UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RUTHELLE FRANK, CARL ELLIS, JUSTIN LUFT, DARTRIC DAVIS, BARBARA ODEN, SANDRA JASHINSKI, PAMELA DUKES, ANTHONY SHARP, ANTHONY JUDD, ANNA SHEA, MATTHEW DEARING, MAX KLIGMAN, SAMANTHA MESZAROS, STEVE KVASNICKA, SARAH LAHTI, DOMONIQUE WHITEHURST by his mother and next friend SABRENA PUTNAM, and EDWARD HOGAN

Civil Action File No. _______________________
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

v.

SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin;

JUDGE THOMAS BARLAND, JUDGE GERALD C. NICHOL, JUDGE MICHAEL BRENNAN, JUDGE THOMAS CANE, JUDGE DAVID G. DEININGER, JUDGE TIMOTHY VOCKE, in their official capacities as Members of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, KEVIN J. KENNEDY, in his official capacity as Director and General Counsel of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, and NATHANIEL E. ROBINSON, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Elections Division of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board;

MARK GOTTLIEB, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of

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Transportation; LYNNE JUDD, in her official capacity, as Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles; KRISTINA BOARDMAN, in her official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Field Services at the Division of Motor Vehicles; DONALD D. REINCKE his official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region; TRACY JO HOWARD, in her official capacity as Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region; SANDRA M. BRISCO in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region; BARNEY L. HALL, in his official capacity as Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region; DONALD J. GENIN, in his official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northeast Region; JILL LOUIS GEOFFROY, in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the North Central Region; PATRICIA A. NELSON, in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northwest Region;
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs Ruthelle Frank, Carl Ellis, Justin Luft, Dartric Davis, Barbara
Oden, Sandra Jashinski, Pamela Dukes, Anthony Sharp, Anthony Judd, Anna
Shea, Matthew Dearing, Max Kligman, Samantha Meszaros, Steve Kvasnicka,
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Sarah Lahti, Domonique Whitehurst by his mother and next friend Sabrena Putnam, and Edward Hogan (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), who are eligible Wisconsin voters, bring this action to protect their right to vote under the United States Constitution and federal law. Wisconsin’s voter identification law, 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (“the photo ID law”), will—as applied to these voters and the classes of voters they represent—deprive them of their fundamental right to vote.
Plaintiffs, through their undersigned counsel, bring this Complaint against Defendant Scott Walker, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin (“Governor Walker”); Judge Thomas Barland, in his official capacity as Chair of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board (“GAB”); Judge Gerald C. Nichol, in his official capacity as Vice Chair of the GAB; Judge Michael Brennan, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Judge Thomas Cane, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Judge David G. Deininger, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Judge Timothy Vocke, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Kevin J. Kennedy, in his official capacity as Director and General Counsel of the GAB; Nathaniel E. Robinson, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Elections Division of the GAB (“the GAB Defendants”); Defendant Mark Gottlieb, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (“WisDOT”) (“Secretary Gottlieb”); Defendant Lynne Judd, in her official capacity as the Administrator of the Division
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of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) at WisDOT; Defendant Kristina Boardman, in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Field Services at the DMV; Defendants Donald D. Reincke and Tracy Jo Howard, in their respective official capacities as Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region; Defendants Sandra M. Brisco and Barney L. Hall in their respective official capacities as Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region; Defendant Donald J. Genin in his official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northeast Region; Defendant Jill Louis Geoffroy in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the North Central Region; and Defendant Patricia A. Nelson in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northwest Region (“the WisDOT/DMV Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege upon knowledge as to their own conduct and observations and upon information and belief as to the conduct of others:
NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Wisconsin state officials’ enforcement of 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (the “photo ID law”), which requires voters in Wisconsin to present photo identification in order to cast their
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votes either in person at a polling place or by absentee ballot. This requirement will be effective as of Wisconsin’s spring primary on February 21, 2012.
2. This lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment that the photo ID law is unconstitutional as applied to certain classes of eligible Wisconsin voters, and to enjoin its enforcement with respect to these classes. The photo ID law imposes a severe and undue burden on the fundamental right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; violates the Twenty-Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as an unconstitutional poll tax; and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in arbitrarily refusing to accept certain identification documents.
PARTIES 3. Each of the plaintiffs named in this Complaint is a citizen of the United States, a resident of the State of Wisconsin, and is, or will be on or before February 21, 2012, a duly qualified elector eligible to vote in local, state, and federal elections in Wisconsin. Every United States citizen age 18 or older who has resided in an election district or ward in the State of Wisconsin for 28 consecutive days before any election where the citizen offers to vote is an eligible elector (hereinafter, “eligible Wisconsin voter”). Wis. Stat. § 6.02(1).
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4. Plaintiff Ruthelle Frank is an 84-year-old Caucasian resident of Brokaw, Wisconsin, where she has served on the Village Board since 1996, and an eligible voter registered to vote in Wisconsin. She has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of her birth certificate, which she needs to prove citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV. Ms. Frank was born at her home in Brokaw in 1927. Though she has never possessed a birth certificate, upon information and belief, the state Register of Deeds has a record of her birth and could produce a certified copy of her birth certificate at a charge. However, that record bears an incorrect spelling of her maiden name: Wedepohl. The process to amend a birth certificate is lengthy and costly, with some reports suggesting it might require $200 or more. She has voted in every election since 1948 and intends to vote in Wisconsin again next year.
5. Plaintiff Carl Ellis is a 52-year-old African-American/Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. A veteran of the United States Army, Mr. Ellis is currently living in a homeless shelter for veterans and has no income or savings. Mr. Ellis has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate from the Illinois Department of Public Health’s Vital Records Office. Given his financial circumstances, Mr. Ellis cannot afford to pay for a certified copy of his Illinois birth certificate. He does, however, possess a Veterans Identification Card (“VIC”), which is issued by
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the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and contains his name and photograph. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
6. Plaintiff Justin Luft is a 20-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. He has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law. He has traveled twice to the Wisconsin DMV office to obtain a state ID card, but was unable to do so due to the lack of a Social Security Card (“SSC”) or any other accepted form of proof of identity. Mr. Luft has visited the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) office five times with his mother in a reasonable, but unsuccessful, effort to obtain a duplicate of his SSC. He does not have a car, and thus, all the trips he has made to try to obtain an SSC and state ID card have been by bus. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
7. Plaintiff Dartric Davis is a 21-year-old African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Mr. Davis has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate from the Illinois Department of Public Health’s Vital Records Office. He moved to Wisconsin in 2011 and has never held a Wisconsin driver’s license or Wisconsin state ID card. Mr. Davis has made several attempts to acquire a certified copy of his birth certificate from Illinois, but has so far been unable to do so. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
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8. Plaintiff Barbara Oden is a 57-year-old, African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Ms. Oden has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of her birth certificate and a Social Security Card (“SSC”). She needs these documents to prove citizenship and identity, respectively, to the Wisconsin DMV in order to obtain a free state ID card. She was denied a SSC by an employee at the Social Security Administration office, who informed her that she must present a photo ID in order to obtain an SSC. Ms. Oden has no income or savings. She intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
9. Plaintiff Sandra Jashinski is a 48-year-old, Caucasian and Native American (Cherokee) resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Ms. Jashinski has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a Social Security Card (“SSC”), which she requires to prove her identity to the Wisconsin DMV and obtain a free state ID card. An employee at the Social Security Administration office informed Ms. Jashinski that she must present a photo ID in order to obtain an SSC and then denied her an SSC when she could not present a photo ID. As a homeless person, Ms. Jashinski also has no way to prove a current Wisconsin residence street address. She intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
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10. Plaintiff Pamela Dukes is a 51-year-old African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. She has none of the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of her birth certificate from Cook County, Illinois, which she needs to prove citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV. Ms. Dukes receives monthly Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) disability benefits, but has no other income or savings. She spends the overwhelming majority of her SSI income on rent, and the remainder is devoted to utility bills and other necessary living expenses. She is therefore unable to afford a certified copy of her Illinois birth certificate. She intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
11. Plaintiff Anthony Sharp is a 19-year-old, African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. He is living with his mother, possesses none of the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, and lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate, which he requires to prove citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV. Mr. Sharp has no income or savings and is therefore unable to afford a certified copy of his Wisconsin birth certificate. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
12. Plaintiff Anthony Judd is a 46-year-old, Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. He has none of the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of his New York birth
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certificate, which he needs to prove citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV. Mr. Judd has no regular income whatsoever, receives no government benefits, and has no savings. He is therefore unable to afford a certified copy of his New York birth certificate. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
13. Plaintiff Anna Shea is a 20-year-old Caucasian junior at Lawrence University, an accredited four-year private university in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. She lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. She currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Colorado which she does not want to surrender. Ms. Shea voted in the November 2010 general election and intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
14. Plaintiff Matthew Dearing is an 18-year-old African-American freshman at Lawrence University, an accredited four-year private university in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. He lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. He currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of New York which he does not want to surrender. Mr. Dearing intends to vote in Wisconsin next year and will vote for the first time in 2012.
15. Plaintiff Max Kligman is a 19-year-old Caucasian freshman at Lawrence University, an accredited four-year private university in Appleton,
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Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. He lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. He currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of California which he does not want to surrender. Mr. Kligman intends to vote in Wisconsin next year and will vote for the first time in 2012.
16. Plaintiff Samantha Meszaros is an 18-year-old Caucasian freshman at Carthage College, an accredited four-year private college in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. She lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. She currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Illinois which she does not want to surrender. Ms. Meszaros intends to vote in Wisconsin next year and will vote for the first time in 2012.
17. Plaintiff Steve Kvasnicka is a 20-year-old Caucasian junior at Carthage College, an accredited 4-year private college in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. He lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. He currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Illinois which he does not want to surrender. Mr. Kvasnicka intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
18. Plaintiff Sarah Lahti is an 18-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a student at Milwaukee Area Technical College (“MATC”), where
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she is studying for her GED. She lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. She currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Tennessee which she does not want to surrender. Ms. Lahti has an MATC student ID card with her name and photo. She intends to vote in Wisconsin next year and will vote for the first time in 2012.
19. Plaintiff Domonique Whitehurst, by his mother and next friend Sabrena Putnam, is a 17-year-old African-American and Native American (Blackfoot) student at Milwaukee Area Technical College. He will turn 18 on February 4, 2012, prior to the spring primary. Mr. Whitehurst has an MATC ID card with his name and photo. He has no other accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law. Mr. Whitehurst intends to vote in Wisconsin next year and will vote for the first time in 2012.
20. Plaintiff Edward Hogan is a 21-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a student at Milwaukee Area Technical College (“MATC”), where he is studying towards an associate’s degree. He lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, including a compliant student ID card. Mr. Hogan has an MATC student ID card with his name and photo. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
21. Defendant Scott Walker is the Governor of the State of Wisconsin. He is sued in his official capacity only.
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22. Defendant Judge Thomas Barland is the Chair of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board (“GAB”). Defendant Judge Gerald C. Nichol is the Vice Chair of the GAB. Defendants Judge Michael Brennan, Judge Thomas Cane, Judge David G. Deininger, and Judge Timothy Vocke are the four remaining members of the GAB. The GAB is charged with administering Wisconsin’s election laws and has the authority to promulgate rules applicable to all jurisdictions within the state for the purpose of interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct of elections or ensuring their proper administration. Each of the GAB members listed above is sued in his official capacity only.
23. Defendant Kevin J. Kennedy is the Director and General Counsel of the GAB, and Defendant Nathaniel E. Robinson is the Administrator of the Elections Division of the GAB. They are sued in their official capacities only.
24. Defendant Mark Gottlieb is the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (“WisDOT”), which includes the DMV. He is sued in his official capacity only.
25. Defendant Lynne Judd is the Administrator of the Wisconsin DMV. She is sued in her official capacity only.
26. Defendant Kristina Boardman is the Director of the Bureau of Field Services at the Wisconsin DMV. She is sued in her official capacity only.
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27. Defendants Donald D. Reincke and Tracy Jo Howard are, respectively, the Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region. Defendants Sandra M. Brisco and Barney L. Hall are, respectively, the Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region. Defendant Donald J. Genin is the Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northeast Region. Defendant Jill Louis Geoffroy is the Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the North Central Region. Defendant Patricia A. Nelson is the Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northwest Region. The Bureau of Field Services is the entity within DMV responsible for issuing driver’s licenses and identification cards. They are sued in their official capacities only.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 28. This case arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) & (4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 29. Venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), because at least two of the Defendants reside in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and all the Defendants reside in Wisconsin, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because a
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substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted herein have occurred—and continue to occur—in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
FACTS RELATED TO THE PHOTO ID LAW 30. Prior to the enactment of the photo ID law, no voter in any situation was required to provide any form of proof of identity in order to cast a ballot, much less one of a specified, limited number of photo IDs. Wisconsin voters only needed to provide proof of residence to register to vote in certain situations, but never to cast a ballot. When required, a range of documentation is accepted by Wisconsin election officials to prove residency, including both photo and non-photo forms of identification such as ID cards or licenses of any kind issued by any Wisconsin governmental unit, utility bills, bank account statements, paycheck stubs, any government-issued document, and residential leases. 31. The photo ID law, 2011 Wisconsin Act 23, was signed into law on May 25, 2011 and will be effective for all elections beginning in February 2012. Under the new photo ID law, Wisconsin voters must present one form of photo identification from a limited statutory list in order to cast a ballot.1 Unlike voter ID laws in other states such as Indiana’s photo ID law, which was upheld against a facial challenge in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181
1 This is in addition to, not instead of, the requirement to register to vote.
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(2008), Wisconsin’s photo ID law applies to both in-person voting and most
absentee voting.
32. The list of accepted photo IDs in Wisconsin is restricted to only the
following: (1) a Wisconsin driver’s license; (2) a Wisconsin state ID card issued by
the Wisconsin DMV; (3) an identification card issued by a U.S. uniformed service;
(4) a U.S. passport; (5) a certificate of U.S. naturalization that was issued not
earlier than 2 years before the date of an election at which it is presented; (6) an
unexpired receipt issued at the time of application for a Wisconsin driver’s license
or state ID card; (7) an identification card issued by a federally recognized Indian tribe in Wisconsin2; and (8) an unexpired identification card issued by a Wisconsin
university or college accredited as defined in Wis. Stat. § 39.30(1)(d), which
contains the signature of the individual to whom it is issued, the issuance date, and
an expiration date not later than 2 years after the date of issuance (collectively, “accepted photo ID”). Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m).3 The first four accepted photo IDs
2 Upon information and belief, the federally recognized tribes in Wisconsin are: Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Forest County Potawatomi, HoChunk Nation, Lac Court Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Menominee Indian Tribe, Oneida Tribe of Indians, Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, St. Croix Chippewa Indians, Sokaogan Mole Lake Community, and Stockbridge Munsee Community. 3 A voter using a college or university ID card must also present separate proof of current enrollment. A discussion of the proof-of-enrollment requirement appears in a September 12th GAB Memorandum. See GAB Memorandum, “Photo ID Implementation Issues – Student ID Cards,” Sept. 12, 2011, at 3-4.
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must be unexpired or, if expired, must have expired after the date of the most recent general election. Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(a). A voter who is required to surrender his or her operator’s license or driving receipt by a law enforcement officer within 60 days of the date of an election may present an original copy of the citation or notice in lieu of the license or receipt for a license, and this too constitutes “accepted photo ID.” Wis. Stat. § 6.79(7).
33. The following is a non-exhaustive list of forms of identification that will not be accepted for in-person or absentee voting: (1) any federal photo identification not specifically listed, and thus excluding, among others, Veterans Identification Cards (“VICs”); (2) any Wisconsin government-issued card, license, or document other than a driver’s license or state ID card; (3) driver’s licenses and state ID cards issued by another state government; (4) any local government-issued card, license, or document; (5) technical college identification cards;4 (6) any public or medical assistance benefit cards issued by any unit of government; and (7) any governmental or non-governmental employer photo identification cards.
34. The only voters exempt from showing photo ID when voting in person are electors with proof of confidential elector status due to the existence of a protective order. Wis. Stat. § 6.79(6).
4 Certain Wisconsin legislators continue to oppose the use of technical college ID cards and to threaten their valid use as accepted photo ID. See infra.
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35. The only voters exempt from providing photo identification when voting absentee are military, overseas, or confidential voters, Wis. Stat. §§ 6.34(1), 6.87(4)(b)1; voters in nursing homes, qualified community based residential facilities, qualified adult family homes, and qualified residential care apartment complexes who vote with special voting deputies, Wis. Stat. § 6.875(6)(c), or who live in such a facility but special voting deputies are not sent, and who “submit[] with [their] absentee ballot[s] a statement signed by the same individual who witnesses voting of the ballot that contains the certification of an authorized representative of the complex, facility, or home that the elector resides in the complex, facility, or home and the complex, facility, or home is certified or registered as required by law, that contains the name and address of the elector, and that verifies that the name and address are correct,” Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)5; voters who are indefinitely confined because of age, physical illness, or infirmity or are disabled for an indefinite period and who, by signing a statement to that effect, require that an absentee ballot be sent to the voter automatically for every election,5 Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(2)(a), 6.87(4)(b)2; and absentee voters who have not changed their names or addresses since the prior time they voted absentee and who previously provided proof of photo identification. Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)3. 5 In these situations, the elector must submit “with his or her absentee ballot a statement signed by the same individual who witnesses voting of the ballot which contains the name and address of the elector and verifies that the name and address are correct.” Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)2.
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36. Under Wis. Stat. § 227.24, as affected by 2011 Wis. Act 21 and as amended by 2001 Wis. Act 32, an agency’s proposed emergency administrative rule in final draft form is subject to gubernatorial review before it can be submitted for review by the relevant Standing Committee and the Joint Committee for the Review of Administrative Rules (“JCRAR”) and—barring a legislative override— ultimately promulgated. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g (“An agency may not file an emergency rule with the legislative reference bureau . . . and an emergency rule may not be published until the governor approves the emergency rule in writing.”); see also Wis. Stat. § 227.185 (gubernatorial approval required for non-emergency administrative rules); see also Executive Order No. 50. If JCRAR determines a statement of policy or an interpretation of a statute is a rule, it may compel an agency to issue an emergency rule and submit it to the Governor under Act 21. Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(b). If the agency is so directed, then it must submit a Statement of Scope for Governor Walker’s review and approval or rejection. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1d. There is no binding statutory deadline by which the Governor must respond to the submitting agency. Even if the Governor approves the Statement of Scope, he/she may still reject an emergency rule when it is subsequently submitted in final draft form. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g.
37. Initially, the GAB interpreted the photo ID law as not permitting the use of technical college ID cards at the polls. See GAB Memorandum, “Photo ID
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Implementation Issues – Student ID Cards,” Sept. 12, 2011, at 1-3. At its November 9, 2011 meeting, the GAB reversed course and voted unanimously to find that technical colleges are embraced by the photo ID law’s phrase “a . . . college in this state that is accredited.” Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(f). However, on November 15, 2011, the JCRAR voted 6-4 to force the GAB to issue an emergency rule codifying its interpretation of the photo ID law, a rule that must be submitted to Governor Walker under Act 21 before the legislative review process. The Statement of Scope for an emergency rule addressing the use of technical college ID cards was submitted to Governor Walker on November 22, 2011, and Governor Walker approved it on December 2, 2011. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 1-3. Ten days after the statement’s publication in the administrative register, GAB may approve the proposed emergency rule and then draft the rule. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1d. However, it must then submit the emergency rule in final draft form to Governor Walker, who may approve or reject it. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g.
38. Governor Walker therefore exercises direct control over the implementation of the photo ID law and the scope and degree of the burdens it imposes on eligible Wisconsin voters, particularly technical college student voters in Class 4 (see infra). Governor Walker also exercises veto power over any bill
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introduced to prevent the promulgation of an emergency rule. Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(i).
39. Even if Governor Walker approves the emergency rule concerning the use of technical college ID cards, the Legislature may still block the emergency rule by enacting a statute. During the November 15th meeting, several of the JCRAR members who voted with the majority expressed their belief that the Legislature did not intend to include technical college ID cards, because an amendment designed to expressly authorize their use as accepted photo ID (in addition to the statutory standard above) was defeated. At this time, the JCRAR’s actions threaten to exclude technical college ID cards from the list of accepted photo ID. Furthermore, even assuming Governor Walker and the Legislature do not block the emergency rule, given publication and notice requirements, Defendant Kennedy believes it is “unlikely” the rule will be effective before the February 2012 primary election. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 2-3.
40. There were 382,006 students enrolled in the technical college system in the 2009-2010 academic year, which constitutes 8.8% of Wisconsin’s total votingage population.6 Of these technical college students, 59,323 were minority students. By sharp contrast, there were only 18,000 minority students in the entire 6 The 2010 Census dataset labeled “2010 Redistricting Data SF (PL 94-171)” was used to calculate this percentage.
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University of Wisconsin (“UW”) System in the same academic year. Indeed, there were more minority students (20,916) at Milwaukee Area Technical College alone than in the entire UW System.
41. Student voters at colleges or universities outside the technical college system face their own challenges in casting a ballot. As the GAB’s Director and General Counsel, Defendant Kennedy, has stated, no college or university student ID cards in Wisconsin were in compliance with the specifications of the photo ID law at the time of its passage. Many college and university ID cards lacked one or more of the following required elements: the signature of the individual to whom the ID card is issued, the issuance date, and an expiration date not later than 2 years after the date of issuance. In early September, the GAB voted to permit the use of stickers to supply the missing required information and thereby bring noncomplaint student ID cards into compliance. See GAB Memorandum, “Photo ID Implementation Issues – Student ID Cards,” Sept. 12, 2011, at 4-5. At its September 27, 2011 meeting, members of the Wisconsin State Legislature’s JCRAR expressed concerns about the use of stickers and communicated their belief that the GAB could only lawfully implement this policy by adopting an administrative rule. Following that meeting, Defendant Kennedy submitted a memo to the GAB, urging it to reverse course. See GAB Memorandum, “Administrative Rulemaking Process and Timeline,” Oct. 6, 2011, at 1-2. At its
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November 9, 2011 meeting, the GAB reaffirmed that colleges and universities could bring their ID cards into compliance with stickers that included the missing information. However, on November 15, 2011, the JCRAR voted 6-4 to force the GAB to issue an emergency rule codifying the sticker supplementation policy, a rule that will first be submitted to Governor Walker under 2011 Wis. Act 21. See infra. Therefore, the JCRAR’s actions threaten to block the use of stickers to bring student ID cards into compliance with the photo ID law.
42. In order to promulgate an emergency rule allowing colleges and universities to take advantage of stickers as a cost-efficient fix for the problem, the GAB must first submit a Statement of Scope for Governor Walker’s review and approval or rejection. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1d. The GAB has not yet submitted a Statement of Scope concerning this emergency rule to Governor Walker. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 2. As explained in detail by Defendant Kennedy in his October 6, 2011 Memorandum, given certain notice and publication timing requirements, as well as the lack of any binding deadline by which the Governor must respond to the submitting agency, it will be impossible to obtain legal clarity in a timely manner on the validity of using stickers to bring student ID cards into compliance with the photo ID law. Wisconsin colleges and universities require clarity on this issue, and the GAB needs to begin training poll
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workers well in advance of the February 21, 2012 Spring Primary. See GAB
Memorandum, “Administrative Rulemaking Process and Timeline,” Oct. 6, 2011, at 2-4.7 Defendant Kennedy clarified in a recent memo to the GAB that it is
virtually certain that the rule will not be effect until after the February 2012
primary election. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules
as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 3. In this manner,
Governor Walker exercises direct control over the implementation of the photo ID
law and the scope and degree of the burdens it imposes on eligible Wisconsin
voters, particularly student voters with out-of-state drivers’ licenses who are
members of Class 3 (see infra).
43. Forcing the GAB to issue administrative rules to implement a less
expensive fix for student ID cards and to ensure that technical college student ID
cards will be accepted has already resulted in an increased probability that
numerous colleges and universities will fail to issue compliant student ID cards by
the time of the February 21, 2012 Spring Primary.
7 In a memorandum for the GAB’s December 13, 2011 meeting, Defendant Kennedy wrote: “Staff remains concerned that JCRAR’s actions on these three matters, and the general exercise of §227.26(2), Wis. Stats., authority for day-today election administration issues, affect the ability of the G.A.B. to provide timely and uniform advice for the proper administration of elections, particularly with sufficient notice such that proper training of election officials may be conducted. As a result of 2011 Act 21, the process to complete promulgation of an emergency rule is more complicated and lengthy.” See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 2.
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44. Technical college ID cards will need to conform to the same statutory specifications, but these schools have no incentive to begin this time-consuming and costly process without an assurance that such cards will in fact be usable for voting purposes.
45. Upon information and belief, at least two Wisconsin private colleges and one University of Wisconsin campus have started to issue, or stated they will issue, student ID cards that comply with the photo ID law’s specifications. Upon information and belief, one Wisconsin technical college has also said it will issue student ID cards that comply with the photo ID law’s specifications, but as discussed in paragraph ___, it is unclear whether any technical college ID cards will be considered valid for voting,
46. Upon information and belief, a number of Wisconsin private colleges and UW System campuses have either started to issue, or stated they will issue, separate voting-only ID cards.
47. At the November 9, 2011 hearing, Defendant Kevin Kennedy stated that the GAB will be reviewing every Wisconsin college or university ID card for its conformity to the photo ID law and for its security. The GAB will then inform municipal clerks and poll workers throughout Wisconsin as to which college or university ID cards may be accepted at the polls and which may not be accepted. Therefore, the validity of each voting-only ID card issued by a college or
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university will be determined by the GAB. Until the GAB approves a particular college or university’s ID, given the uncertainty and policy reversals surrounding the use of student ID cards to vote in Wisconsin, students at that school will have no assurance that these separate voting-only ID cards will in fact be treated as accepted photo ID for voting purposes in 2012.
48. Upon information and belief, other Wisconsin colleges and universities, including but not limited to Carthage College, have expressed no plans to issue any kind of voting-compliant student ID cards.
FACTS RELATED TO OBTAINING WISCONSIN PHOTO ID AND THE UNDERLYING DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY WISCONSIN DMV 49. The Wisconsin DMV, a division within WisDOT, is required to issue
state ID cards free of charge if the applicant is a U.S. citizen, will be at least 18 years old by the next election, and requests that the card be provided free for voting purposes. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(5)(a), as amended by 2011 Wis. Act 23 § 138.
50. There are 88 DMV offices currently operating in the State of Wisconsin, and 3 new offices are scheduled to open in 2012 for a total of 91.
51. Upon information and belief, only one DMV office in Wisconsin has any weekend hours, and the Madison Odana Renewal Center only processes renewal license and ID card applications. It is open on Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to
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4:00 p.m. Upon information and belief, there is no DMV office in Wisconsin that will process an original driver’s license or state ID card application on the weekend.
52. Upon information and belief, no DMV office in Wisconsin stays open later than 5:30 p.m.
53. There are no mobile DMV units in Wisconsin, capable of traveling to and issuing driver’s licenses and state ID cards in remote areas of the state. Upon information and belief, WisDOT has no plans to establish and deploy such mobile units.
54. An individual who resides in Wisconsin and wishes to obtain a free Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes must surrender any valid out-of-state driver’s license he/she possesses. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(1)(b), as amended by 2011 Wis. Act 23 § 130.
55. A person with a driver’s license from another state who wishes to obtain a Wisconsin driver’s license must pay a fee. Wis. Stat. § 343.21. There is no fee waiver for obtaining a driver’s license even if that license will constitute the individual’s sole form of accepted photo ID for voting purposes.
56. Wisconsin DMV offices require first-time applicants for state ID cards and driver’s licenses to present: (1) proof of name and date of birth, (2) proof of identity, (3) proof of citizenship, legal permanent resident or conditional resident
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status of the United States, or legal presence in the United States, (4) proof of Wisconsin residency, and (5) a Social Security Number. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(2). “First-time applicants” encompass all persons who have not previously held a Wisconsin driver’s license or ID card, even if they have such licenses or cards from other states.
57. Applicants for a renewal, reinstatement, reissue, or duplicate8 Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card must present proof of identity, Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(2)(b), and may be required to present proof of citizenship, legal permanent resident or conditional resident status of the United Status, or legal presence in the United States. Id. § 102.15(2)(bm)2. Applicants for a renewal, reinstatement, reissue, or duplicate Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card following certain actions, such as suspension, revocation, or cancellation of the prior license or ID card, must also provide proof of name and date of birth and proof of residency. Id. § 102.15(2)(c). Applicants for an original, renewal, reinstatement, reissue, or duplicate driver’s license or state ID card may be required to provide proof of residency if the applicant uses certain documents to prove name and date of birth or identity, or if the documents do not have a current residential address or do not include a current acceptable Wisconsin residential address. Id. § 102.15(4m). 8 A replacement for a lost or stolen identification card (or drivers’ license) is called a “duplicate.”
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58. Voters who lack the necessary primary documents for an original, renewal, or duplicate driver’s license or ID card often must travel to and interact with multiple government offices and entities, such as the vital records office of their birth state and the Social Security Administration, in order to obtain the underlying documents needed to secure a state ID card. The process to obtain documents required in order to obtain a photo ID card can be extremely complex, particularly for individuals with lower levels of education and/or literacy, and difficult for those without access to reliable transportation.
59. If voters lack one or more of the documents required in order to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card, Defendants do not provide direct or individualized assistance to the voters to obtain those documents.
60. Rules promulgated by WisDOT provide that for a driver’s license or state ID card application satisfactory proof of name and date of birth includes the following: (a) for a person born in Wisconsin, a certified copy of the person’s Wisconsin birth certificate; (b) for a person born in another jurisdiction, other than a Canadian province, a certified copy of his or her birth certificate or the equivalent document from that other jurisdiction or a certificate of birth abroad issued by the U.S. Department of State; (c) a U.S. passport; (d) an expired Wisconsin driver’s license; (e) an expired Wisconsin ID card; (f) a U.S. certificate of naturalization (which costs $345.00); (g) a certificate of U.S. citizenship (which costs $600.00);
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(h) a Native American ID card which was issued by a federally recognized tribe or a band of a federally recognized tribe, issued in Wisconsin, which includes a photograph and signature and has been approved by the Secretary of WisDOT; (i) a court order under seal related to the adoption or divorce or to a name or gender change that includes the person’s current full legal name, date of birth and in the case of a name change or divorce order, the person’s prior name; (j) an armed forces of the United States common access card or DD Form 2 ID card issued to military personnel; (k) a Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration (“DHS/TSA”) transportation worker identification credential; or various immigration documents. Id. § 102.15(3).
61. If the applicant is unable to provide accepted proof of name and date of birth and the documents are “unavailable” (defined in Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(1) to exclude documents the applicant merely forgot to bring, as well as lost or destroyed documents where a replacement original or certified copy may be obtained upon request), then the applicant may petition the DMV Administrator, Defendant Judd, to consider alternative documentation, or “extraordinary proof,” of name and date of birth. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(3)(b). Defendant Judd may delegate to her subordinates the authority to accept or reject such extraordinary proof of name and date of birth, but there are no rules guiding that
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determination. Id. § 102.15(3)(c). Upon information and belief, no signage or other readily visible notice announces that this alternative procedure even exists.
62. WisDOT rules provide that for a driver’s license or state ID card application, satisfactory proof of citizenship, legal permanent resident status, conditional resident status or legal presence includes a U.S. state or local government-issued birth certificate, a valid U.S. passport, a certificate of U.S. citizenship (which costs $600.00), a U.S. Certificate of naturalization (which costs $345.00), a DHS/TSA transportation worker identification credential, and a variety of immigration-related documents. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(3m). Therefore, a first-time applicant for a Wisconsin ID card who lacks a U.S. passport, has no immigration and naturalization history, and does not work for DHS/TSA, must either produce a certified copy of his/her birth certificate to obtain a Wisconsin photo ID card or pay $135.00 to obtain a U.S. passport. No alternative procedure is available for persons unable to obtain this documentation.
63. Persons born in Wisconsin can obtain certified copies of their birth certificates from the Wisconsin Vital Records Office in the Wisconsin Department of Health Services or local registrars. Wisconsin charges $20.00 to locate and
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make a certified copy of a birth certificate, and the voter generally must bear his or her own costs in obtaining the birth certificate.9
64. Fees to obtain birth certificates for persons born outside Wisconsin vary and can be even higher than Wisconsin fees. Minnesota, for example, charges $26.00 for a certified copy of a birth certificate.
65. Certain states’ and counties’ vital records offices require a governmentissued photo ID to obtain a certified copy of one’s birth certificate or otherwise set forth a restrictive list of documents that must be shown in order to obtain a certified copy of a birth certificate.
66. In many states, including Wisconsin, identification requirements imposed on individuals differ in practice from the official statutory or regulatory requirements. These requirements are often inconsistently or misleadingly stated in publicly available documents, including on official websites. For example, Wisconsin state law, Wis. Stat. § 69.21, states that state and local registrars “shall” issue a certified copy of a birth certificate to a person “with a direct and tangible interest” in the matter, who pays the required fee. Administrative rules confirm that the “state registrar and local registrars shall provide certified documentary
9 The Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors included in its recently-adopted budget funding to provide a limited number of birth certificates free to county residents. Upon information and belief, that plan has not yet been implemented, and will not be adequate to provide free birth certificates for all county residents who need them.
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proof of a vital event for individual use to any person who requests that proof and has a direct and tangible interest as defined in s. 69.20 (1), Stats.” Wis. Admin. Code DHS § 142.04. However, the birth certificate application form requires that the person requesting a certified copy of a birth certificate provide “acceptable identification,” in the form of either a “current valid photo ID,” i.e., a Wisconsin or out-of-state driver’s license or state photo ID card, or two forms of a limited list of types of secondary identification documents. The secondary list includes only the following: a government-issued employee I.D. card or badge with photo, a U.S. passport, a checkbook or bankbook, a “major” credit card, a health insurance card, a “recent” dated, signed lease, a “recent” utility bill, or “recent” traffic ticket. The application available on the Wisconsin Department of Health Services’ (“DHS”) website states that the identification requirement applies to both in-person and mail-in applications. However, at the time of this filing, the DHS website and numerous county registrar websites continued to state that that no identification is required if the certificate copies are mailed. For instance, the birth certificate application on the Dane County Register of Deeds website calls for “valid photo ID,” but makes clear that this is only “required to pick up [the certificate] in person.”
67. WisDOT rules provide that for a driver’s license or state ID card application, satisfactory proof of identity includes only the following: (a) a valid
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driver’s license, including a license from another jurisdiction, except a Canadian province; (b) military discharge papers; (c) a U.S. government and military dependent ID card; (d) a valid photo identification card issued by Wisconsin or another jurisdiction, except a Canadian province; (e) a marriage certificate or certified copy of judgment of divorce; (f) a Social Security Card; (g) an additional document listed in paragraph __ above that would be sufficient to prove name and date of birth, but was not used to prove name and date of birth; or (h) a DHS/TSA transportation worker identification credential. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(4). No alternative procedure is available for persons unable to obtain this documentation.
68. For many low-income eligible Wisconsin voters, presenting a Social Security Card (“SSC”) is the only method to prove identity to the Wisconsin DMV. However, the Social Security Administration generally requires an individual to provide evidence of identity in order to obtain an SSC. To obtain an original SSC, the applicant must establish his/her U.S. citizenship, age, and identity. For a replacement SSC, the applicant must provide documents to establish his/her U.S. citizenship and identity. Identification requirements that SSC applicants are told they must satisfy often differ in practice from the requirements set forth in law.
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69. WisDOT rules provide that to obtain a driver’s license or state ID card, an individual may be required to provide a form of proof that contains “a current acceptable Wisconsin residence street address.” Id. § 102.15(4m).10 A document listing a post office box or commercial mail receiving agency as the mailing address is not acceptable. No alternative procedure is available for persons unable to obtain this documentation.
70. Under official state regulations, satisfactory proof of residency includes only the following: (a) a utility bill for water, gas, electric or landline phone service which is at least 30 days old; (b) a paycheck or stub with the customer’s name and address, and the employer’s name and address; (c) an account statement at least 30 days old from a Wisconsin financial institution; or (d) mortgage documents for a residential real property located in Wisconsin. Id. § 102.15(4m)(b), (c), (d), (f).11
71. The Wisconsin DMV’s website sets out a broader list of purportedly acceptable documents to prove residency. The policy authorizing the use of such documents has not, however, been promulgated as an official administrative rule and, for the reasons discussed in Paragraph ___, may not be legally binding and could be blocked or overridden by the actions of Governor Walker or the 10 The Wisconsin DMV website states that this is mandatory for all first-time applicants aged 18 years or older. 11 So numbered in original; no (a) or (e) are listed in the regulations.
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Legislature. Moreover, even the unofficial broader list fails to include such documents as residential leases, homeless shelter verifications, and Internet bills.
PLAINTIFF CLASS ALLEGATIONS CLASS 1
72. Class 1 is defined as: all eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID and are unable for legal and/or practical reasons to obtain one or more of the primary, underlying documents required to obtain a Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes. These individuals are either legally barred from obtaining one or more of the primary documents needed to obtain a Wisconsin ID card or have made a reasonable but unsuccessful attempt to acquire one or more of the necessary documents.
73. This class of eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID includes—but is not limited to—individuals who must prove citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV with a birth certificate, lack certified copies of their birth certificates, and are unable to obtain birth certificates due to their birth-state’s identification requirements; individuals who must prove citizenship to the DMV with a birth certificate, but who were never issued birth certificates; individuals who lack, and cannot obtain, proof of Wisconsin residency under Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(4m); and individuals who lack and cannot obtain any of the
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forms of proof of identity accepted by the Wisconsin DMV, such as a Social Security Card. This class also includes eligible Wisconsin voters who are unable to obtain a free Wisconsin ID card due to the misapplication of applicable laws and regulations or the imposition of incorrect or excessive documentary requirements upon individuals by the Wisconsin DMV and/or by the local, state, or federal entity responsible for issuing a document required to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card or driver’s license.
74. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 1 Representatives Ruthelle Frank, Justin Luft, Dartric Davis, Barbara Oden, and Sandra Jashinski’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
75. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, by denying the right to vote to eligible Wisconsin voters who have been unable to obtain one or more of the primary
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documents needed for a Wisconsin state ID card, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 2 76. Class 2 is defined as: all eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID and for whom the costs incurred in obtaining a Wisconsin state ID card, such as obtaining a certified and accurate copy of a birth certificate to prove citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV and in traveling to the nearest Wisconsin DMV office, would constitute a severe financial burden. 77. According to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (“ACS”) 5Year Estimates, 357,912 Wisconsin residents ages 18 to 64 and 57,900 Wisconsin residents ages 65 years and older had incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty level (“FPL”), and 161,664 Wisconsin residents ages 18 to 64 and 16,183 Wisconsin residents ages 65 years and older had incomes below 50 percent of the FPL.12 78. According to a study conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families, in November 2008 there were 12,608 families who were receiving food stamps in the State of Wisconsin but had zero earned or unearned income. 12 These figures are estimates with the following margins of error: +/- 0.1%, +/0.1%, +/- 0.1%, and +/- 0.3%, respectively.
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79. The photo ID law will force a significant percentage of eligible, poor Wisconsin voters to make a choice between, on the one hand, paying for a birth certificate and/or incurring significant travel costs in order to acquire a state ID card and, on the other hand, paying for necessities. This constitutes an undue and unconstitutional burden under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
80. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 2 Representatives Carl Ellis, Pamela Dukes, Anthony Sharp, and Anthony Judd’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
81. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, given that Defendants are forcing low-income, eligible Wisconsin voters to spend scarce financial resources in order to cast their votes, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
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the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 3 82. Class 3 is defined as all Wisconsin voters who are residents of Wisconsin for voting purposes, who lack any accepted photo ID, and who would be forced to surrender an out-of-state driver’s license in order to obtain a free Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes. 83. This class includes—but is not limited to—currently enrolled students at accredited Wisconsin colleges or universities whose colleges or universities have not issued compliant student ID cards, and who would be forced to surrender outof-state driver’s licenses in order to obtain free Wisconsin ID cards that they need in order to vote. 84. This surrender rule imposes a material requirement on voters who wish to obtain a free state ID card for voting purposes by forcing persons who are Wisconsin residents for voting purposes, but who possess out-of-state driver’s licenses, to choose between surrendering their driving privileges to obtain a free Wisconsin state ID card, paying a fee for a Wisconsin driver’s license, or losing their right to vote. 85. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to
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the class. Class 3 Representatives Anna Shea, Matthew Dearing, Max Kligman, Samantha Meszaros, Steve Kvasnicka, and Sarah Lahti’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
86. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 4 87. Class 4 is defined as: all currently enrolled students at accredited Wisconsin technical colleges who intend to vote in Wisconsin in 2012 and who lack accepted photo ID. 88. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 4 Representatives Sarah Lahti, Domonique Whitehurst, and
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Edward Hogan’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
89. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 5 90. Class 5 is defined as: all eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID, must prove citizenship to the DMV office and can only do so with certified and accurate copies of their birth certificates, lack certified and accurate copies of their birth certificates, and will need to pay one or more fees to obtain certified and accurate copies of their birth certificates. 91. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 5 Representatives Ruthelle Frank, Carl Ellis, Pamela Dukes,
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Anthony Sharp, and Anthony Judd’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
92. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, by forcing eligible Wisconsin voters to pay a fee in order to obtain a required primary document for a state ID card, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 6 93. Class 6 includes all veterans of a uniformed service of the United States who are eligible Wisconsin voters, lack accepted photo ID, and possess a Veterans Identification Card (“VIC”) issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. 94. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to
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the class. Plaintiffs and Class 6 Representative Carl Ellis’s claim is typical of the claims of the class, and Mr. Ellis will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
95. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, by refusing to accept U.S. government-issued Veterans Identification Cards, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLAIMS COUNT ONE: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment [Class 1] 96. The allegations contained in Paragraphs ___ through ___ are hereby incorporated in Count One of the complaint as if set forth herein.
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97. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the imposition of severe burdens on the right to vote unless they are narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
98. Eligible Wisconsin voters in Class 1 lack one or more primary documents required to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card and are or have been unable to obtain them. Members of Class 1 are subjected to multiple regulatory and practical barriers to obtaining a Wisconsin state ID card.
99. Since voters in this class are unable to obtain one or more of the necessary primary documents, they cannot obtain a photo ID and therefore cannot vote in Wisconsin.
100. The burden imposed on these class members’ fundamental right to vote is extremely severe—in many cases, rising to the level of a total deprivation of the right to vote. This burden is not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest.
101. Accordingly, the photo ID law imposes an undue burden as to this class of eligible Wisconsin voters and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to them.
COUNT TWO: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 2]
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102. The allegations contained in Paragraphs ___ through ___ are hereby incorporated in Count Three of the complaint as if set forth herein.
103. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the imposition of severe burdens on the right to vote unless they are narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
104. For the hundreds of thousands of eligible low-income and poor Wisconsin voters, paying a fee to obtain a certified and accurate copy of a birth certificate and/or incurring travel costs in order to obtain a Wisconsin ID card constitutes a severe burden on the right to vote.
105. The burden imposed on these voters is severe and not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling governmental interest.
106. Accordingly, the photo ID law imposes an undue burden on members of Class 2 and, therefore, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to Class 2.
COUNT THREE: Violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 3]
107. The allegations contained in Paragraphs ___ through ___ are hereby incorporated in Count Four of the complaint as if set forth herein.
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108. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”
109. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits states from conditioning the right to vote in federal elections on the payment of a tax or fee, or imposing on federal voters an additional condition—or material requirement—that would not apply if they paid such a tax or fee. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 538-42 (1965). Poll taxes on the right to vote in state elections are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966).
110. Wisconsin residents who possess and wish to retain an out-of-state driver’s license and who lack all the other accepted forms of photo ID will not be able to obtain free Wisconsin ID cards for voting purposes without surrendering their out-of-state driver’s licenses.
111. The compulsory surrender of an out-of-state driver’s license constitutes a material requirement imposed on an eligible voter who refuses to forfeit his/her right to vote without paying an unconstitutional poll tax.
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112. Therefore, as applied to Class 3, the photo ID law violates the TwentyFourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
COUNT FOUR: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 4]
113. The allegations contained in Paragraphs ___ through ___ are hereby incorporated in Count Five of the complaint as if set forth herein.
114. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the imposition of severe burdens on the right to vote unless they are narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance, and requires that any state election law which imposes reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on the right to vote be justified by the state’s important regulatory interests. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
115. The GAB has construed the photo ID law to authorize the use of accredited technical college ID cards for voting purposes; however, the ultimate disposition of this rule has been thrown into considerable doubt as described herein. Even though student ID cards from all other accredited colleges and universities in Wisconsin will be accepted, certain Wisconsin legislators believe
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technical college ID cards are excluded under the photo ID law and the administrative review process threatens to result in that exclusion.
116. This differential treatment of student ID cards from accredited 2-year colleges and student ID cards from accredited technical colleges is wholly arbitrary, not narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest, and not even justified by a merely important regulatory interest.
117. Accordingly, since it lacks a rational basis, the exclusion of technical college ID cards is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT FIVE: Violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 5]
118. The allegations contained in Paragraphs ___ through ___ are hereby incorporated in Count Six of the complaint as if set forth herein.
119. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”
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120. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits states from conditioning the right to vote in federal elections on the payment of a tax or fee, or imposing on federal voters an additional condition—or material requirement—that would not apply if they paid such a tax or fee. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 538-42 (1965). Poll taxes on the right to vote in state elections are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966).
121. The fee(s) required to obtain a certified and accurate copy of one’s birth certificate constitutes an unconstitutional poll tax for eligible Wisconsin voters in this class.
122. Accordingly, the photo ID law is unconstitutional as applied to members of Class 5.
COUNT SIX: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 6]
123. The allegations contained in Paragraphs ___ through ___ are hereby incorporated in Count Eight of the complaint as if set forth herein.
124. Veterans Identification Cards (“VICs”) contain the name and photo of the veteran and are issued by a U.S. government agency.
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125. The photo ID law does not permit the use of Veterans Identification Cards to cast a ballot.
126. This differential treatment of Veterans Identification Cards issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and military ID cards issued by a U.S. uniformed service (including the United States Army, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Coast Guard, the United States Public Health Services Commissioned Corps, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps), which are accepted as photo ID for voting purposes, is wholly arbitrary and lacks a rational basis.
127. Accordingly, the exclusion of Veterans Identification Cards from the list of accepted photo IDs is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that: (i) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 1
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 1;
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(ii) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 2 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 2;
(iii) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 3 under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 3;
(iv) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 4 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 4;
(v) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 5 under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 5;
(vi) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 6 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 6;
(vii) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); and
(viii) Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just.
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Respectfully submitted this 13th day of December, 2011,
/s Laurence J. Dupuis Laurence J. Dupuis Bar No.: 1029261 Karyn Rotker Bar No.: 1007719 American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin 207 E. Buffalo Street, Suite 325 Milwaukee, WI 53202-5774 Phone: (414) 272-4032 Fax: (414) 272-0182 ldupuis@aclu-wi.org krotker@aclu-wi.org
M. Laughlin McDonald* Jon Sherman* Nancy Abudu* American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc. 230 Peachtree Street, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone: (404) 523-2721 Fax: (404) 653-0331 lmcdonald@aclu.org jsherman@aclu.org nabudu@aclu.org
Karen E. Cunningham** Heather Maria Johnson** National Law Center for Homelessness & Poverty 1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400 Washington, DC 20005 Phone: (202) 638-2535 Fax: (202) 628-2737 kcunningham@nlchp.org hjohnson@nlchp.org
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*Attorney Admission Application Pending **Attorney Admission Application and Motion for Fee Waiver Pending
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 11-CV-01128

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) OF WISCONSIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JUDGE DAVID G. DEININGER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 12-CV-00185

DECISION AND ORDER In May 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (“Act 23”), which requires Wisconsin residents to present a document including photo identification (“photo ID”) in order to vote. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 104 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Wis. Stat. Ch. 5 and 6).1 The plaintiffs in the two cases captioned above claim the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment and/or Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

1 Act 23's photo ID requirement was in effect only in the February 2012 election. In March 2012, two separate Wisconsin circuit courts enjoined the statute on state constitutional grounds. As of the date of this decision, one of the injunctions remains in effect and both cases are pending in the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

