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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

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LOUIS H. HOPSON, JR.; LESLIE EDWARDS;

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ERICA FOOTE; ANTOINE TRAVERS ;

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CHARLES CARTER; KAREN ALSTON;

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JACQUES BONAPARTE; CARLOS PERRY;

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SHIRLEY ONYANGO; EDWARD TINDEL;

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TONY ELLISON; EXDOL WILLIAMS;

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MELVIN RUSSELL; ZEINAB RABOLD;

LYNELL GREEN; and MAURICE PRICE,

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individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, :

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Plaintiffs,

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-against-

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THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, A

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF

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MARYLAND, AND THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE

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DEPARTMENT,

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Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION No: 1:04-CV-03842 (AMD)
SECOND AMENDED CLASS-ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is an action brought to remedy employment discrimination on the basis of

color and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages to secure future protection and to

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redress the past deprivation of rights guaranteed Plaintiffs Louis H. Hopson, Jr., Leslie Edwards, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Charles Carter, Karen Alston, Jacques Bonaparte, Carlos Perry, Shirley Onyango, Edward Tindel, Tony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Zeinab Rabold, Lynell Green, and Maurice Price (collectively, the “Named Plaintiffs”) and members of the class (together, Named Plaintiffs and members of the class are referred to hereafter as “Plaintiffs”) and Plaintiff Melvin Russell under federal laws. Plaintiff Russell brings claims individually.
2. Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, a municipal corporation of the State of Maryland (the “City” or “Baltimore”), and the Baltimore City Police Department (the “BPD”) (collectively, “Defendants”) have engaged in or perpetuated a long-standing pattern and practice of discrimination against African-American members of the BPD on the basis of color and/or race by, inter alia:
(a) terminating African-American officers during the probationary period of their employment for offenses or alleged offenses for which Caucasian officers are not terminated or, in some cases, not even disciplined; (b) maintaining policies and procedures for the administration of the disciplinary system that have a disparate impact on African-Americans by facilitating the imposition of unfounded and unwarranted charges and unfounded, unwarranted, overly severe and disparate penalties upon African-American officers for offenses or alleged offenses for which Caucasian officers are not similarly or comparably charged or disciplined. Penalties include but are no t limited to: (i) the loss of vacation time; (ii) suspension from the force and/or of police powers; (iii) loss of pensions; and (iv) termination; and (c) intentionally discriminating against African-American officers through disparate treatment of African-American officers within the disciplinary system and through discriminatory denial of promotion opportunities.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331.
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4. Venue is properly placed in the District of Maryland under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) because the central offices of Defendants are within this district, a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim arose in this district, and records relevant to the practices complained of herein are located in this district.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS Class Defined
5. Named Plaintiffs seek to represent the following class, and/or such sub-classes as deemed appropriate by the Court: all African-American sworn members who have been employed by the BPD since January 1992 (the “Class Period”), and who have been subjected to discrimination on the basis of color and/or race in the form of centralized policies and practices governing the disciplinary system that, though neutral on their face, have a disparate impact on African-American BPD employees. Numerosity
6. The class is too numerous to be joined in one action. Upon information and belief, there are more than 1,285 African-American past or present members of the BPD who have been affected by the discrimination complained of herein. Commonality of Claims
7. The class members share a number of questions of law and fact in common, including but not limited to: (i) whether members of the class have been deprived by Defendants of the right to be free of discrimination in employment on the basis of color and/or race and whether such discrimination constitutes a deprivation of the rights guaranteed to class members by federal and state laws; (ii) whether, through the use of the policies and procedures of the disciplinary system of the BPD, Defendants have created a centralized disciplinary mechanism
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that leads to excessively subjective decision- making and has a disparate impact on AfricanAmerican officers; and (iii) whether Defendants utilize the disciplinary system to charge African-American officers of the BPD with alleged infractions for which Caucasians are not charged and/or to impose more severe punishment on African-American officers than on similarly situa ted Caucasians officers who commit similar or more egregious offenses. Typicality of Claims
8. Named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class in that they, like the other members of the class, have suffered from the various forms of discriminatory policies, pattern, practices and/or customs because of their color and/or race. Collectively, Named Plaintiffs represent the full range of discriminatory practices alleged by the class, and their claims all arise out of the BPD’s systematic, centralized and continuing practice of discriminating against African-American officers through excessively subjective policies and procedures governing the disciplinary process. Adequacy of Representation
9. Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Named Plaintiffs desire to represent the class and have retained counsel experienced in litigating class action, discrimination claims. Counsel for Named Plaintiffs have the resources, expertise, and experience to prosecute this action. There are no known conflicts among members of the class or between the attorneys and members of the class. Class Action Maintainable Under Rule 23(b)(2)
10. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the BPD in its policies and practices for disciplinary decisions has acted or refused to act in a manner generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the class
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as a whole. Plaintiffs’ claim for damages does not predominate over their claim for injunctive relief. Class Action Maintainable Under Rule 23(b)(3)
11. This action is properly maintainable as a class action also because questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over questions affecting only the individual members. A class action is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because (i) individual actions would necessarily focus primarily on the BPD’s discriminatory policies directed at class members as a whole and thus would be unnecessarily duplicative; (ii) individual actions would be an inefficient use of judicial resources given the significant numerosity of the class and the correspondingly high number of individual actions this court would have to adjudicate on substantially the same issues of law and fact; and (iii) some members of the class may not file individual actions for fear of retaliation by Defendants, as observed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in its determination letters, whereas a class action ensures relief for all members of the class. The EEOC determination letters, attached to the Original Complaint as Exhibit A, are incorporated herein by reference.
PARTIES 12. Plaintiff Louis H. Hopson, Jr., is an African-American male and has been employed by the BPD since November 23, 1981. 13. Plaintiff Leslie Edwards is an African-American male and was employed by the BPD from December 17, 1979 until his termination on or about April 20, 1994. 14. Plaintiff Erica Foote is an African-American female and was employed by the BPD from November 1992 until her termination in 1999.
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15. Plaintiff Antoine Travers is an African-American male and was employed by the BPD from 1986 until his termination in 1995.
16. Plaintiff Charles Carter is an African-American male and was employed by the BPD from November 1981 until his termination in November 1989. He was reinstated in February 1991 and terminated again in April 2005.
17. Plaintiff Karen Alston is an African-American female and has been employed by the BPD from August 21, 1981 until she was forced to resign in April 1998.
18. Plaintiff Jacques Bonaparte is an African-American male and has been employed by the BPD since May 6, 1992.
19. Plaintiff Carlos Perry is an African-American male and was employed by the BPD from May 2003 until his termination on or about November 9, 2004.
20. Plaintiff Shirley Onyango is an African-American female and has been employed by the BPD since 1979.
21. Plaintiff Edward Tindel is an African-American male and was employed by the BPD from 1988 until his termination on or about April 2003.
22. Plaintiff Tony Ellison is an African-American male and has been employed by the BPD since September 1992.
23. Plaintiff Exdol Williams is an African-American male and has been employed by the BPD since June 2000.
24. Plaintiff Melvin Russell is an African-American male and has been employed by the BPD since October 8, 1979.
25. Plaintiff Zeinab Rabold is an African-American female and was employed by the BPD from 1982 until she was forced to resign on or about November 10, 2004.
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26. Plaintiff Lynell Green is an African-American male and has been employed by the BPD since 2001.
27. Plaintiff Maurice Price is an African-American male and was employed by the BPD from 1983 until his termination in April 1998.
28. Defendant Baltimore is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Maryland and is an “employer” as defined by Title VII. Defendant Baltimore is a “person” for purposes of enforcement of the rights guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
29. Defendant BPD is a department, agency, bureau and/or subdivision of the City, and is or was the employer of all the members of the class. Defendant BPD is an “employer” as defined by Title VII. Defendant BPD is a “person” for purposes of enforcement of the rights guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT I. Disparate Discipline Imposed upon African-American Officers in the BPD
30. Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of disparate discipline with respect to African-American police officers. The disciplinary process of the BPD, although purportedly neutral on its face, is administered through centralized, excessively subjective policies and procedures that have a disparate impact on African-American officers. Although the disciplinary process has been modified over time, none of the changes has materially altered the disparate impact that the disciplinary process has on African-American officers.
31. The excessive subjectivity in the disciplinary process has resulted in both unintentional and/or intentional discrimination against African-American officers on the basis of
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their race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline. Defendants have intentionally discriminated against African-American officers on the basis of their race and/or color through a pattern and practice of disparate treatment of African-American officers within the disciplinary system.
32. Investigations and reports have confirmed the disparate discipline imposed upon African-American officers by Defendant BPD. For example, in November 1996, the Baltimore Community Relations Committee (“CRC”) issued a report (the “CRC Report”) detailing the disparate discipline imposed upon African-American members of the BPD.
33. The CRC issued its report in response to a study performed by Donald Reid (the “Reid Report”), a former officer with the BPD. The Reid Report also found disparity in the number of African-American members terminated from the BPD compared with that of Caucasian members.
34. Upon information and belief, racial disparities in the disciplinary system have been documented and raised by members of the BPD at weekly BPD Crime Statistics Meetings. Despite knowledge of clear disparities in punishment of African-American officers charged with disciplinary violations as compared with similarly situated Caucasian officers charged with similar violations, Defendants have failed to take effective measures to address the disparate impact on and disparate treatment of African-American officers through the disciplinary system of the BPD.
35. Public officials have also acknowledged the disparate discipline imposed upon African-American officers in the BPD. For example, Mayor Martin O’Malley, as Chairman of the Legislative Services Committee for the City Council of Baltimore, prepared a report in 1998
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noting racial discrimination in the BPD (the “O’Malley Report”). The O’Malley Report found widespread problems of disparate discipline of African-American officers within the BPD.
36. According to a report commissioned and endorsed by Defendant Baltimore in April 2000, 80 percent of BPD officers surveyed believe that discipline of BPD members is unfair and not uniform.
37. According to a report published on Defendant Baltimore’s own website, Defendant Baltimore admitted as recently as January 11, 2001, to “historical patterns of racial disparity within the BPD” and, more specifically, “a disparity between termination rates of black officers versus that of Caucasian officers” as a result of the disparate discipline imposed upon African-American officers in the BPD.
38. In particular, the policy known as the Disciplinary Matrix (“Matrix”) (BPD General Order C-10), which establishes the penalties for violations of disciplinary rules and regulations, and the policies known as BPD General Orders C-1 through C-8, which collectively establish the disciplinary system within the BPD, are overly subjective and vague, thereby fostering a disciplinary process that in practice has a disparate impact on and enables disparate treatment of African-American members of the BPD. The Matrix, attached to the First Amended Complaint as Exhibit F, is incorporated herein by reference.
39. Upon information and belief, the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”), which oversees the administration of the disciplinary system, operates in a manner that has a disparate impact on and enables disparate treatment of African-American officers within the BPD. The lack of training and guidance of IAD staff was specifically documented as a cause for concern in the 2000 report commissioned by the City. Upon information and belief, the lack of clear standards continues and results in African-American officers more freque ntly having charges
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brought and sustained against them than similarly situated Caucasian officers charged with comparable or even more serious offenses.
40. Upon information and belief, the Legal Affairs Division (“Legal”), which historically was a part of the disciplinary system, lacks clear guidelines for its operations and operates in a manner that has a disparate impact on and enables disparate treatment of AfricanAmerican officers.
41. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers in the BPD often receive no discipline or only “unofficial” discipline – i.e., minor discipline is administered by the commanding officer (“CO”) but no charges are filed and nothing is recorded, nor is anything referred to IAD or Legal – for the same offenses for which African-American officers in the BPD receive formal discipline.
42. Upon information and belief, statistical evidence will show that during the Class Period African-American officers in the BPD have been and are being terminated or subjected to harsher discipline at a significantly higher rate than Caucasian members of the BPD.
43. Upon information and belief, the BPD disciplinary system is a centralized mechanism through which discrimination based on color and/or race is perpetuated through excessively subjective decision- making, rather than being exposed and eradicated through fair, balanced, and objective procedures.
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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NAMED PLAINTIFFS LOUIS H. HOPSON, JR.
44. Plaintiff Louis H. Hopson, Jr., has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation, non-promotion and a hostile work environment.
45. Beginning in 1992, Plaintiff Hopson suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of his employment and to create a hostile work environment. He has been subjected frequently to racially derogatory epithets and racially- motivated threatening actions by Caucasian supervisors and co-workers.
46. Plaintiff Hopson was subjected to retaliation for filing internal complaints of racial discrimination when he was transferred to the Communications Division in January 1995 and placed on the least desirable shift for five years, which resulted in significantly diminished respons ibilities, less opportunity for promotion, and damage to Plaintiff Hopson’s workplace reputation.
47. Upon information and belief, in or about 1996, Plaintiff Hopson was subjected to disparate discipline when he was charged with making a less than truthful statement and with misconduct for alleged interference with a Caucasian officer. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses. Upon informatio n and belief, Plaintiff Hopson was discriminatorily denied promotion while less qualified Caucasian officers were promoted over him.
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48. On October 25, 1996, Plaintiff Hopson filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, citing discrimination based on the severe and hostile work environment to which he had been subject since January 1, 1992, the retaliatory actions by his Caucasian supervisors, discriminatory non-promotion, and disparate discipline.
49. On May 29, 1998, Plaintiff Hopson cross- filed another timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the CRC. In this charge, Plaintiff Hopson cited the BPD’s attempt to terminate him by charging him with a domestic violence incident, which purportedly occurred 18 years earlier, in retaliation for speaking before the Legislative Black Caucus on racial discrimination. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses.
50. Upon information and belief, in 1998, Plaintiff Hopson was denied promotion to the rank of Lieutenant based on his race and/or color and in retaliation for his EEOC charges and internal complaints of discrimination. Upon information and belief, less qualified Caucasian officers were promoted over him.
51. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Hopson was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation for engaging in protected activity when he was terminated in August 1998 for allegedly making a false statement. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses. Plaintiff Hopson appealed his termination to the Baltimore City Circuit Court, which ordered that he be reinstated.
52. In or about August 1998, Plaintiff Hopson timely filed a third charge of discrimination with the EEOC. This EEOC charge cited race discrimination and retaliation with regard to his August 1998 termination.
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53. On February 10, 1999, Plaintiff Hopson received a determination letter from the EEOC in which the EEOC found evidence of class-wide discrimination agains t AfricanAmericans officers in the BPD. (Ex. A)
54. In or about July 2001, Plaintiff Hopson timely filed a fourth charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In this EEOC charge, Plaintiff Hopson cited a continuing hostile work environment, retaliation and discriminatory non-promotion.
55. Plaintiff Hopson received a Right to Sue notice on September 7, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff Hopson timely filed this action.
LESLIE EDWARDS 56. Plaintiff Leslie Edwards has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline. 57. On or about April 20, 1994, Plaintiff Edwards suffered disparate discipline when he was terminated on charges of misconduct, false reporting and making a false statement. 58. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses. 59. Plaintiff Edwards timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In his EEOC charge, Plaintiff Edwards cited race discrimination with regard to his termination. 60. Plaintiff Edwards appealed his termination to the Baltimore City Circuit Court, which vacated his termination and remanded Plaintiff Edwards’ case to the BPD for further review. The BPD terminated him again, and Plaintiff Edwards appealed to the Circuit Court a second time, which again vacated his termination and remanded the case to the BPD for further review. The BPD terminated him a third time on or about October 24, 2000, and Plaintiff Edwards did not appeal due to his lack of resources.
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61. On or about, September 26, 2000, Plaintiff Edwards received a determination letter from the EEOC finding evidence of disparate discipline imposed upon African-American officers as a class. (Ex. A)
62. Plaintiff Edwards received a Right to Sue notice on or about September 7, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff Edwards timely filed this action.
ERICA FOOTE 63. Plaintiff Erica Foote has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of her race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline. 64. In or about September 1997, Plaintiff Foote was subjected to disparate discipline when she was charged with destruction of property, disorderly conduct and assault. All but the assault charge were sustained and she was terminated on or about May 1999. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been charged or terminated for similar or more egregio us offenses. 65. On or about June 17, 1999, Plaintiff Foote timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In her EEOC charge, Plaintiff Foote cited discrimination based on her race and/or color and her sex with regard to her termination. 66. On or about September 13, 2000, the EEOC issued a determination letter in which it found evidence of disparate discipline imposed upon African American officers as a class. (Ex. A) 67. On September 29, 2004, Plaintiff Foote received a Right to Sue notice, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff Foote timely filed this action.
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ANTOINE TRAVERS 68. Plaintiff Antoine Travers has been subjected to discrimination based upon his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline and retaliation. 69. On or about December 1995, Plaintiff Travers was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation when he was terminated on charges of assault and disobeying an “order.” Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been charged or terminated for similar or even worse offenses. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Travers was subjected to retaliation for complaining of instances of racial discrimination within the BPD. 70. Plaintiffs Travers appealed his termination to the Baltimore Circuit Court which upheld the Trial Board’s decision to terminate him in or about 1996. Plaintiff Travers further appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals which remanded to the Trial Board. The Trial Board terminated Plaintiff Travers again on or about August 1998. 71. Plaintiff Travers timely filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in or about June 1999. In his EEOC charge, Plaintiff Travers cited race discrimination with regard to his termination. 72. In or about September 2000, the EEOC issued a determination letter to Plaintiff Travers, attached hereto as Exhibit I, in which it found evidence of class-wide discrimination against African-Americans officers in the BPD. 73. Plaintiff Travers received a Right to Sue notice on September 7, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J. Plaintiff Travers timely filed this action.
CHARLES H. CARTER 74. Plaintiff Charles H. Carter has been subjected to discrimination based on his race and/or color in the forms of disparate discipline, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.
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75. Beginning in or about October 1996, Plaintiff Carter was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation when he was targeted for criminal prosecution – on charges later dropped by the Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office for lack of credible evidence – after filing an internal written allegation of race discrimination against his Caucasian supervisor. Plaintiff Carter remained incarcerated on the charges for six months because the BPD petitioned to revoke his bail. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have committed similar or more egregious violations and have not been incarcerated for six months on charges or subject to disciplinary proceedings. Upon information and belief, the BPD has never petitioned to have a police officer’s bail revoked.
76. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Carter has suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of his employment and to create a hostile work environment and has been subjected to repeated acts of retaliation for engaging in protected activities. His police powers have been repeatedly suspended after filing internal written allegations of racial discrimination within the BPD and otherwise opposing racial discrimination within the BPD.
77. On or about July 1, 1997 and December 28, 1998, Plaintiff Carter timely filed charges of discrimination with the CRC and the EEOC. In his charges, Plaintiff Carter cited disparate discip line and retaliatory suspension of his police powers.
78. Plaintiff Carter received an EEOC determination letter on September 13, 2000, finding “patterns and practices of harsher discipline of African-American officers than the discipline of similarly situated Caucasian officers and retaliation for complaining of disparate treatment.” (Ex. A)
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79. On or about March 2002, Plaintiff Carter was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation when he was charged for a November 15, 2001 incident. The charge alleged that Plaintiff Carter was involved in an altercation and that his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. On or about April 2004, a memo was placed Plaintiff Carter’s his personnel jacket stating that on or about November 15, 2001, he conducted himself in a manner unbecoming to a member or the BPD by having a blood alcohol level in excess of the state standard for driving – even though Plaintiff Carter was not driving – and while wearing his service weapon. Upon information and belief, this charge was filed against Plaintiff Carter for opposing racial discrimination in the BPD. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been charged for similar or more egregious offenses.
80. In or about April 2004, Plaintiff Carter was charged with two counts of disobeying a direct order and one count of depriving the rightful owner. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers are not charged for engaging in similar or more egregious conduct. Plaintiff Carter was offered a severe letter of reprimand as punishment for this offense, but refused to take the punishment because he was not guilty of any violation of BPD policy. In response, Plaintiff Carter’s police powers were suspended pending a disciplinary hearing.
81. Plaintiff Carter received a Right to Sue notice on or about September 7, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff Carter timely filed this action.
KAREN ALSTON 82. Plaintiff Karen Alston has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of her race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.
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83. Upon information and belief, on or about December 6, 1995, Plaintiff Alston suffered discriminatory treatment on the basis of her race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of employment and to create a hostile work environment when her Caucasian sergeant reassigned a call to a Caucasian officer and when her Caucasian sergeant demanded that she write an administrative report for misinforming his fiancé that he was out on an assignment when his fiancé called.
84. Upon information and belief, in or about January 1996, Plaintiff Alston was subjected to retaliation when she received an “unsatisfactory” performance review after filing an internal charge of race discrimination against her Caucasian sergeant on or about December 12, 1995.
85. On or about March 19, 1996 and April 25, 1996, Plaintiff Alston was subjected to disparate discipline when she was charged with insubordination, false statements and failure to notify the BPD of her departure from her home while on medical leave. In or about March 1998, a trial board sustained only minor charges related to insubordination and medical leave, and Plaintiff Alston received a ten-day, unpaid suspension, a sever letter of reprimand, and written counseling. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been charged or terminated for similar or even worse offenses.
86. In or about April 1998, Plaintiff Alston was denied extended disability leave and forced to retire. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers on extended disability leave were not forced to retire.
87. Upon information and belief, on or about April 8, 1999, Plaintiff Alston filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In her EEOC charge, Plaintiff Alston cited race discrimination with regard to her termination.
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88. On or about September 13, 2000, the EEOC issued a determination letter finding “patterns and practices of harsher discipline of African-American officers than the discipline of similarly situated Caucasian officers and retaliation for complaining of disparate discipline.” (Ex. A).
89. Plaintiff Alston received a Right to Sue notice on September 7, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff Alston timely filed this action.
JACQUES BONAPARTE 90. Plaintiff Jacques Bonaparte has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline and retaliation. 91. On or about January 2002, Plaintiff Bonaparte was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation when he was charged with insubordination after complaining about discriminatory patrol assignments. He received twelve days suspension without pay and a letter of reprimand. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses. 92. On or about February 13, 2002, Plaintiff Bonaparte timely filed a charge of discrimination with the CRC, alleging disparate discipline and retaliation based on the allegations in Paragraph 91. 93. Plaintiff Bonaparte received a Right to Sue notice on March 22, 2005, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J. Plaintiff Bonaparte timely filed this action.
CARLOS PERRY 94. Plaintiff Carlos Perry has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline and a hostile work environment.
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95. Beginning on or about November 3, 2003, Plaintiff Perry suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of his employment and to create a hostile work environment. Plaintiff Perry was harassed by seven Caucasian officers, denied an assignment to a patrol post and placed on administrative suspension without ever being informed of the basis for his suspension, despite repeated requests.
96. On or about November 9, 2004, Plaintiff Perry was subjected to disparate discipline when he was terminated on misconduct charges relating to the November 3, 2003 incident. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged “offenses.”
97. On or about November 9, 2004, Plaint iff Perry timely filed a timely charge of discrimination with the CRC. In his CRC charge, Plaintiff Perry cited race discrimination with regard to his termination.
98. Plaintiff Perry received a Right to Sue notice on or about March 23, 2005, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J. Plaintiff Perry timely filed this action.
SHIRLEY ONYANGO 99. Plaintiff Shirley Onyango has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of her race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation, non-promotion and a hostile work environment. 100. In October 10, 2000, Plaintiff Onyango was subjected to non-promotion when she was informed that she had met all qualifications for promotion to sergeant but learned that she would not be promoted because of a knee injur y, which purportedly limited her ability to perform certain tasks. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers with more severe physical limitations than Plaintiff Onyango have been promoted to sergeant.
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101. On or about October 20, 2000, Plaintiff Onyango cross- filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC and CRC. In this charge, Plaintiff Onyango cited non-promotion on the basis of her race.
102. Beginning in March 2001, Plaintiff Onyango suffered discrimination on the basis of her race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of her employment and to create a hostile work environment when she was subjected to discriminatory treatment by her Caucasian supervisor, who withdrew her authority to order subordinates to write call reports, required her to sign out for break, required her to handle calls on the terminal when she was the officer in charge, and engaged in extensive review of her files.
103. Also beginning in March 2001, Plaintiff Onyango was subjected to retaliation for opposing racism within the BPD. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Onyango’s Caucasian superior repeatedly questioned Plaintiff Onyango regarding her use of leave to attend Joint Committee meetings with the NAACP and cancelled departmentally-approved, scheduled vacation and/or leave periods related to Plaintiff Onyango’s attendance at NAACP meetings and conventions.
104. As a result of the severe and pervasive hostile work environment and retaliation to which she had been subjected, Plaintiff Onyango was forced to take stress leave for five months beginning on or about October 2001.
105. On or about December 12, 2001, Plaintiff Onyango filed a charge of discrimination with the CRC. In her CRC charge, Plaintiff Onyango cited retaliation and the hostile work environment she suffered beginning in March 2001.
106. In or about March 2002, Plaintiff Onyango returned to work and was subjected to continuing harassment by her Caucasian supervisor, who refused to restore her police powers.
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On or about June 14, 2002, Plaintiff Onyango filed an amendment to her December 12, 2001 CRC charge, citing the BPD’s failure to restore her police powers and the adverse effect this had on her job performance.
107. Thereafter, on or about September 2002, upon information and belief, Plaintiff Onyango was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation for filing an amendment to her EEOC charge when she was subjected to unfounded disciplinary charges by her Caucasian supervisor, who charged her with insubordination and mishandling her firearm. Upon information and belief, the charge for mishandling a firearm has been made part of her personnel jacket even though IAD did not sustain the charges and a trial board was never convened. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers are not similarly charged or disciplined for similar or more egregious offenses.
108. Again, on or about October 2002, Plaintiff Onyango was subjected to disparate discipline when she was charged with filing a fraudulent overtime form. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers are not similarly charged or disciplined for similar or worse offenses.
109. Plaintiff Onyango received a Right to Sue notice on or about March 23, 2005, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J. Plaintiff Onyango timely filed this action.
EDWARD TINDEL 110. Plaintiff Edward Tindel has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation and a hostile work environment. 111. Upon information and belief, beginning on or about 2001, Plaintiff Tindel suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of employment and to create a hostile work environment when
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Caucasian officers and supervisors subjected him to racist slurs and race-based assumptions and singled him out for reprimands, to which similarly situated Caucasian officers were not subjected.
112. Upon information and belief, on or about 2001, Plaintiff Tindel became the target of retaliation for filing an internal EEO complaint about his Caucasian lieutenant’s racially discriminatory conduct.
113. Upon information and belief, in June 2001, Plaintiff Tindel was subjected to disparate discipline when he was charged with insubordination, reckless driving, neglect of duty, not securing juveniles properly, and failure to write a custody report in a timely fashion. He received seven days suspension and a severe letter of reprimand as a result of these charges. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses.
114. In or about July 2002, Plaintiff Tindel was subjected to disparate discipline when he was charged with multiple alleged violations related to his role in responding to a July 2001 altercation. On or about April 1, 2003, a trial board recommended a 70-day suspension, a severe letter of reprimand and counseling, but specifically refused to recommend termination. Plaintiff Tindel was ultimately terminated by the Police Commissioner in April 2003. Upon information and belief, Caucasian officers have not been and are not similarly disciplined or even charged for similar alleged offenses.
TONY ELLISON 115. Plaintiff Tony Ellison has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation and a hostile work environment.
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Case 1:04-cv-03842-AMD Document 18-3 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 24 of 37
116. Beginning on or about December 2003, Plaintiff Ellison suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of employment and to create a hostile work environment when he was involuntarily transferred out of the prestigious drug unit to which he was assigned and replaced by less qualified Caucasian officers, and when his Caucasian lieutenant targeted him throughout 2004 for unwarranted criticism and punitive assignments to which similarly situated Caucasian officers were not assigned.
117. On or about December 15, 2004, Plaintiff Ellison timely filed a charge of discrimination with the CRC. In his CRC charge, Plaintiff Ellison cited race discrimination by the BPD related to treatment by his Caucasian lieutenant. Plaintiff Ellison received a Right to Sue notice on or about March 23, 2005, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J. Plaintiff Ellison timely commenced this action.
118. On or about May 2005, Plaintiff Ellison was subjected to disparate discipline and retaliation when he was belatedly charged with failure to wear his hat in June 2004 by the Caucasian lieutenant who was the subject of Plaintiff Ellison’s December 2004 CRC charge. IAD’s investigation into the allegation was pending at the time of filing this complaint. Upon information and belief, the discipline charges filed against Plaintiff Ellison were filed in retaliation for Plaintiff Ellison filing his December 2004 CRC charge. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers are not charged with failure to wear a hat.
EXDOL WILLIAMS 119. Plaintiff Exdol Williams has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation and a hostile work environment.
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120. On or about May 2003, Plaintiff Williams was subjected to disparate discipline when he was charged with and fined for failure to appear in court. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers are not fined as frequently or severely as African-American officers for failure to appear in court.
121. Plaintiff Williams also suffered disparate discipline on or about April 28, 2004 when a Caucasian lieutenant charged him with insubordination for failure to call the Assistant U.S. Attorney as directed, and IAD sustained those charges. Upon information and belief, IAD sustained the allegation in or about May 2004 but never formally notified Plaintiff Williams of its finding, as required by BPD policy. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers are not investigated or disciplined for comparable or more egregious conduct.
122. Beginning in or about December 2003, Plaintiff Williams suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of his employment and to create a hostile work environment whe n he was involuntarily transferred out of the prestigious drug unit to which he was assigned and replaced by less qualified Caucasian officers, and when his Caucasian lieutenant targeted him throughout 2004 for unwarranted criticism and punitive assignment s to which similarly situated Caucasian officers were not assigned.
123. On or about December 15, 2004, Plaintiffs Williams timely filed a charge of discrimination with the CRC. In his CRC charge, Plaintiff Williams cited race discrimination by the BPD related to his treatment by his Caucasian lieutenant.
124. Plaintiff Williams received a Right to Sue notice on or about March 23, 2005, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit J. Plaintiff Williams timely commenced this action.
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MELVIN RUSSELL 125. Plaintiff Melvin Russell has been subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of retaliation and a hostile work environment. 126. Plaintiff Russell suffered discriminatory treatment on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of employment and to create a hostile work environment. Beginning late 1995, Plaintiff Russell was denied overtime opportunities, passed over for better assignments, denied opportunities for advancement, denied equipment requests and subject to more intense scrutiny related to his job performance because of his race and/or color. 127. Upon information and belief, in or about January 2004, after complaining to his supervisors about what he perceived as racism in the BPD, Plaintiff Russell was involuntary transferred to a less prestigious task force and replaced with a less qualified Caucasian sergeant. 128. On or about February 27, 2004, Plaintiff Russell timely filed a charge of discrimination with the CRC. In his CRC charge, Plaintiff Russell alleged that he has suffered discrimination on the basis of race up to and including his retaliatory transfer. 129. Plaintiff Russell received a Right to Sue notice on or about October 7, 2004, a copy of which has been attached hereto as Exhibit B. Plaintiff Russell timely filed this action.
ZEINAB RABOLD 130. Plaintiff Zeinab Rabold has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of her race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation, and a hostile work environme nt. 131. Throughout her 22-year career, Plaintiff Rabold suffered discrimination on the basis of her race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of her employment and to create a hostile work environment. She has been subjected to racially
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Case 1:04-cv-03842-AMD Document 18-3 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 27 of 37
derogatory epithets and racially- motivated, threatening actions by her Caucasian supervisors and co-workers.
132. As Chief of IAD, Plaintiff Rabold was subject to retaliation and disparate discipline in the form of termination after uncovering racially discriminatory practices and attempting to discipline officers who furthered such practices.
133. On or about June 10, 2005, Plaintiff Rabold cross- filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the CRC, asserting disparate discipline and retaliation based on her termination and hostile work environment throughout her employment with the BPD up to and including her termination.
LYNELL GREEN 134. Plaintiff Lynell Green has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline, retaliation and a hostile work environment. 135. Plaintiff Green suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color that was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the conditions of his employment and to create a hostile work environment when his Caucasian sergeant subjected him to heightened scrutiny, racist slurs and race-based assumptions, and other forms of less favorable treatment than Caucasian officers received. 136. In or about December 2003, Plaintiff Green participated in an EEO investigation of his sergeant and lieutenant in which he opposed racial discrimination by them, and was thereafter subjected to retaliation for having participated in the EEO investigation. 137. In or about October 2004, Plaintiff Green was subjected to disparate discipline when he was charged with making a “false statement” in a report. Upon information and belief,
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Case 1:04-cv-03842-AMD Document 18-3 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 28 of 37
similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been and are not charged for similar alleged offenses.
138. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Green was subjected to retaliation by his Caucasian sergeant after the filing of this class action lawsuit when Plaintiff Green’s Caucasian sergeant stated that he would give a bad evaluation to those individuals who had complained about him.
MAURICE PRICE 139. Plaintiff Maurice Price has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of his race and/or color in the form of disparate discipline. 140. In or about 1994 and again in or about 1997, Plaintiff Price was subjected to disparate discipline when charges were brought against Plaintiff Price related to an alleged domestic incident. In or about 1998, a trial board sentenced Plaintiff Price to 45 days suspension without pay. Approximately two months later, the Police Commissioner terminated Plaintiff Price. Upon information and belief, similarly situated Caucasian officers have not been charged or terminated for similar or more serious offenses.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (CLASS-WIDE VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VII) 141. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 140. 142. This claim is brought on behalf of Named Plaintiffs Hopson, Edwards, Foote, Travers, Carter, Alston, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Ellison, Williams, Rabold, Green, and Price and the class they represent. 143. Defendants have maintained and continue to maintain a system of administering discipline in the BPD that is excessively subjective and has had and will continue to have a disparate impact on African-American members of the BPD. This has resulted in the creation
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and maintenance of a systematic, centralized and continuing practice of discrimination in the disciplinary process. Furthermore, Defendants have intentionally discriminated against AfricanAmerican officers on the basis of race and/or color through a pattern and practice of disparate treatment of African-American officers within the disciplinary system.
144. Defendants’ discriminatory practices described above have resulted in the loss of past and future wages and other job benefits for class members.
145. The foregoing conduct violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e), et.seq.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (INDIVIDUAL VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VII) 146. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 145. 147. This claim is brought individually as a non-class claim on behalf of Plaintiffs Hopson, Travers, Carter, Alston, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green. 148. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs Hopson, Travers, Carter, Alston, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green on the basis of their race and/or color by retaliating against them for engaging in protected activities, and by subjecting them to a hostile work environment that was so severe and hostile as to alter the terms and conditions of their employment, and by denying them job promotions afforded to similarly situated Caucasian employees. 149. Defendants’ discriminatory and retaliatory practices have resulted in the loss of past and future wages and other job benefits, and have caused Plaintiffs Hopson, Travers, Carter, Alston, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green to suffer humiliation, embarrassment and emotional distress.
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150. The foregoing conduct violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e), et.seq.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (CLASS-WIDE VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981) 151. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 150. 152. This claim is brought on behalf of Named Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onayngo, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, and Rabold, and Green and the class they represent. 153. Section 1981 provides in pertinent part that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by Caucasian citizens.” 154. Defendants have acted under color of law to discriminate on the basis of race and/or color against Named Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onayngo, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, and Rabold, and Green and the class by imposing unfounded, unwarranted and overly severe and disparate penalties upon African-American officers for offenses or alleged offenses for which Caucasian officers are not similarly or comparably disciplined or not disciplined at all. 155. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants maintained a series of customs, policies and practices that proximately caused and continue to cause and that were likely to lead and continue to lead to the violation of the civil and constitutional rights of Named Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onayngo, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, and Rabold, and Green and class members. 156. The discrimination against Named Plaintiffs and class members in the form of disparate discipline was willful and wanton and constitutes a continuing violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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157. The foregoing conduct violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(INDIVIDUAL VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981) 158. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 157. 159. This claim is brought individually as a non-class claim on behalf of Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green. 160. Defendants have acted under color of law to intentionally discriminate against Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green on the basis of their race and/or color by retaliating against them for engaging in protected activities and by subjecting them to a hostile work environment that was so severe and hostile as to alter the terms and conditions of their employment. 161. Defendants’ discriminatory and retaliatory practices have resulted in the loss of past and future wages and other job benefits, and have caused Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green to suffer humiliation, embarrassment and emotional distress. 162. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants maintained a series of customs, policies and practices that proximately caused and continue to cause and that were likely to lead and continue to lead to the violation of the civil and constitutional rights of Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green. 163. Defendants’ discrimination against Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green by Defendants in the forms of a severe and pervasive hostile work environment and retaliation for particip ating in protected activities was willful and wanton and constitutes a continuing violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 164. The foregoing conduct violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (CLASS-WIDE VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 165. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 164. 166. This claim is brought on behalf of Named Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Rabold, and Green and the class they represent. 167. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Such violations are actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 168. Defendants have acted under color of law to intentionally discriminate against Named Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Rabold, and Green on the basis of their race and/or color by retaliating against them for engaging in protected activities and by subjecting them to a hostile work environment that was so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of their employment. 169. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants maintained a series of customs, policies and practices that proximately caused and continue to cause and that were likely to lead and continue to lead to the violation of the constitutional and civil rights of Named Plaintiffs and Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Rabold, and Green and class members. 170. The foregoing conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (INDIVIDUAL VIOLATIONS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983) 171. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 170. 172. This claim is brought individually as a non-class claim on behalf of Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green. 173. Defendants have acted under color of law to intentionally discriminate against Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green on the basis of their race and/or color by retaliating against them for engaging in protected activities and by subjecting them to a hostile work environment that was so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of their employment. 174. At all times herein mentioned, Defendants maintained a series of customs, policies and practices that proximately caused and continue to cause and that were likely to lead and continue to lead to the violation of the constitutional and civil rights of Plaintiffs Carter, Bonaparte, Perry, Onyango, Tindel, Ellison, Williams, Russell, Rabold, and Green. 175. The foregoing conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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RELIEF ALLEGATIONS 176. Named Plaintiffs and the class they represent have no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law to redress the on-going wrongs alleged herein, and the injunctive relief sought in this action is the only means of securing complete and adequate relief from these on-going wrongs. Named Plaintiffs and the class they represent are now suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from Defendants’ discriminatory acts and omissions. 177. The actions on the part of Defendants have caused and continue to cause Named Plaintiffs and all class members substantial losses in earnings, promotional opportunities and other employment benefits, in an amount to be determined according to proof.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF FOR THE CLASS WHEREFORE, Named Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: a. Issue an order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) and/or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the manner described above herein, with Named Plaintiffs as the class representatives and their counsel of record as class counsel; b. Enter a class-wide judgment declaring that the acts and practices of Defendants are in violation of the laws of the United States; c. Issue a permanent injunction:
(i) Requiring Defendants to abolish discrimination on the basis of race within and among the BPD;
(ii) Requiring Defendants to treat African-American officers the same as Caucasian officers in regard to the terms and conditions of employment, the investigation of alleged infractions, the discipline process related to such infractions, and the penalties associated with such infractions;
(iv) Appointing an independent monitor to ensure fairness and compliance with the orders of this Court;
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(v) Requiring Defendants to immediately rescind and expunge any and all unfair discipline issued to Named Plaintiffs and members of their class from any and all files and records of the BPD;
(vi) Requiring Defendants to provide fair and non-discriminatory references to Named Plaintiffs and members of their class for future employment, consistent with the expunged disciplinary records; and
(vii) Requiring Defendants, upon request by Named Plaintiffs or members of their class to immediately reinstate any and all Named Plaintiffs and members of their class who were wrongfully terminated from employment due to the discriminatory acts complained of herein. e. Order that Defendants immediately reimburse, and make whole any and all Named Plaintiffs and members of their class for any and all the benefits they would have received had it not been for Defendants’ illegal actions including, but not limited to restoring benefits and seniority to the Named Plaintiffs from the time of Defendants’ illegal actions taken against the Named Plaintiffs. f. Award compensatory damages for the pain, suffering, emotional distress, loss of dignity, humiliation, and damages to reputation and livelihood endured by Named Plaintiffs and members of the class in amounts that are fair, just and reasonable, to be determined at trial; g. Award Named Plaintiffs and members of their class all costs of this action and reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); and h. Grant Named Plaintiffs and members of their class such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, including injunctive and declaratory relief as may be required in the interest of justice.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF FOR INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:
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Case 1:04-cv-03842-AMD Document 18-3 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 36 of 37

