Case 1:14-cv-01316 Document 1 Filed 08/04/14 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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ELLA LANE )

2400 3rd Street NE

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Washington, D.C. 20002,

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ADRIAN CROSSLAND )

2400 3rd Street NE

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Washington, D.C. 20002,

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TERRENCE CROSSLAND )

2400 3rd Street NE

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Washington, DC 20002,

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Plaintiffs.

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)

v.

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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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1350 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

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Washington, D.C. 20004,

)

)

Officer John Wright )

Metropolitan Police Department

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(Badge No. 2907), )

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John Doe Officers 1–10,

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 1:14-cv-1316 Jury Trial Demanded

COMPLAINT

1. On October 27, 2012, officers from the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)

held 71-year-old Ella Ann Lane outside of her hom e for m ore than six hours. The of ficers did

not allow Ms. Lane, who had been watching televi sion alone when they arrived, to re-enter her

own hom e. The eld erly Ms. Lane was unable to eat, ge t water, o r us e her b athroom until h er

daughter returned from work, at which tim e Ms. Lane was able to go to McDonald’s to use the

public restroom.

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2. Ms. Lane, a retired grandm other, was not suspected of any wrongdoing, nor did the officers have any facts or evidence that any illegal activity had ever occurred in her home.
3. Instead, the officers sought to enter her home and to look through all of her m ost intimate possessions because they had found a firearm in a jacket belonging to an acquaintance of Ms. Lane’s grandson as that m an—whom Ms. Lane had never met—was sitting on the sidewalk steps below Ms. Lane’s yard and outsi de her fence. Based on their “training” and “experience” concerning the habits of “persons involved in illegal activities,” MP D officers asserted in a search warrant application that th ey believed they would fi nd evidence of crim inal activity in Ms. Lane’s home.
4. When MPD of ficers finally obtained a warra nt to search th e home, they om itted from the sworn warrant application presented to the Superior Court judge that two police officers had already illegally entered and searched Ms. Lane’s home without a warrant and found nothing unlawful.
5. Nothing illegal was ever found in the home. 6. Nonetheless, as detailed below, Ms. La ne was physically a bused and verbally threatened by the MPD officers, including one MPD officer who, after finding nothing illegal, told Ms. Lane that, if he was ev er called back to her house, he w ould make sure that she lost her home. Ms. Lane had lived in the home for over 37 years. 7. Before MPD officers finally left her hom e that night, the officers deleted the photographic evidence that Ms. Lane had taken of th e officers’ pre-warrant illegal intrusion onto her property from her digital camera. 8. The egregious and unlawful actions of th e local governm ent agents in this case have become a frightening reality for many impoverished families of color in the Dis trict. What
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happened to Ms. Lane and her family raises serious questions about the systemic misconduct and recklessness of the Metropolitan Police Department and its agents in obt aining search warrants and executing home raids in the District of Columbia.1
Nature of the Action 9. The Plain tiffs seek compensatory relief fo r the violations of their con stitutional rights against the District of Columbia and the Defendant Officers in their individual capacities.
Jurisdiction and Venue 10. This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United S tates Constitution. This Court has ju risdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 11. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Parties 12. Plaintiff Ella Ann Lane is a 72-year-old resident of the Dist rict of Colum bia. Plaintiff Adrian Crossland is a 53-year-old resident of the Dist rict of Colum bia. She is Ms . Lane’s daughter. Plaintiff Terrence Crossfield is a 28-year-old resident of the District of Columbia. He is Ms. Lane’s grandson. 13. Defendant the District of Colum bia is th e m unicipal en tity that ope rates th e Metropolitan Police Department and that trains and supervises the Defendant officers. 14. Defendant Officer John Wright prepared and swore under oath the search warrant application and participated in the planning and execution of the hom e search. He a lso initiated and participated in the unlawfu l stop, search, and arrest of Te rrence Crossland on which the
1 The allegations in this Com plaint are based on personal kn owledge as to m atters in which the Plaintiffs have had personal involvement and information and belief as to all other matters.
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home search warrant was ostensibly predicat ed and entered and searched Ms. Lane’s home without a warrant prior to obtaining a search warrant.
15. John Doe Officers 1–10 are the Metropoli tan Police Departm ent officers who participated in the planning and execution of the home search, who participated in the unlawful stop, search, and seizure of Mr . Crossland, the unlawful seizur e of Ms. Lane, the unlawful seizure of Ms. Crossland, and the unlawful warra ntless home search. On information and belief, their last names include Haselden, King, Skaluba, Boykins, Yates, Peterson, Paul, and Hoffm an. Defendants Wright and the Distri ct of Columbia are in possession of the full nam es and badge numbers of Defendant John Doe Officers, and their full identities can be easily discovered.
Factual Background The Events As Described in the Warrant Application 16. According to the warrant application, Defendants W right and Haselden were driving by Ms. Lane’s house on what they called “VICE patrol.” Defenda nt Wright claimed to observe three men sitting on the steps in front of Ms. Lane’s property “outside the fence line.”2 17. While driving his car, Defendant Wright observed a hand-rolled “cigar,” which he claimed to believ e to contain m arijuana. See Exhibit 1. Defendant Wright also observed a Styrofoam cup, which he asserted “is often us ed by people when th ey drink alcohol.” Id. As a result, Defendant Wright, who was wearing a tactical ballistics vest marked “POLICE,” decided to pull over the car and question the men. Id. 18. Defendant Wright asked the m en if they lived at the house a nd then asked the m for identification. Defendant Wright received Terrence Cro ssland’s identification, which
2 Despite Defendant W right’s characterization of the steps as “outside the fence lin e” of Ms . Lane’s property, the steps are on her property, and the three m en were situ ated o n the s teps before they met the public sidewalk.
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indicated that he lived at the address, and asked one of the other men, Mr. Crutchfield, to put out the cigar. Mr. Crutchf ield to ld the officer that it was not marijuana but “Scooby Snacks,” a popular brand of synthetic marijuana available in stores in the District at the time.
19. According to Defendant W right, all thre e m en then “cons ented” to a search , which turned up nothing illegal on any of them. Id.
20. Defendant W right claim ed that, after th e search, Mr. Crossl and said that his friends could hang out with him on his porch. Defendant Wright told them that it was okay to go hang out on the porch, and the three m en got up to walk up the stairs and through the yard to the porch. Id.
21. Defendant Wright claimed that, after the three men got up, Mr. Boatwright failed to pick up a red jacket that was next to him. Defendant Wright told the men that they forgot their jacket, and the m en allegedly denied ownership. Defendant W right told the m en that he would personally keep the bottle of Henne ssey peeking out of the jacket if it did not b elong to th em. Mr. Crossland then allegedly stated that the jack et was his. De fendant W right claim ed not to believe Mr. Crossland because Mr. Crossland wa s already wearing a jacket and because Mr. Boatwright was not wearing a jacket. Id.
22. Instead of allowing the m en to take the jacket back, Defendant W right, claiming that the jacket was “abandoned,” th en picked it up and searched it, supposedly “to ascertain true ownership.” Id. Defendant W right picked up the jack et even though the jacket, as well as Defendant Wright when he went to pick it up, was on private property.
23. Defendant W right claim ed to have unzi pped a pocket in the jacket and found a handgun inside the pocket.
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24. Other Defendant MPD officer s were called to the scen e, and the Defendants took the Styrofoam cup that had been next to Mr. B oatwright on the stair s and sm elled the contents, agreeing that the liquid smelled like Hennessey.3 Id. According to the warra nt application, the officers then handcuffe d and arrested all thre e m en for possession of an open container of alcohol. Id. The poss ible eviden tiary basis o f this charg e again st all three m en was not explained. Officers als o arrest ed Mr. Crutchfield for possession of synthetic m arijuana for possessing the cigar.
25. The Defendants took all three men away from the yard in front of the house to the police station. No charges were pursued against Mr. Crossland, who was not in possession of the cup, the cigar, or the red jacket. H owever, officers took his cellular phone and have never (as of the date of this Complaint) returned it, despite repeated requests.
26. At the station, Mr. Boatwright waived his Miranda rights and adm itted that th e red jacket containing the firearm was his, th at the Hennes sey in the ja cket was his, tha t th e Styrofoam cup next to his foot was his, and that he had found the firearm in March. Id. at 4.
27. Even though, according to th e warrant app lication, Mr. Boatwright confessed to the ownership of the jacket and firearm —and thereby confirmed Defendant W right’s belief that Mr. Boatwright was the owner of the jacket—D efendant W right nonetheless sought a search warrant for the home that Mr. Crossland shared with his mother and grandmother.
The Obvious Lack of Probable Cause 28. The warrant application m ade by Defendant W right to search Ms. Lane’s hom e was egregiously lacking in probable cause. See generally Exhibit 1. No reasonable officer could have believed that it established probable cause to search the family’s home.
3 All of the officers entered the property without permission and without a warrant. 6

