Case: 1:15-cv-02407 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/19/15 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN VERGARA, CARLOS RUIZ, and JOSE GARCIA,
Plaintiffs, v. OFFICER J. V. DAL PONTE, #18823, OFFICER B. SRISUTCH, #7575, OFFICER P. J. NIGRO, #670, UNKNOWN OFFICERS, and the CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT NOW COME the Plaintiffs, John Vergara (hereinafter “PLAINTIFF VERGARA”), Carlos Ruiz (hereinafter “PLAINTIFF RUIZ”), and Jose Garcia (hereinafter “PLAINTIFF GARCIA”), by and through their attorney, Blake W. Horwitz, Esq., of The Blake Horwitz Law Firm, Ltd., complaining of Officer J. V. Dal Ponte, #18823, Officer B. Srisutch, #7575, Officer P.J. Nigro, #670, and unknown individual officers (collectively “DEFENDANT OFFICERS”), and the City of Chicago (hereinafter “DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO”), and state as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This is an action for damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

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2. Jurisdiction for PLAINTIFFS’ federal claims is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a).
3. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the claims arose in this district as alleged below.
PARTIES 4. PLAINTIFF VERGARA is a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States. 5. PLAINTIFF RUIZ is a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States. 6. PLAINTIFF GARCIA is a resident of the State of Illinois and a citizen of the United States. 7. DEFENDANT OFFICERS are duly appointed and sworn police officers of DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO. 8. At all times material to this Complaint, DEFENDANT OFFICERS were acting in the course and scope of their employment, by ordinance and/or regulation of DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO, and under the color of state law. 9. DEFENDANT OFFICERS are sued in their individual capacities. 10. DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO is a municipal corporation that is duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois. 11. DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO is the employer and principal of DEFENDANT OFFICERS.

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FACTS 12. On or about September 29, 2011, PLAINTIFFS were at Paseo Boricua Grocery and Deli, which is located at 2706 West Division, Chicago, Illinois 60622. 13. In the early afternoon, DEFENDANT OFFICERS entered the restaurant. 14. DEFENDANT OFFICERS were wearing masks. 15. DEFENDANT OFFICERS were armed. 16. DEFENDANT OFFICERS ordered PLAINTIFF VERGARA and PLAINTIFF GARCIA to put their hands on the counter. 17. DEFENDANT OFFICERS ordered PLAINTIFF RUIZ to lie down on the ground. 18. DEFENDANT OFFICERS searched PLAINTIFFS and took their personal belongings. 19. DEFENDANT OFFICERS handcuffed PLAINTIFFS. 20. PLAINTIFFS did not violate any law immediately prior to or during their detainment. 21. DEFENDANT OFFICERS did not have an arrest warrant to stop or detain PLAINTIFF VERGARA. 22. DEFENDANT OFFICERS did not have an arrest warrant to stop or detain PLAINTIFF RUIZ. 23. DEFENDANT OFFICERS did not have an arrest warrant to stop or detain PLAINTIFF GARCIA.

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24. None of the DEFENDANT OFFICERS witnessed PLAINTIFF VERGARA violate any law within seven (7) days prior to his handcuffing on September, 29, 2011.
25. None of the DEFENDANT OFFICERS witnessed PLAINTIFF RUIZ violate any law within seven (7) days prior to his handcuffing on September, 29, 2011.
26. None of the DEFENDANT OFFICERS witnessed PLAINTIFF GARCIA violate any law within seven (7) days prior to his handcuffing on September, 29, 2011.
27. DEFENDANT OFFICERS did not have any other legal justification to stop or detain PLAINTIFFS.
28. DEFENDANT OFFICERS placed PLAINTIFFS in a police vehicle. 29. DEFENDANT OFFICERS took PLAINTIFFS to a police warehouse at the intersection of South Homan Street and West Filmore Avenue (hereinafter “Homan Square”). 30. DEFENDANT OFFICERS detained PLAINTIFFS against their will at Homan Square for eight to nine hours. 31. DEFENDANT OFFICERS placed PLAINTIFFS in a cell with no sink or toilet. 32. DEFENDANT OFFICERS handcuffed PLAINTIFFS to a bar on the cell’s wall.

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33. At no time did DEFENDANT OFFICERS read PLAINTIFFS their Miranda rights.
34. DEFENDANT OFFICERS ignored multiple requests by PLAINTIFFS to speak with an attorney.
35. DEFENDANT OFFICERS threatened to charge PLAINTIFF VERGARA with a crime if he did not provide DEFENDANT OFFICERS with information.
36. DEFENDANT OFFICERS threatened to charge PLAINTIFF RUIZ with a crime if he did not provide DEFENDANT OFFICERS with information.
37. DEFENDANT OFFICERS threatened to charge PLAINTIFF GARCIA with a crime if he did not provide DEFENDANT OFFICERS with information.
38. DEFENDANT OFFICERS attempted to coerce false confessions out of PLANTIFFS.
39. DEFENDANT OFFICERS ignored multiple requests by PLAINTIFFS to notify their families of their whereabouts.
40. DEFENDANT OFFICERS ignored multiple requests by PLAINTIFFS for food, water, and access to a restroom.
41. DEFENDANT OFFICERS ignored PLAINTIFF RUIZ’S statements about his medical problems and his requests for medicine.
42. Hours into the detainment, PLAINTIFF VERGARA specifically asked to speak with civil rights attorney Blake Horwitz.

