U.S. District Court Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:17−cv−00526−SDD−EWD

CLOSED

Ayo et al v. East Baton Rouge Parish Assigned to: Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick Referred to: Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 08/07/2017 Date Terminated: 12/06/2019 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Henry Ayo on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated TERMINATED: 03/14/2019

represented by Ivy Wang Southern Poverty Law Center 201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 (504) 486−8982 Email: ivy.wang@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brandon J. Buskey American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St. 18th Floor New York New York, NY 10004 212−284−7364 Fax: 212−549−2654 Email: bbuskey@aclu.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce Warfield Hamilton ACLU of Louisiana PO Box 56157 New Orleans, LA 70156 504−522−0617 Email: bhamilton@laaclu.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Emily Early SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 East Ponce de Leon Ave. Suite 340 Decatur, GA 30037 404−221−4036 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: emily.early@splcenter.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sara Zampierin SOUTHERN POVERTY LAWCENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 334−956−8200 Fax: 334−956−8481 Email: sara.zampierin@splcenter.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff

Kaiasha White on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff Tayari Ross
V. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr.

represented by Ivy Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brandon J. Buskey (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily Early (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Zampierin (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ivy Wang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brandon J. Buskey (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Bruce Warfield Hamilton (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily Early (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sara Zampierin (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Dele Akintade Adebamiji Dele A. Adebamiji & Associates P. O. Box 80712 1724 Dallas Drive Suite 14 Baton Rouge, LA 70806 225−927−9006 Fax: 225−927−6008 Email: dadebam1@bellsouth.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration
Defendant Sid J. Gautreaux, III In his Official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish TERMINATED: 06/04/2018

represented by Dele Akintade Adebamiji (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Tara Lynn Johnston Erlingson Banks, PLLC 301 Main Street Suite 2110 Baton Rouge, LA 70801 225−218−4446 Fax: 225−246−2876 Email: tjohnston@erlingsonbanks.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra Marie Lamothe Burglass & Tankersley 5213 Airline Drive New Orleans, LA 70001 504−836−0413 Email: alamothe@burglass.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/07/2017
08/08/2017
08/09/2017 08/09/2017 08/10/2017 08/11/2017 08/11/2017 08/11/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 053N−1622500.), filed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Attachment Summons, # 3 Attachment Summons, # 4 Attachment Summons)(Wang, Ivy).(Attachment 1 replaced on 8/9/2017) (Attachment 2, 3, 4 replaced on 8/9/2017) (ELW). Modified on 8/9/2017 to flatten documents (ELW). (Entered: 08/07/2017)
2 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Cleve Dunn, Sr, Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, Sid J. Gautreaux, III, filed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Dunn summons, # 2 Attachment RHI summons, # 3 Attachment Sheriff summons)(Wang, Ivy) (Attachment 1, 2 & 3 replaced on 8/9/2017) (ELW). Modified on 8/9/2017 to flatten document (ELW). Modified on 8/15/2017 to sub pleading as per Order #8(LLH). (Entered: 08/08/2017)
3 Summons Issued as to All Defendants. (NOTICE: Counsel shall print and serve both the summons and all attachments in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.) (ELW) (Entered: 08/09/2017)
4 MOTION to Substitute Pleading by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Page 30 of Amended Complaint, # 2 Attachment Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) Modified on 8/10/2017 to edit text (LLH). (Entered: 08/09/2017)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 4 MOTION to Substitute Pleading . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 08/10/2017)
5 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White (Wang, Ivy) Modified to edit event type on 8/11/2017 (SGO). (Entered: 08/11/2017)
6 MOTION for Emily Early to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number 053N−1625025) by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Declaration, # 2 Attachment Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
7 MOTION for Sara Zampierin to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number 053N−1625031) by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Declaration, # 2 Attachment Certificate of Good Service, # 3 Attachment

08/14/2017 08/14/2017 08/14/2017
08/16/2017 08/21/2017 08/21/2017 08/30/2017 09/12/2017 09/13/2017 09/27/2017 10/17/2017
10/27/2017
10/27/2017
10/31/2017

Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 08/11/2017)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 7 MOTION for Sara Zampierin to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number 053N−1625031), 6 MOTION for Emily Early to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number 053N−1625025). This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (EDC) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
8 ORDER granting 4 Motion to Substitute Pleading. The clerk's office is directed to substitute R. Doc. 4−1 at page 30 in R. Doc. 2. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 8/14/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
9 ORDER granting 6 and 7 Motions for Admission pro hac vice. Sara Zampierin and Emily Early are hereby GRANTED leave to appear and participate pro hac viceas co−counsel for Plaintiffs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 8/14/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 08/14/2017)
10 MOTION for Brandon Buskey to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number 053N−1627157) by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Attachment Certificate of Admission, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 10 MOTION for Brandon Buskey to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Filing fee $100.00, Receipt Number 053N−1627157). This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (ELW) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
11 ORDER granting 10 Motion for Brandon Buskey to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 8/21/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
12 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ORDER: Scheduling Conference set for 10/26/2017 at 10:00 AM in chambers before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. Status Report due by 10/12/2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 8/29/2017. (LLH) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
13 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. Sid J. Gautreaux, III waiver sent on 8/28/2017, answer due 10/27/2017. (Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 09/12/2017)
14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White re 12 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ORDER (Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 09/13/2017)
15 ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/27/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 09/27/2017)
16 Notice to Counsel: In light of all defendants having not made an appearance in this matter, the Scheduling Conference is reset for 12/7/2017 at 09:00 AM in chambers before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. Status Report due by 11/22/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) (Entered: 10/17/2017)
17 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Johnston, Tara) (Main Document 17 replaced on 11/1/2017) (ELW). (Attachment 1 replaced on 11/1/2017) (ELW). Modified on 11/1/2017 per rec doc order #19 (ELW). (Entered: 10/27/2017)
18 MOTION to Substitute File Corrected Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Corrected Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Corrected Memo in Support, # 3 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Order)(Johnston, Tara) (Entered: 10/27/2017)
19 ORDER granting 18 MOTION to Substitute File Corrected Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. Signed

10/31/2017 11/01/2017 11/03/2017
11/03/2017
11/17/2017 11/20/2017
11/21/2017 11/28/2017 11/28/2017 11/30/2017 11/30/2017 12/14/2017 01/04/2018 01/04/2018 01/04/2018

by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 10/31/17. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 10/31/2017)
20 MOTION for Extension of Time to Serve Process on Defendants Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, Inc., and Cleve Dunn, Sr. by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Foster Declaration, # 2 Exhibit B − Steimel Declaration, # 3 Exhibit C − Bechdel Declaration, # 4 Attachment − Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 10/31/2017)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 20 MOTION for Extension of Time to Serve Process on Defendants Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, Inc., and Cleve Dunn, Sr.. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 11/01/2017)
21 ORDER granting 20 Motion to Extend Time to Serve Process on Defendants RHI, Inc. and Cleve Dunn, Sr. Plaintiffs shall have until December 7, 2017, to effect service of process on Defendants Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, Inc., and Cleve Dunn, Sr. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 11/3/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 11/03/2017)
22 Notice to Counsel: In light of the Order (R. Doc. 21), the court finds good cause to continue the Scheduling Conference to 1/18/2018 at 10:30 AM in chambers before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. Status Report due by 1/4/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) Modified to edit text on 1/4/2018 (BLR). (Entered: 11/03/2017)
23 RESPONSE in Opposition to 17 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 11/17/2017)
24 NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 23 Response in Opposition to Motion. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Strike the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (ELW) (Entered: 11/20/2017)
25 Plaintiffs' Combined Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits and to Strike the Incorrect Pleading (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed order, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Response)(Wang, Ivy) Modified to edit text on 11/21/2017 (BLR). (Entered: 11/21/2017)
26 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. Cleve Dunn, Sr served on 11/22/2017, answer due 12/13/2017. (Early, Emily) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
27 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. Rehabilitation Home Incarceration served on 11/22/2017, answer due 12/13/2017. (Early, Emily) (Entered: 11/28/2017)
28 ORDER granting 25 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 11/30/2017. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
29 RESPONSE in Opposition to 17 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (KAH) (Entered: 12/04/2017)
30 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Order granting Motion for Leave, # 3 Proposed Pleading; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(Johnston, Tara) (Entered: 12/14/2017)
31 MOTION to Enroll Dele A. Adebamiji as Attorney by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (Adebamiji, Dele) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 31 MOTION to Enroll Dele A. Adebamiji as Attorney . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LLH) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
32 ORDER granting 31 Motion to Enroll as Attorney. Added attorney Dele Akintade Adebamiji for Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 1/4/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 01/04/2018)

01/04/2018
01/04/2018 01/04/2018 01/05/2018
01/11/2018 01/11/2018 01/19/2018 02/05/2018 02/05/2018
02/05/2018 02/06/2018
02/06/2018 02/08/2018 02/09/2018 02/14/2018

33 Notice to Counsel: In light of all defendants having not made an appearance in this matter, good cause is shown to CONTINUE the Scheduling Conference to 3/1/2018 at 10:00 AM in chambers before Judge Shelly D. Dick. Status Report due by 2/15/2018.(This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
34 First MOTION and Order for Extension of Time to File Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 1/4/2018 to edit text.(EDC). (Entered: 01/04/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 34 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (EDC) (Entered: 01/04/2018)
35 ORDER granting 34 Motion and Order for Extension of Time to file Answer to Complaint based on sufficient showing of excusable neglect pursuant to F.R.C.P. 6(b)(1)(B). Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration answer due 2/2/2018. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 1/5/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
36 ORDER granting 30 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 1/11/18. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 01/11/2018)
37 REPLY Memorandum in Support of 17 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (SGO) (Entered: 01/12/2018)
Set/Reset Hearings: Scheduling Conference set for 3/1/2018 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 5 before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry) (BLR) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
38 MOTION for Clerks Entry of Default as to Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, Inc. and Cleve Dunn, Sr. by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Kenneth Holmes, # 2 Affidavit of Emily Early, # 3 Proposed Default)(Wang, Ivy) Modified on 2/8/2018 to replace attachment 1 as per rec doc 40(KAH). (Entered: 02/05/2018)
39 MOTION to Substitute File Request for Entry of Default by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Request for Default Entry, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Exhibit A, # 3 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Exhibit B, # 4 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Entry of Default, # 5 Attachment Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 39 MOTION to Substitute File Request for Entry of Default . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 02/05/2018)
40 ORDER granting 39 Motion to Substitute Request for Entry of Default. The clerk's office is directed to replace R. Doc. 38−1 with R. Doc. 39−2. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 2/6/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
41 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants Motion To Dismiss by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Proposed Pleading;)(Adebamiji, Dele) (Entered: 02/06/2018)
42 CLERK'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (KAH) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
43 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 41 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants Motion To Dismiss filed by All Plaintiffs. (Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 02/09/2018)
44 ORDER granting 41 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants Motion To Dismiss. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 2/14/18. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 02/14/2018)

02/14/2018 02/15/2018 02/23/2018
03/07/2018 03/08/2018
03/08/2018 03/20/2018
03/20/2018 04/13/2018 04/13/2018 05/04/2018 05/11/2018 05/11/2018 05/21/2018
05/24/2018

46 MOTION to Dismiss by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(KAH) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
45 STATUS REPORT by All Plaintiffs. (Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
47 ORDER: In light of the pending motions to dismiss 17 and 46 good cause exists to defer entry of a scheduling order in this matter. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference set for 3/1/2018 is CANCELED. This case will be re−evaluated in 90 days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 2/23/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
48 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD RESPONSE in Opposition to 46 MOTION to Dismiss by Cleve Dunn, Sr., and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration filed by All Plaintiffs. (Wang, Ivy) Modified on 3/22/2018 to remove the document as it has been stricken(SWE). (Entered: 03/07/2018)
49 NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 48 Response in Opposition to Motion. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Strike the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (KAH) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
50 MOTION to Strike 48 Response in Opposition to Motion , MOTION to Substitute File Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Dunn, Rehabilitation Home Incarceration by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
51 ORDER granting 50 Motion to Strike 48 Response in Opposition to Motion and granting 50 MOTION to Substitute File Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss by Dunn, Rehabilitation Home Incarceration filed by Kaiasha White, Henry Ayo. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 3/20/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 03/20/2018)
52 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 46 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (SWE) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
53 MOTION to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Lamothe, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 53 MOTION to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (NLT) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
54 RESPONSE in Opposition to 53 MOTION to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit − Declaration of Emily Early)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 05/04/2018)
55 MOTION to Compel Defendants Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration's Responses to Plaintiffs' Written Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit)(Wang, Ivy) Modified to edit text on 5/11/2018 (SGO). (Entered: 05/11/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 55 MOTION to Compel Defendants Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration's Responses to Plaintiffs' Written Discovery. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (SGO) (Entered: 05/11/2018)
56 NOTICE of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE: Telephone Conference set for 5/29/2018 at 11:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes to discuss 55 Motion to Compel. Counsel participating in the Conference shall call 877−336−1839 using access code 9565780 five minutes prior to conference. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) (Entered: 05/21/2018)
57 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD Reply MEMORANDUM in Support of 53 MOTION to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification filed by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Lamothe, Alexandra) Modified to edit text on 5/24/2018 (SGO).

05/25/2018 05/25/2018 05/25/2018 05/29/2018
06/05/2018 06/05/2018 06/06/2018 06/06/2018 06/06/2018
06/07/2018
06/14/2018 06/15/2018 06/15/2018

Modified on 6/8/2018 to remove the document as it has been stricken per RD 64 (SGO). (Entered: 05/24/2018)
58 MOTION to Strike 57 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Lamothe, Alexandra) Modified to edit text on 5/25/2018 (SGO). (Entered: 05/25/2018)
59 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Reply Memorandum, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Lamothe, Alexandra) Modified to edit text on 5/25/2018 (SGO). (Entered: 05/25/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 59 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification , 58 MOTION to Strike 57 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (SGO) (Entered: 05/25/2018)
60 Minute Entry/Telephone Conference Report and Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes: Telephone Status Conference held on 5/29/2018. The parties discussed the pending Motion to Compel. Because the parties could not resolve this matter during the telephone conference with the court, Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration shall have the time period provided in the Local Rules of this court in which to respond to the Motion to Compel. (SGO) (Entered: 05/29/2018)
61 RULING granting 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/4/2018. (SGO) (Entered: 06/05/2018)
62 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 55 MOTION to Compel Responses to Written Discovery filed by All Defendants. (Adebamiji, Dele) Modified to edit text on 6/5/2018 (SGO). (Entered: 06/05/2018)
63 MOTION to Vacate Preliminary Default by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adebamiji, Dele) Modified to edit text on 6/6/2018 (SGO). (Entered: 06/06/2018)
64 ORDER granting 58 Motion to Strike 57 Reply Memorandum. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/6/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 06/06/2018)
65 ORDER granting 59 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of 53 Motion to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification filed by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. The clerk's office is directed to file R. Doc. 59−1 into the record. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/6/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) Modified to edit text on 6/7/2018 (BLR). (Entered: 06/06/2018)
66 ORDER Vacating 65 ORDER granting 59 MOTION for Leave to File Reply Memorandum in Support of 53 Motion to Bifurcate Discovery Prior to Class Certification filed by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. Sid J. Gautreaux, III was dismissed on 6/5/2018, 61 Ruling. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/7/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) Modified to edit text on 6/7/2018 (BLR). (Entered: 06/07/2018)
67 MOTION for Leave to File Reply by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Proposed Pleading;, # 3 Exhibit)(Wang, Ivy) Modified to edit text on 6/15/2018 (SGO). (Entered: 06/14/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 67 MOTION for Leave to File Reply. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (SGO) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
68 ORDER granting 67 MOTION for Leave to File Reply filed by Kaiasha White, Henry Ayo. The clerk's office is directed to file R. Docs. 67−1 and 67−2 into the record. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/15/2018. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)

06/15/2018 06/27/2018 09/12/2018 09/12/2018 09/21/2018 09/24/2018 09/26/2018 10/09/2018
11/20/2018 11/21/2018 11/26/2018
11/30/2018
11/30/2018

(BLR) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
69 REPLY MEMORANDUM in Support of 55 MOTION to Compel Defendants Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration's Responses to Plaintiffs' Written Discovery filed by Henry Ayo, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(EDC) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
70 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to 63 MOTION to Vacate Preliminary Default filed by All Plaintiffs. (Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 06/27/2018)
71 RULING denying 46 Motion to Dismiss. The Parties are to simultaneously brief the issue of Judicial Immunity as to the claims against RHI arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, briefs to be filed within ten (10) days of this Order, maximum of 10 pages, no replies permitted. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/12/2018. (SGO) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
Set/Reset Deadlines (Court Use Only) (SGO) (Entered: 09/12/2018)
72 Memorandum in Support of Judicial Immunity as to the Claims Against RHI Arising Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. (Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 9/24/2018 to edit text (SGO). (Entered: 09/21/2018)
73 Supplemental Brief on Judicial Immunity filed by All Plaintiffs. (Wang, Ivy) Modified on 9/25/2018 to edit text (SGO). (Entered: 09/24/2018)
74 RULING granting 63 Motion to Vacate the Entry of Default. The Clerk's 42 Entry of Default is VACATED. The Defendants shall pay the Plaintiffs an amount sufficient to reimburse the Plaintiffs for the time and expense incurred in filing the pleadings at Record Documents 38 and 70. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 9/26/2018. (SGO) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
75 RULING AND ORDER: The 55 Motion to Compel Defendants Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration's Responses to Plaintiffs' Written Discovery13 is GRANTED to the extent is seeks an award of expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5). Defendants Cleve Dunn, Sr. and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration shall pay to Plaintiffs $1000.00 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5). Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 10/9/2018. (KAH) (Entered: 10/09/2018)
76 MOTION on Non−Party, Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux, III, to Quash Petitioners' Subpoena Duces Tecum or Alternatively, MOTION for Protective Order by Sid J. Gautreaux, III. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Warden Dennis Grimes, # 2 Attachment Certificate, # 3 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Lamothe, Alexandra) Modified on 11/21/2018 to edit the text (KAH). (Entered: 11/20/2018)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 76 MOTION on Non−Party, Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux, III, to Quash Petitioners' Subpoena Duces Tecum MOTION for Protective Order . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 11/21/2018)
77 NOTICE of TELEPHONE CONFERENCE: Telephone Conference set for 11/30/2018 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes to discuss 76 Motion to Quash. Counsel participating in the Conference shall call 877−336−1839 using access code 9565780 five minutes prior to conference. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) (Entered: 11/26/2018)
78 Telephone Conference Report and Order/Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes: Telephone Conference held on 11/30/2018. The Court inquired into whether the parties had amicably resolved any of the issues raised in the Motion. The parties stated that those issues have been satisfactorily resolved. Sheriff Sid Gautreaux III's 76 Motion to Quash Petitioners' Subpoena Duces Tecum or Alternatively, Motion for Protective Order is DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice to the Sheriff re−urging the Motion to Quash in the future, if necessary. (KAH) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
79 ORAL ORDER: Sheriff Sid Gautreaux III's 76 Motion to Quash Petitioners' Subpoena Duces Tecum or Alternatively, Motion for Protective Order is DENIED AS MOOT without prejudice to the Sheriff re−urging the Motion to Quash in the future, if

