percent (23%) of the total number of summonses filed were dismissed as insufficient.
127. The Annual Report from the Criminal Court, City of New York in 2009 has not been published as of the date of this com plaint; however, given the nearly identical statistics from the preceding two years, it is presumed that 2009 will produce similar statistics.
128. Further, additional data provided by Eyewitness News indicates that sin ce 1994 the number of summonses issued by the NYPD has increases five hundred percent (500%).
129. The statistical data in connection with the documented evidence of high ranking officials within the N YPD explicitly instructing officers to adhere to these quotas, is

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representative of an explic it and/or tacit policy, pattern and practi ce of issuing summonses regardless of probable cause or an y legitimate legal basis for their issuance in order to adhere to summons quotas set out by the NYPD.
130. Additionally, upon inform ation and belief, a partial basis being the racial composition of the nam ed plaintiffs in this m atter thus far, this policy, pattern and practice is purposely enforced in neighborhoo ds and areas which have a high composition of m inority residents, which disparately im pacts said indi viduals based on an im permissible classification under the Constitution of the United States.
131. In addition, according to NYPD’s own reports, since 200 7, one m illion seven hundred twenty four thousand nine hundred and forty eight (1,724,948) indi viduals have been stopped by the NYPD and of those individu als, one million four hundred thirty n ine thousand eight hundred and ninety six (1,439,896) were either African American or Hispanic.
132. According to those statistics of the to tal number of individuals stopped by the NYPD since 2007, approxim ately eighty three pe rcent (83%) were Af rican American or Hispanic.
133. Upon information and belief as well as data com piled by the NYACL U, a significant percentage of the total number of individuals stopped were issued a summons.
134. Upon information and belief a high percen tage of those summ onses issued were not based upon probable cause or any legitim ate basis under the law, but were pursuant to the NYPD’s policy pattern and practice of having subordi nate officers issue summonses in order to meet quotas established by the City of New York, the NYPD, RAYMOND KE LLY, PAUL BROWN and the NYPD Supervisory defendants.
135. Upon information and belief this pattern and practice has a knowingly disparate impact on plaintiffs and members of the class, specifically other African American and Hispanic

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individuals, in vio lation of their Constitutional rights as secured by the Four th and Fif th Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
136. In light of the hundreds of thousands of summonses that are dism issed in a calendar year that are actually do cumented as being dismissed in addition to the sum monses that were never filed or were dism issed at or after arraignm ent, is representative of th e fact that defendants either or should have known, that many police officers and supervisory personnel were engaging in the lawless and unconstitution al practice of issui ng individuals summonses regardless of probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law; yet defendant have repeatedly failed to take any action to end this conduct and in fact expressly and/or tacitly encourage the lawless and unconstitutional actions.
137. The NYPD Supervisory Defendants, including defendants RAYMOND KELLY and PAUL BROWN’s failure to train, discipline or supervise o fficers regarding their obligation not to issue summ onses unless based upon probabl e cause or som e legitimate basis under th e law, exhibited gross and wanton de liberate indifference to the consti tutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
138. Upon information and belief, the issuance of summ onses regardless of probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law in order to meet quotas and goals given to the officers is well known and in fact encouraged th roughout the NYPD. Ne vertheless, the NYPD Supervisory Defendants, RAYM OND KELLY and PAUL BROWN continue to allow police officers to continue the practice, tolerate a nd encourage these unconstitutional practices. The failure to ta ke measures to curb this unconstitu tional practice constitutes acquiesc ence in the known unlawful behavior of their subordinates. The prevalence and general knowledge of these summonses and the rate of their dism issal, and the failure of supervisory defendants to take remedial action, constitute deliberate indifference to the rights of plaintiffs and the Class.

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139. The NYPD Supervisory Defendants, RAYMOND KELLY and PAUL BROWN conduct has been a substantial factor in the cont inuance of the issuance of these summonses in the absence of probable cause or any legi timate basis under the law only to m eet quota requirements set forth by the NYPD has been a subs tantial factor in the continuance of such arrests and summonses and a proxim ate cause of the constitutional violat ions alleged in this complaint.
140. Because the pattern and practice of arre sting individuals and issuing summonses absent probable cause in furtherance of m eeting quotas and requirem ents set forth by RAYMOND KELLY, PAUL BROWN and NYPD Supervisory defendants has existed for m any years the af orementioned defendants knew and encouraged this uncons titutional behavior and repeatedly failed to take action to end this conduct by subordinate officers.
141. Because this explicit and/ or tacit pattern and practice existed of arres ting individuals and issuing summ onses absent probable cause in furtherance of the quota policy explicitly encouraged by RAYM OND KELLY, PAUL BROWN and NYPD supervisory defendants knew or should have known that polic e officers assign ed to precincts within New York City required training, superv ision, and discipline regarding their obligations not to issue summonses absent probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law.
142. The pattern of unconstitu tional issuance of summonses pursuant to quotas established by policy making officials within the NYPD and the City of New York; the failure to train staff regarding the nullity of the statutes; and the failure to supervise and/or discipline staff responsible for the unconstitutional issuance of summonses are so institutionalized as to represent a policy or custom of unconstitutional summonses under a quota system that caused the depravation of plaintiffs’ rights and those of the Class.

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143. The NYPD and the City of New York, through its agents and em ployees has failed or refused to hold acc ountable high ranking supervisor s, commanding officers and subordinate officers-in the face of frequent misconduct, over a period of years. This failure is the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiffs and those of the Class. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR DEPRIVATION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 1983
144. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and reallege each an d every allegation con tained in paragraphs “1” through “143” with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
145. All of the afore mentioned acts of defe ndants, their agents, servants and employees, were carried out under the color of state law.
146. All of the aforementioned acts deprived plaintiffs and the members of the Class of the rights, equal protections, privileges and im munities guaranteed to citizens of the United States by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Four teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
147. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants in their cap acities as police officers, with all of the actual and/or apparent authority attendant thereto.
148. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants in their cap acities as p olice officers, pursuant to the custo ms, usages, practices, procedures, and the rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police Department, all under the supervision of ranking officers of said department.
149. Defendants, collectively and individually, while acting und er color of state law, engaged in conduct that constituted a custom , usage, practice, procedure or rule of the respective municipality/authority, which is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States.

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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FALSE ARREST UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 150. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered “1" through “149" with the sam e force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 151. As a result of defendants’ aforem entioned conduct, plaintiffs and members of the Class were subjec ted to an illega l, improper and f alse arrest in the f orm of detention and the issuance of summonses by the defendants a nd prosecuted by the defe ndants in cr iminal proceedings, without an y probable cause, priv ilege, consent or any legitim ate basis under the law. 152. As a direct and proximate result of the misconduct and abuse of authority detailed above, plaintiffs sustained the damages hereinbefore alleges. 153. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiffs’ and members of the Class’ liberty was restricted for an extend ed period o f time, and they were put in fear for their s afety, were humiliated and subjected to handcuffing, and other physical restraints, without probable cause.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 154. PlaintiffS repeat, reiterat e and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered “1" through “153" with the sam e force and effect as if fully set forth herein. 155. Defendants issued plaintiffs and members of the Class summonses requiring them to appear in court for prosecution without any probable cause. 156. Defendants issued said summonses to plaintiffs and mem bers of the Clas s pursuant to NYPD’s unconstitutional summ ons quota policy m aliciously, in bad faith and without probable cause.

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157. Defendants did not m ake a com plete and fu ll statement of fact s to the District Attorney on the back of the summons issued to plaintiffs and members of the Class.
158. Defendants withheld ex culpatory evidence from the Distric t Attorney r egarding the NYPD quota policy for issuing summonses.
159. Defendants were directly and actively i nvolved in the initia tion of crim inal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class in that the summonses themselves were the instruments under which plaintiffs and members of the Class were prosecuted.
160. Defendants lacked probable cau se to initiate crim inal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class.
161. Defendants acted with m alice in initiating criminal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class.
162. Defendants were directly a nd actively involved in the continuation of crim inal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class.
163. Defendants lacked probable cause to continue criminal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class.
164. Defendants acted with m alice in conti nuing criminal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class.
165. Defendants misrepresented and falsified evidence throughout all phases of the criminal proceedings.
166. Notwithstanding the perjurious and fraudulent conduct of defendants, the criminal proceedings against plaintiffs and members of the Class were terminated favorably.

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167. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiffs and members of the Class’ liberty was restricted for an extend ed period o f time, and they was put in f ear for their s afety, were humiliated and subjected to handcuffing, and other physical restraints, without probable cause.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
168. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and reallege each an d every allegation con tained in paragraphs “1" through “167" as if the same were more fully set forth at length herein.
169. Defendants caused plaintiffs and members of the Class to be issued summonses in the absence of any evidence of crim inal wrongdoing, notwithstanding their knowledge that said summonses were not based on probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law in violation of the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
170. Defendants caused plaintiffs and members of the Class to be issued summonses in the absence of any evidence of crim inal wrongdoing, notwithstanding their knowledge that said summonses were not based on probable cause or any legitimate basis under the law and knowing that plaintiffs and members of the class would b e required to appear in court to be prosecuted under the aforementioned unconstitutionally issued summonses in violation of the constitu tional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
171. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants and subordinate officers of the NYPD in their capacities as police officers and officials, with all the actual and/or apparent authority attendant thereto.
172. The acts com plained of were carried out by the aforem entioned individual defendants and subordinate NYPD officers in thei r capacities as police officers and officials pursuant to the cu stoms, policies, usages, practices, procedures, and rule s of the C ity of New York and the New York City Police Departme nt, all under the supervision of RAYMOND

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 27 of 31
KELLY, PAUL BROWN and other ranking officers of said department.
173. The aforementioned customs, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of
the City of New York and the New York City Po lice Department include, but are not limited to,
the following unconstitutional practices:
i. Creating a quotas system for NYPD subordinate officers requiring the officers to issue a certain num ber of summonses per m onth and year regardless of probable cause;
ii. Creating a policy of awarding incentives to officers who meet or exceed the required number of summonses to be issued according to NYPD’ s quota;
iii. Creating a policy of punishing officer s who fail to m eet the required number of summonses established by NYPD’s quota;
iv. Issuing summonses regardless of pr obable cause or any legal basis in order to meet the requirements of the quota established by the NYPD;
v. Disproportionately issuing summonses to black and Hispanic individuals in violation their rights under the E qual Protection Clause pursuant to the quota established by the NYPD
vi. Showing deliberate indifference to whether the summonses issued pursuant to that quo ta established by the NYPD were issued based on probable cause or any legal basis;
vii. Showing deliberate indifference to the tr aining of subordina te officers to not issue summonses unless they are issued upon probable cause or a basis under the law;
viii. Showing deliberate indifference to the supervision of subordinate officers in enforcing the quotas system established by the NYPD for the issuance of summonses in determining whether they were legitimately issued;
174. The existence of the aforesaid un constitutional customs and policies m ay be
inferred from repeated occurrences of si milar wrongful conduct as is the case with the eight (8)
plaintiffs in this m atter as well as the Annual Re ports from the Crim inal Courts of the City of
New York, NYP D’s own statistics and statistic s and reports m aintained by the NYACL U and

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 28 of 31
other City Agencies. 175. The foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the
City of New York and the New York City Police Department constituted a deliberate indifference to the safety, well-be ing and constitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
176. The foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of Ne w York and the New York City Poli ce Department were the direct and proxim ate cause of the constitutional violations suffered by plaintiffs and members of the Clas s as alleged herein.
177. The foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Polic e Department were the moving force behind the constitutional violations suffered by plaintiffs and the members of the Class as alleged herein.
178. As a result of the foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police D epartment, plaintiffs and members of the Class were issued summ onses without probable cause or any legal basis and in many instances were subjected to detention, search, restrain ts, handcuffing and verbal and mental abuse in violation of their constitutional rights.
179. As a result of the foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police D epartment, plaintiffs and members of the Class were caused to appear in court to be prosecuted on these unconstitutionally issued summonses and in m any instances causing them to lose tim e from work or school in violation of their constitutional rights.
180. As a result of the foregoing custom s, policies, usages, practices, procedures and rules of the City of New York and the New York City Police D epartment, plaintiffs and

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 29 of 31

members of the Class were targeted, stopped and issued unconstitutional summonses based on an impermissible classification under the Equal Prot ection Clause of the Fo urteenth Amendment, their race.
181. Defendants, collectively and individually, while acting und er color of state law, were directly and activ ely involved in violat ing the con stitutional rights of plaintiffs and members of the Class.
182. Defendants, collectively and individually, while acting und er color of state law, acquiesced in and encouraged a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by subordinate police officers, and were directly respon sible for the violation of the constitutio nal rights of plaintiffs and members of the class.
183. All of the foregoing acts by defendants de prived plaintiffs and m embers of the Class of federally protected rights, including, but not limited to, the right:
i. Not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law; ii. To be free from search, seizure and arrest not based upon probable cause;
and, iii. To receive equal protection under the law. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs and members of the Class request the following relief jointly and severally as against all of the defendants:

1.

A judgment declaring that defendants ha ve committed the violations of law

alleged in this action;

2.

An order preliminarily and permanently enjoining and directing defendants to

cease enforcement of this quota system for the issuance of summonses;

3.

Directing that immediate remedial training on the proper and legal grounds for

the issuance of summonses be prov ided to all c urrent members of the NYPD

(in the precincts and the police academy);

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 30 of 31

4.

Directing defendants to put in place a system for monitoring the summonses

issued and the leg al basis for their issu ance so that baseless summ onses that

have been issued can be immediately dismissed;

5.

Compensatory damages against all defenda nts in an am ount to be proven at

trial;

6.

Punitive damages against all defend ants, except the City, in an amount to be

proven at trial;

7.

An order awarding disbursem ents, costs, and attorneys’ f ees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1988; and

8.

Such other further relief that the court may deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York May 25, 2010
225 (212)

BY:________/S____________ JON L. NORINSBERG (JN-2133)
Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, N.Y. 10007
791-5396
BY:_______/S_____________ COHEN & FITCH LLP JOSHUA P. FITCH (JF-2813) GERALD M. COHEN (GC-0414) 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, N.Y. 10007 (212) 374-9115
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 1 Filed 05/25/10 Page 31 of 31

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 

SHARIF STINSON, et . ,
Plaintiffs, against
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

-- X 10 Civ. 4228 OPINION
X

A P PEA RAN C E S:

At

Plaintiff

COHEN & FITCH LLP 
 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 
 New York, NY 10007 

Joshua P. Fitch, Esq. Gerald M. Cohen, Esq.

THE LAW OFFICES OF JON L. 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, NY 10007
Jon L. Norinsberg,

NORINSBERG,

Att

for the Defendants

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 By: Qiana C. Smith-Williams, Esq.

Sweet, D.J.

Defendants have moved, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3,

reconsideration of the April 23, 2012 opinion (t "April 23

Opinion) in which the Court

ed Plaintiffs' motion

class

certification. Because Defendants have fail to identi any

controlling law or facts the April 23 Opinion overlooked,

motion for reconsideration is denied.

Prior Proceedings

A

led recitation of the ior

ngs and facts

of

s case is provided in the April 23 Opinion granting

Plaintiffs' motion for ass certification. See Stinson v. Ci of

N.Y., No. 10 C . 4228 (RWS) , 2012 WL 1450553, at *2 5 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 23, 2012) Famili ty with t se prior proceedings and facts

is assumed.

Defendants' motion for reconsideration highlights two

aspects of the April 23 nion: (1) the Court's determination that

the proposed class was ascertainable,

(2) the Court's

determination that Plainti==s had

t ly al eged a specific

policy promulgated

De=endants, namely that Defendants have

established a practice by which NYPD of cers ssue summonses 1 


Wl

probable cause

order to meet a summons quota. Because

~t provides a bac round to Defendants' motion, t se two aspects

of

il 23 Op on will be re ewed.

A. The April 23 Opinion's Holding Regarding Ascertainability

The llpril 3 nion addressed the implied requirement

that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requ res that a proposed c_ass be

ascertainab e. See St;nson, 2012 WL 4505 3, at w12- 8. n

rea ng this conclus on, the Court noted that the Cityw

Summons

Operation

lves a two-st rev~ew process: first, the Centra

Receiving Unit conducts a fec+- review, srnissi~g those summonses

that

ude a serious defect such as a ssing signature or

narrative or improper return date; second, the Assoc;ate Court

Clerk and Supervising Judge n each county coo

es a process

where the suwmonses are re ewed for facial sufficiency. To

precise~y describe what is meant

the term "facial sufficiency,"

the

23 Opi on delved

o the soecific sections of the New

York Criminal Procedure Law applicable to the NYP;J's sumInons

issuance

ration. The

il 23 i n described how these

"summonses" are better described as "

rance tickets" under the

C.P.L., see id. at *13-14, and that a po ice off cer issuing an

appearance icket subse

ly files an "accusatory nstrument" in

the Criminal Court of he

Y of New York, id. at *15. The C.P.L. 2 


requires the "accusatory instrument" to

facia ly suff cient, as

mandated

N.Y. C.P.L. §§ "00.40 and :00.15.

Applying these statutes, the April 23 Opinion held that

the facial sufficiency review conducted as part of the Citywide

Summons Operation - the second step of the two part review process

described above - involved a judicial determination as to whether

the summons issued lacked probable cause. As an initial st I the

Court noted that the term "reasonable cause," used

N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (b) I has been held to be synonymous with "probable cause./I

See Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *16. The April 23 Opinion then

noted that, although other reasons for dismissal at the faci

sufficiency review stage are possible, it is unlike that these

alternative rationales apply to the summonses at issue in this

litigation:

As noted above, N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.15 requires smissal of a

summons that

Is to state the court in which it is filed,

the title of the action, the name of the subscribing

complainant, the offense charged or a sufficiently descriptive

factual statement, and § 100.40(1) (c) requires non-hearsay

allegations to est ish each element of the fense. Under

the summons review process described above, the technical

errors enumerated in N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.15 are addressed in the

fect review conducted prior to

judicial determination of

facial sufficiency. With re

to N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (c), the offenses for which the summonses in this

case are being issued establish lack of non-hearsay

allegations to be an improbable reason for smissal.

According to the [Office of Court Administration] statistics,

the offenses for which the most summonses were issued include

3 


consumption of coholon [t street,] disorderly conduct,

violations of motor vehicle safety rules, bicycle on the

sidewalk, trespass, of

matter in the street/public

place, failure to comply with signs/parking of

s, reckless

driving, littering, unlawful being the park after hours,

unlawful possession of marijuana, unreasonable noise,

unlicensed operation of a vehicle, unlicensed vending and

operation of a motor vehicle with a suspended registration.

Given the nature of these offenses, and Plaintiffs' deposition

testimony describing how summonses were issued on the basis of

NYPD officers' personal observations, an overwhelming number

of the summonses found to be faci ly sufficient would not be

smissed on hearsay grounds pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (c). Thus, the Citywide Summon Operation's two-step

review process and the nature of the offenses involved

establi the vast majority of those summonses failing to

survive judicial review for

l sufficiency to have been

smissed for want of probable cause.

Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *16. Accordingly, the April 23 Opinion Id that Plaintiffs had established the implied Rule 23(a) requirement of ascertainability.

B. The April 23 Opinion's Holding Regarding Commonality

In addition to

ing on the April 23 Opinion's

scussion of ascertainability, Defendants' motion for

reconsideration so addresses the April 23 Opinion's holding that

PI

iffs met the commonality prong of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In

considering Rule 23(a) 's commonality requirement, the April 23

Opinion addressed the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), in which the

4 


Supreme Court addressed Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement in the

context

Wal Mart employees' tIe VII claims alleging unlawful

sexual discrimination in pay and promotion. See Stinson, 2012 WL

1450553, at *8-9. In ~~kes, the Supreme Court held that

Wal-

Mart employees had failed to allege commonality, which requires a

"common connectionfl among putative pIa iffs' claims. See Dukes,

131 S.Ct. at 2551. ~he Supreme Court held that such a "common

connection" was lacking in Dukes because the basis for liability

was not

y sfavor in pay and promotion[ but the reason why

each class member was disfavored:

~he

y corporate policy that pI ntiffs' evidence

convincingly establishes is Wal Mart's \ icy' of allowing

discretion by local supe sors over employment matters. On

its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform

employment practice

would provide the commonality needed

for a class action; it is a

icy against having

form

employment practices.

Id. at 2554. Because the wal-Mart employees had failed to i

ify

a corporate

icy that led to the local managers' discretion being

exercised in a uniformly scriminatory way, the Supreme Court he

commonality to be lacking. See . at 2556 57.

April 23

Opinion distinguished Dukes from this case, noting

t, "[u] nl i

in Dukes where the plaintiffs alleged a corporate policy of

discretion to local managers and a corporate

ture hostile to the

advancement of women, Plaintiffs here have all
5 


a specific

policy promulgated by Defendants, namely, that Defendants have established a practice by which NYPD officers issue summonses without probable cause in order to meet a summons quota." Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *9. As such, the April 23 Opinion held that Plaintiffs had established the express Rule 23(a) requirement of commonali

The Applicable Standard

Defendants request reconsideration of the April 23

Opinion pursuant to Local C 1 Rule 6.3. The standard governing

motions under Local Civil Rule 6.3 is

same as that governing

motions made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, see He~derson v.

Metro. Bank &TrysL_Co~, 502 F. Supp. 2d 372, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007),

and a court may grant reconsideration where "the moving party can

point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-

matters,

other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter

the conclusion reached by the court.H Id. at 376 (quoting In re

BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 123

Cir. 2003)). Additionally, the

party moving for reconsideration can obtain relief by demonstrating

an "intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new

evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest

injustice. II Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted) Parrish

v. Sol~e(::it'2' 253 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 6 


("Reconsideration

granted to correct clear error l prevent

fest injustice or review

court's decision in light of the

availabi ity of new evidence.") (cit

Atl. Ai

Ltd.

v. Nat'l Mediation 'I 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992));
---------~~~--------------~

C a t s k i l l Dev. L.L.C. v. Park Place __ .._________ ~~~~~~~~~_~~~c~

~.~~~

E~_n_t_m__'_t

_

_

_

_ ~...

.
~

,

154 F.

Supp.

2d

696, 701-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting reconsideration due to

court's erroneous application of a statute). The moving party must

demonstrate controlling law or

1 matters put fore the court

on the underlying motion

the movant believes the court

overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the

court's decision. See Linden v. Dist. Council 1707-AFSCME, 415

Fed. Appx. 337, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2011) (affi ng dismis

of

reconsideration motion as movant did not identi any relevant

facts or cont ling authority that t lower court overlooked) i

v. Besi

. Inc., 28 Fed. Appx. 73, 75 (2d Cir.

------------~------~--....~~--~-------

2002) (affirming dismissal of reconsideration motion where movant

" led to demonstrate that the [lower] court overlooked any fact
of consequence or controlling legal authority at the time the court

decided [the case]").

The reason for the rule confining recons

ion to

matters that were "overlooked" is to "ensure the finality of

decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a

decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with
7

additional matters. U Pol

v. St. Mart's Press Inc., No. 97

Civ. 690 (MBM) , 2000 WL 98057, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). A court must narrowly

construe and strictly ly Local Civil Rule 6.3, so as to avoid

duplicative

ings on previous considered issues, and to prevent

the rule from being

as a substitute for appealing a f

judgment. See In re Bear Stearns Cos . nco Sec. Derivative

ERISA Lit . , 08 M.D.L. No. 1963, 2009 WL 2168767, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
----~~......= " - - - -

Jul. 16, 2009) ("A motion

reconsideration is not a motion to

reargue those issues already consi red when a party does not like

the way

original motion was resolved. U ) (quoting

v.

Polan, 496 F. Supp. 2d 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) i Re

.com v.

-~~----------

Lansa, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 3578, 2008 WL 4376367, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 25, 2008) ( "

standard

ing such a motion is

strict, and reconsideration will generally

deni unless t

moving party can

nt to controlling decisions or

a that

court overlooked-matters, in other words, that ght reasonably be

expected to alter the conclusion

by the court. u) (citations

and quotation marks omitted) i Ball

v. Parkstone

LLC, No.

06 Civ. 13099, 2008 WL 4298572, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008)

("Local Rule 6.3 is to be narrowly construed and strictly applied

in order to avoid repetitive

s on issues that the court has

fully considered.") (quoting Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of the

8 


. Sch... Dist., ~~~-=~-----~---~~~ --~~--- 237 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) .

Motions for reconsideration "are not vehicles for taking

a second bite at the apple,

. and [the court]

d] not

consi

facts not in

record to

facts that the court

overlooked." Rafter v. Liddle, 288 Fed. Appx. 768, 769 (2d Cir.

2008) (citat

and quotation marks omitted) .

Defendants' Motion For Reconsideration Is Denied

Defendants request reconsideration of the April 23

Opinion on grounds that the proposed class fails to meet

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). First, Defendants contend

that the proposed class does not meet t implied Rule 23(a)

requirement of ascertainabili because the April 23 Opinion

misinterpreted the applicable provisions of the New York Criminal

Procedure Law and overlooked case law interpreting those

provisions. Second, Defendants contend that the April 23 Opinion

incorrectly

sed the issue of commonality, as the proposed

class did not meet Rule 23(a) 's commonality requirement because

Plaintiffs have fa led to demonstrate a municipa1 policy or

practice. Because Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the

Court overlooked any fact of consequence or controlling legal 9 


authority in the April 23 Opinion, Defendants motion for

reconsideration is

ed.

A. Defendants Raise No Controlling Law Or Facts The April 23 
 Opinion Overlooked To Warrant Reconsideration Of The 
 Ascertainability Issue 


Defendants raise three main arguments against the April

23 Opinion's determination that the proposed class is ascertainable

under ?ed. R. Civ. P. 23{a). ?irst, Defendants contend that a

"reasonable cause" determination under N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b)

is not a merits bas finding of a 1

of probable cause. Second,

Defendants contend that,

April 23 Opinion ignored the

that, in addition to

ring non-hearsay legations, N.Y. C.P.L.

§ 100.40(1) (c)

res an accusatory instrument to set forth a

prima facie case, thereby presenting grounds upon which a summons

may have been dismissed independent of

lack probable cause.

Finally, Defendants suggest that the

1 23 Opinion's use of a

rebuttable presumption in def

the class is inappropriate.

1. Defendants Fail To Raise Controlling Law Or Facts That The April 23 Opinion Overlooked Concerning N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40 (1) (b)

According to Defendants,

proposed class is not

ascertainable because a "reasonable cause" determination under N.Y.
10 


C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b) is not a merits based f ing of a lack of

probable cause. Defendants contend

t April 23 Op on

overlooked applicable New York case law concerning the

interpretation of the sections of the Cri nal

Law cited

above and that

S case law does not support t finding that a

dismissal on the basis of faci insufficiency neces

ly

implicates a judicial determination of probable cause.

Citing the New York Court of Appeals case

e v.

15 N.Y.3d 100, 905 N.Y.S.2d 542, 931 N.E.2d 526 (2010),

Defendants cont

that, under N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b), a

determination of faci sufficiency is not a merits-ba

determination

ther there was probable cause to summons an

individual, rat

it is a j sdictional determinat

t

must

be made prior to arraignment to ensure t

court has

juri ction to hear a

nal matter. In

, the Court of

----"'~-

Appeals held that a "valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is

a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal

prosecution," -- , ...~'----- 15 N.Y.3d at 103, and that an arresting

officer's allegation fail to provide

ficient detail of the

criminal conduct, thereby violating

re

e cause

requirement of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40. Defendants contend that this

Court Appeals case est i s that dismissal on the basis of

faci

insufficiency is not a merits-based determination of whether
11 


an officer had probable cause. According to Defendants, the fact

that the defendant in

pl guil removes any doubt that

probable cause existed and undercuts the idea that a dismissal on

the basis of facial insufficiency is merits-based rather than

j sdicti

Additional , Defendants contend that the fact

New

York courts allow prosecutors to re-file a facial deficient

accusatory instrument in order to cure deficiencies belies the

notion that the judiciary engages in a merits- ed probable cause

analysis in smissing a summons

basis

facial insufficiency.

As such, Defendants state that a proposed class of the entire pool

summonses dismissed for facial insufficiency is inappropriate,

as those dismissals do not neces

ly implicate a judicial merits

based determination of a I

of probable cause, and the proposed

class is not ascertai

e thout engaging in tens of thousands,

if not hundreds of thousands, of mini-tri s to assess whether a

particular pIa iff \'Jas issued a summons without probable cause.

In further support of this argument, Defendants cite Haus

v. Ci of New York, No. 03 Civ. 4915(RWS) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,

2011) where aintiffs 1

that the summonses issued to them

were devoid of probable cause due to defects on the face of

summons.

Court

ect pI ntiffs' argument, noting that 12

"[t]he existence or non- stence of probable cause is measured by

the events occurring at the t

of arrest, and whi a defect in

the charging document may lead to the dismissal of the charge, that

does not demonstrate that the arrest was invalid. u rd. at 245.

Defendants' contentions fail to est ish grounds for

recons ration of the April 23 Opinion. None of the briefing

related to Plaintiffs' class certification motion cited the

e

decision, nor was the case raised at oral argument.

With respect to Haus v. Ci of New York, the April 23 Opinion ~--..~~.~~-~~--~--..--~---
squarely addressed the issue Defendants' identify, recognizing

that, while there are alternative reasons for dismissal of a

summons other than a lack of probable cause, an analysis of the

applicable statutes and the Citywide Summons Operation's two-stage

review

s leads to the conclusion that the overwhelming

majori of summonses dismissed at the faci

ficiency review

stage were dismissed for want of probable cause. See Stinson, 2012

WL 1450553, at *16. Defendants' citations to the

and Haus

decisions f 1 to

se a point of law or controlling authority the

April 23 Opinion overlooked.

Furthermore, Defendants' contention that the Citywide

Summons Operation's facial sufficiency review does not involve a

judici

determination of whether the summons issued lacked 13 


probable cause is mi

ded. As was noted

the April 23 Opinion,

"[t]he term 'reasonable cause' is synonymous th 'probable

cause.'ff Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *16 (cit

v. Port

Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d

r . 1 9 8 5 ) ; H a h n v . .. .. .... __ __ ~C ~~~_,~_ ~.C __.C~

~

~~

820 F. Supp. 4, 58 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also Williams v. Ward,

845 F.2d 374, 387 n.16 (2d Cir. 1988) ("'Reasonable cause' under

Criminal Procedure Law 'is substantially the same as 'probable

cause' within the

of

Fourth Amendment. I") (quoting

Greene v. Brown, 535 F. Supp. 1096, 1100 (B.D.N.Y. 1982)). As was

expla

in the April 23 Opinion, PIa iffs need only establish

the Rule 23(a) factors by a preponderance of the evidence, see In

re FI Telecom Holdi

Ltd. Sec. Lit

.3d 29, 35 (2d

Cir. 2009), and "[a]lthough other reasons for dismissal at the

facial

ficiency

ew stage are poss e, it is unlikely t

these ternat

rationales apply to the summonses at issue in

this litigat

" Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *16. While

Defendants are correct that di ssal pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (b) is not, to the exclusion of all other rationales, a

determination that a summons was issued without probable cause, the

April 23 Opinion held that \\t~e Citywide Summon Operation's two-

step review process and the nature of

offenses involved

establi the vast majori of those summonses fail

to survive

judicial review for facial sufficiency to have been d smissed for

want of probable cause." Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *16. --~~~14 


Because Defendants have f I LO raise controlling law

that Lhe April 23 Opinion overlooked

ng N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (b)'s reasonable cause requirement, Defendants' motion for

reconsideration based on this issue is denied.