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In the Frank case, individuals who are eligible to vote in Wisconsin contend that Act 23 violates both the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In the LULAC case, four organizations argue that Act 23 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. With the agreement of the parties, I handled the cases together without formally consolidating them and, in November 2013, conducted a two week trial to the court. In this decision, which constitutes my findings and conclusions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, I address the major issues presented. In an effort to make the opinion as readable as possible, I have placed several relatively technical discussions of expert testimony in appendices rather than in the text.
Before proceeding, I note that I am only addressing two of the plaintiffs’ claims—the Frank plaintiffs’ claim that Act 23 places an unjustified burden on the right to vote and the claim of both the Frank and LULAC plaintiffs that Act 23 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I do not address the Frank plaintiffs’ remaining claims, which are all constitutional claims. My reason for not addressing the remaining claims is based on the “longstanding principle of judicial restraint” under which courts are to “avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Camreta v. Greene, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained below, all of the plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunctive relief against enforcement of the photo ID requirement on the ground that the requirement violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This makes consideration of any of the Frank plaintiffs’ constitutional claims unnecessary. Still, I believe it is wise to consider the constitutional claim of whether Act 23 places an unjustified burden on the right to vote. As my analysis below will demonstrate, the Section 2 statutory claim and the unjustified-burden constitutional claim
2
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overlap substantially, in that many factual findings are relevant to both claims. Indeed, the Section 2 analysis is largely identical to the unjustified-burden analysis, except that the Section 2 analysis involves the additional question of whether Act 23 has a disproportionate impact on Blacks and Latinos and produces a “discriminatory result.”2 Thus, it would likely not be a wise use of judicial resources to address the Section 2 claim but leave the unjustified-burden claim unresolved. Addressing only the former claim could result in an appeal and then a remand to this court for consideration of the constitutional claim, and then a second appeal involving only the constitutional claim. Of course, by not addressing all constitutional claims, I am leaving the door open to successive appeals. But unlike the unjustified-burden constitutional claim, the remaining constitutional claims do not overlap substantially with the Section 2 claim and could more easily be addressed in separate proceedings.
My analysis proceeds as follows. First, I give an overview of the relevant provisions of Act 23. Second, I address the Frank plaintiffs’ claim that Act 23 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposes substantial burdens on the many eligible voters who do not currently possess photo IDs, and because such burdens are not justified by the state interests that Act 23 purports to serve. Third, I address the plaintiffs’ claim that Act 23 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it has a disproportionate impact on the voting rights of Blacks and Latinos. Finally, I briefly address some remaining procedural
2 Because the Section 2 and unjustified-burden analyses are highly similar, with the Section 2 analysis presenting additional questions that the unjustified-burden analysis does not, I discuss the unjustified-burden claim first.
3
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matters, namely, the Frank plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims of certain Frank plaintiffs.
I. Overview of Act 23 Under Act 23, in order to vote, a person must present one of nine forms of photo ID to prove his or her identity.3 An acceptable photo ID includes one of the following that is unexpired or that expired after the most recent general election:4 (1) a Wisconsin driver’s license, (2) a Wisconsin state ID card, (3) an ID card issued by a United States uniformed service, or (4) a United States passport. Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(a). A person may also present: (5) a naturalization certificate issued within the last two years, (6) an unexpired receipt issued when a person applies for a Wisconsin driver’s license, which is valid for 60 days as a temporary license, (7) an unexpired receipt issued when a person applies for a state ID card, which is valid for 60 days as a temporary ID card, (8) an unexpired ID card issued by a federally recognized Indian tribe in Wisconsin or (9) an unexpired ID card issued by an accredited Wisconsin university or college that contains the date of issuance, the person’s signature and an expiration date no later than two years from the date of issuance. Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(b)–(f). If a person presents a student ID, the person must also produce a document showing that he or she is currently enrolled. Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(f).
3 To qualify to vote in Wisconsin, a person must be a citizen of the United States, 18 or older and a resident of the state for 28 consecutive days prior to the election. Wis. Stat. § 6.02(1).
4 A general election is one held “in even-numbered years . . . in November . . . .” Wis. Stat. § 5.02(5).
4
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Act 23 does not allow an individual to use a Veteran’s ID Card, the photo ID that the United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs issues when veterans leave the military. Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 871. An individual also cannot use an ID from one of Wisconsin’s 16 twoyear technical colleges. The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board (“GAB”), a nonpartisan board consisting of six retired judges which administers Wisconsin elections, found that technical college IDs which met the requirements set out for student IDs were acceptable, but a legislative committee required the GAB to promulgate an administrative rule on the matter. The GAB did so, but both the legislative committee and the Governor must approve the rule and neither has done so. Tr. 879–80, 883.
When voting in-person, an individual must state his or her name and address and produce one of the accepted forms of photo ID. The clerk or poll worker will then check the poll list to determine if there is a registered voter with matching information and inspect the ID to see if the name on it conforms to the name on the poll list and the photograph reasonably resembles the individual. Wis. Stat. § 6.79(2)(a). If these requirements are met, the individual will be allowed to sign the poll book and receive a ballot. If an individual does not have a qualifying ID, he or she may cast a provisional ballot. However, such ballot will be counted only if the individual appears at the municipal clerk’s office with an acceptable ID by 4:00 p.m. on the Friday after the election. Wis. Stat. §§ 6.79(3)(b), 6.97(3)(b). Individuals requesting absentee ballots must also present photo IDs. Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(1)(ar), 6.87(1). A requester must mail in a photocopy of an acceptable photo ID with his or her request. Wis. Stat. § 6.87(1).
The statute provides limited exceptions. The photo ID requirement does not apply to: (1) absentee voters who have previously supplied acceptable photo IDs and whose
5
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names and addresses have not changed, Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)3, (2) absentee voters who are in the military or overseas, Wis. Stat. § 6.87(1), (3) voters who have confidential listings as a result of domestic abuse, sexual assault or stalking, Wis. Stat. § 6.79(6), (4) voters who have surrendered their driver’s licenses due to a citation or notice of intent to revoke or suspend the license who present a copy of the citation or notice, Wis. Stat. § 6.79(7), and (5) absentee voters who are elderly, infirm or disabled and indefinitely confined to their homes or certain care facilities, Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(2), 6.875. Additionally, an individual with a religious objection to being photographed can apply for a Wisconsin state ID card that does not include a photo. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(4g).
Individuals who lack a qualifying photo ID can apply for a Wisconsin state ID card at the Wisconsin Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). The cost for such a card is normally $18.00, but Act 23 requires the DMV to waive the fee if the applicant is a citizen who will be at least 18 on the date of the next election, and the applicant asks that the card be issued without charge for voting purposes. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(5)(a)3. To obtain a state ID card, a person must obtain certain primary identification documents and appear at a DMV service center to submit an application and be photographed.
II. Fourteenth Amendment Claim: Unjustified Burden on the Right to Vote The Frank plaintiffs are eligible Wisconsin voters who claim that Act 23's photo ID
requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposes an unjustified burden on their right to vote. The Constitution does not expressly provide a right to vote, but it does so implicitly. Harper v. Va. State Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (noting that the right to vote is “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all
6
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rights”). Further, the right to vote is a fundamental right protected by both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.’” (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (the right to vote is one of the liberty interests protected by the due process clause); Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 (“[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Thus, states may not enact laws that unduly burden the right to vote. No litmus test, however, neatly separates valid and invalid election laws. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008). Rather, the Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test that courts must apply on a case-by-case basis. Id.
The test adopted by the Court recognizes that, “as a practical matter, there must be substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). It further recognizes that an election regulation, “whether it governs the registration and qualification of voters . . . or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. Thus, courts applying the balancing test must weigh “‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury’” to the right to vote against “‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
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The rigor of the inquiry into the state’s interests depends on the extent to which the challenged election law burdens the right to vote. Id. Even very slight burdens “must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)).
In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered a claim similar to that of the Frank plaintiffs. The Crawford plaintiffs challenged an Indiana statute requiring citizens voting in person on election day, or casting a ballot in person at the office of the circuit court clerk prior to election day, to present a photo ID. 553 U.S. at 185. A majority of the Court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the statute was invalid. Although no opinion expressed the rationale of a majority of the Court, six Justices agreed that the Anderson/Burdick balancing test applied to the plaintiffs’ claim. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189–91 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 204–08 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The opinions differed, however, with respect to how the balancing test was to be applied. Justice Scalia’s view of the test was that a law could be evaluated only on the basis of its “reasonably foreseeable effect on voters generally,” rather than on its effect on subgroups of voters. Id. at 206 (emphasis in original). In contrast, Justice Stevens seemed to assume that a law could be invalid based on its effect on a subgroup of voters. Id. at 200–03. Here, however, he concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to produce a record that enabled the Court to determine whether the law placed an excessive and/or unjustified burden on the rights of a subgroup of voters. Id. at 200 (“[O]n the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.”). Justice Stevens determined
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that this gap in the record left the Court with no choice but to weigh the state’s justifications for the law against its “broad application to all Indiana voters.” Id. at 202–03. He and the Justices who joined his opinion concluded that because 99% of Indiana’s voting-age population already possessed photo IDs that would allow them to comply with the new law, id. at 188 n.6, the state’s general interests in the law were sufficient to justify the burdens it imposed on Indiana voters generally. Id. at 202–03.
Because in Crawford a majority of the Court agreed that a photo ID requirement such as provided in Act 23 is to be evaluated under the Anderson/Burdick balancing test, I will apply that test here. However, because a majority of the Court could not agree on how to apply the test, Crawford is not binding precedent on that matter. “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here, the opinion authored by Justice Stevens is the narrowest. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens concluded that the Indiana law was valid because the state interests justified the law’s burden on “all Indiana voters.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202–03. But Justice Stevens did not expressly answer the further constitutional question answered by Justice Scalia: whether a law could be invalidated based on the burdens imposed on a subgroup of voters. Justice Scalia answered “no” to this question, id. at 204–08, while Justice Stevens determined only that the plaintiffs had not shown that the Indiana law imposed excessive burdens on a subgroup of voters, id. at 200–03. Because Justice Stevens’s opinion is narrowest, and because Justice Stevens did not determine whether a law could be invalidated based on
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the burdens it imposes on a subgroup of voters, Crawford is not precedential as to that question.
To find the rule of decision, then, I revert back to Anderson and Burdick, which are cases that produced majority opinions. And as I read these cases, they require invalidation of a law when the state interests are insufficient to justify the burdens the law imposes on subgroups of voters. Both cases emphasized that “[a] court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789) (emphasis added). The focus of this language is the rights of an individual plaintiff rather than the rights of “voters generally.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 206 (opinion of Scalia, J.). This implies that an unjustified burden on some voters will be enough to invalidate a law, even if, because the law burdens other voters only trivially, the state’s interests are sufficient to justify the burden placed on such other voters. Moreover, in Anderson, the Court explicitly framed the question presented as whether the Ohio law at issue placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting rights of a subgroup of the state’s voters—namely, the subgroup composed of Anderson’s supporters. 460 U.S. at 782 (“The question presented by this case is whether Ohio's early filing deadline placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of Anderson's supporters.”). For these reasons, I conclude that a law like Act 23 is invalid if it imposes burdens on a subgroup of a state’s voting population that are not outweighed by the state’s justifications
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for the law. Given the above legal standards, I will proceed as follows. First, I will identify the
state interests the defendants put forward to justify Act 23 and assess the extent to which Act 23 is necessary to serve those interests. Second, I will identify and assess the magnitude of the burdens Act 23 imposes on the right to vote. Finally, I will determine whether the state’s interests are sufficiently weighty to justify those burdens.
A. The State’s Justifications for Act 23 The defendants claim that Act 23's identification scheme serves four state interests: (1) detecting and preventing in-person voter-impersonation fraud; (2) promoting public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process; (3) detecting and deterring “other types of voter fraud;” and 4) promoting orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping. Defs.’ Post-Trial Br. at 8.
1. Detecting and preventing in-person voter-impersonation fraud The defendants claim that Act 23 will deter or prevent voter fraud by making it harder to impersonate a voter and cast a ballot in his or her name without detection. Detecting and preventing in-person voter-impersonation fraud is a legitimate state interest, see Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196, and the photo ID requirement does, to some extent, serve that interest by making it harder to impersonate a voter at the polls. However, as explained below, because virtually no voter impersonation occurs in Wisconsin and it is exceedingly unlikely that voter impersonation will become a problem in Wisconsin in the foreseeable future, this particular state interest has very little weight. The evidence at trial established that virtually no voter impersonation occurs in
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Wisconsin. The defendants could not point to a single instance of known voter impersonation occurring in Wisconsin at any time in the recent past. The only evidence even relating to voter impersonation that the defendants introduced was the testimony of Bruce Landgraf, an Assistant District Attorney in Milwaukee County. Landgraf testified that in “major elections,” by which he means gubernatorial and presidential elections, his office is asked to investigate about 10 or 12 cases in which a voter arrives at the polls and is told by the poll worker that he or she has already cast a ballot. Tr. 2056–57. However, his office determined that the vast majority of these cases—approximately 10 each election—have innocent explanations, such as a poll worker’s placing an indication that a person has voted next to the wrong name in the poll book. Tr. 2057. Still, about one or two cases each major election remain unexplained, and the defendants contend that these one or two cases could be instances of voter-impersonation fraud. I suppose that’s possible, but most likely these cases also have innocent explanations and the District Attorney’s office was simply unable to confirm that they did.5 Moreover, the most Landgraf’s testimony shows is that cases of potential voter-impersonation fraud occur so infrequently that no rational person familiar with the relevant facts could be concerned about them. There are over 660,000 eligible voters in Milwaukee County,6 and if the District Attorney’s office finds two unexplained cases each
5 Landgraf did not explain the methods his office used to determine that there were innocent explanations for the vast majority of cases, but the defendants introduced into evidence memos discussing the steps the District Attorney’s office took to investigate two potential “stolen vote” cases. Defs.’ Ex. 1033, 1034. In both cases, the investigator interviewed the voter and the poll workers who recorded the allegedly fraudulent vote and reviewed the entry for the vote in the poll book. Id. This was the extent of the District Attorney’s investigation.
6 Frank Ex. 600 at 34 (Table 2).
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major election, that means that there is less than one questionable vote cast each major election per 330,000 eligible voters. The rate of potential voter-impersonation fraud is thus exceedingly tiny.
The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs confirms that voter-impersonation fraud does not occur in Wisconsin. The plaintiffs offered the testimony of Lorraine Minnite, a professor at Rutgers University who specializes in the study of the incidence of voter fraud in contemporary American elections. Professor Minnite studied elections in Wisconsin during the years 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012 to determine whether she could identify any incidents of voter fraud. She consulted a variety of sources of information, including newspaper databases, news releases by the Wisconsin Attorney General, criminal complaints, decisions by state courts, and documents issued by the GAB. From these sources, Minnite was able to identify only one case of voter-impersonation fraud. Tr. 1036–42. And the single case of voter-impersonation fraud did not involve in-person voter impersonation. Rather, that case involved a man who applied for and cast his recently deceased wife’s absentee ballot.7 Tr. 1041. Thus, from Minnite’s work, it appears that there
7 Act 23's photo ID requirement applies to absentee ballots, and thus had it been in effect at the time of this incident it may have prevented the man from voting his deceased wife’s absentee ballot. However, the man could have easily circumvented Act 23 in this instance if he possessed his deceased wife’s ID, since to vote absentee all a person needs to do is mail a copy of a photo ID with the request for an absentee ballot. Tr. 1041–42; Wis. Stat. § 6.87(1). Cf. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (noting that a photo ID requirement for absentee ballots is pointless because “[t]he voter could make a photocopy of his driver's license or passport or other government-issued identification and include it with his absentee ballot, but there would be no way for the state election officials to determine whether the photo ID actually belonged to the absentee voter, since he wouldn't be presenting his face at the polling place for comparison with the photo”).
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have been zero incidents of in-person voter-impersonation fraud in Wisconsin during recent elections.
Some have suggested that voter fraud might be more widespread than the low number of prosecutions indicates because the laws that prohibit voter fraud are underenforced. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953. However, the defendants do not suggest that there is any underenforcement of such laws in Wisconsin. And the evidence at trial indicates that such laws are vigorously enforced. In 2004, a Joint Task Force was created to investigate and prosecute voter fraud that occurred in Milwaukee during the 2004 presidential election. LULAC Ex. 68 ¶ 28. The task force included the United States Attorney, the Milwaukee County District Attorney, the Milwaukee City Attorney and a representative of the Milwaukee Police Department. In 2002, the United States Department of Justice started the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative in response to allegations of voter fraud across the country. LULAC Ex. 68 ¶¶ 20, 25. From 2002 to 2005, one of the goals of this initiative was to identify and prosecute individuals who committed voter fraud. Previously, the Department had only brought charges against conspiracies to corrupt the political process and not against individuals acting alone. One of the cities the Department focused on was Milwaukee. And, in September 2008, the Wisconsin Attorney General announced that his office was partnering with the Milwaukee County District Attorney to form an “Election Fraud Task Force” to detect, investigate and prosecute election fraud crimes in Milwaukee County. LULAC Ex. 812 ¶ 4. Before the 2010 general election, the Election Fraud Task Force expanded to include the district attorneys of 11 more counties. Id. ¶ 5. The task force not only followed-up on complaints about voter fraud, but it also dispatched teams of assistant attorneys general and special agents for the Division of
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Criminal Investigation to polling places across Wisconsin during the 2008, 2010 and 2012 elections, including the special June 2012 recall election. Accordingly, the lack of prosecutions for voter-impersonation fraud in Wisconsin cannot be attributed to underenforcement.
The defendants contend that the absence of known instances of voter-impersonation fraud could be explained by the fact that such fraud is difficult to detect. However, the witnesses called by the defendants to testify about their efforts to investigate voter fraud did not indicate that voter-impersonation fraud is difficult to detect. When Michael Sandvick, a former Milwaukee police officer, was asked at trial whether or not voter fraud was difficult to detect, he answered, “There are different types of voter fraud. Some of them are hard to detect and some of them are not.” Tr. 2036. When asked what types are hard to detect, he gave only one example: someone using a fake address to vote. He did not mention voter impersonation.
Moreover, if voter impersonation is occurring often enough to threaten the integrity of the electoral process, then we should be able to find more evidence that it is occurring than we do. If, for example, voter impersonation is a frequent occurrence, then we should find more than two unexplained cases per major election in which a voter arrives at the polls only to discover that someone has already cast a ballot in his or her name. Another way to determine whether voter impersonation is occurring is a method suggested by the defendants’ expert witness, M.V. Hood III, a professor of political science at the University of Georgia. See M.V. Hood III & William Gillespie, They Just Do Not Vote Like They Used To: A Methodology to Empirically Assess Election Fraud, 93 Social Science Quarterly 76 (March 2012). Professor Hood and his coauthor explain that one way to commit voter-
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impersonation fraud is to impersonate a registered voter who is recently deceased. Obviously, the deceased voter cannot show up at the polls, and thus a person who wanted to cast an illegal ballot could appear at the place where the deceased voter was registered and give the deceased voter’s name. Hood’s method for detecting this type of fraud involves comparing a database of deceased registered voters to a database of persons who had cast ballots in a recent election. If the researcher is able to match entries in both databases, then further investigation could be undertaken to determine whether voter impersonation had occurred. Hood and his coauthor applied this methodology to the 2006 elections in Georgia and found no evidence of ballots being illegally cast in the name of deceased voters. Id. at 81–92.
Thus, although voter-impersonation fraud may be difficult to detect, it is not invisible. If it is occurring in Wisconsin to any significant extent, then at trial the defendants should have been able to produce evidence that it is. The absence of such evidence confirms that there is virtually no voter-impersonation fraud in Wisconsin.
The defendants also contend that even if there currently is no voter impersonation in Wisconsin, the state has an interest in taking steps to prevent voter-impersonation fraud from becoming a problem in the future. In support of this contention, the defendants point out that the Supreme Court has stated that legislatures “should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1986). However, the Supreme Court has also stated that states cannot burden the right to vote in order to address dangers that are remote and only “theoretically imaginable.” Williams v. Rhodes,
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393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968). In the present case, no evidence suggests that voter-impersonation fraud will become a problem at any time in the foreseeable future. As the plaintiffs’ unrebutted evidence shows, a person would have to be insane to commit voterimpersonation fraud. The potential costs of perpetrating the fraud, which include a $10,000 fine and three years of imprisonment, are extremely high in comparison to the potential benefits, which would be nothing more than one additional vote for a preferred candidate (or one fewer vote for an opposing candidate), a vote which is unlikely to change the election’s outcome. Tr. 1017–19, 1342. Adding to the cost is the fact that, contrary to the defendants’ rhetoric, voter-impersonation fraud is not “easy” to commit. To commit voterimpersonation fraud, a person would need to know the name of another person who is registered at a particular polling place, know the address of that person, know that the person has not yet voted, and also know that no one at the polls will realize that the impersonator is not the individual being impersonated. Tr. 1341. The defendants offered no evidence at trial to support the notion that it is easy to obtain this knowledge. Thus, given that a person would have to be insane to commit voter-impersonation fraud, Act 23 cannot be deemed a reasonable response to a potential problem.8
2. Promoting public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process
The defendants claim that the photo ID requirement serves the state’s interest in
8 I also note that, if the state were concerned with preventing voter fraud from becoming a problem in the future, it would be taking steps to combat forms of voter fraud other than in-person voter impersonation. As Professor Barry Burden explained, “[i]f there is fraud taking place on any scale, it’s going to be more likely to happen with absentee ballots and with voter registration, but that’s not where [Act 23] targeted its efforts in an effort to stop voter fraud.” Tr. 1342.
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promoting confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. It is true that the state has an interest in protecting the public’s confidence in the integrity of elections so that citizens are encouraged to participate in the democratic process. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197. However, the defendants produced no empirical support for the notion that Act 23's photo ID requirement actually furthers this interest. In contrast, one of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Barry Burden, a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, testified that the available empirical evidence indicates that photo ID requirements have no effect on confidence or trust in the electoral process. He described a study conducted by Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily and published in the Harvard Law Review which looked at the relationship between photo ID laws and voter confidence in the electoral process. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1756 (2008). Burden explained that this study employed multivariate analysis of survey data and found “zero relationship” between voter ID laws and a person’s level of trust or confidence in the electoral process. Tr. 1385.
Perhaps the reason why photo ID requirements have no effect on confidence or trust in the electoral process is that such laws undermine the public’s confidence in the electoral process as much as they promote it. As Professor Minnite testified, the publicity surrounding photo ID legislation creates the false perception that voter-impersonation fraud is widespread, thereby needlessly undermining the public’s confidence in the electoral process:
Q. And based on your research, do you think the public thinks there’s more voter fraud than there actually is?
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A. Yes.
Q. And why do you think that occurs?
A. Well, I think people don’t pay a lot of attention to these issues. I would imagine that concern about voter fraud is probably not on the very top of everyone’s list of concerns with respect to public policy or so forth, and so they don’t know a lot about it.
They don’t know a lot about how elections are run. They don’t know about all the details. They don’t pay a lot of attention when politicians are fighting over ID laws. They only know what they may pick up on a little bit from the news here and there. And when you have a lot of this discussion about voter fraud when voter fraud allegations are being made and they’re being picked up in the media and they’re being repeated over and over and over again, the public might generally have a sense that there might be a little bit of a problem.
And I’ve also written about how—and this is my view, how there’s kind of—we have a kind of cynicism about politics in the United States. And we have what I call the voter fraud myth, connecting to sort of the larger cultural myth about the corruption of politics and that people who engage in politics are somehow corrupt.
So it sort of connects to a broader sense to perhaps a new kind of cynicism when people are catching every now and then on the news or in the newspaper another story about somebody may have voted twice or . . . [an] “illegal” citizen may have cast an illegal ballot.
So in general, the sort of context over the last so many years that’s been created to the average person, I think they don’t know what to make of it.
So they defer to what we would call, in survey research, elite opinion. And when they hear people in important positions in government saying there’s a lot of fraud out there, when this particular law is meant address all this fraud, they’re going to intend to maybe take that on authority because they’ll say I don’t know. I don’t know how to run elections. I don’t hear too much about it, but I hear an important person or government official saying there’s a lot of fraud, I think that’s really influenced people to think that the problem is really bigger than it is.
Tr. 1019–20. Burden likewise testified that unsubstantiated allegations of voter fraud made
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by public officials undermine confidence in the electoral system. Tr. 1388–89. And Kevin Kennedy, the director of the GAB, in a letter to the Speaker of the Wisconsin State Assembly, offered the same opinion: “Speaking frankly on behalf of our agency and local election officials, absent direct evidence I believe continued unsubstantiated allegations of voter fraud tend to unnecessarily undermine the confidence that voters have in election officials and the results of the elections.” Tr. 1389.
Another way that photo ID laws undermine confidence in the electoral process is by causing members of the public to think that the photo ID requirement is itself disenfranchising voters and making it harder for citizens to vote, thus making results of elections less reflective of the will of the people. See Tr. 578–79, 582–83 (testimony that Act 23 will exacerbate the lack of trust that the Black and Latino communities already have in the system); Tr. 951 (Lorene Hutchins, a Wisconsin voter, testified that she believes Act 23 is designed to keep certain people from voting); Tr. 396 (testimony that many voters believe Act 23 was designed to confuse voters).
For these reasons, I conclude that Act 23 does not further the state’s interest in promoting confidence in the electoral process.
3. Detecting and deterring other types of fraud The defendants contend that the photo ID requirement will help detect and deter forms of voter fraud other than voter impersonation. However, the defendants do not adequately explain how that could be so. The first type of unlawful voting the defendants cite is “voting under invalid voter registrations.” Defs.’ Post-Trial Br. at 12–13. The examples the defendants give of this kind of voter fraud are voting by a registered voter who has been convicted of a felony and voting by a non-citizen who has managed to register to vote.
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However, the defendants do not explain how the requirement to present an ID at the polls will prevent these types of unlawful voting, and I cannot think of any way that it could. If a person is registered and has a valid ID, that person will be allowed to vote. No evidence in the record indicates that persons convicted of a felony or non-citizens will be unable to present qualifying forms of ID. The defendants also claim that the photo ID requirement will help prevent unlawful voting by registered Wisconsin voters who no longer maintain residency in the state but who have not yet been removed from the poll list and unlawful double voting by individuals who register to vote in more than one state. Again, however, the defendants fail to explain how the requirement to present a photo ID will prevent these forms of unlawful voting, and I cannot think of any way that it could. Thus, I find that Act 23 does not serve the state’s interest in preventing types of voting fraud other than in-person voter-impersonation fraud.
4. Promoting orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping
The final state interest cited by the defendants is the state’s interest in promoting orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping. Again, there is no question that this is an important state interest. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196. However, the defendants have not identified any way in which Act 23's photo ID requirement serves this interest that is distinct from the state’s interest in detecting and preventing voter fraud. See id. (mentioning the state’s interest in promoting orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping in the course of a discussion of the state’s interest in detecting and preventing voter fraud). Thus, Act 23 serves the state’s interest in orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping only to the extent that it serves the state’s
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interest in detecting and preventing voter fraud. For the reasons already discussed, Act 23 only weakly serves the latter interest.
B. The Burdens Imposed by Act 23 Act 23 applies to all Wisconsin residents. However, the burdens it imposes on the right to vote fall primarily on individuals who do not currently possess a photo ID. For those who already have a qualifying ID, such as a driver’s license, the barrier to voting that Act 23 creates is extremely low: such individuals must simply remember to bring their IDs to the polls. But, as I will discuss, many eligible voters do not currently have a photo ID. And the daily lives of many of these individuals are such that they have not had to obtain a photo ID for purposes such as driving.9 For these eligible voters, the requirement that they obtain a photo ID in order to vote erects a more substantial barrier. They must do whatever it takes to gather the necessary documents and make a special trip to the DMV in order to procure an ID that they will expect to use for no purpose other than to vote. Although it is true that those individuals who already have IDs must have at one time experienced the burdens and inconveniences of obtaining them (and must continue to experience the burdens and inconveniences of keeping their IDs valid), the photo ID requirement creates a unique barrier for those who would not obtain a photo ID but for Act
9 Tr. 40–41 (Alice Weddle testified that she does not have a qualifying ID, does not drive, has never flown on an airplane, has never left the United States and does not have a bank account); Tr. 55 (Plaintiff Eddie Holloway testified that he does not have a qualifying ID and has never traveled on an airplane); Tr. 207–08 (Plaintiff Shirley Brown testified that she does not have an ID and has never left the country or flown on a plane); Tr. 703–04 (Rose Thompson testified that before Act 23, she had no need for a photo ID); Tr. 434 (Kenneth Lumpkin testified that inner-city businesses understand that many of their customers do not have a photo ID and that they adapt as, for example, by cashing checks without requiring an ID).
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23. The individuals who obtained their IDs before the photo ID requirement went into effect (or who would today obtain an ID for reasons unrelated to voting) expect to derive benefits from having those IDs that are unrelated to voting. For example, a person who obtains a driver’s license receives a daily benefit—the ability to drive—from having experienced the burden of gathering the necessary documents and visiting the DMV. Once the photo ID requirement was adopted, that person received the benefit of being able to vote at no additional cost. In contrast, a person whose daily life did not require possession of a photo ID prior to the imposition of the photo ID requirement is unlikely to derive any benefit from possessing a photo ID other than the ability to continue voting. Yet that person must pay the same costs—in the form of the hassle of obtaining the underlying documents and making a trip to the DMV—as the person who obtained the ID for driving. This difference in expected benefits results in Act 23 imposing a unique burden on those who need to obtain an ID exclusively for voting, with the result that these individuals are more likely to be deterred from voting than those who already possess an ID for other reasons.
Based primarily on the testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Leland Beatty, a statistical marketing consultant with extensive experience in business and politics, I find that approximately 300,000 registered voters in Wisconsin, roughly 9% of all registered voters, lack a qualifying ID.10 To put this number in context, in 2010 the race for governor in Wisconsin was decided by 124,638 votes, and the race for United States Senator was decided by 105,041 votes. See LULAC Ex. 2 ¶ 10 & Table 2. Thus, the number of registered voters who lack a qualifying ID is large enough to change the outcome of
10 In Appendix A, I discuss in detail how I arrived at this figure.
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Wisconsin elections. In addition to these registered voters without an ID, there are a number of persons who are eligible to vote but not yet registered who lack an ID. Because Wisconsin permits same-day registration at the polls, any eligible voter may become a registered voter on election day. One of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Matthew Barreto, a professor at the University of Washington and an expert on voting behavior, survey methods and statistical analysis, conducted a telephonic survey of eligible voters in Milwaukee County. Professor Barreto found that there were 63,085 eligible voters in Milwaukee County alone who lack a qualifying ID.11
A substantial number of the 300,000 plus eligible voters who lack a photo ID are lowincome individuals who either do not require a photo ID to navigate their daily lives or who have encountered obstacles that have prevented or deterred them from obtaining a photo ID. At trial, I heard from eight witnesses who intend to vote in Wisconsin elections but who do not currently possess a qualifying photo ID. Seven of these witnesses are low income. Alice Weddle testified that she is unemployed, receives Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid benefits and has no bank accounts or credit cards. She attempted to obtain an ID but was unable to do so because she does not have a birth certificate. Eddie Holloway testified that he would be homeless if his sister did not agree to take him in, and that he is on various forms of public assistance. He testified that he attempted to obtain an ID but was unable to do so because of an error on his birth certificate that he cannot afford to have corrected. Rickey Davis testified that he is unemployed, has no bank accounts and attempted to obtain a photo ID but could not get one because he does not have a birth
11 In Appendix B, I discuss Professor Barreto’s conclusions in more detail.
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certificate. Shirley Brown testified that she lives on Social Security disability and attempted to obtain an ID but was unable to do so because she does not have a birth certificate. Melvin Robertson testified that he has no education beyond grade school and that he would like to obtain an ID but cannot because he lacks a birth certificate. Rose Thompson testified that after Act 23 was enacted, she attempted to obtain an ID but could not afford to pay the fees associated with obtaining her birth certificate from Mississippi. Sim Newcomb testified that he does not drive, relies on public transportation, has not recently traveled outside the United States, does not travel on airplanes, and that to the extent he needs a photo ID for banking, he is able to use his Veteran’s ID card, which is not an acceptable ID under Act 23. He testified that he attempted to obtain a Wisconsin ID card but could not satisfy the DMV’s documentation requirements.12
Professor Barreto’s research sheds additional light on the demographic makeup of those who lack an ID and lends further support to the conclusion that a substantial number of the 300,000 plus voters who lack an ID are low income. Barreto found that between 20,494 and 40,511 eligible voters in Milwaukee County who lack an ID earn less than $20,000 per year. Frank Ex. 600 at 31. As already noted, Barreto found that the total number of eligible voters in Milwaukee County who lack an ID is 63,085. Thus, individuals who make less than $20,000 per year comprise between 32% and 64% of the population
12 Many other witnesses, including public officials and employees of service organizations, testified that they have encountered many low-income voters who lack qualifying IDs. These witnesses include Nicole Collazo-Santiago, Yolanda Adams, Carmen Cabrera, Pastor Michelle Yvette Townsend de Lopez, Anita Johnson, Kenneth Lumpkin, Richard Bolar, Jayme Montgomery Baker, and Reverend Willie Brisco. Tr. 128–30, 137–49, 154, 163–72, 371–73, 397–400, 433, 436, 445–47, 491–92, 578, 582.
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of eligible voters without an ID. Barreto also found that 80.5% of the eligible voters without an ID have no education past the high-school level. Frank Ex. 600 at 29. Because individuals with less education are likely to be lower income,13 this finding also shows that a substantial number of voters who lack an ID are low income.
In light of the fact that a substantial number of the 300,000 plus voters who lack an ID are low income, Act 23's burdens must be assessed with reference to them rather than with reference to a typical middle- or upper-class voter. Although the latter voter may have little trouble obtaining an ID, he or she is not the type of voter who will need to obtain one in order to comply with Act 23. Thus, in the discussion that follows, I identify the burdens associated with obtaining a qualifying photo ID and explain how they will impact low-income voters.
For almost all low-income voters who lack an ID, the easiest ID to obtain will be the free state ID card, which is issued by the DMV. To obtain a state ID card, a person generally must present documents that satisfy four requirements: (1) proof of name and date of birth, (2) proof of United States citizenship or legal presence in the United States, (3) proof of identity, and (4) proof of Wisconsin residency. See Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15. The DMV will only accept certain documents to satisfy each of these requirements.14 However,
13 Tr. 1208 (Plaintiffs’ expert, Marc Levine, a Professor of History, Urban Studies and Economic Development at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, testified that education levels correlate “quite highly” with levels of employment.).
14 The DMV allows a person to apply for either a REAL ID compliant or noncompliant card. A REAL ID compliant card is a card that satisfies the minimum issuance standards set out in the REAL ID Act of 2005, and it will be accepted by the federal government for official purposes (such as entering a federal building or boarding a commercial airplane). In this opinion, I set out the requirements for obtaining a noncompliant card because they are a little more flexible.
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if a person has a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card that has been expired for fewer than eight years, the person will be allowed to renew using a procedure that generally requires only proof of a social security number. Tr. 1092–94; Defs.’ Ex. 1074.
To prove name, date of birth and United States citizenship, most people will need to produce a birth certificate. The evidence at trial showed that a substantial number of eligible voters who lack Act 23-qualifying IDs also lack birth certificates. Professor Barreto, in his survey of Milwaukee County eligible voters, found that 25,354 persons lacked both a qualifying ID and a birth certificate.15 Tr. 301–02. Seven of the witnesses who testified about their own lack of a qualifying ID stated that it was the lack of a birth certificate that was preventing them from obtaining an ID. Tr. 37–38, 93–94, 209–11, 401, 418–19, 708–09; Frank Ex. 606 at 7–12.
To obtain a Wisconsin birth certificate, a person must produce either a driver’s license or a state ID card or two documents from the following list: (1) a government-issued ID with photograph, (2) a United States passport, (3) a checkbook or bankbook, (4) a major credit card, (5) a health-insurance card, (6) a recent, signed lease, or (7) a utility bill or traffic ticket. Tr. 1663; Frank Ex. 138. The person must also pay a fee of $20. Wis. Stat. § 69.22(1)(a).16 Those who were not born in Wisconsin will need to determine how to obtain
15 Of those who lacked both an ID and a birth certificate, some were able to satisfy the name, date of birth, and citizenship requirements using other documents, and thus only 20,162 of the 25,354 persons who lacked birth certificates would have been unable to satisfy those requirements. Tr. 301–02.
16 After the passage of Act 23, two Wisconsin counties, Dane and Milwaukee, allocated sums to pay for Wisconsin birth certificates for persons born in those counties. Tr. 494, 535–36, 1793.
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a birth certificate from their place of birth. It generally takes more time and expense to obtain a birth certificate from outside one’s state of residence than it does to obtain a birth certificate from within the state. See LULAC Ex. 811 ¶ 60. Professor Barreto found that 46.9% of eligible voters in Milwaukee County who lack both an accepted photo ID and a valid birth certificate were born outside Wisconsin. Frank Ex. 600 at 24.
Individuals who need a free state ID card must also produce a document that the DMV will accept as proof of identity. Professor Barreto found that there are approximately 1,640 eligible voters in Milwaukee County alone who do not have qualifying photo IDs and do not have any of the documents the DMV accepts to prove identity. Frank Ex. 600 at 37. Newcomb, one of the eight witnesses who testified about their inability to obtain an ID, testified that when he tried to obtain a state ID card he was unsuccessful because he lacked proof of identity. Tr. 845–46. Other witnesses, Dewayne Smith and Carl Ellis, testified that they did not have proof of identity when Act 23 first passed and had to obtain such proof before they could apply for state ID cards. Tr. 562–63, 566–67, 856–58.
Most voters who do not have proof of identity will need to procure a social security card, as this is the most commonly available document to use to prove identity. Defs.’ Ex. 1077; Tr. 467, 1819. To obtain a social security card, a person must visit the Social Security Office and show “convincing documentary evidence of identity.” 20 C.F.R. § 422.10(c). Such evidence “may consist of a driver’s license, identity card, school record, medical record, marriage record, passport, Department of Homeland Security document, or other similar document serving to identify the individual.” Id. Voters who need free state ID cards to vote will not have driver’s licenses, state ID cards or passports, so they will need to present one of the other items on the list. If they do not have one of these items, they will need to
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procure one by visiting a school, hospital or another governmental agency, where they may again be asked for an ID, and the document may cost money. See Tr. 857 (Smith had to ask his sister to show the hospital her photo ID so he could get his medical records to apply for a social security card); Tr. 121 (marriage certificate from the State of Illinois costs $11).
The remaining documentary requirement to obtain a state ID card is proof of residence. For most voters, this requirement will be easy to satisfy, as the DMV accepts a variety of documents that most individuals are likely to have on hand. Still, homeless voters who do not have a relationship with a social-service agency will be unable to prove residency. Tr. 1889 (homeless people can only prove residence by getting a letter from a social service agency). And they will be unable to provide the DMV with a physical address where it can send their ID cards once they are ready. Id. This will make it impossible for them to obtain a state ID card because the DMV does not allow individuals to pick up ID cards in-person. Id.
Having explained the general legal requirements for obtaining a free state ID card and identified the necessary underlying documents, I consider the practical obstacles a person is likely to face in deciding whether to obtain an ID for voting purposes. Again, because most individuals who lack ID are low income, I consider these obstacles from the perspective of such an individual.
The first obstacle to obtaining an ID will be to identify the requirements for obtaining a free state ID card. I am able to summarize the requirements for obtaining an ID because I have access to the Wisconsin Statutes and Administrative Code and heard testimony on the topic at trial. A typical voter who needs an ID, however, must educate him or herself on these requirements in some other way. Although this may be easy for some, for others,
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especially those with lower levels of education, it will be harder. Moreover, a person who needs to obtain one or more of the required documents to obtain an ID, such as a birth certificate, must determine not only the DMV’s documentation requirements, but also the requirements of the agency that issues the missing document. This adds a layer of complexity to the process. See,e.g., Tr. 93–94 (Davis testified that the DMV told him he needs to order his birth certificate from Tennessee but he has no idea how to go about ordering it).
Assuming the person is able to determine what he or she needs to do to obtain an ID, the person must next consider the time and effort involved in actually obtaining the ID. This will involve at least one trip to the DMV. There are 92 DMV service centers in the state. Defs.’ Ex. 1071. All but two of these close before 5:00 p.m. and only one is open on weekends. Tr. 1083–84, 1806–07. So, it is likely that the person will have to take time off from work. The person will either need to use vacation time if it’s available or forego the hourly wages that he or she could have earned in the time it takes to obtain the ID. See Tr. 845 (Newcomb was unable to take paid time off from work to obtain an ID). The person will also have to arrange for transportation. Since this person does not have a driver’s license and is low income, most likely he or she must use public transportation or arrange for another form of transportation. See Tr. 845–46 (Newcomb does not have a car and had to take a 45-minute bus ride to get to the DMV); Tr. 211 (Brown paid $3.00 each way to a driver from Medicare so she could get to the DMV); Tr. 562, 566–67 (Ellis walked to the DMV, which took 45 minutes each way, because he does not have a car and could not afford bus fare); Tr. 151–52 (Adams testified that the DMV in Kenosha is “out in the county,” which means people who live in the inner-city and do not have cars must take the bus to
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get there); Tr. 430–33 (Lumpkin stated that the location of the DMV in Racine County is a problem because it is 3–5 miles away from the inner-city where the majority of the city’s population lives, and cabs do not serve the inner-city); see also Frank Ex. 635 at 50–51 (GAB received a lot of complaints from voters who were having a hard time getting to the DMV, even from people in the City of Milwaukee, which has a “pretty good” public transportation system). Further, for some individuals public transportation will be of no help because not all of the DMV’s service centers are accessible by public transit. Tr. 1848.
If the person does not have all of the documents the DMV requires to obtain an ID, then the person will most likely have to visit at least one government agency in addition to the DMV. If that is the case, then the person will likely have to take even more time off of work and pay additional transportation costs. Tr. 856–58 (Smith testified that he had to take the bus and ask for rides from others in order to visit the DMV, the Social Security Office, and other locations). Perhaps it is possible for a person to obtain a missing underlying document by mail, but even so that will require time and effort.
A person who needs to obtain a missing underlying document is also likely to have to pay a fee for the document. For some low-income individuals, it will be difficult to pay even $20.00 for a birth certificate. See Tr. 1988–89 (Robert Spindell, a member of the Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Milwaukee, stated that he personally knows individuals who will cannot pay even $20.00 for a birth certificate); see also Tr. 431–32 (“[W]hen the choice is made whether or not to pay $33 for an ID or to put some food on the table, I think any of us can kinda guess which way people will go.”). Three witnesses, Thompson, Davis and Ellis, testified that they could barely afford to pay for a birth certificate. Tr. 88, 564–66, 704–05. And Raymond Ciszewski testified that he has met many
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low-income individuals in Milwaukee who have trouble paying for their birth certificates.
Ciszewski is a volunteer at St. Benedict’s Church in Milwaukee. Tr. 530–31. He works in the
church’s birth-certificate program, which helps low-income individuals obtain birth
certificates by paying the birth-certificate fee to the extent it exceeds $5.00. Tr. 534–35. The
program primarily serves homeless individuals, persons recently out of jail and persons in
rehabilitation programs. Tr. 532–33. Ciszewski testified that over the last seven years he
has helped over 600 people acquire birth certificates who would not otherwise have been
able to afford them, and many of these people could barely afford the $5.00 co-pay the
church requires. Tr. 532, 534–36.17
17 Some voters will find that there is no birth certificate on file for them in the states where they were born. This is not a common problem, but it will affect some voters. Tr. 1103, 1161. Melvin Robertson and Nancy Wilde testified that they were born in Wisconsin, but the Wisconsin Vital Records Office does not have birth certificates on file for them. Tr. 401, 418–19 (Robertson); Frank Ex. 607 at 6–14 (Wilde). Missing birth certificates are also a common problem for older African American voters who were born at home in the South because midwives did not issue birth certificates. Tr. 37–38, 205–06, 209, 372, 431, 700. And Amish Mennonite voters frequently lack birth certificates. Tr. 1856–57. There are also some voters whose official birth records have been destroyed, for example, in a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina. Tr. 479–80, 1856–57.
If there is no birth record on file in a person’s state of birth, a person can use the MV3002 procedure to prove citizenship and name and date of birth. This procedure requires a person to ask his or her state of birth to complete DMV form MV3002, certifying that there is no birth record on file. Wis. Adm. Code § Trans. 102.15(1), (3)(b). A person must then submit the completed MV3002 to a DMV team leader or supervisor for review along with alternative documentation that provides “strong evidence” of the person’s “name, date of birth and place of birth.” Tr. 1872; see also Wis. Adm. Code § Trans. 102.15(1), (3)(b). Team leaders and supervisors have the discretion to decide on a caseby-case basis whether a person’s alternative documentation is “strong” enough. Tr. 1872; Wis. Adm. Code § Trans. 102.15(3)(c). As a result, whether a voter is able to obtain a state ID card will depend on which DMV service center the voter visits and which supervisor is on duty.
The DMV does not, however, publicize the MV3002 procedure because it wants to minimize exceptions. Tr. 474, 1872, 1877–78. As a result, a person who needs to use the MV3002 may never learn about it. Consequently, those who need to use it are more likely to give up trying to get an ID than to be granted an exception. The testimony of Debra
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An additional problem is whether a person who lacks an ID can obtain one in time
to use it to vote. For many who need an ID, it will take longer than a day or two to gather the
necessary documents and make a trip to the DMV. Indeed, if a person needs to obtain a
birth certificate, especially from another state, it might take weeks or longer to obtain it. Tr.
1114, 1660–61. If an election is imminent, a person may be unable to procure an ID in time
to vote or to validate a provisional ballot by the Friday after the election.
Another problem that arises is a person’s having errors or discrepancies in the
documents needed to obtain an ID. For example, the DMV requires the name on a person’s
Crawford illustrates this problem. Crawford testified that she first took her mother, Bettye Jones, to the DMV service center in Waukesha County to get a free state ID card for voting purposes. But a customer service representative at the DMV told Jones she could not get a state ID card because she did not have a certified copy of her birth certificate. Tr. 60–61. Crawford explained that her mother was born at home in Tennessee in 1935 and had never been issued a birth certificate, and Jones offered the DMV an official letter from the State of Tennessee stating that it had no birth record on file. Tr. 56–57, 61–62. The customer service representative told her this was not sufficient. Tr. 62. Crawford asked to speak with a manager, and the manager agreed with the front-line staff member and insisted that Jones produce a birth certificate. Tr. 62.
Crawford asked the vital-records office in Tennessee to conduct another search, which again produced no birth record. Tr. 64. She then started the complicated process of applying for a delayed birth certificate. Tr. 64–72. While she was doing this, she contacted the DMV again via email to confirm that the birth certificate really was required and was again told that it was. Tr. 74. When she asked a third time if an exception could be made for extenuating circumstances, she was told, “The supervisor at the DMV station you go to has the authority to make exceptions; however, I doubt one would be made for not having either a birth certificate or passport.” Tr. 74. Once she learned that supervisors had some discretion, Crawford decided to take her mother to the DMV service center in Milwaukee County in the hopes of finding a more helpful supervisor. Tr. 75. There the supervisor agreed to waive the birth certificate requirement after viewing Jones’s alternative documentation. Tr. 75. If Crawford had known about the MV3002 procedure, Jones’s experience with the DMV might have been much different. As it was, Jones only received a state ID card because her daughter made multiple inquiries and took Jones to two different DMV service centers. A voter in Jones’s position who is less tenacious will have to go through the difficult process of obtaining a delayed birth certificate in order to preserve her right to vote.
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social security card and birth certificate to match. If there is an error in a person’s social
security record, the person must visit the Social Security Office and correct the record. Tr.
1884.18 If there is an error in a person’s birth certificate, the person must get it amended.19
Making additional trips to government agencies to resolve discrepancies will require more
time off work and additional transportation costs.
The defendants contend that the burden on those with errors or discrepancies in their
18 Janet Turja, a manager at the DMV’s service center in Waukesha County, testified that she encounters individuals with errors in their social security records about once or twice a week. Tr. 480. And Diane Hermann-Brown testified that she had to take her mother to the Social Security Office because her middle name was “Lois” but Social Security had it listed as “Loise.” Tr. 1795–96.
19 Six witnesses testified at trial that they have had problems with birth certificates, either their own or a parent’s, that contained errors that the DMV said had to be corrected. See Tr. 43–51 (Holloway’s name is “Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr.” but the birth certificate says “Eddie Junior Holloway” and he has not been able to correct it); Frank Ex. 606 at 8–9; Frank Ex. 1087 (Ruthelle Frank’s maiden name was “Wedepohl” but it is spelled “Wedepal” on her birth certificate); Tr. 952–53, 965–68 (Lorene Hutchins’s birth certificate was missing her first name); Tr. 95–100 (Genevieve Winslow’s maiden name was “Genevieve Kujawski” but her birth certificate says “Ganava Kujansky”); Tr. 113–14 (Miriam Simon’s mother’s maiden name was “Shirley Grace Mendel” but birth certificate says “Genevieve Shirley Mendel”); Tr. 1615–16 (William Trokan’s father’s name was “Andrew Trokan” but birth certificate says “Andro Trokan”). Amending a birth certificate can be expensive and timeconsuming. The process depends on a person’s state of birth and the type of error in the birth certificate, but most states charge a fee for an amended birth certificate. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 69.22(5)(a) (standard fee for an amended birth certificate in Wisconsin is $30.00), see also Frank Ex. 606 at 9–10 (Frank was told it could cost up to $200.00 to get her Wisconsin birth certificate amended). And a person might need to travel to the place where he or she was born to collect documents that verify the person’s name, date of birth, or place of birth, such as early school records or a baptismal certificate. See Tr. 569–71 (the birth date on Reverend Willie Brisco’s Mississippi birth certificate was wrong and his grandmother in Mississippi had to collect his hospital and school records and travel 210 miles to apply for an amendment for him). A person might even have to hire a local attorney to apply for an amendment. Tr. 959–63 (to get her Mississippi birth certificate amended Katherine Clark had to hire an attorney and the process took more than six months and cost more than $2000).
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underlying documents is mitigated by the fact that the DMV has discretion to grant exceptions. Although it is true that the DMV will sometimes make exceptions for such persons, this fact is not made known to applicants, Tr. 1121–24, 1891–94, and thus those who might benefit from the exception procedure are unlikely to learn of it. Consequently, those with errors in their underlying documents are more likely to give up trying to get an ID than to be granted an exception. The testimony of Genevieve Winslow illustrates this problem. Winslow is eligible to vote in Wisconsin. She testified that she did not have a qualifying photo ID when Act 23 went into effect, so she visited the DMV service center in Milwaukee County on Grange Avenue to apply for a free state ID card for voting purposes. Tr. 111. She brought with her a certified copy of her birth certificate, a certified copy of her marriage certificate, her social security card, her Medicare card, her property tax bill and her expired passport. Tr. 106. But the DMV employee who reviewed her application told her she could not get an ID because her name is misspelled on her birth certificate. Tr. 99–100. Her maiden name was Genevieve Kujawski, but her birth certificate says “Ganava Kujansky” (Ganava is the Polish version of Genevieve). Tr. 95–96. The employee told Winslow she would need to get her birth certificate amended. Tr. 106–07. Winslow and her son asked to speak with two different supervisors, who both agreed that Winslow would need to get an amended birth certificate. Tr. 107. Her son was frustrated by this experience and decided to call Winslow’s state senator, Senator Tim Carpenter. Tr. 100–01. An aide in the senator’s office told Winslow’s son to contact James Miller, an official at the DMV. Tr. 100–01, 109–10. Miller said Winslow should return to the same DMV service center with the same documentation and ask for a particular supervisor. Tr. 110–11. When she did this, the DMV issued her an ID. Tr. 111–12. No one ever explained to Winslow why she was able
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to get an ID. They just told her it was a “special deal.” Tr. 101.20
20 Two other witnesses testified that to get an exception they also had to get a public official involved. Miriam Simon testified that her mother, Shirley Simon, who passed away shortly before trial, was eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Simon took her mother to the DMV service center in Milwaukee County on Mill Road after the passage of Act 23 so she could obtain a free state ID card for voting purposes. Tr. 116. Her mother brought a certified copy of her birth certificate, her social security card and a utility bill. Tr. 117. But the employee at the DMV who reviewed Simon’s mother’s application told her she could not get a state ID card because there was an error on her birth certificate. Tr. 118–19. Her mother’s maiden name was Shirley Grace Mendel, but her birth certificate said “Genevieve Shirley Mendel.” Tr. 113–14. All of her other documentation listed her married name, which was “Shirley M. Simon.” Tr. 117. Simon had anticipated a problem with her mother’s birth certificate and had brought an affidavit from her uncle explaining that the hospital had made an error when submitting the information for the birth certificate. Tr. 117–18. The affidavit was drafted in the 1970s and her mother had previously used it to obtain a passport. Id. The DMV employee said the affidavit was insufficient and suggested that Simon’s mother get an amended birth certificate. Tr. 118–19. Like Winslow, Simon was frustrated by this experience and decided to call her mother’s state senator, Senator Chris Larsen, for help. An aide in the senator’s office told Simon that the senator would have someone from the DMV call her. Tr. 119–20. Shortly thereafter, she received a call from DMV supervisor Barney Hall. Tr. 120–21. He told her that if she got a marriage certificate for her mother, the DMV would be able to issue her an ID. Id. She did this and returned to the DMV where a supervisor issued her mother a state ID card. Tr. 122–23.
William Trokan testified that he took his father, Andrew Trokan, to the DMV in Milwaukee County on Mill Road to get a free state ID card for voting purposes. Tr. 1614–15. His father brought a certified copy of his birth certificate, his social security card, his employee ID from Milwaukee County and a utility bill. Tr. 1615. But the DMV employee who reviewed his father’s application said he could not get an ID because his birth certificate listed his first name as “Andro,” which is the Slovak spelling of Andrew. Tr. 1615. All of his other documentation said “Andrew.” Tr. 1615–16. Trokan asked to speak with a supervisor, but the supervisor agreed that the birth certificate would need to be amended before the DMV could issue a state ID card. Tr. 1616. Trokan left frustrated and, like Winslow, called Senator Carpenter. Tr. 1616–1617. Senator Carpenter said he would set up an appointment for Trokan and his father to return to the DMV. Tr. 1617–18. During this second visit, the DMV issued Trokan’s father a state ID card. Id.
Kristina Boardman, the deputy administrator of the DMV, testified that the DMV has also received emails from public officials on behalf of other voters who had trouble obtaining state ID cards, and high-ranking DMV officials have intervened on behalf of those voters. For example, she received an email from Senator Carpenter’s office about Leo Navulis, a voter who was denied a free state ID card because his name is spelled wrong on his birth certificate. Tr. 1109. Navulis visited the DMV service center in Milwaukee County on Chase Avenue and presented a certified copy of his birth certificate and a social security card, but he was turned away because his social security card said “Leo Peter
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Given the obstacles identified above, it is likely that a substantial number of the
300,000 plus voters who lack a qualifying ID will be deterred from voting. Although not every
voter will face all of these obstacles, many voters will face some of them, particularly those
who are low income. And the evidence at trial showed that even small obstacles will be
enough to deter many individuals who lack an ID from voting. Professor Burden testified
about the “calculus of voting,” which is “the dominant framework used by scholars to study
voter turnout.” LULAC Ex. 811 at 811; Tr. 1278–83. Under this framework, even small
increases in the costs of voting can deter a person from voting, since the benefits of voting
are slight. Tr. 1279–80. As Burden explained:
[The framework] suggests that voting is a low-cost, low-benefit activity and that very slight changes, marginal changes in the costs can have large effects on participation. So even small factors like weather or illness, day-to-day interruptions can deter a person from voting. Obviously administrative costs imposed by the state could be part of that as well.
Tr. 1279–80; see also Tr. 1220–21 (Professor Levine also testified about the calculus of
voting). Thus, for many voters who lack an ID, even minor burdens associated with
obtaining one will be enough to deter them from voting. Cf. Crawford 472 F.3d at 951
(“[E]ven very slight costs in time or bother or out-of-pocket expense deter many people from
voting, or at least from voting in elections they're not much interested in.”). But in light of the
Navulis” while his birth certificate said “Leo Packus Navwulis.” Frank Ex. 428. Boardman reviewed Navulis’s case and told the supervisor at the DMV service center to make an exception and issue Navulis an ID. Id. Boardman also received some emails from Governor Scott Walker’s office asking officials at the DMV to assist voters who were having trouble obtaining state ID cards. For example, she received an email about Audrey Anderson, who had asked the governor for help because her mother had been denied an ID because there were errors in her birth certificate. Tr. 1861–63; Frank Ex. 429. In response to the email, Boardman asked another DMV official to meet with Anderson and try to resolve the situation. Id.
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evidence presented at trial, it is also clear that for many voters, especially those who are low income, the burdens associated with obtaining an ID will be anything but minor. Therefore, I conclude that Act 23 will deter a substantial number of eligible voters from casting a ballot.
C. Weighing the Burdens Against the State Interests In the previous section I determined that Act 23's burdens will deter or prevent a substantial number of the 300,000 plus voters who lack an ID from voting. “Substantial” is of course not a precise quantity, but a more precise measurement is impracticable. There is no way to determine exactly how many people Act 23 will prevent or deter from voting without considering the individual circumstances of each of the 300,000 plus citizens who lack an ID. But no matter how imprecise my estimate may be, it is absolutely clear that Act 23 will prevent more legitimate votes from being cast than fraudulent votes. Cf. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 953–54 (assessing whether “there are fewer impersonations than there are eligible voters whom the [Indiana photo ID] law will prevent from voting”). Thus, Act 23's burdens are not justified by the state’s interest in detecting and preventing in-person voter impersonation. Moreover, because the state’s interest in safeguarding confidence in the electoral process is evenly distributed across both sides of the balance—a law such as Act 23 undermines confidence in the electoral process as much as it promotes it—that interest cannot provide a sufficient justification for the burdens placed on the right to vote. Accordingly, the burdens imposed by Act 23 on those who lack an ID are not justified. Having found a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, I turn to the appropriate remedy. The lead opinion in Crawford noted that, even if the Indiana photo ID law placed an unjustified burden on some voters, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the proper remedy would be to invalidate the entire statute. 553 U.S. at 203. In the present case,
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however, invalidating Act 23 is the only practicable way to remove the unjustified burdens placed on the substantial number of eligible voters who lack IDs. The plaintiffs suggest that I could order the defendants to allow eligible voters without photo IDs to vote without showing an ID or by signing an affidavit affirming their identities and lack of an ID. However, ordering such relief would be the functional equivalent of enjoining the current law and replacing it with a new law drafted by me rather than the state legislature. It is not clear that this approach would amount to a narrower remedy than simply enjoining the current law. Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to avoid “judicial legislation,” United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995), and this is an apt term for the remedy envisioned by the plaintiffs. To grant this remedy, I would need to make a policy judgment as to whether eligible voters who do not have IDs should be required to sign affidavits of identity before receiving a ballot. And, if I found that an affidavit was required, I would need to decide what language the affidavit should contain. Once I issued this relief, I would have to supervise the state’s election-administration officials to ensure that they were properly implementing my instructions. These tasks are outside the limited institutional competence of a federal court, and therefore I may not rewrite the photo ID requirement to conform it to constitutional requirements. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 329–30 (2006). I conclude that the only practicable remedy is to enjoin enforcement of the photo ID requirement.21
21 I also note that the defendants have not suggested that any remedy other than enjoining enforcement of the photo ID requirement would be an appropriate remedy in this case.
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III. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Both the LULAC plaintiffs and the Frank plaintiffs contend that Act 23's photo ID requirement violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Before addressing the merits of this claim, I address the defendants’ argument that the LULAC plaintiffs lack standing to sue under the Voting Right Act. A. Standing of LULAC plaintiffs The defendants contend that the four LULAC plaintiffs lack standing to pursue a claim for injunctive relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Whether they do has little practical significance, as the plaintiffs in the Frank case unquestionably have standing to pursue a claim for injunctive relief under Section 2, and only one plaintiff with standing is needed. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951. Nonetheless, because one or more of the plaintiffs with standing might drop out of this case before it is finally resolved, I will determine whether all four of the LULAC plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief under Section 2. The defendants argue that the LULAC plaintiffs lack Article III standing and also lack what is known as “statutory standing.” I will begin with Article III standing, which requires a plaintiff to show that he or she has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged acts of the defendant and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Each element of standing must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. Id. at 561. We are at the trial stage of this case, and so the elements of standing must be supported by the evidence adduced at trial. Id.
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The only element of Article III standing that is in dispute is whether the LULAC plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact. For this reason, I will not discuss the traceability or redressability elements.
The LULAC plaintiffs contend that they have established standing in two ways. First, they contend that they have standing to seek redress for their own injuries. Second, they contend that they have “associational” standing, which allows an organizational plaintiff to bring suit to redress an injury suffered by one or more of its members, even if the organization itself has not been injured. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
Turning first to the question of whether the LULAC plaintiffs have suffered their own injuries, I conclude that they have. It is well-established that an organization suffers a cognizable injury in fact when it devotes resources, however minimal, to dealing with effects of a law that are adverse to its interests. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982); Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951. I find based on the evidence adduced at trial that all four LULAC plaintiffs have devoted resources to dealing with the effects of Act 23 and would devote additional resources to dealing with those effects if the state-court injunctions were lifted. Each plaintiff devoted resources to educating its members and others whose interests it serves about the law and to helping individuals obtain qualifying forms of photo ID, and each plaintiff would do so again if Act 23 were reinstated. Tr. 146–49, 185–88 (LULAC); Tr. 375, 386 (Cross Lutheran Church); Tr. 343–47, 357–58 (Milwaukee Area Labor Council); Tr. 489–92, 519–20 (Wisconsin League of Young Voters). Accordingly, all four plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief to redress their own injuries.
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The defendants advance two reasons why the LULAC plaintiffs do not have standing in their own right. First, relying on a case from the Fifth Circuit, the defendants point out that not every diversion of resources establishes an injury in fact. See NAACP v. City of Kyle, Texas, 626 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010). But Kyle does not suggest that the diversion of resources demonstrated by the plaintiffs in this case fails to qualify as an injury in fact. The resources found insufficient in that case were resources spent litigating the very claim at issue in the suit.22 Id. at 238. In the present case, no plaintiff is claiming litigation expenses as an injury in fact. Rather, they point to resources expended on educating their members and others about the requirements of Act 23 and on ensuring that those members and others obtain forms of identification that would allow them to vote. This is precisely the kind of expenditure of resources that the Seventh Circuit deemed sufficient to support standing in Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951.
Second, the defendants contend that the LULAC plaintiffs lack standing because they voluntarily spent resources in response to Act 23 and were not compelled to do so. This argument, as another court has recognized, “finds no support in the law.” Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1166 (11th Cir. 2008). If a voluntary as opposed to compelled expenditure of resources were insufficient to confer standing, then Crawford was wrongly decided, as Indiana’s photo-identification law did not “compel” the
22 The court also found that although the plaintiffs claimed to have spent resources on “prelitigation” activities, they failed to prove that they actually expended resources on such activities in response to the challenged law. Kyle, 626 F.3d at 238–39. The court found the plaintiffs had only “conjectured” that in the absence of the law they would have spent their resources elsewhere. Id. at 239. In the present case, I find that the LULAC plaintiffs have shown concretely that but for Act 23, they would have spent their resources elsewhere.
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Democratic Party to expend resources on getting its supporters to the polls.23 Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951. The only support the defendants can find for their argument is a single sentence in a Seventh Circuit opinion, which the defendants take out of context. The sentence is “No one has standing to object to a statute that imposes duties on strangers.” Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2011). Taken out of context, this sentence implies that a person lacks standing to challenge a statute unless the statute imposes a legal duty on him or her, and that therefore a voluntary expenditure of resources made in response to the effects of the statute would not qualify as an injury in fact. But the law at issue in that case was a law requiring the President of the United States to issue each year a proclamation designating the first Thursday in May as a National Day of Prayer. Id. at 805. This law imposed no duties on anyone other than the President, and in addition it could not have prompted the plaintiff or anyone other than the President to expend any resources at all, voluntarily or not. Thus, placed in its proper context, the sentence cited by the defendants stands for the simple proposition that a person does not have standing to challenge a law that causes him or her no injury in fact. It does not stand for the proposition that a voluntary expenditure of resources does not qualify as an injury in fact.
Having found that the LULAC plaintiffs have standing to sue to redress their own injuries, I need not decide whether they also have standing to sue on behalf of their members. However, in the event that it becomes a relevant question on appeal, I will
23 I realize that the opinion in Crawford states that the Indiana law “compell[ed]” the Democratic Party to devote resources to getting its supporters to the polls, but it is obvious that the opinion was not using “compelled” in the sense of “required by law.” The Indiana law did not require the Democratic Party to do anything.
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determine whether the LULAC plaintiffs also have standing to sue on behalf of their members. An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the association's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
With respect to the first Hunt element, a member of one of the plaintiffs would have standing in his or her own right if that member is suffering an injury in fact. The defendants argue that the only way a member of the plaintiffs—that is, an individual voter—could be suffering an injury as a result of Act 23 is if that member currently lacks an acceptable form of photo ID and is unable to obtain an acceptable form of photo ID. However, the part of Act 23 that the plaintiffs challenge is the provision requiring a voter to present a photo ID at the polls. It is the need to present such an ID that injures a voter and confers standing to sue. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[r]equiring a registered voter either to produce photo identification to vote in person or to cast an absentee or provisional ballot is an injury sufficient for standing”). This means that even those members of the plaintiffs who currently possess an acceptable form of ID have standing to sue. Id. at 1352 (“[T]he lack of an acceptable photo identification is not necessary to challenge a statute that requires photo identification to vote in person.”).24 Thus, every member of the plaintiff organizations who is a Wisconsin voter has suffered an injury in fact. As the defendants do not dispute that each plaintiff has members who intend
24 I also note that IDs expire, and so even if a person currently holds a valid ID, Act 23 burdens that person with the obligation of keeping it valid.
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to vote in Wisconsin elections, I conclude that all four LULAC plaintiffs have members who are injured by Act 23.
Moreover, even if the lack of an acceptable photo ID were a prerequisite to standing, at least one of the LULAC plaintiffs, Cross Lutheran Church, has members who lack such an ID. Weddle, an African American member of the Church, testified at trial that she currently does not possess an acceptable form of photo identification. Tr. 35–36. I find her testimony credible and conclude that she does not, in fact, possess an acceptable form of photo identification. The defendants contend that Weddle could if she tried hard enough obtain an acceptable form of identification, but this has no bearing on her standing to sue. The premise of this lawsuit is that voters should not have to bear the burdens associated with obtaining and presenting identification in order to vote. A plaintiff who must bear those burdens in order to vote is necessarily injured by Act 23, whether or not he or she would be successful in obtaining and presenting an ID. Accordingly, I find that Cross Lutheran Church has members who have standing to challenge Act 23 on the ground that they lack acceptable forms of ID.25
The second Hunt element requires that the lawsuit be “germane” to the organization’s purpose. I find that this lawsuit is germane to each LULAC plaintiff’s purpose. LULAC’s mission is to “advance the economic condition, educational attainment, political influence, housing, health, and civil rights of the Hispanic population of the United States.” Tr. 158–59. It is hard to imagine a suit that is more germane to this mission than the present
25 A representative of Cross Lutheran Church testified that it has members besides Weddle who lack acceptable forms of identification. Tr. 373. From this testimony, I conclude that Weddle is not the only member of the Church who lacks acceptable identification.
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suit, which seeks to remove a barrier to minority participation in the political process and thus advance the political influence of Hispanics. Cross Lutheran Church believes that God requires it to fight for the civil rights of its members. Tr. 365–66, 377–78. Again, it is hard to imagine a suit that is more germane to this purpose than the present suit. One of the purposes of the Milwaukee Area Labor Council is “[t]o organize for social and economic justice, to propose and support legislation that is beneficial to working families, and to oppose legislation that harms working people.” Tr. 342–43. Again, the present suit is germane to this purpose. Finally, this lawsuit is obviously germane to one of the purposes of the League of Young Voters Education Fund, which is to encourage young people of color to vote. Tr. 518.
The third Hunt element asks whether the claim asserted or the relief requested requires the participation of the organization’s members in the lawsuit. I conclude that the participation of members is not required. The claims were tried without substantial participation by the plaintiffs’ members, and nothing about the relief requested—an injunction—requires their participation. Accordingly, this element is satisfied.
Having concluded that the four LULAC plaintiffs have Article III standing, I turn to the defendants’ remaining standing argument, which is that the plaintiffs lack “statutory standing.” As I noted in a prior opinion, LULAC ECF No. 84, “statutory standing” is not a matter of standing in the Article III sense but a question of substantive law. The question is whether the statute under which the plaintiffs sue, here Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, authorizes the plaintiffs to sue. See Steel Co v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 92 (1998).
With respect to that question, Section 2 allows suits to be instituted by “aggrieved 46
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person[s].” See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a. The Supreme Court has determined that similar language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 incorporates the “zone of interests” test. Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 863, 870 (2011). Under this test, a plaintiff may not sue unless he falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. Id. at 870. The test denies a right to sue where “the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Id. (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987)).
The defendants contend that only individuals seeking to enforce their right to vote are within the zone of interests of Section 2, and that organizations seeking to protect the voting rights of individuals are not within the zone of interests. I disagree. The word “person” in an act of Congress is presumed to include organizations, see 1 U.S.C. § 1, and thus the text of the statute does not suggest that a cause of action under Section 2 is limited to individuals. Moreover, the Senate Report on the bill that added the “aggrieved persons” language to the Voting Rights Act confirms that Congress intended to confer a right to sue on organizations seeking to protect the voting rights of their members and others. See S. Rep. No. 94-295, at 40 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 806–07 (“An ‘aggrieved person’ is any person injured by an act of discrimination. It may be an individual or an organization representing the interests of injured persons.”). The evidence adduced at trial establishes that all four LULAC plaintiffs are organizations representing the interests of individuals whose voting rights are burdened by Act 23. Therefore, I find that all four LULAC plaintiffs fall within the zone of interests of Section 2 and are aggrieved persons within the
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meaning of Section 2. In support of their argument that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved persons, the
defendants cite Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1989), and various district court cases that rely on Roberts.26 In Roberts, the Eighth Circuit held that “an unsuccessful candidate attempting to challenge election results does not have standing under the Voting Rights Act.” 883 F.2d at 621. Neither this holding nor the reasoning that led to it supports the defendants’ argument that organizations representing the interests of injured voters cannot be aggrieved persons under Section 2. In fact, the Eighth Circuit implied that had the plaintiff in Roberts been suing to protect the rights of other voters, he would have been an aggrieved person. Id. (“Nor does Roberts allege that he is suing on behalf of persons who are unable to protect their own rights.”). Accordingly, the defendants’ reliance on Roberts and the district court cases decided in its wake is misplaced.
In sum, I find that all four LULAC plaintiffs have Article III standing in two ways: they have standing to seek redress for their own injuries and also associational standing. I also find that all four plaintiffs have statutory standing.
B. Merits Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits states from imposing or applying “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). To prove a Section 2 violation, a plaintiff does not
26 The defendants cite one district court case that does not rely on Roberts, Assa‘ad–Faltas v. South Carolina, 2012 WL 6103204 (D.S.C. Nov. 14, 2012), but as I cannot see any way in which that case supports the defendants’ argument, I will not discuss it further.
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need to prove discriminatory intent. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 & n.21 (1991). Rather, a Section 2 violation is established “if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by [§ 1973(a)] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In the present case, the plaintiffs claim that the requirement to show a photo ID is a voting practice that results in Blacks and Latinos having less opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Before going further, I must determine how to apply Section 2 in the context of a challenge to a voting practice like the requirement to present a photo ID at the polls. Much of the Section 2 jurisprudence was developed in the context of so-called “vote dilution” cases. The term “vote dilution”—which is contrasted with the term “vote denial”—describes cases involving structural devices, such as at-large elections and redistricting plans, that can be used to minimize or cancel out the effect of minority votes. At-large elections can be used to minimize or cancel out the effect of minority votes because they submerge a minority group that would likely constitute a majority in a single-member district within a larger white majority. Redistricting plans can be used to minimize or cancel out the effect of minority votes because they scatter a minority voting bloc that would likely constitute a majority in a properly drawn district among several irregular districts, with the result that the minority voting bloc within any single district is too small to constitute a majority. The present case does not involve at-large elections, redistricting plans, or similar structural devices, and
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the legal standards developed for dealing with those devices do not necessarily apply here. For example, the so-called “Senate factors” or “Gingles factors,” see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1978), play a central role in vote-dilution cases. However, those factors were developed to assist courts in resolving the tension between, on the one hand, ensuring that structural practices such as at-large elections and redistricting plans are not used to dilute minority voting power, and, on the other, the Congressional directive that Section 2 does not require proportional representation. See Baird v. City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1992); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 722 (2006). Factors developed for this purpose are not necessarily relevant to cases, like this one, that do not present that tension, and in any event the federal courts have largely disregarded the Senate factors in Section 2 cases that do not involve challenges to at-large elections, redistricting plans, and the like. See Tokaji, supra, at 720–21 (arguing that the Senate factors do not help courts decide cases that do not involve vote dilution and observing that the lower courts have mostly disregarded those factors in vote-denial cases). Thus, I cannot resolve the present issue by applying the legal standards developed for vote-dilution cases.27
Although the vast majority of Section 2 cases involve vote dilution, appellate courts have extensively discussed Section 2 in the context of felon disenfranchisement, which does not involve vote dilution and falls into the category of “vote denial.” See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson
27 The defendants agree that the Senate factors are designed for vote-dilution cases and that they should not be applied in the present case. Defs.’ Post-Trial Br. at 48–50.
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v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). However, the consensus that has emerged in those cases is that laws disenfranchising felons do not violate Section 2 because those laws existed when the Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 and the legislative history of the Act supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to invalidate them. See, e.g., Farrakhan, 623 F.3d at 993 (finding that “[f]elon disenfranchisement laws have a long history in the United States,” and that “Congress was no doubt aware of these laws when it enacted the VRA in 1965 and amended it in 1982, yet gave no indication that felon disenfranchisement was in any way suspect”). This reasoning obviously does not apply to voter photo identification requirements, which are a recent phenomenon. See Kathleen M. Stoughton, A New Approach to Voter ID Challenges: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 292, 296–98 (2013) (describing history of voter ID legislation, which begins in the year 2000). Thus, the felondisenfranchisement cases are not helpful.
Because the cases contain only limited guidance,28 I will focus on the text of the statute. See Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the importance of considering the text of Section 2). The key language states that a violation of Section 2 is established if the totality of the circumstances shows that the challenged voting practice results in a political process that is not “equally open to participation by members [of a minority group],” in that the members of that group “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
28 There is one appellate case applying Section 2 in the photo ID context, Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). However, that case does not set out a comprehensive test governing Section 2 photo ID cases.
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representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The meaning of this language is clear: “Section 2 requires an electoral process ‘equally open’ to all, not a process that favors one group over another.” Gonzalez, 535 F.3d at 598. Justice Scalia, in a dissent in a votedilution case, provided the following illustration of the meaning of Section 2: "If, for example, a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week, and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites, blacks would have less opportunity ‘to participate in the political process’ than whites, and Section 2 would therefore be violated . . . ." Chisom, 501 U.S. at 407–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Based on the text, then, I conclude that Section 2 protects against a voting practice that creates a barrier to voting that is more likely to appear in the path of a voter if that voter is a member of a minority group than if he or she is not. The presence of a barrier that has this kind of disproportionate impact prevents the political process from being “equally open” to all and results in members of the minority group having “less opportunity” to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
The next question is whether the evidence adduced at trial shows that Wisconsin’s photo ID requirement creates a barrier to voting that is more likely to appear in the path of a voter if that voter is Black or Latino. The photo ID requirement applies to all voters, regardless of race. However, as explained in Section II.B, above, the requirement places a unique and heightened burden on those who must obtain an ID if they wish to continue voting in Wisconsin. These individuals are more likely to be deterred from voting than those who obtained their photo IDs for other reasons, such as driving. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that this unique burden disproportionately impacts Black and Latino voters. As the defendants concede, the plaintiffs’ evidence “shows that minorities are less
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likely than whites to currently possess qualifying ID.” Defs.’ Post-Trial Brief at 1. Because the defendants concede that minorities are less likely than whites to currently possess a photo ID, it is not necessary for me to discuss the evidence adduced at trial in support of this point and make explicit findings of fact. Nonetheless, because the parties presented substantial evidence on this question at trial and explicit findings might prove useful in the event of an appeal, I will explain how the evidence adduced at trial leads to the conclusion that, in Wisconsin, Blacks and Latinos are less likely than whites to possess a qualifying form of photo identification.
Three of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses offered testimony supporting the conclusion that Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin are less likely than whites to possess a qualifying ID. First, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of Leland Beatty. As discussed in more detail in Appendices A and C,29 Beatty compared a list of Wisconsin registered voters to a list of individuals holding a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card and attempted to determine how many registered voters could be matched to a corresponding driver’s license or state ID card. Then, using the assistance of a third party, Beatty determined the likely race of the Wisconsin registered voters who could not be matched to a driver’s license or state ID card and computed the percentage of registered voters of each race who lacked such forms of ID. After performing this analysis, Beatty concluded that minority registered voters in Wisconsin “were substantially more likely to be without a matching driver’s license or state ID than white voters.” Tr. 645. Specifically, he found that data for the year 2012 showed that
29 Appendix A discusses Beatty’s methodology and findings insofar as they bear on the question of the number of Wisconsin voters who lack an ID. Appendix C discusses Beatty’s methodology and findings insofar as they bear on the question of whether the voters who lack an ID are disproportionately Black and Latino.
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African American voters in Wisconsin were 1.7 times as likely as white voters to lack a matching driver’s license or state ID and that Latino voters in Wisconsin were 2.6 times as likely as white voters to lack these forms of identification. Tr. 646–47, 658; LULAC Ex. 2. He also found that data for the year 2013 showed that African American voters in Wisconsin were 1.4 times as likely as white voters to lack a matching driver’s license or state ID and that Latino voters were 2.3 times as likely as white voters to lack these forms of identification. Tr. 686; LULAC Ex. 817 ¶¶ 4, 9. I consider Beatty’s findings and opinions credible and have given them significant weight in making my findings of fact.
Before moving on, I note that Professor Hood performed a matching analysis that was similar to Beatty’s, except that he did not attempt to identify the race of the registered voters who did not possess an ID. As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, under some of Hood’s criteria for determining whether a given registered voter could be matched to an ID, Hood found that the number of registered voters who could not be matched was smaller than the number found by Beatty: Beatty found that about 317,000 registered voters lacked an ID, while under the loosest of Hood’s criteria only about 167,000 registered voters lacked an ID. For the reasons explained in Appendix A, I find Beatty’s number more reliable than Hood’s. But it is worth noting that when Beatty analyzed the racial breakdown of the voters Hood deemed to be without IDs, he found that the disproportionate impact on Blacks and Latinos was even greater: using Hood’s numbers, Beatty found that both Blacks and Latinos were more than twice as likely as whites to lack driver’s licenses or state ID cards. Tr. 682–84.
Next, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of Professor Barreto. Like Beatty, Barreto offered opinions on the existence of racial disparities in the possession of photo
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identification. However, the scope of Barreto’s opinions differ from Beatty’s in three ways. First, while Beatty examined ID possession by individuals who are registered to vote, Barreto examined ID possession by individuals who are eligible to vote. Second, while Beatty examined statewide possession rates, Barreto focused on Milwaukee County. Third, while Beatty focused on possession of driver’s licenses and state ID cards, Barreto investigated possession rates of all forms of Act 23-qualifying ID.
As indicated in Section II.B and Appendix B, Barreto’s opinions were based on a telephonic survey of Milwaukee County residents. The results of the survey showed that a sizable portion of the population of eligible voters in Milwaukee County do not possess either a qualifying form of ID or the documents needed to obtain a qualifying form of ID. Frank Ex. 600 at 16–17. Moreover, the results showed that Black and Latino eligible voters are less likely than white voters to possess a qualifying form of ID. Specifically, Barreto found that while only 7.3% of eligible white voters lack a qualifying form of ID, 13.2% of eligible African American voters and 14.9% of eligible Latino voters lack a qualifying form of ID. Tr. 304.
The defendants offer several reasons why I should give Barreto’s findings limited weight. I have already discussed these reasons somewhat in Appendix B, in the context of determining the number of Wisconsin voters who lack IDs and the burdens they will face. Here I will discuss these reasons in the context of determining whether those who lack qualifying IDs are disproportionately likely to be Black or Latino.
First, the defendants contend that Barreto’s findings are outdated. The survey was conducted in January of 2012, and the trial of this matter was held in November of 2013. The defendants note that between the time of the survey and the time of trial, Wisconsin’s
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free ID program was in effect, that a significant number of people obtained IDs through this program during that time, and that a disproportionate share of free IDs were issued to Black and Latino voters. Thus, argue the defendants, it is possible that the free ID program mitigated somewhat the disparity in possession rates by the time of trial. I agree that this is possible. But the defendants do not suggest that the free ID program eliminated the disparity in possession rates identified in Barreto’s survey. Moreover, at the time of Barreto’s survey, the free ID program had been in effect for six months,30 and thus to some extent the survey results do account for the issuance of free IDs. Finally, it would be speculative to conclude that those who obtained free IDs since the time of Barreto’s survey are individuals who previously lacked a qualifying form of ID. Many of the free IDs could have been issued as replacement IDs to individuals who already possessed IDs at the time of Barreto’s survey, or as duplicate IDs to individuals who already possessed another form of ID at the time of the survey, such as a driver’s license.31 And looking at the number of free IDs issued in isolation fails to take into account possible changes in the population of eligible voters: perhaps there has been an increase in the population of eligible voters, and although many new voters have obtained free IDs, many others have not obtained any form of ID. The defendants’ own expert witness agreed that it would be speculative to draw conclusions about the disparity in possession rates based on the issuance of free IDs alone.
30 The free ID program began in July 2011, Tr. 1806, and Barreto’s survey was conducted between December 2011 and January 2012.
31 As discussed in Appendix B, although the DMV is not supposed to issue state ID cards to individuals who already possess a valid driver’s license, the data that the DMV provided to Beatty and Hood reflects that the DMV has issued many individuals both a driver’s license and a state ID card. See also Tr. 739.
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Tr. 1559–61. Finally, Beatty updated his matching analysis just prior to trial, and he found that racial disparities in possession rates persist. Thus, despite the age of Barreto’s survey, I remain convinced that his results support the conclusion that Blacks and Latinos are less likely than whites to possess qualifying forms of ID.
The defendants also point out that Barreto studied possession rates in Milwaukee County rather than statewide, and that therefore his findings do not prove that the disparities he found exist at the state level. This is a fair point, but it is weakened by the fact that Beatty studied statewide possession rates and found that the disparities Barreto identified in Milwaukee County do exist at the state level. Moreover, Milwaukee is the largest county in the state and has the state’s largest populations of Blacks and Latinos, and thus findings based on a study of Milwaukee County alone are suggestive of what a statewide study would find. Tr. 284–85, 1517–20. Finally, there is no reason to think that in other parts of the state minorities possess IDs at such high rates and whites possess IDs at such low rates that the disparities found in Milwaukee County would be cancelled out if individuals from outside of Milwaukee were included in the study. To the contrary, a study of voting-age adults in Wisconsin published in 2005 found that Blacks and Latinos residing outside of Milwaukee County were less likely than whites to possess a valid driver’s license. See John Pawasarat, The Drivers License Status of the Voting Age Population in Wisconsin, p. 22 (UW-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute, June 2005); LULAC Ex. 58.32
32 This study reported that in Milwaukee County, 73% of white adults, 47% of Black adults, and 43% of Hispanic adults possessed valid driver’s licenses. The study reported that in the balance of the state, 85% of white adults, 53% of Black adults, and 52% of Hispanic adults possessed valid driver’s licenses.
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Accordingly, I conclude that Barreto’s findings, when added to the other evidence in this case, support the conclusion that minorities in Wisconsin are less likely than whites to possess a qualifying ID.
The remaining expert witness who offered testimony on the disparity in ID possession rates among minorities and white voters is Professor Burden. He identified a consensus in the literature showing that Black and Latino voters in Wisconsin and elsewhere in the United States are less likely than white voters to possess photo IDs. Tr. 1329–34. Burden cited the following studies: (1) a study performed by Professor Barreto and others showing that minorities in Indiana were less likely than whites to possess photo IDs, see Matt A. Barreto, et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: Political Science & Politics 111 (2009); (2) an article coauthored by the defendants’ expert witness, Professor Hood, which found that Blacks and Latinos in Georgia were less likely than whites to have driver’s licenses, see M.V. Hood III & Charles S. Bullock III, Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Georgia’s Voter Identification Statute, 36 Am. Politics Research 555 (2008) (Def. Ex. 1005); (3) a study by the American Automobile Association showing that, in the United States, 18-yearold whites are significantly more likely than 18-year-old Blacks and Latinos to have driver’s licenses, see AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, Timing of Driver’s License Acquisition and Reasons for Delay among Young People in the United States, 2012, at 11, table 3 (August 2013), available at www.aaafoundation.org/research/completed-projects (last viewed April 28, 2014); and (4) the study by Pawasarat, discussed above, finding that in 2005 Black and Latino adults in Wisconsin were much more likely than white adults to lack valid driver’s licenses, LULAC Ex. 58. Burden’s testimony and the literature he cites reinforce the
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conclusion that Black and Latino voters in Wisconsin are more likely than white voters to
lack qualifying IDs.
The defendants have pointed to no evidence introduced at trial or studies performed
by others showing that Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin or elsewhere possess IDs at the
same or nearly the same rates as whites. To the contrary, as noted, they concede that
“minorities are less likely than whites to currently possess qualifying ID.” Defs.’ Post-Trial
Br. at 1. Thus, in light of the evidence presented at trial and the defendants’ admission, the conclusion that Blacks and Latinos disproportionately lack IDs is inescapable.33
Although the defendants concede that Blacks and Latinos disproportionately lack
IDs, they argue that the plaintiffs have not shown that Blacks and Latinos are incapable of
obtaining qualifying IDs. This argument depends on the premise that a violation of Section
2 cannot be found unless the challenged voting practice makes it impossible for affected
minorities to vote. As defense counsel argued in his closing:
Even if the Court accepts all of the plaintiffs' expert testimony and declarations in this case regarding statistics and data and estimates, plaintiffs have not shown that those Wisconsin voters who currently lack a form of Act
33 The defendants contend that some of the evidence at trial shows that there is a “trend toward greater driver license and state ID possession rates for minorities.” Defs.’ Post-Trial Br. at 39. Primarily, they rely on Beatty’s findings, which show that, in 2013, the possession rates for Blacks and Latinos were higher than they were in 2012. However, as Beatty explained, one cannot infer that a trend exists from only two data points. Tr. 689. Moreover, Beatty had more complete data in 2013 than he did in 2012, and this might explain the difference in possession rates. Tr. 689–90. In any event, even if there were a trend showing improvements in possession of qualifying IDs by minorities, this would have no legal significance. The most a trend would show is that it is possible that at some point in the future Act 23 would not have a disproportionate impact on minorities. But I must grant or deny relief based on the conditions that were shown to exist at the time of trial, not on conditions that may or may not exist at some unknown point in the future. Thus, the question of whether there is a trend toward greater minority possession rates is irrelevant.
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23 ID can never, ever obtain a form of Act 23 ID . . . . It is not enough to show that minorities are less likely to have a form of Act 23 ID when those voters are fully capable of getting a form of Act 23 ID. Tr. 2134, 2142. Under the defendants’s view of the law, the example given by Justice Scalia in Chisom—a county’s permitting voting registration for only three hours one day a week and thereby making it more difficult for Blacks to register than whites—would not involve a violation of Section 2, since it would of course be possible for every Black person in the county to register during the one three-hour window per week. However, no authority supports the defendants’ view of the law. The cases the defendants cite state that “a bare statistical showing” of disproportionate impact is not enough to prove a Section 2 violation. See Tr. 2134–35, citing Smith v. Salt River Project Ag. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997). But what these cases mean is that beyond showing a disproportionate impact on minorities, a Section 2 plaintiff must show that the disproportionate impact is tied in some way to the effects of discrimination. There is nothing in these cases indicating that a Section 2 plaintiff must show that the challenged voting practice makes it impossible for minorities to vote or that minorities are incapable of complying with the challenged voting procedure. Therefore, I reject the defendants’ argument that Act 23 could violate Section 2 only if minorities who currently lack IDs are incapable of obtaining them.34 The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs’ have not shown that minorities “face
34 Of course, some minorities who lack IDs will find it impossible to obtain them. Several African American witnesses testified at trial about their unsuccessful attempts to obtain IDs. See Tr. 36–38 (Weddle); 43–52 (Holloway); 88 (Davis); 210–12 (Brown); 704–05 (Thompson); 844–47 (Newcomb).
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different considerations than whites in obtaining qualifying ID.” Defs.’ Post-Trial Br. at 1–2. In making this argument, the defendants imply that the burden of having to obtain an ID is not, by itself, a burden that could result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote, and that the plaintiffs must point to some more serious burden that disproportionately impacts Black and Latino voters before they could establish a violation of Section 2. I disagree. Even if the burden of obtaining a qualifying ID proves to be minimal for the vast majority of Blacks and Latinos who will need to obtain one in order to vote, that burden will still deter a large number of such Blacks and Latinos from voting. As discussed in Section II.C, the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses testified that, under the dominant framework used by scholars to study voter turnout, even small increases in the costs of voting can deter a person from voting, since the benefits of voting are slight and can be elusive. Tr. 1279–80, 1220–21. Under this framework, the need to obtain an ID is likely to deter a substantial number of individuals who lack IDs from voting, even if most of these individuals could obtain an ID without much trouble. These individuals, who prior to Act 23 were unwilling to pay the costs necessary to obtain an ID, are unlikely to pay those costs in order to comply with Act 23 when the expected benefits of voting are slight. Act 23 thus creates a political process in which white voters, who are more likely to already possess qualifying IDs than Black and Latino voters, will not face the deterrent effect of having to obtain an ID that they would not obtain but for the requirement to present it at the polls, while Blacks and Latinos who wish to vote and who lack qualifying IDs must pay the cost, in the form of time or bother or out-of-pocket expense, to obtain what is essentially a license to vote. This is not a political process that is “equally open to participation” by Blacks and Latinos. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). It is one in which a disproportionate share of the Black and Latino populations must shoulder an
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additional burden in order to exercise the right to vote. But even if the defendants were correct that the plaintiffs needed to show that Blacks
and Latinos face different considerations than whites in obtaining qualifying IDs, the plaintiffs would still have shown that Act 23 violates Section 2. There are additional hurdles that Blacks and Latinos who lack IDs are more likely to have to overcome than whites who lack them. First, as Professor Barreto’s survey indicates, Black and Latino voters who lack a qualifying ID are more likely than white voters to also lack one or more of the underlying documents they would need to obtain a qualifying ID as a first-time applicant. In Milwaukee County, only 2.4% of white eligible voters lack both a qualifying ID and one or more of the underlying documents needed to obtain an ID, while 4.5% of Black and 5.9% of Latino eligible voters lack both an ID and at least one underlying document.35 Frank Ex. 600 at 23–24; Tr. 307–08. The defendants note that Barreto did not determine whether it would be impossible for those who lack both an ID and an underlying document to obtain the underlying document, but this misses the point. The point is that Barreto’s survey shows that even among the pool of white and minority voters who lack IDs, Black and Latino voters are more disadvantaged than whites because they are more likely to have to overcome two hurdles in order to vote rather than one. First, they will have to obtain the missing underlying document, which will likely involve some time (such as a trip to the office of vital records) and expense (such as the fee for obtaining a birth certificate). Then, they will have to obtain
35 Professor Barreto determined that the difference between whites and Blacks, and the difference between whites and Latinos, are statistically significant. Frank Ex. 600 at 23. This means that the differences identified in the survey are likely to be real and not merely the result of chance. Tr. 304–05.
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state ID cards, which will involve the time and expense of going to the DMV. The need to overcome two hurdles instead of one makes the burden more substantial for a disproportionate share of Blacks and Latinos.
Another reason why it will be more difficult for many Blacks and Latinos to obtain IDs is that Blacks and Latinos are more likely to have been born outside of Wisconsin than whites. Professor Burden identified survey results showing that for the 5-year period ending in 2011, 75% of white residents were born in Wisconsin, yet only 59% of Blacks and 43% of Latino residents were born in the state. LULAC Ex. 811 ¶ 60. As discussed in Section II.B, it generally takes more time and expense to obtain a birth certificate from outside one’s state of residence than it does to obtain a birth certificate from within the state. See also id. Therefore, Blacks and Latinos who need to obtain a birth certificate are likely to find themselves facing a more daunting task than their white counterparts.36 Moreover, Latino voters who speak primarily Spanish will face additional difficulties as they try to navigate a process that was designed to accommodate those who speak English. See Tr. 171 (witness testified that she did not see Spanish forms at DMV and could not get help from bilingual personnel); Tr. 133 (witness testified that she has worked with Latinos who encountered language barriers at the DMV).37
36 Many older voters of color face the additional problem of never having had an official birth certificate in the first place. As late as 1950, nearly a quarter of nonwhite births in rural areas in the United States went unregistered, as opposed to 10% of white births in rural areas in the United States. S. Shapiro, Development of Birth Registration and Birth Statistics in the United States, 4:1 Populations Studies: A Journal of Demography 86, 98–99 (1950), available at ECF No. 37-13 in Case No. 12-C-185.
37 Many Latino voters who were born in Puerto Rico will have trouble obtaining their birth certificates because the Puerto Rican government annulled all birth certificates of individuals born there prior to 2010. To obtain a new birth certificate, a person must either
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Up to this point, I have only discussed the evidence establishing that Act 23 has a disproportionate impact on Blacks and Latinos. But courts have stated that, to succeed on a Section 2 claim, a plaintiff must do more than establish that the challenged voting practice results in a disproportionate impact. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project, 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that “a bare statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority” does not, by itself, prove a violation of § 2). Rather, the plaintiff must also show that the challenged voting practice produces a “discriminatory result.” Id. What this seems to mean is that the plaintiff must show that the disproportionate impact results from the interaction of the voting practice with the effects of past or present discrimination and is not merely a product of chance. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”).
I find that the plaintiffs have shown that the disproportionate impact of the photo ID requirement results from the interaction of the requirement with the effects of past or present discrimination. Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin are disproportionately likely to live in poverty.38 Individuals who live in poverty are less likely to drive or participate in other
travel to Puerto Rico or pay a “hefty charge” to obtain a new birth certificate by mail. Tr. 131. Professor Barreto found that 16.7% of eligible Latinos in Milwaukee County were born in Puerto Rico and that 38.4% of those born in Puerto Rico had yet to obtain a new birth certificate. Frank Ex. 600 at 25.
38 Tr. 1193–95 (Black median household income in Metropolitan Milwaukee is 42% that of whites; this disparity is the second worst out of the 40 largest metropolitan areas; Hispanic median household income is 56% that of whites; this disparity is ninth from the bottom out of the 36 largest metropolitan areas); Tr. 1196–97 (in Metropolitan Milwaukee, Black poverty rate is 39%, Hispanic poverty rate 30%, and white poverty rate is 8%; disparity between Blacks and whites is the largest of 40 largest metropolitan areas;
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activities for which a photo ID may be required (such as banking, air travel, and international travel),39 and so they obtain fewer benefits from possession of a photo ID than do individuals who can afford to participate in these activities. In addition, as explained in Section II.B, low-income individuals who would like to obtain an ID generally find it harder to do so than do those with greater resources. Cf. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 138 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that “the burdens associated with obtaining an ID will weigh most heavily on the poor”), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). Thus, we find that Blacks and Latinos are less likely than whites to obtain a photo ID in the ordinary course of their lives and are more likely to be without one.
The reason Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately likely to live in poverty, and therefore to lack a qualifying ID, is because they have suffered from, and continue to suffer from, the effects of discrimination. At trial, Professor Levine of the University of WisconsinMilwaukee testified that residential segregation and housing discrimination are major causes of the socioeconomic disparities between whites and minorities in Wisconsin. By certain measures, Milwaukee ranks the worst of the 102 largest metropolitan areas in Black/white segregation and the ninth worst in Latino/white segregation. Tr. 1201–02. This
disparity between Hispanics and whites is the seventh largest out of 36 metropolitan areas); Tr. 1263–64 (poverty rate for Blacks is 39.2% in Metropolitan Milwaukee and 38.8% statewide); see also LULAC Ex. 811 ¶ 30 (Professor Burden explains that the poverty rate in Wisconsin is 11% for Whites, 38% for Latinos, and 39% for Blacks, and that the Latino-White and Black-White gaps are both greater than the national average).
39 Tr. 1302 (Professor Burden explained that “being in an inner-city core and having somewhat lower levels of socioeconomic status, blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin are more likely to use public transportation or to walk as a means to get around the city. That means they're less likely to own a vehicle, less likely to drive, less likely to own a driver's license.”); see also supra note 9.
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level of segregation is, as Levine testified, “the cornerstone from which all of these other socioeconomic disparities flow.” Tr. 1202–03. It prevents Black and Latino populations in central Milwaukee from accessing suburban employment opportunities. Tr. 1203. And there is a robust correlation between metropolitan areas that have high levels of segregation and low levels of Black male employment. Tr. 1208. Levine also testified that contemporary segregation can be traced in part to Milwaukee’s history of housing discrimination. Tr. 1204–06.
The socioeconomic disparities between whites and minorities in Wisconsin are also traceable to the effects of discrimination in employment. Levine described one study of the Milwaukee labor market, conducted in the early 2000s, which showed that white job applicants received call-back interviews more than twice as frequently as Black applicants, and that even white applicants with criminal records received call-back interviews more frequently than Black applicants. Tr. 1211–13. Levine concluded that this study showed that “discrimination was alive and well in the Milwaukee labor market.” Tr. 1212. Levine testified that racial disparities in education also contribute to the lower socioeconomic status of Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin, and that these disparities are likewise a product of discrimination. Tr. 1214–16.
Professor Levine summarized his findings concerning the effects of discrimination on the socioeconomic status of Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin as follows:
There’s little question that across the gamut of indicators that I’ve looked at that Milwaukee, and to the extent that I have indicators on Wisconsin, reveal the sharpest, most pervasive, most persistent, and most entrenched racial and ethnic socioeconomic disparities of virtually any region of the country.
Across these indicators, in indicator after indicator, be it poverty, be it 66
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income, be it employment, be it minority business ownership, be it educational achievement, be it incarceration rates, the Black community and the Hispanic community in Wisconsin exhibit, without question, the effects of the historical legacy of discrimination as well as contemporary practices of discrimination. Tr. 1217.40 Similar testimony from Professor Burden, see Tr. 1298–1314, lends further support to the conclusion that the reason Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately likely to lack an ID is because they are disproportionately likely to live in poverty, which in turn is traceable to the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and housing. Based on this evidence, I conclude that Act 23's disproportionate impact results from the interaction of the photo ID requirement with the effects of past and present discrimination and is not merely a product of chance. Act 23 therefore produces a discriminatory result. A remaining question is whether Section 2 requires or allows me to take the state’s interest in the challenged voting practice into account. There is nothing in the text of Section 2 indicating that the state’s interest is relevant, but one of the “unenumerated” Senate factors—whether the policy underlying the challenged voting practice is “tenuous”—suggests that it is. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37. Moreover, it seems reasonable to understand Section 2 as allowing a state to maintain a voting practice despite any discriminatory result it produces if the practice is clearly necessary to protect an important state interest. However, as discussed in Section II.A., Act 23 only weakly serves the state
40 Although many of Levine’s findings were derived from evidence concerning Metropolitan Milwaukee rather than Wisconsin, he noted that 72% of Wisconsin’s Black population and 45% if its Latino population live in Metropolitan Milwaukee. He concluded that, given this concentration of minorities in the Milwaukee area, any trends that apply to Metropolitan Milwaukee “essentially become statewide trends.” Tr. 1263.
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interests put forward by the defendants. Accordingly, I conclude that those interests are tenuous and do not justify the photo ID requirement’s discriminatory result.
To summarize my findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim: Act 23 has a disproportionate impact on Black and Latino voters because it is more likely to burden those voters with the costs of obtaining a photo ID that they would not otherwise obtain. This burden is significant not only because it is likely to deter Blacks and Latinos from voting even if they could obtain IDs without much difficulty, but also because Blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites to have difficulty obtaining IDs. This disproportionate impact is a “discriminatory result” because the reason Black and Latino voters are more likely to have to incur the costs of obtaining IDs is that they are disproportionately likely to live in poverty, and the reason Black and Latino voters are disproportionately likely to live in poverty is connected to the history of discrimination against Blacks and Latinos in Wisconsin and elsewhere. Finally, Act 23 only tenuously serves the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud and protecting the integrity of the electoral process, and therefore the state’s interests do not justify the discriminatory result. Accordingly, the photo ID requirement results in the denial or abridgment of the right of Black and Latino citizens to vote on account of race or color.
A remaining matter is to identify the appropriate remedy.41 The plaintiffs request a permanent injunction against enforcement of the photo ID requirement, and the defendants have not argued that this is not a proper remedy. Moreover, such an injunction is the only
41 Although I have already granted the Frank plaintiffs a permanent injunction on the ground that Act 23 places an unjustified burden on the right to vote, I separately consider whether I would grant the same remedy under Section 2.
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practicable remedy—surely it would make little sense to allow Blacks and Latinos to vote without showing IDs while continuing to require white voters to show IDs. Thus, I will enjoin the defendants from requiring voters to present photo IDs in order to cast a ballot.
The LULAC plaintiffs point out that the Wisconsin legislature might amend the photo ID provisions of Act 23 in response to this decision. They ask me to make clear that I will schedule expedited proceedings to address any claim that an amendment to Act 23 has cured the defects identified in this opinion and provides grounds for relief from the permanent injunction. I will do so. Should the State of Wisconsin enact legislation amending the photo ID requirement, and should the defendants believe that, as amended, the photo ID requirement no longer violates Section 2, they may file a motion for relief from the permanent injunction. If an election is imminent at the time that the defendants file their motion, I will schedule expedited proceedings on the motion. However, I also note that, given the evidence presented at trial showing that Blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites to lack an ID, it is difficult to see how an amendment to the photo ID requirement could remove its disproportionate racial impact and discriminatory result.
IV. Other Matters There are two remaining procedural matters to consider. The first is the Frank plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the second is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims of certain plaintiffs. Given that the relief granted in this case is a permanent injunction against enforcement of the requirement that eligible voters present a photo ID to cast a ballot, these matters are moot. The motion for class certification is moot because, as the defendants concede, all members of the proposed classes will benefit from the permanent injunction whether or not classes are certified, and there is no reason to formally
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certify a class. Defs.’ Br. in Opp. to Mot. For Class Cert. at 8, 20 (arguing that if Act 23 were enjoined there would be “no need for any classes as the remedy would invalidate the entire photo identification requirement and cover all of the citizens and registered voters in the State of Wisconsin”). Similarly, the motion to dismiss the claims of certain plaintiffs is moot—those plaintiffs will benefit from the relief requested regardless of whether they are dismissed as plaintiffs. Cf. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951 (noting that as long as one plaintiff has standing to seek the injunctive relief requested, question of standing of additional parties can be ignored).
V. Conclusion For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that the named Defendants and Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all those acting in concert or participation with them, or having actual or implicit knowledge of this Order by personal service or otherwise, are hereby permanently enjoined from conditioning a person’s access to a ballot, either in-person or absentee, on that person’s presenting a form of photo identification. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Frank plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is DENIED as MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for judgment on partial findings is DENIED as MOOT. FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter final judgment consistent with this opinion.
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Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 29th day of April 2014. s/ Lynn Adelman _______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
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Appendix A: Wisconsin Voters Who Lack A Qualifying ID I base my finding that approximately 300,000 registered voters in Wisconsin lack a qualifying ID primarily, but not exclusively, on the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert, Leland Beatty. Beatty is a statistical marketing consultant with extensive experience both in business and politics. He sought to determine the number of registered voters who, as of September 2013, did not possess either a driver’s license or state ID card, which matched the information maintained in the list of registered voters. Drivers’ licenses and state ID cards are the two most common forms of Act-23 identification.1 To do this, Beatty obtained databases from both the DMV and GAB. The DMV database contained information about individuals with driver’s licenses or state ID cards with expiration dates in September 2013 or later. The GAB database contained information about individuals who were registered to vote as of September 2013. Beatty compared the information in the databases to determine how many registered voters could be “matched” to a DMV product. Initially, Beatty created three definitions of a “match.” First, he counted a pair of entries as a match if a person having the same first name, last name, date of birth, residence county and zip code could be found in both the GAB and DMV databases. Second, he counted a pair of entries as a match if a person having the same first name, last name and date of birth could be found in both databases. Third, he counted a pair of entries as a match if a person having the same last name, date of birth and zip code could be found in both databases. This latter definition of a match was designed to account for
1 Previous to the trial, Beatty prepared reports based on pre-September 2013 data. I will focus, however, on the results Beatty obtained from the September 2013 data, as such data best reflects the facts that existed at the time of trial.
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individuals who were identified by a nickname in one database and their formal first name in the other.
After running these matches, Beatty attempted to “recover” or “reclaim” some of the non-matches by determining whether circumstances justified deeming them a match. First, he attempted to match people with multiple-word first or last names such as individuals with names like Mary Ann or Maryann or those with hyphenated last names. Beatty isolated the records of individuals with multi-word names and accepted a pair of entries as a match if either word in the multi-word name matched. Second, he attempted to match individuals who may have recently changed their last name as indicated by a field in the DMV database. He did this by treating any person listed in the DMV database as having a former last name as a registered voter with either a driver’s license or a state ID card if he could find a person in the GAB database having the same first name, middle initial and date of birth. 2
After reclaiming as many unmatched registered voters as he could, Beatty determined that 317,735 registered voters possessed neither a driver’s license nor a state ID card. The total number of registered voters in Wisconsin was 3,395,688.2 Thus, 9.4% of
2 Beatty testified that this last definition of match, i.e., persons with former last names who could be matched based on first name, middle initial, and date of birth, might have resulted in a slight overcount of the number of voters with “matching” IDs, since in such cases the last name on the ID would not match the last name that would appear in the poll book. Thus, a poll worker would likely deny the person access to a ballot if he or she tried to use the ID to vote. Tr. 688.
2I calculated the total number of registered voters by taking the number from the bottom of the "total voters" column of the table that appears in paragraph nine of Beatty's 2013 declaration (3,373,749) and adding 21,939, which is the number of unmatched registered voters who were excluded from the totals in the table because their race could not be determined. See LULAC Ex. 817 ¶¶ 8 & 9.
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registrants lacked a matching driver’s license or state ID card. In response to Beatty, the defendants offered the testimony of M.V. Hood III, a
University of Georgia professor of political science. Hood also attempted to match registered voters in the GAB database with individuals in the DMV database in order to identify the number of registrants who possessed a qualifying ID. Hood, however, used different criteria than Beatty for determining what counted as a match, and he concluded that between 167,351 (4.9% of registrants) and 368,824 (10.9% of registrants) did not possess a driver’s license or state ID card.3
The significant differences between the criteria employed by Beatty and Hood involve the use of the identification number associated with an entry. In the DMV database, the identification number is the number that appears on a person’s driver’s license or state ID card. In 2006, as required by the Help America Vote Act, Wisconsin began asking voters to write down this number when they registered to vote. Thus, for post-2006 registrants, the entries in the GAB database include an identification number. Hood used these numbers in two ways. First, he assumed that two entries qualified as a match if they had matching identification numbers. Second, employing some of his more “relaxed” criteria, he assumed that if a person had an identification number associated with his or her entry in the GAB database, that person also possessed a driver’s license or a state ID card, even if the person could not be matched to a specific driver’s license or state ID card by other means. Hood’s use of identification numbers in these two ways caused him to find a greater number
3 I derive the percentages by dividing the number of registered voters who lack an ID by 3,395,695, which is the number of registered voters in the GAB database that Hood used.
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of matches between registered voters and DMV products than did Beatty. And as explained below, I find that his use of identification numbers in these ways renders his conclusions about the number of registered voters without an ID suspect. Therefore, I give greater weight to Beatty’s conclusions than I do Hood’s.
Regarding Hood’s automatically counting a pair of entries as a match if they contained the same identification number: In the course of his work, Beatty noticed a large number of cases in which two individuals with the same identification number had different names or dates of birth. As an example, Beatty points to a case in which an identification number in the GAB database was assigned to a person with the first name Damon who was born in 1980 and resides in Milwaukee County, while the same identification number in the DMV database was assigned to a person with the first name Danielle who was born in 1971 and resides in Marinette County.4 LULAC Ex. 202 ¶ 6. On the basis of these observations, Beatty concluded that identification numbers were not unique. The defendants argue that Hood was right to assume that identification numbers are unique, but the only evidence they provide in support of this contention is Hood’s testimony, which in turn is based on an interview he conducted with Debra Kraemer, a DMV employee who told Hood that DMV identification numbers are unique. Kraemer did not testify at trial, and the defendants have not explained how she determined that identification numbers are unique. Thus, I will not credit her hearsay statement. Besides interviewing Kraemer, Hood made no effort to verify whether identification numbers are unique, such as examining his matches to determine
4 I have omitted the last names of these individuals to protect their privacy. However, their last names are different.
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whether the names, dates of birth, etc., matched.5 Tr. 1546. Moreover, the defendants have not attempted to explain why, if identification numbers are unique, Beatty was able to find instances in which the same identification number was assigned to two different individuals, as in the case of Damon and Danielle. For these reasons, I conclude that Hood’s decision to automatically count a pair of entries as a match if they had matching identification numbers renders his conclusions about the number of registered voters without an ID suspect.6
Regarding Hood’s decision to deem a person with an identification number in the GAB database as possessing an ID: During his interview with Kraemer, Hood learned that DMV identification numbers are not permanent and that they are generated using an algorithm based on a person’s name, sex, and date of birth. Any changes or corrections to a person’s name or date of birth will cause the DMV to issue a new identification number. In light of this information, Hood hypothesized that some of the individuals with identification numbers in the GAB database who did not match an entry in the DMV database had informed the DMV of changes or corrections to their names or dates of birth. This would have caused the DMV to issue a new identification number, and this identification number
5 Hood testified that he “did some manual checking,” but he did not explain what he meant by that and, in the same breath, admitted that really he just assumed that state ID numbers were unique. Tr. 1545.
6 I add that although Beatty did not automatically assume that entries with matching identification numbers were matches, he did give these entries a chance to match by name, date of birth, zip code and the other criteria he applied to all entries in the databases. Thus, while Beatty would not have counted the Damon and Danielle case as a match, he would have counted any entries with matching identification numbers as matches if those entries satisfied his other criteria.
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would be different than the GAB identification number and also could have explained why Hood was unable to generate a match using the person’s name and date of birth. Hood also hypothesized that some of his unmatched voters with identification numbers may have been in possession of a DMV product that expired before September 11, 2013, the latest date on which an ID could expire and still appear in the database Hood received from the DMV. If the ID expired after the date of the last general election, the person holding it could use it to comply with Act 23 until the date of the next general election. See Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(a). On the basis of these hypotheses, which he did not meaningfully test,7 Hood, under his more relaxed criteria, counted every person in the GAB database with an identification number associated with his or her name as a registered voter who possessed a driver’s license or a state ID card that could be used for voting. Hood determined that, under his relaxed criteria, the number of voters without a DMV product ranged from 167,351 to 285,425. See Defs.’ Ex. 1001 at 6–7 & Table 2.
In general, I think it is reasonable to assume that a person with an identification number in the GAB database at one time possessed either a driver’s license or a state ID card. After all, if a number appears in GAB database, it means that the person had a DMV identification number at the time he or she registered to vote and wrote that number down on the registration form. But the fact that a person at one time had a matching DMV product tells us little about whether that person currently has a matching DMV product. Possibly a
7 Hood sent 20 names of individuals with identification numbers in the GAB database and no corresponding product in the DMV database to Kraemer, and Kraemer determined that 85% of those cases could be explained by changes to a person’s name. However, as Hood admitted, no reasonable social scientist would draw conclusions about a population of about 80,000 from a sample of only 20. Tr. 1537–38.
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significant number of people with identification numbers in the GAB database still have the driver’s licenses or state ID cards they used when they registered, but assuming Hood’s hypotheses are true, those cards will either be expired or they will have names on them that differ from the names that appear in the poll books. If they are expired, they could not be used to comply with Act 23 unless they expired between November 6, 2012 and September 12, 2013, and there is no evidence indicating that the number of IDs with expiration dates within this range is likely to be significant. If the IDs have different names on them, then it is unlikely that they could be used to comply with Act 23 because the names on the IDs will likely not conform to the names that appear in the poll books. See Wis. Stat. § 6.79(2)(a). Thus, I do not agree that individuals with identification numbers in the GAB database can, on that basis alone, be counted as individuals who currently possess a driver’s license or state ID card that could be used to comply with Act 23. As Beatty did not automatically count such individuals as possessing a DMV product, I give greater weight to his opinion on the number of registered voters lacking IDs than I do to Hood’s.
The defendants point out that Beatty did not investigate whether those who lack a valid driver’s license or a valid state ID card nonetheless possess some other form of qualifying ID, such as a passport or a military ID. They then note that it is possible that the percentage of voters who possess only a form of ID other than a driver’s license or a state ID card could be large. While this is possible, the defendants have pointed to no evidence suggesting that it is likely that a large percentage of the 317,735 voters who lack a valid driver’s license or a valid state ID card possess some other form of ID. And plaintiffs’ evidence is to the contrary. As discussed in greater detail in Appendix B, Matthew Barreto, an associate professor of political science at the University of Washington, conducted a
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telephonic survey of eligible voters in Milwaukee County and asked the survey respondents about the forms of ID they possessed. One of his findings was that the percentage of Milwaukee County eligible voters who had only a form of ID other than a driver’s license or a state ID card was 0.3%. Tr. 300. Although Barreto’s survey was conducted in Milwaukee County rather than statewide and targeted eligible voters rather than registered voters, there is no reason to think that the percentage of registered voters in the state who possess only a form of ID other than a driver’s license or a state ID card is much higher than 0.3%. Applying this percentage to the number of registered voters in the GAB database provided to Beatty (3,395,688), we can estimate that about 10,000 voters in Wisconsin possess only a form of qualifying ID other than a driver’s license or state ID card. If we subtract this estimate from the number of registered voters without a valid driver’s license or state ID card, the estimated number of voters without any form of Act 23-qualifying ID in the state becomes 307,735. As this is an estimate rather than a precise measurement, I will round down to 300,000 and find that this is the number of registered voters in Wisconsin who, at the time of trial, did not possess a qualifying form of ID. This is approximately 9% of the population of registered voters in Wisconsin.
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Appendix B: Expert Opinions of Matthew Barreto Professor Matthew Barreto is an expert on voting behavior, survey methods and statistical analysis who, in January 2012, conducted a telephonic survey of eligible voters in Milwaukee County. Barreto designed the survey in collaboration with Professor Gabriel Sanchez of the University of New Mexico. The survey asked voters whether they had a qualifying photo ID as defined in Act 23. It also asked voters whether they had all of the primary documents required to obtain a free state ID card as a first-time applicant. The results showed that, of 661,958 eligible voters in Milwaukee County, 9.53% or 63,085 voters did not possess an acceptable form of photo ID, and 34.1% of these voters—21,512 people—also lacked the primary documents required to get a free state ID card as a firsttime applicant. Frank Ex. 600 at 16–17, 34, 37. Barreto concluded that the most common problem for individuals who lack primary documents is the requirement that they show proof of citizenship and name and date of birth. The survey results showed that 32% of the eligible voters in Milwaukee County who lack a photo ID—20,162 people—do not have certified copies of their birth certificates or any of the other documents necessary to prove citizenship. Frank Ex. 600 at 37. Barreto also found that approximately 2.6% of the eligible voters in Milwaukee County who lack a qualifying photo ID—approximately 1,640 people—do not have any of the documents necessary to prove identity. Id. The defendants argue first that Barreto’s data it is outdated because the survey was conducted in January 2012 and the trial took place in November 2013. They suggest that, between the time of the survey and the time of trial, many of the individuals who lacked an ID at the time of Barreto’s survey might have obtained one through the state’s free ID program. They offer evidence showing that, between July 2011 and September 2013, the
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DMV issued 74,030 free state ID cards to Milwaukee County residents for voting purposes. Defs.’ Ex. 1001 at 19 (Table 9).
I agree that it is possible that some of those who lacked an ID at the time of Barreto’s survey have obtained one, but I find it unlikely that the free ID program substantially reduced the number of eligible voters without an ID. First, at the time of Barreto’s survey, the free ID program had already been in effect for six months. Thus, the survey results account for the issuance of some of the free IDs. Second, some of the free IDs the DMV issued were replacement or renewal IDs that went to individuals who already had an ID. See Tr. 1818 (noting that a person can get a replacement or renewal card as part of the free ID program). Third, it is very likely that some of the free IDs were issued to individuals who already had driver’s licenses. Although the DMV is not supposed to issue state ID cards to individuals who already possess a driver’s license, data from the DMV shows that many individuals in Wisconsin possess both a driver’s license and a state ID card. In April 2012, one of the plaintiffs’ experts, Leland Beatty, reviewed the DMV’s records and found 112,397 duplicate records in the driver’s license and state ID card databases. LULAC Ex. 2. In these cases, the driver’s license holder and the ID card holder had the same first name, last name, date of birth, gender, ethnicity, county of residence and zip code. LULAC Ex. 2. When Beatty updated his work in September 2013, he found that the number of duplicates had increased. Tr. 736, 739. Overall he found that about 30% of state ID card holders also have a driver’s license. Tr. 690.1 One reason for the high number of duplicates might be that
1 The defendants’ expert, M.V. Hood III, reached a similar conclusion. When he compared the driver’s license database to the state ID card database in 2012, he found 114,607 duplicate records. Defs.’ Ex. 1003 ¶ 7. In 2013, he found 146,137 duplicates. Defs.’ Ex. 1001 at 3.
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there is a common misconception that under Act 23 a person must obtain a special ID card from the DMV in order to vote even if he or she already has a driver’s license. Tr. 1814. Fourth, looking at the number of free IDs issued in isolation fails to take into account possible changes in the population of eligible voters: possibly that population increased. The defendants’ own expert agreed that it would be speculative to draw conclusions about current possession rates based on the issuance of free IDs alone. Tr. 1559–61. For all of these reasons, I find it unlikely that the free ID program has significantly changed the number of eligible voters who lack an ID.2
Alternatively, the defendants argue that Barreto’s survey results should be given little weight because it will be easy for most of those who lack photo IDs to get free state ID cards. As evidence of this, they point to the testimony of Professor Hood. Hood reviewed Barreto’s survey and found that it “was conducted in a professional manner using commonly accepted survey research practices,” and he agreed that the survey results show that only 90.5% of eligible voters in Milwaukee County have a qualifying photo ID under Act 23. Defs.’ Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20, 26. However, he noted that the survey results show that an additional 6.9% of survey respondents who do not currently have a qualifying photo ID stated that they have had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card at some point in their lives. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. He believes that all of these individuals should be able to easily obtain free state ID cards for voting purposes because they successfully obtained them in the past. Id. Thus, he
2 The defendants suggest that the November 2012 presidential election may have prompted a large number of individuals who lacked an ID at the time of Barreto’s survey to obtain one. But Act 23 was enjoined well before that election. Thus, individuals who lacked an ID would have had little incentive to obtain one.
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concludes that 97.4% of eligible voters in Milwaukee County either have a qualifying ID or could easily obtain one.
I reject Hood’s conclusion that it will be easy for all 6.9% of the voters who held IDs at some point in the past to obtain a state ID card because I do not know anything about the circumstances of these voters. I do not know how long ago they held their IDs, and I do not know if they currently possess all of the primary documents required to obtain a state ID card. Even if a voter at some point had all of the documents required to get a state ID card, he or she could have lost some of the necessary documents. This is especially true for low-income voters, who Barreto found are more likely to lack a qualifying ID. Frank Ex. 600 at 28–31. It is also important to note that the DMV’s documentation requirements have changed and become more strict over time. For example, the DMV used to accept a baptismal certificate or hospital birth certificate as proof of citizenship, but now it will only accept a certified copy of a birth certificate. Tr. 1848–49. Thus, a person who was able to meet the documentation requirements at some point in the past may not be able to do so today even if they still have all of the documents they used to obtain their first ID card.
Hood’s analysis does, however, raise a question about how many of the eligible voters in Milwaukee County who currently lack IDs will be treated as first-time applicants by the DMV. The DMV treats anyone who had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card that expired within the last eight years as a renewal applicant, and it only requires renewal applicants to show proof of identity and, if the person has moved, proof of residence to get a state ID card. Tr. 1092–94; Defs.’ Ex. 1074. Barreto’s survey data shows that approximately 9.53% of eligible voters in Milwaukee County—approximately 63,085 people—do not have qualifying photo IDs under Act 23. The DMV will treat approximately
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17,210 of these voters as first-time applicants because they are part of the 2.6% of people identified by Hood who have never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card. Defs.’ Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. But it is unclear how many of the remaining approximately 45,875 voters will be treated as first-time applicants because these voters have had Wisconsin driver’s licenses or state ID cards at some point in the past. Anyone in this group who has had an ID that expired within the last eight years will be treated as a renewal applicant.
Because of the uncertainty about who will be treated as a first-time applicant, the record does not indicate exactly how many eligible voters in Milwaukee County lack a qualifying photo ID and the primary documents required to get one. I know from Barreto’s report that 21,512 voters lack an ID and the documents required to get an ID if they are first time applicants, but I do not know how many of these voters will actually be treated as firsttime applicants because Barreto did not consider this question. Barreto’s data does, however, prove three things: (1) approximately 9.53% of the eligible voters in Milwaukee County, or 63,085 voters, do not have qualifying IDs under Act 23, (2) the DMV will treat at least 17,210 of these voters as first-time applicants if they apply for a state ID card because they have never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card, and (3) there are approximately 1,640 eligible voters in Milwaukee County alone who lack qualifying IDs and proof of identity, which the DMV will require them to show regardless of whether they are a first-time or renewal applicant.
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Appendix C: Beatty’s Methodology in Determining Disproportionate Impact Beatty performed a “matching” analysis of databases maintained by the GAB and the
DMV. The GAB database contained a list of Wisconsin registered voters, and the DMV databases contained lists of Wisconsin residents who have a current driver’s license and/or state ID card. Beatty’s methodology proceeded in two major steps. First, he determined how many registered voters in the GAB database could be matched to either a driver’s license or a state ID card in the DMV database. I have explained how he performed this step in Appendix A. Second, Beatty attempted to identify the race of the remaining unmatched voters. I explain this step of his methodology below.
Beatty submitted certain information about the unmatched voters to a third party, Ethnic Technologies, to determine their likely race. The reason Beatty did this is that the GAB database did not include information about race, and thus he had to determine the race of the voters who could not be matched to a DMV product through some other process. Ethnic Technologies is a firm that uses information about the name of a person and where that person lives to determine his or her likely race and ethnicity (among other characteristics). Typical clients of the firm include companies and organizations that engage in direct marketing in which it is important to know the race or ethnicity of the individuals receiving the company’s marketing materials. Tr. 598–601.
Beatty explained the general process that a firm like Ethnic Technologies uses to identify race and ethnicity as follows:
[Beatty]: They [Ethnic Technologies] use a system that breaks out each part of a person’s name so that they have a mini database that’s built up over a long period of time where they understand name prefixes, middle parts of last names, name suffixes that are highly predictive of country of origin. They begin with the first name. The first name is very indicative of the cultural
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values of the namer of a person. Typically parents. So they begin there and where there are names that are only found in one particular type of—one particular race, that’s gonna be determinative. If the first name is not determinative they move to the last name where they literally parse it apart syllable by syllable and understand what the name means, what its derivation is, and what country of origin it was likely from.
Q. And is there other information beyond first and last name that goes into that analysis?
A. Yes. If it’s still not decisive they use the middle name which like the first name is very indicative of the cultural values of the namer. If we’re still uncertain we look at that actual latitude and longitude, put it in a block, and understand if it is predominantly, overwhelmingly, marginally one race or another.
Q. And when you say that latitude and longitude, what do you mean by that?
A. It’s—latitude and longitude is a way of measuring a particular spot on the earth. And if you know the latitude and longitude you can place it right into a neighborhood.
Q. You mean of the individual’s residence.
A. Yes.
Q. And when you say in a certain block what do you mean by that?
A. A census block in urban areas is often literally a city block. In rural areas it may cover a wider expanse, but mostly in urban areas it’s close to an exact city block.
Q. And is there information available about the racial demographics of the residents of a census block?
A. Yes, there’s both census data, there’s commercial data, but also we aggregate the voter file itself to understand the voter makeup in that block.
Tr. 636–37.
John Mas, a former employee of Ethnic Technologies, provided examples to illustrate
Ethnic Technologies’ general methodology: “So the premise is that you look at a person’s
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first name and you can infer a little bit about their culture or their background or you can look at their last name. If you heard Alex Rodriguez you wouldn’t think that he’s a Chinese person playing baseball.” Tr. 606. The firm then refines its analysis by drawing inferences based on the neighborhood in which the person lives: “So you could have people with the last name Lee, like Bruce Lee or Stan Lee and help decipher if he’s Chinese or Jewish. So if you know where they live you can know that Bruce Lee if he lived in Chinatown more than likely would be Chinese, or Stan Lee if he lived in Riverdale, New York was Jewish.” Tr. 608.
Using the data Beatty provided, Ethnic Technologies was able to identify the likely race of 91.6% of the unmatched voters in 2012 and 93.1% of the unmatched voters in 2013. Beatty then computed the percentage of registered voters of each race that lacked a matching driver’s license or state ID. This produced the following results: In 2012, 9.5% of white voters, 16.2% of Black voters, and 24.8% of Hispanic voters lacked a matching ID. In 2013, 8.3% of white voters, 11.5% of Black voters, and 19.2% of Hispanic voters lacked a matching ID.
The defendants offer two criticisms of Beatty’s methodology. Their first criticism is that Beatty’s analysis failed to account for the possibility that unmatched voters might possess a form of qualifying ID other than a driver’s license or a state ID card. This is a fair point, but as other evidence in this case establishes, only an extremely small number of people possess a form of qualifying ID other than a driver’s license or a state ID card and do not also possess either a driver’s license or a state ID card. Tr. 300 (testimony of Professor Barreto reporting that only 0.3 percent of Milwaukee County residents had only a form of ID other than a driver’s license or state ID card). Thus, although some unmatched
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voters will possess a form of qualifying ID other than a driver’s license or state ID card, it is highly unlikely that these unmatched voters are so numerous that they would affect Beatty’s ultimate conclusion that minorities are substantially more likely than whites to lack a qualifying form of ID.
The defendants’ second criticism of Beatty’s methodology has to do with his use of Ethnic Technologies to determine the race of the unmatched voters. The defendants point out that Ethnic Technologies determined the likely race of the unmatched voters by inputting the voters’ names and locations into its proprietary software program, and that no witness gave precise details about the algorithm on which that software is based. However, the general principles underlying the software are known. As Beatty testified, the software first attempts to match a person’s first name to an ethnicity, then examines the last name and possibly middle name, and finally uses information about the neighborhood in which the person lives to estimate the person’s race and ethnicity. Ethnic Technologies also explains that this is the general principle underlying its software on its website. See LULAC Ex. 211; www.ethnictechnologies.com (last viewed April 28, 2014).
Moreover, even though we do not know the precise details surrounding Ethnic Technologies’ software, there is ample evidence in the record indicating that Ethnic Technologies’ software is reliable enough for the purposes it was used in this case, which is to estimate the racial makeup of a population. First, there is a consensus in the academic literature that although the general principles employed by Ethic Technologies—known as onomastics, Tr. 662–63—do not perfectly determine a person’s race, they “provide[] a sufficient level of classification confidence to be used in the measurement of inequalities and in the design and delivery of services that meet the needs of ethnic minorities.” Pablo
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Mateos, A Review of Name-based Ethnicity Classifications Methods and their Potential in Population Studies, Population, Space and Place, July/August 2007, at 243; LULAC Ex. 213 at 26. Here, we are attempting to measure a racial inequality, and thus software based on onomastics is a proper tool to use. Second, a study supported by a grant from the National Cancer Institute found that Ethnic Technologies’ software was “nearly perfect in estimating white race”—meaning that the software almost never identified a person as nonwhite when the person self-identified as white. Jessica T. DeFrank et al., Triangulating Differential Nonresponse by Race in a Telephone Survey, Preventing Chronic Disease, July 2007, at 1, 5; LULAC Ex. 212. It is true that the software misidentified a large number of self-identified Black individuals as white, id., but this does not undermine Beatty’s conclusion that Black voters are more likely than white voters to lack photo ID. If anything, it indicates that the disparity in possession rates is even greater, as it implies that many of the unmatched voters whom Ethnic Technologies identified as white are actually Black.1 Moreover, as Beatty testified, Ethnic Technologies has improved its software since the time of the CDC study, and today the software has less of a tendency to misidentify Blacks as whites. Tr. 661–62.
A final factor indicating that Ethnic Technologies’ software is reliable is the fact that Ethnic Technologies has been able to remain in business since 1995. Tr. 597. Marketers would not continue to hire Ethnic Technologies to estimate the race and ethnicity of their target audiences if its software were unreliable. And Beatty himself testified that he has
1 As Beatty explained, there is a tendency to misidentify Black individuals as white because they often have the same names and live in the same neighborhoods as whites. Tr. 661.
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been using Ethnic Technologies in his work for many years and has found their results to be very reliable. Tr. 634–35, 662–63.
In sum, I conclude that Beatty’s methods, and the conclusions he reached after applying those methods, are reliable and should be given significant weight.
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT WALKER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 11-C-01128

