Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 45 Filed 02/06/09 Page 1 of 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-10157-RWZ
CECIL BARRETT, JR., CYNTHIA BARRETT, JEAN BLANCO GUERRIER, ANGELIQUE M. BASTIEN, JACQUELINE GRISSETT, CRAIG GRISSETT, and
STEVEN PARHAM on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v.
H&R BLOCK, INC., OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION and H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORPORATION N/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER February 6, 2009
ZOBEL, D.J. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are before the court. For the reasons discussed
below, the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is denied, but H&R Block, Inc.’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is allowed. I. Background
Plaintiffs bring this putative class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated minority homeowners against H&R Block, Inc. (“H&R Block”) and its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One”) and H&R Block Mortgage Corporation (“H&R Block Mortgage”). Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ “Discretionary Pricing Policy” has a widespread discriminatory impact on minority applicants for home mortgage loans in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
1 H&R Block Bank, a Federal Savings Bank, Member FDIC, was named as a defendant but has since been voluntarily dismissed from the action.

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U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (“ECOA”), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (“FHA”).
Plaintiffs allege that H&R Block “offered a full range of home mortgage services through its direct and indirect subsidiaries” Option One and H&R Block Mortgage. (Am. Compl. (Docket # 4) ¶ 18.) Option One was “primarily a wholesale mortgage lender and offered its services through its branches and a national network of mortgage brokers,” while H&R Block Mortgage “was a retail mortgage lender making direct-toconsumer loans nationwide.” (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)2 According to plaintiffs, when a proposed borrower applied for a loan Option One first computed a risk-based financing rate (the “Par Rate”) based on objective criteria of creditworthiness. However, Option One then authorized a subjective component in its credit pricing system (the “Discretionary Pricing Policy”) to impose additional charges unrelated to the borrower’s creditworthiness. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage played a role by jointly establishing the Discretionary Pricing Policy and participating in the decisions to grant credit to borrowers, including by applying the Discretionary Pricing Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 5354.)
Plaintiffs allege that “the Discretionary Pricing Policy, by design, caused persons with identical or similar credit scores to pay different amounts for the cost of credit.” (Id. ¶ 68.) Although facially neutral, the policy had a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities, in that minorities paid more discretionary charges on their home loans than similarly situated white borrowers.
2 Both entities ceased originating loans in 2007. 2

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Option One and H&R Block Mortgage have collectively moved to dismiss the complaint entirely for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). H&R Block moves separately for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5). II. The Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). A complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief” in order to survive a motion to dismiss, and “while a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)).
Defendants proffer four arguments in support of their motion to dismiss, which the court addresses sequentially.
A. Disparate Impact Claims under the ECOA and FHA The FHA prohibits any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person ni making available such a transaction, or i n the term s or condi tions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). The ECOA prohibits any creditor from discriminating against a
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qualified applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction “on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has adopted “the consensus among the circuits” and ruled that disparate impact claims are permissible under the FHA. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002). Although the First Circuit has not decided whether disparate impact claims are permissible under the ECOA, the circuit courts and many district courts that have decided the issue have uniformly concluded that they are. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1982); Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.3d 1082, 1101 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 492 U.S. 901 (1989); Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (dictum); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008). Indeed, defendants cite no authority which concludes that the ECOA does not permit disparate impact claims.
Nonetheless, defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), when read in tandem with its earlier decisions in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), and Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005), compels the conclusion that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under either the ECOA or the FHA because neither statute contains language focusing on the “effects of the action . . . rather than the motivation for the action.” (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Docket # 14), 6 (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 235-36).) I have previously considered and rejected this argument. See
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Alleyne v. Flagstar Bank, No. 07-cv-12128-RWZ, slip op. at 4-7 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2008). In Alleyne, I noted that Smith – which held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) authorizes claims of age discrimination based on disparate impact – does not require adverse effects language as a necessary prerequisite to allowing disparate impact liability. Rather, it “was decided on the basis of a number of canons of statutory interpretation and does not define a unique textual interpretation standard sufficient to invalidate First Circuit precedent on the FHA.” Id. at 6-7.3 I also noted that the agency charged with interpreting the ECOA, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), has concluded that Congress intended to allow disparate impact claims under that statute, and “while application of the plurality’s textual interpretation of the ADEA in Smith would support the conclusion that the ECOA does not allow discriminatory impact claims, its reliance on agency interpretation would suggest the opposite. Therefore, Smith provides insufficient guidance to reverse the unanimous conclusions of the FRB and the courts that have considered the issue.” Id. at 5, 7. I adhere to my prior ruling on this issue.
B. Failure to Adequately Plead a Disparate Impact Claim Defendants argue that “[d]iscrimination claims based on a defendant’s alleged subjective or discretionary decision-making process require particularized identification
3 See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1997) (discouraging lower courts from concluding that “more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent” and “reaffirm[ing] that if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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of specific practices that allegedly result in a disparate impact,” and plaintiffs’ general allegations of a “Discretionary Pricing Policy” fall short of this standard. (Docket # 14, 3.)4
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91 (1988), the Supreme Court held that “subjective or discriminatory . . . practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach,” reasoning that “[i]f an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply.” The Court noted that to establish a prima facie case a plaintiff must “begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is challenged,” and is “responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” Id. at 994. The Court reiterated this requirement in Wards Cove, noting that “a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under attack.” Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 n.3 (1994). Finally, in Smith, the
4 Defendants also briefly assert that the complaint fails to allege a causal connection between the challenged conduct and the statistical disparities, but fail to expound on this argument. (See Docket # 14, 9.) Accordingly, I do not consider it. See United States v. Van Anh, 523 F. 3d 43, 53 n.8 (1st Cir. 2008) (arguments not sufficiently developed are deemed waived).
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Supreme Court rejected a disparate impact claim under the ADEA because plaintiffs “have done little more than point out that the pay plan at issue is relatively less generous to older workers than to younger workers. They have not identified any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers.” Smith, 544 U.S. at 241. Relying on Wards Cove, Watson and Smith, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claim must fail because it is a challenge to their “overall loan origination process that allegedly includes both objective and subjective factors, the aggregate result of which is alleged to have a disparate impact on minority loan applicants.” (Docket # 14, 10.) In fact, plaintiffs’ challenge is not to the “overall loan origination process,” but to the specific “Discretionary Pricing Policy” within that process that permitted loan officers and brokers to impose additional discretionary charges unrelated to a borrower’s creditworthiness. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-44.) Plaintiffs have adequately identified the practice at issue: “establishing a par rate keyed to objective indicators of creditworthiness while simultaneously authorizing additional charges keyed to factors unrelated to those criteria.” Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 257 (D. Mass. 2008).5 Cf. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant
5 It is also noteworthy that Smith, Watson and Wards Cove were all decided in the context of summary judgment or after a trial. In all three the issue was whether the plaintiffs’ evidence adequately established a prima facie case of disparate impact, not whether plaintiffs had adequately alleged disparate impact in their complaint. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 231, 243 (challenge to summary judgment ruling); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 648 (challenge to findings made after trial); Watson, 487 U.S. at 983-84 (same).
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fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”) (citation omitted).6
C. Statute of Limitations The FHA provides that a plaintiff must file suit within two years after “the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). Actions under ECOA similarly have a two-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (“No such action shall be brought later than two years from the date of the occurrence of the violation . . . .”). Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed to the extent they are based on alleged conduct which occurred more than two years before the complaint was filed. Plaintiffs respond that various tolling doctrines, including the continuing violations doctrine, the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment by defendants, apply to preserve claims based on conduct extending beyond the two-year period. Plaintiffs, seven minority homeowners, filed their complaint in February 2008. All of the plaintiffs except two, Cecil Barrett, Jr. and Cynthia Barrett (“the Barretts”), first entered into loan agreements with Option One after February 2006, within the statute of
6 I note that the complaint also contains a bare allegation that “[d]ue to H&R Block’s policies as to where to place its offices and how to market its products, minority borrowers were more likely than white borrowers to apply for credit from H&R Block through its sub-prime subsidiary Option One, or from an Option One authorized broker.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.) To the extent plaintiffs intend to assert a claim of disparate impact based upon unspecified H&R Block policies relating to office location and marketing (and it is not clear that they do), such a claim is not sufficiently pled.
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limitations period.7 The Barretts purchased their home in January 2004, and refinanced their home loan with Option One on two occasions, in August 2005 and April 2006. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 81.) Defendants argue that the Barretts cannot assert claims based upon the first refinancing in August 2005.
The Supreme Court recognized the application of the continuing violations doctrine in actions brought under the FHA in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). In Havens, the Court held that a complaint which alleges a continuing illegal practice, rather than isolated incidents of violative conduct, is timely so long as the last occurrence of the illegal practice happened during the limitations period. See id. at 380-81; see also id. at 380 (“Statutes of limitations . . . are intended to keep stale claims out of the courts. Where the challenged violation is a continuing one, the staleness concern disappears.”) (internal citation omitted). Here, plaintiffs allege a continuing illegal practice – the Discretionary Pricing Policy – and that defendants used this practice both when the Barretts first refinanced their loan in August 2005 and again when they refinanced in April 2006, within the limitations period. That is sufficient to render all of the Barretts’ FHA claims timely at this stage. See id.; accord Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d. 251, 261-62 (D. Mass. 2008).
The question of whether the continuing violations doctrine applies to ECOA
7 Plaintiffs Jean Blanco Guerrier and Angelique Bastien purchased their home, with Option One as the lender, in April 2006. Jacqueline Grissett and Craig Grissett held a home loan with a different lender and refinanced this loan with Option One in August 2006. Plaintiff Steven Parham similarly refinanced a previous home loan (entered into with a different lender) with Option One in September 2006. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93, 105, 119.)
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claims is less settled. See Sanders v. USDA Rural Housing, No. 3-06-0587, 2007 WL 2471799, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2007) (discussing ambiguity in case law). Nonetheless, defendants do not suggest that the ECOA claims should be analyzed differently from the FHA claims, and the court cannot discern any reason why the continuing violations doctrine should not apply. Application of the doctrine here is also consistent with this circuit’s recognition of the doctrine in Title VII claims. See Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[i]n interpreting the ECOA, this court looks to Title VII case law”); Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 400-01 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying doctrine to Title VII claim). See also Miller, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 261-62 (applying continuing violation doctrine to ECOA claim); Ramirez v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., No. C08-0369-THE, 2008 WL 2051018, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (same); Davis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705-06 (N.D. Miss. 2005) (same).
D. Ability to Simultaneously Pursue ECOA and FHA Claims Defendants argue that plaintiffs are not permitted to simultaneously pursue both ECOA and FHA claims. It is true that plaintiffs may only recover under one of these theories. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(i). However, nothing in the statute limits them from proceeding under both theories, and Rule 8 permits plaintiffs to plead alternative theories of liability. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied. III. H&R Block’s Motion to Dismiss H&R Block moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5), asserting that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts and that it has been improperly served. It argues that it did not originate any of the mortgages at issue and is a holding company that has not transacted any business in Massachusetts and has no contacts within the Commonwealth.
A. Legal Standards Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction over H&R Block. Philips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 25 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008). As with any other motion to dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 24. The court must then “add to the mix facts put forward by the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted.” Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). Under the prima facie analysis, the inquiry is “whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 26. An exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by state statute and in compliance with the Constitution. Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 135 (1st Cir. 2006). The Massachusetts long-arm statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3, has been interpreted to be coextensive with the outer limits of the Constitution. “Automatic” Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Seneca Foods Corp., 280 N.E.2d 423, 424 (Mass. 1972). Accordingly, the state and constitutional inquiry merge. Under circuit precedent, The due process clause imposes several requirements on the exercise of
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personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. First, the defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state. For specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s claim must be related to the defendant’s contacts. For general jurisdiction, in which the cause of action may be unrelated to the defendant’s contacts, the defendant must have continuous and systematic contacts with the state. Second, for either type of jurisdiction, the defendant’s contacts with the state must be purposeful. And third, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances. Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs assert that there is both general and specific jurisdiction over H&R Block. “The critical factor in the personal jurisdiction calculus – both general and specific – is the existence of ‘minimum contacts’ between the nonresident defendant and the forum.” Negron-Torres v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2007). B. Specific Jurisdiction “A court may assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant ‘where the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant’s forum-based contacts.’” Negron-Torres, 478 F.3d at 24 (quoting United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 (1st Cir. 1992)). The First Circuit has affirmed that “the relatedness requirement is not an open door; it is closely read, and it requires a showing of a material connection. This court steadfastly rejects the exercise of personal jurisdiction whenever the connection between the cause of action and the defendant’s forum-state contacts seems attenuated and indirect.” Harlow, 432 F.3d at 61 (holding that “the defendant’s in-state conduct must form an important, or at least material, element of proof in the plaintiff’s case”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Plaintiffs allege that defendants Option One and H&R Block Mortgage are wholly-owned subsidiaries of H&R Block, which is headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21-22.) Further, they assert that H&R Block Bank, which “offers a variety of residential mortgage loan products,” commenced operations in 2006, “at which time H&R Block Inc. became a savings and loan holding company.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Although the complaint sets forth a number of actions taken within the Commonwealth, it conflates H&R Block and H&R Block Bank by referring to them collectively as “H&R Block,” and in many instances directs its allegations collectively to “Defendants” as a group, rendering it difficult to discern what contacts, if any, H&R Block had within the Commonwealth. For example, when plaintiffs allege that “H&R Block . . . participated in the decisions to grant credit to Plaintiffs including, without limitation, by making the Discretionary Pricing Policy applicable to their loans,” (id. ¶ 54), it is unclear whether they are referring to H&R Block, H&R Block Bank, or both, and it is certainly unclear whether any decision by H&R Block was made in Massachusetts. See Mass. Sch. of Law, 142 F.3d at 36 (rejecting notion that Massachusetts court had personal jurisdiction over defendants who decided to deny a Massachusetts school’s accreditation at a meeting in New York, and noting, “[w]e have wrestled before with this issue of whether the in-forum effects of extra-forum activities suffice to constitute minimum contacts and have found in the negative”). Although the court must treat specific facts affirmatively alleged by plaintiffs as true, it need not credit conclusory allegations. Id. at 34.
In any event, “[t]he prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction must be based
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on evidence of specific facts set forth in the record. In other words, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and make affirmative proof.” Negron-Torres, 478 F.3d at 23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence suggesting that H&R Block participated in formulating or approving the Discretionary Pricing Policy, or had other forum-based activities related to their claims. Indeed, H&R Block directly contradicts plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations about its involvement. The Vice President and Secretary of H&R Block avers that it does not set financing rates and terms for the origination of mortgages or finance transactions, does not participate in credit decisions made by Option One, and was not involved in the origination of any of plaintiffs’ mortgages. (Aff. of Bret G. Wilson (“Wilson Aff.”) (Docket # 12, Ex. A) ¶¶ 22-25.) Mr. Wilson further avers that H&R Block: (1) is a holding company that is authorized to transact business only in Missouri; (2) does not pay the salaries of any employees of its subsidiaries; (3) has a separate board of directors and keeps separate books and records from its subsidiaries; (4) does not own, lease, or have any real property in Massachusetts; (5) has no offices, agents, employees, mailboxes, telephone listings, bank accounts, or business operations in Massachusetts; (6) does not derive or expect to derive any direct revenue from goods consumed or services rendered in Massachusetts; (7) does not own the “H&R Block” servicemark; (8) does not own, develop, or place any “H&R Block” or “Option One” advertisements; and (9) does not direct or control the day-to-day operations or management of H&R Block Bank, H&R Block Mortgage, or Option One. (Id. ¶¶ 3-21.) Under these circumstances, plaintiffs have failed to meet the relatedness requirement and cannot establish specific
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personal jurisdiction over H&R Block.8
C. General Jurisdiction
“A court has general jurisdiction when the litigation is not directly founded on the
defendant’s forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in
continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state.” Negron-
Torres, 478 F.3d at 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs do not present sufficient evidence that H&R Block conducts continuous
and systematic activity in Massachusetts. Although they assert that H&R Block’s
corporate filing with the Massachusetts Secretary of State establishes that it is licensed
to do business within the Commonwealth, the H&R Block, Inc. entity referenced in the
filing ceased to exist in 1993, when it merged into H&R Block Eastern Tax Services,
Inc. (See Docket # 19, Ex. 1.) The articles of merger confirm this interpretation.
(Docket # 25, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs do not proffer any other evidence that H&R Block is
registered to do business in Massachusetts. Moreover, as discussed above, Mr.
Wilson’s affidavit directly contradicts any allegations that H&R Block is active in the
8 Negron-Torres is directly on point. In that case, the plaintiff suffered an injury due to the alleged negligence of the local telephone company (the “PRTC”). She sued Verizon Communications, the majority owner of PRTC by virtue of its controlling interest in PRTC’s holding company, on the theory that “Verizon Communications exercised its authority over PRTC ‘to direct or cause the direction of management and policies’ of PRTC,” and her cause of action arose “out of Verizon’s negligence in guiding, managing, controlling, and/or supervising the policies and procedures [PRTC] implemented under Verizon’s management and instruction.” 478 F.3d at 25. Verizon provided a declaration directly contradicting these allegations and asserting that it was merely a holding company that did not sell, market, or provide telecommunications services. The First Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to meet the requirements of the relatedness test because she “provided only conclusory allegations” to demonstrate that the defendant’s in-state conduct formed a material element of proof in the case. Id.
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Commonwealth. (Wilson Aff. ¶ 9.) As a general principle, jurisdiction over a wholly-owned subsidiary does not
automatically confer jurisdiction over the parent corporation. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1091 (1st Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, plaintiffs suggest that H&R Block should be subject to jurisdiction in Massachusetts because of “its efforts to create an image in the public mind of H&R Block as a single financial services conglomerate.” (Docket # 19, 3.) Plaintiffs point to the company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission in which H&R Block refers to itself and its subsidiaries as “the Company,” “we,” “our” and “us,” as well as various website and marketing materials that they assert generically refer to “H&R Block.” (Id. at 11-12.) However, the website and advertising materials submitted by plaintiffs expressly refer to entities other than H&R Block, Inc. (See, e.g., Docket # 19, Ex. 3 (H&R Block Services, Inc.); http://www.hrblock.com/mortgages/index.html (H&R Block Bank).) In any event, H&R Block has expressly stated that it does not own the “H&R Block” servicemark. (Wilson Aff. ¶ 10.) See Negron-Torres, 478 F.3d at 26 (“the mere use of a trademark or logo does not suffice to demonstrate the existence of the requisite minimum contacts”). In addition, it is difficult to agree with the proposition that a company may waive any claim of corporate independence by merely collectively referring to itself and its subsidiaries in public filings. Indeed, the case law in this circuit is clear that
the mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary. There is a presumption of corporate separateness
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that must be overcome by clear evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of the subsidiary. Id. at 27 (quoting Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980)). Plaintiffs cite only two cases in support of their argument, and both are easily distinguished. In Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002), the plaintiffs proffered evidence that the parent company had participated in establishing the challenged lending practices and had dictated the fees charged by its subsidiaries and the specific language of the disclosures provided by its subsidiaries. See id. at 1166. This is precisely the evidence lacking in this case. In Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 WL 31194868, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002), the plaintiffs asserted various claims against H&R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc., H&R Block Tax Services, Inc. and H&R Block, Inc. for damages stemming from the preparation of their tax returns. Although the tax returns were prepared by H&R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc., the court extended jurisdiction over H&R Block Tax Services, Inc. based upon plaintiffs’ evidence that the latter exercised “pervasive control” over the former. Id. It also extended jurisdiction over H&R Block, Inc. because “H&R Block” has been held out as one company, which performs only one business (namely that of prepari ng income tax returns). C ertainly, then, there would have been projected to [plaintiffs] sufficient ambiguity about any internal separation in corporate identity and responsi bilities to support a “reasonable perception that [the separate corporate entities] were one and the same.” Id. (quoting United Electrical, 960 F.3d at 1095). Even assuming, without necessarily agreeing, that the reasoning of Sorenson is correct, it lacks force in this situation, as all of the plaintiffs allege that they entered into loan agreements with Option One, not an
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entity nominally similar to H&R Block.9 Indeed, the loan documents attached to their complaint do not reference H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage at all. (See Am. Compl., Exs. 1-12.) Under these circumstances, it is difficult to discern a reasonable basis for plaintiffs to perceive H&R Block and Option One to be the same company.
Plaintiffs have simply not put forth clear evidence demonstrating that H&R Block exercises control over the activities of subsidiaries which have continuous and systematic activity in the Commonwealth and, as discussed above, Mr. Wilson’s affidavit expressly contradicts this notion. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not established the existence of general jurisdiction over H&R Block.
D. Jurisdictional Discovery Plaintiffs seek jurisdictional discovery in the event that their allegations are found lacking. Contrary to their assertion, they are not “entitled” to jurisdictional discovery. (Docket # 19, 17.) Rather, the court retains “broad discretion” to permit “a modicum of jurisdictional discovery” if the plaintiff puts forth a colorable claim of personal jurisdiction and “present[s] facts to the court which show why jurisdiction would be found if discovery were permitted.” United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 626 (1st Cir. 2001). “Failure to allege specific contacts, relevant to establishing personal jurisdiction, in a jurisdictional discovery request can be fatal to that request.” Id. at 626-27. Here, plaintiffs generally request discovery without any
9 (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 81 (Barretts twice refinanced their home loan with Option One); id. ¶ 93 (Guerrier and Bastien used Option One as their lender); id. ¶ 105 (Grissets refinanced their loan with Option One); id. ¶ 119 (Parham refinanced with Option One).)
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indication of the specific information they would seek or expect to find that would establish personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the request for jurisdictional discovery is denied. See id. at 626. However, plaintiffs will be getting discovery from the remaining defendants. If that discovery develops evidence demonstrating the existence of personal jurisdiction over H&R Block in Massachusetts, plaintiffs may move to have it added as a party again.10 IV. Conclusion
H&R Block’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Docket # 11) is ALLOWED. The motion to dismiss by Option One and H&R Block Mortgage (Docket # 13) is DENIED.