2. Defendants Fail To Raise Controlling Law Or Facts That The April 23 Opinion Overlooked Concerning N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40 (1) (c)

In addition to the argument that a determination that a

summons lacked reasonable cause under N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b)

does not establish a merits-based determination that a summons was

i

wi

probable cause, Defendants attack

April 23

Opinion's reasoning concerning N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c), noting

that this section of

Criminal Procedure Law, in addition to

requiring non hearsay all

ions, also requires that

officer

issuing

summons set

allegations supporting every

ement of

c

charged. Defendants note that criminal

informations are frequently dismissed for failing to satisfy this

prima facie requirement. According to Defendants, a summons may be

dismissed as facially insufficient as a result of an officer1s

failure to mee~ the prima facie requirement of N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (c), a standard that has no bearing on the question of

probable cause. 15

Notwithstanding Defendants' contentions,

April 23

Opinion considered t requirements of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40 (1) (c)

and ld that

nature of the offenses involved in s

litigation est ished N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c) to

an

improbable reason for smissal. See Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at

*16. None of the cases Defendants cite in support of their

argument that reconsideration is warrant on the basis of the

April 23 Opinion's misinterpretation of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c)

were cited in the initial class certificat brief

Defendants

have thus failed to identi an issue the April 23 Opinion

overlooked and reconsideration is unwarrant

Even if Defendants had identifi controlling law the

April 23 Opinion overlooked, applicable precedent from the New York

Court of Appeals defining the requirements of N.Y. C.P.L. §§

100.40(1) (b) and 100.40(1) (c) reveals Defendants' inte

ation of

these statutes to be incorrect. In

Appeals addressed the faci sufficiency of a misdemeanor complaint

leging possession of a gravity knife, hoI

that

accusatory

instrument lacked reasonable cause under N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40 (4) (b) :

16

"The f

part of a misdemeanor complaint must allege

'facts an evidentiary

ter' [citing N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.15(3)] demonstrat

'reasonable cause' to

ieve the

de

committed the

charged [citing N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(4) (b)] "

e v. Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729, 731 (1986).

Here, the misdemeanor complaint, insofar as it

cribed the

arrest

officer's conclusion that defendant had a gravi

knife,

1 to

any support or

anation whatsoever

ficer's lief. That violation of the "reasonable

cause" requirement amounted to a jurisdict 1 defect.

Not every knife is a weapon for purposes of Penal Law §

265.01(1), which specifically outlaws possession a gravity

knife, among other weapons.

. A conclusory statement that

an object recovered from a fendant is a gravity kni does

not alone meet t

Ie cause

rement.

, 15 N.Y.3d at 102-04. As such, the Court of Appeals

d

---"-­

that the

trument at issue in

ran afoul of

N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(4) (b) 's reasonable cause

rement for

misdemeanor complaints

it failed to provide sufficient

facts leging that the object recovered was a gravity knife. In

order to satisfy

statutory

rement that an accusatory

instrument allege facts of an evi

nature demonstrating

reasonable cause to lieve that the fendant committed t crime

charged, an accusatory instrument must estab_ish the requisite

elements of that offense. Put differently, the reasonable cause

provision of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(4) (b) requires that the

accusatory instrument provide a ma facie case.

17

Although N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(4) (b) pertains to

misdemeanor complaints and not the summonses at issue in this

litigation, the Court of Appeal's

erpretation of this statute is

relevant because the language of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(4) (b) and

N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b) is nearly verbatim. Accordingly, the

Court of Appeals' holding in

that the reasonable cause

provision

N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(4) (b) requires a prima

ie case

is equal applicable to the reasonable cause provision of N.Y.

C.P.L. § 100.40 (1) (b).

A basic premise of statutory interpretation "disfavor[s]

interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous."

Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117

L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) i see also

~~nti2rio:r::, 228 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). However,

erpreting

N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b) 's reasonable cause requirement to

require that the information lude facts sufficient to allege the

elements of the offense charged does not render N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (b) duplicative of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c). N.Y.

C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c) mandates that "[n]on hearsay allegations of

the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting

depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense

charged and the defendant's commission thereof." N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (c). As such, the focus of this provision 18

the Criminal

Procedure Law is not that the information provide a prima ie

casei instead, the focus is that an

ormation provi non-hearsay

legations to support each element of the offense. The New York

Court of Appeals, in the case of

andro,

irms this

interpretation of the statute:

The reason for requiring the additi

showing of a prima

facie case for an information lies in the unique function that

an information serves under the statutory scheme established

by the minal Procedure Law. An information is often

instrument upon which the de~endant is prosecuted for a

misdemeanor or a pet offense. Unl a felony compla , it

is not f lowed by a preliminary hearing and a Grand Jury

proceeding. Thus,

Ie need not, at any time pr to

t 1, present actual evidence

rating a prima fac

case, as with an indictment following a felony complaint.

Because an information must, for jurisdictional purposes,

contain nonhearsay fac

allegations sufficient to establish

a prima facie case, a prosecutor's

statements, set

forth in a bill of particulars, cannot supply necessary

fac

allegations to cure a deficient information.

contrast, an indictment, which presupposes that the Grand

Jury, before issuance of the indictment, has found t

a

prima facie case exists may, as a pleading, be corrected by a

bill of particulars.

That it was this distinguishing characteristic of an

information - its use as the sole instrument upon ch the

defendant could be prosecuted - which prompted

Legislature

to write in the special restrictions applicable to

informations found in C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c) and 1CO.15 (3) is

confirmed by the legislative history leading to the enactment

of these sections as part of the Criminal Procedure Law.

e v. Al andro, 7C N.Y.2d 133, 138, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71 (1987) (citations omitted) Thus, the Court of Appeals
19 


confirms that purpose of N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (cl IS to ensure

that an information provi non

allegations detailing the

offense charged.

Defendants'

t ir contention chat N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (c) imposes a prima facie case requirement independent of

§ 100.40(l)(b)'s reasonable cause

rement wi citations to

e v. Jones, 9 N.Y.3d 259, 848 N.Y.S.2d 600, 878 N.E.2d 1016

(2007), and People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 33. According to

De

s, in both cases, the

truments at issue

satisfied the reasonable cause

rement 0 N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40 (1) (b) but were ul timately dismis

il

to establish

facie requirement of N. Y. C. P. L. § 100.40 (1) (c), thereby

t

that a finding of a lack of a

ma facie case is

te

apart from a determination of rea

e cause.

in, Defendants fail to offer case law the

1 23

Opinion

, as neither of these cases was rai

in the

initial class certification briefing. Even if t se cases are

cons

, De

s' argument fails. In

Ie v. Jones, while

the Court

s

rule the accusatory instrument

icient

on

that it failed to allege a prima facie case, the Court

of

Is

ma facie case requirement as one imposed by

both N.Y. C.P.L. §§ 100.40(1) (b) and 100.40(1) (c). See Jones, 9 20

N.Y.3d at 261 ("Paragraphs (b)

(c) of C.P.L. § 100.40(1), read

in conjunct

ace the burden on the People to make out the

prima fac case for the offense

rged in the text of t

informat • 1/) • Further, t Court of Appeals in Jones, citing

v. Ale andro,

ized the rat

le for

ring non

hearsay al:egations described above, noting that the purpose of

N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40 (1) (c) is to provide a defendant with

safeguards comparable to ~he presence of a Grand Jury for felony

complaints and a supporting deposition for misdemeanor complaints.

See id. at 262. Finally, there is no indication in Jones that the

Court of Appeals found t reasonable cause requiremen~ of N.Y.

C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (b) sa::isfied.

In

le v. Ale andro,

Court of Appeals states that

\\ [t]

'prima facie case' reauirement that the factua~ part

establish every element of the offense charged [cita~ion to N.Y.

C.P.L. § 100.40 (1) (cl] -

ies, however, to informations alone. 1I

However, as described above, the Ale andro Court's desc

ion of

the reason for ~he

ma facie requiremen~ is focused on the idea

that, because of the 1

1 safeguards, a prosecutor's

all

ions in an informa~ion mus:: be non hearsay. Furthermore,

recen:: Court of Appeals jurisprudence

ing N.Y. C.P.L. §

100.40(1) (c) suggests the enumerating of elements ~o be linked with

the concept of reasonable cause, see 21

le v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d

738,741,944 N.Y.S.2d 715,967 N.E.2d 1160 (2012) ("An information

is valid

j sdictional purposes if it contains nonconclusory

factual legations that, if assumed to be true, address each

element

the crime charged, thereby afr

ng reasonable cause to

believe that der

committed that offense U ),

further

support to the idea that the purpose behind N.Y. C.P. §

100.40(1) (cl is to ensure that an information includes non-hearsay

all

ions.

Because the April 23 inion addressed the requirements

N.Y. C.P.L. § 100.40(1) (c), Defendants have iled to

demonstrate that the April 23 Opinion overlooked any fact of

consequence or controlling I

authority, and reconsideration on

the basis of this statutory

sion is not warranted.

3. Defendants Fail To Raise Controlling Law Or Facts That The April 23 Opinion Overlooked Concerning The Use Of A Rebuttable Presumption To Define The Class

Defendants object to the April 23 Op ion's holding that

"[i]ndividuals who were issued summonses that survived the New York

City Citywi Summons Operations' de t review but were dismissed

during the second-round review process upon a judicial finding of

fac

insufficiency are presumptive members of the class, but

Defendants can challenge any presumptive class membey on grounds 22

that the summons at issue was smis

reasons other than a

lack of probable cause. U Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *17.

Defendants contend that this

sumption artifici

satisfies the

ascertainability requirement for class certification, and, since

the presumption is rebuttable, class membership cannot be

ascerta

until t factual ana is of probable cause for each

summons is undertaken.

Defendants, cit

ck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125

S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), a case which held that an arrest

is valid if

valid basis

sted even if probable cause did not

exist with respect to the stat basis for the arrest, contend that

each summons at issue must

analyzed to termine

her

probable cause existed

that the April 23 Opinion

inappropriately shifted t burden by presuming that every summons

was issued without probable cause. Defendants state that

sease

is similar to Morton v.

of Detroit, No. 11-cv 12925, 2012 WL

------------~~------------

1166984 (E.D. Mich.

. 9, 2012), a case where plaintiff brought a

class action seeking to declare a loitering ordinance

unconstitutional. In that case, the Eastern District of Michigan

denied class certification of all individuals ticketed under t

ordinance who appeared in court and had their tickets dismissed

because the "reason each ticket was dismissed may that there was

insufficient probable cause, but other reasons

have resulted in

a dismis

of the ticket, such as when an officer fails to appear

in court or the individual entered a plea agreement

ing to

plead guilty to cert n charges in exchange for the city attorney

smissing other charges. u Morton, 2012 WL 1166984, at *3.

.... ~

--~.-

Again, Defendants fail to raise any

s or controlling

law the April 23 Opinion overlooked. The April 23 Opinion

addressed

v. Alford, see Stinson, 2012 WL 1450053, at

- - - - - - - ------~-....

...~~----

*18, and the Morton v. Ci of Detroit case was not ------.--------~~-------------

sented in

the initial class certification briefi

Furthermore, Defendants

ignore that that the April 23 Opinion did not blindly impose a

presumption that individuals who rece

summonses were issued

those summonses without probable cause. The April 23 Opinion

detailed the two-stage review process of

Citywi Summons

Operation, evaluat all possible ~eans

which a summons could be

dismissed at the facial sufficiency review stage and concluded t

under

l

e preponderance of the evidence standard, that

it was more likely than not that summonses dismissed at che facial

review s

were smissed for lack of

Ie cause.

Defendants' citation to

Eastern District of Michigan's decision

in Morton is unavailing, as the Court in that case d not confront

the two-stage Cicywide Summons Operacion review process or the

provisions of che New York Criminal Procedure Law chat make class

certification appropriace in t

present accion. 24 


Defendants, in the briefing supporting the motion, have

offered an incorrect int

ation of

April 23 Opinion's

holdi

Although Defendants' sinterpretation does not

constitute grounds for reconsideration, some clarification is

appropriate. Defendants state that "the Court's

truction that

defendants can

lenge any of the presumptive class members only

on grounds other than a lack of probable cause is troubling."

Def.'s Mem. at 4 n.2. Defendants appear to construe this language

to mean that they are only permitted to mount a challenge to a

putative plaintiff's membership in the class bas on anything

except whether that putat plaintiff's summons was issued with

probable cause. The April 23 Opinion, however, held the exact

opposite, namely

Defendants can mount a challenge based

precisely on probable cause as to those summonses Defendants

believe were issued with probable cause notwithstanding the

presumption that these summonses were wrong ly issued:

Defendants,

their opposition brief, highlight various

aspects

Plaintiffs' deposition testimony suggesting that at

least some of the summonses Plaintiffs received were issued

with probable cause and object to the Court "rubber stamping a

proposed class to include anyone who has had a summons

dismissed." For this reason, the boundaries of the class have

been narrowed to include only those putative plaintiffs whose

summonses were dismissed during

second-step,

ial

sufficiency review process, where the applicable statutes

suggest the reason for dismis to be a lack of probable

cause. Additionally, affording Defendants the abili to

25

challenge any

at

plaintiff's membership in

class

will ensure that the class is not overly inc ive.

Stinson. 2012 WL 1450553, at *17 n.6.

B. Defendants Raise No Controlling Law Or Facts The April 23 Opinion Overlooked To Warrant Reconsideration Of The Commonality Issue

In addition to att

t April 23 inion's holding

regarding the implied Rule 23 (a)

rement of ascertainability,

Defendants' attack the April 23 Opinion's hoI

concerning

express Rule 23(a) requirement of commonali

However,

Defendants' object

concerning commonality fail to demonstrate

that t April 23 Opinion overlooked

fact of conseauence or

controll

1

authority so as to require reconsideration of the

decision to grant class certification.

1. The April 23 Opinion Addresses The Existence Of A Policy And The Causal Link Between That Policy And The NYPD Issuing Summonses Without Probable Cause

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs in this action suffer

from t same commonality pitfalls as Plaintiffs in the Dukes case,

as the April 23

nion overlooked Defendants' contention that

Plaintiffs must present sufficient evide:1Ce of a Inunic 1 policy

26

that has caus the alleged constitutional deprivation applicable

to the entire proposed class. Defendants contend that, even if a

quota exists,

ntiffs have not

the "s

ficant" proof

required under - - -s of a munic

policy directing officers to

issue summonses without probable cause or forcing officers to issue

summonses without probable cause in order to meet a quota.

Defendants contend t~at the evidence reli upon in the April 23

Opinion, including the Office of Court Administration statistics,

tape recordings of roll calls at two police precincts and an

employment arbitration decision, fail to satis Plaintiffs' Rule

23 burden. According to Defendants, t~e dismissals for facial

insufficiency do not constitute a fi ng of no probable cause,

Plaintiffs have made no showing that the two speakers on the roll

call tapes are McmE?l~ policymakers or that the content of these

tapes represents an NYPD policy sufficient to hold the n L'l of New

York and NYPD liable under Monell, and the arbitration decision

finding traffic summons

in the 7 Precinct in 2005 does not

support an NYPD policy of issuing summonses wit~out probable cause.

Defendants note that Plaintiffs have offered no proof t~at officers

are issuing similar numbers of summonses, tnereby suggesting the

existence of a quota, and that the summons issuance process instead

appears to be discretionary, much like the discriminatory policy at

issue in Dukes. Defendants also contend that, even if it is

assumed t~at a quota policy exists, Plaintiffs have not presented 27 


testimony from KYPD officers

the auota po:icy prompted them to

issue invalid summonses, nor have Plaintiffs presented

other

evidence suggesting that summonses issued pursuant to this quota

lacked probable cause.

Notwi

anding Defendants' contentions, the April 23

Opinion held that Plaintiffs had established the existence of a

common policy or custom - the quota as well as the causal link

between that common policy and the harm inflicted on Plaintiffs

the issuance of summonses without probable cause. The April 23

Opinion detailed the s

ficant proof establishing the existence

of that policy, including

from roll call meetings and

the January 14, 2006 arbitrator's ruling t

held that the 75th

Prec tempI

a quota with

to traffic summonses. See

Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *4 5. Additionally, the

I 23

Opinion noted that 620,149 summonses were dismissed at

second-

round facial sufficiency

ew stage, and an analysis of New

York's Cri nal Procedure Law suggested that the overwhel

number of these 620,149 summonses were dismissed because

lacked probable cause. See Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at

*16.

The April 23 Opinion express defines the theory

Defendants

have an unconstitutional quota policy and that this quota

icy

has caused Defendants to issue Plaintiffs summonses that lacked

probable cause. See Stinson, 2012 WL 1450553, at *9 ("Plaintiffs 28 


here have

1 -'-

a

ific policy promulgat by Defendants,

namely, that Defendants have est lished a practice by which NYPD

officers issues summonses without probable cause

r to meet a

summons quota. ") . As was noted in the April 23 Opi on,

Defendants' citation to Dukes is unavail~ng, as

decentralized

discretion afforded to local

-Mart managers is unlike the

cent ized, citywide quota policy leged

See id.

Defendants fail to raise any controlling law or facts

that the

I 23 Opinion overlooked and,

ng ,have

provided no basis upon which the Court's holding can be

reconsidered.

2. The April 23 Opinion's Use Of A Presumption Does Not Inappropriately Establish Commonality

Si lar to

ir

concerning ascertainability,

Defendants contend that

il 23 Opinion's imposition of a

sumption that a summons was invali y issued artificially

establi s the element of

ity. De

s highlight the

cases of Casale v. Kel

257 F.R.D. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and Brown

v. Kell , 244 F.R.D. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) I which both involved the

certification of a class of aintiffs who had been issued

summonses

violating statutes that had been

ously declared

19

unconstitutional. According to Defendants, In those two cases, the

Court acknowledged that some of the summonses involved may

articulate a charge ba on a statute other than the one that had

been prev~ously held unconstitutional, see

ding that an arrest is valid f any valid basis existed even if

probable cause did not exist with respect to the stated basis for

the arrest), and that sub-classes could be employed to address

these concerns. According to Defendants, this case, unlike Casale

or Brown, involves summonses that address a wide range of criminal

violations that are not held together by the glue of having been

issued pursuant to a specific unconstitutional statute. Because

the certified class in this case does not have

s ue of

commonali ,Defendants contend that it is, in fact, more like the

subclasses for which

icularized determinat on of probable cause

are necessary.

The April 23

and applied the holdings of those cases to the present

action. Although the present action, unlike Casale or Brown, does

not revolve around a single unconstitutional statute, it does

revolve around a single 1

quota policy. Based on the

presented, the April 23 Opinion concluded that a

preponderance of the evidence suggested the existence of a specific

quota policy promulgated

Defendants that was common to each 30 


Plaintiffs' cl

for relief. Defendants have failed to raise new

ts or law to rebut the April 23 Op

's holding regarding the

existence of this quota poli and are there

not entitl to

reconsideration.

3. The April 23 Opinion Establishes Rule 23(b) (2) and Rule 23(b) (3) Requirements To Be Met

Finally, Defendants state that, because PI

iffs have

not identified a municipal policy, PIa iffs cannot ~eet the

requireTents of Rule 23(b) (2) or the more stringent predominance

requirement of Rule 23 (b) (3) See

lar v.

ion and

Customs Enforcement Div. of

't of Homeland Sec., No. 07

Civ. 8225 (KBF) , 2012 vJL '344417, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 20:2)

("[F]or the same reasons that aintiffs are unable to satisfy the

commonali

rement of Rule 23 (a), they are unable to satisfy

the requirement of 23 (b) (2) that the party opposing the class has

act or re

to act on grounds

ly applicable to the

class, thereby

ng appropriate final injunct

relief or

corresponding declaratory relie~ with respect to the class as a

whole. H ); see also Moore v. Paine Webber ~nc., 306 F.3d 12 7, 1252

(2d Cir. 2002). As noted

April 23 inion det led the

evidence supporting the existence of a munici I policy. Because

Defendants' motion for reconsideration has failed to present

31

overlooked law or facts that undermine the April 23 Opinion regarding this issue, Defendants' arguments concerning Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23 (b) (2) or Rule 23 (b) (3) are rejected. Conclusion
Based on the conclusions set forth above, Defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied.
It is so ordered. New York, NY
July /3 ' 2012
ROBERT W. SWEET U.S.D.J.
32 


 
 CCaasese: 112:1-300-c6v9-042D2o8c-uRmWeSnt: D35ocumPeangte4: 71 F1ile2d/1122/2/1021/212 P79a3g0e811of 11

MANDATE United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

S.D.N.Y.–N.Y.C. 10-cv-4228 Sweet, J.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 1t2h day of December, two thousand twelve.

Present:

Robert A. Katzmann, Barrington D. Parker, Richard C. Wesley,
Circuit Judges.

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: _________________ DATE FILED: _D__e_c._1_2_,_2_0_1_2__

Sharif Stinson, et al., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, v.
The City of New York, et al.,
Defendants-Petitioners,
P.O.s John Does, #1-50 individually and in their official capacities (the name John Doe being fictitious as the true names are presently unknown),
Defendants.

12-3069

Petitioners, through counsel, move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), for leave to appeal the district court’s order granting Respondents’ motion for class certification. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the petition is DENIED because an immediate appeal is unwarranted. See Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001).
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

SAO-JM
MANDATE ISSUED ON 12/12/2012

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X

SHARIF STINSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs, - against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

10 Civ. 4228 (RWS} OPINION

Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
COHEN & FITCH LLP 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, NY 10007 By: Gerald M. Cohen, Esq.
Joshua P. Fitch, Esq.

1l

USDC SDJ'.c'Y
DOClHvi!:~T

!III

ELECTRONICALLY FILEt i J

DOC#: __

DATE FILED:

THE LAW OFFICES OF JON L. NORINSBERG, 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, NY 10007 By: Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq.

ESQ.

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 51 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10010 By: Benjamin J. ldin, Esq.
Christopher T. Cook, Esq. Elinor C. Sutton, Esq. Jennifer D. Bishop, Esq. Kevin A. Janus, Esq. Steig D. Olson, Esq. Stephen R. Neuwirth, Esq.

At

Defendants

ZACHARY W. CARTER CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

1

100 Church Street New York, NY 10007
By: Qiana C. Smith-Williams, Esq.
Joanne M. McLaren, Esq. Lisa M. Richardson, Esq. Sheila Weinstein, Esq. Steven M. Silverberg, Esq. Suzanna P. Mettham, Esq. Daniel S. Passeser, Esq.
2

Sweet, D.J.,
Defendants Raymond W. Kelly, the City of New York, and 50 John Doe police officers (collectively, the "Defendants" or the "City") have filed a second motion seeking to remove the statutory seal imposed by N.Y.C.P.L. §§ 160.50 and 160.55 on the records of all individuals whose criminal court summonses were dismissed for factual insufficiency between May 1, 2007 and the conclusion of this litigation. Based on the conclusions set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Prior Proceedings

Prior opinions have set forth the history of this class

action, familiarity with which is assumed. See, e.g., Stinson

v. City of New York, 282 F.R.D. 360, 364-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

(laying out the facts of the case). The Defendants filed a

previous motion to unseal the summonses on August 12, 2015.

(Dkt. No. 228.) That motion sought the unsealing in order to

identify and depose presumptive members of the plaintiff class,

and then to challenge whether the summonses issued to them truly

lacked probable cause.

id. at 1.) The prior motion was

denied by an opinion dated December 11, 2015, which rejected any

discovery into absent class members and ruled that all such

3

inquiries should be deferred until the claims process, after common questions of fact and law have been resolved. Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2015 WL 8675360 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2015).
The Defendants filed their second motion to unseal the records on January 21, 2016. (Dkt. No. 266.) The Plaintiffs filed their opposition papers on February 4, 2016 (Dkt. No. 270), and the Defendants replied on February 10, 2016. (Dkt. No. 271). The motion was heard the following day.
Applicable Standard
The primary purpose of the sealing of records pursuant N.Y.C.P.L. §§ 160.50 and 160.55 is to ensure confidentiality and to protect the charged individual from the potential public stigma associated with a criminal prosecution. See Lehman v. Kornblau, 206 F.R.D. 345, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Harper v.
--=-l-i-ll-o-, 89 N.YY.2d 761, 766 (1997)). However, like other
state statutory privileges, these seals "must be construed narrowly, and must yield when outweighed by a federal interest in presenting relevant information to a trier of fact .. Thus, as a matter of comity, federal courts must balance the deference to be accorded state created privileges with the need for the information sought to be protected by the privilege."
4

Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695, 2001 WL 228091, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2001). The policy priorities that the state legislature sought to further by enacting these privacy protections must be given "serious consideration, even if they are not determinative." Id.
The Motion is Granted in Part and Denied in Part
The instant matter differs from the previous motion to unseal not in the relief that the Defendants seek, but in what they intend to do once they receive it. While the previous motion to unseal sought access to the City's dismissed summons records in order to contact presumptive members of the plaintiff class, depose them, and establish that the summonses issued to them did in fact have probable cause, see Stinson, 2015 WL 8675360, at *1, the current motion seeks to have the records unsealed so that an expert can aggregate the statistics and discern patterns, and to identify officers who issued disputed summonses so that they can be called at trial. The first use of the records is permissible; the second is not.
As a threshold matter, the Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not consider the merits of the City's motion because it is, in effect, a motion for reconsideration filed outside the 14-day period established by Local Civil Rule 6.3. They also
5

note that the Defendants do not cite any new facts or law that the Court ignored in its prior Opinion, and that the arguments made in support of the instant motion could have (and perhaps should have) been raised at that time. "Courts in the Second Circuit are reluctant to permit parties . . . to avoid both the filing deadlines of a motion for reconsideration and the legal requirements of such a motion by disguising such a motion as an amended pleading or as another motion." State Farm. Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mallela, No. 00 Civ. 4923, 2002 WL 31946762, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002). However, courts can and do exercise their discretion to consider new arguments even when the procedural requirements for reconsideration are in doubt. See, e.g., id.
One of the central elements that the Plaintiffs must prove at trial is the existence of an official policy, pattern, or practice sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It is expected that the Plaintiffs will point to the sheer number of dismissed summonses - approximately 850,000 - as evidence of the existence of such a policy, and the Plaintiffs indicated at oral argument that this contention will likely be part of their case at trial. Although the Court concluded at the class certification stage that "the vast majority of those summonses . . . have been dismissed for want
6

of probable cause," Stinson v. City of New York, 282 F.R.D. 360, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the jury is entitled to make its own, independent determination regarding that factual issue at trial.
The Defendants contend that by allowing an expert to analyze the narrative statements written by NYPD officers when issuing a summons, perhaps from a representative sample section of the hundreds of thousands of summonses at issue, patterns may emerge indicating that the number of summonses that lacked probable cause is not as high as it appears. Statistical analyses of large amounts of NYPD data have been helpful in past cases, see, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), and unsealing has at times been ordered for that purpose. See, e.g., Casale v. City of N.Y., No. 07 Civ. 2173, Dkt. No. 7, at *1 (unsealing records of summonses issued for loitering in action alleging an NYPD practice of issuing summonses under unconstitutional subsections of the New York Penal Law). There exists a possibility that experts can aggregate the written narratives and produce probative evidence. Unsealing is therefore permissible for that purpose. 1
Defendants' second proffered purpose for the unsealing of summonses to identify the individual officers who issued the summonses and permit them to testify in this case - is not
1 The Court reaches no conclusion regarding whether the statistical evidence produced by the Defendants' experts will ultimately have any probative value, or whether it will be of sufficient reliab1l1ty to be presented to a jury.
7

,
permissible. This request is essentially another avenue for discovery into the circumstances of the summonses issued to absent class members, an area of inquiry that the Court has already ruled to be neither relevant nor ripe. Stinson, 2015 WL 8675360, at *2. Given the need to prove a policy, pattern, or practice, and the sheer number of dismissed summonses at issue, the value of any inquiry into individual incidents may be questionable.
The imposition of such a discovery burden is particularly unwarranted at this late stage, where discovery is nearing its end. See id. at *2 (noting that the case had been ongoing for years prior to the previous unsealing motion and chiding the
ty because it "chose to wait until discovery was drawing to a close.") 2 Moreover, allowing the Defendants to elicit testimony from police officers about summonses issued to absent class members might very well incentivize the Plaintiffs to rebut the officers' testimony by calling those same absent class members to the stand exactly the outcome rejected in the previous opinion. See id. at *3 (denying unsealing based in part on the privacy interests of the absent members of the plaintiff class). The motion is therefore denied with respect to officer names and other identifying information, but granted with regard to the
2 At oral argument, counsel for the City represented that the process of unsealing the summons records would not result in a delay in the d1scovery schedule.
8

narrative section of the dismissed summonses. Cf. MacNamara v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 9612, 2006 WL 3298911, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2006) (allowing production of arrest narratives, but rejecting production of large number of officer names where the burden would be "significant" and the list would contain innocent officers, as well as those who engaged in abusive behavior); Larsen v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 0665, 2005 WL 1020871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2005) (declining motion to compel production of names and memo books from all officers assigned to a demonstration where the information would be relevant "only in particula zed instances") .
Conclusion
The motion to unseal is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above. The Defendants shall submit a proposed Order allowing the unsealing, which shall provide for the redaction or withholding of information identifying both the citizen who received the summons and the officer who issued it. The Order shall also limit the distribution of all non-public summons information to the parties' attorneys and experts.
9

It is so orde~ed.

