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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2003 JUl21 PM 2: 07
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIAN~O;\L I i t\ G. WHYTE CLERK ~

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY)

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

RITE AID CORPORATION,

)

)

Defendant.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
03-2079
COMPLAINT
SECI FMAG. 3
Jury Trial Demand

NATURE OF THE ACTION
This action is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawful employment practices and to provide appropriate relief to Tiffany R. Blackmon ("Blackmon") who was adversely affected by such practices. The Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") alleges that Blackmon, a female, was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by Defendant Rite Aid Corporation ( "Defendant", "Employer" or "Defendant Employer") and discharged because she complained to the Defendant about the sexually work environment. The allegations are more particularly stated in paragraph 8 below.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 451,1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of
=- Fee~·process' X Dktd
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- DOC. NO.-:/--

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) and (3) ("Title VIlli), and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.c. § 1981a.
2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were at all material times committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
PARTIES 3. The EEOC is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times Defendant has been a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Pennsylvania, continuously doing business in the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans, and continuously has had at least 15 employees. 5. At all relevant times Defendant continuously has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e (b), (g) and (h). 6. At all relevant times all material facts occurred within the jurisdiction of this Court.
2

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit Blackmon filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. From October 2001 through the date of her discharge, March 29, 2002, Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices at its store # 7255, which is located at St. Charles and Louisiana avenues in New Orleans, Louisiana, in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a), and Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). These practices, including requests for dates, sexually-oriented comments, inappropriate touching and rubbing, and misuse of the store's security camera to "zoom in" on her breasts as well as the breasts and buttocks of other employees and customers, constituted sexual harassment of Blackmon and the creation of a sexually hostile work environment perpetrated by two of Defendant's undercover security detectives against Blackmon in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). Defendant knew or should have known about the sexual harassment and sexually hostile work environment, but it failed to take prompt, corrective or remedial action. Accordingly, Defendant is liable for the sexually hostile work environment perpetrated by its undercover security detectives in violation of Title VII. Furthermore, on or about March 29, 2002, Defendant discharged Blackmon in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a), because she complained about the misconduct of its undercover security detectives, which she reasonably
3

and in good faith believed constituted unlawful sexual harassment. Accordingly, Defendant is liable for its retaliatory discharge of Blackmon in violation of Title VII.
9. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 8 above has been to deprive Blackmon of equal employment opportunities, alter her conditions of employment and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because of her sex and internal discrimination complaint, in violation of Section703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a), and Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 8 above were intentional.
12. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 8 above were done and/or allowed to be done with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Blackmon.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in sexual harassment, discriminatory retaliation, and any other employment practices which discriminate on the basis of sex or protected activity in violation of Title VII. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which are designed 1) to prevent and correct sexually hostile work environments and
4

discriminatory retaliation in its stores, and 2) which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.
C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Tiffany Blackmon by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement of Ms. Blackmon.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Tiffany Blackmon by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in paragraph 8 above, including, but not limited to, job search expenses and medical expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Tiffany Blackmon by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in paragraph 8 above, including, but not limited to, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Tiffany Blackmon punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct, as described in paragraph 8 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.
5

JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel No Bar Roll Number A:Siie~
___~~A-U KEITH:HILL Regional Attorney Bar Roll No. 15200000
.!lfsIJA t ~L
MICHELLE T. BUTLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Bar Roll No. 1286
N. ELEANOR GRAHAM Senior Trial Attorney Bar Roll Number 16946 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION New Orleans District Office 701 Loyola Avenue, Suite 600 New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 Telephone: (504) 589-6922
(504) 589-2701 Facsimile: (504) 589-2805
6

AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS: CT Corporation System 8550 United Plaza Blvd. Baton Rouge, LA 70809
7

 
 Au=-14-0~

From-EEOC LEGAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTIZNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION N(. 03-2079

K & B LOUISIANA CORPORATION D/B/A RIT£ AID,
Defendant.

SECTION F. MAG. 3 ~J~JP.Y TRIAl_ DEM ~

AMENDED CO~m~-A~. T
NOW INTO COURT, comes Plaintiff, the United Slams Equal Employrrent Op )ormmty Comrmssion, and files its Amended Complaint to correct the name and identifyi]=g mtb~ marion for the Defendant, K & B Louisiana Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, which was errotieously named and idendfied in the original Complaint as Rtte Aid Corporation.
NATURE OF THE ACTION This action is brought under Tide VII of the Civil P.zghts Act of 1964, a~ amen ed, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct unlawf-1 employment practices ~nd to ] ,rovide appmpriam relief to Tiffany R. Blackmon CBlackmon") who was adversely affected b) such practices. The Plaintiff F_.qual Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or
__ Fee . -- -
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"Commission") alleges that Blackmon, a female, was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by Defendant K & B Louisiana Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid ("Defendant", "Employer" or "Defendant Employer") and discharged because she complained to the Defendant about the sexually hostile work environmenTt.he allegations are more particularly stated in paragraph 8 below.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451,1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) ("Title VII"), and pursuant to Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. The employment practices alleged to be unlawful were at all material times committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
PARTIES 3. The EEOC is the agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). 4. At all relevant times Defendant has been a Louisiana corporation, which by acquisition and/or merger has been doing business as Rite Aid. Defendant continuously has had at least 15 employees.
2

5. At all relevant times Defendant continuously has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce under Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (b), (g) and (h).
6. At all relevant times all material facts occurred within the jurisdiction of this Court.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 7. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit Blackmon filed a charge with the Commission alleging violations of Title VII by Defendant. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 8. From October 2001 through the date of her discharge, March 29, 2002, Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices at its store # 7255, which is located at St. Charles and Louisiana avenues in New Orleans, Louisiana, in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). These practices, including requests for dates, sexually-oriented comments, inappropriate touching and rubbing, and misuse of the store’s security camera to "zoom in" on her breasts as well as the breasts and buttocks of other employees and customers, constituted sexual harassment of Blackmon and the creation of a sexually hostile work environment perpetrated by two of Defendant’s undercover security detectives against Blackmon in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Defendant knew or should have known about the sexual harassment and sexually hostile work environment, but it failed to take prompt, corrective or remedial action. Accordingly, Defendant is liable for the sexually hostile work environment perpetrated by its undercover security detectives in violation of Title VII. Furthermore, on or about March 29, 2002, Defendant

discharged Blackmon in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), because she complained about the misconduct of its undercover security detectives, which she reasonably and in good faith believed constituted unlawful sexual harassment. Accordingly, Defendant is liable for its retaliatory discharge of Blackmon in violation of Title VII.
9. The effect of the practices complained of in paragraph 8 above has been to deprive Blackmon of equal employment opportunities, alter her conditions of employment and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee because of her sex and internal discrimination complaint, in violation of Section703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
11. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 8 above were intentional.
12. The unlawful employment practices complained of in paragraph 8 above were done and/or allowed to be done with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Blackmon.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendant Employer, its officers, successors, assigns, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from engaging in sexual harassment, discriminatory retaliation, and any other employment practices which discriminate on the basis of sex or protected activity in violation of Title VII. B. Order Defendant Employer to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which are designed 1) to prevent and correct sexually hostile work environments and
4

discriminatory retaliation in its stores, and 2) which eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment practices.
C. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Tiffany Blackmon by providing appropriate back pay with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices, including but not limited to reinstatement of Ms. Blackmon.
D. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Tiffany Blackmon by providing compensation for past and future pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in paragraph 8 above, including, but not limited to, job search expenses and medical expenses, in amounts to be determined at trial.
E. Order Defendant Employer to make whole Tiffany Blackmon by providing compensation for past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices described in paragraph 8 above, including, but not limited to, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation, in amounts to be determined at trial.
F. Order Defendant Employer to pay Tiffany Blackmon punitive damages for its malicious and reckless conduct, as described in paragraph 8 above, in amounts to be determined at trial.
G. Grant such further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
H. Award the Commission its costs of this action.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND
The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel No Bar Roll Number Assigned
KEITH T.[i-HLL Regional Attorney Bar Roll No. 15200000
MICI~LLE T. BUTLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Bar Roll No. 1286
N. ELEANOR GRAHAM Senior Trial Attorney Bar Roll Number 16946 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION New Orleans District Office 701 Loyola Avenue, Suite 600 New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 Telephone: (504) 589-6922
(504) 589-2701 Facsimile: (504) 589-2805

AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS:
CT Corporation System 8550 United Plaza Blvd. Baton Rouge, LA 70809

 
 FILElJ
u.s. OiSTf~'C! COURT
EASTERHO IShi leT 0F L. II,
2003 AUG 26 AM 10: 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

*

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

*

an agency of the United States

*

of America,

*

C.A. No. 03-2079

Plaintiff *

*

v.

*

SECT. F

*

K&B LOUISIANA CORPORATION *

d/b/a Rite Aid

*

MAG. 3

Defendant *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

TIFFANY BLACKMON'S COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

Intervenor, Tiffany Blackmon, files this complaint in intervention as a party-

plaintiff, as authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.

A. Introduction

1. Intervenor, Tiffany Blackmon, is an individual domiciled in the State of

Louisiana.

2. Plaintiff, The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC")

is an agency of the United States of America, and will be served with a copy of this

complaint through its attorney of record, N. Eleanor Graham, at EEOC, 701 Loyola,
,

Suite 600, New Orleans, LA 70113, New Orleans, LA by certified mail.

