Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 1 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

*

KATE CALVIN, JOHN NELSON,

*

CHARLES J. PARRISH, LONNIE GRIFFIN

*

and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

*

*

Plaintiffs,

*

*

vs.

*

*

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF

*

COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY *

SCHOOL BOARD, and MARTY BISHOP,

*

SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, in his official *

capacity,

*

*

Defendants.

*

*

Case No.:

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF NATURE OF THE CASE
1. Plaintiffs challenge the redistricting plan the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners and the Jefferson County School Board adopted in 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the “2013 Redistricting Plan” or “the Plan”), as a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal representation under the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs assert that the 2013 Redistricting Plan is a form a prison-based gerrymandering. Defendants’ decision to include the inmate population at Jefferson Correctional Institution (“JCI”) unlawfully inflates the political strength of actual residents in the district that houses the prison (District 3) and dilutes the voting strength of those living in all of the other districts in the county (Districts 1, 2, 4 and 5).

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2. “Prison-based gerrymandering” is a practice whereby local governments like Jefferson County include inmates as residents of the district where the prison is located when drawing election lines. The Jefferson County Board of Commissioners (“Board of Commissioners”) and the Jefferson County School Board (“School Board”), adopted the same redistricting plan in 2013 for their respective five single-member districts. The Plan treats the approximately 1,157 inmates at JCI as if they were "residents" of District 3 even though the overwhelming majority of these individuals remain residents of their pre-incarceration community for virtually all legal purposes, including voting.
3. The incarcerated population at JCI constitutes a full 37.73% of the people who make up District 3, and 43.2% of the voting age population in the district. As a result, every four actual residents of District 3 have as much political influence in county and school affairs as seven residents in any other district. Consequently, the voting strength of persons residing in District 3 is artificially inflated and the voting strength of persons residing in all of the other districts is weakened, in violation of the “one person, one vote” principle established by the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. The 2013 Redistricting Plan has a discriminatory effect on Jefferson County residents outside of District 3. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the use of the Plan for any and all future elections, and to replace it with a plan that protects their right to equal protection under the law pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4), and 28 U.S.C .§§ 2201 and 2202. This suit is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
THE PARTIES 7. Plaintiff KATE CALVIN is a resident of Monticello, Florida located in Jefferson County, and she lives in District 2. Ms. Calvin is over the age of 18 and is a registered voter in Jefferson County. She regularly votes in Jefferson County and city elections. 8. Plaintiff JOHN NELSON is a resident of Monticello, Florida located in Jefferson County, and he lives in District 2. Mr. Nelson is over the age of 18 and is a registered voter in Jefferson County. He regularly votes in Jefferson County and city elections. From 2010-2014, Mr. Nelson served as a member of the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners for District 2. 9. Plaintiff CHARLES J. PARRISH is a resident of Monticello, Florida located in Jefferson County, and he lives in District 4. He is over the age of 18 and is a registered voter in Jefferson County. He regularly votes in Jefferson County and city elections. 10. Plaintiff LONNIE GRIFFIN is a resident of Monticello, Florida located in Jefferson County, and lives in District 1. He is over the age of 18 and is a registered voter in Jefferson County. He regularly votes in Jefferson County and city elections.
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11. Plaintiff CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE (CUP) is a not-for-profit organization based in Jefferson County, Florida. It has a membership of over 125 people who are all residents of Jefferson County, and they have members located in each of the five districts represented on the County Commission and on the School Board. CUP’s mission is to serve the needs of Jefferson County residents, particularly the AfricanAmerican community. CUP achieves its goal by monitoring the activities of local government agencies through attendance at and participation in county commission, school board, and city council meetings. The organization also educates the public on issues such as voting rights, teen pregnancy, economic development, and criminal justice reform. CUP conducts voter education programs, including voter registration drives and Get Out the Vote activities.
12. Defendant JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS governs Jefferson County. Fla. Stat. §§ 125.01, 124.01. Jefferson County is a geographical and political subdivision of the State of Florida located within the Northern District of Florida. The Board of Commissioners has the authority to fix district boundaries “so as to keep them as nearly equal in proportion to population as possible.” Fla. Stat. § 124.01(3). The Board of Commissioners is charged with ensuring Jefferson County’s compliance with applicable state and federal laws.
13. Defendant JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD is the agency head for the Jefferson County School System and is responsible for the governance and administration of the Jefferson County School System. The School Board has the authority to fix election district boundaries and is charged with ensuring the School Board’s compliance with applicable state and federal laws. Fla. Stat. § 1001.32.
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14. Defendant MARTY BISHOP is the Supervisor of Elections for Jefferson County. He has statutory powers, duties and responsibilities concerning the conduct of elections held in Jefferson County. He oversees and is responsible for the administration of elections in the county, including elections for both the County Commission and School Board. Fla. Stat. § 98.015. He is sued in his official capacity.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 15. The Jefferson County Board of Commissioners has five members who serve four-year, staggered terms, with an election occurring every two years. The members represent single-member districts and are elected by voters from the individual district in which the commission candidate lives. 16. The Jefferson County School Board has five members, each of whom represent single-member districts and are elected by voters from the individual district in which the School Board candidate lives. School Board members are elected to serve four-year, staggered terms during the general election held in November of even numbered years. 17. Jefferson Correctional Institution (JCI) is located in Jefferson County, in District 3. According to the 2010 Census data, the total inmate population of JCI was 1,157. 18. Upon information and belief, the majority of the persons incarcerated at JCI are not residents of Jefferson County, much less District 3. Instead, for purposes of voting, they remain residents of the county where they lived and were registered to vote prior to their incarceration. Fla. Stat. § 101.045(1).
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19. Upon information and belief, all of the inmates or a significant majority of the inmates at JCI are ineligible to vote in county elections because they are incarcerated for a felony conviction. Fla. Const. art. VI, § 4(a); Fla. Stat. § 97.041(2)(b).
20. Upon information and belief, the children of persons incarcerated at JCI are not allowed to attend public schools in Jefferson County by claiming residence of the parent at JCI.
21. Upon information and belief, incarcerated persons at JCI cannot voluntarily visit or patronize public or private establishments in Jefferson County such as restaurants, hotels, grocery stores, gas stations, schools, movie theaters, museums, musical performances, shops, parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, theatres, churches, businesses, recreational centers, or public transportation.
22. Upon information and belief, persons incarcerated at JCI do not have a choice as to where they will serve their prison sentences.
23. Felony sentences in Florida can range from one year to life imprisonment, or even death. Fla. Stat. § 775.08(1). Jefferson County Demographics
24. According to the 2010 Census data, the total population of Jefferson County including the prison was 14,761. The total population deviation of the Plan is approximately 8.67%. Under the Plan, the Black voting age population is 47.62%, and the Hispanic voting age population is 7.35%.
25. According to the 2010 Census data, the total population of Jefferson County excluding the prison was 13,604.
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26. The total population deviation when the prison is excluded is 42.63%, far outside the constitutional limits on population deviation under the one person, one vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
27. When the prison is excluded from the total population count, the Black voting age population decreases to 32.73%, and the Hispanic voting age population decreases to 2.80%. Jefferson County Redistricting
28. Upon information and belief, following the 2010 Census, the County Commission hired a consultant who prepared two proposed redistricting plans – Plan A and Plan B. Both proposed plans included the prison inmates at JCI in the total population count.
29. In or around November 2013, the School Board held a public hearing during which it considered Plan A and Plan B for its own redistricting purposes. The School Board hired an independent consultant to review Plan A and Plan B and to draft alternative plans.
30. Some of the alternative plans the independent consultant for the School Board prepared showed that it was possible to satisfy traditional redistricting principles, including the one person, one vote standard, without including the inmates at JCI in the total population count.
31. On or about December 3, 2013, the County Commission held a public hearing regarding the adoption of a new redistricting plan.
32. Plaintiff Kate Calvin attended the December 3, 2013 public hearing and testified in opposition to Plan A and Plan B. As part of her testimony, she presented
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slides which pointed out the severe population discrepancies that including the incarcerated population at JCI in District 3 would cause. Plaintiff Calvin also argued that Plan A unfairly diluted minority voting strength and created an unfair voting advantage for white voters.
33. Plaintiff John Nelson served on the County Commission, representing District 2, during the December 3, 2013 public hearing. He opposed both Plan A and Plan B and argued the plans unnecessarily diluted minority voting strength. He also urged his fellow commissioners to vote against both plans.
34. On or about December 3, 2013, following the public hearing on redistricting, the County Commission voted 3-2 to approve Plan A (the “2013 Redistricting Plan”), even though the plan relies on the inmates at JCI to make up 37.73% of the total population in District 3, and 43.2% of the voting age population in the district.
35. Plaintiff Nelson voted against Plan A. 36. In or around December 2013, the School Board adopted Plan A as its redistricting plan. 37. As a result of the 2013 Redistricting Plan, the voting strength of individual residents living in District 3 is inflated and the voting strength of Plaintiffs and the residents living in Districts 1, 2, 4, and 5 is diluted. 38. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' actions complained of herein, and that harm will continue unless Defendants' current practice of counting prison populations for the purpose of apportionment is declared unlawful and enjoined.
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39. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law other than this action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of Equal Protection) 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 42. The "one person, one vote" principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that each person's vote shall be equal to that of his or her fellow citizens. 43. The reliance on the incarcerated population at JCI to help make up District 3 in Jefferson County for purposes of drawing district lines inflates the voting strength and political influence of the residents in District 3 and dilutes the voting strength and political influence of Plaintiffs and other persons residing outside of District 3, in violation of the Equal Protection requirement of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to: (1) Exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim brought under the United States Constitution; (2) Declare that the 2013 Redistricting Plan adopted by the Jefferson County Commission and Jefferson County School Board violates Plaintiffs' right to equal
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protection under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
(3) Enjoin Defendants and their agents, employees, and representatives from conducting elections for the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners and the Jefferson County School Board under the 2013 Redistricting Plan;
(4) In the event Defendants fail or are unable to implement a redistricting plan that comports with the Constitution of the United States, enforce a court ordered redistricting plan;
(5) Award Plaintiffs the expenses, costs, fees, and other disbursements associated with the filing and maintenance of this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and reasonable expert fees pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e);
(6) Exercise continuing jurisdiction over this action during the enforcement of its judgment; and
(7) Award any other and further relief this Court deems proper and just. DATED this 9th day of March, 2015.
Respectfully submitted, s/Nancy G. Abudu Nancy Abudu (Fla. Bar No. 111881) nabudu@aclufl.org Shalini Goel Agarwal (Fla. Bar No. 90843) sagarwal@aclufl.org ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc. 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 340 Miami, FL 33137 Tel: 786-363-2700 Fax: 786-363-1448
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Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 1 Filed 03/09/15 Page 11 of 11 Randall C. Berg, Jr. (Fla. Bar No. 318371) rberg@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org Dante P. Trevisani (Fla. Bar No. 72912) dtrevisani@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 100 SE Second St., Ste. 3750 Miami, FL 33131-2115 Tel: 305.358.2081 Fax: 305.358.0910
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 Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 49 Filed 03/19/16 Page 1 of 86

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KATE CALVIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH, LONNIE GRIFFIN, AND CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CASE NO. 4:15CV131-MW/CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, AND MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

Defendants. ___________________________/

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a fictional Florida county—I’ll call it Marshall

County—with a total census population of 12,000. Marshall

County is run by a board of commissioners comprised of five peo-

ple, each of whom is elected from a single-member district with a

total census population of exactly 2,400. The Marshall County

School Board, which also has five members, uses the same district

lines.
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Marshall County is home to one of the state’s largest state prisons—I’ll call it Marshall Correctional Institution, or MCI— with an inmate population as of the last census of 2,200. The vast majority of inmates at MCI are not from Marshall County. MCI is run according to rules promulgated by the Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and laws passed by the Florida Legislature; the Board of County Commissioners and the School Board have no legal authority to directly regulate the conduct of inmates while they’re inside the walls of MCI. Everything—from who is allowed to visit MCI, to where the inmates may smoke—is determined by legislators and administrators operating at the state level and officials at the prison who are employed by the state.
MCI is located entirely within District 3 of the County Commission/School Board districts. Thus, only 200 of the 2,400 people who are “residents” of District 3 are not incarcerated—just 8.5%. When elections are held every four years for the County Commission and School Board, only these 200 people (more precisely, the subset of these 200 people who are eligible to vote and who choose to vote) elect the County Commissioner for District 3 and the School Board member for District 3. In each of the other districts, none of which contains a prison, 2,400 people (more precisely, the
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subset of these 2,400 people who are eligible to vote and who choose to vote) elect a County Commissioner and a School Board member.
Does Marshall County’s districting scheme comport with the “one person, one vote” principle articulated by the Supreme Court? The short answer is “no.” The scheme obviously weighs the votes of District 3 voters more heavily than those of voters in other districts. Less obviously, but just as importantly, the scheme gives the non-incarcerated population of District 3 (whether they vote or not) an increased ability to access and influence their representatives and increased opportunities to reap the benefits of that influence. “One person, one vote” is a theory of representative democracy that is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, but Marshall County’s scheme doesn’t pass muster under any of them.
The real county at issue in this case, Jefferson County, differs from Marshall County only in degree. Its districting scheme is perhaps “less unconstitutional” than Marshall County’s, but it still violates the Equal Protection Clause.
A. Jefferson County Jefferson County is a county in North Florida situated just east of Tallahassee. The total population of the county, according to 2010 census data, is 14,761. ECF No. 24, at 4 ¶ 8. The county is
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governed by the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners (“Board of Commissioners”), whose five members are each elected from a single-member district. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 2, 5. The county’s school system is run by the Jefferson County School Board (“School Board”), which is also comprised of five members elected from five single-member “residence areas.” Id. at 3 ¶ 4–5. Unlike the members of the Board of Commissioners, each of the members of the School Board “serve[s] as the representative of the entire [county], rather than as the representative of” the residence area or district from which he was elected.1 § 1001.363, Fla. Stat. (2015).
Jefferson County is home to the Jefferson Correctional Institution (“JCI”), a state prison. The 2010 Census counted JCI as containing 1,157 inmates. ECF No. 30-8, at 10. As of May 18, 2015, only nine inmates at JCI were convicted in Jefferson County. ECF No. 30-1, at 52. The rest were convicted elsewhere in Florida and sent to JCI; a prisoner in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”) has no say in where he will serve his sentence. § 944.17(2), Fla. Stat. (2015); ECF No. 30-8, at 3.
1 The Jefferson County School Board is the governing body of the Jefferson County School District. This means, unfortunately, that the term “district” has two different legal meanings vis-à-vis the School Board and the Board of Commissioners. To avoid confusion, I will use “district” throughout to refer to one of the five geographic areas that together cover all of the county.
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B. Redistricting Under Florida law, the Board of Commissioners is required to redistrict following each United States Census. Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(e). The Board of Commissioners is supposed to divide the county “into districts of contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable.” Id. The School Board does not have to redistrict following the census, but has the statutory authority to redistrict if it deems it necessary to do so. § 1001.36, Fla. Stat. (2015). Following the 2010 census, the Board of Commissioners consulted with a redistricting expert and concluded that it needed to redistrict in order to meet its obligations under the Florida Constitution. ECF No 25, at 4 ¶¶ 5–7. In 2013, the Board retained a number of attorneys and mapping/districting experts to help draw up proposals for a new districting scheme. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 7–8. The School Board quite sensibly decided to re-draw its district lines to conform to those of the Board of Commissioners. ECF No. 48-9, at 35–36. The two bodies—“the Boards,” collectively— met together on a number of occasions in mid-to-late 2013 to discuss the proposed redistricting plans. See ECF No. 30-1, at 32; ECF No. 30-4, at 3. At one point, the School Board retained a mapping/districting expert to design maps “to take to the table in talks
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with the . . . Board of Commissioners.” ECF No. 30-4, at 2. That expert prepared two maps for the School Board, ECF No. 30-1, at 29, one of which it presented to the Board of Commissioners at a November 4, 2013 joint workshop, ECF No. 30-4, at 3–4.
Throughout this process, the Boards received advice about how to deal with the large prison population in the county. The Board of Commissioners “was counseled that the [JCI] prison population must be included within the reapportionment base, and the population must be included within the district in which the prison was located.” ECF No. 25, at 4 ¶ 8. The School Board was also advised that the prison population at JCI had to be included when determining whether districts contained roughly equal numbers of people. ECF No. 30-1, at 29.
This advice appears to have been based on opinions issued by the Attorney General of Florida to the Gulf County Board of County Commissioners and Gulf County School Board in 2001. ECF No. 24, at 4. Those opinions advised that, as a matter of state law, the Gulf County Boards were “required to include the prison population of the county” when determining whether districts contained substantially equal population numbers. 2001-55 Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. (2001) (Gulf County Board of County Commissioners);
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2001-56 Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. (2001) (Gulf County School Board).2
The Attorney General arrived at his conclusions largely on the ba-
sis of the statutory definition of the term “population” (the defini-
tion is the same now as it was in 2001):
Reference to the population or number of inhabitants of any county, city, town, village, or other political subdivision of the state shall be taken to be that as shown by the last preceding official decennial federal census, . . . which shall also be the state census and shall control in all population acts and constitutional apportionments, unless otherwise ordered by the Legislature. § 1.01(7), Fla. Stat. (2015).
The United States Census Bureau, which is the federal en-
tity tasked with conducting the decennial census, counts prisoners
as living in the census block(s) containing the correctional facilities
in which they are incarcerated. How We Count America, U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, www.census.gov/2010census/about/how-we-count.php
(last visited Mar. 16, 2016). The Census Bureau seems to recognize
that this choice could potentially present problems, and that some
state and local governments might want to adjust census data to
2 Gulf County did not follow the Attorney General’s advice—it excluded its large prison population when redistricting following the 2000 Census. ECF No. 30-5, at 7. In fact, at least seven Florida counties adjust census data to exclude prison populations when determining whether there is substantial equality of population across districts. Id.
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remove or relocate (to their pre-prison residences) prison popula-

tions. Robert Groves, So, How Do You Handle Prisons?, Director’s

Blog, U.S. Census Bureau (Mar. 1, 2010), http://directorsblog.blogs

.census.gov/2010/03/01/so-how-do-you-handle-prisons/. To facili-

tate this, the Census Bureau “releas[ed] early counts of prisoners”

following the 2010 Census. Id.

The Boards did not use this data. Consistent with the advice

received from lawyers and mapping experts, the Boards approved

a districting plan that roughly equalized census population—in-

cluding the JCI population—among the five districts. ECF No. 25,

at 5 ¶ 10; ECF No. 24, at 5. The table below summarizes the pop-

ulation distribution among districts both including and excluding

the prison population. The “ideal” district size in each case is

simply one-fifth of the total population, meaning one-fifth of the

census population or one-fifth of the nonprisoner population.

District
1 2 3 4 5

Census Population
2979 2822 3070 3073 2817

Deviation from Ideal
0.91% -4.40% 4.00% 4.10% -4.57%

Population w/o Prison
2979 2822 1913 3073 2817

Deviation from Ideal
9.48% 3.71% -29.69% 12.94% 3.53%

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See ECF No. 30-1, at 13–14. JCI’s inmates were all counted as part of District 3.
This data can be used to compute a measure of population equality for the districting scheme called the “total deviation” or “overall deviation.” Id. at 13 n.7; see also Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1215 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996). This measure is computed by summing together the absolute values of the percent deviations for the smallest and largest districts.3 ECF No. 30-1, at 13 n.7. The larger the total deviation, the less equality of population exists across districts. If it is proper to include prisoners in the total population count, then the districts as drawn by the Boards have a total deviation of 8.67%. If, on the other hand, the prisoners should not be counted when assessing substantial equality of population across districts, then the total deviation is 42.63%.
C. The Present Litigation, Including Threshold Matters 1. Nature of this Suit
Plaintiffs brought suit in March 2015, a little over a year after the Boards approved the new districting scheme. ECF No. 1.

3

In

math

terms:



𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡

%

=

100

, |max(−)| + | min(−)|


where nideal is the size of an ideal district and i is taken over the set of N dis-

tricts i=1, 2, . . . N.