Dated:

New Yo:rk,. N~ew Y2o0r1k6 February ~..,} '

10

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 297 Filed 04/01/16 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------- ---------------------------X
SHARIF STINSON, et al., Plaintiffs,
- against CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
---------- --------------- -- -- --X
Sweet, D. J.,

10 Civ. 4228 (RWS) ORDER

The Plaintiffs' letter-motion regarding unsealing (Dkt. No. 289) and the Defendants' cross-motion (Dkt. No. 295) are each granted in part and denied in part.
As discussed in the Court's recent Opinion, Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2016 WL 817445 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016), the statutory sealing requirements of New York Criminal Procedure Law§§ 160.50 and 160.55 are set aside for the limited purpose of allowing the City to search for and provide certain information regarding all criminal court summonses that were dismissed for facial insufficiency from May 25, 2007 until the conclusion of this litigation (the "Summonses") to the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York (the "Corporation Counsel") and to Class Counsel, for use in this case only.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 297 Filed 04/01/16 Page 2 of 3
The Office of Court Administration shall provide Corporation Counsel and Class Counsel with the following information, if retained by the Office of Court Administration: the location where each Summons was issued, the date and time of day when the Summons was issued, the narrative portion of the Summons, the offense for which the Summons was sued, the Summons number, and the Command of the NYPD employee who issued the Summons. The Office of Court Administration shall not provide any other information regarding the Summonses.
The New York City Police Department shall provide Corporation Counsel and Class Counsel with the following information, if retained by the New York City Police Department: the location where each Summons was issued, the date and time of day when the Summons was issued, the narrative portion of the Summons, the offense for which the Summons was issued, the Summons number, and the Command of the NYPD employee who issued the Summons. The New York City Police Department shall not provide any other information regarding the Summonses.
The Office of Court Administration and New York City Police Department shall redact or otherwise withhold any information that could be used to identify either the c izen who received the Summons or the NYPD employee who issued the Summons.
The distribution of all non-public Summons information shall be limited to Corporation Counsel, Class Counsel, and

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 297 Filed 04/01/16 Page 3 of 3
experts retained in the present matter by Corporation Counsel or Class Counsel.
To the extent that the New York City Police Department, the Office of Court Administration, or any other New York City Agency has or had access to the Summonses, it may not access, use, review, or analyze any non-public information (other than the information listed in the third paragraph of this Order) in or derived from the summonses for the purposes of this litigation, and may not provide any non-public information from the Summonses (other than the information listed in the third paragraph of this Order), or any analysis or work product that concerns or is derived from any non-public information from the summonses (other than the information listed in the third paragraph of this Order), to any person or entity, including Corporation Counsel or Class Counsel, for the purposes of this litigation.
It is so ordered.
New York, NY
March Jt , 2016

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319 Filed 01/23/17 Page 1 of 5

auinneifianuel
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, New York looio TEL (212) 849-7000

Cohen & Fitch LLP
THE WOOLWORTH BUILDING 233 Broadway, Suite 1800 New York, NY 10279 tel: 212.374.9115 fax: 212.406.2313

Jon L. Norinsberg PLLC
Transportation Building 225 Broadway, Suite 2700
New York, NY 10007 tel: 212-791-5396 fax: 212-406-6890

VIA ECF Honorable Robert W. Sweet United States District Judge Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10007

January 23,2017

Re: Stinson, et ai v. The City ofNew York et al. 10 CV4228 (RWS)
Your Honor,
We are co-lead class counsel for the Plaintiff Class in the above-referenced action. We write on behalf of all of the parties to advise the Court that the Class and Defendants have reached a proposed settlement of the litigation, and to request the Court’s preliminary approval of the settlement. Specifically, the parties respectfully request that Your Honor (1) so order the enclosed Stipulation of Settlement, and (2) enter the enclosed Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the class settlement in this case.’ In addition, it is respectfully requested that Your Honor appoint Rust Consulting as claims administrator.
It is well settled that ‘“[wjhere the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class and falls within the
The Stipulation of Settlement and the Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Approval, as well as a Proposed Notice and a Proposed Claim form, are all enclosed with this letter. {See Stipulation of Settlement Attached as Exhibit A; Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Approval Attached as Exhibit B; Proposed Long Form Notice Attached as Exhibit C; Proposed Short Form Notice Attached as Exhibit D; and Proposed Claim Form Attached as Exhibit E). Also accompanying this letter are the Affirmation of the Hon. John S. Martin, who served as mediator of the parties’ settlement negotiations, and the Declaration of Tiffaney Janowicz, Esq., in support of the proposed plan for notice to class members. {See Declaration of the Hon. John S. Martin Attached as Exhibit F; and, the Declaration of Tiffaney Janowicz Attached as Exhibit G).
1

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319 Filed 01/23/17 Page 2 of 5
reasonable range of approval, preliminary approval is granted.’” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 2006 WL 3247396, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 176 F.R.D. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). Indeed, where a settlement is the “product of arm’s length negotiations eonducted by experienced counsel knowledgeable in complex class litigation,” the settlement enjoys a “presumption of fairness.” In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 173-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Michael Milken and Assocs. Sec. Litig., 150 F.R.D. 57, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Henry v. Little Mint, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 3996, 2014 WL 2199427, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014) (“If the settlement was achieved through experienced counsel’s arm’s-length negotiations, absent fraud or collusion, courts should be hesitant to substitute their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement.”).
Moreover, “[i]n terms of the overall fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement, a full fairness analysis is unnecessary at this stage; preliminary approval is appropriate where a proposed settlement is merely within the range of possible approval.” Reade-Alvarez, 237 F.R.D. 26, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Yim v. Carey Limousine NY, No. 14-cv-5883, 2016 WL 1389598, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2016) (“In the context of a motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, the standards are not so stringent as those applied when the parties seek final approval.”). Overall, “in contrast to final approval, [preliminary approval] ‘is at most a determination that there is what might be termed ‘probable cause’ to submit the proposal to class members and hold a full-scale hearing as to its fairness.’” Nieves v. Cmty. Choice Health Plan of Westchester, Inc., 2012 WL 857891, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Menkes v. Stolt Nielsen S.A., 270 F.R.D. 80, 101 (D. Conn. 2010)). For the reasons summarized herein and based on terms of the settlement specifically set forth in the attached documents, it is respectfully submitted that the standards for preliminary approval are met in this case.
Pursuant to Your Honor’s Class Certification Order, the class in this case is composed of “individuals who were issued summonses that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial insufficiency and who were ticketed without probable cause.” Stinson v. City of NY., 282 F.R.D. 360, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).^ Furthermore, as Your Honor is aware, over the past six (6) years, this case has been vigorously litigated by both sides, throughout every phase of the proceedings. Indeed, there have been hundreds of thousands of documents exchanged in discovery, hundreds of hours of audio visual materials reviewed, forty-four (44) depositions taken and over thirty (30) substantive motions litigated, including four separate motions on the issue of class certification alone. Thus, the parties had a very developed factual and legal record to consider when assessing the potential for settlement of the claims. Moreover, the sheer expenditure of resources in prosecuting and defending the class claims thus far, as well as the prospective resources to be expended if the case proceeded to trial, are factors strongly militating in favor of granting preliminary approval in this case. See e.g, In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig.,\63 F.R.D. 200, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Instead of the lengthy, costly, and uncertain course of further litigation, the settlement provides a significant and expeditious route to recovery for the Class.”).
^ Based on that definition, the size of this class is currently estimated to be in the range of 850,000 to 1 million individuals.
2

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319 Filed 01/23/17 Page 3 of 5
At the same time, the settlement here was the product of lengthy arms-length negotiations among highly skilled and experienced counsel. All negotiations proceeded with the involvement, by agreement of all parties, of the Hon. John S. Martin (Ret.), who served as mediator. Under Judge Martin’s supervision, the parties engaged in three separate in-person mediation sessions, which included some of the highest-ranking officials at the NYPD, the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of the Corporation Counsel, as well as the full set of court-appointed co-lead counsel for the Class. Also with Judge Martin’s involvement, counsel for the parties engaged in numerous follow-up teleconferences and emails regarding the potential terms of a settlement. Throughout the course of this process, the parties presented to each other detailed overviews of the case, exchanged detailed Mediation Statements that summarized evidence supporting their respective positions, and with the help and guidance of Judge Martin evaluated both the potential value of the claims and the risks for each side of proceeding to trial. Ultimately, this process yielded a proposed settlement that all sides believe is both highly significant and fair. Indeed, as mediator Judge Martin explains in his accompanying affirmation:
“As the result of my involvement in this matter I can attest to the fact that the negotiations of this settlement were conducted at arm’s length, with counsel for all parties vigorously representing their clients' interest. In my opinion, it would not have been possible for the class representatives to obtain a more favorable settlement than that which is now embodied in the proposed settlement agreement before the Court. During the course of the settlement discussions I had extensive discussions individually with each of the parties concerning the litigation risks involved, and the settlement that they reached reflected their reasonable valuation of those risks.”
(Ex. F).
Subject to this Court’s approval, Defendant the City of New York has agreed to pay Settlement Benefits of up to seventy-five million dollars ($75,000,000.00), with up to Fifty-Six Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($56,500,000.00) to be used to fund settlement payments to individual class members, service awards to the named Class representatives, and costs of notice and settlement administration, and an additional Eighteen Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($18,500,000.00) to pay attorney’s fees and costs.^ The Settlement Agreement provides, subject to Court approval, that payments to individual class members shall be made on a pro rata basis, based on the number of claims made, at a rate of up to one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) per eligible summons. The Settlement Agreement provides that any funds not distributed through the claims process or used to cover attorney’s fees and costs shall revert back to the City.
Furthermore, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the New York Police Department (“NYPD”), since this litigation commenced, has made certain significant changes to its policies, practices and procedures related to criminal summonses, and the NYPD also will be making additional changes to those policies, practices and procedures in the coming months. Among other
' As Judge Martin notes in his accompanying affirmation, “Plaintiffs’ counsel refused to negotiate with respect to their fees until the amount of payment to the class was resolved and the general terms of non-monetary terms had been resolved in principle.” (Ex. F.)
3

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319 Filed 01/23/17 Page 4 of 5
things, the policy, practice and procedure changes address the use of quotas, numerical measurements of performance, and other matters that have been the subject of the Class’ injunctive relief claims in this case.
In addition, subject to Court approval, both sides recommend the appointment of Rust Consulting to serve as the claims administrator and to effectuate notice to the class. With nearly 30 years of class action settlement administration experience. Rust is among the leaders in the industry, having administered more than 5,200 class action settlements, including 2,000 in the past five years alone. Moreover, Rust has previously been approved as the elaims administrator in civil rights class actions involving the City of New York. See, e.g., Casale v. Kelly, 08-Civ-2173 (SAS) and Brown v. Kelly, 05-Civ.5442 (SAS); McBean v. City ofNew York, 02 Civ. 5426 (JGK).
As more fully set forth in the accompanying declaration of Tiffaney Janowicz, Esq., while the notices were initially drafted by Co-Lead Class Counsel, Rust worked with Counsel to ensure that both notices were “written and designed to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.” (Ex. G at f 5). Indeed, as Ms. Janowicz declares, both notices “are adequate and typical of notices in class action cases like this.” (Id.). Furthermore, Co-Lead Class Counsel worked with Rust to develop a proposed Notiee Program intended to provide Class members with the best notice practicable under the circumstances.
Specifieally, Rust will utilize the last known name and address information class members to send the short form notice and elaim form to class members via first class mail. Prior to mailing. Rust will verify the accuracy of the address information by running it through the United States Postal Service National Change of Address and Coding Accuraey Support System. After mailing, any notices that are returned as undeliverable will go through an address trace process to locate an alternate address. In addition to sending the short form notice via direct mail. Rust proposes to publish the short form notice in El Diario La Prensa - New York City, the New York Post, AM New York, Caribbean Life News and New York Amsterdam News. Rust will also maintain a website where it will provide links to both the long and short form notices, as well as the claim form. And Rust will maintain a toll-free number “helpline” to assist in answering any questions from class members. At the conclusion of the proposed notification program. Rust will prepare a declaration that summarizes the work Rust has performed and relevant statistics related to the notice process.
Finally, it respeetfully requested that this Court approve the schedule outlined in the Stipulation of Settlement and the Proposed Order. Specifically, the Notice will be mailed to Class Members within 45 days of the Preliminary Approval Order. Class Members will then have 45 days from the date the Notice is mailed to opt out of the settlement or object to it. Given this timeline, it is requested that the Court hold a Fairness Hearing on May 24 2017, or the first date thereafter that is convenient for the Court, and plaintiffs will file a Motion for Final Approval of the Class Settlement no later than 40 days prior to the Fairness Hearing date.
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the terms of the settlement in this case are “at least sufficiently fair, reasonable and adequate to justify notice to those affected and an opportunity to be heard.” In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475, 482, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1589 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). As such, the parties request that Your Honor (1) so order the enclosed
4

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319 Filed 01/23/17 Page 5 of 5

Stipulation of Settlement, (2) enter the enclosed Proposed Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the class settlement in this case, and (3) appoint Rust Consulting as the Claims Administrator and approved the proposed notice plan so that class notice may be commenced.
Thank you for your consideration of this reciuest.
Respectfully submitted.
C
c Joshua P.XFitch Gerald M.V^ohen ■GehemfeTitch LLP
I
Stephen R. Neuwirth Elinor Sutton Quinn Emanuel Urauhart & Sullivan. LI.P

Enclosures
Via ECF
cc: Rachel Scligman Weiss, Esq. Qiana Smith-Williams, E.sq.

'Jotv-tTCNorinsberg Jon L. Norinsberg PLLC

5

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 1 of 35
EXHIBIT A 44 55

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 2 of 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHARIF STINSON, etal, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
V.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.. Defendants.

10 Civ. 4228 (RWS)

ST1PU1..AT10N AND PROPOSED PRELIMINARY APPUOVAl. ORDER

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 3 of 35
Subject to approval by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”), SHARIF STINSON, RYBURN WALKES, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JEREMY THAMES, LEANDER GRIFFIN, RICARDO JONES and VICTOR BRELAND (collectively “Class Representatives”), on behalf of the class previously certified by the Court of themselves and all other individuals who were issued Criminal Court summonses by THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (“NYPD”) that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial or legal insufficiency by the court prior to trial, and whose C Summonses were issued without probable cause (the “Class”), represented by their attorneys, Cohen & Fitch LLP, The Law Office of Jon L. Norinsberg, PLLC and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP (collectively “Class Counsel”); and Defendants CITY OF NEW YORK and RAYMOND W. KELLY represented by their attorneys The Office of Corporation Counsel and Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP (collectively, “Counsel for Defendants”), hereby enter this Stipulation in the litigation captioned Stinson, etal. V. The City ofNew York, et. al. Case No. 10 Civ. 4228 (RWS) (the “Civil Action”).
WHEREAS, on May 25, 2010, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit (“Lawsuit”) against the City of New York (“City”) and Raymond W. Kelly (together with the City, “Defendants”) alleging that pursuant to a pattern and practice the New York City Police Department (hereinafter “NYPD” or “Department”) violated constitutional rights of the Class Members by, inter alia, issuing criminal summonses returnable to the Summons Part (“Csummonses”) without probable cause in response to pressure to meet alleged quotas and that the NYPD failed to train, discipline, or supervise officers regarding their obligation not to issue summonses without a constitutional basis;
WHEREAS, Defendants deny the existence of such policies or practices; WHEREAS, according to the New York State Office of Court Administration

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 4 of 35
(“OCA”) ’ the number of C-summonses issued by the NYPD that were docketed in New
York City by year (no defectives included) from May 25, 2007 through December 31,2015
are;
May 25, 2007 through December 31, 2007; 298,140 January 1,2008 through December 31, 2008: 490,069 January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009: 520,295 January 1,2010 through December 31, 2010: 518,265 January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011: 485,303 January 1,2012 through December 31,2012; 473,068 January 1, 2013 through December 31,2013: 426,709 January 1, 2014 through December 31,2014; 357,472 January 1, 2015 through December 31,2015; 294,683
WHEREAS, according to OCA, between May 25, 2007 and December 31, 2015
the number of docketed C-summonses that were dismissed for facial insufficiency from
May 25, 2007 through December 31, 2015 are as follows:
May 25, 2007 through December 31, 2007; 75,904 January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008: 128,513 January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009; 140,884 January I, 2010 through December 31,2010: 120,279 January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011; 115,563 January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012: 110,068 January 1,2013 through December 31, 2013: 88,994 January 1,2014 through December 31, 2014: 70,057 January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015; 49,457
WHEREAS, the percentage of C-summonses that were docketed by the OCA (no
defectives included) and dismissed for facial insufficiency compared to the total number of
C-summonses that were docketed by the OCA (no defectives included) by year from May
25, 2007 through December 31, 2015 are:
May 25, 2007 through December 31, 2007: 25% January 1,2008 through December 31, 2008: 26% January 1,2009 through December 31, 2009: 27% January 1,2010 through December 31,2010; 23% January 1,2011 through December 31,2011: 24%
The NYPD makes no representations concerning the accuracy of the OCA’s data. 2

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 5 of 35
January 1,2012 through December 31, 2012: 23% January 1,2013 through December 31, 2013: 21% January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014: 20% January 1,2015 through December 31, 2015: 17% WHEREAS, the parties have reached a settlement agreement and now desire to resolve the issues raised in this litigation, without further proceedings and without admitting any fault or liability; and WHEREAS, the parties have engaged in discovery; and WHEREAS, Defendants have represented to the Class that during the pendency of this litigation: (I) the NYPD has made changes to its policies and procedures; and (2) legislative enactments and/or intergovernmental agreements were passed which implicate the subject matter herein, including, by way of example, the following: (1) On August 30, 2010, the Governor of New York signed into law S2956A (the 'Quota Bill”) which modified and expanded New York Labor Law 215-a to prohibit discrimination against or threatening of an employee for the failure to meet quotas for a ticket, summons, or arrest authorized by any general, special, or local law. (2) In November 2010, the NYPD published Legal Bureau Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 20 concerning the Quota Bill. (3) On August 1, 2013, the Department revised Patrol Guide Section 205-38 Investigation of Incidents of Retaliation Against Members of Seiwice,' to again reiterate that “it remains the written policy of the Department that retaliation against any Member of Service for voluntarily providing infoirnation regarding Misconduct and Corruption will not be tolerated.
3

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 6 of 35
(4) On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York found the NYPD liable for a pattern and practice of racial profiling and unconstitutional stops and appointed a Federal Monitor pursuant to the Remedial Order in Floyd v. City of New York and Davis v. City of New York. Under the Federal Monitor, the NYPD has represented to the Class that it has developed new Patrol Guide procedures, and updated training and reference materials on investigative encounters. Additionally, Defendants have represented to the Class that the NYPD is in the process of developing a new robust system for evaluating officer performance.
(5) In April 2015, Mayor Bill de Blasio in conjunction with the New York State Unified Court System announced the “Justice Reboot” initiative. Mayor de Blasio stated that the initiative “is about rethinking the way we approach criminal justice in NYC. As part of Justice Reboot, the C-summons form was revised, in part, to reduce the number of C-summonses being dismissed for facial insufficiency and/or other defects. Defendants have represented to the Class that the revised C-summons form provides more room in the narrative section to allow officers to write more details about the incident for which the summons is issued, and also includes additional sections relating to Trespass, Disorderly Conduct, and Consumption of Alcohol in Public the offenses for which a large percentage of C-summonses are issued - which are aimed at prompting an officer to include more detailed facts concerning his/her personal
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observations. The City hopes that these changes will lead to fuither annual decreases in the number of C-summonses dismissed as facially insufficient. (6) In February of 2016, and again in June of 2016, the NYPD conducted training on Justice Reboot and the new C-summons form. Department personnel responsible for issuing C-summonses and their supervisors were advised that the narrative portion of the C-summonses must be fully complete and received additional training on the elements of the offenses of Trespass, Disorderly Conduct, and Consumption of Alcohol in Public. Defendants have made a representation to the Class that the NYPD anticipates that such training will be repeated, including as part of the Recruit Training Curriculum. (7) On June 13, 2016, Mayor de Blasio signed the Criminal Justice Reform Act, which consists of eight bills that give the NYPD the ability to address certain quality of life offenses by issuing civil summonses, in lieu of C-summonses or custodial arrests. Defendants have represented to the Class that pursuant to Local Law 71 of 2016, the NYPD will provide its officers with guidance concerning when to use the civil summons and criminal enforcement options when addressing the specified offenses, which include open container, littering, public urination, many parks offenses and unreasonable noise. The Criminal Justice Reform Act further requires the NYPD to make such guidance publicly available by June 2017. Defendants have represented to the Class that the NYPD is in the process of developing procedures to timely bring itself into compliance with the requirements of The Criminal Justice Reform Act.
- According to OCA data, the percentage of C-summonses dismissed as facially insufficient has declined yearly since 2011.
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(8) The NYPD voluntarily posts certain summons data on the NYPD website for 2007 to the present, broken down by precinct and offense charged. Additionally, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act, the NYPD will begin posting quarterly summons data broken down by offense charged, race, age, gender, borough, and precinct for civil and criminal summonses by November 1, 2017. The Department represents that it is already in compliance with its requirements under the Act to report data relative to Desk Appearance Tickets. As part of this Settlement Agreement, the NYPD will agree to also post information directing the public to OCA’s website for information concerning the adjudication of C-summonses. The NYPD is exploring the feasibility of utilizing existing technology to link information provided by the OCA regarding C-summonses dismissed as facially insufficient with internal data identifying the summons-issuing officers, offenses charged, commands and boroughs to better identify dismissal trends, mitigate risk of dismissals for facial insufficiency, and foster constructive dialogue with OCA regarding unifoiTnity and transparency in the court system.
(9) The NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters will make a confidential presentation to counsel for the Class regarding the changes to the performance evaluation system, which revoked Operations Order 40 Police Officer Performance Objectives.
WHEREAS, the NYPD intends to present the following pilots and/or ongoing projects at the Fairness Hearing:
(1) The City will make reasonable efforts to ensure that, within six months of the Court’s final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release, the NYPD will 6

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send a Department-wide email and a FINEST message (i) instructing all Members of Service that quotas and/or numeric performance goals that otherwise fall within the plain meaning of New York State Labor Law Section 215-a for enforcement activity are against Department policy and may not be implemented; (ii) advising supervisory personnel that they may be subject to disciplinary action if they implement such quotas and/or numeric performance goals for enforcement activity; (iii) instructing Members of Service that they should notify lAB if they believe that they have been threatened or retaliated against in relation to any such quota and/or numeric performance goal, including without limitation the failure to comply with or satisfy any quota and/or numeric performance goal. The Department has revoked any bulletin, operations order or policy that is contrary to the above, and has ensured that such revocation was communicated via email to all members of service. The City will make reasonable efforts to ensure that, within eighteen months of the court’s final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release, the foregoing content from the Department-wide email shall be a subject included in Recruit Training, that it will be the subject of a Department-wide in-service training for calendar year 2017, and will be incorporated into all promotional training for Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains. (2) As of 2016, allegations made by any Member of Service against executives in the rank of Captain or above regarding the existence of quotas and/or numeric performance goals will be investigated by the Internal Affairs Bureau as “M” or Misconduct cases and assigned to lAB Group 1 on a pilot basis, subject to a
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continuing assessment of the allocation of lAB resources and the discretion of the Police Commissioner pursuant to the City Charter. (3) Within six months of the Court’s final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release allegations made by any Member of Service against a Sergeant or Lieutenant regarding the existence of quotas and/or numeric performance goals will be investigated by the designated parent command Investigations Unit, as opposed to the command that is the subject of the quota allegation. (4) The City will make reasonable efforts to ensure that, within twelve months of the Court’s final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release, the NYPD will conduct a targeted internal review of all relevant training materials for recruits, and all relevant promotional and all in-service training, to ensure compliance in both form and substance with the Quota Bill. (5) The City will make reasonable efforts to ensure that within three months of the Court’s final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release, the NYPD will make changes to its Patrol Guide and conduct training relative to the distribution of “Contact Cards” bearing the officer’s name, shield and command, to be provided on demand. Where no card is available, the officer must provide his or her name, rank and command to any person upon request. including the recipient of a C-summons.
WHEREAS, the Parties have engaged in settlement negotiations and discussions before the Honorable John S. Martin (Retired), SDNY Mediator, over the course of three separate mediations spanning a period of one year on August 5, 2015, August 4, 2016 and August 22, 2016.
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NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the

undersigned, as follows:

I.

DEFINITIONS

The terms described below shall have the meanings defined in this Section

wherever used in this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, and for the

purposes of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order only.

1.1 Bar Date” is the date established by the Court by which any presumptive

Class Member who wishes to receive payment pursuant to this Stipulation must file his/her

Claim Form(s). The parties agree that this date should be 180 days from the Date of Class

Notice.

1.2 C Summons” means any process issued by any NYPD officer pursuant to

New York Criminal Proeedure Law § 130.10, whieh is returnable to a New York City

Criminal Court (“Criminal Court”).

1.3 The “Civil Action” means the litigation captioned Stinson, et al. v. City of

New York, ct al.. Case No. 10 Civ. 4228, before Judge Robert W. Sweet in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 1.4 uClaimant” means a Proposed Settlement Class Member who has submitted

a Claim Form for review by the Claims Administrator. 1.5 ccClaims Administrator” means the Claims Administrator appointed by the

Court.

1.6

Claim Form” means the form attaehed hereto as Exhibit A.

1.7 aClass Counsel” means the law firms of Cohen & Fitch LLP, The Law

Office of Jon L. Norinsberg, PLLC and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

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1.8 Class Fund” means the amount to be paid by the City for all claims of Class Members, service awards to the Class Representatives, and administrative costs. That amount shall be up to $56,500,000.00 (Fifty-Six Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars).
1.9 Class Member” means any member of the Settlement Class. 1.10 u,Class Period” means the period commencing on May 25, 2007, and ending on the date of entry of a Preliminary Approval Order. 1.11 Class Representatives” means SHARIF STINSON, RYBURN WALKES, GARY SHAW, MICHAEL BENNETT, CHANEL MEAUSA, DAVID THOMPSON, JEREMY THAMES, LEANDER GRIFFIN, RICARDO JONES and VICTOR BRELAND. 1.12 Counsel for Defendants” means the Office of Corporation Counsel and Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP. 1.13 uCosts” are those costs incurred by Class Counsel in connection with the prosecution of this litigation, and separate and distinct from, and do not include. Class Counsel’s attorney’s fees. Costs also do not include any fees or expenses incurred by the Claims Administrator, or in connection with the dissemination of Notice, which Defendant City of New York agrees to fund separately and in addition to any payment to Class Counsel of attorneys’ fees and costs. 1.14 The “Court” means the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 1.15 ccDate of Class Notice” means the date when the Administrator first mails out the Claim Forms to the presumptive Class Members, which must occur within sixty (60) days of the Preliminary Approval Order or such other time as may be set by the Court. 1.16 uDefendants” means the City of New York and Raymond W. Kelly.
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1.17 Effective Date” means the date upon which all of the following have occurred; (1) entry of an Order by the Court granting Final Approval to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, approving attorneys’ fees and costs, and dismissing the Civil Action with prejudice; and (2) the time for appeal of the Final Approval Order has expired, or if an appeal from the Final Approval Order, or any portion thereof, is taken, the appeal results in affirmance of the Court’s Final Approval Order of the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.
1.18 Eligible Claimant” means a Class Member who has submitted a timely and complete Claim Form regarding an Eligible C Summons to the Claims Administrator and whose claim is not otherwise barred for the reasons set forth in the Claim Form.
1.19 'Eligible C Summons” means a C Summons issued by an NYPD officer. from the start of the class period. May 25, 2007, through [Preliminary Approval Date], which was dismissed by the Criminal Court for facial or legal insufficiency and lacked probable cause.
1.20 Final Approval Order” means an Order by the Court, after a fairness hearing, granting Final Approval to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, approving Class Counsel’s fees and costs, approving Service Award Payments, and dismissing the Civil Action with prejudice;
1.21 Final Approval Date” means the date of entry by the Court of the Final Approval Order.
1.22 Notice of Class Action Settlemenf’ means the notice approved by the Court for dissemination to Class Members by the means approved by the Court.
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1.23 NYPD Officer” means any agent or employee of the New York City Police Department authorized with powers designated by New York Criminal Procedure Law § 2.20.
1.24 Opt-Out” is any potential Class Member who files a timely request to be excluded from the Class.
1.25 Parties” means the Class and Defendants. 1.26 'Preliminary Approval Date” means the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. 1.27 Preliminary Approval Order” means the Order entered by the Court preliminarily approving this Stipulation, approving Class Counsel’s fees and costs, approving the Service Award Payments, scheduling a fairness hearing, and approving a plan of notice to the Class. 1.28 ■Released Claims” means any and all past or present claims or causes of action (including any suits, petitions, demands or other claims in law, equity or arbitration), and any and all allegations of liability or damages, of whatever kind, nature or description, direct or indirect, in law, equity or arbitration, absolute or contingent, whether class or individual in nature, including both known claims and Unknown Claims, asserted or unasserted, for monetary and non-monetary relief (including without limitation attorneys’ fees, costs or disbursements incurred by the Class Representatives and/or the Class or any Class Member in connection with or related to the Civil Action), that were or could have been asserted by the Class Representatives and/or any Class Member against the Defendants and any of their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, successors and/or assigns and in the case of all such entities, their respective past and present representatives, officers, directors, attorneys, agents, employees, privies and insurers (collectively defined
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as the “Released Parties”), based upon or arising out of the same transactions, series of connected transactions, occurrences or nucleus of operative facts that form the basis of the claims that were or could have been asserted in the Civil Action, including any and all claims asserted in the original and subsequently amended complaints filed in the Civil Action. This Release does not include or cover any actions or omissions occurring after the Preliminary Approval Date, nor does it include or cover any claims stemming from any certified class action, other than this Civil Action in which a Class Representative or Class Member in this Civil Action already is a member of the class.
1.29 Released Parties” means any and all Defendants, namely the City of New York and Raymond W. Kelly, and any of their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, successors and/or assigns and in the case of all such entities, their respective past and present representatives, officers, directors, attorneys, agents, employees, privies and insurers.
1.30 Settlement Administration Expenses” means expenses incurred by the Claims Administrator in connection with the implementation and administration of, and dissemination of notice, and processing of claims pursuant to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.
1.31 Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order” means this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order and all Exhibits attached hereto.
1.32 Settlement Class” is defined as the Class previously certified by the Court in the Civil Action, comprising the Class Representatives and all other individuals who were issued C Summonses by the NYPD that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial or legal insufficiency by the court prior to trial, and whose C Summonses were issued without probable cause during the Class Period. Individuals are excluded from the
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Class if between the date they received an Eligible C Summons and the date of the entry of

the Preliminary District Court Approval, they entered into individual releases as part of

individual agreements with the City that did not carve out an exception for this Civil

Action. A claim is also excluded if it concerns an Eligible C Summons that was previously

the subject of a lawsuit against the City of New York and/or individual NYPD officers and

the individual named in the summons obtained recovery in that lawsuit for claims relating

to that Eligible C Summons following motion practice or trial.

1.33 “Summons Incident” means an encounter between a Class Member and a

member of the NYPD in which the Class Member received at least one Eligible C

Summons.

1.34 Unknown Claims” means any and all Released Claims which any Class

Representative or Class Member does not know or suspect to exist in their favor at the time

of the release of the Released Parties, which if known by them might have affected their

decision(s) with respect to the Settlement. With respect to any and all Released Claims, the

Parties stipulate and agree that upon the end of the claims period, the Class Representatives

and Class Members shall waive any and all provisions, rights and benefits conferred by any

law of any state or territory of the United States, or principle of common law with respect

to Unknown Claim. The Parties acknowledge, and all Class Members by operation of law

shall be deemed to have acknowledged, that the inclusion of “Unknown Claims” in the

definition of Released Claims was bargained for and was a material element of the

Settlement.

II.

MUTUAL FULL COOPERATION

2.1 The Parties agree that they will fully cooperate with each other to effectuate

and implement all terms and conditions of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary 14

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Approval Order, and exercise good faith efforts to accomplish the terms and conditions of

this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.

III. 3.1

UNSEALING OF CRIMINAL COURT SUMMONSES Upon the request of Counsel for Defendants and/or Class Counsel, the New

York State Office of Court Administration shall provide the parties with any and all

information and documentation pertaining to C Summonses dismissed as facially or legally

insufficient, and sealed pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYC PL”) §§

160.50 and/or 160.55, from May 25, 2007 until the Preliminary Approval Date. Counsel

for Defendants, the NYPD, and Class Counsel, shall only use the information and/or

documents received from OCA pursuant to this paragraph for purposes of implementing

this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.

3.2 Upon the request of Counsel for Defendants, the New York City Police

Department shall provide said counsel with specific requested infonnation and

documentation pertaining to C Summonses dismissed as facially or legally insufficient, and

sealed by operation of NYC PL §§ 160.50 and/or 160.55, from May 25, 2007 until the

Preliminary Approval Date. Neither Counsel for Defendants nor Class Counsel shall make

any use of that information and document except solely for purposes of implementing this

Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.

IV. 4.1.

RELEASES Upon the Effective Date of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary

Approval Order, in consideration for the agreements by the Parties and other good and

valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, all

Class Representative and Class Members, on behalf of themselves, their heirs, executors.

administrators, predecessors, successors and assigns shall hereby release, remise and 15

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forever discharge the Released Parties (as defined above) from each and every Released Claim, and shall forever be barred and enjoined from initiating, continuing, filing or otherwise prosecuting any Released Claim against any of the Released Parties. Unless a Class Member opts out of the Settlement pursuant to Section 7.22 below, this Release shall apply whether or not such Class Member has executed and delivered a Claim Form or otherwise actively participated in the Settlement.
4.2. Every Class Member, except for those who Opt-Out pursuant to Section 7.22 below, shall be deemed to and shall have knowingly and voluntarily waived, released, discharged and dismissed the Released Claims, with full knowledge of any and all rights they may have, and they hereby assume the risk of any mistake in fact in connection with the true facts involved, or with regard to any facts which are now unknown to them.
4.3. The Parties and Class Members acknowledge that the covenants and promises made by Defendants herein constitute adequate consideration in exchange for the Released Claims.
4.4. Nothing in this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order shall be construed to bar any claims of Class Representative or Class Members based on or arising out of events occurring after the date of the Preliminary Approval Order. Nor shall anything in this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order be construed to bar any claims by Class Representatives or Class Members based on or arising out of claims in any certified class action, other than this Civil Action, in which the Class Representative or Class Member already is a member of the certified class.

V.

SET’I 'L EM EN1’ BEN EFITS

5.1 Subject to Court approval, the parties have agreed to Settlement Benefits of

up to Seventy-Five Million Dollars ($75,000,000.00), comprising (i) the payment of up to 16

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Fifty-Six Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($56,500,000.00) to the Class, which represents the Class Fund, and (ii) the payment of up to Eighteen Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($18,500,000.00), which represents the separately agreed upon attorney’s fees (collectively the “Settlement Benefits”). No later than forty-five (45) calendar days after the Effective Date, Defendant the City of New York shall cause to be deposited, in an interest bearing account as set forth in paragraph 5.2 below, the Settlement Benefits in the amount approved by the Court in the Final Approval Order.
5.2 The Settlement Benefits shall be maintained in an interest bearing bank account managed by the Claims Administrator under the supervision of Class Counsel. The Office of the Corporation Counsel shall identify an attorney to be provided monthly reports from the Claims Administrator on the status of the Settlement Fund Account.
5.3 The Claims Administrator shall distribute the Settlement Benefits pursuant to the provisions below, and on the time schedule described herein and pursuant to any orders of the Court.
5.4 In the event that the Settlement Benefits are not completely distributed for any reason, any and all remaining funds shall revert back to the City. The Claims Administrator shall provide, by wire transfer, the amount to be reverted to the City no later than twenty (20) business days after the distribution of the settlement monies described in Section 7.28 below. In addition, within one (I) year and fifteen (15) business days from the date of distribution of the settlement checks described in Section 7.28 below, the Claims Administrator shall provide to the City, by wire transfer, the amount of any settlement checks not paid from the Class Fund Account as a result of any Class Representative’s or Class Member’s failure to cash the check within one (1) year.
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VI.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES. ADMINISTRATIVE

EXPENSES AND SERVICE AWARD PAYMENTS

A. Altornevs' Fees and Expenses. 6.1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), Class Counsel shall apply for reasonable

attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by Class Counsel.