February 6, 2009 DATE

/s/Rya W. Zobel RYA W. ZOBEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10 As the court lacks jurisdiction over H&R Block, it need not address its argument regarding insufficient service of process.
19

 
 Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 1 of 41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CECIL BARRETT, JR., CYNTHIA BARRETT, JEAN BLANCO GUERRIER, ANGELIQUE M. BASTIEN, JACQUELINE GRISSETT, CRAIG GRISSETT, STEVEN PARHAM, BETTY HOFFMAN, EDWARD HOFFMAN, DORIS MURRAY, JOSLYN DAY and KEISHA CHAVERS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, vs.
OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION and H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORP. N/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.
Defendants.

C.A. NO. 08-10157 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, Cecil Barrett Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Blanco Guerrier, Angelique M. Bastien

Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty and Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray,

Joslyn Day and Keisha Chavers (collectively “Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, by their undersigned attorneys, allege as follows:

1.

This is a class action brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other

similarly situated minority homeowners, against Option One Mortgage Corporation and H&R

Block Mortgage Corp. (collectively "Defendants"), under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1691, et seq. (“ECOA”) and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 2 of 41

seek remedies for themselves and the Class (defined in ¶126, below) for the discriminatory

effects of the Defendants' home financing policies and practices.

2. As described below, the Defendants have established a specific, identifiable and

uniform credit pricing system, a component of which, referred to herein as the Discretionary

Pricing Policy, authorizes unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an

otherwise objective risk-based financing rate. In other words, after a finance rate acceptable to

the Defendants is determined by objective criteria (e.g., the individual’s credit history, credit

score, debt-to-income ratio and loan-to-value ratios), the Defendants' credit pricing policy

authorizes additional discretionary finance charges. These subjective, additional finance charges

have a widespread discriminatory impact on minority applicants for home mortgage loans, in

violation of ECOA and the FHA.

3. The mortgage lending industry has a long history of racial discrimination, offering

minorities products and terms that are drastically worse than those given to their similarly-

situated white counterparts. Recently, the Federal Reserve Board confirmed that blacks and

other minorities are still more likely to pay higher prices for mortgages than whites.

4.

In 2003, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (“NCRC”) released a

report on credit discrimination titled, “The Broken System: Discrimination and Unequal Access to Affordable Loans by Race and Age,”1 that indicated that consumers living in areas with more

minority residents are more likely to have mortgages with interest rates higher than the

“prevailing and competitive” rates, often because of discrimination in lending.

1 This report is available at http://ncrc.org/policy/cra/documents/ncrcdiscrimstudy.pdf.

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 3 of 41

5. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) Data for 2006 revealed that black and Hispanic borrowers are more likely to obtain higher-priced loans than are white borrowers.2 The

data indicated that black homeowners who received subprime mortgage loans were much more

likely to be issued a higher-rate loan than white borrowers with the same qualifications.

6. In a speech last year, Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman of the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation observed that “previous studies have suggested higher-priced, subprime

lenders are more active in lower income, urban areas and that minority access to credit is dominated by higher cost lenders.”3

7. In 2006, the Center for Responsible Lending, a non-profit research organization,

uncovered “large and statistically significant” differences between the rates of subprime loans

offered to blacks and whites, even when income and credit risk were taken into consideration.

Compared to their otherwise similarly-situated white counterparts, blacks were 31-34% more

likely to receive higher rate fixed-rate loans and 6-15% more likely to receive adjustable-rate loans.4

8.

Subprime loans to blacks and other minorities not only impose higher interest

rates, they are typically laden with excessive, unreasonable and often improperly disclosed fees

as well. See n.3.

9.

These significant disparities are not mere coincidences. They are the result of a

systematic and discriminatory policy of targeting minority borrowers for high-cost loans.

Defendants’ business practices include implementing and maintaining policies that discriminate

2 This report is available at www.ffiec.gov./hmda. 3 See “Remarks of Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC; Inter-American Development
Bank,” October 18, 2006, available at
http://www/fdic.gov/new/speeches/archives/2006/chairman/spoct1806.html.

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 4 of 41
against minorities. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to seek relief from the harms suffered as a result of Defendants’ practices and to enjoin Defendants from continuing its discriminatory practices.
10. The Defendants have established policies for retail and wholesale access to their loan products that subject minority financing applicants to a significantly higher likelihood of exposure to discretionary points and fees. These costs drive up the average cost of a mortgage loan made by one of the defendants to minority homeowners.
11. Plaintiffs seek damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement and restitution of monies disparately obtained from minority borrowers.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action arising under federal law. 13. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) inasmuch as the unlawful discriminatory practices are alleged to have been committed in this District, Defendants regularly conduct business in this District, and some of the named Plaintiffs reside in this District.
PARTIES 14. Plaintiffs, Cecil Barrett Jr. and Cynthia Barrett, (the “Barretts”) are married minority homeowners who reside at 965 Morton Street, Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126. 15. Plaintiffs, Jean Blanco Guerrier and Angelique M. Bastien (“Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien”) are married minority homeowners who reside at 38 Himoor Circle, Randolph, Massachusetts 02368.
4 See “Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages,”

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 5 of 41
16. Plaintiffs, Jacqueline Grissett and Craig Grissett (the “Grissetts”) are married minority homeowners who reside at 22 Country Club Drive, Randolph, Massachusetts 02368.
17. Plaintiff, Steven Parham, (“Mr. Parham”) is a minority homeowner who resides at 20 Brockton Street, Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126.
18. Plaintiffs Betty and Edward Hoffman (the “Hoffmans”) are married minority homeowners who reside at 11 Harwood Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts 02124.
19. Plaintiff Doris Murray (“Murray”) is a minority homeowner who resides at 9806 S. Winston Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60643.
20. Plaintiff Joslyn Day (“Day”) is a minority homeowner who resides at 407 Washington Street, Unit 6, Dorchester, Massachusetts 02124.
21. Plaintiff Keisha Chavers (“Chavers”) is a minority homeowner who resides at 5849 S. Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637.
22. Defendant, Option One Mortgage Company (“Option One”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of H&R Block, Inc. Option One was primarily a wholesale mortgage lender and offered its services through its branches and a national network of mortgage brokers until December 2007, when H&R Block, Inc. terminated Option One’s loan origination business. Option One maintains a principal place of business at 3 Ada, Irvine, California 92618 and although it is not making new loans, continues its servicing and collection operations.
23. Defendant, H&R Block Mortgage Corp. ("H&R Block Mortgage") is a whollyowned subsidiary of H&R Block, Inc. H&R Block Mortgage was a retail mortgage lender making direct-to-consumer loans nationwide until H&R Block, Inc. terminated H&R
available at www.responsiblelending.org.

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 6 of 41
BlockMortgage’s loan origination business in 2007. H&R Block Mortgage maintains a principal place of business located at 6561 Irvine Center Drive, Irvine, California 92616.
24. According to the Massachusetts Secretary of State’s Office, H&R Block Mortgage Corp. changed its name to Option One Mortgage Services, Inc. on or about July 23, 2007.
FACTS A. MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORICALLY HAS
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST MINORITIES 25. Borrowers who obtain a home loan at an unnecessarily high interest rate will pay hundreds of dollars more each month in mortgage payments, making them more vulnerable to short term economic distress that may result from job loss or medical problems. In consequence, minority homeowners run higher risks of foreclosure, and will accumulate equity in their homes much more slowly than white borrowers. While for some minority borrowers with tarnished credit histories, higher-priced home loans provide the only access to the mortgage market and to homeownership, many other minorities will be paying far more for their mortgages than their credit histories justify. 26. The skyrocketing levels of foreclosures in urban areas, and minority communities in particular, have been tied to the growth of concentrated subprime lending in these areas.5 Concentrated foreclosures have a devastating impact on cities and neighborhoods. They affect local property values, serve as a magnet for crime, and hurt a city’s property tax base.6
5 Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith. March 2004. “Risky Business: An Econometric Analysis of the Relationship Between Subprime Lending and Foreclosures.” Woodstock Institute: Chicago, IL. 6 For discussions of the external impacts of foreclosures, see Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith. June 2005. There Goes the Neighborhood: The Effect of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values. Woodstock Institute: Chicago, IL; Immergluck, Dan and Geoff Smith.

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 7 of 41
27. While many institutions specialize in lending to either prime or subprime markets, there is an important set of large lenders that are active in both markets. These lenders utilize diverse lending channels such as branch, broker and correspondent networks that allow them to reach a wide variety of geographic markets. Their size also gives them the capacity to offer an array of products that may be appropriate for customers with different levels of credit quality.
28. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University’s 2005 study called “The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending,” mortgage lending discrimination today is subtle but pervasive, with minority consumers continuing to have less-than-equal access to loans at the best price and on the best terms that their credit history, income, and other individual financial considerations merit more than three decades after the enactment of national fair lending legislation.
29. The passage of civil rights legislation and fair lending laws in the 1960s and 1970s brought an end to the most virulent forms of overt racial discrimination in the housing markets, but throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mortgage lenders found more subtle ways to discriminate, including maintaining offices only in white neighborhoods and engaging in practices such as redlining (refusing to lend on properties in predominantly minority neighborhoods).
30. After such redlining practices were challenged in the 1990s, mortgage lenders changed tactics once again, making loans to minorities, but charging higher interest rates and loan-related fees than they charged to similarly situated white borrowers. Loan data that
November 2006. “The Impact of Single Family Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime.” Housing Studies (21:6); and Apgar, William, Mark Duda, and Rochelle Nawrocki Gorey.
7

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 8 of 41
mortgage lenders must now compile and disclose under the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority borrowers and similarly-situated white borrowers.
31. The HMDA requires mortgage lenders to report information about the home loans they process each year. In 2005, lenders reported information on more than 30 million home loan applications pursuant to HMDA. In 1989, Congress required lenders to begin disclosing information about mortgage borrowers’ race and ethnicity. In 2004, concerned with potential racial discrimination in loan pricing and recognizing that racial or other types of discrimination can occur when loan officers and mortgage brokers have latitude in setting interest rates, the Federal Reserve Board began requiring lenders to also report information concerning rates, points, and fees, charged to borrowers on high-cost loans.
32. According to the Federal Reserve, both 2004 and 2005 HMDA data revealed that “Blacks and minority borrowers were more likely . . . to have received higher-priced loans than non-Hispanic whites . . .. [which has] increased concern about the fairness of the lending process.”7
33. HMDA data for 2004 reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority borrowers and non-Hispanic whites even after controlling for borrowers’ gender, income, property location, and loan amount. After accounting for those differences in the 2004 HMDA data, minority borrowers were still almost twice as likely to receive a higher-rate home loan as
February 2005. The Municipal Costs of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case Study. Foreclosure Prevention Foundation: Minneapolis, MN. 7 Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort and Glenn B. Canner, “Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, A124, A159 (revised Sept. 18, 2006) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf).
8

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 9 of 41
non-Hispanic whites.8 In a speech last year, the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Martin Gruenberg, discussed the 2004 HMDA data and observed that that data “clearly indicated” that minority borrowers are more likely to receive high-cost home loans than are non-Hispanic whites.9
34. Likewise, HMDA data for 2005 shows that “for conventional home-purchase loans, the gross mean incidence of higher-priced lending was 54.7 percent for blacks and 17.2 percent for non-Hispanic whites, a difference of 37.5 percentage points.” Avery, supra, at A159. The situation is similar for refinancing, where there is a difference of 28.3 percentage points between blacks and non-Hispanic whites. Id. at A124, A159.
35. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) released a report entitled “The High Cost of Credit: Disparities in High-priced Refinanced Loans to Minority Homeowners in 125 American Cities,” dated September 27, 2005, that found that “[i]n every metropolitan area where at least 50 refinances were made to African-American homeowners, African-Americans were more likely to receive a high-cost loan than White homeowners.”
36. The study found that, nationally, black home purchasers were 2.7 times more likely and Hispanics were 2.3 times more likely than white borrowers to be issued a problematic, subprime loan. Additionally, the ACORN study, available at www.acorn.org, found that nationally, for refinance loans, African Americans were 1.8 times more likely and Hispanics were 1.4 times more likely than white borrowers to be issued a problematic, subprime loan.
8 This is available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Testimony-Ernst061306.pdf 9 This speech is available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2006/chairman/spoct1806.html.
9

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 10 of 41
37. Differences in economic status are not to blame. These racial disparities were found to persist even among borrowers of the same income level. The ACORN study found that, among upper-income purchasers (defined as persons with incomes 120% or greater than the area median income for their metropolitan area), African Americans were 3.3 times more likely and Hispanics were 3 times more likely than similarly-situated whites to be issued a high-cost, subprime loan. Further, the ACORN study found that, with respect to refinance loans, among upper-income borrowers, African Americans and Hispanics were 1.7 times more likely than similarly-situated whites to be issued a high-cost, subprime loan.
38. While some borrowers in the subprime market are genuine credit risks, minority borrowers have been preyed upon by mortgage lenders and illegally steered into subprime loans. Defendants have engaged in this discriminatory lending by refusing to offer minority borrowers the prime loans offered to similarly-qualified white borrowers.
39. Studies by Freddie Mac and Standard & Poor’s have found that 20% to 30% of borrowers who receive subprime mortgages could have qualified for traditional mortgages at the lower rates offered by banks to prime borrowers. This seriously disadvantages the borrower by effectively diluting the equity of the property, placing the borrower in jeopardy of default, and forcing the borrower to spend years paying off additional loan balances without developing any equity in their home.
40. Further, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development found that in neighborhoods where at least 80 percent of the population is African American, borrowers were 2.2 times as likely as borrowers in the nation as a whole to refinance with a subprime lender.
10

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 11 of 41
Higher-income borrowers living in predominately blacks neighborhoods are twice as likely as lower-income white borrowers to have subprime loans.10
41. The predatory lending practices of the Defendants and other mortgage lenders lead to dire financial consequences for borrowers. Earlier this year, over eighty consumer groups wrote to federal banking agencies about a particular type of subprime loan, 2/28 the adjustable rate mortgage (“2/28 ARM”). A 2/28 ARM typically contains an average built-in “shock payment” increase of 29%, even if interest rates remain unchanged. Fitch Ratings reports that the actual payment shock may be as high as 48%. The majority of subprime loans made to minorities had these adjustable rates. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that 2.2 million such subprime loans have ended or will end in foreclosure, a rate of 19%.
42. Each named Plaintiff has a 2/28 ARM. 43. The Center for Responsible Lending published a study in December 2006 on the effects of foreclosure.11 The report states that the costs of subprime foreclosures fall heavily on African American and Hispanic homeowners, since subprime mortgages are disproportionately made in communities of color. HMDA data shows that over half of loans to black borrowers are higher-cost loans, which, by definition, are a proxy for subprime loans. For Hispanic homeowners, the portion of higher-cost loans is also very high, at four in ten. This data implies that subprime foreclosures will affect eight percent of recent Hispanic borrowers and 10 percent of recent blacks borrowers. By comparison, subprime foreclosures will likely occur among only about four percent of recent white borrowers.
10 See “All Other Things Being Equal: A Paired Testing Study of Mortgage Lending Institutions,” 2002, available at www.huduser.org.
11

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 12 of 41
44. The Center for Responsible Lending released an additional study in November, 200712 that explains how when a home goes into foreclosure, the negative effects extend beyond individual families losing their homes to surrounding neighbors and the wider community. The 2007 study further reports that a foreclosure on a home lowered the price of other nearby singlefamily homes, on average, by 0.9 percent. That impact was even higher in lower-income neighborhoods, where each foreclosure dropped home values by an average of 1.44 percent. The study notes that communities of color will be especially harmed, since these communities receive a disproportionate share of subprime home loans.
45. The 2007 study projects that, nationally, foreclosures on subprime home loans originated in 2005 and 2006 will have numerous impacts on the neighborhoods and communities in which they occur. For instance, the study predicts that 44.5 million neighboring homes will experience devaluation because of subprime foreclosures that take place nearby, and the total decline in house values and tax base from nearby foreclosure will be about $223 billion. Homeowners living near foreclosed properties will see their property values decrease $5,000 on average.
46. A growing number of research studies and investigations show that significant racial disparities still exist.13
11 See “Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners.” December 2006, available at www.responsiblelending.org. 12 See “Subprime Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $223 Billion; 44.5 Million Homes Lost $5,000 on Average.” Center for Responsible Lending, available at www.responsiblelending.org. 13 California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More for the American Dream: A MultiState Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending” (March 2007) (http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007_Report-2005_HMDA.pdf); Ross, “The
12

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 13 of 41
47. Moreover, and importantly, research studies have suggested that borrowers’ credit profiles cannot fully explain why some borrowers, and not others, are saddled with higher cost loans. Researchers have raised “doubts that risk can adequately explain racial differences” in high-cost loans.14 In other words, evidence “suggests that weak borrower credit profiles do not fully explain why some borrowers get stuck with higher-cost home loans.”15 B. THE DEFENDANTS’ DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY CONTINUES THE
PERVASIVE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING 48. Option One was one of the largest subprime mortgage-lending companies in the United States. Option One publicly promoted its home financing expertise by means of nationwide advertising campaigns. In its advertisements, Option One solicited persons to apply for financing with Option One either in one of its branch offices or through one of the mortgage brokers whom Option One had authorized to accept applications on its behalf. 49. H&R Block made home-mortgage loans directly to consumers through its subsidiary, H&R Block Mortgage. 50. Option One made home-mortgage loans - the majority of which were subprime loans - that were arranged by its loan officers and/or its network of mortgage brokers. Those loans were made in reliance on Option One’s credit-granting policies and with the participation of H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp.
Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination” (Revised July 2006) (Univ. of Connecticut, Working Paper 2005-19R) (http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2005-19r.pdf). 14 Bradford, Center for Community Change, “Risk or Race? Racial Disparities and the Subprime Refinance Market” (May 2002) (http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/report/report/relfiles/ccc_0729_risk.pdf). 15 California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More for the American Dream: A MultiState Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending.” (March 2007).
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51. Due to H&R Block’s policies as to where to place its offices and how to market its products, minority borrowers were more likely than white borrowers to apply for credit from H&R Block through its sub-prime subsidiary Option One, or from an Option One authorized broker.
52. Even after controlling for differences in credit risk, because of the Discretionary Pricing Policy, loans obtained from Option One or Option One’s network of brokers are more expensive, on average, than loans obtained directly from H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage.
53. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp., in the ordinary course of its business, regularly participates in credit decisions made by Option One, including setting the terms of credit available in transactions originated by Option One. H&R Block, H&R Block Mortgage Corp. and Option One jointly established the Discretionary Pricing Policy at issue in this case.
54. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp. participated in the decisions to grant credit to the Plaintiffs including, without limitation, by making the Discretionary Pricing Policy applicable to their loans.
55. Based on the latest available Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, minority homeowners who borrowed from Option One were more likely than whites to have received a high-APR loan.
56. A high-APR loan is a loan whose APR is at least three percentage points higher than the interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities of the same maturity, at the time the loan was made.
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Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 15 of 41
57. While credit differences may explain some part of the disparities in rate and terms, the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy accounts for a significant portion of the disparity.
58. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy is unrelated to a borrower’s objective credit characteristics such as credit history, credit score, debt-to-income ratio and loanto-value ratios and results in purely subjective charges that affect the rate otherwise available to borrowers.
59. Option One provided its loan officers and authorized mortgage brokers with substantial information about its loan programs, rates and credit criteria, as well as its policies for compensating its loan officers and mortgage brokers who arranged business for it.
60. Option One authorized certain mortgage brokers to accept applications on its behalf, to quote financing rates and terms (within the limitations set by H&R Block), to inform credit applicants of Option One’s financing options and to originate finance transactions using H&R Block’s forms, in accordance with its policies.
61. Option One provided its loan officers and brokers with credit applications, loan contracts and other required financing forms, as well as instructions on filling out such documents necessary to complete home mortgage transactions.
62. After a customer provided credit information to one of Option One’s loan officers or brokers, Option One computed a financing rate through an objective credit analysis that, in general, discerned the creditworthiness of the customer.
63. These credit analyses considered numerous risk-related variables of creditworthiness, including credit bureau histories, payment amounts, debt ratio, bankruptcies,
15

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 16 of 41
automobile repossessions, charge-offs, prior foreclosures, payment histories, credit score, debtto-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios and other risk-related attributes or variables. On information and belief, Option One used these variables to determine a “mortgage score” for each credit applicant.
64. Based on these objective risk-related variables and the resulting mortgage score, Option One derived a risk-based financing rate at which it would provide a home mortgage, often called the “Par Rate.” Alternatively, experienced Option One loan officers and brokers estimated the risk-related Par Rate by referring to the applicant’s credit bureau determined credit score.
65. Although Option One’s initial analysis applied objective criteria to calculate this risk-related Par Rate, Option One then authorized a subjective component in its credit pricing system —the Discretionary Pricing Policy — to impose additional non-risk charges. On information and belief, the applicable Par Rates and authorized discretionary charges were communicated by Option One to its loan officers and brokers via regularly published “rate sheets.” On information and belief, such rate sheets were published by Option One via intranet and internet.
66. The discretionary charges are paid by the customer as a component of the total finance charge (the “Contract APR”), without the homeowner knowing that a portion of their contract APR was a non-risk-related charge.
67. Loan officers and brokers had discretion, within the limits set by the Defendants, to impose discretionary mark-ups as additional points in interest – “a rate mark-up”, or as points
16

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and fees on the loan. When there was a rate mark-up, the Defendants received additional

income.

68. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy, by design, caused persons with

identical or similar credit scores to pay different amounts for the cost of credit. As a result of

using a subjective pricing component that is designed to charge persons with the same credit

profiles different amounts of finance charge, the objective qualities of the initial credit analysis

used to calculate the Par Rate are undermined and the potential for race bias became inherent in

the transaction.

69. The Discretionary Pricing Policy, although facially neutral (insofar as the

Defendants use the same or effectively the same policy for all credit applicants), had a

disproportionately adverse effect on minorities compared to similarly situated whites in that

minorities paid disparately more discretionary charges (both in frequency and amount) than

similarly situated whites. Statistical analysis of discretionary charges imposed on minority and

white customers of other mortgage companies that use credit pricing systems structured like that

of Option One has revealed that minorities, after controlling for credit risk, are substantially

more likely than similarly situated whites to pay such charges.

70.

Loan officers and brokers are agents of Option One for the purpose of setting

credit price, which always was set based on the Defendants’ policy.

71. The disparate impact suffered by minorities is a direct result of the Defendants’

Discretionary Pricing Policy in that the Defendants designed, disseminated, controlled,

implemented and profited from the Discretionary Pricing Policy creating the disparate impact.

17

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72. The Defendants have a non-delegable duty to ensure that their mortgage financing structure and policies do not have a disparate impact on legally protected classes, such as minorities. Despite having such a non-delegable duty, the Defendants chose to use, a commission-driven, subjective pricing policy that they knew or should have known had a significant and pervasive adverse impact on minority homeowners.
73. The disparities between the terms of the Defendants’ transactions involving minority homeowners and the terms involving whites homeowners cannot be a product of chance and cannot be explained by factors unrelated to race, but, instead, are the direct causal result of the use of the discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy.
74. There are no legitimate business reasons justifying the Defendants’ discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy that could not be achieved by a policy that has no discriminatory impact or a greatly reduced discriminatory impact. C. THE DEFENDANTS’ DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS Facts Relating To The Barretts
75. Plaintiffs, Cecil Barrett Jr. and Cynthia Barrett reside at 965 Morton Street, Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126.
76. On or about January 16, 2004, the Barretts purchased their Mattapan home for approximately $277,000.00.
77. On August 19, 2005, the Barretts refinanced their home loan with Option One. 78. The loan, (Loan No. 161044209) was a 30-year, adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 8.653%. The loan amount was $416,000.00. According to the note, the loan
18

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had a five-year fixed rate followed by a 25-year variable rate feature and was an interest only loan.
79. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, the Barretts paid $21,641.08 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $17,500 broker fee to Money-Wise Solutions (“Money-Wise”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $620.00 processing fee to Money-Wise, a $650 underwriting fee to Option One and a $50.00 funding fee to Option One.
80. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161044209 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, respectively.
81. On April 6, 2006, the Barretts refinanced their Option One loan with a second Option One loan.
82. The second loan (Loan No. 161048049), which has a loan amount of $500,000, is an adjustable rate loan with a balloon feature, providing for a final payment of $344,113.90. The APR of the second loan was 10.536%.
83. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, the Barretts paid $17,066.32 in settlement charges in connection with the second loan, including, a $3,500 broker fee to Logic Mortgage & Finance (“Logic”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $595.00 processing fee to Logic, an $850 underwriting fee to Option One, a $50.00 funding fee to Option One and a $7,500 loan origination fee to Option One.
84. True and correct copies of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161048049 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4, respectively.
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85. According to credit reports available to Option One, Mr. Barrett had an average credit score of 681 and Ms. Barrett had an average credit score of 665 as of January 20, 2006.
86. At the time of the transactions, the Barretts had credit scores that would have qualified with many lenders for a mortgage in the prime-market. Instead, the Barretts received mortgages at sub-prime rates and on sub-prime terms.
87. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp, by various means and through its policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to the Barretts, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
88. On information and belief, unbeknownst to the Barretts, the contract APR on the mortgage loans were actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
89. On information and belief, the Barretts were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
90. On information and belief, the Barretts were charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
91. The Barretts were not offered less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with their credit characteristics directly from H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage Corp. Facts Relating To Mr. Guerrier And Ms. Bastien
92. Plaintiffs, Jean Blanco Guerrier and Angelique Bastien reside at 38 Himoor Circle, Randolph, Massachusetts 02368 with their teenaged son and daughter.
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93. On or about April 28, 2006, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien purchased their Randolph home for approximately $390,000 with Option One as the lender.
94. The loan, (Loan No. 161048878) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 10.844%. The loan amount was $360,000. According to the note, the loan had a twoyear fixed rate followed by a 28-year variable rate feature.
95. Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien first discovered that the loan had an adjustable rate at the closing, but felt pressured to close because they had sold their previous home on the same day.
96. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien paid $13,403.23 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $6,040.00 broker fee to LEHI Mortgage Services, Inc. (“LEHI”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $570.00 processing fee to LEHI, a $295.00 application fee to LEHI, an $850 underwriting fee to Option One, a $50.00 funding fee to Option One and a $900 loan discount fee to Option One.
97. True and correct copies of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161048878 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6, respectively.
98. At the time of the transaction, Mr. Guerrier had a credit score that would have qualified with many lenders for a mortgage in the prime-market. Instead, Mr. Guerrier received a mortgage at sub-prime rates and on sub-prime terms.
99. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp., by various means and through its policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
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100. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien, the contract APR on the mortgage loans were actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
101. On information and belief, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
102. On information and belief, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien were charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
103. Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien were not offered less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with their credit characteristics directly from H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage Corp. Facts Relating To The Grissetts
104. Plaintiffs, Jacqueline Grissett and Craig Grissett reside at 22 Country Club Drive, Randolph, Massachusetts 02368 with their three children, aged 5 years, 9 years and 11 years.
105. On or about August 4, 2006, the Grissetts refinanced their previous Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. mortgage loan with Option One.
106. Option One split the refinance into two loans, Loan No. 161050324, with a principal amount of $253,600.00 and Loan No. 161050329, with a principal amount of $63,400.00.
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107. The larger loan, (Loan No. 161050324) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 10.878%. According to the note, the loan had a two-year fixed rate followed by a 28-year variable rate feature.
108. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, the Grissetts paid $11,651.65 in settlement charges in connection with the larger loan, including, a $5,072.00 broker fee to Maritime Mortgage (“Maritime”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $950 underwriting fee to Option One, and a $50.00 funding fee to Option One.
109. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161050324 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8, respectively.
110. The smaller loan, (Loan No. 161050329), is a 30-year fixed rate loan with a disclosed APR of 14.131%.
111. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161050329 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 10, respectively.
112. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp., by various means and through its policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to the Grissetts, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
113. On information and belief, unbeknownst to the Grissetts, the contract APR on the mortgage loans were actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
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114. On information and belief, the Grissetts were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
115. On information and belief, the Grissetts were charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
116. The Grissetts were not offered less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with their credit characteristics directly from H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage Corp. Facts Relating To Mr. Parham
117. Plaintiff, Steven Parham resides at 20 Brockton Street, Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126 with his wife and their 11 year old daughter.
118. While serving a police detail on Norfolk Street in Mattapan, Mr. Parham was approached by a mortgage broker from People’s Choice Mortgage, Inc. (“People’s Choice”), who told Mr. Parham that he could find him a mortgage loan at a lower interest rate.
119. On or about September 29, 2006, Mr. Parham refinanced his previous mortgage loan serviced by AMC Mortgage Services, Inc. with Option One.
120. The loan, (Loan No.161050485) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 10.829%. According to the note, the loan has a two-year fixed rate followed by a 28-year variable rate feature. The loan note also requires a balloon payment of $340,057.01.
121. According to the HUD-1A Settlement Statement, Mr. Parham paid $12,208.92 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $4,940.00 broker fee to People’s Choice, an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $500.00 processing fee to People’s Choice, a $850.00 underwriting fee to Option One and a $50.00 funding fee to Option One. In
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addition, Option One paid a $4,940.00 yield spread premium to People’s Choice for marking up the interest rate on the loan.
122. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-1A Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161050485 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 11 and Exhibit 12, respectively.
123. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage Corp., by various means and through its policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to Mr. Parham, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
124. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Mr. Parham, the contract APR on the mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
125. On information and belief, Mr. Parham was subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
126. On information and belief, Mr. Parham was charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
127. Mr. Parham was not offered less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with their credit characteristics directly from H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage Corp. Facts Relating To The Hoffmans
128. Plaintiffs Betty and Edward Hoffman reside at 11 Harwood Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts 02124.
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129. 130. The Hoffmans purchased their Dorchester home in 1970 for approximately
$15,900.00. 131. On August 24, 2007, the Hoffmans refinanced their existing home loan with a
mortgage loan from Option One. 132. The loan (Loan No. 231098060) was a 30-year, fixed rate loan with a disclosed
APR of 10.699%. The loan amount was $321,950.00. 133. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, the Hoffmans paid $13,370.33
in settlement charges in connection with the loan including a $8,853.63 broker fee to People’s Choice Mortgage Inc. (“People’s Choice”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $600 processing fee to People’s Choice, a $350 application fee to People’s Choice, a $850 underwriting fee to Option One and a $50 funding fee to Option One. On the Hoffmans’ loan, Option One paid additional broker compensation in the form of a $3,219.50 yield spread premium to People’s Choice for marking up the interest rate on the loan.
134. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 231098060 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 13 and Exhibit 14, respectively.
135. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage, by various means and through their policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to the Hoffmans, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
136. On information and belief, unbeknownst to the Hoffmans, the Contract APR on the mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a
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totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
137. On information and belief, the Hoffmans were subject to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
138. On information and belief, the Hoffmans were charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
139. Defendants did not offer the Hoffmans their less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with their credit characteristics directly under Defendants’ policies. Facts Relating To Doris Murray
140. Plaintiff Murray resides at 9806 S. Winston Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60643. 141. On or about August 5, 2005, Murray refinanced her existing home loan with a mortgage loan from Option One. 142. The loan (Loan No. 041068915) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 10.482%. The loan amount was $182,000.00. According to the note, the loan had a two-year fixed rate followed by a 28-year variable rate feature. 143. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, Murray paid over $7,400 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $3,640 broker fee to Skyline Title, (“Skyline”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $530 processing fee to Skyline, a $650 underwriting fee to Option One, and a $50 funding fee to Option One. 144. True and correct copies of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 041068915 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 15 and Exhibit 16, respectively.
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145. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage, by various means and through its policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to Murray, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
146. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Murray, the Contract APR on the mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
147. On information and belief, Murray was subject to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
148. On information and belief, Murray was charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
149. Defendants did not offer Murray its less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with her credit characteristics directly under Defendants’ policies. Facts Relating To Joslyn Day
150. Plaintiff Day resides at 407 Washington Street, Unit 6, Dorchester, Massachusetts 02124.
151. In 2005, Day worked part time in H&R Block’s call center as a customer service representative arranging appointments for people seeking tax preparation services.
152. During the time Day worked for H&R Block, an H&R Block Mortgage loan officer named Gilbert began calling her to suggest that she refinance her then existing home loan with Countrywide Home Loans (“Countrywide”) with a loan from H&R Block Mortgage. Day does not know how Gilbert obtained her telephone number.
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153. Prior to speaking with Gilbert, Day had no intention of refinancing her Countrywide loan and explained to Gilbert that she was not interested in refinancing.
154. However, Gilbert continued to call Day and eventually convinced her to refinance with H&R Block Mortgage.
155. Day refinanced her Countrywide loan with H&R Block Mortgage on May 16, 2005.
156. The loan (Loan No. 711006957) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 11.759%. According to the note, the loan had a two-year fixed rate followed by a 28year variable rate feature.
157. According to the HUD-1A Settlement Statement, Day paid $9,723.40 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $6,982.50 loan origination fee to H&R Block Mortgage and a $695 underwriting fee to H&R Block Mortgage.
158. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-1A Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 711006957 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 17 and Exhibit 18, respectively.
159. H&R Block and Option One by various means and through their policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to Day, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
160. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Day, the Contract APR on the mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
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161. On information and belief, Day was subject to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
162. On information and belief, Day was charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
163. H&R Block Mortgage did not offer Day less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with her credit characteristics directly under Defendants’ policies. Facts Relating To Keisha Chavers
164. Plaintiff Chavers resides at 5849 S. Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637. 165. On or about September 14, 2005, Chavers refinanced her existing home loan with a mortgage loan from Option One. The financing was arranged through Approved Financial, Inc. (“Approved Financial”), an Option One approved mortgage broker. 166. The loan (Loan No. 041072031) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 9.807%. The loan amount was $130,878.56. This loan was a 2/28 ARM under which the interest rate can rise to 10.1% on the first change date, October 1, 2007, and thereafter can increase by 1% every six months up to a maximum of 13.1%. Option One or its closing agent provided Chavers with only one copy of the Federal Notice of Right To Cancel. 167. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, Chavers paid over $6,100.00 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $2,025.00 “Mortgage Broker Fee” to Approved Financial, a $300 “Application Fee” to Approved Financial, a $300 “processing fee” to Approved Financial, a $650 “underwriting fee” to Option One, and a $50 “funding fee” to Option One.
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168. Option One also paid indirect broker compensation in the form of a $1,350.00 yield spread premium to Approved Financial, which imposed a substantial additional cost on plaintiff.
169. True and correct copies of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 041072031 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 19 and Exhibit 20, respectively.
170. H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage, by various means and through its policies, participated in the decision to grant credit to Chavers, including the rates and terms on which credit would be granted.
171. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Chavers, the Contract APR on the mortgage loan was actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
172. On information and belief, Chavers was subject to Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
173. On information and belief, Chavers was charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
174. Defendants did not offer Chavers its less expensive loan products that were available to borrowers with her credit characteristics directly under Defendants’ policies.
DISCOVERY/FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (TOLLING) 175. While long suspected, mortgage lending discrimination has only recently been disclosed and quantified. It has only been in the last few years that mortgage lenders have been required to submit details of their subprime home loans under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
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Act. The groups that have studied predatory lending and the mortgage market have uncovered incredible racial disparities in the types of mortgages offered.
176. The causes of action alleged herein accrued upon discovery of the discriminatory impact of the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy. Plaintiffs and members of the Class did not discover and could not have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence the factual bases of those claims. Indeed, the data forming the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims only recently was released and analyzed in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, because the Defendants knowingly and actively concealed the facts alleged herein, Plaintiffs and the Class have been kept ignorant of vital information essential to the pursuit of these claims, without any fault or lack of diligence on their part.
177. Commission-driven, discretionary pricing systems, such as those used in the mortgage industry and structurally similar to the system utilized by the Defendants, have been found to produce significant discriminatory effects. Knowledge concerning the significant and pervasive discriminatory impact of such commission-driven, discretionary credit pricing systems has been widely circulated within the financing industry for several years, as a result of numerous actions by the United States Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies. See, Facts, section A supra. Thus, the Defendants knew or should have known that their credit pricing system causes minority homeowners to pay more for mortgage financing than the amounts paid by white customers with identical or effectively identical credit scores.
178. Despite the fact that the Defendants knew or should have known of the discriminatory effect of their Discretionary Pricing Policy, none of the loan documents inform
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the customer that its finance rates ultimately are subjective and not based solely on risk-related characteristics.
179. The Defendants were and are under a continuous non-delegable duty to disclose to the Plaintiffs and Class material information regarding their loans. The fact that certain loan terms are subjective and discretionary is information a reasonable borrower would consider important when deciding whether to accept the loan and on what terms. The fact that the subjective and discretionary components result in a disparate impact on minority is also information a reasonable minority borrower would consider important.
180. The Defendants failed to disclose this information, however, and Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably relied upon the Defendants’ representation that terms of their loans would be based on their creditworthiness. The Defendants’ financing documents falsely fostered the image that the Defendants offer competitive rates that objectively are set. However, the Defendants never disclosed to its credit applicants the fact that: (a) its credit rates are subjective and can vary significantly among persons with identical credit profiles; and (b) it had authorized and provided a financial incentive to mortgage brokers to subjectively increase the credit rate above the rate otherwise available to the homeowner.
181. Due to the inherent nature of the Defendants’ undisclosed Discretionary Pricing Policy and due to the Defendants’ deception and concealment, the Defendants’ minority customers had no way of knowing or suspecting: (a) the existence of the Defendants’ subjective credit pricing policy; (b) that they were charged additional subjective credit charges; (c) that they were charged a disproportionately greater amount for their cost of credit than similarly situated white persons, and or (d) that any part of the loan price was negotiable. Thus, the
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Defendants are estopped from relying on any statutes of limitation in their defenses of this action.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 182. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 183. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 184. This class action is brought pursuant to ECOA and the FHA by the individual named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all minority consumers (the “Class”) who obtained an Option One home mortgage loan in the United States between January 1, 2001 and the date of judgment in this action (the “Class Period”) and who were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy pursuant to which they paid discretionary points, fees or interest mark-ups in connection with their loan. The term “minority” refers to blacks and Hispanics as defined by federal law. 185. The phrase "Discretionary Pricing Policy" refers to the Defendants’ policy of authorizing its loan officers and brokers to impose subjective, discretionary charges and interest mark-ups that are included in the finance charge loans they originate. 186. Plaintiffs do not know the exact size or identities of the proposed Class, since such information is in the exclusive control of the Defendants. Plaintiffs believe that the Class encompasses many thousands or tens of thousands of individuals who are dispersed geographically throughout the United States. Therefore, the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
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187. All members of the Class have been subject to and affected by the same Discretionary Pricing Policy. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These questions include, but are not limited to the following:
a. the nature, scope and operations of Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy; b. whether H&R Block, Inc., H&R Block Bank, Option One, and H&R Block Mortgage are creditors under the ECOA because, for example, in the ordinary course of its business they participate in the decision as to whether or not to extend credit to consumers; c. whether the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy is a facially neutral credit pricing system that has effected racial discrimination in violation of ECOA; d. whether there are statistically significant disparities between the amount of the discretionary charges imposed on minority persons and the amount of the discretionary charges imposed on white persons that are unrelated to creditworthiness; e. whether any legitimate business reason for the Discretionary Pricing Policy can be achieved by a credit pricing system less discriminatory in its impact; f. whether the Court can enter declaratory and injunctive relief; g. the proper measure of actual and/or punitive damages and/or restitution; and
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h. the proper measure of disgorgement and/or other relief for unjust enrichment. 188. The claims of the individual named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class and do not conflict with the interests of any other members of the Class in that both the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were subject to the same Discretionary Pricing Policy that disproportionately has affected minority homeowners. 189. The individual named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. They are committed to the vigorous prosecution of the Class’ claims and have retained attorneys who are qualified to pursue this litigation and have experience in class actions – in particular, consumer protection and discrimination actions. 190. A class action is superior to other methods for the fast and efficient adjudication of this controversy. A class action regarding the issues in this case does not create any problems of manageability. 191. In the alternative, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
COUNT I DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
192. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 193. The Defendants are creditors as defined in ECOA, and in the ordinary course of its business, participated in the decision of whether or not to extend credit to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representatives herein, and all prospective Class members.
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194. The Defendants designed, disseminated, controlled, implemented and profited from the discriminatory policy and practice alleged herein — the Discretionary Pricing Policy — which has had a disparate economic impact on minorities compared to similarly situated whites.
195. All actions taken by Option One’s loan officers and authorized brokers were in accordance with the specific authority granted to them by Option One and were in furtherance of the Defendants’ policies and practices.
196. As a result of the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy, the Defendants have collected more in finance charges from minority borrowers than from similarly situated white persons, for reasons unrelated to credit risk.
197. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
198. Plaintiffs and prospective class members are aggrieved persons as defined in ECOA by virtue of having been subject to the Defendants’ discriminatory, Discretionary Pricing Policy.
COUNT II DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 199. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 200. The Defendants engaged in residential real estate-related transactions with respect to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representatives herein, and all prospective Class members. 201. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy has resulted in discrimination with respect to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representatives herein, and all prospective members of the Class.
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202. As a result of the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy, the Defendants have collected more in finance charges from minorities than from similarly situated white persons, for reasons unrelated to credit risk.
203. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Fair Housing Act and constitutes actionable discrimination on the basis of race.
204. Plaintiffs and the Class are aggrieved persons as defined in FHA by virtue of having been subject to the Defendants’ discriminatory, Discretionary Pricing Policy.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief: a. Certify this case as a class action and certify the named Plaintiffs herein to be adequate class representatives and their counsel to be class counsel; b. Enter a judgment, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613, declaring the acts and practices of Defendants complained of herein to be in violation of ECOA and the FHA; c. Grant a permanent or final injunction, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613(c), enjoining the Defendants, and the Defendants' agents and employees, affiliates and subsidiaries, from continuing to discriminate against Plaintiffs and the members of the Class because of their race through further use of the Discretionary Pricing Policy or any other nonrisk-related discretionary pricing policy employed by the Defendants; d. Order the Defendants, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613(c), to adopt and enforce a policy that requires appropriate training of the Defendants' employees and its brokers and correspondent lenders to prevent discrimination;
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e. Order the Defendants, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613(c), to monitor and/or audit the racial pattern of its financings to ensure the cessation of discriminatory effects in its home mortgage transactions;
f. Order disgorgement, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c), of all disproportionate nonrisk charges imposed on minorities by the Defendants' Discretionary Pricing Policy; and order the equitable distribution of such charges to all appropriate class members; together with other relief for unjust enrichment;
g. Order actual and punitive damages and/or restitution to the Plaintiffs and the Class pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c);
h. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) and/or 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c); and
i. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court finds necessary and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted, On behalf of the Plaintiffs,
/s/ Gary Klein Gary Klein Gary Klein (BBO # 560769) Shennan Kavanagh (BBO # 655174) RODDY KLEIN & RYAN 727 Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02111-2810 39

