Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 1 of 7
U.S. District Court [LIVE AREA] Middle District of Georgia (Macon) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:16−cv−00353−MTT

MKW

COEN v. BRYSON et al Assigned to: US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/03/2016 Date Terminated: 10/01/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 555 Prisoner: Prison Condition Jurisdiction: Federal Question

JERRY THOMAS COEN

represented by ALEXANDRIA E G SWETTE 767 FIFTH AVE NEW YORK, NY 10153 212−310−8339 Email: alexandria.swette@weil.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ANNA BITENCOURT EMILIO 8630 FENTON ST STE 820 SILVER SPRING, MD 20910 240−650−2832 Email: anna.bitencourt@nad.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

CLAUDIA CENTER 39 DRUMM STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 415−343−0762 Email: ccenter@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

RALPH I MILLER 2001 M ST NW STE 600 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 Email: ralph.miller@weil.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

SUSAN MIZNER 39 DRUMM STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 415−343−0762 Email: smizner@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ZOE BRENNAN−KROHN 39 DRUMM ST SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 415−343−0762 Email: zbrennan−krohn@aclu.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

AUDREY E STANO

Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 2 of 7
201 REDWOOD SHORES PKWY 6TH FLOOR REDWOOD SHORES, CA 94065 Email: audrey.stano@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KOSHA S TUCKER PO BOX 77208 ATLANTA, GA 30357 678−271−0073 Email: ktucker@acluga.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
SEAN JENGWEI YOUNG PO BOX 77208 ATLANTA, GA 30357 678−981−5295 Email: syoung@acluga.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant COMMISSIONER HOMER BRYSON GDOC
Defendant Warden WALTER BERRY Central State Prison
Defendant JOHN FAGAN Deputy Warden, Central State Prison
Defendant MICHAEL THOMAS Deputy Warden, Central State Prison
Defendant JUANITA THORPE Chief Counselor, Central State Prison
Defendant WILLIAM CZARNESKI Deputy Warden of Administration, Georgia State Prison Defendant SHENECA KING Unit Manager, Central State Prison

represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO 40 CAPITOL SQ SW ATLANTA, GA 30334 404−657−4355 Email: ecusimano@law.ga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 3 of 7

Defendant JONES Case Counselor, Central State Prison
Defendant DEPUTY WARDEN MIZELL DAVIS
Defendant COUNSELOR RACHEAL MONCRIEF
Defendant LT BASELY
Defendant LT CHILDRESS
Defendant LT PHILLIP
Defendant CAPTAIN HALL
Movant TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL TERMINATED: 04/13/2017

represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL GDC868431 CENTRAL STATE PRISON 4600 FULTON MILL RD MACON, GA 31208 PRO SE
ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/03/2016 08/03/2016 08/04/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants (Attachments: # 1 Envelope),filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope)(ans) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
4 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis Filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN.. Motion(s) referred to STEPHEN HYLES.(ans) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
2 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge issued at the direction of the
Court. (ans) (Entered: 08/04/2016)

Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 4 of 7

08/04/2016 09/07/2016 09/19/2016 11/28/2016 11/30/2016 01/06/2017 02/15/2017
02/15/2017 04/13/2017
07/17/2017 08/10/2017 09/08/2017
09/08/2017
09/13/2017
09/13/2017 09/18/2017

3 Consent Form (28 USC 636(c)(1)) sent to JERRY THOMAS COEN (ans) (Entered: 08/04/2016)
5 ORDER denying 4 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Ordered by US
MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES on 09/07/2016 (efw) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
Filing fee Paid $400.00 (ans) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
6 MOTION for an Injunction Filed by TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope). Motion(s) referred to STEPHEN HYLES.(ans) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
7 Letter from JERRY COEN regarding request for another consent form − 3 consent form sent to plaintiff re 3 Consent to Proceed Form Sent (ans) (Entered: 11/30/2016)
8 AMENDED COMPLAINT re 1 Complaint against All Defendants by JERRY THOMAS COEN (Attachments: # 1 Attachments − Various prison documents not marked as exhibits, # 2 Cover Letter, # 3 Envelope)(ans) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
9 ORDER directing Plaintiff to serve the individual Defendants. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION recommending denial of 6 MOTION for an Injunction
filed by TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL. Ordered by US MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES on 2/15/2017. (efw) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
10 NOTICE of Change of Address by JERRY THOMAS COEN. His Release date is 02/18/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope)(cma) (Entered: 02/15/2017)
11 ORDER ADOPTING 9 Report and Recommendations and DENYING 6 Motion for
Injunction. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to forward Bell a copy of the Court's standard § 1983 forms and the necessary forms to permit him to move to proceed in forma pauperis. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 4/13/2017. (tlh) (Entered: 04/13/2017)
12 Letter from JERRY THOMAS COEN regarding update to Court regarding service (Attachments: # 1 Envelope)(ans) (Entered: 07/17/2017)
13 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to WILLIAM CZARNESKI (ans) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
14 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint by WALTER BERRY, HOMER BRYSON, JOHN FAGAN, JONES, SHENECA KING, MICHAEL THOMAS, JUANITA THORPE filed by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support). Motion(s) referred to STEPHEN HYLES.(CUSIMANO, ANGELA) Modified to remove TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL on 9/14/2017 (ans). (Entered: 09/08/2017)
15 MOTION to Stay Discovery by WALTER BERRY, HOMER BRYSON, JOHN FAGAN, JONES, SHENECA KING, MICHAEL THOMAS, JUANITA THORPE filed by ANGELA ELLEN CUSIMANO. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support). Motion(s) referred to STEPHEN HYLES.(CUSIMANO, ANGELA) Modified on to remove TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL as a filer 9/14/2017 (ans). (Entered: 09/08/2017)
16 ORDER for Response to Motion re: 14 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint filed by WALTER BERRY, SHENECA KING, JOHN FAGAN, HOMER BRYSON, JONES, MICHAEL THOMAS, JUANITA THORPE. Plaintiff is ordered to respond to Defendant's motion within twenty one (21) days. Ordered by US MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES on 9−13−17. (bdd) Modified to remove TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL from docket text on 9/14/2017 (ans). TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL was selected as a filer in error when 14 was docketed. (Entered: 09/13/2017)
17 This is a text only entry; no document issued. ORDER granting 15 Motion to Stay
discovery. Discovery is stayed pending response to, and consideration of, Defendant's motion to dismiss. Ordered by US MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES on 9−13−17. (bdd) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
18 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to MICHAEL THOMAS (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)

Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 5 of 7

09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 04/17/2018 06/07/2018 06/07/2018 06/08/2018 06/12/2018
06/15/2018 06/15/2018
06/19/2018 06/20/2018 06/20/2018
06/20/2018

19 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to JUANITA THORPE (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
20 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to RACHEAL MONCRIEF (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
21 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to SHENECA KING (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
22 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to HALL (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
23 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to HOMER BRYSON (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
24 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to WILLIAM CZARNESKI (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
25 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed as to WALTER BERRY (ans) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
26 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint Filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN. (Attachments: # 1 Envelope). Motion(s) referred to STEPHEN HYLES.(ans) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
27 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by SEAN JENGWEI YOUNG on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney SEAN JENGWEI YOUNG added to party JERRY THOMAS COEN(pty:pla) (YOUNG, SEAN) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
28 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by KOSHA S TUCKER on behalf of All Plaintiffs Attorney KOSHA S TUCKER added to party JERRY THOMAS COEN(pty:pla) (TUCKER, KOSHA) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
US MAGISTRATE JUDGE STEPHEN HYLES no longer assigned to case. (ans) (Entered: 06/08/2018)
29 ORDER for Response. Plaintiff has fourteen days from the date on this Order to
respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants have fourteen days from the date on this Order to respond to Plaintiff's pro se motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In accordance with M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.3, each party has fourteen days after service of these responses to file a reply. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 6/12/2018. (tlh) (Entered: 06/12/2018)
30 STIPULATION re 26 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by JERRY THOMAS COEN (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 30 Stipulation re 26 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN ); Other. The parties may not stipulate to extend response and reply deadlines for motions. Leave of Court is required. A motion to extend the response and reply deadlines must be filed. (ggs) Modified spelling of motion on 6/18/2018 (ans). (Entered: 06/15/2018)
31 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by RALPH I MILLER (nop) (Entered: 06/19/2018)
32 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by AUDREY E STANO (nop) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
33 MOTION to Amend/Correct 8 Amended Complaint by JERRY THOMAS COEN filed by CLAUDIA CENTER. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Proposed Order)(CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 06/20/2018)
34 This is a text only entry; no document issued. ORDER re 30 Stipulation filed by
JERRY THOMAS COEN: Defendants have through and including July 11, 2018 to respond to 33 Motion to Amend/Correct Amended Complaint. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 6/20/18. (lnb) (Entered: 06/20/2018)

Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 6 of 7

06/21/2018 06/26/2018 06/26/2018 07/09/2018 07/11/2018 07/13/2018 07/18/2018 07/25/2018 07/26/2018 07/27/2018 08/13/2018 08/21/2018 09/04/2018
09/13/2018
09/13/2018
09/27/2018

35 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by ALEXANDRIA E G SWETTE (nop) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
36 RESPONSE filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN re 14 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
37 AFFIDAVIT re 36 Response to Motion to Dismiss by JERRY THOMAS COEN (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 06/26/2018)
38 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by ANNA BITENCOURT EMILIO (nop) (Entered: 07/09/2018)
39 RESPONSE filed by BASELY, TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL, WALTER BERRY, HOMER BRYSON, CHILDRESS, WILLIAM CZARNESKI, MIZELL DAVIS re 33 MOTION to Amend/Correct 8 Amended Complaint (CUSIMANO, ANGELA) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
40 REPLY to Response filed by BASELY, TIMOTHY O'NEAL BELL, WALTER BERRY, HOMER BRYSON, CHILDRESS, WILLIAM CZARNESKI, MIZELL DAVIS re 33 MOTION to Amend/Correct 8 Amended Complaint (CUSIMANO, ANGELA) (Entered: 07/13/2018)
41 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by SUSAN MIZNER, CLAUDIA CENTER (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Admission) (nop) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
42 REPLY to Response filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN re 33 MOTION to Amend/Correct 8 Amended Complaint (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 07/25/2018)
Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 42 Reply to Response to Motion filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN ); Certificate of Service not attached. Do NOT refile document − file only the Certificate of Service and link to document. (mdm) (Entered: 07/26/2018)
43 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by JERRY THOMAS COEN re 42 Reply to Response to Motion (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 07/27/2018)
44 MOTION to Vacate by JERRY THOMAS COEN filed by CLAUDIA CENTER. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Lift Stay of Discovery, # 2 Proposed Order Granting Motion to Lift Stay)(CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
45 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by ZOE BRENNAN−KROHN (nop) (Entered: 08/21/2018)
46 RESPONSE filed by BASELY, WALTER BERRY, HOMER BRYSON, CHILDRESS, WILLIAM CZARNESKI, MIZELL DAVIS, JOHN FAGAN, HALL, JONES, SHENECA KING, RACHEAL MONCRIEF, PHILLIP, MICHAEL THOMAS, JUANITA THORPE re 44 MOTION to Vacate (CUSIMANO, ANGELA) (Entered: 09/04/2018)
47 ORDER DENYING as moot 14 Motion to Dismiss; DENYING as moot 26 Motion
for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint; GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 33 Motion to Amend/Correct 8 Amended Complaint; and GRANTING 44 Motion to Lift Stay. The parties have 90 days from the date of this order to complete discovery. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 9/13/2018. (tlh) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
48 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. The parties are ORDERED, on or before September 27, 2018, to show cause why the instant action should not be consolidated with Civil
Action No. 5:16−CV−467−MTT pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE MARC THOMAS TREADWELL on 9/13/2018. (tlh) (Entered: 09/13/2018)
49 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by JERRY THOMAS COEN (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 09/27/2018)

Case 5:16-cv-353 As of: 02/13/2019 06:40 PM EST 7 of 7

09/28/2018 09/28/2018

Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 49 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal filed by JERRY THOMAS COEN ); Dismissal must be signed by all parties who have appeared or by leave of court. (ans) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
50 STIPULATION of Dismissal by JERRY THOMAS COEN (CENTER, CLAUDIA) (Entered: 09/28/2018)

 
 .- \
. ,j

......

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 1 of 10

, Revision 2007

PROCEED~~ IFNOTRHTEHUENMBITIkDE.BDDLBSETADTISETSR.DIDCISITVTORISFIICOGTNECOORUGRIAT

QUESTIONNAIRE PROSE

FOR PRISONERS UNDER42 U.S.C. §1983

C~...
.

. .' I ~.

AUG - 3 AH 9=02

;·.'·. ·

..

.{)t,PIJ1f WIIAP/511 wii~~ C2Atit~s/a_,

e/i.t£f' C:.011N5~LoR SvM11A 1?1Aoi£J CAS£

.CbrJMJtl.ol<, .MIJ JoNdS, CA5£ CovAif&/41:.

MS' MD,Vf!JUef. ~ot CoMM:IS..r:JbJt/Ef< ~~

(GIVE FULL NAME AND PRISON NUMBER OF PJ..AINTIFF}
Plaintiff VS.

8tK)f'<N.JyO5-r:blA' M1, A/)N¥fAu6ryel(WAkRiNIJEGN /V1-J'1I" Z8~AJLELL~PLl1t/i4PJSJIUIP

\NA8.J)bY WALf,fg 9SP¥ IJefvft ~

,fi: 16-CV- 353

WAtfJEN:J'6/IJ{{z1GJWft.AL I ;

!MPvry WN<P£HMffJIBY. ~

(NAME OF EACB Dl!:lii!:NDANT)

.
Defendant(s) :

------------~--------·
I. GENERAL INFORMATION
gp 'JfR.Ry etNfRAL 1231....[/S(NY,Dae)aoonmutWefreunfhacLuaenltltdyonwoNlaouemcraMea~rty0iaoionLnnudoLocwpforpnsiervsiroiscvnotiennnMdguwoA(mhkf?CeobrweOBeryl.oho~n)ugLa?.Gr)e~ U/nbogw(i/:'JJc{TooA nAMfi.nA3ed!1{t !t~;JW . ANA~ 7~ S?1wfflM5 FN'(

(b) (c)

GLYNN Name and location ofcourt which imposed sentence

[OOJtlfjt

WShevnPwafsils;e!ontl<enc«(~2iomtpJo8~1ed?~oE/AftJRfAt£!Io,.ftWdA~ JOO'J

;9fiA (d) Did you appeal y~tur sentence and/or conviction?
(e) What w.. the result ofyonr appeal?

0 Yes • No

.B) Y/JU8AAy (f) Approximate .iate.your sentence will be completed

:JIJI 'I

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 2 of 10

II. PREVIOUS LAWSUITS 4. Other than the appeal ofyour conviction or sentence, have you ever submitted a lawsuit for filing in any federal or state court dealing with the SAME FACTS involved in this lawsuit or otherwise related to your imprisonment? D Yes • No 5. If your answer to question 4. is "Yes," list that lawsuit below, giving the following information: {nrvou BAVJ: FILED MOJI1: THAN ONE LAWSUIT: LIS'l' OTBJ:RUWSUITS ON A Sl:l'ARATESBEETOJl'Al'ER, GIVING THE SAME
lNFO:aMATIDNFOlll:ACR)
IV/A · (a) Parties to the previous lawsuit INVOLVING SAME FACTS: Plaintiff(s):
Defendant(s):_ _ _ _ _ _ ____..119t-40t...:~~-----------

(b) (c) (d)

NDNaoamcmkeeeotoNffCjuuomudrgbtee=r·a:-s-s-ig-n-.e~ -d-t-o~-c~a-s4e0:~_'AW_:_h:_e_n__di_ _d y__ o·u-_ -fi-leL_~th-_ i-sil_ 0a~w:_ s-u.i_ t~?~_._:_.__._A_ j_&.-.-:--:~--0J.:-.L:_-.:_-_----_--

(e) Is this case still pending 0 Yes • No (f) Ifyour answer to (e) is "No," when was it disposed o and what were the results?
(Dm YOU WIN? WAS 'J'BX CASE DISMISSED? Dm YOU Al'l'J:AL?)