DECISION AND ORDER When the plaintiffs commenced this suit, they alleged that Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to present photo identification at the polls, 2011 Wis. Act 23 (“Act 23"), violated the Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Following a trial on the claims alleged in this and a companion case, I concluded that Act 23 placed an unjustified burden on the plaintiffs’ voting rights and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. I also concluded that Act 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Having found these violations, I entered an injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the photo ID requirement. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014). The defendants appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014). In my prior decision, I noted that I was leaving certain of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims unresolved. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 842–43. Those claims involved Act 23's failure to include certain forms of photo ID, such as veteran’s ID cards, on the list of acceptable IDs, and its allegedly placing a poll tax on persons who would be required to surrender their out-of-state driver’s licenses in order to obtain free ID cards to use for

voting. The plaintiffs now move for class certification and for relief on these unresolved claims. I address those claims below.
However, before I turn to the unresolved claims, I discuss the plaintiffs’ request for class certification and for relief on behalf of persons they describe as “Class 1 voters,” i.e., those voters “who lack photo ID and face systemic practical barriers to obtaining an ID.” See Pls.’ Br. at 16, ECF No. 223. The relief they seek in connection with this claim is an injunction allowing persons to vote at their polling place without presenting an ID but instead by signing an affidavit attesting to their identity and to the difficulties they would face in obtaining ID. Id. at 18. This “Class 1" claim is not a claim I left unresolved in my prior decision. It is the constitutional claim on which I granted relief: I found that Act 23 imposed unjustified burdens on voters who currently lack photo ID and will face heightened barriers to obtaining ID. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 862–63. I specifically considered the plaintiffs’ proposed affidavit procedure and determined that an injunction against the law’s enforcement was a more appropriate remedy for the violation of the plaintiffs’ rights. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed my decision and did not remand for further proceedings in connection with this claim. It did not, for example, vacate the injunction and remand with instructions to consider granting some other remedy, such as the plaintiffs’ proposed affidavit procedure. Rather, it held that the plaintiffs’ claim was no different than the claim the Supreme Court considered and rejected in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). Frank, 768 F.3d at 751. I am not free to disregard this holding on remand. See, e.g., Kovacs v. United States, 739 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The lower court is bound, through the mandate rule, to the resolution of any points that the higher court has addressed.”).
2

For two reasons, the plaintiffs contend that the Class 1 claim they are now pursuing
is different than the claim the Seventh Circuit considered and rejected: (1) they seek relief
on behalf of a narrower class of voters,1 and (2) they seek relief that is somewhat narrower
than the relief I previously granted.2 But these facts do not change the claim such that it
falls outside the Seventh Circuit’s holding on appeal. The Seventh Circuit characterized
the plaintiffs’ claim as a “facial” challenge that was indistinguishable from the claim in
Crawford because it was based on “predictions about the effects of requiring photo ID”
rather than on “results.” Frank, 768 F.3d at 747. The court implied that a constitutional
claim that is not foreclosed by Crawford would be one based on proof that “substantial
numbers of persons eligible to vote have tried to get a photo ID but been unable to do so,”
id. at 746, or on proof that the law has in fact significantly reduced voter turnout, id. at 747,
751. As I read the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, it holds that Crawford disposes of any
constitutional claim based on a “prediction” that barriers to obtaining photo ID will prevent
1In their reply brief, the plaintiffs contend that the members of Class 1 are limited to individuals who will face one of three barriers to obtaining ID: (1) having to deal with name mismatches or other errors in an underlying document needed to obtain ID; (2) having to obtain an underlying document from an agency other than the DMV; and (3) the person’s underlying document does not exist. Pls.’ Reply Br. at 10, ECF No. 237.
2I say “somewhat” narrower because the relief is not limited to identified members of the class. Under the plaintiffs’ proposed affidavit procedure, any person who appeared at the polls would be allowed to vote without showing ID so long as he or she signed an affidavit in the required form. Thus, a person willing to commit voter-impersonation fraud could submit a false affidavit and then vote in someone else’s name. Since that would undermine the law’s purpose, which is to assure the public that voter-impersonation fraud will not occur, the proposed affidavit procedure seems little better than enjoining the law in its entirety. Of course, in-person voter-impersonation fraud is virtually nonexistent, but I am bound by the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Crawford, under which photo-ID laws are deemed to confer “substantial benefits” because they promote “confidence in electoral integrity.” Frank, 768 F.3d at 751.
3

a group of persons from voting. The plaintiffs’ reformulated Class 1 claim fits this description. It seeks relief on behalf of a group of voters who have not yet tried to obtain ID,3 based on the prediction that it will be hard for them to obtain ID, and that therefore they “are likely to be deterred from voting in future elections.” Pls.’ Br. at 18. This is precisely the claim that I previously resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor and was reversed on. I continue to believe that my decision was correct and that the plaintiffs’ claim is not foreclosed by Crawford, but the Seventh Circuit disagreed and I am bound by its decision. Therefore, I cannot reconsider the “Class 1" claim.
I. TECHNICAL COLLEGE ID Plaintiff Domonique Whitehurst seeks to represent a class of “Wisconsin technical college students who have photo ID otherwise acceptable under the student ID provisions of Act 23.” Pls.’ Br. at 10, ECF No. 223. Under the student ID provisions of Act 23, such an ID may be used for voting if it is issued by a university or college in Wisconsin that is “accredited” (as defined by Wis. Stat. § 39.90(1)(d)), and meets certain other requirements. See Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(f). The plaintiff contends that any refusal to accept technical college IDs as acceptable forms of ID for complying with Act 23 would violate the Equal Protection Clause, and she seeks an injunction requiring the defendants to accept such
3To be sure, some members of the class, including class representatives Ruthelle Frank and Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., have tried and failed to obtain ID. However, the class definition is not limited to those who have tried and failed to obtain ID. Nor is the proposed relief tailored to those who have tried and failed to obtain ID. As noted, the plaintiffs’ proposed affidavit procedure would be available to any person who shows up at the polls and is willing to sign an affidavit stating that it would be hard for him or her to obtain ID. A true “as applied” remedy for a person who has made a reasonable effort to obtain ID but been unable to do so would be an injunction requiring the state to issue that person an ID.
4

IDs so long as they are otherwise indistinguishable from the types of student ID already accepted under Act 23.
Act 23 does not expressly state that technical college IDs may not be used for voting, and since November 2011, the Government Accountability Board (which is the state agency charged with implementing Act 23) has interpreted Act 23 to mean that technical college IDs are acceptable. However, when in September 2011 the GAB first considered whether technical college IDs are acceptable, it concluded that the legislature “did not intend for technical college ID cards to be treated as equivalent to those issued by other universities and colleges.” Defs.’ Ex. 1049 at p. 2. It reached this conclusion after noting that the legislature had rejected amendments to Act 23 that would have explicitly included technical college IDs in the list of acceptable IDs. Id. But then the GAB reconsidered this conclusion at its meeting on November 9, 2011, and it decided “to allow technical college ID cards for voting purposes.” Defs.’ Ex. 1050, fifth page. At the November meeting, the GAB determined that the ordinary meaning of the word “college,” as used in the statute, included technical colleges. Id.
A few days after the GAB interpreted Act 23 to allow the use of technical college IDs, the Wisconsin Legislature’s Joint Committee for the Review of Administrative Rules directed the GAB to embody its interpretation of Act 23 in an emergency administrative rule. See Defs.’ Ex. 1050, seventh page; Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(b). The GAB then created an emergency rule allowing the use of technical college IDs for voting. Shortly thereafter, the state courts enjoined the implementation of Act 23, and the GAB suspended its administrative rulemaking. See Decl. of Kevin Kennedy ¶ 8–9, ECF No. 230. In May 2015, following the reversal of the state-court injunctions and the injunction I issued in this case,
5

the GAB reissued the emergency rule, and Governor Scott Walker approved it. See ECF No. 235. The emergency rule has been in force ever since, and the GAB has taken steps to make that rule permanent. Kennedy Decl. ¶¶ 13–23. However, as of the date of this opinion, the permanent rule has not replaced the emergency rule.
The defendants contend that the GAB’s interpretation of Act 23 and its rulemaking have rendered the plaintiff’s equal-protection claim moot. However, although I agree that the plaintiff’s claim is not justiciable at this time, I do so on the basis of ripeness rather than mootness. Mootness comes into play when it is too late to grant relief to the plaintiff; ripeness comes into play when it is too early to do so. See Capeheart v. Terrell, 695 F.3d 681, 648 (7th Cir. 2012). By the time the plaintiffs filed this suit, the GAB had interpreted Act 23 to allow the use of technical college IDs for voting. The plaintiffs nonetheless included a claim on behalf of technical college students in their complaint because they feared that at some point in the future either the GAB, the governor, or the state legislature would take some action to prevent the use of technical college IDs for voting. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47–48, ECF No. 31. The plaintiff’s claim thus relates to future events that may or may not occur, which raises a question of ripeness rather than mootness. See Wis. Right to Life v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 148 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ripeness concerns may arise when a case involves uncertain or contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or not occur at all.”).
Here, the plaintiff’s claim is not ripe because too many contingent and unlikely events must occur before she and the proposed class members would be precluded from using technical college IDs at the polls. For nearly four years, the GAB has interpreted Act 23's student-ID provision as including technical college IDs, and it has issued both
6

emergency and proposed permanent rules that embody its interpretation. To date, neither the governor nor the legislature has disagreed with the GAB’s interpretation, and these branches of state government have taken no action to block the GAB’s rules. Even if the GAB’s rules do not become permanent, the GAB could continue to interpret Act 23 the way it has and continue to instruct local election officials to accept technical college IDs at the polls. See Defs.’ Ex. 1050 at 7–8 (noting that GAB instructed local election officials to accept technical college IDs even before the emergency rules went into effect). The plaintiff suggests that the legislature could enact a new statute explicitly forbidding the use of technical college IDs for voting, Am. Compl. ¶ 48, and at oral argument her lawyer pointed out that the legislature is considering a bill to eliminate the GAB altogether, which might result in the creation of a new agency responsible for administering the election laws, which agency, in turn, might interpret Act 23 as excluding technical college IDs, see Tr. of Oral Argument at 7. But these are highly speculative future events, and the chance that they will occur is too small to justify constitutional adjudication. See Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2010) (claim is unripe when it depends on the occurrence of “too many unlikely steps”).
Moreover, should the events the plaintiff fears come to pass, she (or another technical college student) may commence a new suit at that time and seek a preliminary injunction. The suit would present a relatively straightforward legal question that could be resolved quickly, and if the plaintiff’s claim has merit an injunction could likely be issued between the time the defendants announce their decision to exclude technical college IDs and the date of an election. Thus, withholding judicial review until after that decision has been made would not impose a hardship on the plaintiff or the proposed class members.
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See Wis. Right to Life, 664 F.3d at 148 (explaining that case is unripe when plaintiff cannot show that delaying judicial review until feared events occur will cause hardship).
For these reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for relief on behalf of technical college students will be denied, and her claim will be dismissed as unripe.
II. OUT-OF-STATE DRIVER’S LICENSES Plaintiffs Samantha Meszaros and Matthew Dearing seek to represent a class of “all Wisconsin voters who are residents of Wisconsin for voting purposes, who lack any accepted photo ID, and who would be forced to surrender an out-of-state driver’s license in order to obtain a free Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes.” ECF No. 194 at 101. These plaintiffs contend that the photo ID requirement, as applied to members of the proposed class, amounts to a poll tax that violates both the 24th Amendment to the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their argument is that persons who possess an out-of-state license are faced with an impermissible choice: they must either pay a fee to obtain another form of Act 23-compliant ID (such as a passport) or surrender their driving privileges to obtain a free Wisconsin state ID card.4 See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965). An initial problem is that the claims of the class representatives are moot. Both Meszaros and Dearing testified at trial that they have obtained U.S. passports and that they did so for reasons other than to vote in Wisconsin. Tr. at 696, 977. Thus, assuming that
4Under Wisconsin law, a person may be issued a state ID card only if he or she surrenders any driver’s license issued to that person by another jurisdiction. See Wis. Stat. § 343.50(1)(b); Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.14(2).
8

they are otherwise qualified Wisconsin voters,5 Meszaros and Dearing may now vote in Wisconsin without obtaining a free Wisconsin state ID or surrendering their out-of-state driver’s licenses. They therefore are no longer subject to the claimed poll tax, and their individual claims must be dismissed as moot.6 It follows that I cannot certify a class in which Meszaros and Dearing are the class representatives. Weismueller v. Kosobocki, 513 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If . . . the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot before the class is certified, the suit must be dismissed because no one besides the plaintiff has a legally protected interest in the litigation.”).
The plaintiffs contend that even if Meszaros and Dearing’s claims are moot, another person, Brittney Frederick, is willing to serve as the class representative. Frederick filed a declaration stating that she is a student at Carthage College and does not currently possess any form of Act 23-compliant ID. See ECF No. 238-1. She does possess a student photo ID card issued by Carthage, but she is not sure whether that ID is acceptable for voting purposes. Frederick has an unexpired driver’s license issued by Illinois, which is where she grew up and where her parents live. She states that she does not want to either pay for a Wisconsin driver’s license or to surrender her Illinois driver’s license.
5At the time of trial, Dearing was not a Wisconsin resident and for that reason was not eligible to vote in Wisconsin. Tr. at 980. However, he stated that he hoped to return to Wisconsin. Id.
6Meszaros and Dearing contend that their claims are not moot because they are still prohibited from using their out-of-state driver’s licenses to comply with Act 23. Reply Br. at 17–18, ECF No. 237. However, the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused not by their inability to use their out-of-state licenses at the polls, but by their inability to obtain Act 23-compliant ID without choosing between either paying fees or surrendering their out-of-state driver’s licenses. Now that the plaintiffs have obtained Act 23-compliant ID, they no longer face this allegedly impermissible choice. Thus, their claims are moot.
9

Frederick is not identified in the plaintiffs’ most recent complaint, did not participate in discovery, and did not testify at the trial. The defendants have not conceded that the facts as alleged in her declaration are true.7 Thus, before Frederick could represent a class, the plaintiffs would have to file a complaint identifying her as a plaintiff. The defendants would then be entitled to take discovery with respect to her claim, and a second trial might be required.
Moreover, the plaintiffs have not convinced me that there are a large number of persons in Wisconsin who do not possess Act 23-qualifying ID and who could not obtain such an ID without having to surrender an out-of-state driver’s license. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (class may not be certified unless “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical”). In moving for class certification, the plaintiffs identified college students and “snowbirds”—individuals who live in Wisconsin during warmer months and who live in other states during the winter—as the types of individuals who will likely possess an out-of-state driver’s license yet be eligible to vote in Wisconsin. However, most college students will possess student photo ID cards issued by their colleges, and the evidence presented does not convince me that student ID cards issued by colleges or universities in Wisconsin will fail to meet Act 23's requirements. Thus, at this point, I have no reason to think that college students in Wisconsin must surrender any out-of-state IDs in their possession in order to vote. As for snowbirds, none testified at trial. The only evidence in the record pertaining to them is the testimony of a GAB employee who stated
7The defendants have moved to strike Frederick’s declaration on the ground that it was filed with the plaintiffs’ reply brief. See ECF No. 240. Although I will not strike the declaration, neither will I assume that Frederick’s statements are true.
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that he had heard from approximately ten individuals who complained about having to surrender their out-of-state driver’s licenses to obtain Wisconsin ID cards. Tr. at 1687–88. This testimony does not demonstrate that the number of individuals who cannot vote without surrendering an out-of-state driver’s license is “so numerous that joinder of all the members is impractical.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). No details with respect to these ten individuals were offered at trial, and it is possible that they possess some form of qualifying ID. Even assuming that these individuals lack Act 23-qualifying ID and could not obtain such ID without surrendering an out-of-state driver’s license, it is not impractical to join ten individuals to a suit.
More generally, I doubt that there are a large number of qualified Wisconsin voters who may legally drive in Wisconsin without possessing a valid Wisconsin driver’s license. To vote in Wisconsin, a person must reside in Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. § 6.02(1). “Residence” is defined as “the place where the person's habitation is fixed, without any present intent to move, and to which, when absent, the person intends to return.” Wis. Stat. § 6.10(1).8 It is illegal for a Wisconsin resident to operate a motor vehicle in this state unless that person possesses a valid operator’s license issued by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation. Wis. Stat. § 343.05(3)(a). Nonresidents, however, may operate a motor vehicle in Wisconsin so long as they are at least 16 years old and have a valid license issued by the person’s home jurisdiction. Wis. Stat. § 343.05(4)(b)1. Under the motor-vehicle code, a “resident” is defined as “an adult whose one home and
8Other subsections of Wis. Stat. § 6.02 provide additional standards for determining residence, but those standards do not alter the basic requirement that residence is the place where the person’s habitation is fixed, without any present intent to move, and to which, when absent, the person intends to return.
11

customary and principal residence, to which the person has the intention of returning whenever he or she is absent, is in this state.” Wis. Stat. § 343.01(2)(g). This definition has the same meaning as “residence” under the voting laws—both definitions define residence as meaning, essentially, a person’s “domicile.” See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “domicile” as “[t]he place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as home; a person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.”). It is thus difficult to envision a scenario in which an adult could be a resident of Wisconsin for purposes of the voting laws and not also be a resident of Wisconsin for purposes of the motor-vehicle code, such that the person could legally drive in Wisconsin without surrendering his or her out-of-state license. The plaintiffs have not offered an interpretation of these statutes that would permit such a result.
If a person who is qualified to vote in Wisconsin must be a resident of Wisconsin for driving purposes, then the only persons who could claim that having to surrender an out-ofstate driver’s license is a poll tax are persons who (a) are qualified to vote in Wisconsin, (b) never drive in Wisconsin, (c) possess a driver’s license issued by another state, (d) occasionally drive in that other state, and (e) do not already possess a form of Act 23qualifying ID. All other persons who are qualified to vote in Wisconsin and who wish to retain their driving privileges would be required to obtain a Wisconsin driver’s license and surrender their out-of-state driver’s license regardless of whether they intended to vote in Wisconsin. I doubt that there are many persons who would fit criteria (a) through (e), and the plaintiffs have not submitted evidence indicating that such persons exist. The students who testified at the trial admitted to driving in Wisconsin, and thus if they are residents for
12

voting purposes they are required to have Wisconsin driver’s licenses regardless of whether they wish to vote. Tr. at 698, 980–81. As noted, no snowbirds testified at trial, but in any event I doubt that a person who lives in Wisconsin during its warmer months never drives while in Wisconsin but drives in the state in which that person lives for the remainder of the year. Thus, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).
For these reasons, the claims of the named class members, Meszaros and Dearing, will be dismissed as moot, and the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class in connection with their poll-tax claim will be denied.
III. VETERAN’S ID Plaintiffs Sam Bulmer, Carl Ellis, and Rickie Lamont Harmon seek to represent a class of veterans who possess photo identification cards issued by U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.9 The specific ID card at issue is the Veteran Health Identification Card, which veterans use to obtain treatment at VA health facilities. See Young Decl. Ex. 17, ECF No. 238-14. Act 23 does not include such ID cards among the kinds of photo ID cards that may be used for voting. See Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m). The plaintiffs contend that the exclusion of veteran’s ID from the list of acceptable kinds of photo ID is arbitrary and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to any person who possesses a veteran’s ID.
9When the plaintiffs originally moved for class certification, they defined the class in a way that limited it to persons who possessed veteran’s ID and no form of Act 23qualifying ID. See ECF No. 64 at 21. However, they have since expanded the proposed class definition to include all persons who possess veteran’s ID, regardless of whether they also possess Act 23-qualifying ID. See ECF No. 223 at 9; ECF No. 237 at 17–18.
13