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Telephone: (617) 357-5500 ext. 15 Facsimile: (617) 357-5030
Andrew S. Friedman (admitted pro hac vice) Wendy J. Harrison (admitted pro hac vice) BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C. 2901 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1000 Phoenix, AZ 85012 Telephone: (602) 274-1100 Facsimile (602) 274-1199
Al Hofeld, Jr. Law Offices of Al Hofeld, Jr., LLC and The Social Justice Project, Inc. 208 S. LaSalle Street, Suite #1650 Chicago, IL 60604 Phone (312) 345-1004 Fax (312) 346-3242
Stuart Rossman (BBO # 430640) Charles Delbaum (BBO # 543225) NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER 7 Winthrop Square, 4th Flr. Boston, MA 02110 Telephone: (617) 542-8010 Facsimile: (617) 542-8028
Marvin A. Miller Matthew E. VanTine Lori A. Fanning MILLER LAW LLC 115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910 Chicago, IL 60603 Telephone: (312) 332-3400
Samuel H. Rudman Robert M. Rothman COUGHLIN STOIA GELLER RUDMAN & ROBBINS LLP 58 South Service Road, Suite 200 Melville, NY 11747 Telephone: (631) 367-7100 Facsimile: (631) 367-1173
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Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 57 Filed 07/09/09 Page 41 of 41 Dated: July 9, 2009
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Gary Klein, hereby certify that this document, filed through the ECF system, will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing and paper copies will be sent to any non-registered participants by first class mail, postage prepaid, on July 9, 2009.
/s/ Gary Klein Gary Klein
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-10157-RWZ
CECIL BARRETT, JR., et al.
v.
H&R BLOCK, INC., OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION and H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORPORATION n/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.1
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
March 21, 2011
ZOBEL, D.J. Now pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Plaintiffs
are African-American homeowners who bring suit on behalf of themselves and similarly
situated homeowners against H&R Block, Inc. (“H&R Block”), and its wholly-owned
subsidiaries, San Canyon Corp., f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One”)
and Ada Services Corporation, f/k/a H&R Block Mortgage Corporation (“H&R Block Mortgage”) (collectively, “Option One” or “Defendants”).2
The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that H&R Block and Option One violated
1H&R Block Bank, a Federal Savings Bank, Member FDIC, was named as a defendant but has since been voluntarily dismissed from the action. H&R Block, Inc. was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The only defendants remaining are Option One Mortgage Corporation and Option One Mortgage Services, Inc., which became the new name of H&R Mortgage Services in July 2007.
2Plaintiffs are Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Blanco Guerrier, Angelique M. Bastien, Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty and Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day and Keisha Chavers (collectively “Plaintiffs”),

the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (“ECOA”), and the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (“FHA”),3 by giving its authorized brokers
discretion to impose additional charges to the borrower’s wholesale mortgage loans
unrelated to a borrower’s creditworthiness, a policy that had a disparate impact on
African-American borrowers in that it resulted in their being charged higher rates than
similarly situated whites.4
Plaintiffs now move to certify a class of “[a]ll African-American borrowers who
obtained a mortgage loan from one of the Defendants between January 1, 2001 and
the [d]ate of [j]udgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See Docket #
74, Pl.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Class Certification at 17.
I. Background
Plaintiffs Cecil and Cynthia Barrett (“the Barretts”) purchased their home in 2004
for approximately $277,000. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 76. They refinanced the
3The ECOA provides that it is unlawful “for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). Similarly, the FHA makes it unlawful “for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
4This court previously concluded that disparate impact claims are cognizable under both the FHA and ECOA. See Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss (Docket # 45) at 3-5; see also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d, 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000) (disparate impact claims allowable under FHA); and Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 256-257 (D. Mass. 2008) (disparate impact claims allowable under ECOA).
2

mortgage on their home in Mattapan, Massachusetts, in 2005, taking out a $416,000 loan with a 30-year term and a disclosed Annual Percentage Rate, or “APR,” of 8.653 percent. Id. at ¶¶ 77-78. The Barretts were assisted by Money-Wise Solutions, a mortgage broker authorized to originate loans with Option One. Id. at ¶ 79. On April 6, 2006, they again refinanced. Id. at ¶ 81. That loan, also with Option One, was for $500,000, and had an adjustable rate with a balloon feature, providing for a final payment of $344,113.90. Id. at ¶ 82. The APR on the second loan was 10.536%. Id. The remaining plaintiffs similarly used brokers to obtain wholesale mortgage loans from Option One and allege that they were charged a higher APR than similarly-situated whites.
H&R Block made home mortgage loans to consumers through its subsidiaries, H&R Block Mortgage and Option One. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 49. Option One was primarily a wholesale mortgage lender and offered its services through its branches and a national network of mortgage brokers. Id. at ¶ 22.
In the wholesale mortgage lender market, independent mortgage brokers act as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders like Option One. A broker identifies prospective borrowers, facilitates the loan origination process, and transmits prospective borrowers’ respective applications to lenders for a determination of whether or not to grant the loan. This reliance on brokers enabled Option One to fund mortgages in areas where it had not established any retail presence of its own. Option One worked with numerous authorized brokers when it was in the wholesale mortgage business, which it abandoned in late 2007. Between 2001 and 2007, H&R Block
3

Mortgage’s subprime retail originations represented approximately 10% of Option One’s overall loan origination volume.
The pricing of Option One’s mortgage loans was comprised of an objective and a subjective component. According to Plaintiffs, when a proposed borrower applied for a loan, Option One first computed a risk-based financing rate (the “Par Rate”) based on objective criteria of creditworthiness, such as FICO score, property value, and loan-to-value ratio to determine credit parameters, and set prices for its loan products. This information was communicated to brokers on a rate sheet listing Option One’s “par” interest rate, which did not result in any broker compensation. That objective component of loan pricing is not at issue here.
Option One also authorized a subjective component in its credit pricing system (the “Discretionary Pricing Policy”), which governed brokers' compensation for their services. This is the policy at issue. Under this policy, brokers were permitted to set interest rates higher than the par rate, as well as to charge loan origination and processing fees. Option One paid brokers a “yield spread premium” or “rebate” when they did so. Brokers were paid more for loans that cost the borrower more, though their total compensation was capped at 5 percent of the loan amount. As the name implies, there were no objective criteria for the imposition of these higher rates and fees, which were set by the brokers in their discretion. These discretionary charges were negotiated between the broker and borrower as part of the total finance charge (the “Contract APR”), without specific disclosure that a portion of the Contract APR was a non-risk related charge.
4

Option One, along with H&R Block and H&R Block Mortgage, jointly established the Discretionary Pricing Policy and participated in the decisions to grant credit to borrowers. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54.) Option One monitored the fees charged by its brokers to ensure they complied with its policies.
Plaintiffs allege that “by design,” the Discretionary Pricing Policy “caused persons with identical or similar credit scores to pay different amounts for the cost of credit.” (Id. ¶ 68.) Although facially neutral, the policy had an adverse effect on African-Americans in that they paid higher discretionary charges on their home loans than did similarly situated white borrowers. Plaintiffs bring these claims under a disparate impact theory, challenging “practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). II. Legal Standard
To obtain class certification, plaintiffs must satisfy four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) as well as one of several requirements of Rule 23(b). Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003).
Rule 23(a) provides that a class may be certified only if “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
5

Courts have characterized this rule to require plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. See Smilow, 323 F.3d at 38.
Rule 23(b) allows for several different types of class actions. Plaintiffs seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) which requires a showing “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
Before certifying a class, courts are required to engage in “a rigorous analysis of the prerequisites established by Rule 23.” In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2008). Accordingly, when considering disputed issues for class certification, a district court may “probe behind the pleadings to formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play out.” DeRosa v. Massachusetts Bay Commuter Rail Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D. Mass. 2010) (citations omitted). However, the court may not consider whether the party seeking class certification has stated a cause of action or is likely to prevail on the merits. See In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2006). A district court must certify a class if it concludes that the moving party has met its burden of proof on each element. III. Analysis
A. Rule 23(a) 1. Numerosity
Under Rule 23(a)(1), the numerosity requirement is met if “the class is so
6

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” From 2001 through 2007, Option One made at least 130,000 wholesale and
retail loans to African-American borrowers located across the United States. Defendants do not dispute that the numerosity requirement has been met.
2. Commonality To demonstrate commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), Plaintiffs must establish “common questions of law and fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). It is not necessary that members of the proposed class share every fact in common or present identical legal issues. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Securities Litig., 03-cv-10165-RWZ, 2005 WL 3178162, at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, the rule requires “a sufficient constellation of common issues [that] binds class members together.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2000). In actions based on disparate impact, commonality is satisfied if the lawsuit “tend[s] to show the existence of a class of persons affected by a company-wide policy or practice of discrimination.” Attenborough v. Const. and General Bldg. Laborers’ Local 79, 238 F.R.D. 82, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Individual factual differences among the putative class members will not preclude a finding of commonality. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001). To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must (1) identify the specific practice being challenged; and (2) show that it effected different results in different populations. See Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-995 (1988). “[I]t is not enough to simply allege that there
7

is a disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy that leads to such an
impact. Rather, the [plaintiff] is responsible for isolating and identifying the specific ...
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” See
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, “[p]roof of disparate impact is based not on an examination of individual
claims, but on a statistical analysis of the class as a whole.” In re Wells Fargo
Residential Mortg. Lending Discrimination Litigation, 08-md-01930, 2010 WL 4791687,
*2 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant, who may either discredit the plaintiff’s statistics
or proffer its own computations to demonstrate that no disparity exists. See Watson,
487 U.S. at 996-97.
First, Option One argues that the named Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirement
of commonality because the results of an aggregated statistical regression cannot
supply classwide proof of discrimination, particularly where individual Plaintiffs did
receive a lower APR.5 It relies on its studies that the majority of putative class
5Citing Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980), Defendants further contend that delegation of discretion cannot, as a matter of law, form the policy required to make out a claim of disparate impact discrimination. This argument is unavailing. It is not the delegation of discretion that constitutes the policy, but rather the existence of a commonly applied practice that satisfies the requirement. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (policies which designate discretionary authority to individual actors are actionable if they have a verifiable discriminatory impact on a protected class); see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same).
Moreover, this court previously held that Plaintiffs adequately identified the practice at issue, namely “establishing a par rate keyed to objective indicators of
8

members paid an amount that was statistically the same as they would have paid had they been white, and that another 2.6% of class members paid an amount less than predicted. Defendants contend that such disparities as existed are explainable not by race but by factors such as geography and the individual broker. Second, Defendants contend that individualized pricing, changes in policy, and other practices preclude classwide adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs demonstrate common questions of fact and law through the expert report of Yale Law School Professor Dr. Ian Ayres (“Professor Ayres”), whose analysis of Option One’s mortgage data leads him to conclude that the Discretionary Pricing Policy did have a disparate impact on minority borrowers because “African Americans paid more for Option One mortgage loans than whites with similar risk-characteristics.” Docket # 89-3, Report of Professor Ayres (“Ayres Report”) at 6, ¶ 10. In his study, Professor Ayres compares the annual percentage rate, or “APR,” paid by white and minority borrowers for Option One wholesale loans originated from 2001 to 2007. He finds that the mean APR for African-Americans was 9.876%, as compared with a mean APR of 9.415% for whites, a difference of 0.461%. See Ayres Report at 7, ¶ 10.
To compare similarly situated whites and minorities, Professor Ayres also performed regression analysis, a statistical method that allows him to control for legitimate risk factors that may affect the cost of a loan. Controlling for such risk factors, he concluded that the APRs of African-Americans are 0.086% higher than
creditworthiness while simultaneously authorizing additional charges keyed to factors unrelated to those criteria.” Barrett v. H & R Block, 08-cv-10157-RWZ (Docket # 45) at 7.
9

those of similarly situated whites, resulting in an average payment of $134 more per year for each of the former group’s loans. Professor Ayres’ study relies entirely on evidence common to the class and does not require any individualized inquiry.
The central question of fact and law is common to the class. Plaintiffs assert that the discretionary pricing strategy they challenge was executed uniformly, and its adverse effects were felt in the same way by Plaintiffs and all class members. Therefore, common questions include whether Option One’s policy resulted in a pricing disparity between white and minority borrowers and whether those disparities are justified by legitimate risk factors.
Defendants dispute commonality through their own expert, Dr. Darius Palia (“Dr. Palia”), Professor of Finance and Economics at Rutgers Business School, who asserts that there is no evidence that there was “a commonly applied ‘Discretionary Pricing Policy’ that was the cause of a class-wide disparate impact on African-American borrowers.” See Docket # 89-1 (Rebuttal Report of Dr. Palia dated May 4, 2010, hereinafter “Palia Report”).
Using Professor Ayres’ numbers, Dr. Palia replicated Professor Ayres’ exact regression analysis to highlight alleged errors. Dr. Palia points to two major flaws in Professor Ayres’ analysis. First, he argues that the Ayres regression model was improperly applied to the aggregate, and not separately to the individual mortgage brokers that used the so-called “Discretionary Pricing Policy.” If such a policy had, in fact, been applied, “the disparate impact caused by the policy should be observed consistently across the various brokers that applied it”; if not, “that would suggest that
10

loan pricing is the result of individualized decision-making rather than the result of a common policy.” Second, Dr. Palia contends that Professor Ayres’ failure to apply his regression model separately to local geographic markets in which borrowers applied for and obtained their mortgage loans renders his conclusions inaccurate. After completing his own analysis, Dr. Palia concluded: “(1) the statistical evidence does not show any common pattern of disparate impact against African-American borrowers either across the brokers that originated the loans or across the geographic markets in which the largest numbers of loans were originated; (2) even among the minority of brokers and geographic markets in which African-Americans experienced statistically higher APRs than similarly-situated whites, there is no common cause of such pricing differences; and (3) nine of ten loans extended to named plaintiffs had APRs that were not statistically different from the APR that would have been predicted had the borrowers been white.”
Although Defendants hotly dispute the merits of Professor Ayres’ analysis, it has long been the rule that disputes about the respective experts’ statistics are tantamount to disputes about the parties’ proof of the merits and are not grounds for denying class certification. See In re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24, 35 (2d Cir. 2006) (experts’ disagreement on whether a discriminatory impact could be shown is a disagreement as to the merits, and is not a valid basis for denying class certification). Statistical disputes in civil rights cases “encompass the basic merits inquiry and need not be proved to raise common questions and demonstrate the appropriateness of
11

class resolution.” Id. at 594.6 Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement. 3. Typicality
A plaintiff may represent a class only if his or her claims are “typical” of those of the putative class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). In general, a plaintiff's claim is typical if it “arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230 F.R.D. 61, 78 (D. Mass. 2005). Where, however, “a named plaintiff may be subject to unique defenses that would divert attention from the common claims of the class, that plaintiff cannot be considered typical of the class.” In re Bank of Boston Corp. Securities Litigation, 762 F.Supp. 1525, 1532 (D. Mass. 1991). While commonality “examines the relationship of facts and legal issues common to class members,” typicality “focuses on the relationship of facts and issues between the class and its representatives.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 613 n. 37 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that their claims are typical because Option One made loans to each Plaintiff under the same subjective Discretionary Pricing Policy to which the class was subjected.
Option One counters that the named Plaintiffs are not typical for two reasons: (1)
6Defendants contend that arguments that one party’s statistics are “unreliable or based on an unaccepted method” must be resolved at the certification stage. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 591-592 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Here, however, Defendants do not contend that the statistical analysis was based on an unaccepted method. Rather, they contend that Dr. Ayres’ model produces results which do not prove a disparate impact caused by any policy.
12

some have suffered no injury in connection with their loans and therefore lack standing; and (2) individualized defenses demonstrate that there is no “typical” named plaintiff.
i. Standing Defendants assert that certain Plaintiffs were not injured because they received loans that were priced more favorably than similarly situated white borrowers. Further they argue that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Dr. Ayres’ conclusions of disadvantage to AfricanAmerican borrowers as a group does not support the inference that the named Plaintiffs were so disadvantaged. Absent such individualized evidence, the named Plaintiffs are not typical of the class they represent, and thus lack standing. Plaintiffs have alleged that the disparate impact was the result of the Discretionary Pricing Policy, a common practice that governed the pricing of all class members’ mortgages. The named Plaintiffs were subject to that policy, and have advanced a viable theory showing that it produced harm. That is sufficient to satisfy the typicality requirement.
ii. Individualized Defenses Next, Defendants contend that the individual circumstances surrounding each named Plaintiff’s loans expose each to individual defenses which defeat typicality. In particular, Defendants contend that several Plaintiffs submitted loan applications which contained false information, subjecting them to a defense of unclean hands. This argument is unavailing. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that because the purpose of the ECOA is to eradicate discrimination, the unclean hands defense is not available to question liability. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352,
13

356-57, 360 (1995) (holding that the unclean hands defense “has not been applied where Congress authorizes broad equitable relief to serve important national policies” including civil rights statutes such as the ADEA); see also Moore v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 55 F.3d 991, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that an unclean hands defense did not defeat liability under the ECOA).
Finally, Defendants say that the necessity for an individualized statute of limitations defense determination defeats typicality. This, too, is without merit. First, this court has already ruled against Defendant’s statute of limitations defense with respect to the named Plaintiffs when it denied their motion to dismiss. Second, all named Plaintiffs but one filed within the requisite time. Third, at the class certification stage, a court’s analysis of unique defenses focuses on whether those defenses will “unacceptably detract from the focus of the litigation to the detriment of absent class members.” Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, any statute of limitations defense will not do so.
4. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the proposed class representatives “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This requirement has two parts. Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that “the interests of the representative party will not conflict with the interests of any of the class members,” and second, that “counsel chosen by the representative party is qualified, experienced and able to vigorously conduct the proposed litigation.” In re M3 Power Razor System Marketing & Sales Practice Litigation, 270 F.R.D. 45, 55 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp.,
14