~p_~~cessq\..,. ,

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Oktd CtRmDe

~
p- $ -

_ Doc. No. _ __

3. Defendant, K&B Louisiana Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, is a foreign corporation authorized to do and doing business in the State of Louisiana. Defendant will be served with a copy of this complaint through its attorney of record, George D. Fagan, at Leake & Andersson, L.L.P., 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 1700, New Orleans, LA 701631701, by certified mail.
B. The Original Lawsuit
4. Plaintiff, the EEOC, sued Defendant for employment discrimination including sexual harassment, a sexually hostile environment and prohibited retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Defendant, K&B Louisiana Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid has not yet filed an Answer.
C. Intervenor's Cause of Action 5. Intervenor adopts, incorporates and realleges all the allegations of the original complaint filed herein by the EEOC, and request a trial by jury. 6. Intervenor is a person aggrieved by the conduct of the Defendant as complained of in the original complaint.
D. Damages 7. Intervenor has suffered economic losses, loss of income, benefits, humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life as a result of the conduct of Defendant, its agents and employees, as described in the original complaint.
-2-

F. Prayer 8. For these reasons, intervenor prays that after due proceedings she recovers a Judgment against Defendant, K&B Louisiana Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid for the following:
A. Injunctive relief enjoining the Defendant's conduct; B. Award of damages to compensate her for her economic losses
(including back-pay, front pay and loss of benefits), mental anguish, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life; C. Award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish the Defendant for its conduct and to deter it from further conduct of a like nature; and D. An award of the reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees, costs, and applicable judicial interest.
Respectfully submitted,
e L. Ai ebarrena (#22235) T.A. wight L. McNamara (#22521)
3621 Ridgelake Dr., Suite 300 Metairie, Louisiana 70002 Telephone (504) 828-5595 Attorneys for Tiffany Blackmon
-3-

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that I sent a copy of Motion to Intervene as a Right Memorandum in Support, and Complaint of Intervention to each party's attorney listed below on
August ~'0/ 03, by the method indicated next to the attorney's name.

u.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, represented by

N. Eleanor Graham 701 Loyola, Suite 600 New Orleans, LA 70113 Tel. (504) 589-6922 Fax (504) 589-2805

Certified Mail #7001 2510 0008 9933 5225

K&B Louisiana Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, represented by

George D. Fagan Leake & Andersson, L.L.P. 1100 Poydras Street Suite 1700 New Orleans, LA 70163-1701 Tel (504) 585-7500 Fax (504) 585-7775

Certified Mail #7001 2510 0008 9933 6628

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 zao~ JUL 28! P 3: 03

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 03-2079 "N"(3)

K & B LOUISIANA CORPORATION Defendant

JUDGE ENGELHARDT MAG. KNOWLES

CONSENT DECREE

Considering the joint motion for the entry of this Consent Decree submitted by the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the Commission"), plaintiff, K & B

Louisiana Corporation d/b/a! Rite Aid. ("Rite Aid"), defendant, through their respective.

counsel of record, and the representations regarding the consent of Tiffany Blackmon to

the entry of this Decree;

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

I. Within ninety (90) days of the entry of this Order, Rite Aid shall provide

training to Craig Gagnon, Ronald Lowe, David Neu, Lester Perkins and Ed Washington

that provides an overview of Title VII retaliation law, including the prohibitions against

DATE nF'ENT JUL 29 2004

taking adverse action against a person engaging in any protected activity (filing, making or reporting a discrimination complaint and participation in a proceeding covered by Title VII adverse action) and the consequences of doing so.
2. Within sixty (60) days of providing the training to each such person as described in the preceding paragraph, Rite Aid or its counsel shall provide the Commission's New Orleans District Office Regional Attorney with a writing describing the date on which each listed person was trained as set forth in paragraph I of this Order.
3. Rite Aid re-affirms and hereby states that it has maintained all postings required by federal or state law in its Louisiana store and office locations, and agrees to continue to do so.
4. Rite Aid re-affirms and hereby states that it has provided reasonable notice of its policies and procedures as well as any laws regarding the prohibition against unlawful retaliation in its Louisiana store and office locations and agrees to continue to do so, and further agrees to post the name and telephone number for the Human Resources Manager and the RlTE-CALL "800" number in the same location in its Louisiana store and office locations.
5. Should any provision of this Decree be declared or be determined by any Court to be illegal or invalid, the validity of the remaining parts, terms and provisions shall not be affected thereby, and said illegal or invalid part, term or provision shall be deemed not to be a part of this Decree.
2

6. The Commission and Rite Aid shall each bear its own attorneys' fees and

costs incurred in connection with the litigation of this lawsuit.

7. This Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action for the purpose of

enforcing this Decree, if necessary; and either party is empowered to enforce this Decree

through the applicable judicial enforcement procedures, for a period of twelve (12)

months following the entry of this Decree.

8. This Decree sets forth the entire agreement between the Commission and

Rite Aid, and it fully supersedes any and all prior agreements or understandings between

the Commission and Rite Aid pertaining to the subject matter herein. There are no other

provisions, agreements or understandings that are contained herein; and this Decree

cannot be altered by oral agreement between the parties, but only by written court-ordered

modification.

9. Except to maintain the jurisdiction of the Court as described above, the

Commission's lawsuit and claims against Rite Aid be and hereby are dismissed with

~ prejudice.

~ New Orleans, Louisiana, is

day of July, 2004.

3

SUBMITTED AND APPROVED BY:

Date:

ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel No Bar Roll Number
JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel No Bar Roll Number
~~LfA~~ KElT T. HILL Regional Attorney Bar Roll Number 15200000

MIC LLE T. BUTLER Supervisory Trial Attorney Bar Roll Number 1286
/?rC~~
N. ELEANOR GRAHAM Senior Trial Attorney Bar Roll Number 16946 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION New Orleans District Office 701 Loyola Avenue Suite 600 New Orleans, LA 70113 Telephone: (504) 589-6922
(504) 589-6817 Facsimile: (504) 589-2805
4

Date: 11;)1 /0 c/ I

-and-
, ar No. 14260 AR ETT, Bar No.28311
New Orleans, Louisiana 70163 Tel.: (504) 585-7500 Fax: (504) 585-7775 Counsel for Defendant

5

 
 E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
2004 WL 1488578 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v.
RITE AID CORPORATION
No. Civ.A. 03–2079. | June 30, 2004.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Nancy Eleanor Graham, Keith T. Hill, Michelle T. Butler, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff.
James Louis Arruebarrena, Dwight Loisel McNamara, Arruebarrena & McNamara, Metairie, LA, for Intervenor-Plaintiff.
George Davidson Fagan, Wendy Lynn Rovira, Leake & Andersson, LLP, New Orleans, LA, Karen M. Dicke, Cozen & O’Connor, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.
Opinion
ORDER AND REASONS
ENGELHARDT, J.
*1 Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant K & B Louisiana Corporation doing business in Louisiana as Rite Aid (“Rite Aid”). For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that Defendant’s motion is granted in part, in that Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s claims against defendant for compensatory damages, injunctive relief and punitive damages arising out of Title VII hostile work environment are dismissed; Defendant’s motion is denied in all other respects.
I. BACKGROUND
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Plaintiff herein, and Tiffany R. Blackmon, Intervenor, claim that Blackmon was a victim of continuous sexual harassment and inappropriate conduct while she worked for Rite Aid as a security officer from October 3, 2001 to March 2002,1 and that Rite Aid retaliated against Blackmon after she reported two incidents of sexual harassment to her immediate supervisor, Maurice Kirksey.
Throughout the relevant time period, Tiffany Blackmon was employed by Rite Aid as a day-shift2 uniformed security officer at its retail store located at 3401 St. Charles Avenue in New Orleans, Louisiana (“Rite Aid Store No. 7255”). Blackmon’s immediate supervisor was Maurice Kirksey, the Security Guard Coordinator; Kirksey’s office and base of operations were located on the second floor of Store No. 7255. Kirksey’s immediate supervisor was David Neu, a Loss Prevention Manager, whose office and base of operations are located at the Rite Aid Regional Office3 in Metairie, Louisiana. In addition to supervising Kirksey, Neu also directly supervised an undercover security team in the New Orleans area. Some members of the undercover surveillance team operated a mobile camera system; these members included Lester Perkins, Shedrick Wilson, Amos Nelson and Ed Washington. While the undercover surveillance team was posted in various Rite Aid stores, the team used Rite Aid Store No. 7255 as its base of operations.
Tiffany Blackmon was interviewed and hired by Maurice Kirksey. It is undisputed that, after she was hired, Blackmon, along with a few other new hires, participated in a week-long new hire orientation program. This orientation was held on the second floor of Rite Aid Store No. 7255; Kirksey led the orientation and was assisted by several field training officers (FTO’s). That
1