6. Have yon ever snbmitted a lawsuit for filing in any federal or state court dealing with facts
QIBER THAN those involved in this lawsuit? 0 Yes • No
7. If your answer to question 6. is "Yes," list that lawsuit below, giving the following . information: (IFYOURAVEFJLEDMOJIE'I'JlAi.IONEUWSUIT,IJSTOTHEllUWSUITSONASEl'ARATESltt.ETOFPAl'~GIVINGTBJ:SAMJ:

JNFOBMATION FOB. J:ACR)

(a.} Parties to the previous lawsuit: Plaintifi(s):_ _ _ _ _ _ _-.L.~.=....:.....--+--------Defendant(s):._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-r----J.r..y~----------

~L4~~~-=----When lawsuit?_L..&~f)t-~!:..Jr___ (b) NameofCourl:.____________-+~~--------------------------

(c) . DoeketNumber:.__

did you tile this

,
•

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 3 of 10

(d) Name ofjudge assigned to case:.______,J!?~-~-!J~A~.__________

(e) Is this case still pending 0 Yes •No

(f)
{l>m

YOU

Ify
WIN?

our
WAS

answer to (e) is
TU CASJ: DISMISSED?

"No," when was
DtD YOU A1'1'EAL?)

i

t

disposed o
~

f

a

nd

w

h

a

t

were

the

results?

8. AS TO ANY LAWSUIT FTI..ED IN ANY FEDERAL COURT in which you were permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, was any suit dismissed on the ground that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim? 0 Yes • No
~~ ·. . ~j1 Ifyour answer is Y'r, state the name of the court and docket number as to each case:

ID. PLACE OF INCIDENT COMPLAINED ABOUT
9. Where did the matters you complain about in this lawsuit take place? CWTRAL
S'1Alfe PusaN LJIJJO (vL[DAI MJL.L loAD MACtwJ CEo/lGrA Jt«D$
(a) Does this institution have a grievance procedure? • Yes D No
(b) Ifyour an8wer to question 9(a) is "Yes," answer the following: (1) Did you present your complaint(s) herein tp the institution as a grievance?

•Yes

ONo

A By (2)UNYeffJs,MwV.ht~NatwJYaBstt1hdleAuretMs(uplt&t?{WPMAAiSldA~ stwifjfi//lJ.$/JRAt/!fffENP.ED

1Jt£ 1}l£y'

(3) IfNo, explain why not:_______,,,..:."'~IA~~----------

. '

',. '

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 4 of 10

(c) What, if anything else, did you do or attempt to do to bring your complaint(s} to the

attention of prison officials? Give
~ WRrdr flit 1/VMAf£

dates
Aff

and places and the names ofpersons talked
.AUS 0MJ31JDSMM off'ft£

to.

of~v/!sr.z&A'/Jbl\lf AN.O CAMfirA/tfCE

(d) Did you appeal any denial of your grievance to the highest level possible in the

A!S/oltf.SC. prison

system? _ •Yes (1) IfYes, to whom did
fJvRPM~Ef.uLLy

/JAtl£ 0 No
you appeal and what was the result? 1/¢1 /+11/J 1N~tMIALLy £A:t1,tp 1f;J

(?.Ef'IION A
(2) IfNo, explain

VAL f(J
why you did

not

appeal:. _

_

_ _,.f\}~~1=1.~.-.....----

CoAS{AL E£/311RAij JooB . SfA/t~ :J~J 10. In what other institutions have you been confined? Give dates of entry and exit.

IV. PARTIES TO THIS LAWSUIT
-a~ ~7S'JI/65 11. List your CURRENT place of incarceration/mailing address.
£-J L()L-B
U. List the full name, tile oftieial po.sition, and the place of employment of each defendant in this laWSUit. (ATIACJI ADDtrlONAL TA.GES IF NECESSA.llY)
f/aMsJ. IJRy~N~ {AMMtr'lbAfd /)&/Wl(MifdoFCo/1/Jl:D;p//s
\NALffl.. ertgy WARfdN ~ ~

. .. '

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 5 of 10

V. STATEMENT OF CLAIM
y1WWvp3oieo.HHurlsrIaEAontcRenTltdasEhyiwmetothhhusseoepmacaiwnonc?dnecetricedhDeoneeaendnrlstestceh(oarsnafi)itptbnietpoevorneoohpnslkovreaowepdgdvlaat.ieocdiaIneecyfs,dhoytH,notdahO,uneeWWhfddeaHenovyfndEeoeaunNmsnerdtoptachwrnaoeertna(atissshntt)eiaictynniusdvohtoeouieonnlevhntet(easascdvl)ol,earyfiiingompnhauca,mtlpsncueeouwdrdmmi,enihprbgfeeleanrtvreiheiniaocennela.ansdbtsaTeoasmdeuery,ltetla,fsotnoshcoerdcettfhuWcforoeortHarheutcdeOrhhtr,
cAaFClfaETOfioDmNTrEdHCSRyDIEIoSSAOPuELATsN,RIuRAMOfUANfTiELTcDiG;EEeDnSILiVftIOYRtsEiF.umEcACCehNItTVioYs!ImnLLIeaPEfektRGdheeOeAsduCcLcaoEhtAuDaarRrtUlgGnaRuetUmeeEMrdeRstnEiEmatNsdQe.dT,UiKttOIhiERoeRnEEcaCPSolInTIiTNnrHtEf.MowAAriITmlNNlPaYaDLtdiCEoTvnAAiHsfSeDArEoyITmoSNRuOGyUoRSofLuB.tSE,hETyi8sSoAOuIaTMnFwUdPTiTlwLlHEibEESlel,
notified.·

C6/1"ML or

WHERE institutions?

did

the

incidentyou are
S7J/TE

complaining about occur? That is, at
fn.SW (8l!(.$1/rf£Wil)£

what

institution

WHEN do you allege this incidenttook place? ~CE

MtlfNCAR. C£g91:zo.M I

m Cf(VJJ''ADfJt./RJ?6LlPJWGAJJt;Hfp'at').#AzJno£:TpNNhfU>o,a_pjNAfpM1ReL1nJ1t$e..£V&.dW?AEN,I1lIJItIt)tMHSeD.,f£DAEA0vNMff£)k££MfN£'B./EnJOy£NMe[teO)FiNJSANJLt1Kf!VW'lTrt&r~.s/.JdlMtSi£!fl7Zlrt3DGt¥/l/lIE:~ fr£JE&PNEYtMJ/A82/AJr1'EJKCJ&.MEMIf.vfAHtldlH6lOodr,f;tttRJ;t:lA:£l wiit.r;
~' ~t:!& ; t: t~ t~:~:~ : :?:= k~~ }teErS10.t'C5WMtf/Et:ALLrH& fe~WCE£)tJi /i:"c6510 1/J£/f$
:=::=:= =:~ ~~~ ~~: ~~ ASVJ1/f,Utl LAJ&WE6t@JAf<MJM . M;.Pf)/I)JV~EtO1'4lMIIJ!A/gIA£tz£v/&a: i/$.ACtclAk!tirAJI6AfV£;Lto'f~

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 6 of 10
V. STATEMENT oF CLAIM
BE MISTAEAIED AND DI5CRIMIJVAr£D AG/r!NSI
BASED DIV /V1f AB;Il.ffY lo UA!PEI<SIA/t!P AM.E/a'CAA/
S.r6i.J LAAI&UAGtE tJR. £/116L:£.sJI A.s tJ/ftLL 171£.5£ .NtJ AMER:Cel+!tl SJbAI L/IAJ&u/!6E f/11/Eilfli(.EffR.f ALIAILABL£
Vvffl-/ 8£1<7YF:f£1) [out16£LOIZ5. 7b 7£Ac)J A/1/Y fRotRJwrs
foR 7)1£ f)£1-Jrto ££ HARI<AS.SEJ.J AAit> 1/?EA!EiJJ/ll A
CR. vEL A~ UAIIJ511AL- PuNJSIIME/tl/AN'O MA/VAIEA' .f/11
.vlf6L,A[foJJ o~ /)IE fiG-JI1 )}M.b,A!DM61/T 10 JJIE /JA!f/E) ST;tfE Co#s15:}v/ftJ#. f}I.Jh ;rs A D£1..fJ5ERA-1E J/v'J2r~/E~­ ENCE fo M£ lt!ViJ /1LL f!Jf}/EI< 0£A~fA//VIIJffS 11£/?EJt/C£/.11PAl- 51/tr£ Pfl.£50;tJI
Jo LEGAL ARGVMEAI/ !Wf) Cd/fl%OAI o£1itJ1ilo/JJ/V
(/) ;Vtxf&; fRo-s£ CoM!-l.A:J;,v[, A-1<£ £/tltf/LEIJ U8£f<AL CoAJSfr<.Vctioltf 5££: li/l£#£i v: gERN£1? L/l>'l U.S, SJ9~
.ur.5';2o --1 1 ( '9?:1) A-AIO .B.zLLMAA!· vt UMANA D£fJJtrM£f2f-CoRR/3C1fOA{ ~& r'.3d 7DS; 7~-9tJ {J99s).
ALL.. 1Hf Dtf£/1/DAJif(s) NANt£D .rAJ tJjz-s- AcifoAI!IA5 \ltDLiff£D MY {;xuiL AAJL/ {o!15&To7YoAIAL... &b#1s
UAIP£1< 11-IE AJJA 7 5EC[£tJA! $1Jl/ o;: 1JIE I<~!IAgfLJUbbAJ
/+Gf {!;y PuRPo.>~Ly ME eC!JMM{)IJJCA-lJICJN lA.ifrJI My (A;Vt.;tiy :LMfJOS:t'/t/6 /tBUS£ AAIL? fl/ff(f)S')}Jf> /Jy iJ.BQ;fL
of Acc.&ss 10 6;/~AMVJJf~A-TroiJ Ey;v;r/MEA/1 AlfltJ
fJGV£C£S ;4AIO JfVXILIARy A.r/J5 /1#0 ft<tJ&/UMs 1liA-1
ltR£ f/).15T£1tJT£0 UA/()E~ /I1l£ :11- oF '1!1-E !lf)IJ AAf/J L!5,
OEPA-R-tfMfA/1 oF "Svs1.:rc£ f<..£(j,vLAp:DA/S 1(; 1112£..0
g :lt C. f./{. 3S: /01/ ALSo SE£: t/;2 USC. § /d/LJI
et secy"

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 7 of 10

,\1. STAfE/1/J.E/1/f of tLA.ZM

1-

--

· I HAllE to/117J:/IIUALLY Co1vtPLA:r!VEP rio 771£ tAJAI{D-

folll oF· f!__tfAf1RAL S"'/A/1:? fJI<rSo/11 t7oMM..rS5...LoA/EK

l1oAAER BR.yA# Wf/tJ B£Pt4C£!J 8/?rA» 0WE#5 A&vr

Dff1!trN:IAJ6 1'11£ NEW' /Ee/IA/oLo6( CALL£0 tu.IZ@
RELAy 5£RvfCE (tiffS) fRot.LtO_z:-1116 ~~ Pvr<PL£ W11A!Vr

U/J;tC41ro~'<i5 .2A/C A#LJ Sof<EAJSo.AI f!oMMvA/.IeA-trcJA£1

\/fOEafJJJtJA/£ /)tJE 1o #y Olt!LY M£/1-Ais 12 UMMo-

or N:tCAJlE f5 /Jy M£AAIS

AME'~CA,A/ SziA/ LM!W-

A6£.• /}JJs '1Eei-!AioLo6y liAs /JLI?EA-PY 8££V /J1AN-

DA-1EO AJ\/t> .f/1/S!f/tif'.E,t? 5£E: .5171/£ oEAM.;f)II.AA!J2

~\I~ CHB;rsto/))H< :}AgSaL_ CAS.£• .AltJjl' £L/I-J;2-S7~J

L'oMMQAM/cAL;tlt o£k&1!7/Jeky 11. A{)AMs_ C/+5E.

;Vo: 3:1'1-ev- 00001-GFVI-~/d)J /J~LU.ET#:

7G,-/- JJSI f)A-7£: os-/;9/:Jt?/s-

Sf!J[f/(A£1/r of CWM {;Oitll o
.1 AM f.Jor A-BL£ ·ro toMMON.£eAIE By ·!rys
W/fJZI/ JS Mo£1Zy :UfAfLESSAI3LE1 fNOf'£M8LE., (!)VfOA-1ED) DJ}MoDED; A-.AJIJ OBst>L£7E !IE££ A-r Jlfz> flte:£~:£-fy AJI!J 1?1£ M/-J#f CJJMPLAIAl7S 1-iA-VE.8£bfl!
f<.fSGc(£0 of?.. \.IJilEAI 'loLJJ /o ·?#'E /f/}MJA/fS/M/JOA/ RrEsPoN5ED l3!tcl< .I'/11 M ABUSIVE MAAIAI££ fA1M.SFE1e~~r '-IJ:£1# A 1-£.55 -rJ/AN fJ£~1£cT /?soutioAI.f
itM Also CoiJJfAIUrut-Ly O;rseRJNLrfi/A-/.ELJ MID
Al!L£/JAffiJ AG#Jfl~r By 711£ 51A-F.F ()JuNSEltJRs /rWJ

51Af£Mfl.lr o f CLAIA!I ~AlT. Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 8 of 10
! ..
{H;IS ;:£N51J:1u/;L{)If/ CAU5£ rfJ£1<13- .:£5 Alo /kobKAM
f<5.(( f/1~ DEA ~ lNf1ll ,A/t> CEitlfUE£J /IM.$~/b(/SJr#
LAt<~6uA6£ f#~l<f~EJ:E~s AJ/t' o~<_ /MIIItiN~ /~~
· ~!< ME £A ell :iAJrfv.:rRy 70 AAIY fJ!<o&RAMs oflt l}ss;zsME
JjJ EDUe/f{Lo# of. A-Aij /1£/..jJ f£R:mP/ L£Af)s 10 A8115TV£ P,£AG/J:bA/5 f2.£1AtJA/foAI Mt> 1JI~J:/f1S, Mf tEeEA!T Gfl.--
fi3VANCE ~kA5 OY/.2££) &v.5.E /!lEy S"Ay ///ERE INST-
ALt.:LII6 :f~P;ty V;LS:IIAUo# !3vl fiiEy /1/IV£ ,AioTAf)-
Dfl..ESS£0 1/f£ r!rC11'll~l _;£/ lA/fLL 57YlL /(£(pw/<EA
ra£ Lrvt AN1£/l.JCAN $GAl LA#GVA-6£ JNJ#IREr~
- ME fD CoMMUAI..IC/1/E tt/f/1/ ()'//lEI< t#fif> LJo A/t'T
VA/0£/?SJA-AIL) AMEIUVt# S1G.A/ l.A#tuAG£ W/trcl-l _I AM A fRofou#OLy OMF A#.O Mf AIA7YVE ·LAAI~uAGE .:z-s ),pt£/JJ't!/ftf/ .s;z-G# LM!t-uA&£ ;IN AAI.O 55 8AS.:zz:-ALLy My' ()tvLy MMA/S 0~ CoMMVNICA--1£01\/#f eot<IV'#VE
7o B£ fJiscfifM.XIV'A-7/iD A&AINsr DvE ro 1l!Ey AlE
NoT W;£LLLf\/6 70 CoMpLy Wfll/ ~tJF~L LAw BASED Of/ 1/f£!<~ BuD6£Tif{('/ A!EFOs /3111 7JJEy,AtE
R£e,£VfJV6 ~£fJ~!<IJL .f"vA/0/t/6 131// .NorfJMki<LY US~#G 1'!1£M ~rJ~ 7JJ-E fb~fbs£ S{){)GI/TAA/LJ 7/1/1-/J 10 ;kLOMMCJ>0J-f1J:'oAI 171£ ;1/EELJS o,C;1/E t?.EAF_l/V/\114-
(15 c; 8.fCIII)J£ of' Obi;LAL A-AIO /)EL-IBEMU fitlOZF~-
&RENeE 10 AaoMMDDA-Jio# 7o /!1£ ;/£.E/}S {);: $£
0£4-F~ My ~AM:£Ly' ;r~ hJRC£0 70 !3j_o[/< {)of<
f.2o1MAUAI:ICATfoiC/ VJflil £/JC/1 o111E.Rs 1JJ/I/;9L;y
(ZJ:Jv LD ;Jor 8£ ABL£ 1o 11£1/~ ~!{oM ME A.AILJ J {)£Sf!:-R¥1~ /o \P"A-#1 ·(d ;J£4~ ;::f<OM ~6vr g£CAOS£ 1J/£y V-14/ff 10 )/ftAI< fflM ME.