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The gist of Plaintiffs’ claim is that the districting scheme dilutes their voting power and “political influence,” thereby denying them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 1, at 9 ¶ 43. Although the districts contain roughly equal numbers of “census persons,” Plaintiffs claim that the inclusion of all of the JCI inmates in the population base in one district effectively weighs the votes of the (nonprisoner) voters of that district more heavily than Plaintiffs’ votes, and also gives the nonprisoners living in that district greater political influence. Id. This, according to Plaintiffs, violates the “one person, one vote” principle and thus the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 9 ¶¶ 42–43. Plaintiffs do not argue that, as a legal matter, the Equal Protection Clause forbids state and local governments from counting prisoners when redistricting; rather, Plaintiffs argue that the effect of the Boards’ decision to count prisoners under the circumstances of this case has resulted in an Equal Protection violation. ECF No. 30, at 12.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 1, at 9–10. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek (1) a declaration that the current districting scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause; (2) an injunction preventing Defendants from conducting elections for
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the Boards under the current scheme; (3) if Defendants cannot develop a scheme that passes constitutional muster, an injunction compelling Defendants to use a districting scheme fashioned by this Court. Id.
Each party has moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 24 & 30. After a hearing, I determined that the record needed more information about whether the inmates possess a “representational nexus” with the Boards. ECF No. 43. The parties supplemented the record, and it is now possible for me to rule on the motions for summary judgment.
2. Parties and Standing Plaintiff Kate Calvin is a registered voter living in District 2 in Jefferson County. ECF No. 21, at 3 ¶ 7. She participated as a citizen in the redistricting efforts, attending at least one meeting of the Board of Commissioners and engaging an expert to help determine the feasibility of removing JCI inmates from the population base. Id. at 5 ¶ 32; ECF No. 30-1, at 28. Plaintiff John Nelson is the former County Commissioner for District 2, and still resides there. ECF No. 21, at 3 ¶ 8. When he was on the Board of Commissioners, he voted against the redistricting plan that was eventually adopted. Id. at 5 ¶ 33. Plaintiff Charles J. Parrish is a resident of
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District 4 and is registered to vote in Jefferson County. Id. at 3 ¶ 9. Plaintiff Lonnie Griffin is a resident of District 1 and is registered to vote in Jefferson County. Id. at 3 ¶ 10. Plaintiff Concerned United People is, by its description, “a not-for-profit organization based in Jefferson County . . . [whose] mission is to serve the needs of Jefferson County residents, particularly the African-American community.” ECF No. 1, at 4 ¶ 11.
The Boards have already been introduced, and more will be said later about their responsibilities and powers under Florida law. The remaining defendant is Marty Bishop, the Supervisor of Elections for Jefferson County. ECF No. 21, at 5 ¶ 14. He is sued in his official capacity. Id.
Defendants have not challenged any of the plaintiffs’ Article III standing to bring this lawsuit, but of course standing “implicates . . . subject matter jurisdiction, and accordingly must be addressed as a threshold matter regardless of whether it is raised by the parties.” Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Cos., Inc.,
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797 F.3d 1248, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v’ Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003)).4 Calvin, Parrish, and Griffin are all voters in districts that are allegedly overpopulated, and therefore they have standing. See Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1974).5 And there the standing inquiry ends—as long as “one named plaintiff . . . ha[s] standing for each . . . claim[],” there is a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. Jackson v. Okaloosa Cty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1536–37 (11th Cir. 1994).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND A. The Evolution of the Right to Vote
The Constitution as ratified in 1788 did not bestow a right to vote on all citizens of the United States. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 170–73 (1874). The individual states were responsible for determining which citizens would be granted the power to vote,
4 Maybe “must” is a little strong—after all, courts routinely neglect to “address” standing. See, e.g., Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015). It’s probably more accurate to say that a court must be sure that there is standing, and if it’s arguable that there is not standing, the court should explicitly “address” the issue.
5 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981 are binding as precedent within the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
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and from the outset different states made different choices. Connecticut required voters to be “quiet and peaceable.” Id. at 172. Massachusetts required voters to have “a freehold estate within the [state] of the annual income of three pounds, or any estate of the value of sixty pounds.” Id. Nearly all states required voters to be male. Id. at 172–73.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified in 1868 and 1870, respectively, didn’t change things right away. In Hapersett, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not automatically grant women the right to vote. 88 U.S. at 178. And in United States v. Cruikshank, the Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment granted a right of “exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race,” but that it did not grant a right to vote. 92 U.S. 542, 555–56 (1875).
Technically, these holdings are still good law—there is no free-floating “right” to vote protected by the U.S. Constitution in the same sense that there’s a right to free speech or a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature
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chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college.”); Hoch v. Phelan, 796 F. Supp. 130, 132 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting that “the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee the right to vote in state elections”). But what has changed dramatically since the time of Hapersett are the limitations the Equal Protection Clause places on states’ ability to choose who may vote. Once a state chooses to let any particular group or class of people vote, it may not deny the vote to others in a way that denies them equal protection of the laws. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). So even though there’s not a right to vote in the strictest sense of the term “right,” both courts and citizens can regularly speak of the “right to vote,” and even characterize it as fundamental, see, e.g., Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003), without being incorrect in any way that matters for practical purposes.
B. The Development of “One Person, One Vote” The Supreme Court recognized relatively early that outright denial of the ability to vote—even in a primary election—could violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927). But for many years the Court was unwilling to
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apply an equal protection analysis to claims of vote dilution result-
ing from malapportioned legislative districts. In 1946, the Court
expressly held in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter that such
claims were “of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not [fit]
for judicial determination.” Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552
(1946). The Colegrove Court distinguished Herndon and similar
cases from the districting/dilution claim before it (which involved
Illinois’ Congressional districts) as follows:
This is not an action to recover for damage because of the discriminatory exclusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other citizens. The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity. . . . In effect this is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the councils of the Nation. Because the Illinois legislature has failed to revise its Congressional Representative districts in order to reflect great changes, during more than a generation, in the distribution of its population, we are asked to do this, as it were, for Illinois. Id. (emphasis added).
I quote from this opinion at length because it represents a
view that has been emphatically rejected, and so it offers valuable
clues as to what errors should be avoided when thinking about di-
lution claims. The chief error in the majority opinion in Colegrove
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was the failure to recognize the personal nature of the rights at stake. As Justice Black recognized in his dissent in Colegrove (which was joined by Justice Douglas):
No one would deny that the equal protection clause would . . . prohibit a law that would expressly give certain citizens a half-vote and others a full vote. The probable effect of the [districting scheme at issue] in the coming election will be that certain citizens, and among them the petitioners, will in some instances have votes only one-ninth as effective in choosing representatives to Congress as the votes of other citizens. Such discriminatory legislation seems to me exactly the kind that the equal protection clause was intended to prohibit. Id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting). The view of Justices Black and Douglas won out, though it took over 15 years. Black and Douglas reiterated their opposition to the so-called “political question” holding of Colegrove in their dissent in South v. Peters, arguing that “[t]he right to vote includes the right . . . to have the vote counted at full value without dilution or discount.” 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Finally, in Baker v. Carr, the Court adopted this view, holding that vote dilution claims could be brought under the Equal Protection Clause. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
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In Carr, the Court only answered the question of whether vote dilution claims based on malapportionment were justiciable, not how to analyze such claims. The Court tackled the latter question in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).6 Wesberry dealt with malapportionment of congressional districts, 376 U.S. at 2, while Reynolds dealt with malapportionment of state legislative districts, 377 U.S. at 536– 38. In each case, the Court held that large disparities among the number of people living in different legislative districts violated the Constitution. But the Court concluded that malapportionment of congressional districts offends Article I, § 2 of the Constitution,7 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17–18, while malapportionment of state legislative districts offends the Equal Protection Clause, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. This difference has turned out to have an im-
6 The Court first used the precise phrase “one person, one vote” in Gray v. Sanders, a case involving Georgia’s odd system for electing United States Senators and certain state officials. 372 U.S. 368, 370–72 (1963). The Court took pains to point out that Gray was not a case about apportionment, but the logic of the opinion, and particularly the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he conception of political equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote” clearly led to Reynolds and Wesberry.
7 Technically, Article I, Section 2 as amended by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which effectively repealed the Three-Fifths Clause. See Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 527 n.20 (5th Cir. 2000).
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portant consequence: the Court has tolerated much larger deviations in total census population among state legislative districts than among congressional districts. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1973). The Court extended Reynolds to units of local government (county commissions, etc.) in Avery v. Midland County, holding that “units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area [must] not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population.” 390 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1968).
One thing this discussion of the history of one person, one vote makes clear is that the injury in a case involving malapportioned districts is personal, not structural.8 The constitutional infirmity in a set of malapportioned legislative districts lies not in the failure to equalize some population measure, but in the infringement of some peoples’ rights to participate in our form of representative democracy. Put another way, when a suit challenging a districting scheme reaches federal court, the court does not sit as
8 But see Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 Yale L.J. 1888 (2012) (arguing that in one person, one vote cases, “the real action is not in the domain of individual rights, but rather in structural questions about the allocation of group political power”).
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a super-legislature to question the districting choices of the legislative body from a policy standpoint. Rather, the court functions in its traditional role as a vindicator of individual rights.
In the 50-plus years since Reynolds v. Sims, this principle has sometimes been obscured. On occasion courts seem to focus on equalizing census population across districts as an end in and of itself. See, e.g., Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge panel), rev’d sub nom. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). And courts, including the Supreme Court, have also spent much energy fleshing out the doctrine regarding the other side of the constitutional balance—the legitimacy and importance of the reasons offered up by governments to justify disparities in the size of districts. See, e.g., Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691–92 (1964). It’s easy to lose sight of the fact that the rights at stake in one person, one vote cases “are personal and individual,” South, 339 U.S. at 280 (Douglas, J., dissenting), but it’s also vital that this fact not be forgotten.
C. One Person, One Vote Mechanics For cases involving state and local governmental bodies, a one person, one vote claim requires an inquiry into whether the apportionment scheme being challenged “may reasonably be said
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to advance [a] rational state policy and, if so, whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits.” Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three-judge panel), aff’d mem. 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (citations and quotations omitted). In practice, the first question usually asked is “how large are the population disparities?”
One measure of population disparities is the “total deviation” or “overall deviation” described above in Part. I.B. If the total deviation is under 10%, the population disparities are considered “minor,” and a plaintiff will generally have to provide further proof (besides the disparities themselves) showing that the districting scheme is arbitrary or discriminatory in order to prevail. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220. If the total deviation is above 10%, the state or local government must justify the disparities or else the scheme will be invalidated. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1340. Courts sometimes refer to this burden-shifting approach to one person, one vote claims as the “safe harbor rule,” though that moniker can be misleading since deviations below 10% may still violate one person, one vote. See Frank v. Forest Cty., 336 F.3d 570, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.). A state or local government may be able to
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justify a districting scheme with a relatively large total population deviation by invoking one or more of a number of well-recognized state interests, including the interests in “making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent [r]epresentatives.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
In the typical one person, one vote case—which this case is not—the question of what constitutes the “population” for purposes of computing the total population deviation is not at issue. There are really two questions embedded in this question, one theoretical and one practical. First, who are the people who should in theory be counted for determining equality of population? Second, what source(s) of data are acceptable for determining this population? I’ll get to the first question soon enough. As for the second question, the Supreme Court has long endorsed the use of census data as a basis for drawing legislative districts, even while acknowledging the shortcomings of that data. “[T]he census data provide the only reliable—albeit less than perfect—indication of . . . districts’ ‘real’ relative population levels. Even if one cannot say with certainty that one district is larger than another merely because it has a higher census count, one can say with certainty that
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the district with a larger census count is more likely to be larger than the other district than it is to be smaller or the same size. That certainty is sufficient for decisionmaking.” Id. at 738.
But while census data is almost always the starting point for determining a population base, it need not, and in some cases cannot, be the ending point. The Court has recognized that blind reliance on census data can lead to unconstitutional results. In Mahan v. Howell, for instance, the Court considered a districting plan that relied on census data to count some 36,000 military personnel in the state senate district where they were “home-ported”—that is, the district containing their naval base. 410 U.S. at 330–31. However, only about half of these people actually lived in the district, either on the naval base or off the base but still within the district. Id. The Court held that the scheme was unconstitutional. The scheme “resulted in . . . significant population disparities,” and the state could not fall back on its reliance on census figures to justify these disparities because “[t]he . . . use of [a] census enumeration to support a conclusion that all of the Navy personnel on a ship actually resided within the state senatorial district in which the ship was docked placed upon the census figures a weight that they were not intended to bear.” Id.
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More recently, courts have allowed states to alter census data by assigning prisoners to their pre-incarceration places of residence or removing them from the population base for districting purposes. See Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894–97 (D. Md. 2011) (three-judge panel), aff’d mem. 133 S. Ct. 29 (2012). In allowing this, the Fletcher court emphasized that “a State may choose to adjust the census data, so long as those adjustments are thoroughly documented and applied in a nonarbitrary fashion and they otherwise do not violate the Constitution.” Id. at 894–95. In the context of prisoners, the court noted that such adjustments might be appropriate because “prisoners are counted [by the Census Bureau] where they are incarcerated for pragmatic and administrative reasons, not legal ones.” Id. at 895.
III. WHAT DOES ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE MEAN? A. The Personal Rights and Interests Protected By “One Person, One Vote”
The early one person, one vote cases identified two distinct personal interests that are negatively impacted by malapportionment. First, there is obviously the right or interest in voting and in having one’s vote counted on an equal basis with others. See
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Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (“an individual’s right to vote . . . is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State”). Second, there is the interest in being represented on an equal footing with one’s neighbors. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (“Equal representation for equal numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to elected representatives.”) (emphasis added). Lower courts have since labeled these rights—or, more precisely, the principles related to these rights— “electoral equality” and “representational equality.” See, e.g., Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 525 (5th Cir. 2000). An apportionment scheme that effectively weighs one voter’s vote more heavily than another’s can be said to violate the principle of electoral equality, while an apportionment scheme that effectively gives one denizen9 greater “representational strength” than another can be
9 The term “denizen” is used here and throughout this opinion to mean one who lives in a district and is represented by an elected official, whether or not he or she votes or is entitled to vote. This term has significant advantages over “constituent,” which can refer either to someone entitled to vote for a representative or to someone represented by a representative whether or not he or she is entitled to vote. See Constituency, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (“1. The body of citizens dwelling in a defined area and entitled to elect a representative. 2. The residents of an electoral district.”). Denizen is also preferable to “citizen,” which of course carries with it a legal meaning that
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said to violate the principle of representational equality. And when these principles are violated, it means that some people—those living in districts with too many people, typically—are denied equal protection of the laws.
Although these principles are distinct, the Supreme Court seemed to discuss them interchangeably in the early cases. This is perhaps because those cases involved districts with wide disparities in total population and voter population, so the districting schemes at issue violated both principles. See Chen, 206 F.3d at 525–26; Daly, 93 F.3d at 1223. Only a handful of cases have dealt with the vexing problem of what to do when districts are drawn in such a way so as to serve one principle but not the other—that is, when districts are drawn in such a way that the number of voters is the same in each, but the number of total people varies by a great amount (or the other way around).
The first of these cases was Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), which involved an interim districting plan for Hawaii’s state legislature. The plan used registered voters as a population
might be misleading in the context of this case. The term “voter” is used throughout this opinion to mean one who is entitled to vote in a jurisdiction, whether or not she actually votes. I will occasionally use “constituent,” and when it is used, it has the same meaning as denizen.
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base rather than census data—that is, it attempted to roughly
equalize the number of registered voters per representative across
the legislative districts. 384 U.S. at 86–91. Because of the presence
of a large number of military personnel stationed in Hawaii but
not registered to vote there, the use of such a base led to “sizable
differences in results [compared to those] produced by the distri-
bution according to the State’s total population, as measured by
the federal census figures.” Id. at 90.
The Supreme Court upheld the interim scheme against a
“one person, one vote” challenge. In doing so, it clarified that “the
Equal Protection Clause does not require the States to use total
population figures derived from the federal census as the standard
by which . . . substantial population equivalency is to be meas-
ured.” Id. at 91 (emphasis added). The Court further noted the fol-
lowing: [T]his Court [has never] suggested that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime in the apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed and against which compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured. The decision to include or exclude any such group involves choices about the nature of representation with which we have been shown no constitutionally founded reason to interfere. Unless a choice is
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one the Constitution forbids, . . . the resulting apportionment base offends no constitutional bar, and compliance with the rule established in Reynolds v. Sims is to be measured thereby. Id. at 92 (citations omitted). Because the use of registered voters as a population base appeared to lead to similar results as would have been achieved “had state citizen population been the guide,” the Court held that the scheme complied with one person, one vote. Id. at 92–96. The lower courts have interpreted Burns in strikingly different ways. The Ninth Circuit decision in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), contains two such interpretations in its majority and dissenting opinions. Garza involved the redrawing of the districts for the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. 918 F.2d at 765. Because Los Angeles County contained a large number of nonvoters, using total population (census population, roughly speaking) as a base led to drastically different results than using voter population as a base. Id. at 773–74. The County, citing Burns, argued that the districting plan (which had been ordered by the district court) violated one person, one vote by giving voters living in districts with large populations of nonvoters more voting strength than voters in other districts. Id. at 773.
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The majority in Garza not only rejected the argument that voter population was the relevant population to be equalized under Reynolds, but actually went so far as to suggest that equalizing voter population would violate one person, one vote by impairing the ability of nonvoters to access and petition their representatives. See id. at 774–76. The majority, despite its description of “protect[ing] the voting power of citizens” and “ensur[ing] equal representation for equal numbers of people” as “coequal goals,” basically held that representational equality trumps electoral equality. See id.
Judge Kozinski dissented in relevant part. After a lengthy review of the Supreme Court’s one person, one vote jurisprudence, Judge Kozinski “concluded that it is the principle of electoral equality that lies at the heart of one person one vote.” Id. at 785 (Kozinski, J., dissenting in relevant part). Still, Kozinski admitted that his “colleagues may ultimately have the better of the argument” and that the Supreme Court, if confronted directly with the issue, might go either way. Id.
Two other Circuit Courts of Appeals have considered cases pitting electoral equality against representational equality and
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drawn different lessons from Burns than either the majority or dissent in Garza. In Daly v. Hunt, the Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to the districting scheme for a board of county commissioners and a school board. 93 F.3d at 1214. The court rejected both the Garza majority’s approach and Judge Kozinski’s approach, concluding instead that courts should defer to a state or local government’s decision to favor electoral or representational equality when both cannot be achieved. See id. at 1225–27. The court reasoned that because districting is “inherently political,” courts (particularly federal courts) should be wary of interfering with choices about what theory of representative democracy a state or local government chooses. See id. The Fifth Circuit more or less followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead in Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502 (2000).10
10 More recently, a three-judge District Court followed the reasoning of Chen and Daly and rejected a challenge to Texas’ state senate districting scheme on the grounds that it diluted voters’ votes by including large groups of nonvoters in the population base. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A14CV335, 2014 WL 5780507 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014), prob. juris. noted Evenwel v. Abbott, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015). That case is on appeal to the Supreme Court; oral arguments were held on December 8, 2015. See Argument Transcripts, Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument _transcript/2015 (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
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For reasons discussed later on, I need not decide whether Judge Kozinski, the Garza majority, or the Daly court is correct. That said, the best answer is probably that the Equal Protection Clause (through the one person, one vote principle) protects both representational and electoral equality. If a state or local government chooses a population base that appears to serve either one of these principles, or even one that serves both imperfectly, it is not the job of a court to step in and enforce its particular theory of representative democracy. If a state or local government is confronted with a situation in which it knows that it can’t serve both principles—in other words, in which it knows that it will have to draw districts in a way that dilutes some voters’ voting strength or some denizens’ representational strength—then the choice of which principle should prevail is one for the state or local government.
There’s another point which bears mentioning. State and local governments (or whoever conducts redistricting activities) don’t actually pick a theory of representative democracy; rather, they draw district lines. Ultimately, to determine whether one person, one vote principles have been violated, it is necessary to look at the population base that’s been chosen, because there is no way to directly measure vote dilution or representational harm. That’s
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why courts seem to focus so much on the structural question of whether a particular population base is appropriate—it’s the only thing that can be measured. But as discussed above in Part II.C, census data is imperfect, and other data (data on registered voters, for instance) is even worse. See generally Nathaniel Persily et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2015). The result of all this is that there is (and should be) a reluctance on evidentiary grounds to find that the choice of a particular population base violates one person, one vote. That is, it’s hard to prove that the choice of a particular population base for redistricting leads to vote dilution and/or dilution of representational strength. The Daly court recognized this evidentiary problem and cited it alongside the federalism/judicial restraint rationale as a reason for being wary of interfering with a state or local government’s choice of population base. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1227–28.
So courts should probably be reluctant to interfere with a state or local government’s districting scheme on the grounds that
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it uses the “wrong” population base.11 But that doesn’t mean that a court should never interfere. In particular, Burns still counsels that the choice of apportionment base can’t be “one the Constitution forbids,” 384 U.S. at 92, a somewhat circular command that will be discussed later. For now, though, it’s necessary to look more closely at something acknowledged as a key concern in Garza, Daly, and Hunt—representational equality.
B. The Nature of Representational Equality and the “Right” to be Represented
Garza, Hunt, and Daly showcase at least three different theories of what one person, one vote means. But all of these theories—even Judge Kozinski’s voter-centric theory articulated in his Garza dissent—recognize that the choice to use voter population as a population base when there are large pockets of nonvoters costs those nonvoters something. In other words, all three theories recognize “representational equality” as a real concern to be taken into account in one person, one vote cases. Furthermore, these
11 It’s possible that things are different for congressional districts. It’s difficult to read Wesberry—and the constitutional provisions on which it relied—and conclude that drawing congressional districts so as to achieve electoral equality would be permissible. Article I, Section 2 (as amended by the Fourteenth Amendment) seems to mandate that representational equality be the guiding principle for congressional districting. See Brief of the ACLU and the ACLU of Texas as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 7–13, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2015).
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cases make clear that representational equality is not a structural
or administrative state interest (like preserving county lines, etc.)
that justifies deviations in the number of voters, but rather a prin-
ciple that reflects the existence of an underlying personal interest
or right in being represented.
This is not an interest or right—I’ll call it a right, though for
purposes of this case it doesn’t matter12—often discussed by courts.
Its contours are usually not particularly germane in one person,
one vote cases, and certainly not outcome-determinative. But un-
derstanding this right is crucial to deciding this case, so it is nec-
essary to glean its rough outline. That outline is best elucidated by
investigating two questions. First, what does a representative do
for those he represents? Second, in what ways (besides voting) can
someone affect the performance of the representative’s functions?
12 Whether the existence of representational equality as a valid constitutional concern implies that there exists an individual, legally cognizable right to be represented is an open question. Would a nonvoter in a district with an excess of people have standing to bring an Equal Protection claim alleging dilution of her “representational strength” just as a voter in such a district would have standing to bring an Equal Protection challenge alleging dilution of her vote? Frankly, it’s hard to see why not, though that view is not universally shared. See Brief for Appellants at 38–40, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. July 31, 2015) (arguing that none of the Supreme Court’s decisions “suggest (let alone hold) that a resident’s diluted access to his or her representative is a ‘legally cognizable injury’ within the meaning of the one-person, one-vote rule”).
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(Or, put another way, what does the represented do for or to their representative?)
1. What Does a Representative Do? In broad terms,13 a representative does three key things for her constituents. First, she helps make and/or influence policy decisions, such as passing (or not passing) laws and choosing or approving administrative officials. Sometimes the effects of those decisions will be direct—a representative votes to make a county “dry,” thereby forcing bars in the area to close and affecting the livelihood of some denizens. Other times the effects will be more indirect—a representative supports a sales tax hike to fund county schools, which enables a local high school to provide its teachers with better equipment, which leads to a better-educated workforce, which increases the earning power of the denizens of the community. The policy choices made by the representative may reflect the will of her constituents, or they may reflect the representative’s
13 There is a rich social science literature on the nature of representation. See generally Political Representation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Oct. 17, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/. This case doesn’t require diving into the literature, as all that’s needed for present purposes is a rough outline of the “right to be represented.”
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own determination as to what’s best for her constituents,14 or
(more cynically) they may reflect the will of powerful special inter-
ests, or caprice, or bias.
Second, a representative acts as an “ombudsperson[,] [a]
friend and guide in the complex channels of . . . government” for
her constituents. See Rossito-Canty v. Cuomo, 86 F. Supp. 3d 175,
181–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). As one esteemed judge15 has noted in the
context of congressional representatives, a constituent “frustrated
by the lack of an appropriate response with respect to a welfare
payment, aid to small business in sending its products abroad, tax
14 “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.” 2 Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 89, 95 (1774), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15198/ 15198-h/15198-h.htm. Burke’s “trustee” model of representation can be contrasted with the “delegate” model of representation, in which a representative merely enacts her constituents’ preferences. See generally Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of Hope and Fear, 124 Yale L.J. 528, 533–34 (2014). Obviously in practice most representatives fall somewhere between pure trustee and pure delegate. Indeed, Madison and Hamilton seemed to contemplate representation as encompassing both delegate- and trustee-like features. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 40–43 (1985).
15 The judge in the Rossito-Canty case was Senior Judge Jack Weinstein, a legendary trial judge who literally wrote the book on evidence. See Jack B. Weinstein et al., Evidence: Cases and Materials (9th ed. 1997). Before he was appointed to the bench by President Johnson in 1967, Weinstein assisted the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and wrote a brief in support of the appellants in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964), one of the early one person, one vote cases. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the FiftyEighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (2008).
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collections, or other matters[ may] turn[] for help to the Representative from the district” in which he lives. Id. Certainly the channels of government are less complex at the county level than at the national or state level, but there are still a host of things that a county representative can help her constituents with that have nothing to do with policymaking.16
Third, a representative acts as the voice of her constituents in the legislative body. This is related to, but distinct from, her role as a policymaker. There may be situations in which a representative is unable to influence policy, but can still articulate the interests of her constituents. Acting as a mouthpiece for views that are unlikely to prevail in the short term has an important instrumental function—this year’s minority view may yet garner a majority—and also arguably has an expressive element separate and apart from any policy-related utilitarian benefit. See generally Steven N. Sherr, Freedom and Federalism: The First Amendment’s Protection of Legislative Voting, 101 Yale L.J. 233 (1991).
16 Consider, for example, Leon County Commissioner Bryan Desloge. Desloge, the Commissioner for District 4 in Leon County, used to publish a newsletter (“Bryan’s Brief”) in which he sometimes informed his constituents that he was available to help them with issues related to solid waste collection. Bryan Desloge, Bryan’s Brief (Feb. 2014), https://cms.leoncountyfl.gov/Portals/0/CountyCommission/District4/Newsletters/201402.pdf.
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2. The Role of the Represented The most obvious way someone can influence his representative is through voting. But voting is not the beginning and end of citizenship, just as campaigning and being elected is (hopefully) not the beginning and end of public service. Especially at the local level, the people ostensibly represented by a legislator have opportunities to engage with that legislator in multiple ways, both official and unofficial, to try to influence the representative’s decisions. People write letters and mount protests, but they also take more subtle measures—they invite representatives to tour their neighborhoods; they exploit personal connections to gain greater access to representatives or to put pressure on representatives to take certain actions; and, of course, they give money. Some courts have tied such activities to the First Amendment right to petition. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775. Even given the preeminent place the First Amendment occupies in the fabric of our democracy, that may be understating the importance of these activities. “[I]t is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, [and] it is particularly essential that” a legislative body elected directly by the people “should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate
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sympathy with, the people.” The Federalist No. 52, at 361 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). Besides voting, the best way to ensure that a representative has “an intimate sympathy with” those she represents is to protect the ability of the represented to access and influence her. This goes beyond the First Amendment right to petition, and touches on something even deeper—the nature of a representative form of government. Cf. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553 (“The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”).
C. Representational Injuries Caused By Malapportionment
With a better grasp of the nature of the right to be represented, it’s possible to understand how malapportionment negatively affects that right. The most commonly cited harm to denizens in a district with too many people is the harm of “dilute[d] . . . access . . . to their representative.” Garza, 918 F.2d at 775. This “access harm” would affect the right to be represented in multiple ways. Most obviously, it would infringe on the ability to influence representatives’ policy choices. It would also diminish the ability
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to use representatives as ombudspersons, and it would limit the ability of representatives to voice all their constituents’ views.
But as the Fourth Circuit noted in Daly—and as the discus-
sion above makes clear— “the right to petition one’s representative
is but one facet of the concept of representation,” Daly, 93 F.3d at 1226, and the harm flowing from malapportionment is greater than just the harm of diminished ability to access or petition one’s representative. Judge Kozinski identified a second type of harm in his Garza dissent. “[A]ssuming that elected officials are able to obtain benefits for their districts in proportion to their share of the total membership of the governing body,” a representative with a larger number of denizens in her district will bring home a lower level of services per denizen. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 781 (Kozinski, J., dissenting in relevant part).
In addition, a representative with a relatively large constituency is likely to have a wider range of interests, and even some internal conflicts, within that constituency, making it more difficult to determine which policy choices would benefit her constituents the most. Her effectiveness as a representative may be impaired by the need to familiarize herself with and reconcile this
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larger set of (possibly competing) interests. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1903, 1919–20, 1944–46 (2013) (discussing how a larger variety of interests within a district impairs the ability of an elected official to represent her constituents’ views); cf. The Federalist No. 56, at 379–83 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (arguing that a ratio of one member of the House of Representatives to every 30,000 inhabitants would be large enough to ensure that each representative would “be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents”).
Finally, there’s the harm that occurs as a result of having the same “power”—that is, one vote in the legislative body—spread over a larger number of people. “Although the overall power of [a] governing body is generally not divisible, each representative individually should have the same ability to influence the actions performed by the governing body as a whole. These representatives should represent roughly the same number of constituents, so that each person, whether or not they are entitled to vote, receives a fair share of the governmental power, through his or her representative.” Daly, 93 F.3d at 1226; see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14–15 (discussing the evils of the old British system in which some
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small villages enjoyed much smaller inhabitant-to-representative ratios than large cities like London).
Note that all of these harms sound in equal protection because the denizens of a district with a relatively large number of people have less access, influence, etc. than those in districts with a smaller population. That is, they have less “representational strength.”
D. The Need for a Representational Nexus The harms discussed above—reduced access, reduced influence, a reduced portion of government services, less effective representation, and diminished power in the polity as a whole—only occur to people who are meaningfully affected by a representative’s actions.17 If the representative can’t make decisions that meaningfully affect me; if the representative can’t act as my ombudsperson because the governing body to which she belongs can’t do anything for me; if I’m not receiving services from the governing body—under these circumstances, there’s no representational nexus18 between the representative and me.
17 The one minor exception being the expressive aspect of a representative’s speech on behalf of others.
18 This term was first used in a reported case by Judge Kozinski. See Pub. Integrity Alliance, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 805 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015).
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I’ve been assuming all along that everyone who “lives in” a representative’s district has a representational nexus with that representative and is therefore a denizen of that representative’s district, and indeed that’s a good assumption. If someone is physically located or housed in a particular legislative district, that is almost always a good indication that there’s a representational nexus between that person and the representative for the district. But this is a matter of correlation, not causation. A person does not have a representational nexus with a representative because of that person’s physical location, but rather because of the ability of the representative to meaningfully affect that person’s life, and the representative will normally have such an ability as to all people physically located in her district.
It’s easy to think of situations in which neither physical presence nor representational nexus is present—I don’t live in San Francisco, nor do I have much, if any, interest in how San Francisco draws its Board of Supervisors districts—and of course it’s
He used it to refer to the relationship between an elected official and his constituency: “Given the city’s concession that each council member represents all of Tucson, it’s clear that the representational nexus runs between the city and the council member, not between the ward and the council member.” Id. I use it in a slightly different way to mean a relationship between an official and an individual denizen.
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easy to conceive of situations in which both are present. There are also certainly situations in which a person arguably has a representational nexus with someone who represents a different jurisdiction. Consider Belleville, Illinois, just across the Mississippi River from St. Louis. About a quarter of working Bellevillians work in St. Louis.19 One would assume that many Bellevillians are greatly affected by at least some of the decisions made by the Missouri Legislature, and that they probably have a representational nexus with the Missouri state representatives from St. Louis.
This case represents an even odder situation, one in which a group of people lives full-time within the geographical boundaries of a district and yet has little, if any, representational nexus with the representative from that district or the legislative body to which he belongs.
More on that later, though. For now, armed with a better understanding of what the right to representation means, I’ll turn to the question of what legal standard should be used to analyze whether inclusion of a particular group in a population base offends the Equal Protection Clause.
19 See City of Belleville Comprehensive Plan § 5, pg. 7 (adopted June 16, 2014), http://belleville.net/DocumentCenter/View/1208.
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E. “A Choice the Constitution Forbids” The Court in Burns emphasized (and the lower courts’ decisions in Daly and Chen confirmed) that states have flexibility in choosing which population should be equalized in drawing districts. The only condition is that the choice cannot be “one the Constitution forbids,” Burns, 384 U.S. at 92, which on its own is not a very helpful limitation. (“A choice of population base is constitutional unless the Constitution forbids it.”) But this language is not the only clue as to what the Court meant. Burns itself, the other early one person, one vote cases discussed above, and Chen, Garza, and Daly’s treatment of those cases suggest two different (but ultimately equivalent) methods to determine whether use of a particular population base violates Equal Protection.
1. The Choice Can’t Violate Both Electoral and Representational Equality Principles
Judge Kozinski noted in his Garza dissent that “a careful reading of the Court’s [one person, one vote] opinions suggests that equalizing total population is viewed not as an end in itself, but as a means of achieving electoral equality.” 918 F.2d at 783 (Kozinski, J., dissenting in relevant part). Judge Kozinski was trying to make
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the point that electoral equality is more important than representational equality—a point about which this Court expresses no opinion—but he was also arguing that the ultimate injury inflicted by malapportionment is the infringement of individual rights, not the fact of malapportionment itself. As discussed earlier, disparities in total census population are evidence that these individual rights are being infringed, but are not in and of themselves unconstitutional. Cf. id. (noting that “[t]otal population . . . is only a proxy for equalizing the voting strength of eligible voters”).
But which individual rights? Judge Kozinski thought the right “to cast equally weighted votes,” and therefore the principle of electoral equality, was of paramount importance, and that the principle of representational equality was “subservient.” Id. at 782–83. The Garza majority disagreed, holding that the need to ensure equal representational rights for nonvoting denizens was more important than ensuring electoral equality. Id. at 774–76 (majority opinion). The Chen and Daly courts in effect held that a state could choose whether to satisfy representational equality or electoral equality—that is, in case of a conflict, a state could decide whether the right to be represented equally or the right to case an equally weighted vote was more important.