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29. Lacking an y actual ev idence con necting th e hom e to any crim inal activity, Defendant W right asserted, base d on his “training” and “experience,” that he believed that “persons involved in illegal ac tivities maintain books, records, docum entation and other papers relating to the ordering, sales and servicing of their firearms.” Exhibit 1 at 5.
30. Defendant W right also asserted: “I also know that there [sic] people keep their firearms and ammunition inside of their homes.” Id.
31. These entirely vague and conclusory st atements of purported “training” and “experience” about the habits of criminals and other “people” were offered as the key factual and evidentiary link to justify the search of Ms. Lane’s home.
32. The warran t application cont ained not a single particul arized f act to e stablish probable cause that a search of the hom e would reveal evidence of a crime, let alone the specific items sought.
33. As this Court has held b efore in response to the MPD’s prev ious efforts to search the homes belonging to those whom officers find on th e street with a firearm , this kind of vague assertion ab out the purported habits of people “involved in illegal activities” wou ld not even have been nearly sufficient to establish probable cause to raid and search Mr. Boatwright’s home (the home of the person who possessed the firearm), let alone to raid and search the home of Mr. Crossland. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000).
34. The warrant application did not present a ny facts remotely rising to the level of probable cause to believe that Mr. Crossland was involved in any “illegal activities,” Exhibit 1 at
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5, let alone that he owned a fi rearm, m uch le ss tha t h e s tored the sp ecific f irearms-related
accessories sought by the warrant inside his grandmother’s home.4
35. Nor did Defendant W right present any ev idence tha t M r. Bo atwright had ever
even been in Mr. Crossland’s hom e (he had not) , even assum ing that governm ent agents could
raid any home which any person whom officers find with a firearm had recently visited.5
36. Defendant Wright also ignored the fact th at the hom e sought to be searched was
Mr. Crossland’s hom e when he pu rportedly ju stified the s earch by as serting in the warr ant
application that gun possessors ke ep extra guns in “their” hom es. Based on this assertion,
Defendant Wright’s purported justification for searching the home was also self-defeating.
37. After the p aragraph in the warran t appl ication containing Defendant W right’s
generalized statements of “training” and “experience” concerning the habits of “persons involved
in illegal activitie s,” the warrant applicati on then sought perm ission for what am ounted to a
Colonial Era general warrant, requesting that “a Search Warrant be issued for the entire premises
… for any other evidence of a crime that may be found.” Exhibit 1 at 5.6
4 The warrant sought a detailed list of item s which Defendant W right claimed would, based on his “training” and “experience,” be in Mr. Cr ossland’s home: “Ammunition, Holsters, Targets, Gun Cleaning kits, Other Firearm s, Notes, Ledgers, Documentation and other Papers Relating to the Ordering, Sales, Servicing, and use of thei r Firearm s and Other Item s Related to Illegal Possession of Firearms.” Exhibit 1 at 1. 5 Even if agents of the governm ent were allo wed to search any hom e near which a person had been found in possession of a firearm (which has been rejected by this Court), and even if agents of the government were allowed to search the hom e of Mr. Cr ossland having f ound a firearm in the possession of a dif ferent person, the warr ant application f ailed to allege tha t anyone in th e house had done anything illegal or would possess evidence of any illegal gun activity because he failed to put forward any evidence that any person in the home did not have a license to possess a firearm. As Defendant W right knew, it was not and is not illegal to possess a firearm at one’s home in the District. Nowhere did Defendant W right allege, as ot her MPD offi cers rout inely demonstrate when seeking search warrants, that the residents of the hom e did not possess valid licenses or that they had been disqualified from lawful firearm ownership. 6 Both of the se generalizations are facially unrea sonable. The category of “persons involved in illegal activ ities” th at Defendant W right offe red as a category with consistent habits, is
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The Statements of “Training” and “Experience” Contained False and Reckless Statements and Material Omissions
38. The warrant application’s vague, general, a nd conclusory statements of “training” and “experience” concerning what those invo lved in “illeg al activ ities” a nd other “people” are likely to do were not only plainly insufficient to establish probable caus e to se arch the Lan e family home, they were also knowingly false, incomplete, and misleading.
39. Defendant W right’s assertion that poli ce were likely to find the detailed gunrelated item s based on his assertions of “training” and “experience” was knowingly and recklessly f alse. Defen dant W right om itted to te ll the Sup erior Court judge that, in executing similar search warrants based solely on statemen ts of “training” and “experience” about gun possessors, MPD office rs rarely fin d such item s and that, based on info rmation c ollected and produced by the MPD, it was overwhelm ingly likely that the Defendants would not find the items listed.
40. In cas es, su ch as this o ne, in which MPD offi cers seek a hom e search warran t based only on the seizure of a firearm in a st reet stop and their cl aimed “training” and “experience,” home searches rarely produce ev idence of the illegal activity that police allegedly seek. For exam ple, records created and kept by MPD officers show that, in the one-year period surrounding and including the raid of the Lane family home, 91% of such warrants searching for guns in the District failed to find any guns in the home.
41. The MPD i s even less successful in finding the docum entary evidence of gun crimes that the Defendants purport edly sought (including “ledge rs,” “targets,” “notes,” and
generalized beyond any reasonable m eaning. Fo r example, a person involved in sm oking synthetic marijuana outside a friend’s hom e may have different habits than a person who drinks alcohol out of a Styrofoam cup, both of whom may have different habits than a person involved in a large firearm s trafficking enterprise. Similarly, any reasonable officer would know that police are not permitted to search a home for “any other evidence of a crime that may be found.”
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“papers relating to the ordering, sales, servicing, and use of their firearm s,” supra note 4). According to MPD records, in the one-year pe riod surrounding and including the search of the Lane fa mily hom e, MPD officers failed to find any such docum entation in at least 94% (and likely much higher) of such cases. Seeking to e xpand the scope of the hom e search to exam ine any and all private papers in th e hom e, Defendant W right deliber ately and reck lessly f ailed to inform the Superior Court judge that MPD officers rarely find such item s when searches are based solely on MPD st atements of “training” and “experience” rather than on evidence th at actually links the home to illegal activity.
42. Moreover, finding such records and docum entation was even less lik ely than the MPD’s overall 94 % failure rate in Mr. Boatwright ’s case because he had admitted to “finding ” the firearm rather than legally purchasing it. The odds of finding Mr. Boatwright’s likely nonexistent gun-related paperwork in Mr. Crossland’s home (a hom e inside which Mr. Boatwright had never ventured) was even more miniscule.
43. This f ailure rate is no t surprising g iven the other things that Defendant W right omitted from the application m ade to the is suing judge. Defendant W right failed to inform the judge about other obviously m aterial facts in his possession, such as that m any firearm s— particularly because of the Dist rict’s long history of almost uniform prohibition on guns and th e inability of m any District res idents to valid ly purchase a f irearm—are passed an d traded by individuals without docum entation or records, and without the person possessing any of the receipts or accoutrements of legal gun ownership.
44. Defendant Wright also asserted that, because bu llets are not sold individually, id. at 5 (“[I]t is extremely uncommon for indiv idual rounds of ammunition to b e sold.”), and only sold in “bricks” of 50, there would be additional bullets inside the home of Ms. Lane. Citing the
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same MPD “training” and “experience,” however, a different MPD officer claimed under oath, to a different Superior Court judge seeking a different warrant, th at, because one cannot legally purchase bullets in the District, “there are of ten places w here you ca n buy loose bullets or individual bullets from other gun possessors.”
45. Defendant W right did not bother to in clude in the affidavit any reason why searching th e hom e of an acquaintance of a gun possessor would be justified or supported by evidence, let alone that it would b e more likely to yield success than the MPD’s d ismal success rate in searching the homes of actual firearms possessors.
The Warrant Application Falsely Recounted and Intentionally Omitted Critical Material Information 46. In addition to the warrant application’s facial invalid ity an d false and reckless generic statem ents and om issions, the warran t a pplication also suffered from a num ber of significant legal and factual flaws given the actual events that occurred that day. 47. Defendant W right’s warran t applicat ion, in addition to itself describ ing unconstitutional sea rches, f ailing re motely to e stablish probable cause, a nd including false and misleading statements of “train ing” and “experience,” also knowi ngly and recklessly m isstated and omitted critical factual information about what happened. 48. The warrant application did not recount m any of the im portant events leading up to the warrant application, incl uding that the Defendants had already unlawfully entered and searched the home without a warrant and without finding anything illegal. 49. As Defendants Wright, Haselden, and a thir d officer not disclosed in the warrant application were questioning the three m en on the steps outside the hom e, the Defendants brought the three m en onto the yard of the hom e to search them . The Defendants had no
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permission to bring the m en into the yard and no perm ission to enter the property to search them.7
50. Defendant Wright asserted that “all three individuals consented to a search.” That statement was false. Instead, immediately after exiting the police car, Defendant Wright ordered the men to stay where they were. After seizing the men, Defendant Wright and the other officers then immediately searched the m en, including pu tting their hands into the pockets of the three men. Officers did not have reasona ble suspicion to stop and detain the men or probable cause to search them.
51. After Def endant W right allowed th e m en to go up to the porch to c ontinue hanging out because he had not found anything illegal, he noticed that Mr. Boatwright had lef t his red jacket on the property near the steps. Defendant Wright threatened to sm ash the gl ass alcohol bottle on the steps of the property if the men did not take the jack et, at which point Mr. Crossland asked the officer to hand him the jacket so he did not break glass on his walkway. At that point, Defendant Wright unzipped the jacket and began searching it, later falsely claim ing to the Superior Court judge that it was “abandoned” property and w ithout revealing to the judge that the jacket had been seized from private property.
52. When Ms. Lane heard officers outside her home and on her yard and porch, she came outside to her porch from her kitchen, wher e she had been watching television. When she saw officers on her property without perm ission, searching and then handcuffing her grandson, she got her cam era and started taking photos of where the officers were and what they were doing. Ms. Lane wanted proof that police offi cers had come onto her property and seized and searched her grandson without permission.
7 The men had always been seated on the front steps of the property, and officers themselves also entered onto the property to search the men.
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53. As Ms. Lane stood watching officers arre sting her grandson, Mr. Crossland asked his grandmother why they were arresting him . Officers did not explain to Ms. Lane or to Mr. Crossland what he wa s being arrested for. Neither Defendant W right nor any other officer explained to Mr. Crossland that he was being arrested for posse ssion of an open container of alcohol, apparently for the Styrofoam cup that had been sitting next to Mr. Boatwright.
54. After the arrests, several Defendants walked up to Ms. Lane’s porch and asked Ms. Lane if they could com e into her house and speak to her. She told them that they could not but that she would talk to them outside. The Defendants told her that they had found a gun on one of the three young m en, although Ms. Lane di d not know Mr. Boatwright and had never spoken to him.
55. Defendant W right then told Ms. L ane that he wanted to search her hom e. Ms. Lane asked the officer: “Do you have a search wa rrant?” Defendant Wright stated: “No, but I’m going in anyway.”
56. Defendant Wright and anothe r Defendant officer then walked past Ms. Lane into Ms. Lane’s house. After the Defendants ente red her home without perm ission and without a warrant, Ms. Lane attem pted to follow them into the house to see what they were going to do to her belongings. As she tried to enter her ow n home, she was grabbed by the arm by Defendant Haselden.
57. Defendant Haselden forcibly pulled her b ack and restrained her from going back into her own house.
58. After the two Defenda nts had searched the hom e for about 10 m inutes, they exited.
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59. The search warrant application m ade to the Superior Court judge did not m ention any of these events, including that officers had already entered and searched the home and found nothing illegal in it.
60. Defendant W right m erely stated in the warrant application that officers were “stationed” outside the home to prevent the supposed destruction of “evidence.”
61. The warrant application also omitted that officers had unlawfully brought the men into the yard to search them, without permission of anyone who lived in the house.
62. In addition, the app lication also m isleadingly stated that Def endant Wright found the m en “outside the fence line” o f the hom e w ithout s tating that the m en were sitting on the steps belonging to Ms. Lane a nd her property. Thus, the Defenda nt Wright obscured from the Superior C ourt judge that his seizure of the men and t he seizure of the red jacket, even independent of his unlawful search of that jacket on the absurd premise that it was “abandoned” on private property, occurred only after he had m ade an unauthorized entrance onto the property, supposedly to investigate a cigar and Styrofoam cup, neither of which was unlawful.
63. Had Defendant Wright told the Superior Court judge about these illegal stops and seizures, including that he unlawfully entered the family’s property in order to grab and search the red jacket, the Superior Cour t judge would have been obliged not to consider any evidence discovered as a result of that unlawful seizure.
The Conduct of Officers After the Unlawful Seizures and the First Home Search 64. When Defe ndant W right left to write the search warrant application, the Defendants ordered Ms. Lane not to go back into her hom e. Ms. Lane was afraid because sh e was elderly, alone, and had just been forcibly restrained from walking into her own home.
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65. Three Defendants rem ained with then 71-ye ar-old Ms. Lane to guard the house. They refused to perm it Ms. Lane to enter her own hom e to get f ood, to drink water, or to go t o the bathroom.
66. October 27, 2012, was an uncomfortably chilly evening for Ms. Lane. 67. After nearly four hours, Ms. Lane was fina lly able to use the bathroom when her daughter, Adrian Crossland, arrived after work at approximately 6:00 p.m . Ms. Lane was then able to go to McDonald’s to use the public bathroom. 68. When Defendant Wright arrived with the warrant, Ms. Lane asked to see it. One of the Defendants told her: “We said that we would get a warrant, not that we’d show it to you.” 69. When the D efendants refused to show the family the warra nt, f earing that they were again entering their hom e illegally, Ms. Crossland called 911 to report th at the police were entering her and her mother’s home without permission. 70. The Defendants kept Ms. Lane and her daughter, Ms. Crossland, outside the gate in front of their yard, even as it got colder. One of the Defendant officers was d eliberately holding and pushing down on the gate such that it trapped Ms. Crossland’ s foot, even after sh e told him that it was painful. 71. After searching the home, the Defendants found nothing illegal. When he left the house, Defendant Wright told the two women: “We didn’t find anything, but we’ll be back.” He then warned Ms. Lane: “If I get called back to this address again, you’ll have to move.” 72. Ms. Lane had been living in the home since 1975. 73. When the wom en entered the house, Ms. La ne went to her digital cam era and found that the Defendant officers had deleted all of the photographs that she had taken of police unlawfully searching and arresting her grandson in the middle of her yard.
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74. The Defendants also to re apart the bedroom in which Adrian Crossland had been sleeping. It took the family three days to clean the damage done by officers.8
75. The experience traumatized and humiliated the Plaintiffs. 76. Mr. Crossland spent the weekend in jail due to his unlawful arrest prior to being released without charge. There was no probabl e cause to b elieve that he had comm itted any offense. 77. The courthouse was closed on the fo llowing Monday, and Mr. Crossland was therefore not released until his case was no-papered on Tuesda y, October 30. He spent three days locked in jail due to the patently unlawful arrest. 78. The Defendants took Mr. Crossland’s phone during his arrest and refused to leave it with Ms. Lane at the home. Despite repeated requests, the phone has never been returned.
The MPD’s Policies and Practices 79. The Def endants in th is case attempted to tur n a stree t sto p and arres t into an automatic raid and search of a ho me. To accom plish that, th e Defendants relied on vague, facially ins ufficient, u nsubstantiated, and g rossly m isleading and inten tionally incom plete statements of “training” and “experience.” 80. Through training its officer s to use these statem ents of “training” and “experience” and by supplying the content of that “training,” the MPD has begun an initiative to conduct ho me raids, som etimes at multiple ho mes, in every situation in which officers find a firearm in the possession of a person anywhere in the District, based not on any actual police work or ev idence linkin g the hom e to a firearm, but based on false and m isleading statem ents
8 Ms. Lane’s brother returned to the home while officers had sealed the property. He sought to get his dentures because he had a date, but he was not permitted into the home to get his teeth.
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about the habits of a generic category of people that it labels “crim inal,” “gun possessors,” or “persons involved in illegal activities.”
81. The MPD trains its officers that, based on bare bones affidavits like Officer Wright’s and assertions of “t raining” and “expe rience” like the ones he m ade, any MPD officer is able to turn any gun arrest anyw here in the District into an autom atic home raid, even though officers know that they are overwhelmingly unlikely to find the evidence that they claim to seek.
82. The MPD has adopted a pattern, policy, and practice of instructing its o fficers to obtain and execute search warrants at the alle ged residences of people on whom they find firearms during traffic and street stops—as well as, in som e cases, the residences of any person with any person who is found with a firearm . The MPD em ploys this pattern, policy, and practice despite the obvious lack of any evidentiary connection to the residence and rulings from this Court that such subsequent hom e raids ba sed solely o n possession of a firearm som ewhere outside the home clearly lack probable cause.
83. In the on e-year period including the execu tion of the warran t in this case, MPD officers (including dozens of officers and supervis ors from police district s throughout the City) employed materially sim ilar statem ents based on the MPD’s “training ” and their “experience” after stree t arres ts inv olving firearm possession in order to ex ecute at least 56 hom e searches; these MPD raids resu lted from incidents in which police claimed to find fi rearms during a street stop but presented no other evidence linking the home to any criminal activity.
84. MPD off icers are tra ined by the MPD to substitute these a nd m aterially sim ilar statements of “training” and “e xperience” for traditional evidence when they wan t to search a particular location but lack any evidence about the home itself.
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Claims for Relief One: The Warrant Application Was So Lacking in Probable Cause that No Reasonable Officer Could Have Relied on It in Good Faith. 85. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-84 above. 86. The Defendants obtaining and executing the s earch warrant for the Plain tiffs’ home relied on a warrant application that was so facially lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer could have relied on it in good fa ith to search the family’s home. The warrant utterly failed to provide any evidence linking th e hom e to any crim inal activity, let alone to establish probable cause that the specific gun-related items sought would be found. T he reliance on such an application to search the home clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. Two: The Warrant A pplication Containe d Statemen ts that Were Know ingly and Recklessly False and Made Material Omissions. 87. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-86 above. 88. Defendant Wright’s application pr esented to the Super ior Court judge contained statements of “training ” and “experien ce,” as well as statem ents concerning th e seizures , searches, and arrests outside the home, that were knowingly and recklessly false and m isleading. The application also omitted material facts known to Defendant Wright that, if presented, would have underm ined the asserted probable cause basis for issuing the warrant. The Fourth Amendment prohibits obtaining a warrant on the basis of knowi ngly and recklessly false and misleading assertions as well as the knowing and reckless omission of material information. Three: T he Warra nt Applica tion Relied on Info rmation Obtained in an Unconstitutional Manner. 89. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-88 above. 90. The warran t applica tion relied o n m aterial inf ormation deriv ed f rom the unconstitutional seizure and search of Mr. Cro ssland, Mr. Boatwright, a nd Mr. Crutchfield, as
18

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well as fro m the unlawful search o f the red jack et. Becaus e evidence of the firearm was found through the unlawful seizures and searches, that inform ation was im properly included in the warrant app lication and renders an y hom e search perf ormed on the basis of unconstitu tional activity a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Four: The Obvious Lack of Probable Cause and False and Reckless Statements and Omissions Were the Result of a Policy, Pattern, and Custom of the MPD and the Result of the MPD’s Failure Properly to Train and Supervise its Officers.
91. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-90 above. 92. The MPD has established a pattern, policy, and practice of train ing its o fficers to include in search warrant appl ications statements of “training” and “experience” that are unsubstantiated, vague, self-defeating, contradictory, woefully insufficient to substitute for actual evidence, incomplete, and materially false and recklessly misleading. The MPD has established a pattern, policy, and practice of training its officer s to use such statem ents of “training” and “experience” about the habits of people that officers stop on the street to substitute for any actual evidence or police inve stigation in to any ev identiary link to a particular resid ence. Despite having knowledge of the fatal fact ual and legal flaws in these statements, the MPD has f ailed to train and supervise its officers on the Fourth Amendment standards for obtaining highly intrusive home search warrants. As a resu lt, MPD officer s from every Police Dis trict routinely seek and execute extraordinarily intrusive, dangerous, an d demeaning search warrants based on a web of insufficient, false, misleading, and unsubstantiated assertions. Five: The Defendants Entered and Search ed the Plaintiffs’ Home and Property Without a Warrant 93. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-92 above.
19

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94. The Defendants entered and search ed th e Plaintiffs’ hom e pr ior to obtaining a warrant in violation of the Fo urth Am endment. Officers also entered and remained on th e property without a warrant and without permission.
Six: The Defendants Illegally Seized Ms. Lane 95. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-94 above. 96. Defendant Haselden unlawfully grabbed Ms. Lane and forcibly restrained her from going into her ow n home. Three Defendant s kept Ms. Lane on her porch and unlawfully denied her entry into her own home for a period of six hours, refusing to let her eat, get water, or use the bathroom. The seizure of Ms. Lane on her own porch violated the Fourth Amendment. Seven: The Defendants Unlaw fully Seized, Searched, and Arrested Mr. Crossland and Unlawfully Retained Possession of His Cellular Phone 97. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-96 above. 98. The Defendants unlawfully seized and searched Mr. Crossland without reasonable suspicion o r probab le cause to b elieve th at he had co mmitted an y of fense. Def endants unlawfully arrested Mr. Crossland without prob able cause to believe th at he had comm itted any offense. After his arrest, officers unlawfully took his cellular phone and have failed to return it, even though no charges were pursued against Mr. Crossland and despite repeated requests for the return of the phone. The seizure, searches, a nd arrest of Mr. Crossland violate the Fourth Amendment, and the continued retention of Mr . Crossland’s property without providing any notice or opportunity to be heard about the taking of the property and without ever returning the property, violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Eight: The Defendants Exceeded the Scope o f the Warrant, Used Excessive Force, Made Unnecessary and Unreasonable Seizu res Not Authori zed By the Warrant, a nd Engaged in Conduct that Shocks the Conscience in Violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
20

Case 1:14-cv-01316 Document 1 Filed 08/04/14 Page 21 of 21

99. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-98 above.