780 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 1985)). Option One does not dispute the adequacy of these class representatives, and
the court discerns no conflicts between Plaintiffs and any members of the class. Accordingly, all four requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met.
B. Rule 23(b)(3) As they request certification under Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs must present evidence showing the predominance of common issues and the superiority of a class action. The court now turns to these two requirements.
1. Predominance Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” This predominance requirement “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation” and is a “far more demanding” standard than Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-24 (1997). The Rule is intended to ensure “that common issues predominate, not that all issues be common to the class.” In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2005 WL 3178162, *2 (D. Mass. 2005) (citations omitted). Option One disputes predominance by reiterating its arguments against commonality. The disparity in APR is explained not by race, Option One argues, but by other legitimate variables. The key question again is whether Option One’s Discretionary Pricing Policy had
15

a disparate impact, that is, whether it fell “more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). Since the claim is disparate impact, the relevant evidence will focus on “statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities.” Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
Professor Ayres’ analysis provides evidence of the disparate impact on a classwide basis. Competing explanations for those disparities are examined by way of regression analyses that assess the effect of competing variables. Option One can defend against Plaintiffs’ case either by demonstrating that its discretionary policy had a valid business justification, or by challenging the statistical basis for Plaintiffs’ claim. In either case, the legal contention applies across the class. Thus, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing the predominance of common questions.
2. Superiority The final requirement for class certification is “that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The pertinent factors in assessing superiority are “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions” and “the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Id. Superiority exists where “there is a real question whether the putative class members could sensibly litigate on their own for these amounts of damages, especially with the prospect of expert testimony required.” Gintis v. Bouchard Transp. Co., Inc., 596 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2010).
16

It would be neither economically feasible nor efficient for class members to pursue these claims against Option One individually. The amounts recoverable for individual class members are too low for class members to bring individual claims. The class action is manageable because liability will be determined based on statistical proof, and remedies can be calculated on a class-wide basis. A class is therefore superior to other methods for adjudicating these claims.
C. Class Period While the result on the merits is by no means certain, the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, and class certification is appropriate. However, several questions remain unresolved. Most notably, the proposed dates of the beginning and end of the class period are left singularly unsubstantiated. Moreover, it is unclear how and when Option One began to identify loan applicants by race.
D. Rule 23(g) Since the court has determined that Plaintiffs have met Rule 23’s requirements for class certification, the court must appoint class counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). On or before April 11, 2011, any counsel who wishes to serve as class counsel shall file the requisite motions and documentation to support his/her request. IV. Conclusion Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (Docket # 72) is ALLOWED, subject to limitation by time. A class of “[a]ll African-American borrowers who obtained a mortgage loan from one of the Defendants” is hereby certified.
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March 21, 2011 DATE

/s/Rya W. Zobel RYA W. ZOBEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18

 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-10157-RWZ
CECIL BARRETT, JR., et al. v.
OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION and H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORPORATION n/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER September 18, 2012
ZOBEL, D.J. On March 21, 2011, the court issued an order certifying a plaintiff class in this
action to include all African-American borrowers who obtained a mortgage loan from one of the defendants (collectively, “Option One”) within a certain period of time.1 Docket # 103. Three months later, the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). Now pending before the court is Option One’s motion to decertify the class in light of that case. I. Background
The factual background of this case is detailed in the certification order. Briefly,
1The certification order left unresolved the beginning and end of the class period. Given the court’s resolution of the present motion, it is unnecessary to clarify the former class period, and plaintiffs’ motion for clarification (Docket # 11) is denied as moot.

plaintiffs are a number of African-American individuals who obtained home mortgage loans from Option One through mortgage brokers. They allege that defendants’ loan pricing policy violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (“ECOA”), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (“FHA”), by giving authorized brokers the discretion to impose additional charges unrelated to a borrower’s creditworthiness. Plaintiffs claim this policy had a disparate impact on African-American borrowers by resulting in higher mortgage rates for African-American borrowers than similarly situated white borrowers.
According to plaintiffs, Option One’s loan pricing consisted of a fixed and ap discretionary component. When a proposed borrower applied for a new loan, Option One first calculated a fixed “par rate” for that borrower. The par rate was based on objective criteria of creditworthiness, such as the borrower’s credit score and the value of the property to be mortgaged. That fixed component is not at issue. However, Option One also included a discretionary component in its credit pricing system. Specifically, it authorized its brokers to set interest rates higher than the par rate and to charge loan origination and processing fees. These higher rates and additional fees were left to the individual brokers’ subjective discretion; Option One only set a maximum markup for the par rate. Brokers were paid more for loans that yielded higher rates and thus cost consumers more.
Plaintiffs argue that Option One’s policy of granting brokers discretion to set higher rates had an adverse effect on African-American borrowers, because on average Option One’s brokers assessed higher discretionary charges against African-
2

American borrowers than against similarly situated white borrowers. Plaintiffs do not claim that Option One’s policy was intended to discriminate against African-Americans; instead, they bring their claims under a disparate impact theory, which challenges “practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), a class action may only proceed if “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-51. This requirement is generally known as “commonality.” Members of the class need not share every fact in common or present identical legal issues; however, they must share “a sufficient constellation of legal issues [that] binds class members together.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2000). If a certified class no longer meets the commonality requirement, whether because of factual or legal developments, it must be decertified. See O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 410-13 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (decertifying for failure to meet Rule 23(a)’s typicality requirement).
Decertification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(C), which authorizes the court to decertify a class “at any time before final judgment.” In re Sonus Networks, Inc. Securities Litigation, 229 F.R.D. 339, 348 (D. Mass. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of showing that decertification is proper. Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Civil Action No. 06-12234-DJC, 2012 WL 957633, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 21,
3

2012). 4

III. Analysis The court’s certification order concluded that plaintiffs had demonstrated
commonality because the class members’ claims shared a legal and factual question: whether Option One’s pricing policy, by granting brokers discretion to set higher rates, resulted in a disparate impact on African-American borrowers. It found plaintiffs’ contentions supported by the expert report of Professor Ian Ayres of Yale Law School. Id. at 9; see Docket # 89-3, Report of Professor Ayres (“Ayres Report”). Professor Ayres prepared a regression analysis comparing the annual percentage rate (“APR”) paid by white and minority borrowers for Option One wholesale loans originated from 2001 to 2007. He found that, controlling for all legitimate risk factors that might affect the cost of a loan, the APRs paid by African-American borrowers nationwide were on average 0.086% higher than the APRs paid by similarly situated white borrowers. Ayres Report at 7 tbl.1. That is, in dollar terms, African-American borrowers on average spent about $134 more per year on their mortgages than similarly situated white borrowers. See id.
Under Wal-Mart, this showing is no longer sufficient to establish commonality. Wal-Mart establishes that a nationwide policy of granting discretion to local units can only raise a common question if the local units have a “common mode of exercising discretion.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-55. Furthermore, Wal-Mart disapproves the use of aggregate, nationwide statistics to prove a common method of exercising discretion at the local level. See id. at 2555.
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court considered a plaintiff class of “about one and a
5

half million plaintiffs, current and former female employees of . . . Wal-Mart.” Id. at 2547. The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s policy of granting local managers discretion over pay and promotion decisions violated Title VII under a disparate impact theory, because local managers disproportionately exercised that discretion in favor of male employees. The plaintiffs further argued that a uniform “corporate culture” at Wal-Mart allowed bias against women to affect local managers’ exercise of discretion, “thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.” Id. at 2548. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs submitted statistical analyses performed at the regional and national level showing that there were statistically significant disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart, and that these disparities could only be explained by gender discrimination. Id. at 2555.
The Court ruled that the plaintiff class failed to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). It described Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing discretion by local managers as “just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.” Id. at 2554. The Court recognized that giving discretion to lower-level supervisors could be a policy giving rise to a disparate impact claim, but ruled that such a claim would only be common to members of a nationwide class if the plaintiffs identified a “common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company.” Id. at 2554-55. Otherwise, the Court found, “[i]n a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction.” Id. at 2555; see also
6

id. at 2555-56 (emphasizing that plaintiffs must show a “specific employment practice” beyond “the bare existence of delegated discretion”).
Furthermore, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ statistical analyses were insufficient to show a common method of exercising discretion that would satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). Because the statistical analyses were performed on regional and national data, they could not “establish the uniform, store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.” Id. at 2555. In other words, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs could not demonstrate commonality just by pointing to a disparate impact in the nationwide average; instead, they would have to show a disparate impact in each store where members of the plaintiff class worked. “Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.” Id. at 2556.
Plaintiffs’ class in this case faces the same commonality problem as did the WalMart class. Plaintiffs’ challenge Option One’s policy of granting its brokers discretion to set higher rates. However, they do not point to any “common mode of exercising discretion,” see id. at 2555, that was shared by all of Option One’s brokers. For instance, if plaintiffs claimed that Option One’s brokers uniformly exercised their discretion by considering specific attributes that produce disparate impact—such as “scores on general aptitude tests or educational achievements,” id. at 2254—they would state a common question justifying class treatment. But without some such claim, the Supreme Court tells us, “demonstrating the invalidity of one [broker’s] use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another’s.” Id. Because
7

plaintiffs do not claim that all of Option One’s brokers exercised their discretion in the same way, they do not raise a single question common to all plaintiffs in the class.
As in Wal-Mart, plaintiffs here submit a statistical analysis to demonstrate that Option One’s policy had a disparate impact. And as in Wal-Mart, plaintiffs’ analysis examines aggregate data at a national level, rather than considering each broker individually. Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis shows that on average, nationwide, AfricanAmerican borrowers pay more for their loans than white borrowers. But that is no longer sufficient to establish commonality. Instead, under Wal-Mart, plaintiffs can only show a common question if they can show a common disparate impact at the level of each individual broker, thereby raising the inference that the brokers shared a common mode of exercising their discretion.
Plaintiffs make three arguments seeking to distinguish Wal-Mart and show a common question. First, they point out that each broker used the same two-stage process to set the class members’ mortgage rates. However, the first stage of this process—Option One’s par rate—is not at issue. Plaintiffs only challenge the second stage of the process: the brokers’ discretion to set rates higher than the par rate. And as discussed above, plaintiffs do not allege any specific common practice that the brokers used in exercising that discretion. Second, plaintiffs note that all of the brokers’ decisions are recorded in the terms of a consummated loan, making it easier to compare the outcomes for similarly-situated candidates. While that makes this case factually different from Wal-Mart, it does not raise any common question satisfying Rule 23(a)(2). Finally, plaintiffs argue that all of the brokers’ decisions “are explainable by a
8

common profit motive.” Id. That probably does not distinguish this case from Wal-Mart; there is a fair argument that the Wal-Mart managers’ employment decisions can be similarly explained. The argument also cuts against plaintiffs’ primary claim that Option One’s pricing policy creates a disparate impact not justified by any legitimate business reason, since a common profit motive is presumably a legitimate business reason. But most importantly, the argument fails to show any common practice or mode of exercising discretion. Even if driven by a common profit motive, the brokers could have made widely different decisions in pursuit of that profit motive. Cf. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (noting that commonality fails where some managers might use sex-neutral and performance-based criteria, some managers might use criteria with a disparate impact, and some managers might intentionally discriminate).
Other courts in similar cases have also concluded post-Wal-Mart that classes like the one certified here lack commonality. See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., MDL No. 1974, 2011 WL 4862174 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011), perm. app. granted, No. 11-0514 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 277 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Pa. 2011); In re Wells Fargo Residential Mortg. Lending Discrimination Litig., No. 08-MD-01930 MMC, 2011 WL 3903117 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).2 For the reasons set forth above, the court agrees.
IV. Conclusion
2Plaintiffs cite one similar case reaching the opposite conclusion. See Transcript of Preliminary Approval of Settlement Hearing, Harris v. Citigroup, Inc., Civil Action No. 08-10147-MLW (D. Mass. Feb. 15, 2012). However, that decision arose in the context of a settlement hearing, and the parties did not vigorously debate whether certification was proper. See id. at 18-19, 30-31. The ruling in that case was issued from the bench. Id. at 29-31.
9

Defendants’ Motion to Decertify Class (Docket # 112) is ALLOWED.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the class be and hereby is decertified.

September 18, 2012 DATE

/s/Rya W. Zobel RYA W. ZOBEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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 Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 1 of 23

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CECIL BARRETT, JR., CYNTHIA BARRETT, JEAN BLANCO GUERRIER, and ANGELIQUE M. BASTIEN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, vs.
H&R BLOCK, INC., H&R BLOCK BANK, a Federal Savings Bank, Member FDIC, OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION and H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORP. N/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.
Defendants.

C.A. NO. 08-10157 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, Cecil Barrett Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Blanco Guerrier, and Angelique M.

Bastien, (collectively “Plaintiffs") on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, by

their undersigned attorneys, allege as follows:

1.

This is a class action brought by Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other

similarly situated minority homeowners, against H&R Block, Inc., H&R Block Bank, and their

wholly-owned subsidiaries, Option One Mortgage Corporation and H&R Block Mortgage Corp.

(collectively "Defendants"), under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq.

(“ECOA”) and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs seek remedies for

themselves and the Class (defined in ¶83, below) for the discriminatory effects of the

Defendants' home financing policies and practices. 1

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 2 of 23

2.

As described below, the Defendants have established a specific, identifiable and

uniform credit pricing system, a component of which, referred to herein as the Discretionary

Pricing Policy, authorizes unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an

otherwise objective risk-based financing rate. In other words, after a finance rate acceptable to

the Defendants is determined by objective criteria (e.g., the individual’s credit history, credit

score, debt-to-income ratio and loan-to-value ratios), the Defendants' credit pricing policy

authorizes additional discretionary finance charges. These subjective, additional finance charges

have a widespread discriminatory impact on minority applicants for home mortgage loans, in

violation of ECOA and the FHA.

3.

The Defendants have established policies for retail and wholesale access to their

loan products that subject minority financing applicants to a significantly higher likelihood of

exposure to discretionary points and fees. These costs drive up the average cost of a mortgage

loan made by one of the defendants to minority homeowners.

4.

Plaintiffs seek damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement and

restitution of monies disparately obtained from minority borrowers.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

which confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in a civil action arising under federal law.

6.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) inasmuch as the

unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have been committed in this District, Defendants

regularly conduct business in this District, and the named Plaintiffs reside in this District.

2

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 3 of 23
PARTIES 7. Plaintiffs, Cecil Barrett Jr. and Cynthia Barrett, (the “Barretts”) are married minority homeowners who reside at 965 Morton Street, Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126. 8. Plaintiffs, Jean Blanco Guerrier and Angelique M. Bastien (“Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien”) are married minority homeowners who reside at 38 Himoor Circle, Randolph, Massachusetts 02368. 9. Defendant, H&R Block, Inc., offered a full range of home mortgage services through its direct and indirect subsidiaries, Option One Mortgage Corporation and H&R Block Mortgage Corporation. H&R Block, Inc. is headquartered at One H&R Block Way, Kansas City, Missouri 64105. 10. On or about May 1, 2006, Defendant, H&R Block Bank, a Federal Savings Bank, Member FDIC, commenced operations, at which time H&R Block, Inc. became a savings and loan holding company. H&R Block Bank offers a variety of residential mortgage loan products. 11. For the purposes of this complaint, H&R Block, Inc. and H&R Block Bank will be collectively referred to as “H&R Block.” 12. Defendant, Option One Mortgage Company (“Option One”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of H&R Block, Inc. Option One was primarily a wholesale mortgage lender and offered its services through its branches and a national network of mortgage brokers until December 2007, when H&R Block, Inc. terminated Option One’s loan origination business. Option One maintains a principal place of business at 3 Ada, Irvine, California 92618 and although it is not making new loans, continues its servicing and collection operations. 13. Defendant, H&R Block Mortgage Corp. ("H&R Block Mortgage") is a whollyowned subsidiary of H&R Block, Inc. H&R Block Mortgage was a retail mortgage lender
3

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 4 of 23
making direct-to-consumer loans nationwide until H&R Block, Inc. terminated H&R Block Mortgage’s loan origination business in 2007. H&R Block Mortgage maintains a principal place of business located at 6561 Irvine Center Drive, Irvine, California 92616.
14. According to the Massachusetts Secretary of State’s Office, H&R Block Mortgage Corp. changed its name to Option One Mortgage Services, Inc. on or about July 23, 2007.
FACTS A. MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORICALLY HAS
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST MINORITIES 15. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University’s 2005 study called “The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending,” mortgage lending discrimination today is subtle but pervasive, with minority consumers continuing to have less-than-equal access to loans at the best price and on the best terms that their credit history, income, and other individual financial considerations merit more than three decades after the enactment of national fair lending legislation. 16. The passage of civil rights legislation and fair lending laws in the 1960s and 1970s brought an end to the most virulent forms of overt racial discrimination in the housing markets, but throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mortgage lenders found more subtle ways to discriminate, including maintaining offices only in white neighborhoods and engaging in practices such as redlining (refusing to lend on properties in predominantly minority neighborhoods). 17. After such redlining practices were challenged in the 1990s, mortgage lenders changed tactics once again, making loans to minorities, but charging higher interest rates and
4

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 5 of 23
loan-related fees than they charged to similarly-situated white borrowers. Loan data that mortgage lenders must now compile and disclose under the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority borrowers and similarly-situated white borrowers.
18. The HMDA requires mortgage lenders to report information about the home loans they process each year. In 2005, lenders reported information on more than 30 million home loan applications pursuant to HMDA. In 1989, Congress required lenders to begin disclosing information about mortgage borrowers’ race and ethnicity. In 2004, concerned with potential racial discrimination in loan pricing and recognizing that racial or other types of discrimination can occur when loan officers and mortgage brokers have latitude in setting interest rates, the Federal Reserve Board began requiring lenders to also report information concerning rates, points, and fees, charged to borrowers on high-cost loans.
19. According to the Federal Reserve, both 2004 and 2005 HMDA data revealed that “Blacks and minority borrowers were more likely . . . to have received higher-priced loans than non-minority whites. . . . [which has] increased concern about the fairness of the lending process.” Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort and Glenn B. Canner, “Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, A124, A159 (revised Sept. 18, 2006) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf) (last viewed December 19, 2007).
20. HMDA data for 2004 reveals profound loan pricing disparities between minority borrowers and non-minority whites even after controlling for borrowers’ gender, income, property location, and loan amount. After accounting for those differences in the 2004 HMDA data, minority borrowers were still almost twice as likely to receive a higher-rate home loan as
5

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 6 of 23
non-minority whites. (http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Testimony-Ernst061306.pdf) (last viewed December 19, 2007). In a speech last year, the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Martin Gruenberg, discussed the 2004 HMDA data and observed that that data “clearly indicated” that minority borrowers are more likely to receive high-cost home loans than are non-minority whites. (http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2006/chairman/spoct1806.html) (last viewed December 19, 2007).
21. Likewise, HMDA data for 2005 shows that “for conventional home-purchase loans, the gross mean incidence of higher-priced lending was 54.7 percent for blacks and 17.2 percent for non-minority whites, a difference of 37.5 percentage points.” Avery, supra, at A159. The situation is similar for refinancing, where there is a difference of 28.3 percentage points between blacks and non-minority whites. Id. at A124, A159.
22. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) released a report entitled “The High Cost of Credit: Disparities in High-priced Refinanced Loans to Minority Homeowners in 125 American Cities,” dated September 27, 2005, that found that “[i]n every metropolitan area where at least 50 refinances were made to African-American homeowners, African-Americans were more likely to receive a high-cost loan than White homeowners.”
23. A growing number of research studies and investigations show that significant racial disparities still exist. California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More for the American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending” (March 2007) (http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/2007_Report-2005_HMDA.pdf) (last viewed December 19, 2007); Ross, “The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination”
6