02/20/2019 02/20/2019 02/20/2019 03/14/2019
03/21/2019 03/22/2019 03/22/2019 04/11/2019 04/12/2019 04/15/2019 04/16/2019 04/26/2019 05/01/2019 05/01/2019 05/02/2019

necessary. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 11/30/2018. (KAH) (Entered: 11/30/2018)
80 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal as Named Plaintiff and Proposed Class Representative by Henry Ayo (Early, Emily) Modified on 2/20/2019 to edit the text (KAH). (Entered: 02/20/2019)
81 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Second Amended Complaint, # 3 Attachment Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 02/20/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 81 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 02/20/2019)
82 ORDER granting 80 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as Named Plaintiff and Proposed Class Representative. Pursuant to Rule 41 (a)( I )(A)(i) of the federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the individual and class claims of Henry Ayo as a named plaintiff and proposed class representative are hereby dismissed. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 3/13/2019. (KAH) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
83 Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's 81 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 4/12/2019 to edit text (ELW). (Entered: 03/21/2019)
84 MOTION for Leave to File Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand to Plaintiffs' Original and Amended Complaints and Defendants' Counter Claim by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;)(Adebamiji, Dele) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 84 First MOTION for Leave to File Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand to Plaintiffs' Original and Amended Complaints and Defendants' Counter Claim . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (ELW) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
85 RESPONSE in Opposition to 83 Response in Opposition to 81 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by Kaiasha White. (Wang, Ivy) Modified on 4/12/2019 to edit the text (SWE). (Entered: 04/11/2019)
86 RESPONSE in Opposition to 84 First MOTION for Leave to File Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Jury Demand to Plaintiffs' Original and Amended Complaints and Defendants' Counter Claim filed by Kaiasha White. (Hamilton, Bruce) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
87 MOTION to Strike 83 Response in Opposition to 81 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Wang, Ivy) Modified on 4/16/2019 to edit the text (SWE). (Entered: 04/15/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 87 MOTION to Strike 83 Response in Opposition to 81 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (SWE) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
88 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD First REPLY to 86 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by All Defendants. (Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 5/7/2019 STRICKEN as ordered by rec doc 91 (ELW). (Entered: 04/26/2019)
89 MOTION to Strike an Incorrectly Filed Document by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Proposed Pleading;)(Adebamiji, Dele) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
90 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Answer and Affirmative Defenses by Cleve Dunn, Sr., Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;)(KAH) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 89 MOTION to Strike an Incorrectly Filed Document . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 05/02/2019)

05/02/2019 05/02/2019 05/06/2019 05/07/2019 05/20/2019 05/28/2019
05/28/2019 06/04/2019 06/06/2019
06/07/2019
06/12/2019

MOTION(S) REFERRED: 90 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Answer and Affirmative Defenses. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
91 ORDER granting 89 Motion to Strike 88 Reply. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 5/2/2019. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
92 Request for Expedited MOTION to Stay Discovery by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 5/7/2019 to edit the text (KAH). (Entered: 05/06/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 92 Request for Expedited MOTION to Stay Discovery. This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (KAH) (Entered: 05/07/2019)
93 RESPONSE in Opposition to 92 Request for Expedited MOTION to Stay Discovery MOTION for Expedited Hearing filed by Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Emily C.R. Early)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 05/20/2019)
94 NOTICE AND ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that a hearing will be held on June 12, 2019 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 5 to discuss the 81 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and the 87 Motion to Strike 83 Response in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, both filed by Plaintiff Kaiasha White, and the 84 First Motion for Leave to File Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, 90 Motion for Leave to File Response to Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Answer and Affirmative Defenses, and 92 Request for Expedited Motion to Stay Discovery, all filed by Defendants Cleve Dunn, Sr., Sid J. Gautreaux, III, and RHI. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, by no later than June 4, 2019, the parties shall jointly submit Section H, Proposed Scheduling Order, of their 45 February 15, 2018 Joint Status Report with amended dates so that this matter can proceed. The parties newly−submitted Proposed Scheduling Order shall propose a date(s) for the dispositive and Daubert motion deadline that is on or before January 15, 2020. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.)(BLR) (Entered: 05/28/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Proposed Scheduling Order due by 6/4/2019. (LLH) (Entered: 05/29/2019)
95 Proposed Scheduling Order by Kaiasha White. (Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 06/04/2019)
96 SCHEDULING ORDER: In accordance with FRCP 16(b), the following discovery deadlines are established. Amended Pleadings due by 6/14/2019. F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) disclosures due by 6/14/2019. Discovery due by 10/23/2019. Plaintiff's Expert Witness List due by 10/23/2019. Defendant's Expert Witness List due by 11/6/2019. Rebuttal Experts due by 12/6/2019. Plaintiff's Expert Reports due by 11/6/2019. Defendant's Expert Reports due by 11/20/2019. Discovery from Experts due by 1/6/2020. Motions shall be filed by 1/15/2020. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/5/2019. (KAH) (Entered: 06/06/2019)
97 Notice Setting Trial and Related Deadlines: Jury Trial set for 9/14/2020 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 3 before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick. Pretrial Conference set for 9/1/2020 at 02:00 PM in chambers before Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick. Affidavit of Settlement Efforts due by 8/3/2020. All other Trial deadlines are set as stated in the attached Notice. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 6/7/19. (BKA) (Entered: 06/07/2019)
98 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes: Motion Hearing held on 6/12/2019 on six pending motions ( 81 , 83 , 84 , 87 , 90 and 92 . The Court heard argument relative to motions and gave reasons for ruling. The 81 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to docket R. Doc. 81−2, which shall become Plaintiffs operative complaint in this matter. The 83 Motion for Leave to File Opposition and the 92 Request for Expedited Motion to Stay Discovery are DENIED. The 87 Motion to Strike Defendants Opposition, and the 84 Motion for Leave to File Answers, Affirmative Defenses, and Counter−Claims and the 90 Motion for Leave to File a Response in support thereof, are DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/12/2019. (SWE) (Entered: 06/13/2019)

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07/02/2019 07/19/2019 07/23/2019 07/23/2019 07/29/2019 07/31/2019 08/01/2019 08/06/2019 08/06/2019 08/06/2019 08/21/2019

100 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against Cleve Dunn, Sr., Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, filed by Kaiasha White, Tayari Ross.(SWE) (Entered: 06/13/2019)
99 ORAL ORDER The 81 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Kaisha White, is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to docket R. Doc. 81−2, which shall become Plaintiffs operative complaint in this matter. The 83 Motion for Leave to File Opposition and the 92 Request for Expedited Motion to Stay Discovery filed by Defendants Cleve Dunn and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, Inc., are DENIED. The 87 Motion to Strike Defendants Opposition, filed by Plaintiff, and the 84 Motion for Leave to File Answers, Affirmative Defenses, and Counter−Claims and the 90 Motion for Leave to File a Response in support thereof, filed by Defendants, are DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 6/12/2019. (SWE) (Entered: 06/13/2019)
101 MOTION to Dismiss by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 7/3/2019 to edit the text (NLT). (Entered: 07/02/2019)
102 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time Respond to 101 MOTION to Dismiss by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) Modified on 7/19/2019 to edit the text (SWE). (Entered: 07/19/2019)
103 ORDER granting 102 Motion for Extension of Time until 7/29/19 to File Response to 101 MOTION to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/23/19. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 101 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . Response due by 7/29/2019. (LLH) (Entered: 07/23/2019)
104 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORDRESPONSE in Opposition to 101 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White. (Wang, Ivy) Modified on 8/6/2019 to remove the document as it has been stricken in accordance with RD 108 (SWE). (Entered: 07/29/2019)
105 NOTICE OF NON−COMPLIANCE with LR 7(g) as to 104 Response in Opposition to Motion. REQUIRED CORRECTION: A combined Motion for Leave to Exceed the Page Limits and Motion to Substitute the Incorrect Pleading must filed within 24 hours of this notice. Otherwise, the original filing may be stricken by the Court without further notice. (KAH) (Entered: 07/31/2019)
106 First MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages , First MOTION to Substitute 104 Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; proposed Response to Motion to Dismiss (with additional page), # 2 proposed order)(Early, Emily) Modified on 8/1/2019 to link the motions (KMW). (Entered: 08/01/2019)
107 ORDER granting 106 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages; granting 106 MOTION to Substitute Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Kaiasha White, Tayari Ross. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 8/6/19. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
108 ORDER: granting 106 MOTION to Exceed Page Limits and to Substitite Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The brief docketed as Doc. No. 104 is stricken, and the substitute brief docketed as Doc. No. 106−1 shall be filed into the record. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 8/6/2019. (SWE) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
109 RESPONSE in Opposition to 101 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White. (SWE) (Entered: 08/06/2019)
110 STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD First REPLY to 109 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, 101 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by All Defendants. (Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 8/28/2019 to remove the document as it has been stricken in accordance with record document 114 (KAH).

08/22/2019
08/22/2019
08/27/2019
08/27/2019 08/27/2019 10/04/2019
10/07/2019
10/14/2019 10/15/2019 10/16/2019 10/25/2019 10/25/2019 10/30/2019 12/05/2019

(Entered: 08/21/2019)
111 MOTION to Strike an Incorrectly Filed Document 110 First REPLY to 109 Memorandum in Opposition to 101 MOTION to Dismiss by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;, # 2 Proposed Pleading;)(Adebamiji, Dele) Modified on 8/23/2019 to edit the docket text (KMW). (Main Document 111 replaced on 8/23/2019) (KMW). (Entered: 08/22/2019)
112 MOTION for Leave to File Response to 109 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to 101 Motion to Dismiss by Cleve Dunn, Sr., Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;)(KMW) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/23/2019: # 2 Proposed Order) (KMW). Modified on 8/23/2019 to link the documents, edit the docket text, and attach the proposed order (KMW). (Entered: 08/23/2019)
113 ORDER granting 112 MOTION for Leave to File Response to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by Cleve Dunn, Sr., Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 8/27/19. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 08/27/2019)
114 ORDER granting 111 Motion to Strike. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 8/27/19. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BKA) (Entered: 08/27/2019)
115 RESPONSE to 109 Memorandum in Opposition to 101 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Cleve Dunn, Sr., Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. (KAH) (Entered: 08/28/2019)
116 Notice to Counsel: In light of the attached correspondence requesting a a telephone status conference, a Telephone Conference is set for 10/7/2019 at 02:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes. Counsel shall continue to work in good faith preparing a Joint Protective Order applicable to Judge White's deposition. If the parties are able to reach an agreement prior to the scheduled telephone conference, chambers shall be notified to cancel the conference. Counsel participating in the Conference shall call 877−336−1839 using access code 9565780 five minutes prior to conference. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (Entered: 10/04/2019)
117 Notice to Counsel: In light of communication to chambers indicating that the parties reached and agreement regarding a Joint Protective Order applicable to Judge White's deposition, the telephone conference set for 10/7/2019 at 2:00 p.m. is CANCELED. (This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY. There is no hyperlink or PDF document associated with this entry.) (BLR) (Entered: 10/07/2019)
118 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Discovery Deadlines by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Order)(Early, Emily) (Entered: 10/14/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 118 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Discovery Deadlines . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (EDC) (Entered: 10/15/2019)
119 ORDER granting 118 Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines. Discovery due by 12/23/2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 10/16/2019. (EDC) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
120 Agreed Motion For Joint Protective Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Order)(Buskey, Brandon) Modified on 10/25/2019 to edit text (LT). (Entered: 10/25/2019)
MOTION(S) REFERRED: 120 Agreed Motion For Joint Protective Order . This motion is now pending before the USMJ. (LT) (Entered: 10/25/2019)
121 ORDER granting 120 Joint Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder−Doomes on 10/30/2019. (KAH) (Entered: 10/30/2019)
122 NOTICE of Settlement in Principle and Stipulation and Motion to Stay All Future Deadlines by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading;

12/06/2019 12/06/2019

Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 12/05/2019)
123 ORDER: This action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the right, upon good cause shown within sixty (60) days, to reopen the action if the settlement is not consummated. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 12/6/2019. (SWE) (Entered: 12/06/2019)
124 GENERAL ORDER: All pleadings and other papers filed under seal in civil and criminal actions shall be maintained under seal for thirty days following final disposition of the action. After that time, all sealed pleadings and other papers shall be placed in the case record unless a District Judge or Magistrate Judge, upon motion and for good cause shown, orders that the pleading or other paper be maintained under seal.

The deadline for filing any motions regarding the unsealing of any document shall be within thirty days of the final disposition of any action and shall contain a concise statement of reasons for maintaining the pleading or other paper under seal.

ATTENTION: If a motion to retain documents under seal is NOT filed, all documents shall be placed in the public case record, unless specifically identified in the attached General Order.

02/12/2020 02/12/2020

Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 7/8/2019. (SWE) (Entered: 12/06/2019)
125 Joint MOTION to Dismiss Claims Against Defendants by Tayari Ross, Kaiasha White. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Pleading; Proposed Order)(Wang, Ivy) (Entered: 02/12/2020)
126 ORDER granting 125 Joint Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendants Cleve Dunn and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. Signed by Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick on 2/12/2020. (SWE) (Entered: 02/12/2020)

 
 Case 3:17-cv-00526-SDD-EWD Document 1 08/07/17 Page 1 of 30

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

)

HENRY AYO, and KAIASHA WHITE )

on behalf of themselves and all others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CLEVE DUNN, Sr.,

)

)

REHABILITATION HOME

)

INCARCERATION,

)

)

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH,

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 3:17-cv-526 COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION JURY DEMAND

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. For years, Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”), a private

organization purporting to provide pretrial supervision services, has profited off individuals in

East Baton Rouge Parish by requiring them to pay hundreds of dollars to RHI to be released

from jail—effectively holding them for ransom. This fee is the creation of RHI alone—it is not

ordered by any court. Those who cannot afford the fee languish in jail for days, weeks, or even

months as they and their loved ones scramble to pay off RHI.

2. This scheme is arranged by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”), RHI’s Chief Executive

Officer, and officials with the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), who, at RHI’s

direction, refuse to release individuals ordered to RHI supervision until they pay the initial fee.

These officials do not inquire into an individual’s ability to pay RHI’s initial fee.

1

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3. The practice occurs with the knowledge of Trudy White, a criminal court judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana (the “JDC”), who sets bond for arrestees and indiscriminately orders them to undergo supervision by RHI—often for indefinite periods of time before their cases go to trial.
4. After arrestees pay RHI’s initial fee and are released by the Prison, RHI continues to exact money from them, charging a $225 monthly fee and additional fees for requirements such as classes and ankle monitoring. RHI and Dunn wrongfully use the threat of arrest by East Baton Parish Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials, as well as the threat of bond revocation by the JDC and additional jailing at the Prison, to coerce payment.
5. Plaintiffs Kaiasha White and Henry Ayo bring this class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Louisiana and federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Acts (RICO), and other state causes of action against Defendants Dunn, RHI”, and East Baton Rouge Parish (“the Parish”). Defendant Dunn regularly commits predicate acts under RICO–extorting money from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class—by wrongfully detaining them in jail until they pay RHI’s initial fee, then threatening them with additional jailing if they fail to satisfy RHI’s continuing demands for money once released. Plaintiffs seek actual and treble damages to compensate them and the proposed Class for the injuries they have sustained, and continue to sustain, because of Defendant Dunn’s extortionate activities.
6. Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class also seek damages from East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI for their policy and practice of detaining Plaintiffs and proposed Class members in the Prison until they paid RHI’s initial fee, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection and their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
2

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7. Finally, Plaintiffs Ayo and White individually seek damages from RHI under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act for RHI’s harmful and oppressive commercial practices, and, on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class, seek damages from RHI for conversion and unjust enrichment under state law.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This is a civil class action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, the United States Constitution, and Louisiana law. 9. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 10. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.
III. PARTIES A. Plaintiffs
11. Plaintiff Henry Ayo is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish. 12. Plaintiff Kaiasha White is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish. B. Defendants 13. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr., is the Executive Director of Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. He is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. 14. Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”) is a non-profit corporation registered with the State of Louisiana, with its principal place of business in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
3

Case 3:17-cv-00526-SDD-EWD Document 1 08/07/17 Page 4 of 30
15. Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish is a parish organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana.
IV. FACTS General Facts A. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court 16. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court (the “JDC”) has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters and original exclusive jurisdiction of state felony cases in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1)-(2). Louisiana district court judges are elected and serve six-year terms. There are eight criminal court judges who hear misdemeanor and felony cases in the JDC. 17. The JDC and individual judges also make agreements with private companies to provide certain court services such as pre-trial supervision. 18. Judge White has served on the JDC since 2009 and was re-elected to the JDC in 2014. She presides over both civil matters and state misdemeanor and felony cases assigned to Criminal Division J, Section 8, of the JDC. B. RHI’s Judicial and Political Ties to Judge White 19. RHI is among the private companies that offer pretrial supervision services for the JDC. 20. According to its website, RHI, which is registered as a non-profit corporation in Louisiana,1 has supervised thousands of individuals in East Baton Rouge, Orleans, Ascension, and Tangipahoa parishes since its inception in 1993.2
1 See La. Sec’y of State, “Search for La. Business Filings,” Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, https://coraweb.sos.la.gov/CommercialSearch/CommercialSearchDetails.aspx?CharterID=60196 2_DF50A07E17.
4

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21. RHI is owned and operated by the Dunn family, who live in Baton Rouge. Cleve

Dunn Sr., Evonne Dunn, and Tameka Dunn all serve as co-directors of RHI.

22. website.3

RHI is the only approved vendor for pre-trial supervision on Judge White’s

23. RHI does not have a formal written contract with the JDC. Its provision of

services to Judge White is based on an informal arrangement between RHI and Judge White.

24. RHI officials and Judge White are political allies. RHI officials and employees

supported Judge White’s 2014 re-election campaign.