100. In add ition to th e s tring of hum iliating uncon stitutional s eizures com mitted by

Defendants when they unlawfully entered the Plaintiffs’ property—including the forceful

detention of 71-year-old Ms. Lane on her porch for six hours to pr event her from re-entering her

own hom e—the Defendants also exceeded th e scope of th e warran t b y exam ining Ms. Lane’s

digital cam era and deleting photographs that she had taken of police m isconduct. The

Defendants also taunted and threatened the famil y, caus ing them to believe that th ey were in

danger of losing the hom e that Ms. Lane had o ccupied since 1975. The unlawful, painful, and

unjustified seizures, taunts, and threats m ade to innocent and vulnerable people on their own

property shock the conscience and violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

Request for Relief

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue a judgment against the Defendants:

a. Holding the appropriate Defendants liable to the Plaintiffs for compensatory damages in an amount appropriate to the proof adduced at trial;
b. Holding the appropriate Defendants (other than the District of Columbia) liable to the Plaintiffs for punitive damages in an amount appropriate to the proof adduced at trial;
c. Awarding to plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; and d. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectf

ully submitted,

Alec Equal 916
Date: August 4, 2014

__/s/ Alec Karakatsanis______________ Karakatsanis (D.C. Bar No. 999294)
Justice Under Law G Street, NW #701 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 681-2409
Attorney for Plaintiff

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 Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 1 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

ELLA LANE, et al.,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 1:14‐cv‐01316 (RBW)

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants, the District of Columbia

(“District”), Officer John Wright, and John Doe Police Officers 1‐10, by and through

undersigned counsel, hereby move the Court for an Order dismissing the Complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants seek dismissal

because (1) on the face of the Complaint, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified

immunity (2) Plaintiffs failed to allege a Monell violation against the District; and (3) the

officers were not negligent per se.

The grounds for this motion are more fully set forth in the accompanying

memorandum of points and authorities. A proposed order is also attached.

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 2 of 19
LCvR 7(m) Certificate Because this motion is dispositive, LCvR 7(m) does not require Defendants to seek Plaintiffs’ consent.
Respectfully Submitted, IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General Civil Litigation Division /s/ Jonathan H. Pittman JONATHAN H. PITTMAN [430388] Chief, Civil Litigation Division Section III /s/ Joseph A. González JOSEPH A. GONZÁLEZ Assistant Attorney General D.C. Bar No. 995057 /s/ Aaron J. Finkhousen AARON J FINKHOUSEN [1010044] 441 4th Street, N.W., Sixth Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001‐2714 202‐724‐6511 (direct) aaron.finkhousen@dc.gov
2

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 3 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

ELLA LANE, et al.,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 1:14‐cv‐01316 (RBW)

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants, the District of Columbia, Officer

John Wright, and John Doe Police Officers 1‐10, by and through undersigned counsel,

hereby move the Court for an Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants seek dismissal because (1) on the

face of the Complaint, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity; and (2)

Plaintiffs failed to allege a Monell violation against the District.

Plaintiffs allege eight claims for relief. Compl. ¶¶ 85‐100. These eight claims can

be conceptually organized as follows: (1) an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment

by the individual officers in acquiring and serving the search warrant (Counts 1, 2, 3, 5,

6, 7, and 8); and (2) an alleged Monell violation against the District of Columbia (Count

4). The individual officers are shielded by qualified immunity because Plaintiffs allege

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 4 of 19
no constitutional violation and because the officers’ actions did not violate any clearly
established right. Plaintiffs have failed to allege a Monell claim against the District
because there is no underlying constitutional violation.
Introduction
Plaintiffs allege that police officers humiliated and embarrassed them when the
officers arrested Plaintiff Terrance Crossland and two of his friends after finding a gun
in a jacket Crossland represented belonged to him. The gun did not belong to Plaintiffs
and no incriminating evidence was found in their home. Thus, they conclude no
warrant to search their home should have issued. However,
The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause, a standard well short of absolute certainty. Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like [plaintiffs] unfortunately bear the cost. Officers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity; and the resulting frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as was true here. When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm, however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. Los Angeles Cnty., California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615‐16 (2007).
Nature of the Case
While on a regular patrol, Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer John
Wright observed what he believed was evidence of the use of marijuana and the
consumption of alcohol. Compl. ¶ 17. Officer Wright approached the individuals he
had observed and began questioning them. Compl. ¶ 18. The three individuals were 2

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 5 of 19
on Plaintiff Ella Lane’s property. Compl. n.2. During the conversation, Officer Wright picked up a jacket that conspicuously contained a bottle of Hennessey. Compl. ¶ 22. When Officer Wright picked up the jacket, he found a pistol. Compl. ¶ 23, Ex. 1. The officers then performed a safety sweep of the surrounding area and arrested the three individuals. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 56. The officers entered and briefly searched Ms. Lane’s home. Compl. ¶ 56. Ms. Lane did not explicitly object to the officers entering the home after they explained to her the reason for arresting the three individuals. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 55, 56.
Officer Wright then applied for a warrant based on the discovery of the gun and his experience and training. Compl. Ex. 1. The D.C. Superior Court issued a warrant, which the officers executed the same day. Compl. Ex. 1. Ms. Lane was forced to wait outside for four hours. Compl. ¶ 67. The officers found no contraband. Compl. ¶ 71.
Ms. Lane alleges the officers deleted pictures she had taken of the officers. Compl. ¶ 73.
Standard of Review To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court set forth a “two‐pronged approach” that a court may utilize when ruling on a motion to dismiss
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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). While a court generally must consider a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the court may first “identify[] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Thus, the basic pleading standards “demand [] more than an unadorned, the‐defendant‐unlawfully‐harmed‐me accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Once the court has determined that the plaintiff has asserted “well‐pleaded factual allegations,” the court “should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Applying these standards to the instant case, the Court should dismiss the Complaint.
Argument I. The individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a two‐step process for determining whether qualified immunity should apply in a particular case. The first inquiry under Saucier is whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party claiming to have been injured, show that the government officialʹs conduct violated a constitutional right. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated, qualified immunity is appropriate. Id. If the plaintiffʹs rights were violated, the second inquiry is whether, “in light of the specific context of the case,” the right in
4

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question was “clearly established.” Id. A right is “clearly established” if “the contours of that right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Claims of qualified immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Katz, 533 U.S. at 200‐01 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
When police officers obtain a warrant before executing a search, they are ordinarily entitled to rely on the issuing judgeʹs determination that probable cause exists. See United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 1006‐07 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable ... will the shield of [qualified] immunity be lost.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344‐45 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were reasonable and because any rights Plaintiffs seek to vindicate were not clearly established.
a. The warrant was supported by probable cause.1 In determining whether an affidavit supports probable cause to support a search warrant, a judge must take a common‐sense approach and determine whether there is a

1

Because whether a warrant is supported by probable cause is a question of law,

Plaintiffs’ allegations that the warrant was not supported by probable cause need not be

presumed true in a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

5

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 8 of 19
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Courts have routinely rejected
hypertechnical, post hoc reviews of probable cause. See, e.g., id. at 236. The
Constitution requires only “the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and
prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013)
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). To determine whether an affidavit
could support probable cause where a plaintiff alleges omission of material
information, “logic dictates that the affidavit be read as if the allegedly relevant material
were included to determine whether probable cause would have been undetermined.”
Ogden v. Dist. of Columbia, 676 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D.D.C. 1987) affʹd in an unpublished
opinion, 861 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Here, the affidavit supporting the warrant provides that:
1) The officer was assigned to the 5th District VICE Unit and had experience in gun arrests and search warrants where guns, narcotics, and money had been found;
2) The officer described the arrest that led him to conclude probable cause existed to search 2400 3rd Street NE: a) The officer was operating an unmarked police vehicle when he observed three individuals sitting on the steps in front of 2400 3rd Street NE; b) The officer identified the three individuals as Darrell Boatwright, Benjamin Crutchfield, and Terrance Crossland, Jr.; c) From the car and while driving down Bryant Street, the officer observed what appeared to be a marijuana cigar and proceeded to drive closer to the three individuals; d) The officer then noticed a Styrofoam cup, which he knew to be regularly used by individuals drinking alcohol; e) The officer inquired whether anyone lived at the address and Plaintiff Crossland stated that he did;
6

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 9 of 19
f) The officer asked Mr. Crutchfield, who was smoking what appeared to be a marijuana cigar, to put out the cigar and Mr. Crutchfield declared it to be synthetic marijuana;
g) The officer then asked for and received identification cards from Mr. Boatwright and Mr. Crutchfield;
h) The officer learned that the Styrofoam cup had liquor in it; i) The officers then noticed a red jacket, which conspicuously contained a bottle of
alcohol, lying on the steps where the three individuals had been seated and behind where Mr. Crossland was seated; j) The officer searched the jacket to ascertain ownership because Mr. Crossland claimed the jacket, but was already wearing a jacket; k) The officer found a pistol in the jacket; l) The officer called for assistance and, when additional officers arrived, placed all three individuals under arrest. 3) An investigation into the pistol revealed that the pistol was stolen and loaded with six rounds, one of which was found in the chamber; 4) Later, Mr. Boatwright claimed ownership of the jacket, the gun, and the alcohol; and 5) The officer sought a warrant based on his knowledge and experience of the likelihood of discovering gun paraphernalia in the home of a gun owner;
Compl. at Ex. 1. Plaintiffs allege that the affidavit cannot support probable cause
because the search of the jacket was unreasonable, the affidavit omits certain relevant
facts, and Mr. Boatwright did not reside at 2400 3rd Street.
Plaintiffs allege that the initial search of Mr. Boatwright’s jacket was
unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. Compl. ¶¶ 54. This statement is
irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claim. Use of unlawfully obtained evidence “works no new
Fourth Amendment wrong.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905‐906 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354, 94 S.Ct. 613, 623, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). In
fact, evidence obtained in derogation of the Fourth Amendment is regularly admitted
against co‐conspirators or co‐defendants who have no personal right of privacy in the
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places searched or the evidence seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491–492 (1963). Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). Thus, the source of the evidence has no bearing on its usefulness in determining probable cause, Plaintiffs’ allegation to the contrary notwithstanding. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (holding a Court need not presume the truth of legal conclusions found in a complaint). Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Boatwright rather than Mr. Crossland possessed the jacket. See Compl. ¶ 45. Thus, because Plaintiffs have no privacy interest in Mr. Boatwright’s property, they can have no objection to its use against them.2
Plaintiffs next allege that the affidavit omits material information about the success rates of MPD warrants of this type. Compl. ¶¶ 39‐42. Plaintiff’s alleged omissions are irrelevant. In evaluating Plaintiffs’ allegation of material omission, “logic dictates that the affidavit be read as if the allegedly relevant material were included to determine whether probable cause would have been undetermined.” Ogden v. Dist. of Columbia, 676 F. Supp. at 327. Plaintiffs allege that search warrants based on training and experience often find no evidence. Compl. ¶ 41, 42. However, the Supreme Court has held success and failure rates have limited usefulness. See Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1056‐

2

Plaintiffs may contend that because the jacket did not belong to them, probable cause to

search their home does not follow from finding the jacket. This argument is unavailing because

officers are not required to sort out every possible explanation at the time of determining

probable cause. United States v. Traylor, 2009 WL 87470 at *3 (W.D.N.Y. January 12, 2009). The

test for probable cause only requires a reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot at 2400

3rd Street and that evidence of that activity could be found on the property. See id.

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Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 11 of 19
57 (“Making matters worse, the decision below treats records of a dogʹs field performance as the gold standard in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import.”). Plaintiffs’ emphasis on the gold standard of statistical evidence overlooks the obvious fact supporting probable cause here: the officers found a gun on the property. Compl. n.2 (alleging the steps where the jacket containing the gun was found were on Plaintiffs’ property); see also United States v. Quilling, 261 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2001) (“constructive possession can be established by showing that the contraband was seized at the defendant’s residence”).
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Boatwright did not reside at 2400 3rd Street. See Compl. ¶ 42. This statement does not detract from finding probable cause. The officers found a gun (at the time, an illegal item), which Mr. Boatwright admitted he had not legally purchased or obtained, on the property of 2400 3rd Street. By the very low standard of probable cause, the officers reasonably concluded that other evidence related to the gun may be located on the property.
Plaintiffs further challenge whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Crossland. Compl. ¶ 98. Mr. Crossland flatly stated that he owned the jacket containing a stolen pistol. Compl. ¶ 21. Mr. Crossland later recanted this claim. Compl. ¶ 26. The officers had probable to arrest Mr. Crossland because he claimed to own a jacket that contained a gun. Mr. Boatwright’s confession does not foreclose a
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finding of probable cause to arrest Mr. Crossland because Mr. Boatwright’s confession came after all three men were arrested. See Compl. ¶ 26.
b. The means of executing the search warrant were reasonable. “The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. The execution of the search here was reasonable. Plaintiffs allege two unreasonable actions by the officers in executing the search: (1) not permitting Ms. Lane to return inside her home; and (2) performing a protective sweep of Ms. Lane’s property. 1. The officers reasonably refused to permit Ms. Lane to enter her home. The officers reasonably detained Ms. Lane while awaiting a search warrant to arrive. Officers are permitted to detain occupants of a dwelling that is subject to a search warrant, even absent particularized suspicion to the individual detained. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702‐703 (1981). Even assuming the officers lacked particularized suspicion that Ms. Lane had committed any crime, they were permitted to detain her during the search. Thus, the officers reasonably refused to permit Ms. Lane to enter her home once the search was underway. The officers reasonably prevented her from reentering her home before the search began. The Supreme Court recently held that Summers’ justifications for detention do not extend past the immediate vicinity of the premises but did not address time constraints on Summers detentions. Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1042
10

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(2013). Unlike Bailey, Ms. Lane was not detained; rather, she was not permitted to return to her home. Compl. ¶ 67. Thus, the burden on Ms. Lane closely followed the first concern discussed in Summers – ensuring the efficacy of the search – because Ms. Lane was merely prevented from tampering with, concealing, or destroying any evidence that may have been in her home. Cf. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 575 (“Law enforcement officers may seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant.”).3
Moreover, to the extent that Bailey clarified or modified the scope of Summers, the officers did not violate any rights that were established by Bailey. This is because Bailey was decided on February 18, 2013, four months after the conduct alleged here. As a result, at the time of the conduct alleged here, Summers controlled, and the officers could not have known that their detention of Ms. Lane violated a right established by Bailey. See, e.g., Butera, 235 F.3d at 652 (holding, after examining the law at the time of the alleged police misconduct, that the specific right at issue was not clearly established in the D.C. Circuit).
2. The protective sweep was reasonable. “A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly

3

Acevedo’s holding addressed this rule from Chadwick as it relates to containers found in

automobiles and permitted officers to search containers inside of a vehicle if they had probable

cause to search the vehicle. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579.

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confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). A protective sweep is justified “if the searching officer possesse[d] a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant[ed] the officer in believing . . . that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (ellipsis added). In this case, the officers arrested three individuals for possession of a firearm. Having found one gun on the scene, the officers reasonably believed – enough so to support a finding of probable cause to search – that there may be other guns on the property. See Compl. Ex. 1. The officers arrested the three individuals on the front porch of the home. Compl. ¶ 51. The officers then observed a fourth individual coming out of the house. Compl. ¶ 52. The officers, thus, had an articulable suspicion that there may be other individuals in the home who have access to weapons and pose a threat to the officers. The officers, therefore, performed a protective sweep of the home. Compl. ¶ 58. Thus, the officers had a reasonable belief based on articulable facts permitting a protective sweep of the home, which according to the allegations of the complaint, lasted approximately ten minutes. Id.
c. The warrant was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the officers’ belief in its validity unreasonable.
“For an officer to lose the shield of immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that if the omitted material had been included, ‘a reasonably well‐trained officer . . . would
12

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have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for a warrant.’ ” Ogden, 676 F. Supp. at 328 (quoting Malley 475 U.S. at 344‐45) (alteration in original). On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiffs have failed to make this showing.
Plaintiffs allege that the affidavit failed to include (1) information that the gun was a product of an illegal search and (2) information related to MPD department‐wide statistics regarding the success rate of search warrants supported by training and experience.4 Compl. ¶¶ 42, 51. As discussed above, information that the officers found the gun allegedly in derogation of Mr. Boatwright’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is irrelevant to finding probable cause because Fourth Amendment rights are individual rights, and the gun was not found in derogation of Plaintiffs’ rights. Likewise, information related to the success rate of past MPD searches is not relevant because it does not reflect on Officer Wright’s (the affiant’s) training and experience, because it does not negate the possibility of success, and because finding a gun on a property creates probable cause for finding additional contraband on the property. Thus, this additional information does not strip the warrant application of all

4

Plaintiffs also allege that the affidavit should have reached other conclusions based on

the officer’s training and experience. Compl. ¶¶ 44. That bullets are sold individually and

illegally on the street does not discredit Officer Wright’s conclusion that bullets are regularly

sold in packs of 50 or more rounds.