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43. The DEFENDANT OFFICER(S) then asked PLAINTIFF VERGARA if he intended to tell Mr. Horwitz about his experience at Homan Square.
44. The DEFENDANT OFFICER(S) threatened PLAINTIFF VERGARA by saying, “If you’re going to tell Blake, I’m going to pin a case on you and everybody else in here.”
45. DEFENDANT OFFFICERS offered to release PLAINTIFFS if they agreed not to disclose their experience at Homan Square to an attorney and/or Blake Horwitz.
46. PLAINTIFFS were intimidated by DEFENDANT OFFICERS’ threats. In order to be released and to avoid criminal charges, PLAINTIFFS agreed not to reveal information about or bring lawsuits regarding their time at Homan Square.
47. After forcing PLAINTIFFS to promise that they would not tell attorneys about their detainment, DEFENDANT OFFICERS released PLAINTIFFS.
48. DEFENDANT OFFICERS returned PLAINTIFFS to the Paseo Boricua Grocery and Deli.
49. In the weeks following PLAINTIFFS’ release, DEFENDANT OFFICERS drove by the Paseo Boricua Grocery and Deli on a daily basis. DEFENDANT OFFICERS yelled from their police cars that they were watching PLAINTIFFS.
50. DEFENDANT OFFICERS took active steps to prevent PLAINTIFFS from filing a lawsuit regarding their detainment at Homan Square by threatening

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to charge PLAINTIFFS with crimes if they called an attorney, by driving PLAINTIFFS back to the restaurant upon their release, and by physically intimidating PLAINTIFFS.
51. Until publication of details about Homan Square in The Guardian newspaper, PLAINTIFFS relied on the DEFENDANT OFFICERS’ threats and did not speak to attorneys about their experience at Homan Square because they were afraid of police and concerned for the safety of their families.
COUNT I False Arrest Claim Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and the U.S. Constitution
(DEFENDANT OFFICERS) 52. PLAINTIFFS re-allege paragraphs 1-51 as set forth above. 53. The actions of DEFENDANT OFFICERS in detaining PLAINTIFFS without any legal justification violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court enter Judgment in their favor and against DEFENDANT OFFICERS, and award PLAINTIFFS compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT II Excessive Force Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983
(DEFENDANT OFFICERS) 54. PLAINTIFFS re-allege paragraphs 1-51 as set forth above.

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55. The actions of DEFENDANT OFFICERS violated PLAINTIFFS’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court enter Judgment in their favor and against DEFENDANT OFFICERS, and award PLAINTIFFS compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT III Failure to Intervene Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(DEFENDANT OFFICERS) 56. PLAINTIFFS re-allege paragraphs 1-51 as set forth above. 57. DEFENDANT OFFICERS present for the physical abuse of PLAINTIFFS had the opportunity, but failed to intervene and prevent such abuse. 58. The actions of DEFENDANT OFFICERS violated PLAINTIFFS’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force. WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court enter Judgment in their favor and against DEFENDANT OFFICERS, and award PLAINTIFFS compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT IV Illegal Search of Person Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983
(DEFENDANT OFFICERS) 59. PLAINTIFFS re-allege paragraphs 1-51 as set forth above.

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60. The actions of DEFENDANT OFFICERS in searching PLAINTIFFS without any legal justification violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court enter Judgment in their favor and against DEFENDANT OFFICERS, and award PLAINTIFFS compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT V Civil Conspiracy Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983
(DEFENDANT OFFICERS) 61. PLAINTIFF re-alleges paragraphs 1-51 as set forth above. 62. DEFENDANT OFFICERS acted in concert pursuant to an agreement to deprive PLAINTIFFS of their constitutional rights. 63. DEFENDANT OFFICERS knowingly and intentionally schemed and worked together in a common plan to falsely arrest, illegally detain, and physically abuse PLAINTIFFS. 64. DEFENDANT OFFICERS then conspired to cover up the false arrest, illegal detention, and physical abuse of PLAINTIFFS. WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court enter Judgment in their favor and against DEFENDANT OFFICERS, and award PLAINTIFFS compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.

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COUNT VI Monell Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983
(DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO) 65. PLAINTIFFS re-allege paragraphs 1-64 as set forth above. 66. The Constitutional violations described in this Complaint were effectuated by DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO through its customs, practices, and policies (hereinafter referred to as the “City’s Conduct”). The City’s Conduct was the moving force behind the injuries sustained by the PLAINTIFFS and other innocent citizens. 67. Chicago police officers, for at least five years prior to September 29, 2011, arrested innocent civilians absent probable cause, and brought said individuals to Homan Square. At that location, officers interrogated, threatened and presented false evidence to civilians. 68. The innocent civilians brought to Homan Square were physically seized and essentially kidnapped by unidentified officers, placed in police vehicles, and driven to a then-secret location. 69. Once at the location, the innocent civilians were secretly detained for extended periods of time without notice to their families. 70. The detention of these innocent civilians was absent probable cause. The interrogation of these civilians occurred while they were handcuffed to a bar on the cell’s wall. These civilians were not read their Miranda rights.