25. Cleve Dunn Jr. served as Chairperson of Judge White’s Campaign Committee;

White’s campaign paid Cleve Dunn, Sr. for marketing; and RHI paid Frederick Hall, a former

RHI employee, and his wife, Gloria Hall, who owns and operates the bond company to which

RHI routinely refers putative supervisees, for campaign support activities.

C. Defendants’ Pretrial Supervision Scheme

26. Individuals arrested for criminal offenses in East Baton Rouge Parish are initially

taken to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”).

27. The following day, they appear via closed-circuit television between the Prison

and the JDC for a hearing to determine probable cause for detention and to set bond. The eight

criminal judges of the JDC take turns conducting this hearing, with each serving as the “duty

judge” for a given week.

2 Who We Are, REHAB. HOME INCARCERATION (2014), http://www.rhiweb.com/. 3 Judge Trudy M. White, “Approved Vendors,” http://judgetrudywhite.com/page.php?name=vendors (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). Judge White also assigns individuals a company called Street Crimes Alternatives for pretrial supervision. However, this company is also run by Dunn.
5

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28. Usually before the hearing, the judge on duty has already reviewed the affidavit of probable cause and set a bond amount and release conditions for the defendant. At this hearing, the duty judge may adjust an arrestee’s bond based on facts disclosed at the hearing.
29. When Judge White is on duty, she typically asks an arrestee only about his knowledge of the charges and informs him of the bond amount. She generally does not ask questions beyond these topics. Nor does she allow arrestees to be heard on issues beyond these topics. Although a public defender may be present to note the cases appointed to the public defender office, no representation is provided at this initial hearing.
30. Since Judge White’s re-election to the JDC in 2014, she has assigned arrestees to supervision by RHI. White does so without conducting in open court an individualized determination of, or providing an opportunity for arrestees to be heard on, the need for, or the conditions of, RHI supervision. Indeed, White appears to make assignments to RHI via the bond form before arrestees appear before her, and she does not ask arrestees any questions before assigning them to RHI, such as whether an arrestee can afford to pay bond or RHI’s initial or monthly fees.
31. Rather than conduct these inquiries, Judge White signs an order making RHI supervision a condition of release on bond, without instruction about the terms of this supervision. Plaintiff Ayo’s bond order, which includes the term of supervision by RHI while on bond, is reproduced here:
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32. Judge White usually sets the duration of RHI’s supervision at either ninety days, irrespective of the supervisee’s next court date, or for an indefinite period of time.
33. As shown in Ayo’s bond order, however, Judge White otherwise does not provide specific supervision terms for RHI to enforce. For instance, Judge White does not order a curfew or impose house arrest on those assigned to RHI, though those are listed as “special conditions” that she could check to apply in her standard order.
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34. Nor does Judge White order payment of the initial fee or monthly fee as a condition of release from the Prison. Instead, RHI sets this payment as a condition of release.
35. East Baton Rouge Parish has authority over, and responsibility for, operating the Prison, and Sheriff Gautreaux III and Warden Grimes have final policymaking authority for the East Baton Rouge Parish’s operation of the Prison.
36. Through an agreement with RHI, Sheriff Gautreaux III and Warden Grimes, as final policymakers for East Baton Rouge Parish with respect to jailing and releasing arrestees at the Prison, created and enforce a policy that the Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission from RHI—permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made.
37. RHI demands an initial fee of $525. 38. Arrestees typically only learn they must pay this initial fee to be released when they or their family members attempt to post bail or when they first meet with RHI at the Prison. 39. Arrestees who cannot immediately pay the initial RHI fee may wait in jail for days or weeks until they can pay all or some portion of the initial fee. 40. At the time of release, the arrestee’s next court date typically has not been scheduled, and the arrestee has not been arraigned. In some cases, the supervisee is not arraigned during the RHI supervision term. Thus, supervision sometimes ends before the arrestee ever re-appears before Judge White for his or her next hearing. 41. Upon release, RHI requires the arrestee—now a “supervisee”—to sign a contract setting forth RHI’s future fees and conditions of supervision. A copy of a redacted, standard contract is reproduced here:
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42. According to the terms of RHI’s standard contract, RHI supervisees must pay a $225 monthly fee to their assigned RHI officer, or “Monitor,” during their supervision term.
43. The standard contract also sets a curfew for supervisees, restricting supervisees from spending the night anywhere other than at their reported residential address.
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44. Despite collecting significant fees for its supervision, RHI does not require supervisees to make other substantive reports to their RHI Monitor other than their compliance with curfew. Nor does it typically require supervisees to meet their Monitor in person unless it is to make payment of their supervision fees. Rather, supervisees must only call their RHI Monitor by telephone multiple times a day and leave a voicemail message if the Monitor does not answer.
45. At RHI’s discretion, a Monitor may require a supervisee to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times for additional fees.
46. Additionally, RHI may require supervisees to attend and pay additional fees for classes taught by RHI employees. RHI also imposes a number of other conditions, including prohibiting supervisees from consuming any alcohol, restricting their movement to within East Baton Rouge Parish, requiring them to complete a “mental evaluation” through a certified physician, or mandating 50 hours of community service.
47. RHI’s standard contract with supervisees explicitly states that it will report any violation of these conditions to the JDC, which may result in the supervisee’s arrest by “East Baton Rouge City Police” or by an RHI official.
48. RHI Monitors and Dunn himself threaten supervisees with re-arrest if they fail to make financial payments or comply with RHI’s costly supervision conditions—without affirmatively inquiring into their ability to pay. Accordingly, supervisees pay (or attempt to pay) the fee out of fear of re-arrest and bond revocation by scraping together money from friends or family.
49. The policies and practices of RHI, including the standard contract and the fees required, were implemented by Defendant Dunn and enforced by his employees at his direction.
D. Plaintiffs’ Experience with Defendants’ Pretrial Scheme
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a. Plaintiff Henry Ayo 50. Plaintiff Henry Ayo appeared before Judge White on August 8, 2016, via closed circuit television from the Prison after he was arrested on suspicion of attempting to steal an air conditioning unit from a vacant property. 51. Judge White set his bond at $8,000, informed him of the charges, and assigned him to RHI supervision. White informed him that someone from RHI would visit him at the Prison to explain the process. 52. Judge White did not ask Mr. Ayo any questions about himself, his charges, or his case; she did not set or otherwise explain any terms of the RHI supervision; and she did not allow Mr. Ayo to ask any questions concerning the supervision. 53. A few days later, a RHI employee Frederick Hall came to the Prison and brought documents for Mr. Ayo to sign. Mr. Hall told Mr. Ayo that he would have to wear an ankle monitor and pay for it before he could be released. Mr. Hall said that once he was released, Mr. Ayo would have to call his RHI monitor every day in the morning and at night to ensure he was complying with his curfew, and that he would also have to pay a monthly fee to RHI. Mr. Hall explained that Mr. Ayo would be under house arrest, but he could leave for approved events like work and church. 54. Mr. Ayo stayed in jail another two months because he and his wife could not afford the bond amount and to pay RHI. Mr. Ayo was not working at the time and relied on his wife’s earnings. 55. When Mr. Ayo and his wife finally saved up enough money, the bail bondsperson came to their house, took the money for the bail fee, and agreed to post bail. The bondsperson told Ms. Ayo that she needed to call RHI but that the bondsperson did not know why.
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56. Ms. Ayo called RHI and spoke to Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall informed her that she still had to pay approximately $500 to RHI for Mr. Ayo to be released from the Prison and would have to continue paying each month. Mr. Hall then came to her house to collect this initial fee. Ms. Ayo told Mr. Hall she could not pay the full amount at that time. Mr. Hall allowed her to pay $225 initially, and to pay the rest later. She asked Mr. Hall how much they would have to pay in total, and Mr. Hall told her it would likely add up to $1000.
57. RHI then notified Prison officials that they could release Mr. Ayo from jail, and the Prison released Mr. Ayo.
58. Later, an RHI Monitor came to Mr. Ayo’s home for him to sign additional documents. The Monitor required Mr. Ayo to sign a contract, which provided that, if Mr. Ayo violated the agreement, including nonpayment of the $225 monthly fee, he could be arrested by an RHI official or East Baton Rouge law enforcement.
59. The Monitor told Mr. Ayo that in addition to reporting to her, he would have to take a decision-making class with an additional fee. However, Mr. Ayo never paid or went to this class.
60. While on RHI supervision, Mr. Ayo, who was not stably employed at the time, would pay as much money as he could to cover RHI’s fees—typically sending $50 or $100 money orders in the mail. Despite their attempts to keep up with the payments, RHI charged them late fees. Mr. Ayo and his wife, who helped with the payments and was working two jobs, had to put off paying for utilities such as water and electricity to pay RHI.
61. Mr. Ayo was never given an ankle monitor, though the RHI representative had told him his fees were in part to pay for the ankle monitor.
62. Mr. Ayo paid until his case concluded on February 27, 2017.
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63. After the case closed, RHI still called Mr. Ayo to demand that he pay $200 that it claimed he owed RHI. Altogether Mr. and Mrs. Ayo have paid approximately $1,000 to RHI.
b. Plaintiff Kaiasha White 64. Plaintiff Kaisha White appeared before Judge White on August 8, 2016, after her arrest on charges of simple and aggravated battery concerning an argument with her partner. 65. Judge White set her bond at $4,000 and informed her that she would also have to report to RHI. 66. Judge White did not ask Ms. White any questions about herself, her charges, or her case; did not set any terms of the RHI supervision; and did not allow Ms. White to ask any questions about the supervision. 67. Ms. White did not have money to pay RHI, as she was unemployed at the time and relied on her partner and family members to pay her living expenses. Thus, she was detained in the Prison for another month until her mother received a social security check. 68. On or about September 1, 2016, Ms. White’s mother gave a bail bondswoman $500. The bondswoman told Ms. White that the bondswoman and RHI would split the payment, and that a portion would go towards RHI’s initial fee. 69. The next day, RHI employee Hall went to the Prison and met with Ms. White. He informed her that she would have to pay the remainder of the initial fee and monthly supervision fee after she was released. He then had her sign RHI’s contract, which provided that Ms. White could be arrested by an RHI official or East Baton Rouge law enforcement if she violated its terms. Later that day, Ms. White was released from the Prison. 70. During Ms. White’s detention in the Prison for her inability to pay RHI’s initial fee, a severe flood hit Baton Rouge in mid-August, damaging her home and her and her son’s
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belongings. Because she was being held in the Prison, she could not check on her home or attempt to salvage her possessions for several weeks.
71. Following Ms. White’s release from the Prison, Ms. White’s mother paid an additional $250 towards the initial fee. Ms. White later met with Frederick Hall at her house. Mr. Hall told her that she would have to wear an ankle monitor and that he would call her each night to make sure she obeyed curfew.
72. In the following months, Ms. White called Mr. Hall on occasion to let him know she was trying to save up money to pay her monthly fee. She repeatedly asked him how long she would be on RHI supervision, but he did not give her a definite time; her bond order also did not indicate how many days she would be on supervision. Mr. Hall also did not provide Ms. White with an ankle monitor.
73. As time passed and she still was not able to pay RHI’s monthly fees, Mr. Hall accused her of falsely claiming that she was trying to pay. Ms. White became afraid that RHI would have her arrested.
74. During this time, Ms. White lacked a stable place to live and had to stay with family and friends because her home was still flood damaged.
75. On or about late December or early January, Ms. White told Mr. Hall that she could pay RHI $300.
76. Because Ms. White was worried that if she saw Mr. Hall in person, he would have her arrested, she had her son meet Mr. Hall to deliver the payment.
77. Sometime after she made this payment, another RHI representative also called Ms. White to inform her she had failed to pay for and attend a $55-per-month class. However, Mr. Hall had not told Ms. White that she was required to attend this class. The RHI
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representative told her that if she did not comply, RHI would have her arrested during the next police “round up.”
78. Ms. White called Mr. Hall to ask why she was being required to take and pay for the class, but no one answered at his phone number. She subsequently received a letter from RHI stating that Mr. Hall had left RHI.
79. Ms. White did not hear from Mr. Hall again. However, she began receiving letters from RHI claiming that she owed roughly $800. Ms. White lacks the money to pay this amount. She still does not know for how long she was under RHI supervision or whether it has actually ended.
Facts Common to All RICO Counts 80. Plaintiff White is a “person” entitled to bring a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and La. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356(E). 81. Plaintiff Ayo is a “person” entitled to bring a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and La. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356(E). 82. RHI is a corporate enterprise that regularly engages in interstate commerce. RHI’s engagement in interstate commerce includes, but is not limited to, using telecommunications and electronic monitoring technology to track supervisees across state lines, purchasing and employing electronic monitoring devices that are produced and sold outside the state of Louisiana, accepting payment of fees by credit card, and maintaining a website available to users in interstate commerce. 83. Defendant Dunn is an individual and thus a “person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
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84. Defendant Dunn has conducted the affairs of RHI through a pattern of racketeering to achieve the common purpose of unlawfully extorting money from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class. These racketeering acts are an integral part of RHI’s regular course of business.
85. As described above, on numerous occasions over an unknown period of time Defendant Dunn has committed related, predicate acts of extortion by threatening to keep, and— through East Baton Rouge officials Gautreaux III and Grimes—arranging with the Prison to keep Plaintiffs and the proposed Class in jail until they have paid RHI’s required initial fee, and instructing his employees to do the same. Thereafter, Defendant Dunn, directly and through the actions of his Monitors and other employees, continues this unlawful use of fear to threaten Plaintiffs and the proposed Class with further jail time or court sanctions if they fail to pay RHI’s monthly and programmatic fees.
86. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn has committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs and the proposed Class from the Prison until they paid money towards the RHI initiation fee. Additionally, by unlawfully using the fear of arrest and jail by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials, Dunn on numerous occasions extorted from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class a monthly supervision fee, along with fees for classes or other requirements imposed at the discretion of RHI employees.
87. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
88. These actions are a regular way of conducting the ongoing business of RHI.
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89. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities, Plaintiffs and the proposed Class have been injured in their property in that they have paid and continue to pay RHI’s fees due to the fear induced by Dunn and RHI employees’ wrongful use and threats of arrest and jailing.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 90. Plaintiffs White and Ayo propose a class seeking damages as to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). The Class is defined as: All individuals whom Judge White ordered to pretrial supervision by Defendant RHI who were subsequently supervised by RHI. 91. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiffs and putative Class members can challenge Defendants’ extortionate racketeering scheme and unlawful use and threat of wealth-based detention to extort fees from Plaintiffs and the Class. 92. Class-action status under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate because questions of law or fact common to proposed Class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 93. Furthermore, as detailed below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). A. Requirements of Rule 23(a) Rule 23(a)(1) - Impracticability of Joinder Due to Numerosity
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94. The precise size of the proposed Class is unknown by Plaintiffs, but it is substantial given the number of arrestees Judge White has assigned to RHI supervision in recent years.
95. Court records indicate that over three hundred people were ordered to RHI supervision by Judge White in 2015 and 2016.
96. Many of the proposed Class members are low-income individuals who will be difficult to identify and likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Joinder of every member of the proposed Class would be impracticable. Rule 23(a)(2) - Commonality
97. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the proposed Class. The named Plaintiffs seek monetary relief from Defendants’ extortionate and unconstitutional pretrial supervision practices, which violate the state and federally-protected rights of the Class members.
98. Among the most important common questions of fact for the proposed Class are: a. Whether RHI, independent of Judge White, sets terms for an arrestee’s release and the fees for its supervision services; b. Whether Dunn, RHI, and the Parish have made an agreement that individuals Judge White assigns to RHI may not be released from the Prison until they have paid RHI’s initial fee, and RHI notifies the Prison of such payment; c. Whether RHI and the Parish enforce this agreement against the proposed Class without determining whether proposed Class members can afford to pay RHI’s initial fee;
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d. Whether the Parish has a policy, practice, or custom of detaining arrestees until obtaining RHI’s permission to release them;
e. Whether RHI’s standard contract provides for an initial fee and monthly fees; f. Whether RHI’s standard contract provides for arrest and jailing for failure to pay
its fees; g. Whether Dunn directs RHI employees to threaten to arrest and jail Proposed Class
members who do not pay the monthly supervisory fees and other mandated fees to RHI; 99. Among the most important common questions of law for the proposed Class are: a. Whether Defendant Dunn’s operation of RHI through a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically, extorting money from Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class by unlawfully detaining them in the Prison until they pay RHI’s initial fee, then threatening them with additional jailing if they fail to pay RHI monthly fees once released, violates the Louisiana and federal RICO Acts; b. Whether East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI’s practice of detaining Plaintiffs Ayo and White and members of the proposed Class in the Prison because they could not pay RHI’s initial fee violates Plaintiffs and proposed Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process and equal protection; c. Whether East Baton Rouge Parish’s and RHI’s detention of Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members after they posted bonds constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and d. Whether RHI lacks any legal authority or right to collect fees from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members.
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Rule 23(a)(3) - Typicality 100. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
proposed Class, and they have the same interests in this case as all other proposed Class members that they represent. Each of them suffers injuries from Defendants’ failure to comply with state and federal law: they were each confined in jail for nonpayment of RHI’s initial fee, without inquiry into their ability to pay, and then threatened with additional jailing if they did not pay RHI’s subsequent fees and costs. The answer to whether Defendants’ scheme is unlawful will determine the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other proposed Class member.
101. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices violate their federal and state rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the proposed Class. Rule 23(a)(4) - Adequacy
102. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class they seek to represent.
103. Plaintiffs have no interests separate from, or in conflict with, those of the proposed Class they seek to represent as a whole, and they seek damages, which Plaintiffs pursue on behalf of the entire proposed Class that they seek to represent.
C. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 104. Class certification of the proposed Class is appropriate because common
questions of law and fact, including those listed above, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
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105. The proposed Class seeks damages against Defendant Dunn, East Baton Rouge Parish, and RHI for jailing the proposed Class until its members were able to pay RHI’s initial fee, engaging in a pretrial supervision scheme that allowed RHI, under Dunn’s direction, to extort additional fees and costs from the proposed Class by wrongfully threatening future jail time and court sanctions for nonpayment.
D. The Requirements of Rule 23(g) 106. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana, and the Southern Poverty Law Center who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) Plaintiffs Ayo and White the Proposed Class against Cleve Dunn, Sr. 107. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt Paragraphs 1 through 106 of this Complaint. 108. Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”) is an enterprise engaged in and whose activities affect interstate commerce. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr., is RHI’s Executive Director. 109. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Defendant Dunn conducts RHI’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to illegally extort money from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and proposed Class Members. Specifically, Dunn has made an agreement with Judge Trudy White for RHI to be Judge White’s approved vendor for pretrial court supervision. Dunn then
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imposes conditions of supervision for arrestees assigned to RHI, including imposing fees for release and monthly supervision, and uses threats of incarceration for supervisees who do not comply with RHI’s conditions or pay the required fees.
110. Dunn has made a separate agreement with Prison officials that prohibits the release of pretrial arrestees assigned to RHI unless the arrestees pay RHI’s initial fee and RHI sends confirmation to the Prison that the arrestee has paid said fee.
111. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn has committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class from the East Baton Rouge Parish Jail until they paid the initial fee to RHI. By unlawfully using the fear of arrest by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials to coerce payment, Dunn additionally extorted from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class on numerous occasions a monthly monitoring fee of $225, along with other fees for classes required at the discretion of RHI employees.
112. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
113. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities and his violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class have been injured in their property because they have paid and continue to pay RHI’s fees from the fear induced by Dunn and RHI’s wrongful threats of arrest and jailing.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Louisiana Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act
(LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C)) Plaintiff Ayo and White and the Proposed Class against Cleve Dunn, Sr.
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114. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 106 of this Complaint.
115. RHI is an enterprise that conducts business in the state of Louisiana. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr., is RHI’s Executive Director.
116. In violation of LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C), Defendant Dunn conducts RHI’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to illegally extort money from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and proposed Class Members. Specifically, Dunn has made an agreement with Judge Trudy White for RHI to be White’s approved vendor for pretrial court supervision. Dunn then imposes conditions of supervision for arrestees assigned to RHI, including imposing fees for release and monthly supervision, and uses threats of incarceration for supervisees who do not comply with RHI’s conditions or pay the required fees.
117. Dunn has made a separate agreement with Prison officials that prohibits the release of pretrial arrestees assigned to RHI unless the arrestees pay RHI’s initial fee and RHI sends confirmation to the Prison that the arrestee has paid said fee.
118. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn has committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class from the East Baton Rouge Parish Jail until they secured and paid the initial fee to RHI. By unlawfully using the fear of arrest by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials to coerce payment Dunn additionally extorted from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class on numerous occasions a monthly monitoring fee of $225 on behalf of RHI, along with other fees for classes or other services required at the discretion of RHI employees.
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119. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity under Louisiana law.
120. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities and violations of LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C), Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class have been injured in their property in that they have paid and continue to pay RHI’s fees from the fear induced by Dunn and RHI’s wrongful threats of arrest and jailing.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
(Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI
121. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Complaint.
122. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection prohibit jailing a person solely because of her inability to access money and make a monetary payment.
123. Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty under state and federal law.
124. Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish’s practice and policy—enforced through its final policy makers Gautreaux III and Grimes—to jail Plaintiffs and members of the Proposed Class until they could pay RHI the initial fee, without an affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative conditions of release, violated Plaintiffs’ and the proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the
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Fourteenth Amendment by detaining arrestees until they could pay the initial RHI fee and be released from the Prison.
125. Defendant RHI also violated Plaintiffs’ and the proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining arrestees until they could pay the initial RHI fee and be released from the Prison, without an affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative conditions of release.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI 126. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Complaint. 127. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures—including the detention of individuals beyond expiration of a valid order of confinement, without probable cause. 128. Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish’s practice and policy—enforced through its final policy makers Gautreaux III and Grimes—and Defendant RHI’s practice to continue to detain Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members, until they paid the initial RHI fee, without probable cause, and thus beyond the time Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members should have obtained pretrial release after posting bond, violated Plaintiffs proposed Class members’ Fourth Amendment rights.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act
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(La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405) Plaintiffs Ayo and White against RHI 129. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 of this Complaint. 130. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) bars “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405, and authorizes recovery for any person who suffers an “ascertainable loss” as a result of this misconduct, whether of money or property, La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409(A). 131. Defendant RHI has violated LUTPA by entering an agreement whereby White assigns pretrial arrestees to RHI without a meaningful hearing as to whether RHI supervision is appropriate, and without allowing any other pretrial supervision agency to provide whatever supervisory conditions may be appropriate. 132. Defendant RHI further violates LUTPA by imposing conditions of release and determining its supervision fees without any lawful authority, thereby allowing RHI to charge supervisees exorbitant rates without any market competition. RHI then collects these fees by jailing or threatening to jail those under its supervision. 133. RHI’s practices offend public policy and are unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious. They have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs significant losses in both their money and property.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conversion
Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against RHI 134. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Complaint.
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135. Louisiana law protects against the intentional wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another’s goods, depriving her of permanent or indefinite possession.
136. Through the scheme described above, RHI has engaged in the tort of conversion by charging and collecting fees that are not authorized by statute or by order of the JDC.
137. RHI has also prevented Plaintiffs’ and proposed Class members’ release from jail until arrestees pay the initial fee, and RHI used the threat of future jailing to coerce payment of further fees.
138. Thus, Plaintiffs and proposed Class members are forced to agree to pay, and do pay, these fees under threats of arrest, jail, bond revocation, and duress.
139. As a result, RHI lacks any legal authority or right to collect and retain Plaintiffs’ and the proposed Class members’ initial and monthly fees. RHI thus has intentionally and wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs and proposed Class members of their monetary property.
140. RHI’s practices have directly harmed Plaintiffs and proposed Class members in their loss of property.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against RHI 141. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Complaint. 142. Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[a] person who has been enriched at the expense of another is bound to compensate that person.”
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143. Through the scheme describe above, RHI has unjustly enriched itself at Plaintiffs’ and proposed Class members’ expense by requiring exorbitant and unnecessary fees that are collected under threat and that are not authorized by law.
VII. REQUESTED RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs requests the following relief:
144. That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action; 145. Certification of the Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3); 146. Award treble damages to each Plaintiff and Class member and against Defendant Dunn for his violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes (Count I); 147. Award the greater of treble damages or $10,000 to each Plaintiff and Class member and against Defendant Dunn for his violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes (Count II); 148. Award damages to Plaintiffs and Class members and against Defendants East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI for these Defendants’ jailing of Plaintiffs and Class members because of nonpayment of RHI’s initial fee without properly considering Plaintiffs’ ability to pay, in violation of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection and Due Process (Count III); 149. Award damages to Plaintiffs and Class members and against Defendants East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI for their jailing of Plaintiffs and Class members for unlawfully prolonging Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ detention at the Prison after posted bond, in violation of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment (Count IV);
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150. Award damages to Plaintiffs and against Defendant RHI for RHI’s violations of the LUTPA (Counts V);
151. Award damages to Plaintiffs and proposed Class members and against Defendant RHI for RHI’s conversion and unjust enrichment (Counts VI and VII);
152. Award prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; 153. Grant other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