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“indicia of probable cause” nor does it “render official belief in” a finding of probable

cause “unreasonable.”5 See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344‐45.

Therefore, the Court should dismiss the Complaint with prejudice because there

was no underlying constitutional violation and the officers’ reliance on the search

warrant was objectively reasonable.

II. Because there is no underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiffs have not pleaded a Monell claim against the District.
Plaintiffs bring a Monell claim against the District in Counts Five and Eight of the

Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 102, 109.6 A municipality’s liability under § 1983 is limited. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[A] local

government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted by its employees or

agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). A prima facie

case of a Monell claim requires both (1) a “predicate constitutional violation” and (2)

“that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” See Baker v. Dist. Of

Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

5

Plaintiffs assign bad faith to Officer Wright. Compl. ¶ 45. While the Court should

presume this assertion to be true in evaluating the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Officer

Wright’s subjective belief is irrelevant. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000)

(“The parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is

irrelevant in determining whether that officerʹs actions violate the Fourth Amendment.”).

6

Count 4 states: “The obvious lack of probable cause and false and reckless statements

and omissions were the result of a policy, pattern, and custom of such conduct by the MPD and

the result of MPD’s failure to properly train and supervise its officers.” Compl. Count 4

Caption (formatting omitted). Defendants’ treat this as a Monell claim against the District.

14

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 17 of 19
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)); accord Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); Konah v. Dist. of Columbia, 971 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (D.D.C. 2013).
Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers fail, Plaintiffs have failed
to demonstrate the requisite “predicate constitutional violation” for Monell liability in
this case. Thus, the Court should dismiss Count Four with prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court should dismiss the Complaint with
prejudice.
Respectfully Submitted,
IRVIN B. NATHAN Attorney General for the District of Columbia
GEORGE C. VALENTINE Deputy Attorney General Civil Litigation Division
/s/ Jonathan H. Pittman JONATHAN H. PITTMAN [430388] Chief, Civil Litigation Division Section III
/s/ Joseph A. González JOSEPH A. GONZÁLEZ Assistant Attorney General D.C. Bar No. 995057
/s/ Aaron J. Finkhousen AARON J FINKHOUSEN [1010044] 441 4th Street, N.W., Sixth Floor South Washington, D.C. 20001‐2714 202‐724‐6511 (direct)
15

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 18 of 19 aaron.finkhousen@dc.gov
16

Case 1:14-cv-01316-RDM Document 9 Filed 09/16/14 Page 19 of 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

ELLA LANE, et al.,

)

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 1:14‐cv‐01316 (RBW)

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT

Upon consideration of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, any response thereto,

and the entire record, it is by the Court this ______________ day of ________________,

2014, ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and it is

further ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

____________________________________ REGGIE B. WALTON DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELLA LANE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14-1316 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This is one of a series of cases pending before this Court seeking damages from the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) and individual officers for allegedly searching private homes without probable cause.1 The common thread in each case is an attack on the MPD’s practice of seeking search warrants based on an averment that the investigating officer “knows” based on his or her “training and experience” that individuals suspected of certain crimes— typically involving the illegal distribution of drugs or unlawful possession of a gun—are likely to have evidence of their unlawful activity in their homes. In each case, the plaintiff alleges that the officer who submitted the affidavit in support of the warrant knew, or should have known, that just the opposite is true—that, in fact, people who are arrested outside their homes on drug or gun charges rarely keep evidence of their illegal activity in their homes. Although all of these cases rely on this common theme, each is also unique. Some involve drug arrests, some guns, and some both. Some involve little or no evidence of a nexus to

1 Queen v. District of Columbia, 15-cv-01518; Davis v. District of Columbia, 15- cv-01497; S.H. v. District of Columbia 14-cv-1317; Pitts v. District of Columbia, 14-cv-1319, Lane v. District of Columbia, 14-cv-1316; A.B. v. District of Columbia, No. 15-cv-1490.

the residence searched, while others involve a more substantial connection. And most involve additional allegations of police misconduct, separate from the alleged deficiencies in the warrant or supporting affidavit. As a result, just as a magistrate must “make . . . practical, common-sense decision[s] [based on] all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Court must independently evaluate the particular circumstances presented in each of these cases.
The present dispute began when the investigating officer found a handgun in the pocket of a jacket left by one of three men on the top step of a walkway leading from the street to the house where one of the three men (Terrence Crossland) lived with his mother (Adrian Crossland) and grandmother (Ella Lane). That discovery led to Terrance Crossland’s arrest (along with the other two men), a brief warrantless search of the Crossland/Lane home, the subsequent issuance of a warrant to search the home for various items relating to the ownership and use of firearms, and a second, more extensive search of the home. No evidence of illegality was found in either search of the home, and the MPD ultimately declined to bring any charges against Terrance Crossland. Following these events, Terrance Crossland, Adrian Crossland and Ella Lane brought this action, challenging the legality of virtually all of the actions of the police officers that day, from their initial interaction with Terrance Crossland on the steps outside his home through their second search of the Crossland/Lane home later that evening. Their complaint names the officer who submitted the affidavit in support of the search warrant, five other named officers, an unspecified number of unnamed officers, and the MPD itself.
The MPD, the District, and the individual officers (collectively, the “District”) have moved to dismiss the complaint, principally on the grounds that the officers’ conduct was lawful; that, in any event, the individual officers are protected by qualified immunity; and that the
2

plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim against the MPD under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Dkt. 9. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT the motion in part and DENY it in part.
I. BACKGROUND For purposes of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the following allegations from the complaint are taken as true.2 See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In addition, the search warrant and supporting affidavit are attached to the complaint and are thus properly before the Court for purposes of resolving the defendants’ motion. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that when considering a motion to dismiss, a court may “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which we may take judicial notice.”). According to the complaint, MPD officers John Wright and Timothy Haselden, along with an unnamed third officer, were patrolling in a cruiser in northeast Washington, D.C., on October 27, 2012, when they saw three men sitting on the steps outside the Crossland/Lane home. Compl. ¶ 16; Dkt. 1-1 at 2. Wright saw one of them smoking a “hand-rolled cigar,” which he believed to be marijuana. Compl. ¶ 17. He “also observed a [s]tyrofoam cup, which he [later] asserted ‘is often used by people when they drink alcohol.’” Id. (quoting Dkt. 1-1 at 3). He pulled over to question the men. Id.
2 The Court cites the initial complaint, rather than the amended complaint, Dkt. 25, because the pending motion to dismiss was directed at that version of the complaint, and the amended complaint merely added the names of some of the defendants without altering any of the substantive allegations at issue.
3

On the steps were Darrell Boatwright, Terrance Crossland, and Benjamin Crutchfield. Dkt. 1-1 at 2. Crutchfield was smoking the “cigar.” Id. Crossland and Crutchfield were both wearing jackets; Boatwright was not.3 Id. The styrofoam cup was next to Boatwright’s left foot. Id. at 3. After exiting the cruiser, Wright “immediately . . . ordered the men to stay where they were.” Compl. ¶ 50. Although Wright later averred in an application submitted for a warrant to search the Crossland/Lane home that the three men then consented to a search, see Dkt. 1-1 at 3, the complaint disputes that assertion, alleging that the officers “immediately searched the men,” a search that “include[ed] putting their hands into the[ir] pockets.” Compl. ¶ 50. That search did not yield any contraband from any of the men. Id. ¶ 51. Wright then asked the three men for identification and asked whether they lived at the house. Id. ¶ 18. Crossland said he did, and he handed over his identification, which listed an address matching the house. Id. Wright also asked Crutchfield to put out the “cigar.” Id. Crutchfield complied but explained that he was smoking “Scoobie Snacks,” a synthetic marijuana, and not “real weed.” Id.; Dkt. 1-1 at 3. Boatwright and Crutchfield also provided their identification. Dkt. 1-1 at 3. Having found nothing warranting further action, Wright granted the three men permission to move to the front porch. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 51.
According to Wright’s affidavit, Boatwright “neglect[ed] to pick up [a] red jacket that was next to him” when the men got up to move. Compl. ¶ 51; Dkt. 1-1 at 3. Wright claims he then told the group that they had left the jacket behind, but “[t]he three collectively denied ownership of the jacket.” Dkt. 1-1 at 3. A bottle of Hennessy (a cognac) was apparently protruding from one of the pockets of the jacket, and, according to Wright, he told the three men that he would keep it if none of the men claimed the jacket. Id. At that point, according to
3 All references herein to “Crossland,” without including a first name, are to Terrence Crossland. 4

Wright’s affidavit, Crossland responded, “yeah man, it’s my jacket[;] I got it.” Id. The affidavit adds, however, that Wright “found this to be strange because [Crossland] was already wearing a jacket and . . . Boatwright was the only individual in the group to not have a jacket on.” Id. Wright, accordingly, told Boatwright to sit back down. Id. Wright then searched the red jacket and found a handgun. Id. at 3–4. Wright called for backup after finding the gun, and five more officers arrived at the scene. Id. at 4. They placed all three men under arrest for carrying a pistol and possessing an open container of alcohol. Id. This latter charge was based on the officers’ belief that the liquid in the styrofoam cup smelled like Hennessy.4 Crutchfield was also charged with “Possession of Other in reference to the synthetic marijuana.” Id.
The complaint tells a different story than the affidavit, and it is that story that is controlling for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. Instead of Wright threatening to keep the bottle of Hennessy, the complaint alleges that Wright “threatened to smash the glass alcohol bottle on the steps of the property if the men did not take the jacket.” Compl ¶ 51. And instead of Crossland saying “it’s my jacket,” the complaint alleges that Crossland merely responded to Wright’s demand that someone take the jacket to avoid Wright’s threat to break the bottle on Crossland’s walkway. Id. Plaintiffs agree in their complaint that Wright then searched the red jacket and found the handgun. Id.
Overhearing the commotion outside, seventy-one year-old Ella Lane emerged from the house and took pictures of the officers as they searched and then arrested the three men,
4 The complaint states that Crossland is twenty-eight years-old, Compl. ¶ 12, but does not provide the ages of Boatwright or Crutchfield. There is no evidence in the affidavit or elsewhere suggesting that any of the men was younger than twenty-one or that the officers had reason to suspect that any of the three was underage. The allegations of the complaint and the affidavit also indicate that the three men were on private property at all relevant times. Compl. ¶ 16 & n.2; cf. D.C. Code § 25-1001 (prohibiting an open container of alcohol on various pieces of public property).
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including her grandson. Compl. ¶ 52. After placing the men under arrest, several officers walked up to the porch where Lane was standing and asked if they could go into the home to speak with her. Id. ¶ 54. She refused entry, offering instead to speak with the officers outside. Id. The officers explained that they had found a gun on one of the men and that they wanted to search her home. Id. ¶¶ 54–55. Lane asked whether Wright had a warrant, and he responded, “[No], but I’m going in anyway.” Id ¶ 55. He then walked past Lane and into her home along with another, unnamed officer. Id. ¶ 56. She tried to follow them in, but Haselden “grabbed [her] by the arm” and “forcibly pulled her back and restrained her from going back into her own house.” Id. ¶¶ 56–57. Wright and the unnamed officer searched the house for approximately ten minutes. Id. ¶ 58. It does not appear that they found anything relevant or took anything with them following the search.
After this initial search, Wright left to seek a search warrant. Compl. ¶ 64. Three officers “remained with . . . Lane to guard the house,” and they did not allow Lane to re-enter her home while they awaited the warrant. Id. ¶ 65. As a result, Lane waited outside on an “uncomfortably chilly” October evening for “nearly four hours” and could not retrieve food or water or use the bathroom in her home. Id. ¶¶ 65–67. She was finally able to use a bathroom when her daughter, Adrian Crossland, came home and took her to a nearby McDonald’s. Id. ¶ 67.
While Lane was forced to wait outside her home, Wright prepared the affidavit that included his account of the events stated above, and he then applied for and obtained a warrant to search the Crossland/Lane home. See Dkt. 1-1. In addition to describing the events that led up to the arrest of the three men, the affidavit described a number of events that occurred after the officers and three men arrived at the police station. At the station, police officers identified the
6

seized firearm by its serial number as stolen, and all three men were then “additionally charged
with Unregistered Firearm and Unregistered Ammunition.” Id. at 4. The officers also examined
the gun and learned that it contained five rounds of ammunition in its magazine and one in its
chamber. Id. According to the affidavit, Boatwright “admitted to purchasing the Hennessy,
admitted the styrofoam cup with the liquid was his, . . . admitted the red jacket was his, [and]
admitted the weapon was his.” Id. Significantly, the affidavit explained that Boatwright
correctly identified “the weapon [as] a ‘25’ (.25 Caliber)” pistol and correctly stated that “it was
loaded with six (6) cartridges (rounds of ammunition) and that it was not registered.” Id.
The affidavit noted that Crossland admitted that he lived at the home that the officers
sought to search and that his D.C. driver’s license confirmed this fact. Id. It also stated that a
woman named “Ella” came out of the house and told the officers that both she and Crossland
lived there. Id. Of particular relevance, the affidavit further stated:
Based on your affiant’s training, experience and participation in narcotic and drug related investigations, your affiant knows that, persons involved in illegal activities maintain books, records, documentation and other papers relating to the ordering, sales and servicing of their firearms. I know that the aforementioned items are generally maintained where persons involved in criminal activity can obtain and read[ily] access them. I also know that there people keep their firearms and ammunition inside of their homes. One reason is to keep the police from recovering the firearms and another is to protect themselves from being robbed while inside their homes by others involved in illegal activities. Ammunition in your Affiant’s experience is sold in boxes, known as ‘Bricks” containing 50 rounds of ammunition. In your Affiant’s experience, it is extremely uncommon for individual rounds of ammunition to be sold. Since many guns, including the larger assault weapon models, do not carry 50 rounds of ammunition, it is very common that individuals store their extra ammunition in their places of residence.
Id. at 5. The affidavit concluded by requesting a search warrant for the Crossland/Lane home
“for the reasons set forth and for any other evidence of a crime that may be found.” Id. The
affidavit did not disclose that the requesting officers had already conducted an initial ten-minute
7

search of the home and that, during that brief search, they found no evidence of illegal activity. See Compl. ¶¶ 56–59.
Judge Gregory Jackson of the Superior Court for the District of Columbia signed the search warrant, permitting the MPD to search the plaintiffs’ home for “[a]mmunition, [h]olsters, [t]argets, [g]un [c]leaning kits, [o]ther [f]irearms, [n]otes, [l]edgers, [d]ocumentation and other [p]apers [r]elating to the [o]rdering, [s]ales, [s]ervicing and use of their [f]irearms and [o]ther [i]tems [r]elated to [i]legal [p]ossession of [f]irearms.” Dkt. 1-1 at 1. The MPD executed the search warrant, while Lane, now accompanied by her daughter, continued to wait outside. Compl. ¶¶ 64–70. The complaint further alleges that the officers who conducted the search “physically abused and verbally threatened” Lane. One officer, for example, allegedly told Lane that he would force her to move from her home if he was ever called back to the house. Id. ¶¶ 6, 71. In addition, at some point during one of the two searches, an MPD officer allegedly deleted from Lane’s camera the photographs that she had taken of the arrest of her grandson earlier that day. Id. ¶¶ 7, 73. The officers also “tore apart” Adrian Crossland’s bedroom. Id. ¶ 74. It took the family three days to clean up the mess left behind after the search. Id. Terrence Crossland, meanwhile, spent the weekend in jail and was released on October 30, 2013. Id. ¶ 77. No charges were filed against him in connection to the incident. Id. The MPD has not yet returned a cellphone they took from Crossland when they arrested him. Id. ¶ 98.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party moving to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) bears the burden of showing that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570, (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court need not accept as true any legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations, “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” or a “‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557) (alteration in original). The plaintiff, however, is entitled to “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
Police officers enjoy qualified immunity from personal liability for civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This limited protection “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). The law is “[o]rdinarily” clearly established if there is “a Supreme Court or Circuit decision” on the issue or [if] the clearly established weight of authority from other courts . . . ha[s] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F.3d 96, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001)). There need not be “a case
9