a. Grant such equitable relief as is proper and just, including but not limited to,

requiring Defendants to immediately enter into a plan to eliminate the hostile work environment

at the BPD, including: (i) requiring the training of all police officers on the force in human

relations and racial sensitivity; (ii) requiring Defendants to enter into a plan to move the

processing of administrative charges outside the control of the BPD to a separate city office

administered by a body monitored by the EEOC; (iii) requiring the City to take appropriate

disciplinary action against Defendants for their discriminatory actions; and (iv) order that

Defendants provide Individual Plaintiffs with backpay with interest;

b. Award compensatory damages for the pain, suffering, emotional distress, loss of

dignity, humiliation, and damages to reputation and livelihood endured by Individual Plaintiffs in

amounts that are fair, just and reasonable, to be determined at trial;

c. Award Individual Plaintiffs and members of their class all costs of this action and

reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided for in 42 USC § 1988 and 42 USC § 2000e-5(k); and

d. Grant Individual Plaintiffs and members of their class such other and further relief

as the Court deems just and proper, including injunctive and declaratory relief as may be

required in the interest of justice.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of all issues in this action tha t are so

triable.

Dated:

June 13, 2005

By: _________________/s/____________________
Susan E. Huhta (MD Bar No. 14547) WASHINGTON LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS
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Case 1:04-cv-03842-AMD Document 18-3 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 37 of 37
11 Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 319-1000 Fax: (202) 319-1010 Peter D. Isakoff (MD Bar No. 03939) Kristin King Brown David D. Cross Lisa R. Fine WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 1501 K Street, NW, Suite 100 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 682-7000 Fax: (202) 682-7281 Robert L. Smith, Jr. (MD Bar No. 024468) Law Offices of Robert L. Smith, Jr., LLC 10 North Calvert Street, Suite 204 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: (410) 244-1222 Fax: (410) 244-1333
37

 
 Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 1 of 20

( ITY OF FL\LT/\IORE
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June 23, 2009

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The Honorable Paul W. Grimm United States Magistrate Gannatz Federal Courthouse 101 West Lombard St. Chambers 8B Baltimore, MD 21201

Re: Louis Hopson, et aI. v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore et aI., Civil No. 04-3842 (WDQ)

Dear Magistrate Grimm:

The parties advise that the above litigation has been settled in principle and hereby enclose an executed copy of the Settlement Agreement and exhibits thereto. The parties have also prepared the enclosed draft Stipulation of Dismissal and Retention of Jurisdiction to Enforce Settlement Agreement.

As provided in Section 1 of the Settlement Agreement, the Agreement is to become effective "on the date ofthe latest to occur ofthe following: when it is signed by all parties, when it is approved by the Baltimore City Board of Estimates, and if necessary by the Baltimore City Council and the United States District Court."

It is anticipated that the Board of Estimates will consider the Settlement at its June 24,2009 meeting. We do not believe that approval by the City Council is required. That leaves approval by this Court, to the extent such approval is necessary.

As you know, on June 29, 2009, at 11 :00 a.m., the case is set for a chambers conference before Your Honor, at which time the parties shall advise as to the status of the settlement and to address any matters as necessary.

Very truly yours,

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v~/1~.d//cJ4f4--}l

Peter D. Isakoff, Esquire Counsel for Plaintiffs
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George A. Nilson, Esquire Counsel for Defendants

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 2 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

LOUIS H. HOPSON, JR. et al.

*

Plaintiffs v.

* * Civil Action 1:04-cv-03842 (WDQ)

THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL

*

OF BALTIMORE, et al.

*
Defendants.

*
************************************************************************

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL AND RETENTION OF JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

In accordance with the tenns of the Settlement Agreement reached between the parties, the tenns of which are set forth at Exhibit 1 and accompanying exhibits (hereinafter "Settlement Agreement") and are incorporated by reference, it is hereby this __ day of _ _ _ _, 2009,
ORDERED that the claims asserted in this case be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with each party bearing its own costs; PROVIDED, however, that it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to enforce the tenns of the Settlement Agreement.

WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 3 of 20

Settlement Agreement
This Settlement Agreement is entered into this 18th day of June, 2009, by and among Louis H. Hopson, Jr., Leslie Edwards, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Charles Carter, Karen Alston, Jacques Bonaparte, Carlos Perry, Shirley Onyango, Edward Tindel, Tony EUison, Exdol Williams, Melvin Russell, LyneH Green, and Maurice Price (collectively the "Individual Plaintiffs") and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Baltimore City Police Department (the "BPD") (collectively, the "Defendants"). The Individual Plaintiffs and Defendants are collectively referred to herein as the "Parties."
WHEREAS the Individual Plaintiffs, as well as five other individuals who are no longer named plaintiffs. commenced litigation (the "Utigation") by filing a -- - - - - - -- class- action-complaint-(the..£'Complainf1-)-against-Befendants--in-the-United--8t-ates-District Court for the District of Maryland, Case No. 1:04-CV-03842, alleging that Defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against African--------- AIDericanpolice officers erilpIoyedbyTheBID,-fficfiiOii1gThe-IndiViauarFlrunnffs,----- ------ ---- -------primarily though not exclusively through the BPD's internal disciplinary system (the "Disciplinary Process");
WHEREAS since 2005, the Parties have conducted but not completed discovery with respect to class certification issues, although no motion for class certification has been filed; and
. WHEREAS the Parties desire to settle the Litigation on the terms contained herein on an individual basis without adntission of liability and without· . admission by Defendants that class certification is appropriate,

THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1.