DATED this 7th day of August, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ivy Wang Ivy Wang On Behalf of Plaintiffs’ Counsel
Ivy Wang, La. Bar No. 35368 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 1055 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 505 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 P: 504-228-7279 F: 504-486-8947 E: ivy.wang@splcenter.org
Emily Early, ASB-8536B18H* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 East Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 340 Decatur, Georgia 30037 P: 404-221-4036 F: 404-221-5857 E: emily.early@splcenter.org
Sara Zampierin, ASB-1695-S34H* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 P: 334-956-8200 F: 334-956-8481 E: emily.early@splcenter.org E: sara.zampierin@splcenter.org

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Bruce Hamilton, La. Bar No. 33170 ACLU Foundation of Louisiana P.O. Box 56157 New Orleans, Louisiana 70156 P: 504-522-0628 F: 504-613-6511 E: bhamilton@laaclu.org Brandon Buskey (ASB-2753-A50B)* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: (212) 549-7364 E: bbuskey@aclu.org *application for pro hac vice pending Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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 Case 3:17-cv-00526-SDD-EWD Document 2 08/08/17 Page 1 of 30

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

)

HENRY AYO, and KAIASHA WHITE )

on behalf of themselves and all others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CLEVE DUNN, Sr.,

)

)

)

REHABILITATION HOME

)

INCARCERATION,

)

)

SID J. GAUTREAUX III, in his official )

capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge )

Parish

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 3:17-cv-526
AMENDED COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION
JURY DEMAND

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. For years, Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”), a private

organization purporting to provide pretrial supervision services, has profited off individuals in

East Baton Rouge Parish by requiring them to pay hundreds of dollars to RHI to be released

from jail—effectively holding them for ransom. This fee is the creation of RHI alone—it is not

ordered by any court. Those who cannot afford the fee languish in jail for days, weeks, or even

months as they and their loved ones scramble to pay off RHI.

2. This scheme is arranged by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”), RHI’s Chief Executive

Officer, and East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Office officials operating the East Baton Rouge

Parish Prison (the “Prison”), who, at RHI’s direction, refuse to release individuals ordered to

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RHI supervision until they pay the initial fee. These officials do not inquire into an individual’s ability to pay RHI’s initial fee.
3. The practice occurs with the knowledge of Trudy White, a criminal court judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana (the “JDC”), who sets bond for arrestees and indiscriminately orders them to undergo supervision by RHI—often for indefinite periods of time before their cases go to trial.
4. After arrestees pay RHI’s initial fee and are released by the Prison, RHI continues to exact money from them, charging a $225 monthly fee and additional fees for requirements such as classes and ankle monitoring. RHI and Dunn wrongfully use the threat of arrest by East Baton Parish Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials, as well as the threat of bond revocation by the JDC and additional jailing at the Prison, to coerce payment.
5. Plaintiffs Kaiasha White and Henry Ayo bring this class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Louisiana and federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Acts (RICO), and other state causes of action against Defendants Dunn, RHI, and East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Sid Gautreaux, III (“Gautreaux”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish. Defendant Dunn regularly commits predicate acts under RICO–extorting money from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class—by wrongfully detaining them in jail until they pay RHI’s initial fee, then threatening them with additional jailing if they fail to satisfy RHI’s continuing demands for money once released. Plaintiffs seek actual and treble damages to compensate them and the proposed Class for the injuries they have sustained, and continue to sustain, because of Defendant Dunn’s extortionate activities.
6. Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class also seek damages from Gautreaux in his official capacity and RHI for their policy and practice of detaining Plaintiffs
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and proposed Class members in the Prison until they paid RHI’s initial fee, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection and their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
7. Finally, Plaintiffs Ayo and White individually seek damages from RHI under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act for RHI’s harmful and oppressive commercial practices, and, on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class, seek damages from RHI for conversion and unjust enrichment under state law.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This is a civil class action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, the United States Constitution, and Louisiana law. 9. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 10. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.
III. PARTIES A. Plaintiffs
11. Plaintiff Henry Ayo is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish. 12. Plaintiff Kaiasha White is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish. B. Defendants 13. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr., is the Executive Director of Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. He is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
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14. Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”) is a non-profit corporation registered with the State of Louisiana, with its principal place of business in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
15. Defendant Sid J. Gautreaux, III is the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish. He is sued in his official capacity.
IV. FACTS General Facts A. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court 16. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court (the “JDC”) has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters and original exclusive jurisdiction of state felony cases in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1)-(2). Louisiana district court judges are elected and serve six-year terms. There are eight criminal court judges who hear misdemeanor and felony cases in the JDC. 17. The JDC and individual judges also make agreements with private companies to provide certain court services such as pre-trial supervision. 18. Judge White has served on the JDC since 2009 and was re-elected to the JDC in 2014. She presides over both civil matters and state misdemeanor and felony cases assigned to Criminal Division J, Section 8, of the JDC. B. RHI’s Judicial and Political Ties to Judge White 19. RHI is among the private companies that offer pretrial supervision services for the JDC.
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20. According to its website, RHI, which is registered as a non-profit corporation in Louisiana,1 has supervised thousands of individuals in East Baton Rouge, Orleans, Ascension, and Tangipahoa parishes since its inception in 1993.2

21. RHI is owned and operated by the Dunn family, who live in Baton Rouge. Cleve

Dunn Sr., Evonne Dunn, and Tameka Dunn all serve as co-directors of RHI.

22. website.3

RHI is the only approved vendor for pre-trial supervision on Judge White’s

23. RHI does not have a formal written contract with the JDC. Its provision of

services to Judge White is based on an informal arrangement between RHI and Judge White.

24. RHI officials and Judge White are political allies. RHI officials and employees

supported Judge White’s 2014 re-election campaign.

25. Cleve Dunn Jr. served as Chairperson of Judge White’s Campaign Committee;

White’s campaign paid Cleve Dunn, Sr. for marketing; and RHI paid Frederick Hall, a former

RHI employee, and his wife, Gloria Hall, who owns and operates the bond company to which

RHI routinely refers putative supervisees, for campaign support activities.

C. Defendants’ Pretrial Supervision Scheme

26. Individuals arrested for criminal offenses in East Baton Rouge Parish are initially

taken to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), which is staffed and operated by the

East Baton Rouge Sheriff, Defendant Gautreaux.