. ' '

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 9 of 10

ro 1Hfs f/!f5 f2A-u.s£D I} HlfRDS/f.r/) CJAI T/IEM A> WELL
HOfMlJfS:S£-Crf~A<DuBsstE,:D:Lro1#1)--AJfAEL-Mv£AN#AoP#t>wPMl/ffyyESoICrA/LJ~..xA'//K'I<EEAUUEA/A\NJeIAe£L/f#LMLJ..KmAy-

FAMJ-L y AAILJ F'll.I&v/JS, A#O i.,Awy~s_, A#f} tJPIF

AWoCARy. 1}1£f(E~ ;W A-M£/<fcA# 5It-# LAAJtvA&E

;rNTEI<iJR.£7Erls- IJtJR:1'»6 A-;Ao/ OJ~c;rfLPfA-~f f~t£Eb- ·
JN{..s ANO ~ HlfV.E }fLLN'/Jy£ £#fJEfJ up /JEJ;vb W-

:r v/IC'!£0 of (Jr;d5Etpv&JC£s, $AM Nor /{ESf>o-4.518-
L£ for< • AM BUNG 0.£Af££f} Ov£ P!<OC£55 M.O

A MEAIVIAIG-FvL f2J61-/1 10 8.£ !1£/M£) A-/t/[) U#tJ-

ERST50f) /JI:JS f5 3v-s7 A F£w 08S7Jk;LES I 4£

ON A 0A:£Ly 8/151> '/!JA/s 8&£Aib CREA!.GfJ 8y

1flo5f:
AAIO

JN ·rH£ 1}JfJl<
MAKJ~ (51)R£. :I

fo.sd;£o# '10 OV£R5EE M.E AM fRofJERLy f<Efiii~;EL:IW­

£0. :£ LEAVE
fJoMPLAIAif,

R~£o/o)MR./o·CA;-v-MP£_N;'O.;A-A{IOo

A/JP
.)

JO

17113

jc

f ,. ' ',. .

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 1 Filed 08/03/16 Page 10 of 10

14. List the name and address of every person you believe was a WITNESS to the incident(s) you complain about, BRIEFLY stating what you believe each person knows from having seen
Or heard What happened. (USEADDITIONALS:anTS,IFNECESSARY)
£AM M.AKWG &P.rEs of;ILL M V Gxt/;J:!?_!IS A/t!l)

BBPDN'sEs wldctJ;NrLL 8E Eat<l;v;:ll()£P 7d ill.rs &uru:

OINsCEAPMPYOIICIIAL>£E0,.:·£.5

DocX£1EO

oR.

A-AI AfffJI{AI#C/ ·

~5. BRIEFLY state exactly what you want the court to do for you. That is, what kind of relief are you seeking in this lawsuit? Do not make any legal arguments and do not cite any cases

Or Statutes! (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY)

16. You may attach additional pages ifyou wish to make any legal argument. However, legal arguments are NOT required in order for you to obtain relief under §1983. If the court desires legal argument from you, it will request it. Ifany defendant presents a legal argument,

you

!dl!

be

afforded

an

J
opportunity

to

respond

thereto.

17. KEEP IN MIND THAT ONCE YOUR LAWSUIT IS FILED, THE COURT WllL REQUIRE YOU TO DILIGENJ'LYPROSECUTE IT. That means that you will be required to go forward with your case witbout delay. Thus, ifyou fail to adequately prepare your case before you file it, you may find your lawsuit dismissed for failure to prosecute ifyou take no action Qnce it is filed. YOU WILL RECEIVE NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COURT TELLING YOU WHAT TO DO OR HOW TO DO IT! IT IS YOUR RESPONSIDll.JTY AND YOURS ALONE TO PROSECUTE YOUR OWN CASE! Hyoufail to prosecute your case, it will be dismissed under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.
Signed this .1.:

day or....,.A~()j-rU:....o.f.T.._ _ _--J, 20 I to .

 
 Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT :-

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA' i ' • .

MACON

DIVISION

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PRISONERS PROCEEDING PRO SE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(GIVE FULL NAME AND PRISON NUMBER OF PLAINTIFF)
Plaintiff
vs.
CoMMt~/M/£1/ 11/JMtR 88VStJN 7
ef.ru_,

CIVIL ACTION NO: 5.~JI, -C 1/-§3-M7"r-M5#

(NAME OF EACH DEFENDANT)

Defendant(s)

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. 2.

Your full name and prison number Name and location of prison where

J£/?RVfJ/oMAJ
you are :lOw confined

{d'JfAIM/IJ '759!/~ L {;J?v/'MJ,. 51Zf1E'~R/

3.

Sentence you (a) What

wareerenoywousecrovnivnigct(ehdowof?IoBng?~)JZ'u I/h£A.ff'CA,LIs<ER.::tJ«AvJz):/iJfA/Ic./t:~

AG6MI/ Bltff.tg_V

.

Coug( (b)

Name

and

location

of:Ourt

which

imposed

sentence

Gb;JA/N

CovAJ/V ;

Jdov.s£
(c) When was sentence imposed?___....::h_.':Q=..Zi~....:;;;;J~()~·. : : ;J(). ; :;. .O_ . ~:._ f __-==----

(d) Did you appeal your sentence and/or conviction? > YesO NoJI
(e) What was the result of your appeal?_ _ _ _ ____.~'--"~'-=g;....·.=.._- - - - - - - -

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 2 of 10

(f) Approximate date your sentence will be completed__.....&,/p...c;;,...;;:'l):;...._...:../.-=~;,..JIL-)/?~;;;...L/_?=----­

II. PREVIOUS LAWSUITS

NOTE: FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ALL PRIOR CIVIL CASES MAY RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF THIS

CASE. IF YOU ARE UNSURE OF ANY PRIOR CASES YOU HAVE FILED, THAT FACT MUST BE

DISCLOSED AS WELL.

4. Other than an appeal of your conviction or sentence, and other than any habeas action, have you

filed a lawsuit dealing with the same or similar facts or issues that are involved in this action?
Yes 0 No Ill

5. If your answer to question 4 is "Yes," list that lawsuit below, giving the following information:

(IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, LIST OTHER LAWSUITS ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER, GIVING THE SAME INFORMATION FOR

EACH)

(a) Parties to the previous lawsuit INVOLVING SAME FACTS:

Plaintiff(s):

/1.(/A

Defendant(s):,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---~.J¥~'/AL..L.---------------

(~ NameofCourt:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

(c) Docket Number:_---.~f14~~ji:.J/J~- When did you file this lawsuit?__---~.t¥-:....:t,~rJA"--'-----

r-/A"-=------------ (d)

Name

of

judge

assigned

to

case:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---:..M...::,
1

D Ill (e) Is this case still pending?

Yes

No

(f) If your answer to (e) is "No", when was it disposed of and what were the results?

(DID YOU WIN? WAS THE CASE DISMISSED? DID YOU APPEAL?)

0 Ill 6. Other than an appeal of your conviction or sentence, and other than any habeas action, have you

ever filed any lawsuit while incarcerated or detained? Yes

No

7. If your answer to question 6 is "Yes," list that lawsuit below, giving the following information:

(IF YOU HAVE FILED MORE THAN ONE LAWSUIT, LIST OTHER LAWSUITS ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER, GIVING THE SAME INFORMATION FOR

EACH)

(a) Parties to the previous lawsuit:

Plaintiff(s):_.;....__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-r------L;U-¥-Yt!.....'A=---------

(b) DNeafmenedoafnCt(osu):r_ t:______..._ .,.--_ __ ____.l'_-VA:t.!,_)'!-J----I.~../.~~!tf.-0I..iL'JA.!...-.__.__.;_:__._;.____--_:--_------r-_ ---_ --
(c) Docket Nurnber:_---.~J1?'""""~;..:..:..4__ When did you file this la':"}uit? ~

(d) Name of judge assigned to case:________~/\-1~4'/c..:I~:....:..,_--------

(e) Is this case still pending?

D Yes No Ill

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 3 of 10

(f) If your answer to (e) is "No", when was it disposed of and.what were the results?
(DID YOU WIN? WAS THE CASE DISMISSED? DID YOU APPEAL?)
AI/A

8. AS TO ANY LAWSUIT FILED IN ANY FEDERAL COURT in which you were permitted to

proceed in forma pauperis, was any suit dismissed on the ground that it·was frivolous, malicious, or

failed to state a claim?

Jl YesO No

If your answer is Yes, state the name of the court and docket number as to each case:

!tf/A

AJ,/A

III. PLACE OF INCIDENT COMPLAINED ABOUT

9. Where did the matters you complain about in this lawsuit take place? Ct1V/fti}L .szAf'£

f&t:soAI V.ULAlJfl) AA.AEit'(IW' w.ff/ll)f5/IAT}..:[{fEf At.:'fLAW (AIJI,I)

(a) Does this institution have a grievance procedure?

Jl Yes

NoD

(b) If your answer to question 9(a) is "Yes", answer the following:

(1) Did you present your complaint(s) herein to the institution as a grievance?

Yesll

NoD

(2) IfYes, what was the result?_ _ _~,M...~:.:l'.._.L~S~~-"-~-~=··S:~l/._tJ.""""J.._L....;..__ __

(3) IfNo, explain why not:________--'-&;...=...j.'h~'A..J"----------

. "

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 4 of 10

(c) What, if anything else, did you do or attempt to do to bring your complaint(s) to the
attention of prison officials? Give dates and places and the names of persons talked to.
DEpvty )AJ/.li{{)£AL 'JOHN £/JrAtfle/:tLLr'J CAfE .ftr/N.5£LOR,

(d) Did you appeal any denial of your grievance to the highest level possible in the prison

D system?
(1)

If

Yesll Yes, to whom

No did you

appeal

and

what

was

the

result?_---.~lllj.~/A"'-'-----

(2) If No, explain why you did not appeal:_ _ _ _....,L...:loLL-::...._-----

10. In what other institutions have been confined? Give dates of entry and exit.

6!tJ/?Ii1'A

f1£AG!t/1JS.t:s .

l
'

C/AS51J!itAWAI

f'_.ro,AI

/&URIJ41/ I

20

r2QC>t; M&/5 57JI-£ fi<ISlYJ/ MARCH 2roF 70:1010. C!f/11/ML S72J1E

PMsodOc;frWJtJ 10 f£t IY,. ,9LJJ'[ MAA'tJuT. '

IV. PARTIES TO THIS LAWSUIT 11. List your CURRENT place of incarceration/mailing address.
3£~&V ·OitJAM5 CtJ£& G()L 75'?l/6.L8 /t'l-6
ljb!J[) fi;LfbAl MILL f</)

12. List the full name, the official position, and the place of employment of each defendant in this laWSUit. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Dt{JV1y WJ+PNt,l, MIULL f)Avn,~ CA!£t1JoUJEIH<M SI<Ad-/EJJL/IKWCI<IE£

PENry lAIAROfA4 All:(c/19JL Zl#M.AS; t)N!JAMNA6M.$/1EA/ECA KrAit

Pnn.ue . C/ld/ (P_f:IAIJELtJ~J,LIA@'!l:J :WM'JIE. L0?JlS£f!A L;f CtirtJ215£S.S

wlf8[)fbjwALfE£&&'!J Lr

tr HALL

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 5 of 10

V. STATEMENT OF CLAIM 13. In the space hereafter provided, and on separate sheets of paper if necessary, set forth your claims and contentions against the defendant(s) you have named herein. Tell the court WHAT you contend happened to you, WHEN the incident(s) you complain about occurred, WHERE the incident(s) took place, HOW your constitutional rights were violated, and WHO violated them? Describe how each defendant was involved, including the names of other persons who were also involved. If you have more than one claim, number and set forth each claim SEPARATELY.
DO NOT GIVE ANY LEGAL ARGUMENT OR CIT ANY CASES OR STATUTES AT THIS TIME; if such is needed at a later time, the court will advise you of this and will afford you sufficient time to make such arguments. KEEP IN MIND THAT RULES 8 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE REQUIRES THAT PLEADINGS BE SIMPLE, CONCISE, and DIRECT! If the court needs additional information from you, you will be notified.

WHERE did the incident you are complaining about occur? That is, at what institution or
J institutions? C&JfP.AL S'l/fr£ f>ll,I5oN { BvT.51AfEIA/02E

WHEN do you allege this incident took place? JJ:uc£ My..lAICABCC.BA9):op

WHAT happened?:t'HNE &LEIJ fJN.cRAL Gli!EVAA.(Ag' w/lg.II/I,IIY£'GI)#/{
V~tJf)Ef) taoBy:1ile.SfAI4,1ltfiJE/AI((M£A!LtJrU~~ lll£ WAR$1Mt1

f"£1 ITIUJL .dA1£/kt:wAIA/JMT.ms7'Mt"1tW{;t:'MLUJ/21;v6 All- AIAAA!fl)IJ£fbR}f-
f 1»tB;f)M1£o f1H'f££Cf8!o£8fLfl£<MsLJAlMtg$&.VfAO! [b/O/rJlL?AU.o:ArIt6J///M£vl,d6/~f(/AU1~/1E6Vo./0&M/J.Wfh£t£;rA;o{/'
~z.wlfAMf.t.I/JEAid!wfEdrPN/tOM {!L(};fL LJotJSVAL Puut9/JMEA!l)livdcJG1I/MII{AI{)AAU1'1<tf41'7b $ L /PntJ:rffp~/bpgfEE/JIA~&"'
l!(; tv£ {@C£>~ COUS1%1vtitWAL 8fkllfj;. AOA MIIJ /!EJiiVIn r"VJ#tuLAO;
AM8aA-ALtllldll /2rsA&t.I1%BAc[AHIJ/{J.V.£84 trfA1A A /&tf;t.W~LijlEAf'
AMJ1flo ).IPOIAIIIEAAIACU.S.SAAJI)AIE~HAI)/ICC/25 tofcs {;CAt~

C

A

L

t

,

t

;

v

6

.

SJ ~

!

/

l

V

1

f

r

s) ~

tJRACCESS

10

7

J

¥ '

/

f

rr/s
~

Jo

{

t

J

M

M

I

.