Effective Date and Term: This Agreement shall be effective ("Effective Date") on

the date of the latest to occur of the following: when it is signed by all parties, when it is

approved by the Baltimore City Board of Estimates and, if necessary, by the Baltimore City

Council and the United States District Court. The Parties and their-counsel will exercise best

efforts to obtain any necessary approvals of this Agreement. It shall remain in effect during

the term of the Consultant as described in Section VII herein, including any extension.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue: The Parties agree that the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has jurisdiction over this action and will jointly move to have the Court retain jurisdiction of this action for the purpose of enabling any of the Parties to apply to the Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be necessary to carry out or construe or enforce compliance with this Agreement.
m. Mutual Releases:

US_ACTIVE:'.43070235'D1143070l35_I.Doc\

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 4 of 20

A. Release of Defendants by the Individual Plaintiffs: In exchange for the consideration detailed below, including the Settlement Fund and Non-Monetary Re1iet~ the Individual Plaintiffs will exercise a release in the form attached as Exhibit A.hereto, except that the release for Plaintiff Charles Carter shall not extend to any claims at issue in his termination litigation currently pending in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Case No. 24-C-07009926), the release for Plaintiff Exdol Williams shall not extend to any claims at issue in his currently pending EEO complaint, and the release for Plaintiff Louis Hopson shall not extend to any claims at issue regarding uncredited pension time from 1998 and 1999 which are beyond the bounds of the Complaint herein. The Parties agree, however, that nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as a release of any claims of putative class members other than Individual Plaintiffs.
B. Release of Individual Plaintiffs by Defendants: In exchange for release of claims referenced in " III.A above and the other terms and conditions set forth herein, the Defendants shall execute releases in the form attached as Exhibit B hereto.
IV. No Admission of Liability: This Agreement constitutes a compromise and settlement of disputed claims and shall not be deemed or construed to be an admission of liability by any of the Parties at any time for any purpose.
V. Target Dates: The Parties recognize the importance of timely implementation of the remedial measures provided in this Agreement. The schedule(s) set forth in the Agreement for implementing remedial measures are based on the Parties' current best estimates of the time required for such implementation. Defendants will make good faith efforts to meet the schedule(s) set forth herein. In the event that, notwithstanding the BPD's good faith efforts, the BPD determines that extending some part of the schedule becomes necessary, the BPD agrees to provide advance notice to Plaintiffs' Counsel.
VI. Monetary Relief --Settlement Fund
A. Settlement Fund
Defendants shall create a fund in the amount of $2,500,000.00 (the "Settlement Fund") which will be placed in escrow within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date of this Agreement. Any interest earned on the Settlement Fund shall be the property of Defendants. The Settlement Fund will be used to pay the claims of the fifteen Individual Plaintiffs as well as all of Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in connection with the Litigation. As detailed in " VII.B.2.b below, Defendants have agreed to fund and hold no less than five (5) leadership training classes during the five years following the Effective Date of the Agreement. If, for any reason, during the first three years following the Effective Date of the Agreement, the BPD fails to fund and commence at least three leadership training classes, the Defendants will add to the Settlement Fund the amount of$150,000.00 within thirty (30) days of the three-year anniversary of the Effective Date. Moreover, if, for any reason, by the end of the subsequent two years, the BPD has failed to hold at least three leadership training classes during the five years following the Effective Date, for each leadership training class not held, the Defendants will add to the Settlement Fund the amount of $150,000.00 within thirty (30) days of the tive-

us ACTIVE. 43070235,01 '430702.15 I DOC99995 203 I

2

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 5 of 20

year anniversary of the Effective Date. The total of any amounts added to the Settlement Fund as a result of the BPD's failure to hold leadership classes may not exceed $300,000. All amounts paid as a result of this paragraph will be distributed to the Individual Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' Counsel according to a methodology to be determined solely by the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel. Plaintiffs and their Counsel agree to hold Defendants harmless with regard to any matter, dispute or claim which may arise out of the methodology used to divide the settlement funds.
B. Confidentiality of Settlement Amounts: The total amount recovered by any Individual Plaintiff from the Settlement Fund shall be kept completely confidential, and shall be disclosed to no one other than Plaintiffs' counsel, that Individual Plaintiff and such person's spouse (or significant other) and immediate family, such person's accounting, financial and legal advisors, the Internal Revenue Service and as otherwise required by law. Each of the above persons to whom such authorized disclosures are made shall, in turn, be required to maintain the confidentiality of such information. In the event that Defendants prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such amount awarded to a Plaintiff based on the aforementioned methodology is disclosed by an Individual Plaintiff otherwise than as limited by this paragraph, such Individual Plaintiff shall be liable for breach of contract to the Defendants for liquidated damages equal to the total amount of such individual recovery. Additionally, if it is determined that the aggregate amount awarded to the Individual Plaintiffs as a whole is disclosed other than to accounting, financial and legal advisors, the Internal Revenue Service and as otherwise required by law, the Individual Plaintiffs who were determined by a preponderance of evidence to have disclosed that amount shall pay to the Defendants liquidated damages equal to the amount of their individual recoveries. The confidentiality obligations imposed by ~ VI.B are perpetual and shall survive termination of this Agreement for any reason.

VII. Non-Monetary Relief
A. Consultant
1. The BPD will retain the services of an outside Consultant who shall be selected upon mutual agreement of the parties in a process to be determined by them, or in the alternative by former Maryland Attorney General Stephen H. Sachs from a list consisting of no more than two nominees submitted by the Plaintiffs and Defendants, respectively. The BPO will enter into a contract with the consultant on terms satisfactory to the Consultant and the City and consistent with the terms of this Settlement Agreement, for a term of three years beginning upon execution of the Consultant's contract, extendable by up to an additional two years if the Consultant reports at the end of three years that there is a continuing substantive problem relative to racial discrimination or disparities in the BPD's disciplinary system on which the BPD is not making identifiable and reasonable progress based on the data and other objective evidence particularized by the Consultant that supports the extension notice. Plaintiffs' Counsel shall receive any drafts of the contract submitted to the Consultant for possible execution with the opportunity to comment on it before it becomes tinal. The BPO will attempt to finalize that contract with the consultant within thirty days of the Effective

us _ACTIVE \43070235\01\43070235 _1.DOC\99't95.2031

3

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 6 of 20

Date.
2. The BPD will include in the contract with the Consultant provisions for background briefings and information gathering during the first six months of the Consultant's appointment pertaining to the Disciplinary and EEO functions within the BPD generally, including any changes undertaken and implemented or planned within the previous two years.
3. The Consultant will be assigned a telephone number and P.O. Box at which he/she will be able to receive information from employees of the BPD or others relating to the disciplinary system and EEO function of the BPD and whether minority employees are or may be discriminated against or disparately treated by the system based on their race. The Consultant may follow up on such information as he/she sees fit and may consider it in periodic reports to the BPD. The retention of the Consultant and hislher role, together with the Consultant's contact information, will be disseminated appropriately throughout the BPD. Periodic reports prepared by the EEO office and circulated internally within the BPD and the City shall be concurrently provided by that office to the consultant. The Consultant may also make reasonable inquiries in hislher discretion consistent with the purposes of the settlement, including with respect to the BPD's EEO function.
4. Beginning July 1,2010, and continuing every six months thereafter through the term of the Consultant, the BPD shall deliver to the Consultant a report reflecting all disciplinary activity within the BPD during the prior twelve months as reflected in the collective disciplinary databases, enhanced by the addition of the matters provided for in Exhibit D. These reports shall be accompanied by appropriate demographic information pertaining to the BPD generally. These reports shall include at least the following fields of information as applicable for each accused individual and incident: the race, sex, age, rank, and years of service of the accused officer, the date and substance of the complaint, charging party (source of complaint), date and substance of disciplinary charges/determinations of Charging Committee, date and substance of lID findings, date and substance of trial board findings/determinations, final disposition including the sanction imposed, if any, and any comment (in mitigation or aggravation or otherwise), all in such format as shall be agreed upon by the BPD and the Consultant. They shall be accompanied by other available information from the BPD reasonably calculated to shed light on the reported data. The Consultant will be entitled to meet and confer at and for reasonable times with a representative or representatives of the BPD of the Consultant's choosing to discuss the data contained in each such report within 30 days of receiving the report. Provided that they have executed a confidentiality agreement in the form attached as Exhibit C hereto, Plaintiffs' counsel herein shall receive the reports and data provided for in this paragraph and the reports and responses provided for in ~ VIILA.5. below - all through Defendants' counsel and contemporaneously with their being provided to the Consultant or the BPD as the case may be.
5. The Consultant will submit a written report to the Police Commissioner by December 31, 2009, and following each six-month data report from the BPD to the Consultant pursuant to the provisions hereof, which reports will include any areas of either progress or concern, observations, and any recommended actions for the BPD to consider in

us ACTIVE 430702J5101 143070235 ~1.DOCY9995 2031

4

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 7 of 20

light of what the data indicates and in light of any other infonnation that the Consultant has become aware of. The Conunissioner shall respond to such periodic reports within 60 days of receiving them and in such responses will identify whatever actions he/she proposes to take in response to the Consultant's report or otherwise. If the Consultant is not satisfied with the Commissioner's response, and if that dissatisfaction is not promptly resolved between the Conunissioner and the Consultant, then the Consultant may submit hislher report together with the Commissioner's response to the Mayor of the City for consideration and any appropriate action by the Mayor.

B. BPD Remedial Measures

1. General Goal: Defendants are and shall remain committed to equal employment opportunities in all aspects of employment. The purpose of these general remedial measures is to provide Plaintiffs and all other employees of the BPD with a work environment free of illegal discrimination and retaliation. In particular, the purpose of these measures is to assure that the BPD's disciplinary policies and procedures are applied to African-American employees in a manner equivalent to the manner in which those same disciplinary policies and procedures are applied to non-African American employees. The purposes of these measures are also to ensure that BPD provides an effective means for employees to lodge internal complaints of discrimination andlor retaliation, and further to provide for a good faith investigation and resolution of all such claims. All provisions herein apply to all employees of the BPD.

2. Specific Measures:

a. The Defendants have taken and agree to take the steps necessary to enhance their MIS data capture and reporting systems relative to disciplinary actions within the BPD, and to initiate and execute the training activities, described generally on Exhibit 0 hereto. They agree to use their best efforts to do so no later than June 30,20 IO. Those enhancements and activities are expected to cost approximately $892,253.20 beyond what has already been expended as indicated on Exhibit D.

b. The Defendants have begun offering a leadership training program through the University of Maryland that tocuses on providing leadership training to minority and women Sergeants and Lieutenants in the BPD in classes of 25 (the "Leadership Training Programs"). The Leadership Training Programs have an estimated cost per class of $150,000 and are designed and intended to support the development of critical leadership skills among the minority and women officers of the BPD. The BPD agrees to offer at least tive of these Leadership Training Programs over the next five years through the University of Maryland or otherwise. Failure to hold these classes during this five-year period will result in additions to the Settlement Fund as set forth in ~ VI.A above.

c.

lAD and Trial Board training provisions related to trial board

process shall be funded and conducted at least at levels consistent with Exhibit 0 hereto.

Additional training shall be provided during the term of the Consultant to personnel in the EEO

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 8 of 20

Office, the members of the Charging Committee, and to Trial Board personnel as follows:

(1) Personnel in the BPD's EEO Office shall receive allliual training provided by the federal EEOC office that is pertinent to the discharge of their functions;

(2) Members of the Charging Committee and those who serve on trial boards shall be provided annual training designed to assist them in fairly administering the disciplinary process and assuring that it does not discriminate against minority employees.

d. At present, the BPD's Charging Committee of five individuals includes four minority members and one female member. The Charging Committee is responsible for determining on recommendation from disciplining authorities within the BPD what if any formal charges should be "prosecuted" to a Trial Board determination. The Commissioner and the BPD agree that as the composition of that Committee may change, it will during the next five years always include minority representation reflective of the extent to which the BPD's sworn officers are minorities and will always include one female member.

C. Individual Plaintiffs' Personnel Records:

1. Expungement: The Defendants have asserted that they are barred, both legally and by the BPD's own historical practices, from expunging any of the disciplinary records of the Plaintiffs herein except in accordance with the criteria of Section 3-110 of the Maryland Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (the "Statute"). If at any time during the five-year period following the Effective Date of this Agreement, the BPD grants expungement of the disciplinary records of a police officer under circumstances not at the time authorized by the express provisions of the Statute, then any Plaintiff may seek and shall be granted expungement of his or her disciplinary records that pre-date the Effective Date. And in all events, the Plaintiffs retain any rights they have to expungement under Section 3-110 to the extent applicable.

2.

Confidentiality: Plaintiffs' personnel files and the disciplinary

proceedings reflected therein are confidential and limited from disclosure by various laws. The

BPD reiterates its standard practice, and agrees it will be followed with regard to Individual

Plaintiffs, and that, except to the extent required by law, the BPD will respond to requests for

employment history and information by disclosing dates of service only, and will not disclose

any Individual Plaintiffs disciplinary history or whether the end of service was as a result of

termination or resignation or otherwise.

VIII. No Retaliation

Defendants shall not retaliate against any of the Individual Plaintiffs for their having brought or pursued this Litigation.

IX. Choice of Law

US_ACTIVE \43070235\01 \43070235 _I .DOC\99995.203 1

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Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 9 of 20

This Settlement Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of Maryland, without giving effect to the provisions, policies or principles thereof relating to choice or contlict of laws.
X. Plaintiffs' Representation
The Individual Plaintiffs state that they have been represented by Plaintiffs' Counsel in the Litigation and have consulted with Plaintiffs' Counsel in connection with their review and execution of this Agreement.
XI. Entire Agreement
This Settlement Agreement constitutes the entire agreement among the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes any oral representations or agreements, but does not modify any other written agreement except as specificaJly provided for herein.
XII. Counterparts
This Settlement Agreement may be executed in counterparts and shall be legally binding, subject to obtaining the necessary approvals as set forth in paragraph I herein, when all signatures are exchanged by email.
Individual Plaintiffs
Louis H. Hopson, Jr.

Leslie Edwards Erica Foote Antoine Travers

Baltimore City Police Department By:
Approved as to form and legal sufficiency
this k:....- Day of )004 ,2009 by City
Solicitor
/~7_. L/(U George Nilson, Esq.

us _,A,CTlV E4}070235'O I'4307()235 _I,f)OC\99995 2031

7

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 10 of 20

Charles Carter Karen Alston Jacques Bonaparte Carlos Perry Shirley Onyango Edward Tindel. Tony Ellison Exdol Williams Melvin Russell LynelJ Green Maurice Price

Approved: Board of Estimates of Baltimore
__,2009
Deputy Comptroller Harriet Taylor, Clerk

US/,CTIVE.\430702.15\OI'43070235 _1.DOC99995.20J I

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Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ DocumeEnXt H30I6BIT AFiled 06/23/2009 Page 11 of 20

RELEASE
In accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated _ __ , 2009, [Plaintiff Name] as Releasor hereby agrees to and does RELEASE and FOREVER DISCHARGE the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Baltimore City Police Department (hereafter "Releasees"), from any and all claims or causes of action, known or unknown, that were asserted or that could have been asserted in the litigation Hopson Jr. et al. v. Mayor & City Council ()f Baltimore, et aL., U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Case No.1 :04-cv-03842, from the beginning of time through the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement.

Dated: _ _ _, 2009

[Plaintiff Name]

US ACTIVE:'clJU7U235'OI14JUl0235 JDOC\9<J'>95 203 I

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 12 of 20 EXHIBIT A- Charles Carter Version

RELEASE
In accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated - - - ,2009, Charles
Carter as Releasor hereby agrees to and does RELEASE and FOREVER DISCHARGE the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Baltimore City Police Department (hereafter "Releasees"), from any and all claims or causes of action, known or unknown, that were asserted or that could have been asserted in the litigation Hopson Jr. et al. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, et aI., U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Case No. I :04-cv-03842, (the "Hopson Litigation") from the beginning of time through the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement, provided, however, that this Release does not release any claims or causes of action, known or unknown, that were asserted or could have been asserted against any of the Releasees in the litigation Charles H. Carter v. Edward Ambrose, ct al., Case No. 24-C-07-009926, currently pending in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals nor does it release any other claims Releasor may have against any of the Releasees arising on or after Releasor's termination and not related to the Hopson Litigation

Dated: _ _ _, 2009

Charles H. Carter

us _ACTlVE4J0702JS\OI4VJ702J5_1 DOC~9~95 ]U} I

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 13 of 20
EXHIBIT A- Exdol Williams Version

RELEASE In accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated _ _,2009, Exdol Williams as Releasor hereby agrees to and does RELEASE and FOREVER DISCHARGE the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Baltimore City Police Department (hereafter "Releasees"), from any and all claims or causes of action, known or unknown, that were asserted or that could have been asserted in the litigation Hopson Jr. et al. v. Mayor & City Council ofBaltimore, et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Case No.1 :04-cv-03842, from the beginning of time through the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement, provided, however, that this Release does not release any claims that Releasor may have against any of the Releasees in connection with an internal complaint filed with the EEO Section of the Baltimore City Police Department in September 2008.

Dated: _ _ _,2009

Exdol Williams

lJS _ACTIVE '43070235 10143070235_ ID()('''99995 cllJ 1

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 14 of 20
EXHIBIT A- Louis Hopson Version RELEASE
In accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated _ _,2009, Louis H. Hopson, Jr. as Releasor hereby agrees to and does RELEASE and FOREVER DISCHARGE the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Baltimore City Police Department (hereafter "Releasees"), from any and all claims or causes of action, known or unknown, that were asserted or that could have been asserted in the litigation Hopson Jr. et al. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, et aI., U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Case No. I :04-cv-03842, from the beginning of time through the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement, provided, however, that this Release does not release any claims that Releasor may have against any of the Releasees in cOImection with the Releasor's potential for credit to his pension that was unrecognized while the Releasor was terminated from the BPD between September 1998 and August 1999. Dated: _ _ _, 2009
Louis H. Hopson, Jr.
us _ACTIVE '43070235\01 '43070235 _I. D0099995.2031

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ DocumeEntX3H0I6BIT BFiled 06/23/2009 Page 15 of 20
RELEASE In accordance with the Settlement Agreement dated _ _,2009, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Baltimore City Police Department as Releasors hereby agree to and do RELEASE and FOREVER DISCHARGE Louis H. Hopson, Jr., Maurice Price, Shirley Onyango, Melvin Russell, Edward Tindel, Karen Alston, Erica Foote, Exdol Williams, Jacques Bonaparte, Antoine Travers, Leslie Edwards, Charles Carter, LyneH Green, Anthony Ellison, and Carlos Perry and, if any, their heirs, executors, administrators, and agents (hereafter "Releasees"), from any and all claims or causes of action, known or unknown, of whatsoever form or nature from the beginning of time through the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement. Dated: _ _ _, 2009
Baltimore City Police Department By:
Approved as to form and legal suffIciency this(~ Day of ~"f2009 by City Solicitor George~Nilson, Esq.
US ACTIVE 43070"3501 '4307U2J5.1 00('99995.2031

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 16 of 20

EXHIBIT C

CONFIDENTIALITY OF CONSULTANT REPORTS AND BPD RESPONSES

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement reached between the parties in

Louis H. Hopson, Jr. et at. v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et aI., Civil

Action No. 1:04-cv-03842 (AMD), on

_ _, 2009, the parties have agreed,

inter alia, that the Consultant provided for in that agreement shall, for the duration of the

term of the Consultant, collect various records and prepare reports concerning discipline

within the Baltimore Police Department (BPD), as further described in the two

paragraphs below and Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, and provide that

information to counsel for plaintiffs, and that such records and reports shall be treated as

confidential;

ACCORDINGLY, it is this _ _ day of _ _ _ _, 2009 AGREED:

1. Designation of Materials to be received by Consultant and provided to Plaintiffs' counsel as Confidential:

a. The BPD shall deliver to the Consultant a repOIi reflecting all disciplinary activity within the BPD during the twelve months prior to the beginning date of the tem1 of the Consultant, as reflected in the collective disciplinary databases, enhanced by the addition of the matters provided for in Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement. These reports shall be accompanied by appropriate demographic information pertaining to the BPD generally. These reports shall include at least the following fields of information as applicable for each accused individual and incident: the race, sex, age, rank, and years of service of the accused officer, the date and substance of the complaint, charging party (source of complaint), date and substance of disciplinary charges/detenninations of Charging Committee, date and substance of IID findings, date and substance of trial board findings/detenninations, final disposition including the sanction imposed, if any, and any comment (in mitigation or aggravation or otherwise), all in such format as shall be agreed upon by the BPD and the Consultant. They shall be accompanied by other available information from the BPD reasonably calculated to shed light on the reported data. Plaintiffs' counsel herein shall receive the reports and data provided for in this paragraph and the reports and responses provided for in ~ VILA.S of the Settlement Agreement - all through Defendants' counsel and contemporaneously with their being provided to the Consultant or the BPD as the case may be. All such data and documents described in this paragraph and any and all other data and documents referring, related to, or referencing the produced documents shall be subject to this Agreement and considered confidential information.
b. The Consultant will submit a written report to the Police Commissioner by December 31,2009, and following each six month data report from the BPD to the Consultant pursuant to the provisions hereof, which reports will include any areas of either progress or concern, observations, and any recommended actions for the BPD to consider in light of what the data indicates and in light of any other information that the Consultant has become aware of. The Commissioner shall respond to such periodic

US ACTIVE:1430702J5'OI'4J070235 ~ I DOC9999520.11

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 17 of 20

reports within 60 days of receiving them and in such responses will identify whatever actions he/she proposes to take in response to the Consultant's report or otherwise. If the Consultant is not satisfied with the Commissioner's response, and if that dissatisfaction is not promptly resolved between the Commissioner and the Consultant, then the Consultant may submit hislher report together with the Commissioner's response to the Mayor of the City for consideration and any appropriate action by the Mayor. All such data and documents described in this paragraph and any and all other data and documents referring, related to, or referencing the produced documents shall be subject to this Agreement and considered confidential infonnation.

')

Duties of Parties to Keep Materials received by Consultant and provided to

Plaintiffs' counsel as Confidential:

a.