1 See La. Sec’y of State, “Search for La. Business Filings,” Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, https://coraweb.sos.la.gov/CommercialSearch/CommercialSearchDetails.aspx?CharterID=60196 2_DF50A07E17. 2 Who We Are, REHAB. HOME INCARCERATION (2014), http://www.rhiweb.com/. 3 Judge Trudy M. White, “Approved Vendors,” http://judgetrudywhite.com/page.php?name=vendors (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). Judge White also assigns individuals a company called Street Crimes Alternatives for pretrial supervision. However, this company is also run by Dunn.
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27. The following day, they appear via closed-circuit television between the Prison and the JDC for a hearing to determine probable cause for detention and to set bond. The eight criminal judges of the JDC take turns conducting this hearing, with each serving as the “duty judge” for a given week.
28. Usually before the hearing, the judge on duty has already reviewed the affidavit of probable cause and set a bond amount and release conditions for the defendant. At this hearing, the duty judge may adjust an arrestee’s bond based on facts disclosed at the hearing.
29. When Judge White is on duty, she typically asks an arrestee only about his knowledge of the charges and informs him of the bond amount. She generally does not ask questions beyond these topics. Nor does she allow arrestees to be heard on issues beyond these topics. Although a public defender may be present to note the cases appointed to the public defender office, no representation is provided at this initial hearing.
30. Since Judge White’s re-election to the JDC in 2014, she has assigned arrestees to supervision by RHI. White does so without conducting in open court an individualized determination of, or providing an opportunity for arrestees to be heard on, the need for, or the conditions of, RHI supervision. Indeed, White appears to make assignments to RHI via the bond form before arrestees appear before her, and she does not ask arrestees any questions before assigning them to RHI, such as whether an arrestee can afford to pay bond or RHI’s initial or monthly fees.
31. Rather than conduct these inquiries, Judge White signs an order making RHI supervision a condition of release on bond, without instruction about the terms of this supervision. Plaintiff Ayo’s bond order, which includes the term of supervision by RHI while on bond, is reproduced here:
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32. Judge White usually sets the duration of RHI’s supervision at either ninety days, irrespective of the supervisee’s next court date, or for an indefinite period of time.
33. As shown in Ayo’s bond order, however, Judge White otherwise does not provide specific supervision terms for RHI to enforce. For instance, Judge White does not order a curfew or impose house arrest on those assigned to RHI, though those are listed as “special conditions” that she could check to apply in her standard order.
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34. Nor does Judge White order payment of the initial fee or monthly fee as a condition of release from the Prison. Instead, RHI sets this payment as a condition of release.
35. Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux III has authority over, and responsibility for, operating the Prison. LSA-R.S. § 13:5539(C) (“Each sheriff shall be the keeper of the public jail of his parish . . .”). Gautreaux and Prison Warden Dennis Grimes (“Grimes”) have final policymaking authority on jailing and releasing arrestees for the East Baton Rouge Sheriff.
36. Through an agreement with RHI, Gautreaux and Grimes, as final policymakers for the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff with respect to jailing and releasing arrestees at the Prison, created and enforce a policy that the Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission from RHI—permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made.
37. RHI demands an initial fee of $525. 38. Arrestees typically only learn they must pay this initial fee to be released when they or their family members attempt to post bail or when they first meet with RHI at the Prison. 39. Arrestees who cannot immediately pay the initial RHI fee may wait in jail for days or weeks until they can pay all or some portion of the initial fee. 40. At the time of release, the arrestee’s next court date typically has not been scheduled, and the arrestee has not been arraigned. In some cases, the supervisee is not arraigned during the RHI supervision term. Thus, supervision sometimes ends before the arrestee ever re-appears before Judge White for his or her next hearing. 41. Upon release, RHI requires the arrestee—now a “supervisee”—to sign a contract setting forth RHI’s future fees and conditions of supervision. A copy of a redacted, standard contract is reproduced here:
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42. According to the terms of RHI’s standard contract, RHI supervisees must pay a $225 monthly fee to their assigned RHI officer, or “Monitor,” during their supervision term.
43. The standard contract also sets a curfew for supervisees, restricting supervisees from spending the night anywhere other than at their reported residential address.
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44. Despite collecting significant fees for its supervision, RHI does not require supervisees to make other substantive reports to their RHI Monitor other than their compliance with curfew. Nor does it typically require supervisees to meet their Monitor in person unless it is to make payment of their supervision fees. Rather, supervisees must only call their RHI Monitor by telephone multiple times a day and leave a voicemail message if the Monitor does not answer.
45. At RHI’s discretion, a Monitor may require a supervisee to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times for additional fees.
46. Additionally, RHI may require supervisees to attend and pay additional fees for classes taught by RHI employees. RHI also imposes a number of other conditions, including prohibiting supervisees from consuming any alcohol, restricting their movement to within East Baton Rouge Parish, requiring them to complete a “mental evaluation” through a certified physician, or mandating 50 hours of community service.
47. RHI’s standard contract with supervisees explicitly states that it will report any violation of these conditions to the JDC, which may result in the supervisee’s arrest by “East Baton Rouge City Police” or by an RHI official.
48. RHI Monitors and Dunn himself threaten supervisees with re-arrest if they fail to make financial payments or comply with RHI’s costly supervision conditions—without affirmatively inquiring into their ability to pay. Accordingly, supervisees pay (or attempt to pay) the fee out of fear of re-arrest and bond revocation by scraping together money from friends or family.
49. The policies and practices of RHI, including the standard contract and the fees required, were implemented by Defendant Dunn and enforced by his employees at his direction.
D. Plaintiffs’ Experience with Defendants’ Pretrial Scheme
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a. Plaintiff Henry Ayo 50. Plaintiff Henry Ayo appeared before Judge White on August 8, 2016, via closed circuit television from the Prison after he was arrested on suspicion of attempting to steal an air conditioning unit from a vacant property. 51. Judge White set his bond at $8,000, informed him of the charges, and assigned him to RHI supervision. White informed him that someone from RHI would visit him at the Prison to explain the process. 52. Judge White did not ask Mr. Ayo any questions about himself, his charges, or his case; she did not set or otherwise explain any terms of the RHI supervision; and she did not allow Mr. Ayo to ask any questions concerning the supervision. 53. A few days later, a RHI employee Frederick Hall came to the Prison and brought documents for Mr. Ayo to sign. Mr. Hall told Mr. Ayo that he would have to wear an ankle monitor and pay for it before he could be released. Mr. Hall said that once he was released, Mr. Ayo would have to call his RHI monitor every day in the morning and at night to ensure he was complying with his curfew, and that he would also have to pay a monthly fee to RHI. Mr. Hall explained that Mr. Ayo would be under house arrest, but he could leave for approved events like work and church. 54. Mr. Ayo stayed in jail another two months because he and his wife could not afford the bond amount and to pay RHI. Mr. Ayo was not working at the time and relied on his wife’s earnings. 55. When Mr. Ayo and his wife finally saved up enough money, the bail bondsperson came to their house, took the money for the bail fee, and agreed to post bail. The bondsperson told Ms. Ayo that she needed to call RHI but that the bondsperson did not know why.
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56. Ms. Ayo called RHI and spoke to Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall informed her that she still had to pay approximately $500 to RHI for Mr. Ayo to be released from the Prison and would have to continue paying each month. Mr. Hall then came to her house to collect this initial fee. Ms. Ayo told Mr. Hall she could not pay the full amount at that time. Mr. Hall allowed her to pay $225 initially, and to pay the rest later. She asked Mr. Hall how much they would have to pay in total, and Mr. Hall told her it would likely add up to $1000.
57. RHI then notified Prison officials that they could release Mr. Ayo from jail, and the Prison released Mr. Ayo.
58. Later, an RHI Monitor came to Mr. Ayo’s home for him to sign additional documents. The Monitor required Mr. Ayo to sign a contract, which provided that, if Mr. Ayo violated the agreement, including nonpayment of the $225 monthly fee, he could be arrested by an RHI official or East Baton Rouge law enforcement.
59. The Monitor told Mr. Ayo that in addition to reporting to her, he would have to take a decision-making class with an additional fee. However, Mr. Ayo never paid or went to this class.
60. While on RHI supervision, Mr. Ayo, who was not stably employed at the time, would pay as much money as he could to cover RHI’s fees—typically sending $50 or $100 money orders in the mail. Despite their attempts to keep up with the payments, RHI charged them late fees. Mr. Ayo and his wife, who helped with the payments and was working two jobs, had to put off paying for utilities such as water and electricity to pay RHI.
61. Mr. Ayo was never given an ankle monitor, though the RHI representative had told him his fees were in part to pay for the ankle monitor.
62. Mr. Ayo paid until his case concluded on February 27, 2017.
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63. After the case closed, RHI still called Mr. Ayo to demand that he pay $200 that it claimed he owed RHI. Altogether Mr. and Mrs. Ayo have paid approximately $1,000 to RHI.
b. Plaintiff Kaiasha White 64. Plaintiff Kaisha White appeared before Judge White on August 8, 2016, after her arrest on charges of simple and aggravated battery concerning an argument with her partner. 65. Judge White set her bond at $4,000 and informed her that she would also have to report to RHI. 66. Judge White did not ask Ms. White any questions about herself, her charges, or her case; did not set any terms of the RHI supervision; and did not allow Ms. White to ask any questions about the supervision. 67. Ms. White did not have money to pay RHI, as she was unemployed at the time and relied on her partner and family members to pay her living expenses. Thus, she was detained in the Prison for another month until her mother received a social security check. 68. On or about September 1, 2016, Ms. White’s mother gave a bail bondswoman $500. The bondswoman told Ms. White that the bondswoman and RHI would split the payment, and that a portion would go towards RHI’s initial fee. 69. The next day, RHI employee Hall went to the Prison and met with Ms. White. He informed her that she would have to pay the remainder of the initial fee and monthly supervision fee after she was released. He then had her sign RHI’s contract, which provided that Ms. White could be arrested by an RHI official or East Baton Rouge law enforcement if she violated its terms. Later that day, Ms. White was released from the Prison. 70. During Ms. White’s detention in the Prison for her inability to pay RHI’s initial fee, a severe flood hit Baton Rouge in mid-August, damaging her home and her and her son’s
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belongings. Because she was being held in the Prison, she could not check on her home or attempt to salvage her possessions for several weeks.
71. Following Ms. White’s release from the Prison, Ms. White’s mother paid an additional $250 towards the initial fee. Ms. White later met with Frederick Hall at her house. Mr. Hall told her that she would have to wear an ankle monitor and that he would call her each night to make sure she obeyed curfew.
72. In the following months, Ms. White called Mr. Hall on occasion to let him know she was trying to save up money to pay her monthly fee. She repeatedly asked him how long she would be on RHI supervision, but he did not give her a definite time; her bond order also did not indicate how many days she would be on supervision. Mr. Hall also did not provide Ms. White with an ankle monitor.
73. As time passed and she still was not able to pay RHI’s monthly fees, Mr. Hall accused her of falsely claiming that she was trying to pay. Ms. White became afraid that RHI would have her arrested.
74. During this time, Ms. White lacked a stable place to live and had to stay with family and friends because her home was still flood damaged.
75. On or about late December or early January, Ms. White told Mr. Hall that she could pay RHI $300.
76. Because Ms. White was worried that if she saw Mr. Hall in person, he would have her arrested, she had her son meet Mr. Hall to deliver the payment.
77. Sometime after she made this payment, another RHI representative also called Ms. White to inform her she had failed to pay for and attend a $55-per-month class. However, Mr. Hall had not told Ms. White that she was required to attend this class. The RHI
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representative told her that if she did not comply, RHI would have her arrested during the next police “round up.”
78. Ms. White called Mr. Hall to ask why she was being required to take and pay for the class, but no one answered at his phone number. She subsequently received a letter from RHI stating that Mr. Hall had left RHI.
79. Ms. White did not hear from Mr. Hall again. However, she began receiving letters from RHI claiming that she owed roughly $800. Ms. White lacks the money to pay this amount. She still does not know for how long she was under RHI supervision or whether it has actually ended.
Facts Common to All RICO Counts 80. Plaintiff White is a “person” entitled to bring a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and La. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356(E). 81. Plaintiff Ayo is a “person” entitled to bring a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and La. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356(E). 82. RHI is a corporate enterprise that regularly engages in interstate commerce. RHI’s engagement in interstate commerce includes, but is not limited to, using telecommunications and electronic monitoring technology to track supervisees across state lines, purchasing and employing electronic monitoring devices that are produced and sold outside the state of Louisiana, accepting payment of fees by credit card, and maintaining a website available to users in interstate commerce. 83. Defendant Dunn is an individual and thus a “person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
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84. Defendant Dunn has conducted the affairs of RHI through a pattern of racketeering to achieve the common purpose of unlawfully extorting money from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class. These racketeering acts are an integral part of RHI’s regular course of business.
85. As described above, on numerous occasions over an unknown period of time Defendant Dunn has committed related, predicate acts of extortion by threatening to keep, and— through East Baton Rouge officials Gautreaux and Grimes—arranging with the Prison to keep Plaintiffs and the proposed Class in jail until they have paid RHI’s required initial fee, and instructing his employees to do the same. Thereafter, Defendant Dunn, directly and through the actions of his Monitors and other employees, continues this unlawful use of fear to threaten Plaintiffs and the proposed Class with further jail time or court sanctions if they fail to pay RHI’s monthly and programmatic fees.
86. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn has committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs and the proposed Class from the Prison until they paid money towards the RHI initiation fee. Additionally, by unlawfully using the fear of arrest and jail by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials, Dunn on numerous occasions extorted from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class a monthly supervision fee, along with fees for classes or other requirements imposed at the discretion of RHI employees.
87. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
88. These actions are a regular way of conducting the ongoing business of RHI.
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89. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities, Plaintiffs and the proposed Class have been injured in their property in that they have paid and continue to pay RHI’s fees due to the fear induced by Dunn and RHI employees’ wrongful use and threats of arrest and jailing.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 90. Plaintiffs White and Ayo propose a class seeking damages as to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). The Class is defined as: All individuals whom Judge White ordered to pretrial supervision by Defendant RHI who were subsequently supervised by RHI. 91. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiffs and putative Class members can challenge Defendants’ extortionate racketeering scheme and unlawful use and threat of wealth-based detention to extort fees from Plaintiffs and the Class. 92. Class-action status under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate because questions of law or fact common to proposed Class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 93. Furthermore, as detailed below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a). A. Requirements of Rule 23(a) Rule 23(a)(1) - Impracticability of Joinder Due to Numerosity
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94. The precise size of the proposed Class is unknown by Plaintiffs, but it is substantial given the number of arrestees Judge White has assigned to RHI supervision in recent years.
95. Court records indicate that over three hundred people were ordered to RHI supervision by Judge White in 2015 and 2016.
96. Many of the proposed Class members are low-income individuals who will be difficult to identify and likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Joinder of every member of the proposed Class would be impracticable. Rule 23(a)(2) - Commonality
97. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the proposed Class. The named Plaintiffs seek monetary relief from Defendants’ extortionate and unconstitutional pretrial supervision practices, which violate the state and federally-protected rights of the Class members.
98. Among the most important common questions of fact for the proposed Class are: a. Whether RHI, independent of Judge White, sets terms for an arrestee’s release and the fees for its supervision services; b. Whether Dunn, RHI, and Gautreaux, in his official capacity, have made an agreement that individuals Judge White assigns to RHI may not be released from the Prison until they have paid RHI’s initial fee, and RHI notifies the Prison of such payment; c. Whether RHI and Gautreaux, in his official capacity, enforce this agreement against the proposed Class without determining whether proposed Class members can afford to pay RHI’s initial fee;
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d. Whether Gautreaux has a policy, practice, or custom of detaining arrestees until obtaining RHI’s permission to release them;
e. Whether RHI’s standard contract provides for an initial fee and monthly fees; f. Whether RHI’s standard contract provides for arrest and jailing for failure to pay
its fees; g. Whether Dunn directs RHI employees to threaten to arrest and jail Proposed Class
members who do not pay the monthly supervisory fees and other mandated fees to RHI; 99. Among the most important common questions of law for the proposed Class are: a. Whether Defendant Dunn’s operation of RHI through a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically, extorting money from Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class by unlawfully detaining them in the Prison until they pay RHI’s initial fee, then threatening them with additional jailing if they fail to pay RHI monthly fees once released, violates the Louisiana and federal RICO Acts; b. Whether Gautreaux and RHI’s practice of detaining Plaintiffs Ayo and White and members of the proposed Class in the Prison because they could not pay RHI’s initial fee violates Plaintiffs and proposed Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process and equal protection; c. Whether Gautreaux and RHI’s detention of Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members after they posted bonds constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and d. Whether RHI lacks any legal authority or right to collect fees from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members.
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Rule 23(a)(3) - Typicality 100. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
proposed Class, and they have the same interests in this case as all other proposed Class members that they represent. Each of them suffers injuries from Defendants’ failure to comply with state and federal law: they were each confined in jail for nonpayment of RHI’s initial fee, without inquiry into their ability to pay, and then threatened with additional jailing if they did not pay RHI’s subsequent fees and costs. The answer to whether Defendants’ scheme is unlawful will determine the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other proposed Class member.
101. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices violate their federal and state rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the proposed Class. Rule 23(a)(4) - Adequacy
102. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class they seek to represent.
103. Plaintiffs have no interests separate from, or in conflict with, those of the proposed Class they seek to represent as a whole, and they seek damages, which Plaintiffs pursue on behalf of the entire proposed Class that they seek to represent.
C. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 104. Class certification of the proposed Class is appropriate because common
questions of law and fact, including those listed above, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
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105. The proposed Class seeks damages against Defendant Dunn, Defendant Gautreaux in his official capacity, and RHI for jailing the proposed Class until its members were able to pay RHI’s initial fee, engaging in a pretrial supervision scheme that allowed RHI, under Dunn’s direction, to extort additional fees and costs from the proposed Class by wrongfully threatening future jail time and court sanctions for nonpayment.
D. The Requirements of Rule 23(g) 106. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana, and the Southern Poverty Law Center who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) Plaintiffs Ayo and White the Proposed Class against Cleve Dunn, Sr. 107. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt Paragraphs 1 through 106 of this Amended Complaint. 108. Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”) is an enterprise engaged in and whose activities affect interstate commerce. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr., is RHI’s Executive Director. 109. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Defendant Dunn conducts RHI’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to illegally extort money from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and proposed Class Members. Specifically, Dunn has made an agreement with Judge Trudy
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White for RHI to be Judge White’s approved vendor for pretrial court supervision. Dunn then imposes conditions of supervision for arrestees assigned to RHI, including imposing fees for release and monthly supervision, and uses threats of incarceration for supervisees who do not comply with RHI’s conditions or pay the required fees.
110. Dunn has made a separate agreement with Prison officials that prohibits the release of pretrial arrestees assigned to RHI unless the arrestees pay RHI’s initial fee and RHI sends confirmation to the Prison that the arrestee has paid said fee.
111. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn has committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class from the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison until they paid the initial fee to RHI. By unlawfully using the fear of arrest by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials to coerce payment, Dunn additionally extorted from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class on numerous occasions a monthly monitoring fee of $225, along with other fees for classes required at the discretion of RHI employees.
112. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
113. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities and his violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class have been injured in their property because they have paid and continue to pay RHI’s fees from the fear induced by Dunn and RHI’s wrongful threats of arrest and jailing.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Louisiana Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act
(LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C))
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Plaintiff Ayo and White and the Proposed Class against Cleve Dunn, Sr. 114. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 106 of this Amended Complaint. 115. RHI is an enterprise that conducts business in the state of Louisiana. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr., is RHI’s Executive Director. 116. In violation of LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C), Defendant Dunn conducts RHI’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to illegally extort money from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and proposed Class Members. Specifically, Dunn has made an agreement with Judge Trudy White for RHI to be White’s approved vendor for pretrial court supervision. Dunn then imposes conditions of supervision for arrestees assigned to RHI, including imposing fees for release and monthly supervision, and uses threats of incarceration for supervisees who do not comply with RHI’s conditions or pay the required fees. 117. Dunn has made a separate agreement with Prison officials that prohibits the release of pretrial arrestees assigned to RHI unless the arrestees pay RHI’s initial fee and RHI sends confirmation to the Prison that the arrestee has paid said fee. 118. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn has committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class from the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison until they secured and paid the initial fee to RHI. By unlawfully using the fear of arrest by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials to coerce payment Dunn additionally extorted from Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class on numerous occasions a monthly monitoring fee of $225 on behalf of RHI, along with other fees for classes or other services required at the discretion of RHI employees.
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119. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity under Louisiana law.
120. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities and violations of LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C), Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class have been injured in their property in that they have paid and continue to pay RHI’s fees from the fear induced by Dunn and RHI’s wrongful threats of arrest and jailing.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
(Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against Sid J. Gautreaux, III in his official
capacity as Sheriff for East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI 121. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Amended Complaint. 122. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection prohibit jailing a person solely because of her inability to access money and make a monetary payment. 123. Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty under state and federal law. 124. Defendant Gautreaux’s practice and policy—enforced through Gautreaux and Grimes as final policymakers for the Sheriff on jailing and releasing practices at the Prison—to jail Plaintiffs and members of the Proposed Class until they could pay RHI the initial fee, without an affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative conditions of release, violated Plaintiffs’
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and the proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining arrestees until they could pay the initial RHI fee and be released from the Prison.
125. Defendant RHI also violated Plaintiffs’ and the proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining arrestees until they could pay the initial RHI fee and be released from the Prison, without an affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative conditions of release.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux, III in his official capacity as Sheriff for East Baton Rouge Parish and RHI 126. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Amended Complaint. 127. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures—including the detention of individuals beyond expiration of a valid order of confinement, without probable cause. 128. Defendant Gautreaux’s practice and policy —enforced through Gautreaux and Grimes as final policymakers for the Sheriff on jailing and releasing practices at the Prison—and Defendant RHI’s practice to continue to detain Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members, until they paid the initial RHI fee, without probable cause, and thus beyond the time Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members should have obtained pretrial release after posting bond, violated Plaintiffs proposed Class members’ Fourth Amendment rights.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act
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(La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405) Plaintiffs Ayo and White against RHI 129. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 of this Amended Complaint. 130. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) bars “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405, and authorizes recovery for any person who suffers an “ascertainable loss” as a result of this misconduct, whether of money or property, La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409(A). 131. Defendant RHI has violated LUTPA by entering an agreement whereby White assigns pretrial arrestees to RHI without a meaningful hearing as to whether RHI supervision is appropriate, and without allowing any other pretrial supervision agency to provide whatever supervisory conditions may be appropriate. 132. Defendant RHI further violates LUTPA by imposing conditions of release and determining its supervision fees without any lawful authority, thereby allowing RHI to charge supervisees exorbitant rates without any market competition. RHI then collects these fees by jailing or threatening to jail those under its supervision. 133. RHI’s practices offend public policy and are unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious. They have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs significant losses in both their money and property.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conversion
Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against RHI
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134. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Amended Complaint.
135. Louisiana law protects against the intentional wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another’s goods, depriving her of permanent or indefinite possession.
136. Through the scheme described above, RHI has engaged in the tort of conversion by charging and collecting fees that are not authorized by statute or by order of the JDC.
137. RHI has also prevented Plaintiffs’ and proposed Class members’ release from jail until arrestees pay the initial fee, and RHI used the threat of future jailing to coerce payment of further fees.
138. Thus, Plaintiffs and proposed Class members are forced to agree to pay, and do pay, these fees under threats of arrest, jail, bond revocation, and duress.
139. As a result, RHI lacks any legal authority or right to collect and retain Plaintiffs’ and the proposed Class members’ initial and monthly fees. RHI thus has intentionally and wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs and proposed Class members of their monetary property.
140. RHI’s practices have directly harmed Plaintiffs and proposed Class members in their loss of property.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiffs Ayo and White and the proposed Class against RHI 141. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 79 and 90 through 106 of this Amended Complaint. 142. Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[a] person who has been enriched at the expense of another is bound to compensate that person.”
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143. Through the scheme describe above, RHI has unjustly enriched itself at Plaintiffs’ and proposed Class members’ expense by requiring exorbitant and unnecessary fees that are collected under threat and that are not authorized by law.
VII. REQUESTED RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs requests the following relief:
144. That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action; 145. Certification of the Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3); 146. Award treble damages to each Plaintiff and Class member and against Defendant Dunn for his violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes (Count I); 147. Award the greater of treble damages or $10,000 to each Plaintiff and Class member and against Defendant Dunn for his violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes (Count II); 148. Award damages to Plaintiffs and Class members and against Defendants Gautreaux in his official capacity and RHI for these Defendants’ jailing of Plaintiffs and Class members because of nonpayment of RHI’s initial fee without properly considering Plaintiffs’ ability to pay, in violation of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection and Due Process (Count III); 149. Award damages to Plaintiffs and Class members and against Defendants Gautreaux official capacity and RHI for their jailing of Plaintiffs and Class members for unlawfully prolonging Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ detention at the Prison after posted bond, in violation of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment (Count IV);
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150. Award damages to Plaintiffs and against Defendant RHI for RHI’s violations of the LUTPA (Counts V);
151. Award damages to Plaintiffs and proposed Class members and against Defendant RHI for RHI’s conversion and unjust enrichment (Counts VI and VII);
152. Award prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; 153. Grant other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