E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
training included viewing a set of two videotapes and reviewing certain written material. The new hires read these materials during their class time and were tested on their knowledge of those materials.
The EEOC and Intervenor allege that throughout her nearly six months of employment with Rite Aid, Blackmon was subjected to verbal and physical forms of sexual harassment, primarily by Lester Perkins and Ed Washington, two of the undercover security detectives. In her deposition, Blackmon testified that on, about six or seven occasions, while she was standing in the middle of the aisle or walking around the store, Perkins walked up close to her and looked her up and down and “make remarks under his breath, stuff like that, like mm-hmm, how fine [Blackmon] was.” Deposition of Tiffany Blackmon, pp. 159–62 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1; Defendant’s Exhibit “A”). Perkins would then “act like ... he made a mistake and he would rub [his hand or body] across [Blackmon’s] behind.” Id. Blackmon also testified that on one occasion Perkins came back to the storeroom and rubbed his finger across the back of her neck, causing Blackmon to jump. Id., pp. 163–65. When she jumped, Perkins pinched her thigh. Id. Blackmon also testified that Perkins unsuccessfully tried to kiss her once while she was in the storeroom during lunch break. Id., pp. 165–66.
*2 With respect to the alleged verbal harassment, Blackmon testified that Perkins “would make remarks about how pretty [she] was, how pretty [her] chest was, just things like that that made [her] uncomfortable.” Dep. of Blackmon, p. 166. On different occasions, Perkins asked Blackmon what she slept in at night. Id., pp. 168–70. Twice, when Perkins brushed up against Blackmon, he stated, “I wonder what it feel like,” which Blackmon believed to be a reference to what it would feel like to sleep with her. Id. Blackmon further testified that Perkins suggested two or three times that he was going to Blackmon’s house without invitation; however, Perkins never actually did. Id., pp. 167–69.
Blackmon testified that she witnessed inappropriate conduct directed toward other female associates at Rite Aid Store No. 7255. Specifically, she witnessed Lester Perkins make comments of a sexual nature (i.e., “how she was built, how big her chest was”) to fellow uniformed security officer Lakeisha Banford. Dep. of Blackmon, pp. 192–94. Blackmon also stated that Perkins would make “nasty jokes” in the presence of both Banford and Blackmon. Id. Ms. Blackmon also witnessed Mr. Perkins (i) tell another female employee “these little jokes about he’d F’ed somebody in a freezer in another job”, id.; and (ii) asked Maurice one day whether “[Maurice} was F-ing [Blackmon].” Id., pp. 214–15.
Also according to Ms. Blackmon, she once witnessed certain undercover security detectives zooming the cameras on the chests and buttocks of women; this occurred during Mardi Gras. Dep. of Blackmon, pp. 208–14. On one other occasion, one female cashier told Blackmon that she had witnessed the undercover detectives zooming cameras on people. See id. Maurice Kirksey also testified that, on two separate occasions, he witnessed Lester Perkins zooming the camera in on women in the store—once in July of 1999 during Kirksey’s training and later during Mardi Gras in 2002. Dep. of Maurice Kirksey, pp. 106–08, 302–05 (Pl.’s Ex. 4; Def.’s Ex. “B”).
Ms. Blackmon testified that another undercover security detective, Ed Washington, also engaged in inappropriate or offensive behavior towards her, beginning with the 2002 Mardi Gras season. See Dep. of Blackmon, pp. 220–34. Specific conduct to which Ms. Blackmon testified included Washington (i) backing her into a corner of the store on three separate occasions and trying to flirt with her and asking for her phone number, and (ii) commenting on her figure and telling her that she “better not gain [any] weight” about “four or five times”. Id. Blackmon also stated that Washington twice told her that he was going to her house; Washington never did go to her house, however. Id.
Blackmon also testified that Washington touched her on one occasion when he “cupped” her breast. Dep. of Blackmon, pp. 220–34. Specifically, Blackmon stated that Washington came up to her in the store and said “your radio shouldn’t be up like this”, i.e., on her left breast pocket; grabbed her breast; and stated “[i]t should be down here.” Id.
*3 According to Blackmon, she reported each allegedly inappropriate incident to her supervisor Maurice Kirksey. Kirksey has testified that Blackmon complained to him about the behavior of the undercover detectives an estimated ten to twenty times, “pretty much every time [Perkins] was in the store....” Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 211, 213, 229. On March 13, 2002, Kirksey sent an internal e-mail, referred to as a “SYSM”, to his supervisor David Neu to report that an unnamed female security officer (Tiffany Blackmon) believed that Amos Nelson, an undercover security detective, was misusing the security cameras by zooming in on the breasts and buttocks of her and other women in the store, and that Ed Washington, another undercover security detective, had asked the guard for her phone number and said that he might come by her house. See SYSM, dated March 13, 2002, from Maurice Kirksey to Dave Neu (Def.’s Ex. “E”). It is undisputed that Maurice Kirksey did not report the alleged misconduct to any persons within Rite Aid management, human resources or anyone else, including David Neu (the supervisor of both Kirksey and the undercover security detectives), until March 13, 2002.
In the days and weeks following the March 13, 2002 SYSM, Plaintiff and Intervenor allege that Mr. Neu contacted and spoke 2