6.2 Defendants have agreed to pay Class Counsel $18,500,000.00 for attorneys’

fees and Costs, subject to Court approval. Defendants will not object to a motion by Class

Counsel for attorney’s fees and Costs of $18,500,000.00.

6.3 No later than fifty (50) calendar days after the Effective Date, the Claims

Administrator will pay from the Settlement Benefits the Class Counsel attorneys’ fees and

Costs approved by the Court. Prior to the payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses. Class

Counsel will provide the Claims Administrator with Tax Payer Identification Numbers for

Class Counsel and executed Form W-9s. Form 1099s shall be provided to Class Counsel

for the payments made to Class Counsel.

B. Administrative Expenses.

6.4 No later than fourteen (14) days after the Preliminary Approval Order, the

City shall cause to be deposited into a bank account designated by the Claims

Administrator an amount equal to the amount approved by the District Court for payment

to the Claims Administrator to cover the costs of Notice agreed to by the Parties and/or

ordered by the Court, except that the total of said funds shall not exceed Six Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00). Any such payment shall be debited against the Class

Fund. The Claims Administrator will submit monthly bills to the Parties and may pay

itself from these funds in accordance with its bill provided the Parties do not object to the

bill within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the monthly bill.

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c. Service Award Payments
6.5 Subject to Court approval, the Claims Administrator will pay from the Settlement Benefits $15,000 to each Class Representative in recognition of the time and energy that each has devoted to litigating this lawsuit, and his or her willingness to serve as a representative of the Class (collectively “Service Award Payments”). This amount shall be in addition to whatever Settlement Payment each Class Representative shall receive as a Class Member. VII. INDIVIDUAL SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS TO CLASS MEMBERS AND
CLAIMS PROCESS A. Individual Settlement Payments 7.1 Settlement payments to Class Members and Class Representatives will be in settlement of all their claims. 7.2 The amount in the Class Fund remaining after payments of Court-approved Settlement Administration Expenses and Service Award Payments, as provided herein, shall be proportionately divided, on a per summons basis, among all Class Representatives and Class Members submitting claim forms deemed valid by the Claims Administrator, provided that the maximum compensation per summons shall not exceed $150.00 (One Hundred Fifty Dollars) (the amounts paid to Class Representatives and Class Members pursuant to this paragraph being the “Individual Settlement Payment”). 7.3 If a Class Member received more than one Eligible C Summons at the same date and time in a single Summons Incident, that Class Member may only recover a single time for the Summons Incident, and may not recover for each Eligible C Summons issued at the same date and time. However, a Class Member who received more than one Eligible
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C Summons in separate Summons Incidents, at different dates and/or times, may recover once for each Summons Incident.
B. Claims Administrator’s Duties 7.4 The Claims Administrator shall (1) transmit the Notice and Claim Forms, by the means approved by the Court, to Proposed Settlement Class Members; (2) establish a website and toll-free phone number where information about the Settlement will be available to Class Members and Class Members can ask, and receive responses to. questions; (3) publish notice in the publications and in the manner set forth in the Declaration of Tiffany Janowicz, Rust Consulting; (4) respond to questions from Proposed Settlement Class Members; (5) review and assess the validity of Claims submitted by Class Members; (6) perform a calculation of the Individual Settlement Benefits consistent with this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order; (7) provide infonnation to the Parties’ counsel about the Settlement Benefits Account, as provided herein; (8) arrange for and distribute checks containing Individual Settlement Payments to Class Members; (9) arrange for and distribute checks containing Service Award Payments to the Class Representatives; (10) arrange for reversion back to the City of any amounts from the Settlement Benefits that revert pursuant to the terms of this Proposed Preliminary Approval Order; (11) create a database of Class Members who have filed timely and valid claims; (12) create a database of Opt-Outs; (13) provide Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendants with monthly bills and a final accounting; and (14) perform any other duties necessary to fulfill the foregoing responsibilities and any other responsibilities set forth in this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.
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C. Notice and Claim Forms 7.5 Within five (5) business days after the Preliminary Approval Date, or the date on which the Court unseals the information held by OCA and the NYPD regarding the Proposed Settlement Class Members, or within such other time period set by the Court, the City shall provide a copy of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order or a separate Unsealing Order to the OCA and the NYPD. Within five (5) business days after receiving unsealed data from the OCA or the NYPD, the City shall provide to the Claims Administrator and Class Counsel the unsealed data as received from the OCA or the NYPD. 7.6 No later than twenty (20) business days after the date that the City provides the unsealed data, or within such other time period set by the Coiud, the Claims Administrator shall, by the means approved by the Court, transmit the Notice of Class Action Settlement and a Claim form (in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B or in such other form as may be approved by the Court), in substantively the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, or in such other form as may be approved by the Court, to the Proposed Settlement Class Members. The Parties intend to provide actual notice to each Proposed Settlement Class Member, to the extent practicable. 7.7 In order to provide the best notice practicable, the Claims Administrator will do the following before any mailing of the Notice and Claim Form; (1) run the list of all Proposed Settlement Class Members through the United States Postal Seiwice’s National Change of Address database (“NCOA”); and (2) perform address searches using public and proprietary electronic resources which collect their data from various sources such as utility records, property tax records, motor vehicle registration records (where allowed) and credit bureaus.
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7.8 If envelopes from the mailing of the Notice and Claim Form are returned with forwarding addresses, the Claims Administrator will re-mail the Notice and Claim Form to the new address within two weeks of receiving the returned envelope. In the event that a Notice of Class Action Settlement and Claim Form are returned to the Claims Administrator by the United States Postal Service because the address of the recipient is no longer valid, h^, the envelope is marked “Return to Sender”, the Claims Administrator shall perform a standard skip trace in an effort to attempt to ascertain the current address of the particular Class Member in question and, if such an address is ascertained, the Claims Administrator will re-send the Notice and Claim Form within two weeks of receiving the newly ascertained address; if no updated address is obtained for that Class Member, the Notice of Class Action Settlement and Claim Form shall be sent again to the Class Member’s last known address. With respect to envelopes marked “Return to Sender”, the Claims Administrator will also call any identified last-known telephone numbers (and telephone numbers updated through public and proprietary databases) of Class Members for the purpose of obtaining the Class Members’ current addresses.
7.9 The Claims Administrator shall provide to Counsel for Defendants and Class Counsel, at least ten (10) business days prior to the Final Fairness Hearing, a list of Class Members for whom notices were returned as undeliverable and for whom efforts to obtain an alternative address failed.
7.10 Class Counsel shall provide the Court, at least five (5) calendar days prior to the Final Fairness Hearing, a declaration by the Claims Administrator of due diligence and proof of transmission, by whatever means have been approved by the Court, of the Notice and Claims forms.
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D. Submission of Claim Forms After Final Approval 7.11 All Class Members seeking payment pursuant to the settlement must make such a claim in writing using the Claim Form in the form attached as Exhibit B or such other form as may be approved by the Court, All Claim Forms must be signed by the Claimant. Each Class Member must submit his or her own completed Claim Form for each Eligible C Summons for which the Class Member seeks payment. All Claim Forms must be mailed to the Claims Administrator and postmarked by the claim filing deadline set by the Court, and to be set forth in the Notice and Claim Form, in order to be considered timely. In order for a Claim Form to be considered complete, all questions must be answered and all applicable blanks filled in in a manner legible to the Claims Administrator. Failure to file a timely and complete Claim Form by the deadline for submission of all Claim Forms, if not .corrected within the remedial period set forth in Paragraph 7.14 below, shall bar the Class Member from receiving payment with respect to any summons for which a completed Claim Form has not been timely submitted. 7.12 Class Members who file a Claim Form must notify the Claims Administrator of any change of address. The Claims Administrator shall be available through a website and a toll-free phone line to respond to requests from Class Members for assistance in completing and filing Claim Forms. 7.13 No untimely filed and/or incomplete Claim Forms may be accepted by the Claims Administrator, except that (1) the Claims Administrator may extend the deadline for receipt of Claim Forms by up to ten (10) additional calendar days (but no more) where error or delay by United States Postal Service is established; and/or (2) the Claims Administrator may provide a one-time extension of the deadline for receipt of Claim Forms of up to thirty (30) additional calendar days upon good cause shown.
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E, Administrative Review of All Claims 7.14 The Claims Administrator shall conduct a review of all Claim Forms to determine whether the Claim Form is completed and has been timely submitted. In the event that a Claim Form is timely, but is incomplete, the Claims Administrator shall provide a one-time twenty (20) calendar day remedial period in which a Claimant can rectify any errors in the Claim Form. 7.15 The Claims Administrator shall also conduct a review of each claim submitted, as well as data provided by the OCA and the City, in order to determine the eligibility of the claim for payment. If the Claims Administrator rejects a claim as not meeting the terms or provisions of the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, the Claims Administrator shall so notify the Claimant, Class Counsel, and Defense Counsel, in writing and specify the eligibility and/or entitlement criteria that the Claimant failed to satisfy. 7.16 The Claims Administrator shall, within 45 days of the deadline set by the Court for submission of Claim Forms (subject to any extensions of the submission deadline pursuant to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order), complete its review and issue a final determination as to which Class Members, on a per Summons Incident basis, are entitled to receive payment pursuant to the settlement, and the amount to which each such Class Member is entitled. F. Objections 7.17 Proposed Settlement Class Member objections to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order must be in writing, and must include a detailed description of the basis of the objection.
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7.18 Objections must be filed with the Court, with copies served on the Claims Administrator, Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendants, within sixty (60) calendar days after the Notice is mailed by the Claims Administrator, or within such other time period, or pursuant to such other procedures, as may be set by the Court. Proposed Settlement Class Members who fail to make objections in the manner specified above shall be deemed to have waived any objections and shall be foreclosed from making any objection (whether by appeal or otherwise) to the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order. Only Members of the Proposed Settlement Class who have not chosen to exclude themselves from the Class pursuant to Section G herein shall be entitled to object to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.
7.19 No Class Member may appear at the Final Fairness Hearing for the purpose of objecting to the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order without first having timely filed and served his or her objection(s) in writing.
7.20 Any lawyer intending to appear for a Class Member for the purpose of making objections must also file a Notice of Appearance with the Court by the objection deadline and must also serve copies by mail to Counsel for the Parties by the objection deadline.
7.21 An objector may withdraw his or her objection at any time. G. Exclusions 7.22 Class Members may exclude themselves, or Opt-Out, of the Settlement. Any Class Member who wants to Opt-Out, of the Settlement Class must file a timely request for exclusion pursuant to the provisions described in the Notice of Class Action Settlement, or pursuant to such other requirements as may be set by the Court. Such written request for exclusion must contain the name, address and telephone number of the person requesting
25

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 28 of 35
exclusion, or such other information as may be required by the Court. The exclusion request must be personally signed by the Proposed Settlement Class Member. No exclusion request may be made on behalf of a group of Proposed Settlement Class Members, unless permitted by the Court. Unless otherwise determined by the Court, the postmark date of the mailing envelope shall be the exclusive means used to determine whether a request mailed for exclusion has been timely submitted. Any Class Member who timely submits such a request for exclusion shall be barred from participation in the Settlement, shall not receive any portion of the Settlement Benefits, and shall not be entitled to object to the Stipulation and Preliminary Approval Order. The Claims Administrator on a weekly basis shall provide Class Counsel and Defendants’ Counsel with a copy of all requests for exclusion that are received.
7.23 Class Counsel shall file with the Court all timely requests for exclusion. 7.24 Any Class Member who does not timely file a request to Opt-Out of the Settlement shall be deemed part of the Settlement and be bound by this Stipulation and all subsequent proceedings, orders and judgments herein. H. Class Monetary Distribution Procedure 7.25 On a rolling basis to be completed no later than five (5) calendar days after the deadline for completion of the claims determination process described in Paragraph 7.16, the Claims Administrator shall provide the Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendants with a list of Eligible Claimants, and the amount to be paid to each such Eligible Claimant. 7.26 Every thirty (30) days after the Preliminary Approval Order, the Administrator shall provide the Counsel for Defendants and Class Counsel with a list of those persons who are preliminarily eligible so that the City may, on a rolling basis,
26

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 29 of 35
determine whether that person’s award with need to be reduced due to New York City Child Support Liens and/or Medicare liens.
7.27 No later than thirty (30) calendar days after receiving the list of Eligible Claimants, as set forth in paragraph 7.24 above, Counsel for Defendants will provide the Claims Administrator and Class Counsel with a list of the Eligible Claimants against whom there are New York City Child Support and/or Medicare liens, and the amount of such lien(s). The amount allowing for New York City Child Support and/or Medicare liens will be deducted from the sum to which an Eligible Claimant is entitled. Prior to providing this list, the City shall send to each person owing New York City Child Support Liens and to Class Counsel a notice describing that they owe these liens and information on how to file a challenge regarding the deduction of the New York City Child Support Liens from the award. If the City later determines that the amount of the lien was incorrect, the City shall directly pay that person the amount that was incorrectly withheld from that person’s Settlement Benefit.
7.28 No later than thirty (30) calendar days after Defendant the City of New York deposits the Settlement Benefits in an interest bearing account, as set forth in paragraph 5.1 above, the Claims Administrator shall cause to be mailed, via First Class mail, or by such other means as shall be determined by the Court, payment checks to the Class Members to whom a payment is due, after the deduction of any amounts due pursuant to New York City Child Support and/or Medicare liens, if applicable.
7.29 If a Class Member to whom a payment is due is deceased at the time of such distribution hereunder, the amount payable to such deceased Class Member shall be paid to his or her estate, provided that the estate provides an appropriate certification to the Claims Administrator.
27

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7.30 All payment checks distributed by the Claims Administrator must indicate,

in bold, words to the effect that “the check must be cashed within one (1) year or it will

become void.” The back of each check will contain a legend stating: “By negotiating this

check and accepting payment I agree that I have waived and released the Released Parties

from all Released Claims as defined in the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval

Order and in the Notice in this matter. This Release is effective as of the Effective Date.

VIII.

DUT!F..S OF Cl.ASS COlJNSKi. PRIOR TO COURT APFROVAI.

8.1 Promptly upon execution of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary

Approval Order by Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendants, but by no later than ten (10)

calendar days thereafter, Class Counsel shall apply to the Court for the entry of this Order:

(i) Preliminarily approving the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, as well as the payment of attorneys’ fees and Costs, and Service Award Payments;
(ii) Approving as to form and content the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement;
(iii) Approving as to form and content the proposed Claim Form;
(iv) Directing the mailing of the Notice and Claim Form by first class mail to the Proposed Settlement Class Members;
(V) Setting deadlines for objecting to the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, for seeking exclusion from the Proposed Settlement Class, and for submission of Claim Forms; and.

(Vi) Scheduling a Final Fairness Hearing as soon as practicable on the question of whether the Settlement, attorneys’ fees and Costs and Service Award Payments should be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate.

28

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 31 of 35

IX. 9.1

DUTIES OF CLASS COUNSEL IN CONNKCTiON WITH FINAL COURT APPROVAL
Following the Court’s Order of Preliminary Approval, and no later than

forty (40) days prior to the date set by the Court for the Final Approval Hearing, Class

Counsel shall submit a motion for a Final Approval Order:

(i) Granting final approval to the Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, adjudging the terms thereof to be fair, reasonable and adequate, and directing consummation of its terms and provisions;
(ii) Granting final approving of attorneys’ fees and Costs, and Service Award Payments;
(iii) Dismissing the Civil Action with prejudice; and

(iv) Ordering that all materials containing Confidential or Highly Confidential Information pursuant to the Protective Order entered in the Civil Action shall be returned to the producing party or destroyed by the party to whom those materials were produced within one-hundred eighty (180) calendar days after the Effective Date, with the exception that the Parties may retain copies of their work product; copies of all filed documents (whether or not filed under seal or submitted to the Court without being officially filed); and materials necessary to oversee compliance with and implementation of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, except that, with respect to materials necessary to oversee such compliance and implementation, all documents and materials designated Highly Confidential shall be returned to Defendants or Defendants’ Counsel, who shall retain and maintain that information in the form in which it is returned until 180 days after the Effective Date.

X.

PARTIES’ AlJTlIORi rY

10.1 The signatories hereby represent that they are fully authorized to enter into

this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order and to bind the Parties and the

Class Members to the terms and conditions hereof, subject to Court approval.

10.2 All of the Parties acknowledge that individual Class Members are entitled to

consult an attorney at their own expense regarding their participation in the proposed

Settlement and all terms of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order,

29

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 32 of 35

including without limitation the Releases set forth herein. The Parties acknowledge that they have been represented by competent, experienced Counsel throughout all negotiations and mediation that preceded the execution of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, and this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order is made with the consent and advice of Counsel who have jointly prepared this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.

10.3 All of the Parties acknowledge that they are participating voluntarily and

knowingly in exchange for the consideration described herein. The Parties further

acknowledge that they were provided with a reasonable period of time within which to consider this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.

XI.

MODIFICATION

11.1 This Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order and its

attachments may not be terminated or substantively changed, altered or modified, except in

writing by all Parties, and subject to Court approval.

XII.

ENTIRE PROPOSED PRF.UMINARY APPROVAL ORDER

12.1 This Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order and its exhibits

and attachments, subject to Court approval, constitute the entire agreement among the

Parties concerning the subject matter hereof No extrinsic oral or written representations or terms shall modify, vary or contradict the terms of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order. In the event of any conflict between this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order and any other document or information (other than

an order of the Court), the Parties intend that this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order shall be controlling.

30

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 33 of 35
XIII. INTERPRETATION 13.1 This Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order shall be
construed as a whole according to its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against any party, regardless of who drafted or who was principally responsible for drafting this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order or any specific term or condition thereof.
XIV. CH.Q.1C.E...QE LAW ANP.HiRISDICXim 14.1 This Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order and the exhibits
thereto shall be considered to have been negotiated, executed and delivered, and to be wholly performed, in the State of New York, and the rights and obligations of the Parties to this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order shall be subject to, governed by, construed, enforced, and administered in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to that State’s choice-of-law principles.
14.2 The Court, and any appellate court from which appeals of the Court’s decisions may properly be brought, shall retain jurisdiction of the implementation and enforcement of the terms of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, and all Parties hereto and their counsel shall submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of implementing and enforcing the Settlement embodied in this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.
XV. COUNTERPARTS 15.1 This Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order may be executed in counterparts, and when each party has signed and delivered at least one such counterpart. each counterpart shall be deemed an original, and, when taken together with other signed counterparts, shall constitute one Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, which shall be binding upon and effective as to all Parties and the Class.
31

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 34 of 35
XVI. VOIDING THE STIPULATION AND PROPOSED PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER
16,1 In the event this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, or any amended version agreed upon by the Parties, does not obtain judicial approval for any reason, this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order shall be null and void in its entirety, unless expressly agreed in writing by all Parties. In that event, the Parties and the Class shall be deemed to have returned to the status quo in the Civil Action as it was immediately prior to the execution of this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order.
XVII. FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING 17.1 A Final Fairness Hearing shall be held at a date and time to be set by the Court, at which time the Court will hear argument as to whether the Court should approve the settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, and Service Award Payments.
32

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-1 Filed 01/23/17 Page 35 of 35

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed this Stipulation and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order as of the date indicated below;
Dated: January 23, 2017

Cohen & Fitch, LLP

Jon L. Norinsberg PLLC

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LI.P

By/ Gerald' vl. Cbhen/ ----Joshua Fitch / Cohen I 'i Fitch, lljLP 4233-iJroadway, Suite 1800 New York, NY 10279 (212) 374-9115
Co-Lead Class Counsel

225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York, NY 10007 (212) 791-5396

Stephen Neiiwirth Elinor C. Sutton 51 Madison Ave., 22"“ Floor New York, NY 10010 (212)849-7325

ZACHARY W. CARTER Corporation Counsel of The City of New York

Qiana Smith-Williams Rachel Seligman Weiss Suzanna PublickerMetlham Daniel Passeser 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 (212)356-2360
SO ORDERED:

Robert W. Sweet, U.S.D.J.

33

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 320 Filed 01/24/17 Page 1 of 4
Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-2 Filed 01/23/17 Page 2 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------)(
SHARIF STINSON, et al., on Behalf of Themselves and Other Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

10 CV 4228 (RWS)

-against-

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. ,

Defendants.

------------------------------------------------------------)(
ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, APPROVING PROPOSED NOTICE PLAN, AND APPOINTING
SETTLEMENT CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Class Plaintiffs' request for

preliminary approval of a proposed settlement, for approval of a proposed notice plan, and

for appointment of a settlement claims administrator. (Letter, Dated January 23 , 2017,

Dkt. No. 319) (the "Class Plaintiffs ' Letter").

I. Preliminary Approval of Settlement

1. Based upon the Court's review of the Class Plaintiffs ' Letter, the Stipulation

of Settlement Attached thereto as Exhibit A, the Affirmation of the Honorable John S.

Martin (Ret.) ("Martin Affirmation") attached thereto as Exhibit F, and all other papers

submitted in connection with Class Plaintiffs ' Letter, the Court grants preliminary

approval to the settlement memorialized in the Joint Stipulation ("Settlement Agreement")

(Ex. A of Class Plaintiffs Letter).

2. The Court concludes that the proposed Settlement Agreement is within the

range of possible settlement approval , such that notice to the Class is appropriate.

3. The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is the result of extensive,

05300-62870/ 8770760 . 1

----------------------~ Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 320 Filed 01/24/17 Page 2 of 4 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-2 Filed 01/23/17 Page 3 of 5

arm's length negotiations by counsel well-versed in the prosecution of civil right cases

and class actions.

4. The assistance of an experienced mediator, the Honorable John S.

Martin (Ret.) of the Southern District of New York, reinforces that the Settlement

Agreement is non-collusive.

5. Settlement at this stage in the litigation avoids additional expense and delay

and ensures a prompt and substantial recovery for the Plaintiffs and class members.

II. Class Administrator and Class Notice

6. The Court approves the appointment of Rust Consulting as claims

administrator.

7. As set forth in the Declaration of Tiffaney Janowicz, Esq., with nearly 30

years of class action settlement administration experience, including class actions

involving the City of New York, Rust is experienced in the administration of class action

settlements.

8. With the assistance of Rust, Co-Lead Class Counsel has devised a Notice

Program intended to provide Class members with the best notice practicable under the

circumstances, including:

(a) sending the short form notice and claim form via first class mail to each potential Class member;

(b) publishing a summary notice in El Diario La Prensa - New York City, New York Daily News (NY), and the New York Post;

(c) delivering notice via banner ads to New York City IP addresses;

(d) building and maintaining a case-specific website; and

(e)
05300-62870/8770760 .1

establishing and maintaining a toll-free helpline where a combination of interactive voice response and live telephone support will be available to assist potential members of the Class.
2

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 320 Filed 01/24/17 Page 3 of 4
Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-2 Filed 01/23/17 Page 4 of 5

9. The Court approves both the form and substance of the proposed Long and
Short form Notices of Class Action Settlement ("Notices"), which are attached as
Exhibit C and D to Class Plaintiffs' Letter, and directs its distribution to the Class.
10. The content of the Notices complies with due process and Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.
11. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B), a notice must provide:
the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language: the nature of the action; the definition of the class certified; the class claims, issues, or defenses; that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires; that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded; and the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

12 . The Notices satisfy each of these requirements and adequately put class members on notice of the proposed settlement.
13. The Notices describe the terms of the settlement, inform the class about the allocation of attorneys' fees, and provide specific information regarding the date, time, and place of the final approval hearing.
III. Schedule 14. The Court hereby sets the following schedule for dissemination of Notice and the final approval hearing:
a. The Notice will be mailed to Class Members within 45 days after this Order;

05300-62870/ 8770760 . 1

3

..

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 320 Filed 01/24/17 Page 4 of 4

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 319-2 Filed 01/23/17 Page 5 of 5

b. Class Members will have 45 days from the date the Notice is mailed to opt out of the settlement or object to it ("Notice Period");
c. No later than 40 days prior to the Fairness Hearing, Plaintiffs will file a Motion for Final Approval of Settlement;
d. The Court will hold a final Fairness Hearing on May 24, 2017 at t}~- at the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York, Courtroom_;
e. If the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement, the Court will issue a Final Order and Judgment. If no party appeals the Court's Final Order and Judgment, the "Effective Date" of the settlement will be 30 days after the Court enters its Final Order and Judgment;
f. If a party appeals the Court's Final Order and Judgment, the "Effective Date" of Settlement shall be the day after all appeals are finally resolved;
g. The Settlement Claims Administrator will disburse settlement checks to the Class Members, the Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and expenses awarded by the Court to Class Counsel, and the Named Plaintiffs' Service Awards approved by the Court to the Named Plaintiffs as soon as possible but no more than 45 days after the Effective Date.
~
It is SO ORDERED this 'l-iday of.--i-:---

05300-62870/ 8770760 . 1

4

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 329 Filed 04/18/17 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------x

SHARIF STINSON, et al.,

- against -

Plaintiffs,

10 Civ. 4228 (RWS)
0 RDE R

THE CITY OF NEW YORK , et al., Defendants.
----------------------------------------x
Sweet, D.J.

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT FLECTRONTCAT TY FILED
DOC#: DATE FILED:

The Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of class settlement, service payments to class representatives, and attorneys' fees and expenses, dated April 14, 2017, will be heard at ll:OOAM on Wednesday, May 24, 2017 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. All papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6 .1.

It is so ordered .

7 , New York, NY

April /

2017

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 1 of 31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------x
SHARIF STINSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

- against -

10 Civ. 4228 (RWS) OPINION

THE CITY OF NEW YORK , et al.,

---------------------D-e-f-e-n-d-a-n-t-s-.-----------r:-=x===========n

A P P E A RA N C E S:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs COHEN & FITCH LLP 233 Broadway, Suite 1800 New York, NY 10279 By: Gera l d M. Cohen, Esq.
Joshua P. Fitch, Esq.

USDC SDNY
\, DOCU~itENT
I I jj ELECTl{ONICALLY FlLED
l~l DOOATCEF#I:L-ELJ- : h I~ 17 11

THE LAW OFFICES OF JON L. NORINSBERG PLLC 225 Broadway, Suite 2700 New York , NY 10 007 By: Jon L. Norisberg, Esq.

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 51 Madison Avenue New York , NY 10010 By: Stephen Neuwirth , Esq.
Elinor C. Sutton, Esq.

Attorney for Defendants ZACHARY W. CARTER Corporation Counsel of the City of New York 100 Church Street New York , NY 10007 By: Rachel Seligman Weiss, Esq.

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 2 of 31
Sweet, D.J.
This civil rights class action is the paradigm of change and progress achievable in a society undergirded by the rule of law. Skilled and dedicated counsel for the parties, aided by a highly experienced and pragmatic mediator, have reached a resolution benefitting all concerned. The strongly held positions, vigorously litigated and, initially, diametrically opposed, have been illuminated by facts developed in the discovery process and resolved. Thanks to the skill of those involved and a concerned administration, those injured will be compensated, police procedures will be clarified and strengthened, and the rights of all citizens will be fortified through what has been represented as the largest settlement of Fourth Amendment claims in New York City history.
To that end, named Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson, Ryburn Walkes, Gary Shaw, Michael Bennett, Chanel Meausa, David Thomson, Jeremy Thames, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, and Victor Breland (collectively, "Class Representatives" or "Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and the Class1 , have moved for orders (i) granting final approval of the proposed 1 The Class is represented by Cohen & Fitch, LLP, Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq., and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP (hereinafter, the "Class Counsel").
1

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 3 of 31
settlement (the "Settlement") with the City of New York ("N YC " ) , Raymond Ke ll y ("Kelly") , the former Commissioner of the New York Police Department ("NYPD"), and unnamed New York City Police Officers (collectively, "Defendants") ; (ii) the award of service payments to the Class Representatives; and (iii) the granting of attorneys ' fees and expenses . For the reasons set forth below , Plaintiffs' motion is granted.
I. Prior Proceedings
The procedural history and factual background of this lengthy and intensely litigated class action has been set forth in prior opinions by this Court. See e . g ., Stinson v . City of N. Y., 282 F.R.D. 360, 364 - 67 (S .D. N.Y. 2012) (laying out of the allegations and factual background of the case) ; Stinson v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2015 WL 4610422 (S.D.N.Y. July 23 , 2015) (detailing stages of the discovery process); Stinson v. City of N. Y. , No. 10 Civ . 4228 , 2016 WL 817445 (S . D. N. Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (describing multiple motions to unseal). Familiarity with this case ' s general background is assumed.
The instant action concerns hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers who , over the course of many years, were issued summonses later dismissed after a finding of facial
2

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 4 of 31
insufficiency or were ticketed without probable cause . The Plaintiff Class is defined as "the Class Representatives and all other individuals who were issued C Surrunonses by the NYPD that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial or legal insufficiency by the court prior to trial, and whose C Surrunonses were issued without probable cause during the Class Period [May 25 , 2007 through January 24 , 20 1 7 ] ." (Dec l aration of Gerald M. Cohen dated April 14, 2017 (" Cohen Deel."), Ex . D at ! 1.32 , Dkt . 327) ; see also Stinson , 282 F.R.D. at 363 (defining and certifying c lass).
During 2015 and 2016 , the parties met with retired Southern District of New York District Judge John S. Martin to meditate and try to reach a sett lement . The first full-day mediation session in August 2015 was unsuccessful. (Pls. ' Mem. in Supp . at 7- 8 . ) After an additional year of d is covery and motion practice, the parties engaged Judge Mart in for a series of meditation sessions throughout August 2016 . (Id . ) These sessions culmi nated on August 22 , 2016 with an agreement between the part i es as to a final Class Fund figure and general outl ine of remedial measured to be taken by the NYPD . (Pls .' Mem . in Supp. at 8.) Subsequent meetings, often with ass i stance from Judge Martin, resulted i n determining proposed amounts for attorneys ' fees , expense
3

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 5 of 31
reimbursements , the notice and proof of c l aims language , and c l aims procedures . (Pls .' Mem. in Supp . at 9 . )
On January 23 , 2017 , both parties requested preliminary approval of the Settlement , notice plan , and appointment of Rust Consulting as the Settlement claims administrator. (Dkt. 319.) The Court granted preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement on January 24 , 201 7 , ( Dkt . 320), wh i ch was amended with approval on January 30, 201 7, (Dkt . 322) .
The proposed Settlement contains both monetary and nonmonetary benefits to the Class . Within seventy- five days of the Settlement's final approval, NYC wi l l create a fund for the Class that will contain $56 . 5 million (the "Class Fund"), from which any service awards for Class Representatives and expense costs in the administration of the Cl ass Fund would be drawn. 2 (Cohen Deel ., Ex. D at~~ 5 . 1 , 6.4 , 6 . 5.) The remaining Class Fund will be distributed pro rata to e l igi ble claimants on a per summons incident basis with a maximum payout of $150 per summons. (Cohen Deel. , Ex. D at ~ 7. 2.) A separate and
2 Class Counsel has represented that administrative costs are est i mated to be between 1 . 35 and 1 . 5 million dollars. (Pls. ' Mem. in Supp. at 22 n.8.)
4

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 6 of 31
additional $18.5 million is to be paid to Class Counsel by NYC for attorneys' fees and expense. (Cohen Deel., Ex . D at~ 5.1.)
In addition, the NYPD has stated that within three to twelve months of the Settlement 's final approval, the NYPD wil l undertake remedial measures related to quotas, including: sending Department-wide commun i cat ions informing officers that quotas and other numeric measures of performance are improper and subject to investigation by the NYPD's Internal Affairs Bureau; revising the tr a ining new NYPD recruits receive with regard to quotas and teaching recruits how to report observed issues without fear of reprisal; and improving public relations by simplifying the process for individuals who receive summons to identify officers responsible and for voicing complaints about summons if individuals believe the summons was i ssued unfairly. 3 (Cohen Deel., Ex. D at 6-8. )
3 These are in addition to a number of other remedial steps that the NYC and NYPD have undertaken since the start of the instant lawsuit, including passing laws that expand the use of civil summons versus C- Summons and custodial arrests , amending the NYPD forms for writ in g and issuing summons to include more narrative space, providing regular summons issuance data to increase NYPD transparency , and revising internal NYPD officer patrol procedures and training on investigative encounters. (Cohen Deel., Ex. D at 3- 6.)
5

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 7 of 31
Following preliminary approval , a total of 922 , 316 copies of the Notice and Proof of Claim (" Notices " ) were mailed to potential Class members after reviewing records provided by the New York Office of Court Administration. (Cohen Deel ., Ex. F. ) At the time of the Fairness Hearing, fi ve object i ons had been filed and thirt y individuals had opted- out of the Settlement. 4 ( Fairness Hr'g Tr. 48:9-10, May 24 , 2017 . )
On April 14 , 2017 , Plaintiffs moved for final approval of the Settlement , servi ce payments to Class Representatives , and granting of attorneys ' fees and expenses . (Dkt. 324 . ) On May 24 , 2017 , a Fairness Hearing was held pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P . 23(e) (2) , at which time counsel from both sides spoke , ob ject ions to the proposed Settlement were heard , and the motion was marked fully submitted.
II. Applicable Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that "claims, i ssues , or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed , or compromised onl y with the court 's approval. " Fed . R. Civ. P . 23(e) . The Court may approve
4 Objections to the proposed Class Settlement are discussed in greater detail at Section III(ii) (2) , in fra.
6

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 8 of 31

a settlement " onl y after a hearing and on finding that the

settlement

is fair , reasonable , and adequate. " Cent .