DATED this 8th day of August, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ivy Wang Ivy Wang On Behalf of Plaintiffs’ Counsel
Ivy Wang, La. Bar No. 35368 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 1055 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 505 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 P: 504-228-7279 F: 504-486-8947 E: ivy.wang@splcenter.org
Emily Early, ASB-8536B18H* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 East Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 340 Decatur, Georgia 30037 P: 404-221-4036 F: 404-221-5857 E: emily.early@splcenter.org
Sara Zampierin, ASB-1695-S34H* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 P: 334-956-8200 F: 334-956-8481 E: emily.early@splcenter.org E: sara.zampierin@splcenter.org

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/s/Bruce Hamilton____________________ Bruce Hamilton Bruce Hamilton, La. Bar No. 33170 ACLU Foundation of Louisiana P.O. Box 56157 New Orleans, Louisiana 70156 P: 504-522-0628 F: 504-613-6511 E: bhamilton@laaclu.org Brandon Buskey (ASB-2753-A50B)* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: 212- 549-7364 F: 212-549-2654 E: bbuskey@aclu.org *application for pro hac vice pending Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

HENRY AYO, and KAIASHA WHITE on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

CIVIL ACTION 17-526-SDD-EWD

VERSES CLEVE DUNN Sr., REHABILITATION HOME INCARCERATION, SID J.
RULING Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“FRCP 12(b)(6)”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted filed by Defendant, Sid J. Gautreaux, III, in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish (“Defendant” or “Sheriff”). Plaintiffs, Henry Ayo and Kaiasha White, (“Plaintiffs”) filed an Opposition,2 and Movant has filed a Reply.3 For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be granted. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Allegations Plaintiffs, Henry Ayo (“Ayo”) and Kaiasha White (“White”), bring claims on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), against Sid J. Gautreaux, in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish. Plaintiffs also assert claims against Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”) and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”), under Federal and State Racketeering Influenced Corrupt

1 Rec. Doc. 17. 2 Rec Doc. 23 (duplicate filed at Rec. Doc. 29). 3 Rec. Doc. 37.
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Organization Acts (“RICO”), the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”), and state tort claims for conversion and unjust enrichment.4
According to the Amended Complaint,5 Plaintiffs were arrested in East Baton Rouge Parish and taken to the East Baton Rouge prison (“prison”).6 The Plaintiffs appeared before 19th Judicial District Court (“JDC”) Judge Trudy White (“Judge White”) “for a hearing to determine probable cause for detention and to set bond”7 on the day following their respective arrests. Ayo, who was arrested on a charge of Simple Burglary of an Inhabited Dwelling and related offenses, alleges that “Judge White set his bond at $8,000, informed him of the charges, and assigned him to RHI supervision. White informed him that someone from RHI would visit him at the Prison to explain the process.”8 The Amended Complaint incorporates Ayo’s Bond Order entered by Judge White.9 The Bond Order directs the Sherriff to release Ayo “upon a good and solvent bond conditioned as the law directs in the total sum of $8,000.”10 The Order further provides: “You shall be under the supervision of RHI-Cleve Dunn @ 364-7753 for a period of 90 days to ensure compliance with this order upon release on bond.”11 Finally, the Order directs that “You shall not be released on bond without first meeting with your bond supervisor.”12 Plaintiff White alleges that, following an “arrest on charges of simple

4 Rec. Doc. 2. 5 Id. 6 The Plaintiffs’ arrests and subsequent State Court proceedings are unrelated. 7 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶27, 50, 64. 8 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶51. 9 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶31. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id.
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and aggravated battery…Judge White set her bond at $4,000 and informed her that she would also have to report to RHI.”13
Plaintiffs claim that the Sheriff violated their constitutional rights secured under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that the Sherriff is the final policy maker responsible for the detention and release of prisoners in East Baton Rouge Parish and that, “[t]hrough an agreement with RHI,” the Sherriff “created and enforce[d] a policy that the Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission from RHI—permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made.”14 Plaintiffs allege that continued detention until an arrestee can “pay the initial RHI fee and be release from the Prison” violates their fundamental liberty interests secured by the Fourteenth Amendment15 and constitutes an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.16
Urging dismissal for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6), the Sherriff argues that, “[e]ven if the Sheriff created and enforced a policy that the Prison will not release arrestees ‘until it receives permission from RHI-permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made,’ Plaintiffs have not alleged that the policy is the moving force behind the violation of their constitutional right and have failed to show a direct causal link between the alleged policy and the violation.”17

13 Rec. Doc. ¶ 64, 65. 14 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶8. 15 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 124. 16 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 128. 17 Rec. Doc. 17-1.
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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”18 The Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”19 “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”20 In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”21 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”22 However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”23 In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than
18 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). 19 Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011). 20 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467). 21 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal citations and brackets omitted)(hereinafter Twombly). 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)(internal citations omitted)(hereinafter “Iqbal”). 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Document Number: 45937
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a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”24 “Furthermore, while the
court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”25 On a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”26
B. Section 1983 Claims against the Sheriff A suit against a government official in his official capacity is the equivalent of filing suit against the government agency of which the official is an agent.27 Accordingly, the
claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity are, in effect, claims against the municipal entity he represents, which is East Baton Rouge Parish.28
To determine whether a public official is liable in his official capacity, the Court
looks to the jurisprudence addressing municipality or local government liability under Section 1983.29 Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of three elements:
1) an official policy or custom, of which, 2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and 3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.30
In order for a municipality to be held liable under Section 1983, the plaintiff must
24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004). 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). 27 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv, of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F. 3d 452,466 (5th Cir. 1999) 28 Graham, 473 U.S. at 165; see also Bellard v. Gautreaux, No. CIV.A. 08-627, 2010 WL 3523051, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2010) amended in part, No. CIV.A. 08-627, 2010 WL 4977480 (M.D. La. Dec. 2, 2010), affirmed, 675 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2012) and affirmed, 675 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2012). 29 Id. at 470. 30 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010). Document Number: 45937
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identify an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom that caused his/her injury.31
It is not enough for a Section 1983 plaintiff to identify conduct properly attributable
to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through deliberate conduct,
the municipality was a ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must
show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of
federal rights.32
Movant urges dismissal arguing that Plaintiffs fail to plead plausible allegations that
the Sheriff’s detention and release policies and/or practices were the “moving force”
behind the constitutional violation. The following are the entirety of the allegations against
the Sheriff:
2. This scheme is arranged by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”), RHI’s Chief Executive Officer, and East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Office officials operating the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), who, at RHI’s direction, refuse to release individuals ordered to RHI supervision until they pay the initial fee.
15. Defendant Sid J. Gautreaux, III is the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish. He is sued in his official capacity.
26. Individuals arrested for criminal offenses in East Baton Rouge Parish are initially taken to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), which is staffed and operated by the East Baton Rouge Sheriff, Defendant Gautreaux.
31 Monell v. Dep 't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Parm v. Shumate,513 F. 3d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 129 S.Ct. 42, 172 L.Ed.2d 21 (2008). 32 Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). Document Number: 45937
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35.
Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux III has authority over, and responsibility for, operating the Prison. LSA-R.S. § 13:5539(C) (“Each sheriff shall be the keeper of the public jail of his parish . . .”). Gautreaux and Prison Warden Dennis Grimes (“Grimes”) have final policymaking authority on jailing and releasing arrestees for the East Baton Rouge Sheriff.
36.
Through an agreement with RHI, Gautreaux and Grimes, as final policymakers for the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff with respect to jailing and releasing arrestees at the Prison, created and enforce a policy that the Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission from RHI—permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made.
124 & 128.
Defendant Gautreaux’s practice and policy—enforced through Gautreaux and Grimes as final policymakers for the Sheriff on jailing and releasing practices at the Prison—to jail Plaintiffs and members of the Proposed Class until they could pay RHI the initial fee, without an affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative conditions of release, violated Plaintiffs and the proposed Class’s fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining arrestees until they could pay the initial RHI fee and be released from the Prison.33
Plaintiffs plead the existence of a “scheme” between the Sherriff and the RHI
principal Cleve Dunn.34 Plaintiffs also plead that there is an “agreement” whereby “the
Prison will not release arrestees from the Prison until it receives permission from RHI—
permission that comes only after RHI is satisfied with the initial payment made.”35
However, these conclusory allegations of a “scheme” and an “agreement” are
unsupported by the detailed factual allegations of the Amended Complaint, set forth in
their entirety above. Plaintiffs fail to plead facts which would allow the Court to draw an

33 Rec. Doc. 2. 34 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 2. 35 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 36.
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inference that the Sherriff was the moving force behind the constitutional violations. Plaintiff Ayo’s Bond Order incorporated at paragraph 31 of the Amended
Complaint provides as follows: 36
 Authorizes release “upon a good and solvent bond conditioned as the law directs in the total sum of $8,000.”
 “You shall be under the supervision of RHI-Cleve Dunn @ 364-7753 for a period of 90 days to ensure compliance with this order upon release on bond.”
 “You shall not be released on bond without first meeting with your bond supervisor.” 37 Nothing in the Bond Order requires the payment of initial fees to RHI as a condition
for release. Plaintiffs allege that “arrestees typically only learn that they must pay this initial fee to be released when they or their family members attempt to post bail or when they first meet with RHI at the Prison.”38 Again, this conclusory allegation is unsupported by the facts pled. Neither Ayo nor White allege that they attempted to post bail but were refused release by the Sheriff until RHI was paid a fee.
Ayo alleges that he had to stay in prison two (2) months because “he and his wife could not afford the bond amount and to pay RHI”.39 There is no allegation that Ayo attempted to post the bond amount but was refused release. Likewise, there is no allegation that a Sheriff’s office employee or Deputy told Ayo that payment of initial fees to RHI was a condition of release. Rather, the Amended Complaint makes plain that Ayo’s belief that paying RHI was a condition of release came from an RHI representative - a “Mr. Hall (“Hall”) - [who] informed [Ayo’s wife] that she still had to pay approximately

36 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶ 31. 37 Id. 38 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶38. 39 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶54.
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$500 to RHI for Mr. Ayo to be released from the Prison.”40 Plaintiff White alleges that “the bondswoman told Ms. White that the bondswoman
and RHI would split the payment, and that a portion would go towards RHI’s initial fee.”41 White further alleges that, “[t]he next day, RHI employee Hall went to the prison and met with Ms. White [and] informed her that she would have to pay the remainder of the initial fee and the monthly supervision fee after she was released.”42 At that time, Hall presented RHI’s contract to White for her signature. Plaintiffs incorporate what is alleged to be “a copy of [RHI’s] redacted, standard contract” as a part of the Amended Complaint.43 Notably, the RHI contract, which White signed, provides that “payment is due upon release of the client from incarceration.”44
On these facts, the Court finds no plausible basis to support the conclusory allegations that the Sheriff was “in agreement” or part of a “scheme” with RHI. At best, the factual allegations suggest that Plaintiffs believed that RHI’s initial fees had to be paid as a condition of release because of what they were allegedly told by RHI or bondsmen. Under the circumstances as pled, it is understandable that the Plaintiffs believed what RHI told them, but there are simply no allegations that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the Sheriff was a moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. At most, the allegations suggest that the Bond Order created an indicia of authority in RHI which RHI then exploited to extract fees in contravention of the plain language of its own contract with Plaintiffs. The law presumes that Plaintiffs read and

40 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶56. 41 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶68. 42 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶69. 43 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶41 44 Id. (emphasis added).
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understood RHI’s fees when they signed the contract with RHI. III. CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, the Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss45 is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on June 4, 2018.
S
JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

45 Rec. Doc. 17. Document Number: 45937

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

HENRY AYO and KAIASHA WHITE on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

CIVIL ACTION 17-526-SDD-EWD

VERSES CLEVE DUNN SR., REHABILITATION HOME INCARCERATION, SID J.
RULING Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss1 by Defendants Rehabilitation Home Incarceration’s (“RHI”) and Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs Henry Ayo (“Ayo”) and Kaiasha White (“White”)(collectively “Plaintiffs”) have filed an Opposition2 to this motion. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiffs have asserted federal3 and state4 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”) claims against Dunn and Civil Rights violations against RHI.5 Plaintiffs have also asserted against RHI Louisiana state law claims of conversion, unjust enrichment, and claims under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”).6 Defendants move for dismissal of the RICO and §1983 claims. Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ LUTPA claims or the other state law claims for conversion or

1 Rec. Doc. 46. 2 Rec. Doc. 52. 3 18 U.S.C. §1962(c). 4 La. R.S. 15:1353(C). 5 42 U.S.C. §1983. 6 La. R.S. 51:1405.
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unjust enrichment; thus, the Court treats the present Motion as a motion for partial
dismissal.
The factual background has been previously reviewed by the Court and will not be
reiterated herein.7 Likewise, the applicable legal standard has been set forth by the Court
in its Ruling on the co-defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.8 The same standard is applicable
and will be applied to the present Motion before the Court.
RICO Claims Against Dunn
Defendants utterly fail to brief the elements of both the federal and state RICO
claims and fail to argue how the Complaint fails to state a claim. Rather, Dunn maintains
that he cannot or should not be amenable to suit because he “has done nothing wrong”
and is distinct from the RHI corporate entity. Dunn urges dismissal arguing that:
[Dunn] owns shares in the company [RHI] but does not alone control the company. Plaintiffs have not and cannot prove nor point to any evidence that CLEVE DUNN, SR., has done anything wrong to plaintiffs or that he has the authority to control the jail house administration or the district court judges.
Plaintiffs’ shotgun approach in this matter must be curtailed and CLEVE DUNN, SR., must be dismissed from this matter as plaintiffs’ Complaint has failed to show what CLEVE DUNN, SR., has done wrong. CLEVE DUNN, SR., must be dismissed as a defendant.
* * * CLEVE DUNN, SR., avers that RHI is a citizen of Louisiana as it was incorporated in Louisiana and has its place of business therein. Without a doubt, a corporation is an entity quite distinct from its stockholders and therefore, since plaintiffs have failed to separate CLEVE DUNN, SR., from RHI and show this Court what CLEVE DUNN, SR., is personally liable for, he should be dismissed from this matter.9

7 See Rec. Doc. 61. 8 Id. 9 Rec. Doc. 46-1.
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On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court cannot determine facts or make credibility determinations. The only inquiry is whether the allegations of the Complaint,10 assumed as true, state a plausible claim for relief.
Dunn argues that he cannot be sued under RICO because he is “personally distinct” from RHI.11 This contention is erroneous. The United States Supreme Court has held that “an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of [the] statute.”12 The Supreme Court explained that RICO “protects a legitimate enterprise from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, and also protects the public from those who would unlawfully use an enterprise (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a vehicle through which unlawful . . . activity is committed.”13
The Complaint states a plausible claim against Dunn. In an apparent misunderstanding of the allegations of the Complaint, Dunn argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege that he committed fraud, misrepresentation, or collusion. However, a plain reading of the Complaint reveals that the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is predicated on allegations of extortion. The factual allegations that Dunn and his agents communicate to arrestees that they will not be released from jail until RHI’s initial fee is paid,14 and the allegations that Dunn and his agents threaten pretrial supervisees with bond revocation and arrest if they fail to pay RHI’s monthly fee,15 are sufficient to state claims under both federal and state RICO statutes.
10 As used herein, the term “Complaint” refers to the Complaint and Amended Complaint, Rec. Docs. 1 & 2. 11 Id. 12 Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). 13 Id. at 164 (internal citations omitted). 14 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 2, 49, 53, 56, 67, and 69. 15 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 4, 48-49, 58, 69, and 77. 47558
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Dunn’s Motion to Dismiss the federal and state RICO claims is DENIED. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Claims Against RHI Seemingly addressing the Plaintiffs’ civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, RHI argues that it “is a private corporation and [has] no judicial power whatsoever”16 and that RHI cannot be liable for any constitutional violations because RHI’s policies were not the “moving force” behind the alleged violations.17 The Court liberally construes this argument as a challenge to the § 1983 claims brought against RHI. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts which plausibly allege "(1) a deprivation of a right secured by federal law, (2) that occurred under color of state law, and 3) was caused by a state actor."18 While RHI fails to brief the state actor requirement, the Court construes the contention that RHI had no judicial power as a challenge to the state actor element. “The party charged with the [constitutional] deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”19 However, private actors may be liable under § 1983 under some circumstances.20 The question thus presented is whether, under the facts plausibly plead, RHI was acting under color of state law and, thus, amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint alleges that: RHI offers pretrial services for the 19th JDC;21 that RHI is “the only approved vendor for pre-trial supervision on Judge White’s website”;22 that RHI “does not have a formal written contract with the JDC, [and its] provision of services to Judge

16 Rec. Doc. 46-1. 17 Id. 18 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004). 19 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). 20 Id. 21 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶19. 22 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶22.
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White is based on an informal arrangement between RHI and Judge White”;23 and that RHI (and not Judge White) sets the conditions of pretrial release and the payment terms for pretrial supervision.24
“Under color of state law has been defined as functions that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.’”25 “The maintenance of a prison system is something ‘traditionally reserved to the state.’”26 Likewise, pretrial detention and supervision are traditionally state functions. Accepting the factual allegations as true, the Court finds that RHI performs the same public functions as the state Court vis-à-vis pretrial conditions of release.
Parroting the arguments advanced by the Sherriff in its Motion to Dismiss,27 RHI argues that the § 1983 claim must be dismissed because, “[e]ven if Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated, RHI internal policy cannot be and was not the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged violations.”28 Conduct constitutes a “moving force” if there is a “direct causal link” between the conduct and the alleged constitutional injury.29 Conduct is the “moving force” if the alleged practice is the “cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted.”30
The Complaint alleges that representatives of RHI told the Plaintiffs that they would
23 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶23. 24 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 33, 34, 41, 42 and 43. 25 Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp., 428 F.Supp.2d 580, 583–84 (E.D.Tex. 2006)(citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982)). 26 Id. at 584 (citing Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 989 (1992)). 27 Rec. Doc. 17-1. 28 Rec. Doc. 46-1. 29 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 580 (5th Cir. 2001). 30 Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 47558
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not be released on bond unless and until they paid the initial fee to RHI.31 The Complaint also alleges that, after release, representatives of RHI threatened the Plaintiffs with rearrest if they failed to make monthly payments to RHI.32 The allegations plausibly suggest that the state Court’s Bond Order created some indicia of authority in RHI which RHI then exploited to extract fees under threat of continued detention or re-arrest. The Court finds that these facts plausibly plead that RHI was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.
RHI’s Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 civil rights claim is DENIED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss33 is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties are to simultaneously brief the issue of Judicial Immunity as to the claims against RHI arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, briefs to be filed within ten (10) days of this Order, maximum of 10 pages, no replies permitted. Baton Rouge, Louisiana this 12th day of September, 2018.
S ____________________________________
SHELLY D. DICK CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

31 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 53, 56, and 69. 32 Rec. Doc. 2, ¶¶ 58, 69, and 77. 33 Rec. Doc. 46.
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 Case 3:17-cv-00526-SDD-EWD Document 100 06/12/19 Page 1 of 33

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TAYARI ROSS and KAIASHA WHITE, )

on behalf of themselves and all others

)

similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CLEVE DUNN, Sr. and

)

REHABILITATION HOME

)

INCARCERATION,

)

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

Case No. 3:17-cv-526
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT – CLASS ACTION JURY DEMAND

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. For years, Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”), a private

organization purporting to provide pretrial supervision services, profited off individuals in East

Baton Rouge Parish by requiring them to pay hundreds of dollars to RHI to be released from jail—

effectively holding them for ransom. This fee was the creation of RHI alone—it was not ordered

by any court. Those who could not afford the fee languished in jail for days, weeks, or even months

as they and their loved ones scrambled to pay off RHI.