M

l

'

A

-

7

Z

u

t

t

7

J

' f

t

1

v
J

(/JMfL!j.,£!1WIJ2..fJ LA~V£.4 AAIPD£VAIAL«Ae,v#RAiA1W7AdN£

~ 1/IA-rffy AAit? 66;?RG!A &i.AysdiiQ€.ZS.:t:A(ACLA's'YI~ L&<:Jt-

£M~Otl1iJA-11E4~t!/M0/2r.IJMIIJ c69JLerc.1J.Jd.CJS/J!Jo.Nt'li\ollAM$

Aclrv.£1:1'4AA!L) RtiLt:Gr.auAtiAftMIE' ..Co~<.M£ 011/i 10?MY

)IAtJV£uuiPMe-r£ AMEVUJ.~t.st'"Y ~/) m£70 7'/l&fi{Am..rtiu!llf:w;:0

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 6 of 10

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 7 of 10

PvRPLf CoMMcJNrCAJioAis -PVc A-A/LJ .£oi(£AisoAI

1o or CDMMUAU'CAUoN'/ lL£1)£of/;bAJ£ /Ju£
CoAAMUN£t'A~.A1' .,7'5 ,8y /VlE"kA/S

10

MV OA/LY/WUf/5
AAIJ~A-#

~IbAf LA/tltOA6£~ 71115 J'£C/IA/CJLtJGY )l~s AL1<641JV

i!JE£11 AAA-Itl/)/tl£/J A;Vb'fA/SU"/vYEP SE£.' S/A-71:: o£

./t!IMtjLAN/2. Vc C!i/<t:f1?;/'Lic.R .'f/18612F C/i.J£. A/t? .£L.#-

JJ.- S?JJ CoM/1110;1/WP/L/JI o~k£1/7~ /IL>AMs

j; C/1-5£ A/0 3/Jl/-CV-06001-6~V1-&13/1 {)OCt:!;''/'#: l)t,-
1-13~1 Olff'E,• OS o/'c20/S'

. S12J1tMEA!L ri£ CL/J;!;ll1 C4trl1:

:f /}M .A/tr/ /l/3/£ JO CoAAM:O/CLLCA-/C' 13y ff;/5 tlfl&c/1
:f-5 AA CJ51'Llj JAI/ICC~S.SA-13L£,;{A!ofJP/IIJLJ0 {)LJ1l)/f/E£]

oufMOD£JJ,ItAI£J o&;oLd£ 11£1¥ ~r1JI..t:s ~ACLLJ/tj

A!tff) /f)£ MAAif {oMfiAf-AJ/s !-lAVE BEEAI /{E:JCL-1£/J

oR \AII/M /oLO 1b 1}
f!:lrD/t- ::£Ill A-d ~f3J!Sic/E

;£ A/JM:1Afrs17?A'[LoAI R£.sjJ6AfS£{)
/JMA/#ER rN('OAI5_rs-7£A// w.rw

A Lf$5 1/i.IJAI ~/£c! /{ESovr!LoA/, :£ AM ALso

Coi//;1:/#Ufvt.t. tf £>;r5C/!.;J:MrA/Aff/J .4#0 AI-.££,;</A-1/£0

;4GA1/t!S1 (Jy 'Y!IE
CIIVS£ -f'f!£Rt :rs

5; V//oJ/'f/k"oG{2R0UAA-MIY,CfoLl.P<I<5111A£AI0L6J 4/~lft~flS£f7A/1I..As/t0i?~

AC-NEPRoUr<fiEfl<OllfAAdAM/&£/(tPUf<AoGI.tSuAfGAsAfHLf<AAM1££u:.4, 6££1f/C#I:/IIEA~fIi~(IE#<RYs

-(o A-,A/y fRoGM-M5 Of< /J-S5;/S1/JACE .£/tl £tJUt'/iffoA/ {)/(

A-.AI( f-lfhf ffi<Jl)IJ,~ UA05 7o 1-J8V5£t/E /?£ACWA/s

fl.ffAvAfo># A-AIO fftffA-15. /vty l~ te£1fl' Gl\t.tV#R£ WAS

D£111.££1) .CAU5E 1Hty .GIJ-y

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 8 of 10

,f/IEf£ 1ft~7ALL1A!G 3-PAV VfSI:/AU'oA/ 131// rl/7/f/
H~RAR£V.~J!Mu;f1£/RL£'/loAAfC)fOL)MN/N(E~IO£M/A)I/.1.t£f"C'/!l.rlIi(~/tl=lA~,/#tJYSCIf£&17lA##/i7Mc.0#.7£~171t8W<JAfL6WL£/?~bSt:/J¥}I~L/L,V11$/£tJ/

UN/J£1<51/JII/) //M£/(ICAAI Szbttl LANGvAGE w/-hZ/1 £ AtA A fRo/OoN'/)LV {)Elf~A/tit? AAy A/AUVE I-A4UJ46'e; ..5

fJM£/(ft'A# S%# I-IJ#6V%E .t:A/ A#tJ ;,z:.s 8/ISfMtJ-y AAY

.OAILV MEA/liS 6,t:' {oMMflllLlX'AUt>IV• .:£ OA//Ydu£· /0 ll£
(J:t:5C/ifM1A!/If'EO AG/lz/t/.57 LJt)E' 16 711~'/ Af<E ,A./ort~&­

'1o CoMPLy l/li.I'Ifl r£/J&</IL t-AW dA5£t> 0/t/ ://1£/(E

Bu/J&EfARV h~vi}.::CNG

J./£SJ5 (}uf 71113y A-1<£ RE'C£\/1/1/G ffLJ.ERAt
/3tJ//tltJr fko&I{J_v us:r:v6 /Aie>1A /t:l£ &E

Pvt<Po..SE £ov6J-17A/1/!J 171/J/'f -10
f)!£ AI~S o~/lie f}£1h MY

/ILCoMMo£JA-,U'dA/
PM//fLy .£S rO.R~

"fo {!JLo·cJ< £)/)/{_ WMMvW.rCJAffoA/ LAJf/# ££/;/ 077/E/f

:r a.//lf tJIA-1' 'fifo/_ Ccv/..IJ N~713£ /J-L'1-£ 1'b /IL51R ~tJ~ .AA£
A/11/J OESG/<.l/E ft; tlfiAA17 ~/lEA£ //<CJM

MY f3f(At15£ 17i6( ~AlA#/ ~fr.Mft.y rG?/<C£

7b /1.159,R MoAA /J!ifv& 'lMv£~

Me• /liE /i?c/' ? lltJoz o;VcE

NAAJ-'O-HMv£NfM1/ ,[0JA.b7£;Iro;/v#&/---/~ 1h-Ao,Af5/V<{£)£.w-AC1/T-0/!/11vl-i</JAE£/Ar1-Lf/At(A>#t~/T.Wt?t'J' AISJi7If<0A£IT.AL5%//M VJME/M ( Iylf_SfpLt?,..Al~{/(¥MA~At;/JeO7At1lfAI&

tY~ A-1//J .:r tAIAA171IIEA/I 7b }),A/ow.. £ C~ A-taff'
rffi£M A-40 ;t: /,t>il£ f'"I/.£M L/~l<y AIIUC:l-1.

r
1/l;fS /#5

t!AtJ5£/J

/J

j-J/1~/)S)ir'jJ OA/ 1/fbrA /15

tf/ELL l/,4-S CAtJ_s-fi) ~II£M fifi/IJ ,A/1£ /b ft.;XjJ~C£

l • .-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 9 of 10

fx-(R£ME tEMol!roAJA-L A-PtJ P/1-ys-reAL- 1/<AVMA A/ti!J O;rsr;?£.SS, .£ 1-JAV£ Alo ul/,4V o,:'A/lA-KE A
c~u Al1 y ~MfLy A#P H?f£.N.Il5; A/Ill) t.Auvy£~,
ANtJ D£4? Af)VtcACy. TJ/f~E:S ,..t/0 /IM£R.f01-A16ICA/ h/}~60))6£ JArT£1<fo'L!ff,e~ iJUIO/Vb /!.Nf {)JJC.ff-J.Lr.NA!lf
or f1l/c£EtJ.fAI5r MLJ ;£ JIAf/E AL.tA/Ayf 61/~~LJ u,P ~.EJA/~
CotlfdCI£'{) Co/tiSJ:fVLWC£5 £AM MJ//?.eftA/S1'13LE
(tJ{(, :£ IJM !JE.z/tl& DM.££0 OvE flAOC£55 AN'LJ A
(lll£A-)If/116/0~ /(rb/1/ '70 5£ /./fi'dR.I) A/f/fJ .U.A/~&5/AAIP
rHZ5 :D :SuJ/A ~1/11 o/35/ACLES _£ FAC# OA/ A
:r (S(}f<!Avt¥JPlo<M-tyt J.8T)4o/ c5MJ1f R3IAM" £~iAlfsJf//~r1#/UJU:t/!oT/#BABf~RJ'~AiJE/tt"J1iI/b/EC//CfN~<5lEJ1J!E1A)A/f1?fut/%JIMELtJJ5AJcyLA1./1.LLAJ1E.u///p1rl/Ms17£/;ER1E/ c / ~£{) fl., Ctl/f-1, ;~('C\.)

/ .•
/ .- ... •'

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 8 Filed 01/06/17 Page 10 of 10

14. List the name and address of every complain about, BRIEFLY stating what

person you you believe

believe was a WITNESS each person knows from

to the incident(s) you having seen or heard

What happened, (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY)
1 AM MAtrMf CopE of ALL AllY EX/f.fiff:/.5 A-A/P

15. BRIEFLY state exactly what you want seeking in this lawsuit? Do not make any

the court to do for you. That is, what legal arguments and do not cite any

kind of relief are you cases or statutes!

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS, IF NECESSARY)

16. You may attach additional pages if you wish to make any legal argument. However, legal arguments are NOT required in order for you to obtain relief under §1983. If the court desires legal argument from you, it will request it. If any defendant presents a legal argument, you will be afforded
an opportunity to respond thereto. 17. KEEP IN MIND THAT ONCE YOUR LAWSUIT IS FILED, THE. COURT WILL REQUIRE YOU TO DILIGENTLY PROSECUTE IT. That means that you will be required to go forward with your case without delay. Thus, if you fail to adequately prepare your case before you file it, you may find your lawsuit dismissed for failure to prosecute if you take no action once it is filed. YOU WILL RECEIVE NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COURT TELLING YOU WHAT TO DO OR HOW TO DO IT! IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AND YOURS ALONE TO PROSECUTE YOUR OWN CASE! If you fail to prosecute your case, it will be dismissed under Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

 
 Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 48 Filed 09/13/18 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JERRY THOMAS COEN and CARLOS HERRERA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 5:16-CV-00353-MTT )
) ) )
)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The claims brought by Plaintiffs Jerry Thomas Coen and Carlos Herrera are

strikingly similar to those brought by Plaintiff Jeremy Woody in Case No. 5:16-CV-467-

MTT. All three Plaintiffs seek damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §

794 et seq., based on events that occurred during their previous incarcerations. It

seems that it would be an inefficient use of judicial and party resources to allow the

same dispute to be litigated concurrently in two separate lawsuits in the same Court.

Thus, the Court is inclined to consolidate the cases pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

While the Court has discretion to consolidate sua sponte, Eghnayem v. Boston Sci.

Corp., 873 F.3d 1304, 1312-17 (11th Cir. 2017), it will give the parties an opportunity to

address and voice any objections to consolidation.

Accordingly, the parties are ORDERED, on or before September 27, 2018, to show cause why the instant action should not be consolidated with Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-467-MTT pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 48 Filed 09/13/18 Page 2 of 2 SO ORDERED, this 13th day of September, 2018.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2

 
 Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JERRY THOMAS COEN,

:

:

Plaintiff,

:

:

VS.

:

:

:

Commissioner HOMER BRYSON; :

et al.,

:

:

Defendants.

:

_________________________________

NO. 5:16-CV-353 (MTT)

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff JERRY THOMAS COEN, a prisoner at Central State Prison in Macon,

Georgia, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an amended

complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 8. He has paid the $400.00 filing fee. After conducting a

preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint, as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow

his claims against all Defendants to go forward for further factual development. Plaintiff

is now DIRECTED to serve the individual Defendants pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Also pending before the Court is a motion for an injunction filed by another inmate,

Timothy O’Neal Bell. ECF No. 6. The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that this motion

be DENIED without prejudice to Mr. Bell filing his own separate § 1983 complaint.

I. Preliminary Screening

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial

1

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 2 of 9
screening of a prisoner complaint “which seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and that the complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (explaining that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
2

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 3 of 9
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, then the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 complaint because the plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in § 1915A “shall” be dismissed on preliminary review).
B. Factual Allegations and Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiff states that he is “profoundly deaf” and his “native language is American Sign Language.” Doc. 1 at 5. He complains that the Defendants, through their practices and procedures, have discriminated against him in violation of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 et seq.; and the United States Constitution. Plaintiff states that he cannot use the standard phones available in Georgia’s prison system to communicate, and the teletypewriter or TTY phone service for the hearing-impaired is inaccessible, inoperable, and outdated. Doc. 1 at 5. As a result, he has no means to communicate with individuals outside of the prison, including family, friends, lawyers, and advocates for the deaf. Doc. 1 at 5, 8. He complains that the Defendants have failed to provide him with access to auxiliary aids or services necessary to enable him to participate in educational, religious, rehabilitative, and other services available to similarly situated non-deaf inmates. Doc. 1 at 5-8. Plaintiff states that there
3

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 4 of 9
no American Sign Language interpreters present during disciplinary proceedings. Doc. 1 at 9. As a result, he is denied the ability to meaningfully participate and defend himself during these proceedings. Doc. 1 at 9.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff raises essentially the same claims but adds Defendants Mizell Davis; Rachael Moncrief; Lieutenants Basely, Childress, and Phillip; and Captain Hall. Doc. 8 at 4. 1 As with Plaintiff’s original complaint, Plaintiff alleges each of these named Defendants violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages. These allegations, when liberally construed in Plaintiff’s favor, are sufficient to allow Plaintiff’s complaint to go forward against all of the named Defendants. II. Motion for Injunction Movant Timothy O’Neal Bell, a blind inmate who is also housed at the Central State Prison, has filed a motion seeking an injunctive and declaratory relief, contending he is “entitled to the same compensation for deliberate discriminatory treatment same as the original Plaintiff.” Mot. Inj. 1, ECF No. 6. Movant further contends that this allegedly discriminatory treatment entitles him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The gist of Movant’s motion is that he wishes to join in Plaintiff’s presently-pending lawsuit. See Mot. Inj. 1. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”) prohibits prisoners from joining together to litigate their claims in this manner. The PLRA requires that a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis be
1Plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right at this stage of the litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). As such, the Undersigned has considered the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The Undersigned also notes that some of these Defendants were listed in the caption of Plaintiff’s original complaint.
4

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 5 of 9
responsible for this Court’s filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis are not allowed to join together as plaintiffs in a single lawsuit and pay only a single filing fee. Instead, each prisoner must file his own lawsuit and pay the full filing fee. Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001). As the Eleventh Circuit in Hubbard noted, requiring each plaintiff to pay the full filing fee is consistent with Congress's purpose of imposing costs on prisoners to deter frivolous suits. Id. at 1197-98. Allowing Movant to join in this lawsuit at this stage of the litigation would enable Movant to avoid paying a filing fee and therefore run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hubbard.
Furthermore, a § 1983 plaintiff may set forth only related claims in one civil rights complaint. He may not join unrelated claims and defendants unless the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B). “[A] claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence if there is a logical relationship between the claims.” Construction Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334, 1337 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998). Movant’s motion does not make clear that there is a logical relationship between his claims and Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint detail the challenges he faces as a deaf inmate, but Movant has alleged he is blind, not deaf. Movant has not explained in his motion why the conditions about which Plaintiff complains are also applicable to Movant’s own situation.
The Undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that Movant’s motion be DENIED
5

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 6 of 9
without prejudice to his filing his own separate § 1983 claim. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to forward Movant a copy of the Court’s standard § 1983 forms and the necessary forms to permit Movant to move to proceed in forma pauperis. III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against all named Defendants must proceed for further factual development. Because Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, he is responsible for serving all of the named Defendants. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff be provided the necessary documents with which to accomplish service upon the Defendants. It is further ORDERED that the Defendants file a Waiver of Reply, an Answer or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Defendants are reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses and of the possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).
OBJECTIONS Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order based on factual and legal
6

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 7 of 9
conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE
During the pendency of this action, all parties shall at all times keep the Clerk of this Court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address may result in the dismissal of a party’s pleadings.
DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION Plaintiff must diligently prosecute his complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Defendants are advised that they are expected to diligently defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set down for trial when the Court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed. FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND
CORRESPONDENCE It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and correspondence with the Clerk of Court. A party need not serve the opposing party by mail if the opposing party is represented by counsel. In such cases, any motions, pleadings, or correspondence shall be served electronically at the time of filing with the Court. If any party is not represented by counsel, however, it is the responsibility of each opposing party to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, and correspondence upon the unrepresented party and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and correspondence filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate of service indicating who has been served and
7