Counsel for the parties shall keep all documents designated as

Confidential under this Agreement secure within their exclusive possession and shall take

reasonable efforts to place such documents in a secure area. Absent written consent of

opposing counsel, "Confidential" documents may be shared only with persons employed

by or at the agency or finn at which counsel is employed or with professionals retained to

assist counsel who sign a copy of this confidentiality Agreement.

b. All copies, duplicates, extracts, summaries, or descriptions of documents or infonnation designated as confidential under this Agreement of any portion thereof, shall be immediately affixed with the word "CONFIDENTIAL" if that word does not already appear.

Peter D. Isakoff, Esq. David N. Southard, Esq. Michael C. Smith, Esq. Weil, Gotshal, & Manges LLP 1300 Eye Street, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: 202-682-7000 Fax: 202-857-0940
-and-
Sue Huhta, Esq. Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs II Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: 202-319-1000 ,Fax: 202-319-1010

George A. Nilson, Esq. Donald R. Huskey, Esq. Governor E. Jackson, III, Esq. Baltimore City Department of Law 101 City Hall 100 N. Holliday Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Tel: 410-396-7359 Fax: 410-576-7203
Attorneysfor Defendants

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Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 18 of 20

EXHIBIT D
MIS Enhancement Costs includes Hardware, Software & Person Hours

Total Dollars -

$981,374.80

lAD Data Conversion Completed lAD Data Conversion To Be Done lAD Application Development Completed lAD Application Development To Be Done lAD Training & Meetings: lAD Reporting & Enhancements: lAD Sub Total
Command Discipline & Trial Board Documentation Scanning Command Discipline & Trial Board Data Conversion To Be Done Command Discipline & Trial Board Application Development To Be Done
Command Discipline & Trial Board Training & Meetings: Command Discipline & Trial
Board Reporting &
Enhancements: Command Discipline & Trial Board Sub Total Software Costs Hardware
Storage Backup System and Tapes Servers Fiber Run from lAD Scanner Software & Hardware Sub Total MIS Total Dollars

Hours 120@$76.00 120@$76.00 160@$73.01 320@$73.01 80@$76.00 200@$73.01
600@$25.00
240@76.00
600@73.01 120@76.00
200@73.01
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Already Incurred $9,120.00

Future Cost $9,120.00

$11,681.60

$20,801.60

$23,363.20 $6,080.00
$14,602.00 $53,165.20

$15,000.00

18,240.00

43,806.00 9,120.00

68,320.00

$14,602.00
$100,768.00 68,320.00

68,320.00 $89,121.60

200,000.00 200,000.00 200,000.00
20,000.00 50,000.00 $738,320.00 $892,253.20

liS _ACTIVEI43070235\OJ '43070235 _I DOC99995.2031

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 19 of 20
CONFIDENTIALITY OF CONSULTANT REPORTS AND BPD RESPONSES
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement reached between the parties in Louis H. Hopson, Jr. et al. v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al., Civil . Action No. I :04-cv-03842 (AMD), on June 18, 2009, the parties have agreed, inter alia, that the Consultant provided for in that agreement shall, for the duration of the term of the Consultant, collect various records and prepare reports concerning discipline within the Baltimore Police Department (BPD), as further described in the two paragraphs below and Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, and provide that information to counsel for plaintiffs, and that such records and reports shall be treated as confidential;
ACCORDINGLY, it is this 18th day of June, 2009 AGREED:
I. Designation of Materials to be received by Consultant and provided to Plaintiffs' counsel as Confidential:
a. The BPD shall deliver to the Consultant a report reflecting all disciplinary activity within the BPD during the twelve months prior to the beginning date of the term of the Consultant, as reflected in the collective disciplinary databases, enhanced by the addition of the matters provided for in Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement. These reports shall be accompanied by appropriate demographic information pertaining to the BPD generally. These reports shall include at least the following fields of information as applicable for each accused individual and incident: the race, sex, age, rank, and years of service of the accused officer, the date and substance of the complaint, charging party (source of complaint), date and substance of disciplinary charges/determinations of Charging Committee, date and substance ofIID findings, date and substance of trial board findings/determinations, final disposition including the sanction imposed, if any, and any comment (in mitigation or aggravation or otherwise), all in such format as shall be agreed upon by the BPD and the Consultant. They shall be accompanied by other available information from the BPD reasonably calculated to shed light on the reported data. Plaintiffs' counsel herein shall receive the reports and data provided for in this paragraph and the reports and responses provided for in ~ VIJ.A.S of the Settlement Agreement - all through Defendants' counsel and contemporaneously with their being provided to the Consultant or the BPD as the case may be. All such data and documents described in this paragraph and any and all other data and documents referring, related to, or referencing the produced documents shall be subject to this Agreement and considered confidential information.
b. The Consultant will submit a written report to the Police Commissioner by December 31,2009, and following each six month data report from the BPD to the Consultant pursuant to the provisions hereof, which reports will include any areas of either progress or concern, observations, and any recommended actions for the BPD to consider in light of what the data indicates and in light of any other information that the Consultant has become aware of. The Commissioner shall respond to such periodic reports within 60 days of receiving them and in such responses will identitY whatever

Case 1:04-cv-03842-WDQ Document 306 Filed 06/23/2009 Page 20 of 20

actions he/she proposes to take in response to the Consultant's report or otherwise. If the Consultant is not satisfied with the Commissioner's response, and if that dissatisfaction is not promptly resolved between the Commissioner and the Consultant, then the Consultant may submit his/her report together with the Commissioner's response to the Mayor of the City for consideration and any appropriate action by the Mayor. All such data and documents described in this paragraph and any and all other data and documents referring, related to, or referencing the produced documents shall be subject to this Agreement and considered confidential information.
2. Duties of Parties to Keep Materials received by Consultant and provided to Plaintiffs' counsel as Confidential:
a. Counsel for the parties shall keep all documents designated as Confidential under this Agreement secure within their exclusive possession and shall take reasonable efforts to place such documents in a secure area. Absent written consent of opposing counsel, "Confidential" documents may be shared only with persons employed by or at the agency or firm at which counsel is employed or with professionals retained to assist counsel who sign a copy of this confidentiality Agreement.
b. All copies, duplicates, extracts, summaries, or descriptions of documents or information designated as confidential under this Agreement of any portion thereof, shall be immediately affixed with the word "CONFIDENTIAL" if that word does not already appear.

Peter D. lsakoff, Esq. David N. Southard, Esq. Michael C. Smith, Esq. Wei!, Gotsha!, & Manges LLP 1300 Eye Street, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 Tel: 202-682-7000 Fax: 202-857-0940
-and-
Sue Huhta, Esq. Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs I I Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: 202-319-1000 Fax: 202-319-10 10
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

George A. Nilson, Esq. Donald R. Huskey, Esq. Governor E. Jackson, III, Esq. Baltimore City Department of Law 101 City Hall J00 N. Holliday Street Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Tel: 410-396-7359 Fax: 410-576-7203
Attorneysfor Defendants

2

 
 Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

232 F.R.D. 228 United States District Court,
D. Maryland.
Louis H. HOPSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
The MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, A Municipal Corporation of the State of Maryland, and the Baltimore City Police
Department, Defendants.
No. CIV.A. AMD-04-3842. | Nov. 22, 2005.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*230 Peter D. Isakoff, Kristin King Brown, Lisa R. Fine, Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP, Susan E. Huhta, Washington, DC, Robert L. Smith, Jr., Law Office of Robert L. Smith Jr. LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Ralph S. Tyler, Elizabeth F. Harris, Joshua Neal Auerbach, Karen Stakem Hornig, Baltimore City Law Department, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GRIMM, United States Magistrate Judge.
This case has been referred to me for resolution of all discovery disputes. Paper no. 27. Pending and ripe for a decision is the Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Rule 33 and 34 discovery. Papers No. 26, 29, and 30. Plaintiffs have asserted putative class claims and individual claims against the City of Baltimore (“The City”) and the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”) alleging that BCPD engaged in racial discrimination against African American police officers in connection with the administration of the disciplinary system for Baltimore police officers. It is alleged that the disparate impact and disparate treatment claims extend back to 1992, the commencement date for the misconduct that is the focus of the class claims.
*231 When the court issued its scheduling order and discovery commenced, Plaintiffs promptly served interrogatories and document production requests on the Defendants. The Rule 34 requests were extensive and clearly sought both “hard copy” records as well as electronically stored records and data. Companion interrogatories included more than 15 specifically designed to discover the nature, extent, and location of

electronically stored records, the Defendants’ IT capabilities, the nature of archived data, e-mail, and records retention policies-in short, all of the computer generated information that is the subject of so much discussion these days.
Defendants answered, raising many objections to the discovery sought, including burdensomeness and expense. Many of their objections, however, were boilerplate, general objections, rather than specific ones, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 33(b)(4) and Rule 34. See Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468 (D.Md.2005). Plaintiffs and Defendants met and corresponded in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the discovery disputes without involving the court. Plaintiffs then followed the procedures outlined in Local Rule 104.8, the issues were fully briefed and, when last efforts to work out their differences failed, the motion and responsive memoranda were filed. To support their objections based on burden and expense, which largely had been unparticularized in their initial written responses, Defendants attached the affidavit of the BCPD’s IT manager, Mr. Michael Roosa. Paper No. 30, Attachment A. Although this affidavit was a welcome addition to the prior conclusory assertions of burden, and did demonstrate the limited number of IT specialists working for the BCPD and the many competing demands for their services, it still fell short of what would be necessary for a proper application of the cost-benefit analysis required by Rule 26(b)(2) to enable the court fairly to tailor the discovery allowed in this particular case. Absent, for example, was any estimate of the number of hours and or costs that would have to be expended in order to comply with the Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.
On November 9, 2005, a hearing was held in open court. One of the Defendants’ concerns was the cost and burden of performing pre-production privilege review of the records sought by the Plaintiffs. I ruled on many of the Rule 34 requests, and also ordered the parties to pursue through other methods, discovery into the Defendants’ electronically stored information. Specifically, because the parties had not met in an effort to agree upon a reasonable discovery plan for electronic discovery, I ordered Defendants, along with Mr. Roosa, to meet with Plaintiffs and their IT representative to consult in good faith in an effort to informally discover sufficient information about the Defendants’ IT systems and electronic records to agree upon a proposed discovery plan to submit to the court for review and approval. I further ordered the parties to discuss the Rule 26(b)(2) factors in connection with the procedures that Defendants reasonably should take to perform a review for privilege and work product claims, given the nature of the litigation, the long time period for which the records were sought, and the resources of the parties. I ordered this conference to take place within 30 days, after which a follow-up
1

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

hearing would be scheduled, during which I would approve a discovery plan and issue an order implementing it.
During the November 9th hearing, I noted that the issues presented in this case prominently showcase challenges that recur in connection with the discovery of electronic data, which are the subject of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that were approved in September 2005 by the Judicial Conference of the United States and forwarded to the United States Supreme Court for adoption, and referral to Congress for its approval. Specifically, this case highlights significant unresolved issues relating to the nature of privilege review that must be performed by a party producing electronically stored information, whether non-waiver agreements entered into by counsel to permit post-production assertion of privilege are permissible, and effective for their intended purpose, as well as the application of principles of substantive evidence law related to the waiver of privilege by inadvertent production. These issues, among the most talked about by lawyers, judges, and the parties who are *232 affected by their resolution, have yet to be fully developed by the courts. And, in this regard, there is no controlling precedent in the Fourth Circuit or this District to guide counsel and clients in this important and potentially hazardous aspect of discovery. I explained to counsel that I intended to supplement my oral ruling with a memorandum and order addressing these issues. This memorandum does so.
[1] This case vividly illustrates one of the most challenging aspects of discovery of electronically stored information-how properly to conduct Rule 34 discovery within a reasonable pretrial schedule, while concomitantly insuring that requesting parties receive appropriate discovery, and that producing parties are not subjected to production timetables that create unreasonable burden, expense, and risk of waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product protection. In the absence of procedural rules tailored to ameliorate this problem, parties and courts have begun to adopt1 innovative methods of addressing it. As noted in the Federal Judicial Center Manual for Complex Litigation:

1

“It has become increasingly common to see parties

enter into agreements to disclose privileged materials

provided the disclosure is not taken to entail waiver as

to all privileged matters. Because courts will give effect

to such agreements, the parties by contract, so to speak,

can avoid the general rule that partial disclosure on a

given subject mater will bring in its wake total

disclosure.” Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client

Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 287-88 (4th

ed.2001).

A responding party’s screening of vast quantities of unorganized computer data for privilege prior to production can be particularly onerous in those jurisdictions in which inadvertent production of privileged data may constitute a waiver of privilege as to a particular item of information, items related to the relevant issue, or the entire data collection. Fear of the consequences of inadvertent waiver may add cost and delay to the discovery process for all parties. Thus, judges often encourage counsel to stipulate at the outset of discovery to a “nonwaiver” agreement, which they can adopt as a case-management order. Such agreements protect responding parties from the most dire consequences of inadvertent waiver by allowing them to “take back” inadvertently produced privileged materials if discovered within a reasonable period, perhaps thirty days from production.2

2

Manual for Complex Litigation, § 11.446, at 80,

(Stanley Marcus, et al. eds., Federal Judicial Center 4th

ed.2004).

Similarly, the recent report of the Judicial Conference

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the

Chief Justice of the United States and the Members of the

Judicial Conference of the United States that forwarded

proposed revisions to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16,

26, 33, 34, and 37, addresses this same issue:

The problems that can result from

efforts to guard against privilege

waiver often become more acute

when discovery of electronically

stored information is sought. The

volume of the information and the

forms in which it is stored make

privilege determinations more

difficult and privilege review

correspondingly more expensive

and time-consuming, yet less likely

to detect all privileged information.

Inadvertent production is

increasingly likely to occur.

Because the failure to screen out

even one privileged item may result

in an argument that there has been

a waiver as to all other privileged

materials related to the same

subject matter, early attention to

this problem is more important as

electronic discovery becomes more

common. Under the proposed

amendments to Rules 26(f) and 16,

if the parties are able to reach an

agreement to adopt protocols for

asserting

privilege

and

work-product protection claims that

will facilitate discovery that is

2

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

faster and at lower cost, they may

ask the court to include such

arrangements

in

a

case-management or other order.3

3

Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice

and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United

States by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, September 2005 at 27. In

September, 2005, the Judicial Conference of the United

States approved the proposed changes for submission to

the Supreme Court, and recommended their adoption

and that they be submitted to Congress for approval.

*233 The commentary to the proposed changes to Rules 16(b) and 26(f) similarly states:
Rule 16(b) is also amended to include among the topics that may be addressed in the scheduling order any agreements that the parties reach to facilitate discovery by minimizing the risk of waiver of privilege or work-product protection. Rule 26(f) is amended to add to the discovery plan the parties’ proposal for the court to enter a case management or other order adopting such an agreement. The parties may agree to various arrangements. For example, they may agree to initial provision of requested materials without waiver of privilege or protection to enable the party seeking production to designate the materials desired or protection for actual production, with the privilege review of only those materials to follow. Alternatively, they may agree that if privileged or protected information is inadvertently produced, the producing party may by timely notice assert the privilege or protection and obtain return of the materials without waiver. Other arrangements are possible. In most circumstances, a party who receives information under such an arrangement cannot assert that production of the information waived a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material.4

4

Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice

and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United

States by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, September 2005 at 26.

In addition, the proposed changes to Rule 26(b)(5) would allow a party to raise post-production claims of privilege and work product protection for electronically stored information, and further establish a procedure for resolving disputes regarding such an assertion. The commentary for this proposed rule change again notes the longstanding complaint that the delay and expense associated with privilege review for electronic records is excessive.5 The proposed rule changes appear to be ideal, were it not for the following cautionary language in the comment:

5

Id. at 52.

The proposed amendment does not address the substantive questions whether privilege or work product protection has been waived or forfeited [by the procedures in the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(5) ]. Instead, the amendment sets up a procedure to allow the responding party to assert a claim of privilege or of work-product protection after production.... It is a nod to the pressures of litigating with the amount and nature of electronically stored information available in the present age, a procedural device for addressing the increasingly costly and time-consuming efforts to reduce the number of inevitable blunders ... [Proposed] Rule 26(b)(5)(2) does not address whether the privilege or protection that is asserted after production was waived by the production. The courts have developed principles to determine whether, and under what circumstances, waiver results

from inadvertent production of privileged or protected information.6

6

Id. at 52, 56.

[2] [3] Thus, after nearly ten years of extensive study7 of the discovery rules by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the procedures proposed to address the burdens of privilege review associated with production of electronically stored information surely would ameliorate them, but at the price of risking waiver or forfeiture of privilege/work product protection,8 depending on the substantive law of the *234 jurisdiction in which the litigation was pending. Absent a definitive ruling on the waiver issue, no prudent party would agree to follow the procedures recommended in the proposed rule. And, as already noted, parties, with the apparent encouragement of courts,9 have been using these procedures even in advance of the adoption of rule changes authorizing them.
3

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

7

Id. at 52.

8

Although it is customary during Rule 34 discovery to

assert simultaneously attorney-client privilege and

work product protection, the two doctrines are distinct,

and what is required to effect a waiver of the

attorney-client privilege is not the same for waiver of

work product protection. In fact, the attorney-client

privilege may be waived more easily than work product

protection. See Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. Twin

Laboratories, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 463-64

(D.Md.1998); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d

619, 623-24 (4th Cir.1988).

For purposes of this case, it is not necessary to

distinguish what is needed to effect a waiver of the

attorney-client privilege from waiver of work

product protection. Since attorney client protection is

waived more easily than work product protection,

procedures that protect against waiver of the former

will, a fortiori, prevent against waiver of the latter.

9

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290

(S.D.N.Y.2003) (“Indeed, many parties to

document-intensive litigation enter into so-called

‘claw-back’ agreements that allow the parties to forego

privilege review altogether in favor of an agreement to

return inadvertently produced privileged documents.

The parties here can still reach such an agreement with

respect to the remaining seventy-two tapes and thereby

avoid any cost of reviewing these tapes for privilege”);

See also The Sedona Conference, The Sedona

Principles: Best Practices Recommendations &

Principles for Addressing Electronic Document

Production, March, 2003, comment 10a,

http://www.thesedonaconference.org (recommending

that parties enter into non-waiver agreements to

facilitate production of electronic records and that they

seek court orders providing that such agreements do not

constitute inadvertent waiver of privilege/work product.

The Sedona Conference identifies itself as a non-profit

charitable research and education organization whose

mission is facilitate education regarding “cutting edge

issues” in law related topics including complex

litigation. It has published recommended practices

regarding electronic document production that have

received widespread attention); American Bar

Association Civil Discovery Standards 31a.xiii, amend.

August 2004 (recommending that the parties participate

in an initial discovery conference and recommends that

at the conference they stipulate “to the entry of a court

order providing that production to other parties or

review by a mutually-agreed independent information

technology consultant of attorney-client privileged or

attorney work-product protected electronic data will not

effect a waiver of privilege or work product

protection”).

Within the Fourth Circuit, however, no case has been found that would provide definitive guidance to practitioners and their clients whether the procedures proposed by the recommended changes to the discovery rules and apparently being utilized at present by counsel, would waive attorney-client privilege or work product protection. As will be seen, forecasting the answer to this important question is not as easy as might be desired.
The changes recommended to Rules 16 and 26 encourage the party receiving the electronic discovery to agree not to assert waiver of privilege/work product protection against an opposing party that agrees to provide expedited production of electronically stored information without first doing a full-fledged privilege review. Similar agreements have been approved by a number of courts in the past. See Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 290 (see quote at n. 9); VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8 (D.Mass.2000) (District court approved stipulation between counsel governing non-waiver of inadvertently produced privileged documents); Ames v. Black Entm’t Television, No. 98CIV0226, 1998 WL 812051, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.18, 1998). (“Lee did not waive [the attorney-client] privilege, even though she answered certain questions about Ebron’s alleged affair, because the parties agreed at her deposition that she could answer selected questions and those answers would not be deemed a waiver of any privileges.”); Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 439 (D.D.C.1984) (“Plaintiffs’ waiver theory fails for yet another reason. Counsel for the parties stipulated in the course of the O’Donnell deposition that testimony by the witness would not be deemed to constitute any waiver of the attorney-client or work product privileges. In view of that stipulation, plaintiffs cannot now rely on the O’Donnell deposition to support a claim of waiver.”); W’ern. Fuels Ass’n, Inc. v. Burlington N’ern. R.R. Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D.Wyo.1984) (“The Order of Magistrate Beaman dated April 18, 1983 states that, in order to expedite discovery herein, inadvertent production of privileged documents during the course of discovery herein shall not constitute a waiver of either the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege. To the extent plaintiff alleges defendant waived such privileges through the production of documents during the course of discovery herein, the Court believes such prior order prevents a waiver.”); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, 61 F.R.D. 35, 42 (E.D.N.Y.1973) (“Prior to any discovery in this case by defendant, plaintiffs and defendant executed a protective order which contemplated a special method of discovery for the particular case and expressly provided there would be no waiver of any privilege *235 unless expressed in writing .... If the language of the protective order is to be applied in the instant case, its requirement of express waiver would seem to preclude any argument of waiver to be implied by a particular course of conduct especially one contemplated in the order itself.”); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 89 F.Supp. 357, 359 (D.Mass.1950)
4

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

(“The defendant seasonably claimed whatever privilege it had. It did not waive its privilege by surrendering the exhibits in response to subpoenas, because it was agreed in advance by Government counsel that compliance with the subpoenas should not constitute a waiver.”). See also Epstein, supra, at 287-88 (“It has become increasingly common to see parties enter into agreements to disclose privileged materials provided the disclosures are not taken to entail waiver as to all privileged matters. Because courts will give effect to such agreements, the parties by contract, so to speak, can avoid the general rule that partial disclosure on a given subject matter will bring in its wake total disclosure.”).10

10

Not all courts have approved non-waiver agreements

between counsel. See Koch Materials Co. v. Shore

Slurry Seal Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 118 (D.N.J.2002)

(Court declined to give effect to agreement between

counsel that production of certain documents would not

waive privilege protection because such agreements

“could lead to sloppy attorney review and improper

disclosure which could jeopardize clients’ cases.”);

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 192 F.R.D. 575,

577-78 (M.D.Tenn.2000) (holding that an agreement

with the government to produce documents without

waiving privilege/work product protection is invalid,

rejecting the doctrine of “selective waiver”).