2. This scheme was arranged by Cleve Dunn, Sr. (“Dunn”), RHI’s Chief Executive

Officer, who directed RHI employees to withhold paperwork authorizing the release of individuals

ordered to RHI supervision from the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”) until they paid

the initial fee.

3. The practice occurred with the knowledge of Trudy White, a criminal court judge

of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana (the “JDC”), who set bond for arrestees and

indiscriminately ordered them to undergo supervision by RHI—often for indefinite periods of time

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before their cases went to trial and without assessing their inability to pay any RHI-related fees, including the initial fee that RHI required of supervisees to be released regardless of whether supervisees satisfied all other conditions for initial release.
4. After arrestees paid RHI’s initial fee and were released by the Prison, RHI continued to exact money from them, charging a $225 monthly fee and additional fees for requirements such as classes and ankle monitoring. RHI and Dunn wrongfully used the threat of arrest by East Baton Parish Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials, as well as the threat of bond revocation by the JDC and additional jailing at the Prison, to coerce payment.
5. Plaintiffs Tayari Ross and Kaiasha White bring this class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Louisiana and federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Acts (RICO), and other state causes of action against Defendants Dunn and RHI. Defendant Dunn regularly committed predicate acts under RICO—extorting money from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class—by wrongfully detaining them in jail until they paid RHI’s initial fee, then threatening them with additional jailing if they failed to satisfy RHI’s continuing demands for money once released. Plaintiffs seek actual and treble damages to compensate them and the proposed Class for the injuries they have sustained because of Defendant Dunn’s extortionate activities.
6. Plaintiff White and the proposed Class also seek damages from RHI for its policy and practice of detaining Plaintiff White and proposed Class members in the Prison until they paid RHI’s initial fee, and in the alternative, for its conspiracy with Judge White to do the same, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. Plaintiff White and the proposed Class also seek damages from RHI for this detention policy and practice in violation of their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
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7. Plaintiff White individually seeks damages from RHI under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act for RHI’s harmful and oppressive commercial practices, and, on behalf of herself and the proposed Class, seeks damages from RHI for conversion and unjust enrichment under state law.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This is a civil class action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, the United States Constitution, and Louisiana law. 9. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). 10. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.
III. PARTIES A. Plaintiffs
11. Plaintiff Tayari Ross is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. 12. Plaintiff Kaiasha White is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. B. Defendants 13. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr. is the Executive Director of Rehabilitation Home Incarceration. He is a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. 14. Defendant Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”) is a non-profit corporation registered with the State of Louisiana, with its principal place of business in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
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IV. FACTS General Facts A. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court 15. The Nineteenth Judicial District Court (the “JDC”) has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters and original exclusive jurisdiction of state felony cases in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1)-(2). Louisiana district court judges are elected and serve six-year terms. There are eight criminal court judges who hear misdemeanor and felony cases in the JDC. 16. The JDC and individual judges also make agreements with private companies to provide certain court services such as pre-trial supervision. 17. Judge White has served on the JDC since 2009 and was re-elected to the JDC in 2014. She presides over civil matters and state misdemeanor and felony cases assigned to Criminal Division J, Section 8, of the JDC. B. RHI’s Judicial and Political Ties to Judge White 18. RHI served as one of the private companies that offer pretrial supervision services for the JDC. 19. RHI, which was registered as a non-profit corporation in Louisiana,1 supervised thousands of individuals in East Baton Rouge, Orleans, Ascension, and Tangipahoa parishes since its inception in 1993. 20. RHI was owned and operated by the Dunn family, who live in Baton Rouge. Cleve Dunn Sr., Evonne Dunn, and Tameka Dunn all serve as co-directors of RHI.
1 See La. Sec’y of State, “Search for La. Business Filings,” Rehabilitation Home Incarceration, https://coraweb.sos.la.gov/CommercialSearch/CommercialSearchDetails.aspx?CharterID=60196 2_DF50A07E17.
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21. RHI was the only approved vendor for pre-trial supervision on Judge White’s website.
22. RHI did not have a formal written contract with the JDC. Its provision of services to Judge White was based on an informal arrangement between RHI and Judge White.
23. Former RHI officials and Judge White are political allies. RHI officials and employees supported Judge White’s 2014 re-election campaign.
24. Cleve Dunn, Jr. served as Chairperson of Judge White’s Campaign Committee; White’s campaign paid Cleve Dunn, Sr. for marketing; and RHI paid Frederick Hall, a former RHI employee, and his wife, Gloria Hall, who owns and operates the bond company to which RHI routinely referred putative supervisees, for campaign support activities.
C. Defendants’ Pretrial Supervision Scheme 25. Individuals arrested for criminal offenses in East Baton Rouge Parish are initially
taken to the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (the “Prison”), which is staffed and operated by the East Baton Rouge Sheriff, Sid J. Gautreaux, III.
26. The following day, they appear via closed-circuit television between the Prison and the JDC for a hearing to determine probable cause for detention and to set bond. The eight criminal judges of the JDC take turns conducting this hearing, with each serving as the “duty judge” for a given week.
27. Usually before the hearing, the judge on duty has already reviewed the affidavit of probable cause and set a bond amount and release conditions for the defendant. At this hearing, the duty judge may adjust an arrestee’s bond based on facts disclosed at the hearing.
28. When Judge White is on duty, she typically asks an arrestee about only his knowledge of the charges and informs him of the bond amount. She generally does not ask
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questions beyond these topics. Nor does she allow arrestees to be heard on issues beyond these topics. Although a public defender may be present to note the cases appointed to the public defender office, no representation is provided at this initial hearing.
29. Between Judge White’s re-election to the JDC in 2014 and September 2017, Judge White regularly assigned hundreds of arrestees to supervision by RHI. White did so without conducting in open court an individualized determination of, or providing an opportunity for arrestees to be heard on, the need for, or the conditions of, RHI supervision. Indeed, White appeared to make assignments to RHI via the bond form before arrestees appeared before her, and she did not ask arrestees any questions before assigning them to RHI, such as whether an arrestee could afford to pay bond or RHI’s initial or monthly fees.
30. Rather than conduct these inquiries, Judge White signed an order making RHI supervision a condition of release on bond, without instruction about many of the terms of this supervision that RHI later imposed. Plaintiff Ross’s bond order, which includes the term of supervision by RHI while on bond, is reproduced here:
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31. Judge White usually set the duration of RHI’s supervision at either ninety days, irrespective of the supervisee’s next court date, or for an indefinite period of time.
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32. As shown in Ross’s bond order, however, Judge White did not order payment of the initial fee or monthly fee as a condition of release from the Prison. Instead, RHI set this payment as a condition of release.
33. RHI demanded an initial fee of $525. 34. Arrestees typically learned they had to pay this initial fee to be released only when they or their family members attempted to post bail or when they first met with RHI representatives at the Prison. 35. RHI represented that the court had ordered this initial fee. 36. The Prison typically released detainees ordered to RHI supervision only after it received confirmation from RHI—confirmation that RHI provided only after it received or made arrangements for the initial payment. 37. Knowing there was no inquiry into supervisees’ ability to pay and intending for there to be no such inquiry, RHI required supervisees to pay, or to promise to pay immediately after their release, the initial fee before approving the release of supervisees from the Prison, thus detaining supervisees who could not pay. In the alternative, RHI conspired with Judge White to detain supervisees until they paid or promised to pay the initial fee with no inquiry into ability to pay and conditioned release upon payment. 38. Arrestees who could not immediately pay the initial RHI fee waited in jail for days or weeks until they could pay all or some portion of the initial fee. They were told that if they were released, they could be rearrested for failing to pay any outstanding amount of the initial fee. 39. At the time of release, the arrestee’s next court date typically had not been scheduled, and the arrestee had not been arraigned. In some cases, the supervisee was not
8