directly on point” for the right to be clearly established, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate” at the time the alleged violation occurred. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). In other words, the “contours” of the right must be “sufficiently clear” so that any “reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A plaintiff seeking to overcome a claim of qualified immunity bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right that the officers allegedly violated was clearly established at the relevant time. See Dukore v. District of Columbia, 799 F.3d 1137, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
III. ANALYSIS The allegations in the complaint are far-ranging, challenging the lawfulness of the MPD officers’ initial stop and search of the men on the steps outside the Crossland/Lane home, the search of the red jacket, Crossland’s arrest, the initial search of the home, the refusal to allow Lane to enter her home for several hours, the refusal to return Crossland’s cellphone, the deletion of the photographs from Lane’s camera, insults that the officers directed at Lane during and after the search, the accuracy of information included in the application for a search warrant, and the omission of other relevant information from the application. Compl. ¶¶ 85–86, 89–90, 93–100. For present purposes, however, the Court will limit is analysis to the five specific issues raised in the defendants’ motion to dismiss: (1) whether the MPD officers had probable cause to arrest Crossland; (2) whether their “protective sweep” of the Crossland/Lane home was lawful; (3) whether the application for the warrant for the subsequent search was supported by probable
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cause; (4) whether the MPD officers who executed the search acted lawfully; and (5) whether the complaint states a claim for municipal liability under Monell.5 A. Arrest of Crossland
The complaint alleges that the officers who arrested Crossland acted without “probable cause to believe that he had committed any offense.” Compl. ¶ 98. To avoid the defendants’ qualified immunity defense with respect to this claim, Crossland must show (1) that the arresting officers violated Crossland’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and (2) that “it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that [their] conduct was unlawful in the situation [they] confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. As explained below, the Court cannot conclude at this stage of the proceeding that the arresting officers are protected by qualified immunity.
1. Warrantless Arrest The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although use of a warrant is the preferred course, “a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or
5 Plaintiffs’ opposition responded to these arguments but also defended other allegations in the complaint, which were not challenged in the defendants’ motion. See Dkt. 11. Unsurprisingly, that led the defendants to address many of these issues for the first time in their reply brief. See Dkt. 12. The plaintiffs, with leave of the Court, then filed a surreply responding to the defendants’ new arguments. See Dkt. 13-1. To avoid confusion, and to ensure that the parties receive a fair and complete opportunity to brief each of the many issues presented, the Court will consider only those arguments for dismissal raised in the defendants’ motion and opening brief. See Jones v. Mukasey, 565 F. Supp. 2d 68, 81 (D.D.C. 2008) (“As the D.C. Circuit has consistently held, the Court should not address arguments raised for the first time in a party’s reply.”); see also McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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is being committed.”6 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Probable cause “is a practical, non-technical conception” that considers “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and [about] which they had reasonably trustworthy information.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). The inquiry focuses on what a reasonable officer would understand about the situation at hand and the arresting officer’s actual “state of mind . . . is irrelevant.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153. The information available to the arresting officer must be sufficient to “warrant a man of reasonable caution [to] belie[ve] that an offense has been or is being committed,” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175–76, by the specific “person to be . . . seized,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). In this respect, “Fourth Amendment case law makes clear that an officer cannot predicate a search or seizure on an individual’s ‘mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity.’” Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).
Here, Crossland was arrested (and held over the weekend) for carrying a pistol and possessing an open container of alcohol. See Dkt. 1-1 at 4. Given that Crossland was twentyeight years-old, see Compl. ¶ 12, was sitting on his own property, id. ¶ 16 & n.2, and, in any event, was not holding or sitting next to the styrofoam cup containing what the officers believed to be alcohol, see Dkt. 1-1 at 2–3, it is not surprising that the defendants do not seek to defend his arrest based on the open container charge.7 They do argue, however, that there was probable cause to arrest Crossland for the illegal possession of handgun. See Dkt. 9 at 11. As explained
6 A warrantless arrest inside a home requires not just probable cause but also exigent circumstances necessitating entry into the home. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). 7 Under D.C. law, it is not unlawful to possess alcohol on private property. See D.C. Code § 251001.
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below, the Court concludes that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Crossland on that ground as well.
As an initial matter, Crossland argues that the arresting officers lacked probable cause because Wright’s search of the jacket that contained the gun was itself unconstitutional. Dkt. 11 at 33. According to Wright’s affidavit, after the officers’ initial interaction with Boatwright, Crossland, and Crutchfield, the three men stood to move to the front porch. When Boatwright got up to move, however, he “neglect[ed] to pick up the red jacket that was next to him.” Dkt. 11 at 3. Wright then said, “hey guys, ya’ll left your jacket,” and “[t]he three collectively responded denying ownership.” Id. Putting aside for the moment Wright’s intervening exchange with Crossland, which is contested, the parties agree that Wright subsequently searched the jacket and found the gun. Id.; Compl. ¶ 23. As Wright later explained, that search was premised on the theory that the jacket was “abandoned property,” which Wright searched “in an effort to ascertain” who owned it. Dkt. 1-1 at 3.
Crossland argues that this theory of abandonment is flawed as a matter of fact and law. He argues that Wright could not reasonably have believed that the jacket, which was located on private property and rolled up next to Boatwright on the steps, was abandoned property, and he contends that the concept of abandonment is inapplicable, as a matter of law, to property that is not left in a “public place.” Dkt. 11 at 34. The defendants, in response, argue that property is deemed “abandoned” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when “[a] voluntary denial of ownership demonstrates sufficient intent of dissociation to prove abandonment.” Dkt. 12 at 9 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
As the defendants correctly argue, see Dkt. 9 at 7, Wright’s search of the jacket is irrelevant to Crossland’s claim that his arrest was unlawful. For present purposes, Crossland
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acknowledges that the jacket, in fact, belonged to Boatwright. See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. The Fourth Amendment, however, covers places and property only in which the individual seeking its protection has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). That is, Fourth Amendment rights “are personal” and “may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). As a result, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134, (1978); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905–06 (1984) (“The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). Crossland, accordingly, cannot challenge the lawfulness of his arrest based on the claim that the sole evidence of his wrongdoing—the handgun found in the jacket— was the product of an illegal search of Boatwright’s jacket.
That conclusion does not, however, dispose of Crossland’s claim that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him for possession of the gun. As discussed above, the existence of probable cause requires a fact-specific inquiry into whether the arresting officers had a “particular[ized]” and “reasonable” belief that Crossland personally committed a crime. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152; Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370–71. The defendants’ opening brief points to only one fact in support of their claim that the officers had probable cause to arrest Crossland: according to Wright, Crossland “flatly stated that he owned the jacket containing the stolen pistol.” Dkt. 9 at 11. But that argument suffers from a fatal flaw: the
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complaint alleges that Wright’s description of what occurred is false, and the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint—as opposed to Wright’s competing rendition of the facts—for purposes of resolving the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. In contrast to Wright’s version of events, the complaint alleges that Wright “threatened to smash the glass bottle [of Hennessy] on the steps of [Crossland’s] property if the men did not take the jacket,” and that Crossland merely agreed to take the jacket to prevent Wright from smashing the bottle of Hennessy on his walkway. Compl. ¶ 51. According to the complaint, Crossland never said that the jacket was his, and thus that presumptively counterfactual premise cannot support the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The defendants come closer to the mark in their reply brief, where they accept the allegations of the complaint for purposes of their motion to dismiss and argue that Crossland’s request that Wright “hand him the jacket” provided sufficient basis for a reasonable officer to infer that Crossland “had some connection to the jacket.” Dkt. 12 at 9. When considered in light of all of the relevant circumstances, however, the Court remains unconvinced that there was probable cause to arrest Crossland.
To start, the Court notes that even the defendants do not equate Crossland’s request that Wright “hand him the jacket” with a claim that the jacket was his. They instead assert that Crossland’s request indicated merely that he “had some connection to the jacket.” Id. It is unclear what this means. For present purposes, however, it suffices to note that there is a substantial difference between the assertion, “yeah man, it’s my jacket” and the assertion, “hand it to me,” made only after Wright allegedly “threatened to smash the glass alcohol bottle on the steps of [Crossland’s] property if the men did not take the jacket.” Compl. ¶ 51. This distinction is reinforced, moreover, by Wright’s response to Crossland’s request for the jacket. Rather than
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handing Crossland the jacket following this exchange, Wright searched the jacket on the theory that none of the three men had claimed ownership and that the jacket was thus “abandoned property.” Compl. ¶¶ 21–22. Wright’s conclusion that the jacket was “abandoned” supports Crossland’s version of the facts and suggests that a reasonable observer in the officers’ position would not have construed Crossland’s agreement to take the jacket in response to a threat of smashed glass on his property as tantamount to an assertion of ownership.
Even more significantly, it is undisputed that Crossland and Crutchfield were already wearing jackets and that Boatwright was the only one of the three who was not wearing a jacket. Id. ¶ 21. The jacket, moreover, was rolled up in a ball on the steps next to where Boatwright had been sitting. Dkt. 1-1 at 3. At the time, Boatwright was seated alone on the top step, while Crossland and Crutchfield were seated in front of him. Id. at 2. Thus, only one of the three men—Boatwright—was not already wearing a jacket, and the jacket was found next to where only one of the three men—again, Boatwright—had been sitting. The commonsense conclusion from these facts is that the jacket belonged to Boatwright. And Wright shared this belief: in his affidavit, he noted that he was skeptical that the jacket belonged to Crossland “because he was already wearing a jacket[,] and . . . Boatwright was the only individual in the group to not have a jacket on.” Dkt. 1-1 at 3. So skeptical, in fact, that immediately after Crossland asked Wright to hand him the jacket, Wright told Boatwright—but not either of the other two men—to sit back down on the steps before Wright searched the jacket. Id. Although the probable cause inquiry does not turn on the subjective belief of the arresting officer, Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153, the inference that an experienced officer like Wright drew as the events at issue actually unfolded sheds light on what a reasonable officer in this situation would conclude. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Crossland, the Court holds that there was insufficient basis to
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“warrant a man of reasonable caution [to] belie[ve] that” the jacket belonged to Crossland. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175–76.
Finally, the defendants gesture at an argument that Crossland constructively possessed the jacket, either because it was on his property, see Dkt. 9 at 11, or because he was sitting near it, see Dkt. 12 at 9. The defendants offer no explanation or analysis in support of either theory— and for good reason. “Constructive possession is established when a person, though lacking such physical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise control over the object.” Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015). To prove constructive possession of a firearm under D.C. law, “the government [must] show that [defendant] (1) knew of the location of the handgun; (2) had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it; and (3) intended to exercise dominion and control over it.” Burnette v. United States, 600 A.2d 1082, 1083 (D.C. 1991). Here, the defendants offer no basis to believe that the mere presence of the gun on Crossland’s property—or the fact that the gun was within his reach, even if unknown to him—meant that he “intended to exercise dominion and control over it.” Indeed, they offer no evidence or reason to infer that Crossland even knew that there was a gun in the jacket’s pocket. Taken to its extreme, the defendants’ first argument (that the jacket was on Crossland’s property) would mean that Crossland’s mother and grandmother were also subject to arrest because the gun was found on their property. And their second theory (that the jacket was within Crossland’s reach) would mean that there is probable cause to arrest someone for illegal possession of handgun if a firearm belonging to someone else is anywhere within reach—even if it is on another person or in his clothing, unbeknownst to the arrestee. That is not the law.
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2. Qualified Immunity Having concluded (based on the allegations in the complaint) that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest Crossland, the Court must consider whether a claim for damages against the individual officers is barred by qualified immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity shields police officers from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court, moreover, has repeatedly admonished “courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’” Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. Rather, because qualified immunity is designed to ensure that only those officers who were “on fair notice that their conduct was illegal” are subject to suit, Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 806 F.3d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 2015), the Court must consider whether “existing precedent” was sufficiently clear and specific to “have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Here, the facts are uncontested for purposes of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The relevant facts and circumstances would have led a reasonable officer to believe—as Wright apparently did, see Dkt. 1-1 at 3—that the jacket likely belonged to Boatwright. But there was some evidence that the jacket belonged to Crossland. There was ample reason to believe that it belonged to one of the three men who sat on the steps, and none of the men claimed ownership when initially asked. Two facts implicated toward Boatwright: he was the only one of the three who was not wearing a jacket, and the jacket was next to him. One fact, although far less probative, pointed to Crossland: he agreed to take the jacket when Wright threatened to smash
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the bottle of Hennessy if the men left the jacket on the steps. There was apparently no evidence to implicate Crutchfield for possession of the firearm other than his presence at the scene.
The relevant question, then, is whether a reasonable officer would have understood that it was unconstitutional to arrest all three men for what appeared to be a single crime, when the most compelling evidence pointed toward Boatwright. Neither Crossland nor the defendants cite any precedent directly on point, and the law on the quantum of evidence required to justify a warrantless arrest is notoriously, if not intentionally, amorphous. Indeed, starting with its decision in Brinegar, the Supreme Court has steered clear of articulating a precise standard for finding probable cause. In that case, the Supreme Court explained that probable cause, “as the very name implies,” requires that courts “deal with probabilities.” 338 U.S. at 175. But the Court failed to identify how probable is probable enough, and instead merely instructed that the answer lies somewhere between the extremes of a “bare suspicion” and evidence sufficient to sustain a “conviction.” Id. Subsequent cases have also declined to fill this gap. In Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, for example, the Court explained that “finely-tuned standards such as proof . . . by a preponderance of evidence, [which are] useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s [probable cause] decision,” and that “an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to ‘probable cause’ may not be helpful.” Id. at 235. And while other “Supreme Court decisions may be read as adopting a more-probable-than-not test,” a leading commentator has observed that “the Court’s more recent decision in Maryland v. Pringle can be interpreted otherwise.” Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Criminal Procedure § 3.3(b) (4th ed.). Thus, although it is “well established” that “probable cause to arrest requires at least some evidence that the arrestee’s conduct meets each of the necessary elements of the offense that the officers believed supports arrest,” Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
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(emphasis added), existing precedent does not clearly define precisely how much more than a “bare suspicion” the law requires.
Similarly, existing precedent does not provide clear guidance regarding the circumstances under which the police may arrest multiple individuals where the evidence “does not point exclusively to one particular individual.” Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (5th ed.). To be sure, as Crossland stresses, well-settled law precludes a “round ‘em all up,” Dkt. 11 at 33, approach to law enforcement, see Barham, 434 F.3d at 573. On the other hand, at least some commentators have suggested that there are times when more than one suspect may be arrested for a single crime. This point is perhaps best framed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which offers the following example: Assume that a police officer sees “B and C bending over a dead man” and that “B and C each accuse the other of murdering” the victim. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 119, comment j (1965). Under those circumstances, according to the Restatement, the police officer would be “privileged to arrest either or both,” even though he could not conclude that it was more probable than not that either committed the crime. Id.; see also LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e). That view, moreover, arguably finds some support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pringle, where the police arrested Pringle along with two other men who were riding in a car that had “$763 of rolled-up cash in the glove compartment,” and five “baggies of cocaine behind the back-seat armrest.” 540 U.S. at 371–72. None of the three men admitted guilt at the time of the arrest, and there was little or no basis to distinguish between their likely guilt. The Supreme Court, nonetheless, held that there was ample basis to find “probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” Id. at 372 (emphasis added); see also Perkins v. United States, 936 A.2d 303, 307 (D.C. 2007) (relying on Pringle in holding that the “modest showing required for probable
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cause” justified arresting both driver and passenger in a car, even if “we posit that joint possession of [the contraband] was unlikely”); LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (“Whether [the reference to sole liability] was a mere slip of the pen is unclear, but if it is not it may well be grounded in” the view that probable cause does not require that the suspects’ guilt be more likely than not.).
Against this background, it is safe to conclude the “question of probable cause in multisuspect situations is far from beyond debate.” Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1028. Based on this lack of clarity, moreover, one might conclude that qualified immunity protects officers who make multisuspect arrests from liability. But, uncertainty does not mean that there is no limiting principle. A mass arrest of everyone in a park, for example, crosses a clearly established line, even where there is “probable cause to believe that some people present . . . had committed arrestable offenses.” Barham, 434 F.3d at 572–73. Here, as the record currently stands, the Court cannot conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint, and drawing all factual inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the likelihood that the gun belonged to Crossland was not just shy of more probable than not or that a reasonable officer could not distinguish between the likely culpability of Crossland and Boatwright. To the contrary, the evidence tipped decidedly toward the conclusion that the gun belonged to Boatwright. Moreover, unlike the drugs in Pringle—and, again, drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor—there was no reason to believe that all three men jointly possessed the gun or that they were “engaged in a common [illegal] enterprise.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. The Court is thus left with a circumstance in which one of three men likely committed a crime, compelling evidence indicated that the gun belonged to Boatwright, yet the police arrested all three. If that is what in fact occurred, it runs afoul of the Supreme
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Court’s admonition that, “[w]here the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added). And even if Pringle narrowed Ybarra, see Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1028–29, it did not go so far as to permit the arrest of three suspects for a single offense where the evidence points decidedly at one of those suspects—as opposed to the other two. Cf. id. at 1029 (describing Pringle’s holding as permitting an officer to “reasonably infer that all present were involved in [a] crime” when “[e]vidence of a ‘common enterprise’ existed”); see also Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957) (“It is not the function of the police to arrest . . . at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should” ultimately charge with the crime.); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479–80 (1963); Barham, 434 F.3d at 573.
It bears emphasis, however, that this decision is limited to the record as it now stands, accepting Crossland’s allegations as true, drawing all factual inferences in his favor, and not including any evidence defendants offer regarding the circumstances of the arrest. The exact nature of the exchange between Wright and Crossland, for example, may shed additional light on the question, and the defendants may be able to identify other evidence that would support the reasonable belief that Crossland committed a crime. On the current record, the Court finds that a reasonable officer would have concluded that very likely the gun belonged to Boatwright and that it was correspondingly very unlikely that it belonged to Crossland (or Crutchfield). On these facts, which would benefit from further development, Crossland’s arrest would have violated clearly established law. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91; Barham, 434 F.3d at 573. In short, no reasonable officer would believe that he could arrest someone even though the officer believes it is far likelier that someone else committed the crime of arrest.
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B. Protective Sweep of the Crossland/Lane Home The fifth count of the complaint alleges that Wright and a second, unidentified officer violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by entering and briefly searching their home after the arrest of Boatwright, Crossland, and Crutchfield but before obtaining a warrant. In response, the defendants argue that this ten-minute search was a justified “protective sweep,” and ask that the Court dismiss this claim on that basis. See Dkt. 9 at 13–14. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Five. 1. Warrantless Search Courts have long recognized that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Accordingly, a police officer may “invade the sanctity of the home” without first obtaining a search warrant only if “the government [can] demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law, we have often said, that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. . . . But we have also recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because [t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (second alteration in original)). This requirement applies, moreover, even “when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to
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believe that incriminating evidence will be found within.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the defendants identify only one “exigent circumstance” that they say justified the warrantless search of the Crossland/Lane home—that a “protective sweep” of the home was necessary to ensure that no one was located in the home who might pose a danger to the officers or others while they completed the arrests of Boatwright, Crossland and Crutchfield. Dkt. 9 at 13–14. In support of this contention, however, they offer no evidence and merely ask that the Court infer from the allegations of the complaint that a protective sweep was justified. They assert that “[h]aving found one gun on the scene, the officers reasonably believed . . . that there may be other guns on the property,” and that the officers were also justified in their concern because they “observed a fourth individual coming out of the house.” Id.