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 8 of 9
where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U.S. Mail, by personal service, etc.).
DISCOVERY Plaintiff shall not commence discovery until an answer or dispositive motion has been filed on behalf of the defendants from whom discovery is sought by the plaintiff. The Defendants shall not commence discovery until such time as an answer or dispositive motion has been filed. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The deposition of the Plaintiff, a state/county prisoner, may be taken at any time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with his custodian. Plaintiff is hereby advised that failure to submit to a deposition may result in the dismissal of his lawsuit under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and the service of written discovery requests) shall be completed within 90 days of the date of filing of an answer or dispositive motion by the defendant (whichever comes first) unless an extension is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This 90-day period shall run separately as to Plaintiff and each Defendant beginning on the date of filing of each Defendant’s answer or dispositive motion (whichever comes first). The scheduling of a trial may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.
8

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT-MSH Document 9 Filed 02/15/17 Page 9 of 9
Discovery materials shall not be filed with the Clerk of Court. No party shall be required to respond to any discovery not directed to him/her or served upon him/her by the opposing counsel/party. The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the Local Rules imposing the following limitations on discovery: except with written permission of the court first obtained, interrogatories may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each party, requests for production of documents and things under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and requests for admissions under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. No party shall be required to respond to any such requests which exceed these limitations.
REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT The Court shall not consider requests for dismissal of or judgment in this action, absent the filing of a motion therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing supporting authorities. Dispositive motions should be filed at the earliest time possible, but in any event no later than one hundred-twenty (120) days from when the discovery period begins, unless otherwise directed. So ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 15th day of February, 2017.
S/ Stephen Hyles UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9

 
 Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JERRY COEN, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN WALTER BERRY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:16-cv-353-MTT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE REVISED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15, 20

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 2 of 15
INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Jerry Coen respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to Rules 15 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to file a Revised Second Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Mr. Coen filed his complaint, pro se, on August 3, 2016. At the time, he was incarcerated in Central State Prison, in Macon, Georgia. Mr. Coen is Deaf. His language is American Sign Language (“ASL”). ASL is a completely different language from English, with distinct syntax, sentence structure, and grammar. ASL is not just English using hands. Mr. Coen, like many Deaf people, has extremely limited ability to read or write English. He filed his complaint without the assistance of an attorney or advocate who could translate between ASL and written English. Mr. Coen prosecuted his case pro se to the best of his ability for almost two years while seeking an attorney. He has now retained the undersigned counsel. The proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint would clarify Mr. Coen’s individual claims against Defendants. It would add new Plaintiffs, who – together with Mr. Coen – seek to represent a class of deaf and hard of hearing people incarcerated in prisons and subject to supervision in Georgia. It would clarify and join the appropriate Defendants for each claim, and would eliminate Defendants who do not need to be parties to the case. Under the liberal amendment standards of Rule 15, and the flexible joinder requirements of Rule 20, Mr. Coen’s motion to amend should be granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY Mr. Coen filed his pro se complaint on August 3, 2016. Doc. 1. On January 6, 2017, Mr. Coen, still incarcerated, and still proceeding pro se, filed an Amended Complaint. Doc. 8. Mr. Coen alleged that Georgia Department of Corrections officials violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., the Rehabilitation
-2-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 3 of 15
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 et seq. On February 15, 2017, Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles issued an order and recommendation advising that all of Mr. Coen’s claims were sufficient to proceed to factual development. Doc. 9. District Judge Marc Treadwell adopted Magistrate Judge Hyles’ recommendation on April 13, 2017. Doc. 11.
On September 8, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Doc. 14, and a Motion to Stay Discovery pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 15. On September 13, 2017, Magistrate Judge Hyles issued a Notification of Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss, advising Mr. Coen of his right to submit an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, or to amend his complaint. Doc. 16. The same day, Magistrate Judge Hyles granted Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery pending consideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 17. Accordingly, no discovery has occurred in this case. On April 17, 2018, Mr. Coen filed a Request for Permission to File a Second Amended Complaint. Doc. 26. At the time, Mr. Coen was in communication with the undersigned counsel, but had not yet retained them. On June 7, 2018, undersigned counsel Sean Young and Kosha Tucker submitted Notices of Appearance in this case. Docs. 27, 28. On June 12, 2018, Judge Treadwell issued an order requiring Mr. Coen to respond to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and requiring Defendants to respond to Mr. Coen’s pro se Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, within 14 days.1 Doc. 29. Defendants have not yet responded to Mr. Coen’s Request for Permission to File a Second Amended Complaint, and the Court has not ruled. This motion supersedes Docket No. 26.
1 Promptly after Judge Treadwell’s Order on June 12, 2018, Plaintiff’s attorneys apprised Defendants’ attorneys of Mr. Coen’s intent to file this Motion to Amend. Plaintiff’s attorneys expressed to Defendants’ attorneys their willingness to amend the briefing schedule to extend Defendants’ time to respond to this operative Motion to Amend and Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint. Mr. Coen is also prepared to file a timely opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 14.
-3-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 4 of 15
ARGUMENT I. The Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint Is Proper Under Rule 15.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend shall be “freely given.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “The thrust of Rule 15(a) is to allow parties to have their claims heard on the merits, and, accordingly, district courts should liberally grant leave to amend.” In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1108 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court may deny leave to amend a complaint only where there is a “substantial reason” for doing so, such as “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; . . . [if] allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or . . . [if] amendment would be futile.” Alhallaq v. Radha Soami Trading, LLC, 484 Fed. App’x 293, 298 (11th Cir. 2012). Absent such a “substantial reason to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial.” Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, “discretion may be a misleading term, for [R]ule 15(a) severely restricts the judge’s freedom, directing that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Espey v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 748, 750 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). Here, because there is no substantial reason to deny Plaintiff’s motion to file the Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint, the motion should be granted.
A. Permitting A Revised Second Amended Complaint Will Cause No Undue Delay.
“[T]he mere passage of time, without more, is an insufficient reason to deny leave to amend a complaint.” Hester v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 941 F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (11th Cir. 1991). Undue delay is typically found “where both the parties and the court were fully prepared for trial,” Burger King Corp., 169 F.3d at 1319, and where the proposed amendment
-4-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 5 of 15
would have postponed trial already scheduled, Rhodes v. Amarillo Hosp. Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, although some months have passed since Mr. Coen first filed his complaint, the case remains in its nascent stages. Defendants have not yet filed a responsive pleading. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 1993) (motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Rule 15(a)). Discovery has not begun. There is no trial date. Cf. Burger King Corp., 169 F.3d at 1319 (denying leave to amend offered “on the eve of trial”); Rhodes, 654 F.2d at 1154 (denying leave to amend three weeks before trial). At this early stage of the case, there is no undue delay in granting this motion and accepting the Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint.
B. There Is No Indication Of Bad Faith. Courts may decline to accept an amended complaint only where a showing of bad faith, such as “use of a motion to amend as a means to postpone a trial date, to impose additional expense on the opposing party, [or] to gain leverage in settlement negotiations,” is apparent on the record. Salter v. City of Brewton, Ala., No. 07-0081-WS-B, 2007 WL 2409819 at *4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2007). Here, there is no indication of bad faith. Mr. Coen has demonstrated a complete good faith desire to have his claims promptly adjudicated. He has proceeded to the best of his ability, in spite of the significant obstacles posed by prosecuting an action pro se while incarcerated, in a language in which he is not proficient. He has shown consistent commitment to using his case to remedy discrimination against not just himself but others who are similarly situated. See Doc. 1, p. 6 (“This is a deliberate indifference to me and all other Deaf inmates here at Central State Prison.”); Doc. 6 (pro se attempt to join Mr. Coen’s case with that of a blind inmate at Central State Prison). He paid the full filing fee while proceeding pro se, even though the fee accounted for more than two-thirds of all funds available to him. Doc. 4,
-5-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 6 of 15
p. 5. Mr. Coen’s diligent prosecution of this case to the best of his ability, and his request to amend promptly after retaining attorneys, reveal no bad faith or dilatory motives.
C. There Is No Undue Prejudice To Defendants. A court may only find prejudice where the defendant can “demonstrate that its ability to present its case would be seriously impaired were the amendment allowed.” Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2003); accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Regions Bank, No. 14-0067-WS-C, 2014 WL 4162264, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2014) (quoting Air Prods.). A court may not find undue prejudice merely because an amendment adds additional expenses, as “[a]ny amendment to an original pleading necessarily involves some additional expense to the opposing party.” Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council of Volusia Cty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Here, permitting the Revised Second Amended Complaint would impose no prejudice on any Defendant in this matter. To date, Defendants’ only substantive engagement has been to file a Motion to Dismiss (which is still pending) and a Motion to Stay Discovery (which was granted). Docs. 14, 15. Permitting an amended complaint at this stage imposes no undue prejudice on Defendants. D. The Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint Is Not Futile. To be properly rejected on futility grounds, a proposed amendment “must be so lacking in merit that the complaint as amended ‘would necessarily fail.’” Allstate Ins., 2014 WL 4162264 at *7 (quoting Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 470 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2006)). There is no basis for rejection based on futility here. II. The Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint Is Proper Under Rule 20. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 authorizes permissive joinder of plaintiffs and defendants. Persons may be joined as plaintiffs if: (1) they “assert a[] right to relief . . . arising
-6-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 7 of 15
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”; and (2) “[a] question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-(B). Similarly, defendants may be joined if: (1) “a[] right to relief is asserted against them . . . with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”; and (2) “a[] question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Id. at (a)(2)(A)-(B). Joinder is “strongly encouraged,” and “the rules are construed generously ‘toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.’” Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 857 F.3d 833, 839 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)).
A. The Joinder Of Plaintiffs Is Proper. In considering the first prong of the permissive joinder standard, “‘[t]ransaction’ is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.” Alexander v. Fulton Cty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)). This “logical relation test is a loose standard which permits a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.” Plant v. Blazer Fin. Servs, Inc. of Ga., 598 F.2d 1371, 1361 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Rhodes v. Target Corp., 313 F.R.D. 656, 659 (M.D. Fla. 2016). “The hallmark of this approach is its flexibility.” Plant, 598 F.2d at 1361. Here, Mr. Coen seeks to join thirteen Plaintiffs to this case, who – along with Mr. Coen – seek to represent a class of deaf and hard of hearing people who have been in the custody of Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”), subject to the authority of Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (“GBOP”) and/or subject to supervision by Georgia Department of
-7-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 8 of 15
Community Supervision (“GDCS”). All Plaintiffs to be joined are deaf or hard of hearing. All are either currently in GDOC custody or subject to GDCS supervision. Those Plaintiffs in GDOC custody are subject to the parole or pardon power of GBOP. All Plaintiffs’ claims to be joined concern the same or logically related occurrences. All Plaintiffs’ claims are based on conduct, policies, procedures, and failures by state officials against deaf and hard-of-hearing people in the custody or supervision of the State of Georgia. Many claims by the new Plaintiffs are virtually identical to claims brought by Mr. Coen individually, including claims that GDOC routinely fails to provide videophones to deaf and hard of hearing inmates, that GDCS routinely refuses to provide interpreters and other auxiliary aids and services for deaf and hard of hearing people on supervision, and that GDOC officials have refused, for decades, to provide interpreters and other auxiliary aids to ensure effective communication with deaf and hard of hearing inmates. Plaintiffs’ claims easily meet the “flexible,” Plant, 598 F.2d at 1361, and “loose,” id., requirement that they share a “logical relationship” with those already pled. Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1301. For example, claims that GDOC fails to provide interpreters at education and substance use classes during incarceration are surely “logically related” to claims that the same actors fail to provide interpreters at meetings with counselors and disciplinary hearings.
The second prong of the permissive joinder standard is also easily met. Numerous questions of law or fact common to all Plaintiffs will arise in the action. For example, all Plaintiffs’ claims will require the Court to consider whether all Defendants maintain policies and practices that discriminate against Plaintiffs by failing to ensure effective communication with deaf and hard of hearing people subject to Defendants’ supervision. All Plaintiffs’ claims will require the Court to analyze violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the U.S. Constitution against Plaintiffs that arise from Defendants’
-8-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 9 of 15
failure to provide interpreters and other auxiliary aids and services at important meetings and events while under Defendants’ control and supervision.
B. The Joinder (And Deletion) Of Defendants Is Proper. Mr. Coen seeks to join twelve Defendants to this case, including three institutional Defendants – GDOC, GDCS, and GBOP – and nine officials from those institutions who are sued in their official capacities. For the same reasons as the proposed joinder of Plaintiffs, the proposed joinder of Defendants is also proper. The joinder of these Defendants ensures that the correct2 and proper parties are before the Court and able to provide complete relief. And the right to relief claimed against the Defendants to be joined concerns transactions or occurrences that are either the same as or logically related to those pled in the existing complaint. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint details the common transactions and occurrences supporting joinder. Specifically, the conduct, failures, policies, and practices of GDOC, GDCS, GBOP, and their officers form a single, discriminatory process through which deaf and hard of hearing people are denied equal access and effective communication at every stage of custody and supervision. For example, Plaintiffs do not understand the terms of their sentences or their parole eligibility because GDOC fails to provide interpreters and auxiliary aids to communicate effectively with Plaintiffs when they are in GDOC custody. This means that Plaintiffs cannot advocate or prepare for parole consideration because they do not know when they are eligible for parole, or what they must do to improve their chances of parole. When Plaintiffs are eventually released from GDOC custody, most are subject to GDCS supervision. GDCS’s failure to ensure effective communication with Plaintiffs
2 Proceeding pro se, Mr. Coen named the individual employees of GDOC he encountered. But the proper Defendants are those named in the Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint: the entity itself and those officials with decision-making authority. The Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint would also drop the unnecessary employee Defendants.
-9-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 10 of 15
on supervision means that Plaintiffs do not understand the terms of their release, and are at increased chance of re-incarceration (a return to GDOC custody) for failing to comply with rules that they never understood. This vicious cycle easily meets the “flexible,” Plant, 598 F.2d at 1361, and “loose,” id., requirement that new claims share a “logical relationship” with those already pled. Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1301.
The proposed joinder of Defendants also meets the second requirement for permissive joinder under Rule 20. Numerous questions of law or fact common to all Defendants will arise in the action. For example, the Court will consider whether all Defendants maintain policies and practices that discriminate against Plaintiffs by failing to ensure effective communication with deaf and hard of hearing people subject to Defendants’ custody and supervision. The Court will analyze violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the U.S. Constitution that arise from all Defendants’ failures to provide interpreters and other auxiliary aids and services at important meetings and events while under Defendants’ control and supervision. III. Mr. Coen’s Claims Against GDOC And Its Officials “Relate Back” To His Claims
Against Individual GDOC Employees. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), an amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading where the amendment changes parties when “the amendment asserts a claim . . . that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); “the party to be brought in by the amendment received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits”; and that party “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity,” id. at (c)(1)(C)(i)-(ii). Mr. Coen requests that this Court find that his individual claims against GDOC and GDOC officials relate back to the date of his original pleading. Mr. Coen’s claims against the current Defendant officials Gregory Dozier and Clinton
-10-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 11 of 15
Perry, Jr.,3 and against the proposed additional Defendants GDOC and GDOC officials as set out in the Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint, arise out of the same conduct and occurrences that he pled in his original complaint. Mr. Coen has consistently claimed, in his original complaint, Amended Complaint, Second Amended Complaint (never deemed filed by the Court), and in this superseding Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint, that GDOC as an institution, and its individual officials, has violated his rights under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the U.S. Constitution by failing to provide interpreters, telecommunication access, and meaningful communication during Mr. Coen’s incarceration.
Moreover, at all relevant times, Defendant GDOC and its officials were on notice of Mr. Coen’s claims. Mr. Coen named numerous GDOC employees as Defendants based on allegations of conduct that occurred as part of their work at GDOC. The named Defendants should have informed their superiors at GDOC that they were named Defendants in a lawsuit, and GDOC officials should, therefore, have been aware of the allegations in the complaint. The Defendants named in Mr. Coen’s original complaint are represented by the same attorneys as GDOC itself. See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, Defendant GDOC and its officials knew or should have known that it was “the beneficiary of a mere slip of a pen,” based on Mr. Coen’s mistake in failing to name GDOC as an institutional defendant. Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1998).
Indeed, courts in the Eleventh Circuit construe such pro se ADA claims against individual prison officials to be claims against the Department of Corrections. See Owens v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 475, 478 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (reasoning that the plaintiff’s ADA “claims against [three individuals] in their official capacities are simply
3 When Mr. Coen filed his complaint in August 2016, the GDOC Commissioner was Homer Bryson and the Warden of CSP was Walter Berry. These positions are currently held by Defendants Gregory Dozier and Clinton Perry, Jr., respectively.
-11-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 12 of 15
claims against the [Florida Department of Corrections]”); Mazzola v. Davis, No. 3:12-CV-1055J-34JRK, 2017 WL 4310256, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2017) (“[L]iberally construing the [Third Amended Complaint], the Court considers Mazzola’s ADA claim as a claim against the [Florida Department of Corrections] through Defendants Davis and Willis in their official capacities.”); Woody v. Bryson, No. 5:16-CV-00467-LJA, 2017 WL 2126598, at *6 (M.D. Ga. May 16, 2017) (liberally construing ADA claims to find that “[c]laims against employees in their ‘official capacities’ are, in essence, against a ‘public entity,’ the Georgia Department of Corrections”); see also Slaughter v. Bryson, No. 5:15-CV-90, 2018 WL 1400976, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2018) (“The Court then directed the Clerk of Court to add the [GDOC] as a Defendant because ADA Title II claims are only cognizable against public entities, and Plaintiff had not named the [GDOC] in his Complaint.”).
Here, Mr. Coen filed his Amended Complaint proceeding pro se in a language in which he is not proficient, and without the guidance or assistance of an attorney or advocate. Not surprisingly, Mr. Coen did not understand the specific, complex statutory and constitutional requirements concerning which Defendants should be named, and in what capacity, in order to obtain injunctive relief and damages under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution. Now represented by counsel, Mr. Coen names the Georgia Department of Corrections as the public entity defendant for his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in his Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint. See Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 961 F.2d 153, 156 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint related back, where plaintiff named the U.S. Postal Service – rather than the Postmaster General – as a defendant). Because Mr. Coen’s individual claims against GDOC and GDOC officials meet the Rule 15(c) criteria for relation back, this Court should treat these allegations against GDOC and its officers as though
-12-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 13 of 15