States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v . Merck-Medco

Managed Care, L.L.C ., 504 F . 3d 229, 247 (2d Cir . 2007) (quoting

Fed . R. Civ . P . 23 (e) (1) (C)). To determine whether a settlement

is fair , reasonable, and adequate, the Second Circuit instructs

district courts to examine "the negot iating process leading up

to the settlement, i.e ., procedural fairness, as well as the

settlement ' s substantive terms , i.e., substantive fairness ."

McReynolds v . Richards - Cantave , 588 F . 3d 790 , 803 - 04 (2d Cir .

2009) (quoting D' Amato v. Deutsche Bank , 236 F.3d 78 , 85 (2d

Cir . 2001)) (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted)

Underlying the court ' s analysis is a "strong judicial policy in

favor of settlements , particularly in the class action context ."

Wal-Mart Stores , Inc . v . Visa U.S.A ., Inc ., 396 F.3d 96 , 116 (2d

Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) .

III. The Proposed Settlement is Approved

1. The Settlement is Procedurally Fair

There is a presumption of fairness when settlements are "reached in arm's-length negotiations between experienced , capable counsel after meaningful discovery." Wal - Mart Stores ,
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Inc. , 396 F . 3d at 116 (citation omitted) . This presumption is well-grounded here. The parties are represented by competent , experienced counsel who engaged in over six years of discovery and contentious motion practice , addressing matters both before this Court and the Second Circuit. See Stinson , 282 F . R.D. at 371 - 72 ; (discussing the litigation experience of Plaintiffs ' counsel) ; ( Pls .' Mem. in Supp . at 5-7) . The proposed Settlement was only reached at the tail-end of discovery and on the eve of summary judgment, after multiple arm' s-length mediation sessions with Judge Martin , all of which further supports finding procedural fairness in the process . (See Cohen Deel., Ex. E at 2; Pls.' Mem. in Supp . at 7-8 , 25 . ) Accordingly , the proposed Settlement is procedurally fair.
11. The Settlement is Substantively Fair
In the Second Circuit, substantive fairness is evaluated by considering the nine factors set forth in City of Detroit v . Grinnell Corp. :
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement ; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; ( 6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants
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to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; [and] ( 9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund t o a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation .
495 F . 2d 448 , 463 (2d Cir . 1974) (citations omitted) , abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v . Integrated Res ., Inc ., 209 F . 3d 43 (2d Cir . 2000) .
As set forth below , eight of the nine of the Grinnell factors weigh , in varying degrees , in favor of approval of the Settlement, and none weigh against . Accordingly, the proposed Settlement is substantively fair .
1. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation
The difficulties presented in this case were legion . The claims in the lawsuit covered a decade ' s worth of NYPD issued summons and arrest quotas from ninety-eight different police precincts across NYC . The Settlement was preceded by intense fact discovery , involving the production and examination o f hundreds of thousands of documents and thousands of hours of audio visual materials . Forty-four depositions were conducted . Class certification was challenged four times over six years and, had settlement not been reached, it is reasonable to expect
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that there would have been many more substantive motions leading up to a l ikely trial of Plaintiffs ' claims, all of which would have been expensive. Accordingly , the first Grinnell factor supports approval of the proposed Settlement.
2 . Reaction of the Class t o the Settlement
" It is well settled that the reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy ." In re Bear Stearns Companies, Inc . Sec . , Derivative , & ERISA Litig . , 909 F . Supp . 2d 259 , 266 (S . D. N. Y. 2012) (quoting In re Am. Bank Note Holographies, Inc ., 127 F. Supp . 2d418 , 425 (S . D. N. Y. 2001)).
A total of 922 , 316 Notices were sent to potential class members . As o f May 14 , 2017, 39 , 094 class members have submitted claim forms , and the claim period window remains open until September 6 , 2017 . (Defs . ' Ltr . of May 19, 2017, Dkt . 334) During the Fairness Hearing , Class Co unsel represented to the Court that there have been only 30 requests for exclusion . (Fairness Hr ' g Tr . 48 : 3- 4.)
Defendants have argued, both in response to the instant motion and during the Fairness Hearing , that the number of
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 12 of 31
undeliverable Notices - represented to the Court during the hearing as approximately 276 , 000 Notices (Fairness Hr ' g Tr. 52:6) - and the Class ' low response rate should forestall the Court's final approval of the Settlement and permit more time to opt - out, (see Defs .' Ltr. of May 19, 2017). The present difficul ty in reaching approximately 30 % of the potential Class members may be offset by the undertaking of the parties to run an additional advertising campaign in major New York newspapers throughout the summer , particularly targeting publ ications popular in neighborhoods where summons tended to be issued . (See Fairness Hr ' g Tr . 55 : 3-22 . )
Ultimately , though , the Notice mailing was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Rule 23. "[ N] otice by mail sent to the l ast known address of the absent class member meets the due process requirement of notice through ' reasonable effort ' even where numerous class members have since changed addresses and do not receive notice . " In re Prudential Sec . Inc. Ltd . P ' ships Litig ., 164 F . R. D. 362 (S . D.N.Y . 1996) (collecting cases) ; see also Gonzalez v . City of N. Y., 396 F. Supp . 2d 411 , 418 (S . D. N. Y. 2005) (finding that individual mailings reaching only one- third of the potential class , even without supplemental newspaper publications , constituted adequate notice) . It is not wholly surprising that a sizeable percentage of the Notices were
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 13 of 31
undeliverable. Given the breadth of time covered by the claim period, and the probability of many potential Class members to have moved and changed addresses, the resultant undeliverable rate does not render the Settlement unfair. See In re W. Union Money Transfer Litig., No. 01 Civ. 0335 (CPS), 2004 WL 3709932, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004) (approving a settlement as fair where undeliverable rate was 45 % because of the "the length of the class period, the size and the mobility of the Settlement Class, and the likelihood that some name and address information may not have been accurately provided or entered at the time").
Contrary to the position of Defendants, it is neither improper nor premature for the Court to rule on the fairness of the Settlement at present based on the current response of the Class. While only a small percentage of Class members have made claims, that number may increase in the coming months. It is the "absence of significant exclusion[s] or objection[s]" that courts in this Circuit regularly consider, not low response rates. In re Bear Stearns, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (citing Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08 Civ. 214 (CM), 2012 WL 2505644, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012) (quoting Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D. Me. 2005)) (observing
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 14 of 31
that "' claims made ' settlements regularly yield response rates of 10 percent or less").
While on occasion courts wait until the close of the claims deadline to determine the fairness of a settlement , the reverse is neither unprecedented , see Lee v . Ocwen Loa n Servicing, LLC , No . 14 Civ . 60649 (JG) , 2015 WL 5449813 , at *23 (S . D. Fla . Sept . 14, 2015) (collecting cases) , nor unfounded in the present circumstance , where even Defendants concede that the " terms of the settlement are fair , " (Defs .' Ltr. of May 19 , 2017) . Delay in approving the Settlement delays the Settlement ' s many positive provisions and prevent s the tens of thousands of wronged Class members who are already claimants from receiving just compensation from the as-yet created Class Fund . (See Cohen Deel . , Ex . D at 17.) Delay also prol ongs the period before the NYPD i s required to implement changes to the NYPD ' s recruit training, its internal reporting protocol, and its officer patrol guidance . (See Cohen Deel ., Ex . D at 6- 8 . ) Approval permits these substantive remedies and valuable reforms to begin .
Five objections were filed prior to the Fairness Hearing . Three objections were letters from claimants : Glenn Johnson , Boisey Caldwell , and Jason Montague . (See Cohen Deel., Ex . G;
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 15 of 31
Pls .' Ltr . of May 23 , 2017 , Ex. A, Dkt. 337.) Mr . Johnson's letter objects to the Settlement 's payment of $150 maximum per summons, which he believes is an insufficiently small amount. Mr . Caldwell's letter, if construed as an objection , expresses similar discontent regarding the size of the settlement amount payout . 5 Mr . Montague ' s letter objects to the need to receive payout from the NYPD for what he terms "a mild inconvenience ." (Pls .' Ltr. of May 23 , 2017 , Ex . A.) To the extent that the handful of objections made based on this issue are grounded in claims actually covered by the Settlement , they do not const itute a basis to reject the Settlement. Given the degree of injury inherent in improperly receiving a summons , on average about fi ve to ten minutes during which time the summons was written up while the Class member simply had to wait, damages of $150 per summons is sufficient to find that portion of the Settlement fair . See, e . g. , Watson v . United States , 17 9 F. Supp. 3d 251, 281 (E . D. N. Y. 2016) (accept ing damages of $83 an hour for " loss of liberty" c laim) .
Two object i ons , while differing slightly , both fundamentally focus on the "Released Claims" language of the
5 Several indiv iduals who spoke at the Fairness Hearing also expressed discontent at the size of the Settlement amount, similar to the letters of Messrs . Johnson and Caldwell. (See , e.g ., Fairness Hr'g Tr . 13 :1- 6 , 15:1 0 , 23:18 . )
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 16 of 31
Settlement . (See Cohen Deel., Ex. D at~ 1 . 28 . ) One objection was made by attorney Jeffrey Rothman ("Rothman" ) on behalf of some of his clients ; one object i on was made by the firms Stecklow & Thompson and Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP on behalf of their clients in a separate litigation , Packard v . City of N. Y., 15 Ci v . 7130 (S . D.N.Y. 20 15 ) ("Pa ckard " ) . Both provided both written submissions and made oral argument at the Fairness Hearing . Rothman objects that the release language has the potential to release Class members' other claims that stem from the issuance of improper summonses, even if those derivative cla ims are substantially more serious , such as claims for excess i ve force by the NYPD. (See Fairness Hr'g Tr. 3 : 216 :1. ) Packard objects that the release language might release claims by potential class members of their yet-uncertified class action against the NYPD based on arrests made during the Occupy Wall Street first anniversary , during which some potential Packard class members might have received summons . (See Fairness Hr'g Tr. 8 : 3-12 : 21 . ) Rothman requests that the release language be removed; Packard requests a carve-out be included in the language fo r their nascent class action . Rothman and Packard claim they have standing to object because some of their clients are potential Class members covered by the instant Settlement .
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 17 of 31

As a threshold matter , it is not apparent that either

Rothman o r Packard have standing to object . On l y a " class member

may ob ject to the [settlement] proposal ," Fed. R. Civ . P .

23(e) (5) , which implies that "[o]bjectors who are non-Class

members lack standing to object to

. the settlement ." In re

Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp ., Inc ., 130 B.R . 910 , 923 & n . 8

(S .D.N. Y. 1 991) (collecting cases) ; see also Cent . States Se . &

Sw . Areas Health , 504 F . 3d at 244 ("N onpart i es to a settlement

generally do not have standing to object to a settlement of a

class action ." ) . Rothman contends that he has clients who are

members of the instant Class , but the only clients he has

identified he also states have opted out . (See Rothman Ltr . of

Apr. 24 , 2017 at 3 & n.3 , Dkt . 330 ; Fairness Hr ' g Tr . 67:19 - 24 ;

Pls. ' Mem . in Resp. to Objections at 2 n.1, Dkt. 335 . ) Class

members who opt - out of the settlement ext inguish their ability

to object to it and those objections need not be considered .

See , e . g ., People United for Children , Inc. v . City of N. Y. , No.

99 Civ . 648 (KTD) , 2 007 WL 582720 , at *3 (S . D. N. Y. Feb . 26 ,

2007) . Packard states that , of their potential class members ,

" [s]ome may have been issued summonses ," but have not identified

any particular individual shown to be a class member of the

instant action . (Fairness Hr ' g Tr . 10: 21 ; see also Fairness Hr' g

Tr. 63:20 - 21 . ) In all likelihood , this renders both objectors

non-parties . Nevertheless , the breadth of the release claim

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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 18 of 31
language is a legitimate concern for the Class and these objectors attended the Fairness Hearing alleging to represent Cl ass members. See United States v . N. Y., No . 13 Civ . 4165 (NGG) (MDG) , 20 1 4 WL 1028982 , at *10 (E . D. N. Y. Mar . 17 , 2014) (cons i de ri ng objections when possible non- party merely " claim[ed] " to include class members , even when objectors failed to att e nd Fairness Hearing) .
Ro thman ' s concern about the Settlement extingu i sh i ng potent i a l claims derivative to improperly i ssued summons is based p rincipal l y on language from the Notice , not the re l ease language of the Settlement , which unlike the Notice does not mention particular causes of act i on to be released by the Sett l ement . (See Rothman Ltr . of Apr . 24 , 2017 at 1-2 , Dkt . 330 ; Fairness Hr ' g Tr . 65 :1 7- 66 : 1 . ) Some of Rothman ' s concerns were s uff i c i entl y resolved at the Fairness Heari ng , du r i ng which the parties st i pulated that the Settlement ' s release l anguage was not to i ncl ude claims for excess i ve force . (Fairness Hr ' g Tr . 69 : 4-12 , 72 : 23 - 25 . ) However , insofar as the release language states that it r eleases claims " based upon or aris i ng out the same t r ansaction , seri es of connected transactions , occurrences or nucleus of operative facts that form the basis of the c l aims t h at we r e or could have been asserted in the [instant ] Civil Action ," both Rothman and Packard ' s concern remain outstanding :
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 19 of 31

some potential claims connected to issued summonses encompassed by the instant Settlement could be released if the Settlement is approved . (Cohen Deel ., Ex . D ~ 1.28 . ) Defendants conceded as much during the Fairness Hearing, stating that , "I f there was something that was factually similar to the summons charge , then there may be an argument that [a class member] cannot recover damages for the arrest based on the re l ease language ." (Fa irness Hr ' g Tr. 45 : 10 - 15 . )

" May " is the correct and operative word here : the thrust of

these objections is a hypothetical exercise . The Settlement ' s

release language does not, by its terms , release any class

member ' s claims of constitutional violation , even if such claims

were connected in some way to the issuance of a summons

otherwise resolved by the instant Settlement . As Class Counsel

stated during the Fairness Hearing , this Settlement is narrowly

about "the improper Fourth Amendment violation of improper

seizure of individuals.

[T]o the extent that someone has a

claim outside that , this would not prevent that individual from

bringing that claim ." (Fairness Hr ' g Tr. 39 : 6- 15.) To argue

otherwise , while perhaps not impossible , would be attenuated ,

and is an argument for another day .

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Given the hypothetical nature of the objections, foreclosed in part by the oral stipulation of the parties and their constraining language at the Fairness Hearing, these objections are noted but do not weigh against approving a Settlement that even the objectors acknowledge obtains "a very significant public good." (Rothman Ltr. of Apr. 24 , 2017 at 1 ) ; see also In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 , 247 -4 8 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Wal-Mart Stores , 396 F.3d at 106) ("Parties often reach broad settlement agreements encompassing claims not presented in the complaint in order to achieve comprehensive settlement of class actions, particularly when a defendant's ability to limit his future liability is an important factor in his willingness to settle.")
In sum, the Court does not find the Notice procedure, presently low claims rate, or object ions to show a negative Class reaction to the Settlement. Rather, the overall low number of objections and requests for exclusion, in the context of the hundreds of thousands of Notices already delivered, is itself a positive indication of general approval. See Grant, 823 F.2 at 24 (finding an otherwise fair settlement should be approved even when 36% of the total class was in opposition) ; Wright v . Stern, 553 F. Supp. 2d 337, 344-45 (S .D. N.Y . 2008) (holding that "[t]he fact that the vast majority of class members neither objected
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 21 of 31
nor opted out is a strong indication" of fairness) . The objections raised are thoughtful , appreciated , and give the Court pause , but ultimately this Grinnell factor leans in favor of approval .
3 . Stage of Proceedings and Amount of Discovery
"In considering this factor , the question is whether the parties had adequate information about their claims such that their counsel can intelligently evaluate the merits of plaintiff ' s c laims, the strengths of the defenses asserted by defendants , and the value of plaintiffs ' causes of action for purposes of settlement ." In re Bear Sterns , 909 F . Supp . 2d at 267 (quoting In re IMAX Sec . Litig ., 283 F.R.D. 1 78 , 190 (S.D . N. Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the parties reached the Settlement after years of discovery , depositions , extensive motion practice , and arguments before this Court and the Second Cir cu it. At this "advanced stage ," the parties were in a position to evaluate intelligently their claims and defenses and to negotiate a fa i rly valued settlement . In re Marsh ERISA Litig. , 265 F.R . D. 12 8 , 139 (S . D. N. Y. 2010) (finding the stage of the proceeding "strongly" favored approval when counsel had "reviewed millions of pages of documents, participated in 100 depositions, exchanged expert reports and
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rebuttal reports , and fully briefed the issue of class certification" ) . This Grinnell factor greatly weighs in favor of approval .
4 . Risks of Establishing Liability and Damages
"Litigation inherently involved risk ," and had this c l ass action advanced to trial , itwould have been no exception . In re PaineWebber Ltd . P ' ships Litig. , 171 F.R.D . 104 , 126 (S .D.N.Y. 19 97) . This was a wide-reaching , complicated civil rights that would have presented Plaintiffs significant obstacles at trial . First , Plaintiffs needed to establish municipal liability by proving the existence of an o fficial NYPD policy , pattern , or practice that required officers to issue summonses regardless of probable cause to meet a minimum quota requirement established by the Department or face punishment . Plaintiffs then needed to show that such a policy resulted in violations of their constitutional rights . Given the breadth of summonses issued over the span of a decade , across almost one hundred precincts , and by countless different police officers , proving their case would have indeed been "a difficult task ." Gentile v . Cnty . of Suffolk , 129 F . R. D. 435 , 444 (E . D. N. Y. 1990) (citing Rizzo v . Goode , 423 U. S . 362 (1976)) . Establishing damages would have been no easier , as putting a value on the violation of one ' s
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coffe r s ' before a settlement can be found adequate ." In re I MAX Sec . Li t i g ., 283 F . R . D. 178 , 191 (S . D. N. Y. 2012) (quoting In re Sony SXRD Rear Projection Television Class Action Litig ., No . 06 Civ . 5173 (RPP) , 2008 WL 1956267 , at *8 (S . D. N.Y . May 1 , 2008)) . Even with a $75 million Settlement , this Grinnell f actor i s neutral as to approval of the Settlement .
7 . The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement Fund in Light of the Best Possible Recovery and All the Attendant Risks of Litigation
"[I] n any case there is a range of reasonabl eness with respect to a settlement. " Newman v . Stein , 464 F . 2d 689 , 693 (2d Cir. 1972) . " The adequacy of the amount achieved in settlement may not be judged ' in comparison with the possible recovery in t he best of all possible worlds , but rather in light of the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiffs ' case. '" In re Giant Interact i ve Grp ., Inc . Sec . Litig ., 279 F . R. D. 151 , 162 (S . D. N. Y. 2011) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod . Liab . Litig ., 597 F . Supp . 740 , 762 (E . D. N. Y. 1984) , aff ' d , 818 F . 2d 145 (2d Cir . 1 987)) . " The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not , in and of i tse l f , mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved ." Grinnell , 495 F . 2d at 455 & n . 2 ("In fact there is no reason , at least in theory , why a satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even
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$4,000 to over $50,000 based on "personal risk (i f any) incurred

by the plaintiff- applicant in becoming and continuing as a

litigant, the time and effort expended by that plaintiff in

assisting in the prosecution of the litigation

[and]

any other burdens sustained by that plaintiff in lending himself

or herself to the prosecution of the claim" ) .

V. Approval of Requested Attorneys' Fees

"The Second Circuit has authorized district courts to employ a percentage - of- the - fund method when awarding [attorneys'] fees in common fund cases , although the Circuit has encouraged district courts to cross-check the percentage fee against counsel's "lodestar" amount of hourly rate multiplied by hours spent. It bears emphasis that whether calculated pursuant to the lodestar or the percentage method , the fees awarded in common fund cases may not exceed what is ' reasonable ' under the circumstances ." In re Giant Interactive Grp ., 279 F.R . D. at 163 64 (quoting Goldberger , 209 F . 3d at 47 , 50) (inter nal c itati o n and quotation marks omitted) . As a general matter, however, "the trend in this Ci rcuit is toward the percentage method ." McDaniel v . Cnty. of Schenectady , 595 F . 3d 411 , 417 (2d Cir . 2010) .

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The six factors laid out by the Second Circuit in Goldberger "are applicable to the court ' s reasonableness determination whether a percentage- of- fund or l odestar approach is used . " I d . at 423 . The factors are : " (l ) the time and labor expended by counsel ; (2) the magnitude and complexities of the litigation ; (3) the risk of the litigation ; (4) the quality of representation ; (5) the requested fee in relati on to the settlement ; and (6) public policy considerati ons . " Goldberger, 209 F . 3d at 50 .
As set forth below , all the Go ldberger factors weigh in favor of finding the requested fee award reasonable .
1 . Time and Labor Expended by Counse l
Class Co uns el and their para - professional staff have dedicated 27 , 753 . 50 hours to the instant class action . (See Pls .' Mem. in Supp . at 29 ; see also Declarat i on of Stephen Neuwirth dated Apr . 14 , 2017 , Ex . A, Dkt . 325 ("N e uwirth Deel.") ; Declaration of Jon L . Norinsberg dated Apr. 14, 2017 at ~~ 49 - 51 , Ex . A, Dkt. 326 ("Norinsberg Deel . ") ; Cohen Deel. at ~~ 52-61 , Ex . H. ) Ove r the years of litigati on , the se h o urs were spent engaged in the work necessary to o rganize and maintain a successful class action : coordinating with Cla ss members ;
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responding to and making motions , including successfully for Class certification ; attending court appearances ; engaging in discovery resulting in hundreds of thousands of produced , organized, and analyzed documents ; taking and defending fortyfour depositions ; and participating in mediation sessions . Given the scope of this case , the time and labor spent by Class Counsel is both reasonable and weigh in favor of approval .
A lodestar cross - check confirms this view . 6 Based on their total hours worked , Class Counsel has reported an aggregated lodestar of $16 , 614 , 153 . 50 . (Pls .' Mem . in Supp. at 29) The requested attorneys ' fees thus represents a multiplier of 1 . 11 of the lodestar . As neither the rates billed nor the multiplier sought are outside the normal ranges regularly accepted in this district , this cross - check supports approval . See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass ' n v . Cnty . o f Albany & Albany Cnty. Bd . of Elections , 522 F . 3d 182 , 191 (2d Cir . 2008) (stating that "a reasonable , paying client would in most cases hire counsel from within his district , or at least counsel whose rates are consistent with those charged locally") ; Febus v . Guardian First Funding Grp. , LLC , 870 F . Supp. 2d 337 , 340
6 The "lodestar" is a numeric value that aims to capture the value of a firm ' s work over the course of a particular litigat i on . It is calculated by multiplying hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate .
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Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 338 Filed 06/12/17 Page 27 of 31
(S . D. N. Y. 2012) (accepting a lodestar multipl i er of 2 . 2 as " well within the range of acceptable " ) .
2 . Magnitude and Complexities of Litigat i on
As set forth above , the i ssues present in the i n stant class act i on we r e factua ll y vast , spanning many years and many p r ecinct s, and legally complex . See Section III(ii) (4) supra . Th is f acto r we i ghs i n favor of approva l.
3 . Risk of Litigation
As d i scu ssed above , there were many risks in this class act i on , including sustaining the Class , proving municipal liab i lity , establishi ng causation , and calculat ing damages . I n addit ion , there i s the risk attendant to when attorneys take a case on a contingency fee: for the past seven years , Class Counse l has had to dedicate resources without guarantee o f compe nsa ti on . When considering attorneys ' fees in such ci r c ums t a n ces , "[n ] o one expects a l awyer whose compensat i on is cont ingent upon h i s success to charge , when successful, as little as he wo u ld charge a client who in adva n ce h ad agreed t o p ay f or his services , regardless of success. " Gr innell, 495 F. 2d
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at 470. Taken together, the risks inherent to this lawsuit weigh toward approval.
4. Quality of Representation
While the Class has been represented by attorneys rightfully recognized as some of the top class action litigators in the country, (see Pls.' Mem. in Supp. at 25 (citing cases)), it is the results of this class action that evidence strongest the quality of the representation. Six years of a vigorous yet forward-moving litigation strategy, a successful Class certification, and, ultimately, a settlement for which the monetary amount is the second largest in NYC history and the non-monetary benefits could be, in the Court's view, "a gamechanger" for NYC communities, all are the true testaments to the strength of the representation provided to the Class and weigh in favor of approval. (Fairness Hr'g Tr. 7 6:24.)
5. Requested Fee in Relation to the Settlement
The requested fee is 24.6% of the total Settlement, a figure that falls at the higher end of fees historically approved in civil rights class actions in this district but nevertheless lands comfortably within permissible bounds. See
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Trinidad v . Pret a Manger (USA) Ltd ., No . 12 Ci v. 6094 (PAE ) , 20 1 4 WL 4670870 , at *11 -1 2 (S . D. N. Y. Sept . 1 9 , 20 1 4) (co l lecting civil ri ghts class action cases showing a range of award percentages from 13 % to 25 % and ultimately approving 25 %, down from an initial request of 33 %) ; Cronas v . Willis Grp . Holdings , Ltd ., No . 06 Civ . 15295 (RMB) , 2011 WL 6778490 , at *6 (S . D. N. Y. Dec . 1 9, 2011) (awarding 21 .7 % in discrimination class act i on and noting similar historically approved ranges) . Thus , thi s factor leans in favor of approva l.
6 . Public Policy Considerations
There is a " strong federal public pol icy favoring enforcement of the civil rights laws so important to the advancement of modern society ." Red Bu l l Assocs . v . Best W. Int ' 1 , I nc ., 862 F . 2d 963 , 967 (2d Ci r . 1 988). The proposed f ee award properly balances moderation with e ncouraging litigants to bring forward substantive and impactful cases that are crucial to enf orci ng our constitutional liberties . See Goldberger , 209 F . 3d a t 53 . Accordingly , this factor weighs in favor of appr ova l .
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For the foregoing reasons , and in the absence of any ob j ect i ons to the proposed attorneys ' fees , the request is found reasonable and approved.
VI. Approval of Requests for Reimbursement of Expenses
" I t is well-settled that attorneys may be compensated for reasonabl e out - of-pocket expenses incurred and customarily charged to their clients , as long they were incidental and necessary to the representation of those clients . " I n re Bear Sterns, 909 F . Supp . 2d at 272 (citations omitted) . Class Counsel have requested $374 , 224 . 19 to date in expenses . (Pls . ' Mem. in Supp . at 34 - 35 . ) The list of submi tted expenses include items li ke " deposition transcript[s] , " "investigator ," " online research , " data storage and document ingestion ," " video deposit i on/videotaping ," "mediation fee ," and many line items that are, in different turns of phrase , related to document pr i nting and reproduction . (Neuwirth Deel ., Ex . Bat l ; see also Nor i nsberg Deel. , Ex. B; Cohen Deel ., Ex . H. ) "T hese expenses are the t ype for which the paying , arms ' length market reimburses attorneys ." Cronas , 2011 WL 6778490 , at *7 (internal quotat i on marks and citation omitted). Moreover , there were no objections to these requests . Reimbursement for these expenses i s there f ore approved .
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Conclusion For the foregoing reasons , Plaintiffs ' mot i on for final
approval of the Settlement , award of service payments to the Cl ass Representatives , and attorneys ' fees and expenses is granted .
It is so ordered. New Yh k, NY June ' / , 2017
U. S.D.J.
33

 
 Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 343 Filed 06/19/17 Page 1 of 4
Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 340-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 1 of 4
r.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------)( SHARIF STINSON, et al., on Behalf of Themselves and Other Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs, -against-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, eta!., Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------------)(

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FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

WHEREAS, this matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion

for Final Approval of the Proposed Class Settlement with all Defendants (the

"Settlement") as memorialized in the Settlement Agreement, dated April 14, 2017, and

upon entry of a Final Order and Judgment; and

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into the Agreement to settle this

Class action on January 23, 2017; and

WHEREAS, on January 24, 2017, the Court entered an Order Granting

Preliminarily Approval of Proposed Settlement, Approving Proposed Notice Plan, and

Appointing Settlement Claims Administrator ("Preliminary Approval Order"); and

WHEREAS, in the paragraph 14(e) of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court

ordered that upon granting Plaintiffs Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement, the

Court would issue a Final Order and Judgment; and,

WHEREAS, the Court held a Fairness Hearing on May 24, 2017 with all parties

present and heard from the putative objectors; and,

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 343 Filed 06/19/17 Page 2 of 4
Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 340-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 2 of 4
WHEREAS, after having reviewing all of the final approval submissions, and having heard from all parties and objectors, the Court issued a Memorandum and Opinion on June 12,2017 granting final approval ofthe Settlement, award of service payments to the Class Representatives, and attorneys' fees and expenses,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 1. Definitions. For purposes of this Order, the Court adopts by reference the
definitions set forth in the "Definitions" section of the Settlement Agreement. 2. Certification of the Class. On April 23, 2012 the Court found that the
requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 had been met, and certified the following Class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), which was incorporated into the Settlement Agreement:
the Class Representatives and all other individuals who were issued C Summonses by the NYPD that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial or legal insufficiency by the court prior to trial, and whose C Summonses were issued without probable cause during the Class Period. 3. Notice. The Court finds that the Notice mailing was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Rule 23, and that the dissemination of the Notice as provided for in the Preliminary Approval Order constituted the most effective and practicable notice, under the circumstances, to all Settlement Class Members concerning the pendency ofthis action, the proposed Settlement, the claim form process and instructions, and the final fairness hearing, and constituted due and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to receive notice
2

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 343 Filed 06/19/17 Page 3 of 4
Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 340-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 3 of 4
required by due process and Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any other applicable law. 4. Final Approval of the Agreement. The Court finds that the proposed Agreement is APPROVED as fair, reasonable and adequate, pursuant to Rule 23(e)(l)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further finds that each and every term, provision, condition and agreement of the Settlement Agreement, including all exhibits thereto, apply and are adopted, incorporated, and made part of this Judgment, as if copied herein in extensor, and shall be effective, implemented and enforced as provided in the Settlement Agreement. 5. Monetary Relief. Defendant the City of New York is required to deposit the full Settlement Benefits in the total amount of $75,000,000.00 into an interest bearing account managed by the settlement administrator as fully set forth in the Settlement Agreement. 6. Compensatory Damages. The Court approves awards of compensatory damages for each eligible class members in amounts up to $150.00 per eligible summons, subject to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Any undistributed compensatory damages not used to pay administrative costs and expenses will revert back to the City. 7. Service Awards. The Court approves service awards of $15,000.00 to each of the I0 Named Plaintiffs as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, which the Court approves for the reasons stated in the opinion approving the Settlement.
3

Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 343 Filed 06/19/17 Page 4 of 4
Case 1:10-cv-04228-RWS Document 340-1 Filed 06/13/17 Page 4 of 4
8. Appointments. The Court has previously appointed Rust Consulting act as the settlement administrator. Rust will continue to act as administrator throughout the claims process.
9. Jurisdiction. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Action, the Settlement Class Representatives, the other Settlement Class Members, and the Defendants. Without affecting the finality of the Judgment, the Court reserves exclusive and continuing jurisdiction and venue with respect to the consummation, implementation, enforcement, construction, interpretation, performance and administration of the Agreement and/or Judgment.
10. Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses. The Court awards to Settlement Class Counsel Attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $18,500,000.00, which the Court has found to be fair, adequate and reasonable. The amounts shall be paid out of the Settlement Benefits by the Claims Administrator in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.
11. Entry of Judgment. There being no just reason to delay entry of this Judgment, the Clerk of the Court is ordered to enter this Judgment forthwith, pursuant to Rule 54(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
~
It is SO ORDERED this-I-f-day of June, 2017.
4

 
 Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 1 of 77
U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Foley Square) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:10−cv−04228−RWS

CLOSED,ECF

Stinson et al v. The City of New York Assigned to: Judge Robert W. Sweet Related Cases: 1:10−cv−06005−RWS
1:12−cv−00073−RWS Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff
Sharif Stinson on behalf of themselves

Date Filed: 05/25/2010 Date Terminated: 06/12/2017 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Gerald M. Cohen Cohen & Fitch, LLP 233 Broadway, Suite 1800 New York, NY 10279 (212) 374−9115 Fax: (212) 406−2313 Email: gcohen@cohenfitch.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jon Louis Norinsberg Law Offices of Jon L. Norinsberg 225 Broadway , Suite 2700 New York, NY 10007 212−791−5396 Fax: 212−406−6890 Email: norinsberg@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch Cohen & Fitch LLP 225 Broadway Suite 2700 New York, NY 10007 (212) 374−9115 Fax: (212) 406−6890 Email: jfitch@cohenfitch.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin Quinn Emanuel 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212)−849−7354 Fax: (212)−849−7100 Email: benjamingildin@quinnemanuel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 51 Madison Avenue 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212) 849−7326 Fax: (212) 849−7100 Email: christophercook@quinnemanuel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 2 of 77

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 51 Madison Avenue 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212)−849−7415 Email: davidlingard@quinnemanuel.com TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton Quinn Emanuel 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212)−849−7325 Fax: (212)−849−7100 Email: elinorsutton@quinnemanuel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 51 Madison Avenue 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212) 849−7312 Fax: (212) 849−7000 Email: jenniferbishop@quinnemanuel.com TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus Quinn Emanuel 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212) 702−8100 Fax: (212) 702−8200 Email: kevinjanus@quinnemanuel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson Quinn Emanuel 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212) 849−7000 Fax: (212) 849−7100 Email: steigolson@quinnemanuel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth Quinn Emanuel 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212)702−8100 x8165 Fax: (212)702−8200 Email: stephenneuwirth@quinnemanuel.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Mariam Farnum on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 3 of 77

Plaintiff Charlene Finley on behalf of themselves
Plaintiff

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 4 of 77

Ryburn Walkes on behalf of themselves

Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jamel Towe on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 5 of 77

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christian Dudley on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jocelyn Ferdinand on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 6 of 77

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Gary Shaw on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 7 of 77

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Michael Bennett on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Michael Bennett Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 8 of 77

Plaintiff
Christian Dudley Other Similarly Situated

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 9 of 77

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Mariam Farnum Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Sharif Stinson Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address)

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 10 of 77

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jocelyn Ferdinand Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 11 of 77

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Charlene Finley Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Gary Shaw Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 12 of 77

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Jamel Towe Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 13 of 77

Ryburn Walkes Other Similarly Situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Chanel Meausa on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 14 of 77

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
David Thompson on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 15 of 77

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Julius Dixon on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Joseph Sarpong on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 16 of 77

Plaintiff
Jeremy Thames on behalf of themselves and others simiarly situated

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 17 of 77

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Sean Pettigrew on behalf of themselves and similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Leander Griffin

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 18 of 77

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Brian Morris on behalf of themselves and similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 19 of 77

Plaintiff
Mica Ancrum on behalf of themselves

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Ricardo Jones on behalf of themselves and similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 20 of 77

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Victor Breland on behalf of themselves and similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Deanne Bishop (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/13/2015

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Lindsey Riddick on behalf of themselves and similarly situated TERMINATED: 01/14/2014

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 21 of 77

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Steig Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Randall Neuwirth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Michael Riddick on behalf of themselves and similarly situated

represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 22 of 77

Plaintiff Mica Ancrum similarly situated
Plaintiff Joseph Sarpong similarly situated

Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Gerald M. Cohen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jon Louis Norinsberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Paul Fitch (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Benjamin Joseph Gildin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 23 of 77

Christopher Thomas Cook (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Lingard (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/16/2015
Elinor Catherine Sutton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin Antoni Janus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant The City of New York

represented by Curt Peter Beck NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel (NYC) 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 (212) 676−1395 Fax: (212) 788−9776 Email: cbeck@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Qiana Charmaine Smith NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel (NYC) 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 (212) 788−1588 Fax: (212) 788−9776 Email: qwilliam@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Amy Seligman New York City Law Department 100 Church Street, Room 4−114 New York, NY 10007 (212) 788−0784 Fax: (212) 788−9776 Email: rseligma@law.nyc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryce Leigh Friedman Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (NY) 425 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 (212) 455−2000 Fax: (212) 455−2502 Email: bfriedman@stblaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Louis Passeser New York City Law Department 100 Church Street

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New York, NY 10007 212−356−2377 Fax: 212−788−9776 Email: dpassese@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joanne Maureen McLaren New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 (212)−356−2671 Fax: (212)−356−3509 Email: jmclaren@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa Marie Richardson New York City Law Department 100 Church Street, Room 4−114 New York, NY 10007 (212) 442−0832 Fax: (212) 788−9776 Email: lrichard@law.nyc.gov TERMINATED: 09/10/2015

Nicholas Shea Davis Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP 425 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017 (212)−455−7845 Fax: (212)−455−2502 Email: nick.davis@tklaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila Weinstein Edelman & Edelman, P.C. 61 Broadway Suite 3010 New York, NY 10006 212−363−3100 Fax: (212) 943−0001 Email: sweinste@law.nyc.gov

Steven Mark Silverberg New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, NY 10007 212−356−2177 Fax: 212−356−4018 Email: ssilverberg@hnrklaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzanna Publicker Mettham NYC Law Department 100 Church Street Room 3−212 New York, NY 10007 212−356−2372 Fax: 212−788−9776 Email: smettham@law.nyc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Raymond W. Kelly Commissioner of the New York Police Department, Individually

represented by Qiana Charmaine Smith (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 25 of 77

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rachel Amy Seligman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Louis Passeser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joanne Maureen McLaren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lisa Marie Richardson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2015

Steven Mark Silverberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Suzanna Publicker Mettham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Paul Brown Deputy Commissioner of the New York Police Department, Individually TERMINATED: 08/31/2010

Defendant
P.O.s John Doe #1−50 (NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), Individually (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)

Defendant
P.O.s John Doe #1−50 (NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), In their Official Capacities, (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)

Defendant
Paul Brown Deputy Commissioner of the New York Police Department, In his official capacity TERMINATED: 08/31/2010

Defendant
Raymond W. Kelly Commissioner of the New York Police Department, In his official capacity

represented by Curt Peter Beck (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Qiana Charmaine Smith (See above for address)

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 26 of 77
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel Amy Seligman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bryce Leigh Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Louis Passeser (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joanne Maureen McLaren (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa Marie Richardson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/10/2015
Nicholas Shea Davis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheila Weinstein (See above for address)
Steven Mark Silverberg (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Suzanna Publicker Mettham (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Respondent
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.

represented by Edward A. McDonald Dechert, LLP (NYC) 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036−6797 (212)−698−3672 Fax: (212)−698−3599 Email: edward.mcdonald@dechert.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lauren Kurtz Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 (212) 698−3542 Fax: (212) 698−0417 Email: lauren.kurtz@dechert.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael J. Gilbert Dechert, LLP (NYC) 1095 Avenue of the Americas

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New York, NY 10036−6797 (212)698−3886 Fax: (212)698−3599 Email: michael.gilbert@dechert.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Respondent Patrick Lynch

represented by Edward A. McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Objector Jeffrey A Rothman

Objector George Packard

Objector Edward Beck

Objector Michelle Berger

Objector Ari Cowan

Objector CONNOR HICKS

Objector Charles Meacham

Objector Chris Phillips

Objector Larry Swetman

Objector AMADON DELLERBA

Intervenor Non−Party Police Officer Deponents

Date Filed 06/28/0100 05/25/2010
05/25/2010

# Docket Text
Set Deadlines/Hearings: (djc) (Entered: 07/01/2010)
1 COMPLAINT against The City of New York , Raymond W. Kelly, Paul Brown, John Doe #1−50. (Filing Fee $ 350.00, Receipt Number 904975)Document filed by Ryburn Walkes, Jamel Towe, Sharif Stinson, Christian Dudley, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Gary Shaw, Michael Bennett, Mariam Farnum, Charlene Finley.(rdz) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
SUMMONS ISSUED as to The City of New York , Raymond W. Kelly, Paul Brown, John Doe #1−50. (rdz) (Entered: 05/27/2010)

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05/25/2010 05/25/2010 06/03/2010
06/03/2010
06/03/2010
06/28/2010
07/14/2010 08/18/2010
08/18/2010 08/31/2010

Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman is so designated. (rdz) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
Case Designated ECF. (rdz) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
2 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. The City of New York served on 5/27/2010, answer due 6/17/2010. Service was accepted by Dmitriy Aronov. Document filed by Ryburn Walkes; Jamel Towe; Sharif Stinson; Christian Dudley; Jocelyn Ferdinand; Gary Shaw; Michael Bennett; Mariam Farnum; Charlene Finley. (Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
3 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. Raymond W. Kelly served on 5/27/2010, answer due 6/17/2010. Service was accepted by Dmitriy Aronov. Document filed by Ryburn Walkes; Jamel Towe; Sharif Stinson; Christian Dudley; Jocelyn Ferdinand; Gary Shaw; Michael Bennett; Mariam Farnum; Charlene Finley. (Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
4 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. Paul Brown served on 5/27/2010, answer due 6/17/2010. Service was accepted by 5/27/2010. Document filed by Ryburn Walkes; Jamel Towe; Sharif Stinson; Christian Dudley; Jocelyn Ferdinand; Gary Shaw; Michael Bennett; Mariam Farnum; Charlene Finley. (Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 06/03/2010)
5 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated 6/17/10 re: counsel requests a sixty−day enlargement of time from the present date until August 16, 2010 to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. The City of New York answer due 8/16/2010; Raymond W. Kelly answer due 8/16/2010. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/23/10) (djc) (Entered: 06/28/2010)
6 PRETRIAL ORDER. Pretrial Conference set for 10/6/2010 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet and as further set forth. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/14/10) (rjm) (Entered: 07/14/2010)
7 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Joshua Fitch dated 8/11/10 re: Request that plaintiffs amend the complaint without leave by 8/31/10 and that defendants answer within 60 days. It is also respectfully requested that the initial conference scheduled for 10/6/10 remain in tact. ENDORSEMENT: So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/17/10) (cd) (Entered: 08/19/2010)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Complaint due by 8/31/2010. (cd) (Entered: 08/19/2010)
8 AMENDED COMPLAINT amending 1 Complaint, against John Doe #1−50((NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), In their Official Capacities, (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)), John Doe #1−50((NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), Individually (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)), Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York with JURY DEMAND.Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Lindsey Riddick, Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Sean Pettigrew, Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Victor Breland, Jeremy Thames, Brian Morris, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Julius Dixon, Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated), Ricardo Jones, Leander Griffin, Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Michael Riddick, Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ). Related document: 1 Complaint, filed by Gary Shaw, Christian Dudley, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Ryburn Walkes, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Charlene Finley.(rdz) (Entered: 09/14/2010)

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09/15/2010 09/15/2010 02/01/2011 02/04/2011
02/04/2011
02/04/2011

9 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. The City of New York served on 9/1/2010, answer due 9/22/2010. Service was accepted by Dmitriy Aronov, Clerk Authorized to Accept. Document filed by Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated). (Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
10 SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED. Raymond W. Kelly served on 9/1/2010, answer due 9/22/2010. Service was accepted by Dmitriy Aronov, Clerk Authorized to Accept. Document filed by Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves). (Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
11 STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER...regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material... (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/1/11) (mro) (Entered: 02/01/2011)
12 MOTION to Certify Class. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 02/04/2011)
13 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 02/04/2011)
14 DECLARATION of Joshua P. Fitch in Support re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit OCA Statistics for Summons Activity for the year of 2004, # 2 Exhibit OCA Statistics for Summons Activity for the year of 2005, # 3 Exhibit OCA Statistics for Summons Activity for the year of 2006, # 4 Exhibit OCA Statistics for Summons Activity for the year of 2007, # 5 Exhibit OCA Statistics for Summons Activity for the year of 2008, # 6 Exhibit OCA Statistics for Summons Activity for the year of 2009)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered:

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02/09/2011
03/04/2011 03/09/2011 03/14/2011
03/23/2011 03/31/2011 04/06/2011 04/14/2011
04/15/2011 04/27/2011 06/24/2011
06/24/2011 08/30/2011

02/04/2011)
15 ORDER Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, dated February 4, 2011, will be heard at noon on Wednesday, March 23, 2011, in courtroom 18C. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 12 MOTION to Certify Class. ( Motion Hearing set for 3/23/2011 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/8/2011) (jmi) (Entered: 02/10/2011)
16 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Qiana Charmaine Smith on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 03/04/2011)
17 ORDER. Defendants' letter to the Court, dated February 18, 2011, will be treated as a motion and will be heard on submission, without oral argument, on March 16, 2011. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/5/11) (djc) (Entered: 03/09/2011)
18 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with JURY DEMAND. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. Related document: 8 Amended Complaint,,,,,, filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 03/14/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Motion Hearing held and argued on 3/23/2011. Motion is pending. (mro) (Entered: 03/25/2011)
***DELETED DOCUMENT. Deleted document number 19 ORDER. The document was incorrectly filed in this case. (ae) (Entered: 04/06/2011)
19 ORDER: Plaintiffs' letter to the Court, dated March 30, 2011, will be treated as a motion to compel and and will be heard at noon on Wednesday, April 13, 2011 in Courtroom 18C. So Ordered (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/5/2011) (js) (Entered: 04/07/2011)
20 ORDER. Having received Plaintiffs' letter to the Court, dated April 12, 2011, stating that Defendants have served responses to Plaintiffs' discovery demands as well as several hundred documents, Plaintiffs' motion to compel, dated March 30, 2011, is hereby dismissed as moot. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/14/11). (djc) (Entered: 04/14/2011)
21 ORDER: Defendants' letter will be treated as a motion on Wednesday, April 20, 2011 to the Court, dated April 12, 2011, compel and will be heard at noon in courtroom 18C. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/15/2011) (jar) (Entered: 04/15/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 4/27/2011 re: 15 Order. (mbe) (Entered: 05/06/2011)
22 CONSENT ORDER: All pre−certification depositions in this matter will be conducted on or before 7/15/2011. Any plaintiff who fails to appear for a scheduled deposition by July 15, 2011, shall be removed as a proposed class representative; and as further set forth in this order. Defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for certification shall be filed no later than 8/26/2011, and plaintiffs' reply papers shall be filed no later than 9/16/2011. (Deposition due by 7/15/2011.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/22/2011) (tro) Modified on 6/28/2011 (tro). (Entered: 06/24/2011)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Responses due by 8/26/2011 Replies due by 9/16/2011. (tro) (Entered: 06/28/2011)
23 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated 8/24/2011 re: Defendants request that the briefing schedule be enlarged as follows: Defendants opposition papers to be served by 9/9/11. Plaintiffs reply papers to be served by 10/21/11. ENDORSEMENT: So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/25/2011) (jfe) (Entered: 08/30/2011)

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09/01/2011 09/09/2011 09/09/2011 10/12/2011 10/17/2011 10/28/2011 11/03/2011 11/08/2011
11/10/2011 11/10/2011

24 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated 8/24/2011 re: Counsel for the Defendants writes to request that Defendant's opposition papers to the class certification motion be served by 9/9/2011 and Plaintiff's reply papers be served by 10/21/2011. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/29/2011) (ab) (Entered: 09/01/2011)
25 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
26 DECLARATION of Qiana Smith−Williams in Opposition re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration Ex. A − F, # 2 Exhibit Declaration Ex. G − L, # 3 Exhibit Declaration Ex. M − P, # 4 Exhibit Declaration Ex. Q − U)(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 09/09/2011)
27 ORDER: At the request of the parties, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, dated February 4, 2011, will be heard at noon on Wednesday, November 16, 2011, in courtroom 18C. IT IS SO ORDERED. ( Status Conference set for 11/16/2011 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/11/2011) (ama) (Entered: 10/12/2011)
28 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Joshua P. Fitch dated 10/14/2011 re: My firm, along with co−counsel Jon Norinsberg, represents plaintiffs in the above−referenced matter and we write to Your Honor to respectfully request an extension of the October 21, 2011 deadline to reply to defendants' opposition to class certification until October 28, 2011. ENDORSEMENT: So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/17/2011) (rdz) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
29 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class.. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves). (Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 10/28/2011)
30 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated 11/2/2011 re: Counsel for the Defendants writes to request that the Court allow defendants to file a sur−reply to Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification, filed October 28, 2011. ENDORSEMENT: Sur−reply permitted as requested. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/3/2011) (ab) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
31 DECLARATION of Jon L. Norinsberg in Support re: 29 Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Bennett Dep., # 2 Exhibit Griffin Dep., # 3 Exhibit Walkes Dep., # 4 Exhibit Meausa Dep., # 5 Exhibit Shaw Dep., # 6 Exhibit Dixon Dep., # 7 Exhibit Jones Dep., # 8 Exhibit Breland Dep., # 9 Exhibit Riddick Dep., # 10 Exhibit Thames Dep., # 11 Exhibit Thompson Dep., # 12 Exhibit Stinson Dep.)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 11/08/2011)
32 FILING ERROR − ELECTRONIC FILING FOR NON−ECF DOCUMENT − RESPONSE to Motion re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class. Sur−Reply in Further Opposition of Class Certification Motion. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) Modified on 11/14/2011 (ldi). (Entered: 11/10/2011)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY THAT THE ATTEMPTED FILING OF Document No. 32 HAS BEEN REJECTED. Note to Attorney Qiana Charmaine Smith : THE CLERK'S OFFICE DOES NOT ACCEPT LETTERS FOR FILING, either through

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11/16/2011 01/18/2012 04/23/2012
04/27/2012 05/07/2012 05/07/2012 05/08/2012 05/09/2012

ECF or otherwise, except where the judge has ordered that a particular letter be docketed. Letters may be sent directly to a judge. (ldi) (Entered: 11/14/2011)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Motion Hearing held on 11/16/2011 re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class. filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. (mro) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
33 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Joshua P. Fitch dated 1/17/2012 re: I write now on behalf of former proposed representative plaintiff Mariam Farnum to request leave for her civil rights to pursue her claim individually. Defendants take no position with respect to this request. ENDORSEMENT: SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/17/2012) (ama) (Entered: 01/18/2012)
34 MEMORANDUM & OPINION: #101736 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. The class certified is defined to include individuals who were issued summonses that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial insufficiency and who were ticketed without probable cause. Individuals who were issued summonses that survived the defect review process but were dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial insufficiency are presumptive members of the class, but Defendants can challenge any presumptive class members on grounds that the summons at issue was dismissed for reasons other than a lack of probable cause. The applicable class period is May 25, 2007 to the present, pursuant to the three year statute of limitations governing actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The class is certified under both Rules 23 (b) (2) and 2 3 (b) (3), with the Rule 23 (b) (2) class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and the Rule 23(b) (3) class seeking money damages. Plaintiffs Sharif Stinson, Ryburn Walkes, Gary Shaw, Michael Bennett, Chanel Meausa. David Thompson, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Victor Breland and Lindsey Riddick will serve as class representatives, and Jon Norinsberg, Esq. and Cohen & Fitch LLP will serve as class counsel. re: 12 MOTION to Certify Class. filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/23/2012) (djc) Modified on 5/2/2012 (jab). (Entered: 04/23/2012)
35 PRETRIAL ORDER: Pretrial Conference set for 5/16/2012 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet and as further set forth in this order. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/27/2012) (lmb) (Entered: 04/27/2012)
36 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 34 Memorandum & Opinion,,,,,,,. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
37 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 36 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 34 Memorandum & Opinion,,,,,,,.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
38 ORDER: The Defendants' motion for reconsideration will be heard on submission on May 30, 2012. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. IT IS SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/08/2012) (ama) (Entered: 05/08/2012)
39 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet, from Joshua P. Fitch, dated 5/8/2012, re: on behalf of both parties to request an extension of both plaintiffs' time to file their opposition to defendants' motion for reconsideration and defendants' time to reply to same. Accordingly, the parties respectfully request that Your Honor adopt the following briefing schedule: Plaintiff's Opposition, 6/5/2012; Defendants' Reply, 6/18/2012. Parties also request that the conference currently scheduled for May 16, 2012 be adjourned to a date and time following the determination of defendants'

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 33 of 77

06/04/2012 06/12/2012
06/26/2012 06/26/2012 07/19/2012 09/14/2012 09/14/2012 09/26/2012 10/04/2012 12/12/2012
12/12/2012 02/07/2013

instant motion. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. ( Responses due by 6/5/2012, Replies due by 6/18/2012.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/8/2012) (ja) (Entered: 05/09/2012)
40 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Gerald M. Cohen dated 5/31/2012 re: Request to modify the briefing schedule as follows: Plaintiffs' Opposition: 6/12/2012; Defendants' Reply: 6/26/2012. ENDORSEMENT: So Ordered. ( Responses due by 6/12/2012, Replies due by 6/26/2012.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/4/2012) (jar) (Entered: 06/04/2012)
42 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 36 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 34 Memorandum & Opinion,,,,,,,.. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 06/12/2012)
43 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 36 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 34 Memorandum & Opinion,,,,,,,.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
44 DECLARATION of Qiana Smith−Williams in Support re: 36 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 34 Memorandum & Opinion,,,,,,,.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
45 OPINION denying re: #102082 36 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 34 Memorandum & Opinion filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/13/2012) (cd) Modified on 7/23/2012 (jab). (Entered: 07/19/2012)
46 ORDER: Please be advised that the conference scheduled for 5/16/12 has been rescheduled to 9/26/12 at 4:30 p.m. in Courtroom 18C. Please notify opposing counsel of the change. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/14/2012) (jfe) Modified on 9/14/2012 (jfe). (Entered: 09/14/2012)
Set/Reset Hearings: Pretrial Conference set for 9/26/2012 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (jfe) (Entered: 09/14/2012)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Interim Pretrial Conference held on 9/26/2012. PTC held. Case is on appeal to circuit pending decision. (lmb) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
***DELETED DOCUMENT. Deleted document number 47 STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY. The document was incorrectly filed in this case. (mt) (Entered: 10/04/2012)
47 MANDATE of USCA (Certified Copy) USCA Case Number 12−3069. Petitioners, through counsel, move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), for leave to appeal the district courts order granting Respondents motion for class certification. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the petition is DENIED because an immediate appeal is unwarranted. See Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139−40 (2d Cir. 2001). Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk USCA for the Second Circuit. Issued As Mandate: 12/12/2012. (tp) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
Transmission of USCA Mandate/Order to the District Judge re: 47 USCA Mandate. (tp) (Entered: 12/12/2012)
48 PRETRIAL ORDER: Counsel are directed to appear in courtroom 18C on 3/20/2013 at 4:30 p.m. for a pretrial conference for the purpose of resolving any outstanding discovery or other issues, and setting a time for trial. IT IS SO ORDERED. ( Pretrial Conference set for 3/20/2013 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/07/2013) (ama) (Entered: 02/07/2013)

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 34 of 77

03/11/2013 03/21/2013 04/22/2013 04/25/2013 04/25/2013 04/29/2013
07/29/2013 07/29/2013
07/29/2013
07/29/2013
07/29/2013

49 ORDER: 3/20/2013 Pretrial Conference reset for 3/21/2013 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Please notify opposing counsel of the change. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/11/2013) (cd) (Entered: 03/11/2013)
50 ORDER: 3/21/2013 Pretrial Conference reset for 4/24/2013 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Please notify opposing counsel of the change. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/21/2013) (cd) (Entered: 03/21/2013)
51 ORDER: 4/24/2013 Pretrial Conference reset for 4/25/2013 at 04:30 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Please notify opposing counsel of the change. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/22/2013) (cd) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Pretrial Conference held on 4/25/2013. (mro) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Pretrial Conference held on 4/25/2013. (mro) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
52 ORDER: All motions are to be made returnable at 12:00 noon on Wednesday and in compliance with the rules of this Court. The parties shall complete all fact discovery by 1/15/2014 and all expert discovery by 4/16/2014. The parties shall file all motion, other than motions in limine, by this date. The parties shall submit to the court trial briefs, a jointed proposed pretrial order, and, if applicable, motions in limine and proposed jury charges, voir dire requests and special verdict form in accordance with the annexed form and instructions by 5/7/2014. Final Pretrial Conference set for 5/7/2014 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/25/2013) (tro) (Entered: 04/29/2013)
53 MOTION to Appoint Counsel to Appoint Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP as Co−Lead Class Counsel. Document filed by Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). Return Date set for 8/21/2013 at 12:00 PM.(Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
54 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 53 MOTION to Appoint Counsel to Appoint Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP as Co−Lead Class Counsel.. Document filed by Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
55 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Stephen Randall Neuwirth on behalf of Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Neuwirth, Stephen) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
56 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Steig Olson on behalf of Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Olson, Steig) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
57 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Elinor Catherine Sutton on behalf of Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 35 of 77

08/07/2013
08/29/2013 09/05/2013
09/12/2013 09/16/2013 09/25/2013 10/01/2013 10/01/2013 10/02/2013 10/04/2013
10/07/2013 10/08/2013

Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
58 ORDER re: 53 MOTION to Appoint Counsel to Appoint Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP as Co−Lead Class Counsel filed by Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, Julius Dixon, Ryburn Walkes, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Lindsey Riddick, Leander Griffin. The plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan as co−lead class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) will be heard on submission on August 21, 2013. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Rule 6.1. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/5/2013) (tn) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
59 MEMO ENDORSED on NOTICE OF MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP AS CO−LEAD CLASS COUNSEL PURSUANT TO FED R. CIV. P. 23(G) granting 53 Motion to Appoint Counsel. ENDORSEMENT: Motion granted, no opposition. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/23/2013) (rsh) (Entered: 08/29/2013)
60 ORDER: The Defendants' motion for a protective order, dated August 23, 2013, will be heard at noon on Wednesday, September 25, 2013 in courtroom 18C. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. (Status Conference set for 9/25/2013 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/30/2013) (rsh) (Entered: 09/05/2013)
61 NOTICE of Attorney Change of Name. Document filed by The City of New York. (Publicker, Suzanna) (Entered: 09/12/2013)
62 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference Reply to Defendants' 08.23.13 Motion for Protective Order addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated September 16, 2013. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Publicker, Suzanna) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 9/25/2013 re: 63 Letter filed by The City of New York. Remark: Motion for a protective order held. (sc) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
63 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Snith−Williams dated 8/23/2013 re: Request for a protective order and that the Court limit the anticipated Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Document filed by The City of New York.(cd) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
64 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Stephen R. Neuwirth dated 8/30/2013 re: Response to defendant City of NY letter, dated 8/23/2013 (previous docket entry) re request for a protective order be denied. Document filed by Sharif Stinson et al.(cd) (Entered: 10/01/2013)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Status Conference held on 10/2/2013. (js) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
65 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Steig D. Olson dated 10/04/2013 re: Plaintiffs' Proposed Order. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Lindsey Riddick, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Olson, Steig) (Entered: 10/04/2013)
66 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated October 7, 2013 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Court Endorsement of a Proposed Order. Document filed by The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 10/07/2013)
67 ORDER: Having reviewed the parties' filings and having heard oral argument on September 25, 2013, and October 2, 2013 regarding Defendant City of New York's motion for a protective order, dated August 23, 2013, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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10/10/2013 10/10/2013 12/27/2013 12/27/2013 12/30/2013

(1) Defendant shall provide a witness to testify as to Topic Nos. 1−5 set forth in Plaintiffs' Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition notice served on August l, 2013 (the "Deposition Notice"). Plaintiffs agree to modify the definition of "Enforcement Activity" contained in the Deposition Notice to: "any and all actions taken by members of the NYPD to make arrests, issue summonses, and stop question and frisk civilians, and as further set forth in this document." (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/7/2013) (cd) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
68 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 10/2/2013 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Alena Lynch, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/4/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/15/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/11/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
69 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 10/2/13 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
70 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: MOTIONS held on 9/25/2013 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jerry Harrison, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 1/21/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 1/30/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/31/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 12/27/2013)
71 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a MOTIONS proceeding held on 9/25/13 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 12/27/2013)
72 DOCUMENT REFERRED TO JUDGE FOR APPROVAL − NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff(s) and or their counsel(s), hereby give notice that the above−captioned action is voluntarily dismissed, WITH prejudice against the defendant(s) Paul Brown, Paul Brown, John Doe #1−50((NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), In their Official Capacities, (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)), John Doe #1−50((NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), Individually (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)), Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Lindsey Riddick, Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Sean Pettigrew, Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Victor Breland, Jeremy Thames, Brian Morris, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Julius Dixon, Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated), Ricardo Jones, Leander Griffin, Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Michael Riddick, Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ). (Sutton, Elinor) Modified on 12/31/2013 (ml). (Entered: 12/30/2013)

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 37 of 77

12/31/2013 01/02/2014 01/02/2014 01/13/2014
01/13/2014
01/14/2014 01/14/2014 01/23/2014

***NOTE TO ATTORNEY − DOCUMENT REFERRED TO JUDGE FOR APPROVAL. Note to Attorney Elinor Sutton Document 72 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, was referred to Judge Robert W. Sweet for approval. (ml) (Entered: 12/31/2013)
73 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS by Suzanna Publicker Mettham on behalf of Paul Brown, Paul Brown, Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. New Address: New York City Law Department, 100 Church Street, Rm 3−200, New York, New York, United States 10007, 212−356−2372. (Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
74 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Steven Mark Silverberg on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
75 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 1.13.14 re: Third Party Protective Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
76 STIPULATION AND SCHEDULING ORDER: The parties shall complete all fact discovery by 10/15/2014. The parties shall complete all expert discovery by 1/30/2015. The parties shall submit to the court trial briefs, a joint proposed pretrial order, and, if applicable, motions in limine and proposed jury charges, voir dire requests and special verdict form in accordance with the annexed form and instructions by 3/6/2015. Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/6/2015 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet and the Action shall be added to the trial calendar published in the New York Law Journal. (Brief due by 3/6/2015. Expert Discovery due by 1/30/2015. Fact Discovery due by 10/15/2014. Motions due by 3/6/2015. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 3/6/2015. Final Pretrial Conference set for 3/6/2015 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/9/2014) (tro) Modified on 1/16/2014 (tro). (Entered: 01/14/2014)
77 STIPULATION OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES RIDDICK AND DIXON:IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED and AGREED, pursuant to 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by and between the attorneys for the respective parties herein, that Lindsey Riddick and Julius Dixon are no longer representative plaintiffs and/or class members in this action and that all their claims against the defendants in this action are dismissed with prejudice. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/13/2014) (ama) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
78 ORDER: The Plaintiffs' letter dated January 13, 2014 for a protective order shall be treated as a motion and will be heard on Wednesday January 22, 2014. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. IT IS SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/14/2014) (ama) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
79 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated January 23, 2014 re: Plaintiffs Reply to Motion Regarding Protective Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones,

Case: 1:10-cv-4228 As of: 07/18/2018 09:55 AM EDT 38 of 77

01/28/2014 01/29/2014 02/03/2014
02/05/2014 02/05/2014 02/07/2014
02/10/2014 02/11/2014 02/18/2014

Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 01/23/2014)
80 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Regarding Motion to Compel Deposition Answers addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated January 28, 2014. Document filed by The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 01/28/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 1/29/2014. Discovery motion held; re: 80 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Regarding Motion to Compel Deposition Answers addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated January 28, 2014. filed by The City of New York. (sc) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
81 ORDER: On January 29, 2014, this Court heard argument regarding the production of disciplinary files for NYPD officers being deposed in this matter; and based on the discovery and deposition schedules in this matter, the parties require an order reflecting the Court's ruling; NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: Defendants will produce an unredacted and complete list of all disciplinary allegations made against each office being deposed in this matter. Defendants will produce a summary or description of the underlying facts related to each allegation; and Defendants may designate documents produced pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2 above (and deposition testimony regarding the same documents) as "Attorneys' Eyes Only," such that Plaintiffs' counsel may not disclose the documents or the contents of the documents to anyone other than employees of their respective firms, the relevant deponents (and any court reporter/videographer at the deposition), and the Court. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/3/2014) (ja) Modified on 2/3/2014 (ja). (Entered: 02/03/2014)
82 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Lisa Marie Richardson on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Richardson, Lisa) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
83 ORDER: Plaintiffs and third parties may designate discovery material produced in this Action as "Confidential" under the Protective Order. All provisions of the Protective Order shall apply to discovery material designated as "Confidential" by Plaintiffs or a third party. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/5/2014) (ft) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
84 ORDER: The Plaintiffs' letter dated January 31, 2014 regarding COMPSTAT shall be treated as a motion and will be heard on Tuesday February 11, 2014 at noon. All motion paper shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. IT IS SO ORDERED. Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 80 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Regarding Motion to Compel Deposition Answers addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated January 28, 2014. :( Motion Hearing set for 2/11/2014 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/06/2014) (ama) (Entered: 02/07/2014)
85 ORDER:..regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material.. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/10/2014) (ama) (Entered: 02/10/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 2/11/2014 on discovery motion; re: 80 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Regarding Motion to Compel Deposition Answers addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated January 28, 2014. filed by The City of New York. (sc) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
86 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 2/11/2014 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Patricia Nilsen, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After

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02/18/2014 02/25/2014 02/25/2014 02/25/2014 02/26/2014 02/28/2014 03/07/2014
03/11/2014 03/13/2014

that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/14/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/24/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/22/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
87 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 2/11/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 02/18/2014)
89 MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's February 11, 2014 Order directing the City to provide CompStat meeting videos requested by plaintiffs for review by their counsel, irrespective of the privileged material on the videos. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
90 DECLARATION of Steven M. Silverberg in Support re: 89 MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's February 11, 2014 Order directing the City to provide CompStat meeting videos requested by plaintiffs for review by their counsel, irrespective of the privileged material on the videos.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit C)(Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
91 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 89 MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's February 11, 2014 Order directing the City to provide CompStat meeting videos requested by plaintiffs for review by their counsel, irrespective of the privileged material on the videos.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 02/25/2014)
***DELETED DOCUMENT. Deleted document number 92 Letter. The document was incorrectly filed in this case. (lmb) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
92 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Suzanna Publicker Mettham dated 2/19/14 re: Defendants write to request that the Court grant defendants a brief three day enlargement of time to file a motion for reconsideration regarding the Court's February 11, 2014 Order to produce certain CompStat videos. Defendants contacted plaintiffs' counsel by email and telephone today to seek their consent, but had not heard back at the time of this writing. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/25/2014) (mro) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
93 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton, Joshua Fitch, Jon Norinsberg dated 3.7.14 re: Request for Court Intervention − Disciplinary Files. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/07/2014)
94 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Lisa M. Richardson dated March 11, 2014 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' Feb. 25, 2014 Letter Motion for Disqualification. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Richardson, Lisa) (Entered: 03/11/2014)
95 ORDER: Defendants' motion for reconsideration, dated February 20, 2014 will be submitted on Thursday, March 13, 2014, at noon. Plaintiff's motion to disqualify

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03/13/2014 03/14/2014
03/14/2014 03/17/2014 03/18/2014
03/18/2014

corporate counsel will be heard on Wednesday, March 19, 2014 at noon. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1., ( Motion Hearing set for 3/19/2014 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/6/2014) (lmb) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
96 ORDER: Defendants' motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 2014 will be heard on Wednesday, March 19, 2014, along with the discovery motion set for that date. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/6/2014) (lmb) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
97 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by David Lingard on behalf of Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Lingard, David) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
98 ORDER: Plaintiffs' letter dated March 19, 2014 will be treated as a motion to compel and will be heard in conjunction with the motion to disqualify on Wednesday, March 19, 2014 at noon. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/13/2014) (kgo) (Entered: 03/14/2014)
99 SEALING ORDER: Having considered Plaintiffs' February 26, 2014 request to file under seal their opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 11, 2014 Order, and upon finding good cause exists to seal the opposition based on the inclusion of information designated "Confidential − Attorneys' Eyes Only," IT IS HEREBY: 1. ORDERED that Plaintiffs' request is GRANTED; and it is further 2. ORDERED that Plaintiffs are authorized to file under seal their Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/17/2014) (lmb) (Entered: 03/17/2014)
100 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 3.18.14 re: Plaintiffs Reply Letter to Defendants Mar. 11, 2014 Opposition Letter to Disqualify Corporation Counsel. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
101 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 89 MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's February 11, 2014 Order directing the City to provide CompStat meeting videos requested by plaintiffs for review by their counsel, irrespective of the privileged material on the videos.. Document filed by The City of New York. (Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 03/18/2014)

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03/19/2014 03/19/2014 03/24/2014 03/26/2014
03/27/2014 03/28/2014 03/31/2014 03/31/2014

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument on discovery motion held on 3/19/2014 re: 100 Letter filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. (sc) (Entered: 03/25/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument on Discovery motion held on 3/19/2014 re: document 100 . (cd) (Entered: 04/18/2014)
102 OPINION 104154. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied, and Plaintiff's request for the City to provide non−party officers with a statement relating the potential conflict of representation by corporation counsel is granted. It is so ordered. re: 89 MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's February 11, 2014 Order directing the City to provide CompStat meeting videos requested by plaintiffs for review by their counsel, irrespective of the privileged material on the videos filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/24/2014) (rjm) Modified on 3/25/2014 (rjm). Modified on 4/3/2014 (nt). (Entered: 03/25/2014)
103 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Jon Norinsberg, Elinor Sutton dated March 26, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Request for the Court to Enforce the PBA Subpoena. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/26/2014)
104 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault.(mps) (Entered: 03/27/2014)
105 ORDER. The Plaintiffs' letter dated March 27, 2014 requesting an order compelling non−party, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, to provide outstanding discovery will be heard on Wednesday, April 9, 2014 at noon. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. (Conference set for 4/9/2014 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/27/2014) (rjm) (Entered: 03/28/2014)
106 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated 3/27/2014 re: Defendants write to respectfully request (1) an enlargement of time to comply with the Court's March 25, 2014 Order and (2) that Your Honor endorse that attached Proposed Unsealing Order authorizing defendant City or New York to produce non−party information which may be subject to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §§ 160.50 and 160.55. ENDORSEMENT: Production of videos to commence April 9, 2014. So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/28/2014) (rjm) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
107 UNSEALING ORDER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City of New York, including the Office of Corporation Counsel and the New York City Police Department, sha1l not be bound by the statutory sealing requirements of CPL §§ 160.50 and 160.55, as it relates to the CompStat videos at issue; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant City of New York produce non−party information subject to CPL §§ 160.50 and 160.55, contained on the subject CompStat videos, to plaintiffs; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the use of the above−referenced records is restricted to use in the above−entitled civil rights action and shall be protected by plaintiffs' counsel as "Attorneys' Eyes Only," such that plaintiffs' counsel may not disclose the

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03/31/2014 04/01/2014 04/01/2014 04/01/2014 04/01/2014 04/03/2014 04/04/2014 04/04/2014 04/04/2014 04/08/2014
04/10/2014
04/10/2014
04/14/2014

non−party information on the CompStat videos to anyone other than employees of their firms, relevant deponents (and any court reporter/videographer at the deposition), and the Court. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/28/2014) (rjm) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
Transmission to Sealed Records Clerk. Transmitted re: 107 Order to the Sealed Records Clerk for the sealing or unsealing of document or case. (rjm) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
108 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Edward A. McDonald on behalf of Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
109 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Michael J. Gilbert on behalf of Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (Gilbert, Michael) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
110 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Lauren Kurtz on behalf of Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (Kurtz, Lauren) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
111 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference / Oral Argument addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Lauren Kurtz dated April 1, 2014. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc..(Kurtz, Lauren) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
Minute Entry:Oral Argument on the motion to compel is set for 4/17/2014 at 02:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (sc) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
113 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
114 DECLARATION of Qiana Smith−Williams in Support re: 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 04/04/2014)
115 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Edward A. McDonald dated April 8, 2014 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' March 26, 2014 letter requesting order compelling PBA to produce additional documents pursuant to a third−party subpoena. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 04/08/2014)
116 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: ARGUMENT held on 3/19/2014 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Karen Gorlaski, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/5/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/15/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/14/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
117 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a ARGUMENT proceeding held on 3/19/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 04/10/2014)
118 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated April 14, 2014 re: Reply Letter to the PBA's April 8, 2014 Letter in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request to Enforce the PBA Subpoena. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of

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04/15/2014
04/16/2014 04/17/2014 04/17/2014 04/22/2014

themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
119 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated April 15, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Letter re Defs.' April 4, 2014 Decertification Motion. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
120 ORDER: Defendants' motion for decertification dated April 4, 2014 will be heard on Wednesday, May 7, 2014 at noon. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1.Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012 :( Motion Hearing set for 5/7/2014 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/15/2014) (mro) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
121 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated April 17, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Letter Dated April 15, 2014. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
122 [PROPOSED] ORDER: 1. ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall serve Mr. Barry with a subpoena for testimony as soon as practicable; and it is further 2. ORDERED that the subpoena shall set a date for deposition fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the subpoena; and it is further 3. ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' April 4, 2014 Motion For Decertification shall be due fourteen (14) days from the date of Mr. Barry's deposition. IT IS SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/17/2014) (ajs) (Entered: 04/17/2014)
123 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Benjamin Joseph Gildin on behalf of Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Gildin, Benjamin) (Entered: 04/22/2014)

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04/24/2014 04/24/2014 05/02/2014 05/05/2014
05/07/2014 05/22/2014
05/29/2014

124 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: MOTION held on 4/17/2014 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Martha Drevis, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/19/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/30/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/28/2014.(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
125 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a MOTION proceeding held on 4/17/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Rodriguez, Somari) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
126 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Lee Alan Adlerstein dated 5/1/2014 re: It is respectfully requested that your Honor approve of the May 14, 2014 deposition date through endorsement of this letter or such other manner as the Court deems appropriate. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Deposition due by 5/14/2014.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/1/2014) (rjm) (Entered: 05/02/2014)
127 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Benjamin J. Gildin dated 5.5.2014 re: April 16, 2014 Order regarding Defendants' Motion for Decertification. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Gildin, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/05/2014)
128 ORDER. Defendants' motion for decertification dated April 4, 2014 will now be heard on Wednesday, June 11, 2014 at noon. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. Set Deadlines/Hearing as to 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012.: (Motion Hearing set for 6/11/2014 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/7/2014) (rjm) (Entered: 05/07/2014)
129 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Benjamin J. Gildin dated May 22, 2014 re: compliance with the March 24, 2014 Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Declaration)(Gildin, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/22/2014)
131 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012. . Document filed by Michael Bennett(on

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05/29/2014 05/30/2014
06/02/2014 06/04/2014 06/04/2014 06/10/2014
06/10/2014 06/10/2014 06/12/2014

behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
132 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated May 29, 2014 re: Request For Your Honor to Endorse the Officer Declaration Submitted by Defendants. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/29/2014)
133 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Benjamin J. Gildin dated May 30, 2014 re: Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Decertification Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Gildin, Benjamin) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
134 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Mitchell Garber dated June 2, 2014 re: Motion to Intervene. Document filed by Non−Party Police Officer Deponents.(Garber, Mitchell) (Entered: 06/02/2014)
135 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012. . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 06/04/2014)
136 REPLY AFFIRMATION of Qiana Smith−Williams in Support re: 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 06/04/2014)
137 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Mitchell Garber dated 5/30/2014 re: 1. My firm's Motion to Intervene will be filed by June 2, 2014. 2. Assuming that the Court grants intervention, my firm's letter in response to the City's May 29, 2014 letter be filed by June 9, 2014. 3. The City's Reply will be filed by June 13, 2014. Any Response to the City's Reply will be filed by June 16, 2014. 5. The parties are requesting that the Court schedule argument on June 18, 2014. ENDORSEMENT: Schedule approved with submission on June 18., ( Replies due by 6/13/2014., Surreplies due by 6/16/2014.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/5/2014) (lmb) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
138 ORDER: The previous scheduling order (ECF No. 128) is hereby amended as follows: Defendants' motion for decertification dated April 4, 2014 will now be heard, on submission, on Wednesday, June 11, 2014 at noon. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/9/2014) (tn) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
139 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 132 Letter filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. ENDORSEMENT: The City's draft declaration attached hereto is approved. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/9/2014) (tn) (Entered: 06/10/2014)
140 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Mitchell Garber dated June 12, 2014 re: Withdrawal of Motion To Intervene. Document filed by Non−Party Police Officer Deponents.(Garber, Mitchell) (Entered: 06/12/2014)

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06/13/2014
06/26/2014 07/11/2014 08/14/2014
08/19/2014 08/20/2014

141 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated June 13, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' May 22, 2014 Letter Motion. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 06/13/2014)
142 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Jennifer Deanne Bishop on behalf of Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Bishop, Jennifer) (Entered: 06/26/2014)
143 ORDER. In light of counsel's letter dated June 12, 2014 (ECF #140), the motion to intervene (ECF #134) is hereby marked as withdrawn. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/8/2014). (rjm) (Entered: 07/11/2014)
144 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 8.14.14 re: Plaintiffs request that the PBA be ordered to comply with the Courts previous April 17, 2014 Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
145 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Michael J. Gilbert dated August 19, 2014. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc..(Gilbert, Michael) (Entered: 08/19/2014)
146 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 8.20.14 re: Plaintiffs letter in response to the PBAs August 19, 2014 letter. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy

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08/21/2014 08/21/2014 09/02/2014 09/02/2014 09/05/2014 09/05/2014 09/05/2014 09/05/2014 09/08/2014
09/08/2014

Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 08/20/2014)
147 ORDER granting 145 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply: Opposition to be filed September 5. Motion to be submitted September 10. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/20/2014) (tn) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motions due by 9/10/2014. (tn) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
148 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Sheila Weinstein on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Weinstein, Sheila) Modified on 10/24/2014 (db). (Entered: 09/02/2014)
***STRICKEN DOCUMENT. Deleted document number 148 from the case record. The document was stricken from this case pursuant to 181 Order. (ajs) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
149 FILING ERROR − DEFICIENT DOCKET ENTRY − FILER ERROR − LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Edward A. McDonald dated September 5, 2014 re: motion to quash the subpoena. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(McDonald, Edward) Modified on 9/9/2014 (lb). (Entered: 09/05/2014)
150 RESPONSE re: 144 Letter,,,,, . Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I)(McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
151 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Edward A. McDonald dated September 5, 2014 re: motion to quash the subpoena. Document filed by Patrick Lynch. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
152 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Edward A. McDonald dated September 5, 2014 re: Oral Argument on Motion to Compel. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc..(McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
153 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated September 8, 2014 re: Opposition to Non−Party Patrolmen's Benevolent Association's Request for an Adjournment of the September 10, 2014 Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
154 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 9.8.14 Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly

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09/08/2014 09/10/2014
09/12/2014 09/12/2014
09/15/2014 09/17/2014 09/23/2014

situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
155 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Edward A. McDonald on behalf of Patrick Lynch. (McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 09/08/2014)
156 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 9.10.14 re: Plaintiffs Reply to PBAs September 5, 2014 Opposition to Plaintiffs August 14, 2014 Letter. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit L, # 2 Exhibit M, # 3 Exhibit N, # 4 Exhibit O, # 5 Exhibit P, # 6 Exhibit Q, # 7 Exhibit R)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/10/2014)
157 ORDER: Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of City of New York, Inc.'s motion to quash dated September 5, 2014, will be heard at noon on Wednesday, September 17, 2014 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. Set Deadlines/Hearing: Motion Hearing set for 9/17/2014 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/12/2014) (ajs) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
158 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated September 12, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Opposition to Patrick Lynch's September 5, 2014 Motion to Quash. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/12/2014)
159 REPLY re: 158 Letter,,,,, by Plaintiffs dated September 12, 2014 in Opposition to Mr. Lynchs Motion to Quash the Subpoena. Document filed by Patrick Lynch. (McDonald, Edward) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument was held on 9/17/2014 re: 151 Letter filed by Patrick Lynch. Motion to Quash. (sc) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
160 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated 9.23.14 re: Letter to the Court regarding date for submission of Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants Order to Show Cause. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael

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09/23/2014 09/23/2014 09/23/2014 09/23/2014 09/23/2014 09/29/2014
09/29/2014

Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
161 RESPONSE re: 160 Letter,,,,, regarding plaintiffs' response to defendants' motion for an Order to Show Cause. Document filed by The City of New York. (Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 09/23/2014)
162 OPINION #104783 re: 112 MOTION to Amend/Correct the Certification Order dated April 23, 2012 filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. Based upon the facts and conclusions of law as set forth within, Defendants' motion is denied. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/22/2014) (ajs) Modified on 9/25/2014 (ca). (Entered: 09/23/2014)
163 OPINION #104779: The Motion to Quash Is Denied. As set forth within, the Plaintiffs have cited a number of public statements made by Lynch as the PBA President on the subject of quotas for summons alleged to have been imposed by the New York Police Department. The basis for these statements and communications with others concerning quotas or summons may lead to admissible evidence and are properly discoverable. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/18/2014) (ajs) Modified on 9/25/2014 (ca). (Entered: 09/23/2014)
164 OPINION #104780: The Plaintiffs in this class action have moved to compel the nonparty Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York (the "PBA") to produce documents pursuant to a subpoena and an April 17, 2014 order of this Court (the "April 17 Order"). Based on the conclusions set forth within, the motion is granted. It is so ordered. (See Order.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/18/2014) (ajs) Modified on 9/25/2014 (ca). Modified on 9/25/2014 (ca). (Entered: 09/23/2014)
165 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Steven M. Silverberg dated 9/23/2014 re: Extension of time. ENDORSEMENT: The order to show cause will be heard October 1, opposition to be filed September 29, reply October 1. So ordered. (Replies due by 10/1/2014. Show Cause Response due by 9/29/2014.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/23/2014) (ajs) (Entered: 09/24/2014)
166 OPPOSITION BRIEF to Defendants' Sept. 22, 2014 Motion for an Order to Show Cause. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
168 STIPULATION AND SCHEDULING ORDER: The parties shall complete all fact discovery by April 15, 2015. The parties shall complete all expert discovery by July

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09/30/2014
09/30/2014 09/30/2014 09/30/2014 10/06/2014

30, 2015. The parties shall submit to the court trial briefs, a joint proposed pretrial order, and, if applicable, motions in limine and proposed jury charges, voir dire requests and special verdict form (in accordance with the April 25, 2013 Order) by September 3, 2015. A final pretrial conference will be held at 4:30 p.m., and as further set forth herein. (Expert Discovery due by 7/30/2015. Fact Discovery due by 4/15/2015. Motions due by 9/3/2015. Pretrial Order due by 9/3/2015.), (Final Pretrial Conference set for 9/3/2015 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/29/2014) (ja) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
167 OPPOSITION BRIEF re: 166 Opposition Brief,,,, Declaration of Elinor C. Sutton in Support Of Plaintiffs' Opposition (Dkt. No. 166) to Defendants' Sept. 22, 2014 Motion for an Order to Show Cause. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit J)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
169 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 9/17/2014 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Rose Prater, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 10/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/1/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
170 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 9/17/2014 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
171 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 167 Opposition Brief,,,,,, regarding Defendants' Sept. 22, 2014 Motion for an Order to Show Cause. Document filed by The City of New York. (Silverberg, Steven) (Entered: 09/30/2014)
172 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated October 6, 2014 re: Plaintiffs' Authorities on Rule 26(b)(5)(B) dispute. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3

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10/10/2014 10/16/2014 10/16/2014 10/17/2014 10/20/2014
10/21/2014 10/22/2014 10/30/2014

Exhibit Exhibit C)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 10/07/2014)
173 OPINION #104864: For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs are directed to return all copies of the Documents to Defendants. Plaintiffs may, however, rely on any material learned prior to the Defendants' September 16 Letter in challenging Defendants' assertion of privilege. Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' assertion of privilege dated October 8, 2014, must be served by Friday, October 17, 2014. Defendants' response, if any, must be served by Tuesday, October 21, 2014. The parties will be heard on Defendants' assertion of privilege on October 22, 2014 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/10/2014) (ajs) Modified on 10/14/2014 (soh). (Entered: 10/10/2014)
174 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 10/1/2014 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Karen Gorlaski, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/10/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/20/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/17/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
175 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 10/1/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
176 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Joanne Maureen McLaren on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (McLaren, Joanne) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
177 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated October 17, 2014 re: Opposition to Defendants' October 8 Letter. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit D)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 10/20/2014)
178 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated October 21, 2014 re: In Further Support of Defendants Motion To Find The Briefing and Topics Books Privileged. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
5Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 10/22/2014 re: 177 Letter filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. (Court Reporter Paula Speer) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 10/24/2014)
179 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: ARGUMENT held on 10/22/2014 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Paula Speer, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After

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10/30/2014 11/06/2014 12/24/2014
12/26/2014 12/27/2014 12/29/2014 12/29/2014 12/29/2014
12/29/2014

that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/4/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/31/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
180 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a ARGUMENT proceeding held on 10/22/14 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/30/2014)
181 ORDER: Document number 148 is hereby stricken and removed from the docket. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/6/2014) (ajs) (Entered: 11/06/2014)
182 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference to compel discovery of Schoolcraft documents (redacted) addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Jon Norinsberg dated December 15, 2014. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Cohen, Gerald) Modified on 12/29/2014 (db). (Entered: 12/24/2014)
183 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 182 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference to compel discovery of Schoolcraft documents (redacted) addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Jon Norinsberg dated December 15, 2014. Redacted. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Mettham, Suzanna) Modified on 12/29/2014 (db). (Entered: 12/26/2014)
187 ORDER: Plaintiffs letter dated December 15, 2014 will be treated as a motion to compel and will be heard at noon on Wednesday, January 21, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. All motion papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. (Motion Hearing set for 1/21/2015 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 12/27/2014) (ajs) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Gerald M. Cohen to RE−FILE Document 182 LETTER MOTION for Local Rule 37.2 Conference to compel discovery of Schoolcraft documents (redacted) addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Jon Norinsberg dated December 15, 2014. Use the event type Letter found under the event list Other Documents. (db) (Entered: 12/29/2014)
***NOTE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Note to Attorney Suzanna Publicker Mettham to RE−FILE Document 183 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion. Use the event type Letter found under the event list Other Documents. (db) (Entered: 12/29/2014)
184 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Jon Norinsberg dated December 15, 2014 re: to compel discovery of Schoolcraft documents (redacted). Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 12/29/2014)
185 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Suzanna Publicker Mettham dated December 26, 2014 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' December 22, 2014 (incorrectly dated 12.15.14) Letter. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 12/29/2014)

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12/30/2014 12/31/2014 12/31/2014 01/03/2015 01/05/2015 01/07/2015 01/07/2015
01/16/2015

186 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Gerald Cohen dated December 30, 2014 re: extension of time to Reply Re: Schoolcraft Documents. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
188 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Lisa M. Richardson dated December 31, 2014 re: Plaintiff's request for an extension dated December 30, 2014. Document filed by The City of New York.(Richardson, Lisa) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
189 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Gerald Cohen dated December 31, 2014 re: extension of time to Reply Re: Schoolcraft Documents. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 12/31/2014)
192 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 186 Letter,, filed by Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Leander Griffin re: Extension of time. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/3/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
190 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Jon Norinsberg dated January 5, 2015 re: Redacted Reply In Support of Motion to Compel Schoolcraft documents. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cohen, Gerald) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
191 NOTICE of Substitution of Attorney. Old Attorney: Suzanna Publicker Mettham, New Attorney: Qiana Smith−Williams, Address: NYC Law Department, 100 Church Street, New York, NY − New York, United States 10007, 2123562360. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
193 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from David Lingard dated January 7, 2015 re: Motion by David Lingard for Leave to Withdraw Appearance. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Lingard, David) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
194 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE on re: 193 Letter,,,, filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin.

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01/16/2015
01/19/2015 01/20/2015
01/21/2015 01/23/2015 01/28/2015 01/28/2015

ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. Attorney David Lingard terminated. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/12/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
195 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated January 16, 2015 re: Motion to Enforce the Courts September 18, 2014 Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
196 ORDER: Plaintiffs' letter dated January 16, 2015 will be treated as a motion to compel and will be heard at noon on Wednesday, January 28, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. (Motion Hearing set for 1/28/2015 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/19/2015) (ajs) Modified on 1/20/2015 (ajs). (Entered: 01/20/2015)
197 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Kevin Antoni Janus on behalf of Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Janus, Kevin) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 1/21/2015 re: 187 Order, Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings, the motion to compel was resolved by oral order. (Court Reporter Jennifer Thun) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
198 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Michael J. Gilbert dated January 23, 2015 re: in opposition to Plaintiffs January 16, 2015 motion for an order requiring the PBA to comply with this Courts September 23, 2014 Order the September Order). Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I)(Gilbert, Michael) (Entered: 01/23/2015)
199 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Michael J. Gilbert dated January 28, 2015 re: late service of Plaintiffs' reply brief. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc..(Gilbert, Michael) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
200 OPINION #105172: For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's request for production of the Books is denied. It is so ordered. (See Opinion.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/23/2015) (ajs) Modified on 1/29/2015 (soh). (Entered: 01/28/2015)

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01/28/2015 02/02/2015 02/02/2015 02/04/2015 02/04/2015 02/12/2015
02/18/2015 02/18/2015

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 1/28/2015 re: 195 Letter filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. Motion resolved by oral order.Previlege issues will be subject to meet and confer to be conducted within a week. (Court Reporter Jennifer Thun) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 01/30/2015)
201 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 1/21/2015 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jennifer Thun, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 2/26/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/9/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/7/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
202 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 1/21/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/02/2015)
203 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 1/28/2015 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Jennifer Thun, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/2/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/12/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/8/2015.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
204 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 1/28/2015 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
205 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated February 12, 2015 re: Briefing Schedule for Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel the PBA to Produce Certain Documents on its Privilege Log. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
206 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Michael J. Gilbert dated February 18, 2015 re: Briefing Schedule set forth in the Joint Letter dated February 12, 2015 [ECF No. 205]. Document filed by Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc..(Gilbert, Michael) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
207 ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' and PBA's joint letter (Dkt. No. 205 ), the proposed briefing schedule is approved and Plaintiffs' motion to compel will be heard, on submission, on March 4, 2015. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet

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04/09/2015 04/10/2015 04/14/2015 04/16/2015

on 2/13/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 02/18/2015)
208 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Plaintiffs and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association dated April 9, 2015 re: Stipulation and Proposed Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 04/09/2015)
209 STIPULATION AND RULE 502(D) ORDER: 1. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.'s (the "PBA") production of documents, electronically stored information ("ESI") or information, whether inadvertent or otherwise, following entry of this Order shall not be construed as a waiver of any applicable privileges or protection from discovery in this case or in any other federal, state, or administrative proceeding. This Order shall be interpreted to provide the maximum protection allowed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d). 2. Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit the PBA's right to conduct a review of documents, ESI, or information for relevance, responsiveness and/or segregation of privileged information before production. 3. Nothing contained herein is intended to or shall serve to limit the PBA's right to designate documents, ESI, or information as "Confidential" or "Attorneys' Eyes Only" pursuant to the Stipulation and Protective Order entered February 1, 2011 [Docket No. 11], as amended by the Order entered February 10, 2014 [Docket No. 85] (the "Protective Order"). (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/10/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 04/10/2015)
210 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Plaintiffs and Defendants dated April 14, 2015 re: Stipulation and Proposed Scheduling Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
211 STIPULATION AND SCHEDULING ORDER: IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties, by and through their respective undersigned counsel, and made an Order of the Court subject to the Court's approval, that the Orders in this case dated April 25, 2013, January 9, 2014, and September 29, 2014 are amended as follows: 1. The parties shall complete the production of all currently outstanding documents by June 12, 2015. 2. The parties shall complete all fact discovery by August 28, 2015. 3. The parties shall complete service of all Requests for Admission by November 11, 2015. 4. The parties shall complete all expert depositions by December 11, 2015 (the parties may depose all experts). 5. All discovery shall be completed by December 11, 2015. 6. The parties shall submit to the Court trial briefs,

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04/16/2015 05/12/2015
05/14/2015 05/14/2015 05/14/2015
05/16/2015

a joint proposed pretrial order, and, if applicable, motions in limine and proposed jury charges, voir dire requests and special verdict form (in accordance with the April 25, 2013 Order) by January 29, 2016. A final pretrial conference will be held at 4:30 pm on that date and the Action shall be added to the trial calendar published in the New York Law Journal. ( Brief due by 1/29/2016., Deposition due by 12/11/2015., Discovery due by 12/11/2015., Fact Discovery due by 8/28/2015., Motions due by 1/29/2016., Proposed Pretrial Order due by 1/29/2016.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/15/2015) (mro) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
Set/Reset Hearings: Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/29/2016 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (mro) (Entered: 04/16/2015)
212 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 5/12/2015 re: Motion to Compel Deposition of Police Officer Ryan Boylan. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 05/12/2015)
213 ORDER: Plaintiffs' letter, dated May 12, 2015, will be treated as a motion and will be heard at noon on Wednesday, May 20, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/13/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to Motion Hearing set for 5/20/2015 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (kgo) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
214 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 5/14/2015 re: Motion to Compel Defendants to Produce Electronically Stored Information. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 05/14/2015)
215 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Christopher Thomas Cook on behalf of Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones,

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05/18/2015 05/18/2015 05/19/2015 05/20/2015 05/22/2015
05/26/2015

Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Cook, Christopher) (Entered: 05/16/2015)
216 ORDER. The Defendants' letter seeking a stay of discovery, dated May 15, 2015, will be treated as a motion and will be heard along with the currently−scheduled motions to compel, at noon on Wednesday, May 20, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/18/2015) (rjm) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
217 ORDER. Plaintiffs' letter, dated May 14, 2015, will be treated as a motion and will be heard, along with their other currently−scheduled letter−motion to compel, at noon on Wednesday, May 20, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/15/2015) (rjm) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
218 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated May 19, 2015 re: In Response to Plaintiffs' Letters Dated May 12 and 14, 2015. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/19/2015)
Minute Entry Motion on submission held on 5/20/2015 re: 212 Letter filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
219 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 5/21/2015 re: Letter in Further Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel ESI Production. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit L, # 2 Exhibit M, # 3 Exhibit N, # 4 Exhibit O)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
220 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated May 26, 2015 re: List of Custodians in Connection With Plaintiffs' May 21, 2015 Letter. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 05/26/2015)

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05/28/2015 06/29/2015
07/02/2015 07/13/2015 07/23/2015 07/29/2015 08/11/2015