E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
only to his undercover security detectives and simply accepted their word, without having consulted with Ms. Blackmon. Soon thereafter, according to Kirksey, he and Neu met on March 26, 2002, at Rite Aid Store No. 72724 to discuss a proposed reduction in the security officer workforce. Dep. of Kirksey, p. 232. At that meeting, when questioned by Kirksey about the status of the complaint concerning Tiffany Blackmon, Neu allegedly told Kirksey that Kirksey had no choice but to remove Tiffany Blackmon and Lakeisha Banford from the schedule if the two female security officers could not work with the surveillance cameras. Id., pp. 232, 241–42. Kirksey stated that Neu then wrote out a schedule for the uniformed officers at Rite Aid Store No. 7255, and that Neu’s schedule did not include Blackmon or Banford. Id. Kirksey has testified that, following the meeting with Neu, he personally met with Blackmon at Rite Aid Store No. 7255, at which time he informed her that he had been ordered to take her off the schedule and advised her about her rights and that she may want to see an attorney. Id., pp. 256–58
Kirksey went on vacation on or about March 29, 2002, and upon his return, he tendered his resignation to Rite Aid through its Regional Office on April 12, 2002. David Neu executed Blackmon’s termination paperwork on April 15, 2002.5 See Separation Notice for Tiffany Blackmon (Pl.’s Ex. 14).
On July 21, 2003, the EEOC filed a Complaint with this Court, alleging that Tiffany Blackmon was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment by Defendant Rite Aid and discharged because she complained to Defendant about the sexually hostile work environment, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On August 26, 2003, Blackmon intervened in the proceeding, adopting all of the allegations of the Complaint filed by the EEOC. The EEOC and Blackmon seek compensatory and punitive damages, and Blackmon seeks reasonable attorney’s fees. The EEOC also seeks injunctive relief as follows: requiring Rite Aid to conduct training on sexual harassment; precluding David Neu from ever investigating any complaints of discrimination; providing periodic reporting to the EEOC on various subjects to ensure compliance; and prohibiting Rite Aid from engaging in any discriminatory or retaliatory conduct.
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Summary Judgment *4 “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ’ Kee v. City of Rowlett, Texas, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.), (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c))), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 210 (2001). “The moving party bears the burden of showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 210. If the moving party meets this burden, “the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. “A dispute over a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a jury reasonably could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The substantive law determines which facts are material.” Id. at 211. Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994).
B. Claim of Hostile Work Environment Based on Sexual Harassment Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive working environment. See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of the State of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). Under Fifth Circuit precedent, to establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim based on a co-worker’s conduct, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a “term, condition, or privilege of the employment;” and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Jones v. Flagship Int’l., 793 F.2d 714, 719–20 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 952, 93 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1987).
Rite Aid argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the sexual harassment claim as there exists no genuine issue of
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E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
material fact that: (1) Blackmon failed to take steps to adequately report the alleged continuous harassment, with the result that Rite Aid management had no knowledge of the alleged harassment; (2) Blackmon’s claims, even if taken as true for purposes of this motion, are not so severe and pervasive that they altered the terms and conditions of her employment; and (3) Rite Aid took “prompt remedial action” as a result of the reported conduct and because Blackmon left Rite Aid’s employ soon thereafter, Rite Aid was deprived of any substantial opportunity to show that its corrective action was effective. Thus, Rite Aid contends, Plaintiff and Intervenor cannot establish the fourth and fifth elements of a hostile work environment claim.
*5 As an initial matter, for summary judgment purposes, the Court finds that the first three elements of a hostile work environment claim have been met, i.e., that Blackmon was subjected to unwelcome verbal comments and physical contact of a sexual nature first by Lester Perkins and later by Ed Washington.6
The fourth element of the prima facie case questions whether the undercover guards’ alleged harassment was so severe and pervasive that it altered the terms and conditions of her employment. The EEOC and Intervenor, at this juncture, must present evidence of an objectively and subjectively abusive work environment. Harris v.. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). Whether an environment is objectively hostile or abusive depends upon the totality of the circumstances, focusing on factors such as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. See accord Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1055, 117 S.Ct. 682, 136 L.Ed.2d 607 (1997). “To be actionable, the challenged conduct must be both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person would find it hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that the victim perceived it to be so.” Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22, 114 S.Ct. at 370).
Whether the conduct of Perkins and of Washington rendered Blackmon’s working environment objectively hostile or abusive must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874. Blackmon alleges that Perkins’ harassing comments and actions began in October of 2001, when she was hired by Kirksey, and ended in March of 2002, and that Washington’s harassing comments and actions commenced during the Mardi Gras season7 and ended in March of 2002.8 Blackmon further alleges that the conduct occurred every time Perkins and/or Washington were in Rite Aid Store No. 7255. Even accepting as true Plaintiff and Intervenor’s allegations that this conduct occurred regularly over the course of five to six months, the Court must also consider the other factors that contribute to whether an environment is objectively hostile or abusive.
The Court finds that the comments made to Blackmon were offensive and sophomoric; however, they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment. Rather, the Court finds that each comment made by Perkins and by Washington is the “equivalent of a mere utterance of an epithet that engender offensive feelings.” See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963, 120 S.Ct. 395, 145 L.Ed.2d 308 (1999) (finding that several inappropriate comments, including “your elbows are the same color as your nipples,” and touchings, including rubbing his hands down her arm from her shoulder to her wrist, which occurred over the course of two years were “boorish and offensive” but were not objectively severe or pervasive enough to constitute actionable sexual harassment). See also Jones v. Seago Manor Nursing Home, 2002 WL 31051027, at *1, 4 (N.D.Tex. Sept.11, 2002) (stating that plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence fell short of the type of extreme conduct necessary to establish the hostile work environment when plaintiff alleged that her supervisor told her, “You know, if I stick [my penis] in you, you’ll say computer right”; said to her “Ooh, girl, I could stick this long [expletive deleted] in you and you ... go tell your husband that you’ll leave him for a white man”; touched plaintiff’s buttocks and remarked that “it must be jelly because jam [does not] shake like that”; and grabbed his crotch and looked at plaintiff).
*6 The Court finds similarly that the six to seven alleged instances where Perkins brushed up against Blackmon in the aisles, the three times that Washington allegedly cornered Blackmon in the store, and any other unwelcomed physical touching—allegations of which are relatively few in number over several months—were neither severe nor physically threatening, though quite unwelcome. See id. See also Hockman v. Westward Communications, L.L.C., 282 F.Supp.2d 512 (E.D.Tex.2003) (finding male co-worker’s conduct that included commenting about a former employee’s nice shape; brushing up against plaintiff; once popping plaintiff on the buttocks with a rolled up newspaper; once attempting to kiss plaintiff and grab her breast at the same time; and making other inappropriate comments of a sexual nature; to be boorish and offensive, but did not create a hostile or abusive work environment); Weiss v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1993) (finding that conduct that included attempting to kiss plaintiff once at bar and twice at work, several incidents of unwanted touching, placing “I love you” signs in her work area, and asking her out on dates were not sufficient for actionable harassment).
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E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
Finally, the Court finds that the conduct of Perkins and of Washington did not unreasonably interfere with Blackmon’s work performance, nor did it undermine Blackmon’s workplace competence. See Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 270 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that, in addition to other factors, a “plaintiff must show that implicit or explicit in the sexual content is the message that plaintiff is incompetent because of her sex”). Nowhere does Plaintiff or Intervenor provide this evidence. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Tiffany Blackmon competently discharged her duties during the time of the alleged harassment. Blackmon testified that she was Employee of the Week one time, an award given by the store manager Dan Patterson who, according to Blackmon, liked her because she was doing her job and catching the most shoplifters. Dep. of Blackmon, p. 262. Despite the alleged unwelcomed conduct, Blackmon testified that she “liked her little job” and felt as if she could have advanced with the company. Id., pp. 321–22. Maurice Kirksey testified that, in March of 2002, in light of the proposed reduction in security workforce, he had elected to keep Blackmon in part because of her “exemplary” performance. Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 232–33. In fact, in the March 13, 2002 SYSM, Kirksey wrote that the “AM guard at 7255 [presumably, Blackmon] has been doing an outstanding job as of late apprehending and deterring shoplifters at that store.” See SYSM, dated March 13, 2002.
The Court is cognizant of and guided by controlling jurisprudence indicating that “Title VII was only meant to bar conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected classmember’s opportunity to succeed in the workplace.” Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874 (quoting Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1055, 117 S.Ct. 682, 117 U.S. 682, 136 L.Ed.2d 607 (1997). The harassing actions of Pekrins and Washington, while offensive, are not the type of extreme conduct that would prevent Blackmon from succeeding in the workplace. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2284, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1988) (“[C]onduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment”). See also DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Assoc’n., 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that courts must always bear in mind that an ultimate goal of Title VII is to “level the playing field for women who work by preventing others from impairing their ability to compete on an equal basis with men”, and that this goal of equality is not served by “[a]ny lesser standard of liability, couched in terms of conduct which sporadically wounds or offends but does not hinder a female employee’s performance....”). Based upon a consideration of all the circumstances, the Court finds that the alleged conduct of Perkins and Washington did not render Shepherd’s work environment objectively “hostile” or “abusive.”
*7 The allegations here involve far less objectionable circumstances that those for which courts afford relief. See, e.g., Farpella–Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803 (5th cir.1996) (finding a hostile environment where plaintiff’s supervisor made frequent egregious comments about plaintiff’s sexual proclivity to her and, on numerous occasions, threatened plaintiff with her job when she asked him to stop making these comments; Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.1989) (reversing summary judgment for employer, concluding hostile environment existed where female employee was sexually harassed frequently and by many co-workers and supervisors over a period of nearly three years; the harassment there, which was not denied, included repeated groping of and sexually suggestive comments made to plaintiff; plaintiff’s having received over thirty pornographic notes in her locker; sexually explicit pictures and graffiti, some directed at plaintiff, drawn on the walls where plaintiff worked; one occasion of a co-worker dangling plaintiff over a stairwell; and one coworker having told plaintiff he would cut off her breast and shove it down her throat).
The same holds true with the cases Plaintiff has cited in its Opposition—Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Company, 213 F.3d 933 (6th Cir.2000), cert. granted, 531 U.S. 1069, 121 S.Ct. 756, 148 L.Ed.2d 659, rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 843, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001); and Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir.1997) cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001, 118 S.Ct. 1183, 140 L.Ed.2d 313 (1998), abrogated by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Plaintiff cites these two cases in support of its argument that the conduct here was sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to create an objectively hostile work environment. However, the conduct alleged herein, while offensive (and should surely subject the alleged perpetrators to prompt disciplinary action by their supervisors), is far less objectionable than the egregious circumstances found in the Pollard9 and Doe10 cases.
The Court finds that, in light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, there is no basis from which a jury could reasonably find that Tiffany Blackmon was subjected to harassment which affected a “term, condition, or privilege” of her employment. Therefore, the Court does not reach the question of whether Defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the sexual harassment hostile work environment claim.
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E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
C. Retaliation Claim Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer to retaliate against an employee for bringing a charge under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Retaliation claims based upon circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 352–54 (5th Cir.2001). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 286, 299 (5th Cir.2000). To establish a prima facie case, the EEOC and Intervenor must show: (1) Ms. Blackmon engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) Rite Aid carried out an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal nexus exists between Blackmon’s protected activity and Rite Aid’s adverse action. See Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1429, 146 L.Ed.2d 327 (2000). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate—but not prove—a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Evans, 246 F.3d at 350; Haynes, 207 F.3d at 299. If the defendant meets its burden of production, then the presumption of intentional discrimination is rebutted and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason proffered by the defendant is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Evans, 246 F.3d at 350; Haynes, 207 F.3d at 299.
*8 Based on the foregoing, the first issue is whether Blackmon has shown a prima facie case of retaliation. It is clear that Blackmon has met the first element of a prima facie case because she has demonstrated that she engaged in protected activity by complaining to Kirksey about the undercover security detectives’ conduct towards her. See Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that an “employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII if she has either (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing’ under Title VII”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)).
Rite Aid argues that the EEOC and Blackman cannot establish the second and third elements of a prima facie case because Blackmon was not subjected to an adverse employment action while she was still employed by Rite Aid. Rite Aid argues that the company could not have retaliated against Blackmon because (1) Blackmon’s last date of employment with the company was four days before the alleged retaliatory act; and (2) Lakeisha Banford testified that she quit working for Rite Aid on her own accord and was not terminated.11
The second element of a prima facie case requires that Plaintiff and Intervenor demonstrate that Blackmon suffered an adverse employment action. “Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decision.” Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781–82 (5th Cir.1995). “[T]ypical examples of ultimate employment decisions that can support a claim of retaliation include hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting and compensating.” Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir.2003).
Blackmon claims that she suffered an adverse employment decision when, at the March 26, 2002 meeting, Neu instructed Kirksey to terminate her, and Neu thereafter took her off the work schedule. Rite Aid, on the other hand, argues that Plaintiff and Intervenor cannot establish that Rite Aid carried out an adverse employment action. Rite Aid directs the Court’s attention to a Punch Detail History which shows that Tiffany Blackmon last clocked into work at Store No. 7255 on Friday, March 22, 2002. However, the Court does not find Defendant’s arguments persuasive. As Plaintiff correctly states, the record is void of undisputed testimony that Blackmon quit or resigned prior to being informed that she was removed from the guard schedule; Defendant’s termination paperwork shows that she remained an employee until April 15, 2002; and Defendant lacks any other personnel paperwork for Blackmon during the last one or two days prior to her removal from the schedule because it lost her personnel file.
In her deposition, Blackmon testified that she was told by Kirksey that she and Lakeisha Banford “were being terminated because [the two women] reported the sexual harassment.” Dep. of Blackmon, p. 290. According to Blackmon, Kirksey told her that Neu had instructed him to terminate Blackmon and Banford. See id. Kirksey has testified that on March 26, 2002, he met with Neu at Rite Aid Store No. 7272 to discuss Kirksey’s suggestions regarding the proposed reduction in security workforce. Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 231–33. Prior to discussing the reduction, Kirksey inquired into the status of Neu’s investigation of Blackmon’s complaint, at which time Neu told Kirksey that he had spoken to his detectives and that he did not want the two women to work at Rite Aid anymore. Id., pp. 241–242, 353–54 (“They’re liars. I don’t want them working here no more.”). Kirksey has stated that after Neu made those comments, Neu drafted a new work schedule which did not include Blackmon or Banford. Id., pp. 232, 241–42. While Neu denied that he was at Rite Aid Store No. 7272 on March 26, 2002, Neu has admitted that he told Kirksey to talk to Blackmon and see if he could resolve the issue. Dep. of David Neu, pp. 197–98, 282 (Pl.’s Ex. 6; Def.’s Ex. “C”). Neu also told Kirksey that Kirksey did not have much choice “if this young lady, Blackmon, felt so uncomfortable that she could not work in a store where there were cameras.” Id., pp. 199–200. Viewing the
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E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and Intervenor, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the second element of the prima facie case, specifically with respect to the circumstances under which Blackmon left the employ of Rite Aid.
*9 The third element in establishing Blackmon’s prima facie case is whether there is a causal connection between Blackmon’s complaints to her supervisor and Blackmon’s alleged termination. “In order to establish the causal link between the protected conduct and the illegal employment action as required by the prima facie case, the evidence must show that the [adverse employment action] was based in part on knowledge of the employee’s protected activity.” Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir.1998). The causal connection can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as showing that the employer had knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, and showing the temporal proximity of that activity to the alleged retaliatory action. See Evans, 246 F.3d at 354. “[A] plaintiff need not prove that her protected activity was the sole factor motivating the employer’s challenged decision in order to establish the ‘causal link’ element of a prima facie case.” Id. at 355.
In this case, according to Kirksey, Neu instructed him to terminate Blackmon and Banford because “they’re liars”. Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 241–42. Although Neu denies having met with Kirksey on March 26, 2002, Neu admits that he told Kirksey that Kirksey did not really have any choice but to terminate Blackmon if she could not work in a store with surveillance cameras.12 Dep. of Neu, pp. 199–200. Should a jury conclude that Rite Aid carried out an adverse employment action with respect to Blackmon, it would not be unreasonable, in light of the summary judgment evidence, for a juror to find the existence of a causal link between the protected activity (i.e., lodging her complaints) and the adverse employment action.
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff and Intervenor have established a prima facie case of retaliation here, the burden would consequently shift to Rite Aid to articulate a legitiamte nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Rite Aid argues that in March of 2002, economic circumstances forced Rite Aid management to consider various ways to reduce security costs. Although, according to Rite Aid, no determination had yet been made, Kirksey gave his security guards a “heads-up” and told them to keep their eyes open for any other employment opportunities that may come their way. Rite Aid contends that it had made no such decision, but as a result of Kirksey’s unauthorized forewarning, several security guards unilaterally quit working for Rite Aid. Rite Aid also states that, if it had implemented a reduction in force, it is likely that Blackmon, who had only worked for the company for several months, would have been layed off. Having reviewed the record, however, the Court finds that the testimony of Kirksey, if taken as true, suggests that definitive decisions were being made in late March of 2002 and that Neu had opted to retain certain guards, such as Andrea Hill, who were hired months after Blackmon was hired. See Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 232–33.
*10 Viewing the facts and all the inferences in favor of Blackmon, the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the circumstances under which Tiffany Blackmon left the employ of Rite Aid and as to Rite Aid’s nondiscriminatory reasons.13 It will be up to the trier of fact, the jury, to hear the testimony and weigh the credibility of the witnesses to determine those facts. Accordingly, Rite Aid is not entitled to summary judgment on the claim of retaliation.
D. Injunctive Relief The EEOC is vested with broad authority to remedy unlawful discrimination. See E.E.O.C. v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 445 (6th Cir.1999). Part of that authority includes the EEOC’s right to file suit over the subject matter of a charge that does not conciliate in order to vindicate the public interest and to obtain relief for an aggrieved individual. Id. at 457–58. See also E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002). Unlike private litigants, the EEOC is not constrained by certain procedural requirements, and it may recover injunctive relief upon a showing of intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1); see also Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 467. In the matter before the Court, should the trier of fact find that Defendant has intentionally discriminated in the past (i.e., retaliation in violation of Title VII), then this Court has broad discretion to craft an injunction that will ensure the employer’s compliance with the law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1); Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 467. “Thus, the EEOC may obtain such general injunctive relief, under the equitable discretion of the court, even where the EEOC only identifies one or a mere handful of aggrieved employees.” Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 467–68 (citations omitted).
Defendant argues that the EEOC is not excused from its burden of satisfying the constitutional requirements of an “actual case or controversy that warrants injunctive relief by proving a real and immediate risk of future harm.” Def.’s Mem., p. 27. Defendant argues that the Court should grant summary judgment on this claim because the EEOC has not presented any evidence of a real and actual risk of future violations by Rite Aid or that there is any immediate or threatened risk of harm to others. However, Defendant loses sight of the particular remedies afforded Title VII litigants and the EEOC, and instead cites
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E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
cases such as Great–West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002).14 Indeed, the law is clear that “the EEOC may seek injunctive relief to correct discrimination uncovered during its investigation of the charge of just one individual.” Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468 (citing E.E.O.C. v. McLean Trucking, 525 F.2d 1007, 1010 & n. 8 (6th Cir.1975). Moreover, “[t]he EEOC may obtain a permanent injunction even where it does not allege a pattern or policy of discrimination.” Id. (citing E.E.O.C. v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 557 (8 th Cir.1998); E.E.O.C. v. Ilona of Hungary, 108 F.3d 1569, 1578 (7th Cir.1978)).
*11 Furthermore, as Plaintiff correctly states, defendant’s argument “misses the mark and disregards the underlying reason for granting equitable relief based on a finding of even one instance of past discrimination—to vindicate the public interest and provide a measure of public insurance of employer compliance with the law where it has failed.” Pl.’s Opp. Mem., pp. 21–22 (citing Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 467).
Because the Court has granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the sexual harassment hostile work environment claim, summary judgment must also be granted in Defendant’s favor insofar as the EEOC seeks injunctive relief relative to sexual harassment. On the other hand, should the jury find in favor of the EEOC and Blackmon on the retaliation claim, then the Court will possess broad discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief. Here, although there is evidence that, at all times relevant, Rite Aid implemented certain policies and trained all of its employees, should a jury find in favor of Plaintiff and Intervenor on the claim of retaliation, then this Court has the discretion to “provide a measure of public insurance” that Defendant will comply with the law in the future. Here, assuming arguendo that the jury does find the retaliatory action occurred, the summary judgment evidence reveals that there may be genuine issues regarding the propriety of (i) the training of Tiffany Blackmon, Maurice Kirksey and/or David Neu regarding complaint-reporting procedures and retaliation;15 (ii) the apparent absence of any specific contact names and phone numbers and of the “1–800–RITE CALL” telephone number in defendant’s posted anti-discrimination and complaint-reporting policies; (iii) the absence of any written policy issued by Defendant that is devoted solely to retaliation;16 (iv) the absence of any written policy that would have prevented any retaliatory termination of an employee without involving a representative of Defendant’s human resources department;17 and (v) the delay between the time that Rite Aid’s posters addressing anti-discrimination policies and complaint-reporting procedures were created and/or modified (September of 2001) and the time that the policies were certified as posted by the manager of Rite Aid Store No. 7255 (March 15, 2002).18
Accordingly, the Court will preserve its discretion to render injunctive relief and other affirmative relief in this case until after the parties have presented their cases and the jury has rendered its verdict.
E. Punitive Damages A complaining party may recover punitive damages under Title VII against a defendant such as Rite Aid “if the complaining party demonstrates that [defendant] engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U .S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (emphasis added). “The terms ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’ pertain to the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). “[A]n employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages. 527 U.S. at 535, 119 S.Ct. at 2125. “The inquiry does not end with a showing of the requisite ‘malice or ... reckless indifference’ on the part of certain individuals, however. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535, 119 S.Ct. at 2126. “[I]n the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory decisions of management agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.” 527 U.S. at 535, 119 S.Ct. at 2129 (internal quotation omitted).
*12 The Fifth Circuit has explained that “[a]n employer is liable for punitive damages in a Title VII action if: (1) its agent is employed in a position of managerial capacity; (2) the agent acts within the scope of employment; and (3) the agent acts with malice or reckless indifference towards the federally protected rights of the plaintiff.” Green v. Adm’r of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 653 (5th Cir.2002). “However, such liability may not be imputed if the agent’s actions are contrary to the employer’s good faith effort to comply with Title VII.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit has likewise commented on what constitutes a “good faith defense” to punitive damages:
In the present case, Bally’s has made out the “good faith” defense to punitive damages. Davidson was arguably an agent in a managerial capacity, and she may have acted with malice or reckless indifference to the rights of plaintiffs within the scope of her employment. However, these actions
8