The defendants argue that the claims of the proposed class representatives are
moot because, during the pendency of this case, all of them were able to obtain a form of
photo ID that is already accepted under Act 23. However, the injury for which the plaintiffs
seek redress is their inability to use their veteran’s ID for voting purposes. The plaintiffs’
having obtained other IDs that they can use for voting purposes does not redress that
injury. Although the inability to use a veteran’s ID for voting purposes may seem like a
minor injury in light of the plaintiffs’ possession of another form of ID, it nonetheless is
sufficient to give the plaintiffs “a direct stake in the outcome of the litigation.” See United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973). The plaintiffs wish to use their veteran’s ID for voting purposes, but the defendants
will not allow them to. An injunction requiring the defendants to accept the plaintiffs’
veteran’s IDs would redress their injuries. Thus, the named plaintiffs continue to have standing, and their claims are not moot.10
The defendants next argue that I may not certify the proposed class of veterans
because the class would not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), because
the claims of the named plaintiffs are not typical of the claims of the class, see Rule
10My conclusion that the claims of veterans who possess acceptable ID are not moot is consistent with my conclusion that the claims of those who possess both out-of-state ID and Act 23-qualifying ID are moot. This is because the claims of those with out-of-state ID relate to the process of obtaining acceptable ID—they claim they are injured because they cannot obtain Act 23-qualifying ID without paying a poll tax. If the plaintiffs have obtained Act 23-qualifying ID without paying a poll tax, then they are no longer suffering the claimed injury. In contrast, the veterans do not challenge the process of obtaining ID; they challenge what is, in their view, the arbitrary exclusion of veteran’s ID from the list of Act 23-qualifying ID. Thus, the named plaintiffs who are veterans may challenge the continued refusal to accept veteran’s ID even though they have obtained acceptable forms of photo ID.
14

23(a)(3), and because the named plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives, see
Rule 23(a)(4). However, rather than addressing these issues, I will proceed to address the
merits of the named plaintiffs’ claims. I do this because, as I will discuss, those claims fail
on the merits. Thus, certifying a class of veterans would not benefit the plaintiffs. Rather,
it would benefit only the defendants by precluding unnamed veterans from bringing their
own, separate claims. See Myrick v. WellPoint, Inc., 764 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2014). But the
defendants oppose class certification and thus seem content to waive this benefit.
Therefore, I will proceed to the merits. See Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., 70 F.3d 937,
941–42 (7th Cir. 1995).
The plaintiffs argue that it is arbitrary to exclude veteran’s ID from the list of
acceptable forms of ID when a veteran’s ID is “just as secure” (i.e., just as likely to ensure
that the person presenting it is who he or she claims to be) as other forms of Act 23-
qualifying ID—namely, ID cards issued by a U.S. uniformed service (“military ID cards”) and ID cards issued by federally recognized Indian tribes in Wisconsin (“tribal ID cards”).11
Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(a)3 & (e). Therefore, argue the plaintiffs, Act 23 cannot survive rational-basis scrutiny.12 Under such scrutiny, a statutory classification must be upheld “if
11The parties do not identify a comprehensive standard for judging the degree of “security” offered by a given form of ID. However, some forms of military and tribal ID cards apparently do not bear expiration dates. Tr. at 1965. At the time Act 23 was passed, veteran’s ID cards did not bear expiration dates. See Def. Post-trial Br. at 123, ECF No. 176. (However, newly issued cards have expiration dates. See Young Decl. Exs. 4 & 8.) It is apparently the lack of expiration dates that makes some military ID cards, tribal ID cards, and veteran’s ID cards “less secure” than other forms of ID, such as driver’s licenses and passports.
12In a footnote, the plaintiffs suggest that the Anderson/Burdick balancing test, see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), rather than rational-basis scrutiny, might apply to the question of whether the defendants
15

there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
There is no dispute that veteran’s ID is “just as secure” as some forms of military and tribal ID that are acceptable under Act 23. However, this does not make Wisconsin’s decision to exclude veteran’s ID arbitrary or irrational. The plaintiffs’ argument implies that the state must accept all forms of photo ID that are “just as secure” as the least secure form of ID that is already on the list of accepted IDs. That would produce a very long list. The federal judiciary, for example, issues ID cards to its employees that contain the employee’s name and photograph, as well as the date of issuance and an expiration date. Presumably, this card would be “just as secure” as a veteran’s ID, tribal ID, or military ID. Moreover, many other federal, state, and local governmental agencies likely issue photo IDs to their employees that could be deemed “just as secure” as military IDs or tribal IDs. Under the plaintiffs’ argument, those IDs would have to be accepted as well. Undoubtedly, many other forms of photo ID could be identified that are “just as secure” as the forms of ID already accepted under Act 23.
It is rational for Wisconsin to limit the number of acceptable IDs to a manageable amount, while at the same time accepting enough forms of ID to make it likely that most voters will already possess one of the accepted forms. If the state could not limit the number of IDs to a manageable amount, state officials would be required to compile a list
may exclude veteran’s ID. See Reply Br. at 3 n.2, ECF No. 237. However, the plaintiffs do not develop this argument, and it was raised for the first time in their reply brief. For these reasons, I will not consider the argument. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Veluchamy, 643 F.3d 185, 189–90 (7th Cir. 2011) (court is not required to consider undeveloped arguments); Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 382 (7th Cir. 2009) (argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived).
16

of all forms of accepted ID that a Wisconsin voter might possess, make sure that the list was updated regularly, and identify all the forms of ID that are “just as secure” as the least secure form of ID that is already on the list of acceptable IDs. Act 23 would need to be periodically amended to include any new forms of ID that are “just as secure” as the IDs that are already accepted. And poll workers would need frequent training on which IDs are acceptable. All of this would make it harder for the state to administer the law, and it is rational for the state to want to minimize this burden.
To be sure, Wisconsin probably could have included veteran’s ID on the list of Act 23-qualifying ID without significantly increasing its administrative burden. However, for the reasons just discussed, the state had to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of ID somewhere. Drawing such a line “inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.” Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315–16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Wisconsin’s decision to exclude veteran’s ID from the list of acceptable forms of ID is “virtually unreviewable.” Id. at 316.
Moreover, one can conceive of reasons for wanting to expand the list of acceptable forms of ID to include military ID and tribal ID, even if they may be deemed “less secure” than some of the other forms of acceptable ID, but not expand the list to include veteran’s ID. Military ID cards are issued to active-duty personnel and their family members (among others). These individuals tend to relocate more frequently than voters generally and for that reason may not reside in Wisconsin for long enough to find themselves in need of a
17

Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card. Thus, the state could rationally conclude that
military voters should be able to use their military ID cards at the polls, even though they may be “less secure” than other forms of ID.13 The same rationale would not apply to
veterans, who are no more likely to relocate frequently than voters generally. Thus, the
state had a rational basis for expanding the list of acceptable ID to include military ID but
not veteran’s ID.
As for tribal ID cards, they are issued by quasi-sovereign Indian tribes to their
members. The state could rationally conclude that tribal ID cards hold the same status
within the tribal community as Wisconsin state ID cards hold outside of it, and that
therefore they should be treated the same as Wisconsin state ID cards for voting purposes,
even if they could be deemed somewhat “less secure” than Wisconsin state ID cards
because they do not have expiration dates. This rationale would not apply to veteran’s ID
cards, as obviously veterans do not comprise a quasi-sovereign community that issues its
own form of citizen ID. Thus, the state had a rational basis for expanding the list of
acceptable ID to include tribal ID cards but not veteran’s ID cards.
13The plaintiffs note that military ID cards are issued not just to active-duty personnel, but also to retirees and others who might not relocate as frequently as activeduty personnel. Although that may be true, it does not render the state’s decision to accept military ID cards irrational. The plaintiffs have not shown that there is a form of military ID that is possessed only by active-duty personnel who are likely to relocate, such that the state could have limited its acceptance of military IDs to that form. But more importantly, under rational-basis scrutiny, the state is not required to draw its lines with precision. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, even if the state could have limited its acceptance of military IDs to a form that it possessed only by active-duty personnel, the Equal Protection Clause would not have required it to do so. Id. at 656 (noting that court will not interfere with legislative line-drawing even when the lines drawn are overinclusive or underinclusive).
18

In their briefs and at oral argument, the plaintiffs relied heavily on Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir 2014). In that case, a group of secular humanists alleged that Indiana’s marriage-solemnization statute violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment because it allowed solemnization by religious officials of certain religious groups but disallowed solemnization by equivalent officials of secular groups. The Seventh Circuit held that the statute violated the First Amendment by favoring religious groups over secular groups. But it also stated that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it made irrational and absurd distinctions. Id. at 874–75. The plaintiffs contend that this case stands for the proposition that a state’s desire for a finite list does not justify its exclusion of items from that list that otherwise could have been included. But that’s not what the case says. Indiana did not defend its exclusion of secular humanists from its list of approved marriage celebrants on the ground that including them would open the door to an unmanageably long list. Indiana gave other reasons for excluding them. See id. at 874. Moreover, the reason the exclusion of humanists was irrational was that the statute “discriminated arbitrarily among religious and ethical beliefs.” Id. at 875. The statute, for example, permitted officials of the Church of Satan, “whose high priestess avows that her powers derive from having sex with Satan,” to solemnize marriages, yet precluded Buddhists, “who emphasize love an peace,” from doing so. Id. As explained above, nothing like that is going on here. Wisconsin had a rational basis for including tribal and military IDs on the list of acceptable IDs yet excluding veteran’s IDs.
19

Accordingly, the named plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction requiring the state to accept veteran’s ID cards for voting purposes. Their claims will be dismissed on the merits.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for permanent injunction, class certification, and judgment on remaining as-applied claims is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ reply brief and supporting materials is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claim of Domonique Whitehurst is dismissed as unripe. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims of Samantha Meszaros and Matthew Dearing are dismissed as moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims of Sam Bulmer, Carl Ellis, and Rickie Lamont Harmon are dismissed on the merits. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 19th day of October 2015.
s/ Lynn Adelman _______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
20

 
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Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 05/04/16 Page 7 of 11 Document 263

Case:C1a5s-e3:51852-358D2ocumDeoncut:m0e0n7t1:237651554 Filed:F0i4le/1d2: /0250/1064/201P6agesP:a1ges: 1 (8 of 11) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov

April 12, 2016 Before:

FINAL JUDGMENT
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants

No. 15-3582

v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Govenor of the State of Wisconsin, et al., Defendants - Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No: 2:11-cv-01128-LA Eastern District of Wisconsin District Judge Lynn Adelman

The portions of the district court’s decision that have not been appealed stand. The portion that concerns veterans’ ID is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss that aspect of the litigation as moot. The remainder of the decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. Appellants shall recover costs.

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 05/04/16 Page 8 of 11 Document 263

Case: 15-3582 Document: 00712751555

Filed: 05/04/2016 Pages: 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

(9 of 11)

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov

May 4, 2016

BILL OF COSTS

Taxed in Favor of: Appellant Dartric Davis ; Appellant Carl Ellis ; Appellant Ruthelle Frank ; Appellant Justin Luft ; Appellant Barbara Oden

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants

No. 15-3582

v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Govenor of the State of Wisconsin, et al., Defendants - Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No: 2:11-cv-01128-LA Eastern District of Wisconsin District Judge Lynn Adelman
The mandate or agency closing letter issued in this cause on May 4, 2016.

BILL OF COSTS issued in the amount of: $883.00.

Cost of Each Item

For docketing a case on appeal or review or 1.
docketing any other proceeding: ___________________________

__________

2. For reproduction of any record or paper, __________
per page: _______________________________________

3. For reproduction of briefs: ___________________________________________

__________

TOTAL:

form name: c7_BillOfCosts(form ID: 140)

Total Cost Each Item
__________ __________ 883.00 883.00

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 05/04/16 Page 9 of 11 Document 263

Case: 15-3582 Document: 00712751556

Filed: 05/04/2016 Pages: 2 (10 of 11)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604

Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov

May 4, 2016

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF MANDATE

To:

Jon W. Sanfilippo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District of Wisconsin

Milwaukee , WI 53202-0000

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants

No. 15-3582

v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Govenor of the State of Wisconsin, et al., Defendants - Appellees

Originating Case Information:

District Court No: 2:11-cv-01128-LA Eastern District of Wisconsin District Judge Lynn Adelman
Herewith is the mandate of this court in this appeal, along with the Bill of Costs, if any. A certified copy of the opinion/order of the court and judgment, if any, and any direction as to costs shall constitute the mandate.

AMOUNT OF BILL OF COSTS (do not include the $):

883.00

DATE OF MANDATE OR AGENCY CLOSING LETTER ISSUANCE:

05/04/2016

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 05/04/16 Page 10 of 11 Document 263

Case: 15-3582 Document: 00712751556

Filed: 05/04/2016 Pages: 2 (11 of 11)

RECORD ON APPEAL STATUS:

No record to be returned

NOTE TO COUNSEL: If any physical and large documentary exhibits have been filed in the above-entitled cause, they are to be withdrawn ten (10) days from the date of this notice. Exhibits not withdrawn during this period will be disposed of.
Please acknowledge receipt of these documents on the enclosed copy of this notice.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Received above mandate and record, if any, from the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Date:

Received by:

5/4/16
_________________________

___S_/_D__._M_c__L_e_o__d__B_r__o_c_k______________

form name: c7_Mandate(form ID: 135)

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 05/04/16 Page 11 of 11 Document 263

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 11-C-1128

SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________

DECISION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs, a number of individuals who are eligible to vote in Wisconsin, filed

this suit in 2011, alleging that Wisconsin’s law requiring them to present photo

identification at the polls, 2011 Wis. Act 23 (“Act 23"), violates the Constitution and

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Following a trial on the claims alleged in this and a

companion case, I concluded that Act 23 placed an undue burden on the plaintiffs’

voting rights and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. I also concluded that

Act 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Having found these violations, I

entered an injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the photo ID

requirement. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014). The defendants

appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.

2014) (“Frank I”).

On remand, the plaintiffs sought relief in connection with certain claims that I did

not resolve in my first decision. I issued a decision denying relief on those claims on

October 19, 2015. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging two aspects of my decision.

First, the plaintiffs challenged my conclusion that Frank I precluded me from considering

1 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 1 of 44 Document 294

the plaintiffs’ claim for relief on behalf of persons who cannot obtain Act 23-qualifying ID with reasonable effort. Second, the plaintiffs challenged my conclusion that Act 23’s exclusion of veterans’ ID cards from the list of IDs that may be used for voting did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
While the plaintiffs’ appeal was pending, Wisconsin amended Act 23 to require election officials to accept veterans’ IDs. See 2015 Wis. Act 261, § 2. Because the parties agreed that this rendered the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the refusal to accept such IDs moot, the Seventh Circuit vacated my decision on that claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it as moot. See Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Frank II”). In accordance with that instruction, I will in this order dismiss that claim as moot.
As to the plaintiffs’ other argument, the Seventh Circuit held that its decision in the first appeal did not preclude me from considering the plaintiffs’ claim for relief on behalf of those who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort. It therefore vacated my dismissal of that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 385–88.
Now that the case has been remanded a second time, the plaintiffs have filed a motion to supplement their complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), a motion to certify a class, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and a motion for a preliminary injunction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). The motion for a preliminary injunction seeks an order requiring the defendants to offer voters who do not possess an ID and who cannot obtain one with reasonable effort the option of receiving a ballot by executing an affidavit to that effect.1
1 Throughout this opinion, I refer to the relief the plaintiffs seek as an “affidavit” option. However, in legal jargon, “affidavit” usually refers to a statement that is sworn before an officer, such as a notary. The affidavit that the plaintiffs request will not be notarized or sworn, and thus it might be more accurate to refer to the affidavit as a “declaration,”
2 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 2 of 44 Document 294

The plaintiffs also seek an order requiring the defendants to publicize this affidavit option by sending individualized notice to all registered voters who, according to DMV records, might not possess qualifying ID.
I will grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and will order the defendants to implement an affidavit option in time for the general election on November 8, 2016. As explained in more detail below, although most voters in Wisconsin either possess qualifying ID or can easily obtain one, a safety net is needed for those voters who cannot obtain qualifying ID with reasonable effort. The plaintiffs’ proposed affidavit option is a sensible approach that will both prevent the disenfranchisement of some voters during the pendency of this litigation and preserve Wisconsin’s interests in protecting the integrity of its elections. I will also grant the plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint and their motion for class certification. However, I will not require the defendants to mail individualized notice of the affidavit option to certain voters.
I. I begin with the plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint. The sole purpose of this pleading is to add three named plaintiffs and potential class representatives to the case: Melvin Robertson, Leroy Switlick, and James Green. The proposed supplemental complaint alleges that these individuals do not possess Act 23qualifying ID, that they face significant barriers to obtaining ID, and that the requirement to present ID at the polls prevented them from voting in Wisconsin elections during 2016. See Decl. of Sean J. Young Ex. 1, ECF No. 280-1.
which is a statement made under penalty of perjury that is not notarized or sworn to. However, because the parties use the term “affidavit,” I will as well.
3 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 3 of 44 Document 294

The defendants contend that I should not allow these individuals to be added as plaintiffs because their claims will be addressed as part of a separate lawsuit that is pending in the Western District of Wisconsin, One Wisconsin Institute, Inc., et al. v. Judge Gerald C. Nichol, et al., W.D. Wis. Case No. 15-C-0324. The defendants contend that adding the new plaintiffs to this case would be duplicative and inefficient. However, Robertson, Switlick and Green are not parties to the One Wisconsin case. It is true that they may benefit from any relief granted in One Wisconsin, but that is also true of the individuals who are already named as plaintiffs in this case. If I were to deny Robertson, Switlick and Green leave to join this case, they would still have a right to file their own, separate suit, and thus not allowing them to become parties in this case would only increase the risk of duplicative litigation. It is better to have their claims and the claims of the existing plaintiffs, all of which are virtually identical, litigated as part of a single action. For that reason, I will grant the plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint.
II. I next address the defendants’ argument that no plaintiff has standing to seek an affidavit option on behalf of persons who lack ID and cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort. To have standing, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560– 61 (1992). The plaintiffs have put forth the following individuals as plaintiffs with standing to pursue an affidavit option: Ruthelle Frank, Shirley Brown, DeWayne Smith, Melvin Robertson, Leroy Switlick, and James Green. Pls.’ Br. at 24, ECF No. 279. So long as
4 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 4 of 44 Document 294

one of these individuals has standing, the claim may proceed rather than be dismissed for lack of standing. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 n.7 (2008).
The defendants point out that two of these plaintiffs, Brown and Smith, have obtained ID, and contend that therefore their claims are moot. A claim becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party. Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012). Here, because Brown and Smith have obtained ID, they would not benefit from the relief that the plaintiffs currently seek, i.e., an order requiring the defendants to allow those who lack ID to obtain a ballot by signing an affidavit stating that they have been unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort. Thus, such an order would not be effectual relief for them. However, these plaintiffs still have a sufficient stake in this case to remain plaintiffs. That is because the plaintiffs intend to argue on appeal that Frank I was wrongly decided and that Act 23 should be enjoined in its entirety. See Pls.’ Br. at 6 n.4, ECF No. 279. As I noted in my original decision, those who possess IDs have standing to seek an injunction that prevents them from having to show their IDs at the polls to receive a ballot. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 866. But, for purposes of this order, I will assume that Brown and Smith do not have standing to seek an affidavit option and examine whether any of the other plaintiffs do.
The defendants contend that the claim of Ruthelle Frank, who does not possess an ID, is moot because she was able to vote by absentee mail in this year’s elections without having to show ID under Act 23’s “indefinitely confined” exception. That exception provides that a person “who is indefinitely confined because of age, physical illness or infirmity or is disabled for an indefinite period may by signing a statement to
5 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 5 of 44 Document 294

that effect” vote by absentee ballot without presenting ID. Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(2)(a), 6.87(4)(b)2. However, Frank prefers to vote in person and has voted absentee only because she lacks ID and therefore cannot vote in person. See Frank Dep. at 12–13, ECF No. 280-4. Thus, Frank continues to suffer an injury in fact, i.e., the inability to vote in person, that is caused by the photo-ID requirement, and that would be redressed by the creation of an affidavit option. She therefore continues to have standing to seek the requested injunctive relief.
The remaining plaintiffs, Robertson, Switlick and Green, also have standing to seek an order creating an affidavit option. These plaintiffs do not currently possess IDs, have been unable to vote in recent elections, and allege that they cannot with reasonable effort obtain IDs. The defendants contend that these plaintiffs do not have standing because they have not shown that they tried to obtain IDs under the Wisconsin DMV’s most recent procedures. However, while the plaintiffs’ failure to apply for IDs under the current procedures may be relevant to the merits of their claims, it does not deprive them of standing to seek an affidavit option, which if granted would prevent them from having to apply for IDs at all. Moreover, Leroy Switlick did attempt to obtain an ID as recently as April 2016 but was unsuccessful. Decl. of Leroy Switlick ¶¶ 8–10, ECF No. 280-6. This would have been after the DMV instituted most of its new procedures but before a recent emergency rule (discussed below) went into effect in May 2016. Having to reapply for an ID every time the DMV changes its procedures would itself require more than reasonable effort, and thus Switlick undoubtedly has standing to seek an affidavit remedy. This reasoning also applies to Melvin Robertson, who attempted to obtain an ID before 2014. Decl. of Melvin Robertson ¶ 7, ECF No.
6 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 6 of 44 Document 294

280-5. Accordingly, I conclude that Robertson, Switlick and Green have standing to seek an order creating an affidavit option.
III. Next, I address the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The plaintiffs propose to certify a class defined as eligible Wisconsin voters without acceptable forms of identification for voting and who have one or more of the following barriers to obtaining ID: (1) name mismatches or other errors in a document needed to obtain ID; (2) a need to obtain an underlying document from an agency other than the DMV in order to obtain ID; and/or (3) one or more underlying documents necessary to obtain ID cannot be found. See Pls. Prop. Order at 1–2, ECF No. 278-1. However, the affidavit remedy the plaintiffs seek on behalf of this class would apply to a broader class of persons, namely, to all those who face a “reasonable impediment” to obtaining acceptable ID. The order they seek would direct the defendants to: Create an affidavit in simple language that would allow voters without acceptable identification for voting to cast a regular ballot at the polling place or an absentee ballot, by affirming that they face a “reasonable impediment” to obtaining acceptable identification. The form should have boxes that a voter may check for “lack of transportation,” “disability or illness,” “lack of birth certificate,” “work schedule,” “family responsibilities,” and “other reasonable impediment.” See id. at 2. To bring the class definition in line with the proposed remedy, I will define
the proposed class as all those eligible to vote in Wisconsin who cannot with reasonable effort obtain a qualifying photo ID. Most of the members of this class will also fit into one of the plaintiffs’ three categories, since individuals in those categories are the ones most likely to encounter reasonable impediments. See Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386 (describing the members of the plaintiffs’ three categories as those who cannot “obtain a qualifying photo ID with reasonable effort”).
7 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 7 of 44 Document 294

Having defined the proposed class, I turn to whether it may be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. A district court may certify a class of plaintiffs if the proposed class satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—and any one of the conditions of Rule 23(b). Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006). For the reasons explained below, I conclude that these elements are satisfied.
A. I first address the four Rule 23(a) requirements. Numerosity. Under Rule 23(a)(1), a class may be certified only if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” I find that the proposed class satisfies this requirement. Although it is true that the vast majority of Wisconsin voters already possess qualifying ID, and although it may be true that many voters who do not already possess qualifying ID can obtain one with ease, there can be no doubt that some voters in Wisconsin still face high hurdels to obtaining ID. As explained in more detail below, the DMV has already denied IDs to more than 50 applicants who sought IDs under the DMV’s current rules, and it is likely that many others will be unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort. Moreover, it is clearly impracticable to join all such individuals as plaintiffs. There is no way to identify every person in the state who currently faces high hurdles to obtaining ID. Indeed, many individuals likely will not even realize that they fall within the class definition until they attempt to obtain ID and discover the hurdles that affect them. For example, a person might believe that it will be easy to obtain an ID only to discover, upon getting to the DMV, that his or her documentation is not acceptable. This person will benefit from the relief sought by the class but could not have been joined as a named plaintiff. A related point is that new
8 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 8 of 44 Document 294

class members will be created while the case is pending, as people turn eighteen, move to Wisconsin, or otherwise become eligible to vote here and discover that they cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort. It is not possible to identify all of these individuals in advance and join them as named plaintiffs. Accordingly, Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied.
Commonality. Rule 23(a)(2) provides that a class may be certified only if “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” This requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members “have suffered the same injury.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). This, in turn, requires the plaintiff to show that the class’s claims “depend upon a common contention” that is central to the validity of every class member’s claim and which can be resolved on a classwide basis, i.e., in one stroke. Id. at 350. Here, I conclude that plaintiffs have satisfied this standard. One common question is this: Does Act 23, as applied to those who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID, violate the Constitution as it was understood in decisions such as Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)? If the answer to this common question is yes, then another common question arises: Is the proper remedy for this violation of the class members’ rights an injunction requiring the creation of an affidavit option in the form that the plaintiffs have sought?
Typicality. Rule 23(a)(3), in pertinent part, requires that “the claims . . . of the representative parties [be] typical of the claims . . . of the class.” The Seventh Circuit has interpreted this requirement to mean that the named representatives’ claims must “have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983); accord Munro v.
9 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 9 of 44 Document 294

Target Corp., 580 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2009). The court has stated that “[a] plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232 (quoting H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1115(b) at 185 (1977)); accord Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006). The court has also stated that “[t]he typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members.” De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232; accord Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514.
In the present case, I conclude that the claims of class representatives Frank, Robertson, Switlick and Green are typical of the claims of the class. The named plaintiffs’ claims share the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large. Those characteristics are (1) the lack of a qualifying ID, and (2) the existence of a high hurdle to obtaining such ID. The class representatives’ claims are also based on the same legal theory as the class’s claims, i.e., violation of the Constitution as understood in Anderson and Burdick.
Adequacy of representation. Rule 23(a)(4) requires the representative parties to demonstrate that they will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This requirement focuses on matters such as whether the class representatives have retained appropriate counsel and whether the representatives have interests that conflict with the interests of the class. See, e.g., Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). In the present case, the defendants do not dispute that Frank, Robertson, Switlick and Green are adequate class representatives,
10 Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 07/19/16 Page 10 of 44 Document 294

and it appears to me that they and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Therefore, I conclude that Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.
B. I next examine whether one of the conditions in Rule 23(b) is satisfied. Here, the plaintiffs seek certification under either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2). I conclude that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2) and for that reason will not discuss Rule 23(b)(1). Rule 23(b)(2) permits class certification if “the party opposing the class has acted or refuses to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d 426, 441 (7th Cir. 2015). “Colloquially, 23(b)(2) is the appropriate rule to enlist when the plaintiffs’ primary goal is not monetary relief, but rather to require the defendant to do or not do something that would benefit the whole class.” Chicago Teachers Union, 797 F.3d at 441. Rule 23(b)(2) is generally considered to be the appropriate procedural vehicle for certifying civil-rights claims seeking injunctive relief. Id. Here, the defendants have acted or failed to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, in that Act 23 applies to all of those who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID. Moreover, the general requirements for obtaining qualifying ID are the same for all class members. Although the class members do not all face the same high hurdles to obtaining ID, the plaintiffs have not asked the court to fashion different remedies for each hurdle. Rather, the plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring the defendants to allow all class members to vote by presenting an affidavit in lieu of photo ID. This would be an adequate remedy for the entire class, and thus final injunctive
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relief would operate in favor of the class as a whole. Certification is therefore appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2).
C. The defendants also contend that class certification should be denied because the proposed class is vague or indefinite, i.e., that it is not “ascertainable.” See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977–78 (7th Cir. 1977). I disagree. The class is defined as all eligible Wisconsin voters who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID. Although one may contend that the term “reasonable effort” is indefinite, as applied to the facts of this case it is definite enough. The essential point is that the class includes anyone who does not currently possess qualifying ID and who, to obtain one, would have to do more than retrieve a birth certificate and related documents from his or her desk drawer and make a single trip to the DMV. The class would also include those who cannot, without going to unreasonable lengths, make a single trip to the DMV, such as those with health problems who find travel difficult and those who cannot afford the costs of transportation to the DMV. To administer this case, it is not necessary to define the class with greater precision. Because the class is being certified under Rule 23(b)(2), there will be no need to identify specific class members so that they may receive notice and an opportunity to opt out. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); 1 William B. Rubenstein, et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 3:7 (5th ed. 2011) (explaining that definiteness is less important in Rule 23(b)(2) cases, where class members do not have notice and opt-out rights); 5 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice–Civil § 23.21[5] (3d ed. 2016) (same). Moreover, the lack of greater definiteness will not impede the adjudication of the class’s claims or the implementation of the affidavit remedy. It is not necessary to
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identify all class members who cannot with reasonable effort obtain ID in order to determine whether any person who cannot is entitled to relief. Likewise, the defendants do not need to identify any class members in advance to implement the affidavit procedure. Rather, the defendants merely need to make the affidavit forms available to all voters and allow those who complete them to receive a ballot without producing an ID. Thus, the class is definite enough to make all aspects of this case administrable. See Moore, supra, § 23.21[5] (“Because [in a Rule 23(b)(2) class] the defendant is obligated to comply with any orders granting injunctive or declaratory relief and the representative plaintiffs may enforce compliance, the court may not need to identify each individual who might be entitled to relief.”).
IV. Having certified a class, I turn to the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must make an initial showing that (1) they will suffer irreparable harm in the period before the final resolution of their claim; (2) traditional legal remedies are inadequate; and (3) the claim has some likelihood of success on the merits. BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 323–24 (7th Cir. 2015). If the plaintiffs make this showing, the court weighs the factors against one another, assessing whether the balance of harms favors the plaintiffs or whether the harm to the defendants or the public is sufficiently weighty that the injunction should be denied. Id. In the present case, the first two factors of the initial showing are clearly satisfied. Those who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID will be unable to vote in any elections that occur between now and when their claims are finally resolved. At least two elections will occur during that period: the partisan primary on August 9, 2016,
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and the general election on November 8, 2016. However, additional elections are likely to occur before the plaintiffs’ claims are finally resolved, including a statewide election on February 21, 2017. See Decl. of Michael Haas ¶ 44, ECF No. 286. If the plaintiffs
were unable to vote in these elections, traditional legal remedies, such as monetary
damages, would be inadequate. Thus, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a
preliminary injunction turns on their likelihood of success on the merits and whether the balance of harms favors the issuance of an injunction. I consider these issues below.2
A. Under the framework set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983),
and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), a voting regulation will violate the
constitutional rights of a plaintiff where the regulation imposes an undue burden on the plaintiff’s voting rights. To determine whether a regulation imposes an undue burden, the court balances the burdens faced by the plaintiff against the state’s interests in the regulation, “taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson,
460 U.S. at 789).
In the present case, the defendants contend that Act 23 furthers its interests in
detecting and deterring voter-impersonation fraud and in promoting public confidence in
the integrity of elections. These interests have been recognized as important enough to
2 The defendants have filed a motion to strike some of the evidence that the plaintiffs have filed in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 290. That evidence consists largely of declarations and discovery materials that were gathered during the course of the One Wisconsin case in the Western District of Wisconsin. The defendants have not cited any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, local rule of this court, or other legal authority that supports their motion. Nor am I aware of any rule or authority that would support striking this evidence. Accordingly, the motion to strike will be denied.
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justify the burdens that Act 23 places on the vast majority of Wisconsin’s voters, who either already possess qualifying ID or can obtain qualifying ID with reasonable effort. See Frank I, 768 F.3d at 749–51. The question presented at this stage of the case is whether the state’s interests are sufficient to require some voters to expend more than reasonable effort to obtain qualifying ID, and to disenfranchise those voters who cannot obtain ID not matter how hard they try. See Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386–87.
1. The defendants do not contend that the Constitution permits Wisconsin to deny access to a ballot to those who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID. Rather, they contend that all eligible voters in the state who employ reasonable effort will obtain qualifying ID—specifically, a Wisconsin state ID card issued by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation’s Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). I thus begin by discussing the evidence in the record that pertains to the DMV’s procedures for issuing these IDs to voters who need them. I then address whether those procedures ensure that all voters who employ reasonable effort will obtain qualifying ID. As the discussion below indicates, while the DMV’s latest procedures may make it easy for the majority of applicants to obtain a state ID card, there will still be some who will be unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort. A safety net, such as the plaintiffs’ affidavit option, is necessary to protect the voting rights of these individuals.
a. The basic requirements for obtaining a free state ID card for voting purposes are set out in a Wisconsin administrative regulation, Trans 102.15. See Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15. This regulation requires applicants to present proof of six items: (1)
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name, (2) date of birth, (3) United States citizenship,3 (4) identity, (5) Wisconsin residency, and (6) social security number. See § Trans 102.15(3), (3m), (4), (4m) & (5). To prove name, date of birth and United States citizenship, most applicants will need to produce a birth certificate. §§ Trans 102.15(3)(a)1–2, (3m)(a)1; Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 856. To prove identity, most applicants will need to produce a social security card. § Trans 102.15(4)(a)13; Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 856–57. To prove Wisconsin residency, an applicant must produce a document that lists the applicant’s address, such as a utility bill or paystub. § Trans 102.15(4m). To prove social security number, the person generally needs no documentation but must provide the number to the DMV. § Trans 102.15(5).
In my original opinion in this case, which I issued in April 2014, I made extensive findings about the burdens a person may encounter when trying to prove the six items required by Trans 102.15. See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 855–62. However, since the date of that opinion, Wisconsin has made several changes to this rule in an attempt to make the process of obtaining ID easier. The DMV has also adopted various informal practices that have not been codified in the rule but which are designed to further reduce the burdens associated with obtaining ID for voting purposes.
Under the current system, to obtain a free state ID card, a person begins by gathering whatever documentation he or she has and bringing them to a DMV customer service center. There are 92 service centers, or field offices, in the state. Each county
3 To receive a state ID card, a person does not have to be a United States citizen. Rather, a person who is not a citizen may receive a state ID card if he or she is a legal permanent resident or is otherwise legally present in the United States. See Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3m). However, to be qualified to vote, a person must be a United States citizen. See Wis. Stat. § 6.02. Thus, if a person applies for a free state ID card to use for voting purposes, the person must prove U.S. citizenship.
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has a service center that is open at least 20 hours per week. If a person arrives at a service center, completes an application for a free state ID card, and produces all of the necessary documentation to prove the six items required by Trans 102.15, the DMV will issue the person an ID. Decl. of Kristina Boardman ¶ 9, ECF No. 287.4 If, however, the person arrives at the DMV and is either missing a required document or the documents are not in order (such as because the person’s name is different or spelled differently on a supporting document), the person will have to rely on one of the DMV’s procedures for handling these problems.
One of the DMV’s procedures is known as the ID Petition Process, or “IDPP.” This process is used when the ID applicant does not have a birth certificate or other document needed to prove name, date of birth, and/or United States citizenship. The authority for the DMV to use this process is found in § Trans 102.15(5m), which was recently amended by way of an emergency rule promulgated by the Department of Transportation and approved by Wisconsin’s governor. See Emergency Rule 1618, §§ 6–9 (effective May 13, 2016).5 However, the DMV has been applying this procedure since September 2014. Boardman Decl. ¶ 12.
To use the ID petition process, an individual must go to a DMV service center, fill out an application for a free state ID card, and also complete a petition (known as “Form MV3012”) to be issued an ID without producing documents that prove name, date of birth, and citizenship. The person must also present documents to prove identity and Wisconsin residency. Boardman Decl. ¶ 13. Once this happens, an employee at the
4 Kristina Boardman is the Administrator of the DMV. 5 The emergency rule can be found on the Internet by entering “Emergency Rule 1618” into a search engine. Copies of the rule have been filed with the court. See ECF No. 280-24.
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DMV service center scans any documents that the applicant brought to the DMV and transmits them to the DMV’s central office in Madison. The central office will then attempt to verify the applicant’s name, date of birth, and U.S. citizenship by contacting various federal, state, and local agencies. The DMV does not charge the applicant a fee for using the petition process, and the goal of the process is to verify the applicant’s qualifications without requiring the applicant to make trips to other agencies or to pay a fee to obtain documents like a birth certificate.
The ID petition process is performed in stages. In the first stage, DMV’s central office attempts to quickly verify the applicant’s qualifications by finding his or her birth certificate through contact with public agencies. If the central office is successful, it will mail an ID card to the applicant’s address. However, if the central office is unsuccessful, the petition enters the second stage, where it is referred to the DMV’s Compliance, Audit and Fraud Unit, which goes by the acronym “CAFU.” Boardman Decl. ¶ 20. Once the petition reaches CAFU, an investigator is assigned to the case. The investigator then employs “investigatory skills developed in other aspects of CAFU’s work” to verify the applicant’s name, date of birth, and citizenship. Id. ¶ 23. These investigators are not restricted in the information they can consider and will often talk to family members, hospitals, and school districts to verify the applicant’s qualifications. An investor may also contact the applicant and ask him or her to provide additional information. CAFU’s primary goal is to locate the applicant’s birth certificate. But if it cannot find one, CAFU will try to find one of the documents that may be accepted as a birth-certificate substitute under the DMV’s “extraordinary proof” process. See Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(5m)(b)3. These documents include: a baptismal certificate, a hospital birth certificate, a delayed birth certificate, a census record, an
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early school record, a family bible, and a doctor’s record of post-natal care. Id. After CAFU concludes its investigation, it makes a recommendation to the Director of the DMV’s Bureau of Field Service (currently Jim Miller). The Director then makes the final decision on the petition. Boardman Decl. ¶ 29. The administrative rule, as amended by Emergency Rule 1618, states that a petition must be granted if the Director “concludes, on the basis of secondary documentation or other corroborating information, that it is more likely than not that the name, date of birth or U.S. citizenship provided by the applicant is correct.” Emergency Rule 1618, § 8. If the Director denies the petition, the applicant does not receive an ID.
The May 2016 emergency rule also created a process under which the DMV must issue a temporary identification card “receipt” to any person who applies for a state ID card to use for voting purposes and who needs to use the ID petition process. See Emergency Rule 1618, § 10 (creating § Trans 102.15(6m)). The receipt is a sheet of paper that contains the person’s name, signature, photograph, and other information (such as the date of issuance and an expiration date). See Ex. 1020, ECF No. 287-8. An unexpired identification card receipt is a form of qualifying ID under Act 23 and thus can be used for voting. See Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(d). The emergency rule provides that the DMV must issue the receipt “not later than the sixth working day after the applicant” files the petition to use the ID petition process (i.e., Form MV3012), and that the receipt must be issued by first-class mail. Emergency Rule 1618, § 10. Thus, if a person applies for a state ID card for voting purposes, also submits Form MV3012, and also supplies sufficient proof of identity and Wisconsin residency, the DMV will mail the person a temporary ID receipt within approximately six days. The person may then use the ID for voting purposes while he or she is waiting for the DMV’s central office and/or
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CAFU to verify his or her name, date of birth, and U.S. citizenship. The DMV also has an internal policy under which, during the week of an election, it will mail a temporary ID receipt to an applicant on the same day that the application is made. Boardman Decl. ¶ 44. The purpose of this internal policy is to get a temporary ID receipt into the hands of a voter who did not have qualifying ID on election day in time to allow the voter to validate his or her provisional ballot by 4 p.m. on the Friday after the election.6 Id.
A temporary ID receipt expires after 60 days. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(1)(c). However, the Emergency Rule requires the DMV to mail a new receipt to an applicant 10 days before the receipt expires. Emergency Rule 1618, § 10. The DMV states that it will generally send two renewals to an applicant, such that all applicants will have a valid ID receipt for a total of 180 days. Boardman Decl. ¶ 41. Moreover, a person will continue getting additional renewal ID receipts so long as the person’s ID petition is under review. Id. The DMV will stop issuing renewal receipts only if it determines that the applicant committed fraud, it determines that the person is not eligible for a permanent ID, the applicant does not respond to DMV requests for further information related to the investigation, or the person requests that the DMV cancel the ID petition process. Id.
In addition to the ID petition process, the DMV has adopted two new procedures for processing ID applications in which there is a discrepancy between the name on a birth record or other underlying document and the name the applicant uses. First, the DMV will disregard a single-letter discrepancy in the applicant’s first, middle, or last
6 Under Wisconsin law, if a person does not have qualifying ID on election day, he or she may cast a provisional ballot. Wis. Stat. § 6.79(3)(b). The ballot will not be counted unless the person presents qualifying ID to the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners by 4 p.m. on the Friday following the election. Wis. Stat. § 6.97(3)(b).
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name. See Boardman Decl. ¶ 36. Thus, if the person uses the first name “Shaun” but an underlying document lists his first name as “Shawn,” the person will still be issued an ID without having to use any formal exception process. (The DMV’s policy of disregarding single-letter discrepancies is not codified in the Administrative Code.) Second, if an individual has a different name, or a name that is significantly different from the name on his or her birth record, then a person can fill out a document that the DMV keeps on hand entitled “Affidavit of Common Law Name Change.” This procedure, which was recently codified as part of the May 2016 emergency rule, see Emergency Rule 1618 §§ 1–3, is designed for cases in which a person has used a name that is different from the one that appears on his or her birth certificate for many years but has not had the name officially changed by a court order or other formal means. Under Wisconsin common law, if the person has consistently and continuously used the name, then the name is considered to have been legally changed even though no formal procedure was used. See State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 245–46 (1998). The DMV’s affidavit procedure allows the applicant to make this fact known to the DMV. The DMV’s form affidavit contains a space for a notary signature, but according to the defendants, a DMV employee may notarize the form for free. Boardman Decl. ¶ 38; but see Young Decl. Ex. 41(applicant tells CAFU agent that he cannot get name-change affidavit notarized and agent does not advise applicant that notary services are available at the DMV). After the person submits the affidavit, the DMV will do “research” and then either approve or deny the name-change request. See Boardman Decl. Ex. 1018 at 2 (internal DMV document stating that “approval process may take up to 2 weeks while research is completed” and that DMV will “send the customer a letter approving or denying the request to change their name”).
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Presumably, if the name change is approved, the DMV will also send the person an ID card. However, I have been unable to locate anything in the record that explains when an ID will be issued after a person submits an Affidavit of Common Law Name Change.
b. Having explained the DMV’s current procedures for issuing state ID cards, I next consider whether they result in all voters who employ reasonable effort obtaining qualifying ID. I conclude that although many individuals who need qualifying ID will be able to obtain one with reasonable effort under these procedures, there will still be some who will not. Indeed, because there are likely thousands of eligible voters in Wisconsin who lack qualifying ID, see Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 854, it is virtually self-evident that some of them will either need to exercise extraordinary effort to obtain qualifying ID or be unable to obtain ID no matter how hard they try. However, as explained below, the evidence produced so far also supports this conclusion. The record contains evidence about the results of the DMV’s ID petition process, which, as explained above, is used when an applicant for an ID cannot produce a birth certificate or other record that proves name, date of birth, and citizenship. According to the defendants, between September 15, 2014 and May 12, 2016, applicants filed 1,389 petitions. Boardman Decl. ¶ 32. Of those, 1,132 petitions were granted. Of the remaining 257 petitions, 67 remain “pending.” Id. Ex. 1017. This leaves 190 petitions that were resolved without issuing an ID to the applicant. Of these, 98 are listed as “cancelled by the customer,” 40 were suspended based on the lack of response from the applicant, and 52 were flat denials. Id. The defendants state that one petition was denied because it was determined that the person was not a U.S. citizen. Boardman
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Decl. ¶ 33. No evidence in the record suggests that the remaining denials involved applications by individuals who are not eligible to vote in Wisconsin.
From the evidence in the record pertaining to the denied ID petitions, I find that it will be impossible or nearly impossible for some class members to obtain a free state ID card. The record contains reports and other internal DMV documents reflecting that several ID petitions were denied because the applicant was unable to provide, and CAFU was unable to locate, satisfactory information proving name, date of birth, and/or citizenship. For example, one report pertains to a woman was born in Cook County, Illinois, and who did not have a copy of her birth certificate. Young Decl., Ex. 59. The DMV was unable to locate her birth records, and when a CAFU investigator contacted Cook County Hospital, he was told that the hospital would not release information over the phone and would only release information to the applicant for a fee. The CAFU investigator then contacted the applicant and asked her to provide one of the other documents accepted as a birth-certificate substitute, such as a baptismal certificate. The applicant informed the investigator that she did not have any of those documents and had no way to obtain them. The investigator told her that he would keep trying. A few months later, the applicant called the DMV and expressed frustration that it had not verified her qualifications and issued her an ID. Eventually, the DMV denied the petition because it could not verify the applicant’s qualifications and the applicant could not provide the DMV with any further leads. Reports and internal DMV emails pertaining to other applicants indicate that other petitions were denied for similar reasons. See Young Decl. Ex. 60 (petition denied because CAFU could not find birth record and applicant did not have access to documents accepted as birth-certificate substitute); id. Ex. 56 (same); id. Ex. 45 (petition denied because CAFU could not find birth record and
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applicant did not respond to request to produce birth-certificate substitute); id. Ex. 44 (same).
Other reports suggest that individuals will be unable to obtain ID without going to unreasonable lengths. In one case, CAFU could not find a birth certificate for a person who was born in Tennessee, but it could find a birth certificate and social security number that seemed to match the individual but which contained a different last name than the one she currently used. The CAFU investigator eventually determined that, most likely, the name discrepancy stemmed from the fact that the applicant had been adopted and her original birth certificate had been voided. The investigator determined that the only solution to the problem was for the applicant to find court documents or adoption papers from Tennessee that supported her current name. The investigator informed the applicant of this fact and gave her the number for a Tennessee postadoption service. When the applicant did not contact CAFU with further information, her application for a state ID card was denied. See Young Decl. Exs. 39 & 61. In this case, it appears that it may have been possible for the applicant to obtain an ID. However, to obtain the ID, the applicant would have had to exert unreasonable effort in tracking down adoption papers and court records from Tennessee.
In another case involving a name mismatch, the applicant’s name was spelled differently on his Mississippi birth certificate than it was on his social security card. Id. Ex. 42. The applicant considered the name on the birth certificate to be a misspelling. When the applicant’s daughter brought the birth certificate to the DMV, the employees at the counter informed her that she would have to return to Mississippi to get the name corrected. The daughter informed CAFU that the people at the counter “were very nasty to her.” However, the CAFU investigator asked her to return to the DMV and
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have the employees at the counter scan the birth certificate so it could be sent to the investigator. The daughter did this but experienced additional problems with staff at her local DMV. (The daughter told the investigator that the process “has been the biggest headache.”) About a month after the petition was submitted, the investigator informed the applicant’s daughter that the applicant would need to either request a name correction through the Social Security Administration or initiate court proceedings to legally change his name. When the daughter informed the investigator that the applicant was not willing to do either of these things, the investigator recommended that the DMV send the applicant a denial letter. However, someone at the DMV then advised the investigator that the applicant could use the common law name-change affidavit. The investigator relayed this information to the daughter. The daughter then submitted the affidavit, but the DMV rejected it because the applicant’s “old name” (which he had not used for 74 years) was misspelled on the affidavit and because the daughter had signed the affidavit rather than the applicant. The daughter advised the DMV that she had power of attorney for her father, who recently had a stroke and could not write. The DMV then sent the daughter a copy of the affidavit with the old name correctly spelled and advised her to sign and return the affidavit along with proof that she had power of attorney for her father. When the DMV received no further response from the applicant or his daughter, it denied the petition. By this time, the daughter had been trying for five months to obtain an ID for her father.
In this case, the applicant may have eventually been able to obtain ID. However, doing so would have involved an unreasonable amount of effort. The applicant’s daughter made numerous contacts with the DMV over a five-month period, including two in-person trips that the daughter found unpleasant, and sending in a name-change
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affidavit that the DMV rejected. Although the daughter did not respond after the DMV mailed her a second name-change affidavit and requested proof that she had power of attorney for her father, by that point the daughter had already exerted more than reasonable effort on her father’s behalf.
Next, I find that errors made by DMV staff will result in applicants being unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort. It is virtually self-evident that in a large bureaucracy like the DMV—which has 92 separate locations and between 350 and 370 employees at those locations, see Boardman Decl. ¶ 7—errors will be made. Some of these errors will prevent applicants from obtaining ID with reasonable effort. One error that seems to happen frequently is counter staff’s failure to inform an ID applicant who lacks a birth certificate that he or she can use the ID petition process. See Young Decl. Exs. 20, 57. If an applicant who lacks a birth certificate is not informed of the petition process, he is likely to conclude that he cannot obtain an ID and may give up, even if he might have been able to obtain an ID easily if he had been told about the petition process. A related error that has occurred is CAFU’s failing to inform applicants with name mismatches that they could use the common law name-change affidavit and obtain notary services for free at the DMV. See Young Decl. Exs. 41 at p.2 (applicant informs CAFU investigator that he cannot get affidavit notarized and investigator does not advise him that notary services are available at DMV) & 42 (CAFU recommends denying ID to applicant with name mismatch without realizing that applicant could use name-change affidavit). Other errors may result in an applicant having to make a second trip to the DMV to complete the application process. See id. Exs. 65 & 72; Boardman Decl. ¶ 34 (noting that DMV staff members sometimes fail to scan or copy an applicant’s documents, and that when this happens the applicant must return to the
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DMV to supply the necessary information a second time). This second trip would involve more than reasonable effort for many voters, especially those with limited time and limited access to transportation.
Another burden for those who use the ID petition process is keeping in touch with the CAFU investigator over the period of weeks or months that it takes the investigator to verify the applicant’s qualifications. In some cases, this will be a substantial burden. For example, one CAFU report documents a case in which an applicant had to stay in touch with an investigator over a three-month period. See Young Decl. Ex. 41. During that time, the applicant spoke on the phone with the investigator nine times, made two in-person visits to his local DMV, made calls to other agencies in an effort to track down documents, and asked his nephew to scan and email documents to the DMV. Eventually, the applicant was issued an ID, but only after exerting more than reasonable effort. If this applicant had been homeless, he would almost certainly have failed to obtain an ID. Although the DMV states that it is able to mail documents to a homeless person though a shelter, food pantry, or social-services agency, see Boardman Decl. ¶ 31, it would be nearly impossible for a homeless person to make nine phone calls to a CAFU investigator over a three-month period. The DMV has acknowledged that is difficult for CAFU to keep in touch with applicants. See Dep. of Susan Schilz at 34:14– 35:5 (attached as Ex. 37 to Young Decl.).
Another problem is that the DMV’s new procedures do not relieve an applicant from having to produce a document that proves his or her identity. See Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(4) (requiring proof of identity); Boardman Decl. ¶ 13 (person using
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ID petition process must still provide proof of identity and Wisconsin residency).7 As I
found during the trial on the plaintiffs’ original claims, to satisfy this requirement, a
person will generally need to produce a social security card. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at
856–57. However, to obtain a social security card, a person generally must present
photo ID to the Social Security Administration. Id. Obviously, a person applying for a
free photo ID for voting will not already have a photo ID, and thus it will be nearly
impossible for a person who needs a free photo ID and does not already possess his or
her social security card to prove identity.8 See Frank II, 819 F.3d at 386. The DMV
does accept other documents as proof of identity, such as a valid state ID card or
driver’s license from another jurisdiction, military discharge papers, or a marriage
certificate, see Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(4)(a), but many applicants who lack
ID will also lack these documents. Moreover, the DMV does not have any procedure in
place that is analogous to the IDPP in which DMV employees will track down proof of
7 Emergency Rule 1618, § 4 exempts a person applying for a free ID for voting purposes from having to provide his or her social security number, which would otherwise be required under Trans 102.15(5). However, the Emergency Rule does not relieve the person from having to prove identity under Trans 102.15(4), which, as discussed in the text, generally requires an applicant to produce a social security card. 8 The administrator of the DMV states that a temporary ID card receipt can be used to obtain “birth records and source documents from other jurisdictions that require a photo ID with an application.” Boardman Decl. ¶ 45. However, under DMV rules, a person cannot obtain a temporary ID card receipt without proof of identity, and thus a person who must obtain a social security card to use as proof of identity will not be eligible for a temporary ID card receipt. See id. ¶ 40 (temporary ID card receipt issued to those who enter IDPP) & ¶ 13 (to enter IDPP, a person must produce proof of identity and Wisconsin residency). Moreover, even if a person without proof of identity could obtain a temporary ID card receipt, the evidence suggests that the Social Security Administration will not issue a social security card to those who present such a receipt as their only form of identification. See Young Decl. Ex. 17 at p.6 (Social Security Administration flyer stating that “DMV receipt” cannot be used to obtain a replacement social security card).
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identity on behalf of an applicant. Thus, I find that the proof-of-identity requirement will result in some eligible Wisconsin voters being unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort.
Another category of eligible voters who will be unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort is those who cannot reasonably make even a single trip to the DMV. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (implying that, for some voters, making even a single trip to the DMV is an undue burden on the right to vote). This category includes those who because of health reasons cannot travel easily, those without reasonable access to transportation to the DMV, and those who cannot afford to miss work for the time required to make a trip to the DMV. See Decl. of Rachel Fon, ECF No. 280-12 (explaining that health problems and poverty have made it impossible for her to obtain ID “without going through a great amount of effort”). The defendants point out that Wisconsin law allows those who are “indefinitely confined because of age, physical illness or infirmity,” and those who are “disabled for an indefinite period,” to vote by absentee ballot without proof of identification. See Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(2)(a); 6.87(4)(b)2. However, assuming that this removes any undue burden on the voting rights of those who meet the definitions of “indefinitely confined” or “disabled for an indefinite period,” it does nothing to help the other members of this category, including those whose health problems do not result in “confinement” or rise to the level of a disability, and those who simply cannot afford a trip to the DMV. Thus, transportation barriers will result in some eligible voters being unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort.
Finally, those who find themselves without qualifying ID on election day might be unable to obtain ID in time to have their ballots counted without going to unreasonable lengths. This category of eligible voters includes those who reasonably believe that they already possess qualifying ID, only to discover at the polls that their ID is
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unacceptable. See Decl. of Alexandra Kirschner ¶ 6, ECF No. 280-15 (arrived at polls believing that she could use out-of-state driver’s license as proof of identification); Decl. of Miguel Angel Vega ¶ 6, ECF No. 280-21 (same); Decl. of Neil Albrecht ¶ 9, ECF No. 280-8 (executive director of the Milwaukee election commission described how he personally observed two voters attempt to vote using IDs that had expired outside the acceptable expiration range). As I previously noted, under Wisconsin law, these voters may cast a provisional ballot, but they must validate the ballot by presenting qualifying ID to a municipal clerk or city election commission by 4 p.m. on the Friday following the election. See Wis. Stat. §§ 6.79(3)(b); 6.97(3)(b). Because elections are held on Tuesdays, these voters will have about three days to get to the DMV, obtain qualifying ID, and then get to the office of the municipal clerk or election commission. Even voters who have in their possession everything they need to obtain an ID from the DMV may be unable, with reasonable effort, to jump through these hoops within three days. However, those who need to use the ID petition process will face higher hurdles. These voters will be able to validate their provisional ballots only after receiving temporary ID card receipts in the mail. Thus, these voters must get to the DMV immediately, apply for an ID through the petition process, and then hope that the temporary ID card receipt arrives in the mail within a day or two. If it does, then the voter must immediately get to the office of the municipal clerk or election commission to validate his or her provisional ballot. Not all such voters will be able to complete this process in time. See Kirschner Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 280-15 (unable to validate provisional ballot in time); Vega Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 280-21 (same).
Before moving on, I note that the defendants contend that no voter will face undue burdens under the DMV’s current procedures because, according to them,
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“[a]nyone who goes to a Wisconsin DMV office and applies for a free state ID will be mailed, within six days, either an ID card or photo receipt that is valid for voting.” Defs.’ Br. at 1, ECF No. 285. The defendants then contend that, for this reason, no eligible voter who employs reasonable effort will fail to obtain qualifying ID. However, as discussed above, the record does not support the defendants’ contention that anyone who goes to the DMV and applies for an ID will receive either an ID or a temporary ID card receipt. Those who do not supply sufficient proof of identity and proof of Wisconsin residency will not receive even a temporary ID card receipt. Boardman Decl. ¶ 40 (temporary ID card receipt issued to those who enter ID petition process) & ¶ 13 (to enter ID petition process, a person must produce proof of identity and Wisconsin residency). Moreover, the defendants’ contention overlooks the possibility that DMV staff will err and fail to inform applicants who lack underlying documentation about the ID petition process and related procedures. These applicants will be turned away without receiving even a temporary ID card receipt. The defendants also overlook those who cannot with reasonable effort make even a single trip to the DMV to begin the ID petition process and be mailed a temporary ID card receipt, as well as those who do not realize they lack qualifying ID until election day and who cannot reasonably be expected to obtain a temporary ID card receipt and validate a provisional ballot within three days.
In any event, even if it were true that every eligible voter in Wisconsin who needs ID could with reasonable effort obtain a temporary ID card receipt in time for the next election, it would not follow that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief. Obviously, a temporary ID card receipt will at some point expire and not be renewed. What every class member will eventually need is an actual ID card, not just an ID card receipt. As demonstrated above, some eligible voters who apply for an ID using the petition
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process will eventually be denied an ID card because the DMV will be unable to verify their qualifications. When their temporary ID cards expire, these individuals will be unable to vote, potentially for the rest of their lives. Unquestionably, some mechanism needs to be in place to preserve the voting rights of these individuals.
The defendants contend that even if temporary ID card receipts are not permanent solutions, they at least make it unnecessary to grant a preliminary injunction, since every voter who goes to the DMV today and applies for an ID will receive a temporary ID card receipt that is likely to be valid for 180 days, a period that encompasses both the August primary and the November general election. Again, however, I stress that some voters will be unable to obtain even a temporary ID card receipt with reasonable effort. But even if all could, preliminary relief would still be needed to prevent irreparable harm to some voters. Although an ID card receipt issued today is likely to be valid for 180 days, it would expire before February 21, 2017, the date of the first statewide election scheduled to occur after the November general election. It is not likely that the plaintiffs’ claims will be finally resolved before then. Preliminary relief is therefore needed to ensure that the plaintiffs’ voting rights are not denied during that election and any other elections that may occur before this case is over.
2. Having concluded that, even under the DMV’s current procedures, many voters will be unable to obtain qualifying ID with reasonable effort, I turn to the question of whether the state’s interests are sufficient to require some voters to employ more than reasonable effort to obtain an ID to vote. Here, the state’s interests must be measured against the specific remedy that the plaintiffs seek, which is an injunction requiring the
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defendants to implement an affidavit option. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199–200 (noting that, under the Anderson/Burdick framework, a court must take into account the specific relief sought by the plaintiffs).
As I previously noted, the state’s interests in requiring photo ID are preventing voter-impersonation fraud and promoting voter confidence.9 These interests have been found sufficient to require most voters to present photo ID. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191– 97; Frank I, 768 F.3d at 749–50. However, no court has found that these interests are sufficient to prevent a person who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort, or who cannot obtain ID at all, from voting. And I find, for the reasons explained below, that these interests would not be undermined to any significant extent by allowing voters who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort to present an affidavit in lieu of photo identification. Thus, I conclude that the state’s interests do not outweigh the burdens placed on the plaintiffs’ voting rights, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to an affidavit remedy. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
In assigning weight to the state’s interests under the Anderson/Burdick balancing test, I recognize that those interests are important and that Act 23 serves those interests to some extent. However, the interests do not justify disenfranchising voters who cannot with reasonable effort obtain ID. As I found in my original opinion in this case, there is virtually no voter-impersonation fraud in Wisconsin. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 847–50. And the defendants have produced no evidence suggesting that the public’s confidence in the electoral process would be undermined by excusing those voters who 9 The defendants also contend that Act 23 furthers the state’s interests in promoting orderly election administration and accurate recordkeeping. However, the defendants have not identified any way in which Act 23’s photo ID requirement serves these interests other than by detecting and preventing voter fraud. Thus, I do not separately discuss these interests.
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cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort from presenting ID.10 Indeed, Wisconsin already allows some to vote without presenting photo ID—those who claim to be indefinitely confined or disabled. See Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(2)(a); 6.87(4)(b)2. Moreover, many states that have voter photo-identification requirements allow those who lack IDs to vote by signing an affidavit or other statement to that effect rather than by presenting ID, and the defendants do not suggest that the laws of those states fail to prevent fraud and promote voter confidence. See Idaho Code § 34-1114; Ind. Code § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c); La. Rev. Stat. § 18:562; Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.523(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163166.13(c)(2); S.C. Code § 7-13-710(D)(1)(b). It is true that some of the states that accept affidavits or statements in lieu of photo ID require the use of provisional ballots and other procedures for challenging the ballots cast by those who do not present ID. However, some states do not. See Idaho Code § 34-1114; La. Rev. Stat. § 18:562. The defendants here have not argued that the use of provisional ballots is necessary to protect the state’s interests.
The defendants do contend that allowing voters to use affidavits in lieu of IDs whenever they “subjectively” determine that they are unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort “without any process for verifying that reason” would undermine the integrity of Wisconsin elections. Defs.’ Br. at 21, 24, ECF No. 285. However, the defendants produce no evidence that supports the notion that allowing a few voters to present an affidavit while the vast majority present a photo ID would undermine the integrity of Wisconsin elections, even if the voters who use affidavits are permitted to
10 The Supreme Court recently reiterated that where a state law burdens a constitutional right, the state must produce evidence supporting its claim that the burden is necessary to further the state’s claimed interests. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15274, slip op. at 19–21 (June 27, 2016).
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determine for themselves what constitutes a reasonable impediment and there is no process for verifying that reason. And it seems to me that even if some voters who use affidavits give false reasons or reasons that do not qualify as reasonable impediments (such as “not wanting to pose for a photo”) the state’s interests would not be seriously undermined. Just about any voter who does not face a reasonable impediment to obtaining ID will prefer to get the ID rather than take the time to fill out a bogus affidavit every time he or she goes to the polls. Thus, the number of affidavits listing insufficient or false reasons should be very tiny. Also, someone who wishes to use the affidavit to commit fraud will likely list a legitimate reason on the affidavit rather than call attention to himself or herself by listing a clearly insufficient reason. So coming up with a finite list of recognized reasonable impediments is not likely to do anything to prevent fraud or to promote public confidence in elections. Finally, the states that already use “reasonable impediment” affidavits allow voters to subjectively determine what qualifies as a reasonable impediment and do not have procedures in place for challenging the sufficiency of the reasons given. See North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2016 WL 1650774, at *120 (M.D.N.C. April 25, 2016); South Carolina v. U.S., 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2012).11 This strongly suggests that such procedures are not required to protect the states’ interests in preventing fraud and promoting voter confidence. I also note that the defendants have not explained how they would go about investigating whether a reason given by a voter on the affidavit is true or whether it qualifies as a reasonable impediment. Nor have 11 Under the laws of North and South Carolina, “state and county officials may not review the reasonableness of the voter’s explanation”; rather, they may only review the explanation for falsity. South Carolina, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 34; see McCrory, 2016 WL 1650774, at *120 (explaining that North Carolina’s reasonable-impediment procedure is virtually identical to South Carolina’s).
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they proposed that I incorporate any specific procedures into the affidavit option that would assist the defendants in verifying the reason given or in adjudicating whether it qualifies as a reasonable impediment.
The defendants point out that I previously determined that an affidavit remedy would be inappropriate because it would require me to re-write Act 23 and partially manage the state’s election officials. See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 863. However, I made that determination in the context of choosing between enjoining Act 23 in its entirety and fashioning a different remedy. I reasoned that the difficulty of implementing an affidavit remedy weighed in favor of enjoining the law as to all voters. Id. However, now that such an injunction is off the table, I must create a safety net to prevent those who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort from losing the right to vote.12 The defendants have not proposed their own solution to this problem, and thus the only potential remedy is the plaintiffs’ affidavit procedure. Even if that approach is not ideal, it is better than leaving the plaintiffs with no relief at all.
B. For the reasons stated above, I conclude that the plaintiffs are very likely to succeed on their claim that Act 23 is unconstitutional as applied to those who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort, and that the appropriate remedy is to allow those voters to present an affidavit in lieu of photo identification. In the discussion above, I also implicitly addressed the public interest and the balance of harms and determined that those factors weigh in favor of preliminary relief, in that I determined that the state’s
12 In describing the affidavit option as a “safety net,” I do not mean to imply that it is preferable to an injunction invalidating Act 23 in its entirety. I continue to believe, for the reasons expressed in my original opinion, that enjoining the photo ID requirement in its entirety is the proper remedy.
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interests in requiring photo ID do not justify disenfranchising the plaintiffs while this litigation is pending. In this section, I address some remaining arguments made by the defendants regarding the public interest and the balance of harms.
First, the defendants contend that it would be difficult for the state’s electionadministration officials to implement an affidavit remedy in time for the August and November elections. As I explain in Part IV.C, I agree that it is not possible to implement the affidavit remedy in time for the election on August 9, and therefore I will not include that election within the scope of the injunction. However, the defendants have not shown that it would be difficult to implement the remedy in time for the general election on November 8. To implement the affidavit remedy, the defendants need only direct elections officials to print a stack of affidavits in the form that I will specify, make them available at the polls and to those who vote absentee, and accept properly completed affidavits from voters in lieu of photo ID. As discussed above, any reason the voter deems a reasonable impediment must be accepted, and thus election officials will not have to receive training on what constitutes a reasonable impediment. Rather, election officials must only make sure the voter signs his name and either checks a box on the form or writes something in the space for identifying other reasonable impediments. The municipal clerks of Wisconsin’s largest municipalities have submitted declarations stating that it would be practical to accomplish these tasks in time for the November election. Decl. of Neil Albrecht ¶¶ 14–16 (municipal clerk for City of Milwaukee states that affidavit option could be implemented in time for November election); Decl. of Maribeth Witzel-Behl ¶¶ 16–17 (municipal clerk for City of Madison states that affidavit option could be implemented in time for November election).
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One aspect of carrying out my order that will impose a more significant burden on the defendants is informing voters of the affidavit option. As explained in more detail in Part IV.D of this opinion, I will not grant the plaintiffs’ request for an order requiring the defendants to send individualized notice of the affidavit option to voters who may lack qualifying ID. However, the defendants will still have to revise their publicity materials relating to the photo ID requirement to include information about the affidavit option and will also have to train election officials to inform voters at the polls about this option. This will require the election-administration defendants to exercise significant effort. See Decl. of Michael Haas ¶¶ 30–42. Still, I find that it is practical to complete these tasks in time for the November election. Id. ¶ 42 (indicating that it is likely possible to implement the affidavit option in time for November election). Moreover, I find that, under the balance of harms, requiring the defendants to put forth this effort prior to the final resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims is justified by the plaintiffs’ strong likelihood of success on the merits and the certainty that many of the plaintiffs would suffer significant irreparable harm (i.e., disenfranchisement) if preliminary relief were not granted.
The defendants also contend that preliminary relief is inappropriate because of the possibility of voter confusion. That is, the defendants contend that if I grant a preliminary injunction creating an affidavit option, and then the plaintiffs lose at trial and the injunction is dissolved, some voters will mistakenly think that they may still vote by presenting an affidavit rather than an ID. Voter confusion is of course a risk. However, as I have found, the plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of success on the merits, and thus the affidavit option is not likely to be dissolved after trial. Moreover, any confusion that arises will likely only affect those voters who would be unable to vote without the
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affidavit option. Those who already have IDs will use them whether or not the affidavit option is available, as will those who can obtain ID with reasonable effort. Only those who cannot obtain ID with reasonable effort will suffer if they erroneously believe that the affidavit option is still available after trial. But disenfranchising those voters while this litigation is pending would be worse than causing them to be confused after trial, when they would likely be unable to vote anyway due to their inability to obtain ID with reasonable effort. So again, the balance of harms favors preliminary relief.
Finally, the defendants contend that I should not grant preliminary relief because they are unsure whether they have the power to implement an affidavit option. Defs.’ Br. at 23, ECF No. 285. The defendants point out that Wisconsin’s “municipal clerks,” who are not defendants in this case, are the officials who have “charge and supervision” of the state’s elections. Wis. Stat. § 7.15(1). The defendants then question whether they have authority under state law to require these clerks to accept affidavits from voters in lieu of photo ID.
Under Wisconsin election law, a “municipal clerk” is defined as “the city clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive director of the city election commission and their authorized representatives.” Wis. Stat. § 5.02(10). There are approximately 1,900 such clerks in Wisconsin. See Trial Testimony of Kevin Kennedy at 888; Declaration of Michael Haas ¶ 12, ECF No. 286. Obviously, it would be impractical to join all of these clerks as defendants, and it is not necessary to do so. The defendants in this case include the Governor of the State of Wisconsin and the members of the state’s Elections Commission, which, until recently, was known as the Government Accountability Board.
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See 2015 Wis. Act 118; Haas Decl. ¶ 1 n.1.13 These defendants possess authority under Wisconsin law to require municipal clerks to implement the affidavit remedy. First, the governor, as the chief executive of the state, has the power to require municipal clerks, who are creatures of state law, to implement a court order issued under the U.S. Constitution and that concerns the state’s election laws. Indeed, the defendants submit no evidence and develop no legal argument indicating that the governor lacks this power. Rather, the defendants merely question whether the Elections Commission has this power. See Defs.’ Br. at 23; see generally Haas Decl.
But the Elections Commission clearly has this power as well. State law vests the commission with “the responsibility for the administration of [the Wisconsin Statutes governing elections] and other laws relating to elections.” Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1). Carrying out a federal court’s order concerning the state’s election procedures would qualify as administering the state’s election laws and “other laws relating to elections” (which includes federal laws relating to elections). Municipal clerks, who lack the power to administer election laws but only have the power to conduct elections in accordance with those laws, see Wis. Stat. § 7.15(1), could not disobey the commission’s directive to make affidavits available to voters and to accept them in lieu of photo ID. The administrator of the Elections Commission points out that the commission might not have authority under state law to pass a formal administrative rule implementing the affidavit requirement. Haas Decl. ¶¶ 15–17. However, such a rule is unnecessary. Although the commission has rulemaking authority, see Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1)(f), that is
13 The plaintiffs have not named the members of the new Elections Commission as defendants. However, because those members are successors to the members of the Government Accountability Board, who have been named as defendants in their official capacities, they are automatically substituted as parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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just one manifestation of its general authority to administer election laws. Pursuant to

its general authority, the commission may direct municipal clerks to implement a court

order pertaining to the state’s election procedures and federal law.