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71. The false evidence presented to the civilians was in the form of a threat exemplified as “If you do not tell me what I want to know, I will put these drugs on you.”
72. The innocent civilians brought to Homan Square were prohibited from using the restroom, eating, and/or speaking to an attorney.
73. DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO’S conduct, though the actions of its policy makers, were to train its officers: to seize, transport, and secretly detain citizens at Homan Square; to detain citizens for extended periods of time while handcuffed to a bar on a cell wall; to interrogate citizens when they had not been read their Miranda rights; to deny citizens access to attorneys; to attempt to coerce false confessions out of citizens; to deny citizens the ability to tell their families of their whereabouts; to refuse citizens access to a restroom, food, or water; and to threaten citizens that they would be charged with crimes if they did not provide information.
74. These policies and practices were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and proximately caused PLAINTIFFS to suffer damages.
75. Alternatively, the City’s Conduct was to act like the proverbial ostrich and, though aware of misconduct at Homan Square, allowed the misconduct to continue to occur in such a manner as to permit officers: to seize, transport, and secretly detain citizens at Homan Square; to detain citizens for extended periods of time while handcuffed to a bar on a cell wall; to interrogate citizens when they had

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not been read their Miranda rights; to deny citizens access to attorneys; to attempt to coerce false confessions out of citizens; to deny citizens the ability to tell their families of their whereabouts; to refuse citizens access to a restroom, food, or water; and to threaten citizens that they would be charged with crimes if they did not provide information.
76. The City’s Conduct, as alleged above, has gone unchecked and has been allowed to exist in the City of Chicago for a significant period of time, so much so, that police officers for DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO recognize that they will not be punished for committing said acts and that, in fact, said acts are either permitted or quietly consented to by superior officers of the Chicago Police Department in order to permit said conduct to re-occur.
77. These customs, as set forth above, were maintained and implemented unreasonably by official policy makers of the DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO, with deliberate indifference to an obvious need, and in a manner that shocks the conscience, and were the direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts committed by DEFENDANT OFFICERS and the injured suffered by PLAINTIFFS.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court enter Judgment in their favor and against DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO, and award PLAINTIFFS compensatory and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees, and any other relief that this Court deems just and equitable.

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COUNT VII Indemnification Claim Pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102
(DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO) 78. PLAINTIFFS re-allege paragraphs 1-77 as set forth above. 79. The acts of the DEFENDANT OFFICERS described in the above claims were willful and wanton, and committed within the scope of their employment. 80. Pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102, DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO is liable for any judgments in this case arising from the actions of DEFENDANT OFFICERS. WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court order DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO to indemnify DEFENDANT OFFICERS for any judgment entered in this case arising from the actions of DEFENDANT OFFICERS.
JURY DEMAND PLAINTIFF demands trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Blake Horwitz, Esq. One of the Attorneys for PLAINTIFFS Blake Horwitz, Esq. The Blake Horwitz Law Firm, Ltd. 111 W. Washington, Suite 1611 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Telephone: (312) 676-2100

 
 Case: 1:15-cv-02407 Document #: 47 Filed: 01/31/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:193

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN VERGARA, CARLOS RUIZ,

)

and JOSE GARCIA,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

OFFICER J.V. DAL PONTE, et al.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 15-cv-02407 Judge Andrea R. Wood

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs John Vergara, Carlos Ruiz, and Jose Garcia claim that they were arrested

without legal justification and then illegally detained at a police warehouse known as Homan

Square by Chicago police officers John Dal Ponte, Boonserm Srisutch, and Perry J. Nigro

(together, the “Defendant Officers”), as well as several other unknown police officers. Plaintiffs

have sued the Defendant Officers and the City of Chicago (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (Dkt.

No. 22), in which they contend, first, that all counts against them are time-barred because the

Complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired; and second, that Plaintiffs have

failed to plead a plausible claim against the City of Chicago under Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Because the Court finds that the Complaint was filed after

the statute of limitations had expired and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to

these circumstances, the Motion is granted.

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BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the Complaint and accepted as true for purposes of the Motion. 1 On or about September 29, 2011, Plaintiffs were at a grocery store when the Defendant Officers entered the store armed and wearing masks. (Compl. ¶¶ 12–15, Dkt. No. 1.) The Defendant Officers searched and handcuffed Plaintiffs without an arrest warrant to stop or detain them, even though Plaintiffs had not violated any law. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 20–23.) The Defendant Officers then placed Plaintiffs in a police vehicle and took them to Homan Square. (Id. ¶¶ 28– 29.) There, Defendants Officers detained Plaintiffs for eight or nine hours, during which time the Defendant Officers did not read Plaintiffs their rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and ignored Plaintiffs’ multiple requests to speak with an attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 33–34.) The Defendant Officers also attempted to coerce false confessions from Plaintiffs and threatened to charge them with crimes if they did not provide the Defendant Officers with information. (Id. ¶¶ 35–38.) During his detention, Vergara asked to speak with a civil rights attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) In response, the Defendant Officers threatened to “pin a case” on Plaintiffs if Vergara spoke to any lawyer. (Id. ¶¶ 43–44.) Plaintiffs’ ordeal eventually ended when the Defendant Officers offered to release Plaintiffs, but only if they agreed not to disclose their experience at Homan Square. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs agreed and were released. (Id. ¶ 47.) On a daily basis over the weeks following Plaintiffs’ release, the Defendant Officers drove by the grocery store where the Defendant Officers originally arrested Plaintiffs and yelled from their police cars that they “were watching” Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 49.) Still, out of fear of the
1 For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court takes all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2001).
2