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 7 of 23
(Revised July 2006) (Univ. of Connecticut, Working Paper 2005-19R) (http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2005-19r.pdf) (last viewed December 19, 2007).
24. Moreover, and importantly, research studies have suggested that borrowers’ credit profiles cannot fully explain why some borrowers, and not others, are saddled with higher cost loans. Researchers have raised “doubts that risk can adequately explain racial differences” in high-cost loans. Bradford, Center for Community Change, “Risk or Race? Racial Disparities and the Subprime Refinance Market” (May 2002) (http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/report/report/relfiles/ccc_0729_risk.pdf) (last viewed December 19, 2007). In other words, evidence “suggests that weak borrower credit profiles do not fully explain why some borrowers get stuck with higher-cost home loans.” California Reinvestment Coalition, et al., “Paying More for the American Dream: A Multi-State Analysis of Higher Cost Home Purchase Lending” (March 2007). B. THE DEFENDANTS’ DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY CONTINUES THE
PERVASIVE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING 25. Option One was one of the largest subprime mortgage-lending companies in the United States. Option One publicly promoted its home financing expertise by means of nationwide advertising campaigns. In its advertisements, Option One solicited persons to apply for financing with Option One either in one of its branch offices or through one of the mortgage brokers whom Option One had authorized to accept applications on its behalf. 26. H&R Block made home-mortgage loans directly to consumers through its subsidiary, H&R Block Mortgage. 27. Option One made home-mortgage loans - the majority of which were subprime loans - that were arranged by its loan officers and/or its network of mortgage brokers. Those
7

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 8 of 23
loans were made in reliance on Option One’s credit-granting policies and with the participation of H&R Block.
28. Due to H&R Block’s policies as to where to place its offices and how to market its products, minority borrowers were more likely than white borrowers to apply for credit from H&R Block through its sub-prime subsidiary Option One, or from an Option One authorized broker.
29. Because of the Discretionary Pricing Policy, loans obtained from Option One or Option One’s network of brokers are more expensive, on average, than loans obtained directly from H&R Block or H&R Block Mortgage.
30. Based on the latest available Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, minority homeowners who borrowed from Option One were more likely than whites to have received a high-APR loan.
31. A high-APR loan is a loan whose APR is at least three percentage points higher than the interest rate on U.S. Treasury securities of the same maturity, at the time the loan was made.
32. While credit differences may explain some part of the disparities in rate and terms, the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy accounts for a significant portion of the disparity.
33. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy is unrelated to a borrower’s objective credit characteristics such as credit history, credit score, debt-to-income ratio and loanto-value ratios and results in purely subjective charges that affect the rate otherwise available to borrowers.
8

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 9 of 23
34. Option One provided its loan officers and authorized mortgage brokers with substantial information about its loan programs, rates and credit criteria, as well as its policies for compensating its loan officers and mortgage brokers who arranged business for it.
35. Option One authorized certain mortgage brokers to accept applications on its behalf, to quote financing rates and terms (within the limitations set by H&R Block), to inform credit applicants of Option One’s financing options and to originate finance transactions using H&R Block’s forms, in accordance with its policies.
36. Option One provided its loan officers and brokers with credit applications, loan contracts and other required financing forms, as well as instructions on filling out such documents necessary to complete home mortgage transactions.
37. After a customer provided credit information to one of Option One’s loan officers or brokers, Option One computed a financing rate through an objective credit analysis that, in general, discerned the creditworthiness of the customer.
38. These credit analyses considered numerous risk-related variables of creditworthiness, including credit bureau histories, payment amounts, debt ratio, bankruptcies, automobile repossessions, charge-offs, prior foreclosures, payment histories, credit score, debtto-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios and other risk-related attributes or variables. On information and belief, Option One used these variables to determine a “mortgage score” for each credit applicant.
39. Based on these objective risk-related variables and the resulting mortgage score, Option One derived a risk-based financing rate at which it would provide a home mortgage, often called the “Par Rate.” Alternatively, experienced Option One loan officers and brokers
9

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 10 of 23
estimated the risk-related Par Rate by referring to the applicant’s credit bureau determined credit score.
40. Although Option One’s initial analysis applied objective criteria to calculate this risk-related Par Rate, Option One then authorized a subjective component in its credit pricing system —the Discretionary Pricing Policy — to impose additional non-risk charges. On information and belief, the applicable Par Rates and authorized discretionary charges were communicated by Option One to its loan officers and brokers via regularly published “rate sheets.” On information and belief, such rate sheets were published by Option One via intranet and internet.
41. The discretionary charges are paid by the customer as a component of the total finance charge (the “Contract APR”), without the homeowner knowing that a portion of their contract APR was a non-risk-related charge.
42. Loan officers and brokers had discretion, within the limits set by the Defendants, to impose discretionary mark-ups as additional points in interest – “a rate mark-up”, or as points and fees on the loan. When there was a rate mark-up, the Defendants received additional income.
43. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy, by design, caused persons with identical or similar credit scores to pay different amounts for the cost of credit. As a result of using a subjective pricing component that is designed to charge persons with the same credit profiles different amounts of finance charge, the objective qualities of the initial credit analysis used to calculate the Par Rate are undermined and the potential for race bias became inherent in the transaction.
10

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 11 of 23

44. The Discretionary Pricing Policy, although facially neutral (insofar as the

Defendants use the same or effectively the same policy for all credit applicants), had a

disproportionately adverse effect on minorities compared to similarly situated whites in that

minorities paid disparately more discretionary charges (both in frequency and amount) than

similarly situated whites. Statistical analysis of discretionary charges imposed on minority and

white customers of other mortgage companies that use credit pricing systems structured like that

of Option One has revealed that minorities, after controlling for credit risk, are substantially

more likely than similarly situated whites to pay such charges.

45.

Loan officers and brokers are agents of Option One for the purpose of setting

credit price, which always was set based on the Defendants’ policy.

46. The disparate impact suffered by minorities is a direct result of the Defendants’

Discretionary Pricing Policy in that the Defendants designed, disseminated, controlled,

implemented and profited from the Discretionary Pricing Policy creating the disparate impact.

47. The Defendants have a non-delegable duty to ensure that their mortgage financing

structure and policies do not have a disparate impact on legally protected classes, such as

minorities. Despite having such a non-delegable duty, the Defendants chose to use, a

commission-driven, subjective pricing policy that they knew or should have known had a

significant and pervasive adverse impact on minority homeowners.

48. The disparities between the terms of the Defendants’ transactions involving

minority homeowners and the terms involving whites homeowners cannot be a product of chance

and cannot be explained by factors unrelated to race, but, instead, are the direct causal result of

the use of the discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy.

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Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 12 of 23
49. There are no legitimate business reasons justifying the Defendants’ discriminatory Discretionary Pricing Policy that could not be achieved by a policy that has no discriminatory impact or a greatly reduced discriminatory impact. C. THE DEFENDANTS’ DISCRETIONARY PRICING POLICY DISCRIMATED
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS Facts Relating To The Barretts
50. Plaintiffs, Cecil Barrett Jr. and Cynthia Barrett reside at 965 Morton Street, Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126.
51. On or about January 16, 2004, the Barretts purchased their Mattapan home for approximately $277,000.00.
52. On August 19, 2005, the Barretts refinanced their home loan with Option One. 53. The loan, (Loan No. 161044209) was a 30-year, adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 8.653%. The loan amount was $416,000.00. According to the note, the loan had a five-year fixed rate followed by a 25-year variable rate feature and was an interest only loan. 54. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, the Barretts paid $21,641.08 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $17,500 broker fee to Money-Wise Solutions (“Money-Wise”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $620.00 processing fee to Money-Wise, a $650 underwriting fee to Option One and a $50.00 funding fee to Option One. 55. True and correct copies of Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161044209 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, respectively. 56. On April 6, 2006, the Barretts refinanced their Option One loan with a second Option One loan.
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Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 13 of 23
57. The second loan (Loan No. 161048049), which has a loan amount of $500,000, is an adjustable rate loan with a balloon feature, providing for a final payment of $344,113.90. The APR of the second loan was 10.536%.
58. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, the Barretts paid $17,066.32 in settlement charges in connection with the second loan, including, a $3,500 broker fee to Logic Mortgage & Finance (“Logic”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $595.00 processing fee to Logic, an $850 underwriting fee to Option One, a $50.00 funding fee to Option One and a $7,500 loan origination fee to Option One.
59. True and correct copies of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161048049 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4, respectively.
60. According to credit reports available to Option One, Mr. Barrett had an average credit score of 681 and Ms. Barrett had an average credit score of 665 as of January 20, 2006.
61. At the time of the transactions, the Barretts had credit scores that would have qualified with many lenders for a mortgage in the prime-market. Instead, the Barretts received mortgages at sub-prime rates and on sub-prime terms.
62. On information and belief, unbeknownst to the Barretts, the contract APR on the mortgage loans were actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
63. On information and belief, the Barretts were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
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64. On information and belief, the Barretts were charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons. Facts Relating To Mr. Guerrier And Ms. Bastien
65. Plaintiffs, Jean Blanco Guerrier and Angelique Bastien reside at 38 Himoor Circle, Randolph, Massachusetts 02368 with their teenaged son and daughter.
66. On or about April 28, 2006, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien purchased their Randolph home for approximately $390,000 with Option One as the lender.
67. The loan, (Loan No. 161048878) is a 30-year adjustable rate loan with a disclosed APR of 10.844%. The loan amount was $360,000. According to the note, the loan had a twoyear fixed rate followed by a 28-year variable rate feature.
68. Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien first discovered that the loan had an adjustable rate at the closing, but felt pressured to close because they had sold their previous home on the same day.
69. According to the HUD-One Settlement Statement, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien paid $13,403.23 in settlement charges in connection with the loan, including, a $6,040.00 broker fee to LEHI Mortgage Services, Inc. (“LEHI”), an Option One authorized mortgage broker, a $570.00 processing fee to LEHI, a $295.00 application fee to LEHI, an $850 underwriting fee to Option One, a $50.00 funding fee to Option One and a $900 loan discount fee to Option One.
70. True and correct copies of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure and HUD-One Settlement Statement provided in connection with Loan No. 161048878 are attached hereto and labeled Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6, respectively.
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71. At the time of the transaction, Mr. Guerrier had a credit score that would have qualified with many lenders for a mortgage in the prime-market. Instead, Mr. Guerrier received a mortgage at sub-prime rates and on sub-prime terms.
72. On information and belief, unbeknownst to Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien, the contract APR on the mortgage loans were actually a combination of an objective, risk-based calculation and a totally subjective, discretionary component added pursuant to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
73. On information and belief, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy.
74. On information and belief, Mr. Guerrier and Ms. Bastien were charged a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related credit charges than similarly situated white persons.
ALLEGATIONS OF NON-DISCLOSURE – FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (TOLLING)
75. The causes of action alleged herein accrued upon discovery of the discriminatory impact of the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy. Plaintiffs and members of the Class did not discover and could not have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence the factual bases of those claims. Indeed, the data forming the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims only recently was released and analyzed in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, because the Defendants knowingly and actively concealed the facts alleged herein, Plaintiffs and the Class have been kept ignorant of vital information essential to the pursuit of these claims, without any fault or lack of diligence on their part.
76. Commission-driven, discretionary pricing systems, such as those used in the mortgage industry and structurally similar to the system utilized by the Defendants, have been
15

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 16 of 23
found to produce significant discriminatory effects. Knowledge concerning the significant and pervasive discriminatory impact of such commission-driven, discretionary credit pricing systems has been widely circulated within the financing industry for several years, as a result of numerous actions by the United States Department of Justice and federal regulatory agencies. See, Facts, section A supra. Thus, the Defendants knew or should have known that their credit pricing system causes minority homeowners to pay more for mortgage financing than the amounts paid by white customers with identical or effectively identical credit scores.
77. Despite the fact that the Defendants knew or should have known of the discriminatory effect of their Discretionary Pricing Policy, none of the loan documents inform the customer that its finance rates ultimately are subjective and not based solely on risk-related characteristics.
78. The Defendants were and are under a continuous non-delegable duty to disclose to the Plaintiffs and Class material information regarding their loans. The fact that certain loan terms are subjective and discretionary is information a reasonable borrower would consider important when deciding whether to accept the loan and on what terms. The fact that the subjective and discretionary components result in a disparate impact on minority is also information a reasonable minority borrower would consider important.
79. The Defendants failed to disclose this information, however, and Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably relied upon the Defendants’ representation that terms of their loans would be based on their creditworthiness. The Defendants’ financing documents falsely fostered the image that the Defendants offer competitive rates that objectively are set. However, the Defendants never disclosed to its credit applicants the fact that: (a) its credit rates are subjective and can vary significantly among persons with identical credit profiles; and (b) it had authorized
16

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 17 of 23
and provided a financial incentive to mortgage brokers to subjectively increase the credit rate above the rate otherwise available to the homeowner.
80. Due to the inherent nature of the Defendants’ undisclosed Discretionary Pricing Policy and due to the Defendants’ deception and concealment, the Defendants’ minority customers had no way of knowing or suspecting: (a) the existence of the Defendants’ subjective credit pricing policy; (b) that they were charged additional subjective credit charges; (c) that they were charged a disproportionately greater amount for their cost of credit than similarly situated white persons, and or (d) that any part of the loan price was negotiable. Thus, the Defendants are estopped from relying on any statutes of limitation in their defenses of this action.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS 81. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 82. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 83. This class action is brought pursuant to ECOA and the FHA by the individual named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all minority consumers (the “Class”) who obtained an Option One home mortgage loan in the United States between January 1, 2001 and the date of judgment in this action (the “Class Period”) and who were subject to the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy pursuant to which they paid discretionary points, fees or interest mark-ups in connection with their loan. The term “minority” refers to blacks and Hispanics as defined by federal law.
17

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84. The phrase "Discretionary Pricing Policy" refers to the Defendants’ policy of authorizing its loan officers and brokers to impose subjective, discretionary charges and interest mark-ups that are included in the finance charge loans they originate.
85. Plaintiffs do not know the exact size or identities of the proposed Class, since such information is in the exclusive control of the Defendants. Plaintiffs believe that the Class encompasses many thousands or tens of thousands of individuals who are dispersed geographically throughout the United States. Therefore, the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
86. All members of the Class have been subject to and affected by the same Discretionary Pricing Policy. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These questions include, but are not limited to the following:
a. the nature, scope and operations of Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy; b. whether H&R Block, Inc., H&R Block Bank, Option One, and H&R Block
Mortgage are creditors under the ECOA because, for example, in the ordinary course of its business they participate in the decision as to whether or not to extend credit to consumers; c. whether the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy is a facially neutral credit pricing system that has effected racial discrimination in violation of ECOA; d. whether there are statistically significant disparities between the amount of the discretionary charges imposed on minority persons and the amount of the discretionary charges imposed on white persons that are unrelated to creditworthiness;
18

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 19 of 23
e. whether any legitimate business reason for the Discretionary Pricing Policy can be achieved by a credit pricing system less discriminatory in its impact;
f. whether the Court can enter declaratory and injunctive relief; and g. the proper measure of disgorgement or damages. 87. The claims of the individual named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class and do not conflict with the interests of any other members of the Class in that both the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were subject to the same Discretionary Pricing Policy that disproportionately has affected minority homeowners. 88. The individual named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. They are committed to the vigorous prosecution of the Class’ claims and have retained attorneys who are qualified to pursue this litigation and have experience in class actions – in particular, consumer protection and discrimination actions. 89. A class action is superior to other methods for the fast and efficient adjudication of this controversy. A class action regarding the issues in this case does not create any problems of manageability. 90. In the alternative, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the case, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
COUNT I DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
91. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 92. The Defendants are creditors as defined in ECOA, and in the ordinary course of its business, participated in the decision of whether or not to extend credit to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representatives herein, and all prospective Class members.
19

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 20 of 23
93. The Defendants designed, disseminated, controlled, implemented and profited from the discriminatory policy and practice alleged herein — the Discretionary Pricing Policy — which has had a disparate economic impact on minorities compared to similarly situated whites.
94. All actions taken by Option One’s loan officers and authorized brokers were in accordance with the specific authority granted to them by Option One and were in furtherance of the Defendants’ policies and practices.
95. As a result of the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy, the Defendants have collected more in finance charges from minority borrowers than from similarly situated white persons, for reasons unrelated to credit risk.
96. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
97. Plaintiffs and prospective class members are aggrieved persons as defined in ECOA by virtue of having been subject to the Defendants’ discriminatory, Discretionary Pricing Policy.
COUNT II DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 98. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 99. The Defendants engaged in residential real estate-related transactions with respect to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representatives herein, and all prospective Class members. 100. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy has resulted in discrimination with respect to the Plaintiffs, the proposed Class representatives herein, and all prospective members of the Class.
20

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 21 of 23
101. As a result of the Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy, the Defendants have collected more in finance charges from minorities than from similarly situated white persons, for reasons unrelated to credit risk.
102. The Defendants’ Discretionary Pricing Policy violates the Fair Housing Act and constitutes actionable discrimination on the basis of race.
103. Plaintiffs and the Class are aggrieved persons as defined in FHA by virtue of having been subject to the Defendants’ discriminatory, Discretionary Pricing Policy.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the following relief: a. Certify this case as a class action and certify the named Plaintiffs herein to be adequate class representatives and their counsel to be class counsel; b. Enter a judgment, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613, declaring the acts and practices of Defendants complained of herein to be in violation of ECOA and the FHA; c. Grant a permanent or final injunction, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613(c), enjoining the Defendants, and the Defendants' agents and employees, affiliates and subsidiaries, from continuing to discriminate against Plaintiffs and the members of the Class because of their race through further use of the Discretionary Pricing Policy or any other nonrisk-related discretionary pricing policy employed by the Defendants; d. Order the Defendants, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613(c), to adopt and enforce a policy that requires appropriate training of the Defendants' employees and its brokers and correspondent lenders to prevent discrimination;
21

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 22 of 23
e. Order the Defendants, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c) and/or 42 U.S.C. §3613(c), to monitor and/or audit the racial pattern of its financings to ensure the cessation of discriminatory effects in its home mortgage transactions;
f. Order disgorgement, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1691e(c), of all disproportionate nonrisk charges imposed on minorities by the Defendants' Discretionary Pricing Policy; and order the equitable distribution of such charges to all appropriate class members; together with other relief for unjust enrichment;
g. Order actual and punitive damages and/or restitution to the Plaintiffs and the Class pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c);
h. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) and/or 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c); and
i. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court finds necessary and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Respectfully submitted, On behalf of the Plaintiffs,
/s/ Gary Klein Gary Klein Gary Klein (BBO # 560769) Shennan Kavanagh (BBO # 655174) RODDY KLEIN & RYAN 727 Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02111-2810 Telephone: (617) 357-5500 ext. 15 22

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 1 Filed 02/01/08 Page 23 of 23

Dated: February 1, 2008

Facsimile: (617) 357-5030
Stuart Rossman (BBO # 430640) Charles Delbaum (BBO # 543225) NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER 77 Summer Street, 10th Flr. Boston, MA 02141 Telephone: (617) 542-8010 Facsimile: (617) 542-8028
Thomas M. Sobol (BBO # 471770) Gregory Matthews (BBO # 653316) HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP One Main Street, 4th Floor Boston, MA 02142 Telephone: (617) 475-1950 Facsimile: (617) 482-3003
Marvin A. Miller Matthew E. VanTine Lori A. Fanning MILLER LAW LLC 115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910 Chicago, IL 60603 Telephone: (312) 332-3400
Samuel H. Rudman Robert M. Rothman Mark S. Reich LERACH COUGHLIN STOIA GELLER RUDMAN & ROBBINS LLP 58 South Service Road, Suite 200 Melville, NY 11747 Telephone: (631) 367-7100 Facsimile: (631) 367-1173

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 Case: 12-C80a3se3 1:0D8o-ccvu-m10e1n5t:71-R7 WZPaDgeo:c1umenDt a1t3e1FilFeidle: d020/20/70/82/01133 PagEent1ryoIfD2: 5710170

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 12-8033

CECIL BARRETT, JR., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Petitioners, ______________________
ANGELIQUE BASTIEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Defendants, Respondents. ________________________
H & R BLOCK, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants. ________________________
Before
Howard, Stahl and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT
Entered: February 7, 2013
Plaintiff-Petitioners, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), seek leave from this court to appeal the district court's recent decertification of a class in a suit brought pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619. The requirements for interlocutory review of class action determinations are stringent, and, in our view, they have not been met here. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293-94 (1st Cir. 2000) (setting out factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow review pursuant

Case: 12-C80a3se3 1:0D8o-ccvu-m10e1n5t:71-R7 WZPaDgeo:c2umenDt a1t3e1FilFeidle: d020/20/70/82/01133 PagEent2ryoIfD2: 5710170
to Rule 23(f)). Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal is DENIED. By the Court: /s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk.
cc: Kevin M. Costello Wendy J. Harrison Shennan Kavanagh Gary Klein Stuart T. Rossman Samuel Howard Rudman Kathleen Marie Guilfoyle Elizabeth Lemond McKeen

 
 Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 132 Filed 08/21/13 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CECIL BARRETT, JR., CYNTHIA BARRETT, JEAN BLANCO GUERRIER, JACQUELINE GRISSETT, CRAIG GRISSETT, STEVEN PARHAM, BETTY HOFFMAN, EDWARD HOFFMAN, DORIS MURRAY, JOSLYN DAY and KEISHA CHAVERS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v.
OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION and H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORP. N/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.
Defendants.