they were pled in August 2016. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff Jerry Coen requests that this Court grant this motion to file the Proposed Revised Second Amended Complaint under Rules 15(a) and 20. Mr. Coen further requests that the Court find that Mr. Coen’s individual claims against GDOC and its officers relate back to the original filing of this case under Rule 15(c).

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June 2018,

Sean Young, Georgia State Bar No. 790399 Kosha Tucker, Georgia State Bar No. 214335 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF GEORGIA, INC. P.O. Box 77208 Atlanta, GA 30357 Phone: (678) 981-5295 Fax: (770) 303-0060 SYoung@acluga.org KTucker@acluga.org
Ralph Miller, pro hac vice WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES LLP 2001 M Street, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 682-7000 Ralph.Miller@weil.com
Audrey Stano, pro hac vice WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES LLP 201 Redwood Shores Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Phone: (650) 802-3000 Audrey.Stano@weil.com

/s/ Zoe Brennan-Krohn Susan Mizner, pro hac vice Claudia Center, pro hac vice Zoe Brennan-Krohn, pro hac vice pending Talila A. Lewis, pro hac vice pending AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION DISABILITY RIGHTS PROGRAM 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Phone: (415) 343-0762 Fax: (415) 395-0950 SMizner@aclu.org CCenter@aclu.org ZBrennan-Krohn@aclu.org Talila.A.Lewis@gmail.com
Anna Bitencourt, pro hac vice pending NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 TTY: (301) 587-1789 Fax: (301) 587-1791 Anna.Bitencourt@nad.org

-13-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 14 of 15 Nigar Shaikh, pro hac vice pending Alexandria Swette, pro hac vice pending WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153-0119 Phone: (212) 310-8000 Nigar.Shaikh@weil.com Alexandria.Swette@weil.com
-14-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 33 Filed 06/20/18 Page 15 of 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 20, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing Motion for Leave to File Revised Second Amended Complaint with the Clerk for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia by using the CM/ECF system. A true and correct copy of this brief has been served via the Court’s CM/ECF system on all counsel of record.
/s/ Claudia Center Claudia Center Attorney for Plaintiffs
-15-

 
 Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 1 of 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JERRY THOMAS COEN and CARLOS HERRERA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; et al.,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 5:16-CV-00353-MTT )
) ) )
)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Coen’s first

amended complaint, Doc. 14; Coen’s pro se motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint, Doc. 26; Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised second amended

complaint, Doc. 33; and Coen’s motion to lift the stay of discovery, Doc. 44. Upon

consideration of the record, briefs, and procedural posture of this case, the Court

DENIES as MOOT the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Coen’s first amended complaint

and Coen’s pro se motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 14);

GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised

second amended complaint (Doc. 33); ORDERS Plaintiff to file a recast second

amended complaint that complies with this Order; and GRANTS Coen’s motion to lift

the stay of discovery (Doc. 44).

The Court concludes that Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised second

amended complaint is GRANTED to the extent he seeks (1) to clarify his factual

allegations relating to his claims for damages under Title II of the Americans with