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police, Plaintiffs did not speak to attorneys about their experience until The Guardian published an article about Homan Square.2 (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiffs subsequently filed the present lawsuit on March 19, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint asserts claims against the Defendant Officers for false arrest, use of excessive force, failure to intervene, illegal search of a person, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs also assert a Monell claim and an indemnification claim against the City of Chicago.
DISCUSSION Defendants ask this Court to dismiss all of the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). When reviewing a plaintiff’s complaint, the Court must accept all of the well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed as time-barred. Claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries in the state where the injury occurred. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Kelly v. City of Chi., 4 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, Illinois’s two-year
2 The parties dispute which article Plaintiffs read in the Guardian and when it was published. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 10 n.1., Dkt. No. 22; Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 10, 13, Dkt. No. 33.) The parties do agree, however, that the article was an exposé that described Homan Square as a “black site” where the police detain citizens under suspicious circumstances. (Reply to Mot. to Dismiss at 5, Dkt. No. 34.)
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statute of limitations for personal injury lawsuits applies here. Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of City of Chi., 275 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2001); 735 ILCS 5/13–202). Although dismissal at the pleading stage on statute of limitations grounds often would be premature, it is appropriate when the allegations of the complaint show that relief is barred. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2008). And here, the allegations on the face of the Complaint establish that the conduct at issue took place on September 29, 2011, yet Plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit until three-and-a-half years later on March 19, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 12, Dkt. No. 12.) Plaintiffs did not bring their claims until well after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Thus, this action must be dismissed as time-barred unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate that the statute of limitations should be tolled for some reason. The reason offered by Plaintiffs relies on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Courts apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent a defendant from using the expiration of a statute of limitations as a defense when it was the defendant’s own conduct that prevented the plaintiff from filing within the statutory time period. Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit has held that, “in a case such as this, where the federal court is applying a (borrowed) state statute of limitations, the federal doctrine of equitable estoppel, not the state doctrine, controls.” Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 598. Under federal law, the defense of equitable estoppel may be based on “[a]ny deliberate or otherwise blameworthy conduct by the defendant that causes the plaintiff to miss the statutory deadline.” Id. at 597. “Equitable estoppel comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time,” and is not to be confused with equitable tolling, which “permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if despite the exercise of all due
4

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diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.” Id. at 595. Equitable estoppel applies when (1) the defendant exhibited deliberate, blameworthy conduct beyond the wrongdoing alleged, (2) the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit was due to the plaintiff actually and reasonably relying upon the defendant’s improper conduct, and (3) the plaintiff filed suit promptly after the conduct that resulted in the estoppel is removed. Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 597–98; Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chi. Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999); Ashafa, 146 F.3d at 464.
The Court first considers whether Plaintiffs have identified “[a]ny deliberate or otherwise blameworthy conduct” that caused them to miss the statutory deadline. Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 597. Underlying misconduct by officers is not enough to demonstrate that the statute of limitations should be stayed; the misconduct must also conceal the alleged harm that the plaintiff suffered. Ramirez v. City of Chi., No. 09 C 5119, 2009 WL 1904416, at *2, 4 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2009). Affirmative action can be indicated “expressly or impliedly . . . to discourage [the Plaintiff] from bringing the claims in the instant action.” Id. at *5. Fear of reprisal from the police on its own is not enough. Reyes v. City of Chi., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2008). But when that fear is based upon threats made with the intent to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit, those threats constitute affirmative steps separate from the underlying wrong. Cook, 2014 WL 4493813 at *4.
Here, the Defendant Officers’ misconduct extended beyond Plaintiffs’ time at Homan Square and caused a fear of the police that prevented Plaintiffs from timely filing suit. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that in the weeks following their detention at Homan Square, the Defendant Officers drove by the grocery store that Plaintiffs frequented and yelled from their police cars that they were watching Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 49.) The Defendant Officers’ conduct surely
5

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could be viewed as an implicit threat of police reprisal should Plaintiffs report their experiences at Homan Square. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 47.) Those threats went beyond the underlying wrongdoing upon which Plaintiffs’ claim was brought; thus, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Defendant Officers acted affirmatively to prevent them from filing suit.
The Court next looks to whether Plaintiffs actually and reasonably relied on the Defendant Officers’ conduct. Hentosh,167 F.3d at 1174 (citing Wheeldon v. Monon Corp., 946 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)). A court may apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel when there is a casual link between the defendant’s relied upon conduct and the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit. Castro v. City of Chi., No. 07 CV 941, 2013 WL 5435275, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013); see also Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport, 377 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs here allege that the Defendant Officers’ threats caused them to have a fear of reprisal that prevented Plaintiffs from filing suit. Therefore, the pleading adequately establishes that Plaintiffs did actually and reasonably rely on the threats while they were made.
Though the facts alleged by Plaintiffs are sufficient to establish the first and second elements of equitable estoppel, they fail to establish the third element: that Plaintiffs filed suit promptly after the obstacle to filing was removed. Even when plaintiffs reasonably rely on threats of reprisal, they do not have an endless amount of time to file suit. Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 597. A change in the immediacy of the defendant’s threat diminishes the reasonableness of any continued fear and eliminates the effect of the defendant’s conduct. Castro, 2013 WL 5435275 at *1. Without facts supporting the reiteration of threats by the defendants, a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he reasonably relied upon the defendant’s conduct. Id. at *3. Although the Seventh Circuit has not specified a time-limit for bringing claims in these circumstances, it
6