I also note that the defendants had no difficulty implementing the injunctive relief

that I granted in 2014. If the defendants were able to direct municipal clerks to stop

requiring voters to present photo ID at the polls in 2014, then they will be able to direct

municipal clerks to allow voters to cast a ballot by presenting an affidavit in lieu of photo

ID in 2016. Accordingly, I reject the defendants’ suggestion that uncertainty over

whether they have power to require municipal clerks to implement an affidavit remedy is

a reason not to grant that remedy in the first place.

C.

In this section, I explain why I will not require the defendants to implement the

affidavit option for the August 9 primary. First, the plaintiffs have not argued that it

would be practical to implement the option in time for this election, which is only a few

weeks away. Second, the Administrator of the Elections Commission, who would have

primary responsibility for implementing the affidavit option, states that it is not possible

to implement that remedy by the date of the election. Haas Decl. ¶¶ 8–12, 41. Aside

from the sheer administrative difficulty of implementing the affidavit option by August 9,

there is the fact that, as a practical matter, the August election has already begun:

municipal clerks began mailing absentee ballots to voters on June 10, 2016, and the

deadline for mailing absentee ballots was June 23, 2016. Haas Decl. ¶¶ 9–10.

Moreover, in-person early voting begins on July 25, 2016.

See

http://www.gab.wi.gov/voters/absentee (viewed July 19, 2016). Given these facts, the

possibility of disrupting the administration of the August election is too great to require 41

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the defendants to change the rules applicable to that election now. I realize that this will cause some class members irreparable harm because they will be unable to vote in the August primary, but under the balance of harms, the harm to the defendants and to the public that would be caused by requiring implementation by August 9 outweighs the harm to these class members. Accordingly, I will order the defendants to implement the affidavit option in time for the November general election.
D. Next, I address the plaintiffs’ request that the preliminary injunction require the defendants to “send an individualized mailing to all registered voters who do not appear in the DMV database as having acceptable photo ID, informing them about the voter ID law and the affidavit option.” ECF No. 278-1 at 2. I am not convinced that individualized notice to voters is required to prevent irreparable harm. The Elections Commission is already planning an advertising campaign relating to the photo ID requirement, Haas Decl. ¶¶ 30–35, and that campaign will now have to include information about the affidavit option. The commission will also have to train elections officials to inform voters about the affidavit option. While it might also be useful to send individualized notice of the affidavit option to voters who might need it, I do not believe that this step is necessary. At this point, I will leave it to the Elections Commission to decide how best to publicize the affidavit option. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ request for an order requiring individualized notice will be denied.
E. Finally, I must specify the form of the affidavit and other details concerning the implementation of the affidavit option. I have modeled the form of the affidavit on North
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Carolina’s “reasonable impediment declaration.” See Young Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 2802. The affidavit must contain the following language:
I declare under penalty of perjury that I am the individual identified below, and that I have been unable to obtain acceptable photo identification with reasonable effort. This is due to the following reason(s): __ Lack of transportation __ Lack of birth certificate or other documents needed to obtain photo ID __ Work schedule __ Disability or illness __ Family responsibilities __ Other (please identify): ______________________________________ The affidavit shall have a space for the voter to print his or her name, a space for the voter’s signature, and a space for a date. The affidavit does not have to be notarized or sworn before any officer. The Elections Commission may include spaces on the affidavit that are to be completed by election officials for administrative purposes, such as a space for identifying the polling location at which the affidavit was received. The defendants shall ensure that copies of the affidavit are available at the polls and also to those who vote by absentee ballot. Any voter who completes and submits an affidavit shall receive a regular ballot, even if that voter does not show acceptable photo identification. No person may challenge the sufficiency of the reason given by the voter for failing to obtain ID. Finally, the defendants shall include the affidavit option in any publicity materials related to the photo ID requirement, shall train poll workers to inform voters who arrive at the polls without qualifying ID about the affidavit option, and shall otherwise make reasonable efforts to ensure that voters are made aware of the affidavit option.
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V. For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 278) is GRANTED. All defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all those acting in concert or participation with them, or having actual or implicit knowledge of this order by personal service or otherwise, are directed to implement the affidavit option, in the manner specified in this opinion, in time for the general election on November 8, 2016, and all elections that occur after that date, while this preliminary injunction is in force. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint (ECF No. 278) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (ECF No. 278) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ claims involving veterans’ ID cards are DISMISSED as MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to file confidential court records under seal (ECF No. 289) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to strike (ECF No. 290) is DENIED. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 19th day of July, 2016.
s/Lynn Adelman LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 11-C-1128

SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________

DECISION AND ORDER

Before me now is the defendants’ motion to stay, pending appeal, my order

granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c);

Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1). The preliminary injunction requires Wisconsin’s governor and

its election-administration officials to implement a procedure in which voters are

excused from having to present photo ID if they execute an affidavit stating that they

have been unable to obtain an ID with reasonable effort.

The standard for granting a stay pending appeal mirrors that for granting a

preliminary injunction. In re A&F Enters., Inc. II, 742 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2014). To

determine whether to grant a stay, I consider the moving party’s likelihood of success

on the merits, the irreparable harm that will result to each side if the stay is either

granted or denied in error, and whether the public interest favors one side or the other.

Id. As with a motion for a preliminary injunction, a “sliding scale” approach applies; the

greater the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, the less heavily the

balance of harms must weigh in its favor, and vice versa. Id.

1

Because the legal standard for granting a stay pending appeal mirrors that for granting a preliminary injunction, and because I have already determined that the plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction, I conclude that the defendants are not entitled to a stay pending appeal. I will largely rest on the reasoning set out in my decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction. In this decision, I will address only those arguments that the defendants make in support of their motion to stay that they did not also make in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
First, the defendants argue that a few of the examples I relied on when finding that some plaintiffs will be unable to obtain ID with reasonable effort arose under “old law,” i.e., before the Department of Transportation adopted the emergency rules that became effective on May 13, 2016. See Emergency Rule 1618. The defendants contend that these examples might have turned out differently had the emergency rules been in effect when the individuals in the examples applied for a free state ID card. However, the emergency rules did not create a brand new procedure for issuing free state ID cards. Rather, as the defendants represented in their original brief, the rules merely “codifie[d] the best practices that have evolved through DMV’s experience.” Defs. Br. at 3, ECF No. 285. Kristina Boardman, the Administrator of the DMV, confirmed that the emergency rules merely codified the DMV’s existing practices and added deadlines for processing an ID application. Boardman Decl. ¶ 39, ECF No. 287. She stated that the “ID petition process,” which is codified in the emergency rules and used to assist applicants who do not have documents that prove name, date of birth, and citizenship, “was created in September of 2014.” Boardman Decl. ¶ 12; see also ¶ 21 (stating that Compliance, Audit, and Fraud Unit “became involved in the ID [petition process] in September of 2014”). Further, the procedures relating to the DMV’s name-
2

change affidavit were already in place before they were codified in the emergency rule on May 13, 2016. One DMV report reflects use of this procedure on October 9, 2015. Decl. of Sean Young Ex. 42 at pp.4–5, ECF No. 280. Another report reflects use of this procedure on December 10, 2015. Id. Ex. 41 at p.2. The only significant change made by the emergency rules is the requirement that the DMV issue temporary ID card receipts to those who apply for an ID and enter the ID petition process. The emergency rules do not appear to have significantly altered the practices that the DMV has been following since September 2014 for issuing permanent ID cards.
To illustrate this point, I address the three examples that the defendants describe as outdated in their motion for a stay. First, the defendants point to a case report reflecting that, in June 2015, the DMV denied an ID to a person after an investigator with the DMV’s Compliance, Audit, and Fraud Unit (“CAFU”) failed to locate her birth records. Young Decl. Ex. 59. The defendants note that this occurred before the emergency rules went into effect in May 2016. However, it is clear that at the time of this denial the DMV was already employing the procedures that would later be codified in the emergency rules. Specifically, the ID applicant’s case was referred to a CAFU investigator under the ID petition process, just as it would have been under the emergency rules. The investigator then attempted to track down the applicant’s birth records, just as he or she would have under the emergency rules, but was unsuccessful. The applicant was unable to produce any other documentation that would allow the DMV to verify her name, date of birth, and citizenship, and thus the DMV denied her application for an ID. Nothing in the emergency rules would have changed this outcome. Under those rules, an applicant must still produce, or a CAFU investigator must be able to find, some documentation to verify the applicant’s name,
3

date of birth, and citizenship. See Emergency Rule 1618, § 8. In cases where this is not possible, such as the case reflected in Exhibit 59, the applicant will not receive a permanent ID, will not receive any further temporary ID card receipts, and will be precluded from voting in any future elections. A safety net is needed to preserve the voting rights of individuals who find themselves in this situation.
The other two examples that the defendants describe as outdated involved applicants with name mismatches. In one case, I noted that the DMV had erred by failing to inform an applicant, in December 2015, that the DMV could notarize his namechange affidavit for free. Young Decl. Ex. 41. The defendants now contend that this was not an error because at that time the DMV’s free notarization process had not been established. See Defs.’ Mot. to Stay at 10, ECF No. 297. However, the defendants do not cite evidence to support the proposition that the free notary service did not exist in December 2015. See id. And clearly some procedures relating to the name-change affidavit were in place at that time, as the DMV recorded in its report that it provided a name-change affidavit to the applicant on December 10, 2015. See Young Decl. Ex. 41 at p.2. Boardman in her declaration does not suggest that the DMV’s free notary service was adopted at a different time than when the general name-change affidavit procedures were adopted. See Boardman Decl. ¶¶ 35–38. Thus, from the evidence submitted at this point in the case, I find that free notary services were available at the DMV in December 2015. I also note that the emergency rules do not say anything about notary services, and thus those rules did not change any of the DMV’s practices relating to such services.
The remaining example involves a case in which the DMV denied, in January 2016, an ID to an applicant after the applicant’s daughter tried for months to obtain an
4

ID for him and eventually gave up after the DMV rejected the name-change affidavit she had completed on his behalf. Young Decl. Ex. 42. The defendants again note that this occurred before the emergency rules went into effect. But they do not explain how the result would have been different under the emergency rules. The applicant used the ID petition process and the name-change affidavit process, both of which would later be codified in the emergency rules, and still failed to obtain an ID. The defendants do not identify any way in which the processing of this ID application would have been different had it been filed after the effective date of the new rules.
I also note that the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits would be high even if some of the specific examples I discussed in my opinion might be handled differently today. Even under current law, an ID application will be denied unless the DMV finds “secondary documentation or other corroborating information” establishing that it is more likely than not that the person’s name, date of birth, and citizenship, as stated on the person’s application for an ID, is correct. See Emergency Rule 1618, § 8. Obviously there will be cases in which the DMV is unable to find sufficient documentation or information on behalf of an applicant. Moreover, as I explained at length in my original opinion, inevitably other obstacles will arise that prevent individuals who exercise reasonable effort from obtaining ID. Again, some safety net must be available to protect the voting rights of these individuals.
In their motion to stay, the defendants also contend that the safety net I created has the effect of “abrogat[ing]” the elector-challenge procedures established by Wisconsin law. They refer specifically to Wisconsin Statute § 6.92(1), which provides that “each inspector shall challenge for cause any person offering to vote whom the inspector knows or suspects is not a qualified elector or who does not adhere to any
5

voting requirement under this chapter,” and to Wisconsin Statute § 6.925, which provides that “[a]ny elector may challenge for cause any person offering to vote whom the elector knows or suspects is not a qualified elector.” However, the injunction does not interfere with these challenge procedures insofar as the procedures allow inspectors and electors to challenge a voter’s qualifications. That is, the injunction does not prohibit anyone from challenging a voter on the ground that he or she is not a U.S. citizen residing in Wisconsin who is age 18 or older, or on the ground that he or she is disqualified from voting. See Wis. Stat. §§ 6.02, 6.03 (establishing qualifications for electors and grounds for disqualification). The injunction thus does not interfere with § 6.925 at all, and it interferes with § 6.92(1) only to the extent that it prevents inspectors from challenging a person who submits an affidavit in lieu of an ID on the ground that he or she did not produce an ID. Moreover, nothing in my order prevents an inspector or another elector from challenging a voter on the ground that the voter is not the person he or she claims to be. Under the order, only the sufficiency of the reason given by the voter for being unable to obtain ID is not subject to challenge. Accordingly, the injunction interferes with Wisconsin’s challenge procedures only as much as is necessary to provide the plaintiffs with effective relief.
Finally, I address the defendants’ argument under Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006). That case is generally cited for the proposition that courts should be reluctant to issue orders affecting a state’s election procedures when an election is imminent. The rationale underlying this proposition is that orders issued very close to an election may “result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Id. at 4–5. However, the November election is more than three months away, and as I explained in my opinion granting the injunction, it will not be difficult for the defendants
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to implement the affidavit option in time for that election. Indeed, the defendants have already begun to implement the affidavit option. See Wis. Elec. Comm’n Mem. re: Photo ID Litigation (July 20, 2016), available at http://goo.gl/yJdEGp (viewed July 29, 2016). Thus, the risk of voter confusion is very low. That low risk does not outweigh the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs that would arise if the affidavit option were not available for the November election, especially once the plaintiffs’ strong likelihood of success on the merits is factored into the balance, as it must be. See In re A&F Enters., Inc. II, 742 F.3d at 766.
For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 29th day of July, 2016. s/ Lynn Adelman ______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
7

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RUTHELLE FRANK, SHIRLEY BROWN,

NANCY LEA WILDE, EDDIE LEE

HOLLOWAY, JR., MARIANNIS GINORIO,

FRANK YBARRA, SAM BULMER,

PAMELA DUKES, CARL ELLIS, RICKIE

LAMONT HARMON, DARTRIC DAVIS,

BARBARA ODEN, DEWAYNE SMITH,

SANDRA JASHINSKI, JUSTIN LUFT,

Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-01128

ANNA SHEA, MATTHEW DEARING,

(LA)

MAX KLIGMAN, SAMANTHA

MESZAROS, STEVE KVASNICKA,

SARAH LAHTI, DOMONIQUE

WHITEHURST, EDWARD HOGAN,

ANTHONY JUDD, AND ANTHONY

SHARP, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,

Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs Ruthelle Frank, Shirley Brown, Nancy Lea Wilde, Eddie Lee
Holloway, Jr., Mariannis Ginorio, Frank Ybarra, Sam Bulmer, Pamela Dukes, Carl
Ellis, Rickie Lamont Harmon, Dartric Davis, Barbara Oden, DeWayne Smith,

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Sandra Jashinski, Justin Luft, Anna Shea, Matthew Dearing, Max Kligman, Samantha Meszaros, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Domonique Whitehurst, Edward Hogan, Anthony Judd, and Anthony Sharp (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), who are eligible Wisconsin voters, bring this action to protect their rights, and the rights of all other similarly situated Wisconsin residents, to vote under the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. Wisconsin’s voter identification law, 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (“the photo ID law” or “Act 23”), will deprive the named plaintiffs above and the classes of voters they represent of their fundamental right to vote.
Plaintiffs, through their undersigned counsel, bring this Complaint against Defendant Scott Walker (“Defendant Walker”), in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin; Judge David G. Deininger in his official capacity as Chair of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board (“GAB”); Judge Michael Brennan, in his official capacity as Vice Chair of the GAB; Judge Thomas Barland, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Judge Thomas Cane, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Judge Gerald C. Nichol, in his official capacity as a member of the GAB; Kevin J. Kennedy, in his official capacity as Director and General Counsel of the GAB; Nathaniel E. Robinson, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Elections Division of the GAB (“the GAB Defendants”); Defendant Mark Gottlieb, in his official capacity as Secretary
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of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (“WisDOT”); Defendant Lynne Judd (“Defendant Judd”), in her official capacity as the Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) at WisDOT; Defendant Kristina Boardman, in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Field Services at the DMV; Defendants Donald D. Reincke and Tracy Jo Howard, in their respective official capacities as Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region; Defendants Sandra M. Brisco and Barney L. Hall in their respective official capacities as Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region; Defendant Donald J. Genin in his official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northeast Region; Defendant Jill Louise Geoffroy in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the North Central Region; and Defendant Patricia A. Nelson in her official capacity as Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northwest Region (“the DMV Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege upon knowledge as to their own conduct and observations and upon information and belief as to the conduct of others:
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NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. This action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Wisconsin state officials’ enforcement of 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (the “photo ID law”), which requires voters in Wisconsin to present photo identification in order to cast their votes either in person at a polling place or by absentee ballot. This requirement went into effect on February 21, 2012, the date of Wisconsin’s spring primary. 2. This lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment that the photo ID law is unconstitutional as applied to certain classes of eligible Wisconsin voters and to enjoin its enforcement with respect to these classes. It also seeks a declaratory judgment that the photo ID law violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and an injunction as applied to Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and the State of Wisconsin. The photo ID law imposes a severe and undue burden on the fundamental right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; violates the Twenty-Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as an unconstitutional poll tax; violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in arbitrarily refusing to accept certain identification documents; and violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, due to its disproportionate negative impact on minority voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and in the State of Wisconsin.
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PARTIES 3. Each of the plaintiffs named in this Complaint is a citizen of the United States, a resident of the State of Wisconsin, and is a duly qualified elector eligible to vote in local, state, and federal elections in Wisconsin. Every United States citizen age 18 or older who has resided in an election district or ward in the State of Wisconsin for 28 consecutive days before any election where the citizen offers to vote is an eligible elector (hereinafter, “eligible Wisconsin voter”). Wis. Stat. § 6.02(1). 4. Plaintiff Ruthelle Frank is an 84-year-old Caucasian resident of Brokaw, Wisconsin, where she has served on the Village Board since 1996, and an eligible voter registered to vote in Wisconsin. She has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or Wisconsin state ID card. Mrs. Frank was born at her home in Brokaw in 1927. Though she has never possessed a copy of her birth certificate, upon information and belief, the state Register of Deeds has a record of her birth and could produce a certified copy of her birth certificate at a charge. However, that record bears an incorrect spelling of her maiden name and her parents’ names. She was informed that amending her birth certificate would require a legal proceeding which could be lengthy and cost as much as $200. The DMV office would not accept her baptismal certificate and did not inform Mrs. Frank of any alternative procedure to satisfy this requirement.
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She has voted consistently since 1948 and wishes to vote in Wisconsin again this year.
5. Plaintiff Shirley Brown is a 73-year-old African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. She has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or Wisconsin state ID card. Ms. Brown lacks a certified copy of her birth certificate. Ms. Brown was born in Louisiana at home by midwife and, upon information and belief, there is no record of her birth on file with the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”) Vital Records Registry. Furthermore, when Ms. Brown sought confirmation from the DHH Vital Records Registry in Louisiana that no birth record existed, the agency inexplicably sent her a birth certificate for her sister, June Rose Brown, who is about four years younger. The DMV office Ms. Brown visited when trying to obtain an ID did not inform her of any alternative procedure to satisfy its documentary proof requirements. Ms. Brown wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
6. Nancy Lea Wilde is a 74-year-old Caucasian resident of Schofield, Wisconsin and an eligible and registered voter. She has no accepted photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card. Mrs. Wilde lacks a certified copy of her birth certificate which she needs to prove her citizenship to the Wisconsin DMV. Instead, Mrs. Wilde possesses a
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hospital certificate of her birth and a baptismal certificate. Mrs. Wilde was born in Wausau, Wisconsin, but both the Marathon County, Wisconsin Register of Deeds and the Wisconsin Vital Records Office in Madison, Wisconsin have informed Mrs. Wilde that there is no record of her birth on file. About two years ago, the DMV office in Wausau denied her a state ID card, since she could not present a certified copy of her birth certificate. Recently, in response to further inquiry, a DMV employee called Mrs. Wilde and informed her that she could secure a certification from the Wisconsin Vital Records Office that there is no record of her birth and use her hospital and baptismal certificates instead to obtain a state ID card. However, DMV never provided her with the forms to use or gave her clear instructions on how to proceed. Mrs. Wilde has voted consistently since 1957 and intends to vote in Wisconsin again this year.
7. Plaintiff Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr. is an African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible and registered voter. He has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or Wisconsin state ID card. Mr. Holloway, Jr. lacks an accurate and certified copy of his birth certificate. Mr. Holloway, Jr. was born in Decatur, Illinois. His father’s name was “Eddie Lee Holloway,” and his parents gave him the name “Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr.” However, his birth certificate, which Mr. Holloway, Jr. possesses, bears the name “Eddie Junior Holloway.” His Social
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Security Card and expired Illinois state ID card both bear the name “Eddie L Holloway Jr”. When he tried to obtain an ID, the DMV office denied his application because of the discrepancies between his birth certificate and other documents, and did not inform him of any alternative procedure to satisfy its proof requirements. He has been informed that the legal proceeding needed to amend his birth certificate would cost him hundreds of dollars. Mr. Holloway, Jr. is unemployed due to disability and cannot afford the expense of seeking an amendment to his birth certificate. Mr. Holloway, Jr. wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
8. Plaintiff Mariannis Ginorio is a 19-year-old Hispanic/Latino resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. She has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or Wisconsin state ID card. Ms. Ginorio was born in Puerto Rico and has a birth certificate that was issued prior to July 1, 2010, when Puerto Rico began issuing new birth certificates pursuant to Law 191 of 2009 as Amended. In accordance with Puerto Rican law, the Wisconsin DMV has deemed all certified copies of birth certificates issued prior to July 1, 2010 invalid for purposes of proving U.S. citizenship at a Wisconsin DMV office. Additionally, because she does not have current government-issued photo identification, Ms. Ginorio cannot meet the application requirement to obtain a certified copy of the new birth certificate from
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Puerto Rico. Ms. Ginorio also has limited income from her employment and numerous bills to pay, so that applying for a birth certificate will be a financial burden. Ms. Ginorio wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
9. Plaintiff Frank Ybarra is a 59-year-old Hispanic/Latino resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Many years ago, he had a driver’s license and state photo ID card issued by the State of Wisconsin, but Mr. Ybarra currently has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law. Mr. Ybarra was born in Milwaukee, but lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate and lacks the documents that are normally required by Wisconsin to obtain a birth certificate. Furthermore, he was born “Frank Pronto” in Milwaukee County and legally changed his name to “Frank Ybarra,” his father’s name, while living in Texas when he was in his twenties. However, he does not have the court records from this name change and is unable to acquire them without incurring significant financial and other burdens. Mr. Ybarra is currently experiencing homelessness and usually sleeps on the street. He has no regular income and no savings, but occasionally finds work on a day-by-day basis, and cannot afford any costs to obtain necessary documents for the state ID card application. As an unsheltered homeless person with no connection to any social service agency other than a meal program, it is unclear whether he can prove Wisconsin residency for the state ID card application and receive a state ID card in the mail at a current Wisconsin
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residence street address. Additionally, Mr. Ybarra could use his Texas court records as proof of identity, but barring that, he will be compelled to obtain a Social Security Card. Mr. Ybarra wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
10. Sam Bulmer is a 63-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible and registered voter. He has no accepted photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card. Mr. Bulmer is a 13-year veteran of the United States Air Force and was an instructor with the Air Force Training Command. He is currently living in a homeless shelter for veterans and subsists on an extremely limited monthly pension, which is limited further by the shelter’s policies requiring him to set aside a significant portion of his money. Mr. Bulmer lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate from the State of Kansas and cannot afford the $15.00 birth certificate application fee. Even if he could, he lacks the documents to satisfy the identification requirement for a mail-in birth certificate application. Mr. Bulmer also lacks a Social Security Card (“SSC”), which is accepted proof of identity for the Wisconsin state ID card application. Mr. Bulmer does, however, possess a Veterans Identification Card (“VIC”), which is issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and contains his name and photograph. Mr. Bulmer wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
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11. Plaintiff Pamela Dukes is a 51-year-old African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. She has none of the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of her birth certificate from Cook County, Illinois. Ms. Dukes receives monthly Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) disability benefits, but has no other income or savings. She spends the overwhelming majority of her SSI income on rent, and the remainder is devoted to utility bills and other necessary living expenses. She is therefore unable to afford a certified copy of her Illinois birth certificate. Ms. Dukes wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
12. Plaintiff Carl Ellis is a 52-year-old African-American/Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. A veteran of the United States Army, Mr. Ellis is currently living in a homeless shelter for veterans and has no income or savings. Mr. Ellis has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate from the Illinois Department of Public Health’s Vital Records Office. Mr. Ellis cannot afford to pay for a certified copy of his Illinois birth certificate. He does, however, possess a Veterans Identification Card (“VIC”), which is issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and contains his name and photograph. He wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
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13. Rickie Lamont Harmon is a 60-year-old African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible and registered voter. His Wisconsin state ID card has expired and is not usable as photo ID to vote in Wisconsin. Mr. Harmon is a veteran of the United States Army. He is currently living in a homeless shelter for veterans. Mr. Harmon has no accepted photo ID under the photo ID law, but does possess a Veterans Identification Card (“VIC”), which is issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and contains his name and photograph. Mr. Harmon wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
14. Plaintiff Dartric Davis is a 21-year-old African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Mr. Davis has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate from the Illinois Department of Public Health’s Vital Records Office. He moved to Wisconsin in 2011 and has never held a Wisconsin driver’s license or Wisconsin state ID card. Mr. Davis has made several attempts to acquire a certified copy of his birth certificate from Illinois, but has so far been unable to do so. He wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
15. Plaintiff Barbara Oden is a 57-year-old, African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Ms. Oden has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a Social Security Card (“SSC”), which is accepted proof of identity for the Wisconsin state ID card application. She was
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denied an SSC by an employee at the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) office, who told her that she must present a photo ID in order to obtain an SSC. Ms. Oden wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
16. Plaintiff DeWayne Smith is a 50-year-old, African-American resident of Cudahy, Wisconsin, which is in Milwaukee County, and an eligible and registered voter. Mr. Smith has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a Social Security Card (“SSC”), which is accepted proof of identity for the Wisconsin state ID card application. He has attempted on numerous occasions to obtain a replacement for his lost SSC. However, every time he visits the SSA office, employees inform him each time that he cannot obtain a replacement SSC without a photo ID. He has since learned that alternative identification, such as an employee ID card, a school ID card, or a health insurance cards, may be used to obtain an SSC, but he does not have any of those documents either. He wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
17. Plaintiff Sandra Jashinski is a 48-year-old, Caucasian and Native American (Cherokee) resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. Ms. Jashinski has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and lacks a Social Security Card (“SSC”), which is accepted proof of identity for the Wisconsin state ID card application. An employee at the Social Security Administration office told Ms. Jashinski that she must present a photo ID in order
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to obtain an SSC and then denied her an SSC when she could not do so. Ms. Jashinski is homeless and unsheltered and lacks connections to any social service agency other than a meal program. As a result, she may also have no way to prove her residency and receive a state ID card in the mail at a current Wisconsin residence street address. She wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
18. Plaintiff Justin Luft is a 20-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. He has no accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law and has never had a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card. Mr. Luft has twice traveled to the Wisconsin DMV office to obtain a state ID card, but was unable to do so due to his lack of a Social Security Card (“SSC”) or any other accepted form of proof of identity. He has visited the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) office multiple times with his mother, but has been unsuccessful in obtaining a duplicate of his SSC. He does not have a car, and thus, the trips he has made to try to obtain an SSC and state ID card have been by bus. He wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
19. Plaintiff Anna Shea is a 20-year-old Caucasian student at Lawrence University, an accredited four-year private university in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. She currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Colorado which she does not want to surrender and a Lawrence voting-only ID
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card, the validity of which for voting purposes remains uncertain. Ms. Shea voted in the November 2010 general election and wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
20. Plaintiff Matthew Dearing is an 18-year-old African-American student at Lawrence University, an accredited four-year private university in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. He currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of New York which he does not want to surrender. Lawrence University is offering its students voting-only ID cards, but their validity for voting purposes remains uncertain. Mr. Dearing wishes to cast his first vote this year in Wisconsin.
21. Plaintiff Max Kligman is a 19-year-old Caucasian student at Lawrence University, an accredited four-year private university in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. He currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of California which he does not want to surrender. Lawrence University is offering its students voting-only ID cards, but their validity for voting purposes remains uncertain. Mr. Kligman wishes to cast his first vote this year in Wisconsin.
22. Plaintiff Samantha Meszaros is an 18-year-old Caucasian freshman at Carthage College, an accredited four-year private college in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. She lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law. Upon information and belief, Carthage’s newly revised student ID cards
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will comply with Act 23’s requirements, but the school has not started issuing these. She currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Illinois which she does not want to surrender. Ms. Meszaros intends to cast her first vote this year in Wisconsin.
23. Plaintiff Steve Kvasnicka is a 20-year-old Caucasian junior at Carthage College, an accredited 4-year private college in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and an eligible voter. He lacks all the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law. Upon information and belief, Carthage’s newly revised student ID cards will comply with Act 23’s requirements, but the school has not started issuing these. He currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Illinois which he does not want to surrender. Mr. Kvasnicka wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
24. Plaintiff Sarah Lahti is an 18-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a student at Milwaukee Area Technical College (“MATC”), where she is studying for her GED. She currently holds an unexpired driver’s license from the State of Tennessee which she does not want to surrender and an MATC student ID card with her name and photo. She lacks all other accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law. Ms. Lahti wishes to cast her first vote this year in Wisconsin.
25. Plaintiff Domonique Whitehurst is an 18-year-old African-American and Native American (Blackfoot) student at Milwaukee Area Technical College
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(“MATC”). Mr. Whitehurst has an MATC ID card with his name and photo, but no other accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law. Mr. Whitehurst wishes to cast his first vote ever this year in Wisconsin.
26. Plaintiff Edward Hogan is a 21-year-old Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a student at MATC as well, where he is studying towards an associate’s degree. Mr. Hogan has an MATC student ID card with his name and photo, but no other accepted form of photo ID under the photo ID law. He wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
27. Plaintiff Anthony Judd is a 46-year-old, Caucasian resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. He has none of the accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law. Due to the efforts of an individual with no legal obligation to do so who provided financial and logistical support to him, subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiff Judd obtained documents and is in the process of applying for a photo ID card. However, he has not yet received the state ID card, which DMV now mails to all applicants, and as an unsheltered homeless person, it is unclear whether his efforts will be successful. He wishes to vote in Wisconsin this year.
28. Anthony Sharp is a 19-year-old, African-American resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and an eligible voter. He is living with his mother, and at the time the initial complaint in this action was filed, possessed none of the
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accepted forms of photo ID under the photo ID law, and lacks a certified copy of his birth certificate. Mr. Sharp has no income or savings. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, Mr. Sharp was able to obtain an ID card solely because Milwaukee County decided to allow certain persons born in the county to obtain free birth certificates, and because of repeated visits to various agencies to obtain other documents necessary to obtain photo ID. He intends to vote in Wisconsin next year.
29. Defendant Scott Walker is the Governor of the State of Wisconsin. He is sued in his official capacity only.
30. Defendant Judge David G. Deininger is the Chair of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board (“GAB”). Defendant Judge Michael Brennan is the Vice Chair of the GAB. Defendants Judge Gerald C. Nichol, Judge Thomas Barland, and Judge Thomas Cane are the three remaining members of the GAB. There is currently one vacant seat. The GAB is charged with administering Wisconsin’s election laws and has the authority to promulgate rules applicable to all jurisdictions within the state for the purpose of interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct of elections or ensuring their proper administration. Each of the GAB members listed above is sued in his official capacity only.
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31. Defendant Kevin J. Kennedy is the Director and General Counsel of the GAB, and Defendant Nathaniel E. Robinson is the Administrator of the Elections Division of the GAB. They are sued in their official capacities only.
32. Defendant Mark Gottlieb is the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (“WisDOT”), which includes the DMV. He is sued in his official capacity only.
33. Defendant Lynne Judd is the Administrator of the Wisconsin DMV. She is sued in her official capacity only.
34. Defendant Kristina Boardman is the Director of the Bureau of Field Services at the Wisconsin DMV. She is sued in her official capacity only.
35. Defendants Donald D. Reincke and Tracy Jo Howard are, respectively, the Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region. Defendants Sandra M. Brisco and Barney L. Hall are, respectively, the Region Manager and Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region. Defendant Donald J. Genin is the Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northeast Region. Defendant Jill Louise Geoffroy is the Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the North Central Region. Defendant Patricia A. Nelson is the Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northwest Region. The Bureau of Field Services is
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the entity within DMV responsible for issuing driver’s licenses and identification cards. They are sued in their official capacities only.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 36. This case arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) & (4), 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(d), 1973j(f), and 1983. 37. Venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), because at least two of the Defendants reside in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and all the Defendants reside in Wisconsin, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted herein have occurred—and continue to occur—in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
FACTS RELATED TO THE PHOTO ID LAW 38. Prior to the enactment of the photo ID law, with a single, limited exception,1 Wisconsin voters were not required to provide proof of identity in order to cast a ballot, much less one of a specified, limited number of photo IDs. While Wisconsin voters need to provide proof of residence to register to vote if they are registering close to or on the day of an election, a range of documentation is accepted by Wisconsin election officials to prove residency, including both
1 Under the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), first-time voters who register by mail must produce “a current and valid photo identification” or “a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter.” 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2).
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photo and non-photo forms of identification such as ID cards or licenses of any kind issued by any Wisconsin governmental unit, utility bills, bank account statements, paycheck stubs, any government-issued document, and residential leases.
39. The photo ID law, 2011 Wisconsin Act 23, was signed into law on May 25, 2011 and went into effect with the February 21, 2012 primary. Under the new photo ID law, Wisconsin voters must present one form of photo identification from a limited statutory list in order to cast a ballot.2 Unlike voter ID laws in other states such as Indiana’s photo ID law, which was upheld against a facial constitutional challenge in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), Wisconsin’s photo ID law applies to both in-person voting and most absentee voting.
40. The list of accepted photo IDs in Wisconsin is restricted to only the following: (1) a Wisconsin driver’s license; (2) a Wisconsin state ID card issued by the Wisconsin DMV; (3) an identification card issued by a U.S. uniformed service; (4) a U.S. passport; (5) a certificate of U.S. naturalization that was issued not earlier than 2 years before the date of an election at which it is presented; (6) an unexpired receipt issued at the time of application for a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card; (7) an identification card issued by a federally recognized Indian
2 This is in addition to, not instead of, the requirement to register to vote.
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tribe in Wisconsin3; and (8) an unexpired identification card issued by a Wisconsin
university or college accredited as defined in Wis. Stat. § 39.30(1)(d), which
contains the signature of the individual to whom it is issued, the issuance date, and
an expiration date not later than 2 years after the date of issuance (collectively, “accepted photo ID”). Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m).4 The first four accepted photo IDs
must be unexpired or, if expired, must have expired after the date of the most
recent general election. Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(a). A voter who is required to
surrender his or her driver’s license or driving receipt by a law enforcement officer
within 60 days of the date of an election may present an original copy of the
citation or notice in lieu of the license or receipt for a license, and this too
constitutes “accepted photo ID.” Wis. Stat. § 6.79(7).
41. The following is a non-exhaustive list of forms of identification that will
not be accepted for in-person or absentee voting: (1) any federal photo
identification not specifically listed, and thus excluding, among others, Veterans
Identification Cards (“VICs”); (2) any Wisconsin government-issued card, license,
3 Upon information and belief, the federally recognized tribes in Wisconsin are: Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Forest County Potawatomi, Ho-Chunk Nation, Lac Court Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, Menominee Indian Tribe, Oneida Tribe of Indians, Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, St. Croix Chippewa Indians, Sokaogan Mole Lake Community, and Stockbridge Munsee Community. 4 A voter using a college or university ID card must also present separate proof of current enrollment. A discussion of the proof-of-enrollment requirement appears in a September 12th GAB Memorandum. See GAB Memorandum, “Photo ID Implementation Issues – Student ID Cards,” Sept. 12, 2011, at 3-4.
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or document other than a driver’s license or state ID card; (3) driver’s licenses and state ID cards issued by other states; (4) any local government-issued card, license, or document; (5) any public or medical assistance benefit cards issued by any unit of government; and (6) any governmental or private employer photo identification.
42. The only voters exempt from showing photo ID when voting in person are electors with proof of confidential elector status due to the existence of a protective order or similar proof of domestic violence. Wis. Stat. § 6.79(6).
43. The only voters exempt from providing photo identification when voting absentee are military, overseas, or confidential voters, Wis. Stat. §§ 6.34(1), 6.87(4)(b)1; voters in nursing homes, qualified community based residential facilities, qualified adult family homes, and qualified residential care apartment complexes who vote with special voting deputies, Wis. Stat. § 6.875(6)(c), or voters who live in such facilities that are not visited by special voting deputies and who “submit[] with [their] absentee ballot[s] a statement signed by the same individual who witnesses voting of the ballot that contains the certification of an authorized representative of the complex, facility, or home that the elector resides in the complex, facility, or home and the complex, facility, or home is certified or registered as required by law, that contains the name and address of the elector, and that verifies that the name and address are correct,” Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)5; voters who are indefinitely confined because of age, physical illness or infirmity or
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are disabled for an indefinite period and who, by signing a statement to that effect, require that an absentee ballot be sent to the voter automatically for every election,5 Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(2)(a), 6.87(4)(b)2; and absentee voters who have not changed their names or addresses since the prior time they voted absentee and who previously provided proof of photo identification, Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)3.
44. 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 also imposed a requirement that in-person voters sign the poll book in order to receive a ballot, unless for reason of disability the person is unable to do so. Wis. Stat. § 6.79(2).
45. Under Wis. Stat. § 227.24, as affected by 2011 Wis. Act 21 and as amended by 2001 Wis. Act 32, an agency’s proposed emergency administrative rule in final draft form is subject to gubernatorial review before it can be submitted for review by the relevant Standing Committee and the Joint Committee for the Review of Administrative Rules (“JCRAR”) and—barring a legislative override— ultimately promulgated. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g (“An agency may not file an emergency rule with the legislative reference bureau . . . and an emergency rule may not be published until the governor approves the emergency rule in writing.”); see also Wis. Stat. § 227.185 (gubernatorial approval required for non-emergency administrative rules); Executive Order No. 50. If JCRAR determines a statement
5 In these situations, the elector must submit “with his or her absentee ballot a statement signed by the same individual who witnesses voting of the ballot which contains the name and address of the elector and verifies that the name and address are correct.” Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)2.
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of policy or an interpretation of a statute is a rule, it may compel an agency to issue an emergency rule and submit it to the Governor under Act 21. Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(b). If the agency is so directed, then it must submit a Statement of Scope for Defendant Walker’s review and approval or rejection. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1d. There is no binding statutory deadline by which the Governor must respond to the agency. Even if the Governor approves the Statement of Scope, he/she may still reject an emergency rule when it is subsequently submitted in final draft form. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g.
46. Initially, the GAB interpreted the photo ID law as not permitting the use of technical college ID cards at the polls. See GAB Memorandum, “Photo ID Implementation Issues – Student ID Cards,” Sept. 12, 2011, at 1-3. However, at its November 9, 2011 meeting, the GAB reversed course and voted unanimously to find that technical colleges are embraced by the photo ID law’s phrase “a . . . college in this state that is accredited.” Wis. Stat. § 5.02(6m)(f). However, on November 15, 2011, the JCRAR voted 6-4 to force the GAB to issue an emergency rule codifying its interpretation of the photo ID law, a rule that must be submitted to Defendant Walker under Act 21 before the legislative review process. The Statement of Scope for an emergency rule addressing the use of technical college ID cards was submitted to Defendant Walker on November 22, 2011, and he approved it on December 2, 2011. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3
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Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 1-3. Following its publication in the Administrative Register, the GAB approved the statement on January 12, 2012. GAB staff subsequently drafted a rule which the GAB approved, but the rule has not yet been promulgated in final form. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1d; Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g; GAB Memorandum, Approve Proposed Rule Permitting Use of Technical College Student Identification Cards for Voting, for the Feb. 7, 2012 Meeting, at 1.6
47. Given his power to approve or reject any emergency rule in final draft form, Defendant Walker exercises direct control over the implementation of the photo ID law and the scope and degree of the burdens it imposes on eligible Wisconsin voters, particularly technical college student voters in Class 4 (see infra). Defendant Walker also exercises veto power over any bill introduced to prevent the promulgation of an emergency rule. Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(i).
48. Even if Defendant Walker approves the emergency rule concerning the use of technical college ID cards, the Legislature may still block it by enacting a statute. During the November 15th meeting, several of the JCRAR members who voted with the majority expressed their belief that the Legislature did not intend to include technical college ID cards, because an amendment designed expressly to authorize their use as accepted photo ID (in addition to the statutory accredited-
6 See GAB 10 Relating to Voter Identification, Specifies a WTCS ID Card May Be Used for Voting, available at https://health.wisconsin.gov/admrules/public/Rmo?nRmoId=12383.
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college standard above) was defeated. The JCRAR’s actions continue to threaten the exclusion of technical college ID cards from the list of accepted photo ID. Furthermore, given the review process and publication and notice requirements, the rule could not be made effective before the February 21, 2012 primary election, though GAB did instruct elections officials throughout the state to accept technical college ID cards. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 2-3. At this pace, even assuming Defendant Walker and the Legislature do not block the emergency rule, it may not be in effect for the Spring Election and Presidential Preference Primary on April 3, 2012 either.
49. There were 382,006 students enrolled in the technical college system in the 2009-2010 academic year, or 8.8% of Wisconsin’s total voting-age population.7 Of these technical college students, there were approximately 60,000 minority
7 The 2010 Census dataset labeled “2010 Redistricting Data SF (PL 94-171)” was used to calculate this percentage.
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enrollees.8 By contrast, there are less than 20,000 minority students in the entire University of Wisconsin (“UW”) System in the present academic year.9
50. Student voters at colleges or universities outside the technical college
system face their own challenges in casting a ballot. Upon information and belief,
all college and university ID cards in Wisconsin at the time the photo ID law was
enacted lacked one or more of the required elements: a signature, an issuance date,
and an expiration date not later than 2 years after the issuance date. In early
September, the GAB voted to permit the use of stickers to supply the missing
required information and thereby bring non-complaint student ID cards into
compliance. See GAB Memorandum, “Photo ID Implementation Issues – Student
ID Cards,” Sept. 12, 2011, at 4-5. Upon information and belief, this method is
significantly less expensive than digitally printing the missing information on
wholly redesigned ID cards. At its September 27, 2011 meeting, members of the
Wisconsin State Legislature’s JCRAR expressed concerns about the use of stickers
and communicated their belief that the GAB could only lawfully implement this
8 The Wisconsin Technical College System’s publicly available data is less than complete. 27,709 students did not report race or ethnicity, and though 2,210 are listed as “multi-ethnic,” there is no more specific information. The figure reported above is the summation of the American Indian, Asian, black, Hispanic, and Hawaiian or Pacific Islander populations for 20092010, which is 59,673 students. Wisconsin Technical College System, FY 2001-2010 Systemwide Enrollment by Sex and Race/Ethnicity, available at http://www.wtcsystem.edu/reports/data/factbook/pdf/ethnicity.pdf. 9 The University of Wisconsin System, Students Statistics, Fall 2011-12, Headcount Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity and Age, available at http://www.wisconsin.edu/opar/ssb/201112/pdf/r_b107_tot.pdf.
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policy by adopting an administrative rule. Following that meeting, Defendant Kennedy submitted a memo to the GAB, urging it to reverse course. See GAB Memorandum, “Administrative Rulemaking Process and Timeline,” Oct. 6, 2011, at 1-2. However, at its November 9, 2011 meeting, the GAB reaffirmed that colleges and universities could bring their ID cards into compliance with stickers that included the missing information. However, on November 15, 2011, the JCRAR voted 6-4 to force the GAB to issue an emergency rule codifying the sticker supplementation policy, a rule that will first be submitted to Defendant Walker under 2011 Wis. Act 21. See infra. Therefore, the JCRAR’s actions threaten to block the use of stickers to bring student ID cards into compliance with the photo ID law.
51. In order to promulgate an emergency rule allowing colleges and universities to take advantage of stickers as a cost-efficient solution, the GAB must first submit a Statement of Scope for Defendant Walker’s review and approval or rejection. Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1d. As of March 2, 2011, the GAB had still not submitted a Statement of Scope to Defendant Walker. See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 2.10 Given his power to reject this emergency rule in its final draft
10 Despite this inaction, upon information and belief, a number of college and university administrations are relying on stickers to affix one or more of the missing pieces of information, such as a 2-year expiration date, to their students’ revised voting-only ID cards.
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form, Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(e)1g, and his power to veto any legislation attempting
to override the rule, Wis. Stat. § 227.26(2)(i), Defendant Walker exercises direct
control over the implementation of the photo ID law and the scope and degree of
the burdens it imposes on eligible Wisconsin voters, particularly student voters
with out-of-state drivers’ licenses who are members of Class 3 (see infra).
52. Even if GAB initiates the rulemaking process on the sticker
supplementation option, given certain notice and publication requirements, as well
as the lack of any binding deadline by which the Governor must respond to the
submitting agency, it will be impossible to obtain legal clarity in a timely manner
on the validity of using stickers to bring student ID cards into compliance with the
photo ID law. Wisconsin colleges and universities require clarity on this issue as
soon as possible, and the GAB needs to begin training poll workers well in
advance of this year’s upcoming elections. See GAB Memorandum, “Administrative Rulemaking Process and Timeline,” Oct. 6, 2011, at 2-4.11
53. Forcing the GAB to issue administrative rules to implement a less
expensive fix for student ID cards such as stickers and to ensure that technical
11 In a memorandum for the GAB’s December 13, 2011 meeting, Defendant Kennedy wrote: “Staff remains concerned that JCRAR’s actions on these three matters, and the general exercise of §227.26(2), Wis. Stats., authority for day-to-day election administration issues, affect the ability of the G.A.B. to provide timely and uniform advice for the proper administration of elections, particularly with sufficient notice such that proper training of election officials may be conducted. As a result of 2011 Act 21, the process to complete promulgation of an emergency rule is more complicated and lengthy.” See GAB Memorandum, “Promulgation of 3 Emergency Rules as Directed by JCRAR,” for Dec. 13, 2011 Meeting, at 2.
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college student ID cards will be accepted has already increased the probability that numerous colleges and universities will fail to issue compliant student ID cards in time for upcoming elections this year.
54. Technical college ID cards will need to conform to the same statutory specifications outlined for all college and university ID cards, but these schools have no incentive to begin this time-consuming and costly process without an assurance that such cards will in fact be usable for voting purposes. Until the conclusion of the emergency rulemaking and review process is completed for “GAB 10 Relating to Voter Identification, Specifies a WTCS ID Card May Be Used for Voting,” technical colleges will lack a conclusive legal answer on the categorical validity of their students’ ID cards.
55. Upon information and belief, some private and University of Wisconsin System (“UW System”) campuses, as well as some technical colleges, have started to issue, or stated they will issue, student ID cards that comply with the photo ID law’s specifications.
56. Upon information and belief, a number of Wisconsin private colleges and UW System campuses have either started to issue, or stated they will issue, separate voting-only ID cards. Upon information and belief, the GAB has reportedly approved a design for the UW System voting-only ID cards, but it has
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not issued any formal and publicly available documentation approving any college or university’s new voting-only ID cards.
57. At the November 9, 2011 hearing, Defendant Kevin Kennedy stated that the GAB will be reviewing every Wisconsin college or university ID card for its conformity to the photo ID law and for its security. The GAB will inform municipal clerks and poll workers throughout Wisconsin as to which college or university ID cards may be accepted at the polls and which may not be accepted. Therefore, the validity of each voting-only ID card issued by a college or university will ultimately be determined by the GAB. Until the GAB formally and publicly approves a particular college or university’s ID card, given the uncertainty and policy reversals surrounding the use of student ID cards to vote in Wisconsin, students at that school will have no assurance that these separate voting-only ID cards will in fact be treated as accepted photo ID for voting purposes in 2012.
58. Upon information and belief, other Wisconsin colleges and universities have expressed that they have no plans at this time to issue any kind of votingcompliant student ID cards.
FACTS RELATED TO OBTAINING WISCONSIN PHOTO ID AND THE UNDERLYING DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY WISCONSIN DMV 59. The Wisconsin DMV, a division of WisDOT, is required to issue state
ID cards free of charge if the applicant is a U.S. citizen, will be at least 18 years
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old by the next election, and requests that the card be provided free for voting purposes. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(5)(a), as amended by 2011 Wis. Act 23 § 138. A voter may not receive a state ID card for free if he or she currently possesses an unexpired Wisconsin driver’s license. Act 23 failed to make duplicate ID cards (replacements for lost or stolen IDs) issued for voting purposes free of charge, but this was changed by subsequent legislation which went into effect at the beginning of January 2012.
60. Defendants’ public education efforts and training of DMV, GAB, and local officials involved in election administration remain woefully inadequate to inform eligible Wisconsin voters of the specific requirements for voting under Act 23 and ensure uniform, non-arbitrary treatment during the state ID card application process. For example, upon information and belief, numerous local officials and even DMV employees continue to erroneously inform voters at polling places and at DMV offices that the address on an accepted photo ID must reflect the voter’s current address. Moreover, upon information and belief, some voters who have applied for state ID cards for voting purposes are still being charged fees for duplicate ID cards and/or are unaware of the changed requirements. As a consequence, voters face arbitrary, unlawful, and unfair treatment when applying for duplicate ID cards for voting purposes. This demonstrates Defendants’
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widespread failure to train and educate county and municipal clerks, DMV employees, and poll workers on what the photo ID law does and does not mandate.
61. As of the week of January 23, 2012, DMV had 92 offices in the State of Wisconsin, an increase from 88 offices when the photo ID law was enacted.
62. Only one DMV office in Wisconsin has any weekend hours, and the Madison Odana Renewal Center only processes renewal license and ID card applications. Thus, there is no DMV office in Wisconsin that will process an original driver’s license or state ID card application on the weekend.
63. No DMV office in Wisconsin stays open later than 5:30 p.m. 64. Not all DMV offices are open full-time. Each county must have at least 20 hours per week of driver’s license and state ID card services, and a number of DMV offices are open only 20 hours a week. Wis. Stat. § 110.08(5)(a). 65. Upon information and belief, WisDOT has no plans to establish and deploy mobile DMV units capable of servicing voters who live far from a DMV office and/or otherwise have difficulty traveling to a DMV office to obtain a state ID card for voting purposes. 66. An individual who resides in Wisconsin and wishes to obtain a free Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes must surrender any valid out-of-state driver’s license he/she possesses. Wis. Stat. § 343.50(1)(b), as amended by 2011 Wis. Act 23 § 130.
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67. A person with a driver’s license from another state who wishes to obtain a Wisconsin driver’s license must pay a fee. Wis. Stat. § 343.21. There is no fee waiver for obtaining a driver’s license, even if that license will constitute the individual’s sole form of accepted photo ID for voting purposes.
68. Wisconsin DMV offices require first-time applicants for state ID cards and driver’s licenses to present: (1) proof of name and date of birth, (2) proof of identity, (3) proof of citizenship, legal permanent resident or conditional resident status of the United States, or legal presence in the United States, (4) proof of Wisconsin residency, and (5) a Social Security Number. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(2). “First-time applicants” encompass all applicants who have not previously held a Wisconsin driver’s license or ID card, even if they have such licenses or cards from other states.
69. Applicants for a renewal, reinstatement, reissue, or duplicate12 Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card must present proof of identity, Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(2)(b), and may be required to present proof of citizenship, legal permanent resident or conditional resident status of the United Status, or legal presence in the United States. Id. § 102.15(2)(bm)2.13 Applicants
12 A replacement for a lost or stolen identification card (or driver’s license) is called a “duplicate.” 13 The DMV website suggests that any applicant who has previously held a Wisconsin driver’s license or state ID card more than 8 years ago must submit all the same documentation as a firsttime applicant: “If you have held a driver license in the past eight years and now wish to apply
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for a renewal, reinstatement, reissue, or duplicate Wisconsin driver’s license or
state ID card following certain actions, such as suspension, revocation, or
cancellation of the prior license or ID card, must also provide proof of name and
date of birth and proof of residency. Id. § 102.15(2)(c). Applicants for an original,
renewal, reinstatement, reissue, or duplicate driver’s license or state ID card may
be required to provide proof of residency if the applicant uses certain documents to
prove name and date of birth or identity, or if the documents do not have a current
residential address or do not include a current acceptable Wisconsin residential
address. Id. § 102.15(4m).
70. Voters who lack the necessary primary documents for an original,
renewal, duplicate, or reinstatement driver’s license or ID card often must travel to
and interact with multiple government offices and entities, such as the vital records
office of their birth state and the Social Security Administration, in order to obtain
for an original ID card, you would only be required to provide proof of identity upon application for your ID card.” For those whose licenses or ID cards expired within the last 8 years, a separate regulation provides that identity is proven where the DMV is able to locate a record with a digital photo of the applicant for a duplicate, reinstated, or renewed license or state ID card. See Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(4)(c) (“A person applying without a personal appearance to reinstate a suspended or revoked license or identification card or to renew a license subject to s. Trans 102.03 (2) and (5) or obtain a duplicate license or identification card, if all of the following apply: 1. The department is able to produce an acceptable photograph and facsimile signature for the individual from its digital image computer records. 2. The person's name as shown on the license is unchanged. 3. The person is a Wisconsin resident.”). It is unclear whether this alternative procedure to prove identity is uniformly applied to all duplicate, reinstatement, and renewal applicants. In any event, based on when the person applicant last obtained a DMV product, there may not be any digital photo of the person on file. Upon information and belief, typically the photos contained in the system date from 2005 onward, and the oldest photos are from 1992.
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the underlying documents needed to secure a state ID card. The process to obtain documents required in order to obtain a photo ID card can be extremely complex and difficult, particularly for individuals with lower levels of education, literacy, and resources, and limited or no access to information or reliable transportation.
71. If voters lack one or more of the documents required in order to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card, Defendants do not normally provide direct or individualized assistance to the voters to obtain those documents.
72. Rules promulgated by WisDOT provide that for a driver’s license or state ID card application satisfactory proof of name and date of birth includes the following: (a) for a person born in Wisconsin, a certified copy of the person’s Wisconsin birth certificate; (b) for a person born in another jurisdiction, other than a Canadian province, a certified copy of his or her birth certificate or the equivalent document from that other jurisdiction or a certificate of birth abroad issued by the U.S. Department of State; (c) a U.S. passport; (d) an expired Wisconsin driver’s license; (e) an expired Wisconsin ID card; (f) a U.S. certificate of naturalization (which costs $345.00); (g) a certificate of U.S. citizenship (which costs $600.00); (h) a Native American ID card which was issued by a federally recognized tribe or a band of a federally recognized tribe in Wisconsin, includes a photograph and signature, and has been approved by the Secretary of WisDOT; (i) a court order under seal related to the adoption or divorce or to a name or gender change that
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includes the person’s current full legal name, date of birth and in the case of a name change or divorce order, the person’s prior name; (j) an armed forces of the United States common access card or DD Form 2 ID card issued to military personnel; (k) a Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration (“DHS/TSA”) transportation worker identification credential; or various immigration documents. Id. § 102.15(3).
73. If the applicant is unable to provide accepted proof of name and date of birth and the documents are “unavailable” (defined in Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(1) to exclude documents the applicant merely forgot to bring, as well as lost or destroyed documents where a replacement original or certified copy may be obtained upon request), then the applicant may petition the DMV Administrator, Defendant Judd, to consider alternative documentation of name and date of birth. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(3)(b). Defendant Judd may delegate to her subordinates the authority to accept or reject such alternative proof of name and date of birth, but there are seemingly no rules or standards guiding that determination. Id. § 102.15(3)(c). Upon information and belief, no signage or other clear public notice at DMV offices or on the DMV website announces that this alternative procedure even exists.
74. WisDOT rules provide that for a driver’s license or state ID card application, satisfactory proof of citizenship, legal permanent resident status,
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conditional resident status or legal presence includes a U.S. state or local government-issued birth certificate, a valid U.S. passport, a certificate of U.S. citizenship (which costs $600.00), a U.S. Certificate of naturalization (which costs $345.00), a DHS/TSA transportation worker identification credential, and a variety of immigration documents. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(3m). Therefore, a first-time applicant for a Wisconsin ID card who lacks a U.S. passport, has no immigration and naturalization history, and does not work for DHS/TSA, must either produce a certified copy of his/her birth certificate to obtain a Wisconsin photo ID card or pay at least $55.00 to obtain a U.S. passport card.
75. Prior to 2007, when Wisconsin law was amended to comply with the REAL ID Act, individuals could obtain Wisconsin driver’s licenses and state ID cards without presenting documentary proof of citizenship. 2005 Wis. Act 126 § 2; 2007 Wis. Act 20 §§ 3245, 3257, 3379; Wis. Stat. §§ 343.165(1), 343.14(2)(es), 343.50(4). Now this documentary proof is mandatory.
76. Plaintiffs Ruthelle Frank, Shirley Brown, Nancy Lea Wilde, Eddie Lee Holloway Jr., Mariannis Ginorio, Frank Ybarra, Sam Bulmer, Pamela Dukes, Carl Ellis, and Dartric Davis have no document listed in Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15 that they can use to prove their name and date of birth and U.S. citizenship.
77. While Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15 does not set forth any alternative procedure for ID card applicants unable to obtain one of the listed forms
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of documentary proof of U.S. citizenship, Defendant Judd has nevertheless suggested that some alternative procedure to prove citizenship, name and date of birth, and possibly other documentary proof requirements, may exist. Upon information and belief, some applicants for whom there is no birth certificate on file at a vital records office have been told they can satisfy the proof of citizenship requirement by: (1) obtaining a document from the relevant vital records office certifying that there is no record of birth on file; and (2) if requested, presenting alternative documents evidencing the person’s birth, including but perhaps not limited to hospital certificates and baptismal certificates. DMV informed Plaintiff Nancy Lea Wilde that they could make use of an alternative procedure involving the certification of a lack of a birth record. To the extent such a procedure exists, upon information and belief, DMV does not consistently or routinely inform voters of, or apply, this procedure. A similarly situated voter like Plaintiff Shirley Brown, whose birth in Louisiana was never registered and who has no birth certificate, was never offered an opportunity to prove her eligibility for an ID card in this manner. It remains unclear whether DMV offices are in fact issuing ID cards under this alternative procedure.
78. Upon information and belief, there are no written rules, standards, or procedures governing who is given notice of any alternative procedure that may exist, or regarding the type and quantity of alternative documents that may suffice
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to meet the requirement. Moreover, upon information and belief, there are no written rules, standards, or procedures governing the DMV’s review of applications making use of any alternative procedure that may exist. Instead, each application is reviewed on an ad hoc basis by DMV officials unconstrained by specific and definite rules and standards.
79. Upon information and belief, some applicants with inaccurate birth certificates due to name misspellings, name transpositions, and other defects may also be allowed to substitute alternative documentary proof and obtain photo ID cards. However, upon information and belief, DMV lacks any notice procedures or standards for applying the suggested alternative procedure. DMV employees never offered any such alternative procedure to persons including but not limited to Plaintiffs Ruthelle Frank and Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr.
80. To the extent DMV is offering some applicants an alternative means of satisfying the name and date of birth and/or proof of citizenship (when a birth certificate is “unavailable” or otherwise insufficient) and/or other documentary proof requirements for a state ID card, upon information and belief, the alternative scheme is marked by a standard-less exercise of discretion and has resulted in the arbitrary and disparate treatment of similarly situated voters who are attempting to acquire Wisconsin’s accepted photo ID of last resort.
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81. The inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary treatment of voters without birth certificates demonstrates that DMV employees have not been adequately trained on the photo ID law, on whatever rules, policies, and procedures may exist to handle ID card applicants without birth certificates or with inaccurate birth certificates, and/or on how to handle and resolve situations that are not addressed by existing rules, policies, and procedures.
82. Persons born in Wisconsin can obtain certified copies of their birth certificates from the Wisconsin Vital Records Office in the Wisconsin Department of Health Services or from local registrars. Wisconsin normally charges $20.00 to locate and make a certified copy of a birth certificate, and the voter generally must bear his or her own costs in obtaining the birth certificate.
83. Fees to obtain birth certificates for persons born outside Wisconsin vary and can be even higher than Wisconsin’s fee. Minnesota, for example, charges $26.00 for a certified copy of a birth certificate.
84. Some states will charge a fee for merely searching their records, regardless of whether or not a record of birth is found. The birth certificate application forms for both Wisconsin and Louisiana, the birth states of Plaintiffs Nancy Lea Wilde and Shirley Brown, respectively, charge for a “search” of birth records, not just for copies that are in fact located.
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85. Certain states’ and counties’ vital records offices require a governmentissued photo ID to obtain a certified copy of one’s birth certificate or otherwise set forth a restrictive list of documents that must be shown in order to obtain a certified copy of a birth certificate, including offices in Illinois (Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Carl Ellis, and Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr.), Kansas (Sam Bulmer), Puerto Rico (Ginorio), and Wisconsin (Ybarra). Often these document lists are restricted to documents that many voters, including poor, homeless, and/or informally housed individuals, are unlikely to possess.
86. In many states, including Wisconsin, identification requirements imposed on individuals differ in practice from the official statutory or regulatory requirements and are inconsistently applied to similarly situated applicants. These requirements are often inconsistently or misleadingly stated in publicly available documents, including on official websites and on the applications themselves, even for different vital records offices within the same state.
87. Wisconsin state law, Wis. Stat. § 69.21, sets forth that state and local registrars “shall” issue a certified copy of a birth certificate to a person “with a direct and tangible interest” in the matter, who pays the required fee. Administrative rules confirm that the “state registrar and local registrars shall provide certified documentary proof of a vital event for individual use to any person who requests that proof and has a direct and tangible interest as defined in
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s. 69.20 (1), Stats.” Wis. Admin. Code DHS § 142.04. However, the birth certificate application form requires that the person requesting a certified copy of a birth certificate provide “acceptable identification,” in the form of either a “current valid photo ID,” i.e., a Wisconsin or out-of-state driver’s license or state photo ID card, or two items from a limited list of types of secondary identification documents. The secondary list includes only the following: a government-issued employee I.D. card or badge with photo, a U.S. passport, a checkbook or bankbook, a “major” credit card, a health insurance card, a “recent” dated, signed lease, a “recent” utility bill, or “recent” traffic ticket. The application available on the Wisconsin Department of Health Services’ (“DHS”) website states that the identification requirement applies to both in-person and mail-in applications. At the time of this filing, numerous county registrar websites continued to state that no identification is required if the certified copies are mailed to the applicant. For instance, the birth certificate application on the Dane County Register of Deeds website calls for “valid photo ID,” but makes clear that this is only “required to pick up [the certificate] in person.” As a result, similarly situated voters throughout Wisconsin have to follow different identification requirements in obtaining their birth certificates depending on the county in which they were born.
88. WisDOT rules provide that for a driver’s license or state ID card application, satisfactory proof of identity includes only the following: (a) a valid
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driver’s license, including a license from another jurisdiction, except a Canadian province; (b) military discharge papers; (c) a U.S. government and military dependent ID card; (d) a valid photo identification card issued by Wisconsin or another jurisdiction, except a Canadian province; (e) a marriage certificate or certified copy of judgment of divorce; (f) a Social Security Card; (g) an additional document that would be sufficient to prove name and date of birth, but was not used to prove name and date of birth; or (h) a DHS/TSA transportation worker identification credential. Wis. Admin. Code Trans. § 102.15(4).
89. For many low-income eligible Wisconsin voters, presenting a Social Security Card (“SSC”) is the only method to prove identity to the Wisconsin DMV. In order to obtain an SSC, the Social Security Administration generally requires an individual to provide evidence of identity. To obtain an original SSC, the applicant must establish his/her U.S. citizenship, age, and identity. For a replacement SSC, the applicant must provide documents to establish his/her U.S. citizenship and identity. Upon information and belief, identification requirements that SSC applicants are told they must satisfy often differ in practice from the requirements set forth in law. These requirements are inconsistently stated and applied to applicants across Wisconsin’s SSA offices and even to different applicants at the same SSA office.
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90. WisDOT rules provide that to obtain a driver’s license or state ID card, an individual may be required to provide a form of proof that contains “a current acceptable Wisconsin residence street address.” Id. § 102.15(4m).14 A document listing a post office box or commercial mail receiving agency as the mailing address is not acceptable.
91. Under official state regulations, satisfactory proof of residency includes only the following: (a) a utility bill for water, gas, electric or landline phone service which is at least 30 days old; (b) a paycheck or stub with the customer’s name and address, and the employer’s name and address; (c) an account statement at least 30 days old from a Wisconsin financial institution; or (d) mortgage documents for a residential real property located in Wisconsin. Id. § 102.15(4m)(b), (c), (d), (f).15
92. The Wisconsin DMV’s website sets out a broader list of purportedly acceptable documents to prove residency. The policy authorizing the use of such documents has not, however, been promulgated as an official administrative rule and, for the reasons discussed in paragraph 47, may not be legally binding and could be blocked or overridden by the actions of Defendant Walker or the Legislature. Moreover, even the unofficial website list of accepted documentary
14 The Wisconsin DMV website states that this is mandatory for all first-time applicants aged 18 years or older. 15 So numbered in original; no (a) or (e) are listed in the regulations.
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proof of residency fails to expressly include such documents as Internet bills, provide a procedure to establish residency for unsheltered homeless persons who lack a relationship with a social service organization, or provide a procedure for other voters who do not receive bills, bank accounts, or other permissible documents at an allowable mailing address.
93. Recently, Wisconsin DMV updated its website to include a policy allowing individuals experiencing homelessness to prove residency. Under this policy, an ID card applicant lacking a current residence address may obtain a letter from a shelter or other private or public “social service organization” or “social service agency” (terms which are not defined) with whom he or she has a relationship, attesting to the individual’s residency and stating that the organization will receive an ID card in the mail on the applicant’s behalf. The letter must be on official letterhead and certify that the person working with the social service provider knows the applicant, the applicant’s name, and that the individual frequents the residence listed for purposes of securing an ID card (which could include a homeless shelter or other location where a homeless person may spend time or return to). At this time, the policy remains vague, and it is unclear how DMV will interpret and apply it, or whether there has been sufficient training for employees and guidance for social service organizations to ensure proper and consistent treatment. Moreover, it appears that the policy relies solely on the
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willingness of social service organizations to verify a homeless individual’s residence and to receive and hold ID cards mailed to them. As a consequence, the policy excludes from protection homeless individuals without ties to social service organizations and those with ties to organizations that cannot or will not complete the required certification, and it may exclude from protection those homeless individuals who move between locations or social service organizations, either voluntarily or involuntarily.
THE PHOTO ID LAW’S IMPACT ON RACIAL MINORITIES IN MILWAUKEE COUNTY, WISCONSIN AND THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 94. The photo ID law is a voting standard, practice, or procedure under 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a). 95. African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin as a whole will be individually disfranchised and collectively disempowered by the photo ID law.
96. African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin disproportionately lack accepted photo ID and disproportionately lack the documents necessary to obtain a free Wisconsin state ID card, when compared to their white counterparts. As a result, these minority voters in Milwaukee County,
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Wisconsin and in the State of Wisconsin are less likely to be able to obtain accepted photo ID than their white counterparts.
97. These statistically significant racial disparities in rates of accepted photo ID and underlying document possession stem from a variety of social and historical factors. African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and in the State of Wisconsin have lower income, lower employment rates, lower levels of education, and lower access to information than their white counterparts.
98. Members of these minority groups in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin will be denied the right to vote on account of race or color by the photo ID law. Since minority voters will be disproportionately barred from voting under this strict photo ID requirement, the political processes in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin, are not equally open to participation by African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters, and they will therefore have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
99. These statistically significant disparities dilute the voting strength of African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin
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and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin, and thus impair their ability to elect representatives of their choice.
100. The recorded racial disparities in terms of possession of accepted photo ID and the primary documents DMV accepts for Wisconsin state ID card applications are statistically significant and demonstrate that the photo ID law has reduced the probability that votes cast by African-American and Hispanic/Latino residents of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, the State of Wisconsin will be counted.
101. An alternative election scheme is available that does not have a disproportionate negative impact on the opportunity of African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, the State of Wisconsin to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice, as compared to other members of the electorate.
102. African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters bear the effects of racial discrimination in education, employment, housing, and health, which have hindered their ability to participate effectively in the political process. The photo ID law operates upon this existing vulnerability to disfranchise African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and the State of Wisconsin.
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103. Certain political campaigns in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and the State of Wisconsin have been characterized by overt and subtle racial appeals, as well as racialized statements by voters.
104. There has been a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the African-American and Hispanic/Latino communities in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and the State of Wisconsin.
105. The policies and justifications proffered in defense of the photo ID law are tenuous and not supported by the evidence.
PLAINTIFF CLASS ALLEGATIONS CLASS 1
106. Class 1 is defined as: all eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID, lack one or more of the documents DMV accepts to obtain a Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes, and face legal or systemic practical barriers to completing the process of obtaining an ID.
107. This class of eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID includes—but is not limited to—individuals who are unable to obtain photo ID from the DMV because they: were never issued birth certificates or lack accurate birth certificates; are unable to obtain certified copies of their birth certificates due
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to their birth states’ identification requirements; lack and cannot obtain proof of Wisconsin residency; and lack and cannot obtain any documentary proof of identity accepted by the Wisconsin DMV.
108. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 1 Representatives Ruthelle Frank, Shirley Brown, Nancy Lea Wilde, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., Mariannis Ginorio, Frank Ybarra, Sam Bulmer, Dartric Davis, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, DeWayne Smith, Sandra Jashinski, and Anthony Judd’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
109. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, by denying the right to vote to eligible Wisconsin voters who have been unable to obtain one or more of the primary documents accepted by DMV for the Wisconsin state ID card application, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
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class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 2 110. Class 2 is defined as: all eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID and for whom the costs incurred in obtaining a Wisconsin state ID card, including but not limited to the cost of obtaining certified and accurate copies of birth certificates or any other documentary proof accepted by the Wisconsin DMV or the cost of traveling to the nearest Wisconsin DMV office, would constitute a financial burden. 111. The photo ID law will force a significant percentage of eligible, poor Wisconsin voters to make a choice between, on the one hand, paying for a birth certificate and/or marriage certificate and/or incurring significant travel costs in order to acquire a state ID card and, on the other hand, paying for basic life necessities. This constitutes an at least substantial burden, which is undue and unconstitutional burden under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 112. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (“ACS”) 5-Year Estimates, approximately 357,912 Wisconsin residents ages 18 to 64 and 57,900 Wisconsin residents ages 65 years and older had incomes below 100
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percent of the federal poverty level (“FPL”), and approximately 161,664 Wisconsin residents ages 18 to 64 and 16,183 Wisconsin residents ages 65 years and older had incomes below 50 percent of the FPL. According to the 2006-2010 American Community Survey (“ACS”) 5-Year Estimates, approximately 10.3% of the Wisconsin voting-age population—or 443,082 individuals—had incomes below the FPL in the last 12 months. According to a study conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families, in November 2008, there were 12,608 families who were receiving food stamps in the State of Wisconsin but had zero earned or unearned income.
113. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 2 Representatives Pamela Dukes, Mariannis Ginorio, Ruthelle Frank, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., Carl Ellis, Frank Ybarra, Sam Bulmer, and Dartric Davis’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
114. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to
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protect their interests. Additionally, given that Defendants are forcing eligible Wisconsin voters to spend their scarce financial resources in order to cast their votes, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 3 115. Class 3 is defined as all Wisconsin voters who are residents of Wisconsin for voting purposes, who lack any accepted photo ID, and who would be forced to surrender an out-of-state driver’s license in order to obtain a free Wisconsin ID card for voting purposes. 116. This class includes—but is not limited to—currently enrolled students at accredited Wisconsin colleges or universities whose colleges or universities have not issued student ID cards that have been found compliant with the photo ID law, and who would be forced to surrender out-of-state driver’s licenses in order to obtain free Wisconsin ID cards that they need in order to vote. 117. This surrender rule imposes a material requirement on voters who wish to obtain a free state ID card for voting purposes by forcing persons who are Wisconsin residents for voting purposes, but who possess out-of-state driver’s licenses, to choose between paying a fee for a Wisconsin driver’s license,
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surrendering their driver’s license to obtain a free Wisconsin state ID card, or losing their right to vote.
118. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 3 Representatives Anna Shea, Matthew Dearing, Max Kligman, Samantha Meszaros, Steve Kvasnicka, and Sarah Lahti’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
119. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
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CLASS 4 120. Class 4 is defined as: all enrolled students at accredited Wisconsin technical colleges who lack any form of accepted photo ID other than technical college ID cards. 121. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 4 Representatives Domonique Whitehurst, Edward Hogan, and Sarah Lahti’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 122. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
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CLASS 5 123. Class 5 is defined as: all eligible Wisconsin voters who lack accepted photo ID, must obtain one or more primary documents that DMV accepts to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card, including but not limited to certified and accurate copies of birth, marriage, and name change certificates or records or of the non-existence thereof, and will be required to pay one or more fees to obtain these documents. 124. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 5 Representatives Ruthelle Frank, Shirley Brown, Nancy Lea Wilde, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., Mariannis Ginorio, Frank Ybarra, Sam Bulmer, Carl Ellis, Pamela Dukes, and Dartric Davis’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 125. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, by requiring eligible Wisconsin voters to pay
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a fee in order to obtain a document DMV insists they produce to obtain a state ID card, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 6 126. Class 6 includes all veterans of a uniformed service of the United States who are eligible Wisconsin voters, lack accepted photo ID, and possess a Veterans Identification Card (“VIC”) issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. 127. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Plaintiffs and Class 6 Representatives Sam Bulmer, Carl Ellis, and Rickie Lamont Harmon’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 128. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to
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protect their interests. Additionally, by refusing to accept U.S. government-issued Veterans Identification Cards, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLASS 7 129. Class 7 is defined as: all eligible African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in the State of Wisconsin who lack accepted photo ID. 130. Subclass 7.1 is defined as: all eligible African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin who lack accepted photo ID. 131. This class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and questions of fact that are common to the class. Class 7 and Subclass 7.1 Representatives Shirley Brown, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., Mariannis Ginorio, Frank Ybarra, Barbara Oden, Carl Ellis, Rickie Lamont Harmon, Pamela Dukes, Dartric Davis, DeWayne Smith, and Domonique Whitehurst’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 132. Prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants;
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or (b) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Additionally, Defendants have subjected voters to a fundamentally unfair electoral system and therefore acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.
CLAIMS COUNT ONE: Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 1] 133. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 109 are hereby incorporated in Count One of the complaint as if set forth herein. 134. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It prohibits the imposition of severe burdens on the right to vote unless they are narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 135. Eligible Wisconsin voters in Class 1 lack one or more primary documents required to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card and are subjected to
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multiple legal and/or systemic practical barriers to obtaining the ID card under GAB’s implementation of the photo ID law and DMV’s restrictive regulatory scheme.
136. Since voters in this class are unable to obtain one or more of the necessary primary documents or are otherwise burdened by the legal and/or systemic practical barriers encountered in this difficult process, they cannot obtain a photo ID and therefore cannot vote in Wisconsin.
137. The burdens imposed on Class 1 members’ fundamental right to vote are severe and not narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest. By imposing a severe and undue burden on the right to vote, Defendants have violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT TWO: Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 2] 138. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-105 and 110-114 are hereby incorporated in Count Two of the complaint as if set forth herein. 139. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It prohibits the imposition of severe burdens on the right
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to vote unless they are narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
140. For the hundreds of thousands of eligible low-income and poor Wisconsin voters, paying the underlying, often multiple, fees and expenses, including transportation costs, to obtain a Wisconsin state ID card constitutes a burden on the right to vote, which is at a minimum substantial.
141. The burden imposed on these voters is severe and not narrowly tailored to advance any compelling governmental interest.
142. Accordingly, the photo ID law imposes an undue burden on members of Class 2 which is at a minimum substantial and, therefore, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to Class 2.
COUNT THREE: Violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 3]
143. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-105 and 115-119 are hereby incorporated in Count Three of the complaint as if set forth herein.
144. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
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President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”
145. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits states from conditioning the right to vote in federal elections on the payment of a tax or fee, or imposing on federal voters an additional condition—or material requirement—that would not apply if they paid such a tax or fee. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 538-42 (1965). Poll taxes on the right to vote in state elections are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966).
146. Wisconsin residents who possess and wish to retain an out-of-state driver’s license and who lack all the other accepted forms of photo ID will not be able to obtain free Wisconsin ID cards for voting purposes without surrendering their out-of-state driver’s licenses.
147. The compulsory surrender of an out-of-state driver’s license constitutes a material requirement imposed on an eligible voter who refuses to forfeit his/her right to vote without paying an unconstitutional poll tax.
148. Therefore, as applied to Class 3, the photo ID law violates the TwentyFourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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COUNT FOUR: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 4]
149. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-105 and 120-122 are hereby incorporated in Count Four of the complaint as if set forth herein.
150. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It forbids the imposition of severe burdens on the right to vote unless they are narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance, and requires that any state election law which imposes reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on the right to vote be justified by the state’s important regulatory interests. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
151. The GAB has construed the photo ID law to authorize the use of accredited technical college ID cards for voting purposes. However, the ultimate disposition of this rule has been thrown into considerable doubt for the reasons described herein. The administrative review process still threatens to result in that exclusion.
152. This differential treatment of student ID cards from accredited 2-year colleges and student ID cards from accredited technical colleges is wholly
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arbitrary, not narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest, and not even justified by a merely important regulatory interest.
153. Accordingly, since it lacks a rational basis, the exclusion of technical college ID cards is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT FIVE: Violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 5]
154. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-105 and 123-125 are hereby incorporated in Count Five of the complaint as if set forth herein.
155. The fee(s) required to obtain certified and accurate copies of primary documents DMV requires before issuing a state ID card, such as birth, marriage, or name change certificates or records or proof of the non-existence thereof, constitute(s) an unconstitutional poll tax for eligible Wisconsin voters in this class.
156. Accordingly, the photo ID law is unconstitutional as applied to members of Class 5.
COUNT SIX: Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Class 6]
157. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-105 and 126-128 are hereby incorporated in Count Six of the complaint as if set forth herein.
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158. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
159. Veterans Identification Cards (“VICs”) contain the name and photo of the veteran and are issued by a U.S. government agency.
160. The photo ID law does not permit the use of VICs to vote. 161. This differential treatment of VICs and other forms of accepted photo ID under the law bearing the voter’s legal name and a photograph, including other forms of photo ID issued by a federal agency, is wholly arbitrary and lacks a rational basis. 162. Accordingly, the exclusion of Veterans Identification Cards from the list of accepted photo IDs is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT SEVEN: Violation of Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
163. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-105 and 129-132 are hereby incorporated in Count Seven of the complaint as if set forth herein.
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164. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution . . . .”) (citing cases). “Uniform rules” and “specific standards” are necessary to guarantee equal treatment of voters. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106-07.
166. By vesting control over the process of obtaining Act 23’s accepted photo ID of last resort with the DMV Defendants, Defendants have forced voters to navigate the DMV’s complex bureaucratic rules and procedures, some of which are written, fixed, and readily accessible to voters, and some of which are unwritten, variable, and not readily accessible to voters.
167. The Wisconsin DMV, on the one hand, ostensibly applies a set of documentary proof requirements with clearly enumerated items that satisfy each of the requirements set forth in Wis. Admin. Code Trans § 102.15 and then, on the other hand, upon information and belief, arbitrarily offers certain ID card
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applicants the option to satisfy these proof requirements with alternative certifications and forms of documentary proof that have not been reduced to writing and publicly listed and/or advertised. To the extent these alternative means to satisfy the name and date of birth, citizenship, and/or other documentary proof requirements to obtain a state ID card are in fact being implemented, the determinations as to who may use these alternative procedures and whether to approve the applications are characterized by standard-less discretion and not governed by a set of definite and specific rules, standards, policies, or procedures.
168. Upon information and belief, DMV provides no meaningful notice of any alternative procedures that may exist, and DMV does not have any uniform standards, rules, or policies to guide the outcomes of any such procedures.
169. As a result of these statewide inconsistencies and ad hoc informal rulings on ID card applications, eligible Wisconsin voters are subjected to arbitrary and disparate treatment that differently values the votes of similarly situated voters in Wisconsin.
170. These inconsistent procedures may also have a disparate negative impact on minority voters in Milwaukee County and the State of Wisconsin.
171. By subjecting similarly situated eligible Wisconsin voters to arbitrary and disparate treatment, failing to set forth any definite and specific rules, standards, or procedures by which to constrain DMV employee discretion in
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determinations that directly affect the right to vote, and failing to provide adequate and uniform notice of rules, policies, practices, and standards affecting the process of obtaining a state ID card, Defendants have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT EIGHT: Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
172. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 105, as well as the allegations supporting Count Seven, are hereby incorporated in Count Eight of the complaint as if set forth herein.
173. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from “deprive[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where an electoral system is marked by fundamental unfairness. League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078-79 (1st Cir. 1978) (“[D]ue process is implicated where the entire election process including as part thereof the state’s administrative and judicial corrective process fails on its face to afford fundamental fairness.”); Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899-901 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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175. The photo ID law has forced DMV officials and employees to serve as gatekeepers to the ballot box. DMV has no prior experience handling the votes of eligible Wisconsin residents or even voter registration.
176. Because of the photo ID law, the Wisconsin DMV has, or should have, rapidly implemented procedures for and retrained its employees on the photo ID law.
177. Wisconsin DMV has failed to adequately implement a uniform, consistently applied scheme for providing free photo ID to voters. This failure directly affects the rights of eligible Wisconsin voters to receive the photo ID that state law mandates they have.
178. Wisconsin DMV has treated similarly situated voters in an arbitrary and disparate manner due to its failure to establish and implement uniform and definite rules, standards, and procedures to process voter ID card applications. DMV has also failed to provide meaningful and adequate notice of its requirements, rules, standards, and policies to Wisconsin voters.
179. Additionally, the photo ID law, as implemented by Defendants, compels eligible Wisconsin voters to interact with multiple other federal, state, and local agencies, which have also subjected similarly situated eligible Wisconsin voters to arbitrary and inconsistent treatment and the exercise of standard-less discretion.
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180. The GAB and DMV’s efforts in terms of public information and
education have been insufficient to meaningfully and adequately inform Wisconsin
voters about the radical and complex legal changes wrought by Act 23 in a timely
fashion.
181. Accordingly, Defendants have created an electoral system that is
fundamentally unfair and therefore violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
COUNT NINE: Vote Denial in Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 [Class 7]
182. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 105 and 129
through 132 are hereby incorporated in Count Nine of the complaint as if set forth
herein.
183. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. . . .
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
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42 U.S.C. § 1973. 184. African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin disproportionately lack accepted photo ID and disproportionately lack the primary documents DMV accepts as part of the application process for a state ID card for voting purposes, when compared to their white counterparts. Numerous minority voters are unable to obtain accepted photo ID and will be barred from voting.
185. Since minority voters will be disproportionately barred from voting under this strict photo ID requirement, the political processes in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, the State of Wisconsin are not equally open to participation by African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters, and they will therefore have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
186. Minority residents of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and in the State of Wisconsin have suffered the effects of discrimination in the areas of education, employment, housing, and health, which have hindered their ability to participate effectively in the political process. S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 28-29.
187. The photo ID law is a qualification to voting or a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting which is denying the right to vote to individual
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plaintiffs on account of race or color in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
COUNT TEN: Vote Dilution in Violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 [Class 7]
188. The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 105 and 129
through 132, as well as the allegations supporting Count Nine, are hereby
incorporated in Count Ten of the complaint as if set forth herein.
189. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. . . .
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973.
190. African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin,
disproportionately lack accepted photo ID and disproportionately lack the primary
documents DMV accepts as part of the application process for a state ID card for
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voting purposes, when compared to their white counterparts. As a result, these minority voters are less likely to be able to obtain accepted photo ID than their white counterparts and thus less likely to see their ballots counted.
191. The photo ID law is a qualification to voting or a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting which, based on the totality of the circumstances, will render elections in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and in the State of Wisconsin not equally open to participation by African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters, in that they will have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
192. These disparities dilute the voting strength of African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and the State of Wisconsin and thus impair their ability to elect representatives of their choice.
193. There is available an alternative election scheme that does not have a disproportionate negative impact on the opportunity of African-American and Hispanic/Latino voters in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, the State of Wisconsin to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice, when compared to other members of the electorate.
194. The photo ID law increases the probability that minority voters’ ballots will not be counted and thus dilutes African Americans’ and Latinos’ votes in
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Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and, upon information and belief, in the State of Wisconsin on account of race or color in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
195. Minority residents of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and in the State of Wisconsin have suffered the effects of discrimination in the areas of education, employment, housing, and health, which have hindered their ability to participate effectively in the political process. S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 28-29; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [minority] and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that: (i) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 1
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 1; (ii) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 2 under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
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Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 2; (iii) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 3 under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 3; (iv) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 4 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 4; (v) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 5 under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 5; (vi) The Court declare the photo ID law unconstitutional as applied to Class 6 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law as applied to members of Class 6; (vii) The Court declare the photo ID law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and enjoin the photo ID law; (viii) The Court declare the photo ID law violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoin the photo ID law;
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(ix) The Court declare the photo ID law violates Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973) as applied to Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin and the State of Wisconsin, and enjoin the enforcement of the
photo ID law in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and the State of
Wisconsin;
(x) Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees, reasonable expert fees,
and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 1973l(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d); and
(xi) Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of March, 2012,
/s Laurence J. Dupuis Laurence J. Dupuis Bar No.: 1029261 Karyn Rotker Bar No.: 1007719 American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin 207 E. Buffalo Street, Suite 325 Milwaukee, WI 53202-5774 Phone: (414) 272-4032 Fax: (414) 272-0182 ldupuis@aclu-wi.org krotker@aclu-wi.org
M. Laughlin McDonald Jon Sherman Nancy Abudu American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc. 230 Peachtree Street, Suite 1440
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Atlanta, GA 30303 Phone: (404) 523-2721 Fax: (404) 653-0331 lmcdonald@aclu.org jsherman@aclu.org nabudu@aclu.org
Karen E. Cunningham Heather Maria Johnson National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty 1411 K Street NW, Suite 1400 Washington, DC 20005 Phone: (202) 638-2535 Fax: (202) 628-2737 kcunningham@nlchp.org hjohnson@nlchp.org
Neil Steiner Diane Princ Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036-6797 Phone: (212) 698-3822 Fax: (212) 698-3599 neil.steiner@dechert.com diane.princ@dechert.com
Craig Falls Dechert LLP 1775 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-2401 Phone: (202) 261-3373 Fax: (202) 261-3333 craig.falls@dechert.com
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 11-CV-01128