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 2 of 30
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”); (2) to withdraw any claims not alleged in the proposed revised second amended complaint, including any claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”); (3) to add Carlos Herrera as a Plaintiff and add Herrera’s ADA and RA claims for damages only; and (4) to delete unnecessary Defendants named in the original and first amended complaint and add the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”) and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (“GBOP”) as the only named Defendants. Coen’s motion for leave to amend the revised second amended complaint is DENIED to the extent he seeks: (1) to clarify his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims; (2) to add or clarify his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief; (3) to add claims related to his (or any other Plaintiffs’) post-incarceration probation or parole; (4) to add additional Plaintiffs other than Herrera; (5) to add any claims for Herrera other than those brought under the ADA and RA; and (6) to add any individual Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND Jerry Thomas Coen was incarcerated at Central State Prison (“CSP”) in Macon, Georgia when he filed his original complaint against twelve Defendants on August 3, 2016. Doc. 1. Coen alleged he was “profoundly deaf” and his “native language” was American Sign Language (“ASL”). Doc. 1 at 5. He complained that the Defendants, through their practices and procedures, discriminated against him in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; and the United States Constitution. Doc. 1 at 5. Coen stated he was unable to use the standard telephones available in Georgia’s prison system to communicate and the teletypewriter or TTY telephone service for the
-2-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 3 of 30
hearing-impaired was inaccessible, inoperable, and outdated. Doc. 1 at 5. As a result, Coen had no means to communicate with individuals outside of the prison, including family, friends, lawyers, and advocates for the deaf. Doc. 1 at 5, 8. He complained that the Defendants failed to provide him with access to auxiliary aids or services necessary to enable him to participate in educational, religious, rehabilitative, and other services available to similarly situated non-deaf inmates. Doc. 1 at 5-8. He stated there were no ASL interpreters present during disciplinary proceedings. Doc. 1 at 9. He was, therefore, denied the ability to meaningfully participate and defend himself during these proceedings. Doc. 1 at 9.
On January 6, 2017, Coen filed an amended complaint, in which he raised essentially the same claims, but added additional Defendants. Doc. 8.
On February 15, 2017, the United States Magistrate Judge ordered Coen’s action could go forward against all named Defendants. Because Coen was not proceeding in forma pauperis, he was responsible for serving all of the Defendants. Doc. 9 at 6. The Clerk of Court was ordered to forward to Coen the documents needed for service. Doc. 9 at 6. The Court’s CM-ECF record shows that the Clerk’s office mailed a copy of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 package to Coen on February 16, 2017.
Coen was released from prison on February 18, 2017. Doc. 10. On July 17, 2017, the Court docketed a letter from Coen in which he stated that on July 12, 2017 he “mailed to each individual [D]efendant . . . via first-class mail a copy of the complaint and a request that they waive service . . . .” Doc. 12.
On September 8, 2017, Defendants Commissioner Homer Bryson, Warden Walter Berry, Deputy Warden John Fagan, Counselor Jones, Deputy Warden Mizell
-3-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 4 of 30
Davis, Counselor Racheal Moncrief, Deputy Warden Michael Thomas, Unit Manager Sheneca King, Chief Counselor Juanita Thorpe, Lt. Basely, Lt. Childress, Lt. Phillip, and Captain Hall moved to dismiss Coen’s first amended complaint and to stay discovery. Docs. 14; 15. On September 13, 2017, the Magistrate Judge ordered Coen to respond to the motion to dismiss and stayed discovery. Docs. 16; 17.
On April 17, 2018, Coen filed a “Request for Permission to File this Second Amended Complaint.” Doc. 26. He stated that he “wish[ed] to clarify some factual allegations, add [D]efendants, and add relevant facts about [his] post-release situation as a Deaf suvpervisee.” Doc. 26 at 1. Coen also stated that he was communicating with attorneys and hoped to retain counsel. Doc 26 at 1-2.
Counsel for Coen entered an appearance on June 7, 2018 and filed a motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint along with an eighty-two page proposed second amended complaint (“proposed complaint”) on June 20, 2018. Docs. 27; 28; 33; 33-1. Pursuant to the Court’s June 12, 2018 Order, Coen responded to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss on June 26, 2018. Docs 36; 37.
The Defendants have responded to Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint. Doc. 39.
II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REVISED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Prior to obtaining counsel, Coen filed a pro se motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Doc. 26. After he obtained counsel, they filed a motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint along with the proposed complaint.1 Doc.
1 Counsel for Coen states that the motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint “supersedes” Coen’s pro se motion for permission to file a second amended complaint. Doc. 33 at 3. Therefore, Coen’s pro se motion at Doc. 26 is DENIED AS MOOT.
-4-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 5 of 30
33. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint was pending when both of these motions were filed. Doc. 14. Should the Court grant the motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint, the proposed complaint would supersede the first amended complaint. Fritz v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint); Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2103) (quoting Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. & Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that “‘an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading’”). Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss the first amended complaint would, therefore, be rendered moot. Beasley v. City of Atlanta, 2012 WL13012619, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (citations omitted) (finding that “the amended complaint renders moot the motion to dismiss because the motion seeks to dismiss a pleading that has been superseded”); Gulf Coast Recycling, Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 2008 WL 434880, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Thus, “[i]n the interest of justice and efficiency, the Court will commence by evaluating” Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint. Carbiener v. Lender Processing Serv, Inc., 2014 WL 12616966, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
Coen seeks leave to amend his complaint to “clarify [his] individual claims against Defendants.” Doc. 33 at 2. He also wants to add thirteen additional “Plaintiffs, who—together with Mr. Coen—seek to represent a class of deaf or hard of hearing people incarcerated in prisons and subject to supervision in Georgia.” Doc. 33 at 2.
-5-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 6 of 30
These thirteen additional Plaintiffs are all deaf or hard of hearing individuals2 who are currently or formerly in the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”), currently or formerly subjected to the authority of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (“GBOP”), and/or currently under the supervision of the Georgia Department of Community Supervision (“GDCS”). Doc. 33 at 8. Coen seeks to “eliminate Defendants who do not need to be parties to the case” and add other Defendants, including GDOC, GBOP, and GDCS. Doc. 33 at 2, 9.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should feely give leave when justice so requires.” The Court has “‘extensive discretion’ to decide whether or not to allow a party to amend a complaint.” Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hargett v. Valley Fed. Sav. Bank, 60 F.3d 754, 761 (11th Cir. 1995)). Amendment is properly denied if it would prejudice the defendants, follows undue delay, or is futile. Id. (citing Tech. Res. Serv., Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 134 F.3d 1458, 1463-64 (11th Cir. 1998)). An amendment is futile if “‘the complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal.’” Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255,1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Because justice does not require district courts to waste their time on hopeless cases, leave may be denied if a proposed amendment fails to correct the deficiencies in the original complaint or otherwise fails to state a claim.” Mizzaro v.
2 The proposed complaint states that “the terms deaf and hard of hearing . . . refer to individuals with hearing levels or hearing loss that qualify as ‘disabilities’ under the [ADA] and the [RA].” Doc. 33-1 at 2, n.1. The Court uses the term “deaf” in this Order to refer to both deaf and hard of hearing individuals.
-6-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 7 of 30
Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
In this case, the Defendants oppose Coen’s motion for leave to file the revised second amended complaint on the basis of futility alone. Doc. 39 at 5. They argue that the proposed complaint is futile for the same three reasons advanced in Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint: (1) Coen fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief; (2) Coen is still barred from recovering compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) Coen’s claims for injunctive relief are moot. Doc. 39 at 3-9. Defendants also argue that joinder of unrelated Plaintiffs and Defendants should not be allowed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. Doc. 39 at 9-12. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. A. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
The Defendants argue that the Court should deny Coen’s motion for leave to file the revised second amended complaint because it “fails to mention any of the individual Defendants by name; describe the specific conduct each Defendant allegedly engaged in; provide any details about when Plaintiff requested and was denied access to communication; or describe in any meaningful way the programs that he is allegedly being denied access to.” Doc. 39 at 5.
The proposed complaint alleges the Defendants have violated Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the RA, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by engaging the following conduct:
-7-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 8 of 30
1. Alleged failure to provide equally effective communication The proposed complaint alleges the Defendants fail to provide equally effective communication to deaf persons within the prisons and to deaf probationers and parolees under state supervision. Doc. 33-1 at 19. Specifically, deaf individuals are not provided the necessary auxiliary aids and services to allow them to take part in, or adequately understand, the following: (1) the initial classification process, which occurs at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (Doc. 33-1 at 21); (2) the initial prisoner orientation, which occurs at various state prisons (Doc. 33-1 at 22); (3) disciplinary proceedings (Doc. 33-1 at 22-25); (4) educational, vocational, and religious programs (Doc. 33-1 at 25-27); (5) meetings and conversations with in-custody counselors and staff (Doc. 33-1 at 27- 28); (6) employment (Doc. 33-1 at 29-30); (7) parole and re-entry planning (Doc. 33-1 at 30-31); (8) information communicated verbally to all inmates in prison (Doc. 33-1 at 32-33); (9) information conveyed in writing to all inmates in prison (Doc. 33-1 at 33); and (10) meetings with community supervision officers (Doc. 33-1 at 33-35). As to Coen, the proposed complaint contains allegations related solely to number three—an inability to effectively participate in one disciplinary proceeding. Specifically, on an unspecified date in 2016 at CSP, unnamed Defendants subjected Coen to a disciplinary hearing. Coen’s hands were cuffed behind his back during the hearing, and he was unable to communicate or understand the proceedings. “The handcuffs were on too tightly causing Mr. Coen pain and injury.” Doc. 33-1 at 25. Coen suffered “bruising and cuts from the handcuffs . . . [and] still has scars on his wrists from the experience.”
-8-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 9 of 30
Doc. 33-1 at 45. Coen spent a week in solitary confinement following the disciplinary hearing. Doc. 33-1 at 25.
Coen’s alleged inabilities to understand and participate in the disciplinary proceeding are potentially actionable under both the ADA and the RA. Both statutes permit suits by disabled persons who face discrimination on account of their disabilities, or who are excluded from or denied the benefits of services because of their disabilities. Title II of the ADA requires that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 of the RA requires that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of . . . his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “[B]oth statutes are generally construed to impose the same legal requirements.” Forbes v. St. Thomas Univ., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1999)). The ADA and RA extend to state prison inmates. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998); Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 1999). The proposed complaint alleges that GDOC’s policies and procedures failed to provide for interpreters or other communication access during Coen’s disciplinary process and called for indiscriminately handcuffing Coen, a deaf inmate, during the disciplinary hearing. Doc. 33-1 at 23. Coen alleges he was, therefore, “subjected to discrimination” and effectively “excluded from participation in” the entire disciplinary process. 42
-9-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 10 of 30
U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). As to Coen, these facts are enough to state potential claims under the ADA and RA.
The proposed complaint does not, however, allege a viable claim that Coen’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. Allegations suggesting denial of a fair disciplinary hearing do not, without more, state a due process claim. A prisoner seeking to state a claim for denial of due process must first allege facts to show that the denial of a fair hearing caused him to suffer an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Only after the Court finds that the prisoner suffered “an atypical and significant hardship,” can it consider whether the hearing provided was adequate to provide due process. Id. Spending one week in solitary confinement is not a dramatic departure from the ordinary conditions of prison life. Id. at 486 (finding thirty days’ confinement in segregation is not “an atypical and significant hardship”). Since Coen did not suffer “an atypical and significant hardship,” there simply could be no due process violation. Id.
2. Failure to provide effective communication and to meet minimum constitutional requirements in medical, dental, and mental health care
The proposed complaint alleges generally that GDOC repeatedly fails to provide interpreters, Communication Access Realtime Translation (“CART”), or other aids and services at medical appointments. Doc. 33-1 at 35. Additionally, unnamed Defendants have failed to ensure deaf prisoners get appointments with hearing specialists to obtain hearing aids and cochlear implants. Doc. 33-1 at 35. While the proposed complaint provides details regarding how several prisoners and former prisoners have been
-10-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 11 of 30
impacted by these alleged failures, there are no allegations specific to Coen. Doc. 33-1 at 36-38.
3. Unequal access to telecommunications The proposed complaint alleges that GDOC provides prisoners who can hear regular access to telephones to communicate with family, friends, attorneys, and others outside of the prison. Doc. 33-1 at 39. But deaf inmates cannot use the telephones, and GDOC’s teletypewriters (“TTY”) are often broken or outdated. Doc. 33-1 at 40. While the proposed complaint provides details regarding how several prisoners and former prisoners have been impacted by the alleged inability to communicate with persons outside the prisons, there are no allegations specific to Coen. Doc. 33-1 at 41. 4. Unreasonable use of administrative isolation According to the proposed complaint, deaf “inmates are particularly affected by the sensory deprivations of solitary confinement, administrative segregation, protective custody, and other forms of prolonged isolation.” Doc. 33-1 at 43. Unlike inmates who can hear, deaf inmates are unable to communicate or hear announcements during isolation. As a result they routinely miss meals, showers, appointments, or medications while in isolation. Doc. 33-1 at 44. “While hearing inmates can shout to communicate to others in isolation or to get the attention of passing guards, deaf . . . inmates generally cannot share information through speech.” Doc. 33-1 at 43. Also, inmates in segregation are allowed books to “mitigate the sensory and social isolations of segregation.” Doc. 33-1 at 44. But deaf inmates cannot benefit from this policy or practice because most of them “do not understand written English.” Doc. 33-1 at 44.
-11-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 12 of 30
Coen alleges he was “held in solitary confinement for a week.” Doc. 33-1 at 44. During that time, he had no idea how long he would remain in confinement, “[h]e was completely cut off from all communication,” and he suffered “significant mental distress and exacerbation of depression.” Doc. 33-1 at 44.
Coen’s allegations raise the potential claim that GDOC’s administrative isolation policies and procedures have subjected him to discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. These facts, however, do not raise a claim that Coen suffered cruel and unusual punishment. “The Eighth Amendment proscribes punishment that shocks the conscience, offends society’s evolving notions of decency or is grossly disproportionate to the offense.” Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1428 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)). Administrative segregation alone does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1428-29. Also, “‘the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards.’” Id. at 1429 (citing Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686). Here, it does not appear that Coen was deprived of adequate food, sanitation, clothing, or any other necessity during his brief solitary confinement. Also, the confinement was for only one week. Coen has not stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim.
5. Use and placement of handcuffs without regard to communication The proposed complaint alleges that many deaf inmates communicate primarily or exclusively with their hands and when “GDOC routinely handcuffs” these inmates behind their backs, they are unable to communicate. Doc. 33-1 at 44-45. Coen alleges that he was handcuffed at the disciplinary hearing that resulted in his one-week detention in administrative segregation. Doc. 33-1 at 25. He states he was unable to
-12-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 13 of 30
communicate at the hearing. Plus, the handcuffs were too tight, and “[h]e still has scars on his wrists from this experience.” Doc. 33-1 at 45.
Coen alleges he was unable to participate in the disciplinary hearing because GDOC’s policy or “routine[]” procedure required that he be handcuffed behind his back. This states a potential claim under the ADA and the RA. However, as explained above, Coen has not stated a viable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim in relation to the disciplinary hearing. Also, to any extent that Coen seeks to allege cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, he has failed. The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, . . . the infliction of pain totally without penological justification . . . , [and] the infliction of punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must prove both an objective and subjective component. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1992). He must show the alleged wrongdoing was objectively “‘harmful enough’” to establish a constitutional violation, Id. at 8 (citations omitted), and that the defendant acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” Id. at 7. Even assuming that Coen could establish the objective element, he has alleged no facts to establish that any of the named Defendants acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” when they tightened his handcuffs before this hearing. Id. In fact, he has not alleged who was responsible for placing the handcuffs too tightly on his wrists.
6. Failure to include deaf inmates in emergency planning The proposed complaint alleges that GDOC has emergency plans and equipment in place to warn and protect inmates in the event of an emergency. Doc. 33-
-13-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 14 of 30
1 at 46. However, GDOC does not have adequate equipment in place to provide warnings to deaf inmates. The proposed complaint provides no details of how Coen, or any other inmate, has been affected by these shortcomings.
7. Failure to maintain an accessible, adequate administrative exhaustion process
The proposed complaint alleges that the grievance process is inaccessible to deaf inmates. Doc. 33-1 at 46. Most deaf inmates are not literate in English and, therefore, cannot access the grievance process or file grievances. Doc. 33-1 at 47. In relation to Coen, the second amended complaint alleges that he “attempted to file a grievance about the injuries to his wrists and torso that he experienced from handcuffs being too tight,” but the grievance counselor threw the grievance in the trash. Doc. 33-1 at 48.
While the fact that Coen was unable, due to his disability, to participate in the grievance process potentially raises claims under the ADA and the RA, it does not raise any constitutional claims. There is no constitutional right to participate in prison grievance procedures. See Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1989); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir.2001) (stating that “the existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner. . .”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.1994) (stating that “the Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state”).
In conclusion, as far as Coen is concerned, the factual allegations in the proposed complaint do not state any viable constitutional claims. The proposed complaint, however, alleges enough facts to raise narrow claims under the ADA and
-14-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 15 of 30
RA. Namely, that Coen, during his incarceration at CSP, was either discriminated against, effectively excluded from, or denied the benefits of, the disciplinary process,3 the grievance process, and various components of administrative segregation because of his disability. B. Compensatory and punitive damages
Coen does not seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 42 at 5-6. Instead, he seeks compensatory damages under the ADA and the RA against GDOC. Doc. 331 at 76, 78. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners are barred from recovering compensatory or punitive damages unless they have suffered more than a de minimis physical injury.4 Doc. 39 at 6 (citing Brooks v. Powell, 800 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2015)). Defendants argue that Coen alleged only a de minimis physical injury in his first amended complaint and has done so again in the proposed complaint.
The PLRA provides that “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The only physical injury Coen allegedly sustained was to his wrists and torso when, on one occasion, his hands were cuffed behind his back before and during a disciplinary hearing. Doc. 33-1 at 25. The proposed complaint states: “The handcuffs were on too tightly, causing Mr. Coen pain and injury” (Doc. 33-1 at 25); “He experienced bruising and cuts from the handcuffs” (Doc. 33-1 at 45); and “[h]e still has
3 Included in this claim is Coen’s allegation that he was unreasonably handcuffed behind his back on the way to, and during, this disciplinary hearing and, therefore, could not communicate or defend himself. Doc. 33-1 at 45. 4 If Coen’s injuries are de minimis, he could recover only nominal damages of $1.00. Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1308.
-15-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 16 of 30
scars on his wrists from this experience” (Doc. 33-1 at 45). It, therefore, appears that Coen’s skin was cut and damaged to the extent that he still bears scars. Doc. 42 at 6.
While the Court agrees with Defendants that bruises, welts, scrapes, and marks are de minimis, it appears that Coen’s injuries might have been more extensive. He states that he has permanent scars as a result of the handcuffs being placed too tightly on his wrists. Compare Johnson v. Georgia, 2007 WL 601619, at *3-*4 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (citations omitted) (stating that a physical injury such as a “‘sore muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an abrasion, a bruise[,]’” for which people do not ordinarily seek medical care, are considered de minimis injuries), with Owens v. Hart, 2016 WL 450297, at *10 (M.D. Ga. 2016) (citations omitted) (declining to find that injuries were de minimis when plaintiff suffered scrapes, abrasions, significant swelling, and a permanent knot on his head). The Court agrees with Coen that the question whether he experienced more than a de minimis physical injury should not be decided in this preliminary context. Doc. 42 at 6-7. Instead, it can be decided after the parties have had an opportunity to conduct discovery to verify the extent of Coen’s injuries. C. Injunctive relief
When Coen filed his original and first amended complaint, he was incarcerated at CSP. Docs. 1; 8. He was released from confinement on February 18, 2017. Doc. 10. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are mooted by a prisoner’s release from prison. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Coen raises two arguments in an effort to avoid this well-established rule. First, Coen states that he still has standing to seek injunctive relief to remedy the unlawful violations he is experiencing while on probation under state supervision. Second, he argues that his
-16-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 17 of 30
risk of reincarceration is so great, he should not be foreclosed from obtaining injunctive and declaratory relief against GDOC and its officials. Doc. 42 at 7-9.
The proposed complaint alleges that Defendants deny deaf probationers and parolees “equally effective communication in meetings with their parole and probation officers, local sheriffs, and in reviewing the conditions of parole or probation.” Doc. 331 at 3. As a result, these probationers and parolees often do not know what is required of them and end up violating the conditions of their release and returning to prison. Docs. 33-1 at 3; 37. The proposed complaint contains no allegations specific to Coen. Yet, in an affidavit submitted in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Coen states his probation office, which is in Glynn County, does not provide ASL interpreters, and he, therefore, does “not fully understand the conditions of [his] probation. But [he] thinks that [his] probation officer can send [him] back to prison if [he does] not follow all the rules of probation.” Doc. 37 at 1. The second amended complaint seeks to add two additional Plaintiffs who are currently “subject to state supervision under GDCS” (Jeremy Woody and Carlos Herrera) (Doc. 33-1 at 9, 11), and two Defendants who are responsible for supervising probationers and parolees across the state (GDCS and Michael Nail, Commissioner of GDCS) (Doc. 33-1 at 12, 14).
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 states that the Court “should feely give leave” to amend, the Court finds that claims arising during probation should be brought in a separate action. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants when a “right to relief . . . aris[es] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and involves a “question of law or fact [that is] common to all . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. As the Court explained in a recent case,
-17-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 18 of 30
“[w]hile Plaintff’s probation allegations perhaps raise common issues of RA and ADA law, the factual dissimilarities between the highly secured prison environment and the less secure probation environment are too pronounced to satisfy the ‘series of transactions or occurrences’ inquiry.” Woody v. Perry, 2018 WL 3060084, at *2 (M.D. Ga. 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3059608 (M.D. Ga. 2018). Stated another way, the post-incarceration claims asserted against GDCS and Nail do not “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as the conditions of confinement claims against GDOC and its officials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). The factual issues surrounding the alleged failure to provide effective communication inside Georgia’s prisons bear little relation to the factual issues surrounding the alleged failure to provide non-prisoners with effective communication. Coen, Woody, and Herrera are not prejudiced by this determination. They may file separate civil action raising these claims and seeking damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.
Next, Coen argues that his risk of returning to prison is so great that he should not be foreclosed from obtaining injunctive and declaratory relief against GDOC and its officials. Doc. 42 at 8-9. Defendants counter that Coen has made no factual showing that he is in danger of violating his probation. Instead, his argument that he is in danger of being reincarcerated is “nothing but pure speculation.” Doc. 39 at 8. In reply, Coen points to the recidivism rate in Georgia:
The state’s recidivism rate—the proportion of individuals reconvicted within three years of release—is about 30 percent. In 2015, nearly 37 percent of people exiting probation were incarcerated, revoked, or had another unsuccessful discharge. The same year, 22 percent of people exiting parole were re-incarcerated. More than two out of three people admitted to prison were sent there for probation and parole revocations.
-18-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 19 of 30
As of July 2018, 44 percent of the state’s prison population has been incarcerated in Georgia at least once before. Doc. 42 at 8 (footnotes and citations omitted). Coen’s argument proves too much. Statistically, every probationer and parolee face a significant risk of returning to prison. Therefore, using Coen’s logic, every probationer and parolee should be allowed to enjoin GDOC’s future behavior. This, however, is not the law. Because Coen is no longer incarcerated, he simply does not have a personal interest in enjoining GDOC’s future behavior. McKinnon v. Talladega Cty, Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that claim for declaratory and injunctive relief remained available because plaintiff, who had been transferred from the jail about which he complained, might be returned to the same jail at some future date); McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding “when an inmate’s claim for prospective injunctive relief regarding conditions of confinement becomes moot due to the inmate-plaintiff’s release from confinement, the inmate’s parole or supervised release status does not, absent some exceptional showing, bring that claim under the narrow ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception to the mootness doctrine”); Schauer v. Fogg, 885 F. Supp. 28, 31 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that by parolee’s logic—request for injunctive relief not moot because he could be re-incarcerated if he violated parole—“anyone would have standing to sue for an injunction against prison conditions because they might someday be incarcerated”). As for any re-incarceration risk specific to Coen, all he states is that he does “not fully understand the conditions of [his] probation.” Doc. 37 at 1. The same could probably be said for many probationers or parolees. Given the “pervasive cycle of incarceration to parole/probation to re-incarceration” that Coen details in his brief, it
-19-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 20 of 30
seems that many probationers and parolees fail to understand, or at least adhere to, the conditions of their supervised release. Doc. 42 at 8. Coen has successfully managed his probation for approximately sixteen months. Doc. 10. His argument that he might one day be re-incarcerated is speculative. Doc. 37 at 1; Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating plaintiff’s argument that he might one day be transferred back to county jail is “too speculative”). Coen can no longer benefit from the injunctive relief he requests from GDOC and its officials. Thus, his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot. D. Joinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20
Plaintiffs may join in one action if “(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-(B). The Court “has broad discretion to join parties or not.” Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “Whether multiple claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences depends on whether a ‘logical relationship’ exists between the claims.” Rhodes v. Target Corp., 313 F.R.D. 656, 659 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (quoting Alexander v. Fulton Cty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)). For there to be a “logical relationship,” the claims must “arise from common operative facts.” Barber v. America’s Wholesale Lender, 289 F.R.D. 364, 367 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (citations omitted). Even in situations where joinder is permissible, it is not mandated. Rhodes, 313 F.R.D. at 659. “Thus, ‘even if the technical requirements
-20-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 21 of 30
for joinder are met, the Court has discretion to deny joinder if it determines that the addition of a party under Rule 20 will not foster the objectives of the rule, but will result in prejudice, expense[,] or delay.’” Id. (citations omitted).
1. Potential Plaintiffs who are currently incarcerated Coen argues that joinder of thirteen additional Plaintiffs is appropriate because all of the potential Plaintiffs are deaf or hard of hearing and all are either currently in GDOC custody and subject to the pardon and parole power of GBOP, or no longer in custody but still subject to GDCS supervision. Doc. 33 at 7-8. He states that “[a]ll Plaintiffs’ claims are based on conduct, policies, procedures, and failures by state officials against deaf and hard-of-hearing people in the custody or supervision of the State of Georgia.” Doc. 33 at 8. Coen claims the second prong of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) is “easily met” because “[n]umerous questions of law or fact common to all Plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Doc. 33 at 8. As stated previously, when Coen filed his original complaint in this action he was a prisoner at CSP and was, therefore, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Docs. 1; 8. Coen moved to proceed in forma pauperis, but the Court denied the motion because he had enough money in his prisoner account to pay the filing fee. Docs. 4; 5. Ten or eleven5 of the Plaintiffs Coen seeks to add are currently incarcerated and are, therefore, subject to the PLRA. Doc. 33 at 7-12. Defendant argues that joinder is prohibited by Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2001). In Hubbard, eighteen unrepresented prisoners brought a 42
5 John Doe is one of Coen’s potential Plaintiffs. Doc. 33 at 8. He states that “Doe is in the custody or under the supervision of the Defendants.” Doc. 33 at 8. The Court, therefore, does not know if Doe is incarcerated and subject to the PLRA or not.
-21-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 22 of 30
U.S.C. § 1983 action in forma pauperis, alleging inadequate medical care and diet at the prison in which they were incarcerated. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the PLRA clearly and unambiguously requires that ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Id. at 1197. Thus, multiple prisoners may not join in one action and share the filing fee. Id. at 1197-98. To the extent that Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 conflicts with the filingfee requirement of the PLRA, “the statute repeals the Rule.” Id. at 1198 (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Coen states that, unlike the situation in Hubbard, he is currently represented by counsel, and he paid the filing fee. Some courts have determined that prisoners may not join in one action even if they are represented, and even if each one pays the required filing fee. Garcia v. McNeil, 2010 WL 4823370, at *2 (N.D. Fla. 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 4818067 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1198) (holding that prisoners who are represented by counsel and who have non-frivolous claims cannot join under Rule 20 even if each pays the filing fee). However, this Court determined in a previous case that additional prisoners could join an action when they were represented by counsel and the original plaintiff had paid the filing fee. Mann v. Donald, 2009 WL 811574, at * 9 (M.D. Ga. 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 811577 (M.D. Ga. 2009). As Coen points out, if Defendants’ argument prevailed, no group of represented prisoners could ever bring a class action, and this is not the law. Doc. 42 at 11 n.12 (citing Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634, 673 (M.D. Ala. 2016); Henderson v. Thomas, 289 F.R.D. 506, 512 (M.D. Ala. 2012); Anderson v. Garner, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1387 (N.D. Ga. 1997)).
-22-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 23 of 30
Even if the PLRA does not prohibit joinder in this case, factors weigh in favor of denying Coen’s motion to join the ten or eleven Plaintiffs who are currently incarcerated. Most notably, those who are currently incarcerated have an interest in enjoining GDOC’s future behavior; Coen does not. The proposed complaint requests the Court to order the Defendants to modify their policies, practices, and procedures to comply with the ADA, the RA, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 33-1 at 7381. The substantial and complex issues related to how the Defendants could and should modify their policies, practices, and procedures simply are not present in Coen’s case. See Swan, 293 F.3d at 1253 (finding plaintiff who wanted to join action could not satisfy the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) because he did not share the original plaintiff’s right to injunctive relief). The claims and potential relief that exist in Coen’s case are narrow: Coen only has claims for money damages under the ADA and the RA involving CSP’s grievance process, one disciplinary hearing, and one stay in administrative segregation. It simply would not serve the interests of justice to so greatly expand a case that has already been pending in this Court for two years. Barber, 289 F.R.D. at 368 (citations omitted) (stating that “considerations of judicial economy, case management, prejudice to parties, and fundamental fairness” may caution against joinder). The incarcerated Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by this ruling. They can file their own suit or suits in which they may seek to enjoin GDOC’s future behavior.
2. Potential Plaintiffs who are not currently incarcerated The other potential Plaintiffs (Woody and Herrera) are, like Coen, currently “subject to state supervision under GDCS.” Doc. 33-1 at 9, 11. Woody currently has an
-23-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 24 of 30
action pending in this Court in which he is litigating ADA and RA claims against Warden Clinton Perry and former Warden Walter Berry in their official capacities for violations that allegedly occurred at CSP. See Woody v. Bryson, Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-467 (M.D. Ga. 2016). Woody’s suit against these two individuals in their official capacity is, in effect, a suit against GDOC. Woody v. Bryson, Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-467, Docs. 25 at 14; 29 at 2-3 (M. D. Ga. 2016) (citations omitted). The Court, therefore, agrees with Defendants that Woody cannot “‘maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.’” Doc. 39 at 13 (citations omitted).
Coen argues that Woody’s attempt to join this suit is his way of adhering to the Court’s previous ruling in his lawsuit. Doc. 42 at 11. In that case, the Court denied Woody’s attempt to add his post-incarceration injunctive relief claims to his ongoing ADA and RA claims for damages stemming from his confinement at CSP. Woody v. Bryson, Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-467, Docs. 25 at 14; 29 at 2-3 (M. D. Ga. 2016). The Court instructed Woody to file a separate case to address the claims related to his probation. Id. Likewise, in this Order, the Court has instructed Coen that he may not join his probation-related claims to his prison-related claims. Claims arising from a lack of effective communication during probation or parole simply do not “arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as claims alleging a lack of adequate communication during incarceration. Although all of the claims “may raise similar legal issues [under the ADA or the RA], they are not logically related because they do not arise from common operative facts.” Barber, 289 F.R.D. at
-24-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 25 of 30
367. Thus, Coen, Woody, and Herrera cannot raise probation-related claims in this action.
This leaves only Herrera and his prison-related claims, which are: (1) Herrera needed to take a specific risk-reduction class before he could be
considered for parole. Doc. 33-1 at 26. But Augusta State Medical Prison (“ASMP”) repeatedly rejected Herrera from the risk-reduction class because ASMP refused to provide interpreters. Doc. 33-1 at 26. Herrera’s inability to take the class was a contributing factor to his denial of parole in July 2016. Doc. 33-1 at 26. Other contributing factors included GBOP’s “failure to ensure effective communication access.” Doc. 33-1 at 27. (2) Herrera was discriminated against on the basis of his disability when he worked in the kitchen at ASMP. Doc. 33-1 at 29. (3) In April 2018, while incarcerated at CSP, Herrera failed to hear guards announce inspection and was forced to wash windows as punishment for failing to prepare for inspection. Doc. 33-1 at 32. (4) Herrera, who has high blood pressure, had no way to communicate with medical staff and, therefore, received no medical care for “shortness of breath” in March 2018 at CSP. Doc. 33-1 at 37. (5) Unnamed “prison officials at ASMP” retaliated against the deaf inmates, including Herrera, for filing grievances and transferred them to CSP in February, 2018. Doc. 33-1 at 49. Herrera, like Coen, seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 33-1 at 79, 81. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and damages
-25-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 26 of 30
under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. Doc. 33-1 at 76, 78. Just as with
Coen, Herrera is no longer incarcerated and is not entitled to injunctive or declaratory
relief. Herrera, therefore, has failed to request any available relief under § 1983. Also,
the factual allegations in the proposed complaint fail to set forth any viable constitutional claims.6 But, as with Coen, the facts in the proposed complaint do raise potential claims
under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. Given the similarities to Coen, the
Court finds that Herrera meets the requirements in Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-(B).
Herrera may join his ADA and RA claims for damages that arose during incarceration at
ASMP and CSP in this action. Herrera, like Coen and Woody, will need to file a
separate action to address any probation or parole-related claims.
3. Defendants
Coen seeks to “join twelve Defendants in this case, three institutional
Defendants—GDOC, GDCS, and GBOP—and nine officials from those institutions who are sued in their official capacities.” Doc. 33 at 9. Coen states that the individual
Defendants are those with “decision-making authority.” Doc. 33 at 9 n.2. He alleges
that “GDOC (as well as GDCS and GBOP) [are] public entity defendants for his ADA
6 Herrera’s factual allegations do not raise Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violations. There is no constitutional right to parole or constitutional right to obtain or keep a certain job in prison. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1495 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding Georgia’s parole system creates no liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause); Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that “job assignment and reassignment remain the prerogative of the prison administrators). Being made to wash windows does not amount to an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Allegations that unnamed prison staff failed to treat his shortness of breath, without more, fail to show a serious medical need or that any particular defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Harper v. Lawrence Cty, 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010). While the factual allegations potentially show a retaliatory transfer by unnamed officials at ASMP, the proposed complaint does not contain a count for First Amendment retaliation. Doc. 33-1. Additionally, the only relief Herrera seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is injunctive and declaratory relief. Even if he stated a constitutional claim, he, like Coen, would not be entitled to this relief because he is no longer in prison.
-26-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 27 of 30
and [RA] claims.” Doc. 36 at 9. He seeks to name GDOC officials “for injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Doc. 36 at 9.
As with plaintiffs, defendants may be joined in one action if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B). The Court has discretion when it comes to joinder of defendants. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
As explained above, the proposed complaint raises potential claims for damages under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA related to Coen’s and Herrera’s alleged inabilities as deaf inmates to communicate in prison. “Only public entities are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “State prisons are public entities for purposes of the ADA.” Owens v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 475, 477 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Yeskey, 524 U.S.at 210). Similarly, the requirements of Section 504 of the RA apply to “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C.§ 794(a). The term “program or activity” means the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). This language suggests that RA claims should be brought against the public entity as well. Individuals are not subject to personal liability under either the ADA or the RA.7 See Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated and superseded on other grounds by 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006).
7 The only exception is that individuals may be personally liable for violations of ADA’s anti-retaliation provision. 42 U.S.C.§ 12203(a); Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (11th Cir.
-27-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 28 of 30
The Court has found that claims involving an inability to communicate during probation or parole do not “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as claims related to an inability to communicate during incarceration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B). Thus, GDCS cannot be joined in this action. However, GDOC and GBOP may be added as Defendants. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (finding that “[l]ike state prisons, state parole boards ‘fall squarely within the statutory definition of “public entity,” which includes “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”’”).
The ADA and RA claims for damages against the individual Defendants that Plaintiff seeks to add in their official capacities are “indistinguishable from [P]laintiff’s claims against” GDOC and GBOP. Clifton v. Ga. Merit Sys., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Because the Court is adding GDOC and GBOP as Defendants, claims for damages against the individual Defendants in their official capacity are “redundant.” Id. at 1362-63. To the extent that Coen seeks to add the individual Defendants because he seeks injunctive relief under § 1983 against these individuals, the Court has determined that Coen and Herrera have not raised any viable constitutional claims and that Coen’s and Herrera’s requests for injunctive relief were mooted by their release from prison.
2003). It does not appear that Coen seeks to raise any ADA claims against individual Defendants in their personal capacity. Doc. 36 at 8-9. While the proposed complaint alleges that Herrera was retaliated against for filing grievances, it does not identify the Defendant or Defendants who retaliated against him. Also, it does not identify one grievance that Herrera filed. Thus, the proposed complaint has not identified any specific instances of retaliation against Herrera. As such, the proposed complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA against any individual Defendant in his or her personal capacity.
-28-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 29 of 30
Accordingly, the Court sees no need to add the individual Defendants in any capacity. The only Defendants in this action going forward are GDOC and GBOP.
III. MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Coen’s first amended complaint was pending when he filed his motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint. Docs. 14; 33. The Court grants in part and denies in part Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint. The proposed complaint, therefore, supersedes the first amended complaint, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint is moot. Fritz, 676 F.2d at 1358; Beasley, 2012 WL13012619, at *1. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, DENIED AS MOOT. Should Defendants think it appropriate, they may file a motion to dismiss the revised second amended complaint.
IV. DISCOVERY Plaintiff moves to vacate the Magistrate Judge’s order that stayed discovery in this case pending the outcome of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Doc. 44. Defendants’ motion to dismiss has now been resolved. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion and reopens discovery for a period of ninety days from the date of this Order.
V. CONCLUSION Coen’s motion for leave to amend the revised second amended complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Coen’s motion for leave to file a revised second amended complaint is GRANTED to the extent he seeks (1) to clarify his factual allegations relating to his claims for damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”); (2) to withdraw any claims not alleged in the proposed revised second amended complaint, including
-29-