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What none of these cases held was that a state or local government could draw districts in a way that violates both electoral and representational equality. Such a districting scheme would deny all denizens of some districts—voters and nonvoters alike— equal protection of the laws. It would of course dilute the voting strength of voters, but it would also dilute the representational strength of those voters and of their nonvoting neighbors. A scheme that violates both of these principles is unconstitutional under any interpretation of one person, one vote. See Davidson v. City of Cranston, 52 F. Supp. 3d 325, 332 (D.R.I. 2014).
So one “choice the Constitution forbids” is a choice that violates both representational and electoral equality. This brings me back to the “representational nexus” concept. People who lack a meaningful or substantial representational nexus with a given legislative body, or whose representational nexus with that body is substantially attenuated relative to others in the body’s jurisdiction, don’t “count” for purposes of representational equality—that is, their cognizable representational rights vis-à-vis that body are not affected by the size of that body’s districts, nor does their presence affect the representational rights of others. Nonvoters, of course, don’t “count” for purposes of electoral equality. Nonvoters
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who also lack a meaningful representational nexus don’t count at all, and including a relatively large, geographically compact group of such people in a district impermissibly dilutes the voting and representational strength of people in other districts.
2. The Choice Can’t Discriminate “Arbitrarily” The second method is more doctrinally orthodox. In Burns, the Court cited Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), as a case containing an example of a “choice the Constitution forbids,” and discussed that same case in a footnote. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 92. Carrington involved Texas’ blanket rule denying all members of the armed services the franchise even when some of those servicemen and women would have qualified as residents. 380 U.S. at 91– 93. Burns pointed to this sort of categorization as arbitrary, as opposed to categorization based on (presumably reasonable) residency requirements. Burns, 384 U.S. at 92 n.21 (“The difference between exclusion of all military and military-related personnel, and exclusion of those not meeting a State’s residence requirements is a difference between an arbitrary and a constitutionally permissible classification.”). This portion of Burns suggests that when choosing to include a group in or exclude a group from its population base for purposes
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of districting, a state or local government must not discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. That is, the choice to include or exclude any identifiable group from the population base must pass muster under the applicable equal protection standard. But how to determine the standard? Although the Court in Burns characterized the discrimination in Carrington as “arbitrary”—implying that the traditional rational basis/strict scrutiny framework should be applied—it’s difficult to see how Texas lacked a rational basis in the traditional sense for denying the vote to members of the military. If the end goal was to ensure that only true residents could vote, then excluding a class of people containing many nonresidents would qualify as rational. See Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under rational basis review, a court must accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.”).
The better reading of Burns—and a reading more consistent with equal protection jurisprudence in the vote-dilution context— is that choices about whether to exclude a particular group from (or include a group in) the population base are subject to something
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more exacting than rational basis review. Cf. Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d at 898–900 (“In the absence of a suspect classification, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to only two types of voting regulations. The first type includes regulations that unreasonably deprive some residents in a geographically defined governmental unit from voting in a unit wide election. . . . The second type are regulations that contravene the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ by diluting the voting power of some qualified voters within the electoral unit.”). This is not inconsistent with the statement in Burns that “[s]tates are [not] required to include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime in the apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed.” 384 U.S. at 92. All of the listed groups are by definition not permanent residents, and therefore discrimination on the basis of residency—which is allowed—would exclude them from the population base without any overinclusion of the type found impermissible in Carrington.
Burns and Carrington suggest the following equal protection methodology to determine whether a population base is permissi-
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ble. First, start with the census population. It’s an imperfect measure, but it’s the traditional starting point for most legislative bodies. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 744–49 (1973).
Second, identify any groups to be excluded. A group may be excluded from the population base if it is not similarly situated to the remainder of the population either with respect to citizenship (that is, ability to vote), residency, or denizenship. So, consistent with Burns and Carrington, “exclusion of those not meeting a State’s residence requirements” would be proper because such people are not similarly situated to residents. On the other hand, exclusion of a group based on some characteristic that might be correlated with citizenship, etc.—like military status—is forbidden. See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 93–96; see also Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. at 692. The “fit” has to be fairly good—better than would be required for rational basis review.
Third, even if no group is sought to be excluded, the census baseline itself must be examined. The Census Bureau does not include or exclude any group based on any coherent theory of representative democracy, but rather makes choices about who to count and where to count them for reasons of efficiency and administrative ease. See, e.g., Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 895. It may be the
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case that the census count itself makes choices that are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. See Mahan, 410 U.S. at 330–31.
In particular, it may be that the census includes some group that is not similarly situated to the rest of the populace in any relevant respect. Treating such a group the same as other citizens, denizens, or residents would violate the Equal Protection Clause because “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.” Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
Consider in this regard a jurisdiction with a large pocket of nonvoters who also happen to lack a meaningful representational nexus with the local legislative body. This group is not similarly situated to its “neighbors” in terms of residency, citizenship, or denizenship. Treating this group as if it were like the people surrounding it would be just as “arbitrary”—more arbitrary, in fact— than the exclusion of military personnel from the population base on the grounds that they’re not really residents.
As promised, then, this second line of thinking leads to the same place as the first—inclusion of a group of nonvoters who also
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lack a substantial representational nexus with the relevant legislative body violates one person, one vote if such inclusion seriously dilutes the voting power and-or representational strength of others. This sort of arbitrary (in the Burns/Carrington sense of “arbitrary,” not the “lacking a rational basis” sense of arbitrary) state action does not pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause.
IV. ANALYSIS A. The “Safe Harbor” Rule
The peskiest of the pin bones keeping us from the meat of this case is the so-called “safe harbor” rule, which the parties (particularly Defendants) devote tremendous energy to discussing. This rule provides that state and local districting schemes with total deviations of less than 10% are presumptively constitutional and represent “the result of an ‘honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.’” Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577)).
As an initial matter, it should be noted that the safe harbor rule is not a substantive rule of constitutional law, but rather a way of determining in one person, one vote cases which party should bear the burden of proof in demonstrating compliance or noncompliance with the Constitution. See, e.g., Larios, 300 F.
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Supp. 2d at 1340–41. “[T]he Supreme Court has not created a 10% maximum population deviation threshold, below which all redistricting decisions are inherently constitutional.” Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 267 (4th Cir. 2015). Even assuming that the safe harbor rule were applicable with full force to this case, the fact that the districting scheme has population deviations smaller than 10% does not insulate it from judicial review.
But there are two good reasons why the safe harbor rule is of little use in this case. First, one of the central legal issues in this case concerns the assumptions underlying the rule. If the major factor in determining compliance with one person, one vote is substantial equality of total census population between districts, then of course a rule that uses a measure of such equality as a way to determine the likelihood of compliance makes sense. But one of the issues here is whether substantial equality of total census population between districts is the indispensable measure of compliance with one person, one vote under the facts of this case.
Consider the following hypothetical. Let’s say Jefferson County decided to draw districts so as to equalize the number of people in each district who don’t own pet lizards. Let’s further say that only 0.5% of Jefferson County denizens own pet lizards, and
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that all of them are clustered in a single geographic area. The result of this scheme would be that the district containing the lizardowner cluster would have more total people, and that each of these denizens’ voting and representational strength would be diluted.
Now imagine that a lizard owner living in the overpopulated district brings a one person, one vote claim, arguing that the choice to exclude lizard owners from the population base is a “choice the Constitution forbids” because it amounts to arbitrary discrimination. Under Defendants’ theory, that challenge would be doomed because, even assuming that total population (including lizard owners) were used as a population base, the total deviation would be far less than 10%. This is not a convincing argument—the basis of the challenge is that the chosen population base makes no sense, not that the lines have been drawn in a discriminatory way. The safe harbor rule is designed to be used when a challenge is brought to the way district lines are drawn, not when a challenge is brought to what population is equalized within a set of district lines.
Second, the safe harbor rule was not designed to be used in a factual situation such as this one. As Judge Posner has noted about the safe harbor rule, “[r]ules are attractive devices for economizing on litigation costs and minimizing judicial discretion; and
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safe harbors are particularly welcome to the bar. But a rule applied to circumstances remote from those contemplated when it was adopted can produce perverse results.” Forest Cty., 336 F.3d at 572–73. In Forest County, it was the plaintiffs rather than the defendants who sought to use the safe harbor rule to their advantage, but the underlying error was similar: the safe harbor rule was designed to be used for relatively large districts, not small districts. For districts of the size at issue in this case, blocks of nonvoters as found in a prison may greatly distort the rough equivalence between total population and voter population that the Supreme Court presumed existed, and which did in fact exist, in its early one person, one vote cases. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1223. To mechanically apply the rule in this case would be to ignore this dramatic difference in factual scenarios.
The safe harbor rule is simply not very relevant to this case. If Plaintiffs can show that, under the facts of this case, including the JCI inmates in the population base is “a choice the Constitution forbids,” then they are entitled to relief.
B. Representational Nexus The two doctrinal paths outlined above in Part III.E lead to the same point. An apportionment base for a given legislative body
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cannot be chosen so that a large number of nonvoters who also lack a meaningful representational nexus with that body20 are packed into a small subset of legislative districts. Doing so impermissibly dilutes the voting and representational strength of denizens in other districts and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
For Plaintiffs to prevail in this case, they have to show that the JCI inmates comprise a (1) large number of (2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational nexus with the Boards, and that they’re (4) packed into a small subset of legislative districts. Elements (2) and (4) are undisputed. I’ll get to element (1) later. The crux of this case is whether Plaintiffs have shown that the JCI inmates lack a meaningful representational nexus with the Boards.
I’ll answer this question by examining three types of facts. First and most important is the evidence in the record—the adjudicative facts. This includes a number of stipulated facts, some depositions, two expert reports, and a large number of state laws
20 Or, equivalently, a large number of nonvoters whose representational nexus with the legislative body is substantially different—different in kind, not just degree—from the typical person present in the legislative body’s jurisdiction. The question is whether the population at issue is similarly situated in any relevant way to the typical denizens and/or voters of the jurisdiction with respect to the legislative body.
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and regulations of which I can take judicial notice. Second are what might be termed “legislative facts.” By that I mean “proposition[s] about the state of the world, as opposed to . . . proposition[s] about these litigants.” Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014).
These two types of evidence clearly show that the JCI inmates lack any meaningful representational nexus with the Boards, and there’s no need from a purely legal standpoint to go any further. But my conclusion is bolstered—and in some sense brought to life—by examining what are sometimes called background facts; that is, “facts . . . designed to increase the reader’s understanding of a case by placing the adjudicative facts in an illuminating context.” Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 137 (2013). These facts, while insufficient on their own to support the finding that the JCI inmates lack a meaningful representational nexus with the Boards, help ground this finding in the context of the real world.
1. The Record A review of the record leads inexorably to three interrelated factual conclusions. First, the conditions of confinement for the inmates at JCI are almost entirely determined by policies set at the
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state level and by prison officials acting under state law. Second, most of the inmates at JCI have very little meaningful opportunity to engage with members of the nonincarcerated public, and those who are allowed to engage with the public must do so under conditions prescribed by prison officials. Third, the District 3 representatives on the Boards have not, as a matter of fact, made any meaningful effort to engage with prisoners.
JCI is run by its warden “subject to the orders, policies, and regulations established” by DOC. § 944.14, Fla. Stat. (2015).21 Its operations are also controlled by Florida statutory law, which prescribes everything from the areas in which prisoners can smoke, id. § 944.115, to the conditions under which restraints may be used on a pregnant prisoner, id. § 944.241.22 For the most part, however, the Florida Legislature has delegated to DOC the job of regulating state prisons like JCI. Florida law states that “[DOC] shall have supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of the in-
21 Laws passed by the Florida Legislature and the regulations promulgated pursuant to those laws are proper subjects of judicial notice to the extent they’re adjudicative facts. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 443 n.16 (5th Cir. 1981).
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mates, buildings, grounds, property, and all other matters pertaining to . . . adult correctional institutions.” Id. § 945.025(1). Pursuant to the authority granted to it, DOC has adopted regulations governing everything from inmate grievance procedures, see Fla. Admin. Code Ch. 33-103, to the provision of food services in state prisons, id. Ch. 33-204, to the provision of dental services, id. R. 33-402.101.
The deposition testimony of JCI’s warden confirms that the conditions of JCI inmates’ confinement are largely determined by prison officials, state-level administrators, and state legislators. Inmates’ mail—outgoing and in some cases incoming—is reviewed by prison officials. ECF No. 48-1, at 14–15. Prison officials, acting pursuant to DOC regulations, decide who can visit inmates and under what conditions those visits may take place. Id. at 17–18. When inmates are allowed to leave the prison for some reason (death in the family, court appearance, etc.), they are wellsupervised for the duration of their release and are thoroughly searched upon returning. Id. at 22–30.
In addition to having their prison environment largely controlled by prison officials and state-level actors, JCI inmates are mostly isolated from the outside world. Most prisoners at JCI are
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on close or medium confinement,23 which means that they generally cannot leave the institution. Id. at 78–79. JCI must therefore be a world unto itself, separated from the rest of the county and self-reliant. JCI (through a private contractor) provides most medical services for prisoners “in-house.” Id. at 80. JCI has its own library and law library. Id. at 79. JCI has its own water system and its own sewage treatment system, ECF No. 45, at 2 ¶¶ 4, 6. When there is a need for law enforcement to investigate an incident at JCI, the Inspector General’s Office—not local law enforcement— typically is the first to respond. ECF No. 48-1, at 82.
It’s true that some JCI inmates work outside the prison and therefore have slightly more of a connection to the community. Id. at 32–47, 52–57, 61–65, 73–75. But even these inmates largely operate in a bubble, prohibited from interacting with members of the community (aside from the county or City of Monticello employees supervising them) and heavily regulated in their movements. See
23 The Warden “guessed” that the percentage of prisoners on community or minimum confinement was 15–20%, which would put the percentage on close or medium confinement at 80–85%. See ECF No. 48-1, at 79.
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id. at 40–43. The Warden made clear that an inmate working outside JCI “shouldn’t approach [a citizen] and communicate with a citizen.” Id. at 63.
It’s also true that the prison is not completely divorced from the county. If there is a medical emergency, officials at the prison will call 911, which will in turn cause Jefferson County Fire & Rescue to send an ambulance to the prison.24 Id. at 48; 80–81. Similarly, JCI will call 911 for a fire. Id. at 49. JCI has an agreement with Jefferson County to carry off its trash. Id. at 46. Numerous organizations—religious groups such as churches, mostly—come to JCI and work with or minister to inmates. Id. at 60–61.
On the whole, though, the record bears out Plaintiffs’ contention that “JCI inmates are not true constituents in Jefferson County.” ECF No. 48, at 8. The JCI inmates’ isolation and the fact that state-level entities (DOC, mostly) have legal authority to alter the conditions of the inmates’ confinement combine to render the Boards impotent to meaningfully affect inmates’ lives. The Boards can’t directly regulate the lives of inmates because any such regulations would be preempted to the extent they conflicted with state
24 Of course, the ambulance would take the inmate to a hospital in Leon County. ECF No. 48-1, at 80.
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law. See Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831–32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (discussing preemption).
Nor can the Boards meaningfully affect the lives of inmates indirectly by the economic and social policy decisions they make at the county level. If the Board of Commissioners decides to exercise its powers under Florida law to “[p]rovide and operate . . . public transportation systems” or “license and regulate taxis,”25 these choices will have next to no effect on inmates. The same is true of most decisions regarding zoning, infrastructure, and the like—the inmates’ isolation from the rest of Jefferson County means that the policy choices made by the Board of Commissioners affect the inmates substantially less than they affect the denizens of District 3. This is even more true of the School Board, which has far more limited powers than the Board of Commissioners.26 See generally §§ 1001.41–.42, Fla. Stat. (2015).
25 See § 125.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). This section sets out a long list of the “powers and duties” of county governments.
26 As mentioned above in Part I.A, each of the members of the School Board “serve[s] as the representative of the entire [county], rather than as the representative of” the district from which he was elected. § 1001.363, Fla. Stat. (2015). This means that the representational strength of any denizen vis-à-vis the School Board is not affected by the size of the district in which he lives,
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This is not to say that some of the decisions of the Boards won’t have incidental effects on the JCI inmates. For instance, if the Board of Commissioners decides to make efforts to help small businesses in the community, the effect may be to make visiting Jefferson County more pleasant, which might in turn make it more likely for inmates’ family members to come visit them at JCI. But there is little doubt that the inmates stand in a different position vis-à-vis the Boards than do the denizens of District 3.
The record also shows that the District 3 representatives (and the Boards as a whole) have made very little effort to engage with the inmates at JCI. The warden stated that he has no discussions with any County Commissioner “regarding issues related to inmates,” ECF No. 48-1, at 49, and that he also can’t recall any County Commissioners or School Board members meeting one-onone with any inmates, id. at 18–19. District 3 County Commissioner Hines Boyd stated that “[a]bout the only opportunity we have to interact with the inmates directly would be maybe when we see them on work crews.” ECF No. 48-7, at 16. Boyd described
making the inclusion of the JCI inmates in District 3’s population utterly unjustifiable on representational equality grounds. The parties don’t bring this up, and at any rate it doesn’t alter the result, so I’ll assume that each School Board member represents his district alone.
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touring the prison and meeting with officials and employees at the prison, but it appears that the occasion for many of those meetings was the threatened closure of JCI. Id. at 16–19. That closure would have had a negative impact on the employees at JCI, id. at 18– 19—many of whom presumably live in Jefferson County—so Boyd’s increased interest in the prison at the time of its threatened closure makes perfect sense. Boyd was responding to the needs of his constituents—the employees at JCI. Shirley Washington, the School Board member from District 3, has visited the prison, but not in her “School Board capacity.” ECF No. 48-9, at 32.
2. “Propositions About the State of the World” The record facts reveal that JCI is a state-run island inside Jefferson County, and that its inmates are mostly immune to the policy choices made at the county level. This is entirely consistent with general observations made by other courts about prisoners and their relationship with the communities surrounding their prisons. In Fletcher v. Lamone, for instance, the court addressed an argument that it was improper for a state to adjust census data to account for prisoners without also adjusting for college students and members of the military. 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896. The court
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rejected this argument in part because “college students and military personnel have the liberty to interact with members of the surrounding community and to engage fully in civic life. In this sense, both groups have a much more substantial connection to, and effect on, the communities where they reside than do prisoners.” Id.
The broader point—one so obvious it’s properly termed a legislative fact—is that prisoners are isolated from society. Indeed, this is one of the purposes of incarceration. See, e.g., Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1143, 1174–75 (2006). Moreover, prisoners are subject to control by the authority operating the institution in which they are incarcerated. See United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1158 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that “[p]rison inmates serve their sentences under the pervasive control of the corrections staff”). These two facts together make state prisons into de facto islands of state control.
This is in contrast to other situations in which people live on an “island” under the legal control of some superior level of government. Consider Evans v. Cornman, a case in which the Su-
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preme Court considered whether Maryland could deny the fran-
chise to people living on the grounds of the National Institutes of
Health (“NIH”), a federal enclave in the state. 398 U.S. 419, 419–
20 (1970). The Court, in addressing the question of whether the
people living in the enclave were among those “primarily or sub-
stantially interested in or affected by electoral decisions” made at
the state and local levels, identified a number of ways in which
such decisions would affect NIH residents:
[Residents of the federal enclave] are as concerned with state spending and taxing decisions as other Maryland residents, for Congress has permitted the States to levy and collect their income, gasoline, sales, and use taxes—the major sources of state revenues—on federal enclaves. . . . State unemployment laws and workmen’s compensation laws likewise apply to persons who live and work in federal areas. . . . [NIH residents] are required to register their automobiles in Maryland and obtain drivers’ permits and license plates from the State; they are subject to the process and jurisdiction of State courts; they themselves can resort to those courts in divorce and child adoption proceedings; and they send their children to Maryland public schools.
Id. at 424. In other words, the residents of the NIH enclave would
necessarily come into contact with the machinery of state govern-
ment in the course of living their lives. As the Court put it, “[i]n
their day-to-day affairs, residents of the NIH grounds are just as
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interested in and connected with electoral decisions . . . as are their neighbors who live off the enclave.” Id. at 426. The same cannot be said of the JCI inmates and the Boards.
3. “Outside the Record” In some sense, the question of whether there’s a representational nexus between the JCI inmates and the Boards is really a question of whether the JCI inmates could reasonably be considered part of the political community of District 3. The facts discussed above—adjudicative and legislative—give an emphatic “no” answer to that question. The correctness of that answer is confirmed by looking at two sources outside the record. The first source is really a compilation of sources that together shed light on whether prisoners are commonly perceived as belonging to the community. Note first that Florida law uses some variant of the phrase “reentry into the community” in numerous places when discussing state prisoners. See, e.g., § 944.705, Fla. Stat. (2015). This suggests that inmates are not part of the surrounding community while incarcerated (otherwise there would be no “reentry”). Indeed, Florida even has an alternative to incarceration called “community control,” defined as “a form of intensive, supervised custody in the community, including surveillance on
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weekends and holidays, administered by officers with restricted caseloads. Community control is an individualized program in which the freedom of an offender is restricted within the community, home, or noninstitutional residential placement and specific sanctions are imposed and enforced.” Id. § 948.001(3) (emphasis added). Numerous other sources similarly speak of the prison as being something separate and apart from the community. See, e.g., Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Reentry Trends in the United States (Aug. 20, 2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/reentry.pdf. The fact that Florida legislators (and many others) appear to consider being in the community and being incarcerated as two distinct and mutually exclusive states does not, by itself, prove anything. But it is completely consistent with (and therefore reinforces) the JCI-specific facts in the record, the observations of numerous courts considering the nature of incarceration generally, and, frankly, common sense.
The second “outside the record” source that confirms that JCI inmates are not properly considered part of the political community vis-à-vis the Boards is the publicly-available information about the Boards’ activities. The minutes, agendas, etc. from the
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Boards’ meeting are available online,27 which makes it possible to get a sense of what the Boards actually do. An examination of the agendas of some the Board of County Commissioners’ recent meetings gives a flavor of its activities. Consider the Board’s August 4, 2015 meeting. See Minutes of Regular Session, Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs (Aug. 4, 2015). After the call to order, invocation, etc. the Board considered the following matters (among others): whether to issue a small grant to a private Christian school, id. at 2; the ongoing process of designating two properties in the county as brownfield sites, id.; and whether to approve a bid for a sidewalk construction project (it was approved), id.
Two weeks later, following what appears to have been a lively debate, the Board passed a resolution banning the practice of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”). See Minutes of Regular Session, Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 1–2 (Aug. 18, 2015). The Board also voted to keep the millage rate at 8.3 mills, id. at 2, and discussed (with input from at least one Jefferson County denizen) concerns about the size of the Sheriff’s Office budget, id. at 2–3.28
27 See BOCC Records, Jefferson County Clerk of Court, http://www.jeffersonclerk.com/bocc-records.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2016).
28 None of this is mentioned to diminish the importance of the Board of Commissioners. The Board has “broad authority to enact ‘county ordinances
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Later, in November 2015, the Board voted to install stairs at a local park and approved a new library director. See Minutes of Regular Session, Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 2 (Nov. 3, 2015). Two citizens spoke about items not on the agenda—one “expressed his concerns about government spending” and the other “stated his concerns that log trucks traveling in Wacissa and Waukeenah were speeding and putting citizens in danger” and “asked the Board to consider additional signage and/or speed bumps.” Id. at 1.
Would some of these discussions have been of possible interest to JCI inmates? Certainly—fracking, for instance, could conceivably affect the water supply at JCI.29 But most of the matters dealt with at the meetings would have little, if any, practical effect on JCI inmates. The meeting minutes tend to confirm that the Board of Commissioners’ power does not penetrate the walls of
not inconsistent with general or special law.’” Tallahassee Med. Ctr., 681 So. 2d at 831 (quoting what is now Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(f).). Undoubtedly the Board’s policy decisions are of great moment to the denizens of Jefferson County, as evidenced by the spirited debates recounted in the minutes of the Board’s meetings.
29 See EPA, Draft Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas on Drinking Water Resources: Executive Summary ES-6 (June 2015) (“From our assessment, we conclude there are above and below ground mechanisms by which hydraulic fracturing activities have the potential to impact drinking water resources.”)
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JCI, and that the inmates, while they’re physically located in Jefferson County, are effectively living in a state-run enclave.
4. JCI Inmates Lack a Meaningful Representational Nexus With the Boards
To summarize, the inmates at JCI are isolated from the surrounding community and subject to the control of DOC and the state. The Boards possess little legal authority or practical ability to substantially affect the JCI inmates’ lives through their policies. The District 3 representatives, and the Boards as a whole, appear to have made very little, if any, effort to solicit the input of JCI inmates. All of this is completely consistent with the general proposition that prisoners go on with their lives mostly separated from the communities in which their facilities happen to be located.
Given these facts, it’s clear that the inmates lack a meaningful representational nexus with the District 3 representatives and with the Boards as a whole. It is difficult to see how the District 3 representatives “represent” the inmates in the same way they represent others who are physically located in District 3. The representatives can’t really make policy decisions that would affect the inmates. The representatives could, of course, discuss issues of concern to the inmates during meetings and informally with other
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members of the Boards, but to what end? The proper target of such concerns in the vast majority of situations would be prison officials or state legislators. Given the nature of the inmates’ incarceration and the fact that DOC already has a comprehensive grievance system in place, it is unclear how the District 3 representatives could function as ombudspersons to inmates. Finally, any government benefits “brought home” by the representatives would likely be unavailable to the inmates because of their isolation from the community and the limits placed on their liberty.
Defendants nonetheless claim that the JCI inmates are properly counted as part of the political community and that they have a representational nexus with the Boards. ECF No. 46, at 10– 11. Defendants point out a number of ways in which the Boards act, directly or indirectly, to affect the lives of JCI inmates, but they basically boil down to three arguments: (1) the county provides emergency medical (ambulance), fire, and waste pickup services to JCI, ECF No. 46, at 3–7; (2) local government officials (including members of the Boards) can and have met with JCI offi-
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cials “acting on behalf of” inmates, id. at 3–4; and (3) local government officials and/or members of the community occasionally interact with inmates, id. at 4–6.30
These arguments are unpersuasive. The first argument is true as far as it goes—JCI is served by Jefferson County Fire & Rescue, see ECF No. 47-7, at 8–9—but it doesn’t really help Defendants much. The question isn’t whether the JCI inmates have any connection to the governing bodies of Jefferson County, but rather whether they have a substantial enough connection to plausibly be considered denizens on the same footing as the denizens of District 3. Having access to emergency medical and fire services doesn’t establish such a connection. The second argument fails because (1) it appears that local officials have met with prison officials quite infrequently, and (2) local officials have not met with prison officials to discuss the welfare of inmates, but rather to discuss how the prison affects the local economy—that is, how it affects nonincarcerated persons in the county. See ECF No. 48-1, at
30 Defendants also advance an argument that goes like this: the Boards “vote on budgets that impact the quality of education in the public schools in Jefferson County,” which then affects the quality of the labor pool, which then affects the “quality of correctional officers selected from that pool,” which then affects prisoners’ lives. ECF No. 36, at 7. This argument fails. A rubber band won’t stretch that far without snapping.
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66–67; ECF No. 48-7, at 17–19. The third argument fails because, as discussed earlier, the direct interactions between inmates and local officials have been so minimal as to be nearly nonexistent.
There are two anecdotes recounted by the District 3 representatives during their depositions that are in some ways more telling than anything else in the record. Hines Boyd, who has been the County Commissioner for District 3 for over seven years, was asked at his deposition about a statement in his affidavit that he had received letters from JCI inmates “on occasion.”
Q. Okay. Now, you state in this affidavit that you can’t recall the subject of those letters. But sitting here today, do you recall the subject matter of those inmate letters?
A. No. There was nothing that I could help any of those prisoners with that they asked for. So I just opened the letter, and I read it and set it aside.
Q. Did you ever respond to any of those letters?
A. No, I did not. ECF No. 48-7, at 21. It’s not surprising that Boyd couldn’t help the inmates writing to him—he doesn’t really represent them.
Shirley Washington, the School Board member from District 3, was asked about her relationship with the inmates at JCI. She
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stated that she had gone to the prison as a community member
rather than as a public official and interacted with inmates on a
few occasions. ECF No. 48-9, at 32. Ms. Washington lamented the
“condition” of the inmates’ confinement, confessing that her “first
visit [to JCI] was quite tearful.” Id. Plaintiffs’ lawyer asked her to
elaborate:
Q. Can you tell me what you mean by “condition?”
A. Well, the way they were living, having two in one cell. I mean, their freedom is gone.
Q. Okay. So we’re talking about their housing situation?
A. Yes. . . . Q. Okay. Did you do anything after that visit to address the housing condition for those inmates?
A. There was nothing I can do there about that, because they have administrators and other folks to take care of that. That would have been certainly out of my lane. . . . Q. . . . [D]id you believe that as a School Board member, there was anything you could do to improve their conditions, their housing conditions that you witnessed?
A. No, no.
Id. at 32–34.
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These are anecdotes, and do not by themselves prove any-
thing about the JCI inmates’ representational nexus with the
Boards. But they certainly support the conclusion—arrived at af-
ter considering other facts in the record and certain “legislative
facts” about the nature of incarceration—that the JCI inmates can-
not reasonably be considered to be denizens in the same way as
other people living in Jefferson County.31
C. The Constitutionality of the County’s Districting Scheme 1. Size of Deviations
The inmates at JCI lack a meaningful representational
nexus with the Boards. They are situated differently with respect
to the Boards than other people in Jefferson County—the true den-
izens of the County—in every way that matters for representative
democracy. Treating them alike makes little if any sense. The
question becomes whether there’s enough cognizable harm to the
representational and voting rights of those living in other districts
31 What about JCI inmates who were residents of Jefferson County preincarceration? They are more likely to have a representational nexus with the Boards, and should perhaps be counted. Plaintiffs suggest that there are nine such people, but a closer look reveals that there are nine inmates who were convicted in Jefferson County. ECF No. 30-1, at 52. It’s unclear whether all or some or none of these inmates were actually residents of Jefferson County. At any rate, the number is so small that accidentally excluding some of these inmates from the count would not appreciably dilute anyone’s voting or representational rights.
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to strike down the scheme as violative of one person, one vote. In other words, is the inmate population large enough that counting it dilutes these rights?
In some sense, the size of the inmate population shouldn’t matter. The “arbitrary discrimination” doctrinal path discussed earlier suggests that any population arbitrarily included in a population base, no matter how small, works an unconstitutional dilution of others’ rights.
But there’s no need to go that far—in this case, the inmate population is relatively large, and its inclusion quite clearly denies the denizens of Districts 1, 2, 4, and 5 equal protection of the laws by diluting both their representational and voting strength.32 The true denizen population of District 3 is about two-thirds the denizen population of the other districts, giving each denizen in District 3 one-and-a-half times the representational strength of the
32 Plaintiffs contend that the overall population deviation once the JCI inmates are excluded is above the 10% “safe harbor” threshold, and that Defendants have failed to provide a justification for such a large deviation. ECF No. 30, at 15–17. This argument, much like Defendants’ safe harbor argument, assumes the result it wants this Court to reach in drawing its conclusion. Whether the JCI inmates should be excluded when drawing districts is precisely the question this Court must answer, and pointing out the deviations that result when they are not counted does little to address that question.
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denizens of other districts and. Assuming there are no large pockets of nonvoters in Jefferson County aside from the JCI inmates, the disparity in denizen population also gives the voters in District 3 about one-and-a-half times the voting strength of the voters in other districts. This is clearly an equal protection violation.
Viewed another way, the total deviation of 42.63% that results from not counting the prisoners is simply too large to be ignored. The safe harbor rule, while inapplicable to this case, does at least provide a rough guide to how large deviations in the relevant numbers across districts must be for there to be no doubt that unlawful dilution has taken place. That threshold—10%—is crossed here, with room to spare.
2. Defendants’ Justifications As discussed at length already, the typical safe harbor/burden-shifting framework used in one person, one vote cases really has no applicability to this case. Defendants nonetheless offer what amount to “justifications” for the large total deviation that results when prisoners are excluded from the population base. One such justification is that the districting plan “serves the goal of promoting representational equality.” ECF No. 46, at 8. It doesn’t. Another argument—one not framed as a justification, but
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one that nonetheless sounds like a justification—is that Florida law required the Boards to count the prisoners. ECF No. 24, at 12– 13. That may or may not be true; the legal advice the Boards received was certainly to that effect. If it is true, though, it’s no justification—state law must yield when it leads to a result that conflicts with the mandates of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). To the extent Defendants are arguing that their good-faith belief that they were required to count the prisoners is a justification, they are mistaken. See Raske v. Martinez, 876 F.2d 1496, 1502 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The federal courts recognize no doctrine of ‘constitutional mistake’ that can absolve a legislature from the consequences of a misapprehension concerning a statute’s constitutionality.”)
D. The Special Circumstances of this Case (Or, the Not-So-Slippery Slope)
Defendants have predictably made a “slippery slope” argument. They warn that “should th[is] Court enter the arena of determining which individuals are worthy of being included in an entity’s population data, it should not be unexpected that arguments to exclude other segments of the population will shortly follow. Policy arguments exist to exclude resident aliens and minors, or to
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give more weight to areas that have a high concentration of eligible voters, such as areas with high concentrations of the elderly as opposed to younger families with children. This Court should not wade into these political judgments.” ECF No. 36, at 8–9.
I am convinced that the slope ahead is not so slippery. There are three key features of this case that make it special. First is the fact that we are dealing with prisoners. Prisoners are not like minors, or resident aliens, or children—they are separated from the rest of society and mostly unable to participate in civic life. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we are dealing with state prisoners and a county government. It is the interplay of the limited powers of the county government, the fact that the prisoners are under state control, and the fact that the prisoners are confined that deprives the prisoners of a meaningful representational nexus with the county government. Third, the size of the prison population relative to the size of the districts is such that counting the prisoners makes a substantial difference. This would not be the case in in counties with larger populations.
If any of these features were not present, this would be a different case. In particular, the situation would be quite different if we were dealing with a state legislative district, because state
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prisoners are obviously affected by the policies put in place at the state level. When Mr. Boyd received letters from JCI inmates, he put those letters aside because there was nothing he could do for them in his capacity as a County Commissioner. The same would not be true of the state senator and representative whose territory includes JCI.
E. A Closing Thought Defendants maintain that concluding that the JCI inmates cannot be counted for purposes of drawing districts for the Boards is “a policy determination as to [the] political equality of a certain segment of the population, a determination that [c]ourts have explicitly refused to make.” ECF No. 36, at 2 n.2. It is certainly true that the Supreme Court has made it clear that, as a general proposition, states get to decide—usually through legislative processes—“who counts” for purposes of state and local districting. The Court has also made clear, however, that federal courts have an important role to play in protecting individual rights, and that is precisely what this Court is doing. But to say that this Court is merely protecting the rights of the denizens of Districts 1, 2, 4, and 5 in making this decision is slightly disingenuous. My decision rests on the fact that there is
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no meaningful representational nexus between the Boards and the inmates at JCI—that is, there is nothing gained, constitutionally speaking, by including JCI inmates in the population base. This is the essential difference between this case and a case like Garza in which the population whose inclusion was at issue clearly possessed representational rights that would be impaired if the population was not included in the population base. The lack of a representational nexus itself turns in large part on the fact that the JCI inmates live sharply circumscribed lives. The fact is that the JCI inmates do not have “political equality” with the other denizens of Jefferson County vis-à-vis the Boards—not in terms of voting, of course, but also not in terms of representation.
That lack of political equality is not a consequence of my decision, but a factual predicate of it. In short, I have not decided that the JCI inmates lack political equality with their “neighbors” in Jefferson County—the State of Florida has. Florida has explicitly deprived the JCI inmates of their voting rights, see § 944.292(1), Fla. Stat. (2015), and it has implicitly deprived them of their representational rights, at least with respect to units of local government. That the deprivation is implicit makes it no less a deprivation.
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F. Remedy “When a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme unconstitutional, it is . . . appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). Despite the fact that this is an election year, I’m confident that the Boards can quickly devise a plan that does not impermissibly dilute the voting and representational strength of the denizens of Jefferson County. Plaintiffs have submitted what they term an “illustrative plan,” and their expert claims that this plan meets all constitutional and statutory requirements. ECF No. 30-1, at 14–17. This could perhaps be a starting point for the Boards—or perhaps not. Whatever they choose to do, the Boards must act relatively quickly. If they “do not respond, or the imminence of [the] . . . election makes it impractical for them to do so, it [will] become[] the ‘unwelcome obligation’” of this Court to devise an interim districting plan. See Lipscomb, 437 U.S. at 540.
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V. CONCLUSION Defendants argue vigorously that excluding the JCI inmates from the population base for districting purposes would be “arbitrary.” ECF No. 46, at 8; ECF No. 36, at 7–8. The opposite is true— including them in the population base is arbitrary. The inmates at JCI, unlike aliens, children, etc. living in Jefferson County, are not meaningfully affected by the decisions of the Boards. To say they are “constituents” of the Board representatives from District 3 is to diminish the term constituent. To treat the inmates the same as actual constituents makes no sense under any theory of one person, one vote, and indeed under any theory of representative democracy. Furthermore, such treatment greatly dilutes the voting and representational strength of denizens in other districts. Jefferson County’s districting scheme for its Board of County Commissioners and School Board therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 1. Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 30, is GRANTED. Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24, is DENIED.
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Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 49 Filed 03/19/16 Page 86 of 86