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has emphasized that once the circumstance giving rise to the estoppel is removed, the plaintiff must file suit. Id. (citing Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 597.)
In this case, the threats that Plaintiffs allege prevented them from bringing suit earlier lasted only a matter of weeks. At most, then, the statute of limitations was stayed for the weeks following the Defendant Officers’ conduct at Homan Square in 2011. Once the Defendant Officers were no longer present to enforce the threats, Plaintiffs could no longer have reasonably relied on a fear of reprisal to prevent them from filing suit, as a general fear of police retaliation will not circumvent the statute of limitations. Castro, 2013 WL 5435275 at *3 (citing Beckel, 301 F.3d at 624; Ramirez, 2009 WL 1904416 at *5). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs waited until 2015 to file suit—i.e., approximately one year after the statute of limitations had run. Based on Plaintiffs’ own allegations, the Court cannot conclude that the Defendant Officers’ conduct over the few weeks following the incident warrants tolling the statute of limitations for at least a year.
Furthermore, although Plaintiffs argue that they only finally felt safe enough to file suit once details about Homan Square were printed in The Guardian newspaper (Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 3, Dkt. No. 33), the deliberate misconduct allegedly committed by the Defendant Officers ended just weeks after the illegal arrest and detention. Accordingly, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs establish that the Complaint is time-barred and provide no basis for the Court to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to permit the claims to proceed. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ entire action is time-barred, there is no need to address the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the City of Chicago.
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

ENTERED:

Dated: January 31, 2018

__________________________ Andrea R. Wood United States District Judge

8

 
 Case: 1:15-cv-02407 Document #: 58 Filed: 10/22/19 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:233

Case: 18-1266 Document: 00713506111

Filed: 10/22/2019 Pages: 8

In the
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 18-1266

JOHN VERGARA, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 15-cv-02407 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.
____________________

ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2019 ____________________

Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.
SYKES, Circuit Judge. John Vergara, Carlos Ruiz, and Jose Garcia filed a civil-rights lawsuit against the City of Chicago and Chicago Police Officers John Dal Ponte, Boonserm Srisuch, and Perry Nigro. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit as untimely. The plaintiffs asked the district judge to equitably estop the defendants from raising the limitations defense, claiming that the officers intimidated them into silence.

Case: 1:15-cv-02407 Document #: 58 Filed: 10/22/19 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:234

Case: 18-1266 Document: 00713506111

Filed: 10/22/2019 Pages: 8

2

No. 18-1266

The judge dismissed the suit in a minute order saying she would later file an opinion explaining her reasons. The promised opinion came almost two years later, and the plaintiffs then appealed. Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, entry of judgment for appeal purposes occurred 150 days after the judge’s minute order, see FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(A), and the 30-day time to file a notice of appeal ran from that date, see Walker v. Weatherspoon, 900 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 2018). The appeal was therefore woefully late.
The defendants noted the untimeliness problem in their docketing statement, but this filing too was quite late. Our circuit’s rules require the appellee to identify errors in the appellant’s docketing statement within 14 days. 7TH CIR. R. 3(c)(1); see Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 897 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). The defendants missed that deadline by about six months.
After disentangling this procedural web, we decline to dismiss the appeal. The defendants’ objection to the Rule 4(a) violation came too late under Circuit Rule 3(c)(1). But the suit is untimely, and our precedent forecloses the plaintiffs’ equitable estoppel theory. We affirm.
I. Background
This case comes to us from a dismissal on the pleadings, so we accept the following facts from the plaintiffs’ complaint as true. See Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2019). In September 2011 Chicago Police Officers Dal Ponte, Srisuch, and Nigro stopped and searched the plaintiffs without justification and took them to Homan Square, a notorious police warehouse that was later exposed

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as a den of police misconduct. There the officers interrogated the plaintiffs for eight or nine hours, omitting Miranda warnings and ignoring their repeated requests for an attorney. The plaintiffs were denied food, water, and access to a bathroom, and the officers tried to coerce false confessions from them. The officers also threatened to file false charges against the plaintiffs if they told anyone about their mistreatment at Homan Square.
The plaintiffs were released only after they agreed to keep quiet about what had happened. Over the next two weeks, the officers told the plaintiffs they “were watching” them. Fearing for their safety, the plaintiffs did not seek legal redress for this police misconduct.
In early 2015 the Guardian newspaper ran an exposé on Homan Square, and at that point the plaintiffs felt secure enough to speak to an attorney. In March they sued the City and the three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a raft of constitutional violations. But the suit came three and a half years after their detention, so the defendants moved to dismiss it as untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
On March 31, 2016, the district judge issued a minute order dismissing the suit “[f]or the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order to follow.” The judge issued her opinion almost two years later, on January 31, 2018, together with a Rule 58 judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a). On February 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal and docketing statement.
By then, however, the time to appeal had long since expired. A notice of appeal is due 30 days after entry of the

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judgment or order appealed from, but when the district court omits a separate Rule 58 judgment, “entry” occurs 150 days after the judgment or order is entered on the court docket. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(A). Here the judge dismissed the case by minute order entered on March 31, 2016. By operation of Rule 4(a)(7)(A), that order was deemed “entered” for appeal purposes 150 days later, and the time to file a notice of appeal expired 30 days after that.
On August 17, 2018, the defendants filed their docketing statement noting the untimeliness problem and moved to dismiss the appeal. We directed the parties to brief the dismissal motion with the merits.
II. Discussion
We begin by untangling the procedural snarl. Under Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the plaintiffs had to file a notice of appeal within “30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Rule 4(a) also specifies how to calculate the date of “entry.” For most civil judgments, including this one, the date of entry is the earlier of (1) the day “the judgment … is set forth on a separate document” in accordance with Rule 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or (2) “150 days … from entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(A).
The February 6, 2018 notice of appeal was clearly untimely under these rules. The judge dismissed the case by minute order on March 31, 2016. Her opinion explaining her reasons came two years later—on January 31, 2018—along with a Rule 58 judgment. Because of this unusual gap, the dismissal order’s date of entry was 150 days after March 31, 2016—or