The commentary to the proposed changes to Rule 26(b)(5) anticipates arguments that production of privileged/protected information under a non-waiver agreement will waive the privilege or protection, but asserts that “courts have developed principles for determining whether waiver results from inadvertent production of privileged information.”13 However, because there is no uniform position taken by the courts on whether inadvertent production waives privilege/work product protection, care must be taken to identify the controlling law in each jurisdiction. Specifically, three distinct positions have been taken by the courts: the “strict accountability” approach followed by the Federal Circuit and the First Circuit14 (which almost always finds waiver, even if production was inadvertent, because “once confidentiality is lost, it can never be restored”);15 the lenient/ “to *236 err is human” approach, followed by the Eighth Circuit and a handful of district courts16 (which views waiver as requiring intentional and knowing relinquishment of the privilege, and finds waiver in circumstances of inadvertent disclosure only if caused by gross negligence);17 and the third approach, adopting a “ ‘balancing’ test that requires the court to make a case-by-case determination of whether the conduct is excusable so that it does not entail a necessary waiver.”18

Although the use of “non-waiver” agreements presently may be growing-and if the proposed changes to the discovery rules are adopted they can be expected to increase significantly-they certainly are not risk-free. Some commentators appear to be openly skeptical of their ability to insulate the parties from waiver,11 and even if they are enforceable as between the parties that enter into them, it is questionable whether they are effective against third-parties.12 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426-27 (3d Cir.1991) (Agreement between litigant and DOJ that documents produced in response to investigation would not waive privilege does not preserve privilege against different entity in unrelated civil proceeding); Bowne v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (non-waiver agreement between producing party in one case not applicable to third party in another civil case).

11

24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,

Federal Rules of Evidence, Ch. 6 § 5507, 579 and 579

n. 22 (1986).

13

Comment to proposed changes to Rule 26(b)(5) at 15.

See also comment to proposed changes to Rule 16(b) at

3 (“Alternatively, [the parties] ... may agree that if

privileged information is inadvertently produced the

producing party may by timely notice assert the

privilege and obtain return of the materials without

waiving the privilege.”); Manual for Complex

Litigation, supra, § 11.446 (Non-waiver agreements

“protect responding parties from the most dire

consequences of inadvertent waiver by allowing them

to ‘take back’ inadvertently produced privileged

materiels if discovered within a reasonable period,

perhaps thirty days from production.”).

14

Epstein, supra, at 309.

15

Id. The District of Columbia Circuit also adheres to the

strict liability approach. Saltzburg et al, Federal Rules

of Evidences Manual, § 501.02[5][k][v] at 501-54 (8th

ed.2002); citing In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976

(D.C.Cir.1989).

12

Id. at 579 (“A stipulated non-waiver may be defensible

as between the two parties inasmuch as they are free to

argue between themselves that certain evidence will not

be used. But it is questionable whether such agreements

should be effective as against third parties.”)

16

Epstein, supra, at 310-11.

17

Id.

5

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

18

Id. at 311. A number of district courts within the Fourth

Circuit have adopted this approach. See F.C. Cycles

Inc. v. Fila, 184 F.R.D. 64, 76 (D.Md.1998) (“Of late,

however, numerous district courts in this circuit have

embraced the balancing test [regarding waiver of

attorney-client privilege for inadvertently disclosed

material]”); see also McCafferty’s v. The Bank of Glen

Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 167-69. (D.Md.1998) citing In

re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 279

(M.D.N.C.1992); F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty

Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.Va.1991).

The Fourth Circuit has not yet considered the doctrine of inadvertent disclosure of attorney client/work-product materials in the context of voluminous production during discovery in a civil case.19 However, its discussion of the doctrine of waiver in other contexts provides useful circumstantial evidence of how they might rule.

19

F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc., 184 F.R.D. at 76.

disclosure by the client to a third-party waives the privilege not only as to the specific communication disclosed, but often as to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.”24 Although one respected commentator has cited In re Grand Jury Proceedings for the proposition that the Fourth Circuit has adopted the “strict liability” approach to inadvertent disclosures of attorney-client privileged information,25 this court has observed that the issue of inadvertent disclosure has not expressly been addressed by the *237 Fourth Circuit.26 The very uncertainty of the Fourth Circuit’s position is grounds for proceeding cautiously, because if the In re Grand Jury Proceedings case does suggest that the court would take a strict liability approach, the waiver would be broad subject matter waiver, rather than waiver limited to the contents of the disclosed document. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d at 1357. The Fourth Circuit’s subsequent case, United States v. Pollard (In re Marietta), 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir.1988) is further grounds for caution with respect to the inadvertent waiver doctrine.27

20

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d at 1355

(internal citations omitted).

[4] In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir.1984) the Fourth Circuit examined the attorney-client privilege and its waiver in the context of a subpoena issued to a lawyer to testify before a grand jury regarding a client’s business activities. The court narrowly interpreted the privilege because its application “ ‘impedes [the] full and free discovery of the truth’ and is ‘in derogation of the public’s right to every man’s evidence,’ ” accordingly the court stated that it “is to be ‘strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with its principle.’ ”20 The court noted that “the essence of the privilege is that the communication was intended to be confidential”21 adding: “In fact, so strong is this requirement of confidentiality that it has been held that the privilege may be lost ‘even if the disclosure is inadvertent’ such as in some circumstances ‘eavesdropping’ and again, where if the privileged communication consisted of ‘privileged documents,’ the party did not ‘take reasonable steps to insure and maintain [their] confidentiality.’ ”22 The court continued: “It is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the [attorney client] privilege ... he must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality ... [t]aking or failing to take precautions may be considered as bearing on intent to preserve confidentiality. In particular, courts have consistently ‘refused to apply the privilege to information that the client intends his attorney to impart to others ....’ ”23 Finally, the court stated that “[a]ny disclosure inconsistent with maintaining the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship waives the attorney-client privilege. Any voluntary

21

Id.

22

Id. at 1356 (internal citations omitted).

23

Id. at 1356; citing In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d

Cir.1973) (J. Friendly).

24

Id. at 1357.

25

Saltzburg et al, supra, § 501.02[5][k][v] at 501-54.

26

F.C. Cycles Int’l Inc., 184 F.R.D. at 76 (“The defendant

asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit has adopted the middle-ground approach

[to inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privileged

material]. The Court has not expressly addressed this

issue.”).

27

It should be noted that Fed.R.Evid. 501 provides that

“in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an

element of a claim or defense as to which State law

6

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.” Thus, for diversity cases in this district in which Maryland law governs, state privilege law, not federal, governs. Maryland has adopted the “balancing approach” to inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Elkton Care Center Assocs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Quality Care Mgmt., 145 Md.App. 532, 805 A.2d 1177 (2002). See also F.H. Chase, Inc. v. Clark/Gilford, 341 F.Supp.2d 562, 562 (D.Md.2004) (applying the balancing test of Elkton Care Center in diversity contract case in federal court). Counsel must be cautious to make sure which standard governs in their cases, and in cases asserting both federal and state claims, both federal and state privilege standards could be applicable, which could result in the paradoxical situation in which a producing party’s conduct could constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for the federal claims, but not for the state claims.
In Martin Marietta, the Fourth Circuit again examined the attorney-client privilege and its waiver in the context of a criminal case. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir.1988). The defendant in a mail fraud case sought to subpoena production from his employer certain documents that it had disclosed previously to the United States to settle criminal and administrative cases against it. Id. at 620. The employer resisted the subpoena arguing that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Id. The defendant responded that the prior disclosure waived the privilege and protection. Id. The Fourth Circuit examined whether the employer’s prior production impliedly waived the privilege and protection. Id. at 621-23. It stated, relevantly:
Implied waiver nullifies a privilege when disclosure of a privileged communication has vitiated confidentiality. Unlike express waiver which allocates control of the privilege between parties to the communication, implied waiver allocates control of the privilege between the judicial system and the party holding the privilege .... Martin Marietta argues for application of a limited implied waiver as to both privileges. Most courts continue to state the rule of implied waiver in absolute form-any disclosure of a confidential communication outside a privileged relationship will waive the privilege as to all information related to the same subject matter. That is commonly referred to as subject matter waiver as opposed to

Id. at 623.

limited waiver for which Martin Marietta argues. However, competing policy concerns, such as facilitating the settlement of litigation, permitting full cooperation among joint defendants, expediting discovery and encouraging voluntary disclosure to regulatory agencies have led courts to carve out exceptions to the purportedly absolute rule of waiver .... The Fourth Circuit has previously rejected the limited waiver concept as to the attorney-client privilege and as to non-opinion work-product. We have embraced the limited waiver concept as to opinion work-product.

The lessons taught by the In re Grand Jury Proceedings and Martin Marietta cases are sobering to those with cases pending in the Fourth Circuit when considering the procedures suggested by the proposed changes to the rules of civil procedure to deal with the burdens and expense of privilege review related to discovery of voluminous electronically stored information. Both these cases were decided more than fifteen years ago, long before the problems associated with computer generated and stored information *238 were on anyone’s radar scope. Although both were decided in the context of grand jury investigations in criminal cases, neither confined its ruling to application of the privilege in that context, but, rather, spoke broadly in terms that would apply equally to civil cases. Further, they clearly express a very strict interpretation of the attorney-client privilege, and an unambiguous willingness narrowly to confine it to its essential function-preserving communications intended to be kept confidential. Finally, both cases take an unforgiving view of the results of its waiver-subject matter waiver.
This case thus highlights an unavoidable clash of important policies. On the one hand is the substantive law narrowly confining the attorney-client privilege to its essential purpose, with subject-matter waiver as the price for unprotected disclosure. On the other is the distinct trend towards limiting the nature and amount of discovery to the needs of the particular case, given the issues in the case, the importance of the facts sought to be discovered, and the resources of the parties, such as embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2), and the proposed changes to the rules of civil procedure relating to discovery of electronically stored information. In attempting to resolve this clash, it is important to have a clear appreciation of what is at stake. This requires an awareness of the
7

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

enormous costs that would accompany a requirement that in all civil cases the production of electronically stored information could not be accomplished until after a comprehensive privilege review and particularized assertion of privilege and work product claims.
The commentary to the proposed changes to Rules 16 and 26, quoted above, speak of the costs associated with discovery of electronically stored information in general, and privilege review prior to production specifically: “The volume of the information and the forms in which it is stored make privilege determinations more difficult and privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming, yet less likely to detect all privileged information.”28 One does not have to look very hard to find specific cases that provide a factual basis for this concern. In Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y.2002) the court was faced with motions by defendants that sought to be protected from the burden and expense of producing e-mail that had been requested by the plaintiffs during discovery in a civil case. One defendant supported its motion with an estimate from a computer consultant that it would cost $395,944 to select, catalogue, restore, and process a limited sampling of the e-mails sought, and $9,750,000 to do the same for all e-mail requested. Rowe Entm’t, 205 F.R.D. at 425. Another defendant produced cost estimates ranging from $43,110 to $84,060 to produce requested e-mail, with an estimated cost of $247,000 to review the e-mail for privilege and work-product prior to production. Id. A third estimated that it would take more than two years to retrieve and catalogue the e-mails requested by the plaintiff at a cost of $395,000, with an additional cost of $120,000 to conduct privilege review-which would take a full-time employee two years to complete. Id. at 426. In another case, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y.2003) the defendant submitted cost estimates in support of its request to shift the production costs to the plaintiff of $165,954.67 to search for and restore responsive electronic information, with an additional estimated expense of $107,694.72 for attorney and paralegal review costs.

can be used as evidence in a legal action. Since e-mail can provide especially devastating evidence, the use of e-evidence is increasing. In a survey of *239 1,100 U.S. Companies conducted by the American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute, 14% of respondents said they were ordered by a court or regulator to produce employee e-mail in 2002, which was up from 9% in 2001.29

29

Linda Volonino, Electronic Evidence and Computer

Forensics, 12 Communications of the Association for

Information Systems 27, October 2003, at 7, available

at http://cais.isworld.org/articles/12-27/article.pdf.

The same study estimates that “discovery of e-mail occurs in nearly 100% of federal civil ... cases and major employment disputes,”30 with the following impact on the responding party:

30

Id. at 11.

Responding to a discovery request for a corporation’s internal e-mail may seem simple and straightforward to the courts or lawyers. However, a company served with a request to produce e-mail messages faces time consuming and expensive processes. The cost and complexity depends on the volume of e-records, how they are organized, and their accessibility. The cost of responding to a discovery request can be in the millions of dollars if several years’ worth of archived e-mail and files must be located, restored, sorted through and cleansed to remove non-relevant confidential material .... Those costs are often in the millions of dollars.31

31

Id. at 14.

28

Report of the Judicial Conference on Rules of Practice

and Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States,

supra, at 27, n. 3.

Those who bear the administrative and financial costs of responding to voluminous discovery requests for electronically stored information are mindful of the potential burden and expense. A publication of the Association for Information Systems (AIS) has observed:
Broadly defined, e-evidence is electronically-stored information on any type of computer device that

Importantly, the foregoing costs must be borne before the lawyers begin the job of privilege review. With regard to the process of assembling electronic information responsive to discovery requests, an entire industry of consultants has developed to provide services to litigants.32 Some consultants are nothing short of giddy in their projections of the expected fees to be earned from these services. For example, the reports of a survey conducted by a “digital discovery” consultant of users of consulting services led it to conclude “[b]ased on our research, we estimate that 2004 domestic commercial electronic discovery revenues were in the range of $832 million-a 94 percent increase from 2003.”33 Projections
8

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

for the next three years were equally attention grabbing: 2005: $1.282 billion; 2006: $1.923 billion; and 2007: $2.865 billion.34 It also is instructive to look back to see how quickly these costs have grown in such a short time. Estimated total revenues earned by consulting companies providing services to litigants regarding discovery of electronic information was:

32

“A cottage industry of companies assisting with the

production and retrieval of electronic data and litigation

has recently arisen.” T. Delaney, E-Mail Discovery:

The Duties, Danger and Expense, 46 Fed. Lawyer 42,

44 (Jan.1999).

33

Socha-Gelbmann 2005 Electronic Discovery Survey

Results,

http://www.sochaconsulting.com/2005surveyresults.ht

m.

34

Id.

1999 $40 million :

2000 $70 million :

2001 $150 million :

2002 $270 million :

2003 $430 million35 :

35 Socha-Gelbmann 2004 Electronic Discovery Survey

Results,

http://

www.sochaconsulting.com/Publications/DDEE%

2005.03.pdf; Socha-Gelbmann 2004 Electronic

Discovery

Survey

Results,

http://www.sochaconsulting.c

om/Publications/LawTechnologyNews% 20Article%

208.04.pdf.

[5] Despite the uncertainty regarding which approach to inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged material would be adopted by the Fourth Circuit, there is a viable method of dealing with the practical challenges to privilege review of electronically stored information without running an unacceptable risk of subject-matter waiver. It lies with the courts issuing scheduling orders under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16, protective orders under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), or discovery management orders

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2) that incorporate procedures under which electronic records will be produced without waiving privilege or work product that the courts have determined to be reasonable given the nature of the case, and that have been agreed to by the parties. This practice, already commonly followed in cases where discovery of electronic records is anticipated, is specifically encouraged by the proposed rule changes to the discovery rules now under *240 review by the Supreme Court.36 As will be seen, it is essential to the success of this approach in avoiding waiver that the production of inadvertently produced privileged electronic data must be at the compulsion of the court, rather than solely by the voluntary act of the producing party, and that the procedures agreed to by the parties and ordered by the court demonstrate that reasonable measures were taken to protect against waiver of privilege and work product protection. To appreciate how the process must work, one must understand Fed.R.Evid. 501, and the doctrine of compelled disclosure encompassed by Proposed, but not enacted, Rule of Evidence 512. Fed.R.Evid. 501 states:

36

Supra n. 3 and n. 4.

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. (Emphasis added). Therefore, it “authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by interpreting ‘common law principles ... in the light of reason and experience.’ ” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996). And, because “ ‘the common law is not immutable, but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions,’ ” Id. (internal citations omitted), Rule 501 “did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.’ ” Id. at 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Notably, when Congress elected to adopt the “general mandates” of Rule 501, it rejected a series of specific privilege rules that had been “formulated by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of
9

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

Evidence and approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States and by [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Many learned commentators have observed that, because the proposed evidence rules, often referred to as “standards,” were approved by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court, they evidence the common law of privilege and therefore may be applied under Rule 501 if reason and experience make such application appropriate. See 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 512.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997 (“Supreme Court Standards are not part of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court originally proposed the Standards as Rules, but Congress struck them before enacting the other proposed rules into law. However, Supreme Court Standard 512 retains considerable utility as a guide to the federal common law referred to in Rule 501.”); Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 501.1 (5th ed. 2001) (“While the nine rules recognizing specific privileges as drafted by the Advisory Committee and prescribed by the Supreme Court do not have the force of law, they do provide standards reflective of the ‘reason and experience’ mentioned in Rule 501.) These nine specific provisions relating to privilege, ..., are consistent and co-extensive with privileges recognized by the federal common law. The remaining proposed rules, now Standards, deal with procedural aspects governing all privileges, no matter their source of origin .... Standard 512 provides an exception for disclosure where compelled or made without opportunity to claim.”); Saltzburg, et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 501.02[3] (“While common-law development is now mandated, the question remains whether the Federal Courts in developing the law of privileges should consider the proposed-but-rejected privileges as either persuasive or controlling. Most Courts have held that the recommendations of the Advisory *241 Committee and the Supreme Court are a useful guide, though not controlling in determining the existence and scope of a federal privilege.”).
As noted in the above cited authorities, one of the proposed rules, Standard 512, is especially relevant to this case. It states: “[e]vidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the privilege.” Proposed Rule 512, 56 F.R.D. at 259. The commentary to proposed Rule 512 recognized that it cannot undo the damage that inadvertent disclosure of privileged information causes, but it can contain it. “Confidentiality, once destroyed, is not susceptible of restoration, yet some measures of repair may be accomplished by preventing uses of the evidence against the holder of the privilege. The remedy of exclusion is therefore made available when the earlier disclosure was compelled erroneously or without opportunity to claim the privilege.” Id.

Federal courts also have referenced Proposed Rule 512 in contexts that are relevant to this case, to hold that a party that is compelled to produce privileged material, or erroneously produces it, does not waive the privilege. In Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.1978), the Ninth Circuit held that IBM had not waived its privilege claims to records that erroneously had been produced in prior litigation involving different parties, because the production was in response to an accelerated discovery schedule that the trial court had imposed, and the disclosures had been unintentional. Notably, the court observed that in the earlier litigation, IBM had produced 17 million pages of documents during a court ordered production schedule that had “dramatically accelerated the document inspection program.” Transamerica, 573 F.2d at 648. The court noted that during this demanding production schedule, IBM had undertaken “herculean” efforts to review documents for privilege. Id. at 648-49. Therefore, it had not been guilty of any want of diligence. Of greater importance, however, was the fact that the trial judge had ruled that “the inadvertent production of allegedly privileged material by either party would not constitute a waiver of that party’s right to claim the attorney-client privilege, provided only that the party disclaiming waiver had continued to employ procedures reasonably designed to screen out privileged material.” Id. at 649-50.
In concluding that IBM had not waived its privilege claims by producing the documents in the earlier litigation, and therefore could not be compelled by Transamerica in the subsequent litigation to produce it, the Ninth Circuit declined to view the issue solely as one of inadvertent disclosure, but rather focused on the importance of the court’s compulsion of the production of the documents under conditions that unavoidably resulted in disclosure of some privileged material. The court observed:
We do not decide, however, whether this sort of ‘inadvertent’ disclosure constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, for we believe that this case is properly decided upon the basis of a legal principle upon which the parties are in complete accord. Specifically, IBM asserts, and [Transamerica] concedes, that a party does not waive the attorney-client privilege for documents that he is compelled to produce.
Id. at 650-51. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on proposed Rule 512: “Proposed Rule 512 is perhaps even more on point. This proposed rule would have prohibited the use of any privileged matter if its disclosure had been ‘compelled erroneously’ or had been ‘made without opportunity to claim the privilege.’ It is
10

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

our belief that under the specific circumstances of the accelerated discovery proceedings in the CDC litigation, IBM’s inadvertent production there of some privileged documents does not constitute a waiver of the privilege protecting the production of those documents, for that production was ‘made without (adequate) opportunity to claim the privilege.’ ” Id. at 651.

Also central to the court’s ruling was its recognition that the production of some privileged material by IBM had occurred as a result of the trial court’s discovery order:

Id. at 652.

As the judicial officer directly in charge of supervising the discovery proceedings in *242 that litigation ... [the trial judge] was in an ideal position to determine whether the timetable he himself had imposed was so stringent that, as a practical matter, it effectively denied IBM the opportunity to claim the attorney-client privilege for documents it was producing for inspection by CDC. TCC acknowledges that waiver cannot be directly compelled, and ... [the judge’s] rulings recognize and we so hold, that neither can it be indirectly compelled.

Finally, the court noted that the trial judge had further issued a ruling “explicitly protecting and preserving all claims of privilege, provided only that the parties wishing to preserve privilege had engaged in suitable screening techniques.” Id.
Subsequent courts have applied the ruling of Transamerica or independently referred to Proposed Rule 512 in instances where a party had been compelled to produce privileged material erroneously, or without adequate opportunity to review it for privilege. Sangre De Cristo Community Mental Health Serv., Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 1461, 1466 (10th Cir.1983) (“production of privileged documents by an attorney under court order does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the privilege,” citing Proposed Rule 512, “[a]lthough Congress did not enact rule 512, it still has utility as a standard of law on the privileges that should be applied in federal courts.” (internal citations omitted)); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F.Supp. 936, 938, n. 4 (S.D.Fla.1991) (citing Transamerica); and Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Nos. 2:98-1879-23 and 2:98-3235-23, 1999 WL 33591437, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct.25, 1999) (noting that Proposed Rule 512 may have utility in determining federal common law of privilege); Amway

Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, at *2 (W.D.Mich. April 3, 2001) (noting court decisions holding that privilege is not lost if disclosure was compelled erroneously or if holder did not have opportunity to assert privilege, citing treatises, case law)37.

37

No decision from the Fourth Circuit has been found

discussing whether Proposed Rule 512 constitutes the

“common law” of privilege under Rule 501. However,

in Farnsworth Cannon v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268,

270-71, n. 8 (4th Cir.1980), the Fourth Circuit did

recognize that proposed privilege rule 509(e) (state

secrets privilege) was part of the common law of

privilege despite the fact that it had not been adopted.