2. Defendants are enjoined from using the current dis-

tricting plan for the Jefferson County Board of County

Commissioners and the Jefferson County School

Board.

3. Defendants must submit to this Court on or before

Monday, April 4, 2016 a proposed districting plan

that complies with this Order and with all applicable

federal and state laws, to the extent those state laws

are compatible with federal law.

SO ORDERED on March 19, 2016.

s/Mark E. Walker

____

United States District Judge

86

 
 Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KATE CALVIN,JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH,LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO.: 4:15-CV-00131-MW-CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS,in his official capacity,

Defendants.

DEFENDANT,JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS'NOTICE OF FILING PURSUANT TO ORDER
Pursuant to the Court's March 19, 2016, Order, the Defendant, Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners submits the following:
1. Affidavit of Stephen Walker, Chair of the Board of County Commissioners — providing the approved proposed Mapla-1 that excludes the inmate population from the census data used to develop the District Map;
2. Affidavit of Kurt Spitzer, the consultant who developed Map la-1 — providing the methodology used for developing Map 1a-1, and

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 3
3. Affidavit of Marty Bishop, Supervisor of Elections — providing elections data from prior case involving redistricting litigation in Jefferson County.
Respectfully submitted, / s / Linda Bond Edwards LINDA BOND EDWARDS Florida Bar No.0057282 BRIAN L. HAYDEN Florida Bar No.058987 RUMBERGER,KIRK & CALDWELL A Professional Association 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 702 Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2507 Telephone: (850)222-6550 Telecopier: (850)222-8783 E-mail: ledwards@rumberger.com
bhayden@rumberger.com Attorneys for Defendants Board and Bishop
2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 4, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following: Nancy G. Abudu at nabudu@aclufl.org; Shalini Goel Agarwal at sagarwal@aclufl.org; Randall C. Berg, Jr. at rberg@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org; and Dante P. Trevisani at dtrevisani@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org and Gerald B. Curington at jcurington@ausley.com.
/ s / Linda Bond Edwards LINDA BOND EDWARDS Florida Bar No.0057282 BRIAN L. HAYDEN Florida Bar No.058987 RUMBERGER,KIRK & CALDWELL A Professional Association 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 702 Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2507 Telephone: (850)222-6550 Telecopier: (850)222-8783 E-mail: ledwards@rumberger.com
bhayden@rumberger.com Attorneys for Defendants Board and Bishop
3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KATE CALVIN,JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH,LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO.: 4:15-CV-00131-MW-CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS,in his official capacity,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN WALKER STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF LEON

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Stephen Walker, who being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 20
2. I am the elected commissioner for County District 5 for the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) for Jefferson County and I currently serve as Chair ofthe BOCC.
3. Upon learning of the March 19, 2016 Order in the above referenced matter, the BOCC contacted Kurt Spitzer, the consultant that provided the redistricting maps for the BOCC in 2013. He was generally advised of the requirement to remove the inmate population from the census data used for redistricting. He was also advised that, in accordance with the Court's order, the map had to meet all state and federal requirements.
4. We also publically noticed BOCC meetings to discuss any proposed map for March 28-31 and April 1, 2016 in order to comply with the Court's order.
5. On March 28, 2016, the BOCC voted not to appeal the Order and engaged Mr. Spitzer to provide proposed maps for our consideration. In discussion of redistricting maps, the BOCC was also mindful of the requirements of earlier litigation that established single member districts in Jefferson County. The BOCC's understanding ofthe litigation,Parrish, et al v. Jefferson County, Florida, et al., Case No. TCA-83-7481 1\4MP (N.D. Fla December 18, 1985), was that one district had to remain a majority minority district (which historically has been District 2) and one district had to be a balanced district (which historically has been District 3). The "balanced district" was established so that a candidate of
2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 20
either race could be elected. At the time of the 1985 final order, the Black population in District 3 was 37.3%. (See Exhibit 1.)1
6. After public meetings on March 28 and March 30 and a joint meeting with the School Board of Jefferson County on March 31 to consider proposed maps, on April 1, 2016, the BOCC for Jefferson County unanimously voted to accept what has been identified as Map 1a-1 as the Map showing county districts. (See Attachment A.)
7. Map la-1 excludes the prison population as ordered by the Court and raises the percentage of African American voters in District 3 to just over 40%,the highest in Jefferson County history.
8. In accordance with Florida Statutes Chapter 124.02, upon your approval of the BOCC's proposed map or another map, the BOCC will enter the boundaries established by the maps into the minutes of the BOCC and a certified copy shall be published at least once per week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in Jefferson County.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Stephen Walker
I This final order was modified on February 28, 1986, but the population numbers did not change.
3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 4 of 20 STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
The foregoing instrument was sworn to and subscribed before me this
1-k day of April, 2016, Stephen Walker.
Signature ofNotary
AUNDREA M.SCOTT
MY COMMISSION # FF937946 EXPIRES:December 29,2019
PRINT,TYPE OR STAMP NAME OF NOTARY
Personally known OR Produced Identification
Type ofIdentification Produced TL, ckv Ne)rs\ 1 k'cyeAr‘c-,('
4
8939620.1

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 5 of 20

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

CHARLES J. PARRISH; GEORGIANA BARKER, JOHN BYRD; CLARENCE GANZY, THOMAS B. SCOTT, SR.; ALBERT HALL, DRESSIE MAE SLOAN; C. W. McQUEEN; WILLIAM TILLMAN; DOUGLAS TURNER, JR.; JOHN BARKER; and JAMES JONES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

vs.

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION NO.
TCA-83-7481-MMP

JEFFERSON COUNTY, FLORIDA; WALTER EDWARDS; MORDAUNT BISHOP;. BUTLER WALKER; GEN COOKSEY; and JOHN WARD, County Commissioners, their successors ana agents, all in their official
capacities,

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT
On December 22, 1983, the above named Plaintiffs filed
their Complaint .against the above. named Defendants alleging that at-large county-wide voting for members of the Jefferson

OFF113;: OF

DEC 13 P1112: 35

FILE

EXHIBIT
Oi
2
YI

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 6 of 20
County Commission excludes black representation and participation and minimizes and cancels out black voting strength in violation of their rights secured by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, Publ. L. No. 97-205, §3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982), amending 42 U.S.C. §1973, et. seq. (hereinafter "Voting Rights Act").
The Court, having reviewed the status of this action, and being aided by the recommendations of the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel_, and being of the opinion that the' best interest of all the parties and all the citizens of Jefferson County, Florida, would be served by approving the Final Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the Fiona' Judgmept tendered by ?laintiffs' and Defendants' counsel, finds that said Judgment was entered into voluniarilv by the parties, and that it should be approved.
IT IS THEREFORE, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. This decree extends to all issues set forth in the Complaint in this matter and to the 'class of Plaintiffs defined as all black residents of Jefferson County, Florida.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and the parties thereto.
3. That pursuant to the Florida Constitution, Art. 8, §5, Jefferson County has provided for the election of all members of the Jefferson County Commission through at-large elections.
-2-

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 7 of 20

4. That due to a series of factors including a past history of official racial discrimination within Jefferson

County and the State of Florida, certain socio-economic

conditions of black citizens in Jefferson County, the at-large

election system for the Jefferson County Commission has had the

effect of denying black citizens of Jefferson County an_ equal

opportunity to participate in the political process and elect

candidates of their own choice in violation of Plaintiffs'

rights as described by the Voting_Right4-Ast-

5. Defendin;:ts ate I'.large elect onSlar

dined from -prositding county-wide ch vio1ateSIthe.>Voting Righti

Act.