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) OF WISCONSIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JUDGE DAVID G. DEININGER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 12-CV-00185

DECISION AND ORDER In this decision and order, I address the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal of my order of April 29, 2014, in which I permanently enjoined the defendants from conditioning a person’s access to a ballot on that person’s presenting a form of photo identification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) & Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1). The standard for granting a stay pending appeal mirrors that for granting a preliminary injunction. In re A & F Enterprises, Inc. II, 742 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2014). Stays, like preliminary injunctions, are necessary to mitigate the damage that can be done during the interim period before a legal issue is finally resolved on the merits. The goal is to minimize the costs of error. Id. To determine whether to grant a stay, I must consider the moving party's

likelihood of success on the merits, the irreparable harm that will result to each side if the stay is either granted or denied in error, and whether the public interest favors one side or the other. Id. As with a motion for a preliminary injunction, a “sliding scale” approach applies; the greater the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must weigh in its favor, and vice versa. Id. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
On appeal, the defendants argue that I misinterpreted the law applicable to the plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In general, the law applicable to such claims is unsettled, and thus I acknowledge that the defendants have some likelihood of success on the merits. However, having considered the specific arguments that the defendants raise in their motion for a stay, I conclude that their likelihood of success on the merits is low. I discuss these arguments below, as well as the defendants’ argument that the scope of the injunction is too broad.
1. Fourteenth Amendment In their motion for a stay pending appeal, the defendants initially argued that my disposition of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim is likely to be reversed because I made three errors: (1) deciding the claim when my disposition of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Voting Rights Act made it unnecessary to do so, Mot. to Stay at 7; (2) enjoining the law as to all voters when I found that the law placed an unjustified burden on only a subgroup of voters, id. at 8; and (3) giving insufficient weight to the state’s interest in preventing or deterring voter-impersonation fraud, id. at 9–10. In a recent letter, the defendants raise a fourth argument: that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Milwaukee Branch
2

of the NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, __ Wis. 2d __, indicates that “Act 23 is lawful.” Letter of Aug. 1, 2014, at 1. I address each argument in turn.
First, in my original order, I acknowledged that, given my resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Voting Rights Act, I could have declined to resolve the Fourteenth Amendment claim. Dec. & Order at 2–3. But as I explained, the two claims overlap substantially, in that many of the factual findings I made at the conclusion of a nearly twoweek trial were relevant to both claims, and therefore it would have been inefficient to resolve the claim under the Voting Rights Act but not the claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The defendants do not fully develop their argument that this approach constituted reversible error; instead, they merely assert in conclusory fashion that the decision to address the Fourteenth Amendment claim was error. Mot. to Stay at 7. Thus, I see no reason to think that the defendants are likely to succeed on this argument on appeal.
The defendants’ second argument is that I should not have enjoined the photo-ID requirement in its entirety because I found that many Wisconsin voters already have a qualifying ID and thus will not experience unjustified burdens. The defendants suggest that I should have fashioned some other remedy that was limited to the voters who will experience the unjustified burdens that I identified. Mot. to Stay at 8. But as I explained in my original order, there is no practicable way to remove the unjustified burdens on the voters who do not currently possess an ID without enjoining the photo ID requirement as to all voters. Dec. & Order at 38–39. Indeed, the defendants did not, in their post-trial brief, identify any practicable remedy short of enjoining Act 23 in its entirety, and they do
3

not, in their motion for a stay pending appeal, identify any such remedy. Thus, I conclude that the defendants are not likely to succeed on this argument.
The defendants’ third argument is that my “application of the Anderson/Burdick balancing test was incorrect”1 because I “gave insufficient weight to the legitimate and important state interests that the Supreme Court recognized in Crawford.”2 Mot. to Stay at 9. Specifically, the defendants contend that I gave insufficient weight to the state’s interest in preventing and deterring voter-impersonation fraud. They argue that Crawford establishes that a state has a “legitimate and important interest” in preventing and deterring voter-impersonation fraud even in the absence of evidence that such fraud has occurred. Mot. to Stay at 9. I agree that Crawford generally establishes that a state has a legitimate and important interest in preventing or deterring voter-impersonation fraud, even in the absence of evidence that such fraud has occurred. But Crawford does not hold that a court may not consider the evidence (or lack thereof) that such fraud has occurred when deciding how much weight to assign to that particular interest under the Anderson/Burdick balancing test. If the evidence shows that voter-impersonation fraud is prevalent, then the state’s interest in preventing and deterring such fraud may be “sufficiently weighty to justify” the burdens placed on the rights of individual voters. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)). But if the evidence shows that voterimpersonation fraud is rare or nonexistent, then the state’s interest is assigned less weight. In the present case, the evidence showed that virtually no voter-impersonation fraud occurs
1Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
2Crawford v. Marion County Elec. Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 4

in Wisconsin and that it is unlikely to become a problem in the foreseeable future. For these reasons, I determined that the state’s interest in preventing or deterring voterimpersonation fraud was insufficiently weighty to justify the burdens Act 23 placed on a substantial number of voters. The defendants have not shown that this application of the Anderson/Burdick balancing test was erroneous.
The defendants remaining argument concerning the Fourteenth Amendment claim is that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, establishes that Act 23 is lawful. In their letter to me, the defendants do not expand on this argument, but in their appellate filings, they argue that the state supreme court’s construction of an administrative regulation “will eliminate the potential financial burden that many voters who lack a birth certificate might experience when obtaining a free ID card from the DMV.” Consol. Reply Br. of Defendants-Appellants at 5. To explain the defendants’ argument, I must first briefly discuss the relevant part of NAACP v. Walker.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court began its discussion of the administrative regulation at issue here by noting that, at the state trial-court level, the plaintiffs provided evidence that they were required to make payments to government agencies to obtain certain primary documents, such as birth certificates, that the division of motor vehicles (“DMV”) requires them to produce in order to obtain free state ID cards for voting. NAACP, 2014 WI 98, ¶¶ 50 & 52, __ Wis. 2d __. The court then determined that the DMV’s requiring a person to produce a document that he or she cannot obtain without making a payment to a government agency resulted in a severe burden on the right to vote. Id. ¶¶ 60–62. In an effort to eliminate this severe burden, the court construed a regulation of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation that granted the administrator of the DMV discretion to issue
5

state ID cards to persons who could not produce a birth certificate or other specifically
identified document as proof of name and date of birth. Id. ¶¶ 66–71. That regulation
states that if a person is “unable” to provide a birth certificate or other specifically identified
document, and such documents are “unavailable” to the person, the person may make a
written petition to the administrator of the DMV for an exception to the requirement to
produce a birth certificate or similar document. Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(b) & (c).3 Under the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s construction of this regulation, a person is
“unable” to provide a birth certificate or similar document, and such documents are
“unavailable” to the person, “so long as [the person] does not have the documents and
would be required to pay a government agency to obtain them.” NAACP, 2014 WI 98,
¶ 69.
3The full text of § Trans 102.15(3)(b) & (c) provides as follows:
(b) If a person is unable to provide documentation under [§ Trans 102.15(3)(a)], and the documents are unavailable to the person, the person may make a written petition to the administrator of the division of motor vehicles for an exception to the requirements of par. (a). The application shall include supporting documentation required by sub. (4) and:
1. A certification of the person’s name, date of birth and current residence street address on the department’s form;
2. An explanation of the circumstances by which the person is unable to provide any of the documents described in par. (a); and
3. Whatever documentation is available which states the person’s name and date of birth.
(c) The administrator may delegate to the administrator’s subordinates the authority to accept or reject such extraordinary proof of name and date of birth.
6

Under the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s construction of this regulation, then, a person is entitled to petition for an exception to the birth-certificate requirement if the person cannot obtain a birth certificate without paying a fee to a government agency. But this does not mean that the person will be able to obtain a free state ID for voting without producing a birth certificate. This is so because, under the regulation at issue, a person must still provide “[w]hatever documentation is available which states the person’s name and date of birth,” Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.15(3)(b)3., and then the administrator, in his or her discretion, may accept or reject “such extraordinary proof of name and date of birth,” id. § Trans 102.15(3)(c). There is no guidance in the regulation that indicates what kind of documentation might constitute “extraordinary proof of name and date of birth” or what factors the administrator should consider when exercising his or her discretion to determine whether the documentation the person has produced constitutes extraordinary proof. In NAACP, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not provide any guidance to the administrator concerning the meaning of “extraordinary proof” or set forth any standard that might guide the exercise of the administrator’s discretion. Instead, the court offered this cryptic instruction: “the administrator, or his or her designee, shall exercise his or her discretion in a constitutionally sufficient manner.” 2014 WI 98, ¶ 70.
Another problem is that it is not clear how members of the public who need to obtain a free state ID will learn that the DMV now has discretion to issue IDs to persons who cannot obtain birth certificates without paying fees to government agencies. At the trial in this case, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the DMV does not publicize its exception procedure, which involves using Form MV3002, because the DMV wants to minimize exceptions. Dec. & Order at 32–33 n. 17. In light of this evidence, I concluded that a
7

person who might need an exception is more likely to give up trying to get an ID than to be granted an exception. Id. at 32–36 & n.17. Nothing in the supreme court’s decision requires the DMV to do a better job of informing the public that the MV3002 procedure exists.
Thus, from the mere fact that a person may petition for an exception to the birthcertificate requirement if the person cannot obtain a birth certificate without paying a fee to a government agency, it does not follow that the person will actually obtain a free ID card without producing a birth certificate, and so the defendants have not shown that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s construction of § Trans 102.15(3)(b) and (c) “will eliminate the potential financial burden that many voters who lack a birth certificate might experience when obtaining a free ID card from the DMV.” Consol. Reply Br. of Defendants-Appellants at 5. In any event, having to pay a fee to obtain a birth certificate is only one of many burdens that a person who needs to obtain an ID for voting purposes might experience. See Dec. & Order at 29–36. So even if I assumed that the supreme court’s construction of § Trans 102.15(3)(b) and (c) eliminates the burden of having to pay a fee to obtain a birth certificate or similar document, I could not conclude that the burdens Act 23 places on the right to vote have been lessened to such a degree that the state’s interests are now sufficient to justify them. Accordingly, the state supreme court’s decision does not significantly increase the defendants’ likelihood of success on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
2. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act The defendants argue that my disposition of the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim is likely to be reversed for two reasons: (1) I incorrectly determined that the LULAC plaintiffs have
8

“statutory standing,” and (2) my interpretation of how Section 2 applies in a “vote denial” case was erroneous. I have already addressed the statutory-standing argument twice and will not discuss it further, except to note that even if the defendants prevail on this argument on appeal, they will not succeed in reversing my disposition of the Section 2 claim, as the Frank plaintiffs unquestionably have statutory standing.4
With respect to my interpretation of Section 2, the defendants argue that I am likely to be reversed because my interpretation “would potentially invalidate other laws not reasonably subject to challenge, such as voter registration laws.” Mot. to Stay at 11. The defendants argue that my interpretation has the potential to invalidate voting practices that are unquestionably legitimate (or, in their words, “not reasonably subject to challenge”) if they have disproportionate impacts on the poor, as a greater percentage of minorities than whites are poor, and this is due to the history of discrimination against minorities. The suggestion is that my interpretation will lead to an absurd result by invalidating laws that Congress, in passing Section 2, could not have intended to invalidate. But what unquestionably legitimate voting practice is likely to have a disproportionate impact on the poor? In their motion to stay, the defendants point to voter registration, but they do not explain how voter registration is likely to have a disproportionate impact on the poor. In their appellate filings, the defendants point to “all existing voting practices that require inperson voting” by giving the following example:
4The defendants suggest that if it is determined on appeal that the LULAC plaintiffs lack statutory standing, then any evidence presented by the LULAC plaintiffs will need to be “subtracted” from the evidence at trial. Mot. to Stay at 16. However, at trial, the defendants stipulated that any evidence offered by the LULAC plaintiffs would also be considered evidence offered by the Frank plaintiffs, and vice versa. Tr. at 7.
9

[A]ssume that a plaintiff could prove that minority voters are less likely to own automobiles than white voters. Further assume that this is because minorities are more likely to be poor and that the higher rate of poverty among minorities is the result of historical or current societal discrimination. Under the district court’s analysis, all existing voting practices that require inperson voting may constitute a violation of Section 2 because in-person voting is more difficult without an automobile. Consol. Reply Br. at 18. Here, however, the final premise of the defendants argument—that in-person voting is more difficult without an automobile—is likely false. Based on the evidence presented at trial, I can conclude that lower-income minorities, especially those who do not own automobiles, are likely to live in urban areas, where it is easier to walk to a polling place than to drive. So it is very difficult to envision a plaintiff using disparities in rates of automobile ownership as a basis for challenging an existing voting practice that requires a person’s presence at the polls. In any event, even if it could be shown that an unquestionably legitimate voting practice would have a disproportionate impact on the poor, and therefore on minorities, that practice would not necessarily be invalidated under my interpretation of Section 2. As I noted in my original decision, if the voting practice was clearly necessary to protect an important state interest—an interest that is not “tenuous”—that voting practice could be sustained even if it has a disproportionate impact on minorities. Dec. & Order at 67–68. Any voting practice that could be described as “unquestionably legitimate” or “not reasonably subject to challenge” will almost certainly be clearly necessary to protect an important state interest. Consequently, I conclude that there is no merit to the defendants’ argument that my interpretation of Section 2 will lead to results that Congress did not intend.
10

The defendants also argue that it was error for me to cite Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), in the course of interpreting Section 2. The defendants make the obvious point that a dissent has no precedential value. But I did not cite Justice Scalia’s dissent for its precedential value. I cited it because it illuminates the plain meaning of Section 2: it shows that I am not the only jurist to have read the text of Section 2 and come to the conclusion that it means that a state may not adopt a voting practice that makes it more difficult for minorities to vote than whites. The defendants also note that Justice Scalia’s dissent was part of a “vote dilution” case, not a vote-denial case. But even though that is true, it does not alter the fact that the example Justice Scalia gave—a county’s making it more difficult for Blacks to register to vote than whites—involved vote denial rather than vote dilution. Indeed, Justice Scalia himself described his example as involving a “nondilution § 2 violation[].” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 408 (emphasis in original). So the dissent is instructive on the meaning of Section 2 as applied to a vote-denial claim.
The defendants also argue that I should have upheld Act 23 under Section 2 because Act 23 does not cause any of the racial disparities I identified, such as the disparity in poverty rates for whites and minorities and the resulting disparity in IDpossession rates. But although Act 23 does not cause these disparities, it clearly interacts with them in a way that makes it harder for minorities to vote. And it is this interaction with the effects of discrimination that produces a discriminatory result.5 Thornburg v. Gingles,
5Some of the classic practices used to prevent minorities from voting—literacy tests and poll taxes—did not, by themselves, cause the underlying disparities that allowed the practices to effectively suppress minority voting. Literacy tests did not cause illiteracy; they exploited the fact that, because of the effects of discrimination, Blacks were less likely to
11

478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice,
or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” (Emphasis added)).6 The Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the idea that a voting
practice that produces a disproportionate racial impact may survive scrutiny under
Section 2 so long as the voting practice, by itself, is not responsible for any underlying
racial disparities. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016–20 (9th Cir. 2003).
As the court stated, “demanding ‘by itself’ causation would defeat the interactive and
contextual totality of the circumstances analysis repeatedly applied by [other] circuits in
Section 2 cases, as they also require a broad, functionally-focused review of the evidence
to determine whether a challenged voting practice interacts with surrounding racial
discrimination in a meaningful way or whether the practice's disparate impact ‘is better
explained by other factors independent of race.’” Id. at 1018 (quoting Smith v. Salt River
Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1997)). The court
continued:
Certainly, plaintiffs must prove that the challenged voter qualification denies or abridges their right to vote on account of race, but the 1982 Amendments and subsequent case law make clear that factors outside the election system can contribute to a particular voting practice's disparate impact when those
be able to read than whites. Likewise, poll taxes did not cause poverty; they exploited the fact that, because of the effects of discrimination, Blacks were more likely to be poor than whites.
6Although Thornburg was a vote-dilution case, not a vote-denial case, the Court did not limit the language I have quoted to vote-dilution cases. Rather, the Court made clear that Section 2 applies to vote-denial cases as well as vote-dilution cases, id. at 478 U.S. at 45 n.10, and the quoted language identifies “the essence of a Section 2 claim,” not the essence of a vote-dilution claim.
12

factors involve race discrimination. Therefore, under Salt River and consistent with both Congressional intent and well-established judicial precedent, a causal connection may be shown where the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances. Id. at 1019 (emphasis added).7 In other words, the question in a Section 2 case is whether
the challenged practice magnifies or exacerbates an existing racial disparity caused by
discrimination in other areas, thereby importing the effects of that discrimination into the
electoral process. In the present case, the evidence showed that discrimination in areas
such as employment, housing, and education caused higher poverty rates for minorities
than for whites, with the result that a greater percentage of the minority population lacks
a photo ID and will have more difficulty obtaining an ID. Act 23 thus imports the effects of
discrimination in these areas into the electoral process and produces a discriminatory
result.
The defendants also contend that my interpretation of Section 2 is incorrect because
my interpretation “focuses not on causation but on mere likelihood.” Mot. to Stay at 12.
This is in reference to the following language in my opinion: “Section 2 protects against a
voting practice that creates a barrier to voting that is more likely to appear in the path of a
voter if that voter is a member of a minority group than if he or she is not.” Dec. & Order
at 52. The defendants argue that my interpretation focuses on whether a voting practice
“could potentially create more difficulty for minorities to vote than non-minorities,” rather
7In Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010), the en banc court found that the voting practice at issue in the Farrakhan case I cited in the text—a felon disenfranchisement law—did not violate Section 2. However, the court did not disturb the holding that a Section 2 analysis requires consideration of factors external to the challenged voting mechanism itself. See 623 F.3d at 995 (Thomas, J., concurring).
13

than on whether it actually creates more difficulty for minorities to vote than non-minorities. Mot. to Stay at 13 (emphasis in original). This is wrong. Under my interpretation, a voting practice violates Section 2 only when it actually creates more difficulty for minorities to vote. And I found that Act 23 actually creates more difficulty for minorities to vote than non-minorities, in that Act 23 will prevent or deter a greater percentage of minorities from voting than whites. Dec. & Order at 61–63. The phrase “more likely than whites” (and related phrases) refers to the fact that although not every minority will be deterred or prevented from voting, a greater percentage of minorities will be deterred or prevented from voting than whites. Perhaps what the defendants mean to argue is that a voting practice does not violate Section 2 unless it prevents or deters every member of a racial group from voting. But there is no support for this narrow view of Section 2. The text states that a violation of Section 2 occurs when the political process is not “equally open to participation” by members of a minority group in that its members “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). If a voting practice will prevent or deter a greater percentage of minorities from voting than whites, the political process is not “equally open to participation” by minorities, in that they will not have the same opportunity as whites to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Finally, the defendants argue that because my conclusion that Act 23 violates Section 2 depends on the premise that a greater percentage of minorities than whites are poor, I have turned income or wealth into a protected class. That is incorrect. I concluded that Act 23 produces a discriminatory result because it interacts with the effects of racial discrimination, including higher poverty rates for minorities than for whites. If the reason
14

a greater percentage of minorities than whites in Wisconsin are poor were unrelated to racial discrimination, then showing that minorities are more likely than whites to be poor would not have been sufficient to show that Act 23 produces a discriminatory result. Thus, the root cause of Act 23's disproportionate impact is discrimination on account of race, not income or wealth.
3. Scope of Injunction The defendants’ final argument is that I issued a permanent injunction that is impermissibly broad, in that I enjoined the defendants from enforcing any requirement to produce a photo ID to gain access to a ballot, not simply the photo-ID requirement embodied in Act 23. Importantly, however, I stated that if the State of Wisconsin enacted a new photo-ID law, the defendants could file a motion for relief from the permanent injunction, and that I would schedule expedited proceedings on any such motion, if necessary. Dec. & Order at 69. The defendants contend that I would have no jurisdiction to hear such a motion while an appeal from the order granting the original injunction was pending, because ordinarily a district court loses jurisdiction over a case between the time a notice of appeal is filed and the time the mandate issues. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) states that while an appeal from an order granting an injunction is pending, the district court may modify the injunction. Moreover, to the extent there were any doubt over whether I would have jurisdiction to consider a motion to modify the injunction, the procedure outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1 would apply. These rules provide that if a timely motion is made in the district court for relief that the district court lacks authority to grant because an appeal is pending, the district court may inform the court of appeals that it would grant the
15

motion (or that the motion raises a substantial issue), and then the court of appeals may remand the case to the district court for a ruling on the motion. Thus, if the State of Wisconsin enacts a new photo-ID law, the defendants are not precluded from seeking relief from the present injunction.
With respect to the question of whether I erred in enjoining the defendants from enforcing any photo-ID requirement, not just Act 23, I first note that even if this were error, it would not be grounds for staying my order pending appeal. If the court of appeals concludes that the injunction is impermissibly broad, the court will not reverse my order in its entirety. Rather, the court will vacate the injunction and remand with instructions to enter an injunction limited to Act 23. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that court of appeals will “restrict the breadth” of an overbroad injunction). Thus, the argument that the injunction is too broad does not support the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal. At best, it is an argument that supports modifying the injunction pending appeal, which the defendants have not asked me to do.
In any event, the defendants have not shown that I erred in enjoining them from enforcing any photo-ID requirement, not just Act 23. An injunction “must . . . be broad enough to be effective, and the appropriate scope of the injunction is left to the district court's sound discretion.” Russian Media Group. LLC v. Cable America, Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 2010). To make an injunction effective, a district court may enjoin “similar conduct reasonably related to” the violation established in the litigation. EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 2013). In the present case, I concluded that to render the injunction effective, it was necessary to enjoin similar conduct reasonably related to the enforcement of Act 23. While the present case was under consideration, the
16

Wisconsin Assembly adopted an amendment to Act 23, and the state’s governor announced that he would call a special session of the legislature to modify Act 23 in the event that the courts did not uphold it. Now, it is possible that the state could make changes to Act 23 that result in its surviving scrutiny under the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. However, given the evidence presented during the trial, it seemed doubtful that the kind of changes being discussed at the time would have had that result. Thus, to prevent the defendants from circumventing the injunction by enforcing a new photo-ID requirement that continued to place unjustified burdens on a substantial number of voters and that produced a discriminatory result, I enjoined the defendants from enforcing any photo-ID requirement, not just Act 23 as it then existed, until such time as it could be determined whether the new law removed the unjustified burdens and discriminatory result. In my discretion, I determined that an injunction of this breadth was necessary to render the relief afforded to the plaintiffs effective.
The defendants contend that, although a district court has authority to enjoin a defendant from engaging in conduct that is similar to the conduct found to be unlawful in the litigation, I abused my discretion by imposing a remedy that could be likened to the preclearance requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which the Supreme Court addressed in Shelby County v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). But the preclearance requirement of Section 5 prevents a covered jurisdiction from enforcing any changes to state election law until they have been precleared by the federal government. Id. at 2624. The injunction I issued allows the State of Wisconsin to enforce any changes to its election law that it wants, so long as the law at issue does not require a person to present a photo ID as a condition to receiving a ballot. Nothing in Shelby County suggests
17

that once a specific voting practice has been shown to be unlawful under Section 2, a court may not enjoin a state from adopting a similar voting practice without first seeking relief from the injunction. Thus, the defendants’ reliance on Shelby County is misplaced. B. Irreparable Harm and the Public Interest
The other factors that I must consider when deciding whether to stay an injunction pending appeal are the irreparable harm that will result to each side if the stay is either granted or denied in error, and whether the public interest favors one side or the other. The irreparable harm that will result to the defendants if the stay is denied in error is tied to the interests the defendants put forward to justify Act 23 in the first place: preventing inperson voter-impersonation fraud and promoting public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. But as I found in deciding this case on the merits, there is virtually no in-person voter-impersonation fraud in Wisconsin, and there is no evidence that laws such as Act 23 promote public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. Thus, if a stay pending appeal is denied in error, the defendants would suffer very little irreparable harm—almost certainly no in-person voter-impersonation fraud will have occurred during the time that the appeal was pending, and the public’s confidence in the integrity of the electoral process will not have declined.
On the other side of the balance, the irreparable harm that the plaintiffs would suffer if a stay were granted in error would be significant. To begin with, some of the named individual plaintiffs, including Shirley Brown and Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., would be unable to vote during any election that occurred while the stay was in effect, as they lack a photo ID and have been unable to obtain a photo ID. Similarly, many members and individuals represented by the organizational plaintiffs in the LULAC case would be prevented or
18

deterred from voting because of Act 23. Finally, under the public-interest factor, I take into account the fact that a large number of individuals who are not parties to this case and who might not be represented by any of the LULAC organizations would also be prevented or deterred from voting if Act 23 were reinstated pending appeal.
In short, in balancing the potential for irreparable harm to each party, I reiterate my finding that “it is absolutely clear that Act 23 will prevent more legitimate votes from being cast than fraudulent votes.” Dec. & Order at 38. Thus, the balance of the harms weighs against a stay pending appeal. C. Sliding Scale
Having found that the defendants’ likelihood of success on appeal is low, that the defendants would suffer very little irreparable harm if a stay pending appeal were denied in error, and that the plaintiffs and members of the public would suffer significant irreparable harm if a stay pending appeal were granted in error, I conclude that, under the sliding-scale approach, I should not stay the permanent injunction pending appeal.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 13th day of August 2014.
s/ Lynn Adelman _______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
19

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action no. 2:11-cv-01128(LA)

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT Plaintiffs bring this supplemental complaint to allege the following: 1. Since the filing of the original and First Amended Complaint and the prior Supplemental Complaint, Andrew Voegele, who lacks accepted photo ID for voting, have been harmed by Wisconsin’s voter ID law. 2. Andrew Voegele is an eligible Wisconsin voter who will be disenfranchised in the November 2016 general elections because of Wisconsin’s voter ID law unless this Court immediately intervenes. Voegele moved to Prescott, Wisconsin from Minnesota in August 2016 and did not learn about Wisconsin’s voter ID law until he arrived at the polls on November 8, 2016. Because he does not have an acceptable photo ID for voting, he was compelled to cast a provisional ballot, which will not be counted unless he presents acceptable photo ID by Friday. He has a Minnesota driver’s license, which he does not want to surrender in exchange for a Wisconsin ID, because he regularly commutes to a suburb of Minneapolis for work as a school teacher and he may wish to return to Minneapolis someday in the future. He also does not want to spend $34 for a

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 11/10/16 Page 1 of 2 Document 326

Wisconsin driver’s license just to vote. Voegele will be disenfranchised simply because

Wisconsin stubbornly refuses to issue eligible Wisconsin voters a free ID for voting

unless they surrender their out-of-state driver’s license, see Wis. Stat. § 343.50(1)(b);

Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 102.14(2), even though driving has nothing to do with voting.

Dated this 10th day of November 2016,

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sean J. Young

KARYN L. ROTKER State Bar No. 1007719 LAURENCE J. DUPUIS State Bar No. 1029261 American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation 207 East Buffalo Street, Suite 325 Milwaukee, WI 53202 (414) 272-4032 krotker@aclu-wi.org ldupuis@aclu-wi.org

SEAN J. YOUNG DALE E. HO SOPHIA LIN LAKIN American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc. 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 (212) 549-2693 syoung@aclu.org dale.ho@aclu.org slakin@aclu.org

NEIL A. STEINER Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 (212) 698-3822 neil.steiner@dechert.com
CRAIG G. FALLS Dechert LLP 1900 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 261-3373 craig.falls@dechert.com
ANGELA M. LIU Dechert LLP 35 West Wacker Drive, Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 646-5816 angela.liu@dechert.com

LAUGHLIN MCDONALD American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc. 230 Peachtree Street, Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 523-2721 lmcdonald@aclu.org
TRISTIA BAUMAN National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty 2000 M Street NW, Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 638-2535 tbauman@nlchp.org

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 11/10/16 Page 2 of 2 Document 326

 
 Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059" RUTHELLE"FRANK,"et#al.,"
v."

Plaintiffs+Appellees,"

SCOTT"WALKER,"Governor"of"Wisconsin,#et#al.," Defendants+Appellants."
____________________"
LEAGUE" OF" UNITED" LATIN" AMERICAN" CITIZENS" (LULAC)" OF" WISCONSIN,#et#al.,"
Plaintiffs+Appellees,"
v."

DAVID" G." DEININGER," Member," Government" Accountability" Board,#et#al.,"
Defendants+Appellants."
____________________"

Appeals"from"the"United"States"District"Court" for"the"Eastern"District"of"Wisconsin."
Nos."11)CV)01128"&"12)CV)00185"—"Lynn$Adelman,#Judge."
____________________"

ARGUED"SEPTEMBER"12,"2014"—"DECIDED"OCTOBER"6,"2014" ____________________"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

2"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

Before"EASTERBROOK,"SYKES,"and"TINDER,#Circuit#Judges."
EASTERBROOK,# Circuit# Judge." Since" 2005" Indiana" has" re) quired" voters" to" present" photographic" identification" at" the" polls."The"Supreme"Court"held"that"this"statute"is"compatible" with" the" Constitution.# Crawford# v.# Marion# County# Election# Board," 553" U.S." 181" (2008)." In" May" 2011" Wisconsin" enacted" a" similar" statute," 2011" Wis." Act" 23." A" district" court" held" that" Act" 23" is" unconstitutional" and" enjoined" its" implementation." Frank# v.# Walker," 2014" U.S." Dist." LEXIS" 59344" (E.D." Wis." Apr." 29,"2014),"stay"denied,"2014"U.S."Dist."LEXIS"111811"(E.D."Wis." Aug." 13," 2014)." After" receiving" briefs" and" argument," we" stayed"that"injunction."Order"issued"Sept."12,"2014;"reconsid) eration"denied"Sept."26,"2014;"opinions"issued"Sept."30,"2014." We" now" reverse" the" injunction," because" the" district" court’s" findings"do"not"justify"an"outcome"different"from#Crawford."
The" Justices" observed" that" a" commission" chaired" by" for) mer"President"Carter"had"recommended"the"use"of"photo"ID" to"verify"a"person’s"entitlement"to"vote."Commission"on"Fed) eral" Election" Reform," Building# Confidence# in# U.S.# Elections" 18" (2002)." The" Court" added" that" the" Help" America" Vote" Act" of" 2002"(HAVA)"requires"states"to"verify"a"person’s"eligibility"to" vote,"using"photo"ID,"portions"of"Social"Security"numbers,"or" unique" state)assigned" identifiers." 52" U.S.C." §21083(a)(5)(A)," formerly" 42" U.S.C." §15483(a)(5)(A)." Many" people" register" to" vote" when" they" get" drivers’" licenses" (National" Voter" Regis) tration" Act" of" 1993," 52" U.S.C." §20504," formerly" 42" U.S.C." §1973gg–3)," which" links" registration" and" photo" ID" from" the" outset." The" Justices" concluded" that" both" the" prevention" of" voter"impersonation"on"election"day"and"the"preservation"of" public"confidence"in"the"integrity"of"elections"justify"a"photo" ID" requirement," even" though" persons" who" do" not" already"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

3"

have" government)issued" photo" IDs" must" spend" time" to" ac) quire" necessary" documents" (such" as" birth" certificates)" and" stand"in"line"at"a"public"agency"to"get"one."“For"most"voters" who" need" them," the" inconvenience" of" making" a" trip" to" the" [department" of" motor" vehicles]," gathering" the" required" doc) uments,"and"posing"for"a"photograph"surely"does"not"qualify" as" a" substantial" burden" on" the" right" to" vote," or" even" repre) sent"a"significant"increase"over"the"usual"burdens"of"voting.”" 553" U.S." at" 198." These" observations" hold" for" Wisconsin" as" well"as"for"Indiana."
Wisconsin’s" law" differs" from" Indiana’s," but" not" in" ways" that"matter"under"the"analysis"in#Crawford."One"difference"is" that"Wisconsin"requires"photo"ID"for"absentee"voting"as"well" as"in)person"voting;"a"person"casting"an"absentee"ballot"must" submit" a" photocopy" of" an" acceptable" ID." Another" difference" is"that"when"a"person"who"appears"to"vote"in"person"lacks"a" photo"ID"but"says"that"he"has"one,"and"therefore"casts"a"pro) visional" ballot," the" state" will" count" that" ballot" if" the" voter" produces" the" photo" ID" by" the" next" Friday;" in" Indiana" the" voter"signs"an"affidavit"of"eligibility"in"one"of"the"state’s"cir) cuit" courts" (which" usually" means" travel" to" the" county" seat)" within"10"days."Offices"of"the"Department"of"Motor"Vehicles" in" Wisconsin" (where" most" people" get" government)issued" photo"IDs)"are"open"shorter"hours"than"those"in"Indiana,"but" more" than" three" years" have" passed" since" Act" 23’s" adoption," which" makes" it" difficult" to" conclude" that" people" who" want" photo" ID" have" been" unable" to" find" an" open" office" in" all" that" time;"no"one"thinks"that"people"who"want"drivers’"licenses"in" Wisconsin" are" unable" to" get" them" because" of" limited" office" hours." Wisconsin’s" list" of" acceptable" documents" (drivers’" li) censes," Wisconsin" state" ID" cards," passports," military" ID" of" persons"in"active"service,"recent"naturalization"papers,"photo"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

4"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

ID" issued" by" a" recognized" Indian" tribe," or" signed" photo" ID" issued"by"a"college"or"university)"omits"some"documents"that" Indiana"accepts"(see"553"U.S."at"198"n.16)"and"includes"some" that" Indiana" omits." There" are" other" differences" in" detail," but" none" establishes" that" the" burden" of" voting" in" Wisconsin" is" significantly"different"from"the"burden"in"Indiana."
The" district" court" concluded" that# Crawford" is" not" control) ling" for" three" principal" reasons." First," the" judge" estimated" that" 300,000" registered" voters" in" Wisconsin" lack" a" photo" ID" that" the" state" will" accept" for" voting." That" is" approximately" 9%" of" the" state’s" 3,395,688" registered" voters." The" district" judge" in" Crawford," by" contrast," estimated" that" only" 43,000" persons"eligible"to"vote"lacked"an"acceptable"photo"ID."458"F." Supp." 2d" 775," 807" (S.D." Ind." 2006)." Second," the" judge" found" that" voter)impersonation" fraud" (a" ringer" pretending" to" be" a" registered"voter)"happens"so"rarely"in"Wisconsin"that"the"de) sire" to" reduce" its" occurrence" cannot" justify" any" significant" burden"on"voters."Third,"the"judge"found"that"white"persons" who" are" eligible" to" vote" are" more" likely" than" others" to" have" in"their"possession"either"an"acceptable"photo"ID"or"the"doc) uments"(such"as"copies"of"birth"certificates)"that"make"it"sim) ple" to" get" an" acceptable" photo" ID." The" judge" found" that" in" Milwaukee"County"(which"the"judge"took"as"a"proxy"for"the" whole"state)"97.6%"of"white"eligible"voters"have"a"qualifying" photo"ID"or"the"documents"they"need"to"get"one."That"figure" is" 95.5%" for" black" eligible" voters" and" 94.1%" for" Latino" eligi) ble" voters." The" judge" concluded" from" the" first" two" findings" that"Act"23"violates"the"Constitution"and"from"the"third"that" it"violates"the"Voting"Rights"Act."The"judge"made"many"oth) er"findings,"but"these"are"the"most"important"ones."

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

5"

Before" we" address" the" significance" of" the" findings" the" judge"made,"we"mention"a"few"things"that"the"judge"did#not" find."First,"the"judge"did"not"find"that"substantial"numbers"of" persons"eligible"to"vote"have"tried"to"get"a"photo"ID"but"been" unable" to" do" so." Eight" people" testified" that" they" had" been" frustrated"when"trying"to"get"photo"IDs."Six"of"the"eight"testi) fied" that" the" state" would" not" issue" photo" IDs" because" they" lack" birth" certificates," but" they" did" not" testify" that" they" had" tried"to"get"them,"let"alone"that"they"had"tried"but"failed."On) ly"two"testified"that"distance"or"poverty"hindered"them"when" trying"to"obtain"birth"certificates"or"correct"records"to"remove" an"error"from"a"birth"certificate."
Nor" did" the" judge" find" that" the" situation" of" these" eight" differed" from" the" situation" of" many" persons" in" Indiana." The" record"in"Crawford"contains"evidence"about"the"same"kind"of" of"frustration,"encountered"by"persons"born"out"of"state,"who" are" elderly" and" may" have" forgotten" their" birthplaces" and" birthdates" (if" their" parents" ever" told" them)," who" are" unedu) cated" (and" thus" may" not" grasp" how" to" get" documents" from" public" agencies)," or" who" are" poor" (and" so" may" have" trouble" getting" to" a" public" agency," or" paying" fees" for" copies" of" doc) uments)." The" district" judge" here" made" extensive" findings" demonstrating"that"the"poor"are"less"likely"to"have"photo"IDs" than" persons" of" average" income." Yet" the" district" judge" in# Crawford"also"discussed"these"problems;"so"did"the"Supreme" Court," which" deemed" them" an" inadequate" basis" for" holding" Indiana’s"law"unconstitutional."553"U.S."at"199–203."
The" Court" reached" that" conclusion" even" though" Indiana" charged"for"copies"of"birth"certificates—as"did"Wisconsin,"at" the" time" of" trial." Between" the" trial" and" the" argument" of" this" appeal," however," the" Supreme" Court" of" Wisconsin" directed"

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Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

state"officials"to"issue"photo"IDs"without"requiring"applicants" to" present" any" document" that" must" be" paid" for." Milwaukee# Branch#of#NAACP#v.#Walker,"2014"WI"98"¶¶"66–70."Moreover," Wisconsin" recently" issued" regulations" requiring" officials" to" get" birth" certificates" (or" other" qualifying" documents)" them) selves" for" persons" who" ask" for" that" accommodation" on" the" basis" of" hardship." Emergency" Rule" 14," Wis." Admin." Reg." 704b"(August"31,"2014)."So"at"the"time"of"trial"it"was"no"hard) er" to" get" supporting" documents" in" Wisconsin" than" in" Indi) ana,"and"today"it"is"easier"in"Wisconsin"than"in"Indiana.1"
Second," the" judge" did" not" make" findings" about" what" happened"to"voter"turnout"in"Wisconsin"during"the"February" 2012" primary," when" Act" 23" was" enforced" (before" two" state" judges" enjoined" it)." Did" the" requirement" of" photo" ID" reduce" the" number" of" voters" below" what" otherwise" would" have" been" expected?" Did" that" effect" differ" by" race" or" ethnicity?" The"record"does"not"tell"us."This"suit,"like"Crawford,"therefore" is"a"challenge"to"Act"23"as"written"(“on"its"face”),"rather"than" to"its"effects"(“as"applied”)."
The" record" also" does" not" reveal" what" has" happened" to" voter"turnout"in"the"other"states"(more"than"a"dozen)"that"re) quire"photo"IDs"for"voting."If"as"plaintiffs"contend"a"photo"ID" requirement" especially" reduces" turnout" by" minority" groups," students,"and"elderly"voters,"it"should"be"possible"to"demon)

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""
1"Milwaukee#Branch#of#NAACP"and"the"regulations"leave"much"to"the" discretion" of" the" employees" at" the" Department" of" Motor" Vehicles" who" decide" whether" a" given" person" has" an" adequate" claim" for" assistance" or" dispensing" with" the" need" for" a" birth" certificate." Whether" that" discretion" will"be"properly"exercised"is"not"part"of"the"current"record,"however,"and" could"be"the"subject"of"a"separate"suit"if"a"problem"can"be"demonstrated."