The Transamerica case and those that have followed it would allow parties that have entered into an agreement to preserve privilege claims with respect to production of electronically stored information to avoid subsequent claims by third parties that the production waived the privilege, provided: (a) the party claiming the privilege took reasonable steps given the volume of electronically stored data to be reviewed, the time permitted in the scheduling order to do so, and the resources of the producing party; (b) the producing party took reasonable steps to assert promptly the privilege once it learned that some privileged information inadvertently had been disclosed, despite the exercise of reasonable measures to screen for privilege and, importantly; (c) the production had been compelled by court order that was issued after the court’s independent evaluation of the scope of electronic discovery permitted, the reasonableness of the procedures the producing party took to screen out privileged material or assert post-production claims upon discovery of inadvertent production of privileged information, and the amount of time that the court allowed the producing party to spend on the production. Thus, the Transamerica case provides a method to meet the goals of the proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding preservation of privilege claims during production of electronically stored material within the context of existing substantive privilege law, which the proposed rule changes cannot trump.
And, even the D.C. Circuit, one of the staunchest adherents to the “strict accountability” approach to waiver of privileged material, has recognized in an analogous context that production of privileged information under circumstances where the party asserting the privilege is unable effectively to prevent the disclosures or to assert the privilege, does not result in waiver.
*243 In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921 (D.C.Cir.1997), the D.C. Circuit examined whether the production of tapes of communications between a security trader and his wife, assertedly
11

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

protected by the marital communications privilege, by the husband’s employer that had retained copies of the tapes, waived the privilege. Importantly, the court recognized that the issue involved more than the concept of inadvertent production of privileged material by the holder of the privilege or its attorney. Rather, the court observed:
the question of the Lavins’ alleged waiver arises in an unusual context, different from that of any of the cases on which the district court and the parties rely. The Lavins assert the privilege with regard to communications, the physical manifestations of which belong to a third party, Mr. Lavin’s employer. Consequently, the cases cited that discuss implied waiver when the holder of the privilege or his attorney is in possession of the materials at issue and fails to take adequate precautions to maintain their confidentiality, i.e. negligent or inadvertent disclosures, offer limited guidance on whether disclosure by third parties over whom the holder of the privilege has virtually no control ... may nonetheless be held to constitute waiver. In cases of involuntary disclosures, at least one court has held that waiver occurs only when the holder has failed to take reasonable steps to reclaim the protected material.
Lavin, 111 F.3d at 929-30 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit adopted the following language from a Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.1992):
[W]hen the disclosure of privileged material is involuntary, we will find the privilege preserved if the privilege holder has made efforts ‘reasonably designed’ to protect and preserve the privilege. Conversely, we will deem the privilege to be waived if the privilege holder fails to pursue all reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the privileged matter.
Lavin, 111 F.3d at 930, citing de la Jara, 973 F.2d at 749. The Lavin court further explained its ruling in language

that is equally instructive to this case:
In our view the Ninth Circuit’s standard with regard to involuntary disclosures strikes the proper balance between the conflicting policies of facilitating truth-seeking by construing privileges strictly and, at the same time, fairly and adequately ‘protecting the privacy of marriage and encouraging open and frank communications .... In light of the modern regulatory age and technological advances, moreover, such an approach is necessary precisely because the ability to protect against all disclosures is becoming increasingly elusive ... Unless communications remain privileged as long as the holder has acted reasonably in attempting to protect them, involuntary disclosures by third parties may render illusory the privilege’s guarantee of privacy.
Lavin, 111 F.3d at 930 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
This observation from one of the strongest proponents of the strict accountability doctrine of privilege waiver is significant. There is little conceptual difference between the nonconsensual disclosure of privileged material by a third party over whom the privilege holder has no control, and involuntary production by a party ordered to produce voluminous materials by court order that requires disclosure within a time frame that, despite reasonable screening, prevents unrestricted opportunity to review for privilege. In either instance, provided the holder of the privilege has taken all reasonable measures under the circumstances to prevent disclosure, but was prevented from doing so by matters beyond his control, a finding of waiver would be unfair and improper. Further, the D.C. Circuit recognized what is painfully apparent in a world where almost all writings are generated and stored electronically, and far more widely disseminated than in the days of “paper documents”-technological advances have made it increasingly difficult to protect against all involuntary disclosures. If, indeed, the common law of privilege is not frozen in antiquity, but rather is flexible and adaptable to changing *244 circumstances,38 then it must be elastic enough to permit reasonable measures to facilitate production of voluminous electronically stored information during discovery without imposing on the parties unreasonable burdens on their human and fiscal resources. The unavoidable truth is that it is no longer remarkable that electronic document discovery may encompass hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of electronic records that are potentially discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1). In this environment, to insist in every case upon “old world” record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the litigation, and mark a dramatic retreat from the commendable efforts since the adoption of Rule 26(b)(2) to tailor the methods
12

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

and costs of discovery to fit the case at hand. And, of equal importance, a failure to adapt to current “real world” discovery realities will unacceptably lengthen pretrial discovery, because courts cannot insist upon such painstaking and costly review unless they are willing to allow enough time to do so reasonably. It is unlikely that courts are going to embrace the notion of years-long timetables to allow parties to assemble and review voluminous electronic information prior to production during discovery.

38

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8, 116 S.Ct. 1923.

[6] The foregoing discussion of Rule 501, Proposed Rule 512, and the Transamerica and Lavin cases teach valuable lessons to apply to the challenges presented in this, and most cases, regarding the discovery of electronically stored information. First, to the extent that parties already are negotiating “non-waiver” electronic records production agreements, a practice encouraged by the proposed changes to Rule 16(f), they would be unwise to assume that such agreements will excuse them from undertaking any pre-production privilege review, or doing less of a pre-production review than is reasonable under the circumstances. In circuits that have adopted the “strict waiver” approach to inadvertent production, such an agreement would be fatal. And, even in those jurisdictions that have adopted the more lenient “balancing test,” the producing party still must show that reasonable measures were taken to screen for privileged information.39 The better approach is to assume that complete pre-production privilege review is required, unless it can be demonstrated with particularity that it would be unduly burdensome or expensive to do so.

39

A casual reading of the proposed changes to Rules 16

and 26 and their accompanying commentary, without

evaluation of the governing substantive law of privilege

waiver, could lead counsel to conclude that the

proposed rules permit them to, with a wink and a nod,

forego reasonable pre-production review altogether, or

to do only a cursory screening. This would be a

mistake. Reviewing appellate courts are unlikely to

accept the doctrine of compelled disclosure under

Proposed Rule 512 if it is offered to justify

transparently inadequate pre- and post-production

privilege review and assertion. If the producing party

had adequate opportunity to do full pre-production

review, or greater privilege review than was done, but,

through sloppiness or want of diligence failed to do so,

the reviewing court is unlikely to find present the level

of compulsion necessary to immunize the production

from waiving privilege. Similarly, absent any clear

signal from the appellate courts that they should do

otherwise, district courts called upon to “bless” the

production procedures agreed upon by counsel with a

court order should independently satisfy themselves

that full privilege review reasonably cannot be accomplished within the amount of time court allowing for the production. The court also should satisfy itself that the procedures agreed upon by counsel regarding privilege production are in fact reasonable and that more could not be accomplished within the production period given the scope of electronic records production permitted by the court.
[7] The cost-benefit balancing factors listed in Rule 26(b)(2) provide useful analytical tools to enable a producing party to marshal the specific facts that would justify less than full pre-production privilege review. The amount of discovery of electronically stored information that should be permitted in a particular case will be a function of the issues in the litigation, the resources of the parties, whether the discovery sought is available from alternative sources that are less burdensome, and the importance of the evidence sought to be discovered by the requesting party to its ability to prove its claims. As this court noted in Thompson v. *245 HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93 (D.Md.2003), courts have nearly limitless ability under Rule 26(b)(2) to fashion reasonable limits to potentially burdensome discovery requests, but the parties must get beyond the posturing that all too often takes place and provide the court with particularized information and reasonable suggestions how to do so.
[8] In this case the BCPD did file an affidavit intended to particularize the unreasonable burden that would result from producing all of the records sought by the Plaintiffs in their Rule 34 requests. However, it was less complete than it should have been. It did identify the limited number of information technology personnel available to conduct the search for electronic records, and the competing demands on their services within the police department, but it failed to estimate the number of hours that would be required for them to conduct the requested review, or to sufficiently demonstrate how this would impact adversely the fiscal and operational capabilities of the police department. A party that seeks an order from the court that will allow it to lessen the burden of responding to allegedly burdensome electronic records discovery bears the burden of particularly demonstrating that burden and of providing suggested alternatives that reasonably accommodate the requesting party’s legitimate discovery needs.
[9] [10] Second, as this case graphically demonstrates, it is no longer acceptable for the parties to defer good faith discussion of how to approach discovery of electronic records until they have complied with the briefing schedule in Local Rule 104.8. Rather, as the proposed changes to Rule 16(f) make clear, counsel have a duty to take the initiative in meeting and conferring to plan for appropriate discovery of electronically stored information at the commencement of any case in which electronic
13

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

records will be sought. In the absence of any guidance in the court’s scheduling order, or in the local rules of court, the parties are not without resources that will assist them in determining what to discuss at their meeting. Indeed, the newly revised Civil Discovery Standards for the American Bar Association Section on Litigation40 contain detailed information about the issues that the parties should discus in their effort to agree upon an electronic records discovery plan. At a minimum, they should discuss: the type of information technology systems in use and the persons most knowledgeable in their operation; preservation of electronically stored information that may be relevant to the litigation; the scope of the electronic records sought (i.e. e-mail, voice mail, archived data, back-up or disaster recovery data, laptops, personal computers, PDA’s, deleted data) the format in which production will occur (will records be produced in “native” or searchable format, or image only; is metadata sought); whether the requesting party seeks to conduct any testing or sampling of the producing party’s IT system; the burdens and expenses that the producing party will face based on the Rule 26(b)(2) factors, and how they may be reduced (i.e. limiting the time period for which discovery is sought, limiting the amount of hours the producing party must spend searching, compiling and reviewing electronic records, using sampling to search, rather than searching all records, shifting to the producing party some of the production costs); the amount of pre-production privilege review that is reasonable for the producing party to undertake, and measures to preserve post-production assertion of privilege within a reasonable time; and any protective orders or confidentiality orders that should be in place regarding who may have access to information that is produced.

40

American Bar Association Civil Discovery Standards

29, amend. August 2004.

[11] It cannot be emphasized enough that the goal of the meeting to discuss discovery is to reach an agreement that then can be proposed to the court. The days when the requesting party can expect to “get it all” and the producing party to produce whatever they feel like producing are long gone. In many cases, such as employment discrimination cases or civil rights cases, electronic discovery is not played on a level field. The plaintiff typically has relatively few electronically stored records, while the defendant often has an immense volume of it. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to have reasonable expectations as to what should be produced by the defendant.
*246 [12] In this case, the Plaintiffs filed voluminous and detailed Rule 33 and 34 discovery requests that clearly identified their interest in discovering electronically stored information. The Defendants’ immediate response

should have been to invite the Plaintiffs to meet to discuss a reasonable discovery plan. Instead, objections first were raised, many of them boilerplate and conclusory, in the Defendants’ answers to the discovery requests. The Plaintiffs responded with multiple written communications outlining their objections to the Defendants responses. When impasse was not overcome, the Plaintiffs followed the procedures in Local Rule 104.8 and prepared and served a motion to compel. Only when that motion was fully briefed was it filed with the court. An expedited hearing was held, but even so, months had passed from the commencement of discovery while the dispute festered. Such delay is no longer acceptable, and it is the duty of the parties to initiate the negotiation process if the court has not ordered it. As I ordered during the hearing, the meeting that should have occurred months ago will be held within 30 days. A follow-up hearing with the court will be scheduled at which time a reasonable electronic discovery plan will be ordered.
One of the issues the parties were ordered to discuss was the nature of privilege review the Defendant would undertake, both pre- and post-production. The Defendants were advised that they bore the burden of demonstrating with particularity the need for less than full pre-production privilege review, as well as of proposing reasonable alternatives. I advised the parties that at the follow-up hearings, I would issue an order that compelled production of electronic records within a specific time that is reasonable. I also stated that I would independently determine, using the Rule 26(b)(2) factors, the amount of electronic discovery that would be permitted; whether less than full privilege review was reasonable given the extent of electronic discovery allowed and the time to do so and, if full privilege review was not feasible, whether the procedures agreed to by counsel are reasonable. If so, I will issue an order approving them that includes language that compliance with the approved procedures will not result in the waiver of any privilege or work product claim for any inadvertently produced privileged material. As I stated during the hearing, the issuance of such an order is essential to protecting against subject matter waiver of attorney-client privileged or work product protected information. In this regard I am persuaded that the holding in the Transamerica case is correct, and that Proposed Rule 512 is part of the common law of privilege that may be recognized by this court under Rule 501, because both reason and experience militate in favor of its application under the facts of this case. If I eventually am proved wrong, then the Defendants still will be able to argue that their production of privileged information was under the erroneous belief that this order immunized them from waiver, as Proposed Rule 512 speaks both to production compelled without adequate opportunity to raise privilege claims, as well as erroneous production of privileged information.41
14

Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (2005)

41

24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham,

Federal Rules of Evidence, Ch. 6 § 5507, 579 and 579

n. 122 (1986). Thus, even the treatise most openly

critical of trial courts’ approval of agreements between

parties to produce discovery without full privilege

review acknowledges that the producing party who was

subject to such an order has a viable defense under the

concept of “erroneous production” against a subsequent

opposing party that claims that the privilege was

waived.

Parallel Citations
97 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 617, 63 Fed.R.Serv.3d 582
	  

It is so ordered.

15

 
 U.S. District Court District of Maryland (Baltimore) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:04−cv−03842−AMD

CASREF

Hopson et al v. City Of Baltimore et al Assigned to: Judge Andre M Davis Referred to: Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm Cause: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race) Plaintiff Louis H. Hopson TERMINATED: 02/04/2005
Plaintiff Zeinab Rabold TERMINATED: 08/06/2006

Date Filed: 12/06/2004 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Peter D Isakoff Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 I St Ste 900 Washington, DC 20005 12026827000 Fax: 12028570940 Email: Peter.Isakoff@weil.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr Law Office of Robert L Smith Jr LLC 10 N Calvert St Ste 204 Baltimore, MD 21202 14102441222 Email: rlsmithesq@cs.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Aff 11 Dupont Circle NW Ste 400 Washington, DC 20036 12023191000 Fax: 12023191010 Email: sue_huhta@washlaw.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 I St NW Ste 900 Washington, DC 20005 12026827024 Fax: 12028570940 Email: kristin.brown@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 Eye St Ste 900 Washington, DC 20005 12026827209 Fax: 12028570940 Email: lisa.fine@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 I St NW Ste 900

Plaintiff John M. Mack TERMINATED: 02/04/2005
Plaintiff Jacques Bonaparte

Washington, DC 20005 12026827000 Fax: 12028570940 Email: david.cross@weil.com TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP

Plaintiff Melvin Russell

1300 Eye St NW Ste 900 Washington, DC 20005 12026827000 Fax: 12028570940 Email: david.southard@weil.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 Eye St Ste 900 Washington, DC 20005 12026827000 Fax: 12026820940 Email: john.thompson@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 Eye St NW Ste 900 Washington, DC 20005 12026827000 Fax: 12028570940 Email: joshua.janow@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP 1300 Eye St NW Washington, DC 20005 12026827000 Fax: 12028570940 Email: michael.smith@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Christine Boyd TERMINATED: 02/04/2005

David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carlos Perry
Plaintiff Anthony Goode TERMINATED: 02/04/2005

represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Leslie Edwards
Plaintiff Michael Farrar TERMINATED: 02/04/2005

Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Edward Tindel
Plaintiff Lynell Green

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Plaintiff Shirley Onyango

David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr

Plaintiff Anthony Ellison

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Exdol Williams
Plaintiff Michael Edwards TERMINATED: 02/04/2005

Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Erica Foote

Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address)

Plaintiff Antoine Travers
Plaintiff Karen Alston

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Charles H. Carter TERMINATED: 02/04/2005
Plaintiff Maurice Price

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address)

Plaintiff Louis H. Hopson, Jr.

TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter D Isakoff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert L Smith, Jr (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Nelson Southard (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address)

Plaintiff Charles Carter
V. Defendant City Of Baltimore The TERMINATED: 02/04/2005

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by David Daniel Cross (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/25/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David Nelson Southard (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John H Thompson (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua D Janow (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kristin King Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lisa R Fine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael C Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan E Huhta (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan E Huhta (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth F Harris Baltimore City Law Department 101 City Hall 100 N Holliday St Baltimore, MD 21202 14103963249 Fax: 14106594077 Email: elizabeth.harris@baltimorecity.gov TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Baltimore City Police Department The

Joshua Neal Auerbach Office of the Attorney General Civil Division 200 Saint Paul Place Baltimore, MD 21202 14105766965 Fax: 14105766955 Email: jauerbach@oag.state.md.us TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cary Berkeley Kaye NelsonMullins Riley and Scarborough LLP Poinsett Plaza Ste 900 104 S Main St Greenville, SC 29601 18642502300 Fax: 18642322925 Email: cary.kaye@nelsonmullins.com TERMINATED: 04/04/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Donald R Huskey Baltimore City Law Department 100 N Holliday St Baltimore, MD 21202 14103963299 Fax: 14105767203 Email: donald.huskey@baltimorecity.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Governor Eugene Jackson, III Baltimore City Law Department 100 N Holliday St Baltimore, MD 21202 14103967536 Fax: 14103967203 Email: governor.jackson@baltimorecity.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph S Tyler Baltimore City Law Department 101 City Hall 100 N Holliday St Baltimore, MD 21202 14103968393 Fax: 14106594077 Email: ralph.tyler@baltimorecity.gov TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach

Defendant Martin O'Malley Mayor of the City of Baltimore TERMINATED: 06/14/2005
Defendant Leonard D. Hamm Police Commissioner for the City of Baltimore TERMINATED: 02/04/2005 Defendant Edward T. Norris Former Police Commissioner for the City of Baltimore TERMINATED: 06/14/2005

(See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig Baltimore Police Department Legal Affairs Division 242 W 29th St Baltimore, MD 21211 14103962495 Fax: 14103962126 Email: karen.hornig@baltimorepolice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Francis Conti Baltimore Police Department Office of Legal Affairs 242 W 29th St Baltimore, MD 21211 14103962496 Fax: 14103962126 Email: michael.conti@baltimorepolice.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valerie Joan Stanley 329 Prince George St Laurel, MD 20707 13015493126 Email: Valerie.Stanley@baltimorecity.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant . Thomas Frazier Former Police Commissioner for the City of Baltimore TERMINATED: 06/14/2005
Defendant Sean R. Malone Labor Commissioner for the City of Baltimore TERMINATED: 02/04/2005 Defendant Maria Korman Trial Board Counsel for the Baltimore City Police Department TERMINATED: 06/14/2005
Defendant Gary May Former Legal Affairs Director for the Baltimore City Police Department, in their official capacities TERMINATED: 06/14/2005
Defendant Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore a municipal corporation of the State of Maryland

Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cary Berkeley Kaye (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/04/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Leonard D. Hamm Acting Police Commissioner TERMINATED: 06/14/2005
Defendant

Donald R Huskey (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Governor Eugene Jackson, III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Ralph S Tyler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
George A Nilson Baltimore City Law Department City Hall Ste 101 100 N Holliday St Baltimore, MD 21202 14103968393 Fax: 14106594077 Email: george.nilson@baltimorecity.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Francis Conti (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valerie Joan Stanley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sean R. Malone Former Legal Affairs Director for the City of Baltimore and Current Commissioner TERMINATED: 06/14/2005
Defendant Zeinab A. Rabold

represented by Elizabeth F Harris (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua Neal Auerbach (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/26/2007 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen Stakem Hornig (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Neal M Janey, Sr Janey Law Firm PC Four E Rolling Crossroad Ste 305 Catonsville, MD 21228 14103406616 Fax: 14106629644 Email: nealjaneylaw@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Interested Party Esquire Robert L. Smith

represented by Anne Elizabeth Langford Shaw Pittman LLP 2300 N St NW Washington, DC 20037 12026638000 Fax: 12026638007 Email: anne.langford@pillsburylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
David J Cynamon Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 2300 N St NW Washington, DC 20037 12026638000 Fax: 12026638007 Email: david.cynamon@pillsburylaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed # 12/06/2004
12/06/2004

Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Baltimore City Police Department, City Of Baltimore, Thomas Frazier, Leonard D. Hamm, Maria Korman, Sean R. Malone, Gary May, Edward T. Norris, Martin O'Malley ( Filing fee $ 150 receipt number 2299387.), filed by Karen Alston, Jacques Bonaparte, Christine Boyd, Charles H. Carter, Leslie Edwards, Michael Edwards, Anthony Ellison, Michael Farrar, Erica Foote, Anthony Goode, Lynell Green, Louis H. Hopson, John M. Mack, Shirley Onyango, Carlos Perry, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Melvin Russell, Edward Tindel, Antoine Travers, Exdol Williams. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Civil Cover Sheet)(rank, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
2 Jury Trial Demand by Karen Alston, Jacques Bonaparte, Christine Boyd, Charles H. Carter, Leslie Edwards, Michael Edwards, Anthony Ellison, Michael Farrar, Erica Foote, Anthony Goode, Lynell Green, Louis H. Hopson, John M. Mack, Shirley Onyango, Carlos Perry, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Melvin Russell, Edward Tindel, Antoine Travers, Exdol Williams. (rank, Deputy Clerk)

12/08/2004 02/03/2005
02/18/2005
02/24/2005
02/24/2005 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 03/22/2005 03/28/2005
04/06/2005
04/06/2005 04/07/2005 04/08/2005

(Entered: 12/08/2004)
3 Summons Issued 20 days as to Baltimore City Police Department, City Of Baltimore, Thomas Frazier, Leonard D. Hamm, Maria Korman, Sean R. Malone, Gary May, Edward T. Norris, Martin O'Malley. (rank, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/08/2004)
4 AMENDED COMPLAINT against City Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department, Martin O'Malley, Leonard D. Hamm, Edward T. Norris, Thomas Frazier, Sean R. Malone, Maria Korman, Gary May, filed by Leslie Edwards, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Charles H. Carter, Maurice Price, Louis H. Hopson, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of service# 2 Exhibit sheet for exhibit a−d# 3 Exhibit E# 4 Exhibit F# 5 Exhibit G# 6 Exhibit H# 7 Highlighted version of amended complaint)(Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 02/03/2005)
5 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Leonard D. Hamm, Sean R. Malone, Baltimore City Police Department, Martin O'Malley, Edward T. Norris, Thomas Frazier, Maria Korman, Gary May. Responses due by 3/7/2005 (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/18/2005)
6 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 5 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 3/14/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order # 2 Affidavit of service)(Isakoff, Peter) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
7 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 6 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response Response due by 3/28/2005. (Judge Davis) (Entered: 02/24/2005)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Lisa R Fine on behalf of all plaintiffs (Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Kristin King Brown on behalf of all plaintiffs (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
10 REPORT of Rule 26(f) Planning Meeting. (Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 03/22/2005)
11 RESPONSE in Opposition re 5 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Replies due by 4/11/2005. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 03/28/2005)
12 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Leonard D. Hamm, Sean R. Malone, Baltimore City Police Department, Martin O'Malley, Edward T. Norris, Thomas Frazier, Maria Korman, Gary May. Responses due by 4/25/2005 (Attachments: # 1 # 2)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Karen Stakem Hornig on behalf of all defendants (Hornig, Karen) (Entered: 04/06/2005)
14 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 12 Motion of defendants for Leave to File Excess Pages of no more than 35 pages. Signed by Judge Andre M Davis on 4/7/05. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/07/2005)
15 REPLY to Response to Motion re 5 MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Leonard D. Hamm, Sean R. Malone, Baltimore City Police Department, Martin O'Malley, Edward T. Norris, Thomas Frazier, Maria Korman, Gary May. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Sutton Case − unpublished)(Hornig, Karen) (Entered: 04/08/2005)