6. The attached "Election Plan," Appendices 1 through 4,

contains the election plan for the Jefferson County Commission,

Florida to conduct future elections. Appendix 1 sets forth the population by race contained in each of the five single member

districts. Appendix 2Tcontains a copy of the map of Jefferson

County depicting the boundaries of each district. Appendix

contains a legal• description listing the boundaries of each district. Appendix 4 lta,ts each piesent County Commissioner,

the district number from which the Commissioner was elected and

the date the Commissioner was elected:

7. The Court has been advised that the parties_ have not resolved issues pertaining to the timetable for implementation

of the five single member district election plan. Accordingly, the Court will enter a seParate order which will provide for

-3-

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 8 of 20
Jlr
the schedule of elections for the Jefferson County Commission in the single member district election system described herein.
8. Therefore, the Court finds that the "Election Plan" as submitted is a proper remedy in this action, and is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Judgment as attached. AW:elections henceforth will proceed• on :a single district basis; •that is all candidates •i future elections must reside in the residence area for whi.oh'theY seek eleCtion and' OnlY'voters in thAt particular residence area shall cast ballots for the particular candidate running in that area.
9. a. As the prevailing party in this action, Plaintiffs are entitled, pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a8 amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973(e), and Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988, to an award of attorney fees and litigation expense reimbursement.
b. The parties will attempt to resolve the attorney fees and litigation expense reimbursement issue. In the event the parties have resolved this issue, the Court shall be so informed and all attorney fees and costs for Plaintiffs' counsel shall be payable to Plaintiffs by Defendants within twenty (30) days after the execution of the Final Judgment.
c. In the event the parties have not agreed on the amount of Plaintiffs' attorney fees and litigation expenses, Plaintiffs shall file with the Court within twenty (30) days from issuance of the Court's Final Judgment appropriate fee/expense submissions and accompanying memoranda as to this
-4-

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 9 of 20

issue. Defendants shall respond within twenty (30) days from

Plaintiffs' filing. The Court shall then enter an appropriate

Order granting Plaintiffs' attorney fees and litigation

expenses consistent with the parties' submissions.

10. •This litigation will be deemed closed and will be

removed from the pending docket of this Court, upon this Court

issuing a separate order scheduling elections under the single

member election system as described herein, and after being--

advised that the attorney fees issue has been resolved or, if

not resolved between the parties, the entry of an Order

Awarding Attorney Fees.

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THIS 4; 7/ 1 day of

%Y'

-)

1985.

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:

T. BUCKINGH BIRD, ESQ. P.O. Box 247 Monticello, Florida 32344

G. GRAHAM CAROTHERS, ESQ.Q P.O. Box 391 Tallahssee, Florida 31302

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

DATED:

,2&24414./3 /9es-

0180P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ROBERT E. WEISBERG DAVID M. LIPMAN,
LIPMAN & WEISBERG 5901 S.W. 74 Street Suite 304 Miami, Florida 33143-5186 (305) 662-2600 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS DATED: ''''')e(kj..)-4A\/).

-5-

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 10 of 20

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

CHARLES J. PARRISH; GEORGIANA BARKER, JOHN BYRD; CLARENCE GANZY, THOMAS B. SCOTT, SR.; ALBERT HALL, DRESSIE MAE SLOAN; C. W. McQUEEN; WILLIAM TILLMAN; DOUGLAS TURNER, JR.; JOHN BARKER; and JAMES JONES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CIVIL ACTION NO. TCA-83-7481-MMP

JEFFERSON COUNTY, FLORIDA; WALTER EDWARDS; MORDAUNT BISHOP; BUTLER WALKER; GEN COOKSEY; and JOHN WARD,
County Commissioners) their successors and agents, all in their official
capacities)

Defendants.

APPENDICES TO FINAL JUDGMENT
1. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA REFLECTING POPULATION AND VOTER REGISTRATION BY DISTRICT
2. MAP OF SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS 3. LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS 4. LIST OF PRESENT COMMISSIONERS

-2-

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 11 of 20
APPENDIX 1 DEMOGRAP2IC DATA REFLECTING
POPULATION AND VOTER REGISTRATION BY DISTRICT

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 12 of 20

e

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA REFLECTING POPULATION AND VOTER REGISTRATION BY DISTRICT

Population

District Total* White (%)

(orange) I

2,198

977 (44.4)

(yellow) II

2,124

762 (35.9)

(blue) III

2,061

1,281 (62.2)

(green) IV

2,330

(red)

V . 1,990

1,460 (62.7) 1,085 (54.5)

Totals 10,703

5,565 (50.8)

Black

(%)

1,217 (55.4)

1,357 (63.9)

769 (37.3)

865 (37.1)

902 (45.3)

5,110 (48.6)

District I
II III
IV V
Totals

Voting Age Population

Total 1,416

White

(%)

676 (47.7)

Black (%) 740 (52.3)

1,414

582 (41.2)

832 (58.8)

1,403

952 (67.9)

451 (32,1)

1,612

1,054 (65.4)

558 (34.6)

1,302

762 (57.7)

540 (40.8)

7,147

4,026 (56.3) 3,121 (43.7)

*Population totals include persons of other origins

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 13 of 20
APPENDIX 2 MAP OF SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 14 of 20
APPENDIX NO. 3 LEGAL DESCRIPTION

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 15 of 20

LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS FOR

/4

JEFFERSON COUNTY, FLORIDA

DISTRICT 1;
Beginning at a point in the Georgia-Florida line at the intersection of said line and a county road known as Georgia Forks W. Road, thence South along Georgia Forks W. Road to its intersection with First Branch, thence South along First Branch to its intersection with County Road 149-A, thence easterly along county Road 149-A to its intersection with Little Branch, thence South along Little Branch to its intersection with a county road known as Caesar Steen Road, thence South along Caesar Steen Road to its intersection with County Road 146, thence southwesterly along CR 146 to its intersection with a county road known as Cypress Road /Rocky Branch Road; thence West along Cypress Road to its intersection with the East City Limits •of Monticello, thence West, North and West, along the City Limits line to its intetsection with Dump Street; thence South along Dump Street to its intersection with Rocky Branch Road, thence West along Rocky Branch Road to its intersection with Railroad Street; thence South Along Railroad Street to its intersection with Pearl Street/Ccunty Road 146; thence East along Pearl Street/CR 146 to its intersection with Simpson Avenue, thence South along Simpson Avenue to its intersection with U.S. 90; thence southeasterly along u,S. 90 to its intersection with a county road known as Big Joe Road, thence South along Big Joe Road to its intersection with
County Road 158, thence westerly along CR 158 to its intersection with a county road known as Turkey Scratch Road, thence
southeasterly along Turkey Scratch Road to its intersection with the Tallahassee Base Line, thence West along the Tallahassee Base Line to its intersection with a county road known as WPA road, thence South along the WPA Road to its intersection with U.S, 27, thence westerly along U.S. 27 to its intersection with a county road known as Welaunee Road, thence South along Welaunee Road to a county road known 'as Walker Springs Road, thence East along Walker Springs Road to• a county road known as O'Neal Tram Road; thence South along O'Neal Tram Road to the Jefferson County/Taylor County Line, thence North along the Jefferson County/Taylor County. Line and Jefferson County/Madison County Line to its intersection with the Georgia-Florida Line; thence West along the Georgia-Florida Line to the Point of Beginning.
City of Monticello municipal limits boundary being those in effect on December 16, 1985.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 16 of 20
//
' DISTRICT
Beginning at a point on the North City Limits Line of Monticello at the intersection of said line" with Dump Street, thence running westerly along the North City Limits Line to its intersection with Jefferson Street/U.S, 19; thence South along Jefferson Street/U.S. 19 to its intersection with the South City Limits at Nacosa Road, also including that portion of Coopers Pond subdivision as annexed to the City of Monticello, thence East and northerly along the City Limits Line to its intersection with Washington Street/U.S. 90; thence North along Simpson Avenue to intersection with Pearl Street, thence West along Pearl Street to its intersection with Railroad Street; thence North along Railroad Street to its intersection with Rocky Branch Road; thence East along Rocky Branch Road to its intersection with Dump Street, thence North along Dump Street to the Point of Beginning.
DISTRICT III.
Beginning als a point on the North City Limits Line of the City of Monticello at the :intersection of said line and Jefferson Street/U.S. 19, thence running South along Jefferson Street/U.S. 19 to its intersection with the South City Limits at Nacosa Road, but excluding that portion of Coopers Pond subdivision as annexed to the City of Monticello, thence East and northerly along the City Limits Line to its intersection with U.S. 90, thence southeasterly along U.S. 90 to its intersection with a county road known as Dig Joe Road, thence South along Big Joe Road to its intersection with County Road 158, thence westerly along CR 158 to its intersection with a County Road known • as Turkey Scratch Road, thence southeasterly along Turkey Scratch Road to its intersection with the Tallahassee Base Line; thence westerly along the. Tallahassee Base Line to its intersection with a county road known as WPA Road, thence North and West along WPA Road to its intersection with U.S. 19, thence South along U.S. 19 to its intersection with a county road known as Thomson Road, thence West along Thomson Road to its intersection with CR 259, thence South along CR 259 to its intersection with a county road known as Water Mill Road, thence northwesterly along Water Mill Road to ,its intersection with Lloyd Creek, thence northwesterly along Lloyd Creek to its intersection with Morris Creek, thence easterly and northerly along Morris Creek to its intersection with CR 158-A, thence easterly along CR 150-A to its intersection with Caney Creek, thence northwesterly along Caney Creek to its intersection with U.S. 90, thence easterly along U.S. 90 to its intersection with Lois Creek, thence southerly along Lois Creek to its intersection with Casa Bianca Creek, thence South, North and East along Casa Bianca Creek to its intersection with Bird Creek, thence easterly along Bird Creek to its intersection with the West City Limits of Monticello, thence North and East along the West City Limits Line, to include Holly Hills subdivision and Pecan Grove Estates subdivision as annexed to the City of Monticello, and to the point of Beginning.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 17 of 20
DISTRICT IV.
Beginning at a point on the Georgia-Florida Line at the intersection of said line and a county road known as Georgia Forks W. Road, thence running South along Georgia Forks W. Road to its intersection with First Branch, thence South along First Branch to its intersection with County Road 149-A, thence easterly along CR 149-A to its intersection with Little Branch, thence South along Little Branch to its intersection with a county road known as Caesar Steen Road, thence South along Caesar Steen Road to County Road 146, thence southwesterly along County Road 146 to its intersection with Cypress Road/Rocky Branch Road, thence West along Cypress Road to its intersection with the East City Limit Line of Monticello, thence North, West and then southerly along the City Limits Line to its intersection with Bird Creek, thence northwesterly along Bird Creek to its intersection with Casa Bianca Creek, thence South and West along Casa Bianca Creek to 'its intersection with Lois Creek, thence northwesterly along Lois Creek to its intersection with U.S. 90, thence West along U.S. 90 to its intersection with Caney Creek, thence southeasterly along Caney Creek to its intersection with County Road 158-A, thence West along CR 158-A to its intersection with Morris Creek, thence southerly along Morris Creek to its intersection with U.S. 10, thence West along U.S. 10 to its intersection with Lloyd Creek, thence South on Lloyd Creek to its intersection with County Road 158, thence Easterly along CR 158 to its intersection with the county road known as the Lloyd-Waukeenah Road, thence South along the Lloyd-Waukeenah Road to its intersection with the county road known as the Springfield Road, thence West along the Springfield road to its intersection with State Road 59, thence South along State Road 59 to its intersection with U.S. 27, thence West along U.S. 27 to its intersection with the Jefferson County/Leon County Line, thence North along the Jefferson County/Leon County Line to its intersection with the Georgia-Florida Line, thence East along the Georgia-Florida Line to the Point of Beginning.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 18 of 20
DISTRICT V.
beginning at a point on the Jefferson County/Leon County Line at the intersection of said line and U.S. 27, thence running southeasterly along U.S. 27 to its intersection with State Road 59, thence north along S.R. 59 to its intersection with a county road known as the Springfield Road, thence westerly along the Springfield Road to its intersection with the county Toad known as the Lloyd-Waukeenah Road, thence northwesterly along the Lloyd-Waukeenah Road to its intersection with County Road 158, thence west along CR 158 to its intersection with Lloyd Creek, thence northerly along Lloyd Creek to its intersection with U.S. 10, thence east ,along U.S. 10 to its intersection with MOrris Creek, thence southerly along Morris Creek to its intersection with Lloyd Creek, thence southeasterly along Lloyd Creek to its intersection with a county road known as Water Mill Road, thence easterly along Water Mill Road to its intersection with County Road 259, thence .north along CR 259 to its intersection with a county road known as Thomson Road, thence easterly along Thomson Road to its intersection with U.S. 19, thence northeasterly along U.S. 19 to its intersection with a county road known as WPA Road, thence easterly and southerly along WPA Road to its intersection with U.S. 27, thence westerly along U.S. 27 to its intersection with a county road known as Welaunee Road, thence south along Welaunee Road to a county Road known as Walker Springs Road; thence east along Walker Springs Road to a county road known as O'Neal Tram Road, thence south along O'Neal Tram Road to its intersection with the Jefferson County/Taylor County Line, thence south along the Jefferson County/Taylor County Line to the Gulf of Mexico, thence westerly along the Gulf of Mexico to the Jefferson County/Wakulla County Line, thence north along the Jefferson County/Wakulla County line and Jefferson County/Leon County Line to the point of beginning.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 19 of 20

DISTRICT NUMBER FROM WHICH COMMISSIONER ELECTED

APPENDIX NO. 4

NAME OF COMMISSIONER MORDAUNT BISHOP JOHN WARD1/ GENE COOKSEY WALTER EDWARDS BUTLER WALKER

YEAR ELECTED 1984 1982 1984 1982 1984

1/ Commissioner John Ward does not live in District No. 2 which results in no Commissioner residing in District No. 2 as defined by this Final Judgment. However, Commissioner Ward shall continue as the representative of District No. 2 through the completion of his term in 1986.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-1 Filed 04/04/16 Page 20 of 20
PLAN la-1 DISTRICTS

Lariy Halme Betsy Barti ld

Shirley Washingt

Stephen Walker

•

wau komm

..— ..I.... • CtiarleS BOland
~4wadnaf r•

Aounders

^e lamn Bishop

Insel 111

IKAgenelei VIrterif
* Commissioner Residence 6 School Board Reeldence SM Priem
Ezi Plan 10-1 Distel BOUndary
Existing Distrlcte District 1 - Benjamin Bishop District 2- Gene Hall District 3- Hines Boyd District Betsy Berfielel District 5- Stephen Walker
[73 - City Boundary CounlyBoundaw
113State Botindie

Sandra Saunders
6

Hines Boyd

Gene Hall

Milos

' AVERAGE DISTRICT

ACTUAL

PERCENT !

(MEAN)

!DEVIATION

1 WHITE

#

POPULATION!

DEVIATION [

POPULATION

1 2 3 4 5 1

2721 2721 2721 2721 2721

2855 2690 2839 2611 2612 yepe HI. I

134.00 • (31.00) ' 118.00 j (110.00) (109.00) !

4.69% -1.15% 4.16% -4.21% -4.17%

1964 1074 1553 2010 1728

PERCENT WHITE

68.79% 39.93% 54.70% 76.98% 66.16% •

771 1533 1144 536 804

PERCENT

PERCENT

HISPANIC

BLACK

HISPANIC

27.01%

117

56.99%

64 :

40.30%

141

20.53% i 69 :

30.78% 1 71

4.10% 2.38% 4.97% 2.64% 2.72%

OTHER

PERCENT OTHER

4

120

4.20%

83

3.09%

142

5.00%

65

2.49%

80

3.06%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KATE CALVIN,JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH,LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO.: 4:15-CV-00131-MW-CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS,in his official capacity,

Defendants.
/ AFFIDAVIT OF KURT SPITZER STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF LEON

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Kurt Spitzer, who being

first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the matters set forth

herein. 2.

My name is Kurt Spitzer. I hold a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of

South Florida and a Masters in Public Administration from Florida State University. 3. I have served as the consultant in redistricting for the following entities: Boards of

County Commissioners and School Boards for Flagler, Brevard, Levy, Pinellas, Nassau, Sumter

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 10
and Jefferson counties; the Leon County School Board, the cities of Daytona Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Fort Myers and Pompano Beach.
4. In March 2015, I was engaged by the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County as the consultant to redraw the redistricting maps in Jefferson County Florida so that the Board of County Commissioners could comply with the court order dated March 19, 2016 in the matter of Calvin, et al v. Board ofCounty Commissioners, Jefferson County School Board, and'Warty Bishop, Supervisor ofElections ofJefferson County in his Official Capacity, Case No. 4:15cv131-MW/CAS, pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida .
5. I drew the redistricting maps based on criteria specified in the Court's order to remove the census blocks that included inmates housed at Jefferson Correctional Institution. I followed the same methodology that I used when I drew the maps in December 2013.
6, Monticello (pop.2,506), the county seat and largest community in Jefferson County, is about 25 miles east of Tallahassee. In addition to Monticello, there are five small unincorporated communities in Jefferson County with boundaries defined by the Census Bureau (called "Census Designated Places") — Wacissa (pop. 386), Waukeenah (pop. 272), Lloyd (pop. 281), Lamont(pop. 178)and Aucilla(pop. 100). The county has a land area of598 square miles and a water area of about 38 square miles.
7. Excluding the prison population, the county has a total population of 13,607 and a non-Hispanic single-race Black population of 4,788 (35.19%). The 2010 non-Hispanic White population is 8,329(61.18%). Thus, without taking into account the prison population, the 2010
2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 10
total minority population in Jefferson County is 5,740 (42.18%) — consisting of all persons who are not single-race, non-Hispanic White. 1
8. At a minimum, all county governments are required to consider the necessity to realign the district boundaries of tis legislative body (the County Commission) after each decennial census. The primary purpose of such redistricting exercises is to determine if the population of each district is as close to being equal to one another as is possible, thus furthering the goal of"one person, one vote" and other policy objectives.
9. Population is the dominant criteria to be considered in all districting plans. Districts should be as nearly equal in population as is possible and in most cases, may not be greater than 5% over(or under)the average district size.
10. Other criteria are considered when redistricting commission boundaries. They are intended to preserve communities of interest and create districts and district boundaries that are easily understood by voters. All criteria are considered in total — none are absolute. A variety of factors are "balanced" with each other.
11. In addition to equal population, other criteria include: no discriminatory effect; census blocks; logical boundaries; municipal and neighborhood boundaries; compact district shape; and recognition of existing district boundaries. I will describe each of these more fully below.
12. No Discriminatory Effect — where it is clear that a minority community votes in a cohesive manner, districts should not be drawn in a way that has a discriminatory effect toward that community. District boundaries that have the effect of diluting minority voting strength should be avoided. However, districts that have highly illogical or "bizarre" shapes, that are
i The amounts do not equal 100% because some Hispanics may be counted twice in the census data.
3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 4 of 10
drawn exclusively to create minority-influence or minatory-majority districts, should likewise be avoided.
13. Census Blocks — Data from census blocks is presumed to be correct and is an efficient source of population information. Generally, district boundary lines should follow census block boundaries, although splitting one or more census blocks is acceptable when necessary to further a valid policy objective,
14. Logical Boundaries — District boundaries should generally follow significant, existing natural or man-made boundaries when possible and practical to do so, such as major highways, railroads, water bodies, etc., as those types of boundaries are more easily understood by the electorate.
15. Municipal and Neighborhood Boundaries — District boundaries should attempt to avoid splitting neighborhood and municipal boundaries.
16. Compact District Shape — While district shapes will never be perfect circles or squares, they should have a shape that is relatively compact. "Bizarre" or "serpentine" shapes should be avoided.
17. Recognition of Existing District Boundaries — Plans to redistrict count commissions should follow existing boundaries to the extent possible, as such plans recognize the preferences of the voters that elected the incumbents.
18. The consulting team used several sources of data during the course of the project. Population information for 2010 was obtained from the US Bureau of the Census in unites known as "census blocks." Such blocks are of widely varying shapes and population sizes but generally follow logical boundaries such as city blocks, streets, roads or highways, creek beds, lakes, railroad tracks, etc.
4

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 5 of 10
19. Block data includes the total number of persons identified as being residents of the census block. It also includes a wide variety of information concerning the background of each person, such as race and ethnicity. Data concerning the existing district boundary lines was provided to the consultant by the staff of Jefferson County. Additionally, a wide variety of other readily available geographic features (roads, water bodies, etc.) was added into the mapping database.
20. The primary software used for data analysis and mapping purposes was ESRI Corporation's ArcGIS 10,1.
21. Current commission district boundaries were added as a data field. Layering existing districts over the 2010 population data allowed the consultant to determine the current population of each district and whether one or more districts were significantly over or under the population of the average district size, and the racial composition of the population of each district.
22. Generally districts should be less than 5% over or under the average size of a commission district. After adding the current district boundaries to the new population data, it was determined that the populations ofthe current commission districts were not"as nearly equal in population as possible" as required by the Florida constitution and statutes.
23. Following the guidelines in the above referenced matter, an using the 2010 data, the average or "ideal" population size of the commission districts in Jefferson County is 2721. Current populations of the existing commission districts excluding the inmate population are as follows:
5

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 6 of 10

Jefferson Co Population Totals(no Prison)

Dist!CI 1 District 2 District 3 District 4 District 5
Jefferson County

Existing (Plan A)Districts

V1THT
2,078 1,057 1,069 2,348 1,777 8,329

SU( 790
1,676 747 623 953
4,788

0TH 130 88 83 102 87 490

HSP 129 73 81 104 75 462

• TOT :PCTEILK 2,998 26.3509006 2,820 59.39716312 1,899 39.33649289 3;073 20.27334852 2;817 33.83031594 3,607 35.187771

277

9.23

99

3.50

-822 -43.31

352 11.44

96

3.39

Average Population (no Prison)=

2,721.40 2,721

24. Thus, none of the five districts are within the generally-accepted thresholds for population; two of the five districts deviate significantly from the average district size. Districts 1 and 4 should lose at least a small amount of population. District 3's population has to increase to accommodate for the loss of the prison population. All Districts except 3 will lose population.
25. Redistricting of the County Commission's district boundaries was necessary to comply with the Court's order in order to bring Jefferson's Commission Districts into compliance.
26. Alternative Plan 1 a-1 for the new district boundaries meet acceptable criteria and was proposed for discussion and consideration. Demographic and statistical information concerning the plan is included in a table located at the bottom ofthe map. (See Attachment A)
27. To add population to District 3 from the other Districts and to make adjustments to all Districts so that their populations were as nearly equal as practicable and to meet the other criteria as required by state and federal statutes and case law, the following reassignments in census blocks were made. Blocks not listed in the below table were not moved from the District to which they were assigned in 2013.

6

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 7 of 10

Block Name
Block 3021 Block 3022 Block 3023 Block 3024 Block 3040 Block 3055 Block 3056 Block 3057 Block 3058 Block 3059 Block 3071 Block 1069 Block 1071 Block 1072 Block 1074 Block 1075 Block 1076 Block 4055 Block 4056 Block 4066 Block 4068 Block 4069 Block 1002 Block 3006 Block 3008 Block 3014 Block 1024 Block 1028 Block 1029 Block 1059 Block 1060 Block 1061 Block 1062 Block 1106 Block 1107 Block 1108 Block 2016 Block 3002 Block 2058 Block 2078 Block 2088 Block 2093 Block 2095 Block 2171

Existing Districts w/o Prison

Plan 1a-1 Districts w/o Prison

1

1

3

1

1

1

3

1

3

1

3

1

1

1

3

1

2

1

2

1

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

3

3

3

3

1

3

2

3

2

3

2

3

2

2

2

1

2

4

2

4

2

4

2

4

2

4

2

4

2

4

3

4

0

0

3

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

Notes
Jefferson Arms A•artments Jefferson Correctional Institution
7

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 8 of 10

Block 1006 Block 1007 Block 1008 Block 1009 Block 1012 Block 1023 Block 1024 Block 1025 Block 1026 Block 1079 Block 1080 Block 2021 Block 2022 Block 2023 Block 2024 Block 2025 Block 2026 Block 2036 Block 2082 Block 2084 Block 4036 Block 4037 Block 4039 Block 4040 Block 4050 Block 4051 Block 2003 Block 1003 Block 1004 Block 1005 Block 1006 Block 1007 Block 1008 Block 1009 Block 1010 Block 1011 Block 1022 Block 1023 Block 1024 Block 1025 Block 1026 Block 1027 Block 1042 Block 1043 Block 1044 Block 1045 Block 1046 Block 1056

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

3

4

4

4

4

3

4

4

4

3

4

2

4

4

2

4

2

4

2

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 9 of 10

Block 1057 Block 1059 Block 1068 Block 1077 Block 1081

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

5

3

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Kurt Spitzer
STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF LEON
The foregoing instrument was sworn to and subscribed before me this April, 2016, by Kurt Spitzer.

day of

Signature of Notary
AUNDREA M.SCOTT
MY COMMISSION #FF937946 EXPIRES:Occerobar 29,2019
PRINT,TYPE OR STAMP NAME OF NOTARY
Personally known OR Produced Identification Type of Identification Produced "V L QC(
9

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-2 Filed 04/04/16 Page 10 of 10 PLAN la-1 DISTRICTS

Hehlt' Radheld
Jd'JSGI1D®24
COmerry

Benlaafm Bishop
* Coramlaener Reeldense • Stnnal Hnard sosehr* • Prlson Ej Plan 18.1 Diele Boandsry ExIsting DIstrIcts
Dielet 1 - UNemin BlshoP DIshIst 2.Gene Hall DishIct 3- Hinee Boyel DisIdol 4 - Betsy Badield Diele 5- Stephen Welker City Boundaly County Boundary Stete Boundee

HInes Boyd

Gerte` Hall

DISTRICT

AVERAGEACTUAL (MEAN)

DEVIATION PERCENT

POPULATION POPULATION

DEVIATION

2721

2855

134,00

4,69%

2

2721

2690

(31 00) : -1 15%

3

2721

2839

118 00

4 16%

2721

2611

(110.00)

-4 21%

5

2721

2612

(109 00)

-4 17%

WHITE
1964 1074 1553 2010 1728

PERCENT

PERCENT

PERCENT

WHITE

KLACK KACK HISPANIC HISPAMC

6879% 39 93% 54 70% 76 98% 66 16%

771 1533 1144 538 804

27.01% . 56,99% 40.30% 20 53% 30 78%

117 64 141 69 71. j

410% 2 38% 4 97% 264% 2 72%

OTHER • PERCENT OTHER

120

4 20%

83

309%

142

500%

65

2 49%

80

306%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-3 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 5

04-04-'16 13:15 FROM-Jefferson Co, Supery 850-997-6958

T-589 P0002/0006 F-449

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KATE CALVIN,JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J.PARRISH,LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO,: 4:15-CV-00131-MW-CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS,in his official capacity,

Defendants,

AFFIDAVIT OF MARTY BISHOP STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

BEFORE ME,the undersigned authority, personally appeared Marty Bishop, who being first duly sworn,deposes and says as follows:
1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-3 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 5

04-04-'16 13:15 FROM-Jefferson Co, Supery 850-997-6958

T-589 P0003/0006 F-449

2. I currently serve as the elected Supervisor of Elections for Jefferson County, Florida. I am also the custodian of voting and election records for Jefferson County.
3. On March 31, 2016, I reviewed a document prepared by Commissioner Hines Boyd entitled "DISTRICT 3 VOTER PERFORMANCE, COUNTY COMMISSION AND SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS WITH BLACK AND WHITE CANDIDATES 2002-2014."(See Exhibit A,)
4. The information contained in this document is true and correct based on my review ofthe election records for Jefferson County.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-3 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 5

04-04-'16 13:15 FROM-Jefferson Co, Supery 850-997-6958

T-589 P0004/0006 F-449

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
The foregoing instrument was sworn to and subscribed before me this q day ofApril,2016,by Marty Bishop,

Offil1111,114V

0,4S1W8Y/0:17A4:04%, ,

:4=

•v231'.