“A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). The courts have identified “two types of protective sweeps.” United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1995). First, “as incident to [an] arrest,” police officers may, “as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Second, “[b]eyond that,” the officers may conduct a protective sweep only when the presence of “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Id.
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The defendants do not argue that this case involves the first type of sweep, nor could they. The three men were arrested outside the plaintiffs’ home, and there is no basis to believe that the search was limited to the space “immediately adjoining” the plaintiffs’ “yard and porch,” where the arrests occurred. Id.; Compl. ¶ 52. Indeed, even if the officers might have been justified in searching the entryway of the home or any other space “immediately adjoining the place of arrest,” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, that would not—at least without further explanation and evidence—justify a ten-minute search of the home.
Nor can the Court conclude based on the bare pleadings that “articulable facts” support the “rational inference” that a “prudent officer” would believe that the house “harbor[ed]” anyone who “pos[ed] a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. The defendants rely entirely on the discovery of a handgun in the pocket of a jacket on the steps leading up to the house. Dkt. 9 at 14. Even if that fact may have justified the officers in believing that the men on the steps posed a danger, all three were under arrest by the time the protective sweep occurred. As the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly observed, once an individual is under arrest, “he no longer pose[s] a threat to the police.” United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d at 269. The question, then, is whether a prudent officer might have reasonably inferred that the arrestees had confederates in the house who might have posed an immediate risk.
In at least one case, the D.C. Circuit has held that an arrest outside a residence supported a protective sweep of the residence. See United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d at 1282, 1284–85 (D.C. Cir. 1995). That decision establishes that “[a]lthough Buie concerned an arrest made in the home, the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court are fully applicable where, as here, the arrest takes place just outside the residence.” Id. at 1284. But the fact that an arrest occurred
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outside, rather than inside, the residence remains “relevant to the question whether” the officers “could reasonably fear an attack by someone within it.” Id. In Henry, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the protective sweep was justified only because an informant had told the police that the suspect whom they sought to arrest “would have weapons and that [his] ‘boys’ or ‘counterparts’ . . . might be with him.” Id. Furthermore, the reasonable concern of the arresting officers was heightened by the fact that the arrest was effectuated “just outside the open door” to the apartment” and by the fact that they heard the arrestee tell another man—who was outside the building peering into a window to the hallway—“they got me,” thereby also potentially alerting any of the arrestee’s “boys” who might be hiding in the apartment. Id.
In contrast to Henry, the only evidence the defendants identify here, see Dkt. 9 at 14, that might support an inference that there were others in the house who might have posed an immediate danger to the arresting officers was the fact that Lane—a seventy-one year-old woman—emerged from the house and “started taking photos of where the officers were and what they were doing,” Compl. ¶ 52. It is a stretch, to say the least, to contend that Lane’s actions provided a reasonable basis to infer that others, who might pose an immediate danger, were also harbored in the house.
There is also a separate problem with the officers’ assertion that they were entitled to conduct a protective sweep: The existing record does not disclose the scope of the ten-minute search of the home. A search of an entire house constitutes a far more substantial invasion of privacy than a visual inspection of the rooms adjacent to where the arrest occurs. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). At this phase of the litigation, the Court does not know whether the officers who conducted the search opened drawers, looked under mattresses, and made their way through the entire home, or whether they simply walked through the spaces
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proximate to the front porch. Absent those details, the Court cannot conclude that the officers conducted merely a protective sweep—even if such a sweep was justified—instead of a fullblown search. Granting all inferences to the plaintiff, the Court would conclude that it is possible they could prevail on this claim even assuming the officers could conduct a protective sweep.
The Court, accordingly, concludes that the defendants failed to identify the type of “articulable facts” that would ordinarily support a protective sweep, or that the ten-minute search of the home constituted such a sweep. This is not to say that the defendants’ actions were unjustified, but only that the present record is insufficient to conclude that they are currently entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
2. Qualified Immunity For similar reasons, the Court concludes that the present record does not establish that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The relevant law is well-settled. A protective sweep is permissible only to secure the immediate area of an arrest or to mitigate a reasonable suspicion—based on articulable facts—that “the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Here, a reasonable officer would have understood this rule and that the three men who were under arrest outside the home posed no such threat. See Henry, 48 F.3d at 1284. Aside from the discovery of a handgun on one of these three men, the only other fact that the defendants currently rely upon is Lane’s emergence from the home. The Court cannot agree that a reasonable officer would have believed, based on the appearance of a seventy-one year-old resident taking pictures with a camera, that the house might be harboring an individual who “pos[ed] a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Based on the current record, the Court accordingly cannot
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conclude that the officers’ actions were protected by qualified immunity. And as the Court just explained, it is plausible that the scope of the ten-minute search went beyond a protective sweep to ensure officer safety. If the officers spent more time in the home than was necessary to ensure their safety, then they conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment without any exigent circumstances, and qualified immunity would not protect them. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 (1981) (“[W]arrantless searches of a home are impermissible absent consent or exigent circumstances.”). C. Probable Cause to Obtain the Search Warrant
The centerpiece of the plaintiffs’ case attacks the defendants’ acquisition and execution of the warrant to search the Crossland/Lane home. As in the companion cases to this one, see supra n. 1, the plaintiffs argue that the warrant application was “egregiously lacking in probable cause,” Compl. ¶ 28, and that it contained “knowingly and recklessly false and misleading” statements as well as material omissions that “would have undermined the asserted probable cause basis for issuing the warrant,” id. ¶ 88. The defendants disagree, arguing that the application contained ample evidence to support a finding of probable cause and that the “alleged omissions” from the application were “irrelevant.” Dkt. 9 at 10. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that, if the plaintiffs’ allegations are accepted as true, and if the allegedly false information is accordingly excised from the application and the omitted information is added, the application plainly fails to establish probable cause to search the Crossland/Lane home.
As both Judges Boasberg and Chutkan have recently explained in cases similar to this one, see Davis v. District of Columbia, 156 F. Supp. 3d 194, 200 (D.D.C. 2016); Pitts v. District of Columbia, 2016 WL 1301046, at *7–9 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2016), the starting point in evaluating
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the sufficiency of a warrant application in the face of alleged falsity is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). There, the Court explained that all
warrant applications carry an expectation of truthfulness:
When the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to comprise “probable cause,” the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing. This does not mean “truthful” in the sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant’s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely it is to be “truthful” in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.
438 U.S. at 164–65 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, “the deference
[typically] accorded a magistrate’s finding of probable cause,” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 914 (1984), gives way when the affidavit upon which the magistrate relied “contain[ed] a
deliberately or recklessly false statement,” Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. Simply put, “because the
judicial officer would typically have no reason to suspect the falsehoods,” Davis, 156 F. Supp.
3d at 201, neither the court nor the parties can take any comfort in a magistrate’s finding of
probable cause.
A finding—or, at this stage of the litigation, an allegation—of deliberate or reckless
falsity, however, does not end the inquiry. The Court must then ask whether the falsity was
material; that is, once “the affidavit’s false material [is] set to one side,” the Court must assess
whether the remaining portions of the affidavit are sufficient “to establish probable cause.”
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. The same two-step approach applies to omissions as well. The Court
must first determine whether the affiant deliberately or recklessly omitted relevant information
and must then ask whether “inclusion” of the omitted information “in the affidavit would [have]
defeat[ed] probable cause.” United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a plaintiff’s claim is premised on a deliberate
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falsehood or omission, the Court’s task is the same. It must excise any information that is allegedly false and include any information allegedly omitted, thus creating a “hypothetical, redacted affidavit,” and it must then ask whether that affidavit “still established probable cause.” United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The particular aspect of probable cause relevant to this case is the so-called “nexus” requirement: the government must have “reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). Absent such a nexus between the items sought and the property the police hope to search, there is no probable cause.
The warrant to search the Crossland/Lane home was premised exclusively on Wright’s affidavit. See generally Dkt. 1-1. That document begins with a recitation of Wright’s version of the events that led to the arrest of the three men. It explains that, after returning to the police station, the officers learned that the handgun was a stolen .25 caliber pistol, which contained five rounds of ammunition in the magazine and a sixth round in the chamber. Id. at 4. It noted that Boatwright admitted that the red jacket and gun (as well as the Hennessy and styrofoam cup) were his and that Boatwright confirmed this fact by correctly telling the officers that the gun contained six rounds. Id. It averred that Crossland—but not the other men—lived at the residence the officers sought to search. Id. It contained Wright’s representation that he knew, based on his “training, experience and participation in narcotic and drug related investigations” that “persons involved in illegal activities maintain books, records, documentation and other papers relating to the ordering, sales and servicing of firearms” in a place where they “can obtain and read[il]y access them.” Id. at 5. And based on this same training and experience, Wright claimed personal knowledge that “people keep their firearms and ammunition inside their
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homes,” and that because “it is extremely uncommon for individual rounds of ammunition to be sold[,] . . . it is very common that individuals store . . . extra ammunition in their place of residence.” Id.
The plaintiffs claim that many of these assertions were knowingly or recklessly false. First, as discussed above, the plaintiffs dispute Wright’s description of the events leading up to the arrest of the three men. Most notably, while Wright says that Crossland claimed that the red jacket was his, the plaintiffs contend that he merely agreed to take the jacket from Wright after Wright threatened to break the bottle of Hennessy on Crossland’s walkway “if the men did not take the jacket.” Compl. ¶ 51. Second, they allege that Wright’s representation that his training and experience provided support for the search was demonstrably false. Far from supporting probable cause, they allege, the actual experience of the MPD shows that “MPD officers rarely find [the types of items sought here] and that, based on information collected and produced by the MPD it was,” in fact, “overwhelmingly likely that the [officers] would not find the items listed.” Id. ¶ 39. And while Wright claimed that “it is extremely uncommon for individual rounds of ammunition to be sold,” Dkt. 1-1 at 5, thus suggesting that the officers might find additional rounds in the Crossland/Lane home, the plaintiffs allege that other MPD officers have submitted affidavits in other cases averring that “there are often places where you can buy loose bullets or individual bullets from other gun possessors,” Compl. ¶ 44.
The plaintiffs also allege that Wright omitted material information from his affidavit. For one, they point out that Wright failed to disclose in his four-page, single spaced affidavit that he and another officer had already conducted a ten-minute search of the Crossland/Lane home and that they found no evidence of wrongdoing. Id. ¶ 4. For another, they allege that Wright “failed to inform the judge . . . that many firearms . . . are passed and traded by individuals without
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documentation or records, and without the person possessing any of the receipts or accoutrements of legal gun ownership.” Id. ¶ 43. And finally, as in similar cases pending in this Court, they argue that Wright omitted statistics and other material information that would have permitted the issuing judge to conclude that, even if the handgun belonged to Crossland, it was extremely unlikely that the MPD would have found evidence of any illegal firearms activity in Crossland’s home. They allege, for example, that “in the one-year period surrounding and including the search of the Lane family home” warrants “based only on the seizure of a firearm in a street stop and [the officer’s] ‘training’ and ‘experience’ . . . failed to find any guns in the home” 91% of the time, and that those searches seeking the type of “documentation” the officers sought here were successful even less often.8 Id. ¶¶ 40-41.
The defendants do not confront the allegations that Wright’s declaration included deliberate falsehoods or that he deliberately omitted any reference to the protective sweep of the Crossland/Lane home. See Dkt. 9 at 7–12. They instead focus on the plaintiffs’ argument that the warrant omitted statistical evidence regarding the limited success rate of similar warrants based on MPD officers’ actual experience. Id. at 10–11. In particular, they rely on a Supreme Court case that cautioned against overreliance on the statistical success rate of drug-sniffing dogs. See Dkt. 12 at 4 (citing Scott v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1056–57 (2013)). In their reply brief, the defendants raise additional potential flaws with the data the plaintiffs have proffered: they say that the sample size is too small; that there may be cases where officers arrested
8 The plaintiffs also complain that the affidavit fails to say the officers illegally entered Lane’s yard and searched Boatwright’s jacket. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 49, 51. These issues would be relevant, however, only if they could result in the Court excising from the search warrant Wright’s discovery of the firearm in Boatwright’s jacket. The Court has already explained, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not offer the plaintiffs any protection from a search warrant based on information unconstitutionally seized from the jacket.
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individuals for unlawful gun possession but did not seek a search warrant; that officers could have simply missed relevant evidence during the execution of some of the unsuccessful search warrants; and that in some of the sample cases, evidence might have been removed from a home between the arrest and the execution of the warrant. See id. These potential flaws, the defendants argue, undermine the relevance of the plaintiffs’ statistics and render their omission immaterial. Id. at 4–5. Finally, the defendants maintain that the fact that Boatwright—who had confessed at the station to owning the gun—did not live at the Crossland/Lane address “does not detract from finding probable cause.” Dkt. 9 at 11.
At least at this early stage of the litigation, the Court is unpersuaded. The defendants are correct that the statistics the plaintiffs offer may be flawed and that these statistics, standing alone, do not conclusively show that the warrant lacked probable cause. But it is not the Court’s role to resolve this dispute on a motion to dismiss. The complaint alleges that Wright’s affidavit deliberately included false statements and omitted conflicting, material information regarding his “training” and “experience” in an effort to establish the required connection between the gun found in the jacket and the search of the Crossland/Lane home. As Judge Boasberg observed in Davis, although probable cause is not a formulaic concept susceptible to precise measures of probability, that does not render statistical evidence of the type the plaintiffs invoke irrelevant. See 156 F. Supp. 3d at 201. To the contrary, the MPD’s own reliance on “training” and “experience”—and the D.C. Circuit’s past reliance on assertions of that type9—confirm that actual experience is properly considered as part of the “totality of circumstances” that inform the
9 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 775 F.3d 405, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 636, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Spencer, 530 F.3d at 1007; United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Thomas, 989 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
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probable cause determination. That experience, moreover, must bear a logical connection to the circumstances facing the officers in any given case. Here, defendants do not contest that Boatwright did not live at the house that the officers searched, and they offer no explanation of how Wright’s “training” and “experience” could possibly have supported the contention that evidence of Boatwright’s criminal activity might be found in Crossland’s house. The absence of a nexus is the absence of probable cause.
While focusing their attack on the probity of the plaintiffs’ statistics, the defendants fail to make an argument that bears more serious consideration. More than two decades ago, the D.C. Circuit upheld a finding of probable cause to search a suspect’s home based, in part, on the affiant’s “experience” that “drug dealers frequently keep business records, narcotics, proceeds from sales, and firearms in their homes.” Thomas, 989 F.2d at 1255. More recently, that court went a step further, not only deferring to a police officer’s assertion in a search warrant affidavit that “his training and experience” showed that “‘narcotics traffickers often keep additional supplies of narcotics within their residences,’ along with weapons and large sums of cash,” but adding: “The officer’s commonsense assessment echoes this Court’s own analysis of the matter,” that is “‘[c]ommon experience suggests that drug dealers must mix and measure the merchandise, protect it from competitors, and conceal evidence of their trade . . . in secure locations,” and that “[f]or the vast majority of drug dealers, the most convenient location to secure items is the home.’” Cardoza, 713 F.3d at 661 (quoting Spencer, 530 F.3d at 1007).
But even if the defendants had relied on the the Thomas line of cases, the Court would conclude that the complaint should survive a motion to dismiss for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs allege with some specificity that Wright’s training and experience in fact support the opposite conclusion. No such proffer was made in Thomas or Cardoza, and thus the only
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evidence before the D.C. Circuit in those cases supported the conclusion reflected in its decisions. Second, even putting that difference aside, it is far from clear that the same common sense that applies to drug dealers applies to those who unlawfully possess handguns. To the contrary, it seems implausible that people illegally possessing handguns typically “maintain books, records, documentation and other papers relating to the ordering, sales and servicing of their firearms.” See Dkt. 1-1 at 5. It strikes this Court as common sense that people do not tend to keep paperwork concerning their stolen firearms, like the gun seized in this case. Nor is it self-evident that those who illegally possess guns on the street keep additional ammunition in their homes. As Judge Lamberth has explained: “While drug dealers usually require a place to store their inventory, gun owners can (and often do) carry their entire artillery—often a single pistol—with them at any one time.” United States v. Hopkins, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000). The plaintiffs also allege, in response to the assertion in Wright’s affidavit that ammunition is often purchased in rounds of fifty, see Dkt. 1-1 at 5, that another MPD officer has testified under oath in a different case that “there are often places where you can buy loose bullets or individual bullets from other gun possessors,” id. ¶ 44.
Accepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Court must therefore consider how a “hypothetical” affidavit might have read, omitting any deliberately false statements and inserting any deliberately omitted information. Thus recreated, Wright’s affidavit would have averred that he found a handgun in the pocket of a jacket found on the ground; that Boatwright was the only one of the three men not wearing a jacket; that he later admitted that the gun and the jacket were his, and he corroborated this admission by telling the officers the precise caliber of the firearm and the exact number of bullets it was holding; that Crossland agreed to take the jacket from Wright, but only after Wright insisted that he would break the Hennessy bottle on Crossland’s
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steps if none of the men took it; that, of the three men, only Crossland lived at the home the officers sought to search; that Wright and another officer had already searched the Crossland/Lane home for ten minutes and found no evidence of wrongdoing; that, even if there was reason to believe the gun may have belonged to Crossland, in the vast majority of cases where the MPD conducts searches following stops that uncover illegal guns, the searches are unsuccessful; and that there are often places to purchase “loose bullets or individual bullets,” thus decreasing the likelihood that additional ammunition might be found in the house.
To pose the question whether such a hypothetical affidavit could possibly establish probable cause is to answer it. As amended, the affidavit fails to offer any colorable nexus between the handgun found in the pocket of Boatwright’s jacket and the Crossland/Lane home. It establishes, at most, that an acquaintance of Crossland possessed a gun while sitting on the steps leading from the street to Crossland’s home. It does not indicate that Boatwright was ever in the house, that Crossland was engaged in any unlawful conduct, or that people who are merely acquainted with people who illegally carry guns are likely to have evidence of that conduct in their homes. The hypothesized affidavit, accordingly, offers no “reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized [were] located on the property to which entry [wa]s sought.” Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556.
The Court must also consider what follows from this conclusion. According to the plaintiffs, the mere fact that Wright obtained “a warrant on the basis of knowing and recklessly false and misleading assertions” and omissions amounts to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 87–88. That is not quite correct. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, not against unreasonable warrants. Thus, for example, the plaintiffs would have no cause of action if the MPD had never executed the warrant. For this
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reason, the Court will construe the second count of the complaint as alleging that Wright harmed the plaintiffs by causing a search of their home through the acquisition of a search warrant that contained knowing or reckless misstatements and material omissions. See Compl. ¶ 88. The Supreme Court has held that such conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. The Court, accordingly, holds that Wright violated plaintiffs’ clearly established rights by obtaining the warrant and thereby causing the search to occur, and he is not entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts as pled. D. Execution of the Warrant
In cases like this one, alleging that members of the police force violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search (or causing a search to occur) pursuant to a defective warrant, the Court must apply the same standard that governs application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). That standard, announced in Leon, asks whether the officers’ reliance on the warrant was “objectively reasonable.” 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). If it was, that ends the inquiry, and the police officers who caused or effectuated the search are immune from claims for damages.
In assessing objective reasonableness, the Court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances. “[T]he fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant,” however, “is the clearest indication that the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012). An executing officer in that case would know that a neutral judicial officer, who is responsible for reviewing warrant applications, had determined that the application establishes probable cause, and at least “[i]n the ordinary case, [such] an officer cannot be expected to question” that determination. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. But “the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional
37