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strate"that"effect."Actual"results"are"more"significant"than"lit) igants’"predictions."But"no"such"evidence"has"been"offered."
The" lack" of" evidence" about" what" has" happened" in" other" states" (or" even" in" Wisconsin" itself" in" 2012)" means" that" this" case" is" in" the" same" posture" as" Indiana’s:" the" parties" and" the" district"court"have"tried"to"make"predictions"about"the"effects" of" requiring" photo" ID," but" the" predictions" cannot" be" com) pared"with"results."
Plaintiffs" want" us" to" treat" Crawford" as" a" case" in" which" there"was"no"record,"so"that"the"Supreme"Court"had"no"facts" to" go" on." That’s" not" what" happened." An" extensive" record" was" compiled" in# Crawford," and" the" district" judge" issued" a" lengthy" opinion." The" judge" in" Indiana" thought," just" as" the" judge"in"Wisconsin"has"found,"that"some"voters"would"be"un) able," as" a" practical" matter," to" get" photo" IDs—because" of" age" or"infirmity,"lack"of"ability"to"pay"for"birth"certificates,"or"the" difficulty" of" obtaining" them" from" public)records" bureaus" thousands" of" miles" away" in" other" states—and" therefore" would" have" to" travel" to" the" county" seat" after" every" election" to" file" an" affidavit" of" eligibility," but" could" not" ascertain" how" many" people" were" in" that" category." The" trial" in" Wisconsin" produced"the"same"inability"to"quantify."
The" findings" not" made" affect" how" to" interpret" the" find) ings" that" were" made." Take" the" conclusion" (based" on" the" tes) timony" of" a" “marketing" consultant”)" that" 300,000" registered" voters"lack"acceptable"photo"ID."The"number"is"questionable;" the"district"judge"who"tried"the"Indiana"case"rejected"a"large" estimate"as"fanciful"in"a"world"in"which"photo"ID"is"essential" to" board" an" airplane," enter" Canada" or" any" other" foreign" na) tion," drive" a" car" (even" people" who" do" not" own" cars" need" li) censes" to" drive" friends’" or" relatives’" cars)," buy" a" beer," pur)

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Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

chase" pseudoephedrine" for" a" stuffy" nose" or" pick" up" a" pre) scription"at"a"pharmacy,"open"a"bank"account"or"cash"a"check" at" a" currency" exchange," buy" a" gun," or" enter" a" courthouse" to" serve"as"a"juror"or"watch"the"argument"of"this"appeal."Could" 9%" of" Wisconsin’s" voting" population" really" do" none" of" these" things?" (Some" may" have" photo" ID" that" is" not" accepted" for" elections," such" as" a" veteran’s" card," but" the" record" does" not" show" how" many" people" get" through" life" with" the" sort" of" photo" ID" that" Wisconsin" does" not" accept" for" voting.)" None) theless," we" accept" the" district" court’s" finding" in" this" case." What"is"its"legal"significance?"
Plaintiffs"describe"registered"voters"who"lack"photo"ID"as" “disenfranchised.”" If" the" reason" they" lack" photo" ID" is" that" the" state" has" made" it" impossible," or" even" hard," for" them" to# get" photo" ID," then" “disfranchised”" might" be" an" apt" descrip) tion." But" if" photo" ID" is" available" to" people" willing" to" scrounge" up" a" birth" certificate" and" stand" in" line" at" the" office" that" issues" drivers’" licenses," then" all" we" know" from" the" fact" that" a" particular" person" lacks" a" photo" ID" is" that" he" was" un) willing" to" invest" the" necessary" time." And# Crawford" tells" us" that" “the" inconvenience" of" making" a" trip" to" the" [department" of" motor" vehicles]," gathering" the" required" documents," and" posing" for" a" photograph" surely" does" not" qualify" as" a" sub) stantial" burden" on" the" right" to" vote," or" even" represent" a" sig) nificant"increase"over"the"usual"burdens"of"voting.”"553"U.S." at"198."
Registering"to"vote"is"easy"in"Wisconsin.2"Yet"of"those"eli) gible,"only"78%"have"registered."(In"raw"numbers,"4.247"mil)
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""
2"In"order"to"register,"a"person"must"provide"proof"of"residence"(such" as"a"driver’s"license,"utility"bill,"bank"statement,"or"residential"lease)"and" any" one" of" (1)" the" applicant’s" driver’s" license" number" and" expiration"

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lion"were"eligible"in"2012,"and"of"that"number"only"3.318"mil) lion"were"registered."The"difference"is"almost"a"million,"vast) ly"exceeding"the"number"of"registered"voters"who"lack"photo" ID." U.S." Census" Bureau," Reported# Voting# and# Registration# by# Sex,# Race# and# Hispanic# Origin,# for# States:# November# 2012" (May" 2013).)" This" proportion" is" lower" than" the" 91%" of" registered" voters" who" have" qualifying" photo" ID." We" know" from" regis) tration" data" (and" the" fact" that" not" all" registered" persons" cast" ballots)" that# any" procedural" step" filters" out" some" potential" voters." No" one" calls" this" effect" disfranchisement," even" though" states" could" make" things" easier" by," say," allowing" everyone"to"register"or"vote"from"a"computer"or"smartphone" without" travel" or" standing" in" line." Yet" if" 22%" of" the" eligible" population" does" not" perform" even" the" easiest" step," registra) tion,"it"is"difficult"to"infer"from"the"fact"that"9%"have"not"ac) quired" photo" ID" that" that" step" is" particularly" difficult." A" more" plausible" inference" would" be" that" people" who" do" not" plan"to"vote"also"do"not"go"out"of"their"way"to"get"a"photo"ID" that" would" have" no" other" use" to" them." This" does" not" imply" that" a" need" for" photo" ID" is" an" obstacle" to" a" significant" num) ber"of"persons"who"otherwise"would"cast"ballots."
Some" of" the" district" court’s" other" findings" support" the" conclusion" that" for" most" eligible" voters" not" having" a" photo" ID" is" a" matter" of" choice" rather" than" a" state)created" obstacle."

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""" "
date," (2)" a" Wisconsin" Department" of" Transportation" ID" number" and" its" expiration"date,"or"(3)"the"last"four"digits"of"the"applicant’s"Social"Securi) ty"number."Residents"can"register"by"mail"or"through"a"Special"Registra) tion"Deputy"(someone"trained"by"a"municipality"to"collect"voter"registra) tion"forms)"until"20"days"before"an"election."They"can"register"in"a"munic) ipal"clerk’s"office"until"the"Friday"before"an"election."And"they"can"regis) ter"at"a"polling"place"on"election"day."

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Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

We" have" mentioned" the" court’s" finding" that" 2.4%" of" white" adult" residents" in" Milwaukee" County" do" not" now" have" in" their" possession" either" a" qualifying" photo" ID" or" the" docu) mentation" needed" to" get" one." (This" is" the" same" thing" as" the" proposition"that"97.6%"do"have"a"photo"ID"or"the"qualifying" documents.)" The" judge" estimated" that" 4.5%" of" blacks" and" 5.9%" of" Latinos" lack" both." But" if" 9%" of" eligible" voters" lack" a" photo"ID,"this"necessarily"means"that"more"than"half"of"eligi) ble"voters"who"lack"a"photo"ID"do"have"a"birth"certificate"or" other"qualifying"documents"among"the"family"records."(One" witness" testified" that," of" persons" who" lack" qualifying" photo" IDs," 32%" also" lack" the" documents" needed" to" get" one;" this" means"that"68%"of"all"persons"who"lack"a"photo"ID"could"get" one" without" hassle.)" If" people" who" already" have" copies" of" their"birth"certificates"do"not"choose"to"get"free"photo"IDs,"it" is"not"possible"to"describe"the"need"for"a"birth"certificate"as"a" legal"obstacle"that"disfranchises"them."
Because"the"burden"of"getting"a"photo"ID"in"Wisconsin"is" no" greater" than" the" burden" in" Indiana," the" district" court’s" constitutional"holding"must"rest"on"its"finding"that"photo"IDs" do"not"serve"any"important"purpose—for"if"that’s"right,"then" under"the"constitutional"standard"laid"out"in#Crawford"even"a" modest"burden"is"forbidden."
The" district" judge" concluded" that" the" only" kind" of" fraud" that" photo" IDs" address" is" impersonation" of" voters" at" the" polls," and" he" found" that" impersonation" does" not" happen" in" Wisconsin."(He"allowed"that"some"frauds"may"go"undetected" but" thought" that" the" number" is" trivial.)" Although" the" judge" recognized" that" some" voter)impersonation" frauds" had" been" detected—on" one" occasion," for" example," a" man" cast" an" ab) sentee"ballot"for"his"deceased"wife—the"judge"thought"that"a"

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photo" ID" would" not" necessarily" prevent" these." He" observed" that" the" man" could" have" submitted" a" photocopy" of" his" de) ceased"wife’s"photo"ID."The"state"also"contended"that"requir) ing"identification"of"voters"at"the"polls"promotes"public"con) fidence"in"the"integrity"of"elections,"but"the"judge"found"that" there"is"no"relation"between"voter)identification"statutes"and" public"confidence."It"follows,"the"judge"concluded,"that"Wis) consin’s"Act"23"serves"no"legitimate"purpose."
One" problem" with" relying" on" these" findings" is" that" the" first"of"them—the"conclusion"that"voter"impersonation"is"ra) re" if" not" nonexistent—is" identical" to" a" finding" made" in" the" Indiana" litigation." The" district" judge" in" Indiana" found" that" there" had" never" been" a" documented" instance" of" voter) impersonation" fraud" in" that" state." The" Supreme" Court" recit) ed"this"finding,"553"U.S."at"194–96,"yet"found"it"inadequate"to" conclude"that"the"statute"does"not"serve"any"purpose."That’s" because" the" Supreme" Court" thought" that" a" photo" ID" re) quirement" has" other" benefits" (id." at" 191–97):" it" deters" fraud" (so"that"a"low"frequency"stays"low);"it"promotes"accurate"rec) ord" keeping" (so" that" people" who" have" moved" after" the" date" of" registration" do" not" vote" in" the" wrong" precinct);" it" pro) motes" voter" confidence." The" Court" took" the" last" of" these" as" almost" self)evidently" true." And" the" need" for" documentation" such"as"a"birth"certificate"to"get"a"photo"ID"suggests"another" benefit:" it" will" prevent" some" people" who" should" not" have" registered" (because" they" are" too" young" or" not" citizens)" from" voting" when" they" are" unable" to" get" a" qualifying" photo" ID." Wisconsin" allows" registration" on" election" day," and" a" photo" ID" can" help" to" verify" (or" refute)" representations" a" person" makes"when"trying"to"register."

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Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

The" dissenting" Justices" were" not" impressed" by" the" bene) fits" their" colleagues" touted." Justice" Souter" (joined" by" Justice" Ginsburg)"heaped"scorn"on"them,"deeming"them"unsubstan) tiated" and" at" any" event" too" modest" to" justify" an" appreciable" burden." 553" U.S." at" 223–37" (dissenting" opinion)." (Justice" Breyer," who" also" dissented," did" so" because" in" his" view" the" photo" ID" requirement" discouraged" too" many" people" from" voting;" he" did" not" join" Justice" Souter’s" view" that" the" law" served" no" valid" purpose.)" In" this" litigation," plaintiffs" pro) duced" the" testimony" of" a" political" scientist" who" agrees" with" Justice"Souter,"and"the"district"judge"found"as"a"fact"that"the" majority" of" the" Supreme" Court" was" wrong" about" benefits" such" as" better" record" keeping" and" promoting" public" confi) dence." Maybe" that" testimony" will" eventually" persuade" the" Justices"themselves,"but"in"our"hierarchical"judicial"system"a" district" court" cannot" declare" a" statute" unconstitutional" just" because"he"thinks"(with"or"without"the"support"of"a"political" scientist)"that"the"dissent"was"right"and"the"majority"wrong."
To" put" this" in" legalese," whether" a" photo" ID" requirement" promotes"public"confidence"in"the"electoral"system"is"a"“leg) islative" fact”—a" proposition" about" the" state" of" the" world," as" opposed" to" a" proposition" about" these" litigants" or" about" a" single" state." Judges" call" the" latter" propositions" “adjudicative" facts.”" On" matters" of" legislative" fact," courts" accept" the" find) ings" of" legislatures" and" judges" of" the" lower" courts" must" ac) cept"findings"by"the"Supreme"Court."See,"e.g.,"Armour#v.#Indi+ anapolis,"132"S."Ct."2073,"2080"(2012);"A#Woman’s#Choice—East# Side#Women’s#Clinic#v.#Newman,"305"F.3d"684"(7th"Cir."2002)."
The" district" judge" heard" from" one" political" scientist," whose"view"may"or"may"not"be"representative"of"the"profes) sion’s."After"a"majority"of"the"Supreme"Court"has"concluded"

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that"photo"ID"requirements"promote"confidence,"a"single"dis) trict"judge"cannot"say"as"a"“fact”"that"they"do"not,"even"if"20" political"scientists"disagree"with"the"Supreme"Court."
Photo"ID"laws"promote"confidence,"or"they"don’t;"there"is" no"way"they"could"promote"public"confidence"in"Indiana"(as" Crawford" concluded)" and" not" in" Wisconsin." This" means" that" they" are" valid" in" every" state—holding" constant" the" burden" each"voter"must"bear"to"get"a"photo"ID—or"they"are"valid"in" no"state."Functionally"identical"laws"cannot"be"valid"in"Indi) ana"and"invalid"in"Wisconsin"(or"the"reverse),"depending"on" which" political" scientist" testifies," and" whether" a" district" judge’s" fundamental" beliefs" (his" “priors,”" a" social" scientist" would" say)" are" more" in" line" with" the" majority" on" the" Su) preme"Court"or"the"dissent."
Wisconsin)specific" findings# do" matter" to" some" issues;" if" the"burden"of"getting"a"photo"ID"in"Wisconsin"were"material) ly" greater" than" the" burden" in" Indiana," then" Wisconsin’s" law" could" indeed" be" invalid" while" Indiana’s" stands." But" no" one" suggests" that" photo" ID" laws" promote" confidence" in" Indiana" but" not" Wisconsin;" the" district" court’s" finding" concerns" the" nation"as"a"whole."(The"political"scientist"who"testified"at"tri) al"relied"not"on"his"own"work,"or"even"on"work"in"a"refereed" scholarly"journal,"but"on"Stephen"Ansolabehere"&"Nathaniel" Persily,"Vote#Fraud#in#the#Eye#of#the#Beholder:#The#Role#of#Public# Opinion# in# the# Challenge# to# Voter# Identification# Requirements," 121" Harv." L." Rev." 1737" (2008)," which" reported" the" results" of" one"opinion"poll"of"people"living"throughout"the"country.)"
That"photo"IDs"promote"confidence,"even"if"they"have"no" other" effect," is" widely" accepted" outside" the" field" of" voting." Take" the" photo" ID" requirement" for" boarding" an" aircraft." As" far" as" we" are" aware," a" need" to" produce" photo" ID" has" never"

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Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

prevented"a"hijacking"or"act"of"terrorism;"no"one"even"argues" that" it" has." Magnetometers," x)ray" machines," and" other" tech) nical"resources"find"guns,"knives,"and"explosives."(Find"them" frequently:" many" people" who" possess" photo" ID" try" to" carry" these"items"onto"planes.)"But"the"public#feels"safer"when"eve) ryone" must" show" a" photo" ID," which" makes" the" requirement" a"rational"one."Perhaps"that"is"why"both"state"and"federal"ju) diciaries" require" photo" ID" of" people" entering" courthouses," even" though" it" is" the" magnetometers" and" other" technical" gear,"not"the"ID,"that"finds"the"weapons."
If"the"public"thinks"that"photo"ID"makes"elections"cleaner," then" people" are" more" likely" to" vote" or," if" they" stay" home," to" place"more"confidence"in"the"outcomes."These"are"substantial" benefits."One"district"judge’s"contrary"view"is"not"enough"to" condemn" a" state" statute" as" unconstitutional." By" contrast," a" finding" that" a" photo" ID" law" has" significantly" reduced" the" turnout" in" a" particular" state" would" imply" that" the" require) ment’s" additional" costs" outweigh" any" benefit" in" improving" confidence"in"electoral"integrity."As"we"have"observed,"how) ever," the" judge" did" not" find" that" photo" ID" laws" measurably" depress"turnout"in"the"states"that"have"been"using"them."
We" have" said" enough" to" demonstrate" that" Crawford" re) quires" us" to" reject" a" constitutional" challenge" to" Wisconsin’s" statute." (The" Supreme" Court" of" Wisconsin" reached" the" same" conclusion" in# Milwaukee# Branch# of# NAACP" and" League# of# Women# Voters# v.# Walker," 2014" WI" 97" (July" 31," 2014)," both" of" which" reversed" injunctions" that" had" been" issued" by" state" judges.)" In# Crawford" plaintiffs" relied" exclusively" on" the" Con) stitution;" in" this" suit" plaintiffs" also" contended," and" the" dis) trict"judge"found,"that"the"state"law"violates"§2"of"the"Voting" Rights"Act,"52"U.S.C."§10301,"formerly"42"U.S.C."§1973:"

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(a)"No"voting"qualification"or"prerequisite"to"voting"or"standard," practice," or" procedure" shall" be" imposed" or" applied" by" any" State" or" political" subdivision" in" a" manner" which" results" in" a" denial" or" abridgement" of" the" right" of" any" citizen" of" the" United" States" to" vote"on"account"of"race"or"color,"or"in"contravention"of"the"guar) antees" set" forth" in" section" 10303(f)(2)" of" this" title," as" provided" in" subsection"(b)."
(b)"A"violation"of"subsection"(a)"is"established"if,"based"on"the"to) tality" of" circumstances," it" is" shown" that" the" political" processes" leading" to" nomination" or" election" in" the" State" or" political" subdi) vision" are" not" equally" open" to" participation" by" members" of" a" class" of" citizens" protected" by" subsection" (a)" in" that" its" members" have" less" opportunity" than" other" members" of" the" electorate" to" participate"in"the"political"process"and"to"elect"representatives"of" their" choice." The" extent" to" which" members" of" a" protected" class" have"been"elected"to"office"in"the"State"or"political"subdivision"is" one"circumstance"which"may"be"considered:"Provided,"That"noth) ing" in" this" section" establishes" a" right" to" have" members" of" a" pro) tected" class" elected" in" numbers" equal" to" their" proportion" in" the" population."
The"judge"recognized"that"most"case"law"concerning"the"ap) plication" of" §2" concerns" claims" that" racial" gerrymandering" has" been" employed" to" dilute" the" votes" of" racial" or" ethnic" groups."See,"e.g.,"Thornburg#v.#Gingles,"478"U.S."30"(1986);"Chi+ som#v.#Roemer,"501"U.S."380"(1991)."In"Gingles"the"Justices"bor) rowed" nine" factors" from" a" Senate" committee" report" (often" called"the"“Gingles"factors”)"as"the"standard"for"applying"§2." The" judge" found" that" line" of" cases" unhelpful" for" situations" involving" eligibility" to" vote." The" judge" recognized" that" a" separate"line"of"§2"cases"does"involve"eligibility"and"has"con) cluded"that"felon)disfranchisement"statutes"do"not"violate"§2" even" though" these" laws" have" a" disparate" impact" on" minori) ties."(Both"blacks"and"Latinos"are"more"likely"to"have"felony" convictions" than" are" whites.)" See" Farrakhan# v.# Gregoire," 623" F.3d"990"(9th"Cir."2010)"(en"banc);"Simmons#v.#Galvin,"575"F.3d"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

16"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

24"(1st"Cir."2009);"Hayden#v.#Pataki,"449"F.3d"305"(2d"Cir."2006)" (en" banc);" Johnson# v.# Governor# of# Florida," 405" F.3d" 1214" (11th" Cir." 2005)" (en" banc)." But" the" judge" deemed" all" of" those" deci) sions" irrelevant" too," because" most" felon)disfranchisement" laws"predate"the"Voting"Rights"Act."
The"judge"thought"that"§2"offers"the"best"guide"to"its"own" interpretation" and" emphasized" the" rule" that" laws" must" not" “result[]" in" a" denial”" of" the" right" to" vote." Act" 23" has" such" a" result," the" judge" concluded," because" white" registered" voters" are" more" likely" to" possess" qualifying" photo" IDs," or" the" doc) uments" necessary" to" get" them." We" have" mentioned" one" sta) tistical"disparity:"97.6%"of"whites,"95.5%"of"blacks,"and"94.1%" of" Latinos" currently" possess" either" qualifying" photo" IDs" or" the" documents" that" would" permit" Wisconsin" to" issue" them.3" (In" other" words," these" registered" voters" have," or" can" get," photo" IDs" without" asking" any" public)records" office" for" any" additional"document,"such"as"a"birth"certificate.)"If"instead"of" asking" who" has" either" photo" IDs" or" the" documents" required" to"get"them,"we"ask"only"who"had"qualifying"photo"IDs"as"of"
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""
3" We" have" given" the" percentages" of" persons" who" have" these" docu) ments."Plaintiffs"express"the"figures"differently,"giving"the"percentages"of" persons" who" lack" the" documents" (2.4%" of" whites," 4.5%" of" blacks," and" 5.9%" of" Latinos)," then" dividing" one" percentage" by" another" to" yield" an" expression"such"as"“registered"Black"voters"in"Wisconsin"were"70%"more" likely"than"white"voters"to"lack"a"driver’s"license"or"state"ID”"(LULAC"Br." 2)."That"is"a"misuse"of"data."Dividing"one"percentage"by"another"produc) es" a" number" of" little" relevance" to" the" problem." If" 99.9%" of" whites" had" photo" IDs," and" 99.7%" of" blacks" did," the" same" approach" would" yield" the" statement" “blacks" are" three" times" as" likely" as" whites" to" lack" qualifying" ID”" (0.3" /" 0.1" =" 3)," but" such" a" statement" would" mask" the" fact" that" the" populations"were"effectively"identical."That’s"why"we"do"not"divide"per) centages."

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

17"

the" trial," the" district" judge" estimated" that" 92.7%" of" whites," 86.8%"of"blacks,"and"85.1%"of"Latinos"did."Finally,"the"judge" found"that"it"would"be"harder"for"blacks"and"Latinos,"on"av) erage," to" get" the" documents" they" need," because" for" the" five" years" ending" in" 2011" some" 75%" of" Wisconsin’s" white" resi) dents" had" been" born" in" that" state," while" only" 59%" of" blacks" and"43%"of"Latinos"had"been"born"there."Getting"birth"certif) icates" from" other" states" is" harder" than" getting" them" from" Wisconsin," the" judge" found." The" decision" of" the" Supreme" Court" of" Wisconsin" and" the" state’s" new" regulations" may" re) duce" that" burden" but" cannot" eliminate" it;" persons" who" rely" on"the"waiver"procedure"still"must"apply"for"it,"which"means" that" on" average" black" and" Latino" residents" must" file" more" paperwork"than"white"residents."
Although" these" findings" document" a" disparate" outcome," they" do" not" show" a" “denial”" of" anything" by" Wisconsin," as" §2(a)" requires;" unless" Wisconsin" makes" it" needlessly" hard" to" get" photo" ID," it" has" not" denied" anything" to" any" voter." Nor" did" the" district" court" find" that" differences" in" economic" cir) cumstances" are" attributable" to" discrimination" by" Wisconsin." The" judge" explained" his" findings" this" way:" “the" reason" Blacks" and" Latinos" are" disproportionately" likely" to" lack" an" ID" is" because" they" are" disproportionately" likely" to" live" in" poverty,"which"in"turn"is"traceable"to"the"effects"of"discrimi) nation" in" areas" such" as" education," employment," and" hous) ing.”" 2014" U.S." Dist." LEXIS" 59344" at" *119." The" judge" did" not" conclude" that" the" state" of" Wisconsin" has" discriminated" in" any" of" these" respects." That’s" important," because" units" of" government"are"responsible"for"their"own"discrimination"but" not"for"rectifying"the"effects"of"other"persons’"discrimination." See," e.g.," Milliken# v.# Bradley," 418" U.S." 717" (1974)." Section" 2(a)" forbids" discrimination" by" “race" or" color”" but" does" not" re)

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

18"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

quire" states" to" overcome" societal" effects" of" private" discrimi) nation"that"affect"the"income"or"wealth"of"potential"voters."
Section"2(b)"tells"us"that"§2(a)"does"not"condemn"a"voting" practice" just" because" it" has" a" disparate" effect" on" minorities." (If"things"were"that"simple,"there"wouldn’t"have"been"a"need" for# Gingles" to" list" nine" non)exclusive" factors" in" vote)dilution" cases.)"Instead"§2(b)"tells"us:"“A"violation"of"subsection"(a)"is" established" if," based" on" the" totality" of" circumstances," it" is" shown" that" the" political" processes" leading" to" nomination" or" election" in" the" State" or" political" subdivision" are" not# equally# open" to" participation" by" members" of" a" class" of" citizens" pro) tected" by" subsection" (a)" in" that" its" members" have" less# oppor+ tunity" than" other" members" of" the" electorate" to" participate" in" the" political" process”" (emphasis" added)." Act" 23" does" not" draw"any"line"by"race,"and"the"district"judge"did"not"find"that" blacks"or"Latinos"have"less"“opportunity”"than"whites"to"get" photo" IDs." Instead" the" judge" found" that," because" they" have" lower"income,"these"groups"are"less"likely"to#use"that"oppor) tunity."And"that"does"not"violate"§2."In"voting)dilution"cases," citizens" lumped" into" a" district" can’t" extricate" themselves" ex) cept" by" moving," so" clever" district)line" drawing" can" disad) vantage" minorities." But" Act" 23" extends" to" every" citizen" an" equal"opportunity"to"get"a"photo"ID."
To" the" extent" outcomes" help" to" decide" whether" the" state" has"provided"an"equal"opportunity,"we"must"look"not"at"Act" 23" in" isolation" but" to" the" entire" voting" and" registration" sys) tem." If" blacks" and" Latinos" do" not" get" photo" IDs" at" the" same" frequency" as" whites," that" will" reduce" their" relative" share" of" voting"in"Wisconsin."By"how"much?"We"don’t"know,"because" (for"reasons"we"have"covered)"it"may"be"that"the"people"who" do" not" get" photo" IDs" are" also" those" least" likely" to" vote" with"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

19"

or" without" photo" IDs." Experience" from" other" states" would" help" to" understand" the" full" effect," but" the" record" lacks" that" information." But" we" do" know," from" data" published" by" the" Census"Bureau,"that"blacks"do"not"seem"to"be"disadvantaged" by"Wisconsin’s"electoral"system"as"a"whole."In"2012"79.6%"of" Wisconsin’s" eligible" white" non)Hispanic" residents" were" reg) istered" to" vote." That" year," 81%" of" the" state’s" eligible" black" residents"were"registered"to"vote."(Only"46.8%"of"Latino"resi) dents" were" registered;" this" might" be" caused" by" errors" in" the" data;" the" Census" Bureau" provides" an" 18.4%" margin" of" error" for"this"figure.)"In"2012"75%"of"the"state’s"eligible"white"non) Hispanic" registered" voters" went" to" the" polls;" 78.5%" of" the" state’s" eligible" black" voters" cast" ballots." Even" if" Act" 23" takes" 2.1%" off" this" number" (the" difference" between" the" 97.6%" of" white" voters" who" already" have" photo" ID" or" qualifying" doc) uments," and" the" 95.5%" of" black" voters" who" do)," black" turn) out"will"remain"higher"than"white"turnout."
We"are"not"saying"that,"as"long"as"blacks"register"and"vote" more" frequently" than" whites," a" state" is" entitled" to" make" changes" for" the" purpose" of" curtailing" black" voting." Far" from" it;" that" would" clearly" violate" §2." Our" point," rather," is" that" when"the"validity"of"the"state’s"voting"laws"depends"on"dis) parate"impact,"as"the"district"court"held,"it"is"essential"to"look" at" everything" (the" “totality" of" circumstances”," §2(b)" says)" to" determine" whether" there" has" been" such" an" impact." Other) wise"§2"will"dismantle"every"state’s"voting"apparatus."
No" state" has" exactly" equal" registration" rates," exactly" equal" turnout" rates," and" so" on," at" every" stage" of" its" voting" system."At"oral"argument,"counsel"for"one"of"the"two"groups" of"plaintiffs"made"explicit"what"the"district"judge’s"approach" implies:"that"if"whites"are"2%"more"likely"to"register"than"are"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

20"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

blacks," then" the" registration" system" top" to" bottom" violates" §2;" and" if" white" turnout" on" election" day" is" 2%" higher," then" the"requirement"of"in)person"voting"violates"§2."Motor)voter" registration," which" makes" it" simple" for" people" to" register" by" checking"a"box"when"they"get"drivers’"licenses,"would"be"in) valid," because" black" and" Latino" citizens" are" less" likely" to" own" cars" and" therefore" less" likely" to" get" drivers’" licenses." (The"district"judge"cited"with"approval,"2014"U.S."Dist."LEXIS" 59344" at" *102" n.32," a" study" concluding" that" in" Milwaukee" County"73%"of"white"adults,"47%"of"black"adults,"and"43%"of" Hispanic" adults" have" valid" drivers’" licenses;" this" implies" an" equally"large"difference"in"registration"rates"using"the"motor) voter" protocol.)" Yet" it" would" be" implausible" to" read" §2" as" sweeping"away"almost"all"registration"and"voting"rules."It"is" better" to" understand" §2(b)" as" an" equal)treatment" require) ment" (which" is" how" it" reads)" than" as" an" equal)outcome" command"(which"is"how"the"district"court"took"it)."
For" the" sake" of" argument," let" us" put" all" of" the" felon) disfranchisement" cases" to" one" side," even" though" they" offer" strong" support" for" our" reading" of" §2," in" voter)qualification" situations," as" an" equal)treatment" requirement." Three" appel) late" opinions" have" applied" §2" to" voter)qualification" rules" other"than"felon)disfranchisement"statutes:"Gonzalez#v.#Arizo+ na," 677" F.3d" 383," 404–10" (9th" Cir." 2012)" (en" banc);" Ohio# State# Conference#of#NAACP#v.#Husted,"No."14)3877"(6th"Cir."Sept."24," 2014),"stayed"under"the"name"Husted#v.#NAACP,"No."14A336" (S." Ct." Sept." 29," 2014);" and" League# of# Women# Voters# of# North# Carolina#v.#North#Carolina,"No."14)1845"(4th"Cir."Oct."1,"2014)." Gonzalez"held"that"Arizona’s"voter"ID"statute"(which"requires" voters" to" present" one" qualifying" photo" ID" or" two" qualifying" non)photo"IDs)"is"valid"under"§2;"the"court"cited#Gingles"but" did"not"use"most"of"its"nine"factors"or"establish"an"alternative"

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

21"

approach." The" Fourth" Circuit" and" the" Sixth" Circuit," by" con) trast,"found#Gingles"unhelpful"in"voter)qualification"cases"(as" do"we)"and"restated"the"statute"as"calling"for"two"inquiries."
Based" on" our" reading" of" the" plain" language" of" the" statute" and" relevant" Supreme" Court" authority," we" agree" with" the" Sixth" Cir) cuit"that"a"Section"2"vote)denial"claim"consists"of"two"elements:"
•" First," “the" challenged" ‘standard," practice," or" procedure’" must" impose" a" discriminatory" burden" on" members" of" a" protected" class," meaning" that" members" of" the" protected" class" ‘have" less" opportunity" than" other" members" of" the" electorate" to" partici) pate"in"the"political"process"and"to"elect"representatives"of"their" choice.’”" Husted," 2014" WL" 4724703," at" *24" (quoting" [52" U.S.C." §10301(a)–(b),"formerly]"42"U.S.C."§1973(a))(b));"
•"Second,"that"burden"“must"in"part"be"caused"by"or"linked"to"‘so) cial" and" historical" conditions’" that" have" or" currently" produce" discrimination" against" members" of" the" protected" class.”" Id." (quoting"Gingles,"478"U.S."at"47)."
League# of# Women# Voters," slip" op." 33–34." We" are" skeptical" about" the" second" of" these" steps," because" it" does" not" distin) guish" discrimination" by" the" defendants" from" other" persons’" discrimination."In"vote)dilution"cases,"the"domain"of"Gingles," the" government" itself" draws" the" district" lines;" no" one" else" bears" responsibility." But" if" we" were" to" adopt" this" approach" for"the"sake"of"argument,"our"plaintiffs"would"fail"at"the"first" step," because" in" Wisconsin" everyone" has" the" same" oppor) tunity"to"get"a"qualifying"photo"ID."
Photo"ID"laws"have"been"politically"contentious."Crawford" remarked" on" the" apparently" partisan" nature" of" the" disa) greement" between" those" who" favor" and" those" who" oppose" these" statutes." The" lead" opinion" stated:" “if" a" nondiscrimina) tory" law" is" supported" by" valid" neutral" justifications," those" justifications"should"not"be"disregarded"simply"because"par)

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

22"

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

tisan" interests" may" have" provided" one" motivation" for" the" votes"of"individual"legislators."…"The"application"of"the"stat) ute" to" the" vast" majority" of" Indiana" voters" is" amply" justified" by" the" valid" interest" in" protecting" ‘the" integrity" and" reliabil) ity" of" the" electoral" process.’”" 553" U.S." at" 204." That" is" true" of" Wisconsin"as"well."
One" final" comment." Even" if" Act" 23" violated" §2" or" the" Constitution"because"of"its"disparate"impact"on"economically" disadvantaged" voters," the" district" court’s" injunction" could" not"be"affirmed."It"reads:"
[T]he" named" Defendants" and" Defendants’" officers," agents," serv) ants,"employees,"and"attorneys,"and"all"those"acting"in"concert"or" participation" with" them," or" having" actual" or" implicit" knowledge" of" this" Order" by" personal" service" or" otherwise," are" hereby" per) manently" enjoined" from" conditioning" a" person’s" access" to" a" bal) lot," either" in)person" or" absentee," on" that" person’s" presenting" a" form"of"photo"identification."
2014"U.S."Dist."LEXIS"59344"at"*124."The"injunction"is"perpetu) al"and"unconditional."Even"if"Wisconsin"offers"a"photo"ID"to" everyone"registered"to"vote,"without"the"need"for"supporting" documentation," it# still" can" not" require" anyone" to" present" photo"ID"at"a"polling"place."Under"the"injunction’s"language," it" is" irrelevant" how" well" the" changes" required" by# Milwaukee# Branch#of#NAACP"or"adopted"by"regulation"work"in"alleviat) ing"difficulties"that"some"persons"encounter"in"getting"photo" IDs."
A"district"judge’s"remedial"authority"is"limited"to"ending" the" illegal" conduct—and" the" problem" identified" by" the" dis) trict" court" is" not" photo" ID" in" the" abstract," but" how" income" and"education"affect"the"probability"of"having"photo"ID."The" injunction" should" have" allowed" the" state" an" opportunity" to" make"photo"ID"more"readily"available."

Case: 14-2058 Document: 74

Filed: 10/06/2014 Pages: 23

Nos."14)2058"&"14)2059"

23"

Details" of" the" injunction" do" not" matter," however," given" our" conclusion" that" Act" 23" does" not" violate" either" §2" or" the" Constitution."The"judgment"of"the"district"court"is"reversed."

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
______________________________________________________________________

RUTHELLE FRANK, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 11-C-1128

SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________

DECISION AND ORDER

In this suit challenging Wisconsin’s photo identification law, 2011 Wis. Act 23, the

plaintiffs have moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint adding Andrew Voegele

as a plaintiff to this case, as well as for a temporary restraining order requiring the

defendants to count the provisional ballot that Voegele cast in Wisconsin on November

8, 2016.

According to Voegele’s declaration, he is a citizen of the United States, is 18

years of age or older, and resides in Prescott, Wisconsin, which is on the border

between Minnesota and Wisconsin. He moved to Prescott from Minneapolis in August

2016. Voegele continues to work in Minnesota, and he commutes to work by car every

weekday. He also visits Minnesota frequently and drives while there. On November 8,

2016, Voegele arrived at his polling place in Prescott, registered to vote, and attempted

to cast a ballot. However, he did not have a form of photo identification required by

Wisconsin’s photo ID law. Voegele then cast a provisional ballot. Under Wisconsin law,

for this ballot to be counted, he must present an acceptable form of photo ID to the

municipal clerk by 4 p.m. on Friday, November 11, 2016. See Wis. Stat. § 6.97(3)(b).

1

However, Voegele does not currently possess any form of acceptable ID. Although he could obtain either a Wisconsin driver’s license or a free Wisconsin state identification card, which are acceptable forms of ID under the photo ID law, he does not want to obtain either of these forms of ID, because, under Wisconsin law, to obtain these forms of ID, he would have to surrender his Minnesota driver’s license. Voegele states that he does not want to surrender his Minnesota driver’s license because, although he intends to reside in Wisconsin for the foreseeable future, he still drives in Minnesota and may decide to return there some day.
Voegele contends that requiring him to surrender his Minnesota driver’s license to obtain either a Wisconsin driver’s license or a Wisconsin state ID card imposes an undue burden on his right to vote and thus violates the Constitution as it was understood in decisions such as Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)). He seeks leave to file a supplemental complaint and join this case, as well as a temporary restraining order requiring the defendants to count his provisional ballot even if he does not present an acceptable form of photo ID to the municipal clerk by 4p.m. on Friday. The defendants oppose these motions.
First, I conclude that the motion to file a supplemental complaint should be granted. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), a court may permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out claims arising out of any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. Here, Voegele’s claim relates to the overarching issues to be decided in this litigation, namely, whether the photo ID law imposes undue burdens on the voting rights of individuals facing certain specific barriers to obtaining ID. Further, it would conserve
2

judicial resources to fold Voegele’s claim into this suit rather than require him to file an entirely separate suit. Accordingly, I will accept the supplemental complaint.
Next, I address Voegele’s motion for a temporary restraining order. A request for a temporary restraining order is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and the standard for deciding whether to grant one is similar to that for granting a preliminary injunction. Thus, to obtain relief, Voegele must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of harms tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). As explained below, Voegele has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. For this reason, I do not consider the other factors.
Voegele does not contend that, if he tried, he would be unable to obtain a free Wisconsin state ID card or a Wisconsin driver’s license in time to validate his provisional ballot by 4 p.m. on Friday. Thus, the only obstacle to Voegele’s obtaining acceptable ID in time to validate his provisional ballot is his unwillingness to surrender his Minnesota driver’s license.1 However, Voegele states in his declaration that he resides in Wisconsin and intends to do so indefinitely. Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 321-1. Under Wisconsin law, a resident of the state cannot legally operate a motor vehicle in the state unless he or she has been issued a Wisconsin driver’s license. See Wis. Stat. § 343.05(3)(a) & (4)(b)1; see also Wis. Stat. § 343.01(2)(g) (defining “resident” for
1 Voegele states in is declaration that he does not wish to pay the $34 fee that Wisconsin charges when it issues a Wisconsin driver’s license. However, as I explain in the text, Voegele must pay that fee if he wishes to continue driving in Wisconsin regardless of whether he also wishes to vote in Wisconsin. Thus, the fee is not a burden on his voting rights.
3

purposes of motor-vehicle code as “an adult whose one home and customary and principal residence, to which the person has the intention of returning whenever he or she is absent, is in this state”). Thus, Voegele cannot legally drive in Wisconsin unless he obtains a Wisconsin driver’s license and surrenders his Minnesota license. Although Voegele wishes to drive in both Minnesota and Wisconsin, he does not contend that a Wisconsin resident possessing a valid Wisconsin driver’s license cannot legally drive in Minnesota without also possessing a Minnesota driver’s license. Thus, Voegele has no valid reason to possess both a Wisconsin driver’s license and a Minnesota driver’s license. If Voegele no longer wishes to drive in Wisconsin, he may obtain a free state ID card. Although Voegele would have to surrender his Minnesota driver’s license in order to obtain the free state ID card, he does not contend that he intends to drive in Minnesota but not drive in Wisconsin. Nor does he contend that, if he surrendered his Minnesota driver’s license and later decided to return to Minnesota and drive there, it would be difficult to obtain a new Minnesota driver’s license. Thus, Voegele has no valid reason to possess both a Wisconsin state ID card and a Minnesota driver’s license.
In light of the above, I do not see any way in which requiring Voegele to surrender his Minnesota driver’s license to obtain either a free Wisconsin state ID card or a Wisconsin driver’s license could be thought to impose an undue burden on his right to vote. Therefore, Voegele has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint is GRANTED.
4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 10th day of November, 2016. s/ Lynn Adelman ______________________ LYNN ADELMAN District Judge
5

 
 Case: 16-3003 Document: 24

Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 2

United States Court of Appeals

For  the  Seventh  Circuit  

Chicago,  Illinois  60604  

  

  

August  10,  2016  

  

  

Before  

  

FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge  

  

MICHAEL  S.  KANNE,  Circuit  Judge  

  

DIANE  S.  SYKES,  Circuit  Judge  

  

  

Nos.  16-­‐‑3003  &  16-­‐‑3052  

Appeals  from  the  United  

RUTHELLE  FRANK,  et  al.,      Plaintiffs-­‐‑Appellees,  Cross-­‐‑Appellants,  

States  District  Court  for   the  Eastern  District  of   Wisconsin.  

      v.  

No.  11-­‐‑C-­‐‑1128  

SCOTT  WALKER,  in  his  official  capacity  as  

Lynn  Adelman,  Judge.  

Governor  of  the  State  of  Wisconsin,  et  al.,  

   Defendants-­‐‑Appellants,  Cross-­‐‑Appellees.  

  

  

Order  

  

   The  injunction  entered  by  the  district  court  on  July  19,  2016,  is  stayed  

pending  appeal.  Applying  the  standards  of  Nken  v.  Holder,  556  U.S.  418  (2009),  

we  conclude  both  that  the  district  court’s  decision  is  likely  to  be  reversed  on  

appeal  and  that  disruption  of  the  state’s  electoral  system  in  the  interim  will  cause  

irreparable  injury.  

  

   Our  most  recent  decision  in  this  case  concluded  that  anyone  who  is  eligible  

to  vote  in  Wisconsin,  but  cannot  obtain  a  qualifying  photo  ID  with  reasonable  

effort,  is  entitled  to  an  accommodation  that  will  permit  him  or  her  to  cast  a  ballot.  

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 08/10/16 Page 1 of 2 Document 313

Case: 16-3003 Document: 24

Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 2

Nos.  16-­‐‑3003  &  16-­‐‑3052  

  

Page  2  

  

  

Frank  v.  Walker,  819  F.3d  384  (7th  Cir.  2016).  On  remand,  the  district  court  

concluded  that  at  least  some  voters  fall  in  this  category,  notwithstanding  the  

most  recent  revisions  to  the  procedures  that  Wisconsin  uses  to  issue  photo  IDs.  

But  instead  of  attempting  to  identify  these  voters,  or  to  identify  the  kinds  of  

situations  in  which  the  state’s  procedures  fall  short,  the  district  court  issued  an  

injunction  that  permits  any  registered  voter  to  declare  by  affidavit  that  

reasonable  effort  would  not  produce  a  photo  ID—even  if  the  voter  has  never  

tried  to  secure  one,  and  even  if  by  objective  standards  the  effort  needed  would  be  

reasonable  (and  would  succeed).  

  

   The  district  court’s  injunction  allows  any  registered  voter  to  check  a  box  

stating  a  reason  why  reasonable  effort  would  not  produce  a  qualifying  photo  ID.  

The  boxes  include  lack  of  necessary  documents  (apparently  including  situations  

in  which  the  person  has  not  tried  to  obtain  them),  “work”,  “family  

responsibilities”,  and  “other”—and  the  voter  can  put  anything  in  the  “other”  

box,  including  a  belief  that  spending  a  single  minute  to  obtain  a  qualifying  photo  

ID  is  not  reasonable.  The  injunction  adds  that  state  officials  are  forbidden  to  

dispute  or  question  any  reason  the  registered  voter  gives.  Yet  the  Supreme  Court  

held  in  Crawford  v.  Marion  County  Election  Board,  553  U.S.  181,  198  (2008),  that  

“the  inconvenience  of  making  a  trip  to  the  [department  of  motor  vehicles],  

gathering  the  required  documents,  and  posing  for  a  photograph  surely  does  not  

qualify  as  a  substantial  burden  on  the  right  to  vote,  or  even  represent  a  

significant  increase  over  the  usual  burdens  of  voting.”  A  given  voter’s  

disagreement  with  this  approach  does  not  show  that  requiring  one  trip  to  a  

governmental  office  is  unreasonable.  

  

   Because  the  district  court  has  not  attempted  to  distinguish  genuine  

difficulties  of  the  kind  our  opinion  mentioned,  819  F.3d  at  385–86,  or  any  other  

variety  of  substantial  obstacle  to  voting,  from  any  given  voter’s  unwillingness  to  

make  the  effort  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  a  state  can  require,  there  is  

a  substantial  likelihood  that  the  injunction  will  be  reversed  on  appeal.  

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 08/10/16 Page 2 of 2 Document 313

 
 Case: 16-3003 Document: 37

Filed: 08/15/2016 Pages: 2

United States Court of Appeals

For  the  Seventh  Circuit  

Chicago,  Illinois  60604  

  

  

August  15,  2016  

  

  

Before  

  

FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK,  Circuit  Judge  

  

MICHAEL  S.  KANNE,  Circuit  Judge  

  

DIANE  S.  SYKES,  Circuit  Judge  

  

  

Nos.  16-­‐‑3003  &  16-­‐‑3052  

Appeals  from  the  United  

RUTHELLE  FRANK,  et  al.,      Plaintiffs-­‐‑Appellees,  Cross-­‐‑Appellants,  

States  District  Court  for   the  Eastern  District  of   Wisconsin.  

      v.  

No.  11-­‐‑C-­‐‑1128  

SCOTT  WALKER,  in  his  official  capacity  as  

Lynn  Adelman,  Judge.  

Governor  of  the  State  of  Wisconsin,  et  al.,  

   Defendants-­‐‑Appellants,  Cross-­‐‑Appellees.  

  

  

Order  

  

   The  motion  for  reconsideration  of  our  order  staying  the  district  court’s  

injunction  is  denied.  

  

   Our  stay  order  observed  that  permitting  every  voter  to  decide  for  himself  or  

herself  how  much  effort  to  obtain  a  qualifying  photo  ID  is  “reasonable”  does  not  

appear  to  implement  our  decision  of  last  April,  which  contemplated  that  the  

court  rather  than  individual  voters  would  make  this  decision.  

  

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 08/16/16 Page 1 of 2 Document 318

Case: 16-3003 Document: 37

Filed: 08/15/2016 Pages: 2

Nos.  16-­‐‑3003  &  16-­‐‑3052  

  

Page  2  

  

  

   Meanwhile,  in  a  parallel  suit  in  the  Western  District  of  Wisconsin,  a  different  

district  judge  analyzed  the  procedures  Wisconsin  now  has  in  place  to  deal  with  

registered  voters  who  lack  photo  IDs.  Under  that  procedure,  any  applicant  must  

receive  a  photo  ID  on  request,  unless  the  state  shows  that  a  given  applicant  is  

ineligible  to  vote,  has  committed  fraud,  or  does  not  answer  queries  for  six  

months.  The  judge  in  the  Western  District  litigation  concluded  that  this  

procedure,  which  Wisconsin  calls  the  ID  Petition  Process  or  IDPP,  is  generally  

adequate  to  ensure  that  all  qualified  voters  receive  photo  IDs  but  expressed  

concern  that  temporary  documents  issued  early  in  the  process  may  not  have  

sufficient  duration—though  they  will  all  be  valid  at  least  through  this  

November’s  election.  The  judge  has  directed  the  state  to  make  some  changes  to  

this  process  but  stayed  that  part  of  his  injunction  pending  appellate  review,  

explaining:  

  

The  court  will  stay  the  requirement  that  the  state  fundamentally  

reform  the  IDPP  before  the  next  election.  To  be  clear:  the  state  must  

reform  the  IDPP  because  the  current  process  prevents  some  

qualified  electors  from  getting  acceptable  IDs,  and  even  successful  

petitioners  must  often  endure  undue  burdens  before  getting  those  

IDs.  But  the  state’s  emergency  measures  already  in  place  will  allow  

anyone  who  enters  the  IDPP  to  get  a  receipt  that  will  serve  as  a  

valid  ID  for  the  November  2016  election.  This  is  not  a  permanent  

solution  because  the  long-­‐‑term  status  of  the  receipts  is  uncertain.  

But  the  required  reform  can  wait  until  the  parties  complete  their  

appeal.  

  

One  Wisconsin  Institute,  Inc.  v.  Thomsen,  No.  15-­‐‑cv-­‐‑324-­‐‑jdp  (W.D.  Wis.  Aug.  11,  

2016),  slip  op.  2.  The  fact  that  anyone  who  applies  under  the  IDPP  will  receive  a  

receipt  entitling  him  or  her  to  vote  in  November  means  that  further  temporary  

relief,  such  as  the  injunction  issued  by  the  Eastern  District,  is  unnecessary.  The  

relative  merits  of  the  three  competing  approaches—the  state’s,  the  Eastern  

District’s,  and  the  Western  District’s—safely  can  be  left  to  decision  in  the  

ordinary  course,  after  full  briefing  and  argument.  

Case 2:11-cv-01128-LA Filed 08/16/16 Page 2 of 2 Document 318

 
 Case: 16-3003 Document: 40

Filed: 08/29/2016 Pages: 4

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________ Nos. 16‐3003 & 16‐3052 RUTHELLE FRANK, et al.,
Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants,
v.
SCOTT WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Wisconsin, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. ____________________
Nos. 16‐3083 & 16‐3091 ONE WISCONSIN INSTITUTE, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants,
v.
MARK L. THOMSEN, et al., Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees.
____________________
On Petitions for Initial Hearing En Banc
____________________
AMENDED AUGUST 29, 2016 ____________________

Case: 16-3003 Document: 40

Filed: 08/29/2016 Pages: 4

2

Nos. 16‐3003, 16‐3052, 16‐3083 & 16‐3091

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER, FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, KANNE, ROVNER, WILLIAMS, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Before us are two sets of appeals and cross‐ appeals, each of which concerns Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. In each matter, one originating in the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the other in the Western District of Wisconsin, the plaintiffs have petitioned for initial review en banc. We have consolidated their petitions for the purposes of this order. The plaintiffs ar‐ gue that only initial en banc treatment will permit a decision in time for the court’s conclusions to be put into effect for the election upcoming in November 2016. It is questionable whether action on that schedule is feasible, given that Wis‐ consin will start printing absentee ballots at the end of this month. We will assume for the sake of argument, however, that this obstacle alone is not enough to deny the petitions.
There is a more important concern, however, which has to do with the regularity of the judicial process. Whether this court should try to resolve the parties’ disputes on such a short schedule depends in part on whether qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. In evaluating that question, we must take account of the con‐ clusions reached by the district court in the Western District of Wisconsin in One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen, No. 15‐CV‐324‐JDP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100178 (W.D. Wis. July 29, 2016). The Eastern District of Wisconsin, in the decision under review in Nos. 16‐3003 and 16‐3052, concluded that every registered voter should be allowed to vote if he or she signs an affidavit stating that obtaining a qualifying photo ID would be unreasonably hard. A panel of this court has stayed

Case: 16-3003 Document: 40

Filed: 08/29/2016 Pages: 4

Nos 16‐3003, 16‐3052, 16‐3083 & 16‐3091

3

that order. See Order, Frank v. Walker, Nos. 16‐3003 & 16‐3052 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016). The Western District, by contrast, de‐ clined to adopt the affidavit procedure but required Wiscon‐ sin to reform its ID Petition Process (IDPP), revised in May in response to this court’s decision in Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 2016) (Frank II).
Frank II held that “[t]he right to vote is personal and is not defeated by the fact that 99% of other people can secure the necessary credentials easily”, and that the state may not frus‐ trate this right for any eligible person by making it unreason‐ ably difficult to obtain a qualifying photo ID. Id. at 386. The district court in One Wisconsin Institute concluded from this that an eligible voter who submits materials sufficient to ini‐ tiate the IDPP is entitled to a credential valid for voting, un‐ less readily available information shows that the petitioner is not a qualified elector. The court in One Wisconsin Insti‐ tute also held that the state must inform the general public that those who enter the IDPP will promptly receive a creden‐ tial valid for voting, unless readily available information shows that the petitioner is not a qualified elector entitled to such a credential. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100178 at *181–82. This court denied the State’s motion to stay the Western Dis‐ trict’s injunction pending appeal. See Order, One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, Nos. 16‐3083 & 16‐3091 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2016).
The State assures us that the temporary credentials re‐ quired in the One Wisconsin Institute decision will indeed be available to all qualified persons who seek them. In its re‐ sponse to the petition for initial hearing en banc in Nos. 16‐ 3003 and 16‐3052, it said this: ʺ[T]he State has already volun‐ tarily accommodated any concerns relating to the November

Case: 16-3003 Document: 40

Filed: 08/29/2016 Pages: 4

4

Nos. 16‐3003, 16‐3052, 16‐3083 & 16‐3091

2016 election. Specifically, Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles (‘DMV’) to mail auto‐ matically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. See Wis. EmR1618, § 10. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, proof of citizenship, and the like. Id. § 6.” Resp. to Pet. For Initial Hr’g En Banc at 1, Frank v. Walker, Nos. 16‐3052 & 16‐ 3003 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2016) (emphasis in original).
Given the State’s representation that “initiation” of the IDPP means only that the voter must show up at a DMV with as much as he or she has, and that the State will not refuse to recognize the “initiation” of the process because a birth certif‐ icate, proof of citizenship, Social Security card, or other par‐ ticular document is missing, we conclude that the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. Our conclusion depends also on the State’s compli‐ ance with the district court’s second criterion, namely, that the State adequately inform the general public that those who en‐ ter the IDPP will promptly receive a credential for voting, un‐ less it is plain that they are not qualified. The Western District has the authority to monitor compliance with its injunction, and we trust that it will do so conscientiously between now and the November 2016 election.
On these understandings, the petitions for initial hearing en banc are DENIED.

 
 Case 2:17-cv-01256-KM Document 83 Filed 01/25/19 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 1663

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RAVIDATH RAGBIR, Petitioner,

Civ. No. 17-1256 (KM)

V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ORDER

Respondent.

The Court having reviewed the submissions and conducted an evidentiary hearing, for or the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion,
IT IS this 25th day of January 2019
ORDERED that petitioner’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis, under 28 U.S.C. §
1651, is denied on the merits; and it is further ORDERED that the stay of removal pendente life that is currently in place shall continue
for another ten days to permit the filing of any relevant applications; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall mark this case as closed.

/v
i:

KEVINMCNULtY

4

United States District Judge

 
 APPEAL,ATTYOPEN,PROTO,REOPEN
United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin (Milwaukee) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11−cv−01128−LA

Frank et al v. Walker et al Assigned to: Judge Lynn Adelman related Case: 2:11−cv−00510−LA Case in other court: 14−2058
USCA:Barland,et al; 05/12/14, 14−2058 15−3582 USCA: Frank, et al.; 11/17/15, 15−3582 Seventh Circuit, 16−3003 USCA Walker 07/22/16, 16−3003 Seventh Circuit, 16−3052 USCA Frank 07/28/16, 16−3052 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/13/2011 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 441 Civil Rights: Voting Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Ruthelle Frank

represented by Craig G Falls Dechert LLP 1900 K St NW − Ste 1200 Washington, DC 20006 202−261−3373 Fax: 202−261−3373 Email: craig.falls@dechert.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karyn L Rotker American Civil Liberties Union of WI Foundation Inc 207 E Buffalo St − Ste 325 Milwaukee, WI 53202 414−272−4032 Fax: 414−272−0182 Email: krotker@aclu−wi.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M Laughlin McDonald American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 2600 Marquis One Tower 230 Peachtree St − Ste 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−523−2721 Fax: 404−653−0331 Email: lmcdonald@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Neil A Steiner Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 212−698−3822 Fax: 212−698−0480 Email: neil.steiner@dechert.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Angela M Liu Dechert LLP 35 W Wacker Dr − Ste 3400 Chicago, IL 60601 312−646−5800 Fax: 312−646−5858 Email: angela.liu@dechert.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 125 Broad St New York, NY 10004 212−549−2693 Fax: 212−549−2651 Email: dale.ho@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ Dechert LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 212−649−8743 Fax: 212−698−3599 Email: diane.princ@dechert.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson National Law Center for Homelessness & Poverty 2000 M St NW − Ste 210 Washington, DC 20036 202−638−2535 Fax: 202−628−2737 Email: hjohnson@nlchp.org TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
James T Van Strander Dechert LLP 1900 K St NW − Ste 1200 Washington, DC 20006 202−261−3317 Fax: 202−261−3333 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeremy N Rosen National Law Center for Homelessness & Poverty 2000 M St NW − Ste 210 Washington, DC 20036 202−347−3124 Fax: 202−628−2737 Email: jrosen@nlchp.org TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 2600 Marquis One Tower 230 Peachtree St − Ste 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−523−2721 Fax: 404−653−0331

Email: jsherman@aclu.org TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham National Law Center for Homelessness & Poverty 2000 M St NW − Ste 210 Washington, DC 20036 202−638−2535 Fax: 202−628−2737 Email: kcunningham@nlchp.org TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 2600 Marquis One Tower 230 Peachtree St − Ste 1440 Atlanta, GA 30303 404−523−2721 Fax: 404−653−0331 Email: nabudu@aclu.org TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster Arnold & Porter LLP 370 17th St − Ste 4400 Denver, CO 80202−1370 303−863−1000 Fax: 303−832−0428 Email: nathan.foster@aporter.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 125 Broad St − 18th Fl New York, NY 10004 212−284−7359 Fax: 212−549−2651 Email: syoung@aclu.org TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 125 Broad St − 18th Fl New York, NY 10004 212−519−7836 Fax: 212−549−2648 Email: slakin@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Inc 125 Broad St − 18th Fl New York, NY 10004 212−549−2500 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: athomas@aclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman National Law Center for Homelessness &

Plaintiff
Carl Ellis TERMINATED: 10/19/2015

Poverty 2000 M St NW − Ste 210 Washington, DC 20036 202−638−2535 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis American Civil Liberties Union of WI Foundation Inc 207 E Buffalo St − Ste 325 Milwaukee, WI 53202 414−272−4032 Fax: 414−272−0182 Email: ldupuis@aclu−wi.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013

Plaintiff Justin Luft

Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson

Plaintiff Dartric Davis

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Barbara Oden

Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address)

Plaintiff Sandra Jashinski

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012

Plaintiff Anthony Sharp

Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address)

Plaintiff Pamela Dukes

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis

Plaintiff Anthony Judd

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anna Shea

Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen

Plaintiff
Matthew Dearing TERMINATED: 10/19/2015

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Max Kligman

Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Samantha Meszaros TERMINATED: 10/19/2015

represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steve Kvasnicka

Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu

Plaintiff Sarah Lahti

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Domonique Whitehurst a minor by his mother and next friend, Sabrena Putnam TERMINATED: 10/19/2015

Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Edward Hogan

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman

Plaintiff Shirley Brown

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls Dechert LLP 1900 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 202−261−3373 Fax: 202−261−3373 Email: craig.falls@dechert.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address)

Plaintiff Nancy Lea Wilde

TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr

Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Mariannis Ginorio

represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address)

Plaintiff Frank Ybarra

TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015

Plaintiff
Sam Bulmer TERMINATED: 10/19/2015

Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Rickie Lamont Harmon TERMINATED: 10/19/2015

Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Dewayne Smith

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Craig G Falls (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James T Van Strander (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Karyn L Rotker (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M Laughlin McDonald (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Neil A Steiner (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Angela M Liu (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dale E Ho (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Diane N Princ (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Heather Maria Johnson (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/30/2013
Jeremy N Rosen (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/26/2015
Jonathan L Sherman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/20/2012
Karen E Cunningham (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/06/2013
Nancy G Abudu (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/26/2013
Nathan D Foster (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean J Young (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/07/2017
Sophia L Lakin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tiffany Alora Thomas (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Tristia Bauman

V.
Defendant
Governor Scott Walker in his official capacity as Governor of State of Wisconsin

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Laurence J Dupuis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Maria S Lazar Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−267−3519 Fax: 608−267−2223 Email: lazarms@doj.state.wi.us TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−266−0020 Fax: 608−267−2223 Email: keenanbp@doj.state.wi.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−266−9231 Fax: 608−267−8906 Email: benedoncm@doj.state.wi.us TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski United States Department of Justice (ED−WI) 17 W Main St Madison, WI 53703 608−266−7477 Fax: 608−267−2223 Email: kawskicp@doj.state.wi.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−267−8901 Fax: 608−267−8906 Email: lenningtondp@doj.state.wi.us

Defendant
Judge Thomas Barland in his official capacity as member of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board

TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−267−8904 Fax: 608−266−9594 Email: johnsonkarpg@doj.state.wi.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−266−3094 Fax: 608−267−8906 Email: schmelzerjj@doj.state.wi.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−266−5457 Fax: 608−267−2223 Email: murphysm@doj.state.wi.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General 17 W Main St PO Box 7857 Madison, WI 53707−7857 608−266−8690 Fax: 608−267−2223 Email: bellaviatc@doj.state.wi.us TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Judge Gerald Nichol in his official capacity as a member of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board TERMINATED: 07/22/2016
Defendant Judge Michael Brennan in his official capacity as a member of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board

Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington

Defendant Judge Thomas Cane in his official capacity as a member of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board
Defendant Judge David G Deininger in his official capacity as a member of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013

Defendant Judge Timothy Vocke in his official capacity as a member of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board TERMINATED: 07/22/2016
Defendant Kevin J Kennedy in his official capacity as Director & Gen Counsel of Wis Gov't Accountability Board TERMINATED: 07/22/2016

Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia

Defendant Nathaniel E Robinson in his official capacity as Administrator of Elections Div of the Wis Gov't Accountability Board
Defendant Mark Gottlieb in his official capacity as Secretary of the Wis Dep't of Transportation

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Lynne B Judd in her official capacity as Administrator of Div of Motor Vehicles
Defendant Kristina Boardman in her official capacity as Administrator of the DOT's Div of Motor Vehicles

Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp

Defendant Donald Reincke in his official capacity as Region Manager, DMV Bureau of Field Services, SW Region
Defendant Tracy Jo Howard Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sandra M Brisco in her official capacity as Region Manager, DMV Bureau of Field Services, SE Region
Defendant Barney L Hall Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services Office for the Southeast Region

Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon

Defendant
Donald J Genin Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northeast Region

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address)

Defendant Jill Louis Geoffroy Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the North Central Region
Defendant Patricia A Nelson Region Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Northwest Region

TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Maria S Lazar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/25/2015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carrie M Benedon (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel P Lennington (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/21/2013

Defendant Mark L Thomsen Election Commission Chair
Defendant Beverly R Gill Elections Commission Secretary
Defendant Ann S Jacobs Elections Commission Vice−Chair

Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas C Bellavia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/29/2013
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Julie M Glancey Elections Commission Commissioner
Defendant Steve King Elections Commission Commissioner
Defendant Don M Millis Elections Commission Commissioner

Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Michael Haas Interim Administrator of the Elections Commission
Defendant Jim Miller DMV Director of the Bureau of Field Services
Defendant Jill Reeve Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southwest Region

Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Miranda Horton Region Operational Manager of the DMV Bureau of Field Services office for the Southeast Region
Amicus James Janis
Amicus Dorothy Janis

Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Brian P Keenan (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clayton P Kawski (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gabe Johnson−Karp (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jody J Schmelzer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean Michael Murphy (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael T Morley Michael T Morley Esq 616 E St NW #254 Washington, DC 20004 860−778−3883 Fax: 202−393−2851 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph L Olson Michael Best & Friedrich LLP 100 E Wisconsin Ave − Ste 3300 Milwaukee, WI 53202−4108 414−271−6560 Fax: 414−277−0656 Email: jlolson@michaelbest.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael T Morley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph L Olson

Amicus Erin M Decker
Amicus Matthew Augustine
Amicus Robert Ziegelbauer
Amicus United States Justice Foundation

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael T Morley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph L Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael T Morley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph L Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Michael T Morley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph L Olson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Lane HW Fitzgerald The Fitzgerald Law Firm 2031 Riverside Dr − Ste A PO Box 194 Beloit, WI 53512−0194 608−318−3489 Fax: 608−234−4767 Email: info@thefitzgeraldlawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/13/2011
12/13/2011
12/13/2011