(25LSignat re of Notary

4

"

4

41E46,1V

* AT:

; . 4 . 4

i4\,

4P

E

1.94111i110

PRENT,TYPE O STAMP NAME OF

NOTARY

Personally known

OR.Produced Identification

Type ofIdentification Produced

3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-3 Filed 04/04/16 Page 4 of 5

DISTRICT 3 VOTER PERFORMANCE
COUNTY COMMISSION AND SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS
WITH BLACK AND WHITE CANDIDATES,2002-2014

SCHOOL BOARD,2002 NON-PARTISON RACE

Fred Shofner(W)

483

Shirley Washington (B)

390

Total

873

Pct.
55.3% 44.7%

Win Margin

Results

93 Won by white candidate.

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2004 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

Gene Cooksey(W)

343 49.6%

C. P. Miller(B)

348 50.4%

Total

691

5

Won by black candidate

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2004 GENERAL ELECTION

Jerry Sutphin(W)

598 53.9%

C. P. Miller(B)

512 46.1%

Total

1110

86 Won by white candidate

SCHOOL BOARD,2006 NON-PARTISON RACE

Fred Shofner(W)

370

Shirley Washington (B)

395

Total

765

48.4% 51.6%

25 Won by black candidate

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2008 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

Hines Boyd(W)

340 46.6%

C. P. Miller(B)

310 42.5%

Ann Ransom Reddick(B)

79 10.8%

Tota!

729

30 Won by white candidate

SCHOOL BOARD,2010 NON-PARTISON RACE

Julia McBee

344

Shirley Washington

380

Tota!

724

47.5% 52.5%

36 Won by black candidate

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2012 GENERAL ELECTION

Hines Boyd(W)

409 35.2%

C. P. Miller(B)

392 33.8%

Vernie Key(W)

360 31.0%

Total

1161

17 Won by white candidate

SCHOOL BOARD,2014 NON-PARTISON RACE

Julia McBee(W)

270

Herbert Thomas(B)

50

Shirley Washington (B)

352

Tota!

672

40.2% 7.4% 52.4%

82 Won by black candidate

SUMMARY: 4 RACES WON BY WHITE CANDIDATES 4 RACES WON BY BLACK CANDIDATES AVERAGE WINNING MARGIN WAS 47 VOTES

NOTE: M of March 31,2016,there were 9297 registered voters in Jefferson County,an average of 1859 per district.
) A 1% difference In the black:white voter ratio in an average district represents 18.6 registered voters. EXHIBIT

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 52-3 Filed 04/04/16 Page 5 of 5

SCHOOL BOARD,2002 NON-PARTISON RACE

Fred Shofner(W)

483

Shirley Washington (B)

390

Total

873

Pct.
55.3% 44.7%

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2004 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

Gene Cooksey(W)

343 49.6%

C. P. Miller(B)

348 50.4%

Total

691

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2004 GENERAL ELECTION

Jerry Sutphin(W)

598 53.9%

C. P. Miller (B)

512 46.1%

Total

1110

SCHOOL BOARD,2006 NON-PARTISON RACE

Fred Shofner(W)

370

Shirley Washington (B)

395

Total

765

48.4% 51.6%

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2008 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

Hines Boyd(W)

340 46.6%

C. P. Miller(B)

310 42.5%

Ann Ransom Reddick (B)

79 10.8%

Total

729

SCHOOL BOARD,2010 NON-PARTISON RACE

Julia McBee

344

Shirley Washington

380

Total

724

47.5% 52.5%

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,2012 GENERAL ELECTION

Hines Boyd(W)

409 35.2%

C. P. Miller(B)

392 33.8%

Vernie Key(W)

360 31.0%

Total

1161

SCHOOL BOARD,2014 NON-PARTISON RACE

Julia McBee(W)

270

Herbert Thomas(B)

50

Shirley Washington (B)

352

Total

672

40.2% 7.4% 52.4%

 
 Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Tallahassee Division

KATE CALVIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH, LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.: 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS

vs.

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, in his official capacity,

Defendants.

__________________________________________/

PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN

Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby submit for consideration and approval their

Illustrative Plan for the redistricting of Jefferson County. In support of this submission,

Plaintiffs state as follows:

1. On March 19, 2016, this Court struck down Jefferson County’s 2013 redistricting

plan as unconstitutional under the “one person, one vote” principle of the Fourteenth

Amendment. DE 49.

2. In its order, the Court instructed Defendants to file by April 4, 2016, “a proposed

districting plan that complies with this Order and with all applicable federal and state laws, to the

extent those state laws are compatible with federal law.” Id. at 86.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55 Filed 04/08/16 Page 2 of 4
3. The Court also provided Plaintiffs the opportunity to file by April 8, 2016, their
own proposed redistricting plan, which Plaintiffs label their “Illustrative Plan”. DE 53.
4. As explained in greater detail in the Supplemental Declaration of William S.
Cooper which accompanies this filing, Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan complies with this Court’s
order by excluding the prison population at Jefferson Correctional Institution, and abides by
traditional redistricting principles.
5. Moreover, in light of the ruling in Parrish, et al. v. Jefferson County, Florida, et
al., Case No. TCA-83-7481 MMP (N.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 1985)1, Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan
ensures that District 3 remains a competitive district in light of the County’s history of racial
discrimination in the area of voting as compared to Defendants’ proposed plan.
6. For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court adopt their
Illustrative Plan and issue a final judgment in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Nancy G. Abudu Nancy Abudu (Fla. Bar No. 111881) nabudu@aclufl.org Shalini Goel Agarwal (Fla. Bar No. 90843) sagarwal@aclufl.org ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc. 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 340 Miami, FL 33137 Tel: 786-363-2700 Fax: 786-363-1448
Randall C. Berg, Jr. (Fla. Bar No. 318371) rberg@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org Dante P. Trevisani (Fla. Bar No. 72912) dtrevisani@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org
1 A copy of this court order is attached to Defendant Jefferson County Board of Commissioners' Notice of Filing, DE 52-1, Affidavit of Stephen Walker, April 4, 2016, Attachment A, Exhibit 1.
2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55 Filed 04/08/16 Page 3 of 4 Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 100 SE Second St., Ste. 3750 Miami, FL 33131-2115 Tel: 305.358.2081 Fax: 305.358.0910 Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55 Filed 04/08/16 Page 4 of 4
Certificate of Service I hereby certify that on April 8, 2016, I sent this document to counsel for the parties list below in the manner prescribed.
/s/ Nancy G. Abudu Nancy G. Abudu By CM/ECF: Gerald B. Curington Ausley McMullen, P.A. P.O. Box 391 (32302) 123 S. Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Email: jcurington@ausley.com mmckenzie@ausley.com Attorneys for Defendant Jefferson County School Board Linda Bond Edwards Brian Hayden Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell A Professional Association 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 702 Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2507 Telephone: (850) 222-6550 E-mail: ledwards@rumberger.com bhayden@rumberger.com Attorneys for Defendants Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners and Marty Bishop, Supervisor of Elections, in his official capacity
4

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Tallahassee Division
KATE CALVIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH, LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,
Case No.: 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Plaintiffs, vs. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, in his official capacity, Defendants. __________________________________________/
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF WILLIAM S. COOPER WILLIAM S. COOPER, acting in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 26(a)(2)(B) and 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, does hereby declare and say: 1. My name is William S. Cooper. I serve as a demographic and redistricting expert for the Plaintiffs in this action. I submitted a declaration in this case on June 5, 2015, and a supplemental declaration on January 19, 2016.

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 2 of 10
2. I submit this declaration in order to present the Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan (“Illustrative Plan”) as the proposed remedy in this case.1 As discussed infra, Defendants’ Proposed 2016 Remedial Districting Plan (“2016 Plan”)2 unnecessarily reduces the total Black population in District 3 and, thereby, dilutes African American voting strength in that district. The 2016 Plan therefore does not comply with the spirit of the consent decree and final judgment in Parrish, et al. v. Jefferson County, Florida, et al., Case No. TCA-83-7481 MMP (N.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 1985)3, which established two majority-Black districts. In the 1985 Consent Decree Plan, District I and District II have Black voting age population (BVAP) majorities. A third district, District V, has a BVAP of 40.8%. 4 Methodology and Sources
3. I have reviewed the affidavits and documents filed by the Defendants on April 4, 2016 pursuant to the March 19, 2016 Court Order.
4. The GIS shapefile of the 2016 Plan was given to me by Plaintiffs’ counsel, Nancy Abudu, via a forwarded email sent to her by Defendants’ counsel at about 10 p.m. on April 3, 2016.
1 See DE 30-1, Cooper Declaration, June 5, 2015, ¶¶ 31-39. 2 Defendants refer to the 2016 Plan as “Map 1a-1” in their Notice of Filing. 3 A copy of this court order is attached to Defendant Jefferson County Board of Commissioners' Notice of Filing, DE 52-1, Affidavit of Stephen Walker, April 4, 2016, Attachment A, Exhibit 1. 4 See Affidavit of Stephen Walker, April 4, 2016, Attachment A and Exhibit 1.
2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 3 of 10
5. I used Maptitude for Redistricting to analyze the 2016 Plan. I relied on the same Census sources and methodology described in my June 5, 2015 declaration.5
6. I also analyzed voter registration rates at the district level by geocoding an Excel file listing registered voters by address produced by the office of the Jefferson County Superintendent of Elections.6 Geocoding is a technical process available in Maptitude and other GIS software that locates voters by street number and address and converts those locations to points on a computer map. The points can then be tallied to calculate the number of registered voters and Black registered voters by district.
7. In addition, for demographic background, I reviewed socio-economic characteristics of African Americans and non-Hispanic Whites in Jefferson County, as reported in the 2008-2012 American Community Survey published by the U.S. Census Bureau. See Exhibit D.
Summary Statistics for the 2016 Plan 8. There is one minor technical discrepancy in the 2016 Plan. The plan
properly excludes a single prison census block with 1,154 persons, but fails to
5 See Cooper Declaration, June 5, 2015, ¶¶ 18-23. 6 The Excel file was sent to me via email by Kate Calvin, a plaintiff in this lawsuit.
3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 4 of 10
exclude a second adjacent prison census block with 3 persons.7 For this reason, the 2016 Plan reports a total county population of 13,607 rather than the correct 13,604 total reported for the Illustrative Plan.8
9. Exhibit A attached to this declaration shows population and voting age population (VAP) summary statistics for the 2016 Plan. The statistical summary in Exhibit A does not correct the 3-person prison block discrepancy and is therefore consistent with Exhibit A attached to the April 4, 2016 Affidavit of Kurt Spitzer. Exhibit A in the Spitzer affidavit reports total population statistics by district for the 2016 Plan, but does not provide the VAP statistics that I report in Exhibit A.
10. Exhibit B shows population and VAP summary statistics for the Illustrative Plan, reproduced from my June 5, 2016 Declaration. 9
Comparison of the Illustrative Plan and April 2016 Plan 11. The Black population percentage in Jefferson County has fallen from
48.6% in 1980 to 35.2% in 2010 (excluding the prison).10 Given the demographic
7 See Cooper Declaration, June 5, 2015, ¶ 16. 8 See Id. at Exhibit D-2. 9 Ibid. 10 See DE 52-1, Affidavit of Stephen Walker, April 4, 2016, Attachment A, Exhibit 1.
4

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 5 of 10

shift that has occurred in Jefferson County since 1980, it is no longer possible to create two Black-majority districts. But it is easy to create a competitive District 3, as demonstrated in the Illustrative Plan.
12. The table in Figure 1 compares Black VAP percentages for the Illustrative Plan and the 2016 Plan. The Illustrative Plan has a higher BVAP in both majority-Black District 2 (1.58 % margin) and District 3 (3.41% margin). Figure 1 Comparison of Black Voting Age Population Percentage by Plan

Illustrative April 2016

District

Plan

Plan

Margin

1

24.45%

25.71%

-1.26%

2

53.63%

52.05%

1.58%

3

41.65%

38.24%

3.41%

4

16.42%

19.04%

-2.62%

5

31.04%

29.95%

1.09%

13. A more competitive District 3, as configured in the Illustrative Plan, can be accomplished while shifting fewer persons into different districts than the 2016 Plan. Compared to the malapportioned 2013 Plan, the Illustrative Plan shifts 797 persons and the 2016 Plan shifts 889 persons.
14. Compared to District 2 under the malapportioned 2013 Plan, District 2 in the Illustrative Plan is changed only to remove the entire Jefferson Arms housing complex block (pop. 255) and another adjacent census block (pop. 13) that also lies
5

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 6 of 10
outside the Monticello town boundaries.11 The 2016 Plan makes these changes and others to District 2, resulting in a 52.05% BVAP compared to 53.63% BVAP under the Illustrative Plan.
15. Except for Monticello, no municipality or unincorporated place (identified by the Census Bureau as a “census designated place”) is split under the Illustrative Plan. By contrast, in addition to Monticello, the April 2016 Plan splits the community of Lamont (pop. 178) between District 3 and District 5.
16. There are no incumbent conflicts in the Illustrative Plan and all elected commissioners and school board members would continue to represent their current districts.
17. Exhibit C-1 is a countywide map depicting the Illustrative Plan, with blue lines showing the April 2016 Plan boundaries. Exhibit C-2 is a similar map of the Monticello area. Exhibit C-3 zooms to the south end of District 3.
18. An address searchable Google map of the Illustrative Plan, with an overlay showing the 2016 Plan, can be viewed at: http://www.fairdata2000.com/Fusion/Illustrative_Plan_Comparison/index.html
11 The Jefferson Arms census block was split between Districts 2 and 3 under the 2013 Plan.
6

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 7 of 10

Voter Registration by Race in Jefferson County

19. According to the Jefferson County Superintendent of Elections, as of

April 5, 2016, there are 9,489 registered voters in Jefferson County, of whom 3,050

(32.1%) self-identified as non-Hispanic Black.

20. The table in Figure 2 compares Black registered voter percentages by

district for the Illustrative Plan and the 2016 Plan. The Illustrative Plan has higher

Black registered voter percentages in majority-Black District 2 (1.6 % margin) and

District 3 (3.1% margin).

Figure 2

Comparison of Black Registered Voters by Plan

Illustrative April 2016

District

Plan

Plan

Margin

1

24.0%

25.3%

-1.3%

2

54.8%

53.2%

1.6%

3

43.3%

40.2%

3.1%

4

15.5%

17.5%

-2.0%

5

26.6%

25.2%

1.4%

Socio-Economic Profile by Race of Jefferson County 21. Non-Hispanic Whites in Jefferson County outpace African Americans
across a broad range of socio-economic measures, as reported in the 5-year 2008-

7

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 8 of 10
2012 American Community Survey (ACS) published by the Census Bureau.12 These
socio-economic disparities are detailed in the charts and tables I prepared in
Exhibit D and are summarized in the paragraphs that follow:
(a) Education
• In Jefferson County, nearly one-third (30.6%) of the Black population over the age of 25 lacks a high school diploma, compared to 12.8% of their White counterparts.
(b) Income
• Nearly one-third (30%) of the Black population lives in poverty, compared to 12.5% of Whites. In addition, over one-third of Black children (36.7%) live in poverty, compared to15.2% of White children.
• In Jefferson County, Black median household income is $24,958 – about half of the $49,095 median income of White households.
• Black family households (defined by the Census Bureau as households with related persons) exhibit a similar median income disparity vis-à-vis White family households – $29,175 for Black median family household income compared to $59,286 for White family households.
(c) Employment
• The $16,169 median earnings level of African Americans working full-time in Jefferson County is just a little over half of the $31,803 annual median earnings garnered by Whites.
• The Black unemployment rate (for the working-age population ages 16-64, expressed as a percent of the civilian labor force) is several percentage points higher than the rate for Whites. On average, over the course of the 5-
12 The 2008-12 ACS has a survey midpoint of July 2010, roughly coincident with April 1, 2010 Census Day. In this section, “White” refers to non-Hispanic White. There is not a separate category for non-Hispanic Black or Any Part Black in the American Community Survey.
8

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 9 of 10
year survey, 18.8% of working-age African Americans were unemployed, while 11.9% of their White counterparts were unemployed.
• Just 19.8% of African Americans in Jefferson County are employed in management or professional occupations, which is about half the 38.8% rate achieved by Whites. (d) Housing
• About one-third of Black households (30.7%) rent their residences, compared to a rental rate of 17.7% for White households.
Conclusion 22. The Illustrative Plan respects traditional redistricting criteria, including
one-person one-vote, compactness, contiguity, respect for communities of interest, and the non-dilution of minority voting strength.
23. In my opinion, the proper BVAP benchmark comparison for the present-day opportunity District 3 should be District V (40.8% BVAP) under the 1985 Consent Decree Plan –– not District III (32.1% BVAP), as suggested by Commissioner Walker in his affidavit.13
24. In view of the sharp socio-economic disparities in the County, the Illustrative Plan –– with a higher BVAP percentage in District 3 –– will afford African Americans the best opportunity to elect their candidate of choice in a second district, as envisioned in the 1985 Consent Decree Plan.
13 See DE 52-1, Affidavit of Stephen Walker, April 4, 2016, ¶5 and Attachment A, Appendix 1.
9

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-1 Filed 04/08/16 Page 10 of 10
# # # I reserve the right to continue to supplement my declarations in light of additional facts, testimony and/or materials that may come to light. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct according to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Executed on: April , 2016 WILLIAM S. COOPER
10

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-2 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 1

Population Summary Report
2016 Adopted Plan -- Jefferson County, FL (excluding JCI prison from the apportionment base)

District

Population Deviation % Deviation Black

% Black

18+ Pop

NH18+ 18+ Black % 18+ Black Black

% NH18+ Black

18+ Hispanic

% 18+ Hispanic

18+ Minority Pop

% 18+ Minority
Pop

1 2 3 4 5
Total
Total Deviation

2855 2690 2839 2611 2612
13607

134 4.92% -31 -1.14% 118 4.34% -110 -4.04% -109 -4.01%
8.96%

771 1533 1144
536 804

27.01% 56.99% 40.30% 20.53% 30.78%

4788 35.19%

2310 2069 2254 2096 2130
10859

594 1077
862 399 638

25.71% 52.05% 38.24% 19.04% 29.95%

3570 32.88%

591 1067
854 395 634

25.58% 51.57% 37.89% 18.85% 29.77%

3541 32.61%

86 3.72% 38 1.84% 91 4.04% 43 2.05% 47 2.21%

305

2.81%

706 1137
983 475 712

30.56% 54.95% 43.61% 22.66% 33.43%

4013 36.96%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-3 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 1

Population Summary Report
Illustrative Plan -- Jefferson County, FL (excluding JCI prison from the apportionment base)

District

Population Deviation % Deviation Black

% Black

18+ Pop

NH18+ 18+ Black % 18+ Black Black

% NH18+ Black

18+ Hispanic

% 18+ Hispanic

18+ Minority Pop

% 18+ Minority
Pop

1 2 3 4 5
Total
Total Deviation

2768 2590 2645 2768 2833
13604

47 1.73% -131 -4.81%
-76 -2.79% 47 1.73% 112 4.12%
8.93%

709 1513 1157
507 900

25.61% 58.42% 43.74% 18.32% 31.77%

4786 35.18%

2241 1984 2101 2223 2307
10856

548 1064
875 365 716

24.45% 53.63% 41.65% 16.42% 31.04%

3568 32.87%

545 1050
867 365 712

24.32% 52.92% 41.27% 16.42% 30.86%

3539 32.60%

88 3.93% 40 2.02% 65 3.09% 60 2.70% 51 2.21%

304

2.80%

659 1123
967 463 798

29.41% 56.60% 46.03% 20.83% 34.59%

4010 36.94%

Prison

1157

554 47.88%

1157

554 47.88%

551 47.62%

85

7.35%

641 55.40%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-4 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 1

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-5 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 1

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-6 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 1

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 62
Selected Socio-Economic Data Jefferson County, Florida
African American and White, Not Hispanic Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
www.fairvote2020.org www.fairdata2000.com 29-Dec-13

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 2 of 62
C02003.DETAILED RACE - Universe: TOTAL POPULATION Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Population of one race: White Black or African American American Indian and Alaska Native Asian alone Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Some other race Population of two or more races: Two races including Some other race Two races excluding Some other race, and three or more races Population of two races: White; Black or African American White; American Indian and Alaska Native White; Asian Black or African American; American Indian and Alaska Native All other two race combinations Population of three races Population of four or more races

Population

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of Total

14,564 14,388
8,769 5,376
30 12 10 191 176 42 134 146 36 58
0 10 42 30
0

*****

100.0%

94

98.8%

249

60.2%

93

36.9%

35

0.2%

19

0.1%

16

0.1%

181

1.3%

94

1.2%

58

0.3%

72

0.9%

82

1.0%

32

0.2%

42

0.4%

21

0.0%

18

0.1%

58

0.3%

47

0.2%

21

0.0%

Note: Hispanics may be of any race. See Table B03002 and chart.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey
Although the American Community Survey (ACS) produces population, demographic and housing unit estimates, it is the Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program that produces and disseminates the official estimates of the population for the nation, states, counties, cities and towns and estimates of housing units for states and counties.

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 3 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 4 of 62
B03002. HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY RACE - Universe: TOTAL POPULATION Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Not Hispanic or Latino: White alone Black or African American alone American Indian and Alaska Native alone Asian alone Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone Some other race alone Two or more races: Two races including Some other race Two races excluding Some other race, and three or more races Hispanic or Latino

Population
14,564 14,020
8,400 5,316
30 12 10 112 140 42 98 544

Margin of Error (+/-)
***** ***** 210
81 35 19 16 154 87 58 65 *****

% of Total
100.0% 96.3% 57.7% 36.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 1.0% 0.3% 0.7% 3.7%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

Although the American Community Survey (ACS) produces population, demographic and housing unit estimates, it is the Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program that produces and disseminates the official estimates of the population for the nation, states, counties, cities and towns and estimates of housing units for states and counties.

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 5 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 6 of 62
B03002. HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY RACE Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Population

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of Total

Hispanic or Latino: White alone
Black or African American alone American Indian and Alaska Native alone Asian alone Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone Some other race alone Two or more races: Two races including Some other race Two races excluding Some other race, and three or more races

544

*****

100.0%

369

69

67.8%

60

41

11.0%

0

21

0.0%

0

21

0.0%

0

21

0.0%

79

44

14.5%

36

32

6.6%

0

21

0.0%

36

32

6.6%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

Although the American Community Survey (ACS) produces population, demographic and housing unit estimates, it is the Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program that produces and disseminates the official estimates of the population for the nation, states, counties, cities and towns and estimates of housing units for states and counties.

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 7 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 8 of 62
B01001. SEX BY AGE Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Total: Under 18 years 18 to 64 years 65 years and over
Male: Under 18 years 18 to 64 years 65 years and over
Female: Under 18 years 18 to 64 years 65 years and over

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

5,376 1,293 3,409
674 2,785
643 1,870
272 2,591
650 1,539
402

93

100.0%

NC

24.1%

NC

63.4%

NC

12.5%

144

51.8%

NC

12.0%

NC

34.8%

NC

5.1%

117

48.2%

NC

12.1%

NC

28.6%

NC

7.5%

8,400 1,190 5,481 1,729 4,345
617 2,905
823 4,055
573 2,576
906

210

100.0%

NC

14.2%

NC

65.3%

NC

20.6%

389

51.7%

NC

7.3%

NC

34.6%

NC

9.8%

412

48.3%

NC

6.8%

NC

30.7%

NC

10.8%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey
Although the American Community Survey (ACS) produces population, demographic and housing unit estimates, it is the Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program that produces and disseminates the official estimates of the population for the nation, states, counties, cities and towns and estimates of housing units for states and counties.