search . . . does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness.” Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245. Even with a warrant in hand, it remains “incumbent on the officer executing [it] to ensure the search is lawfully authorized,” Groh, 540 U.S. at 563, and he or she remains subject to suit if the warrant “is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. This threshold for bringing suit for damages is an admittedly “high one,” Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245, but it is surmountable in the rare case where “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
In considering the reasonableness of the MPD officers’ reliance on the warrant in this case, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants draw a clear distinction between Wright, who prepared and filed the allegedly misleading affidavit, and the other officers. Because not all of the defendants are necessarily similarly situated, the Court will first address the plaintiffs’ claim against Wright and will then turn to the other officers.
1. Officer Wright Wright prepared and submitted the allegedly false and misleading application for a search warrant. See Dkt. 1-1. That allegation places him in a fundamentally different posture than the officers who merely executed the warrant. To the extent that Wright “prepared the invalid warrant” application, he has no basis to “argue that he reasonably relied on the” issuing judge’s “assurance that the warrant contained an adequate description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid.” Groh, 540 U.S. at 564. The Court, accordingly, denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count One as against Wright. See, e.g., Pitts, 2016 WL 1301046, at *11. 2. Remaining Officers
38

The question whether the remaining officers were entitled to rely on the warrant is
considerably more difficult. As an initial matter, the Court notes that not all officers in this
second group are necessarily similarly situated. Some may have had reason to know that some
or all of the assertions contained in Wright’s affidavit were false, while others may have been in
the dark. But the plaintiffs have made no effort to distinguish among the officers, and they have
not alleged that any officers—other than Wright—who executed the warrant had reason to know
that Wright’s averments were false. The Court must therefore dismiss Count One against the
remaining officers unless it was “obvious” from the face of Wright’s affidavit “that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.”10 Malley, 475
U.S. at 341; see also Winder v. Erste, 905 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that
once qualified immunity is asserted, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the official is
not entitled to qualified immunity),
Even under this permissive standard, the plaintiffs make a substantial argument that no
reasonable officer could have believed that the Wright affidavit was sufficient to establish
probable cause to search the Crossland/Lane home. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, illegal
activity outside a home may, at times, support a finding of probable cause to search the home.
See Thomas, 989 F.2d at 1254; see also Washington, 775 F.3d at 409; Spencer, 530 F.3d at 1007;
10 The complaint alleges that Haselden and a third, unnamed officer were present when Wright spoke with Crossland about the jacket and when Wright conducted a warrantless search of the Crossland/Lane home, see Compl. ¶¶ 49–51, 55–57, raising the possibility that they may have been aware that the affidavit mischaracterized Crossland’s statement regarding the jacket and omitted the fact that the officers had already performed a ten-minute warrantless search of the home. But although the complaint includes a generic allegation that all of the officers “participated in the planning and execution of the home search, . . . the unlawful stop, search, and seizure of Mr. Crossland, the unlawful seizure of Ms. Lane, the unlawful seizure of Ms. Crossland and [her] property, and the unlawful warrantless home search,” Compl. ¶ 15, it does not specify whether Haselden or the unnamed officer was personally involved in executing the warrant or whether they were aware of any other falsehoods or omissions in the affidavit.
39

United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d at 72. The essential requirement for making such a showing, however, is establishing a reasonable nexus between the illegal conduct and the home. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556. For this reason, “residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.” Hopkins, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the link between the illegal conduct (Boatwright’s possession of the firearm) and the Crossland/Lane home is decidedly weak. Even accepting the facts as Wright recounted them in his affidavit, there were good reasons to doubt that the red jacket (and hence the gun) belonged to Crossland. To be sure, Wright avers that Crossland said that the jacket was his when Wright threatened to keep the bottle of Hennessy if none of the men claimed the jacket. Dkt. 1-1 at 3. But the affidavit also states that the jacket was on the ground next to where Boatwright sat, that Boatwright was the only one of the three men without a jacket, and that, even after Crossland said the jacket was his, Wright concluded that the jacket was “abandoned.” Id. at 2–3. The affidavit further states that it was Boatwright who “neglect[ed] to pick up the red jacket” when the men moved to the porch. Id. at 3. Even more significantly, the affidavit asserts that Boatwright admitted—against his interest—that the gun was his, and he was able to corroborate that admission by confirming the caliber of the gun and how many bullets were in it. Id. at 4. Thus, reading the affidavit, a reasonable officer would conclude that, although there was some minimal evidence that the jacket and gun belonged to Crossland, it was far more likely that both belonged exclusively to Boatwright.
To the extent the gun belonged to Boatwright, the affidavit contains no colorable basis for believing that evidence of Boatwright’s crime might be found in the Crossland/Lane home. Wright invokes his purported “training” and “experience” to establish that “persons involved in
40

illegal activities maintain books, records, documentation and other papers relating to their ordering, sales and servicing of their firearms” in a place where that person “can obtain and access them.” Dkt. 1-1 at 5. He further states that “people keep their firearms and ammunition in their homes.” Id. (emphasis added). But the affidavit contains no averment even suggesting that Boatwright, who lived elsewhere, would have been able to “obtain and access” records and materials relating to his handgun in Crossland’s house. Certainly, no reasonable officer would have believed that the unadorned fact that Boatwright was sitting with Crossland on Crossland’s front steps established probable cause to search Crossland’s house for evidence of Boatwright’s criminal activity.
That, then, leaves the possibility that the affidavit might be read to say that both Crossland and Boatwright claimed ownership of the jacket that contained the handgun and that a search of Crossland’s home was warranted to determine, in essence, which of two confessions of guilt to accept. Read in this fashion, Wright’s invocation of his “training” and “experience” is at least comprehensible, although it might still raise questions in the mind of a reasonable officer. For one thing, he relied on his “training, experience and participation in narcotics and drug related investigations,” Dkt. 1-1 at 5 (emphasis added), to support his conclusions, but there was no evidence that would have led a reasonable officer to believe that Crossland (or Boatwright) was engaged in illegal narcotics activity. And as discussed above, it is far from clear that the type of “commonsense” inference that the D.C. Circuit has recognized in drug cases applies in gun cases, where there is not the same need to maintain “a place to store . . . inventory.” Hopkins, 128 F. Supp.2d at 7; see supra p. 34.
The Court concludes that the Wright affidavit would not establish probable cause to search the Crossland/Lane home, even if read in this generous fashion; it would at most establish
41

that there was some possibility (albeit remote) that the gun belonged to Crossland and that, if it was his, there might have been some evidence of that fact in the home. That, however, does not end the inquiry. Rather, absent cause to doubt the veracity of the affidavit or the neutrality of the magistrate, the relevant question is whether the warrant’s shortcomings were so “obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded” that the affidavit supported issuance of the warrant. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. That assessment, moreover, must be made through the lens of an officer who knows that a neutral, judicial officer, trained in the relevant law has reviewed the affidavit and found that it was sufficient. As the Supreme Court explained in Messerschmidt, while “a [judicial officer’s] approval” of a warrant application “does not automatically render an officer’s conduct reasonable[,] . . . [t]he fact that the officers secured . . . approval[] is certainly pertinent in assessing whether they could have held a reasonable belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause.” 132 S. Ct. at 1249–50. Despite the significant deficiencies in the warrant, the Court nonetheless concludes that it “was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the officers can be considered ‘plainly incompetent’ for concluding otherwise.” Id. at 1250 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). As construed above, the showing of probable cause was weak principally because it was unlikely that the gun belonged to Crossland. But there was at least some possibility that it did—the warrant said that Crossland asked Wright to hand him the jacket, and that jacket held a gun. See Dkt. 1-1 at 3. Assessing the quantum of evidence necessary to justify a search is the type of judgment where a reasonable officer is most likely to defer to the neutral, judicial officer’s determination that sufficient evidence was presented. That is not to say that the existence of a warrant “automatically” absolves the executing officer of responsibility to ensure that there is probable cause but only that the judicial imprimatur is a relevant consideration, particularly where the existence of probable cause turns on the inherently
42

imprecise assessment of how probable is probable enough. Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249– 50.
The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Count One of the complaint against all of the individual officers other than Wright. To the extent the plaintiffs have a good-faith basis to allege that other officers were aware of the falsehoods and omissions allegedly included in the affidavit, they may seek leave to amend to pursue those other officers as well. E. Policy, Pattern, and Custom of the MPD
Finally, Count Four of the complaint seeks to hold the District of Columbia liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for its “pattern, policy, and practice of training its officers to include in search warrant applications statements of ‘training’ and ‘experience’ that are unsubstantiated, vague, self-defeating, contradictory, woefully insufficient[,] . . . incomplete, and materially false and recklessly misleading.” Compl. ¶ 92. The Court must conduct a two-step inquiry when evaluating a claim for municipal liability. See Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)). “First, the court must determine whether the complaint states a claim for a predicate constitutional violation. Second . . . [it] must determine whether the complaint states a claim that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the violation.” Id. (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 120). Here, the District’s sole argument for dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for municipal liability is that they have not established a “predicate constitutional violation.” Dkt. 9 at 15. In concluding that the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient basis to proceed against Wright, the Court has already concluded otherwise. The District makes no argument as to the second prong of Baker, and, in any event, the complaint adequately alleges that the purportedly unconstitutional search of the
43