Case 3:17-cv-00526-SDD-EWD Document 100 06/12/19 Page 9 of 33 arraigned during the RHI supervision term. Thus, supervision sometimes ended before the arrestee ever re-appeared before Judge White for his or her next hearing.
40. Upon release, RHI required the arrestee—now a “supervisee”—to sign a contract setting forth RHI’s future fees and conditions of supervision. A copy of a redacted, standard contract is reproduced here:
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41. According to the terms of RHI’s standard contract, RHI supervisees had to pay a $225 monthly fee to their assigned RHI officer, or “Monitor,” during their supervision term.
42. The standard contract also set a curfew for supervisees, restricting supervisees from spending the night anywhere other than at their reported residential address.
43. Despite collecting significant fees for its supervision, RHI did not require supervisees to make other substantive reports to their RHI Monitor other than their compliance with curfew. Nor did it typically require supervisees to meet their Monitor in person except for purposes of paying their supervision fees. Rather, supervisees had to only call their RHI Monitor by telephone multiple times a day and leave a voicemail message if the Monitor did not answer.
44. At RHI’s discretion, a Monitor could require a supervisee to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times for additional fees.
45. Additionally, RHI could require supervisees to attend and pay additional fees for classes taught by RHI employees. RHI also imposed a number of other conditions, including prohibiting supervisees from consuming any alcohol, restricting their movement to within East Baton Rouge Parish, requiring them to complete a “mental evaluation” through a certified physician, or mandating 50 hours of community service.
46. RHI’s standard contract with supervisees explicitly states that it will report any violation of these conditions to the JDC, which may result in the supervisee’s arrest by “East Baton Rouge City Police” or by an RHI official.
47. RHI Monitors and Dunn himself threatened supervisees with re-arrest if they failed to make financial payments or comply with RHI’s costly supervision conditions—without affirmatively inquiring into their ability to pay. Accordingly, supervisees paid (or attempted to
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pay) the fee out of fear of re-arrest and bond revocation by scraping together money from friends or family.
48. The policies and practices of RHI, including the standard contract and the fees required, were implemented by Defendant Dunn and enforced by his employees at his direction.
49. In or around September 2017, Judge White instructed RHI to stop supervision of supervisees she had referred to RHI and informed RHI that she would no longer refer cases to RHI due to recent media scrutiny and this litigation.
D. Plaintiffs’ Experience with Defendants’ Pretrial Scheme a. Plaintiff Tayari Ross
50. Plaintiff Tayari Ross appeared before Judge White on June 16, 2016, via closedcircuit television from the Prison after his arrest on several traffic charges.
51. Judge White informed Mr. Ross of his charges and set his bond at $6,500. She did not tell him that he would have to pay fees to RHI or that he would be detained for failure to pay the initial fee to RHI.
52. Later that day, Mr. Ross called his mother, Betty Johnson, from jail to ask for her help in arranging for a bail bond to secure his release from the Prison. After their call, Ms. Johnson contacted a bail bondsman and paid him roughly $800 for the premium.
53. After the bail bondsman posted the bond at the Prison, Mr. Ross was called to central booking to be processed for release. He waited in central booking for several hours. When he asked Prison staff why he had not yet been released, he was told that a “hold” had been put on him. Mr. Ross then called his mother again and asked her to help get the “hold” lifted.
54. Ms. Johnson called the bail bondsman, who also did not know how to lift the “hold.” After calling the Prison, the bail bondsman got back on the phone with Ms. Johnson and
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told her that he spoke to Prison staff, who informed him that Mr. Ross would have to pay $525 for Mr. Ross to be released. The bondsman informed her that she could go to the Prison to speak to the people who had placed the “hold” on Mr. Ross.
55. Ms. Johnson went to the front gate of the Prison. When she told Prison staff the reason she was there, a staff member went inside and sent out a man who identified himself as an RHI employee. The two of them spoke in the parking lot, where Ms. Johnson protested that her son should not be held in the Prison because his bond had already been posted. The man said that Judge White had ordered a $525 payment, even though Judge White’s bond order did not impose a requirement to pay RHI. He also informed Ms. Johnson that Mr. Ross would be put on “probation,” although Mr. Ross had not been found guilty of his charges.
56. Ms. Johnson insisted that she did not have $525 to pay to RHI for Mr. Ross’s release, and she continued to protest that Mr. Ross should not be held after the bond had been posted. During this time, Mr. Ross called her again, and she placed Mr. Ross on the phone with the RHI employee.
57. Many hours after Mr. Ross had posted bond, the RHI employee agreed to lift the “hold” on Mr. Ross on the condition that he pay RHI $500 as soon as he was released. The RHI employee told Mr. Ross that he would have to meet with Frederick Hall, an RHI supervisor, immediately after his release. The RHI employee also warned Mr. Ross that if he did not immediately pay the $525 fee—which RHI represented to Mr. Ross as a court-ordered fee in some instances—he would be sent back to the Prison.
58. Mr. Ross promised that he would pay as soon as he was released. The RHI employee went back inside the jail, and Mr. Ross was freed several hours later. Although his bond
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order required him to meet with his bond supervisor prior to his release, no one from RHI met with Mr. Ross in the Prison.
59. Upon his release, Mr. Ross went to his employer and asked for a cash advance. He then went to RHI’s office that same morning, where he waited for over an hour and a half until Isabelle Robinson, an RHI employee, arrived. She explained that in addition to the initial fee and monthly fee, Mr. Ross would have to pay $60 for a class offered by RHI. Mr. Ross paid $585 to her. He then sat in a room with four or five other people who were also waiting to meet with Frederick Hall. While waiting, Mr. Ross watched as several of the other people in the room told Mr. Hall that they did not have the money to pay RHI’s fees. Mr. Hall told each of them that they would go back to jail if they could not pay their fees, and he then directed them to Cleve Dunn’s office. Mr. Ross believed that if he did not keep up with his payments he would be sent back to the Prison.
60. Once enough people had arrived, Mr. Hall gave a presentation on the rules of RHI supervision. He stated that everyone would be required to adhere to a 10 p.m. curfew, and that some people would be required to wear ankle monitors and to have a Breathalyzer installed in their cars.
61. However, RHI did not provide an ankle monitor to Mr. Ross. 62. Mr. Ross called Mr. Hall each day when he got to work and when he returned home at night. 63. Mr. Ross made regular payments on his monthly fee of $225, even though he was supporting his three daughters, two of whom lived with him, as well as repaying his employer for the cash advance he had taken out to pay RHI’s initiation fee. He sometimes borrowed money from his mother to keep up with payments.
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64. Mr. Hall would often come to the restaurant where Mr. Ross worked as a manager to pick up his payments. On one occasion, Mr. Hall accused Mr. Ross of underpaying on the monthly fee, even though both he and Mr. Ross had counted the money when Mr. Ross had made the payment. Mr. Ross tried to protest that he did not owe RHI additional money, but ultimately he had to pay it out of fear of RHI sending him back to Prison.
65. On August 31, 2016, Mr. Ross met with Ms. Robinson, an employee at RHI. Like Mr. Hall, Ms. Robinson said that Mr. Ross had underpaid RHI and owed additional money. Mr. Ross insisted that he had already paid that amount, and told her to call Mr. Hall to confirm. To avoid being sent back to Prison, Mr. Ross paid Ms. Robinson $305 and was told to watch a video on “effective decision making.” After watching the video, he received a certificate of completion for RHI’s 90-day monitoring program.
66. Apart from the video on effective decision making and the phone calls he made to his monitor, Mr. Ross did not receive any supervision services from RHI.
b. Plaintiff Kaiasha White 67. Plaintiff Kaisha White appeared before Judge White on August 8, 2016, after her arrest on charges of simple and aggravated battery concerning an argument with her partner. 68. Judge White set her bond at $4,000 and informed her that she would also have to report to RHI. 69. Judge White did not ask Ms. White any questions about herself, her charges, or her case; did not set any terms of the RHI supervision; and did not allow Ms. White to ask any questions about the supervision. Judge White also did not inform Plaintiff White that she would be detained if she did not pay RHI the initial fee.
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70. Ms. White did not have money to pay RHI, as she was unemployed at the time and relied on her partner and family members to pay her living expenses. Thus, she was detained in the Prison for another month until her mother received a social security check.
71. On or about September 1, 2016, Ms. White’s mother gave a bail bondswoman $500. The bondswoman told Ms. White that the bondswoman and RHI would split the payment, and that a portion would go towards RHI’s initial fee.
72. The next day, RHI employee Hall went to the Prison and met with Ms. White. He informed her that she would have to pay the remainder of the initial fee—which RHI had represented as a court-ordered fee—and monthly supervision fee after she was released. He then had her sign RHI’s contract, which provided that Ms. White could be arrested by an RHI official or East Baton Rouge law enforcement if she violated its terms. Later that day, Ms. White was released from the Prison.
73. During Ms. White’s detention in the Prison for her inability to pay RHI’s initial fee, a severe flood hit Baton Rouge in mid-August, damaging her home and her and her son’s belongings. Because she was being held in the Prison, she could not check on her home or attempt to salvage her possessions for several weeks.
74. Following Ms. White’s release from the Prison, Ms. White’s mother paid an additional $250 towards the initial fee. Ms. White later met with Frederick Hall at her house. Mr. Hall told her that she would have to wear an ankle monitor and that he would call her each night to make sure she obeyed curfew.
75. In the following months, Ms. White called Mr. Hall on occasion to let him know she was trying to save up money to pay her monthly fee. She repeatedly asked him how long she would be on RHI supervision, but he did not give her a definite time; her bond order also did not
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indicate how many days she would be on supervision. Mr. Hall also did not provide Ms. White with an ankle monitor.
76. As time passed and Ms. White still was not able to pay RHI’s monthly fees, Mr. Hall accused her of falsely claiming that she was trying to pay. Ms. White became afraid that RHI would have her arrested.
77. During this time, Ms. White lacked a stable place to live and had to stay with family and friends because her home was still flood damaged.
78. On or about late December 2016 or early January 2017, Ms. White told Mr. Hall that she could pay RHI $300.
79. Because Ms. White was worried that if she saw Mr. Hall in person, he would have her arrested, she had her son meet Mr. Hall to deliver the payment.
80. Sometime after she made this payment, another RHI representative called Ms. White to inform her she had failed to pay for and attend a $55-per-month class. However, Mr. Hall had not told Ms. White that she was required to attend this class. The RHI representative told her that if she did not comply, RHI would have her arrested during the next police “round up.”
81. Ms. White called Mr. Hall to ask why she was being required to take and pay for the class, but no one answered at his phone number. She subsequently received a letter from RHI stating that Mr. Hall had left RHI.
82. Ms. White did not hear from Mr. Hall again. However, she began receiving letters from RHI claiming that she owed roughly $800. Ms. White lacked the money to pay this amount. She still does not know for how long she was under RHI supervision.
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Facts Common to All RICO Counts 83. Plaintiff Ross is a “person” entitled to bring a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and La. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356(E). 84. Plaintiff White is a “person” entitled to bring a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and La. Stat. Ann. § 15:1356(E). 85. RHI was a corporate enterprise that regularly engaged in interstate commerce. RHI’s engagement in interstate commerce included, but was not limited to, using telecommunications and electronic monitoring technology to track supervisees across state lines, purchasing and employing electronic monitoring devices that are produced and sold outside the state of Louisiana, accepting payment of fees by credit card, and maintaining a website available to users in interstate commerce. 86. Defendant Dunn is an individual and thus a “person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 87. Defendant Dunn conducted the affairs of RHI through a pattern of racketeering to achieve the common purpose of unlawfully extorting money from Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class. These racketeering acts were an integral part of RHI’s regular course of business. 88. As described above, on numerous occasions over an unknown period of time Defendant Dunn committed related, predicate acts of extortion by threatening to keep, and arranging with the Prison to keep Plaintiffs and the proposed Class in jail until they have paid RHI’s required initial fee, and instructing his employees to do the same. Thereafter, Defendant Dunn, directly and through the actions of his Monitors and other employees, continued this
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unlawful use of fear to threaten Plaintiffs and the proposed Class with further jail time or court sanctions if they failed to pay RHI’s monthly and programmatic fees.
89. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs and the proposed Class from the Prison until they paid money towards the RHI initiation fee. Additionally, by unlawfully using the fear of arrest and jail by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials, Dunn on numerous occasions extorted from Plaintiffs and the proposed Class a monthly supervision fee, along with fees for classes or other requirements imposed at the discretion of RHI employees.
90. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constituted a pattern of racketeering activity.
91. These actions were a regular way of conducting the ongoing business of RHI. 92. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities, Plaintiffs and the proposed Class have been injured in their property in that they paid RHI’s fees due to the fear induced by Dunn and RHI employees’ wrongful use and threats of arrest and jailing.
V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 93. Plaintiffs Ross and White propose a class seeking damages as to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3). The Class is defined as: All individuals whom Judge White ordered to pretrial supervision by Defendant RHI who were subsequently supervised by RHI. 94. A class action is a superior means, and the only practicable means, by which the named Plaintiffs and putative Class members can challenge Defendants’ extortionate racketeering
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scheme and unlawful use and threat of wealth-based detention to extort fees from Plaintiffs and the Class.
95. Class-action status under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate because questions of law or fact common to proposed Class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
96. Furthermore, as detailed below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a).
A. Requirements of Rule 23(a) Rule 23(a)(1) - Impracticability of Joinder Due to Numerosity
97. The precise size of the proposed Class is unknown by Plaintiffs, but it is substantial given the number of arrestees Judge White has assigned to RHI supervision in recent years.
98. Court records indicate that over three hundred people were ordered to RHI supervision by Judge White in 2015 and 2016.
99. Many of the proposed Class members are low-income individuals who will be difficult to identify and likely lack financial resources to bring an independent action or to be joined in this action. Joinder of every member of the proposed Class would be impracticable. Rule 23(a)(2) - Commonality
100. The relief sought is common to all members of the Class, and common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the proposed Class. The named Plaintiffs seek monetary relief from Defendants’ extortionate and unconstitutional pretrial supervision practices, which violate the state and federally-protected rights of the Class members.
101. Among the most important common questions of fact for the proposed Class are:
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a. Whether RHI, independent of Judge White, set terms for an arrestee’s release and the fees for its supervision services;
b. Whether RHI and Judge White had an agreement to act in concert to incarcerate Plaintiff White and putative Class members without any determination of their ability to pay before being incarcerated for non-payment of the initial fee while under RHI pre-trial supervision;
c. Whether Defendants refused to authorize release from the Prison of individuals referred to RHI by Judge White until individuals paid, or promised to pay, RHI’s initial fee to Defendants’ satisfaction;
d. Whether RHI enforced this agreement against the proposed Class without determining whether proposed Class members could afford to pay RHI’s initial fee;
e. Whether RHI’s standard contract provided for an initial fee and monthly fees; f. Whether RHI’s standard contract provided for arrest and jailing for failure to pay
its fees; and g. Whether Dunn directed RHI employees to threaten to arrest and jail Proposed Class
members who did not pay the monthly supervisory fees and other mandated fees to RHI. 102. Among the most important common questions of law for the proposed Class are: a. Whether Defendant Dunn’s operation of RHI through a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically, extorting money from Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class by unlawfully detaining them in the Prison until they pay RHI’s initial fee, then threatening them with additional jailing if they failed to pay RHI monthly fees once released, violated the Louisiana and federal RICO Acts;
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b. Whether RHI’s practice of denying authorization to release Plaintiff White and members of the proposed Class from the Prison because they could not pay RHI’s initial fee violated Plaintiff White and proposed Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process and equal protection;
c. Whether Judge White and RHI conspired to violate Plaintiff White and proposed Class members’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process and equal protection;
d. Whether RHI’s practice of denying authorization to release Plaintiff White and the proposed Class members after they posted bonds constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
e. Whether RHI lacked any legal authority or right to collect fees from Plaintiff White and the proposed Class members.
Rule 23(a)(3) - Typicality 103. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
proposed Class, and they have the same interests in this case as all other proposed Class members that they represent. Each of them suffered injuries from Defendants’ failure to comply with state and federal law: they were each confined in jail for nonpayment of RHI’s initial fee, without inquiry into their ability to pay, and then threatened with additional jailing if they did not pay RHI’s subsequent fees and costs. The answer to whether Defendants’ scheme is unlawful will determine the claims of the named Plaintiff and every other proposed Class member.
104. If the named Plaintiffs succeed in the claim that Defendants’ policies and practices violate their federal and state rights, that ruling will likewise benefit every other member of the proposed Class.
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Rule 23(a)(4) - Adequacy 105. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the proposed Class
they seek to represent. 106. Plaintiffs have no interests separate from, or in conflict with, those of the proposed
Class they seek to represent as a whole, and they seek damages, which Plaintiffs pursue on behalf of the entire proposed Class that they seek to represent.
B. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 107. Class certification of the proposed Class is appropriate because common questions
of law and fact, including those listed above, predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
108. The proposed Class seeks damages against Defendants Dunn and RHI for jailing the proposed Class until its members were able to pay RHI’s initial fee and for engaging in a pretrial supervision scheme that allowed RHI, under Dunn’s direction, to extort additional fees and costs from the proposed Class by wrongfully threatening future jail time and court sanctions for nonpayment.
C. The Requirements of Rule 23(g) 109. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Louisiana, and the Southern Poverty Law Center who have experience litigating complex civil rights matters in federal court and extensive knowledge of both the details of Defendants’ practices and the relevant constitutional and statutory law. Counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action.
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VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) Plaintiffs Ross and White and the Proposed Class against Cleve Dunn, Sr. 110. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt Paragraphs 1 through 109 of this Second Amended Complaint. 111. Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (“RHI”) is an enterprise engaged in and whose activities affect interstate commerce. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr. is RHI’s Executive Director. 112. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Defendant Dunn conducted RHI’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to illegally extort money from Plaintiffs Ross and White and proposed Class Members. Specifically, Dunn made an agreement with Judge Trudy White for RHI to be Judge White’s approved vendor for pretrial court supervision. Dunn then imposed conditions of supervision for arrestees assigned to RHI, including imposing fees for release and monthly supervision, and used threats of incarceration for supervisees who did not comply with RHI’s conditions or pay the required fees. 113. Dunn made a separate agreement with Prison officials that prohibited the release of pretrial arrestees assigned to RHI unless the arrestees paid RHI’s initial fee and RHI sent confirmation to the Prison that the arrestee had paid said fee. 114. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class from the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison until they paid the initial fee to RHI. By unlawfully using the fear of arrest by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or
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RHI officials to coerce payment, Dunn additionally extorted from Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class on numerous occasions a monthly monitoring fee of $225, along with other fees for classes required at the discretion of RHI employees.
115. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constituted a pattern of racketeering activity.
116. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities and his violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class were injured in their property because they paid RHI’s fees from the fear induced by Dunn and RHI’s wrongful threats of arrest and jailing.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF Louisiana Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act
(LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C)) Plaintiffs Ross and White and the Proposed Class against Cleve Dunn, Sr. 117. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 109 of this Second Amended Complaint. 118. RHI was an enterprise that conducted business in the state of Louisiana. Defendant Cleve Dunn, Sr. was RHI’s Executive Director. 119. In violation of LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C), Defendant Dunn conducted RHI’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to illegally extort money from Plaintiffs Ross and White and proposed Class Members. Specifically, Dunn made an agreement with Judge Trudy White for RHI to be White’s approved vendor for pretrial court supervision. Dunn then imposed conditions of supervision for arrestees assigned to RHI, including imposing fees for release and
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monthly supervision, and used threats of incarceration for supervisees who did not comply with RHI’s conditions or pay the required fees.
120. Dunn made a separate agreement with Prison officials that prohibited the release of pretrial arrestees assigned to RHI unless the arrestees paid or promised to pay RHI’s initial fee and RHI sent confirmation to the Prison that the arrestee had paid said fee.
121. Pursuant to and in furtherance of this unlawful scheme, Defendant Dunn committed multiple, related predicate acts of extortion by refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class from the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison until they secured and paid or promised to pay the initial fee to RHI. By unlawfully using the fear of arrest by East Baton Rouge law enforcement or RHI officials to coerce payment, Dunn additionally extorted from Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class on numerous occasions a monthly monitoring fee of $225 on behalf of RHI, along with other fees for classes or other services required at the discretion of RHI employees.
122. Defendant Dunn’s use of RHI to extort money from arrestees assigned by Judge White constituted a pattern of racketeering activity under Louisiana law.
123. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Dunn’s racketeering activities and violations of LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353(C), Plaintiffs Ross and White and the proposed Class were injured in their property in that they paid RHI’s fees from the fear induced by Dunn and RHI’s wrongful threats of arrest and jailing.
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Conspiracy to Violate the
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection) Plaintiff White and the proposed Class against RHI 124. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 82 and 93 through 109 of this Second Amended Complaint. 125. The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection prohibit jailing a person solely because of her inability to access money and make a monetary payment. 126. Plaintiff White and the proposed Class have a fundamental interest in pretrial liberty under state and federal law. 127. Defendant RHI violated Plaintiff White and the proposed Class’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining arrestees until they could pay RHI’s initial fee and be released from the Prison, without an affirmative inquiry into or findings concerning ability to pay, and without consideration of and findings concerning alternative conditions of release. 128. In the alternative, RHI had an agreement with Judge White to act in concert, and thus conspired with Judge White, to incarcerate Plaintiff White and other RHI supervisees to deprive them of their right to an ability-to-pay determination before being incarcerated for nonpayment of the initial fee—which RHI represented to supervisees as court-ordered—while under RHI pre-trial supervision. Judge White referred individuals to RHI for pretrial supervision with knowledge that once she referred them to RHI, RHI arranged to detain individuals at the Prison until supervisees paid the initial fee.
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129. RHI deprived Plaintiff White and the proposed Class of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment through its policies and practices and/or through the conspiracy with Judge White.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution Plaintiff White and the proposed Class against RHI 130. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 82 and 93 through 109 of this Second Amended Complaint. 131. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures—including the detention of individuals beyond expiration of a valid order of confinement, without probable cause. 132. Defendant RHI’s practice of refusing to authorize the release of Plaintiff White and the proposed Class members from the Prison until they paid or promised to pay the initial RHI fee, without probable cause, and thus beyond the time Plaintiff White and the proposed Class members should have obtained pretrial release after posting bond, violated Plaintiff White and proposed Class members’ Fourth Amendment rights.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act
(La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405) Plaintiff White against RHI 133. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 49 and 67 through 82 of this Second Amended Complaint.
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134. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) bars “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1405, and authorizes recovery for any person who suffers an “ascertainable loss” as a result of this misconduct, whether of money or property, La. Stat. Ann. § 51:1409(A).
135. Defendant RHI violated LUTPA by entering an agreement whereby Judge White assigned pretrial arrestees to RHI without a meaningful hearing as to whether RHI supervision was appropriate, and without allowing any other pretrial supervision agency to provide whatever supervisory conditions may have been appropriate.
136. Defendant RHI further violated LUTPA by imposing conditions of release and determining its supervision fees without any lawful authority, thereby allowing RHI to charge supervisees exorbitant rates without any market competition. RHI then collected these fees by jailing or threatening to jail those under its supervision.
137. RHI’s practices offend public policy and are unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, and substantially injurious. They directly and proximately caused Plaintiff White significant losses in both her money and property.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Conversion
Plaintiff White and the proposed Class against RHI 138. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 49 and 67 through 82 of this Second Amended Complaint. 139. Louisiana law protects against the intentional wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another’s goods, depriving her of permanent or indefinite possession.
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140. Through the scheme described above, RHI engaged in the tort of conversion by charging and collecting fees that are not authorized by statute or by order of the JDC.
141. RHI also prevented Plaintiff White and proposed Class members’ release from jail until arrestees paid the initial fee, and RHI used the threat of future jailing to coerce payment of further fees.
142. Thus, Plaintiff White and proposed Class members were forced to agree to pay, and did pay, these fees under threats of arrest, jail, bond revocation, and duress.
143. As a result, RHI lacked any legal authority or right to collect and retain Plaintiff White’s and the proposed Class members’ initial and monthly fees. RHI thus intentionally and wrongfully deprived Plaintiff White and proposed Class members of their monetary property.
144. RHI’s practices directly harmed Plaintiff White and proposed Class members in their loss of property.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiff White and the proposed Class against RHI 145. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt herein Paragraphs 1 through 49 and 67 through 83 of this Second Amended Complaint. 146. Article 2298 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[a] person who has been enriched at the expense of another is bound to compensate that person.” 147. Through the scheme described above, RHI unjustly enriched itself at Plaintiff White’s and proposed Class members’ expense by requiring exorbitant and unnecessary fees that were collected under threat and that are not authorized by law.
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VII. REQUESTED RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the following relief:
a) That the Court assume jurisdiction over this action; b) Certification of the Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3); c) Award treble damages to Plaintiffs Ross and White and Class members and against
Defendant Dunn for his violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes (Count I); d) Award the greater of treble damages or $10,000 to Plaintiffs Ross and White and Class members and against Defendant Dunn for his violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes (Count II); e) Award damages to Plaintiff White and Class members and against Defendant RHI for its actions, and conspiracy with Judge White, to jail Plaintiff White and putative Class members because of their nonpayment of RHI’s initial fee, without properly considering Plaintiff White’s ability to pay, in violation of Plaintiff White’s and Class members’ Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection and Due Process (Count III); f) Award damages to Plaintiff White and Class members and against RHI for its jailing of Plaintiff White and Class members for unlawfully prolonging Plaintiff White’s and putative Class members’ detention at the Prison after they had posted bond, in violation of Plaintiff White’s and class members’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment (Count IV); g) Award damages to Plaintiff White and against Defendant RHI for RHI’s violations of the LUTPA (Count V);
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h) Award damages to Plaintiff White and proposed Class members and against Defendant

RHI for RHI’s conversion and unjust enrichment (Counts VI and VII);

i) Award prevailing party costs, including attorney fees; and

j) Grant other relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

DATED this __ day of February, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

___________________________________ Ivy Wang On Behalf of Plaintiffs’ Counsel

Ivy Wang, La. Bar No. 35368 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 201 St. Charles Ave, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 P: 504-486-8982 F: 504-486-8947 E: ivy.wang@splcenter.org

Emily Early, ASB-8536B18H* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 East Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 340 Decatur, GA 30037 P: 404-221-4036 F: 404-221-5857 E: emily.early@splcenter.org

Sara Zampierin, ASB-1695-S34H* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 400 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36104 P: 334-956-8200 F: 334-956-8481 E: emily.early@splcenter.org E: sara.zampierin@splcenter.org

___________________________________ Bruce Hamilton On Behalf of Plaintiffs’ Counsel

Bruce Hamilton, La. Bar No. 33170 ACLU Foundation of Louisiana P.O. Box 56157

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New Orleans, LA 70156 P: 504-522-0628 F: 504-613-6511 E: bhamilton@laaclu.org Brandon Buskey, ASB-2753-A50B* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 P: 212- 549-7364 F: 212-549-2654 E: bbuskey@aclu.org *Admitted pro hac vice Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served via the Court’s CM/ECF system on counsel of record for Defendants.
Dated: February __, 2019. Ivy Wang On Behalf of Plaintiffs’ Counsel
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