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 9 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 10 of 62
B05003. SEX BY AGE BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS
Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Total: Under 18 years: Native Foreign born: Naturalized U.S. citizen Not a U.S. citizen 18 years and over: Native Foreign born: Naturalized U.S. citizen Not a U.S. citizen
Male: Under 18 years: Native Foreign born: Naturalized U.S. citizen Not a U.S. citizen 18 years and over: Native Foreign born: Naturalized U.S. citizen Not a U.S. citizen

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of % of AA Total White, Not

Error (+/-)

by Age

Hispanic

Margin of % of NHW Error (+/-) Total by Age

5,376 1,293 1,293
0 0 0 4,083 3,968 115 77 38 2,785 643 643 0 0 0 2,142 2,088 54 16 38

93

100.0%

NC

100.0%

NC

100.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

100.0%

NC

97.2%

NC

2.8%

NC

1.9%

NC

0.9%

144

51.8%

125

100.0%

125

100.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

70

100.0%

83

97.5%

44

2.5%

16

0.7%

44

1.8%

8,400 1,190 1,190
0 0 0 7,210 7,068 142 112 30 4,345 617 617 0 0 0 3,728 3,668 60 30 30

210

100.0%

NC

100.0%

NC

100.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

100.0%

NC

98.0%

NC

2.0%

NC

1.6%

NC

0.4%

117

51.7%

85

100.0%

85

100.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

58

100.0%

69

98.4%

39

1.6%

24

0.8%

29

0.8%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 11 of 62

Jefferson County, Florida

Female: Under 18 years: Native Foreign born: Naturalized U.S. citizen Not a U.S. citizen 18 years and over: Native Foreign born: Naturalized U.S. citizen Not a U.S. citizen

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA by Age

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of % of NHW by

Error (+/-)

Age

2,591 650 650 0 0 0
1,941 1,880
61 61
0

117

48.2%

113

100.0%

113

100.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

47

100.0%

69

96.9%

57

3.1%

57

3.1%

21

0.0%

4,055 573 573 0 0 0
3,482 3,400
82 82
0

147

48.3%

147

100.0%

147

100.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

21

100.0%

69

97.6%

69

2.4%

69

2.4%

21

0.0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 12 of 62

B07004. GEOGRAPHICAL MCOaBseILI4T:Y15IN-cTvH-0E0P1A3S1T-MYWEA-RCBAYSRADCoEcuFOmRenCtU5R5R-E7NTFRileEdSI0D4E/N0C8E/1I6N TPHEagUeN1IT3EoDfS6T2ATES - Universe:
POPULATION 1 YEAR AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Same house 1 year ago Moved within same county Moved from different county within same state Moved from different state Moved from abroad

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

5,277 4,597
376 272
10 22

113

100.0%

217

87.1%

189

7.1%

75

5.2%

20

0.2%

30

0.4%

8,372 7,560
210 387 215
0

210

100.0%

260

90.3%

139

2.5%

83

4.6%

167

2.6%

21

0.0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 14 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 15 of 62
B08105. MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO WORK - Universe: WORKERS 16 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Car, truck, or van - drove alone Car, truck, or van - carpooled Public transportation (excluding taxicab) Walked Taxicab, motorcycle, bicycle, or other means Worked at home

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1817 1424
275 19 9 0 90

185

100.0%

179

78.4%

121

15.1%

30

1.0%

16

0.5%

21

0.0%

88

5.0%

3245 2576
448 10 31 43
137

292

100.0%

288

79.4%

131

13.8%

17

0.3%

42

1.0%

51

1.3%

75

4.2%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 16 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 17 of 62
B11002. HOUSEHOLD TYPE BY RELATIVES AND NONRELATIVES FOR POPULATION IN HOUSEHOLDS Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: In family households In nonfamily households

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

4669 4005
664

169

100.0%

232

85.8%

174

14.2%

7814 6616 1198

275

100.0%

360

84.7%

248

15.3%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 18 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 19 of 62
B12002. MARITAL STATUS FOR THE POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Never married Now married (except separated) Separated Widowed Divorced Male: Never married Now married (except separated) Separated Widowed Divorced Female: Never married Now married (except separated) Separated Widowed Divorced

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

4,266 1,997 1,219
124 402 524 2,252 1,191 656
62 56 287 2,014 806 563 62 346 237

132

100.0%

NC

46.8%

NC

28.6%

NC

2.9%

NC

9.4%

NC

12.3%

106

52.8%

182

27.9%

158

15.4%

41

1.5%

45

1.3%

101

6.7%

71

47.2%

172

18.9%

156

13.2%

50

1.5%

92

8.1%

96

5.6%

7,425 1,584 4,167
79 544 1,051 3,878 1,014 1,987
69 118 690 3,547 570 2,180
10 426 361

58

100.0%

NC

21.3%

NC

56.1%

NC

1.1%

NC

7.3%

NC

14.2%

74

52.2%

138

13.7%

198

26.8%

43

0.9%

61

1.6%

129

9.3%

33

47.8%

134

7.7%

211

29.4%

16

0.1%

109

5.7%

132

4.9%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 20 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 21 of 62
C15002. SEX BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FOR THE POPULATION 25 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Less than high school diploma High school graduate, GED, or alternative Some college or associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher
Male: Less than high school diploma High school graduate, GED, or alternative Some college or associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher
Female: Less than high school diploma High school graduate, GED, or alternative Some college or associate's degree Bachelor's degree or higher

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

3,617 1,106 1,498
610 403 1,894 710 840 296
48 1,723
396 658 314 355

114

100.0%

NC

30.6%

NC

41.4%

NC

16.9%

NC

11.1%

90

52.4%

154

19.6%

153

23.2%

119

8.2%

37

1.3%

89

47.6%

120

10.9%

170

18.2%

113

8.7%

142

9.8%

6,620 848
2,194 2,401 1,177 3,445
501 1,155 1,154
635 3,175
347 1,039 1,247
542

92

100.0%

NC

12.8%

NC

33.1%

NC

36.3%

NC

17.8%

58

52.0%

102

7.6%

164

17.4%

168

17.4%

134

9.6%

67

48.0%

142

5.2%

181

15.7%

216

18.8%

143

8.2%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 22 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 23 of 62
B17010. POVERTY STATUS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS OF FAMILIES BY FAMILY TYPE BY PRESENCE OF RELATED CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

Total: Income in the past 12 months below poverty level: Married-couple family: With related children under 18 years Other family: Male householder, no wife present With related children under 18 years Female householder, no husband present With related children under 18 years Income in the past 12 months at or above poverty level: Married-couple family: With related children under 18 years Other family: Male householder, no wife present With related children under 18 years Female householder, no husband present With related children under 18 years

1,205 373 100 29 273 93 80 180 174 832 466 244 366 79 18 287 118

148

100.0%

149

31.0%

88

8.3%

29

2.4%

122

22.7%

83

7.7%

78

6.6%

112

14.9%

111

14.4%

150

69.0%

141

38.7%

111

20.2%

131

30.4%

49

6.6%

28

1.5%

126

23.8%

73

9.8%

2,422 246 188 52 58 28 17 30 30
2,176 1,851
551 325 137
74 188
88

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

184

100.0%

114

10.2%

108

7.8%

46

2.1%

52

2.4%

26

1.2%

26

0.7%

49

1.2%

49

1.2%

209

89.8%

204

76.4%

149

22.7%

129

13.4%

68

5.7%

51

3.1%

109

7.8%

76

3.6%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 24 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 25 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 26 of 62
B17020 POVERTY STATUS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS BY AGE - Universe: POPULATION FOR WHOM POVERTY STATUS IS DETERMINED Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total:
Income in the past 12 months below poverty level:
Under 18 years
18 to 64 years 65 years and over Income in the past 12 months at or above poverty level: Under 18 years 18 to 64 years 65 years and over

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA By Age

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of % of NHW By

Error (+/-)

Age

4,687
1,406
461
855 90
3,281 796
1,907 578

142

100.0%

403

30.0%

NC

36.7%

254

31.0%

NC

13.5%

394

70.0%

NC

63.3%

250

69.0%

NC

86.5%

7,682
959
176
610 173 6,723 980 4,326 1,417

252

100.0%

302

12.5%

NC

15.2%

227

12.4%

NC

10.9%

394

87.5%

NC

84.8%

276

87.6%

NC

89.1%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 27 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 28 of 62
B19001. HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Less than $ 10,000 $ 10,000 to $ 14,999 $ 15,000 to $ 24,999 $ 25,000 to $ 34,999 $ 35,000 to $ 49,999 $ 50,000 to $ 74,999 $ 75,000 to $ 99,999 $ 100,000 to $ 149,999 $ 150,000 to $ 199,999 $ 200,000 or more

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1,849 372 199 354 277 188 251 142 60 6 0

171

100.0%

153

20.1%

99

10.8%

NC

19.1%

NC

15.0%

NC

10.2%

NC

13.6%

102

7.7%

NC

3.2%

10

0.3%

21

0.0%

3,460 99
297 411 307 671 779 430 261 141
64

148

100.0%

71

2.9%

102

8.6%

NC

11.9%

NC

8.9%

NC

19.4%

NC

22.5%

142

12.4%

NC

7.5%

82

4.1%

44

1.8%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 29 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 30 of 62
B19013. MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Median household income in the past 12 months (in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars)

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

$ 24,958 $

9,640 $ 49,095 $

4,703

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 31 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 32 of 62
B19101. FAMILY INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Less than $ 10,000 $ 10,000 to $ 14,999 $ 15,000 to $ 24,999 $ 25,000 to $ 34,999 $ 35,000 to $ 49,999 $ 50,000 to $ 74,999 $ 100,000 to $ 149,999 $ 150,000 to $ 199,999 $ 200,000 or more

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1,205 219 86 251 175 135 148 43 6 0

148

100.0%

129

18.2%

74

7.1%

NC

20.8%

NC

14.5%

NC

11.2%

NC

12.3%

NC

3.6%

10

0.5%

21

0.0%

2,422 30
144 261 137 503 529 227 107
64

184

100.0%

49

1.2%

76

5.9%

NC

10.8%

NC

5.7%

NC

20.8%

NC

21.8%

NC

9.4%

73

4.4%

44

2.6%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 33 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 34 of 62
B19113. MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

Median family income in the past 12 months (in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars)

$ 29,175 $

9,874 $

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

59,286 $

4,335

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 35 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 36 of 62
B19202. MEDIAN NONFAMILY HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Median nonfamily household income in the past 12 months (in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars)

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

$ 19,149 $

5,434 $ 32,067 $

7,454

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 37 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 38 of 62
B19301. PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

Per capita income in the past 12 months (in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars)

$ 12,362 $

1,761 $ 25,227 $

2,042

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 39 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 40 of 62
B20017. MEDIAN EARNINGS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) BY SEX BY WORK EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS FOR THE POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER WITH EARNINGS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

Median earnings in the past 12 months (in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars) -Total: Male -Total Worked full-time, year-round in the past 12 months Other Female -Total Worked full-time, year-round in the past 12 months Other

$ 16,169 $

3,729 $ 31,803 $

$ 19,722 $ 14,485 $ 35,295 $

$ 32,969 $ 11,228 $ 42,036 $

$

8,664 $

1,291 $ 12,409 $

$ 15,989 $

$ 21,857 $

$

7,537 $

2,028 $ 4,834 $ 3,032 $

28,429 $ 42,076 $
6,984 $

3,970
6,110 4,681 7,868
4,699 5,491 2,581

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 41 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 42 of 62
B20005. SEX BY WORK EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS BY EARNINGS IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2010 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) FOR THE POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Total: Worked full-time, year-round in the past 12 months: No earnings With earnings: $ 1 to $ 9,999 or loss $ 10,000 to $ 19,999 $ 20,000 to $ 29,999 $ 30,000 to $ 49,999 $ 50,000 to $ 74,999 $ 75,000 or more Other: No earnings With earnings: less than full time, year-round
Male: Worked full-time, year-round in the past 12 months: No earnings With earnings: $ 1 to $ 9,999 or loss $ 10,000 to $ 19,999 $ 20,000 to $ 29,999 $ 30,000 to $ 49,999 $ 50,000 to $ 74,999 $ 75,000 or more

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

4,219 1,138
0 1,138
90 272 300 309 134
33 3,081 2,222
859 2,219
543 0
543 83 61 85
202 107
5

119

100.0%

NC

27.0%

NC

0.0%

NC

27.0%

NC

2.1%

NC

6.4%

NC

7.1%

NC

7.3%

NC

3.2%

NC

0.8%

NC

73.0%

NC

52.7%

NC

20.4%

91

52.6%

131

12.9%

21

0.0%

131

12.9%

NC

2.0%

NC

1.4%

NC

2.0%

NC

4.8%

NC

2.5%

NC

0.1%

7,342 2,630
0 2,630
92 331 359 786 710 352 4,712 3,502 1,210 3,815 1,396
0 1,396
63 184 123 442 346 238

83

100.0%

NC

35.8%

NC

0.0%

NC

35.8%

NC

1.3%

NC

4.5%

NC

4.9%

NC

10.7%

NC

9.7%

NC

4.8%

NC

64.2%

NC

47.7%

NC

16.5%

81

52.0%

214

19.0%

21

0.0%

214

19.0%

NC

0.9%

NC

2.5%

NC

1.7%

NC

6.0%

NC

4.7%

NC

3.2%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 43 of 62

Jefferson County, Florida

Other: No earnings With earnings:
Female: Worked full-time, year-round in the past 12 months: No earnings With earnings: $ 1 to $ 9,999 or loss $ 10,000 to $ 19,999 $ 20,000 to $ 29,999 $ 30,000 to $ 49,999 $ 50,000 to $ 74,999 $ 75,000 or more Other: No earnings With earnings:

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1,676 1,295
381 2,000
595 0
595 7
211 215 107
27 28 1,405 927 478

146

39.7%

137

30.7%

139

9.0%

67

47.4%

151

14.1%

21

0.0%

151

14.1%

NC

0.2%

NC

5.0%

NC

5.1%

NC

2.5%

NC

0.6%

NC

0.7%

148

33.3%

124

22.0%

130

11.3%

2,419 1,814
605 3,527 1,234
0 1,234
29 147 236 344 364 114 2,293 1,688 605

217

32.9%

245

24.7%

165

8.2%

35

48.0%

196

16.8%

21

0.0%

196

16.8%

NC

0.4%

NC

2.0%

NC

3.2%

NC

4.7%

NC

5.0%

NC

1.6%

204

31.2%

157

23.0%

177

8.2%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 44 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 45 of 62
C21001. SEX BY AGE BY VETERAN STATUS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION 18 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Veteran Nonveteran
Male: 18 to 64 years: Veteran Nonveteran 65 years and over: Veteran Nonveteran
Female: 18 to 64 years: Veteran Nonveteran 65 years and over: Veteran Nonveteran

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

4,075 349
3,726 2,134 1,862
221 1,641
272 89
183 1,941 1,539
39 1,500
402 0
402

90

100.0%

NC

8.6%

NC

91.4%

70

52.4%

69

45.7%

115

5.4%

123

40.3%

9

6.7%

56

2.2%

57

4.5%

47

47.6%

39

37.8%

40

1.0%

56

36.8%

23

9.9%

21

0.0%

23

9.9%

7,197 1,277 5,920 3,715 2,892
649 2,243
823 528 295 3,482 2,576
80 2,496
906 20
886

63

100.0%

NC

17.7%

NC

82.3%

63

51.6%

63

40.2%

124

9.0%

131

31.2%

21

11.4%

95

7.3%

95

4.1%

21

48.4%

21

35.8%

67

1.1%

67

34.7%

21

12.6%

29

0.3%

29

12.3%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 46 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 47 of 62
B22005. RECEIPT OF FOOD STAMPS/SNAP IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS BY RACE OF HOUSEHOLDER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: HH received Food Stamps/SNAP in the past 12 months HH did not receive Food Stamps/SNAP in the past 12 months

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1,849 446
1,403

171

100.0%

148

24.1%

154

75.9%

3,460 453
3,007

148

100.0%

134

13.1%

181

86.9%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 48 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 49 of 62
C23002. SEX BY AGE BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS FOR THE POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Total: In labor force: In Armed Forces Civilian: Employed Unemployed Not in labor force
Male: 16 to 64 years: In labor force: In Armed Forces Civilian: Employed Unemployed Not in labor force 65 years and over: In labor force: Employed Unemployed Not in labor force

Jefferson County, Florida

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

4,219 2,246
8 2,189 1,826
412 1,973 2,219 1,947
999 8
991 826 165 948 272
0 0 0 272

119

100.0%

NC

53.2%

NC

0.2%

NC

51.9%

NC

43.3%

NC

9.8%

NC

46.8%

91

52.6%

90

46.1%

135

23.7%

15

0.2%

134

23.5%

141

19.6%

95

3.9%

148

22.5%

9

6.4%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

21

0.0%

9

6.4%

7,342 3,813
13 3,613 3,370
430 3,529 3,815 2,992 1,835
13 1,822 1677
145 1,157
823 126 113
13 697

83

100.0%

NC

51.9%

NC

0.2%

NC

49.2%

NC

45.9%

NC

5.9%

NC

48.1%

81

52.0%

81

40.8%

194

25.0%

20

0.2%

193

24.8%

212

22.8%

74

2.0%

189

15.8%

21

11.2%

63

1.7%

60

1.5%

18

0.2%

63

9.5%

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 50 of 62

Jefferson County, Florida

Female: 16 to 64 years: In labor force: In Armed Forces Civilian: Employed Unemployed Not in labor force 65 years and over: In labor force: Employed Unemployed Not in labor force

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

2,000 1,598 1,198
0 1,198
951 247 400 402
49 49
0 353

67

47.4%

66

37.9%

134

28.4%

21

0.0%

134

28.4%

131

22.5%

97

5.9%

134

9.5%

23

9.5%

41

1.2%

41

1.2%

21

0.0%

48

8.4%

3,527 2,621 1,791
0 1,791 1,519
272 830 906
61 61
0 845

35

48.0%

35

35.7%

169

24.4%

21

0.0%

169

24.4%

168

20.7%

116

3.7%

171

11.3%

21

12.3%

37

0.8%

37

0.8%

21

0.0%

37

11.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 51 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 52 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 53 of 62
C24010. SEX BY OCCUPATION FOR THE CIVILIAN EMPLOYED POPULATION 16 YEARS AND OVER Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Management, professional, and related occupations Service occupations Sales and office occupations Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations: Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
Male: Management, business, science, and arts occupations: Service occupations Sales and office occupations Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations: Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
Female: Management, professional, and related occupations Service occupations Sales and office occupations Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations: Production, transportation, and material moving occupations

African American
1,826 361 520 435 214 296 826 127 81 218 214 186
1,000 234 439 217 0 110

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Margin of Hispanic Error (+/-)

187

100.0%

NC

19.8%

NC

28.5%

NC

23.8%

NC

11.7%

NC

16.2%

141

45.2%

85

7.0%

64

4.4%

137

11.9%

110

11.7%

89

10.2%

128

54.8%

95

12.8%

130

24.0%

106

11.9%

21

0.0%

101

6.0%

3,370

293

1,307

NC

601

NC

790

NC

405

NC

267

NC

1,790

224

559

155

347

116

268

91

379

107

237

108

1,580

170

748

166

254

86

522

146

26

41

30

36

% of NHW Total 100.0%
38.8% 17.8% 23.4% 12.0%
7.9% 53.1% 16.6% 10.3%
8.0% 11.2%
7.0% 46.9% 22.2%
7.5% 15.5%
0.8% 0.9%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 54 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 55 of 62
B25003. TENURE - Universe: OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Owner occupied Renter occupied

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1,849 1,282
567

171

100.0%

155

69.3%

157

30.7%

3,460 2,849
611

148

100.0%

151

82.3%

159

17.7%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.h

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 56 of 62

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 57 of 62
B25014. OCCUPANTS PER ROOM - Universe: OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: 1.00 or less occupants per room 1.01 or more occupants per room

African American

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of NHW Total

1,849 1,820
29

171

100.0%

167

98.4%

30

1.6%

3,460 3,454
6

148

100.0%

149

99.8%

10

0.2%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.ht

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 58 of 62

B18101. AGE BY DISABILITCYaSsTeA4T:U1S5-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 59 of 62
Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Under 18 years: With a disability No disability 18 to 64 years: With a disability No disability 65 years and over: With a disability No disability

African American
4,708 1,286
88 1,198 2,754
460 2,294
668 363 305

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

145

100.0%

34

27.3%

57

1.9%

65

25.4%

139

58.5%

175

9.8%

184

48.7%

26

14.2%

93

7.7%

92

6.5%

7,696 1,183
39 1,144 4,923
882 4,041 1,590
733 857

Margin of Error (+/-)
256 58 41
149 151 214 231
55 105 107

% of NHW Total
100.0% 15.4%
0.5% 14.9% 64.0% 11.5% 52.5% 20.7%
9.5% 11.1%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 60 of 62

C27001B. HEALTH INSURACNCasEeC4O:V1E5R-cAvG-0E0S1T3A1T-MUSWB-YCAAGSE Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 61 of 62
Data Set: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates

Jefferson County, Florida

Total: Under 18 years: With health insurance coverage No health insurance coverage 18 to 64 years: With health insurance coverage No health insurance coverage 65 years and over: With health insurance coverage No health insurance coverage

African American
4,708 1,286 1,197
89 2,754 1,597 1,157
668 668
0

Margin of Error (+/-)

% of AA Total

White, Not Hispanic

145

100.0%

34

27.3%

94

25.4%

88

1.9%

139

58.5%

250

33.9%

233

24.6%

26

14.2%

26

14.2%

21

0.0%

7,696 1,183 1,091
92 4,923 3,663 1,260 1,590 1,590
0

Margin of Error (+/-)
256 148 139
51 151 298 273
55 55 21

% of NHW Total
100.0% 15.4% 14.2% 1.2% 64.0% 47.6% 16.4% 20.7% 20.7% 0.0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey

For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see Survey Methodology. http://www.census.gov/acs/www/UseData/index.htm

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 55-7 Filed 04/08/16 Page 62 of 62

 
 Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KATE CALVIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH, LONNIE GRIFFIN, AND CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CASE NO. 4:15CV131-MW/CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, AND MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

Defendants. ___________________________/

ORDER APPROVING DEFENDANTS’ PLAN

Defendants have submitted a proposed districting plan. ECF

No. 52. Plaintiffs claim that this plan violates a 1985 consent de-

cree that served as the basis for a stipulated judgment in this

Court. ECF Nos. 55 & 57. For the reasons set forth below, this

Court disagrees. The plan may not be perfect, but Plaintiffs have

not shown that it violates any federal or state law or that it violates

the 1985 consent decree.