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 47 Filed 09/13/18 Page 30 of 30
any claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”); (3) to add Carlos Herrera as a Plaintiff and add Herrera’s ADA and RA claims for damages only; and (4) to delete unnecessary Defendants named in the original and first amended complaint and add the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”) and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (“GBOP”) as the only named Defendants. Coen’s motion for leave to amend the revised second amended complaint is DENIED to the extent he seeks: (1) to clarify his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims; (2) to add or clarify his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief; (3) to add claims related to his (or any other Plaintiffs’) post-incarceration probation or parole; (4) to add additional Plaintiffs other than Herrera; (5) to add any claims for Herrera other than those brought under the ADA and RA; and (6) to add any individual Defendants.
Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a recast second amended complaint that complies with the rulings in this Order.
The Court DENIES as MOOT both Defendants’ motion to dismiss Coen’s first amended complaint and Coen’s pro se motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Docs. 14; 26.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to lift the stay of discovery and the parties have ninety days from the date of this order to complete discovery.
SO ORDERED, this 13th September, 2018. S/ Marc T. Treadwell MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
-30-

 
 Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 50 Filed 09/28/18 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION

JERRY COEN, Plaintiff, v.
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 5:16-cv-353-MTT

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41 It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the undersigned pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) that the above-entitled action be, and it hereby is, dismissed without prejudice.
Dated: September 28, 2018

By: /s/ Claudia Center Claudia Center Counsel for Plaintiff Jerry Coen

By: /s/ Ellen Cusimano Ellen Cusimano Assistant Attorney General Counsel for Defendants

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 50 Filed 09/28/18 Page 2 of 4

Sean Young, Georgia State Bar No. 790399 Kosha Tucker, Georgia State Bar No. 214335 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF GEORGIA, INC. P.O. Box 77208 Atlanta, GA 30357 Phone: (678) 981-5295 Fax: (770) 303-0060 SYoung@acluga.org KTucker@acluga.org
Susan Mizner, pro hac vice Claudia Center, pro hac vice Zoe Brennan-Krohn, pro hac vice Talila A. Lewis, pro hac vice pending AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION DISABILITY RIGHTS PROGRAM 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 Phone: (415) 343-0781 Fax: (415) 395-0950 SMizner@aclu.org CCenter@aclu.org ZBrennan-Krohn@aclu.org Talila.A.Lewis@gmail.com

Christopher M. Carr Attorney General
Kathleen M. Pacious Deputy Attorney General
Roger A. Chalmers Senior Assistant Attorney General
Ellen Cusimano Assistant Attorney General
State Law Department 40 Capitol Square SV/ Atlanta, GA 30334 Tel: (404) 657-4355 Fax: (404) 651-5304 ecusimano@law.ga.gov
Counsel for Defendants

Ralph Miller, pro hac vice WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES LLP 2001 M Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 682-7000 Ralph.Miller@weil.com

Audrey Stano, pro hac vice WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES LLP 201 Redwood Shores Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Phone: (650) 802-3000 Audrey.Stano@weil.com

Nigar Shaikh, pro hac vice Alexandria Swette, pro hac vice WEIL, GOTSCHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153-0119

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 50 Filed 09/28/18 Page 3 of 4
Phone: (212) 310-8000 Nigar.Shaikh@weil.com Alexandria.Swette@weil.com
Anna Bitencourt, pro hac vice NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 TTY: (301) 587-1789 Fax: (301) 587-1791 Anna.Bitencourt@nad.org
Counsel for Plaintiff Jerry Coen

Case 5:16-cv-00353-MTT Document 50 Filed 09/28/18 Page 4 of 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on September 28, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41 with the Clerk for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia by using the CM/ECF system. A true and correct copy of this brief has been served via the Court’s CM/ECF system on all counsel of record.
/s/ Claudia Center Claudia Center Attorney for Plaintiffs