E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)
were contrary to Bally’s good faith effort to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, as is evidenced by the fact that Bally’s had a well-publicized policy forbidding sexual harassment, gave training on sexual harassment to new employees, established a grievance procedure for sexual harassment complaints, and initiated an investigation of the plaintiff’s complaints. These actions evidence a good faith effort on the part of Bally’s to prevent and punish sexual harassment. As a result, an instruction on punitive damages was not required.
Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir.2002).
Because the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the sexual harassment hostile work environment claim, summary judgment must also be granted in Defendant’s favor insofar as Plaintiff and Intervenor seek punitive damages on the sexual harassment claim. On the other hand, assuming arguendo that the jury finds in favor of the EEOC and Blackmon on the retaliation claim, then the Court must determine whether or not the alleged retaliatory actions of David Neu are contrary to the Rite Aid’s asserted good faith effort to comply with Title VII.
While there is evidence that, at all times relevant, Rite Aid implemented certain policies and trained all of its employees, Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence creates genuine issues of material fact regarding Defendant’s good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. Although Rite Aid’s Employee Relations Administrator, Charlene Nash, has testified in her deposition that the company strives to protect its associates and their interests at the company, there is also testimony and other evidence in the record, when taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and Intervenor, that suggests that the Defendant may not have acted in a prompt and thorough manner to comply with Title VII.19
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment insofar as it seeks a dismissal of the claims for punitive damages on the retaliation claim. The Court does note that, in light of the summary judgment evidence produced by Rite Aid, it finds Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s claim for punitive damages to be doubtful. However, the Court will entertain a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages at the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case, in the event the evidence (or lack thereof) warrants.

III. CONCLUSION
*13 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that
(1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART, dismissing Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s claim for damages arising out of Title VII hostile work environment;
(2) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART, dismissing Intervenor’s claim for injunctive relief based upon Title VII hostile work environment;
(3) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART, dismissing Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s claim for punitive damages arising out of Title VII hostile work environment; and
(4) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED in all other respects.

Footnotes

1

The exact date that Ms. Blackmon last reported to work is in dispute. Rite Aid contends that Ms. Blackmon’s last day of work with

the company was March 22, 2002. See Rite Aid Punch Detail History for Tiffany Blackmon (Defendant’s Exhibit “G”). Based

upon certain deposition testimony and the fact that Ms. Blackmon’s work file is lost, the EEOC and Blackmon argue that

Blackmon was possibly employed at least through March 26, 2002.

2

Rite Aid’s payroll records do indicate that Blackmon worked an evening shift during the first few weeks of her employment with

Rite Aid. See Rite Aid Punch Detail History for Tiffany Blackmon. Starting in November of 2001, Blackmon primarily worked the

day-shift, which generally began at 7:00 a.m. and ended at 3:00 p.m. See id.

3

Rite Aid Store No. 7255 is part of Rite Aid Region 50, which includes Rite Aid stores in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama; the

9

E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)

regional office is located at 7060 Veterans Boulevard in Metairie, Louisiana.

4

Rite Aid Store No. 7272 is located at the intersection of Claiborne and Napoleon Avenues.

5

Blackmon’s termination paperwork was completed on the same day as the termination paperwork for fourteen other Rite Aid

uniformed security officers.

6

Both Lester Perkins and Ed Washington deny the allegations of misconduct directed toward Blackmon, as well as the allegations of

misuse of the surveillance cameras. Dep. of Lester Perkins, pp. 124, 170–73 (Pl.’s Ex. 11 in globo ); Affidavit of Lester Perkins

(Def .’s Ex. “M”); Dep. of Ed Washington, pp. 81–82 (Pl.’s Ex. 12 in globo ); Aff. of Ed Washington (Def.’s Ex. “O”).

In addition, Maurice Kirksey has testified that he witnessed the undercover security detectives, including Perkins and

Washington, “flirt” with the new hires and security guards. Dep. of Kirksey, p. 101. Kirksey explained this flirting to mean

“brushing up against [the new hires and guards]”, asking them out and asking them to lunch. See id. While Kirksey did witness

the undercover detectives flirt with Blackmon, he never personally witnessed any of the behavior that was the subject of

Blackmon’s complaints. Id., pp. 211–13, 334–35.

7

Mardi Gras day in 2002 was February 12th.

8

The Court must consider the conduct of Perkins and Washington together in determining whether the alleged harassment created

an actionable hostile work environment. See, e.g., Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933 (6th Cir.2000), cert.

granted, 531 U.S. 1069, 121 S.Ct. 756, 148 L.Ed.2d 659, rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 843, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62

(2001) (“Each alleged act of harassment must not be viewed in a vacuum, but must be considered together with other acts”).