1

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 2 of 7
As an initial matter, it’s necessary to clarify what the “consent decree” requires. In late 1985, Judge Maurice M. Paul of this Court entered a judgment that had been agreed to by the parties, which certainly sounds like a consent decree. “A consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). There was some suggestion at the telephonic hearing held on April 15, 2016 that there’s more to the consent decree—that there’s some other agreement which includes terms not spelled out in the final judgment. If there is some additional agreement, the parties have not pointed this Court to it. At any rate, it is the judgment and attachments thereto that must be considered first. See, e.g., Ahern v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 133 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Although consent decrees have the force of a court order, they are also a form of contract to be construed according to basic principles of contract interpretation.”).
The judgment entered by Judge Paul does a few things:
2

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 3 of 7
(1) it enjoins Jefferson County from using county-wide atlarge elections in a manner that violates the Voting Rights Act, ECF No. 52-1, at 7;
(2) it adopts an election plan for “future elections,” id.; and (3) it provides that “all elections henceforth will proceed on a
single district basis; that is all candidates in future elections must reside in the residence area for which they seek election and only voters in that particular residence area shall cast ballots for the particular candidate running in that area,” id. at 8. Defendants’ plan clearly doesn’t violate items (1) or (3). Plaintiffs’ contention is apparently that Defendants’ plan violates the decree by using an election plan that is in some sense inconsistent with the plan adopted in 1985, and therefore violates item (2). Obviously the new plan is not the same as the old one—Jefferson County has redistricted many times since 1985 in light of population and demographic changes—but Plaintiffs’ claim is that the new plan violates the “spirit” of the old one. ECF No. 55-1, at 2. In particular, Plaintiffs claim that the new plan violates the requirement that District 3 be a “balance” district. ECF No. 57, at 2–3. This argument fails for two reasons.
3

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 4 of 7
First, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the “spirit”—as opposed to the terms—of the consent decree is sufficiently ascertainable and articulable that it should be enforced as they request. No doubt the 1985 judgment was intended to address a history of racial discrimination in Jefferson County, and to that end the practice of at-large elections was ended and single-member districts were drawn in a way to allow African-Americans to elect their candidates of choice. See ECF No. 52-1, at 7–8. These provisions are clearly enforceable. Certainly the consent decree as a whole was intended to increase African-American political power in Jefferson County. But that doesn’t mean that the consent decree requires (or perhaps even allows) this Court to maximize such political power upon redistricting. Cf. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1253 (5th Cir. 1987) (“If . . . a federal court may take almost any action against a state to enforce a consent decree so long as it is ‘consistent with’ the ‘spirit’ of the applicable constitutional law and the decree itself, there is no limitation on the scope of the court’s power.”); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984) (“It is to be recalled that the ‘scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it’ or by
4

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 5 of 7
what ‘might have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.’”) (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1971)).
Second, to the extent the consent decree contains an enforceable provision in its spirit requiring that there be a “balance” district, Plaintiffs haven’t shown that the new plan violates that provision. Plaintiffs have not shown that 40.8%—the percentage of the voting age population that was African-American in the “balanced” district under the 1985 plan—is a magic number that must be satisfied under the markedly different demographic facts present today. Of course 40.8% is better than 38.24% (the number under Defendants’ plan) for purposes of maximizing African-American political strength, but Plaintiffs haven’t shown that the difference would actually lead to loss of political opportunity. True, Plaintiffs’ expert opines that Plaintiffs’ plan1 “will afford African Americans the best opportunity to elect their candidate of choice in a second district,” ECF No. 55-1, at 9, but by that reasoning it’s hard to see why one should stop at 40.8%, or even 41.65%.
1 Under Plaintiffs’ proposed plan, the voting age population of District 3 would be 41.65% African-American. ECF No. 55-1, at 5.
5

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 6 of 7
In the absence of a consent decree, there is no doubt that Defendants’ plan would have to be accepted. “Where . . . [a] legislative body . . . respond[s] [to an invalidated districting scheme] with a proposed remedy, a court may not thereupon simply substitute its judgment of a more equitable remedy for that of the legislative body; it may only consider whether the proffered remedial plan is legally unacceptable because it violates anew constitutional or statutory voting rights—that is, whether it fails to meet the same standards applicable to an original challenge of a legislative plan in place.” McGhee v. Granville Cty., 860 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 42 (1982)). The consent decree doesn’t change anything, because (1) it doesn’t appear to require that there be a second “balanced” district and (2) even if it does, Plaintiffs have not shown that District 3 in Defendants’ plan isn’t such a district. Plaintiffs’ version of District 3 is certainly better for purposes of maximizing African-American political power, but Plaintiffs haven’t shown that the difference is one that violates the terms or spirit of the consent decree. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED: 1. Defendants’ proposed districting plan as described in
ECF No. 52 is accepted.
6

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 62 Filed 04/18/16 Page 7 of 7

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment stating “IT IS ORDERED

AND ADJUDGED that judgment be entered in favor of

Plaintiffs and against Defendants. The districting plans

or schemes used by the Jefferson County Board of County

Commissioners and the Jefferson County School Board

are hereby declared to be in violation of the Equal Protec-

tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants

and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attor-

neys, and those other persons who are in active concert or

participation with them, shall not use these districting

schemes or allow them to be used in future elections. De-

fendants shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the

Court-approved districting plan, ECF No. 52, is officially

adopted.”

3. This Court retains jurisdiction to settle issues relating to

attorney’s fees and other ancillary matters.

4. The Clerk shall close the file.

SO ORDERED on April 18, 2016.

s/Mark E. Walker

____

United States District Judge

7

 
 Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 70 Filed 07/13/16 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Tallahassee Division

KATE CALVIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J. PARRISH, LONNIE GRIFFIN and CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No.: 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, and MARTY BISHOP, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, in his official capacity,

Defendants. /

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND JOINT MOTION TO ENTER CONSENT ORDER AND CLOSE THE CASE

Plaintiffs and Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., give notice that the parties have amicably resolved Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees and costs, and jointly move for the entry of the attached Agreed Order administratively closing this action and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement.

Nancy Abudu Fla. Bar No. 111881 nabudu@aclufl.org Shalini Goel Agarwal Fla. Bar No. 90843 sagarwal@aclufl.org ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc. 4500 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 340 Miami, FL 33137 Tel: 786-363-2700 Fax: 786-363-1448

Linda Bond Edwards Fla. Bar No. 0057282 ledwards@rumberger.com Brian L. Hayden Fla. Bar No. 058987 bhayden@rumberger.com RUMBERGER, KIRK & CALDWELL 215 South Monroe St., Suite 702 P.O. Box 10507 Tallahassee, FL 32302-2507 Tel: 850-222-6550 Fax: 850-222-8783

{07127683;2}

Case 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS Document 70 Filed 07/13/16 Page 2 of 2

Randall C. Berg, Jr. Fla. Bar No. 318371 rberg@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org Dante P. Trevisani Fla. Bar No. 72912 dtrevisani@FloridaJusticeInstitute.org Florida Justice Institute, Inc. 100 SE Second St., Ste. 3750 Miami, FL 33131-2115 Tel: 305-358-2081 Fax: 305-358-0910
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
By: s/Randall C. Berg, Jr. . Randall C. Berg, Jr.

Attorneys for Jefferson County Board of Commissioners and Marty Bishop
By: s/Linda Bond-Edwards Linda Bond-Edwards
Gerald B. Curington Fla. Bar No. 224170 jcurington@ausley.com AUSLEY McMULLEN, P.A. P.O. Box 391 (32302) 123 S. Calhoun St. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Tel: 850-425-5342 Fax: 850-222-7560
Attorneys for Jefferson County School Board
By: s/Gerald B. Curington Gerald B. Curington

{07127683;2}-2-

 
 CLOSED,MEDIATION
U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida (Tallahassee) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:15−cv−00131−MW−CAS

CALVIN et al v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al Assigned to: JUDGE MARK E WALKER Referred to: MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES A STAMPELOS Cause: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/09/2015 Date Terminated: 04/18/2016 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting Jurisdiction: Federal Question

KATE CALVIN

represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE INC− MIAMI FL 100 SE 2ND ST 3750 BANK OF AMERICA TWR MIAMI, FL 33131 305−358−2081 Fax: 305−358−0910 Email: dtrevisani@floridajusticeinstitute.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

RANDALL CHALLEN BERG FLORIDA JUSTICE INSTITUTE INC − MIAMI FL 3750 BANK OF AMERICA TOWER 100 SE SECOND ST MIAMI, FL 33131 305−358−2081 Fax: 305−358−0910 Email: rberg@floridajusticeinstitute.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL 515 FAIRWAY DRIVE MIAMI BEACH, FL 33141 706−473−6329 Email: sagarwal@aclufl.org TERMINATED: 06/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY

NANCY GBANA ABUDU ACLU FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA INC − MIAMI FL 4500 BISCAYNE BLVD STE 340 MIAMI, FL 33137 786−363−2707 Fax: 786−363−1108 Email: nabudu@aclufl.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff JOHN NELSON

represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

RANDALL CHALLEN BERG

Plaintiff CHARLES J PARRISH
Plaintiff LONNIE GRIFFIN
Plaintiff CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY
NANCY GBANA ABUDU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RANDALL CHALLEN BERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY
NANCY GBANA ABUDU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RANDALL CHALLEN BERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY
NANCY GBANA ABUDU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by DANTE PASQUALE TREVISANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RANDALL CHALLEN BERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
Defendant JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
Defendant MARTY BISHOP SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/15/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY
NANCY GBANA ABUDU (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by BRIAN LEE HAYDEN RUMBERGER KIRK & CALDWELL PA − TALLAHASSEE FL 215 S MONROE ST STE 702 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32301 850−222−6550 Fax: 850−222−8783 Email: bhayden@rumberger.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LINDA BOND EDWARDS RUMBERGER KIRK & CALDWELL PA − TALLAHASSEE FL 215 S MONROE ST STE 702 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32301 850/222−6550 Fax: 850/222−8783 Email: ledwards@rumberger.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ZACKERY AARON SCHARLEPP COPPINS MONROE ADKINS ETC PA − TALLAHASSEE FL 1319 THOMASWOOD DR TALLAHASSEE, FL 32308 850−422−2420 Email: zascharlepp@coppinsmonroe.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by GERALD BETZIG CURINGTON AUSLEY & MCMULLEN − TALLAHASSEE FL 123 S CALHOUN ST TALLAHASSEE, FL 32301 850−224−9115 Fax: 850−222−7560 Email: jcurington@ausley.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by BRIAN LEE HAYDEN (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LINDA BOND EDWARDS (See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ZACKERY AARON SCHARLEPP (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/09/2015 03/25/2015
03/25/2015
03/25/2015 03/25/2015 03/25/2015 03/26/2015
04/07/2015 04/07/2015
04/07/2015 04/08/2015 04/09/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 1129−3201161.), filed by KATE CALVIN. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons) (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
2 CIVIL COVER SHEET. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet) (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 03/09/2015)
3 Summonses Issued as to MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit) (sac) (Entered: 03/10/2015)
4 SUMMONS Returned Executed by LONNIE GRIFFIN, KATE CALVIN, CHARLES J PARRISH, JOHN NELSON, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS served on 3/19/2015, answer due 4/9/2015. (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by LONNIE GRIFFIN, KATE CALVIN, CHARLES J PARRISH, JOHN NELSON, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE. JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD served on 3/20/2015, answer due 4/10/2015. (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed by LONNIE GRIFFIN, KATE CALVIN, CHARLES J PARRISH, JOHN NELSON, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE. MARTY BISHOP served on 3/19/2015, answer due 4/9/2015. (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by LINDA BOND EDWARDS on behalf of MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (EDWARDS, LINDA) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by ZACKERY AARON SCHARLEPP on behalf of MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
9 INITIAL SCHEDULING ORDER : Fed.R.Civ.P. 7.1 Corporate Disclosure Statement Deadline set for 4/9/2015. Rule 26 Meeting Report due by 5/11/2015. Discovery due by 7/24/2015. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 3/26/2015. (sac) (Entered: 03/27/2015)
10 Consent MOTION to Extend Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
11 ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT, re: 10 Consent MOTION to Extend Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint. Defendants, Jefferson County Board of Commissioners and Marty Bishop, shall file their responses to the complaint on or before May 11, 2015. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/7/2015. (kjw) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
Set/Reset Deadline − Defendant's Response to the Complaint is due by 5/11/2015 per 11 ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT. (kjw) (Entered: 04/07/2015)
12 Corporate Disclosure Statement/Certificate of Interested Persons by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by GERALD BETZIG CURINGTON on behalf of JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD (CURINGTON, GERALD) (Entered: 04/09/2015)

04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/14/2015 04/20/2015 04/21/2015 04/21/2015
05/05/2015 05/06/2015 05/08/2015 05/28/2015 05/29/2015
07/29/2015 07/29/2015 08/04/2015 08/05/2015

14 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer To Plaintiffs' Complaint by JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (CURINGTON, GERALD) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
15 ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT ECF No. 14 − Defendant Jefferson County School Board shall file its response to the complaint on or before 5/11/2015. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/13/2015. (sac) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
Reset Answer Deadlines per 11 ORDER: MARTY BISHOP answer due 5/11/2015; JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS answer due 5/11/2015. (sac) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
16 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (CURINGTON, GERALD) (Entered: 04/20/2015)
17 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
18 SCHEDULING AND MEDIATION ORDER re: 17 Report: (Discovery due by 9/18/2015., Dispositive Motions to be filed by 10/9/2015., Bench Trial set for 2/16/2016 08:15 AM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER., Mediation Report due by 10/30/2015.), Case referred to mediation. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/21/2015. (tdl) (Entered: 04/21/2015)
19 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Rule 26(A)(1) Disclosures by JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (CURINGTON, GERALD) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
20 ORDER EXTENDING TIME: 19 Motion for Extension of Time is granted. Defendant has until May 15, 2015, to file its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 5/6/15. (amm) (Entered: 05/06/2015)
21 ANSWER to 1 Complaint by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS. (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 05/08/2015)
22 Consent MOTION to Extend TimeTo File and Serve Any Remedial Phase Expert Witness Reports by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 05/28/2015)
23 ORDER GRANTING ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE AND SERVE WITNESS REPORTS, re: 22 Consent MOTION to Extend Time To File and Serve Any Remedial Phase Expert Witness Reports. Plaintiffs shall disclose any remedial phase expert witness report intended for use during the remedial phase of litigation sixty (60) days after this Court's ruling on the liability phase of the lawsuit. Any depositions to be taken shall be accomplished within thirty (30) days from the disclosure of expert witness reports. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 5/29/2015. (kjw) (Entered: 05/29/2015)
24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (Internal deadline for referral to judge if response not filed earlier: 8/17/2015). (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
25 NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN BISHOP by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD re 24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 07/29/2015)
26 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment by KATE CALVIN. (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 08/04/2015)
27 ORDER GRANTING 26 UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re 24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment (Internal deadline for referral to judge if response not filed earlier: 9/18/2015). Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 8/5/2015. (pll) (Entered: 08/05/2015)

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28 MOTION to Abrogate Mediation Order re 18 Scheduling Order,, Case Referred to Mediation, by KATE CALVIN. (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 08/12/2015)
29 ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO ABROGATE MEDIATION ORDER. This Court has considered, without hearing, the Joint Motion to Abrogate Mediation Order. ECF No. 28 . The motion is GRANTED. The parties are relieved of the requirement to mediate. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 8/13/2015. (kjw) (Entered: 08/13/2015)
30 MOTION for Summary Judgment by KATE CALVIN. (Internal deadline for referral to judge if response not filed earlier: 10/9/2015). (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit) (ABUDU, NANCY) Modified on 9/21/2015 to reflect 21−day deadline (vkm). (Entered: 09/18/2015)
31 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
32 ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re ECF No. 31 (Internal deadline for referral to judge if response not filed earlier: 11/9/2015). Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 10/8/2015. (tdl) (Entered: 10/08/2015)
33 ORDER FOR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. Attorney Conference to take place by 12/23/2015. Pretrial Stipulation due by 1/6/2016. Jury Trial set for 2/16/2016 08:15 AM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER. Telephonic Pretrial Conference set for 1/13/2016 12:15 PM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 10/20/15. (vkm) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
34 Joint MOTION Remove From Trial Calendar re 33 Pretrial Order, and Expedite Consideration of Pending Cross Motions for Summary Judgment by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 10/27/2015)
35 ORDER GRANTING IN PART 34 JOINT MOTION TO REMOVE CASE FROM TRIAL CALENDAR − This Court removes this cause from the trial docket of February 16, 2016, pending ruling on cross motions for summary judgment. This Court shall expedite ruling on the motions with the understanding that criminal cases are this Court's first priority. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 10/28/2015. (vkm) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
36 RESPONSE to Motion re 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 11/05/2015)
37 MOTION for Leave to File re 36 Response to Motion for Summary Judgment a Reply Brief by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Proposed Reply) (AGARWAL, SHALINI) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
38 ORDER GRANTING 37 UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE AND ACCEPTING REPLY AS FILED. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 11/10/2015. (vkm) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
39 REPLY to Response to Motion re 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by KATE CALVIN. (vkm) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
40 NOTICE of Hearing on 24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment , 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment : Motion Hearing set for 1/1/2016 09:00 AM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER. United States Courthouse, 111 North Adams St., Tallahassee, Florida 32301.
NOTE: If you or any party, witness or attorney in this matter has a disability that requires special accommodation, such as, a hearing impairment that requires a sign language interpreter or a wheelchair restriction that requires ramp access, please

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contact Pam Lourcey at 850−521−3501 in the Clerk's Office at least one week prior to the hearing (or as soon as possible) so arrangements can be made.
s/ Pam Lourcey Courtroom Deputy Clerk (pll) (Entered: 12/07/2015)
41 NOTICE of *RESCHEDULED* Hearing on 24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment, 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment : Motion Hearing set for 1/6/2016 09:00 AM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER. United States Courthouse, 111 North Adams St., Tallahassee, Florida 32301.
NOTE: If you or any party, witness or attorney in this matter has a disability that requires special accommodation, such as, a hearing impairment that requires a sign language interpreter or a wheelchair restriction that requires ramp access, please contact Pam Lourcey at 850−521−3501 in the Clerk's Office at least one week prior to the hearing (or as soon as possible) so arrangements can be made.
s/ Pam Lourcey Courtroom Deputy Clerk (pll) (Entered: 12/09/2015)
42 NOTICE Of Withdrawal of Appearance by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (SCHARLEPP, ZACKERY) (Entered: 12/30/2015)
43 Minute Entry for proceedings held before JUDGE MARK E WALKER: Oral Argument held on 1/6/2016. Parties to supplement the record; any additional depositions to be taken by January 31, 2016. Depositions and Supplemental Briefs of no more than 15 pages, if any that court needs to take judicial notice of, shall be filed within 10 business days after January 31, 2016. ( Supplemental Materials due by 2/16/2016}. (Court Reporter Lisa Jones.) (pll) (Entered: 01/06/2016)
44 NOTICE of Appearance by BRIAN LEE HAYDEN on behalf of MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (HAYDEN, BRIAN) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
45 STIPULATION of Facts by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
46 MEMORANDUM in Support re 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 24 Joint MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (EDWARDS, LINDA) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
47 NOTICE of Filing Documents in Support of Defendants' Supplemental Brief by MARTY BISHOP, JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD re 46 Memorandum in Support of Motion (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Barwick, # 2 Affidavit Boyd, # 3 Affidavit Matthews, # 4 Exhibit Depo Boyd, # 5 Exhibit Depo Cooksey, # 6 Exhibit Depo Griffin, # 7 Exhibit Depo Hodgson, # 8 Exhibit Depo Nelson, # 9 Exhibit Depo Washington, # 10 Exhibit RSPRA) (EDWARDS, LINDA) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
48 MEMORANDUM in Support re 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 9 −− Hodgson Deposition, # 2 Exhibit 10 −− Boyd Affidavit, # 3 Exhibit 11 −− County Agenda and Materials, # 4 Exhibit 12 −− County Materials, # 5 Exhibit 13 −− County Materials, # 6 Exhibit 14 −− County Plan, # 7 Exhibit 15 −− Boyd Deposition, # 8 Exhibit 16 −− Commission Agenda etc., # 9 Exhibit 17 −− Washington dep, # 10 Exhibit 18 −− Defs' Responses to Request for Admission) (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
49 ORDER ON 24 and 30 MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Plaintiffs Cross−Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 30 , is GRANTED. Defendants Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24 , is DENIED. Defendants are enjoined from using the current districting plan for the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners and the Jefferson County School Board. Defendants must submit to

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this Court on or before Monday, April 4, 2016 a proposed districting plan that complies with this Order and with all applicable federal and state laws, to the extent those state laws are compatible with federal law. ( Miscellaneous Deadline for proposed districting plan − by 4/4/2016.). Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 3/19/16. (pll) (Entered: 03/19/2016)
50 Consent MOTION to Extend Timeto File Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Expenses, and to file a Bill of Costs by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 03/29/2016)
51 ORDER ON MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME − The motion, ECF No. 50 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs will file motions for attorney's fees and expenses and a bill of costs on or before 5/13/2016, or within the time limits prescribed by the Federal rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules−−whichever comes later. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 3/29/2016. (vkm) (Entered: 03/29/2016)
52 NOTICE of Filing Pursuant to Court's March 19, 2016 Order by JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS re 49 Order,,,, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,, (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Stephen Walker, # 2 Affidavit Kurt Spitzer, # 3 Affidavit Marty Bishop) (EDWARDS, LINDA) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
53 ORDER SETTING TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO STATE POSITION ON PROPOSED DISTRICTING PLAN re 52 Notice. (Plaintiffs Proposed Districting Plan due by 4/8/2016.) Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/4/2016. (tdl) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
54 AFFIDAVIT re 49 Order,,,, Set Deadlines/Hearings,,, Notice of Filing Pursuant to Court's March 19, 2016 Order by JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Shirley Washington) (CURINGTON, GERALD) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
55 RESPONSE by KATE CALVIN re 52 Notice (Other), . (Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit) (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
56 ORDER SETTING TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO FILE BRIEF ON DISTRICTING PLANS Re: 55 PLAINTIFFS SUBMISSION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY and 52 NOTICE OF FILING PURSUANT TO 49 ORDER (Plaintiff's Brief Re: 52 Notice due by: 4/12/2016). Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/8/2016. (vkm) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
57 RESPONSE by KATE CALVIN re 56 Order,, Set Deadlines/Hearings, . (ABUDU, NANCY) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
58 ORDER SETTING HEARING re 57 Response and 52 Notice − This Court will set a hearing for this Friday, April 15, 2016 in Tallahassee. The Clerk will communicate with the parties and select a time for the hearing. The parties must come to the hearing ready to explain why Defendants' proposed districting scheme complies or doesn't comply with the consent decree. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/12/2016. (vkm) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
59 NOTICE OF HEARING: Argument of Counsel set for 4/15/2016 04:00 PM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER. **DUE TO THE COURT'S TRIAL SCHEDULE IN GAINESVILLE; THIS HEARING MUST BE SET AT THE ABOVE DATE/TIME.** United States Courthouse, 111 North Adams St., Tallahassee, Florida 32301.
NOTE: If you or any party, witness or attorney in this matter has a disability that requires special accommodation, such as, a hearing impairment that requires a sign language interpreter or a wheelchair restriction that requires ramp access, please contact Pam Lourcey at 850−521−3501 in the Clerk's Office at least one week prior to the hearing (or as soon as possible) so arrangements can be made.
s/ Pam Lourcey Courtroom Deputy Clerk (pll) Modified on 4/13/2016 (pll). (Entered: 04/12/2016)

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60 NOTICE OF TELEPHONIC HEARING: Telephonic Hearing for Argument of Counsel set for 4/15/2016 04:00 PM in U.S. Courthouse Tallahassee before JUDGE MARK E WALKER. AT&T LANGUAGE United States Courthouse, 111 North Adams St., Tallahassee, Florida 32301.
You may dial into the conference call as early as 3:55 PM EST. Call in number: 888−684−8852. When prompted for an access code, enter: 8131706#. If you are asked to join as the host, just ignore and wait until you are asked for a security code. When asked for a security code, enter: 7898#. Say your name, when prompted. You are now in the conference call. Remember to mute your phone when you are not speaking.
NOTE: If you or any party, witness or attorney in this matter has a disability that requires special accommodation, such as, a hearing impairment that requires a sign language interpreter or a wheelchair restriction that requires ramp access, please contact Pam Lourcey at 850−521−3501 in the Clerk's Office at least one week prior to the hearing (or as soon as possible) so arrangements can be made.
s/ Pam Lourcey Courtroom Deputy Clerk (pll) (Entered: 04/13/2016)
61 Minute Entry for proceedings held before JUDGE MARK E WALKER:Telephonic Hearing held on 4/15/2016. Court hears argument on language of proposed consent decree. Order to follow. (Court Reporter Lisa Jones.) (pll) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
62 ORDER APPROVING DEFENDANTS' PLAN − Defendants' proposed districting plan as described in ECF No. 52 is accepted. The Clerk shall enter judgment stating "IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants. The districting plans or schemes used by the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners and the Jefferson County School Board are hereby declared to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, shall not use these districting schemes or allow them to be used in future elections. Defendants shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Court−approved districting plan, ECF No. 52 , is officially adopted." This Court retains jurisdiction to settle issues relating to attorney's fees and other ancillary matters. The Clerk shall close the file. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 4/18/2016. (vkm) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
63 CLERK'S JUDGMENT entered pursuant to 62 ORDER APPROVING DEFENDANTS' PLAN. (vkm) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
64 UNOPPOSED Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, and Bill of Costs by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (TREVISANI, DANTE) Modified on 5/5/2016 to reflect motion is unopposed (vkm). (Entered: 05/04/2016)
65 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME − The motion for an extension of time, ECF No. 64 , is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file a motion for attorney's fees and costs or notify this court that the issue has been settled on or before 6/15/2016. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 5/5/2016. (vkm) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
66 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File to File Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Expenses, and Costs by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (BERG, RANDALL) (Entered: 06/11/2016)
67 ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME − The motion for an extension of time, ECF No. 66 , is GRANTED. (Motion for Attorney's Fees & Costs due by 7/15/2016.) Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 6/12/2016. (tdl) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
68 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Shalini Goel Agarwal by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (AGARWAL, SHALINI) (Entered: 06/14/2016)

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69 ORDER GRANTING 68 MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL − Attorney SHALINI GOEL AGARWAL terminated. The Clerk shall disconnect the notice of electronic filing for withdrawing counsel. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 6/15/2016. (vkm)***NOTICE DISCONNECTED FOR COUNSEL AS DIRECTED*** (Entered: 06/15/2016)
70 NOTICE of Settlement and Joint Motion to Enter Consent Order and Close the Case by KATE CALVIN, CONCERNED UNITED PEOPLE, LONNIE GRIFFIN, JOHN NELSON, CHARLES J PARRISH (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Consent Order (Proposed)) (TREVISANI, DANTE) (Entered: 07/13/2016)
71 ORDER ACKNOWLEDGING SETTLEMENT re 70 Notice of Settlement − The parties ask this Court to retain jurisdiction. This Court will do so. This case shall remain closed. Signed by JUDGE MARK E WALKER on 7/14/2016. (vkm) (Entered: 07/14/2016)