04/08/2005 05/22/2005 06/13/2005
06/14/2005 06/14/2005
06/14/2005
06/30/2005 07/07/2005 07/08/2005 07/11/2005 08/15/2005
08/23/2005 10/03/2005 10/05/2005

16 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua Neal Auerbach on behalf of all defendants (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 04/08/2005)
17 LETTER ORDER denying 5 Motion to Dismiss (Judge Davis) (Entered: 05/22/2005)
18 MOTION to Amend/Correct Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 6/30/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order# 2 Second Amended Complaint# 3 Affidavit of Service# 4 Exhibit Sheet for Exhibits A to H# 5 Exhibit I# 6 Exhibit J# 7 Highlighted Version of Amended Complaint)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 06/13/2005)
19 ORDER granting 18 Motion of plaintiffs for leave to file a second amended complaint. Signed by Judge Andre M Davis on 6/14/05. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
20 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department, filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Attachments: # 1 highlight copy of amended complaint)(slf, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 6/15/2005 (eg, Deputy Clerk). (c/rec'd &c/s to chambers 6/15/05) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
21 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Class Action Complaint served on Ralph S. Tyler, City Solicitor, Baltimore City Department of Law on 6/14/05, filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 06/14/2005)
22 ANSWER to Amended Complaint by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department.(Tyler, Ralph) (Entered: 06/30/2005)
23 Consent MOTION for Protective Order by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 7/25/2005 (Harris, Elizabeth) Modified on 7/7/2005 (slf, Deputy Clerk).(FILED IN ERROR, NOT A MOTION) (Entered: 07/07/2005)
24 Correspondence re: Proposed Order (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/08/2005)
25 PROTECTIVE/CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER (Judge Davis) (Entered: 07/11/2005)
26 NOTICE of service of motion to compel discovery by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry (Attachments: # 1 Motion to Compel# 2 Notice of Filing Under Seal)(Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 08/15/2005)
27 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm for Discovery. Signed by Judge Andre M Davis on 8/23/05. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
28 NOTICE of service of response to motion to compel discovery by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/03/2005)
29 NOTICE of service of reply to response to motion to compel discovery by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine

10/14/2005
10/20/2005 10/21/2005 10/24/2005 11/07/2005
11/09/2005 11/09/2005
11/22/2005 11/29/2005 12/05/2005 12/05/2005 12/06/2005

Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Reply In Further Support Of Their Motion To Compel Discovery)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 10/05/2005)
30 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 10/31/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Opposition to Motion# 2 Certificate of Discovery)(Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 10/14/2005)
31 PAPERLESS ORDER re 30 Scheduling a hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, Defendants' Opposition, and Plaintiffs' Reply for Wednesday, November 9, 2005 at 1 p.m. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/20/05. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 10/20/2005)
32 MOTION to Seal Declaration of Michael Roosa by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 11/7/2005 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
33 PAPERLESS ORDER re 32 GRANTING Defendants' Motion to File Declaration of Michael Roosa Under Seal. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/24/05. (Grimm, Paul)(ake) (Entered: 10/24/2005)
34 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Related to Class Certification Issues by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 11/28/2005 (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 11/07/2005)
Discovery Hearing held on 11/9/2005 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (E.R.: Goldsmith.) (hsg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
35 PAPERLESS ORDER re 26 29 30 34 For the reasons stated on the record in today's hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. (Paper Nos. 26, 29, &30). In addition, the parties' Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery Related to Class Certification Issues is GRANTED (Paper No. 34). The new deadline for the completion of discovery will be established during the parties' meeting with the Court following the 30−day meet and confer period. This meeting will take place in Court on MONDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2005 AT 2 P.M., at which time the parties will present their discovery plan to the Court for review and approval. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/9/05. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 11/09/2005)
36 MEMORANDUM &ORDER granting in part and denying in part 30 Motion of plaintiff to Compel. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/22/05. (This memorandum stems from the hearing and order (dkt entry #35) on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and related papers nos. 26, 29, &30)(hml, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 11/22/2005 (hml, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 11/22/2005)
37 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of 11/9/05 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/29/2005)
38 MOTION of David D. Cross to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Leslie Edwards, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (rank, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
39 ORDER granting 38 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by the Clerk on 12/5/05. (c/m 12/5/05 rk) (rank, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
40 PAPERLESS ORDER RESCHEDULING the time of the in Court Hearing on discovery to begin at 1:00 p.m.(Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 12/06/2005)

12/07/2005 12/09/2005
12/09/2005
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41 Correspondence re: Hearing on Discovery Plan (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/07/2005)
42 PAPERLESS ORDER re 41 APPROVING Defendants' Request to invite counsel on behalf of the Fraternal Order of Police to attend the Monday, December 12, 20005 hearing at 1 p.m. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/9/05. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
43 STIPULATION Stipulated Order Regarding Joint Discovery Plan by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Baltimore City Police Department, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
44 Supplemental to 43 Stipulation, filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Submission with Respect to Proposed Joint Discovery Plan). (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
45 RESPONSE re 44 Supplemental, Submission filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/11/2005)
Scheduling Conference held on 12/12/2005 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (Tape #1) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
46 LETTER ORDER summarizing rulings at the December 12, 2005 status hearing. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/13/05. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2005)
47 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/16/2005)
Telephone Discovery Conference held on 12/16/2005 Pending negotiations held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/19/2005)
48 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
49 Correspondence re: (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
50 STIPULATION re 25 Protective/Confidentiality Order Stipulated Order Amending Stipulated Order Regarding Confidentiality of Discovery Material by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Baltimore City Police Department, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Cross, David) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
51 LETTER ORDER summarizing rulings from a telephone status hearing on Friday, December 16, 2005. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/23/05. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
52 Correspondence re: Proposed Preservation Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit No. 1 Proposed Preservation Order# 2 Exhibit No. 2 Preservation Email# 3 Exhibit No. 3 Preservation Email II)(Hornig, Karen) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
53 Correspondence re: (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−email# 2 Exhibit 2−Email)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
54 Correspondence re: Proposed Order For Preservation Of Documents Filed By Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Memorandum)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 12/23/2005)
55 ORDER DIRECTING defendants to provide particularized responses within 10 days. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/27/05. (jnl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/27/2005)

12/28/2005 12/28/2005 01/03/2006 01/04/2006 01/05/2006
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01/17/2006 01/19/2006

56 NOTICE of Appearance by David J Cynamon on behalf of Robert L. Smith (Cynamon, David) (Entered: 12/28/2005)
57 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 12/12/05 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/29/2005)
58 Correspondence re: conflict discovery (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
59 PAPERLESS ORDER re 58 − APPROVING the parties' request to schedule depositions on their agreed to dates of January 16, 2006 and January 19, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 1/4/06. (Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 01/04/2006)
60 LETTER ORDER re: the parties proposed preservation orders (52 This Order outlines what provisions shall be included in the preservation order and requests that defendants draft the revised order and have plaintiffs review it before electronically filing it with the Court within 10 days of this Order. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 1/5/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
61 Correspondence re: (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 01/10/2006)
62 Correspondence re: Response to Defendants' 1/10/06 Letter (Cynamon, David) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
63 PAPERLESS ORDER re Paper Nos. 61 &62. I have reviewed the parties' letters regarding the discovery responses pertaining to the conflict issue. As a result, I order the following: (1) a hearing on the issues raised in the parties' letters will be held by telephone this FRIDAY, JANUARY 13, 2005 AT 12 P.M. Defense counsel shall coordinate and initiate the call and have a court reporter available to transcribe the hearing. (2) No further discovery motions shall be filed between the date of this Order and the hearing on Friday. If the parties' have additional discovery disputes, they may be raised during the telephone hearing. (3) Unless ordered by the Court at the hearing on Friday, or otherwise agreed to by counsel, Mr. Smith's deposition will take place as scheduled on Monday, January 16, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 01/11/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
64 Correspondence re: (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/11/2006)
65 Correspondence re: Smith discovery (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
66 Correspondence re: (Cross, David) (Entered: 01/13/2006)
67 STIPULATION re 60 Order, by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Baltimore City Police Department, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
68 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department re 55 Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
69 RESPONSE re 68 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Rule 72 Objection to Ruling of Magistrate Judge filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 01/19/2006)

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02/22/2006
02/22/2006

70 PAPERLESS ORDER re 67 APPROVING Order for Preservation of Documents, Paper No. 67. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 01/23/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 01/23/2006)
71 LETTER ORDER RE: This letter responds to certain issues raised by defendants January 11, 2006 letter (#64), which was submitted in response to the Court's letter order of December 27, 2005(#55) and the letters submitted by defendants and the plaintiffs dated January 13, 2006 (#65 and 66) as therein set forth. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 1/23/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
72 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/25/2006)
73 Correspondence re: (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 01/26/2006)
74 Correspondence re: Robert Smith deposition (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 02/07/2006)
75 Correspondence re: Defendants Request to Reopen the Deposition of Robert Smith (Cynamon, David) (Entered: 02/08/2006)
76 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
77 LETTER ORDER re 76 Miscellaneous Correspondence. Within 10 days of this Order, Defendant shall electronicall file its Motion to Compel on this discrete issue as therein set forth. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/10/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
78 LETTER ORDER re 74 Miscellaneous Correspondence summarizing rulings from 2/10/06 in which Defendant's request to re−open Mr. Smith's Deposition was Granted, and setting a briefing schedule for the anticipated Motion to Disqualify. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/10/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
79 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
80 Correspondence re: Response to Defendants Correspondence Docket #79 (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 02/14/2006)
81 Correspondence re: (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6)(Harris, Elizabeth) Modified on 2/22/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk).(attachments rec'd 2/21/06 to be placed UNDER SEAL) (Entered: 02/17/2006)
82 Correspondence re: R. Smith conflict (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
83 MOTION to Seal Defendants' Technology Plan by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 3/10/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
84 Correspondence re: Response to Defendants Correspondence Docket #81 (Cross, David) (Entered: 02/21/2006)
85 PAPERLESS ORDER re 64 80 79 81 73 84 An in−court hearing shall be held on TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2006 AT 10:30 A.M. regarding all of the confidentiality issues discussed in the above−referenced docket entries. No further briefing on these issues shall be filed without permission of the Court. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 02/22/06.(Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
86 LETTER ORDER Granting defendants request to file a letter motion to compel regarding issues that arose during Mr. Smith's continued deposition re 82 Miscellaneous Correspondence. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/22/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/22/2006)
87 MOTION to Compel Complete Response to Interrogatory No. 1 by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 3/13/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 02/22/2006)

02/24/2006 02/28/2006
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88 MOTION to Compel by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 3/13/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Smith Feb 20 Deposition Transcript# 2 Exhibit Smith Jan 16 Dep Transcript Excerpts)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 02/24/2006)
89 RESPONSE in Opposition re 88 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Compel filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Replies due by 3/14/2006. (Cross, David) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
90 STIPULATION re 87 MOTION to Compel Complete Response to Interrogatory No. 1 Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings on Defendants' Motion to Compel a Complete Response to Interrogatory Number One by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Baltimore City Police Department, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Cross, David) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
91 PAPERLESS ORDER re 85 CHANGE IN HEARING START TIME The in−court hearing scheduled for TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2006 regarding confidentiality issues, will begin at 10:00 a.m. rather than 10:30 a.m. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 03/01/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 03/01/2006)
92 RESPONSE in Opposition re 88 MOTION to Compel filed by Robert L. Smith. Replies due by 3/17/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts)(Cynamon, David) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
93 PAPERLESS ORDER The parties' Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings on Defendants' Motion to Compel a Complete Response to Interrogatory Number One (Paper No. 90) is GRANTED. This stay relates to Defendants' Motion, Paper No. 87, and the clerk's office shall please administratively terminate the motion, to be reinstated if the stay is lifted. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 03/03/06.(Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
94 Correspondence re: Smith motion to compel (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
95 Correspondence re: Opposition to Request to Reply (Cross, David) (Entered: 03/03/2006)
96 PAPERLESS ORDER re 94 95 The Defendants' Request to file a Reply is DENIED. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 03/06/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
Discovery Hearing held on 3/7/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm (Court Reporter ER: Preston−Banks) (ggpb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/07/2006)
97 LETTER ORDER scheduling bi−weekly status/discovery dispute hearings. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 3/7/06. (slfs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2006)
98 LETTER ORDER within 10 days Mr. Smith will please submit to me, ex parte, an affidavit that details the chronology and substance of any communications he has had with his co−counsel regarding the Reid Report, stating in particular the source of the information and how he acquired it as therein set forth. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 3/10/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2006)
99 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department of Filing of Documents Under Seal (Attachments: # 1)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
100 SEALED− MOTION to File Under Seal Defendants' memorandum in support of motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel and notice of intention to call Robert L. Smith as a witness, with exhibits by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 3/31/2006 (slf, Deputy

03/13/2006
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Clerk) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
101 SEALED − MOTION for Other Relief for determination that use of privileged documents in connection with disqualification motion does not waive privilege as to those documents or otherwise and memorandum in support of that motion by City Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 3/31/2006 (Harris, Elizabeth) Modified on 3/14/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 03/14/2006)
102 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department of filing of documents under seal (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
103 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
104 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 3/7/06. (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
105 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 100 MOTION to Seal Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel and Notice of Intention to Call Robert L. Smith as a Witness and Extending Defendants' Time to Reply to Plaintiffs' Response and Proposed Order by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 4/3/2006 (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
106 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 105 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Responses due by 4/14/2006 (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/16/2006)
107 NOTICE of Appearance by Cary Berkeley Kaye on behalf of Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department (Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
Status Conference held on 3/22/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. ( FTR Gold: Karaska.) (rk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
108 RESPONSE in Opposition re 101 MOTION for Other Relief for determination that use of privileged documents in connection with disqualification motion does not waive privilege as to those documents or otherwise and memorandum in support of that motion filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Replies due by 4/13/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
109 MOTION to Seal Ex. 1 to Notice of Substitute Pages by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 4/17/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 03/31/2006)
110 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department of Substitute Pages (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Notice of filing of Exhibit 1 under seal)(Kaye, Cary)( EXHIBIT 1, placed under SEAL) Modified on 4/3/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 03/31/2006)
111 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 3/22/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/06/2006)
112 Substantive legal issues − addressing (Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 04/12/2006)
113 Correspondence re: Response to Docket No. 112 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cross, David) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
114 REPLY to Response to Motion re 101 MOTION for Other Relief for determination that use of privileged documents in connection with disqualification motion does not waive privilege as to those documents or otherwise and memorandum in support of that motion filed by Mayor and City

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05/08/2006

Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
115 Substantive legal issues − addressing (Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
116 Correspondence re: Response to Docket # 115 re: addressing substantive legal issues (Cross, David) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
117 MOTION to Seal the Memorandum of Robert L. Smith, Jr., Esq. in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify and to Call Mr. Smith as a Witness and all accompanying documents by Robert L. Smith. Responses due by 5/1/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Cynamon, David) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
118 SEALED − NOTICE by Robert L. Smith of Filing of Documents Under Seal (Cynamon, David)(rec'd 2 sets 4/17/06) Modified on 4/17/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 04/14/2006)
119 RESPONSE in Opposition re 100 MOTION to Seal to Disqualify all Plaintiffs' Counsel Filed by The Washington Lawyers' Committee and Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Replies due by 4/28/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Affidavit Declaration of Susan Huhta# 3 Affidavit Declaration of Kristin K. Brown)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 04/14/2006)
120 Correspondence re: 4/19/06 hearing (Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 04/17/2006)
Status Hearing held on 4/19/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (CD: #1) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
121 Correspondence re: (Cross, David) (Entered: 04/20/2006)
122 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 5/11/2006 (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 04/24/2006)
123 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 12/12/05 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/26/2006)
124 MOTION to Seal by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 5/15/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
125 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 04/28/2006)
126 SEALED − REPLY to Response to Motion re 100 MOTION to Seal filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (slf, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 5/1/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk).(rec'd 2 hard copies 5/1/06) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
Status Conference held on 5/3/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm in 7B. ( ER: Karaska.) (rk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/03/2006)
127 Joint MOTION for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Robert L. Smith, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 5/25/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 −− Memorandum in Support of Motion# 2 Text of Proposed Order # 3 Appendix of Unreported Cases)(Cynamon, David)(rec'd 1 hard copy 5/8/06) Modified on 5/8/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 05/08/2006)
128 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 4/19/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) Additional attachment(s) added on 5/8/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk).

05/08/2006 05/09/2006
05/10/2006 05/11/2006 05/12/2006 05/16/2006 05/16/2006 05/22/2006
05/22/2006
05/23/2006 05/24/2006
05/26/2006
05/30/2006 05/30/2006
06/02/2006
06/02/2006

(Entered: 05/08/2006)
129 Correspondence re: (Cross, David) (Entered: 05/08/2006)
130 PAPERLESS ORDER denying 88 Motion to Compel. Having reviewed Defendants' Motion, Paper No. 88, and related papers, Paper Nos. 89, 92, and the ex parte affidavit from Mr. Smith (as I ordered to be filed in Paper No. 98), I find that there is an insufficient basis for re−opening Mr. Smith's deposition, and therefore, Defendants' Motion is DENIED. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 05/09/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 05/09/2006)
131 Correspondence re: disqualification reply memorandum (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 05/10/2006)
132 Correspondence re: Rule 11 motion (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 05/11/2006)
133 Correspondence re: Court's appointment of expert (Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 05/12/2006)
134 Correspondence re: Defendants' correspondence, Docket No. 131 (Isakoff, Peter) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
135 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 5/3/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
136 PAPERLESS ORDER Rescheduling the Wednesday, May 31st bi−weekly status hearing. The next bi−weekly status hearing, scheduled for Wednesday, May 31st is RESCHEDULED for TUESDAY, MAY 30, 2006 AT 2 P.M. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 05/22/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
137 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department re 130 Order on Motion to Compel, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Magistrate judge's ruling# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 05/22/2006)
138 LETTER ORDER appointing an IT expert to assist with discovery dispute issues. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 5/23/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
139 MOTION for Protective Order on Open Cases by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 6/12/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order# 2 Exhibit Ex. A# 3 Exhibit Ex. B# 4 Exhibit Ex. C# 5 Text of Proposed Order)(Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 05/24/2006)
140 PAPERLESS ORDER re 136 . The bi−weekly status conference scheduled for Tuesday, May 30, 2006 will begin at 9:30 a.m. Please note the time change. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 05/26/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 05/26/2006)
Remark: Status hearing held before Judge Grimm (dms, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
141 LETTER ORDER for the reasons stated today during the status hearing, the Plaintiffs' request to suspend the filing of a response to the Defendants' motion for a protection order, until phase two discovery takes place is Granted, subject to re−evaluation at the July 12, 2006 status conference. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 5/30/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2006)
142 RESPONSE re 137 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court, filed by Robert L. Smith. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Robert L. Smith, Esq., Pursuant to Letter Order dated March 10, 2006)(Cynamon, David) (Entered: 06/02/2006)
143 RESPONSE re 137 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court, filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 06/02/2006)

06/13/2006 06/13/2006 06/16/2006 06/17/2006 06/19/2006 06/22/2006 06/23/2006 06/28/2006 06/30/2006 06/30/2006 07/11/2006
07/12/2006
07/12/2006 07/14/2006 07/17/2006 07/18/2006

144 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings of Status Hearing of 5/30/06. (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
145 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/13/2006)
146 MOTION for Protective Order by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 7/3/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/16/2006)
147 RESPONSE re 143 Response,, 142 Response, 137 Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court, filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 06/17/2006)
148 Correspondence re: electronic discovery plan description requested by the Court (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
149 Correspondence re: Defendants' Proposed Protective Order (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
150 PAPERLESS ORDER GRANTING 146 defendants' Motion for Protective Order. Plaintiffs filed letter on 6/22/06, Paper No. 149, with no objection to defendants' Order. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 6/23/06.(Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 06/23/2006)
Telephone Discovery Conference held on 6/28/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
151 MOTION for Protective Order for non−sustained comparator disciplinary files by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 7/17/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Tuffy)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
152 MOTION to Dismiss by Zeinab Rabold. Responses due by 7/17/2006 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion Seeking Dismissal Without Prejudice# 2 Exhibit A. to Memorandum of Law# 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 06/30/2006)
153 PAPERLESS ORDER The following bi−weekly status conference dates are CANCELED: July 12th, July 26th, and August 9th. The next status conference will be held Wednesday, August 2nd, 2006 at 3 p.m. (subject to the previously ordered SOP of counsel contacting Chambers if there are no issues to resolve). The regularly scheduled bi−weekly status conferences will resume on Wednesday, August 23, 2006 at 3 p.m. (also subject to the above−mentioned SOP, of course). Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 07/11/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
154 RESPONSE in Opposition re 152 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Replies due by 7/26/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit Exhibit 4)(Auerbach, Joshua) Modified on 7/13/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk).(rec'd 1 hard copy which is connected to Motion to Compel, sent to J. Grimm) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
155 MOTION to Compel Responses from Plaintiff Zeinab Rabold by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 7/31/2006 (Auerbach, Joshua) Modified on 7/13/2006 (slf, Deputy Clerk).(rec'd 1 hard copy sent to J. Grimm) (Entered: 07/12/2006)
156 RESPONSE in Opposition re 151 MOTION for Protective Order for non−sustained comparator disciplinary files filed by Louis H. Hopson, Jr. Replies due by 7/28/2006. (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 07/14/2006)
157 PAPERLESS ORDER denying 139 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Motion for Protective Order, to be reinstated at the request of the Defendants. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 07/17/06. (Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 07/17/2006)
158 NOTICE by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques

07/21/2006
07/25/2006 07/26/2006
08/01/2006
08/03/2006 08/06/2006 08/07/2006 08/14/2006
08/14/2006 08/14/2006 08/23/2006 08/23/2006 08/23/2006 08/25/2006 08/28/2006 08/31/2006 08/31/2006

Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance for David D. Cross (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 07/18/2006)
159 REPLY to Response to Motion re 151 MOTION for Protective Order for non−sustained comparator disciplinary files filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 07/21/2006)
160 Correspondence re: oral argument (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
161 REPLY to Response to Motion re 155 MOTION to Compel Responses from Plaintiff Zeinab Rabold Reply in Further Support of Motion for Dismissal Without Prejudice filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Zeinab Rabold, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1)(Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 07/26/2006)
162 PAPERLESS ORDER re 153 As discussed earlier today, tomorrow's status hearing has been rescheduled for MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. At that time the parties will present oral argument on the pending discovery issue pertaining to unsustained files. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 08/01/06.(Grimm, Paul) (ake) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
163 REPLY to Response to Motion re 155 MOTION to Compel Responses from Plaintiff Zeinab Rabold filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 08/03/2006)
164 LETTER ORDER granting 152 Motion to Dismiss (Judge Davis) (Entered: 08/06/2006)
165 Joint Correspondence re: Technology Expert (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 08/07/2006)
Motion Hearing held on 8/14/2006 re 151 MOTION for Protective Order for non−sustained comparator disciplinary files filed by Baltimore City Police Department,, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (Court Reporter er: Smith.) (jas, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
Oral Order (Grimm, MJ) requesting a copy of the transcript of the motion hearing held on 8/14/06 (jas, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
166 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 151 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/14/06. (hml, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2006)
Status hearing held on 8/23/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (Tape #1) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2006)
ORAL MOTION by Joshua Janow, Esq. for David Southard, Esq. to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Louis Hopson et al, "Granted" by the Court in open court on 8/23/06. (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2006)
ORAL ORDER (Grimm, MJ) requesting a copy of the status hearing held on 8/23/06 before Judge Grimm be transcribed and filed with current hearing transcripts.(std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2006)
167 ORDER granting 155 Motion of defendant to Compel responses from Zeinab Rabold. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/25/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
168 Correspondence re: Rabold discovery (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 08/28/2006)
169 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 8/14/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
170 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 8/23/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2006)

09/06/2006 09/15/2006 09/19/2006
09/19/2006
09/20/2006
09/20/2006 09/21/2006 09/22/2006 09/22/2006 09/25/2006
09/25/2006 09/26/2006 09/28/2006 10/03/2006 10/04/2006 10/12/2006 10/13/2006 10/13/2006 10/16/2006 10/16/2006 10/18/2006 10/24/2006
10/26/2006

Status hearing held on 9/6/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (Tape #1) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/08/2006)
171 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 9/6/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/15/2006)
172 ORDER granting 83 Motion of defendants to Seal motion to file Technology Plan. Signed by Judge Andre M Davis on 9/19/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
173 ORDER granting 32 Motion of defendants to Seal Declaration of Michael Roosa. Signed by Judge Andre M Davis on 9/19/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/19/2006)
174 ORDERED that one transcript copy of the Status Hearing held on 8/23/06 in Baltimore be prepared at the expense of the parties, jointly. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 9/18/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
Status Hearing held on 9/20/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (FTR Gold − CD #1) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/21/2006)
175 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/21/2006)
176 Correspondence re: Response to Defendants' Correpondence on September 21, 2006 (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
177 Correspondence re: letter brief regarding non−privileged nature of defendants draft affidavits (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 09/22/2006)
178 PAPERLESS ORDER The bi−weekly status/discovery hearing scheduled for WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2006 will be held at 11 A.M. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 09/25/2006. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
179 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
180 Correspondence re: (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
181 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the court on 9/20/06 (status hearing) (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/2006)
182 Correspondence re: response to defendants' letter brief dated September 26, 2006 (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 10/03/2006)
Status hearing held on 10/4/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (Tape #1) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2006)
183 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 10/4/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/12/2006)
184 Substantive legal issues − addressing (Attachments: # 1)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
185 Correspondence re: relevance of draft investigative reports (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
186 Correspondence re: plaintiffs' response to defendants' letter brief dated October 13, 2006 (Brown, Kristin) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
187 Correspondence re: (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 10/16/2006)
Status Hearing held on 10/18/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (E.R.: Goldsmith.) (hsg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2006)
188 Correspondence re: Rabold discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sept. 18 Ltr from Neal Janey to Joshua Auerbach# 2 Exhibit Oct. 13 Ltr from Neal Janey to Joshua Auerbach# 3 Exhibit Oct. 24 Ltr from Neal Janey to Joshua Auerbach)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 10/24/2006)
189 PAPERLESS ORDER The bi−weekly discovery status hearing scheduled for NOVEMBER 1, 2006 is CANCELLED. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, bi−weekly telephone status hearings will resume on WEDNESDAY,

10/27/2006 10/31/2006 11/01/2006 11/02/2006 11/07/2006 11/08/2006 11/14/2006 11/14/2006
11/14/2006
11/15/2006 11/21/2006 11/22/2006 11/22/2006
12/11/2006 12/13/2006 12/13/2006 12/14/2006 12/20/2006 12/20/2006

NOVEMBER 15, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/26/2006. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw) (Entered: 10/26/2006)
190 Correspondence re: Rabold discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Sept. 19 Letter from J. Auerbach to N. Janey)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
191 LETTER ORDER regarding the scheduling of discovery. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/31/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
192 Correspondence re: burden of preserving draft reports (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
193 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 10/18/06 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/03/2006)
194 LETTER ORDER regarding the deposition of Zeinab Rabold. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/6/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/07/2006)
195 LETTER ORDER regarding discovery. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/8/06. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/08/2006)
196 Correspondence re: Rabold deposition (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Auerbach Nov. 9, 2006 Letter# 2 Exhibit Janey Nov. 13, 2006 Letter)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
197 PAPERLESS ORDER The parties' request for a brief extension of time in which to take the deposition of Zeinab Rabold is GRANTED. As agreed upon by the parties, the deposition will take place on DECEMBER 8, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/14/2006. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
198 PAPERLESS ORDER The bi−weekly discovery conference scheduled for WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2006 AT 3 P.M. will be an in−court hearing. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/14/2006. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw) (Entered: 11/14/2006)
Status Hearing held on 11/15/2006 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (ER: C. Lunkin.) (cdl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
199 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 11/15/06. (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/21/2006)
200 Joint Correspondence re: Extension of Time (Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 11/22/2006)
201 PAPERLESS ORDER re: 200 Miscellaneous Correspondence. The parties' joint request for an extension of time in which to reach an agreement on a sampling exercise for draft investigative reports is GRANTED. The parties are to inform the Court whether they have reached an agreement by 4 P.M. on TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2006. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/22/2006. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw). (Entered: 11/22/2006)
202 Correspondence re: request to file Rule 37 motion (Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 12/11/2006)
203 Joint Correspondence re: Proposed Order (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/13/2006)
204 PAPLERLESS ORDER re 202 Miscellaneous Correspondence APPROVING Defendant's request to file Motion pursuant to Rule 37. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/13/06. (Grimm, Paul) (Entered: 12/13/2006)
205 ORDER re: Production of Electronic Data. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/13/06. (hml, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2006)
206 NOTICE of Appearance by David Nelson Southard on behalf of all plaintiffs (Southard, David) (Entered: 12/20/2006)
207 NOTICE of Appearance by Joshua D Janow on behalf of all plaintiffs (Janow, Joshua) (Entered: 12/20/2006)

12/20/2006 12/20/2006 12/21/2006 12/22/2006 12/27/2006
12/29/2006 01/04/2007 01/05/2007
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208 NOTICE of Appearance by John H Thompson on behalf of all plaintiffs (Thompson, John) (Entered: 12/20/2006)
209 Correspondence re: request for permission to file a motion to compel (Southard, David) (Entered: 12/20/2006)
210 PAPERLESS ORDER re 209 Miscellaneous Correspondence, APPROVING Plaintiffs' request to file a motion to compel discovery. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/21/06. (Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
211 Correspondence re: Proposed Discovery Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
212 MOTION to Compel Discovery by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 1/16/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Service of Motion to Compel# 2 Plaintiffs' Certificate of Discovery Conference# 3 Text of Proposed Order # 4 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel# 5 Exhibit A to Memorandum# 6 Exhibit B to Memorandum# 7 Exhibit 3 to Memorandum# 8 Exhibit D to Memorandum# 9 Exhibit E to Memorandum# 10 Exhibit F to Memorandum# 11 Exhibit G to Memorandum# 12 Exhibit H to Memorandum# 13 Exhibit I to Memorandum# 14 Exhibit J to Memorandum# 15 Exhibit K to Memorandum)(Southard, David) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
213 ORDER MEMORIALIZING the Court's Rulings made during the Telephone Discovery Status Conference. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/29/06. (jlb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/29/2006)
214 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Francis Conti on behalf of Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department (Conti, Michael) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
215 Second MOTION to Compel re Z Rabold by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 1/22/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Pt. 1 (Dep. Tr.)# 2 Exhibit Ex A Pt. 2 (Dep. Tr.)# 3 Exhibit Ex. B (Dep. Ex. 15)# 4 Exhibit Ex. D (Interrogatories to Rabold)# 5 Exhibit Ex. D (Janey Jan. 2 Ltr.)# 6 Exhibit Ex. E (Janey Oct. 24 Ltr))(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
216 MOTION to Compel Responses to Interrogatories by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 1/22/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing of Lengthy Exhibits)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
217 MOTION to Compel Responses to Document Requests by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 1/22/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing of Lengthy Exhibits)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/05/2007)
218 Correcting Earlier Submission (Attachments: # 1)(Auerbach, Joshua) (Entered: 01/07/2007)
219 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department Appearance of Governor E. Jackson, III (Conti, Michael) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
220 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney. Responses due by 1/26/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Harris, Elizabeth) (Entered: 01/09/2007)
221 Joint Correspondence re: Proposed Schedule (Isakoff, Peter) (Entered: 01/11/2007)
222 RESPONSE in Opposition re 212 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department.Replies due by 1/30/2007. (Conti, Michael) (Entered: 01/16/2007)

01/18/2007 01/19/2007
01/22/2007
01/22/2007
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03/07/2007 03/08/2007 03/26/2007

223 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time for Response to Defendants' Second Motion to Compel Regarding Zeinab Rabold by Zeinab Rabold. Responses due by 2/5/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Southard, David) (Entered: 01/18/2007)
224 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 223 Joint Motion for Extension of Time for Zeinab Rabold to respond to Defendants' motion to compel. Ms. Rabold, through counsel, shall inform the Court when she receives the final transcript of her deposition, and her response will be due fourteen (14) days thereafter. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 01/19/2007. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
225 Joint MOTION to Stay Proceedings on Defendants Motion to Compel Responses to Certain Document Requests and Certain Interrogatories by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Baltimore City Police Department, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 2/8/2007 (Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
226 RESPONSE to Motion re 217 MOTION to Compel Responses to Document Requests filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry.Replies due by 2/5/2007. (Fine, Lisa) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
227 LETTER ORDER dismissing 212 Motion to Compel; dismissing 216 Motion to Compel; dismissing 217 Motion to Compel; dismissing 225 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 1/25/07. (eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/25/2007)
228 NOTICE of Appearance by Neal M Janey, Sr on behalf of Zeinab A. Rabold (Janey, Neal) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
229 RESPONSE to Motion re 215 Second MOTION to Compel re Z Rabold and/or for an Order Deeming Certain Facts Established for the Purposes of this Litigation filed by Zeinab Rabold.Replies due by 2/20/2007. (Southard, David) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
230 RESPONSE in Opposition re 215 Second MOTION to Compel re Z Rabold filed by Zeinab Rabold.Replies due by 2/20/2007. (Janey, Neal) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
231 REPLY to Response to Motion re 215 Second MOTION to Compel re Z Rabold filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Email)(Hornig, Karen) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
232 PAPERLESS ORDER A discovery status conference will be held by telephone on WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2007 at 3:30 P.M. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall coordinate and initiate the call to my chambers. The parties should be prepared to discuss the status of their efforts to resolve their discovery disputes in the manner contemplated by my January 25, 2007 letter order. (Paper No. 227). Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 02/27/2007. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw). (Entered: 02/27/2007)
Telephone Discovery Conference held on 3/7/2007 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
233 LETTER ORDER setting forth the schedule for the remainder of class discovery. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 3/7/07. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
234 STATUS REPORT on Rabold Discovery Dispute by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Hornig, Karen) (Entered: 03/26/2007)

03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/27/2007 03/27/2007 03/27/2007 03/27/2007
03/29/2007 03/30/2007 04/03/2007 04/04/2007 04/23/2007 04/23/2007 04/23/2007 05/24/2007 05/24/2007 05/24/2007 06/04/2007
07/02/2007

235 STATUS REPORT /Conference Among Counsel Regarding Motion to Compel by Zeinab A. Rabold. (Janey, Neal) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
236 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 220 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Ralph S Tyler; Joshua Neal Auerbach and Elizabeth F Harris terminated (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
237 PAPERLESS ORDER finding as moot [] Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
Motions No Longer Referred: 122 Consent MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages, 127 Joint MOTION for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (cags, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
238 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 122 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
239 MEMORANDUM to Parties (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
240 ORDER granting 100 Motion to Seal; granting 101 Motion for determination of non−waiver; granting 109 Motion to Seal; granting 117 Motion to Seal; granting 124 Motion to Seal; denying 127 Motion for Sanctions (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
241 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department Notice of Appearance of Donald R. Huskey on Behalf of the Defendants (Conti, Michael) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
242 LETTER ORDER denying 215 Second Motion of defendants to Compel discovery. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 3/29/07. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/30/2007)
243 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 4/20/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Kaye, Cary) (Entered: 04/03/2007)
244 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 243 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Cary Berkeley Kaye terminated (Judge Davis) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
245 NOTICE of Appearance by Anne Elizabeth Langford on behalf of Robert L. Smith (Langford, Anne) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
246 Ex Parte MOTION for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal by Robert L. Smith. Responses due by 5/10/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Langford, Anne) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
247 ORDER granting 246 Motion for Extension of Time (Judge Davis) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
248 Emergency MOTION to Vacate Disqualification Order by Robert L. Smith. Responses due by 6/11/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Motion# 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Cynamon, David) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
249 ORDER granting 248 Motion to Vacate (Judge Davis) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
250 CORRECTED ORDER GRANTING 248 Emergency MOTION to Vacate Disqualification Order filed by Robert L. Smith (Judge Davis) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
251 PAPERLESS ORDER requesting that the parties submit a joint discovery status report on or before JULY 2, 2007. The status report should indicate whether discovery is proceeding on schedule and should alert the Court to any pending discovery disputes that may require Court intervention. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 06/04/2007. (Grimm, Paul)(kmw). (Entered: 06/04/2007)
252 Status Report Submitted Joint Discovery Status Report by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Baltimore City Police Department, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry (Attachments: # 1

07/06/2007
07/09/2007 07/13/2007 07/18/2007
07/20/2007
07/20/2007
07/20/2007
07/24/2007 08/01/2007 08/03/2007 08/03/2007

Exhibit Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit Exhibit C)(Janow, Joshua) (Entered: 07/02/2007)
253 PAPERLESS ORDER thanking counsel for their Joint Status Report (Paper # 252), filed on 7/2/07. The Court would like to schedule a Telephone Conference call with counsel, and asks that counsel for Plaintiffs', Peter D. Isakoff, handle the scheduling of this call with all counsel and chambers. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 7/6/07. (Grimm, Paul) (Entered: 07/06/2007)
254 Correspondence re: Telephone Conference on July 13, 2007 (Southard, David) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
Telephone Discovery Conference held on 7/13/2007 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (cag, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
255 PAPERLESS ORDER in follow−up to the telephone conference held on 7/13/07, the Court requests that counsel for Defendant, Governor Eugene Jackson, III, coordinate scheduling of Telephone Conference with the Court for the week of July 30, 2007, preferably in the a.m. between 9:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 7/18/07. (Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
256 NOTICE of service of motion to compel discovery by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry (Southard, David) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
257 MOTION to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 8/6/2007 (Southard, David) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
258 MOTION to Compel /Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Testimony Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. Responses due by 8/6/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A to Memorandum# 2 Exhibit Exhibit B to Memorandum# 3 Exhibit Exhibit C to Memorandum# 4 Exhibit Exhibit D to Memorandum# 5 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Compelling Discovery# 6 Plaintiffs' Certificate of Discovery Conference Pursuant to Local Rule 104.7)(Southard, David) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
259 Correspondence re: Scheduling of Teleconference on August 2, 2007 (Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 07/24/2007)
Telephone Discovery Conference held on 8/1/2007 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
260 LETTER ORDER setting a in−court discovery hearing. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/2/07. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/03/2007)
261 RESPONSE in Opposition re 258 MOTION to Compel /Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Testimony Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) MOTION to Compel /Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Testimony Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) MOTION to Compel /Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Testimony Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), 257 MOTION to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) MOTION to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department.Replies due by 8/17/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Opposition# 3 Exhibit Exhibit2OppositiontoMotion# 4 Exhibit Exhibit3Opposition# 5 Exhibit Exhibit4OppositiontoMotion# 6 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order Denying Motion to Compel# 7 Exhibit Certificate of Service)(Stanley, Valerie)

08/13/2007 08/16/2007 08/17/2007
08/27/2007 09/04/2007 09/07/2007 10/01/2007
10/02/2007 10/11/2007 10/18/2007
10/30/2007 11/01/2007
11/02/2007

(Entered: 08/03/2007)
262 Correspondence re: Further Joint Status Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Southard, David) (Entered: 08/13/2007)
263 PAPERLESS ORDER thanking counsel for their joint Status Report, Paper No. 262, dated August 13, 2007 and confirming the In−Court Discovery Status Hearing scheduled for Friday, September 7, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/16/07. (Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 08/16/2007)
264 REPLY to Response to Motion re 257 MOTION to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) MOTION to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of their Motion to Compel Discovery Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry. (Southard, David) (Entered: 08/17/2007)
265 LETTER ORDER granting in part and denying in part 257 Motion of plaintiffs to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 258 Motion of plaintiffs to Compel. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/24/07. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/27/2007)
266 MODIFIED PAPERLESS ORDER changing the time for the In−Court Discovery Status Hearing scheduled for Friday, September 7, 2007 to 3:00 p.m. Thanking counsel in advance for their cooperation in this matter. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 9/4/07. (Grimm, Paul) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
Status Hearing held on 9/7/2007 held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (ER: C. Lunkin.) (cdl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
267 MOTION for Discovery by City Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Responses due by 10/18/2007 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memorandum in Support of Motion for Determination of Undue Burden and Expense# 2 Exhibit Exhibit1Plaintiffs'FourthSetofInterrogatories# 3 Exhibit Plaintiffs'FifthSetofDocumentRequests# 4 Text of Proposed Order ProposedOrderGrantingDefendants'Motion)(Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
268 NOTICE of Appearance by Valerie Joan Stanley on behalf of Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department (Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 10/02/2007)
269 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 9/7/07. (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/11/2007)
270 RESPONSE in Opposition re 267 MOTION for Discovery Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Determination of Undue Burden and Expense filed by Leslie Edwards, Louis H. Hopson, Jr, Charles Carter, Edward Tindel, Lynell Green, Shirley Onyango, Anthony Ellison, Exdol Williams, Erica Foote, Antoine Travers, Karen Alston, Maurice Price, Jacques Bonaparte, Melvin Russell, Carlos Perry.Replies due by 11/1/2007. (Southard, David) (Entered: 10/18/2007)
271 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael C Smith on behalf of all plaintiffs (Smith, Michael) (Entered: 10/30/2007)
272 REPLY to Response to Motion re 267 MOTION for Discovery Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for a Determination of Undue Burden and Expense filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Exhibit 2 Affidavit of Michael Roosa# 2 Affidavit Exhibit 3 Affidavit of Mary Eilerman)(Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 11/01/2007)
273 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department re 272 Reply to Response to Motion, Notice of Filing of Lengthy Exhibit to Pleading 272 (Stanley, Valerie) Modified on 11/2/2007 (slf, Deputy Clerk).(rec'd 2 copies 11/2/07) (Entered: 11/02/2007)

11/13/2007
11/19/2007
11/21/2007 12/21/2007 12/28/2007 01/14/2008 01/24/2008 02/07/2008 02/07/2008 02/14/2008 02/15/2008
03/04/2008
03/04/2008
03/11/2008 03/12/2008

274 LETTER ORDER setting forth decision on defendants motion for determination for undue burden and requiring defendant to arrange a conference call with the Court and counsel within 10 days in order to schedule an in−court hearing. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/13/07. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/13/2007)
275 PAPERLESS ORDER setting a telephone conference call for WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2007 at 1:00 p.m., so that the parties may provide details needed to schedule a hearing on Defendants motion for a determination of undue burden. Defendants are to coordinate with Plaintiffs' counsel and place the call to chambers. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/19/2007. (Grimm, Paul)(awm) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
276 LETTER ORDER scheduling an in−court hearing for December 21, 2007. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/21/07. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
Motion Hearing held on 12/21/2007 re: 267 MOTION for Discovery filed by City Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department held before Judge Paul W. Grimm. (FTR Gold.) (std, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/2007)
278 ORDER denying 267 Motion for Motion for Determination of Undue Burden and Expense Regarding Plaintiffs'Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Plaintiffs' Fifth Set of Document Request. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 12/28/07. (eg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/28/2007)
279 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings before the Court on 12/21/07 (file separately) (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2008)
280 Supplemental Request for Hearing/Trial (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Southard, David) (Entered: 01/24/2008)
281 LETTER ORDER DENYING re 280 Request for Hearing/Trial date filed by Louis H. Hopson, Jr.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/7/08. (slf, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
282 NOTICE by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department Entry of Appearance of George A. Nilson (Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 02/07/2008)
283 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time in which to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 2007 by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department Responses due by 3/3/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 02/14/2008)
284 PAPERLESS ORDER APPROVING PAPER NO. 283 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time in which to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 2007 filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/15/08. (Grimm, Paul)(jnf) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
285 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department Responses due by 3/21/2008 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Granting Defendants' Second Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time)(Stanley, Valerie) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
286 PAPERLESS ORDER APPROVING PAPER NO. 285 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time in which to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 2007 filed by Mayor and City Council Of Baltimore, Baltimore City Police Department. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm on 3/05/08. (Grimm, Paul)(awm) (Entered: 03/04/2008)
287 MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER re: Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel (Judge Davis) (Entered: 03/11/2008)
288 PAPERLESS ORDER scheduling an in court hearing on the matter of the on−going electronic discovery for THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008, from 9 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.. The parties are required to bring with them the IT, computer, or

e−discovery experts who have been attempting to find a solution to the problems identified during the December 21, 2007 hearing. The parties are also to file separate status letters updating the court on the status of electronic production since the Court's December 21, 2007 hearing and its subsequent order, Paper No. 278, by no later than Tuesday, April 1, 2008. Signed by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm on 03/12/08. (Grimm, Paul)(awm) (Entered: 03/12/2008)