9

The undisputed evidence before the Sixth Circuit in Pollard established that plaintiff, a female operator in the hydrogen peroxide

area in defendant’s plant, was subjected to constant harassment from male operators and from the males who worked under her

supervision and that said harassment was based solely on the fact the plaintiff was a woman. 213 F.3d 933. The undisputed

evidence established that many of the men in the peroxide area did not approve of women working in the department; the men

would frequently make, in plaintiff’s presence, degrading comments about women, including comments about women’s inability to

accomplish tasks as well as men. Id. at 938. After the defendant company asked plaintiff to give a speech to girls participating in

the national Take Your Daughter To Work program, all of the men of plaintiff’s shift, with one exception, stopped talking to

plaintiff. Id. Soon thereafter, one male operator directed all the men under plaintiff’s supervision to consult him first prior to

following any instructions from plaintiff. Id. That same male operator would set off false alarms in plaintiff’s area, causing her to

run around in search of a non-existent problem. Id. at 939. When the false alarms occurred when plaintiff was cooking her dinner,

the men would turn up the stove to burn her food while she was searching for the problem. Id. Some of the real alarms were not

brought to plaintiff’s attention, causing plaintiff to appear incompetent to the operator on the next shift. Id. When plaintiff

transferred to a different shift, the entire shift, including a supervisor, held a party, admittedly to celebrate plaintiff’s departure. Id.

at 941. Following a bench trial, the Court found that the conduct amounted to severe and pervasive harassment, which—along with

the proven knowledge of management and the lack of an effort to remedy the situation—created an abusive work environment

under Title VII.

10

In Doe v. City of Belleville, III., the Seventh Circuit was presented with the issue of whether same-sex harassment was actionable

under Title VII, which the Court ultimately answered in the affirmative. 119 F.3d 563. In reversing summary judgment in favor of

the defendant, the Court found that there was more than enough evidence to permit the factfinder to conclude that each of the

brothers subjectively experienced his workplace as hostile. Id . at 595. The Doe plaintiffs were two sixteen-year old brothers hired

by the defendant to cut grass in the municipal cemetery during one summer. Id. at 566. As the appellate court described, “both

young men were subjected to a relentless campaign of harassment by their male co-workers”, all of whom were significantly older

than plaintiffs. Id. To differentiate the two brothers, the men nicknamed J., who was overweight, the “fat boy”, and H., who wore

an earring, the “fag” or the “queer.” Id. One of the older co-workers called H. his “bitch” and, in the presence of others, said that he

was going to take H. “out to the woods” and “get [him] up the ass.” Id. at 567. Other male co-workers encouraged this behavior

and made similar derogatory comments. Id. The verbal taunting of H. turned physical one day when the same co-worker walked

toward H. saying, “I’m finally going to find out if you’re a girl or guy,” and then grabbed H. by the testicles. Id. In his deposition

testimony, H. testified that the atmosphere during his summer employment was “very abusive” and that he had felt threatened. Id.

at 595.

11

Maurice Kirksey has testified that, at the March 26, 2002 meeting, David Neu instructed him to terminate both Blackmon and

Banford. Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 231, 241–42.

12

The Court notes that this evidence might constitute direct evidence of retaliation such that the McDonnell Douglas test would be

inapplicable. See Fierros v. Texas Dept. of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 192 (5 th Cir.2001) (finding that if a “plaintiff presents direct

evidence that the employer’s motivation for the adverse action was at least in part retaliatory, then the McDonnell Douglas

framework does not apply”). Because the Court concludes that Rite Aid is not entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation

claim, regardless of the method of proof, the Court will not address this issue at this time.

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E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2004)

13

Rite Aid argues that Blackmon’s failure to timely report suspected retaliation serves as an additional basis for this Court to grant

Rite Aid’s motion for summary judgment. Rite Aid, however, directs the Court to no jurisprudence holding or suggesting such.

Evidence of Blackmon’s failure to report and immediate retention of an attorney, if admissible and supported by law, will be

simply another factor for the jury to consider.

14

The question presented to the Supreme Court in Knudson was whether a provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974 (ERISA), authorizing plan participants and fiduciaries to bring civil action to obtain “appropriate equitable relief”,

authorized an action for specific performance by an employee benefit plan to enforce a reimbursement provision of the plan, 534

U.S. at 206, 122 S.Ct. at 711. The Court held that because the plan was seeking legal relief—the imposition of personal liability on

the plan beneficiaries for a contractual obligation to pay money—the ERISA provision did not authorize the action. 534 U.S. at

221, 122 S .Ct. at 719. Throughout the opinion, the Court addressed the plan’s various arguments “struggl[ing] to characterize the

relief sought as ‘equitable” ’ so as to fit within ERISA’s authorization of a civil action to obtain “appropriate equitable relief.” 534

U.S. at 210, 122 S.Ct. at 713.

15

For example, Kirksey has testified that he did receive any training on Rite Aid’s anti-retaliation policy; Kirksey stated that the

emphasis during his training was loss prevention and security procedures. Dep. of Kirksey, pp. 318–21. While he stated that he

would not tolerate retaliation, Neu was not aware whether Rite Aid had a policy against retaliation toward employees who

complained of discrimination. Dep. of Neu, p. 119. In addition, Blackmon testified that she did not recall whether, during new hire

orientation, she was told about the 800 telephone number. Dep. of Blackmon, pp. 123–24.

16

Rite Aid’s retaliation policy is found at the end of its complaint resolution policy. See Rite Aid Associate Handbook (Pl .’s Ex.

10.1, Def.’s Ex. “P”); Rite Aid Associate Atlas (Def.’s Ex. “Q”); Rite Aid “Associate Complaint Resolution” poster (Pl.’s Ex. 10.4,

Def.’s Ex. R).

17

While Rite Aid has a verbal policy originating from its Corporate Office that no one in the company can be fired without having

human resources as a partner, Rite Aid does not have a written policy requiring same. Dep. of Keith Lovett at 69–74 (Pl.’s Ex. 9,

Def.’s Ex. “S”).

18

See Rite Aid’s “Discrimination”, “Harassment in the Workplace” and “Associate Complaint Resolution” posters, each dated

“09/2001” (Pl.’s Ex. 10.2—10.4, Def.’s Ex. “R”); cf. Rite Aid Posting Certification for Store NO. 7255, “Date Posted: 3/15/02”

(Pl.’s Ex. 10.6).

19

As set forth earlier, the deposition testimony reveals the existence of genuine issues regarding the propriety and completeness of

matters such as the Rite Aid’s training of its associates and supervisors, and the delays associated with the creation, publication and

dissemination of policies and procedures related to discrimination and complaint resolution.

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2000E, CLOSED, MAG-3, PROTO
U. S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:03-cv-02079-KDE

EEOC v. Rite Aid Corporation, et al Assigned to: Judge Kurt D Engelhardt Demand: $0 Cause: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

Date Filed: 07/21/2003 Date Terminated: 07/07/2004 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

represented by Nancy Eleanor Graham Equal Employment Opportunity Commission New Orleans District Office 1555 Poydras St. Suite 1900 New Orleans, LA 70112 (504) 595-2875 Email: nancy.graham@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Keith T. Hill Equal Employment Opportunity Commission New Orleans District Office 701 Loyola Ave. Suite 600 New Orleans, LA 70113 (504) 589-6817

Intervenor Plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon

Michelle T. Butler Equal Employment Opportunity Commission New Orleans District Office 1555 Poydras St. Suite 1900 New Orleans, LA 70112 (504) 595-2872 Email: michelle.butler@eeoc.gov
represented by James Louis Arruebarrena James L. Arruebarrena, Attorney at Law

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V.
Defendant
Rite Aid Corporation TERMINATED: 08/14/2003
Defendant
K&B Louisiana Corporation (Erroneously named as Rite Aid Corporation) doing business as Rite Aid

1010 Common St. Suite 3000 New Orleans, LA 70112 504-525-2520 Email: jim@unfairtermination.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dwight Loisel McNamara Arruebarrena & McNamara 3621 Ridgelake Dr. Suite 300 Metairie, LA 70002 504-828-5595
represented by George Davidson Fagan Leake & Andersson, LLP Energy Centre 1100 Poydras St. Suite 1700 New Orleans, LA 70163-1701 (504) 585-7500 Email: gfagan@leakeandersson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen M. Dicke Leake & Andersson, LLP Energy Centre 1100 Poydras St. Suite 1700 New Orleans, LA 70163-1701 504-585-7500 Email: kdicke@leakeandersson.com TERMINATED: 01/20/2004
Wendy Lynn Rovira Leake & Andersson, LLP Energy Centre 1100 Poydras St. Suite 1700 New Orleans, LA 70163-1701 (504) 585-7500

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Date Filed 07/21/2003 07/21/2003 08/14/2003 08/22/2003 08/22/2003 08/26/2003 08/27/2003 08/29/2003 09/12/2003
09/17/2003 10/15/2003 10/22/2003 10/22/2003
11/18/2003

Email: wrovira@leakeandersson.com

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT; 1 summons(es) issued (nn) (Entered: 07/21/2003)

Automatic Referral (Utility Event) to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (ijg) (Entered: 07/21/2003)

2 PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED complaint [1-1] terminating party Rite Aid Corporation; adding K&B LA Corp; 1 summons(es) issued (nn) (Entered: 08/18/2003)

3 ANSWER by defendant K&B LA Corp to original and amended complaints by plaintiff EEOC [2-1], [1-1] (nn) (Entered: 08/25/2003)

4 Motion by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon and ORDER granting leave to file a cmp in intervention by Judge Martin L. Feldman Date Signed: 8/25/03 (nn) (Entered: 08/26/2003)

5 Intervenor's COMPLAINT by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (nn) (Entered: 08/26/2003)

6 MINUTE ENTRY ( 8/25/03 ) Preliminary Conference is set 9:30 9/17/03 before the mag by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (nn) (Entered: 08/27/2003)

7 ANSWER by defendant K&B LA Corp to complaint of intervention by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon [5-1] (nn) (Entered: 09/02/2003)

8 MINUTE ENTRY ( 9/12/03 ) A Prelim Conf was held by phone 9:30 9/17/03 , one of the ptys does not wish to consent to trial bfr the Mag Judge; the matter is returned to the dkt of the Dist Judge for scheduling of a prelim conf & the selection of pre-trial & trial dates by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (ca) (Entered: 09/15/2003)