221 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated May 28, 2015 re: Plaintiffs' Letter Submissions Dated May 21 and 26, 2015. Document filed by The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/28/2015)
222 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 6/29/2015 re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Related to Spoliation of Relevant Evidence. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, John Doe #1−50((NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), In their Official Capacities, (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)), John Doe #1−50((NYPD Supervisory, Training and Police Personnel), Individually (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown)), Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Appendix I, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L, # 15 Exhibit M, # 16 Exhibit N, # 17 Exhibit O, # 18 Exhibit P, # 19 Exhibit Q, # 20 Exhibit R, # 21 Exhibit S, # 22 Exhibit T, # 23 Exhibit U, # 24 Exhibit V, # 25 Exhibit W, # 26 Exhibit X, # 27 Exhibit Y, # 28 Exhibit Z, # 29 Exhibit AA, # 30 Exhibit AB, # 31 Exhibit AC, # 32 Exhibit AD, # 33 Exhibit AE, # 34 Exhibit AF, # 35 Exhibit AG, # 36 Exhibit AH, # 37 Exhibit AI, # 38 Exhibit AJ, # 39 Exhibit AK, # 40 Exhibit AL, # 41 Exhibit AM, # 42 Exhibit AN)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 06/29/2015)
223 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated July 2, 2015 re: Response to Plaintiffs' Motion For An Adverse Inference. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 07/02/2015)
224 ORDER: The Plaintiffs' letter seeking sanctions, dated June 29, 2015, will be treated as a motion and will be heard at noon on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. All papers shall be submitted in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. (Pre−Motion Conference set for 9/30/2015 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/9/2015) (spo) (Entered: 07/13/2015)
225 OPINION #105713: The Plaintiffs' motion to compel the deposition of Officer Boylan is denied as moot. The Plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of Electronically Stored Information is granted in part and denied in part, as discussed above. The Defendant's motion for a stay of the case is denied. It is SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/18/2015) (ama) (ama). (Main Document 225 replaced on 7/24/2015) (ajs). Modified on 7/29/2015 (ca). (Main Document 225 replaced on 7/30/2015) (ajs). (Entered: 07/23/2015)
226 MOTION for Jennifer Deanne Bishop to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Bishop, Jennifer) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
227 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated August 11. 2015. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The

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08/12/2015 08/12/2015 08/13/2015 08/13/2015
08/17/2015
08/18/2015 08/18/2015

City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 08/11/2015)
228 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Lisa M. Richardson dated August 12, 2015 re: Defendants' request for Unsealing Order. Document filed by The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Unsealing Order)(Richardson, Lisa) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
229 LETTER RESPONSE in Support of Motion addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated August 12, 2015 re: 227 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated August 11. 2015. . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
230 MEMO ENDORSED ORDER on MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE granting 226 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. Attorney Jennifer Deanne Bishop terminated. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/11/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 08/13/2015)
231 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 8/12/2015 re: 227 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated August 11. 2015. . Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 08/13/2015)
232 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Defendants' August 12, 2015 request for Unsealing Order (Dkt. 228) addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated August 17, 2015. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
233 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Daniel Louis Passeser on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 08/18/2015)
235 ORDER: The Defendants' letter−motion to unseal records will be heard on submission on Wednesday, September 9, 2015. All papers shall be submitted in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/18/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 08/20/2015)

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08/18/2015 08/18/2015 08/19/2015
08/21/2015 08/22/2015 08/28/2015
09/03/2015

236 ORDER granting 232 Letter Motion for Extension of Time. The Defendants' letter−motion for an extension of time is granted. The Defendants' opposition papers shall be filed by Friday, September 11, 2015. Plaintiffs' reply papers shall be filed by Friday, October 2, 2015. The motion will be heard at noon on Wednesday, October 7, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/18/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to Responses due by 9/11/2015 Replies due by 10/2/2015. Motion Hearing set for 10/7/2015 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (ajs) (Entered: 08/20/2015)
234 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated August 19, 2015 re: Plaintiffs' August 17, 2015 LETTER MOTION (Dkt. 232) for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Defendants' August 12, 2015 request for Unsealing Order (Dkt. 228). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 08/19/2015)
237 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated August 21, 2015 re: Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for an Enlargement of Time to Oppose Defendants' Request for an Unsealing Order. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 08/21/2015)
238 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 232 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Opposition to Defendants' August 12, 2015 request for Unsealing Order (Dkt. 228) addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated August 17, 2015. filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/22/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 08/25/2015)
239 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet dated August 28, 2015 re: Request for Extension of Time to Comply With the August 28, 2015 Fact Discovery Deadline Set Forth in the Stipulation and Scheduling Order (Dkt. 211). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 08/28/2015)
240 MOTION for Lisa M. Richardson to Withdraw as Attorney . Document filed by The City of New York.(Richardson, Lisa) (Entered: 09/03/2015)

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09/03/2015 09/03/2015
09/10/2015 09/10/2015 09/10/2015 09/11/2015 09/23/2015 09/25/2015 10/03/2015

241 DECLARATION of Lisa M. Richardson in Support re: 240 MOTION for Lisa M. Richardson to Withdraw as Attorney .. Document filed by The City of New York. (Richardson, Lisa) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
242 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Joshua P. Fitch dated September 3, 2015 re: Letter in Opposition to Defendants' August 12, 2015 request for Unsealing Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A (REDACTED))(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 09/03/2015)
243 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Curt Peter Beck on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Beck, Curt) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
244 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 239 Letter,,,,, filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin, re: Request for Extension of Time. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/9/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
245 MEMO ENDORSED ORDER on MOTION TO WITHDRAW granting 240 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. Attorney Lisa Marie Richardson terminated. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/9/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
246 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated September 11, 2015 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For An Adverse Inference. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
247 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Daniel Passeser dated September 23, 2015 re: Defendants letter reply in support of their August 12, 2015 letter motion to unseal records. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Revised proposed unsealing order)(Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 09/23/2015)
248 ENDORSED LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Marjorie Singer dated 9/11/2015 re: We are seeking an extension of time to respond to the subpoena. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/25/2015) (kgo) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
249 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 10/2/2015 re: Pls.' Reply In Further Support of Mot. for Sanctions (Dkt. 222). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy

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10/05/2015 10/05/2015
10/06/2015 10/06/2015
10/09/2015 10/14/2015

Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Appendix II, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12, # 14 Exhibit 13, # 15 Exhibit 14, # 16 Exhibit 15, # 17 Exhibit 16, # 18 Exhibit 17, # 19 Exhibit 18, # 20 Exhibit 19, # 21 Exhibit 20, # 22 Exhibit 21, # 23 Exhibit 22, # 24 Exhibit 23, # 25 Exhibit 24, # 26 Exhibit 25)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 10/03/2015)
250 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Adverse Inferences Scheduled for October 7, 2015 addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated October 5, 2015. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
251 LETTER RESPONSE in Opposition to Motion addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated October 5, 2015 re: 250 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Adverse Inferences Scheduled for October 7, 2015 addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated October 5, 2015. . Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 10/05/2015)
252 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 250 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Adverse Inferences Scheduled for October 7, 2015 addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated October 5, 2015. filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. ENDORSEMENT: Any sur−reply to be filed on 10/9/15. Argument 10/14/15. So ordered. (Surreplies due by 10/9/2015.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 10/6/2015) (ajs) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
253 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated October 6, 2015 re: Exhibit 18 to Dkt. 249, Inadvertently Omitted From Public Filing. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 18)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
254 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated October 9, 2015 re: Defendants' Sur−reply In Further Support of Their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Spoliation Sanctions. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 10/09/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 10/14/2015 re: 222 Letter,,,,,,,,, filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David

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10/20/2015 10/20/2015
10/26/2015 10/26/2015 11/09/2015 12/11/2015

Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Sharif Stinson, Michael Bennett, John Doe #1−50, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. The Court reserved decision on the motion for sanctions. (Court Reporter Tom Murray) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
255 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Daniel Passeser dated October 20, 2015 re: Defendants' motion to unseal records. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
256 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 10/20/2015 re: Defendants' October 20, 2015 Letter Regarding the Unsealing of Absent Class Member Records (Dkt. 255). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
257 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: MOTION held on 10/14/2015 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Thomas Murray, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 11/19/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/30/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/27/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
258 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a MOTION proceeding held on 10/14/15 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 10/26/2015)
259 ORDER. The documents will remain sealed. The officer in question is not a party to this proceeding and that her privacy interests are worthy of protection. The Plaintiffs' proposed redacted version of the grievance identifies other officers involved in the events, who also have privacy interests meriting consideration. These concerns do not apply to the email from Commissioner Kelly, and its contents are already available to the public because it was read in open court and transcribed by the court reporter. The request to unseal the documents relating to the officer's transfer is therefore denied. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/4/2015) (rjm) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
260 OPINION #106076: Defendants Raymond W. Kelly, the City of New York, and 50 John Doe police officers (collectively, the "Defendants" or the "City") have filed a letter−motion to remove the statutory seal imposed by N.Y.C.P.L. §§ 160.50 and 160.55 on the records of all individuals who received criminal court summonses between May 1, 2007 and the conclusion of this litigation. The City has failed to make the strong showing required to unseal the records. Its need for the information sought is insufficient to outweigh the privacy interests at issue and the deference accorded to state−created privileges. See Daniels, 2001 WL 228091, at *1. The motion to unseal is therefore denied. It is so ordered. (As further set forth in this Order) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 12/11/2015) (kko) Modified on 12/22/2015 (ca). (Entered: 12/11/2015)

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12/30/2015 12/30/2015 12/30/2015 12/31/2015 01/05/2016
01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/25/2016
01/28/2016 01/28/2016 02/04/2016

261 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Curt P. Beck dated December 30, 2015 re: Amendments FRCP 37. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Beck, Curt) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
262 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Bryce Leigh Friedman on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Friedman, Bryce) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
263 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Nicholas Shea Davis on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Davis, Nicholas) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
264 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Suzanna Publicker Mettham dated December 31, 2015 re: Former Commissioner Kelly's Emails. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 12/31/2015)
265 OPINION #106131: The Plaintiffs' motion for an adverse inference is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above. The parties shall meet and confer regarding a schedule for completing all outstanding discovery and submitting a pretrial order; in the event that they are unable to come to an agreement, they are directed to appear for a conference at 4:00pm on Thursday, January 28 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. It is so ordered. (As further set forth in this Order) (Status Conference set for 1/28/2016 at 04:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/2/2016) (kl) Modified on 1/11/2016 (kl). Modified on 1/13/2016 (ca). (Entered: 01/05/2016)
266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
267 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members. . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
268 ORDER Setting Hearing on Motion 266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members: The Defendants' second motion to unseal, dated January 21, 2016, will be heard at noon on Thursday, February 11, 2016 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. Motion Hearing set for 2/11/2016 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/25/2016) (tn) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
269 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated January 28, 2016 re: Discovery Schedule and including a Proposed Scheduling Order. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 01/28/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Conference held on 1/28/2016. (Court Reporter Khris Sellin) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
270 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members. . Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 02/04/2016)

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02/04/2016 02/10/2016 02/11/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016
02/16/2016 02/16/2016 02/17/2016 02/19/2016
02/19/2016

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Conference held on 2/4/2016. City to run searches on William Bratton email according to the same term for other custodians. (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
271 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members. . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 2/11/2016 re: 266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. Decision reserved.The parties are directed to return on February 16, 2016 at 12:00 p.m. for a conference. (Court Reporter Karen Gorlaski) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 02/11/2016)
272 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) limiting the scope of the March 11, 2015 Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
273 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 272 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) limiting the scope of the March 11, 2015 Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition. . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
274 DECLARATION of Suzanna Publicker Mettham in Support re: 272 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) limiting the scope of the March 11, 2015 Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition.. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V)(Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Status Conference held on 2/16/2016. Plaintiff should draft an order memoralizing the term of discovery imposed and to submit the order to the defendant and the Court. If defendant have concerns or objection to the order they may file a letter to the Court. (Court Reporter Linda Fisher) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 02/16/2016)
275 ORDER: The Defendants' motion for a protective order, dated February 12, 2016, will be heard at noon on Thursday, March 17, 2016 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. (Motion Hearing set for 3/17/2016 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/15/2016) (spo) Modified on 2/25/2016 (spo). (Entered: 02/16/2016)
276 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Curt P. Beck dated Feb. 17, 2016 re: Request for the Court to so order fully executed 502(d) Stipulation. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Attachments: # 1 Fully Executed 502(d) Stipulation)(Beck, Curt) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
277 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 2/4/2016 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Andrew Walker, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/14/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/24/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
278 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 2/4/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/19/2016)

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02/19/2016 02/19/2016 02/19/2016
02/19/2016
02/23/2016 02/24/2016

279 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 1/28/2016 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Khristine Sellin, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/14/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/24/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
280 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 1/28/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
281 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated February 19, 2016 re: Draft Order Submitted in Accordance With Judge Sweet's Instructions in February 16, 2016 Minute Entry. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
282 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated February 19, 2016 re: Draft Order Submitted in Accordance With Judge Sweet's Instructions in February 16, 2016 Minute Entry. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
283 RULE 502(d) STIPULATION & ORDER regarding procedures to be followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/21/2016) (spo) (Entered: 02/23/2016)
284 OPINION #106235 re: 266 SECOND MOTION to Unseal records of summonses issued to presumptive class members, filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. The motion to unseal is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above. The Defendants shall submit a proposed Order allowing the unsealing, which shall provide for the redaction or withholding of information identifying both the citizen who received the summons and the officer who issued it. The Order shall also limit the distribution of all non−public summons information to the parties' attorneys and experts. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/23/2016) (spo) Modified on 2/24/2016 (spo). Modified on 2/24/2016 (spo). Modified on 3/1/2016 (ca). (Entered: 02/24/2016)

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02/29/2016 02/29/2016 03/01/2016
03/09/2016
03/16/2016

285 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 2/11/2016 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Karen Gorlaski, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 3/24/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/4/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/3/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
286 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 2/11/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
287 ORDER: Defendants shall complete the production of electronically stored information in this matter by July 1, 2016. Documents will be produced on a rolling basis on the following timetable: a. Plaintiffs shall designate a first round of 30(b)(6) topics that the parties have agreed−upon and a reasonable number of search terms associated with the same by February 19, 2016. Defendants shall complete the production of the document families containing these terms by April 1, 2016. b. Plaintiffs shall designate a second round of 30(b)(6) topics that the parties have agreed−upon and a reasonable number of search terms associated with the same on or before April 1, 2016. Defendants shall complete the production of the document families containing these terms by May 2, 2016. c. Plaintiffs shall designate a third round of 30(b)(6) topics that the parties have agreed−upon and a reasonable number of search terms associated with the same on or before May 2, 2016. Defendants shall complete the production of the document families containing these terms by June 1, 2016. d. Plaintiffs shall designate a final round of 30(b)(6) topics that the parties have agreed−upon and a reasonable number of search terms associated with the same on or before June 1, 2016. Defendants shall complete the production of the document families containing these terms by July 1, 2016, to a 30(b)(6) topic, the parties shall in good faith attempt to schedule the deposition for that 30(b)(6) topic as soon as practicable. The parties shall complete all fact depositions by September 15, 2016. Deposition due by 9/15/2016. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 2/26/2016) (tn) (Entered: 03/01/2016)
288 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 272 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) limiting the scope of the March 11, 2015 Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition. . Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Appendix)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
289 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor Sutton dated 3/16/2016 re: Records Sealed under 160.50 & 160.55. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on

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03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/17/2016 03/24/2016 03/24/2016 03/24/2016
03/29/2016

behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
290 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Daniel Passeser dated March 16, 2016 re: in response to Plaintiffs' letter (Docket No. 289). Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
291 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 272 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) limiting the scope of the March 11, 2015 Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition. . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Mettham, Suzanna) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 3/17/2016 re: 272 MOTION for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) limiting the scope of the March 11, 2015 Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Deposition filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. Orally resolve by the Court. Granted in part and denied in part. (Court Reporter Vincent Bologna) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
292 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: motion held on 3/17/2016 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Vincent Bologna, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 4/18/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/28/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/27/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 03/24/2016)
293 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a motion proceeding held on 3/17/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 03/24/2016)
294 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated 3/16/2016 re: Plaintiffs' proposed order regarding records sealed pursuant to NYCPL Sections 160.50 and 160.55. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/24/2016)
295 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − CROSS MOTION to Unseal . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. Return Date set for 3/31/2016 at 12:00 PM. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − defendants' proposed unsealing order)(Passeser, Daniel) Modified on 3/30/2016 (db). (Entered: 03/29/2016)

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03/30/2016 03/31/2016
03/31/2016 04/01/2016 04/04/2016 04/04/2016 04/05/2016 04/13/2016 04/13/2016 04/15/2016

***NOTICE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Notice to Attorney Daniel Louis Passeser to RE−FILE Document 295 CROSS MOTION to Unseal . Use the event type Memorandum in Support of Motion found under the event list Replies, Opposition and Supporting Documents. ***REMINDER*** − Motion to Unseal WAS NOT FILED. First file Motion, then file and link any supporting documents. (db) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
296 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated 3/30/2016 re: Plaintiffs' reply in support of proposed order regarding records sealed pursuant to NYCPL Sections 160.50 and 160.55. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 3/31/2016 re: 295 CROSS MOTION to Unseal filed by The City of New York, Raymond W. Kelly. (Court Reporter Sonia Ketter)Decision Reserved. (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
297 ORDER: The Plaintiffs' letter−motion regarding unsealing (Dkt. No. 289) and the Defendants' cross−motion (Dkt. No. 295) are each granted in part and denied in part. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/31/2016) (spo) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
298 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Rachel Amy Seligman on behalf of Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York. (Seligman, Rachel) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
299 FILING ERROR − WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU − MOTION to Amend/Correct 297 Order, . Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Seligman, Rachel) Modified on 4/5/2016 (db). (Entered: 04/04/2016)
***NOTICE TO ATTORNEY TO RE−FILE DOCUMENT − EVENT TYPE ERROR. Notice to Attorney Rachel Amy Seligman to RE−FILE Document 299 MOTION to Amend/Correct 297 Order, . Use the event type Letter found under the event list Other Documents. (db) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
300 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: CONFERENCE held on 3/31/2016 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Sonya Ketter Huggins, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 5/9/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/19/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/15/2016.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
301 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a CONFERENCE proceeding held on 3/31/16 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
302 UNSEALING ORDER: WHEREAS the law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP has also appeared in this action as counsel for defendants The City of New York and

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04/15/2016 05/12/2016
05/16/2016 05/18/2016 05/18/2016 05/23/2016 05/26/2016

Raymond Kelly, and no objection having been filed, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP shall have access to the same information on the same terms as the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York and Class Counsel were permitted by the Unsealing Order. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/12/2016) (cf) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
Transmission to Sealed Records Clerk. Transmitted re: 302 Unsealing Order to the Sealed Records Clerk for the sealing or unsealing of document or case. (cf) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
303 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated May 12, 2016 re: Plaintiffs' May 12, 2016 Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendants. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
304 ORDER: The Defendants' motion to compel discovery dated May 12, 2016 shall be heard at noon on Thursday, May 26, 2016 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. All papers shall be served in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. (Motion Hearing set for 5/26/2016 at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 18C, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/16/2016) (spo) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
305 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 303 Letter,,,,,, Regarding Discovery addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated May 18, 2016. Document filed by The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
306 ORDER granting 305 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 303 Letter Regarding Discovery addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated May 18, 2016. Document filed by The City of New York. So ordered. (Responses due by 5/23/2016. Replies due by 5/26/2016). (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/18/2016) (rjm) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
307 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated May 23, 2016 re: Opposition to Plaintiffs' Letter dated May 12, 2016 Seeking Certain Discovery. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
308 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated May 26, 2016 re: Plaintiffs' May 26, 2016 Reply in Further Support of Mot. to Compel Discovery from Defendants (Dkt. 303). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly

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05/26/2016 06/02/2016
06/03/2016
06/07/2016 06/07/2016

Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 21, # 2 Exhibit 22)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 05/26/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Oral Argument held on 5/26/2016 re: 303 Letter filed by Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Mica Ancrum, Jamel Towe, Mariam Farnum, Brian Morris, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Sean Pettigrew, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Chanel Meausa, Christian Dudley, Joseph Sarpong, Ryburn Walkes, Julius Dixon, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Riddick, Lindsey Riddick, Charlene Finley, Leander Griffin. Parties will submit summary order.(Court Reporter Khris Sellin) (Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
309 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated June 2, 2016 re: Stipulation and Proposed Scheduling Order. Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
310 STIPULATION AND SCHEDULING ORDER. 1. At a hearing held on May 26, 2016, this Court ordered Defendants to produce certain documents to Plaintiffs. Defendants shall produce these documents on a rolling basis and make a good faith effort to complete the production of these documents by July 1, 2016, and shall complete the production by no later than July 15, 2016. 2. The parties shall complete all tact discovery by September 15, 2016. 3. The parties shall complete the service of all Requests tor Admission by October 27, 2016. 4. All expert discovery shall be completed by December 8, 2016, with the following interim deadlines: the parties shall exchange opening expert reports on October 10, 2016; the parties shall exchange opening expert reports on November 10, 2016; and the parties shall complete expert depositions by December 8, 2016 (the parties may depose all experts). 5. The parties shall submit to the Court trial briefs, a joint proposed pretrial order, and, if applicable, motions in limine and proposed jury charges, voir dire requests and special verdict form by February 1, 2017. A final pretrial conference will be held at 4:30 pm on that date and the Action shall be added to the trial calendar published in the New York Law Journal. 6. The first day of trial shall be March 1, 2017. So ordered. (Deposition due by 12/8/2016. Expert Discovery due by 12/8/2016. Fact Discovery due by 9/15/2016. Motions in limine due by 2/1/2017. Proposed Pretrial Order due by 2/1/2017.), (Final Pretrial Conference set for 2/1/2017 at 04:30 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/3/2016) (rjm) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
311 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Argument held on 5/26/2016 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Khristine Sellin, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/1/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/11/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/8/2016.(Grant, Patricia) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
312 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Argument proceeding held on 05/26/2016 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely

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07/01/2016 07/07/2016
07/12/2016 07/22/2016 08/01/2016 08/02/2016 01/23/2017
01/24/2017

electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Grant, Patricia) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
313 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rachel Seligman Weiss dated July 1, 2016. Document filed by The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
314 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Elinor C. Sutton dated July 7, 2016 re: Response to Defendants' July 1, 2016 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery (Dkt. 313). Document filed by Mica Ancrum(on behalf of themselves ), Mica Ancrum(similarly situated), Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Julius Dixon, Christian Dudley(on behalf of themselves ), Christian Dudley(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(Other Similarly Situated), Mariam Farnum(on behalf of themselves ), Jocelyn Ferdinand(on behalf of themselves), Jocelyn Ferdinand(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(Other Similarly Situated), Charlene Finley(on behalf of themselves), Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Brian Morris, Sean Pettigrew, Lindsey Riddick, Michael Riddick, Joseph Sarpong(on behalf of themselves ), Joseph Sarpong(similarly situated), Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Jamel Towe(on behalf of themselves), Jamel Towe(Other Similarly Situated), Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Sutton, Elinor) (Entered: 07/07/2016)
315 LETTER REPLY to Response to Motion addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rachel Seligman Weiss dated July 12, 2016 re: 313 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rachel Seligman Weiss dated July 1, 2016. . Document filed by The City of New York. (Seligman, Rachel) (Entered: 07/12/2016)
316 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 315 Reply to Response to Motion, filed by The City of New York. ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 7/20/2016) (cf) (Entered: 07/22/2016)
317 LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to comply with discovery deadline regarding shared drives addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rachel Seligman Weiss dated August 1, 2016. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Passeser, Daniel) (Entered: 08/01/2016)
318 ORDER granting 317 Letter Motion for Extension of Time. So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 8/2/2016) (kl) (Entered: 08/02/2016)
319 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Executed Stipulation of Settlement and Proposed Preliminary Approval Order of Class Action Settlement with Accompanying Exhibits Submitted On Behalf of All Parties. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Stipulation of Settlement, # 2 Exhibit B − Proposed Preliminary Approval Order, # 3 Exhibit C − Proposed Long Form Notice, # 4 Exhibit D − Proposed Short Form Notice, # 5 Exhibit E − Proposed Claim Form, # 6 Exhibit F − Affirmation of the Honorable John S. Martin (Ret.), # 7 Exhibit G − Declaration of Tiffaney Janowicz, Esq. with Rust Consulting)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
320 ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, APPROVING PROPOSED NOTICE PLAN, AND APPOINTING SETTLEMENT CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR: The Court concludes that the proposed Settlement Agreement is within the range of possible settlement approval, such that notice to the Class is appropriate. (As further set forth in this Order.) The Court will hold a final Fairness Hearing on May 24, 2017 at noon at the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York, Courtroom. ( Fairness Hearing set for 5/24/2017 at 12:00 PM before Judge Robert W. Sweet.) (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/24/2017) (cf) (Entered:

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01/26/2017 01/30/2017 03/07/2017 04/14/2017 04/14/2017
04/14/2017
04/14/2017
04/14/2017

01/25/2017)
321 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Qiana Smith−Williams dated January 26, 2017 re: Request to Amend the Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Settlement. Document filed by The City of New York.(Smith, Qiana) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
322 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 321 Letter re: Request to Amend the Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Settlement filed by The City of New York ENDORSEMENT: So ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 1/26/2017) (cla) (Entered: 01/30/2017)
323 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rolly A. Lessin dated 3/2/2017 re: Kindly send forms necessary to initiate claims process in reference to the above captioned suit. (jwh) (Entered: 03/07/2017)
324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses . Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
325 DECLARATION of Stephen R. Neuwirth on Behalf of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP in Support re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses .. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
326 DECLARATION of Jon L. Norinsberg on behalf of the Law Offices of Jon L. Norinsberg in Support re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses .. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
327 DECLARATION of Gerald M. Cohen on Behalf of Cohen & Fitch LLP in Support re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses .. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
328 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses . . Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).

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04/18/2017 04/24/2017 04/24/2017 04/24/2017 04/24/2017 05/19/2017 05/19/2017
05/19/2017
05/23/2017

(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
329 ORDER: The Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of class settlement, service payments to class representatives, and attorneys' fees and expenses, dated April 14, 2017, will be heard at 11:00 AM on Wednesday, May 24, 2017 in Courtroom 18C, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street. All papers shall beserved in accordance with Local Civil Rule 6.1. It is so ordered. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 4/17/2017) (ama) (Entered: 04/18/2017)
330 Objection to the release aspect of the proposed settlement. Document filed by Jeffrey A Rothman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Rothman, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
331 Objection re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses . . Document filed by George Packard, Edward Beck, Michelle Berger, Ari Cowan, CONNOR HICKS, Charles Meacham, Chris Phillips, Larry Swetman, AMADON DELLERBA. (Smith, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
332 DECLARATION of Jeffrey G. Smith in Support re: 331 Objection (non−motion),. Document filed by Edward Beck, Michelle Berger, Ari Cowan, AMADON DELLERBA, CONNOR HICKS, Charles Meacham, George Packard, Chris Phillips, Larry Swetman. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Smith, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
333 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Packard Plaintiffs' Objection to the Proposed Settlement and Release of Claims; Declaration of Jeffrey G. Smith ISO Packard Plaintiffs' Objection served on Cohen & Fitch LLP; Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP; Offices of Jon L. Norinsberg PLLC; Office of the Corporation Counsel on 4/24/2017. Document filed by Edward Beck, Michelle Berger, Ari Cowan, AMADON DELLERBA, CONNOR HICKS, Charles Meacham, George Packard, Chris Phillips, Larry Swetman. (Smith, Jeffrey) (Entered: 04/24/2017)
334 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rachel Seligman Weiss dated 5/19/2017 re: seeking deferral of final approval of class settlement. Document filed by The City of New York.(Seligman, Rachel) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
335 RESPONSE in Support of Motion re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses . PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTIONS FILED IN OPPOSITION TO FINAL APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED CLASS SETTLEMENT. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
336 DECLARATION of Joshua P. Fitch in Opposition re: 335 Response in Support of Motion,,,. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Packard Email)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 05/19/2017)
337 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Plaintiffs' Class Counsel dated May 23, 2017 re: In response and opposition to defendants' letter seeking deferral of final approval of class settlement. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated).(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 05/23/2017)

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05/24/2017 06/12/2017 06/12/2017 06/13/2017
06/14/2017 06/14/2017 06/19/2017

Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Robert W. Sweet: Fairness Hearing held on 5/24/2017. (Court Reporter Kelly Surina) Decision Reserved.(Chan, Tsz) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
338 OPINION re: 324 MOTION to Approve Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement, Service Payments to Class Representatives and Attorneys Fees and Expenses . filed by Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw, Ricardo Jones, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes, Jeremy Thames, Victor Breland, Michael Bennett, Sharif Stinson, Leander Griffin: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the Settlement, award of service payments to the Class Representatives, and attorneys' fees and expenses is granted. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/7/2017) (jwh) Modified on 6/12/2017 (jwh). (Entered: 06/12/2017)
339 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Rachel Seligman Weiss dated June 12, 2017 re: Seeking clarification of the Final Approval Order. Document filed by Raymond W. Kelly, Raymond W. Kelly, The City of New York.(Seligman, Rachel) (Entered: 06/12/2017)
340 LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Class Counsel for the Plaintiff Class dated June 13, 2017 re: requesting that Your Honor enter the attached Proposed Final Order and Judgment of Approval of Class Action Settlement and deny defendants letter seeking clarification of the Final Approval Opinion. Document filed by Michael Bennett(on behalf of themselves ), Michael Bennett(Other Similarly Situated), Victor Breland, Leander Griffin, Ricardo Jones, Chanel Meausa, Gary Shaw(Other Similarly Situated), Gary Shaw(on behalf of themselves), Sharif Stinson(Other Similarly Situated), Sharif Stinson(on behalf of themselves), Jeremy Thames, David Thompson, Ryburn Walkes(on behalf of themselves), Ryburn Walkes(Other Similarly Situated). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit PROPOSED FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT)(Fitch, Joshua) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
341 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: conference held on 5/24/2017 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kelly Surina, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/5/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/17/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/12/2017.(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
342 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a conference proceeding held on 5/24/17 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(McGuirk, Kelly) (Entered: 06/14/2017)
343 FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT: in favor of Brian Morris, Chanel Meausa, Charlene Finley, Christian Dudley, David Thompson, Gary Shaw, Jamel Towe, Jeremy Thames, Jocelyn Ferdinand, Joseph Sarpong, Leander Griffin, Mariam Farnum, Mica Ancrum, Michael Bennett, Michael Riddick, Ricardo Jones, Ryburn Walkes, Sean Pettigrew, Sharif Stinson, Victor Breland against The City of New York, Mica Ancrum, Raymond W. Kelly. On April 23, 2012 the Court found that the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 had been met, and certified the following Class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), which was incorporated into the Settlement Agreement: the Class Representatives and all other individuals who were issued C Summonses by the NYPD that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial or legal insufficiency by the court prior to trial, and whose C Summonses were issued without probable cause during the Class Period. Final Approval of the Agreement. The Court finds that the proposed Agreement is APPROVED as fair, reasonable and adequate, pursuant to Rule 23(e)(l)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further finds that each and every term, provision, condition and agreement of the Settlement Agreement, including all exhibits thereto, apply and are adopted, incorporated, and made part of this Judgment, as if copied herein in extensor, and shall be effective, implemented and enforced as provided in the Settlement

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Agreement. Monetary Relief. Defendant the City of New York is required to deposit the full Settlement Benefits in the total amount of $75,000,000.00 into an interest bearing account managed by the settlement administrator as fully set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Compensatory Damages. The Court approves awards of compensatory damages for each eligible class members in amounts up to $150.00 per eligible summons, subject to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Any undistributed compensatory damages not used to pay administrative costs and expenses will revert back to the City. Service Awards. The Court approves service awards of $15,000.00 to each of the 10 Named Plaintiffs as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, which the Court approves for the reasons stated in the opinion approving the Settlement. Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses. The Court awards to Settlement Class Counsel Attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $18,500,000.00, which the Court has found to be fair, adequate and reasonable. The amounts shall be paid out of the Settlement Benefits by the Claims Administrator in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. Entry of Judgment. There being no just reason to delay entry of this Judgment, the Clerk of the Court is ordered to enter this Judgment forthwith, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/19/2017) (ap) Modified on 6/21/2017 (ap). Modified on 6/23/2017 (ap). Modified on 7/5/2017 (ap). (Entered: 06/19/2017)
344 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings re: Conference held on 5/24/2017 before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kelly Surina, (212) 805−0300. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 8/1/2017. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/11/2017. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/10/2017.(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 07/11/2017)
345 NOTICE OF FILING OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT Notice is hereby given that an official transcript of a Conference proceeding held on 5/24/17 has been filed by the court reporter/transcriber in the above−captioned matter. The parties have seven (7) calendar days to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript may be made remotely electronically available to the public without redaction after 90 calendar days...(Siwik, Christine) (Entered: 07/11/2017)