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants by Anthony Sharp, Sabrena Putnam, Carl Ellis, Ruthelle Frank, Edward Hogan, Domonique Whitehurst, Steve Kvasnicka, Anna Shea, Matthew Dearing, Samantha Meszaros, Sandra Jashinski, Justin Luft, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Sarah Lahti, Pamela Dukes, Dartric Davis, Barbara Oden. ( Filing Fee PAID $350 receipt number 0757−1404403) (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Dupuis, Laurence)
NOTICE Regarding assignment of this matter to Judge Lynn Adelman ;Consent/refusal forms for Magistrate Judge Callahan to be filed within 21 days;the consent/refusal form is available on our web site ;pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1 a disclosure statement is to be filed upon the first filing of any paper and should be filed now if not already filed. (blr)
2 DISCLOSURE Statement by All Plaintiffs. (Dupuis, Laurence)

12/13/2011
12/13/2011
12/14/2011
12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011 12/20/2011

3 MOTION to Waive Fees for Admission of Attorneys by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Karen Cunningham, # 2 Exhibit Applications for Admission)(Dupuis, Laurence)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 3 MOTION to Waive Fees for Admission of Attorneys. The Declaration should have been filed as a separate entry. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (blr)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 12/14/11 granting 3 MOTION to Waive Fees for Admission of Attorneys filed by Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dartric Davis, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Anna Shea, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
4 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Barney L. Hall (Dupuis, Laurence)
5 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs David Deininger (Dupuis, Laurence)
6 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Donald Genin (Dupuis, Laurence)
7 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Donald Reincke (Dupuis, Laurence)
8 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Gerald Nichol (Dupuis, Laurence)
9 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Jill Geoffroy (Dupuis, Laurence)
10 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Kristina Boardman (Dupuis, Laurence)
11 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Kevin Kennedy (Dupuis, Laurence)
12 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Lynne Judd (Dupuis, Laurence)
13 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Michael Brennan (Dupuis, Laurence)
14 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Mark Gottlieb (Dupuis, Laurence)
15 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Nathaniel Robinson (Dupuis, Laurence)
16 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Patricia Nelson (Dupuis, Laurence)
17 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Sandra Brisco (Dupuis, Laurence)
18 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Scott Walker (Dupuis, Laurence)
19 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Thomas Barland (Dupuis, Laurence)
20 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Thomas Cane (Dupuis, Laurence)
21 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Timothy Vocke (Dupuis, Laurence)
22 REQUEST for Issuance of Summons by All Plaintiffs Tracy Howard (Dupuis, Laurence)

12/21/2011
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Summons Issued as to Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Timothy Vocke, Scott Walker. (blr)
23 Refusal to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge by All Plaintiffs. (Dupuis, Laurence)
24 NOTICE of Appearance by Clayton P Kawski on behalf of All Defendants. Attorney(s) appearing: Clayton Kawski,Thomas Bellavia, Carrie Benedon (Kawski, Clayton)
25 STIPULATION by All Parties. (Kawski, Clayton)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 1/12/12 approving 25 Stipulation for extension. Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' complaint due 2/13/12. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
Set/Reset Deadlines: All Defendants' answer due 2/13/12. (dm)
26 Refusal to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
27 ANSWER to 1 Complaint, by All Defendants.(Kawski, Clayton)
28 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 2/14/12. Telephone Conference set for 3/7/2012 10:30 AM before Judge Lynn Adelman. The court will initiate the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
29 Joint REPORT of Rule 26(f) Plan by All Parties. (Johnson, Heather)
30 NOTICE of Appearance by Diane N Princ on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: Neil A. Steiner, Craig G. Falls, Diane N. Princ (Princ, Diane)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 30 Notice of Appearance; All documents should contain the s/signature of the attorney who files the document. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (blr) (Entered: 03/02/2012)
31 AMENDED COMPLAINT First Amended Complaint against All Defendants All Plaintiffs filed by Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Ruthelle Frank, Edward Hogan, Domonique Whitehurst, Steve Kvasnicka, Anna Shea, Matthew Dearing, Samantha Meszaros, Sandra Jashinski, Justin Luft, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Sarah Lahti, Pamela Dukes, Dartric Davis, Barbara Oden.(Dupuis, Laurence) Modified on 3/5/2012 (blr).
32 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn)
33 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 32 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs . (Attachments: (1) SEE ENTRY 35 Declaration of Shirley Brown, # 2 Declaration of Sam Bulmer, # 3 Declaration of Pamela Dukes, # 4 Declaration of Carl Ellis, # 5 Declaration of Ruthelle Frank, # 6 Declaration of Mariannis Ginorio, # 7 Declaration of Rickie Lamont Harmon, # 8 Declaration of Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr., # 9 Declaration of Barbara Oden, # 10 Declaration of DeWayne Smith, # 11 Declaration of Nancy Lea Wilde)(Rotker, Karyn) Modified on 3/5/2012 (blr).
34 DECLARATION of Karyn Rotker in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to 11 Named Plaintiffs (Docs. 32 & 33). (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A (Kennedy Dep Trans), # 2 Attachment B (Judd Dep Trans), # 3 Attachment C (Birth Cert Info), # 4 Attachment D (Def Br in Oppn in State Court case), # 5 Attachment E (Excerpt Moritz College Law Rept), # 6 Attachment F (Mayer Rept in State court case), # 7 Attachment G (Form GAB−131), # 8 Attachment H (Excerpts of Nat'l Comm'n Elect Reform Rept), # 9 Attachment I (Page from US VA website), # 10 Attachment J (VHA Directive 1610.01), # 11 Attachment K (Excerpts of HUD/VA Rept on Veteran Homelessness), # 12 Exhibit 1 (Kennedy Testimony 1−26−11), # 13 Exhibit 2 (Kennedy Testimony 4−27−11), # 14 Exhibit 3 (Kennedy Letter 5−3−11), # 15 Exhibit 4 (Kennedy Testimony 9−27−11), # 16 Exhibit 5 (Kennedy Testimony 11−15−11), # 17 Exhibit 7 (News Article 10−13−10), # 18 Exhibit 8 (News Article 11−24−11), # 19

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Exhibit 9 (GAB Flowchart for ID), # 20 Exhibit 10 (News Article 5−25−10), # 21 Exhibit 11 (GAB News Release 7−8−11), # 22 Exhibit 21 (DMV Homelessness Policy), # 23 Exhibit 27 (Email 12−1−11), # 24 Exhibit 34 (Email 9−27−11), # 25 Exhibit 39 (Email 9−6−11))(Rotker, Karyn)
35 DECLARATION of Shirley Brown (corrected) in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to 11 Named Plaintiffs (Docs 32, 33, 33−1). (Dupuis, Laurence)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 33 Brief in Support of Motion; Electronically filed documents should not be scanned whenever possible. The attached Declarations should have been extracted directly from your word processing software and should have included an electronic signature (s/signature). These documents do not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (blr) (Entered: 03/05/2012)
36 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/7/12. See order for dates. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
37 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephonic Scheduling Conference held on 3/7/2012. Court will issue a scheduling order. (blr)
NOTICE by the Court. Any representatives of plaintiffs who are participaing in the telephone scheduling conference set for 3/23/12 at 3:00 PM in Case No. 12CV185 must call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until we access the call.(cc: all counsel)(dm)
38 RESPONSE to Motion filed by All Defendants re 32 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs . (Kawski, Clayton)
39 DECLARATION of James G. Miller in Support of Brief in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motion. (Kawski, Clayton)
40 DECLARATION of Clayton P. Kawski in Support of Brief in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Affidavit of David Buerger, # 2 Exhibit NAACP March 6, 2012 Order, # 3 Exhibit League March 12, 2012 Order, # 4 Exhibit NAACP March 15, 2012 Order, # 5 Exhibit League March 20, 2012 Order, # 6 Exhibit Bulmer's Answers, # 7 Exhibit Dukes' Answers, # 8 Exhibit Ellis' Answers, # 9 Exhibit Frank's Answers, # 10 Exhibit Ginorio's Answers, # 11 Exhibit Harmon's Answers, # 12 Exhibit Holloway's Answers, # 13 Exhibit Oden's Answers, # 14 Exhibit Smith's Answers, # 15 Exhibit Wilde's Answers, # 16 Exhibit Brown's Answers, # 17 Exhibit Veterans Affairs website)(Kawski, Clayton)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 39 Declaration; The Court prefers that documents be extracted directly from your word processing software whenever possible and should include an electronic signature (s/signature). This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (blr) (Entered: 03/21/2012)
41 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 32 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs . (Rotker, Karyn)
42 DECLARATION of Karyn Rotker in Support of Reply Brief (as to Motion for Prel. Inj. as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs), Dkt. 41. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Def. Motion for Stay in NAACP State Court Case, # 2 Exhibit Def. Motion for Stay in League of Wmn Voters State Court Case, # 3 Exhibit Email communications btwn Def and Pl Counsel, # 4 Exhibit Red Cliff Tribal ID)(Rotker, Karyn)
43 DECLARATION of Lucille Berrien in Support of Reply Brief (as to Motion for Prel. Inj. as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs), Dkt. 41. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted military ID card, # 2 Exhibit Email chain confirming validity of ID)(Rotker, Karyn)
44 DECLARATION of Arvina Martin in Support of Reply Brief (as to Motion for Prel. Inj. as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs), Dkt. 41. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Tribal ID)(Rotker, Karyn)

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45 ANSWER to 31 Amended Complaint, by All Defendants.(Kawski, Clayton)
46 STIPULATION and Proposed Confidentiality Protective Order by All Plaintiffs. (Dupuis, Laurence)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 46 Stipulation; The proposed order should be filed as an attachment to the stipulation. Please ensure that the proposed order has been emailed to the proposed email box for the assigned judge in Word or WordPerfect format. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (blr) (Entered: 04/11/2012)
47 Joint MOTION to Amend/Correct Enlarge Revise Scheduling Order and Exceed Page Limitations by All Parties. (Kawski, Clayton). Added MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages on 4/12/2012 (blr).
48 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/12/12 granting 47 Motion to Amend/Correct; Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. See order for details. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rotker, Karyn)
50 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Rotker, Karyn)
51 DECLARATION of Marcella Althof in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
52 DECLARATION of Audrey Anderson in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
53 DECLARATION of Nancy Marcus in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Cover Sheet for DVD (to be filed by hand) − DVD Available in Judge's File)(Rotker, Karyn) Modified text on 4/23/2012 (blr).
54 DECLARATION of Samantha Meszaros in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
55 DECLARATION of Bridget Marion Nowak in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
56 DECLARATION of Ruth Ann Obermeyer in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
57 DECLARATION of Miriam Simon in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
58 DECLARATION of William Trokan in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
59 DECLARATION of Nancy Lea Wilde in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rotker, Karyn)
60 DECLARATION of Genevieve Winslow in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Rotker, Karyn)
61 DECLARATION of Mark Young in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A)(Rotker, Karyn)
62 DECLARATION of Karyn Rotker in Support of Preliminary Injunction. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attach A − Boardman Dep Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit Attach B − Fernan Dep Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit Attach C − Haas Dep Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit Attach D − Hein Dep Excerpts, # 5 Exhibit Attach E − Krueger Dep Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit Attach F −Lebwohl Dep Excerpts, # 7 Exhibit Attach G − Miller Dep Excerpts, # 8 Exhibit Attach H − Robinson Dep Excerpts, # 9 Exhibit Attach I − Turja Dep Excerpts, # 10 Exhibit Attach J − Expert Report, # 11 Exhibit Attach K − Article, # 12 Exhibit Attach L − USDOJ Objection to TX ID Law, # 13 Exhibit Attach M − Census (ACS) Tables, # 14 Exhibit Attach N − 2011 Point in Time Survey, # 15 Exhibit Attach O − HUD Homeless Assessment Rept, # 16 Exhibit Attach P − Census Rept on

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Resid Segregation, # 17 Exhibit Attach Q − US v New Berlin Consent Decree, # 18 Exhibit Attach R − Documents Produced in Discovery, # 19 Exhibit Dep Ex 20 − Article, # 20 Exhibit Dep Ex 25 − Email communication, # 21 Exhibit Dep Ex 30 − BDS 316, # 22 Exhibit Dep Ex 33 − Email communications, # 23 Exhibit Dep Ex 47 − DMV Tech & Training Update, # 24 Exhibit Dep Ex 48 − Email communication, # 25 Exhibit Dep Ex 49 − Email communication, # 26 Exhibit Dep Ex 50 − Email communication, # 27 Exhibit Dep Ex 51 − Meeting Minutes, # 28 Exhibit Dep Ex 52 − GAB Document, # 29 Exhibit Dep Ex 55 − BFS 14, # 30 Exhibit Dep Ex 56 − Email communication, # 31 Exhibit Dep Ex 57 − DMV Press Release, # 32 Exhibit Dep Ex 61 − Email communication, # 33 Exhibit Dep Ex 66 − Sec 215 of DLM, # 34 Exhibit Dep Ex 67 − Sec 110 of DLM, # 35 Exhibit Dep Ex 68 − Sec 410 of DLM, # 36 Exhibit Dep Ex 81 − Email communication, # 37 Exhibit Dep Ex 83 − Email communication, # 38 Exhibit Dep Ex 86 − Email communication, # 39 Exhibit Dep Ex 107 − Sec 225 of DLM, # 40 Exhibit Excerpt of Dep Ex 109 − GAB Elect Admin Plan)(Rotker, Karyn)
63 MOTION to Certify Class by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falls, Craig)
64 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 63 MOTION to Certify Class . (Falls, Craig)
65 DECLARATION of Edward Hogan in Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Falls, Craig)
66 DECLARATION of Anthony Judd In Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Falls, Craig)
67 DECLARATION of Max Kligman In Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Falls, Craig)
68 DECLARATION of Steve Kvasnicka In Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Falls, Craig)
69 DECLARATION of Anna Shea In Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Falls, Craig)
70 DECLARATION of Hannah J. Somers In Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Falls, Craig)
71 DECLARATION of Craig Falls in Support of Motion for Class Certification. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attach A − Turja Dep Excerpts, # 2 Exhibit Attach B − Hass Dep Excerpts, # 3 Exhibit Attach C − Hein Dep Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit Attach D − Dep Ex 111, # 5 Exhibit Attach E − Veterans Homelessnes Rept, # 6 Exhibit Attach F − Overview of Wisconsin Tech College System, # 7 Exhibit Attach G − W2 Take−up Study, # 8 Exhibit Attach H − Census (ACS) Tables)(Falls, Craig)
72 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/26/12. Telephone Status Conference set for 5/3/2012 10:30 AM before Judge Lynn Adelman. See order for dialing instructions. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
73 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephonic Status Conference held on 5/3/2012. Court will issue a scheduling order pursuant to the parties' agreement. (blr) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
74 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/3/2012. Telephone Status Conference before Judge Lynn Adelman set for 8/13/2012 at 10:30am. See Order for dialing instructions and for additional scheduling dates and instructions. Bench Trial before Judge Lynn Adelman set for 9/10/2012 at 10:00am. (cc: all counsel)(nts) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
75 CONFIDENTIALITY STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/9/12. See order for details. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
76 STIPULATION Regarding Confidentiality of SVRS Production by All Parties. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sherman, Jonathan)

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77 QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY STIPULATION FOR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION FROM THE STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/14/12. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
78 STIPULATION Regarding Plaintiffs' March 9 Requests for Production by All Parties. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Sherman, Jonathan)
79 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/21/12 approving 78 Stipulation. Plaintiffs' replies in support of their Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification due Friday June 22, 2012. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
80 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Supplemental Memorandum. (Rotker, Karyn)
81 DECLARATION of Karyn Rotker Authenticating Expert Report. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Expert Report and Disclosures of Prof. Marc Levine)(Rotker, Karyn)
82 NOTICE of Appearance by Clayton P Kawski on behalf of Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Timothy Vocke, Scott Walker. Attorney(s) appearing: Maria Lazar (Kawski, Clayton)
83 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 63 MOTION to Certify Class . (Lazar, Maria)
84 Second DECLARATION of Clayton P. Kawski . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A−April 27, 2012, email chain, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B−April 24, 2012, email chain)(Lazar, Maria) Modified text on 6/5/2012 (blr).
85 BRIEF in Opposition filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Timothy Vocke, Scott Walker re 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Benedon, Carrie)
86 DECLARATION of Carrie Benedon . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Aopy of Gonzalez v. Arizona, # 2 Exhibit B − Copy of a Transcript of the Deposition of Patrick Fernan that was held on April 2, 2012, in Madison, Wisconsin, # 3 Exhibit C − Copy of a Transcript of the Deposition of James Miller that was held on March 30, 2012, in Madison, Wisconsin.)(Benedon, Carrie)
87 MOTION to File Amicus Brief by Dorothy Janis, James Janis, Erin M Decker, Matthew Augustine, Robert Ziegelbauer. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Olson, Joseph)
88 DISCLOSURE Statement by Matthew Augustine, Erin M Decker, Dorothy Janis, James Janis, Robert Ziegelbauer. (Olson, Joseph)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 88 Disclosure Statement; All documents should contain an electronic signature (s/signature) of the attorney who files the document. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov. (blr) (Entered: 06/05/2012)
89 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/7/12 granting 87 Motion to File Amicus Brief. Further ordering that amici curiae brief due 6/8/12 and counsel for amici curiae are permitted to present oral argument in support of brief and in opposition to motion for preliminary injunction. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
90 MOTION for Reconsideration of Courts Order Permitting Filing of Amicus Brief and Oral Argument by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn)
91 BRIEF in Opposition filed by Matthew Augustine re 32 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction as to Eleven Named Plaintiffs, 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , 87 MOTION to File Amicus Brief . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Olson, Joseph)

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NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 91 Brief in Opposition to Motion, filed by Matthew Augustine ; Attachments to documents should be clearly described. This document does not need to be re−filed.; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov. (blr) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
92 LETTER from Plaintiffs' Counsel re Request for Reconsideration . (Sherman, Jonathan)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting plaintiffs an additional 15 pages for replies due 6/29/12 signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/13/12. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
93 DUPLICATE FILING − SEE 94 MOTION to Withdraw Notice of Withdrawal of Amici Curiea Robert Ziegelbauer and Erin Decker by Erin M Decker, Robert Ziegelbauer. (Olson, Joseph) Modified on 6/25/2012 (blr).
94 NOTICE by Erin M Decker, Robert Ziegelbauer Notice of Withdrawal of Amici Curiea Robert Ziegelbauer and Erin Decker (Olson, Joseph)
95 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . (Sherman, Jonathan)
96 DECLARATION of Gwen Moore . (Sherman, Jonathan)
97 DECLARATION of David Canon . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Sherman, Jonathan)
98 DECLARATION of Jon Sherman . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attachment A − Documents, # 2 Exhibit Attachment B − VA Form 1010EZ, # 3 Exhibit Attachment C − Patrick Fernan Deposition Excerpts, # 4 Exhibit Attachment D − Nathaniel Robinson Deposition Excerpts, # 5 Exhibit Deposition Exhibit 31)(Sherman, Jonathan)
99 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 63 MOTION to Certify Class . (Falls, Craig)
100 DECLARATION of Jon Sherman in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Falls, Craig)
101 DECLARATION of Monica Wedgewood . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Rouse Decl.), # 2 Exhibit B (Fondtaine Decl.), # 3 Exhibit C (Newcomb Decl.), # 4 Exhibit D (Conn Decl.))(Falls, Craig)
102 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION To Increase Number of Depositions That Plaintiffs May Take by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order re Plaintiffs' Motion to Increase Number of Depositions)(Sherman, Jonathan)
103 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/12/12 that defendants shall respond to plaintiffs motion to increase the number of depositions that plaintiffs may take 102 by July 13, 2012. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
104 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 102 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION To Increase Number of Depositions That Plaintiffs May Take . (Kawski, Clayton)
105 DECLARATION of Clayton P. Kawski . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Kawski, Clayton)
106 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/16/12 granting 102 Motion to increase number of depositions taken by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may take a maximum of 18 depositions. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
107 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Status Conference held on 8/15/2012,September trial for this case is postponed to a date next spring. Court will reserve time on October 10, 2012 at 10:30am for oral argument on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.Parties will notify court by sending a letter on October 8, 2012 if they will not need this time ( Status Conference set for 12/18/2012 10:30 AM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman.) (jcl)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 49 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . Motion Hearing set for 10/10/2012 10:30 AM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI

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53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (jcl) (Entered: 08/16/2012)
108 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Sherman, Jonathan)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 8/20/12 granting 108 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dartric Davis, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Anna Shea, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
109 LETTER from Laurence Dupuis regarding schedule. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Order Denying Stay in Milwaukee Br. NAACP v. Walker)(Dupuis, Laurence)
110 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel P Lennington on behalf of Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Scott Walker. Attorney(s) appearing: Daniel P. Lennington (Lennington, Daniel)
111 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/24/12. Telephone Status Conference set for 9/27/2012 10:00 AM before Judge Lynn Adelman. Participants must call in. See order. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
112 NOTICE of Appearance by Joseph Louis Olson on behalf of Matthew Augustine, Dorothy Janis, James Janis. Attorney(s) appearing: Michael T. Morley and Joseph Louis Olson (Olson, Joseph)
113 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephone Conference held on 9/27/2012; parties should be prepared for an immediate status conference if the state supreme court reverses the state court injunction (vkb)
114 LETTER from Plaintiffs' counsel to Court regarding status of state court voter ID proceedings. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit WI S.Ct. Order in League of Women Voters v Walker, # 2 Exhibit WI S.Ct. Order in NAACP v. Walker, # 3 Exhibit Article regarding AG comments on voter ID)(Rotker, Karyn)
115 LETTER from Clayton P. Kawski/Charles G. Curtis, Jr./Laurence J. Dupuis Regarding October 10, 2012 hearing. (Kawski, Clayton)
NOTICE by the Court. Injunction hearing scheduled for 10/10/12 at 10:30 a.m. is CANCELED. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
116 MOTION to File Amicus Brief by United States Justice Foundation. (Attachments: # 1 Brief, # 2 Proposed Order)(Fitzgerald, Lane)
NOTICE by the Court. Procedure for telephone status conference on 12/18/12 at 10:30 AM: Participants need to call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until we access the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
117 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Status Conference held on 12/18/2012, Court set follow−up TelephoneStatus Conference for 1/30/2013 10:30 AM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (jcl)
NOTICE by the Court. Procedure for telephone status conference on 1/30/13 at 10:30 AM: Participants need to call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until we access the call. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
118 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephonic Status Conference held on 1/30/2013. Court set follow−up status conference for July 29, 2013 at 1:30pm. Parties shoudl follow same call−in procedure. (Status Conference set for 7/29/2013 01:30 PM before Judge Lynn Adelman.) (blr)

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119 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Karen E. Cunningham by All Plaintiffs. (Johnson, Heather)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/6/13 granting 119 Unopposed MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Karen E. Cunningham filed by Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dartric Davis, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Anna Shea, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
120 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/26/2013 Granting 120 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Nancy G Abudu terminated. (cc: all counsel) (nts)
121 MOTION to Waive Attorney Admission Fees by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Jeremy Rosen)(Rotker, Karyn)
122 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney and Substitute Counsel by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn)
124 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Status Conference held on 7/29/2013; see scheduling order (vkb) (Entered: 07/30/2013)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/30/13 GRANTING 121 MOTION to Waive Attorney Admission Fees filed by Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dartric Davis, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Anna Shea, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/30/13 GRANTING 122 MOTION to Withdraw Heather Maria Johnson as Attorney and Substitute Jeremy Rosen filed by Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dartric Davis, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Anna Shea, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
123 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/30/13. Final Pretrial Conference set for 10/21/2013 10:30 AM in Room 364, 517 E. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. Pretrial reports due 10/14/2013; Court Trial set for 11/4/2013 10:00 AM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
125 NOTICE of Appearance by Dale E Ho on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: Dale E. Ho (Ho, Dale)
126 DISCLOSURE Statement by All Plaintiffs. (Ho, Dale)
127 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Exclude Defendants' Supplemental Witnesses by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn)
128 DECLARATION of Karyn Rotker in support of PlaintiffsCivil L. R. 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive Motion to Exclude Defendants Recently Disclosed Witnesses. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Attach. A − Defendants Supplemental Disclosures)(Rotker, Karyn)
129 LETTER from Assistant Attorney General Clayton P. Kawski . (Kawski, Clayton)
130 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 127 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Exclude Defendants' Supplemental Witnesses . (Kawski, Clayton)
131 DECLARATION of Clayton P. Kawski Fourth Declaration of Clayton P. Kawski. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Kawski, Clayton)
132 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/12/13. Status Conference set for 9/18/2013 11:00 AM in Courtroom 364, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(dm)

09/12/2013 09/12/2013 09/13/2013 09/16/2013
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133 NOTICE of Appearance by Sean J Young on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: Sean J. Young (Young, Sean)
134 DISCLOSURE Statement by All Plaintiffs. (Young, Sean)
Set/Reset Hearings: Status Conference set for 9/18/2013 11:00 AM will now be held on 9/16/2013 11:00 AM in Courtroom 364, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
135 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Status Conference held on 9/16/2013; Court DENIED Plaintiff's motion to exclude defendants; supplemental witnesses (docket #127). Plaintiffs may depose defendants' new witnesses, and they are free to object to any expert testimony offered by these witnesses at trial. Court gave parties permission to wait until after the trial to file their proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law. When they do so, they an cite to the record created at trial. Motions in limine are due 10/21/2013 and responses to those motions are due 10/28/2013. Follow−up telephone Status Conference set for 10/28/2013 01:00 PM in Courtroom 390, 517 E Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53202 before Judge Lynn Adelman. (jcl) Modified on 9/17/2013 (jcl). (Entered: 09/17/2013)
136 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Compel the Production of Complete and Un−redacted Survey Data by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
137 DECLARATION of Clayton P. Kawski Fifth Declaration of Clayton P. Kawski. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C)(Kawski, Clayton)
138 LETTER from Assistant Attorney General Clayton P. Kawski . (Kawski, Clayton)
139 EXHIBIT B to 137 Fifth Declaration of Clayton P. Kawski; one CD containing a database file in.csv format; IN JUDGE'S FILE(vkb) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
140 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Compel Deposition Testimony of Ruthelle Frank by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
141 DECLARATION of Assistant Attorney General Clayton P. Kawski Sixth Declaration of Clayton P. Kawski. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Kawski, Clayton)
142 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 136 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Compel the Production of Complete and Un−redacted Survey Data . (Young, Sean)
143 DECLARATION of Sean J. Young in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Civil L.R. 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive Motion to Compel Production of Un−Redacted Survey Data. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − FJC Guide on Survey Research, # 2 Exhibit B − AAPOR Code of Ethics)(Young, Sean)
144 DECLARATION of Matthew A. Barreto in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Civil L.R. 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive Motion to Compel Production of Un−Redacted Survey Data. (Young, Sean)
145 LETTER from Attorney for Plaintiffs Sean J. Young . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Email Correspondence, # 2 Exhibit B − Pls.' Opp'n to Mot. to Compel Prod. of Un−Redacted Data)(Young, Sean)
146 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/27/13 denying 136 Motion to Compel. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
147 NOTICE of Appearance by Angela M Liu on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: Angela M. Liu (Liu, Angela)
NOTICE by the Court. Procedure for 10/7/13 1:00 PM telephone status conference: Participants need to call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until we access the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)

10/01/2013 10/01/2013
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148 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 140 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Compel Deposition Testimony of Ruthelle Frank . (Young, Sean)
149 DECLARATION of Sean J. Young in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Civil L.R. 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony of Ruthelle Frank. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Frank Deposition Transcript, # 2 Exhibit B − Complete E−mail Correspondence Between Counsel)(Young, Sean)
150 STIPULATION Confidentiality Stipulation and Agreed Qualified Protective Order for Production of Information from the Statewide Voter Registration System by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, Dartric Davis, Matthew Dearing, David G Deininger, Pamela Dukes, Carl Ellis, Ruthelle Frank, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Edward Hogan, Tracy Jo Howard, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Samantha Meszaros, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Barbara Oden, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Timothy Vocke, Scott Walker, Domonique Whitehurst. (Kawski, Clayton)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 150 Stipulation filed by defendants; The proposed order should be filed as an attachment to the stipulation. Please ensure that the proposed order has been emailed to the proposed email box for the assigned judge in Word or WordPerfect format. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (vkb)
153 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Status Conference held on 10/7/2013; The deadline for pretrial reports is now 10/18/2013. Exhibits should be submitted Wednesday 10/30/2013. Motions in limine are due 10/23/2013 and response briefs are due 10/30/2013 (jcl) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
151 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 10/8/13 denying 140 Motion to Compel. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
152 CONFIDENTIALITY STIPULATION AND AGREED QUALIFIED PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION FROM THE STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM approving 150 Stipulation signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 10/8/13. See order. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
NOTICE by the Court. FINAL PRETRIAL on 10/21/2013 at 10:30 AM will now be held by telephone. Participants need to call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until we access the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
154 PRETRIAL REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Trial Exhibit List)(Young, Sean)
155 Civil Local Rule 16(c) PRETRIAL REPORT by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
156 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Final Pretrial Conference held on 10/21/2013; Parties discussed schedule for trial (jcl)
157 MOTION in Limine by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Falls, Craig)
158 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 157 MOTION in Limine . (Falls, Craig)
159 DECLARATION of Craig G. Falls in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in LImine (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(Falls, Craig)
160 DECLARATION of Laurence J. Dupuis in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Falls, Craig)

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161 DECLARATION of Ruthelle Frank in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine (Falls, Craig)
162 DECLARATION of Laurence J. Dupuis in further support of motion in limine (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A − Letter from Dr. Murdock)(Dupuis, Laurence)
163 RESPONSE to Motion filed by All Defendants re 157 MOTION in Limine Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine. (Lennington, Daniel)
165 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Court Trial held on 11/4/2013; See transcript for details (Court Reporter John Schindhelm) (jcl) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
164 Exhibit List by All Defendants. (Lazar, Maria)
166 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Court Trial continued on 11/05,11/06,11/07 and completed on 11/8/2013 (Court Reporter John Schindhelm) (jcl) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
170 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Court Trial held on 11/12/2013; See transcripts for details (Court Reporter John Schindhelm) (jcl) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
171 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Court Trial completed on 11/14/2013;Court trial continued on 11/14/2013 and completed on 11/15/2013;see transcripts for details(Court Reporter John Schindhelm) (jcl) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
167 MOTION for Judgment Defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) Motion for Judgment on Partial Findings as to the Claims of Certain Plaintiffs by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
168 Seventh DECLARATION of Clayton P. Kawski (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C)(Kawski, Clayton)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 168 Declaration; The description of the attachments contains duplicate text. In the future, when attaching documents to the main document you may select a description from the category drop−down list but then you should not repeat that word in the description text box. For example, if you choose Exhibit from the drop−down list, then you may simply type A in the description text box and Exhibit A will appear on the docket. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (vkb)
169 Exhibit List by All Plaintiffs. (Steiner, Neil)
172 Exhibit List by All Defendants. (Lazar, Maria)
173 NOTICE by All Defendants Notice of Withdrawal (Lennington, Daniel)
174 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/22/13. Parties' post−trial briefs due 12/20/2013. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
175 LETTER from Maria S. Lazar . (Lazar, Maria)
176 TRIAL BRIEF Defendants' Post−Trial Brief by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
177 TRIAL BRIEF Frank Plaintiffs' Post−Trial Brief by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn) Amended brief filed at 194 ; Modified on 1/17/2014 (vkb)
178 TRANSCRIPT of MASTER INDEX OF COURT TRIAL held on 11/4/13 to 11/13/13 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)

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179 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 1 held on 11/4/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
180 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 2 held on 11/5/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
181 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 3 held on 11/6/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
182 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 4 held on 11/7/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
183 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 5 held on 11/8/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
184 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 6 held on 11/12/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)

12/30/2013
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01/03/2014 01/06/2014 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 01/08/2014 01/16/2014 01/16/2014 04/29/2014 04/29/2014 05/06/2014 05/07/2014 05/12/2014
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185 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 7 held on 11/14/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
186 TRANSCRIPT of COURT TRIAL VOL 8 held on 11/15/2013 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 1/24/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/3/2014. (Schindhelm, John)
187 NOTICE of Intent to Redact by Sean J Young re 179 Transcript,,, 181 Transcript,,, 182 Transcript,,, 180 Transcript,,, (Young, Sean)
188 Transcript Redaction Statement re 179 Transcript,,, 181 Transcript,,, 182 Transcript,,, 180 Transcript,,, by attorney Sean J Young (Young, Sean)
189 REDACTION re 179 Transcript (Schindhelm, John)
190 REDACTION re 180 Transcript (Schindhelm, John)
191 REDACTION re 181 Transcript (Schindhelm, John)
192 REDACTION re 182 Transcript (Schindhelm, John)
193 LETTER from Attorney for Plaintiffs Sean J. Young . (Young, Sean)
194 AMENDED TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiffs' Amended Post−Trial Brief by All Plaintiffs. (Rotker, Karyn) Modified on 1/17/2014 (vkb)
195 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/29/14 denying as moot 63 Motion to Certify Class; denying as moot 167 Motion for Judgment. Finally ordering the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment consistent with this opinion. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
196 JUDGMENT signed by Deputy Clerk and approved as to form by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/29/14. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
197 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Request Fees & Costs by All Parties. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation of Parties, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Dupuis, Laurence)
198 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/7/14 granting 197 Motion for Extension of Time. All issues relating to an award of attorneys fees and costs shall be held in abeyance until any such appeals are decided. See order. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
199 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 195 Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Judgment,, 196 Judgment by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Scott Walker. Filing Fee PAID $505, receipt number 0757−1888397 (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 Decision and Order, dated April 29, 2014, # 2 Judgment, dated April 29, 2014)(Kawski, Clayton)
200 Docketing Statement by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J

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Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Scott Walker re 199 Notice of Appeal,, (cc: all counsel) (Kawski, Clayton)
201 MOTION to Stay Notice of Motion and Motion to Stay Permanent Injunction Pending Appeal by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Mark Gottlieb, Barney L Hall, Tracy Jo Howard, Lynne B Judd, Kevin J Kennedy, Patricia A Nelson, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Scott Walker. (Kawski, Clayton)
202 7th Circuit Information Sheet re: 199 Notice of Appeal, (dlm)
203 Attorney Cover Letter re: 199 Notice of Appeal, (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet)(dlm)
204 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 199 Notice of Appeal, (dlm)
205 USCA Case Number 14−2058 re: 199 Notice of Appeal, filed by Scott Walker, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Lynne B Judd, Tracy Jo Howard, Kristina Boardman, David G Deininger, Thomas Cane, Barney L Hall, Kevin J Kennedy, Michael Brennan, Mark Gottlieb, Donald J Genin, Patricia A Nelson, Thomas Barland, Nathaniel E Robinson, Sandra M Brisco, Gerald Nichol and Donald Reincke. (lmt) (Entered: 05/13/2014)
206 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 201 MOTION to Stay Notice of Motion and Motion to Stay Permanent Injunction Pending Appeal . (Rotker, Karyn)
207 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Defendants re 201 MOTION to Stay Notice of Motion and Motion to Stay Permanent Injunction Pending Appeal . (Kawski, Clayton)
208 Exhibit List. (cms)
209 EXHIBITS received Exhibit list filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List) (cms)
210 LETTER from Clayton P. Kawski . (Kawski, Clayton)
211 LETTER from Plaintiffs regarding Defendants' motion to stay and State Supreme Court decisions. (Dupuis, Laurence)
212 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 8/13/14 denying 201 Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
213 Appeal Record Request received from 7th Cir. Re: USCA Case Number 14−2058, 14−2059. (dlm) (Entered: 08/20/2014)
214 Certified Record on Appeal Transmitted to US Court of Appeals 14−2058, 2059 in PDF format sent via US mail (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet)(dlm)
215 ORDER of USCA 14−2058 and 14−2059 The appeals remain under advisement and an opinion on the merits will issue in due course. (dlm) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
216 ORDER of USCA re 199 Notice of Appeal. IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a stay of mandate is GRANTED. (lmt) (Entered: 10/16/2014)
217 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time Joint Motion For An Order Holding In Abeyance Proceedings Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs; Stipulation and Proposed Order Thereon by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Joint Stipulation, # 2 Proposed Order)(Foster, Nathan)
218 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/4/14 granting 217 Motion for Extension of Time. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
219 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Plaintiffs. (Rosen, Jeremy)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 219 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Rickie Lamont Harmon, Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dewayne Smith, Dartric Davis, Nancy Lea Wilde, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Frank Ybarra, Anna Shea, Sam Bulmer, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Shirley Brown, Mariannis Ginorio, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 1/26/15. (cc: all counsel)(dm)

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220 ORDER of USCA 14−2058 re 199 There is accordingly no controversy requiring judicial resolution, and the application for a renewed stay is DENIED as moot. (see order for details). (dl)
221 USCA Mandate (certified copy) USCA Number 14−2058 There is accordingly no controversy requiring judicial resolution, and the application for a renewed stay is DENIED as moot. Bill of costs attached and record on appeal consisting of 2 boxes of exhibits to be returned at a later date. (see order for details). (dl)
222 MOTION for Permanent Injunction , MOTION to Certify Class , MOTION for Judgment on Remaining As−Applied Claims by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Young, Sean)
223 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 222 MOTION for Permanent Injunction MOTION to Certify Class MOTION for Judgment on Remaining As−Applied Claims . (Young, Sean)
Appeal Record Returned consisting of 2 boxes of exhibits re 199 Notice of Appeal (lmf)
224 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 3/30/15. Telephone status conference set for 4/1/2015 11:00 AM CST before Judge Lynn Adelman. Participants will need to call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. Participants will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until the court accesses the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
225 Expedite MOTION to Bifurcate Class Certification and Suspend Other Briefing by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
226 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Status Conference held on 4/1/2015; Defendants' motion to bifurcate class certification and suspend other briefing is denied. Defendants' brief in opposition to plaintiffs' latest motion is due 04/24/2015. Plaintiffs' reply brief is due 05/15/2015 (jcl)
227 BILL OF COSTS Proposed by All Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Itemization of Fees for Court Reporter and Transcripts, # 2 Exhibit Itemization of Fees for Witnesses)(Kawski, Clayton)
228 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 222 MOTION for Permanent Injunction MOTION to Certify Class MOTION for Judgment on Remaining As−Applied Claims . (Kawski, Clayton)
229 DECLARATION of Kristina H. Boardman (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − MV3012 Form, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B − Certified Records)(Kawski, Clayton)
230 DECLARATION of Kevin J. Kennedy (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A − Statement of Scope, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B − Governor Approval Letter, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C − Letter to LRB)(Kawski, Clayton)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 227 Bill of Costs filed by defendants; To ensure proper processing of the Bill of Costs this document must be submitted using the form provided on our web site; please use the proper form and email it (do not re−file it) to wied_clerks_milw@wied.uscourts.gov (vkb)
231 BRIEFING LETTER re: Proposed Bill of Costs Electronically Transmitted to Parties (vkb)
232 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to Reply and MOTION for Leave to File an Oversized Reply Memorandum by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Young, Sean). Added MOTION for Leave to File on 5/4/2015 (vkb)
233 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/5/15 granting 232 Motion for Extension of Time; Motion for Leave to File. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
234 RESPONSE filed by All Plaintiffs re 227 Bill of Costs (Ho, Dale)
235 LETTER from Atty Kawski to Judge Adelman . (Attachments: # 1 Letter from Gov. Walker to Kennedy−Approval Ch GAB 10, # 2 Exhibit Wis. Admin Code GAB Emergency Rule)(Kawski, Clayton)

05/19/2015 05/22/2015 05/22/2015
05/26/2015 05/27/2015 06/03/2015 07/23/2015 07/25/2015 08/06/2015 09/04/2015
09/14/2015
09/16/2015 10/02/2015 10/05/2015 10/12/2015 10/19/2015

236 BRIEF filed by All Defendants re 227 Bill of Costs, 234 Response (Non−Motion) Def's Br. in Opp'n to Pl's Objections to Bill of Costs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Invoices)(Kawski, Clayton)
237 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 222 MOTION for Permanent Injunction MOTION to Certify Class MOTION for Judgment on Remaining As−Applied Claims . (Young, Sean)
238 DECLARATION of Sean J. Young (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Frederick Decl., # 2 Exhibit 2 − Duerst Decl., # 3 Exhibit 3 − Baker Decl., # 4 Exhibit 4 − Munson Decl., # 5 Exhibit 5 − Qualls Decl., # 6 Exhibit 6 − Davis Decl., # 7 Exhibit 7 − Thompson Decl., # 8 Exhibit 8 − Flower Decl., # 9 Exhibit 9 − Fr. Ex. 372, # 10 Exhibit 10 − Fr. Ex. 606, # 11 Exhibit 11 − Fr. Ex. 1, # 12 Exhibit 12 − Fr. Ex. 600, # 13 Exhibit 13 − Fr. Ex. 5, # 14 Exhibit 14 − VA Webpage, # 15 Exhibit 15 − NCSL Webpage, # 16 Exhibit 16 − State Voter ID Webpages, # 17 Exhibit 17 − DOD Webpage, # 18 Exhibit 18 − Indiana BMV Webpage, # 19 Exhibit 19 − Emergency Rule, # 20 Exhibit 20 − Kennedy Mem., # 21 Exhibit 21 − WTCS Report, # 22 Exhibit 22 − S. Carolina Aff.)(Young, Sean)
239 REPLY filed by All Plaintiffs re 227 Bill of Costs, 234 Response (Non−Motion) Plaintiffs' Reply in Objection to Defendants' Bill of Costs. (Rotker, Karyn)
240 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Strike Pl's Evidence Filed on Reply and to Strike Portions of Pl's Reply Brief by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
241 RESPONSE to Motion filed by All Plaintiffs re 240 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Strike Pl's Evidence Filed on Reply and to Strike Portions of Pl's Reply Brief . (Young, Sean)
242 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by All Defendants. (Lazar, Maria)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/25/15 granting 242 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Maria S Lazar terminated. (cc: all counsel) (lls) (Entered: 07/27/2015)
243 LETTER from Attorney Sean J. Young re: Supplemental Legal Authority. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14−41127 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015))(Young, Sean)
244 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/4/15 setting telephone conference for 9/14/2015 11:00 AM CST before Judge Lynn Adelman to schedule oral argument on 222 . Participants will need to call in for the conference as follows: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. Participants will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be put on hold until the court accesses the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
245 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/14/2015; Oral Argument Hearing set for 10/5/2015 11:00 AM before Judge Lynn Adelman; Each side limited to 30 minutes (jcl) (Entered: 09/15/2015)
246 NOTICE of Appearance by Sophia L Lakin on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: Sophia Lin Lakin (Lakin, Sophia)
247 NOTICE of Change of Address by Angela M Liu (Liu, Angela)
248 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman:Oral Argument Hearing held on 10/5/2015; Oral argument held (Court Reporter John Schindhelm) (jcl) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
249 NOTICE of Appearance by Brian P Keenan on behalf of All Defendants. Attorney(s) appearing: Brian P. Keenan (Keenan, Brian)
250 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 10/19/15 denying 222 Motion for Permanent Injunction, Motion to Certify Class and Motion for Judgment; denying 240 Motion to Strike. Further ordering that the claim of Domonique Whitehurst is dismissed as unripe. Further ordering that the claims of Samantha Meszaros and Matthew Dearing are dismissed as moot. Further ordering that the claims of Sam Bulmer, Carl Ellis, and Rickie Lamont Harmon are dismissed on the

11/02/2015
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merits. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
251 TRANSCRIPT of ORAL ARGUMENT held on 10/5/2015 before Judge Lynn Adelman Court Reporter/Transcriber John Schindhelm, Contact at WWW.JOHNSCHINDHELM.COM to order directly... Or. Transcripts may be purchased using the Transcript Order Form found on our website or viewed at the court public terminal. NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: If necessary, within 7 business days each party shall inform the Court of their intent to redact personal identifiers by filing a Notice of Intent to Redact. Please read the policy located on our website www.wied.uscourts.gov Redaction Statement due 11/27/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/7/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/4/2016. (Schindhelm, John)
252 LETTER from Attorney Sean J. Young re: judgment per Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). (Young, Sean)
253 JUDGMENT signed by Deputy Clerk on 11/5/15. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
254 Joint MOTION for Attorney Fees Proceedings to be Held in Abeyance by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulation to Hold in Abeyance, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Kawski, Clayton)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 254 Joint MOTION for Attorney Fees Proceedings to be Held in Abeyance filed by Scott Walker, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Lynne B Judd, Tracy Jo Howard, Kristina Boardman, Timothy Vocke, David G Deininger, Thomas Cane, Barney L Hall, Kevin J Kennedy, Michael Brennan, Mark Gottlieb, Donald J Genin, Patricia A Nelson, Thomas Barland, Nathaniel E Robinson, Sandra M Brisco, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke ; The Stipulation to this document should have been filed as separate entry. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing and the user manual found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (jcl) (Entered: 11/13/2015)
255 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/13/15 granting 254 Motion for Attorney Fees Proceedings to be Held in Abeyance. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
256 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 253 Judgment, 250 Order on Motion for Permanent Injunction, Order on Motion to Certify Class, Order on Motion for Judgment, Order on Motion to Strike,,,,,,,, by All Plaintiffs. Filing Fee PAID $505, receipt number 0757−2222337 (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 Decision and Order, # 2 Judgment)(Rotker, Karyn)
257 Docketing Statement by All Plaintiffs re 256 Notice of Appeal, (cc: all counsel) (Rotker, Karyn)
258 Attorney Cover Letter re: 256 Notice of Appeal, (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet)(dl)
259 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 256 Notice of Appeal, (dl)
260 USCA Case Number 15−3582 re: 256 Notice of Appeal filed by all plaintiff's.(lmf) (Entered: 11/18/2015)
261 Appeal Record Request received from 7th Cir. Re: USCA Case Number 15−3582. (dl)
262 Certified Record on Appeal 15−3582 Transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 256 Notice of Appeal (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 docket sheet)(dl)
263 USCA Mandate (certified copy)The portions of the district courts decision that have not been appealed stand. The portion that concerns veterans ID is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss that aspect of the litigation as moot. The remainder of the decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. Appellants shall recover costs. as to 256 Notice of Appeal, filed by Rickie Lamont Harmon, Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dewayne Smith, Dartric Davis, Nancy Lea Wilde, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Frank Ybarra, Anna Shea, Sam Bulmer, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Shirley Brown, Mariannis Ginorio, Pamela Dukes,

05/04/2016 05/06/2016
05/06/2016 05/12/2016 05/12/2016
05/24/2016
05/25/2016 05/25/2016 05/25/2016 05/26/2016 05/26/2016 05/31/2016 06/01/2016 06/03/2016
06/06/2016 06/06/2016

Max Kligman, Justin Luft USCA Number 15−3582 ;REOPENED (dmm)
264 LETTER from Attorney Sean J. Young . (Young, Sean)
265 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/6/16. A telephone status conference will be held on May 12, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. CST. The court will initiate the call. Counsel are asked to call 414/297−1285 to provide contact information.. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
Reset Hearings: TIME CHANGE ONLY−−Telephone status conference set for 5/12/2016 before Judge Lynn Adelman will commence at 1:00 PM CST. The court will initiate the call. (dm)
266 NOTICE of Appearance by Sean Michael Murphy on behalf of All Defendants. Attorney(s) appearing: S. Michael Murphy (Murphy, Sean)
267 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephonic Status Conference held on 5/12/2016; The parties shall execute a protective order relating to the confidentiality of discovery materials produced in the pending W.D. Wis. voter ID case, and the defendants shall produce those discovery materials to the plaintiff in this case within two weeks. Status Conference set for 6/7/2016 01:00 PM by telephone before Judge Lynn Adelman. (bx)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 268 Stipulation filed by Scott Walker, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Lynne B Judd, Tracy Jo Howard, Kristina Boardman, Timothy Vocke, David G Deininger, Thomas Cane, Barney L Hall, Kevin J Kennedy, Michael Brennan, Mark Gottlieb, Donald J Genin, Patricia A Nelson, Thomas Barland, Nathaniel E Robinson, Sandra M Brisco, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke ; The proposed order should be filed as an attachment to the stipulation. Please ensure that the proposed order has been emailed to the proposed email box for the assigned judge in Word or WordPerfect format. This document does not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing and the user manual found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (jcl) (Entered: 05/25/2016)
268 STIPULATION & Agreed Qualified Protective Order by All Defendants. (Murphy, Sean)
269 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/25/16. The Confidentiality Stipulation and Agreed Qualified Protective Order 268 shall stand as the Order of this court. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
270 LETTER from Attorney Sean J. Young . (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Young, Sean)
271 LETTER from Attorney S. Michael Murphy in Opposition to DKT 270. (Murphy, Sean)
272 ORDER re confidentiality signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 5/26/16. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
273 LETTER from Laurence Dupuis re Order extending protective order to ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation and National Law Center for Homelessness & Poverty. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Dupuis, Laurence)
274 ORDER amending Confidentiality Stipulation and Agreed Qualified Protective Order 268 signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/1/16. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
NOTICE by the Court. CALL−IN PROCEDURE for telephonic status conference scheduled for 6/7/2016 at 1:00 PM: dial access number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be placed on hold until we access the call. (dm)
275 LETTER from AAG S. Michael Murphy on behalf of the defendants to Honorable Lynn Adelman re upcoming Status Conference on June 7, 2016. (Murphy, Sean)
276 LETTER from Attorney Sean J. Young in response to Defendants' June 6, 2016 letter. (Young, Sean)

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277 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephonic Status Conference held on 6/7/2016; Court will not stay this case pending outcome of One Wisconsin case. Plaintiffs state that they intend to file their motion for preliminary injunction by mid−June. (bx) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
278 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Young, Sean)
279 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 278 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification . (Young, Sean)
280 DECLARATION of Sean J. Young in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit 24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29 Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32, # 33 Exhibit 33, # 34 Exhibit 34, # 35 Exhibit 35, # 36 Exhibit 36, # 37 Exhibit 37, # 38 Exhibit 38, # 39 Exhibit 39, # 40 Exhibit 40, # 41 Exhibit 41, # 42 Exhibit 42, # 43 Exhibit 43, # 44 Exhibit 44, # 45 Exhibit 45, # 46 Exhibit 46, # 47 Exhibit 47, # 48 Exhibit 48, # 49 Exhibit 49, # 50 Exhibit 50, # 51 Exhibit 51, # 52 Exhibit 52, # 53 Exhibit 53, # 54 Exhibit 54, # 55 Exhibit 55, # 56 Exhibit 56, # 57 Exhibit 57, # 58 Exhibit 58, # 59 Exhibit 59, # 60 Exhibit 60, # 61 Exhibit 61, # 62 Exhibit 62, # 63 Exhibit 63, # 64 Exhibit 64, # 65 Exhibit 65, # 66 Exhibit 66, # 67 Exhibit 67, # 68 Exhibit 68, # 69 Exhibit 69, # 70 Exhibit 70, # 71 Exhibit 71, # 72 Exhibit 72, # 73 Exhibit 73, # 74 Exhibit 74, # 75 Exhibit 75)(Young, Sean)
281 MOTION to Expedite Briefing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification by All Plaintiffs. (Young, Sean)
TEXT ONLY ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/13/16. IT IS ORDERED that the defendants shall respond to the plaintiffs' motion to expedite briefing on their motion for a preliminary injunction and related matters no later than June 14, 2016. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
282 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 281 MOTION to Expedite Briefing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification . (Murphy, Sean)
283 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 6/15/16 granting 281 Motion to Expedite to the extent that the defendants shall file their brief in response to plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction on or before June 29, 2016. Plaintiffs' reply brief due July 8, 2016. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
284 LETTER from Attorney Sean J. Young re: Supplemental Legal Authority. (Young, Sean)
285 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Defendants re 278 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification . (Murphy, Sean)
286 DECLARATION of Michael Haas (Murphy, Sean)
287 DECLARATION of Kristina Boardman (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1013 (Boardman Dec.) − Wisconsin Identification Card (ID) Application (form MV3004), # 2 Exhibit 1014 (Boardman Dec.) − DX168 Free State IDs issued from July 2011 − April 2016, # 3 Exhibit 1015 (Boardman Dec.) − DMV Administrator Petition − Unavailable Documentation (form MV3012), # 4 Exhibit 1016 (Boardman Dec.) − DX294 CAFU Processing Petitioner Applications−Internal, # 5 Exhibit 1017 (Boardman Dec.) − DX280 Monthly ID Petition Record Process Report, # 6 Exhibit 1018 (Boardman Dec.) − DX282 Common Law Name Change Process, # 7 Exhibit 1019 (Boardman Dec.) − DX278 Affidavit of Common Law Name Change, # 8 Exhibit 1020 (Boardman Dec.) − Page from PX445 Photo ID Reciept)(Murphy, Sean)

06/29/2016
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07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/22/2016 07/25/2016
07/25/2016

288 DECLARATION of S. Michal Murphy (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1001 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_16_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 1002 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_17_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 3 Exhibit 1003 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_18_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 4 Exhibit 1004 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_19_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 5 Exhibit 1005 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_20_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 6 Exhibit 1006 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_23_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 7 Exhibit 1007 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_24_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 8 Exhibit 1008 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_25_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 9 Exhibit 1009 (Murphy Dec.) − 5_26_16 Court Trial Transcript, # 10 Exhibit 1010 (Murphy Dec.) − Plaintiffs' Admitted Exhibit List, # 11 Exhibit 1011 (Murphy Dec.) − Defendants' Admitted Exhibits List, # 12 Exhibit 1012 (Murphy Dec.) − DVD of Defendants Admitted Exhibits, # 13 Exhibit 1021 (Murphy Dec.) − DVD of Plaintiffs' Admitted Exhibits CONFIDENTIAL FILED UNDER SEAL)(Murphy, Sean)
289 MOTION to Restrict Document Dkt. 288−13: Ex. 1021 filed with Murphy Decl. by All Defendants. (Murphy, Sean)
290 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Strike by All Defendants. (Kawski, Clayton)
291 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 278 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , Leave to File Supplemental Pleading, and Class Certification . (Young, Sean)
292 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 290 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Strike . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Young, Sean)
293 LETTER from AAG S. Michael Murphy re: Updates to parrallell litigation and photo receipt renewals. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A − Transcript of Oral Argument held 6−30−16, # 2 Attachment B − IDPP Renewal Cover Letter, # 3 Attachment C − IDPP Newly−issued Cover Letter)(Murphy, Sean)
294 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/19/2016 Granting 278 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Granting Motion to file a supplemental complaint; Granting Motion for class certification; Granting 289 Motion to Seal Document; Denying 290 Motion to Strike; Dismissing as Moot claims involving veterans' ID cards. (cc: all counsel) (lls)
295 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 294 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion to Seal Document, Order on Motion to Strike,,, by All Defendants. Filing Fee PAID $505, receipt number 0757−2387085 (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 Frank v. Walker Decision & Order issued 7−19−16 [Dkt 294])(Murphy, Sean)
296 Docketing Statement by All Defendants re 295 Notice of Appeal, (cc: all counsel) (Murphy, Sean)
297 MOTION to Stay PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL by All Defendants. (Murphy, Sean)
298 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Expedite BRIEFING & A DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL by All Defendants. (Murphy, Sean)
299 Attorney Cover Letter re: 295 Notice of Appeal, (Attachments: # 1 Docket Sheet)(dmm)
300 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 295 Notice of Appeal, (dmm)
301 USCA Case Number 16−3003 Seventh Circuit re: 295 Notice of Appeal, filed by Scott Walker, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Lynne B Judd, Tracy Jo Howard, Kristina Boardman, Timothy Vocke, David G Deininger, Thomas Cane, Barney L Hall, Kevin J Kennedy, Michael Brennan, Mark Gottlieb, Donald J Genin, Patricia A Nelson, Thomas Barland, Nathaniel E Robinson, Sandra M Brisco, Gerald Nichol, Donald Reincke. (dmm)
302 RESPONSE to Motion filed by All Plaintiffs re 298 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Expedite BRIEFING & A DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL . (Dupuis, Laurence)

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08/10/2016
08/12/2016

TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 298 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION to Expedite BRIEFING & A DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/25/16. Plaintiffs' brief due 7/26/2016, defendants' reply due 7/27/2016. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
303 SUPPLEMENT by Ruthelle Frank Supplemental Complaint. (Young, Sean)
304 BRIEF in Opposition filed by All Plaintiffs re 297 MOTION to Stay PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL . (Young, Sean)
305 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by All Defendants re 297 MOTION to Stay PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL . (Murphy, Sean)
306 NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL as to 294 Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion to Seal Document, Order on Motion to Strike,,, by Shirley Brown, Sam Bulmer, Dartric Davis, Matthew Dearing, Pamela Dukes, Carl Ellis, Ruthelle Frank, Mariannis Ginorio, Rickie Lamont Harmon, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Samantha Meszaros, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Domonique Whitehurst, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra. Filing Fee PAID $505, receipt number 0757−2390307. (Young, Sean)
307 Docketing Statement by All Plaintiffs re 306 Notice of Cross Appeal,, (cc: all counsel) (Young, Sean)
308 Attorney Cover Letter re: 306 Notice of Cross Appeal,, (Attachments: # 1 Docket Sheet)(dmm)
309 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 306 Notice of Cross Appeal,, (dmm)
310 USCA Case Number 16−3052 Seventh Circuit re: 306 Notice of Cross Appeal,, filed by Rickie Lamont Harmon, Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Matthew Dearing, Dewayne Smith, Dartric Davis, Nancy Lea Wilde, Domonique Whitehurst, Ruthelle Frank, Anthony Sharp, Carl Ellis, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Samantha Meszaros, Frank Ybarra, Anna Shea, Sam Bulmer, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Shirley Brown, Mariannis Ginorio, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Justin Luft. (dmm)
311 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 7/29/16 denying 297 Defendants' Motion to Stay. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
312 RESPONSE filed by All Defendants re 303 Supplement COMPLAINT (Murphy, Sean)
313 ORDER of USCA The injunction entered by the district court on July 19, 2016, is stayed pending appeal re 306 Notice of Cross Appeal and 295 Notice of Appeal,(dmm)
314 NOTICE of Appearance by Jody J Schmelzer on behalf of Kristina Boardman, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker. Attorney(s) appearing: Jody J. Schmelzer (Schmelzer, Jody)
315 NOTICE of Appearance by Gabe Johnson−Karp on behalf of Kristina Boardman, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker. Attorney(s) appearing: Gabe Johnson−Karp (Johnson−Karp, Gabe)
316 AMENDED ANSWER to 303 Plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Lynne B Judd, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker. (Murphy, Sean) Modified on 8/15/2016 (bx).

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317 WRONG DOC ATTACHED SEE DOC 318ORDER of USCA The motion for reconsideration of our order staying the district courts injunction is denied. re 306 Notice of Cross Appeal, 295 Notice of Appeal. (dmm) Modified on 8/16/2016 (dmm).
318 ORDER of USCA The motion for reconsideration of our order staying the district courts injunction is denied. re 306 Notice of Cross Appeal,, 295 Notice of Appeal, (dmm)
319 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order on behalf of new proposed Plaintiff Andrew Voegele, MOTION to File Supplemental Complaint adding Plaintiff Andrew Voegele by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Young, Sean)
320 BRIEF in Support filed by All Plaintiffs re 319 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order on behalf of new proposed Plaintiff Andrew Voegele MOTION to File Supplemental Complaint adding Plaintiff Andrew Voegele . (Young, Sean)
321 DECLARATION of Sean J. Young in support of Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Andrew Voegele, # 2 Exhibit Proposed Supplemental Complaint on behalf of Andrew Voegele)(Young, Sean)
322 ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/9/16 that defendants shall file a response to the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and motion to file a supplemental complaint no later than 9:00 a.m. on November 10, 2016. (cc: all counsel)(dm) Modified on 11/9/2016 (dm).
323 BRIEF in Opposition filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Lynne B Judd, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker re 319 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order on behalf of new proposed Plaintiff Andrew Voegele MOTION to File Supplemental Complaint adding Plaintiff Andrew Voegele . (Murphy, Sean)
324 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by Shirley Brown, Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Ruthelle Frank, Mariannis Ginorio, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra re 319 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order on behalf of new proposed Plaintiff Andrew Voegele MOTION to File Supplemental Complaint adding Plaintiff Andrew Voegele . (Young, Sean)
325 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 11/10/16 that the plaintiffs motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint is GRANTED. Further ordering that the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED. (cc: all counsel) (dm)
326 SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT by Shirley Brown, Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Ruthelle Frank, Mariannis Ginorio, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra Supplemental Complaint. (Young, Sean) Modified on 11/14/2016 (jcl).
327 RESPONSE filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Lynne B Judd, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker re 326 Supplement, (Murphy, Sean)
328 Appeal Record Request received from 7th Cir. Re: USCA Case Number 16−3003 & 16−3052. (dmm)
329 Certified Record on Appeal Transmitted to US Court of Appeals consisting of 2 vols of pleadings & 2 loose pleadings Doc # 280 & 288 all in PDF format sent via email to

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USCA re 306 Notice of Cross Appeal,, 295 Notice of Appeal, (cc: all counsel) (Attachments: # 1 Docket Sheet)(dmm)
330 LETTER from Sean Young, Attorney for Plaintiffs to The Honorable Lynn Adelman. (Young, Sean)
331 RESPONSE filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Lynne B Judd, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker re 330 Letter (Murphy, Sean)
332 SCHEDULING ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 12/27/16. Status Conference set for 1/30/2017 10:30 AM by telephone before Judge Lynn Adelman. Participants need to call in for the conference as follows: dialaccess number 1−877−336−1839. You will be prompted for an access code (4144803) and a security code (1234). Once that information is entered participants will be placed on hold until we access the call. (cc: all counsel)(dm)
333 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lynn Adelman: Telephonic Status Conference held on 1/30/2017; Parties may proceed with discovery. Court will set deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions at a later date. (bx)
334 NOTICE of Appearance by Karyn L Rotker on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: James T. Van Strander (Rotker, Karyn)
335 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Sean J. Young by Shirley Brown, Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Ruthelle Frank, Mariannis Ginorio, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra. (Young, Sean)
TEXT ONLY ORDER granting 335 Motion For Withdrawal of Counsel, Attorney Sean J Young, signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 4/7/17. (cc: all counsel) (gc)
336 NOTICE of Appearance by Tiffany Alora Thomas on behalf of All Plaintiffs. Attorney(s) appearing: Alora Thomas (Thomas, Tiffany)
337 SUGGESTION OF DEATH Upon the Record as to Ruthelle Frank by Shirley Brown, Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Carl Ellis, Ruthelle Frank, Mariannis Ginorio, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra. (Ho, Dale)
338 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION for Clarification of the Stipulated Protective Order by Shirley Brown, Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Mariannis Ginorio, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Laurence J. Dupuis, # 2 Exhibit A Schmelzer−Wolf Emails, # 3 Exhibit B Incomplete Application, # 4 Exhibit C Email re Production)(Thomas, Tiffany)
NOTICE of Electronic Filing Error re 338 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION for Clarification of the Stipulated Protective Order filed by Anthony Judd, Barbara Oden, Edward Hogan, Dewayne Smith, Dartric Davis, Nancy Lea Wilde, Anthony Sharp, Sandra Jashinski, Sarah Lahti, Steve Kvasnicka, Frank Ybarra, Anna Shea, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Shirley Brown, Pamela Dukes, Max Kligman, Mariannis Ginorio, Justin Luft ; All documents should contain the s/signature of the attorney who files the document, also the Declaration to this document should have been filed as a separate entry. These documents do not need to be re−filed; Please refer to the policies and procedures for electronic case filing and the user manual found at www.wied.uscourts.gov (jcl) (Entered: 08/29/2017)
339 RESPONSE to Motion filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Lynne B Judd, Steve

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King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker re 338 Rule 7(h) Expedited Non−Dispositive MOTION for Clarification of the Stipulated Protective Order . (Murphy, Sean)
340 DECLARATION of S. Michael Murphy ISO Def's Opposition to Pl's Mtn for Clarification of Stip. Prot. Ord. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. − Confidentiality Stipulation and Agreed Qualified Protective Order, # 2 Exhibit B. − Letter dated 2−17−17 from AAG Schmelzer to Defs' Counsel, # 3 Exhibit C. − Letter dated 3−1−17 from AAG Schmelzer to Defs' Counsel)(Murphy, Sean)
341 DECISION AND ORDER signed by Judge Lynn Adelman on 9/11/17. IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for clarification of the protective order is GRANTED to the extent the court concludes that the plaintiffs' proposed use of the DMV information would not violate the terms of the protective order. See order. (cc: all counsel) (gc)
342 MOTION to Supplement Complaint by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed supplemental complaint)(Rotker, Karyn)
343 BRIEF in Opposition filed by Thomas Barland, Kristina Boardman, Michael Brennan, Sandra M Brisco, Thomas Cane, David G Deininger, Donald J Genin, Jill Louis Geoffroy, Beverly R Gill, Julie M Glancey, Mark Gottlieb, Michael Haas, Barney L Hall, Miranda Horton, Tracy Jo Howard, Ann S Jacobs, Lynne B Judd, Steve King, Jim Miller, Don M Millis, Patricia A Nelson, Jill Reeve, Donald Reincke, Nathaniel E Robinson, Mark L Thomsen, Scott Walker re 342 MOTION to Supplement Complaint . (Murphy, Sean)
344 REPLY BRIEF in Support filed by Shirley Brown, Dartric Davis, Pamela Dukes, Mariannis Ginorio, Edward Hogan, Eddie Lee Holloway, Jr, Sandra Jashinski, Anthony Judd, Max Kligman, Steve Kvasnicka, Sarah Lahti, Justin Luft, Barbara Oden, Anthony Sharp, Anna Shea, Dewayne Smith, Nancy Lea Wilde, Frank Ybarra, Robert Ziegelbauer re 342 MOTION to Supplement Complaint . (Thomas, Tiffany)