9 NOTICE/ORDER that a preliminary conference is scheduled by telephone before courtroom deputy at 3:15 10/21/03 by Clerk (nn) (Entered: 09/17/2003)

10 ORDERED that Case is reassigned to Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt by Judge Martin L. Feldman (nn) (Entered: 10/16/2003)

11 Re-NOTICE/ORDER that a preliminary conference is scheduled by telephone before courtroom deputy at 11:15 11/18/03, by Clerk (sek) (Entered: 10/22/2003)

12 ORDER that the case referral to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III is RESCINDED, VACATED & SET ASIDE; all further proceedings will be held bfr the US Dist Judge , by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (sek) (Entered: 10/22/2003)

13 MINUTE ENTRY ( 11/18/03): Preliminary Conference held; amendments due 12/18/03 ; pretrial conf set 9:30 7/1/04 ; jury trial set

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01/07/2004
01/20/2004
01/22/2004 02/26/2004 02/26/2004 02/26/2004 02/26/2004 02/26/2004 02/27/2004 04/01/2004 04/01/2004 04/01/2004 04/01/2004
04/01/2004
04/02/2004
04/05/2004

8:30 7/12/04 ; by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (lg) (Entered: 11/19/2003)
14 JOINT MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER and order granting same as set forth herein. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III Date Signed: 1/8/04 (tbl) (Entered: 01/09/2004)
15 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER withdrawing attorney Karen M. Dicke for K&B LA Corp by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 01/21/04 (crc) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
16 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Tiffany Blackmon on 2/10/04 and Maurice Kirksey on 3/22/04 (tbl) (Entered: 01/23/2004)
17 Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of Richard Ellison on 3/26/04 (tbl) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
18 Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of Dave Neu on 3/25/04 (tbl) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
19 Notice of Deposition and subpoena by plaintiff EEOC of Ed Washington on 3/24/04 (tbl) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
20 Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of Lester Perkins on 3/23/04 (tbl) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
21 Notice of Videotaped Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of Maurice Kirksey on 3/22/04 (tbl) (Entered: 02/27/2004)
22 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Ed Washington on 2/27/04 (tbl) (Entered: 03/01/2004)
23 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Hilton New Orleans Riverside svd 3/22/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
24 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to personnel records custodian of Exceptional Temporaries Inc svd 3/23/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
25 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to the personnel records custodian of Crescent Guardian Inc svd 3/23/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
26 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to the medical records custodian for Charity Hospital/LSU Mental Health Services svd 3/31/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
27 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to medical records custodian of Desire/Florida Mental Heath Clinic svd 3/31/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/01/2004)
28 MINUTE ENTRY ( 4/2/04 ): A settlement conference is scheduled before the undersigned at 2:30 5/27/04; settlement letters due by 5/24/04. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 04/02/2004)
29 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Grescent Guardian Inc, Exceptional Temporaries Inc on 4/13/04 (lg) (Entered: 04/05/2004)

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04/05/2004
04/05/2004 04/05/2004 04/05/2004 04/13/2004 04/14/2004 04/19/2004 04/19/2004
04/19/2004
04/19/2004 04/30/2004 04/30/2004 04/30/2004 04/30/2004 05/03/2004 05/03/2004 05/04/2004 05/05/2004

30 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Desire/Florida Mental Health Clinic & Charity Hospital/LSU Mental Health Services on 4/19/04 (lg) (Entered: 04/05/2004)
31 Re-Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of Dave Neu on 4/7/04 (tbl) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
32 Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of Charlene Nash & Keith Lovett on 4/21/04 (tbl) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
33 Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of James Toney on 4/20/04 (tbl) (Entered: 04/06/2004)
34 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Lakisha Banford on 5/14/04 (tbl) (Entered: 04/14/2004)
35 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Amer Commercial Security Services on 4/14/04 (tbl) (Entered: 04/15/2004)
36 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Sidney F. Lewis svd 4/16/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
37 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Medical Records Custodian of Central City Mental Health Clinic svd 4/16/04 (nn) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
38 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Sidney F Lewis Esq. & Jones, Walker, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre LLP on 4/30/04 (lg) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
39 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Central City Mental Health Clinic on 4/30/04 (lg) (Entered: 04/20/2004)
40 Re-Notice of Deposition by plaintiff EEOC of James Toney on 5/12/04 (tbl) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
41 Preliminary exhibit list by plaintiff EEOC (tbl) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
43 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to personnel records custodian of Vinson Guard Service svd 4/30/04 (nn) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
44 Preliminary witness list submitted by plaintiff EEOC (tbl) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
42 Notice of Records Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of American Commercial Security Systems on 5/14/04 (tbl) (Entered: 05/03/2004)
45 Witness and exhibit list submitted by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 05/04/2004)
46 Supplemental and amending witness and exhibit list submitted by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
47 Exhibit list by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (lg) (Entered: 05/05/2004)

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05/05/2004 05/05/2004 05/05/2004 05/05/2004 05/11/2004 05/11/2004
05/13/2004
05/19/2004 05/19/2004 05/20/2004 05/21/2004 05/21/2004 05/21/2004 05/21/2004 05/21/2004

48 Witness list submitted by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (lg) (Entered: 05/05/2004)
49 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Job Corps on 5/19/04 (plh) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
50 2nd suppl & amd Witness & Exhibit list by defendant K&B LA Corp (plh) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
51 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp upon Kell Stelly of Job Corps on 5/5/04 (plh) (Entered: 05/06/2004)
52 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Dr. Trent Desselle on 5/21/04 (tbl) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
53 MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp for leave to take second deposition of Tiffany Blackmon referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III to be heard before Magistrate Judge Knowles at 11:00 6/2/04 (tbl) (Entered: 05/12/2004)
54 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp for expedited hearing and ORDER that an expedited hearing on dft's motion for leave to take second deposition of Tiffany Blackmon [53-1] will be held at 2:00 5/19/04 by telephone bfr the undersigned; opp memo due by the close of business on 5/18/04. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III Date Signed: 5/17/04 (tbl) (Entered: 05/18/2004)
55 Supplemental memorandum in opposition by plaintiff EEOC to motion for leave to take second deposition of Tiffany Blackmon [53-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 05/19/2004)
56 Memo in opposition by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon to motion for leave to take second deposition of Tiffany Blackmon [53-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 05/19/2004)
57 MINUTE ENTRY ( 5/19/04 ) denying defendant's motion for leave to take second deposition of Tiffany Blackmon [53-1] by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 05/20/2004)
58 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Burns Intl Systems & Swiss Security on 6/3/04 (sek) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
59 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to the personnel records custodian for Swiss Security svd 5/19/04 (nn) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
60 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Lee Protection Security & North American Security Officers on 6/3/04 (sek) (Entered: 05/21/2004)
61 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to North American Security Officers, LLC svd 5/21/04 (nn) (Entered: 05/24/2004)
62 Fourth supplemental and amending witness and exhibit list submitted by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 05/24/2004)

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05/25/2004
05/25/2004 05/26/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004 05/27/2004
05/28/2004 05/28/2004 05/28/2004 05/28/2004 05/28/2004

63 MOTION by dft K&B LA Corp to allow the continuation of the depositions of Lakisha Banford and Dr. Trent Desselle because of improper statements and objections by opposing counsel referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III to be heard before Magistrate Judge at 11:00 6/9/04 (ca) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
64 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER GRANTING it leave to file its memorandum in support of summary judgment in excess of the 25 page limit set out in Local Rule 7.8.1E by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 5/27/04 (ca) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
66 Motion by dft K&B LA Corp and ORDER GRANTING same leave to substitute orig afdts in support of its motion for summary judgment by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 5/27/04 (ca) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
65 MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP to be heard before Judge at 9:30 6/9/04 (ca) (Entered: 05/27/2004)
67 Fifth Supplemental Witness and Exhibit list submitted by defendant K&B LA Corp (ca) (Entered: 05/28/2004)
70 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER that same is granted leave to supplement the record with the attached transcript of Dr. Trent Desselle in support of its mtn to allow the continuation of the depositions of Lakisha Banford & Dr. Trent Desselle filed on 5/25/04 . by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 5/28/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
68 MINUTE ENTRY (5/27/04) A Settlement conf was conducted this date , settlement can not be reached at this time; a continuation settlement conf will be scheduled prior to trial by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (ca) (Entered: 05/28/2004)
69 MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp to compel supplemental responses referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III to be heard before Magistrate Judge Knowles at 11:00 6/16/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
73 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER that same is granted leave to file suppl memo in further support of its 5/25/04 mtn for sum jgm & other relief . by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 6/1/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
75 MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp for expedited hearing on its motion for leave of court to propound interrogatories in excess of 25 to Tiffany Blackmon and UNSIGNED ORDER (tbl) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
79 Motion by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon and ORDER continuing defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP [65-1] to 9:30 6/16/04; pla's opp memo is due 6/11/04. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 6/4/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/07/2004)

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06/01/2004 06/01/2004
06/01/2004 06/01/2004 06/01/2004 06/02/2004
06/07/2004 06/08/2004 06/08/2004 06/08/2004 06/08/2004 06/10/2004

71 Memo in opposition by plaintiff EEOC to motion to compel supplemental responses [69-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
72 Memo in opposition by plaintiff EEOC to motion to allow the continuation of the depositions of Lakisha Banford and Dr. Trent Desselle because of improper statements and objections by opposing counsel [63-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 06/01/2004)
74 Supplemental memorandum by defendant K&B LA Corp in support of its motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP (tbl) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
76 MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp for leave to propound addl interrogs on Tiffany Blackmon referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III; no hrg date (tbl) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
77 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC to compel dft to respond to second set of req for prod referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III to be heard before Magistrate Judge Knowles at 11:00 6/16/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
78 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/1/04 ) ORDERED that dft's motion for expedited hearing on its motion for leave of court to propound in excess of 25 to Tiffany Blackmon [75-1] is denied; dft's motion for leave to propound addl interrogs on Tiffany Blackmon [76-1] is denied; and dft's motion to compel supplemental responses [69-1] is denied. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 06/02/2004)
80 Memo in opposition by defendant K&B LA Corp to motion to compel dft to respond to second set of req for prod [77-1] filed by plaintiff EEOC (tbl) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
81 Memo in opposition by plaintiff EEOC to motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP [65-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 06/08/2004)
82 Memo in opposition by defendant K&B LA Corp to motion to compel dft to respond to second set of req for prod [77-1] filed by plaintiff EEOC (tbl) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
83 Notice of Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Wyndham International dba Radisson New Orleans on 6/22/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/09/2004)
85 Motion by plaintiff EEOC for leave to file a suppl memo in support of EEOC's mtn to compel filed on 6/1/04 and UNSIGNED ORDER (tbl) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
84 OBJECTION/MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp for review of Mag Judge Knowles 6/2/04 order denying their mtn for exp hrg and mtn to compel to be heard before Judge at 9:30 7/21/04 (dmg) (Entered: 06/14/2004)