C.A. NO. 08-10157-RWZ

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Blanco Guerrier, Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day and Keisha Chavers (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and defendants Option One Mortgage Corporation and H&R Block Mortgage Corporation (collectively, “Defendants,”), by and through their counsel, hereby stipulate to the dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ claims in this case, with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees.

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 132 Filed 08/21/13 Page 2 of 3

Dated: August 21, 2013

Respectfully submitted,
On behalf of Defendants:
/s/ Elizabeth Lemond McKeen Elizabeth Lemond McKeen emckeen@omm.com Danielle N. Oakley doakley@omm.com O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 610 Newport Center Dr., 17th Floor Newport Beach, CA 92660-6429 Tel: (949) 760-9600
On behalf of Plaintiffs:
/s/ Shennan Kavanagh Shennan Kavanagh kavanagh@kkcllp.com Gary Klein klein@kkcllp.com KLEIN KAVANAGH COSTELLO, LLP 85 Merrimac Street Boston, MA 02114 Tel: (617) 357-5500

2

Case 1:08-cv-10157-RWZ Document 132 Filed 08/21/13 Page 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Elizabeth Lemond McKeen, hereby certify that this document, filed through the ECF system, will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing and paper copies will be sent to any non-registered participants by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on August 21, 2013.
/s/ Elizabeth Lemond McKeen
3

 
 Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 1 of 25
United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:08−cv−10157−RWZ

Barrett, Jr. et al v. HRBlock, Inc., et al Assigned to: Judge Rya W. Zobel Demand: $9,999,000 related Case: 1:08−cv−11225−RWZ Cause: 42:405 Fair Housing Act
Plaintiff
Cecil Barrett, Jr.

Date Filed: 02/01/2008 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Andrew S. Friedman Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman &Balint, P.C. 2901 North Central Avenue Suite 100 Phoenix, AZ 85012 602−274−1100 Fax: 602−274−1199 Email: afriedman@bffb.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles M. Delbaum National Consumer Law Center 7 Winthrop Square 4th Floor Boston, MA 02110 617−542−8010 Fax: 617−542−8033 Email: cdelbaum@nclc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary E. Klein Klein Kavanagh Costello, LLP 85 Merrimac Street, 4th Floor Boston, MA 02114 617−357−5500 ext. 15 Fax: 617−357−5030 Email: klein@kkcllp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jeffrey L. Taren Kinoy, Taren &Geraghty P.C. 224 S.Michigan Ave Suite 300 Chicago, Il 60604 312 663 5210 Fax: 6663 Email: ktgtaren@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stuart T. Rossman National Consumer Law Center 7 Winthrop Square 4th Floor Boston, MA 02110 617−542−8010 Fax: 617−542−8028

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 2 of 25

Email: srossman@nclc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison Bonnett Fairbourn, Friedman &Balint, P.C. 2325 East Camelback Road Suite 300 Phoenix, AZ 85016 602−274−1100 Fax: 602−274−1199 Email: wharrison@bffb.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Costello Klein Kavanagh Costello, LLP 85 Merrimac Street, 4th Flr. Boston, MA 02114 617−357−5500 Fax: 617−357−5030 Email: costello@kkcllp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh Klein Kavanagh Costello, LLP 85 Merrimac Street, 4th Flr. Boston, MA 02114 617 357 5500 Fax: 617 357 5030 Email: kavanagh@kkcllp.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cynthia Barrett

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles M. Delbaum (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Costello (See above for address)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 3 of 25

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jean Guerrier

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles M. Delbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Costello (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Angelique Bastien TERMINATED: 01/13/2010

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles M. Delbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 4 of 25

Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin Costello (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jacqueline Grissett

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles M. Delbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Klein (See above for address)

Kevin Costello (See above for address)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 5 of 25

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Craig Grissett

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles M. Delbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Klein (See above for address)

Kevin Costello (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Steven Parham

represented by Andrew S. Friedman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles M. Delbaum (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 6 of 25

Stuart T. Rossman (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wendy J. Harrison (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Klein (See above for address)

Kevin Costello (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Betty Hoffman

represented by Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Edward Hoffman

represented by Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Doris Murray

represented by Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 7 of 25

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Joslyn Day

represented by Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Keisha Chavers

represented by Gary E. Klein (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jeffrey L. Taren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
HRBlock, Inc., TERMINATED: 02/06/2009

represented by Brian P Brooks O'Melveny &Myers LLP 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, DC 20006 202−383−5300 TERMINATED: 06/14/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kyra A. Grundeman O'Melveny &Myers LLP 1625 Eye Street NW \ Washington, DC 20006 202−383−5300 Fax: 202−383−5414 Email: kgrundeman@omm.com TERMINATED: 06/04/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 8 of 25

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles K. Mone Pierce, Davis &Perritano, LLP 90 Canal Street, 4th Floor Boston, MA 02114 617−350−0950 Fax: 617−350−7760 Email: cmone@piercedavis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathleen M. Guilfoyle Campbell, Campbell, Edwards &Conroy, PC One Constitution Plaza Third Floor Boston, MA 02129 617−241−3109 Fax: 617−241−5115 Email: kguilfoyle@campbell−trial−lawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
HRBlock Bank TERMINATED: 07/18/2008

represented by Brian P Brooks (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyra A. Grundeman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/04/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles K. Mone (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Option One Mortgage Corporation

represented by Aaron M. Rofkahr O'Melveny &&Myers LLP Two Embarcadero Center 28th Floor San Francisco, MA 94111 415−984−8700 Email: arofkahr@omm.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian P Brooks (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth L. McKeen O'Melveny &&Myers LLP 610 Newport Center Drive 17th Floor Newport Beach, CA 92660

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 9 of 25

949−760−9600 Email: emckeen@omm.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyra A. Grundeman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/04/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Randall W. Edwards O'Melveny &Myers LLC 2 Embarcadero Center Suite 2800 San Francisco, CA 94111 415−984−8700 Email: redwards@omm.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bimal Patel O'Melveny &Meyers LLP 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, DC 20006 202−383−5300 Email: bpatel@omm.com TERMINATED: 07/06/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian D. Boyle O'Melveny &Myers, LLP 1625 Eye Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006 202−383−5300 Fax: 202−383−5414 Email: bboyle@omm.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles K. Mone (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle N. Oakley O'Melveny &Myers LLP 610 Newport Center Drive Suite 1700 Newport Beach, CA 92660 949 823 6900 Email: doakley@omm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathleen M. Guilfoyle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
HRBlock Mortgage Corporation n/k/a Option One Mortgage Service Inc.

represented by Aaron M. Rofkahr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 10 of 25

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian P Brooks (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/14/2011 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elizabeth L. McKeen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyra A. Grundeman (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/04/2012 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Randall W. Edwards (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bimal Patel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/06/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian D. Boyle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles K. Mone (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle N. Oakley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathleen M. Guilfoyle (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sand Canyon Corporation

represented by Elizabeth L. McKeen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bimal Patel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/06/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian D. Boyle (See above for address)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 11 of 25

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle N. Oakley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant ADA Services Corportaion

represented by Elizabeth L. McKeen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bimal Patel (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/06/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian D. Boyle (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Danielle N. Oakley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Interested Party
Boston Bar Association Lawyers Committe

represented by Michael E. Aleo Lesser, Newman &Nasser, LLP 39 Main Street Northampton, MA 01060 413−584−7331 Fax: 617−482−4392 Email: aleo@lnn−law.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/01/2008 02/01/2008 02/01/2008
02/01/2008 02/12/2008

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against all defendants Filing fee: $ 350, receipt number 01010000000001834601, filed by Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits 1−6, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Case Assignment. Judge Rya W. Zobel assigned to case. If the trial Judge issues an Order of Reference of any matter in this case to a Magistrate Judge, the matter will be transmitted to Magistrate Judge Collings (Edge, Eugenia) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
2 Summons Issued as to HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. Counsel receiving this notice electronically should download this summons, complete one for each defendant and serve it in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 and LR 4.1. Summons will be mailed to plaintiff(s) not receiving notice electronically for completion of service. (Edge, Eugenia) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
Remark: Summons did not attached properly. Paper summons issued and mailed to Atty. Klein. (Edge, Eugenia) (Entered: 02/01/2008)
3 NOTICE by Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien Of Filing First Amended Class Action Complaint (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 02/12/2008)

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02/12/2008
03/04/2008 03/04/2008 03/04/2008 03/11/2008 03/14/2008 03/14/2008
03/17/2008
03/27/2008 03/27/2008 03/27/2008 03/27/2008 03/27/2008 04/08/2008
04/10/2008 04/11/2008
05/01/2008

4 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, filed by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits 1−12)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 02/12/2008)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed HRBlock, Inc., served on 2/22/2008, answer due 3/13/2008. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
6 SUMMONS Returned Executed Option One Mortgage Corporation served on 2/22/2008, answer due 3/13/2008. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
7 SUMMONS Returned Executed HRBlock Mortgage Corporation served on 2/26/2008, answer due 3/17/2008. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Kevin Costello on behalf of Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien (Costello, Kevin) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles K. Mone on behalf of HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation (Mone, Charles) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
10 Stipulation for an Extension of Time to 3/27/08 to Respond to the Amended Complaint by HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation.(Mone, Charles) Modified on 3/17/2008 (Johnson, Jay). (Entered: 03/14/2008)
Motions terminated: 10 MOTION for Extension of Time to 3/27/08 to Response to Complaint Stipulation for an Extension of Time to Respond to the Amended Complaint filed by HRBlock, Inc.,, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Bank, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process by HRBlock, Inc.,.(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 03/27/2008)
12 MEMORANDUM in Support re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process filed by HRBlock, Inc.,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 03/27/2008)
13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation.(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 03/27/2008)
14 MEMORANDUM in Support re 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Mone, Charles) (Entered: 03/27/2008)
15 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by HRBlock, Inc.,, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Mone, Charles) (Entered: 03/27/2008)
16 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to 5/1/08 to To File Responses To Defendants' Motions To Dismiss by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien.(Costello, Kevin) (Entered: 04/08/2008)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 16 Motion for Extension of Time to 5/1/08 (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
17 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Andrew S. Friedman and Wendy J. Harrison Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 01010000000001924335. by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
18 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 13 of 25

05/01/2008 05/02/2008 05/02/2008
05/02/2008 05/06/2008 05/19/2008 05/29/2008 05/29/2008 06/02/2008
06/02/2008 06/02/2008

Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
19 Opposition re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process filed by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit McClay)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 05/01/2008)
ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint, 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process : Motion Hearing set for 5/20/2008 03:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 17 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Andrew S. Friedman for Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier and Angelique Bastien, Wendy J. Harrison for Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier and Angelique Bastien. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Forms and then scroll down to CM/ECF Forms. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
20 NOTICE of Appearance by Shennan Alexandra Kavanagh on behalf of Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien (Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 05/02/2008)
ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint, 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process : Motion Hearing reset for 6/12/2008 02:30 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 05/06/2008)
21 DECLARATION Of Gary Klein For The Purpose Of Submitting Supplemental Authority Directly Relevant To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 05/19/2008)
22 Assented to MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss by Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
23 Assented to MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by HRBlock, Inc.,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit HRBlock, Inc.'s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Bret G. Wilson)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 22 Motion for Leave to File; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document.; granting 23 Motion for Leave to File; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
24 REPLY to Response to 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint (Leave to File Granted June 2, 2008) filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Mone, Charles) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
25 REPLY to Response to 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process (Leave to File Granted June 2, 2008) filed by HRBlock, Inc.,. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration of Bret G. Wilson)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 06/02/2008)

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06/09/2008 06/10/2008 06/10/2008 06/11/2008 06/11/2008 06/11/2008
06/12/2008
06/19/2008 06/30/2008 06/30/2008 06/30/2008 07/03/2008

26 MOTION for Leave to File Plaintiffs' Sur−Reply by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Sur−Reply, # 2 Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Sur−Reply, # 3 Exhibit 2 to Plaintiffs' Sur−Reply)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/09/2008)
27 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Brian P. Brooks by HRBlock, Inc.,, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Attorney Brian P. Brooks in Support of Defendants' Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
28 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Kyra A. Grundeman by HRBlock, Inc.,, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Attorney Kyra A. Grundeman in Support of Defendants' Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 06/10/2008)
Filing fee/payment: $ 50.00, receipt number BST004082 for 27 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Brian P. Brooks (Russo, Patricia) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
Filing fee/payment: $ 50.00, receipt number BST004083 for 28 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Kyra A. Grundeman (Russo, Patricia) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 27 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Brian P Brooks for HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Kyra A. Grundeman for HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Forms and then scroll down to CM/ECF Forms.; granting 28 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Brian P Brooks for HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Kyra A. Grundeman for HRBlock, Inc.,, HRBlock Bank, Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Forms and then scroll down to CM/ECF Forms. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 06/11/2008)
Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Rya W. Zobel: Motion Hearing held on 6/12/2008 re 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process filed by HRBlock, Inc.,, 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. Judge hears counsel and takes matter under advisement; (Court Reporter: Catherine Handel.)(Attorneys present: Klein, Costello, Kavanagh, Mone, Brooks &Grundeman) (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 06/12/2008)
29 NOTICE of Appearance by Kathleen M. Guilfoyle on behalf of HRBlock, Inc.,, Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation (Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 06/19/2008)
30 Letter/request (non−motion) from Michael Aleo regarding Amicus Brief. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 07/01/2008)
31 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss by Boston Bar Association. (Attachments: # 1 Amicus Curiae Brief)(Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 07/01/2008)
32 MEMORANDUM in Support re 31 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Boston Bar Association. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 07/01/2008)
33 MOTION for Leave to File Corrected Copies of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief and the Amicus Brief by Boston Bar Association. (Attachments: # 1 Corrected Amicus Brief) (Additional attachment(s)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 15 of 25

07/08/2008
07/08/2008 07/14/2008 07/15/2008 07/17/2008 07/18/2008 08/06/2008 09/08/2008 10/17/2008
10/17/2008 10/17/2008

added on 7/7/2008: # 2 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief) (Johnson, Jay). Modified on 7/7/2008 (Johnson, Jay). (Entered: 07/07/2008)
34 Transcript of Motion to Dismiss Hearing held on June 12, 2008, before Judge Zobel. Court Reporter: Catherine A. Handel at 617/261−0555. The Transcript may be purchased through the Court Reporter, viewed at the public terminal, or viewed through PACER after it is released. Redaction Request due 7/28/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/5/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/3/2008. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 07/08/2008)
35 NOTICE is hereby given that an official transcript of a proceeding has been filed by the court reporter in the above−captioned matter. Counsel are referred to the Court's Transcript Redaction Policy, a copy of which is attached to this entry.. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 07/08/2008)
36 Opposition re 31 MOTION for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 07/14/2008)
37 Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered on service for H &R Block Bank.(Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 07/15/2008)
38 NOTICE by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien Of Voluntary Dismissal Of Defendant HRBlock Bank Pursuant To Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
Notice of correction to docket made by Court staff. Correction: #38 Notice (other) of Voluntary Dismissal corrected because: WRONG EVENT. Document is a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal for which there is an event. E−mail sent describing the fix. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 07/18/2008)
39 DECLARATION Of Gary Klein For The Purpose Of Submitting Supplemental Authority Relevant To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
40 DECLARATION Of Gary Klein For The Purpose Of Submitting Supplemental Authority Relevant To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 26 Motion for Leave to File; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document.; granting 31 Motion for Leave to File; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document.; granting 33 Motion for Leave to File; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
41 AMICUS BRIEF filed by Boston Bar Association Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. (Aleo, Michael) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
42 SUR−REPLY to Motion re 13 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 10/17/2008)

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11/17/2008
11/21/2008 02/06/2009 02/06/2009 02/23/2009 02/25/2009 02/25/2009 02/27/2009 03/04/2009 03/05/2009 03/05/2009 03/26/2009 03/26/2009
04/09/2009
04/10/2009

43 DECLARATION of Gary Klein for the Purpose of Submitting Supplemental Authority Directly Relevant to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Part 1, # 2 Exhibit 1 − Part 2, # 3 Exhibit 1 − Part 3)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 11/17/2008)
44 DECLARATION Of Kyra Grundeman For The Purpose Of Submitting Supplemental Authority Relevant To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Grundeman, Kyra) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
45 Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying 13 Motion to Dismiss (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
46 NOTICE of Scheduling Conference Scheduling Conference set for 3/4/2009 03:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 02/06/2009)
47 Defendants' ANSWER to 4 Amended Complaint, by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation.(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 02/23/2009)
48 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation.(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
49 JOINT SUBMISSION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 02/25/2009)
50 CERTIFICATION pursuant to Local Rule 16.1 by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 02/27/2009)
Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Rya W. Zobel: Scheduling Conference held on 3/4/2009. motions 11/20/09; oppositions 12/18/09; 5 page reply 1/5/10; hearing 1/20/10 at 2:00 p.m. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 03/09/2009)
51 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles M. Delbaum on behalf of Cynthia Barrett (Delbaum, Charles) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
52 NOTICE of Appearance by Stuart T. Rossman on behalf of Cynthia Barrett (Rossman, Stuart) (Entered: 03/05/2009)
53 MOTION to Amend 45 Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, to Include Certification for Interlocutory Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(B) by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation.(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
54 MEMORANDUM in Support re 53 MOTION to Amend 45 Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, to Include Certification for Interlocutory Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(B) MOTION to Amend 45 Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, to Include Certification for Interlocutory Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(B) filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
55 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 53 MOTION to Amend 45 Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, to Include Certification for Interlocutory Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(B) MOTION to Amend 45 Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction, to Include Certification for Interlocutory Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(B) filed by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: endorsedORDER entered denying 53 Motion to Amend (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 04/10/2009)

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07/09/2009 07/09/2009 07/29/2009 08/05/2009
08/07/2009 08/07/2009 09/01/2009 09/01/2009 09/03/2009 09/03/2009 09/08/2009
10/13/2009 10/13/2009

56 STIPULATION Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) Permitting Filing of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
57 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants, filed by Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits 1 − 20)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
58 ANSWER to 57 Amended Complaint, by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation.(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
59 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order and to Set Remaining Deadlines Contained in the Parties' Joint Statement re 49 Joint submission, Scheduling Conference by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Keisha Chavers, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 08/05/2009)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: endorsedORDER entered granting 59 Motion to extend scheduling order. The court adopts the schedule contained in Exhibit A attached hereto except that the hearing on class certification will be on 5/25/10 at 2:00 p.m. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Class certification Hearing set for 5/25/2010 02:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
60 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Aaron M. Rofkahr by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Aaron Rofkahr)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
61 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Randall W. Edwards by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Randall W. Edwards)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 09/01/2009)
Filing fee/payment: $ 50.00, receipt number BST012562 for 61 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Randall W. Edwards (Russo, Patricia) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
Filing fee/payment: $ 50.00, receipt number BST012563 for 60 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Aaron M. Rofkahr (Russo, Patricia) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 60 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Randall W. Edwards for Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Aaron M. Rofkahr for Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. granting 61 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Randall W. Edwards for Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Aaron M. Rofkahr for Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Case Information, then Electronic Filing (CM/ECF) and go to the CM/ECF Registration Form. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 09/08/2009)
62 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Elizabeth L. McKeen by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Attorney Elizabeth L. McKeen)(Mone, Charles) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
Filing fee/payment: $ 50.00, receipt number BST013262 for 62 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Elizabeth L. McKeen (Russo, Patricia) (Entered: 10/13/2009)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 18 of 25

10/28/2009
11/04/2009
11/18/2009
11/25/2009 12/01/2009 12/01/2009 12/15/2009
12/15/2009 01/11/2010 01/11/2010 01/12/2010 01/13/2010 03/12/2010

Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 62 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Elizabeth L. McKeen for Sand Canyon Corporation, ADA Services Corportaion, Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Case Information, then Electronic Filing (CM/ECF) and go to the CM/ECF Registration Form. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 10/28/2009)
63 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Jeffrey L. Taren Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 01010000000002653085. by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Keisha Chavers, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 11/04/2009)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Electronic ORDER entered granting 63 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice; Added Jeffrey L. Taren for Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Keisha Chavers, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier and Angelique Bastien. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Case Information, then Electronic Filing (CM/ECF) and go to the CM/ECF Registration Form. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
64 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time on Scheduling Order by Option One Mortgage Corporation, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: endorsed ORDER entered granting 64 Motion for Extension of Time. And the new schedule, approved. (RWZ) Amended Pleadings due by 3/31/2010. Motions due by 4/22/2010; oppositions 5/21/10; reply 6/10/10; class certification hearing set for 6/24/10 at 2:00 p.m. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 12/01/2009)
Set/Reset Hearings: Class certification Hearing set for 6/24/2010 02:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 12/01/2009)
65 Stipulated Protective Order (Stipulated) by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Keisha Chavers, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien.(Klein, Gary) Modified on 12/15/2009 to reflect the filing of a stipulation. The motion for protective order has been terminated.(Johnson, Jay). (Entered: 12/15/2009)
Motion terminated as document filed is a stipulation: 65 MOTION for Protective Order (Stipulated) MOTION for Protective Order (Stipulated) filed by Jean Guerrier, Cynthia Barrett, Edward Hoffman, Angelique Bastien, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Jacqueline Grissett, Betty Hoffman, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Keisha Chavers. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 12/15/2009)
66 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to 3/11/10 to Extend Scheduling Order to Analyze New Data by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Keisha Chavers, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier, Angelique Bastien.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: endorsed ORDER entered granting 66 Motion for Extension of Time. This is the last extension; Motion Hearing reset for 8/24/2010 02:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
67 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff Angelique M. Bastien's Claims Without Prejudice (Unopposed) by Angelique Bastien.(Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 01/12/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: endorsed ORDER entered granting 67 Motion to Dismiss as to Angelique Bastien's claims without prejudice and so ordered. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 01/13/2010)
68 Assented to MOTION for Extension of Time to March 22, 2010 to Submit Plaintiffs' Expert Report for Class Certification by Jacqueline Grissett, Craig

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 19 of 25

03/16/2010 03/22/2010 03/23/2010
05/24/2010 06/16/2010 06/18/2010
06/21/2010 06/21/2010 06/21/2010 06/21/2010

Grissett, Steven Parham, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Joslyn Day, Keisha Chavers, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Cynthia Barrett, Jean Guerrier.(Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 03/12/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: endorsed ORDER entered granting 68 Motion for Extension of Time; plaintiff 3/22; defendant 5/4; (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
69 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Danielle N. Oakley Filing fee: $ 50, receipt number 0101−2831987 by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Attorney Oakley)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 03/22/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 69 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Added Danielle N. Oakley for ADA Services Corportaion,Danielle N. Oakley for HRBlock Mortgage Corporation,Danielle N. Oakley for Option One Mortgage Corporation,Danielle N. Oakley for Sand Canyon Corporation. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Case Information, then Electronic Filing (CM/ECF) and go to the CM/ECF Registration Form. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 03/23/2010)
70 STIPULATION Regarding Deadline to Exchange Rebuttal Expert Reports for Class Certification by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 05/24/2010)
71 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (Unopposed) by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 71 Motion for Leave to File Document ; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 06/18/2010)
72 MOTION to Certify Class by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
73 MOTION to Seal Document Pursuant to Protective Order by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
74 MEMORANDUM in Support re 72 MOTION to Certify Class (Submitted Under Seal Pursuant to Protective Order) filed by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
75 DECLARATION re 72 MOTION to Certify Class (of Shennan Kavanagh) by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Deposition Transcript of Vivian Olson (filed under seal), # 2 Exhibit B − Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of Dale Sugimoto (filed under seal), # 3 Exhibit C − Class Certification Rebuttal Report of Patricia McCoy (filed under seal), # 4 Exhibit D − Class Certification Report of Ian Ayres (filed under seal), # 5 Exhibit E − Rebuttal Report of Darius Palia (filed under seal), # 6 Exhibit F − Reply Class Certification Report of Ian Ayres (filed under seal), # 7 Exhibit G − Deposition Transcript of Darius Palia (filed under seal), # 8 Exhibit H − Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of Maritime Mortgage Corp. (filed under seal), # 9 Exhibit I − Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of People's Choice Mortgage (filed under seal), # 10

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 20 of 25

06/21/2010
06/21/2010
06/24/2010 06/28/2010 06/30/2010
07/12/2010 07/12/2010 07/13/2010
07/15/2010 07/16/2010 07/19/2010 07/21/2010 07/21/2010

Exhibit J − Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of Contour Mortgage (filed under seal), # 11 Exhibit K − Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of NE Moves Mortgage (filed under seal), # 12 Exhibit L − Excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of First Eastern Mortgage Corp. (filed under seal))(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
76 DECLARATION re 72 MOTION to Certify Class (of Gary Klein) by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Roddy Klein &Ryan Resume, # 2 Exhibit B − Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman &Balint, P.C., # 3 Exhibit National Consumer Law Center Resume, # 4 Exhibit D − Robbins Geller Rudman &Dowd, LLP Resume)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
77 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE pursuant to LR 5.2 by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham re 76 Declaration, 72 MOTION to Certify Class, 73 MOTION to Seal Document Pursuant to Protective Order, 75 Declaration,,,,, 74 Memorandum in Support of Motion,. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 06/21/2010)
78 RESPONSE to Motion re 73 MOTION to Seal Document Pursuant to Protective Order Notice of Non−Opposition filed by ADA Services Corportaion, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Sand Canyon Corporation. (McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/24/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ENDORSED ORDER entered granting 73 Motion to Seal Document (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 06/29/2010)
79 SEALED DOCUMENT: Memorandum in Support of 72 Motion to Certify Class (Attachments:(Exhibits A−L to 75 the Declaration of Shennan Kavanagh) # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L) Modified on 6/30/2010 (Johnson, Jay). (Entered: 06/30/2010)
80 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Bimal Patel Filing fee: $ 50, receipt number 0101−2981031 by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
81 Joint MOTION to Amend Briefing Schedule and, Joint MOTION to Continue Hearing Date on Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification to September 16, 2010 at 2:30 p.m. ( Responses due by 7/26/2010) by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation.(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 07/12/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 80 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Added Bimal Patel. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Case Information, then Electronic Filing (CM/ECF) and go to the CM/ECF Registration Form. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 07/13/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ENDORSED ORDER entered granting 81 Motion to Amend; granting 81 Motion to Continue(Hearing reset for 9/16/2010 02:30 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel.) (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
82 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Boston Bar Association. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Aleo, Michael) (Entered: 07/16/2010)
83 Opposition re 82 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief filed by ADA Services Corportaion, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Sand Canyon Corporation. (Oakley, Danielle) (Entered: 07/19/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ENDORSED ORDER entered denying 82 Motion for Leave to File Document (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
84 Joint MOTION to Substitute Documents Filed Under Seal by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett,

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 21 of 25

08/02/2010 08/03/2010 08/03/2010
08/04/2010 08/04/2010 08/04/2010
08/04/2010 08/04/2010 08/04/2010 08/05/2010
08/23/2010

Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 07/21/2010)
85 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by ADA Services Corportaion, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Sand Canyon Corporation.(Oakley, Danielle) (Entered: 08/02/2010)
86 Assented to MOTION for Leave to File Documents Under Seal Pursuant to Protective Order by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation.(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/03/2010)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ENDORSED ORDER entered granting 85 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages ; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document.; granting 86 Motion for Leave to File Document ; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 08/04/2010)
87 MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 72 MOTION to Certify Class REDACTED −− Leave to File Granted on August 4, 2010 filed by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/04/2010)
88 AFFIDAVIT of Dale Sugimoto in Opposition re 72 MOTION to Certify Class filed by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/04/2010)
89 AFFIDAVIT of Elizabeth L. McKeen in Opposition re 72 MOTION to Certify Class filed by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AA, # 2 Exhibit BB, # 3 Exhibit CC −− REDACTED, # 4 Exhibit DD, # 5 Exhibit EE, # 6 Exhibit FF −− REDACTED, # 7 Exhibit GG −− REDACTED, # 8 Exhibit HH −− FILED UNDER SEAL, # 9 Exhibit II, # 10 Exhibit JJ, # 11 Exhibit KK, # 12 Exhibit LL, # 13 Exhibit MM −− REDACTED, # 14 Exhibit NN −− REDACTED, # 15 Exhibit OO, # 16 Exhibit PP, # 17 Exhibit QQ −− REDACTED, # 18 Exhibit RR, # 19 Exhibit SS −− REDACTED, # 20 Exhibit TT −− REDACTED)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/04/2010)
90 Amended MOTION for Leave to File Substitute Documents for Those Filed Under Seal by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Rossman, Stuart) (Entered: 08/04/2010)
91 (Sealed Document) MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 72 MOTION to Certify Class filed by ADA Services Corportaion, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Sand Canyon Corporation. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 08/05/2010)
92 (SEALED DOCUMENT): Declaration of Dale Sugimoto in Support of 91 Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−5)(Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 08/05/2010)
93 SEALED DOCUMENT: Declaration of Elizabeth L. McKeen in Support of 91 Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit AA, # 2 Exhibit BB, # 3 Exhibit CC, # 4 Exhibit DD, # 5 Exhibit EE, # 6 Exhibit FF, # 7 Exhibit GG, # 8 Exhibit HH, # 9 Exhibit II, # 10 Exhibit JJ, # 11 Exhibit KK, # 12 Exhibit MM, # 13 Exhibit NN, # 14 Exhibit OO, # 15 Exhibit PP, # 16 Exhibit QQ, # 17 Exhibit RR, # 18 Exhibit SS, # 19 Exhibit TT)(Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 08/05/2010)
94 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (Unopposed) by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 08/23/2010)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 22 of 25

08/23/2010 08/24/2010 08/25/2010 08/25/2010 09/16/2010
09/17/2010 09/24/2010
09/29/2010

95 DECLARATION of Shennan Kavanagh in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I)(Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 08/23/2010)
96 RESPONSE to Motion re 94 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (Unopposed) MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages (Unopposed) filed by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 08/24/2010)
97 DECLARATION re 96 Response to Motion, by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − [Proposed] Reply)(Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 08/25/2010)
98 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE pursuant to LR 5.2 by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham re 97 Declaration,. (Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 08/25/2010)
ELECTRONIC Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Rya W. Zobel: granting 84 Motion ; granting 90 Motion for Leave to File Document ; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document.; granting 94 Motion for Leave to File Document as to the 2nd version ; Counsel using the Electronic Case Filing System should now file the document for which leave to file has been granted in accordance with the CM/ECF Administrative Procedures. Counsel must include − Leave to file granted on (date of order)− in the caption of the document.; Motion Hearing held on 9/16/2010 re 72 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Jean Guerrier, Cynthia Barrett, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Jacqueline Grissett, Betty Hoffman, Joslyn Day, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Keisha Chavers. (Court Reporter: Catherine Handel at 617−261−0555.)(Attorneys present: various) (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 09/16/2010)
99 REPLY to Response to 72 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix 1 − GreenPoint Decision)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
100 NOTICE by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham re 79 Sealed document, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Class Certification [Redacted], # 2 Exhibit 2 − Deposition Transcript of Vivian Olson, taken on October 14, 2009 [Redacted], # 3 Exhibit 3 − cited excerpts of the Deposition Transcript of Dale Sugimoto, taken on October 15, 2009 [Redacted], # 4 Exhibit 4 − Class Certification Rebuttal Report of Patricia McCoy [Redacted], # 5 Exhibit 5 − Class Certification Report of Ian Ayres [Redacted], # 6 Exhibit 6 − Rebuttal Report of Darius Palia [Unredacted], # 7 Exhibit 7 − Reply Class Certification Report of Ian Ayres [Unredacted], # 8 Exhibit 8 − Deposition Transcript of Darius Palia, taken on June 1, 2010 [Unredacted], # 9 Exhibit 9 − cited excerpts of the Deposition taken pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of Maritime Mortgage Corporation (James Brennan, Deponent), taken on March 23, 2010 [Unredacted], # 10 Exhibit 10 − cited Excerpts of the Deposition taken pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of Peoples Choice Mortgage (David Fasano, Deponent) [Unredacted], # 11 Exhibit 11 − cited excerpts of the Deposition taken pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of NE Moves Mortgage, LLC (William Mullin, Deponent) [Unredacted])(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 09/24/2010)
101 Transcript of Motions Hearing held on September 16, 2010, before Judge Rya W. Zobel. The Transcript may be purchased through the Court Reporter, viewed at the public terminal, or viewed through PACER after it is released. Court Reporter

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 23 of 25

09/29/2010 03/21/2011 04/10/2011 04/10/2011 04/10/2011
04/14/2011 06/10/2011 08/26/2011 09/13/2011 09/14/2011 10/06/2011

Name and Contact Information: Catherine Handel at 617−261−0555 Redaction Request due 10/20/2010. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/1/2010. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/28/2010. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
102 NOTICE is hereby given that an official transcript of a proceeding has been filed by the court reporter in the above−captioned matter. Counsel are referred to the Court's Transcript Redaction Policy, a copy of which is attached to this entry.. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
103 Judge Rya W. Zobel: Memorandum of Decision entered granting 72 Motion to Certify Class, subject to limitation by time. Any counsel who wishes to serve as class counsel shall file the requisite motions and documentations to support his/her request by 4/11/2011. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 03/21/2011)
104 MOTION to Appoint Counsel (Unopposed) by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 04/10/2011)
105 MEMORANDUM in Support re 104 MOTION to Appoint Counsel (Unopposed) filed by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 04/10/2011)
106 DECLARATION re 104 MOTION to Appoint Counsel (Unopposed) of Shennan Kavanagh by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. Roddy Klein Ryan Resume, # 2 Exhibit B. Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman &Balint, P.C. Resume, # 3 Exhibit C. The Law Offices of Al Hofeld, Jr., LLC Resume, # 4 Exhibit D. The National Consumer Law Center Resume, # 5 Exhibit E. Miller Law LLC Resume, # 6 Exhibit F. Robbins Geller Rudman &Dowd LLP Resume, # 7 Exhibit G. Chavez &Gertler LLP Resume, # 8 Exhibit H. Kinoy, Taren &Geraghty P.C. Resume)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 04/10/2011)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ENDORSED ORDER entered granting 104 Motion to Appoint Co−Lead Class Counsel and Class Counsel (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 04/15/2011)
107 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by Elizabeth L. McKeen re: withdrawal of Brian P. Brooks as counsel for Defendants Option One Mortgage Corporation and HRBlock Mortgage Corporation (McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/10/2011)
108 NOTICE by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham of Judgment of the United States Supreme Court for the First Circuit on Defendants' Motion for Leave to Appeal (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Klein, Gary) (Entered: 08/26/2011)
109 STIPULATION and Proposed Order Regarding Briefing Schedule on Parties' Plan for Motions Related to Class Certification by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 09/13/2011)
110 Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered. re 109 Stipulation, filed by Jean Guerrier, Cynthia Barrett, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Jacqueline Grissett, Betty Hoffman, Joslyn Day, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Keisha Chavers, (Hearing set for 11/30/2011 02:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel.)(Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 09/15/2011)
111 MOTION for Clarification of Class Period by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham.(Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 10/06/2011)

Case: 1:08-cv-10157 As of: 07/30/2014 10:33 AM EDT 24 of 25

10/06/2011 10/06/2011
10/17/2011 11/03/2011 11/03/2011
11/22/2011 11/22/2011 11/22/2011
11/28/2011 11/30/2011

112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and by Option One Mortgage Corporation.(McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/06/2011)
113 MEMORANDUM in Support re 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Danielle N. Oakley in Support of Defendants' Motion to Decertify Class, # 2 Exhibits A−G to Oakley Declaration, # 3 Exhibits H−L to Oakley Declaration, # 4 Exhibits M−P to Oakley Declaration, # 5 Exhibit Q to Oakley Declaration, # 6 Exhibit R to Oakley Declaration, # 7 Exhibit S to Oakley Declaration)(McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/06/2011)
114 Notice of Supplemental Authorities re 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
115 Opposition re 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and filed by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 11/03/2011)
116 Opposition re 111 MOTION for Clarification of Class Period filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Danielle N. Oakley, # 2 Exhibit A to Oakley Declaration, # 3 Exhibit B to Oakley Declaration, # 4 Exhibit C to Oakley Declaration, # 5 Exhibit D to Oakley Declaration, # 6 Exhibit E to Oakley Declaration, # 7 Exhibit F to Oakley Declaration, # 8 Exhibit G to Oakley Declaration)(Oakley, Danielle) (Main Document 116 replaced on 11/4/2011) (Johnson, Jay). (Entered: 11/03/2011)
117 Assented to MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice for admission of Brian Boyle Filing fee: $ 50, receipt number 0101−3683217 by ADA Services Corportaion, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Sand Canyon Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Brian Boyle)(Guilfoyle, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
118 REPLY to Response to 111 MOTION for Clarification of Class Period filed by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Kavanagh, Shennan) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
119 REPLY to Response to 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and filed by ADA Services Corportaion, HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Sand Canyon Corporation. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Danielle N. Oakley In Support Of Defendants' Reply In Support of Motion to Decertify Class, # 2 Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Danielle N. Oakley, # 3 Exhibit 2 to Declaration of Danielle N. Oakley)(McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/22/2011)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 117 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Added Brian Boyle. Attorneys admitted Pro Hac Vice must register for electronic filing. To register go to the Court website at www.mad.uscourts.gov. Select Case Information, then Electronic Filing (CM/ECF) and go to the CM/ECF Registration Form. (Johnson, Jay) (Entered: 11/28/2011)
ELECTRONIC Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Rya W. Zobel: Motion Hearing held on 11/30/2011 re 111 MOTION for Clarification of Class Period filed by Jean Guerrier, Cynthia Barrett, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Jacqueline Grissett, Betty Hoffman, Joslyn Day, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Keisha Chavers, 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and filed by Option One Mortgage Corporation. (Court Reporter: Catherine Handel at 617−261−0555.)(Attorneys present: various) (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 12/01/2011)

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11/08/2012 12/04/2012 02/08/2013 08/21/2013

120 NOTICE of Change of Address or Firm Name by Gary E. Klein (Klein, Gary) (Entered: 01/06/2012)
121 Notice of Supplemental Authorities re: 115 Opposition to 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp and Option One Mortgage Corporation. filed by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Costello, Kevin) Modified on 3/9/2012 (Johnson, Jay). (Entered: 03/09/2012)
122 Notice of Supplemental Authorities re 112 MOTION to Decertify Class filed jointly by defendants HRBlock Mortgage Corp. and by Option One Mortgage Corporation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A to Notice, # 2 Exhibit B to Notice, # 3 Exhibit C to Notice)(McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/27/2012)
123 NOTICE by Cynthia Barrett, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Keisha Chavers, Joslyn Day, Craig Grissett, Jacqueline Grissett, Jean Guerrier, Betty Hoffman, Doris Murray, Steven Parham re 121 Notice of Supplemental Authorities, of Filing Document Referred to in Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authorities (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Costello, Kevin) (Entered: 04/09/2012)
124 Transcript of Hearing on Class Certification held on November 30, 2011, before Judge Rya W. Zobel. The Transcript may be purchased through the Court Reporter, viewed at the public terminal, or viewed through PACER after it is released. Court Reporter Name and Contact Information: Catherine Handel at 617−261−0555 Redaction Request due 5/25/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/4/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/2/2012. (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
NOTICE is hereby given that an official transcript of a proceeding has been filed by the court reporter in the above−captioned matter. Counsel are referred to the Court's Transcript Redaction Policy, available on the court website at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/attorneys/general−info.htm (Scalfani, Deborah) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
125 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by Elizabeth L. McKeen re: withdrawal of attorney Kyra A. Grundeman (McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/01/2012)
126 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance by Elizabeth L. McKeen re: withdrawal of attorney Bimal Patel (McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/03/2012)
127 NOTICE of Change of Address or Firm Name by Wendy J. Harrison (Harrison, Wendy) (Entered: 08/28/2012)
128 Judge Rya W. Zobel: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered granting 112 Motion to Decertify Class (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 09/18/2012)
Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered. Motions terminated: 111 MOTION for Clarification of Class Period filed by Jean Guerrier, Cynthia Barrett, Edward Hoffman, Doris Murray, Jacqueline Grissett, Betty Hoffman, Joslyn Day, Cecil Barrett, Jr., Craig Grissett, Steven Parham, Keisha Chavers. Denied as moot;(Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 09/24/2012)
129 ELECTRONIC NOTICE of Hearing. Status Conference set for 12/4/2012 02:00 PM in Courtroom 12 before Judge Rya W. Zobel. (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 11/08/2012)
130 ELECTRONIC Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge Rya W. Zobel: Status Conference held on 12/4/2012. Case is still over the COA (Court Reporter: No Court Reporter Used.)(Attorneys present: Kavanagh &Guilfoyle) (Urso, Lisa) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
131 USCA Judgment. Accordingly, the petition for leave to appeal is DENIED. Judgment issued in the USCA 2/7/2013 (Ramos, Jeanette) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
132 STIPULATION of Dismissal With Prejudice by HRBlock Mortgage Corporation, Option One Mortgage Corporation. (McKeen, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/21/2013)