Lane/Crossland home was the result of the District’s “pattern, policy, and practice” of an affiant officer falsely claiming that his training and experience led him to believe that evidence of a crime would be present. Compl. ¶ 92. The Court will therefore deny the District’s motion to dismiss count four of the complaint. See, e.g., Pitts, 2016 WL 1301046, at *9.
CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 9, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge Date: September 30, 2016
44

 
 Case: 1:14-cv-01316-RDM As of: 02/06/2019 10:06 PM EST 1 of 7
CLOSED,JURY,STAYED,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:14−cv−01316−RDM

LANE et al v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al Assigned to: Judge Randolph D. Moss Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/04/2014 Date Terminated: 05/01/2017 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

ELLA LANE

represented by Alec George Karakatsanis Civil Rights Corps 910 17th Street, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 681−2721 Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Hubbard CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS 910 17 Street NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 930−3835 Email: katherine@civilrightscorps.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phil Telfeyan EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 601 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 505−2058 Email: ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff ADRIAN CROSSLAND

represented by Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Hubbard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff TERRENCE CROSSLAND

represented by Alec George Karakatsanis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katherine Hubbard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:14-cv-01316-RDM As of: 02/06/2019 10:06 PM EST 2 of 7

Phil Telfeyan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Defendant JOHN WRIGHT Officer TERMINATED: 05/01/2017 Defendant JOHN DOE 1−10 TERMINATED: 05/01/2017 Defendant TIMOTHY HASELDON Officer TERMINATED: 05/01/2017 Defendant SYDNEY WRIGHT Officer TERMINATED: 05/01/2017 Defendant KATHERINE SKALUBA Officer TERMINATED: 05/01/2017 Defendant SARAH HOFFMAN Officer TERMINATED: 05/01/2017

represented by Joseph Alfonso Gonzalez SCHERTLER & ONORATO, LLP 901 New York Avenue, NW Suite 500 West Washington, DC 20001 (202) 628−4199 Fax: (202) 628−4177 Email: jgonzalez@schertlerlaw.com TERMINATED: 10/27/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Aaron Josiah Finkhousen OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 724−7334 Fax: (202) 730−0493 Email: aaron.finkhousen@dc.gov
represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)
represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)
represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)
represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)
represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)
represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)

Case: 1:14-cv-01316-RDM As of: 02/06/2019 10:06 PM EST 3 of 7

Defendant
DAVID WILDEY Officer TERMINATED: 05/01/2017

represented by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen (See above for address)

Date Filed 08/04/2014
08/04/2014 08/04/2014 08/04/2014 08/05/2014 08/06/2014
08/26/2014 08/27/2014
08/28/2014 09/02/2014 09/05/2014 09/16/2014 09/22/2014 10/13/2014

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants with Jury Demand ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0090−3798422) filed by ELLA LANE, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ADRIAN CROSSLAND. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
Case Assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton. (sth, ) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
2 SUMMONS (1) Issued Electronically as to JOHN WRIGHT. (Attachments: # 1 Summons)(sth, ) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
3 NOTICE of Filing by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE (Attachments: # 1 Summons 1, # 2 Summons 2)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 08/04/2014)
4 SUMMONS (2) Issued Electronically as to District of Columbia Attorney General, and the District of Columbia Mayor. (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons)(sth, ) (Entered: 08/05/2014)
5 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the District of Columbia Attorney General. Date of Service Upon District of Columbia Attorney General 8/5/2014. ( Answer due for ALL D.C. DEFENDANTS by 8/26/2014.), RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA served on 8/5/2014, RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on the Mayor of the District of Columbia. Date of Service Upon the Mayor for the District of Columbia on 08/05/2014. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 08/06/2014)
6 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 6 the District's Consent Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to [the] Plaintiff[s'] Complaint. For good cause shown, and in light of the parties' consent, it is hereby ORDERED that the District's Consent Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to the Plaintiff[s'] Complaint is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the District of Columbia shall respond to the plaintiffs' complaint on or before September 9, 2014. Signed by Judge Reggie B. Walton on August 27, 2014. (lcrbw2) (Entered: 08/27/2014)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Answer or respond to complaint by 9/9/2014, (mpt, ) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
7 WAIVER OF SERVICE by ELLA LANE, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ADRIAN CROSSLAND. JOHN WRIGHT waiver sent on 8/4/2014, answer due 10/3/2014. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 09/02/2014)
8 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint, by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 09/05/2014)
9 MOTION to Dismiss by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN DOE 1−10, JOHN WRIGHT (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 09/16/2014)
10 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 09/22/2014)
11 Memorandum in opposition to re 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE. (Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 10/13/2014)

Case: 1:14-cv-01316-RDM As of: 02/06/2019 10:06 PM EST 4 of 7

10/23/2014 10/27/2014 11/13/2014 11/18/2014
11/18/2014
01/07/2015 01/27/2015 01/27/2015
01/28/2015 02/04/2015 02/10/2015 02/11/2015 02/11/2015
02/12/2015 02/13/2015 02/16/2015

12 REPLY to opposition to motion re 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN DOE 1−10, JOHN WRIGHT. (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
13 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1: Sur−Reply)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
14 Memorandum in opposition to re 13 MOTION for Leave to File Sur−Reply filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN DOE 1−10, JOHN WRIGHT. (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 8 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Upon consideration of the District's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Plaintiff's Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED nunc pro tunc to September 5, 2014. Signed by Judge Reggie B. Walton on November 18, 2014. (lcrbw2) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
ORDER granting 10 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Upon consideration of the Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond, and in light of the parties' consent, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted nunc pro tunc to September 22, 2014. Signed by Judge Reggie B. Walton on November 18, 2014. (lcrbw2) (Entered: 11/18/2014)
Case randomly reassigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. Judge Reggie B. Walton no longer assigned to the case. (ztnr, ) (Entered: 01/07/2015)
15 MOTION to Compel by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants shall respond to the Motion to Compel on or before February 10, 2015. Plaintiffs shall file a reply on or before February 17, 2015. The parties shall appear for a status conference on February 20, 2015 at 10:00 AM, in Courtroom 21. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 1/27/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearing: The Defendants shall respond to the Motion to Compel on or before 2/10/2015; Plaintiffs shall file a reply on or before 2/17/2015. Status Conference set for 2/20/2015, at 10:00 AM, in Courtroom 21 before Judge Randolph D. Moss. (kt) (Entered: 01/28/2015)
16 NOTICE of Appearance by Phil Telfeyan on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 02/04/2015)
17 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 15 MOTION to Compel by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 02/10/2015)
18 RESPONSE re 17 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 15 MOTION to Compel filed by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply 17 and Plaintiffs' Response 18 , it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 15 on or before February 13, 2015. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 2/11/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
Set/Reset Deadline: Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 15 on or before 2/13/2015. (kt) (Entered: 02/12/2015)
19 RESPONSE re 15 MOTION to Compel filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 02/13/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall be prepared to discuss the pending motion to compel and whether limited discovery should be authorized at this time at the February 20, 2015 status conference. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on February 16, 2015. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 02/16/2015)

Case: 1:14-cv-01316-RDM As of: 02/06/2019 10:06 PM EST 5 of 7

02/16/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015 02/20/2015
02/23/2015 03/11/2015 03/20/2015 04/22/2015 09/25/2015 09/25/2015 09/25/2015 09/25/2015
09/29/2015 09/29/2015 09/29/2015 09/29/2015

20 REPLY to opposition to motion re 15 MOTION to Compel filed by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE. (Telfeyan, Phil) (Entered: 02/16/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Randolph D. Moss: Status Conference held on 2/20/2015. Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Lisa Foradori) (kt) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
21 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN DOE 1−10, JOHN WRIGHT. Attorney Aaron Josiah Finkhousen terminated. (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: As discussed at today's status conference, the Court shall construe Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 15 as a Motion for Expedited Discovery. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants may file any supplemental opposition to the motion on or before March 6, 2015. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 2/20/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 02/20/2015)
Set/Reset Deadline: The Defendants may file any supplemental opposition to the motion on or before 3/6/2015. (kt) (Entered: 02/23/2015)
22 NOTICE regarding consent to expedited discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 03/11/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of Defendant's Notice Regarding Consent to Expedited Discovery 22 , it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 15 is DENIED without prejudice as moot. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on March 20, 2015. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
23 MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1: First Amended Complaint)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 04/22/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply 13 and Defendant's Opposition 14 , it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. The proposed sur−reply [13−1] is deemed FILED. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 9/25/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 23 , it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. The Amended Complaint [23−1] is deemed FILED. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 9/25/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 09/25/2015)
24 SURREPLY to re 9 MOTION to Dismiss filed by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE. (zrdj) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
25 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN DOE 1−10, TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY, JOHN WRIGHT, SYDNEY WRIGHT with Jury Demand filed by TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ADRIAN CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE.(zrdj) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
26 ENTERED IN ERROR.....NOTICE by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE re 25 Amended Complaint (Karakatsanis, Alec) Modified on 9/29/2015 Counsel will Refile (zrdj). (Entered: 09/29/2015)
27 NOTICE of Summons by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE re 25 Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
28 SUMMONS (5) Issued Electronically as to TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY, SYDNEY WRIGHT. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Forms)(zrdj) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
29 NOTICE by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE re 25 Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Search Warrant Application)(Karakatsanis, Alec) (Entered: 09/29/2015)

Case: 1:14-cv-01316-RDM As of: 02/06/2019 10:06 PM EST 6 of 7

10/13/2015 10/14/2015 10/14/2015 10/23/2015 10/28/2015 12/04/2015 09/30/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/19/2016 10/27/2016
10/27/2016 10/27/2016
10/27/2016 12/09/2016 12/09/2016

30 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 25 Amended Complaint by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 10/13/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: Defendants' Consent Motion for Extension of Time 30 is hereby GRANTED. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 25 on or before October 23, 2015. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 10/14/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
Set/Reset Deadline: Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 25 on or before 10/23/2015. (kt) (Entered: 10/14/2015)
31 Joint MOTION for Order permitting the Parties to incorporate previous Motion to Dismiss briefing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 10/23/2015)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties' Joint Motion to Incorporate Prior Briefing 31 is hereby GRANTED. The motion to dismiss 9 , opposition 10 , reply 12 , and sur−reply 24 are hereby deemed applicable to the Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 10/28/2015. (lcrdm2, ) (Entered: 10/28/2015)
32 NOTICE of Acceptance of Service by TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY re 25 Amended Complaint (Gonzalez, Joseph) (Entered: 12/04/2015)
33 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants' motion to dismiss 9 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. See attached document for details. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 9/30/2016. (lcrdm1, ) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of the Court's ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss 33 , the parties are hereby ORDERED to appear for a status conference on October 28, 2016, at 2 p.m., to discuss the next phase of the litigation. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 10/18/2016. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: A Status Conference is set for 10/28/2016, at 2:00 PM, in Courtroom 21 before Judge Randolph D. Moss. (kt) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
34 NOTICE of Appearance by Katherine Hubbard on behalf of ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE (Hubbard, Katherine) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
35 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Aaron Josiah Finkhousen on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY, JOHN WRIGHT, SYDNEY WRIGHT Substituting for attorney Joseph A. Gonzalez (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
36 Joint MOTION to Continue October 28, 2016 Status Conference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY, JOHN WRIGHT, SYDNEY WRIGHT (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the joint Motion to Continue Status Conference 36 , the motion is hereby GRANTED. The status conference originally scheduled for October 28, 2016, is hereby VACATED and RESCHEDULED for December 9, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 10/27/2016. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
Set/Reset Hearings: The Status Conference set for 10/28/2016 is VACATED and RESCHEDULED to 12/9/2016, at 9:00 AM, in Courtroom 21, before Judge Randolph D. Moss. (kt) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Randolph D. Moss: Status Conference held on 12/9/2016. Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter: Jeff Hook). (kt) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' representation that they have agreed to stay this case in order to focus on settlement efforts, it is hereby ORDERED that this case be STAYED pending further notice. The parties shall notify the Court if at any time they wish to employ alternative dispute resolution or mediation before a magistrate

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12/09/2016 01/09/2017 01/09/2017
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04/27/2017 05/01/2017 05/01/2017 05/01/2017

judge. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint status report on or before January 9, 2017, regarding the status of the settlement talks. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 12/9/2016. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
Set/Reset Deadlines: The parties shall file a joint status report on or before 1/9/2017. (kt) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
37 Joint STATUS REPORT by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE. (Hubbard, Katherine) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
MINUTE ORDER: As the parties requested in their Joint Status Report 37 , it is hereby ORDERED that the parties shall file a further joint status report on or before February 8, 2017, unless the parties have filed a stipulation of dismissal by that date. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 1/9/2017. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: The parties shall file a further joint status report on or before 2/8/2017. (kt) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
38 Joint STATUS REPORT by ADRIAN CROSSLAND, TERRENCE CROSSLAND, ELLA LANE. (Hubbard, Katherine) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
MINUTE ORDER: Upon consideration of the parties' Joint Status Report 38 , it is hereby ORDERED that, on or before February 22, 2017, unless the parties have filed a stipulation of dismissal by that date, the parties shall file a further joint status report. The status report shall (1) advise the Court as to the status of the settlement negotiations and (2) state both parties' views as to whether mediation before a magistrate judge or in the Circuit Executive's Office would further the negotiation process. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 2/8/2017. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 02/08/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 2/22/2017. (dot) (Entered: 02/09/2017)
39 Joint STATUS REPORT by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY, JOHN WRIGHT, SYDNEY WRIGHT. (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 02/22/2017)
MINUTE ORDER: The parties are hereby ORDERED to file a further status report regarding settlement efforts on or before April 24, 2017. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 4/6/2017. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Joint Status Report due by 4/24/2017. (kt) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
MINUTE ORDER: Per the Court's previous Minute Order, the parties were to submit a further joint status report on or before April 24, 2017. They have not done so. It is accordingly ORDERED that the parties submit the contemplated status report on or before May 1, 2017, or, if they are unable to do so, appear for a status conference at 11:00 a.m. on May 4, 2017, to show cause for their failure to comply with the Court's order. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 4/27/2017. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 04/27/2017)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Joint Status Report due on or before 5/1/2017. Status Conference set for 5/4/2017, at 11:00 AM, in Courtroom 21, before Judge Randolph D. Moss. (kt) (Entered: 04/27/2017)
40 STIPULATION of Dismissal by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TIMOTHY HASELDON, SARAH HOFFMAN, KATHERINE SKALUBA, DAVID WILDEY, JOHN WRIGHT, SYDNEY WRIGHT. (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
41 STIPULATION of Dismissal by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Finkhousen, Aaron) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
MINUTE ORDER: In light of the parties' stipulation of dismissal, this action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 5/1/2017. (lcrdm3, ) (Entered: 05/01/2017)