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06/10/2004 06/10/2004
06/10/2004
06/14/2004 06/14/2004
06/14/2004 06/15/2004 06/16/2004 06/16/2004 06/16/2004
06/17/2004 06/17/2004 06/17/2004 06/17/2004

86 Supplemental memorandum by plaintiff EEOC in support of its motion to compel dft to respond to second set of req for prod (tbl) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
87 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/9/04 ) ORDERED that pla's motion to compel as supplemented [77-1] is set for ORAL hrg bfr the undersigned on 6/21/04 following the settlement conf which is scheduled to commence at 9:30. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles, III (tbl) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
88 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/9/04 ): A continuation settlement conference is scheduled before the undersigned at 9:30 6/21/04; settlement letters due by 6/16/04. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 06/14/2004)
89 Memo in opposition by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon to motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP [65-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
90 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/14/04 ) Ordered that all mtns in limine shall be filed no later than 6/21/04 & shall be noticed for hrg at 9:30 6/30/04; opp memo thereto shall be filed by the close of business 6/24/04. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (tbl) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
91 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER that same is granted leave to file its reply memo to pla's opp to its mtn for sum jgm . by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 6/15/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
92 Reply by defendant K&B LA Corp to plaintiff's opposition to its motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP [65-1] (tbl) (Entered: 06/15/2004)
93 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to David Neu on 6/14/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
94 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Lester Perkins on 6/14/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/16/2004)
99 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER that same is granted leave to file its suppl reply to the pla's opp to its mtn for sum jgm . by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 6/17/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
95 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Richard Paul Ellison on 6/14/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
96 Memorandum by defendant K&B LA Corp in opposition to motion for leave to file a supplemental memo in support of pla's mtn to compel by plaintiff EEOC (tbl) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
97 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Tiffany R. Blackmon on 6/16/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
98 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/16/04 ) Ordered that defendant's motion for review of Mag Judge Knowles 6/2/04 order denying their mtn for exp hrg mtn to

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06/17/2004 06/18/2004
06/21/2004 06/21/2004 06/21/2004 06/21/2004 06/22/2004 06/22/2004 06/24/2004

compel [84-1] is fixed for hrg, WITH ORAL ARGUEMENT, at 11:00 6/17/04 bfr the undersigned. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (tbl) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
100 Reply by defendant K&B LA Corp to plaintiff's opposition to its motion for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the FRCP [65-1] (tbl) (Entered: 06/17/2004)
101 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/17/04 ) Bfr the Court on this date is Rite Aid's objs to Mag Judge Knowles 6/2/04 denial of its (1) mtn for exp hrg for leave to propound addl interrogs on intervenor Tiffany Blackmon; (2) mtn to allow the continuation of the depositions of Lakisha Banford & Dr. Trent Desselee because of improper statements and objs by opposing counsel; & (3) mtn to compel suppl responses; ordered that (1) the Mag Judge's order denying dft's mtn for exp hrg for leave to propound addl interrogs to Tiffany Blackmon is affirmed; (2) the Mag Judge's order denying dft's mtn to allow the continuation of the depositions of Lakisha Banford and Dr. Trent Desselee because of improper statements & objs by opposing counsel is affirmed in part & reversed in part as set forth herein; and (3) the Mag Judge's order denying dft's mtn to compel suppl responses is affirmed, as amended as set forth herein. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (tbl) (Entered: 06/18/2004)
102 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/21/04 ) Plaintiff's motion to compel dft to respond to second set of req for prod as supplemented is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 06/21/2004)
103 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/21/04 ) Settlement conference was held 9:30 6/21/04 ; settlement negotiations will continue by telephone . by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 06/22/2004)
104 MOTION by defendant K&B LA Corp in limine barring pla & intervenor Tiffany Blackmon from presenting testimony on the subjects listed herein to be heard before Judge Engelhardt at 9:30 6/30/04 (tbl) Modified on 06/23/2004 (Entered: 06/23/2004)
105 Request for Oral Argument by defendant K&B LA Corp regarding its motion in limine barring pla & intervenor Tiffany Blackmon from presenting testimony on the subjects listed herein [104-1] and UNSIGNED ORDER (tbl) Modified on 06/23/2004 (Entered: 06/23/2004)
106 MINUTE ENTRY ( 6/22/04 ) Ordered that defendant's req for oral argument [105-1] on its mtn in limine is denied. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (tbl) (Entered: 06/23/2004)
107 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp and ORDER that same is granted leave to supplement the record with exhibits referenced in its mtn in limine filed on 6/21/04 . by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 6/24/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
108 Supplement by defendant K&B LA Corp to its motion in limine barring

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06/24/2004
06/24/2004 06/24/2004 06/24/2004 06/24/2004
06/24/2004 06/24/2004
06/24/2004
06/25/2004 06/25/2004 06/28/2004 06/28/2004 06/30/2004

pla & intervenor Tiffany Blackmon from presenting testimony on the subjects listed herein filed on 6/21/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
109 Memo in opposition by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon to motion in limine barring pla & intervenor Tiffany Blackmon from presenting testimony on the subjects listed herein [104-1] filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
110 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of trial subp to Ed Joseph Washington on 6/18/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
111 USM RETURN OF SERVICE of trial subp to Lakisha T. Banford on 6/18/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
112 Federal Rule 68 Offer of judgment filed by defendant K&B LA Corp (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
113 Memorandum by defendant K&B LA Corp in opposition to motion in limine to exclude opinion testimony of dft's licensed vocational rehabilitation counselors filed by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
114 Memorandum by defendant K&B LA Corp in opposition to motion in limine to exclude 6/14/02 reinstatement letter filed by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
115 Memorandum by defendant K&B LA Corp in opposition to motion in limine to exclude Blackmon's psychiatric records, the testimony of Dr. Trent Desselle or other mental health professional or any reference to Blackmon's psychiatric disorders filed by plaintiff EEOC, intervenorplaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
116 Memorandum by defendant K&B LA Corp in opposition to motion in limine to exclude cumulative witnesses and the testimony of witnesses that is not from personal knowledge filed by plaintiff EEOC, intervenorplaintiff Tiffany Blackmon (tbl) (Entered: 06/25/2004)
117 Notice of Continuation Deposition by defendant K&B LA Corp of Lakisha Banford on 6/30/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/28/2004)
118 RETURN OF SERVICE of subp to Lakisha Banford on 6/24/04 (tbl) (Entered: 06/28/2004)
119 Supplemental discovery responses by defendant K&B LA Corp to Tiffany Blackmon's interrogs & req for prod of docs (tbl) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
120 Supplemental responses by defendant K&B LA Corp to EEOC's interrogs, req for prod of docs & req for admissions (tbl) (Entered: 06/29/2004)
121 ORDER AND REASONS: For the reasons stated herein, it is ordered that dft's motion for summary judgment [65-1] is granted in part dismissing pla's & intervenor's claim for damages arising out of the Title

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07/01/2004 07/01/2004
07/01/2004
07/01/2004
07/01/2004 07/02/2004 07/06/2004
07/07/2004 07/08/2004 07/27/2004 07/28/2004 07/28/2004

VII hostile work environment; granted in part dismissing intervenor's claim for injunctive relief based upon Title VII hostile work environment; granted in part dismissing pla's & intervenor's claim for punitive damages arising out of the Title VII hostile work environment; and denying the mtn in all other respects. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (tbl) (Entered: 07/01/2004)
122 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon in limine to exclude letter dated 6/14/02 which Rite Aid claims is an offer of reinstatement to be heard before Judge; no hearing date set (ca) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
123 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon, & plaintiff EEOC in limine to exclude the use of Ms. Blackmon's psychiatric medical records, the testimony of Dr. Trent Desselle (or any psychologist or counselor) and any reference by defense counsel at trial of any alleged emotional/mental/psychiatric disorders of Ms. Blackmon to be heard before Judge; no hrg date set (ca) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
124 MOTION by intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon, plaintiff EEOC in limine to exclude cumulative witnesses & the testimony of witnesses that is not from personal knowledge to be heard before Judge; no hearing date set (ca) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
125 MOTION by plaintiff EEOC, intervenor-plaintiff Tiffany Blackmon in limine to exclude inappropriate opinion testimony of defendant's licensed vocational rehabilitation counselors to be heard before Judge; no hearing date set (ca) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
126 PRE-TRIAL ORDER; PTC held 9:30 7/1/04 ; jury trial set 8:30 7/12/04 by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (ca) (Entered: 07/02/2004)
127 Objections by defendant K&B LA Corp to plaintiff's and intervenor's joint exhibit list (tbl) (Entered: 07/06/2004)
128 MINUTE ENTRY ( 7/1/04 ) Final pretrial conf held this date; jury trial is scheduled to commence 8:30 7/12/04 ; parties to comply with deadlines as set forth herein. by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (tbl) (Entered: 07/06/2004)
129 SIXTY DAY ORDER to dismiss case by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt Date Signed: 7/6/04 (CLOSED) (tbl) (Entered: 07/07/2004)
130 MINUTE ENTRY ( 7/7/04 ) Following further discussions among the parties, the case has settled. by Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles III (tbl) (Entered: 07/08/2004)
131 Motion by defendant K&B LA Corp for leave to file joint mtn for consent decree and UNSIGNED ORDER (plh) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
132 Joint Motion by plaintiff EEOC, defendant K&B LA Corp for entry of consent decree (plh) (Entered: 07/29/2004)
133 CONSENT DECREE & ORDER that the ptys comply as set forth in doc by Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt (plh) (Entered: 07/29/2004)

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