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August 29, 2016. The plaintiffs had 30 days from that date to appeal. The notice of appeal came a year and a half later.
The question is whether the plaintiffs’ procedural misstep requires dismissal of the appeal. Rule 4(a) is not jurisdictional, but it is a mandatory claim-processing rule, see Walker, 900 F.3d at 356, which means that it “must be enforced” if it is “properly invoked,” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017). Still, we have emphasized that “[t]he ‘properly invoked’ qualifier is important, for a litigant may … forfeit the benefit of these rules.” Walker, 900 F.3d at 356.
That’s exactly what the plaintiffs accuse the defendants of doing. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants forfeited their objection by failing to comply with our circuit rules. Circuit Rule 3(c)(1) requires that if an appellant’s docketing statement “is not complete and correct, the appellee must provide a complete one to the court of appeals clerk within 14 days after the date of the filing of the appellant’s docketing statement.” The defendants didn’t comply with this deadline. They delayed filing their corrective docketing statement until August 17, 2018—six months after the plaintiffs filed theirs—only then drawing our attention to the untimeliness problem.
We think the plaintiffs have a good point about forfeiture. Cf. Walker, 900 F.3d at 357 (holding that parties can waive arguments through docketing statements); Hamer, 897 F.3d at 840 (holding the same). As a “time limitation found in a procedural rule,” Circuit Rule 3(c)(1) is a claimprocessing rule. In re Wade, 926 F.3d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). We may enforce our rules through waiver and forfeiture doctrine. See Walker,

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900 F.3d at 357 (“Enforcing waivers and forfeitures gives litigants incentives to explore issues themselves rather than wait for the court to do the work. It is best to have defects detected in time to dismiss the appeal without the need for briefs and argument.”).
The defendants forfeited their Rule 4(a) objection by missing the deadline specified in Circuit Rule 3(c)(1). The rule gave them 14 days to correct the record if the plaintiffs’ docketing statement wasn’t “complete and correct.” And the plaintiffs’ docketing statement wasn’t correct. A docketing statement must include “[t]he date of entry of the judgment … sought to be reviewed.” 7TH CIR. R. 28(a)(2)(i). The plaintiffs incorrectly reported the date of entry as January 31, 2018. As we’ve explained, the correct date of entry is August 29, 2016. Under Circuit Rule 3(c)(1), the defendants had to correct the record within 14 days. They waited six months. That’s enough for forfeiture.
To be sure, we can suspend our rules for “good cause.” 7TH CIR. R. 2. So Circuit Rule 3(c)(1) isn’t a mandatory claimprocessing rule like Rule 4(a). See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 714 (2019) (stating that whether a claim-processing rule is mandatory turns “on whether the text of the rule leaves room for … flexibility”). But the defendants haven’t given us good cause to suspend the rule. Disrupting an otherwise orderly appeal with an untimely objection in the middle of briefing is a proper ground to enforce forfeiture. By not following our rules, the defendants’ objection “just complicated the appeal.” Walker, 900 F.3d at 357. We deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.
That brings up the merits. We review a dismissal order de novo. Ochoa v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 992, 994

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(7th Cir. 2018). “[A] motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with the statute of limitations should be granted only where the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.” Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 613– 14 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs’ complaint fits that description. Indeed, the plaintiffs don’t dispute that their lawsuit is untimely. They instead invoke equitable estoppel, which bars a limitations defense if “the defendant took active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time, such as by hiding evidence or promising not to plead the statute of limitations.” Lucas v. Chi. Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). To raise equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must actually and reasonably rely on the other party’s actions. Rager v. Dade Behring, Inc., 210 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2000).
The plaintiffs contend that police intimidation can justify equitable estoppel. We have repeatedly disagreed: “[A] threat to retaliate is not a basis for equitable estoppel.” Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002); accord Shanoff v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2001). “To allow the use of retaliation as a basis for extending the statute of limitations would … distort the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Beckel, 301 F.3d at 624.
The plaintiffs’ theory—that the officers’ threats intimidated them into silence until the Guardian’s exposé provided “a newfound sense of security”—suffers from the same deficiencies as other retaliation claims. Most importantly, it would significantly expand our equitable-estoppel doctrine without a limiting principle. It allows retaliatory threats to

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indefinitely extend the time to sue. But the protection offered by equitable estoppel ends when “the circumstance giving rise to the estoppel is removed.” Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of Chi., 275 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2001). The problem with the plaintiffs’ argument is readily apparent: They contend that the officers’ threats, which stopped two weeks after the alleged constitutional violations, tolled the limitations period for the next three and a half years.
Statutes of limitations “serve the important purpose of encouraging the prompt filing of claims and by doing so of enhancing the likelihood of accurate determinations and removing debilitating uncertainty about legal liabilities.” Shanoff, 258 F.3d at 703 (quotation marks omitted). Extending equitable estoppel to this case would permit plaintiffs to avoid the limitations period for § 1983 claims indefinitely by alleging an episode of official intimidation. We cannot endorse such an expansion of the doctrine. See id. at 702 (“[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that we must seriously recognize and apply statutes of limitations.”).
In short, the suit is untimely, equitable estoppel does not apply, and the judge was right to dismiss the case.
AFFIRMED

 
 Case: 1:15-cv-02407 As of: 06/12/2020 10:55 PM CDT 1 of 6
FINNEGAN,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:15−cv−02407

Vergara et al v. Dal Ponte et al Assigned to: Honorable Andrea R. Wood Case in other court: 18−01266 Cause: 42:1981 Civil Rights Plaintiff John Vergara
Plaintiff Carlos Ruiz
Plaintiff Jose Garcia

Date Filed: 03/19/2015 Date Terminated: 01/31/2018 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Kara Brooke Amouyal Blake Horwitz Law Firm 111 W. Washington St Ste. 1611 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 676−2100 Email: kamouyal@bhlfattorneys.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Tapie Fay The Blake Horwitz Law Firm 111 W. Washington St. Suite 1611 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 676−2100 Email: katherinet105@gmail.com TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Blake Wolfe Horwitz The Blake Horwitz Law Firm, Ltd. 111 W. Washington St. Suite 1611 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 676−2100 Email: bhorwitz@bhlfattorneys.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kara Brooke Amouyal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Tapie Fay (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Blake Wolfe Horwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Kara Brooke Amouyal (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Katherine Tapie Fay (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/27/2015
Blake Wolfe Horwitz

Case: 1:15-cv-02407 As of: 06/12/2020 10:55 PM CDT 2 of 6
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant J. V. Dal Ponte Officer, #18823
Defendant B. Srisutch Officer, #7575
Defendant

represented by Jorge V. Cazares Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP 155 N. Franklin Street Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 704−3000 Email: jcazares@hinshawlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter Jones , Jr. Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C. 180 North LaSalle Street Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60601−2700 (312) 768−7800 Email: wjones@pjjlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli Jackson Lewis P.C. 150 N. Michigan, Suite 2500 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 787−4949 Email: jonathan.cifonelli@jacksonlewis.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Steiner Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C. 180 North LaSalle Street, Suite 3400 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 768−7800 Email: rsteiner@pjjlaw.com TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
represented by Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016

Case: 1:15-cv-02407 As of: 06/12/2020 10:55 PM CDT 3 of 6

P. J. Nigro Officer, #670
Defendant Unknown Officers Defendant City of Chicago

represented by Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016
represented by Jorge V. Cazares (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Walter Jones , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rachel C. Steiner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/01/2016

Date Filed 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/19/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015 03/20/2015

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by John Vergara, Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752−10459698.(Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara by Blake Wolfe Horwitz (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Andrea R. Wood. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Sheila Finnegan. (aee, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants City of Chicago, J. V. Dal Ponte, P. J. Nigro, B. Srisutch (pg, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)
4 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Initial status hearing set for 5/27/2015 at 9:00 AM. The parties are directed to meet and conduct a planning conference pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). At least seven days before the initial status hearing, the parties shall file a joint written status report, not to exceed five pages in length. The initial status report shall provide the information described on the Court's website at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under District Judges, Judge Andrea R. Wood, Initial Status Conference. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 03/20/2015)

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03/25/2015 03/25/2015 03/26/2015 04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/13/2015 04/14/2015
04/15/2015
04/30/2015 04/30/2015 04/30/2015 04/30/2015 04/30/2015 05/05/2015
05/13/2015 05/13/2015

5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara by Blake Wolfe Horwitz (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara by Katherine Tapie Fay AMENDED (Fay, Katherine) (Entered: 03/25/2015)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara by Kara Brooke Amouyal (Amouyal, Kara) (Entered: 03/26/2015)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants City of Chicago, B. Srisutch by Walter Jones, Jr (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants City of Chicago, B. Srisutch by Jorge V. Cazares (Cazares, Jorge) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants City of Chicago, B. Srisutch by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
11 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants City of Chicago, B. Srisutch by Rachel C. Steiner (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
12 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, B. Srisutch for extension of time to file answer regarding complaint 1 (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
13 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer, motion for relief 12 before Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 4/16/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/13/2015)
14 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Motion Hearing set for 4/16/2015 at 9:15 AM 13 is stricken and reset for 4/16/2015 at 9:00 AM. TIME CHANGE ONLY. In the future, defendants must comply with the specified date and time of motion hearings. The days and times on which particular judges hear motions is available online at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/judges/JudgesMotionSchedule.aspx. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
15 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Defendants City of Chicago and Officer Srisuth Motion for extension of time to answer 12 is granted. The deadline for Defendants City of Chicago and Officer Srisuth to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's complaint is extended to 5/13/2015. The motion presentment date of 4/16/2015 is stricken. Parties need not appear. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 04/15/2015)
16 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant J. V. Dal Ponte by Walter Jones, Jr (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
17 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant J. V. Dal Ponte by Jorge V. Cazares (Cazares, Jorge) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
18 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant J. V. Dal Ponte by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
19 MOTION by Defendant J. V. Dal Ponte for extension of time to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's Complaint (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
20 NOTICE of Motion by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli for presentment of extension of time 19 before Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 5/6/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/30/2015)
21 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Defendant Dal Ponte's unopposed motion for extension of time to answer or otherwise plead 19 is granted. The deadline for Defendant Ponte to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's complaint is extended to 5/13/2015. The motion presentment date of 5/6/2015 is stricken. Parties need not appear. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 05/05/2015)
22 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
23 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 22 before Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 5/19/2015 at 09:00

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05/18/2015 05/18/2015 05/18/2015 05/18/2015 05/19/2015
05/20/2015 05/22/2015 05/22/2015 05/27/2015
06/08/2015 06/23/2015 07/23/2015 08/17/2015 10/06/2015 10/20/2015 11/20/2015 01/13/2016

AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/13/2015)
24 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant P. J. Nigro by Jorge V. Cazares (Cazares, Jorge) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
25 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant P. J. Nigro by Walter Jones, Jr (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
26 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant P. J. Nigro by Jonathan Booker Cifonelli (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
27 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants J. V. Dal Ponte, P. J. Nigro by Rachel C. Steiner (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 05/18/2015)
28 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Motion hearing held. Plaintiffs shall respond to Defendant's motion to dismiss 22 by 6/9/2015. Defendants shall reply thereto by 6/23/2015. The initial status hearing set for 5/27/2015 4 remains firm. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
29 STATUS Report JOINT by Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 05/20/2015)
30 MOTION by Defendants City of Chicago, J. V. Dal Ponte, P. J. Nigro, B. Srisutch to stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint With Prejudice (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
31 NOTICE of Motion by Walter Jones, Jr for presentment of motion to stay 30 before Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 5/28/2015 at 09:00 AM. (Jones, Walter) (Entered: 05/22/2015)
32 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Status hearing held. Defendants' Motion to Stay 30 is granted. Discovery is stayed pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. Hearing set for 5/28/15 is stricken. Plaintiffs' oral motion to withdraw as counsel is granted. Attorney Katherine Fay is granted leave to withdraw her appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs. Status hearing set for 8/6/15 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 05/27/2015)
33 RESPONSE by Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergarain Opposition to MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 22 (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 06/08/2015)
34 REPLY by City of Chicago, J. V. Dal Ponte, P. J. Nigro, B. Srisutch to response in opposition to motion 33 (Cifonelli, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/23/2015)
35 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: On the Court's own motion, the status hearing set for 8/6/2015 is stricken and reset for 8/18/2015 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 07/23/2015)
36 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: On the Court's own motion, the status hearing set for 8/18/2015 is stricken and reset for 10/7/2015 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 08/17/2015)
37 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: On the Court's on motion, the status hearing set for 10/7/2015 is stricken and reset for 10/21/2015 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 10/06/2015)
38 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: On the Court's on motion, the status hearing set for 10/21/2015 is stricken and reset for 11/20/2015 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 10/20/2015)
39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Status hearing set for 11/20/2015 at 9:00 AM is stricken. The Court's ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss 22 to follow by separate order. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 11/20/2015)
40 MOTION by Plaintiffs Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara for discovery LIFT STAY OF DISCOVERY AND LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 01/13/2016)

Case: 1:15-cv-02407 As of: 06/12/2020 10:55 PM CDT 6 of 6

01/13/2016 01/19/2016
03/31/2016
05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/01/2016
01/31/2018 01/31/2018
01/31/2018 02/06/2018 02/06/2018 02/07/2018 02/07/2018 02/07/2018 10/22/2019 10/22/2019 10/22/2019
10/22/2019

41 NOTICE of Motion by Blake Wolfe Horwitz for presentment of motion for discovery, 40 before Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 1/19/2016 at 09:00 AM. (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 01/13/2016)
42 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Plaintiffs' motion to lift stay of discovery and for leave to file first amended complaint 40 is taken under advisement along with Defendants' motion to dismiss 22 . No further briefing is required at this time. The Court will rule on the pending motions before the end of the week. The motion presentment hearing set for 1/19/2016 is stricken. Parties need not appear. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 01/19/2016)
43 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion and Order to follow, the Defendants Motion to Dismiss 22 is granted. Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs' motion to lift stay of discovery and for leave to file and amended complaint 40 is denied as moot. Mailed notice(aw, ) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
44 MOTION by Attorney Rachel C. Steiner to withdraw as attorney for City of Chicago, J. V. Dal Ponte, P. J. Nigro, B. Srisutch. No party information provided (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
45 NOTICE of Motion by Rachel C. Steiner for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 44 before Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 6/2/2016 at 09:00 AM. (Steiner, Rachel) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
46 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Motion by counsel to withdraw as attorney 44 is granted. Attorney Rachel C. Steiner is withdrawn as counsel of record for Defendants. The motion presentment date of 6/2/2016 is stricken. Parties need not appear. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
47 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 1/31/2018.Mailed notice(ef, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)
48 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Consistent with the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Defendants. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)
49 ENTERED JUDGMENT. Mailed notice(ef, ) (Entered: 01/31/2018)
50 NOTICE of appeal by Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara regarding orders 49 , 47 Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0752−14093994. (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
51 DOCKETING Statement by Jose Garcia, Carlos Ruiz, John Vergara regarding notice of appeal 50 (Horwitz, Blake) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
52 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 50 (ek, ) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
53 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 50 . Notified counsel (ek, ) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
54 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 50 ; USCA Case No. 18−1266. (ph, ) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
55 MANDATE of USCA dated 10/22/2019 regarding notice of appeal 50 ;USCA No.18−1266 ; No record to be returned. (kp, ) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
56 BILL of Costs from the USCA, appeal no. 18−1266. (kp, ) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
57 CERTIFIED COPY OF USCA JUDGMENT dated 9/30/2019 regarding notice of appeal 50 ; USCA No. 18−1266 ; The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED, with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (kp, ) (Entered: 10/22/2019)
58 CERTIFIED COPY OF OPINION from the USCA for the 7th Circuit; Argued 4/17/2019; Decided 9/30/2019 in USCA case no. 18−1266. (kp, ) Modified on 10/23/2019 (kp, ). (Entered: 10/22/2019)